Grice
ed Appio: il primo filosofo inglese, il primo filosofo romano. Murford. Wikipedia Ricerca Appio Claudio Cieco politico e
letterato romano Lingua Segui Modifica Appio Claudio Cieco Project Rome logo
Clear.png Console della Repubblica romana Appio Claudio Cieco in Senato.jpg
Appio Claudio Cieco accompagnato dai senatori nella Curia, simbolo del potere
di Roma nell'epoca repubblicana Nome originale Appius
Claudius Caecus Gens Claudia
Consolato 307
a.C., 296 a.C. Appio Claudio Cieco (in latino: Appius Claudius Caecus; 350 a.C.
– 271 a.C.) è stato un politico e letterato romano, nato di nobili origini in
quanto membro dell'antica gens Claudia. Secondo la leggenda, la sua cecità, da
cui gli derivò il cognomen"Caecus", "Cieco",[1] fu dovuta
all'ira degli dèi per la sua idea di unificare il pantheon greco romano con
quello celtico e quello germanico.[2] Fu un personaggio particolarmente
significativo, caratterizzato da una marcata sensibilità verso la società greca,
che lo portò ad intendere la fusione tra di essa e il mondo romano come un
profondo arricchimento per l'Urbe.[3] Fu il primo intellettuale latino, dedito
all'attività letteraria e interessato alla filosofia, nella tradizione romana
arcaica considerate attività infruttuose ed indegne di un civis.
Biografia Modifica Placca commemorativa ad Appio Claudio Cieco (Museo
della Civiltà, Roma) Percorse un brillante cursus honorum, in quanto rivestì
quasi tutte le più importanti cariche pubbliche e militari. Fu censore nel 312
a.C., quando ridistribuì i nullatenenti, originariamente presenti nelle 4
tribùcittadine, tra tutte le tribù allora esistenti.[4] Fu console nel
307[5] e nel 296 a.C., sempre con Lucio Volumnio Flamma Violente come
collega.[6] Mentre a Voluminio era toccata la campagna nel Sannio, ad Appio,
toccò quella in Etruria, dove i popoli Etruschi si erano nuovamente sollevati,
in seguito all'arrivo di un grosso esercito Sannita.[6] Dopo aver fronteggiato
gli eserciti nemici in piccole scaramucce di poco conto, all'esercito romano in
Etruria arrivò l'aiuto di quello condotto da Volumnio, arrivato dal Sannio,
dove si era inizialmente recato. Nonostante l'inimicizia tra i due consoli,
l'esercito romano riunito ebbe la meglio su quello Etrusco-Sannita.[7] Nel
295 a.C., con poteri proconsolari, insieme all'altro proconsole Lucio Volumnio
Flamma Violente, sconfisse quanto restava dell'esercito Sannita, scampato alla
battaglia del Sentino, in uno scontro in campo aperto, nei pressi di
Caiatia.[8] Fu inoltre dittatore nel 292 e nel 285 a.C. Ebbe un ruolo
rilevante nelle guerre contro Etruschi, Latini, Sabini e Sanniti, che sconfisse
in battaglia nel 296 a.C. A lui si deve la costruzione del primo
acquedotto, l'Aqua Appia, della via Appia, che da lui prese nome e che rappresenta
una chiara traccia dell'interesse di Appio Claudio per un'espansione romana
verso la Magna Grecia,[9] e del tempio di Bellona. Pur essendo un patrizio
appartenente all'alta aristocrazia romana, aprì in qualità di censore il senato
ai cittadini di bassa estrazione sociale e ai figli di liberti. Combattendo le
istanze più conservatrici della società romana, decise anche di ripartire i
cittadini tra le classi previste dall'ordinamento centuriato tenendo in
considerazione i beni mobili oltre che le proprietà terriere. Permise, inoltre,
agli abitanti humiles di Roma di iscriversi alle tribù rustiche, che erano
precedentemente controllate dai membri dell'aristocrazia terriera. Di lui
si ricorda la grande abilità oratoria: fu una sua orazione del 280 a.C., in
senato, a dissuadere i Romani dall'accettare le proposte di pace di Pirro.
Secondo la testimonianza di Cicerone, questa orazione fu il primo testo
letterario latino ad essere trascritto e conservato.[10] Per sua
iniziativa nel 304 a.C. fu pubblicato a cura del suo segretario Gneo Flavio il
civile ius, il testo delle formule di procedura civile (legis actiones),
chiamato Ius Flavianum e il calendario in cui erano distinti i dies fasti e
dies nefasti. Sarebbe stato punito con la cecità e l'estinzione della
famiglia, per avere ceduto allo stato romano il diritto di officiare al culto
di Ercole[11] tradizionalmente attribuito ai membri della Gens
Potitia.[12] Letteratura Modifica Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svg Lo
stesso argomento in dettaglio: Età preletteraria latina. A suo nome ci è giunta
una raccolta di Sententiae, massime a carattere moraleggiante e filosofeggiante
particolarmente apprezzate dal filosofo greco Panezio, nel II secolo a.C.
Secondo un'informazione fornita da Cicerone,[13] Appio Claudio avrebbe
risentito dell'influenza della dottrina pitagorica, mentre risulta oggi più
probabile che le sue massime siano da collegarsi ai versi sentenziosi della
contemporanea commedia nuova greca. Nell'opera, di cui ci sono giunti
esclusivamente tre frammenti, Appio Claudio sviluppava argomenti vari di
carattere sapienziale; particolarmente importante risulta la risoluzione che
egli propose per alcuni problemi dell'ortografia latina, quali l'applicazione
del rotacismo, ovvero la trasformazione della "s" intervocalica in
"r", e l'abolizione dell'uso della "z" per indicare la
"s" sonora. Risulta probabile che l'intera opera fosse scritta in
versi saturni, come due dei tre frammenti di cui disponiamo: (LA)
«aequi animi compotem esse ne quid fraudis stuprique ferocia pariat.»
(IT) «essere padrone di un animo equilibrato, affinché la dismisura non
provochi danno e disonore.» (Frammento 1 Morel; trad. di G. Pontiggia.)
(LA) «Amicum cum vides obliviscere miserias; inimicus si es commentus,
nec libens aeque.» (IT) «Quando vedi un amico, dimentichi gli
affanni: ma se pensi che ti sia nemico, non li dimentichi così
facilmente.» (Frammento 2 Morel; trad. di G. Pontiggia.) Il terzo
frammento ci è giunto per tradizione indiretta tramite lo Pseudo Sallustio,[14]
e risulta dunque alterato rispetto alla sua forma originale: (LA)
«fabrum esse suae quemque fortunae.» (IT) «Ciascuno è artefice del
proprio destino.» (Frammento 3 Morel; trad. di G. Pontiggia.) Un'altra
opera attribuita all'autore è il De usurpationibus, risalente al IV secolo a.C.
Su questo punto, però, si registra nella letteratura romanistica un generale
scetticismo.[15] Note Modifica ^ Il cognomen era uno dei tria nomina che
componevano i nomi di persona nella Roma antica: il praenomen, cioè quello che
oggi chiamiamo primo nome ("Appio"); il nomen, o gentilizio, che
identificava la famiglia (gens) di appartenenza ("Claudio"); e infine
il cognomen, che non era obbligatorio, ma veniva attribuito alle persone in
seguito ad atti significativi compiuti vita, nel qual caso venivano detti
cognomina ex virtute: per esempio, Gneo Marcio venne detto Coriolano per le sue
gesta nella guerra contro Corioli; ovvero, Publio Cornelio Scipione fu detto
Africanus perché sconfisse i cartaginesi in Africa. I cognomina potevano essere
attribuiti in base a determinate caratteristiche di una persona, e Appio
Claudio ottenne il proprio, appunto, dalla sua cecità. ^ Romano Impero: APPIO
CLAUDIO CIECO. ^ Clemente, p. 43. ^ Tito Livio, Ab Urbe condita libri, IX, 46.
^ Tito Livio, Ab Urbe condita, IX, 42. ^ a b Tito Livio, Ab Urbe condita, X,
15. ^ Tito Livio, Ab Urbe condita, X, 18-20. ^ Tito Livio, Ab Urbe condita, X,
31. ^ Clemente, p. 44. ^ Marco Conti, Letteratura Latina (1a) - Dalle Origini
All'Età di Silla, Sansoni per la scuola, p. 2. ^ Compendio delle antichità
romane ossia leggi, costumi, usanze, e cerimonie dei romani. Compilato per
l'istruzione della gioventù. Traduzione dal francese, G. Miglio, 1817 - 224
pagine, pg 81-82 ^ Tito Livio, I, 7. ^ Tusculanae disputationes, IV, 2, 4. ^
Epistula ad Caesarem, I, 1, 2: in carminibus Appius ait fabrum esse suae
quemque fortunae, nei carmina Appio dice che ciascuno è artefice del proprio
destino. ^ Masiello, Corso di Storia del Diritto Romano, p. 114. Bibliografia
Modifica G. Clemente, Basi sociali e assetti istituzionali nell'età della
conquista in AAVV, Storia Einaudi dei Greci e dei Romani. Repubblica imperiale.
L'età della conquista, Einaudi, 2008. A. Garzetti, Appio Claudio Cieco nella
storia politica del suo tempo, in Athenaeum, 1947, pp. 174 sgg. Michel Humm,
Appius Claudius Caecus: la République accomplie, Paris, BEFRA, 2005. G.
Pontiggia, M.C. Grandi, Letteratura latina. Storia e testi, Milano, Principato,
1996. Voci correlate Modifica Aqua Appia Via Appia Appio Claudio (Roma) Marcius
Vates Altri progetti Modifica Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una
pagina dedicata a Appio Claudio Cieco Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene
citazioni di o su Appio Claudio Cieco Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia
Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Appio Claudio Cieco Collegamenti
esterni Modifica Clàudio Cièco, Appio, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Gaetano De Sanctis.,
CLAUDIO Cieco, Appio, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1931. Modifica su Wikidata Claudio Cieco, Appio, in Dizionario di
storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2010. Modifica su Wikidata Clàudio
Cièco, Àppio, su sapere.it, De Agostini. Modifica su Wikidata ( EN ) Appio
Claudio Cieco, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
Modifica su Wikidata ( LA ) Opere di Appio Claudio Cieco, su Musisque Deoque.
Modifica su Wikidata ( LA ) Opere di Appio Claudio Cieco, su PHI Latin Texts,
Packard Humanities Institute. Modifica su Wikidata ( EN ) Opere di Appio
Claudio Cieco, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata
Controllo di autorità VIAF
( EN ) 51580452 · BAV 495/51625 ·CERL cnp00405967 · LCCN( EN ) nr95020971 · GND
( DE ) 11942598X ·BNE ( ES ) XX1261781 (data) · BNF( FR ) cb15059315x (data) ·
WorldCat Identities ( EN ) viaf-51580452 Portale Antica Roma
Portale Biografie Portale Lingua latina Ultima modifica 8
giorni fa di Er Cicero PAGINE CORRELATE Quinto Fabio Massimo Rulliano politico
romano Terza guerra sannitica conflitto tra Roma e i Sanniti (298 a.C.-
290 a.C.) Lucio Volumnio Flamma Violente politico e militare romano
Wikipedia Il contenuto
Grice ed Aquino – teoria dell’intenzione –
filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Roccasecca). Filosofo. Grice: “Srawson
used to joke and call me St. Thomas, as I rushed to tutor on ‘De
interpretatione’ ‘That’s precisely what Aquino did at Bologna! Can’t the tutee
not interpret it by himself?!’” Tommaso d'Aquino (Roccasecca, 1225 – Abbazia di
Fossanova, 7 marzo 1274) è stato un religioso, teologo, filosofo e accademico
italiano. Frate domenicano esponente della Scolastica, era definito Doctor
Angelicus dai suoi contemporanei. È venerato come santo dalla Chiesa cattolica
che dal 1567 lo considera anche dottore della Chiesa. Tommaso rappresenta
uno dei principali pilastri teologici e filosofici della Chiesa cattolica: egli
è anche il punto di raccordo fra la cristianità e la filosofia classica, che ha
i suoi fondamenti e maestri in Socrate, Platone e Aristotele, e poi passati
attraverso il periodo ellenistico, specialmente in autori come Plotino. Fu
allievo di sant'Alberto Magno, che lo difese quando i compagni lo chiamavano
"il bue muto" dicendo: «Ah! Voi lo chiamate il bue muto! Io vi dico,
quando questo bue muggirà, i suoi muggiti si udranno da un'estremità all'altra
della terra!». San Tommaso d'Aquino San Tommaso d'Aquino e gli angeliSan
Tommaso sorretto dagli angeli, del Guercino Sacerdote e Dottore
della Chiesa Nascita1225 Morte7 marzo 1274 Venerato daChiesa
cattolica e Chiesa anglicana Canonizzazione18 luglio 1323 da Papa Giovanni XXII
Santuario principaleChiesa dei Giacobini Tolosa Ricorrenza28 gennaio; 7 marzo
(forma straordinaria) AttributiAbito domenicano, libro, penna e calamaio,
modellino di chiesa, sole raggiato sul petto, colomba. Patrono diTeologi,
accademici, librai, scolari, studenti, fabbricanti di matite; regione Campania;
comune di Aquino, Grottaminarda, Monte San Giovanni Campano e Priverno; diocesi
di Sora-Cassino-Aquino-Pontecorvo; Belcastro; Falerna; San Mango
d'Aquino. San Tommaso in una vetrata della Cattedrale di Saint-Rombouts,
Mechelen (Belgio). Tommaso dei conti d'Aquino nacque, forse, nel 1225 nella
contea di Aquino, territorio dell'odierna Roccasecca, nel Regno di Sicilia
(Sgarbossa). Secondo altre tesi, San Tommaso sarebbe nato a Belcastro; a
sostegno di esse si segnalano quelle di fra' Giovanni Fiore da Cropani, storico
calabrese del XVII secolo, che lo scriveva nella sua opera Della Calabria
illustrata, di Gabriele Barrio nella sua opera De antiquitate et situ Calabriae
e di padre Girolamo Marafioti, teologo dell'ordine dei Minori Osservanti, nella
sua opera Croniche ed antichità di Calabria. Il castello paterno di
Roccasecca rimane comunque ancora oggi il luogo più accreditato della sua
nascita, da Landolfo d'Aquino e da Donna Teodora Galluccio, nobildonna teanese
appartenente al ramo Rossi della famiglia napoletana dei Caracciolo. La sua data
di nascita non è certa, ma è calcolata in maniera approssimativa a partire da
quella della sua morte. Bernardo Gui, ad esempio, afferma che Tommaso è morto
quando aveva compiuto i suoi quarantanove anni e iniziato il suo cinquantesimo
anno. Oppure, in un testo un po' anteriore, Tolomeo da Lucca fa eco ad
un'incertezza: «Egli è morto all'età di 50 anni, ma alcuni dicono 48».
Tuttavia, oggi, sembra che ci sia accordo nel fissare la sua data di nascita
tra il 1224 e il 1226. Da Montecassino a Napoli Secondo le usanze del
tempo Tommaso, essendo il figlio più piccolo, era destinato alla vita
ecclesiastica e proprio per questo a soli cinque anni fu inviato dal padre
Landolfo come oblato nella vicina Abbazia di Montecassino, di cui era abate
Landolfo Sinibaldo, figlio di Rinaldo d'Aquino, per ricevere l'educazione
religiosa e succedere a Sinibaldo in qualità di abate. In ossequio alla regola
benedettina, Landolfo versò un'oblazione di venti once d'oro al monastero
cassinese perchè accettasero il figlio di una nobile famiglia e in tenera età.In
quegli anni l'abbazia si trovava in un periodo di decadenza e costituiva una
preda contesa dal Papa e dall'imperatore. Ma il trattato di San Germano,
concluso tra il Papa Gregorio IX e l'imperatore Federico II il 23 luglio 1230,
inaugurava un periodo di relativa pace ed è proprio allora che si può collocare
l'ingresso di Tommaso nel monastero. In quel luogo Tommaso ricevette i primi
rudimenti delle lettere e fu iniziato alla vita religiosa benedettina. Ma
a partire dal 1236 la calma di cui godeva il monastero fu nuovamente turbata e
Landolfo, consigliato dal nuovo abate, Stefano di Corbario, volle mettere al
riparo il figlio dai disordini e inviò Tommaso, oramai adolescente, a Napoli,
perché potesse seguire degli studi più approfonditi. Così nell'autunno del
1239, a quattordici o quindici anni, Tommaso si iscrisse al nuovo Studium
generale, l'Università degli studi fondata nel 1224 da Federico II per formare
la classe dirigente del suo Impero. Fu proprio a Napoli, dove era stato
fondato un convento, che Tommaso conobbe i Domenicani, ordine in cui entrò a
far parte e in cui fece la sua vestizione nell'aprile del 1244. Ma
l'ingresso di Tommaso presso i Frati predicatori comprometteva definitivamente
i piani dei suoi genitori riguardo al suo futuro incarico di abate di
Montecassino. Così la madre inviò un corriere ai suoi figli, che in quel
periodo stavano guerreggiando nella regione di Acquapendente, perché
intercettassero il loro fratello e glielo conducessero. Essi, accompagnati da
un piccolo drappello, catturarono facilmente il giovane religioso, lo fecero
salire su di un cavallo e lo condussero al Castello di Monte San Giovanni
Campano, un castello di famiglia ove fu tenuto prigioniero per due anni. Qui
tutta la famiglia tentò di far cambiare idea a Tommaso, ma inutilmente.
Tuttavia bisogna precisare che egli non fu né maltrattato né rinchiuso in
qualche prigione, si trattava piuttosto di un soggiorno obbligato, in cui
Tommaso poteva entrare e uscire a piacimento e anche ricevere visite. Ma
prendendo atto che Tommaso era ben saldo nella sua risoluzione, la sua famiglia
lo restituì al convento di Napoli nell'estate del 1245. Ciò avvenne in
occasione del Concilio di Lione del 17 luglio 1245, allorché papa Innocenzo IV
ufficializzò la deposizione dell'imperatore Federico II di Svevia. Gli studi a Parigi
e a Colonia Beato Angelico: San Tommaso d'Aquino Dipinto del Velazquez I
Domenicani di Napoli ritennero che non fosse sicuro trattenere presso di loro
il novizio e lo inviarono a Roma dove si trovava il maestro dell'Ordine,
Giovanni Teutonico, il quale stava per partire alla volta di Parigi, dove si
sarebbe celebrato il Capitolo generale del 1246. Egli accolse Tommaso
inviandolo prima a Parigi e poi a Colonia, dove c'era un fiorente Studium
generale sotto la direzione di fra Alberto (il futuro sant'Alberto Magno),
maestro in teologia, il quale era ritenuto sapiente in tutti i campi del
sapere. Al seguito di Giovanni Teutonico, si sarebbe dunque messo in
viaggio per Parigi e vi avrebbe trascorso tre anni scolastici. Qui potrebbe
aver studiato le arti, sia in facoltà che in convento. Partì per Colonia con
fra' Alberto, presso il quale continuò il suo studio della teologia e il suo
lavoro di assistente. Il soggiorno di Tommaso a Colonia, al contrario di quello
a Parigi, non è mai stato messo in dubbio, poiché è ben testimoniato dalle
fonti. Il capitolo generale dei Domenicani riunito a Parigi decise la creazione
di uno studium generale a Colonia, città nella quale esisteva già un convento domenicano
fondato da fra' Enrico, compagno di Giordano di Sassonia. L'incarico di
insegnare venne affidato a fra Alberto, la cui reputazione in quel periodo era
già notevole. Questo soggiorno a Colonia costituì una tappa decisiva nella vita
di Tommaso. Per quattro anni, dai 23 ai 27 anni, Tommaso poté assimilare
profondamente il pensiero di Alberto. Un esempio di questa influenza lo
troviamo nell'opera nota con il nome di Tabula libri Ethicorum, la quale si
presenta come un lessico le cui definizioni sono molto spesso delle citazioni
quasi letterali di Alberto. Il primo periodo di insegnamento a Parigi. Chiesa
dei domenicani di Friesach: San Tommaso e papa Urbano V e il dogma della
transustanziazione Quando il Maestro Generale dei Domenicani domandò ad Alberto
di indicargli un giovane teologo che potesse essere nominato baccelliere per
insegnare a Parigi, Alberto gli propose Tommaso che stimava sufficientemente
preparato in scientia et vita. Sembra che Giovanni Teutonico abbia esitato per
via della giovane età del prescelto, 27 anni, perché secondo gli statuti
dell'Università egli avrebbe dovuto averne 29 per poter assumere canonicamente
quest'impegno. Fu grazie alla mediazione del cardinale Ugo di Saint-Cher che la
richiesta di Alberto fu esaudita e Tommaso ricevette quindi l'ordine di recarsi
subito a Parigi e di prepararsi a insegnare. Egli iniziò il suo insegnamento
come baccelliere nel settembre di quello stesso anno, cioè del 1252, sotto la
responsabilità del maestro Elia Brunet de Bergerac che occupava il posto
lasciato vacante a causa della partenza di Alberto. A Parigi Tommaso
trovò un clima intellettuale meno tranquillo di quello di Colonia. Ancora era
vietato commentare i libri di Aristotele, ma durante la prima parte del
soggiorno di Tommaso, la Facoltà delle Arti avrebbe finalmente ottenuto il
permesso di insegnare pubblicamente tutti i libri del grande filosofo
greco. Fu nuovamente in Italia, impegnato nell'insegnamento e negli
scritti teologici: fu prima assegnato a Orvieto, come lettore, vale a dire
responsabile per la formazione continua della comunità. Qui ebbe il tempo per
completare la stesura della Summa contra Gentiles e della Expositio super Iob
ad litteram. Inoltre qui Tommaso, che non conosceva direttamente il greco in
maniera sufficiente a leggere i testi di Aristotele in originale, si poté
avvalere dell'opera di traduzione di un confratello, Guglielmo di Moerbeke,
eccellente grecista. Guglielmo rifece o rivide le traduzioni delle opere di
Aristotele e pure dei principali commentatori greci (Temistio, Ammonio,
Proclo). Alcune fonti riportano addirittura che Guglielmo avrebbe tradotto
Aristotele dietro richiesta (ad istantiam) di Tommaso stesso. Il contributo di
Guglielmo, anche lui in Italia come Tommaso dopo il 1260, fornì a Tommaso un
prezioso apporto che gli permise di redigere le prime parti dei Commenti alle
opere di Aristotele, spesso validi ancora oggi per la comprensione e
discussione del testo aristotelico. Soggiornò a Roma come maestro reggente. Nel
febbraio 1265 il neoeletto papa Clemente IV lo convocò a Roma come teologo
pontificio. Nello stesso anno gli fu ordinato dal Capitolo domenicano di Agnani
di insegnare allo studium conventuale del convento romano della Basilica di
Santa Sabina, fondato alcuni anni prima. Lo studium di Santa Sabina diviene un
esperimento per i domenicani, il primo studium provinciale dell'Ordine, una
scuola intermedia tra lo studium conventuale e lo studium generale. Prima di
allora la Provincia romana non offriva una formazione specializzata di alcun
tipo, solo semplici scuole conventuali, con i loro corsi di base di teologia
per i frati residenti. Il nuovo studium provinciale di Santa Sabina divenne la
scuola più avanzata per la provincia. Durante il suo soggiorno romano, Tommaso
cominciò a scrivere la Summa Theologiae e compilò numerosi altri scritti su
varie questioni economiche, canoniche e morali. Durante questo periodo, ebbe
l'opportunità di lavorare con la corte papale (che non era residente a Roma). Nel
secondo periodo di insegnamento a Parigi, la sua occupazione principale fu
l'insegnamento della Sacra Pagina e proprio a questo periodo risalgono alcune
delle sue opere più celebri, come i commenti alla Scrittura e le Questioni
Disputate. Anche se i commenti al Nuovo Testamento restano il cuore della sua
attività, egli si segnala anche per la varietà della sua produzione, come ad
esempio la scrittura di diversi brevi scritti (come ad esempio il De Mixtione
elementorum, il De motu cordis, il De operationibus occultis naturae...) e per
la partecipazione alle problematiche del suo tempo: che si tratti di secolari o
dell'averroismo vediamo Tommaso impegnato su tutti i fronti. A questa
multiforme attività bisogna aggiungere un ultimo tratto: Tommaso è anche il
commentatore di Aristotele. Tra queste opere ricordiamo: l' Expositio libri
Peri ermenias, l' Expositio libri Posteriorum, la Sententia libri Ethicorum, la
Tabula libri Ethicorum, il Commento alla Fisica e alla Metafisica. Vi sono poi
anche delle opere incompiute, come la Sententia libri Politicorum, il De Caelo
et Mundo, il De Generatione et corruptione, il Super Meteora. Gli ultimi
anni e la morte Ritratto di Tommaso ad opera di Fra Bartolomeo Fu quindi
richiamato in Italia a Firenze per il Capitolo generale dell'Ordine dei Domenicani[8],
secondo dopo quello del 1251[9]. Lascia definitivamente Parigi e poco dopo la
Pentecoste di quello stesso anno il capitolo della provincia domenicana di Roma
gli affidò il compito di organizzare uno Studium generale di teologia,
lasciandolo libero di scegliere il luogo, le persone e il numero degli
studenti. Ma la scelta di Napoli era già stata designata da un precedente
capitolo provinciale ed è anche verosimile che Carlo I d'Angiò abbia fatto
pressione perché venisse scelta la sua capitale come sede e che a capo di
questo nuovo centro di teologia venisse insediato un maestro di fama. Tommaso
D'Aquino abitò per oltre un anno San Domenico Maggiore nell'ultimo periodo
della sua vita, lasciandovi scritti e reliquie[10]. Gli fu offerto l'arcivescovado
di Napoli, che non volle mai accettare, continuando a vivere in povertà, dedito
allo studio e alla preghiera. Durante gli ultimi anni del periodo napoletano,
continuò a procurarsi testi filosofici che leggeva e commentava con cura,
disputandone i contenuti con i suoi confratelli e studenti. Si dedicò anche
alle opere scientifiche di Aristotele relative ai fenomeni atmosferici e ai
terremoti, cercando di procurarsi testi sulla costruzione degli acquedotti e la
possibilità di applicazione della geometria alle costruzioni, commentando le
traduzioni di testi greci e arabi in latino. La famiglia D'aquino era in
rapporti con Federico II di Svevia che aveva istituzionalizzato la Scuola
Medica Salernitana, primo centro di fruizione culturale degli scritti medici e
filosofici di Avicenna e Averroè, noti al Dottore Angelico. Stabilendosi presso
la sorella Teodora al Castello dei Sanseverino[13], tenne una serie di lezioni
straordinarie nella celebre Scuola Medica che aveva sollecitato l'onore ed il
decoro della parola dell'Aquinate[8]. A memoria del suo soggiorno, nella Chiesa
di San Domenico si conservano la reliquia del suo braccio e le spoglie delle
sorelle. Partecipò al capitolo della sua provincia a Roma in qualità di
definitore. Ma alcune settimane più tardi, mentre celebrava la Messa nella
cappella di San Nicola, Tommaso ebbe una sorprendente visione tanto che dopo la
messa non scrisse, non dettò più nulla e anzi si sbarazzò persino degli
strumenti per scrivere. A Reginaldo da Piperno, che non comprendeva ciò che
accadeva, Tommaso rispose dicendo: «Non posso più. Tutto ciò che ho scritto mi
sembra paglia in confronto con quanto ho visto». «San Bonaventura,
entrato nello studio di Tommaso mentre scriveva, vide la colomba dello Spirito
accanto al suo volto. Ultimato il trattato sull'Eucaristia, lo depose
sull'altare davanti al crocifisso per ricevere dal Signore un segno. Subito fu
sollevato da terra e udì le parole: Bene scripsisti, Thoma, de me quam ergo
mercedem accipies? E rispose Non aliam nisi te, Domine. Anche Paolo fu rapito
al terzo cielo, e poi Antonio e tutta una serie di santi fino a Caterina; il
volo, il levarsi in aria indica la vicinanza con il cielo e con Dio, con
archetipo nelle figure di Enoch e Elia.» (Il piccolo Tommaso e
l'"appetito" per i libri in L'Osservatore Romano, 28 gennaio 2010. Tommaso
e il socius si misero in viaggio per partecipare al Concilio che Gregorio X
aveva convocato per il 1º maggio 1274 a Lione. Dopo qualche giorno di viaggio
arrivarono al castello di Maenza, dove abitava sua nipote Francesca. È qui che
si ammalò e perse del tutto l'appetito. Dopo qualche giorno, sentendosi un po'
meglio, tentò di riprendere il cammino verso Roma, ma dovette fermarsi
all'abbazia di Fossanova per riprendere le forze. Tommaso rimase a Fossanova
per qualche tempo e tra il 4 e il 5 marzo, dopo essersi confessato da
Reginaldo, ricevette l'eucaristia e pronunciò, com'era consuetudine, la
professione di fede eucaristica. Il giorno successivo ricevette l'unzione dei
malati, rispondendo alle preghiere del rito. Morì di lì a tre giorni, mercoledì
7 marzo 1274, alle prime ore del mattino dopo aver ricevuto l'Eucaristia. Le
spoglie di Tommaso d'Aquino sono conservate nella chiesa domenicana detta Les
Jacobins a Tolosa. La reliquia della mano destra, invece, si trova a Salerno,
nella chiesa di San Domenico; il suo cranio si trova invece nella concattedrale
di Priverno, mentre la costola del cuore nella Basilica concattedrale di
Aquino. Il pensiero di Tommaso San Tommaso d'Aquino, ritratto di
Carlo Crivelli Per Tommaso l'anima è creata "a immagine e somiglianza di
Dio" (come dice la Genesi), unica, immateriale (priva di volume, peso ed
estensione), forma del corpo e non localizzata in un punto particolare di esso,
trascendente come Dio e come lui in una dimensione al di fuori dello spazio e
del tempo in cui sono il corpo e gli altri enti. L'anima è tota in toto
corpore, contenuta interamente in ogni parte del corpo, e in questo senso
legata ad esso indissolubilmente: si veda, sul tema, la questione 76 della
Prima Parte della Summa theologiae, questione dedicata appunto al rapporto tra
anima e corpo. Secondo Tommaso: «Ciò che si accetta per fede sulla base
della rivelazione divina non può essere contrario alla conoscenza naturale...
Dio non può indurre nell'uomo un'opinione o una fede contro la conoscenza
naturale... tutti gli argomenti contro la fede non procedono rettamente dai
primi principii per sé noti.» (Tommaso d'Aquino, Summa contra Gentiles,
I, 7.) Nella filosofia tomista Dio è descritto con le seguenti proprietà:[senza
fonte] massimo grado possibile di ogni qualità (che è, è stata o possa
essere fra gli enti), fra queste: sommo amore e sommo bene immutabile, semplice
e indivisibile: è da sempre e per sempre uguale a sé stesso, a lui nulla manca
e in lui nulla cambia. eterno: non nasce e non muore, vive da sempre e per
sempre infinito in atto (non infinito potenziale): non ha limite-confine di
tempo o di spazio onnisciente unico: nessuno, nemmeno Dio può creare un altro
Dio onnipotente: ma non può perpetrare il male e non può creare un altro Dio
per sé: non riceve la vita o altre proprietà da alcuno, poteva esistere senza
gli enti da lui creati, che perciò non nascono come parte di lui e non sono
Dio. trascendente: Dio non è un ente qualunque tra gli altri enti, la
differenza tra Dio e gli altri enti è una differenza quantitativa, vale a dire
stesse qualità ma in un minore grado di completezza e perfezione. Gli enti
creati, fra cui gli angeli e l'uomo, in infiniti gradi a lui somigliano, sono
come Dio, ma non sono Dio: non hanno una parte fisica dell'essere per essenza,
poiché l'essere è semplice, senza parti e indivisibile. Questo essere (inteso
da S.Tommaso come "Ipsum esse subsistens") ha molte proprietà in
comune con l'essere della filosofia greca, così come lo definì Parmenide: uno e
unico, semplice e indivisibile, infinito ed eterno, onnisciente. La differenza
sostanziale però consiste nel fatto che crea gli enti, è più grande della somma
di essi, e può esistere senza. Anche nell'ultima forma del pensiero greco,
quello di Plotino, troviamo che l'emanazione dall'essere agli enti è un fatto
eterno, ma anche necessario e reversibile, non una libera scelta dell'assoluto,
che avrebbe potuto non manifestarsi. Il concetto di creazione ("produzione
dal nulla") è peraltro estraneo alla filosofia greca ed è proprio del
pensiero giudaico-cristiano. Se la trascendenza nega il panteismo, la
personalità di Dio nega a sua volta il deismo (che sarà proprio degli
Illuministi): trascendenza ed essere per sé non significano lontananza
inarrivabile. Gli uomini non nascono, ma hanno la possibilità di diventare
parte integrante di Dio e, già in questa esistenza terrena, di identificare la
propria vita con la vita del creatore. In modo identico, si può dire che
l'essere per san Tommaso non è solo l'essere comune o la piattaforma di tutto
ciò che esiste, ma è l’esse ut actus inteso come atto puro che perfeziona ogni
altra perfezione (essenza, sostanza, forma). Dio è atto puro, puro da ogni
potenza, limite e imperfezione. Quando l'essere è mischiato o ricevuto in una
potenza, allora è atto misto ed è ente finito. Tommaso fonda la sua concezione
metafisica sul concetto di Analogia, rielaborando in maniera molto originale il
pensiero aristotelico. Le cinque vie per dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio
San Tommaso distinse tre forme di conoscenza umana in relazione all'ente e al
suo Creatore: an sit ("se sia"), quomodo sit ("in che modo
sia"), quid sit ("che cosa sia"). La conoscenza umana di Dio è
possibile soltanto in merito alla Sua esistenza e ad un quomodo sit negativo,
nel quale la mente umana procede ad analizzare il creato sensibile, e, per
analogia e differenza, identifica tutte le qualità dell'ente che non possono
essere proprie di Dio Creatore, pur essendone l'opera. Tale percorso fu
chiamato via negationis (o anche ' via remotionis) ordinata al fine di
descrivere il quomodo non sit("in che modo non sia") di Dio. Esso è
effetto della grazia divina ed è possibile soltanto perché il Creatore decide
liberamente di rivelarSi all'uomo, conducendolo per mano da una serie di
negazioni delle qualità dell'ente colte con i cinque sensi fino a pervenire ad
un'affermazione intelligibile e positiva di Lui. L'autore delle Cinque
Vie, infine, escluse che la dimostrazione razionale dell'esistenza e unicità di
Dio potesse rivelare all'uomo anche la Sua vera essenza, quel qui sit che
rimane un mistero accessibile soltanto alla virtù ed è ritenuto un limite
esterno per il dominio possibile della ragione. La conoscenza teologica può
essere soltanto indiretta, relativa agli effetti della causa prima e del fine ultimo
sulla Sua creazione. Molti pensatori cristiani hanno elaborato diversi percorsi
razionali per cercare di dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio: mentre Anselmo d'Aosta,
sulla scia neoplatonica di Agostino d'Ippona procedeva sia a simultaneo, cioè
dal concetto stesso di Dio, da lui ritenuto id quo maius cogitari nequit (nel
Proslogion, cap.2.3), sia a posteriori (nel Monologion) per dimostrare
l'esistenza di Dio, l'unico modo per arrivarci, secondo Tommaso, consiste nel
procedere a posteriori: partendo cioè dagli effetti, dall'esperienza sensibile,
che è la prima a cadere sotto i nostri sensi, per dedurne razionalmente la sua
Causa prima. Si tratta di quella che chiama demonstratio quia, cioè, appunto
dagli effetti, il cui risultato è ammettere necessariamente che esista il punto
d'arrivo della dimostrazione, anche se non è pienamente intelligibile, come in
questo caso, ed in altri, il perché (demonstratio quid, es. i sillogismi: le
premesse esprimono proprietà che sono cause della conclusione: «Ogni uomo è
mortale; ogni ateniese è uomo; ogni ateniese è mortale": essere uomo e
mortale è necessaria causa della mortalità di ogni ateniese)» Sulla base
di questo sfondo di pensiero Tommaso espone le sue prove dell'esistenza di Dio,
Tutte e cinque, con alcune variazioni, seguono questa struttura. Constatazione
di un fatto in rerum natura, nell'esperienza sensibile ordinaria (movimento
inteso come trasformazione; causalità efficiente subordinata; inizio e fine
dell'esistenza degli esseri generabili e corruttibili, perciò materiali,
contingenti nel suo vocabolario, che quindi possono essere e non essere;
gradualità degli esseri nelle perfezioni trascendentali, come bontà, verità,
nobiltà ed essere stesso; finalità nei processi degli esseri non
intelligenti); 2) analisi metafisica di quel dato iniziale esperenziale
alla luce del principio metafisico di causalità, enunciato in varie
formulazioni ("Tutto ciò che si muove è mosso da un altro"; "È
impossibile che una cosa sia causa efficiente di sé stessa"; "Ora, è
impossibile che tutte di tal natura siano state sempre, perché ciò che può non
essere un tempo non esisteva"; "Ma il grado maggiore o minore si
attribuiscono alle diverse cose secondo che si accostano di più o di meno a
qualcosa di sommo o di assoluto"; "Ora, ciò che è privo di
intelligenza non tende al fine se non perché è diretto da un essere conoscitivo
e intelligente"); 3) impossibilità di un regressus in infinitum
inteso in senso metafisico, non quantitativo, perché ciò renderebbe
inintelligibile, inspiegabile pienamente il dato di fatto di partenza esistente
("Ora, non si può in tal modo procedere all'infinito, perché altrimenti
non vi sarebbe un primo motore, e di conseguenza nessun altro motore...";
"Ma procedere all'infinito nelle cause efficienti equivale ad eliminare la
prima causa efficiente; e così non avremmo neppure l'effetto ultimo, né le
cause intermedie..."; "Dunque non tutti gli esseri sono contingenti,
ma bisogna che nella realtà ci sia qualcosa di necessario. Ora, tutto ciò che è
necessario, o ha la causa della sua necessità in un altro essere oppure no.
D'altra parte [in questo genere di esseri] non si può procedere
all'infinito..."; questo passaggio manca, per la sua evidenza agli occhi
dell'Aquinate manca nella quarta via e nella quinta via, si passa direttamente
alla conclusione; 4) conclusione deduttiva strettamente razionale (senza
nessuna cogenza di fede) che identifica il 'conosciuto' sotto quel determinato
aspetto con quello "che tutti chiamano Dio", o espressioni simili
("Dunque è necessario arrivare ad un primo motore che non sia mosso da
altri; e tutti riconoscono che esso è Dio"; "Dunque bisogna ammettere
una prima causa efficiente, che tutti chiamano Dio"; "Dunque bisogna concludere
all'esistenza di un essere che sia di per sé necessario e non tragga da altri
la propria necessità, ma sia causa di necessità agli altri. E questo tutti
dicono Dio"; "Ora ciò che è massimo in un dato genere è causa di
tutti gli appartenenti a quel genere, come il fuoco, caldo al massimo, è causa
di ogni calore, come dice lo stesso Aristotele. Dunque vi è qualcosa che per
tutti gli enti è causa dell'essere, della bontà e di qualsiasi perfezione. E
questo chiamiamo Dio"; "Vi è dunque un qualche essere intelligente,
dal quale tutte le cose naturali sono ordinate ad un fine: e quest'essere
chiamiamo Dio". I cinque percorsi indicati da San Tommaso sono: Ex
motu et mutatione rerum (tutto ciò che si muove esige un movente primo perché,
come insegna Aristotele nella Metafisica: "Non si può andare all'infinito
nella ricerca di un primo motore"); Ex ordine causarum efficientium (cioè
"dalla causa efficiente", intesa in senso subordinato, non in senso
coordinato nel tempo. Tommaso non è, per sola ragione, in grado di escludere la
durata indefinita nel tempo di un mondo creato da Dio, la cosiddetta creatio ab
aeterno: ogni essere finito, partecipato, dipende nell'essere da un altro detto
causa; necessità di una causa prima incausata); Ex rerum contingentia (cioè
"dalla contingenza". Nella terminologia di Tommaso la generabilità e
corruttibilità sono prese come segno evidente della possibilità di essere e non
essere legata alla materialità, sinonimo, nel suo vocabolario di
"contingenza", ben diverso dall'uso più comune, legato ad una
terminologia avicenniana, dove "contingente" è qualsiasi realtà che
non sia Dio. Tommaso, in questa argomentazione della Summa Theologiae distingue
attentamente il necessario dipendente da altro (anima umana e angeli) e necessario
assoluto (Dio). L'esistenza di esseri generabili e corruttibili è in sé
insufficiente metafisicamente, rimanda ad esseri necessari, dapprima dipendenti
da altro, quindi ad un essere assolutamente necessario); Ex variis gradibus
perfectionis (le cose hanno diversi gradi di perfezioni, intese in senso
trascendentale, come verità, bontà, nobiltà ed essere, sebbene sia usato un
'banale' esempio fisico legato al fuoco e al calore; ma solo un grado massimo
di perfezione rende possibile, in quanto causa, i gradi intermedi); Ex rerum
gubernatione (cioè "dal governo delle cose": le azioni di realtà non
intelligenti nell'universo sono ordinate secondo uno scopo, quindi, non essendo
in loro quest'intelligenza, ci deve essere un'intelligenza ultima che le ordina
così). Kant, pur ammettendo l'esistenza di Dio come postulato della ragion
pratica, ritiene che l'esistenza di Dio sia indimostrabile da un punto di vista
teoretico-speculativo: nella Dialettica trascendentale della Critica della
ragion pura, Kant ha contestato tali dimostrazioni, pur non prendendo in realtà
in considerazione direttamente le cinque "vie" di San Tommaso, ma le
prove dell'esistenza di Dio nella filosofia leibniziano-wollfiana. La critica
kantiana si rivolge infatti alla: 1) prova ontologica; 2) prova cosmologica e
3) prova fisico-teologica. Se per quanto riguarda almeno nelle conclusioni sia
S.Tommaso, sia Kant sono concordi nel rifiutare la prova ontologica, per quanto
riguarda la prova cosmologica e quella fisico- teologica, Kant critica queste
due prove (a cui si possono ridurre le cinque "vie tomistiche), in quanto
sarebbero legate ad un'estensione indebita dell'uso della ragione (nel suo uso
teoretico-speculativo), i cui concetti razionali, cioè le idee, sono vuote.
Solo l'intuizione empirica infatti potrebbe ovviare a ciò: per questo motivo
l'idea di Dio è assolutamente non verificabile tramite la ragione, superando i
limiti dell'esperienza possibile. Processo conoscitivo. Tommaso, affermava
che la conoscenza dell'essere umano, in quanto dotato di un corpo creato da
Dio, muove sempre dall'universo immanente, sensibile e corporeo nella direzione
dell'universo trascendente, intellegibile (invisibile) e incorporeo. In tale
aspetto, si differenziò da sant'Agostino, che pensava che questa avvenisse tramite
l'illuminazione divina.[senza fonte] Agostino sostenne che la sorgente
del sapere e dell'essere è la stessa, Dio Creatore dell'universo, e che quindi
i due piani dell'essere e del sapere non possono cadere in contraddizione l'uno
con l'altro. Senza negare Agostino[senza fonte], San Tommaso aggiunse che il
corpo umano deve poter essere capace di conoscere il creato mediante la sua
mente e i suoi sensi, poiché l'uomo non soltanto è una creatura di Dio, ma più
di ogni altro vivente è l'unico creato a immagine e somiglianza della mente e
del Suo corpo umano-divino di Dio Padre e di Gesù, Suo Figlio. Tommaso aggiunse
che i due piani dell'essere e del sapere sono tra loro comunicanti: infatti, le
Cinque Vie dimostrarono che dall'essere della natura corporea è possibile
giungere a conoscere e dimostrare la possibilità, la realtà e la necessità
dell'esistenza e dell'unicità di Dio. Prima ancora di questo, mediante
ogni conoscenza (anche scientifica[senza fonte]) del creato, Tommaso riuscì a
raggiungere il dono e il raro privilegio della visione del Corpo del Cristo
risorto e del dialogo personale con Lui, il giorno della ricorrenza di San
Nicola, poco tempo prima di completare la Summa theologica e di morire. Ciò non
significa che Tommaso disconoscesse il pensiero di sant'Agostino, che è invece
citato a più riprese nella Summa Theologica', e che fu dichiarato Dottore della
Chiesa nel 1298, dopo la morte dell'Aquinate. La conoscenza degli
universali però appartiene solo alle intelligenze angeliche; noi, invece, conosciamo
gli universali post-rem, ossia li ricaviamo dalla realtà sensibile. Soltanto
Dio conosce ante rem. La conoscenza è, quindi, un processo di adeguamento
dell'anima o dell'intelletto e della cosa, secondo una formula che dà ragione
del sofisticato aristotelismo di Tommaso. Veritas: Adaequatio intellectus ad
rem. Adaequatio rei ad intellectum. Adaequatio intellectus et
rei.» «Verità: Adeguamento dell'intelletto alla cosa. Adeguamento della
cosa all'intelletto. Adeguamento dell'intelletto e della cosa.» (Tommaso
d'Aquino) La creazione secondo Tommaso Tommaso spiega che l'uomo può stabilire
a partire dalla ragione il rapporto creaturale di dipendenza dell'universo da
Dio ovvero la creatio ex nihilo intesa come totale dipendenza dell'essere
creato, anche quello sostanziale, dall'Essere divino[26]. Ciò che la sola
ragione non può stabilire è se il mondo è eterno o se è stato creato nel tempo
ovvero se ha un cominciamento. La verità della seconda alternativa (la
creazione con un inizio temporale) può essere conosciuta, secondo Tommaso,
solamente per fede a partire dalla rivelazione divina. Dio, creando l'uomo,
fornisce l'esistenza all'uomo secondo una dinamica simile a quella di atto e
potenza, e lo rende quindi ente reale, fornito di esistenza (che è propriamente
definita da Tommaso actus essendi oltre che di essenza. Soltanto in Dio, atto
puro, essenza ed esistenza coincidono. Il rapporto tra Dio (necessario) e la
creatura (contingente) è analogico in un solo senso: le creature sono simili a
Dio. Il rapporto è di somiglianza non univoca né equivoca. Secondo Tommaso
tutti gli enti sono buoni, poiché somigliano a Dio: "bonum" è uno dei
tre trascendenti (o trascendentali), ovvero di caratteri applicabili a ogni
ente e perciò trascendenti le categorie di Aristotele. Gli altri due sono
"unum" e "verum". Nelle opere di Tommaso l'universo
(o cosmo) ha una struttura rigorosamente gerarchica[senza fonte]: posto al
vertice da Dio che viene posto come al di là della fisicità, governa da solo il
mondo al di sopra di tutte le cose e gli enti; al di sotto di Dio troviamo gli
angeli (forme pure e immateriali), ai quali Tommaso attribuisce la definizione
di intelligenze motrici dei cieli anch'esse ordinate gerarchicamente tra di
loro; poi un gradino più in basso troviamo l'uomo, posto al confine tra il
mondo delle sostanze spirituali e il regno della corporeità, in ogni uomo
infatti si ha l'unione del corpo (elemento materiale) con l'anima intellettiva
(ovvero la forma, che secondo Tommaso costituisce l'ultimo grado delle intelligenze
angeliche): l'uomo è l'unico ente che fa parte sia del mondo fisico, sia del
mondo spirituale. Tommaso crede che la conoscenza umana cominci con i sensi:
l'uomo, non avendo il grado di intelligenza degli angeli, non è in grado di
apprendere direttamente gli intelligibili, ma può apprendere solamente
attribuendo alle cose una forma e quindi solamente grazie all'esperienza
sensibile. Un'altra facoltà necessaria che caratterizza l'uomo è la sua
tendenza a realizzare pienamente la propria natura ovvero compiere ciò per cui
è stato creato[senza fonte]. Ciascun uomo infatti corrisponde all'idea divina
su cui è modellato, di cui l'uomo è consapevole e razionale, conscio delle
proprie finalità, alle quali si dirige volontariamente avvalendosi dell'uso dell'intelletto:
l'uomo prende le proprie decisioni sulla base di un ragionamento pratico,
attraverso il quale tra due beni sceglie sempre quello più consono al
raggiungimento del suo fine. Nel fare ciò segue la Legge naturale, che è
scritta nel cuore dell'uomo. La legge naturale, che è un riflesso della Legge
eterna, deve essere il fondamento della Legge positiva, cioè l'insieme delle
norme che gli uomini stabiliscono storicamente in un dato tempo ed in un dato
luogo. Al di sotto dell'uomo troviamo le piante e le varie molteplicità
degli elementi. Concezione della donna Sacra conversazione di
Monticelli (Ghirlandaio, XV secolo) Tommaso riprende e cita, nella prima parte
della Summa theologiae, alle questioni 92 e 99, l'affermazione di Aristotele
(De generatione et corruptione 2,3) per cui la donna sarebbe un uomo mancato
(mas occasionatus). L'aquinate afferma che "rispetto alla natura
particolare la femmina è un essere difettoso e manchevole" (I, 92, 1).
«Infatti la virtù attiva racchiusa nel seme del maschio tende a produrre un
essere perfetto simile a sé, di sesso maschile, e il fatto che ne derivi una
femmina può dipendere dalla debolezza della virtù attiva, o da
un'indisposizione della materia, o da una trasmutazione causata dal di fuori,
per esempio dai venti australi, che sono umidi, come dice il filosofo.»
Ma aggiunge: «Rispetto invece alla natura nella sua universalità, la femmina
non è un essere mancato, ma è espressamente voluto in ordine alla generazione.
Ora, l'ordinamento della natura nella sua universalità dipende da Dio, il quale
è l'autore universale della natura. Quindi, nel creare la natura, egli produsse
non solo il maschio, ma anche la femmina 2. Ci sono due specie di sudditanza.
La prima, servile, è quella per cui chi è a capo si serve dei sottoposti per il
proprio interesse: e tale dipendenza sopravvenne dopo il peccato. Ma vi è una
seconda sudditanza, economica o politica, in forza della quale chi è a capo si
serve dei sottoposti per il loro interesse e per il loro bene. E tale sudditanza
ci sarebbe stata anche prima del peccato, poiché senza il governo dei più saggi
sarebbe mancato il bene dell'ordine nella società umana. E in questa sudditanza
la donna è naturalmente soggetta all'uomo: poiché l'uomo ha per natura un più
vigoroso discernimento razionale.» (Somma teologica, I, 92, 1, ad 1) «la
diversità dei sessi rientra nella perfezione della natura umana» (Somma
teologica, I, 99, 2, ad 1.) Importanza ed eredità Magnifying glass icon
mgx2.svgTomismo. Tommaso disputa con Averroè Trionfo di san
Tommaso, di Lippo Memmi Trionfo di san Tommaso, di Benozzo Gozzoli San
Tommaso fu uno dei pensatori più eminenti della filosofia Scolastica, che verso
la metà del XIII secolo aveva raggiunto il suo apice. Egli indirizzò diversi
aspetti della filosofia del tempo: la questione del rapporto tra fede e
ragione, le tesi sull'anima (in contrapposizione ad Averroè), le questioni
sull'autorità della religione e della teologia, che subordina ogni campo della
conoscenza. Tali punti fermi del suo pensiero furono difesi da diversi
suoi seguaci successivi, tra i quali Reginaldo da Piperno, Tolomeo da Lucca,
Giovanni di Napoli, il domenicano francese Giovanni Capreolus e Antonino di
Firenze. Infine però, con la lenta dissoluzione della Scolastica, si ebbe parallelamente
anche la dissoluzione del Tomismo, col conseguente prevalere di un indirizzo di
pensiero nominalista nel successivo sviluppo della filosofia, e una progressiva
sfiducia nelle possibilità metafisiche della ragione, che indurrà Lutero a
giudicare quest'ultima «cieca, sorda, stolta, empia e sacrilega».[30]
Oggigiorno il pensiero di Tommaso d'Aquino trova ampio consenso anche in
ambienti non cattolici (studiosi protestanti statunitensi, ad esempio) e
perfino non cristiani, grazie al suo metodo di lavoro, fortemente razionale e
aperto a fonti e contributi di ogni genere: la sua indagine intellettuale
procede dalla Bibbia agli autori pagani, dagli ebrei ai musulmani, senza alcun
pregiudizio, ma tenendo sempre il suo centro nella Rivelazione cristiana, alla
quale ogni cultura, dottrina o autore antico faceva capo.[senza fonte] Il suo
operato culmina nella Summa Theologiae (cioè "Il complesso di
teologia"), in cui tratta in maniera sistematica il rapporto fede-ragione
e altre grandi questioni teologiche. Agostino vedeva il rapporto
fede-ragione come un circolo ermeneutico (dal greco ermeneuo, cioè
"interpreto") in cui credo ut intelligam et intelligo ut credam
(ossia "credo per comprendere e comprendo per credere"). Tommaso
porta la fede su un piano superiore alla ragione, affermando che dove la
ragione e la filosofia non possono proseguire inizia il campo della fede e il
lavoro della teologia.[senza fonte] Dunque, fede e ragione sono certamente in
circolo ermeneutico e crescono insieme sia in filosofia che in teologia. Mentre
però la filosofia parte da dati dell'esperienza sensibile o razionale, la
teologia inizia il circolo con i dati della fede, su cui ragiona per credere
con maggiore consapevolezza ai misteri rivelati. La ragione, ammettendo di non
poterli dimostrare, riconosce che essi, pur essendo al di sopra di sé, non sono
mai assurdi o contro la ragione stessa: fede e ragione, sono entrambe dono di
Dio e non possono contraddirsi. Questa posizione esalta ovviamente la ricerca
umana: ogni verità che io posso scoprire non minaccerà mai la Rivelazione anzi,
rafforzerà la mia conoscenza complessiva dell'opera di Dio e della Parola di
Cristo. Si vede qui un esempio tipico della fiducia che nel Medioevo si
riponeva nella ragione umana. Nel XIV secolo queste certezze andranno in crisi,
coinvolgendo l'intero impianto culturale del periodo precedente. La
teologia, in ambito puramente speculativo, rispetto alla tradizione classica,
era considerata una forma inferiore di sapere, poiché usava in prestito gli
strumenti della filosofia, ma Tommaso fa notare, citando Aristotele, che anche
la filosofia non può dimostrare tutto, perché sarebbe un processo all'infinito.
Egli distingue due tipi di scienze: quelle che esaminano i propri principi e
quelle che ricevono i principi da altre scienze. L'ideale, per uno spirito
concreto come Tommaso, sarebbe superare la fede e raggiungere la conoscenza ma,
sui misteri fondamentali della Rivelazione, questo non è possibile nella vita
terrena del corpo. Avverrà nella vita eterna dello spirito. La filosofia
è dunque ancilla theologiae e regina scientiarum, prima fra i saperi delle
scienze. Il primato del sapere teologico non è nel metodo, ma nei contenuti
divini che affronta, per i quali è sacrificabile anche la necessità filosofica.
Il punto di discrimine fra filosofia e teologia è la dimostrazione
dell'esistenza di Dio; dei due misteri fondamentali della Fede (Trinitario e
Cristologico), la ragione può dimostrare solamente il primo, l'esistenza di
Dio, mentre non può dimostrare che questo Dio è necessariamente Trinitario. Ciò
non è un paradosso razionale, perché da una premessa falsa non possono che
derivare nel sillogismo conseguenze false, è più semplicemente qualcosa che la
ragione non può spiegare: un Dio Uno e Trino. Il maggior servizio che la
ragione può fare alla fede è che non è possibile nemmeno dimostrare il
contrario, che Dio non è Trinitario, che la negazione non dimostrabile della
Trinità a sua volta porta conseguenze paradossali e contraddittorie, laddove
invece la Sua affermazione per fede è feconda di verità e conseguenze non
contraddittorie. La ragione non può entrare nella parte storica dei misteri
religiosi, può mostrare solo prove storiche che tal "profeta" è
esistito, ma non che era Dio, e il senso della Sua missione, che è appunto un
dato, un fatto a cui si può credere o meno. Il primato della teologia
verrà fortemente discusso nei secoli successivi, ma sarà anche lo studio
praticato da tutti i filosofi cristiani nel Medioevo e oltre, tant'è che Pascal
fece la sua famosa "scommessa" ancora nel XVII secolo. La teologia
era questione sentita dal popolo nelle sacre rappresentazioni, era il mondo dei
medioevali e degli zelanti studenti che attraversavano a piedi le paludi di
Francia per ascoltare le lectiones dell'Aquinate nella prestigiosa Università
della Sorbonne di Parigi, incontrandosi da tutta Europa. Gli storici
della filosofia richiamano l'attenzione anche sulla prevalenza dell'intelletto
rispetto ad una prevalenza della volontà nella vita intellettuale/spirituale
dell'uomo. La prima è seguita da San Tommaso e dalla sua scuola, mentre l'altra
è propria di San Bonaventura e della scuola francescana. Per Tommaso il fine
supremo è "vedere Dio", mentre per Bonaventura fine ultimo dell'uomo
è "amare Dio". Quindi per Tommaso la categoria più alta è "il
vero", mentre per Bonaventura è "il bene". Per ambedue però,
"il vero" è anche "il bene", e "il bene" è anche
"il vero". Il pensiero di Tommaso ebbe influenza anche su
autori non cristiani, a cominciare dal famoso pensatore ebreo Hillel da
Verona. A partire dal secondo Novecento poi il suo pensiero viene ripreso
nel dibattito etico da autori cattolici e non, quali Gertrude Elizabeth
Margaret Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Ruth Foot e Jacques Maritain.
Culto Fu canonizzato nel 1323 da papa Giovanni XXII. La sua memoria viene
celebrata dalla Chiesa cattolica il 28 gennaio; la stessa, nella Forma
straordinaria, lo ricorda il 7 marzo. La Chiesa luterana lo ricorda l'8
marzo. San Tommaso d'Aquino è patrono dei teologi, degli accademici, dei
librai e degli studenti. È patrono della città e della diocesi privernate e
della Città e della diocesi aquinate. L'11 aprile 1567 papa Pio V lo
dichiarò dottore della Chiesa con la bolla Mirabilis Deus. Il 29 giugno
1923, nel VI centenario della canonizzazione, papa Pio XI gli dedicò
l'enciclica Studiorum Ducem. L'enciclica Aeterni Patris di papa Leone
XIII ricorda san Tommaso come il più illustre esponente della Scolastica. Gli
statuti dei Benedettini, degli Carmelitani, degli Agostiniani, della Compagnia
di Gesù dispongono l'obbligatorietà dello studio e della messa in pratica delle
dottrine di Tommaso, del quale l'enciclica afferma: «Per la verità, sopra
tutti i Dottori Scolastici, emerge come duce e maestro San Tommaso d’Aquino, il
quale, come avverte il cardinale Gaetano, “perché tenne in somma venerazione
gli antichi sacri dottori, per questo ebbe in sorte, in certo qual modo,
l’intelligenza di tutti”. Le loro dottrine, come membra dello stesso corpo
sparse qua e là, raccolse Tommaso e ne compose un tutto; le dispose con ordine
meraviglioso, e le accrebbe con grandi aggiunte, così da meritare di essere
stimato singolare presidio ed onore della Chiesa Cattolica. Clemente VI, Nicolò
V, Benedetto XIII ed altri attestano che tutta la Chiesa viene illustrata dalle
sue meravigliose dottrine; San Pio V poi confessa che mercé la stessa dottrina
le eresie, vinte e confuse, si disperdono come nebbia, e che tutto il mondo si
salva ogni giorno per merito suo dalla peste degli errori. Altri, con Clemente
XII, affermano che dagli scritti di lui sono pervenuti a tutta la Chiesa
copiosissimi beni, e che a lui è dovuto quello stesso onore che si rende ai
sommi Dottori della Chiesa Gregorio, Ambrogio, Agostino e Girolamo. Altri,
infine, non dubitarono di proporlo alle Accademie e ai grandi Licei quale
esempio e maestro da seguire a piè sicuro. A conferma di questo Ci sembrano
degnissime di essere ricordate le seguenti parole del Beato Urbano V
all’Accademia di Tolosa: “Vogliamo, e in forza delle presenti vi imponiamo, che
seguiate la dottrina del Beato Tommaso come veridica e cattolica, e che vi
studiate con tutte le forze di ampliarla”. Successivamente innocenzo XII, nella
Università di Lovanio, e Benedetto XIV, nel Collegio Dionisiano presso Granata,
rinnovarono l’esempio di Urbano.» (Enciclica Aeterni Patris[31]) Opere di
San Tommaso Sintesi teologiche Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Summa contra
Gentiles Summa Theologiae Questioni disputate Quaestiones disputatae de
Veritate Quaestiones disputatae De potentia Quaestio disputata De anima
Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis Quaestiones disputatae De malo
Quaestiones disputatae De uirtutibus Quaestio disputata De unione uerbi
incarnati Quaestiones de Quodlibet I-XII Commenti biblici Expositio super
Isaiam ad litteram Super Ieremiam et Threnos Principium “Rigans montes de
superioribus” et “Hic est liber mandatorum Dei” Expositio super Iob ad litteram
Glossa continua super Evangelia (Catena Aurea) Lectura super Mattheum Lectura
super Ioannem Expositio et Lectura super Epistolas Pauli Apostoli Postilla
super Psalmos Commenti ad Aristotele Sententia Libri De anima Sententia
Libri De sensu et sensato Sententia super Physicam Sententia super Meteora
Expositio Libri Peryermenias Expositio Libri Posteriorum Sententia Libri
Ethicorum Tabula Libri Ethicorum Sententia Libri Politicorum Sententia super
Metaphysicam Sententia super Librum De caelo et mundo Sententia super Libros De
generatione et corruptione Super libros de generatione et corruptione
Altri commenti Super Boetium De Trinitate Expositio Libri Boetii De ebdomadibus
Super Librum Dionysii De divinis nomibus Super Librum De Causis Scritti
polemici Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem De perfectione spiritualis
vitae Contra doctrinam retrahentium a religione De unitate intellectus contra
Avveroistas De aeternitate mundi Trattati De ente et essentia De
principiis naturae Compendium theologiae seu brevis compilatio theologiae ad
fratrem Raynaldum De regno ad regem Cypri De substantiis separatis
Lettere e pareri De emptione et venditione ad tempus Contra errores Graecorum
De rationibus fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum Expositio super primam et secundam
Decretalem ad Archidiaconum Tudertinum De articulis fidei et ecclesiae sacramentis
ad archiepiscopum Panormitanum Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de
108 articulis De forma absolutionis De secreto Liber De sortibus ad dominum
Iacobum de Tonengo Responsiones ad lectorem Venetum de 30 et 36 articulis
Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 43 articulis Responsio ad
lectorem Bisuntinum de 6 articulis Epistola ad ducissam Brabantiae De mixtione
elementorum ad magistrum Philippum de Castro Caeli De motu cordis ad magistrum
Philippum de Castro Caeli De operationibus occultis naturae ad quendam militem
ultramontanum De iudiciis astrorum Epistola ad Bernardum abbatem
casinensem Opere liturgiche, prediche, preghiere Officium de festo
Corporis Christi ad mandatum Urbani Papae Inno Adoro te devote Collationes in
decem precepta Collationes in orationem dominicam in Symbolum Apostolorum in
salutationem angelicam. Traduzioni italiane Lo specchio dell'anima, La
sentenza di Tommaso d'Aquino sul "De anima" di Aristotele, Traduzione
e testo latino a fronte, Ed. San Paolo, Milano 2012. (È tradotto anche il testo
dell'Aristotele latino). Catena aurea, Glossa continua super Evangelia vol. 1,
Matteo, Bologna, Matteo, Bologna, Marco, Bologna 2007 Commento ai Libri di
Boezio, Super Boetium De Trinitate, Expositio Libri Boetii De Ebdomadibus, Bologna,
Commento ai Nomi Divini di Dionigi, Super Librum Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus
vol. 1, Bologna 2004 vol. 2, (comprende anche De ente et essentia), Bologna,
2004 Commento al Corpus Paulinum, Expositio et lectura super Epistolas Pauli
Apostoli vol. 1, Romani, Bologna 2004 vol. 2, 1 Corinzi, Bologna 2004 vol. 3, 2
Corinzi, Galati, Bologna, 2004 vol. 4, Efesini, Filippesi, Colossesi, Bologna,
2004 vol. 5, Tessalonicesi, Timoteo, Tito, Filemone, Bologna, Ebrei, Bologna, Commento
al Libro di Giobbe, Bologna, 1995 Commento all'Etica Nicomachea di Aristotele,
Sententia Libri Ethicorum, in 2 volumi, Bologna, 1998 Commento alla Fisica di
Aristotele, Sententia super Physicorum vol. 1, Bologna, 2004 vol. 2, Bologna,
2004 vol. 3, Bologna, 2005 Commento alla Metafisica di Aristotele, Sententia
super Metaphysicorum vol. 1, Bologna, Bologna, 2005 vol. 3, Bologna, 2005
Commento alla Politica di Aristotele, Sententia Libri Politicorum, Bologna, Commento
alle Sentenze di Pietro Lombardo, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum in 10
volumi, Bologna, Ed. ESD, 2002 Compendio di teologia, Compendium theologiae,
Bologna, I Sermoni e le due Lezioni inaugurali, Bologna, 2003 La conoscenza
sensibile, Commenti ai libri di Aristotele: Il senso e il sensibile; La memoria
e la reminiscenza, Bologna, La perfezione cristiana nella vita consacrata,
Bologna, 1995 De venerabili sacramentu altaris, Bologna, 1996 La Somma contro i
Gentili, Summa contra Gentiles vol. 1, (traduzione Tito Centi), Bologna (traduzione
Tito Centi), Bologna, 2001 vol. 3, (traduzione Tito Centi), Bologna, 2001 La
Somma Teologica, Summa Theologiae, in 35 volumi La Somma Teologica, Summa
Theologiae, in 6 volumi, Bologna, Ed. ESD Le Questioni Disputate, Quaestiones
Disputatae vol. 1, La Verità, Bologna, 1992 vol. 2, La Verità, Bologna, 1992
vol. 3, La Verità, Bologna, 1993 vol. 4, L'anima umana, Bologna, 2001 vol. 5,
Le virtù, Bologna, 2002 vol. 6, Il male, Bologna, Il male, Bologna, La potenza divina, Bologna, La potenza divina,
Bologna, Questioni su argomenti vari, Bologna, Questioni su argomenti vari,
Bologna, Logica dell'enunciazione, Commento al libro di Aristotele Peri
Hermeneias, Expositio Libri Peryermenias, Bologna, Opuscoli politici: Il
governo dei principi, Lettera alla duchessa del Brabante, La dilazione nella
compravendita, Bologna, Opuscoli spirituali: Commenti al Credo, Padre Nostro,
Ave Maria, Dieci Comandamenti, Ufficio e Messa per la Festa del Corpus Domini,
Le preghiere di san Tommaso, Lettera a uno studente, Bologna, Pagine di
Filosofia: I principi della natura, De principiis naturae ad fratrem
Silvestrum, sola trad. it., e antologia ragionata e commentata di altri brani
filosofici di antropologia, gnoseologia, teologia naturale, etica, politica e
pedagogia. Inni eucaristici A Tommaso d'Aquino sono classicamente attribuiti
gli inni eucaristici per la solennità del Corpus Domini, usati per secoli in
occasione dell'adorazione eucaristica. Gli inni sono stati confermati nella
liturgia solenne dal Concilio Vaticano II: Adoro te devote Pange lingua,
che contiene al termine il Tantum ergo sacramentum Sacris sollemniis Verbum
supernum prodiens Note Napoli A.N.
Rossi, Delle dissertazioni di Alessio Niccolo Rossi intorno ad alcune materie
alla citta di Napoli appartenenti, Pasquale Cayro, Storia sacra e profana
d'Aquino e sua diocesi del signor D. Pasquale Cayro, patrizio anagnino,
Vincenzo Orsino, 1808,348. Ferante della
Marra, Discorsi delle famiglie estinte, forastiere o non comprese ne' seggi di
Napoli imparentate colla casa della Marra. Composti dal signor Ferrante della
Marra duca della Guardia, dati in luce da Camillo Tutini, Ottavio Beltrano, Jean-Pierre
Torrell, O. P., Amico della verità: vita e opere di Tommaso d'Aquino, Edizioni
Studio Domenicano, Fino a pochi anni fa gli storici avevano dei dubbi sulla
veridicità del soggiorno di Tommaso a Parigi nel periodo immediatamente
successivo a quello in cui la sua famiglia lo restituì all'Ordine. Dallo studio
delle fonti, Walz-Novarina concludono che il viaggio di Tommaso in compagnia di
Giovanni Teutonico «... senza essere certo, può considerarsi probabile... », ma
erano più riservati circa la questione degli studi a Parigi. Grandi eruditi
come Denifle e De Groot si associano a questa opinione, ma altri come
Mandonnet, Chenu e Glorieux, osservano che il viaggio a Parigi non avrebbe
avuto alcun senso se Tommaso non avesse dovuto svolgervi i suoi studi, questo
perché lo studium generale di Colonia non era funzionante prima del 1248, data
della sua apertura dovuta a fra Alberto al momento del suo ritorno in questa
città. Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Introduzione
a Tommaso d'Aquino, Roma-Bari, Laterza, Aristotele, Etica Nicomachea, a cura di
Marcello Zanatta, traduzione di Marcello Zanatta, vol. 1, 8. ed, Milano,
Rizzoli, Astrid Filangieri, La vita e le Opere di San Tommaso d'Aquino. Storia
dell'Ordine Domenicano a Firenze, su fiorentininelmondo.La cella di San Tommaso
a San Domenico Maggiore (Napoli). G. Bosco, Storia ecclesiastica ad uso della
gioventù utile ad ogni grado di persone, Torino, Libreria Salesiana Editore, con
l'approvazione del card. Lorenzo Gastaldi, arcivescovo di Torino Filmato audio Luca Bianchi, Onorato Grassi e
Costantino Esposito, Tommaso e la sua eredità - il pensiero che nasce
dall'esperienza, Centro Culturale di Milano,
«Non è vero che alcuni traduttori
lavorassero al suo servizio, come Guglielmo di Moerbeke». (v. 1h 14'). Premio letterario internazionale San Tommaso
d’Aquino, sabato 4 a Mercato San Severino., su gazzettadisalerno, Mercato San
Severino (SA), Convento di San Domenico a Salerno, oggi caserma, su salernodavedere.
Sandra Isetta, Il piccolo Tommaso e l'"appetito" per i libri, in
L'Osservatore Romano. Jean-Pierre Torrell, Amico della verità,392 Quaestio 76 della Parte I della Summa
Theologiae di San Tommaso d'Aquino. A cura di Marcello Landi Massimo
Adinolfi, Francesco Paolo Adorno, Francesco Berto, Massimo Cacciari, Piero
Coda, Carmela Covino, Adriano Fabris, Franco Ferrari, Ernesto Forcellino, Carlo
Sini, Luigi Vero Tarca, Vincenzo Vitiello, La conoscenza di Dio tra remotio e
revelatio nella "Summa theologiae" di San Tommaso D'Aquino, in Il
Pensiero. Rivista di filosifia, XLVI, Inschibboleth Edizioni, S. Th. I, q.2, a.2, c. e luoghi paralleli nei
commenti aristotelici Cf. Summa
Theologiae, Iª q. 2 a. 3 Cf. Summa
Theologiae, pars I, quaestio 2 articolo 3.
Immanuel Kant, Critica della ragion pura, Laterza, Leo Elders, The
Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, E.J. Brill, When St. Thomas
Aquinas had a foretaste of heaven on St. Nicholas’ feast day, su
lifesitenews.com, Cf. Quaestio disputata de anima, a. 3 ad 1; Summa Theologiae,
Iª q. 16 aa. 1-2. Sofia Vanni Rovighi,
Introduzione a Tommaso d'Aquino, Roma-Bari, Laterza, Summa contra gentiles, libro II, 31-37 e Summa
theologiae, pars I quaestio 46 La Somma
Teologica. Sola trad. italiana: Volume 1 - Prima Parte, Edizioni Studio Domenicano,
«Né prima né dopo, si è pensato con tanta precisione, con tanta intima
sicurezza logica, quanto nell'epoca dell'alta Scolastica. L'essenziale è che
allora il puro pensiero si svolgeva con matematica sicurezza di idea in idea,
di giudizio in giudizio, di conclusione in conclusione» (Rudolf Steiner, La
filosofia di Tommaso d'Aquino, II, Opera Omnia, 74). Steiner aggiungeva che «il
nominalismo è il padre di tutto lo scetticismo moderno» (conferenza del marzo
1908, cit. in Posizione dell'antroposofia nei confronti della filosofia, O.O.,
108). Martin Lutero, Servo arbitrio, WA
51, 126. Encilica Aeterni Patris, su
vatican.va. (o la traduzione similare qui riportata. Heinrich Fries, Georg Kretschmar (a cura di),
I classici della teologia, Jaca Book, 2005,978-88-16-30402-4. Annotazioni Nella Sala del Tesoro di San Domenico
Maggiore è conservato un arazzo raffigurante il Carro del Sole, parte delle
Storie ed alle Virtù di san Tommaso d’Aquino, donato ai domenicani da Vincenza
Maria d’Aquino Pico Bibliografia Tommaso d'Aquino, Super libros de generatione
et corruptione, Jacques Myt, Jacques Giunta. Thomas Aquinas; Richard J. Regan,
Compendium of theology Oxford University Press. Aimé Forest, Saint Thomas d'Aquin,Mellottée,
Le Ragioni del Tomismo dopo il centenario dell'enciclica "Aeterni
Patris", Ares, Milano, Maria Cristina Bartolomei, Tomismo e Principio di
non contraddizione, Milani, Padova, 1973 Giuseppe Barzaghi, La Somma Teologica
di San Tommaso d'Aquino, in Compendio. Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna,
2009 Inos Biffi, La teologia e un teologo. San Tommaso d'Aquino, Edizioni
Piemme, Casale Monferrato (AL), [ Krzysztof Charamsa, Dispensa introduttiva
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in Tommaso d'Aquino Ebraismo e Cristianità Opere Adoro Te Devote Quaestio
disputata de malo Summa Theologiae Personalità Al-Ghazali Domingo Báñez Hillel
ben Samuel da Verona San Bernardo di Chiaravalle San Bonaventura da Bagnoregio
Teologia e filosofia Comunione dei santi Tomismo Filosofia medioevale Analogia
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Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Tommaso
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Famiglia domenicana. ·Biografie Portale Biografie Cattolicesimo Portale
Cattolicesimo Filosofia Portale Filosofia Medioevo Portale Medioevo Categorie:
Religiosi italianiTeologi italianiFilosofi italiani del XIII secoloNati nel
1225Morti nel 1274Morti il 7 marzoNati a RoccaseccaTommaso d'AquinoAccademici
italianiProfessori dell'Università di ParigiDottori della Chiesa
cattolicaFilosofi cattoliciFilosofi della politicaDomenicani
italianiScolasticiSanti italiani del XIII secoloSanti canonizzati da Giovanni
XXIISanti domenicaniSanti per nomePersonaggi citati nella Divina Commedia
(Paradiso)Studenti dell'Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico IIScrittori
medievali in lingua latinaTomismoSanti incorrotti[altre] “Perhaps the Italian most studied at Oxford!”Grice. Aquino and
intentionalityClarkArmini -- aquinokeyword:
“medieval pragmatics”! -- thomism, the theology and philosophy of Thomas
Aquinas. The term is applied broadly to various thinkers from different periods
who were heavily influenced by Aquinas’s thought in their own philosophizing
and theologizing. Here three different eras and three different groups of
thinkers will be distinguished: those who supported Aquinas’s thought in the
fifty years or so following his death in 1274; certain highly skilled
interpreters and commentators who flourished during the period of “Second
Thomism” sixteenthseventeenth centuries; and various late nineteenth- and
twentieth-century thinkers who have been deeply influenced in their own work by
Aquinas. Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Thomism. Although Aquinas’s genius
was recognized by many during his own lifetime, a number of his views were
immediately contested by other Scholastic thinkers. Controversies ranged, e.g.,
over his defense of only one substantial form in human beings; his claim that
prime matter is purely potential and cannot, therefore, be kept in existence
without some substantial form, even by divine power; his emphasis on the role
of the human intellect in the act of choice; his espousal of a real distinction
betweeen the soul and its powers; and his defense of some kind of objective or
“real” rather than a merely mind-dependent composition of essence and act of
existing esse in creatures. Some of Aquinas’s positions were included directly
or indirectly in the 219 propositions condemned by Bishop Stephen Tempier of
Paris in 1277, and his defense of one single substantial form in man was
condemned by Archbishop Robert Kilwardby at Oxford in 1277, with renewed
prohibitions by his successor as archbishop of Canterbury, John Peckham, in
1284 and 1286. Only after Aquinas’s canonization in 1323 were the Paris
prohibitions revoked insofar as they touched on his teaching in 1325. Even
within his own Dominican order, disagreement about some of his views developed
within the first decades after his death, notwithstanding the order’s highly
sympathetic espousal of his cause. Early English Dominican defenders of his
general views included William Hothum d.1298, Richard Knapwell d.c.1288, Robert
Orford b. after 1250, fl.129095, Thomas Sutton d. c. and William Macclesfield, Dominican
Thomists included Bernard of Trilia d.1292, Giles of Lessines in present-day
Belgium d.c.1304?, John Quidort of Paris d. 1306, Bernard of Auvergne d. after
1307, Hervé Nédélec d.1323, Armand of Bellevue fl. 131634, and William Peter
Godin d.1336. The secular master at Paris, Peter of Auvergne d. 1304, while
remaining very independent in his own views, knew Aquinas’s thought well and
completed some of his commentaries on Aristotle. Sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century Thomism. Sometimes known as the period of Second Thomism,
this revival gained impetus from the early fifteenth-century writer John
Capreolus 13801444 in his Defenses of Thomas’s Theology Defensiones theologiae
Divi Thomae, a commentary on the Sentences. A number of fifteenth-century
Dominican and secular teachers in G. universities also contributed: Kaspar
Grunwald Freiburg; Cornelius Sneek and John Stoppe in Rostock; Leonard of
Brixental Vienna; Gerard of Heerenberg, Lambert of Heerenberg, and John Versor
all at Cologne; Gerhard of Elten; and in Belgium Denis the Carthusian.
Outstanding among various sixteenth-century commentators on Thomas were Tommaso
de Vio Cardinal Cajetan, Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, Francisco de Vitoria
Salamanca, and Francisco’s disciples Domingo de Soto and Melchior Cano. Most
important among early seventeenth-century Thomists was John of St. Thomas, who
lectured at Piacenza, Madrid, and Alcalá, and is best known for his Cursus
philosophicus and his Cursus theologicus. Theravada Buddhism Thomism 916 916 The nineteenth- and twentieth-century revival.
By the early to mid-nineteenth century the study of Aquinas had been largely
abandoned outside Dominican circles, and in most Roman Catholic s and
seminaries a kind of Cartesian and Suarezian Scholasticism was taught. Long
before he became Pope Leo XIII, Joachim Pecci and his brother Joseph had taken
steps to introduce the teaching of Thomistic philosophy at the diocesan
seminary at Perugia in 1846. Earlier efforts in this direction had been made by
Vincenzo Buzzetti, by Buzzetti’s students Serafino and Domenico Sordi, and by
Taparelli d’Aglezio, who became director of the Collegio Romano Gregorian in 1824. Leo’s encyclical Aeterni Patris1879
marked an official effort on the part of the Roman Catholic church to foster
the study of the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas. The intent was to
draw upon Aquinas’s original writings in order to prepare students of
philosophy and theology to deal with problems raised by contemporary thought.
The Leonine Commission was established to publish a critical edition of all of
Aquinas’s writings; this effort continues today. Important centers of Thomistic
studies developed, such as the Higher Institute of Philosophy at Louvain
founded by Cardinal Mercier, the Dominican School of Saulchoir in France, and
the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. Different groups of
Roman, Belgian, and Jesuits acknowledged
a deep indebtedness to Aquinas for their personal philosophical reflections.
There was also a concentration of effort in the United States at universities
such as The Catholic of America, St.
Louis, Notre Dame, Fordham, Marquette, and Boston, to mention but a few, and by
the Dominicans at River Forest. A great weakness of many of the nineteenthand
twentieth-century Latin manuals produced during this effort was a lack of
historical sensitivity and expertise, which resulted in an unreal and highly
abstract presentation of an “Aristotelian-Thomistic” philosophy. This weakness
was largely offset by the development of solid historical research both in the
thought of Aquinas and in medieval philosophy and theology in general,
championed by scholars such as H. Denifle, M. De Wulf, M. GrabmannMandonnet, F.
Van Steenberghen, E. Gilson and many of his students at Toronto, and by a host
of more recent and contemporary scholars. Much of this historical work
continues today both within and without Catholic scholarly circles. At the same
time, remarkable diversity in interpreting Aquinas’s thought has emerged on the
part of many twentieth-century scholars. Witness, e.g., the heavy influence of
Cajetan and John of St. Thomas on the Thomism of Maritain; the much more
historically grounded approaches developed in quite different ways by Gilson
and F. Van Steenberghen; the emphasis on the metaphysics of participation in
Aquinas in the very different presentations by L. Geiger and C. Fabro; the
emphasis on existence esse promoted by Gilson and many others but resisted by
still other interpreters; the movement known as Transcendental Thomism,
originally inspired byRousselot and by J. Marechal in dialogue with Kant; and
the long controversy about the appropriateness of describing Thomas’s
philosophy and that of other medievals as a Christian philosophy. An increasing
number of non-Catholic thinkers are currently directing considerable attention
to Aquinas, and the varying backgrounds they bring to his texts will
undoubtedly result in still other interesting interpretations and applications
of his thought to contemporary concerns.
: --a strange genitive for
“Aquino,” the little village where the saint was born. while Grice, being C. of
E., would avoid Aquinas like the rats, he was aware of Aquinas’s clever
‘intention-based semantics’ in his commentary of Aristotle’s De
Interpretatione. Saint Thomas 122574,
philosopher-theologian, the most influential thinker of the medieval
period. He produced a powerful philosophical synthesis that combined
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements within a Christian context in an original
and ingenious way. Life and works. Thomas was born at Aquino castle in
Roccasecca, Italy, and took early schooling at the Benedictine Abbey of Monte
Cassino. He then studied liberal arts and philosophy at the of Naples 123944 and joined the Dominican
order. While going to Paris for further studies as a Dominican, he was detained
by his family for about a year. Upon being released, he studied with the
Dominicans at Paris, perhaps privately, until 1248, when he journeyed to a
priori argument Aquinas, Saint Thomas 36
36 Cologne to work under Albertus Magnus. Thomas’s own report reportatio
of Albertus’s lectures on the Divine Names of Dionysius and his notes on
Albertus’s lectures on Aristotle’s Ethics date from this period. In 1252 Thomas
returned to Paris to lecture there as a bachelor in theology. His resulting
commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard dates from this period, as do two
philosophical treatises, On Being and Essence De ente et essentia and On the
Principles of Nature De principiis naturae. In 1256 he began lecturing as
master of theology at Paris. From this period 125659 date a series of
scriptural commentaries, the disputations On Truth De veritate, Quodlibetal
Questions VIIXI, and earlier parts of the Summa against the Gentiles Summa
contra gentiles; hereafter SCG. At different locations in Italy from 1259 to
1269, Thomas continued to write prodigiously, including, among other works, the
completion of the SCG; a commentary on the Divine Names; disputations On the
Power of God De potentia Dei and On Evil De malo; and Summa of Theology Summa theologiae;
hereafter ST, Part I. In January 1269, he resumed teaching in Paris as regent
master and wrote extensively until returning to Italy in 1272. From this second
Parisian regency date the disputations On the Soul De anima and On Virtues De
virtutibus; continuation of ST; Quodlibets IVI and XII; On the Unity of the
Intellect against the Averroists De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas;
most if not all of his commentaries on Aristotle; a commentary on the Book of
Causes Liber de causis; and On the Eternity of the World De aeternitate mundi.
In 1272 Thomas returned to Italy where he lectured on theology at Naples and
continued to write until December 6, 1273, when his scholarly work ceased. He
died three months later en route to the Second Council of Lyons. Doctrine.
Aquinas was both a philosopher and a theologian. The greater part of his
writings are theological, but there are many strictly philosophical works
within his corpus, such as On Being and Essence, On the Principles of Nature,
On the Eternity of the World, and the commentaries on Aristotle and on the Book
of Causes. Also important are large sections of strictly philosophical writing
incorporated into theological works such as the SCG, ST, and various
disputations. Aquinas clearly distinguishes between strictly philosophical
investigation and theological investigation. If philosophy is based on the
light of natural reason, theology sacra doctrina presupposes faith in divine
revelation. While the natural light of reason is insufficient to discover
things that can be made known to human beings only through revelation, e.g.,
belief in the Trinity, Thomas holds that it is impossible for those things
revealed to us by God through faith to be opposed to those we can discover by
using human reason. For then one or the other would have to be false; and since
both come to us from God, God himself would be the author of falsity, something
Thomas rejects as abhorrent. Hence it is appropriate for the theologian to use
philosophical reasoning in theologizing. Aquinas also distinguishes between the
orders to be followed by the theologian and by the philosopher. In theology one
reasons from belief in God and his revelation to the implications of this for
created reality. In philosophy one begins with an investigation of created
reality insofar as this can be understood by human reason and then seeks to
arrive at some knowledge of divine reality viewed as the cause of created
reality and the end or goal of one’s philosophical inquiry SCG II, c. 4. This
means that the order Aquinas follows in his theological Summae SCG and ST is
not the same as that which he prescribes for the philosopher cf. Prooemium to
Commentary on the Metaphysics. Also underlying much of Aquinas’s thought is his
acceptance of the difference between theoretical or speculative philosophy
including natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics and practical
philosophy. Being and analogy. For Aquinas the highest part of philosophy is
metaphysics, the science of being as being. The subject of this science is not
God, but being, viewed without restriction to any given kind of being, or
simply as being Prooemium to Commentary on Metaphysics; In de trinitate, qu. 5,
a. 4. The metaphysician does not enjoy a direct vision of God in this life, but
can reason to knowledge of him by moving from created effects to awareness of
him as their uncreated cause. God is therefore not the subject of metaphysics,
nor is he included in its subject. God can be studied by the metaphysician only
indirectly, as the cause of the finite beings that fall under being as being,
the subject of the science. In order to account for the human intellect’s
discovery of being as being, in contrast with being as mobile studied by
natural philosophy or being as quantified studied by mathematics, Thomas
appeals to a special kind of intellectual operation, a negative judgment,
technically named by him “separation.” Through this operation one discovers
that being, in order to be realized as such, need not be material and
changAquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas 37 37 ing. Only as a result of this judgment is
one justified in studying being as being. Following Aristotle and Averroes,
Thomas is convinced that the term ‘being’ is used in various ways and with
different meanings. Yet these different usages are not unrelated and do enjoy
an underlying unity sufficient for being as being to be the subject of a single
science. On the level of finite being Thomas adopts and adapts Aristotle’s
theory of unity by reference to a first order of being. For Thomas as for
Aristotle this unity is guaranteed by the primary referent in our predication
of being substance. Other things are
named being only because they are in some way ordered to and dependent on substance,
the primary instance of being. Hence being is analogous. Since Thomas’s
application of analogy to the divine names presupposes the existence of God, we
shall first examine his discussion of that issue. The existence of God and the
“five ways.” Thomas holds that unaided human reason, i.e., philosophical
reason, can demonstrate that God exists, that he is one, etc., by reasoning
from effect to cause De trinitate, qu. 2, a. 3; SCG I, c. 4. Best-known among
his many presentations of argumentation for God’s existence are the “five
ways.” Perhaps even more interesting for today’s student of his metaphysics is
a brief argument developed in one of his first writings, On Being and Essence
c.4. There he wishes to determine how essence is realized in what he terms
“separate substances,” i.e., the soul, intelligences angels of the Christian
tradition, and the first cause God. After criticizing the view that created
separate substances are composed of matter and form, Aquinas counters that they
are not entirely free from composition. They are composed of a form or essence
and an act of existing esse. He immediately develops a complex argument: 1 We
can think of an essence or quiddity without knowing whether or not it actually
exists. Therefore in such entities essence and act of existing differ unless 2
there is a thing whose quiddity and act of existing are identical. At best
there can be only one such being, he continues, by eliminating multiplication
of such an entity either through the addition of some difference or through the
reception of its form in different instances of matter. Hence, any such being
can only be separate and unreceived esse, whereas esse in all else is received
in something else, i.e., essence. 3 Since esse in all other entities is
therefore distinct from essence or quiddity, existence is communicated to such
beings by something else, i.e., they are caused. Since that which exists
through something else must be traced back to that which exists of itself,
there must be some thing that causes the existence of everything else and that
is identical with its act of existing. Otherwise one would regress to infinity
in caused causes of existence, which Thomas here dismisses as unacceptable. In
qu. 2, a. 1 of ST I Thomas rejects the claim that God’s existence is
self-evident to us in this life, and in a. 2 maintains that God’s existence can
be demonstrated by reasoning from knowledge of an existing effect to knowledge
of God as the cause required for that effect to exist. The first way or
argument art. 3 rests upon the fact that various things in our world of sense
experience are moved. But whatever is moved is moved by something else. To
justify this, Thomas reasons that to be moved is to be reduced from
potentiality to actuality, and that nothing can reduce itself from potency to
act; for it would then have to be in potency if it is to be moved and in act at
the same time and in the same respect. This does not mean that a mover must
formally possess the act it is to communicate to something else if it is to
move the latter; it must at least possess it virtually, i.e., have the power to
communicate it. Whatever is moved, therefore, must be moved by something else.
One cannot regress to infinity with moved movers, for then there would be no
first mover and, consequently, no other mover; for second movers do not move
unless they are moved by a first mover. One must, therefore, conclude to the
existence of a first mover which is moved by nothing else, and this “everyone
understands to be God.” The second way takes as its point of departure an ordering
of efficient causes as indicated to us by our investigation of sensible things.
By this Thomas means that we perceive in the world of sensible things that
certain efficient causes cannot exercise their causal activity unless they are
also caused by something else. But nothing can be the efficient cause of
itself, since it would then have to be prior to itself. One cannot regress to
infinity in ordered efficient causes. In ordered efficient causes, the first is
the cause of the intermediary, and the intermediary is the cause of the last
whether the intermediary is one or many. Hence if there were no first efficient
cause, there would be no intermediary and no last cause. Thomas concludes from
this that one must acknowledge the existence of a first efficient cause, “which
everyone names God.” The third way consists of two major parts. Some Aquinas,
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas 38
38 textual variants have complicated the proper interpretation of the
first part. In brief, Aquinas appeals to the fact that certain things are
subject to generation and corruption to show that they are “possible,” i.e.,
capable of existing and not existing. Not all things can be of this kind
revised text, for that which has the possibility of not existing at some time does
not exist. If, therefore, all things are capable of not existing, at some time
there was nothing whatsoever. If that were so, even now there would be nothing,
since what does not exist can only begin to exist through something else that
exists. Therefore not all beings are capable of existing and not existing.
There must be some necessary being. Since such a necessary, i.e.,
incorruptible, being might still be caused by something else, Thomas adds a
second part to the argument. Every necessary being either depends on something
else for its necessity or it does not. One cannot regress to infinity in
necessary beings that depend on something else for their necessity. Therefore
there must be some being that is necessary of itself and that does not depend on
another cause for its necessity, i.e., God. The statement in the first part to
the effect that what has the possibility of not existing at some point does not
exist has been subject to considerable dispute among commentators. Moreover,
even if one grants this and supposes that every individual being is a
“possible” and therefore has not existed at some point in the past, it does not
easily follow from this that the totality of existing things will also have
been nonexistent at some point in the past. Given this, some interpreters
prefer to substitute for the third way the more satisfactory versions found in
SCG I ch. 15 and SCG II ch. 15. Thomas’s fourth way is based on the varying
degrees of perfection we discover among the beings we experience. Some are more
or less good, more or less true, more or less noble, etc., than others. But the
more and less are said of different things insofar as they approach in varying
degrees something that is such to a maximum degree. Therefore there is
something that is truest and best and noblest and hence that is also being to
the maximum degree. To support this Thomas comments that those things that are
true to the maximum degree also enjoy being to the maximum degree; in other
words he appeals to the convertibility between being and truth of being. In the
second part of this argument Thomas argues that what is supremely such in a
given genus is the cause of all other things in that genus. Therefore there is
something that is the cause of being, goodness, etc., for all other beings, and
this we call God. Much discussion has centered on Thomas’s claim that the more
and less are said of different things insofar as they approach something that
is such to the maximum degree. Some find this insufficient to justify the
conclusion that a maximum must exist, and would here insert an appeal to
efficient causality and his theory of participation. If certan entities share
or participate in such a perfection only to a limited degree, they must receive
that perfection from something else. While more satisfactory from a
philosophical perspective, such an insertion seems to change the argument of
the fourth way significantly. The fifth way is based on the way things in the
universe are governed. Thomas observes that certain things that lack the
ability to know, i.e., natural bodies, act for an end. This follows from the
fact that they always or at least usually act in the same way to attain that
which is best. For Thomas this indicates that they reach their ends by
“intention” and not merely from chance. And this in turn implies that they are
directed to their ends by some knowing and intelligent being. Hence some
intelligent being exists that orders natural things to their ends. This
argument rests on final causality and should not be confused with any based on
order and design. Aquinas’s frequently repeated denial that in this life we can
know what God is should here be recalled. If we can know that God exists and
what he is not, we cannot know what he is see, e.g., SCG I, c. 30. Even when we
apply the names of pure perfections to God, we first discover such perfections
in limited fashion in creatures. What the names of such perfections are
intended to signify may indeed be free from all imperfection, but every such
name carries with it some deficiency in the way in which it signifies. When a
name such as ‘goodness’, for instance, is signified abstractly e.g., ‘God is
goodness’, this abstract way of signifying suggests that goodness does not
subsist in itself. When such a name is signified concretely e.g., ‘God is
good’, this concrete way of signifying implies some kind of composition between
God and his goodness. Hence while such names are to be affirmed of God as
regards that which they signify, the way in which they signify is to be denied
of him. This final point sets the stage for Thomas to apply his theory of
analogy to the divine names. Names of pure perfections such as ‘good’, ‘true’,
‘being’, etc., cannot be applied to God with Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas,
Saint Thomas 39 39 exactly the same
meaning they have when affirmed of creatures univocally, nor with entirely
different meanings equivocally. Hence they are affirmed of God and of creatures
by an analogy based on the relationship that obtains between a creature viewed
as an effect and God its uncaused cause. Because some minimum degree of
similarity must obtain between any effect and its cause, Thomas is convinced
that in some way a caused perfection imitates and participates in God, its
uncaused and unparticipated source. Because no caused effect can ever be equal
to its uncreated cause, every perfection that we affirm of God is realized in
him in a way different from the way we discover it in creatures. This
dissimilarity is so great that we can never have quidditative knowledge of God
in this life know what God is. But the similarity is sufficient for us to
conclude that what we understand by a perfection such as goodness in creatures
is present in God in unrestricted fashion. Even though Thomas’s identification
of the kind of analogy to be used in predicating divine names underwent some
development, in mature works such as On the Power of God qu. 7, a. 7, SCG I
c.34, and ST I qu. 13, a. 5, he identifies this as the analogy of “one to
another,” rather than as the analogy of “many to one.” In none of these works
does he propose using the analogy of “proportionality” that he had previously
defended in On Truth qu. 2, a. 11. Theological virtues. While Aquinas is
convinced that human reason can arrive at knowledge that God exists and at meaningful
predication of the divine names, he does not think the majority of human beings
will actually succeed in such an effort SCG I, c. 4; ST IIIIae, qu. 2, a. 4.
Hence he concludes that it was fitting for God to reveal such truths to mankind
along with others that purely philosophical inquiry could never discover even
in principle. Acceptance of the truth of divine revelation presupposes the gift
of the theological virtue of faith in the believer. Faith is an infused virtue
by reason of which we accept on God’s authority what he has revealed to us. To
believe is an act of the intellect that assents to divine truth as a result of
a command on the part of the human will, a will that itself is moved by God
through grace ST II IIae, qu. 2, a. 9. For Thomas the theological virtues,
having God the ultimate end as their object, are prior to all other virtues
whether natural or infused. Because the ultimate end must be present in the
intellect before it is present to the will, and because the ultimate end is present
in the will by reason of hope and charity the other two theological virtues, in
this respect faith is prior to hope and charity. Hope is the theological virtue
through which we trust that with divine assistance we will attain the infinite
good eternal enjoyment of God ST IIIIae,
qu. 17, aa. 12. In the order of generation, hope is prior to charity; but in
the order of perfection charity is prior both to hope and faith. While neither
faith nor hope will remain in those who reach the eternal vision of God in the
life to come, charity will endure in the blessed. It is a virtue or habitual
form that is infused into the soul by God and that inclines us to love him for
his own sake. If charity is more excellent than faith or hope ST II IIae, qu.
23, a. 6, through charity the acts of all other virtues are ordered to God,
their ultimate end qu. 23, a. 8. Aquino
-- Aquinismo“If followers of William are called Occamists, followers of a Saint
should surely call themselves “Aquinistae”! -- neo-Thomismas opposed to palaeo-Thomism
--, a philosophical-theological movement in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries manifesting a revival of interest in Aquinas. It was stimulated by
Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris 1879 calling for a renewed emphasis
on the teaching of Thomistic principles to meet the intellectual and social
challenges of modernity. The movement reached its peak in the 0s, though its
influence continues to be seen in organizations such as the Catholic Philosophical Association. Among its
major figures are Joseph Kleutgen, Désiré Mercier, Joseph Maréchal, Pierre
Rousselot, Réginald Garrigou-LaGrange, Martin Grabmann, M.-D. Chenu, Jacques
Maritain, Étienne Gilson, Yves R. Simon, Josef Pieper, Karl Rahner, Cornelio
Fabro, Emerich Coreth, Bernard Lonergan, and W. Norris Clarke. Few, if any, of
these figures have described themselves as NeoThomists; some explicitly
rejected the designation. Neo-Thomists have little in common except their
commitment to Aquinas and his relevance to the contemporary world. Their
interest produced a more historically accurate understanding of Aquinas and his
contribution to medieval thought Grabmann, Gilson, Chenu, including a
previously ignored use of the Platonic metaphysics of participation Fabro. This
richer understanding of Aquinas, as forging a creative synthesis in the midst
of competing traditions, has made arguing for his relevance easier. Those
Neo-Thomists who were suspicious of modernity produced fresh readings of
Aquinas’s texts applied to contemporary problems Pieper, Gilson. Their
influence can be seen in the revival of virtue theory and the work of Alasdair
MacIntyre. Others sought to develop Aquinas’s thought with the aid of later
Thomists Maritain, Simon and incorporated the interpretations of Counter-Reformation
Thomists, such as Cajetan and Jean Poinsot, to produce more sophisticated, and
controversial, accounts of the intelligence, intentionality, semiotics, and
practical knowledge. Those Neo-Thomists willing to engage modern thought on its
own terms interpreted modern philosophy sympathetically using the principles of
Aquinas Maréchal, Lonergan, Clarke, seeking dialogue rather than confrontation.
However, some readings of Aquinas are so thoroughly integrated into modern
philosophy that they can seem assimilated Rahner, Coreth; their highly
individualized metaphysics inspired as much by other philosophical influences,
especially Heidegger, as Aquinas. Some of the labels currently used among
Neo-Thomists suggest a division in the movement over critical, postKantian
methodology. ‘Existential Thomism’ is used for those who emphasize both the
real distinction between essence and existence and the role of the sensible in
the mind’s first grasp of being. ‘Transcendental Thomism’ applies to figures
like Maréchal, Rousselot, Rahner, and Coreth who rely upon the inherent
dynamism of the mind toward the real, rooted in Aquinas’s theory of the active
intellect, from which to deduce their metaphysics of being. Dedicatio. Dilecto
sibi praeposito Lovaniensi frater Thomas de Aquino salutem et verae sapientiae
incrementa. Diligentiae tuae, qua in iuvenili aetate non vanitati sed
sapientiae intendis, studio provocatus, et desiderio satisfacere cupiens, libro
Aristotelis, qui peri hermeneias dicitur, multis obscuritatibus involuto, inter
multiplices occupationum mearum sollicitudines, expositionem adhibere curavi,
hoc gerens in animo sic altiora pro posse perfectioribus exhibere, ut tamen
iunioribus proficiendi auxilia tradere non recusem. Suscipiat ergo studiositas
tua praesentis expositionis munus exiguum, ex quo si profeceris, provocare me
poteris ad maiora. 1 Sicut dicit philosophus in III de anima, duplex est
operatio intellectus: una quidem, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia,
per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essentiam uniuscuiusque rei in
seipsa; alia est operatio intellectus scilicet componentis et dividentis.
Additur autem et tertia operatio, scilicet ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio
procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignotorum. Harum autem operationum prima
ordinatur ad secundam: quia non potest esse compositio et divisio, nisi
simplicium apprehensorum. Secunda vero ordinatur ad tertiam: quia videlicet
oportet quod ex aliquo vero cognito, cui intellectus assentiat, procedatur ad
certitudinem accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis. There is a twofold operation of
the intellect, as the Philosopher says in III De anima [6: 430a 26]. One is the
understanding of simple objects, that is, the operation by which the intellect
apprebends just the essence of a thing alone; the other is the operation of
composing and dividing. There is also a third operation, that of reasoning, by
which reason proceeds from what is known to the investigation of things that
are unknown. The first of these operations is ordered to the second, for there
cannot be composition and division unless things have already been apprehended
simply. The second, in turn, is ordered to the third, for clearly we must
proceed from some known truth to which the intellect assents in order to have
certitude about something not yet known. Aquinas pr. 2 Cum autem logica dicatur
rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur circa ea quae
pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis. De his igitur quae pertinent
ad primam operationem intellectus, idest de his quae simplici intellectu
concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro praedicamentorum. De his vero,
quae pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmativa et
negativa, determinat philosophus in libro perihermeneias. De his vero quae
pertinent ad tertiam operationem determinat in libro priorum et in
consequentibus, in quibus agitur de syllogismo simpliciter et de diversis
syllogismorum et argumentationum speciebus, quibus ratio de uno procedit ad
aliud. Et ideo secundum praedictum ordinem trium operationum, liber
praedicamentorum ordinatur ad librum perihermeneias, qui ordinatur ad librum
priorum et sequentes. 2. Since logic is called rational science it must direct
its consideration to the things that belong to the three operations of reason
we have mentioned. Accordingly, Aristotle treats those belonging to the first
operation of the intellect, i.e., those conceived by simple understanding, in
the book Praedicamentorum; those belonging to the second operation, i.e., affirmative
and negative enunciation, in the book Perihermeneias; those belonging to the
third operation in the book Priorum and the books following it in which he
treats the syllogism absolutely, the different kinds of syllogism, and the
species of argumentation by which reason proceeds from one thing to another.
And since the three operations of reason are ordered to each other so are the
books: the Praedicamenta to the Perihermeneias and the Perihermeneias to the
Priora and the books following it. Aquinas pr. 3. Dicitur ergo liber iste, qui
prae manibus habetur, perihermeneias, quasi de interpretatione. Dicitur autem
interpretatio, secundum Boethium, vox significativa, quae per se aliquid
significat, sive sit complexa sive incomplexa. Unde coniunctiones et praepositiones
et alia huiusmodi non dicuntur interpretationes, quia non per se aliquid
significant. Similiter etiam voces signi-ficantes naturaliter, non ex proposito
aut cum imaginatione aliquid significandi, sicut sunt voces brutorum animalium,
interpretationes dici non possunt. Qui enim interpretatur aliquid exponere
intendit. Et ideo sola nomina et verba et orationes dicuntur interpretationes,
de quibus in hoc libro determinatur. Sed tamen nomen et verbum magis
interpretationis principia esse videntur, quam interpretationes. Ille enim
interpretari videtur, qui exponit aliquid esse verum vel falsum. Et ideo sola
oratio enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur, interpretatio vocatur.
Caeterae vero orationes, ut optativa et imperativa, magis ordinantur ad
exprimendum affectum, quam ad interpretandum id quod in intellectu habetur.
Intitulatur ergo liber iste de interpretatione, ac si dicetur de enunciativa
oratione: in qua verum vel falsum invenitur. Non autem hic agitur de nomine et
verbo, nisi in quantum sunt partes enunciationis. Est enim proprium
uniuscuiusque scientiae partes subiecti tradere, sicut et passiones. Patet
igitur ad quam partem philosophiae pertineat liber iste, et quae sit necessitas
istius, et quem ordinem teneat inter logicae libros.3. The one we are now
examining is named Perihermeneias, that is, On Interpretation. Interpretation,
according to Boethius, is "significant vocal sound —whether complex or
incomplex — which signifies something by itself.” Conjunctions, then, and
prepositions and other words of this kind are not called interpretations since
they do not signify anything by themselves. Nor can sounds signifying naturally
but not from purpose or in connection with a mental image of signifying
something—such as the sounds of brute animals—be called interpretations, for
one who in terprets intends to explain something. Therefore only names and
verbs and speech are called interpretations and these Aristotle treats in this
book. The name and verb, however, seem to be principles of interpretation
rather than interpretations, for one who interprets seems to explain something
as either true or false. Therefore, only enunciative speech in which truth or
falsity is found is called interpretation. Other kinds of speech, such as
optatives and imperatives, are ordered rather to expressing volition than to
interpreting what is in the intellect. This book, then, is entitled On
Interpretation, that is to say, On Enunciative Speech in which truth or falsity
is found. The name and verb are treated only insofar as they are parts of the
enunciation; for it is proper to a science to treat the parts of its subject as
well as its properties. It is clear, then, to which part of philosophy this
book belongs, what its necessity is, and what its place is among the books on
logic. I. 1. Praemittit autem huic operi philosophus prooemium, in quo
sigillatim exponit ea, quae in hoc libro sunt tractanda. Et quia omnis scientia
praemittit ea, quae de principiis sunt; partes autem compositorum sunt eorum principia;
ideo oportet intendenti tractare de enunciatione praemittere de partibus eius.
Unde dicit: primum oportet constituere, idest definire quid sit nomen et quid
sit verbum. In Graeco habetur, primum oportet poni et idem significat. Quia
enim demonstrationes definitiones praesupponunt, ex quibus concludunt, merito
dicuntur positiones. Et ideo praemittuntur hic solae definitiones eorum, de
quibus agendum est: quia ex definitionibus alia cognoscuntur. The Philosopher
begins this work with an introduction in which he points out one by one the
things that are to be treated. For, since every science begins with a treatment
of the principles, and the principles of composite things are their parts, one
who intends to treat enunciation must begin with its parts, Therefore Aristotle
begins by saying: First we must determine, i.e., define, what a name is and
what a verb is. In the Greek text it is First we must posit, which signifies
the same thing, for demonstrations presuppose definitions, from which they conclude,
and hence definitions are rightly called "positions.” This is the reason
he only points out here the definitions of the things to be treated; for from
definitions other things are known. 2. Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro
praedicamentorum de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum
de nomine et verbo determinaretur. Ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum
triplex potest esse consideratio. Una quidem, secundum quod absolute
significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinet ad librum
praedicamentorum. Alio modo, secundum rationem, prout sunt partes
enunciationis. Et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro; et ideo traduntur sub
ratione nominis et verbi: de quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum
tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi, quae pertinent ad rationem
dictionum, secundum quod constituunt enunciationem. Tertio modo, considerantur
secundum quod ex eis constituitur ordo syllogisticus, et sic determinatur de
eis sub ratione terminorum in libro priorum. It might be asked why it is
necessary to treat simple things again, i.e., the name and the verb, for they
were treated in the book Praedicamentorum. In answer to this we should say that
simple words can be considered in three ways: first, as they signify simple
intellection absolutely, which is the consideration proper to the book
Praedicamentorum; secondly, according to their function as parts of the
enunciation, which is the way they are considered in this book. Hence, they are
treated here under the formality of the name and the verb, and under this
formality they signify something with time or without time and other things of
the kind that belong to the formality of words as they are components of an
enunciation. Finally, simple words may be considered as they are components of
a syllogistic ordering. They are treated then under the formality of terms and
this Aristotle does in the book Priorum. 3 Potest iterum dubitari quare,
praetermissis aliis orationis partibus, de solo nomine et verbo determinet. Ad
quod dicendum est quod, quia de simplici enunciatione determinare intendit,
sufficit ut solas illas partes enunciationis pertractet, ex quibus ex
necessitate simplex oratio constat. Potest autem ex solo nomine et verbo
simplex enunciatio fieri, non autem ex aliis orationis partibus sine his; et
ideo sufficiens ei fuit de his duabus determinare. Vel potest dici quod sola
nomina et verba sunt principales orationis partes. Sub nominibus enim
comprehenduntur pronomina, quae, etsi non nominant naturam, personam tamen
determinant, et ideo loco nominum ponuntur: sub verbo vero participium, quod
consignificat tempus: quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam habeat. Alia vero
sunt magis colligationes partium orationis, significantes habitudinem unius ad
aliam, quam orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia huiusmodi non sunt partes
navis, sed partium navis coniunctiones. It might be asked why he treats only
the name and verb and omits the other parts of speech. The reason could be that
Aristotle intends to establish rules about the simple enunciation and for this
it is sufficient to consider only the parts of the enunciation that are
necessary for simple speech. A simple enunciation can be formed from just a
name and a verb, but it cannot be formed from other parts of speech without
these. Therefore, it is sufficient to treat these two.On the other hand, the
reason could be that names and verbs are the principal parts of speech.
Pronouns, which do not name a nature but determine a person-and therefore are
put in place of names-are comprehended under names. The participle-althougb it
has similarities with the name-signifies with time and is therefore
comprehended under the verb. The others are things that unite the parts of
speech. They signify relations of one part to another rather than as parts of
speech; as nails and other parts of this kind are not parts of a ship, but
connect the parts of a ship. 4 His igitur praemissis quasi principiis,
subiungit de his, quae pertinent ad principalem intentionem, dicens: postea
quid negatio et quid affirmatio, quae sunt enunciationis partes: non quidem
integrales, sicut nomen et verbum (alioquin oporteret omnem enunciationem ex
affirmatione et negatione compositam esse), sed partes subiectivae, idest
species. Quod quidem nunc supponatur, posterius autem manifestabitur. After he
has proposed these parts [the name and the verb] as principles, Aristotle
states what he principally intends to establish:... then what negation is and
affirmation. These, too, are parts of the enunciation, not integral parts
however, as are the name and the verb—otherwise every enunciation would have to
be formed from an affirmation and negation—but subjective parts, i.e., species.
This is supposed here but will be proved later. 5 Sed potest dubitari: cum
enunciatio dividatur in categoricam et hypotheticam, quare de his non facit
mentionem, sicut de affirmatione et negatione. Et potest dici quod hypothetica
enunciatio ex pluribus categoricis componitur. Unde non differunt nisi secundum
differentiam unius et multi. Vel potest dici, et melius, quod hypothetica
enunciatio non continet absolutam veritatem, cuius cognitio requiritur in
demonstratione, ad quam liber iste principaliter ordinatur; sed significat
aliquid verum esse ex suppositione: quod non sufficit in scientiis
demonstrativis, nisi confirmetur per absolutam veritatem simplicis
enunciationis. Et ideo Aristoteles praetermisit tractatum de hypotheticis
enunciationibus et syllogismis. Subdit autem, et enunciatio, quae est genus
negationis et affirmationis; et oratio, quae est genus enunciationis. Since
enunciation is divided into categorical and hypothetical, it might be asked why
he does not list these as well as affirmation and negation. In reply to this we
could say that Aristotle has not added these because the hypothetical
enunciation is composed of many categorical propositions and hence categorical
and hypothetical only differ according to the difference of one and many.Or we
could say—and this would be a better reason—that the hypothetical enunciation
does not contain absolute truth, the knowledge of which is required in
demonstration, to which this book is principally ordered; rather, it signifies
something as true by supposition, which does not suffice for demonstrative
sciences unless it is confirmed by the absolute truth of the simple
enunciation. This is the reason Aristotle does not treat either hypothetical
enunciations or syllogisms. He adds, and the enunciation, which is the genus of
negation and affirmation; and speech, which is the genus of enunciation. 6 Si quis ulterius quaerat, quare non facit
ulterius mentionem de voce, dicendum est quod vox est quoddam naturale; unde
pertinet ad considerationem naturalis philosophiae, ut patet in secundo de
anima, et in ultimo de generatione animalium. Unde etiam non est proprie
orationis genus, sed assumitur ad constitutionem orationis, sicut res naturales
ad constitutionem artificialium. If it should be asked why, besides these, he
does not mention vocal sound, it is because vocal sound is something natural and
therefore belongs to the consideration of natural philosophy, as is evident in
II De Anima [8: 420b 5-421a 6] and at the end of De generatione animalium [ch.
8]. Also, since it is something natural, vocal sound is not properly the genus
of speech but is presupposed for the forming of speech, as natural things are
presupposed for the formation of artificial things. 7 Videtur autem ordo enunciationis
esse praeposterus. Nam affirmatio naturaliter est prior negatione, et iis prior
est enunciatio, sicut genus. Et per consequens oratio enunciatione. Sed
dicendum quod, quia a partibus inceperat enumerare, procedit a partibus ad
totum. Negationem autem, quae divisionem continet, eadem ratione praeponit
affirmationi, quae consistit in compositione: quia divisio magis accedit ad
partes, compositio vero magis accedit ad totum. Vel potest dici, secundum
quosdam, quod praemittitur negatio, quia in iis quae possunt esse et non esse,
prius est non esse, quod significat negatio, quam esse, quod significat
affirmatio. Sed tamen, quia sunt species ex aequo dividentes genus, sunt simul
natura; unde non refert quod eorum praeponatur. In this introduction, however,
Aristotle seems to have inverted the order of the enunciation, for affirmation
is naturally prior to negation and enunciation prior to these as a genus; and
consequently, speech to enunciation. We could say in reply to this that he
began to enumerate from the parts and consequently he proceeds from the parts
to the whole. He puts negation, which contains division, before affirmation,
which consists of composition, for the same reason: division is closer to the
parts, composition closer to the whole. Or we could say, as some do, that he
puts negation first because in those things that can be and not be, non-being,
which negation signifies, is prior to being, which affirmation signifies.
Aristotle, however, does not refer to the fact that one of them is placed
before the other, for they are species equally dividing a genus and are
therefore simultaneous according to nature. II. 1. Praemisso prooemio, philosophus accedit
ad propositum exequendum. Et quia ea, de quibus promiserat se dicturum, sunt
voces signi-ficativae complexae vel incomplexae, ideo praemittit tractatum de
sign-ificatione vocum. Et deinde de vocibus signi-ficativis determinat de
quibus in prooemio se dicturum promiserat. Et hoc ibi:. Nomen ergo est vox
significativa et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Pprimo, determinat qualis sit
sign-ificatio vocum. Scundo, ostendit differentiam significationum vocum complexarum
et incomplexarum. Ibi: est autem quemadmodum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.
Primo quidem, praemittit ordinem signi-ficationis vocum. Secundo, ostendit
qualis sit vocum signi-ficatio, utrum sit ex natura vel *ex impositione* [ex positione,
ex arte non ex natura – signo ex natura – signo ex arte, segno da natura, segno
d’arte --. Ibi: et quemadmodum nec litterae et cetera. After his introduction
the Philosopher begins to investigate the things he has proposed. Since the
things he promised to speak of are either complex or incomplex significant
vocal sounds, he prefaces this with a treatment of the signification of vocal
sounds; then he takes up the significant vocal sounds he proposed in the
introduction where he says, A name, then, is a vocal sound significant by
convention, without time, etc. In regard to the signification of vocal sounds
he first determines what kind of signification vocal sound has and then shows
the difference between the signification of complex and incomplex vocal sounds
where he says, As sometimes there is thought in the soul, etc. With respect to
the first point, he presents the order of the signification of vocal sounds and
then shows what kind of signification vocal sound has, i.e., whether it is from
nature or by imposition. This he does where he says, And just as letters are
not the same for all men, etc. 2 Est ergo considerandum quod circa primum tria
proponit, ex quorum uno intelligitur quartum. Aristoteles proponit enim scripturam,
voces et animae passiones, ex quibus intelliguntur res. Nam passio est ex im-pressione
alicuius agentis. Et sic passiones animae originem habent ab ipsis rebus
[teoria causale della percezione]. Et si quidem homo esset naturaliter animal
solitarium, sufficerent sibi animae passiones, quibus ipsis rebus
conformaretur, ut earum *notitiam* [nota, notitia – notizia – notatura --] in se haberet. Sed quia homo est animal
naturaliter politicum et sociale [chi ama la comunicazione!], necesse fuit quod
conceptiones unius hominis *innotescerent* [co-gnoscere] [informare,
notificare, essibire, per influire] aliis, quod fit per vocem. Et ideo necesse
fuit esse voces signi-ficativas, ad hoc quod homines ad invicem conviverent.
Unde illi, qui sunt diversarum linguarum, non possunt bene convivere ad
invicem. Rursum si homo uteretur sola cognitione sensitiva, quae respicit solum
ad hic et nunc, sufficeret sibi ad convivendum aliis vox signi-ficativa, sicut
et caeteris animalibus, quae per quasdam voces, suas conceptiones invicem sibi
manifestant. Sed quia homo utitur etiam intellectuali cognitione, quae
abstrahit ab hic et nunc. Consequitur ipsum sollicitudo non solum de
praesentibus secundum locum et tempus, sed etiam de his quae distant loco et
futura sunt tempore. Unde ut homo conceptiones suas etiam his qui distant
secundum locum et his qui venturi sunt in futuro tempore manifestet, necessarius
fuit usus scripturae. Apropos of the order of signification of vocal sounds he
proposes three things, from one of which a fourth is understood. He proposes
writing, vocal sounds, and passions of the soul; things is understood from the
latter, for passion is from the impression of something acting, and hence
passions of the soul have their origin from things. Now if man were by nature a
solitary animal the passions of the soul by which he was conformed to things so
as to have knowledge of them would be sufficient for him; but since he is by
nature a political and social animal it was necessary that his conceptions be
made known to others. This he does through vocal sound. Therefore there had to
be significant vocal sounds in order that men might live together. Whence those
who speak different languages find it difficult to live together in social
unity. Again, if man had only sensitive cognition, which is of the here and
now, such significant vocal sounds as the other animals use to manifest their
conceptions to each other would be sufficient for him to live with others. But
man also has the advantage of intellectual cognition, which abstracts from the
here and now, and as a consequence, is concerned with things distant in place
and future in time as well as things present according to time and place. Hence
the use of writing was necessary so that he might manifest his conceptions to
those who are distant according to place and to those who will come in future
time. 3. Sed quia logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, signi-ficatio
vocum, quae est *immediate* [senza medio, non-mediata] ipsis conceptionibus
intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius. Signi-ficatio
autem litterarum, tanquam magis remota [mediate], non pertinet ad eius
considerationem, sed magis ad considerationem grammatici e non filosofi. Et
ideo exponens ordinem signi-ficationum non incipit a litteris, sed a vocibus. Quarum
primo signi-ficationem exponens, dicit: sunt ergo ea, quae sunt in voce, notae,
idest, signa earum passionum quae sunt in anima. Dicit autem ergo, quasi ex
praemissis concludens. Qquia supra dixerat determinandum esse de nomine et
verbo et aliis praedictis. Haec autem sunt voces signi-ficativae. Ergo oportet
vocum significationem exponere. However, since logic is ordered to obtaining
knowledge about things, the signification of vocal sounds, which is immediate
to the conceptions of the intellect, is its principal consideration. The
signification of written signs, being more remote, belongs to the consideration
of the grammarian rather than the logician. Aristotle therefore begins his
explanation of the order of signification from vocal sounds, not written signs.
First he explains the signification of vocal sounds: Therefore those that are
in vocal sound are signs of passions in the soul. He says "therefore” as
if concluding from premises, because he has already said that we must establish
what a name is, and a verb and the other things he mentioned; but these are
significant vocal sounds; therefore, signification of vocal sounds must be explained.
4. Utitur autem hoc modo loquendi, ut dicat, ea quae sunt in voce, et non,
voces, ut quasi continuatim loquatur cum praedictis. Dixerat enim dicendum esse
de nomine et verbo et aliis huiusmodi. Haec autem tripliciter habent esse. Uno
quidem modo, in conceptione intellectus. Alio modo, in prolatione vocis. Tertio
modo, in conscriptione litterarum. Dicit ergo, ea quae sunt in voce etc. Ac si
dicat, nomina et verba et alia consequentia, quae tantum sunt in voce, sunt
notae. Vel, quia non omnes voces sunt signi-ficativae, et earum quaedam sunt
signi-ficativae *naturaliter*, quae longe sunt a ratione nominis et verbi et
aliorum consequentium. Ut appropriet suum dictum ad ea de quibus intendit, ideo
dicit, ea quae sunt in voce, idest quae continentur sub voce, sicut partes sub
toto. Vel, quia vox est quoddam naturale, nomen autem et verbum signi-ficant *ex
institutione humana*, quae advenit rei naturali sicut materiae, ut forma lecti
ligno. Ideo ad *de-signandum* [DE-SIGNARE, desegno] nomina et verba et alia
consequentia dicit, ea quae sunt in voce, ac si de lecto diceretur, ea quae
sunt in ligno. When he says "Those that are in vocal sound,” and not
"vocal sounds,” his mode of speaking implies a continuity with what he has
just been saying, namely, we must define the name and the verb, etc. Now these
have being in three ways: in the conception of the intellect, in the utterance
of the voice, and in the writing of letters. He could therefore mean when he
says "Those that are in vocal sound,” etc., names and verbs and the other
things we are going to define, insofar as they are in vocal sound, are signs.
On the other hand, he may be speaking in this way because not all vocal sounds
are significant, and of those that are, some are significant naturally and
hence are different in nature from the name and the verb and the other things
to be defined. Therefore, to adapt what he has said to the things of which he
intends to speak he says, "Those that are in vocal sound,” i.e., that are
contained under vocal sound as parts under a whole. There could be still
another reason for his mode of speaking. Vocal sound is something natural. The
name and verb, on the other hand, signify by human institution, that is, the
signification is added to the natural thing as a form to matter, as the form of
a bed is added to wood. Therefore, to designate names and verbs and the other
things he is going to define he says, "Those that are in vocal sound,” in
the same way he would say of a bed, "that which is in wood.” 5. Circa id
autem quod dicit, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, considerandum est quod
passiones animae communiter dici solent appetitus *sensibilis* affectiones,
sicut ira, gaudium et alia huiusmodi, ut dicitur in II Ethicorum. Et verum est
quod huiusmodi passiones significant naturaliter quaedam voces hominum, ut
gemitus infirmorum [infirmi], et aliorum animalium, ut dicitur in I politicae.
Sed nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis *ex institutione* humana. Et ideo
oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina
et verba et orationes significant immediate, secundum sententiam Aristotelis.
Non enim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo
significandi apparet. Significat enim hoc nomen ‘homo’ naturam humanam [homo]
in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod significet immediate
hominem singularem. Unde Platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam *ideam*
[hominis] separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit
realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu. Ideo
necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus conceptiones
immediate [IN-MEDIATA, NON-MEDIATA – senza medio] et eis mediantibus [MEDIATA
-- medio] res. U segna [mediatamente] che piove non che CREDE che piove. When he speaks of passions in the soul we are
apt to think of the affections of the sensitive appetite, such as anger, joy,
and the other passions that are customarily and commonly called passions of the
soul, as is the case in II Ethicorum [5: 1105b 21]. It is true that some of the
vocal sounds man makes signify passions of this kind naturally, such as the
groans of the sick and the sounds of other animals, as is said in I Politicae
[2: 1253a 10-14]. But here Aristotle is speaking of vocal sounds that are
significant by human institution. Therefore "passions in the soul” must be
understood here as conceptions of the intellect, and names, verbs, and speech,
signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to the
teaching of Aristotle. They cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from
the mode of signifying, for the name "man” signifies human nature in
abstraction from singulars; hence it is impossible that it immediately signify
a singular man. The Platonists for this reason held that it signified the
separated idea of man. But because in Aristotle’s teaching man in the abstract
does not really subsist, but is only in the mind, it was necessary for
Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect
immediately and things by means of them. 6. Sed quia non est consuetum quod
conceptiones intellectus Aristoteles nominet passiones. Ideo Andronicus posuit
hunc librum non esse Aristotelis. Sed manifeste invenitur in 1 de anima quod
passiones animae vocat omnes animae *operations* [judicate/volere – accetare].
Unde et ipsa conceptio intellectus passio dici potest. Vel quia intelligere
nostrum non est sine “phantasmate” [sing. fantasma – etym. – fendere,
offendere, manifestare, diafano]. Quod non est sine corporali [del corpo]
passione. Unde et *imaginativam* philosophus in III de anima vocat passivum [non
activum] intellectum. Vel quia extenso nomine passionis ad omnem receptionem,
etiam ipsum intelligere intellectus possibilis [passibilis] quoddam *pati* est,
ut dicitur in III de anima. Utitur autem potius nomine passionum, quam
intellectuum: tum quia ex aliqua animae passione provenit, puta *ex amore* vel
odio, ut homo interiorem conceptum per vocem alteri significare velit. Tum
etiam quia significatio vocum refertur ad conceptionem intellectus, secundum
quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam *impressionis* [im-primere – ex-primere]
vel passionis. Since Aristotle did not customarily speak of conceptions of the
intellect as passions, Andronicus took the position that this book was not
Aristotle’s. In I De anima, however, it is obvious that he calls all of the
operations of the soul "passions” of the soul. Whence even the conception
of the intellect can be called a passion and this either because we do not
understand without a phantasm, which requires corporeal passion (for which
reason the Philosopher calls the imaginative power the passive intellect) [De
Anima III, 5: 430a 25]; or because by extending the name "passion” to
every reception, the understanding of the possible intellect is also a kind of
undergoing, as is said in III De anima [4: 429b 29]. Aristotle uses the name
"passion,” rather than "understanding,” however, for two reasons:
first, because man wills to signify an interior conception to another through
vocal sound as a result of some passion of the soul, such as love or hate;
secondly, because the signification of vocal sound is referred to the
conception of the intellect inasmuch as the conception arises from things by
way of a kind of impression or passion. 7. Secundo, cum dicit: et ea quae scribuntur
etc., agit de signi-ficatione Scripturae: et secundum Alexandrum hoc inducit ad
manifestandum praecedentem sententiam per modum similitudinis, ut sit sensus. Ita
ea quae sunt in voce sunt signa passionum animae, sicut et litterae sunt signa
vocum. Quod etiam manifestat per sequentia, cum dicit: et quemadmodum nec
litterae etc.; inducens hoc quasi signum praecedentis. Quod enim litterae
significent voces, significatur per hoc, quod, sicut sunt diversae voces apud
diversos, ita et diversae litterae. Et secundum hanc expositionem, ideo non
dixit, et litterae eorum quae sunt in voce, sed ea quae scribuntur. Quia
dicuntur litterae etiam in prolatione et Scriptura, quamvis magis proprie,
secundum quod sunt in Scriptura, dicantur litterae; secundum autem quod sunt in
prolatione, dicantur elementa vocis. Sed quia Aristoteles non dicit, sicut et
ea quae scribuntur, sed continuam narrationem facit, melius est ut dicatur,
sicut Porphyrius exposuit, quod Aristoteles procedit ulterius ad complendum
ordinem significationis. Postquam enim dixerat quod *nomina* [Fido --
denotatum] et verba [-- is shaggy -- attributum], quae sunt in voce, sunt *signa*
eorum quae sunt *in* *anima*, continuatim subdit quod nomina et verba quae
scribuntur, signa sunt eorum nominum et verborum quae sunt in voce. When he
says, and those that are written are signs of those in vocal sound, he treats
of the signification of writing. According to Alexander he introduces this to
make the preceding clause evident by means of a similitude; and the meaning is:
those that are in vocal sound are signs of the passions of the soul in the way
in which letters are of vocal sound; then he goes On to manifest this point
where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are
vocal sounds the same—by introducing this as a sign of the preceding. For when
he says in effect, just as there are diverse vocal sounds among diverse peoples
so there are diverse letters, he is signifying that letters signify vocal.
sounds. And according to this exposition Aristotle said those that are written
are signs... and not, letters are signs of those that are in vocal sound,
because they are called letters in both speech and writing, alt bough they are
more properly called letters in writing; in speech they are called elements of
vocal sound. Aristotle, however, does not say, just as those that are written,
but continues with his account. Therefore it is better to say as Porphyry does,
that Aristotle adds this to complete the order of signification. For after he
says that names and verbs in vocal sound are signs of those [names and verbs –
‘Fido is shaggy’ denotative – attributive – the S is P -- in the soul, he
adds—in continuity with this—that names and verbs that are written are signs of
the names and verbs that are in vocal sound. 8. Deinde cum dicit: et
quemadmodum nec litterae etc., ostendit differentiam praemissorum signi-ficantium
et signi-ficatorum, quantum ad hoc, quod est esse secundum naturam, vel non
esse. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim, ponit quoddam signum, quo
manifestatur quod nec voces nec litterae naturaliter significant. Ea enim, quae
naturaliter significant sunt eadem apud omnes. Significatio autem litterarum et
vocum, de quibus nunc agimus, non est eadem apud omnes. Sed hoc quidem apud
nullos unquam dubitatum fuit quantum ad litteras. Quarum non solum *ratio
significandi est ex impositione* [positione], sed etiam ipsarum formatio fit *per
artem* [per arte ma non ‘artificiale’ – signo di natura, signo di arte, signum
naturae, signum artis, signum naturalis – signum artis – segno artato -- --.
[non per naturam]. Voces autem naturaliter formantur; unde et apud quosdam
dubitatum fuit, utrum naturaliter significent. Sed Aristoteles hic determinat
ex similitudine litterarum, quae sicut non sunt eaedem apud omnes, ita nec
voces. Unde manifeste relinquitur quod sicut nec litterae, ita nec voces
naturaliter significant, sed *ex institutione* humana. Voces autem illae, quae
naturaliter signi-FICANT, sicut gemitus infirmorum [infirmi] et alia huiusmodi,
sunt *eadem* apud omnes. Then where he says, And just as letters are not the
same for all men so neither are vocal sounds the same, he shows that the
foresaid things differ as signified and signifying inasmuch as they are either
according to nature or not. He makes three points here. He first posits a sign
to show that neither vocal sounds nor letters signify naturally; things that
signify naturally are the same among all men; but the signification of letters
and vocal sounds, which is the point at issue here, is not the same among all
men. There has never been any question about this in regard to letters, for
their character of signifying is from imposition and their very formation is
through art. Vocal sounds, however, are formed naturally and hence there is a
question as to whether they signify naturally. Aristotle determines this by
comparison with letters: these are not the same among all men, and so neither
are vocal sounds the same. Consequently, like letters, vocal sounds do not
signify naturally but by human institution. The vocal sounds that do signify
naturally, such as groans of the sick and others of this kind, are the same
among all men. 9. Secundo, ibi. Quorum
autem etc., ostendit passiones animae naturaliter esse, sicut et res, per hoc
quod eaedem sunt apud omnes. Unde dicit. Quorum autem. Idest sicut passiones
animae sunt eaedem omnibus (quorum primorum, idest quarum passionum primarum,
hae, scilicet voces, sunt *notae*, idest *signa*; comparantur enim passiones
animae ad voces, sicut primum ad secundum. Voces enim non proferuntur, nisi ad
ex-primendum [exprimere] in-teriores [interior/exterior] animae passiones), et
res etiam eaedem, scilicet sunt apud omnes, quorum, idest quarum rerum, hae,
scilicet passiones animae sunt similitudines. Ubi attendendum est quod litteras
dixit esse notas, idest signa vocum, et voces passionum animae similiter. Passiones
autem animae dicit esse similitudines rerum. Et hoc ideo, quia res non
cognoscitur ab anima nisi per aliquam sui similitudinem existentem vel in sensu
vel in intellectu. Litterae autem ita sunt signa vocum, et voces passionum,
quod non attenditur ibi aliqua ratio similitudinis, sed sola ratio *institutionis*,
sicut et in multis aliis signis. Ut *tuba* est signum [sola ratio institutionis]
belli [notifica la partenza dalla battaglia]. In passionibus autem animae
oportet attendi rationem similitudinis ad exprimendas res, quia naturaliter eas
designant, non ex institutione. Secondly, when he says, but the passions of the
soul, of which vocal sounds are the first signs, are the same for all, he shows
that passions of the soul exist naturally, just as things exist naturally, for
they are the same among all men. For, he says, but the passions of the soul,
i.e., just as the passions of the soul are the same for all men; of which
first, i.e., of which passions, being first, these, namely, vocal sounds, are
tokens [cf. teach] --,” i.e., signs” (for passions of the soul are compared to
vocal sounds as first to second since vocal sounds are produced *only* to
express interior passions of the soul), so also the things... are the same,
i.e., are the same among all, of which, i.e., of which things, passions of the
soul are likenesses. Notice he says here that letters are signs, i.e., signs of
vocal sounds, and similarly vocal sounds are signs of passions of the soul, but
that passions of the soul are likenesses of things. This is because a thing is
not known by the soul unless there is some likeness of the thing existing
either in the sense or in the intellect. Now letters are signs of vocal sounds
and vocal sounds of passions in such a way that we do not attend to any idea of
likeness in regard to them but *only one [idea] of institution, as is the case
in regard to many other signs, for example, the trumpet as a sign of war. But
in the passions of the soul we have to take into account the idea of a likeness
to the things represented, since passions of the soul designate things
naturally, not by institution. 10 Obiiciunt autem quidam, ostendere volentes
contra hoc quod dicit passiones animae, quas significant voces, esse omnibus
easdem. Primo quidem, quia diversi diversas sententias habent de rebus, et ita
non videntur esse eaedem apud omnes animae passiones. Ad quod respondet
Boethius quod Aristoteles hic nominat passiones animae conceptiones
intellectus, qui numquam decipitur; et ita oportet eius conceptiones esse apud
omnes easdem. Quia, si quis a vero discordat, hic non intelligit. Sed quia
etiam in intellectu potest esse falsum, secundum quod componit et dividit, non
autem secundum quod cognoscit quod quid est, idest essentiam rei, ut dicitur in
III de anima; referendum est hoc ad simplices intellectus conceptiones (quas
significant voces incomplexae), quae sunt eaedem apud omnes: quia, si quis vere
intelligit quid est [homo] [viz. animale razionale], quodcunque aliud aliquid,
quam [hominem] apprehendat, non intelligit hominem. Huiusmodi autem simplices
conceptiones intellectus sunt, quas primo voces significant. Unde dicitur in IV
metaphysicae quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio. Et ideo *signanter*
dicit. Quorum primorum hae *notae* sunt, ut scilicet referatur ad primas conceptiones
a vocibus primo signi-ficatas. There are some who object to Aristotle’s
position that passions of the soul, which vocal sounds signify, are the same
for all men. Their argument against it is as follows. Different men have different
opinions about things. Therefore, passions of the soul do not seem to be the
same among all men. Boethius in reply to this objection says that here
Aristotle is using ‘passions of the soul’ to denote conceptions of the
intellect, and since the intellect is never deceived, conceptions of the
intellect must be the same among all men. For if someone is at variance with
what is true, in this instance he does not understand. However, since what is
false can also be in the intellect, not as it *knows* what a thing is, i.e., the
essence of a thing, but as it composes and divides, as is said in III De anima
[6: 430a 26]. Aristotle’s statement should be referred to the simple
conceptions of the intellect — that are signified by the incomplex vocal sounds
— which are the same among all men. For if someone truly understands what man [homo[
is [viz. animale razionale], whatever else than man he apprehends he does not
understand *as* man. Simple conceptions of the intellect, which vocal sounds
first signify, are of this kind. This is why Aristotle says in IV Metaphysicae
[IV, 4: 1006b 4] that the notion which the name signifies is the definition.”
And this is the reason Aristotle expressly says, ‘of which first [passions]
these are signs [notae]’, I.e., so that this will be referred to the first
conceptions [conceptiones] first signified by vocal sounds. 11. Sed adhuc
obiiciunt aliqui de nominibus aequi-vocis, in quibus eiusdem vocis non est
eadem passio, quae significatur apud omnes. Et respondet ad hoc Porphyrius quod
unus homo, qui vocem profert, ad unam intellectus conceptionem signi-ficandam
eam refert. Et si aliquis alius, cui loquitur, aliquid aliud intelligat, ille
qui loquitur, se exponendo, faciet quod referet intellectum ad idem. Sed melius
dicendum est quod intentio Aristotelis non est asserere *identitatem*
conceptionis animae per comparationem ad vocem, ut scilicet unius vocis una sit
conception. Quia voces sunt diversae apud diversos. Sed intendit asserere
identitatem conceptionum animae per comparationem ad res, quas similiter dicit
esse easdem. The equivocal name is given as another objection to this position,
for in the case of an equivocal name the same vocal sound does *not* signify
the same passion among all men. Porphyry answers this by pointing out that a
man who utters a vocal sound *intends* it to signify one conception of the
intellect. If the person to whom he is speaking understands something else by
it, the one who is speaking, by explaining himself, will make the one to whom he
is speaking refer his understanding to the same thing. However it is better to
say that it is not Aristotle’s intention to maintain an identity of the
conception of the soul in relation to a vocal sound such that there is one
conception in relation to one vocal sound, for vocal sounds are different among
different peoples. Rather, he intends to maintain an identity of the
conceptions of the soul in relation to things, which things he also says are the
same. 12 Tertio, ibi: de his itaque etc., excusat se a diligentiori harum
consideratione: quia quales sint *animae passiones*, et quomodo sint rerum
similitudines, dictum est in libro de anima. Non enim hoc pertinet ad logicum
negocium, sed ad naturale. Thirdly when he says, This has been discussed,
however, in our study of the soul, etc., he excuses himself from a further
consideration of these things, for the nature of the passions of the soul and
the way in which they are likenesses of things does not pertain to logic but to
philosophy of nature and has already been treated in the book De anima [III,
4-8]. III. 1. Postquam philosophus tradidit ordinem signi-ficationis vocum, hic
agit de diversa vocum signi-ficatione. Quarum quaedam significant verum vel
falsum, quaedam non. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, praemittit differentiam. Secundo,
manifestat eam; ibi: circa compositionem enim et cetera. Quia vero conceptiones
intellectus prae-ambulae sunt ordine naturae vocibus, quae *ad eas exprimendas*
[exprimere] proferuntur [pro-ferere], ideo ex similitudine differentiae, quae
est circa intellectum, assignat differentiam, quae est circa signi-ficationes
vocum. Ut scilicet haec manifestatio non solum sit ex simili, sed etiam ex causa
quam imitantur effectus. After the Philosopher has treated the order of the
signification of vocal sounds, he goes on to discuss a diversity in the
signification of vocal sounds, i.e., some of them signify the true or the
false, others do not. He first states the difference and then manifests it
where he says, for in composition and division there is truth and falsity. Now
because in the order of nature conceptions of the intellect precede vocal
sounds, which are uttered to express them, he assigns the difference in respect
to the significations of vocal sounds from a likeness to the difference in
intellection. Thus the manifestation is from a likeness and at the same time
from the cause which the effects imitate. 2. Est ergo considerandum quod, sicut
in principio dictum est, duplex est operatio intellectus, ut traditur in III de
anima. In quarum una non invenitur verum et falsum, in altera autem invenitur.
Et hoc est quod dicit quod in anima aliquoties est intellectus sine vero et
falso, aliquoties autem ex necessitate habet alterum horum. Et quia voces
significativae [notae, signa, vestigial] formantur ad exprimendas – exprimere
-- conceptiones – conceptus -- intellectus, ideo ad hoc quod *signum* [signans
– segno -- segnante] conformetur [conformatur] signato [segnato], necesse est
quod etiam vocum significativarum similiter quaedam significent sine vero et
falso, quaedam autem cum vero et falso. The operation of the intellect is
twofold, as was said in the beginning, and as is explained in III De anima [6:
430a 26]. Now truth and falsity is found in one of these operations but not in
the other. This is what Aristotle says at the beginning of this portion of the
text, i.e., that in the soul sometimes there is thought without truth and
falsity, but sometimes of necessity it has one or the other of these. And since
significant vocal sounds are formed to express these conceptions of the
intellect, it is necessary that some significant vocal sounds signify without
truth and falsity, others with truth and falsity—in order that the sign be
conformed to what is signified. 3 Deinde cum dicit: circa compositionem etc.,
manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo, quantum ad id quod dixerat de intellectu;
secundo, quantum ad id quod dixerat de assimilatione vocum ad intellectum; ibi:
nomina igitur ipsa et verba et cetera. Ad ostendendum igitur quod intellectus quandoque
est sine vero et falso, quandoque autem cum altero horum, dicit primo quod
veritas et falsitas est circa compositionem et divisionem. Ubi oportet
intelligere quod una duarum operationum intellectus est indivisibilium
intelligentia: in quantum scilicet intellectus intelligit absolute cuiusque rei
quidditatem sive essentiam per seipsam, puta quid est homo vel quid album vel
quid aliud huiusmodi. Alia vero operatio intellectus est, secundum quod
huiusmodi simplicia concepta simul componit et dividit. Dicit ergo quod in hac
secunda operatione intellectus, idest componentis et dividentis, invenitur
veritas et falsitas: relinquens quod in prima operatione non invenitur, ut etiam
traditur in III de anima. Then when he says, for in composition and division
there is truth and falsity, he manifests what he has just said: first with
respect to what he has said about thought; secondly, with respect to what he
has said about the likeness of vocal sounds to thought, where he says Names and
verbs, then are like understanding without composition or division, etc. To
show that sometimes there is thought without truth or falsity and sometimes it
is accompanied by one of these, he says first that truth and falsity concern
composition and division. To understand this we must note again that one of the
two operations of the intellect is the understanding of what is indivisible.
This the intellect does when it understands the quiddity or essence of a thing
absolutely, for instance, what man is or what white is or what something else
of this kind is. The other operation is the one in which it composes and
divides simple concepts of this kind. He says that in this second operation of
the intellect, i.e., composing and dividing, truth and falsity is found; the
conclusion being that it is not found in the first, as he also says in III De
anima [6: 430a 26]. 4 Sed circa hoc primo videtur esse dubium: quia cum divisio
fiat per resolutionem ad indivisibilia sive simplicia, videtur quod sicut in
simplicibus non est veritas vel falsitas, ita nec in divisione. Sed dicendum
est quod cum conceptiones intellectus sint similitudines rerum, ea quae circa
intellectum sunt dupliciter considerari et nominari possunt. Uno modo, secundum
se: alio modo, secundum rationes rerum quarum sunt similitudines. Sicut imago
Herculis secundum se quidem dicitur et est cuprum; in quantum autem est
similitudo Herculis nominatur homo. Sic etiam, si consideremus ea quae sunt
circa intellectum secundum se, semper est compositio, ubi est veritas et
falsitas; quae nunquam invenitur in intellectu, nisi per hoc quod intellectus
comparat unum simplicem conceptum alteri. Sed si referatur ad rem, quandoque
dicitur compositio, quandoque dicitur divisio. Compositio quidem, quando
intellectus comparat unum conceptum alteri, quasi apprehendens coniunctionem
aut identitatem rerum, quarum sunt conceptiones; divisio autem, quando sic
comparat unum conceptum alteri, ut apprehendat res esse diversas. Et per hunc
etiam modum in vocibus affirmatio dicitur compositio, in quantum coniunctionem
ex parte rei significat; negatio vero dicitur divisio, in quantum significat
rerum separationem. There seems to be a difficulty about this point, for
division is made by resolution to what is indivisible, or simple, and therefore
it seems that just as truth and falsity is not in simple things, so neither is
it in division. To answer this it should be pointed out that the conceptions of
the intellect are likenesses of things and therefore the things that are in the
intellect can be considered and named in two ways: according to themselves, and
according to the nature of the things of which they are the likenesses. For
just as a statue—say of Hercules—in itself is called and is bronze but as it is
a likeness of Hercules is named man, so if we consider the things that are in
the intellect in themselves, there is always composition where there is truth
and falsity, for they are never found in the intellect except as it compares
one simple concept with another. But if the composition is referred to reality,
it is sometimes called composition, sometimes division: composition when the
intellect compares one concept to another as though apprehending a conjunction
or identity of the things of which they are conceptions; division, when it so
compares one concept with another that it apprehends the things to be diverse.
In vocal sound, therefore, affirmation is called composition inasmuch as it
signifies a conjunction on the part of the thing and negation is called
division inasmuch as it signifies the separation of things. 5 Ulterius autem
videtur quod non solum in compositione et divisione veritas consistat. Primo
quidem, quia etiam res dicitur vera vel falsa, sicut dicitur aurum verum vel
falsum. Dicitur etiam quod ens et verum convertuntur. Unde videtur quod etiam
simplex conceptio intellectus, quae est similitudo rei, non careat veritate et
falsitate. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in Lib. de anima quod sensus propriorum
sensibilium semper est verus; sensus autem non componit vel dividit; non ergo
in sola compositione vel divisione est veritas. Item, in intellectu divino
nulla est compositio, ut probatur in XII metaphysicae; et tamen ibi est prima
et summa veritas; non ergo veritas est solum circa compositionem et divisionem.
There is still another objection in relation to this point. It seems that truth
is not in composition and division alone, for a thing is also said to be true
or false. For instance, gold is said to be true gold or false gold.
Furthermore, being and true are said to be convertible. It seems, therefore,
that the simple conception of the intellect, which is a likeness of the thing,
also has truth and falsity. Again, the Philosopher says in his book De anima
[II, 6: 418a 15], that the sensation of proper sensibles is always true. But
the sense does not compose or divide. Therefore, truth is not in composition
and division exclusively. Moreover, in the divine intellect there is no
composition, as is proved in XII Metaphysicae [9: 1074b 15–1075a 11]. But the
first and highest truth is in the divine intellect. Therefore, truth is not in
composition and division exclusively. 6 Ad huiusmodi igitur evidentiam
considerandum est quod veritas in aliquo invenitur dupliciter: uno modo, sicut
in eo quod est verum: alio modo, sicut in dicente vel cognoscente verum.
Invenitur autem veritas sicut in eo quod est verum tam in simplicibus, quam in
compositis; sed sicut in dicente vel cognoscente verum, non invenitur nisi
secundum compositionem et divisionem. Quod quidem sic patet. To answer these
difficulties the following considerations are necessary. Truth is found in
something in two ways: as it is in that which is true, and as it is in the one
speaking or knowing truth. Truth as it is in that which is true is found in
both simple things and composite things, but truth in the one speaking or
knowing truth is found only according to composition and division. This will
become clear in what follows. 7 Verum enim, ut philosophus dicit in VI
Ethicorum, est bonum intellectus. Unde de quocumque dicatur verum, oportet quod
hoc sit per respectum ad intellectum. Comparantur autem ad intellectum voces
quidem sicut signa, res autem sicut ea quorum intellectus sunt similitudines.
Considerandum autem quod aliqua res comparatur ad intellectum dupliciter. Uno
quidem modo, sicut mensura ad mensuratum, et sic comparantur res naturales ad
intellectum speculativum humanum. Et ideo intellectus dicitur verus secundum
quod conformatur rei, falsus autem secundum quod discordat a re. Res autem
naturalis non dicitur esse vera per comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, sicut
posuerunt quidam antiqui naturales, existimantes rerum veritatem esse solum in
hoc, quod est videri: secundum hoc enim sequeretur quod contradictoria essent
simul vera, quia contradictoria cadunt sub diversorum opinionibus. Dicuntur
tamen res aliquae verae vel falsae per comparationem ad intellectum nostrum,
non essentialiter vel formaliter, sed effective, in quantum scilicet natae sunt
facere de se veram vel falsam existimationem; et secundum hoc dicitur aurum
verum vel falsum. Alio autem modo, res comparantur ad intellectum, sicut
mensuratum ad mensuram, ut patet in intellectu practico, qui est causa rerum.
Unde opus artificis dicitur esse verum, in quantum attingit ad rationem artis;
falsum vero, in quantum deficit a ratione artis. Truth, as the Philosopher says
in VI Ethicorum [2: 1139a 28-30], is the good of the intellect. Hence, anything
that is said to be true is such by reference to intellect. Now vocal sounds are
related to thought as signs, but things are related to thought as that of which
thoughts are likenesses. It must be noted, however, that a thing is related to
thought in two ways: in one way as the measure to the measured, and this is the
way natural things are related to the human speculative intellect. Whence thought
is said to be true insofar as it is conformed to the thing, but false insofar
as it is not in conformity with the thing. However, a natural thing is not said
to be true in relation to our thought in the way it was taught by certain
ancient natural philosophers who supposed the truth of things to be only in
what they seemed to be. According to this view it would follow that
contradictories could be at once true, since the opinions of different men can
be contradictory. Nevertheless, some things are said to be true or false in
relation to our thought—not essentially or formally, but effectively—insofar as
they are so constituted naturally as to cause a true or false estimation of
themselves. It is in this way that gold is said to be true or false. In another
way, things are compared to thought as measured to the measure, as is evident
in the practical intellect, which is a cause of things. In this way, the work
of an artisan is said to be true insofar as it achieves the conception in the
mind of the artist, and false insofar as it falls short of that conception. 8
Et quia omnia etiam naturalia comparantur ad intellectum divinum, sicut
artificiata ad artem, consequens est ut quaelibet res dicatur esse vera
secundum quod habet propriam formam, secundum quam imitatur artem divinam. Nam
falsum aurum est verum aurichalcum. Et hoc modo ens et verum convertuntur, quia
quaelibet res naturalis per suam formam arti divinae conformatur. Unde
philosophus in I physicae, formam nominat quoddam divinum. Now all natural things
are related to the divine intellect as artifacts to art and therefore a thing
is said to be true insofar as it has its own form, according to which it
represents divine art; false gold, for example, is true copper. It is in terms
of this that being and true are converted, since any natural thing is conformed
to divine art through its form. For this reason the Philosopher in I Physicae
[9: 192a 17] says that form is something divine. 9. Et sicut res dicitur vera
per comparationem ad suam mensuram, ita etiam et sensus vel intellectus, cuius
mensura est res extra animam. Unde sensus dicitur verus, quando per formam suam
conformatur rei extra animam existenti. Et sic intelligitur quod sensus proprii
sensibilis sit verus. Et hoc etiam modo intellectus apprehendens quod quid est
absque compositione et divisione, semper est verus, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Est autem considerandum quod quamvis sensus proprii obiecti sit verus, non
tamen cognoscit hoc esse verum. Non enim potest cognoscere habitudinem conformitatis
suae ad rem, sed solam rem apprehendit; intellectus autem potest huiusmodi
habitudinem conformitatis cognoscere; et ideo solus intellectus potest
cognoscere veritatem. Unde et philosophus dicit in VI metaphysicae quod veritas
est solum in mente, sicut scilicet in cognoscente veritatem. Cognoscere autem
praedictam conformitatis habitudinem nihil est aliud quam iudicare ita esse in
re vel non esse: quod est componere et dividere; et ideo intellectus non
cognoscit veritatem, nisi componendo vel dividendo per suum iudicium. Quod
quidem iudicium, si consonet rebus, erit verum, puta cum intellectus iudicat
rem esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est. Falsum autem quando dissonat a
re, puta cum iudicat non esse quod est, vel esse quod non est. Unde patet quod
veritas et falsitas sicut in cognoscente et dicente non est nisi circa
compositionem et divisionem. Et hoc modo philosophus loquitur hic. Et quia
voces sunt signa intellectuum, erit vox vera quae significat verum intellectum,
falsa autem quae significat falsum intellectum: quamvis vox, in quantum est res
quaedam, dicatur vera sicut et aliae res. Unde haec vox, homo est asinus, est
vere vox et vere signum; sed quia est signum falsi, ideo dicitur falsa. And
just as a thing is said to be true by comparison to its measure, so also is
sensation or thought, whose measure is the thing outside of the soul.
Accordingly, sensation is said to be true when the sense through its form is in
conformity with the thing existing outside of the a soul. It is in this way that
the sensation of proper sensibles is true, and the intellect apprehending what
a thing is apart from composition and division is always true, as is said in
III De anima [3: 427b 12; 428a 11; 6: 43a 26]. It should be noted, however,
that although the sensation of the proper object is true the sense does not
perceive the sensation to be true, for it cannot know its relationship of
conformity with the thing but only apprehends the thing. The intellect, on the
other hand, can know its relationship of conformity and therefore only the
intellect can know truth. This is the reason the Philosopher says in VI
Metaphysicae [4: 1027b 26] that truth is only in the mind, that is to say, in
one knowing truth. To know this relationship of conformity is to judge that a thing
is such or is not, which is to compose and divide; therefore, the intellect
does not know truth except by composing and dividing through its judgment. If
the judgment is in accordance with things it will be true, i.e., when the
intellect judges a thing to be what it is or not to be what it is not. The
judgment will be false when it is not in accordance with the thing, i.e., when
it judges that what is, is not, or that what is not, is. It is evident from
this that truth and falsity as it is in the one knowing and speaking is had
only in composition and division. This is what the Philosopher is speaking of
here. And since vocal sounds are signs of thought, that vocal sound will be
true which signifies true thought, false which signifies false thought, although
vocal sound insofar as it is a real thing is said to be true in the same way
other things are. Thus the vocal sound "Man is an ass” is truly vocal
sound and truly a sign, but because it is a sign of something false it is said
to be false. 10 Sciendum est autem quod philosophus de veritate hic loquitur
secundum quod pertinet ad intellectum humanum, qui iudicat de conformitate
rerum et intellectus componendo et dividendo. Sed iudicium intellectus divini
de hoc est absque compositione et divisione: quia sicut etiam intellectus
noster intelligit materialia immaterialiter, ita etiam intellectus divinus
cognoscit compositionem et divisionem simpliciter. It should be noted that the
Philosopher is speaking of truth here as it relates to the human intellect, which
judges of the conformity of things and thought by composing and dividing.
However, the judgment of the divine intellect concerning this is without
composition and division, for just as our intellect understands material things
immaterially, so the divine intellect knows composition and division simply.” Deinde
cum dicit: nomina igitur ipsa et verba etc., manifestat quod dixerat de
similitudine vocum ad intellectum. Et primo, manifestat propositum. Secundo,
probat per signum. Ibi: huius autem signum et cetera. Concludit ergo ex
praemissis quod, cum solum circa compositionem et divisionem sit veritas et
falsitas in intellectu, consequens est quod ipsa nomina et verba, divisim
accepta, assimilentur intellectui qui est sine compositione et divisione; sicut
cum homo vel album dicitur, si nihil aliud addatur: non enim verum adhuc vel
falsum est; sed postea quando additur esse vel non esse, fit verum vel falsum. When
he says, Names and verbs, then, are like thought without composition or
division, he manifests what he has said about the likeness of vocal sounds to
thought. Next he proves it by a sign when he says, A sign of this is that
"goatstag” signifies something but is neither true nor false, etc. Here he
concludes from what has been said that since there is truth and falsity in the
intellect only when there is composition or division, it follows that names and
verbs, taken separately, are like thought which is without composition and
division; as when we say "man” or "white,” and nothing else is added.
For these are neither true nor false at this point, but when "to be” or
"not to be” is added they be come true or false. Nec est instantia de eo,
qui per unicum nomen veram responsionem dat ad interrogationem factam; ut cum
quaerenti: quid natat in mari? Aliquis respondet, piscis. Nam intelligitur
verbum quod fuit in interrogatione positum. Et sicut nomen per se positum non
significat verum vel falsum, ita nec verbum per se dictum. Nec est instantia de
verbo primae et secundae personae, et de verbo exceptae actionis: quia in his
intelligitur certus et determinatus nominativus. Unde est *implicita* --
im-plicata – implicatura – implicitura -- compositio, licet non explicita –
ex-plicata – explicatura – explicitura --.
Although one might think so, the case of someone giving a,, single name
as a true response to a question is not an instance that can be raised against
this position; for example, suppose someone asks, "What swims in the sea?”
and the answer is "Fish”; this is not opposed to the position Aristotle is
taking here, for the verb that was posited in the question is understood. And
just as the name said by itself does not signify truth or falsity, so neither
does the verb said by itself. The verbs of the first and second person and the
intransitive verb” are not instances opposed to this position either, for in
these a particular and determined nominative is understood. Consequently there
is implicit composition, though not explicit. 13. Deinde cum dicit: signum autem etc.,
inducit signum ex nomine composito, scilicet “hirco-cervus”, quod componitur ex
“hirco” et “cervus” et quod in graeco dicitur “tragelaphos” -- nam “tragos” est
‘hircus’, et “elaphos” ‘cervus’. [Benedetto Croce – Calogero – antifascism –
liberaldemocrazia – Berlusconi – ‘che diavolo e un icocerco? Una chimera, ma
anche un obggetivo possibile”] Huiusmodi enim nomina significant aliquid,
scilicet quosdam conceptus simplices, licet rerum compositarum; et ideo non est
verum vel falsum, nisi quando additur esse vel non esse, per quae exprimitur
iudicium intellectus. Potest autem addi esse vel non esse, vel secundum
praesens tempus, quod est esse vel non esse in actu, et ideo hoc dicitur esse
simpliciter; vel secundum tempus praeteritum, aut futurum, quod non est esse
simpliciter, sed secundum quid; ut cum dicitur aliquid fuisse vel futurum esse.
Signanter autem utitur exemplo ex nomine significante quod non est in rerum
natura, in quo statim falsitas apparet, et quod sine compositione et divisione
non possit verum vel falsum esse. Then
he says, A sign of this is that "goatstag” signifies something but is
neither true nor false unless "to be or "not to be” is added either
absolutely or according to time. Here he introduces as a sign the composite
name "goatstag,” from "goat” and "stag.” In Greek the word is
"tragelaphos,” from "tragos” meaning goat and "elaphos” meaning
stag. Now names of this kind signify something, namely, certain simple concepts
(although the things they signify are composite), and therefore are not true or
false unless "to be” or "not to be” is added, by which a judgment of
the intellect is expressed. The "to be” or "not to be” can be added
either according to present time, which is to be or not to be in act and for
this reason is to be simply; or according to past or future time, which is to
be relatively, not simply; as when we say that something has been or will be.
Notice that Aristotle expressly uses as an example here a name signifying
something that does not exist in reality, in which fictiveness is immediately
evident, and which cannot be true or false without composition and
division. IV. 1. Postquam [Aristoteles] philosophus
determinavit de ordine significationis vocum, hic accedit ad determinandum de
ipsis vocibus signi-ficativis. Et quia principaliter intendit de enunciatione,
quae est subiectum huius libri. In qualibet autem scientia oportet praenoscere
principia subiecti. Ideo primo, determinat de principiis enunciationis; secundo,
de ipsa enunciatione. Ibi: enunciativa vero non omnis et cetera. Circa primum
duo facit: primo enim, determinat principia quasi materialia enunciationis,
scilicet partes integrales ipsius. Secundo, determinat principium formale,
scilicet orationem, quae est enunciationis genus. Ibi: oratio autem est vox
signi-ficativa et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo, determinat de nomine,
quod signi-ficat rei substantiam. Secundo, determinat de verbo, quod significat
actionem vel passionem procedentem a re. Ibi: verbum autem est quod con-significat
tempus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo, definit nomen; secundo,
definitionem exponit. Ibi: in nomine enim quod est equiferus etc. Tertio,
excludit quaedam, quae perfecte rationem nominis non habent, ibi: non homo vero
non est nomen. [“Having determined the order of the signification of vocal sounds,
the Philosopher begins here to establish the definitions of the significant
vocal sounds. His principal intention is to establish what an enunciation
is—which is the subject of this book—but since in any science the principles of
the subject must be known first, he begins with the principles of the
enunciation and then establishes what an enunciation is where he says, All
speech is not enunciative, etc.” With respect to the principles of the
enunciation he first determines the nature of the quasi material principles,
i.e., its integral parts, and secondly the formal principle, i.e., speech,
which is the genus of the enunciation, where he says, Speech is significant
vocal sound, etc.” Apropos of the quasi material principles of the enunciation
he first establishes that a name signifies the substance of a thing and then
that the verb signifies action or passion proceeding from a thing, where he
says The verb is that which signifies with time, etc.” In relation to this
first point, he first defines the name, and then explains the definition where
he says, for in the name "Campbell” the part "bell,” as such,
signifies nothing, etc., and finally excludes certain things—those that do not
have the definition of the name perfectly—where he says, "Non-man,” however,
is not a name, etc.”] 2. Circa primum considerandum est quod definitio ideo
dicitur terminus, quia includit totaliter rem. Ita scilicet, quod nihil rei est
extra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio non conveniat. Nec aliquid aliud est
infra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio conveniat. [“It should be noted in
relation to defining the name, that a definition is said to be a limit because
it includes a thing totally, i.e., such that nothing of the thing is outside of
the definition, that is, there is nothing of the thing to which the definition
does not belong; nor is any other thing under the definition, that is, the
definition belongs to no other thing.”] 3 Et ideo quinque ponit in definitione
nominis. Primo, ponitur vox per modum generis, per quod distinguitur nomen ab
omnibus sonis, qui non sunt voces. Nam vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus,
cum imaginatione quadam, ut dicitur in II de anima. Additur autem prima
differentia, scilicet *signi-ficativa*, ad differentiam quarumcumque vocum non
significantium, sive sit vox litterata et articulata, sicut “biltris”, sive non
litterata et non articulata, sicut sibilus pro nihilo factus. Et quia de signi-ficatione
vocum in superioribus actum est, ideo ex praemissis concludit quod nomen est
vox signi-ficativa. Aristotle posits five parts in the definition of the name.
Vocal sound is given first, as the genus. This distinguishes the name from all
sounds that are not vocal; for vocal sound is sound produced from the mouth of
an animal and involves a certain kind of mental image, as is said in II De
anima [8: 420b 30-34]. The second part is the first difference, i.e.,
significant, which differentiates the name from any non-significant vocal
sound, whether lettered and articulated, such as "biltris,” or
non-lettered and non-articulated, as a hissing for no reason. Now since he has
already determined the signification of vocal sounds, he concludes from what
has been established that a name is a significant vocal sound. 4 Sed cum vox sit quaedam res *naturalis*,
nomen autem non est aliquid naturale sed ab hominibus institutum, videtur quod
non debuit genus nominis ponere vocem, quae est *ex natura*, sed magis *signum*,
quod est *ex institutione*. Ut diceretur: nomen est *signum* vocale. Sicut
etiam convenientius definiretur scutella, si quis diceret quod est vas ligneum,
quam si quis diceret quod est lignum formatum in vas. But vocal sound is a natural thing, whereas a
name is not natural but instituted by men; it seems, therefore, that Aristotle
should have taken sign, which is from institution, as the genus of the name,
rather than vocal sound, which is from nature. Then the definition would be: a
name is a vocal sign, etc., just as a salver would be more suitably defined as
a wooden dish than as wood formed into a dish. 5. Sed dicendum quod *arti-ficialia*
sunt quidem in genere substantiae ex parte materiae, in genere autem
accidentium ex parte formae. Nam formae *arti-ficialium* accidentia sunt. Nomen
ergo signi-ficat formam accidentalem ut concretam subiecto. Cum autem in
definitione omnium accidentium oporteat poni subiectum, necesse est quod, si
qua nomina accidens in abstracto signi-ficant quod in eorum definitione ponatur
accidens in recto, quasi genus, subiectum autem in obliquo, quasi differentia; ut
cum dicitur, simitas est curvitas nasi. Si qua vero nomina accidens significant
in concreto, in eorum definitione ponitur materia, vel subiectum, quasi genus,
et accidens, quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simum est nasus curvus. Si
igitur nomina rerum *arti-ficialium* significant formas accidentales, ut
concretas subiectis *naturalibus*, convenientius est, ut in eorum definitione
ponatur res *naturalis* quasi genus, ut dicamus quod scutella est lignum
figuratum, et similiter quod nomen est vox signi-ficativa. Secus autem esset,
si nomina *arti-ficialium* acciperentur, quasi signi-ficantia ipsas formas
arti-ficiales in abstracto. [5. “It should be noted, however, that while it is
true that artificial things are in the genus of substance on the part of
matter, they are in the genus of accident on the part of form, since the forms
of artificial things are accidents. A name, therefore, signifies an accidental
form made concrete in a subject. Now the subject must be posited in the
definition of every accident; hence, when names signify an accident in the
abstract the accident has to be posited directly (i.e., in the nominative case)
as a quasi-genus in their definition and the subject posited obliquely (i.e.,
in an oblique case such as the genitive, dative, or accusative) as a
quasi-difference; as for example, when we define snubness as curvedness of the
nose. But when names signify an accident ill the concrete, the matter or
subject has to be posited in their definition as a quasi-genus and the accident
as a quasi-difference, as when we say that a snub nose is a curved nose.
Accordingly, if the names of artificial things signify accidental forms as made
concrete in *natural* subjects, then it is more appropriate to posit the
natural thing in their definition as a quasi-genus. We would say, therefore,
that a salver is shaped wood, and likewise, that a name is a significant vocal
sound. It would be another matter if names of *artificial* things were taken as
signifying artificial forms in the abstract”]. 6. Tertio, Aristotele ponit
secundam differentiam cum dicit: ‘secundum placitum’, idest *secundum
institutionem humanam a beneplacito hominis procedentem*. Et per hoc differt
nomen a vocibus signi-FICANTIBUS *naturaliter*, sicut sunt *gemitus infirmorum*
[gemitus infirmi] et voces brutorum animalium. 7. Quarto, ponit tertiam
differentiam, scilicet sine tempore, per quod differt nomen a verbo. Sed
videtur hoc esse falsum: quia hoc nomen dies vel annus significat tempus. Sed
dicendum quod circa tempus tria possunt considerari. Primo quidem, ipsum
tempus, secundum quod est res quaedam, et sic potest significari a nomine,
sicut quaelibet alia res. Alio modo, potest considerari id, quod tempore
mensuratur, in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter
tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio et passio, ideo verbum
quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat cum tempore. Substantia
autem secundum se considerata, prout significatur per nomen et pronomen, non
habet in quantum huiusmodi ut tempore mensuretur, sed solum secundum quod
subiicitur motui, prout per participium significatur. Et ideo verbum et
participium significant cum tempore, non autem nomen et pronomen. Tertio modo,
potest considerari ipsa habitudo temporis mensurantis; quod significatur per
adverbia temporis, ut cras, heri et huiusmodi. The fourth part is the third
difference, i.e., without time, which differentiates the name from the verb.
This, however, seems to be false, for the name "day” or "year”
signifies time. But there are three things that can be considered with respect
to time; first, time itself, as it is a certain kind of thing or reality, and
then it can be signified by a name just like any other thing; secondly, that
which is measured by time, insofar as it is measured by time. Motion, which
consists of action and passion, is what is measured first and principally by
time, and therefore the verb, which signifies action and passion, signifies
with time. Substance considered in itself, which a name or a pronoun signify,
is not as such measured by time, but only insofar as it is subjected to motion,
and this the participle signifies. The verb and the participle, therefore,
signify with time, but not the name and pronoun. The third thing that can be
considered is the very relationship of time as it measures. This is signified
by adverbs of time such as "tomorrow,” "yesterday,” and others of this
kind. 8 Quinto, ponit quartam differentiam cum subdit: cuius nulla pars est
significativa separata, scilicet a toto nomine; comparatur tamen ad
significationem nominis secundum quod est in toto. Quod ideo est, quia
significatio est quasi forma nominis; nulla autem pars separata habet formam
totius, sicut manus separata ab homine non habet formam humanam. Et per hoc
distinguitur nomen ab oratione, cuius pars significat separata; ut cum dicitur,
homo iustus. The fifth part is the fourth difference, no part of which is
significant separately, that is, separated from the whole name; but it is
related to the signification of the name according as it is in the whole. The
reason for this is that signification is a quasi-form of the name. But no
separated part has the form of the whole; just as the hand separated from the
man does not have the human form. This difference distinguishes the name from
speech, some parts of which signify separately, as for example in "just
man.” 9 Deinde cum dicit: in nomine enim quod est etc., manifestat praemissam
definitionem. Et primo, quantum ad ultimam particulam; secundo, quantum ad
tertiam; ibi: secundum vero placitum et cetera. Nam primae duae particulae
manifestae sunt ex praemissis; tertia autem particula, scilicet sine tempore,
manifestabitur in sequentibus in tractatu de verbo. Circa primum duo facit:
primo, manifestat propositum per nomina composita; secundo, ostendit circa hoc
differentiam inter nomina simplicia et composita; ibi: at vero nonquemadmodum
et cetera. Manifestat ergo primo quod pars nominis separata nihil significat,
per nomina composita, in quibus hoc magis videtur. In hoc enim nomine quod est
equiferus, haec pars ferus, per se nihil significat sicut significat in hac
oratione, quae est equus ferus. Cuius ratio est quod unum nomen imponitur ad
significandum unum simplicem intellectum; aliud autem est id a quo imponitur
nomen ad significandum, ab eo quod nomen significat; sicut hoc nomen lapis
imponitur a laesione pedis, quam non significat: quod tamen imponitur ad
significandum conceptum cuiusdam rei. Et inde est quod pars nominis compositi,
quod imponitur ad significandum conceptum simplicem, non significat partem
conceptionis compositae, a qua imponitur nomen ad significandum. Sed oratio
significat ipsam conceptionem compositam: unde pars orationis significat partem
conceptionis compositae. When he says, for in the name "Campbell” the part
"bell” as such signifies nothing, etc., he explains the definition. First
he explains the last part of the definition; secondly, the third part, by convention.
The first two parts were explained in what preceded, and the fourth part,
without time, will be explained later in the section on the verb. And first he
explains the last part by means of a composite name; then he shows what the
difference is between simple and composite names where he says, However the
case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names, etc. First,
then, he shows that a part separated from a name signifies nothing. To do this
he uses a composite name because the point is more striking there. For in the
name "Campbell” the part "bell” per se signifies nothing, although it
does signify something in the phrase "camp bell.” The reason for this is
that one name is imposed to signify one simple conception; but that from which
a name is imposed to signify is different from that which a name signifies. For
example, the name "pedigree”, The Latin here is lapis, from laesione
pedis. To bring out the point St. Thomas is making herean equivalent English
word of Latin derivation, i.e., "pedigree,” has been used. Close is
imposed from pedis and grus [crane’s foot] which it does not signify, to
signify the concept of a certain thing. Hence, a part of the composite
name—which composite name is imposed to signify a simple concept—does not
signify a part of the composite conception from which the name is imposed to
signify. Speech, on the other hand, does signify a composite conception. Hence,
a part of speech signifies a part of the composite conception. 10. Deinde cum
dicit: at vero non etc., ostendit quantum ad hoc differentiam inter nomina
simplicia et composita, et dicit quod non ita se habet in nominibus
simplicibus, sicut et in compositis: quia in simplicibus pars nullo modo est
significativa, neque secundum veritatem, neque secundum apparentiam; sed in
compositis vult quidem, idest apparentiam habet significandi; nihil tamen pars
eius significat, ut dictum est de nomine equiferus. Haec autem ratio
differentiae est, quia nomen simplex sicut imponitur ad significandum conceptum
simplicem, ita etiam imponitur ad significandum ab aliquo simplici conceptu;
nomen vero compositum imponitur a composita conceptione, ex qua habet
apparentiam quod pars eius significet. When he says, However, the case is not
exactly the same in simple names and composite names, etc., he shows that there
is a difference between simple and composite names in regard to their parts not
signifying separately. Simple names are not the same as composite names in this
respect because in simple names a part is in no way significant, either
according to truth or according to appearance, but in composite names the part
has meaning, i.e., has the appearance of signifying; yet a part of it signifies
nothing, as is said of the name "breakfast.” The reason for this difference
is that the simple name is imposed to signify a simple concept and is also
imposed from a simple concept; but the composite name is imposed from a
composite conception, and hence has the appearance that a part of it signifies.
11. Deinde cum dicit: “secundum placitum”, etc., manifestat tertiam partem
praedictae definitionis; et dicit quod ideo dictum est quod nomen “significat
secundum placitum”, quia nullum nomen est “naturaliter”. Ex hoc enim est nomen,
quod significat: non autem significat *naturaliter*, sed *ex institutione*. Et
hoc est quod subdit: sed quando fit nota, idest quando imponitur ad
significandum. Id enim quod naturaliter significat *non fit* [cfr.
signi-FICARE], sed naturaliter est signum. Et hoc *signi-ficat* cum dicit. Illitterati
enim soni, ut ferarum, quia scilicet litteris *signi-FICARI* non possunt. Et
dicit potius sonos quam voces, quia quaedam animalia non habent vocem, eo quod
carent pulmone, sed tantum quibusdam sonis proprias *passiones* *naturaliter* *signi-FICANT*.
Nihil autem horum sonorum est nomen. Ex quo manifeste datur intelligi quod
nomen non significat naturaliter. --- 12. Sciendum tamen est quod circa hoc
fuit diversa quorumdam opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod nomina nullo modo
naturaliter significant: nec differt quae res quo nomine significentur. Alii
vero dixerunt quod nomina omnino naturaliter significant, quasi nomina sint
naturales similitudines rerum. Quidam vero dixerunt quod nomina non naturaliter
significant quantum ad hoc, quod eorum significatio non est a natura, ut
Aristoteles hic intendit; quantum vero ad hoc naturaliter significant quod
eorum significatio congruit naturis rerum, ut Plato dixit. Nec obstat quod una
res multis nominibus significatur: quia unius rei possunt esse multae
similitudines; et similiter ex diversis proprietatibus possunt uni rei multa
diversa nomina imponi. Non est autem intelligendum quod dicit: quorum nihil est
nomen, quasi soni animalium non habeant nomina: nominantur enim quibusdam
nominibus, sicut dicitur rugitus leonis et mugitus bovis; sed quia nullus talis
sonus est nomen, ut dictum est. However, there were diverse opinions about
this. Some men said that names in no way signify naturally and that it makes no
difference which things are signified by which names. Others said that names
signify naturally in every way, as if names were natural likenesses of things.
Still others said names do not signify naturally, i.e., insofar as their
signification is not from nature, as Aristotle maintains here, but that names
do signify naturally in the sense that their signification corresponds to the
natures of things, as Plato held. The fact that one thing is signified by many
names is not in opposition to Aristotle’s position here, for there can be many
likenesses of one thing; and similarly, from diverse properties many diverse
names can be imposed on one thing. When Aristotle says, but none of them is a
name, he does not mean that the sounds of animals are not named, for we do have
names for them; "roaring,” for example, is said of the sound made by a
lion, and "lowing” of that of a cow. What he means is that no such sound
is a name. 13 Deinde cum dicit: non homo vero etc., excludit quaedam a nominis
ratione. Et primo, nomen infinitum; secundo, casus nominum; ibi: Catonis autem
vel Catoni et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod non homo non est nomen. Omne enim
nomen significat aliquam naturam determinatam, ut homo; aut personam
determinatam, ut pronomen; aut utrumque determinatum, ut Socrates. Sed hoc quod
dico non homo, neque determinatam naturam neque determinatam personam
significat. Imponitur enim a negatione hominis, quae aequaliter dicitur de
ente, et non ente. Unde non homo potest dici indifferenter, et de eo quod non
est in rerum natura; ut si dicamus, Chimaera est non homo, et de eo quod est in
rerum natura; sicut cum dicitur, equus est non homo. Si autem imponeretur a
privatione, requireret subiectum ad minus existens: sed quia imponitur a
negatione, potest dici de ente et de non ente, ut Boethius et Ammonius dicunt.
Quia tamen significat per modum nominis, quod potest subiici et praedicari,
requiritur ad minus suppositum in apprehensione. Non autem erat nomen positum
tempore Aristotelis sub quo huiusmodi dictiones concluderentur. Non enim est
oratio, quia pars eius non significat aliquid separata, sicut nec in nominibus
compositis; similiter autem non est negatio, id est oratio negativa, quia
huiusmodi oratio superaddit negationem affirmationi, quod non contingit hic. Et
ideo novum nomen imponit huiusmodi dictioni, vocans eam nomen infinitum propter
indeterminationem significationis, ut dictum est. When he says, "Non-man,”
however, is not a name, etc., he points out that certain things do not have the
nature of a name. First he excludes the infinite name; then the cases of the
name where he says, "Of Philo” and "to Philo,” etc. He says that
"non-man” is not a name because every name signifies some determinate
nature, for example, "man,” or a determinate person in the case of the
pronoun, or both determinately, as in "Socrates.” But when we say
"non-man” it signifies neither a determinate nature nor a determinate
person, because it is imposed from the negation of man, which negation is
predicated equally of being and non-being. Consequently, "non-man” can be
said indifferently both of that which does not exist in reality, as in "A
chimera is non-man,” and of that which does exist in reality, as in "A
horse is non-man.” Now if the infinite name were imposed from a privation it
would require at least an existing subject, but since it is imposed from a
negation, it can be predicated of being and nonbeing, as Boethius and Ammonius
say. However, since it signifies in the mode of a name, and can therefore be
subjected and predicated, a suppositum is required at least in apprehension. In
the time of Aristotle there was no name for words of this kind. They are not
speech since a part of such a word does not signify something separately, just
as a part of a composite name does not signify separately; and they are not
negations, i.e., negative speech, for speech of this kind adds negation to
affirmation, which is not the case here. Therefore he imposes a new name for
words of this kind, the "infinite name,” because of the indetermination of
signification, as has been said. 14 Deinde cum dicit: Catonis autem vel Catoni
etc., excludit casus nominis; et dicit quod Catonis vel Catoni et alia
huiusmodi non sunt nomina, sed solus nominativus dicitur principaliter nomen,
per quem facta est impositio nominis ad aliquid significandum. Huiusmodi autem
obliqui vocantur casus nominis: quia quasi cadunt per quamdam declinationis
originem a nominativo, qui dicitur rectus eo quod non cadit. Stoici autem
dixerunt etiam nominativos dici casus: quos grammatici sequuntur, eo quod
cadunt, idest procedunt ab interiori conceptione mentis. Et dicitur rectus, eo
quod nihil prohibet aliquid cadens sic cadere, ut rectum stet, sicut stilus qui
cadens ligno infigitur. When he says, "Of Philo” and "to Philo” and
all such expressions are not names but modes of names, he excludes the cases of
names from the nature of the name. The nominative is the one that is said to be
a name principally, for the imposition of the name to signify something was
made through it. Oblique expressions of the kind cited are called cases of the
name because they fall away from the nominative as a kind of source of their
declension. On the other hand, the nominative, because it does not fall away,
is said to be erect. The Stoics held that even the nominatives were cases (with
which the grammarians agree), because they fall, i.e., proceed from the
interior conception of the mind; and they said they were also called erect
because nothing prevents a thing from falling in such a way that it stands
erect, as when a pen falls and is fixed in wood. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 4 n. 15Deinde
cum dicit: ratio autem eius etc., ostendit consequenter quomodo se habeant
obliqui casus ad nomen; et dicit quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est eadem
et in aliis, scilicet casibus nominis; sed in hoc est differentia quod nomen
adiunctum cum hoc verbo est vel erit vel fuit semper significat verum vel
falsum: quod non contingit in obliquis. Signanter autem inducit exemplum de
verbo substantivo: quia sunt quaedam alia verba, scilicet impersonalia, quae
cum obliquis significant verum vel falsum; ut cum dicitur, poenitet Socratem,
quia actus verbi intelligitur ferri super obliquum; ac si diceretur, poenitentia
habet Socratem. Then he says, The definition of these is the same in all other
respects as that of the name itself, etc. Here Aristotle shows how oblique
cases are related to the name. The definition, as it signifies the name, is the
same in the others, namely, in the cases of the name. But they differ in this
respect: the name joined to the verb "is” or "will be” or "has
been” always signifies the true or false; in oblique cases this is not so. It
is significant that the substantive verb is the one he uses as an example, for
there are other verbs, i.e., impersonal verbs, that do signify the true or
false when joined with a name in an oblique case, as in "It grieves
Socrates,” because the act of the verb is understood to be carried over to the
oblique cases, as though what were said were, "Grief possesses Socrates.”
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 4 n. 16Sed contra: si nomen infinitum et casus non sunt
nomina, inconvenienter data est praemissa nominis definitio, quae istis
convenit. Sed dicendum, secundum Ammonium, quod supra communius definit nomen,
postmodum vero significationem nominis arctat subtrahendo haec a nomine. Vel
dicendum quod praemissa definitio non simpliciter convenit his: nomen enim
infinitum nihil determinatum significat, neque casus nominis significat
secundum primum placitum instituentis, ut dictum est. However, an objection
could be made against Aristotle’s position in this portion of his text. If the
infinite name and the cases of the name are not names, then the definition of
the name (which belongs to these) is not consistently presented. There are two
ways of answering this objection. We could say, as Ammonius does, that
Aristotle defines the name broadly, and afterward limits the signification of
the name by subtracting these from it. Or, we could say that the definition
Aristotle has given does not belong to these absolutely, since the infinite
name signifies nothing determinate, and the cases of the name do not signify
according to the first intent of the one instituting the name, as has been
said. V. 1. Postquam philosophus determinavit de nomine: hic determinat de
verbo. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, definit verbum; secundo, excludit quaedam
a ratione verbi; ibi: non currit autem, et non laborat etc.; tertio, ostendit
convenientiam verbi ad nomen; ibi: ipsa quidem secundum se dicta verba, et
cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ponit definitionem verbi; secundo
exponit eam; ibi: dico autem quoniam consignificat et cetera. After determining
the nature of the name the Philosopher now determines the nature of the verb.
First he defines the verb; secondly, he excludes certain forms of verbs from
the definition, where he says, "Non-matures” and "non-declines” I do
not call verbs, etc.; finally, he shows in what the verb and name agree where
he says, Verbs in themselves, said alone, are names, etc. First, then, he
defines the verb and immediately begins to explain the definition where he
says, I mean by "signifies with time,” etc. 2 Est autem considerandum quod
Aristoteles, brevitati studens, non ponit in definitione verbi ea quae sunt
nomini et verbo communia, relinquens ea intellectui legentis ex his quae
dixerat in definitione nominis. Ponit autem tres particulas in definitione
verbi: quarum prima distinguit verbum a nomine, in hoc scilicet quod dicit quod
consignificat tempus. Dictum est enim in definitione nominis quod nomen
significat sine tempore. Secunda vero particula est, per quam distinguitur
verbum ab oratione, scilicet cum dicitur: cuius pars nihil extra significat. In
order to be brief, Aristotle does not give what is common to the name and the
verb in the definition of the verb, but leaves this for the reader to
understand from the definition of the name. He posits three elements in the
definition of the verb. The first of these distinguishes the verb from the
name, for the verb signifies with time, the name without time, as was stated in
its definition. The second element, no part of which signifies separately,
distinguishes the verb from speech. 3 Sed cum hoc etiam positum sit in
definitione nominis, videtur hoc debuisse praetermitti, sicut et quod dictum
est, vox significativa ad placitum. Ad quod respondet Ammonius quod in definitione
nominis hoc positum est, ut distinguatur nomen ab orationibus, quae componuntur
ex nominibus; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal. Quia vero sunt etiam quaedam
orationes quae componuntur ex verbis; ut cum dicitur, ambulare est moveri, ut
ab his distinguatur verbum, oportuit hoc etiam in definitione verbi iterari.
Potest etiam aliter dici quod quia verbum importat compositionem, in qua
perficitur oratio verum vel falsum significans, maiorem convenientiam videbatur
verbum habere cum oratione, quasi quaedam pars formalis ipsius, quam nomen,
quod est quaedam pars materialis et subiectiva orationis; et ideo oportuit
iterari. This second element was also given in the definition of the name and
therefore it seems that this second element along with vocal sound significant
by convention, should have been omitted. Ammonius says in reply to this that
Aristotle posited this in the definition of the name to distinguish it from
speech which is composed of names, as in "Man is an animal”; but speech
may also be composed of verbs, as in "To walk is to move”; therefore, this
also bad to be repeated in the definition of the verb to distinguish it from
speech. We might also say that since the verb introduces the composition which
brings about speech signifying truth or falsity, the verb seems to be more like
speech (being a certain formal part of it) than the name which is a material
and subjective part of it; therefore this had to be repeated. 4 Tertia vero
particula est, per quam distinguitur verbum non solum a nomine, sed etiam a
participio quod significat cum tempore; unde dicit: et est semper eorum, quae
de altero praedicantur nota, idest signum: quia scilicet nomina et participia
possunt poni ex parte subiecti et praedicati, sed verbum semper est ex parte
praedicati. The third element distinguishes the verb not only from the name,
but also from the participle, which also signifies with time. He makes this
distinction when he says, and it is a sign of something said of something else,
i.e., names and participles can be posited on the part of the subject and the
predicate, but the verb is always posited on the part of the predicate. 5 Sed
hoc videtur habere instantiam in verbis infinitivi modi, quae interdum ponuntur
ex parte subiecti; ut cum dicitur, ambulare est moveri. Sed dicendum est quod
verba infinitivi modi, quando in subiecto ponuntur, habent vim nominis: unde et
in Graeco et in vulgari Latina locutione suscipiunt additionem articulorum
sicut et nomina. Cuius ratio est quia proprium nominis est, ut significet rem
aliquam quasi per se existentem; proprium autem verbi est, ut significet
actionem vel passionem. Potest autem actio significari tripliciter: uno modo,
per se in abstracto, velut quaedam res, et sic significatur per nomen; ut cum
dicitur actio, passio, ambulatio, cursus et similia; alio modo, per modum
actionis, ut scilicet est egrediens a substantia et inhaerens ei ut subiecto,
et sic significatur per verba aliorum modorum, quae attribuuntur praedicatis.
Sed quia etiam ipse processus vel inhaerentia actionis potest apprehendi ab
intellectu et significari ut res quaedam, inde est quod ipsa verba infinitivi
modi, quae significant ipsam inhaerentiam actionis ad subiectum, possunt accipi
ut verba, ratione concretionis, et ut nomina prout significant quasi res
quasdam. But it seems that verbs are used as subjects. The verb in the
infinitive mode is an instance of this, as in the example, "To walk is to
be moving.” Verbs of the infinitive mode, however, have the force of names when
they are used as subjects. (Hence in both Greek and ordinary Latin usage
articles are added to them as in the case of names.) The reason for this is
that it is proper to the name to signify something as existing per se, but
proper to the verb to signify action or passion. Now there are three ways of
signifying action or passion. It can be signified per se, as a certain thing in
the abstract and is thus signified by a name such as "action,”
"passion,” "walking,” "running,” and so on. It can also be
signified in the mode of an action, i.e., as proceeding from a substance and
inhering in it as in a subject; in this way action or passion is signified by
the verbs of the different modes attributed to predicates. Finally—and this is
the third way in which action or passion can be signified—the very process or
inherence of action can be apprehended by the intellect and signified as a
thing. Verbs of the infinitive mode signify such inherence of action in a
subject and hence can be taken as verbs by reason of concretion, and as names
inasmuch as they signify as things. 6 Potest etiam obiici de hoc quod etiam
verba aliorum modorum videntur aliquando in subiecto poni; ut cum dicitur,
curro est verbum. Sed dicendum est quod in tali locutione, hoc verbum curro,
non sumitur formaliter, secundum quod eius significatio refertur ad rem, sed
secundum quod materialiter significat ipsam vocem, quae accipitur ut res
quaedam. Et ideo tam verba, quam omnes orationis partes, quando ponuntur
materialiter, sumuntur in vi nominum. On this point the objection may also be
raised that verbs of other modes sometimes seem to be posited as subjects; for
example when we say, "‘Matures’is a verb.” In such a statement, however,
the verb "matures” is not taken formally according as its signification is
referred to a thing, but as it signifies the vocal sound itself materially,
which vocal sound is taken as a thing. When posited in this way, i.e.,
materially, verbs and all parts of speech are taken with the force of names. 7 Deinde cum dicit: dico vero quoniam
consignificat etc., exponit definitionem positam. Et primo, quantum ad hoc quod
dixerat quod consignificat tempus; secundo, quantum ad hoc quod dixerat quod
est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur, cum dicit: et semper est et cetera.
Secundam autem particulam, scilicet: cuius nulla pars extra significat, non
exponit, quia supra exposita est in tractatu nominis. Exponit ergo primum quod
verbum consignificat tempus, per exemplum; quia videlicet cursus, quia
significat actionem non per modum actionis, sed per modum rei per se existentis,
non consignificat tempus, eo quod est nomen. Curro vero cum sit verbum
significans actionem, consignificat tempus, quia proprium est motus tempore
mensurari; actiones autem nobis notae sunt in tempore. Dictum est autem supra
quod consignificare tempus est significare aliquid in tempore mensuratum. Unde
aliud est significare tempus principaliter, ut rem quamdam, quod potest nomini
convenire, aliud autem est significare cum tempore, quod non convenit nomini,
sed verbo. Then he says, I mean by "signifies with time” that
"maturity,” for example, is a name, but "matures” is a verb, etc.”’
With this he begins to explain the definition of the verb: first in regard to
signifies with time; secondly, in regard to the verb being a sign of something
said of something else. He does not explain the second part, no part of which
signifies separately, because an explanation of it has already been made in
connection with the name. First, he shows by an example that the verb signifies
with time. "Maturity,” for example, because it signifies action, not in
the mode of action but. in the mode of a thing existing per se, does not
signify with time, for it is a name. But "matures,” since it is a verb
signifying action, signifies with time, because to be measured by time is proper
to motion; moreover, actions are known by us in time. We have already mentioned
that to signify with time is to signify something measured in time. Hence it is
one thing to signify time principally, as a thing, which is appropriate to the
name; however, it is another thing to signify with time, which is not proper to
the name but to the verb. 8 Deinde cum dicit: et est semper etc., exponit aliam
particulam. Ubi notandum est quod quia subiectum enunciationis significatur ut
cui inhaeret aliquid, cum verbum significet actionem per modum actionis, de
cuius ratione est ut inhaereat, semper ponitur ex parte praedicati, nunquam
autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in vi nominis, ut dictum est. Dicitur
ergo verbum semper esse nota eorum quae dicuntur de altero: tum quia verbum
semper significat id, quod praedicatur; tum quia in omni praedicatione oportet
esse verbum, eo quod verbum importat compositionem, qua praedicatum componitur
subiecto. Then he says, Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something that belongs
to something, i.e., of something present in a subject. Here he explains the
last part of the definition of the verb. It should be noted first that the
subject of an enunciation signifies as that in which something inheres. Hence,
when the verb signifies action through the mode of action (the nature of which
is to inhere) it is always posited on the part of the predicate and never on
the part of the subject—unless it is taken with the force of a name, as was
said. The verb, therefore, is always said to be a sign of something said of
another, and this not only because the verb always signifies that which is
predicated but also because there must be a verb in every predication, for the
verb introduces the composition by which the predicate is united with the
subject. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 5 n. 9Sed dubium videtur quod subditur: ut eorum
quae de subiecto vel in subiecto sunt. Videtur enim aliquid dici ut de
subiecto, quod essentialiter praedicatur; ut, homo est animal; in subiecto
autem, sicut accidens de subiecto praedicatur; ut, homo est albus. Si ergo
verba significant actionem vel passionem, quae sunt accidentia, consequens est
ut semper significent ea, quae dicuntur ut in subiecto. Frustra igitur dicitur
in subiecto vel de subiecto. Et ad hoc dicit Boethius quod utrumque ad idem
pertinet. Accidens enim et de subiecto praedicatur, et in subiecto est. Sed
quia Aristoteles disiunctione utitur, videtur aliud per utrumque significare.
Et ideo potest dici quod cum Aristoteles dicit quod, verbum semper est nota eorum,
quae de altero praedicantur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi significata
verborum sint quae praedicantur, quia cum praedicatio videatur magis proprie ad
compositionem pertinere, ipsa verba sunt quae praedicantur, magis quam
significent praedicata. Est ergo intelligendum quod verbum semper est signum
quod aliqua praedicentur, quia omnis praedicatio fit per verbum ratione
compositionis importatae, sive praedicetur aliquid essentialiter sive
accidentaliter. The last phrase of this portion of the text presents a
difficulty, namely, "of something belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in
a subject.” For it seems that something is said of a subject when it is
predicated essentially, as in "Man is an animal”; but in a subject, when
it is an accident that is predicated of a subject, as in "Man is white.”
But if verbs signify action or passion (which are accidents), it follows that
they always signify what is in a subject. It is useless, therefore, to say
"belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in a subject.” In answer to this
Boethius says that both pertain to the same thing, for an accident is
predicated of a subject and is also in a subject. Aristotle, however, uses a
disjunction, which seems to indicate that he means something different by each.
Therefore it could be said in reply to this that when Aristotle says the verb
is always a sign of those things that are predicated of another” it is not to
be understood as though the things signified by verbs are predicated. For
predication seems to pertain more properly to composition; therefore, the verbs
themselves are what are predicated, rather than signify predicates.” The verb,
then, is always a sign that something is being predicated because all
predication is made through the verb by reason of the composition introduced,
whether what is being predicated is predicated essentially or accidentally.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 5 n. 10Deinde cum dicit: non currit vero et non laborat etc.,
excludit quaedam a ratione verbi. Et primo, verbum infinitum; secundo, verba
praeteriti temporis vel futuri; ibi: similiter autem curret vel currebat. Dicit
ergo primo quod non currit, et non laborat, non proprie dicitur verbum. Est
enim proprium verbi significare aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis; quod
praedictae dictiones non faciunt: removent enim actionem vel passionem, potius
quam aliquam determinatam actionem vel passionem significent. Sed quamvis non
proprie possint dici verbum, tamen conveniunt sibi ea quae supra posita sunt in
definitione verbi. Quorum primum est quod significat tempus, quia significat
agere et pati, quae sicut sunt in tempore, ita privatio eorum; unde et quies
tempore mensuratur, ut habetur in VI physicorum. Secundum est quod semper
ponitur ex parte praedicati, sicut et verbum: et hoc ideo, quia negatio
reducitur ad genus affirmationis. Unde sicut verbum quod significat actionem
vel passionem, significat aliquid ut in altero existens, ita praedictae
dictiones significant remotionem actionis vel passionis. When he says,
"Non-matures” and "non-declines” I do not call verbs, etc., he
excludes certain forms of verbs from the definition of the verb. And first he
excludes the infinite verb, then the verbs of past and future time.
"Non-matures” and "non-declines” cannot strictly speaking be called
verbs for it is proper to the verb to signify something in the mode of action
or passion. But these words remove action or passion rather than signify a
determinate action or passion. Now while they cannot properly be called verbs,
all the parts of the definition of the verb apply to them. First of all the
verb signifies time, because it signifies to act or to be acted upon; and since
these are in time so are their privations; whence rest, too, is measured by
time, as is said in VI Physicorum [3:234a 24–234b 9; & 8: 238a 23–239b 41].
Again, the infinite verb is always posited on the part of the predicate just as
the verb is; the reason is that negation is reduced to the genus of
affirmation. Hence, just as the verb, which signifies action or passion,
signifies something as existing in another, so the foresaid words signify the
remotion of action or passion. 11 Si quis autem obiiciat: si praedictis
dictionibus convenit definitio verbi; ergo sunt verba; dicendum est quod
definitio verbi supra posita datur de verbo communiter sumpto. Huiusmodi autem
dictiones negantur esse verba, quia deficiunt a perfecta ratione verbi. Nec
ante Aristotelem erat nomen positum huic generi dictionum a verbis
differentium; sed quia huiusmodi dictiones in aliquo cum verbis conveniunt,
deficiunt tamen a determinata ratione verbi, ideo vocat ea verba infinita. Et
rationem nominis assignat, quia unumquodque eorum indifferenter potest dici de
eo quod est, vel de eo quod non est. Sumitur enim negatio apposita non in vi
privationis, sed in vi simplicis negationis. Privatio enim supponit
determinatum subiectum. Differunt tamen huiusmodi verba a verbis negativis,
quia verba infinita sumuntur in vi unius dictionis, verba vero negativa in vi
duarum dictionum. Now someone might object that if the definition of the verb
applies to the above words, then they are verbs. In answer to this it should be
pointed out that the definition which has been given of the verb is the
definition of it taken commonly. Insofar as these words fall short of the
perfect notion of the verb, they are not called verbs. Before Aristotle’s time
a name bad not been imposed for a word that differs from verbs as these do. He
calls them infinite verbs because such words agree in some things with verbs
and yet fall short of the determinate notion of the verb. The reason for the
name, he says, is that an infinite verb can be said indifferently of what is or
what is not; for the adjoined negation is taken, not with the force of
privation, but with the force of simple negation since privation supposes a
determinate subject. Infinite verbs do differ from negative verbs, however, for
infinite verbs are taken with the force of one word, negative verbs with the
force of two. 12 Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem curret etc., excludit a
verbo verba praeteriti et futuri temporis; et dicit quod sicut verba infinita
non sunt simpliciter verba, ita etiam curret, quod est futuri temporis, vel
currebat, quod est praeteriti temporis, non sunt verba, sed sunt casus verbi.
Et differunt in hoc a verbo, quia verbum consignificat praesens tempus, illa
vero significant tempus hinc et inde circumstans. Dicit autem signanter
praesens tempus, et non simpliciter praesens, ne intelligatur praesens
indivisibile, quod est instans: quia in instanti non est motus, nec actio aut
passio; sed oportet accipere praesens tempus quod mensurat actionem, quae
incepit, et nondum est determinata per actum. Recte autem ea quae
consignificant tempus praeteritum vel futurum, non sunt verba proprie dicta:
cum enim verbum proprie sit quod significat agere vel pati, hoc est proprie
verbum quod significat agere vel pati in actu, quod est agere vel pati
simpliciter: sed agere vel pati in praeterito vel futuro est secundum quid. When
he says, Likewise, "has matured” and "will mature” are not verbs, but
modes of verbs, etc., he excludes verbs of past and future time from the
definition. For just as infinite verbs are not verbs absolutely, so "will
mature,” which is of future time, and "has matured,” of past time, are not
verbs. They are cases of the verb and differ from the verb—which signifies with
present time—by signifying time before and after the present. Aristotle
expressly says "present time” and not just "present” because he does
not mean here the indivisible present which is the instant; for in the instant
there is neither movement, nor action, nor passion. Present time is to be taken
as the time that measures action which has begun and has not yet been
terminated in act. Accordingly, verbs that signify with past or future time are
not verbs in the proper sense of the term, for the verb is that which signifies
to act or to be acted upon and therefore strictly speaking signifies to act or
to be acted upon in act, which is to act or to be acted upon simply, whereas to
act or to be acted upon in past or future time is relative. 13 Dicuntur etiam
verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis rationabiliter casus verbi, quod
consignificat praesens tempus; quia praeteritum vel futurum dicitur per
respectum ad praesens. Est enim praeteritum quod fuit praesens, futurum autem
quod erit praesens. It is with reason that verbs of past or future time are
called cases of the verb signifying with present time, for past or future are
said with respect to the present, the past being that which was present, the
future, that which will be present. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 5 n. 14Cum autem
declinatio verbi varietur per modos, tempora, numeros et personas, variatio
quae fit per numerum et personam non constituit casus verbi: quia talis
variatio non est ex parte actionis, sed ex parte subiecti; sed variatio quae
est per modos et tempora respicit ipsam actionem, et ideo utraque constituit
casus verbi. Nam verba imperativi vel optativi modi casus dicuntur, sicut et
verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis. Sed verba indicativi modi praesentis temporis
non dicuntur casus, cuiuscumque sint personae vel numeri. Although the
inflection of the verb is varied by mode, time, number, and person, the
variations that are made in number and person do not constitute cases of the
verb, the reason being that such variation is on the part of the subject, not
on the part of the action. But variation in mode and time refers to the action
itself and hence both of these constitute cases of the verb. For verbs of the
imperative or optative modes are called cases as well as verbs of past or
future time. Verbs of the indicative mode in present time, however, are not
called cases, whatever their person and number. 15 Deinde cum dicit: ipsa
itaque etc., ostendit convenientiam verborum ad nomina. Et circa hoc duo facit:
primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: et
significant aliquid et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ipsa verba secundum se
dicta sunt nomina: quod a quibusdam exponitur de verbis quae sumuntur in vi
nominis, ut dictum est, sive sint infinitivi modi; ut cum dico, currere est
moveri, sive sint alterius modi; ut cum dico, curro est verbum. Sed haec non
videtur esse intentio Aristotelis, quia ad hanc intentionem non respondent
sequentia. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod nomen hic sumitur, prout communiter
significat quamlibet dictionem impositam ad significandum aliquam rem. Et quia
etiam ipsum agere vel pati est quaedam res, inde est quod et ipsa verba in
quantum nominant, idest significant agere vel pati, sub nominibus
comprehenduntur communiter acceptis. Nomen autem, prout a verbo distinguitur,
significat rem sub determinato modo, prout scilicet potest intelligi ut per se
existens. Unde nomina possunt subiici et praedicari. He points out the
conformity between verbs and names where he says, Verbs in themselves, said
alone, are names. He proposes this first and then manifests it. He says then,
first, that verbs said by themselves are names. Some have taken this to mean
the verbs that are taken with the force of names, either verbs of the infinitive
mode, as in "To run is to be moving,” or verbs of another mode, as in
"‘Matures’ is a verb.” But this does not seem to be what Aristotle means,
for it does not correspond to what he says next. Therefore "name” must be
taken in another way here, i.e., as it commonly signifies any word whatever
that is imposed to signify a thing. Now, since to act or to be acted upon is
also a certain thing, verbs themselves as they name, i.e., as they signify to
act or to be acted upon, are comprehended under names taken commonly. The name
as distinguished from the verb signifies the thing under a determinate mode,
i.e., according as the thing can be understood as existing per se. This is the
reason names can be subjected and predicated. 6 Deinde cum dicit: et significant
aliquid etc., probat propositum. Et primo, per hoc quod verba significant
aliquid, sicut et nomina; secundo, per hoc quod non significant verum vel
falsum, sicut nec nomina; ibi: sed si est, aut non est et cetera. Dicit ergo
primo quod in tantum dictum est quod verba sunt nomina, in quantum significant
aliquid. Et hoc probat, quia supra dictum est quod voces significativae
significant intellectus. Unde proprium vocis significativae est quod generet
aliquem intellectum in animo audientis. Et ideo ad ostendendum quod verbum sit
vox significativa, assumit quod ille, qui dicit verbum, constituit intellectum
in animo audientis. Et ad hoc manifestandum inducit quod ille, qui audit,
quiescit. He proves the point he has just made when he says, and signify something,
etc., first by showing that verbs, like names, signify something; then by
showing that, like names, they do not signify truth or falsity when he says,
for the verb is not a sign of the being or nonbeing of a thing. He says first
that verbs have been said to be names only insofar as they signify a thing.
Then he proves this: it has already been said that significant vocal sound
signifies thought; hence it is proper to significant vocal sound to produce
something understood in the mind of the one who hears it. To show, then, that a
verb is significant vocal sound he assumes that the one who utters a verb
brings about understanding in the mind of the one who bears it. The evidence he
introduces for this is that the mind of the one who bears it is set at rest. 17
Sed hoc videtur esse falsum: quia sola oratio perfecta facit quiescere
intellectum, non autem nomen, neque verbum si per se dicatur. Si enim dicam,
homo, suspensus est animus audientis, quid de eo dicere velim; si autem dico,
currit, suspensus est eius animus de quo dicam. Sed dicendum est quod cum
duplex sit intellectus operatio, ut supra habitum est, ille qui dicit nomen vel
verbum secundum se, constituit intellectum quantum ad primam operationem, quae
est simplex conceptio alicuius, et secundum hoc, quiescit audiens, qui in
suspenso erat antequam nomen vel verbum proferretur et eius prolatio
terminaretur; non autem constituit intellectum quantum ad secundam operationem,
quae est intellectus componentis et dividentis, ipsum verbum vel nomen per se dictum:
nec quantum ad hoc facit quiescere audientem. But what Aristotle says here
seems to be false, for it is only perfect speech that makes the intellect rest.
The name or the verb, if said by themselves, do not do this. For example, if I
say "man,” the mind of the hearer is left in suspense as to what I wish to
say about mail; and if I say "runs,” the bearer’s mind is left in suspense
as to whom I am speaking of. It should be said in answer to this objection that
the operation of the intellect is twofold, as was said above, and therefore the
one who utters a name or a verb by itself, determines the intellect with
respect to the first operation, which is the simple conception of something. It
is in relation to this that the one hearing, whose mind was undetermined before
the name or the verb was being uttered and its utterance terminated, is set at
rest. Neither the name nor the verb said by itself, however, determines the
intellect in respect to the second operation, which is the operation of the
intellect composing and dividing; nor do the verb or the name said alone set
the hearer’s mind at rest in respect to this operation. 18 Et ideo statim
subdit: sed si est, aut non est, nondum significat, idest nondum significat
aliquid per modum compositionis et divisionis, aut veri vel falsi. Et hoc est
secundum, quod probare intendit. Probat autem consequenter per illa verba, quae
maxime videntur significare veritatem vel falsitatem, scilicet ipsum verbum
quod est esse, et verbum infinitum quod est non esse; quorum neutrum per se
dictum est significativum veritatis vel falsitatis in re; unde multo minus
alia. Vel potest intelligi hoc generaliter dici de omnibus verbis. Quia enim
dixerat quod verbum non significat si est res vel non est, hoc consequenter
manifestat, quia nullum verbum est significativum esse rei vel non esse, idest
quod res sit vel non sit. Quamvis enim omne verbum finitum implicet esse, quia
currere est currentem esse, et omne verbum infinitum implicet non esse, quia
non currere est non currentem esse; tamen nullum verbum significat hoc totum,
scilicet rem esse vel non esse. Aristotle therefore immediately adds, but they
do not yet signify whether a thing is or is not, i.e., they do not yet signify
something by way of composition and division, or by way of truth or falsity.
This is the second thing he intends to prove, and he proves it by the verbs
that especially seem to signify truth or falsity, namely the verb to be and the
infinite verb to non-be, neither of which, said by itself, signifies real truth
or falsity; much less so any other verbs. This could also be understood in a
more general way, i.e., that here he is speaking of all verbs; for he says that
the verb does not signify whether a thing is or is not; he manifests this
further, therefore, by saying that no verb is significative of a thing’s being
or non-being, i.e., that a thing is or is not. For although every finite verb
implies being, for "to run” is "to be running,” and every infinite
verb implies nonbeing, for "to non-run” is "to be non-running,”
nevertheless no verb signifies the whole, i.e., a thing is or a thing is not. 19
Et hoc consequenter probat per id, de quo magis videtur cum subdit: nec si hoc
ipsum est purum dixeris, ipsum quidem nihil est. Ubi notandum est quod in
Graeco habetur: neque si ens ipsum nudum dixeris, ipsum quidem nihil est. Ad
probandum enim quod verba non significant rem esse vel non esse, assumpsit id
quod est fons et origo ipsius esse, scilicet ipsum ens, de quo dicit quod nihil
est (ut Alexander exponit), quia ens aequivoce dicitur de decem praedicamentis;
omne autem aequivocum per se positum nihil significat, nisi aliquid addatur
quod determinet eius significationem; unde nec ipsum est per se dictum
significat quod est vel non est. Sed haec expositio non videtur conveniens, tum
quia ens non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed secundum prius et posterius; unde
simpliciter dictum intelligitur de eo, quod per prius dicitur: tum etiam, quia
dictio aequivoca non nihil significat, sed multa significat; et quandoque hoc, quandoque
illud per ipsam accipitur: tum etiam, quia talis expositio non multum facit ad
intentionem praesentem. Unde Porphyrius aliter exposuit quod hoc ipsum ens non
significat naturam alicuius rei, sicut hoc nomen homo vel sapiens, sed solum
designat quamdam coniunctionem; unde subdit quod consignificat quamdam
compositionem, quam sine compositis non est intelligere. Sed neque hoc
convenienter videtur dici: quia si non significaret aliquam rem, sed solum
coniunctionem, non esset neque nomen, neque verbum, sicut nec praepositiones
aut coniunctiones. Et ideo aliter exponendum est, sicut Ammonius exponit, quod
ipsum ens nihil est, idest non significat verum vel falsum. Et rationem huius
assignat, cum subdit: consignificat autem quamdam compositionem. Nec accipitur
hic, ut ipse dicit, consignificat, sicut cum dicebatur quod verbum
consignificat tempus, sed consignificat, idest cum alio significat, scilicet
alii adiunctum compositionem significat, quae non potest intelligi sine
extremis compositionis. Sed quia hoc commune est omnibus nominibus et verbis,
non videtur haec expositio esse secundum intentionem Aristotelis, qui assumpsit
ipsum ens quasi quoddam speciale. He proves this point from something in which
it will be clearer when he adds, Nor would it be a sign of the being or
nonbeing of a thing if you were to say "is” alone, for it is nothing. It
should be noted that the Greek text has the word "being” in place of
"is” here. In order to prove that verbs do not signify that a thing is or
is not, he takes the source and origin of to be [esse], i.e., being [ens]
itself, of which he says, it is nothing. Alexander explains this passage in the
following way: Aristotle says being itself is nothing because "being”
[ens] is said equivocally of the ten predicaments; now an equivocal name used
by itself signifies nothing unless something is added to determine its
signification; hence, "is” [est] said by itself does not signify what is
or is not. But this explanation is not appropriate for this text. In the first place
"being” is not, strictly speaking, said equivocally but according to the
prior and posterior. Consequently, said absolutely, it is understood of that of
which it is said primarily. Secondly, an equivocal word does not signify
nothing, but many things, sometimes being taken for one, sometimes for another.
Thirdly, such an explanation does not have much application here. Porphyry
explains this passage in another way. He says that "being” [ens] itself
does not signify the nature of a thing as the name "man” or "wise”
do, but only designates a certain conjunction and this is why Aristotle adds,
it signifies with a composition, which cannot be conceived apart from the
things composing it. This explanation does not seem to be consistent with the
text either, for if "being” itself does not signify a thing, but only a
conjunction, it, like prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a name nor a
verb. Therefore Ammonius thought this should be explained in another way. He
says "being itself is nothing” means that it does not signify truth or
falsity. And the reason for this is given when Aristotle says, it signifies
with a composition. The "signifies with,” according to Ammonius, does not
mean what it does when it is said that the verb signifies with time; "signifies
with,” means here signifies with something, i.e., joined to another it
signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the
composition. But this explanation does not seem to be in accordance with the
intention of Aristotle, for it is common to all names and verbs not to signify
truth or falsity, whereas Aristotle takes "being” here as though it were
something special. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 5 n. 20 Et ideo ut magis sequamur verba
Aristotelis considerandum est quod ipse dixerat quod verbum non significat rem
esse vel non esse, sed nec ipsum ens significat rem esse vel non esse. Et hoc
est quod dicit, nihil est, idest non significat aliquid esse. Etenim hoc maxime
videbatur de hoc quod dico ens: quia ens nihil est aliud quam quod est. Et sic
videtur et rem significare, per hoc quod dico quod et esse, per hoc quod dico
est. Et si quidem haec dictio ens significaret esse principaliter, sicut
significat rem quae habet esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse. Sed
ipsam compositionem, quae importatur in hoc quod dico est, non principaliter
significat, sed consignificat eam in quantum significat rem habentem esse. Unde
talis consignificatio compositionis non sufficit ad veritatem vel falsitatem:
quia compositio, in qua consistit veritas et falsitas, non potest intelligi,
nisi secundum quod innectit extrema compositionis. Therefore in order to
understand what Aristotle is saying we should note that he has just said that
the verb does not signify that a thing exists or does not exist [rem esse vel non
esse]; nor does "being” [ens] signify that a thing exists or does not
exist. This is what he means when he says, it is nothing, i.e., it does not
signify that a thing exists. This is indeed most clearly seen in saying
"being” [ens], because being is nothing other than that which is. And thus
we see that it signifies both a thing, when I say "that which,” and
existence [esse] when I say "is” [est]. If the word "being” [ens] as
signifying a thing having existence were to signify existence [esse] principally,
without a doubt it would signify that a thing exists. But the word "being”
[ens] does not principally signify the composition that is implied in saying
"is” [est]; rather, it signifies with composition inasmuch as it signifies
the thing having existence. Such signifying with composition is not sufficient
for truth or falsity; for the composition in which truth and falsity consists
cannot be understood unless it connects the extremes of a composition. 21 Si
vero dicatur, nec ipsum esse, ut libri nostri habent, planior est sensus. Quod
enim nullum verbum significat rem esse vel non esse, probat per hoc verbum est,
quod secundum se dictum, non significat aliquid esse, licet significet esse. Et
quia hoc ipsum esse videtur compositio quaedam, et ita hoc verbum est, quod
significat esse, potest videri significare compositionem, in qua sit verum vel
falsum; ad hoc excludendum subdit quod illa compositio, quam significat hoc
verbum est, non potest intelligi sine componentibus: quia dependet eius
intellectus ab extremis, quae si non apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus
compositionis, ut possit in ea esse verum, vel falsum. If in place of what
Aristotle says we say nor would "to be” itself [nec ipsum esse], as it is
in our texts, the meaning is clearer. For Aristotle proves through the verb
"is” [est] that no verb signifies that a thing exists or does not exist,
since "is” said by itself does not signify that a thing exists, although
it signifies existence. And because to be itself seems to be a kind of
composition, so also the verb "is” [est], which signifies to be, can seem
to signify the composition in which there is truth or falsity. To exclude this
Aristotle adds that the composition which the verb "is” signifies cannot
be understood without the composing things. The reason for this is that an
understanding of the composition which "is” signifies depends on the
extremes, and unless they are added, understanding of the composition is not
complete and hence cannot be true or false. 22 Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum
est consignificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex
consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum
actualitatis absolute: nam est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et
ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter
significat hoc verbum est, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus
substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare
quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus
illud per hoc verbum est, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem
secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex
consequenti hoc verbum est significat compositionem. Therefore he says that the
verb "is” signifies with composition; for it does not signify composition
principally but consequently. it primarily signifies that which is perceived in
the mode of actuality absolutely; for "is” said simply, signifies to be in
act, and therefore signifies in the mode of a verb. However, the actuality
which the verb "is” principally signifies is the actuality of every form
commonly, whether substantial or accidental. Hence, when we wish to signify
that any form or act is actually in some subject we signify it through the verb
"is,” either absolutely or relatively; absolutely, according to present
time, relatively, according to other times; and for this reason the verb
"is” signifies composition, not principally, but consequently. VI. 1. Postquam
philosophus determinavit de nomine et de verbo, quae sunt principia materialia
enunciationis, utpote partes eius existentes; nunc determinat de oratione, quae
est principium formale enunciationis, utpote genus eius existens. Et circa hoc
tria facit: primo enim, proponit definitionem orationis; secundo, exponit eam;
ibi: dico autem ut homo etc.; tertio, excludit errorem; ibi: est autem oratio
omnis et cetera. Having established and explained the definition of the name
and the verb, which are the material principles of the enunciation inasmuch as
they are its parts, the Philosopher now determines and explains what speech is,
which is the formal principle of the enunciation inasmuch as it is its genus.
First he proposes the definition of speech; then he explains it where he says,
Let me explain. The word "animal” signifies something, etc.; finally, he
excludes an error where he says, But all speech is significant—not just as an
instrument, however, etc. 2 Circa primum
considerandum est quod philosophus in definitione orationis primo ponit illud
in quo oratio convenit cum nomine et verbo, cum dicit: oratio est vox
significativa, quod etiam posuit in definitione nominis, et probavit de verbo
quod aliquid significet. Non autem posuit in eius definitione, quia supponebat
ex eo quod positum erat in definitione nominis, studens brevitati, ne idem
frequenter iteraret. Iterat tamen hoc in definitione orationis, quia
significatio orationis differt a significatione nominis et verbi, quia nomen
vel verbum significat simplicem intellectum, oratio vero significat intellectum
compositum. In defining speech the Philosopher first states what it has in
common with the name and verb where he says, Speech is significant vocal sound.
This was posited in the definition of the name but not repeated in the case of
the verb, because it was supposed from the definition of the name. This was
done for the sake of brevity and to avoid repetition; but subsequently he did
prove that the verb signifies something. He repeats this, however, in the definition
of speech because the signification of speech differs from that of the name and
the verb; for the name and the verb signify simple thought, whereas speech
signifies composite thought. 3 Secundo autem ponit id, in quo oratio differt a
nomine et verbo, cum dicit: cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatim.
Supra enim dictum est quod pars nominis non significat aliquid per se
separatum, sed solum quod est coniunctum ex duabus partibus. Signanter autem
non dicit: cuius pars est significativa aliquid separata, sed cuius aliquid
partium est significativum, propter negationes et alia syncategoremata, quae
secundum se non significant aliquid absolutum, sed solum habitudinem unius ad
alterum. Sed quia duplex est significatio vocis, una quae refertur ad
intellectum compositum, alia quae refertur ad intellectum simplicem; prima
significatio competit orationi, secunda non competit orationi, sed parti
orationis. Unde subdit: ut dictio, non ut affirmatio. Quasi dicat: pars
orationis est significativa, sicut dictio significat, puta ut nomen et verbum,
non sicut affirmatio, quae componitur ex nomine et verbo. Facit autem mentionem
solum de affirmatione et non de negatione, quia negatio secundum vocem
superaddit affirmationi; unde si pars orationis propter sui simplicitatem non
significat aliquid, ut affirmatio, multo minus ut negatio. Secondly, he posits
what differentiates speech from the name and verb when he says, of which some
of the parts are significant separately; for a part of a name taken separately
does not signify anything per se, except in the case of a name composed of two
parts, as he said above. Note that he says, of which some of the parts are
significant, and not, a part of which is significant separately; this is to
exclude negations and the other words used to unite categorical words, which do
not in themselves signify something absolutely, but only the relationship of
one thing to another. Then because the signification of vocal sound is twofold,
one being referred to composite thought, the other to simple thought (the first
belonging to speech, the second, not to speech but to a part of speech), he
adds, as words but not as an affirmation. What he means is that a part of
speech signifies in the way a word signifies, a name or a verb, for instance;
it does not signify in the way an affirmation signifies, which is composed of a
name and a verb. He only mentions affirmation because negation adds something
to affirmation as far as vocal sound is concerned for if a part of speech,
since it is simple, does not signify as an affirmation, it will not signify as
a negation. 4 Sed contra hanc definitionem Aspasius obiicit quod videtur non
omnibus partibus orationis convenire. Sunt enim quaedam orationes, quarum
partes significant aliquid ut affirmatio; ut puta, si sol lucet super terram,
dies est; et sic de multis. Et ad hoc respondet Porphyrius quod in quocumque
genere invenitur prius et posterius, debet definiri id quod prius est. Sicut
cum datur definitio alicuius speciei, puta hominis, intelligitur definitio de
eo quod est in actu, non de eo quod est in potentia; et ideo quia in genere
orationis prius est oratio simplex, inde est quod Aristoteles prius definivit
orationem simplicem. Vel potest dici, secundum Alexandrum et Ammonium, quod hic
definitur oratio in communi. Unde debet poni in hac definitione id quod est
commune orationi simplici et compositae. Habere autem partes significantes
aliquid ut affirmatio, competit soli orationi, compositae; sed habere partes
significantes aliquid per modum dictionis, et non per modum affirmationis, est
commune orationi simplici et compositae. Et ideo hoc debuit poni in definitione
orationis. Et secundum hoc non debet intelligi esse de ratione orationis quod
pars eius non sit affirmatio: sed quia de ratione orationis est quod pars eius
sit aliquid quod significat per modum dictionis, et non per modum
affirmationis. Et in idem redit solutio Porphyrii quantum ad sensum, licet
quantum ad verba parumper differat. Quia enim Aristoteles frequenter ponit
dicere pro affirmare, ne dictio pro affirmatione sumatur, subdit quod pars
orationis significat ut dictio, et addit non ut affirmatio: quasi diceret,
secundum sensum Porphyrii, non accipiatur nunc dictio secundum quod idem est
quod affirmatio. Philosophus autem, qui dicitur Ioannes grammaticus, voluit
quod haec definitio orationis daretur solum de oratione perfecta, eo quod
partes non videntur esse nisi alicuius perfecti, sicut omnes partes domus
referuntur ad domum: et ideo secundum ipsum sola oratio perfecta habet partes significativas.
Sed tamen hic decipiebatur, quia quamvis omnes partes referantur principaliter
ad totum perfectum, quaedam tamen partes referuntur ad ipsum immediate, sicut
paries et tectum ad domum, et membra organica ad animal: quaedam vero
mediantibus partibus principalibus quarum sunt partes; sicut lapides referuntur
ad domum mediante pariete; nervi autem et ossa ad animal mediantibus membris
organicis, scilicet manu et pede et huiusmodi. Sic ergo omnes partes orationis
principaliter referuntur ad orationem perfectam, cuius pars est oratio
imperfecta, quae etiam ipsa habet partes significantes. Unde ista definitio
convenit tam orationi perfectae, quam imperfectae. Aspasius objects to this
definition because it does not seem to belong to all parts of speech. There is
a kind of speech he says, in which some of the parts signify as an affirmation;
for instance, "If the sun shines over the earth, it is day,” and so in
many other examples. Porphyry says in reply to this objection that in whatever
genus there is something prior and posterior, it is the prior thing that has to
be defined. For example, when we give the definition of a species—say, of
man—the definition is understood of that which is in act, not of that which is
in potency. Since, then, in the genus of speech, simple speech is prior,
Aristotle defines it first. Or, we can answer the objection in the way
Alexander and Ammonious do. They say that speech is defined here commonly.
Hence what is common to simple and composite speech ought to be stated in the
definition. Now to have parts signifying something as an affirmation belongs
only to composite speech, but to have parts signifying something in the mode of
a word and not in the mode of an affirmation is common to simple and composite
speech. Therefore this had to be posited in the definition of speech. We should
not conclude, however, that it is of the nature of speech that its part not be
an affirmation, but rather that it is of the nature of speech that its parts be
something that signify in the manner of words and not in the manner of an
affirmation. Porphyry’s solution reduces to the same thing as far as meaning is
concerned, although it is a little different verbally. Aristotle frequently
uses "to say” for "to affirm,” and hence to prevent "word” from
being taken as "affirmation” when he says that a part of speech signifies
as a word, he immediately adds, not as an affirmation, meaning—according to
Porphyry’s view—"word” is not taken here in the sense in which it is the
same as "affirmation.” A philosopher called John the Grammarian thought
that this definition could only apply to perfect speech because there only seem
to be parts in the case of something perfect, or complete; for example, a house
to which all of the parts are referred. Therefore only perfect speech has
significant parts. He was in error on this point, however, for while it is true
that all the parts are referred principally to the perfect, or complete whole,
some parts are referred to it immediately, for example, the walls and roof to a
house and organic members to an animal; others, however, are referred to it
through the principal parts of which they are parts; stones, for example, to
the house by the mediate wall, and nerves and bones to the animal by the
mediate organic members like the hand and the foot, etc. In the case of speech,
therefore, all of the parts are principally referred to perfect speech, a part
of which is imperfect speech, which also has significant parts. Hence this
definition belongs both to perfect and to imperfect speech. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 6
n. 5Deinde cum dicit: dico autem ut homo etc., exponit propositam definitionem.
Et primo, manifestat verum esse quod dicitur; secundo, excludit falsum
intellectum; ibi: sed non una hominis syllaba et cetera. Exponit ergo quod
dixerat aliquid partium orationis esse significativum, sicut hoc nomen homo,
quod est pars orationis, significat aliquid, sed non significat ut affirmatio
aut negatio, quia non significat esse vel non esse. Et hoc dico non in actu,
sed solum in potentia. Potest enim aliquid addi, per cuius additionem fit
affirmatio vel negatio, scilicet si addatur ei verbum. When he says, Let me
explain. The word "animal” signifies something, etc., he elucidates the
definition. First he shows that what he says is true; secondly, he excludes a
false understanding of it where he says, But one syllable of "animal” does
not signify anything, etc. He explains that when he says some parts of speech
are significant, he means that some of the parts signify something in the way the
name "animal,” which is a part of speech, signifies something and yet does
not signify as an affirmation or negation, because it does not signify to be or
not to be. By this I mean it does not signify affirmation or negation in act,
but only in potency; for it is possible to add something that will make it an
affirmation or negation, i.e., a verb. 6 Deinde cum dicit: sed non una hominis
etc., excludit falsum intellectum. Et posset hoc referri ad immediate dictum,
ut sit sensus quod nomen erit affirmatio vel negatio, si quid ei addatur, sed
non si addatur ei una nominis syllaba. Sed quia huic sensui non conveniunt
verba sequentia, oportet quod referatur ad id, quod supra dictum est in
definitione orationis, scilicet quod aliquid partium eius sit significativum
separatim. Sed quia pars alicuius totius dicitur proprie illud, quod immediate
venit ad constitutionem totius, non autem pars partis; ideo hoc intelligendum
est de partibus ex quibus immediate constituitur oratio, scilicet de nomine et
verbo, non autem de partibus nominis vel verbi, quae sunt syllabae vel
litterae. Et ideo dicitur quod pars orationis est significativa separata, non
tamen talis pars, quae est una nominis syllaba. Et hoc manifestat in syllabis,
quae quandoque possunt esse dictiones per se significantes: sicut hoc quod dico
rex, quandoque est una dictio per se significans; in quantum vero accipitur ut
una quaedam syllaba huius nominis sorex, soricis, non significat aliquid per
se, sed est vox sola. Dictio enim quaedam est composita ex pluribus vocibus,
tamen in significando habet simplicitatem, in quantum scilicet significat
simplicem intellectum. Et ideo in quantum est vox composita, potest habere
partem quae sit vox, inquantum autem est simplex in significando, non potest
habere partem significantem. Unde syllabae quidem sunt voces, sed non sunt
voces per se significantes. Sciendum tamen quod in nominibus compositis, quae
imponuntur ad significandum rem simplicem ex aliquo intellectu composito,
partes secundum apparentiam aliquid significant, licet non secundum veritatem.
Et ideo subdit quod in duplicibus, idest in nominibus compositis, syllabae quae
possunt esse dictiones, in compositione nominis venientes, significant aliquid,
scilicet in ipso composito et secundum quod sunt dictiones; non autem
significant aliquid secundum se, prout sunt huiusmodi nominis partes, sed eo modo,
sicut supra dictum est. He excludes a false understanding of what has been said
by his next statement. But one syllable of "animal” does not signify
anything. This could be referred to what has just been said and the meaning
would be that the name will be an affirmation or negation if something is added
to it, but not if what is added is one syllable of a name. However, what he
says next is not compatible with this meaning and therefore these words should
be referred to what was stated earlier in defining speech, namely, to some
parts of which are significant separately. Now, since what is properly called a
part of a whole is that which contributes immediately to the formation of the
whole, and not that which is a part of a part, "some parts” should be
understood as the parts from which speech is immediately formed, i.e., the name
and verb, and not as parts of the name or verb, which are syllables or letters.
Hence, what is being said here is that a part of speech is significant
separately but not such a part as the syllable of a name. He manifests this by
means of syllables that sometimes can be words signifying per se. "Owl,”
for example, is sometimes one word signifying per se. When taken as a syllable
of the name "fowl,” however, it does not signify something per se but is
only a vocal sound. For a word is composed of many vocal sounds, but it has
simplicity in signifying insofar as it signifies simple thought. Hence, a word
inasmuch as it is a composite vocal sound can have a part which is a vocal
sound, but inasmuch as it is simple in signifying it cannot have a signifying
part. Whence syllables are indeed vocal sounds, but they are not vocal sounds
signifying per se. In contrast to this it should be noted that in composite
names, which are imposed to signify a simple thing from some composite
understanding, the parts appear to signify something, although according to
truth they do not. For this reason he adds that in compound words, i.e.,
composite names, the syllables may be words contributing to the composition of
a name, and therefore signify something, namely, in the composite, and
according as they are words; but as parts of this kind of name they do not
signify something per se, but in the way that has already been explained. 7 Deinde
cum dicit: est autem oratio etc., excludit quemdam errorem. Fuerunt enim aliqui
dicentes quod oratio et eius partes significant naturaliter, non ad placitum.
Ad probandum autem hoc utebantur tali ratione. Virtutis naturalis oportet esse
naturalia instrumenta: quia natura non deficit in necessariis; potentia autem
interpretativa est naturalis homini; ergo instrumenta eius sunt naturalia.
Instrumentum autem eius est oratio, quia per orationem virtus interpretativa
interpretatur mentis conceptum: hoc enim dicimus instrumentum, quo agens
operatur. Ergo oratio est aliquid naturale, non ex institutione humana significans,
sed naturaliter. Then he says, But all speech is significant—not just as an
instrument, however, etc. Here he excludes the error of those who said that
speech and its parts signify naturally rather than by convention. To prove
their point they used the following argument. The instruments of a natural
power must themselves be natural, for nature does not fail in regard to what is
necessary; but the interpretive power is natural to man; therefore, its
instruments are natural. Now the instrument of the interpretive power is speech
since it is through speech that expression is given to the conception of the
mind; for we mean by an instrument that by which an agent operates. Therefore,
speech is something natural, signifying, not from human institution, but
naturally. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 6 n. 8Huic autem rationi, quae dicitur esse
Platonis in Lib. qui intitulatur Cratylus, Aristoteles obviando dicit quod
omnis oratio est significativa, non sicut instrumentum virtutis, scilicet
naturalis: quia instrumenta naturalia virtutis interpretativae sunt guttur et
pulmo, quibus formatur vox, et lingua et dentes et labia, quibus litterati ac
articulati soni distinguuntur; oratio autem et partes eius sunt sicut effectus
virtutis interpretativae per instrumenta praedicta. Sicut enim virtus motiva utitur
naturalibus instrumentis, sicut brachiis et manibus ad faciendum opera
artificialia, ita virtus interpretativa utitur gutture et aliis instrumentis
naturalibus ad faciendum orationem. Unde oratio et partes eius non sunt res
naturales, sed quidam artificiales effectus. Et ideo subdit quod oratio
significat ad placitum, idest secundum institutionem humanae rationis et
voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, sicut et omnia artificialia causantur ex
humana voluntate et ratione. Sciendum tamen quod, si virtutem interpretativam
non attribuamus virtuti motivae, sed rationi; sic non est virtus naturalis, sed
supra omnem naturam corpoream: quia intellectus non est actus alicuius
corporis, sicut probatur in III de anima. Ipsa autem ratio est, quae movet
virtutem corporalem motivam ad opera artificialia, quibus etiam ut instrumentis
utitur ratio: non sunt autem instrumenta alicuius virtutis corporalis. Et hoc
modo ratio potest etiam uti oratione et eius partibus, quasi instrumentis:
quamvis non naturaliter significent. Aristotle refutes this argument, which is
said to be that of Plato in the Cratylus, when he says that all speech is
significant, but not as an instrument of a power, that is, of a natural power;
for the natural instruments of the interpretive power are the throat and lungs,
by which vocal sound is formed, and the tongue, teeth and lips by which letters
and articulate sounds are formulated. Rather, speech and its parts are effects
of the interpretative power through the aforesaid instruments. For just as the
motive power uses natural instruments such as arms and hands to make an
artificial work, so the interpretative power uses the throat and other natural
instruments to make speech. Hence, speech and its parts are not natural things,
but certain artificial effects. This is the reason Aristotle adds here that
speech signifies by convention, i.e., according to the ordinance of human will
and reason. It should be noted, however, that if we do not attribute the
interpretative power to a motive power, but to reason, then it is not a natural
power but is beyond every corporeal nature, since thought is not an act of the
body, as is proved in III De anima [4: 429a 10]. Moreover, it is reason itself
that moves the corporeal motive power to make artificial works, which reason
then uses as instruments; and thus artificial works are not instruments of a
corporeal power. Reason can also use speech and its parts in this way, i.e., as
instruments, although they do not signify naturally. VII. 1. Postquam
philosophus determinavit de principiis enunciationis, hic incipit determinare
de ipsa enunciatione. Et dividitur pars haec in duas: in prima, determinat de
enunciatione absolute; in secunda, de diversitate enunciationum, quae provenit
secundum ea quae simplici enunciationi adduntur; et hoc in secundo libro; ibi:
quoniam autem est de aliquo affirmatio et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in
partes tres. In prima, definit enunciationem; in secunda, dividit eam; ibi: est
autem una prima oratio etc., in tertia, agit de oppositione partium eius ad
invicem; ibi: quoniam autem est enunciare et cetera. Circa primum tria facit:
primo, ponit definitionem enunciationis; secundo, ostendit quod per hanc
definitionem differt enunciatio ab aliis speciebus orationis; ibi: non autem in
omnibus etc.; tertio, ostendit quod de sola enunciatione est tractandum, ibi:
et caeterae quidemrelinquantur. Having defined the principles of the
enunciation, the Philosopher now begins to treat the enunciation itself. This
is divided into two parts. In the first he examines the enunciation absolutely;
in the second the diversity of enunciations resulting from an addition to the
simple enunciation. The latter is treated in the second book, where he says,
Since an affirmation signifies something about a subject, etc.”’ The first
part, on the enunciation absolutely, is divided into three parts. In the first
he defines enunciation; in the second he divides it where he says, First
affirmation, then negation, is enunciative speech that is one, etc.;” in the
third he treats of the opposition of its parts to each other, where he says,
Since it is possible to enunciate that what belongs to a subject does not
belong to it, etc. In the portion of the text treated in this lesson, which is
concerned with the definition of enunciation, he first states the definition,
then shows that this definition differentiates the enunciation from other
species of speech, where he says, Truth and falsity is not present in all
speech however, etc., and finally indicates that only the enunciation is to be
treated in this book where he says, Let us therefore consider enunciative
speech, etc. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod oratio, quamvis non sit
instrumentum alicuius virtutis naturaliter operantis, est tamen instrumentum
rationis, ut supra dictum est. Omne autem instrumentum oportet definiri ex suo
fine, qui est usus instrumenti: usus autem orationis, sicut et omnis vocis
significativae est significare conceptionem intellectus, ut supra dictum est:
duae autem sunt operationes intellectus, in quarum una non invenitur veritas et
falsitas, in alia autem invenitur verum vel falsum. Et ideo orationem
enunciativam definit ex significatione veri et falsi, dicens quod non omnis
oratio est enunciativa, sed in qua verum vel falsum est. Ubi considerandum est
quod Aristoteles mirabili brevitate usus, et divisionem orationis innuit in hoc
quod dicit: non omnis oratio est enunciativa, et definitionem enunciationis in
hoc quod dicit: sed in qua verum vel falsum est: ut intelligatur quod haec sit
definitio enunciationis, enunciatio est oratio, in qua verum vel falsum est. The
point has just been made that speech, although it is not an instrument of a
power operating naturally, is nevertheless an instrument of reason. Now every
instrument is defined by its end, which is the use of the instrument. The use
of speech, as of every significant vocal sound, is to signify a conception of
the intellect. But there are two operations of the intellect. In one truth and
falsity is found, in the other not. Aristotle therefore defines enunciative
speech by the signification of the true and false: Yet not all speech is
enunciative; but only speech in which there is truth or falsity. Note with what
remarkable brevity he signifies the division of speech by Yet not all speech is
enunciative, and the definition by, but only speech in which there is truth or
falsity. This, then, is to be understood as the definition of the enunciation:
speech in which there is truth and falsity. 3 Dicitur autem in enunciatione
esse verum vel falsum, sicut in signo intellectus veri vel falsi: sed sicut in
subiecto est verum vel falsum in mente, ut dicitur in VI metaphysicae, in re
autem sicut in causa: quia ut dicitur in libro praedicamentorum, ab eo quod res
est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. True or false is said to be in the
enunciation as in a sign of true or false thought; but true or false is in the
mind as in a subject (as is said in VI Metaphysicae [1027b 17–1028a 5]), and in
the thing as in a cause (as is said in the book Predicamentorum [5: 4a 35–4b
9])—for it is from the facts of the case, i.e., from a thing’s being so or not
being so, that speech is true or false. 4 Deinde cum dicit: non autem in
omnibus etc., ostendit quod per hanc definitionem enunciatio differt ab aliis
orationibus. Et quidem de orationibus imperfectis manifestum est quod non
significant verum vel falsum, quia cum non faciant perfectum sensum in animo
audientis, manifestum est quod perfecte non exprimunt iudicium rationis, in quo
consistit verum vel falsum. His igitur praetermissis, sciendum est quod
perfectae orationis, quae complet sententiam, quinque sunt species, videlicet
enunciativa, deprecativa, imperativa, interrogativa et vocativa. (Non tamen
intelligendum est quod solum nomen vocativi casus sit vocativa oratio: quia
oportet aliquid partium orationis significare aliquid separatim, sicut supra
dictum est; sed per vocativum provocatur, sive excitatur animus audientis ad
attendendum; non autem est vocativa oratio nisi plura coniungantur; ut cum
dico, o bone Petre). Harum autem orationum sola enunciativa est, in qua
invenitur verum vel falsum, quia ipsa sola absolute significat conceptum
intellectus, in quo est verum vel falsum. Next he shows that this definition
differentiates the enunciation from other speech, when he says, Truth or
falsity is not present in all speech however, etc. In the case of imperfect or
incomplete speech it is clear that it does not signify the true or false, since
it does not make complete sense to the mind of the hearer and therefore does
not completely express a judgment of reason in which the true or false
consists. Having made this point, however, it must be noted that there are five
species of perfect speech that are complete in meaning: enunciative,
deprecative, imperative, interrogative, and vocative. (Apropos of the latter it
should be noted that a name alone in the vocative case is not vocative speech,
for some of the parts must signify something separately, as was said above. So,
although the mind of the hearer is provoked or aroused to attention by a name
in the vocative case, there is not vocative speech, unless many words are
joined together, as in "O good Peter!”) Of these species of speech the
enunciative is the only one in which there is truth or falsity, for it alone signifies
the conception of the intellect absolutely and it is in this that there is
truth or falsity. 5 Sed quia intellectus vel ratio, non solum concipit in
seipso veritatem rei tantum, sed etiam ad eius officium pertinet secundum suum
conceptum alia dirigere et ordinare; ideo necesse fuit quod sicut per
enunciativam orationem significatur ipse mentis conceptus, ita etiam essent
aliquae aliae orationes significantes ordinem rationis, secundum quam alia
diriguntur. Dirigitur autem ex ratione unius hominis alius homo ad tria: primo
quidem, ad attendendum mente; et ad hoc pertinet vocativa oratio: secundo, ad
respondendum voce; et ad hoc pertinet oratio interrogativa: tertio, ad
exequendum in opere; et ad hoc pertinet quantum ad inferiores oratio
imperativa; quantum autem ad superiores oratio deprecativa, ad quam reducitur
oratio optativa: quia respectu superioris, homo non habet vim motivam, nisi per
expressionem sui desiderii. Quia igitur istae quatuor orationis species non
significant ipsum conceptum intellectus, in quo est verum vel falsum, sed
quemdam ordinem ad hoc consequentem; inde est quod in nulla earum invenitur
verum vel falsum, sed solum in enunciativa, quae significat id quod mens de
rebus concipit. Et inde est quod omnes modi orationum, in quibus invenitur
verum vel falsum, sub enunciatione continentur: quam quidam dicunt indicativam
vel suppositivam. Dubitativa autem ad interrogativam reducitur, sicut et
optativa ad deprecativam. But the intellect, or reason, does not just conceive
the truth of a thing. It also belongs to its office to direct and order others
in accordance with what it conceives. Therefore, besides enunciative speech,
which signifies the concept of the mind, there had to be other kinds of speech
to signify the order of reason by which others are directed. Now, one man is
directed by the reason of another in regard to three things: first, to attend
with his mind, and vocative speech relates to this; second, to respond with his
voice, and interrogative speech relates to this; third, to execute a work, and
in relation to this, imperative speech is used with regard to inferiors,
deprecative with regard to superiors. Optative speech is reduced to the latter,
for a man does not have the power to move a superior except by the expression
of his desire. These four species of speech do not signify the conception of
the intellect in which there is truth or falsity, but a certain order following
upon this. Consequently truth or falsity is not found in any of them, but only
in enunciative speech, which signifies what the mind conceives from things. It
follows that all the modes of speech in which the true or false is found are
contained under the enunciation, which some call indicative or suppositive. The
dubitative, it should be noted, is reduced to the interrogative, as the
optative is to the deprecative. 6 Deinde cum dicit: caeterae igitur
relinquantur etc., ostendit quod de sola enunciativa est agendum; et dicit quod
aliae quatuor orationis species sunt relinquendae, quantum pertinet ad
praesentem intentionem: quia earum consideratio convenientior est rhetoricae
vel poeticae scientiae. Sed enunciativa oratio praesentis considerationis est.
Cuius ratio est, quia consideratio huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam
demonstrativam, in qua animus hominis per rationem inducitur ad consentiendum
vero ex his quae sunt propria rei; et ideo demonstrator non utitur ad suum
finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, significantibus res secundum quod earum
veritas est in anima. Sed rhetor et poeta inducunt ad assentiendum ei quod
intendunt, non solum per ea quae sunt propria rei, sed etiam per dispositiones
audientis. Unde rhetores et poetae plerumque movere auditores nituntur
provocando eos ad aliquas passiones, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. Et
ideo consideratio dictarum specierum orationis, quae pertinet ad ordinationem
audientis in aliquid, cadit proprie sub consideratione rhetoricae vel poeticae,
ratione sui significati; ad considerationem autem grammatici, prout
consideratur in eis congrua vocum constructio. Then Aristotle says, Let us
therefore consider enunciative speech, etc. Here he points out that only
enunciative speech is to be treated; the other four species must be omitted as
far as the present intention is concerned, because their investigation belongs
rather to the sciences of rhetoric or poetics. Enunciative speech belongs to
the present consideration and for the following reason: this book is ordered
directly to demonstrative science, in which the mind of man is led by an act of
reasoning to assent to truth from those things that are proper to the thing; to
this end the demonstrator uses only enunciative speech, which signifies things
according as truth about them is in the mind. The rhetorician and the poet, on
the other hand, induce assent to what they intend not only through what is
proper to the thing but also through the dispositions of the hearer. Hence,
rhetoricians and poets for the most part strive to move their auditors by
arousing certain passions in them, as the Philosopher says in his Rhetorica [I,
2: 1356a 2, 1356a 14; III, 1: 1403b 12]. This kind of speech, therefore, which
is concerned with the ordination of the hearer toward something, belongs to the
consideration of rhetoric or poetics by reason of its intent, but to the
consideration of the grammarian as regards a suitable construction of the vocal
sounds. VIII. 1. Postquam philosophus definivit enunciationem, hic dividit eam.
Et dividitur in duas partes: in prima, ponit divisionem enunciationis; in
secunda, manifestat eam; ibi: necesse est autem et cetera. Having defined the
enunciation the Philosopher now divides it. First he gives the division, and
then manifests it where he says, Every enunciative speech however, must contain
a verb, etc. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod Aristoteles sub breviloquio
duas divisiones enunciationis ponit. Quarum una est quod enunciationum quaedam
est una simplex, quaedam est coniunctione una. Sicut etiam in rebus, quae sunt
extra animam, aliquid est unum simplex sicut indivisibile vel continuum,
aliquid est unum colligatione aut compositione aut ordine. Quia enim ens et
unum convertuntur, necesse est sicut omnem rem, ita et omnem enunciationem
aliqualiter esse unam. It should be noted that Aristotle in his concise way
gives two divisions of the enunciation. The first is the division into one
simply and one by conjunction. This parallels things outside of the soul where
there is also something one simply, for instance the indivisible or the
continuum, and something one either by aggregation or composition or order. In
fact, since being and one are convertible, every enunciation must in some way
be one, just as every thing is. 3 Alia vero subdivisio enunciationis est quod
si enunciatio sit una, aut est affirmativa aut negativa. Enunciatio autem affirmativa
prior est negativa, triplici ratione, secundum tria quae supra posita sunt: ubi
dictum est quod vox est signum intellectus, et intellectus est signum rei. Ex
parte igitur vocis, affirmativa enunciatio est prior negativa, quia est
simplicior: negativa enim enunciatio addit supra affirmativam particulam
negativam. Ex parte etiam intellectus affirmativa enunciatio, quae significat
compositionem intellectus, est prior negativa, quae significat divisionem
eiusdem: divisio enim naturaliter posterior est compositione, nam non est
divisio nisi compositorum, sicut non est corruptio nisi generatorum. Ex parte
etiam rei, affirmativa enunciatio, quae significat esse, prior est negativa,
quae significat non esse: sicut habitus naturaliter prior est privatione. The
other is a subdivision of the enunciation: the division of it as it is one into
affirmative and negative. The affirmative enunciation is prior to the negative
for three reasons, which are related to three things already stated. It was
said that vocal sound is a sign of thought and thought a sign of the thing.
Accordingly, with respect to vocal sound, affirmative enunciation is prior to
negative because it is simpler, for the negative enunciation adds a negative
particle to the affirmative. With respect to thought, the affirmative
enunciation, which signifies composition by the intellect, is prior to the
negative, which signifies division, for division is posterior by nature to
composition since division is only of composite things—just as corruption is only
of generated things. With respect to the thing, the affirmative enunciation,
which signifies to be is prior to the negative, which signifies not to be, as
the having of something is naturally prior to the privation of it. 4 Dicit ergo
quod oratio enunciativa una et prima est affirmatio, idest affirmativa
enunciatio. Et contra hoc quod dixerat prima, subdit: deinde negatio, idest
negativa oratio, quia est posterior affirmativa, ut dictum est. Contra id autem
quod dixerat una, scilicet simpliciter, subdit quod quaedam aliae sunt unae,
non simpliciter, sed coniunctione unae. What he says, then, is this:
Affirmation, i.e., affirmative enunciation, is one and the first enunciative
speech. And in opposition to first he adds, then negation, i.e., negative
speech, for it is posterior to affirmative, as we have said. In Opposition to
one, i.e., one simply, he adds, certain others are one, not simply, but one by
conjunction. 5 Ex hoc autem quod hic dicitur argumentatur Alexander quod
divisio enunciationis in affirmationem et negationem non est divisio generis in
species, sed divisio nominis multiplicis in sua significata. Genus enim univoce
praedicatur de suis speciebus, non secundum prius et posterius: unde
Aristoteles noluit quod ens esset genus commune omnium, quia per prius
praedicatur de substantia, quam de novem generibus accidentium. From what
Aristotle says here Alexander argues that the division of enunciation into
affirmation and negation is Dot a division of a genus into species, but a
division of a multiple name into its meanings; for a genus is not predicated
according to the prior and posterior, but is predicated univocally of its
species; this is the reason Aristotle would not grant that being is a common
genus of all things, for it is predicated first of substance, and then of the
nine genera of accidents. 6 Sed dicendum quod unum dividentium aliquod commune
potest esse prius altero dupliciter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut
naturas dividentium; alio modo, secundum participationem rationis illius
communis quod in ea dividitur. Primum autem non tollit univocationem generis,
ut manifestum est in numeris, in quibus binarius secundum propriam rationem
naturaliter est prior ternario; sed tamen aequaliter participant rationem
generis sui, scilicet numeri: ita enim est ternarius multitudo mensurata per
unum, sicut et binarius. Sed secundum impedit univocationem generis. Et propter
hoc ens non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis: quia in ipsa ratione
entis, substantia, quae est ens per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis,
quod est ens per aliud et in alio. Sic ergo affirmatio secundum propriam
rationem prior est negatione; tamen aequaliter participant rationem
enunciationis, quam supra posuit, videlicet quod enunciatio est oratio in qua
verum vel falsum est. However, in the division of that which is common, one of
the dividing members can be prior to another in two ways: according to the
proper notions” or natures of the dividing members, or according to the
participation of that common notion that is divided in them. The first of these
does not destroy the univocity of a genus, as is evident in numbers. Twoness,
according to its proper notion, is naturally prior to threeness, yet they
equally participate in the notion of their genus, i.e., number; for both a
multitude consisting of three and a multitude consisting of two is measured by
one. The second, however, does impede the univocity of a genus. This is why
being cannot be the genus of substance and accident, for in the very notion of
being, substance, which is being per se, has priority in respect to accident,
which is being through another and in another. Applying this distinction to the
matter at hand, we see that affirmation is prior to negation in the first way,
i.e., according to its notion, yet they equally participate in the definition
Aristotle has given of the enunciation, i.e., speech in which there is truth or
falsity. 7 Deinde cum dicit: necesse est autem etc., manifestat propositas
divisiones. Et primo, manifestat primam, scilicet quod enunciatio vel est una
simpliciter vel coniunctione una; secundo, manifestat secundam, scilicet quod
enunciatio simpliciter una vel est affirmativa vel negativa; ibi: est autem
simplex enunciatio et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, praemittit
quaedam, quae sunt necessaria ad propositum manifestandum; secundo, manifestat
propositum; ibi: est autem una oratio et cetera. Where he says, Every
enunciative speech, however, must contain a verb or a mode of the verb, etc.,
he explains the divisions. He gives two explanations, one of the division of
enunciation into one simply and one by conjunction, the second of the division
of the enunciation which is one simply into affirmative or negative. The latter
explanation begins where he says, A simple enunciation is vocal sound
signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, etc. Before
he explains the first division, i.e., into one simply and one by conjunction,
he states certain things that are necessary for the evidence of the explanation,
and then explains the division where he says, Enunciative speech is one when it
signifies one thing, etc. 8 Circa primum duo facit: primo, dicit quod omnem
orationem enunciativam oportet constare ex verbo quod est praesentis temporis,
vel ex casu verbi quod est praeteriti vel futuri. Tacet autem de verbo
infinito, quia eumdem usum habet in enunciatione sicut et verbum negativum.
Manifestat autem quod dixerat per hoc, quod non solum nomen unum sine verbo non
facit orationem perfectam enunciativam, sed nec etiam oratio imperfecta.
Definitio enim oratio quaedam est, et tamen si ad rationem hominis, idest
definitionem non addatur aut est, quod est verbum, aut erat, aut fuit, quae
sunt casus verbi, aut aliquid huiusmodi, idest aliquod aliud verbum seu casus verbi,
nondum est oratio enunciativa. He states the first thing that is necessary for
his explanation when he says that every enunciative speech must contain a verb
in present time, or a case of the verb, i.e., in past or future time. (The
infinite verb is not mentioned because it has the same function in the
enunciation as the negative verb.) To manifest this he shows that one name,
without a verb, does not even constitute imperfect enunciative speech, let
alone perfect speech. Definition, he points out, is a certain kind of speech,
and yet if the verb "is” or modes of the verb such as "was” or
"has been” or something of the kind, is not added to the notion of man,
i.e., to the definition, it is not enunciative speech. 9 Potest autem esse dubitatio:
cum enunciatio constet ex nomine et verbo, quare non facit mentionem de nomine,
sicut de verbo? Ad quod tripliciter responderi potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla
oratio enunciativa invenitur sine verbo vel casu verbi; invenitur autem aliqua
enunciatio sine nomine, puta cum nos utimur infinitivis verborum loco nominum;
ut cum dicitur, currere est moveri. Secundo et melius, quia, sicut supra dictum
est, verbum est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur. Praedicatum autem est
principalior pars enunciationis, eo quod est pars formalis et completiva
ipsius. Unde vocatur apud Graecos propositio categorica, idest praedicativa.
Denominatio autem fit a forma, quae dat speciem rei. Et ideo potius fecit
mentionem de verbo tanquam de parte principaliori et formaliori. Cuius signum
est, quia enunciatio categorica dicitur affirmativa vel negativa solum ratione
verbi, quod affirmatur vel negatur; sicut etiam conditionalis dicitur
affirmativa vel negativa, eo quod affirmatur vel negatur coniunctio a qua
denominatur. Tertio, potest dici, et adhuc melius, quod non erat intentio
Aristotelis ostendere quod nomen vel verbum non sufficiant ad enunciationem
complendam: hoc enim supra manifestavit tam de nomine quam de verbo. Sed quia
dixerat quod quaedam enunciatio est una simpliciter, quaedam autem coniunctione
una; posset aliquis intelligere quod illa quae est una simpliciter careret omni
compositione: sed ipse hoc excludit per hoc quod in omni enunciatione oportet
esse verbum, quod importat compositionem, quam non est intelligere sine
compositis, sicut supra dictum est. Nomen autem non importat compositionem, et
ideo non exigit praesens intentio ut de nomine faceret mentionem, sed solum de
verbo. But, one might ask, why mention the verb and not the name, for the
enunciation consists of a name and a verb? This can be answered in three ways.
First of all because enunciative speech is not attained without a verb or a
mode of the verb, but it is without a name, for instance, when infinitive forms
of the verb are used in place of names, as in "To run is to be moving.” A
second and better reason for speaking only of the verb is that the verb is a
sign of what is predicated of another. Now the predicate is the principal part
of the enunciation because it is the formal part and completes it. This is the
reason the Greeks called the enunciation a categorical, i.e., predicative,
proposition. It should also be noted that denomination is made from the form
which gives species to the thing. He speaks of the verb, then, but not the
name, because it is the more principal and formal part of the enunciation. A
sign of this is that the categorical enunciation is said to be affirmative or
negative solely by reason of the verb being affirmed or denied, and the
conditional enunciation is said to be affirmative or negative by reason of the
conjunction by which it is denominated being affirmed or denied. A third and
even better reason is that Aristotle did not intend to show that the name or
verb is not sufficient for a complete enunciation, for he explained this
earlier. Rather, he is excluding a misunderstanding that might arise from his
saying that one kind of enunciation is one simply and another kind is one by
conjunction. Some might think this means that the kind that is one simply,
lacks all composition. But he excludes this by saying that there must be a verb
in every enunciation; for the verb implies composition and composition cannot
be understood apart from the things composed, as he said earlier.” The name, on
the other hand, does not imply composition and therefore did not have to be mentioned.
10 Secundo; ibi: quare autem etc., ostendit aliud quod est necessarium ad
manifestationem propositi, scilicet quod hoc quod dico, animal gressibile
bipes, quae est definitio hominis, est unum et non multa. Et eadem ratio est de
omnibus aliis definitionibus. Sed huiusmodi rationem assignare dicit esse
alterius negocii. Pertinet enim ad metaphysicum; unde in VII et in VIII
metaphysicae ratio huius assignatur: quia scilicet differentia advenit generi non
per accidens sed per se, tanquam determinativa ipsius, per modum quo materia
determinatur per formam. Nam a materia sumitur genus, a forma autem
differentia. Unde sicut ex forma et materia fit vere unum et non multa, ita ex
genere et differentia. The other, point necessary for the evidence of the first
division is made where he says, but then the question arises as to why the
definition "terrestrial biped animal” is something one, etc. He indicates
by this that "terrestrial biped animal,” which is a definition of man, is
one and not many. The reason it is one is the same as in the case of all
definitions but, he says, to assign the reason belongs to another subject of
inquiry. It belongs, in fact, to metaphysics and he assigns the reason in VII
and VIII Metaphysicae [VII, 12: 1037b 7; VIII, 6: 1045a 6] which is this: the
difference does not accrue to the genus accidentally but per se and is
determinative of it in the way in which form determines matter; for the genus
is taken from matter, the difference from form. Whence, just as one thing—not
many—comes to be from form and matter, so one thing comes to be from the genus
and difference. 11 Excludit autem quamdam rationem huius unitatis, quam quis
posset suspicari, ut scilicet propter hoc definitio dicatur unum, quia partes
eius sunt propinquae, idest sine aliqua interpositione coniunctionis vel morae.
Et quidem non interruptio locutionis necessaria est ad unitatem definitionis,
quia si interponeretur coniunctio partibus definitionis, iam secunda non
determinaret primam, sed significarentur ut actu multae in locutione: et idem
operatur interpositio morae, qua utuntur rhetores loco coniunctionis. Unde ad
unitatem definitionis requiritur quod partes eius proferantur sine coniunctione
et interpolatione: quia etiam in re naturali, cuius est definitio, nihil cadit
medium inter materiam et formam: sed praedicta non interruptio non sufficit ad
unitatem definitionis, quia contingit etiam hanc continuitatem prolationis
servari in his, quae non sunt simpliciter unum, sed per accidens; ut si dicam,
homo albus musicus. Sic igitur Aristoteles valde subtiliter manifestavit quod
absoluta unitas enunciationis non impeditur, neque per compositionem quam
importat verbum, neque per multitudinem nominum ex quibus constat definitio. Et
est eadem ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad
materiam, et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum
simpliciter. The reason for the unity of this definition might be supposed by
some to be only that of juxtaposition of the parts, i.e., that
"terrestrial biped animal” is said to be one only because the parts are
side by side without conjunction or pause. But he excludes such a notion of its
unity. Now it is true that non-interruption of locution is necessary for the
unity of a definition, for if a conjunction were put between the parts the
second part would not determine the first immediately and the many in locution
would consequently signify many in act. The pause used by rhetoricians in place
of a conjunction would do the same thing. Whence it is a requirement for the
unity of a definition that its parts be uttered without conjunction and
interpolation, the reason being that in the natural thing, whose definition it
is, nothing mediates between matter and form. However, non-interruption of
locution is not the only thing that is needed for unity of the definition, for
there can be continuity of utterance in regard to things that are not one
simply, but are accidentally, as in white musical man.” Aristotle has therefore
manifested very subtly that absolute unity of the enunciation is not impeded
either by the composition which the verb implies or by the multitude of names
from which a definition is established. And the reason is the same in both cases,
i.e., the predicate is related to the subject as form to matter, as is the
difference to a genus; but from form and matter a thing that is one simply
comes into existence. 12 Deinde cum dicit: est autem una oratio etc., accedit
ad manifestandam praedictam divisionem. Et primo, manifestat ipsum commune quod
dividitur, quod est enunciatio una; secundo, manifestat partes divisionis
secundum proprias rationes; ibi: harum autem haec simplex et cetera. Circa
primum duo facit: primo, manifestat ipsam divisionem; secundo, concludit quod
ab utroque membro divisionis nomen et verbum excluduntur; ibi: nomen ergo et
verbum et cetera. Opponitur autem unitati pluralitas; et ideo enunciationis
unitatem manifestat per modos pluralitatis. He begins to explain the division when
he says, Enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing, etc. First he
makes the common thing that is divided evident, i.e., the enunciation as it is
one; secondly, he makes the parts of the division evident according to their
own proper notions, where he says, Of enunciations that are one, simple
enunciation is one kind, etc. After he has made the division of the common
thing evident, i.e., enunciation, he then concludes that the name and the verb
are excluded from each member of the division where he says, Let us call the
name or the verb a word only, etc. Now plurality is opposed to unity. Therefore
he is going to manifest the unity of the enunciation through the modes of
plurality. 13 Dicit ergo primo quod enunciatio dicitur vel una absolute,
scilicet quae unum de uno significat, vel una secundum quid, scilicet quae est
coniunctione una. Per oppositum autem est intelligendum quod enunciationes
plures sunt, vel ex eo quod plura significant et non unum: quod opponitur primo
modo unitatis; vel ex eo quod absque coniunctione proferuntur: et tales opponuntur
secundo modo unitatis. He begins his explanation by saying that enunciation is
either one absolutely, i.e., it signifies one thing said of one thing, or one
relatively, i.e., it is one by conjunction. In opposition to these are the
enunciations that are many, either because they signify not one but many
things, which is opposed to the first mode of unity or because they are uttered
without a connecting particle, which is opposed to the second mode of unity. 14
Circa quod considerandum est, secundum Boethium, quod unitas et pluralitas
orationis refertur ad significatum; simplex autem et compositum attenditur
secundum ipsas voces. Et ideo enunciatio quandoque est una et simplex puta cum
solum ex nomine et verbo componitur in unum significatum; ut cum dico, homo est
albus. Est etiam quandoque una oratio, sed composita, quae quidem unam rem
significat, sed tamen composita est vel ex pluribus terminis; sicut si dicam,
animal rationale mortale currit, vel ex pluribus enunciationibus, sicut in
conditionalibus, quae quidem unum significant et non multa. Similiter autem
quandoque in enunciatione est pluralitas cum simplicitate, puta cum in oratione
ponitur aliquod nomen multa significans; ut si dicam, canis latrat, haec oratio
plures est, quia plura significat, et tamen simplex est. Quandoque vero in
enunciatione est pluralitas et compositio, puta cum ponuntur plura in subiecto
vel in praedicato, ex quibus non fit unum, sive interveniat coniunctio sive
non; puta si dicam, homo albus musicus disputat: et similiter est si
coniungantur plures enunciationes, sive cum coniunctione sive sine
coniunctione; ut si dicam, Socrates currit, Plato disputat. Et secundum hoc
sensus litterae est quod enunciatio una est illa, quae unum de uno significat,
non solum si sit simplex, sed etiam si sit coniunctione una. Et similiter
enunciationes plures dicuntur quae plura et non unum significant: non solum
quando interponitur aliqua coniunctio, vel inter nomina vel verba, vel etiam inter
ipsas enunciationes; sed etiam si vel inconiunctione, idest absque aliqua
interposita coniunctione plura significat, vel quia est unum nomen aequivocum,
multa significans, vel quia ponuntur plura nomina absque coniunctione, ex
quorum significatis non fit unum; ut si dicam, homo albus grammaticus logicus
currit. Boethius interprets this passage in the following way. "Unity” and
"plurality” of speech refers to what is signified, whereas "simple”
and "composite” is related to the vocal sounds. Accordingly, an
enunciation is sometimes one and simple, namely, when one thing is signified by
the composition of name and verb, as in "Man is white.” Sometimes it is
one and composite. In this case it signifies one thing, but is composed either
from many terms, as in "A mortal rational animal is running,” or from many
enunciations, as in conditionals that signify one thing and not many. On the
other hand, sometimes there is plurality along with simplicity, namely, when a
name signifying many things is used, as in "The dog barks,” in which case
the enunciation is many because it signifies many things [i.e., it signifies
equivocally], but it is simple as far as vocal sound is concerned. But
sometimes there is plurality and composition, namely, when many things are posited
on the part of the subject or predicate from which one thing does not result,
whether a conjunction intervenes or not, as in "The musical white man is
arguing.” This is also the case if there are many enunciations joined together,
with or without connecting particles as in "Socrates runs, Plato
discusses. According to this exposition the meaning of the passage in question
is this: an enunciation is one when it signifies one thing said of one thing,
and this is the case whether the enunciation is one simply or is one by
conjunction; an enunciation is many when it signifies not one but many things,
and this not only when a conjunction is inserted between either the names or
verbs or between the enunciations themselves, but even if there are many things
that are not conjoined. In the latter case they signify many things either
because an equivocal name is used or because many names signifying many things
from which one thing does not result are used without conjunctions, as in
"The white grammatical logical man is running.” 15 Sed haec expositio non
videtur esse secundum intentionem Aristotelis. Primo quidem, quia per
disiunctionem, quam interponit, videtur distinguere inter orationem unum
significantem, et orationem quae est coniunctione una. Secundo, quia supra
dixerat quod est unum quoddam et non multa, animal gressibile bipes. Quod autem
est coniunctione unum, non est unum et non multa, sed est unum ex multis. Et
ideo melius videtur dicendum quod Aristoteles, quia supra dixerat aliquam
enunciationem esse unam et aliquam coniunctione unam, vult hic manifestare quae
sit una. Et quia supra dixerat quod multa nomina simul coniuncta sunt unum,
sicut animal gressibile bipes, dicit consequenter quod enunciatio est iudicanda
una non ex unitate nominis, sed ex unitate significati, etiam si sint plura
nomina quae unum significent. Vel si sit aliqua enunciatio una quae multa
significet, non erit una simpliciter, sed coniunctione una. Et secundum hoc,
haec enunciatio, animal gressibile bipes est risibile, non est una quasi
coniunctione una, sicut in prima expositione dicebatur, sed quia unum
significat. However, this exposition does not seem to be what Aristotle had in
mind. First of all the disjunction he inserts seems to indicate that he is
distinguishing between speech signifying one thing and speech which is one by
conjunction. In the second place, he has just said that terrestrial biped
animal is something one and not many. Moreover, what is one by conjunction is
not one, and not many, but one from many. Hence it seems better to say that
since he has already said that one kind of enunciation is one simply and
another kind is one by conjunction be is showing here what one enunciation is.
Having said, then, that many names joined together are something one as in the example
"terrestrial biped animal,” he goes on to say that an enunciation is to be
judged as one, not from the unity of the name but from the unity of what is
signified, even if there are many names signifying the one thing; and if an
enunciation which signifies many things is one, it will not be one simply, but
one by conjunction. Hence, the enunciation "A terrestrial biped animal is
risible,” is not one in the sense of one by conjunction as the first exposition
would have it, but because it signifies one thing. 16 Et quia oppositum per
oppositum manifestatur, consequenter ostendit quae sunt plures enunciationes,
et ponit duos modos pluralitatis. Primus est, quod plures dicuntur
enunciationes quae plura significant. Contingit autem aliqua plura significari
in aliquo uno communi; sicut cum dico, animal est sensibile, sub hoc uno
communi, quod est animal, multa continentur, et tamen haec enunciatio est una
et non plures. Et ideo addit et non unum. Sed melius est ut dicatur hoc esse
additum propter definitionem, quae multa significat quae sunt unum: et hic
modus pluralitatis opponitur primo modo unitatis. Secundus modus pluralitatis
est, quando non solum enunciationes plura significant, sed etiam illa plura
nullatenus coniunguntur, et hic modus pluralitatis opponitur secundo modo
unitatis. Et secundum hoc patet quod secundus modus unitatis non opponitur
primo modo pluralitatis. Ea autem quae non sunt opposita, possunt simul esse.
Unde manifestum est, enunciationem quae est una coniunctione, esse etiam
plures: plures in quantum significat plura et non unum. Secundum hoc ergo
possumus accipere tres modos enunciationis. Nam quaedam est simpliciter una, in
quantum unum significat; quaedam est simpliciter plures, in quantum plura
significat, sed est una secundum quid, in quantum est coniunctione una; quaedam
sunt simpliciter plures, quae neque significant unum, neque coniunctione aliqua
uniuntur. Ideo autem Aristoteles quatuor ponit et non solum tria, quia
quandoque est enunciatio plures, quia plura significat, non tamen est
coniunctione una, puta si ponatur ibi nomen multa significans. Then — because
an opposite is manifested through an opposite — he goes on to show which
enunciations are many, and he posits two modes of plurality. Enunciations are
said to be many which signify many things. Many things may be signified in some
one common thing however; when I say, for example, "An animal is a
sentient being,” many things are contained under the one common thing, animal,
but such an enunciation is still one, not many. Therefore Aristotle adds, and
not one. It would be better to say, however, that the and not one is added
because of definition, which signifies many things that are one. The mode of
plurality he has spoken of thus far is opposed to the first mode of unity. The second
mode of plurality covers enunciations that not only signify many things but
many that are in no way joined together. This mode is opposed to the second
mode of unity. Thus it is evident that the second mode of unity is not opposed
to the first mode of plurality. Now those things that are not opposed can be
together. Therefore, the enunciation that is one by conjunction is also many
many insofar as it signifies many and not one. According to this understanding
of the text there are three modes of the enunciation: the enunciation that is
one simply inasmuch as it signifies one thing; the enunciation that is many
simply inasmuch as it signifies many things, but is one relatively inasmuch as
it is one by conjunction; finally, the enunciations that are many simply—those
that do not signify one thing and are not united by any conjunction. Aristotle
posits four kinds of enunciation rather than three, for an enunciation is
sometimes many because it signifies many things, and yet is not one by
conjunction; a case in point would be an enunciation in which a name signifying
many things is used. 17 Deinde cum dicit: nomen ergo et verbum etc., excludit
ab unitate orationis nomen et verbum. Dixerat enim quod enunciatio una est,
quae unum significat: posset autem aliquis intelligere, quod sic unum
significaret sicut nomen et verbum unum significant. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum
subdit: nomen ergo, et verbum dictio sit sola, idest ita sit dictio, quod non
enunciatio. Et videtur, ex modo loquendi, quod ipse imposuerit hoc nomen ad
significandum partes enunciationis. Quod autem nomen et verbum dictio sit sola
manifestat per hoc, quod non potest dici quod ille enunciet, qui sic aliquid
significat voce, sicut nomen, vel verbum significat. Et ad hoc manifestandum
innuit duos modos utendi enunciatione. Quandoque enim utimur ipsa quasi ad
interrogata respondentes; puta si quaeratur, quis sit in scholis? Respondemus,
magister. Quandoque autem utimur ea propria sponte, nullo interrogante; sicut
cum dicimus, Petrus currit. Dicit ergo, quod ille qui significat aliquid unum
nomine vel verbo, non enunciat vel sicut ille qui respondet aliquo
interrogante, vel sicut ille qui profert enunciationem non aliquo interrogante,
sed ipso proferente sponte. Introduxit autem hoc, quia simplex nomen vel
verbum, quando respondetur ad interrogationem, videtur verum vel falsum
significare: quod est proprium enunciationis. Sed hoc non competit nomini vel
verbo, nisi secundum quod intelligitur coniunctum cum alia parte proposita in
interrogatione. Ut si quaerenti, quis legit in scholis? Respondeatur, magister,
subintelligitur, ibi legit. Si ergo ille qui enunciat aliquid nomine vel verbo
non enunciat, manifestum est quod enunciatio non sic unum significat, sicut
nomen vel verbum. Hoc autem inducit sicut conclusionem eius quod supra
praemisit: necesse est omnem orationem enunciativam ex verbo esse vel ex casu
verbi. Where he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, etc., he
excludes the name and the verb from the unity of speech. His reason for making
this point is that his statement, "an enunciation is one inasmuch as it
signifies one thing,” might be taken to mean that an enunciation signifies one
thing in the same way the name or verb signify one thing. To prevent such a
misunderstanding he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, i.e., a
locution which is not an enunciation. From his mode of speaking it would seem
that Aristotle himself imposed the name "phasis” [word] to signify such
parts of the enunciation. Then he shows that a name or verb is only a word by
pointing out that we do not say that a person is enunciating when be signifies
something in vocal sound in the way in which a name or verb signifies. To
manifest this he suggests two ways of using the enunciation. Sometimes we use
it to reply to questions; for example if someone asks "Who is it who
discusses,” we answer "The teacher.” At other times we use the
enunciation, not in reply to a question, but of our own accord, as when we say
"Peter is running.” What Aristotle is saying, then, is that the person who
signifies something one by a name or a verb is not enunciating in the way in
which either the person who replies to a question or who utters an enunciation
of his own accord is enunciating. He introduces this point because the simple
name or verb, when used in reply to a question seems to signify truth or
falsity and truth or falsity is what is proper to the enunciation. Truth and
falsity is not proper, however, to the name or verb unless it is understood as
joined to another part proposed in a question; if someone should ask, for
example, "Who reads in the schools,” we would answer, "The teacher,”
understanding also, "reads there.” If, then, something expressed by a name
or verb is not an enunciation, it is evident that the enunciation does not
signify one thing in the same way as the name or verb signify one thing.
Aristotle draws this by way of a conclusion from, Every enunciative speech must
contain a verb or a mode of the verb, which was stated earlier. 18 Deinde cum
dicit: harum autem haec simplex etc., manifestat praemissam divisionem secundum
rationes partium. Dixerat enim quod una enunciatio est quae unum de uno
significat, et alia est quae est coniunctione una. Ratio autem huius divisionis
est ex eo quod unum natum est dividi per simplex et compositum. Et ideo dicit:
harum autem, scilicet enunciationum, in quibus dividitur unum, haec dicitur
una, vel quia significat unum simpliciter, vel quia una est coniunctione. Haec
quidem simplex enunciatio est, quae scilicet unum significat. Sed ne
intelligatur quod sic significet unum, sicut nomen vel verbum, ad excludendum
hoc subdit: ut aliquid de aliquo, idest per modum compositionis, vel aliquid ab
aliquo, idest per modum divisionis. Haec autem ex his coniuncta, quae scilicet
dicitur coniunctione una, est velut oratio iam composita: quasi dicat hoc modo,
enunciationis unitas dividitur in duo praemissa, sicut aliquod unum dividitur
in simplex et compositum. Then when he says, Of enunciations that are one,
simple enunciation is one kind, etc., he manifests the division of enunciation
by the natures of the parts. He has said that the enunciation is one when it
signifies one thing or is one by conjunction. The basis of this division is the
nature of one, which is such that it can be divided into simple and composite.
Hence, Aristotle says, Of these, i.e., enunciations into which one is divided,
which are said to be one either because the enunciation signifies one thing
simply or because it is one by conjunction, simple enunciation is one kind,
i.e., the enunciation that signifies one thing. And to exclude the
understanding of this as signifying one thing in the same way as the name or
the verb signifies one thing he adds, something affirmed of something, i.e., by
way of composition, or something denied of something, i.e., by way of division.
The other kind—the enunciation that is said to be one by conjunction—is
composite, i.e., speech composed of these simple enunciations. In other words,
he is saying that the unity of the enunciation is divided into simple and
composite, just as one is divided into simple and composite. 19 Deinde cum
dicit: est autem simplex etc., manifestat secundam divisionem enunciationis,
secundum videlicet quod enunciatio dividitur in affirmationem et negationem. Haec
autem divisio primo quidem convenit enunciationi simplici; ex consequenti autem
convenit compositae enunciationi; et ideo ad insinuandum rationem praedictae
divisionis dicit quod simplex enunciatio est vox significativa de eo quod est
aliquid: quod pertinet ad affirmationem; vel non est aliquid: quod pertinet ad
negationem. Et ne hoc intelligatur solum secundum praesens tempus, subdit:
quemadmodum tempora sunt divisa, idest similiter hoc habet locum in aliis
temporibus sicut et in praesenti. He manifests the second division of the
enunciation where he says, A simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that
something belongs or does not belong to a subject, i.e., the division of
enunciation into affirmation and negation. This is a division that belongs
primarily to the simple enunciation and consequently to the composite
enunciation; therefore, in order to suggest the basis of the division he says
that a simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a
subject, which pertains to affirmation, or does not belong to a subject, which
pertains to negation. And to make it clear that this is not to be understood
only of present time he adds, according to the divisions of time, i.e., this
holds for other times as well as the present. 20 Alexander autem existimavit
quod Aristoteles hic definiret enunciationem; et quia in definitione
enunciationis videtur ponere affirmationem et negationem, volebat hic accipere
quod enunciatio non esset genus affirmationis et negationis, quia species nunquam
ponitur in definitione generis. Id autem quod non univoce praedicatur de multis
(quia scilicet non significat aliquid unum, quod sit unum commune multis), non
potest notificari nisi per illa multa quae significantur. Et inde est quod quia
unum non dicitur aequivoce de simplici et composito, sed per prius et
posterius, Aristoteles in praecedentibus semper ad notificandum unitatem
enunciationis usus est utroque. Quia ergo videtur uti affirmatione et negatione
ad notificandum enunciationem, volebat Alexander accipere quod enunciatio non
dicitur de affirmatione et negatione univoce sicut genus de suis speciebus. Alexander
thought that Aristotle was defining the enunciation here and because he seems
to put affirmation and negation in the "definition” he took this to mean
that enunciation is not the genus of affirmation and negation, for the species
is never posited in the definition of the genus. Now what is not predicated
univocally of many (namely, because it does not signify something one that is
common to many) cannot be made known except through the many that are
signified. "One” is not said equivocally of the simple and composite, but
primarily and consequently, and hence Aristotle always used both "simple”
and "composite” in the preceding reasoning to make the unity of the
enunciation known. Now, here he seems to use affirmation and negation to make
the enunciation known; therefore, Alexander took this to mean that enunciation
is not said of affirmation and negation univocally as a genus of its species. 21
Sed contrarium apparet ex hoc, quod philosophus consequenter utitur nomine
enunciationis ut genere, cum in definitione affirmationis et negationis subdit
quod, affirmatio est enunciatio alicuius de aliquo, scilicet per modum
compositionis, negatio vero est enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo, scilicet per
modum divisionis. Nomine autem aequivoco non consuevimus uti ad notificandum
significata eius. Et ideo Boethius dicit quod Aristoteles suo modo breviloquio
utens, simul usus est et definitione et divisione eius: ita ut quod dicit de eo
quod est aliquid vel non est, non referatur ad definitionem enunciationis, sed
ad eius divisionem. Sed quia differentiae divisivae generis non cadunt in eius
definitione, nec hoc solum quod dicitur vox significativa, sufficiens est definitio
enunciationis; melius dici potest secundum Porphyrium, quod hoc totum quod
dicitur vox significativa de eo quod est, vel de eo quod non est, est definitio
enunciationis. Nec tamen ponitur affirmatio et negatio in definitione
enunciationis sed virtus affirmationis et negationis, scilicet significatum
eius, quod est esse vel non esse, quod est naturaliter prius enunciatione.
Affirmationem autem et negationem postea definivit per terminos utriusque cum
dixit: affirmationem esse enunciationem alicuius de aliquo, et negationem
enunciationem alicuius ab aliquo. Sed sicut in definitione generis non debent
poni species, ita nec ea quae sunt propria specierum. Cum igitur significare
esse sit proprium affirmationis, et significare non esse sit proprium negationis,
melius videtur dicendum, secundum Ammonium, quod hic non definitur enunciatio,
sed solum dividitur. Supra enim posita est definitio, cum dictum est quod
enunciatio est oratio in qua est verum vel falsum. In qua quidem definitione
nulla mentio facta est nec de affirmatione, nec de negatione. Est autem
considerandum quod artificiosissime procedit: dividit enim genus non in
species, sed in differentias specificas. Non enim dicit quod enunciatio est
affirmatio vel negatio, sed vox significativa de eo quod est, quae est
differentia specifica affirmationis, vel de eo quod non est, in quo tangitur
differentia specifica negationis. Et ideo ex differentiis adiunctis generi
constituit definitionem speciei, cum subdit: quod affirmatio est enunciatio
alicuius de aliquo, per quod significatur esse; et negatio est enunciatio
alicuius ab aliquo quod significat non esse. But the contrary appears to be the
case, for the Philosopher subsequently uses the name "enunciation” as a
genus when in defining affirmation and negation he says, Affirmation is the
enunciation of something about something, i.e., by way of composition; negation
is the enunciation of something separated from something, i.e., by way of
division. Moreover, it is not customary to use an equivocal name to make known
the things it signifies. Boethius for this reason says that Aristotle with his
customary brevity is using both the definition and its division at once.
Therefore when he says that something belongs or does not belong to a subject
he is not referring to the definition of enunciation but to its division.
However, since the differences dividing a genus do not fall in its definition
and since vocal sound signifying is not a sufficient definition of the
enunciation, Porphyry thought it would be better to say that the whole
expression, vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to
a subject, is the definition of the enunciation. According to his exposition
this is not affirmation and negation that is posited in the definition, but capacity
for affirmation and negation, i.e., what the enunciation is a sign of, which is
to be or not to be, which is prior in nature to the enunciation. Then
immediately following this he defines affirmation and negation in terms of
themselves when he says, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about
something; negation the enunciation of something separated from something. But
just as the species should not be stated in the definition of the genus, so
neither should the properties of the species. Now to signify to be is the
property of the affirmation, and to signify not to be the property of the
negation. Therefore Ammonius thought it would be better to say that the
enunciation was not defined here, but only divided. For the definition was
posited above when it was said that the enunciation is speech in which there is
truth or falsity—in which definition no mention is made of either affirmation
or negation. It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle proceeds very
skillfully here, for he divides the genus, not into species, but into specific
differences. He does not say that the enunciation is an affirmation or
negation, but vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a subject, which
is the specific difference of affirmation, or does not belong to a subject,
which is the specific difference of negation. Then when he adds, Affirmation is
the enunciation of something about something which signifies to be, and
negation is the enunciation of something separated from something, which
signifies not to be, he establishes the definition of the species by joining
the differences to the genus. IX. 1. Posita divisione enunciationis, hic agit
de oppositione partium enunciationis, scilicet affirmationis et negationis. Et
quia enunciationem esse dixerat orationem, in qua est verum vel falsum, primo,
ostendit qualiter enunciationes ad invicem opponantur; secundo, movet quamdam
dubitationem circa praedeterminata et solvit; ibi: in his ergo quae sunt et
quae facta sunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit qualiter una
enunciatio opponatur alteri; secundo, ostendit quod tantum una opponitur uni;
ibi: manifestum est et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in duas partes: in
prima, determinat de oppositione affirmationis et negationis absolute; in secunda,
ostendit quomodo huiusmodi oppositio diversificatur ex parte subiecti; ibi:
quoniam autem sunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit quod omni
affirmationi est negatio opposita et e converso; secundo, manifestat
oppositionem affirmationis et negationis absolute; ibi: et sit hoccontradictio
et cetera.Having mad e the division of the enunciation, Aristotle now deals
with the opposition of the parts of the enunciation, i.e., the opposition of
affirmation and negation. He has already said that the enunciation is speech in
which there is truth or falsity; therefore, he first shows how enunciations are
opposed to each other; secondly, he raises a doubt about some things previously
determined and then resolves it where he says, In enunciations about that which
is or has taken place, etc. He not only shows how one enunciation is opposed to
another, but that only one is opposed to one, where he says, It is evident also
that there is one negation of one affirmation. In showing how one enunciation is
opposed to another, he first treats of the opposition of affirmation and
negation absolutely, and then shows in what way opposition of this kind is
diversified on the part of the subject where he says, Since some of the things
we are concerned with are universal and others singular, etc. With respect to
the opposition of affirmation and negation absolutely, he first shows that
there is a negation opposed to every affirmation and vice versa, and then where
he says, We will call this opposed affirmation and negation
"contradiction,” he explains the opposition of affirmation and negation
absolutely. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod ad ostendendum suum
propositum philosophus assumit duplicem diversitatem enunciationis: quarum
prima est ex ipsa forma vel modo enunciandi, secundum quod dictum est quod
enunciatio vel est affirmativa, per quam scilicet enunciatur aliquid esse, vel
est negativa per quam significatur aliquid non esse; secunda diversitas est per
comparationem ad rem, ex qua dependet veritas et falsitas intellectus et
enunciationis. Cum enim enunciatur aliquid esse vel non esse secundum
congruentiam rei, est oratio vera; alioquin est oratio falsa. In relation to
the first point, that there is a negation opposed to every affirmation and vice
versa, the Philosopher assumes a twofold diversity of enunciation. The first
arises from the very form or mode of enunciating. According to this diversity,
enunciation is either affirmative—in which it is enunciated that something is —
or negative — in which it is signified that something is not. The second is the
diversity that arises by comparison to reality. Truth and falsity of thought
and of the enunciation depend upon this comparison, for when it is enunciated
that something is or is not, if there is agreement with reality, there is true
speech; otherwise there is false speech. 3 Sic igitur quatuor modis potest
variari enunciatio, secundum permixtionem harum duarum divisionum. Uno modo,
quia id quod est in re enunciatur ita esse sicut in re est: quod pertinet ad
affirmationem veram; puta cum Socrates currit, dicimus Socratem currere. Alio
modo, cum enunciatur aliquid non esse quod in re non est: quod pertinet ad
negationem veram; ut cum dicitur, Aethiops albus non est. Tertio modo, cum
enunciatur aliquid esse quod in re non est: quod pertinet ad affirmationem
falsam; ut cum dicitur, corvus est albus. Quarto modo, cum enunciatur aliquid
non esse quod in re est: quod pertinet ad negationem falsam; ut cum dicitur,
nix non est alba. Philosophus autem, ut a minoribus ad potiora procedat, falsas
veris praeponit: inter quas negativam praemittit affirmativae, cum dicit quod
contingit enunciare quod est, scilicet in rerum natura, non esse. Secundo
autem, ponit affirmativam falsam cum dicit: et quod non est, scilicet in rerum
natura, esse. Tertio autem, ponit affirmativam veram, quae opponitur negativae
falsae, quam primo posuit, cum dicit: et quod est, scilicet in rerum natura,
esse. Quarto autem, ponit negativam veram, quae opponitur affirmationi falsae,
cum dicit: et quod non est, scilicet in rerum natura, non esse. The enunciation
can therefore be varied in four ways according to a combination of these two
divisions: in the first way, what is in reality is enunciated to be as it is in
reality. This is characteristic of true affirmation. For example, when Socrates
runs, we say, "Socrates is running.” In the second way, it is enunciated
that something is not what in reality it is not. This is characteristic of true
negation, as when we say, "An Ethiopian is not white.” In the third way,
it is enunciated that something is what in reality it is not. This is
characteristic of a false affirmation, as in "The raven is white.” In the
fourth way, it is enunciated that something is not what it is in reality. This
is characteristic of a false negation, as in "Snow is not white.” In order
to proceed from the weaker to the stronger the Philosopher puts the false
before the true, and among these he states the negative before the affirmative.
He begins, then, with the false negative; it is possible to enunciate, that
what is, namely, in reality, is not. Secondly, he posits the false affirmative,
and that what is not, namely, in reality, is. Thirdly, he posits the true
affirmative—which is opposed to the false negative he gave first—and that what
is, namely, in reality, is. Fourthly, he posits the true negative—which is
opposed to the false affirmative—and that what is not, namely, in reality, is
not. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 9 n. 4Non est autem intelligendum quod hoc quod dixit:
quod est et quod non est, sit referendum ad solam existentiam vel non
existentiam subiecti, sed ad hoc quod res significata per praedicatum insit vel
non insit rei significatae per subiectum. Nam cum dicitur, corvus est albus,
significatur quod non est, esse, quamvis ipse corvus sit res existens. In
saying what is and what is not, Aristotle is not referring only to the
existence or nonexistence of a subject. What he is saying is that the reality
signified by the predicate is in or is not in the reality signified by the subject.
For what is signified in saying, "The raven is white,” is that what is
not, is, although the raven itself is an existing thing. 5 Et sicut istae
quatuor differentiae enunciationum inveniuntur in propositionibus, in quibus
ponitur verbum praesentis temporis, ita etiam inveniuntur in enunciationibus in
quibus ponuntur verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis. Supra enim dixit quod
necesse est enunciationem constare ex verbo vel ex casu verbi. Et hoc est quod
subdit: quod similiter contingit, scilicet variari diversimode enunciationem
circa ea, quae sunt extra praesens tempus, idest circa praeterita vel futura,
quae sunt quodammodo extrinseca respectu praesentis, quia praesens est medium
praeteriti et futuri. These four differences of enunciations are found in
propositions in which there is a verb of present time and also in enunciations
in which there are verbs of past or future time. He said earlier that every
enunciative speech must contain a verb or a mode of the verb. Here he makes
this point in relation to the four differences of enunciations: similarly it is
possible to enunciate these, i.e., that the enunciation be varied in diverse
ways in regard to those times outside of the present, i.e., with respect to the
past or future, which are in a certain way extrinsic in respect to the present,
since the present is between the past and the future. 6 Et quia ita est,
contingit omne quod quis affirmaverit negare, et omne quod quis negaverit
affirmare: quod quidem manifestum est ex praemissis. Non enim potest affirmari
nisi vel quod est in rerum natura secundum aliquod trium temporum, vel quod non
est; et hoc totum contingit negare. Unde manifestum est quod omne quod
affirmatur potest negari, et e converso. Et quia affirmatio et negatio opposita
sunt secundum se, utpote ex opposito contradictoriae, consequens est quod
quaelibet affirmatio habeat negationem sibi oppositam et e converso. Cuius
contrarium illo solo modo posset contingere, si aliqua affirmatio affirmaret
aliquid, quod negatio negare non posset. Since there are these four differences
of enunciation in past and future time as well as in present time, it is
possible to deny everything that is affirmed and to affirm everything that is
denied. This is evident from the premises, for it is only possible to affirm
either that which is in reality according to past, present, or future time, or
that which is not; and it is possible to deny all of this. It is clear, then,
that everything that is affirmed can be denied or vice versa. Now, since
affirmation and negation are per se opposed, i.e., in an opposition of
contradiction, it follows that any affirmation would have a negation opposed to
it, and conversely. The contrary of this could happen only if an affirmation
could affirm something that the negation could not deny. 7 Deinde cum dicit: et
sit hoc contradictio etc., manifestat quae sit absoluta oppositio affirmationis
et negationis. Et primo, manifestat eam per nomen; secundo, per definitionem;
ibi: dico autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod cum cuilibet affirmationi
opponatur negatio, et e converso, oppositioni huiusmodi imponatur nomen hoc,
quod dicatur contradictio. Per hoc enim quod dicitur, et sit hoc contradictio,
datur intelligi quod ipsum nomen contradictionis ipse imposuerit oppositioni
affirmationis et negationis, ut Ammonius dicit. When he says, We will call this
opposed affirmation and negation "contradiction,” he explains what
absolute opposition of affirmation and negation is. He does this first through
the name; secondly, through the definition where he says, I mean by
"opposed” the enunciation of the same thing of the same subject, etc.
"Contradiction,” he says, is the name imposed for the kind of opposition
in which a negation is opposed to an affirmation and conversely. By saying We will
call this "contradiction,” we are given to understand—as Ammonius points
out—that he has himself imposed the name "contradiction” for the
opposition of affirmation and negation. 8 Deinde cum dicit: dico autem opponi
etc., definit contradictionem. Quia vero, ut dictum est, contradictio est
oppositio affirmationis et negationis, illa requiruntur ad contradictionem,
quae requiruntur ad oppositionem affirmationis et negationis. Oportet autem
opposita esse circa idem. Et quia enunciatio constituitur ex subiecto et praedicato,
requiritur ad contradictionem primo quidem quod affirmatio et negatio sint
eiusdem praedicati: si enim dicatur, Plato currit, Plato non disputat, non est
contradictio; secundo, requiritur quod sint de eodem subiecto: si enim dicatur,
Socrates currit, Plato non currit, non est contradictio. Tertio, requiritur
quod identitas subiecti et praedicati non solum sit secundum nomen, sed sit
simul secundum rem et nomen. Nam si non sit idem nomen, manifestum est quod non
sit una et eadem enunciatio. Similiter autem ad hoc quod sit enunciatio una,
requiritur identitas rei: dictum est enim supra quod enunciatio una est, quae
unum de uno significat; et ideo subdit: non autem aequivoce, idest non sufficit
identitas nominis cum diversitate rei, quae facit aequivocationem. Then he
defines contradiction when he says, I mean by "opposed” the enunciation of
the same thing of the same subject, etc. Since contradiction is the opposition
of affirmation and negation, as he has said, whatever is required for the
opposition of affirmation and negation is required for contradiction. Now,
opposites must be about the same thing and since the enunciation is made up of
a subject and predicate the first requirement for contradiction is affirmation
and negation of the same predicate, for if we say "Plato runs” and
"Plato does not discuss,” there is no contradiction. The second is that
the affirmation and negation be of the same subject, for if we say
"Socrates runs” and "Plato does not run,” there is no contradiction.
The third requirement is identity of subject and predicate not only according
to name but according to the thing and the name at once; for clearly, if the
same name is not used there is not one and the same enunciation; similarly
there must be identity of the thing, for as was said above, the enunciation is
one when it signifies one thing said of one thing.”’ This is why he adds, not
equivocally however, for identity of name with diversity of the thing—which is
equivocation—is not sufficient for contradiction. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 9 n. 9Sunt
autem et quaedam alia in contradictione observanda ad hoc quod tollatur omnis
diversitas, praeter eam quae est affirmationis et negationis: non enim esset
oppositio si non omnino idem negaret negatio quod affirmavit affirmatio. Haec
autem diversitas potest secundum quatuor considerari. Uno quidem modo, secundum
diversas partes subiecti: non enim est contradictio si dicatur, Aethiops est
albus dente et non est albus pede. Secundo, si sit diversus modus ex parte
praedicati: non enim est contradictio si dicatur, Socrates currit tarde et non
movetur velociter; vel si dicatur, ovum est animal in potentia et non est
animal in actu. Tertio, si sit diversitas ex parte mensurae, puta loci vel
temporis; non enim est contradictio si dicatur, pluit in Gallia et non pluit in
Italia; aut, pluit heri, hodie non pluit. Quarto, si sit diversitas ex
habitudine ad aliquid extrinsecum; puta si dicatur, decem homines esse plures
quoad domum, non autem quoad forum. Et haec omnia designat cum subdit: et
quaecumque caetera talium determinavimus, idest determinare consuevimus in
disputationibus contra sophisticas importunitates, idest contra importunas et
litigiosas oppositiones sophistarum, de quibus plenius facit mentionem in I
elenchorum. There are also certain other things that must be observed with
respect to contradiction in order that all diversity be destroyed except the
diversity of affirmation and negation, for if the negation does not deny in
every way the same thing that the affirmation affirms there will not be
opposition. Inquiry can be made about this diversity in respect to four things:
first, are there diverse parts of the subject, for if we say "An Ethiopian
is white as to teeth” and "An Ethiopian is not white as to foot,” there is
no contradiction; secondly, is there a diverse mode on the part of the
predicate, for there is no contradiction if we say "Socrates runs slowly”
and "Socrates is not moving swiftly,” or "An egg is an animal in
potency” and "An egg is not an animal in act”; thirdly, is there diversity
on the part of measure, for instance, of place or time, for there is no
contradiction if we say "It is raining in Gaul” and "It is not
raining in Italy,” or "It rained yesterday” and "It did not rain
today”; fourthly, is there diversity from a relationship to something
extrinsic, as when we say "Ten men are many in respect to a house, but not
in respect to a court house.” Aristotle designates all of these when he adds,
nor in any of the other ways that we have distinguished, i.e., that it is usual
to determine in disputations against the specious difficulties of the sophists,
i.e., against the fallacious and quarrelsome objections of the sophists, which
he mentions more fully in I Elenchorum [5: 166b 28–167a 36]. X. 1 Quia
philosophus dixerat oppositionem affirmationis et negationis esse
contradictionem, quae est eiusdem de eodem, consequenter intendit distinguere
diversas oppositiones affirmationis et negationis, ut cognoscatur quae sit vera
contradictio. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, praemittit quamdam divisionem
enunciationum necessariam ad praedictam differentiam oppositionum assignandam;
secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: si ergo universaliter et cetera.
Praemittit autem divisionem enunciationum quae sumitur secundum differentiam
subiecti. Unde circa primum duo facit: primo, dividit subiectum enunciationum;
secundo, concludit divisionem enunciationum, ibi: necesse est enunciare et
cetera. The Philosopher has just said that contradiction is the opposition of
the affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same subject. Following
upon this he distinguishes the diverse oppositions of affirmation and negation,
the purpose being to know what true contradiction is. He first states a
division of enunciation which is necessary in order to assign the difference of
these oppositions; then he begins to manifest the different oppositions where
he says, If, then, it is universally enunciated of a universal that something
belongs or does not belong to it, etc. The division he gives is taken from the
difference of the subject and therefore he divides the subject of enunciations
first; then he concludes with the division of enunciation, where he says, we
have to enunciate either of a universal or of a singular, etc. 2 Subiectum
autem enunciationis est nomen vel aliquid loco nominis sumptum. Nomen autem est
vox significativa ad placitum simplicis intellectus, quod est similitudo rei;
et ideo subiectum enunciationis distinguit per divisionem rerum, et dicit quod
rerum quaedam sunt universalia, quaedam sunt singularia. Manifestat autem
membra divisionis dupliciter: primo quidem per definitionem, quia universale
est quod est aptum natum de pluribus praedicari, singulare vero quod non est
aptum natum praedicari de pluribus, sed de uno solo; secundo, manifestat per
exemplum cum subdit quod homo est universale, Plato autem singulare. Now the
subject of an enunciation is a name or something taken in place of a name. A
name is a vocal sound significant by convention of simple thought, which, in
turn, is a likeness of the thing. Hence, Aristotle distinguishes the subject of
enunciation by a division of things; and he says that of things, some are
universals, others singulars. He then explains the members of this division in
two ways. First he defines them. Then he manifests them by example when he
says, "man” is universal, "Plato” singular. 3 Accidit autem dubitatio
circa hanc divisionem, quia, sicut probat philosophus in VII metaphysicae,
universale non est aliquid extra res existens. Item, in praedicamentis dicitur
quod secundae substantiae non sunt nisi in primis, quae sunt singulares. Non
ergo videtur esse conveniens divisio rerum per universalia et singularia: quia
nullae res videntur esse universales, sed omnes sunt singulares. There is a
difficulty about this division, for the Philosopher proves in VII Metaphysicae
[14: 1039a 23] that the universal is not something existing outside of the
thing; and in the Predicamenta [5: 2a 11] he says that second substances are
only in first substances, i.e., singulars. Therefore, the division of things
into universals and singulars does not seem to be consistent, since according
to him there are no things that are universal; on the contrary, all things are
singular. 4 Dicendum est autem quod hic dividuntur res secundum quod significantur
per nomina, quae subiiciuntur in enunciationibus: dictum est autem supra quod
nomina non significant res nisi mediante intellectu; et ideo oportet quod
divisio ista rerum accipiatur secundum quod res cadunt in intellectu. Ea vero
quae sunt coniuncta in rebus intellectus potest distinguere, quando unum eorum
non cadit in ratione alterius. In qualibet autem re singulari est considerare
aliquid quod est proprium illi rei, in quantum est haec res, sicut Socrati vel
Platoni in quantum est hic homo; et aliquid est considerare in ea, in quo
convenit cum aliis quibusdam rebus, sicut quod Socrates est animal, aut homo,
aut rationalis, aut risibilis, aut albus. Quando igitur res denominatur ab eo
quod convenit illi soli rei in quantum est haec res, huiusmodi nomen dicitur
significare aliquid singulare; quando autem denominatur res ab eo quod est
commune sibi et multis aliis, nomen huiusmodi dicitur significare universale,
quia scilicet nomen significat naturam sive dispositionem aliquam, quae est
communis multis. Quia igitur hanc divisionem dedit de rebus non absolute
secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed secundum quod referuntur ad intellectum,
non definivit universale et singulare secundum aliquid quod pertinet ad rem,
puta si diceret quod universale extra animam, quod pertinet ad opinionem
Platonis, sed per actum animae intellectivae, quod est praedicari de multis vel
de uno solo. The things divided here, however, are things as signified by
names—which names are subjects of enunciations. Now, Aristotle has already said
that names signify things only through the mediation of the intellect;
therefore, this division must be taken as a division of things as apprehended
by the intellect. Now in fact, whatever is joined together in things can be
distinguished by the intellect when one of them does not belong to the notion
of the other. In any singular thing, we can consider what is proper to the
thing insofar as it is this thing, for instance, what is proper to Socrates or
to Plato insofar as he is this man. We can also consider that in which it
agrees with certain other things, as, that Socrates is an animal, or man, or
rational, or risible, or white. Accordingly, when a thing is denominated from
what belongs only to this thing insofar as it is this thing, the name is said
to signify a singular. When a thing is denominated from what is common to it
and to many others, the name is said to signify a universal since it signifies
a nature or some disposition which is common to many. Immediately after giving
this division of things, then—not of things absolutely as they are outside of
the soul, but as they are referred to the intellect—Aristotle defines the
universal and the singular through the act of the intellective soul, as that
which is such as to be predicated of many or of only one, and not according to
anything that pertains to the thing, that is, as if he were affirming such a
universal outside of the soul, an opinion relating to Plato’s teaching. 5 Est
autem considerandum quod intellectus apprehendit rem intellectam secundum
propriam essentiam, seu definitionem: unde et in III de anima dicitur quod
obiectum proprium intellectus est quod quid est. Contingit autem quandoque quod
propria ratio alicuius formae intellectae non repugnat ei quod est esse in
pluribus, sed hoc impeditur ab aliquo alio, sive sit aliquid accidentaliter
adveniens, puta si omnibus hominibus morientibus unus solus remaneret, sive sit
propter conditionem materiae, sicut est unus tantum sol, non quod repugnet
rationi solari esse in pluribus secundum conditionem formae ipsius, sed quia
non est alia materia susceptiva talis formae; et ideo non dixit quod universale
est quod praedicatur de pluribus, sed quod aptum natum est praedicari de
pluribus. There is a further point we should consider in relation to this
portion of the text. The intellect apprehends the thing—understood according to
the thing’s essence or definition. This is the reason Aristotle says in III De
anima [4:429b 10] that the proper object of the intellect is what the thing
essentially is. Now, sometimes the proper nature of some understood form is not
repugnant to being in many but is impeded by something else, either by
something occurring accidentally (for instance if all men but one were to die)
or because of the condition of matter; the sun, for instance, is only one, not
because it is repugnant to the notion of the sun to be in many according to the
condition of its form, but because there is no other matter capable of
receiving such a form. This is the reason Aristotle did not say that the
universal is that which is predicated of many, but that which is of such a
nature as to be predicated of many. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 6Cum autem omnis
forma, quae nata est recipi in materia quantum est de se, communicabilis sit
multis materiis; dupliciter potest contingere quod id quod significatur per
nomen, non sit aptum natum praedicari de pluribus. Uno modo, quia nomen
significat formam secundum quod terminata est ad hanc materiam, sicut hoc nomen
Socrates vel Plato, quod significat naturam humanam prout est in hac materia.
Alio modo, secundum quod nomen significat formam, quae non est nata in materia
recipi, unde oportet quod per se remaneat una et singularis; sicut albedo, si
esset forma non existens in materia, esset una sola, unde esset singularis: et
propter hoc philosophus dicit in VII Metaphys. quod si essent species rerum
separatae, sicut posuit Plato, essent individua. Now, since every form which is
so constituted as to be received in matter is communicable to many matters,
there are two ways in which what is signified by a name may not be of such a
nature as to be predicated of many: in one way, because a name signifies a form
as terminated in this matter, as in the case of the name "Socrates” or
"Plato,” which signifies human nature as it is in this matter; in another
way, because a name signifies a form which is not constituted to be received in
matter and consequently must remain per se one and singular. Whiteness, for
example, would be only one if it were a form not a existing in matter, and
consequently singular. This is the reason the Philosopher says in VII
Metaphysicae [6: 1045a 36–1045b 7] that if there were separated species of
things, as Plato held, they would be individuals. 7 Potest autem obiici quod
hoc nomen Socrates vel Plato est natum de pluribus praedicari, quia nihil
prohibet multos esse, qui vocentur hoc nomine. Sed ad hoc patet responsio, si
attendantur verba Aristotelis. Ipse enim non divisit nomina in universale et
particulare, sed res. Et ideo intelligendum est quod universale dicitur quando,
non solum nomen potest de pluribus praedicari, sed id, quod significatur per
nomen, est natum in pluribus inveniri; hoc autem non contingit in praedictis
nominibus: nam hoc nomen Socrates vel Plato significat naturam humanam secundum
quod est in hac materia. Si vero hoc nomen imponatur alteri homini significabit
naturam humanam in alia materia; et sic eius erit alia significatio; unde non
erit universale, sed aequivocum. It could be objected that the name
"Socrates” or "Plato” is of such a kind as to be predicated of many,
since there is nothing to prevent their being applied to many. The response to
this objection is evident if we consider Aristotle’s words. Notice that he
divides things into universal and particular, not names. It should be
understood from this that what is said to be universal not only has a name that
can be predicated of many but what is signified by the name is of such a nature
as to be found in many. Now this is not the case in the above-mentioned names,
for the name "Socrates” or "Plato” signifies human nature as it is in
this matter. If one of these names is imposed on another man it will signify
human nature in other matter and thus another signification of it.
Consequently, it will be equivocal, not universal. 8 Deinde cum dicit: necesse
est autem enunciare etc., concludit divisionem enunciationis. Quia enim semper
enunciatur aliquid de aliqua re; rerum autem quaedam sunt universalia, quaedam
singularia; necesse est quod quandoque enuncietur aliquid inesse vel non inesse
alicui universalium, quandoque vero alicui singularium. Et est suspensiva
constructio usque huc, et est sensus: quoniam autem sunt haec quidem rerum
etc., necesse est enunciare et cetera. When he says, we have to enunciate
either of a universal or of a singular that something belongs or does not
belong to it, he infers the division of the enunciation. Since something is
always enunciated of some thing, and of things some are universals and some
singulars, it follows that sometimes it will be enunciated that something
belongs or does not belong to something universal, sometimes to something
singular. The construction of the sentence was interrupted by the explanation
of universal and singular but now we can see the meaning: Since some of the things
we are concerned with are universal and others singular... we have to enunciate
either of a universal or of a singular that something belongs or does not
belong to it. 9 Est autem considerandum quod de universali aliquid enunciatur
quatuor modis. Nam universale potest uno modo considerari quasi separatum a
singularibus, sive per se subsistens, ut Plato posuit, sive, secundum
sententiam Aristotelis, secundum esse quod habet in intellectu. Et sic potest
ei aliquid attribui dupliciter. Quandoque enim attribuitur ei sic considerato
aliquid, quod pertinet ad solam operationem intellectus, ut si dicatur quod
homo est praedicabile de multis, sive universale, sive species. Huiusmodi enim
intentiones format intellectus attribuens eas naturae intellectae, secundum
quod comparat ipsam ad res, quae sunt extra animam. Quandoque vero attribuitur
aliquid universali sic considerato, quod scilicet apprehenditur ab intellectu
ut unum, tamen id quod attribuitur ei non pertinet ad actum intellectus, sed ad
esse, quod habet natura apprehensa in rebus, quae sunt extra animam, puta si
dicatur quod homo est dignissima creaturarum. Hoc enim convenit naturae humanae
etiam secundum quod est in singularibus. Nam quilibet homo singularis dignior
est omnibus creaturis irrationalibus; sed tamen omnes homines singulares non
sunt unus homo extra animam, sed solum in acceptione intellectus; et per hunc
modum attribuitur ei praedicatum, scilicet ut uni rei. Alio autem modo
attribuitur universali, prout est in singularibus, et hoc dupliciter. Quandoque
quidem ratione ipsius naturae universalis, puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod
ad essentiam eius pertinet, vel quod consequitur principia essentialia; ut cum
dicitur, homo est animal, vel homo est risibilis. Quandoque autem attribuitur
ei aliquid ratione singularis in quo invenitur, puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid
quod pertinet ad actionem individui; ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat. Singulari
autem attribuitur aliquid tripliciter: uno modo, secundum quod cadit in
apprehensione; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est singulare, vel praedicabile de uno
solo. Quandoque autem, ratione naturae communis; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est
animal. Quandoque autem, ratione sui ipsius; ut cum dicitur, Socrates ambulat.
Et totidem etiam modis negationes variantur: quia omne quod contingit
affirmare, contingit negare, ut supra dictum est. 9. In relation to the point being made here we have
to consider the four ways in which something is enunciated of the universal. On
the one band, the universal can be considered as though separated from
singulars, whether subsisting per se as Plato held or according to the being it
has in the intellect as Aristotle held; considered thus, something can be
attributed to it in two ways. Sometimes we attribute something to it which
pertains only to the operation of the intellect; for example when we say,
"Man,” whether the universal or the species, "is predicable” of many.
For the intellect forms intentions of this kind, attributing them to the nature
understood according as it compares the nature to the things outside of the
mind. But sometimes we attribute something to the universal thus considered
(i.e., as it is apprehended by the intellect as one) which does not belong to
the act of the intellect but to the being that the nature apprehended has in
things outside of the soul; for example, when we say "Man is the noblest
of creatures.” For this truly belongs to human nature as it is in singulars,
since any single man is more noble than all irrational creatures; yet all
singular men are not one man outside of the mind, but only in the apprehension
of the intellect; and the predicate is attributed to it in this way, i.e., as
to one thing. On the other hand, we attribute something to the universal as in
singulars in another way, and this is twofold: sometimes it is in view of the
universal nature itself; for instance, when we attribute something to it that
belongs to its essence, or follows upon the essential principles, as in
"Man is an animal,” or "Man is risible.” Sometimes it is in view of
the singular in which the universal is found; for instance, when we attribute
something to the universal that pertains to the action of the individual, as in
"Man walks. Moreover, something is attributed to the singular in three
ways: in one way, as it is subject to the intellect, as when we say
"Socrates is a singular,” or "predicable of only one”; in another
way, by reason of the common nature, as when we say "Socrates is an
animal”; in the third way, by reason of itself, as when we say "Socrates
is walking.” The negations are varied in the same number of ways, since
everything that can be affirmed can also be denied, as was said above. 10 Est
autem haec tertia divisio enunciationis quam ponit philosophus. Prima namque
fuit quod enunciationum quaedam est una simpliciter, quaedam vero coniunctione
una. Quae quidem est divisio analogi in ea de quibus praedicatur secundum prius
et posterius: sic enim unum dividitur secundum prius in simplex et per
posterius in compositum. Alia vero fuit divisio enunciationis in affirmationem
et negationem. Quae quidem est divisio generis in species, quia sumitur
secundum differentiam praedicati ad quod fertur negatio; praedicatum autem est
pars formalis enunciationis; et ideo huiusmodi divisio dicitur pertinere ad
qualitatem enunciationis, qualitatem, inquam, essentialem, secundum quod
differentia significat quale quid. Tertia autem est huiusmodi divisio, quae
sumitur secundum differentiam subiecti, quod praedicatur de pluribus vel de uno
solo, et ideo dicitur pertinere ad quantitatem enunciationis, nam et quantitas
consequitur materiam. This is the third division the Philosopher has given of
the enunciation. The first was the division of the enunciation into one simply
and one by conjunction. This is an analogous division into those things of
which one is predicated primarily and consequently, for one is divided
according to the prior and posterior into simple and composite. The second was
the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation. This is a division
of genus into species, for it is taken from the difference of the predicate to
which a negation is added. The predicate is the formal part of the enunciation
and hence such a division is said to pertain to the quality of the enunciation.
By "quality” I mean essential quality, for in this case the difference
signifies the quality of the essence. The third division is based upon the
difference of the subject as predicated of many or of only one, and is
therefore a division that pertains to the quantity of the enunciation, for quantity
follows upon matter. 11 Deinde cum dicit: si ergo universaliter etc., ostendit
quomodo enunciationes diversimode opponantur secundum diversitatem subiecti. Et
circa hoc duo facit: primo, distinguit diversos modos oppositionum in ipsis
enunciationibus; secundo, ostendit quomodo diversae oppositiones diversimode se
habent ad verum et falsum; ibi: quocirca hasquidem impossibile est et cetera.Aristotle
shows next how enunciations are opposed in diverse ways according to the
diversity of the subject when he says, If, then, it is universally enunciated
of a universal that something belongs or does not belong to it, etc. He first
distinguishes the diverse modes of opposition in enunciations; secondly, he
shows how these diverse oppositions are related in different ways to truth and
falsity where he says, Hence in the case of the latter it is impossible that
both be at once true, etc. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 12Circa primum considerandum
est quod cum universale possit considerari in abstractione a singularibus vel
secundum quod est in ipsis singularibus, secundum hoc diversimode aliquid ei
attribuitur, ut supra dictum est. Ad designandum autem diversos modos
attributionis inventae sunt quaedam dictiones, quae possunt dici
determinationes vel signa, quibus designatur quod aliquid de universali, hoc
aut illo modo praedicetur. Sed quia non est ab omnibus communiter apprehensum
quod universalia extra singularia subsistant, ideo communis usus loquendi non
habet aliquam dictionem ad designandum illum modum praedicandi, prout aliquid
dicitur in abstractione a singularibus. Sed Plato, qui posuit universalia extra
singularia subsistere, adinvenit aliquas determinationes, quibus designaretur
quomodo aliquid attribuitur universali, prout est extra singularia, et vocabat
universale separatum subsistens extra singularia quantum ad speciem hominis,
per se hominem vel ipsum hominem et similiter in aliis universalibus. Sed
universale secundum quod est in singularibus cadit in communi apprehensione
hominum; et ideo adinventae sunt quaedam dictiones ad significandum modum
attribuendi aliquid universali sic accepto. First, then, he distinguishes the
diverse modes of opposition and since these depend upon a diversity in the
subject we must first consider the latter diversity. Now the universal can be
considered either in abstraction from singulars or as it is in singulars, and
by reason of this something is attributed in diverse modes to the universal, as
we have already said. To designate diverse modes of attribution certain words
have been conceived which may be called determinations or signs and which
designate that something is predicated in this or that mode. But first we
should note that since it is not commonly apprehended by all men that
universals subsist outside of singulars there is no word in common speech to
designate the mode of predicating in which something is said of a universal
thus in abstraction from singulars. Plato, who held that universals subsist
outside of singulars, did, however, invent certain determinations to designate
the way in which something is attributed to the universal as it is outside of
singulars. With respect to the species man he called the separated universal
subsisting outside of singulars "man per se”’or "man itself,” and he
designated other such universals in like manner. The universal as it is in
singulars, however, does fall within the common apprehension of men and
accordingly certain words have been conceived to signify the mode of
attributing something to the universal taken in this way. 13 Sicut autem supra
dictum est, quandoque aliquid attribuitur universali ratione ipsius naturae
universalis; et ideo hoc dicitur praedicari de eo universaliter, quia scilicet
ei convenit secundum totam multitudinem in qua invenitur; et ad hoc designandum
in affirmativis praedicationibus adinventa est haec dictio, omnis, quae
designat quod praedicatum attribuitur subiecto universali quantum ad totum id
quod sub subiecto continetur. In negativis autem praedicationibus adinventa est
haec dictio, nullus, per quam significatur quod praedicatum removetur a
subiecto universali secundum totum id quod continetur sub eo. Unde nullus
dicitur quasi non ullus, et in Graeco dicitur, udis quasi nec unus, quia nec
unum solum est accipere sub subiecto universali a quo praedicatum non
removeatur. Quandoque autem attribuitur universali aliquid vel removetur ab eo
ratione particularis; et ad hoc designandum, in affirmativis quidem adinventa
est haec dictio, aliquis vel quidam, per quam designatur quod praedicatum
attribuitur subiecto universali ratione ipsius particularis; sed quia non
determinate significat formam alicuius singularis, sub quadam indeterminatione
singulare designat; unde et dicitur individuum vagum. In negativis autem non
est aliqua dictio posita, sed possumus accipere, non omnis; ut sicut, nullus,
universaliter removet, eo quod significat quasi diceretur, non ullus, idest,
non aliquis, ita etiam, non omnis, particulariter removeat, in quantum excludit
universalem affirmationem. As was said above, sometimes something is attributed
to the universal in view of the universal nature itself; for this reason it is
said to be predicated of the universal universally, i.e., that it belongs to
the universal according to the whole multitude in which it is found. The word "every”
has been devised to designate this in affirmative predications. It designates
that the predicate is attributed to the universal subject with respect to the
whole of what is contained under the subject. In negative predications the word
"no” has been devised to signify that the predicate is removed from the
universal subject according to the whole of what is contained under it. Hence,
saying nullus in Latin is like saying non ullus [not any] and in Greek??de??
[none] is like??de e?? [not one], for not a single one is understood under the
universal subject from which the predicate is not removed. Sometimes something
is either attributed to or removed from the universal in view of the
particular. To designate this in affirmative enunciations, the word "some,”
or "a certain one,” has been devised. We designate by this that the
predicate is attributed to the universal subject by reason of the particular.
"Some,” or "a certain one,” however, does not signify the form of any
singular determinately, rather, it designates the singular under a certain
indetermination. The singular so designated is therefore called the vague
individual. In negative enunciations there is no designated word, but "not
all” can be used. just as "no,” then, removes universally, for it signifies
the same thing as if we were to say "not any,” (i.e., "not some”) so
also "not all” removes particularly inasmuch as it excludes universal
affirmation. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 14Sic igitur tria sunt genera
affirmationum in quibus aliquid de universali praedicatur. Una quidem est, in
qua de universali praedicatur aliquid universaliter; ut cum dicitur, omnis homo
est animal. Alia, in qua aliquid praedicatur de universali particulariter; ut
cum dicitur, quidam homo est albus. Tertia vero est, in qua aliquid de
universali praedicatur absque determinatione universalitatis vel
particularitatis; unde huiusmodi enunciatio solet vocari indefinita. Totidem
autem sunt negationes oppositae. There are, therefore, three kinds of
affirmations in which something is predicated of a universal: in one, something
is predicated of the universal universally, as in "Every man is an
animal”; in another, something is predicated of the universal particularly, as
in "Some man is white.” The third is the affirmation in which something is
predicated of the universal without a determination of universality or
particularity. Enunciations of this kind are customarily called indefinite.
There are the same number of opposed negations. 15 De singulari autem quamvis
aliquid diversa ratione praedicetur, ut supra dictum est, tamen totum refertur
ad singularitatem ipsius, quia etiam natura universalis in ipso singulari
individuatur; et ideo nihil refert quantum ad naturam singularitatis, utrum
aliquid praedicetur de eo ratione universalis naturae; ut cum dicitur, Socrates
est homo, vel conveniat ei ratione singularitatis. In the case of the singular,
although something is predicated of it in a different respect, as was said
above, nevertheless the whole is referred to its singularity because the universal
nature is individuated in the singular; therefore it makes no difference as far
as the nature of singularity is concerned whether something is predicated of
the singular by reason of the universal nature, as in "Socrates is a man,”
or belongs to it by reason of its singularity. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 16Si
igitur tribus praedictis enunciationibus addatur singularis, erunt quatuor modi
enunciationis ad quantitatem ipsius pertinentes, scilicet universalis,
singularis, indefinitus et particularis. If we add the singular to the three
already mentioned there will be four modes of enunciation pertaining to
quantity: universal singular, indefinite, and particular. 17 Sic igitur
secundum has differentias Aristoteles assignat diversas oppositiones enunciationum
adinvicem. Et primo, secundum differentiam universalium ad indefinitas;
secundo, secundum differentiam universalium ad particulares; ibi: opponi autem
affirmationem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, agit de oppositione
propositionum universalium adinvicem; secundo, de oppositione indefinitarum;
ibi: quando autem in universalibus etc.; tertio, excludit dubitationem; ibi: in
eo vero quod et cetera. Aristotle assigns the diverse oppositions of
enunciations according to these differences. The first opposition is based on
the difference of universals and indefinites; the second bn the difference of
universals and particulars, the latter being treated where he says, Affirmation
is opposed to negation in the way I call contradictory, etc. With respect to
the first opposition, the one between universals and indefinites, the
opposition of universal propositions to each other is treated first, and then
the opposition of indefinite enunciations where he says, On the other hand,
when the enunciations are of a universal but not universally enunciated, etc.
Finally he precludes a possible question where he says, In the predicate,
however, the universal universally predicated is not true, etc. Aquinas lib. 1
l. 10 n. 18Dicit ergo primo quod si aliquis enunciet de subiecto universali
universaliter, idest secundum continentiam suae universalitatis, quoniam est,
idest affirmative, aut non est, idest negative, erunt contrariae enunciationes;
ut si dicatur, omnis homo est albus, nullus homo est albus. Huius autem ratio
est, quia contraria dicuntur quae maxime a se distant: non enim dicitur aliquid
nigrum ex hoc solum quod non est album, sed super hoc quod est non esse album,
quod significat communiter remotionem albi, addit nigrum extremam distantiam ab
albo. Sic igitur id quod affirmatur per hanc enunciationem, omnis homo est
albus, removetur per hanc negationem, non omnis homo est albus. Oportet ergo
quod negatio removeat modum quo praedicatum dicitur de subiecto, quem designat
haec dictio, omnis. Sed super hanc remotionem addit haec enunciatio, nullus
homo est albus, totalem remotionem, quae est extrema distantia a primo; quod
pertinet ad rationem contrarietatis. Et ideo convenienter hanc oppositionem
dicit contrarietatem. He says first, then, that if someone enunciates
universally of a universal subject, i.e., according to the content of its
universality, that it is, i.e., affirmatively, or is not, i.e., negatively,
these enunciations will be contrary; as when we say, "Every man is white,”
"No man is white.” And the reason is that the things that are most distant
from each other are said to be contraries. For a thing is not said to be black
only because it is not white but because over and beyond not being white—which
signifies the remotion of white commonly—it is, in addition, black, the extreme
in distance from white. What is affirmed by the enunciation "Every man is
white” then, is removed by the negation "Not every man is white”; the
negation, therefore, removes the mode in which the predicate is said of the
subject which the word "every” designates. But over and beyond this
remotion, the enunciation "No man is white” which is most distant from
"Every man is white,” adds total remotion, and this belongs to the notion
of contrariety. He therefore appropriately calls this opposition contrariety.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 19Deinde cum dicit: quando autem etc., ostendit qualis
sit oppositio affirmationis et negationis in indefinitis. Et primo, proponit
quod intendit; secundo, manifestat propositum per exempla; ibi: dico autem non
universaliter etc.; tertio, assignat rationem manifestationis; ibi: cum enim
universale sit homo et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod quando de universalibus
subiectis affirmatur aliquid vel negatur non tamen universaliter, non sunt
contrariae enunciationes, sed illa quae significantur contingit esse contraria.
Deinde cum dicit: dico autem non universaliter etc., manifestat per exempla.
Ubi considerandum est quod non dixerat quando in universalibus particulariter,
sed non universaliter. Non enim intendit de particularibus enunciationibus, sed
de solis indefinitis. Et hoc manifestat per exempla quae ponit, dicens fieri in
universalibus subiectis non universalem enunciationem; cum dicitur, est albus
homo, non est albus homo. Et rationem huius expositionis ostendit, quia homo,
qui subiicitur, est universale, sed tamen praedicatum non universaliter de eo
praedicatur, quia non apponitur haec dictio, omnis: quae non significat ipsum
universale, sed modum universalitatis, prout scilicet praedicatum dicitur universaliter
de subiecto; et ideo addita subiecto universali, semper significat quod aliquid
de eo dicatur universaliter. Tota autem haec expositio refertur ad hoc quod
dixerat: quando in universalibus non universaliter enunciatur, non sunt
contrariae. When he says, On the other hand, when the enunciations are of a
universal but not universally enunciated, etc., he shows what kind of
opposition there is between affirmation and negation in indefinite
enunciations. First he states the point; he then manifests it by an example
when he says, I mean by "enunciated of a universal but not universally,”
etc. Finally he gives the reason for this when he says, For while "man” is
a universal, it is not used as universal, etc. He says first, then, that when
something is affirmed or denied of a universal subject, but not universally,
the enunciations are not contrary but the things that are signified may be
contraries. He clarifies this with examples where he says, I mean by
"enunciated of a universal but not universally,” etc. Note in relation to
this that what he said just before this was "when... of universals but not
universally enunciated” and not, "when... of universals particularly,” the
reason being that he only intends to speak of indefinite enunciations, not of
particulars. This he manifests by the examples he gives. When we say "Man
is white” and "Man is not white,” the universal subjects do not make them
universal enunciations. He gives as the reason for this, that although man,
which stands as the subject, is universal, the predicate is not predicated of
it universally because the word "every” is not added, which does not
itself signify the universal, but the mode of universality, i.e., that the
predicate is said universally of the subject. Therefore when "every” is
added to the universal subject it always signifies that something is said of it
universally. This whole exposition relates to his saying, On the other hand,
when the enunciations are of a universal but not universally enunciated, they
are not contraries. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 20Sed hoc quod additur: quae autem
significantur contingit esse contraria, non est expositum, quamvis obscuritatem
contineat; et ideo a diversis diversimode exponitur. Quidam enim hoc referre
voluerunt ad contrarietatem veritatis et falsitatis, quae competit huiusmodi
enunciationibus. Contingit enim quandoque has simul esse veras, homo est albus,
homo non est albus; et sic non sunt contrariae, quia contraria mutuo se
tollunt. Contingit tamen quandoque unam earum esse veram et alteram esse
falsam; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, homo non est animal; et sic ratione
significati videntur habere quamdam contrarietatem. Sed hoc non videtur ad
propositum pertinere, tum quia philosophus nondum hic loquitur de veritate et
falsitate enunciationum; tum etiam quia hoc ipsum posset de particularibus
enunciationibus dici. Immediately after this he adds, although it is possible
for the things signified to be contraries, and in spite of the fact that this
is obscure he does not explain it. It has therefore been interpreted in
different ways. Some related it to the contrariety of truth and falsity proper
to enunciations of this kind, For such enunciations may be simultaneously true,
as in "Man is white” and "Man is not white,” and thus not be
contraries, for contraries mutually destroy each other. On the other hand, one
may be true and the other false, as in "Man is an animal” and "Man is
not an animal,” and thus by reason of what is signified seem to have a certain
kind of contrariety. But this does not seem to be related to what Aristotle has
said: first, because the Philosopher has not yet taken up the point of truth
and falsity of enunciations; secondly, because this very thing can also be said
of particular enunciations. Alii vero, sequentes Porphyrium, referunt hoc ad
contrarietatem praedicati. Contingit enim quandoque quod praedicatum negatur de
subiecto propter hoc quod inest ei contrarium; sicut si dicatur, homo non est
albus, quia est niger; et sic id quod significatur per hoc quod dicitur, non est
albus, potest esse contrarium. Non tamen semper: removetur enim aliquid a
subiecto, etiam si contrarium non insit, sed aliquid medium inter contraria; ut
cum dicitur, aliquis non est albus, quia est pallidus; vel quia inest ei
privatio actus vel habitus seu potentiae; ut cum dicitur, aliquis non est
videns, quia est carens potentia visiva, aut habet impedimentum ne videat, vel
etiam quia non est aptus natus videre; puta si dicatur, lapis non videt. Sic
igitur illa, quae significantur contingit esse contraria, sed ipsae
enunciationes non sunt contrariae, quia ut in fine huius libri dicetur, non
sunt contrariae opiniones quae sunt de contrariis, sicut opinio quod aliquid
sit bonum, et illa quae est, quod aliquid non est bonum. Others, following
Porphyry, relate this to the contrariety of the predicate. For sometimes the
predicate may be denied of the subject because of the presence of the contrary
in it, as when we say, "Man is not white” because he is black; thus it
could be the contrary that is signified by "is not white.” This is not
always the case, however, for we remove something from a subject even when it
is not a contrary that is present in it but some mean between contraries, as in
saying, "So-and-so is not white” because he is pale; or when there is a
privation of act or habit or potency, as in saying, "So-and-so is
non-seeing” because he lacks the power of sight or has an impediment so that he
cannot see, or even because something is not of such a nature as to see, as in
saying, "A stone does not see.” It is therefore possible for the things
signified to be contraries, but the enunciations themselves not to be; for as
is said near the end of this book, opinions that are about contraries are not
contrary,”’ for example, an opinion that something is good and an opinion that
something is evil. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 22Sed nec hoc videtur ad propositum
Aristotelis pertinere, quia non agit hic de contrarietate rerum vel opinionum,
sed de contrarietate enunciationum: et ideo magis videtur hic sequenda expositio
Alexandri. Secundum quam dicendum est quod in indefinitis enunciationibus non
determinatur utrum praedicatum attribuatur subiecto universaliter (quod faceret
contrarietatem enunciationum), aut particulariter (quod non faceret
contrarietatem enunciationum); et ideo huiusmodi enunciationes indefinitae non
sunt contrariae secundum modum quo proferuntur. Contingit tamen quandoque
ratione significati eas habere contrarietatem, puta, cum attribuitur aliquid
universali ratione naturae universalis, quamvis non apponatur signum
universale; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, homo non est animal: quia hae
enunciationes eamdem habent vim ratione significati; ac si diceretur, omnis
homo est animal, nullus homo est animal. This does not seem to relate to what
Aristotle has proposed either, for he is not treating here of contrariety of
things or opinions, but of contrariety of enunciations. For this reason it
seems better here to follow the exposition of Alexander. According to his
exposition, in indefinite enunciations it is not determined whether the
predicate is attributed to the subject universally (which would constitute
contrariety of enunciations), or particularly (which would not constitute
contrariety of enunciations). Accordingly, enunciations of this kind are not
contrary in mode of expression. However, sometimes they have contrariety by
reason of what is signified, i.e., when something is attributed to a universal
in virtue of the universal nature although the universal sign is not added, as
in "Man is an animal” and "Man is not an animal,” for in virtue of
what is signified these enunciations have the same force as "Every man is
an animal” and "No man is an animal.” Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 23Deinde cum
dicit: in eo vero quod etc., removet quoddam quod posset esse dubium. Quia enim
posuerat quamdam diversitatem in oppositione enunciationum ex hoc quod
universale sumitur a parte subiecti universaliter vel non universaliter, posset
aliquis credere quod similis diversitas nasceretur ex parte praedicati, ex hoc scilicet
quod universale praedicari posset et universaliter et non universaliter; et
ideo ad hoc excludendum dicit quod in eo quod praedicatur aliquod universale,
non est verum quod praedicetur universale universaliter. Cuius quidem duplex
esse potest ratio. Una quidem, quia talis modus praedicandi videtur repugnare
praedicato secundum propriam rationem quam habet in enunciatione. Dictum est
enim supra quod praedicatum est quasi pars formalis enunciationis, subiectum
autem est pars materialis ipsius: cum autem aliquod universale profertur
universaliter, ipsum universale sumitur secundum habitudinem quam habet ad
singularia, quae sub se continet; sicut et quando universale profertur
particulariter, sumitur secundum habitudinem quam habet ad aliquod contentorum sub
se; et sic utrumque pertinet ad materialem determinationem universalis: et ideo
neque signum universale neque particulare convenienter additur praedicato, sed
magis subiecto: convenientius enim dicitur, nullus homo est asinus, quam, omnis
homo est nullus asinus; et similiter convenientius dicitur, aliquis homo est
albus, quam, homo est aliquid album. Invenitur autem quandoque a philosophis
signum particulare appositum praedicato, ad insinuandum quod praedicatum est in
plus quam subiectum, et hoc praecipue cum, habito genere, investigant
differentias completivas speciei, sicut in II de anima dicitur quod anima est
actus quidam. Alia vero ratio potest accipi ex parte veritatis enunciationis;
et ista specialiter habet locum in affirmationibus quae falsae essent si
praedicatum universaliter praedicaretur. Et ideo manifestans id quod posuerat,
subiungit quod nulla affirmatio est in qua, scilicet vere, de universali
praedicato universaliter praedicetur, idest in qua universali praedicato utitur
ad universaliter praedicandum; ut si diceretur, omnis homo est omne animal.
Oportet enim, secundum praedicta, quod hoc praedicatum animal, secundum singula
quae sub ipso continentur, praedicaretur de singulis quae continentur sub
homine; et hoc non potest esse verum, neque si praedicatum sit in plus quam
subiectum, neque si praedicatum sit convertibile cum eo. Oporteret enim quod
quilibet unus homo esset animalia omnia, aut omnia risibilia: quae repugnant
rationi singularis, quod accipitur sub universali. When he says, But as regards
the predicate the universal universally predicated is not true, etc., he
precludes a certain difficulty. He has already stated that there is a diversity
in the opposition of enunciations because of the universal being taken either
universally or not universally on the part of the subject. Someone might think,
as a consequence, that a similar diversity would arise on the part of the
predicate, i.e., that the universal could be predicated both universally and
not universally. To exclude this he says that in the case in which a universal
is predicated it is not true that the universal is predicated universally.
There are two reasons for this. The first is that such a mode of predicating
seems to be repugnant to the predicate in relation to its status in the
enunciation; for, as has been said, the predicate is a quasi-formal part of the
enunciation, while the subject is a material part of it. Now when a universal
is asserted universally the universal itself is taken according to the
relationship it has to the singulars contained under it, and when it is
asserted particularly the universal is taken according to the relationship it
has to some one of what is contained under it. Thus both pertain to the
material determination of the universal. This is why it is not appropriate to
add either the universal or particular sign to the predicate, but rather to the
subject; for it is more appropriate to say, "No man is an ass” than
"Every man is no ass”; andlikewise, to say, "Some man is white” than,
"Man is some white.” However, sometimes philosophers put the particular
sign next to the predicate to indicate that the predicate is in more than the
subject, and this especially when they have a genus in mind and are
investigating the differences which complete the species. There is an instance
of this in II De anima [1:412a 22] where Aristotle says that the soul is a
certain act.”’ The other reason is related to the truth of enunciations. This
has a special place in affirmations, which would be false if the predicate were
predicated universally. Hence to manifest what he has stated, he adds, for
there is no affirmation in which, i.e., truly, a universal predicate will be
predicated universally, i.e., in which a universal predicate is used to
predicate universally, for example, "Every man is every animal.” If this
could be done, the predicate "animal” according to the singulars contained
under it would have to be predicated of the singulars contained under
"man”; but such predication could not be true, whether the predicate is in
more than the subject or is convertible with the subject; for then any one man
would have to be all animals or all risible beings, which is repugnant to the
notion of the singular, which is taken tinder the universal. Aquinas lib. 1 l.
10 n. 24Nec est instantia si dicatur quod haec est vera, omnis homo est omnis
disciplinae susceptivus: disciplina enim non praedicatur de homine, sed
susceptivum disciplinae; repugnaret autem veritati si diceretur, omnis homo est
omne susceptivum disciplinae. The truth of the enunciation "Every man is
susceptible of every discipline” is not an instance that can be used as an
objection to this position, for it is not "discipline” that is predicated
of man but "susceptible of discipline.” It would be repugnant to truth if
it were said that "Every man is everything susceptible of discipline.” 25 Signum
autem universale negativum, vel particulare affirmativum, etsi convenientius
ponantur ex parte subiecti, non tamen repugnat veritati etiam si ponantur ex
parte praedicati. Contingit enim huiusmodi enunciationes in aliqua materia esse
veras: haec enim est vera, omnis homo nullus lapis est; et similiter haec est
vera, omnis homo aliquod animal est. Sed haec, omnis homo omne animal est, in
quacumque materia proferatur, falsa est. Sunt autem quaedam aliae tales
enunciationes semper falsae; sicut ista, aliquis homo omne animal est (quae
habet eamdem causam falsitatis cum hac, omnis homo omne animal est); et si quae
aliae similes, sunt semper falsae: in omnibus enim eadem ratio est. Et ideo per
hoc quod philosophus reprobavit istam, omnis homo omne animal est, dedit
intelligere omnes consimiles esse improbandas. On the other hand, although the
negative universal sign or the particular affirmative sign are more
appropriately posited on the part of the subject, it is not repugnant to truth
if they are posited on the part of the predicate, for such enunciations may be
true in some matter. The enunciation "Every man is no stone,” for example,
is true, and so is "Every man is some animal.” But the enunciation
"Every man is every animal,” in whatever matter it occurs, is false. There
are other enunciations of this kind that are always false, such as, "Some
man is every animal” (which is false for the same reason as "Every man is
every animal” is false). And if there are any others like these, they are
always false; and the reason is the same in every case. And, therefore, in
rejecting the enunciation "Every man is every animal,” the Philosopher
meant it to be understood that all similar enunciations are to be rejected. XI.
1. Postquam philosophus determinavit de oppositione enunciationum, comparando
universales enunciationes ad indefinitas, hic determinat de oppositione
enunciationum comparando universales ad particulares. Circa quod considerandum
est quod potest duplex oppositio in his notari: una quidem universalis ad
particularem, et hanc primo tangit; alia vero universalis ad universalem, et
hanc tangit secundo; ibi: contrariae vero et cetera. Now that he has determined
the opposition of enunciations by comparing universal enunciations with
indefinite enunciations, Aristotle determines the opposition of enunciations by
comparing universals to particulars. It should be noted that there is a twofold
opposition in these enunciations, one of universal to particular, and he
touches upon this first; the other is the opposition of universal to universal,
and this he takes up next, where he says, They are opposed contrarily when the
universal affirmation is opposed to the universal negation, etc. 2 Particularis
vero affirmativa et particularis negativa, non habent proprie loquendo
oppositionem, quia oppositio attenditur circa idem subiectum; subiectum autem
particularis enunciationis est universale particulariter sumptum, non pro
aliquo determinato singulari, sed indeterminate pro quocumque; et ideo, cum de
universali particulariter sumpto aliquid affirmatur vel negatur, ipse modus
enunciandi non habet quod affirmatio et negatio sint de eodem: quod requiritur
ad oppositionem affirmationis et negationis, secundum praemissa. The particular
affirmative and particular negative do not have opposition properly speaking,
because opposition is concerned with the same subject. But the subject of a
particular enunciation is the universal taken particularly, not for a
determinate singular but indeterminately for any singular. For this reason,
when something is affirmed or denied of the universal particularly taken, the
mode of enunciating is not such that the affirmation and negation are of the
same thing; hence what is required for the opposition of affirmation and
negation is lacking. 3 Dicit ergo primo quod enunciatio, quae universale
significat, scilicet universaliter, opponitur contradictorie ei, quae non
significat universaliter sed particulariter, si una earum sit affirmativa,
altera vero sit negativa (sive universalis sit affirmativa et particularis
negativa, sive e converso); ut cum dicitur, omnis homo est albus, non omnis
homo est albus: hoc enim quod dico, non omnis, ponitur loco signi particularis
negativi; unde aequipollet ei quae est, quidam homo non est albus; sicut et
nullus, quod idem significat ac si diceretur, non ullus vel non quidam, est
signum universale negativum. Unde hae duae, quidam homo est albus (quae est
particularis affirmativa), nullus homo est albus (quae est universalis negativa),
sunt contradictoriae. First he says that the enunciation that signifies the
universal, i.e., universally, is opposed contradictorily to the one that does
not signify universally but particularly, if one of them is affirmative and the
other negative (whether the universal is affirmative and the particular
negative or conversely), as in "Every man is white,” "Not every man
is white.” For, the "not every” is used in place of the particular
negative sign; consequently, "Not every man is white” is equivalent to
"Some man is not white.” In a parallel way "no,” which signifies the
same thing as "not any” or "not some,” is the universal negative
sign; consequently, the two enunciations, "Some man is white,” which is
the particular affirmative, and "No man is white,” which is the universal
negative, are contradictories. 4 Cuius ratio est quia contradictio consistit in
sola remotione affirmationis per negationem; universalis autem affirmativa removetur
per solam negationem particularis, nec aliquid aliud ex necessitate ad hoc
exigitur; particularis autem affirmativa removeri non potest nisi per
universalem negativam, quia iam dictum est quod particularis affirmativa non
proprie opponitur particulari negativae. Unde relinquitur quod universali
affirmativae contradictorie opponitur particularis negativa, et particulari
affirmativae universalis negativa. The reason for this is that contradiction
consists in the mere removal of the affirmation by a negation. Now the
universal affirmative is removed by merely the negation of the particular and
nothing else is required of necessity; but the particular affirmative can only
be removed by the universal negative because, as has already been said, the
particular negative is not properly opposed to the particular affirmative.
Consequently, the particular negative is opposed contradictorily to the
universal affirmative and the universal negative to the particular affirmative.
5 Deinde cum dicit: contrariae vero etc., tangit oppositionem universalium
enunciationum; et dicit quod universalis affirmativa et universalis negativa
sunt contrariae; sicut, omnis homo est iustus, nullus homo est iustus, quia
scilicet universalis negativa non solum removet universalem affirmativam, sed
etiam designat extremam distantiam, in quantum negat totum quod affirmatio
ponit; et hoc pertinet ad rationem contrarietatis; et ideo particularis
affirmativa et negativa se habent sicut medium inter contraria. When he says,
They are opposed contrarily when the universal affirmation is opposed to the
universal negation, etc., he touches on the opposition of universal
enunciations. The universal affirmative and universal negative, he says, are
contraries, as in "Every man is just... No man is just”; for the universal
negative not only removes the universal affirmative but also designates an
extreme of distance between them inasmuch as it denies the whole that the
affirmation posits; and this belongs to the notion of contrariety. The
particular affirmative and particular negative, for this reason, are related as
a mean between contraries. 6 Deinde cum dicit: quocirca has quidem etc.,
ostendit quomodo se habeant affirmatio et negatio oppositae ad verum et falsum.
Et primo, quantum ad contrarias; secundo, quantum ad contradictorias; ibi:
quaecumque igiturcontradictiones etc.; tertio, quantum ad ea quae videntur
contradictoria, et non sunt; ibi: quaecumque autem in universalibus et cetera.
Dicit ergo primo quod quia universalis affirmativa et universalis negativa sunt
contrariae, impossibile est quod sint simul verae. Contraria enim mutuo se
expellunt. Sed particulares, quae contradictorie opponuntur universalibus
contrariis, possunt simul verificari in eodem; sicut, non omnis homo est albus,
quae contradictorie opponitur huic, omnis homo est albus, et, quidam homo est
albus, quae contradictorie opponitur huic, nullus homo est albus. Et huiusmodi
etiam simile invenitur in contrarietate rerum: nam album et nigrum numquam
simul esse possunt in eodem, sed remotiones albi et nigri simul possunt esse:
potest enim aliquid esse neque album neque nigrum, sicut patet in eo quod est
pallidum. Et similiter contrariae enunciationes non possunt simul esse verae,
sed earum contradictoriae, a quibus removentur, simul possunt esse verae. He
shows how the opposed affirmation and negation are related to truth and falsity
when he says, Hence in the case of the latter it is impossible that both be at
once true, etc. He shows this first in regard to contraries; secondly, in regard
to contradictories, where he says, Whenever there are contradictions with
respect to universal signifying universally, etc.; thirdly, in regard to those
that seem contradictory but are not, where he says, But when the contradictions
are of universals not signifying universally, etc. First, he says that because
the universal affirmative and universal negative are contraries, it is
impossible for them to be simultaneously true, for contraries mutually remove
each other. However, the particular enunciations that are contradictorily
opposed to the universal contraries, can be verified at the same time in the
same thing, for example, "Not every man is white” (which is opposed
contradictorily to "Every man is white”) and "Some man is white” (which
is opposed contradictorily to "No man is white”). A parallel to this is
found in the contrariety of things, for white and black can never be in the
same thing at the same time; but the remotion of white and black can be in the
same thing at the same time, for a thing may be neither white nor black, as is
evident in something yellow. In a similar way, contrary enunciations cannot be
at once true, but their contradictories, by which they are removed, can be true
simultaneously. 7 Deinde cum dicit: quaecumque igitur contradictiones etc.,
ostendit qualiter veritas et falsitas se habeant in contradictoriis. Circa quod
considerandum est quod, sicut dictum est supra, in contradictoriis negatio non
plus facit, nisi quod removet affirmationem. Quod contingit dupliciter. Uno modo,
quando est altera earum universalis, altera particularis, ut supra dictum est.
Alio modo, quando utraque est singularis: quia tunc negatio ex necessitate
refertur ad idem (quod non contingit in particularibus et indefinitis), nec
potest se in plus extendere nisi ut removeat affirmationem. Et ideo singularis
affirmativa semper contradicit singulari negativae, supposita identitate
praedicati et subiecti. Et ideo dicit quod, sive accipiamus contradictionem
universalium universaliter, scilicet quantum ad unam earum, sive singularium
enunciationum, semper necesse est quod una sit vera et altera falsa. Neque enim
contingit esse simul veras aut simul falsas, quia verum nihil aliud est, nisi
quando dicitur esse quod est, aut non esse quod non est; falsum autem, quando
dicitur esse quod non est, aut non esse quod est, ut patet ex IV
metaphysicorum. Then he says, Whenever there are contradictions with respect to
universals signifying universally, one must be true and the other false, etc.
Here he shows how truth and falsity are related in contradictories. As was said
above, in contradictories the negation does no more than remove the
affirmation, and this in two ways: in one way when one of them is universal,
the other particular; in another way when each is singular. In the case of the
singular, the negation is necessarily referred to the same thing—which is not
the case in particulars and indefinites—and cannot extend to more than removing
the affirmation. Accordingly, the singular affirmative is always contradictory
to the singular negative, the identity of subject and predicate being supposed.
Aristotle says, therefore, that whether we take the contradiction of universals
universally (i.e., one of the universals being taken universally) or the
contradiction of singular enunciations, one of them must always be true and the
other false. It is not possible for them to be at once true or at once false
because to be true is nothing other than to say of what is, that it is, or of
what is not that it is not; to be false, to say of what is not, that it is, or
of what is, that it is not, as is evident in IV Metaphysicorum [7: 1011b 25]. 8
Deinde cum dicit: quaecumque autem universalium etc., ostendit qualiter se
habeant veritas et falsitas in his, quae videntur esse contradictoria, sed non
sunt. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo proponit quod intendit; secundo, probat
propositum; ibi: si enim turpis non probus etc.; tertio, excludit id quod
facere posset dubitationem; ibi: videbitur autem subito inconveniens et cetera.
Circa primum considerandum est quod affirmatio et negatio in indefinitis
propositionibus videntur contradictorie opponi propter hoc, quod est unum
subiectum non determinatum per signum particulare, et ideo videtur affirmatio
et negatio esse de eodem. Sed ad hoc removendum philosophus dicit quod
quaecumque affirmative et negative dicuntur de universalibus non universaliter
sumptis, non semper oportet quod unum sit verum, et aliud sit falsum, sed
possunt simul esse vera. Simul enim est verum dicere quod homo est albus, et,
homo non est albus, et quod homo est probus, et, homo non est probus. When he
says, But when the contradictions are of universals not signifying universally,
etc., he shows how truth and falsity are related to enunciations that seem to
be contradictory, but are not. First he proposes how they are related; then he
proves it where he says, For if he is ugly, he is not beautiful, etc.; finally,
he excludes a possible difficulty where he says, At first sight this might seem
paradoxical, etc. With respect to the first point we should note that
affirmation and negation in indefinite propositions seem to be opposed
contradictorily because there is one subject in both of them and it is not
determined by a particular sign. Hence, the affirmation and negation seem to be
about the same thing. To exclude this, the Philosopher says that in the case of
affirmative and negative enunciations of universals not taken universally, one
need not always be true and the other false, but they can be at once true. For
it is true to say both that "Man is white” and that "Man is not
white,” and that "Man is honorable” and "Man is not honorable. 9 In
quo quidem, ut Ammonius refert, aliqui Aristoteli contradixerunt ponentes quod
indefinita negativa semper sit accipienda pro universali negativa. Et hoc
astruebant primo quidem tali ratione: quia indefinita, cum sit indeterminata,
se habet in ratione materiae; materia autem secundum se considerata, magis
trahitur ad id quod indignius est; dignior autem est universalis affirmativa,
quam particularis affirmativa; et ideo indefinitam affirmativam dicunt esse
sumendam pro particulari affirmativa: sed negativam universalem, quae totum
destruit, dicunt esse indigniorem particulari negativa, quae destruit partem,
sicut universalis corruptio peior est quam particularis; et ideo dicunt quod
indefinita negativa sumenda est pro universali negativa. Ad quod etiam inducunt
quod philosophi, et etiam ipse Aristoteles utitur indefinitis negativis pro
universalibus; sicut dicitur in libro Physic. quod non est motus praeter res;
et in libro de anima, quod non est sensus praeter quinque. Sed istae rationes
non concludunt. Quod enim primo dicitur quod materia secundum se sumpta sumitur
pro peiori, verum est secundum sententiam Platonis, qui non distinguebat privationem
a materia, non autem est verum secundum Aristotelem, qui dicit in Lib. I
Physic. quod malum et turpe et alia huiusmodi ad defectum pertinentia non
dicuntur de materia nisi per accidens. Et ideo non oportet quod indefinita
semper stet pro peiori. Dato etiam quod indefinita necesse sit sumi pro peiori,
non oportet quod sumatur pro universali negativa; quia sicut in genere
affirmationis, universalis affirmativa est potior particulari, utpote
particularem affirmativam continens; ita etiam in genere negationum universalis
negativa potior est. Oportet autem in unoquoque genere considerare id quod est
potius in genere illo, non autem id quod est potius simpliciter. Ulterius
etiam, dato quod particularis negativa esset potior omnibus modis, non tamen
adhuc ratio sequeretur: non enim ideo indefinita affirmativa sumitur pro
particulari affirmativa, quia sit indignior, sed quia de universali potest
aliquid affirmari ratione suiipsius, vel ratione partis contentae sub eo; unde
sufficit ad veritatem eius quod praedicatum uni parti conveniat (quod
designatur per signum particulare); et ideo veritas particularis affirmativae
sufficit ad veritatem indefinitae affirmativae. Et simili ratione veritas
particularis negativae sufficit ad veritatem indefinitae negativae, quia
similiter potest aliquid negari de universali vel ratione suiipsius, vel
ratione suae partis. Utuntur autem quandoque philosophi indefinitis negativis
pro universalibus in his, quae per se removentur ab universalibus; sicut et
utuntur indefinitis affirmativis pro universalibus in his, quae per se de
universalibus praedicantur. On this point, as Ammonius reports, some men,
maintaining that the indefinite negative is always to be taken for the
universal negative, have taken a position contradictory to Aristotle’s. They
argued their position in the following way. The indefinite, since it is
indeterminate, partakes of the nature of matter; but matter considered in
itself is regarded as what is less worthy. Now the universal affirmative is
more worthy than the particular affirmative and therefore they said that the
indefinite affirmative was to be taken for the particular affirmative. But,
they said, the universal negative, which destroys the whole, is less worthy
than the particular negative, which destroys the part (just as universal
corruption is worse than particular corruption); therefore, they said that the
indefinite negative was to be taken for the universal negative. They went on to
say in support of their position that philosophers, and even Aristotle himself,
used indefinite negatives as universals. Thus, in the book Physicorum [III, 1:
200b 32] Aristotle says that there is not movement apart from the thing; and in
the book De anima [III, 1: 424b 20], that there are not more than five senses.
However, these reasons are not cogent. What they say about matter—that
considered in itself it is taken for what is less worthy—is true according to
the opinion of Plato, who did not distinguish privation from matter; however,
it is not true according to Aristotle, who says in I Physicae [9: 192a 3 &
192a 22], that the evil and ugly and other things of this kind pertaining to
defect, are said of matter only accidentally. Therefore the indefinite need not
stand always for the more ignoble. Even supposing it is necessary that the
indefinite be taken for the less worthy, it ought not to be taken for the
universal negative; for just as the universal affirmative is more powerful than
the particular in the genus of affirmation, as containing the particular
affirmative, so also the universal negative is more powerful in the genus of
negations. Now in each genus one must consider what is more powerful in that
genus, not what is more powerful simply. Further, if we took the position that
the particular negative is more powerful than all other modes, the reasoning
still would not follow, for the indefinite affirmative is not taken for the
particular affirmative because it is less worthy, but because something can be
affirmed of the universal by reason of itself, or by reason of the part
contained under it; whence it suffices for the truth of the particular
affirmative that the predicate belongs to one part (which is designated by the
particular sign); for this reason the truth of the particular affirmative
suffices for the truth of the indefinite affirmative. For a similar reason the
truth of the particular negative suffices for the truth of the indefinite
negative, because in like manner, something can be denied of a universal either
by reason of itself, or by reason of its part. Apropos of the examples cited
for their argument, it should be noted that philosophers sometimes use
indefinite negatives for universals in the case of things that are per se
removed from universals; and they use indefinite affirmatives for universals in
the case of things that are per se predicated of universals. 10 Deinde cum
dicit: si enim turpis est etc., probat propositum per id, quod est ab omnibus
concessum. Omnes enim concedunt quod indefinita affirmativa verificatur, si
particularis affirmativa sit vera. Contingit autem accipi duas affirmativas
indefinitas, quarum una includit negationem alterius, puta cum sunt opposita
praedicata: quae quidem oppositio potest contingere dupliciter. Uno modo,
secundum perfectam contrarietatem, sicut turpis, idest inhonestus, opponitur
probo, idest honesto, et foedus, idest deformis secundum corpus, opponitur
pulchro. Sed per quam rationem ista affirmativa est vera, homo est probus,
quodam homine existente probo, per eamdem rationem ista est vera, homo est
turpis, quodam homine existente turpi. Sunt ergo istae duae verae simul, homo
est probus, homo est turpis; sed ad hanc, homo est turpis, sequitur ista, homo
non est probus; ergo istae duae sunt simul verae, homo est probus, homo non est
probus: et eadem ratione istae duae, homo est pulcher, homo non est pulcher.
Alia autem oppositio attenditur secundum perfectum et imperfectum, sicut moveri
opponitur ad motum esse, et fieri ad factum esse: unde ad fieri sequitur non
esse eius quod fit in permanentibus, quorum esse est perfectum; secus autem est
in successivis, quorum esse est imperfectum. Sic ergo haec est vera, homo est
albus, quodam homine existente albo; et pari ratione, quia quidam homo fit
albus, haec est vera, homo fit albus; ad quam sequitur, homo non est albus.
Ergo istae duae sunt simul verae, homo est albus, homo non est albus. When he
says, For if he is ugly, he is not beautiful, etc., he proves what he has
proposed by something conceded by everyone, namely, that the indefinite
affirmative is verified if the particular affirmative is true. We may take two
indefinite affirmatives, one of which includes the negation of the other, as
for example when they have opposed predicates. Now this opposition can happen
in two ways. It can be according to perfect contrariety, as shameful (i.e.,
dishonorable) is opposed to worthy (i.e., honorable) and ugly (i.e., deformed
in body) is opposed to beautiful. But the reasoning by which the affirmative
enunciation, "Man is worthy,” is true, i.e., by some worthy man existing,
is the same as the reasoning by which "Man is shameful” is true, i.e., by
a shameful man existing. Therefore these two enunciations are at once true,
"Man is worthy” and "Man is shameful.” But the enunciation, "Man
is not worthy,” follows upon "Man is shameful.” Therefore the two
enunciations, " Man is worthy,” and "Man is not worthy,” are at once
true; and by the same reasoning these two, "Man is beautiful” and
"Man is not beautiful.” The other opposition is according to the complete
and incomplete, as to be in movement is opposed to to have been moved, and
becoming to to have become. Whence the non-being of that which is coming to be
in permanent things, whose being is complete, follows upon the becoming but
this is not so in successive things, whose being is incomplete. Thus, "Man
is white” is true by the fact that a white man exists; by the same reasoning,
because a man is becoming white, the enunciation "Man is becoming white”
is true, upon which follows, "Man is not white.” Therefore, the two
enunciations, "Man is white” and "Man is not white” are at once true.
11 Deinde cum dicit: videbitur autem etc., excludit id quod faceret
dubitationem circa praedicta; et dicit quod subito, id est primo aspectu
videtur hoc esse inconveniens, quod dictum est; quia hoc quod dico, homo non
est albus, videtur idem significare cum hoc quod est, nullus homo est albus.
Sed ipse hoc removet dicens quod neque idem significant neque ex necessitate
sunt simul vera, sicut ex praedictis manifestum est. Then when he says, At
first sight this might seem paradoxical, etc., he excludes what might present a
difficulty in relation to what has been said. At first sight, he says, what has
been stated seems to be inconsistent; for "Man is not white” seems to
signify the same thing as "No man is white.” But he rejects this when he
says that they neither signify the same thing, nor are they at once true
necessarily, as is evident from what has been said. XII. 1. Postquam
philosophus distinxit diversos modos oppositionum in enunciationibus, nunc
intendit ostendere quod uni affirmationi una negatio opponitur, et circa hoc
duo facit: primo, ostendit quod uni affirmationi una negatio opponitur;
secundo, ostendit quae sit una affirmatio vel negatio, ibi: una autem
affirmatio et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit quod intendit;
secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: hoc enim idem etc.; tertio, epilogat quae
dicta sunt; ibi: manifestum est ergo et cetera. Having distinguished the
diverse modes of opposition in enunciations, the Philosopher now proposes to
show that there is one negation opposed to one affirmation. First he shows that
there is one negation opposed to one affirmation; then he manifests what one
affirmation and negation are, where he says, Affirmation or negation is one
when one thing is signified of one thing, etc. With respect to what he intends
to do he first proposes the point; then he manifests it where he says, for the
negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation affirms, etc. Finally,
he gives a summary of what has been said, where he says, We have said that
there is one negation opposed contradictorily to one affirmation, etc. 2 Dicit ergo primo, manifestum esse quod unius
affirmationis est una negatio sola. Et hoc quidem fuit necessarium hic dicere:
quia cum posuerit plura oppositionum genera, videbatur quod uni affirmationi
duae negationes opponerentur; sicut huic affirmativae, omnis homo est albus,
videtur, secundum praedicta, haec negativa opponi, nullus homo est albus, et
haec, quidam homo non est albus. Sed si quis recte consideret huius
affirmativae, omnis homo est albus, negativa est sola ista, quidam homo non est
albus, quae solummodo removet ipsam, ut patet ex sua aequipollenti, quae est,
non omnis homo est albus. Universalis vero negativa includit quidem in suo
intellectu negationem universalis affirmativae, in quantum includit
particularem negativam, sed supra hoc aliquid addit, in quantum scilicet
importat non solum remotionem universalitatis, sed removet quamlibet partem
eius. Et sic patet quod sola una est negatio universalis affirmationis: et idem
apparet in aliis. He says, then, that it is evident that there is only one
negation of one affirmation. It is necessary to make this point here because he
has posited many kinds of opposition and it might appear that two negations are
opposed to one affirmation. Thus it might seem that the negative enunciations,
"No man is white” and "Some man is not white” are both opposed to the
affirmative enunciation, "Every man is white.” But if one carefully
examines what has been said it will be evident that the only negative opposed
to "Every man is white” is "Some man is not white,” which merely
removes it, as is clear from its equivalent, "Not every man is white.” It
is true that the negation of the universal affirmative is included in the
understanding of the universal negative inasmuch as the universal negative
includes the particular negative, but the universal negative adds something
over and beyond this inasmuch as it not only brings about the removal of universality
but removes every part of it. Thus it is evident that there is only one
negation of a universal affirmation, and the same thing is evident in the
others. 3 Deinde cum dicit: hoc enim etc., manifestat propositum: et primo, per
rationem; secundo, per exempla; ibi: dico autem, ut est Socrates albus. Ratio
autem sumitur ex hoc, quod supra dictum est quod negatio opponitur
affirmationi, quae est eiusdem de eodem: ex quo hic accipitur quod oportet
negationem negare illud idem praedicatum, quod affirmatio affirmavit et de
eodem subiecto, sive illud subiectum sit aliquid singulare, sive aliquid
universale, vel universaliter, vel non universaliter sumptum; sed hoc non
contingit fieri nisi uno modo, ita scilicet ut negatio neget id quod affirmatio
posuit, et nihil aliud; ergo uni affirmationi opponitur una sola negatio. When
he says, for the negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation
affirms, etc., he manifests what he has said: first, from reason; secondly, by
example. The reasoning is taken from what has already been said, namely, that
negation is opposed to affirmation when the enunciations are of the same thing
of the same subject. Here he says that the negation must deny the same
predicate the affirmation affirms, and of the same subject, whether that
subject he something singular or something universal, either taken universally
or not taken universally. But this can only be done in one way, i.e., when the
negation denies what the affirmation posits, and nothing else. Therefore there
is only one negation opposed to one affirmation. 4 Deinde cum dicit: dico
autem, ut est etc., manifestat propositum per exempla. Et primo, in
singularibus: huic enim affirmationi, Socrates est albus, haec sola opponitur,
Socrates non est albus, tanquam eius propria negatio. Si vero esset aliud
praedicatum vel aliud subiectum, non esset negatio opposita, sed omnino
diversa; sicut ista, Socrates non est musicus, non opponitur ei quae est,
Socrates est albus; neque etiam illa quae est, Plato est albus, huic quae est,
Socrates non est albus. Secundo, manifestat idem quando subiectum affirmationis
est universale universaliter sumptum; sicut huic affirmationi, omnis homo est
albus, opponitur sicut propria eius negatio, non omnis homo est albus, quae
aequipollet particulari negativae. Tertio, ponit exemplum quando affirmationis
subiectum est universale particulariter sumptum: et dicit quod huic
affirmationi, aliquis homo est albus, opponitur tanquam eius propria negatio,
nullus homo est albus. Nam nullus dicitur, quasi non ullus, idest, non aliquis.
Quarto, ponit exemplum quando affirmationis subiectum est universale indefinite
sumptum et dicit quod isti affirmationi, homo est albus, opponitur tanquam
propria eius negatio illa quae est, non est homo albus. In manifesting this by example,
where he says, For example, the negation of "Socrates is white,” etc., he
first takes examples of singulars. Thus, "Socrates is not white” is the
proper negation opposed to "Socrates is white.” If there were another
predicate or another subject, it would not be the opposed negation, but wholly
different. For example, "Socrates is not musical” is not opposed to
"Socrates is white,” nor is "Plato is white” opposed to
"Socrates is not white.” Then he manifests the same thing in an
affirmation with a universal universally taken as the subject. Thus, "Not
every man is white,” which is equivalent to the particular negative, is the
proper negation opposed to the affirmation, "Every man is white.” Thirdly,
he gives an example in which the subject of the affirmation is a universal
taken particularly. The proper negation opposed to the affirmation "Some
man is white” is "No man is white,” for to say "no” is to say
"not any,” i.e., "not some.” Finally, he gives as an example
enunciations in which the subject of the affirmation is the universal taken
indefinitely; "Man is not white” is the proper negation opposed to the
affirmation "Man is white.” 5 Sed videtur hoc esse contra id, quod supra
dictum est quod negativa indefinita verificatur simul cum indefinita affirmativa;
negatio autem non potest verificari simul cum sua opposita affirmatione, quia
non contingit de eodem affirmare et negare. Sed ad hoc dicendum quod oportet
quod hic dicitur intelligi quando negatio ad idem refertur quod affirmatio
continebat; et hoc potest esse dupliciter: uno modo, quando affirmatur aliquid
inesse homini ratione sui ipsius (quod est per se de eodem praedicari), et hoc
ipsum negatio negat; alio modo, quando aliquid affirmatur de universali ratione
sui singularis, et pro eodem de eo negatur. The last example used to manifest
his point seems to be contrary to what he has already said, namely, that the
indefinite negative and the indefinite affirmative can be simultaneously
verified; but a negation and its opposite affirmation cannot be simultaneously
verified, since it is not possible to affirm and deny of the same subject. But
what Aristotle is saying here must be understood of the negation when it is
referred to the same thing the affirmation contained, and this is possible in
two ways: in one way, when something is affirmed to belong to man by reason of
what he is (which is per se to be predicated of the same thing), and this very
thing the negation denies; secondly, when something is affirmed of the
universal by reason of its singular, and the same thing is denied of it. 6 Deinde
cum dicit: quod igitur una affirmatio etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt, et
concludit manifestum esse ex praedictis quod uni affirmationi opponitur una
negatio; et quod oppositarum affirmationum et negationum aliae sunt contrariae,
aliae contradictoriae; et dictum est quae sint utraeque. Tacet autem de
subcontrariis, quia non sunt recte oppositae, ut supra dictum est. Dictum est
etiam quod non omnis contradictio est vera vel falsa; et sumitur hic large
contradictio pro qualicumque oppositione affirmationis et negationis: nam in
his quae sunt vere contradictoriae semper una est vera, et altera falsa. Quare
autem in quibusdam oppositis hoc non verificetur, dictum est supra; quia
scilicet quaedam non sunt contradictoriae, sed contrariae, quae possunt simul
esse falsae. Contingit etiam affirmationem et negationem non proprie opponi; et
ideo contingit eas esse veras simul. Dictum est autem quando altera semper est
vera, altera autem falsa, quia scilicet in his quae vere sunt contradictoria. He
concludes by summarizing what has been said: We have said that there is one
negation opposed contradictorily to one affirmation, etc. He considers it
evident from what has been said that one negation is opposed to one affirmation;
and that of opposite affirmations and negations, one kind are contraries, the
other contradictories; and that what each kind is has been stated. He does not
speak of subcontraries because it is not accurate to say that they are
opposites, as was said above. He also says here that it has been shown that not
every contradiction is true or false, "contradiction” being taken here
broadly for any kind of opposition of affirmation and negation; for in
enunciations that are truly contradictory one is always true and the other
false. The reason why this may not be verified in some kinds of opposites has
already been stated, namely, because some are not contradictories but
contraries, and these can be false at the same time. It is also possible for
affirmation and negation not to be properly opposed and consequently to be true
at the same time. It has been stated, however, when one is always true and the
other false, namely, in those that are truly contradictories. 7 Deinde cum
dicit: una autem affirmatio etc., ostendit quae sit affirmatio vel negatio una.
Quod quidem iam supra dixerat, ubi habitum est quod una est enunciatio, quae
unum significat; sed quia enunciatio, in qua aliquid praedicatur de aliquo
universali universaliter vel non universaliter, multa sub se continet, intendit
ostendere quod per hoc non impeditur unitas enunciationis. Et circa hoc duo
facit: primo, ostendit quod unitas enunciationis non impeditur per
multitudinem, quae continetur sub universali, cuius ratio una est; secundo,
ostendit quod impeditur unitas enunciationis per multitudinem, quae continetur
sub sola nominis unitate; ibi: si vero duobus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod
una est affirmatio vel negatio cum unum significatur de uno, sive illud unum
quod subiicitur sit universale universaliter sumptum sive non sit aliquid tale,
sed sit universale particulariter sumptum vel indefinite, aut etiam si
subiectum sit singulare. Et exemplificat de diversis sicut universalis ista
affirmativa est una, omnis homo est albus; et similiter particularis negativa
quae est eius negatio, scilicet non est omnis homo albus. Et subdit alia
exempla, quae sunt manifesta. In fine autem apponit quamdam conditionem, quae
requiritur ad hoc quod quaelibet harum sit una, si scilicet album, quod est
praedicatum, significat unum: nam sola multitudo praedicati impediret unitatem
enunciationis. Ideo autem universalis propositio una est, quamvis sub se
multitudinem singularium comprehendat, quia praedicatum non attribuitur multis
singularibus, secundum quod sunt in se divisa, sed secundum quod uniuntur in
uno communi. The Philosopher explains what one affirmation or negation is where
he says, Affirmation or negation is one when one thing is signified of one
thing, etc. He did in fact state this earlier when he said that an enunciation
is one when it signifies one thing, but because the enunciation in which
something is predicated of a universal, either universally or not universally,
contains under it many things, he is going to show here that unity of
enunciation is not impeded by this. First he shows that unity of enunciation is
not impeded by the multitude contained under the universal, whose notion is
one. Then he shows that unity of enunciation is impeded by the multitude
contained under the unity of a name only, where he says, But if one name is
imposed for two things, etc. He says, then, that an affirmation or negation is
one when one thing is signified of one thing, whether the one thing that is
subjected be a universal taken universally, or not, i.e., it may be a universal
taken particularly or indefinitely, or even a singular. He gives examples of
the differ6nt kinds: such as, the universal affirmative "Every man is
white” and the particular negative, which is its negation, "Not every man
is white,” each of which is one. There are other examples which are evident. At
the end he states a condition that is required for any of them to be one, i.e.,
provided the "white,” which is the predicate, signifies one thing; for a
multiple predicate with a subject signifying one thing would also impede the
unity of an enunciation. The universal proposition is therefore one, even
though it comprehends a multitude of singulars under it, for the predicate is
not attributed to many singulars according as each is divided from the other,
but according as they are united in one common thing. 8 Deinde cum dicit: si
vero duobus etc., ostendit quod sola unitas nominis non sufficit ad unitatem
enunciationis. Et circa hoc quatuor facit: primo, proponit quod intendit;
secundo, exemplificat; ibi: ut si quis ponat etc.; tertio, probat; ibi: nihil
enim differt etc.; quarto, infert corollarium ex dictis; ibi: quare nec in his
et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod si unum nomen imponatur duabus rebus, ex
quibus non fit unum, non est affirmatio una. Quod autem dicit, ex quibus non
fit unum, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ad excludendum hoc quod multa
continentur sub uno universali, sicut homo et equus sub animali: hoc enim nomen
animal significat utrumque, non secundum quod sunt multa et differentia ad
invicem, sed secundum quod uniuntur in natura generis. Alio modo, et melius, ad
excludendum hoc quod ex multis partibus fit unum, sive sint partes rationis,
sicut sunt genus et differentia, quae sunt partes definitionis: sive sint
partes integrales alicuius compositi, sicut ex lapidibus et lignis fit domus.
Si ergo sit tale praedicatum quod attribuatur rei, requiritur ad unitatem
enunciationis quod illa multa quae significantur, concurrant in unum secundum
aliquem dictorum modorum; unde non sufficeret sola unitas vocis. Si vero sit
tale praedicatum quod referatur ad vocem, sufficiet unitas vocis; ut si dicam,
canis est nomen. When he says, But if one name is imposed for two things, he
shows that unity of name alone does not suffice for unity of an enunciation. He
first makes the point; secondly, he gives an example, where he says, if someone
were to impose the name "cloak” on horse and man, etc.; thirdly, he proves
it where he says, For this is no different from saying "Horse and man is white,”
etc.; finally, he infers a corollary from what has been said, where he says,
Consequently, in such enunciations, it is not necessary, etc. If one name is
imposed for two things, he says, from which one thing is not formed, there is
not one affirmation. The from which one thing is not formed can be understood
in two ways. It can be understood as excluding the many that are contained
under one universal, as man and horse under animal, for the name "animal”
signifies both,.not as they are many and different from each other but as they
are united in the nature of the genus. It can also be understood—and this would
be more accurate—as excluding the many parts from which something one is
formed, whether the parts of the notion as known, as the genus and the difference,
which are parts of the definition, or the integral parts of some composite, as
the stones and wood from which a house is made. If, then, there is such a
predicate which is attributed to a thing, the many that are signified must
concur in one thing according to some of the modes mentioned in order that
there be one enunciation; unity of vocal sound alone would not suffice.
However, if there is such a predicate which is referred to vocal sound, unity
of vocal sound would suffice, as in "‘Dog’is a name.” 9 Deinde cum dicit:
ut si quis etc., exemplificat quod dictum est, ut si aliquis hoc nomen tunica
imponat ad significandum hominem et equum: et sic, si dicam, tunica est alba,
non est affirmatio una, neque negatio una. Deinde cum dicit: nihil enim differt
etc., probat quod dixerat tali ratione. Si tunica significat hominem et equum,
nihil differt si dicatur, tunica est alba, aut si dicatur, homo est albus, et,
equus est albus; sed istae, homo est albus, et equus est albus, significant
multa et sunt plures enunciationes; ergo etiam ista, tunica est alba, multa
significat. Et hoc si significet hominem et equum ut res diversas: si vero
significet hominem et equum ut componentia unam rem, nihil significat, quia non
est aliqua res quae componatur ex homine et equo. Quod autem dicit quod non
differt dicere, tunica est alba, et, homo est albus, et, equus est albus, non
est intelligendum quantum ad veritatem et falsitatem. Nam haec copulativa, homo
est albus et equus est albus, non potest esse vera nisi utraque pars sit vera:
sed haec, tunica est alba, praedicta positione facta, potest esse vera etiam
altera existente falsa; alioquin non oporteret distinguere multiplices
propositiones ad solvendum rationes sophisticas. Sed hoc est intelligendum
quantum ad unitatem et multiplicitatem. Nam sicut cum dicitur, homo est albus
et equus est albus, non invenitur aliqua una res cui attribuatur praedicatum;
ita etiam nec cum dicitur, tunica est alba. He gives an example of what he
means where he says, For example, if someone were to impose the name
"cloak,” etc. That is, if someone were to impose the name "cloak” to
signify man and horse and then said, "Cloak is white,” there would not be
one affirmation, nor would there be one negation. He proves this where he says,
For this is no different from saying, etc. His argument is as follows. If
"cloak” signifies man and horse there is no difference between saying
"Cloak is white” and saying, "Man is white, and, Horse is white.” But
"Man is white, and, horse is white” signify many and are many
enunciations. Therefore, the enunciation, "Cloak is white,” signifies many
things. This is the case if "cloak” signifies man and horse as diverse
things; but if it signifies man and horse as one thing, it signifies nothing,
for there is not any thing composed of man and horse. When Aristotle says that
there is no difference between saying "Cloak is white” and, "Man is
white, and, horse is white,” it is not to be understood with respect to truth
and falsity. For the copulative enunciation "Man is white and horse is
white” cannot be true unless each part is true; but the enunciation "Cloak
is white,” under the condition given, can be true even when one is false;
otherwise it would not be necessary to distinguish multiple propositions to
solve sophistic arguments. Rather, it is to be understood with respect to unity
and multiplicity, for just as in "Man is white and horse is white” there
is not some one thing to which the predicate is attributed, so also in
"Cloak is white.” 10 Deinde cum dicit: quare nec in his etc., concludit ex
praemissis quod nec in his affirmationibus et negationibus, quae utuntur
subiecto aequivoco, semper oportet unam esse veram et aliam falsam, quia
scilicet negatio potest aliud negare quam affirmatio affirmet. When he says,
Consequently, it is not necessary in such enunciations, etc., he concludes from
what has been said that in affirmations and negations that use an equivocal
subject, one need not always be true and the other false since the negation may
deny something other than the affirmation affirms. XIII. 1. Postquam
philosophus determinavit de oppositione enunciationum et ostendit quomodo
dividunt verum et falsum oppositae enunciationes; hic inquirit de quodam quod
poterat esse dubium, utrum scilicet id quod dictum est similiter inveniatur in
omnibus enunciationibus vel non. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, proponit
dissimilitudinem; secundo, probat eam; ibi: nam si omnis affirmatio et cetera. Now
that he, has treated opposition of enunciations and has shown the way in which
opposed enunciations divide truth and falsity, the Philosopher inquires about a
question that might arise, namely, whether what has been said is found to be so
in all enunciations or not. And first he proposes a dissimilarity in
enunciations with regard to dividing truth and falsity, then proves it where he
says, For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, etc. 2 Circa
primum considerandum est quod philosophus in praemissis triplicem divisionem
enunciationum assignavit, quarum prima fuit secundum unitatem enunciationis,
prout scilicet enunciatio est una simpliciter vel coniunctione una; secunda
fuit secundum qualitatem, prout scilicet enunciatio est affirmativa vel
negativa; tertia fuit secundum quantitatem, utpote quod enunciatio quaedam est
universalis, quaedam particularis, quaedam indefinita et quaedam singularis. In
relation to the dissimilarity which he intends to prove we should recall that
the Philosopher has given three divisions of the enunciation. The first was in
relation to the unity of enunciation, and according to this it is divided into
one simply and one by conjunction; the second was in relation to quality, and
according to this it is divided into affirmative and negative; the third was in
relation to quantity, and according to this it is either universal, particular,
indefinite, or singular. 3 Tangitur autem hic quarta divisio enunciationum
secundum tempus. Nam quaedam est de praesenti, quaedam de praeterito, quaedam
de futuro; et haec etiam divisio potest accipi ex his quae supra dicta sunt:
dictum est enim supra quod necesse est omnem enunciationem esse ex verbo vel ex
casu verbi; verbum autem est quod consignificat praesens tempus; casus autem
verbi sunt, qui consignificant tempus praeteritum vel futurum. Potest autem
accipi quinta divisio enunciationum secundum materiam, quae quidem divisio
attenditur secundum habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum: nam si praedicatum per
se insit subiecto, dicetur esse enunciatio in materia necessaria vel naturali;
ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, vel, homo est risibile. Si vero praedicatum
per se repugnet subiecto quasi excludens rationem ipsius, dicetur enunciatio
esse in materia impossibili sive remota; ut cum dicitur, homo est asinus. Si
vero medio modo se habeat praedicatum ad subiectum, ut scilicet nec per se
repugnet subiecto, nec per se insit, dicetur enunciatio esse in materia
possibili sive contingenti. Here he treats of a fourth division of enunciation,
a division according to time. Some enunciations are about the present, some
about the past, some about the future. This division could be seen in what
Aristotle has already said, namely, that every enunciation must have a verb or
a mode of a verb, the verb being that which signifies the present time, the
modes with past or future time. In addition, a fifth division of the
enunciation can be made, a division in regard to matter. It is taken from the
relationship of the predicate to the subject. If the predicate is per se in the
subject, it will be said to be an enunciation in necessary or natural matter.
Examples of this are "Man is an animal” and "Man is risible.” If the
predicate is per se repugnant to the subject, as excluding the notion of it, it
is said to be an enunciation in impossible or remote matter; for example, the
enunciation "Man is an ass.” If the predicate is related to the subject in
a way midway between these two, being neither per se repugnant to the subject
nor per se in it, the enunciation is said to be in possible or contingent matter.
4 His igitur enunciationum differentiis consideratis, non similiter se habet
iudicium de veritate et falsitate in omnibus. Unde philosophus dicit, ex
praemissis concludens, quod in his quae sunt, idest in propositionibus de
praesenti, et in his quae facta sunt, idest in enunciationibus de praeterito,
necesse est quod affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit vera vel falsa.
Diversificatur tamen hoc, secundum diversam quantitatem enunciationis; nam in
enunciationibus, in quibus de universalibus subiectis aliquid universaliter
praedicatur, necesse est quod semper una sit vera, scilicet affirmativa vel
negativa, et altera falsa, quae scilicet ei opponitur. Dictum est enim supra
quod negatio enunciationis universalis in qua aliquid universaliter
praedicatur, est negativa non universalis, sed particularis, et e converso
universalis negativa non est directe negatio universalis affirmativae, sed
particularis; et sic oportet, secundum praedicta, quod semper una earum sit
vera et altera falsa in quacumque materia. Et eadem ratio est in
enunciationibus singularibus, quae etiam contradictorie opponuntur, ut supra
habitum est. Sed in enunciationibus, in quibus aliquid praedicatur de
universali non universaliter, non est necesse quod semper una sit vera et
altera sit falsa, qui possunt ambae esse simul verae, ut supra ostensum est. Given
these differences of enunciations, the judgment of truth and falsity is not
alike in all. Accordingly, the Philosopher says, as a conclusion from what has
been established: In enunciations about that which is, i.e., in propositions
about the present, or has taken place, i.e., in enunciations about the past,
the affirmation or the negation must be determinately true or false. However,
this differs according to the different quantity of the enunciations. In
enunciations in which something is universally predicated of universal
subjects, one must always be true, either the affirmative or negative, and the
other false, i.e., the one opposed to it. For as was said above, the negation
of a universal enunciation in which something is predicated universally, is not
the universal negative, but the particular negative, and conversely, the
universal negative is not directly the negation of the universal affirmative,
but the particular negative. According to the foregoing, then, one of these
must always be true and the other false in any matter whatever. And the same is
the case in singular enunciations, which are also opposed contradictorily.
However, in enunciations in which something is predicated of a universal but
not universally, it is not necessary that one always be true and the other
false, for both could be at once true. 5 Et hoc quidem ita se habet quantum ad
propositiones, quae sunt de praeterito vel de praesenti: sed si accipiamus
enunciationes, quae sunt de futuro, etiam similiter se habent quantum ad
oppositiones, quae sunt de universalibus vel universaliter vel non
universaliter sumptis. Nam in materia necessaria omnes affirmativae determinate
sunt verae, ita in futuris sicut in praeteritis et praesentibus; negativae vero
falsae. In materia autem impossibili, e contrario. In contingenti vero
universales sunt falsae et particulares sunt verae, ita in futuris sicut in
praeteritis et praesentibus. In indefinitis autem, utraque simul est vera in
futuris sicut in praesentibus vel praeteritis. The case as it was just stated
has to do with propositions about the past or the present. Enunciations about
the future that are of universals taken either universally or not universally
are also related in the same way in regard to oppositions. In necessary matter
all affirmative enunciations are determinately true; this holds for
enunciations in future time as well as in past and present time; and negative
enunciations are determinately false. In impossible matter the contrary is the
case. In contingent matter, however, universal enunciations are false and
particular enunciations true. This is the case in enunciations about the future
as well as those of the past and present. In indefinite enunciations, both are
at once true in future enunciations as well as in those of the present or the
past. 6 Sed in singularibus et futuris est quaedam dissimilitudo. Nam in
praeteritis et praesentibus necesse est quod altera oppositarum determinate sit
vera et altera falsa in quacumque materia; sed in singularibus quae sunt de
futuro hoc non est necesse, quod una determinate sit vera et altera falsa. Et
hoc quidem dicitur quantum ad materiam contingentem: nam quantum ad materiam
necessariam et impossibilem similis ratio est in futuris singularibus, sicut in
praesentibus et praeteritis. Nec tamen Aristoteles mentionem fecit de materia
contingenti, quia illa proprie ad singularia pertinent quae contingenter
eveniunt, quae autem per se insunt vel repugnant, attribuuntur singularibus
secundum universalium rationes. Circa hoc igitur versatur tota praesens
intentio: utrum in enunciationibus singularibus de futuro in materia
contingenti necesse sit quod determinate una oppositarum sit vera et altera
falsa. In singular future enunciations, however, there is a difference. In past
and present singular enunciations, one of the opposites must be determinately
true and the other false in any matter whatsoever, but in singulars that are
about the future, it is not necessary that one be determinately true and the
other false. This holds with respect to contingent matter; with respect to
necessary and impossible matter the rule is the same as in enunciations about
the present and the past. Aristotle has not mentioned contingent matter until
now because those things that take place contingently pertain exclusively to
singulars, whereas those that per se belong or are repugnant are attributed to
singulars according to the notions of their universals. Aristotle is therefore
wholly concerned here with this question: whether in singular enunciations
about the future in contingent matter it is necessary that one of the opposites
be determinately true and the other determinately false. 7 Deinde cum dicit:
nam si omnis affirmatio etc., probat praemissam differentiam. Et circa hoc duo
facit: primo, probat propositum ducendo ad inconveniens; secundo, ostendit illa
esse impossibilia quae sequuntur; ibi: quare ergo contingunt inconvenientia et
cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit quod in singularibus et futuris
non semper potest determinate attribui veritas alteri oppositorum; secundo,
ostendit quod non potest esse quod utraque veritate careat; ibi: at vero
nequequoniam et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes, in quarum prima ponit
quamdam consequentiam, scilicet quod si omnis affirmatio vel negatio
determinate est vera vel falsa ita in singularibus et futuris sicut in aliis,
consequens est quod omnia necesse sit vel determinate esse vel non esse. Deinde
cum dicit: quare si hic quidem etc. vel, si itaque hic quidem, ut habetur in
Graeco, probat consequentiam praedictam. Ponamus enim quod sint duo homines,
quorum unus dicat aliquid esse futurum, puta quod Socrates curret, alius vero
dicat hoc idem ipsum non esse futurum; supposita praemissa positione, scilicet
quod in singularibus et futuris contingit alteram esse veram, scilicet vel
affirmativam vel negativam, sequetur quod necesse sit quod alter eorum verum
dicat, non autem uterque: quia non potest esse quod in singularibus
propositionibus futuris utraque sit simul vera, scilicet affirmativa et
negativa: sed hoc habet locum solum in indefinitis. Ex hoc autem quod necesse
est alterum eorum verum dicere, sequitur quod necesse sit determinate vel esse
vel non esse. Et hoc probat consequenter: quia ista duo se convertibiliter
consequuntur, scilicet quod verum sit id quod dicitur, et quod ita sit in re.
Et hoc est quod manifestat consequenter dicens quod si verum est dicere quod
album sit, de necessitate sequitur quod ita sit in re; et si verum est negare,
ex necessitate sequitur quod ita non sit. Et e converso: quia si ita est in re
vel non est, ex necessitate sequitur quod sit verum affirmare vel negare. Et
eadem etiam convertibilitas apparet in falso: quia, si aliquis mentitur falsum
dicens, ex necessitate sequitur quod non ita sit in re, sicut ipse affirmat vel
negat; et e converso, si non est ita in re sicut ipse affirmat vel negat,
sequitur quod affirmans vel negans mentiatur. He proves that there is a
difference between these opposites and the others where he says, For if every
affirmation or negation is true or false, etc. First he proves it by showing
that the opposite position leads to what is unlikely; secondly, he shows that
what follows from this position is impossible, where he says, These absurd
consequences and others like them, etc. In his proof he first shows that in
enunciations about future singulars, truth cannot always be determinately
attributed to one of the opposites, and then he shows that both cannot lack
truth, where he says, But still it is not possible to say that neither is true,
etc. He gives two arguments with respect to the first point. In the first of
these he states a certain consequence, namely, that if every affirmation or
negation is determinately true or false, in future singulars as in the others,
it follows that all things must determinately be or not be. He proves this
consequence where he says, wherefore, if one person says, etc.,or as it is in
the Greek, for if one person says something will be, etc.”’ Let us suppose, he
argues, that there are two men, one of whom says something will take place in
the future, for instance, that Socrates will run, and the other says this same
thing will not take place. If the foregoing position is supposed—that in
singular future enunciations one of them will be true, either the affirmative
or the negative it would follow that only one of them is saying what is true,
because in singular future propositions both cannot be at once true, that is,
both the affirmative and the negative. This occurs only in indefinite
propositions. Moreover, from the fact that one of them must be speaking the
truth, it follows that it must determinately be or not be. Then he proves this
from the fact that these two follow upon each other convertibly, namely, truth
is that which is said and which is so in reality. And this is what he manifests
when he says that, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it necessarily
follows that it is so in reality; and if it is true to deny it, it necessarily
follows that it is not so. And conversely, for if it is so in reality, or is
not, it necessarily follows that it is true to affirm or deny it. The same
convertibility is also evident in what is false, for if someone lies, saying
what is false, it necessarily follows that in reality it is not as he affirms
or denies it to be; and conversely, if it is not in reality as he affirms or
denies it to be, it follows that in affirming or denying it he lies. 8. Est
ergo processus huius rationis talis. Si necesse est quod omnis affirmatio vel
negatio in singularibus et futuris sit vera vel falsa, necesse est quod omnis
affirmans vel negans determinate dicat verum vel falsum. Ex hoc autem sequitur
quod omne necesse sit esse vel non esse. Ergo, si omnis affirmatio vel negatio
determinate sit vera, necesse est omnia determinate esse vel non esse. Ex hoc
concludit ulterius quod omnia sint ex necessitate. Per quod triplex genus
contingentium excluditur. The process of Aristotle’s reasoning is as follows.
If it is necessary that every affirmation or negation about future singulars is
true or false, it is necessary that everyone who affirms or denies,
determinately says what is true or false. From this it follows that it is
necessary that everything be or not be. Therefore, if every affirmation or
negation is determinately true, it is necessary that everything determinately
be or not be. From this he concludes further that all things are of necessity.
This would exclude the three kinds of contingent things. 9 Quaedam enim
contingunt ut in paucioribus, quae accidunt a casu vel fortuna. Quaedam vero se
habent ad utrumlibet, quia scilicet non magis se habent ad unam partem, quam ad
aliam, et ista procedunt ex electione. Quaedam vero eveniunt ut in pluribus;
sicut hominem canescere in senectute, quod causatur ex natura. Si autem omnia
ex necessitate evenirent, nihil horum contingentium esset. Et ideo dicit nihil
est quantum ad ipsam permanentiam eorum quae permanent contingenter; neque fit
quantum ad productionem eorum quae contingenter causantur; nec casu quantum ad
ea quae sunt in minori parte, sive in paucioribus; nec utrumlibet quantum ad ea
quae se habent aequaliter ad utrumque, scilicet esse vel non esse, et ad
neutrum horum sunt determinata: quod significat cum subdit, nec erit, nec non
erit. De eo enim quod est magis determinatum ad unam partem possumus
determinate verum dicere quod hoc erit vel non erit, sicut medicus de
convalescente vere dicit, iste sanabitur, licet forte ex aliquo accidente eius
sanitas impediatur. Unde et philosophus dicit in II de generatione quod futurus
quis incedere, non incedet. De eo enim qui habet propositum determinatum ad
incedendum, vere potest dici quod ipse incedet, licet per aliquod accidens
impediatur eius incessus. Sed eius quod est ad utrumlibet proprium est quod,
quia non determinatur magis ad unum quam ad alterum, non possit de eo
determinate dici, neque quod erit, neque quod non erit. Quomodo autem sequatur
quod nihil sit ad utrumlibet ex praemissa hypothesi, manifestat subdens quod,
si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit vera, oportet quod vel ille qui
affirmat vel ille qui negat dicat verum; et sic tollitur id quod est ad
utrumlibet: quia, si esse aliquid ad utrumlibet, similiter se haberet ad hoc
quod fieret vel non fieret, et non magis ad unum quam ad alterum. Est autem
considerandum quod philosophus non excludit hic expresse contingens quod est ut
in pluribus, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia tale contingens non excludit
quin altera oppositarum enunciationum determinate sit vera et altera falsa, ut
dictum est. Secundo, quia remoto contingenti quod est in paucioribus, quod a
casu accidit, removetur per consequens contingens quod est ut in pluribus:
nihil enim differt id quod est in pluribus ab eo quod est in paucioribus, nisi
quod deficit in minori parte. The three kinds of contingent things are these:
some, the ones that happen by chance or fortune, happen infrequently; others
are in determinate to either of two alternatives because they are not inclined
more to one part than to another, and these proceed from choice; still others
occur for the most part, for example, men becoming gray in old age, which is
caused by nature. If, however, everything took place of necessity, there would
be none of these kinds of contingent things. Therefore, Aristotle says, nothing
is with respect to the very permanence of those things that are contingently
permanent; or takes place with respect to those that are caused contingently;
by chance with respect to those that take place for the least part, or
infrequently; or is indeterminate to either of two alternatives with respect to
those that are related equally to either of two, i.e., to being or to nonbeing,
and are determined to neither of these, which he signifies when he adds, or
will be, or will not be. For of that which is more determined to one part we
can truly and determinately say that it will be or will not be, as for example,
the physician truly says of the convalescent, "He will be restored to
health,” although perchance by some accident his cure may be impeded. The
Philosopher makes this same point when he says in II De generatione [11: 337b
7], "A man about to walk might not walk.” For it can be truly said of
someone who has the determined intention to walk that he will walk, although by
some accident his walking might be impeded. But in the case of that which is
indeterminate to either of two, it cannot determinately be said of it either
that it will be or that it will not be, for it is proper to it not to be
determined more to one than to another. Then he manifests how it follows from
the foregoing hypothesis that nothing is indeterminate to either of two when he
adds that if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, then either
the one who affirms or the one who denies must be speaking the truth. That
which is indeterminate to either of two is therefore destroyed, for if there is
something indeterminate to either of two, it would be related alike to taking
place or not taking place, and no more to one than to the other. It should be,
noted that the Philosopher is not expressly excluding the contingent that is
for the most part. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, this
kind of contingency still excludes the determinate truth of one of the opposite
enunciations and the falsity of the other, as has been said. Secondly, when the
contingent that is infrequent, i.e., that which takes place by chance, is
removed, the contingent that is for the most part is removed as a consequence,
for there is no difference between that which is for the most part and that
which is infrequent except that the former fails for the least part. 10 Deinde
cum dicit: amplius si est album etc., ponit secundam rationem ad ostendendum
praedictam dissimilitudinem, ducendo ad impossibile. Si enim similiter se habet
veritas et falsitas in praesentibus et futuris, sequitur ut quidquid verum est
de praesenti, etiam fuerit verum de futuro, eo modo quo est verum de praesenti.
Sed determinate nunc est verum dicere de aliquo singulari quod est album; ergo
primo, idest antequam illud fieret album, erat verum dicere quoniam hoc erit
album. Sed eadem ratio videtur esse in propinquo et in remoto; ergo si ante
unum diem verum fuit dicere quod hoc erit album, sequitur quod semper fuit
verum dicere de quolibet eorum, quae facta sunt, quod erit. Si autem semper est
verum dicere de praesenti quoniam est, vel de futuro quoniam erit, non potest
hoc non esse vel non futurum esse. Cuius consequentiae ratio patet, quia ista
duo sunt incompossibilia, quod aliquid vere dicatur esse, et quod non sit. Nam
hoc includitur in significatione veri, ut sit id quod dicitur. Si ergo ponitur
verum esse id quod dicitur de praesenti vel de futuro, non potest esse quin
illud sit praesens vel futurum. Sed quod non potest non fieri idem significat
cum eo quod est impossibile non fieri. Et quod impossibile est non fieri idem
significat cum eo quod est necesse fieri, ut in secundo plenius dicetur.
Sequitur ergo ex praemissis quod omnia, quae futura sunt, necesse est fieri. Ex
quo sequitur ulterius, quod nihil sit neque ad utrumlibet neque a casu, quia
illud quod accidit a casu non est ex necessitate, sed ut in paucioribus; hoc
autem relinquit pro inconvenienti; ergo et primum est falsum, scilicet quod
omne quod est verum esse, verum fuerit determinate dicere esse futurum. When he
says, Furthermore, on such a supposition, if something is now white, it was
true to say formerly that it will be white, etc., he gives a second argument to
show the dissimilarity of enunciations about future singulars. This argument is
by reduction to the impossible. If truth and falsity. are related in like
manner in present and in future enunciations, it follows that whatever is true
of the present was also true of the future, in the way in which it is true of
the present. But it is now determinately true to say of some singular that it
is white; therefore formerly, i.e., before it became white, it was true to say
that this will be white. Now the same reasoning seems to hold for the proximate
and the remote. Therefore, if yesterday it was true to say that this will be
white, it follows that it was always true to say of anything that has taken
place that it will be. And if it is always true to say of the present that it
is, or of the future that it will be, it is not possible that this not be, or,
that it will not be. The reason for this consequence is evident, for these two
cannot stand together, that something truly be said to be, and that it not be;
for this is included in the signification of the true, that that which is said,
is. If therefore that which is said concerning the present or the future is
posited to be true, it is not possible that this not be in the present or
future. But that which cannot not take place signifies the same thing as that
which is impossible not to take place. And that which is impossible not to take
place signifies the same thing as that which necessarily takes place, as will
be explained more fully in the second book. It follows, therefore, that all
things that are future must necessarily take place. From this it follows
further, that there is nothing that is indeterminate to either of two or that
takes place by chance, for what happens by chance does not take place of
necessity but happens infrequently. But this is unlikely. Therefore the first
proposition is false, i.e., that of everything of which it is true that it is,
it was determinately true to say that it would be. 11 Ad cuius evidentiam
considerandum est quod cum verum hoc significet ut dicatur aliquid esse quod
est, hoc modo est aliquid verum, quo habet esse. Cum autem aliquid est in
praesenti habet esse in seipso, et ideo vere potest dici de eo quod est: sed
quamdiu aliquid est futurum, nondum est in seipso, est tamen aliqualiter in sua
causa: quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ut sic sit in sua causa ut
ex necessitate ex ea proveniat; et tunc determinate habet esse in sua causa;
unde determinate potest dici de eo quod erit. Alio modo, aliquid est in sua
causa, ut quae habet inclinationem ad suum effectum, quae tamen impediri
potest; unde et hoc determinatum est in sua causa, sed mutabiliter; et sic de
hoc vere dici potest, hoc erit, sed non per omnimodam certitudinem. Tertio,
aliquid est in sua causa pure in potentia, quae etiam non magis est determinata
ad unum quam ad aliud; unde relinquitur quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum
determinate dici quod sit futurum, sed quod sit vel non sit. For clarification
of this point, we must consider the following. Since "true” signifies that
something is said to be what it is, something is true in the manner in which it
has being. Now, when something is in the present it exists in itself, and hence
it can be truly said of it that it is. But as long as something is future, it
does not yet exist in itself, but it is in a certain way in its cause, and this
in a threefold way. It may be in its cause in such a way that it comes from it
necessarily. In this case it has being determinately in its cause, and
therefore it can be determinately said of it that it will be. In another way,
something is in its cause as it has an inclination to its effect but can be
impeded. This, then, is determined in its cause, but changeably, and hence it
can be truly a said of it that it will be but not with complete certainty.
Thirdly, something is in its cause purely in potency. This is the case in which
the cause is as yet not determined more to one thing than to another, and
consequently it cannot in any way be said determinately of these that it is
going to be, but that it is or is not going to be. 12 Deinde cum dicit: at vero
neque quoniam etc., ostendit quod veritas non omnino deest in singularibus
futuris utrique oppositorum; et primo, proponit quod intendit dicens quod sicut
non est verum dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum sit verum determinate,
sic non est verum dicere quod non utrumque sit verum; ut si quod dicamus, neque
erit, neque non erit. Secundo, ibi: primum enim cum sit etc., probat propositum
duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est: affirmatio et negatio dividunt verum
et falsum, quod patet ex definitione veri et falsi: nam nihil aliud est verum
quam esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; et nihil aliud est falsum quam
esse quod non est, vel non esse quod est; et sic oportet quod si affirmatio sit
falsa, quod negatio sit vera; et e converso. Sed secundum praedictam positionem
affirmatio est falsa, qua dicitur, hoc erit; nec tamen negatio est vera: et
similiter negatio erit falsa, affirmatione non existente vera; ergo praedicta
positio est impossibilis, scilicet quod veritas desit utrique oppositorum.
Secundam rationem ponit; ibi: ad haec si verum est et cetera. Quae talis est:
si verum est dicere aliquid, sequitur quod illud sit; puta si verum est dicere
quod aliquid sit magnum et album, sequitur utraque esse. Et ita de futuro sicut
de praesenti: sequitur enim esse cras, si verum est dicere quod erit cras. Si
ergo vera est praedicta positio dicens quod neque cras erit, neque non erit,
oportebit neque fieri, neque non fieri: quod est contra rationem eius quod est
ad utrumlibet, quia quod est ad utrumlibet se habet ad alterutrum; ut navale
bellum cras erit, vel non erit. Et ita ex hoc sequitur idem inconveniens quod
in praemissis. Then Aristotle says, But still it is not possible to say that
neither is true, etc. Here he shows that truth is not altogether lacking to
both of the opposites in singular future enunciations. First he says that just
as it is not true to say that in such enunciations one of the opposites is
determinately true, so it is not true to say that neither is true; as if we
could say that a thing neither will take place nor will not take place. Then
when he says, In the first place, though the affirmation be false, etc., he
gives two arguments to prove his point. The first is as follows. Affirmation
and negation divide the true and the false. This is evident from the definition
of true and false, for to be true is to be what in fact is, or not to be what
in fact is not; and to be false is to be what in fact is not, or not to be what
in fact is. Consequently, if the affirmation is false, the negation must be
true, and conversely. But if the position is taken that neither is true, the
affirmation, "This will be” is false, yet the negation is not true;
likewise the negation will be false and the affirmation not be true. Therefore,
the aforesaid position is impossible, i.e., that truth is lacking to both of
the opposites. The second argument begins where he says, Secondly, if it is
true to say that a thing is white and large, etc. The argument is as follows.
If it is true to say something, it follows that it is. For example, if it is
true to say that something is large and white, it follows that it is both. And
this is so of the future as of the present, for if it is true to say that it
will be tomorrow, it follows that it will be tomorrow. Therefore, if the
position that it neither will be or not be tomorrow is true, it will be
necessary that it neither happen nor not happen, which is contrary to the
nature of that which is indeterminate to either of two, for that which is
indeterminate to either of two is related to either; for example, a naval
battle will take place tomorrow, or will not. The same unlikely things follow,
then, from this as from the first argument. XIV. 1. Ostenderat superius
philosophus ducendo ad inconveniens quod non est similiter verum vel falsum
determinate in altero oppositorum in singularibus et futuris, sicut supra de
aliis enunciationibus dixerat; nunc autem ostendit inconvenientia ad quae
adduxerat esse impossibilia. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit
impossibilia ea quae sequebantur; secundo, concludit quomodo circa haec se
veritas habeat; ibi: igitur esse quod est et cetera. The Philosopher has
shown—by leading the opposite position to what is unlikely—that in singular
future enunciations truth or falsity is not determinately in one of the opposites,
as it is in other enunciations. Now he is going to show that the unlikely
things to which it has led are impossibilities. First he shows that the things
that followed are impossibilities; then he concludes what the truth is, where
he says, Now that which is, when it is, necessarily is, etc. 2 Circa primum
tria facit: primo, ponit inconvenientia quae sequuntur; secundo, ostendit haec
inconvenientia ex praedicta positione sequi; ibi: nihil enim prohibet etc.;
tertio, ostendit esse impossibilia inconvenientia memorata; ibi: quod si
haecpossibilia non sunt et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, ex praedictis rationibus
concludens, quod haec inconvenientia sequuntur, si ponatur quod necesse sit
oppositarum enunciationum alteram determinate esse veram et alteram esse falsam
similiter in singularibus sicut in universalibus, quod scilicet nihil in his
quae fiunt sit ad utrumlibet, sed omnia sint et fiant ex necessitate. Et ex hoc
ulterius inducit alia duo inconvenientia. Quorum primum est quod non oportebit
de aliquo consiliari: probatum est enim in III Ethicorum quod consilium non est
de his, quae sunt ex necessitate, sed solum de contingentibus, quae possunt
esse et non esse. Secundum inconveniens est quod omnes actiones humanae, quae
sunt propter aliquem finem (puta negotiatio, quae est propter divitias
acquirendas), erunt superfluae: quia si omnia ex necessitate eveniunt, sive
operemur sive non operemur erit quod intendimus. Sed hoc est contra intentionem
hominum, quia ea intentione videntur consiliari et negotiari ut, si haec
faciant, erit talis finis, si autem faciunt aliquid aliud, erit alius finis. With
respect to the impossibilities that follow he first states the unlikely things
that follow from the opposite position, then shows that these follow from the
aforesaid position, where he says, For nothing prevents one person from saying
that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc. Finally he shows that these
are impossibilities where he says, But these things appear to be impossible,
etc. He says, then, concluding from the preceding reasoning, that these
unlikely things follow—if the position is taken that of opposed enunciations
one of the two must be determinately true and the other false in the same way
in singular as in universal enunciations—namely, that in things that come about
nothing is indeterminate to either of two, but all things are and take place of
necessity. From this he infers two other unlikely things that follow. First, it
will not be necessary to deliberate about anything; whereas he proved in III
Ethicorum [3: 1112a 19] that counsel is not concerned with things that take
place necessarily but only with contingent things, i.e., things which can be or
not be. Secondly, all human actions that are for the sake of some end (for
example, a business transaction to acquire riches) will be superfluous, because
what we intend will take place whether we take pains to bring it about or
not—if all things come about of necessity. This, however, is in opposition to
the intention of men, for they seem to deliberate and to transact business with
the intention that if they do this there will be such a result, but if they do
something else, there will be another result. 3 Deinde cum dicit: nihil enim
prohibet etc., probat quod dicta inconvenientia consequantur ex dicta
positione. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit praedicta inconvenientia
sequi, quodam possibili posito; secundo, ostendit quod eadem inconvenientia
sequantur etiam si illud non ponatur; ibi: at nec hoc differt et cetera. Dicit
ergo primo, non esse impossibile quod ante mille annos, quando nihil apud
homines erat praecogitatum, vel praeordinatum de his quae nunc aguntur, unus
dixerit quod hoc erit, puta quod civitas talis subverteretur, alius autem
dixerit quod hoc non erit. Sed si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate est
vera, necesse est quod alter eorum determinate verum dixerit; ergo necesse fuit
alterum eorum ex necessitate evenire; et eadem ratio est in omnibus aliis; ergo
omnia ex necessitate eveniunt. Where he says, For nothing prevents one person
from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc., he proves that
the said unlikely things follow from the said position. First he shows that the
unlikely things follow from the positing of a certain possibility; then he
shows that the same unlikely things follow even if that possibility is not
posited, where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have
actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc. He says, then, that it
is not impossible that a thousand years before, when men neither knew nor
ordained any of the things that are taking place now, a man said, "This
will be,” for example, that such a state would be overthrown, and another man
said, "This will not be.” But if every affirmation or negation is determinately
true, one of them must have spoken the truth. Therefore one of them had to take
place of necessity; and this same reasoning holds for all other things.
Therefore everything takes place of necessity. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 4Deinde
cum dicit: at vero neque hoc differt etc., ostendit quod idem sequitur si illud
possibile non ponatur. Nihil enim differt, quantum ad rerum existentiam vel
eventum, si uno affirmante hoc esse futurum, alius negaverit vel non negaverit;
ita enim se habebit res si hoc factum fuerit, sicut si hoc non factum fuerit.
Non enim propter nostrum affirmare vel negare mutatur cursus rerum, ut sit
aliquid vel non sit: quia veritas nostrae enunciationis non est causa
existentiae rerum, sed potius e converso. Similiter etiam non differt quantum
ad eventum eius quod nunc agitur, utrum fuerit affirmatum vel negatum ante
millesimum annum vel ante quodcumque tempus. Sic ergo, si in quocumque tempore
praeterito, ita se habebat veritas enunciationum, ut necesse esset quod alterum
oppositorum vere diceretur; et ad hoc quod necesse est aliquid vere dici
sequitur quod necesse sit illud esse vel fieri; consequens est quod unumquodque
eorum quae fiunt, sic se habeat ut ex necessitate fiat. Et huiusmodi
consequentiae rationem assignat per hoc, quod si ponatur aliquem vere dicere
quod hoc erit, non potest non futurum esse. Sicut supposito quod sit homo, non
potest non esse animal rationale mortale. Hoc enim significatur, cum dicitur
aliquid vere dici, scilicet quod ita sit ut dicitur. Eadem autem habitudo est
eorum, quae nunc dicuntur, ad ea quae futura sunt, quae erat eorum, quae prius
dicebantur, ad ea quae sunt praesentia vel praeterita; et ita omnia ex
necessitate acciderunt, et accidunt, et accident, quia quod nunc factum est,
utpote in praesenti vel in praeterito existens, semper verum erat dicere,
quoniam erit futurum.Then he shows that the same thing follows if this
possibility is not posited where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference
whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc. It
makes no difference in relation to the existence or outcome of things whether a
person denies that this is going to take place when it is affirmed, or not; for
as was previously said, the event will either take place or not whether the
affirmation and denial have been made or not. That something is or is not does
not result from a change in the course of things to correspond to our
affirmation or denial, for the truth of our enunciation is not the cause of the
existence of things, but rather the converse. Nor does it make any difference
to the outcome of what is now being done whether it was affirmed or denied a
thousand years before, or at any other time before. Therefore, if in all past
time, the truth of enunciations was such that one of the opposites had to have
been truly said and if upon the necessity of something being truly said it
follows that this must be or take place, it will follow that everything that
takes place is such that it takes place of necessity. The reason he assigns for
this consequence is the following. If it is posited that someone truly says
this will be, it is not possible that it will not be, just as having supposed
that man is, he cannot not be a rational mortal animal. For to be truly said
means that it is such as is said. Moreover, the relationship of what is said.
now to what will be is the same as the relationship of what was said previously
to what is in the present or the past. Therefore, all things have necessarily
happened, and they are necessarily happening, and they will necessarily happen,
for of what is accomplished now, as existing in the present or in the past, it
was always true to say that it would be. 5 Deinde cum dicit: quod si haec
possibilia non sunt etc., ostendit praedicta esse impossibilia: et primo, per
rationem; secundo, per exempla sensibilia; ibi: et multa nobis manifesta et
cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit propositum in rebus humanis;
secundo, etiam in aliis rebus; ibi: et quoniam est omnino et cetera. Quantum
autem ad res humanas ostendit esse impossibilia quae dicta sunt, per hoc quod
homo manifeste videtur esse principium eorum futurorum, quae agit quasi dominus
existens suorum actuum, et in sua potestate habens agere vel non agere; quod
quidem principium si removeatur, tollitur totus ordo conversationis humanae, et
omnia principia philosophiae moralis. Hoc enim sublato non erit aliqua utilitas
persuasionis, nec comminationis, nec punitionis aut remunerationis, quibus
homines alliciuntur ad bona et retrahuntur a malis, et sic evacuatur tota
civilis scientia. Hoc ergo philosophus accipit pro principio manifesto quod
homo sit principium futurorum; non est autem futurorum principium nisi per hoc
quod consiliatur et facit aliquid: ea enim quae agunt absque consilio non habent
dominium sui actus, quasi libere iudicantes de his quae sunt agenda, sed quodam
naturali instinctu moventur ad agendum, ut patet in animalibus brutis. Unde
impossibile est quod supra conclusum est quod non oporteat nos negotiari vel
consiliari. Et sic etiam impossibile est illud ex quo sequebatur, scilicet quod
omnia ex necessitate eveniant. When he says, But these things appear to be
impossible, etc., he shows that what has been said is impossible. He shows this
first by reason, secondly by sensible examples, where he says, We can point to
many clear instances of this, etc. First he argues that the position taken is
impossible in relation to human affairs, for clearly man seems to be the
principle of the future things that he does insofar as he is the master of his
own actions and has the power to act or not to act. Indeed, to reject this
principle would be to do away with the whole order of human association and all
the principles of moral philosophy. For men are attracted to good and withdrawn
from evil by persuasion and threat, and by punishment and reward; but rejection
of this principle would make these useless and thus nullify the whole of civil
science. Here the Philosopher accepts it as an evident principle that man is
the principle of future things. However, he is not the principle of future
things unless he deliberates about a thing and then does it. In those things
that men do without deliberation they do not have dominion over their acts,
i.e., they do not judge freely about things to be done, but are moved to act by
a kind of natural instinct such as is evident in the case of brute animals.
Hence, the conclusion that it is not necessary for us to take pains about
something or to deliberate is impossible; likewise what it followed from is
impossible, i.e., that all things take place of necessity. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14
n. 6Deinde cum dicit: et quoniam est omnino etc., ostendit idem etiam in aliis
rebus. Manifestum est enim etiam in rebus naturalibus esse quaedam, quae non
semper actu sunt; ergo in eis contingit esse et non esse: alioquin vel semper
essent, vel semper non essent. Id autem quod non est, incipit esse aliquid per
hoc quod fit illud; sicut id quod non est album, incipit esse album per hoc
quod fit album. Si autem non fiat album permanet non ens album. Ergo in quibus
contingit esse et non esse, contingit etiam fieri et non fieri. Non ergo talia
ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt, sed est in eis natura possibilitatis, per quam
se habent ad fieri et non fieri, esse et non esse. Then he shows that this is
also the case in other things where he says, and that universally in the things
not always in act, there is a potentiality to be and not to be, etc. In natural
things, too, it is evident that there are some things not always in act; it is
therefore possible for them to be or not be, otherwise they would either always
be or always not be. Now that which is not begins to be something by becoming
it; as for example, that which is not white begins to be white by becoming
white. But if it does not become white it continues not to be white. Therefore,
in things that have the possibility of being and not being, there is also the
possibility of becoming and not becoming. Such things neither are nor come to
be of necessity but there is in them the kind of possibility which disposes
them to becoming and not becoming, to being and not being. 7 Deinde cum dicit:
ac multa nobis manifesta etc., ostendit propositum per sensibilia exempla. Sit
enim, puta, vestis nova; manifestum est quod eam possibile est incidi, quia
nihil obviat incisioni, nec ex parte agentis nec ex parte patientis. Probat
autem quod simul cum hoc quod possibile est eam incidi, possibile est etiam eam
non incidi, eodem modo quo supra probavit duas indefinitas oppositas esse simul
veras, scilicet per assumptionem contrarii. Sicut enim possibile est istam
vestem incidi, ita possibile est eam exteri, idest vetustate corrumpi; sed si
exteritur non inciditur; ergo utrumque possibile est, scilicet eam incidi et
non incidi. Et ex hoc universaliter concludit quod in aliis futuris, quae non
sunt in actu semper, sed sunt in potentia, hoc manifestum est quod non omnia ex
necessitate sunt vel fiunt, sed eorum quaedam sunt ad utrumlibet, quae non se
habent magis ad affirmationem quam ad negationem; alia vero sunt in quibus
alterum eorum contingit ut in pluribus, sed tamen contingit etiam ut in
paucioribus quod altera pars sit vera, et non alia, quae scilicet contingit ut
in pluribus. Next he shows the impossibility of what was said by examples
perceptible to the senses, where he says, We can point to many clear instances
of this, etc. Take a new garment for example. It is evident that it is possible
to cut it, for nothing stands in the way of cutting it either on the part of
the agent or the patient. He proves it is at once possible that it be cut and
that it not be cut in the same way he has already proved that two opposed
indefinite enunciations are at once true, i.e., by the assumption of
contraries. just as it is possible that the garment be cut, so it is possible
that it wear out, i.e., be corrupted in the course of time. But if it wears out
it is not cut. Therefore both are possible, i.e., that it be cut and that it
not be cut. From this he concludes universally in regard to other future things
which are not always in act, but are in potency, that not all are or take place
of necessity; some are indeterminate to either of two, and therefore are not
related any more to affirmation than to negation; there are others in which one
possibility happens for the most part, although it is possible, but for the
least part, that the other part be true, and not the part which happens for the
most part. 8 Est autem considerandum quod, sicut Boethius dicit hic in
commento, circa possibile et necessarium diversimode aliqui sunt opinati.
Quidam enim distinxerunt ea secundum eventum, sicut Diodorus, qui dixit illud
esse impossibile quod nunquam erit; necessarium vero quod semper erit;
possibile vero quod quandoque erit, quandoque non erit. Stoici vero
distinxerunt haec secundum exteriora prohibentia. Dixerunt enim necessarium
esse illud quod non potest prohiberi quin sit verum; impossibile vero quod
semper prohibetur a veritate; possibile vero quod potest prohiberi vel non
prohiberi. Utraque autem distinctio videtur esse incompetens. Nam prima
distinctio est a posteriori: non enim ideo aliquid est necessarium, quia semper
erit; sed potius ideo semper erit, quia est necessarium: et idem patet in
aliis. Secunda autem assignatio est ab exteriori et quasi per accidens: non
enim ideo aliquid est necessarium, quia non habet impedimentum, sed quia est
necessarium, ideo impedimentum habere non potest. Et ideo alii melius ista
distinxerunt secundum naturam rerum, ut scilicet dicatur illud necessarium,
quod in sua natura determinatum est solum ad esse; impossibile autem quod est
determinatum solum ad non esse; possibile autem quod ad neutrum est omnino
determinatum, sive se habeat magis ad unum quam ad alterum, sive se habeat
aequaliter ad utrumque, quod dicitur contingens ad utrumlibet. Et hoc est quod
Boethius attribuit Philoni. Sed manifeste haec est sententia Aristotelis in hoc
loco. Assignat enim rationem possibilitatis et contingentiae, in his quidem
quae sunt a nobis ex eo quod sumus consiliativi, in aliis autem ex eo quod
materia est in potentia ad utrumque oppositorum. With regard to this question
about the possible and the necessary, there have been different opinions, as
Boethius says in his Commentary, and these will have to be considered. Some who
distinguished them according to result—for example, Diodorus—said that the
impossible is that which never will be, the necessary, that which always will
be, and the possible, that which sometimes will be, sometimes not. The Stoics
distinguished them according to exterior restraints. They said the necessary
was that which could not be prevented from being true, the impossible, that
which is always prevented from being true, and the possible, that which can be
prevented or not be prevented. However, the distinctions in both of those cases
seem to be inadequate. The first distinctions are a posteriori, for something
is not necessary because it always will be, but rather, it always will be
because it is necessary; this holds for the possible as well as the impossible.
The second designation is taken from what is external and accidental, for
something is not necessary because it does not have an impediment, but it does
not have an impediment because it is necessary. Others distinguished these
better by basing their distinction on the nature of things. They said that the
necessary is that which in its nature is determined only to being, the
impossible, that which is determined only to nonbeing, and the possible, that
which is not altogether determined to either, whether related more to one than
to another or related equally to both. The latter is known as that which is
indeterminate to either of two. Boethius attributes these distinctions to
Philo. However, this is clearly the opinion of Aristotle here, for he gives as
the reason for the possibility and contingency in the things we do the fact
that we deliberate, and in other things the fact that matter is in potency to
either it of two opposites. 9 Sed videtur haec ratio non esse sufficiens. Sicut
enim in corporibus corruptibilibus materia invenitur in potentia se habens ad
esse et non esse, ita etiam in corporibus caelestibus invenitur potentia ad
diversa ubi, et tamen nihil in eis evenit contingenter, sed solum ex
necessitate. Unde dicendum est quod possibilitas materiae ad utrumque, si
communiter loquamur, non est sufficiens ratio contingentiae, nisi etiam addatur
ex parte potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determinata ad unum; alioquin si
ita sit determinata ad unum quod impediri non potest, consequens est quod ex
necessitate reducat in actum potentiam passivam eodem modo. But this reasoning
does not seem to be adequate either. While it is true that in corruptible
bodies matter is in potency to being and nonbeing, and in celestial bodies
there is potency to diverse location; nevertheless nothing happens contingently
in celestial bodies, but only of necessity. Consequently, we have to say that
the potentiality of matter to either of two, if we are speaking generally, does
not suffice as a reason for contingency unless we add on the part of the active
potency that it is not wholly determined to one; for if it is so determined to
one that it cannot be impeded, it follows that it necessarily reduces into act
the passive potency in the same mode. 10 Hoc igitur quidam attendentes
posuerunt quod potentia, quae est in ipsis rebus naturalibus, sortitur
necessitatem ex aliqua causa determinata ad unum quam dixerunt fatum. Quorum
Stoici posuerunt fatum in quadam serie, seu connexione causarum, supponentes
quod omne quod in hoc mundo accidit habet causam; causa autem posita, necesse
est effectum poni. Et si una causa per se non sufficit, multae causae ad hoc
concurrentes accipiunt rationem unius causae sufficientis; et ita concludebant
quod omnia ex necessitate eveniunt. Considering this, some maintained that the very
potency which is in natural things receives necessity from some cause
determined to one. This cause they called fate. The Stoics, for example, held
that fate was to be found in a series or interconnection of causes on the
assumption that everything that happens has a cause; but when a cause has been
posited the effect is posited of necessity, and if one per se cause does not
suffice, many causes concurring for this take on the nature of one sufficient
cause; so, they concluded, everything happens of necessity. 11 Sed hanc
rationem solvit Aristoteles in VI metaphysicae interimens utramque
propositionum assumptarum. Dicit enim quod non omne quod fit habet causam, sed
solum illud quod est per se. Sed illud quod est per accidens non habet causam;
quia proprie non est ens, sed magis ordinatur cum non ente, ut etiam Plato
dixit. Unde esse musicum habet causam, et similiter esse album; sed hoc quod
est, album esse musicum, non habet causam: et idem est in omnibus aliis
huiusmodi. Similiter etiam haec est falsa, quod posita causa etiam sufficienti,
necesse est effectum poni: non enim omnis causa est talis (etiamsi sufficiens
sit) quod eius effectus impediri non possit; sicut ignis est sufficiens causa
combustionis lignorum, sed tamen per effusionem aquae impeditur combustio. Aristotle
refutes this reasoning in VI Metaphysicae [2: 1026a 33] by destroying each of
the assumed propositions. He says there that not everything that takes place
has a cause, but only what is per se has a cause. What is accidental does not have
a cause, for it is not properly being but is more like nonbeing, as Plato also
held. Whence, to be musical has a cause and likewise to be white, but to be
musical white does not have a cause; and the same is the case with all others
of this kind. It is also false that when a cause has been posited—even a
sufficient one—the effect must be posited, for not every cause (even if it is
sufficient) is such that its effect cannot be impeded. For example, fire is a
sufficient cause of the combustion of wood, but if water is poured on it the
combustion is impeded. 12 Si autem utraque propositionum praedictarum esset
vera, infallibiliter sequeretur omnia ex necessitate contingere. Quia si
quilibet effectus habet causam, esset effectum (qui est futurus post quinque
dies, aut post quantumcumque tempus) reducere in aliquam causam priorem: et sic
quousque esset devenire ad causam, quae nunc est in praesenti, vel iam fuit in
praeterito; si autem causa posita, necesse est effectum poni, per ordinem
causarum deveniret necessitas usque ad ultimum effectum. Puta, si comedit
salsa, sitiet: si sitiet, exibit domum ad bibendum: si exibit domum, occidetur
a latronibus. Quia ergo iam comedit salsa, necesse est eum occidi. Et ideo
Aristoteles ad hoc excludendum ostendit utramque praedictarum propositionum
esse falsam, ut dictum est. However, if both of the aforesaid propositions were
true, it would follow infallibly that everything happens necessarily. For if
every effect has a cause, then it would be possible to reduce an effect (which
is going to take place in five days or whatever time) to some prior cause, and
so on until it reaches a cause which is now in the present or already has been
in the past. Moreover, if when the cause is posited it is necessary that the
effect be posited, the necessity would reach through an order of causes all the
way to the ultimate effect. For instance, if someone eats salty food, he will
be thirsty; if he is thirsty, he will go outside to drink; if he goes outside
to drink, he will be killed by robbers. Therefore, once he has eaten salty
food, it is necessary that he be killed. To exclude this position, Aristotle
shows that both of these propositions are false. 13 Obiiciunt autem quidam
contra hoc, dicentes quod omne per accidens reducitur ad aliquid per se, et ita
oportet effectum qui est per accidens reduci in causam per se. Sed non
attendunt quod id quod est per accidens reducitur ad per se, in quantum accidit
ei quod est per se, sicut musicum accidit Socrati, et omne accidens alicui
subiecto per se existenti. Et similiter omne quod in aliquo effectu est per
accidens consideratur circa aliquem effectum per se: qui quantum ad id quod per
se est habet causam per se, quantum autem ad id quod inest ei per accidens non
habet causam per se, sed causam per accidens. Oportet enim effectum
proportionaliter referre ad causam suam, ut in II physicorum et in V
methaphysicae dicitur. However, some persons object to this on the grounds that
everything accidental is reduced to something per se and therefore an effect
that is accidental must be reduced to a per se cause. Those who argue in this
way fail to take into account that the accidental is reduced to the per se
inasmuch as it is accidental to that which is per se; for example, musical is
accidental to Socrates, and every accident to some subject existing per se.
Similarly, everything accidental in some effect is considered in relation to
some per se effect, which effect, in relation to that which is per se, has a
per se cause, but in relation to what is in it accidentally does not have a per
se cause but an accidental one. The reason for this is that the effect must be
proportionately referred to its cause, as is said in II Physicorum [3: 195b
25-28] and in V Metaphysicae [2: 1013b 28]. 14 Quidam vero non attendentes
differentiam effectuum per accidens et per se, tentaverunt reducere omnes
effectus hic inferius provenientes in aliquam causam per se, quam ponebant esse
virtutem caelestium corporum in qua ponebant fatum, dicentes nihil aliud esse
fatum quam vim positionis syderum. Sed ex hac causa non potest provenire
necessitas in omnibus quae hic aguntur. Multa enim hic fiunt ex intellectu et
voluntate, quae per se et directe non subduntur virtuti caelestium corporum:
cum enim intellectus sive ratio et voluntas quae est in ratione, non sint actus
organi corporalis, ut probatur in libro de anima, impossibile est quod directe
subdantur intellectus seu ratio et voluntas virtuti caelestium corporum: nulla
enim vis corporalis potest agere per se, nisi in rem corpoream. Vires autem
sensitivae in quantum sunt actus organorum corporalium per accidens subduntur
actioni caelestium corporum. Unde philosophus in libro de anima opinionem
ponentium voluntatem hominis subiici motui caeli adscribit his, qui non
ponebant intellectum differre a sensu. Indirecte tamen vis caelestium corporum
redundat ad intellectum et voluntatem, in quantum scilicet intellectus et
voluntas utuntur viribus sensitivis. Manifestum autem est quod passiones virium
sensitivarum non inferunt necessitatem rationi et voluntati. Nam continens
habet pravas concupiscentias, sed non deducitur, ut patet per philosophum in
VII Ethicorum. Sic igitur ex virtute caelestium corporum non provenit
necessitas in his quae per rationem et voluntatem fiunt. Similiter nec in aliis
corporalibus effectibus rerum corruptibilium, in quibus multa per accidens
eveniunt. Id autem quod est per accidens non potest reduci ut in causam per se
in aliquam virtutem naturalem, quia virtus naturae se habet ad unum; quod autem
est per accidens non est unum; unde et supra dictum est quod haec enunciatio
non est una, Socrates est albus musicus, quia non significat unum. Et ideo
philosophus dicit in libro de somno et vigilia quod multa, quorum signa
praeexistunt in corporibus caelestibus, puta in imbribus et tempestatibus, non
eveniunt, quia scilicet impediuntur per accidens. Et quamvis illud etiam
impedimentum secundum se consideratum reducatur in aliquam causam caelestem;
tamen concursus horum, cum sit per accidens, non potest reduci in aliquam causam
naturaliter agentem. Some, however, not considering the difference between
accidental and per se effects, tried to reduce all the effects that come about
in this world to some per se cause. They posited as this cause the power of the
heavenly bodies and assumed fate to be dependent on this power—fate being,
according to them, nothing else but the power of the position of the
constellations. But such a cause cannot bring about necessity in all the things
accomplished in this world, since many things come about from intellect and
will, which are not subject per se and directly to the power of the heavenly
bodies. For the intellect, or reason, and the will which is in reason, are not
acts of a corporeal organ (as is proved in the treatise De anima [III, 4: 429a
18]) and consequently cannot be directly subject to the power of the heavenly
bodies, since a corporeal force, of itself, can only act on a corporeal thing.
The sensitive powers, on the other hand, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal
organs, are accidentally subject to the action of the heavenly bodies. Hence,
the Philosopher in his book De anima [III, 3: 427a 21] ascribes the opinion
that the will of man is subject to the movement of the heavens to those who
hold the position that the intellect does not differ from sense. The power of
the heavenly bodies, however, does indirectly redound to the intellect and will
inasmuch as the aq intellect and will use the sensitive powers. But clearly the
passions of the sensitive powers do not induce necessity of reason and will,
for the continent man has wrong desires but is not seduced by them, as is shown
in VII Ethicorum [3: 1146a 5]. Therefore, we may conclude that the power of the
heavenly bodies does not bring about necessity in the things done through
reason and will. This is also the case in other corporeal effects of
corruptible things, in which many things happen accidentally. What is
accidental cannot be reduced to a per se cause in a natural power because the
power of nature is directed to some one thing; but what is accidental is not
one; whence it was said above that the enunciation "Socrates is a white
musical being” is not one because it does not signify one thing. This is the
reason the Philosopher says in the book De somno et vigilia [object] Close that
many things of which the signs pre-exist in the heavenly bodies—for example in
storm clouds and tempests—do not take place because they are accidentally
impeded. And although this impediment considered as such is reduced to some
celestial cause, the concurrence of these, since it is accidental, cannot be
reduced to a cause acting naturally. 15 Sed considerandum est quod id quod est
per accidens potest ab intellectu accipi ut unum, sicut album esse musicum,
quod quamvis secundum se non sit unum, tamen intellectus ut unum accipit, in
quantum scilicet componendo format enunciationem unam. Et secundum hoc
contingit id, quod secundum se per accidens evenit et casualiter, reduci in
aliquem intellectum praeordinantem; sicut concursus duorum servorum ad certum
locum est per accidens et casualis quantum ad eos, cum unus eorum ignoret de
alio; potest tamen esse per se intentus a domino, qui utrumque mittit ad hoc
quod in certo loco sibi occurrant. However, what is accidental can be taken as
one by the intellect. For example, "the white is musical,” which as such
is not one, the intellect takes as one, i.e., insofar as it forms one
enunciation by composing. And in accordance with this it is possible to reduce
what in itself happens accidentally and fortuitously to a preordaining
intellect For example, the meeting of two servants at a certain place may be
accidental and fortuitous with respect to them, since neither knew the other
would be there, but be per se intended by their master who sent each of them to
encounter the other in a certain place. 16 Et secundum hoc aliqui posuerunt
omnia quaecumque in hoc mundo aguntur, etiam quae videntur fortuita vel
casualia, reduci in ordinem providentiae divinae, ex qua dicebant dependere
fatum. Et hoc quidem aliqui stulti negaverunt, iudicantes de intellectu divino
ad modum intellectus nostri, qui singularia non cognoscit. Hoc autem est
falsum: nam intelligere divinum et velle eius est ipsum esse ipsius. Unde sicut
esse eius sua virtute comprehendit omne illud quod quocumque modo est, in
quantum scilicet est per participationem ipsius; ita etiam suum intelligere et
suum intelligibile comprehendit omnem cognitionem et omne cognoscibile; et suum
velle et suum volitum comprehendit omnem appetitum et omne appetibile quod est
bonum; ut, scilicet ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile cadat sub eius
cognitione, et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum cadat sub eius voluntate: sicut ex
hoc ipso quod est ens, aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa, quam ipse
perfecte comprehendit, cum sit per intellectum agens. Accordingly, some have
maintained that everything whatever that is effected in this world—even the
things that seem fortuitous and casual—is reduced to the order of divine
providence on which they said fate depends. Other foolish men have denied this,
judging of the Divine Intellect in the mode of our intellect which does not
know singulars. But the position of the latter is false, for His divine
thinking and willing is His very being. Hence, just as His being by its power
comprehends all that is in any way (i.e., inasmuch as it is through
participation of Him) so also His thinking and what He thinks comprehend all
knowing and everything knowable, and His willing and what He wills comprehend
all desiring and every desirable good; in other words, whatever is knowable
falls under His knowledge and whatever is good falls under His will, just as
whatever is falls under His active power, which He comprehends perfectly, since
He acts by His intellect. 17 Sed si providentia divina sit per se causa omnium
quae in hoc mundo accidunt, saltem bonorum, videtur quod omnia ex necessitate
accidant. Primo quidem ex parte scientiae eius: non enim potest eius scientia
falli; et ita ea quae ipse scit, videtur quod necesse sit evenire. Secundo ex
parte voluntatis: voluntas enim Dei inefficax esse non potest; videtur ergo
quod omnia quae vult, ex necessitate eveniant. It may be objected, however,
that if Divine Providence is the per se cause of everything that happens in
this world, at least of good things, it would look as though everything takes
place of necessity: first on the part of His knowledge, for His knowledge
cannot be fallible, and so it would seem that what He knows happens
necessarily; secondly, on the part of the will, for the will of God cannot be
inefficacious; it would seem, therefore, that everything He wills happens of
necessity. 18 Procedunt autem hae obiectiones ex eo quod cognitio divini
intellectus et operatio divinae voluntatis pensantur ad modum eorum, quae in
nobis sunt, cum tamen multo dissimiliter se habeant. These objections arise
from judging of the cognition of the divine intellect and the operation of the
divine will in the way in which these are in us, when in fact they are very
dissimilar. 19 Nam primo quidem ex parte cognitionis vel scientiae
considerandum est quod ad cognoscendum ea quae secundum ordinem temporis
eveniunt, aliter se habet vis cognoscitiva, quae sub ordine temporis
aliqualiter continetur, aliter illa quae totaliter est extra ordinem temporis.
Cuius exemplum conveniens accipi potest ex ordine loci: nam secundum
philosophum in IV physicorum, secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine est
prius et posterius in motu et per consequens in tempore. Si ergo sint multi
homines per viam aliquam transeuntes, quilibet eorum qui sub ordine
transeuntium continetur habet cognitionem de praecedentibus et subsequentibus,
in quantum sunt praecedentes et subsequentes; quod pertinet ad ordinem loci. Et
ideo quilibet eorum videt eos, qui iuxta se sunt et aliquos eorum qui eos praecedunt;
eos autem qui post se sunt videre non potest. Si autem esset aliquis extra
totum ordinem transeuntium, utpote in aliqua excelsa turri constitutus, unde
posset totam viam videre, videret quidem simul omnes in via existentes, non sub
ratione praecedentis et subsequentis (in comparatione scilicet ad eius
intuitum), sed simul omnes videret, et quomodo unus eorum alium praecedit. Quia
igitur cognitio nostra cadit sub ordine temporis, vel per se vel per accidens
(unde et anima in componendo et dividendo necesse habet adiungere tempus, ut
dicitur in III de anima), consequens est quod sub eius cognitione cadant res
sub ratione praesentis, praeteriti et futuri. Et ideo praesentia cognoscit
tanquam actu existentia et sensu aliqualiter perceptibilia; praeterita autem
cognoscit ut memorata; futura autem non cognoscit in seipsis, quia nondum sunt,
sed cognoscere ea potest in causis suis: per certitudinem quidem, si totaliter
in causis suis sint determinata, ut ex quibus de necessitate evenient; per
coniecturam autem, si non sint sic determinata quin impediri possint, sicut
quae sunt ut in pluribus; nullo autem modo, si in suis causis sunt omnino in
potentia non magis determinata ad unum quam ad aliud, sicut quae sunt ad
utrumlibet. Non enim est aliquid cognoscibile secundum quod est in potentia,
sed solum secundum quod est in actu, ut patet per philosophum in IX
metaphysicae. On the part of cognition or knowledge it should be noted that in
knowing things that take place according to the order of time, the cognitive power
that is contained in any way under the order of time is related to them in
another way than the cognitive power that is totally outside of the order of
time. The order of place provides a suitable example of this. According to the
Philosopher in IV Physicorum [11:219a 14], before and after in movement, and
consequently in time, corresponds to before and after in magnitude. Therefore,
if there arc many men passing along some road, any one of those in the ranks
has knowledge of those preceding and following as preceding and following,
which pertains to the order of place. Hence any one of them sees those who are
next to him and some of those who precede him; but he cannot see those who
follow behind him. If, however, there were someone outside of the whole order
of those passing along the road, for instance, stationed in some high tower
where he could see the whole road, he would at once see all those who were on
the road—not under the formality of preceding and subsequent (i.e., in relation
to his view) but all at the same time and how one precedes another. Now, our
cognition falls under the order of time, either per se or accidentally; whence
the soul in composing and dividing necessarily includes time, as is said in III
De anima [6: 430a 32]. Consequently, things are subject to our cognition under
the aspect of present, past, and future. Hence the soul knows present things as
existing in act and perceptible by sense in some way; past things it knows as
remembered; future things are not known in themselves because they do not yet
exist, but can be known in their causes—with certitude if they are totally
determined in their causes so that they will take place of necessity; by
conjecture if they are not so determined that they cannot be impeded, as in the
case of those things that are for the most part; in no way if in their causes
they are wholly in potency, i.e., not more determined to one than to another,
as in the case of those that are indeterminate to either of two. The reason for
this is that a thing is not knowable according as it is in potency, but only
according as it is in act, as the Philosopher shows in IX Metaphysicae [9: 1051a
22]. 20 Sed Deus est omnino extra ordinem temporis, quasi in arce aeternitatis
constitutus, quae est tota simul, cui subiacet totus temporis decursus secundum
unum et simplicem eius intuitum; et ideo uno intuitu videt omnia quae aguntur
secundum temporis decursum, et unumquodque secundum quod est in seipso
existens, non quasi sibi futurum quantum ad eius intuitum prout est in solo
ordine suarum causarum (quamvis et ipsum ordinem causarum videat), sed omnino
aeternaliter sic videt unumquodque eorum quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut
oculus humanus videt Socratem sedere in seipso, non in causa sua. God, however,
is wholly outside the order of time, stationed as it were at the summit of
eternity, which is wholly simultaneous, and to Him the whole course of time is
subjected in one simple intuition. For this reason, He sees in one glance
everything that is effected in the evolution of time, and each thing as it is
in itself, and it is not future to Him in relation to His view as it is in the
order of its causes alone (although He also sees the very order of the causes),
but each of the things that are in whatever time is seen wholly eternally as
the human eye sees Socrates sitting, not in its causes but in itself. 21 Ex hoc
autem quod homo videt Socratem sedere, non tollitur eius contingentia quae
respicit ordinem causae ad effectum; tamen certissime et infallibiliter videt
oculus hominis Socratem sedere dum sedet, quia unumquodque prout est in seipso
iam determinatum est. Sic igitur relinquitur, quod Deus certissime et
infallibiliter cognoscat omnia quae fiunt in tempore; et tamen ea quae in
tempore eveniunt non sunt vel fiunt ex necessitate, sed contingenter. Now from
the fact that man sees Socrates sitting, the contingency of his sitting which
concerns the order of cause to effect, is not destroyed; yet the eye of man
most certainly and infallibly sees Socrates sitting while he is sitting, since
each thing as it is in itself is already determined. Hence it follows that God
knows all things that take place in time most certainly and infallibly, and yet
the things that happen in time neither are nor take place of necessity, but contingently.
22 Similiter ex parte voluntatis divinae differentia est attendenda. Nam
voluntas divina est intelligenda ut extra ordinem entium existens, velut causa
quaedam profundens totum ens et omnes eius differentias. Sunt autem
differentiae entis possibile et necessarium; et ideo ex ipsa voluntate divina
originantur necessitas et contingentia in rebus et distinctio utriusque
secundum rationem proximarum causarum: ad effectus enim, quos voluit
necessarios esse, disposuit causas necessarias; ad effectus autem, quos voluit
esse contingentes, ordinavit causas contingenter agentes, idest potentes
deficere. Et secundum harum conditionem causarum, effectus dicuntur vel
necessarii vel contingentes, quamvis omnes dependeant a voluntate divina, sicut
a prima causa, quae transcendit ordinem necessitatis et contingentiae. Hoc
autem non potest dici de voluntate humana, nec de aliqua alia causa: quia omnis
alia causa cadit iam sub ordine necessitatis vel contingentiae; et ideo oportet
quod vel ipsa causa possit deficere, vel effectus eius non sit contingens, sed
necessarius. Voluntas autem divina indeficiens est; tamen non omnes effectus
eius sunt necessarii, sed quidam contingentes. There is likewise a difference
to be noted on the part of the divine Will, for the divine will must be
understood as existing outside of the order of beings, as a cause producing the
whole of being and all its differences. Now the possible and the necessary are
differences of being, an(] therefore necessity and contingency in things and
the distinction of each according to the nature of their proximate causes
originate from the divine will itself, for He disposes necessary causes for the
effects that He wills to be necessary, and He ordains causes acting
contingently (i.e., able to fail) for the effects that He wills to be
contingent. And according to the condition of these causes, effects are called
either necessary or contingent, although all depend on the divine will as on a
first cause, which transcends the order of necessity and contingency. This,
however, cannot be said of the human will, nor of any other cause, for every
other cause already falls under the order of necessity or contingency; hence,
either the cause itself must be able to fail or, if not, its effect is not
contingent, but necessary. The divine will, on the other hand, is unfailing;
yet not all its effects are necessary, but some are contingent. 23 Similiter
autem aliam radicem contingentiae, quam hic philosophus ponit ex hoc quod sumus
consiliativi, aliqui subvertere nituntur, volentes ostendere quod voluntas in
eligendo ex necessitate movetur ab appetibili. Cum enim bonum sit obiectum
voluntatis, non potest (ut videtur) ab hoc divertere quin appetat illud quod
sibi videtur bonum; sicut nec ratio ab hoc potest divertere quin assentiat ei
quod sibi videtur verum. Et ita videtur quod electio consilium consequens
semper ex necessitate proveniat; et sic omnia, quorum nos principium sumus per
consilium et electionem, ex necessitate provenient. Some men, in their desire
to show that the will in choosing is necessarily moved by the desirable, argued
in such a way as to destroy the other root of contingency the Philosopher
posits here, based on our deliberation. Since the good is the object of the
will, they argue, it cannot (as is evident) be diverted so as not to seek that
which seems good to it; as also it is not possible to divert reason so that it
does not assent to that which seems true to it. So it seems that choice, which
follows upon deliberation, always takes place of necessity; thus all things of
which we are the principle through deliberation and choice, will take place of
necessity. 24 Sed dicendum est quod similis differentia attendenda est circa
bonum, sicut circa verum. Est autem quoddam verum, quod est per se notum, sicut
prima principia indemonstrabilia, quibus ex necessitate intellectus assentit;
sunt autem quaedam vera non per se nota, sed per alia. Horum autem duplex est
conditio: quaedam enim ex necessitate consequuntur ex principiis, ita scilicet
quod non possunt esse falsa, principiis existentibus veris, sicut sunt omnes
conclusiones demonstrationum. Et huiusmodi veris ex necessitate assentit
intellectus, postquam perceperit ordinem eorum ad principia, non autem prius.
Quaedam autem sunt, quae non ex necessitate consequuntur ex principiis, ita
scilicet quod possent esse falsa principiis existentibus veris; sicut sunt
opinabilia, quibus non ex necessitate assentit intellectus, quamvis ex aliquo
motivo magis inclinetur in unam partem quam in aliam. Ita etiam est quoddam
bonum quod est propter se appetibile, sicut felicitas, quae habet rationem
ultimi finis; et huiusmodi bono ex necessitate inhaeret voluntas: naturali enim
quadam necessitate omnes appetunt esse felices. Quaedam vero sunt bona, quae
sunt appetibilia propter finem, quae comparantur ad finem sicut conclusiones ad
principium, ut patet per philosophum in II physicorum. Si igitur essent aliqua
bona, quibus non existentibus, non posset aliquis esse felix, haec etiam essent
ex necessitate appetibilia et maxime apud eum, qui talem ordinem perciperet; et
forte talia sunt esse, vivere et intelligere et si qua alia sunt similia. Sed
particularia bona, in quibus humani actus consistunt, non sunt talia, nec sub
ea ratione apprehenduntur ut sine quibus felicitas esse non possit, puta,
comedere hunc cibum vel illum, aut abstinere ab eo: habent tamen in se unde
moveant appetitum, secundum aliquod bonum consideratum in eis. Et ideo voluntas
non ex necessitate inducitur ad haec eligenda. Et propter hoc philosophus
signanter radicem contingentiae in his quae fiunt a nobis assignavit ex parte
consilii, quod est eorum quae sunt ad finem et tamen non sunt determinata. In
his enim in quibus media sunt determinata, non est opus consilio, ut dicitur in
III Ethicorum. Et haec quidem dicta sunt ad salvandum radices contingentiae,
quas hic Aristoteles ponit, quamvis videantur logici negotii modum excedere. In
regard to this point there is a similar diversity with respect to the good and
with respect to the true that must be noted. There are some truths that are
known per se, such as the first indemonstrable principles; these the intellect
assents to of necessity. There are others, however, which are not known per se,
but through other truths. The condition of these is twofold. Some follow
necessarily from the principles, i.e., so that they cannot be false when the
principles are true. This is the case with all the conclusions of
demonstrations, and the intellect assents necessarily to truths of this kind
after it has perceived their order to the principles, but not before. There are
others that do not follow necessarily from the principles, and these can be
false even though the principles be true. This is the case with things about
which there can be opinion. To these the intellect does not assent necessarily,
although it may be inclined by some motive more to one side than another.
Similarly, there is a good that is desirable for its own sake, such as
happiness, which has the nature of an ultimate end. The will necessarily
adheres to a good of this kind, for all men seek to be happy by a certain kind
of natural necessity. There are other good things that are desirable for the
sake of the end. These are related to the end as conclusions are to principles.
The Philosopher makes this point clear in II Physicorum [7: 198a 35]. If, then,
there were some good things without the existence of which one could not be
happy, these would be desirable of necessity, and especially by the person who
perceives such an order. Perhaps to be, to live, and to think, and other
similar things, if there are any, are of this kind. However, particular good
things with which human acts are concerned are not of this kind nor are they
apprehended as bein,r such that without tbeni happiness is impossible, for
instance, to eat this food or that, or abstain from it. Such things,
nevertheless, do have in them that whereby they move the appetite according to
some good considered in them. The will, therefore, is not induced to choose
these of necessity. And on this account the Philosopher expressly designates
the root of the contingency of things effected by us on the part of
deliberation—which is concerned with those things that are for the end and yet
are not determined. In those things in which the means are determined there is
no need for deliberation, as is said in III Ethicorum [3: 1112a 30–1113a 14].
These things have been stated to save the roots of contingency that Aristotle
posits here, although they may seem to exceed the mode of logical matter. XV. 1
Postquam philosophus ostendit esse impossibilia ea, quae ex praedictis
rationibus sequebantur; hic, remotis impossibilibus, concludit veritatem. Et
circa hoc duo facit: quia enim argumentando ad impossibile, processerat ab
enunciationibus ad res, et iam removerat inconvenientia quae circa res
sequebantur; nunc, ordine converso, primo ostendit qualiter se habeat veritas
circa res; secundo, qualiter se habeat veritas circa enunciationes; ibi: quare
quoniam orationes verae sunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit
qualiter se habeant veritas et necessitas circa res absolute consideratas;
secundo, qualiter se habeant circa eas per comparationem ad sua opposita; ibi:
et in contradictione eadem ratio est et cetera. Now that the Philosopher has
shown the impossibilities that follow from the foresaid arguments, he concludes
what the truth is on this point. In arguing to the impossibility of the
position, he proceeded from enunciations to things, and has already rejected
the unlikely consequences in respect to things. Now, in the converse order, he
first shows the way in which there is truth about things; secondly, the way in
which there is truth in enunciations, where he says, And so, since speech is
true as it corresponds to things, etc. With respect to truth about things be
first shows the way in which there is truth and necessity about things
absolutely considered; secondly, the way in which there is truth and necessity
about things through a comparing of their opposites, where he says, And this is
also the case with respect to contradiction, etc. 2 Dicit ergo primo, quasi ex
praemissis concludens, quod si praedicta sunt inconvenientia, ut scilicet omnia
ex necessitate eveniant, oportet dicere ita se habere circa res, scilicet quod
omne quod est necesse est esse quando est, et omne quod non est necesse est non
esse quando non est. Et haec necessitas fundatur super hoc principium:
impossibile est simul esse et non esse: si enim aliquid est, impossibile est
illud simul non esse; ergo necesse est tunc illud esse. Nam impossibile non
esse idem significat ei quod est necesse esse, ut in secundo dicetur. Et
similiter, si aliquid non est, impossibile est illud simul esse; ergo necesse
est non esse, quia etiam idem significant. Et ideo manifeste verum est quod
omne quod est necesse est esse quando est; et omne quod non est necesse est non
esse pro illo tempore quando non est: et haec est necessitas non absoluta, sed
ex suppositione. Unde non potest simpliciter et absolute dici quod omne quod
est, necesse est esse, et omne quod non est, necesse est non esse: quia non
idem significant quod omne ens, quando est, sit ex necessitate, et quod omne
ens simpliciter sit ex necessitate; nam primum significat necessitatem ex
suppositione, secundum autem necessitatem absolutam. Et quod dictum est de
esse, intelligendum est similiter de non esse; quia aliud est simpliciter ex
necessitate non esse et aliud est ex necessitate non esse quando non est. Et
per hoc videtur Aristoteles excludere id quod supra dictum est, quod si in his,
quae sunt, alterum determinate est verum, quod etiam antequam fieret alterum
determinate esset futurum. 2. He begins, then, as though concluding from
premises: if the foresaid things are unlikely (namely, that all things take
place of necessity), then the case with respect to things must be this:
everything that is must be when it is, and everything that is not, necessarily
not be when it is not. This necessity is founded on the principle that it is
impossible at once to be and not be; for if something is, it is impossible that
it at the same time not be; therefore it is necessary that it be at that time.
For "impossible not to be” signifies the same thing as "necessary to
be,” as Aristotle says in the second book. Similarly, if something is not, it
is impossible that it at the same time be. Therefore it is necessary that it
not be, for they also signify the same thing. Clearly it is true, then, that
everything that is must be when it is, and everything that is not must not be
when it is not. This is not absolute necessity, but necessity by supposition.
Consequently, it cannot be said absolutely and simply that everything that is
must be, and that everything that is not must not be. For "every being,
when it is, necessarily is” does not signify the same thing as "every being
necessarily is, simply. The first signifies necessity by supposition, the
second, absolute necessity. What has been said about to be must be understood
to apply also to not to be, for "necessarily not to be simply” and
"necessarily not to be when it is not” are also different. By this
Aristotle seems to exclude what was said above, namely, that if in those things
that are, one of the two is determinately true, then even before it takes place
one of the two would determinately be going to be. 3 Deinde cum dicit: et in
contradictione etc., ostendit quomodo se habeant veritas et necessitas circa
res per comparationem ad sua opposita: et dicit quod eadem ratio est in
contradictione, quae est in suppositione. Sicut enim illud quod non est
absolute necessarium, fit necessarium ex suppositione eiusdem, quia necesse est
esse quando est; ita etiam quod non est in se necessarium absolute fit
necessarium per disiunctionem oppositi, quia necesse est de unoquoque quod sit
vel non sit, et quod futurum sit aut non sit, et hoc sub disiunctione: et haec
necessitas fundatur super hoc principium quod, impossibile est contradictoria
simul esse vera vel falsa. Unde impossibile est neque esse neque non esse; ergo
necesse est vel esse vel non esse. Non tamen si divisim alterum accipiatur,
necesse est illud esse absolute. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum: quia
necessarium est navale bellum esse futurum cras vel non esse; sed non est
necesse navale bellum futurum esse cras; similiter etiam non est necessarium
non esse futurum, quia hoc pertinet ad necessitatem absolutam; sed necesse est
quod vel sit futurum cras vel non sit futurum: hoc enim pertinet ad
necessitatem quae est sub disiunctione. 3. He shows how truth and necessity is
had about things through the comparing of their opposites where he says, This
is also the case with respect to contradiction, etc. The reasoning is the same,
he says, in respect to contradiction and in respect to supposition. For just as
that which is not absolutely necessary becomes necessary by supposition of the
same (for it must be when it is), so also what in itself is not necessary
absolutely, becomes necessary through the disjunction of the opposite, for of
each thing it is necessary that it is or is not, and that it will or will not
be in the future, and this under disjunction. This necessity is founded upon
the principle that it is impossible for contradictories to be at once true and
false. Accordingly, it is impossible that a thing neither be nor not be;
therefore it is necessary that it either be or not be. However if one of these
is taken separately [i.e., divisively], it is not necessary that that one be
absolutely. This he manifests by example: it is necessary that there will be or
will not be a naval battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary that a naval
battle will take place tomorrow, nor is it necessary that it will not take
place, for this pertains to absolute necessity. It is necessary, however, that
it will take place or will not take place tomorrow. This pertains to the
necessity which is under disjunction. 4 Deinde cum dicit: quare quoniam etc. ex
eo quod se habet circa res, ostendit qualiter se habeat circa orationes. Et
primo, ostendit quomodo uniformiter se habet in veritate orationum, sicut circa
esse rerum et non esse; secundo, finaliter concludit veritatem totius
dubitationis; ibi: quare manifestum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, quia hoc
modo se habent orationes enunciativae ad veritatem sicut et res ad esse vel non
esse (quia ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio est vera vel falsa),
consequens est quod in omnibus rebus quae ita se habent ut sint ad utrumlibet,
et quaecumque ita se habent quod contradictoria eorum qualitercumque contingere
possunt, sive aequaliter sive alterum ut in pluribus, ex necessitate sequitur
quod etiam similiter se habeat contradictio enunciationum. Et exponit
consequenter quae sint illae res, quarum contradictoria contingere queant; et
dicit huiusmodi esse quae neque semper sunt, sicut necessaria, neque semper non
sunt, sicut impossibilia, sed quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt. Et ulterius
manifestat quomodo similiter se habeat in contradictoriis enunciationibus; et
dicit quod harum enunciationum, quae sunt de contingentibus, necesse est quod
sub disiunctione altera pars contradictionis sit vera vel falsa; non tamen haec
vel illa determinate, sed se habet ad utrumlibet. Et si contingat quod altera
pars contradictionis magis sit vera, sicut accidit in contingentibus quae sunt
ut in pluribus, non tamen ex hoc necesse est quod ex necessitate altera earum determinate
sit vera vel falsa. Then when he says, And so, since speech is true as it
corresponds to things, etc., he shows how truth in speech corresponds to the
way things are. First he shows in what way truth of speech conforms to the
being and nonbeing of things; secondly, and finally, he arrives at the truth of
the whole question, where he says, Therefore it is clear that it is not
necessary that of every affirmation and negation of opposites, one is true and
one false, etc. He says, then, that enunciative speech is related to truth in
the way the thing is to being or nonbeing (for from the fact that a thing is or
is not, speech is true or false). It follows, therefore, that when things are
such as to be indeterminate to either of two, and when they are such that their
contradictories could happen in whichever way, whether equally or one for the
most part, the contradiction of enunciations must also be such. He explains
next what the things are in which contradictories can happen. They are those
that neither always are (i.e., the necessary), nor always are not (i.e., the
impossible), but sometimes are and some times are not. He shows further how
this is maintained in contradictory enunciations. In those enunciations that
are about contingent things, one part of the contradiction must be true or
false tinder disjunction; but it is related to either, not to this or that
determinately. If it should turn out that one part of the contradiction is more
true, as happens in contingents that are for the most part, it is nevertheless
not necessary on this account that one of them is determinately true or false. 5
Deinde cum dicit: quare manifestum est etc., concludit principale intentum et
dicit manifestum esse ex praedictis quod non est necesse in omni genere
affirmationum et negationum oppositarum, alteram determinate esse veram et
alteram esse falsam: quia non eodem modo se habet veritas et falsitas in his
quae sunt iam de praesenti et in his quae non sunt, sed possunt esse vel non
esse. Sed hoc modo se habet in utriusque, sicut dictum est, quia scilicet in
his quae sunt necesse est determinate alterum esse verum et alterum falsum:
quod non contingit in futuris quae possunt esse et non esse. Et sic terminatur
primus liber. 5. Then he says, Therefore, it is clear that it is not necessary
that of every affirmation and negation of opposites, one is true and one,
false, etc. This is the conclusion he principally intended. It is evident from
what has been said that it is not necessary in every genus of affirmation and
negation of opposites that one is determinately true and the other false, for
truth and falsity is not had in the same way in regard to things that are
already in the present and those that are not but which could be or not be. The
position in regard to each has been explained. In those that are, it is
necessary that one of them be determinately true and the other false; in things
that are future, which could be or not be, the case is not the same. The first
book ends with this. lib. 2 l. 1 n. 1Postquam philosophus in primo libro
determinavit de enunciatione simpliciter considerata; hic determinat de
enunciatione, secundum quod diversificatur per aliquid sibi additum. Possunt
autem tria in enunciatione considerari: primo, ipsae dictiones, quae
praedicantur vel subiiciuntur in enunciatione, quas supra distinxit per nomina
et verba; secundo, ipsa compositio, secundum quam est verum vel falsum in
enunciatione affirmativa vel negativa; tertio, ipsa oppositio unius
enunciationis ad aliam. Dividitur ergo haec pars in tres partes: in prima,
ostendit quid accidat enunciationi ex hoc quod aliquid additur ad dictiones in
subiecto vel praedicato positas; secundo, quid accidat enunciationi ex hoc quod
aliquid additur ad determinandum veritatem vel falsitatem compositionis; ibi:
his vero determinatis etc.; tertio, solvit quamdam dubitationem circa
oppositiones enunciationum provenientem ex eo, quod additur aliquid simplici
enunciationi; ibi: utrum autem contraria est affirmatio et cetera. Est autem
considerandum quod additio facta ad praedicatum vel subiectum quandoque tollit
unitatem enunciationis, quandoque vero non tollit, sicut additio negationis
infinitantis dictionem. Circa primum ergo duo facit: primo, ostendit quid
accidat enunciationibus ex additione negationis infinitantis dictionem;
secundo, ostendit quid accidat circa enunciationem ex additione tollente
unitatem; ibi: at vero unum de pluribus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit:
primo, determinat de enunciationibus simplicissimis, in quibus nomen finitum
vel infinitum ponitur tantum ex parte subiecti; secundo, determinat de
enunciationibus, in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum ponitur non solum ex
parte subiecti, sed etiam ex parte praedicati; ibi: quando autem est tertium
adiacens et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, proponit rationes quasdam
distinguendi tales enunciationes; secundo, ponit earum distinctionem et
ordinem; ibi: quare prima est affirmatio et cetera. Circa primum duo facit:
primo, ponit rationes distinguendi enunciationes ex parte nominum; secundo, ostendit
quod non potest esse eadem ratio distinguendi ex parte verborum; ibi: praeter
verbum autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit rationes
distinguendi enunciationes; secundo, exponit quod dixerat; ibi: nomen autem
dictum est etc.; tertio, concludit intentum; ibi: erit omnis affirmatio et
cetera. 1. In the first book, the Philosopher has dealt with the enunciation
considered simply. Now he is going to treat of the enunciation as it is
diversified by the addition of something to it. There are three things that can
be considered in the enunciation: first, the words that are predicated or
subjected, which he has already distinguished into names and verbs; secondly,
the composition, according to which there is truth or falsity in the affirmative
or negative enunciation; finally, the opposition of one enunciation to another.
This book is divided into three parts which are related to these three things
in the enunciation. In the first, he shows what happens to the enunciation when
something is added to the words posited as the subject or predicate; in the
second, what happens when something is added to determine the truth or falsity
of the composition. He begins this where he says, Having determined these
things, we must consider in what way negations and affirmations of the possible
and not possible, etc. In the third part he solves a question that arises about
the oppositions of enunciations in which something is added to the simple
enunciation. This he takes up where he says, There is a question as to whether
the contrary of an affirmation is a negation, or whether the contrary of an
affirmation is another affirmation, etc. With respect to additions made to the
words used in the enunciation, it should be noted that an addition made to the
predicate or the subject sometimes destroys the unity of the enunciation, and
sometimes not, the latter being the case in which the addition is a negative
making a word infinite. Consequently, he first shows what happens to the
enunciation when the added negation makes a word infinite. Secondly, he shows
what happens when an addition destroys the unity of the enunciation where he
says, Neither the affirmation nor the negation which affirms or denies one
predicate of many subjects or many predicates of one subject is one, unless
something one is constituted from the many, etc. In relation to the first point
he first investigates the simplest of enunciations, in which a finite or
infinite name is posited only on the part of the subject. Then he considers the
enunciation in which a finite or infinite name is posited not only on the part
of the subject, but also on the part of the predicate, where he says, But when
"is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, etc. Apropos of
these simple enunciations, he proposes certain grounds for distinguishing such
enunciations and then gives their distinction and order where he says,
Therefore the primary affirmation and negation is "Man is,” "Man is
not,” etc. And first he gives the grounds for distinguishing enunciations on
the part of the name; secondly, he shows that there are not the same grounds
for a distinction on the part of the verb, where he says, There can be no
affirmation or negation without a verb, etc. First, then, he proposes the
grounds for distinguishing these enunciations; secondly, he explains this where
he says, we have already stated what a name is, etc.; finally, he arrives at
the conclusion he intended where he says, every affirmation will be made up of
a name and a verb, or an infinite name and a verb. 2 Resumit ergo illud, quod
supra dictum est de definitione affirmationis, quod scilicet affirmatio est
enunciatio significans aliquid de aliquo; et, quia verbum est proprie nota
eorum quae de altero praedicantur, consequens est ut illud, de quo aliquid
dicitur, pertineat ad nomen; nomen autem est vel finitum vel infinitum; et
ideo, quasi concludens subdit quod quia affirmatio significat aliquid de
aliquo, consequens est ut hoc, de quo significatur, scilicet subiectum
affirmationis, sit vel nomen, scilicet finitum (quod proprie dicitur nomen, ut
in primo dictum est), vel innominatum, idest infinitum nomen: quod dicitur
innominatum, quia ipsum non nominat aliquid cum aliqua forma determinata, sed
solum removet determinationem formae. Et ne aliquis diceret quod id quod in
affirmatione subiicitur est simul nomen et innominatum, ad hoc excludendum
subdit quod id quod est, scilicet praedicatum, in affirmatione, scilicet una,
de qua nunc loquimur, oportet esse unum et de uno subiecto; et sic oportet quod
subiectum talis affirmationis sit vel nomen, vel nomen infinitum. First of all,
he goes back to what was said above in defining affirmation, namely, that
affirmation is an enunciation signifying something about something; and, since
it is peculiar to the verb to be a sign of what is predicated of another, it
follows that that about which something is said pertains to the name; but the
name is either finite or infinite; therefore, as if drawing a conclusion, he
says that since affirmation signifies something about something it follows that
that about which something is signified, i.e., the subject of an affirmation,
is either a finite name (which is properly called a name), or unnamed, i.e., an
infinite name. It is called "unnamed” because it does not name something
with a determinate form but removes the determination of form. And lest anyone
think that what is subjected in an affirmation is at once a name and unnamed,
he adds, and one thing must be signified about one thing in an affirmation,
i.e., in the enunciation, of which we are speaking now; and hence the subject
of such an affirmation must be either the name or the infinite name. 3 Deinde
cum dicit: nomen autem etc., exponit quod dixerat, et dicit quod supra dictum
est quid sit nomen, et quid sit innominatum, idest infinitum nomen: quia, non
homo, non est nomen, sed est infinitum nomen, sicut, non currit, non est
verbum, sed infinitum verbum. Interponit autem quoddam, quod valet ad
dubitationis remotionem, videlicet quod nomen infinitum quodam modo significat
unum. Non enim significat simpliciter unum, sicut nomen finitum, quod
significat unam formam generis vel speciei aut etiam individui, sed in quantum
significat negationem formae alicuius, in qua negatione multa conveniunt, sicut
in quodam uno secundum rationem. Unum enim eodem modo dicitur aliquid, sicut et
ens; unde sicut ipsum non ens dicitur ens, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum
quid, idest secundum rationem, ut patet in IV metaphysicae, ita etiam negatio
est unum secundum quid, scilicet secundum rationem. Introducit autem hoc, ne
aliquis dicat quod affirmatio, in qua subiicitur nomen infinitum, non
significet unum de uno, quasi nomen infinitum non significet unum. When he
says, we have already stated what a name is, etc., he relates what he has previously
said. We have already stated, he says, what a name is and what that which is
unnamed is, i.e., the infinite name. "Non-man” is not a name but an
infinite name, and "non-runs” is not a verb but an infinite verb. Then he
interposes a point that is useful for the preclusion of a difficulty, i.e.,
that an infinite name in a certain way does signify one thing. It does not
signify one thing simply as the finite name does, which signifies one form of a
genus or species, or even of an individual; rather it signifies one thing
insofar as it signifies the negation of a form, in which negation many things
are united, as in something one according to reason. For something is said to
be one in the same way it is said to be a being. Hence, just as nonbeing is said
to be being, not simply, but according to something, i.e., according to reason,
as is evident in IV Metaphysicae [21: 1003b 6], so also a negation is one
according to something, i.e., according to reason. Aristotle introduces this
point so that no one will say that an affirmation in which an infinite name is
the subject does not signify one thing about one subject on the grounds that an
infinite name does not signify something one. 4 Deinde cum dicit: erit omnis
affirmatio etc., concludit propositum scilicet quod duplex est modus
affirmationis. Quaedam enim est affirmatio, quae constat ex nomine et verbo;
quaedam autem est quae constat ex infinito nomine et verbo. Et hoc sequitur ex
hoc quod supra dictum est quod hoc, de quo affirmatio aliquid significat, vel
est nomen vel innominatum. Et eadem differentia potest accipi ex parte
negationis, quia de quocunque contingit affirmare, contingit et negare, ut in
primo habitum est. When he says, every affirmation will be made up of a name
and a verb or an infinite name and a verb, he concludes that the mode of
affirmation is twofold. One consists of a name and a verb, the other of an
infinite name and a verb. This follows from what has been said, namely, that
that about which an affirmation signifies something is either a name or
unnamed. The same difference can be taken on the part of negation, for of
whatever something can be affirmed it can be denied, as was said in the first
book. 5 Deinde cum dicit: praeter verbum etc., ostendit quod differentia
enunciationum non potest sumi ex parte verbi. Dictum est enim supra quod,
praeter verbum nulla est affirmatio vel negatio. Potest enim praeter nomen esse
aliqua affirmatio vel negatio, videlicet si ponatur loco nominis infinitum
nomen: loco autem verbi in enunciatione non potest poni infinitum verbum,
duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia infinitum verbum constituitur per
additionem infinitae particulae, quae quidem addita verbo per se dicto, idest
extra enunciationem posito, removet ipsum absolute, sicut addita nomini, removet
formam nominis absolute: et ideo extra enunciationem potest accipi verbum
infinitum per modum unius dictionis, sicut et nomen infinitum. Sed quando
negatio additur verbo in enunciatione posito, negatio illa removet verbum ab
aliquo, et sic facit enunciationem negativam: quod non accidit ex parte
nominis. Non enim enunciatio efficitur negativa nisi per hoc quod negatur
compositio, quae importatur in verbo: et ideo verbum infinitum in enunciatione
positum fit verbum negativum. Secundo, quia in nullo variatur veritas
enunciationis, sive utamur negativa particula ut infinitante verbum vel ut
faciente negativam enunciationem; et ideo accipitur semper in simpliciori
intellectu, prout est magis in promptu. Et inde est quod non diversificavit
affirmationem per hoc, quod sit ex verbo vel infinito verbo, sicut
diversificavit per hoc, quod est ex nomine vel infinito nomine. Est autem
considerandum quod in nominibus et in verbis praeter differentiam finiti et
infiniti est differentia recti et obliqui. Casus enim nominum, etiam verbo
addito, non constituunt enunciationem significantem verum vel falsum, ut in
primo habitum est: quia in obliquo nomine non concluditur ipse rectus, sed in
casibus verbi includitur ipsum verbum praesentis temporis. Praeteritum enim et
futurum, quae significant casus verbi, dicuntur per respectum ad praesens. Unde
si dicatur, hoc erit, idem est ac si diceretur, hoc est futurum; hoc fuit, hoc
est praeteritum. Et propter hoc, ex casu verbi et nomine fit enunciatio. Et
ideo subiungit quod sive dicatur est, sive erit, sive fuit, vel quaecumque alia
huiusmodi verba, sunt de numero praedictorum verborum, sine quibus non potest
fieri enunciatio: quia omnia consignificant tempus, et alia tempora dicuntur
per respectum ad praesens. When he says, There can be no affirmation or
negation without a verb, etc., he intends to show that enunciations cannot be
differentiated on the part of the verb. He made the point earlier that there is
no affirmation or negation without a verb. However there can be an affirmation
or negation without a name, i.e., when an infinite name is posited in place of
a name.” An infinite verb, on the other hand, cannot be posited in an
enunciation in place of a verb, and this for two reasons. First of all, the
infinite verb is constituted by the addition of an infinite particle which,
when added to a verb said by itself (i.e., posited outside of the enunciation),
removes it absolutely, just as it removes the form of the name absolutely when
added to it. Therefore, outside of the enunciation, the infinite verb, as well
as the infinite name, can be taken in the mode of one word. But when a negation
is added to the verb in an enunciation it removes the verb from something and
thus makes the enunciation negative, which is not the case with respect to the
name. For an enunciation is made negative by denying the composition which the
verb introduces; hence, an infinite verb posited in the enunciation becomes a
negative verb. Secondly, whichever way we use the negative particle, whether as
making the verb infinite or as making a negative enunciation, the truth of the
enunciation is not changed. The negative particle, therefore, is always taken
in the more absolute sense, as being clearer. This, then, is why Aristotle does
not diversify the affirmation as made up of a verb or infinite verb, but as
made up of a name or an infinite name. It should also be noted that besides the
difference of finite and infinite there is the difference of nominative and
oblique cases. The cases of names even with a verb added do not constitute an
enunciation signifying truth or falsity, as was said in the first book, for the
nominative is not included in an oblique name. The verb of present time,
however, is included in the cases of the verb, for the past and future, which
the cases of the verb signify, are said with respect to the present. Whence,
‘if we say, "This will be,” it is the same as if we were to say,
"This is future”; and "This has been” the same as "This is
past.” A name, then, and a case of the verb do constitute an enunciation.
Therefore Aristotle adds that "is,” or "will be,” or "was,” or
any other verb of this kind that we use are of the number of the foresaid verbs
without which an enunciation cannot be made, since they all signify with time
and past and future time are said with respect to the present. 6 Deinde cum
dicit: quare prima erit affirmatio etc., concludit ex praemissis distinctionem
enunciationum in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum ponitur solum ex parte
subiecti, in quibus triplex differentia intelligi potest: una quidem, secundum
affirmationem et negationem; alia, secundum subiectum finitum et infinitum;
tertia, secundum subiectum universaliter, vel non universaliter positum. Nomen
autem finitum est ratione prius infinito sicut affirmatio prior est negatione;
unde primam affirmationem ponit, homo est, et primam negationem, homo non est.
Deinde ponit secundam affirmationem, non homo est, secundam autem negationem,
non homo non est. Ulterius autem ponit illas enunciationes in quibus subiectum universaliter
ponitur, quae sunt quatuor, sicut et illae in quibus est subiectum non
universaliter positum. Praetermisit autem ponere exemplum de enunciationibus,
in quibus subiicitur singulare, ut, Socrates est, Socrates non est, quia
singularibus nominibus non additur aliquod signum. Unde in huiusmodi
enunciationibus non potest omnis differentia inveniri. Similiter etiam
praetermittit exemplificare de enunciationibus, quarum subiecta particulariter
ponuntur, quia tale subiectum quodammodo eamdem vim habet cum subiecto
universali, non universaliter sumpto. Non ponit autem aliquam differentiam ex
parte verbi, quae posset sumi secundum casus verbi, quia sicut ipse dicit, in
extrinsecis temporibus, idest in praeterito et in futuro, quae circumstant
praesens, est eadem ratio sicut et in praesenti, ut iam dictum est. When he
says, Therefore the primary affirmation and negation is, etc., he infers from
the premises the distinction of enunciations in which the finite and infinite
name is posited only on the part of the subject. Among these there is a
threefold difference to be noted: the first, according to affirmation and
negation; the second, according to finite and infinite subject; the third,
according as the subject is posited universally or not universally. Now the
finite name is prior in notion to the infinite name just as affirmation is
prior to negation. Accordingly, he posits "Man is” as the first
affirmation and "Man is not” as the first negation. Then he posits the
second affirmation, "Non-man is,” and the second negation, "Non-man
is not.” Finally he posits the enunciations in which the subject is universally
posited. These are four, as are those in which the subject is not universally
posited. The reason he does not give examples of the enunciation with a singular
subject, such as "Socrates is” and "Socrates is not,” is that no sign
is added to singular names, and hence not every difference can be found in
them. Nor does he give examples of the enunciation in which the subject is
taken particularly, for such a subject in a certain way has the same force as a
universal subject not universally taken. He does not posit any difference on
the part of the verb according to its cases because, as he himself says,
affirmations and negations in regard to extrinsic times, i.e., past and future
time which surround the prcsent, are similar to these, as has already been
said. II. 1 Postquam philosophus distinxit enunciationes, in quibus nomen
finitum vel infinitum ponitur solum ex parte subiecti, hic accedit ad
distinguendum illas enunciationes, in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum
ponitur ex parte subiecti et ex parte praedicati. Et circa hoc duo facit;
primo, distinguit huiusmodi enunciationes; secundo, manifestat quaedam quae
circa eas dubia esse possent; ibi: quoniam vero contrariaest et cetera. Circa
primum duo facit: primo, agit de enunciationibus in quibus nomen praedicatur
cum hoc verbo, est; secundo de enunciationibus in quibus alia verba ponuntur;
ibi: in his vero in quibus et cetera. Distinguit autem huiusmodi enunciationes
sicut et primas, secundum triplicem differentiam ex parte subiecti
consideratam: primo namque, agit de enunciationibus in quibus subiicitur nomen
finitum non universaliter sumptum; secundo de illis in quibus subiicitur nomen
finitum universaliter sumptum; ibi: similiter autem se habent etc.; tertio, de
illis in quibus subiicitur nomen infinitum; ibi: aliae autem habent ad id quod
est non homo et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit diversitatem
oppositionis talium enunciationum; secundo, concludit earum numerum et ponit
earum habitudinem; ibi: quare quatuor etc.; tertio, exemplificat; ibi:
intelligimus vero et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, proponit quod
intendit; secundo, exponit quoddam quod dixerat; ibi: dico autem et cetera. 1. After
distinguishing enunciations in which either a finite or an infinite name is
posited only on the part of the subject, the Philosopher begins here to
distinguish enunciations in which either a finite or an infinite name is
posited as the subject and as the predicate. First he distinguishes these
enunciations, and then he manifests certain things that might be doubtful in
relation to them where he says, Since the negation contrary to "Every
animal is just,” is the one signifying "No animal is just,” etc. With
respect to their distinction he first deals with enunciations in which the name
is predicated with the verb "is”; secondly, with those in which other
verbs are used, where he says, In enunciations in which "is” does not join
the predicate to the subject, for example, when the verb "matures” or
"walks” is used, etc.” He distinguishes these enunciations as he did the
primary enunciations, according to a threefold difference on the part of the
subject, first treating those in which the subject is a finite name not taken
universally, secondly, those in which the subject is a finite name taken
universally where he says, The same is the case when the affirmation is of a
name taken universally, etc.” Thirdly, he treats those in which an infinite
name is the subject, where he says, and there are two other pairs, if something
is added to non-man” as a subject, etc. With respect to the first enunciations
[in which the subject is a finite name not taken universally] he proposes a
diversity of oppositions and then concludes as to their number and states their
relationship, where he says, In this case, therefore, there will be four
enunciations, etc. Finally, he exemplifies this with a table. Aquinas lib. 2 l.
2 n. 2Circa primum duo oportet intelligere: primo quidem, quid est hoc quod
dicit, est tertium adiacens praedicatur. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est
quod hoc verbum est quandoque in enunciatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum
dicitur, Socrates est: per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare, quam quod
Socrates sit in rerum natura. Quandoque vero non praedicatur per se, quasi
principale praedicatum, sed quasi coniunctum principali praedicato ad
connectendum ipsum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur, Socrates est albus, non est
intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura, sed ut attribuat
ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo, est; et ideo in talibus, est, praedicatur ut
adiacens principali praedicato. Et dicitur esse tertium, non quia sit tertium
praedicatum, sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enunciatione, quae simul cum
nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum, ut sic enunciatio dividatur in duas
partes et non in tres. In relation to the first point two things have to be
understood. First, what is meant by "is” is predicated as a third element
in the enunciation. To clarify this we must note that the verb "is” itself
is sometimes predicated in an enunciation, as in "Socrates is.” By this we
intend to signify that Socrates really is. Sometimes, however, "is” is not
predicated as the principal predicate, but is joined to the principal predicate
to connect it to the subject, as in "Socrates is white.” Here the
intention is not to assert that Socrates really is, but to attribute whiteness
to him by means of the verb "is.” Hence, in such enunciations "is” is
predicated as added to the principal predicate. It is said to be third, not
because it is a third predicate, but because it is a third word posited in the
enunciation, which together with the name predicated makes one predicate. The
enunciation is thus divided into two parts and not three. Aquinas lib. 2 l. 2
n. 3Secundo, considerandum est quid est hoc, quod dicit quod quando est, eo
modo quo dictum est, tertium adiacens praedicatur, dupliciter dicuntur
oppositiones. Circa quod considerandum est quod in praemissis enunciationibus,
in quibus nomen ponebatur solum ex parte subiecti, secundum quodlibet subiectum
erat una oppositio; puta si subiectum erat nomen finitum non universaliter
sumptum, erat sola una oppositio, scilicet est homo, non est homo. Sed quando
est tertium adiacens praedicatur, oportet esse duas oppositiones eodem subiecto
existente secundum differentiam nominis praedicati, quod potest esse finitum
vel infinitum; sicut haec est una oppositio, homo est iustus, homo non est
iustus: alia vero oppositio est, homo est non iustus, homo non est non iustus.
Non enim negatio fit nisi per appositionem negativae particulae ad hoc verbum
est, quod est nota praedicationis. Secondly, we must consider what he means by
when "is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, in the mode
in which we have explained, there are two oppositions. In the enunciations
already treated, in which the name is posited only on the part of the subject,
there was one opposition in relation to any subject. For example, if the
subject was a finite name not taken universally there was only one opposition,
"Man is,” "Man is not.” But when "is” is predicated in addition
there are two oppositions with regard to the same subject corresponding to the difference
of the predicate name, which can be finite or infinite. There is the opposition
of "Man is just,” "Man is not just,” and the opposition, "Man is
non-just,” "Man is not non-just.” For the negation is effected by applying
the negative particle to the verb "is,” which is a sign of a predication. 4
Deinde cum dicit: dico autem, ut est iustus etc., exponit quod dixerat, est
tertium adiacens, et dicit quod cum dicitur, homo est iustus, hoc verbum est,
adiacet, scilicet praedicato, tamquam tertium nomen vel verbum in affirmatione.
Potest enim ipsum est, dici nomen, prout quaelibet dictio nomen dicitur, et sic
est tertium nomen, idest tertia dictio. Sed quia secundum communem usum
loquendi, dictio significans tempus magis dicitur verbum quam nomen, propter
hoc addit, vel verbum, quasi dicat, ad hoc quod sit tertium, non refert utrum
dicatur nomen vel verbum.When he says, I mean by this that in an enunciation
such as"Man is just,” etc., he explains what he means by when "is” is
predicated as a third element in the enunciation. When we say "Man is
just,” the verb "is” is added to the predicate as a third name or verb in
the affirmation. Now "is,” like any other word, may be called a name, and
thus it is a third name, i.e., word. But because, according to common usage, a
word signifying time is called a verb rather than a name Aristotle adds here,
or verb, as if to say that with respect to the fact that it is a third thing,
it does not matter whether it is called a name or a verb. 5 Deinde cum dicit:
quare quatuor erunt etc., concludit numerum enunciationum. Et primo, ponit
conclusionem numeri; secundo, ponit earum habitudinem; ibi: quarum duae quidem
etc.; tertio, rationem numeri explicat; ibi: dico autem quoniam est et cetera.
Dicit ergo primo quod quia duae sunt oppositiones, quando est tertium adiacens
praedicatur, cum omnis oppositio sit inter duas enunciationes, consequens est
quod sint quatuor enunciationes illae in quibus est, tertium adiacens,
praedicatur, subiecto finito non universaliter sumpto. Deinde cum dicit: quarum
duae quidem etc., ostendit habitudinem praedictarum enunciationum ad invicem;
et dicit quod duae dictarum enunciationum se habent ad affirmationem et
negationem secundum consequentiam, sive secundum correlationem, aut analogiam,
ut in Graeco habetur, sicut privationes; aliae vero duae minime. Quod quia
breviter et obscure dictum est, diversimode a diversis expositum est. He goes
on to say, In this case, therefore, there will be four enunciations, etc. Here
he concludes to the number of the enunciations, first giving the number, and
then their relationship where he says, two of which will correspond in their
sequence, in respect of affirmation and negation, with the privations but two
will not. Finally, he explains the reason for the number where he says, I mean
that the "is” will be added either to "just” or to "non-just,”
etc. He says first, then, that since there are two oppositions when "is”
is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, and since every opposition
is between two enunciations, it follows that there are four enunciations in
which "is” is predicated as a third element when the subject is finite and
is not taken universally. When he says, two of which will correspond in their
sequence, etc., he shows their relationship. Two of these enunciations are
related to affirmation and negation according to consequence (or according to
correlation or proportion, as it is in the Greek) like privations; the other
two are not. Because this is said so briefly and obscurely, it has been
explained in diverse ways. 6 Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod
tripliciter nomen potest praedicari in huiusmodi enunciationibus. Quandoque
enim praedicatur nomen finitum, secundum quod assumuntur duae enunciationes,
una affirmativa et altera negativa, scilicet homo est iustus, et homo non est
iustus; quae dicuntur simplices. Quandoque vero praedicatur nomen infinitum,
secundum quod etiam assumuntur duae aliae, scilicet homo est non iustus, homo
non est non iustus; quae dicuntur infinitae. Quandoque vero praedicatur nomen
privativum, secundum quod etiam sumuntur duae aliae, scilicet homo est
iniustus, homo non est iniustus; quae dicuntur privativae. Before we take up
the various explanations of this passage there is a general point in relation
to it that needs to be clarified. In this kind of enunciation a name can be
predicated in three ways. We can predicate a finite name and by this we obtain
two enunciations, one affirmative and one negative, "Man is just” and
"Man is not just.” These are called simple enunciations. Or, we can
predicate an infinite name and by this we obtain two other enunciations,
"Man is non-just” and "Man is not non-just,” These are called
infinite enunciations. Finally, we can predicate a privative name and again we
will have two, "Man is unjust” and "Man is not unjust.” These are called
privative. 7 Quidam ergo sic exposuerunt, quod duae enunciationes earum, quas
praemiserat scilicet illae, quae sunt de infinito praedicato, se habent ad
affirmationem et negationem, quae sunt de praedicato finito secundum
consequentiam vel analogiam, sicut privationes, idest sicut illae, quae sunt de
praedicato privativo. Illae enim duae, quae sunt de praedicato infinito, se
habent secundum consequentiam ad illas, quae sunt de finito praedicato secundum
transpositionem quandam, scilicet affirmatio ad negationem et negatio ad
affirmationem. Nam homo est non iustus, quae est affirmatio de infinito
praedicato, respondet secundum consequentiam negativae de praedicato finito,
huic scilicet homo non est iustus. Negativa vero de infinito praedicato,
scilicet homo non est non iustus, affirmativae de finito praedicato, huic
scilicet homo est iustus. Propter quod Theophrastus vocabat eas, quae sunt de
infinito praedicato, transpositas. Et similiter etiam affirmativa de privativo
praedicato respondet secundum consequentiam negativae de finito praedicato,
scilicet haec, homo est iniustus, ei quae est, homo non est iustus. Negativa
vero affirmativae, scilicet haec, homo non est iniustus, ei quae est, homo est
iustus. Disponatur ergo in figura. Et in prima quidem linea ponantur illae,
quae sunt de finito praedicato, scilicet homo est iustus, homo non est iustus.
In secunda autem linea, negativa de infinito praedicato sub affirmativa de
finito et affirmativa sub negativa. In tertia vero, negativa de privativo
praedicato similiter sub affirmativa de finito et affirmativa sub negativa: ut
patet in subscripta figura. (Figura). Sic ergo duae, scilicet quae sunt de
infinito praedicato, se habent ad affirmationem et negationem de finito
praedicato, sicut privationes, idest sicut illae quae sunt de privativo
praedicato. Sed duae aliae quae sunt de infinito subiecto, scilicet non homo
est iustus, non homo non est iustus, manifestum est quod non habent similem
consequentiam. Et hoc modo exposuit herminus hoc quod dicitur, duae vero,
minime, referens hoc ad illas quae sunt de infinito subiecto. Sed hoc manifeste
est contra litteram. Nam cum praemisisset quatuor enunciationes, duas scilicet
de finito praedicato et duas de infinito, subiungit quasi illas subdividens,
quarum duae quidem et cetera. Duae vero, minime; ubi datur intelligi quod
utraeque duae intelligantur in praemissis. Illae autem quae sunt de infinito
subiecto non includuntur in praemissis, sed de his postea dicetur. Unde manifestum
est quod de eis nunc non loquitur. Now the passage in question has been
explained by some in the following way. Two of the enunciations he has given,
those with an infinite predicate, are related to the affirmation and negation
of the finite predicate according to consequence or analogy, as are privations,
i.e., as those with a privative predicate. For the two with an infinite
predicate are related according to consequence to those with a finite predicate
but in a transposed way, namely, affirmation to negation and negation to
affirmation. That is, "Man is non-just,” the affirmation of the infinite
predicate, corresponds according to consequence to the negative of the finite
predicate, i.e., to "Man is not just”; the negative of the infinite predicate,
"Man is not non-just,” corresponds to the affirmative of the finite
predicate, i.e., to "Man is just.” Theophrastus for this reason called
those with the infinite predicate, "transposed.” The affirmative with a
privative predicate also corresponds according to consequence to the negative
with a finite predicate, i.e., "Man is unjust” to "Man is not just”;
and the negative of the privative predicate to the affirmative of the finite
predicate, "Man is not unjust” to "Man is just.” These enunciations
can therefore be placed in a table in the following way: Man is just Man is not
non-just Man is not unjust Man is not just Man is non-just Man is unjust This
makes it clear that two, those with the infinite predicate, are related to the
affirmation and negation of the finite predicate in the way privations are,
i.e., as those that have a privative predicate. It is also evident that there
are two others that do not have a similar consequence, i.e., those with an
infinite subject, "Non-man is just” and "Non-man is not just.” This
is the way Herminus explained the words but two will not, i.e., by referring it
to enunciations with an infinite subject. This, however, is clearly contrary to
the words of Aristotle, for after giving the four enunciations, two with a
finite predicate and two with an infinite predicate, he adds two of which...
but two will not, as though he were subdividing them, which can only mean that
both pairs are comprised in what he is saying. He does not include among these
the ones with an infinite subject but will mention them later. It is clear,
then, that he is not speaking of these here. 8 Et ideo, ut Ammonius dicit, alii
aliter exposuerunt, dicentes quod praedictarum quatuor propositionum duae,
scilicet quae sunt de infinito praedicato, sic se habent ad affirmationem et
negationem, idest ad ipsam speciem affirmationis et negationis, ut privationes,
idest ut privativae affirmationes seu negationes. Haec enim affirmatio, homo
est non iustus, non est simpliciter affirmatio, sed secundum quid, quasi secundum
privationem affirmatio; sicut homo mortuus non est homo simpliciter, sed
secundum privationem; et idem dicendum est de negativa, quae est de infinito
praedicato. Duae vero, quae sunt de finito praedicato, non se habent ad speciem
affirmationis et negationis secundum privationem, sed simpliciter. Haec enim,
homo est iustus, est simpliciter affirmativa, et haec, homo non est iustus, est
simpliciter negativa. Sed nec hic sensus convenit verbis Aristotelis. Dicit
enim infra: haec igitur quemadmodum in resolutoriis dictum est, sic sunt
disposita; ubi nihil invenitur ad hunc sensum pertinens. Et ideo Ammonius ex
his, quae in fine I priorum dicuntur de propositionibus, quae sunt de finito
vel infinito vel privativo praedicato, alium sensum accipit. Since this exposition
is not consonant with Aristotle’s words, others, Ammonius says, have explained
this in another way. According to them, two of the four propositions, those of
the infinite predicate, are related to affirmation and negation, i.e., to the
species itself of affirmation and negation, as privations, that is, as
privative affirmations and negations. For the affirmation, "Man is
non-just,” is not an affirmation simply, but relatively, as though according to
privation; as a dead man is not a man simply, but according to privation. The
same thing applies to the negative enunciation with an infinite predicate.
However, the two enunciations having finite predicates are not related to the
species of affirmation and negation according to privation, but simply, for the
enunciation "Man is just” is simply affirmative and "Man is not just”
is simply negative. But this meaning does not correspond to the words of
Aristotle either, for he says further on: This, then, is the way these are
arranged, as we have said in the Analytics, but there is nothing in that text
pertaining to this meaning. Ammonius, therefore, interprets this differently
and in accordance with what is said at the end of I Priorum [46: 51b 5] about
propositions having a finite or infinite or privative predicate. Aquinas lib. 2
l. 2 n. 9 Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod, sicut ipse dicit,
enunciatio aliqua virtute se habet ad illud, de quo totum id quod in
enunciatione significatur vere praedicari potest: sicut haec enunciatio, homo
est iustus, se habet ad omnia illa, de quorum quolibet vere potest dici quod
est homo iustus; et similiter haec enunciatio, homo non est iustus, se habet ad
omnia illa, de quorum quolibet vere dici potest quod non est homo iustus.
Secundum ergo hunc modum loquendi, manifestum est quod simplex negativa in plus
est quam affirmativa infinita, quae ei correspondet. Nam, quod sit homo non
iustus, vere potest dici de quolibet homine, qui non habet habitum iustitiae;
sed quod non sit homo iustus, potest dici non solum de homine non habente
habitum iustitiae, sed etiam de eo qui penitus non est homo: haec enim est
vera, lignum non est homo iustus; tamen haec est falsa, lignum est homo non
iustus. Et ita negativa simplex est in plus quam affirmativa infinita; sicut
etiam animal est in plus quam homo, quia de pluribus verificatur. Simili etiam
ratione, negativa simplex est in plus quam affirmativa privativa: quia de eo
quod non est homo non potest dici quod sit homo iniustus. Sed affirmativa
infinita est in plus quam affirmativa privativa: potest enim dici de puero et
de quocumque homine nondum habente habitum virtutis aut vitii quod sit homo non
iustus, non tamen de aliquo eorum vere dici potest quod sit homo iniustus.
Affirmativa vero simplex in minus est quam negativa infinita: quia quod non sit
homo non iustus potest dici non solum de homine iusto, sed etiam de eo quod
penitus non est homo. Similiter etiam negativa privativa in plus est quam
negativa infinita. Nam, quod non sit homo iniustus, potest dici non solum de
homine habente habitum iustitiae, sed de eo quod penitus non est homo, de
quorum quolibet potest dici quod non sit homo non iustus: sed ulterius potest
dici de omnibus hominibus, qui nec habent habitum iustitiae neque habent
habitum iniustitiae. To make Ammonius’ explanation clear, it must be noted
that, as Aristotle himself says, the enunciation, by some power, is related to
that of which the whole of what is signified in the enunciation can be truly
predicated. The enunciation, "Man is just,” for example, is related to all
those of which in any way "is a just man” can be truly said. So, too, the
enunciation "Man is not just” is related to all those of which in any way
"is not a just man” can be truly said. According to this mode of speaking
it is evident, then, that the simple negative is wider than the infinite
affirmative which corresponds to it. Thus, "is a non-just man” can truly
be said of any man who does not have the habit of justice; but "is not a
just man” can be said not only of a man not having the habit of justice, but
also of what is not a man at all. For example, it is true to say "Wood is
not a just man,” but false to say, "Wood is a non-just man.” The simple
negative, then, is wider than the infinite affirmative-just as animal is wider
than man, since it is verified of more. For a similar reason the simple
negative is wider than the privative affirmative, for "is an unjust man”
cannot be said of what is not man. But the infinite affirmative is wider than
the private affirmative, for "is a non-just man” can be truly said of a
boy or of any man not yet having a habit of virtue or vice, but "is an
unjust man” cannot. And the simple affirmative is narrower than the infinite
negative, for "is not a non-just man” can be said not only of a just man, but
also of what is not man at all. Similarly, the privative negative is wider than
the infinite negative. For "is not an unjust man” can be said not only of
a man having the habit of justice and of what is not man at all—of which
"is not a non-just man” can be said—but over and beyond this can be said
about all men who neither have the habit of justice nor the habit of injustice.
10 His igitur visis, facile est exponere praesentem litteram hoc modo. Quarum,
scilicet quatuor enunciationum praedictarum, duae quidem, scilicet infinitae,
se habebunt ad affirmationem et negationem, idest ad duas simplices, quarum una
est affirmativa et altera negativa, secundum consequentiam, idest in modo
consequendi ad eas, ut privationes, idest sicut duae privativae: quia scilicet,
sicut ad simplicem affirmativam sequitur negativa infinita, et non convertitur
(eo quod negativa infinita est in plus), ita etiam ad simplicem affirmativam
sequitur negativa privativa, quae est in plus, et non convertitur. Sed sicut
simplex negativa sequitur ad infinitam affirmativam; quae est in minus, et non
convertitur; ita etiam negativa simplex sequitur ad privativam affirmativam,
quae est in minus, et non convertitur. Ex quo patet quod eadem est habitudo in
consequendo infinitarum ad simplices quae est etiam privativarum. With these
points in mind it is easy to explain the present sentence in Aristotle. Two of
which, i.e., the infinites, will be related to the simple affirmation and
negation according to consequence, i.e., in their mode of following upon the
two simple enunciations, the infinitives will be related as are privations,
i.e., as the two privative enunciations. For just as the infinite negative
follows upon the simple affirmative, and.is not convertible with it (because
the infinite negative is wider), so also the privative negative which is wider
follows upon the simple affirmative and is not convertible. But just as the
simple negative follows upon the infinite affirmative, which is narrower and is
not convertible with it, so also the simple negative follows upon the privative
affirmative, which is narrower and is not convertible. From this it is clear
that there is the same relationship, with respect to consequence, of infinites
to simple enunciations as there is of privatives. 11 Sequitur, duae autem,
scilicet simplices, quae relinquuntur, remotis duabus, scilicet infinitis, a
quatuor praemissis, minime, idest non ita se habent ad infinitas in
consequendo, sicut privativae se habent ad eas; quia videlicet, ex una parte
simplex affirmativa est in minus quam negativa infinita, sed negativa privativa
est in plus quam negativa infinita: ex alia vero parte, negativa simplex est in
plus quam affirmativa infinita, sed affirmativa privativa est in minus quam
infinita affirmativa. Sic ergo patet quod simplices non ita se habent ad
infinitas in consequendo, sicut privativae se habent ad infinitas. He goes on
to say, but two, i.e., the simple entinciations that are left after the two
infinite enunciations have been taken care of, will not, i.e., are not related
to infinites according to consequence as privatives are related to them,
because, on the one hand, the simple affirmative is narrower than the infinite
negative, and the privative negative wider than the infinite negative; and on
the other hand, the simple negative is wider than the infinite affirmative, and
the privative affirmative narrower than the infinite affirmative. Thus it is
clear that simple entinciations are riot related to infinites in respect to
consequence as privatives are related to infinites. 12 Quamvis autem secundum
hoc littera philosophi subtiliter exponatur, tamen videtur esse aliquantulum
expositio extorta. Nam littera philosophi videtur sonare diversas habitudines
non esse attendendas respectu diversorum; sicut in praedicta expositione primo
accipitur similitudo habitudinis ad simplices, et postea dissimilitudo
habitudinis respectu infinitarum. Et ideo simplicior et magis conveniens
litterae Aristotelis est expositio Porphyrii quam Boethius ponit; secundum quam
expositionem attenditur similitudo et dissimilitudo secundum consequentiam
affirmativarum ad negativas. Unde dicit: quarum, scilicet quatuor praemissarum,
duae quidem, scilicet affirmativae, quarum una est simplex et alia infinita, se
habebunt secundum consequentiam ad affirmationem et negationem; ut scilicet ad
unam affirmativam sequatur alterius negativa. Nam ad affirmativam simplicem
sequitur negativa infinita; et ad affirmativam infinitam sequitur negativa
simplex. Duae vero, scilicet negativae, minime, idest non ita se habent ad
affirmativas, ut scilicet ex negativis sequantur affirmativae, sicut ex
affirmativis sequebantur negativae. Et quantum ad utrumque similiter se habent privativae
sicut infinitae. But although this explains the words of the Philosopher in a
subtle manner the explanation appears a bit forced. For the words of the
Philosopher seem to say that diverse relationships will not apply in respect to
diverse things; however, in the exposition we have just seen, first there is an
explanation of a similitude of relationship to simple enunciations and then an
explanation of a dissimilitude of relationship in respect to infinites. The
simpler exposition of this passage of Aristotle by Porphyry, which Boethius
gives, is therefore more apposite. According to Porphyry’s explanation there is
similitude and dissimilitude according to consequence of affirmatives and
negatives. Thus Aristotle is saying: Of which, i.e., the four enunciations we
are discussing, two, i.e., affirmatives, one simple and the other infinite, will
be related according to consequence in regard to affirmation and negation,
i.e., so that upon one affirmative follows the other negative, for the infinite
negative follows upon the simple affirmative and the simple negative upon the
infinite affirmative. But two, i.e., the negatives, will not, i.e., are not so
related to affirmatives, i.e., so that affirmatives follow from negatives. And
with respect to both, privatives are related in the same way as the infinites.
Aquinas lib. 2 l. 2 n. 13Deinde cum dicit: dico autem quoniam etc., manifestat
quoddam quod supra dixerat, scilicet quod sint quatuor praedictae
enunciationes: loquimur enim nunc de enunciationibus, in quibus hoc verbum est
solum praedicatur secundum quod est adiacens alicui nomini finito vel infinito:
puta secundum quod adiacet iusto; ut cum dicitur, homo est iustus, vel secundum
quod adiacet non iusto; ut cum dicitur, homo est non iustus. Et quia in neutra
harum negatio apponitur ad verbum, consequens est quod utraque sit affirmativa.
Omni autem affirmationi opponitur negatio, ut supra in primo ostensum est.
Relinquitur ergo quod praedictis duabus enunciationibus affirmativis respondet
duae aliae negativae. Et sic consequens est quod sint quatuor simplices
enunciationes. Then Aristotle says, I mean that the "is” will be added
either to "just” or to "non-just,” etc. Here he shows how, under
these circumstances, we get four enunciations. We are speaking now of
enunciations in which the verb "is” is predicated as added to some finite
or infinite name, for instance as it adjoins "just” in "Man is just,”
or "non-just” in "Man is non-just.” Now since the negation is not
applied to the verb in either of these, each is affirmative. However, there is
a negation opposed to every affirmation as was shown in the first book.
Therefore, two negatives correspond to the two foresaid affirmative
enunciations, making four simple enunciations. 14 Deinde cum dicit:
intelligimus vero etc., manifestat quod supra dictum est per quandam figuralem
descriptionem. Dicit enim quod id, quod in supradictis dictum est, intelligi
potest ex sequenti subscriptione. Sit enim quaedam quadrata figura, in cuius
uno angulo describatur haec enunciatio, homo est iustus, et ex opposito
describatur eius negatio quae est, homo non est iustus; sub quibus scribantur
duae aliae infinitae, scilicet homo est non iustus, homo non est non iustus.
(Figura). In qua descriptione apparet quod hoc verbum est, affirmativum vel
negativum, adiacet iusto et non iusto. Et secundum hoc diversificantur quatuor
enunciationes. Then he says, The following diagram will make this clear. Here
he manifests what he has said by a diagrammatic description; for, as he says,
what has been stated can be understood from the following diagram. Take a
four-sided figure and in one corner write the enunciation "Man is just.”
Opposite it write its negation "Man is not just,” and under these the two
infinite enunciations, "Man is non-just,” "Man is not non-just.” Man
is just Man is not non-just Man is not just Man is non-just It is evident from
this table that the verb "is” whether affirmative or negative is adjoined
to "just” and "non-just.” It is according to this that the four
enunciations are diversified. 15 Ultimo autem concludit quod praedictae
enunciationes disponuntur secundum ordinem consequentiae, prout dictum est in
resolutoriis, idest in I priorum. Alia littera habet: dico autem, quoniam est
aut homini aut non homini adiacebit, et in figura, est, hoc loco homini et non
homini adiacebit. Quod quidem non est intelligendum, ut homo, et non homo
accipiatur ex parte subiecti, non enim nunc agitur de enunciationibus quae sunt
de infinito subiecto. Unde oportet quod homo et non homo accipiantur ex parte
praedicati. Sed quia philosophus exemplificat de enunciationibus in quibus ex parte
praedicati ponitur iustum et non iustum, visum est Alexandro, quod praedicta
littera sit corrupta. Quibusdam aliis videtur quod possit sustineri et quod
signanter Aristoteles nomina in exemplis variaverit, ut ostenderet quod non
differt in quibuscunque nominibus ponantur exempla. Finally, he concludes that
these enunciations are disposed aaccording to an order of consequence that he
has stated in the Analytics, i.e., in I Priorum [46: 51b 5]. There is a variant
reading of a previous portion of this text, namely, I mean that "is” will
be added either to "man” or to non-man,” and in the diagram "is” is
added to "man” and "non-man. This cannot be understood to mean that
"man” and "non-man” are taken on the part of the subject; for
Aristotle is not treating here of enunciations with an infinite subject and
hence "man” and "non-man” must be taken on the part of the predicate.
This variant text seemed to Alexander to be corrupt, for the Philosopher has
been explicating enunciations in which "just” and "non-just” are
posited on the part of the predicate. Others think it can be sustained and that
Aristotle has intentionally varied the names to show that it makes no
difference what names are used in the examples. III. 1 Postquam philosophus
distinxit enunciationes in quibus subiicitur nomen infinitum non universaliter
sumptum, hic intendit distinguere enunciationes, in quibus subiicitur nomen
finitum universaliter sumptum. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, ponit
similitudinem istarum enunciationum ad infinitas supra positas; secundo,
ostendit dissimilitudinem earumdem; ibi: sed non similiter etc.; tertio,
concludit numerum oppositionum inter dictas enunciationes; ibi: hae duae igitur
et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod similes sunt enunciationes, in quibus est
nominis universaliter sumpti affirmatio. Having distinguished enunciations in
which the subject is an infinite name not taken universally, Aristotle now
distinguishes enunciations in which the subject is a finite name taken
universally. He first proposes a similarity between these enunciations and the
infinite enunciations already discussed, and then shows their difference where
he says, But it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that
those on the diagonal both be true, etc. Finally, he concludes with the number
of oppositions there are between these enunciations where he says, These two
pairs, then, are opposed, etc. He says first, then, that enunciations in which
the affirmation is of a name taken universally are similar to those already
discussed. 2 Quoad primum notandum est quod in enunciationibus indefinitis
supra positis erant duae oppositiones et quatuor enunciationes, et affirmativae
inferebant negativas, et non inferebantur ab eis, ut patet tam in expositione
Ammonii, quam Porphyrii. Ita in enunciationibus in quibus subiicitur nomen
finitum universaliter sumptum inveniuntur duae oppositiones et quatuor
enunciationes: et affirmativae inferunt negativas et non e contra. Unde
similiter se habent enunciationes supradictae, si nominis in subiecto sumpti
fiat affirmatio universaliter. Fient enim tunc quatuor enunciationes: duae de
praedicato finito, scilicet omnis homo est iustus, et eius negatio quae est non
omnis homo est iustus; et duae de praedicato infinito, scilicet omnis homo est
non iustus, et eius negatio quae est, non omnis homo est non iustus. Et quia
quaelibet affirmatio cum sua negatione unam integrat oppositionem, duae
efficiuntur oppositiones, sicut et de indefinitis dictum est. Nec obstat quod
de enunciationibus universalibus loquens particulares inseruit; quoniam sicut
supra de indefinitis et suis negationibus sermonem fecit, ita nunc de
affirmationibus universalibus sermonem faciens de earum negationibus est
coactus loqui. Negatio siquidem universalis affirmativae non est universalis negativa,
sed particularis negativa, ut in I libro habitum est. It is to be noted in
relation to Aristotle’s first point that in indefinite enunciations there were
two oppositions and four enunciations, the affirmatives inferring the negatives
and not being inferred by them, as is clear in the exposition of Ammonius as
well as of Porphyry. In enunciations in which the finite name universally taken
is the subject there are also two oppositions and four eminciations, the
affirmatives inferring the negatives and not the contrary. Hence, enunciations
are related in a similar way if the affirmation is made universally of the name
taken as the subject. For again, four enunciations will be made, two with a
finite predicate-"Every man is just,” and its negation, "Not every
man is just”-and two with an infinite predicate-"Every man is non-just”
and its negation, "Not every man is non-just.” And since any affirmation
together with its negation makes one whole opposition, two oppositions are
made, as was also said of indefinite enunciations. There might seem to be an
objection to his use of particulars when speaking of universal enunciations,
but this cannot be objected to, for just as in dealing with indefinite
enunciations he spoke of their negations, so now in dealing with universal
affirmatives be is forced to speak of their negations. The negation of the
universal affirmative, however, is not the do universal but the particular
negative as was stated in the first book. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 3 n. 3Quod autem
similis sit consequentia in istis et supradictis indefinitis patet
exemplariter. Et ne multa loquendo res clara prolixitate obtenebretur, formetur
primo figura de indefinitis, quae supra posita est in expositione Porphyrii,
scilicet ex una parte ponatur affirmativa finita, et sub ea negativa infinita,
et sub ista negativa privativa. Ex altera parte primo negativa finita, et sub
ea affirmativa infinita, et sub ea affirmativa privativa. Deinde sub illa
figura formetur alia figura similis illi universaliter: ponatur scilicet ex una
parte universalis affirmativa de praedicato finito, et sub ea particularis
negativa de praedicato infinito, et ad complementum similitudinis sub ista
particularis negativa de praedicato privativo; ex altera vero parte ponatur
primo particularis negativa de praedicato infinito, et sub ea universalis
affirmativa de praedicato finito, et sub ista universalis affirmativa de
praedicato privativo, hoc modo: (Figura). Quibus ita dispositis, exerceatur
consequentia semper in ista proxima figura, sicut supra in indefinitis exercita
est: sive sequendo expositionem Ammonii, ut infinitae se habeant ad finitas,
sicut privativae se habent ad ipsas finitas; finitae autem non se habeant ad
infinitas medias, sicut privativae se habent ad ipsas infinitas: sive sectando
expositionem Porphyrii, ut affirmativae inferant negativas, et non e contra.
Utrique enim expositioni suprascriptae deserviunt figurae, ut patet diligenter
indaganti. Similiter ergo se habent enunciationes istae universales ad
indefinitas in tribus, scilicet in numero propositionum, et numero
oppositionum, et modo consequentiae. A table will make it evident that the
consequence is similar in these and in indefinite eminciations. And lest what
is clear be made obscure by prolixity let us first make a diagram of the
indefinites posited in the last lesson, based upon the exposition of Porphyry.
Place the finite affirmative on one side and under it the infinite negative,
and under this the privative negative. On the other side put the finite
negative first, under it the infinite affirmative, and under this the privative
affirmative. Then under this diagram make another similar to it but of
universals. On one side put the universal affirmative of the finite predicate,
under it the particular negative of the infinite predicate, and to complete the
parallel put the particular negative of the privative predicate under this. On
the other side, first put the particular negative of the infinite predicate,
under it the universal affirmative of the finite predicate,” and under this the
universal affirmative of the privative predicate. Thus: DIAGRAM OF THE
INDEFINITES Man is just Man is not just Man is not non-just Man is non-just Man
is not unjust Man is unjust DIAGRAM OF THE UNIVERSALS Every man is just Not
every man is just. Not every man is non-just Every man is non-just Not every
man is unjust Every man is unjust In this disposition of enunciations, the
consequence always follows in the second diagram just as it followed in regard
to indefinites in the first diagram. This is true if we follow the exposition
of Ammonius in which infinites are related to finites as privatives are related
to the same finites, and the finites not related to the infinite middle
enunciatious as privatives are related to those infinites. It is equally true
if we follow the exposition of Porphyry, in which affirmatives infer negatives
and not vice versa. That the tables serve both expositions will be clear to one
studying them. These universal enunciations, therefore, are related in like manner
to indefinite entinciations in three things: the number of propositions, the
number of oppositions, and the mode of consequence. 4 Deinde cum dicit: sed non
similiter angulares etc., ponit dissimilitudinem inter istas universales et
supradictas indefinitas, in hoc quod angulares non similiter contingit veras
esse. Quae verba primo exponenda sunt secundum eam, quam credimus esse ad
mentem Aristotelis, expositionem; deinde secundum alios. Angulares
enunciationes in utraque figura suprascripta vocat eas quae sunt diametraliter
oppositae, scilicet affirmativam finitam ex uno angulo, et affirmativam
infinitam sive privativam ex alio angulo: et similiter negativam finitam ex uno
angulo, et negativam infinitam vel privativam ex alio angulo. When he says, But
it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that those on the
diagonal both be true, etc., he proposes a difference between the universals
and the indefinites, i.e., that it is not possible for the diagonals to be true
in the case of universals. First we will explain these words according to the
exposition we believe Aristotle had in mind, then according to the opinion of
others. Aristotle means by diagonal eminciations those that are diametrically
opposed in the diagram above, i.e., the finite affirmative in one corner and
the infinite affirmative or the privative in the other; and the finite negative
in one corner and the, infinite negative or privative in the other. 5 Enunciationes
ergo in qualitate similes angulares vocatae, eo quod angulares, idest
diametraliter distant, dissimilis veritatis sunt apud indefinitas et
universales. Angulares enim indefinitae tam in diametro affirmationum, quam in
diametro negationum possunt esse simul verae, ut patet in suprascripta figura
indefinitarum. Et hoc intellige in materia contingenti. Angulares vero in
figura universalium non sic se habent, quoniam angulares secundum diametrum
affirmationum impossibile est esse simul veras in quacumque materia. Angulares
autem secundum diametrum negationum quandoque possunt esse simul verae, quando
scilicet fiunt in materia contingenti: in materia enim necessaria et remota
impossibile est esse ambas veras. Haec est Boethii, quam veram credimus, expositio.
Enunciations that are similar in quality, and called diagonal because
diametrically distant, are dissimilar in truth, tben, in the case of
indefinites and universals. The indefinites on the corners, both oil the
diagonal of affirmations and the diagonal of negations can be simultaneously
true, as is evident in the table of the indefinite entinciations. This is to be
understood in regard to contingent matter. But diagonals of universals are not
so related, for angtilars on the diagonal of affirmations cannot be
simultaneously true in any matter. Those on the diagonal of negations, however,
can sometimes be true simultaneously, i.e., when they are in contingerlt
matter. In necessary and rernote matter it is impossible for both of these to
be true. This is the exposition of Boethitis, which we believe to be the true one.
6 Herminus autem, Boethio referente, aliter exponit. Licet enim ponat
similitudinem inter universales et indefinitas quoad numerum enunciationum et
oppositionum, oppositiones tamen aliter accipit in universalibus et aliter in
indefinitis. Oppositiones siquidem indefinitarum numerat sicut et nos
numeravimus, alteram scilicet inter finitas affirmativam et negativam, et
alteram inter infinitas affirmativam et negativam, quemadmodum nos fecimus.
Universalium vero non sic numerat oppositiones, sed alteram sumit inter
universalem affirmativam finitam et particularem negativam finitam, scilicet
omnis homo est iustus, non omnis homo est iustus, et alteram inter eamdem
universalem affirmativam finitam et universalem affirmativam infinitam,
scilicet omnis homo est iustus, omnis homo est non iustus. Inter has enim est
contrarietas, inter illas vero contradictio. Dissimilitudinem etiam
universalium ad indefinitas aliter ponit. Non enim nobiscum fundat
dissimilitudinem inter angulares universalium et indefinitarum supra
differentiam quae est inter angulares universalium affirmativas et negativas,
sed supra differentiam quae est inter ipsas universalium angulares inter se ex
utraque parte. Format namque talem figuram, in qua ex una parte sub universali
affirmativa finita, universalis affirmativa infinita est; et ex alia parte sub
particulari negativa finita, particularis negativa infinita ponitur; sicque
angulares sunt disparis qualitatis, et similiter indefinitarum figuram format
hoc modo: (Figura). Quibus ita dispositis, ait in hoc stare dissimilitudinem,
quod angulares indefinitarum mutuo se invicem compellunt ad veritatis sequelam,
ita quod unius angularis veritas suae angularis veritatem infert undecumque
incipias. Universalium vero angulares non se mutuo compellunt ad veritatem, sed
ex altera parte necessitas deficit illationis. Si enim incipias ab aliquo
universalium et ad suam angularem procedas, veritas universalis non ita potest
esse simul cum veritate angularis, quod compellit eam ad veritatem: quia si
universalis est vera, sua universalis contraria erit falsa: non enim possunt
esse simul verae. Et si ista universalis contraria est falsa, sua
contradictoria particularis, quae est angularis primae universalis assumptae,
erit necessario vera: impossibile est enim contradictorias esse simul falsas.
Si autem incipias e converso ab aliqua particularium et ad suam angularem
procedas, veritas particularis ita potest stare cum veritate suae angularis,
quod tamen non necessario infert eius veritatem: quia licet sequatur: particularis
est vera; ergo sua universalis contradictoria est falsa; non tamen sequitur
ultra: ista universalis contradictoria est falsa; ergo sua universalis
contraria, quae est angularis particularis assumpti, est vera. Possunt enim
contrariae esse simul falsae. Herminus, however, according to Boethius,
explains this in another way. He takes the oppositions in one way in universals
and in another in indefinites, although he holds that there is a likeness
between universals and indefinites with respect to the n timber of enunciations
and of oppositions. He arrives at the oppositions of indefinites we have, i.e.,
one between the affirmative and negative finites, and the other between the
affirmative and negative infinites. But he disposes the oppositions of
universals in another way, taking one between the finite universal affirmative
and finite particular negative, "Every man is just” and "Not every
man is just,” and the other between the same finite universal affirmative and
the infinite universal affirmative, "Every man is just” and "Every
man is non-just.” Between the latter there is contrariety, between the former
contradiction. He also proposes the dissimilarity between universals and
indefinites in another way. He does not base the dissimilarity between
diagonals of universals and indefinites on the difference between affirinative
and negative diagonals of universals, as we do, but on the difference between
the diagonals of universals on both sides among themselves. Hence he forms his
diagram in this way: under the finite universal affirmative be places the
infinite universal affirmative, and on the other side, under the finite
particular negative the infinite particular negative. Thus the diagonals are of
different quality. He also diagrams the indefinites in this way. Every man is
just? contradictories? Not every man is just contraries subcontraries Every man
is non-just? contradictories? Not every man is non-just Man is just Man is
non-just Man is not just Man is not non-just With enunciations disposed in this
way he says their difference is this: that in indefinite enunciations, one on
the diagonal is true as a necessary consequence of the truth of the other, so
that the truth of one enunciation infers the truth of its diagonal from
wherever you begin * But there is no such mutual necessary consequence in
universals—from the truth of one on a diagonal to the other—since the necessity
of inference fails in part. If you begin from any of the universals and proceed
to its diagonal, the truth of the universal cannot be simultaneous with the
truth of its diagonal so as to compel it to truth. For if the universal is true
its universal contrary will be false, since they cannot be at once true; and if
this universal contrary is false, its particular contradictory, which is the
diagonal of the first universal assumed, will necessarily be true, since it is
impossible for contradictories to be at once false; but if, conversely, you
begin with a particular enunciation and proceed to its diagonal, the truth of
the particular can so stand with the truth of its diagonal that it does not
infer its truth necessarily. For this follows: the particular is true,
therefore its universal contradictory is false. But this does not follow: this
universal contradictory is false, therefore its universal contrary, which is
the diagonal of the particular assumed, is true. For contraries can be at once false.
7 Sed videtur expositio ista deficere ab Aristotelis mente quoad modum sumendi
oppositiones. Non enim intendit hic loqui de oppositione quae est inter finitas
et infinitas, sed de ea quae est inter finitas inter se, et infinitas inter se.
Si enim de utroque modo oppositionis exponere volumus, iam non duas, sed tres
oppositiones inveniemus: primam inter finitas, secundam inter infinitas,
tertiam quam ipse herminus dixit inter finitam et infinitam. Figura etiam quam
formavit, conformis non est ei, quam Aristoteles in fine I priorum formavit, ad
quam nos remisit, cum dixit: haec igitur quemadmodum in resolutoriis dictum
est, sic sunt disposita. In Aristotelis namque figura, angulares sunt
affirmativae affirmativis, et negativae negativis. But the way in which
oppositions are taken in this exposition does not seem to be what Aristotle had
in mind. He did not intend to speak here of the opposition between finites and
infinites, but of the opposition between finites themselves and infinites
themselves. For if we meant to explain each mode of opposition, there would not
be two but three oppositions: first, between finites; second, between infinites;
and third, the one Herminus states between finite and infinite. Even the
diagram Herminus makes is not like the one Aristotle makes at the end of I
Priorum, to which Aristotle himself referred us in the last lesson when he
said, This, then, is the way these are arranged, as we have said in the
Analytics; for in Aristotle’s diagram affirmatives are diagonal to affirmatives
and negatives to negatives. 8 Deinde cum dicit: hae igitur duae etc., concludit
numerum propositionum. Et potest dupliciter exponi; primo, ut ly hae demonstret
universales, et sic est sensus, quod hae universales finitae et infinitae
habent duas oppositiones, quas supra declaravimus; secundo, potest exponi ut ly
hae demonstret enunciationes finitas et infinitas quoad praedicatum sive
universales sive indefinitas, et tunc est sensus, quod hae enunciationes
supradictae habent duas oppositiones, alteram inter affirmationem finitam et
eius negationem, alteram inter affirmationem infinitam et eius negationem.
Placet autem mihi magis secunda expositio, quoniam brevitas cui Aristoteles
studebat, replicationem non exigebat, sed potius quia enunciationes finitas et
infinitas quoad praedicatum secundum diversas quantitates enumeraverat, ad duas
oppositiones omnes reducere, terminando earum tractatum, voluit. Then Aristotle
says, These two pairs, then, are opposed, etc. Here he concludes to the number
of propositions. What he says here can be interpreted in two ways. In the first
way, "these” designates universals, and thus the meaning is that the
finite and infinite universals have two oppositions, which we have explained
above. In the second, "these” designates enunciations which are finite and
infinite with respect to the predicate, whether universal or indefinite, and
then the meaning is that these enunciations have two oppositions, one between
the finite affirmation and its negation and the other between the infinite
affirmation and its negation. The second exposition seems more satisfactory to
me, for the brevity for which, Aristotle strove allows for no repetition;
hence, in terminating his treatment of the enunciations he had enumerated—those
with a finite and infinite predicate according to diverse quantities—he meant
to reduce all the oppositions to two. 9 Deinde
cum dicit: aliae autem ad id quod est etc., intendit declarare diversitatem
enunciationum de tertio adiacente, in quibus subiicitur nomen infinitum. Et
circa hoc tria facit: primo, proponit et distinguit eas; secundo, ostendit quod
non dantur plures supradictis; ibi: magis autem etc.; tertio, ostendit
habitudinem istarum ad alias; ibi: hae autem extra et cetera. Ad evidentiam
primi advertendum est tres esse species enunciationum de inesse, in quibus
explicite ponitur hoc verbum est. Quaedam sunt, quae subiecto sive finito sive
infinito nihil habent additum ultra verbum, ut, homo est, non homo est. Quaedam
vero sunt quae subiecto finito habent, praeter verbum, aliquid additum sive
finitum sive infinitum, ut, homo est iustus, homo est non iustus. Quaedam autem
sunt quae subiecto infinito, praeter verbum, habent aliquid additum sive
finitum sive infinitum, ut, non homo est iustus, non homo est non iustus. Et
quia de primis iam determinatum est, ideo de ultimis tractare volens, ait:
aliae autem sunt, quae habent aliquid, scilicet praedicatum, additum supra
verbum est, ad id quod est, non homo, quasi ad subiectum, idest ad subiectum
infinitum. Dixit autem quasi, quia sicut nomen infinitum deficit a ratione
nominis, ita deficit a ratione subiecti. Significatum siquidem nominis infiniti
non proprie substernitur compositioni cum praedicato quam importat, est,
tertium adiacens. Enumerat quoque quatuor enunciationes et duas oppositiones in
hoc ordine, sicut in superioribus fecit. Distinguit etiam istas ex finitate vel
infinitate praedicata. Unde primo, ponit oppositiones inter affirmativam et
negativam habentes subiectum infinitum et praedicatum finitum, dicens: ut, non
homo est iustus, non homo non est iustus. Secundo, ponit oppositionem alteram
inter affirmativam et negativam, habentes subiectum infinitum et praedicatum
infinitum, dicens: ut, non homo est non iustus, non homo non est non iustus. When
he says, and there, are two other pairs if something is added to "non-man”
as a subject, etc., he shows the diversity of enunciations when "is” is added
as a third element and the subject is an infinite name. First, he proposes and
distinguishes them; secondly, he shows that there are no more opposites than
these where he says, There will be no more opposites than these; thirdly, he
shows the relationship of these to the others where he says, The latter,
however, are separate from the former and distinct from them, etc. With respect
to the first point, it should be noted that there are three species of absolute
[de inesse] enunciations in which the verb "is” is posited explicitly.
Some have nothing added to the subject—which can be either finite or
infinite—beyond the verb, as in "Man is,” "Non-man is.” Some have,
besides the verb, something either finite or infinite added to a finite subject,
as in "Man is just,” "Man is non-just.” Finally, some have, besides
the verb, something either finite or infinite added to an infinite subject, as
in "Non-man is just,” "Non-man is non-just.” He has already treated
the first two and now intends to take tip the last ones. And there are two
other pairs, he says, that have something, namely a predicate. added beside the
verb "is” to "non-man” as if to a subject, i.e., to an infinite
subject. He says "as if” because the infinite name falls short of the notion
of a subject insofar as it falls short of the notion of a name. Indeed, the
signification of an infinite name is not properly submitted to composition with
the predicate, which "is,” the third element added, introduces. Aristotle
enumerates four enunciations and two oppositions in this order as he did in the
former. In addition he distinguishes these from the former finiteness and
infinity. First, he posits the opposition between affirmative and negative
enunciations with an infinite subject and a finite predicate, "Non-man is
just,” "Non-man is not just.” Then he posits another opposition between
those with an infinite subject and an infinite predicate, "Non-man is
non-just,” "Non-man is not non-just. 10 Deinde cum dicit: magis autem
plures etc., ostendit quod non dantur plures oppositiones enunciationum
supradictis. Ubi notandum est quod enunciationes de inesse, in quibus explicite
ponitur hoc verbum est, sive secundum, sive tertium adiacens, de quibus
loquimur, non possunt esse plures quam duodecim supra positae; et consequenter
oppositiones earum secundum affirmationem et negationem non sunt nisi sex. Cum
enim in tres ordines divisae sint enunciationes, scilicet in illas de secundo
adiacente, in illas de tertio subiecti finiti, et in illas de tertio subiecti
infiniti, et in quolibet ordine sint quatuor enunciationes; fiunt omnes
enunciationes duodecim, et oppositiones sex. Et quoniam subiectum earum in
quolibet ordine potest quadrupliciter quantificari, scilicet universalitate,
particularitate, et singularitate et indefinitione; ideo istae duodecim
multiplicantur in quadraginta octo. Quater enim duodecim quadraginta octo
faciunt. Nec possibile est plures his imaginari. Et licet Aristoteles nonnisi
viginti harum expresserit, octo in primo ordine, octo in secundo, et quatuor in
tertio, attamen per eas reliquas voluit intelligi. Sunt autem sic enumerandae
et ordinandae secundum singulos ordines, ut affirmationi negatio prima ex
opposito situetur, ut oppositionis intentum clarius videatur. Et sic contra
universalem affirmativam non est ordinanda universalis negativa, sed
particularis negativa, quae est illius negatio; et e converso, contra
particularem affirmativam non est ordinanda particularis negativa, sed
universalis negativa quae est eius negatio. Ad clarius autem intuendum numerum,
coordinandae sunt omnes, quae sunt similis quantitatis, simul in recta linea,
distinctis tamen ordinibus tribus supradictis. Quod ut clarius elucescat, in
hac subscripta videatur figura: (Figura). Quod autem plures his non sint, ex eo
patet quod non contingit pluribus modis variari subiectum et praedicatum penes
finitum et infinitum, nec pluribus modis variantur finitum et infinitum
subiectum. Nulla enim enunciatio de secundo adiacente potest variari penes
praedicatum finitum vel infinitum, sed tantum penes subiectum quod sufficienter
factum apparet. Enunciationes autem de tertio adiacente quadrupliciter variari
possunt, quia aut sunt subiecti et praedicati finiti, aut utriusque infiniti,
aut subiecti finiti et praedicati infiniti, aut subiecti infiniti et praedicati
finiti. Quarum nullam praetermissam esse superior docet figura. Then he says,
There will be no more opposites than these. Here he points out that there are
no more oppositions of enunciations than the ones be has already given. We should
note, then, that simple [or absolute] enunciations—of which we have been
speaking—in which the verb "is” is explicitly posited whether it is the
second or third element added, cannot be more than the twelve posited.
Consequently, their oppositions according to affirmation and negation are only
six. For enunciations are divided into three orders: those with the second
element added, those with the third element added to a finite subject, and
those with the third element added to an infinite subject; and in any order
there are four enunciations. And since their subject in any order can be
quantified in four ways, i.e., by universality, particularity, singularity, and
indefiniteness, these twelve will be increased to fortyeight (four twelves
being forty-eight). Nor is it possible to imagine more than these. Aristotle
has only expressed twenty of these, eight in the first order, eight in the
second, and four in the third, but through them be intended the rest to be
understood. They are to be enumerated and disposed according to each order so
that the primary negation is placed opposite an affirmation in order to make
the relation of opposition more evident. Thus, the universal negative should
not be ordered as opposite to the universal affirmative, but the particular
negative, which is its negation. Conversely, the particular negative should not
be ordered as opposite to the particular affirmative, but the universal
negative, which is its negation. For a clearer look at their number all those
of similar quantity should be co-ordered in a straight line and in the three
distinct orders given above. The following diagram will make this clear. FIRST
ORDER Socrates is Socrates is not Non-Socrates is Non-Socrates is not Some man
is Some man is not Some non-man is Some non-man is not Man is Man is not
Non-man is Non-man is not Every man is No man is Every non-man is No non-man is
SECOND ORDER Socrates is just Socrates is not just Socrates is non-just
Socrates is not non-just Some man is just Some man is not just Some man is
non-just Some man is not non-just Man is just Man is not just Man is non-just
Man is not non-just Every man is just No man is just Every man is non-just No
man is non-just THIRD ORDER Non-Socrates is just Non-Socrates is not just
Non-Socrates is non-just Non-Socrates is not non-just Some non-man is just Some
non-man is not just Some non-man is non-just Some non-man is not non-just
Non-man is just Non-man is not just Non-man is non-just Non-man is not non-just
Every non-man is just No non-man is just Every non-man is non-just No non-man
is non-just It is evident that there are no more than these, for the subject
and the predicate cannot be varied in any other way with respect to finite and
infinite. Nor can the finite and infinite subject be varied in any other way,
for the enunciation with a second adjoining element cannot be varied with a
finite and infinite predicate but only in respect to the subject. This is clear
enough. But enunciations with a third adjoining element can be varied in four
ways: they may have either a finite subject and predicate, or an infinite
subject and predicate, or a finite subject and infinite predicate, or an
infinite subject and finite predicate. These variations are all evident in the
above table. 11 Deinde cum dicit: hae autem extra illas etc., ostendit
habitudinem harum quas in tertio ordine numeravimus ad illas, quae in secundo
sitae sunt ordine, et dicit quod istae sunt extra illas, quia non sequuntur ad
illas, nec e converso. Et rationem assignans subdit: ut nomine utentes eo quod
est non homo, idest ideo istae sunt extra illas, quia istae utuntur nomine
infinito loco nominis, dum omnes habent subiectum infinitum. Notanter autem
dixit enunciationes subiecti infiniti uti ut nomine, infinito nomine, quia cum
subiici in enunciatione proprium sit nominis, praedicari autem commune nomini
et verbo, omne subiectum enunciationis ut nomen subiicitur. Then when he says,
The latter, however, are separate from the former and distinct from them, etc.,
he shows the relationship of those we have put in the third order to those in
the second order. The former, he says, are distinct from the latter because
they do not follow upon the latter, nor conversely. He assigns the reason when
he adds: because of the use of "non-man” as a name, i.e., the former are
separate from the latter because the former use an infinite name in place of a
name, since they all have an infinite subject. It should be noted that he says
enunciations of an infinite subject use an infinite name as a name; for to be subjected
in an enunciation is proper to a name, to be predicated common to a name and a
verb, and therefore every subject of an enunciation is subjected as a name. 12 Deinde
cum dicit: in his vero in quibus est etc., determinat de enunciationibus in
quibus ponuntur verba adiectiva. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, distinguit
eas; secundo, respondet cuidam tacitae quaestioni; ibi: non enim dicendum est
etc.; tertio, concludit earum conditiones; ibi: ergo et caetera eadem et
cetera. Ad evidentiam primi resumendum est, quod inter enunciationes in quibus
ponitur est secundum adiacens, et eas in quibus ponitur est tertium adiacens
talis est differentia quod in illis, quae sunt de secundo adiacente,
simpliciter fiunt oppositiones, scilicet ex parte subiecti tantum variati per
finitum et infinitum; in his vero, quae habent est tertium adiacens dupliciter
fiunt oppositiones, scilicet et ex parte praedicati et ex parte subiecti, quia
utrumque variari potest per finitum et infinitum. Unde unum ordinem tantum
enunciationum de secundo adiacente fecimus, habentem quatuor enunciationes
diversimode quantificatas et duas oppositiones. Enunciationes autem de tertio
adiacente oportuit partiri in duos ordines, quia sunt in eis quatuor
oppositiones et octo enunciationes, ut supra dictum est. Considerandum quoque
est quod enunciationes, in quibus ponuntur verba adiectiva, quoad significatum
aequivalent enunciationibus de tertio adiacente, resoluto verbo adiectivo in
proprium participium et est, quod semper fieri licet, quia in omni verbo
adiectivo clauditur verbum substantivum. Unde idem significant ista, omnis homo
currit, quod ista, omnis homo est currens. Propter quod Boethius vocat
enunciationes cum verbo adiectivo de secundo adiacente secundum vocem, de
tertio autem secundum potestatem, quia potest resolvi in tertium adiacens, cui
aequivalet. Quoad numerum autem enunciationum et oppositionum, enunciationes
verbi adiectivi formaliter sumptae non aequivalent illis de tertio adiacente,
sed aequivalent enunciationibus, in quibus ponitur est secundum adiacens. Non
possunt enim fieri oppositiones dupliciter in enunciationibus adiectivis,
scilicet ex parte subiecti et praedicati, sicut fiebant in substantivis de
tertio adiacente, quia verbum, quod praedicatur in adiectivis, infinitari non
potest. Sed oppositiones adiectivarum fiunt simpliciter, scilicet ex parte
subiecti tantum variati per infinitum et finitum diversimode quantificati,
sicut fieri didicimus supra in enunciationibus substantivis de secundo
adiacente, eadem ducti ratione, quia praeter verbum nulla est affirmatio vel
negatio, sicut praeter nomen esse potest. Quia autem in praesenti tractatu non
de significationibus, sed de numero enunciationum et oppositionum sermo
intenditur, ideo Aristoteles determinat diversificandas esse enunciationes
adiectivas secundum modum, quo distinctae sunt enunciationes in quibus ponitur
est secundum adiacens. Et ait quod in his enunciationibus, in quibus non
contingit poni hoc verbum est formaliter, sed aliquod aliud, ut, currit, vel,
ambulat, idest in enunciationibus adiectivis, idem faciunt quoad numerum
oppositionum et enunciationum sic posita, scilicet nomen et verbum, ac si est
secundum adiacens subiecto nomini adderetur. Habent enim et istae adiectivae,
sicut illae, in quibus ponitur est, duas oppositiones tantum, alteram inter
finitas, ut, omnis homo currit, omnis homo non currit, alteram inter infinitas
quoad subiectum, ut, omnis non homo currit, omnis non homo non currit. Next he
takes up enunciations in which adjective verbs are posited, when he says, In
enunciations in which "is” does not join the predicate to the subject,
etc. First, he distinguishes these adjective verbs; secondly, he answers an
implied question where he says, We must not say "non-every man,” etc.;
thirdly, he concludes with their conditions where he says, All else in the
enunciations in which "is” does not join the predicate to the subject will
be the same, etc. It is necessary to note here that there is a difference
between enunciations in which "is” is posited as a second adjoining
element and those in which it is posited as a third element. In those with
"is” as a second element oppositions are simple, i.e., varied only on the
part of the subject by finite and infinite. In those having "is” as a
third element oppositions are made in two ways—on the part of the predicate and
on the part of the subject—for both can be varied by finite and infinite. Hence
we made only one order of enunciations with "is” as the second element. It
had four enunciations quantified in diverse ways, and two oppositions. But
enunciations with "is” as a third element must be divided into two orders,
because in them there are four oppositions and eight enunciations, as we said
above. Enunciations with adjective verbs are made equivalent in signification
to enunciations with "is” as the third element by resolving the adjective
verb into its proper participle and "is,” which may always be done because
a substantive verb is contained in every adjective verb. For example,
"Every man runs” signifies the same thing as "Every man is running.”
Because of this Boethius calls enunciations having an adjective verb
"eminciations of the second adjoining element according to vocal sound,
but of the third adjoining element according to power.” He designates them in
this manner because they can be resolved into enunciations with a third
adjoining element to which they are equivalent. With respect to the number and
oppositions of enunciations, those with an adjective verb, formally taken, are
not equivalent to those with a third adjoining element but to those in which
"is” is posited as the second element. For oppositions cannot be made in
two ways in adjectival enunciations as they are in the case of substantival
enunciations with a third adjoining element, namely, on the part of the subject
and predicate, because the verb which is predicated in adjectival enunciations
cannot be made infinite. Hence oppositions of adjectival enunciations are made
simply, i.e., only by the subject quantified in diverse ways being varied by
finite and infinite, as was done above in substantival enunciations with a
second adjoining element, and for the same reason, i.e., there can be no
affirmation or negation without a verb but there can be without a name. Since
the present treatment is not of significations but of the number of
enunciations and oppositions, Aristotle determines that adjectival enunciations
are to be diversified according to the mode in which enunciations with
"is” as the second adjoining element are distinguished. And he says that
in enunciations in which the verb "is” is not posited formally, but some
other verb, such as "matures” or "walks,” i.e., in adjectival
enunciations, the name and verb form the same scheme with respect to the number
of oppositions and enunciations as when is as a second adjoining element is
added to the name as a subject. For these adjectival enunciations, like the
ones in which "is” is posited, have only two oppositions, one between the
finites, as in "Every man runs,” "Not every man runs,” the other
between the infinites with respect to subject, as in "Every non-man runs,”
"Not every non-man runs.” 13 Deinde cum dicit: non enim dicendum est etc.,
respondet tacitae quaestioni. Et circa hoc facit duo: primo, ponit solutionem
quaestionis; deinde, probat eam; ibi: manifestum est autem et cetera. Est ergo
quaestio talis: cur negatio infinitans numquam addita est supra signo
universali aut particulari, ut puta, cum vellemus infinitare istam, omnis homo
currit, cur non sic infinitata est, non omnis homo currit, sed sic, omnis non
homo currit? Huic namque quaestioni respondet, dicens quod quia nomen
infinitabile debet significare aliquid universale, vel singulare; omnis autem
et similia signa non significant aliquid universale aut singulare, sed quoniam universaliter
aut particulariter; ideo non est dicendum, non omnis homo, si infinitare
volumus (licet debeat dici, si negare quantitatem enunciationis quaerimus), sed
negatio infinitans ad ly homo, quod significat aliquid universale, addenda est,
et dicendum, omnis non homo. Then he answers an implied question when he says,
We, must not say "non-every man” but must add the negation to man, etc.
First he states the solution of the question, then he proves it where he says,
This is evident from the following, etc. The question is this: Why is the
negation that makes a word infinite never added to the universal or particular
sign? For example, when we wish to make "Every man runs” infinite, why do
we do it in this way "Every non-man runs,” and not in this, "Non-every
man runs.” He answers the question by saying that to be capable of being made
infinite a name has to signify something universal or singular. "Every”
and similar signs, however, do not signify something universal or singular, but
that something is taken universally or particularly. Therefore, we should not
say "non-every man” if we wish to infinitize (although it may be used if
we wish to deny the quantity of an enunciation), but must add the infinitizing
negation to "man,” which signifies something universal, and say "every
non-man.” 14 Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est autem ex eo quod est etc., probat
hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod omnis et similia non significant aliquod
universale, sed quoniam universaliter tali ratione. Illud, in quo differunt enunciationes
praecise differentes per habere et non habere ly omnis, est non universale
aliquod, sed quoniam universaliter; sed illud in quo differunt enunciationes
praecise differentes per habere et non habere ly omnis, est significatum per ly
omnis; ergo significatum per ly omnis est non aliquid universale, sed quoniam
universaliter. Minor huius rationis, tacita in textu, ex se clara est. Id enim
in quo, caeteris paribus, habentia a non habentibus aliquem terminum differunt,
significatum est illius termini. Maior vero in littera exemplariter declaratur
sic. Illae enunciationes homo currit, et omnis homo currit, praecise differunt
ex hoc, quod in una est ly omnis, et in altera non. Tamen non ita differunt ex
hoc, quod una sit universalis, alia non universalis. Utraque enim habet
subiectum universale, scilicet ly homo, sed differunt, quia in ea, ubi ponitur
ly omnis, enunciatur de subiecto universaliter, in altera autem non
universaliter. Cum enim dico, homo currit, cursum attribuo homini universali,
sive communi, sed non pro tota humana universitate; cum autem dico, omnis homo
currit, cursum inesse homini pro omnibus inferioribus significo. Simili modo
declarari potest de tribus aliis, quae in textu adducuntur, scilicet, homo non
currit, respectu suae universalis universaliter, omnis homo non currit: et sic
de aliis. Relinquitur ergo, quod, omnis et nullus et similia signa nullum
universale significant, sed tantummodo significant, quoniam universaliter de homine
affirmant vel negant. Where he says, This is evident from the following, etc.,
he proves that "every” and similar words do not signify a universal but
that a universal is taken universally. His argument is the following: That by
which enunciations having or not having the "every” differ is not the universal;
rather, they differ in that the universal is taken universally. But that by
which enunciations having and not having the "every” differ is signified
by the "every.” Therefore, that which is signified by the "every” is
not a universal but that the universal is taken universally. The minor of the
argument is evident, though not explicitly given in the text: that in which the
having of some term differs from the not having of it, other things being
equal, is the signification of that term. The major is made evident by
examples. The enunciations "Man matures” and "Every man matures”
differ precisely by the fact that in one there is an "every,” in the other
not. However, they do not differ in such a way by this that one is universal,
the other not universal, for both have the universal subject, "man”; they
differ because in the one in which "every” is posited, the enunciation is
of the subject universally, but in the other not universally. For when I say,
"Man matures,” I attribute maturing to "man” as universal or common
but not to man as to the whole human race; when I say, "Every man
matures,” however, I signify maturing to be present to man according to all the
inferiors. This is evident, too, in the three other examples of enunciations in
Aristotle’s text. For example, "Non-man matures” when its universal is
taken universally becomes "Every non-man matures,” and so of the others.
It follows, therefore, that "every” and "no” and similar signs do not
signify a universal but only signify that they affirm or deny of man
universally. 15 Notato hic duo: primum est quod non dixit omnis et nullus
significat universaliter, sed quoniam universaliter; secundum est, quod addit,
de homine affirmant vel negant. Primi ratio est, quia signum distributivum non
significat modum ipsum universalitatis aut particularitatis absolute, sed
applicatum termino distributo. Cum enim dico, omnis homo, ly omnis denotat
universitatem applicari illi termino homo, ita quod Aristoteles dicens quod
omnis significat quoniam universaliter, per ly quoniam insinuavit applicationem
universalitatis importatam in ly omnis in actu exercito, sicut et in I
posteriorum, in definitione scire applicationem causae notavit per illud verbum
quoniam, dicens: scire est rem per causam cognoscere, et quoniam illius est
causa. Ratio autem secundi insinuat differentiam inter terminos categorematicos
et syncategorematicos. Illi siquidem ponunt significata supra terminos
absolute; isti autem ponunt significata sua supra terminos in ordine ad
praedicata. Cum enim dicitur, homo albus, ly albus denominat hominem in seipso
absque respectu ad aliquod sibi addendum. Cum vero dicitur, omnis homo, ly
omnis etsi hominem distribuat, non tamen distributio intellectum firmat, nisi
in ordine ad aliquod praedicatum intelligatur. Cuius signum est, quia, cum
dicimus, omnis homo currit, non intendimus distribuere hominem pro tota sua
universitate absolute, sed in ordine ad cursum. Cum autem dicimus, albus homo
currit, determinamus hominem in seipso esse album et non in ordine ad cursum.
Quia ergo omnis et nullus, sicut et alia syncategoremata, nil aliud in
enunciatione faciunt, nisi quia determinant subiectum in ordine ad praedicatum,
et hoc sine affirmatione et negatione fieri nequit; ideo dixit quod nil aliud
significant, nisi quoniam universaliter de nomine, idest de subiecto, affirmant
vel negant, idest affirmationem vel negationem fieri determinant, ac per hoc a
categorematicis ea separavit. Potest etiam referri hoc quod dixit, affirmant
vel negant, ad ipsa signa, scilicet omnis et nullus, quorum alterum positive
distribuit, alterum removendo. Two things should be noted here: first, that
Aristotle does not say "every” and "no” signify universally, but that
the universal is taken universally; secondly, that he adds, they affirm or deny
of man. The reason for the first is that the distributive sign does not signify
the mode of universality or of particularity absolutely, but the mode applied
to a distributed term. When I say, "every man” the "every” denotes
that universality is applied to the term "man.” Hence, when Aristotle says
"every” signifies that a universal is taken universally, by the
"that” he conveys the application in actual exercise of the universality
denoted by the "every,” just as in I Posteriorum [2: 71b 10] in the definition
of "to know,” namely, To know scientifically is to know a thing through
its cause and that this is its cause, he signifies by the word "that” the
application of the cause. The reason for the second is to imply the difference
between categorematic and syneategorematic terms. The former apply what is
signified to the terms absolutely; the latter apply what they signify to the
terms in relation to the predicates. For example, in "white man” the
"white” denominates man in himself apart from any regard to something to
be added; but in "every man,” although the "every” distributes man,”
the distribution does not confirm the intellect unless it is under stood in
relation to some predicate. A sign of this is that when we say "Every man
runs” we do not intend to distribute "man” in its whole universality
absolutely, but only in relation to "running.” When we say "White man
runs,” on the other hand, we designate man in himself as "white” and not
in relation to "running.” Therefore, since "every” and "no” and
the other syncategorematic terms do nothing except determine the subject in
relation to the predicate in the enunciation, and this cannot be done without
affirmation and negation, Aristotle says that they only signify that the
affirmation or negation is of a name, i.e., of a subject, universally, i.e.,
they prescribe the affirmation or negation that is being formed, and by this he
separates them from categorematic terms. They affirm, or deny can also be
referred to the signs themselves i.e., "every” and "no,” one of which
distributes positively, the other distributes by removing. 16 Deinde cum dicit:
ergo et caetera eadem etc., concludit adiectivarum enunciationum conditiones.
Dixerat enim quod adiectivae enunciationes idem faciunt quoad oppositionum
numerum, quod substantivae de secundo adiacente; et hoc declaraverat,
oppositionum numero exemplariter subiuncto. Et quia ad hanc convenientiam
sequitur convenientia quoad finitationem praedicatorum, et quoad diversam
subiectorum quantitatem, et earum multiplicationem ex ductu quaternarii in
seipsum, et si qua sunt huiusmodi enumerata; ideo concludit: ergo et caetera,
quae in illis servanda erant, eadem, idest similia istis apponenda sunt. When
he says All else in enunciations in which "is”does not join the predicate
to the subject, etc., he concludes the treatment of the conditions of
adjectival enunciations. He has already stated that adjectival enunciations are
the same with respect to the number of oppositions as substantival enunciations
with "is” as the second element, and has clarified this by a table showing
the number of oppositions. Now, since upon this conformity follows conformity
both with respect to finiteness of predicates and with respect to the diverse
quantity of subjects, and also-if any enunciations of this kind are
enumerated—their multiplication in sets of four, he concludes, Therefore also
the other things, which are to be observed in them, are to be considered the
same, i.e., similar to these. IV. 1. Postquam determinatum est de diversitate
enunciationum, hic intendit removere quaedam dubia circa praedicta. Et circa
hoc facit sex secundum numerum dubiorum, quae suis patebunt locis. Quia ergo
supra dixerat quod in universalibus non similiter contingit angulares esse
simul veras, quia affirmativae angulares non possunt esse simul verae,
negativae autem sic; poterat quispiam dubitare, quae est causa huius
diversitatis. Ideo nunc illius dicti causam intendit assignare talem, quia,
scilicet, angulares affirmativae sunt contrariae inter se; contrarias autem in
nulla materia contingit esse simul veras. Angulares autem negativae sunt
subcontrariae illis oppositae; subcontrarias autem contingit esse simul veras.
Et circa haec duo facit: primo, declarat conditiones contrariarum et subcontrariarum;
secundo, quod angulares affirmativae sint contrariae et quod angulares
negativae sint subcontrariae; ibi: sequuntur vero et cetera. Dicit ergo
resumendo: quoniam in primo dictum est quod enunciatio negativa contraria illi
affirmativae universali, scilicet, omne animal est iustum, est ista, nullum
animal est iustum; manifestum est quod istae non possunt simul, idest in eodem
tempore, neque in eodem ipso, idest de eodem subiecto esse verae. His vero
oppositae, idest subcontrariae inter se, possunt esse simul verae aliquando,
scilicet in materia contingenti, ut, quoddam animal est iustum, non omne animal
est iustum. Having treated the diversity of enunciations Aristotle now answers
certain questions about them. He takes up six points related to the number of
difficulties. These will become evident as we come to them. Since he has said
that in universal enunciations the diagonals in one case cannot be at once true
but can be in another, for the diagonal affirmatives cannot be at once true but
the negatives can,” someone might raise a question as to the cause of this
diversity. Therefore, it is his intention now to assign the cause of this:
namely, that the diagonal affirmatives are contrary to each other, and
contraries cannot be at once true in any matter; but the diagonal negatives are
subcontraries opposed to these and can be at once true. In relation to this he
first states the conditions for contraries and subcontraries. Then he shows
that diagonal affirmatives are contraries and that diagonal negatives are
subcontraries where he says, Now the enunciation "No man is just” follows
upon the enunciation "Every man is nonjust,” etc. By way of resumé,
therefore, he says that in the first book it was said that the negative
enunciation contrary to the universal affirmative "Every animal is just”
is "No animal is just.” It is evident that these cannot be at once true,
i.e., at the same time, nor of the same thing, i.e., of the same subject. But
the opposites of these, i.e., the subcontraries, can sometimes be at once true,
i.e., in contingent matter, as in "Some animal is just” and "Not
every animal is just.” 2 Deinde cum dicit: sequuntur vero etc., declarat quod
angulares affirmativae supra positae sint contrariae, negativae vero
subcontrariae. Et primum quidem ex eo quod universalis affirmativa infinita et
universalis negativa simplex aequipollent; et consequenter utraque earum est
contraria universali affirmativae simplici, quae est altera angularis. Unde
dicit quod hanc universalem negativam finitam, nullus homo est iustus, sequitur
aequipollenter illa universalis affirmativa infinita, omnis homo est non
iustus. Secundum vero declarat ex eo quod particularis affirmativa finita et
particularis negativa infinita aequipollent. Et consequenter utraque earum est
subcontraria particulari negativae simplici, quae est altera angularis, ut in
figura supra posita inspicere potes. Unde subdit quod illam particularem
affirmativam finitam, aliquis homo est iustus, opposita sequitur aequipollenter
(opposita intellige non istius particularis, sed illius universalis
affirmativae infinitae), non omnis homo est non iustus. Haec enim est
contradictoria eius. Ut autem clare videatur quomodo supra dictae enunciationes
sint aequipollentes, formetur figura quadrata, in cuius uno angulo ponatur
universalis negativa finita, et sub ea contradictoria particularis affirmativa
finita; ex alia vero parte locetur universalis affirmativa infinita, et sub ea
contradictoria particularis negativa infinita, noteturque contradictio inter
angulares et collaterales inter se, hoc modo: (Figura). His siquidem sic
dispositis, patet primo ipsarum universalium mutua consequentia in veritate et
falsitate, quia si altera earum est vera, sua angularis contradictoria est
falsa; et si ista est falsa, sua collateralis contradictoria, quae est altera
universalis, erit vera, et similiter procedit quoad falsitatem particularium.
Deinde eodem modo manifestatur mutua sequela. Si enim altera earum est vera,
sua angularis contradictoria est falsa, ista autem existente falsa, sua
contradictoria collateralis, quae est altera particularis erit vera; simili
quoque modo procedendum est quoad falsitatem. When he says, Now the
enunciation, "No man is just” follows upon the enunciation "Every man
is nonjust,” etc., he shows that the diagonal affirmatives previously posited
are contraries, the negatives subcontraries. First he manifests this from the
fact that the infinite universal affirmative and the simple universal negative
are equal in meaning, and consequently each of them is contrary to the simple
universal affirmative, which is the other diagonal. Hence, he says that the
infinite universal affirmative "Every man is non-just” follows upon the
finite universal negative "No man is just,” equivalently. Secondly he
shows this from the fact that the finite particular affirmative and the
infinite particular negative are equal in meaning, and consequently each of
these is subcontrary to the simple particular negative, which is the other
diagonal. This you can see in the previous diagram. He says, then, that the
opposite "Not every man is non-just” follows upon the finite particular
"Some man is just” equivalently (understand "the opposite” not of
this particular but of the infinite universal affirmative, for this is its
contradictory). In order to see clearly how these enunciations are equivalent,
make a four-sided figure, putting the finite universal negative in one corner
and under it the contradictory, the finite particular affirmative. On the other
side, put the infinite universal affirmative and under it the contradictory,
the infinite particular negative. Now indicate the contradiction between
diagonals and the contradiction between collaterals. No man is just equivalents
Every man is non-just contradictories contradictories Some man is just
equivalents Not every man is non-just This arrangement makes the mutual
consequence of the universals in truth and falsity evident, for if one of them
is true, its diagonal contradictory is false; and if this is false, its
collateral contradictory, which is the other universal, will be true. With
respect to the falsity of the particulars the procedure is the same. Their
mutual consequence is made evident in the same way, for if one of them is true,
its diagonal contradictory is false, and if this is false, its contradictory
collateral, which is the other particular, will be true; the procedure is the
same with respect to falsity. 3 Sed est hic unum dubium. In I enim priorum, in
fine, Aristoteles ex proposito determinat non esse idem iudicium de universali
negativa et universali affirmativa infinita; et superius in hoc secundo, super
illo verbo: quarum duae se habent secundum consequentiam, duae vero minime,
Ammonius, Porphyrius, Boethius et sanctus Thomas dixerunt quod negativa simplex
sequitur affirmativam infinitam, sed non e converso. Ad hoc dicendum est,
secundum Albertum, quod negativam finitam sequitur affirmativa infinita
subiecto constante; negativa vero simplex sequitur affirmativam absolute. Unde
utrumque dictum verificatur, et quod inter eas est mutua consequentia cum
subiecti constantia, et quod inter eas non est mutua consequentia absolute.
Potest dici secundo, quod supra locuti sumus de infinita enunciatione quoad
suum totalem significatum ad formam praedicati reductum; et secundum hoc, quia
negativa finita est superior affirmativa infinita, ideo non erat mutua
consequentia: hic autem loquimur de ipsa infinita formaliter sumpta. Unde s.
Thomas tunc adducendo Ammonii expositionem dixit, secundum hunc modum loquendi:
negativa simplex, in plus est quam affirmativa infinita. Textus vero I priorum
ultra praedicta loquitur de finita et infinita in ordine ad syllogismum.
Manifestum est autem quod universalis affirmativa sive finita sive infinita non
concluditur nisi in primo primae. Universalis autem negativa quaecumque
concluditur et in secundo primae, et primo et secundo secundae. However, a
question arises with respect to this. At the end of I Priorum [46: 51b 5],
Aristotle determines from what he has proposed that the judgment of the universal
negative and the infinite universal affirmative is not the same. Furthermore,
in the second book of the present work, in relation to the phrase Of which two
are related according to consequence, two are not. Ammonius, Porphyry,
Boethius, and St. Thomas say that the simple negative follows upon the infinite
affirmative and not conversely.” Albert answers this latter difficulty by
pointing out that the infinite affirmative follows upon the finite negative
when the subject is constant, but the simple negative follows upon the
affirmative absolutely. Hence both positions are verified, for with a constant
subject there is a mutual consequence between them, but there is not a mutual
consequence between them absolutely. We could also answer this difficulty in
this way. In Book II, Lesson 2 we were speaking of the infinite enunciation
with the whole of what it signified reduced to the form of the predicate, and
according to this there was not a mutual consequence, since the finite negative
is superior to the infinite affirmative. But here we are speaking of the
infinite itself formally taken. Hence St. Thomas, when he introduced the
exposition of Ammonius in his commentary on the above passage, said that
according to this mode of speaking the simple negative is wider than the
infinite affirmative. In the above mentioned text in I Priorum [46: 52a 36],
Aristotle is speaking of finite and infinite enunciations in relation to the
syllogism. It is evident, however, that the universal affirmative, whether
finite or infinite is only inferred in the first mode of the first figure,
while any universal negative whatever is inferred in the second mode of the
first figure and in the first and second modes of the second figure. 4 Deinde
cum dicit: manifestum est autem etc., movet secundum dubium de vario situ
negationis, an scilicet quoad veritatem et falsitatem differat praeponere et
postponere negationem. Oritur autem haec dubitatio, quia dictum est nunc quod
non refert quoad veritatem si dicatur, omnis homo est non iustus, aut si
dicatur, omnis homo non est iustus; et tamen in altera postponitur negatio, in
altera praeponitur, licet multum referat quoad affirmationem et negationem.
Hanc, inquam, dubitationem solvere intendens cum distinctione, respondet quod
in singularibus enunciationibus eiusdem veritatis sunt singularis negatio et
infinita affirmatio eiusdem, in universalibus autem non est sic. Si enim est
vera negatio ipsius universalis non oportet quod sit vera infinita affirmatio
universalis. Negatio enim universalis est particularis contradictoria, qua
existente vera, non est necesse suam subalternam, quae est contraria suae
contradictoriae esse veram. Possunt enim duae contrariae esse simul falsae.
Unde dicit quod in singularibus enunciationibus manifestum est quod, si est
verum negare interrogatum, idest, si est vera negatio enunciationis singularis,
de qua facta est interrogatio, verum etiam est affirmare, idest, vera erit
affirmatio infinita eiusdem singularis. Verbi gratia: putasne Socrates est
sapiens? Si vera est ista responsio, non; Socrates igitur non sapiens est,
idest, vera erit ista affirmatio infinita, Socrates est non sapiens. In
universalibus vero non est vera, quae similiter dicitur, idest, ex veritate
negationis universalis affirmativae interrogatae non sequitur vera universalis
affirmativa infinita, quae similis est quoad quantitatem et qualitatem
enunciationi quaesitae; vera autem est eius negatio, idest, sed ex veritate
responsionis negativae sequitur veram esse eius, scilicet universalis quaesitae
negationem, idest, particularem negativam. Verbi gratia: putasne omnis homo est
sapiens? Si vera est ista responsio, non; affirmativa similis interrogatae quam
quis ex hac responsione inferre intentaret est illa: igitur omnis homo est non
sapiens. Haec autem non sequitur ex illa negatione. Falsum est enim hoc,
scilicet quod sequitur ex illa responsione; sed inferendum est, igitur non
omnis homo sapiens est. Et ratio utriusque est, quia haec particularis ultimo
illata est opposita, idest contradictoria illi universali interrogatae quam
respondens falsificavit; et ideo oportet quod sit vera. Contradictoriarum enim
si una est falsa, reliqua est vera. Illa vero, scilicet universalis affirmativa
infinita primo illata, est contraria illi eidem universali interrogatae. Non
est autem opus quod si universalium altera sit falsa, quod reliqua sit vera. In
promptu est autem causa huius diversitatis inter singulares et universales. In
singularibus enim varius negationis situs non variat quantitatem enunciationis;
in universalibus autem variat, ut patet. Ideo fit ut non sit eadem veritas
negantium universalem in quarum altera praeponitur, in altera autem postponitur
negatio, ut de se patet. When he says, And it is also clear with respect to the
singular that if a question is asked and a negative answer is the true one,
there is also a true affirmation, etc., he presents a difficulty relating to
the varying position of the negation, i.e., whether there is a difference as to
truth and falsity when the negation is a part of the predicate or a part of the
verb. This difficulty arises from what he has just said, namely, that it is of
no consequence as to truth or falsity whether you say, "Every man is
non-just” or "Every man is not just”; yet in one case the negation is a part
of the predicate, in the other part of the copula, and this makes a great deal
of difference with respect to affirmation and negation. To solve this problem
Aristotle makes a distinction: in singular enunciations, the singular negation
and infinite affirmation of the same subject are of the same truth, but in
universals this is not so. For if the negation of the universal is true it is
not necessary that the infinite affirmation of the universal is true. The
negation of the universal is the contradictory particular, but if it is true
[i.e., the contradictory particular] it is not necessary that the subaltern,
which is the contrary of the contradictory, be true, for two contraries can be
at once false. Hence he says that in singular enunciations it is evident that if
it is true to deny the thing asked, i.e., if the negation of a singular
enunciation, which has been made into an interrogation, is true, there will
also be a true affirmation, i.e., the infinite affirmation of the same singular
will be true. For example, if the question "Do you think Socrates is
wise?” has "No” as a true response, then "Socrates is non-wise,”
i.e., the infinite affirmation "Socrates is non-wise” will be true. But in
the case of universals the affirmative inference is not true, i.e., from the
truth of a negation to a universal affirmative question, the truth of the
infinite universal affirmative (which is similar in quantity and quality to the
enunciation asked) does not follow. But the negation is true, i.e., from the
truth of the negative response it follows that its negation is true, i.e., the
negation of the universal asked, which is the particular negative. Consider,
for example, the question "Do you think every man is wise?” If the
response "No” is true, one would be tempted to infer the affirmative
similar to the question asked, i.e., then "Every man is non-wise.” This,
however, does not follow from the negation, for this is false as it follows
from that response. Rather, what must be inferred is "Then not every man
is wise.” And the reason for both is that the particular enunciation inferred
last is the opposite, i.e., the contradictory of the universal question, which,
being falsified by the negative response, makes the contradictory of the
universal affirmative true, for of contradictories, if one is false the other
is true. The infinite universal affirmative first inferred, however, is
contrary to the same universal question. Should it not also be true? No,
because it is not necessary in the case of universals that if one is false the
other is true. The cause of the diversity between singulars and universals is
now clear. In singulars the varying position of the negation does not vary the
quantity of the enunciation ‘ but in universals it does. Therefore there is not
the same truth in enunciations denying a universal when in one the negation is
a part of the predicate and in the other a part of the verb. Cajetanus lib. 2
l. 4 n. 5Deinde cum dicit: illae vero secundum infinitaetc., solvit tertiam
dubitationem, an infinita nomina vel verba sint negationes. Insurgit autem hoc
dubium, quia dictum est quod aequipollent negativa et infinita. Et rursus
dictum est nunc quod non refert in singularibus praeponere et postponere
negationem: si enim infinitum nomen est negatio, tunc enunciatio, habens
subiectum infinitum vel praedicatum, erit negativa et non affirmativa. Hanc
dubitationem solvit per interpretationem, probando quod nec nomina nec verba
infinita sint negationes, licet videantur. Unde duo circa hoc facit: primo,
proponit solutionem dicens: illae vero, scilicet dictiones, contraiacentes:
verbi gratia: non homo, et, homo non iustus et iustus. Vel sic: illae vero,
scilicet dictiones, secundum infinita, idest secundum infinitorum naturam,
iacentes contra nomina et verba (utpote quae removentes quidem nomina et verba
significant, ut non homo et non iustus et non currit, quae opponuntur contra ly
homo ly iustus et ly currit), illae, inquam, dictiones infinitae videbuntur
prima facie esse quasi negationes sine nomine et verbo ex eo quod comparatae
nominibus et verbis contra quae iacent, ea removent, sed non sunt secundum
veritatem. Dixit sine nomine et verbo quia nomen infinitum, nominis natura
caret, et verbum infinitum verbi natura non possidet. Dixit quasi, quia nec
nomen infinitum a nominis ratione, nec verbum infinitum a verbi proprietate
omnino semota sunt. Unde, si negationes apparent, videbuntur sine nomine et
verbo non omnino sed quasi. Deinde probat distinctiones infinitas non esse
negationes tali ratione. Semper est necesse negationem esse veram vel falsam,
quia negatio est enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo; nomen autem infinitum non dicit
verum vel falsum; igitur dictio infinita non est negatio. Minorem declarat,
quia qui dixit, non homo, nihil magis de homine dixit quam qui dixit, homo. Et
quoad significatum quidem clarissimum est: non homo, namque, nihil addit supra
hominem, imo removet hominem. Quoad veritatis vero vel falsitatis conceptum,
nihil magis profuit qui dixit, non homo, quam qui dixit, homo, si aliquid aliud
non addatur, imo minus verus vel falsus fuit, idest magis remotus a veritate et
falsitate, qui dixit, non homo, quam qui dixit, homo: quia tam veritas quam
falsitas in compositione consistit; compositioni autem vicinior est dictio
finita, quae aliquid ponit, quam dictio infinita, quae nec ponit, nec componit,
idest nec positionem nec compositionem importat. Then he says, The antitheses
in infinite names and verbs, as in " non-man” and "nonjust,” might
seem to be negations without a name or a verb, etc. Here he raises the third
difficulty, i.e., whether infinite names or verbs are negations. This question
arises from his having said that the negative and infinite are equivalent and
from having just said that in singular enunciations it makes no difference
whether the negative is a part of the predicate or a part of the verb. For if
the infinite name is a negation, then the enunciation having an infinite
subject or predicate will be negative and not affirmative. He resolves this
question by an interpretation which proves that neither infinite names nor
verbs are negations although they seem to be. First he proposes the solution
saying, The antitheses in infinite names and verbs, i.e., words contraposed,
e.g., "non-man,” and "non-just man” and "just man”; or this may
be read as, Those (namely, words) corresponding to infinites, i.e.,
corresponding to the nature of infinites, placed in opposition to names or
verbs (namely, removing what the names and verbs signify, as in "non-man,”
"non-just,” and "non-runs,” which are opposed to "man,”
"just” and "runs”), would seem at first sight to be quasi-negations
without Dame and verb, because, as related to the names and verbs before which
they are placed, they remove them; they are not truly negations however. He
says without a name or a verb because the infinite name lacks the nature of a
name and the infinite verb does not have the nature of a verb. He says quasi
because the infinite name does not fall short of the notion of the name in
every way, nor the infinite verb of the nature of the verb. Hence, if it is
thought that they are negations, they will be regarded as without a name or a
verb, not in every way but as though they were without a name or a verb. He
proves that infinitizing signs of separation are not negations by pointing out that
it is always necessary for the negation to be true or false since a negation is
an enunciation of something separated from something. The infinite name,
however, does not assert what is true or false. Therefore the infinite word is
not a negation. He manifests the minor when he says that the one who says
"non-man” says nothing more of man than the one who says "man.”
Clearly this is so with respect to what is signified, for "non-man” adds
nothing beyond "man”; rather, it removes "man.” Moreover, with respect
to a conception of truth or falsity, it is of no more use to say "non-man”
than to say "man” if something else is not added; rather, it is less true
or false, i.e., one who says non-man is more removed from truth and falsity
than one who says man,” for both truth and falsity depend on composition, and
the finite word which posits something is closer to composition than the
infinite word, which neither posits nor composes, i.e., it implies neither
positing nor composition. 6 Deinde cum dicit: significat autem etc., respondet
quartae dubitationi, quomodo scilicet intelligatur illud verbum supradictum de
enunciationibus habentibus subiectum infinitum: hae autem extra illas, ipsae
secundum se erunt. Et ait quod intelligitur quantum ad significati consequentiam,
et non solum quantum ad ipsas enunciationes formaliter. Unde duas habentes
subiectum infinitum, universalem scilicet affirmativam et universalem negativam
adducens, ait quod neutra earum significat idem alicui illarum, scilicet
habentium subiectum finitum. Haec enim universalis affirmativa, omnis non homo
est iustus, nulli habenti subiectum finitum significat idem: non enim
significat idem quod ista, omnis homo est iustus; neque quod ista, omnis homo
est non iustus. Similiter opposita negatio et universalis negativa habens
subiectum infinitum, quae est contrarie opposita supradictae, scilicet omnis
non homo non est iustus, nulli illarum de subiecto finito significat idem. Et
hoc clarum est ex diversitate subiecti in istis et in illis. When he says, Moreover,
"Every non-man is just does not signify the same thing as any of the other
enunciations, etc., he answers a fourth difficulty, i.e., how the earlier
statement concerning enunciations having an infinite subject is to be
understood. The statement was that these stand by themselves and are distinct
from the former [in consequence of using the name "non-man”]. This is to
be understood not just with respect to the enunciations themselves formally,
but with respect to the consequence of what is signified. Hence, giving two
examples of enunciations with an infinite subject, the universal affirmative
and universal negative,” he says that neither of these signifies the same thing
as any of those, namely of those having a finite subject. The universal
affirmative "Every non-man is just” does not signify the same thing as any
of the enunciations with a finite subject; for it does not signify "Every
man is just” nor "Every man is non-just.” Nor do the opposite negation, or
the universal negative having an infinite subject which is contrarily opposed
to the universal affirmative, signify the same thing as enunciations with a
finite subject; i.e., "Not every non-man is just” and "No non-man is
just,” do not signify the same thing as any of those with a finite subject.
This is evident from the diversity of subject in the latter and the former.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 4 n. 7Deinde cum dicit: illa vero quae est etc., respondet
quintae quaestioni, an scilicet inter enunciationes de subiecto infinito sit
aliqua consequentia. Oritur autem dubitatio haec ex eo, quod superius est inter
eas ad invicem assignata consequentia. Ait ergo quod etiam inter istas est
consequentia. Nam universalis affirmativa de subiecto, et praedicato infinitis
et universalis negativa de subiecto infinito, praedicato vero finito,
aequipollent. Ista namque, omnis non homo est non iustus, idem significat illi,
nullus non homo est iustus. Idem autem est iudicium de particularibus
indefinitis et singularibus similibus supradictis. Cuiuscunque enim quantitatis
sint, semper affirmativa de utroque extremo infinita et negativa subiecti
quidem infiniti, praedicati autem finiti, aequipollent, ut facile potes
exemplis videre. Unde Aristoteles universales exprimens, caeteras ex illis
intelligi voluit. When he says, But "Every non-man is non-just” signifies
the same thing as "No non-man is just,” he answers a fifth difficulty,
i.e., is there a consequence among enunciations with an infinite subject? This
question arises from the fact that consequences were assigned among them
earlier.” He says, therefore, that there is a consequence even among these, for
the universal affirmative with an infinite subject and predicate and the
universal negative with an infinite subject but a finite predicate are
equivalent, i.e., "Every non-man is non-just” signifies the same thing as
"No non-man is just.” This is also the case in particular infinites and
singulars which are similar to the foresaid, for no matter what their quantity,
the affirmative with both extremes infinite and the negative with an infinite
subject and a finite predicate are always equivalent, as may be easily seen by
examples. Hence, Aristotle in giving the universals intends the others to be
understood from these. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 4 n. 8Deinde cum dicit: transposita vero
nomina etc., solvit sextam dubitationem, an propter nominum vel verborum
transpositionem varietur enunciationis significatio. Oritur autem haec quaestio
ex eo, quod docuit transpositionem negationis variare enunciationis
significationem. Aliud enim dixit significare, omnis homo non est iustus, et
aliud, non omnis homo est iustus. Ex hoc, inquam, dubitatur, an similiter
contingat circa nominum transpositionem, quod ipsa transposita enunciationem
varient, sicut negatio transposita. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ponit
solutionem dicens, quod transposita nomina et verba idem significant: verbi
gratia, idem significat, est albus homo, et, est homo albus, ubi est
transpositio nominum. Similiter transposita verba idem significant, ut, est albus
homo, et, homo albus est. When he says, When the names and verbs are
transposed, the enunciations signify the same thing, etc., he resolves a sixth
difficulty: whether the signification of the enunciation is varied because of
the transposition of names or verbs. This question arises from his having shown
that the transposition of the negation varies the signification of the
enunciation. "Every man is non-just,” he said, does not signify the same
thing as "Not every man is just.” This raises the question as to whether a
similar thing happens when we transpose names. Would this vary the enunciation
as the transposed negation does? First he states the solution, saying that
transposed names and verbs signify the same thing, e.g., "Man is white”
signifies the same thing as "White is man.” Transposed verbs also signify
the same thing, as in "Man is white” and "Man white is.” Cajetanus
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 9Deinde cum dicit: nam si hoc non est etc., probat praedictam
solutionem ex numero negationum contradictoriarum ducendo ad impossibile, tali
ratione. Si hoc non est, idest si nomina transposita diversificant
enunciationem, eiusdem affirmationis erunt duae negationes; sed ostensum est in
I libro, quod una tantum est negatio unius affirmationis; ergo a destructione
consequentis ad destructionem antecedentis transposita nomina non variant
enunciationem. Ad probationis autem consequentiae claritatem formetur figura,
ubi ex uno latere locentur ambae suprapositae affirmationes, transpositis
nominibus; et ex altero contraponantur duae negativae, similes illis quoad
terminos et eorum positiones. Deinde, aliquantulo interiecto spatio, sub
affirmativis ponatur affirmatio infiniti subiecti, et sub negativis illius
negatio. Et notetur contradictio inter primam affirmationem et duas negationes
primas, et inter secundam affirmationem et omnes tres negationes, ita tamen
quod inter ipsam et infimam negationem notetur contradictio non vera, sed
imaginaria. Notetur quoque contradictio inter tertiam affirmationem et tertiam
negationem inter se. Hoc modo: (Figura). His ita dispositis, probat
consequentiam Aristoteles sic. Illius affirmationis, est albus homo, negatio
est, non est albus homo; illius autem secundae affirmationis, quae est, est
homo albus, si ista affirmatio non est eadem illi supradictae affirmationi,
scilicet, est albus homo, propter nominum transpositionem, negatio erit altera
istarum, scilicet aut, non est non homo albus, aut, non est homo albus. Sed
utraque habet affirmationem oppositam alia ab illa assignatam, scilicet, est
homo albus. Nam altera quidem dictarum negationum, scilicet, non est non homo
albus, negatio est illius quae dicit, est non homo albus; alia vero, scilicet,
non est homo albus, negatio est eius affirmationis, quae dicit, est albus homo,
quae fuit prima affirmatio. Ergo quaecunque dictarum negationum afferatur
contradictoria illi mediae, sequitur quod sint duae unius, idest quod unius
negationis sint duae affirmationes, et quod unius affirmationis sint duae
negationes: quod est impossibile. Et hoc, ut dictum est, sequitur stante
hypothesi erronea, quod illae affirmationes sint propter nominum transpositionem
diversae. Then he proves the solution from the number of contradictory
negations when he says, For if this is not the case there will be more than one
negation of the same enunciation, etc. He does this by a reduction to the
impossible and his reasoning is as follows. If this is not so, i.e., if
transposed names diversify enunciations, there will be two negations of the
same affirmation. But in the first book it was shown that there is only one
negation of one affirmation. Going, then, from the destruction of the
consequent to the destruction of the antecedent, transposed names do not vary
the enunciation. To clarify the proof of the consequent, make a figure in which
both of the affirmations posited above, with the names transposed are located
on one side. Put the two negatives similar to them in respect to terms and
position on the opposite side. Then leaving a little space, under the
affirmatives put the affirmation with an infinite subject and under the
negatives the negation of it. Mark the contradiction between the first
affirmation and the first two negations and between the second affirmation and
all three negations, but in the latter case mark the contradiction between it
and the lowest negation as not true but imaginary. Mark, also, the
contradiction between the third affirmation and negation. (1) Man is white - contradictories
- Man is not white (2) White is man – contradictories - White is not man (3)
Non-man is white - contradictories - Non-man is not white Now we can see how
Aristotle proves the consequent. The negation of the affirmation "Man is
white” is "Man is not white.” But if the second affirmation, "White
is man,” is not the same as "Man is white,” because of the transposition
of the names, its negation, [i.e., of "White is man”] will be either of
these two: "Non-man is not white,” or "White is not man.” But each of
these has another opposed affirmation than that assigned, namely, than "White
is man.” For one of the negations, namely, "Non-man is not white,” is the
negation of "Non-man is white”; the other, "White is not man” is the
negation of the affirmation "Man is white,” which was the first
affirmation. Therefore whatever negation is given as contradictory to the
middle enunciation, it follows that there are two of one, i.e., two
affirmations of one negation, and two negations of one affirmation, which is
impossible. And this, as has been said, follows upon an erroneously set up
hypothesis, i.e., that these affirmations are diverse because of the
transposition of names. 10 Adverte hic primo quod Aristoteles per illas duas
negationes, non est non homo albus, et, non est homo albus, sub disiunctione
sumptas ad inveniendam negationem illius affirmationis, est homo albus,
caeteras intellexit, quasi diceret: aut negatio talis affirmationis
acceptabitur illa quae est vere eius negatio, aut quaecunque extranea negatio
ponetur; et quodlibet dicatur, semper, stante hypothesi, sequitur unius
affirmationis esse plures negationes, unam veram quae est contradictoria suae
comparis habentis nomina transposita, et alteram quam tu ut distinctam
acceptas, vel falso imaginaris; et e contra multarum affirmationum esse unicam
negationem, ut patet in opposita figura. Ex quacunque enim illarum quatuor
incipias, duas sibi oppositas aspicis. Unde notanter concludit indeterminate:
quare erunt duae unius. Notice first that Aristotle through these two
negations, "Non-man is not white” and "White is not man,” taken under
disjunction to find the negation of the affirmation "Man is white,” has
comprehended other things. It is as though he said: The negation which will be
taken will either be the true negation of such an affirmation or some
extraneous negation; and whichever is taken, it always follows, given the
hypothesis, that there are many negations of one affirmation—one which is the
contradictory of it, having equal truth with the one having its name
transposed, and the other which you accept as distinct, or you imagine falsely.
And conversely, there is a single negation of many affirmations, as is clear in
the diagram. Hence, from whichever of these four you begin, you see two opposed
to it. It is significant, therefore, that Aristotle concludes indeterminately:
Therefore, there will be two [negations] of one [affirmation]. 11 Nota secundo
quod Aristoteles contempsit probare quod contradictoria primae affirmationis
sit contradictoria secundae, et similiter quod contradictoria secundae
affirmationis sit contradictoria primae. Hoc enim accepit tamquam per se notum,
ex eo quod non possunt simul esse verae neque simul falsae, ut manifeste patet
praeposito sibi termino singulari. Non stant enim simul aliquo modo istae duae,
Socrates est albus homo, Socrates non est homo albus. Nec turberis quod eas non
singulares proposuit. Noverat enim supra dictum esse in primo quae affirmatio
et negatio sint contradictoriae et quae non, et ideo non fuit sollicitus de
exemplorum claritate. Liquet ergo ex eo quod negationes affirmationum de
nominibus transpositis non sunt diversae quod nec ipsae affirmationes sunt
diversae et sic nomina et verba transposita idem significant. Note secondly
that Aristotle does not consider it important to prove that the contradictory
of the first affirmation is the contradictory of the second, and similarly that
the contradictory of the second affirmation is the contradictory of the first.
This he accepts as self-evident since they can neither be true at the same time
nor false at the same time. This is manifestly clear when a singular term is
placed first, for "Socrates is a white man” and "Socrates is not a
white man” cannot be maintained at the same time in any mode. You should not be
disturbed by the fact that he does not propose these singulars here, for he was
undoubtedly aware that he had already stated in the first book which
affirmation and negation are contradictories and which not and for this reason
felt that a careful elaboration of the examples was not necessary here. It is
therefore evident that since negations of affirmations with transposed names
are not diverse the affirmations themselves are not diverse, and hence
transposed names and verbs signify the same thing. 12 Occurrit autem dubium
circa hoc, quia non videtur verum quod nominibus transpositis eadem sit affirmatio.
Non enim valet: omnis homo est animal; ergo omne animal est homo. Similiter,
transposito verbo, non valet: homo est animal rationale; ergo homo animal
rationale est, de secundo adiacente. Licet enim nugatio committatur, tamen non
sequitur primam. Ad hoc est dicendum quod sicut in rebus naturalibus est duplex
transmutatio, scilicet localis, scilicet de loco ad locum, et formalis de forma
ad formam; ita in enunciationibus est duplex transmutatio, situalis scilicet,
quando terminus praepositus postponitur, et e converso, et formalis, quando
terminus, qui erat praedicatum efficitur subiectum, et e converso vel
quomodolibet, simpliciter et cetera. Et sicut quandoque fit in naturalibus
transmutatio pure localis, puta quando res transfertur de loco ad locum, nulla
alia variatione facta; quandoque autem fit transmutatio secundum locum, non
pura sed cum variatione formali, sicut quando transit de loco frigido ad locum
calidum: ita in enunciationibus quandoque fit transmutatio pure situalis,
quando scilicet nomen vel verbum solo situ vocali variatur; quandoque autem fit
transmutatio situalis et formalis simul, sicut contingit cum praedicatum fit
subiectum, vel cum verbum tertium adiacens fit secundum. Et quoniam hic
intendit Aristoteles de transmutatione nominum et verborum pure situali, ut
transpositionis vocabulum praesefert, ideo dixit quod transposita nomina et
verba idem significant, insinuare volens quod, si nihil aliud praeter
transpositionem nominis vel verbi accidat in enunciatione, eadem manet oratio.
Unde patet responsio ad instantias. Manifestum est namque quod in utraque non
sola transpositio fit, sed transmutatio de subiecto in praedicatum, vel de
tertio adiacente in secundum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad similia. A doubt
does arise, however, about the point Aristotle is making here, for it does not
seem true that with transposed names the affirmation is the same. This, for
example, is not valid: "Every man is an animal”; therefore, "Every
animal is a man.” Nor is the following example with a transposed verb valid:
"Man is a rational animal and (taking "is” as the second element),
therefore "Man animal rational is”; for although it is nugatory as a whole
combination, nevertheless it does not follow upon the first. The answer to this
is as follows. just as there is a twofold transmutation in natural things,
i.e., local, from place to place, and formal, from form to form, so in
enunciations there is a twofold transmutation: a positional transmutation when
a term placed before is placed after, and conversely, and a formal
transmutation when a term that was a predicate is made a subject, and
conversely, or in whatever mode, simply, etc. And just as in natural things
sometimes a purely local transmutation is made (for instance, when a thing is
transferred from place to place, with no other variation made) and sometimes a
transmutation is made according to place—not simply but with a formal variation
(as when a thing passes from a cold place to a hot place), so in enunciations a
transmutation is sometimes made which is purely positional, i.e., when the name
and verb are varied only in vocal position, and sometimes a transmutation is
made which is at once formal and positional, as when the predicate becomes the
subject, or the verb which is the third element added becomes the second.
Aristotle’s purpose here was to treat of the purely positional transmutation of
names and verbs, as the vocabulary of the transposition indicates; when he
says, then, that transposed names and verbs signify the same thing, he intends
to imply that if nothing other than the transposition of name and verb takes
place in the enunciation, what is said remains the same. Hence, the response to
the present objection is clear, for in both examples there is not only a
transposition but a transmutation of subject to predicate in one case, and from
an enunciation with a third element to one with a second element in the other.
The response to similar questions is evident from this. V. 1. Postquam
Aristoteles determinavit diversitatem enunciationis unius provenientem ex
additione negationis infinitatis, hic intendit determinare quid accidat
enunciationi ex hoc quod additur aliquid subiecto vel praedicato tollens eius
unitatem. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia primo, determinat diversitatem earum; secundo,
consequentias earum; ibi: quoniam vero haec quidem et cetera. Circa primum duo
facit: primo, ponit earum diversitatem; secundo, probat omnes enunciationes
esse plures; ibi: si ergo dialectica et cetera. Dicit ergo quoad primum,
resumendo quod in primo dictum fuerat, quod affirmare vel negare unum de
pluribus, vel plura de uno, si ex illis pluribus non fit unum, non est
enunciatio una affirmativa vel negativa. Et declarando quomodo intelligatur
unum debere esse subiectum aut praedicatum, subdit quod unum dico non si nomen
unum impositum sit, idest ex unitate nominis, sed ex unitate significati. Cum
enim plura conveniunt in uno nomine, ita quod ex eis non fiat unum illius
nominis significatum, tunc solum vocis unitas est. Cum autem unum nomen
pluribus impositum est, sive partibus subiectivis, sive integralibus, ut eadem
significatione concludat, tunc et vocis et significati unitas est, et enunciationis
unitas non impeditur. After the Philosopher has treated the diversity in an
enunciation arising from the addition of the infinite negation, he explains
what happens to an enunciation when something is added to the subject or
predicate which takes away its unity. He first determines their diversity, and
then proves that all the enunciations are many where he says, In fact, if
dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, etc. Secondly, he
determines their consequences, where he says, Some things predicated separately
are such that they unite to form one predicate, etc. He begins by taking up
something he said in the first book: there is not one affirmative enunciation
nor one negative enunciation when one thing is affirmed or denied of many or
many of one, if one thing is not constituted from the many. Then he explains
what he means by the subject or predicate having to be one where he says, I do
not use "one” of those things which, although one name may be imposed, do
not constitute something one, i.e., a subject or predicate is one, not from the
unity of the name, but from the unity of what is signified. For when many
things are brought together under one name in such a way that what is signified
by that name is not one, then the unity is only one of vocal sound. But when
one name has been imposed for many, whether for subjective or for integral
parts, so that it encloses them in the same signification, then there is unity
both of vocal sound and what is signified. In the latter case, unity of the
enunciation is not impeded. 2 Secundum quod subiungit: ut homo est fortasse
animal et mansuetum et bipes obscuritate non caret. Potest enim intelligi ut
sit exemplum ab opposito, quasi diceret: unum dico non ex unitate nominis
impositi pluribus ex quibus non fit tale unum, quemadmodum homo est unum
quoddam ex animali et mansueto et bipede, partibus suae definitionis. Et ne
quis crederet quod hae essent verae definitionis nominis partes, interposuit,
fortasse. Porphyrius autem, Boethio referente et approbante, separat has textus
particulas, dicens quod Aristoteles hucusque declaravit enunciationem illam
esse plures, in qua plura subiicerentur uni, vel de uno praedicarentur plura,
ex quibus non fit unum. In istis autem verbis: ut homo est fortasse etc.,
intendit declarare enunciationem aliquam esse plures, in qua plura ex quibus
fit unum subiiciuntur vel praedicantur; sicut cum dicitur, homo est animal et
mansuetum et bipes, copula interiecta, vel morula, ut oratores faciunt. Ideo
autem addidisse aiunt, fortasse, ut insinuaret hoc contingere posse,
necessarium autem non esse. Then he adds, For example, man probably is an
animal and biped and civilized. This, however, is obscure, for it can be
understood as all example of the opposite, as if he were saying, "I do not
mean by ‘one’ such a ‘one’ as the unity of the name imposed upon many from
which one thing is not constituted, for instance, ‘man’ as ‘one’ from the parts
of the definition, animal and civilized and biped.” And to prevent anyone from
thinking these are true parts of the definition of the name he interposes
perhaps. Porphyry, however, referred to with approval by Boethius, separates
these parts of the text. He says Aristotle first states that that enunciation
is many in which many are subjected to one, or many are predicated of one, when
one thing is not constituted from these. And when he says, For example, man
perhaps is, etc., he intends to show that an enunciation is many when many from
which one thing is constituted are subjected or predicated, as in the example
"Man is an animal and civilized and biped,” with copulas interjected or a
pause such as orators make. He added perhaps, they say, to imply that this
could happen, but it need not. 3 Possumus in eamdem Porphyrii, Boethii et
Alberti sententiam incidentes subtilius textum introducere, ut quatuor hic
faciat. Et primo quidem, resumit quae sit enunciatio in communi dicens:
enunciatio plures est, in qua unum de pluribus, vel plura de uno enunciantur.
Si tamen ex illis pluribus non fit unum, ut in primo dictum et expositum fuit.
Deinde dilucidat illum terminum de uno, sive unum, dicens: dico autem unum, idest,
unum nomen voco, non propter unitatem vocis, sed significationis, ut supra
dictum est. Deinde tertio, dividendo declarat, et declarando dividit, quot
modis contingit unum nomen imponi pluribus ex quibus non fit unum, ut ex hoc
diversitatem enunciationis multiplicis insinuet. Et ponit duos modos, quorum
prior est, quando unum nomen imponitur pluribus ex quibus fit unum, non tamen
in quantum ex eis fit unum. Tunc enim, licet materialiter et per accidens
loquendo nomen imponatur pluribus ex quibus fit unum, formaliter tamen et per
se loquendo nomen unum imponitur pluribus, ex quibus non fit unum: quia
imponitur eis non in quantum ex eis est unum, ut fortasse est hoc nomen, homo,
impositum ad significandum animal et mansuetum et bipes, idest, partes suae definitionis,
non in quantum adunantur in unam hominis naturam per modum actus et potentiae,
sed ut distinctae sint inter se actualitates. Et insinuavit quod accipit partes
definitionis ut distinctas per illam coniunctionem, et per illud quoque
adversative additum: sed si ex his unum fit, quasi diceret, cum hoc tamen stat
quod ex eis unum fit. Addidit autem, fortasse, quia hoc nomen, homo, non est
impositum ad significandum partes sui definitivas, ut distinctae sunt. Sed si
impositum esset aut imponeretur, esset unum nomen pluribus impositum ex quibus
non fit unum. Et quia idem iudicium est de tali nomine, et illis pluribus; ideo
similiter illae plures partes definitivae possunt dupliciter accipi. Uno modo,
per modum actualis et possibilis, et sic unum faciunt; et sic formaliter
loquendo vocantur plura, ex quibus fit unum, et pronunciandae sunt continuata
oratione, et faciunt enunciationem unam dicendo, animal rationale mortale
currit. Est enim ista una sicut et ista, homo currit. Alio modo, accipiuntur
praedictae definitionis partes ut distinctae sunt inter se actualitates, et sic
non faciunt unum: ex duobus enim actibus ut sic, non fit unum, ut dicitur VII
metaphysicae; et sic faciunt enunciationes plures et pronunciandae sunt vel cum
pausa, vel coniunctione interposita, dicendo, homo est animal et mansuetum et
bipes; sive, homo est animal, mansuetum, bipes, rhetorico more. Quaelibet enim
istarum est enunciatio multiplex. Et similiter ista, Socrates est homo, si homo
est impositum ad illa, ut distinctae actualitates sunt, significandum. Secundus
autem modus, quo unum nomen impositum est pluribus ex quibus non fit unum,
subiungitur, cum dicit: ex albo autem et homine et ambulante etc., idest, alio
modo hoc fit, quando unum nomen imponitur pluribus, ex quibus non potest fieri
unum, qualia sunt: homo, album, et ambulans. Cum enim ex his nullo modo possit
fieri aliqua una natura, sicut poterat fieri ex partibus definitivis, clare
liquet quod nomen aliquod si eis imponeretur, esset nomen non unum significans,
ut in primo dictum fuit de hoc nomine, tunica, imposito homini et equo. While
agreeing with the opinion of Porphyry, Boethius, and Albert, we think a more
subtle construction can be made of the text. According to it Aristotle makes
four points here. First, he reviews what an enunciation is in general when he
says, The enunciation is many in which one is enunciated of many or many of
one, unless from the many something one is constituted... as he stated and
explained in the first book. Secondly, he clarifies the term "one,” when
he says, I do not use "one” of those things, etc., i.e., I call a name
one, not by reason of the unity of vocal sound, but of signification, as was
said above. Thirdly, he manifests (by dividing) and divides (by manifesting)
the number of ways in which one name may be imposed on many things from which
one thing is not constituted. From this he implies the diversity of the
multiple enunciation. And he posits two ways in which one name may be imposed
on many things from which one thing is not constituted: first, when one name is
imposed upon many things from which one thing is constituted but not as one
thing is constituted from them. In this case, materially and accidentally
speaking, the name is imposed on many from which one thing is constituted, but
it is formally and per se imposed on many from which one thing is not
constituted; for it is not imposed upon them in the respect in which they
constitute one thing; as perhaps the name "man” is imposed to signify
animal and civilized and biped (i.e., parts of its definition) not as they are
united in the one nature of man in the mode of act and potency, but as they are
themselves distinct actualities. Aristotle implies that he is taking these
parts of the definition as distinct by the conjunctions and by also adding
adversatively, but if there is something one formed from these, Neither the
Greek nor the Latin text of Aristotle has the "if” that Cajetan puts into
this phrase.The correct reading is "...but there is something one formed
from these.” Close as if to say, "when however it holds that one thing is
constituted from these.” He adds perhaps because the name "man” is not
imposed to signify its definitive parts as they are distinct. But if it had
been so imposed or were imposed, it would be one name imposed on many things
from which no one thing is constituted. And since the judgment with respect to
such a name and those many things is the same, the many definitive parts can
also be taken in two ways: first, in the mode of the actual and possible, and
thus they constitute one thing, and formally speaking are called many from
which one thing is constituted, and they are to be pronounced in continuous
speech and they make one enunciation, for example, "A mortal rational
animal is running.” For this is one enunciation, just as is "Man is
running.” In the second way, the foresaid parts of the definition are taken as
they are distinct actualities, and thus they do not constitute one thing, for
one thing is not constituted from two acts as such, as Aristotle says in VII
Metaphysicae [13: 1039a 5]. In this case they constitute many enunciations and
are pronounced either with conjunctions interposed or with a pause in the
rhetorical manner, for example, "Man is an animal and civilized and biped”
or "Man is an animal–civilized–biped.” Each of these is a multiple
enunciation. And so is the enunciation, "Socrates is a man” if "man”
is imposed to signify animal, civilized, and biped as they are distinct
actualities. Aristotle takes up the second way in which one name is imposed on
many from which one thing is not constituted where he says, whereas from
"white” and "man” and "walking” there is not [something one
formed]. Since in no way can any one nature be constituted from "man,”
white,” and "walking” (as there can be from the definitive parts), it is
evident that if a name were imposed on these it would be a name that does not
signify one thing, as was said in the first book of the name "cloak”
imposed for man and horse. 4 Habemus ergo enunciationis pluris seu multiplicis
duos modos, quorum, quia uterque fit dupliciter, efficiuntur quatuor modi.
Primus est, quando subiicitur vel praedicatur unum nomen impositum pluribus, ex
quibus fit unum, non in quantum sunt unum; secundus est, quando ipsa plura ex
quibus fit unum, in quantum sunt distinctae actualitates, subiiciuntur vel
praedicantur; tertius est, quando ibi est unum nomen impositum pluribus ex
quibus non fit unum; quartus est, quando ista plura ex quibus non fit unum,
subiiciuntur vel praedicantur. Et notato quod cum enunciatio secundum membra
divisionis illius, qua divisa est, in unam et plures, quadrupliciter variari
possit, scilicet cum unum de uno praedicatur, vel unum de pluribus, vel plura
de uno, vel plura de pluribus; postremum sub silentio praeterivit, quia vel
eius pluralitas de se clara est, vel quia, ut inquit Albertus, non intendebat
nisi de enunciatione, quae aliquo modo una est, tractare. Demum concludit totam
sententiam, dicens: quare nec si aliquis affirmet unum de his pluribus, erit
affirmatio una secundum rem: sed vocaliter quidem erit una, significative autem
non una, sed multae fient affirmationes. Nec si e converso de uno ista plura
affirmabuntur, fiet affirmatio una. Ista namque, homo est albus, ambulans et
musicus, importat tres affirmationes, scilicet, homo est albus et est ambulans
et est musicus, ut patet ex illius contradictione. Triplex enim negatio illi
opponitur correspondens triplici affirmationi positae. We have, therefore, two
modes of the many (i.e., the multiple enunciation) and since both are
constituted in two ways, there will be four modes: first, when one name imposed
on many from which one thing is constituted is subjected or predicated as
though the name stands for many; the second, when the many from one which one
thing is constituted are subjected or predicated as distinct actualities; the
third, when one name is imposed for a many from which nothing one is
constituted; the fourth, when many which do not constitute one thing are
subjected or predicated. Note that the enunciation, according to the members of
the division by which it has been divided into one and many, can be varied in
four ways, i.e., one is predicated of one, one of many, many of one, and many
of many. Aristotle has not spoken of the last one, either because its plurality
is clear enough or because, as Albert says, he only intends to treat of the
enunciation which is one in some way. Finally [fourthly], he concludes with
this summary: Consequently, if someone affirms something one of these latter
there will not be one affirmation according to the thing: vocally it will be
one; significatively, it will not be one, but many. And conversely, if the many
are affirmed of one subject, there will not be one affirmation. For example,
"Man is white, walking, and musical” implies three affirmations, i.e.,
"Man is white” and "is walking” and "is musical,” as is clear
from its contradiction, for a threefold negation is opposed to it,
corresponding to the threefold affirmation. 5 Deinde cum dicit: si ergo
dialectica etc., probat a posteriori supradictas enunciationes esse plures.
Circa quod duo facit: primo, ponit rationem ipsam ad hoc probandum per modum
consequentiae; deinde probat antecedens dictae consequentiae; ibi: dictum est
autem de his et cetera. Quoad primum talem rationem inducit. Si interrogatio
dialectica est petitio responsionis, quae sit propositio vel altera pars
contradictionis, nulli enunciationum supradictarum interrogative formatae erit
responsio una; ergo nec ipsa interrogatio est una, sed plures. Cuius rationis
primo ponit antecedens: si ergo et cetera. Ad huius intelligendos terminos nota
quod idem sonant enunciatio, interrogatio et responsio. Cum enim dicitur,
caelum est animatum, in quantum enunciat praedicatum de subiecto, enunciatio
vocatur; in quantum autem quaerendo proponitur, interrogatio; ut vero quaesito
redditur, responsio appellatur. Idem ergo erit probare non esse responsionem
unam, et interrogationem non esse unam, et enunciationem non esse unam. Adverte
secundo interrogationem esse duplicem. Quaedam enim est utram partem
contradictionis eligendam proponens; et haec vocatur dialectica, quia
dialecticus habet viam ex probabilibus ad utramque contradictionis partem
probandam. Altera vero determinatam ad unum responsionem exoptat; et haec est interrogatio
demonstrativa, eo quod demonstrator in unum determinate tendit. Considera
ulterius quod interrogationi dialecticae dupliciter responderi potest. Uno
modo, consentiendo interrogationi, sive affirmative sive negative; ut si quis
petat, caelum est animatum? Et respondeatur, est; vel, Deus non movetur? Et
respondeatur, non: talis responsio vocatur propositio. Alio modo, potest
responderi interimendo; ut si quis petat, caelum est animatum? Et respondeatur,
non; vel Deus non movetur? Et respondeatur, movetur: talis responsio vocatur
contradictionis altera pars, eo quod affirmationi negatio redditur et negationi
affirmatio. Interrogatio ergo dialectica est petitio annuentis responsionis,
quae est propositio, vel contradicentis, quae est altera pars contradictionis
secundum supradictam Boethii expositionem. Then when he says, In fact, if
dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, etc., he proves a
posteriori that the foresaid enunciations are many. First he states an argument
to prove this by way of the consequent; then he proves the antecedent of the
given consequent where he says, But we have spoken about these things in the
Topics, etc. Now if dialectical questioning is a request for an answer, either
a proposition or one part of a contradiction, none of the foresaid
enunciations, put in the form of a question, will have one answer. Therefore,
the question is not one, but many. Aristotle first states the antecedent of the
argument, if dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, etc. To
understand this it should be noted that an enunciation, a question, and an
answer sound the same. For when we say, "The region of heaven is
animated,” we call it an enunciation inasmuch as it enunciates a predicate of a
subject, but when it is proposed to obtain an answer we call it an
interrogation, and as applied to what was asked we call it a response.
Therefore, to prove that there is not one response or one question or one
enunciation will be the same thing. It should also be noted that interrogation
is twofold. One proposes either of the two parts of a contradiction to choose
from. This is called dialectical interrogation because the dialectician knows
the way to prove either part of a contradiction from probable positions. The
other kind of interrogation seeks one determinate response. This is the
demonstrative interrogation, for the demonstrator proceeds determinately toward
a single alternative. Note, finally, that it is possible to reply to a
dialectical question in two ways. We may consent to the question, either
affirmatively or negatively; for example, when someone asks, "Is the
region of heaven animated,” we may respond, "It is,” or to the question
"Is not God moved,” we may say, "No.” Such a response is called a
proposition. The second way of replying is by destroying; for example, when
someone asks "Is the region of heaven animated?” and we respond,
"No,” or to the question, "Is not God moved?” we respond, "He is
moved.” Such a response is called the other part of a contradiction, because a negation
is given to an affirmation and an affirmation to a negation. Dialectical
interrogation, then, according to the exposition just given, which is that of
Boethius, is a request for the admission of a response which is a proposition,
or which is one part of a contradiction. 6 Deinde subdit probationem
consequentiae, cum ait: propositio vero unius contradictionis est et cetera.
Ubi notandum est quod si responsio dialectica posset esse plures, non
sequeretur quod responsio enunciationis multiplicis non posset esse dialectica;
sed si responsio dialectica non potest esse nisi una enunciatio, tunc recte
sequitur quod responsio enunciationis pluris, non est responsio dialectica,
quae una est. Notandum etiam quod si enunciatio aliqua plurium contradictionum pars
est, una non esse comprobatur: una enim uni tantum contradicit. Si autem unius
solum contradictionis pars est, una est eadem ratione, quia scilicet unius
affirmationis unica est negatio, et e converso. Probat ergo Aristoteles
consequentiam ex eo quod propositio, idest responsio dialectica unius
contradictionis est, idest una enunciatio est affirmativa vel negativa. Ex hoc
enim, ut iam dictum est, sequitur quod nullius enunciationis multiplicis sit
responsio dialectica, et consequenter nec una responsio sit. Nec praetereas
quod cum propositionem, vel alteram partem contradictionis, responsionemque
praeposuerit dialecticae interrogationis, de sola propositione subiunxit, quod
est una; quod ideo fecit, quia illius alterius vocabulum ipsum unitatem
praeferebat. Cum enim alteram contradictionis partem audis, unam affirmationem
vel negationem statim intelligis. Adiunxit autem antecedenti ly ergo, vel
insinuans hoc esse aliunde sumptum, ut postmodum in speciali explicabit, vel,
permutato situ, notam consequentiae huius inter antecedens et consequens
locandam, antecedenti praeposuit; sicut si diceretur, si ergo Socrates currit,
movetur; pro eo quod dici deberet, si Socrates currit, ergo movetur. Sequitur
deinde consequens: non erit una responsio ad hoc; et infert principalem
conclusionem subdens, quod neque una erit interrogatio et cetera. Si enim
responsio non potest esse una, nec interrogatio ipsa una erit. He adds the
proof of the consequent when he says, and a proposition is a part of one
contradiction. In relation to this it should be noted that if a dialectical
response could be many, it would not follow that a response to a multiple
enunciation would not be dialectical. However, if the dialectical response can
only be one enunciation then it follows that a response to a plural enunciation
is not a dialectical response, for it is one [i.e., it inclines to one part of
a contradiction at a time]. It should also be noted that if an enunciation is a
part of many contradictions, it is thereby proven not to be one, for one
contradicts only one. But if an enunciation is a part of only one
contradiction, it is one by the same reasoning, i.e., because there is only one
negation of one affirmation, and conversely. Hence Aristotle proves the
consequent from the fact that the proposition, i.e., the dialectical response,
is a part of one contradiction, i.e., it is one affirmative or one negative
enunciation. It follows from this, as has been said, that there is no
dialectical response of a multiple enunciation, and consequently not one
response. It should not be overlooked that when he designates a proposition or
one part of a contradiction as the response to a dialectical interrogation, it
is only of the proposition that he adds that it is one, because the very
wording shows the unity of the other. For when you hear one part of a
contradiction, you immediately understand one affirmation or negation. He puts
the "therefore” with the antecedent, either implying that this is taken
from another place and he will explain in particular afterward, or having
changed the structure, he places the sign of the consequent, which should be
between the antecedent and consequent before the antecedent, as when one says,
"Therefore if Socrates runs, he is moved,” for "If Socrates runs,
therefore he is moved.” Then the consequent follows: there will not be one
answer to this, etc.; and the inference of the principal conclusion, for there
would not be a single question. For if the response cannot be one, the question
will not be one. 7 Quod autem addidit: nec si sit vera, eiusmodi est. Posset
aliquis credere, quod licet interrogationi pluri non possit dari responsio una,
quando id de quo quaestio fit non potest de omnibus illis pluribus affirmari
vel negari (ut cum quaeritur, canis est animal? Quia non potest vere de omnibus
responderi, est, propter caeleste sidus, nec vere de omnibus responderi, non
est, propter canem latrabilem, nulla possit dari responsio una); attamen quando
id quod sub interrogatione cadit potest vere de omnibus affirmari aut negari,
tunc potest dari responsio una; ut si quaeratur, canis est substantia? Quia
potest vere de omnibus responderi, est, quia esse substantiam omnibus canibus
convenit, unica responsio dari possit. Hanc erroneam existimationem removet
dicens: nec si sit vera, idest, et dato quod responsio data enunciationi
multiplici de omnibus verificetur, nihilominus non est una, quia unum non
significat, nec unius contradictionis est pars, sed plures responsio illa habet
contradictorias, ut de se patet. He adds, even if there is a true answer,
because someone might think that although one response cannot be given to a
plural interrogation when the question concerns something that cannot be
affirmed or denied of all of the many (for example, when someone asks, "Is
a dog an animal?” no one response can be given, for we cannot truly say of
every dog that it is an animal because of the star by that name; nor can we
truly say of every dog that it is not an animal, because of the barking dog),
nevertheless one response could be given when that which falls tinder the
interrogation can be truly said of all. For example, when someone asks,
"Is a dog a substance?” a single response can be given because it can
truly he said of every dog that it is a substance, for to be a substance belongs
to all dogs. Aristotle adds the phrase, even if there is a true answer, to
remove such an erroneous judgment. For even if the response to the multiple
enunciation is verified of all, it is nonetheless not one, since it does not
signify one thing, nor is it a part of one contradiction. Rather, as is
evident, this response has many contradictories. 8 Deinde cum dicit: dictum est
autem de his in Topicis etc., probat antecedens dupliciter: primo, auctoritate
eorum quae dicta sunt in Topicis; secundo, a signo. Et circa hoc duo facit.
Primo, ponit ipsum signum, dicens: quod similiter etc., cum auctoritate
topicorum, manifestum est, scilicet, antecedens assumptum, scilicet quod
dialectica interrogatio est petitio responsionis affirmativae vel negativae.
Quoniam nec ipsum quid est, idest ex eo quod nec ipsa quaestio quid est, est
interrogatio dialectica: verbi gratia; si quis quaerat, quid est animal? Talis
non quaerit dialectice. Deinde subiungit probationem assumpti, scilicet quod
ipsum quid est, non est quaestio dialectica; et intendit quod quia interrogatio
dialectica optionem respondenti offerre debet, utram velit contradictionis
partem, et ipsa quaestio quid est talem libertatem non proponit (quia cum
dicimus, quid est animal? Respondentem ad definitionis assignationem
coarctamus, quae non solum ad unum determinata est, sed etiam omni parte
contradictionis caret, cum nec esse, nec non esse dicat); ideo ipsa quaestio
quid est, non est dialectica interrogatio. Unde dicit: oportet enim ex data,
idest ex proposita interrogatione dialectica, hunc respondentem eligere posse
utram velit contradictionis partem, quam contradictionis utramque partem
interrogantem oportet determinare, idest determinate proponere, hoc modo: utrum
hoc animal sit homo an non: ubi evidenter apparet optionem respondenti offerri.
Habes ergo pro signo cum quaestio dialectica petat responsionem propositionis,
vel alterius contradictionis partem, elongationem quaestionis quid est a
quaestionibus dialecticis. Where he says, But we have spoken about these things
in the Topics, etc., he proves the antecedent in two ways. First, he proves it
on the basis of what was said in the Topics; secondly, by a sign. The sign is
given first where he says, Similarly it is clear that the question "What
is it?” is not a dialectical one, etc. That is, given the doctrine in the
Topics, it is clear (i.e., assuming the antecedent that the dialectical
interrogation is a request for an affirmative or negative response) that the
question "What is it?” is not a dialectical interrogation, e.g., when
someone asks, "What is an animal?” he does not interrogate dialectically.
Secondly, he gives the proof of what was assumed, namely, that the question
"What is it?” is not a dialectical question. He states that a dialectical
interrogation must offer to the one responding the option of whichever part of
the contradiction he wishes. The question "What is it?” does not offer
such liberty, for in saying "What is an animal?” the one responding is
forced to assign a definition, and a definition is not only determined to one
but is also entirely devoid of contradiction, since it affirms neither being
nor non-being. Therefore, the question "What is it?” is not a dialectical
interrogation. Whence he says, For the dialectical interrogation must provide,
i.e., from the proposed dialectical interrogation the one responding must be
able to choose whichever part of the contradiction he wishes, which parts of
the contradiction the interrogator must specify, i.e., he must propose the
question in this way: "Is this animal man or not?” wherein the wording of
the question clearly offers an option to the one answering. Therefore, you have
as a sign that a dialectical question is seeking a response of a proposition or
of one part of a contradiction, the setting apart of the question "What is
it?” from dialectical questions. VI. 1 Postquam declaravit diversitatem
multiplicis enunciationis, intendit determinare de earum consequentiis. Et
circa hoc duo facit, secundum duas dubitationes quas solvit. Secunda incipit;
ibi: verum autem est dicere et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit
quaestionem; secundo, ostendit rationabilitatem quaestionis; ibi: si enim
quoniam etc.; tertio, solvit eam; ibi: eorum igitur et cetera. Est ergo
dubitatio prima: quare ex aliquibus divisim praedicatis de uno sequitur
enunciatio, in qua illamet unita praedicantur de eodem, et ex aliquibus non.
Unde haec diversitas oritur? Verbi gratia; ex istis, Socrates est animal et est
bipes; sequitur, ergo Socrates est animal bipes; et similiter ex istis,
Socrates est homo et est albus; sequitur, ergo Socrates est homo albus. Ex
illis vero, Socrates est bonus, et est citharoedus; non sequitur, ergo est
bonus citharoedus. Unde proponens quaestionem inquit: quoniam vero haec,
scilicet praedicta, ita praedicantur composita, idest coniuncta, ut unum sit
praedicamentum quae extra praedicantur, idest, ut ex eis extra praedicatis
unite fiat praedicatio, alia vero praedicata non sunt talia, quae est inter
differentia; unde talis innascitur diversitas? Et subdit exempla iam adducta,
et ad propositum applicata: quorum primum continet praedicata ex quibus fit
unum per se, scilicet, animal et bipes, genus et differentia; secundum autem
praedicata ex quibus fit unum per accidens, scilicet, homo albus; tertium vero
praedicata ex quibus neque unum per se neque unum per accidens inter se fieri
sequitur; ut, citharoedus et bonus, ut declarabitur. Having explained the
diversity of the multiple enunciation Aristotle now proposes to determine the
consequences of this. He treats this in relation to two questions which he
solves. The second begins where he says, On the other hand, it is also true to
say predicates of something singly, etc. With respect to the other question,
first he proposes it, then he shows that the question is a reasonable one where
he says, For if we hold that whenever each is truly said of a subject, both
together must also be true, many absurdities will follow, etc. Finally, he
solves it where he says, Those things that are predicated—taken in relation to
that to which they are joined in predication, etc. The first question is this:
Why is it that from some things predicated divisively of a subject an
enunciation follows in which they are predicated of the same subject unitedly,
and from others not? What is the reason for this diversity? For example, from
"Socrates is an animal and he is biped” follows, "Therefore, Socrates
is a biped animal”; and similarly, from "Socrates is a man and he is
white” follows, "Therefore, Socrates is a white man.” But from
"Socrates is good and he is a lute player,” the enunciation,
"Therefore, he is a good lute player” does not follow. Hence in proposing
the question Aristotle says, Some things, i.e., predicates, are so predicated
when combined, that there is one predicate from what is predicated separately,
i.e., from some things that are predicated separately, a united predication is
made but from others this is riot so. What is the difference between these;
whence does such a diversity arise? He adds the examples which we have already
cited and applied to the question. Of these examples, the first contains
predicates from which something one per se is formed, i.e., "animal” and
"biped,” a genus and difference; the second contains predicates from which
something accidentally one is formed, namely, "white man”; the third
contains predicates from which neither one per se nor one accidentally is
formed, "lute player” and "good,” as will be explained. Cajetanus
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 2Deinde cum dicit: si enim quoniam etc., declarat veritatem
diversitatis positae, ex qua rationabilis redditur quaestio: si namque inter
praedicata non esset talis diversitas, irrationabilis esset dubitatio. Ostendit
autem hoc ratione ducente ad inconveniens, nugationem scilicet. Et quia nugatio
duobus modis committitur, scilicet explicite et implicite; ideo primo deducit
ad nugationem explicitam, secundo ad implicitam; ibi: amplius, si Socrateset
cetera. Ait ergo quod si nulla est inter quaecumque praedicata differentia, sed
de quolibet indifferenter censetur quod quia alterutrum separatum dicitur, quod
utrumque coniunctim dicatur, multa inconvenientia sequentur. De aliquo enim
homine, puta Socrate, verum est separatim dicere quod, homo est, et albus est;
quare et omne, idest et coniunctim dicetur, Socrates est homo albus. Rursus et
de eodem Socrate potest dici separatim quod, est homo albus, et quod, est
albus; quare et omne, idest, igitur coniunctim dicetur, Socrates est homo albus
albus: ubi manifesta est nugatio. Rursus si de eodem Socrate iterum dicas
separatim quod, est homo albus albus, verum dices et congrue quod est albus, et
secundum hoc, si iterum hoc repetes separatim, a veritate simili non discedes,
et sic in infinitum sequetur, Socrates est homo albus, albus, albus in
infinitum. Simile quod ostenditur in alio exemplo. Si quis de Socrate dicat
quod, est musicus, albus, ambulans, cum possit et separatim dicere quod, est
musicus, et quod, est albus, et quod, est ambulans; sequetur, Socrates est
musicus, albus, ambulans, musicus, albus, ambulans. Et quia pluries separatim,
in eodem tamen tempore, enunciari potest, procedit nugatio sine fine. Deinde
deducit ad implicitam nugationem, dicens, cum de Socrate vere dici possit
separatim quod, est homo, et quod, est bipes, si coniunctim inferre licet,
sequetur quod, Socrates sit homo bipes. Ubi est implicita nugatio. Bipes enim
circumloquens differentiam hominis actu et intellectu clauditur in hominis
ratione. Unde ponendo loco hominis suam rationem (quod fieri licet, ut docet
Aristoteles II topicorum), apparebit manifeste nugatio. Dicetur enim: Socrates
est homo, idest, animal bipes, bipes. Quoniam ergo plurima inconvenientia
sequuntur si quis ponat complexiones, idest, adunationes praedicatorum fieri
simpliciter, idest, absque diversitate aliqua, manifestum est ex dictis;
quomodo autem faciendum est, nunc, idest, in sequentibus dicemus. Et nota quod
iste textus non habetur uniformiter apud omnes quoad verba, sed quia sententia
non discrepat, legat quicunque ut vult. When he says, For if we hold that
whenever each is truly said of a subject, both together must also be true,
etc., he shows that there truly is such a diversity among predicates and in so
doing renders the question reasonable, for if there were not such a diversity
among predicates the question would be pointless. He shows this by reasoning
lead-ing to an absurdity, i.e., to something nugatory. Now, something nugatory
is effected in two ways, explicitly and implicitly. Therefore, he first makes a
deduction to the explicitly nugatory, secondly to the implicitly, where he
says, Furthermore, if Socrates is Socrates and a man, Socrates is a Socrates
man, etc. If, he says, there is no difference between predicates, and it is
supposed of any of them indifferently that because both are said separately
both may he said conjointly, many absurdities will follow. For of some man, say
Socrates, it is true to say separately that he is a man and he is white;
therefore both -together, i.e., we may also say conjointly, "Socrates is a
white man.” Again, of the same Socrates we can say separately that he is a
white man and that he is white, and both together, i.e., therefore conjointly,
"Socrates is a white white man.” Here the nugatory expression is evident.
Further, if of the same Socrates that you again say separately is a white white
man it will be true and consistent to say that he is white, and according to
this, if again repeating this separately, you will not deviate from a similar
truth, and this will follow to infinity, then Socrates is a white white white
man to infinity. The same thing can be shown by another example, If someone
says of Socrates that he is musical, white, and walking, since it is also
possible to say separately that he is musical, and that he is white, and that
he is walking, it will follow that Socrates is musical, white, walking,
musical, white, walking. And since these can be enunciated many times
separately, yet at the same time, the nugatory statement proceeds without end.
Then he makes a deduction to the implicitly nugatory. Since it can be truly
said of Socrates separately that he is man and that he is biped, it will follow
that Socrates is a biped man, if it is licit to infer conjointly. This is
implicitly nugatory because the "biped,” which indirectly expresses the difference
of man in act and in understanding, is included in the notion of man. Hence, if
we posit the definition of man in place of "man” (which it is licit to do,
as Aristotle teaches in II Topicorum [2: 110a 5]) the nugatory character of the
enunciation will be evident, for when we say "Socrates is a biped man,” we
are saying "Socrates is a biped biped animal.” From what has been said it
is evident that many absurdities follow if anyone proposes that combinations,
i.e., unions of predicates, be made simply, i.e., without any distinction. Now,
i.e., in what follows, we will state how this must be settled. This particular
text is not uniformly worded in the manuscripts, but since no discrepancy of
thought is involved one may read it as he wishes. 3 Deinde cum dicit: eorum
igitur etc., solvit propositam quaestionem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo,
respondet instantiis in ipsa propositione quaestionis adductis; secundo,
satisfacit instantiis in probatione positis; ibi: amplius nec quaecumqueet
cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo namque, declarat veritatem; secundo,
applicat ad propositas instantias; ibi: quocirca et cetera. Determinat ergo
dubitationem tali distinctione. Praedicatorum sive subiectorum plurium duo sunt
genera: quaedam sunt per accidens, quaedam per se. Si per accidens, hoc
dupliciter contingit, vel quia ambo dicuntur per accidens de uno tertio, vel
quia alterum de altero mutuo per accidens praedicatur. Quando illa plura
divisim praedicata sunt per accidens quovis modo, ex eis non sequitur
coniunctim praedicatum; quando autem sunt per se, tum ex eis sequitur coniuncte
praedicatum. Unde continuando se ad praecedentia ait: eorum igitur quae
praedicantur, et de quibus praedicantur, idest subiectorum, quaecumque dicuntur
secundum accidens (et per hoc innuit oppositum membrum, scilicet per se), vel
de eodem, idest accidentaliter concurrunt ad unius tertii denominationem, vel
alterutrum de altero, idest accidentaliter mutuo se denominant (et per hoc
ponit membra duplicis divisionis), haec, scilicet plura per accidens, non erunt
unum, idest non inferent praedicationem coniunctam. When he says, Those things
that are predicated—taken in relation to that to which they are joined in
predication, etc., he solves the proposed question. First he makes an answer
with respect to the instances cited in proposing the question; secondly, he
solves the problem as related to the instances posited in his proof where he
says, Furthermore, predicates that are present in one another cannot be
combined simply. In relation to the first answer, he states the true position
first and then applies it to the instances where he says, This is the reason
"good” and "shoemaker” cannot be combined simply, etc. He settles the
question with this distinction: there are two kinds of multiple predicates and
subjects. Some are accidental, some per se. If they are accidental this occurs
in two ways, either because both are said accidentally of a third thing or
because they are predicated of each other accidentally. Now when the many
predicated divisively are in any way accidental, a conjoined predicate does not
follow from them; but when they are per se, a conjoined predicate does follow
from them. In answering the question, therefore, Aristotle connects what he is
saying with what has gone before: Of those things that are predicated and those
of which they are predicated, i.e., subjects, whichever are said accidentally
(by which he intimates the opposite member, i.e., per se), either of the same
subject, i.e., they unite accidentally for the denomination of one third thing,
or of one another, i.e., they denominate each other accidentally (and by this
he posits the members of a two-fold division), these (i.e., these many
accidentally) will not be one, i.e., do not produce a conjoined predication. 4 Et
explanat utrumque horum exemplariter. Et primo, primum, quando scilicet illa
plura per accidens dicuntur de tertio, dicens: ut si homo albus est et musicus
divisim. Sed non est idem, idest non sequitur adunatim, ergo homo est musicus
albus. Utraque enim sunt accidentia eidem tertio. Deinde explanat secundum,
quando solum illa plura per accidens de se mutuo praedicantur, subdens: nec si
album musicum verum est dicere, idest, et etiamsi de se invicem ista
praedicantur per accidens ratione subiecti in quo uniuntur, ut dicatur, homo
est albus, et est musicus, et album est musicum, non tamen sequitur quod album
musicum unite praedicetur, dicendo, ergo homo est albus musicus. Et causam
assignat, quia album dicitur de musico per accidens, et e converso. He explains
both of these by examples. First, the many said accidentally of a third; for
example, man is white and musical divisively. But they are not the same, i.e.,
it does not follow unitedly that "Man is musical white” for both are
accidental to the same third thing. Then he explains the second member by an
example. In it the many are predicated only of one another. Even if it were
true to say white is musical, i.e., even if these are predicated accidentally
of each other by reason of the subject in which they are united, so that we may
say "Man is white and he is musical, and white is musical,” it still does
not follow that "musical white” is predicated as a unity when we say,
"Therefore, man is musical white.” He gives as the cause of this that "white”
is said of "musical” accidentally and conversely. 5 Notandum est hic quod
cum duo membra per accidens enumerasset, unico tamen exemplo utrumque membrum
explanavit, ut insinuaret quod distinctio illa non erat in diversa praedicata
per accidens, sed in eadem diversimode comparata; album enim et musicum,
comparata ad hominem, sub primo cadunt membro; comparata autem inter se, sub
secundo. Diversitatem ergo comparationis pluralitate membrorum, identitatem
autem praedicatorum unitate exempli astruxit. It must be noted here that
although he has enumerated two accidental members, he explains both members by
this single example so as to imply that the distinction is not one of different
accidental predicates, but of the same predicates compared in different ways.
"White” and "musical” compared to "man” fall under the first
member, but compared with each other, under the second. Hence he has provided
diversity of comparison by the plurality of the members, but identity of
predicates by the unity of the example. 6 Advertendum est ulterius, ad
evidentiam divisionis factae in littera, quod, secundum accidens, potest
dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, ut distinguitur contra perseitatem
posterioristicam, et sic non sumitur hic: quoniam cum dicitur plura praedicata
secundum accidens, aut ly secundum accidens determinaret coniunctionem inter
se, et sic manifeste esset falsa regula; quoniam inter prima praedicata, animal
bipes, seu, animal rationale, est praedicatio secundum accidens hoc modo
(differentia enim in nullo modo perseitatis praedicatur de genere, et tamen
Aristoteles in textu dicit ea non esse praedicata per accidens, et asserit quod
est optima illatio, est animal et bipes, ergo est animal bipes); aut
determinaret coniunctionem illarum ad subiectum, et sic etiam inveniretur
falsitas in regula: bene namque dicitur, paries est coloratus, et est
visibilis, et tamen coloratum visibile non per se inest parieti. Alio modo,
accipitur ly secundum accidens, ut distinguitur contra hoc quod dico, ratione
sui, seu, non propter aliud, et sic idem sonat, quod, per aliud: et hoc modo
accipitur hic. Quaecunque enim sunt talis naturae quod non ratione sui
iunguntur, sed propter aliud, ab illatione coniuncta deficere necesse est, ex
eo quod coniuncta illatio unum alteri substernit, et ratione sui ea adunata
denotat ut potentiam et actum. Est ergo sensus divisionis, quod praedicatorum
plurium, quaedam sunt per accidens, quaedam per se, idest, quaedam adunantur
inter se ratione sui, quaedam propter aliud. Ea quae per se uniuntur inferunt
coniunctum, ea autem quae propter aliud, nequaquam. To make this division
evident it must also be noted that accidentally can be taken in two ways. It
may be taken as it is distinguished from "posterioristic perseity.” This
is not the way it is taken here, for "many predicates accidentally” would
then mean that the "accidentally” determines a conjunction between
predicates, and thus the rule would clearly be false, for the first predicates
he gave as examples are predicated accidentally in this way, namely,
"biped animal,” or "rational animal” (for a difference is not
predicated of a genus in any mode of perseity, and yet Aristotle says in the
text that these are not predicated accidentally, and has asserted that "He
is an animal and biped, therefore he is a biped animal” is a good inference).
Or it would mean that the "accidentally” determines a conjunction of the
predicates with the subject, and thus also the rule would be false, for it is
valid to say, "The wall is colored and it is visible,” yet visible colored
is not per se in the wall. Accidentally” taken in the second way is
distinguished from what I call "on its own account,” i.e., not because of
something else; "accidentally” then means "through another.” This is
the way it is taken here, for whatever are of such a nature that they are
joined because of something else, and not on their own account, do not admit of
conjoined inference, because a conjoined inference subjects one to the other,
and denotes the things united on their own account as potency and act.
Therefore, the sense of the division is this: of many predicates, some are
accidental, some per se, i.e., some are united among themselves on their own
account, some on account of another. Those that are per se united infer
conjointly; those that are united on account of another do not infer conjointly
in any way. 7 Deinde cum dicit: quocirca nec citharoedusetc., applicat
declaratam veritatem ad partes quaestionis. Et primo, ad secundam partem, quia
scilicet non sequitur: est bonus et est citharoedus; ergo est bonus citharoedus,
dicens: quocirca nec citharoedus bonus etc.; secundo, ad aliam partem
quaestionis, quare sequebatur: est animal et est bipes; ergo est animal bipes:
et ait: sed animal bipes et cetera. Et subiungit huius ultimi dicti causam,
quia, animal bipes, non sunt praedicata secundum accidens coniuncta inter se
aut in tertio, sed per se. Et per hoc explanavit alterum membrum primae
divisionis, quod adhuc positum non fuerat explicite. Adverte quod Aristoteles,
eamdem tenens sententiam de citharoedo et bono et musico et albo, conclusit
quod album et musicum non inferunt coniunctum praedicatum; ideo nec citharoedus
et bonus inferunt citharoedus bonus simpliciter, idest coniuncte. Est autem
ratio dicti, quia licet musica et albedo dissimiles sint bonitati et arti
citharisticae in hoc, quod bonitas nata est denominare et subiectum tertium,
puta hominem et ipsam artem citharisticam (propter quod falsitas manifeste
cernitur, quando dicitur: est bonus et citharoedus; ergo bonus citharoedus),
musica vero et albedo subiectum tertium natae sunt denominare tantum, et non se
invicem (propter quod latentior est casus cum proceditur: est albus et est
musicus; ergo est musicus albus), licet, inquam, in hoc sint dissimiles, et
propter istam dissimilitudinem processus Aristotelis minus sufficiens videatur;
attamen similes sunt in hoc quod, si servetur identitas omnimoda praedicatorum
quam servari oportet, si illamet divisa debent inferri coniunctim, sicut musica
non denominat albedinem, neque contra, ita nec bonitas, de qua fit sermo, cum
dicitur, homo est bonus, denominat artem citharisticam, neque e converso. Cum
enim bonum sit aequivocum, licet a consilio, alia ratione dicitur de
perfectione citharoedi, et alia de perfectione hominis. Quando namque dicimus,
Socrates est bonus, intelligimus bonitatem moralem, quae est hominis bonitas
simpliciter (analogum siquidem simpliciter positum sumitur pro potiori); cum
autem infertur, citharoedus bonus, non bonitatem moris sed artis praedicas:
unde terminorum identitas non salvatur; sufficienter igitur et subtiliter
Aristoteles eamdem de utrisque protulit sententiam, quia eadem est haec, et ibi
ratio et cetera. When he says, This is the reason "good” and
"shoemaker” cannot be combined simply, etc., he applies the truth he has
stated to the parts of the question. He applies it first to the second part,
i.e., why this does not follow: "He is good and he is a shoemaker,
therefore he is a good shoemaker.” Then he applies it to the other part of the
question, i.e., why this follows: "He is an animal and he is biped,
therefore he is a biped animal.” He adds the reason in the case of the latter:
"biped” and "animal” are not predicates accidentally conjoined among
themselves, nor in a third thing, but per se. This also explains the other
member of the first division which has not yet been explicitly posited. Notice
that he maintains the same judgment is to be made about lute player and good,
and musical and white. He has concluded that "white” and "musical” do
not infer a conjoined predicate; hence neither do "lute player” and
"good” infer "good lute player” simply, i.e., conjointly. There is a
reason for saying this. For although there is a difference between musical and
white, and goodness and the art of luteplaying, they are also similar. Let us consider
their difference first. Goodness is of such a nature that it denominates both a
third subject, namely, man, and the art of lute-playing. This is the reason the
falsity is clearly discernible when we say "He is good and a lute player,
therefore he is a good lute player.” Musical and whiteness, on the other band,
are of such a nature that they denominate only a third subject, and not each
other, and hence, the error is less obvious in "He is white and be is
musical, therefore he is musical white.” Now it is this difference that makes
Aristotle’s process of reasoning appear somewhat inconclusive. However, they
are similar. For if identity of predicates is kept in every way that is
required for the same things divided to be inferred conjointly, then, just as
"musical” does not denominate "whiteness,” nor the contrary, so
neither does "goodness,” of which we are speaking when we say "Man is
good,” denominate the art of lute-playing,,nor conversely. For "good” is
equivocal—by choice though—and therefore is said of the perfection of the lute
player by means of one notion and of the perfection of man by means of another.
For example, when we say, "Socrates is good” we understand moral goodness,
which is the goodness of man absolutely (for the analogous term posited simply,
stands for what is mainly so); but when good lute player is inferred, it is not
the goodness of morality that is predicated but the goodness of art; whence
identity of the terms is not saved. Therefore, Aristotle has adequately and
subtly expressed the same judgment about both, i.e., "white” and
"musical,” and "good” and "lute player,” for the reason here is
the same as there. Nec praetereundum est quod, cum tres consequentias adduxit
quaestionem proponendo, scilicet; est animal et bipes; ergo est animal bipes:
et, est homo et albus; ergo est homo albus: et, est citharoedus et bonus; ergo
est homo albus: et, est citharoedus et bonus; ergo est bonus citharoedus; et
duas primas posuerat esse bonas, tertiam vero non; huius diversitatis causam inquirere
volens, cur solvendo quaestionem nullo modo meminerit secundae consequentiae,
sed tantum primae et tertiae. Indiscussum namque reliquit an illa consequentia
sit bona an mala. Et ad hoc videtur mihi dicendum quod ex his paucis verbis
etiam illius consequentiae naturam insinuavit. Profundioris enim sensus textus
capax apparet cum dixit quod, non sunt unum album et musicum etc., ut scilicet
non tantum indicet quod expositum est, sed etiam eius causam, ex qua natura
secundae consequentiae elucescit. Causa namque quare album et musicum non
inferunt coniunctam praedicationem est, quia in praedicatione coniuncta oportet
alteram partem alteri supponi, ut potentiam actui, ad hoc ut ex eis fiat aliquo
modo unum, et altera a reliqua denominetur (hoc enim vis coniunctae
praedicationis requirit, ut supra diximus de partibus definitionis); album
autem et musicum secundum se non faciunt unum per se, ut patet, neque unum per
accidens. Licet enim ipsa ut adunantur in subiecto uno sint unum subiecto per
accidens, tamen ipsamet quae adunantur in uno, tertio subiecto, non faciunt
inter se unum per accidens: tum quia neutrum informat alterum (quod requiritur
ad unitatem per accidens aliquorum inter se, licet non in tertio); tum quia non
considerata subiecti unitate, quae est extra eorum rationes, nulla remanet
inter ea unitatis causa. Dicens ergo quod album et musicum non sunt unum,
scilicet inter se, aliquo modo, causam expressit quare coniunctim non infertur
ex eis praedicatum. Et quia oppositorum eadem est disciplina, insinuavit per
illamet verba bonitatem illius consequentiae. Ex eo enim quod homo et albus se
habent sicut potentia et actus (et ita albedo informet, denominet atque unum
faciat cum homine ratione sui), sequitur quod ex divisis potest inferri
coniuncta praedicatio; ut dicatur: est homo et albus; ergo est homo albus.
Sicut per oppositum dicebatur quod ideo musicum et album non inferunt
coniunctum praedicatum quia neutrum alterum informabat. There is another point
that must be mentioned. Aristotle in proposing the question draws three
consequences: "He is an animal and biped, therefore he is a biped animal”
and "He is a man and white, therefore he is a white man” and "He is a
lute player and good, therefore he is a good lute player.” Then he states that
the first two consequences are good, the third not. His intention was to
inquire into the cause of this diversity, but in solving the question he
mentions only the first and third consequences, leaving the goodness or badness
of the second consequence undiscussed. Why is this? I would say in answer to
this that in these few words he has also implied the nature of the second
consequence, for there is a more profound meaning to the statement in the text
that whiteness and being musical is not one. It is a meaning that not only
indicates what has already been explained but also its cause, and from this the
nature of the second consequence is apparent. For the reason "white” and
"musical” do not infer a conjoined predication is that in conjoined
predication one part must be subjected to the other as potency to act such that
in some way one thing is formed from them and one is denominated from the other
(for the force of the conjoined predication requires this, as we have said
above concerning the parts of the definition). "White” and "musical,”
however, do not in themselves form one thing per se, as is evident, nor do they
form one thing accidentally. For while it is true that as united in a subject
they are one in subject accidentally, nevertheless things that are united in
one third subject do not form one thing accidentally among themselves: first,
because neither informs the other (which is required for accidental unity of
things among themselves, although not in a third thing); secondly, because,
considered apart from the unity of a subject, which is outside of their
notions, there is no cause of unity between them. Therefore, when Aristotle
says that whiteness and being musical are not one, i.e., among themselves, in
some measure he expresses the reason why a predicate is not conjointly inferred
from them. And since the same discipline extends to opposites, the goodness of
the second consequence is implied by these words. That is, man and white are
related as potency and act (and so, on its own account whiteness informs,
denominates, and forms one thing with ‘man’); therefore from these taken
divisively a conjoined predication can be inferred, i.e., "He is man and
white, therefore be is a white man”; just as, in the opposite case, it was said
that "musical” and "white” do not infer a conjoined predicate because
neither informs the other. 9 Nec obstat quod album faciat unum per accidens cum
homine: non enim dictum est quod unitas per accidens aliquorum impedit ex
diversis inferre coniunctum, sed quod unitas per accidens aliquorum ratione
tertii tantum est illa quae impedit. Talia enim quae non sunt unum per accidens
nisi ratione tertii, inter se nullam habent unitatem; et propterea non potest
inferri coniunctum, ut dictum est, quod unitatem importat. Illa vero quae sunt
unum per accidens ratione sui, seu inter se, ut, homo albus, cum coniuncta
accipiuntur, unitate necessaria non carent, quia inter se unitatem habent.
Notanter autem apposui ly tantum: quoniam si aliqua duo sunt unum per accidens,
ratione tertii subiecti scilicet, sed non tantum ex hoc habent unitatem, sed
etiam ratione sui, ex hoc quod alterum reliquum informat, ex istis divisis non
prohibetur inferri coniunctum. Verbi gratia, optime dicitur: est quantum et est
coloratum; ergo est quantum coloratum: quia color informat quantitatem. There
is no opposition between the position just stated and the fact that white forms
an accidental unity with man. For we did not say that accidental unity of
certain things impedes inferring a conjunction from divided things,” but that
accidental unity of certain things only by reason of a third thing is the one
that impedes. Things that are one accidentally only by reason of a third thing
have no unity among them selves; and for this reason a conjunction, which
implies unity, cannot be inferred, as we have said. But things that are one
accidentally on their own account, i.e., among themselves, as for example,
"white man,” when taken conjointly, have the necessary unity because they
have unity among themselves. Notice that I have added "only.” The reason
is that if any two C are one accidentally, namely, by reason of a third
subject, and they not only have unity from this but also on their own account
(because one informs the other), then from these taken divisively a conjoined inference
can be made. For example, we can infer, "It is a quantity and it is
colored, therefore it is a colored quantity,” because color informs quantity.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 6 n. 10Potes autem credere quod secunda illa consequentia,
quam non explicite confirmavit Aristoteles respondendo, sit bona et ex eo quod
ipse proponendo quaestionem asseruit bonam, et ex eo quod nulla instantia
reperitur. Insinuavit autem et Aristoteles quod sola talis unitas impedit
illationem coniunctam, quando dixit quaecumque secundum accidens dicuntur vel
de eodem vel alterutrum de altero. Cum enim dixit, secundum accidens de eodem,
unitatem eorum ex sola adunatione in tertio posuit (sola enim haec per accidens
praedicantur de eodem, ut dictum est); cum autem addidit, vel alterutrum de altero,
mutuam accidentalitatem ponens, ex nulla parte inter se unitatem reliquit.
Utraque ergo per accidens adducta praedicata, in tertio scilicet vel
alterutrum, quae impediant illationem coniunctam, nonnisi in tertio unitatem
habent. You can hold as true that this second consequence is good even though
Aristotle has not explicitly confirmed it by returning to it, both from the
fact that in proposing the question he has claimed it as good and also because
there is no instance opposed to it. Moreover, Aristotle has implied that it is
only such unity that impedes the conjoined inference where he says: which are
said accidentally, either of the same subject or of one another. By
accidentally of the same subject, he posits their unity to be only from union in
a third thing (for only these are predicated accidentally of the same subject,
as was said). When he adds, or of one another—positing mutual accidentality—no
unity at all is left between them. Therefore, both kinds of accidental
predicates, namely, in a third thing or in one another, that impede a conjoined
inference have unity only in a third thing. 11 Deinde cum dicit: amplius nec
etc., satisfacit instantiis in probatione adductis, et in illis in quibus
explicita committebatur nugatio, et in illis in quibus implicita; et ait quod
non solum inferre ex divisis coniunctum non licet quando praedicata illa sunt
per accidens, sed nec etiam quaecunque insunt in alio: idest, sed nec hoc licet
quando praedicata includunt se, ita quod unum includatur in significato formali
alterius intrinsece, sive explicite, ut album in albo, sive implicite, ut
animal et bipes in homine. Quare neque album frequenter dictum divisim infert
coniunctum, neque homo divisim ab animali vel bipede enunciatum, animal bipes,
coniunctum cum homine infert; ut dicatur, ergo Socrates est homo bipes, vel
animal homo. Insunt enim in hominis ratione, animal et bipes actu et
intellectu, licet implicite. Stat ergo solutio quaestionis in hoc, quod unitas
plurium per accidens in tertio tantum et nugatio, impediunt ex divisis inferri
coniunctum; et consequenter, ubi neutrum horum invenitur, ex divisis licebit
inferre coniunctum. Et hoc intellige quando divisae sunt simul verae de eodem
et cetera. Then when he says, Furthermore, predicates that are present in one
another cannot be combined simply, etc., he gives the solution for the
instances (both the explicitly nugatory and the implicitly nugatory) cited in
the proof. It is not only not licit, he says, to infer a union from divided
predicates when these are accidental, but it is not licit when the predicates
are present in one another. That is, it is not licit to infer a conjoined
predicate from divided predicates when the predicates include one another in
such a way that one is included in the formal signification of another
intrinsically, or explicitly, as "white” in white,” or implicitly, as
"animal” and "biped” in "man.” Therefore, white” said repeatedly
and divisively does not infer a conjoined predication, nor does "man” divisively
enunciated from "animal” or "biped” infer "biped” or
"animal” conjoined with man, such that we could say, "Therefore,
Socrates is a biped-man” or "animal-man.” For animal and biped are
included in the notion of man in act and in understanding, although implicitly.
The solution of the question, then, is this: the inferring of a conjunction
from divided predicates is impeded when there is unity of the many accidentally
only in a third thing and when there is a nugatory result. Consequently, where
neither of these is found it will be licit to infer a conjunction from divided
predicates. It is to be understood that this applies when the divided
predicates are at once true of the same subject. VII. 1. Postquam expedita est
prima dubitatio, tractat secundam dubitationem. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo,
movet ipsam quaestionem; secundo, solvit eam; ibi: sed quando in adiecto etc.,
tertio, ex hoc excludit quemdam errorem; ibi: quod autem non est et cetera. Est
ergo quaestio: an ex enunciatione habente praedicatum coniunctum, liceat
inferre enunciationes dividentes illud coniunctum; et est quaestio contraria
superiori. Ibi enim quaesitum est an ex divisis inferatur coniunctum; hic autem
quaeritur an ex coniuncto sequantur divisa. Unde movendo quaestionem dicit:
verum autemaliquando est dicere de aliquo et simpliciter, idest divisim, quod
scilicet prius dicebatur coniunctim, ut quemdam hominem album esse hominem, aut
quoddam album hominem album esse, idest ut ex ista, Socrates est homo albus,
sequitur divisim, ergo Socrates est homo, ergo Socrates est albus. Non autem
semper, idest aliquando autem ex coniuncto non inferri potest divisim; non enim
sequitur, Socrates est bonus citharoedus, ergo est bonus. Unde haec est
differentia, quod quandoque licet et quandoque non. Et adverte quod notanter
adduxit exemplum de homine albo, inferendo utramque partem divisim, ut
insinuaret quod intentio quaestionis est investigare quando ex coniuncto potest
utraque pars divisim inferri, et non quando altera tantum. Aristotle now takes
up the second question in relation to multiple enunciations. He first presents
it, and then solves it where he says, When something opposed is present in the
adjunct, from which a contradiction follows, it will not be true to predicate
them singly, but false, etc. Finally, he excludes an error where he says, In
the case of non-being, however, it is not true to say that because it is a
matter of opinion, it is something, etc. The second question is this: Is it
licit to infer from an enunciation having a conjoined predication, enunciations
dividing that conjunction? This question is the contrary of the first question.
The first asked whether a conjoined predicate could be inferred from divided
predicates; the present one asks whether divided predicates follow from
conjoined predicates. When he presents the question he says, on the other hand,
it is also true to say predicates of something singly, i.e., what was
previously said conjointly may be said divisively; for example, that some white
man is a man, or that some white man is white. That is, from "Socrates is
a white man,” follows divisively, "Therefore Socrates is a man,”
"There fore Socrates is white.” However, this is not always the case,
i.e., some times it is not possible to infer divisively from conjoined
predicates, for this does not follow: "Socrates is a good lute player,
therefore he is good.” Hence, sometimes it is licit, sometimes not. Note that
in inferring each part divisively he takes as an ex ample "white man.”
This is significant, for by it he means to imply that his intention is to
investigate when each part can be inferred divisively from a conjoined
predicate, and not when only one of the two can be inferred. 2 Deinde cum
dicit: sed quando in adiecto etc., solvit quaestionem. Et duo facit: primo,
respondet parti negativae quaestionis, quando scilicet non licet; secundo, ibi:
quare in quantiscumque etc., respondet parti affirmativae, quando scilicet
licet. Circa primum considerandum quod quia dupliciter contingit fieri
praedicatum coniunctum, uno modo ex oppositis, alio modo ex non oppositis, ideo
duo facit: primo, ostendit quod numquam ex praedicato coniuncto ex oppositis
possunt inferri eius partes divisim; secundo, quod nec hoc licet universaliter
in praedicato coniuncto ex non oppositis, ibi: vel etiam quando et cetera. Ait
ergo quod quando in termino adiecto inest aliquid de numero oppositorum, ad
quae sequitur contradictio inter ipsos terminos, non verum est, scilicet
inferre divisim, sed falsum. Verbi gratia cum dicitur, Caesar est homo mortuus,
non sequitur, ergo est homo: quia ly mortuus, adiacens homini, oppositionem
habet ad hominem, quam sequitur contradictio inter hominem et mortuum: si enim
est homo, non est mortuus, quia non est corpus inanimatum; et si est mortuus,
non est homo, quia mortuum est corpus inanimatum. Quando autem non inest,
scilicet talis oppositio, verum est, scilicet inferre divisim. Ratio autem
quare, quando est oppositio in adiecto, non sequitur illatio divisa est, quia
alter terminus ex adiecti oppositione corrumpitur in ipsa enunciatione
coniuncta. Corruptum autem seipsum absque corruptione non infert, quod illatio
divisa sonaret. When he says, When something opposed is present in the adjunct,
etc., he solves the question, first by responding to the negative part of the
question, i.e., when it is not licit; secondly, to the affirmative part, i.e.,
when it is licit, where he says, Therefore, in whatever predications no
contrariety is present when definitions are put in place of the names, and
wherein predicates are predicated per se and not accidentally, etc. It should
be noted, in relation to the negative part of the question, that a conjoined
predicate may be formed in two ways: from opposites and from non-opposites.
Therefore, he shows first that the parts in a conjoined predicate of opposites
can never be inferred divisively. Secondly, he shows that this is not licit
universally in a conjoined predicate of non-opposites, where he says, Or,
rather, when something opposed is present in it, it is never true; but when
something opposed is not present, it is not always true. Aristotle says, then,
that when something that is an opposite is contained in the adjacent term,
which results in a contradiction between the terms themselves, it is not true,
namely, to infer divisively, but false. For example, when we say, "Caesar
is a dead man,” it does not follow, "Therefore he is a man,” because the
contradiction between 11 man” and "dead” which results from adding the
"dead” to "man” is opposed to man, for if he is a man he is not dead,
because he is not an inanimate body; and if he is dead he is not a man, because
as dead he is an inanimate body. When something opposed is not present, i.e.,
there is no such opposition, it is true, i.e., it is true to infer divisively.
The reason a divided inference does not follow when there is opposition in the
added term is that in a conjoined enunciation the other term is destroyed by
the opposition of the added term. But that which has been destroyed is not
inferred apart from the destruction, which is what the divided inference would
signify. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 3Dubitatur hic primo circa id quod
supponitur, quomodo possit vere dici, Caesar est homo mortuus, cum enunciatio
non possit esse vera, in qua duo contradictoria simul de aliquo praedicantur. Hoc
enim est primum principium. Homo autem et mortuus, ut in littera dicitur,
contradictoriam oppositionem includunt, quia in homine includitur vita, in
mortuo non vita. Dubitatur secundo circa ipsam consequentiam, quam reprobat
Aristoteles: videtur enim optima. Cum enim ex enunciatione praedicante duo
contradictoria possit utrumque inferri (quia aequivalet copulativae), aut
neutrum (quia destruit seipsam), et enunciatio supradicta terminos oppositos
contradictorie praedicet, videtur sequi utraque pars, quia falsum est neutram
sequi. Two questions arise at this point. The first concerns something assumed
here: how can it ever be true to make such a statement as "Caesar is a
dead man,” since an enunciation cannot be true in which two contradictories are
predicated at the same time of something (for this is a first principle). But
"man” and "dead,” as is said in the text, include contradictory
opposition, for in man is included life, and in dead, non-life. The second
question concerns the consequent that Aristotle rejects, which appears to be
good. The enunciation given as an example predicates terms that are opposed
contradictorily. But from an enunciation predicating two contradictory terms,
either both can be inferred (because it is equivalent to a copulative
enunciation), or neither (because it destroys itself); therefore both parts
seem to follow, since it is false that neither follows. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7
n. 4Ad hoc simul dicitur quod aliud est loqui de duobus terminis secundum se,
et aliud de eis ut unum stat sub determinatione alterius. Primo namque modo,
homo et mortuus, contradictionem inter se habent, et impossibile est quod simul
in eodem inveniantur. Secundo autem modo, homo et mortuus, non opponuntur, quia
homo transmutatus iam per determinationem corruptivam importatam in ly mortuus,
non stat pro suo significato secundum se, sed secundum exigentiam termini
additi, a quo suum significatum distractum est. Ad utrunque autem insinuandum
Aristoteles duo dixit, et quod habent oppositionem quam sequitur contradictio,
attendens significata eorum secundum se, et quod etiam ex eis formatur una vera
enunciatio cum dicitur, Socrates est homo mortuus, attendens coniunctionem
eorum alterius corruptivam. Unde patet quid dicendum sit ad dubitationes. Ad
utramque siquidem dicitur, quod non enunciantur duo contradictoria simul de
eodem, sed terminus ut stat sub distractione, seu transmutatione alterius, cui
secundum se esset contradictorius. These two questions can be answered
simultaneously. It is one thing to speak of two terms in themselves, and
another to speak of them as one stands under the determination of another.
Taken in the first way, "man” and "dead” have a contradiction between
them and it is impossible that they be found in the same thing at the same time.
In the second way, however, "man” and "dead” are not opposed, since
"man,” changed by the destructive element introduced by "dead,” no
longer stands for what it signifies as such, but as determined by the term
added, by which what is signified is removed. Aristotle, in order to imply
both, says two things: that they have the opposition upon which contradiction
follows if you regard what they signify in themselves; and, that one true
enunciation is formed from them as in "Socrates is a dead man,” if you regard
their conjunction as destructive of one of them. Accordingly, the answer to the
two questions is evident. In a case such as this two contradictories are not
enunciated of the same thing at the same time, but one term as it stands under
dissolution or transmutation from the other, to which by itself it would be
contradictory. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 5Dubitatur quoque circa id quod ait:
inest aliquid oppositorum quae consequitur contradictio; superflue enim videtur
addi illa particula, quae consequitur contradictio. Omnia enim opposita
consequitur contradictio, ut patet discurrendo in singulis; pater enim est non
filius, et album non nigrum, et videns non caecum et cetera. Et ad hoc dicendum
est quod opposita possunt dupliciter accipi: uno modo formaliter, idest
secundum sua significata; alio modo denominative, seu subiective. Verbi gratia,
pater et filius possunt accipi pro paternitate et filiatione, et possunt accipi
pro eo qui denominatur pater vel filius. Rursus cum omnis distinctio fiat
oppositione aliqua, ut dicitur in X metaphysicae, supponatur omnino distincta
esse opposita. Dicendum ergo est quod, licet ad omnia opposita seu distincta
contradictio sequatur inter se formaliter sumpta, non tamen ad omnia opposita
sequitur contradictio inter ipsa denominative sumpta. Quamvis enim pater et
filius mutuam sui negationem inferant inter se formaliter, quia paternitas est
non filiatio, et filiatio est non paternitas; in relatione tamen ad
denominatum, contradictionem non necessario inferunt. Non enim sequitur,
Socrates est pater; ergo non est filius; nec e converso. Ut persuaderet igitur
Aristoteles quod non quaecunque opposita colligata impediunt divisam illationem
(quia non illa quae habent contradictionem annexam formaliter tantum, sed illa
quae habent contradictionem et formaliter et secundum rem denominatam),
addidit: quae consequitur contradictio, in tertio scilicet denominato. Et usus
est satis congrue vocabulo, scilicet, consequitur: contradictio enim ista in
tertio est quodammodo extra ipsa opposita. There is also a question about
something else that Aristotle says, namely, something opposed is present...
from which a contradiction follows. The phrase from which a contradiction
follows seems to be superfluous, for contradiction follows upon all opposites,
as is evident in discoursing about singulars; for a father is not a son, and
white is not black, and one seeing is not blind, etc. Opposites, however, can
be taken in two ways: formally, i.e., according to what they signify, and
denominatively, or subjectively. For example, father and son can be taken for
paternity and filiation, or they can be taken for the one who is denominated a
father or a son. But, again, since every distinction is made by some
opposition, as is said in X Metaphysicae [3: 1054a 20], it could be supposed
that opposites are wholly distinct. It must be pointed out, therefore, that
although contradiction follows between all opposites or distinct things
formally taken, nevertheless, contradiction does not follow upon all opposites
denominatively taken. Father and son formally taken infer a mutual negation of
one another, for paternity is not filiation and filiation is not paternity, but
in respect to what is denominated they do not necessarily infer a
contradiction. It does not follow, for example, that "Socrates is a
father; therefore he is not a son,” nor conversely. Aristotle, therefore, in
order to establish that not all combined opposites prevent a divided inference
(since those having a contradiction applying only formally do not prevent a
divided inference, but those having a contradiction both formally and according
to the thing denominated do prevent a divided inference) adds, from which a
contradiction follows, namely, in the third thing denominated. And
appropriately enough he uses the word follows, for the contradiction in "
the third thing denominated is in a certain way outside of the opposites
themselves. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 6Deinde cum dicit: vel etiam quando est
etc., declarat quod ex non oppositis in tertio coniunctis secundum unum
praedicatum, non universaliter possunt inferri partes divisim. Et primo, hoc
proponit quasi emendans quod immediate dixerat, subiungens: vel etiam quando
est, scilicet oppositio inter terminos coniunctos, falsum est semper, scilicet
inferre divisim; quasi diceret: dixi quod quando inest oppositio, non verum sed
falsum est inferre divisim; quando autem non inest talis oppositio, verum est
inferre divisim. Vel etiam ut melius dicatur, quod quando est oppositio, falsum
est semper, quando autem non inest talis oppositio, non semper verum est. Et
sic modificavit supradicta addendo ly semper, et, non semper. Et subdens
exemplum quod non semper ex non oppositis sequatur divisio, ait: ut, Homerus
est aliquid ut poeta; ergo etiam est? Non. Ex hoc coniuncto, est poeta, de
Homero enunciato, altera pars, ergo Homerus est, non sequitur; et tamen clarum
est quod istae duae partes colligatae, est et poeta, non habent oppositionem,
ad quam sequitur contradictio. Igitur non semper ex non oppositis coniunctis illatio
divisa tenet et cetera. When he says, Or, rather, when something opposed is
present in it, it is never true, etc., he explains that the parts cannot
universally be inferred divisively in the case of a conjoined predicate in
which there is a non-opposite as the third thing denominated. He proposes
this—Or, rather, when something opposed is contained in it, i.e., opposition
between the terms conjoined—as if amending what he has just said, namely, it is
always false, i.e., to infer divisively. What he is saying, then, is this: I
have said that when there is inherent opposition it is not true but false to
infer divisively; but when there is not such opposition it is true to infer
divisively; or, even better, when there is opposition it is always false but
when there is not such opposition it is not always true. That is, he modifies
what he first said by the addition of "always” and "not always.” Then
he adds an example to show that division does not always follow from
non-opposites: For example, Homer is something, say, a poet. Is it therefore
true to say also that Homer "is,” or not? From the conjoined predicate, is
a poet, enunciated of Homer, one part, Therefore Homer is, does not follow; yet
it is evident that these two conjoined parts, "is” and "poet,” do not
have the opposition upon which contradiction follows. Therefore, in the case of
conjoined non-opposites a divided inference does not always hold. Cajetanus
lib. 2 l. 7 n. 7Deinde cum dicit: secundum accidens etc., probat hoc, quod modo
dictum est, ex eo quod altera pars istius compositi, scilicet, est, in
antecedente coniuncto praedicatur de Homero secundum accidens, idest ratione
alterius, quoniam, scilicet poeta, praedicatur de Homero, et non praedicatur
secundum se ly est de Homero; quod tamen infertur, cum concluditur: ergo
Homerus est. Considerandum est hic quod ad solvendam illam conclusionem
negativam, scilicet,- non semper ex non oppositis coniunctis infertur divisim,-
sufficit unam instantiam suae oppositae universali affirmativae afferre. Et hoc
fecit Aristoteles adducendo illud genus enunciationum, in quo altera pars
coniuncti est aliquid pertinens ad actum animae. Loquimur enim modo de Homero
vivente in poematibus suis in mentibus hominum. In his siquidem enunciationibus
partes coniunctae non sunt oppositae in tertio, et tamen non licet inferre
utramque partem divisim. Committitur enim fallacia secundum quid ad
simpliciter. Non enim valet, Caesar est laudatus, ergo est: et simile est de
esse in effectu dependente in conservari. Quomodo autem intelligenda sit ratio
ad hoc adducta ab Aristotele in sequenti particula dicetur. When he says, The
"is” here is predicated accidentally of Homer, he proves what he has said.
One part of this composite, namely, "is,” is predicated of Homer in the
antecedent conjunction accidentally, i.e., by reason of another, namely, with
regard to the "poet” which is predicated of Homer; it is not predicated as
such of Homer. Nevertheless, this is what is inferred when one concludes
"Therefore Homer is.” To validate his negative conclusion, namely, that it
is not always true to infer divisively from conjoined non-opposites, it was
sufficient to give one instance of the opposite of the universal affirmative.
To do this Aristotle introduces that genus of enunciation in which one part of
the conjunction is something pertaining to an act of the mind (for we are
speaking only of Homer living in his poems in the minds of men). In such
enunciations the parts conjoined are not opposed in the third thing
denominated; nevertheless it is not licit to infer each part divisively, for
the fallacy of going from the relative to the absolute will be committed. For
example, it is not valid to say, "Caesar is praiseworthy, therefore he
is,” which is a parallel case, i.e., of an effect whose existence requires
maintenance. Aristotle will explain in the following sections of the text how
the reasoning in the above text is to be understood. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n.
8Deinde cum dicit: quare in quantiscunque etc., respondet parti affirmativae quaestionis,
quando scilicet ex coniunctis licet inferre divisim. Et ponit duas conditiones
oppositas supradictis debere convenire in unum, ad hoc ut possit fieri talis
consequentia; scilicet, quod nulla inter partes coniuncti oppositio sit, et
quod secundum se praedicentur. Unde dicit inferendo ex dictis: quare in
quantiscunque praedicamentis, idest praedicatis ordine quodam adunatis, neque
contrarietas aliqua, in cuius ratione ponitur contradictio in tertio (contraria
enim sunt quae mutuo se ab eodem expellunt), aut universaliter nulla oppositio
inest, ex qua scilicet sequatur contradictio in tertio, si definitiones pro
nominibus sumantur. Dixit hoc, quia licet in quibusdam non appareat oppositio,
solis nominibus positis, sicut, homo mortuus, et in quibusdam appareat, ut,
vivum mortuum; hoc tamen non obstante, si, positis nominum definitionibus loco
nominum, oppositio appareat, inter opposita collocamus. Sicut, verbi gratia,
homo mortuus, licet oppositionem non praeseferat, tamen si loco hominis et
mortui eorum definitionibus utamur, videbitur contradictio. Dicemus enim corpus
animatum rationale, corpus inanimatum irrationale. In quantiscunque, inquam,
coniunctis nulla est oppositio, et secundum se, et non secundum accidens
praedicantur, in his verum erit dicere et simpliciter, idest divisim quod fuerat
coniunctim enunciatum. When he says, Therefore, in whatever predications no
contrariety is present when definitions are put in place of the names, etc., he
replies to the affirmative part of the question, i.e., when it is licit to
infer divisively from conjoined predicates. He maintains that two
conditions—opposed to what has been said earlier in this portion of the
text—must combine in one enunciation in order that such a consequence be
effected: there must be no opposition between the parts conjoined, and they
must be predicated per se. He says, then, inferring from what has been said:
Therefore, in whatever predicaments, i.e., predicates joined in a certain
order, no contrariety, in virtue of which contradiction is posited in the third
thing denominated (for contraries mutually remove each other from the same
thing), is present, or universally, no opposition is present, i.e., upon which
a contradiction follows in the third thing denominated, when definitions are taken
in place of the names.... He says this because it may be the case that the
opposition is not apparent from the names alone, as in "dead man,” and
again it may be, as in "living dead,” but whether apparent or not it will
be evident that we are putting together opposites if we posit the definitions
of the names in place of the names. For example, in the case of "dead
man,” if we replace "man” and "dead,” with their definitions, the
contradiction will be evident, for what we are saying is "rational animate
body, irrational inanimate body.” In whatever conjoined predicates, then, there
is no opposition, and wherein predicates are predicated per se and not
accidentally, in these it will also be true to predicate them singly, i.e., say
divisively what had been enunciated conjointly. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 9Ad
evidentiam secundae conditionis hic positae, nota quod ly secundum se potest
dupliciter accipi: uno modo positive, et sic dicit perseitatem primi, secundi,
universaliter, quarti modi; alio modo negative, et sic idem sonat quod non per
aliud. Rursus considerandum est quod cum Aristoteles dixit de praedicato
coniuncto quod, secundum se praedicetur, ly secundum se potest ad tria referri,
scilicet, ad partes coniuncti inter se, ad totum coniunctum respectu subiecti,
et ad partes coniuncti respectu subiecti. Si ergo accipiatur ly secundum se
positive, licet non falsus, extraneus tamen a mente Aristotelis reperitur
sensus ad quodcunque illorum trium referatur. Licet enim valeat, est homo
risibilis, ergo est homo et est risibilis, et, est animal rationale, ergo est
animal et est rationale; tamen his oppositae inferunt similes consequentias.
Dicimus enim, est albus musicus, ergo est musicus et est albus: ubi nulla est
perseitas, sed est coniunctio per accidens, tam inter partes inter se, quam
inter totum et subiectum, quam etiam inter partes et subiectum. Liquet igitur
quod non accipit Aristoteles ly secundum se positive, ex eo quod vana fuisset
talis additio, quae ab oppositis non facit in hoc differentiam. Ad quid enim
addidit, secundum se, et non, secundum accidens, si tam illae quae sunt
secundum se, modo exposito, quam illae quae sunt secundum accidens ex
coniuncto, inferunt divisum? Si vero accipiatur secundum se, negative, idest,
non per aliud, et referatur ad partes coniuncti inter se, falsa invenitur
regula. Nam non licet dicere, est bonus citharoedus; ergo est bonus et
citharoedus; et tamen ars citharizandi et bonitas eius sine medio coniunguntur.
Et similiter contingit, si referatur ad totum coniunctum respectu subiecti, ut
in eodem exemplo apparet. Totum enim hoc, citharoedus bonus, non propter aliud
convenit homini; et tamen non infert, ut dictum est, divisionem. Superest ergo
ut ad partem coniuncti respectu subiecti referatur, et sit sensus: quando aliqua
coniunctim praedicata, secundum se, idest, non per aliud, praedicantur, idest,
quod utraque pars praedicatur de subiecto non propter alteram, sed propter
seipsam et subiectum, tunc ex coniuncto infertur divisa praedicatio. In order
to make this second condition clear, it should be noted that "per se” can
be taken in two ways: positively, and thus it refers to "perseity” of the
first, of the second, and of the fourth mode universally; or negatively, and
thus it means the same as not through something else. It should also be noted
that when Aristotle says of a conjoined predicate that it is predicated
"per se,” the "per se” can be referred to three things: to the parts
of the conjunction among themselves, to the whole conjunction with respect to
the subject, and to the parts of the conjoined predicate with respect to the
subject. Now if "per se” is taken positively, although it will not be
false, nevertheless in reference to any of these three the meaning will be
found to be foreign to the mind of Aristotle. For, although these are valid:
"He is a risible man, therefore he is man and he is risible” and "He
is a rational animal, therefore he is animal and he is rational,” nevertheless
the opposite kind of predication infers consequences in a similar way. For example,
there is no 11 perseity” in "He is a white musician, therefore he is white
and he is a musician”; rather, there is an accidental conjunction, not only
between the parts among themselves and between the whole and the subject, but
even between the parts and the subject. It is evident, therefore, that
Aristotle is not taking "per se” positively, for an addition that does not
differentiate this kind of predication from the opposed kind of predication
would be useless. Why add "per se and not accidentally,” if both those
that are per se in the way explained and those that are conjoined accidentally
infer divisively? If "per se” is taken negatively, i.e., as not through
another, and is referred to the parts of the conjoined predicate among
themselves, the rule is found to be false. It is not licit, for example, to
say, "He is a good lute player, therefore he is good and a lute player”;
yet the art of lute-playing and its goodness are conjoined without anything as
a medium. And the case is the same if it is referred to the whole conjoined
predicate with respect to the subject, as is clear in the same example, for the
whole, "good lute player,” does not belong to man on account of another,
and yet it does not infer the division, as has already been said. Therefore,
"per se” is referred to the parts of the conjoined predicate with respect
to the subject and the meaning is: when the predicates are conjointly
predicated per se, i.e., not through another, i.e., each part is predicated of
the subject, not on account of another but on account of itself and the
subject, then a divided predication is inferred from the conjoined predication.
10 Et hoc modo exponunt Averroes et Boethius; et vera invenitur regula, ut
inductive facile manifestari potest, et ratio ipsa suadet. Si enim partes
alicuius coniuncti praedicati ita inhaerent subiecto quod neutra propter
alteram insit, earum separatio nihil habet quod veritatem impediat divisarum.
Est et verbis Aristotelis consonus sensus iste. Quoniam et per hoc distinguit
inter enunciationes ex quibus coniunctum infert divisam praedicationem, et eas
quibus haec non inest consequentia. Istae siquidem ultra habentes oppositiones
in adiecto, sunt habentes praedicatum coniunctum, cuius una partium alterius
est ita determinatio, quod nonnisi per illam subiectum respicit, sicut apparet
in exemplo ab Aristotele adducto, Homerus est poeta. Est siquidem ibi non
respicit Homerum ratione ipsius Homeri, sed praecise ratione poesis relictae;
et ideo non licet inferre, ergo Homerus est. Et simile est in negativis. Si
quis enim dicat, Socrates non est paries, non licet inferre, ergo Socrates non
est, eadem ratione, quia esse non est negatum de Socrate, sed de pariete in
Socrate. This is the way in which Averroes and Boethius explain this and,
explained in this way, a true rule is found, as can easily be manifested
inductively; moreover, the reasoning is compelling. For, if the parts of some
conjoined predicate so inhere in the subject that neither is in it on account
of another, their separation produces nothing that could impede the truth of
the divided predicates. And this meaning is consonant with the words of
Aristotle, for by this he also distinguishes between enunciations in which the
conjoined predicate infers a divided predicate, and those in which this
consequence is not inherent. For besides the predicates having opposition in
the additional determining element, there are those with a conjoined predicate
wherein one part is a determination of the other in such a way that only
through it does it regard the subject, as is evident in Aristotle’s example,
"Homer is a poet.” The "is” does not regard Homer by reason of Homer
himself, but precisely by reason of the poetry he left. Hence it is not licit
to infer, "Therefore Homer is.” The same is true with respect to negative
enunciations of this type, for it is not licit to infer from "Socrates is
not a wall,” "Therefore Socrates is not.” And the reason is the same:
"to be” is not denied of Socrates, but of "wallness” in Socrates. 11 Et
per hoc patet qualiter sit intelligenda ratio in textu superiore adducta.
Accipitur enim ibi, secundum se negative, modo hic exposito, et secundum
accidens, idest propter aliud. In eadem ergo significatione est usus ly
secundum accidens, solvendo hanc et praecedentem quaestionem: utrobique enim
intellexit secundum accidens, idest, propter aliud, coniuncta, sed ad diversa
retulit. Ibi namque ly secundum accidens determinabat coniunctionem duorum
praedicatorum inter se; hic vero determinat partem coniuncti praedicati in ordine
ad subiectum. Unde ibi, album et musicum, inter ea quae secundum accidens sunt,
numerabantur; hic autem non. Accordingly, it is evident how the reasoning in
the text above is to be understood. "Per se” is taken negatively in the
way explained here, and "accidentally” as "on account of another.”
The "accidentally” is used with the same signification in solving this and
the preceding question. In both he understands "accidentally” to mean
conjoined on account of another, but it is referred to diverse things. In the
preceding question "accidentally” determines the way in which two
predicates are conjoined among themselves; in the latter question it determines
the way in which the part of the conjoined predicate is ordered to the subject.
Hence, in the former, "white” and "musician” are numbered among the
things that are accidental, but in the latter they are not. 12 Sed occurrit
circa hanc expositionem dubitatio non parva. Si enim ideo non licet ex
coniuncto inferre divisim, quia altera pars coniuncti non respicit subiectum
propter se, sed propter alteram partem (ut dixit Aristoteles de ista
enunciatione, Homerus est poeta), sequetur quod numquam a tertio adiacente ad
secundum erit bona consequentia: quia in omni enunciatione de tertio adiacente,
est respicit subiectum propter praedicatum et non propter se et cetera. This
exposition seems a bit dubious, however. For if it is not licit to infer
divisively from a conjoined predicate because one part of the conjoined
predicate does not regard the subject on account of itself but on account of
another part (as Aristotle says of the enunciation, "Homer is a poet”), it
will follow that there will never be a good consequence from the third
determinant to the second, since in every enunciation with a third determinant,
"is” regards the subject on account of the predicate and not on account of
itself. 13 Ad huius difficultatis evidentiam, nota primo hanc distinctionem.
Aliud est tractare regulam, quando ex tertio adiacente infertur secundum et
quando non, et aliud quando ex coniuncto fit illatio divisa et quando non. Illa
siquidem est extra propositum, istam autem venamur. Illa compatitur varietatem
terminorum, ista non. Si namque unus terminorum, qui est altera pars coniuncti,
secundum significationem seu suppositionem varietur in separatione, non
infertur ex coniuncto praedicato illudmet divisim, sed aliud. Nota secundo hanc
propositionem: cum ex tertio adiacente infertur secundum, non servatur
identitas terminorum. Liquet ista quoad illum terminum, est. Dictum siquidem
fuit supra a sancto Thoma, quod aliud importat est secundum adiacens, et aliud
est tertium adiacens. Illud namque importat actum essendi simpliciter, hoc
autem habitudinem inhaerentiae vel identitatis praedicati ad subiectum. Fit
ergo varietas unius termini cum ex tertio adiacente infertur secundum, et
consequenter non fit illatio divisi ex coniuncto. Unde praelucet responsio ad
obiectionem, quod, licet ex tertio adiacente quandoque possit inferri secundum,
numquam tamen ex tertio adiacente licet inferri secundum tamquam ex coniuncto
divisum, quia inferri non potest divisim, cuius altera pars ipsa divisione
perit. Negetur ergo consequentia obiectionis et ad probationem dicatur quod,
optime concludit quod talis illatio est illicita infra limites illationum, quae
ex coniuncto divisionem inducunt, de quibus hic Aristoteles loquitur. To make
this difficulty clear, we must first note a distinction. It is one thing to
treat of the rule when inferring a second determinant from a third determinant,
and when not; it is quite another thing when a divided inference is made from a
conjoined predicate, and when not. The former is an additional point; the
latter is the question we have been inquiring about. The former is compatible
with variety of the terms, the latter not. For if one of the terms which is one
part of a conjoined predicate will be varied according to signification, or
supposition when taken separately, it is not inferred divisively from the
conjoined predicate, but the other is. Secondly, note this proposition: when a
second determinant is inferred from a third, identity of the terms is not kept.
This is evident with respect to the term "is.” Indeed, St. Thomas said
above that "is” as the second determinant implies one thing and "is”
as the third determinant another. The former implies the act of being simply,
the latter implies the relationship of inherence, or identity of the predicate
with the subject. Therefore, when the second determinant is inferred from the
third, one term is varied and consequently an inference is not made of the
divided from the conjoined. Accordingly, the response to the objection is
clear, for although the second determinant can sometimes be inferred from the
third, it is never licit for the second to be inferred from the third as divided
from conjoined, because you cannot infer divisively when one part is destroyed
by that very division. Therefore, let the consequence of the objection be
denied and for proof let it be said that the conclusion that such an inference
is illicit under the limits of inferences which induce division from a
conjoined predicate-is good, for this is what Aristotle is speaking of here. 14
Sed contra hoc instatur. Quia etiam tanquam ex coniuncto divisa fit illatio,
Socrates est albus, ergo est, per locum a parte in modo ad suum totum, ubi non
fit varietas terminorum. Et ad hoc dicitur quod licet homo albus sit pars in
modo hominis (quia nihil minuit de hominis ratione albedo, sed ponit hominem
simpliciter), tamen est album non est pars in modo ipsius est, eo quod pars in
modo est universale cum conditione non minuente, ponente illud simpliciter.
Clarum est autem quod album minuit rationem ipsius est, et non ponit ipsum
simpliciter: contrahit enim ad esse secundum quid. Unde apud philosophos, cum
fit aliquid album, non dicitur generari, sed generari secundum quid. But the
objection is raised against this that in the case of "Socrates is white,
therefore be is,” a divided inference can be made as from a conjoined
predicate, in virtue of the argument that we can go from what is in the mode of
part to its whole as long as the terms remain the same. The answer to this is
as follows. It is true that white man is a part in the mode of man (because
white diminishes nothing of the notion of man but posits man simply); is white,
however, is not a part in the mode of is, because a part in the mode of its
whole is a universal, the condition not diminishing the positing of it simply.
But it is evident that white diminishes the notion of is, and does not posit it
simply, for it contracts it to relative being. Whence when something becomes
white, philosophers do not say that it is generated, but generated relatively. 15
Sed instatur adhuc quia secundum hoc, dicendo, est animal, ergo est, fit
illatio divisa per eumdem locum. Animal enim non minuit rationem ipsius est. Ad
hoc est dicendum quod ly est, si dicat veritatem propositionis, manifeste
peccatur a secundum quid ad simpliciter. Si autem dicat actum essendi, illatio
est bona, sed non est de tertio, sed de secundo adiacente. In accordance with
this, the objection is raised that in saying "It is an animal, therefore
it is,” a divided inference is made in virtue of the same argument; for animal
does not diminish the notion of is itself. The answer to this is that if the is
asserts the truth of a proposition, the fallacy is committed of going from the
relative to the absolute; if the is asserts the act of being, the inference is
good, but it is of the second determinant, not of the third. 16 Potest ulterius
dubitari circa principale: quia sequitur, est quantum coloratum, ergo est
quantum, et, est coloratum; et tamen coloratum respicit subiectum mediante
quantitate: ergo non videtur recta expositio supra adducta. Ad hoc et similia
dicendum est quod coloratum non ita inest subiecto per quantitatem quod sit
eius determinatio et ratione talis determinationis subiectum denominet, sicut
bonitas artem citharisticam determinat; cum dicitur, est citharoedus bonus; sed
potius subiectum ipsum primo coloratum denominatur, quantum vero secundario coloratum
dicitur, licet color media quantitate suscipiatur. Unde notanter supra diximus,
quod tunc altera pars coniuncti praedicatur per accidens, quando praecise
denominat subiectum, quia denominat alteram partem. Quod nec in similibus
instantiis invenitur. There is another doubt, this time about the principle in
the exposition; for this follows, "It is a colored quantity, therefore it
is a quantity and it is colored”; but "colored” regards the subject
through the medium of quantity; therefore the exposition given above does not
seem to be correct. The answer to this and to similar objections is that
"colored” is not so present in a subject by means of quantity that it is
its determination, and by reason of such a determination denominates the subject;
as goodness,” for instance, determines the art of lute-playing when we say
"He is a good lute player.” Rather, the subject itself is first
denominated "colored” and quantity is called "colored” secondarily,
although color is received through the medium of quantity. Hence, we made a
point of saying earlier that one part of a conjoined predicate is predicated
accidentally when it denominates the subject precisely because it denominates
the other part.93 This is not the case here nor in similar instances. 17 Deinde
cum dicit: quod autem non est etc., excludit quorumdam errorem qui, quod non
est, esse tali syllogismo concludere satagebant: quod est, opinabile est. Quod
non est, est opinabile. Ergo quod non est, est. Hunc siquidem processum elidit
Aristoteles destruendo primam propositionem, quae partem coniuncti in subiecto
divisim praedicat, ac si diceret: est opinabile, ergo est. Unde assumendo
subiectum conclusionis illorum ait: quod autem non est; et addit medium eorum,
quoniam opinabile est; et subdit maiorem extremitatem, non est verum dicere,
esse aliquid. Et causam assignat, quia talis opinatio non propterea est, quia
illud sit, sed potius quia non est. When he says, In the case of non-being,
however, it is not true to say that it is something, etc., he excludes the
error of those who were satisfied to conclude that what is not, is. This is the
syllogism they use: "That which is, is ‘opinionable’; that which is not,
is ‘opinionable’; therefore what is not, is.” Aristotle destroys this process
of reasoning by destroying the first proposition, which predicates divisively a
part of what is conjoined in the subject, as if it said "It is
‘opinionable,’ therefore it is.” Hence, assuming the subject of their
conclusion, he says, In the case of that which is not, however; and he adds
their middle term, because it is a matter of opinion; then he adds the major
extreme, it is not true to say that it is something. He then assigns the cause:
it is not because it is but rather because it is not, that there is such
opinion. VIII. 1 Postquam determinatum est de enunciationibus, quarum partibus
aliud additur tam remanente quam variata unitate, hic intendit declarare quid
accidat enunciationi, ex eo quod aliquid additur, non suis partibus, sed
compositioni eius. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, determinat de oppositione
earum; secundo, de consequentiis; ibi: consequentiae vero et cetera. Circa
primum duo facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, exequitur; ibi: nam
si eorum et cetera. Proponit ergo quod iam perspiciendum est, quomodo se
habeant affirmationes et negationes enunciationum de possibili et non possibili
et cetera. Et causam subdit: habent enim multas dubitationes speciales. Sed
antequam ulterius procedatur, quoniam de enunciationibus, quae modales
vocantur, sermo inchoatur, praelibandum est esse quasdam modales enunciationes,
et qui et quot sunt modi reddentes propositiones modales; et quid earum sit
subiectum et quid praedicatum; et quid sit ipsa enunciatio modalis; quisque sit
ordo earum ad praecedentes; et quae necessitas sit specialem faciendi tractatum
de his. Now that he has treated enunciations in which something added to the
parts leaves the unity intact on the one hand, and varies it on the other,
Aristotle begins to explain what happens to the enunciation when something is
added, not to its parts, but to its composition. First, he explains their
opposition; secondly, he treats of the consequences of their opposition where
he says, Logical sequences result from modals ordered thus, etc. With respect
to the first point, he proposes the question he intends to consider and then
begins his consideration where he says, Let us grant that of mutually related
enunciations, contradictories are those opposed to each other, etc. He proposes
that we must now investigate the way in which affirmations and negations of the
possible and not possible are related. He gives the reason when he adds, for
the question has many special difficulties. However, before we proceed with the
consideration of enunciations that are called modal, we must first see that
there are such things as modal enunciations, and which and how many modes
render propositions modal; we must also know what their subject is and their
predicate, what the modal enunciation itself is, what the order is between modal
enunciations and the enunciations already treated, and finally, why a special
treatment of them is necessary. 2 Quia ergo possumus dupliciter de rebus loqui;
uno modo, componendo rem unam cum alia, alio modo, compositionem factam
declarando qualis sit, insurgunt duo enunciationum genera; quaedam scilicet
enunciantes aliquid inesse vel non inesse alteri, et hae vocantur de inesse, de
quibus superius habitus est sermo; quaedam vero enunciantes modum compositionis
praedicati cum subiecto, et hae vocantur modales, a principaliori parte sua,
modo scilicet. Cum enim dicitur, Socratem currere est possibile, non enunciatur
cursus de Socrate, sed qualis sit compositio cursus cum Socrate, scilicet
possibilis. Signanter autem dixi modum compositionis, quoniam modus in enunciatione
positus duplex est. Quidam enim determinat verbum, vel ratione significati
ipsius verbi ut Socrates currit velociter, vel ratione temporis consignificati,
ut Socrates currit hodie; quidam autem determinat compositionem ipsam
praedicati cum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur, Socratem currere est possibile. In
illis namque determinatur qualis cursus insit Socrati, vel quando; in hac
autem, qualis sit coniunctio cursus cum Socrate. Modi ergo non illi qui rem
verbi, sed qui compositionem determinant, modales enunciationes reddunt, eo
quod compositio veluti forma totius totam enunciationem continet. We can speak
about things in two ways: in one, composing one thing with another; in the
other, declaring the kind of composition that exists between the two things. To
signify these two ways of speaking about things we form two kinds of
enunciations. One kind enunciates that something belongs or does not belong to
something. These are called absolute [de inesse] enunciations; these we have
already discussed. The other enunciates the mode of composition of the
predicate with the subject. These are called modal, from their principal part,
the mode. For when we say, "That Socrates run is possible,” it is not the
running of Socrates that is enunciated but the kind of composition there is
between running and Socrates-in this case, possible. I have said "mode of
composition” expressly, for there are two kinds of mode posited in the
enunciation. One modifies the verb, either with respect to what it signifies,
as in "Socrates runs swiftly,” or with respect to the time signified along
with the verb, as in "Socrates runs today.” The other kind modifies the
very composition of the predicate with the subject, as in the example,
"That Socrates run is possible.” The former determines how or when running
is in Socrates; the latter determines the kind of conjunction there is between
running and Socrates. The former, which affects the actuality of the verb, does
not make a modal enunciation. Only the modes that affect the composition make a
modal enunciation, the reason being that the composition, as the form of the
whole, contains the whole enunciation. 3 Sunt autem huiusmodi modi quatuor
proprie loquendo, scilicet possibile et impossibile, necessarium et contingens.
Verum namque et falsum, licet supra compositionem cadant cum dicitur, Socratem
currere est verum, vel hominem esse quadrupedem est falsum, attamen modificare
proprie non videntur compositionem ipsam. Quia modificari proprie dicitur
aliquid, quando redditur aliquale, non quando fit secundum suam substantiam.
Compositio autem quando dicitur vera, non aliqualis proponitur, sed quod est:
nihil enim aliud est dicere, Socratem currere est verum, quam quod compositio
cursus cum Socrate est. Et similiter quando est falsa, nihil aliud dicitur,
quam quod non est: nam nihil aliud est dicere, Socratem currere est falsum,
quam quod compositio cursus cum Socrate non est. Quando vero compositio dicitur
possibilis aut contingens, iam non ipsam esse, sed ipsam aliqualem esse dicimus:
cum siquidem dicitur, Socratem currere est possibile, non substantificamus
compositionem cursus cum Socrate, sed qualificamus, asserentes illam esse
possibilem. Unde Aristoteles hic modos proponens, veri et falsi nullo modo
meminit, licet infra verum et non verum inferat, propter causam ibi
assignandam. This kind of mode, properly speaking, is fourfold: possible,
impossible, necessary, and contingent. True and false are not included because,
strictly speaking, they do not seem to modify the composition even though they
fall upon the composition itself, as is evident in "That Socrates runs is
true,” and "That man is four-footed is false.” For something is said to be
modified in the proper sense of the term when it is caused to be in a certain way,
not when it comes to be according to its substance. Now, when a composition is
said to be true it is not proposed that it is in a certain way, but that it is.
To say, "That Socrates runs is true,” for example, is to say that the
composition of running with Socrates is. The case is similar when it is false,
for what is said is that it is not; for example, to say, "That Socrates
runs is false” is to say that the composition of running with Socrates is not.
On the other hand, when the composition is said to be possible or contingent,
we are not saying that it is but that it is in a certain way. For example, when
we say, "That Socrates run is possible,” we do not make the composition of
running with Socrates substantial, but we qualify it, asserting that it is possible.
Consequently, Aristotle in proposing the modes, does not mention the true and
false at all, although later on he infers the true and the not true, and
assigns the reason for it where he does this. 4 Et quia enunciatio modalis duas
in se continet compositiones, alteram inter partes dicti, alteram inter dictum
et modum, intelligendum est eam compositionem modificari, idest, quae est inter
partes dicti, non eam quae est inter modum et dictum. Quod sic perpendi potest.
Huius enunciationis modalis, Socratem esse album est possibile, duae sunt
partes; altera est, Socratem esse album, altera est, possibile. Prima dictum
vocatur, eo quod est id quod dicitur per eius indicativam, scilicet, Socrates
est albus: qui enim profert hanc, Socrates est albus, nihil aliud dicit nisi
Socratem esse album: secunda vocatur modus, eo quod modi adiectio est. Prima
compositionem quandam in se continet ex Socrate et albo; secunda pars primae
opposita compositionem aliquam sonat ex dicti compositione et modo. Prima
rursus pars, licet omnia habeat propria, subiectum scilicet, et praedicatum,
copulam et compositionem, tota tamen subiectum est modalis enunciationis;
secunda autem est praedicatum. Dicti ergo compositio subiicitur et modificatur
in enunciatione modali. Qui enim dicit, Socratem esse album est possibile, non
significat qualis est coniunctio possibilitatis cum hoc dicto, Socratem esse
album, sed insinuat qualis sit compositio partium dicti inter se, scilicet albi
cum Socrate, scilicet quod est compositio possibilis. Non dicit igitur
enunciatio modalis aliquid inesse, vel non inesse, sed dicti potius modum
enunciat. Nec proprie componit secundum significatum, quia compositionis non
est compositio, sed rerum compositioni modum apponit. Unde nihil aliud est
enunciatio modalis, quam enunciatio dicti modificativa. Since the modal
enunciation contains two compositions, one between the parts of what is said,
the other between what is said and the mode, it must be understood that it is
the former composition that is modified, i.e., the composition between the
parts of what is said, not the composition between what is said and the mode.
This can be seen in an example. In the modal enunciation, "That Socrates
be white is possible,” there are two parts: one, "That Socrates be white,”
the other, "is possible.” The first is called the dictum because it is
that which is asserted by the indicative, namely, "Socrates is white”; for
in saying "Socrates is white” we are simply saying, "That Socrates be
white.” The second part is called the mode because it is the addition of a
restriction. The first part of the modal enunciation consists of a certain
composition of Socrates and white; the second part, opposed to the first, 4
indicates a composition from the composition of dictum and mode. Again, the first
part, although it has all the properties of an enunciation—subject, predicate,
copula, and composition—is, in its entirety, the subject of the modal
enunciation; the second part, the mode, is the predicate. In a modal
enunciation, therefore, the composition of the dictum is subjected and
modified; for when we say, "That Socrates be white is possible,” it does
not signify the kind of conjunction of possibility there is with the dictum
"That Socrates be white,” but it implies the kind of composition there is
of the parts of the dictum among themselves, i.e., of white with Socrates,
namely, that it is a possible composition. The modal enunciation, therefore,
does not say that something is present in or not present in a subject, but
rather, it enunciates a mode of the dictum. Nor properly speaking does it
compose according to what is signified, since it is not a composition of the
composition; rather, it adds a mode to the composition of the things. Hence the
modal enunciation is simply an enunciation in which the dictum is modified. 5 Nec
propterea censenda est enunciatio plures modalis, quia omnia duplicata habeat:
quoniam unum modum de unica compositione enunciat, licet illius compositionis
plures sint partes. Plura enim illa ad dicti compositionem concurrentia, veluti
plura ex quibus fit unum subiectum concurrunt, de quibus dictum est supra quod
enunciationis unitatem non impediunt. Sicut nec cum dicitur, domus est alba,
est enunciatio multiplex, licet domus ex multis consurgat partibus. Because the
modal enunciation has everything duplicated, it must not on that account be
thought to be many. It enunciates one mode of only one composition, although
there are many parts of that composition. The many concurring for the
composition of the dictum are like the many that concur to make one subject, of
which it was said above that it does not impede the unity of the enunciation.”
The enunciation, "The house is white,” is also a case in point, for it is
not multiple, although a house is built of many parts. 6 Merito autem est, post
enunciationes de inesse, de modalibus tractandum, quia partes naturaliter sunt
toto priores, et cognitio totius ex partium cognitione dependet; et specialis
sermo de his est habendus, quia proprias habet difficultates. Notavit quoque Aristoteles
in textu multa. Horum ordinem scilicet, cum dixit: his vero determinatis etc.;
modos qui et quot sunt, cum eos expressit et inseruit; variationem eiusdem
modi, per affirmationem et negationem, cum dixit: possibile et non possibile,
contingens et non contingens; necessitatem cum addidit: habent enim multas dubitationes
proprias et cetera. Modal enunciations are rightly treated after the absolute
enunciation, for parts are naturally prior to the whole, and knowledge of the
whole depends on knowledge of the parts. Moreover, a special discussion of them
was necessary because the modal enunciation has its own peculiar difficulties.
Aristotle indicates in his text many of the things we have taken up here: the
order of modal enunciations, when he says, Having determined these things,
etc.; what and how many modes there are when he expresses and lists them, the
variation of the same mode by affirmation and negation when he says, the
possible and not possible, contingent and not contingent; the necessity of treating
them, when he adds, for they have many difficulties of their own. 7 Deinde cum
dicit: nam si eorum etc., exequitur tractatum de oppositione modalium. Et circa
hoc duo facit: primo, movendo quaestionem arguit ad partes; secundo, determinat
veritatem; ibi: contingit autem et cetera. Est autem dubitatio: an in
enunciationibus modalibus fiat contradictio negatione apposita ad verbum dicti,
quod dicit rem; an non, sed potius negatione apposita ad modum qui qualificat.
Et primo, arguit ad partem affirmativam, quod scilicet addenda sit negatio ad
verbum; secundo, ad partem negativam, quod non apponenda sit negatio ipsi
verbo; ibi: videtur autem et cetera. Then he investigates the opposition of
modal enunciations, where he says, Let us grant that of those things that are
combined, contradictories are those opposed to each other by being related in a
certain way according to "to be” and "not to be,” etc. First, he
presents the question and in so doing gives arguments for the parts; secondly,
he determines the truth, where he says, For it follows from what we have said,
either that the same thing is asserted and denied at once of the same subject,
etc. The question with respect to the opposition of modals is this: Is a
contradiction made in modal enunciations by a negation added to the verb of the
dictum, which expresses what is; or is it not, but rather by a negation added
to the mode which qualifies? Aristotle first argues for the affirmative part,
that the negation must be added to the verb; then he argues for the negative
part, that the negation must not be added to the verb, where he says, However
it seems that the same thing is possible to be and possible not to be, etc. 8 Intendit
ergo primo tale argumentum; si complexorum contradictiones attenduntur penes esse
et non esse (ut patet inductive in enunciationibus substantivis de secundo
adiacente et de tertio, et in adiectivis), contradictionesque omnium hoc modo
sumendae sunt, contradictoria huius, possibile esse, erit, possibile non esse,
et non illa, non possibile esse. Et consequenter apponenda est negatio verbo,
ad sumendam oppositionem in modalibus. Patet consequentia, quia cum dicitur,
possibile esse, et, possibile non esse, negatio cadit supra esse. Unde dicit:
nam si eorum, quae complectuntur, idest complexorum, illae sibi invicem sunt
oppositae contradictiones, quae secundum esse vel non esse disponuntur, idest
in quarum una affirmatur esse, et in altera negatur. His first argument is
this. If of combined things, contradictions are those related according to
"to be” and "not to be” (as is clear inductively in substantive
enunciations with a second determinant, in those with a third determinant, and
in adjectival enunciations) and all contradictions must be obtained in this
way, the contradictory of "possible to be” will be "possible not to
be,” and not, "not possible to be.” Consequently, the negation must be
added to the verb to get opposition in modal enunciations. The consequence is
clear, for when we say "possible to be” and possible not to be” the negation
falls on "to be.” Accordingly, he says, Let us grant that of those things
that are combined, i.e., of complex things, contradictions are those opposed to
each other which are disposed according to "to be” and "not to be,”
i.e., in one of which "to be” is affirmed and in the other denied. 9 Et
subdit inductionem, inchoans a secundo adiacente: ut, eius enunciationis quae
est, esse hominem, idest, homo est, negatio est, non esse hominem, ubi verbum
negatur, idest, homo non est; et non est eius negatio ea quae est, esse non
hominem, idest, non homo est: haec enim non est negativa, sed affirmativa de
subiecto infinito, quae simul est vera cum illa prima, scilicet, homo est. He
goes on to give an induction, beginning with an enunciation having a second determinant.
The negation of "Man is,” is, "Man is not,” in which the verb is
negated. The negation of "Man is,” is not, "Non-man is,” for this is
not the negative but the affirmative of the infinite subject, which is true at
the same time as the first enunciation, "Man is.” Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 8 n.
10Deinde prosequitur inductionem in substantivis de tertio adiacente: ut, eius
quae est, esse album hominem idest, ut illius enunciationis, homo est albus,
negatio est, non esse album hominem, ubi verbum negatur, idest, homo non est
albus; et non est negatio illius ea, quae est, esse non album hominem, idest,
homo est non albus. Haec enim non est negativa, sed affirmativa de praedicato
infinito. Et quia istae duae affirmativae de praedicato finito et infinito non possunt
de eodem verificari, propterea quia sunt de praedicatis oppositis, posset
aliquis credere quod sint contradictoriae; et ideo ad hunc errorem tollendum
interponit rationem probantem quod hae duae non sunt contradictoriae. Est autem
ratio talis. Contradictoriorum talis est natura quod de omnibus aut dictio,
idest affirmatio aut negatio verificatur. Inter contradictoria siquidem nullum
potest inveniri medium; sed hae duae enunciationes, scilicet, est homo albus,
et, est homo non albus, sunt contradictoriae per se; ergo sunt talis naturae
quod de omnibus altera verificatur. Et sic, cum de ligno sit falsum dicere, est
homo albus, erit verum dicere de eo, scilicet ligno, esse non album hominem,
idest, lignum est homo non albus. Quod est manifeste falsum: lignum enim neque
est homo albus, neque est homo non albus. Restat ergo ex quo utraque est simul
falsa de eodem, quod non sit inter eas contradictio. Sed contradictio fit quando
negatio apponitur verbo. He continues the induction with substantive
enunciations having a third determinant. The negation of the enunciation
"Man is white” is "Man is not white,” in which the verb is negated.
The negation is not "Man is nonwhite,” for this is not the negative, but
the affirmative of the infinite predicate. Now it might be thought that the
affirmatives of the finite and infinite predicates are contradictories since
they cannot be verified of the same thing because of their opposed predicates.
To obviate this error, Aristotle interposes an argument proving that these two
are not contradictories. The nature of contradictories, he reasons, is such
that either the assertion, i.e., the affirmation, or the negation, is verified
of anything, for between contradictories no middle is possible. Now the two
enunciations, that something "is white man” and "is nonwhite man” are
per se contradictories. Therefore, they are of such a nature that one of them
is verified of anything. For example, it is false to say "is white man” of
wood; hence "is nonwhite man” will be true to say of it, namely of wood,
i.e., "Wood is nonwhite man.” This is manifestly false, for wood is
neither white man nor nonwhite man. Consequently, there is not a contradiction
in the case in which each is at once false of the same subject. Therefore,
contradiction is effected when the negation is added to the verb. 11 Deinde
prosequitur inductionem in enunciationibus adiectivi verbi, dicens: quod si hoc
modo, scilicet supradicto, accipitur contradictio, et in quantiscunque
enunciationibus esse non ponitur explicite, idem faciet quoad oppositionem
sumendam, id quod pro esse dicitur (idest verbum adiectivum, quod locum ipsius
esse tenet, pro quanto, propter eius veritatem in se inclusam, copulae officium
facit), ut eius enunciationis quae est, homo ambulat, negatio est, non ea quae
dicit, non homo ambulat (haec enim est affirmativa de subiecto infinito), sed
negatio illius est, homo non ambulat; sicut et in illis de verbo substantivo,
negatio verbo addenda erat. Nihil enim differt dicere verbo adiectivo, homo
ambulat, vel substantivo, homo est ambulans. He continues his induction with
enunciations having an adjective verb: Now if the case is as we have stated it,
i.e., contradiction is taken as said above, then in enunciations in which
"to be” is not the determining word added (explicitly), that which is said
in place of "to be” will effect the same thing with respect to the
opposition obtained (i.e., the adjective verb that occupies the place of
"to be,” inasmuch as the truth of "to be” is included in it, effects
the function of the copula). For example, the negation of the enunciation
"Man walks” is not, "Non-man walks” (for this is the affirmative of
the infinite subject) but "Man is not walking.” In this case, as in that
of the substantive verb, the negation must be added to the verb, for there is
no difference between using the adjective verb, as in "Man walks,” and
using the substantive verb, as in "Man is walking.” 12 Deinde ponit
secundam partem inductionis dicens: et si hoc modo in omnibus sumenda est
contradictio, scilicet, apponendo negationem ad esse, concluditur quod et eius
enunciationis, quae dicit, possibile esse, negatio est, possibile non esse, et
non illa quae dicit, non possibile esse. Patet conclusionis sequela: quia in
illa, possibile non esse, negatio apponitur verbo; in ista autem non. Dixit
autem in principio huius rationis: eorum quae complectuntur, idest complexorum,
contradictiones fiunt secundum esse et non esse, ad differentiam incomplexorum
quorum oppositio non fit negatione dicente non esse, sed ipsi incomplexo
apposita, ut, homo, et, non homo, legit, et non legit. Then he posits the
second part of the induction: And if this is always the case, i.e., that
contradiction must be gotten by adding the negation to "to be,” we must
conclude that the negation of the enunciation that asserts "Possible to
be” is "possible not to be,” and not, "not possible to be.” The
consequent of the conclusion is evident, for in "possible not to be” the
negation is added to the verb, in "not possible to be,” it is not. At the
beginning of this argument, Aristotle said, Of those things that are combined,
i.e., complex things, the contradictions are effected according to "to be”
and "not to be.” He said this in reference to the difference between
complex and incomplex things, for opposition in the latter is not made by the
negation expressing "not to be,” but by adding the negative to the
incomplex thing itself, as in "man” and "non-man,” "reads” and
"non-reads.” Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 8 n. 13Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem
idem etc., arguit ad quaestionis partem negativam (scilicet quod ad sumendam
contradictionem in modalibus non addenda est negatio verbo), tali ratione.
Impossibile est duas contradictorias esse simul veras de eodem; sed
supradictae, scilicet, possibile esse, et, possibile non esse, simul
verificantur de eodem; ergo istae non sunt contradictoriae: igitur contradictio
modalium non attenditur penes verbi negationem. Huius rationis primo ponitur in
littera minor cum sua probatione; secundo maior; tertio conclusio. Minor quidem
cum dicit: videtur autem idem possibile esse, et, non possibile esse. Sicut
verbi gratia, omne quod est possibile dividi est etiam possibile non dividi, et
quod est possibile ambulare est etiam possibile non ambulare. Ratio autem huius
minoris est, quoniam omne quod sic possibile est (sicut, scilicet, est
possibile ambulare et dividi), non semper actu est: non enim semper actualiter
ambulat, qui ambulare potest; nec semper actu dividitur, quod dividi potest.
Quare inerit etiam negatio possibilis, idest, ergo non solum possibilis est
affirmatio, sed etiam negatio eiusdem. Adverte quod quia possibile est
multiplex, ut infra dicetur, ideo notanter Aristoteles addidit ly sic,
assumens, quod sic possibile est, non semper actu est. Non enim de omni possibili
verum est dicere quod non semper actu est, sed de aliquo, eo scilicet quod est
sic possibile, quemadmodum ambulare et dividi. Nota ulterius quod quia tale
possibile habet duas conditiones, scilicet quod potest actu esse et quod non
semper actu est, sequitur necessario quod de eo simul est verum dicere,
possibile esse, et, non esse. Ex eo enim quod potest actu esse, sequitur quod
sit possibile esse; ex eo vero quod non semper actu est, sequitur quod sit
possibile non esse. Quod enim non semper est, potest non esse. Bene ergo
intulit Aristoteles ex his duobus: quare inerit etiam negatio possibilis et non
solum affirmatio; potest igitur et non ambulare, quod est ambulabile, et non
videri, quod est visibile. Maior vero subiungitur, cum ait: at vero impossibile
est de eodem veras esse contradictiones. Infertur quoque ultimo conclusio: non
est igitur ista (scilicet, possibile non esse) negatio illius, quae dicit,
possibile esse: quia sunt simul verae de eodem. Caveto autem ne ex isto textu
putes possibile, ut est modus, debere semper accipi pro possibili ad
utrumlibet: quoniam hoc infra declarabitur esse falsum; sed considera quod
satis fuit intendenti declarare quod in modalibus non sumitur contradictio ex
verbi negatione, afferre instantiam in una modali, quae continetur sub
modalibus de possibili. When he says, However, it seems that the same thing is
possible to be and possible not to be, etc., he argues for the negative part of
the question, namely, to get a contradiction in modals the negation should not
be added to the verb. His reasoning is the following: It is impossible for two
contradictories to be true at once of the same subject; but "possible to
be” and "possible not to be” are verified at once of the same thing;
therefore, these are not contradictories. Consequently, contradiction of the
modals is not obtained by negation of the verb. In this reasoning, the minor is
posited first, with its proof; secondly, the major; finally, the conclusion.
The minor is: However, it seems that the same thing is possible to be and
possible not to be. For instance, everything that has the possibility of being
divided also has the possibility of not being divided, and that which has the
possibility of walking also has the possibility of not walking. The proof of this
minor is that everything that is possible in this way (as are possible to walk
and to be divided) is not always in act; for he who is able to walk is not
always actually walking, nor is that which can be divided always divided. And
so the negation of the possible will also be inherent in it, i.e., therefore
not only is the affirmation possible but also the negation. Notice that since
the possible is manifold, as will be said further on, Aristotle explicitly adds
"in this way” when he assumes here that that which is possible is not
always in act. For it is not true to say of every possible that it is not
always in act, but only of some, namely, those that are possible in the way in
which to walk and to be divided are possible. Note also that "possible in
this way” has two conditions: that it is able to be in act, and that it is not
always in act. It follows necessarily, then, that it is true to say of it
simultaneously that it is both possible to be and possible not to be. From the
fact that it can be in act it follows that it is possible to be; from the fact
that it is not always in act it follows that it is possible not to be, for that
which not always is, is able not to be. Aristotle, then, rightly infers from
these two: and so the negation of the possible will also be inherent in it; and
not just the affirmation, for that which could walk could also not walk and
that which could be seen not be seen. The major is: But it is impossible that
contradictions in respect to the same thing be true. The final conclusion
inferred is: Therefore, the negation of "possible to be” is not,
"possible not to be” because they are true at once of the same thing. In
relation to this part of the text, be careful not to suppose that possible as
it is a mode, is always to be taken for possible to either of two alternatives,
for this will be shown to be false later on. If you consider the matter
carefully you will see that it was enough for his intention to give as an
instance one modal contained under the modals of the possible in order to show
that contradiction in modals is not obtained by negation of the verb. 14 Deinde
cum dicit: contingit autem unum ex his etc., determinat veritatem huius
dubitationis. Et quia duo petebat, scilicet, an contradictio modalium ex
negatione verbi fiat an non, et, an potius ex negatione modi; ideo primo,
determinat veritatem primae petitionis, quod scilicet contradictio harum non
fit negatione verbi; secundo determinat veritatem secundae petitionis, quod
scilicet fiat modalium contradictio ex negatione modi; ibi: est ergo negatioet
cetera. Dicit ergo quod propter supradictas rationes evenit unum ex his duobus,
quae conclusimus determinare, aut idem ipsum, idest, unum et idem dicere, idest
affirmare et negare simul de eodem: idest, aut quod duo contradictoria simul
verificantur de eodem, ut prima ratio conclusit; aut affirmationes vel
negationes modalium, quae opponuntur contradictorie, fieri non secundum esse
vel non esse, idest, aut contradictio modalium non fiat ex negatione verbi, ut
secunda ratio conclusit. Si ergo illud est impossibile, scilicet quod duo
contradictoria possunt simul esse vera de eodem, hoc, scilicet quod
contradictio modalium non fiat secundum verbi negationem, erit magis eligendum.
Impossibilia enim semper vitanda sunt. Ex ipso autem modo loquendi innuit quod
utrique earum aliquid obstat. Sed quia primo obstat impossibilitas quae
acceptari non potest, secundo autem nihil aliud obstat nisi quod negatio supra
enunciationis copulam cadere debet, si negativa fieri debet enunciatio, et hoc
aliter fieri potest quam negando dicti verbum, ut infra declarabitur; ideo hoc
secundum, scilicet quod contradictio modalium non fiat secundum negationem
verbi, eligendum est: primum vero est omnino abiiciendum. Aristotle establishes
the truth with respect to this difficulty where he says, For it follows from
what we have said, either that the same thing is asserted and denied at once of
the same subject, etc. Since he is investigating two things, i.e., whether
contradiction of modals is made by the negation of the verb or not; and,
whether it is not rather by negation of the mode, he first determines the truth
in relation to the first question, namely, that contradiction of modals is not
made by negation of the verb; then he determines the truth in relation to the
second, namely, that contradiction of modals is made by negation of the mode,
where he says, Therefore, the negation of "possible to be” is "not
possible to be,” etc. Hence he says that because of the foresaid reasoning one
of these two follows: first, that either the same thing, i.e., one and the same
thing is said, i.e., is asserted and denied at once of the same subject, i.e.,
either two contradictories are verified at once of the same thing, as the first
argument concluded; or secondly, that assertions and denials of modals, which
are opposed contradictorily are not made by the addition of "to be” or
"not to be,” i.e., contradiction of modals is not made by the negation of
the verb, as the second argument concluded. If the former alternative is
impossible, namely, that two contradictories can be true of the same thing at
once, the latter, that contradiction of modals is not made according to
negation of the verb, must obtain, for impossible things must always be
avoided. His mode of speaking here indicates that there is some obstacle to
each alternative. But since in the first the obstacle is an impossibility that
cannot be accepted, while in the second the only obstacle is that the negation
must fall upon the copula of the enunciation if a negative enunciation is to be
formed, and this can be done otherwise than by denying the verb of the dictum,
as will be shown later on, then the second alternative must be chosen, i.e.,
that the contradiction of modals is not made according to negation of the verb,
and the first alternative is to be rejected. IX. 1. Determinat ubi ponenda sit
negatio ad assumendam modalium contradictionem. Et circa hoc quatuor facit:
primo, determinat veritatem summarie; secundo, assignat determinatae veritatis
rationem, quae dicitur rationi ad oppositum inductae; ibi: fiunt enim etc.;
tertio, explanat eamdem veritatem in omnibus modalibus; ibi: eius veroetc.;
quarto, universalem regulam concludit; ibi: universaliter vero et cetera. Quia
igitur negatio aut verbo aut modo apponenda est, et quod verbo non addenda est,
declaratum est per locum a divisione; concludendo determinat: est ergo negatio
eius quae est possibile esse, ea quae est non possibile esse, in qua negatur
modus. Et eadem est ratio in enunciationibus de contingenti. Huius enim, quae
est, contingens esse, negatio est, non contingens esse. Et in aliis, scilicet
de necesse et impossibile idem est iudicium. Aristotle now determines where the
negation must be placed in order to obtain contradiction in modals. He first
determines the truth summarily; secondly, he presents the argument for the
truth of the position, which is also the answer to the reasoning induced for
the opposite position, where he says, For just as "to be” and "not to
be” are the determining additions in the former, and the things subjected are
"white” and "man,” etc.; thirdly, he makes this truth evident in all
the modals, where he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be” is
"not possible not to be,” etc.; fourthly, he arrives at a universal rule
where he says, And universally, as has been said, "to be” and "not to
be must be posited as the subject, etc. Since the negation must be added either
to the verb or to the mode and it was shown above in virtue of an argument from
division that it is not to be added to the verb, he concludes: Therefore, the
negation of "possible to be” is "not possible to be”, that is, the
mode is negated. The reasoning is the same with respect to enunciations of the
contingent, for the negation of "contingent to be” is "not contingent
to be.” And the judgment is the same in the others, i.e., the necessary and the
impossible. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 2Deinde cum dicit: fiunt enim in illis
appositiones etc., subdit huius veritatis rationem talem. Ad sumendam
contradictionem inter aliquas enunciationes oportet ponere negationem super
appositione, idest coniunctione praedicati cum subiecto; sed in modalibus
appositiones sunt modi; ergo in modalibus negatio apponenda est modo, ut fiat
contradictio. Huius rationis, maiore subintellecta, minor ponitur in littera
per secundam similitudinem ad illas de inesse. Et dicitur quod quemadmodum in
illis enunciationibus de inesse appositiones, idest praedicationes, sunt esse
et non esse, idest verba significativa esse vel non esse (verbum enim semper
est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur), subiective vero appositionibus res
sunt, quibus esse vel non esse apponitur, ut album, cum dicitur, album est, vel
homo, cum dicitur, homo est; eodem modo hoc in loco in modalibus accidit: esse
quidem subiectum fit, idest dictum significans esse vel non esse subiecti locum
tenet; contingere vero et posse oppositiones, idest modi, praedicationes sunt.
Et quemadmodum in illis de inesse penes esse et non esse veritatem vel
falsitatem determinavimus, ita in istis modalibus penes modos. Hoc est enim
quod subdit, determinantes, scilicet, fiunt ipsi modi veritatem, quemadmodum in
illis esse et non esse, eam determinat. When he says, For just as "to be”
and "not to be” are the determining additions in the former, and the
things subjected are "white” and "man,” etc., he gives the argument
for the truth of his position. To obtain contradiction among any enunciations
the negation must be applied to the determining addition, i.e., to the word
that joins the predicate with the subject; but in modals the determining
additions are the modes; therefore, to get a contradiction in modals, the
negation must be added to the mode. The major of the argument is subsumed; the
minor is stated in Aristotle’s wording by a further similitude to absolute
enunciations. In absolute enunciations the determining additions, i.e., the
predications, are "to be” and "not to be,” i.e., the verb signifying
"to be” or "not to be” (for the verb is always a sign of those things
that are predicated of another). The things subjected to the determining
additions, i.e., to which to be” and "not to be” are applied, are
"white,” in "White is, "or man,” in "Man is.” This happens
in modals in the same way but in a manner appropriate to them. "To be” is
as the subject, i.e., the dictum signifying "to be” or "not to be”
holds the place of the subject; "is possible” and "is contingent,”
i.e., the modes, are the predicates. And just as in absolute enunciations we
determine truth or falsity with "to be” and "not to be,” so in modals
with the modes. He makes this point when he says, determining additions, i.e.,
these modes effect truth just as "to be” and "not to be” determine
truth and falsity in the others. 3. Et sic patet responsio ad argumentum in
oppositum primo adductum, concludens quod negatio verbo apponenda sit, sicut
illis de inesse. Dicitur enim quod cum modalis enunciet modum de dicto sicut
enunciatio de inesse, esse vel esse tale, puta esse album de subiecto, eumdem
locum tenet modus hic, quem ibi verbum; et consequenter super idem
proportionaliter cadit negatio hic et ibi. Eadem enim, ut dictum est, proportio
est modi ad dictum, quae est verbi ad subiectum. Rursus cum veritas et falsitas
affirmationem et negationem sequantur, penes idem attendenda est affirmatio vel
negatio enunciationis, et veritas vel falsitas eiusdem; sicut autem in
enunciationibus de inesse veritas vel falsitas esse vel non esse consequitur,
ita in modalibus modum. Illa namque modalis est vera quae sic modificat dictum
sicut dicti compositio patitur, sicut illa de inesse est vera, quae sic
significat esse sicut est. Est ergo negatio modo hic apponenda, sicut ibi
verbo, cum sit eadem utriusque vis quoad veritatem et falsitatem enunciationis.
Adverte quod modos, appositiones, idest, praedicationes vocavit, sicut esse in
illis de inesse, intelligens per modum totum praedicatum enunciationis modalis,
puta, est possibile. In cuius signum modos ipsos verbaliter protulit dicens:
contingere vero et posse appositiones sunt. Contingit enim et potest, totum
praedicatum modalis continent. Thus the response to the argument for the
opposite position, which he gave first, is evident. That argument concluded
that the negation should be added to the verb as it is in absolute
enunciations. But since the modal enunciates a mode of a dictum—as the absolute
enunciation enunciates "to be” or "not to be” such, for instance,
"to be white” of a subject—the mode holds the same place here that the
verb does there. Consequently, the negation falls upon the same thing
proportionally here and there, for the proportion of mode to dictum is the same
as the proportion of verb to subject. Again, since truth and falsity follow
upon affirmation and negation, the affirmation and negation of an enunciation
and its truth and falsity must be controlled by the same thing. In absolute
enunciations truth and falsity follow upon "to be” or "not to be,”
hence in the modals they follow upon the mode; for that modal is true which
modifies the dictum as the composition of the dictum permits, just as that
absolute enunciation is true which signifies that something is as it is.
Therefore, negation is added here to the mode just as it is added there to the
verb, since the power of each is the same with respect to the truth and falsity
of an enunciation. Notice that he calls the modes "determining additions,”
i.e., predications—as "to be” is in absolute enunciations—understanding by
the mode the whole predicate of the modal enunciation, for example, "is
possible.” As a sign of this he expresses the modes themselves verbally when he
says, "is possible” and "is contingent” are determining additions.
For "is contingent” and "is possible” comprise the whole predicate of
the modal enunciation. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 4Deinde cum dicit: eius vero quod
est possibile est non esse etc., explanat determinatam veritatem in omnibus
modalibus, scilicet de possibili, et necessario, et impossibili. Contingens
convertitur cum possibili. Et quia quilibet modus facit duas modales
affirmativas, alteram habentem dictum affirmatum, et alteram habentem dictum
negatum; ideo explanat in singulis modis quae cuiusque affirmationis negatio
sit. Et primo in illis de possibili. Et quia primae affirmativae de possibili
(quae scilicet habet dictum affirmatum) scilicet possibile esse, negatio
assignata fuit, non possibile esse; ideo ad reliquam affirmativam de possibili
transiens ait: eius vero, quae est possibile non esse (ubi dictum negatur)
negatio est non possibile non esse. Et hoc consequenter probat per hoc quod
contradictoria huius, possibile non esse, aut est, possibile esse, aut illa,
quam diximus, scilicet, non possibile non esse. Sed illa, scilicet, possibile
esse, non est eius contradictoria. Non enim sunt sibi invicem contradicentes,
possibile esse, et, possibile non esse, quia possunt simul esse verae. Unde et
sequi sese invicem putabuntur: quoniam, ut supra dictum fuit, idem est,
possibile esse, et, non esse, et consequenter sicut ad, posse esse, sequitur,
posse non esse, ita e contra ad, posse non esse, sequitur, posse esse; sed
contradictoria illius, possibile esse, quae non potest simul esse vera est, non
possibile esse: hae enim, ut dictum est, opponuntur. Remanet ergo quod huius
negatio, possibile non esse, sit illa, non possibile non esse: hae namque simul
nunquam sunt verae vel falsae. Dixit quod possibile esse et non esse sequi se
invicem putabuntur, et non dixit quod se invicem consequuntur: quia secundum
veritatem universaliter non sequuntur se, sed particulariter tantum, ut infra
dicetur; propter quod putabitur quod simpliciter se invicem sequantur. Deinde
declarat hoc idem in illis de necessario. Et primo, in affirmativa habente
dictum affirmatum, dicens: similiter eius quae est, necessarium esse, negatio
non est ea, quae dicit necessarium non esse, ubi modus non negatur, sed ea quae
est, non necessarium esse. Deinde subdit de affirmativa de necessario habente
dictum negatum, et ait: eius vero, quae est, necessarium non esse, negatio est
ea, quae dicit, non necessarium non esse. Deinde transit ad illas de impossibili,
eumdem ordinem servans, et inquit: et eius, quae dicit, impossibile esse,
negatio non est ea quae dicit, impossibile non esse, sed, non impossibile esse:
ubi iam modus negatur. Alterius vero affirmativae, quae est, impossibile non
esse, negatio est ea quae dicit non impossibile non esse. Et sic semper modo
negatio addenda est. When he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to
be” is [not, "not possible to be” but] "not possible not to be,”
etc., he makes this truth evident in all the modals, i.e., the possible, the
necessary, and the impossible (the contingent being convertible with the
possible). And since any mode makes two modal affirmatives, one having an
affirmed dictum and the other having a negated dictum, he shows what the
negation of each affirmation is in each mode. First he takes those of the
possible. The negation of the first affirmative of the possible (the one with
an affirmed dictum), i.e., "possible to be,” was assigned as "not
possible to be.” Hence, going on to the remaining affirmative of the possible
he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be” [wherein the dictum
is negated] is, "not possible not to be.” Then he a proves this. The
contradictory of "possible not to be” is either "Possible to be” or
"not possible not to be.” But the former, i.e., "possible to be,” is
not the contradictory of "possible not to be,” for they can be at once
true. Hence they are also thought to follow upon each other, for, as was said
above, the same thing is possible to be and not to be. Consequently, just as
"possible not to be” follows upon "possible to be,” so conversely
"possible to be” follows upon "possible not to be.” But the
contradictory of "possible to be,” which cannot be true at the same time,
is "not possible to be,” for these, as has been said, are opposed.
Therefore, the negation of "possible not to be” is, "not possible not
to be,” for these are never at once true or false. Note that he says, Wherefore
"possible to be” and "possible not to be” would appear to be
consequent to each other, and not that they do follow upon each other, for it
is not true that they follow upon each other universally, but only particularly
(as will be said later); this is the reason they appear to follow upon each
other simply. Then he manifests the same thing in the modals of the necessary,
and first in the affirmative with an affirmed dictum: The case is the same with
respect to the necessary. The negation of "necessary to be” is not,
"necessary not to be” (in which the mode is not negated) but, "not
necessary to be.” Next he adds the affirmative of the necessary with a negated
dictum: and the negation of "necessary not to be is "not necessary
not to be.” Next, he takes up the impossible, keeping the same order. The
negation of "impossible to be” is not, "impossible not to be” but,
"not impossible to be,” in which the mode is negated. The negation of the
other affirmative, "impossible not to be” is "not impossible not to
be.” The negation, therefore, is always added to the mode. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9
n. 5Deinde cum dicit: universaliter vero etc., concludit regulam universalem
dicens quod, quemadmodum dictum est, dicta importantia esse et non esse oportet
ponere in modalibus ut subiecta, negationem vero et affirmationem hoc, idest
contradictionis oppositionem, facientem, oportet apponere tantummodo ad suum
eumdem modum, non ad diversos modos. Debet namque illemet modus negari, qui
prius affirmabatur, si contradictio esse debet. Et exemplariter explanans
quomodo hoc fiat, subdit: et oportet putare has esse oppositas dictiones, idest
affirmationes et negationes in modalibus, possibile et non possibile,
contingens et non contingens. Item cum dixit negationem alio tantum modo ad
modum apponi debere, non exclusit modi copulam, sed dictum. Hoc enim est singulare
in modalibus quod eamdem oppositionem facit, negatio modo addita, et eius
verbo. Contradictorie enim opponitur huic, possibile est esse, non solum illa,
non possibile est esse, sed ista, possibile non est esse; meminit autem modi
potius, et propter hoc quod nunc diximus, ut scilicet insinuaret quod negatio
verbo modi postposita, modo autem praeposita, idem facit ac si modali verbo
praeponeretur, et quia, cum modo numquam caret modalis enunciatio, semper
negatio supra modum poni potest. Non autem sic de eius verbo: verbo enim modi
carere contingit modalem, ut cum dicitur, Socrates currit necessario; et ideo
semper verbo negatio aptari potest. Quod autem in fine addidit, verum et non
verum, insinuat, praeter quatuor praedictos modos, alios inveniri, qui etiam
compositionem enunciationis determinant, puta, verum et non verum, falsum et
non falsum: quos tamen inter modos supra non posuit, quia, ut declaratum fuit,
non proprie modificant. Then he says, And universally, as has been said,
"to be”and "not to be” must be posited as the subject, and those that
produce affirmation and negation must be joined to "to be” and "not
to be,” etc. Here he concludes with the universal rule. As has been said, the
dictums denoting "to be” and "not to be” must be posited in the
modals as subjects, and the one making this an affirmation and negation, i.e.,
the opposition of contradiction, must be added only to the selfsame mode, not
to diverse modes, for the selfsame mode which was previously affirmed must be
denied if there is to be a contradiction. He gives examples of how this is to
be done when he adds, And these are the words that are to be considered
opposed, i.e., affirmations and negations in modals, possible–not possible,
contingent–not contingent. Moreover, when he said elsewhere but in another way
that the negation must be applied only to the mode, he did not exclude the
copula of the mode, but the copula of the dictum. For it is unique to modals
that the same opposition is made by adding a negation to the mode and to its
verb. The contradictory of "is possible to be,” for instance, is not only
"is not possible to be,” but also "not is possible to be.” There are
two reasons, however, for his mentioning the mode rather than the verb: first,
for the reason we have just given, namely, so as to imply that the negation
placed after the verb of the mode, the mode having been put first, accomplishes
the same thing as if it were placed before the modal verb; and secondly,
because the modal enunciation is never without a mode; hence the negation can
always be put on the mode. However, it cannot always be put on the verb of a
mode, for the modal enunciation may lack the verb of a mode as for example in
"Socrates runs necessarily,” in which case the negation can always be
adapted to the verb. In adding "true” and "not true” at the end he
implies that besides the four modes mentioned previously there are others that
also determine the composition of the enunciation, for example, "true” and
"not true,” "false” and "not false”; nevertheless he did not
posit these among the modes first given because, as was shown, they do not properly
modify. X. 1. Postquam determinavit de oppositione modalium, hic determinare
intendit de consequentiis earum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, tradit
veritatem; secundo, movet quandam dubitationem circa determinata; ibi:
dubitabit autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ponit consequentias
earum secundum opinionem aliorum; secundo, examinando et corrigendo dictam
opinionem, determinat veritatem; ibi: ergo impossibile et cetera. Having
established the opposition of modals, Aristotle now intends to determine their
consequents. He first presents the true doctrine; then, he raises a difficulty
where he says, But it may be questioned whether "Possible to be follows
upon "necessary to be,” etc. In presenting the true doctrine, he first
posits the consequents of the opposition of modals according to the opinion of
others; secondly, he determines the truth by examining and correcting their
opinion, where he says, Now the impossible and the not impossible follow
contradictorily upon the contingent and the possible and the not contingent and
the not possible, but inversely, etc. 2 Quoad primum considerandum est quod cum
quilibet modus faciat duas affirmationes, ut dictum fuit, et duabus
affirmationibus opponantur duae negationes, ut etiam dictum fuit in primo;
secundum quemlibet modum fient quatuor enunciationes, duae scilicet
affirmativae et duae negativae. Cum autem modi sint quatuor, efficientur
sexdecim modales: quaternarius enim in seipsum ductus sexdecim constituit. Et
quoniam apud omnes, quaelibet cuiusque modi, undecumque incipias, habet unam
tantum cuiusque modi se consequentem, ideo ad assignandas consequentias
modalium, singulas ex singulis modis accipere oportet et ad consequentiae
ordinem inter se adunare. Before we consider these consequents according to the
opinion of others, we must first note that since any mode makes two
affirmations and there are two negations opposed to these, there will be four
enunciations according to any one mode, two affirmatives and two negatives. And
since there are four modes, there will be sixteen modals. Among these sixteen,
anyone of each mode, from wherever you begin, has only one of each mode following
upon it. Hence, to assign the consequents of the modals, we have to take one
from each mode and arrange them among themselves to form an order of
consequents. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 3Et hoc modo fecerunt antiqui, de quibus
inquit Aristoteles: consequentiae vero fiunt secundum infrascriptum ordinem,
antiquis ita ponentibus. Formaverunt enim quatuor ordines modalium, in quorum
quolibet omnes quae se consequuntur collocaverunt. Ut autem confusio vitetur,
vocetur, cum Averroe, de caetero, in quolibet modo, affirmativa de dicto, et
modo, affirmativa simplex; affirmativa autem de modo et negativa de dicto,
affirmativa declinata; negativa vero de modo et non dicto, negativa simplex;
negativa autem de utroque, negativa declinata: ita quod modi affirmationem vel negationem
simplicitas, dicti vero declinatio denominet. Dixerunt ergo antiqui quod
affirmationem simplicem de possibili, scilicet, possibile est esse, sequitur
affirmativa simplex de contingenti, scilicet, contingens est esse (contingens
enim convertitur cum possibili); et negativa simplex de impossibili, scilicet,
non impossibile esse; et similiter negativa simplex de necessario, scilicet,
non necesse est esse. Et hic est primus ordo modalium consequentium se. In
secundo autem dixerunt quod affirmativas declinatas de possibili et
contingenti, scilicet, possibile non esse, et, contingens non esse, sequuntur
negativae declinatae de necessario et impossibili, scilicet, non necessarium
non esse, et, non impossibile non esse. In tertio vero ordine dixerunt quod
negativas simplices de possibili et contingenti, scilicet, non possibile esse,
non contingens esse, sequuntur affirmativa declinata de necessario, scilicet,
necesse non esse, et affirmativa simplex de impossibili, scilicet, impossibile
esse. In quarto demum ordine dixerunt quod negativas declinatas de possibili et
contingenti, scilicet, non possibile non esse, et, non contingens non esse,
sequuntur affirmativa simplex de necessario, scilicet, necesse esse, et
affirmativa declinata de impossibili, scilicet, impossibile est non esse. The
modals were ordered in this way by the ancients. They disposed them in four
orders placing together in each order those that were a consequent to each
other. Aristotle speaks of this order when he says, Logical consequents follow
according to the order in the table below, which is the way in which the
ancients posited them. Henceforth, however, to avoid confusion let us call the
affirmative of dictum and mode in any one mode, the simple affirmative, as it
is by Averroes, among others; affirmative of mode and negative of dictum, the
declined affirmative; negative of mode and not of dictum, the simple negative;
negative of both mode and dictum, the declined negative. Hence, simplicity of
mode designates affirmation or negation, and so, too, does declination of
dictum. The ancients said, then, that simple affirmation of the contingent,
i.e., "contingent to be” follows upon simple affirmation of the possible,
i.e., "Possible to be” (for the contingent is converted with the possible);
the simple negative of the impossible also follows upon this, i.e., "not
impossible to be”; and the simple negative of the necessary, i.e., "not
necessary to be.” This is the first order of modal consequents. In the second
order they said that the declined negatives of the necessary and impossible,
i.e., "not necessary not to be” and "not impossible not to be,”
follow upon the declined affirmative of the possible and the contingent, i.e.,
"possible not to be” and "contingent not to be.” In the third order,
according to them, the declined affirmative of the necessary, i.e.,
"necessary not to be,” and the simple affirmative of of the impossible,
i.e., "impossible to be,” follow upon the simple negatives of the possible
and the contingent, i.e., "not possible to be” and not contingent to be.”
Finally, in the fourth order, the simple affirmative of the necessary, i.e.,
"necessary to be,” and the declined affirmative of the impossible, i.e.,
"impossible not to be,” follow upon the declined negatives of the possible
and the contingent, i.e., "not possible not to be” and "not
contingent not to be.” 4 Consideretur autem ex subscriptione appositae figurae,
quemadmodum dicimus, ut clarius elucescat depictum. Consequentiae enunciationum
modalium secundum quatuor ordines ab antiquis positae et ordinatae. (Figura). To
make this ordering more evident, let us consider it with the help of the
following table. CONSEQUENTS OF MODAL ENUNCIATIONS IN THE FOUR ORDERS POSITED
AND ORDERED BY THE ANCIENTS FIRST ORDER It is possible to be It is contingent
to be It is not impossible to be It is not necessary to be SECOND ORDER It is
possible not to be It is contingent not to be It is not impossible not to be It
is not necessary not to be It is not possible to be It is not contingent to be
It is impossible to be It is necessary not to be FOURTH ORDER It is not
possible not to be It is not contingent not to be It is impossible not to be It
is necessary to be Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 5Deinde cum dicit: ergo
impossibile et non impossibile etc., examinando dictam opinionem, determinat
veritatem. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia primo examinat consequentias earum de
impossibili; secundo, illarum de necessario; ibi: necessarium autem et cetera.
Unde ex praemissa opinione concludens et approbans, dicit: ergo istae,
scilicet, impossibile, et, non impossibile, sequuntur illas, scilicet,
contingens et possibile, non contingens, et, non possibile, sequuntur, inquam,
contradictorie, idest ita ut contradictoriae de impossibili contradictorias de
possibili et contingenti consequantur, sed conversim, idest, sed non ita quod
affirmatio affirmationem et negatio negationem sequatur, sed conversim,
scilicet, quod affirmationem negatio et negationem affirmatio. Et explanans hoc
ait: illud enim quod est possibile esse, idest affirmationem possibilis negatio
sequitur impossibilis, idest, non impossibile esse; negationem vero possibilis
affirmatio sequitur impossibilis. Illud enim quod est, non possibile esse,
sequitur ista, impossibile est esse; haec autem, scilicet, impossibile esse,
affirmatio est; illa vero, scilicet, non possibile esse, negatio est: hic
siquidem modus negatur; ibi, non. Bene igitur dixerunt antiqui in quolibet
ordine quoad consequentias illarum de impossibili, quia, ut in suprascripta
figura apparet, semper ex affirmatione possibilis negationem impossibilis, et
ex negatione possibilis affirmationem impossibilis inferunt.When he says, Now
the impossible and the not impossible follow contradictorily upon the
contingent and the possible and the not contingent and the not possible, but
inversely, etc., he determines the truth by examining the foresaid opinion.
First, he examines the consequents of enunciations predicating impossibility;
secondly, those predicating necessity, where he says, Now we must consider how
enunciations predicating necessity are related to these, etc. From the opinion
advanced, then, he concludes with approval that the impossible and the not
impossible follow upon the contingent and the possible and the not contingent
and the not possible, contradictorily, i.e., the contradictories of the
impossible follow upon the contradictories of the possible and the contingent,
but inversely, i.e., not so that affirmation follows upon affirmation and
negation upon negation, but inversely, i.e., negation follows upon affirmation
and affirmation upon negation. He explains this when he says, The negation of
"impossible to be” follows upon "possible to be,” i.e., the negation
of the impossible, i.e., "not impossible to be,” follows upon the affirmation
of the possible, and the affirmation of the impossible follows upon the
negation of the possible. For the affirmation, "impossible to be” follows
upon the negation, "not possible to be.” In the latter the mode is
negated, in the former it is not. Therefore, the ancients were right in saying
that in any order, the consequences of enunciations predicating impossibility
are as follows: from affirmation of the possible, negation of the impossible is
inferred; and from negation of the possible, affirmation of the impossible is
inferred. This is apparent in the diagram. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 6Deinde
cum dicit: necessarium autem etc., intendit examinando determinare
consequentias de necessario. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo examinat dicta
antiquorum; secundo, determinat veritatem intentam; ibi: at vero neque
necessarium et cetera. Circa primum quatuor facit. Primo, declarat quid bene et
quid male dictum sit ab antiquis in hac re. Ubi attendendum est quod cum
quatuor sint enunciationes de necessario, ut dictum est, differentes inter se
secundum quantitatem et qualitatem, adeo ut unam integrent figuram oppositionis
iuxta morem illarum de inesse; duae earum sunt contrariae inter se, duae autem
illis contrariis contradictoriae, ut patet in hac figura. (Figura). Quia ergo
antiqui universales contrarias bene intulerunt ex aliis, contradictorias autem
earum, scilicet particulares, male intulerunt; ideo dicit quod considerandum
restat de his, quae sunt de necessario, qualiter se habeant in consequendo
illas de possibili et non possibili. Manifestum est autem ex dicendis quod non
eodem modo istae de necessario illas de possibili consequuntur, quo easdem
sequuntur illae de impossibili. Nam omnes enunciationes de impossibili recte
illatae sunt ab antiquis. Enunciationes autem de necessario non omnes recte
inferuntur: sed duae earum, quae sunt contrariae, scilicet, necesse est esse,
et, necesse est non esse, sequuntur, idest recta consequentia deducuntur ab
antiquis, in tertio scilicet et quarto ordine; reliquae autem duae de
necessario, scilicet, non necesse non esse, et, non necesse esse, quae sunt
contradictoriae supradictis, sunt extra consequentias illarum, in secundo
scilicet et primo ordine. Unde antiqui in tertio et quarto ordine omnia recte
fecerunt; in primo autem et in secundo peccaverunt, non quoad omnia, sed quoad
enunciationes de necessario tantum. When he says, Now we must consider how
enunciations predicating necessity are related to these, etc., he proposes an
examination of the consequents of enunciations predicating necessity in order
to determine the truth about them. First he examines what was said by the
ancients; secondly, he determines the truth, where he says, But in fact neither
" necessary to be” nor "necessary not to be” follow upon "possible
to be,” etc. In his examination of the ancients, Aristotle makes four points.
First, he shows what was well said by the ancients and what was badly said. It
must be noted in regard to this that, as we have said, there are four
enunciations predicating necessity, which differ among themselves in quantity
and quality, and hence they make up a diagram of opposition in the manner of
the absolute enunciations. Two of them are contrary to each other, and two are
contradictory to these contraries, as is clear in the diagram below. necessary
to be contraries necessary not to be not necessary not to be subcontraries not
necessary to be Now the ancients correctly inferred the universal contraries
from the possibles, contingents, and impossibles, but incorrectly inferred their
contradictories, namely, particulars. This is the reason Aristotle says that it
remains to be considered how enunciations predicating necessity are related
consequentially to the possible and not possible. From what Aristotle says, it
is clear that those predicating necessity do not follow upon the possibles in
the same way as those predicating impossibility follow upon the possibles, for
all of the enunciations predicating impossibility were correctly inferred by
the ancients, but those predicating necessity were not. Two of them, the
contraries, "necessary to be” and "necessary not to be,” follow,
i.e., correct consequents were deduced by the ancients in the third and fourth
orders; the remaining two, "not necessary not to be” and "not
necessary to be,” which are contradictories of the contraries, are outside of
the consequents of these, i.e., in the second and first orders. Hence, the
ancients represented everything correctly in the third and fourth orders, but
in the first and second they erred, not with respect to all things, but only
with respect to enunciations predicating necessity. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n.
7Secundo cum dicit: non enim est negatio eius etc., respondet cuidam tacitae
obiectioni, qua defendi posset consequentia enunciationis de necessario in
primo ordine ab antiquis facta. Est autem obiectio tacita talis. Non possibile
esse, et, necesse non esse, convertibiliter se sequuntur in tertio ordine iam
approbato; ergo, possibile esse, et, non necesse esse, invicem se sequi debent
in primo ordine. Tenet consequentia: quia duorum convertibiliter se sequentium
contradictoria mutuo se sequuntur; sed illae duae tertii ordinis
convertibiliter se sequuntur, et istae duae primi ordinis sunt earum
contradictoriae; ergo istae primi ordinis, scilicet, possibile esse, et, non
necesse esse, mutuo se sequuntur. Huic, inquam, obiectioni respondet
Aristoteles hic interimendo minorem quoad hoc quod assumit, quod scilicet
necessaria primi ordinis et necessaria tertii ordinis sunt contradictoriae.
Unde dicit: non enim est negatio eius quod est, necesse non esse (quae erat in
tertio ordine), illa quae dicit, non necesse est esse, quae sita erat in primo
ordine. Et causam subdit, quia contingit utrasque simul esse veras in eodem;
quod contradictoriis repugnat. Illud enim idem, quod est necessarium non esse,
non est necessarium esse. Necessarium siquidem est hominem non esse lignum et
non necessarium est hominem esse lignum. Adverte quod, ut infra patebit, istae
duae de necessario, quas posuerunt antiqui in primo et tertio ordine, sunt
subalternae (et ideo sunt simul verae), et deberent esse contradictoriae; et
ideo erraverunt antiqui. Secondly, he says, For the negation of "necessary
not to be” is not "not necessary to be,” since both may be true of the
same subject, etc. Here he replies to a tacit objection. This reply could be
used to defend the consequent of the enunciation of the necessary made by the
ancients in the first order. The tacit objection is this: "not possible to
be” and "necessary not to be” follow convertibly in the third order which
has already been shown to be correct; therefore, "possible to be” and
"not necessary to be” ought to follow upon each other in the first order.
The consequent holds; for the contradictories of two that convertibly follow
upon each other, mutually follow upon each other; but those two follow upon
each other convertibly in the third order and these two in the first order are
their contradictories; therefore, those of the first order, i.e.,
"possible to be” and "not necessary to be,” mutually follow upon each
other. Aristotle replies here to this objection by destroying what was assumed
in the minor, i.e., that the necessary of the first order and the necessary of
the third order are contradictories. He says, For the negation of
"necessary not to be” (which is in the third order) is not "not
necessary to be” (which has been placed in the first order). He also gives the
reason: it is possible for both to be true at once of the same subject, which
is repugnant to contradictories. For the same thing which is necessary not to
be, is not necessary to be; for example, it is necessary that man not be wood
and it is not necessary that man be wood. Notice, as will be clear later, that
these two which the ancients posited in the first and third orders, are
subalterns and therefore are at once true, whereas they should be
contradictories; hence the ancients were in error. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n.
8Boethius autem et Averroes non reprehensive legunt tam hanc, quam praecedentem
textus particulam, sed narrative utramque simul iungentes. Narrare enim aiunt
Aristotelem qualitatem suprascriptae figurae quoad consequentiam illarum de
necessario, postquam narravit quo modo se habuerint illae de impossibili, et
dicere quod secundum praescriptam figuram non eodem modo sequuntur illas de
possibili illae de necessario, quo sequuntur illae de impossibili. Nam
contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de impossibili sequuntur, licet
conversim; contradictoriae autem de necessario non dicuntur sequi illas
contradictorias de possibili, sed potius eas sequi dicuntur contrariae de
necessario: non inter se contrariae, sed hoc modo, quod affirmationem
possibilis negatio de necessario sequi dicitur, negationem vero possibilis non
affirmatio de necessario sequi ponitur, quae sit contradictoria illi negativae
quae ponebatur sequi ad possibilem, sed talis affirmationis de necessario
contrario. Et quod hoc ita fiat in illa figura ut dicimus, patet ex primo et
tertio ordine, quorum capita sunt negatio et affirmatio possibilis, et extrema
sunt, non necesse esse, et, necesse non esse. Hae siquidem non sunt
contradictoriae. Non enim est negatio eius, quae est, necesse non esse, non
necesse esse (quoniam contingit eas simul verificari de eodem), sed illa
scilicet, necesse non esse, est contraria contradictoriae huius, scilicet, non
necesse esse, quae est, necesse est esse. Sed quia sequenti litterae magis
consona est introductio nostra, quae etiam Alberto consentit, et extorte
videtur ab aliis exponi ly contrariae, ideo prima, iudicio meo, acceptanda est
expositio et ad antiquorum reprehensionem referendus est textus. Boethius and
Averroes read both this and the preceding part of the text, not reprovingly,
but as explanatorily joined together. They say Aristotle explains the quality
of the above table with respect to the consequents of enunciations predicating
necessity after he has explained in what way those predicating impossibility
are related. What Aristotle is saying, then, is that those of the necessary do
not follow those of the possible in the same way as those of the impossible
follow upon the possible. For contradictories of the impossible follow upon
contradictories of the possible, although inversely; but contradictories of the
necessary are not said to follow the contradictories of the possible, but
rather the contraries of the necessary follow upon them. It is not the
contraries among themselves that follow, but contraries in this way: the
negation of the necessary is said to follow upon the affirmation of the possible;
but what follows on the negation of this possible is not the affirmation of the
necessary contradictory to that negative of the necessary following upon the
possible, but the contrary of such an affirmation of the necessary. That this
is the case is evident in the first and third orders. The sources are negation
and affirmation of the possible, and the extremes are "not necessary to
be” and "necessary not to be.” But these are not contradictories, for the
negation of "necessary not to be” is not "not necessary to be,” for
it is possible for them to be at once true of the same thing. "Necessary
not to be” is the contrary of the contradictory of "not necessary to be,”
which contradictory is "necessary to be.” In my judgment, however, the
first exposition should be accepted and this portion of the text taken as a
reproof of the ancients, because the contraries seem to be explained in a
forced way by others, whereas our introduction is more in accord with what
follows in the next part of the text; in addition, it agrees with Albert’s
interpretation. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 9Tertio cum dicit: causa autem cur
etc., manifestat id quod praemiserat, scilicet, quod non simili modo ad illas
de possibili sequuntur illae de impossibili et illae de necessario. Antiquorum
enim hoc peccatum fuit tam in primo quam in secundo ordine, et quod simili modo
intulerunt illas de impossibili et necessario. In primo siquidem ordine, sicut
posuerunt negativam simplicem de impossibili, ita posuerunt negativam simplicem
de necessario, et similiter in secundo ordine utranque negativam declinatam
locaverunt. Hoc ergo quare peccatum sit, et causa autem quare necessarium non
sequitur possibile, similiter, idest, eodem modo cum caeteris, scilicet, de
impossibili, est, quoniam impossibile redditur idem valens necessario, idest,
aequivalet necessario, contrarie, idest, contrario modo sumptum, et non eodem
modo. Nam si, hoc esse est impossibile, non inferemus, ergo hoc esse est
necesse, sed, hoc non esse est necesse. Quia ergo impossibile et necesse mutuo
se sequuntur, quando dicta eorum contrario modo sumuntur, et non quando dicta
eorum simili modo sumuntur, sequitur quod non eodem modo ad possibile se
habeant impossibile et necessarium, sed contrario modo. Nam ad id possibile
quod sequitur dictum affirmatum de impossibili, sequitur dictum negatum de
necessario; et e contrario. Quare autem hoc accidit infra dicetur. Erraverunt
igitur antiqui quod similes enunciationes de impossibili et necessario in primo
et in secundo ordine locaverunt. Thirdly, he says, Now the reason why
enunciations predicating necessity do not follow in the same way as the others,
etc. Here Aristotle shows why enunciations predicating impossibility and
necessity do not follow in a similar way upon those predicating possibility.
This was the error made by the ancients in both the first and second orders,
for in the first order they posited the simple negative of the impossible, and
in a similar way the simple negative of the necessary, and in the second order
their declined negatives, the reason being that they inferred those predicating
impossibility and necessity in a similar way. The cause of this error, then,
and the reason why enunciations predicating necessity do not follow the
possible in the same way, i.e., in a similar mode, as the others, i.e., as the
impossibles, is that the impossible expresses the same meaning as the
necessary, i.e., is equivalent to the necessary, contrarily, i.e., taken in a
contrary mode, and not in the same mode. For if something is impossible to be,
we do not infer, therefore it is necessary to be, but it is necessary not to
be. Since, therefore, the impossible and necessary mutually follow each other
when their dictums are taken in a contrary mode—and not when their dictums are
taken in a similar mode — it follows that the impossible and necessary are not
related in the same way to the possible, but in a contrary way. For the negated
dictum of the necessary follows upon that possible which follows the affirmed
dictum of the impossible, and contrarily. Why this is so will be explained
later. Therefore, the ancients erred when they located similar enunciations of
the impossible and necessary in the first and in the second orders. Cajetanus
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 10 Hinc apparet quod supra posita nostra expositio conformior
est Aristoteli. Cum enim hunc textum induxerit ad manifestandum illa verba:
manifestum est autem quoniam non eodem modo, etc., eo accipiendo sunt sensu
illa verba, quo hic per causam manifestantur. Liquet autem quod hic redditur causa
dissimilitudinis verae inter necessarias et impossibiles in consequendo
possibiles, et non dissimilitudinis falso opinatae ab antiquis: quoniam ex vera
causa nonnisi verum concluditur. Ergo reprehendendo antiquos, veram
dissimilitudinem inter necessarias, et impossibiles in consequendo possibiles,
quam non servaverunt illi, proposuisse tunc intelligendum est, et nunc eam
manifestasse. Quod autem dissimilitudo illa, quam antiqui posuerunt inter
necessarias et impossibiles, sit falso posita, ex infra dicendis patebit.
Ostendetur enim quod contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de necessario
sequuntur conversim; et quod in hoc non differunt ab his quae sunt de
impossibili, sed differunt in hoc quod modo diximus, quod possibilium et
impossibilium se consequentium dictum est similiter, possibilium autem et
necessariorum, se invicem consequentium dictum est contrarium, ut infra clara
luce videbitur. Hence it appears that our exposition is more in conformity with
Aristotle. For he introduced this text to manifest these words: It is evident
that the case here is not the same, etc. By taking this meaning, then, these
words are made clear through the cause. Moreover, it is evident that here the
cause is given of a true dissimilitude between necessaries and impossibles in
following the possibles, and not of a dissimilitude falsely held by the
ancients, for from a true cause only the truth is concluded. Therefore in
reproving the ancients it must be understood that a true dissimilitude between
the necessary and impossible in following the possible, which they did not
beed, has been proposed, and now has been made manifest. It will be clear from
what will be said later that the dissimilitude posited by the ancients between
the necessary and impossible is falsely posited, for it will be shown that
contradictories of the necessary follow contradictories of the possible
inversely, and that in this they do not differ from enunciations predicating
impossibility. They do differ, however, in the way we have indicated, i.e., the
dictum of the possibles and of the impossibles following on them is similar,
but the dictum of the possibles and of the necessaries following on them is
contrary, as will be seen clearly later. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 11 Quarto
cum dicit: aut certe impossibile est etc., manifestat aliud quod proposuerat,
scilicet, quod contradictoriae de necessario male situatae sint secundum
consequentiam ab antiquis, qui contradictiones necessarii ita ordinaverunt. In
primo ordine posuerunt contradictoriam negationem, necesse esse, idest, non
necesse esse; et in secundo contradictoriam negationem, necesse non esse,
idest, non necesse non esse. Et probat hunc consequentiae modum esse malum in
primo ordine. Cognita enim malitia primi, facile est secundi ordinis agnoscere
defectum. Probat autem hoc tali ratione ducente ad impossibile. Ad necessarium
esse sequitur possibile esse: aliter sequeretur non possibile esse, quod
manifeste implicat; ad possibile esse sequitur non impossibile esse, ut patet;
ad non impossibile esse, secundum antiquos, sequitur in primo ordine non
necessarium esse; ergo de primo ad ultimum, ad necessarium esse sequitur non
necessarium esse: quod est inconveniens, quia est manifesta implicatio
contradictionis. Relinquitur ergo quod male dictum sit, quod non necessarium
esse consequatur in primo ordine. Ait ergo et certe impossibile est poni sic
secundum consequentiam, ut antiqui posuerunt, necessarii contradictiones, idest
illas duas enunciationes de necessario, quae sunt negationes contradictoriae aliarum
duarum de necessario. Nam ad id quod est, necessarium esse, sequitur, possibile
est esse: nam si non, idest quoniam si hanc negaveris consequentiam, negatio
possibilis sequitur illam, scilicet, necesse esse. Necesse est enim de
necessario aut dicere, idest affirmare possibile, aut negare possibile: de
quolibet enim est affirmatio vel negatio vera. Quare si dicas quod, ad necesse
esse, non sequitur, possibile esse, sed, non possibile est esse; cum haec
aequivaleat illi quae dicit, impossibile est esse, relinquitur quod ad, necesse
esse, sequitur, impossibile esse, et idem erit, necesse esse et impossibile
esse: quod est inconveniens. Bona ergo erat prima illatio, scilicet, necesse
est esse, ergo possibile est esse. Tunc ultra. Illud quod est, possibile esse,
sequitur, non impossibile esse, ut patet in primo ordine. Ad hoc vero,
scilicet, non impossibile esse, secundum antiquos eodem primo ordine, sequitur,
non necesse est esse (quare contingit de primo ad ultimum); ad id quod est,
necessarium esse, sequitur, non necessarium esse: quod est inconveniens, immo
impossibile. Fourthly, when he says, Or is it impossible to arrange the
contradictions of enunciations predicating necessity in this way? he manifests
another point he had proposed, namely, that contradictories of enunciations
predicating necessity were badly placed according to consequence by the
ancients when they ordered them thus: the contradictory negation to
"necessary to be,” i.e., "not necessary to be,” in the first order,
and the contradictory negation to "necessary not to be,” i.e., "not
necessary not to be,” in the second. Aristotle only proves that this mode of
consequence is incorrect in the first order, for when this is known the mistake
in the second order is readily seen. He does this by an argument leading to an
impossibility. "Possible to be” follows upon "necessary to be”;
otherwise "not possible to be” would follow, which it manifestly implies.
"Not impossible to be” follows upon "possible to be” as is evident,
and, according to the ancients, in the first order, "not necessary to be”
follows upon "not impossible to be.” Therefore, from first to last,
"not necessary to be” follows upon "necessary to be,” which is
inadmissible because there is an obvious implication of contradiction. Therefore,
it is erroneous to say that "not necessary to be” follows in the first
order. He says, then, that in fact it is impossible to posit contradictions of
the necessary according to consequence as the ancients posited them, i.e., in
the first order the contradictory negation of "necessary to be,” i.e.,
"not necessary to be” and in the second the contradictory negation of
"necessary not to be,” i.e., "not necessary not to be.” For
"possible to be” follows upon "necessary to be”; if not, i.e., if you
deny this consequence, the negation of the possible follows upon
"necessary to be,” since the possible must either be asserted of the
necessary or denied, the reason being that of anything there is a true
affirmation or a true negation. Therefore, if you say that "possible to
be” does not follow upon "necessary to be,” but "not possible to be”
does follow, then, since the latter is equivalent to the former, i.e.,
"not possible to be” to "impossible to be,” "impossible to be”
follows upon "necessary to be” and the same thing will be "necessary
to be” and "impossible to be,” which cannot be admitted. Consequently, the
first inference was good, i.e., "It is necessary to be, therefore it is
possible to be.” But again, "possible to be” follows upon "not
impossible to be,” as is evident in the first order, and according to the
ancients, "not necessary to be” follows upon "not impossible to be”
in the same first order. Therefore, from first to last we arrive at this:
"not necessary to be” follows upon "necessary to be,” which is
unlikely, not to say impossible. 12 Dubitatur hic: quia in I priorum dicitur
quod ad possibile sequitur non necessarium, hic autem dicitur oppositum. Ad hoc
est dicendum quod possibile sumitur dupliciter. Uno modo in communi, et sic est
quoddam superius ad necessarium et contingens ad utrunque, sicut animal ad
hominem et bovem; et sic ad possibile non sequitur non necessarium, sicut ad
animal non sequitur non homo. Alio modo sumitur possibile pro una parte
possibilis in communi, idest pro possibili seu contingenti, scilicet ad
utrunque, scilicet quod potest esse et non esse; et sic ad possibile sequitur
non necessarium. Quod enim potest esse et non esse, non necessarium est esse,
et similiter non necessarium est non esse. Loquimur ergo hic de possibili in
communi, ibi vero in speciali. There is a doubt about this, for in I Priorum
[13: 32a 28 and 32b 15], it is said that the not necessary follows upon the
possible, while here the opposite is said. The possible, however, is taken in
two ways: commonly, and thus it is superior to the necessary and the contingent
to either of two alternatives, as is the case with animal in relation to man
and cow; taken in this way, the not necessary does not follow upon the
possible, just as not-man does not follow upon animal. In another way the
possible is taken for one part of the possible commonly, i.e., for the possible
or contingent to either of two alternatives, namely, for what can be and not
be. The not necessary follows upon the possible taken in this way, for what can
be and not be is not necessary to be, and likewise is not necessary not to be.
In the Prior Analytics, then, Aristotle is speaking of the possible in
particular; here of the possible commonly. 13 Deinde cum dicit: at vero neque
necessarium etc., determinat veritatem intentam. Et circa hoc tria facit:
primo, determinat quae enunciatio de necessario sequatur ad possibile; secundo,
ordinat consequentias omnium modalium; ibi: sequuntur enim et cetera. Quoad
primum, sicut duabus viis reprehendit antiquos, ita ex illis duobus motivis
intentum probat. Et intendit quod, ad possibile esse, sequitur, non necesse non
esse. Primum motivum est per locum a divisione. Ad, possibile esse, non
sequitur (ut probatum est), non necesse esse, at vero neque, necesse esse,
neque, necesse non esse. Reliquum est ergo ut sequatur ad eam, non necesse non
esse: non enim dantur plures enunciationes de necessario. Huius communis
divisionis primo proponit reliqua duo membra excludenda, dicens: at vero neque
necessarium esse, neque necessarium non esse, sequitur ad possibile non esse;
secundo probat hoc sic. Nullum formale consequens minuit suum antecedens: tunc
enim oppositum consequentis staret cum antecedente; sed utrumque horum,
scilicet, necesse esse, et, necesse non esse, minuit possibile esse; ergo, et
cetera. Unde, tacita maiore, ponit minoris probationem dicens: illi enim,
scilicet, possibile esse, utraque, scilicet, esse et non esse, contingit
accidere; horum autem, scilicet, necesse esse et necesse non esse, utrumlibet verum
fuerit, non erunt illa duo, scilicet, esse et non esse, vera simul in potentia.
Et primum horum explanans ait: cum dico, possibile esse, simul est possibile
esse et non esse. Quoad secundum vero subdit. Si vero dicas, necesse esse vel
necesse non esse, non remanet utrumque, scilicet, esse et non esse, possibile:
si enim necesse est esse, possibilitas ad non esse excluditur; et si necesse
est non esse, possibilitas ad esse removetur. Utrumque ergo istorum minuit
illud antecedens, possibile esse, quoniam ad esse et non esse se extendit, et
cetera. Tertio subdit conclusionem: relinquitur ergo quod, non necessarium non
esse, comes est ei quae dicit, possibile esse; et consequenter haec ponenda
erit in primo ordine. When he says, But in fact neither "necessary to be”
nor "necessary not to be” follow upon "possible to be,” etc., he
determines the truth. First he determines which enunciation of the necessary
follows upon the possible; secondly, he orders the consequents of all of the
modals, where he says, Thus, these contradictions also follow in the way
indicated, etc. Aristotle has reproved the ancients in two ways; on the basis
of these two he now proves which enunciation of the necessary follows upon the
possible. What he intends to show is that "not necessary not to be”
follows upon "possible to be.” The first argument is taken from a locus of
division. "Not necessary to be” does not follow upon possible to be” (as
has been proved), but neither does "necessary to be” nor "necessary
not to be.” Therefore, "not necessary not to be” follows upon
"possible to be,” since there are no more enunciations of the necessary.
He first proposes the remaining two members that are to be excluded from this
common division: But in fact neither "necessary to be” nor "necessary
not to be” follow upon "possible to be.” Then he proves this: no formal
consequent diminishes its antecedent, for if it did, the opposite of the
consequent would stand with the antecedent; but both of these, namely,
"necessary to be” and "necessary not to be,” diminish possible to
be”; therefore, etc. The major is therefore implied and he gives the proof of
the minor when he says that "possible to be” admits of two possibilities,
namely, "to be” and "not to be”; but of these, namely, "necessary
to be” and "necessary not to be” (whichever should be true), these two,
"to be” and "not to be,” will not be true at the same time in
potency. He explains the first point thus: when I say "possible to be” it
is at once possible to be and not to be. With respect to the second, he adds:
if you should say, "necessary to be” or "necessary not to be,” both
do not remain, i.e., possible to be and not to be do not remain, for if a thing
is necessary to be, possibility not to be is excluded, and if it is necessary
not to be, possibility to be is removed. Both of these, then, diminish the
antecedent, possible to be, for it is extended to "to be” and "not to
be,” etc. Thirdly, he concludes: it remains, therefore, that "not
necessary not to be” accompanies "possible to be,” and consequently will
have to be placed in the first order. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 14 Occurrit in
hac parte dubium circa hoc quod dicit quod, ad possibile non sequitur
necessarium, cum superius dixerit quod ad ipsum non sequitur non necessarium.
Cum enim necessarium et non necessarium sint contradictoria opposita, et de
quolibet sit affirmatio vel negatio vera, non videtur posse evadi quin ad
possibile sequatur necessarium, vel, non necessarium. Et cum non sequatur
necessarium, sequetur non necessarium, ut dicebant antiqui. Augetur et
dubitatio ex eo quod Aristoteles nunc usus est tali argumentationis modo,
volens probare quod ad necessarium sequatur possibile. Dixit enim: nam si non
negatio possibilis consequatur. Necesse est enim aut dicere aut negare. A difficulty
arises at this point with respect to his saying that the necessary does not
follow upon the possible, since he has also said that the not necessary does
not follow upon it. For the necessary and the not necessary are opposed
contradictorily, and since of anything there is a true affirmation or negation,
it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that either the necessary or the
not necessary follows upon the possible; and since the necessary does not
follow, the not necessary must follow, as the ancients said. Furthermore, the
difficulty is augmented by the fact that Aristotle just used such a mode of
argumentation when, to prove that the possible follows upon the necessary, he
said, for if not, the negation will follow; for it is necessary either to
affirm or deny. 15. Pro solutione huius, oportet reminisci habitudinis quae est
inter possibile et necessarium, quod scilicet possibile est superius ad
necessarium, et attendere quod superius potestate continet suum inferius et
eius oppositum, ita quod neutrum eorum actualiter sibi vindicat, sed utrunque
potest sibi contingere; sicut animali potest accidere homo et non homo: et
consequenter inspicere debes quod, eadem est proportio superioris ad habendum
affirmationem et negationem unius inferioris, quae est alicuius subiecti ad
affirmativam et negativam futuri contingentis. Utrobique enim neutrum habetur,
et salvatur potentia ad utrumlibet. Unde, sicut in futuris contingentibus nec
affirmatio nec negatio est determinate vera, sed sub disiunctione altera est
necessario vera, ut in fine primi conclusum est; ita nec affirmatio nec negatio
inferioris sequitur determinate affirmationem vel negationem superioris, sed
sub disiunctione altera sequitur necessario. Unde non valet, est animal, ergo
est homo, neque, ergo non est homo, sed, ergo est homo vel non est homo. Quia
ergo possibile superius est ad necessarium, ideo optime determinavit
Aristoteles neutram contradictionis partem de necessario determinate sequi ad
possibile. Non tamen dixit quod sub disiunctione neutra sequatur; hoc enim est
contra illud primum principium: de quolibet est affirmatio vera vel falsa. Ad
id autem quod additur, ex eadem trahitur radice responsio. Quia enim
necessarium inferius est ad possibile, et inferius non in potentia sed in actu includit
suum superius, necesse est ad inferius determinate sequi suum superius: aliter
determinate sequetur eius contradictorium. Unde per dissimilem habitudinem,
quae est inter necessarium et possibile et non possibile, ex una parte, et
inter possibile et necessarium et non necessarium, ex altera parte, ibi optimus
fuit processus ad alteram contradictionis partem determinate, et hic optimus ad
neutram determinate. In order to resolve this, we must recall the relationship
between the possible and the necessary, namely, that the possible is superior
to the necessary. Now the superior potentially contains its own inferior and
the opposite of it in such a way that neither of them is actually appropriated
by the superior, but each is possible to it; as in the case of man and not-man
in relation to animal. We must also consider that the proportion of the
superior as related to the affirmation and negation of one inferior is the same
(which is the proportion of some subject to the affirmative and negative of a future
contingent), for it is had by neither of the two, and the potency to either is
kept. Accordingly, as in future contingents neither the affirmation nor the
negation is determinately true, but under disjunction one is necessarily true
(as was concluded at the end of the first book), so neither the affirmation nor
negation of the inferior follows upon the affirmation or negation of the
superior determinately, but under disjunction one follows necessarily. This,
for instance, is not valid: "It is animal, therefore it is man,” nor is
"therefore it is not man” valid, but, "therefore it is man or it is
not man.” Since, then, the possible is superior to the necessary, Aristotle has
correctly determined that neither part of the contradiction of the necessary
determinately follows upon the possible. However, he has not said that under
disjunction neither follows; for this would be opposed to the first principle,
that of anything there is a true or false affirmation. The response to what was
added, beginning with "Furthermore, the difficulty is augmented,” etc., is
based upon the same point. Since the necessary is inferior to the possible, and
the inferior does not include its superior in potency but in act, the superior
must follow determinately upon the inferior; otherwise the contradiction of it
would follow determinately. Hence, because of the dissimilar relationship
between the necessary and the possible and not possible on the one hand, and
between the possible and the necessary and not necessary on the other, the
movement of the earlier argument to one part of the contradiction determinately
was quite right, and the movement here to neither determinately was quite right.
16. Oritur quoque alia dubitatiuncula. Videtur enim quod Aristoteles
difformiter accipiat ly possibile in praecedenti textu et in isto. Ibi enim
accipit ipsum in communi, ut sequitur ad necessarium; hic videtur accipere
ipsum specialiter pro possibili ad utrumlibet, quia dicit quod possibile est
simul potens esse et non esse. Et ad hoc dicendum est quod uniformiter usus est
possibili. Nec eius verba obstant: quoniam et de possibili in communi verum est
dicere quod potest sibi utrunque accidere, scilicet, esse et non esse: tum quia
quidquid verificatur de suo inferiori, verificatur etiam de suo superiori,
licet non eodem modo; tum quia possibile in communi neutram contradictionis
partem sibi determinat, et consequenter utranque sibi advenire compatitur,
licet non asserat potentiam ad utranque partem, quemadmodum possibile ad
utrunque. There is another slight difficulty, for it seems that Aristotle takes
the possible in a different way in the preceding text and in this. There he
takes it commonly as it follows upon the necessary; here he seems to take it
specifically for the possible that is indifferent to alternatives, since he
says that the possible is at once possible to be and not to be. But in fact
Aristotle has used the possible uniformly. Nor are his words at variance, for
it is also true to say of the possible as common that it admits of both possibilities,
i.e., of "to be” and "not to be”; first, because whatever is verified
of its inferior is verified also of its superior, although not in the same
mode; secondly, because the possible as common determines neither part of the
contradiction to itself and consequently admits of either happening, although
it does not affirm a potency to each part, as does the possible to either of
two alternatives. 17. Secundum motivum ad idem, correspondens tacitae
obiectioni antiquorum quam supra exclusit, addit cum subdit: hoc enim verum est
et cetera. Ubi notandum quod Aristoteles sub illa maiore adducta pro antiquis
(scilicet, convertibiliter se consequentium contradictoria se mutuo
consequuntur), subsumit minorem: sed horum convertibiliter se sequentium in tertio
ordine (scilicet, non possibile esse et necesse non esse), contradictoria sunt,
possibile esse et non necesse non esse (quoniam modi negatione eis opponuntur);
ergo istae duae (scilicet, possibile esse et non necesse non esse) se
consequuntur et in primo locandae sunt ordine. Unde motivum tangens ait: hoc
enim, quod dictum est, verum est, idest verum esse ostenditur, et de necesse
non esse, idest, et ex illius, scilicet, non necesse non esse, opposita, quae
est, necesse non esse. Vel, hoc enim, scilicet, non necesse non esse, verum
est, scilicet, contradictorium illius de necesse non esse. Et minorem subdens
ait: haec enim, scilicet, non necesse non esse, fit contradictio eius, quae
convertibiliter sequitur, non possibile esse. Et explanans hoc in terminis
subdit. Illud enim, non possibile esse, quod est caput tertii ordinis, sequitur
hoc de impossibili, scilicet, impossibile esse, et haec de necessario,
scilicet, necesse non esse, cuius negatio seu contradictoria est, non necesse
non esse. Et quia, caeteris paribus, modus negatur, et illa, possibile esse,
est (subauditur) contradictoria illius, scilicet, non possibile; igitur ista
duo mutuo se consequuntur, scilicet, possibile esse, et, non necesse non esse,
tamquam contradictoria duorum se mutuo consequentium. The second grounds for
proving the same thing corresponds to the tacit objection of the ancients he
excluded above: For this, he says, is true also with respect to "necessary
to be,” etc. It should be noted here that Aristotle subsumes under the major
cited as a proof for the position of the ancients (namely, contradictories of
consequences convertibly following each other mutually follow upon each other)
this minor: but the contradictories of those following upon each other
convertibly in the third order (i.e., of "not possible to be” and
"necessary not to be”) are "possible to be” and "not necessary
not to be” (for they are opposed to them by negation of mode); therefore, these
two (i.e., "possible to be” and "not necessary not to be”) follow
upon each other and are to be placed in the first order. Hence, with respect to
the basis of the above argument, he says, For this, i.e., what has been said,
is true, i.e., is shown to be true, also with respect to "necessary not to
be,” i.e., of the opposite of "not necessary not to be,” i.e.,
"necessary not to be.” Or, For this, namely, not necessary not to be,” is
true, namely, is the true contradictory of necessary not to be.” He gives the
minor when he says, For "not necessary not to be” is the contradictory of
what follows upon "not possible to be.” Then he states this explicitly:
for "not possible to be,” which is the source of the third order is
followed by this impossible, namely, "impossible to be,” and by this one
of the necessary, namely, "necessary not to be,” of which the negation or
contradictory is "not necessary not to be.” And since, other things being
equal, the mode is negated, and, "possible to be” is (it is understood)
the contradictory of "not possible to be,” therefore, these two mutually
follow upon each other, namely, "possible to be” and "not necessary
not to be,” as contradictories of the two mutually following upon each other.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 18 Deinde cum dicit: sequuntur enim etc., ordinat
omnes consequentias modalium secundum opinionem propriam; et ait quod, hae
contradictiones, scilicet, de necessario, sequuntur illas de possibili,
secundum modum praedictum et approbatum illarum de impossibili. Sicut enim
contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de impossibili sequuntur, licet
conversim; ita contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de necessario
sequuntur conversim: licet in hoc, ut dictum est, dissimilitudo sit quod,
contradictoriarum de possibili et impossibili similiter est dictum,
contradictoriarum autem de possibili et necessario contrarium est dictum, ut in
sequenti videtur figura: consequentiae enunciationum modalium secundum quatuor
ordines ab Aristotele positae et ordinatae. (Figura). Ubi vides quod nulla est
inter Aristotelem et antiquos differentia, nisi in duobus primis ordinibus
quoad illas de necessario. Praepostero namque situ usi sunt antiqui, eam de
necessario, quae locanda erat in primo ordine, in secundo ponentes, et eam quae
in secundo ponenda erat, in primo locantes. Et aspice quoque quod convertibiliter
se consequentium semper contradictoria se consequi ordinavit. Singulis enim
tertii ordinis singulae primi ordinis contradictoriae sunt; et similiter
singulae quarti ordinis singulis, quae in secundo sunt, contradictoriae sunt.
Quod antiqui non observarunt. When he says, Thus, these contradictions also
follow in the way indicated, etc., he orders all of the consequents of modals
according to his own opinion. He says, then, that these contradictions, namely,
of the necessary, follow those of the possible, according to the foresaid and
approved mode of those of the impossible. For just as contradictories of the
impossible follow upon contradictories of the possible, although inversely, so
contradictories of the necessary follow contradictories of the possible
inversely. In the latter, however, as has been said, there is a dissimilarity
in that the dictum of the contradictories of the possible and impossible is
similar, but the dictum of the contradictories of the possible and necessary is
contrary. This can be seen in the following table. CONSEQUENTS OF MODAL
ENUNCIATIONS POSITED AND ORDERED BY ARISTOTLE ACCORDING TO FOUR ORDERS FIRST
ORDER It is possible to be It is contingent to be It is not impossible to be It
is not necessary to be SECOND ORDER It is possible not to be It is contingent
not to be It is not impossible not to be It is not necessary not to be It is
not possible to be It is not contingent to be It is impossible to be It is
necessary not to be FOURTH ORDER It is not possible not to be It is not
contingent not to be It is impossible not to be It is necessary to be Here you
see that there is no difference between Aristotle and the ancients except in
the first two orders with respect to those of the necessary. The ancients
inverted the position of these, placing the necessary that should have been
placed in the first order in the second order, and the one that should have
been in the second in the first. Notice, too, that he has ordered them in such
a way that the contradictories of those following upon each other convertibly,
always follow each other, for each one in the first order is the contradictory
of each one in the third order, and similarly, each of the fourth order the
contradictory of each in the second. This the ancients did not observe. XI. 1. Postquam
Aristoteles declaravit modalium consequentias, hic movet quandam dubitationem
circa unum eorum quae determinata sunt, scilicet quod possibile sequitur ad
necesse. Et duo facit: quia primo dubitationem absolvit; secundo, ex
determinata quaestione alium ordinem earumdem consequentiarum modalibus
statuit; ibi: et est fortasse et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, movet
quaestionem; secundo, determinat eam; ibi: manifestum est et cetera. Movet ergo
quaestionem: primo dicens: dubitabit autem aliquis si ad id quod est necesse
esse sequatur possibile esse; et secundo, arguit ad partem affirmativam
subdens: nam si non sequatur, contradictoria eius sequetur, scilicet non
possibile esse, ut supra deductum est: quia de quolibet est affirmatio vel negatio
vera. Et si quis dicat hanc, scilicet, non possibile esse, non esse
contradictoriam illius, scilicet, possibile esse, et propterea subterfugiendum
velit argumentum, et dicere quod neutra harum sequitur ad necesse esse; talis
licet falsum dicat, tamen concedatur sibi, quoniam necesse erit ipsum dicere
illius contradictoriam fore, possibile non esse. Oportet namque aut non
possibile esse aut possibile non esse, esse contradictoriam, possibile esse; et
tunc in eumdem redibit errorem, quoniam utraeque, scilicet, non possibile esse
et possibile non esse, falsae sunt de eo quod est, necesse esse. Et
consequenter ad ipsum neutra sequi potest. Nulla enim enunciatio sequitur ad
illam, cuius veritatem destruit. Relinquitur ergo quod, ad necesse esse
sequitur possibile esse. Now that he has explained the consequents of modals,
Aristotle raises a question about one of the points that has already been
determined, namely, that the possible follows upon the necessary. He first
raises the question and then settles it where he says, It is evident by now
that not every possibility of being or walking is one that admits of opposites,
etc. Secondly, he establishes another order of the same consequents from the
determination of the present question, where he says Indeed the necessary and
not necessary may well be the principle of all that is or is not, etc. First,
then, he raises the question: But it may be questioned whether "Possible
to be follows upon "necessary to be.” Secondly, he argues to the
affirmative part: Yet if not, the contradictory, "not possible to be,”
would have to follow, as was deduced earlier, for either the affirmation or the
negation is true of anything. And if someone should say "not possible to
be” is not the contradictory of "possible to be,” because he wants to
avoid the conclusion by saying that neither of these follows upon
"necessary to be,” this may be conceded, although what he says is false.
But then he will have to say that the contradictory of "possible to be” is
"possible not to be,” for the contradictory of "possible to be” has
to be either "not possible to be” or "possible not to be.” But if he
says this, he will fall into another error, for it is false to say it is not
possible to be of that which is necessary to be, and it is false to say it is
possible not to be. Consequently, neither follows upon it, for no enunciation
follows upon an enunciation whose truth it destroys. Therefore, "possible
to be” follows upon "necessary to be.” 2. Tertio, arguit ad partem
negativam cum subdit: at vero rursus etc., et intendit talem rationem. Si ad
necesse esse sequitur possibile esse, cum ad possibile sequatur possibile non
esse (per conversionem in oppositam qualitatem, ut dicitur in I priorum, quia
idem est possibile esse et non esse), sequetur de primo ad ultimum quod necesse
est possibile non esse: quod est falsum manifeste. Unde oppositionis hypothesim
subdit: at vero rursus videtur idem possibile esse et non esse, ut domus, et
possibile incidi et non incidi, ut vestis. Quare de primo ad ultimum necesse
esse, erit contingens non esse. Hoc autem est falsum. Ergo hypothesis illa,
scilicet, quod possibile sequatur ad necesse, est falsa. Thirdly, he argues to
the negative part where he says, On the other hand, it seems possible for the
same thing to be cut and not to be cut, etc. His argument is as follows: If
"possible to be” follows upon "necessary to be,” then, since
"possible not to be” follows upon the possible (through conversion to the
opposite quality, as is said in I Priorum [13: 32a 31], for the same thing is
possible to be and not to be), from first to last it will follow that the
necessary is possible not to be, which is clearly false. In this argument,
Aristotle supplies a hypothesis opposed to the position that possible to be
follows upon necessary to be: On the other hand, it seems possible for the same
thing to be cut and not to be cut, for instance a garment, and to be and not to
be, for instance a house. Therefore, from first to last, necessary to be will
be possible not to be. But this is false. Therefore, the hypothesis that the
possible follows upon the necessary is false. 3. Deinde cum dicit: manifestum
est autemetc., respondet dubitationi. Et primo, declarat veritatem simpliciter;
secundo, applicat ad propositum; ibi: hoc igitur possibile et cetera. Proponit
ergo primo ipsam veritatem declarandam, dicens: manifestum est autem, ex
dicendis, quod non omne possibile esse vel ambulare, idest operari: idest, non
omne possibile secundum actum primum vel secundum ad opposita valet, idest ad opposita
viam habet, sed est invenire aliqua possibilia, in quibus non sit verum dicere
quod possunt in opposita. Deinde, quia possibile a potentia nascitur,
manifestat qualiter se habeat potentia ipsa ad opposita: ex hoc enim clarum
erit quomodo possibile se habeat ad opposita. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo
manifestat hoc in potentiis eiusdem rationis; secundo, in his quae aequivoce
dicuntur potentiae; ibi: quaedam vero potentiae et cetera. Circa primum tria
facit: quia primo manifestat qualiter potentia irrationalis se habeat ad
opposita; et ait quod potentia irrationalis non potest in opposita. When he
says, It is evident by now that not every possibility of being or walking,
etc., he answers the question he proposed. First, he manifests the truth
simply, then applies it to the question where he says, So it is not true to say
the latter possible of what is necessary simply, etc. First, then, he proposes
the truth he is going to explain: It is evident by now that not every
possibility of being or walking, i.e., of operating; that is, not everything
possible according to first or second act admits of opposites, i.e., has access
to opposites; there are some possibles of which it is not true to say that they
are capable of opposites. Then, since the possible arises from potency, he
manifests how potency is related to opposites; for it will be clear from this
bow the possible is related to opposites. First he manifests this in potencies
having the same notion; secondly, in those that are called potencies equivocally
where he says, But some are called potentialities equivocally, etc. With
respect to the way in which potencies of the same specific notion are related
to opposites, he does three things. First of all he manifests how an irrational
potency is related to opposites; an irrational potency, he says, is not a
potency that is capable of opposites. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 11 n. 4Ubi notandum
est quod, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., potentia activa, cum nihil aliud sit quam
principium quo in aliud agimus, dividitur in potentiam rationalem et
irrationalem. Potentia rationalis est, quae cum ratione et electione operatur;
sicut ars medicinae, qua medicus cognoscens quid sanando expediat infirmo, et
volens applicat remedia. Potentia autem irrationalis vocatur illa, quae non ex
ratione et libertate operatur, sed ex naturali sua dispositione; sicut calor
ignis potentia irrationalis est, quia calefacit, non ut cognoscit et vult, sed
ut natura sua exigit. Assignatur autem ibidem duplex differentia proposito
deserviens inter istas potentias. Prima est quod activa potentia irrationalis
non potest duo opposita, sed est determinata ad unum oppositorum, sive sumatur
oppositum contradictorie sive contrarie. Verbi gratia: calor non potest
calefacere et non calefacere, quae sunt contradictorie opposita, neque potest
calefacere et frigefacere, quae sunt contraria, sed ad calefactionem
determinatus est. Et hoc intellige per se, quia per accidens calor frigefacere
potest, vel resolvendo materiam caloris, humidum scilicet, vel per antiperistasin
contrarii. Et similiter potest non calefacere per accidens, scilicet si
calefactibile deest. Potentia autem rationalis potest in opposita et
contradictorie et contrarie. Arte siquidem medicinae potest medicus adhibere
remedia et non adhibere, quae sunt contradictoria; et adhibere remedia sana et
nociva, quae sunt contraria. Secunda differentia est quod potentia activa
irrationalis, praesente passo, necessario operatur, deductis impedimentis:
calor enim calefactibile sibi praesens calefacit necessario, si nihil impediat;
potentia autem rationalis, passo praesente, non necessario operatur: praesente
siquidem infirmo, non cogitur medicus remedia adhibere. It must be noted in
this connection that active potency, since it is the principle by which we act
on something else, is divided into rational and irrational potency, as is said
in IX Metaphysicae [2: 1046a 36]. Rational potency operates in connection with
reason and choice; for example, the art of medicine by which the physician,
knowing and willing what is expedient in healing an illness, applies a remedy.
Irrational potency operates according to its own natural disposition, not
according to reason and liberty; for example, the heat of fire is an irrational
potency, because it heats, not as it knows and wills, but as its nature
requires. In the Metaphysics, a twofold difference between these potencies is
assigned which is relevant here. The first is that an irrational active potency
is not capable of two opposites, but is determined to one opposite, whether "opposite”
is taken contradictorily or contrarily; e.g., heat cannot heat and not heat,
which are opposed contradictorily; nor can it heat and cool, which are
contraries, but is deter mined to heating. Understand this per se, for heat can
cool accidentally, either by destroying the matter of heat, namely, the humid,
or through alternation of the contrary. It also has the potentiality not to
heat accidentally, if that which can be heated is lacking. A rational potency,
on the other hand, is capable of opposites, both contradictorily and
contrarily; for by the art of medicine the physician can employ a remedy and
not employ it, which are contradictories, and employ healing and harmful
remedies, which are contraries. The second difference is that an irrational active
potency necessarily operates when a subject is present and impediments are with
drawn; for heat necessarily heats when a subject that can be heated is present,
and nothing impedes it. A rational potency, however, does not necessarily
operate when a subject is present; e.g., when a sick man is present the
physician is not forced to employ a remedy. 5. Dimittantur autem metaphysico
harum differentiarum rationes et ad textum redeamus. Ubi narrans quomodo se
habeat potentia irrationalis ad oppositum, ait: et primum quidem, scilicet, non
est verum dicere quod sit potentia ad opposita in his quae possunt non secundum
rationem, idest, in his quorum posse est per potentias irrationales; ut ignis
calefactivus est, idest, potens calefacere, et habet vim, idest, potentiam
istam irrationalem. Ignis siquidem non potest frigefacere; neque in eius
potestate est calefacere et non calefacere. Quod autem dixit primum ordinem,
nota, ad secundum genus possibilis infra dicendum, in quo etiam non invenitur
potentia ad opposita. The reasons for these differences are given in the
Metaphysics, but let us return to the text. Explaining bow an irrational
potency is related to opposites, he says, First of all, this is not true, i.e.,
it is not true to say that there is a potency to opposites in those which are
not according to reason, i.e., whose power is through irrational potencies; as
fire which is calefactive, i.e., capable of heating, has this power, i.e., this
irrational potentiality, since it is not able to cool, nor is it in its power 4
to heat and not to heat. Note that he speaks here of a first kind. This is in
relation to a second genus of the possible which he will speak of later, in
which there is not a potency to opposites either. 6. Secundo, manifestat
quomodo potentia rationalis se habeat ad opposita, intendens quod potentia
rationalis potest in opposita. Unde subdit: ergo potestates secundum rationem,
idest rationales, ipsae eaedem sunt contrariorum, non solum duorum, sed etiam
plurimorum, ut arte medicinae medicus plurima iuga contrariorum adhibere
potest, et a multarum operationum contradictionibus abstinere potest.
Praeposuit autem ly ergo, ut hoc consequi ex dictis insinuaret: cum enim
oppositorum oppositae sint proprietates, et potentia irrationalis ex eo quod
irrationalis ad opposita non se extendat; oportet potentiam rationalem ad
opposita viam habere, eo quod rationalis sit. Secondly, he shows how a rational
potency is related to opposites, i.e., it is capable of opposites: Therefore
potentialities that are in conjunction with reason, i.e., rational potencies,
are capable of contraries, not only of two, but even of many; for example, a
physician by the art of medicine can employ many pairs of contraries and he can
abstain from doing or not doing many things. He begins with "therefore” so
as to imply that this follows from what has been said.”’ The argument would be:
properties of opposites are opposites; an irrational potency, because it is
irrational, does not extend itself to opposites; therefore a rational potency,
because it is rational, has access to opposites. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 11 n.
7Tertio, explanat id quod dixit de potentiis irrationalibus, propter causam
infra assignandam ab ipso; et intendit quod illud quod dixit de potentia
irrationali, scilicet quod non potest in opposita, non est verum universaliter,
sed particulariter. Ubi nota quod potentia irrationalis dividitur in potentiam
activam, quae est principium faciendi, et potentiam passivam, quae est
principium patiendi: verbi gratia, potentia ad calorem dividitur in posse
calefacere, et in posse calefieri. In potentiis activis irrationalibus verum
est quod non possunt in opposita, ut declaratum est; in potentiis autem
passivis non est verum. Illud enim quod potest calefieri, potest etiam frigefieri,
quia eadem est materia, seu potentia passiva contrariorum, ut dicitur in II de
caelo et mundo, et potest non calefieri, quia idem est subiectum privationis et
formae, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et propter hoc ergo explanando, ait:
irrationales vero potentiae non omnes a posse in opposita excludi intelligendae
sunt, sed illae quae sunt quemadmodum potentia ignis calefactiva (ignem enim
non posse non calefacere manifestum est), et universaliter, quaecunque alia
sunt talis potentiae, quod semper agunt, idest quod quantum est ex se non
possunt non agere, sed ad semper agendum ex sua forma necessitantur. Huiusmodi
autem sunt, ut declaravimus, omnes potentiae activae irrationales. Alia vero
sunt talis conditionis quod etiam secundum irrationales potentias, scilicet
passivas, simul possunt in quaedam opposita, ut aer potest calefieri et
frigefieri. Quod vero ait, simul, cadit supra ly possunt, et non supra ly
opposita; et est sensus, quod simul aliquid habet potentiam passivam ad
utrunque oppositorum, et non quod habeat potentiam passivam ad utrunque
oppositorum simul habendum. Opposita namque impossibile est haberi simul. Unde
et dici solet et bene, quod in huiusmodi est simultas potentiae, non potentia
simultatis. Irrationalis igitur potentia non secundum totum suum ambitum a
posse in opposita excluditur, sed secundum partem eius, secundum potentias
scilicet activas. Thirdly, he explains what he has said about irrational
potencies. He will assign the reason for doing this later. He makes the point
that what he has said about irrational potentiality, i.e., that it is not
capable of opposites, is not true universally, but particularly. It should be
noted here that irrational potency is divided into active potency, which is the
principle of acting, and passive potency, which is the principle of being acted
upon; e.g., potency to heat is divided into potentiality to heat and
potentiality to be heated. Now it is true that active irrational potencies are
not capable of opposites, as was explained. This is not true, however, of
passive potencies, for what can be heated can also be cooled, because the mat
ter is the same, i.e., the passive potency of contraries, as is said in II De
caelo et mundo [7: 286a 23]. It can also not be heated, since the subject of
privation and of form is the same, as is said in I Physic [7: 189b 32].
Therefore, in explaining about irrational potencies, he says, But not all
irrational potentialities should be understood to be excluded from the capacity
of opposites. Those like the potentiality of fire to heat are to be excluded
(for it is evident that fire cannot not heat) I and universally, whatever
others are potencies of such a kind that they always act, i.e., the ones that
of themselves cannot not act, but are necessitated by their form always to act.
All active irrational potencies are of this kind, as we have explained. There
are others, however, of such a condition that even though they are irrational
potencies (i.e., passive) are simultaneously capable of certain opposites; for
example, air can be heated and cooled. "Simultaneously” modifies "are
capable” and not "opposites.” What he means is that the thing
simultaneously has a passive potency to each opposite, and not that it has a
passive potency to have both opposites simultaneously, for it is impossible to
have opposites at one and the same time. Hence it is customary and correct to
say that in these there is simultaneity of potency, not potency of
simultaneity. Therefore, irrational potency is excluded from the capacity of
opposites, not completely, but according to its part, namely, according to
active potencies. 8. Quia autem videbatur superflue addidisse differentias
inter activas et passivas irrationales, quia sat erat proposito ostendisse quod
non omnis potentia oppositorum est; ideo subdit quod hoc idcirco dictum est, ut
notum fiat quoniam nedum non omnis potestas oppositorum est, loquendo de
potentia communissime, sed neque quaecunque potentiae dicuntur secundum eamdem
speciem ad opposita possunt. Potentiae siquidem irrationales omnes sub una
specie irrationalis potentiae concluduntur, et tamen non omnes in opposita
possunt, sed passive tantum. Non supervacanea ergo fuit differentia inter
passivas et activas irrationales, sed necessaria ad declarandum quod non omnes
potentiae eiusdem speciei possunt in opposita. Potest et ly hoc demonstrare
utranque differentiam, scilicet, inter rationales et irrationales, et inter
irrationales activas et passivas inter se; et tunc est sensus, quod hoc ideo
fecimus, ut ostenderemus quod non omnis potestas, quae scilicet secundum eamdem
rationem potentiae physicae dicitur, quia scilicet potest in aliquid ut
rationalis et irrationalis, neque etiam omnis potestas, quae sub eadem specie
continetur, ut irrationalis activa et passiva sub specie irrationalis, ad
opposita potest. Because it might seem superfluous to have added the
differences between active and passive irrational potencies, since enough had
already been said to show that not every potency is of opposites, Aristotle
gives the reason for this. It was not only to make it known that not every
potency is of opposites, speaking of potency most commonly, but also that not
all that are called potencies according to the same species are capable of
opposites. For all irrational potencies are included under one species of
irrational potency, and yet not all are capable of opposites, but only the
passive potencies. It was not superfluous, therefore, to point out the
difference between passive and active irrational potencies, since this was
necessary in order to show that not all potencies of the same species are
capable of opposites. " This” in the phrase "this has been said”
could designate each difference, the one between rational and irrational
potencies, and the one between active and passive irrational potencies. The
meaning is, then, that we have said this to show that not every potentiality
which is said according to the same notion of physical power—namely, because it
can be in something as rational and irrational—not even every potentiality
which is contained under the same species, as active and passive under the
species irrational, is capable of opposites. XII. 1. Intendit declarare quomodo
illae quae aequivocae dicuntur potentiae, se habeant ad opposita. Et circa hoc
duo facit: primo, declarat naturam talis potentiae; secundo, ponit differentiam
et convenientiam inter ipsas et supradictas, ibi: et haec quidem et cetera. Ad
evidentiam primi advertendum est quod V et IX Metaphys., Aristoteles dividit
potentiam in potentias, quae eadem ratione potentiae dicuntur, et in potentias,
quae non ea ratione qua praedictae potentiae nomen habent, sed alia. Et has
appellat aequivoce potentias. Sub primo membro comprehenduntur omnes potentiae
activae, et passivae, et rationales, et irrationales. Quaecunque enim posse dicuntur
per potentiam activam vel passivam quam habeant, eadem ratione potentiae sunt,
quia scilicet est in eis vis principiata alicuius activae vel passivae. Sub
secundo autem membro comprehenduntur potentiae mathematicales et logicales.
Mathematica potentia est, qua lineam posse dicimus in quadratum, et eo quod in
semetipsam ducta quadratum constituit. Logica potentia est, qua duo termini
coniungi absque contradictione in enunciatione possunt. Sub logica quoque
potentia continetur quae ea ratione potentia dicitur, quia est. Hae vero merito
aequivoce a primis potentiae dicuntur, eo quod istae nullam virtutem activam
vel passivam praedicant; et quod possibile istis modis dicitur, non ea ratione
possibile appellatur quia aliquis habeat virtutem ad hoc agendum vel patiendum,
sicut in primis. Unde cum potentiae habentes se ad opposita sint activae vel
passivae, istae quae aequivocae potestates dicuntur ad opposita non se habent.
De his ergo loquens ait: quaedam vero potestates aequivocae sunt, et ideo ad
opposita non se habent. Aristotle now proposes to show in what way potencies
that are called equivocal are related to opposites. He first explains the
nature of this kind of potency, and then gives the difference and agreement all
between these and the foresaid, where he says, This latter potentiality is only
in that which is movable, but the former is also in the immovable, etc. In V
and IX Metaphysicae [V, 12: 1019a 15; 12, 1: 1046a 4], Aristotle divides
potency into those that are called potencies for the same reason, and those
that have the name potency for another reason than the aforesaid potencies. The
latter are named "potencies” equivocally. Under the first member are
included all active and passive, rational and irrational potencies, for
whatever are said to be possible through the active or passive potency they
have, are potencies for the same reason, i.e., because there is in them the
originative force of something active or passive. Mathematical and logical
potencies are included under the second member of this division. That by which
a line can lead to a square we call a mathematical potency, for a line
constitutes a square when protracted back to itself. That by which two terms
can be joined in an enunciation without contradiction is a logical potency.
Logical potency also comprises that which is called "potency” because it
is. The latter [mathematical and logical potencies] are named from the former
equivocally because they predicate no active or passive capacity; and what is
said to be possible in these ways is not termed possible in virtue of having
the capacity to do or undergo as in the first case. Hence, since the potencies
related to opposites are active or passive, the ones that are called
potentialities equivocally are not related to opposites. These, then, are the
potencies he speaks of when he says But some are called potentialities
equivocally, and therefore they are not related to opposites. Cajetanus lib. 2
l. 12 n. 2Deinde declarans qualis sit ista potestas aequivoce dicta, subdit
divisionem usitatam possibilis per quam hoc scitur, dicens: possibile enim non
uno modo dicitur, sed duobus. Et uno quidem modo dicitur possibile eo quod
verum est ut in actu, idest ut actualiter est; ut, possibile est ambulare,
quando ambulat iam: et omnino, idest universaliter possibile est esse, quoniam
est actu iam quod possibile dicitur. Secundo modo autem possibile dicitur
aliquid non ea ratione quia est actualiter, sed quia forsitan aget, idest quia
potest agere; ut possibile est ambulare, quoniam ambulabit. Ubi advertendum est
quod ex divisione bimembri possibilis divisionem supra positam potentiae
declaravit a posteriori. Possibile enim a potentia dicitur: sub primo siquidem
membro possibilis innuit potentias aequivoce; sub secundo autem potentias
univoce, activas scilicet et passivas. Intendebat ergo quod quia possibile
dupliciter dicitur, quod etiam potestas duplex est. Declaravit autem potestates
aequivocas ex uno earum membro tantum, scilicet ex his quae dicuntur possibilia
quia sunt, quia hoc sat erat suo proposito. To clarify the kind of potency that
is called equivocal, he gives the usual division of the possible through which
this is known. "Possible,” he says, is not said in one way, but in two.
Something is said to be possible because it is true as in act, i.e., inasmuch
as it actually is; for example, it is possible to walk when one is already
walking, and in gene eral, i.e., universally, that is said to be possible which
is possible to be because it is already in act. Something is said to be possible
in the second way, not because it actually is, but because it is about to act,
i.e., because it can act; for instance, it is possible for someone to walk
because be is about to walk. Notice here that by this two-membered division of
the possible he makes the division of potency posited above evident a
posteriori, for the possible is named from potency. Under the first member of
the possible he signifies potencies equivocally; under the second, potencies
univocally, i.e., active and passive potencies. He means to show, then, that
since possible is said in two ways, potentiality is also twofold. He explains
equivocal potentialities in terms of only one member, namely, those that are
called possible because they are, since this was sufficient for his purpose.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 3Deinde cum dicit: et haec quidem etc., assignat
differentiam inter utranque potentiam, et ait quod potentia haec ultimo dicta
physica, est in solis illis rebus, quae sunt mobiles; illa autem est et in
rebus mobilibus et immobilibus. Possibile siquidem a potentia dictum eo quod
possit agere, non tamen agit, inveniri non potest absque mutabilitate eius,
quod sic posse dicitur. Si enim nunc potest agere et non agit, si agere debet,
oportet quod mPombaur de otio ad operationem. Id autem quod possibile dicitur
eo quod est, nullam mutabilitatem exigit in eo quod sic possibile dicitur. Esse
namque in actu, quod talem possibilitatem fundat, invenitur et in rebus
necessariis, et in immutabilibus, et in rebus mobilibus. Possibile ergo hoc,
quod logicum vocatur, communius est illo quod physicum appellari solet. When he
says, This latter potentiality is only in that which is movable, but the former
is also in the immovable, etc., he specifies the difference between each
potency. This last potency, he says, [possible because it can be] which is
called physical potency, is only in things that are movable; but the former is
in movable and immovable things. The possible that is named from the potency
which can act, but is not yet acting, cannot be found without the mutability of
that which is said to be possible in this way. For if that which can act now
and is not acting, should act, it is necessary that it be changed from rest to
operation. On the other hand, that which is called possible because it is,
requires no mutability in that which is said to be possible in this way, for to
be in act, which is the basis of such a possibility, is found in necessary
things, in immutable things, and in mobile things. Therefore, the possible
which is called logical, is more common than the one we customarily call
physical. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 4Deinde subdit convenientiam inter utrunque
possibile, dicens quod in utrisque potestatibus et possibilibus verum est non
impossibile esse, scilicet, ipsum ambulare, quod iam actu ambulat seu agit, et
quod iam ambulabile est; idest, in hoc conveniunt quod, sive dicatur possibile
ex eo quod actu est, sive ex eo quod potest esse, de utroque verificatur non
impossibile; et consequenter necessario verificatur possibile, quoniam ad non
impossibile sequitur possibile. Hoc est secundum genus possibilis, respectu
cuius Aristoteles supra dixit: et primum quidem etc., in quo non invenitur via
ad utrunque oppositorum, hoc, inquam, est possibile quod iam actu est. Quod
enim tali ratione possibile dicitur, iam determinatum est ex eo quod actu esse
suppositum est. Non ergo possibile omne ad utrunque possibile est, sive
loquamur de possibili physice, sive logice.Then he shows that there is a
correspondence between these possibles when he adds that not impossible to be
is true of both of these potentialities and possibles, e.g., to walk is not
impossible for that which is already walking in act, i.e., acting, and it is
not impossible for that which could now walk; that is, they agree in that not
impossible is verified of both—of either what is said to be possible from the
fact that it is in act or of what is said to be possible from the fact that it
could be. Consequently, the necessary is verified as possible, for possible
follows upon not impossible. The possible that is already in act is the second
genus of the possible in which access is not found to both opposites, of which
Aristotle spoke when he said, First of all this is not true of the
potentialities which are not according to reason, etc. For that which is said
to be possible because it is already in act is already determined, since it is
supposed as being in act. Therefore, not every possible is the possible of
alternatives, whether we speak of the physical possible or the logical.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 5Deinde cum dicit: sic igitur possibile etc.,
applicat determinatam veritatem ad propositum. Et primo, concludendo ex dictis,
declarat habitudinem utriusque possibilis ad necessarium, dicens quod hoc ergo
possibile, scilicet physicum quod est in solis mobilibus, non est verum dicere
et praedicare de necessario simpliciter: quia quod simpliciter necessarium est,
non potest aliter esse. Possibile autem physicum potest sic et aliter esse, ut
dictum est. Addit autem ly simpliciter, quoniam necessarium est multiplex.
Quoddam enim est ad bene esse, quoddam ex suppositione: de quibus non est
nostrum tractare, sed solummodo id insinuare. Quod ut praeservaret se ab illis
modis necessarii qui non perfecte et omnino habent necessarii rationem,
apposuit ly simpliciter. De tali enim necessario possibile physicum non
verificatur. Alterum autem possibile logicum, quod in rebus immobilibus
invenitur, verum est de illo enunciare, quoniam nihil necessitatis adimit. Et
per hoc solvitur ratio inducta ad partem negativam quaestionis. Peccabat
siquidem in hoc, quod ex necessario inferebat possibile ad utrunque quod
convertitur in oppositam qualitatem. When he says, So it is not true to say the
latter possible of what is necessary simply, etc., he applies the truth he has
determined to what has been proposed. First, by way of a conclusion from what
has been said, he shows the relationship of each possible to the necessary. So,
he says, it is not true to say and predicate this possible, namely physical, which
is only in mobile things, of the necessary simply, because what is necessary
simply cannot be otherwise. The physical possible, however, can be thus and
otherwise, as has been said. He adds "simply” because the necessary is
manifold. There is the necessary for well-being and there is also the necessary
from supposition, but it is not our business to treat these, only to indicate
them. In order, then, to avoid the modes of the necessary that do not have the
notion of the necessary perfectly and in every way, he adds "simply.” Now
the physical possible is not verified of this kind of necessary [i.e., of the
necessary simply], but it is true to enunciate the logical possible, the one
found in immovable things, of the necessary, since it takes away nothing of the
necessity. The argument introduced for the negative part of this question”’ is
destroyed by this. The error in that argument was the inference—by way of
conversion into the opposite quality—of the possible to both alternatives from
the necessary. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 6Deinde respondet quaestioni
formaliter intendens quod affirmativa pars quaestionis tenenda sit, quod
scilicet ad necessarium sequitur possibile; et assignat causam. Quia ad partem
subiectivam sequitur constructive suum totum universale; sed necessarium est
pars subiectiva possibilis: quia possibile dividitur in logicum et physicum, et
sub logico comprehenditur necessarium; ergo ad necessarium sequitur possibile.
Unde dicit: quare, quoniam partem, scilicet subiectivam, suum totum universale
sequitur, illud quod ex necessitate est, idest necessarium, tamquam partem
subiectivam, consequitur posse esse, idest possibile, tamquam totum universale.
Sed non omnino, idest sed non ita quod omnis species possibilis sequatur; sicut
ad hominem sequitur animal, sed non omnino, idest non secundum omnes suas
partes subiectivas sequitur ad hominem: non enim valet: est homo, ergo est
animal irrationale. Et per hoc confirmata ratione adducta ad partem
affirmativam, expressius solvit rationem adductam ad partem negativam, quae
peccabat secundum fallaciam consequentis, inferens ex necessario possibile,
descendendo ad unam possibilis speciem, ut de se patet. Then he replies to the
question formally. He states that the affirmative part of the question must be
held, namely, that the possible follows upon the necessary. Next, he assigns
the cause. The whole universal follows constructively upon its subjective part;
but the necessary is a subjective part of the possible, because the possible is
divided into logical and physical and under the logical is comprehended the
necessary; therefore, the possible follows upon the necessary. Hence he says,
Therefore, since the universal follows upon the part, i.e., since the whole
universal follows upon its subjective part, to be possible to be, i.e.,
possible, as the whole universal, follows upon that which necessarily is, i.e.,
necessary, as a subjective part. He adds: though not every kind of possible
does, i.e., not every species of the possible follows; just as animal follows
upon man, but not in every way, i.e., it does not follow upon man according to
all its subjective parts, for it is not valid to say, "He is a man,
therefore he is an irrational animal.” By this proof of the validity of the
affirmative part, Aristotle has explicitly destroyed the reasoning adduced for
the negative part, which, as is evident, erred according to the fallacy of the
consequent in inferring the possible from the necessary by descending to one
species of the possible. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 7Deinde cum dicit: et est
fortasse quidem etc., ordinat easdem modalium consequentias alio situ,
praeponendo necessarium omnibus aliis modis. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo,
proponit quod intendit; secundo, assignat causam dicti ordinis; ibi: manifestum
est autem et cetera. Dicit ergo: et est fortasse principium omnium
enunciationum modalium vel esse vel non esse, idest, affirmativarum vel
negativarum, necessarium et non necessarium. Et oportet considerare alia,
scilicet, possibile contingere et impossibile esse, sicut horum, scilicet,
necessarii et non necessarii, consequentia, hoc modo: consequentiae
enunciationum modalium secundum quatuor ordines alio convenienti situ ab
Aristotele positae et ordinatae: (Figura). Vides autem hic nihil immutatum,
nisi quod necessariae quae ultimum locum tenebant, primum sortitae sunt. Quod
vero dixit fortasse, non dubitantis, sed absque determinata ratione rem
proponentis est. When he says, Indeed the necessary and not necessary may well
be the principle of all that is or is not, etc., he disposes the same
consequences of modals in another arrangement, placing the necessary before all
the other modes. First he proposes the order of modals and then assigns the
cause of the order where he says, It is evident, then, from what has been said
that that which necessarily is, actually is, etc. Indeed, he says, the
necessary and not necessary may well be the principle of the "to be” or
"not to be” of all modal enunciations, i.e., the necessary and not
necessary is the principle of affirmatives or negatives. And the others, i.e.,
the possible, contingent, and impossible to be must be considered as consequent
to these, i.e., to the necessary and not necessary. THE CONSEQUENTS OF MODAL
ENUNCIATIONS ACCORDING TO THE FOUR ORDERS, POSITED AND DISPOSED BY ARISTOTLE IN
ANOTHER APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENT FIRST ORDER It is necessary to be It is not
possible not to be It is not contingent not to be It is impossible not to be
SECOND ORDER It is necessary not to be It is not possible to be It is not
contingent to be It is impossible to be It is not necessary to be It is
possible not to be It is contingent not to be It is not impossible not to be
FOURTH ORDER It is not necessary not to be It is possible to be It is
contingent to be It is not impossible to be Nothing is changed here except the
enunciations predicating necessity. They have been allotted the first place,
whereas in the former table they were placed last. When he says "may well
be,” it is not because he is in any doubt, but because he is proposing this
here without a determinate proof. 8. Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est
autemetc., intendit assignare causam dicti ordinis. Et primo, assignat causam,
quare praeposuerit necessarium possibili tali ratione. Sempiternum est prius
temporali; sed necessarium dicit sempiternitatem (quia dicit esse in actu,
excludendo omnem mutabilitatem, et consequenter temporalitatem, quae sine motu
non est imaginabilis), possibile autem dicit temporalitatem (quia non excludit
quin possit esse et non esse); ergo necesse merito prius ponitur quam
possibile. Unde dicit, proponendo minorem: manifestum est autem ex his quae
dicta sunt etc., tractando de necessario: quoniam id quod ex necessitate est,
secundum actum est totaliter, scilicet quia omnem excludit mutabilitatem et
potentiam ad oppositum: si enim mutari posset in oppositum aliquo modo, iam non
esset necessarium. Deinde subdit maiorem per modum antecedentis conditionalis:
quare si priora sunt sempiterna temporalibus et cetera. Ultimo ponit
conclusionem: et quae actu sunt omnino, scilicet necessaria, priora sunt
potestate, idest possibilibus, quae omnino actu esse non possunt, licet
compatiantur. When he says, It is evident, then, from what has been said that
that which necessarily is, actually is, etc., he gives the cause of this order.
First he gives the reason for placing the necessary before the possible: the
sempiternal is prior to the temporal; but "necessary” signifies
sempiternal (because it signifies "to be in act,” excluding all mutability
and consequently temporality, which is not imaginable without movement) and the
possible signifies temporality (since it does not exclude the possibility of
being and not being); therefore, the necessary is rightly placed before the
possible. He proposes the minor of this argument when he says, It is evident,
then, from what has been said in treating the necessary, that that which
necessarily is, is totally in act, since it excludes all mutability and potency
to the opposite—for if it could be changed into the opposite in any way, then
it would not be necessary. Next he gives the major, which is in the mode of an
antecedent conditional: and if eternal things are prior to temporal, etc.
Finally, he posits the conclusion: those that are wholly in act in every way,
namely necessary, are prior to the potential, i.e., to possibles, which do not
have being in act wholly although they are compatible with it. Cajetanus lib. 2
l. 12 n. 9Deinde cum dicit: et hae quidem etc., assignat causam totius ordinis
a se inter modales statuti, tali ratione. Universi triplex est gradus. Quaedam
sunt actu sine potestate, idest sine admixta potentia, ut primae substantiae,
non illae quas in praesenti diximus primas, eo quod principaliter et maxime
substent, sed illae quae sunt primae, quia omnium rerum sunt causae,
intelligentiae scilicet. Alia sunt actu cum possibilitate, ut omnia mobilia,
quae secundum id quod habent de actu sunt priora natura seipsis secundum id
quod habent de potentia, licet e contra sit, aspiciendo ordinem temporis. Sunt
enim secundum id quod habent de potentia priora tempore seipsis secundum id
quod habent de actu. Verbi gratia, Socrates prius secundum tempus poterat esse
philosophus, deinde fuit actualiter philosophus. Potentia ergo praecedit actum
secundum ordinem temporis in Socrate, ordine autem naturae, perfectionis et
dignitatis e converso contingit. Prior enim secundum dignitatem, idest dignior
et perfectior habebatur Socrates cum philosophus actualiter erat, quam cum
philosophus esse poterat. Praeposterus est igitur ordo potentiae et actus in
unomet, utroque ordine, scilicet, naturae et temporis attento. Alia vero
nunquam sunt actu sed potestate tantum, ut motus, tempus, infinita divisio
magnitudinis, et infinita augmentatio numeri. Haec enim, ut IX Metaphys.
dicitur, nunquam exeunt in actum, quoniam eorum rationi repugnat. Nunquam enim
aliquid horum ita est quin aliquid eius expectetur, et consequenter nunquam
esse potest nisi in potentia. Sed de his alio tractandum est loco. Then he
says, Some things are actualities without potentiality, namely, the primary
substances, etc. Here he assigns the cause of the whole order established among
modals. The grades of the universe are threefold. Some things are in act
without potentiality, i.e., not combined with potency. These are the primary
substances—not those we have called "first” in the present work because
they principally and especially sustain—but those that are first because they
are the causes of all things, namely, the Intelligences. In others, act is
accompanied with possibility, as is the case with all mobile things, which,
according to what they have of act, are prior in nature to themselves according
to what they have of potency, although the contrary is the case in regard to
the order of time. According to what they have of potency they are prior in
time to themselves according to what they have of act. For example, according
to time, Socrates first was able to be a philosopher, then he actually was a
philosopher. In Socrates therefore, potency precedes act according to the order
of time. The converse is the case, however, in the order of nature, perfection,
and dignity, for when he actually was a philosopher, Socrates was regarded as
prior according to dignity, i.e., more worthy and more perfect than when he was
potentially a philosopher. Hence, when we consider each order, i.e., nature and
time, in one and the same thing, the order of potency and act is reversed.
Others never are in act but are only in potency, e.g., motion, time, the
infinite division of magnitude, and the infinite augmentation of number. These,
as is said in IX Metaphysicae [6: 1048b 9-17], never terminate in act, for it
is repugnant to their nature. None of them is ever such that something of it is
not expected, and consequently they can only be in potency. These, however,
must be treated in another place. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 10 Nunc haec ideo
dicta sint ut, inspecto ordine universi, appareat quod illum imitati sumus in
nostro ordine. Posuimus siquidem primo necessarium, quod sonat actu esse sine
potestate seu mutabilitate, imitando primum gradum universi. Locavimus secundo
loco possibile et contingens, quorum utrunque sonat actum cum possibilitate, et
sic servatur conformitas ad secundum gradum universi. Praeposuimus autem
possibile et non contingens, quia possibile respicit actum, contingens autem
secundum vim nominis respicit defectum causae, qui ad potentiam pertinet:
defectus enim potentiam sequitur; et ex hoc conforme est secundae parti
universi, in qua actus est prior potentia secundum naturam, licet non secundum
tempus. Ultimum autem locum impossibili reservavimus, eo quod sonat nunquam
fore, sicut et ultima universi pars dicta est illa, quae nunquam actu est.
Pulcherrimus igitur ordo statutus est, quando divinus est observatus. This has
been said so that once the order of the universe has been seen it should appear
that we were imitating it in our present ordering. The necessary, which
signifies "to be in act” without potentiality or mutability, has been
placed first, in imitation of the first grade of the universe. We have put the
possible and contingent, both of which signify act with possibility, in second
place in conformity with the second grade of the universe. The possible has
been Placed before the contingent because the possible relates to act whereas
the contingent, as the force of the name suggests, relates to the defect of a
cause-which pertains to potency, for defect follows upon potency. The order of
these is similar to the order in the second part of the universe, where act is prior
to potency according to nature, though not according to time. We have reserved
the last place for the impossible because it signifies what never will be, just
as the last part of the universe is said to be that which is never in act.
Thus, a beautifully proportioned order is established when the divine is
observed. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 11 Quia autem suppositae modalium
consequentiae nil aliud sunt quam aequipollentiae earum, quae ob varium
negationis situm, qualitatem, vel quantitatem, vel utranque mutantis, fiunt;
ideo ad completam notitiam consequentium se modalium, de earum qualitate et
quantitate pauca admodum necessaria dicenda sunt. Quoniam igitur natura totius
ex partium naturis consurgit, sciendum est quod subiectum enunciationis modalis
et dicit esse vel non esse, et est dictum unicum, et continet in se subiectum
dicti; praedicatum autem modalis enunciationis, modus scilicet, et totale
praedicatum est (quia explicite vel implicite verbum continet, quod est semper
nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur: propter quod Aristoteles dixit quod
modus est ipsa appositio), et continet in se vim distributivam secundum partes
temporis. Necessarium enim et impossibile distribuunt in omne tempus vel
simpliciter vel tale; possibile autem et contingens pro aliquo tempore in
communi. Since the consequents of modals, i.e., those placed under each other,
are their equivalents in meaning, and these are produced by the varying
position of the negation changing the quality or quantity or both, a few things
must be said about their quality and quantity to complete our knowledge of
them. The nature of the whole arises from the parts, and therefore we should
note the following things about the parts of the modal enunciation. The subject
of the modal enunciation asserts to be or not to be, and is a singular dictum,
and contains in itself the subject of the dictum. The predicate of a modal
enunciation, namely, the mode, is the total predicate (since it explicitly or
implicitly contains the verb, which is always a sign of something predicated of
another, for which reason Aristotle says that the mode is a determining
addition) and contains in itself distributive force according to the parts of
time. The necessary and impossible distribute in all time either simply or in a
limited way; the possible and contingent distribute according to some time
commonly. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 12 Nascitur autem ex his quinque
conditionibus duplex in qualibet modali qualitas, et triplex quantitas. Ex eo
enim quod tam subiectum quam praedicatum modalis verbum in se habet, duplex
qualitas fit, quarum altera vocatur qualitas dicti, altera qualitas modi. Unde
et supra dictum est aliquam esse affirmativam de modo et non de dicto, et e
converso. Ex eo vero quod subiectum modalis continet in se subiectum dicti, una
quantitas consurgit, quae vocatur quantitas subiecti dicti: et haec
distinguitur in universalem, particularem et singularem, sicut et quantitas
illarum de inesse. Possumus enim dicere, Socratem, quemdam hominem, vel omnem
hominem, vel nullum hominem, possibile est currere. Ex eo autem quod subiectum
unius modalis dictum unum est, consurgit alia quantitas, vocata quantitas
dicti; et haec unica est singularitas: secundum omne enim dictum cuiusque
modalis singulare est istius universalis, scilicet dictum. Quod ex eo liquet
quod cum dicimus, hominem esse album est possibile, exponitur sic, hoc dictum,
hominem esse album, est possibile. Hoc dictum autem singulare est, sicut et,
hic homo. Propterea et dicitur quod omnis modalis est singularis quoad dictum,
licet quoad subiectum dicti sit universalis vel particularis. Ex eo autem quod
praedicatum modalis, modus scilicet, vim distributivam habet, alia quantitas
consurgit vocata quantitas modi seu modalis; et haec distinguitur in universalem
et particularem. As a consequence of these five conditions there is a twofold
quality and a threefold quantity in any modal. The twofold quality results from
the fact that both the subject and the predicate of a modal have a verb in
them. One of these is called the quality of the dictum, the other the quality
of the mode. This is why it was said above that there is an enunciation which
is affirmative of mode and not of dictum, and conversely. Of the threefold
quantity of a modal enunciation, one arises from the fact that the subject of
the modal contains in it the subject of the dictum. This is called the quantity
of the subject of the dictum, and is distinguished into universal, particular,
and singular, as in the case of the quantity of an absolute enunciation. For we
can say: "That ‘Socrates,’ ‘some man,’ ‘every man,”’ or "‘no man,’
run is possible’ " The second quantity is that of the dictum, which arises
from the fact that the subject of one modal is one dictum. This is a unique
singularity, for every dictum of a modal is the singular of that universal,
i.e.,dictum. "That man be white is possible” means "This dictum,
‘that man be white,’ is possible.” "This dictum” is singular in quantity,
just as "this man” is. Hence, every modal is singular with respect to dictum,
although with respect to the subject of the dictum it is universal or
particular. The third quantity is that of the mode, or modal quantity, which
arises from the fact that the predicate of the modal, i.e., the mode, has
distributive force. This is distinguished into universal and particular.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 13 Ubi diligenter duo attendenda sunt. Primum est
quod hoc est singulare in modalibus, quod praedicatum simpliciter quantificat
propositionem modalem, sicut et simpliciter qualificat. Sicut enim illa est
simpliciter affirmativa, in qua modus affirmatur, et illa negativa, in qua
modus negatur; ita illa est simpliciter universalis cuius modus est
universalis, et illa particularis cuius modus est particularis. Et hoc quia
modalis modi naturam sequitur. Secundum attendendum (quod est causa istius
primi) est, quod praedicatum modalis, scilicet modus, non habet solam
habitudinem praedicati respectu sui subiecti, scilicet esse et non esse, sed
habitudinem syncategorematis distributivi, sed non secundum quantitatem partium
subiectivarum ipsius subiecti, sed secundum quantitatem partium temporis
eiusdem. Et merito. Sicut enim quia subiecti enunciationis de inesse propria
quantitas est penes divisionem vel indivisionem ipsius subiecti (quia est nomen
quod significat per modum substantiae, cuius quantitas est per divisionem
continui: ideo signum quantificans in illis distribuit secundum partes
subiectivas), ita quia subiecti enunciationis modalis propria quantitas est
tempus (quia est verbum quod significat per modum motus, cuius propria
quantitas est tempus), ideo modus quantificans distribuit ipsum suum subiectum,
scilicet, esse vel non esse, secundum partes temporis. Unde subtiliter
inspicienti apparebit quod quantitas ista modalis proprii subiecti modalis
enunciationis quantitas est, scilicet, ipsius esse vel non esse. Ita quod illa
modalis est simpliciter universalis, cuius proprium subiectum distribuitur pro
omni tempore: vel simpliciter, ut, hominem esse animal est necessarium vel
impossibile; vel accepto, ut, hominem currere hodie, vel, dum currit, est
necessarium vel impossibile. Illa vero est particularis, in qua non pro omni,
sed aliquo tempore distributio fit in communi tantum; ut, hominem esse animal,
est possibile vel contingens. Est ergo et ista modalis quantitas subiecti sui
passio (sicut et universaliter quantitas se tenet ex parte materiae), sed
derivatur a modo, non in quantum praedicatum est (quod, ut sic, tenetur
formaliter), sed in quantum syncategorematis officio fungitur, quod habet ex eo
quod proprie modus est. Now, there are two things about modal enunciations that
must be carefully noted. The first—which is peculiar to modals—is that the
predicate quantifies the modal proposition simply, as it also qualifies it
simply. For just as the modal enunciation in which the mode is affirmed is
affirmative simply, and negative when the mode is negated, so the modal
enunciation in which the mode is universal is universal simply and particular
in which the mode is particular. The reason for this is that the modal follows
the nature of the mode. The second thing to be noted (which is the cause of the
first) is that the predicate of a modal, i.e., the mode, not only has the
relationship of a predicate to its subject (i.e., to "to be” and "not
to be”), but also has the relationship to the subject, of a distributive
syncategorematic term, which has the effect of distributing the subject, not
according to the quantity of its subjective parts, but according to the
quantity of the parts of its time. And rightly so, for just as the proper
quantity of the subject of an absolute enunciation varies according to the
division or lack of division of its subject (since the subject is a name which
signifies in the mode of substance, whose quantity is from the division of the
continuous, and therefore the quantifying sign distributes according to the
subjective parts), so, because the proper quantity of the subject of a modal
enunciation is time (since the subject is a verb, which signifies in the mode
of movement, whose proper quantity is time), the quantifying mode distributes
the subject, i.e., "to be” or "not to be” according to the parts of
time. Hence, we arrive at the subtle point that the quantity of the modal is
the quantity of the proper subject of the modal enunciation, namely, of
"to be” or "not to be.” Therefore, a modal enunciation is universal
simply when the proper subject is distributed throughout all time, either
simply, as in "That man is an animal is necessary or impossible,” or taken
in a limited way, as in "That man is running today,” or "while he is
running, is necessary or impossible.” A modal enunciation is particular in
which "to be” or "not to be” is distributed, not throughout all time,
but commonly throughout some time, as in "That man is an animal is
possible or contingent.” This modal quantity is therefore also a property of
its subject (in that, universally, quantity comes from the matter) but is
derived from the mode, not insofar as it is a predicate (because, as such, it
is understood formally), but insofar as it performs a syncategorematic
function, which it has in virtue of the fact that it is properly a mode.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 14 Sunt igitur modalium (de propria earum quantitate
loquendo) aliae universales affirmativae, ut illae de necessario, quia
distribuunt ad semper esse; aliae universales negativae, ut illae de
impossibili, quia distribuunt ad nunquam esse; aliae particulares affirmativae,
ut illae de possibili et contingenti, quia distribuunt utrunque ad aliquando esse;
aliae particulares negativae, ut illae de non necesse et non impossibili, quia
distribuunt ad aliquando non esse: sicut in illis de inesse, omnis, nullus,
quidam, non omnis, non nullus, similem faciunt diversitatem. Et quia, ut dictum
est, haec quantitas modalium est inquantum modales sunt, et de his, inquantum
huiusmodi, praesens tractatus fit ab Aristotele; idcirco aequipollentiae, seu
consequentiae earum, ordinatae sunt negationis vario situ, quemadmodum
aequipollentiae illarum de inesse: ut scilicet, negatio praeposita modo faciat
aequipollere suae contradictoriae; negatio autem modo postposita, posita autem
dicti verbo, suae aequipollere contrariae facit; praeposita vero et postposita
suae subalternae, ut videre potes in consequentiarum figura ultimo ab
Aristotele formata. In qua, tali praeformata oppositionum figura, clare videbis
omnes se mutuo consequentes, secundum alteram trium regularum aequipollere, et
consequenter, totum primum ordinem secundo contrarium, tertio contradictorium,
quarto vero subalternum. (Figura). Therefore, with respect to their proper
quantity, some modals are universal affirmatives, i.e., those of the necessary
because they distribute "to be” to all time. Others are universal
negatives, i.e., those of the impossible because they distribute "to be”
to no time. Still others are particular affirmatives, i.e., those signifying
the possible and contingent, for both of these distribute "to be” to some
time. Finally, there are particular negatives, i.e., those of the not necessary
and not impossible, for they distribute "not to be” to some time. This is
similar to the diversity in absolute enunciations from the use of "every,”
"no” "some,” not all,” and "not none.” Now, since this quantity
belongs to modals insofar as they are modals, as has been said, and since
Aristotle is now considering them in this particular respect, the modal
enunciations that are equivalent, i.e., their consequents, are ordered by the
different location of the negation, as is the case with absolute enunciations
that are equivalent. A negative placed before the mode makes an enunciation
equivalent to its contradictory; placed after the mode, i.e., with the verb of
the dictum, makes it equivalent to its contrary; placed before and after the
mode makes it equivalent to its subaltern, as you can see in the last table of
consequents given by Aristotle. In that table of oppositions, you see all the
mutual consequents, according to one of the three rules for making enunciations
equivalent. Consequently, the whole first order of equivalent enunciations is
contrary to the second, contradictory to the third, and the fourth is
subalternated to it. Necessary to be - contraries - Impossible to be subalterns
subalterns Possible to be - subcontraries - Contingent not to be TABLE OF
OPPOSITION OF EQUIPOLLENT MODALS This table is not Cajetan’s but is a full
arrangement of the orders of modal enunciations asdeveloped in this lesson.
Close I Universal Affirmatives It is necessary to be It is not possible not to
be It is not contingent not to be It is impossible not to be contraries II
Universal Negatives It is necessary not to be It is not possible to be It is
not contingent to be It is impossible to be subalterns subalterns IV Particular
Affirmatives It is not necessary not to be It is possible to be It is
contingent to be It is not impossible to be subcontraries III Particular
Negatives It is not necessary to be It is possible not to be It is contingent
not to be It is not impossible not to be. XIII. 1 Postquam determinatum est de
enunciatione secundum quod diversificatur tam ex additione facta ad terminos,
quam ad compositionem eius, hic secundum divisionem a s. Thoma in principio
huius secundi factam, intendit Aristoteles tractare quandam quaestionem circa
oppositiones enunciationum provenientes ex eo quod additur aliquid simplici
enunciationi. Et circa hoc quatuor facit: primo, movet quaestionem secundo,
declarat quod haec quaestio dependet ab una alia quaestione praetractanda; ibi:
nam si ea, quae sunt in voce etc.; tertio, determinat illam aliam quaestionem;
ibi: nam arbitrari etc.; quarto, redit ad respondendum quaestioni primo motae;
ibi: quare si in opinione et cetera. Quaestio quam movere intendit est: utrum
affirmativae enunciationi contraria sit negatio eiusdem praedicati, an
affirmatio de praedicato contrario seu privativo? Unde dicit: utrum contraria
est affirmatio negationi contradictoriae, scilicet, et universaliter oratio
affirmativa orationi negativae; ut, affirmativa oratio quae dicit, omnis homo
est iustus, illi contraria sit orationi negativae, nullus homo est iustus, aut
illi, omnis homo est iniustus, quae est affirmativa de praedicato privativo? Et
similiter ista affirmatio, Callias est iustus, est ne contraria illi
contradictoriae negationi, Callias non est iustus, aut illi, Callias est
iniustus, quae est affirmativa de praedicato privativo? Now that he has treated
the enunciation as it is diversified by an addition made to the terms and by an
addition made to its composition (which is the division of the text made by St.
Thomas at the beginning of the second book), Aristotle takes up another
question about oppositions of enunciations. This question concerns the
oppositions that result from something added to the simple enunciation. First
he asks the question; secondly, he shows that this question depends upon
another, which must be treated first, where he says, For if those things that
are in vocal sound are determined by those in the intellect, etc.; third, he
settles the latter question where he says, It is false, course, to suppose that
opinions are to be defined as contrary because they are about contraries, etc.;
finally, he replies to the first question where he says, If, therefore, this is
the case with respect to opinion, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound
are signs of those in the soul, etc. The first question he raises is this: is
the contrary of an affirmative enunciation the negation of the same predicate
or the affirmation of a contrary or privative predicate? Hence he says, There
is a question as to whether the contrary of an affirmation is the contradictory
negation, and universally, whether affirmative speech is contrary to negative
speech. For instance, is affirmative speech which says "Every man is
just,” contrary to negative speech which says "No man is just,” or to the
affirmative of the privative predicate, "Every man is unjust”? And
similarly, is the affirmation "Callias is just” contrary to the
contradictory negation, "Callias is not just” or is it contrary to "Callias
is unjust,” the affirmative of the privative predicate? Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 13
n. 2Ad evidentiam tituli huius quaestionis, quia hactenus indiscusse ab aliis
est relictus, considerare oportet quod cum in enunciatione sint duo, scilicet
ipsa enunciatio seu significatio et modus enunciandi seu significandi, duplex
inter enunciationes fieri potest oppositio, una ratione ipsius enunciationis,
altera ratione modi enunciandi. Si modos enunciandi attendimus, duas species
oppositionis in latitudine enunciationum inveniemus, contrarietatem scilicet et
contradictionem. Divisae enim superius sunt enunciationes oppositae in
contrarias et contradictorias. Contradictio inter enunciationes ratione modi
enunciandi est quando idem praedicatur de eodem subiecto contradictorio modo
enunciandi; ut sicut unum contradictorium nil ponit, sed alterum tantum
destruit, ita una enunciatio nil asserit, sed id tantum quod altera enunciabat
destruit. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnes quae contradictoriae vocantur, scilicet,
omnis homo est iustus, non omnis homo est iustus, Socrates est iustus, Socrates
non est iustus, ut de se patet. Et ex hoc provenit quod non possunt simul verae
aut falsae esse, sicut nec duo contradictoria. Contrarietas vero inter
enunciationes ratione modi enunciandi est quando idem praedicatur de eodem
subiecto contrario modo enunciandi; ut sicut unum contrariorum ponit materiam
sibi et reliquo communem in extrema distantia sub illo genere, ut patet de albo
et nigro, ita una enunciatio ponit subiectum commune sibi et suae oppositae in
extrema distantia sub illo praedicato. Huiusmodi quoque sunt omnes illae quae
contrariae in figura appellantur, scilicet, omnis homo est iustus, omnis homo
non est iustus. Hae enim faciunt subiectum, scilicet hominem, maxime distare
sub iustitia, dum illa enunciat iustitiam inesse homini, non quocunque modo,
sed universaliter; ista autem enunciat iustitiam abesse homini, non
qualitercunque, sed universaliter. Maior enim distantia esse non potest quam
ea, quae est inter totam universitatem habere aliquid et nullum de universitate
habere illud. Et ex hoc provenit quod non possunt esse simul verae, sicut nec
contraria possunt eidem simul inesse; et quod possunt esse simul falsae, sicut
et contraria simul non inesse eidem possunt. Si vero ipsam enunciationem sive
eius significationem attendamus secundum unam tantum oppositionis speciem, in
tota latitudine enunciationum reperiemus contrarietatem, scilicet secundum
veritatem et falsitatem: quia duarum enunciationum significationes entia
positiva sunt, ac per hoc neque contradictorie neque privative opponi possunt,
quia utriusque oppositionis alterum extremum est formaliter non ens. Et cum nec
relative opponantur, ut clarum est, restat ut nonnisi contrarie opponi possunt.
Since this question has not been discussed by others, we must begin by noting
that there are two things in an enunciation, namely, the enunciation itself,
i.e., the signification, and the mode of enunciating or signifying. Hence, a
twofold opposition can be made between enunciations, one by reason of the enunciation
itself, the other by reason of the mode of enunciating. If we consider the
modes of enunciating, we find two species of opposition among enunciations,
namely, contrariety and contradiction. This point was made earlier when opposed
enunciations were divided into contraries and contradictories. There is
contradiction by reason of mode of enunciating when the same thing is
predicated of the same subject in a contradictory mode; so that just as one of
a pair of contradictories posits nothing but only destroys the other, so one
enunciation 4 asserts nothing, but only destroys what the other was
enunciating. All enunciations that are called contradictories are of this kind;
e.g., "Every man is just,” "Not every man is just”; "Socrates is
just,” "Socrates is not just.” It follows from this that they cannot be at
once true or false, just as two contradictories cannot be at once. There is
contrariety between enunciations by reason of mode of enunciating when the same
thing is predicated of the same subject in a contrary mode of enunciating; so
that just as one of a pair of contraries posits matter common to itself and to
the other which is at the extreme distance under that genus—as is evident for
instance in white and black—so one enunciation posits a subject common to
itself and its opposite at the extreme distance under that predicate. All the
enunciations in the diagram that are called contrary are of this kind, for
example, "Every man is just,” "No man is just.” These make the
subject "man” distant to the greatest degree possible under justice, one
enunciating justice to be in man, not in any way, but universally, the other
enunciating justice to be absent from man, not in any way, but universally. For
no distance can be greater than the distance between the total number of things
having something and none of the total number of things having that thing. It
follows that contrary enunciations cannot be at once true, just as contraries
cannot be in the same thing at once. They can, however, be false at the same time,
just as it is possible that contraries not be in the same thing at the same
time. If we consider the enunciation itself (viz., its signification) according
to only one species of opposition, we will find in the whole range of
enunciations an opposition of contrariety, i.e., an opposition according to
truth and falsity. The reason for this is that the significations of two
enunciations are positive, and accordingly cannot be opposed either
contradictorily or privatively because the other extreme of both of these
oppositions is formally non-being. And since significations are not opposed
relatively, as is evident, the only way they can be opposed is contrarily.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 13 n. 3Consistit autem ista contrarietas in hoc quod duarum
enunciationum altera alteram non compatitur vel in veritate vel in falsitate,
praesuppositis semper conditionibus contrariorum, scilicet quod fiant circa
idem et in eodem tempore. Patere quoque potest talem oppositionem esse
contrarietatem ex natura conceptionum animae componentis et dividentis, quarum
singulae sunt enunciationes. Conceptiones siquidem animae adaequatae nullo alio
modo opponuntur conceptionibus inadaequatis nisi contrarie, et ipsae
conceptiones inadaequatae, si se mutuo expellunt, contrariae quoque dicuntur.
Unde verum et falsum, contrarie opponi probatur a s. Thoma in I parte, qu. 17.
Sicut ergo hic, ita et in enunciationibus ipsae significationes adaequatae
contrarie opponuntur inadaequatis, idest verae falsis; et ipsae inadaequatae,
idest falsae, contrarie quoque opponuntur inter se, si contingat quod se non
compatiantur, salvis semper contrariorum conditionibus. Est igitur in
enunciationibus duplex contrarietas, una ratione modi, altera ratione
significationis, et unica contradictio, scilicet ratione modi. Et, ut confusio
vitetur, prima contrarietas vocetur contrarietas modalis, secunda contrarietas
formalis. Contradictio autem non ad confusionis vitationem quia unica est, sed
ad proprietatis expressionem contradictio modalis vocari potest. Invenitur autem
contrarietas formalis enunciationum inter omnes contradictorias, quia
contradictoriarum altera alteram semper excludit; et inter omnes contrarias
modaliter quoad veritatem, quia non possunt esse simul verae, licet non
inveniatur inter omnes quoad falsitatem, quia possunt esse simul falsae. The
contrariety spoken of here consists in this: of two enunciations one is not
compatible with the other either in truth or falsity—presupposing always the
conditions for contraries, that they are about the same thing and at once. It
can be shown that such opposition is contrariety from the nature of the
conceptions of the soul when composing and dividing, each of which is an
enunciation. Adequate conceptions of the soul are opposed to inadequate
conceptions only contrarily, and inadequate conceptions, if each cancels the
other, are also called contraries. It is from this that St. Thomas proves, in
[Summa theologiae] part I, question 17, that the true and false are contrarily
opposed. Therefore, as in the conceptions of the soul, so in enunciations,
adequate significations are contrarily opposed to inadequate, i.e., true to
false; and the inadequate, i.e., the false, are also contrarily opposed among
themselves if it happens that they are not compatible, supposing always the
conditions for contraries. There is, therefore, in enunciations a twofold
contrariety, one by reason of mode, the other by reason of signification, and
only one contradiction, that by reason of mode. To avoid confusion, let us call
the first contrariety modal and the second formal. We may call contradiction
modal—not to avoid confusion since it is unique—but for propriety of
expression. Formal contrariety is found between all contradictory enunciations,
since one contradictory always excludes the other. It is also found between all
modally contrary enunciations in regard to truth, since they cannot be at once
true. However it is not found between the latter in regard to falsity, since
they can be at once false. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 13 n. 4Quia igitur Aristoteles
in hac quaestione loquitur de contrarietate enunciationum quae se extendit ad
contrarias modaliter, et contradictorias, ut patet in principio et in fine
quaestionis (in principio quidem, quia proponit utrasque contradictorias
dicens: affirmatio negationi etc.; et contrarias modaliter dicens: et oratio
orationi etc., unde et exempla utrarunque statim subdit, ut patet in littera.
In fine vero, quia ibi expresse quam conclusit esse contrariam affirmativae
universali verae dividit, in contrariam modaliter universalem negativam,
scilicet, et contradictoriam: quae divisio falsitate non careret, nisi
conclusisset contrariam formaliter, ut de se patet), quia, inquam, sic accipit
contrarietatem, ideo de contrarietate formali enunciationum quaestio intelligenda
est. Et est quaestio valde subtilis, necessaria et adhuc nullo modo superius
tacta. Est igitur titulus quaestionis; utrum affirmativae verae contraria
formaliter sit negativa falsa eiusdem praedicati, aut affirmativa falsa de
praedicato, vel contrario? Et sic patet quis sit sensus tituli, et quare non
movet quaestionem de quacunque alia oppositione enunciationum (quia scilicet
nulla alia in eis formaliter invenitur), et quod accipit contrarietatem proprie
et strictissime, licet talis contrarietas inveniatur inter contradictorias
modaliter et contrarias modaliter. Dictum vero fuit a s. Thoma provenire hanc
dubitationem ex eo quod additur aliquid simplici enunciationi, quia si tantum
simplices, idest, de secundo adiacente enunciationes attendantur, non habet
haec quaestio radicem. Quia autem simplici enunciationi, idest subiecto et
verbo substantivo, additur aliquid, scilicet praedicatum, nascitur dubitatio
circa oppositionem, an illud additum in contrariis debeat esse illudmet
praedicatum, negatione apposita verbo, an debeat esse praedicatum contrarium
seu privativum, absque negatione praeposita verbo. Aristotle in this question
is speaking of the contrariety of enunciations that extends to contraries
modally and to contradictories. This is evident from what he says in the
beginning and at the end of the question. In the beginning, he proposes both
contradictories when he says, an affirmation... to a negation, etc.; and
contraries modally, when he says, and in the case of speech whether the one
saying... is opposed to the one saying... etc. It is evident, too, from the
examples immediately added. At the end, he explicitly divides what he has
concluded to be contrary to a true universal affirmative, into the modally
contrary universal negative and the contradictory. It is clear at once that
this division would be false unless it comprised the contrary formally. Since
he takes contrariety in this way the question must be understood with respect
to formal contrariety of enunciations. This is a very subtle question and one
that has to be treated and has not been thus far. The question, therefore, is
this: whether the formal contrary of the true affirmative is the false negative
of the same predicate or the false affirmative of the privative predicate,
i.e., of the contrary. The meaning of the question is now clear, and it is
evident why he does not ask about any other oppositions of enunciations-no
other opposition is found in them formally. It is also evident that he is
taking contrariety properly and strictly, notwithstanding the fact that such
contrariety is found among contradictories modally and contraries modally. St.
Thomas has already pointed out that this question arises from the fact that
something is added to the simple enunciation, for as it far as simple
enunciations are concerned, i.e., those with only a second determinant, there
is no occasion for the question. When, however, something is added, namely a
predicate, to the simple enunciation, i.e., to the subject and the substantive
verb, the question arises as to whether what ought to be added in contrary
enunciations is the selfsame predicate with a negation added to the verb or a
contrary, i.e., privative, predicate without a negation added to the verb. 5. Deinde
cum dicit: nam siea etc., declarat unde sumenda sit decisio huius quaestionis.
Et duo facit: quia primo declarat quod haec quaestio dependet ex una alia
quaestione, ex illa scilicet: utrum opinio, idest conceptio animae, in secunda
operatione intellectus, vera, contraria sit opinioni falsae negativae eiusdem
praedicati, an falsae affirmativae contrarii sive privativi. Et assignat
causam, quare illa quaestio dependet ex ista, quia scilicet enunciationes
vocales sequuntur mentales, ut effectus adaequati causas proprias, et ut significata
signa adaequata, et consequenter similis est in hoc utraque natura. Unde
inchoans ab hac causa ait: nam si ea quae sunt in voce sequuntur ea, quae sunt
in anima, ut dictum est in principio I libri, et illic, idest in anima, opinio
contrarii praedicati circa idem subiectum est contraria illi alteri, quae
affirmat reliquum contrarium de eodem (cuiusmodi sunt istae mentales
enunciationes, omnis homo est iustus, omnis homo est iniustus); si ita inquam
est, etiam et in his affirmationibus quae sunt in voce, idest vocaliter
sumptis, necesse est similiter se habere, ut scilicet sint contrariae duae
affirmativae de eodem subiecto et praedicatis contrariis. Quod si neque illic,
idest in anima, opinatio contrarii praedicati, contrarietatem inter mentales
enunciationes constituit, nec affirmatio vocalis affirmationi vocali contraria
erit de contrario praedicato, sed magis affirmationi contraria erit negatio
eiusdem praedicati. When Aristotle says, For if those things that are in vocal
sound are determined by those in the intellect, etc.; he shows where we have to
begin in order to settle this question. First he shows that the question
depends on another question, namely, whether a true opinion (i.e., a conception
of the soul in the second operation of the intellect) is contrary to a false
negative opinion of the same predicate, or to a false affirmative of the
contrary, i.e., privative, predicate. Then he gives the reason why the former
question depends on this. Vocal enunciations follow upon mental as adequate
effects upon proper causes and as the signified upon adequate signs. So, in
this the nature of each is similar. He begins, then, with the reason for this
dependence: For if those things that are in vocal sound are determined by those
in the intellect (as was said in the beginning of the first book) and if in the
soul, those opinions are contrary which affirm contrary predicates about the
same subject, (for example, the mental enunciations, "Every man is just,
"Every man is unjust”), then in affirmations that are in vocal sound, the
case must be the same. The contraries will be two affirmatives about the same
subject with contrary predicates. But if in the soul this is not the case,
i.e., that opinions with contrary predicates constitute contrariety in mental
enunciations, then the contrary of a vocal affirmation will not be a vocal
affirmation with a contrary predicate. Rather, the contrary of an affirmation
will be the negation of the same predicate. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 13 n. 6Dependet
ergo mota quaestio ex ista alia sicut effectus ex causa. Propterea et
concludendo addit secundum, quod scilicet de hac quaestione prius tractandum
est, ut ex causa cognita effectus innotescat dicens: quare considerandum est,
opinio vera cui opinioni falsae contraria est: utrum negationi falsae an certe
ei affirmationi falsae, quae contrarium esse opinatur. Et ut exemplariter
proponatur, dico hoc modo: sunt tres opiniones de bono, puta vita: quaedam enim
est ipsius boni opinio vera, quoniam bonum est, puta, quod vita sit bona; alia
vero falsa negativa, scilicet, quoniam bonum non est, puta, quod vita non sit
bona; alia item falsa affirmativa contrarii, scilicet, quoniam malum est, puta,
quod vita sit mala. Quaeritur ergo quae harum falsarum contraria est verae? The
first question, then, depends on this question as an effect upon its cause. For
this reason, and by way of a conclusion to what he has just been saying, he
adds the second question, which must be treated first so that once the cause is
known the effect will be known: We must therefore consider to which false
opinion the true opinion is contrary, whether it is to the false negation or to
the false affirmation that it is to be judged contrary. Then in order to
propose the question by examples he says: what I mean is this; there are three
opinions of a good, for instance, of life. One is a true opinion, that it is
good, for instance, that life is good. The other is a false negative, that it
is not good, for instance, that life is not good. Still another, likewise
false, is the affirmative of the contrary, that it is evil, for instance, that
life is evil. The question is, then, which of these false opinions is contrary
to the true one. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 13 n. 7Quod autem subdidit: et si est una,
secundum quam contraria est, tripliciter legi potest. Primo, dubitative, ut sit
pars quaestionis; et tunc est sensus: quaeritur quae harum falsarum contraria
est verae: et simul quaeritur, si est tantum una harum falsarum secundum quam
fiat contraria ipsi verae: quia cum unum uni sit contrarium, ut dicitur in X
metaphysicae, quaerendo quae harum sit contraria, quaeremus etiam an una earum
sit contraria. Alio modo, potest legi adversative, ut sit sensus: quaeritur
quae harum sit contraria; quamquam sciamus quod non utraque sed una earum est secundum
quam fit contrarietas. Tertio modo, potest legi dividendo hanc particulam, et
si est una, ab illa sequenti, secundum quam contraria est; et tunc prima pars
expressive, secunda vero dubitative legitur; et est sensus: quaeritur quae
harum falsarum contraria est verae, non solum si istae duae falsae inter se
differunt in consequendo, sed etiam si utraque est una, idest alteri
indivisibiliter unita, quaeritur secundum quam fit contrarietas. Et hoc modo
exponit Boethius, dicens quod Aristoteles apposuit haec verba propter contraria
immediata, in quibus non differt contrarium a privativo. Inter contraria enim
mediata et immediata haec est differentia, quod in immediatis a privativo
contrarium non infertur. Non enim valet, corpus colorabile est non album, ergo
est nigrum: potest enim esse rubrum. In immediatis autem valet; verbi gratia:
animal est non sanum, ergo infirmum; numerus est non par, ergo impar. Voluit
ergo Aristoteles exprimere quod nunc, cum quaerimus quae harum falsarum,
scilicet negativae et affirmativae contrarii, sit contraria affirmativae verae,
quaerimus universaliter sive illae duae falsae indivisibiliter se sequantur,
sive non. 7. Then he
adds, the question, and if there is one, is either one the contrary. This
passage can be read in three ways. It can be read inquiringly so that it is a
part of the question, and then the meaning is: which of these false opinions is
contrary to the true opinion, and, is there one of these by which the contrary
to the true one is effected? For since one is contrary to one other, as is said
in X Metaphysicae [1: 1055a 19], in asking which of these is the contrary we
are also asking whether one of them is the contrary. This can also be read
adversatively, and then the meaning is: which of these is the contrary, given
that we know it is not both but one by which the contrariety is effected? This
can be read in a third way by dividing the first clause, "and if it is
one” from the second clause, "is either one the contrary.” The first part
is then read assertively, the second inquiringly, and the meaning is: which of
these two false opinions is contrary to the true opinion if the two false
opinions differ as to consequence, and also if both are one, i.e., united to
each other indivisibly? Boethius explains this passage in the last way. He says
that Aristotle adds these words because of immediate contraries in which the
contrary does not differ from the privative. For the difference between mediate
and immediate contraries is that in the former the contrary is not inferred
from the privative. For example, this is not valid: "A colored body is not
white, therefore it is black”—for it could be red. In immediate contraries, on
the other hand, it is valid to infer the contrary from the privative; e.g.,
"An animal is not healthy, therefore it is number is not even, therefore
it is odd.” Therefore, Aristotle intends to show here that when we ask which of
these false opinions, i.e., negative and affirmative contraries, is contrary to
the true affirmative, we are asking universally whether these two false
opinions follow each other indivisibly or not. 8. Deinde cum dicit: nam
arbitrari, prosequitur hanc secundam quaestionem. Et circa hoc quatuor facit.
Primo, declarat quod contrarietas opinionum non attenditur penes contrarietatem
materiae, circa quam versantur, sed potius penes oppositionem veri vel falsi;
secundo, declarat quod non penes quaecunque opposita secundum veritatem et
falsitatem est contrarietas opinionum; ibi: si ergo boni etc.; tertio,
determinat quod contrarietas opinionum attenditur penes per se primo opposita
secundum veritatem et falsitatem tribus rationibus; ibi: sed in quibus primo
fallacia etc.; quarto declarat hanc determinationem inveniri in omnibus veram;
ibi: manifestum est igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo proponens intentam
conclusionem, quod falsum est arbitrari opiniones definiri seu determinari
debere contrarias ex eo quod contrariorum obiectorum sunt. Et adducit ad hoc
duplicem rationem. Prima est: opiniones contrariae non sunt eadem opinio; sed
contrariorum eadem est fortasse opinio; ergo opiniones non sunt contrariae ex
hoc quod contrariorum sunt. Secunda est: opiniones contrariae non sunt simul
verae; sed opiniones contrariorum, sive plures, sive una, sunt simul verae
quandoque; ergo opiniones non sunt contrariae ex hoc quod contrariorum sunt.
Harum rationum, suppositis maioribus, ponit utriusque minoris declarationem
simul, dicens: boni enim, quoniam bonum est, et mali, quoniam malum est, eadem
fortasse opinio est, quoad primam. Et subdit esse vera, sive plures sive una
sit, quoad secundam. Utitur autem dubitativo adverbio et disiunctione, quia non
est determinandi locus an contrariorum eadem sit opinio, et quia aliquo modo
est eadem et aliquo modo non. Si enim loquamur de habituali opinione, sic eadem
est; si autem de actuali, sic non eadem est. Alia siquidem mentalis compositio
actualiter fit, concipiendo bonum esse bonum, et alia concipiendo malum esse
malum, licet eodem habitu utrunque cognoscamus, illud per se primo, et hoc
secundario, ut dicitur IX metaphysicae. Deinde subdit quod ista quae ad
declarationem minorum sumpta sunt, scilicet bonum et malum, contraria sunt
etiam contrarietate sumpta stricte in moralibus, ac per hoc congrua usi sumus
declaratione. Ultimo inducit conclusionem. Sed non in eo quod contrariorum
opiniones sunt, contrariae sunt, sed magis in eo quod contrariae, idest, sed
potius censendae sunt opiniones contrariae ex eo quod contrariae adverbialiter,
scilicet contrario modo, idest vere et false enunciant. Et sic patet primum. When
he says, It is false, of course, to suppose that opinions are to be defined as
contrary because they are about contraries, etc., he proceeds with the second
question. First he shows that contrariety of opinions is not determined by the
contrariety of the matter involved, but rather by the opposition of true and
false; secondly, he shows that there is not contrariety of opinions in just any
opposites according to truth and falsity, where he says, Now if there is the
opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and the opinion that it is not
good, etc.; third, he determines that contrariety of opinions is concerned with
the per se first opposites; according to truth and falsity, for three reasons,
where he says, Rather, those opinions in which there is fallacy must be posited
as contrary to true opinions, etc.; finally, he shows that this determination
is true of all, where he says, It is evident that it will make no difference if
we posit the affirmation universally, for the universal negation will be the contrary,
etc. Aristotle says, then, proposing the conclusion he intends to prove, that
it is false to suppose that opinions are to be defined or determined as
contrary because they are about contrary objects. He gives two arguments for
this. Contrary opinions are not the same opinion; but opinions about contraries
are probably the same opinion; therefore, opinions are not contrary from the
fact that they are about contraries. And, contrary opinions are not
simultaneously true; but opinions about contraries, whether many or one, are
sometimes true simultaneously; therefore, opinions are not contraries because
they are about contraries. Having supposed the majors of these arguments, he
posits a manifestation of each minor at the same time. In relation to the first
argument, he says, for the opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and
of that which is evil, that it is evil are probably the same. In relation to
the second argument he adds: and, whether many or one, are true. He uses
"probably,” an adverb expressing doubt and disjunction, because this is
not the place to determine whether the opinion of contraries is the same
opinion, and, because in some way the opinion is the same and in some way not.
In the case of habitual opinion, the opinion of contraries is the same, but in
the case of an actual opinion it is not. One mental composition is actually
made in conceiving that a good is good and another in conceiving that an evil
is evil, although we know both by the same habit, the former per se and first,
the latter secondarily, as is said in IX Metaphysicae [4: 1051a 4]. Then he
adds that good and evil—which are used for the manifestation of the minor—are
contraries even when the contrariety is taken strictly in moral matters; and so
in using this our exposition is apposite. Finally, he draws the conclusion:
however, opinions are not contraries because they are about contraries, but
rather because they are contraries, i.e., opinions are to be considered as
contrary from the fact that they enunciate contrarily, adverbially, i.e., in a
contrary mode, i.e., they enunciate truly and falsely. Thus the first argument
is clear. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 13 n. 9Si ergo boni et cetera. Quia dixerat quod
contrarietas opinionum accipitur secundum oppositionem veritatis et falsitatis
earum, declarat modo quod non quaecunque secundum veritatem et falsitatem
oppositae opiniones sunt contrariae, tali ratione. De bono, puta, de iustitia,
quatuor possunt opiniones haberi, scilicet quod iustitia est bona, et quod non
est bona, et quod est fugibilis, et quod est non appetibilis. Quarum prima est
vera, reliquae sunt falsae. Inter quas haec est diversitas quod, prima negat
idem praedicatum quod vera affirmabat; secunda affirmat aliquid aliud quod bono
non inest; tertia negat id quod bono inest, non tamen illud quod vera
affirmabat. Tunc sic. Si omnes opiniones secundum veritatem et falsitatem sunt
contrariae, tunc uni, scilicet verae opinioni non solum multa sunt contraria,
sed etiam infinita: quod est impossibile, quia unum uni est contrarium. Tenet
consequentia, quia possunt infinitae imaginari opiniones falsae de una re
similes ultimis falsis opinionibus adductis, affirmantes, scilicet ea quae non
insunt illi, et negantes ea quae illi quocunque modo coniuncta sunt: utraque
namque indeterminata esse et absque numero constat. Possumus enim opinari quod
iustitia est quantitas, quod est relatio, quod est hoc et illud; et similiter
opinari quod iustitia non sit qualitas, non sit appetibilis, non sit habitus.
Unde ex supradictis in propositione quaestionis, inferens pluralitatem falsarum
contra unam veram, ait: si ergo est opinatio vera boni, puta iustitiae, quoniam
est bonum; et si est etiam falsa opinatio negans idem, scilicet, quoniam non
est quid bonum; est vero et tertia opinatio falsa quoque, affirmans aliquid
aliud inesse illi, quod non inest nec inesse potest, puta, quod iustitia sit
fugibilis, quod sit illicita; et hinc intelligitur quarta falsa quoque, quae
scilicet negat aliquid aliud ab eo quod vera opinio affirmat inesse iustitiae,
quod tamen inest, ut puta quod non sit qualitas, quod non sit virtus; si ita
inquam est, nulla aliarum falsarum ponenda est contraria opinioni verae. Et
exponens quid demonstret per ly aliarum, subdit: neque quaecunque opinio
opinatur esse quod non est, ut tertii ordinis opiniones faciunt: neque
quaecunque opinio opinatur non esse quod est, ut quarti ordinis opiniones
significant. Et causam subdit: infinitae enim utraeque sunt, et quae esse
opinantur quod non est, et quae non esse quod est, ut supra declaratum fuit.
Non ergo quaecunque opiniones oppositae secundum veritatem et falsitatem
contrariae sunt. Et sic patet secundum.When he says, Now, if there is the
opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and the opinion that it is not
good, etc., he takes up the second point. Since he has just said that
contrariety of opinions is taken according to their opposition of truth and
falsity, he goes on to show that not just any opposites according to truth and
falsity are contraries. This is his argument. Four opinions can be held about a
good, for instance justice: that justice is good, that it is not good, that it
is avoidable, that it is not desirable. Of these, the first is true, the rest
false. The three false ones are diverse. The first denies the same predicate
the true one affirmed; the second affirms something which does not belong to
the good; the third denies what belongs to the good, but something other than
the true one affirmed. Now if all opinions opposed as to truth and falsity are
contraries, then not only are there many contraries to one true opinion, but an
infinite number. But this is impossible, for one is contrary to one other. The
consequence holds because infinite false opinions about one thing, similar to
those cited, can be imagined; such opinions would affirm of it what does not
belong to it and deny what is joined to it in some way. Both kinds are
indeterminate and without number. We can think, for instance, that justice is a
quantity, that it is a relation, that it is this and that; and likewise we can
think that it is not a quality, is not desirable, is not a habit. Hence, from
what was said above in proposing the question, Aristotle infers a plurality of
false opinions opposed to one true opinion: Now if there is the opinion of that
which is good, for instance justice, that it is good, and there is a false
opinion denying the same thing, namely, that it is not good, and besides these
a third opinion, false also, affirming that some other thing belongs to justice
that does not belong and cannot belong to it (for instance, that justice is
avoidable, that it is illicit) and a fourth opinion, also false, that denies
something other than the true opinion affirms, something, however, which does
belong to justice (for instance, that it is not a quality, that it is not a
virtue), none of these other false enunciations are to be posited as the
contrary of the true opinion. To explain what he is designating by "of
these others,” he adds, neither those purporting that what is not, is, as opinions
of the third order do, nor those purporting that what is, is not, as opinions
of the fourth order signify. Then he adds the reason these cannot be posited as
the contrary of the true opinion: for both the opinions that that is which is
not, and that which is not, is, are infinite, as was shown above. Therefore,
not just any opinions opposed according to truth and falsity are contraries.
Thus the second argument is clear. XIV. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 1Quia subtili
indagatione ostendit quod nec materiae contrarietas, nec veri falsique
qualiscunque oppositio contrarietatem opinionum constituit, sed quod aliqua
veri falsique oppositio id facit, ideo nunc determinare intendit qualis sit
illa veri falsique oppositio, quae opinionum contrarietatem constituit. Ex hoc
enim directe quaestioni satisfit. Et intendit quod sola oppositio opinionum
secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem etc. constituit
contrarietatem earum. Unde intendit probare istam conclusionem per quam ad
quaesitum respondet: opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem
eiusdem de eodem sunt contrariae; et consequenter illae, quae sunt oppositae
secundum affirmationem contrariorum praedicatorum de eodem, non sunt
contrariae, quia sic affirmativa vera haberet duas contrarias, quod est
impossibile. Unum enim uni est contrarium.Aristotle has just completed a subtle
investigation in which he has shown that contrariety of matter does not
constitute contrariety of opinion, nor does just any kind of opposition of true
and false, but some opposition of true and false does. Now he intends to
determine what kind of opposition of true and false it is that constitutes
contrariety of opinions, for this will answer the question directly. He
maintains that only opposition of opinions according to affirmation and
negation of the same thing of the same thing, etc., constitutes their
contrariety. Accordingly, as the response to the question, he intends to prove
the following conclusion: opinions opposed according to affirmation and
negation of the same thing of the same thing are contraries; and consequently,
opinions opposed according to affirmation of contrary predicates of the same
subject are not contraries, for if these were contraries, the true affirmative
would have two contraries, which is impossible, since one is contrary to one
other. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 2Probat autem istam conclusionem tribus
rationibus. Prima est: opiniones in quibus primo est fallacia sunt contrariae;
opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt
in quibus primo est fallacia; ergo opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem
et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt contrariae. Sensus maioris est: opiniones
quae primo ordine naturae sunt termini fallaciae, idest deceptionis seu
erroris, sunt contrariae: sunt enim, cum quis fallitur seu errat, duo termini,
scilicet a quo declinat, et ad quem labitur. Huius rationis in littera primo
ponitur maior, cum dicitur: sed in quibus primo fallacia est; adversative enim
continuans sermonem supradictis, insinuavit non tot enumeratas opiniones esse
contrarias, sed eas in quibus primo fallacia est modo exposito. Deinde subdit
probationem minoris talem: eadem proportionaliter sunt, ex quibus sunt
generationes et ex quibus sunt fallaciae; sed generationes sunt ex oppositis
secundum affirmationem et negationem; ergo et fallaciae sunt ex oppositis
secundum affirmationem et negationem. Quod erat assumptum in minore. Unde
ponens maiorem huius prosyllogismi, ait: haec autem, scilicet fallacia, est ex
his, scilicet terminis, proportionaliter tamen, ex quibus sunt et generationes.
Et subsumit minorem: ex oppositis vero, scilicet secundum affirmationem et
negationem, et generationes fiunt. Et demum concludit: quare etiam fallacia,
scilicet, est ex oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de
eodem. Aristotle uses three arguments to prove this conclusion. The first one
is as follows: Those opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries.
Opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same predicate of
the same subject are those in which there is fallacy first. Therefore, these
are contraries. The sense of the major is this: Opinions which first in the
order of nature are the limits of fallacy, i.e., of deception or error, are
contraries; for when someone is deceived or errs, there are two limits, the one
from which he turns away and the one toward which he turns. In the text the
major of the argument is posited first: Rather, those opinions in which there
is fallacy must be posited as contrary to true opinions. By uniting this part
of the text adversatively with what was said previously, Aristotle implies that
not just any of the number of opinions enumerated are contraries, but those in
which there is fallacy first in the manner we have explained. Then he gives
this proof of the minor: those things from which generations are and from which
fallacies are, are the same proportionally; generations are from opposites
according to affirmation and negation; therefore fallacies, too, are from opposites
according to affirmation and negation (which was assumed in the minor). Hence
he posits the major of this prosyllogism: Now the things from which fallacies
arise, namely, limits, are the things from which generations
arise—proportionally however. Under it he posits the minor: but generations are
from opposites, i.e., according to affirmation and negation. Finally, he
concludes, therefore also fallacies, i.e., they are from opposites according to
affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing. Cajetanus lib. 2
l. 14 n. 3Ad evidentiam huius probationis scito quod idem faciunt in processu
intellectus cognitio et fallacia seu error, quod in processu naturae generatio
et corruptio. Sicut namque perfectiones naturales generationibus acquiruntur,
corruptionibus desinunt; ita cognitione perfectiones intellectuales
acquiruntur, erroribus autem seu deceptionibus amittuntur. Et ideo, sicut tam
generatio quam corruptio est inter affirmationem et negationem, ut proprios
terminos, ut dicit V Physic.; ita tam cognoscere aliquid, quam falli circa
illud, est inter affirmationem et negationem, ut proprios terminos: ita quod id
ad quod primo attingit cognoscens aliquid in secunda operatione intellectus est
veritatis affirmatio, et quod per se primo abiicitur est illius negatio. Et
similiter quod per se primo perdit qui fallitur est veritatis affirmatio, et
quod primo incurrit est veritatis negatio. Recte ergo dixit quod iidem sunt
termini inter quos primo est generatio, et illi inter quos est primo fallacia,
quia utrobique termini sunt affirmatio et negatio. This proof will be more
evident from the following: Knowledge and fallacy, or error, bring about the
same thing in the intellect’s progression as generation and corruption do in
nature’s progression. For just as natural perfections are acquired by
generations and perish by corruptions, so intellectual perfections are acquired
by knowledge and lost by errors or deceptions. Accordingly, just as generation
and corruption are between affirmation and negation as proper terms, as is said
in V Physicae [1:224b 35] so both to know something and to be deceived about it
is between affirmation and negation as proper terms. Consequently, what one who
knows attains first in the second operation of the intellect is affirmation of
the truth, and what he rejects per se and first is the negation of it. In like
manner, what he who is deceived loses per se and first is affirmation of the
truth, and acquires first is negation of the truth. Therefore Aristotle is
correct in maintaining that the terms between which there is generation first
and between which there is fallacy first are the same, because with respect to
both, the terms are affirmation and negation. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 4Deinde
cum dicit: si ergo quod bonum est etc., intendit probare maiorem principalis
rationis. Et quia iam declaravit quod ea, in quibus primo est fallacia, sunt
affirmatio et negatio, ideo utitur, loco maioris probandae, scilicet, opiniones
in quibus primo est fallacia, sunt contrariae, sua conclusione, scilicet,
opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem sunt
contrariae. Aequivalere enim iam declaratum est. Fecit autem hoc consuetae
brevitati studens, quoniam sic procedendo, et probat maiorem, et respondet
directe quaestioni, et applicat ad propositum simul. Probat ergo loco maioris
conclusionem principaliter intentam quaestionis, hanc, scilicet: opiniones
oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem sunt contrariae; et non
illae, quae sunt oppositae secundum contrariorum affirmationem de eodem. Et
intendit talem rationem. Opinio vera et eius magis falsa sunt contrariae
opiniones; oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem sunt vera et eius
magis falsa; ergo opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem sunt
contrariae. Maior probatur ex eo quod, quae plurimum distant circa idem sunt
contraria; vera autem et eius magis falsa plurimum distant circa idem, ut
patet. Minor vero probatur ex eo quod opposita secundum negationem eiusdem de
eodem est per se falsa respectu suae affirmationis verae. Opinio autem per se
falsa magis falsa est quacunque alia. Unumquodque enim quod est per se tale,
magis tale est quolibet quod est per aliud tale. When he says, Now, if that
which is good is both good and not evil, the former per se, the latter
accidentally, etc., he intends to prove the major of the principal argument. He
has already shown that the opinions in which there is fallacy first are
affirmation and negation, and therefore in place of the major to be proved (i.e.,
opinions in which it there is fallacy first are contraries) he uses his
conclusion—which has already been shown to be equivalent—that opinions opposed
according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries. Thus
with his customary brevity he at once proves the major, responds directly to
the question, and applies it to what he has proposed. In place of the major,
then, he proves the conclusion principally intended, i.e., that opinions
opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries,
and not those opposed according to affirmation of contraries about the same
thing. His argument is as follows: A true opinion and the opinion that is more
false in respect to it are contrary opinions, but opinions opposed according to
affirmation and negation are the true opinion and the opinion that is more
false in respect to it; therefore, opinions opposed according to affirmation
and negation are contraries. The major is proved thus: those things that are
most distant in respect to the same thing are contraries; but the true and the
more false are most distant in respect to the same thing, as is clear. The
proof of the minor is that the opposite according to negation of the same thing
of the same thing is per se false in relation to the true affirmation of it.
But a per se false opinion is more false than any other, since each thing that
is per se such is more such than anything that is such by reason of something
else. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 5Unde ad suprapositas opiniones in propositione
quaestionis rediens, ut ex illis exemplariter clarius intentum ostendat, a
probatione minoris inchoat tali modo. Sint quatuor opiniones, duae verae,
scilicet, bonum est bonum, bonum non est malum, et duae falsae, scilicet, bonum
non est bonum, et, bonum est malum. Clarum est autem quod prima vera est
ratione sui, secunda autem est vera secundum accidens, idest, ratione alterius,
quia scilicet non esse malum est coniunctum ipsi bono: ideo enim ista est vera,
bonum non est malum, quia bonum est bonum, et non e contra; ergo prima quae est
secundum se vera, est magis vera quam secunda: quia in unoquoque genere quae
secundum se est vera est magis vera. Illae autem duae falsae eodem modo
censendae sunt, quod scilicet magis falsa est, quae secundum se est falsa. Unde
quia prima earum, scilicet, bonum non est bonum, quae est negativa, est per se
et non ratione alterius falsa, relata ad illam affirmativam, bonum est bonum;
et secunda, scilicet, bonum est malum, quae est affirmativa contrarii, ad eamdem
relata est falsa per accidens, idest ratione alterius (ista enim, scilicet,
bonum est malum, non immediate falsificatur ab illa vera, scilicet bonum est
bonum, sed mediante illa alia falsa, scilicet, bonum non est bonum); idcirco
magis falsa respectu affirmationis verae est negatio eiusdem quam affirmatio
contrarii. Quod erat assumptum in minore. Accordingly, returning to the
opinions already given in proposing the question so as to show his intention
more clearly by example, he begins with the proof of the minor. There are four
opinions, of which two are true, "A good is good,” "A good is not
evil”; two are false, "A good is not good” and "A good is evil.” It
is evident that the first is true by reason of itself, the second accidentally,
i.e., by reason of another, for not to be evil is added to that which is good.
Hence, "A good is not evil” is true because a good is good, and not
contrarily. Therefore, the first of these opinions, which is per se true, is
more true than the second, for in each genus that which per se is true is more
true. The two false opinions are to be judged in the same way. The more false
is the one that is per se false. The first of them, the negative, "A good
is not good,” in relation to the affirmative, "A good is good,” is per se false,
not false by reason of another. The second, the affirmative of the contrary,
"A good is evil,” in relation to the same opinion, is false accidentally,
i.e., by reason of another (for "A good is evil” is not immediately
falsified by the true opinion, "A good is good,” but mediately through the
other false opinion "A good is not good”). Therefore, the negation of the
same thing is more false in respect to a trite affirmation than the affirmation
of a contrary. This was assumed in the minor. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 6Unde
rediens ad supra positas (ut dictum est) opiniones, infert primas duas veras
opiniones dicens: si ergo quod bonum est et bonum est et non est malum, et hoc
quidem, scilicet quod dicit prima opinio, est verum secundum se, idest ratione sui;
illud vero, scilicet quod dicit secunda opinio, est verum secundum accidens,
quia accidit, idest, coniunctum est ei, scilicet bono, malum non esse. In
unoquoque autem ordine magis vera est illa quae secundum se est vera. Etiam
igitur falsa magis est quae secundum se falsa est: siquidem et vera huius est
naturae, ut declaratum est, quod scilicet magis vera est, quae secundum se est
vera. Ergo illarum duarum opinionum falsarum in quaestione propositarum,
scilicet, bonum non est bonum, et, bonum est malum, ea quae est dicens, quoniam
non est bonum quod bonum est, idest negativa; scilicet, bonum non est bonum,
est consistens falsa secundum se, idest, ratione sui continet in seipsa
falsitatem; illa vero reliqua falsa opinio, quae est dicens, quoniam malum est,
idest, affirmativa contraria, scilicet, bonum est malum, eius, quae est, idest,
illius affirmationis dicentis, bonum est bonum, secundum accidens, idest,
ratione alterius falsa est. Deinde subdit ipsam minorem: quare erit magis falsa
de bono, opinio negationis, quam contrarii. Deinde ponit maiorem dicens quod,
semper magis falsus circa singula est ille qui habet contrariam opinionem, ac
si dixisset, verae opinioni magis falsa est contraria. Quod assumptum erat in
maiore. Et eius probationem subdit, quia contrarium est de numero eorum quae
circa idem plurimum differunt. Nihil enim plus differt a vera opinione quam
magis falsa circa illam. As was pointed out above, Aristotle returns to the
opinions already posited, and infers the first two true opinions: Now if that
which is good is both good and not evil, and if what the first opinion says is
true per se, i.e., by reason of itself, and what the second opinion says is
trite accidentally (since it is accidental to it, i.e., added to it, that is,
to the good, not to be evil) and if in each order that which is per se true is
more true, then that which is per se false is more false, since, as has been
shown, the true also is of this nature, namely, that the more true is that
which per se is true. Therefore, of the two false opinions proposed in the
question, namely, "A good is not good,” and "A good is evil,” the one
saying that what is good is not good, namely, the negative, is an opinion
positing what is per se false, i.e., by reason of itself it contains falsity in
it. The other false opinion, the one saying it is evil, namely, the affirmative
contrary in respect to it, i.e., in respect to the affirmation saying that a
good is good, is false accidentally, i.e., by reason of another. Then he gives
the minor: Therefore, the opinion of the negation of the good will be more
false than the opinion affirming a contrary. Next, he posits the major, the one
who holds the contrary judgment about each thing is most mistaken, i.e., in
relation to the true judgment the contrary is more false. This was assumed in
the major. He gives as the proof of this, for contraries are those that differ
most with respect to the same thing, for nothing differs more from a true
opinion than the more false opinion in respect to it. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n.
7Ultimo directe applicat ad quaestionem dicens: quod si (pro, quia) harum
falsarum, scilicet, negationis eiusdem et affirmationis contrarii, altera est
contraria verae affirmationi, opinio vero contradictionis, idest, negationis
eiusdem de eodem, magis est contraria secundum falsitatem, idest, magis est
falsa, manifestum est quoniam haec, scilicet opinio falsa negationis, erit
contraria affirmationi verae, et e contra. Illa vero opinio quae est dicens,
quoniam malum est quod bonum est, idest, affirmatio contrarii, non contraria
sed implicita est, idest, sed implicans in se verae contrariam, scilicet, bonum
non est bonum. Etenim necesse est ipsum opinantem affirmationem contrarii
opinari, quoniam idem de quo affirmat contrarium non est bonum. Oportet
siquidem si quis opinatur quod vita est mala, quod opinetur quod vita non sit
bona. Hoc enim necessario sequitur ad illud, et non e converso; et ideo
affirmatio contrarii implicita dicitur. Negatio autem eiusdem de eodem
implicita non est. Et sic finitur prima ratio. Finally, he directly approaches
the question. If (for "since”), then, of two opinions (namely, false
opinions—the negation of the same thing and the affirmation of a contrary), one
is the contrary of the true affirmation, and, the contradictory opinion, i.e.,
the negation of the same thing of the same thing, is more contrary according to
falsity, i.e., is more false, it is evident that the false opinion of negation
will be contrary to the true affirmation, and conversely. The opinion saying
that what is good is evil, i.e., the affirmation of a contrary, is not the
contrary but implies it, i.e., it implies in itself the opinion contrary to the
true opinion, i.e., "A good is not good.” The reason for this is that the
one conceiving the affirmation of a contrary must conceive that the same thing
of which he affirms the contrary, is not good. If, for example, someone
conceives that life is evil, he must conceive that life is not good, for the
former necessarily follows upon the latter and not conversely. Hence,
affirmation of a contrary is said to be implicative, but negation of the same
thing of the same thing is not implicative. This concludes the first argument.
Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 8Notandum est hic primo quod ista regula generalis tradita
hic ab Aristotele de contrarietate opinionum, quod scilicet contrariae
opiniones sunt quae opponuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de
eodem, et in se et in assumptis ad eius probationem propositionibus scrupulosa
est. Unde multa hic insurgunt dubia. Primum est quia cum oppositio secundum
affirmationem et negationem non constituat contrarietatem sed contradictionem
apud omnes philosophos, quomodo Aristoteles opiniones oppositas secundum
affirmationem et negationem ex hoc contrarias ponat. Augetur et dubitatio quia
dixit quod ea in quibus primo est fallacia sunt contraria, et tamen subdit quod
sunt oppositae sicut termini generationis, quos constat contradictorie opponi.
Nec dubitatione caret quomodo sit verum id quod supra diximus ex intentione s.
Thomae, quod nullae duae opiniones opponantur contradictorie, cum hic expresse
dicitur aliquas opponi secundum affirmationem et negationem. Dubium secundo
insurgit circa id quod assumpsit, quod contraria cuiusque verae est per se
falsa. Hoc enim non videtur verum. Nam contraria istius verae, Socrates est
albus, est ista, Socrates non est albus, secundum determinata; et tamen non est
per se falsa. Sicut namque sua opposita affirmatio est per accidens vera, ita
ista est per accidens falsa. Accidit enim isti enunciationi falsitas. Potest
enim mutari in veram, quia est in materia contingenti. Dubium est tertio circa
id quod dixit: magis vero contradictionis est contraria. Ex hoc enim videtur
velle quod utraque, scilicet, opinio negationis et contrarii, sit contraria
verae affirmationi; et consequenter vel uni duo ponit contraria, vel non
loquitur de contrarietate proprie sumpta: cuius oppositum supra ostendimus. The
general rule about the contrariety of opinions that Aristotle has given here
(namely, that contrary opinions are those opposed according to affirmation and
negation of the same thing of the same thing) is accurate both in itself and in
the propositions assumed for its proof. Many questions may arise, however, as a
consequence of this doctrine and its proof. First of all, all philosophers hold
that opposition according to affirmation and negation constitutes
contradiction, not contrariety. How, then, can Aristotle maintain that opinions
opposed in this way are contraries? The difficulty is augmented by the fact
that he has said that those opinions in which there is fallacy first are
contraries, yet he adds that they are opposed as the terms of generation are,
which he establishes to be opposed contradictorily. In addition, there is a
difficulty as to the way in which the assertion of St. Thomas, which we used
above, is true, namely, that no two opinions are opposed contradictorily, since
here it is explicitly said that some are opposed according to affirmation and
negation. The second uestion involves his assumption that the contrary of each
true opinion is per se false. This does not seem to be true, for according to
what was determined previously, the contrary of the true opinion "Socrates
is white” is "Socrates is not white.” But this is not per se false, for
the opposed affirmation is true accidentally, and hence its negation is false
accidentally. Falsity is accidental to such an enunciation because, being in
contingent matter, it can be changed into a true one. A third difficulty arises
from the fact that Aristotle says the contradictory opinion is nwre contrary.
He seems to be proposing, according to this, that both the opinion of the
negation and of a contrary are contrary to a true affirmation. Consequently, he
is either positing two opinions contrary to one or he is not taking contrariety
strictly, although we showed above that he was taking contrariety properly and
strictly. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 9Ad evidentiam omnium, quae primo loco
adducuntur, sciendum quod opiniones seu conceptiones intellectuales, in secunda
operatione de quibus loquimur, possunt tripliciter accipi: uno modo, secundum
id quod sunt absolute; alio modo, secundum ea quae repraesentant absolute;
tertio, secundum ea quae repraesentant, ut sunt in ipsis opinionibus. Primo
membro omisso, quia non est praesentis speculationis, scito quod si accipiantur
secundo modo secundum repraesentata, sic invenitur inter eas et
contradictionis, et privationis, et contrarietatis oppositio. Ista siquidem
mentalis enunciatio, Socrates est videns, secundum id quod repraesentat
opponitur illi, Socrates non est videns, contradictorie; privative autem illi,
Socrates est caecus; contrarie autem illi, Socrates est luscus; si accipiantur
secundum repraesentata. Ut enim dicitur in postpraedicamentis, non solum
caecitas est privatio visus, sed etiam caecum esse est privatio huius quod est
esse videntem, et sic de aliis. Si vero accipiantur opiniones tertio modo,
scilicet, prout repraesentata per eas sunt in ipsis, sic nulla oppositio inter
eas invenitur nisi contrarietas: quoniam sive opposita contradictorie sive
privative sive contrarie repraesententur, ut sunt in opinionibus, illius tantum
oppositionis capaces sunt, quae inter duo entia realia inveniri potest.
Opiniones namque realia entia sunt. Regulare enim est quod quidquid convenit
alicui secundum esse quod habet in alio, secundum modum et naturam illius in
quo est sibi convenit, et non secundum quod exigeret natura propria. Inter
entia autem realia contrarietas sola formaliter reperitur. Taceo nunc de
oppositione relativa. Opiniones ergo hoc modo sumptae, si oppositae sunt,
contrarietatem sapiunt, sed non omnes proprie contrariae sunt, sed illae quae
plurimum differunt circa idem veritate et falsitate. Has autem probavit
Aristoteles esse opiniones affirmationis et negationis eiusdem de eodem. Istae
igitur verae contrariae sunt. Reliquae vero per reductionem ad has contrariae
dicuntur. In order to answer all of the difficulties in regard to the first
argument it must be noted that opinions, or intellectual conceptions in the
second operation, can be taken in three ways: (1) according to what they are
absolutely; (2) according to the things they represent absolutely, (3)
according to the things they represent, as they are in opinions. We will omit the
first since it does not belong to the present consideration. If they are taken
in the second way, i.e., according to the things represented, there can be
opposition of contradiction, of privation, and of contrariety among them. The
mental enunciation "Socrates sees,” according to what it represents, is
opposed contradictorily to. Socrates does not see”; privatively to
"Socrates is blind”; contrarily to "Socrates is purblind.” Aristotle
points out the reason for this in the Postpredicamenta [Categ. 10: 12a 35]: not
only is blindness privation of sight but to be blind is also a privation of to
be seeing, and so of others. Opinions taken in the third way, i.e., as the
things represented through opinions are in the opinions, have no opposition
except contrariety; for opposites as they are in opinions, whether represented
contradictorily or privatively or contrarily, only admit of the opposition that
can be found between two real beings, for opinions are real beings. The rule is
that whatever belongs to something according to the being which it has in
another, belongs to it according to the mode and nature of that in which it is,
and not according to what its own nature would require. Now, between real
beings only contrariety is found formally. (I am omitting here the
consideration of relative opposition.) Therefore, opinions taken in this mode,
if they are opposed, represent contrariety, although not all are contraries
properly. Only those differing most in respect to truth and falsity about the
same thing are contraries properly. Now Aristotle proved that these are -
judgments affirming and denying the same thing of the same thing. Therefore,
these are the true contraries. The rest are called contraries by reduction to
these. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 10 Ex his patet quid ad obiecta dicendum sit.
Fatemur enim quod affirmatio et negatio in seipsis contradictionem constituunt;
in opinionibus vero existentes contrarietatem inter illas causant propter
extremam distantiam, quam ponunt inter entia realia, opinionem scilicet veram
et opinionem falsam circa idem. Stantque ista duo simul quod ea, in quibus
primo est fallacia, sint opposita ut termini generationis, et tamen sint
contraria utendo supradicta distinctione: sunt enim opposita contradictorie ut
termini generationis secundum repraesentata; sunt autem contraria, secundum
quod habent in seipsis illa contradictoria. Unde plurimum differunt. Liquet
quoque ex hoc quod nulla est dissentio inter dicta Aristotelis et s. Thomae,
quia opiniones aliquas opponi secundum affirmationem et negationem verum esse
confitemur, si ad repraesentata nos convertimus, ut hic dicitur. From this the
answer to the objections is clear. We grant that affirmation and negation in
themselves constitute contradiction. In actual judgments,”’ affirmation and
negation cause contrariety between opinions because of the extreme distance
they posit between real beings, namely, true opinion and false opinion in
respect to the same thing. And these two stand at the same time: those in which
there is fallacy first are opposed as the terms of generation are and yet they
are contraries by the use of the foresaid distinction—for they are opposed
contradictorily as terms of generation according to the things represented, but
they are contraries insofar as they have in themselves those contradictories
and hence differ most. It is also evident that there is no disagreement between
Aristotle and St. Thomas, for we have shown that it is true that some opinions
are opposed according to affirmation and negation if we consider the things
represented, as is said here. 11. Tu autem qui perspicacioris ac provectioris
ingenii es compos, hinc habeto quod inter ipsas opiniones oppositas quidam
tantum motus est, eo quod de affirmato in affirmatum mutatio fit: inter ipsas
vero secundum repraesentata, similitudo quaedam generationis et corruptionis
invenitur, dum inter affirmationem et negationem mutatio clauditur. Unde et
fallacia sive error quandoque et motus et mutationis rationem habet diversa
respiciendo, quando scilicet ex vera in per se falsam, vel e converso, quis
mutat opinionem; quandoque autem solam mutationem imitatur, quando scilicet
absque praeopinata veritate ipsam falsam offendit quis opinionem; quandoque
vero motus undique rationem possidet, quando scilicet ex vera affirmatione in
falsam circa idem contrarii affirmationem transit. Quia tamen prima ut quis
fallatur radix est oppositio affirmationis et negationis, merito ea in quibus
primo est fallacia, sicut generationis terminos opponi dixit. It will be noted,
however, by those of you who are more penetrating and advanced in your
thinking, that between opposite opinions there is something of true motion when
a change is made from the affirmed to the affirmed; but according to the order
of representation there is a certain similitude to generation and corruption so
long as the change is bounded by affirmation and negation. Consequently,
fallacy or error may be regarded in different ways. Sometimes it has the aspect
of both movement and change. This is the case when someone changes his opinion
from a true one to one that is per se false, or conversely. Sometimes change
alone is imitated. This happens when someone arrives at a false opinion apart
from a former true opinion. Sometimes, however, there is movement in every respect.
This is the case when reason passes from the true affirmation to the false
affirmation of a contrary about the same thing. However, since the first root
of being in error is the opposition of affirmation and negation, Aristotle is
correct in saying that those in which there is fallacy first are opposed as are
the terms of generation. 12. Ad dubium secundo loco adductum dico quod peccatur
ibi secundum aequivocationem illius termini per se falsa, seu per se vera.
Opinio enim et similiter enunciatio potest dici dupliciter per se vera seu
falsa. Uno modo, in seipsa, sicut sunt omnes verae secundum illos modos
perseitatis qui enumerantur I posteriorum, et similiter falsae secundum
illosmet modos, ut, homo non est animal. Et hoc modo non accipitur in hac regula
de contrarietate opinionum et enunciationum opinio per se vera aut falsa, ut
efficaciter obiectio adducta concludit. Si enim ad contrarietatem opinionum hoc
exigeretur non possent esse opiniones contrariae in materia contingenti: quod
est falsissimum. Alio modo potest dici opinio sive enunciatio per se vera aut
falsa respectu suae oppositae. Per se vera quidem respectu suae falsae, et per
se falsa respectu suae verae. Et tunc nihil aliud est dicere, est per se vera
respectu illius, nisi quod ratione sui et non alterius verificatur ex falsitate
illius. Et similiter cum dicitur, est per se falsa respectu illius, intenditur
quod ratione sui et non alterius falsificatur ex illius veritate. Verbi gratia;
istius verae, Socrates currit, non est per se falsa, Socrates sedet, quia
falsitas eius non immediate sequitur ex illa, sed mediante ista alia falsa,
Socrates non currit, quae est per se illius falsa, quia ratione sui et non per
aliquod medium ex illius veritate falsificatur, ut patet. Et similiter istius
falsae, Socrates est quadrupes, non est per se vera ista, Socrates est bipes,
quia non per seipsam veritas istius illam falsificat, sed mediante ista,
Socrates non est quadrupes, quae est per se vera respectu illius: propter
seipsam enim falsitate istius verificatur, ut de se patet. Et hoc secundo modo
utimur istis terminis tradentes regulam de contrarietate opinionum et
enunciationum. Invenitur siquidem sic universaliter vera in omni materia regula
dicens quod, vera et eius per se falsa, et falsa et eius per se vera, sunt
contrariae. Unde patet responsio ad obiectionem, quia procedit accipiendo ly
per se vera, et per se falsa primo modo. With respect to the second question, I
say that there is an equivocation of the term "per se false” and "per
se true” in the objection. Opinion, as well as enunciation, can be called per
se true or false in two ways. It can be called per se true in itself. This is
the case in respect to all opinions and enunciations that are in accordance
with the modes of perseity enumerated in I Posteriorum [4: 73a; 34–73b 15].
Similarly, they can be said to be per se false according to the same modes. An
example of this would be "Man is not an animal.” Per se true or false is
not taken in this mode in the rule about contrariety of opinions and enunciations,
as the objection concludes. For if this were needed for contrariety of opinions
there could not be contrary opinions in contingent matter, which is false.
Secondly, an opinion or enunciation can be said to be per se true or false in
respect to its opposite: per se true with respect to its opposite false
opinion, and per se false with respect to its opposite true opinion.
Accordingly, to say that an opinion is per se true in respect to its opposite
is to say that on its own account and not on account of another it is verified
by the falsity of its opposite. Similarly, to say that an opinion is per se
false in respect to its opposite means that on its own account and not on
account of another it is falsified by the truth of the opposite. For example,
the opinion that is per se false in respect to the true opinion "Socrates
is running "is not, "Socrates is sitting,” since the falsity of the
latter does not immediately follow from the former, but mediately from the
false opinion, "Socrates is not running.” It is the latter opinion that is
per se false in relation to "Socrates is running,” since it is falsified
on its own account by the truth of the opinion "Socrates is running,” and
not through an intermediary. Similarly, the per se true opinion in respect to
the false opinion "Socrates is four-footed” is not, "Socrates is
two-footed,” for the truth of the latter does not by itself make the former
false; rather, it is through "Socrates is not four-footed” as a medium,
which is per se true in respect to "Socrates is four-footed”; for
"Socrates is not four-footed” is verified on its own account by the
falsity of "Socrates is four-footed,” as is evident. We are using
"per se true” and "per se false” in this second mode in propounding
the rule concerning contrariety of opinions and enunciations. Thus the rule
that the true opinion and the per se false opinion in relation to it and the
false opinion and the per se true in relation to it are contraries, is
universally true in all matter. Consequently, the response to the objection is
clear, for it results from taking "per se true” and "per se false” in
the first mode. 13. Ad ultimum dubium dicitur quod, quia inter opiniones ad se
invicem pertinentes nulla alia est oppositio nisi contrarietas, coactus fuit
Aristoteles (volens terminis specialibus uti) dicere quod una est magis
contraria quam altera, insinuans quidem quod utraque contrarietatis
oppositionem habet respectu illius verae. Determinat tamen immediate quod
tantum una earum, scilicet negationis opinio, contraria est affirmationi verae.
Subdit enim: manifestum est quoniam haec contraria erit. Duo ergo dixit, et
quod utraque, tam scilicet negatio eiusdem quam affirmatio contrarii,
contrariatur affirmationi verae, et quod una tantum earum, negatio scilicet,
est contraria. Et utrunque est verum. Illud quidem, quia, ut dictum est, ambae
contrarietates oppositione contra affirmationem moliuntur; sed difformiter,
quia opinio negationis primo et per se contrariatur, affirmationis vero
contrarii opinio secundario et per accidens, idest per aliud, ratione scilicet
negativae opinionis, ut declaratum est: sicut etiam in naturalibus albo
contrariantur et nigrum et rubrum, sed illud primo, hoc reductive, ut reducitur
scilicet ad nigrum illud inducendo, ut dicitur V Physic. Secundum autem dictum
simpliciter verum est, quoniam simpliciter contraria non sunt nisi extrema
unius latitudinis, quae maxime distant; extrema autem unius distantiae non sunt
nisi duo. Et ideo cum inter pertinentes ad se invicem opiniones unum extremum
teneat affirmatio vera, reliquum uni tantum falsae dandum est, illi scilicet
quae maxime a vera distat. Hanc autem negativam opinionem esse probatum est.
Haec igitur una tantum contraria est illi, simpliciter loquendo. Caeterae enim
oppositae ratione istius contrariantur, ut de mediis dictum est. Non ergo uni
plura contraria posuit, nec de contrarietate large loquutus est, ut obiiciendo
dicebatur. The answer to the third difficulty is the following. Since there is
no other opposition but contrariety between opinions pertaining to each other,
Aristotle (since he chose to use limited terms) has been forced to say that one
is more contrary than another, which implies that both have opposition of
contrariety in respect to a true opinion. However, he determines immediately
that only one of them, the negative opinion, is contrary to a true affirmation,
when he adds, it is evident that it must be the contrary. What he says, then,
is that each, i.e., both negation of the same thing and affirmation of a
contrary, is contrary to a true affirmation, and that only one of them, i.e.,
the negation, is contrary. Both of these statements are true, for both
contrarieties are caused by an opposition contrary to the affirmation, as was
said, but not uniformly. The opinion of negation is contrary first and per se,
the opinion of affirmation of a contrary, secondarily and accidentally, i.e.,
through another, namely, by reason of the negative opinion, as has already been
shown. There is a parallel to this in natural things: both black and red are
contrary to white, the former first, the latter reductively, i.e., inasmuch as
red is reduced to black in a motion from white to red, as is said in V
Physicorum [5: 229b 15]. However, the second statement, i.e., that only one of
them, the negation, is contrary, is true simply, for the most distant extremes
of one extent are contraries absolutely. Nov,, there are only two extremes of
one distance and since between opinions pertaining to each other true
affirmation is at one extreme, the remaining extreme must be granted to only
one false opinion, i.e., to the one that is most distant from the true opinion.
This has been proved to be the negative opinion. Only this one, then, is
contrary to that absolutely speaking. Other opposites are contrary by reason of
this one, as was said of those in between. Therefore, Aristotle has not posited
many opinions contrary to one, nor used contrariety in a broad sense, both of
which were maintained by the objector. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 14 Deinde cum
dicit: amplius si etiam etc., probat idem, scilicet quod affirmationi contraria
est negatio eiusdem, et non affirmatio contrarii secunda ratione, dicens: si in
aliis materiis oportet opiniones se habere similiter, idest, eodem modo, ita
quod contrariae in aliis materiis sunt affirmatio et negatio eiusdem; et hoc,
scilicet quod diximus de boni et mali opinionibus, videtur esse bene dictum,
quod scilicet contraria affirmationi boni non est affirmatio mali, sed negatio
boni. Et probat hanc consequentiam subdens: aut enim ubique, idest, in omni
materia, ea quae est contradictionis altera pars censenda est contraria suae
affirmationi, aut nusquam, idest, aut in nulla materia. Si enim est una ars
generalis accipiendi contrariam opinionem, oportet quod ubique et in omni
materia uno et eodem modo accipiatur contraria opinio. Et consequenter, si in
aliqua materia negatio eiusdem de eodem affirmationi est contraria, in omni
materia negatio eiusdem de eodem contraria erit affirmationi. Deinde intendens
concludere a positione antecedentis, affirmat antecedens ex sua causa, dicens
quod illae materiae quibus non inest contrarium, ut substantia et quantitas,
quibus, ut in praedicamentis dicitur, nihil est contrarium. De his quidem est
per se falsa ea, quae est opinioni verae opposita contradictorie, ut qui putat
hominem, puta Socratem non esse hominem, per se falsus est respectu putantis,
Socratem esse hominem. Deinde affirmando ipsum antecedens formaliter, directe
concludit intentum a positione antecedentis ad positionem consequentis dicens:
si ergo hae, scilicet, affirmatio et negatio in materia carente contrario, sunt
contrariae, et omnes aliae contradictiones contrariae censendae sunt. When
Aristotle says, Further, if this necessarily holds in a similar way in till
other cases it would seen that what we have said is correct, etc., he gives the
second argument to prove that the negation of the same thing is contrary to the
affirmation, and not the affirmation of a contrary. If opinions are necessarily
related in a similar way, i.e., in the same way, in other matter, that is, in
such a way that affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries in
other matter, it would seem that what we have said about the opinions of that
which is good and that which is evil is correct, i.e., that the contrary of the
affirmation of that which is good is not the affirmation of evil but the
negation of good. He proves this consequence when he adds: for the opposition
of contradiction either holds everywhere or nowhere, i.e., in every matter one
part of a contradiction must be judged contrary to its affirmation—or never,
i.e., in no matter. For if there is a general art which deals with contrary
opinions, contrary Opinions must be taken everywhere and in every matter in one
and the same mode. Consequently, if in any matter, negation of the same thing
of the same thin- is the contrary of the affirmation, then in all matter
negation of the same thing of the same thing will be the contrary of the
affirmation. Since he intends in his proof to conclude from the position of the
antecedent, Aristotle affirms the antecedent through its cause: in matter in
which there is not a contrary, such as substance and quantity, which have no
contraries, as is said in the Predicamcnta [Categ. 5: 3b 24; 6: 5b 10], the one
contradictorily opposed to the true opinion is per se false. For example, he
who thinks that man, for instance Socrates, is not man, is per se mistaken with
regard to one who thinks that Socrates is man. Then he affirms the antecedent
formally and concludes directly from the position of the antecedent to the
position of the consequent. If then these, namely, affirmation and negation in
matter which lacks a contrary, are contraries, all other contradictions must be
judged to be contraries. 15. Deinde cum dicit: amplius similiter etc., probat
idem tertia ratione, quae talis est: sic se habent istae duae opiniones de
bono, scilicet, bonum est bonum, et, bonum non est bonum, sicut se habent istae
duae de non bono, scilicet, non bonum non est bonum, et, non bonum est bonum.
Utrobique enim salvatur oppositio contradictionis. Et primae utriusque
combinationis sunt verae, secundae autem falsae. Unde proponens hanc maiorem
quoad primas veras utriusque combinationis ait: similiter se habet opinio boni,
quoniam bonum est, et non boni quoniam non est bonum. Et subdit quoad secundas
utriusque falsas: et super has opinio boni quoniam non est bonum, et non boni
quoniam est bonum. Haec est maior. Sed illi verae opinioni de non bono,
scilicet, non bonum non est bonum, contraria non est, non bonum est malum, nec
bonum non est malum, quae sunt de praedicato contrario, sed illa, non bonum est
bonum, quae est eius contradictoria; ergo et illi verae opinioni de bono,
scilicet, bonum est bonum, contraria erit sua contradictoria, scilicet, bonum
non est bonum, et non affirmatio contrarii, scilicet, bonum est malum. Unde
subdit minorem supradictam dicens: illi ergo verae opinioni non boni, quae est
dicens quoniam scilicet non bonum non est bonum, quae est contraria. Non enim est
sibi contraria ea opinio, quae dicit affirmativae praedicatum contrarium,
scilicet, quod non bonum est malum: quia istae duae aliquando erunt simul
verae. Nunquam autem vera opinio verae contraria est. Quod autem istae duae
aliquando simul sint verae, patet ex hoc quod quoddam non bonum malum est:
iniustitia enim quoddam non bonum est, et malum. Quare contingeret contrarias
esse simul veras: quod est impossibile. At vero nec supradictae verae opinioni
contraria est illa opinio, quae est dicens praedicatum contrarium negativae,
scilicet, non bonum non est malum, eadem ratione, quia simul et hae erunt
verae. Chimaera enim est quoddam non bonum, de qua verum est simul dicere quod
non est bona, et quod non est mala. Relinquitur ergo tertia pars minoris quod ei
opinioni verae quae, est dicens quoniam non bonum non est bonum, contraria est
ea opinio non boni, quae est dicens quod est bonum, quae est contradictoria
illius. Deinde subdit conclusionem intentam: quare et ei opinioni boni, quae
dicit bonum est bonum, contraria est ea boni opinio, quae dicit quod bonum non
est bonum, idest, sua contradictoria. Contradictiones ergo contrariae in omni
materia censendae sunt. Then he says, Again, the opinions of that which is
good, that it is good and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are
parallel. This begins the third argument to prove the same thing. The two
opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and that it is not good, are
related in the same way as the two opinions of that which is not good, that it
is not good and that it is good; i.e., the opposition of contradiction is kept
in both. The first opinion of each combination is true, the second false. Hence
with respect to the first true opinions of each combination he proposes this
major: Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and of that
which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel. With respect to the
second false judgment of each combination he adds: so also are the opinions of
that which is good, that it is not good, and of that which is not good, that it
is good. This is the major. But the contrary of the true opinion of that which
is not good, namely, the true opinion "That which is not good is not
good,” is not, "That which is not good is evil,” nor "That which is
not good is not evil,” which have a contrary predicate, but the opinion that
that which is not good is good, which is its contradictory. Therefore, the
contrary of the true opinion of that which is good, namely, the true opinion
"That which is good is good,” will also be its contradictory, "That
which is good is not good,” and not the affirmation of the contrary "That
which is good is evil.” Hence he adds the minor which we have already stated:
What, then, would be the contrary of the true opinion asserting that that which
is not good is not good? The contrary of it is not the opinion which asserts
the contrary predicate affirmatively, "That which is not good is evil,”
because these two are sometimes at once true. But a true opinion is never
contrary to a true opinion. That these two are sometimes at once true is
evident from the fact that some things that are not good are evil. Take
injustice; it is something not good, and it is evil. Therefore, contraries
would be true at one and the same time, which is impossible. But neither is the
contrary of the above true opinion the one asserting the contrary predicate
negatively, "That which is not good is not evil,” and for the same reason.
These will also be true at the same time. For example, a chimera is something
not good, and it is true to say of it simultaneously that it is not good and
that it is not evil. There remains the third part of the minor: the contrary of
the true opinion that that which is not good is not good is the opinion that it
is good, which is the contradictory of it. Then he concludes as he intended:
the opinion that a good is not good is contrary to the opinion that a good is
good, i.e., its contradictory. Therefore, it must be judged that contradictions
are contraries in every matter. 16. Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est igitur
etc., declarat determinatam veritatem extendi ad cuiusque quantitatis
opiniones. Et quia de indefinitis, et particularibus, et singularibus iam
dictum est, eo quod idem evidenter apparet de eis in hac re iudicium (indefinitae
enim et particulares nisi pro eisdem supponant sicut singulares, per modum
affirmationis et negationis non opponuntur, quia simul verae sunt); ideo ad
eas, quae universalis quantitatis sunt se transfert, dicens, manifestum esse
quod nihil interest quoad propositam quaestionem, si universaliter ponamus
affirmationes. Huic enim, scilicet, universali affirmationi, contraria est
universalis negatio, et non universalis affirmatio de contrario; ut opinioni
quae opinatur, quoniam omne bonum est bonum, contraria est, nihil horum, quae
bona sunt, idest, nullum bonum est bonum. Et declarat hoc ex quid nominis
universalis affirmativae, dicens: nam eius quae est boni, quoniam bonum est, si
universaliter sit bonum: idest, istius opinionis universalis, omne bonum est
bonum, eadem est, idest, aequivalens, illa quae opinatur, quidquid est bonum
est bonum; et consequenter sua negatio contraria est illa quam dixi, nihil
horum quae bona sunt bonum est, idest, nullum bonum est bonum. Similiter autem
se habet in non bono: quia affirmationi universali de non bono reddenda est
negatio universalis eiusdem, sicut de bono dictum est. He then says, It is
evident that it will make no difference if we posit the affirmation
universally, etc. Here he shows that the truth he has determined is extended to
opinions of every quantity. The case has already been stated in respect to
indefinites, particulars, and singulars. On this point their status is alike,
for indefinites and particulars, unless they stand for the same thing, as is the
case in singulars, are not opposed by way of affirmation and negation, since
they are at once true. Therefore he turns his attention to those of universal
quantity. It is evident, he says, that it will make no difference with respect
to the proposed question if we posit the affirmations universally, for the
contrary of the universal affirmative is the universal negative, and not the
universal affirmation of a contrary. For example, the contrary of the opinion
that everything that is good is good is the opinion that nothing that is good
(i.e., no good) is good. He manifests this by the nominal definition of
universal affirmative: for the opinion that that which is good is good, if the
good is universal, i.e., the universal opinion "Every good is good,” is
the same, i.e., is equivalent to the opinion that whatever is good is good.
Consequently, its negation is the contrary I have stated, "Nothing which
is good is good,” i.e., "No good is good.” The case is similar with
respect to the not good. The universal negation of the not good is opposed to
the universal affirmation of the not good, as we have stated with respect to
the good. 17. Deinde cum dicit: quare si in opinione sic se habet etc.,
revertitur ad respondendum quaestioni primo motae, terminata iam secunda, ex
qua illa dependet. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia primo respondet quaestioni;
secundo, declarat quoddam dictum in praecedenti solutione; ibi: manifestum est
autem quoniam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo, directe respondet
quaestioni, dicens: quare si in opinione sic se habet contrarietas, ut dictum
est; et affirmationes et negationes quae sunt in voce, notae sunt eorum, idest,
affirmationum et negationum quae sunt in anima; manifestum est quoniam
affirmationi, idest, enunciationi affirmativae, contraria erit negatio circa
idem, idest, enunciatio negativa eiusdem de eodem, et non enunciatio
affirmativa contrarii. Et sic patet responsio ad primam quaestionem, qua
quaerebatur, an enunciationi affirmativae contraria sit sua negativa, an
affirmativa contraria. Responsum est enim quod negativa est contraria. Secundo,
dividit negationem contrariam affirmationi, idest, negationem universalem et
contradictoriam, dicens: universalis, scilicet, negatio, affirmationi contraria
est et cetera. Ut exemplariter dicatur, ei enunciationi universali affirmativae
quae est, omne bonum est bonum, vel, omnis homo est bonus, contraria est
universalis negativa, ea scilicet, nullum bonum est bonum, vel, nullus homo est
bonus: singula singulis referendo. Contradictoria autem negatio, contraria illi
universali affirmationi est, aut, non omnis homo est bonus, aut, non omne bonum
est bonum, singulis singula similiter referendo. Et sic posuit utrunque divisionis
membrum, et declaravit. Then he says, If, therefore, this is the case with
respect to opinion, and. affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of
those in the soul, etc. With this he returns to the question first advanced, to
reply to it, for he has now completed the second on which the first depends. He
first replies to the question, then manifests a point in the solution of a
preceding difficulty where he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be
contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, etc. First, then, he
replies directly to the question: If, therefore, contrariety is such in the
case of opinions, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of
affirmations and negations in the soul, it is evident that the contrary of the
affirmation, i.e., of the affirmative, enunciation, is the negation of the same
subject. In other words, the negative enunciation of the same predicate of the
same subject will be the contrary, and not the affirmative enunciation of a
contrary. Thus the response to the first question—whether the contrary of the affirmative
enunciation is its negative or the contrary affirmative—is clear. The answer is
that the negative is the contrary. Next, he divides negation as it is contrary
to affirmation, i.e., into the universal negation, and the contradictory: The
universal, i.e., negation, is contrary to the affirmation, etc. In order to
state this division by way of example he relates one enunciation to one
enunciation: the contrary of the universal affirmative enunciation "Every
good is’ good” or "Every man is good,” is the universal negative "No
good is good” or "No man is good.” Again, relating one to one, he says
that the contradictory negation contrary to the universal affirmation is
"Not every man is good” or "Not everything good is good.” Thus he
posits both members of the division and makes the division evident. Cajetanus
lib. 2 l. 14 n. 18 Sed est hic dubitatio non dissimulanda. Si enim affirmationi
universali contraria est duplex negatio, universalis scilicet et
contradictoria, vel uni duo sunt contraria, vel contrarietate large utitur
Aristoteles: cuius oppositum supra declaravimus. Augetur et dubitatio: quia in
praecedenti textu dixit Aristoteles quod, nihil interest si universalem
negationem faciamus ita contrariam universali affirmationi, sicut singularem
singulari. Et ita declinari non potest quin affirmationi universali duae sint
negationes contrariae, eo modo quo hic loquitur de contrarietate Aristoteles. A
difficulty arises at this point which we cannot disregard. If the contrary of
the universal affirmative is a twofold negation, namely, the universal and the
contradictory, either there are two contraries to one affirmation or Aristotle
is using contrariety in a broad sense, although we showed that this was not the
case apropos of an earlier passage of the text. The difficulty is augmented by
the fact that Aristotle said in the passage immediately preceding that it makes
no difference if we take the universal negation as contrary to the universal
affirmation, i.e., as one of its negations. Hence, the conclusion cannot be
avoided that in the mode in which Aristotle speaks of contrariety here, there
are two contrary negations to the universal affirmative. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14
n. 19 Ad huius evidentiam notandum est quod, aliud est loqui de contrarietate
quae est inter negationem alicuius universalis affirmativae in ordine ad
affirmationem contrarii de eodem, et aliud est loqui de illamet universali
negativa in ordine ad negationem eiusdem affirmativae contradictoriam. Verbi
gratia: sint quatuor enunciationes, quarum nunc meminimus, scilicet,
universalis affirmativa, contradictoria, universalis negativa, et universalis
affirmatio contrarii, sic dispositae in eadem linea recta: omnis homo est
iustus, non omnis homo est iustus, omnis homo non est iustus, omnis homo est
iniustus: et intuere quod licet primae omnes reliquae aliquo modo
contrarientur, magna tamen differentia est inter primae et cuiusque earum
contrarietatem. Ultima enim, scilicet affirmatio contrarii, primae contrariatur
ratione universalis negationis, quae ante ipsam sita est: quia non per se sed
ratione illius falsa est, ut probavit Aristoteles, quia implicita est. Tertia
autem, idest universalis negatio, non per se sed ratione secundae, scilicet
negationis contradictoriae, contrariatur primae eadem ratione, quia, scilicet,
non est per se falsa illius affirmationis veritate, sed implicita: continet
enim negationem contradictoriam, scilicet, non omnis homo est iustus, mediante
qua falsificatur ab affirmationis veritate, quia simpliciter et prior est falsitas
negationis contradictoriae falsitate negationis universalis: totum namque
compositius et posterius est partibus. Est ergo inter has tres falsas ordo, ita
quod affirmationi verae contradictoria negatio simpliciter sola est contraria,
quia est simpliciter respectu illius per se falsa; affirmativa autem contrarii
est per accidens contraria, quia est per accidens falsa; universalis vero
negatio, tamquam medium sapiens utriusque extremi naturam, relata ad contrarii
affirmationem est per se contraria et per se falsa, relata autem ad negationem
contradictoriam est per accidens falsa et contraria. Sicut rubrum ad nigrum est
album, et ad album est nigrum, ut dicitur in V physicorum. Aliud igitur est
loqui de negatione universali in ordine ad affirmationem contrarii, et aliud in
ordine ad negationem contradictoriam. Si enim primo modo loquamur, sic negatio
universalis per se contraria et per se falsa est; si autem secundo modo, non
est per se falsa, nec contraria affirmationi. To clear up this difficulty we
must note that it is one thing to speak of the contrariety there is between the
negation of some universal affirmative in relation to the affirmation of a
contrary, and another to speak of that same universal negative in relation to
the negation contradictory to the same affirmative. For example, the four
enunciations of which we are now speaking are the universal affirmative, the
contradictory, the universal negative, and the universal affirmation of a
contrary: "Every man is just,” "Not every man is just,” "No man
is just,” "Every man is unjust.” Notice that although all the rest are
contrary to the first in some way, there is a great difference between the
contrariety of each to the first. The last one, the affirmation of a contrary,
is contrary to the first by reason of the preceding universal negation, for it
is false, not per se but by reason of that negation, i.e., it is implicative,
as Aristotle has already proved. The third, the universal negation, is not per
se contrary to the first either. It is contrary by reason of the second, the
contradictory negation, and for the same reason, i.e., it is not per se false
in respect to the truth of the affirmation but is implicative, for it contains
the contradictory negation "Not every man is just,” by means of which it
is made false in respect to the truth of the affirmation. The reason for this
is that the falsity of the contradictory negation is prior absolutely to the
falsity of the universal negation, for the whole is more composite and
posterior as compared to its parts. There is, therefore, an order among these
three false enunciations. Only the contradictory negation is simply contrary to
the true affirmation, for it is per se false simply in respect to the
affirmation; the affirmative of the contrary is per accidens contrary, since it
is per accidens false; the universal negation, which is a medium partaking of
the nature of each extreme, is per se contrary and per se false as related to
the affirmation of a contrary, but is per accidens false and per accidens contrary
as related to the contradictory negation; just as red in a motion from red to
black takes the place of white, and in a motion from red to white takes the
place of black, as is said in V Physicorum [5: 229b 15]. Therefore, it is one
thing to speak of the universal negation in relation to affirmation of a
contrary and another to speak of it in relation to the contradictory negation.
If we are speaking of it in the first way, the universal negation is per se
contrary and per se false; if in the second, it is not per se false or contrary
to the affirmation. 20. Quia ergo agitur ab Aristotele nunc quaestio, inter
affirmationem contrarii et negationem quae earum contraria sit affirmationi
verae, et non agitur quaestio ipsarum negationum inter se, quae, scilicet,
earum contraria sit illi affirmationi, ut patet in toto processu quaestionis;
ideo Aristoteles indistincte dixit quod utraque negatio est contraria
affirmationi verae, et non affirmatio contrarii. Intendens per hoc declarare
diversitatem quae est inter affirmationem contrarii et negationem in hoc quod
verae affirmationi contrariantur, et non intendens dicere quod utraque negatio
est simpliciter contraria. Hoc enim in dubitatione non est quaesitum, sed illud
tantum. Et similiter dixit quod nihil interest si quis ponat negationem
universalem: nihil enim interest quoad hoc, quod affirmatio contrarii
ostendatur non contraria affirmationi verae, quod inquirimus. Plurimum autem
interesset, si negationes ipsas inter se discutere vellemus quae earum esset affirmationi
contraria. Sic ergo patet quod subtilissime Aristoteles locutus de vera
contrarietate enunciationum, unam uni contrariam posuit in omni materia et
quantitate, dum simpliciter contrarias contradictiones asseruit. Since
Aristotle is now treating the question as to which is the contrary of a true
affirmation, affirmation of a contrary or the negation, and not the question as
to which of the negations is contrary to a true affirmation—as is clear in the
whole progression of the question—bis answer is that both negations are
contrary to the true affirmation without distinction, and that affirmation of a
contrary is not. His intention is to manifest the diversity between the
negation, and the affirmation of a contrary, inasmuch as they are contrary to a
true affirmation. He does not intend to say that both negations are contrary
simply, for this is not the difficulty in question here, but the former is.
With respect to his saying that it makes no difference if we posit the
universal negation, the same point applies, for in regard to showing that
affirmation of a contrary is not contrary to a true affirmation, which is the
question at issue here, it makes no difference which negation is posited. It
would make a great deal of difference, however, if we wished to discuss which
negation was contrary to a true affirmation. It is evident, then, that
Aristotle’s discussion of the true contrariety of enunciations is very subtle,
for he has posited one to one contraries in every matter and quantity, and
affirmed that contradictions are contraries simply. 21. Deinde cum dicit:
manifestum est autem etc., resumit quoddam dictum ut probet illud, dicens
manifestum est autem ex dicendis quod non contingit veram verae contrariam
esse, nec in opinione mentali, nec in contradictione, idest, vocali
enunciatione. Et causam subdit: quia contraria sunt quae circa idem opposita
sunt; et consequenter enunciationes et opiniones verae circa diversa contrariae
esse non possunt. Circa idem autem contingit simul omnes veras enunciationes et
opiniones verificari, sicut et significata vel repraesentata earum simul illi
insunt: aliter verae tunc non sunt. Et consequenter omnes verae enunciationes
et opiniones circa idem contrariae non sunt, quia contraria non contingit eidem
simul inesse. Nullum ergo verum sive sit circa idem, sive sit circa aliud, est
alteri vero contrarium. Et sic finitur expositio huius libri perihermenias. When
he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in
opinion or in contradiction, etc., he returns to a statement he has already
made in order to prove it. It is evident, too, from what has been said, that
true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, i.e.,
in vocal enunciation. He gives as the cause of this that contraries are
opposites about the same thing; consequently, true enunciations and opinions
about diverse things cannot be contraries. However, it is possible for all true
enunciations and opinions about the same thing to be verified at the same time,
inasmuch as the things signified or represented by them belong to the same
thing at the same time; otherwise they are not true. Consequently, not all true
enunciations and opinions about the same thing are contraries, for it is not
possible for contraries to be in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, no
true opinion or enunciation, whether it is about the same thing or is about
another is contrary to another. – [ XI. 6. The third part is the second
difference, i.e., by convention, namely, according to human institution
deriving from the will of man. This differentiates names from vocal sounds
signifying naturally, such as the groans of the sick and the vocal sounds of
brute animals] [?][11 Then Aristotle says, ‘by convention’ is added because
nothing is *by nature* a name, etc. Here Aristotle explains the third part of
the definition. The reason it is said that the name signifies by convention [ad
placitum ex institutione], he says, is that no name exists naturally. For it is
a name because it signifies; it does not signify naturally however, but by
institution [ex institutione]. This Aristotle adds when he says, but it is a
name when it is *made* a sign, i.e., when it is imposed to signify. For that
which signifies naturally is not made a sign, but is a sign naturally. he
explains this when he says: for unlettered sounds, such as those of the brutes
designate, etc., i.e., since they cannot be signified by letters. He says
sounds rather than vocal sounds because some animals—those without lungs—do not
have vocal sounds. Such animals signify proper passions by some kind of
non-vocal sound which signifies naturally. But none of these sounds of the
brutes is a name. We are given to understand from this that a name does not
signify naturally.] Aquino. Keywords: Peri hermeneias, de interpretation,
Austin/Grice, “De interpretation” nota, notare, notante, notato, denotato –
denotare -- Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Aquino: grammatici speculative, per
il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria,
Italia. Refs.: Grice, “Intentionality in Aquino,” Speranza, “Grice and Aquino
on the taxonomy of intentions.” https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51685535573/in/photolist-2mT23wq-2mTCgej-2mSMKfP-2mSQAsN-2mSnTuE-2mS3yF6-2mRV5s7-2mRFSx9-2mRrJCw-2mRh74B-2mQJrAD-2mPYm4t-2mPQGvz-2mPRKiW-2mPMBQM-2mPAuFE-2mPsU62-2mPtnaL-2mPmNVF-2mNaHiH-2mN36eA-2mN2zUd-2mMJokF-2mMNyYv-2mLP4Rj-2mLQc9e-2mLLy7L-2mLLy6U-2mLMaMX-2mLGwVU-2mPu6xB-2mPV6V9-2mKBHiL-2mKG3Hd-2mKT4G5-2mKFc73-2mKwv6q-2mKwnLL-2mKNzk6-2mKBEmt-2mKMAyJ-2mKAsyK-2mKEJsY-2mPvmTf-2mKbfaU-2mKbbNP-2mJLMNt-2mEy4wH-E4u3XA-2mKgT2F
Grice
ed Arangio – colloquio – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Napoli). Grice: “We have Flores, we have Ruiz, we have
Enriques – reminds me of Alan Montefiore! I like Vladimiro Arangio – my
favourite is by far his philosoophising on Socrates’s ‘Sofista’ – he
distinguishes between what he calls ‘Socratic dialogue’ (mine) and ‘dialogo
sofistico’!” -- Vladimiro Arangio-Ruiz (Napoli) filosofo, grecista e accademico
italiano. Fu il primo preside del Liceo scientifico Alessandro Tassoni di
Modena, istituito nel 1923, a seguito della riforma Gentile. Nacque a Napoli nel 1887 da Gaetano,
professore di diritto costituzionale, e da Clementina Cavicchia. Frequentò a
Firenze il corso di lettere nell'Istituto di studi superiori dal 1905 al 1910 e
si laureò con una tesi su Il coro nella tragedia greca in letteratura greca con
Girolamo Vitelli, filologo, grecista, papirologo e senatore del Regno
d'Italia. Vladimiro appartenne a una
illustre famiglia di giuristi: il fratello Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz fu uno dei
maggiori studiosi di diritto romano, ordinario all'Napoli e alla Sapienza di
Roma. Contravvenendo alla tradizione di famiglia, Vladimiro preferì dedicarsi
agli studi filosofici e fu professore alla Scuola normale superiore di Pisa e
alla facoltà di Magistero di Firenze.
Insegnò nei ginnasi di Stato e fu ufficiale d'artiglieria nella Prima guerra
mondiale dove venne ferito. Nel 1921 si laureò per la seconda volta, in
filosofia con Piero Martinetti, discutendo la tesi Conoscenza e moralità
pubblicata nel 1922. In gioventù aveva
sentito fortemente l'influenza del giovane poeta e filosofo Carlo Michelstaedter,
esponente importante della filosofia europea del primo Novecento, del quale
pubblicherà gli scritti. Si propose una
funzione critica ricostruttiva
dell'idealismo storicistico e dell'attualismo di Giovanni Gentile da cui
trasse ispirazione per sviluppare il suo "moralismo assoluto".
Contrariamente alla dottrina gentiliana che dichiarava l'attualismo coincidente
con la "vita dello Stato", Arangio Ruiz credeva che invece fosse
identificabile con il comportamento morale individuale poiché la politica non è
che un aspetto particolare della legge morale per sua natura universale. Fra le sue opere si ricordano. “Prose morali”;
“Umanità dell'arte.” Il Liceo
"Tassoni" tra storia e innovazione.
Fonte: Dizionario di filosofia, riferimenti in. Fabrizio Meroi, «Carlo Michelstaedter» in Il
contributo italiano alla storia del PensieroFilosofia, Roma Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana,.
Ricostruzione filosofica, in Arch. di filosofia, X[1940]20 Carlo Michelstaedter Altri progetti Collabora
a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Vladimiro
Arangio-Ruiz Vladimiro Arangio-Ruiz, su
TreccaniEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Vladimiro Arangio-Ruiz, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Vladimiro Arangio-Ruiz, in Dizionario di
filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2009. Filosofia Filosofo del XX
secoloGrecisti italianiAccademici italiani Professore. Vladimiro Arangio-Ruiz.
Arangio. Keywords: colloqui. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed Arrangio” – The
Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51790746021/in/dateposted-public/
Grice ed Arcais –
filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Cervignano del Freiuli). Filosofo. Grice:
“As Mikos says about the English, ‘de’ adds prestige as in ‘de Grys’ – same
with Italians and ‘d’Arcais,’ after four pescherie owned by one ancestor. –
d’Arcais has been described as a ‘quaresmalitsa,’ who had the unfortune of
being tutored by an atheist! Asa good
stoicp philosopher, he endured it!’ Direttore della rivista MicroMega. È stato
collaboratore de la Repubblica, il Fatto Quotidiano, El País, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung e Gazeta Wyborcza. Ha
sempre unito l’attività di studioso, il lavoro editoriale e l’impegno civile.
Educazione intensamente cattolica. Abbandona la fede nella primavera del 1961.
Maturità scientifica. Maturità classica. Si iscrive al partito comunista (e
federazione giovanile) entrando all’università. Nel 1964 è segretario del
Circolo universitario comunista e nell’estate frequenta la scuola centrale di
partito “Marabini” a Bologna. Si laurea con una tesi su “Marx interprete di
Adamo Smith” e ne sarà a lungo uno degli assistenti. Espulso dal Pci, è uno
degli animatori del movimento studentesco del Sessantotto. Pubblica la rivista
“Soviet”. Nel 1976/7 la rivista “Il Leviatano”. -- è l’organizzatore del
convegno internazionale di tre giorni che apre la “Biennale del dissenso” della
presidenza Ripa di Meana. Viene chiamato
a fondare e dirigere il “Centro culturale Mondoperaio” dal segretario del Psi
Bettino Craxi (alleato delle sinistre di Giolitti e Lombardi). Prima
iniziativa, il convegno internazionale “Marxismo, leninismo, socialismo”,
relatori Cornelius Castoriadis, Gilles Martinet e Rudi Dutschke. Rompe con
Craxi nel gennaio del 1980 quando questi cambia politica, spezza l’alleanza con
Giolitti e Lombardi, torna al governo con la Dc. Nel 1986 fonda insieme a Giorgio Ruffolo la
rivista “MicroMega” (Ruffolo ne uscirà nel 1992, per contrasti su “Mani
pulite”). Fonda la “sinistra dei club” per partecipare alla fondazione del Pds,
che dovrebbe aprirsi alla società civile sulle ceneri dell’ex Pci. Lo abbandona
un anno dopo, viste le promesse non mantenute. Nell’inverno 2000 è protagonista
di una controversia pubblica col cardinal Ratzinger al Teatro Quirino di Roma.
Nel 2002 organizza insieme a Nanni Moretti, Olivia Sleiter e Pancho Pardi la
grande manifestazione dei “girotondi” del 14 settembre a piazza san Giovanni a
Roma. Paolo Flores d'Arcais è "radicalmente ateo". Inizia presto ad occuparsi di politica
nell'organizzazione giovanile del Partito Comunista Italiano, ma presto viene
espulso dalla FGCI per la sua prolungata e grave attività frazionistica, cioè
per la sua doppia militanza nella FGCI e nella Quarta Internazionale
trotskista. Allievo e amico di Lucio Colletti, dopo esser stato uno dei
protagonisti del "Sessantotto" romano, approda a posizioni di
riformismo radicale e verso la fine degli anni settanta ha una breve ma vivida
intesa con Bettino Craxi e Claudio Martelli, dai quali, tuttavia, si distacca
ben presto. Nel 1991 aderisce al Partito
Democratico della Sinistra di Achille Occhetto entrando nella Direzione del
movimento, da cui però fuoriesce due anni dopo poiché favorevole alla guerra
del Golfo a differenza della linea maggioritaria del partito. Tra i promotori
della breve stagione dei girotondi, tenta di proporre una lista di suoi
candidati alle primarie dell'Ulivo per le elezioni politiche del 2006 ma come
lui stesso deve ammettere "realizza un fallimento pieno e perfetto"
raccogliendo appena 130 adesioni alla sua idea. Il 25 marzo 2008 annuncia su
MicroMega che nelle elezioni politiche del 2008 avrebbe votato per il Partito
Democratico in funzione anti-berlusconiana. Il 29 gennaio 2009 decide di
ritentare in politica prospettando il "Partito dei Senza Partito"
insieme ad Antonio Di Pietro ed Andrea Camilleri per partecipare alle elezioni
europee del 2009 ma, il 12 marzo dello stesso anno, viene annunciato il mancato
accordo fra i tre. Per le elezioni politiche del ha dichiarato di votare la lista Rivoluzione
Civile di Antonio Ingroia. Successivamente non nasconde le sue simpatie per il
Movimento 5 Stelle per il quale dichiara di votare. Tuttavia in seguito
all'alleanza tra il Movimento 5 Stelle e la Lega si dice deluso dal Movimento,
accusando in particolare Luigi Di Maio di avere tradito le promesse agli
elettori. Altre opere: “Il maggio rosso
di Parigi. Cronologia e documenti delle lotte studentesche e operaie in
Francia, a cura di, Padova, Marsilio); “Il piccolo sinistrese illustrato, con
Giampiero Mughini, Milano, SugarCo); “Il dubbio e la certezza. Nei dintorni del
marxismo e oltre (Milano, SugarCo); “L'esistenzialismo libertario di Hannah
Arendt, in Hannah Arendt, Politica e menzogna, Milano, SugarCo); “Oltre il PCI.
Per un partito libertario e riformista, Genova, Marietti); “Esistenza e
libertà. A partire da Hannah Arendt, Genova, Marietti); “L'albero e la foresta.
Il partito democratico della sinistra nel sistema politico italiano, con
Umberto Curi, Milano, FrancoAngeli); “La rimozione permanente. Il futuro della
sinistra e la critica del comunismo. Scritti; Genova, Marietti, 1991. 88-211-6898-0. Etica senza fede, Torino,
Einaudi); “Il disincanto tradito, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri); “Hannah Arendt.
Esistenza e libertà, Roma, Donzelli); “Gobetti, liberale del futuro, in Piero
Gobetti, La rivoluzione liberale. Saggio sulla lotta politica in Italia,
Torino, Einaudi); “Il populismo italiano da Craxi a Berlusconi. Dieci anni di
regime nelle analisi di MicroMega, Roma, Donzelli); “L'individuo libertario.
Percorsi di filosofia morale e politica nell'orizzonte del finite” (Torino,
Einaudi); “ Il sovrano e il dissidente, ovvero La democrazia presa sul serio.
Saggio di filosofia politica per cittadini esigenti, Milano, Garzanti); “Dio
esiste? Un confronto su verità, fede, ateismo, moderato da Gad Lerner, con
Joseph Ratzinger, Roma, Somedia Gruppo editoriale L'Espresso); “Il ventennio
populista. Da Craxi a Berlusconi (passando per D'Alema?), Roma, Fazi); “Hannah
Arendt. Esistenza e libertà, autenticità e politica, Roma, Fazi); “Atei o
credenti? Filosofia, politica, etica, scienza”; “Roma, Fazi, Dio? Ateismo della ragione e ragioni della
fede, con Angelo Scola, Venezia, Marsilio); “Itinerario di un eretico” (Lugano,
ADV); “A chi appartiene la tua vita? Una riflessione filosofica su etica,
testamento biologico, eutanasia e diritti civili nell'epoca oscurantista di Ratzinger
e Berlusconi, Milano); “Ponte alle Grazie, 2009. 978-88-6220-068-4. Albert Camus filosofo del
futuro, Torino, Codice); “La sfida oscurantista di Joseph Ratzinger, Milano,
Ponte alle Grazie); “Gesù. L'invenzione del Dio cristiano, Torino, Add); “Macerie.
Ascesa e declino di un regime, Roma, Aliberti); “Perché oggi, in Ernesto Rossi,
Contro l'industria dei partiti, Milano, Chiarelettere); Democrazia! Libertà
privata e libertà in rivolta, Torino, Add); “Il caso o la speranza? Un
dibattito senza diplomazia” (Milano, Garzanti); “La Guerra del Sacro.
Terrorismo, laicità e democrazia radicale, Milano, Raffaello Cortina Editore);
“Questione di vita e di morte, Einaudi, Vele. Note cfr., uno per tutti, il suo volume (a quattro
mani con il cardinale Angelo Scola) "Dio? Ateismo della ragione e ragioni
della fede"Marsilio editore, 2008
Dal sito di MicroMega Articolo de
El País, tradotto in italiano Archiviato il 30 giugno in.
Elezioni Per chi votano Travaglio, Guzzanti, Scanzi, ecc. Tra
Rivoluzione Civile e il Movimento 5 Stelle
La Repubblica del 19 novembre Flores
d'Arcais: “Il Movimento 5 Stelle non esiste più”, su micromega-online. 24 aprile. MicroMega (periodico). reccaniEnciclopedie on
line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Opere di Paolo Flores d'Arcais, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited
srl. Registrazioni di Paolo Flores
d'Arcais, su RadioRadicale, Radio Radicale.
Sito ufficiale di MicroMega. Undici riflessioni sui movimenti articolo
pubblicato sul numero 2 del 2002 di MicroMega. Intervista a D'Arcais sul
ventennale della rivista. Il blog di Paolo Flores d'Arcais, su
ilfattoquotidiano. Filosofia Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI
secoloGiornalisti italiani del XX secoloGiornalisti italiani Professore1944Nati
l'11 luglio Cervignano del FriuliDirettori di periodici italianiFilosofi atei.
Arcais. Paolo Flores d’Arcais. Keywords: giudeo, portughese, Flores – arcais,
d’arcais, piamontese. Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, “Grice ed Arcais” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51791090779/in/dateposted-public/
Grice ed Archibugi –
PAX ROMANA – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Roma).
Filosofo. Grice: “I would hardly call Archibugi a philosopher, but he did
compile a thing ‘filosofi per la pace’ none of them Italian! So much for ‘pax
romana’!” – Grice: “Strawson does call Archibugi a ‘filosofo,’ though!” -- DanieleArchibugi (Roma), filosofo. Nell'ambito
della teoria politica, ha sviluppato, insieme a David Held, l'idea di una
democrazia cosmopolita. Ha anche lavorato su diversi aspetti della
globalizzazione, ed in particolare sulla globalizzazione dell'innovazione e del
cambiamento tecnologico. Dopo una non assidua frequentazione del Liceo
Sperimentale della Bufalotta, si è laureato con lode alla Facoltà di Economia e
Commercio dell'Roma La Sapienza con Federico Caffè. Ha conseguito il dottorato
di ricerca presso lo Science Policy Research Unit dell'Università del Sussex,
dove ha lavorato con Christopher Freeman e Keith Pavitt. Ha insegnato alle
Università del Sussex, Madrid, Napoli, Roma La Sapienza e Roma Luiss,
Cambridge, London School of Economics and Political Science e Harvard. Ha anche
tenuto corsi presso università asiatiche quali la Ritsumeikan University di
Kyoto e la SWEFE University di Chengdu. Nel 2006 è stato nominato
Professore Onorario presso l'Università del Sussex e nel Membro d'Onore del Réseaux de Recherche sur
l'Innovation. Dirigente presso il Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche a
Roma, è Professore di Innovation, Governance and Public Policy presso l'Londra,
Birkbeck College. Dal 1997 al 2002 è stato Commissario dell'Autorità sui
servizi pubblici locali di Roma, eletto a larga maggioranza dal Consiglio
Comunale. La democrazia cosmopolita Il progetto della democrazia
cosmopolita o cosmopolitica si interroga sulla possibilità di applicare alcune
norme e valori della democrazia anche nelle relazioni internazionali. La necessità
deriva dal fatto che la globalizzazione economica e sociale ha reso gli stati
sempre più vulnerabili e che decisioni importanti per loro sono prese al di
fuori dal processo democratico. La soluzione proposta dalla democrazia
cosmopolita è sviluppare istituzioni sovra-statali che siano capaci di
affrontare democraticamente problemi comuni quali l'ambiente, la sicurezza, le
migrazioni, il commercio estero e i flussi finanziari. La democrazia
cosmopolita guarda con fiducia alle organizzazioni internazionali, e desidera
rafforzare al loro interno il controllo dei cittadini, cui va dato un peso
politico parallelo e autonomo rispetto a quello che già hanno i loro governi. A
livello politico, Archibugi ha sostenuto la limitazione del potere di veto nel
Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite e la formazione di un'Assemblea
Parlamentare Mondiale. Ha invece ritenuto insoddisfacenti e anti-democratici i
vertici inter-governativi quali il G7, G8 and G20. Ha anche preso posizione
contro l'idea di una Lega delle democrazie sostenendo che una riforma
democratica delle Nazioni Unite riuscirebbe assai meglio a soddisfare le
medesime istanze. Giustizia globale Fautore della responsabilità
individuale dei governanti nel caso di crimini internazionali, Archibugi ha anche
attivamente sostenuto, sin dalla caduta del muro di Berlino, la creazione di
una Corte penale internazionale, collaborando sia con i giuristi della
Commissione del diritto internazionale delle Nazioni Unite sia con il governo
italiano. Nel corso degli anni, la sua posizione è diventata sempre più
scettica per l'incapacità dei tribunali internazionali di incriminare i più
forti. Ha, quindi, preso posizione a favore di altri strumenti quasi-giudiziari
come le Commissioni per la verità e la riconciliazione e i Tribunali
d'opinione. Globalizzazione della tecnologia Archibugi ha proposto una
tassonomia della globalizzazione della tecnologia che distingue fra tre
meccanismi di trasmissione della conoscenza: sfruttamento internazionale delle
innovazioni, generazione globale delle innovazioni e collaborazioni globali
nella scienza e nella tecnologia.. Come Presidente di un Gruppo di
Esperti dello Spazio di Ricerca Europeo della Commissione europea dedicato alla
collaborazione internazionale nella scienza e nella tecnologia, Archibugi ha
indicato che il declino demografico dell'Europa, combinato con la scarsa
vocazione delle nuove generazioni per le scienze, genererà una drastica carenza
di lavoratori qualificati in meno di una generazione. Questo metterà in
pericolo il livello di benessere della popolazione europea in aree cruciali
come la ricerca medica, le tecnologie dell'informazione e le industrie ad alta
tecnologia. Ha così sostenuto di rivedere radicalmente la politica
dell'immigrazione europea in maniera di accogliere e formare in un decennio
almeno due milioni di studenti dai paesi emergenti e in via di sviluppo,
qualificandoli in discipline quali le scienze e l'ingegneria. Economia
della ricostruzione dopo le crisi economiche Da studioso dei cicli economici, Archibugi
ha combinato la prospettiva keynesiana derivata dai suoi mentori Federico
Caffè, Hyman Minsky e Nicholas Kaldor con quella schumpeteriana derivata da
Christopher Freeman e dallo Science Policy Research Unit dell'Università del
Sussex. Combinando le due prospettive, Archibugi ha sostenuto che per uscire da
una crisi, un paese deve investire nei settori emergenti e che, in assenza di
spirito imprenditoriale del settore privato, il settore pubblico deve avere la
capacità manageriale di sfruttare le opportunità scientifiche e tecnologiche,
anche a salvaguardia dei beni pubblici. Relazioni familiari Figlio
dell'urbanista Franco Archibugi e della poetessa Muzi Epifani, ha numerosi
fratelli e sorelle, tra cui la regista Francesca Archibugi e il politologo
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, con il quale frequentemente collabora nei suoi studi.
I fratelli maggiori del nonno di suo nonno furono Francesco e Alessandro
Archibugi, volontari del Battaglione universitario della Sapienza e la difesa
della Repubblica Romana (1849). Note D. Archibugi è stato uno degli ultimi e più
vicini allievi di Federico Caffè. Partecipò attivamente alle sue ricerche dopo
la misteriosa scomparsa. Cfr. D. Archibugi, I ragazzi che cercarono il Prof.
Caffè, La Repubblica, 8 aprile. Si veda anche Fabrizio Peronaci, La scomparsa
di Federico Caffè. «Un genio anche nell’addio. Come lui solo Majorana»,
intervista a Daniele Archibugi, Corriere, 10 novembre. Membres d'honneur du Réseaux de Recherche sur
l'Innovation Consiglio Nazionale delle
Ricerche, Istituto di Ricerca sulla Popolazione e le Politiche Sociali Birkbeck College, Department of
Management Tom Cassauwers, Interview
with Daniele Archibugi, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 14 settembre. Campaign for the Establishment of a United
Nations Parliamentary Assembly Copia archiviata, su en.unpacampaign.org. 10
ottobre 2009 22 agosto 2009). D.
Archibugi, The G20 is a luxury we can't afford, The Guardian, Saturday 28 March
2008. D. Archibugi, A League of
Democracies or a Democratic United Nations Archiviato il 24 luglio in., Harvard International Review, Ottobre
2008. Intervista su Delitto e castigo
nella società globale. Crimini e processi internazionali, Letture.org.. Daniele Archibugi e Alice Pease, Delitto e
castigo nella società globale. Crimini e processi internazionali, Castelvecchi,
Roma,. Daniele Archibugi, La giustizia
penale internazionale tra passato e futuro, Questione Giustizia, 27 gennaio. Daniele Archibugi and Jonathan Michie, The
Globalization of Technology: A New Taxonomy, "Cambridge Journal of
Economics", 19, no. 1, 1995, 121-140,
Daniele Archibugi (Chair) Opening to the World. Opening to the World:
International Cooperation in Science and Technology Archiviato il 25
luglio in., European Research Area,
2008, D. Archibugi e A. Filippetti,
Innovation and Economic Crisis. Innovation and Economic Crisis. Lessons and
Prospects from the Economic Downturn, Routledge, London,. D. Archibugi, A. Filippetti & M. Frenz,
Investment in innovation for European recovery: a public policy priority,
Science & Public Policy, November.
Daniele Archibugi, «Generare imprese europee per la ricostruzione: la
lezione Airbus», Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 Maggio.
Floriana Bulfon, «Nuovi imprenditori e lavoratori soddisfatti: solo così
dopo il virus l'Italia sarà migliore. Intervista a Daniele Archibugi»,
L'Espresso, 14 Aprile. Daniele
Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Raffaele Marchetti, Global Democracy.
Normative and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,. Nell'ambito
degli studi sull'organizzazione internazionale, ha pubblicato: “Filosofi per la
pace” (Editori Riuniti); “Cosmopolis. È possibile una democrazia sovra-nazionale?”
(Manifestolibri); “Il futuro delle Nazioni Unite” (Edizioni Lavoro); “Diritti
umani e democrazia cosmopolitica” (Feltrinelli); “Cittadini del mondo. Verso
una democrazia cosmopolitica” (Il Saggiatore); “Delitto e castigo nella società
globale. Crimini e processi internazionali, (Castelvecchi); “Cambiamento
tecnologico e sviluppo industriale, (Franco Angeli); “Economia globale e
innovazione” (Donzelli). “Il triangolo dei servizi pubblici, (Marsilio). “Relazione
sulla ricerca e l'innovazione in Italia. Analisi e dati di politica della
scienza e della tecnologia, seconda edizione (CNR Edizioni, ). 978-88-8080-356-0 (IT, EN) Sito ufficiale, su
danielearchibugi.org. Opere di Daniele
Archibugi, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.
Registrazioni di Daniele Archibugi, su RadioRadicale, Radio
Radicale. Sito CNR-IRPPS, Commessa
Globalizzazione. Determinanti e impatto economico, tecnologico e politico.
University of London, Birkbeck College, Home Page Daniele Archibugi. University
of London, Birkbeck College, Intervista su "The Global Commonwealth of
Citizens" Intervista della LA7 a Daniele Archibugi Sull'innovazione
tecnologica, (video). Intervista alla trasmissione Mapperò, SAT2000, sulla
Dichiarazione Universale dei Diritti Umani, (video), Parte prima; Parte
seconda; Parte terza. Dibattito presso la London School of Economics "È
possibile una democrazia globale?" (video in
inglese)://globaldemo.org/film/1255[collegamento interrotto] Intervista a LA7
su "Cittadini del mondo. Verso una democrazia cosmopolitica",.
Intervista a TG3 Linea Notte su "Cittadini del mondo. Verso una democrazia
cosmopolitica" 25 febbraio 2009. Intervista a TG2 Punto IT su
"Cittadini del mondo. Verso una democrazia cosmopolitica", 15 giugno
2009. Discorso su Secrets, Lies and Power, Berlino, European Alternatives, 18
giugno. Intervista sul volume The Handbook of Global Science, Technology and
Innovation, Londra, Birkbeck College, 3 agosto. Lo Stato dell`ArteQuale futuro
per l’Europa?, Trasmissione Rai5, conduce Maurizio Ferraris, con Daniele
Archibugi e Alessandro Politi, 14 luglio. Quante storie Rai3I grandi crimini
contro l'umanità, intervista di Corrado Augias a Daniele Archibugi, 9 novembre.
Crime and Global Justice, Book Launch alla London School of Economics and
Political Science, 28 Febbraio, podcast con Gerry Simpson, Christine Chinkin,
Richard Falk e Mary Kaldor. Daniele Archibugi, Do we Need a Global Criminal
Justice?, Conferenza alla City University of New York, 9 Aprile. Daniele
Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan democracy as a method of addressing controversies",
IAJLJ CONFERENCE "CONTROVERSIAL MULTICULTURALISM", Roma, Novembre,.
Daniele Archibugi, "What is the difference between invention and
innovation?", Birkbeck College University of London, 28 Ottobre.
Presentazione della Relazione sulla ricerca e l'innovazione in Italia, Roma,
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 15 ottobre
Filosofi della politica, Filosofi italiani del XXI secolo. Daniele
Archibugi. Keywords: PAX ROMANA, due citadini del mondo. Refs.: Luigi Speranza,
“Grice ed Archibugi” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51789749142/in/dateposted-public/
Grice ed Arcidiacono –
sintropia, entropia, ed informazione – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Acireale). Filosofo. Grice:
“I like Arcidiacono, and Floridi should pay more attention to him; after all he
what Austin called an ‘Oxonian myopist’! I love him!” “It took me a while to digest Aricidiacono’s
non-intentional use of ‘inform,’ but I suppose he rather follows Shannon than
Plato!” “Arcidiacono pays due attention to Aristotle’s ‘finalismo,’ and as an
Italian, he gives proper due to Plionio – ‘il vecchio,’ as Arcidiacono
comically calls him – Strawson: “As if Pliny the Younger were not now part of
‘storia vecchia’!” – Grice: “In any case, give me Salvatore anyday – his
brother, Giuseppe, cannot qualify as a philosopher!” – Grice: “And another good
thing, too, Arcidiacono, the ‘filosofo’ brough Fantappie as a hashtag in
‘filosofia’!” Grice: “As Arcidiacono notes, Fantappie, not being a filosofo,
committed the usual mispellinggs – ‘syntropia,’ rightly corrected to
‘sintropia’ by the philosophy-educated philosopher Salvatore Arcidiacono!” Nato
e, per una sorprendente coincidenza, morto lo stesso anno del fratello gemello
Giuseppe, divise con quest'ultimo anche gli impegni di ricerca. Laureatosi a
Catania. Insegna a Catania. Perfeziona la Teoria unitaria del mondo fisico e
biologico, collegandola ai più moderni sviluppi della biologia teorica e
molecolare. Da supporto teorico speculativo nel campo della chimica e della
fisica teorica. Elabora una formulazione mediate della teoria sintropica nonché
della Teoria degli universi. Saggio “Visione unitaria dell'Universo”. “Spazio,
tempo, universe”. Altre opere: Visione
unitaria dell'Universo” (UCIIM, Roma); “Spazio, tempo, universe” (Edizioni del
fuoco, Roma); “Materia e Vita” (Massimo, Milano); “Ordine e Sintropia la vita e
il suo mistero” (ed. Studium Christi, Roma); “L'evoluzione sintropica” (Accademia
degli zelanti e dei dafnici, Acireale); “Creazione, evoluzione, principio
antropico” (ed. Il fuoco-Studium Christi); “Entropia, sintropia, informazione.
Una nuova teoria unitaria della fisica, chimica e biologia” (ed. Di Renzo,
Roma); “L'evoluzione dopo Darwin. La teoria sintropica dell'evoluzione, ed. Di
Renzo, Roma); “Problemi e dibattiti di biologia teorica, ed. Di Renzo, Roma
1993. 88-86044-16-X. Note Ignazio Licata, Teoria degli Universi e
Sintropia Archiviato il 17 settembre in. vedi pag 103 di L'accoglienza delle idee di
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin nella cultura italiana degli anni 1955-1965 Scapini, 2005. Demetrio Sodi Pallares, Terapia metabolica
delle cardiopatie. Nuovo approccio terapeutico PICCIN, Padova 1989XVI. 88-299-0616-6
Vannini, 2005. L'accoglienza
delle idee di Pierre Teilhard de Chardin nella cultura italiana degli anni
1955-1965, pag 103 Salvatore
Arcidiacono, Nuevas ideas para la evolución biològica, articolo su Folia
humanistica, Barcellona, novembre 1982, n. 238.
Revue internationale Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Edizioni 85-98,
Ministère de l'éducation nationale et de la culture Belgique, Editore Société
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, 1981.
Antonella Vannini, From mechanical to life causation,, Syntropy 2005, n.
1, pag. 80-105. 1825-7968 (WC ACNP)
Felicita Scapini, La logica dell'evoluzione dei viventiSpunti di riflessione,
in Atti del XII Convegno del Gruppo italiano di biologia evoluzionistica
Firenze, 18-21 febbraio 2004, Firenze, University press, 2006, 88-8453-369-4. Luigi Fantappié Giuseppe Arcidiacono Sintropia Biografia sul sito del suo editore, su
direnzo 9 luglio ). V D M Filosofia della scienza 266416940 Filosofi. Salvatore Arcidiacono. Keywords: sintropia,
entropia, ed informazione; sintropia, antropia, entropia.
arcidiacono — l’implicatura del principio antropico — biologia filosofica —
filosofia della vita — fissisismo — naturalismo — finalismo — vivere — vivente
— ominazione — animazione — definizione del vivente como movente autonomo — il
fine —Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed Arcidiacono” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51791005369/in/dateposted-public/
Grice ed Arco –
GRAVITAS – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Teano). Filosofo. Grice:
“I should like Arco; but he is a priest and I’m C. of E.; on top, I love to say
that philosophy ought to be FUN, provided it’s MY FUN – not Arco’s – so I find
Arco’s ‘dictionary of philosophical ‘umorismo,’ or filosofia ‘umoristica’
frivolous, and unworthy of Roman gravitas!” Nato nella frazione Fontanelle
entra fra i Salesiani di Don Bosco e fu ordinato sacerdote a Roma. Consegue a Napoli
la laurea in filosofia. Per la sua preparazione filosofica, nonché per la
profondità della sua filosofiai, è considerato tra i maggiori filosofi italiani.
Per lungo tempo è stato professore di filosofia presso gli Istituti Salesiani
di Don Bosco. Ricoverato all'ospedale
“San Leonardo” di Castellammare di Stabia, per un blocco renale, e ritornato a
Pacognano di Vico Equense dopo aver superato la crisi, è morto novantaquattrenne.
Uomo di anima sensibile e di infinita fede ha trascorso molto della sua vita
scrivendo, interessandosi di agiografia. È stato protagonista televisivo sulla
prima rete nazionale con il programma: Tempo dello Spirito. Intensa e vasta la sua opera letteraria. Altre opere: “Bartolo Longo e la sua intimità
con Dio”; “Don Bosco si diverte”; Sorgenti di gioia; Gesù sotterra un chicco di
grano; Giorgio La Pira e il risorto; “Fiori di sapienza. Dizionarietto di
saggezza”; “La Donna del Sanctus; Papa Giovanni beato. La parola agli atti
processuali; Quando la teologia prende fuoco. Giuseppe Quadrio sacerdote
salesiano; Don Bosco nella luce del Risorto; Don Bosco sorridente entra in casa
vostra”; “Così Don Bosco amò i giovani”; “Il Padre Nostro”; “Ma c'è poi questo
Dio; Nota bene; Sorgenti di Gioia; L'Ave Maria inno dell'amore filiale; Il
Beato Filippo Rinaldi copia vivente di Don Bosco; “La sorgente eterna dell'amore”;
“Noi esistiamo perché Dio Padre ci ama; Stile di Serenità; La Gioia a Portata
di Mano; Ridi e sorridi da saggio; Il Beato Bartolo Longo; Dolcezza e speranza
nostra; Dio ci ama con cuore d'uomo; Il Padre nostro; La Leva del Mondo: la
preghiera; Sant'Eustachio; Il Cristo in cui Spero; Giorgio La Pira Profeta e
testimone del Risorto; Serva di Dio Elisabetta Jacobucci Francesca Alcantarina;
Beata Maria della Passione; Il Servo di Dio B. Longo; Papa Giovanni Beato; Così
ridono i saggi; Fiori di sapienza; Il segreto di papa Giovanni; S.Alfonso amico
del popolo; La Donna del Sanctus; Il Sacro nome ti chiama per nome; La Leva del
Mondo: la preghiera; Il monumento alla Pace Universale del beato Bartolo Longo;
Il Salesiano è fatto così; Messaggio di Teilhard De Chardin. Intuizioni e idee
madri (Elledici Torino); Un esploratore della felicità: biografia del Servo di
Dio Giacomo Gaglione, Apostolato della Sofferenza. Citazionio su Adolfo L'Arco La comunità di Pacognano ricorda don Adolfo
L'Arco di Raffaele Meazza, Il Giornale di Napoli, sito "Positano
news", Identities-85063233 Biografie
Biografie: di Biografie Categorie: Religiosi
italianiTeologi italianiFilosofi italiani Professore Teano Vico Equense. Adolfo
L’Arco. Arco. Keywords: gravitas, hagiography; if he has religious faith, he is
not a philosopher. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed Arco” – The Swimming-Pool
Library https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51791207845/in/dateposted-public/
Grice ed Ardigò – filosofia italiana – Luigi
Speranza (Casteldidone). Filosofo. Grice: “I love Ardigo – but I have a few
qualms – his “Opere filosofiche’ is improperly indexed! The man wrote zillions!
My attention was first caught by minor
editorial note: “’La morale dei positivisti’ was reprinted a few years later
after its first edition as divided into two parts, “la morale’ proper and
‘Sociologia’ – Since I have used philosophical biology and philosophical
psychology, Ardigo is indeed into ‘philosophical sociology’ – As he notes,
‘sociology’ is today’s philosophese for Aristotelian politics – politica – re
publica romana – And being a positivist, Ardigo provides some good background –
which will later be ‘refuted’ by the neo-idealists that opposed this sort of
philosophy – to the idea of two organisms (two pirots) interacting --. While I
speak of conversational egoism as balanced by conversational tu-ism; Ardigo,
less of an altruist, and who laughs at the ‘ridiculous’ sensist conception of
‘simpatia’ – speaks of two principles: the principle of egoism, or prepotence,
found amoung brutal animals – and the principle of what he calls ANTI-EGOSIM,
found in the civil Italian gentleman – the word ‘civile’ is crucial, as in
Castiglione, ‘discorso,’ or ‘conversazione’ civile. If Wilson found it offensive when Chomsky
spoke of two ideal communicadtors, this is no problem for the positivist – As
Ardigo notes, an Italian will not behave conversationally in the same way when
conversing with some he regards as below his station -- that’s why he (and later I adopted the
same guideline) uses ‘Romolo’ and ‘Remo’ (rather than Jack and Jill, since
there is a gender issue here) as communicators.
As he puts it, ‘the fact that Romolo eventually kills his ‘fratello’ is hardly
relevant from a positivist point of view – surely we don’t require ANTI-EGOSIM
to hold indefeafeasibly, I would disagree with Ardigo’s dismissal of Remo’s
murder – ‘l’assassinio di Remo’ – I discussed this with Hardie – in English,
and, after a ten-minute pause, all I got from him was, ‘what do you mean by
‘of’?’” -- Essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “It’s amazing Ardigo found
psychology a science, and a positive one, too!” – Altre opere: “La psicologia come scienza positive”; “Scritti
vari”; “Venti canti di H. Heine tradotti 100 percent.svg di Heinrich
Heine (1922), traduzione dal tedesco (1908) Testi su Roberto Ardigò. Per le
onoranze a Roberto Ardigò 100 percent.svg di Mario Rapisardi (1915)
Note Gemeinsame Normdatei data.bnf.fr
Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques Brockhaus
Enzyklopädie Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani Categorie: Casteldidone Mantova 1828 1920 28 gennaio 15
settembreAutoriAutori del XIX secoloAutori del XX secoloAutori italiani del XIX
secoloAutori italiani del XX secoloReligiosiFilosofiPedagogistiReligiosi del
XIX secoloReligiosi del XX secoloFilosofi del XIX secoloFilosofi del XX
secoloPedagogisti del XIX secoloPedagogisti del XX secoloAutori
italianiReligiosi italianiFilosofi italianiPedagogisti italianiAutori citati in
opere pubblicateAutori presenti sul Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani Refs.: Grice, “Ardigò and a
positivisitic morality,” Luigi Speranza,
"Grice ed Ardigò," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool
Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia. ARE. Ricerca Roberto Ardigò
psicologo, filosofo e pedagogista italiano (1828-1920) Lingua Segui Modifica
«L'inconoscibile di oggi è il conosciuto di domani.» (Roberto Ardigò[1])
Roberto Felice Ardigò (Casteldidone, 28 gennaio1828 – Mantova, 15 settembre
1920) è stato uno psicologo, filosofo e pedagogista italiano.
Roberto Felice Ardigò Biografia Modifica Roberto Felice[2] Ardigò nacque
a Casteldidone, in provincia di Cremona, il 28 gennaio 1828, da Ferdinando
Ardigò e Angela Tabaglio. A causa delle difficoltà economiche della famiglia,
un tempo agiata, si dovette spostare a Mantova, dove il padre trovò lavoro
presso i cognati. La madre era profondamente religiosa, mentre il padre
sostanzialmente indifferente in materia. Egli ne avrà sempre profondo rispetto
e un forte legame, come anche con la sorella.[3] Studi teologici Modifica
Studiò a Mantova, per poi iscriversi nel 1845 al liceo del Seminario vescovile.
Nel 1848 ottiene un posto gratuito nel seminario di Milano, ma in seguito ai
moti risorgimentali é costretto a rientrare a Mantova. Il suo successivo
tentativo di arruolarsi nell'esercito di Guglielmo Pepe è frustrato da una
febbre malarica che lo colpisce alla vigilia della battaglia di Goito. Proseguì
poi gli studi teologici. Dopo la morte dei genitori, fu accolto a casa sua da
Mons. Luigi Martini, rettore del Seminario mantovano. In quegli anni il
Seminario era investito dalla congiura patriottica che porterà al supplizio dei
Martiri di Belfiore, dei quali ben tre erano sacerdoti, tra cui il leader della
congiura Don Enrico Tazzoli, insegnante presso lo stesso Seminario.
Ardigò fu infine ordinato sacerdote il 22 giugno 1851.[3]
L'insegnamento positivista, la sospensione e la scomunica Modifica Nel 1870
pubblicò La psicologia come scienza positiva e nel 1876 tentò di istituire
presso il Liceo di Mantova, dove insegnava[4], un Gabinetto per le ricerche
psicologiche.[3] Nel metodo di insegnamento, poi, privilegiava il personale e
diretto coinvolgimento degli allievi, sollecitandoli al libero dialogo, con una
attenta analisi di brani critici e dei filosofi, cosa non troppo gradita alle
gerarchie ecclesiastiche e al Ministero dell'Istruzione. Già preda di una
crisi religiosa molto forte, che lo portò infine a divenire ateo[5], tutta
questa polemica lo condusse appunto a smettere l'abito ecclesiastico nel 1871,
a 41 anni, dopo aver aderito ormai completamente alle posizioni positiviste ed
evoluzioniste, che andavano nettamente in contrasto ai dettami della Chiesa
cattolica del tempo, e aver attaccato apertamente il dogma dell'infallibilità
papale.[3] Alla fine, Ardigò venne anche scomunicato, ultimo atto della
polemica contro la Chiesa di cui aveva fatto parte.[6][7] Professore
universitario Modifica Casteldidone, lapide sulla casa natale In totale
insegnò storia della filosofia all'Università di Padova per 28 anni dal 1881.
Considerato tra i padri della psicologia scientifica italiana[8] per aver
promosso una concezione scientifica della psicologia, concepì una complessa
teoria della percezione e del pensiero che non ebbe completa dimostrazione
sperimentale. Nel 1882 Ardigò svolse uno dei suoi maggiori esperimenti in campo
psicologico sperimentale, sulle condizioni dell'adattamento visivo su prismi
ottici.[3] Diverse furono le materie che insegnò nei lunghi anni d'insegnamento
universitario fino alla data del 1º giugno 1909 quando fu collocato a riposo.
Fu, altresì, preside della facoltà di filosofia e lettere dal 1899 al
1902.[3] Il 31 maggio 1908 divenne socio dell'Accademia delle scienze di
Torino.[9] Il 16 ottobre 1913 fu nominato senatore del Regnoma fu
impossibilitato a raggiungere Roma per il giuramento.[3] Durante la sua
vita elogiò Giuseppe Mazzini[10] e Giuseppe Garibaldi[11], criticò la
massoneria[12] (in quanto la riteneva non necessaria in uno stato ormai libero)
ed espresse idee fortemente repubblicane.[13] Ultimi anni e suicidio Modifica
Negli ultimi anni di vita, isolato dall'ambiente intellettuale, ma non dai suoi
discepoli più stretti, soffrì di gravi problemi fisici e depressivi (acuiti
dalla morte della sorella Olimpia, che viveva a casa sua, nel 1907), che lo
condussero a un primo tentativo di suicidio a Padova nel 1918 (dopo aver
appreso della disfatta di Caporetto e della morte di molti giovani italiani),
fallito perché la ferita non era grave[3], ma che si sarebbe ripetuto il 27 agosto
1920[14], questa volta riuscendo nel suo intento: Ardigò morì infatti suicida
all'età di 92 anni nella sua ultima sistemazione a Mantova a casa Nievo,
abitazione che era stata di Ippolito Nievo. Si autoinflisse una ferita
colpendosi con un rasoio (o una roncola) arrugginito alla gola.[15] Le
testimonianze dell'epoca riferiscono che venne trovato seduto alla scrivania,
con la barba bianca del tutto sporca di sangue (barba che gli fu tagliata dai
soccorritori ed è tuttora conservata come cimelio nella sala blindata della
Biblioteca di Mantova[15]); soccorso dai medici, perse comunque conoscenza dopo
aver ribadito le sue intenzioni, e morì due settimane dopo, il 15
settembre.[3][15] Ricezione dell'opera di Ardigò Modifica Il tragico atto
finale della sua vita venne usato dai suoi detrattori - clericali o
neoidealisti - per screditare il positivismo in declino o visto come un gesto
di demenza senile, e non come un atto di un uomo ormai stanco a livello
psicofisico, che aveva dato tutto e vissuto la sua lunga vita secondo
coscienza, quale in effetti era. D'altra parte, seppur il sistema di Ardigò non
era anti-idealistico, furono gli idealisti ad attaccarlo filosoficamente,
seguiti dai marxisti di inizio secolo, come Antonio Gramsci, talvolta
paragonandolo agli esiti più deleteri del positivismo, come l'antropologia
criminale di Cesare Lombroso (risultata poi non scientifica), determinando
l'oblio parziale delle sue opere, tra i maggiori libri filosofici tra il
periodo illuminista (con l'esclusione delle opere filosofiche di Giacomo
Leopardi) e il neoidealismo di Croce e Gentile. Con lo sviluppo del positivismo
logico e la riscoperta del positivismo, si è avuta una lenta rivalutazione di
Ardigò, il maggiore esponente italiano del movimento, assieme a Maria Montessori
e, come lei, tra i fondatori della pedagogia e della psicologia
moderna[3][16][17], oltre che uno dei maggiori pensatori laici della cultura
italiana tra XIX e XX secolo.[18] Commemorazioni Modifica Sulla sua casa
venne apposta una lapide, quando ancora egli era in vita: «(Mantova) (in
una pergamena). Indagatore sapiente dei fenomeni del pensiero e del sentimento.
Assertore impavido della naturale formazione e dell'unità molteplice della
vita. La Società magistrale Mantovana, col plauso degl'insegnanti elementari
d'Italia, della Società filosofica dei professori di Morale e di Pedagogia,
festeggiando l'ottantesimo compleanno del Maestro sublime, augura con fervidi
voti che la nuova generazione cresca degna di lui nel culto della scienza,
nell'apostolato della verità.» (Epigrafe di Mario Rapisardi) La città di
Monza gli ha dedicato una scuola media inferiore e una strada. Anche Milano gli
ha dedicato una strada in zona Forlanini, così come Roma che gli ha dedicato
una piazza tra il quartiere dell'EUR e la Via Laurentina. I libri della
sua biblioteca personale sono conservati presso la Biblioteca universitaria di
Padova.[3] PensieroModifica Mantova, lapide commemorativa Il suo
pensiero mosse dalla conoscenza dei classici teologici e filosofici, come
Agostino d'Ippona e Tommaso d'Aquino (poi abbandonati), all'adesione al
razionalismo e al positivismo di Auguste Comte ed Herbert Spencer (con cui ebbe
una corrispondenza epistolare, ma di cui non condivide né il darwinismo
sociale, né il ruolo marginale da questi attribuito alla filosofia), passando
attraverso il naturalismo del Rinascimento, come quello panteistico di Giordano
Bruno.[19] D'altra parte, del sapere magico-ermetico della filosofia
cinquecentesca della natura, da Bruno stesso a Bernardino Telesio, non vi è
alcun residuo nella filosofia positiva di Ardigò, che prova disinteresse e
disprezzo per la rinascita romantico-idealista della filosofia, a cui, dopo la
"conversione laica", contrappone la vera filosofia
scientifica.[19] Caratteri della «filosofia positiva» di Ardigò Modifica
L'originalità della sua filosofia si distanzia tanto dall'enciclopedismo
naturalistico quanto dal tradizionale spirito di sistema, aprioristico,
deduttivistico, dogmatico.[19] La filosofia trova la sua specificità nel
fondamento del fatto (fisico o psichico) e nell'argomentazione induttiva,
contro le deduzioni a priori, metafisiche, che non hanno fondamento
nell'esperienza come la deduzione logico-matematica.[20] Auguste
Comte Una filosofia, che accetti metodo scientifico e voglia dirsi scientifica,
rifiuta quindi le tesi metafisiche, le entità trascendenti inverificabili,
accetta le ipotesi da verificare. Contro l'astratto razionalismo metafisico
della filosofia, è andato emergendo, secondo Ardigò, dapprima il naturalismo
rinascimentale, che ha trovato seguito nell'empirismo, nell'illuminismo e nel
sensismo, fino al darwinismo e al positivismo.[20] Una filosofia positiva
non può nutrire certezze definitive (se vuol essere portatrice di tesi
riformulabili come le teorie scientifiche) e non può essere un sistema unitario
e dogmatico.[20] Ardigò propone una filosofia che, perduto l'ambito delle
scienze naturali positive, si specifica in autonomia come scienza dei fatti
psichici (psicologia) e dei fatti sociali (sociologia).[20] Psicologia,
pedagogia e sociologia positive Modifica I suoi contributi nell'ambito delle
scienze sono importanti per l'impostazione generale. Interessanti sono le sue
idee sull'evoluzione intesa come passaggio dall'indistinto al distinto, ma
anche condizionata dal caso e caratterizzata dal ritmo. Non tutto dunque è
lineare e meccanico. Ardigò fu uno dei primi psicologi moderni, anche se non
nel senso di terapeuta, ruolo che sarà ricoperto dagli psicoanalisti e dagli
psichiatri, ma nel senso di formatore pedagogico e professionale, oltre che di
teorico e studioso della psiche, come Henri Bergson.[21] Ardigò
insistette sulla necessità di una psicologia ed una pedagogia scientifiche,
soffermandosi sul ruolo delle abitudini. L'educazione infatti sul piano
naturale può essere ricondotta all'acquisizione di comportamenti sedimentati e
certi; questo significa il passaggio da una pedagogia metafisica ed astratta ad
una pedagogia intesa come scienza dell'educazione.[21] L'Io, l'Indistinto
e la nascita della coscienza Seguendo comunque l'assioma comtiano che "non
ci può essere scienza se non di fatti" (anche se Comte riconduce la
psicologia alla filosofia e alla medicina, oltre che alla sociologia), egli
conia inoltre il termine di "confluenza mentale".[22] Teorie
pedagogiche Modifica Ardigò dice: «la pedagogia è la scienza
dell'educazione, per questo l'uomo può acquisire le abitudini di persona
civile, di buon cittadino.» Per Ardigò dunque non tutte le abitudini sono
educative. Dal punto di vista didattico privilegiò l'intuizione, il metodo
oggettivo, la lezione delle cose, il passaggio dal noto all'ignoto, insegnando
poche cose alla volta, ritornando più volte sulle cose spiegate e facendo
continue applicazioni di teorie e casi nuovi. Egli rivalutò la funzione del
gioco, il quale permette al bambino l'occasione di vedere e toccare gli
oggetti, riconoscerne le proprietà e le somiglianze, favorendo lo sviluppo
fisico, il quale va d'accordo con quello mentale. Proprio in riferimento al
gioco, Ardigò criticò le idee di Fröbel.[23] Il problema di Ardigò fu
quello di coniugare la formazione di giuste abitudini con la libertà e
l'autonomia propugnata dai Giardini d'infanzia di Fröbel.[23]
Charles Darwin Natura ed evoluzionismo Modifica Il sistema ardigoiano si configura
come un “naturalismo” evoluzionistico (da lui chiamato però realismo positivo)
che cresce sulla consapevolezza delle scienze e della tecnica, e si regge sotto
una solida epistemologia, mentre si rivolge anche alla morale, sottraendola al
riduzionismo naturalistico e meccanicistico, riservando alla psicologia la
funzione di sovrintendere al tutto.[24] Se tutto ciò che esiste è un fatto
naturale, dal cosmo al cervello umano, dai vegetali ai minerali, non esiste e
non può esistere un Ente trascendente metafisico e non è pensabile alcun
progetto finalistico che permetta una comprensione teleologica della Natura; ad
essa ci si può avvicinare solo con spirito scientifico.[24]L'ignoto di Ardigò
non trascende l'esperienza, non ne è causa prima e soprannaturale, per cui il
suo immanentismo non finisce mai nello spiritualismo a-scientifico e
irrazionalistico (accusa spesso rivolta da Benedetto Croce ai positivisti).[24]
Un motivo di originalità è offerto dal tentativo di attenuare il determinismo e
meccanicismo evoluzionistico e positivistico tramite la dottrina della
casualità. La realtà è per lui continuo passaggio dall'Indistinto al distinto,
e i distinti sono la coscienza umana e il mondo esterno, frutto entrambi dalle
sensazioni e da quell'Indistinto dalla quale procedono per «autosintesi ed
eterosintesi».[24] Riflessione morale Modifica Egli punta a far rinascere
un'etica laica, naturalistica, non prescrittiva, che pone l'uomo davanti alle
scelte, dandogli strumenti conoscitivi per una scelta razionale.[25] Rimane
estraneo però alla questione sociale e alle istanze socialiste (nonostante la
collaborazione con Turati), e, ancor prima, anarchiche, ampiamente diffuse in
Italia, come isolato è anche rispetto alla politica.[26] Le idealità
sociali o massime morali si distinguono in[27]: naturali, perché frutto
solamente dell'evoluzione della specie e della psiche individuale sociali vere
e proprie, cioè etico-giuridiche perché determinate dalla convivenza; esse
devono la propria oggettività alla loro «genesi (...) individuata nello
sviluppo “materiale” dell'uomo (biologico, fisico, ecc.) e (...) si esprimono
storicamente in istituzioni (come la famiglia, lo Stato) le quali disciplinano
e orientano le azioni umane».[27] Va detto che la riflessione ‘di periodo’ ardigoiana
sulla moralità e sulle idealità sociali “nell’idea della giustizia” mostra
l’intento di fondare in Italia la sociologia come scienza sulla cauta
possibilità di concepire nella società la morale senza la religione (Roberto
Ardigò, La morale dei positivisti, Milano, Natale Battezzati, 1879, XXI, p. 290
e sg.). Il progetto di Roberto Ardigò si concretizza maggiormente nelle pretese
di fondare un sapere laico in grado di confrontarsi con le sfere dell’etica e
della filosofia speculativa, senza che quest’ultima possa vantare ex ante una
alleanza “forte” di filosofia e religione e senza avere avuto un confronto con
i temi messi in campo dalla scienza e dai suoi più immediati avanzamenti, così
e come mostrano proprio i primi passi dell’idea di formare un sapere
sociologico autonomizzato dalle sfere dell’eticità (Guglielmo Rinzivillo,
Ardigò e la prima sociologia in Italia, su “Scienzasocietà” n.50, A. IX
maggio-agosto 1991, pp. 25 –31). In questo senso l’impresa di Ardigò di
confrontarsi direttamente con il sapere speculativo risulta essere l’unica nel
suo genere al cospetto del positivismo di fine secolo XIX (Guglielmo
Rinzivillo, La scienza e l’oggetto. Autocritica del sapere strategico, Milano,
Franco Angeli, 2010, ristampa 2012, II, ISBN 9788856824872 ). Ma il tentativo
di formare una scuola si infrange nella ripresa sia europea dello spiritualismo
che più nostrana dell’idealismo e nella contestazione delle dottrine
filosofiche di seguaci come Giovanni Marchesini e Giuseppe Tarozzi (Mariantonella
Portale, Giovanni Marchesini e la “Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini”. La
crisi del positivismo italiano, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2010, ISBN 8856825643) Altre
opere: “Discorso sulla difesa dalla inondazione”; “Pomponazzi”; “La psicologia
come scienza positive” – cf. Grice psicologia filosofica --; “La formazione
naturale nel fatto del sistema solare”; “La morale dei positivisti”;
“Sociologia”; “Il fatto psicologico della percezione”; “Il vero”; “La scienza
della educazione”; “La ragione”; “L'unità della coscienza”; “La nuova filosofia
dei valori”; “Canti di Heine(1922), traduzione dal tedesco Raccolta delle opere,
“Filosofia” (Padova, Draghi). Citato in: Alberto Bonetti, Massimo Mazzoni,
L'Università degli studi di Firenze nel centenario della nascita di Giuseppe
Occhialini (1907-1993), Firenze University Press, 2007, pag. 90, nota ^ Ardigò,
Roberto ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Marco Paolo Allegri, Il realismo positivo di
Roberto Ardigò. L'apogeo teoretico del positivismo Archiviato il 10 dicembre
2014 in Internet Archive. Guido Cimino e Renato Foschi, Percorsi di storia
della psicologia italiana, Kappa, 2015, p. 26, ISBN 8865142162. ^ Antonio Dal
Covolo, Roberto Ardigò. Dal sacerdozio all'ateismo ^ Ardigò su Chi era costui?
^ Ardigò e il sistema positivistico, dal sito della Congregazione per il Clero
del Vaticano ^ Luccio Riccardo, Breve storia della psicologia italiana.
Psicologia Contemporanea, Roberto ARDIGO', su www.accademiadellescienze.it. URL
consultato il 16 luglio 2020. ^ Numero unico, Mazzini, giugno 1905, Milano). ^
Discorso commemorativo pronunciato sul Monumento dei Martiri il 5 giugno 1882
in piazza Sordello. Dal giornale Il Mincio, 11 giugno 1882. ^ Egregio Sig.
Genovesi. Rispondo subito alla di Lei lettera, che convengo interamente con Lei
che dice giustamente che La Massoneria in uno stato libero è un non senso: e
che a combattere l'oscurantismo è più efficace l'opera indefessa ed aperta di
educazione e di elevazione civile che non l'opera tenebrosa e nascosta di una
setta: e che coll'esistenza di questa la gran massa popolare non può che
perdere la fiducia nella giustizia pubblica del proprio paese, nell'idea che la
massoneria sia poi in fine una associazione di interesse pei soci a danno di
quelli che non vi appartengono. E fortuna per me che alle scomuniche sono
avvezzo, e nulla temo perché nulla spero. ^ Lettera del 20 febbraio 1879 in
Lettere edite ed inedite, a cura di W. Büttemeyer, 1° vol., 1990, p. 191. ^
Ardigò, Roberto - Il Contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero – Filosofia
(2012) di Alessandro Savorelli, Treccani ^ a b c Roberto Ardigò 1828-1920 (PDF
), su lnx.societapalazzoducalemantova.it. URL consultato il 17 novembre 2014
(archiviato dall' url originale il 29 novembre 2014). ^ La cultura
filosofica italiana dal 1945 al 1980, Lampi di stampa, 2000, p. 159 ^ Wilhelm
Büttemeyer, Roberto Ardigò e la psicologia moderna, Firenze, La Nuova Italia,
1969 ^ Veniero Accreman, La morale della storia, Guaraldi, Giovanni Landucci,
Roberto Ardigò e la "seconda rivoluzione scientifica", ed Franco
Angeli, RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, 1991 ^ a b c d Marco Paolo Allegri,
Il realismo positivo di Roberto Ardigò. L'apogeo teoretico del positivismo
Archiviato il 10 dicembre 2014 in Internet Archive., pagg. 24-25 ^ a b A.
Groppali e G. Marchesini, Nel 70º anniversario di Roberto Ardigò, ed, Bocca,
Torino, 1898 ^ Roberto Ardigò, La psicologia come scienza positiva, Viviano
Guastalla editore, Mondovì 1870, 169; 177-8 ^ a b Froebel ^ a b c d Marco Paolo
Allegri, Il realismo positivo di Roberto Ardigò. L'apogeo teoretico del
positivismo Archiviato il 10 dicembre 2014 in Internet Archive., pagg. 34-40 ^
Mario Quaranta, Etica e politica nel pensiero di Roberto Ardigò, “Rivista di
storia della filosofia”, 1/1991, 127-44, 142. ^ Quaranta, op. cit. pag. 129 ^ a
b Anna Lisa Gentile, Il positivismo di Roberto Ardigò: un'ideologia italiana,
in “Rivista di storia della filosofia” 1/199 pag. 158 e segg. Bibliografia Modifica
Questo testo proviene in parte dalla relativa voce del progetto Mille anni di
scienza in Italia, opera del Museo Galileo. Istituto Museo di Storia della
Scienza di Firenze (home page), pubblicata sotto licenza Creative Commons
CC-BY-3.0 Davide Poggi, La coscienza e il meccanesimo interiore. Francesco
Bonatelli, Roberto Ardigò e Giuseppe Zamboni, Padova, Poligrafo. Dizionario di
filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2009. Modifica su Wikidata
Roberto Ardigò, su sapere.it, De Agostini. Modifica su Wikidata Alessandro
Bortone, ARDIGÒ, Roberto, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, vol. 4,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana,Opere di Roberto Ardigò, su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN ) Opere di Roberto Ardigò, su
Open Library, Internet Archive consultabili nell'Archivio di Storia della
Psicologia, su archiviodistoria.psicologia1.uniroma1.it. URL consultato il 16
dicembre 2011 (archiviato dall' url originale l'11 luglio 2012).
Alessandro Savorelli, Il contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero:
Filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Altre opere: Pietro Pomponazzi.
La psicologia come scienza positiva. La formazione naturale del sistema solare.
L’inconoscibile di H. Spencer e il Positivismo. La religione di T. Mamiani. Lo
studio della Storia della filosofia. La Morale dei Positivisti. Relatività
della Logica umana. La coscienza vecchia e le idee nuove. Empirismo e
scienza. Sociologia. Il compito della filosofia e la sua perennità. II
fatto psicologico della Percezione. Il Vero. La Ragione. La scienza
sperimentale del pensiero. Il mio insegnamento della filosofia nel R. Liceo di
Mantova. L’Unità della coscienza. L’Inconoscibile di H. Spencer e il
Noumeno di E. Kant. Il meccanismo dell’intelligenza e l’ispirazione geniale.
L’indistinto e il distinto nella formazione naturale. Note eticosociologiche —
Articoli pedagogici. Il Pensiero e la Cosa. L’idealismo della vecchia
speculazione e il Realismo della filosofia positiva. La formazione naturale e
la dinamica della psiche. Saggio di una ricostruzione scientifica della
psicologia. La perennità del Positivismo. Monismo metafisico e monismo
scientifico. La filosofia nel campo del sapere. Atto riflesso e atto
volontario. I tre momenti critici nella storia della Gnostica della filosofia
moderna. Il sogno della veglia. Tesi metafisica, ipotesi scientifica e fatto
accertato. Il quadruplice problema della Gnostica. Guardando il rosso di una
rosa. La nuova filosofia dei valori. Una pretesa pregiudiziale contro il
Positivismo. L’Inconscio — A. Comte, H. Spencer e un positivista italiano.
Infinito e indefinito. Fisico e psichico contrapposti. Repetita juvant. I
presupposti Massimi Problemi. Il Positivismo nelle scienze esatte e nelle
sperimentali. L’individuo. Estema, idea, logismo. Le forme ascendenti della
realtà come cosa e come azione e i diritti veri dello spirito. Lo spirito
aspetto specifico culminante della Energia in funzione nell’organismo animale.
La meteora mentale. Filosofia e positivismo. La ragione scientifica del dovere.
La filosofia vagabonda. L’intelligenza. Altre opere: SCRITTI VARI
RACCOLTI E ORDINATI DA GIOVANNI MARCHESINI Le Monnier scuola - nuovo
FIRENZE FELICE LE MONNIER. Prefazione; opere filosofiche; Polemiche; La
confessione; Sulla storia della confessione esposta nel n. 181 della Favilla
dal sig. Eugenio Pettoello. Il prete professore Ardigò e la confessione.
Calunnie. Risposta del prete professore R. Ardigò alla lettera del sig. Luigi
De Sanctis inserita nel n. 217 della Favilla. Dichiarazione ai lettori. Lettera
dell'illustre De Sanctis. Articolo comunicato. La psicologia positiva e i
problemi della filosofia. Dialogo. Il filosofo e un ignorante. Il liberalismo
di R. Ardigò. Contro la massoneria. R. Ardigò e A. Fouillée. Discorsi.
Garibaldi. Discorso di commemorazione. Per il 70° anniversario. Le Ancelle
della carità al Civico Spedale. I programmi e l’ordine dell’insegnamento. Il
cultore vero della scienza. La gerarchia dei godimenti. La libertà del
sentimento religioso. L’unità internazionale. La filosofia col nuovo
regolamento universitario. La scuola classica e la filosofia. Divisi dalle
religioni, la scienza ci riunirà. Il dolore morale nella società. La
polarizzazione del lavoro mentale. La breccia di Porta Pia. Il significato
morale del XX Settembre. Le immagini rovesciate. Il metodo del lavoro
intellettuale di R. Ardigò. La formazione inconscia delle convinzioni. La
condizione fisica della coscienza. Lettere 100%.svg Lettera 1
100%.svg Lettera. Giudizi e pensieri. Giudizi. Pensieri. Versi. Uno
scherzo in un'ora allegra. Intecta fronde quies. Venti canti di H. Heine.
Schöne Wiege meiner Leiden. Warte, warte, wilder Schiffsmann. Berg und Burgen
schaun herunter. Der Traurige. Zwei Brüder. Die Grenadiere. Auf Flügeln des
Gesanges. Liebste, sollst mir heute sagen. Mein süsses Lieb, wenn du im Grab.
Ich weiss nicht was soll es bedeuten. Mein Herz, mein Herz ist traurig wie der
Mond sich leuchtend dränget auf dem Hardenberge. Der Hirtenknabe. Nachts in der
Kajüte. SOCIOLOGIA. Dedica. Avvertenza. Il potere civile; La reazione
dell' individuo e quella della società; il Diritto intemazionale; Machiavellismo
politico; l’ideale della società umana; le giustizie sociali; L'Idealità
sociale impulsiva del volere individuale è una giustizia; L'Idealità
sociale è una giustizia potenziale; diritto positivo e diritto naturale; triplice
ufficio del potere; giustizia e diritto nella convenienza; la giustizia; la Giustizia
legale (seconda forma dell' ufficio del Potere) è una gradazione
evolutiva superiore di un indistinto inferiore da cui emerge; dall'indistinto
della prepotenza (principio egoistico) nasce il distinto della
giustizia (principio anti-egoistico) che è la risultante dinamica di
quella; la formazione della giustizia nel senso proprio va colla
formazione del potere onde è l’espressione; la giustizia è la forza
specifica dell' organismo sociale; la gradazione della giustizia;
dovere giuridico e dovere morale; obbligatorietà e trascendenza
imperativa del dovere nella coscienza morale; atteggiamento vario della
giustizia e coefficienti relative; funzione della giustizia morale; l'autorità;
criterio positivo del diritto e del dovere; i diritti dell'uomo
sopra le altre cose della natura; i diritti dell'uomo sopra se
stesso; suicidio; il diritto d’autorità; l’autorità nel diritto naturale; la
dottrina positiva dell'autorità e del diritto è liberale; Gl’attti benefici
nell' etica tradizionale; gl’atti benefici nel positivismo; falsa apparenza di paralogismo;
la virtù, il merito, il premio; l’ordine morale; il bene sociale; il fatto del
diritto (diversità, specie, coordinazione) e il suo ideale; il diritto
è in virtù di se stesso; il diritto è la facoltà del bene sociale;
l'esercizio del diritto è la funzione del bene sociale; il diritto costa
una contribuzione; le unità minime, le unità medie e l’unità massima nel corpo
sociale; la selezione interorganica nella evoluzione formatrice
dello Stato Come risulti spiegata la prima forma dell' ufficio del
Potere, e anche la terza: e stabilito r assunto del libro
Conclusione. SOCIOLOGIA Atxyj^ 8vo|ia oòx dEv ^Seaav, el xaOxa fJ “Non ci
sarebbe l’idea della giustizia se non fossero i supplizi.” -- Eraclito di Efeso
presso Clem. Strom. IV, j.. ALL’ILLUSTRE PROFESSORE ENRICO FERRI IL QUALE
PRIMEGGIANDO FRA I MAESTRI DELLA SCIENZA NUOVA DEL DIRITTO PENALE SI COMPIACE
DI RICORDARE CHE ALL’INDIRIZZO POSITIVO DELLA SUA MENTE FECONDISSIMA NON FURONO
ESTRANEE LE LEZIONI DEL SUO ANTICO MAESTRO L'AUTORE DEDICA QUESTO SAGGIO IN
SEGNO DI FRATERNO AFFETTO. AVVERTENZA. Questa sociologia costitue una parte
della morale dei Positivisti. Fu in ogni parte o ritoccata o rifatta. Non vi si
trattano tutte le questioni introdotte e discusse generalmente nei saggi di sociologia;
ma solo la fondamentale: quella cioè della formazione naturale del fatto
speciale caratteristico dell' organismo sociale, ossia della giustizia. E,
relativamente a questo fatto, non dà una riproduzione pitc meno manipolata
delle idee messe in voga dai filosofi più celebrati di questa materia.
Qualunque ne sia il valore, chi scrive presenta qui il frutto della sua
riflessione solitaria; e non recente, ma di vecchia data, e già matura fin da
quando lo esponeva ai filosofi di Mantova, pei quali divenne germe e stimolo ad
elaborazioni ed applicazionidi merito nel campo della filosofia. Restringendosi
poi la trattazione, come qui è divisato, al fatto della giustizia, con ciò la
sociologia tiene a mantenersi nel campo, che le spetta in proprio, e pel quale
riesce una disciplina a sé e distinta da tute le altre. È un errore capitale quello
comunissimo di fare della sociologia un ammasso di tutte le dottrine
riguardanti i fenomeni svariatissimi, che suppongono l’ambiente della società
umana, A tale stregua la cosmologia dovrebbe constare di tutte le dottrine
riguardanti i fenomeni svariatissimi, che suppongono l’ambiente dell’universo
visibile. A questo modo si dà ragione a quelli che persistono a *negare* alla
sociologia filosofica la qualità di disciplina autonoma. Una sub-disciplina
filosofica è un tutto a sé, che si pone e si distingue da quello di tutte le
altre, come la specialità del fatto che essa considera. E, nel caso nostro, la
sociologia filosofica, o la psicologia filosofica dell’intersoggetivita, si
pone e si distingue, come la specialità del fatto della giustizia, nel quale è
la ragione diretta dell'organismo sociale; a quel modo che nel fatto della
gravitazione è la ragione diretta della mutua dipendenza delle masse astrali,
considerata dalla cosmologia filosofica. Così, essendoci il fatto Fisico si dà
la Fisica; essendoci il fatto chimico si dà la chimica; essendoci il fatto
psichico, si dà la psicologia filosofica, e via discorrendo per ogni
sub-disciplina. Si restring la presente trattazione allo studio della
formazione naturale della giustizia, e limitandosi a considerare il fatto di
essa in generale, e non estendendosi a considerarlo in particolare nelle molte
e diverse forme svariate, che si munifesiano, funzionando la giustizia nelle
differenti comàiìmzioni secondarie pnllulanti ed armonizza nèi nella totalità
malto complessa dell’organismo sociale. Ed è solo in qneslo senso, die fuesta
trattazione non aòòraccia tutto r amèito della So- etologia j. co7icernendo
solo la sua farle introduttiva e fondamentaie. Esaurita la prima edizione di
questo quarto Volume delie Opere filosofiche, e anche la seconda, nella quale
tra stata introd^itta qualche piccola correzione ed aggiunta, colia presente
terza questa Sociologia comparisce nella sua edizione quinta. Questa
trattazione deWdi Sociologia suppone e completa quella della morale dei
positivisti. La suppone, in quanto nella morale medesima è presentata l’analisi
della attitudine etico-civile umana, ed è esposta la teoria positiva della responsabilità
sotto tutti i suoi aspetti e rapporti. La completa, in quanto studia la
formaziofie della attitudine etico-civile suddetta. Specialmente sotto V di--
spetto e il rapporto della sua obbligatorietà si interna che esterna. Ma questa della sociologia è poi, come tale,
una trattazione distinta da quella della morale. La morale ha per oggetto suo
speciale e proprio la attitudine etica e quindi la virtu individuale. La sociologia
ha per suo oggetto la costituzione della società civile e quindi la gitistizia
che ne è la funzione caratteristica. Il punto di partenza del nostro
ragionamento è la questione proposta dalla morale dei posttivisti. Il concetto
della responsabilità (de- finito precedentemente come l'astratto delle
sanzioni, onde la società reagisce, rintuzzandola, contro l’azione propriamente
umana individuale) fosse manchevole, non estendendosi quanto la moralità, e
quindi fosse da ripudiarsi. E ciò per la considerazione che sembrerebbe così la
responsabilità riferirsi solamente agli atti intesi nel concetto stretto del
giusto, cioè ai pochi atti esterni, aventi importanza per l’ordine sociale,
commessi in misura e in circostanze determinate, discorso basta notare il
fatto, la cui spiegazione si lascia alla fisiologia. Come l’apparato nervoso
delF organismo biologico vi si forma a poco a poco per naturale svolgimento
e trasformazione di una parte degli elementi prima omogenei della sostanza
viva, cosi l'apparato del P<:7/^r^ nell’organismo dello stato vi si forma a
poco a poco per naturale selezione ed adattamento dì alcuni fra gli individui
del *consorzio* umano informe primitivo. Del pari, come la funzione speciale
dell' apparato nervoso si è in esso determinata per Io svolgimento e la
trasformazione della attività vitale generica della sostanza animale,
cosi la specialità della reazione del potere non è altro che una
distinzione, operatasi a poco a poco e di mano in mano che andava
formandosi, della reazione istintiva comune degli individui eslegi del *consorzio*
umano primitivo. E, come l’attività nuova speciale sovrapposta e dominante
dell' apparato nervoso dell'animale superiore sviluppato non vi sopprime
l’attività iniziale semplice e comune del materiale biologico, la quale vi
persiste allato e al disotto dell' attività nervosa, che la regola,
così la reazione del potere, svoltasi naturalmente collo svolgersi dell'
organismo sociale, non vi sopprime la reazione istintiva detta sopra, la
quale quindi persiste nello Stato civile allato e al disotto della
reazione del Potere, che la regola. E cosi nello Stato vengono a
riscontrarsi contempo- è assai opportuno studiare ulteriormente, e
sotto /r^r df~ versi aspeliì, l'analogia notata fra T organismo dell'
ani- male superiore e quello della Società civile. Nel corpo di un
animale, anche di organizzazione superiore (e quindi massimamente in
quello dell' uomo), ogni parte viva ha in sé la ragione della propria attivita
puramente vegetativa, che ha luogo quindi indipendentemente dal concorso diretto
della funzionalità nervosa centrale. Ma questa funzionalità nervosa
centrale può intervenire ad impedire tanto o quanto la detta attività puramente
vegetativa della parte subordinata, A far ciò l’uomo, nel caso che la
parte si ammali e quindi la sua attività vegetativa si renda anormale,
si sforza (valendosi dell' apparecchio nervoso sovrastante alle
parti) di limitare l’anormalità e di contrastame gli effetti perniciosi
sulle altre. Mettiamo, sostituendo la medicina al cibo, o tralasciando di
mangiare e di adoperare se possibile la parte malata, o operando su di
essa, o staccandola in caso estremo dal resto del corpo. Quindi, l’intervento
della funzionalità centrale qui sarebbe puramente negativa; cioè solo di
impedire tanto o quanto l’attività vegetativa; la quale, nella parte,
sorge in virtù della propria natura dì questa, e non potrebbe esservi
creata ed infusa dalla medesima funzionalità centrale. Un fatto analogo si
osserva nel corpo della società civile. In questo corpo sì riscontrano due
generi di reazione sociale, quello della convenienza, proprio di ciascun
individuo e nascente direttamente dall’urto degli individui fra di loro,
indipendentemente dalla sovrapposizione ad essi del potere al quale sono
subordinati; e quello della giusto, proprio di questo potere. La
reazione di convenienza tra individuo e individuo tende con forza ad
assumere, e spesso assume effettivamente forme irregolari nocive e atte a
turbare in misura più o meno grande il buon assetto della società. Ed è
qui che intervitìne la reazione del giusto per parte del potere
sovrapposto. Ma con effetto solo di impedire e limitare, per quanto
possibile, la irregolarità della rea
zione della convenienza. Si che questa, funzionando pure per forza e legge
propria, non ecceda però la forma e la misura compatibile coll’andamento
migliore del corpo sociale. Le parti singole dell'animale sono
coordinate insieme mediante una funzione, che sì aggiunge alle particolari di
esse e loro sovrasta, dominandole e subordinandole nel sistema complessivo deir
individuo. Questa funzione centralizzatrice ha una efficienza negativa,
na ne ha anche una positive, ed è quella di produrre il concerto delle
parti nell’attività dell’individuo totale. Coè, la vìta propriamente detta,
elevantesi sulla semplice vegetazione di ciascuna parte, adattata e resa
ubbidiente alle esigenze della vita medesima, e quindi, per cosi dire,
ingentilitane. Cosi anche nella societa. Nella quale la funzione assodante
del potere si sovrappone a quelle degli due *associate*, ed è puramente
negativa o di limitazione per rispetto a queste, ma è positiva per rispetto a
se stessa, in quanto cioè si pone e produce un effetto speciale suo
proprio, che si risolve soprattutto in quello della moralizzazione dell'
uomo nello Stato civile. Annunciamo qui solo il fatto, la cui
spiegazione det- tagliata risulterà dal corso della trattazione. L'
individuo eslege è pronto ad impiegare a proprio vantaggio, come T
istinto naturale lo sospinge, tutta la forza materiale onde dispone; e ad
elidere e a togliere di mezzo il più debole. Il che impedirebbe la
formazione della società e il concerto civile delle sue parti. Perchè
tale concerto sia possibile è necessario che sopravvenga neir umano
consorzio una forza superiore, la quale, in nome e colla mira
dell'interesse di tutti, rin- tuzzi e contenga la forza esuberante e
trasmodante dei singoli più forti o irregolarmente operanti, e renda
cosi attuabile lo sviluppo e l’esercizio pieno e non impedito, e
tranquillo, e benefico delle attitudini di ogni elemento, onde è
costituito il corpo sociale. L' istinto della reazione individuale, per
sé, rappre- senterebbe il princìpio egoistico antisociale. Invece il
Po- ^ tere subordinante rappresenta T Idealità sociale ossia il
principio morale antiegoistico. L' individuo nella Società diventa morale
in quanto, ridotto dalla coazione della Giustizia a riconoscere il
principio antiegoistico rappresentato dal Potere associante, vi si
uniforma, ingentilendosi, rinunciando alla tendenza di usare la violenza
rispetto agli altri, contenendosi nei limiti permessi dal Potere,
cooperando con esso al Bene comune. La costituzione quindi
della Società umana, fino al grado di un' alta Civiltà, è possibile,
perchè la psiche umana, a preferenza di quelle dei bruti, è atta alla
for- mazione caratteristica della Idealità sociale, come è di-
mostrato nella Morale dei Positivisti (i). Nella macchina
fisiologica dell' animale non si dà potenza centralizzatrice delle parti senza
un organo di- stinto da esse, che ne sia investito e la possegga.
La forza centralizzatrice poi, in un animale, è in ragione della
massa di questo organo; come la massa stessa è in ra- gione del bisogno
(2) della forza occorrente per dominare le parti. E inoltre neir animale
la materia dell' organo centralizzante è presa dalle parti stesse
centralizzate per via di un processo di selezione naturale, come
dimostra la embriologia e la zoologia comparata. E secondo il
principio generale, da me tante volte ricordato, del pas- saggio dall'
indistinto al distinto (3). (i) Vedi specialmente il Capo
III della terza Parte del Libro primo; e la Parte seconda del Libro
secondo. Per questa espressione bisogno vedi la nota alla pag. 17
del volume ILI di queste Op, fil. Per la teoria dell' indistinto e
del distinto vedi la Fortnazione naturale nel fatto del sistema solare y
nel Voi. II di queste Op, fil. Cosi nella Società» La
coordinazione delle partì com- ponenti e la relativa reazione della Giustizia
non vi può aver luogo senza che vi sia costituito un ordine di per*
sone investito del Potere occorrente all'uopo, e fornito dei mezzi
sufficienti all' effetto. Tale ordine di persone si stabilisce nella
Società per la legge suddetta della selezione naturale, come già
ac- cennammo sopra; e di ciò parleremo in seguito più a
lungo, E r ordine sovraiieggiante nella Società deve essere
in ragione della forza occorrente a produrre Teifetto di contenere le
parti nella associazione dello Stato. Più in queste è la resistenza alla
coordinazione so- ciale, come nella barbarie o nella depravazione,
quando ha ana grande prevalenza T egoismo (o perchè le Idea- lità
sociali non sono ancora progredite nella loro forma- zione, o perchè
abitudini prave sottentrate le paralizzano), e più il Potere centrale è
poderoso e A'iolento, e ha quindi il carattere di Potere militare. E la
Giustizia allora as- sume la forma del fato inesorabile e crudele, che
sforza ad agire colla violenza necessitante. E, nel caso che
manchi nel Potere la forza suffi- ciente, la Società si trova in quello
stato di organizza- zione imperfetta che si osserva negli animali
inferiori aggruppati in masse, che sono piuttosto delle colonie che
non degli individui propriamente detti. Se invece poca o nuila è la
renitenza alla coordina- zione sociale, come nelle Società adulte, colte
e virtuose. quando le Idealità sociali negli individui sì sono già
for- mate e si mantengono impulsive, allora il Potere
centrale assume il carattere di un semplice arbitro morale fra gli
individui associati. E la Giustizia qui perde il carattere della
violenza^ assumendo invece quello di una sentenza vera ed equa, che
ottiene il rispetto e T assentimento col solo essere enunciata. E si
conferma ciò che dicemmo al- trove del regno del fato e del regno della
Giustizia fra gli uomini (i), E discende anche dalle cose
dette che, siccome il dispotismo militare è proprio dello stato della
barbarie, così invece il governo repubblicano è proprio dello stato
della cultura più compita; intendendo per questo governo (idealmente) un
governo formatosi per la selezione natu- rale più propria dell' uomo,
ossia razionale; e di persone funzionanti quasi come semplici arbitri
morali; e rap- presentanti U Idealità sociali ammesse dagli
individui associati, che sono disposti per ciò a rispettarle, senza
bisogno di coazione e di violenza. Le cose dette hanno una conferma da
ciò che si riferisce al Diritto internazionale, e servono a chia-
rirne ÌL fatto e la teoria. • 1 diversi Stati tra loro indipendenti
sono come degli (i) Nella Morale dei Positivisti, Per es. Gap. II
della Parte IV del Libro li, al numero i6 (pag. 399 del voi. Ili di
queste Op, fil, nella edijE. del tSSs^ e 432 dell' ediz. del 1893 e del
1901, e 432 Del- l' ediz, dei 1908). 3"«|P).individui
non co-ordinati l’uno con l’altro sopra i quali vige la ragione del più
forte, poiché l' idealità sociale co-ordinante non è realizzata in un potere
effettivo sovrastante, che si faccia valere; e quindi vi campeggiano sole
attività egoistiche dei singoli, staccati V uno dall' altro.
Ma, essendo il principio della socialità naturale al- l' uomo, come
per esso tendono a stare uniti gli individui nella Società più semplice
della famiglia, e questa e le altre unità sociali più o meno grandi
tendono a colle* garsi organicamente nelle unità dello Stato, cosi gli
Stati tendono poi a riunirsi fra di loro: e, parzialmente, in
gruppi di Stati; e, totalmente, nella unità universale della umanità
intera. E da ciò si vede che il Diritto di uno Stato è rela-
tivo al pari di quello dell' individuo, che ne fa parte; per la ragione
che, come il Diritto di questo viene a sof- frire una limitazione e una
rettificazione col prevalere su di esso del Diritto del Potere dello
Stato particolare che se lo subordina, così anche il Diritto di questo è
limita- bile e rettificabile nella sua subordinazione all'organismo
più grande, del quale tende a far parte. E cosi dicasi della
Giustizia, che è la funzione del Potere. Nella Giustizia del
Potere si riassumono tanto o quanto, diventando la Legge propriamente
detta, o al- meno (se non ne sono in tutto sostituiti) vi si
appuntano come tollerati, o permessi, o anche incoraggiati, certi
atti di iniziativa degli individui ispirati dalla Idealità so- ciale,
tendenti a frenare o vendicare la reazione istintiva irregolare: avverantisi
già nel consorzio umano non ancora sviluppatosi nell'organismo sociale
civile, e per- duranti in questo, o produeentisi nella condizione
della Civiltà. Il padre che governa la famiglia, il forte gene-
roso che difende il debole, V associazione che si prefigge scopi
umanitari, e via dicendo, ne sono esempi. Qui ab- biamo le virtualità
della Giustizia, che ne preparano r avvenimento, o la riforma
miglioratrice, nella Giustizia di fatto dello Stato. E questa Giustizia
di fatto di uno Stato è soggetta a limitazioni e rettificazioni
ulteriori, per via di una Giustizia più ideale, in quanto uno Stato
può subordinarsi alle unità sociali maggiori, delle quali dicemmo, e
quindi alla Legge loro. Data la riunione effettiva di più Stati in
una unità sociale maggiore che li comprenda, e della quale essi
siano le parti componenti, in questa si avrà il Po- tere distinto o specifico
coordinante, del quale abbiamo parlato sopra, col carattere della
Giustizia, di fronte alle funzionalità particolari degli Stati
componenti; la reazione diretta dei quali per ciò fra di loro avrà il
carat- tere della Convenienza, mentre V uno non potrà valersi della
forza materiale contro T altro, sia in sostegno del proprio Diritto, sia
in offesa dell' altrui, ma dovrà la- sciarne r uso al Potere
internazionale sovrastante. Il Diritto internazionale quindi non è
effettivamente un Diritto, se non ha il detto carattere, della
Giustizia. E non ha questo carattere, se non esiste un organo
reale, colla forza sufficiente all'uopo, per esercitarla pratica-
mente. La storia ci presenta diverse forme di questo potere
intemazionale o egemmiico, che dir si voglia. Ma sempre più o meno
imperfette. Per esempio quello esercitato dalla madre patria sopra gli Stati
delle colonie, che ne furono fondate. O quello di uno Stato più
forte sopra altri più deboli soggiogati colle armi, o ridotti a
protettorato, o confederati, O quello di una autorità re- ligiosa sui
popoli che la riconoscono. O quello risultante da una lega, più o meno
precaria, per iscopi determinati. Le forme suddette, come già accennammo,
sono forme di egemonia imperfette, o per la loro ristrettezza e
precarietà, o perchè non abbastanza potenti per farsi valere, o perchè
una tirannia di im forte su molti deboli, E per ciò disfatte o da
disfarsi col progredire della Società. La quale invece tende ad una consociazione
più ideale degli Stati fra di loro. Ma a quale? Poiché, e questa non deve
essere per mezzo di uno Stato più forte che soggioghici altri più
deboli, e tuttavia la consociazione, colla Giustizia so- vrastante
relativa, non è una vera realtà organica se non esiste effettivamente il
potere che la eserciti. La risposta alla domanda si ha in ciò che
dicemmo costituire il governo più perfetto, ossia del vero regno
della Giustizia, cioè n^W Aròiiraio. L'Arbitrato o l'Anfizionia
internazionale. E come si va già disegnando sempre più concretamente nel
fatto dei trattati internazionali aventi forza esecutiva, e del
consenso moralmente giusto e fortemente efficace, che si va stabilendo
nel gruppo degli Stati più civili circa te questioni sociali di interesse
universale, e che influisce anche sopra la legislazione interna dei
singoli Stati, Solo — ac- quando esista realmente, in
forma ben determinata e colla forza necessaria di farsi valere, questa
Anfizionia, potrà esistere un Diritto internazionale veramente tale. Dico,
quando esista questa Anfizionia. Fogniamo sul fare della autorità
centrale elvetica o degli Stati Uniti di America. E dico, quando
questa Anfizionia sia un Potere veramente efficace. Il che non può essere, se
non pel pro- gresso sociale dei singoli Stati dipendenti; come T
Arbi- trato efficace fra gli individui non è possibile che a misura che
questi si perfezionano moralmente, come dimo- strammo. E in effetto
il progresso sociale degli Stati ci- vili è già riuscito a stabilire
delle legislazioni, o comuni, o concordanti, colle rappresentanze e coi mezzi
di esecuzione rispettivi, in ordine ai rapporti di interesse non
politico; come sarebbero il Commercio, T Industria, la Navigazione» le
Comunicazioni, i Diritti privati, le Monete^ le Misure, la Scienza. E tende ad
estendere sempre più questo genere di Giustizia universale, sia colle
Com- pagnie internazionali riconosciute per imprese di interesse
della Civiltà generale, sia coi Congressi pure internazio- nali per altre
sue esigenze, come sarebbe p. e. l'Igiene. Lontana ancora è T epoca della
unione politica in discorso. Ma va facendosene sempre più forte V
aspira- zione, che è già T anima del partito politico dell' internazionalismo,
e che per la forza delle cose deve ormai essere confessata più o meno
dagli stessi governi. Queir epoca è lontana; ma arriverà una
qualche volta; e cioè quando nei singoli Stati saranno state rimosse le
cause che la ritardano: quelle cause precisa- mente che la Civiltà
attuale tende a rimuovere: e che saranno rimosse quando ogni Stato avrà
ottenuto il suo as- setto naturale giusto rispetto all' Estero nella sua
circo- scrizione etnografica, nella sua sicurezza, nel suo equili-
brio cogli altri Stati. Anche la questione del Machiavellismo
politico trova la sua risposta nei principj da noi indicati; riu-
scendo cosi in pari tempo a riconfermarne la verità. La reazione
dell'individuo nella rozzezza eslege del consorzio ancora selvaggio non è
una reazione morale. Non lo è, né di fatto, né di diritto.
Non di fatto, perché il suo movente é il puro istinto egoistico,
pronto senza ritegno al danno altrui, indiffe- rente all'uso di tutti i
mezzi di riuscire: fino alla violenza più spietata, fino all' inganno più vile
e sfacciato. Non di diritto, perché, mancando l'ordinamento so-
ciale e la Giustizia del Potere che ne é il prodotto, non si ha ancora la
ragione, onde le reazioni umane siano giudicate col criterio della
moralità. In una condizione analoga si trova il Potere nello Stato non
progredito nella Civiltà. In tale condizione si rivela nel Potere ciò che si
chiama il Machiavellismo. Il Machiavellismo del Potere può divenire, nel
fatto, una impossibilità e, nel diritto, una immoralità, solo in
forza di una Giustizia relativa che lo impedisca e lo ri- provi,
E come? Per rispondere bisogna distinguere la reazione del
Potere di uno Stato per rispetto al Potere di altri Stati, e quella del
medesimo per rispetto ai propri subordinati. Nel caso della reazione del
Potere di uno Stato per rispetto agli altri Stati è evidente che, se esso
non è tutelato nella sua esistenza da una forza internazionale equa
e^ nella sua tendenza a vantaggiarsi sugli altri e a soperchiarli, non è
frenato dalla medesima, non farà dif- ferenza tra mezzo e mezzo che giovi
al suo intento; e il danno altrui lo procurerà come bene suo
proprio. Il ricorrere ai mezzi opportuni all' intento, nel caso in
discorso, come non ne è impedito dalla Giustizia in- ternazionale, che
non esiste, cosi non è nemmeno ripro- vato, E per ciò il
^lachiavellismo del Potere nella sua rea- zione cogli altri Stati viene
ad essere una possibilità di fatto, senza essere ancora una immoralità di
diritto. Ciò è dimostrato storicamente nelle formazioni in- ternazionali
imperfette di epoche e regioni diverse. Valga r esempio dei vari Stati
della Grecia antica, collegati tanto o quanto fra loro, e insieme isolati
dalle genti non greche; alle quali, considerate per ciò come barbare,
ne- gavano i riguardi che pure si avevano fra loro. E valga r altro
esempio delle religioni abbraccianti diversi Stati, i quali insieme per
ciò di fronte agli altri, considerati siccome infedeli, si credevano
sciolti da ogni freno di procedimento. Nel caso della reazione del
Potere per rispetto ai propri sudditi è da considerare che la sua
condizione in uno Stato progredito nella Civiltà è ben diversa da
quella che la precede. Qui il Potere non è ancora divenuto la semplice
e- spressione del volere di tutti che lo pone, lo regola, lo
sancisce, come la Giustizia che lo rigfuarda. Ma è ancora solo la
conquista machiavellica di una casta, di una fa- miglia, di una persona,
lottanti per conservarlo con tutti i mezzi atti all' uopo di fronte alle
altre caste, ad altre famiglie, ad altre persone dello Stato medesimo,
con una reazione quindi come tra individuo e individuo prima della
costituzione definitiva di una Giustizia superiore al di sopra di
essi. Nel caso in discorso è notevole il fenomeno del concetto della
Giustizia divina, che si pensa sovra- stare alla stessa persona del
Principe (come spiegheremo in seguito); in modo che le sue azioni,
quantunque fuori d* ogni Legge, tuttavia vengono considerate dal punto
di vista della moralità: onde il suo Machiavellismo, persi- stendo
di fatto, viene a cessare in qualche modo di esi- stere di diritto.
Questo fenomeno non è un argomento contro il nostro principio, ma a
favore di esso. La Giustizia perfetta accompagnante lo stesso svi-
luppo iniziale dell'organismo sociale, informa natural- mente la
coscienza di quelli che ne fanno parte. E que- sti, ignorando come si è
formata veramente, la immaginano una entità assoluta preesistente alla Società
e pro- pria del nume divino. E cosi la si pensa valere, nella lotta
fra i competi- tori del Potere, al di sopra e delle imprese degli emuli
e di quelle del vincitore. In effetto però il Potere
conquistato dallo stesso vin- citore lo emancipa dalla Giustizia, che
esso esercita sopra gli altri, e (massimamente se la lotta è eccitata da
idee sociali nuove) si fa autore di una Giustizia nuova che deroga
quella anteriore creduta divina; e questa per con- segfuenza non serve
più quale criterio di moralità delle azioni del Potere medesimo. Di che
luminosamente ci ammaestra la storia nei contrasti multiformi col
Potere sacerdotale sostituito da quello militare, e tra questo e il
civile che gli sottentra nella Civiltà più avanzata. Il conòetto
quindi della Giustizia divina né valse da sé a impedire nel fatto il
Machiavellismo del Potere, né a riprovarlo nel diritto. Parlando
però di impedimento del Machiavellismo non abbiamo inteso di un impedimento
assoluto, ma solo relativo. La forza della Giustizia, che si stabi-
lìsce nella Civiltà avanzata, anche al di sopra del Potere di uno Stato,
ne impedisce il Machiavellismo tanto o quanto; ma non mai affatto. La
cosa qui è precisamente come nelle reazioni ini- que tra cittadino e
cittadino, che la Legge dello Stato tende ad impedire: ed impedisce
realmente tanto o quanto ma non mai del tutto. Dalle cose dette
importa soprattutto che si raccolga V importanza suprema, in ordine alla
moralità, dello sviluppo dell' organismo sociale sopra indicato. Come
accennammo (e lo dimostreremo più largamente in seguito) lo sviluppo del
consorzio umano nello Stato ha per effetto la moralità privata. La
Civiltà che per- feziona r organismo dello Stato all' interno, e
promuove r associazione civile degli Stati ha per effetto la moralità
politica. La Giustizia (e quindi la Responsabilità, che è un suo
correlativo) non è perfettamente tale nell'organismo civile se in questo non si
ha la libertà ù.^\\^ parti coordinatevi, e la distinzione netta del
Potere e delle sue attribuzioni. Importa fissare in modo
preciso in che consista, teo- ricamente, la libertà. La
libertà consiste in ciò, che la parte coordinata neir organismo sociale
vi possa funzionare secondo la di^ sposizione naturale onde è atta a
funzionare. E, in base a tale disposizione, imprescrivibilmente. E, tanto
relativamente a se stessa, quanto nel reagire all' azione collaterale delle
altre parti. S' intende bene che la disposizione naturale onde
la parte è atta a funzionare, traente con sé il diritto impre-
scrivibile alla funzione relativa, deve essere quella del- l' uomo
socialmente perfezionato; e quindi in tutto razionale in ordine alla convivenza
e alla collaborazione cogli altri nel consorzio civilmente perfetto. Ma
la reazione della parte verso le altre deve essere tale che non le
impedisca. Che altrimenti si avrebbe eli- sione di attività nelle parti
impedite, e quindi lesione in queste della loro libertà. È
questa una condizione essenzialissima perchè esista realmente
nell'organismo sociale la libertà vera e per- fetta delle sue
parti. Ora tale condizione importa che la reazione della
parte sulla parte si limiti a quella della pura Conve- nienza, che
esclude la violenza dell' uno suir altro. E cosi questa esclusione,. ossia
questo limite nega- tivo, viene ad essere essenziale al concetto della
libertà. Sicché questa è determinata positivamente dalla attività
intrinseca dell' operante che ne è fornito, e negativamente dalla
rimozione della violenza estrinseca che la impedi- rebbe nella sua sfera
di coordinazione. Il limite negativo suddetto della libertà ne
porta seco di necessità anche uno positivo, per la ragione che la
rimozione degli impedimenti estrinseci alle libertà delle parti non si
può ottenere se non mediante la costituzione di una forza superiore a tutte,
sufficiente all'uopo. La coazione, colla quale questa forza deve
reagire, per lo scopo detto, sopra le parti subordinate, non eli-
mina la libertà, come sarebbe la coazione tra parte e parte.
Come notammo sopra, la coazione della parte come tale è egoistica,
e quindi a vantaggio della parte che la esercita e a danno della parte
che la soffre; mentre la coazione del Potere sovrastante alle parti è
antiegoistica, vantaggiosa alla Società, e quindi diretta a salvare
nella integrità della sua attitudine e funzione la disposizione
naturale di ogni sua parte. La forza superiore del Potere essendo
richie- sta dalle esigenze delle stesse libertà delle parti subor-
dinate» queste devono concorrere a costituirla con una parte della loro
attivitàt sottoponendola quindi alla ne- cessità della organizzazione
sociale. Qui, come dicemmo, abbiamo un limite positivo della
libertà delle parti costitutive della società; ma, siccome è posto da
esse liberamente (mentre l'organizzazione so- ciale è una spontaneità
naturale del consorzio umano nel quale si produce)» allo scopo di
sussistere, torna poi sem- pre che la libertà delle parti medesime rimane
on primo ed un assoluto da cui tutto in ultimo dipende nella
società. Dal bisogno stesso della libertà adunque di- pende
anche il Potere subordinante. E con ciò è legiitimaiù. E quindi anche
determinato in ciò che deve essere. Determinato nel corpo che ne è
investito, il quale non deve essere una delle stesse parti coordinate,
perchè con ciò essa si troverebbe nel caso sopra indicato ed e*
sclusOf della parte che impedisce V altra* Determinato nella azione
che deve esercitare, che è quella precisa richiesta dai due limiti «opra
detti, cioè^ quello di porsi, onde essere in caso dì funzionare, e non
più; e quello di impedire la violenza della parte sulla parte, e non
più- Ciò posto r ideale della Società umana richiede le ragioni che
seguono. L' autonomia perfetta delle parti, che cioè ognuno sia veramente
un arbitrio, come dicemmo nella Morale dei Positivisti (i). E precisamente
quel tanto che si trova di poter essere realmente. Secondo.
Nessuna esecutività diretta o violenta del volere dell' una sull' altra.
Sicché la reazione loro sia quella della Convenienza, scevra da
costringimento ma- teriale. Terzo. Costituzione distinta del
Potere, al quale solo competa la esecutività coattiva sopra le parti
subordinate. Quarto. U ordine del Potere derivante dal corpo
dello Stato per selezione naturale degli ottimi, in dipen- denza dal
volere stesso delle parti che vi si subordinano; e in virtù delle
Idealità sociali proprie delle stesse, e quindi non altro che allo scopo
della tutela delle auto- nomie coordinate nella Società, e della stessa
loro coor- dinazione nella medesima. Quinto. Giusta e stabile
organizzazione e subordina- zioue delle parti corrispondente alla stabile
giusta orga- nizzazione ed efficacia d' azione del Potere. Ma il
fatto concreto delle Società storiche del- l' umanità si presenta assia
vario e complesso. E lo stesso (i) Libro I, Parte II, Capo IV, (Pag. 113
del voi. Ili dì queste Op, fU. nella ediz. del 1883, 118 della ed. del
1893 e del 1901, 122 della ediz. del 1908). Ideale generico di
queste Società non sì può rettamente comprendere senza lo studio diretto
del fatto medesimo. E noi qui lo tenteremo, prendendo le mosse
dalla stessa analogia, alla quale ricorremmo sopra, tra V orga-
nismo sociale e V organismo biologico. Nelle specie infime degli animali le
parti del corpo sono omogenee ed indistinte, o pressoché tali. E
somiglia a questo indistinto preorganico della zoologia r indistinto
preorganico sociale delle truppe o coacerva- zioni disordinate delle
popolazioni selvaggie. Nelle specie animali che seguono alle infime
nella scala zoologica si ha una prima distinzione di formazione:
cioè una moltitudine di parti distinte, congiunte insieme in colonie,
nelle quali non è ancora costituito un apparato speciale distinto unico
atto a subordinarle insieme nella unità più perfetta dell' individuo. E a
ciò somiglia il fatto dei primordi di una formazione sociale, nei
quali, sul suolo medesimo e coi soli rapporti della vicinanza, e
della parità maggiore o minore delle idee, dei costuiri e della
discendenza comune, si trovano a contatto, in un certo numero, le tribù o
i pìccoli Stati indipendenti gli uni degli altri. Nelle
specie animali superiori, per una distinzione ulteriore (onde si forma la
diversità dei tessuti e uno di questi, il nervoso, resta con una speciale
superiorità verso gli altri in quanto, formando un sistema solo di tutte
le sue diramazioni nate in ogni parte, associa cosi colla u- nità
del suo lavoro i lavori di tutte le unità singole su cui domina), si
arriva alla unità organica propriamente detta, che non è più quella della
massa informemente coacervata, né quella delle semplici colonie delle
unità distinte, ma quella dell' individuo complete, E somiglia a
questa distinzione progredita quella della Società ci- vile, formatasi in
seguito alla distinzione delle tribù in caste, e al predominio della più
forte e intelligente sulle altre, e alla trasformazione successiva della
sua tirannia nel Potere regolare, moderatore delle unità sociali
con- federate. Nel processo evolutivo di distinzione della
formazione biologica l’apparato, onde si unificano le parti neir
organismo assai complesso dell' animale, sorge dalle intimità della
sostanza viva. La quale però non risente l’effetto proprio dell' apparato
stesso, uscito dal proprio seno, se non a misura che si è formato
effettivamente. Lo stesso avviene nel processo evolutivo di
distinzione della formazione sociale. Il Potere subordinante, e
quindi ciò che si dice la Legge e la Giustizia, e la relativa Re-
sponsabilità dell' individuo verso di esse, nasce dalla stessa virtù
intima delle parti associate; ossia in ultimo, degli individui umani. E
accennammo già come; e spie- gheremo più a lungo in segfuito. Nasce cioè
in virtù delle Idealità sociali (i), che sono un fenomeno psichico
pro- prio dell' individuo. Ma r individuo non ne ha coscienza
distinta se non dopo che, pel processo naturale indicato, e
inconscia- mente per lui, il Potere stesso si è costituito.
Ed ecco come l' individuo è il fattore della Legge, della
Giustizia, della Responsonilità; e, nello stesso tempo, (i) Su ciò verte
in generale tutto il Libro I della Maiale dei po- sitivisti, e in
particolare il suo Capo III della Parte III. queste suppongono l’evoluzione
sociale già avvenuta, e vi sono risentite siccome la correlazione dell'
individuo subordinato col potere sovraneggiante. E con ciò
siamo ora in grado di rilevare ancora m.e- glio, e una volta di più, la
verità, già illustrata nella Morale dei Positivisti (i), del concetto
della morale degli antichi e di Aristotele in ispecie, che la
consideravano correlativa essenzialmente alla Società formata; e la
fal- sità del concetto ascetico-scolastico, che la considera sic-
come indipendente dalla Società stessa, fondandosi sul fenomeno sopra
indicato (2) del concetto della Gitistizia divina. Ma la coordinazione e
subordinazione, nel corpo sociale come neir animale, e in qualunque altra
unità or- ganica naturale, non è cosi semplice quale, per chiarezza
e preparazione del discorso ulteriore, sopra abbiamo supposto. Non è cosi
semplice. Vale a dire non è puramente un certo numero di parti, proprio
eguali ed equipollenti, concertate per la dipendenza diretta unica e sola
di o- gnuna da un centro immediato di tutte unico e solo; come, per
esempio, i raggi di un cerchio dal punto di mezzo, dal quale si dipartono
uniformemente con ugua- glianza di lunghezza e di divergenza. E
invece immensamente più complessa. Gl’elementi fondamentali ed ultimi del
corpo so- ciale sono gli individui umani, i quali formano, in
gruppi di pochi, degli organismi sociali elementari distinti;
que- (1) Capo V della Parte III del Libro I. (2) N. 6 del l III.
sti piccoli organismi elementari poi si coordinano come parti di
associazioni e di organismi superiori; i quali alla loro volta di nuovo
si aggruppano in complessi maggiori. E la serie di tali ordini maggiori,
che ne abbracciano dei minori, è ben lunga. Come è anche il caso
dell' animale superiore, soprat- tutto dell'umano, nel quale ogni arto ed
ogni viscere è già un complesso ottenuto per una certa serie di combi-
nazioni di gruppi minori; e gli arti e i visceri sono insieme collegati dai
centri del midollo spinale, al quale poi sono sovrapposti gli altri
centri superiori del cervel- letto e dei lobi cerebrali, dipendenti alla
loro volta dal- E qui possiamo venire a una conseguenza im- portantissima
circa i diversi aspetti che assume nella So- cietà civile ciò che dicemmo in
genere, la Giustizia; e quindi anche la Responsabilità. Data la serie delle
subordinazioni dette sopra, solo degli estremi si potrà dire che siano
assolutamente, T in- fimo, la piura Convenienza, e il sommo, la piura
Giustizia. Non COSI dei medii. Qualunque dei quali non sarà asso- lutamente, né
la Giustizia, né la Convenienza; ma con- incoata, e si compia solo
in virtù del Tribunale dello Stato. E cosi il Potere dello Stato, per
rispetto all' eser- cizio della Giustizia subordinata della associazione
particolare, no permette solo quello che non danneggia l'assetto generale della
Società o il Diritto dei soggetti in quanto questi sono enti, oltreché
della essociazione par- ticolare, anche in pari tempo della totale.
Il che fa sì che la Giustizia propria dei Poteri su- bordinati, col
progredire della Società, va sempre più av- vicinandosi a ciò che chiamammo
sopra V arbitrato, E che rispteade massimamente in quello paterno del buon
padre di famiglia. Spieghiamoci meglio. Nelle popolazioni selvaggie
l’individuo è vindice di se stesso, o dei propri voleri, al di sopra dei quali
non è costituito ancora, per la imperfezione della associazione in cui
vive, nessun potere giudicatore. E vindice dei propri voleri, anche se violatori
della libertà dell’altro. La costituzione di. un Potere superiore. nelle
Società progredite, che si assume la vendetta delle violazioni
della libertà individuale, togliendo la esecutività co-attiva al *volere
dell' individuo sopra l’altro*, assicura la libertà di ambi. Tanto la cosa
è cosi che, se per poco vien meno questo Potere superiore, torna subito
all' individuo la ne- cessità e quindi il Diritto della propria vendetta.
Come nel caso che una persona appartenente ad una società civile si
trovasse fra una popolazione selvaggia, o sopra una nave in alto mare e
quindi fuori della portata del Potere vendicatore, o assalito senza
scampo immediato da malfattori, o in un momento di anarchia dello Stato
in cui vive. Nel primo embrione di Società, in quello mettiamo di
una famiglia isolg-ta dal resto degli uomini, le contese tra i fratelli
le giudica e le vendica il padre, che ne è il capo naturale. E la sua
vendetta è illimitata e senza responsabilità verso nessuno.
Nessuno per ciò gli impedisce o gli contende il Di- ritto anche sulla
vita dei figli e della moglie. Non così però, coordinate che siano
le famiglie sotto un Potere superiore nella città che le abbraccia in
una società sola. In questa città il Potere superiore tende a
limitare il Potere del padre al puro necessario per l'esi- stenza, il ben
essere, la prosperità della famiglia come tale; e veglia a che il padre
non eserciti verso i suoi dipendenti altro Potere che questo, che però in
pari tempo concorre ad assicurare: e vendica su di lui ogni eccesso
od abuso del potere. E da ciò consegue naturalmente, che se ne restringa
sempre più la esecutività, e che si converta in semplice arbitrato; nel
quale può soprattutto, e da sé sola, per la propria impulsività morale,
la Idealità sociale, nella quale consiste la Legge, nel cui nome l'arbitrato
si esercita. Ed ecco quindi l’effetto naturale del progresso della
evoluzione sociale: salvare e garantire sempre più le autonomie
naturali. Stabilire sempre più distintamente il compito dei Po- teri
subordinanti; e impedirne gli eccessi e gli abusi. Rendere quindi
con ciò più evidenti le Idealità s(h ciali, e rafforzarne la impulsività,
e ridurle alla condi- zione di Poteri efficaci senza uso di violenza e
quali sem- plici arbitrati. Come più volte, e per varie g^ise,
dedu- cemmo sopra. Il quale eflFetto, che il Potere si converta
in semplice arbitrato, lo riscontrammo anche nello stesso Potere,
solo provvisoriamente supremo, di un singolo Stato. Solo
provvisoriamente supremo. Perchè notammo, che lo Stato tende a
coordinarsi naturalmente nei colle- gamenti intemazionali di più
Stati. E per la stessa legge; mentre dimostrammo, che il
Potere di uno Stato va sempre perdendo del violento, e avvicinandosi alla
natura puramente persuasiva della Idea- lità, che si impone da sé, in
conseguenza di una forza estema e superiore ad esso; cioè del potere
inter-nazionale, tendente ad impedire gli atti di lesa umanità nei
singoli Stati intemazionalmente collegati o altrimenti, e il loro
Machiavellismo. Come emerge poi luminosamente anche dalla storia
politico-sociale contemporanea. Un saggio storico eloquentissimo di
un Po- tere superiore convertitosi in semplice arbitrato si ha nel
fatto della Chiesa Romana, e in seguito all' abolizione di ciò che in
essa si chiamava il braccio secolare. Si verificò in questa
conversione, per questo lato, r Ideale della Società umana, sopra da noi
chiamato anche il regno (razionale) della Giustizia sottentrante a
quello irrazionale del fato; ossia il regno del concorso libero o
autonomico delle parti costituenti; e non eteronomico(\)y ossia p>er
violenza materiale esercitata sopra di esse da una forza, non morale, ma
bruta. E questo arbitrato sociale non è poi altro in fine se non lo
stesso arbitrato della volontà dell' indi- viduo sopra se stesso, onde
emana, come più volte di- cemmo. Ne emana, e quindi ne ha in
sé le ragioni costitu- tive. Nel medesimo tempo però, per le ragioni già
ripe- tute, lo stesso arbitrio individuale non finisce di diven-
tare ciò che deve essere (vale a dire una forza che muove per la
impulsività pura delle Idealità sociali), se non a misura che,
idealizzandosi nel modo anzidetto, si perfe- Circa r Autonomia e la
Eteronomia, vedi la Morale dei Po- siiivisti, Lib. I, Parte II, Capo IV
(Pag. 113 del volume III di queste Opere filosofiche nella ediz. del 1885,
118 della ed. del 1883 e del 1901, e 122 della previa edizione). seziona
il Potere sociale al quale V individuo è subordi- nato. Onde
poi lo studio dell' arbitrio sociale subordinante serve indirettamente a
far conoscere la natura dell'arbi- trio deir individuo umano.
E siccome lo studio da noi qui fatto dell' arbitrio sociale
subordinante ci ha condotto al concetto di una Legge© che si impone colla
sola evidenza della propria Giustizia, con ciò abbiamo una nuova prova
della nostra dottrina (esposta nella Morale dei Positivisti). L'idealità
sociale impulsiva del volere individuale è una Giustizia. Ed
ora poi dalle cose dette possiamo ricavare la conseguenza, alla quale
mirava tutto il lungo discorso fin qui fatto sopra la distinzione e la
genesi della Convenienza e della Giustizia. L' Idealità sociale è la
stessa Legge che si stabilisce nella Società. E la Legge è la Giustizia
in quanto im- porta una Responsabilità dei subordinati verso il
Potere. L' idealità sociale (impulsiva della volontà dell'
indi- viduo, com' è dimostrato nella Morale dei Positivisti) si
viene formando nella psiche dell' individuo convivente nella Società per
effetto di questa convivenza. Per ciò di- ciamo che r Idealità sociale è
infine nuli' altro che l'm- pronta, nella psiche singola di un dato uomo,
della Legge o del Volere sociale subordinante. Nello stesso luogo
indicato nella nota precedente. Da ciò consegne poi che l’Idealità
sociale nella psi- che o nella mente dell' uomo, in cui si è formata
nel modo ora detto, non si presenta come una semplice ve- rità
logica, dipendente da una propria speculazione teo- rica, ma si come
qualche cosa che si impone; cioè come una Legge che la domina da una
altezza superiore, e ac^ compagnata dalla minaccia di una Sanzione
vendicatrice; ossia, non come una semplice idealità qualunque, ma
come una Giustizia. Ed ecco scoperto il nostro gran difficile.
La Giustizia non può essere che la legge del potere subordinante: e
tuttavia la Idealità sociale, impul- siva del volere dell' individuo e
nascente in lui per la evoluzione intima e propria della sua psiche, è
pure una Giustizia. I due asserti parevano contradditorj; e
invece sono veri ambedue, accordandosi tra di loro e spiegandosi a
vicenda. Si spiegano a vicenda. Da una parte, non è possibile
il fatto della Legge del Potere subordinante senza il lavoro psichico dei
di- versi individui che compongono la Società. Dall' altra,
le stesse attitudini dell' individuo sono però massimamente gridate nel
loro funzionamento natu- rale dall' ordine delle cose della Società in
cui vive. E quindi le Idealità sociali dell' individuo devono
assumere nella sua mente la forma della Legge subordinante che domina
nella Società che lo involge: devono essere nella sua mente come 1' eco o
la soggettivazione o il pensiero del fatto oggettivo reale dell'ambiente
che determina il suo lavoro intimo. Il valore scientifico della
detta soluzione della difficoltà propostaci è tanto maggiore in quanto V
indu- zione sociologica qui conferma pienamente V induzione
psicologica, che nella Morale dei Positivisti ci portò alla medesima
conclusione. Alla conclusione cioè, che la morale individuale è
es-- senzialmente dipendente dalla morale sociale; e che VE- tica è
un ramo della Politica, come diceva Aristotile, ossia della Sociologia,
come si dice adesso. E che il principio dei Metafisici, che sia
l'Etica che crei la Sociologia (e non il contrario), è falso. Falso,
come, in ogni altro ramo della scienza, il cre- dere che il fatto
complesso della natura sia determinato direttamente dalle azioni
indipendenti dei singoli compo- nenti, e non che V azione di ogni
componente sia essa stessa determinata dal suo rapporto col resto della
na- tura; come ho spiegato nel libro della Formazione natila rale
nel fatto del sistema solare (i), dove dimostrai che la legge di una
formazione naturale qualunque è questa: che un fatto singolo è il punto
nel quale si intersecano le due linee infinite dello Spazio (o delle cose
tutte quante esistenti) e del Tempo (o delle azioni tutte quante
succedutesi). E godo adesso di avere illustrato quella legge
gene- rale col rilevarne la verifica anche n^Wz. formazione etica.
La quale ha questo carattere, di apparire nella co- scienza
individua siccome una Giustizia. E la Giustizia implica un ambiente
esterno alla coscienza stessa, dal quale sia determinata. Del quale
principio poi (e gioverà notarlo qui ancora, quantunque, la cosa, V
abbiamo accennata altre volte precedentemente) è prova positiva diretta
il fatto storico (superiore a qualunque eccezione, e accertabile
nel modo più evidente) che nmt non fu possìòtle di ira- vare in una
coscienza individuale una Idealità elica, ossia un principio di
Giuslizia, di formazione inconsapevole, £he non corrispondesse al fatto
della Legge sociale real- mente riabilitasi neir amòiente nel quale la
coscienza stessa fu educata. Proprio come sopra nessuna bocca
d'uomo parlante fu mai possibile una parola inconsapevolmente appresa, che a
lui non abbia insegnato la So- cietà dei parlanti fra i quali
crebbe. E come in tutte le cose le diversità degli ambienti creano
le varietà e le specie delle individualità dipen* denti, cosi le Varietà e
le Specie eliche fra gli uomini sono create storicamente dagli ambienti
sociali vari e di- versi, ai quali essi appartengono; e per quella
stessa leg^ge dell’ordine e del Caso, che in ogni parte della na-
tura si verifica nella produzione delle Varietà e delle Specie delle
cose, come dimostrai nel libro testé citato. Che più? La stessa teoria dei
metafisicici for- nisce un argomento in appoggio della nostra.
Anche il Metafisico ha trovato nella coscienza umana Una serie di
Idealità, direttive del volere, con questo ca- rattere della Giustizia o
della Obbligatorietà; e ha argo- mentato che, per ciò stesso, ossia per
tale carattere della obbligatorietà, era giocoforza ricorrere a
qualchecosa di esterno alla coscienza medesima, onde quelle Idealità
le fossero dettate, e di fronte ad essa sancite. Se non che
il Metafisico non si è apposto nella de- terminazione giusta di questo
esterno. Ossia il suo esterno non è quello distinto e vero del
Positivista, che è quanto dire V ambiente sociale; ma T indistinto, anzi
il confuso della speculazione volgare antiscientifica, ossia dio. Non
si è apposto qui il Metafisico, come non si è apposto neir assegnare T
esterno onde dipende la produ- zione della pianta e dell' animale, che il
Positivista ha trovato essere la stessa natura (i) e il Metafisico ha
cre- duto fosse il volere diretto della divinità. L' Idealità etica
è una Legjge obbligante, ossia una Giustizia. Dunque, ha detto il
Metafisico, tale Idealità è prima una realtà fuori dell' uomo, ossia è un
pensiero di dio. E da esso è dettata in modo misterioso all' uomo. Vale
a dire lo stesso pensiero divino di quella Idealità è riflettuto nella
mente umana, come in uno specchio il raggio di luce che lo illumini da un
corpo per sé luminoso. L' Idealità etica è una Legge obbligante. E non
lo sarebbe realmente se non importasse una Sanzione. Dun- que, ha
detto il Metafisico, lo stesso dio ha decretato quella sanzione e la
applica in un modo misterioso. Un castigo misterioso è preparato in una
vita misteriosa av- venire a quelli che trasgrediscono la Legge
stessa. Non sarà inutile qui di avvertire che, pel significato dì
questa parola natura, mi riferisco alla spiegazione che ne do negli
'altri miei libri, e specialmente in quello della Formazione naturale
nel fatto del Sistema solare: e per la quale intendo solamente le
proprietà inerenti alle stesse cose. Sicché è ridicola affatto V
osservazione di certi miei accusatori superficialissimi^ che io con
questa parola non faccia altro che sostituire al soprannaturale, chiamato
dio dai metafisici, un* altro soprannaturale chiamato natura. Dal che si
rileva, che la Metafisica ha notato giu- stamente la relatività della
Giustizia data nella coscienza verso una esteriorità che renda ragione
delle qualità ca- ratteristiche della Giustizia medesima quali la
osserva- zione le riscontra nel fatto della coscienza stessa. Solo
ha sbagliato nel projettare questo fatto. Ha sbagliato la Metafisica nel
projettare V individuo cosciente sul fondo della esteriorità immaginaria
e fallace della divinità^ an- ziché su quello della esteriorità positiva
e vera della Società, Ha sbagliato qui la Metafisica, come
negli altri campi dello scibile la scienza vecchia in genere. Per
esempio, V astronomia tolemmaica, che aveva ragione nel distinguere i
fatti dei movimenti dei corpi celesti, ma errò nella loro projezione.
Proiettandoli essa secondo la ragione del suo falso supposto che la Terra
fosse immo- bile, le osservazioni vere condussero ad un disegno
falso del movimento cosmico reale. Per render vero questo di- segno
r astronomia copernicana non ha avuto bisogno di altro che di projettare
le figure medesime del movimento sidereo, notate dai tolemmaici, secondo
una ragione pro- spettica diversa; cioè secondo la ragione della
immobi- lità del Sole, e della mobilità della Terra intorno ad
esso. E così qui possiamo riconfermare il nostro asserto per ciò che
dicemmo in un capitolo della Morale dei Positivisti (i), dove accennammo
alla genesi storica della (i) Capo VII della Parte I del Libro I, n. 8
(Pag. 70 del Voi. Ili di queste Opere filosofiche nella ediz. del 1885,
72 dell' ed. del 1893 e del 1901, e 75 dell'ediz. del 1908).
stessa Idea della Giustizia divina nel terzo stadio della evoluzione del
sentimento religioso. L’Idealità sociale è gia Giustizia potenziale. La
Giustizia adunque, secondo le cose dette, ha due lati essenziali
correlativi V uno air altro; correla- tivi come r individuo e la Società. Due
lati: dalla parte della Società, ossia come un fatto verificatosi
persistentemente nel Potere che la eser- cita sugli individui dipendenti:
e per questo rispetto spe- cialmente si chiama Giustizia. E dalla parte
dell* indi- viduo nel quale è, non qualchecosa di statico, come nel
Potere, ma una potenzialità, ossia qualche cosa di dinamico: e per questo
rispetto specialmente si chiama Idea- lità sociale. Capitale
questo carattere della Giustizia o dell'Idea- lità sociale dell'
individuo. E positivamente certo: poiché corrisponde alla osservazione
del fatto. E che non si può spiegare se non per le vie onde qui lo
scoprimmo. E senza del quale poi è impossibile chiarire le diverse
forme delle reazioni sociali, e quindi delle responsabilità corrispondenti al
principj etici dominanti nella coscienza individuale. E in che consiste
questa ragione dinamica o questa Potenzialità? Ossia in che modo la
Giustizia nella co- scienza individuale è una Giustizia potenziale?
Nell’individuo non può esistere distintamente in un determinato modo il
concetto della Giustizia so- ciale obbligante, e correlativa ad una
Sanzione, se non per effetto sull'individuo stesso della vita sociale
com- plessiva, della quale esso faccia parte. Questo si: ma è pur
vero che, come la Società è V opera degli individui che r hanno
costituita, cosi la Giustizia che vi domina si deve in ultimo alle loro
disposizioni psicologico-morali, che ne sono la potenzialità
inconsapevole. Secondo. Una volta che la Giustizia sociale è
dive- nuta, pel processo naturale inconsapevole della forma- zione
della Società, un fatto statico atto ad informare di sé la coscienza
dell' individuo vivente sotto il suo re- gfime, questa coscienza concorre
a mantenerla nell'essere suo. E ciò più o meno consapevolmente. Così, per
esempio, il maestro di musica di una data epoca è in possesso della
sua arte perchè questa vi si era naturalmente maturata; e cosi potè
essere da lui appresa nella forma che vi aveva. Egli poi serve in pari
tempo a mantenerne la tradizione. La applicazione della Sanzione sociale
in virtù della detta consapevolezza viene ad essere reclamata dallo
stesso pensiero della Giustizia vivente nella coscienza in-
dividuale. E quindi la detta applicazione è una soddis- fazione
della stessa coscienza individuale. E tanto, che la Sanzione medesima
essendo applicata, mentre soddisfa il reclamo della coscienza
individuale, nello stesso tempo la rafferma e la rende più viva e
sentita, come osser- vammo nella Morale dei Positivisti (Libro II, Parte
IV, Capo II, n. 17 (pag. 400 e seg. del Voi. Ili di queste Opere
filosofiche nella ediz. del 1885, 423 dell' ed. del 1893 e del 1901, e
433 delPediz. del 1908). La coscienza individuale diventa per tal
modo giudice in primo appello, o potenziale, dei fatti e degli
ordinamenti della Socteià complessiva. E giudice delle parti coordinate
nella Società^ Settimo, E giudice di se stessa. Ed ecco, in
questa ultima cerchia, la Giustizia sociale divenuta Giustizia
etica. La Giustizia sociale cosi nell'individuo lo rende un giudice
potenziale verso tre termini: la Società stessa, le altre parti
coordinate (ossia ciò che anche si dice, il prossimo), e se stesso.
Come giudice potenziale verso la Società coopera nella produzione
del Potere e nella riduzione di esso alla sua forma giusta.
Come giudice potenziale verso il prossimo si atteggia nella
reazione che dicemmo della Convenienza. Come giudice potenziale
verso se stesso si manifesta nel fatto intimo del rimorso per la colpa e
della compiacenza morale per la virtù, Resta che si considerino un
poco queste tre specie di giudizi del tribunale individuale della
coscienza di ciascun uomo, E, per ora, la prima e la
seconda. E cominciando dalla prima, ossia del giudizio del- l'
individuo verso il Potere sovrastante. Nello sviluppo normale della vita
sociale la ragione della Autorità subordinante e la sua fissazione
in un Potere effettivamente affidato ad un dato ordine di persone va
producendosi di continuo inconsciamente (quan- tunque in modo
inegualissimo dall' uno all' altro) nella psiche dei singoli individui. E
perciò fu da noi detta sopra, non statica, ma dinamica. Vi si
va producendo di continuo secondo che la com- partecipazione precedente
degli individui stessi li ha messi in grado di procedere, dalla
formazione psichica acquistata inconsciamente nella matrice sociale
educativa, ad una formazione ulteriore. E con un lavoro, che
si svolge si nei singoli indi- vidui, ma nello stesso tempo, per la comunanza
della vita morale, si aiuta nel formarsi del lavoro simultaneo
degli altri. Inegualissimamente, abbiamo detto, nei singoli
indi- vidui. Ma colla consapevolezza del consentimento nella
formazione stessa della massa sociale. In modo che la formazione medesima,
quantunque inegualissima nei singoli, determina una tendenza com-
plessiva, che ha la potenza unica e grande corrispondente alla somma
delle individuali. Potenza che si attesta con un effetto
proporzionato: cioè colla creazione del Potere sociale, che rappresenta
quella Idealità sociale onde è l’effetto (come già di- cemmo), o col
perfezionamento del Potere già esistente, in corrispondenza col
perfezionamento delle stesse Idea- lità sociali. Per tal modo
il Potere, come è una manifestazione spontanea della vita sociale, nella
quale concorrono i sin- goli individui inconsciamente, e prorompe quindi
da tale inconscio concorso irresistibilmente, cioè pel processo in-
vincibile della natura, e diventa coscienza dell'individuo solo dopo che
si è manifestato nella realtà sociale pròdotta dal processo medesimo, così è
potenzialmente prima neir individuo. Ne viene, che V
individuo stesso, una volta che ha potuto cosi accorgersi dell' Idealità
sociale produttrice del Potere sociale (accorgersene cioè dopo la sua
manifesta- zione comune in esso operatasi), s' accorge insieme di
due cose. Che cioè la detta Idealità ha all' estemo per suo
corrispondente il Potere stabilito nella Società, ed è nata dentro di sé:
e che vi è nata col carattere di una Giu- stizia; vale a dire con quel
carattere col quale apparisce all' individuo quando arriva ad averne la
coscienza. E tanto, che l' individuo sfesso per tale Idealità
concepita come Giustizia giudica lo stesso fatto esterno del Potere:
ossia rileva come corrisponde o meno al principio di Giustizia della
propria coscienza, e pone astrattamente una Responsabilità dello stesso
Potere verso esso principio. Ed è ciò precisamente che notammo sopra,
parlando del Machiavellismo polìtico nel suo riguardo all' in- terno,
e del fenomeno storico del concetto della Giustizia divina. Il che
poi spiega un altro fatto della evo- luzione sociale. Quello cioè che, a
misura che una Società progredisce nella cultura e nella umanità,
diminuisce ciò che si dice il Diritto del più forte, é cresce ciò che
si dice il Diritto dell' uomo, e l’ordinamento sociale va sempre
più diventando elettivo. Che è mai il Diritto dell' uomo, che si
attesta di fronte al Diritto del Potere subordinante, se non la
sud- detta coscienza individuale della Idealità sociale, onde il potere
medesimo nasce e vige? Si: è proprio la suddetta coscienza individuale,
che ne è il giudice potenziale, po- nendolo, fissandone i confini, e
creandone la responsabi- lità in modo. astratto verso se stessa.
Questo Diritto, la coscienza lo trova in sé, in seguito al fenomeno
sociale corrispondente verificatosi; a quel modo che la coscienza
dell'arbitrio sopra le proprie gambe si ha solo dopo che si è fatto Tuso
volontario delle gambe medesime. E l’arbitrio la causa onde si
muovono le gambe; ma solo r effetto seguito del movimento rende avvertita
la coscienza di tal suo potere. E ciò è proprio di ogni
genere di coscienza. Per esempio, dell' arte. Che sa dell'arte l'uomo
prima di avere prodotto un' opera d' arte? U opera riuscita inconsciamente
estetica gli rivela il suo potere estetico. E dair opera medesima che 1'
uomo ricava la coscienza e la regola dell' arte in genere e la mossa a
progredire nel correggere e migliorare la precedente, e a giudicarne.
E di mano in mano che la coscienza della Idealità sociale va facendosi
nella generalità distinta e forte e impulsiva in proporzione dell* atto
umano, anche la creazione del potere si sottrae al caso della forza brutale
e si fa dipendente dalle deliberazioni dirette degli indi- vidui
associati: tanto più razionali e libere dalla violenza, quanto più la
massa degli individui stessi è umanizzata. Onde, se la selezione naturale
è la legge secondo la quale negli organismi in genere si crea il loro
apparec- chio centralizzatore, nell'organismo sociale, per la crea-
zione del Potere, che è il suo apparecchio centralizzatore.
■"TW^W^^PP^la selezione naturale si specifica nella forma superiore
della ciezìofie, E anche in ciò toma il principio già ricordato del
procedimento progressivo della Società nel suo sviluppo: cioè del regno
della Giustizia razionale, che si va sempre più sostituendo a quello del
fato: analogo al procedi- mento generico della natura, che neir uomo
tanto più è diventata psiche quanto più ha cessato di essere cosa
meramente _^ica. Tutto ciò nel processo sociale di evoluzione normale. E
nell'anormale? Xeir anormale si genera un movimento periferico
contrastante la funzionalità centrale, che non armonizza colle Idealità
sociali già formate negli individui sotto- posti. Un movimento
contrastante che può andare fino alla distruzione della funzionalità
esistente, e quindi alla sostituzione di un'altra che armonizzi colle
dette Idealità, ossia colla Giustizia potenziale degli individui
medesimi. E questo il processo della rivoluzione. Succede in questa
un fatto analogo a quello fisiolo- gico della passione, nella quale una
eccitazione insolita invadente le parti subordinate dell' organismo sopraffa
i centri, sostituendo quindi il proprio impulso a quello normale
dell'apparato volitivo libero. E tale processo anormale della
rivoluzione, nel fondo, è quello stesso normale detto sopra della
evoluzione. Poi- ché anche in questo il Governo sociale è determinato
dal consenso delle parti subordinate. La differenza sta solo in
ciò, che nel processo normale della evoluzione il centro si presta,
cedendo, ad atteggiarsi secondo le esigenze della Giustizia potenziale; e
nell'anormale della rivohi- none no. In una parola, le forze che agiscono
sono le stesse, e gli eflFetti diversi dipendono dalla diversità
dei rapporti delle forze medesime. La rivoluzione sociale propriamente
detta dunque suppone una condizione avanzata di cultura mo- rale dei
membri della Società. Più è questa cultura morale e più è irresistibile
la forza rivoluzionaria. Ma più questa forza è irresistibile e più
la sua anione è moderata e procede per moto evolutivo anziché
sovversivo- In modo che, nel massimo della cultura, e quindi della
irresistibilità, e conseguentemente della modera- zione, il moto
rivoluzionario coincide con quello normale progressivamente riformante
detto sopra. Q, — Perchè non si incorra in un equivoco circa il
principio sopra stabilito, bisogna ricordare qui esatta- mente il
concetto da noi posto a fondamento di tutto il nostro discorso; ossia
quello della Giustizia potenziale, che infine è la stessa Idealfià
sociale an^iegoùHca; la quale nella umanità perfezionata è impulsiva
irresistibil- mente della volontà individuale. Onde r individuo
rivoluzionario per eccellenza è, non Tuomo di poca levatura, nel quale la
mente e il volere si acconciano a ciò che impera esternamente»
trovando tutto buono; ma il Sapiente, quale fu da noi definito
nella Morale dei positivisti (i). (D Libro I, Parte li. Capo IV, w. 17
(^ag^ lay del Voi. Ili di queste Ofté re filosofiche nella ed, dei iS85,
132 dell* ed* del J&93 e deJ 1901, e 136 dell" ed. del
1908). ^m - 64 - Il sapiente, come ivi dicemmo, è quello
nella co- scienza del quale le Idealità sociali antiegoistiche si
sono espresse colla massima evidenza, e acquistarono la mas- sima
impulsività sul volere. Onde è ciò che si dice un carattere. Esso è per
questo nella impossibilità di patteg- giare cogli ordinamenti riprovati
dalla potenzialità della Giustizia imperante nella sua coscienza: anche
se il patteg- giare gli porti soddisfazioni egoistiche. Ed è anche
nella impossibilità di non isforzarsi secondo la potenzialità me-
desima; anche se il farlo gli porti danni personali. Questi egli li
incontra senza impensierirsene e tranquillamente come Cristo e Socrate, e
tutti i cosi detti martiri delle idee. Sublimemente questo fatto nel
cristianesimo primi- tivo è stato espresso nel principio, che òisogna
ubbidire prima a dio poi agli tcomini, E il principio, come è
chiaro dopo le cose dette, è in tutto vero, quando alla espressione dio,
che indica indistintamente una realtà giusta, si sostituisca quella di
Giustizia potenziale, che indica distintamente la realtà stessa. E
discende poi da ultimo dalle cose dette anche la conseguenza, essere la
teoria della rivoluzione del positivismo diametralmente opposta alla
vecchia della Metafisica, espressa soprattutto oella dottrina del
contratto sociale di Spinoza e di Rousseau. Il contratto sociale è
falso per la storia naturale della umanità. Per la storia naturale
dell' umanità è vera invece un' altra legge: la legge della naturalità
della società umana, formantesi spontaneamente, e inconsci gli indi-
vidui subordinativi. Nella dottrina di Spinoza e di Rousseau il moto rivoluzionario
è determinato dall' individuo che si pone come un assoluto; e quindi è
affatto egoistico; e quindi tende a disfare la Società. Nella dottrina
positivistica invece il moto rivoluzionario è determinato dall'individuo
siccome ordinato naturalmente alla Società; ossia è determinato dall’idealità
che vi hanno relazione. E quindi è essenzialmente ant-iegoistico o
altruistico – l’amore dell’altro, la benevolenza, la beneficenza: e conseguentemente
tende, non a disfare la diada sociale, rna a migliorarla. Consideriamo
ora il giudizio del tribunale indi- viduale della coscienza di ciascun
uomo verso le parti coordinate nella Società, ossia verso di ciò che si
chiama il prossimo. Nel che tocchiamo di un argomento di importanza
principalissima tanto dal lato sociologico quanto dal lato morale
propriamente detto. E la nostra considerazione, cominciando in
questi due ultimi paragrafi del primo Capo del libro, sarà prò-
segpiita nel seguente. La Idealità sociale è una formazione naturale
della psiche individuale umana: e tale Idealità è impulsiva del
volere: e per esso gli atti liberi dell' uomo sono antiegoi- stici e
quindi morali. E (come indicammo anche qui nei paragrafi precedenti) la
Idealità sociale agisce sopra il volere dell'uomo presentandosegli nella
forma della Giustizia; vale adire come qualchecosa che ha rapporto con
una Sanzione: ossia è una legge che importa la Responsabilità del
volere verso di essa. La Giustizia onde è dettata e autorizzata
Téizione del volere ne costituisce il Diritto, La Giustizia che
importa verso di se la Responsabi- lità del volere ne costituisce il
Dovere a). Ed ecco in che modo la Idealità sociale, che è una
formazione naturale spontanea dell* individuo, è in pari tempo, e un
concetto mentale, e un motivo pratico (ossia una forza che determina T
atto volontario), e una Giusti- zia, e una Legge, e un diritto, e un dovere.
L' essere umano, unico o collettivo, in quanto r azione ne è determinata
dalla Giustizia, è una Persona, Il genere poi della Personalità varia
secondo il genere del rapporto creato dalla Giustizia medesima.
Considerando qui il rapporto di subordinare nell'or- ganismo sociale, si
ha la Personalità del Potere. Consi- derando il rapporto di esservi
subordinato, si ha la personalità della parte sociale sottoposta che, in
ultimo, è r individuo. Pel potere la Giustizia è la stessa Legge
dello Stato. Per r individuo è la stessa Idealità sociale che in lui
si forma e che chiamammo Giustizia potenziale. In virtù della Legge
il Potere costringe il subordi- (i) Vedi la Morale dei Positivisti; per
es. Libro I, Parte II, Capo IV, n. 15 e 16 (Pag. 125 del Voi. Ili di
queste Opere filosofiche nella ediz. del 1885, 131, 132 dell* ediz. del
1893 e del 1901 e pag. 135» 136 nella ediz. del 1908). - nato alla
osservanza della Idealità sociale. E quindi il Potere ha un Diritto sul
subordinato, e il subordinato ha un Dovere verso il Potere. E il Diritto
del Potere qui è positivo. Ma in virtù della Giustizia potenziale
anche il subordinato ha una azione sopra lo stesso potere. E per tale rispetto quindi
il potere ha un *dovere* verso il subordinato; e questo ha un *diritto*
verso il Potere. E il *diritto* del subordinato qui è *naturale*. Ed ecco
il concetto vero del diritto naturale, creatore e gfiudice del positivo e
vendicatore sopra lo stesso potere delle ragioni del subordinato. E
cosi, per asserire lo stesso diritto naturale, non occorre punto uscire
dall’uomo, e riferirsi ad una divinità e ad una Legge da essa emanata.
Questo diritto naturale appartiene all'essere umano, malgrado che in esso
non possa formarsi al di fuori della Società e senza che V Idealità
sociale della psiche singola siasi prima convertita nella Legge positiva
del Potere. Essendo poi il Diritto positivo lo stesso fatto
del Potere che si è costituito efifettivamente in una data Società, con
ciò si spiega come possa essere più o meno in contraddizione col Diritto
naturale, preso siccome la Giustizia potenziale astratta, desunta dallo
studio compa- rativo dei fatti sociali, e rappresentante quindi un
ideale, che solo imperfettamente si trovi realizzato nelle singole
formazioni storiche della Società umana. Ed essendo il Diritto positivo stesso
una formazione naturale della totalità sociale, che diventa qual' è col
pas- sare dall' indistinto al distinto (per la legge comune ad ogni
formazione naturale), cosi si spiega come, prima di essere un codice
scritto, è stato una consuetudine sorta per inconscia spontaneità; e come
la stessa consuetudine, che seguita a sorgere pure per inconscia spontaneità
an- che dopo la fissazione del codice, possa a poco a poco avere
prevalenza, come diritto, sopra la legge positiva. Il Diritto naturale,
oltre comprendere la ragione, imperante nel subordinato, di creatore, giudice
e vindice verso il Potere sovrastante, ne ha in sé anche un'
altra. Vale a dire ha in sé anche la ragione di ciò che de-
signammo sopra col nome di Convenienza, che riguarda i rapporti dei
subordinati tra di loro, e non ha esecuti- vità propriamente detta. Ora
é da dire di questa più chiaramente e precisela mente, se e come sia o no
una Giustizia, e quindi appar- tenga alla Moralità; poiché la Moralità
non si può con- cepirla se non con una Sanzione e con una Responsabilità;
e quindi in ordine ad una Legge sovrastante: cioè come una
Giustizia. Domanderemo e risponderemo di nuovo: Quale é l’ufficio
del Potere? L'ufficio del Potere è triplice. Dì stabìlii-si aella Società
a spese delle sue partì. Secondo. Di difendere l’autonomia di
ciascheduna dalla violenza delle altre. Dì dispensare nell'effetto
del mij^Uoramenta delle parti quella forza coniane dell* ambiente
sociale che opera per esso Potere. In tutte e tre le suddette forme del
suo ufficio il Potere esercita sulle parti un Diritto, come abbiamo
detto. E la ragione della azione del Potere è quindi una Giustizia, ossia
è col legata ad una Sanzione, E ciò perchè esiste una Responsabilità per
parte dei subordinati verso di essa azione, se mai violassero gli ordini
stabiliti. E il Diritto medesimo lo dicemmo un Diritto positivo. Ma
questo Diritto positivo dimostrammo sopra di- pendere in ultima analisi
dal Diritto potenziale o dalle Idealità mentali degli individui» Onde, in
ultima analisi, potenzialmente la Giustizia non è altro che le stesse
Idea- lità mentali. La Giustizia dunque si estende quanto la
potenzialità della Idealità sociale, formantesi nella psiche singola
dell’uomo per la sua partecipazione alla vita comune della Società; nella
quale si cova, per cosi dire, il germe in- dividuale, si che si maturi in
lui la disposkione naturale al civile coasorzio. Maturazione questa che
importa tutte tre le forme suddette dell' ufficio del Potere, se non che il
Potere stesso non è tutto l’effetto di tale maturazione; ma solo una parte*
Quella cioè, che si potrebbe chiamare V effetto più disHnéù. Oltre
sififatta parte ne resta un'altra; e più estesa ancora: ed è quella che
non si matura nel fatto di un Potere legale, ma rimane neW indistinto di
ciò che chia- miamo la Convenienza. E la Convenienza la diciamo un
indistinto appunto per- chè il Potere non è altro che un distinto che si
forma poste- riormente da essa per una elaborazione più compiuta.
Ne /iene che, se il Potere è il Diritto distinto, e quindi la sua
ragione una Giustizia distinta, (e cosi la Sanzione e la Responsabilità)
la Convenienza è invece un Diritto indistinto, e quindi anche una Giustizia
indistinta. Una Giustizia indistinta si, ma pur sempre una
Giustizia. Ed ecco come il concetto della Giustizia, e quindi della
Legge morale (col suo rapporto ad una San- zione e con una
Responsabilità) si allarga oltre la sfera delle prescrizioni del codice
pubblico e si estende a tutte le relazioni libere tra individuo e
individuo. E come questa Legge morale extralegale sia anch'essa puramente
una formazione naturale della psiche dell'uomo civile. E quindi non
occorra per ispiegarla ricorrere al sogno della Legge eterna della
divinità. E il farlo sia un errore ana- logo a quello della vecchia
astronomia che, il moto della Luna intorno alla Terra, lo spiegava col
comando dato alla Luna da dio di girare cosi intorno alla Terra, e non
per via della stessa naturale evoluzione cosmica; e, la virtù
dell'a- cido di intaccare il metallo, lo spiegava colla proprietà
in- taccatrice capricciosamente concessa da dio all'acido, e non
per via della stessa disposizione intima degli atomi compo- nenti la
molecola dell'acido e del metallo, onde dipende na- turalmente ossia
necessariamente, il fatto chimico suddetto. La Giustizia legale (seconda
forma dell' ufficio del Po- tere) è una gradazione evolutiva superiore di
un in- distinto inferiore da cui emerge. Ma la cosa ha bisogno di
essere dilucidata meglio e con esempj più concreti. K per
ordine. Cioè secondo le tre forme dette sopra deir ufficio del Potere. E
comincieremo dalla seconda, di difendere l’autonomia di ciascheduna parte della
Società dalla violenza delle altre. La difesa dell' individuo subordinato,
assunta dal Potere, importa che questo lo guardi dalle ofifese
degli altri, e faccia che V ofifensore risarcisca T ofifeso; e che gli
arbitrj singoli nella loro attività si equilibrino vicendevolmente in
modo che la limitazione imposta a ciascheduno sia la minima necessaria,
la minima indi- spa usabile ad ottenere la coordinazione giusta nella So-
cietà, richiedente la collaborazione egualmente non im- pedita di tutte
le sue parti. Ma tale difesa, assunta dal Potere, della libertà
e del Diritto individuale non si pud estendere a tutti asso-
iuiamente i fatti sociali verificantisi attorno ad un indi" viduo.
Non a tutti, di gran lunga. Non a tutti, che sono infinitamente molti. Ma
solo ad alcuni pochi. A quei pochi solamente che è strettamente richiesto
dalla esi- stenza del corpo sociale. E la difesa in discorso,
circa i detti pochi fatti, è propria di quella che si chiama la Giustizia
legale, o po- sitiva, o distinta. Quanto poi agli altri infiniti
fatti rimanenti ha luogo il fenomeno sociale della Convenienza, che
dicemmo es- sere pure una Giustizia; ma non legale, o positiva, o distinta:
sibbene potenziale, o indistinta, o morale. Quella della convenienza è
anch' essa una Giustizia, come la legale. Ma indistinta. E per la ragione
che, nel fondo, V una e r altra sono la cosa medesima, e si differenziano
tra loro solamente come il distinto dall' indistinto. E tanto che,
provenendo nelle formazioni naturali il distinto dall' in- distinto, qui
nella Società la reazione della Giustizia le- gale non è altro infine se
non una forma evolutiva supe- riore della stessa reazione della Convenienza. Anzi
di più. Come l'idealità sociale della psiche umana è sola- mente una
forma evolutiva superiore di un indistinto che si trova già nei bruti,
cosi la Giustizia legale si collega nelle sue gradazioni formative, non
solo con quella della Convenienza propria dell' uomo, ma anche con quella
del semplice talento egoistico osservabile nelle reazioni tra bruto
e bruto. E mettiamo in chiaro la cosa. La reazione tra bruto e
bruto è V effetto di un im- pulso istintivo quasi affatto egoistico. Ma
non del tutto, poiché (come osservai più volte nella Morale dei Positivisti
(i) in certi istinti socievoli dei bruti fa capolino qualche cosa di
antiegoistico. L' istinto egoistico del bruto si continua anche nell’uomo;
nel quale però va emergendo l'impulso antiegoi- stico a misura che si
sviluppano in Fui le formazioni psi- chiche superiori (2); in modo che
nell' individuo umano vivente nella Società apparisce la reazione della
convenienza, che è mista di talento egoistico e di ragione an-
tiegoistica. Quindi nella reazione della Convenienza si ha
una forma di passaggio dal talento egoistico del bruto alla ragione
dello schietto antiegoismo della Giustizia legale. E questa è il divenuto
della Convenienza, come la Con- venienza è il divenuto del talento
egoistico del bruto. E in effetto infinite sono le gradazioni della
reazione della Convenienza; da quella che rasenta la brutale del
(i) Per es. Libro I, Parte III. Capo III, n. 6 (Pag. 149 del
Voi. III di queste Op, fil. nella ediz. del 1885, 156 dell' ediz. del
1893 e del 1901 e 161 dell'ediz. del 1908. Ciò è dimostrato in tutto il corso
della Morale dei Positivisti, essendone V assunto fondamentale.
l^WU IP ■ I puro egoismo, a quella che tocca la
più nobile del puro antiegoismo. Infine, se si guarda una
medesima Società nel suo progresso storico dallo stato della barbarie a
quello della civiltà, e se si guardano le diverse condizioni degli
in- dividui di una medesima Società in un dato tempo. Per la legge,
più volte indicata, che nella formazione natu- rale i diversi del
coesistente sono T immagine dei diversi del successivo. E in oltre,
da una parte, nelle Società imperfette il talento egoistico si riscontra
nello stesso Potere, e dal- l' altra, la Convenienza, a misura che si
spoglia dell' e- goismo, si fa più antiegoistica e tende a diventare
una Giustizia legale. E la Giustizia legale da prima è stata sempre
e da per tutto una Convenienza radicatasi neir uso e final- mente
stabilitasi come legalità. §n. Dall'indistinto della
Prepotenza (principio egoistico) nasce il distinto della giustizia
(principio anti-egoistico) che è la risultante dinamica di quella,
per rendere evidente la verità dell'asserto, che la Giustizia emerge,
come formazione superiore, dal ta- lento egoistico precorso, giova vedere
come succede il fatto. Il più forte è prepotente verso il più
debole. E la Prepotenza è precisamente l'espressione del talento
egoistico in opposizione colla ragione antiegoistica, o della Idealità
sociale, o della Giustizia. Ne viene che l’adulto è prepotente col
fanciullo, l’uomo colla donna, il robusto col debole, il ricco col
povero. Fra gli uomini sempre si verifica tale prepotenza, ma in gradazioni
infinitamente diverse: da un massimo ad un minimo. Cioè in ragione
inversa dell’idealità anti-egoistica contrastante, ossia in ragione inversa
della civiltà. E ciò, tanto considerando la successione dei momenti del
progresso di incivilimento, quanto considerando gli elementi più o meno
inciviliti di una medesima società. Considerando gli elementi più o meno
inciviliti di una medesima Società, la prepotenza dell' adulto del
ro- busto del maschio del ricco e via discorrendo è sempre maggiore
fra le persone rozze e minore fra le colte. E in queste per la ragione
del maggiore sviluppo delle Idealità sociali contrastanti. Le Idealità
sociali si impon- gono alle persone colte per la semplice abitudine che
ab- biano di concepirle. Ai rozzi possono imporsi quando, neir atto
che essi inveiscono con Prepotenza, esse bale- nano neir atteggiamento
disapprovante e minaccioso di vendetta degli altri uomini. Cioè, alle
persone rozze, nelle quali, le Idealità sociali non sono ancora una
coscienza ben forte e distinta, queste frenano il talento egoistico
nella forma di volere sociale con qualche maniera di San- zione; e alle
persone colte non occorre la manifestazione estema vendicatrice, perchè
in esse V imperiosità della ragione della Società è diventata una loro
coscienza, che rinasce efficace senza la espressione materiale esterna
del volere sociale. Ed ecco come avviene il passaggio Del- l'
individuo dalla disposizione egoistica del bruto alla an- tiegoistica
dell' uomo civile. Considerando poi i momenti successivi di formazione
di una medesima Società, la Prepotenza degli individui si vede a poco a
poco eliminata dalla formazione contra- stante del Potere; il quale, per
esempio, ha tolto, in tutto o in parte, le Prepotenze dell' arbitrio
assoluto del padre di famiglia sui figli e sulla moglie, della schiavitù
sotto le diverse sue forme, dei privilegi dei nobili, della infe-
riorità della donna, e via discorrendo. Quando il Potere non era
ancora riuscito a elimi- nare queste Prepotenze anche la coscienza comune
non sentiva distintamente la ingiustizia loro. Mentre questa
ingiustizia vi è divenuta evidentissima in seguito al fatto della Legge
che le ha inibite. Questo fatto ha reso l'ingiustizia medesima evidente al
segno, che nella coscienza di tutti gli individui della società civile le
Prepotenze suddette appariscono delle vere impossibilità, non solo
per gli altri, ma anche pel proprio volere; cioè, nel vo- lere, formatasi
pienamente l' Idealità sociale antiegoistica corrispondente, questa
riusci ad ottenervi una forza assoluta di impulsività. E con ciò si ha la prova
di fatto, e della dottrina nostra generale circa la Moralità
esposta nella Morale dei Positivisti, e della dottrina qui toccata
del divenire della Idealità impulsiva: e della Giustizia legale distinta
dalla Giustizia indistinta della Convenienza. Ancora, le persone civili
sono meno manesche delle rozze. Onde, come fra queste è facilissima e
pronta la vendetta dell' offesa, così fra quelle- riesce invece e
difficilissima e tarda. E ciò nulla ostante la persona civile ha
esigenze infinitamente maggiori e più sottili verso le altre, e nello
stesso tempo assai più raramente offende. E la cosa parrebbe assurda. E lo è
colla teoria vec- chia della ragione degli atti morali. Ma si spiega
chiaris- simamente colla positiva. Il rozzo reagisce direttamente colle
proprie mani, e punisce l’offesa atrocemente: tuttavia è offeso ad
ogni poco. E basta udire, per convincersene, le ingiurie che due
persone rozze si scagliano colla massima facilità. Dunque T idea dell'
utile non è quella che insegna il contegno dell' uomo. Il rozzo è più
religioso del civile; e tuttavia con ciò non è più rispettoso del Diritto
altrui. Dunque 1' idea religiosa non è la ragione della Giustizia. Immensamente
più che nel rozzo è estesa l'idea del proprio diritto nell' uomo civile,
il quale dell' offesa recatagli si risente nel suo intimo assai più ohe il
primo. Ciò dipende dalla più progredita formazione psichica dell' uomo
civile. E questa dal beneficio più largamente produto della influenza formatrice
dell' ambiente sociale. Il risentirsi poi più forte dell' offesa porta
seco una tendenza più forte a reagire. Ma nell’uomo civile anche la
reazione (quantunque più fortemente disposta) ha il carattere della
umanità più progredita. Quella dell' uomo civile è una reazione non
di egoistica e brutale Prepotenza: cioè non è fatta di propria autorità e
di propria mano. E invece una reazione fatta in nome di qualche cosa che
trascende l'individuo; vale a dire in nome di una Idealità sociale rico-
nosciuta come tale. In nome insomma di ciò che si chiama la pubblica
opinione. E questa pubblica opinione, diventata la coscienza della
persona civile, che la trae al risentimento; ed è a questa medesima
pubblica opinione che è lasciato l'in- carico della vendetta: in modo che
l’offensore è responsabile deir offesa verso la stessa pubblica opinione
ven- dicatrice, la quale per ciò viene ad essere una Giustizia. E
conseguentemente una Gitistizia viene ad essere pure la coscienza
individuale, che ne segue la morale impulsività. Una Giustizia indistinta, che
precorre e prepara alla distinta o legale. E come? La pubblica
opinione si forma nel cozzo delle parti della Società fra di loro, onde
nascono le diverse Idea- lità sociali relative. Questa pubblica
opinione si annuncia prima vaga- mente nelle parole e negli atti
accidentali degli individui. A poco a poco si stabilisce nei detti e nei
pro- verbi e nelle usanze e consuetudini comuni. Un pò' alla volta
poi crea i suoi rappresentanti di- retti. Da questi quelli del Potere. Ma
con ciò, che il Potere non può assorbirli in sé tutti. Onde, sotto
tale rapporto, il Potere deve considerarsi siccome il vertice di
una piramide, nel quale va a collimare una infinità di piani sempre più
allargantisi di sotto, cioè una serie di associazioni giudicatrici
subordinate. Costante e organica è questa legge della for- mazione
sociale. Da prima è V individuo che si fa giustizia da se
stesso. Nel che però non si ha la Giustizia vera, ma an- cora solo la
Prepotenza. Poi più persone aventi speciali interessi comuni si
associano in modo tacito e anche espresso in vista di essi; e nella
associazione si va costituendo naturalmente r arbitrio collettivo sopra
le contestazioni che la riguar- dano; nel quale è già quindi un principio
di vera Giu- stizia, quantunque ancora più o meno indeterminata o
in- distinta. Da ultimo il Potere supremo della Società si
arroga il giudizio nelle contese, fissandone precisamente i ter-
mini; ed ecco il meno della Prepotenza e il più dell' an- tiegoismo e
della Giustizia. E questa è la Giustizia di- stinta, derivata per
evoluzione dalla indistinta, come questa lo è dal talento più egoistico dell'
individuo. E nella nostra attuale Società la legge mede- sima
apparisce nella sua massima evidenza. Vediamo costituirvisi dei
giuri al di fuori del Po- tere legale; i quali, in nome di una pubblica
opinione (che è il loro codice) pronunciano dei verdetti, vendica-
tori almeno iniziali delle violazioni della opinione stessa, e che quindi
ne sono la Sanzione sociale diretta. Giusta, ossia antiegoistica, perchè
sociale e non individuale o di Prepotenza. Sanzione producente una
Responsabilità pei violatori delle Idealità sociali corrispondenti; e quindi
atta ad innalzare le Idealità stesse nelle coscienze di tutti al grado di
vera Giustizia; tanto più distinte quanto più stabile e ordinato e
ripetuto e normale è l'esercizio del suo ufficio. E anche quando non
è eliminata ancora del tutto nella vendetta V azione diretta della
persona, che ne ha da essere soddisfatta, si può tuttavia palesare
l'in- tervento subordinante di una autorità superiore all'indi-
viduo. Come nel duello; nel quale la ragione di intimarlo e
di accettarlo deve essere sancita dal codice della opinione corrente ad esso
relativa, e giudicata 1' applicabi- lità al caso particolare da padrini,
e questi devono pre- senziare r esecuzione. Nel duello si ha
quindi una certa Giustizia, quan- tunque molto imperfetta. Imperfetta,
perchè vi si mantiene ancora troppo 1' eccessivo e il brutale dell' atto
di Prepotenza dell' individuo di vendicarsi colle sue mani.
Imperfetta ancora perchè 1' autorità che vi si intromette non è
riconosciuta come tale dalla Legge. Il fatto del duello qui ricordato
toma poi op- portuno per confermare, colle particolarità da esso
of- ferte, la verità delle cose suesposte. L* opinione, che
vige nei paesi civili di. oggi in re- lazione al duello, è una formazione
storica della nostra Società. Perchè, se, da una parte, esso ha la sua
causa generale in alcune ragioni costanti di ogni formazione
sociale, dall' altra però, le formalità che lo accompagnano accusano la
sua provenienza per trasformazione storica dalla consuetudine di un tempo
dei cosi detti giudizi di dio, E da ciò si vede, come sia vero che la
Giustizia (anche quella naturale o potenziale o etema che dir si voglia),
quanto alla forma precisa colla quale è effettiva- mente in una data
Società o coscienza, è una accidenta" lità storica. Come la
produzione di un dato frutto di una data pianta. L’opinione circa il
duello non è qualchecosa di fis- sato e sancito dal Potere legittimo, che
T infligga inde- clinabilmente anche a chi vi si rifiuti. Ma ciò non
toglie che r opinione stessa abbia una forza; e tale da imporsi
quantunque gravosissima, alla volontà. E da ciò si vede che la Giustizia
ha già una effettività piena di efficacia anche nella forma indefinita
della spontaneità vaga della opinione pubblica. Ma r opinione circa
il duello, appunto perchè ancora in quello stadio della vaga spontaneità
sociale, non ma- turata e non maturabile in una Legge del Potere che
la stabilisca per tutta la Società, vi si restringe ad un certo
ordine di persone. E (cosa curiosissima) per questo or- dine di persone è
divenuta una idea di una impulsività potente, certa, indeclinabile, atta
a tenerlo sotto il proprio impero, mentre per gli altri, esenti dalle
influenze onde è insinuata, è come se non esistesse. E tanto che,
dove presso gli uni è moralmente spregevole e disonorato chi non si
attiene alle prescrizioni della opinione favorevole al duello, per gli
altri è cosa ridicola e stolta il tenerne conto. L' opinione
relativa al duello associa delle conse- guenze esecutive gravissime a
fatti riguardanti V onore. L' onore, che è un semplice rapporto mentale
dell' indi- viduo colla Società. E da ciò si vede che neir uomo,
per lo sviluppo speciale onde la sua psiche è capace, si Voi. IV.
6 creano delle entità di un ordine superiore, che sono impossibili
pel bruto e si trovano solo inizialmente e quindi poco avvertite nelle
Società rozze e nelle classi sociali meno colte. Delle entità aventi per
base, non il benes- sere materiale dell* individuo, che è l'espressione
del puro egoismo, ma il benessere degli spiriti associati, che è r
espressione della ragione antiegoistica. Qui insomma r individuo si trova
necessitato perfino al sacrificio vo- lontario della vita in omaggio di
un' idea che lo padro- neggia. L' opinione relativa al duello tende
(come tutte le altre opinioni, con tendenza positiva o negativa) a
diven- tare una Legge della Società. Questa tendenza in parte è
riuscita, in quanto esistono già delle disposizioni posi- tive di Legge
che riguardano il duello. Ma in parte non è riuscita. Ora T analisi
accurata della tendenza medesima e di ciò che n' è riuscito e non riuscito ci
raggua- glia circa il processo naturale, onde la Giustizia indi-
stinta, ossia la Convenienza, si fa la Giustizia distinta, ossia la Legge
positiva. Il Potere ha emanato delle disposizioni relative al
duello. Ciò ha potuto fare solo in seguito all'essersi que- sto fenomeno
sociale fissato a poco a poco nelle sue forme precise, che presentarono
1' occasione alla opinione pubblica di manifestarsi nel senso del partito
adottato nella Legge. Ma, delle disposizioni stesse prese una
volta dall'au- torità in relazione al duello, altre rimasero poi anche
in seguito perchè trovate rispondenti allo scopo sociale, di non
impedire in modo nocivo il corso inevitabile di certe reazioni di
Convenienza j altre invece dovettero essere smesse come inopportune e
quindi contrastate nella prova dalla coscienza dei cittadini, cioè dalla
Giustìzia poten- ziale che, come dicemmo tante volte, è Tarbitro
naturale di ogni Legge sociale. Il Potere però, nella
reazione anche esecutiva del duello, non ha potuto sosHiuirsi ialalmenie,
come è la sua tendenza in generale per rapporto a qualsiasi esecu-
tività forzata delle reazioni dirette tra individuo e indi- viduo. E
ciò ci istruisce praticamente di due cose, che già osservammo sopra. Vale
a dire: Primo. Che nel Potere non si può appuntare se non una
parte delle reazioni tra indivìduo e individuo; come nel cervello non
arrivano direttamente dei fili ner- vosi che governino immediatamente
tutti i punti della massa del corpo: ai quali invece in gran parte il
cer- vello fa sentire la sua influenza solo per J' azione che
esercita sopra centri secondari, aventi però anch' essi una propria
azione, che si compie in parte senza rintervento degli organi
cerebrali. Secondo. Che, se una tendenza reale dell'
individuo non può essere soddisfatta intéramente dalT intervento
del Potere, Tindividuo cerca la soddisfazione da se; come in un assalto
improvviso dì un assassino, dove, non po- lendo la forza pubblica
difendere il cittadino, a questo è concesso il Diritto anche dell'
uccisione a propria di- fesa. Per cui si arguisce, che il
fatto ancora incivile ed anomalo del duello non sarà evitato nella
civiltà, se non quando in questa le questioni circa V onore potranno
es- sere risolte appieno giuridicamente, sia modificandosi l'o-
pinione pubblica relativa, sia trovata in base a questa una legislazione
atta all' effetto. Vedemmo fin qui come la Giustizia legale, af-
fatto antiegoistica, del Potere sorga dalla potenziale della coscienza
degli individui, che ha per base una Idealità sociale antiegoistica non
ancora divenuta una Legge, e nello stadio tuttavia solamente di opinione
più o.meno comune. Resta ora a chiarire come questa Giustizia
poten- ziale, avente per base una Idealità antiegoistica, si svolga
anch' essa alla sua volta da una forma ancora più im- perfetta di
tendenza dell' uomo, cioè dal talento brutale egoistico della Prepotenza. La
reazione del semplice talento brutale, o della Prepotenza, per la
concorrenza dei prepotenti di pari forza, diventa Equipollenza: e quindi
Giustizia, Non occorre per ciò che intervenga un elemento
nuovo. Il diverso, anzi 1' opposto, della Giustizia si ot- tiene per la
semplice reduplicazione dell' identico della Prepotenza elementare dell'
individuo. Per la legge universale dell' emergere del diverso distinto
dair identico indistinto per la reduplicazione dei molti identici (prima
distinzione dell* indistinto uno), che ha luogo in tutte le formazioni
naturali. Come ho dimostrato nello scritto sulla Formazione naturale nel
fatto del sistema solare (Voi. II di queste Opere filosofiche)^ e come
dimostrerò nei libri relativi alla Formazione del pensiero (nei voi. V,
VI e VII di queste stesse Op, fil.) Così nella formazione chimica la
materia identica diventa gli opposti deir acido e della base dopo che,
distintasi in atomi diversi, questi poi si reduplicano e si aggruppano
variamente. La Prepotenza è la coscienza che l' individuo ha acquistato
del fatto della propria Attività che esso ha esperimentato; e la
Giustizia è la coscienza che neir individuo stesso ha dovuto formarsi del
fatto della Equipollenza degli altri individui dato dalla espe-
ricìiza delle Prepotenze concorrenti nella Società. Sicché nel bruto la psiche
non arriva alla trasfor- mazione in discorso, perchè in esso, non essendo
un es- sere sociale, non si può formare la coscienza successiva a
quella della Prepotenza come nell* uomo, che è un essere sociale (Onde poi
raccogliamo la conferma di un altro dei grandi principi da noi già
spiegati della Formazione naturale: vale a dire che la Cosa è il
molteplice preso nella coesistenza dei singoli, e la Forza è lo stesso
molteplice preso nella loro successione. Sicché Cosa e Forza non sono che
distinzioni di un identico indistinto: il quale, preso nello schema della
coesistenza, è la Cosa, e, preso nello schema della successione, è la
Forza. — La Giustizia o T idealità sociale, come apparisce dalle cose
dette nel libro, suppone una successione di fatti; ed è assurda senza
questa supposizione. Ma nello stesso tempo, potendo questi fatti
succedentisi essere presenti contempo- raneamente al pensiero, pel lavoro
suo descritto nella Morale dei Positivisti^ è una entità (Cosa) del
pensiero, ed è una virtù efficiente (Forza) nella dinamica morale
(Impulsività dell* idea). E qui dobbiamo notare una cosa curiosissima,
spiegabile solo colla nostra teoria della identità, nel fondo, della Cosa
che è, e della Forza onde essa agisce. L' Idealità sociale è
impulsiva del volere umano in quanto gli si presenta siccome una
Giustizia, vale a dire in quanto gli fa pro- spettare una Sanzione; ossia
lo avverte della sua responsabilità. E tuttavia, a misura che V Idealità
sociale si fa più viva e abituale, diviene invece più vago il
presentimento pauroso delle relative conseguenze di punizione per parte
della reazione sociale. Anzi il massimo della impulsività dell' Idealità
sociale (nel Sapiente e nel Regno della Giustizia, come dicemmo nella
Morale dei Positivisti) va col minimo del presentimento pauroso della
punizione sanzionatrice. Il concetto umano della Giustizia si forma
da quello della Prepotenza per V equilibrio di molti prepo- tenti
nella loro concorrenza sociale. La filosofia tradizionale (o la
filosofia sana, come la chiamano) spiega la Giustizia ponendola siccome
lo stesso comando di dio. La spiega così: aggiungendo molto
ingenuamente alla sua spiegazione V avvertenza, che la Giustizia,
ri- mane distrutta assolutamente tosto che si rimova la di- vinità
e il suo volere assoluto. E invece la verità è precisamente il
contrario. La Giustizia» in questo volere divino, è V opposto, ossia la
negazione, della Giustizia come tale. Come ne è l'oppo- sto e la
negazione la Prepotenza come tale. Il volere di dio è la Prepotenza
innalzata al grado dèlia Prepotenza assoluta. E il bello si è
che la stessa filosofia tradizionale ha dovuto accorgersi de IT
inconveniente, tanto o quanto, an- ch' essa, senza intenderlo
distintamente. Poiché ha dovuto maritare, nella sua dottrina della
ragione della Giustizia, il principio del volere divino con quello della
conoscenza che dio debba avere dell' essere intimo delle cose, e
della necessità onde il suo volere sìa costretto assolu- Egli è
come dire, che è V ordine dei fatti sociali, il quale è diventalo un
inrro ordine ideale, presente al pensiero in un suo atto intuitivo
momentaneo: qiTasi forza fissatavisi dal di fuori come sommi» unica di
efileni ng^i untisi a poco a poco l’uno all' altro. Proprio come la proprietà
attuale, onde una sostanza è atta ad agire in un dato momento con una
data intensità dì forza, sì è for- mata in questa per la addizione
successiva, mettiamo, dì un certo numero di \:alorie, entratevi dal di
fuori a poco a poco V una dopo V altra. -tamente (se
ha da essere giicsto) a regolarsi nel suo comando secondo le esigenze della
essenza da sé cono- sciuta appieno della cosa, alla quale impartisce il
co- mando. In questo secondo principio maritato al primo è
stata riconosciuta implicitamente, in qtuilche maniera, tardi,
imperfettamente, confusamente e con una contraddizione col primo
principio la verità di ciò che dimostrammo; ossia della derivazione della
Giustizia dallo stesso uomo per effetto della sua convivenza
sociale. Imperfettamente, dicemmo. E la dottrina teologica
della predestinazione n' è testimonio. E tardi: cioè a misura che lo
studio dei fatti guidò al presentimento confuso della verità contenuta
nella dottrina positiva. Tanto che la storia della idea di dio ce
lo presenta prima coir impero capriccioso, dispotico, appassionato,
mutabile del tiranno prepotente. E succes- sivamente con una mitigazione
del capriccio e della prepotenza, quale era suggerita dal fatto della
legislazione sociale in lui oggettivata, che venne diventando
sempre più giusta per T equi librar visi sempre maggiore degli
elementi componenti. Come si è detto, nell'individuo non coordi-
nato nella Società si ha la sua autonomia che si goverua colla
Prepotenza. una risul- tante dinamica di esse, per le
considerazioni che seguono. Con uno straniero, e soprattutto con un barbaro, o
con un selvaggio, un uomo in generale non sente il dovere della Giustizia come
con un altro uomo della sua stessa Società. Perfino si dà che in faccia ad un
uomo di razza diversa si atteggi ne' suoi sentimenti come in faccia ad un bruto
o ad una fiera. E la cosa è naturalissima. La sua Società è in lotta colla
popolazione alla quale appartiene queir uomo. La sua Società quindi si atteggia
verso di essa e verso i suoi Componenti come un prepotente; ed egli pure. Anche
se non è in lotta, dal momento che 1' offesa recata al(Il Nel che si verifica la legge generale di tutta
la natura, che r ambiente è necessario all' ottenimento di una
formazione, mettiamo la nebulosa solare alla formazione di un pianeta, o 1*
ambiente vege- tativo alla formazione di un seme; ma una volta ottenuta la forma-
zione questa funziona come tale anche indipendentemente dalle con- dizioni onde
emerse. Mettiamo la forma e la solidità di un pianeta, e la virtù vegetativa
specifica del seme. ^'^''PfliW^^IF lontano selvaggio non è vendicata dal
tribunale del pro- prio paese, né di nessuno, queir offesa stessa non appa-
risce un attentato vero e proprio contro la Giustizia. Che se ci sono degli
uomini che sentono la Giustizia anche per gli estranei, fossero anche dei
selvaggi, questo succede solo per quelli nei quali il sentimento della
Giu- stizia, prodotto prima nel modo che spiegammo, è diven- tato
una forma perfetta e assolutamente dominante della psiche, e che agisce
da sé e senza il bisogno più del co- stringimento dell' ambiente produttore,
e con una sponta- neità esuberante. Ancora, nella stessa Società un
gentiluomo è molto cauto nelle sue relazioni coi stcoi pari. Non lo è
egualmente trattando con persone di condizione inferiore.E ciò perchè co'
suoi pari le conseguenze speciali del suo contegno (quelle mettiamo di un
duello) hanno indotto un ordine di Convenienza che non occorre per gli
altri, relativamente ai quale le conseguenze non hanno la me-
desima gravità. In una parola, chi sta sopra è prepotente cogli
infe- riori, e non co' suoi pari, coi quali è più giusto. La
formazione della Giustizia nel senso proprio va colla formazione del
Potere onde è l' espressione. L’idea della Giustizia non nasce se non
dietro i fatti determinati prodottisi effettivamente nelle reazioni
degli associati. Dico, dietro i fatti determinati. Non prima di
essi. contenuta. Per questo il Potere (nel senso da noi
qui inteso) è eminentemente la Giustizia, che i poeti
rappresentarono colla bilancia in mano (1* equipollenza giusta degli
arbi- trj) e colla spada nell' altra (la forza onde si determina r
equilibrio tra arbitrio e arbitrio). E lo è perfettamente esso
solo. Lo è eminentemente in quanto dispone di una forza che
costringe e determina i soggetti alla osservanza della Idealità sociale,
o giusta, che dir si voglia. Lo è perfettamente esso solo, in quanto a sé
solo ri- serba il costringimento violento alla osservanza della me-
desima Idealità giusta. Onde viene poi che la Giustizia
propriamente detta si restringe agli atti che possono cadere sotto la
direzione del Potere, e non comprende quelli che ne sono esenti: i
quali per ciò rimangono la sola Convenienza. E su tutto ciò non
cade dubbio. Il furto, per esem- pio, dove non e' é un Potere che lo
inibisca, non é un delitto. È solo un atto pericoloso e che esige del
corag- gio e della avvedutezza in chi lo commette. Dove e' é un
Potere, che proibisca sì il furto, ma sia impotente a impedirlo, il furto
stesso é un delitto vago e non grave. Dove il Potere lo
impedisce effettivamente e lo col- pisce con forti punizioni è un delitto
grave. E può essere un delitto di varie specie se la puni-
zione è varia. Per esempio, il furto del privato a danno del privato,
che importa la prigionia del ladro, è perciò un de- litto infamante. Il
furto invece di un privato che non paga un diritto della pubblica
finanza, onde incorra solamente in una multa pecuniaria, non è più
infamante, a motivo che la punizione non è la prigionia ma la
multa. La quale forza poi del Potere, onde è mante- nuta violentemente
V osservanza della Legge, in due ma- niere è dispensata. '
Direttamente cioè dal Potere, stesso per V otteni- mento delle
condizioni occorrenti alla vita sociale, e indi- rettamente quando esso è
domandato per interesse pro- prio delle parti individualmente
offese. E da ciò due forme di Giustizia. Questa seconda più
sentita dagli individui meno educati e quindi più egoisti; la prima più
sentita dai più eletti e quindi meno egoisti. L' avaro si commuove per la
infrazione della Legge. della proprietà individuale, che è per esso la
Giustizia per ec- cellenza. Il virtuoso si commuove per una disposizione
po- litica antiliberale, preoccupandosi soprattutto della Giu-
stizia in se stessa. La circostanza di questa forza materiale occor-
rente al Potere ci conduce a scoprire una legge fonda- mentale della
Sociologia, ossia della formazione naturale deir organismo e della vita
sociale. Nel Potere, per costituire questa sua forza, sono
as- sorbite delle forze prese dal corpo sociale: e in ima certa
misura (i). Così la forza propria del cervello, onde sono
(i) Ci limitiamo qui a notare il fatto. Quale sia questa misura, e
come sia variabile fra estremi assai distanti secondo le condizioni e gli
stadj storici di una Società, deve essere lasciato a uno studio regolate
le funzioni del corpo di un uomo, è costituita dalle forze prestate dal
sangue del corpo medesimo in una misura, che non può essere oltre certi
limiti. Ora una quantità determinata di forza non può pro-
durre se non un effetto limitato, proporzionato ad essa. Ne viene che, se
la Società è mcipiente o selvaggia o rozza, tutta la forza rimanendo
impegnata nel costringere gli individui a osservare la Legge fondamentale
della esi- stenza sociale, il Potere rimane senza altra forza da
di- sporre per la produzione nella Società di miglioramenti
ulteriori (i). Ma quando in seguito si sono introdotte, colla ripetizione
degli atti violenti di coercizione sociale, le abitu- dini giuste, queste
producono poi V effetto della osser- vanza della Legge per parte dei
soggetti da sé; e la- sciano la forza del Potere disimpegnata e quindi
disponi- bile per altri usi, per altri lavori, per indurre altre
abitu- dini superiori; insomma pel progresso ulteriore della vita
sociale. Cosi nel corpo dell' uomo. Nel bambino il cervello è tutto
impegnato nel produrre le abitudini dell' esercizio delle membra; e
pogniamo anche in quelle di leggere e scrivere. Prodotte queste abitudini
iniziali, resta disponi- particolare, che può da sé fornire
materia per una scienza spcciaU, E per noi basta notare, che la misura in
discorso va crescendo in ragione che progredisce V organizzazione sociale;
analogamente a quanto si osserva negli organismi biologici, nei quali
cresce la pro- porzione del cervello in ragione che si fa maggiore la
centralizzazione degli organi. (i) Ciò si ripete nel caso di
una guerra, che assorbisca le risorse del Governo; e nel caso di anarchia
che le dissipi. bile per altri esercizi. Mettiamo per la cultura
propria- mente detta. E ottenute le abitudini di questa cultura,
ri- mane poi libero per V esercizio di una professione parti-
colare. E cosi via. E insomma la questione dell' immagazzinamento
delle forze. Un' abitudine in un individuo è la forza che, por-
tata sopra di lui una lunga serie di volte, vi si è imma- gazzinata in
questa forma. Come nella produzione delle proprietà delle sostanze
chimiche dalle più semplici alle più complicate. Come nella produzione
della pianta dal seme fino al frutto maturatone. Onde la Giustizia,
che va producendosi nelle coscienze dei singoli uomini raccolti nella
Società civile è )' imma- gazzinamento lento e progressivo della forza
dispensata dal Potere nei singoli atti infiniti del suo esercizio, e
im- pressa e ricevuta in quelle coscienze volta per volta. An- che
nel fatto del concetto della Giustizia, come in ogni fatto distinto della
natura, si ha una forza o un rifmo persistente, ottenuto per la
fissazione di una forza appli- cata dall' ambiente e divenuto 1' essere
costitutivo di ciò in cui si è formato (i), ossia dell' uomo civile come
tale. Il che poi dimostra che anche la Società, come ogni altra
formazione naturale, è una formazione che nasce, progredisce e
muore. Quando nasce, è la violenza che tende a produrre il
fatto e il sentimento della Giustizia. Quando progredisce, è la
forza del Potere che si di- ■I) Si allude alla Legge della Formazione
naturale \A\\\q\X.^ ^o^x?i accennata. spensa ad ottenere
ordini sempre più alti di azioni e di idee giuste. Quando
muore è V organismo vecchio, che non si presta più al mantenimento di
questa forza comune orga- nicamente subordinante del Potere. Come (per
una forma dì questa morte) nella famìglia vien meno il potere su-
bordinante del padre quando la personalità adulta dei figli non si presta
più alla coordinazione di essi sotto la tu- tela del capo della
famiglia. Se non che, riguardo alle Società che muoiono, vale del
pari ancora la relativa legge naturale di ogni altra formazione, per la
quale la morte «di un organismo non è mai totale, restando tuttavia i
ritmi singoli pro- dotti dallo stesso organismo mentre era vivo. Come
nel seme della pianta, che resta alla morte di questa. Come nelle
idee, che restano per gli uomini succedenti a quelli che le hanno
trovate. Sicché il mondo greco e il mondo romano, per es.,
sono morti come quelle date formazioni sociali, ma re- starono le idee
della Giustizia umana nate nel loro seno. Restarono come germi, o
magazzini di forza già elabo- rata. E dei quali si giovarono le Società
europee venute dopo, che non dovettero ricominciare da capo (ossia
dalla condizione infima dell' uomo preistorico) il lavoro della organizzazione
sociale. La giustizia è la forza specifica dell'organismo sociale. Siccome
poi V organismo e la vita sociale si spiegano per la Giustizia che vi si
produce, cosi la teoria «T- della formazione
naturale della vita sociale è anche nello stesso tempo la teorìa della
formazione naturale della Giustizia. La quale per ciò è una formazione
naturale, come il Sistema solare, come un Minerale, come un Ve-
getale, come un animale, come una Goccia di Rugiada, come un qualunque
Pensiero di un uomo. È cioè la Giustizia una formazione naturale
della Società; come, ad esempio, si direbbe che la vegetazione è
una formazione naturale del nostro Pianeta. Ed è la Giustizia la
forza specifica della società medesima. Ne è la forza specifica, come si
direbbe che V affi- nità è la forza specifica delle sostanze chimiche, la
vita delle organiche, la psiche degli animali. Nessuna
affinità, o vita, o psiche, senza sostanza chi- mica, organismo vivo,
animale. Del pari nessuna Giusti- zia senza Società umana. L*
affinità, la vita, la psiche scaturiscono dalle stesse forze onde
esistono i loro soggetti; e ne rappresentano la risultante, che, come
tale, si distingue specificamente dalle forze producenti medesime. E cosi
la Giustizia sca- turisce dalle stesse autonomie prepotenti degli
individui, ed è la specie distinta di essere risultante
naturalmente dal loro contemperarsi insieme. La società quindi, come
tale, è tanto più per- fetta quanto più è forte V idea della Giustizia
formatasi nei consociati; ossia quanto più questi sono morali: sic-
ché meno sia uopo concorrere colla forza materiale al- l' ottenimento
dell* ordine sociale. D che equivale al dire che T Idealità sociale
sia più Voi. IV. 7 impulsiva da se stessa nella psiche di
ciascheduno, e quindi il regno della Gitcstizia {adoperando la nostra
so- lita espressione) si sostituisca a quello del Fato o della
Prepotenza. In modo analogo una sostanza chimica è tanto più
stabile e perfetta quanto più V Affinità degli atomi vi è grande» e la
rende atta a mantenersi nell' essere suo in- dipendentemente dalle
circostanze fisiche esterne della temperatura, delP ambiente, della
compressione e via di- cendo, che suppliscano colla loro azione al
difetto della forza di coesione intima dei componenti. La
costituzione dell'organismo sociale, e quindi la sostituzione della Giustizia
alla Prepotenza, produce la incolumità dei consociati. La incolumità, che
non è altro appunto se non la elisione della Prepotenza oflFen-
dente. Questa incolumità ha due fattori: Primo. La forza
materiale disposta nelle mani del Potere per far valere violentemente la
Legge contro la Prepotenza non domata delle parti subordinate.
Secondo. Il sentimento del Dovere formantesi negli individui associati
nel modo detto sopra. Ora, siccome questo sentimento del Dovere (o questa
Idealità sociale impulsiva, che torna lo stesso) è una vera forza traente
l' individuo a vincere la propria tendenza egoistica della Prepotenza, e
a segfuire la ragione an- tiegoistica della Giustizia o della Legge, cosi
le due forze suddette, del Potere di fuori e del Dovere di dentro
collimanti a produrre V incolumità dei consociati e in^e- granfisi
vicendevolmente nella intensità sufficiente al- l' uopo, si troveranno
concorrervi in ragione inversa. Meno è il sentimento del Dovere
sviluppatosi nei singoli individui, e più dovrà essere la forza
materiale usata dal Potere. E viceversa, più il sentimento del Do-
vere, e meno la forza materiale. E ciò, sia normalmente, sia
accidentalmente; e per certi momenti critici sociali, e per certe
Idealità. La incolumità poi
del cittadino importa un complesso di condizioni sue particolari molte e
diverse, cominciando dalla fondamentale della salvezza della vita
materiale e andando fino alle più delicate (proprie delle condizioni
sociali più perfette) del rispetto morale vicen- devole negli atti anche
più comuni della vita. Il Potere supremo della Società non può
(come altre volte avvertimmo) provvedere per tutte le dette condi-
zioni della incolumità del cittadino: ma deve necessaria- mente intervenire
almeno per le fondamentali. Da ciò consegue che l’azione materiale sulla
persona del cit- Chi consideri tutte le possibili reazioni tra uomo
e uomo in una Società di leggeri può rilevare due cose molto
importanti pel discorso che facciamo qui. Cioè: Primo. La varietà
infinita delle azioni di un uomo atte a destare in qualunque modo la
attenzione di un altro. Fogniamo, partendo da un assassinio e
venendo fino ad uno sbadiglio. Nella quale varietà, come è chiaro
da sé, si hanno delle vere diflFerenze di generi e di specie. Secondo. Il
sentimento nascente in un uomo, per reazione, in seguito all' azione da
lui osservata in un altro. E di tale sentimento abbiamo parlato nella
Morale dei Positivisti (i), mostrando quanto sia variato e come
formi una serie di sentimenti diversi, anzi una scala in ordine di
nobiltà. Ora, per le cose dette, ripetendosi e le azioni e i
sentimenti accompagnanti le reazioni che le susseguono, si producono un
po' alia volta e si fissano nella psiche, come sue potenzialità, delle
Idealità sociali corisppndenti. Le quali per ciò sono costituite dalla
rappresentazione della azione e dalla reazione effettiva conseguente:
onde sono Idealità impulsive del volere, ossia Giustizie. La mente
si confonde pensando alle varietà possibili ad emergere in ragione di
tale processo. I pochi ele- menti del chimico, si sa a quale infinita
varietà di for- mazioni di sostanze si prestano: le poche note
musicali, a quale infinita varietà di composizioni musicali; le
poche lettere dell' alfabeto, a quale infinita varietà di suoni ar-
(i) Libro I, Parte I, Capo III (Pag. 21 e segg. del Voi. Ili
di queste Op, fil. nella ediz. del 1885, del 1893 e 1901, e pag. 22
nel- l'Ediz. del 1908). I20 ticolati. Or
che sarà della varietà delle formazioni psichiche della Giustizia,
pensando anche solo alla varietà dei senti- menti componibili colle rappresentazioni
degli atti sociali? Per farcene una qualche idea prendiamo un
esempio. Neir uomo, fra i molti sentimenti onde è capace, si
ha anche quello caratteristico corrispondente alla espres- sione del
ridere. È questo si può connettere con un nu- mero senza fine di
rappresentazioni di atti, dando ori- gine cosi al genere delle Idealità
comiche; le quali nes- suno ignora quanto siano potenti neir indirizzo
della vita e nell'impero della volontà; mentre è pur vero che il
timore del ridicolo ha talvolta più efficacia che non il timore del
carcere e della multa. Il fatto, pel mondo morale, è analogo a quello
di una sostanza che, potendosi combinare con tutte le altre nel
mondo materiale, è atta a determinarvi un atteggia- mento particolare per
tutto T essere suo. Il nostro mondo, per esempio, sarebbe un mondo
aflFatto diverso da quello che è, se gli mancasse il ferro. E cosi dicasi
degli orga- nismi in genere se mancasse, mettiamo, il potassio che
concorre a formarli, essendovi quindi un ministro della vitcu Allo
stesso modo V atteggiamento morale dell'uomo, quale è al presente,
verrebbe meno, se mancasse il coef- ficiente del riso, che concorre a
formarlo, essendovi quindi con ciò anche esso un ministro del bene.
Il quale ragionamento poi va ripetuto per tutti i sentimenti umani
ad uno ad uno, che sono altrettanti coefficienti dell* Idealità sociale
direttiva delle azioni u- mane, attivandola sotto la forma di generi
speciali dì Idealità o di Giustizie. E della varietà inesauribile
di queste, per tale via ottenute, è un saggio V arte, che nella scultura, nella
pit- tura, nella poesia, nella prosa, riproduce dalla coscienza, in tante
forme, gli atteggiamenti morali dell' uomo. In tante forme li ha riprodotti, e
in tante ancora, senza fine, è atta a riprodurla 3. — E i sentimenti umani
riescono cosi coefScienti della Giustizia, perchè un sentimento, qualunque sia,
essendo la reazione corrispondente ad un atto, ne è anche la Sanzione; e chi
commette V azione atta a susci- tare un sentimento incontra una Responsabilità
in ordine ad esso. Anche ciò è essenziale al concetto naturale vero
e pieno della Responsabilità umana. Anche ciò quindi
appartiene all' ordine naturale della Giustizia nella varietà delle sue
formazioni. Il restringere 1* ordine della Giustizia a quei pòchi
atti ai quali si rìduceva una volta, e che si abbraccia- vano nei dieci
comandamenti del decalogo, è eflFetto di nna grossolana e non scientifica
idea della cosa. Come il restringere che fa il volgo dell' idea dell'
animale a quelli che sono forniti di occhi e di gambe per camminare: e il
restringere l' idea del vegetale a quelli soltanto che hanno le foglie
verdi. La scienza ha trovato animali anche senz' occhi e
fissi alle pietre; e vegetali senza foglie e senza verde. E cosi trova
delle Giustizie senza la Sanzione del carcere e della multa. La
restrizione suddetta corrisponde insomma perfet- tamente a quella che fa
il volgo e fecero gli antichi delle specie degli animali, credute poche e
sempre quelle e mo- dellate a priori sugli esemplari fatti passare da dio
in rivista davanti ad Adamo nel paradiso terrestre. E dipende
dalla stessa ignoranza della legge della formazione naturale. Poche,
dicevano, e sempre quelle, le specie degli ani- mali; e create
direttamente da dio, e mostrate ad Adamo al principio del mondo nel
paradiso terrestre. E cosi, poche e sempre quelle le specie della
Giustizia, impresse da dio direttamente neir anima di ogni uomo che
nasce e scritte sulle tavole di Mosè dalla cima del monte Sinai [cfr.
Grice, ’10 comandi’, decalogo] La scienza sbugiardò V idea meschìnissima
quanto alle specie degli animali. Sbugiarda col positivismo l'idea
meschinissima quanto alla Giustizia. Non dio, autore delle specie degli
animali; ma la natura: e le specie, un nu- mero stragrande; e non fisse,
ma variabili; e variabili accidentalissimamente. E cosi, non dio autore
delle specie della Giustizia, ma la natura: e queste specie, un
numero stragrande e immensamente differenziato; e non fisse, ma
variabili; e variabili accidentalissimamente. L'idealità sociale, ossia
la giustizia morale, formata che sia nella coscienza dell' individuo, vi
fun- ziona come una forza speciale, nel senso antiegoistico
chiarito nella Morale dei Positivisti; e vi produce un doppio effetto,
secondo che si applica al giudizio e alla direzione delle azioni
individuali proprie, ovvero al giu- dìzio e alla direzione delle azioni
degli altri. Da questo secondo effetto dipende la vitalità
intrin- seci e vera della Società, considerata siccome un organismo
naturale nel senso proprio della parola. Perchè la Giustizia, parlando
nella coscienza dell' individuo, è la potenzialità indistinta onde
originano i distinti dei Po- teri sociali effettivi e delle Leggi da essi
emananti; e perchè la Giustizia potenziale degli individui
associati collabora a rendere efficace l’opera del potere e della
legge sociale. E come se si dicesse che un organismo, pogniamo
vegetante, si sviluppa nei suoi organi caratteristici mercè la vitalità
delle parti componenti: e che poi T attività di questi organi speciali è
operativa de' suoi effetti par- ticolari sopra le parti mercè il concorso
della vitalità che si mantiene nelle parti stesse. Sempre insomma la
legge generale della formazione naturale, che l' indistinto non
cessi mai di sottostare al distinto, e di offrire cosi la ra- gione naturale
e del suo essere e del suo operare. Cosi si osserva che una legge
in un paese rimane senza efficacia e come lettera morta se, a farla
valere, è solo il Potere, e non lo ajutano di conserva le singole
coscienze dei cittadini; le quali, accogliendo in sé la forza viva già
formata della Giustizia morale, ne ricevono un impulso atto a muoverle
alla disapprovsizione degli atti contrari alla Legge e a concorrere per
quanto possono a farla valere. E, quanto sia vero ciò che
affermiamo, lo di- mostrano i fatti sociali tutti quanti. Anche, per
esempio. r interesse vivissimo onde si tien dietro allo
svolgimento di un processo criminale, pur dei paesi lontani, pure
re- lativo a persone che non ci riguardano punto, né diret-
tamente, ne indirettamente. Che più? Tanto è viva e potente
nell'uomo T idea della Giustizia antiegoistica, che egli non può stare
che non ne provi V eflFetto più vivo anche pei fatti immagi- nari
delle fole, dei racconti, delle poesie, dei drammi. Data r immaginazione
di un fatto, al quale sia applica- cabile l'idea della Giustizia, questa
per legge psicologica indeclinabile si ridesta nella mente, e col suo
naturale atteggiamento: come in tutte le altre associazioni men-
tali. In ciò la spiegazione della vivezza della voluttà, onde si leggono
o si odono i suddetti racconti, e si as- siste ai drammi. E la vivezza di
tale voluttà è il termo- metro che prova la presenza nella coscienza
della idea efficace della Giustizia e ne ne misura l' intensità. La
punizione materiale, vendicatrice della Giu- stizia, sarà necessaria
quindi in ragione inversa della ef- fettuazione nella coscienza della
Idealità sociale giusta. Meno sarà questa, e più dovrà essere la severità
e la prontezza della pena materiale, che n' è la Sanzione. Il che,
come altrove dicemmo, si fa per due scopi: per quello di supplire, colla
impulsività dall' esterno della minaccia del castigo, al difetto della
impulsività dall* in- terno della Idealità sociale direttrice
dell'azione: e per quello di giovare a produrre questa impulsività nel!'
in- dividuo. Onde, più questa è già prodotta, e meno occorre di
coazione a supplirla. E al massimo assoluto della produzione della
detta impulsività corrisponderà V assenza del bisogno della coa-
zione materiale e la sufficienza per la Moralità del puro fatto psichico
della idea e della disposizione della Giu- stizia, e del giudizio mentale
dettatone di approvazione e disapprovazione dell' atto relativo.
Ciò nel rapporto dinamico tra chi detta la Legge e chi ne è
obbligato ad eseguirla. Ma e' è di più. La effettuazione della
Idealità della Giustizia, in ra- gione che più avviene, più paralizza il
suo contrario, onde deriva; cioè la Prepotenza. E quindi i
sentimenti nei quali questa si esprime: come è, tra gli altri,
quello della vendetta considerata quale sodisf azione egoistica.
E più invece ravviva i sentimenti antiegoistici, come quello della
benevolenza altrui. Ravviva cioè i sentimenti che, nella Morale dei
Positivisti (i), distinguemmo colla denominazione di pietosi, dopo avere
dimostrato che la Pietà è il carattere del sentire dell' uomo in
corrispon- denza della sua formazione caratteristica della Idealità
sociale. Per conseguenza, la stessa pena materiale, a misura
che una Società diventa civile, va perdendo del carattere di una vendetta
espiatoria ed appassionata, assumendo quello di un semplice rimedio; che
si applica a malin- cuore e con sentimento di compassione essendocene
il bisogno e per questo bisogno solamente. E in generale, questa
qualità della assenza del carat- (i) Libro I, Parte III, Capo III,
n. 7 (Pag. 150, 151 del Voi. Ili di queste Op, fil, nella ediz. del 1885,
e pag. 158, 159 nella ediz. del 1893 e del 1901, e pag. 163, 164 nella
ediz. del 1908) e altrove. tere appassionatamente vendicativo e di
pura espiazione si trova nella Società assai più nella reazione del
Potere, che rappresenta maggiormente V Idealità antiegoistica, di
quello che nella reazione della Convenienza, nella quale assai più rimane
dell' egoismo e della Prepotenza. E, negli atti stessi della
Convenienza, la vendetta appassionata, egoistica, prepotente, è più o
meno in ra- gione che è più o meno eflFettuata V idea della
Giustizia neir individuo reagente. Ossia, in una parola,
quantunque la Giustizia im- plichi la Responsabilità, e questa una
Sanzione o una vendetta punitrice, tuttavia, compiuta che sia come
for- mazione psichica individuale essa Giustizia, vi si dissi"
mula o vi si fa latente la vendetta relativa: a quello stesso modo che,
formata che siasi in una sostanza la sua affinità chimica per la
trasformazione in questa di un certo numero di calorie, il fenomeno
propriamente ter- mico vi si dissimula e non si manifesta più in una
tem- peratura misurabile col termometro. E torna cosi, anche nello
studio della Respon- sabilità e del carattere della Idealità sociale come
Giu- stizia, il principio più volte illustrato nella Morale dei
Positivisti per altre vie (i), del regno della Giustizia sot- tentrante
nella Società, di mano in mano che questa si perfeziona, al regno del
fato. E torna ad apparire del pari il carattere speciale deir
uomo formato sotto V influenza dell' ambiente o del- (i)
Libro II, Parte IV. Capo II, n. 16 (Pag. 399 del Voi. Ili di queste Op,
fil. nella ediz. del 1885, e pag. 422, 423 nella ediz. del 1893 e del
1901, e pag 432, 433, nella ediz. del 1908) e altrove.
PPipm>yi^"imtVi- k^i.J»^-» ■-pr^\»y-^r* t-^»t-«- ^vv --..
vt-w- l'organismo sociale: ossia dell' uomo virtuoso, o
sapiente, che dir si voglia. Per lui basta, ed è tutto, V
idea della Giustizia; e il giudizio che fa egli stesso di se medesimo in
virtù di essa: e al di fuori e al di sopra di ogni punizione mate-
riale. Come dice Dante di Virgilio: El mi parea da sé stesso rimorso,
O dignitosa coscienza e netta, Come t' è picciol fallo amaro morso!
E, relativamente al malvagio che lo oflFende, in ra- gione della
offesa, anziché il sentimento della vendetta, cresce in lui quello della
pietà. Come in quel divino cro- cefisso, al quale, negli spasimi di
dolore cagionatigli dalla più atroce delle ingiustizie col più atroce dei
supplizi, l'offesa immensa non riusci che a trargli dall'anima la
preghiera sublime: Padre, perdgna a questi miei crocifis- sori, perchè
non sanno quello che si facciano. Abbiamo parlato di quello che,
sulla fine del primo, avevamo chiamato il secondo degli uffici del
Potere. Resta dunque a parlare del primo di questi uffici,
che dicemmo essere di stabilirsi nella Società a spese delle sue parti; e
del terzo che dicemmo essere di di- spensare nell'effetto del
miglioramento delle parti quella forza comune dell' ambiente sociale che
opera per esso Potere. E lo faremo, cominciando la
illustrazione divisata in questo Capo e nel seguente, e compiendola nelF
ultimo. 2. — La Giustizia propriamente detta non è tutta la
moralità. Questa Giustizia, cóme vedemmo, riguarda la ifuo-
lumità delle parti sociali. E quindi è il solo lato nega- tivo della
Moralità. Ma la Moralità ha anche i suoi lati positivi: come
quelli indicati dalle parole Diritto e Autorità; e quello dei mezzi
onde si costituisce e vive il Potere, organo della Società; e quello del
Premio della virtù. Anche di questi lati positivi quindi (e sotto
il punto di vista prefissoci (i) della Responsabilità) si deve
chia- rire la formazione naturale. Con ciò potrà rimanere spie-
gato appieno il fatto naturale della Moralità, e la ragione della
Responsabilità potrà apparire sotto tutti i suoi aspetti reali.
§11. Criterio positivo del Diritto e del Dovere. Il Diritto
(come dimostrammo nel luogo più volte citato della Morale dei
Positivisti) è la stessa potenza libera che si avvera rielT essere
umano. Considerato questo essere isolatamente, il Diritto, come
dicemmo sopra, coincide colla Prepotenza; e di- venta il Diritto sociale
antiegoistico e giusto (o il Diritto propriamente detto) in quanto è
ridotto in limiti deter- minati dal contrasto della potenza opposta degli
altri uo- mini consociati. Vale a dire: la potenzialità
astratta dell' individuo, nella condizione eflFettiva del suo esercizio
(cioè di fronte alle reazioni delle potenzialità degli altri), diventa
una potenzialità reale determinatamente limitata dalla effi- cienza
contrastante delle potenzialità degli altri uomini. 12) Libro I, Parte II,
Capo IV. n. 15 ecc. (pag. 125 del Voi. nidi queste Op, ftl. nell' ediz.
del 1885, e 131 dell' edìz. del JS93 e del 1901, e pag. 135 nelle ediz.
del 1908). Voi. IV. 9 Tf^r»* Con che
però resta sempre il principio, che il Di- ritto di un uomo è ciò che
esso può fare. Resta sempre; per la ragione xche, posto V uomo
di fronte agli altri, e rimanendone elisa per tale relazione una
parte della potenzialità, la potenzialità sua effettiva non è tutta V
astratta, ma solamente quella che residua dalla elisione sofferta.
E, per togliere ogni dubbio su ciò, basta V osserva- zione del
fatto che, cambiandosi le condizioni e i rap- porti dinamici, onde
dipende la elisione di una parte della potenzialità di un individuo,
questa torna attiva, e con ciò torna Diritto. Il potere di staccare
un frutto ma- turo da un albero non è Diritto dove il contrasto del
possesso altrui impedisce di esercitarlo; ma tolto questo contrasto
(portandoci, mettiamo, in una regione nella quale le piante sono
proprietà comune) lo stesso potere di staccare il frutto torna Diritto,
per la sola ragione che non ha più T impedimento al suo esercizio del
possesso altrui. Il Diritto quindi, come dicemmo pure nello
stesso luogo della Morale dei Positivisti, se in astratto è identico per
ogni uomo, (essendo Tuomo in astratto identico all' uomo) nella realtà
per ogni uomo è diverso, per la ragione che la potenzialità di un uomo
differisce sempre nel caso pratico da quella di un altro: quella
del maschio, ad esempio, da quella della femmina; quella dell' adulto,
del sano, del civile, del colto, dell' educato, dell' uomo di genio, da
quella del bambino, del malato, del selvaggio, dell' ineducato, dell'
imbecille; e via dicendo. wyfmwii^i ' P Jl >»u-.ry
-"^.-^v- ■f^.-.-v-.-f-— l’uomo ha nella natura in forza del
suo arbitrio in quanto è deter- minato dalla Idealità lituana che è la
Idealità sociale. Qui colla spiegazione della formazione della Giustizia
(o dell' Idealità sociale) spieghiamo anche la formazione del Diritto, e
quindi ne indichiamo le condizioni dettagliatamente, che si possono riassumere
nel quadro che segue: A) Arbitrio umano libero. Non il potere generico della
cosa sulla cosa. Non quello della persona in condizione irresponsabile. B)
Arbitrio libero di un uomo (sulla cosa o sull* uomo) in con- fronto colla
reazione delVarbitrio libero dell* altro uomo. Non dove non si pone questa
reazione: e in quanto è regolata dalP Idealità so- ciale. E in ordine a ciò: Arbitrio
libero di un uomo in confronto con una reazione pos- sibile. E qui Diritto
potenziale o naturale. Arbitrio libero di un uomo in confronto con una
reazione reale. E qui Diritto di fatto o positivo^ nelle diverse forme di
questo. il Diritto può essere nello stesso tempo un Dovere, e non
che deòòa. E perchè questa differenza fra Diritto e Diritto?
Rispondendo, apparirà insieme come e quanto con- vengano fra loro
le definizioni apparentemente diverse da noi date del Diritto nella
Morale dei Positivisti (nel luogo sopra citato), dove dicemmo che è in se
stesso la Giustizia, o la Legge o la Idealità sociale, e qui, dove
diciamo che è un potere libero implicante una Respon- sabilità verso una
Sanzione che ne salva V esercizio. Nel caso di chi mangia la propria mela,
M impulsi- vità traente all' azione è data, non dalla Idealità
sociale « antiegoistica, ma dall' istinto egoistico, o da quella
che dicemmo la Prepotenza, precedente T Idealità morale propriamente
detta. Trattandosi di questa Prepotenza, la Re- sponsabilità r accompagna
solo in quanto la limita, e non in quanto la produca. E quindi la stessa
Responsabilità ha con essa un rapporto unico. E. per ciò non può aver che
il nome di Diritto, ossia si può pensare soltanto che r esercizio ne è
reso incolume dalla Responsabilità che lo salva. In vece, nel caso
del padre che educa il figlio, T im- pulsività traente all' azione è data
dalla Idealità sociale antiegoistica, ossia da qualche cosa che è già una
Giu- stizia, implicante quindi T elemento della Responsabilità. Da
ciò proviene che il potere del padre di educare il figlio sia fra due
rapporti: fra quello di eserizio incolume, in quanto è salvaguardato da
una Sanzione sociale relativa, onde è Diritto; e quello che il padre è alla
sua volta obbligato, pure per una Sanzione sociale relativa. ad
avere in sé la Idealità della sua disposizione o del suo potere di
educare il figlio, onde è Dovere. In una parola, il potere
egoistico, non derivando estrinsecamente dall' ordinamento sociale, ma
dalla stessa spontaneità dell' individuo, non può importare se non
la Responsabilità di chi volesse impedirlo. E quindi è solo un
Diritto. Mentre invece il potere antiegoistico, deri- vando come tale
dall' ordinamento sociale, che lo ingenera per mezzo della relativa Sanzione,
impòrta due Re- sponsabilità. Una per chi non lo rispettasse: onde
gli corrisponde il Dovere in un altro. Ed una seconda per chi non
lo avesse e non lo esercitasse: onde, sotto questo rispetto, è un Dovere
esso stesso. Dunque il Diritto è sempre una potenzialità che importa
una Responsabilità, secondo la definizione che qui ne abbiamo dato. Ma
questa potenzialità può es- sere determinata da una Legge, o Giustizia, o
Idealità sociale, secondo che importava la definizione data nella
Morale dei Positivisti, In questo secondo caso, come ivi dicemmo, il
Diritto è nello stesso tempo un Dovere. Non cosi quando la po-
tenzialità è di un ordine estramorale. 8. — E cosi siamo arrivati, per
mezzo della analisi positiva del fatto umano e sociale, a scoprire //
criterio positivo del Diritto e del Dovere. Con questo criterio (e
non altrimenti) si possono ri- solvere i problemi che li riguardano; e
specialmente i quattro fondamentali che seguono: circa i Diritti
dell' uomo sopra le altre cose della natura. Circa i Diritti dell' uomo
sopra se stesso. Circa i Diritti di Autorità. Circa il Diritto, non
di Giustizia, ma di Carità o Beneficenza, che dir si voglia. Nell'esempio
innanzi citato di uno che pigli dei pesci notammo, che il Diritto di chi
lo fa è solo per quanto il fatto riguardi altri uomini, e non per
quanto riguarda i pesci. Coi pesci, che prende, l'uomo ha il
semplice rapporto generale della cosa colla cosa, quale è quello,
pogniamo, della foglia verde oscillante al sole e rubante all'atmo-
sfera la molecola di acido carbonico che vi nuota dentro e si imbatte
alla portata delle boccuccie predatrici. In confronto col pesce 1' uomo
non ha né Diritto né Dovere. Esso, in forza del potere onde é fornito, ne
usa e ne abusa senza offesa della Moralità, che é estranea a tale
ordine di azioni. E nessuno dice reo di colpa e im- morale, né il
pescatore di professione che trae dall'acqua il pesce e ne contempla
impassibile gli spasimi dell'asfis- sia, onde muore dibattendosi
convulsivamente sulla secca arena, e lo piglia cosi per procacciarsi da
vivere; né il pescatore dilettante, che gli infligge quel martirio
per semplice spasso. Ma nella Civiltà progredita si può arrivare
fino al punto di estendere il carattere del Dovere anche alla detta
azione dell' uomo in rapporto col pesce. La Zoofilia - 138 - (che è
una tendenza della Civiltà progredita) cosi parle- rebbe in proposito air
uomo; — Il pesce, prendilo pure: x:hè ti abbisogna per vivere. Ma nel
farlo non eccedere i limiti della stretta necessità. Prendilo per quanto
ti oc- corre, o per mangiarlo, o perchè ti è di danno o di pe-
ricolo il viver suo. Altrimenti rispetta in lui il godi- mento della
propria vita. E, dovendo prenderlo, fa ia modo che avvenga col minore suo
dolore possibile. E tutto ciò consideralo siccome un tuo Dovere verso il
pesce. E, un Dovere analogo, i moralisti più delicati oggi lo
stabilirebbero, non solo pei pesci, ma anche per tutti gli altri animali;
e non solo per gli animali, ma anche per le piante; e non solo per le
piante, ma anche per le cose inanimate senza distinzione. Stabilirebbero
cioè quel- la ordine quarto di Doveri, che chiamano dei Doveri del-
l' uomo verso le cose della najtura: essendo V ordine primo, secondo
loro, quello dei doveri verso dio; il secondo, quello dei Doveri, verso
se stesso; il terzo, quello dei Doveri verso il prossimo. E come
ciò? E giusta tale estensione dell'idea del dovere? E, se giusta, non si
avrebbe con ciò una smentita alla nostra dottrina della formazione
naturale deir idea del dovere? Dicemmo che la effettuazione della
Idealità della Giustizia, in ragione che più avviene, più para-
lizza il suo contrario,., e più invece ravviva i sentimenti
antiegoistici, che distinguemmo col nome di pietosi, caratteristici del sentire
dell' uomo in corrispondenza colla sua formazione della Idealità
sociale. In ordine a ciò, parlando in ispecie della Idealità sociale
della famiglia, nella Morale dei Positivisti (i) scri- vemmo quanto
segne: — Questa Idealità diversifica se- condo le varietà umane. Rozza
fra le rozze, gentile fra le gentili; portante a illimitato uso di potere
nelle So- cietà embrionali, ristretta alla mera necessità dell*
alleva- mento, dell' educazione, e dei riguardi necessari, nelle
So- cietà più perfette; e cosi via per altre diversità e grada-
zioni senza numero. Sicché si può dire, che, se dal bruto air uomo r
idealità in discorso si umanizza, questa uma- nizzazione è neir uomo
stesso maggiore o minore. E, dove è minore, vediamo T effetto, e nella
forma ancor fiera del sentimento relativo, e nella sua limitazione,
restringen- dosi, o alla nazione, o allo stato, o ^alla tribù, o ad
un semplice branco di uomini. Mentre, dove è maggiore, ve- diamo
Teffetto, e nella gentilezza del sentimento, e nella sua estensione, che
abbraccia tutti quanti gli uomini, per quanto diversi e immeritevoli: e
travalica anche il con-- fine dell'umanità, e si presta a che l'uomo sia
pietoso anche cogli animali inferiori, e perfino cogli esseri
inanimati, La pietà cosi estesa, o in genere Tappi icazione del
potere proprio verso le cose 7iei limiti del necessario e del
ragionevole, è una moralità indiretta, e non una mralità diretta. Che
questa è solo quella che dipende immediatamente dalla reazione tra uomo e
uomo; e che quindi ha per correlativo una Sanzione sociale e conseguentemente
ne implica la Respc^nsabilità. (i) Libro I, Parte III, Capo III, 11. 6
(|)a^. 149, 150 del voi. lU di queste Op. fiL nella ediz. del 1885, e
pag'. 156, 157 nel!' ediz. del 1893 e del 1901, e pag. 161, 162 nella
ediz. del 1908). Onde storicamente (nella successione dei periodi
della evoluzione della Moralità umana), e statisticamente (nei gradi
di evoluzione della Moralità propria dei diversi ordini costitutivi di
una stessa Società) da prima si ha solamente la Moralità diretta, o che
riguarda V uomo e non le cose. Le genti più rozze oggi e, fra le
genti più colte, le persone che lo sono meno, né sentono né
sospettano neanco che la Moralità possa riferirsi anche agli atti relativi
ai bruti e alle cose inanimate. Il decalogo mosaico, sintesi dei precetti
morali di uno stadio evolutivo antico e non ancora perfetto della
Moralità, non ne fa cenno nemmeno esso. Ma, sviluppatasi più fortemente
col progredire della civiltà nel sentimento pio la espressione della
Idealità antiegoistica, questa dovette risentirsi e muovere
ogniqual- volta nella rappresentatività umana si fossero avute anche
solo delle analogie coi fatti umani eccitatori dello stesso sentimento
pio. E ciò per la legge generale della attività psichica, la quale
importa che la rappresentazione somigliante (os- sia il ritmo analogo
dell' attività centripeta) determini affetti e volizioni somiglianti
(ossia ritmi analoghi dell’attività riflessa). Mansuefatto l’uomo per
l’effetto dell' ambiente sociale, e reso più umano, e cresciuta in lui la
potenza pietosa, questa dovette scuotersi al palpito, non solo delle viscere
del fratello immolato dalla ferocia dell' assassino, ma (per somiglianza
della cosa) anche di quelle dell’agnello semivivo sul lastrico del pubblico
macello. Do- ||Wli|ILP!iWWiJi,iS"iWii vette scuotersi perfino
alla dilaniazione dei ramoscelli vivi di una pianta, onde il pensiero è
tratto per analogia a rappresentarsela con un senso di dolore. Come
quando Goethe canta di una pianticella di rosa. Der wilde Knabe brach*
s Rdslein auf der Heiden; Ròslein wehrte sich und sùach, Hai/
ihm dock kein Weh und Ach ! Mussi* es eben leiden, E siccome il
senso della pietà è, come dicemmo, il sentimento riassuntivo dell’idealità
antiegoistica, ossia doverosa, cosi il concetto vago del dovere, colla
sua imperatività astratta e quindi misteriosamente indefinita, dovette associarsi
anche alla Pietà sentita in causa dell’analogia per T agnello e per la rosa; e
conseguente- mente si dovette indirettamente o per riflesso, la
ragione del Dovere, estenderla anche al rispetto di un animale e di
una pianta. Ed è ciò che confusamente presentirono quei vecchi
sensisti che posero la facoltà immaginaria del senso della Moralità, o
queir altra misteriosa della *simpatia* o compassione. Ma la cosa può
andare anche più oltre. Il sentimento pio medesimo, rimanendo offeso in
chi è testimonio della azione spietata, compiuta da una per- sona o
sopra un bruto o sopra un' altra cosa, e perciò in lui risentendosi, può
far sì che egli si esprima ripro- vando r azione offendente. Tale
espressione riprovatrice sarebbe una vera San- zione vendicatrice della
resizione di Convenienza, e che — 142 — potrebbe essere assunta dal
Potere, quando esso (come è possibile, anzi probabile, an2i in gran parte
si è già fatto (i) progredendo la Civiltà) convertisse in Legge
pubblica il giudizio privato divenuto comune. Come è notissimo, in tutti si può
dire i paesi civili si sono formate delle società per la difesa degli
animali, e si sono fatte delle confederazioni di esse anche
internazionali, e si tengono di tratto in tratto dei congressi dei loro
rappresentanti. E si sono anche fatte delle leggi proibitive degli
eccessi contro le povere bestie. E credo opportuno riportare (jui
tradotto un tratto a proposito del Konversations Lexikon del Brockhaus
(Lipsia, 1895 voi. 15, pag. 844) — La legislazione più antica contro
quelli che maltrattano gli animali ci è presentata dall' Inghilterra dove
essi erano puniti fino dal secolo passato. Seguì una serie di leggi per
la protezione degli animali domestici, per la proibizione delle giostre
delle fiere, per la limitazione delle vivisezioni. Relativamente presto
anche la Germania dettò leggi nello stesso senso; oltre le misure di
polizia, il codice penale sassone del 30 marzo 1838 indisse la
prescrizione generale per la quale si deferivano alle autorità di polizia
le punizioni per gli eccessi dell' uso anche legittimo degli animali.
Seguirono tosto la Prussia, il Wtirtemberg, ecc. con prescrizioni in
parte più estese. Al presente vige un paragrafo del codice penale dell'
Impero, col quale è punito con una multa che va fino ai 150 marchi, o
col carcere, chi pubblicamente o in modo da fare scandalo con malvagità
d' animo tormenta o tratta male gli animali. Oltre ciò sono in vigore nei
diversi stati delle ordinanze speciali delle autorità amministrative
proibitive di particolari maltrattamenti degli animali e in favore di un
contegno ad essi favorevole, e in specialità con prescrizioni circa il
trasporto degli animali, i cani da tiro, la macejleria, il sopraccarico
dei carri ecc. Nell'Austria, oltre certe ordinanze speciali delle
autorità, ha valore di legge 1* ordinanza ministeriale del 15 febbraio
1855, che dichiara punibile il maltrattamento degli animali che desti
pubblico scandalo; in Francia la cosidetta legge Grammont del 2 luglio
1850 per la protezione degli animali domestici, ecc. I rappresentanti
delle società per la difesa degli animali tendono a che la punibilità
si estenda maggiormente e non si limiti a restrizioni fissate, come
per esempio la pubblicità def maltrattamento. Di tale tendenza pare
ab- biano tenuto conto la Svizzera, 1' Italia (art. 491 del Codice penale
del 1889), il Belgio (Codice penale del 1867), l'America del Nord, ecc.
■^i^i Nel qual caso poi si avrebbe una doverosità diretta formatasi
da una indiretta. E con una Sanzione e una Responsabilità, non misteriosa
e indefinita e vaga, ma determinata. E lo stesso avviene poi per
molte altre dell’idealità morali. E anche per un altro verso V esercizio
del po- tere di un uomo sulle cose può finire coir essere gover-
nato da una doverosità. Come dove uno, che possiede un podere e potrebbe
farne lo strazio che volesse, è tratte- nuto dair idea di non lasciare i
figli senza pane. Nel quale ordine di idee cade il fatto della
legislazione sulla interdizione dei prodighi. E per altri versi
ancora; e per moltissimi. Ogniqual- volta cioè r esercizio del potere, di
un uomo sulle cose offende, o affetta in qualsiasi maniera, il senso e
l’appreziazione dell’altro e ne provoca una reazione, incontrandone quindi una
sanzione e la responsabilità. E in tale ordine di casi è da notarsi che
certi atti fisiologici necessari ed inevitabili, ma incomodi o al
senso esterno o al sentimento estetico, importano una dovero- sità
solo in quanto sono compiuti da un uomo alla pre- senza di altri e non in
quanto sono fatti in disparte e in segreto. Fatta però V abitudine
di considerare gli atti mede- simi fatti alla presenza degli altri come
illeciti, V idea della loro sconvenienza si associa poi ad essi • tanto
o quanto. anche compiendoli nascostamente. E quindi l'uomo, a
misura che diventa civile e moralmente più perfetto, si studia o di
evitarli più che è possibile o, non poten-. I !ij.i«pj dolo
assolutamente, di eseguirli nel modo meno inde- coroso. Ciò
conferma anche la dottrina positiva già da noi accennata (i) della
formazione naturale dei Doveri del- l' uomo verso se stesso. E
spiega in pari tempo il fatto curioso delle an- tiche Moralità religiose,
che consideravano alcuni fatti fisiologicamente necessari dell'uomo,
anche compiuti in- segreto, impuri e tali da inquinarlo, e richiedenti
quindi i riti della purificazione, 7. — Secondo le idee religiose T
arbitrio sulle cose sarebbe una concessione di dio, creatore e quindi
proprie- tario di esse: e in forza di questa concessione l'arbitrio medesimo
sarebbe intero ed assoluto ed esente dalla restrizione doverosa sopra chiarita
di un trattamento umano e di un uso razionale, mancando il precetto
divino rela- tivo, che solo, secondo le idee stesse, può stabilire la
ra- gione del Dovere. E da ciò si vede che il positivismo, anziché
distrug- gere la Moralità, è atto invece ad allargarla più che non
lo faccia la religione. La quale anzi, nella sua gelosia pel monopolio
arrogatosi della morale, si irrita e si im- penna per questo eccesso
(come essa lo chiama) di Mora- lità positiva della Società moderna più
colta, che vuol essere buona anche colle bestie e coi fiori. La
religione si sente in ciò moralmente soverchiata, e se ne vendica
chiamando questa bontà, che essa non sente e non può insegnare, cosa
diabolica e perversa. (i) Vedi sopra Capo II, J VI, n. 14, e la nota (2)
relativa. Si teme che, perduta la religiosità, V uomo tor- nerà alla
ferocia brutale della prepotenza egoistica; e non si vede che invece il
positivismo è ancora più umano e morale che non la religione. Cosi
si lamenta che la Civiltà vada distruggendo la ingenuità santa dei tempi
antichi; e non si vede che' i santi ingenui dei vecchi tempi, perfino le
matrone pa- trizie e venerabili, erano, verso le stesse persone
umane degli schiavi, più fieri e crudeli che il rozzo mulattiere
colla sua bestia ricalcitrante, e il ragazzo ineducato col- r insetto che
strazia senza pietà. L' uomo del positivismo non si umilia
irragionevol- mente col credere che V uso delle cose, sulle quali
sente di avere un potere, sia una concessione gratuita e capric-
ciosa che gli sia stata consentita dal talento o dalla mi- sericordia di
qualcheduno. Ed è orgoglioso di ritenere cosa sua ciò che egli è in
gprado di appropriarsi: anche i mari, le montagfne, il vapore, V
elettricità, che non sono enumerati nel rogito di consegna del paradiso
terrestre. Ma ciò non impedisce che egli agisca verso le cose con
meno insolenza dell' uomo religioso e con maggiore mitezza. Il proposito
del positivista non è quello avaramente egoistico del moralista della
religione, che dice a se stesso: — Queste cose dio me le ha date in proprietà:
dunque perchè non ne caverò per me tutto il pro- fitto possibile? Il suo
proposito è quello retto, onesto, morale della razionalità, di servirsi
cioè delle cose pel bene in genere, proprio od altrui; fosse pur anco
solo il bene delle cose che non sono lo stesso uomo. Voi. IV.
IO '■■■^ ^ Pel moralista della religione le cose sono una pro-
prietà, onde dio, che le ha create e può quindi disporre a suo talento,
lo ha investito, col controsenso che abbia ancora a sudare per
raccogliere i frutti del campo, e lot- tare contro la rabbia, molte volte
fatale, delle bestie fe- roci. Il moralista del positivismo invece, fiero
di se stesso, audace, generoso come Giapeto, non riconosce
donatori. Egli si sente- padrone della natura come frutto della
siia conquista faticosa; e, come un duellante cavalleresco, al- l'
elemento immite della natura dice: Eccoci alla prova; se varrai più di me
soccomberò io; sarai tu a soccom- bere, se sarò io il vincitore. Ma
si dice dal moralista religioso, che un Do- vere originato nel modo da
noi detto sopra non è pro- priamente un Dovere: e che, se V ha fatto V
uomo, esso può anche disfarlo. Secondo il moralista religioso il
Dovere propriamente detto è quello che non è abbandonato alla balia del
ta- lento mutabile e capriccioso dell'uomo: onde è neces- sario che
sia un comando di dio, al quale non è possi- bile sottrarsi. E in
tale credenza è secondato dalla falsa idea, pur generale ancora fra gli
stessi positivisti, che le buone azioni in genere, e in ispecie la pietà
verso i bruti e la ragionevolezza neir uso delle cose, siano naturalità
irre- sponsabili, al pari, mettiamo, degli effetti delle cause fi-
siche sui corpi: disconoscendosi cosi, per ispiegare i fatti in discorso,
la loro natura morale, che è pure una realtà attestata
sperimentalmente. Il positivismo (malgrado i positivisti che sbagliano) vita
futura, conchiudono generalmente che l'uomo da nulla è obbligato ad avere
rispetto alla propria vita, poiché, suicidatosi, rimane senza efficacia
qualunque minaccia che la Società ponesse a trattenerlo. E che quindi sia V
uomo anche moralmente padrone assoluto della propria vita, e possa disporne
come gli talenta. Queste sono due soluzioni opposte ed estreme. False
ambedue, perchè dedotte da una idea del Dovere scien- tificamente non
vera. Una doverosità diretta, relativamente al suici- dio, certo
che non si può trovarla, poiché, né ha nes- suna presa sul suicida una
minaccia di punizione per parte della Società sulla di lui persona, che
se ne sot- trae col suicidio stesso, né é ammissibile l' idea della
Legge divina e della immortalità dell' anima. E, assolutamente parlando,
quanto alla conservazione della propria esistenza, V uomo potrebbe considerarsi
nella condizione estramorale indicata sopra parlando degli atti deir uomo
sopra le cose della natura. E quindi, come non si ascrive a merito il
tendere, nelle condizioni nor- mali dell'animo, a conservarsi in vita, e
neanche a tirare il respiro (quantunque a ciò si possa concorrere
anche colla volontà), cosi il suicidio potrebbe essere riguardato
semplicemente quale effetto naturale di condizioni anor- mali dell' animo
di un uomo, come il tossire delle con- dizioni anormali degli organi
della respirazione. Ma, se non una doverosità diretta, si può bene
avere, circa il suicidio e la conservazione della propria vita, una
doverosità indiretta; per la ragione che molte e diverse Idealità morali
doverose, connesse col fatto della conservazione della vita, possono
essere presenti imperativamente (ossia con una impulsività morale o
do- verosa) nella coscienza disposta al suicidio; e rivestirne la
deliberazione del carattere della reità morale. Mettiamo un padre
disposto a suicidarsi, che pensi di creare, facendolo, la infelicità
materiale e morale der figli superstiti. O uno che pensi danneggiare
suicidan- dosi dei creditori onesti, che si sono fidati di lui e lo
hanno beneficato prestandogli del denaro, che avrebbe potuto pagare
almeno in parte continuando a vivere. E cosi via per moltissimi altri
casi consimili (i). (i) Molto istruttivo per questo è il noto
dramma di Paolo Ferrari, intitolato // Suicidio^ nel quale, come le
tirate spiritualistiche sono freddure senza fondamento scientifico, senza
sugo e ridicole, che è strano che egli creda che si possano prendere sul
serio, cosi invece è pieno di verità e di effetto il quadro delle
conseguenze nella fa- miglia superstite del suicida. Onde poi si
deduce che anche nei casi nei quali la doverosità affetta, per impedirla,
la deliberazione del sui- cidio, questa doverosità non è sempre la
stessa, ma varia secondo il numero, la importanza e la qualità delle
ra- gioni morali intervenienti. Cosi, se un corpo insipido per sé
acquista un sapore da sostanze che glielo danno, que- sto suo sapore
varia secondo la diversità delle sostanze dalle quali Io riceve. Tanto
è vero poi che la doverosità non è in- trinseca al suicidio per se
stesso, e gli è. conferita, quando si dà che Io accompagni, da ragioni
morali intervenienti diverse secondo i casi, che si può pensare Inter
venirvene anche di opposte; e tanto da produrre perfino la dove-
rosità contraria, ossia quella puranco di commetterlo. E invero tutti
quanti i ragionamenti ingegnosissimi architettati da certi moralisti non
poterono mai togliere r aureola di eroismo virtuoso onde risplende la
memoria di Lucrezia romana e di Catone uticense. Dicemmo, che la
doverosità può associarsi al fatto del suicidio, e contrastarlo quindi
nella coscienza morale in quanto si dà accidentalmente la
circostanza che, commettendosi da un uomo, restino inadempiuti dei
Doveri che gli incombono e sono da lui apprezzati. E per ciò affermammo
che la doverosità stessa viene così a riguardare il suicidio, non per sé,
ma indiretta- mente. Se non che è pur vero che anche una
doverosità diretta, atta a contrastare da sé la deliberazione di
com- metterlo, si accompagni al suicidio. E per ciò per una
Sanzione che minacci, non la persona viva (che non può I- "II* PF.I
'darsi come dicemmo), ma la sua fama dopo la morte. La paura di nuocere
alla propria fama col suicidio può trat- tenere tanto o quanto un uomo
dal commetterlo, e in tal caso esisterebbe per quest' uomo una doverosità
diretta impeditiva del suicidio. E sono due gli ordini dei motivi che
possono deter- minare questa Sanzione per la quale la Società può
ven- dicarsi del suicidio sopra la memoria del suicidato. Il primo
è quello delle doverosità indirette accen- nate sopra. E per esse viene ad
avverarsi così ciò che si disse al numero 5 del paragrafo precedente della
dove- rosità indiretta occasione della diretta. Il secondo è quello della
opinione sfavorevole che domini in una Società o in una classe di persone
ri- guardo all'atto der suicidio, fondata sopra la idea che sia una
irreligiosità abbominevole o una rivelazione di debolezza d' animo o di
alterazione delle facoltà mentali. La doverosità diretta dipendente da
una San- zione sociale, determinata da questo secondo ordine di
motivi, è una doverosità accidentale e temporanea, e non normale e
durevole, come si richiede pel Dovere assolu- tamente tale. E
in vero T opinione relativa al suicidio, non sem- pre, non dapertutto, si
trova ad esso sfavorevole. Quante volte, e presso quanti invece il
suicidio è solo ragione di compassione, come per una disgrazia non
colpevole, o è anche una ragione di lode! La disapprovazione
motivata dalle idee religiose vien meno con queste. Si danno circostanze
nelle quali il sui- cidio si riveste del carattere di atto eroicamente lodevole,
come nei citati di Lucrezia romana e di Catone uticense. Si danno
condizioni e periodi dello stato di una Società, che fanno considerare il
suicidio siccome una fatalità ir- responsabile. Che più? Se uno è
colto a commettere una azione criminosa, la gente si avventa sdegnata
contro il delin- quente e si presta in aiuto della pubblica autorità
ven- dicatrice. Si corre invece a salvare dalla morte chi è in
procinto di darsela, e con senso, non di sdegno, ma di pietà, Tutto
giorno si moralizza sul suicidio a fine di impedirlo, ritenendosi di
danno alla Società in gene- rale e a certe sue istituzioni in
particolare. Ma si mora- lizza inutilmente. Le ragioni che si fanno
campeggiare sono inefficaci per mancanza di solidità intrinseca. Il
fatto si ripete ugualmente, come la febbre curata coli* acqua
fresca. E il male, riguardo alla Società, non è tanto nella perdita dei
suicidi, che in generale non costituiscono la sua parte più attiva e
sana, ma nelle condizioni stesse della Società, che, se sono favorevoli
al suicidio, con ciò dimostrano di essere non buone e da
migliorarsi. Per le cose dette certo si scandolezzeranno molti. E
crederanno di avervi trovato un capo d' accusa ineccepibile contro T
etica del positivismo, per sostenere che essa è esiziale alla Moralità
dell' individuo e del corpo sociale. Ma noi rideremo dello scandalo;
ingenuo, se chi lo prova è un pusillo; e ipocrisia, se chi lo pre-
testa è un accorto. E diremo: Acquietatevi, che né la Moralità
individuale, né la Società avranno danno nes- suno. Anzi ne avranno
vantaggio. L' esperienza dimostra che anche tra i credenti in una
fede, che riprova assolutamente il suicìdio, si danno di quelli che lo
commettono. Sicché non si può soste- nere che la religiosità valga ad
impedirli. Quanto alla minaccia dell' eterno castigo il credente suicida,
o la af- fronta disperatamente, o trova modo di persuadersi di po-
terlo evitare. Tanto che si sa di suicidi cattolici che si confessano
prima di darsi la morte. E nei credenti, se si ha il ritegno della paura
della pena avvenire, non si ha poi queir altro, del non credente,
dell'orrore di metter fine per sempre alla esistenza, che per questo non
si pro- lunga oltre la vita attuale. E se si disse, che i credenti
un tempo si trattenevano molte volte dal suicidarsi per r idea di essere
sepolti fuori del cimitero consacrato, non è men vero che ora possa
altrettanto l'idea del biasimo che può restare alla loro memoria.
Abbastanza ha provveduto la natura coli' istinto strapotente della
vita alla conservazione dell' umanità, malgrado i mali gravissimi che ne
accompagnano la esi- stenza. La disperazione che porta al
suicidio non si mani- festa con frequenza allarmante se non in certe
condizioni morbose sociali; e ne è il sintomo. Si manifesta per ef-
fetto delle condizioni medesime, regnino o non regnino le religiose
credenze. Ed avviene pel morbo, onde il sui- cidio è il sintomo, come per
tutti gli altri morbi; che, se non producono la morte, le loro crisi
stesse ajutano la guarigione, sia segnalandoli alla cura da
applicarsi, sia promovendo una reazione salutare. Quando in
una Società si verificano frequenti suicidi HW"*^
» è certo ch^ la pubblica opinione si scuote dalla sua indifferenza
per le cause dalle quali essi dipendono. E finisce per rendere giustizia
alla protesta contro di lei di quelli, ai quali fu fatale lo sdegno
contro la sua durezza. E i singoli individui sono avvertiti e
ammaestrati circa i pericoli fatali di certe posizioni e circa gli
effetti funesti di certi indirizzi della vita, perchè li evitino e
si ravvedano intanto che il male può essere ancora scon-
giurato. Il Diritto suppone l'Autorità; ossia è Diritto solo in quanto
è autorizzato ad esserlo. Ma la stessa Au- torità è tale solo in quanto è
un Diritto. E lo stesso Di- ritto, qualunque esso sia, è in se stesso una
Autorità. Questi asserti sono altrettanti principj
fondamentali positivamente veri; quantunque la loro enunciazione
ab- bia r apparenza di un circolo vizioso. Come dicemmo sopra
tante volte (i), il Diritto per essere veramente tale (e non
semplicemente la potenza di fare, comune ad ogni cosa che agisce), deve
corrispon- dere ad una Sanzione che ne assicuri V esercizio, con-
forme air Idealità sociale o giusta: e importare quindi una
Responsabilità morale. Ora la potenza che stabilisce questa Sanzione, e
verso la quale esiste questa Respon- (E si veda per tutte la nota
al n. 5 del § II di questo Capo III ) sabilità, è ciò che si chiama una
Autorità. Onde è chiaro essere il Diritto un correlativo della Autorità,
e quindi supporla necessariamente. Potrebbe sembrare a prima
giunta che questa dottrina fosse identica alla vecchia religiosa e politica
circa TAutorità e la dipendenza da essa del Diritto. Ma tra quella e la
nostra corre una differenza di opposizione perfetta. La
vecchia dottrina religiosa della Autorità insegna, che ogni Diritto dell*
uomo risulta da una concessione gra- tuita di dio: che il Diritto,
assolutamente parlando, non l'ha se non dio: che T uomo di suo ha solo il
Dovere: che quindi, quando si dice di un uomo che ha un Di- ritto
verso un altro, la cosa va intesa cosi, che dio ha imposto a questo il
Dovere di fare o rispettare o lasciar fare una cosa che lo stesso dio
vuole che sia pertinenza del primo. Politicamente poi la
stessa dottrina insegna che il capo dello Stato è investito divinamente
(e ciò significa la consacrazione e la incoronazione con rito religioso
per parte del sacerdozio) di un potere sopra tutti i cittadini; che
esso ne è il sovrano per volere diretto di dio (onde il titolo Per la
grazia di dio) e indipendentemente dal volere loro e da qualunque ragione
naturale di Giustizia o di bene comune (onde il precetto religioso:
Obedite praepositis vestris etiam discolis)\ e che quindi i citta-
dini, per lo stesso arbitrario volere divino, non sono altro che
sudditi. La scienza ha fatto ragione del principio religioso; r
evoluzione storica sociale del politico. IP^II^KIIV
idn,»»^ij5'tr«'isnfc#«^--xj' Il principio religioso è il solito fenomeno
psicolo- gico volgare, onde, concepito V astratto di un ordine na-
turale di fatti, il medesimo astratto è pensato come una realtà fuori
degli stessi fatti e come causa di essi. Gli esseri viventi, ad esempio,
danno V astratto dalla vt^a, che non è se non la forma caratteristica
speciale che li distingue dai non viventi. Pel fenomeno psicologico
sud- detto si fece di questa vita una realtà atta ad introdursi in
questi esseri che lo possiedono e a renderli vivi con ciò. Cosi fu fatto
per V Autorità. Per una illusione ana- loga; separata mentalmente dalla
funzionalità sociale, onde è un aspetto, fu collocata in dio, e di là si
è fatta valere a cagionare la funzionalità medesima. E qui,
come è ben noto, ci troviamo col solito abbaglio, del metodo metafisico, che
spiega la cosa e il fatto colla stessa cosa e collo stesso fatto. Come
nel de- rivare gli effetti fisiologici dell'Oppio dalla sua Virtù
dormitiva: per citare lo stesso esempio addotto da Pa- squale Villari nel
suo scritto intitolato e La Filosofa po- sitiva e il Metodo storico »
pubblicato fino dal gennaio 1806 nel Politecnico di Milano, e che io qui
ricordo per- chè egli fu il primo che ponesse la questione del
Posi- tivismo (nel senso che ha oggi) in Italia, e perchè una
grande influenza anch' esso ebbe sopra V indirizzo delle riflessioni che
finirono a produrre l'ordine attuale delle mie idee filosofiche. Parlando
poi della applicazione politica dello stesso principio religioso basterà
osservare come per essa il Potere è concepito, non come Giustizia,
ma come Prepotenza ed Usurpazione; onde si ha la Pre- potenza, ossia r
Ingiustizia, eretta alla dignità di principio inorale. Il che è bene scandaloso
in una dottrina che pretende di essere la salvaguardia unica
possibile della Moralità. E questa applicazione politica del
principio religioso si trova poi corrispondere precisamente ad uno stadio
arretrato della evoluzione. Il contrasto sociale (dal quale, come
dimostrammo, dipende la riduzione della Prepotenza e la sua
trasfor- mazione in Giustizia) si attestò da prima nell' impero
della religfiosità e della sua rappresentanza, cioè in quella del
sacerdozio. E allora si disse, il sovrano avere il po- tere da dio, ed
essere responsabile verso di lui dell'uso di esso; e il sacerdozio si
atteggiò a creatore e giudice del sovrano in nome di dio.
Poi, venuta meno per le ragioni storiche la forza ef- fettiva del
sacerdozio nella Società, e quindi il peso del suo contrasto, la
sovranità se ne emancipò, e il legitti- mismo di ortodosso divenne
eterodosso; cioè, riconoscendo ancora T esser suo dal cielo, autore e
giudice della so- vranità della terra, sottrasse però questa alla
elezione e al foro sacerdotale. Incontrastabile veramente è il
principio della filosofia etica tradizionale, che il Diritto suppone la
Autorità e che quindi questa si richiede pure per la Mo- ralità. Ma
si ragiona falsamente dicendo, che il Positivismo viene a distruggere la
Moralità, dal momento che toglie di mezzo l'Autorità; sicché per salvare
la Moralità si debba necessariamente tornare alla filosofia
tradizionale, che sola possa stabilire il principio della Autorità.
L'Autorità, il Positivismo, la pone anch' esso; e con certezza, poiché ne
trova il fatto nella Società e nella psiche deir uomo civile, e ne dà la
spiegazione partendo dalla osservazione di ciò che succede realmente. E
cosi la fissa scientificamente ne' suoi termini veri e giusti, e la
garantisce dal dubbio (fatale sempre in materia di mo- rale), e da ogni
falsa, e dannosa, e immorale interpreta- zione e applicazione.
L'Autorità, che la filosofia tradizionale fa venire dal cielo, è un sogno
antiscientifico ed involgente una con- traddizione. Come
avvertimmo un' altra volta (i), il comando di- vino imponente il Dovere
all' uomo è un principio im- morale della Moralità, mentre in fondo è la
tirannia, o l'ingiustizia, in grado infinito. E mostrarono d'essersene
accorti gli stessi metafisici quando concedettero, che il comando divino
abbia da essere non ripugnante alla es- senza stessa delle cose, per cui
riesca giusto, e dio che ne usa debba chiamarsi santo. La stessa
condizione po- sero anche per la sua Autorità; e cosi, ammettendo
una dipendenza di essa dalla essenza delle cose, fecero di questa
il primo e di dio il secondo, e quindi vennero a disautorarlo.
E r ammettere la condizione in discorso è poi infine un riconoscere
in modo indistinto la verità della nostra dottrina, per la quale
l'Autorità, non è un assoluto,. xm, un relativo. Cioè
l'Autorità è il relativo di qualche cosa che si impone moralmente; vale a
dire con una Responsabilità (i) Sopra Capo II, § II, n. ii.
..LUI «IVI verso una Sanzione, e quuidi verso una reausione
libera od umana: insomma verso la Sanzione sociale. Per cui
l'Autorità non può nascere se non nella Società degli uomini, e non può essere
se non una formazione naturale della sua attività organica. Ma questa
dottrina del positivismo circa l'Au- torità pare anch' essa
contradditoria alla sua volta. Un Potere, come si disse, è una
Autorità in quanto conviene con una Idealità sociale ed è giudicabile
se- condo questa; e quindi il suo esercizio è passibile di una
Responsabilità verso un Tribunale che dispone di una Sanzione per far
valere i principj secondo i quali sentenzia. Ora, siccome
tale è precisamente anche il Diritto, cosi l'Autorità viene ad essere
anch' essa un Diritto. Ma se l'Autorità è un Diritto, e il Diritto
lion è tale se non per l'Autorità subordinante che lo riconosca e
lo sancisca, come potrà darsi l'Autorità, non potendo essere che il
subordinante sia nello stesso tempo il subordinato? Per rispondere alla
difficoltà basta richiamare quanto fu detto sopra (i) della Giustizia
effettiva o giu- ridica, o del corpo sociale; e della potenziale, o dell'
in- dividuo. Ciò che sancisce l'Autorità suprema dello Stato
è in genere l' indistinto delle coscienze individuali, che ve-
demmo sopra come esista e come operi. E che, in modo via via più
distinto, si concreta nelle prerogative proprie della gerarchia sociale (I)
Capo I. i VII. E COSI è tolta la contradd^ione obbiettata.
Il Diritto del subordinato è sancito dalla Autorità stabilita nella
Società. Il Diritto di questa Autorità è sancito anch' esso da qualche
cosa. Ma non da un' altra Autorità superiore a quella della Società, che
non può darsi: sibbene dalla potenzialità morale del corpo sociale
collettivo (o delle coscienze individuali) che si forma ed esiste e
funziona ed è efficace in r^ione e a misura che vige l'ordinamento effettivo
della Società. E questo vero è attestato dal fatto storico co-
stante della Società umana, nella quale sempre si è ma- nifestato questo
processo; da una parte, della Autorità stabilita che sancisce il Diritto
del subordinato; e dal- l'altra, della coscienza comune dei subordinati
che san- cisce il Diritto della Autorità stabilita. Questo
fatto è evidentissimo nella costituzione delle Società moderne più
avanzate, nelle quali é già ricono- sciuta anche legalmente la dipendenza
del Governo, in tutte le sue parti, dal beneplacito dei cittadini. In
tutte le sue parti; mentre ormai la irresponsabilità, o si limita
alla sola persona del capo supremo, o è tolta affatto anche per
questa. All' infuori del potere tirannico della forza e della
violenza di certe Società informi, che non è ancora l'Au- torità giusta
propriamente detta, ma la Prepotenza in- giusta, nei governi teocratici
la potenzialità morale del corpo sociale collettivo si manifesta nella
istituzione e dipendenza del Potere dalla religione. E nei governi
as- soluti laici la potenzialità stessa si manifesta nella dipendenza del
Potere sovrano, che pure ivi ha luogo, da qualche cosa; come dalle
consuetudini, dalle caste, dagli ottimati e via discorrendo.
7. — Ed è poi confermato il vero medesimo dalla distinzione, che
sempre fu riconosciuta, fra il Diritto reale e il potenziale; ossia, che
è lo stesso, fra il Diritto positivo e il naturale. Poiché,
scientificamente parlando, che è mai il Diritto naturale, se non la potenzialità
morale propria degli individui componenti la So- cietà. Il nostro
ragionamento ci ha condotto: Primo, a scoprire la vera indole del Diritto
naturale. Secondo, a spiegare con ciò V origine e la natura
vera della Autorità sociale. A darci il criterio per istabilire i
rapporti del Diritto naturale col positivo, tanto storici quanto
ideali. 2. — Il Diritto positivo è, come già dicemmo più
volte, il Potere quale è costituito e funziona nella Società umana; il
Potere dei subordinanti e quello dei subordinati, in quanto è
riconosciuto fissato e garantito dal primo. (i) Vedi in
proposito: Morale dei Positivisti Libro I, Parte li. Capo IV. n. 15 e
segg. (pag. 125 e segg. del Voi. Ili di queste Op. fil, nella edizione
del 1885, e pag. 131 e segg. nella ediz. del 1893 e del 1901, e pag. 135
e segg. nella ediz. del 1908), e Parte HI, Capo I (pag. 129 e segg. del
medesimo nella ediz. del 1885, e pag. 135 e segg. nella ediz. del 1893 e
del 1901, e pag. 139 e seg. nella ediz. del 1908). — E questa Sociologia
Capo I J VII (principalmente n. 6) e J Vili (principalmente n. 3 e 4), e
Capo II.? 11, nota al n. 5. Il
Diritto naturale non è altro che il potenziale. Ossia quello che
corrisponde alle Idealità sociali, o giu- ste, o morali. £ alle Idealità
sociali universe: tanto a quelle che si sono già avverate nella psiche e
nella co- scienza umana, quanto a quelle che non vi si sono an-
cora avverate, ma vi si possono avverare quandochesia. Dalle quali
definizioni enaerge che il Diritto positivo è determinato e giu- stificato
dal naturale; che il Diritto naturale è imprescrivibile, ed ha un valore
trascenclente assoluto, corrispondendo al va-- lore trascendente assoluto
della natura onde è il prodotto: come una forza o una specie naturale
qualunque, che l'uomo trova nella realtà e deve subirvi e riconoscervi; che
il Diritto naturale è universale, come la natura umana, allo svolgimento
proprio della quale cor- risponde. Quarto, che il Diritto
naturale è infinito. Il Diritto
naturale è infinito, nel senso posi- tivo della parola, spiegato nella
Morale dei Positivisti (i). Infinito cioè nel senso, che è una
potenzialità inter- minabile nelle serie e nelle forme de' suoi
svolgimenti. Una potenzialità indistinta atta a determinarsi nei
fatti dei Diritti distinti che si verificano via via senza fine,
come i fatti in genere nella natura per la sua forza ine- sauribile. E
non mica un pensiero, o un sistema di pen- sieri, già determinato e
fissato in tutto il suo contenuto (Libro II, Parte III, Capo I (pag. 255
e segg. del Voi. Ili di queste Op. fil,, neir ediz. del 1885 e pag. 268
nell'ediz. del 1893 e del 1901, e pag. 275 nella ediz. del 1908). e
in una forma unica, nella mente di dio, come dà la filosofìa
tradizionale. La quale immiserisce meschinissimamente il
concetto del Diritto. Come immiserisce meschinissimamente il con-
cetto delle specie naturali delle piante e degli animali, riducendole ad
un numero chiuso di archetipi fissi pre- stabiliti in una mente
creatrice. Come realtà attuale, già distinta nella sua forma
di Diritto, questo è un fatto accidentale; è il risultato del caso
dell'incontro fortuito delle reazioni particolari che ne determinarono la
effettuazione reale, analogamente a ciò che avviene per ogtii fenomeno
naturale, e come nella Formazione naturale nel fatto del sistema solare
dimo- strai importare la legge universale della Formazione na-
turale. Ma esso Diritto poteva realizzarsi in un infinito numero di altri
modi; come era possibile un infinito altro numero di accidenti (i) nella
coincidenza produttrice della serie degli eventi e della serie delle
condizioni dell'uomo, in cui si avverò la coincidenza. E, del pari, resta
sempre infinito il numero dei momenti evolutivi ulteriori, per la
stessa ragione, e perchè V attività naturale resta sempre inesauribile, e
non si arresta al punto al quale è arrivata in un dato momento. Dalle
quali cose poi emerge che tra il Diritto positivo e il naturale vi deve
sempre essere lotta. Tanto è lungi che il positivo (come discenderebbe
dalle dot- trine dell' etica tradizionale) sia T acquietamento defini-
tivo del naturale; e che questo, eflFettuatolo, riposi in
(i) Vedi la Parte IV dello stesso libro. -
quello, e solo debba stare in guardia contro i principj contrari
(sia delle passioni ree dell' uomo, sia di potenze sovrannaturali perverse)
tendenti a disturbare V assetto etico definitivo del mondo.
Eterna è la lotta fra il «Diritto positivo e il Diritto naturale. E
non effetto della reità di nessuno, ma dello stesso Processo del
Bene. Il Diritto naturale lavora continuamente a trasfor- mare il
talento della Prepotenza egoistica, che rimane nella Autorità vigente, in
ijome della Idealità antiegoi- stica. E la trasformazione, incominciata
sopra il massimo della Prepotenza, e continuata pei gradi insensibili infi-
niti della sua diminuzione, non è mai compiuta total- mente.
Il Diritto positivo di un dato momento è sempre in arretrato verso
le Idealità sociali più progredite, già al- beggianti nelle coscienze
sociali. E la evoluzione di que- ste Idealità, che, nate, si ribellano
subito al Diritto po- sitivo discordante per riformarlo ad immagine di se
stesse, è una evoluzione che mai non cessa. L’Autorità del
subordinante e in pari tempo, un suo Diritto. Soggiungiamo ora che anche
il Diritto del subor- dinato è, esso pure, una Autorità nel vero senso
della parola. Il Diritto del subordinato è si riconosciuto
dalla Au- torità del subordinante, mai non è da questa creato. Esso
esiste per sé in virtù del fatto del suo comparire nella coscienza
individuale. Se questo fatto non si avesse, l'Au- torità del subordinante
non potrebbe fare che fosse il Diritto relativo. Dato che sia il fatto, la
stessa Autorità non può esimersi dall' ammettere il Diritto.
Il Diritto del subordinante quindi si impone per que- sto verso
all'Autorità del subordinante, e perciò è esso stesso una Autorità.
Oltreché poi ogni Diritto, anche di un subordinato, è sempre tanto o
quanto subordinante, cioè atto a determinare dei Doveri e dei Diritti
corre- lativi. E questa dottrina della autorevolezza
intrinseca del Diritto del subordinato (santo pel subordinante,
come l'Autorità di questo è santa pel subordinato), era sentita
nella coscienza etica degli antichi, malgrado il falso loro riferimento
della cosa, quando all' ordine iniquo del prin- cipe tendente a violare
il Diritto naturale del suddito, questo rispondeva: Se il principe
comanda ciò che dio proibisce, o proibisce ciò che dio comanda, l' ordine
e il divieto del principe non hanno valore per la coscienza. La
dottrina positiva dell'Autorità e del Diritto è liberale. Questa dottrina (che è quella del
liberalismo positivo) contrasta a due estremi opposti; esiziali 1'
uno e r altro alla Moralità vera. A quello del Nichilismo del
Diritto individuale della dottrina etico-religiosa dei me- tafisici; e a
quello del dichilismo deldiritto del Potere di un certo socialismo
materialistico. Il Diritto naturale e l'Autorità del Potere, che lo
riconosce, sono fatti naturali della Società, correlativi ruoo all'altro.
Onde» sopprimendo T uno di essi, sì sop- prime anche V altro. Il
Nichilismo materialistico dunque, annullando l'Autorità del Potere viene
ad annullare lo «tesso Diritto individuale, che vorrebbe rimanesse col carattere
di Diritto unico ed assoluto* Il Diritto individuale è un effetto
dell' organismo so- ciale; e tanto che» tolto questo organismo, né
potrebbe formarsi, né perdurare, esistendo di già; come la fun-
zione e il prodotto speciale di un viscere particolare non è segregabile
dall* organismo deir animale e dai centri nervosi superiori, onde è
determinata e regolata V atti- vità di ogni sua parte. Si form<\ il
viscere a misura che si formarono i centri regolatori; si mantiene finché
si mantengono i rapporti di dipendenza da essi. E analogo è il caso
del Diritto individuale nel suo rapporto coli' Au- torità centrale.
E dunque liberale la dottrina positiva che, mante* nendo TAutorità
subordinante, può mantenere anche il Diritto dell' individuo. E, per
conseguenza, illiberale è quella del Nichilismo materialistico, poiché,
distruggendo questa Autorità, finisce con ciò a distruggere anche que*
sto Diritto. Ma la stessa dottrina positiva combatte, nel medesimo
tempo, il principio illiberale del Nichilismo teistico, dal quale non è
riconosciuto nelT individuo un Dìntto propriamente detto, o proveniente
dal suo essere stesso; ed è insegtiato essere il Diritto una
concessione gratuita di dio, che egli possa dare e togliere a suo
pia- dmento, e lasciare anche alla balia degli usurpatori della
sovranità, nei quali si debba in ogni caso riconoscere una Autorità che
non emani dal corpo sociale e sia ir- responsabile verso di esso.
Il positivismo combatte questo principio, stabilendo l'Autorità
originariamente ed inalienaòilmente risiedente neir individuo di
esercitare il suo naturale imperio sopra le cose, sopra di sé, sopra gli
altri. E mostrando, come la dipendenza dell' individuo dal Potere
subordinante non è quella dello schiavo, che è costretto colla violenza
dal padrone, e ne eseguisce i comandi suo malgrado, e col- r ira
incitante alla vendetta; ma è quella liberale di chi fa con persuasione e
con amore. E ciò perchè, l'Autorità giusta subordinante, l'individuo la
pone esso stesso pel Bene di tutti; anche se importa un sacrificio per parte
propria: la pone, la coltiva, la difende come cosa, pro- pria, anzi come
suo proprio Diritto. Proponemmo quattro problemi fondamentali da
risolvere secondo il criterio positivo del Diritto e del Do- vere prima
indicato. Dei primi tre problemi abbiamo trattato nei
paragrafi successivi del Capo medesimo. Tratteremo in questo del
quarto, cioè circa il Diritto, non di Giustizia, ma di Carità Beneficenza, che
dir si voglia. Fin qui il nostro libro ha voluto soddisfare a due
dei tre suoi intendimenti; cioè di dimostrcure che la Moralità, come è
spiegata nella filosofia positiva, com- prende, non solo gli atti della
Gitistizia propriamente detta, ma anche: Primo. Gli atti
infiniti offensivi non contemplati e uon contemplabili dalla Legge. I quali
perciò, esclusi dal campo della Giustizia propriamente detta, vanno
at- tribuiti a queir altro della pura Convenienza. Gli atti sindacabili
soltanto dalla coscienza intima dell' individuo in cui si avverano, e
producenti la sola reazione del Rimorso intemo. Trattando ora del quarto
problema suddetto, vedremo di soddisfare al terzo degli intenti
propostici, vale a dire di mostrare, che la Moralità, come è spie-
gata nella filosofia positiva, comprende anche; Terzo. Gli atti
virtuosi, che V individuo potrebbe fare e sarebbe bene facesse, e non è
costretto a fare. Ossia quegli atti, che non si attribuiscono né alla
Giustizia né alla Convenienza, ma alla Carità, come dicevano i mo-
ralisti vecchi, o alla Filantropia o Beneficenza, come di- rebbero i
nuovi. Gli atti benefici nell* Etica tradizionale. E noto che nell' Etica tradizionale si stabiliscono
due ordini diversi di atti buoni: Quelli ai quali uno é tenuto per
poter essere senza colpa, che si dicono atti di Giustizia; e si
riassumono nel detto: Non fare agli altri ciò che non vuoi che sia
fatto a te. Che é quindi un vero Precetto, E quelli che uno può
tralasciare senza diventare con ciò colpevole, che si dicono atti di
Carità o di Beneficenza, e si riassumono nel detto: Fa agli altri ciò che
vorresti fosse fatto a te. Che è quindi propriamente, non un Precetto, ma
un Consiglio, Ed è noto che 1' osservanza dei primi si dice pro-
durre la semplice Onestà morale; e la semplice Esenzione dalla punizione. E che
la pratica dei secondi pro- duce anche una Perfezione morale; e quindi il
Merito di un premio. Ed è noto ancora che, tra i pronunciati
morali ap- partenenti alla categoria dei Consigli miranti alla mag-
giore Perfezione morale, se ne pongono anche di quelli relativi, non al
bene da farsi agli altri, ma alla nobilita- zione interna della Persona
morale. Il principio del Bene morale non prescritto, e quindi
n&n obbligatorio o gratuito (che è un principio ve- rissimo, anzi è
il principio morale per eccellenza), l'Etica tradizionale, e non potè mai
riuscire a dedurlo rigorosa- mente, ed è, nel sistema di essa,
contradditorio. E regge solo nella dottrina dell'Etica positiva. E
ciò malgrado sembri a tutta prima che questa,, posta la dipendenza da
essa stabilita del fatto morale dalla Sanzione costringente, conduca ad
una conseguenza affatto opposta; a quella cioè di togliere di mezzo
quello che ora chiamammo (ed è senza dubbio) il principio mo- rale
per eccellenza. L' Etica teologico-metafisica tradizionale si è
accorta dell' imbroglio che sta nella sua dottrina; e ha cercato di
cavarsene colla sua solita gherminella (rilevata stupendamente dal
Mefistofele del Faust di Goethe) di un vocabolo equivoco. Cioè col
vocabolo Consiglio contrap- posto a quello di Precetto. Il
Bene morale obbligatorio (ha detto V Etica teolo- gico-metafisica
tradizionale) è il Precetto di dio, che non si può non seguire: il Bene
morale gratuito invece è il suo Consiglio, che l'uomo può anche non
seguire. Ma ciò non è altro, come dicemmo, che una
gherminella. La mentalità divina del Bene morale, onde partono i
metafisici in discorso, derivandone tanto il Precetto quanto il
Consiglio, sta, secondo loro, colla ragione di- vina dell' Ordine morale.
Ora si può domandare: L' Ordine morale metafisico, ragione del Bene,
è esso esigenza assoluta dell' essere proprio delle cose che ri-
guarda? E allora è necessario che sia Precetto tutto il Bene. O sta
invece che l'Ordine morale sia il puro bene- placito di dio, il quale
possa stabilirlo arbitrariamente in un dato modo, e di due sorta, cioè
uno da esigersi inesorabilmente, e un altro da consigliarsi soltanto
e quindi da permettere che sia anche violato da chi voglia? E allora il
Bene morale, anche quello prescritto, non ha un valore assoluto; e si può
supporre che dio po- tesse non averlo voluto, come si suppone dagli
stessi me- tafisici, che egli potesse non aver voluto creare il
mondo. Si può supporre insomma, che il male sia male solo perchè dio r ha
decretato, e che egli avesse potuto decre- tare che non lo fosse. Il che
sarebbe la distruzione pili radicale immaginabile della Moralità. E da
questo dilemma non si scappa. Cosa ben curiosa e ridicola il sistema
etico della filosofia sana, anche da questo punto di vistai
Secondo questa filosofia sana un uomo sa che dio io consiglia ad un
Bene che egli potrebbe fare benissimo; e sa che con ciò darebbe
soddisfazione a lui che deve amare sopra ogni cosa: ma quest' uomo non si
cura, né del Bene per sé, né dell'autorità di dio che lo invita a
farlo, né del dispiacere che gli reca trascurandolo; e ciò per la
preferenza data a un proprio interesse egoistico contrario: e tuttavia il
medesimo uomo rimane dopo tutto questo esente da colpa, e nella grazia
dello stesso dio cosi postergato. L' imbroglio e V assurdo della
distinzione tra il Precetto e il Consiglio dipende dalla distinzione
falsa, posta dai moralisti in discorso nella stessa ragione di-
vina del Bene morale, del Bene doveroso e di quello non doveroso, corrispondente
all' altra distinzione falsa, di un Ordine morale che dio voglia
necessariamente e di uri Ordine morale che egli voglia arbitrariamente; e
che è la conseguenza di un principio ontologico fondamentale
erroneo circa le leggi dell' essere e della causalità in ge- nerale e
della provvidenza in particolare. Nel principio ontologico al quale
alludiamo si accoz- zano, in modo confuso e contradditorio, il necessario
e r arbitrario, come nell' Etica corrispondente la Moralità
determinata dalla ragione assoluta dell' essere e quella determinata
dalla ragione di un comando arbitrario. E per un processo logico
analogo. Il concetto del necessario e dell'assoluto deriva
dalla osservazione della costanza delle leggi naturali dove que-
ste appariscono a tutti. Il concetto dell' accidentale e del-
l'arbitrario deriva dalla osservazione dei fatti, che nella apparenza non
si connettono necessariamente a cause na- turali, onde si attribuiscono
all' intervento diretto volta per volta dell' arbitrio divino; come, pel
volgo, la piog- colare della povertà (che anzi questa
sublimità per sé la povertà non V ha niente affatto, se non ha invece la
qua- lità opposta); ma bensì se mai fosse V effetto inevitabile di
una azione o giusta o caritatevole, sì che uno non a- vesse potuto
rimaner giusto se non si fosse rassegnato ad incontrare la povertà, o
avesse sofferto perfino di subirla per un maggior bene altrui.E così la
povertà volontaria può essere anche pel po- sitivista una cosa sublime ed
eroica. Mentre in caso di- verso egli la direbbe una stoltezza ridicola e
riprovevole. Che se pel religioso la elezione della povertà non è una
stoltezza, ciò dipende unicamente dalla circostanza che egli la riferisce ad
uno scopo; cioè a quello di gua- dagnare con essa il paradiso. Ma, se
cessa così di essf re una stoltezza, riesce però un atto al tutto egoistico e
quindi ancora tutt' altro che eroicamente morale. E merita una speciale considerazione a questo
proposito la dottrina relativa alla elemosina e al dare a prestito. Ho un
ricco, fatto proprio secondo lo spirito dell'E- tica sana teologico-metafisica.
Egli crede fermamente che r esser lui nato ricco e destinato, senza
lavorare, a go- di ogni genere, mentre il povero non ha da coprirsi
a- vendo freddo; se il ricco ha a sua disposizione palazzi e ville, quando il
povero manca di un tetto qualsiasi; se il ricco imbandisce la propria mensa di
cibi e vini costo- sissimi con profusione, dove il povero manca della
stessa polenta; se il ricco ha cavalli e cocchi e servi che lo
ajutano a fare niente, mentre il povero si stima fortunato che altri gli
offra per carità un lavoro che lo esaurisce senza compensarlo; se al ricco si
offrono tutti i pia- ceri da vicino e da lontano (poiché non gli bastano
quelli che può dargli il suo paese e gli occorrono anche quelli che solo
si trovano altrove), e questi gli sono sempre perdonati quand' anche
affatto eccessivi e corrompenti e illeciti e scandalosi, quando il povero ne è
privo al tutto ed è barbaramente rimproverato pur dei pochissimi e grami che
gli sia dato di procurarsi; se fa tutto questo il ricco, non solo crede,
secondo la sua sana morale (che sempre ha cura di contrapporre ad un' altra
diversa, detta da lui empia e sovversiva) di far uso di un Diritto concessogli
da dio per un gusto particolare di predilezione, ma crede poi anche di
adempiere ad nn Dovere: a quel Dovere che si chiama il Dovere di vivere secondo
il proprio stalo. Or bene questo ricco, fatto secondo lo spirito
dell’Etica sana teologico-metafisica, riconosce fra i Doveri del proprio
stato anche quello della elemosina, ritenendo che coir adempirlo diventi, non
solo buono (che lo è già senza la elemosina), ma ottimo, ed in modo perfetto
ed eroico. Ed è assai bello vedere come il nostro ricco
intenda la detta elemosina. C è da rilevarne proprio la sublimila della
morale onde ha lo spirito. Prima di tutto, se egli si trova padrone di una
so- stanza vistosissima ereditata nascendo (quanta fatica, quanto
studio, e quanto merito!), la sua proprietà è cosa sacra, qualunque ne
sia la origine antica: anche se in questa origine fu accumulata colla
frode e colla rapina. È cosa sacra, che gli viene da dio stesso. E, se
deve contribuire una parte piccola e superflua per lui dell' aver suo,
per concorrere alle spese dello Stato che glielo di- fende, o per dare un
pane insufficiente a chi si logora la- vorando penosamente per lui, che
nulla fa e solò consuma godendo e corrompendo, egli intende, nella
goffaggine su- perlativa del suo pensiero, che T operaio, che suda per
la scarsissima paga, e il funzionario pubblico, che si sacri- fica
pel meschino stipendio, della paga e dello stipendio debbano arrossire
come di suoi compassionevoli e gratuiti donativi, e debbano riconoscere
che, se faticando assai hanno poco da mangiare, anche questo poco è tutta
gene- rosità sua, per la quale si compiaccia di largirlo, privandosi di
una piccola parte di ciò che gli sovrabbonda. Ma va più in là l’eroismo
della sua generosità di dare del superfluo a chi non ha di proprio se non
il dovere di lavorare (quando. gliene danno) e di soffrire. Va più in là;
poiché, oltre pagare le imposte che non può frodare, oltre angariare V
operajo coir avarissimo com- penso dei servigi avutine, esercita anche la
viriti dell’eielosina. Non già impoverirsi per ciò. E nemmeno
restringere di nulla gli scialacqui demoralizzanti. Oibò! Sarebbe questo
un venir meno ai Doveri del proprio stato. E nem- meno impiegarvi una,
anche piccola, parte delle super- fluità più riprovevoli. Tanto non
occorre; e di gran lunga. Se, per cavarsi un capriccio
stimato come un nulla, il nostro ricco non bada a spendere un migliaio di
lire, una lira sola è anche troppo gettarla, come si farebbe di un
osso ad un cane, ad un vecchio cadente per la fame. Un pugno di monete di
rame, ecco quanto basta per a- dempiere al Dovere di perfezione della
elemosina, per es- sere morale in grado superlativo ed eroico, per
acquistare il merito -di un posto riservato in paradiso. Poiché
anche quelle miserabili monete di rame della elemosina non si intende mica
s'abbiano a gettare gratis. Né anche per sogno! Anche da esse, quantunque
non abbiano un valore apprezzabile per chi le getta, deve ve- nire
un vantaggio: e un vantaggio assai grande; devono fruttare nientemeno che
una felicità eterna in un'altra vita. E la cosa va di suo piede. Il
povero, la cui vita fu uno strazio continuo, é ben giusto e naturale che
vada poi air inferno, essendo infine, un povero, un malvagio
mascalzone; mentre il ricco, che ha sempre goduto senza nessun merito,
deve essere premiato colla beatitudine del cielo, essen'do infine, un
ricco, una persona buona. Un pugno di piccole monete di rame; ecco
dunque la limosina del ricco, secondo l'Etica sana. Un pugno di
piccole monete di rame date all' impazzata ad una turba degradata di
accattoni che le implorino, facendo ressa e alzando le mani
supplichevoli, intorno al castello minac- cioso e al cocchio superbo, di
chi le getta loro col piglio del disprezzo. E questa turba di accattoni
degradati é poi neces- sario, secondo la stessa Eti.ca sana, che ci sia
anch'essa. Altrimenti come sarebbe possibile al ricco di avere il
vantaggio di procacciarsi il paradiso a si buon mercato, e di far
risplendere, al di sopra dei languenti per inopia, r orgoglio stupido
della ricchezza in tutta la forza della sua brutalità? Onde, nel
pensiero del nostro ricco (fatto secondo ìct spirito dell'Etica sana), è
cosa immoralissima e sovver- siva del Bene, che altri, come il
positivista, cerchi di to- gliere dalla Società T ignominia
dell'accattonaggio: che consigli la Società a provvedere, non in
apparenza ma in realtà, V impotente, 1' ammalato, il disgraziato: e
senza degradarlo, e con un soccorso che apparisca un Diritto
riconosciuto in chi lo riceve, e non una elemosina che lo avvilisca; che
faccia opera affinchè il povero sia educato in modo da sentire il danno e
la vergogna di accattare il pane poltrendo neir ozio; e il vantaggio e la
soddisfa- zione confortevole di guadagnarselo nobilmente col pro-
prio lavoro. E, il sommo della immoralità della condotta del po-
sitivista, il nostro ricco la riscontra poi in questo; che, se si dà il
caso dell' incontro di un infelice bisognoso di soccorso, egli, il
positivista, glielo porga per puro sen- timento antiegoistico di umanità,
senza pensare punto allo interesse, né del paradiso né di nient' altro,
da ricavarne; e lo faccia senza avvilire chi riceve, comportandosi
con esso come il fratello col fratello; e nell' intento, non di
perpetuarne lo stato miserabile, che faccia risaltare meglio- il proprio
più decoroso, ma di agevolargli la via per u- scirne al più presto,
diventando un suo pari. Dopo tutto però bisogna confessare che il
no- stro ricco, fatto secondo lo spirito dell' Etica sana, è
logico. Ma le conseguenze pratiche di tale sua logica ser- vono
assai bene per farne apprezzare i principj. Come, al contrario, la verità
dei principj positivi apparisce nelle conseguenze opposte or ora
accennate, eminentemente (ed esse sole) buone e morali. Certo si
deve ammettere, che nella Società (pur pre- valendo nelle dottrine dei
maestri di morale il concetto teologico-metafisico sopra descritto) si
fece strada a poco a poco, e per, la condotta individuale e per la
direzione delle cose pubbliche, V idea della beneficenza propugnata
dal positivismo, fondata sulla benevolenza effettiva che r uomo,
diventato buono, ha pe' suoi simili, stimati tutti avere gli stessi
Diritti ai beneficj della vita e della So- cietà; alla quale perciò incomba
il debito di provvedere normalmente, più che sia possibile utile e
morale, per gli infelici. Ma giò è V effetto della stessa natura,
che opera se- condo le sue leggi invincibilmente, senza e malgrado
le teorie dei filosofi. E qui pure, come in tutto il resto dei
fatti etici, essa natura ha dimostrato, che la Moralità non si
attacca materialmente ad un atto determinato circa. il quale dio abbia
detto: Questo atto voglio che sia un atto buono. E ha dimostrato che la
Moralità consiste invece nella stessa disposizione antiegoistica dell'
animo, creata dal vivere sociale; e per la quale V atto materiale
(che per sé non è moralmente né buono né cattivo) diventa buono, se
la disposizione relativa dell' animo è buona, e cattivo, se cattiva, E ha
dimostrato che non occorre, che un atto buono sia stato prescritto
positivamente da nes- suno, perchè si introduca nella pratica morale
degli uo- mini, e che questi lo eseguiscono anche senza e prima che
sia stato prescritto. Che anzi la prescrizione positiva medesima è pur essa non
altro che V effetto della disposi- zione potenziale degli individui
precedentemente forma- tasi neir animo moralizzato, nel modo sopra
descritto. Un discorso analogo si può fare circa il dare a
prestito. L' Etica religiosa, computandolo fra gli atti di beneficenza e
volendo quindi che, se altri lo eseguisce, abbia da, poterlo fare
solamente sotto questo riguardo, e conseguentemente senza interesse, ne
sopprime la funzione vitalissima per la prosperità commerciale ed industriale
nel meccanismo economico sociale; lasciando più libero il campo alle
imprese esiziali degli usurai; sottraendo il capitale all'ingegno e
all'operosità dei volonterosi; re- stringendo le fonti del benessere
pubblico e quindi della Moralità comune. E allora non sarà colpa
l'approfittarne per contravvenirla: e Vufficio del galantuomo sarà tulio
nello studio di elu^ dere la Legge, E vi riuscirà, più o meno sempre,
es- sendo verissimo V adagio: Fatta la Legge, trovato V in- ganno.
Ed ecco il galantuomo inappuntabile dell'Etica sana. Quanto diverso, e più
veramente galantuomo, quello del positivismo, che l'Etica sana dice
sovversione, distruzione, negazione della Moralità. Lo scopo dell'
attività umana congegnata insieme nell’organismo sociale è di produrre nella
coscienza degli individui la Idealità morale antiegoistica, atta a
muoverne la volontà a fare il Bene. Fino a che l'individuo, questa
Idealità, non ha potuto formarsela, è un infelice da com- passionarsi,
come il selvaggio che non ha appreso da una Società colta a procurarsi
ciò che forma il benessere e il decoro di un uomo. Si faccia dunque ogni
sforzo per isvolgerne le facoltà etiche onde egli goda del bene di
avere il carattere dell' essere morale. — • 2og — Una volta che Tuomo sia tale,
egli fa il Bene in virtù della Idealità, che è viva in lui e impulsiva per sé
del suo volere. Impulsiva per sé: tanto pel Bene della Giustizia propriamente
detta quanto per quello della beneficenza. Impulsiva sempre; ogni volta che si
presenti V occa- sione di ravvivarsi nella coscienza. Operatrice del Bene
nella stessa misura della sua im- palsività, ossia del suo esserci.
Impulsiva finalmente pel solo fatto di esserci; e senza la scappatoja
immorale del difettò, o nella promulgazione della Legge, o nella sua
redazione negli articoli del co" dice. Poiché, come dimostrammo già
più volte, l'Idealità morale, essendo essa la Giustizia potenziale, non
segue (come vaneggia la filosofia da noi riprovata), ma precede la
Legge propriamente detta; e quindi esiste nella coscienza (ancor prima della
redazione scritta di una Legge e della sua promulgazione) un suo dettato
e una sua an- nunciazione, che integra qualunque difetto della
redazione e della promulgazione positiva; e conseguentemente im-
pedisce che la Legge e il suo spirito siano ipocritamente dissimulati e
dolosamente elusi. Il Bene di perfezione non obbligatoria, la vecchia
Etica teologico-filosofica, lo ravvisò anche negli stessi atti della
Giustizia propriamente detta. E in vero essa insegna, come notammi^
altrove, che, se la volontà si decide a questi atti unicamente
perchè premuta dalla minaccia del castigo sancito per essi, si ha
solo la Giustizia e non la perfezione; e la perfezione si raggiunge,
eseguendo gli atti della Giustizia indipendentemente dalla minaccia del castigo
e per la pura soddis- fazione di fare le cose giuste. Ed è
giustissima questa distinzione fra il primo e il secondo genere della
deliberazione volontaria rispetto ad un medesimo atto obbligatorio. E l'etica
positiva la ri- pete e la mantiene anche per conto suo. E ne approfitta per
argomentarne ad hominem contro TEtica vecchia. Poi- ché questa colla
distinzione in discorso (che è una prova della verità dei principj della nostra
Etica sperimentale) mette a nudo il proprio difetto per gli artificj, ai quali
deve ricorrere affine di conciliarla colle sue teoriche; e per le incongfruenze
che, malgrado gli artificj stessi, vi risultano. Notiamo, per esempio, l’incongruenza
relativa alla distinzione tra T atto di rigorosa Giustizia e V atto gra- tuito,
al quale essa annette il carattere di perfezione mo- rale. Qui non si tratta
più di un Bene supererogatorio, e tuttavia vi trova il carattere della stessa
perfezione. La quale incongruenza svanisce subito partendo dai principj da noi
esposti dell'Etica positiva. L' essenza dell' atto morale propriamente tale,
ossia di perfezione, di un'atto che ecceda l' efifetto diretto della minaccia
del castigo, consiste, come dicemmo, nella atti- tudine del volere a esegfuire
V atto indipendentemente dalla eccitazione esterna della Sanzione del castigo
minacciato. E questa attitudine si ha quando, per effetto appunto della
applicazione della eccitazione esterna mede- sima, a poco a poco si ingenerò e
si rinforzò la dispo- sizione psichica impulsiva per sé; e tanto, che, divenuta
questa una autonomia morale, ha da sé quanto basta per agire, senza bisogno di
esservi ajutata dalla eccitazione della minaccia esteriore. Il che in qualche
maniera é ammesso anche dall' E- tica vecchia, che pur riconosce la detta
spontaneità mo- rale, ricorrendo però per ispiegarla al sogno della grazia di dio,
che sostituisca il timore del castigo all' uopo di muovere la volontà al Bene.
Coi principj dell'Etica positiva é dunque spiegata nel modo più ovvio e
conseguente 1' analogia che corre tra r atto della stretta Giustizia eseguito
per pura bontà d' animo, e l' atto della beneficenza in pari modo prodotto; e
come ambedue possano avere cosi egualmente il carat- tere della Moralità
perfetta. Molto più che è precisamente la spontaneità di operare la Giustizia
(ossia lo Giustizia potenziale) che, precedendola, promuove la legislazione
positiva colla rela- tiva Sanzione costringente (come dimostrammo). Ed é la
stessa spontaneità che ne mantiene il vigore. Chi ha in sé l'amore alla
Giustizia si fa autore diretto o indiretto della Legge, la difende, e concorre
a renderla efficace e a vendicarla, se violata. E non impegna persé la forza
del Potere, lasciandola disponibile interamente all' utile comune della
Società. Dalle quali cose si trae un nuovo argomento in favore del principio
etico positivo in confronto col me- tafisico tradizionale. Nella formazione
della Moralità umana, secondo le cose dette, va considerato il momento
disponente alla for- mazione stessa, e il momento della Moralità già attuata
neir animo. Il momento disponente si ha nel cedere che fa il volere alla
eccitazione che le viene esternamente dalla Sanzione della Legge. Il momento
della Moralità già attuata si ha nella spontaneità acquistata dallo stesso
volere air azione giusta e buona senza il bisogno della suddetta eccitazione.
Or bene: il principio etico metafisico, onde la ragione deir atto morale è
riferita al motivo della pena e del premio, contempla la Moralità nel Momento
dispo- nente, vale a dire quando essa non è ancora la Moralità già fatta: dove
il principio etico positivo, pel quale la ragione dell' atto è nell' Idealità
sociale impulsiva per sé, contempla la Moralità proprio nel momento nel quale
essa esiste veramente nella disposizione effettiva del volere. § VII. La virtic,
il merito e il premio. Ora poi, esposte le quattro considerazioni pro- posteci,
e confermata cosi e chiarita pienamente la dot- trina positiva riguardante gli
atti cosidetti di carità o beneficenza, possiamo anche iritendere più
compiutamente e precisamente, che sia ciò che si chiama la viriti e il me-'
rito, nel loro senso distinto e proprio. Pl'lt.■l.J * — Tr"»T' ^r- Il
merito è la proprietà della virtù, come tale; e non del semplice atto morale. E
la virtù è una disposizione esistente realmente nel- l'uomo virtuoso. Il che,
come sia, è chiaro dalle cose dette sopra. Cosi la scienza è V attitudine
particolare dello scien; ziato. Ed essendo la virtù una disposizione reale
dell'uomo virtuoso, questo per ciò è un essere diverso dall'uomo non virtuoso;
poiché in questo secondo non esiste la potenza etica, che esiste nel primo. E
questo vero è stato riconosciuto (quantunque con- fusamente e in contraddizione
col loro principio (i)) dai moralisti della chiesa, in quanto per essi il
merito e la virtù richiedono la presenza nell'anima di una attività spe- ciale,
vale a dire di ciò che da loro è chiamato, la grazia. Se qualcheduno osservasse
che noi, col ricor- rere alle dottrine dei teologi cattolici per trarne una
con- ferma dei dettati del positivismo, tiriamo in campo inse- gnamenti già
abbandonati dalla stessa filosofia etico-me- tafisica che combattiamo, e che
quindi facciamo opera inutile (come anche oppugnando il dogma della grazia, che
è voler sfondare una porta aperta, non credendo ad esso oramai più nessuno dei
moralisti metafisici non teo- logi), soggiungeremo che la teoria dei metafisici
non teo- logi non è che un riflesso sparuto della dottrina teolo- (r) Vedi
Morale dei Positivisti Libro li, Parte I, Capo II, n. 26, 27 e 28 (pag. 224 e
segg. del Voi. Ili di queste _Op, fil, nella ediz. del 1885, e pag. 234 e segg.
nella edìz. del 1893 e del 1901, e pag. 241 e segg. nella ediz. del 1908). •
^'••^'^'^gica patristico-scolastica precedente; e che ne ha eredi- tato i
difetti perdendone i pregi; rimanendo cosi una su- perficialità destituita
anche di quel valore scientifico, che bisogna pure riconoscere, anzi ammirare,
nellametafisica ecclesiastica. Gli autori della quale furono grandi pensatori
che, se non poterono arrivare alla soluzione positiva del pro- blema morale (ed
era impossibile al loro tempo e nelle loro circostanze), ne ebbero però dei
presentimenti. E il principale fra questi pensatori fu S. Agostino vescovo di
Ippona, il cui genio potè a ragione essere messo allato a quello del divino
Platone. La dottrina della grazia, relativamente al fatto morale, è analoga
alla dottrina della forza creativa, rela- tivamente al fatto fisico. Il corpo
agisce fisicamente perchè ha in sé la pro- prietà di farlo. Del pari T uomo
agisce moralmente per- chè ha in sé la proprietà di agire cosi. Per ispiegare V
azione fisica gli antichi supponevano la produzione della proprietà relativa
nel corpo per parte della onnipotenza divina. E così davano una ragione della
azione fisica stessa quantunque falsa. Il positivismo (come dimostrai nel libro
della Formazione naturale nel fatto del sistema solare) trova che la proprietà
del corpo di agire fisicamente è la stessa sua costituzione naturale. E così
spiega Y azione fisica in modo analogo a quello degli antichi: ma colla
differenza che, dove questi considerano la proprietà introdotta nel corpo
arbitrariamente da dio nel crearlo (che è contro l' insegnamento del fatto), il
positivista considera la proprietà connaturale al corpo medesimo. Nella
evoluzione scientifica, onde si passò dalla spie- gazione antica della azione
fisica alla positiva attuale, tra quella e questa si formò una spiegazione
ibrida e con- tradditoria; la quale, da una parte, riconosceva V appar- tenenza
della proprietà al corpo, proclamandola quindi una naturalità; e, dall'altra,
riconosceva ancora dio quale primo autore di ogni naturalità; il che è una
incon- gruenza scientifica, ed è il vizio capitale della dottrina teistica,
come si trova ad esempio nel sistema del padre Secchi.Tale e quale la storia
della evoluzione della dottrina etica. La virtù, o la proprietà psichica
specifica dell'uomo morale, i teologi cattolici la supponevano un dono santo e
sovrannaturale di dio. Il positivismo invece trova che tale proprietà santa è
la stessa costituzione che potè acqui- stare la psiche umana per 1* azione
esercitata sovr' essa dalla Società; ed è quindi una naturalità nel senso asso-
luto della parola. La dottrina ibrida intermedia dei me- tafisici non teologi
rende confuso econtraddittorio il con- cetto, pur semplice e chiaro, escogitato
dai teologi, della proprietà etica infusa come grazia diviua. Rende, dico,
confuso e contradditorio questo concetto in quanto, da una parte, negano V
intervento diretto dell' azione divina sulla volontà, e, dall'altra, ne
mantengono la indiretta. Il merito è l' indice della virtù. Esso è quindi per
ogni atto virtuoso in ragione inversa dell'intervento del motivo estemo nella
spinta alla deliberazione volon- taria. Appunto come la virtù, la quale,
essendo la pro- pensione ad astenersi dal Male e a fare il Bene ingene- ratasi
neir animo per le vie già indicate, tanto più ha in W-Vfl«-JJJ «.P., —sé di
intensità quanto meno ha bisogno di essere mossa dal costringimento della
minaccia del castigo e dall'ade» scamento della prospettiva di un vantaggio.
Per conseguenza, minimo è il merito nelle azioni buone dipendenti al tutto
dalla diretta efficacia della loro Sanzione esteriore: come in quelle che si
fanno perchè imposte dalle Leggi positive. Ed è massimo nelle azioni buone per
nulla determinate da motivo di fuori: come in quelle del Bene gratuito o supererogatorio,
o di carità e beneficenza, per le quali, o non esiste Sanzione positiva
determinata, o, esistendo, non si considera da chi le fa. Ma la stessa
osservanza della Legge avente 4a sua Sanzione può in un uomo, indipendentemente
dal ri- gfuardo della Sanzione stessa, essere determinatadallavirtùformatasi in
lui di eseguirla solo perchè giusta, come vedemmo sopra nella osservazione
quarta, E così anche per questa osservanza può aversi un grado di me- rito: e
per questo distinguersi nella Società il semplice galantuomo (o quello che non
può essere messo in pri-» gione perchè non fu còlto a delinquere) dall' uomo
virtuoso, che è stimato non disposto a mancare agli obblighi del cittadino
anche aboliti il Tribunale e il carcere. L' uomo, per la formazione che in lui
si veri* fichi della energia morale o della virtù, diventa un essere fornito di
una eccellenzaparticolare; cioè della eccellenza dignità o prerogativa d’essere
morale. E il fatto è analogo a quello, per esempio, della for- mazione della
energia vitale nel corpo materiale, per la quale questo si distingue fra le
cose come ESSERE VIVENTE. Il premio, in relazione alla Moralità, o è una sua
causa, o è un suo effetto. Come causa è la Sanzione allettatrice della quale
par- lammo nel paragrafo quarto al numero sette. E con ciò si comprende percliè
alla osservanza della Legge imposta colla minaccia di una Sanzione punitrice,
ed eseguita per evitarla, non si addica la ragione di un premio, ma solo la
esenzione dal castigo. Con questo la Società si difende dalla offesa dell'
individuo; dal quale si procura invece l'opera utile della beneficenza colla
offerta di un van- taggio. Dove è da considerare che la offerta stessa, fa-
cendosi più per r utile dell' azione che per la sua Mora- lità, non si
differenzia da quella che si fa in generale per la prestazione dell' opera
volontaria da chi la desidera, cominciando dai premj dei concorsi riguardanti o
un libro, una cosa d' arte, o una invenzione scientifica, meccanica,
industriale, o un' impresa, e venendo fino allo stipendio dell'impiegato e alla
mercede giornaliera dell' operajo. Come semplice effetto il premio è la
conseguenza spontanea del merito; ed è l’espressione onde altri lo riconosce.
Sotto questo riguardo anche la semplice osserva- vanza della Legge punitrice
può avere una ragione di premio, se V osservanza avviene nel senso detto sopra
al numero sei, parlando dell'' uomo virtuoso. E il premio consiate in questo
caso, oltreché nella stima comune, anche in ciò, che questo uomo virtuoso è
considerato siccome il rappresentante nato della Legge e del Diritto, come
spiegheremo meglio in seguito. Il premio conseguente al merito della virtù è
una naturalità non determinata positivamente. In generale si restringe alla
stima e alla venerazione degli uomini pel virtuoso; la quale non è altro che la
reazione spontanea sociale di fronte al Bene morale, e quindi si produce negli
uomini in ragione che sono buoni, ossia bene di- sposti moralmente. Ma alla
detta stim^ e venerazione si possono accompagnare anche vantaggi di posizione
so- ciale e di benessere materiale. La mancanza del premio o della espressione
del riconoscimento del merito, quando si verifica, è una ingiustizia, ma non
distoglie dalla virtù chi ha la pro- prietà di averla; essendoché la virtù è
per sé, e basta a se stessa. E non si addice il nome di virtù a quella disposi-
zione a fare il Bene che sia determinata proprio dalla sola idea di averne la
rimunerazione; secondo V osserva- zione sublime del Vangelo su quelli che fanno
il Bene per essere veduti e rimeritati dagli altri.Esso dice di loro
giustissimamente, che rimangono così senza il merito della virtù, essendo già
pagati per quello che hanno fatto egoisticamente in vista della ricompensa. Il
che però non vuol dire che il virtuoso non ap- prezzi la lode e T ammirazione
altrui e non se ne soddisfi. Nobilissimo sentimento é questo di fare stima e di
sod- disfarsi del giudizio morale degli uomini che apprezzano e ammirano la
virtù; e più che di vantaggi materiali anche grandi. E di ciò parlai nel mio
Discorso su Pietro Pomponazzi, dicendo del pensatore, che esso « ama la so-
litudine. Ma non perchè sia privo di sentimenti benevoli, che anzi in lui si
trovano più generosi; mentre nulla tanto disavvezza dall' egoismo, quanto la
scuola delle idee. ^^P". E nemmeno
perchè non apprezzi la stima e la lode degli uomini; che, invece, in nessuno la
passione della gloria è più viva, che in lui. E, nobilmente altero della sua
oscurità, solo egli rinuncia sdegnosamente all' onore, che si acquista colle
umili arti. Sciolto cosi il problema
propostoci, riguardante r azione benefattrice e la virtù che porta ad essa,
gioverà fermarci a considerare il fatto dell' Ordine morale, e la naturalità della
sua formazione. Circa la FORMAZIONE NATURALE NEL FATTO DELL' ORDINE MORALE, in
quanto questo fatto è un Ordine, alle cose dette alla fine del Capo prece-
dente (2) e a quelle più generali esposte nel libro della FORMAZIONE NATURALE
NEL FATTO DEL SISTEMA SOLARE {3) e nel lavoro s\x\Y Inconosciòile di H, Spen-
cer (4), qui ci proponiamo di aggiungerne una nuova. 3. — L' insufficienza e
quindi la falsità del principio assoluto, che un Ordine qualunque naturale
presupponga (i) Vedi pag. 51 del Voi. I di queste Op, fil, nella ediz. del
1S82, ^ P3&- 54 nell'edìz. del 1908). (2) \ VII. Vedi sopratutto V
Appendice sul Caso (pag^. 271 e s%%%. del Voi. II di queste Op, flL nell'ediz.
del 1884, pag. 287 e segg. nel- l'ediz. del 1899, e pag. 295 e segg. nell'ediz.
del 1908). (4) Specialmente al J VII (pag. 353 e segg. dello stesso vo- lume
neir ediz. del 1884, pag. 375 e segg. nella ediz. del 1899, e pag. 383 e segg
nell'ediz. del 1908J. una Mente, che lo abbia concepito anteriormente e pre-
disposto, emerge: Primo. Dalla considerazione che ciò che si chiama, la mente,
è il fatto stesso della formazione psichica umana svolgentesi da ciò che non è
ancor tale: onde la stessa Mente è per tal verso, essa pure, un effetto, come
tutti gli altri avvenimenti naturali. Secondo. Dalla considerazione che, se la
Mente (sorta per graduale isvolgimento da ciò che non era tale), è an- ch' essa
la causa dell' Ordine che è subordinato alla sua efficienzaspecifica, sono del
pari cause di Ordini subor- dinati propri anche tutte le altre formazioni
naturali: anche quelle puramente meccaniche e fisiche. Sicché la il- lazione
che 5i fa per la Mente, come ragione dell'Ordine, vale tanto quanto la
illazione identica che si faccia per l'agente puramente fisico e meccanico. E in
effetto, se r analisi del fatto mentale vi discopre gli elementi e le ragioni
della sua efficienza ordinatrice, anche l'analisi del fatto puramente fisico e
meccanico vi rintraccia pure gli elementi e le ragioni della sua analoga
efficienza ordina- trice. Né più, né meno. Terzo. Dalla considerazione che I'
efficienza ordina- trice della Mente, da una parte, si estende solo alla sfera
dell' ambiente da essa abbracciato, e quindi è impotente al di fuori di questa;
e, dall'altra, essa stessa suppone un ambiente maggiore nel quale si forma e
che la fa es- sere: un ambiente che é, non una Mente, ma qualchecosa di
puramente meccanico e fisico. Sicché, paragonando in- sieme le due formazioni
ordinatrici (cioè la formazione meccanico-fisica, e quella della Mente), la
prima è più ampia della seconda e quindi superiore ed anteriore ad essa.
Quarto. Dalla considerazione che l'Ordine, che realmente si trova esistere in
un dato punto della natura e in un dato momento del tempo, non è V
effettuazione di un disegno, nel quale fosse stabilita la serie degli atti
occorrenti alla effettuazione stessa, fino all'ultimo, cioè a quello del
compimento dell' Ordine contemplato. No. Nella linea del tempo questo ordine ha
la sua ragione in un primo che è fuori della Mente: cioè nelle stesse possibi-
lità di svolgimento verso un Ordine proprie dell' essere naturale attivo. Nella
linea dello spazio poi 1' Ordine in discorso ha tante ragioni quanti sono gli
incontri fortuiti subiti dall' essere naturale attivo nel corso del suo svol-
gimento; in modo che ad ogni incontro lo svolgimento stesso devia
accidentalmente dalla sua direzione prece- dente, e quindi V ordine ultimo non
corrisponde più alla virtualità Iniziale dell' essere che si svolge, ma solo a
quella diversissima e puramente casuale portata dall' in- contro ultimamente
subito. In una parola, la Mente, né pone il disegno dell' Ordine, che è già
nell' essere natu- rale stesso, né lo eseguisce come l' aveva disegnato, poi-
ché la esecuzione sempre ne differisce per opera degli agenti naturali
casualmente concorrenti. Fra i quali può benissimo essere anche la mente stessa
(che è pure una attività naturale), ma 'solo con analoga accidentale effi-
cienza. Ciò fu già chiarito a lungo e dimostrato con argomenti positivi nelle
trattazioni sopra citate. Ora faremo un ragionamento che suppone i suddetti. ne
discende e li completa: ed è poi senz' altro la semplice constatazione logica
del fatto dato dalla osservazione. La teoria metafisica, onde si pone in una
Mente la ragione dell' Ordine delle cose, è basata sopra i due falsi supposti,
che il disegno finale della Mente preceda al tutto la esecuzione estema, e che
l'adattamento delle parti nel tutto reale effettuato sia stato determinato dal
concetto medesimo di esso tutto; sicché questo sia asso- lutamente un fine e le
parti siano assolutamente mezzi; e non il contrario. Il secondo falso supposto
deriva dalla osservazione superficiale ed illudente della specie già formata,
che ap- parisce come un ultimo, ossia come un fine. Anche perchè la specie è di
una stabilità relativamente grandissima per rispetto alla esperienza dell'
uomo. Egli, trovandone già r esistenza anteriormente alle mutazioni conosciute,
la im- magina realizzata nella sua interezza attuale fino dal suo principio: e,
non essendogli dato di essere testimonio del suo trapasso in una specie nuova,
ritiene che sia desti- nata a durare inalterata fin che dura il mondo. E cosi
si forma il proprio concetto della specie, che, o sia come è, o non sia punto.
E, siccome la esistenza di una specie im- plica quella delle parti onde
risulta, cosi l'uomo pensa che queste non siano altro che i mezzi necessari al
fine di essa, e quindi siano il trovato ingegnoso di una Mente; la quale,
formatasi da prima il disegno della specie, sia passata poi a divisare le parti
occorrenti alla sua realiz- zazione. Il primo falso supposto poi deriva dalla
esperienza del fatto della Idealità dell' arte, che è qualchecosa di re-
lativamente compiuto e fisso, e che si comunica qual' è da uomo a uomo: e in un
modo che uno avendone la co- gnizione e segtiendone la rappresentazione
mentale, è atto ad eseguire addirittura, senza tentennamenti e prove im-
perfette, un' opera definitiva, predisponendo e coordinando all'uopo tutto ciò
che si esige. perchè riesca nella realtà quale si concepisce. I metafisici
fanno i due detti falsi supposti, commettendo T errore di considerare il tempo
della osser- vazione siccome una eternità, nella quale non sia diffe- renza tra
un momento e V altro della esistenza; mentre invece nella durata reale i
momenti sono effettivamente diversi l'uno dall'altro, ed essa nei precedenti va
diven- tando ciò che risulta poi nei successivi, cessando in que- sti quello
che era nei primi. L'essere naturale esiste trasformandosi (i); e, nella linea
infinita del tempo, solo per un tratto di questo si trova in una forma che
svanisce col venire del successivo. La specie è questa forma, instabile come il
tempo del quale è figlia. Si muta insensibilmente nel mentre che pare persista
la medesima, come il posto del Sole in cielo che sembra fermo a chi lo guarda.
E ciò vale tanto per la specie, quale complesso di parti, quanto per la parte
coordinata nella specie. L' una e l' altra soggiace del pari al fato del
mutamento. E cosi n) Vedi per ciò 1* Osservazione III del libro della
Formazione naiuraie nel fatto del Sistema solare e sopratutto il J X (p-ig. 193
del Voi. II di queste Op, fil. nella ediz. del 1884, pag. 204 nella ediz. del
1899, e pag. 209 nella ediz. del 1908). la parte viene ad essere, non solo un
mezzo, ma anche un fine, come la specie; e questa, non solo un fine, ma anche
un mezzo, come la parte. Molto più che nella na- tura nessuna cosa è tanto una
specie, che non sia nello stesso tempo semplice parte in una specie più grande;
e nessuna cosa tanto è una parte che non sia nello stesso tempo una specie per
sé. E nella natura medesima non è la esigenza a priori di una specie, destinata
ad esistere, che abbia determi- nato il farsi delle parti occorrenti alla sua
esistenza, se- condo il divisamento precorso di una mente ragionatrice: ma è la
esistenza avveratasi delle stesse parti costitutrici che ha determinato la
formazione della specie, quale si trova in effetto nella realtà. Se le cause
naturali relative (indipendentemente af- fatto da un concetto della specie che
non era prima della esistenza reale di essa) non avessero prodotto le parti
costitutive della specie, questa non si sarebbe realizzata. E se le cause
naturali avessero prodotto le parti in modo diverso, la specie si sarebbe
realizzata diversamente. La coordinazione quindi delle parti alla specie, come
del mezzo al fine, è una coordinazione a posteriori. Non può esistere la specie
qual' è senza le parti occorrenti; e se esiste la specie è solo pel caso
avvenuto della formazione delle parti richiestevi. Per ciò, se la parte è il
mezzo a cui consegue il fine della specie, questo mezzo non è un effetto (come
è sup- posto nella teoria metafisica della Mente che è determi- nata a
ricorrervi dalla necessità del fine della specie); ma è la stessa causa della
specie. E quindi, se si vuol chiamare la specie un fine, ciò va inteso come
dell' effetto che segue la sua causa, e non viceversa, come nella teoria che
ripudiamo. Così, se si avverasse che il tronco di un albero per un accidente
qualunque cadesse sopra un altro tronco in modo da stare sovr' esso in bilico,
e questo fatto dello stare in bilico lo si prendesse come un fine, apparireb-
bero mezzi per ottenerlo la esistenza sotto il caduto di queir altro tronco
colla sua sufficiente resistenza a non piegarsi e rompersi, e T esservi dato
sopra il tronco in bilico col centro della sua gravità. Ma qui il detto fine,
nessuno lo direbbe la causa precedente del fatto; nessuno direbbe i detti mezzi
degli effettivenuti dopo, ossia di- visati e predisposti da una Mente
consecutivamente al pensiero di avere un tronco in bilico sopra un altro. Non
altrimenti è la cosa nel fatto della Idea- lità e dell'Arte umana, e in genere
di tutto ciò che si chiama il disegno ordinatore della Mente. La Mente e il suo
disegno sono fatti della natura, analoghi a tutti gli altri in essa
verificantisi nella sfera biologica e nella inorganica; e quindi soggetti alle
stesse leggi: sono casualità, come la produzione di una specie o la caduta or
ora accennata di un albero sopra un altro. Quando un dato disegno è già un
fatto compiuto, al- lora certo può rimanere un certo tempo come è riuscito; ed
essere trasmesso da uomo ad uomo; e servire per pro- durre addirittura l’opera
corrispondente, e per predisporre e coordinarvi le parti come mezzi al fine
dell'opera stessa; e in modo che questo fine venga ad essere proprio la causa
di dovere divisare i mezzi relativi, e il divisamento di questi mezzi venga ad
essere l’effetto di aver voluto r opera. Ma ciò non succede soltanto per la mente
e pel suo disegno: che succede lo stesso anche per la specie fisica, una volta
che sìa g^ià un fatto compiuto. Una volta che esista g^à la gallina, essa potrà
pro- durre un' altra gallina. Cosi un bruco nato da un altro potrà fare un
bozzolo simile a quello che faceva il suoprocreatore. Un uomo, arrivato a
comporre nella sua Mente il di- segno di una locomotiva a vapore, ha potuto
costruirne una reale: i meccanici in seguito poterono imparare quel disegno e
costruirne delle altre. Non potè succedere che la gallina procreasse altre
galline prima che se ne formasse la specie. E lo stesso del bruco. E lo stesso
dell' uomo. Non potè succedere che questo costruisse la locomotiva a vapore
prima che se ne fosse formato il disegno nella sua Mente. E come la specie
della gallina e quella del bruco non proruppero tali e quali dal nulla, secondo
la cre- denza di un tempo, ma furono la riuscita ultima di una serie
lunghissima di gradazioni di svolgimento dell'essere, che prima non era né
gallina né bruco, cosi il disegno della locomotiva a vapore della Mente umana,
fu la riu- scita ultima di un lavoro del suo pensiero, che prima non era quel
disegno. Né divèrsa nel fondo è la legge della formazione nelle specie
biologiche della gallina e del bruco e nel di- segno della mente umana. E
analoga nei due casi è la ra- gione della potenza di produrre la cosa a propria
immagine e somiglianza, e di fare che nella cosa stessa corri- spondano allo
scopo dell' essere suo i mezzi impiegativi. £ quindi un libro che narri la
storia della invenzione di una macchina è analogo a quello che esponga la
evolu- zione formativa di una specie naturale. E, se, come di- cono i teisti,
dio è 1' autore della natura, questa non se- rebbe altro che il libro nel quale
si può leggere ciò che esso è arrivato a inventarvi, una cosa dopo l'altra, a
poco a poco. Ma dobbiamo dimostrare e chiarire meglio la cosa. Un uomo ha fatto
bollire dell'acqua in un vaso. Ne ha visto sortire del vapore. Per caso copre
il vaso mente ritenta l' esperimento, e il vapore solleva il co- perchio. E
l'uomo pensa allora: — Dunque il vapore è una forza: e non si potrebbe
adoperarla a produrre un qualche lavoro? Sì certo. E si prova ad applicare al
coperchio del vaso un' asta, la quale, alzandosi il coper- chio, trasmette il
suo movimento ad un corpo che essa urta. Ma il movimento così è in un solo
senso; e l' uomo immagina che si potrebbe averlo nei due contrarj di va e
vieni. E che perciò sarebbe necessario che il vapore spingesse il coperchio una
volta al disotto e un' altra al disopra. E quindi studia e trova il modo di far
passare il vapore dal vaso dell' acqua bollente, per un foro in un cilindro,
nel quale sforzi il coperchio medesimo ora al di- sopra e ora al disotto. E
allora gli soccorre V idea di ap- plicare r asta, moventesi avanti e indietro,
ad una ruota per farla girare. E vi riesce praticando un foro all'estre- mità
libera dell' asta e applicandolo ad una caviglia fissata vicino al centro della
ruota. Ed ecco inventata la locomotiva a vapore. Ecco tutto. Il disegno della
locomotiva a vapore, la Mente non lo creò con un suo fiat. Quel disegno in essa
è r esito faticoso e lento di una serie di operazioni succedutevi r una dopo T
altra; e determinatevi da una serie di accidentalità che la trassero fino al
compimento della sua invenzione, che riusci una sorpresa per la mente stessa
che si trovò di esservi arrivata. Analogo è il processo di tutte le formazioni
mentali. La Psicologia positiva lo dimostra nel suo studio della FORMAZIONE
NATURALE NEL FATTO DEL PENSIERO in genere, e logico in ispecie; su di che spero
di pubblicare presto un mio lavoro g^à pressoché ulti- mato (i). L'Estetica
positiva lo dimostra nel suo studio della FORMAZIONE NATURALE NEL FATTO DEL-
L'ARTE, che mi duole assai non avere potuto ancora pre- sentare in un libro pel
quale ho già preparato tutti i materiali. L'Etica sociologica positiva lo
dimostra nel suo studio (i) Cosi ho scritto e ripetuto nelle edizioni precedenti,
quando aveva ancora la fiducia di poter ultimare il lavoro. La speranza ora è
quasi svanita. La circostanza di essere impegnato otto mesi del- l' anno per le
lezioni mi lasciò sempre poco tempo per ciò che avrei voluto fare fuori di
esse. Gran parte del materiale preparato per la Formazione naturale nel fatto
del Pensiero mi ha servito pei tre libri del Vero^ della Ragione e della Unità
della Coscienza, E questi quindi possono supplire tanto o quanto invece del
libro promesso; che poi non ha cessato di preoccuparmi, come apparisce dai
lavori sull'argo- mento pubblicati nei Volumi IX e X di queste Op, fU, Ptll — della FORMAZIONE NATURALE NEL FATTO DELL’ORDINE
MORALE, che è l' oggetto della presente trattazione. 10. — Ora è noto come la
scienza oggi, illuminata e messa sulla strada dal genio di Darwin, dimostri av-
venire allo stesso modo la FORMAZIONE NATURALE NEL FATTO DELLA SPECIE organica:
e per ciò mi devo rimettere ai libri che uq trattano. Anche qui si rileva lo
stesso processo di formazione, indicato per V invenzione del disegno della
locomotiva a vapore nella Mente umana, pei lenti e accidentali ingran- dimenti
e tramutamenti di struttura e conseguentemente di funzione: la stessa ragione,
onde la formazione già ot- tenuta è riprodotta nella forma raggiunta. E per la
stessa legge, da me formulata nel libro della Formazione naturale più volte
citato, del ritmo che lentamente si trasforma per gli urti esterni non concor-
danti, e indefinitamente si conserva in quanto non è di- sturbato, e si
trapianta fuori di sé, applicato come forza ad un altro essere atto a
riceverla. Ciò posto, riepiloghiamo il nostro ragiona- mento. Il piano mentale
è un meccanismo o apparato psico- logico riuscito per aggiunte e modificazioni
cernali suc- cessive, indipendenti da un proposito consapevole del sog- getto
pensante, e occasionato dalle azioni e reazioni ac- cidentalmente verificatesi
tra esso soggetto e le cose ate. Vedi Formazione naturale nel fatto del Sistema
Solare ^ Os- servaz. Ili, J XIV.a impressionarlo,come la specie della gallina è
un mec-- canisfno o apparato fisiologico riuscito per aggiunte e mo-
dificazioni casuali occasionate dalle azioni e reazioni dell' ambiente in cui
si è formata. L' apparato psicologico del piano mentale serve alla produzione
di un' opera a sua immagine e somiglianza: come l'apparato fisiologico della
specie della gallina serve alla produzione di un individuo nuovo della specie
mede- sima. Il fatto è come di uno stromento che 1' arte della natura (cioè del
complesso delle cause che esistono in essa) ha preparato, nel primo caso entro
la psiche deU r uomo, nel secondo caso entro la vita della gallina, per
produrre 1' opera relativa (i). Dunque nel disegno della mente ciò che si
chiama il fitte di esso (poniamo per la locomotiva a vapore di muoversi della
macchina sulla ferrovia colla forza di tra- scinarsi dietro il treno
attaccatovi) non è un primo, che la Mente si sia proposta e che abbia motivato
per essa il divisamento, al quale sia quindi venuta solo dopo, delle sue parti,
come deimezzi necessari al conseguimento del fine medesimo: nel che si fa
consistere la ragione di dover (i) Nel Capo I della Parte II del Libro I della
Morale dei Positivisti, numero 3 ho mostrato potersi definire la Psiche: Un
mondo possibile^ che si presenta coyne il piano dell* opera a chi ha da pro-
durne uno reale. E precedentemente vi è dimostrata la casualità della
formazione del stessa psiche. Una cosa affatto analoga è V energia specifica di
un agente naturale fisico qualunque. Tale energia è un ordine di proprietà
costituite nella cosa per la stessa ragione della casualità della sua
formazione, le quali vengono ad essere la possi- bilità degli effetti che la
cosa è atta a produrre, e precisamente di un ordine di eff*etti corrispondente
all' ordine delle proprietà dalle quali dipendono. Fra la psiche e V agente puramente
fisico nel ri- ricorrere alla Mentalità per ispiegare il fatto dell’ordine,
inteso quale divisamento dei mezzi necessari al conseguimento di un fine. Nel
disegno della mente, ciò che si chiama il fine non è un primo, ma un ultimo,
che vi si verifica posteriormente, perchè prima vi si è verificata la cogni-
zione dei mezzi. Nel fatto particolare della concezione del disegno della
locomotiva a vapore allo scopo di trascinare il treno ferroviario, la Mente che
vi è arrivata possedeva già la cognizione della forza del vapore; e del modo di
farlo agire sopra uno stantuffo si che ne risultasse un movi- mento di va e
vieni sopra un'asta; e del modo di con- vertire il movimento rettilineo dell'
asta in quello circo- lare di una ruota; e la cognizione, che un peso, gravi-
tando sopra ruote che lo portino è girino su guide di ferro, si trasloca con esse.
Solo dopo ciò, solo dopo che la Mente era già pervenuta alla cognizione di
questi mezzi, ad esso potè sovvenire V applicabilità loro al fine di avere un
motore di un treno ferroviario. L'Ordine adunque anche nella Mente è un
risultato accidentale di concorrenze casuali nel quale i mezzi non spetto in
discorso si ha la sola differenza, che nella prima l'ordine mentale, causa
dell'ordine delle opere, mettiamo dell* uomo, è accom- pagnato dalla coscienza
di sé, mentre nel secondo 1' ordine delle proprietà attive, causa dell' ordine
de' suoi effetti, non è fornito di tale coscienza. Ma ciò non influisce punto
ad alterare la natura del processo della estrinsecazione, per così esprimermi,
della attività. Cosciente o non cosciente, V attività funziona in un agente
sempre e necessariamente nel modo onde è atta a funzionare, ossiasecondo
lacostituzione propria dell'attività stessa nella intimità dell'agente che la
esercita. L sono determinati dal fine,
ma è questo determinato dai mezzi. E tanto, che supporre il contrario è
supporre ima impossibilità o un assurdo della dinamica della natura. E cesi la
tantovantata scoperta di Anassagora, che V Or- dine dell'universo importi una
Mente ordinatrice, vale quella del suo predecessore Talete, che si argomentò di
ritenere doversi V attrazione della calamita pel ferro ad un' anima che vivesse
in essa, e ne determinasse questo effetto curioso. Se qualcheduno qui credesse
di sfuggire alla nostra conclusione, osservando che il pensiero che si at-
tribuisce a dio non è come il pensiero dell' uomo, sul quale noi facemmo la
nostra argomentazione, risponde- remmo due cose: Primo. O il pensiero
attribuito a dio è qualche cosa di analogo al pensiero dell'uomo, e allora
l'argomenta- zione fatta su questo vale anche per quello: o non è una cosa
analoga, e allora non si può dire che sia un pen- siero. Perchè a noi, quando
diciamo, pensiero, è impossi- bile concepire altro che non sia lo stesso nostro
pensiero. E poi non si può ancora in nessuna maniera fondarvi sopra r
argomentazione relativa all' Ordine, dal momento che questa è suggerita
precisamente (quantunque per sem- plice illusione) dal fatto dello stesso
pensiero umano. Secondo. Lo stesso fatto della natura poi smentisce
direttamente la supposizione della obiezione. E in che modo? Si disse: Concepì
dio il disegno del mondo e poi lo esegui creandolo: e tale subitoqualedoveva
es- sere poi sempre a gloria sua; e quindi coli' uomo, dotato per ciò da lui,
non solo del senso come il bruto, ma anche della ragione e del libero volere,
che lo rendes- sero atto a conoscerlo e a rendergli omaggio e culto spontaneo.
E il sistema era logico. Non aveva che il piccolo di- fetto di essere basato
sul falso supposto che il mondo at- tuale sia una formazione che persista
immutabilmente: tale al suo primo principio, tale ancora fin che ne dura la
esistenza. Ma la scienza s'è avveduta che la formazione quale ora si presenta,
l'uomo compreso, è una fasetransitoria della esistenza. E con ciò ha distrutto
il sogno che fosse r opera definitiva, nella quale si fosse realizzato
appuntino il disegno di una Mente divina. La scienza s' è avveduta, che lo
stato attuale delle cose è dovuto ad un processo continuo di formazione ana-
logo a quello delle idee e dell' arte dell' uomo, e che que- sto processo è
determinato dalla attività intrinseca delle stesse coseche si
formano, e dal caso delle reazioni delle cose fra di loro. E con ciò ha
distrutto il sogno che siano r Ordine preveduto come fine in una divina idea. I
teisti, smentiti così nel campo degli Ordini della natura fisica, si
restrinsero a sostenere il loro prin- cipio della preordinazione della Mente
divina, nel campo dell' ORDINE MORALE; e credettero che quivi sareb- bero
rim£isti eternamente inoppugnabili. Ma ahi! che anche qui la scienza li ha
seguiti e ha messo in evidenza la insostenibilità della loro tesi.La scienza
positiva dell' Etica sociologfica ha sco- perto, come vedemmo, 1' analogia
perfetta che corre tra la formazione naturale in genere e quella della
Giustizia e del Bene morale in tutte le sue forme. Ha scoperto quindi che tutto
ciò che si riferisce all' Ordine morale, e r Ordine morale medesimo, sono il
prodottolento e pro- gressivo {e vario secondo le dccidentalitàaccompagnanti)
della attività intrinseca dell' essere umano e delle reazioni degli individui
nella convivenza della Società. Il fatto
del Diritto (diversità, specie, coordinazione) e il suo Ideale. Circa la
diversità del Diritto tra individuo e individuo, in ragione della potenzialità
non ugnale dal- l' uno air altro, alle cose dette nel libro della Morale dei
Positivisti {\) e superiormente in questo {2), un'altra im* portantissima qui
ora torna la opportunità di aggfiungerne. La diversità in discorso dipende in
parte dalla stessa costituzione fisico^psichica colla quale uno nasce; e per
questo riguardo si potrebbe chiamarla diversità ini- zicUe; e in parte
(grandissima) è il prodotto della convi- venza sociale: e per questo altro
riguardo si potrebbe (i) Libro I, Parte II, Capo IV, n. 15 ecc. (pag. 125 del
Voi. ITI di queste Op, fil. nella ediz. del 1885, e pag. 131 nella ediz. del
1893 e del 1901 e pag. 135 nella ediz. del 1908). (2) Capo III, J II, n. 3. pi
L I «IP^« chiamarla diversità riuscita. La quale poi alla sua volta influisce
pur anche indirettamente sulla disposizione ini- ziale della nascita. L'
argomento della diversità del diritto, considerata sotto il secondo degli
aspetti ora indicati, è vastissimo: ma noi qui lo toccheremo solo per ciò che
occorre allo scopo della nostra trattazione. Le specialità di condizione di un uomo,
dipen- denti dalla sua relazione e convivenza cogli altri uomini uniti in
Società, sono moltissime; come ognuno sa. Per esempio, la ricchezza, la
parentela, la clientela, gli ade- renti, gli amici, i conoscenti, T ufficio, il
grado, la cultura, il merito, le idee, e via discorrendo. Queste specialità di
condizione sono nello stesso tempo altrettante specialità di attitudini e di
potenza del- l' uomo. E quindi anche, secondo le cose stabilite sopra,
altrettante specialità di Diritti di esso. Si verifica perciò nell'organismo
sociale la legge di tutti gli organismi, per la quale V elemento, che, con-
siderato in astratto e fuori dell' orgfanismo, è uniforme, una volta entrato a
farne parte, si diversifica per opera dell'organismo medesimo; poiché questo,
fra le moltis- sime funzioni delle quali un elemento ha primitivamente la
potenzialità indistinta, lo dispone e lo destina ad una data funzione distinta.
Che è ciò che si chiama anche il fenomeno della divisione del lavoro, ed è
nello stesso tempo ciò che altrove (i) dicemmo corrispondere alla (i) Per
esempio, nella Formazione naturale nel fatto del sistema solarCy Osservazione
III, § V (nel Voi. II di queste Op, fil,). wf^'^vmmmifm^gg^ della varietà, onde
si spiega T attitudine alla esi- stenza e alla virtù formativa nella natura in
generale e negli organismi in particolare. Così vediamo che gli atomi
polivalenti del carbonio si costituiscono, negli organismi degli animali e
delle piante, in una serie di forme diverse di radicali: in una serie tanto più
notevole per numero e varietà, quanto più complicato e perfetto è V organismo
costruitone. Nell'organismo sociale poi i suoi radicali (per ado- perare questa
espressione) o le sue varietà elementari co- stitutive, o attitudini distinte
di funzione, onde emerge r essere suo complessivo quale organismo sociale, sono
precisamente le specialità di condizione dell' uomo sopra accennate: ossia
quelle specialità di potenza, che l'uomo vi assume: ossia le specialità dei
Diritti, I quali Diritti, nell' organismo sociale, in pari tempo, e lo
costituiscono, e ne sono determinati. In modo che la Società si può chiamare la
procreatrice dei Diritti, Come la pianta è la. procreatrice delle sostanze
speciali necessarie alla sua vita particolare; le quali, nello stesso tempo, e
la costituiscono e ne sono determinate. I diritti individuali, per tal modo
nascenti e vigenti in una Società, sono in numero immensamente gratide: e
perchè i fatti determinati sono moltissimi, e perchè questi si connettono
insieme in maniere differen- tissime, e perchè le attitudini emergenti si
diversificano all' infinito secondo le condizioni infinitamente diverse nelle
quali si verificano. Tuttavia si deve avere nella Società umana, in quanto è un
organismo speciale dato, una certa costanza nel nu- - 238 - mero e nella
qualità dei generi secondo i quali si pos- sono classificare i Diritti. Allo
stesso modo che nell'or- ganismo vegetale, per esempio, si ha una certa
costanza nel numero e nella qualità dei generi delle sostante com- ponenti. La
quale costanza però non sarà mai quella delle Idee^ eternamente immutabili, di
Platone; né quella delle specie, sempre le medesime dopo la creazione, dei
vecchi naturalisti; né quella dei Diritti ab eterno ed immutabil- mente
stabiliti dal verbo divino, dell'etica metafisica: ma sarà solo, come dicemmo,
una certa costanza; e si che, da una parte, ammetta una lenta trasformazione
secondo i tempi le circostanze e i casi e, dall'altra, nella realtà si
verifichi sempre con qualche diversità, come il tipo di un uomo o di una
foglia, che non si effettua mai lo stesso in ogni uomo, in ogni foglia. Il
Diritto, che si forma nel modo suddetto, è il Fatto del Diritto; ma non il suo
Ideale, Un uomo esercita la propria potenza in quanto l'ha e in quanto
glaltriglielo permettono, o gli detta la Idealità sociale: che torna lo stesso,
dal momento che la Idealità sociale non è che 1' astratto della reazione altrui
e quindi del permesso dato dagli altri di agire. £ la forma della reazione
altrui e quindi della Idealità sociale, nella loro tendenza a ridurre e
trasformare la prepotenza egoistica originaria dell' arbitrio individuale nella
Giu- stizia antiegoistica del suo concc«:so nel lavoro social- mente utile,
sono continuamente in via di progressivo mu- tamento; come spiegammo sopra, e
come esige, secondo che pure avvertimmo più volte, la legge universale della
^'«ifannipiiij I ^^Formazione naturale applicata al caso particolare della
Formazione etico-sociale.6. — Un uomo esercita la propria potenza in quanto r
ha e gli altri glielo permettono, o gli detta V Idealità sociale regolante il
suo operare. Ecco il Fatto del Diritto. La reazione sociale, e quindi V
Idealità mentale con- seguente diretttiva dell' azione umana, va sempre
trasfor- mando r arbitrio individuale dalla sua originaria prepo-
tenzaegoistica nella Giustizia antiegoistica. £ questa Giustizia antiegoistica,
alla quale tende la detta forza trasformatrice, è T Ideale del Diritto. Ma
questo Ideale è un termine al quale si può andare avvicinandosi sempre più,
senza che si effettui però mai perfettamente. E da ciò consegue: Primo. Che V
Ideale assoluto del Diritto non esiste realmente. Sicché è una assurdità il
concetto di un ordi- namento morale definitivo, come porta la dottrina meta-
fisica della istituzione morale per parte di un legislatore divino, che la
fissasse una volta per sempre, e nei ter- mini di una sognata Giustizia
assoluta e quindi irrefor-mabile. Secondo. Che il fatto del Diritto è sempre
una Giti^ stizia relativa: e cioè relativa al lavoro di riduzione so- ciale
precedente e alla potenza attuale dell' organismo so- ciale derivatone. Ma tale
Giustizia, quantunquesolamente relativa quando sia rapportata ad un concetto
astratto più perfetto dell' organismo sociale, nella Società in cui vige ha
valore come se fosse assoluta, perchè essa giù- ■Jf W4» l dica, non in base all' Ideale o di un' altra
Società o di una Società possibile più perfetta, ma in base al Fatto che si è
già verificato in essa. Terzo. Che ogni Diritto di fatto è nello stesso tempo
in parte una prepotenza ingiusta, che si tende ad elimi- nare, e si va sempre
più eliminando. E ciò, sia regolando meglio il fatto medesimo, sia, quando
occorra, togliendolo del tutto. 8. — Senza questi criteri è affattoinspiegabile
la storia del Diritto, e il processo legislativo delle Società. Tale processo,
senza questi criteri, apparirebbe, non la Giustizia in azione (come è
realmente, e non può non es- sere), ma la ingiustizia incaricata di creare la
Giustizia. E con questi criteri poi si spiega il fatto storico della evoluzione
sociale procreatrice del Diritto più utile e più giusto. La quale evoluzione
quindi, secondo i cri- teri medesimi, si può dire consistere in ciò, che il
Diritto dell' avvenire, ossia il Diritto ideale, combatte e vince il Diritto
delpassato, ossia il Diritto di fatto. L' Ideale assoluto del Diritto dicemmo
che non esiste realmente. E che nella realtà non si ha, dell'Ideale del
Diritto, se non una effettuazione incompleta. E da ciò potrebbe altri dedurre,
che il Diritto di fatto sia un relativo il quale supponga un assoluto: e che
questo assoluto sia l'Ideale o il tipo eternamente deter- minato del Diritto,
che la mente o possieda gfià o abbia la possibilità di possedere quandochesia.
Ma anche ciò è un errore. L'Ideale del Diritto non è un tipo assoluto o eter-
namente determinato, nemmeno come semplice mentalità. L' Idealità del Diritto
è, anch' essa, un fatto, come quello del Diritto effettuatosi realmente. U
Idealità del Diritto presiede si, come mentalità direttiva, nella pro- duzione
del Diritto di fatto, ma è pur sempre un fatto anch' essa. Solo che questa
Idealità è un fatto della mente, dove il Diritto effettuatosi realmente è un
fatto della co- stituzione già vigente esteriormente in una Società. Ed essendo
un fatto ha le proprietà di tutti gli altri fatti jn quanto tali: cioè di
essere casuale e quindi relativo. Il tipo ideale del Diritto è come tutti gli
altri tipi ideali. Per esempio, come quello del disegno della crea-- zione
supposto nella mentedi dio, del quale abbastanza ho discorso nel libro della
Formazione naturale, E come, quello dell' arte; mettiamo dell'Architettura: che
(per una serie di casualità) è riuscito diverso nell'India, in Egitto, in
Roma,in Germania, e via dicendo; e pur nello stesso paese non fu mai identico
affatto nemmeno nella stessa epoca, e nemmeno in due soli architetti, anzi
nemmeno nello stesso architetto in tutta la sua vita. Il tipo ideale del
Diritto, come tutti quanti i tipi ideali, è una formazione mentale, che
apparisce un dato momento per una accidentalità che la suggerisce; vi si
perfeziona poi in una data maniera per altre accidentalità che guidano la mente
a farlo; e un dato momento poi si oblia e si sostituisce con altri diversi e
opposti, ancora per delle accidentalità che ve la inducono. E tanto, che il
tipo ideale stesso non è quindi deter- minabile a priori, come un vero
preesistente inmodofisso e inalterabile nella mente di ognuno: ma solo a poste-
riori, cioè come 1' astratto di tutti i tipi conosciuti veri- Vol. IV. 16 ficatisi
effettivamente nelle Società umane d* ogni tempo. A quella maniera che il tipo
del vegetale non si può avere se non pel confronto mentale fra le forme reali
che effettivamente s* è dato che se ne producessero. IO. — Che se altri dicesse
che il tipo ideale del Di- ritto è assoluto in quanto è il corrispettivo
necessario etico-sociale di una entità reale, cioè dell' uomo e della sua
convivenza nella Società (i), risponderemmo: Primo. Che la reale entità stessa,
dell' uomo e della sua convivenza nella Società, determinante necessaria- mente
il tipo ideale del Diritto, è ancora una somma di accidentalità, che si rileva
a posteriori, e non si prefigge a priori. Secondo. Che il tipo ideale del
Diritto sipresta al concetto di essere il correspettivo necessario del fatto
so- ciale, non come il disegno preesistente di ciò che non è ancora succeduto;
ma solo come V astratto rilevato dopo (i) Su ciò ho scritto nella Psicologia
come scienza positiva (Voi. I di queste Opev e filosofiche pag. 219, 220) un
tratto che stimo op- portono di ripetere anche qui: « Anche nel dire, idealità,
il filosofo positivo esprime un concetto armonizzante i veri imperfetti di
diverse scuole. La scuola psicologica dà l'idea, come una mera forma del tutto
soggettiva, accidentale e variabile del pensiero. La scuola onto- logica le
assegna un valore oggettivo, immutabile ed assoluto. La scuola storica ricorre
per ispiegarla alle relazioni dell'uomo colle con- dizioni esterne in cui vive,
per cui le attribuisce una semioggettività, e la considera, da una parte contro
i psicologi, non una creazione fa- cile ed efimera dell' individuo, ma una
produzione faticosa,lenta, du- revole della Società, e dall' altra contro gli
ontologi, non una intui- zione che la riveli d' un tratto nella sua interezza
ed in una forma unica sempre e per tutti, ma una formazione progressiva e
varia, che incomincia dall' abbozzo per venire al lavoro sempre più finito; e
che riesce con aspetti diversi, secondo le circostanze differenti dalle quali
•*-^..r9,rr-fr- ^.-^ — 243 di ciò che è già succeduto. Onde il ricorrervi che
fanno i nostri avversari è un circolo vizioso. §n. // Diritto è in virtù di se
stesso, gioverà qui ripetere, in forma appropriata a questo punto del nostro
discorso, ciò che pursopra sotto vari aspetti dimostrammo. Quello che può un
uomo, che fa parte di una So- cietà, è una forza, che vi si pone da sé col solo
fatto che r uomo medesimo ne faccia parte; e che vi emerge in quanto non vi è
elisa dal contrasto dei consociati. Come già dicemmo più volte. Emergendo la
forza di un uomo nella Società, vi è dipende. Or bene anche nel filosofo
positivo l' idea è una formazione lenta, progressiva, durevole, non dell'
individuo, ma della società, e dipendente dalie esteme condizioni di essa, ma
solo in quanto queste condizioni esterne e l'opera sociale giovano a dare
eccitamento e rin- forzo al pensiero individuale, il quale è il vero fattore
dell' idea, se- condo chedicono giustamente i psicologisti. Ma l' individuo e
la so- cietà, producendo l' idea, non fanno opera capricciosa, ed avente solo
valore momentaneo e soggettivo. No: tale lavoro ha la sua ragione nella stessa
natura per la quale agiscono, come la forma che assume il seme germogliando. E
come la forma assunta dal seme per la ger- mogliazione, più che se stessa,
rappresenta queir ordine di cose, che ha determinato la formazione della specie
vegetale a cui appartiene, cosi r idea di un uomo, più che 1' operazione
accidentale, soggettiva, variabilissima di esso, rappresenta, secondo che
dicono giustamente gliontologisti, queir ordine assoluto e immutabile, almeno
quantola natura, nel quale è la ragione oggettiva del fatto particolare, che
consideriamo. Vedi per esempio nel Capo I, dove parlammo della Giustizia
potenziale y e nel Capo II, dove parlammo della derivazione della Giustizia
dalla prepotenza. ■«T- riconosciuta: o estrale galmente nel tacito consenso
degli altri uomini, e nell' uso, e nella esplicita manifestazione dell'opinione
pubblica in qualunque modo approvante: o legalmente nelle forme stabilite dal
Potere sociale rico- nosciuto come tale. E pel detto riconoscimento la forza in
discorso acqui- sta il carattere di Diritto, per la ragione che importa la
Responsabilità di chi la lede verso la Società, la quale, col suo
riconoscimento, se ne è costituita tutrice e vin- dice. E quindi è falsa V idea
che il Diritto emani assolu- tamente dall'Autorità superiore, che lo doni o lo
conceda air inferiore. Non emana da essa: esiste potenzialmente prima e
indipendentemente e malgrado di essa: si impone da sé: e sforza la stessa
Autorità ad ammetterlo col riconoscerlo e sancirlo. E anche questo dicemmo già
più volte. Ma ci occorre ora di far notare un fatto essen- ziale alla dottrina
della sociologia positiva, non ancor ri- levato: il fatto cioè che il Potere
sociale crea pur esso direttamente dei Diritti individuali. E, dato questo, si
domanda: come si accorda questo fatto col suddetto principio della emanazione
del Diritto dall'individuo e non dalla Società? Facile è la risposta. Il fatto
della creazione di un Diritto individuale per parte del Potere sociale si ac-
corda col principio in discorso per la ragione che questo Potere, nel caso qui
contemplato, può porre il Diritto neir individuo in quanto può fornirlo di una
forza; e in quanto questa forza, che l' individuo ha ritratto dal potere che
gliel' ha fornita, sia riconoscibile quale Diritto come le altre forze
possedute comecchessia dall'individuo medesimo, e dalla società rispettate o
difese. In ogni caso il fatto del Diritto di un uomo neir organismo sociale è
analogo a quello delle proprietà acquistate dall' elemento materiale quando é
entrato a far parte di un organismo; e, per un esempio, dalla molecola
combinata nel tutto di una sostanza, che acquista la forza specificamente
funzionante della sostanza medesima solo perchè è divenuta V elemento di essa.
Nell’organismo chimico di una sostanza V elemento è la molecola, come neir
organismo sociale l’elemento è la persona di un uomo. L' organismo intero, neir
un caso e neir altro, e' è solo pel rapporto della forza di un ele- mento con
quelle degli altri; ossia per orientarla se- condo la coordinazione acconcia di
tutte. Il che però non esclude: Primo. Che, coordinandosi nella complessa
azione dell' organismo le forze proprie degli elementi, ognuno di questi non ne
ceda un tanto a formare delle somme comuni, che poi siano distribuite di nuovo
nelle parti in ordine alle esigenze generali dell' organismo. Secondo. Che l'
individuo stesso non dipenda (e in quanto giunge all' acquisto di tutte le
forze onde riesce rivestito, e in quanto le conserva e ne usa liberamente)
dall' ambiente sociale, nel quale trova il mezzo dell'acquisto e della sua
gsiranzia. Sicché per questo lato (ma per questo solamente) è vero il principio
della derivazione del Diritto neir individuo dalla Società e dal suo Potere direttivo:
e come, per esempio, nella sostanza del chimico, nella quale, in virtù della
sua costituzione, le forze sono condotte ad assommarsi in certi punti
determinati, e in certa maniera; e poi anche V acquisto e la costanza della
forza specifica operante negli atomi dipendono dall' es- servi coordinati. Il
diritto è la facoltà del bene sociale. L’esercizio del diritto è la funzione
del bene sociale. Dalle cose dette apparisce, che il Diritto è la facoltà del
Bene sociale; e che l'esercizio del Diritto è la funzione del Bene sociale. E ciò,
o solo indirettamente, o anche direttamente. Solo indirettamente, in quanto la
facoltà indi- viduale sia puramente V egoismo contenuto nei limiti inof-
fensivi per gli altri e producente il Bene dell' individuo investitone; che
torna il bene della Società, e perchè è il Bene del suo elemento, e perchè se
ne possono giovare e se ne giovano anche gli altri. Come nel fatto di una
industria, che arricchisce l'in- dustriale, e quindi anche il paese, e offre
nello stesso tempo un utile e un comodo ai consumatori de' suoi pro- dotti. E
anche direttamente, in quanto la facoltà in- dividuale sia quella che
corrisponde alla Idealità antiegoi- stica; la quale, come si estenda in urla
Società adulta e colta e bene ordinata e fiorente, vedemmo sopra; dove anzi
dimostrammo che, se si tien conto di tutte le gra- dazioni della Idealità e
delle disposizioni antiegoistiche (da una minima che lavori insieme con un
massimo di egoismo, ad una massima che lavori insieme ad un mi- nimo
diegoismo), si trova in tutto ciò che può fare e fa r individuo sociale. Il Diritto
costa una contribuzione, I. — Ma, se, da una parte, l'individuo è investito di
una potenza o di un Diritto (del quale usa poi facendo, o indirettamente, o
direttamente, il vantaggio altrui) dal- l' altra, la stessa potenza o Diritto
costa una contribuzione per parte degli altri. E questa una legge naturale
correlativa alla sopra accennata e necessariamente ad essa collegata. Si piglia;
ma si deve dare. Si dà; ma si piglia per poter dare. Questa legge dell'
organismo sociale non è altro cioè che r applicazione al caso particolare di
esso organismo della legge che domina in tutti gli organismi, anzi in tutta la
natura, dove una forza, posseduta da un agente che funziona in virtù di essa,
è, non una forza creata dal nulla neir agente medesimo, ma comunicata ad esso
da altri agenti, che gliela cedono in ragione dei rapporti correnti fra quello
che cede e quello che acquista; come ho dimostrato nel libro della Formazione
naturale, par- lando del ritmo (i). Il vegetale si appropria l' acido carbonico
che lo at- (i) Vedi Formazione naturale nel fatto del sistema solare^ Os-
servazione terza. § XIV (nel Voi. II di queste Op. Jil.J. tornia, e con esso
mantiene la vita. Gli animali maggiori vivono cibandosi dei minori. Neir organismo
di un mam- mifero alcune parti lavorano a preparare il sangue, e le masse
nervose ne fanno consumo. Impossibile V attività specifica nervosa, necessaria
al funzionamento generale deir organismo e anche a quello particolare delle
parti preparanti il sangue, senza la contribuzione di queste alla nutrizione
dei nervi mediante la somministrazione del sangue acconciamente preparato e
distribuito. 2. — Parlando in particolare deir organismo sociale, la
partecipazione al contributo di ciascuna parte è in ra-gione della importanza
del Diritto, e quindi della facoltà di produrre il Bene sociale. Più è r
importanza del Diritto, e più è la facoltà di produrre il Bene sociale. Più è
questa facoltà e più è la partecipazione al contributo delle parti. Come nel
resto della natura, dove si trova che le funzioni più elevate de* suoi agenti
costano un immagaz- zinamento di forza tanto più grande quanto più distinta è
la forma e ìa sfera della efficienza. Risultando cosi una proporzione di
equivalenza tra la natura che dà e quella che riceve. E in questo modo, che al
più della contri- zione apportata corrisponda il più della importanza della
attività emergente. Per la stessa ragione il Diritto di un ordine supe- riore,
quello ad esempio di un Giudice, costa una contri- buzione per parte di quelli
sui quali ha giurisdizione. Sicché il Giudice mangia dei frutti della terra che
essi hanno lavorato, come il sistema nervoso consuma del sangue che fu
preparato da altre parti dell'organisme animale. PPP^P"?!'^. Come molto movimento
equivale a poco di calore, e molto calore a poco di attività chimica, e molta
attività chimica a poco di attività vitale, e molta attività vitale a poco di
pensiero; cosi, nell'ordine etico della natura, a molta materialità (intendendo
con questa espressione le forme inferiori della esistenza) corrisponde poco di
attitudine morale: poiché, nella gradazione delle formazioni naturali e quindi
delle equivalenze delle forze, i suoi poli opposti possiamo rappresentarceli, o
andando dal movimento meccanico al pensiero, che ne è l'ultima trasformazione
(i), o andando dalla materialità alla mora- lità, che è r ultima e più sublime
sfera della evoluzione ascendente della natura insensibile e bruta. Naturale è
questo fatto della contribuzione delle parti nell'organismo sociale. E quindi,
non effetto solo di arbitrio o prepotenza di alcuno, ma necessario; a quel modo
che è necessario l'assorbimento del carbonio per parte del vegetale, e il
consumo del sangue per parte dei nervi. E naturale il fatto stesso; ed anche
giusto, in quanto è, direttamente o indirettamente, consentito ed approvato da
quelli che contribuiscono. Ed è consentito ed approvato da questi per la legge,
rilevata dagli economisti, della domanda; la quale, come tutti sanno, consiste
in ciò, che più una cosa importa a molti e più è domandata; e tanto più si paga
quanto più (i) Intendendo questo nel senso della filosofia positiva e non in
quello della metafìsica materialistica. Come spiego da per tutto nei miei
libri, e più a lungo in quello col titolo V Unità della Coscienza nel VII voi.
dì queste Op. fil. iiu^.i'i>nn^ si
domanda; ma si paga quanto occorre per averla e non più. Questa legge poi, che
determina nei suoi limiti ne- cessari la contribuzione assentita e giusta
nell'organismo sociale, è analoga alla fisiologica, onde un tessuto vivo si
impadronisce delle sostanze che lo nutrono nei limiti deter- minati dallo
stesso bisogno della funzione domandatagli. 4. — E quindi il fatto in discorso
deve essere con- siderato come un caso speciale di selezione naturale; che si
potrebbe chiamare la selezione etico-sociale. E dalle cose dette si conferma e
si chiarisce viemmeglio la dottrina sopra esposta, che il Diritto indi- viduale
è pur esso una autorità (i). Poiché, come ve- demmo, il Diritto individuale si
impone a tutti quelli che contribuiscono all' essere suo; e agli eguali, che lo
rico- noscono e lo rispettano; e agli inferiori, ossia a quelli che, in ragione
dei rapporti nascenti dalla sua speciale natura, ne subiscono una dipendenza e
una direzione; e al Potere sociale subordinante, in quanto questo non lo crea
ma lo riconosce, ed è determinato a riconoscerlo dal fatto stesso di porsi da
sé; onde, una volta che si sia posto, viene ad essere realmente Diritto in
virtù di se stesso. Le unità minime, le unità medie, e V unità ^ massima nel
corpo sociale. L’individuo è V unità minima del composto so- ciale, come r
atomo del composto chimico. E, come in (i) Vedi Capo III, specialmente \ V. tutti
gli altriorganismi naturali, cosi nel sociale, oltre le unità minime degli
individui sociali, e Munita massima dell' intero organismo, si trovano delle
unità di mezzo di terzo grado, risultanti di più individui associati parti-
colarmente fra loro, o di più di queste associazioni di individui collegate
particolarmente in federazioni più grandi. In unaSocietà adulta, fiorente e
grande, la vita del tutto si manifesta nelle più svariate e spiccanti differen-
ziazionidelle attitudini e conseguentemente dei Diritti individuali, come
accennammo or ora. Anzi la grandezza della Società è, alla sua volta, il
risultato di tali varietà o specificazioni di attitudini; ovvero di tale
divisione di lavoro, verificatavisi: come in ogni altro organismo; per esempio,
in quello fisiologico dell' uomo, nel quale la ec- cellenza zoologica sopra gli
altri animali dipende da una suddivisione di specificazioni in massimo
gradodegli or- gani componenti. In un animale del grado infimo della scala
zoologica la sostanza componente (come avvertimmo nel principio del libro) non
è né muscolo ne nervo: come in una Società umana primitivissima tutti gli
individui sono, mettiamo, dei guardiani d' armenti: e non vi si trova una
distinzione di occupazioni, per salire, po- gniamo, da uno che attende a far
pascolare le oche ad uno che attende a costruire stromenti di ottica o di
astro- nomia. La differenziazione in discorso nella Società più pro-gredita va,
si può dire, all' infinito. E non solo nelle u- nità minime degli individui, ma
anche nelle combinazioni medie già dette delle associazioni degli individui e
delle confederazioni di queste associazioni. Le quali pure, nelle Società
adulte fiorenti e grandi, si producono, per cosi dire, anch' esse all' infinito:
dalle più comuni, normali, e costanti, come quella della/amiglia, alle più
insolite, ac- cidentali ed efimere, come quella ad esempio per dare una volta
una festa o uno spettacolo: dalle più piccole, come di due persone in una
impresa commerciale, alle più grandi, come di due provincie di uno Stato tra
loro consorziate per interessi speciali. Or bene, anche queste unità medie sono
(al modo che una data somma, come tale, si distingue dalle sin- gole quantità
sommate, considerate ad una ad una) sog- getti distinti in possesso di una
facoltà speciale, analoga alla individuale, a somiglianza di ciò che pur si
verifica neglialtri organismi naturali: nei quali, per esempio, la cellula
nervosa singola ha le sue proprietà particolari, e una data massa distinta di
cellule nervose ha un dato uf- ficio distinto fisiologico, che essa esercita in
quanto esiste e si conserva nella peculiarità del suo insieme. E siccome poi il
possesso di una potenza di fare im- porta il possesso di un Diritto, come
dimostrammosopra,cosinellaSocietà si danno i Diritti degli individui e i
Diritti delle stssociazioni loro. E questi Diritti delle As- sociazioni hanno
le proprietà già notate dei Diritti indi- viduali più quelle dipendenti dalla
specialità proporzio- nale della associazione. Delle quali ultime proprietà una
massimamente occorre che sia qui messa in rilievo. L' individuo, in astratto,
si può considerare siccome un plasma generico, il quale, nell' ambiente sociale
e nel circolo della sua vita, secondo le disposizioni già pos- sedute nascendo,
e le circostanze accidentali nelle quali viene a cadere, riceve una
particolarità di impronta di- stinta e tutta sua. Nel che ha luogo un fatto di
selezione naturale: cioè la selezione naturale onde una unità so- ciale si
sceme quale individualità distinta fra altre unità. Anche le agglomerazioni di
più individui in associa- zioni o totalità distinte sono determinate e
foggiate, con grandezze, tendenze e attività particolari, neir ambiente
sociale, secondo i bisogni ed i fatti, e costanti e acciden- tali, onde
emergono, per una analoga selezione naturale distinguente un composto singolo
fra altri composti. Ma in questo composto (o unità media, come sopra lo
chiamammo) ha luogo un' altra forma della selezione naturale: cioè quella che,
neir interno stesso del com- posto, diflFerenzia edistingue fra loro le parti
compo- nenti: e si che esso composto riesca un organismo e non rimanga una
semplice agglomerazione inorganica di ele- menti tutti identici fra loro. E
questa forma di selezione si potrebbe chiamare selezione interorganica. La
unità sociale da noi detta media non è puramente un certo numero di parti
addizionate le une alle altre, ma è una collaborazione organica degli individui
o dei soda- lizi aggregati insieme; e quindi con diversità di attinenze e di
facoltà distribuite fra loro. Altri fanno numero, con- tribuiscono e concorrono
a mantenere T associazione: altri invece la rappresentano, la dirigono, ne
applicano le forze accumulatevi. E, occorrendovi specialità di lavoro e di
ufficio, queste vi sono divise quali negli uni e quali negli altri. E, come è
naturale la creazione di queste differenze interorganiche delle parti
costitutive delle unità medie, cosi è naturale la selezione interorganica dalla
quale di- cemmo che proviene. Questa selezione interorganica, come insegna la
os- servazione del fatto, avviene in diverse maniere secondo i casi; ma
soprattutto secondo la legge, che riesce a una data facoltà ufficio chi piti vi
ha attitudine, o ne ha il merito, e colla condizione del consentimento degli
as- sociati. Il fatto del merito, onde uno acquista una preroga- tiva o una
particolarità d'ufficio a preferenza di altri, è analogo a quello notato da
Darwin della specie preva- lente nella lotta per la esistenza. Il fatto del
consentimento degli associati è analogco air altro, pure da Darwin segnalato,
dell* efficacia del- l' ambiente nel secondare la trasformazione progressiva
dell' essere naturale. L' individuo investito di nna facoltà o di un ufficio in
un corpo di individui o di sodalizi viene con ciò ad avere due sorta di facoltà
o di Diritti: cioè il Di- ritto fondamentale spettante a lui come parte
elementare della Società intera, e il Diritto avventizio, onde è in- vestito
come organo speciale della associazione partico- lare a cui appartiene. Il
Diritto fondamentale ha il suo rapporto immediato colla costituzione generale
delle Società che lo garantisce direttamente a tutti senza distinzione: T
avventizio V ha con quella della associazione particolare per la quale e-
merge; ed è garantito dal Potere sociale supremo in quanto esso riconosce il
Diritto della medesima associa- zione particolare. Se privato si dice ciò che è
proprio della unità sociale minima, come tale, e pubblico ciò che è proprio
della unità massima, parlando delle unità medie si dirà che hanno un carattere
di mezzo tra i due, e gradata- mente; in ragione cioè della importanza loro,
intensiva- mente o estensivamente, nella vita sociale complessiva. Il pubblico
poi si differenzia in genere dal privato in quanto ha un rapporto diretto col
Bene, non indivi- duale, ma sociale; ossia è, non egoistico, ma antiegoistico.
La proprietà quindi di ente morale antiegoistico com- peterà massimamente alla
unità più glande o allo Stato. E se, come sopra dicemmo, il Diritto in genere è
\2l fa- coltà del Bene sociale e il suo esercizio è la funzione del Bene
sociale, ciò si avvererà meno pel Diritto privato, più pel Diritto delle
associazioni sociali intermedie, e in grado più alto pel Diritto dello Stato.
Ma non diremo che per questo Diritto dello Stato il principio si avveri proprio
nel grado massimo, per la ragione che, come sopra dicemmo n), uno Stato
singolo, o già in effetto, o almeno in potenza, si coordina internazionalmente
con altri Stati, anzi con tutte le Società umane esistenti sulla terra. La
selezione interorganica nella evoluzione formatrice dello Stato. La legge della
selezione interorganica, che si avvera nella costituzione degli organismi delle
unità com- (i) Dove parlammo del Diritto internazionale (Capo [, \ II). plesse
medie, si avvera poi per le ragioni medesime nella costituzione dell' organismo
della unità massima dello Stato. Ed è per essa legge che ha luogo in questo la
formazione del Potere onde si esercitano le sue fimzioni subordinanti, che sono
poi funzioni del Bene sociale. Questa selezione assume storicamente forme svari
atis- sime. Ma anche la varietà è determinata da una ragione costante, che si
rivela chiarissimamente nella storia poli- tica degli Stati, e che non è altro
che una applicazione del principio nostro fondamentale della formazione etico-
sociale, che cioè la prepotenza è V indistinto onde si forma il distinto della
Giicstizia, E in vero nello stadio iniziale, o della prepotenza, la selezione
formatrice del Potere sociale è dipendente dalla violenza, che a poco a poco si
mitiga nella eredità, finché da ultimo è sostituita, prima in parte e poi del
tutto, dalla elezione (per parte dei subordinati, e in modo legale e pacifico)
dei più degni, in ragione del merito morale e della Giustizia» e non del
soprastare materiale della ricchezza o della forza dei muscoli: e si che riesca
investito dell' ufficio chi si trova piti atto ad esercitarlo, e che il Potere
nella direzione del corpo sociale sia quel premio del virtuoso del quale un'
altra volta parlammo nel Capo precedente (i). 2. — Il costante e vivissimo
lavoro evolutivo del- l' organismo dello Stato, onde si ha la sua formazione
na- turale e il suo sviluppo e isuo progresso, è T applica- zione nel grado
massimo del principio della formazione (I) \ VII, numero 8. morale, cioè, dall'
indistinto (morale solo virtualmente) della prepotenza e dell' egoismo, al
distinto (morale in atto) della Giustizia antiegoistica. Più procede la
formazione organica dello Stato e più si estende e arriva in tutte le parti e
nel!' intimo di esse la virtù direttiva e moralmente perfezionatrice della So-
vranità politica. In modo che, dove prima le parti erano agglomerate e
coacervate e tenute in fascio violentemente, a poco a poco vanno organizzandosi
vitalmente insieme e finiscono coli' aderire 1' una con V altra, e tutte nel
tutto, volontariamente e per liberoconsentimento. Come, per esempio, le
molecole di certe sostanze, che fanno sentire la loro affinità e aderiscono
insieme a formare un cri- stallo solo in seguito ad una compressione che le
sforzò a ravvicinarsi meccanicamente. Il quale processo però va di pari passo
con quel- r altro; che le parti stesse subordinate, di mano in mano che si
orientano nella armonia politica dello Stato, di- ventando partecipi e
collaboratrici della sua vita, reagi- scono sul Potere sovraincombente,
rintuzzando la prepo- tenza, che vi fosse, e riducendolo ad una forza giusta e
mo- rale; ad una forza, in una parola, diretta al Bene di tutti. 3. — Non è
nostro compito (non richiedendolo lo scopo del presente libro) di studiare i
modi precisi onde, per la elezione interorganica, e pel processo di distin-
zione, si va formando nell' organismo dello Stato bordine del Potere, che
riesce un sistema complesso di funzioni speciali esercitate da individui e
corpi particolari; e come nasca il fatto, mettiamo, della divisione del Governo
in diversi ministeri, e di ciascuno di questi in parecchie Voi. IV. 17 dipendenze, alle quali, variamente e per mez£o
di centri subordinati, si rannodano le ultime propag^ni della
am-ministrazionepubblica sparse in ogni parte dello Stato. Pel nostro scopo, in
riguardo alle specializzazioni ac- cennate degli organi del Potere, basterà
fare T osserva- zione (pure importantissima) che, come si distinguono tra loro
le amministrazioni pubbliche, e quindi gli c^getti di ciascheduna, e
conseguentemente il modo di funzionare (che deve atteggiarsi in conformità
dell' intento da otte- nere), cosi si distinguono tra di loro le Sanzioni pub-
bliche e legali degli atti sociali relativi; e quindi (si noti bene) le specie
di Responsabilità, che neemergono. E da ciò proviene che le forme della
Giustizia e quindi della Moralità si specializzano insieme collo spe-
cializzarsi della pubblica amministrazione; onde, moral- mente, non sono, per
esempio, identiche le azioni degli individui giudicate da un tribunale civile e
quellegiudi- cate da una una intendenza di finanza, o da una commis- sione
igienica o di belle arti; e per un reato controla proprietà individuale o per
uno contro le restrizioni della libertà della stampa, in materia scientifica; e
cosi via. Il che non vuol dire però che non si possano tutte le dette azioni
ridurre al genere comune delle obbliga- torie nel foro intimo della coscienza,
in ragione che Del- l' individuo si è formata, come sopra abbiamo dimostrato, r
abitudine virtuosa e propria del saggio; l'abitudine cioè di attribuire
universalmente alle Idealità antiegoistiche sociali un valore obbligativo per
se, assoluto e indipen- dente dalle specialità di procedura e di Sanzione, che
loro corrispondono nella amministrazione governativa. m — Come risuiii spiegata
la prima /orina de li* ufficio del Intere, e anche la terza: e stabilito l'
assunto del liérù. Ora, facendo, colla proporzione dovuta, al fatto del Diritto
del Potere, Tapplicazione del priacipio stabi- lito sopra, che ogni Diritto
importa una conirièuzionc, possiamo trovare la verità di quella che sopra, alla
fine del Capo I, dicemmo la pritna forma dell' ufficio del Po- tere, cioè: di
stabilii*^! nella Società a spese delle sue parti. Et facendo allo stesso
fatto» pure colla pro- porzione dovuta, r applicazione dell' altro principio,
che il Diritto è la facoltà del Bene^ constatiamo la verità di quella, che ivi
stesso chiamammo la terza forma dell' uf- ficio del Potere, cioè: di
flÌH|ìensHri^ la forza propriadeir ambiente sociale (cioè le contribuzioni
suddette) al migli orauiento delle sue parti. In questo ultimo enunciato poi
abbiamo il com- pendio, per cosi dire, di tutta la trattaEione di questo libro,
E> in relazione allo stesso enunciato, si verificano, in ragione cho lo
Stato si perfeziona in ogni sua parte, i principj che seguono: Primo* Che le
contribuzioni di ogni genere, prestate da tutti gli elementi costitutivi dello
Stato, diventano li-èeramente consentile. Secondo. Che le contribuzioni
medesime si vanno av- vicinando al massimo di ciò che pi4Ò dare ciascuno ^
senza suo esiziale detrimento* ^ i '«.iFI-i-^..' TChe nulla, di ciò che è
contribuito, va consur- malo prepotentemente ed egoisticamente da chi è
investito del Potere di disporne. Quarto. Che la erogazione medesima è fatta
secondo il volere di quelli stessi che contribuiscono. Quinto. E alla tutela
dei Diritti di tutti; e dXVotte- nimento della prosperità, e al miglioramento
morale. Sesto. E a questo soprattutto. E nella ragione che il miglioramento
morale ottenuto, supplendo da sé, come dimostrammo sopra (i), alla tutela dei
Diritti e all' otte- nimento della prosperità materiale, lascia per sé disponi-
bili mezzi sempre maggiori. E cosi nello Stato siverifica T idea della prov-
videnza, che il teista colloca in dio, come in esso colloca il tipo della
specie di una pianta, per la solita illusione tante volte notata. E si verifica
anche V idea della grazia, immaginata per una simile illusione dalla teologia
cattolica siccome emanazione divina, atta a rendere V uomo morale, a far che
segua le leggi della Giustizia ed eserciti la beneficenza. La possibilità per
1* individuo di essere morale, di conoscere e seguire la Giustizia, e di essere
benefico verso gli altri, si ha, come dimostrammo nel corso del libro, dalla
sua convivenza nella Società e dalla proprietà di questo di svolgere e
perfezionare le facoltà dell'uomo, e di moralizzarlo. 5. — Onde lo Stato, cosi
concepito, viene ad essere l'attuazione pura e compiuta della Idealità sociale,
ossia (i) In molti luoghi: per es. Numero 2 del J VI del Capo IV. 201 del
principio del Bene an ti egoistico, del Bene morale, in una parola del Bene pel
Bene, E quindi lo Stato medesimo riesce la prova concreta ' sperimentale della
verità del principio della Morale dei positivisti da noi affermato, chiarito,
dimostrato: e una prova evidente, in quanto nel fatto dello Stato il fenomeno
individuale si trovaingrandito, E mi spiego. Se, ad esempio, si può dubitare
che un atomo materiale preso da sé sia pesante, perchè il peso deir atomo è
tanto piccolo che non si può rilevare iso- latamente, il dubbio cessa affatto
prendendo una grande congerie di atomi, nella quale i pesi minimi non valu-
tabili di ognuno sisommano in un peso valutabile, dal quale si arguisce quello
troppo piccolo dei componenti. E, se si può dubitare che una molecola di ferro,
consi- derata isolatamente, sia calamitata, il dubbio cessa quando se ne prenda
una grande massa. E cosi nel caso nostro. Se si può dubitare che T uomo singolo
sia mosso nelle sue azioni da una Idealità sociale antiegoistica, perchè la
ragione di questa, nella singola azioneumana di un individuo, si sottrae
facilmente alla osservazione, stante il concorso e il contrasto colle ragioni
egoistiche, le quali ve la accompagnano, il dubbio è tolto interamente arguendo
dal fatto che, appuntandosi i voleri individuali nella totalità dello Stato, ne
risulta la incontrastabile sovranità del volere morale, e antiegoistico, che vi
os- servammo. Le cose dette nel corso del libro dimostrarono che la
Responsabilità, intesa nel senso che sia Vastraito delle Sanzioni,onde la
Società reagisce, rintuzzandola, contro V azione propriamente umana
individuale, si rife- risce, non solo agli atti della Giustizia propriamente
detta, ma anche a tutti gli altri atti etico-civili dell'uomo; cioè:
Primo. Agli atti offensivi non contemplati e non con- templabili dalla Legge. I
quali perciò, esclusi dal campo della Giustizia propriamente detta, vanno
attribuiti a quel- la altro della puraConvenienza. Secondo. Agli atti
sindacabili soltanto dalla coscienza intima dell* individuo in cui si avverano,
e producenti la sola reazione del rimorso intemo. Terzo. Agli atti virtuosi,
che V individuo potrebbe fare e sarebbe bene facesse, e non fa. Ossia a quegli
atti che non si attribuiscono, ne alla Giustizia, né alla Con- venienza, ma
alla Carità, come dicevano i moralisti vecchi, o alla Filantropia o Beneficenza,
come direbbero inuovi. E cosi è sciolta la questione, propostaci nella
Introduzione, come compito di questa nostra Sociologia. Rodrigo Ardigò. Keywords: sociologia. Grice
ed Ardigò: implicatura cooperativa —
positivismo filosofico — biologia
filosofica — psicologia filosofica naturalista — il sociale — l’intersoggetivo
——, la morale positivista, il positivism filosofico. La morale e il diritto
all’altro – la convivenza sociale – la giustizia, il bene sociale – la
benevolenza e la beneficenza – il calcolo ragionale nella convivenza sociale –
l’evoluzione sociale – l’organismo sociale – il positivismo filosofico –
communicazione e convenienza sociale – l’onesta morale – spettazione di onesta
reciproca – Fondazione naturalistica della morale – Fondazione – il fatto
sociale – il devere, la regola d’oro, fare all’altro cioe che vorreste fatto a
te – consiglio di prudenza – kant – costume – fatto sociale presupposizione del
linguaggio -- Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed Ardigò” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51684424707/in/photolist-2mTna1x-2mRnYF2-2mQzgRD-2mPszkp-2mMZzKx-2mLLy7L-2mLLy6U-2mLLBQT-2mLGwFD-2mKDXUP-2mKT6cK-2mKLzDp-2mKwdUT-2mKAsyK-2mKAuZM-2mKjsJY-2mKfNvB-2mKbbNP
Grice ed Arena – nudi –
filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Ripatransone). Filosofo. Grice:
“I like Arena; my favourite of his tracts are one on what he calls,
ambiguously, ‘guerriero dello spirito,’ which is pretty naif – wasn’t Aeneas
killing for something too, not necessarily ‘spiritus’? – His focus is two
orders: the templari and the teutonic order – my other of his favourite trats
is his ‘nudi’ – or ‘gnudi,’ if you mustn’t
– when Romolo converses with Romo, they are ‘nudi’ – what they say is what they
mean and what they mean is what they say – ‘nakedness’ becomes a philosophical
category, as when Strawson says, ‘the naked true.’” “There is no reason why it
shouldn’t be a philosophical category, since the etymology is fascinating –
vide Clarke, “The naked and the nude,” -- Leonardo Vittorio Arena (Ripatransone),
filosofo. Arena insegna "Storia della filosofia contemporanea" presso
Urbino. Filosofo e orientalista,ha dedicato in particolare al Buddhismo Zen, al
Taoismo e al Sufismo una vasta produzione saggistica; è anche autore di romanzi
e traduzioni sui medesimi temi. Insegna tecniche di meditazione tratte da
pratiche buddhiste e sufi. Ha collaborato ai programmi religiosi della Radio
Svizzera. Pensiero La sua visione filosofica è esposta principalmente
nelle tre opere Nonsense o il senso della vita,Note ai margini del nulla e Sul
nudo, dove si propone una sintesi delle grandi correnti filosofiche orientali e
occidentali, con particolare riguardo a Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Zhuāngzǐ e il
Buddhismo Chán/Zen. Il nonsense, come dall'opera Nonsense o il senso
della vita, è da intendere come la meta di ogni autentica indagine filosofica,
realizzando la "distruzione delle opinioni" sulla scorta del
Buddhismo. La filosofia del nonsense non è teoria, bensì non teoria: come la
zattera del Buddhismo o la scala di Wittgenstein, serve ad arrivare a una sorta
di consapevolezza speciale, per poi essere tranquillamente accantonata. Punto
di partenza: non è possibile formulare una filosofia esente da contraddizioni.
Nelle pagine di ogni filosofo si cela il tarlo dell'incoerenza. Traendo tutte
le conseguenze logiche di ogni filosofia se ne attesta la
contraddittorietà. L'idealismo, base di ogni filosofia, dovrà sfociare
nel vuoto e nel nonsense, laddove se ne sviluppi il suo principio-base, che è
esistenziale prima ancora che teoretico, secondo cui il mondo è la
rappresentazione del soggetto o di una mente cosmica. La posizione del nonsense
spinge a riconoscere che le cose stanno proprio così (Tathātā), cioè sono
caratterizzate da una nudità che non può essere interpretata o espressa
attraverso alcuna dottrina od opinione. Non c'è senso nascosto, e tutto è
già qui, direttamente accessibile nella vita quotidiana all'uomo comune e al
Risvegliato, mai così tanto accomunati. Lo strumento del nonsense è l'arte,
specialmente la musica e si procede verso la dimensione del non suono, già cara
a John Cage, nella sua composizione 4'33", cui Arena dedica una lunga
disamina, nella sua opera La durata infinita del non suono. La stessa tematica
viene ripresa e ampliata in Il tao del non suono, nonché nell'analisi di alcuni
solisti o gruppi di musica contemporanea, come John Lennon, David Sylvian,
Brian Eno, Robert Wyatt, Giacinto Scelsi e Ryuichi Sakamoto. Musica e filosofia
si intersecano, entrambe sono mezzi di conoscenza, addirittura intercambiabili.
Arena è influenzato dalla beat generation, e riconduce parte del suo interesse
di lunga data per l'Oriente ai Beatles e ai grandi gruppi rock dei '60 e
'70. Nella poesia, l'haiku esprime lo yugen, un senso di "profondità
misteriosa" che convive con la semplicità del "qui e ora".
Nonsense implica il superamento degli opposti, quindi permette di giungere alla
non dualità, al di là della logica formale di Aristotele, perseguita
dall'esorcista del nudo, il quale pretende di cogliere e congelare in una
articolazione sistematica il caotico divenire della vita; operazione votata
all'insuccesso, e alla contraddittorietà. Come per Nāgārjuna e Wittgenstein,
anche per Arena la logica può servire a invalidare sé stessa, ma nella
dimensione radicale del kōan, come è concepita nel Chán/Zen. L'insegnamento si
trasmette grazie a una sorta di empatia o comunicazione energetica tra maestro
e allievo -, di baraka nel senso che il termine acquista nel Sufismo -,
veicolata dal silenzio e dal non suono. Nella sua opera Note ai margini
del nulla, Arena riprende la posizione di Bodhidharma, relativa al "non
sapere, non distinzione" (fushiki), in direzione epistemologica ed
ermeneutica, sottolineando la complessità della diffusione del nonsense
nell'ambito del sociale. Egli analizza le concezioni di vari esponenti del
pensiero orientale e occidentale, tra cui Max Stirner, Fernando Pessoa e i
maestri del Taoismo, specie Zhuāngzi. Il nonsense propone un nichilismo
costruttivo, dove le "ragioni" del nulla non vengano concepite
attraverso la modalità unilaterale del nihil privativum, negativum od
oggettivizzato. Arena rovescia la conclusione del Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:
di tutto ciò su cui si dovrebbe tacere occorre proprio parlare. Arena
propone di sondare il nonsense attraverso il nudo, una comprensione che sfoci
nella non comprensione e nel non pensiero, ben più fecondi di quanto la
riflessione logico-formale non abbia dato da vedere all'Occidente. Nietzsche,
Bob Dylan e i maestri Zen si rivelano, al momento, i suoi principali ispiratori
nei toni di una filosofia non accademica, nemica del dogmatismo e della
necrofilia della teoresi. La musica elettronica contemporanea sembra
particolarmente adatta a sondare la nudità, nei modi della improvvisazione
radicale, cui Arena dedica anche un'attività concertistica solista con lo
pseudonimo Mu Machine. Arena ha pubblicato una serie di ebook
sull'analisi di maestri e filosofi alla luce delle categorie del nonsense e del
nudo, sondandone tratti indipendenti dai "punti nodali",
riscontrabili nei compendi od opere manualistiche, e considerando queste figure
nella loro alterità: Samuel Beckett, Jacques Derrida, Nietzsche e Wittgenstein
rientrano nel novero, ma anche Jacques Lacan (cfr. la voce Opere).
Parallelamente, sta sondando le illusioni e i condizionamenti dell'animo, che
non lasciano percepire il nudo/nonsense. La produzione romanzesca è
iniziata con La lanterna e la spada, dove Arena analizza la figura di Qinshi
Huangdi, il primo imperatore della Cina, famoso per l'unificazione della
lingua, del Paese, e il forte impulso dato alla costruzione della Grande
Muraglia, ma anche per il rogo dei libri, che ha ispirato Ray Bradbury in
Farenheit 451, e varie efferatezze. La produzione letteraria è proseguita con
un altro romanzo, L'imperatrice e il dragone (ripubblicato come Il Tao del
sesso), in cui si rievoca un'altra figura molto discussa, stavolta nella Cina
medioevale, quella di Wu Zhao, la quale regnò per virtù propria, fondatrice di
una sua dinastia, e non come semplice imperatrice vedova, altresì famosa per
gli eccessi e le passioni sessuali. Anche di questa figura Arena dà un ritratto
senza giudizi moralistici ed esaminandone i multiformi aspetti, come per il
primo imperatore. In L'Ordine nero, ripubblicato come La svastica sul Tibet, si
tratta della spedizione Schaefer, alla ricerca delle origini della razza umana
e di ineffabili segreti magici. Nel gruppo di nazisti si trova anche il
filosofo Leonard Mayer (personaggio inventato), alla ricerca del segreto della
mente. In Il coraggio del samurai, si parla dell'arcano connubio tra samurai e
ninja, e dei segreti di questi ultimi, descritti attraverso un gruppo di donne
guerriere, la cui sovrana è la misteriosa Padrona, di cui si dice che abbia
quattro secoli; si parla anche di Yoshitsune, un samurai del clan dei Minamoto,
sfortunato quanto valoroso, ostile al fratello Yoritomo. Nell'ultimo
romanzo pubblicato, La corda e il serpente, Arena si discosta dal romanzo
storico e scrive un'opera sperimentale, dove la trama è un pretesto, e si nota
l'influsso di William Burroughsanche di H.Lovecraft, per certi aspetti:
nell'opera si parla di Atlantide, un mondo sommerso, distrutto da una catastrofe;
il protagonista L., darà vita a una nuova specie umana. Arena propone una
personale versione della meditazione nella sua opera La Via del risveglio,
Manuale di meditazione. Egli prende spunto dal buddhismo, vipassana e Zen, dal
sufismo e da Georges Gurdjieff, dalla psicologia analitica di Carl Gustav Jung
(il Libro rosso)[25] e dal lavoro sull'ipnosi di Milton Erickson. Una
meditazione che conduce talvolta agli stati alterati di coscienza e permette di
sviscerare il nudo nonsense, caposaldo della visione filosofica di Arena. Una
meditazione che ha il suo supporto nella musica, la quale non ne costituisce
solo il sottofondo, ma anche la base per approfondire le intuizioni che ne
emergono. "Difficile separare la musica dalla meditazione", scrive Arena,
"l'una porta all'altra".[26] Scopo della meditazione è anche
attingere il non suono, categoria che Arena aveva sviscerato nei succitati
studi su John Cage e Brian Eno. Una meditazione che attinge all'Oriente, ma fa
tesoro delle conquiste psicologiche e spirituali dell'Occidente. Per indicare
la modalità filosofica della pratica Arena propone una metafora: "La
meditazione è premere il pulsante della consapevolezza".[27] Dopo
anni, e non sulla base di un ripensamento quanto di un ampliamento, Arena torna
sul nonsense con una nuova riflessione, imperniata sul non sapere alla luce del
buddhismo Chan/Zen nel suo complesso (non solo in riferimento a Bodhidharma), e
soprattutto da non intendere come non sapere socratico. Il non sapere invita a
diminuire la quantità di nozioni, a spogliare la mente dei preconcetti,
principio che potrebbe essere il pilastro della scoperta scientifica. Lo anima
il non pensiero, attività più affine alla intuizione, che usa la logica
ponendola contro se stessa. Anche questa posizione, come quella relativa al
nonsense nelle opere precedenti, mira all'acquisizione di un equilibrio
psicofisico, all'autorealizzazione, al riparo da dogmatismi ed eurocentrismi.
L'incontro con la nudità permetterà, nella solitudine esistenziale, di svelare
nuove risorse nel soggetto, un incontro con se stessi fecondo e produttivo,
senza entrare in polemica con alcuna visione filosofica, anzi ospitando visioni
del mondo contrastanti. La contraddizione, implicita nel nonsense, è foriera di
nuovi sviluppi teoretici, e consente di recuperare istanze che, nel pensiero
occidentale, erano state sepolte dopo la demonizzazione dei sofisti.[28] Altre opere: “Nietzsche-Wagner-Schopenhauer”
(Fermo); “Il Vaisheshika Sutra di Kanada (Quattroventi) La filosofia di Novalis
(Franco Angeli) Comprensione e creatività. La filosofia di Whitehead (Franco
Angeli) Novalis, Polline (Studio Editoriale) Antologia della filosofia cinese
(Arnoldo Mondadori Editore) Storia del buddhismo Ch'an (Mondadori) Il canto del
derviscio [povero mendicanti sufi] (Mondadori) Il Nyaya Sutra di Gautama (Asram
Vidya Edizioni) Antologia del Buddhismo Ch'an (Mondadori) Diario Zen (Rizzoli)
I maestri (Mondadori) Haiku (Rizzoli); “Al profumo dei pruni. L'armonia e
l'incanto degli haiku giapponesi, Rizzoli ). Realtà e linguaggio dell'inconscio
(Borla) Novalis, Enrico di Ofterdingen (Mondadori) Vivere il Taoismo (Mondadori)
Il Sufismo (Mondadori) Il bimbo e lo scorpione (Mondadori) La grande dottrina e
Il Giusto mezzo (opere confuciane) (Rizzoli) La filosofia indiana (Newton)
Buddha (Newton) La via buddhista dell'illuminazione (Mondadori) Del nonsense (Quattroventi)
Sun-tzu, L'arte della guerra (Rizzoli) Iniziazione all'autorealizzazione. Un
percorso verso la consapevolezza (Edizioni Mediterranee) Chuang-tzu, Il vero libro
di Nan-hua (Mondadori); Zhuangzi (Rizzoli). Poesia cinese dell'epoca T'ang
(Rizzoli) La barriera senza porta (Mondadori) La filosofia cinese (Rizzoli) La
storia di Rama (Mondadori) Nei-ching, canone di medicina cinese (Mondadori) I-ching.
Il libro delle trasformazioni (Rizzoli) Samurai. Ascesa e declino di una nobile
casta di guerrieri (Mondadori) Musashi, Il libro dei cinque anelli (Rizzoli)
Kamikaze. L'epopea dei guerrieri suicidi giapponesi (Mondadori); “Hagakure, Il
codice dei samurai (Rizzoli) La mente allo specchio (Mondadori) Il sogno della
farfalla (Pendragon) Il libro della tranquillità. 100 koan del buddhismo Zen
(Mondadori) Sun Pin, La strategia militare (Rizzoli) Dogen, Shobogenzo
(Mondadori) Tecniche della meditazione taoista (Rizzoli); “Il tao della
meditazione, Rizzoli); I 36 stratagemmi (Rizzoli); I guerrieri dello spirito
(Mondadori); La lanterna e la spada (Piemme) Lo spirito del Giappone (Rizzoli)
L'imperatrice e il dragone (Piemme) La pagoda magica e altri racconti per
trovare la felicità dentro di sé (Piemme); “Il libro nella felicità”; “II pensiero
indiano (Mondadori) Orient Pop. La musica dello spirito (Castelvecchi) L'arte
della guerra e della strategia (Rizzoli) Il lago incantato. Racconti sull'amore
(Piemme) L'ordine nero (Piemme) L'innocenza del Tao (Mondadori); Il maestro e
lo sciamano (Piemme, ) Incontri di filosofia. La biblioteca di Babele, I (Città di Ripatransone). Xunzi, L'arte confuciana
della guerra (Rizzoli) Confucio (Mondadori) Il coraggio del samurai (Piemme)
Nietzsche in Cina nel XX secolo”; Incontri di filosofia. La filosofia come
conoscenza di sé, II (Città di
Ripatransone). Memorie di un funambolo; Note ai margini del nulla; Nonsense o
il senso della vita; La durata infinita del non suono (Mimesis) Il pennello e
la spada. La Via del samurai (Mondadori, ) Introduzione al Sufismo (ebook, ).
Un'ora con Heidegger (Mimesis, ). Introduzione alla storia del Buddhismo Ch'an
(ebook, ). Il libro della tranquillità (Congronglu) 100 koan del Buddhismo
Zen”; L'arte del governo (Huainanzi) (Rizzoli); “Heidegger, il Tao e lo Zen
(ebook, ). Il Tao del sesso: La storia di Wu Zhao; La lanterna e la spade”; “La
svastica sul Tibet”; Il libro dei segreti d'amore”; All'ombra del maestro”; Il
Tao del non suono”; “La filosofia di David Sylvian. Incursioni nel rock
postmoderno (Mimesis); “Ikkyu poeta zen; “La filosofia di Brian Eno. Filosofia
per non musicisti (Mimesis); “Novalis come alchimista”; “La filosofia di Robert
Wyatt. Dadaismo e voceunlimited (Mimesis). Yogasutra (di Patanjali) (Rizzoli ).
Sun-tzu: l'arte della guerra per conoscersi; La barriera senza porta (Wu-men
kuan) 100 koan del buddhismo Zen”; “La comprensione negata”; “Buddha: La via
del risveglio”; “Nagarjuna: la dottrina della via di mezzo (Zhonglun)”; “Il
libro rosso di Jung (ebook, ). La storia di Rama (Ramayana)”; “Sul nudo. Introduzione
al Nonsense (Mimesis). Storia del pensiero indiano”; Lacan Zen, L'altra
psicoanalisi (Mimesis). Storia del pensiero indiano”; “Oltre il nirvana”; L'altro
Derrida”; “Watt, la cosa e il nulla. L'altro Beckett; L'altro Wittgenstein”; “Nietzsche,
lo Zen, Bob Dylan. Un'autobiografia”; “ L'altro Nietzsche”; “Una introduzione
alla filosofia di John Lennon”; “Scelsi: Oltre l'Occidente, Crac Edizioni. La
corda e il serpente, Illusioni, La filosofia di Sakamoto, Il Wabi/Sabi dei
colori proibiti, Mimesis. La Via del risveglio, Manuale di meditazione, Milano,
Rizzoli. Wenzi, Il vero libro del mistero universale. Un classico della filosofia
taoista, Milano, Jouvence. La filosofia di John Lennon. Rock e rivoluzione
dello spirito, Milano-Udine, Mimesis. Togliersi le idee. L'ombra del nonsense, Il
Tao della pedagogia (selezioni da: Annali Primavere-Autunni di Lu Buwei); Il
libro segreto dei ninja: Shoninki; Ikkyu: l'Antibuddha, (poesie in traduzione
dal giapponese); Confucio come counselor, Miyamoto Musashi: Dokkodo; Quanti
orientali. Oltre il Tao della fisica; Daodejing: Laozi come counselor; Zhuangzi:
i capitoli interni; Bhagavad Gita; Qohelet, l'interpretazione "orientale";
Il pensiero giapponese. L'età moderna e contemporanea, Jouvence. La filosofia
di Bob Dylan, Mu Machine Collection; Zhuangzi: i capitoli esterni, Mu Machine
Collection; Zhuangzi: miscellanea, Mu Machine Collection; La raccolta della
roccia blu (i cento koan del Biyanlu), Mu Machine Collection; Basho:Haiku, Mu
Machine Collection; Vivere il taoismo, Mu Machine Collection; Il libro rosso di
Jung: Liber Primus, Mu Machine Collection, ebook. Storia del pensiero
indiano, II, Mu Machine Collection, Storia
del pensiero indiano, III, Mu Machine
Collection, Storia del pensiero indiano,
IV, Mu Machine Collection, ebook. Il libro rosso di Jung: Liber
Secundus, Mu Machine Collection, L'antistoria della filosofia, Mu Machine
Collection, Zen contro Zen, Mu Machine Collection, I greci in Oriente, Mu Machine Collection, Liezi
il libro taoista della verità, Mu Machine Collection, Lo spirito del samurai:
Budoshoshinshu, Mu Machine Collection, Il giardino nascosto (sul tempo), Mu
Machine Collection, Neijing il canone di medicina cinese, Mu Machine Collection,
Dogen Shobogenzo, Mu Machine Collection, Guida al cinese classico, Mu Machine
Collection; Nascita di un samurai, Mu Machine Collection; Il Canone di Mozi. La
logica cinese, Mu Machine Collection, ebook. Jung Zen, Mu Machine Collection. In Inglese Nonsense as the Meaning, ebook,.
Nietzsche in China in the 20th Century, ebook,. The Shadows of the Masters,
ebook,. An Introduction to Sufism, ebook,. The Dervish, ebook,. Cage Nagarjuna
Wittgenstein, ebook,. Nosound, ebook,. The Red Book of Jung, ebook,. Illusions,
ebook,. The Book On Happiness, ebook. On Nudity. An Introduction to Nonsense,
Mimesis International. David Sylvian As A Philosopher, Mimesis International.
In Spagnolo El canto del derviche. Parabolas de la sabiduria Sufi, Grijalbo,
Barcelona 1997. In Francese Sur le nu. Introduction à la philosophie du
Nonsense, Editions Mimésis,. Note L. V.
Arena, Nonsense o il senso della vita, ebook, cap. 1 Nonsense o il senso della vita, cap. 6 L. V. Arena, La durata infinita del non
suono, Mimesis L. V. Arena, Il tao del
non suono, ebook L. V. Arena, Una
introduzione alla filosofia di John Lennon, Kindle Edition L. V. Arena, La filosofia di David Sylvian.
Incursioni nel rock postmoderno, Milano, Mimesis L. V. Arena, La filosofia di Brian Eno,
Milano, Mimesis,. L. V. Arena, La
filosofia di Robert Wyatt, Milano, Mimesis,.
L. V. Arena, Scelsi: Oltre l'Occidente, Falconara Marittima, Crac
Edizioni,. L. V. Arena, La filosofia di
Sakamoto, Il Wabi/Sabi dei colori proibiti, Milano-Udine, Mimesis,.. L. V. Arena, Orient pop. La musica dello
spirito, Roma, Castelvecchi, 2007.
Nagarjuna, The Philosophy of the Middle Way, D. Kalupahana, Albany, 1986 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus,
Torino, Einaudi 1984 L. V. Arena, Note
ai margini del nulla, ebook, passim L.
V. Arena, Note ai margini del nulla, ebook, cap. 1 Biyanlu, 1
Leonardo Vittorio Arena, Zhuangzi: I capitoli interni, ebook; Idem,
Zhuangzi: i capitoli esterni, ebook, idem, Zhuangzi: Miscellanea. ebook.. Contra Kant, Critica della ragion pura,
Roma-Bari, Laterza 1979, p.281 Nonsense
o il senso della vita, Appendice L. V.
Arena, La comprensione negata, ebook,.
Leonardo V. Arena, La filosofia di Bob Dylan, Collezione Mu Machine,
ebook.. Leonardo V. Arena, Nietzsche, lo
Zen, Bob Dylan, Autobiografia, I, ebook. L. V. Arena, Illusioni, Kindle Edition,. L. V. Arena, La Via del risveglio, Manuale di
meditazione, Milano, Rizzoli.. Leonardo
Vittorio Arena, Il libro rosso di Jung, ebook.
Ibidem13. Ibidem15. L. V. Arena, Togliersi le idee, L'ombra del
nonsense,.. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Leonardo
Vittorio Arena Nonsense o il senso della
vita, su amazon. Note ai margini del
nulla, su amazon. L'attività accademica di Leonardo Vittorio Arena
[collegamento interrotto], su uniurb. Il blog filosofico di Leonardo Vittorio
Arena, su leonardovittorioarena.wordpress.com. L'autobiografia, su amazon. Filosofia
Letteratura Letteratura Religioni Religioni Storia Storia Filosofo del XXI secoloOrientalisti
italianiStorici delle religioni italiani 1953 Ripatransone. Leonardo Vittorio
Arena. Keywords: nudi, Novalis, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Wagner, Puccini,
Butterfly, Turandot, Mascagni, Iris, Leoni, L’Oracolo, Confucio, la guerra,
stratagema, strategia, antistoria della filosofia, Heidegger, Wittgenstein,
l’unconscio, Whitehead, Grice on east and west, Staal, ‘those in a position to
know’ – metafisica, greco-latina, Heidegger citato par Arena, Leonardo Arena,
Leonardo Vittorio Arena. Cinese, linguaggio, la filosofia del linguaggio di
Novalis, Gozzi, libretti di Butterfy, Turandot, Isis, L’Oracolo. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed Arena” – The
Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51789467047/in/dateposted-public/
Aristosseno (Taranto). of Taranto. How to live the good life. Aristosseno
filosofo greco antico Lingua Segui Modifica «Diceva Aristosseno che il vero
amore del bello sta nelle attività pratiche e nelle scienze; perché l'amare e
il voler bene hanno inizio dalle buone usanze e occupazioni, così come, nelle
scienze ed esperienze, quelle buone ed oneste amano davvero il bello; mentre
ciò che dai più è detto amore del bello, cioè quello che si manifesta nelle
necessità e nei bisogni della vita è, se mai, la spoglia del vero amore.»
(Stobeo, Florilegio, III, 1, 101.) Aristosseno (in greco antico: Ἀριστόξενος,
Aristóxenos, in latino: Aristoxĕnus; Taranto, ... – ...; fl.335 a.C.[1]) è
stato un filosofo greco antico, peripatetico e scrittore di teoria
musicale. Ritratto immaginario di Aristosseno Biografia Modifica Figlio di Spintaro (allievo di
Socrate), fu da questi e dal padre avviato alla musica e alla filosofia.
S'interessò alla dottrina pitagorica, per poi diventare discepolo di Lampo
Eritreo, di Senofilo e infine uno dei principali allievi di Aristotele: infatti
ebbe l'incarico di tenere nella sua scuola lezioni di musicologia. Aspirò alla
successione del maestro e la nomina di Teofrastoalla direzione della scuola
peripatetica, dopo la morte di Aristotele, fu la profonda delusione della sua
vita [2]. Infatti si trasferì a Mantinea, una città del Peloponnesofamosa
per la diffusione della musica, dove visse per molti anni, ebbe molti discepoli
detti Aristosseni e fu consigliere del re Neleo. Qui scrisse due opere, Il
carattere dei Mantinei [3] e l'Elogio dei Mantinei [4]. Opere Modifica
Secondo Suda, Aristosseno scrisse 453 opere, molte delle quali sulla musica,
per la quale divenne autorità indiscussa. In base ai frammenti, le opere
aristosseniche possono essere divise in vari gruppi [5]. In primo luogo,
Aristosseno si dedicò, sulle orme di Aristotele, allo studio delle teorie
pitagoriche, con opere come la Vita di Pitagora (Πυθαγόρου βίος, fr. 11
Wehrli); Su Pitagora e i suoi allievi (Περὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων αὐτοῦ,
fr. 14 Wehrli); La vita pitagorica (Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ βίου, fr. 31 Wehrli);
Massime pitagoriche (Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀποφάσεις, fr. 34 Wehrli). L'attenzione
alla dimensione educativo-pedagogica è testimoniata dalle Leggi educative
(Παιδευτικοὶ νόμοι, fr. 42-43 Wehrli) e dalle Leggi politiche (Πολιτικοὶ νόμοι,
fr. 44-45 Wehrli). Numerose furono anche le sue biografie: Vita di Archita (Ἀρχύτα
βίος, fr. 47-50 Wehrli); Vita di Socrate (Σωκράτους βίος, fr. 54 Wehrli); Vita
di Platone (Πλάτωνος βίος, fr. 64 Wehrli); Vita di Teleste (Τελέστου βίος, fr.
117 Wehrli), sul poeta ditirambico. Dove, però, Aristosseno lasciò una
duratura impronta fu la teoria della musica, con opere come Sui tonoi(Περὶ
τόνων), di cui resta una breve citazione nel commentario di Porfirio agli
Armonica di Claudio Tolomeo; Sulla musica (Περὶ μουσικῆς, fr. 80, 82, 89
Wehrli); Ascolto della musica (Μουσικὴ ἀκρόασις, fr. 90 Wehrli); Su
Prassidamante (Πραξιδαμάντεια, fr. 91 Wehrli); Sulla melica (Περὶ μελοποιίας,
fr. 93 Wehrli); Sugli strumenti (Περὶ ὀργάνων, fr. 94-95, 102 Wehrli); Sugli
auloi (Περὶ αὐλῶν, fr. 96 Wehrli); Sui flautisti(Περὶ αὐλητῶν, fr. 100 Wehrli);
Sui fori degli auloi(Περὶ αὐλῶν τρήσεως, fr. 101 Wehrli); Sui cori (Περὶ χορῶν,
fr. 103 Wehrli); Sulla danza della tragedia (Περὶ τραγικῆς ὀρχήσεως, fr.
104-106 Wehrli); Comparazioni (Συγκρίσεις, fr. 109 Wehrli); Sui poeti tragici
(Περὶ τραγῳδοποιῶν, fr. 113 Wehrli). Infine, tipicamente erudite erano le
Miscellanee simposiali (Σύμμικτα συμποτικά, fr. 124 Wehrli); Memorabilia (Ὑπομνήματα),
Memorabilia storici(Ἱστορικὰ ὑπομνήματα), Memorabilia in breve (Κατὰ βραχὺ ὑπομνήματα),
Note miscellanee (Σύμμικτα ὑπομνήματα), Note sparse (Τὰ σποράδην): fr. 128-132,
139 Wehrli.[6] A noi sono giunti gli Elementi di armonia (᾿Αρμονικά)
divisi in tre libri: nel primo, intitolato Principii vengono esposti la
definizione della scienza armonica e i suoi argomenti, quali la voce, acuto e
grave, intervalli, melodia, generi, suoni e tonalità; nel secondo vi è una
introduzione filosofica, una presentazione innovativa delle caratteristiche
dell'armonia, una polemica contro gli esperti di musica passati e
tradizionalisti; il terzo libro inizia con l'approfondimento degli intervalli e
s'interrompe sulla parte intitolata Elementi. Musica ed estetica in
Aristosseno Modifica
Interessa rilevare negli scritti di Aristosseno la presenza più o meno
esplicita di un pensiero estetico: un'idea di quel che sia o come debba essere
intesa l'opera d'arte musicale. Alla musica attribuì un notevole influsso etico
ed educativo, ma anche un uso terapeutico: «il vero amore del bello sta
nelle attività pratiche e nelle scienze; perché l'amare e il voler bene hanno
inizio dalle buone usanze e occupazioni, così come, nelle scienze ed
esperienze, quelle buone ed oneste amano davvero il bello; mentre ciò che dai
più è detto amore del bello, cioè quello che si manifesta nelle necessità e nei
bisogni della vita è, se mai, la spoglia del vero amore.» (Stobeo,
Florilegio, III, 1, 101.) Aristosseno applicò alla musica il duplice metodo,
sperimentale e teorico, di chiara influenza aristotelica, tanto da scrivere che
i pitagorici «usavano medicine per purificare il corpo e musica per purificare
la mente». Abbinò questi studi allo sviluppo della dottrina dell'anima come
armonia del corpo, perfezionando gli astratti presupposti
dell'aritmeticapitagorica con l'osservazione attenta dei fenomeni del suono. È,
tra l'altro, andata perduta un'opera di Aristosseno che era intitolata
Sull'ascoltare musica, nella quale pare si sostenesse il carattere necessariamente
attivo di questa operazione, che richiede un vigile e assiduo confronto tra i
suoni passati e quelli presenti e futuri. Ossia, Aristosseno riconobbe la
funzione fondamentale della memoria nell'intelligenza della musica, come
risulta da un paragrafo degli Elementi di armonia: «Di queste due cose, invero,
la musica è coesistenza: sensazione e memoria. Bisogna infatti sentire ciò che
accade e ricordare ciò che è accaduto». Grazie a Plutarco sono giunte
fino a noi altre parti del modello musicale elaborato da Aristosseno, il quale
era consapevole che la musica non poteva essere limitata a una ricreazione
scientifica e nemmeno a un gioco di sensazioni, bensì alla riuscita di tutte le
sue parti, dalle parole ai ritmi e ai suoni, e il compito del genio è quello di
creare le corrispondenze fra questi elementi, attraverso un lavoro di sintesi.
Il compito dell'ascoltatore, secondo le teorie di Aristosseno è quello di
ricostruire l'opera stessa e se la fusione è esaustiva, in qualche modo l'opera
esiste.[6] Note Modifica
^ Secondo la Cronaca eusebiana. ^ Suda, s.v. ^ Μαντινέων ἔθη, fr. 45, I, rr.
1-9 Wehrli. ^ Μαντινέων ἐγκώμιον, fr. 45, I, rr. 10-12 Wehrli. ^ Il riferimento
è all'edizione di F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, vol. 2, Aristoxenos,
Basel/Stuttgart 1967, con il testo greco dei frammenti e commento in tedesco. ^
a b "Dizionario di Musica", di A.Della Corte e G.M.Gatti, Torino
1956, voce "Aristosseno", pp. 21-22. Bibliografia Modifica Carl A.
Huffman (ed.), Aristoxenus of Tarentum: Discussion, New Brunswick - London
2011. Sophie Gibson, Aristoxenus of Tarentum and the Birth of Musicology, New
York, Routledge, 2005. Amedeo Visconti, Aristosseno di Taranto. Biografia e
formazione spirituale, Napoli 1999. F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, vol.
2, Aristoxenos, Basel/Stuttgart 1967. Altri progetti Modifica Collabora a Wikisource
Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Aristosseno Collabora a Wikiquote
Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Aristosseno Collegamenti esterni Modifica
Aristòsseno di Taranto, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Aristosseno di Taranto, in
Dizionario di filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2009. Modifica su
Wikidata ( EN ) Aristosseno, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata ( EN ) Opere di Aristosseno, su Open
Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Aristosseno, in Enciclopedia
Italiana, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Trattato di armonica di
Aristosseno di Taranto, su users.unimi.it. Controllo di autorità VIAF (
EN ) 49269266 · ISNI ( EN ) 0000 0004 0361 8850 · SBN BVEV014339 · BAV495/44017
· CERL cnp00397377 · LCCN( EN ) n83048707 · GND ( DE ) 118650149 ·BNE ( ES )
XX4578909 (data) · BNF( FR ) cb12181778c (data) · NDL( EN , JA ) 00911201
· CONOR.SI ( SL ) 101681763 · WorldCat Identities ( EN ) lccn-n83048707
Portale Biografie Portale Filosofia Portale Magna
Grecia Portale Musica Ultima modifica 13 giorni fa di Biobot PAGINE
CORRELATE Spintaro compositore e filosofo greco antico Clearco di Soli
filosofo cipriota De audibilibus opera dello Pseudo-Aristotele
Grice ed Armetta –
dialogo – filosofia italiana – filosofia siciliana – Luigi Speranza (Palermo). Filosofo. Grice:
“I like Armetta; he is into ‘dialogue,’ I am into conversation. I once
suggested to Strawson that he should write a dissertation on the distinction
betweehn dia-logos and cum-versatio, but he said that ‘converse’ is used to
mean ‘make out’ in the Bible, while ‘dialogue’ ain’t!” Principale allievo di
Santino Caramella, di cui cura il lascito.
Si è laureato in Filosofia presso l’Palermo con Santino Caramella, di
cui è diventato subito assistente universitario. Con lui e gli altri allievi e
collaboratori ha fondato la rivista di filosofia «Dialogo» (1964-1974); dal
1960 al 1992 ha insegnato nei licei di stato (per un lungo periodo di tempo
presso il Liceo Ginnasio Vittorio Emanuele II); dal 1981 insegna presso la
Pontificia Facoltà Teologia di Sicilia «San Giovanni Evangelista», prima come
docente incaricato di Dottrine filosofiche e fino al 2004 anche di Logica; ha
fatto parte della segreteria della Rivista della Facoltà per un decennio fino
al 1998 e sin dall’anno accademico 1985 è Segretario Generale della medesima
Facoltà. Il pensiero di Armetta è una
rilettura del neoidealismo crociano e gentiliano sulla base dello spiritualismo
cristiano. I suoi studi sono rivolti soprattutto alla storia del pensiero
filosofico e teologico in Sicilia, e sono culmila curatela del monumentale
Dizionario Enciclopedico dei pensatori e dei teologi di Sicilia. Altre opere: "La filosofia del volere da
Omero a Platone”; “Storia e idealità in S. Kierkegaard”; “L’uomo come natura”;
“Guida agli scritti di Santino Caramella”; “Teoria e pratica in Santino
Caramella”; “Caramella e Gobetti. Un rapporto oscurato”; “Il Carteggio
Caramella-Croce”; “Il carteggio tra Caramella e Radice”; “Per una società in
dialogo”; “Il pensiero filosofico in Sicilia”; “Elementi di ideologia”; “Istituzioni
ideologiche”; “Rosario La Duca. Guida agli scritti”; “La toponomastica di
TerrasiniFavarotta”; Dizionario enciclopedico dei pensatori e dei teologi di
Sicilia. Secc. XIX e XX, Sciascia Editore, Caltanissetta-Roma); “Dizionario
enciclopedico dei pensatori e dei teologi di Sicilia. Dalle origini al sec XVII
(Sciascia Editore, Caltanissetta-Roma). Riconoscimenti Papa Benedetto XVI lo ha
insignito del titolo di Cavaliere Commendatore dell'Ordine di S. Silvestro (13
febbraio ). Note Caltanissetta, Sciascia Editore,. Filosofia Filosofo
del XX secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1928 Palermo. Francesco Armetta.
Keywords: dialogo, fascimo filosofico, filosofi del fascism, croce e caramella
– il carteggio curato da Armetta, presenza di Caramella nel primo convegno a
Milano, dialogo, implicatura dialettica, Caramella e Giobetti, storia della
filosofia italiana, filosofia politica nella Italia del primo novecento, la
metafisica del dialogo in Vico. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed Armetta” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51791128045/in/dateposted-public/
Grice ed Arrighetti –
filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Firenze). Filosofo. Grice: “I like
Arrighetti: his forte was Aristotle’s rhetoric, and he was very popular with
the Accademia degli Ardenti, and later with a subgroup of this, The Accademia
degli Svelati (which later merged with the Accademia dei Lunatici); his other
forte was the distinction between ‘oratio’ and ‘oratio vvocalis’ – “Os” is of
course Romann for ‘mouth’ – but figuratively for ‘linguaggio’ – (after all, the
tongue is IN the mouth). I happen to prefer ‘mouth,’ because Roman ‘os’ is
related to ‘essere’: you are who you are, i.e. you exist, because you can breathe
through your mouth. Appartenente a una nobile famiglia fiorentina, studiò la
lingua Greca e le filosofie Aristotelica e Platonica nelle Pisa e di Padova.
Dedicatosi agli studi teologici, venne ascritto al Corpo dei Teologi
dell'Università Fiorentina il 20 novembre del 1631. Il Pontefice Urbano VIII,
che aveva molta stima per il giovane, lo creò Canonico Penitenziere della
Cattedrale di Firenze e esaminatore sinodale, posizione che mantenne fino alla
morte. Arrighetti morì il 27 novembre del 1662 all'età di 80 anni. Fu uno dei
membri più illustri dell’Accademia Fiorentina e di quella degli Alterati fra i
quali si chiamò Fiorito. Altre opere:
“La rettorica d’Aristotele e Cicerone spiegata” (Firenze); “La Poetica d'Aristotele, spiegata” (I
Svogliati, Pisa), “Il Piacere” (Firenze); “Il riso” (Firenze); “L’ingegno”
(Firenze), “L’onore” (Firenze); “Vita di S. Francesco Saverio estratta dalle
relazioni, fatte in Concistoro da Francesco Maria Cardinale del Monte”,
“Sermoni sacri, volgari e latini fatti in varie chiese e compagnie di Firenze”;
“Opere spirituali”; “L'Orazione vocale e mentale”; “Tractatus de iis quae
necesitate medii et precepti credenda sunt”. Note Arrighetti (Philippe), in: Louis Gabriel
Michaud: Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, 2ª edizione 1843, 2291.
Arrighetti, Filippo. In: The Biographical Dictionary of the Society for
the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 3, 2
(1844)641 sg. Arrighetti (Philippe), in:
Nouvelle biographie générale, 1852–66,
3358 Arrighetti, Filippo. In: The Biographical Dictionary of the Society
for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge,
3, 2 (1844)641 sg. Biografie
Biografie Cattolicesimo
Cattolicesimo Filosofia Categorie: Religiosi italianiFilosofi italiani
del XVI secoloFilosofi italiani del XVII secoloGrecisti italiani 1582 1662 27 novembre
Firenze PadovaTraduttori dal greco all'italiano. RETTORICA E POETICA
D'ARISTOTILE TRADOTTE E SPIEGATE DA FILIPPO ARRIGHETTI CANONICO FIORENTINO.
PROLOQVII NELLA RETTORICA D'ARISTOTELE RECITATI NELL'ACCADEMIA DELLI SVEGLIATI
IN PISA. RAGIONAMENTO I. De principii vniversali dell'arte. Prooemium. E'
lodevol'usanza di tutti i buoni espositori et massime di quelli d'Aristotele
proporr'alcuni capitoli dal principio di qualunque trattato ch'eglin si metton
ad esporre, i quali da lor son detti prolegomeni, o ver proloquii, molt'utili
reputati non senza legittima cagione, per chiarezza et intelligenza delle cose
che si deven trattare, et molti son questi de quali si fa maggior o minor copia
secondo la qualità de trattati parte nascenti dalla natura delle cose da
insegnarsi, parte da varii accidenti onde si vede che questa, per non dir come
tropp'alta et forse troppo oscura ma al men come lontana dalla prattica, è
stata involta 'n un tenebroso silenzio. Pregoti dunque benigno uditore,
poich'io solco mar non troppo cognito, che tu aiuti questo mio corso con l'aura
benigna della tua attentione. Quel ch'inducesse li huomini et quando a ritrovar
l'arti. E' cosa manifesta a ciascheduno che l'huomo è composto di due parti
principali, d'anima et di corpo. L'anima divina et immortale et per se stessa
aspirante a cose alte et elevate: ma per esser racchiusa nel profondo del corpo
nostro, tale che non può senza l'aiuto suo sostenersi, il ch'è la vita nostra.
Hebben acconcia la terra, onde potessen nutricarsi et altresì provedut'onde
commodamente vivesseno, si dieden alla contemplazione. Et tanto basti haver
detto dell'occasion del ritrovar l'arti, et del tempo in che elle si
ritrovarono. Del fine dell'arti et della via loro in acquistarlo. Delle
differenze dell'arti prese dal modo dell'acquistar il lor fine. Dell'origin et
principio dell'arti. Dell'unità et distintion dell'arti. Del modo del discorrer
dell'arti. Delle differenze tra l'arte com'habito et come metodo. De principii
proprii della Retorica come arte. Quel che sia il persuadibile che è suggetto
dell'oratore. A che specie d'arte si riduca la Rettorica. Dell'origine et
autori della Rettorica. Della dispositione del corpo d'un ragionamento in
universale. Delle parti della Rettorica com'arte. Considerasi la Rettorica come
metodo. Delle parti materiali della Rettorica come metodo et ordine loro. COME
LA RETTORICA SIA COLLEGATA CON LA DIALETTICA. De' luoghi della persuasione in
universale. Schema ad albero dei luoghi rettorici. In che maniera succede il
far fede. Delli affetti e'n che maniera et con che stromenti o ver metodi si
muovino. Che via si deve tenere per far il DIRE DILETTEVOLE. Del modo del
definire comun al poeta et all'oratore. Trattano i logici e metafisici della
diffinizione ma con esquisitezza singulare mostrando che la diffinitione è una
oratione, la quale dichiara la essenza et natura della cosa, et questa da loro
si compone di genere et differenze. Ma havendoci noi proposto di ragionar di
quelli che son più oscuri et manco trattati da professori della Rettorica, che
son chiaramente quelli di cui già habbiam discorso. Poscia che havuto fine il
nostro proposito, porrem anchor noi fine al nostro ragionamento. DELLA
POESIA. RAGIONAMENTO. Qual sia il primo fine del poema. Camminando su l'orme de
discorsi fatti sin a qui sì in generale, sì in particolare sopr'il negozio
rettorico acciocché si proceda secondo l'ordine della natura, che è cominciando
prima delle cose prime, andrem ritrovando il fine a cui s'indirizza questa
professione, o ver arte che dir la vogliamo. Però essend'egli parte della
felicità, vien ad esser ancho parte del fine humano. Insin a qui habbiam
vedut'in quanti modi si piglia il diletto, et non ha dubbio alcuno ch'un di
questi si convien alla poesia; hora è da veder quale et come, et scior le
dubitazioni ch'intorn'a ciò accadesseno. Determinazione del DILETTO come fine
della poesia. Qual sia il giovamento che si trae delle poesia. Dell'imitazione.
Delli stromenti et maniere d'imitar del poeta. Quali sien le cose da esser
imitate. Risposta d'Aristotele alle opposizioni del Castelvetro contro
l'imitazione. Disse Aristotele l'imitazione esser una delle principali cagioni
della poesia et noi poco fa l'habbiam posta come fine. Adunque terremo per
fermo che l'imitazione co'l metro habbin dat'origine alla poesia et che le sien
la vera essenza di quella. Del suggetto della poetica. S'egli è vero quel che
noi habbiam determinato ne discorsi rettorici essend'il suggetto quel ch'è
capace della forma che intende d'introdur l'artefice et ove s'impiega l'opera
del poeta, tutta rigirandos'intorno a questo che s'imiti alcuna attione è
necessario dir ch'ella sia il suo suggetto. Et vedesi che s'è ben dato qualche
condimento all'arti et alla filosofia mediante il verso come fecen molti
scrittori innanzi a Platone Anassagora Empedocle ET APPRESS'I LATINI
LUCREZIO et di medicina da Q. Sereno et altri la qual'usanza non è stata
approvata né seguita da maestri delle scienze et pur le cose da loro eran
trattate co' principii proprii, cosa molt'alieno dal sentimento et processo
poetico. Che sorte d'arte sia la poetica. Dell'unità dell'arte poetica.
Dell'origine della poesia. Del furor poetico. Quel che nel poeta possa più
l'arte o la natura. Due son le parti del ben poetare come di esercitar ben
tutte l'arti et professioni, l'una è l'ingegno, l'altra il giudicio, perché
ogni buon opera debbe esser regolata da buon giudicio. Ma si com'il giudicio
non ha luogo ove non è l'invenzione, sì anchor l'invenzione senza giudicio è
cosa poc'artifiziosa et casuale. Della Rettorica d'Aristotele libro primo.
La Rettorica ha convenienza con la dialettica trattando l'una e l'altra di
quelle cose le quali communemente da tutti in un certo modo si conoscono, né si
riferiscono ad alcuna determinata scienzia. Di qui è che tutti gli huomini in
qualche modo dell'una o dell'altra partecipano, conciosiache tutti infino a un
certo termine sappino arguire e rispondere, e difendere e accusare. Noi dunque
(disse colui) domanderemo che voi giudici stiate a le cose che con il
giuramento havete sententiato, et noi ci staremo? Anchora le altre cose simili
che appartengono all'amplificatione. Et questo basti haver detto quanto alla
fede senza artificio. Sommario del primo libro della Rettorica d'Aristotele. La
Rettorica è distinta da Aristotile in tre libri. Nel primo narra le cose
communi a i tre generi dell'oratione, i quali distinguendosi in deliberativo,
dimostrativo e giudiziale, dichiara le propositioni et il fine di ciascheduno.
Intorno a quai modi allega Aristotile i precetti di trattare de giuramenti. E
così pon fine alle fedi et al primo libro della Rettorica. Sommario delle
cose più notabili del 2° libro della Rettorica d'Aristotile. Seguendo di
ridurre in breve le cose principali del 2° libro della Rettorica d'Aristotile
diremo avanti come in questo libro Aristotile tratta de gli affetti dello
animo, de costumi. Termina poi questo libro annoverando le cose egli ha
trattato nell'ultima parte et proponendo la materia del 3° libro che resta a
perfettionare questa arte, cioè la locutione et dispositione. Sommario
del terzo libro della Rettorica. Nel terzo libro della Rettorica si contengono
come dicemmo da principio due cose principali che sono gli ornamenti della
oratione con le parti di essa. Comprende dunque l'epilogo la benevolenza dell'uditore,
la amplificatione, la commotione degli animi et l'essamenatione delle cose
dette. Lettione. Proemio nella Rettorica d'Aristotele. Se dalle
operationi si conosce la nobiltà della cosa niuna è più propria a manifestare
l'eccellenza dell'animo nostro che quell'istessa la quale da gl'animali
irragionevoli ci fa differenti. E' l'huomo mercé della divina bontà di molti
doni dotato; onde secondo il Filosofo mediante la parte intellettiva vive
sempre desideroso di conoscere la verità. Et Quintiliano seguitando Cicerone
afferma che quest'opera è come un germoglio della civile filosofia. Et questo
basti haver detto circa i preloquii della Rettorica. Qui fa fine Aristotile al
trattato delle fedi senz'artificio et al primo libro della sua Rettorica.
Intorno all'espositione della quale mi sono affaticato, per dar maggior luce et
agevolezza a voi più giovani accademici nell'apprender da questo famoso
filosofo i precetti dell'arte poetica. Il fine della dichiaratione del primo
libro della Rettorica. Proloquii nella Rettorica d'Aristotele. Proemio. E'
lodevol cosa di tutti i buoni espositori et massime di quelli d'Aristotele
proporr'alcuni capitoli dal principio di qualunque trattato che eglin si metton
ad esporre, i quali da lor son detti prolegomeni, o ver proloquii, molt'utili
reputati non senza legittima cagione, per chiarezza et intelligenza delle cose
che si devon trattare, et molti son questi de quali si fa maggior o minor copia
secondo la qualità de trattati. Onde si vede che questa, per non dir come
tropp'alta et forse troppo oscura ma al men come lontana dalla prattica, è
stata involta 'n un tenebroso silenzio. Pregoti dunque benigno lettore,
poich'io solco mar non troppo cognito, che tu aiuti questo mio corso con l'aura
benigna della tua attentione. Proloquii. Discorsi poetici. Qual
sia il primo fine del poema. Quel che nel poeta possa più l'arte o la natura.
Delle parti del poema. Della poetica come metodo. Delle parti della poesia come
metodo. Ne metodi ben ordinati il principio e comincia dalle cose che per ordine
di natura procedono et questo ordine è di più maniere perché o egli è di
perfettione, o di origine. Resta solo per dar fine a questo trattato che noi
aggiunghiamo le considerazioni della musica delle quali col tempo piaccendo a
dio da cui ogni mia attione riconosco, un'altra volta ne scriveremo. Magl. Cl.
Rettorica e Poetica d'Aristotile tradotte e spiegate da Filippo
Arrighetti canonico fiorentino. Il testo del vol. I.com. con questo
titolo, "Proloquii nella Rettorica d'Aristotele recitati nell'Accademia
delli Svegliati in Pisa". Cart., autogr., in fol. Leg.in mezza membr.
Già della Bibl. Mediceo. Palatina. Precede il vol. I la tavola delle materie
(lezioni, proloqui e versioni). II,I,22.(Magl.CI). Il titolo è di a Lezioni,
relazioni e ricordi varii. Ma il vol.contiene "Lettione del Piacere
recitata nell'Accademia degl'Alterati da Filippo Arrighetti accademico detto il
Fiorito" (fol. 1-6). Lezione «DelRiso» delmedesimo (fol.7-10). Lezione
sull'In gegno, del medesimo (fol.13-27). «Notitiaetincontridelviaggiodel R.
card. di Firenze Legato in Francia l'anno 1596 » (fol. 29-31). Propositi tenuti
da S. M. tả (Enrico iv] alli signori del suo Parlamento in presenza del suo
Consiglio et de Duchi et Padri di Francia » (fol. 33 34). « Lettera in materia
delle cose di Francia e de Ghisi » (fol. 35 45). « Lettera del Re di Navarra
[Enrico iv) ai tre Stati del Reame di Francia » (fol. 50-58): in fine è la data
4 marzo 1589. Cart., infol., sec.XVII, autogr.dafol.1-6,f.79. Leg. inmezza
membr.Proviene dalla Bibl. Mediceo-Palat. II,I,23. (Magl.CI.VI, num.15). G.
MAZZATINTI Manoscrilli delle biblioleche d'Italia, viii. (Carlo di Tommaso
Strozzi, num.581. at:interlocutori SaccenteeFrinfri(fol.60-71).—
«Ricordian l'Alchimia u tichi.Autore Iac. Petribonifiorentino» (titolo del sec.XVII).
Precede na nota dei Gonfalonieri di Filippo Arrighetti. Keywords: il
piacere, lista di figure rhetoriche -- A Accumulazione
Adynaton Agnizione Allegoria Allusione Anacoluto Anadiplosi Anagramma Analogia
(retorica) Anastrofe Anfibologia Annominazione Antanaclasi Anticlimax Antifrasi
Antilogia Apagoge Apallage Aprosdoketon Arcaismo B Baritonesi C Cacofemismo
Cacofonia Captatio benevolentiae Catacresi Catafora (figura retorica) Chiasmo
(figura retorica) Clavis aurea Climax (retorica) Concinnitas Correctio D Deissi
Diafora Dialefe Dialisi (figura retorica) Diallage Diastole (retorica) Dieresi
Difrasismo Dilogia Disfemismo Distribuzione (figura retorica) Dittologia E
Ekphrasis Ellissi (figura retorica) Ellissi temporale Enallage Endiadi Endiatri
Enfasi Engo Enjambement Entimema Enumerazione Epanadiplosi Epanalessi Epanodo
Epanortosi Epicherema Epifora (figura retorica) Epifrasi Epitesi F Fallacia
patetica Figura di stile Figura etimologica Figure di suono H Hysteron proteron
I Iato Invettiva Ipallage Iperbato Ipocoristico Ipofora Ipotassi Ipotiposi
Ironia Isocolon K Kakekotoba Kakemphaton Kenning L Latinismo Leixaprén M
Merismo Metalessi Metalogismo Metanoia Metasemema Metatassi N Nemesi storica
Neologismo Noema O Occupatio Olofrase Omeoarco Omeottoto Omoteleuto Onomatopea
P Palindromo Palinodia Panegirico Paradosso Parafrasi Paragone Paraipotassi
Parallelismo Paraprosdokian Paratassi Parequema Paretimologia Parodia Paromeosi
Paronimia Paronomasia Patronimico Pleonasmo Polisemia Polittoto Premunizione
(figura retorica) Priamel Prolessi R Reduplicazione S Sarcasmo Scarto semantico
Senhal Sillessi Similitudine (figura retorica) Simploche Sinafia Sinalefe
Sinchisi Sincope (linguistica) Sineddoche Sineresi Sinestesia Sinonimia Sistole
Tautologia Tmesi Truismo Umorismo Understatement Variatio Zeugma tipi di discorsi,
discorso dimonstrativo, discorso deliberative, discorso di giudizio,
imitazione, ornamentation, parte dell’orazione, giovinetti, rettorica per
giovinetti, dialettica a la sua convenienza colla rettorica, rettorica come
arte, dialettica come arte, l’arte di conversare, filosofia civie, rispondere,
argomentare, il fine della retorica, le la rettorica distinta in tre parti,
demostrazione, giudizio, buon giudizio, deliberazione, albero della retorica,
luoghi retorici, il fine della poesia e il diletto, animale ragionabile,
animale non-ragionabile, lucrezio, cicerone, quintiliano, il dire dilettevole,
la benevolenza dell’oratore, la benevolenza del conversante, la benevolenza
dell’auditore, la benevolenza dell’audienza, principi di rettorica, cicerone
sulla rettorica di Aristotele – l’aristotele toscano, aristotele per i
platonici di fiorenze, del piacere, della lussuria, dell’onore, dell’ingegno,
del riso – Bergson – la felicita come fine – arte e natura – poetica come arte,
il poeta e la natura – l’imitazione come fine della poetica, la filosofia e la
rettorica. Rettorica e dialettica, universalita fra i uomini, la villa di
Giulio di Filippo Arrighetti – Filippo Arrighetti, canonico, detto il Fiorito –
pseudonimo, figura retorica, Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed Arrighetti” – The
Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51690463382/in/photolist-2mKH8TU
Grice ed Assunto – i nazareni – filosofia italiana –
Luigi Speranza (Caltanissetta).
Filosofo. Grice: “I like Assunto; of course in Italy they take aesthetics
seriously; my wife would say that they ONLY take aesthetics seriously! And I
would correct her, ‘You mean that they take only aesthetics seriously,’ and she
would re-correct me, ‘Whatever, dear.’” – “Anyhow, Assunto is best known in
Italy as a historian, but he fails to see that when at Clifton we speak of the
classics we mean the timeless – my timeless meaning was meant as a
Cliftonianism! So Assunto is lacking background when he equates classicism, or
worse, neo-classicism of the Canova type popular in London, as dealing with
‘l’antichita’ – that would have offend Canova: his statues were meant to
represent Platonic timeless ideas or ideals!” Grice: “Gilbert and Leighton are
very explicit about this in ‘The Artist’s Model’!” “Then Assunto thinks he can
play with a fictiotious dichotomy between ‘l’antico’ and ‘il non-antico.’”
Grice: “I treasure Millais’s slogan that at the Royal Academy, he had to do
only TWO things: draw naked men ‘from nature’ – or draw naked men ‘dall’antico’!”
– Grice: “As Millais suddently realised: ‘We found out that there were no
English types that would represent the ‘antico’, or timeless ideal, so we had
to deal with Italian models!” -- L'uomo che contempla il giardino vivendo il
giardino [...] solleva se stesso al di sopra della propria caducità di mero
vivente.» -- Ontologia e teleologia del giardino). Ha compiuto i suoi
studi secondari presso il Liceo Classico di Caltanissetta nella sua città
natale. Laureato in Giurisprudenza è stato avviato alla filosofia da Pantaleo
Carabellese professore di filosofia teoretica presso l'Roma. È stato
docente di Estetica a Urbino dal 1956 e titolare dal 1981 della cattedra di
Storia della filosofia italiana presso la Facoltà di Magistero a Roma.
«Il suo insegnamento è anticonformista, fortemente intriso di contraddittorio.
Ma forse proprio per questo motivo, quando arriva il Sessantotto, il filosofo
sceglie la via della controrivolta: quella che passa attraverso l'élite.
Rifiuta di adeguarsi al voto politico, si oppone ai collettivi e agli
insegnamenti assembleari. I suoi allievi non si oppongono al suo rifiuto, anzi
con questo comportamento Assunto riesce ad attirarsi la stima di molti
esponenti del Movimento studentesco. Talmente rivoluzionario da divenire reazionario,
Rosario Assunto dagli anni Settanta in poi avrà un atteggiamento sempre più
schivo...» Un isolamento, il suo, iniziato col Sessantotto, ma poi sempre
più accentuato; infine, si chiuse nei suoi studi e nelle sue speculazioni dopo
la morte della moglie, la storica dell'arte Wanda Gaeta, molto amata («Sono la
fotocopia di lei, che è stata uccisa dal mio stesso male»). A Roma fu
molto amico di Giulio Carlo Argan pur contrastando le sue idee politiche.
Pensiero Rosario Assunto, interessato ai temi estetici della filosofia da un
punto di vista storico e teoretico li ha trattati non solo come tipici della
filosofia dell'arte e del bello ma considerandoli coincidenti con la filosofia
stessa giudicata come pura estetica. Egli si rifà a Baumgarten, Cartesio,
Leibniz, Kant esaminati soprattutto per la loro concezione dell'uomo e del suo
rapporto con la natura. Una visione tradizionalista della filosofia, proprio
nel momento in cui l'estetica si rivolgeva alla semiotica, che isolò Assunto
soprattutto in Italia, mentre in Germania veniva tradotto e apprezzato.
Assunto ha rappresentato una delle voci più significative all'interno del
dibattito filosofico estetico del Novecento. Vivamente interessato all'estetica
dei giardini anticipa largamente nelle sue opere alcuni rilevanti concetti per
la riflessione più recente, come per esempio quello di "estetica del
paesaggio", che hanno ispirato i temi ambientalisti sulla tutela e
conservazione del paesaggio, naturale o elaborato dall'uomo, che egli definisce
«Spazio limitato, ma aperto; presenza, e non rappresentazione, dell'infinito
nel finito». Altre opere: "Civiltà fascista"; “Il teatro
nell'estetica di Platone, in "Rivista italiana del teatro"; Curatela
di Heinrich von Kleist, Michele Kohlhaas, Torino, Einaudi); “Essere e valore
nella filosofia di C. A. Sacheli, in "Rivista di storia della filosofia";
“L'educazione estetica, Milano, Viola); “Educazione pubblica e privata, Milano,
Viola); “La pedagogia greca, Milano, Viola); “Forma e destino, Milano, Edizioni
di comunità); “L'integrazione estetica. Studi e ricerche, Milano, Edizioni di
comunità); “Teoremi e problemi di estetica contemporanea. Con una premessa
kantiana, Milano, Feltrinelli); “La critica d'arte nel pensiero medioevale,
Milano, Il saggiatore); “Estetica dell'identità. Lettura della Filosofia
dell'arte di Schelling, Urbino, STEU); “Giudizio estetico, critica e censura.
Meditazioni e indagini, Firenze, La nuova Italia); “Stagioni e ragioni
nell'estetica del Settecento, Milano, Mursia); “L'automobile di Mallarmé e
altri ragionamenti intorno alla vocazione odierna delle arti, Roma, Ateneo); “L'estetica
di Immanuel Kant, una antologia dagli scritti a cura di, Torino, Loescher); “Hegel
nostro contemporaneo” (Roma, Unione italiana per il progresso della cultura); “Il
paesaggio e l'estetica I, Natura e storia, Napoli, Giannini); Arte, critica e
filosofia, Napoli, Giannini); “L'antichità come futuro. Studio sull'estetica
del neoclassicismo europeo, Milano, Mursia); “Ipotesi e postille sull'estetica
medioevale. Con alcuni rilievi su Alighieri teorizzatore della poesia, Milano,
Marzorati); “Libertà e fondazione estetica. Quattro studi filosofici, Roma,
Bulzoni); “Intervengono i personaggi (col permesso degli autori), Napoli,
Società editrice napoletana); “Specchio vivente del mondo. Artisti in Roma”
(Roma, De Luca); “Hohenegger. Esploratore del possibile” (Roma, De Luca); “Infinita
contemplazione. Gusto e filosofia dell'Europa barocca, Napoli, Società editrice
napoletana); “Filosofia del giardino e filosofia nel giardino. Saggi di teoria
e storia dell'estetica, Roma, Bulzoni); “La città di Anfione e la città di
Prometeo. Idea e poetiche della città, Milano, Jaca); “La parola anteriore come
parola ulteriore, Bologna, il Mulino); “1. Il parterre e i ghiacciai. Tre saggi
di estetica sul paesaggio del Settecento, Palermo, Novecento); “Verità e
bellezza nelle estetiche e nelle poetiche dell'Italia neoclassica e
primoromantica, Roma, Quasar); “Ontologia e teleologia del giardino, Milano,
Guerini); “Leopardi e la nuova Atlantide, Napoli, Istituto Suor Orsola
Benincasa-Edizioni scientifiche italiane); La natura, le arti, la storia.
Esercizi di estetica, Milano, Guerini studio); “Giardini e rimpatrio. Un
itinerario ricco di fascino attraverso le ville di Roma, in compagnia di
Winckelmann, di Stendhal, dei Nazareni, di D'Annunzio, Roma, Newton Compton); “La
bellezza come assoluto, l'assoluto come bellezza. Tre conversazioni a due o più
voci, Palermo, Novecento); Il sentimento e il tempo, antologia Giuseppe
Brescia, Andria, Grafiche Guglielmi, 1997. Note
Rosario Assunto, Ontologia e teleologia del giardino, Guerini e
Associati, 1994, 978-88-7802-513-4. Enciclopedia multimediale delle scienze
filosofiche, su emsf.rai. 24 agosto 26
agosto ). Paola Nicita, Assunto scandaloso
esteta, La Repubblica, 13 maggio 2006
Cutinelli-Rendina, Emanuele, Il Sessantotto di Rosario Assunto,
Ventunesimo secolo: rivista di studi sulle transizioni: 22, 2,, Soveria
Mannelli: Rubbettino,. Op. cit.
ibidem Assunto scrisse contro il
progetto politico della realizzazione del ponte di Messina Antonio Debenedetti, Rosario Assunto,
filosofo delle forme, Corriere della Sera, 25 gennaio 1994, p.27 Claude Raffestin, Dalla nostalgia del
territorio al desiderio di paesaggio. Elementi per una teoria del paesaggio,
Alinea Editrice, 2005 p.90 Marisa Sedita
Migliore, Il giardino: mito estetico di Rosario Assunto, Società Dante
Alighieri, 2000. Teresa Calvano, Viaggio nel pittoresco: il giardino inglese
tra arte e natura, Donzelli Editore, 1º gennaio 1996, 139–,
978-88-7989-218-6. Claudia Cassatella, Enrica Dall'Ara e Maristella
Storti, L'opportunità dell'innovazione, Firenze University Press, 2007, 191–,
978-88-8453-564-1. Francesca Marzotto Caotorta, All'ombra delle
farfalle. Il giardino e le sue storie, Edizioni Mondadori,, 207–,
978-88-04-61114-1. Domenico Luciani, Luoghi, forma e vita di giardini e
di paesaggi: Premio internazionale Carlo Scarpa per il giardino, 1990-1999,
Fondazione Benetton Studi Ricerche, 2001. Pier Fausto Bagatti Valsecchi e
Andreas Kipar, Il giardino paesaggistico tra Settecento e Ottocento in Italia e
in Germania: Villa Vigoni e l'opera di Giuseppe Balzaretto, Guerini, 1º gennaio
1996, 978-88-7802-665-0. Emanuele
Cutinelli-Rendina, Il Sessantotto di Rosario Assunto (con un carteggio
inedito), in «Ventunesimo secolo», VI (2009),
45-57. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Rosario
Assunto Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o
altri file su Rosario Assunto Opere di Rosario Assunto,. Rosario Assunto, su
Goodreads. Filosofia Filosofo Professore1915 1994 28 marzo 24 gennaio
Caltanissetta Roma. Rosario Assunto. Keywords:
i nazareni, massimo, sala dante, koch, civilta, civilta fascista, theorie des
schoenen; D’Annunzio, i Nazareni, I nazareni, pittori germani a Roma, Casino
del marchese Carlo Massimo, Aligheri, Tasso, Ariosto. D’Annunzio, la
preservazione dei Giardini antichi, villa, giardino di villa, giardino di
palazzo, estetica del giardino, il giardino e il uomo, giardineria, filosofia
del giardino, il giardino di Epicuro a Roma. Horto di Epicuro – il giardino
d’Epicuro (non di Epicuro). Hortus, orto romano, i Scipione e la filosofia a
Roma dopo Carneade – filosofia al giardino – filosofia nell’orto – orto
italiano, giardino italiano, orto romano, simmetria, “teatro, cinematografo,
radio” “sono tre simboli ideali” – “Civilta” – “estetica del teatro in Platone”
assunto — annunzio — i nazareni a roma — il giardino d’epicuro — “teatro,
cinematografo, radio” — teatro nell’estetica platonica — schelling — il bello —
intro alla fondazione della metafisica dei costumi — natura ed arte — roma
città — giovanni gentile — -- Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed Assunto” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51790729324/in/dateposted-public/
Grice ed Astorini – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza
(Albidona). Filosofo. Grice:
“I like Astorini, but more so does Sir Peter, vide his section on ‘Space’ in
“Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics”: ‘Surely we wouldn’t have
space as we know it if it were not for Astorini.” La vivacità del suo ingegno,
e il desiderio di apprendere cose nuove, lo induce a spogliarsi de' pregiudizi
del secolo, e a studiare attentamente i filosofi, conosciuta la forza delle
loro ragioni, ardì dichiararsi nemico del Peripato; al che avendo congiunto lo
studio delle lingue ebraica e siriaca, ei cadde presso alcuni in sospetto di
novatore, e per poco non si attribuì ad arte magica ciò che era frutto del raro
suo ingegno e del suo instancabile studio.” Alcuni considerano i paesi di Cirò
o di Cerenzia la sua patria. Si ritieneno deboli gli argomenti esposti da un
ingegnoso filosofo di Cirò il quale volle
onorare la sua patria della sua nascita. Molti filosofi presero a difendere
l'autorità del romano pontefice e a sostenere la chiesa romana contro i nimici
della medesima. Uno solo, Astorini, ne accennerò per amore di brevità, con
tanto maggior vigore si accinse a difenderla, quanto più avea per sua sventura
potuto comprendere la debolezza dell'armi con cui essa era oppugnata. Vari
luoghi della Calabria Citeriore han preteso all'onore di aver dato i natali a
questo insigne filosofo, ma noi crediamo rimuovere ogni dubbio intorno al luogo
di lui natìo, seguendo in questo punto l'opinione di Zavarrone, il quale
afferma esser egli nato nella Città di Cirò, detta anticamente Cremissa, luogo
non ignobile del Paese de' Bruzi, dove questa famiglia vive ancor oggi onorevolmente.
«Molti scrittori di materie ecclesiastiche rilussero in questo secolo, e fra i
più celebri si annoverano: primo, Astorini. Studia con il padre Diego, medico
in loco, la grammatica, la retorica e la lingua greca. Si trasferì a Cosenza
per completare gli studi e poi a Napoli per apprendere gli studi di filosofia,
e di teologia a Roma, dove fu insignito dalla corte papale del compito di
scrivere alcuni annali. In questo periodo pubblica “De vitali aeconomia foetus
in utero”. Pubblicò alcuni saggi di matematica e geometria, come gli “Elementa
Euclidis ad usum...nova methodo et compendiare olim demonstrate” e un “Decamerone
pitagorico”. Dopo alcuni anni lascia l'Italia per raggiungere la Svizzera e la
Germania, ma in quei territori, come la città di Groninga, riscontra una
notevole influenza religiosa protestante e poiché il conversar co' i filosofi
protestanti gli fece conoscere chiaramente che fuor dalla chiesa di Roma non
v'e unità di fede, decise di tornare in patria -- Terranova, feudo del paese di
Tarsia. Note Giacinto Gimma, Elogi
Accademici Della Società Degli Spensierati Di Rossano, Troise, 1703. 7 dicembre. Si tratta di Francesco Zavarrone (Montalto
Uffugo, 1672Roma, 1740), religioso dell'ordine dei Minimi e teologo al servizio
di illustri politici, come Augusto III re di Polonia e pontefici. Fu lettore
del collegio urbano Propaganda Fide e consultore del Tribunale
dell'Inquisizione. Girolamo Tiraboschi,
Storia della letteratura italiana, Tomo VIII, Parte I, Libro III, par. V
("Notizie e opere delElia Astorini"), Firenze: Molini, Landi e
C.o, 110-11, 1812 (Google libri) Pietro
Napoli-Signorelli, Vicende della Coltura nelle Due Sicilie o sia storia
ragionata, 1784 9781145973954 Niccolò
Morelli di Gregorio, Pasquale Panvini (Domenico Martuscelli), Biografia degli
uomini illustri del Regno di Napoli, ornata de loro rispettivi ritratti, N.
Gervasi, 1826 9781145650077 Niccola
Falcone, Biblioteca storica topografica delle Calabrie (seconda edizione),
1846 9781104076337 Elia Astorini, in Dizionario biografico degli
italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Opere di Elia Astorini, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Filosofi italiani del XVII secoloMatematici
italiani Professore1651 1702 5 gennaio 4 apriled Albidona Terranova da SibariCarmelitani.
Altre opere: "De Vitali Oeconomia foetus in utero" (Groninch);
"Elementa Euclidis ad usum novæ Academiæ Nobilium Senensum, nova methodo,
& compendiariè demonstrata" (Stampat. in Sienna e di nuovo Neap., apud
Felicem Mosca in 8); "Prodromus Apologeticus"; "De Potestate
Sanctæ Sedis Apoftolicæ"; "De Vera Ecclesia Jesu Christi, contrà
Lutheranos,& Calvinianos, libri tres" (Neap. apud de Bonis, in
4); "Apollonij Pergæi Conica, integritati suæ, ordini, atque nitoripri
stino restituta" (Neap. in 4); "De Recto Regimine Catholicæ
Hierarchiæ"; "Ars Magna Pythagorica"; "Philosophia
Symbolica"; "Archimedes restitutus"; "Decameron
Pitagorico"; "Il consenso, e dissenso delle tre Gramatiche Ebraica,
Arabica, e Siriaca; e'l modo facilissimo per apprenderle ciascheduno da se
stesso in breve tempo"; "Commentaria ad Scientiam Galilæi de Triplici
Motu". La movimentata vicenda biografica di Astorini aonda le radici
in una formazione cosmopolita e interdisciplinare, iniziata in Calabria sotto
la guida del padre e proseguita accanto allo zio Tommaso Cornelio, esponente
del fronte de inovatores nella Napoli di metà secolo. Fu per lui naturale
ripudiare la filosofia scolastica e aderire alle teorie dei moderni, da Galilei
a Cartesio, Hobbes e Gassendi, teorie che diuse a Cosenza e tra i filosofi
nobili in varie località del viceregno e che gli recarono grande notorietà. Al
termine di un lungo viaggio in Svizzera, Germania e Paesi Bassi durante il
quale si fece apprezzare per le non comuni capacità didattiche,visse alcuni
anni tra Firenze e Siena, dove frequenta i principali esponenti della cultura
umanistica e scientifica toscana, da Magliabechi a Redi e Viviani. Ritornato
nel viceregno per dedicarsi alla pubblicazione di numerose opere, si pone sotto
la protezione di D. Carlo Francesco Spinelli Principe di Tarsia, ed anche
d'Orsini, avvezzi amendue a favoreggiar letterati. Per l’ampiezza dei temi
arontati, sua "Philosophia Symbolica puo giovarsi del ricco patrimonio
librario custodito nella biblioteca di Spinelli. Il testo e diviso in dialoghi
nei quali sono illustrati tutti gli antichi sistemi filosofici, colle
dimostrazioni matematiche e colle osservazioni fatte in varie accademie, ed
erudizioni prese da' filosofi latini." Sebbene varii luoghi della
Calabria‘si contendano la patria dello Astorino, pure l’opinione più comune de’
suoi biografie, che egli sia nato a Cirò e fu nel battesimo nomato Tommaso
Antonio. Fu gli padre un Diego Astorino professore di medicina reputatissimo in
Albidona, ove da questi il figliuolo apprese la grammatica, la lingua greca e
la rettorica. Studia quindi in Napoli e Roma la filosofia aristotelica, in che
acquista tale riputazione, che gli venne permesso di scrivere a fronte delle
sue conclusioni il motto: de/‘elndet ipse solus. Morto il genitore ripatrio per
assestare i suoi dome stici affari, e iotè frai libri e fra le conversazioni
dei suoi concittadini, dopo non lievi meditazioni, darsi tutto alle dottrine
filosofiche del Telesio, ed alla libera maniera di ragionare. Era cosi istrutto
nelle lingue greca, latina, ebraica, siriaca ed araba, che ne compose le
relative grammatiche. E si disse,secondo l’andazzo de’tempi, e fu accusato
lotto per magia; ma ei pote discolparsi dalla bassa calunnia, e percorrere per
ben tre volte l’ltalia, ovunque acquistandosi e fama ed amicizia. Nominato a
reggente di filosofia a Cosenza, fu da qui il propagatore della moderna
filosofia per le calabrie; come lo fu altresi della città di Penne per gli
Abruzzi. Invitato in Roma, vero o supposto che vi sfinfermasse, egli invece
dimoro per qualche tempo in Albano. Ritenuto a Bari da alcuni nobili filosofi,
che lo vollero a maestro, ebbe a cominciare in quella Chiesa di S. Nicolo il
suo annuale di prediche; ma le convinzioni libere che egli spacciava, gli
mossero fiera persecuzione. Sicclie passò in Zurigo, ed indi in Basilea, ove
non dimore che un solo aniie. Pescia recessi nel Palatinato, donde si trasferì
nell’Assia, dove fu costituito Maggiore ossia Vice Prefetto dell'Universita di
Marburgo con la facoltà d’ insegnar filosofia, dacche non essendo dottorato non
avrebbe potuto insegnarla. In stabile sempre si condusse dappoi in Groninga, e
da quella Repubblica ebbe l'incarico di insegnar filosofia e quivi a spese del
Senato fu dottorato, nel quale anno pubblico il suo saggio, "De vitali
oeeonomia foetus in utero", in cui sostenne la opinione, non per ance in
quell’era divulgate, della generazione dell'uome. Scorgendo intanto, che iteo
legi della Chiesa riformata. fra le mille contese religiose si laceravano,
penso ritornarsene fra’cattolici in ltalia; e d’Amburgo chieseil condono d’ogni
apostasia; il che ottenuto dal S. Uffizio, recatosi presso il Vescovo di
lilunster‘ fece solenne abiura, e si porto in Roma, onorevolmente accolto, ed
inviato in Pisa come predicatore generale. Dopo un anno da Pisa si tradusse in
Firenze, ove si acquista il favore del Granduca, e si concilio l’amistà
fraternevele del Redi, del Viviani, del Marchetti e d’altri molti filosofi. In
Siena, dove recessi come professore di filosofia, coopera efficacemente alla
istituzione dei Fisio-Eritici, e ne fu eletto Principe e Censore perpetuo. Qui
pubblica nel medesimo anno: Eiementft Euclidis nova methodo demostraiei.
Ritornato in Roma fu inviato a Cosenza col grado di maestro in filosofia, e di
prefetto degli studii. Ma riaccesigliodiisempre a cagien de’ suoi meriti, si
ritira in Cervinara nel Principato Ulteriore; e da la spesso recandosi in
Napoli ebbe a cenciliarsi la stima di Carlo Spinelli principe di Tarsia, il
quale per Paifetto che portava all'Astorino (e per rimuoverlo dalla tristezza
in che era caduto per la morte di Francesco Mainerio Astorino) lo indusse a
recarsi in Terranova, deputandolo custode della sua scelta biblioteca. Fu
questa l'ultima residenza, perocchè vi mori. Sono del pari sue opere stampate:
Apollonii Pergei conica integritati suae ac nitori restituta" (Nap.);
"De potestate S. Sedis apos-tolicae, Siena); "De‘nera Ecclesia
Christi disciplina, libri tre Nap.). Fra i molti altri saggi che lascia si
commendano: "Philosophia symbolica iuxta propria principia, in
dialoghi"; "Ars magna Pythagorica," una specie di enciclopedia
scientifico-universale; "Decamerone Pitagorico", in verso,
diviso in dieci giornate, e contenente tutta la filosofia naturale pitagorica
in forma di satire in verso sciolto bernesco; "Commentario, ad scientiam
Galilaei de tripliei motu"; "Archimedes restitutus"; "De
reato reyimine Catholi caelticr archiae; "De vita Christi";
Apologiapro fitte catltolica, che divisava di dedicare a Filippo di Spagna.
Parlano con somma lode di questo dotto filosofo il Cimma, il Zavarroni,
l’Amato, l'Aceti, il Mazzucchelli, l’(lriglia, il liraboschi, il d’ Alllitto,
il Signo relli, i Dizionarii storici, e per tacer‘ di tanti altri,. il Cantù.
ASTORINI, Elia. - Nacque il 3 genn. 1651; è incerto se a Cirò, feudo degli
Spinelli principi di Tarsia che lo protessero nelle ultime fortunose vicende
della sua vita (Zavarroni), o ad Umbriatico oppure ad Albidona (Gimma), dove il
padre Diego esercitò la professione di medico e dove sicuramente egli trascorse
gli anni dell'adolescenza. Sedicenne, nel 1667, entrò fra i carmelitani
dell'antica osservanza, mutando il nome di Tommaso Antonio in quello di Elia.
Completò gli studi di filosofia aristotelica a Napoli nel convento dei Carmine
Maggiore (dove appartenne all'Accademia degli Incauti) e a Roma quelli di
teologia. La morte del padre lo richiamò in Calabria, nell'ambiente
familiare. Stando ai suoi biografi, in questi anni (1670-75) si colloca
la sua prima crisi spirituale che investe il campo delle dottrine filosofiche
acquisite: un radicale atteggiamento antiperipatetico lo avrebbe indotto a
formarsi un sistema eclettico platonico-pitagorico e
meccanicistico-materialistico, quest'ultimo ispirato dalla lettura delle opere
di Galilei, Gassendi, Cartesio, Mersenne, Hobbes. Più prechaniente. possiamo
dire, sulla base degli elementi desumibili da taluni suoi scritti, che egli
riprese il pensiero dei suoi conterranei, del famoso "notomista"
Marco Aurelio Severino, erede delle speculazioni campanelliane e delle teorie
fisiognomiche del Della Porta; di Carlo Musitano, che aveva accolto le
posizioni dei "moderni" come elaborate dalla napoletana Accademia
degli Investiganti; e soprattutto di Tommaso Comelio, del quale l'A. amò più
tardi dichiararsi nipote (cfr. Giornale de, Letterati del 1692..., p.
119). La crisi non gli impedì tuttavia di raggiungere il sacerdozio nel
1675 e di divenire, nel 1680, reggente degli studi e lettore di filosofia e
teologia nel convento dei suo Ordine a Cosenza. Ma i confratelli, nella
congregazìone della provincia di Calabria, il 26 aprile dell'anno successivo,
gli si ribellarono apertamente chiedendo al generale la sua sostituzione.
Rivalità locali, come il contrasto tra l'A. e il provinciale P. T. Puglisi,
adombrano l'inquietudine intellettuale del giovane religioso e le resistenze di
metodi tradizionali di studio. Sospeso dall'insegnamento, penitenziato nel
carcere della curia arcivescovile di Cosenza durante il 1682, l'A. è infine
inviato a Roma per un giudìzio definitivo da parte deì superiori dell'Ordine.
Dopo un breve ciclo di predicazìone si ritira ad Albano: non si sa se per
punizione inflittagli o per motivi di salute. Ha comunque ìnizio adesso il
momento più ambiguo e per taluni aspetti più oscuro della sua vita. Nel
1683 passa a Bari, dove stringe amicizia con G. Tremigliozzi, seguace del
gassendista Sebastiano Bartoli e del Cornelio e fondatore in quello stesso anno
dell'Accademia dei Coraggiosi, bandìtrice delle nuove dottrine antigaleniche
nel settore delle scienze mediche. Partecipò alle polemiche del Tremigliozzi in
difesa del Musitano e compose un "epitafio" sulla "materia
prima" per quella Nuova Staffetta del Parnaso circa gli affari della
medicina...dirizzata all'illustrissima Accademia degli Spensierati di Rossano,
Francoforte 1700, che ad opera del Tremigliozzi costituì una convinta difesa
del metodo sperimentale degli Investiganti contro la metodologia cartesiana. A
Bari conobbe il Gimna, che sarà il suo più diffuso biografo, al quale avrebbe
mostrato vari suoi lavori manoscritti (tra essi un'Ars magna trigonometrica di
cui si dirà più avanti). Predicò a S. Nicola e visse nel convento carmelitano
barese dal quale poco tempo prima era fuggito, apostata in Svizzera, il priore
Angelo Rocco. Se dietro esempio del Rocco o per raggiunta maturazione della sua
crisi, è certo comunque che di lì a poco l'A., rotto ogni indugio, depose
l'abito religioso e riparò anch'egli oltr'Alpe. Da Zurigo raggiunge
Basilea, dove nell'ottobre del 1684 presenzia a esperimenti. di medicina di J.
J. Harder (Apiarium observationibus medicis... refertum,Basileae 1687, pp. 28,
47, 110) e dove rimane circa un anno seguendo anche i corsi di teologia di J.
R. Wettstein (non si sa se il padre, morto nel 1684, o il figlio succedutogli
nello stesso anno sulla cattedra). Sostò nel Palatinato presso il principe
elettore Carlo fino alla morte di lui (26 maggio 1685), per trasferirsì poi,
nel suo peregrinare da università ad università, a quella di Marburgo dove
divìene viceprefetto con facoltà di insegnare filosofia pur non essendo
addottorato (stando al Gimma, ma la notizia non trova conferma nel Catalogus
professorum Academiae Marburgensis 1527-1910, a cura di F. Gundlach, Marburg
1927). A Marburgo prosegue con fervore gli intrapresi studi di medicina ascoltando
le lezioni del rettore J. J. Waldschmiedt. Nel 1686, dopo un breve soggiorno a
Brema, è a Groninga: insegna matematica nel collegio dei nobili cadetti
francesi e si laurea in medicina, il 1° novembre, con la dissertazione De
vitali oeconomia foetus in utero,Groningae 1686 (pubblicata sotto il nome di
Tommaso Antonio), che pare sottendere nello studio del problema della
fecondazione, oggetto allora di discussione tra "ovisti" e
"animalculisti", le preoccupazioni speculative dell'autore, volte
sulla scia del Severino e più del Bartoli alla ricerca del
"principio" vitale e formativo dell'embrione. Durante il
soggiorno in Olanda, tra il 1686-88, si ha notizia vaga di una sua
partecipazione alle polemiche religiose nell'ambito del calvinismo: la difesa che
egli assume del cattolicesimo preannunzia un suo più meditato ritorno
all'antica fede. Attaccato pubblicamente dai ministri calvinisti, si rifugia ad
Amburgo. Qui una sua lettera al S. Uffizio, con la richiesta di poter ritornare
in Italia, gli procura una benigna risposta da parte del cardinale Lorenzo
Brancati di Lauria e un salvacondotto. Assolto dal vescovo di Münster il 13
dic. 1688, è a Roma il 13 marzo dell'anno successivo. Riammesso
nell'Ordine, predicò a Pìsa e, nel 1690, la quaresima a Firenze. Conobbe allora
A. Marchetti, cui dovette unirlo l'interesse per la filosofia
"corpuscolare" e che lo presentò al Magliabechi, il Redi, cui lo legò
la comune curiosità per il problema della generazione, e il Viviani. là questo,
tra il 1691-94, il periodo culturamente più felice dell'Astorii. Nel
1691, per interessamento del principe Gian Gastone de, Medici, ottiene la
cattedra di matematica nella Nuova Accademia dei nobili senesi: per
l'insegnamento prepara un'edizione degli Elementa Euclidis ad usum Novae
Academiae Nobilium Senensium nova methodo et succincta demonstrata..., Senis
1691,dedicata al principe protettore. Ma la prefazione è indirizzata al Redi, e
in essa l'A. chiarisce il proprio metodo ("... etiam proportiones ipsas,
quarum nimis longa est series, redigerem. ad acquationes, more
Analystarum", p. X) ed esalta la matematica in funzione dello sviluppo
delle scienze naturali, concludendo con un elogio della scuola scientifica
toscana, dal Galilei al Redi al Torricelli al Viviani al Marchetti al Bellini
al Malpighi. Il Redi lo ringraziò (v. lettera del 18 sett. 1691, edita in
Gimma, p. 413), promettendo di intervenire nuovamente presso Gian Gastone: il
che dovette procurare all'A. la cattedra straordinaria di filosofia naturale
nell'università di Siena, che resse dal 5 nov. 1692 al 3 apr. 1694.
Intanto, nel 1691, l'A., con Pirro Maria Gabrielli e Teofilo Grifoni, è tra i
fondatori dell'Accademia dei Fisiocritici e ne diviene "principe
perpetuo" (v. lettera del Redi al Gabrielli del 6 ott. 1691, in Redi,
Opere,VIII, p. 56).Dalle lettere che l'A. indirizzò m questo tomo di tempo al
Maghabechi desumiamo molte preziose notizie circa i rapporti tra cultura
filosofica e scientifica meridionale e tradizione sperimentale toscana,
rinnovando l'A. quell'incontro che per la generazione -precedente era stato
compiuto a Pisa dalla scuola iatromeccanica,di G. A. Borelli. Il rapporto
ideale tra le due culture è anzi tanto stretto che l'A. teme per quella
toscana, le ripercussioni della lotta scoppiata a Napoli contro la filosofia
"moderna" (processo degli ateisti): "In Napoli vi sono di gran
rumori: mi scrivono che sia stata origine la dottrina di Tomaso Comelio e che
già la modernità va sossopra. Mi dispiace per diversi capi, benché io non
dubiti esservi framischiate delle calunnie degli emoli aristotelici e
galienisti, e molto più mi dispiace per essersi già qui in Siena eretta
un'Accademia fisicomedica tutta moderna e per esserne io stato eletto principe
perpetuo. L'abbiamo celebrata due volte con l'intervento di tutta la più dotta
nobiltà, ma adesso ci siamo raffredati non sapendo dove vadano a terminare le
faccende" (al Magliabechi, Siena, novembre 1691). Sotto la guida dell'A.
l'Accademia poté tuttavia continuare con tranquillità le riunioni "colla metodo
de' Progimnasmi [i Progymnasmata Physica] di Tomaso Comelio" (al
Magliabechi, Siena, 15 nov. 1691). L'A. sperò contemporaneamente di
raggiungere una sistemazione migliore: ambì (1691) al titolo di maestro di
teologia e sollecitò, tramite il Magliabechi, un intervento del Malpighi, per
il momento senza successo (divenne maestro il 13 marzo 1693);compose, mettendo
a frutto la sua diretta esperienza del mondo protestante, un Prodromus
apologeticus de Potestate sanctae Sedis Apostolicae, Senis 1693,dedicato al cardinale
Francesco Maria de' Medici (ristampato in J. T. Roccaberti, Bibliotheca maxima
pontificia, XI, Romae 1698),introduzione a una progettata serie di
dissertazioni controversistiche, che però non si distacca dalla consueta
letteratura dei tempo; dedica tuttavia il meglio della propria attività ancora
al settore scientifico, apprestando, tra l'altro, l'edizione delle Coniche di
Apollonio, con la quale per suggerimento del Redi e del Viviani intese
completare e sistemare l'edizione già apprestata dal Borelli con l'aiuto di
Abramo Echellense (Firenze 1661), e stendendo uno scritto di meccanica
(Commentaria ad scientiam Galilaei de triplici motu), rimasto inedito. Ma
ai primi del 1694 l'A. lascia quasi improvvisamente Siena per le non buone
condizioni economiche, dati gli scarsi proventi che gli venivano
dall'insegnamento, e per le sue precarie condizioni di salute. Il 29 maggio
1694 è a Roma; poi a Cosenza, quale prefetto degli studi e successivamente
commissario generale nel suo convento di un tempo. Si riaccendono le
persecuzioni a suo danno; le vicende sono ancora più oscure che per gli anni
1680-81, ma gli procurano la protezione del principe di Tarsia, F. Spinelli,
presso il quale, a Terranova, dimorò nel 1697, e quella del cardinale Vincenzo
Maria Orsini (poi Benedetto XIII), allora arcivescovo di Benevento. Il 12 genn.
1697 chiese il trasferimento dalla provincia di Calabria a quella di Terra di
Lavoro nel convento di Cervinara e, in un secondo momento, in quello di
Mongrassano. Nel giugno 1698 è però di nuovo prefetto degli studi a Cosenza; il
10 settembre priore del convento di Scala e come tale partecipa al capitolo
provinciale del maggio 1699. Eletto priore di Mongrassano, non partecipa al
capitolo dell'aprile 1701 per le peggiorate condizioni di salute e rinunzia
anche alla carica. Cura nel frattempo a Napoli la stampa dei De vera
Ecclesia Iesu Christi contra Lutheranos et Calvinianos libri tres (1700), degli
Apollonii Pergaei Conica (1698?, 1702?) e la ristampa degli Elementa Euclidis,
Neapoli 1701. Il nucleo ispiratore dei De vera Ecclesia... libri
tres,abbozzati in parte a Siena e dedicati al principe di Tarsia, ha un reale
interesse. L'A., come aveva accennato in una lettera al Magliabechi, appare
preoccupato di confutare la tesi protestante circa i fondamenti aristotelici
della dottrina cattolica e sostenere invece "la identificazione della
nuova linea culturale incentrata sull'umanesimo e sul neoplatonismo con il
cattolicesimo" (Badaloni). Sulla linea umanistica viene rivendicata anche
la continuità del movimento scientifico del '600italiano. Ma tali motivi
accennati nella prefazione sono sommersi, nell'opera, da un denso argomentare
tradizionale, in cui tuttavia èmessa a frutto dall'A. la conoscenza
dell'ebraico e delle lingue orientali. Nel chiuso ambiente conventuale,
dopo l'esperienza in terra tedesca e in Toscana (durante la quale però sembra
che l'A. sia stato spinto più dall'esigenza di contatti e di fresche osmosi
scientifiche che non da un meditato approfondimento culturale), accanto a un
crescente disagio che lo rende insofferente della disciplina dell'Ordine e lo
induce a frequenti viaggi a Napoli per sorvegliare la stampa delle sue opere,
riaffiorano nell'A. le preoccupazioni proprie di una formazione e di una
tradizione meno aperta e duttile: il pesante enciclopedismo e il gusto
mnemotecnico della giovinezza prendono nuovamente il sopravvento
sull'inteligenza sperimentale della natura, e l'A. dedica gli ultimi anni della
sua vita a studi linguistici, condotti con criteri analogico-combinatori, Il
consenso e dissenso delle tre Grammatiche ebraica, arabica e siriaca, e 'l modo
facilissimo per apprenderle ciascheduno da se stesso in breve tempo (inedito),
e ad elaborare o completare una Philosophia symbolica,sorta di enciclopedia
pitagorica di cui probabilmente facevano parte opere che dai biografi ci sono
indicate con titoli particolari: un'Ars magna pythagorica, un Decamerone
pitagorico (esposizione in rime bernesche della filosofia naturale), una Logica
pythagorica seu de natura et essentia rerum (lo stesso che l'Ars magna?).
Degli inediti è conosciuta soltanto l'Ars magna in duas divisa Dissertationes
Altera De origine rerum altera De ortu et progressu Scientiarum (ms. 336;copia
sec. XVIII, pp. 31 con 4 tavv., della Biblioteca Alessandrina di Roma). La
copia fu effettuata dall'erudito calabrese Zavarroni per la Raccolta d'opuscoli
scientifici e filologici diretta da Angelo Calogerà (cfr. acclusa allo stesso
ms. una lettera dello Zavarroni al Calogerà del 21 luglio 1739).Probabilmente
il carattere in apparenza bizzarro dello scritto dovette dissuadere gli editori
dal darlo alle stampe. Esso, almeno nella copia dello Zavarroni, pare
l'introduzione a una serie di Dissertationes e non va tout court identificato
con l'Ars magna di cui fa menzione il Gimma. Se il De origine rerum,cioè la
prima parte del manoscritto, può in qualche modo connettersi ai primi studi
dell'A., a escludere che il De ortu et progressu Scientiarum sia uno scritto
giovanile contribuiscono il cenno all'edizione postuma dei Progymnasmata del
Comelio (1688),il ricordo del Redi e del Viviani, la notizia degli studi
compiuti dall'A. sulla scienza galileiana del triplice moto, la notevole
conoscenza che l'A. dimostra degli studi di anatonúa, elementi tutti che
presuppongono appunto la sua esperienza culturale in Germania e in
Toscana. La prima parte dell'opera, che vuole essere una guida "ad
metam naturalis sapientiae", contiene una critica agli schemi mnemotecnici
del Lullo e del Kircher e si svolge nell'elencazione di triadi platonico-pitagoriche,
alla cui base v'è il presupposto gnoseologico della possibilità di conseguire
verità assolute attraverso l'ordine naturale delle idee (poiché nella natura
creata v'è una "triplex virtus", "intellectiva, volitiva et effectrix",
ad essa corrisponde una "triplex operatio", "interectio, volitio
et impetus"' ecc.). Tale schema conduce ovviamente alla critica decisa
della definitio logica aristotelico-scolastica che non attingerebbe alla
"quidditas rei" come la definitio methaphysica,vagheggiata
dall'autore. La seconda parte è in sostanza una ripartizione delle
scienze ancora su base platonico-pitagorica. Da "Sophia" è esclusa la
logica, di cui sì ribadisce il carattere meramente discorsivo; ma a
"Sophia" appartengono la metafisica (notevoli i cenni platonizzanti
circa il rapporto microcosmo-macrocosmo); la fisica, per la quale l'A. si
dilunga nella critica all'aristotelismo e al cartesianesimo e nell'esaltazione
della filosofia atomistico-gassendiana e dello sperimentalismo galileiano, pur richiamandosi
insieme nettamente alla tradizione filosofica meridionale da Bernardino Telesio
a Tommaso Cornelio; la politica, per la quale egli esalta l'insegnamento di
Platone; l'etica, per cui continuo è il richiamo al pensiero di Hobbes,
ecc. A questo impasto di vecchio e di nuovo, che contrappunta un momento
della cultura meridionale e riflette il travaglio di un pensiero l'A. dedicò
dunque lo scorcio estremo dei suoi anni, divisi tra la meditazione filosofica e
la occupazione di biblìotecario presso il principe Spinelli, a Terranova di
Sibari, dove morì il 4 apr. 1702. Fonti e Bibl.: Firenze, Bibl.
Naz. Centrale, Magl. CI. VIII,171, Elia Astorini lettere ad Ant.Magliabechi da
25 sett. 1691 a 29 maggio 1694...; Giornale de' Letterati del 1692 e primo di
Modena, pp. 118-119; Giornale...dell'anno 1693, pp. 244-246; F. Redi,
Opere,VIII,Milano 1811, p. 56; G. Gimma, Elogi accademici della società degli
Spensierati di Rossano,I,Napoli 1703, pp. 387-413; A. Zavarroni, Bibliotheca
calabra, Neapoli 1753, pp. 172-174; G. M. Mazzuchelli, Gli Scrittori
d'Italia,I,2, Brescia 1753, pp. 1194-1196 (riprende dal Gimma); N. Di
Cagno-Politi, E. A. filosofo e matematico del sec. XVII,Appunti, 2 ediz., Roma
1890; G. Maugain, Etude sur l'évolution intellectuelle de l'Italie de 1657 à
1750 environ,Paris 1909, pp. 133 s.; A. Grammatico, E. A., O. Carm., insignis
disceptator saec. XVII, in Analecta Ord.Carm.,VI(1927-29), pp. 493-515; N.
Badaloni Introduzione a G.B. Vico, Milano 1961, p. 225. Elia Astorino. Elia
Astorini. Tommaso Antonio Astorini. Keywords. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed
Astorini” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51691259951/in/photolist-2mKMdFR
Grice ed Azeglio – non si danno doveri reciprochi senza
società – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Torino). Filosofo. Grice: “I like Azieglo; first he was a marchese,
unlike me – second he looked for the fundamental law (or ‘fundamental
question,’ as I call it) for the principle of cooperativeness – he finds it’s a
natural thing, not a Rousseaunian contractualist thing – so he is a Griceian at
heart – on top, he relies on Bentham, to minimise the Kantian rationalism and
make it digestibale to those who care about what Azieglo calls ‘amore proprio’
– i. e. conversational self-love as still operating under a wider principle of
conversational benevolence.” Coniò il termine
giustizia sociale, successivamente ripreso e sviluppato da Antonio Rosmini
(1848) nel saggio La Costituzione secondo la giustizia sociale e da John Stuart
Mill nel saggio Utilitarianism.
Taparelli d'Azeglio è stato anche uno dei primi teorici del principio di
sussidiarietà. Era il quarto degli otto figli di Cesare, conte di Lagnasco e
marchese di Montanera, diplomatico della corte di Vittorio Emanuele I, e della
contessa Cristina Morozzo di Bianzè. Alla nascita gli fu imposto il nome di
Prospero che, divenuto gesuita, cambiò in Luigi. I fratelli Massimo e Roberto
furono politici e senatori del Regno.
Maturò la propria vocazione religiosa a seguito di un corso di esercizi
spirituali dettati dal venerabile Pio Brunone Lanteri (1759-1830), fondatore
della congregazione degli Oblati di Maria Vergine. Studiò nel Collegio Tolomei
di Siena e poi nell'Ateneo di Torino fino al 1809. Entrato nel seminario di
Torino, quando il padre fu inviato come diplomatico alla corte di Pio VII si
trasferì con lui a Roma e fu ammesso nel noviziato dei gesuiti di Sant'Andrea
al Quirinale. Fu ordinato sacerdote nel
1820. Iniziò a studiare negli anni 1824-29 la filosofia di San Tommaso
d'Aquino, studio che continuò a Napoli negli anni 1829-32. Nel 1833 fu
destinato al Collegio Massimo di Palermo dove insegnò lingua francese per poi
assumere la cattedra di diritto naturale.
Nel 1840-1843 pubblicò con i tipi della Stamperia d'Antonio Muratori di
Palermo il suo testo più importante, il Saggio teoretico di dritto naturale
appoggiato sul fatto, considerato a quel tempo una vera enciclopedia di morale,
diritto e scienza politica. Nel 1850
ricevette da papa Pio IX il permesso di cofondare con il padre Carlo Maria
Curci La Civiltà Cattolica, rivista della Compagnia di Gesù, ove scrisse per
venti anni per poi assumerne la direzione nell'ultimo periodo della vita. I
suoi oltre duecento articoli pubblicati sulla rivista furono tutti
caratterizzati da un contenuto tale da meritargli il titolo di «martello delle
concezioni liberali»(Antonio Messineo).
Morì a Roma il 21 settembre 1862.
Pensiero Era preoccupato soprattutto dai problemi che nascevano dalla
rivoluzione industriale. Il suo insegnamento sociale influenzò papa Leone XIII
nella stesura dell'enciclica Rerum novarum sulla condizione dei
lavoratori. Proponeva di riprendere gli
insegnamenti della scuola filosofica tomista. A partire dal 1825 portò avanti
questa convinzione, ritenendo che la filosofia soggettiva di Cartesio portasse
a errori drammatici nella moralità e nella politica. Argomentava che mentre la
differenza di opinioni sulle scienze naturali non ha nessun effetto sulla
natura, al contrario idee metafisicamente poco chiare sull'umanità possono
portare al caos nella società. A quel
tempo la Chiesa cattolica non aveva una visione sistematica chiara sui grandi
cambiamenti sociali apparsi all'inizio del secolo XIX in Europa, la qual cosa
portava molta confusione tra la gerarchia ecclesiastica e il laicato. In
risposta a tale problema, Taparelli applicò, in maniera coerente, i metodi del
tomismo alle scienze sociali. Dalle pagine de La Civiltà Cattolica attaccò la
tendenza a separare la legge positiva dalla morale e lo "spirito
eterodosso" della libertà di coscienza che, a suo avviso, distruggeva
l'unità della società. Termini chiave
della sua opera sono socialità e sussidiarietà. Vedeva la società non come un
gruppo monolitico di individui, ma come un insieme di varie sub-società
disposte in diversi livelli, ciascuna formata da individui. Ogni livello di
società ha sia diritti che doveri, ognuno dei quali deve essere riconosciuto e
valorizzato. Ogni livello di società deve cooperare razionalmente e non
fomentare competizione e conflitti. Dopo
l'istituzione della Società delle Nazioni, Taparelli d'Azeglio ne vanne
considerato un precursore. Sua fu l'idea di un'autorità universaleda lui
chiamata "etnarchia"con il ruolo di tribunale e di arbitrio, che
potesse proteggere ogni nazione dalle minacce esterne. Taparelli d'Azeglio
continuò a fungere da autorevole guida al pensiero cattolico in materia di pace
e guerra ancora nel Novecento. Altre opere: “Saggio teoretico di diritto
naturale appoggiato sul fatto” (Palermo); “Nazione e nazionalità” (Genova,
Ponthenier); “La Legge fondamentale d'organizzazione nella società” (Roma,
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura); “La libertà tirannia” “Saggi sul
liberalesimo risorgimentale” (Piacenza, Edizioni di Restaurazione Spirituale);
“La Civiltà Cattolica). Diritto soggettivo, proprietà e autorità in Luigi
Taparelli d'Azeglio, di Alessanfro Biasini, sito della Università Ca Foscari
Venezia. Scuola Dottorale d'Ateneo. The
Origins of Social Justice: Taparelli d’Azeglio, su home.isi.org. Education and Social Justice, J. Zajda, S.
Majhanovich, V. Rust, E. Martín Sabina, Springer Science & Business Media,
20061 Vittoria Armando, Il Welfare oltre
lo Stato. Profili di storia dello Stato sociale in Italia, tra istituzioni e
democrazia Seconda edizione, G. Giappichelli Editore, Georges Minois, La Chiesa
e la guerra. Dalla Bibbia all'èra atomica, Bari, Dedalo, 2003493. L. Pereña, La autoridad internacional en
Taparelli, Libreria editrice dell'Università Gregoriana, 1964, 405-432. Studi Pierre Thibault, Savoir et
pouvoir. Philosophie thomiste et politique cléricale au XIXe siècle, Québec, Maria
Rosa Di Simone, Stato e ordini rappresentativi nel pensiero di Luigi Taparelli
d'Azeglio, «Rassegna storica del Risorgimento», Giovanni Miccoli, Chiesa e
società in Italia fra Ottocento e Novecento: il mito della cristianità, in Id.,
Fra mito della cristianità e secolarizzazione, Casale Monferrato, Francesco
Traniello, La polemica Gioberti-Taparelli sull'idea di nazione, in Id., Da
Gioberti a Moro. Percorsi di una cultura politica, Milano, Francesco Traniello,
Religione, Nazione e sovranità nel Risorgimento italiano, «Rivista di storia e
letteratura religiosa», Emma Abbate, Luigi Taparelli D'Azeglio e l’istruzione
nei collegi gesuitici del XIX secolo, «Archivio storico per le province napoletane»,
Saggio teoretico di dritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto, 5 voll., Palermo,
Stamperia d'Antonio Muratori, 1840-1843. S. T., Per il centenario della nascita
delLuigi Taparelli D'azeglio, in Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali e
Discipline Ausiliarie, Luigi Di Rosa, Luigi Taparelli. L'altro d'Azeglio,
Milano, Cisalpino, Gabriele De Rosa, I Gesuiti in Sicilia e la rivoluzione del
'48, con documenti sulla condotta della Compagnia di Gesù e scritti inediti di
Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1963. A.
Perego, La «Miscellanea Taparelli», in Divus Thomas, Gianfranco Legitimo, Sociologi cattolici
italiani. De MaistreTaparelliToniolo, Roma, Volpe, 1963, 30–51. Antonino Messineo S.J., IlLuigi
Taparelli d'Azeglio e il Risorgimento italiano, in La Civiltà Cattolica, Carlo
Maria Curci Compagnia di Gesù La Civiltà Cattolica Rerum novarum Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio, su
TreccaniEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Angiolo Gambaro, Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio,
in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Luigi Taparelli
d'Azeglio, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Opere di Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio, su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio,. Francesco Pappalardo, Luigi Taparelli
d'Azeglio, in Giovanni Cantoni, Dizionario del pensiero forte, Piacenza,
Cristianità, 1997. Giovanni Vian, Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio, in Il contributo
italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Storia e Politica, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana,.Aloysius Taparelli, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Compagnia
di Gesù Filosofia Sociologia Sociologia
Categorie: Gesuiti italianiFilosofi italiani del XIX secoloSociologi italiani Torino
Roma. Non si danno doveri reciprochi senza società. Egli è costume di chi
spiega diritto naturalo -- il ius naturale -- il considerare certe classi di
doveri dell'un uomo verso l'altro anteriori ad ogni idea di società. E un tal
modo di speculare è coerente con tutto il resto della dottrina allorchè la
società si riguarda come una pura convenzione umana. Ma siccome il fatto di
questa convenzione, per confessione di parecchi fra i suoi difensori, non è se
non una finzione di diritto, fictio juris, ed io non amo fondar sopra una
finzione quanto vi ha di più sacro ed importante nel commercio fra gli uomini,
mi vidi astretto a cercare nel *fatto reale* (italici d'Azeglio) altro miglior
appoggio. E sì mi parve averlo trovato con nulla più che analizzare la idea che
ognuno si forma allorché pronunzia il vocabolo *Società*, o paragonar questa
idea collo stato *naturale* in cui ogni uomo trovasi sulla terra. Ecco per qual
motivo non credei poter trattare dei *doveri reciprochi* fra gli uomini se
prima non li considerava formanti una qualche società. E in verità, come
potrebbero esservi *doveri* reciprochi senza relazioni reciproche? Come
relazioni senza qualche congiunzione? Come congiuzione senza qualche legge?
Come legge senza legislatore e senza autorità? Data poi la congiunzione di
molti esseri intelligenti sotto una autorità comune che altro ci manca per
costituire una società? Parventi dunque ripugnante la voce di *relazioni
extrasociali*, usata dal ch. C. di Haller -- di cui per altro ammiro in molti
punti la dottrina --, nù seppi come introdurmi a considerare i doveri
reciprochi se prima non no stabiliva *sul fatto* le fondamenta con una attenta
osservazione dell’essere sociale. La legge fondamentale del *civico* operar
sociale potrebbe dunque ridursi a questa — la socielà (e per essa la autorità)
dee far sì che ciascuno *cooperi* a *difendere* e crescere il bene altrui senza
sua perdita, anzi con vantaggio proporzionato alla sua cooperazione. Della
società in generale. Società suol dirsi una concorde comunicazione di bene fra
esseri intelligenti. Società di questi esseri *in istato di tendenza* sarà
dunque la *tendenza concorde a fine comune*. E siccome la tendenza intelligente
fra uomini dee produrre azione esterna, cosi la società umana potrà definirsi
*cooperazione concorde di uomini ad un bene comune*. Prop. I.: Gli uomini tutti
hanno nella lor *natura* un elemento di società universale. Prova: Gli uomini
tutti sono obbligati a secondare l’ intento del Crea- tore. Or il Creatore
vuole da essi *cooperazione concorde a ben comune*. Dunque ec. La minore
si prova. Uno è per natura il bene da tutti conosciuto, ed a cui tendono tutti,
giacche una è la loro *natura* ossia impulso primitivo. Questo impulso
manifesta l'ntento del Creatore. Dunque ec. Diremo questo elemento *dovere di
socialità*. Coroll. 1.: Ogni dovere sociale deriva da questo principio *fa il
bene altrui*. Giacché la causa che mi obbliga a far ad altri *un* qualche bene
è che debbo far loro il bene. Coroll. 2.: Questo è il primo principio *sociale*
applicazione del primo principio morale. Coroll. 3: Il precipuo bene di ogni
società è la *onestà*, giacché a questa tende precipuamente la *natura umana*.
Coroll. 4.: Poiché *ottener il bene* è negli *enti ragionevoli* un *divenir
felice*, il fine di universal società è rendere gli *associati* *onestamente
felici*. E poiché la felicità dell’uomo consiste *secondo natura* nei beni di
*mente* e di *corpo*, *assicurarci* e *crescerci* queste due specie di beni è
il fine naturale della società universale. Una società determinata può o
abbracciare tutto il fine naturale con mezzo particolare cioè col convivere
stabilmente, o abbracciarlo parzialmente. Il *fine* particolare della prima
sarà il *convivere* onestamente felice. Della seconda il conseguire quel
particolare oggetto per cui ella si associa. Diremo società *completa* quella
che abbraccia tutto l'obbietto naturale della umana società, cioè il bene di
mente, quello di corpo, o la difesa di entrambi. Incompleta quella che ne
abbraccia sol qualche parte. Coroll. 5.: La società è *mezzo*, non fine dell’
individuo. Luigi Tapparelli d’Azeglio, marchese d’Azeglio. Luigi Prospero Tapparelli
d’Azeglio, marchese d’Azeglio. Prospero Tapperelli d’Azeglio, marchese
d’Azeglio. D’Azeglio. Azeglio. Keywords: non si danno doveri reciprochi senza
società, ius naturale, “non si danno doveri reciprochi senza società”,
cooperazione, cooperare, fa il bene altrui – onesta, fine, principio della
socialita, applicazione del principio della moralita, natura umana, fatto,
socieeta totale, societa parziale, definizione di societa in termine di
cooperazione, ‘de more geometrico’ – tendenzia impulso naturale all’onesta –
societa – azione esterna, esseri ragionabile, esseri intelligente, convivir
stabilmente, felice, -- Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice ed Azeglio” – The
Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51789362417/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Bacchin – anypotheton
haploustaton; overo, i fondamenti della filosofia del linguaggio – filosofia
italiana – Luigi Speranza (Belluno). Filosofo. Grice: “I like Bacchin; as an
Italian he is allows to speak pompously as we at Oxford cannot! But he is
basically saying the commonplace that ‘intersoggetivita’ has a ‘dialectical
dimension’ (interoggetivita come dimensione dialettica) in the sense that the
ego (or ‘l’io’) presupposes the ‘altro’ (as he puts it: ‘a cui’) – therefore;
it is a presupposition of the schema, as Collingwood would have it, alla Cook
Wilson – and thus only transcendentally justified. Bacchin has noted that the
operator ~ is basic in that ‘inter-rogo’ invites a ‘risposta’ whose
‘motivation’ may be ‘implicita’ – the ad-firmatum is motivated by the domanda –
which can be another dimanda: why do you think so? “Why do you ask why I think
so?” -- Bacchin is alla Heidegger and
other phenomenologists, with the ‘essere’ versus appare on which my impicata in
‘Causal Theory of Perception’ depend (‘if A seems B, A is not B. Note that
there is no way to express this implicata without a ~. It might be argued that
it can express with some of the strokes or with some expression that would
flout ‘be brief, rather than the simplest” – and which would involve, as Parmenide
has it, the idea of, precisely –altro’ (other than). Note that Bacchin
equivocates on the ‘altro’ – in the dialectical dimension of intersubjectivity
he obviously means ‘tu,’ not ‘altro.’ In the negation or contradiction (in
dialectical terms) of an affirmation – which is involved in every ‘dialogue’
that Bacchin calls ‘socratico’ or euristico rather than sofistico (based on
equivocation) – the ‘altro’ is the other, A is not B, impying A is other than B
(cf. my ‘Negation and Privation’). This does not need have us multiply the
sense of ‘ne,’ in old Roman!” -- Giovanni Romano Bacchin (Belluno), filosofo. Dopo
aver conseguito la laurea nel 1961, nel 1965 ottenne la libera docenza in
filosofia della storia. Dal 1966 al 1980 insegnò filosofia della storia e
filosofia della scienza presso l'Perugia. Occupò anche la cattedra di filosofia
della scienza presso l'Lecce. Fu docente presso la facoltà di lettere e
filosofia dell'Padova, tenendo la cattedra di filosofia teoretica. Fu membro della "Società Filosofica
Italiana". Morì il 10 gennaio 1995, sulla spiaggia di Rimini. Pensiero Cresciuto filosoficamente nella
scuola metafisica padovana di Marino Gentile, intorno agli anni sessanta,
Bacchin presto sviluppò una propria originalità di approccio e di ricerca
filosofica, che lo rendono difficilmente assimilabile ad una qualche corrente o
"famiglia" filosofica se non quella della libera e inesausta
teoresi. A testimonianza della
specificità del suo approccio metafisico si può citare questa sua
affermazione. «V'è un senso metafisico
che può andare perduto. Né basta parlare di metafisica e considerarsi
metafisici per possederlo. La perdita del senso metafisico è anche trionfo del
condizionale e quindi dell'ipocrisia: "direi", "avanzerei la
proposta", "mi si passi l'espressione", "vorrei che il
lettore ricavasse l'impressione..'", "anche se siamo, il lettore ed
io,certo ioimmensamente piccoli", "a mio sommesso avviso" e così
via in un continuo spostare l'attenzione su di sé e in un continuo, inutile,
domandare scusa al lettore della propriascontatapochezza, rivelando che non è
poi così scontata da non parlarne. Nudo e indifeso alla presenza della verità,
il metafisico non lo può essere di meno di fronte agli uomini, i qualidi certo-
non sono la verità. » Riferimento
costante dell'incessante dialogo filosofico di Bacchin fu senz'altro l'attualismo
gentiliano. Altre opere: “Su le
implicazioni teoretiche della struttura formale” (Roma, Jandi Sapi); “Originarietà
e mediazione del discorso metafisico” (Roma, Jandi Sapi); Sull'autentico nel
filosofare” (Roma, Jandi Sapi); “L'originario come implesso
esperienza-discorso” (Roma, Jandi Sapi); “Il concetto di meditazione e la
teoremi del fondamento” (Roma, Jandi Sapi); “I fondamenti della filosofia del
linguaggio” (Assisi); “L'immediato e la sua negazione, Perugia, Grafica);
“Anypotheton” Saggio di filosofia teoretica” (Roma, Bulzoni); “Teoresi
metafisica” (Padova, Nuova Vita); “Haploustaton” (Firenze, Arnaud); “La
struttura teorematica del problema metafisico”; “Classicità e originarietà della metafisica,
scritti scelti” (Milano, Franco Angeli); “La metafisica agevola o impedisce
l'unità culturale europea?”in ‘Il contributo della cultura all'unità europea',
Danilo Castellano, Edizioni scientifiche italiane, Napoli); “L'attualismo nel
pensiero di Marino Gentile, in Annali, Roma, Fondazione Ugo Spirito 1992.
Note Informazioni biografiche reperibili
anche in G.R. Bacchin, Haploustaton, Arnaud, Firenze 1995 Giovanni Romano Bacchin in Teoresi
metafisica, 1984 Berti, Enrico Ricordo
di Giovanni Romano Bacchin, "Bollettino della Società Filosofica
Italiana", n. s. 154, gennaio-aprile 1995,
126-128 Scilironi, Carlo Tra opposte ragioni: nota in ricordo di
Giovanni Romano Bacchin a dieci anni dalla morte. in Studia patavina: Rivista
di scienze religiose. Filosofia Filosofo Professore1929 1995 27 dicembre 10
gennaio Belluno Rimini. Metafisica del principio. Si
comincia dopo avere cominciato. L’innegabile è innegabilmente. Negare è
escludere un’inclusione indebita. Non v’è limite del sapere. Il luogo del
filosofare è la domanda del luogo per filosofare. Ciò che v’è di originario
nell’esperienza. La filosofia non ha oggetto e nessun oggetto si sottrae alla
filosofia. La riappropriazione metafisica. L’esperienza praticabile è
conversione fattuale in fatto. Funzione della parantesi nell’asserzione e
l’aporia del dogmatico. L’autorità del dogmatico si presenta come critica di
ogni autorità. L’ideale dell’autorità è di essere indiscutibile. Autorità e
intelletto si fronteggiano. Ciò che l’intelletto impone all’autorità è di
essere ciò che pretende di essere. Il luogo della domanda è l’insufficienza di
ciò che si presenta a ciò che, presentan- dosi, non è interamente. L’identità
tra inevitabile e necessario è solo co- struita. Il senso in cui non si può
domandare tutto. Ciò da cui dipendono le valutazioni del domandare. Il senso in
cui non si può non domandare tutto. Domandare tutto è negare di poter asserire.
Paradigma del dottrinario in filosofia. Una richiesta che preceda la domanda di
verità non può essere vera. Il prefilosofico oltrepassa il sapere di non sapere
credendo di superarlo. L’impossibilità di oltrepassare quel ‘limite’ che è la
stessa impossibilità di oltrepassarlo. La costante esistenziale dell’esperienza
e gli equivoci della sua valorazione. La domanda universale investe il
linguaggio come luogo della possibilità dell’errore. Digressione. La base del
filologismo in filosofia. Dell’ingenuità storiografica in filosofia. Le due
direzioni dell’ingenuità storiografica. L’equivoco storico in filosofia.
Equivoco di coscienza storica e conoscenza storica. Le storie della filosofia
rendono la filosofia accessibile al senso comune prefilosofico. L’ideale
sistematico del prefilosofico si prolunga nella storiografia. Filosofare
nonostante la storia della filosofia. Inattualità teoretica dello storicismo.
La nozione dogmatica di storia. Il carattere fideistico della tradizione e il
circolo del riconoscimento. Due figure dell’accoglimento della tradizione:
integralismo e progressismo. La ragione formale come unica ragione delle due
figure. L’ideale immanente del credere è coincidere con il vivere. La ragione. Indice.
Indice formale presiede nel suo uso ciò che la determina nei suoi contenuti. Se
ogni fede è cosmica, ogni cosmo è creduto. La valenza sperimentale è già nella
protomatematica, come si esemplifica in Galilei. Il carattere ipotetico di ogni
riferimento assertorio all’esperienza. Il rischio erme- neutico è considerare
effettivo ciò che è interpretazione, come si esemplifica in Galilei. Il senso
in cui la scienza è alienazione. Ingenuità del ten- tativo di fondare scienza e
filosofia sull’esperienza immediata. Il campo in cui si discute è ciò che
intanto permane indiscusso. Credere di conoscere è non sapere di credere. Il
rapporto tra intendere e pretendere è struttura del conoscere. Il rapporto
strutturale di compreso e comprendente tra universi. Il rapporto di compreso e
comprendente è struttura del contenuto di osservazione. Costanti del progetto
d’esperienza e il vettore di interesse. Il progetto fondamentale e Kant. Il
progetto di filosofare è il modo filosofico di progettare: miraggio del ritorno
all’immediato, Controllabilità e statuto dell’individuale. Ambiguità del
sapersi orientare nel mondo. L’intenzione conoscitiva del fenomeno individuale.
Progetto del conoscere come adeguazione progressiva. Il co- noscere
rappresentato come rappresentazione. Il presupporre è limite presupposto
all’operare. La scienza ignora di essere una fede. La scienza non può sapere
ciò che essa implica, dovendo postulare ciò di cui abbisogna. La considerazione
pensante. La conoscenza scientifica ipotizza la realtà che le consente di
ipotizzare. Tentativo della distinzione tra ‘visione naturale’ e ‘visione
scientifica’ del mondo. Esame della struttura del ‘punto di vista’ nella
configurazione dei sistemi di riferimento. Dopo l’intermezzo ludico, che cosa
si intende per ‘considerazione logica’. La logica formale è il modo formale di
considerare la logica. Il formalismo della logica è il nihilismo della verità.
La conciliazione tra storia mondana e filosofare non può avvenire nella storia
mondana. Ciò che si presenta con la divisione pone la richiesta della
connessione. Il pensiero si affida al linguaggio per essere riconosciuto come
indipendente dal linguaggio. Si esemplifica con l’espressione hegeliana
“movimento dell’essenza”. Si insiste con l’esemplificazione hegeliana. Ancora
esemplificazione hegeliana: la “cosa stessa” non può venire utilizzata. Il
senso della cura–custodia. Il senso in cui il pensare penetra. Il pragmatico è
fittiziamente teoretico. La verità mette in questione ogni discorso intorno
alla verità. Il nesso tra tecnica logica e configurazione funzionale del
concetto. La conoscenza scientifica considera astratto ciò che essa non può
considerare. Rischio dell’equivoco tra mera domanda e domanda pura. L’imporsi
della verità è l’asse delle pseudofilosofie. Volontà di coerenza e volontà di
dominio. Coerenza è fedeltà alla logica di un sistema. Sistema ed esistenza.
Esistenza e chiarificazione. Esistenza e coscienza. Coscienza e punto di vista.
Il punto di vista fondamentale non è un punto di vista. La nozione comune di
esistenza e l’istituzione. Ciò che esiste non è assoluto. Differenza tra
teoresi e teoria e l’impossibilità di scegliere la teoresi. La teoresi, che non
è teoria, appare in una qualche teoria. Poiché l’intero non può essere oggetto,
nessun og- getto è intero. La scienza che escluda la filosofia diventa
“filosofia della natura”. Il mondo della vita impone l’astrazione. La
filosofia non vincola a se stessa le scienze. Ricorso alla formula. La
“formula” e l’aporia del metodo ideale. Il metodo di filosofare è filosofare,
ossia domandare. Inevitabilità dell’astratto. Necessità e cogenza. Il carattere
divino della matematica è l’essenza matematica di Dio anche se Galilei non lo
vuole. L’ordine astratto si esemplifica in Wolff, ma esso è la logica interna
della formulazione del principio di non contraddizione. La “proposizione” è la
figura minima del sistema, la forma del quale è l’equazione. L’ideale del
conoscere esclude dal conoscere l’operare. Le condizioni del conoscere sono
riconosciute nella loro indipendenza dal conoscere, nel conoscere di cui sono
condizioni. La relazione, che è esperienza, non può essere relazione
dell’esperienza con altro da essa. La conoscenza dell’incono- scibilità dello
in sé è conoscenza in sé. L’astratto è inevitabile, ma non necessario. Per dire
con che cosa si comincia, si comincia con la domanda intorno a come si
comincia. Affermare la totalità è dimostrare che es- sa non può venire negata
e, dunque, non abbisogna di venire affermata. La condizione apriori è trovata
analiticamente, perché è contraddittorio che, nel no- stro conoscere, tutto
derivi dall’esperienza. L’uso è unicamente empirico ed è riconosciuto
trascendentalmente. L’analisi è la presenza operante del “principio di non
contraddizione”. La struttura sintetica del giudizio è l’infinitezza
dell’analisi. Il giudizio è domanda infinita di venire fondato. Tra esperienza
e giudizio non sussiste rapporto, perché l’esperienza non può essere un
giudicato. La prima forma di mediazione è l’immediatezza fenomenologica, o
medialità. Il contessere infinito del dato non è dato. Ogni ordinamento di
oggetti è teorico. L’oggetto è pluralità di oggetti. Se è astratto l’oggetto, è
astratto il suo contesto. L’intuizione astrae dal contessere infinito. Ciò che
è dato per primo è risultato di un processo astrattivo: l’intuizione non è
originaria. Differenza tra teorica dei giudizi e teoresi del giudizio.
Impostazione. L’interpretazione empirica dell’oggetto “come tale” quale
“oggetto in generale”: trascrizione generalizzata degli oggetti. La sintesi
precede ogni analisi e la condiziona. Il conoscere presenta un duplice livello:
quello del suo fungere che costituisce l’oggetto, quello della consapevolezza
di tale fungere. Il conoscere muove dalla fiducia nello essere in sé del
conosciuto, con base esclusiva- mente pratica. Può venire formulata anche la
contraddizione, dunque la forma proposizionale non è struttura del giudicare.
L’analisi come pre- senza dell’incontraddittorietà formulata come “principio di
non contraddizione”. Un giudizio media la posizione di altro giudizio:
medialità posizionale o fe- nomenologica. Di volta in volta un giudizio può
valere come analitico o come sintetico. Si intende di sapere con necessità. Se
v’è un modo empirico di conoscere, v’è un modo non empirico di riconoscerlo.
Kant conosce analiticamente che la conoscenza umana è sintetica. Nessun
giudizio matematico è conoscitivo. La ragione dell’aritmetica è un fatto,
perché le risulta possibile ciò che le risulta fattibile. Le categorie. Indice.
Indice trovate dall’analitica sono usate dalla stessa analitica. L’esperienza è
condizione del darsi delle sue condizioni. “Cosa” ha significato operativo. Il
tempo è essenzialmente prassi. Spazio e tempo provengono dalla sintesi
dell’intelletto, ma operano nella sensibilità. L’oggettivazione dell’esperienza
è matematizzazione, di cui il trascendente è negazione. Il trascendentale è, ma
non appare. La sintesi è negazione di se stessa come negarsi reciproco dei suoi
termini. Tempo e durata. La presenza fungente dell’apriori è analiticamente
reperibile nel dato e non lo eccede. La differenza tra conoscere e sapere è
conosciuta e saputa. Conoscere non è sapere e l’oggetto è matematico perché è
oggetto. Esemplificazione con Kant di ambiguità fra matematica e conoscenza. Il
conoscere della matematica, essendo matematico come conoscere, non è conoscere.
La volontà di potenza è l’impotenza dell’io nei confronti delle sue
rappresentazioni. L’io si riferisce a se stesso come dato all’io. Non vi può
essere una ragione pura. Teoresi e finitezza della ragione. Il senso teoretico
dell’inconoscibilità dello “in sé” è quello dell’inoggettivabilità del vero. La
ragione è strumentale per se stessa. Il carattere filosofico della
pricerca. Il carattere dialettico, o negatorio della
filosofia. La dialettica dell identico livello. La dia-letticità
della filosofia e il momento analitico della filosofia del linguaggio. I
limiti di validità dell analisi nella filosofia del linguaggio. Limiti di
validità e valore. Come è possibile una filosofia del linguaggio.
Concetto di "teoria" e sua riduzione. La riduzione del concetto
di teoria e la radice pragmatica dell intellettualismo. La nozione
ateoretica dello "in generale" come base della teoria.
Riduzione del procedimento analitico all inde terminato, cioè al
contraddittorio. Differenza ontologica tra il contraddittorio ed il
negato. La dialetticità come impossibilità di un procedimento analitico
sulla totalità. La domanda totale e la totalità domandata. L intero della
domanda totale e della totalità domandata. La conversione dialettica della
totalità domandata nella esclusività del domandare. La domanda come
riferirsi in atto alla risposta. La problematicità della
"definizione" concettuale. L intersoggettività come
dimensione dialettica. La struttura dialettica dell'implicazione.
L'insignificanza teoretica del disaccordo. La preoccupazione di
raggiungere un accordo effettivo è empirica e filosoficamente ingenua.
Fittizietà del rapporto tra filosofia e senso comune. La superfluità del
problema del "solipsismo". Presenza e coscienza. La
realtà come pensiero si risolve nel pensiero come atto. La realizzazione.
L'attualismo come attualismo puro. La realizzazione come negazione e come
posizione. L'attualismo monistico come naturalismo. La presenza pura. La
coscienza della presenza pura. Il rapporto tra atto ed oggettivazione tra
presenza e pre-sentificazione. Importo teoretico dell'espressione
"Verum et esse convertuntur". La metaforicità intrinseca delia
parola. La "cosa stessa" come l'intero di se stessa. L identità
pensare-essere. Il riproporsi del pensiero su se stesso come origine
della parola "cosa". La duplice funzione della parola
"cosa". Le condizioni ad un indagine critica. L atto critico o
negatorio come atto di pensiero nella coscienza. La ricerca del mezzo
logico adeguato e l interrogazione. I limiti teoretici delle asserzioni
condizionate da interessi. La riduzione pretesa del "sapere"
al "potere" e il concetto ateoretico di "teoria".
L'interpretazione matematicistica nei suoi limiti. La teoria come
formulazione generale. La radice dell'interpretazione
matematicistica. Le condizioni imposte dal concetto d
interpretazione. Il carattere teoretico del controllo sull
esperienza. Lo spostamento del limite come essenziale alle
determinazioni. La determinazione come ritorno dell atto: totalità di
definizione e totalità di esaustione. La totalità di definizione come
"essenza". L' atteggiamento fondamentale umano operante nella
definizione concettuale. Il modo indiretto dì dire l'essenza.
Originarietà e mediazione nel discorso metafisico (Il "Tema";
Svolgimento delle indicazioni teoretiche del "Tema". L'originario
come implesso esperienza-discorso. L'"Esperito" e l'"Esperienza
integrale". Il significato dell'"Implesso"; Il senso
dell'"Originarietà" dell'"Implesso". Il concetto di
meditazione e la teoresi del fondamento (L'impostazione; La
"sospensione" degli enti dall'essere). Giovanni Romano
Bacchin. Keywords: anypotheton, haploustaton; ovvero, i fondamenti della
filosofia del linguaggio, il discorso metafisico – a new discourse on
metaphysics, from genesis to revelations, etymologia di ‘autentico’,
l’esperienza e il disscorso, implesso esperienza-discorso; anypotheton, haploustaton, anypotheton
hypotheton, supponibile, insupponibile, haplloustaton, superlative di haplous,
simplex, simplicior, simplicissum, simplicissmo, complesso, simplice/complesso,
simpliccismo, simplicissimo, complessissimo, complesso proposizionale, semplice
sub-proposizionale – implesso, analisi del concetto d’impicazione – senso e
significato – senso e segno – proposizione – funzione proposizionale –
Whitehead. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Bacchin” – The Swimming-Pool
Library.
Grice e Bacci – I bagni dei
romani – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Sant’Elpidio al Mare). Filosofo.
Grice: “You’ve got to love Bacci; he was born in the Italian equivalent of
Weston-super-Mare, and therefore, he dedicated his philosophy to swimming!” – Studia
a Matelica, Siena, e Roma. Scrive “Del Tevere, della natura...”. Pubblica il “De
Thermis”, un saggio sulle acque, la loro storia e le qualità terapeutiche che
venne accolto con entusiasmo. Dopo aver ottenuto la cattedra alla Sapienza e l'iscrizione
all'albo dei cittadini romani, e nominato Archiatra pontificio. I saggi “Delle
acque albule di Tivoli”, “Delle acque acetose presso Roma e delle acque
d'Anticoli”, “Delle acque della terra bergamasca”, “Tabula semplicim
medicamentorum”, “De venenis et antidotis”, “Della gran bestia detta alce e
delle sue proprietà e virtù”; “Delle dodici pietre preziose della loro forza ed
uso”, “L'Alicorno”. Il monumentale trattato “De naturali vinorum historia”, un
compendio in sette libri su tutti i vini conosciuti. Tratta temi relativi alla
vinificazione e conservazione dei vini; Consumo dei vini in rapporto alle
condizioni di salute; Caratteristiche peculiari dei vini; Uso dei vini nell'antichità
classica, Vini delle varie parti d'Italia, Vini importati a Roma, Vini
stranieri. Note DBI. Andrea Bacci la figura le opere, Atti della
giornata di studi tenutasi il 25 novembre 2000 a Sant'Elpidio a Mare. Altri
progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a
Andrea Bacci Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Andrea Bacci Mario Crespi, Andrea Bacci, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, 5, Roma,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. De Naturali Vinorum Historia De Vinis
ItalEae et de Conuiuijs Antiquorum Libri Septem Andreae BacciI Traduzione del
libro Quinto nella parte dedicata ai vini delle Marche, Gianni Brandozzi,
Associazione culturale Giovane Europa, Filosofi italiani del XVI secoloMedici
italianiScrittori italiani Professore1524 1600 24 ottobre Sant'Elpidio a Mare
Roma Enologi italiani. In quo agitur de balneis
artificialibus, penes instituta recæperit, hoc tempus non esta deo compertum,
nisi quantum legitur fuisse antiquissimum. Nam ex omnibus monumentis quæad notitiam
hominum peruenerunt, vetustissima huncritum lavationum, perinde necessarium ad
communem vitam commemorant. Balnearum enim mentionem invenio non modo ante
ROMANORUM IMPERIUM. Sed ante asiaticos etiam et chaldæos extitisse.
Imòsiiactatis, antequam ulla extitissetliterarumin ventio, dicterija credamus;
extat apud Pisandrum id circo Calida balnea fuif fe natura bal. cognominata
Herculea, quòd Minerva olim fesso Herculi calida parasset. Vel veterum et
Galeni in Thermis primus la tascoengerit quodammodo ad lauacra homines. Quippe
ean ecessitas, quæ uationumv a primordio rerum monstrauerat mortalibus ex
agresti vita victum quærere, sus. Tecta construere,abæstu&
frigoresetueri:eadem & fordesabluere,mun ditiæquecultum monftrauit.primo
quidem quantum vitæsatisfaceret,donec paulatima liqua industriaadhibita, laffata
corpora mollia quarum foturecrea reedocuit. Verum quando id inftitutum locum
aliquem in REPUBLICA HABE ROMANORUM, VANTA fuerit naturæ solertiaincumulandis
gratijsaquarum spontemanantium et quæ differentiæsinttùm simplicis Elementi, tùm
consequentes ex misturi. Et quisvsusearumin balneis. Hactenus proeoac potuimus explicauimus.
Quis enim pro dignitate naturæ, speciales proprietatescunctarum aquarum sermonem
consequi audeat? In hisautem quæ ad thermarum vsum dicendarestant, sirectèquis
thermarum ARTIFICIALIUM magisteriaconsi dignitas. deret, summum artis cum
natura certamen videri poterit. Ut tnesciam anadeo sciuerit natura elargiri mortalibus
tota diumentorum materiam, torqueadeo diuinæ dispositionis ostentare miracula
inaquis. Quanto maiora funt, quæ arsaddiditornamentain Thermissuis. Præsertimfubila
ROMANI IMPERII maiestate. Inquarum monumentis,quæ exeispartimvidentur et
partimle gunturapud varios authores, nons atisconstatapudme vtra fuerit maior, an
magnificentia operis ad illorum temporum instituta, an commoditas popu.
larisadvtilitatemlauationum.Principiononeftdubium fiprima quasiin cunabula
cæterarum rerum coniectemus, quin ipsa vitæ, ac naturæ necessi quia
quia eidem (vtAthenæus est author)vulcanusmuneris vice feruida suppo
fuisset. Etlivera credimusre tulisse Platonem tamspectatæfapientiæautho rem,superatomnium
seculorummemoriam, quamipsetraditexantiquissi mis monumentis, de Atlantica maxim
a olim insula n u n c Oceano ipso occupant aextram Columnas; quam Neptunimunere
cùmomni delitiarum genere Thermar r o n clarssima, hab u i f f c (r e f e r t i
pse) etiam balneas quæ omni cultu ornatæ partim usus, quidem subdiuopaterent,partim
veròsubtectocalentiahaberentlauacrahy Είμαζα, τ'έξιμοιρα,λοιπάτε θερμα,καιανα
CUS Sexcenti sautem post Homerum annis,Hippocratesprimusmedicinæau 4.derat.
thor, Thermarumvsum curandarumægritudinumcaussa, tanquamreiiam in Græciacommunitervsitate
commemorat, ac damnauit aliqua. Floruitau tem (ut ratio temporum habeatur) natusprimooctogesimæ
Olympiadis (ut Hippocrates Soranustradidit)circàPeloponnesiacum bellum:quod(teftePlinio)gestu
estàtricentesimovrbisRoniæannoexactisanteàRegibusannos circitersexa ginta,&
ArtaxersePersarumRegemagnam Græciæ partem, & Hellespontú occupante. Poftquæ
temporadum Græciaindies Sapientiffimorum virorú scriptis venirent illustrior,
perpetua habemus de Balneis testimonia, Socratis, Platonis, Aristotelis, cæterorum
quesuccessu temporum authorum,qui& Aliam, &
PersiamnonfolùmGręciambalnearumvsumhabuissefamiliarem LaconesTber testantur. Laconesinter
Græcos antiquiores, primamlaudem Thermarum marimiznitanquam suuminuentumsibivendicare
videntur, Dioneauthore: ac abeis tores. pofteà huncmorem reliquas nations didicisse.
Quod confirmatpartiumno 36 mina in Thermis Romanis,quæ omnes græcæ
suntvoces,laconicum,Hypo cauftum,Miliarium,& Thermæ ipfæ, nedicam cætera.
Ex quibusconstat vsumThermarumapudRomanos fuiseposteriorem,aceasinæmulationem
Græcorum constructastestanturMarcus Varroin librode antiquis nomini bus,&
itemVitruuius.VeruntamensubilaRomaniimperijmaiestate, sicut omnes artes floruere,
ac inuenta prius ab alijs meliora cuasére, vnde meri to Roma QUASI ALTER A
MVNDI PARENS dictaest: itaomnium maxi mè Thermarumi nftituta incredibiles, &
supraquàm exprimivnquam pof sit,habuêreprogressus,eatamen obliterataferèad
hancætatem,necliteris mandata, multisforsanèdoctishæcmeliusscientibus.Quamobrem
nos, volentes ad noftrarum lauationum regulam, antiquum Thermarum vsum rcuocarein
lucem; operæ precium eftRomanarum institutaprosequi:inqui bus quæ prima ipsarum
introducendarum ratio fuerit, quisordopartium,& quisvsus,& quæ tandem
ineis medicinæ pars extiterit,percurremus. In Critia, berno tempore, atque
feorsumaliaregibuspriuata,alia viris,aliamulieri bus,aliaitem equis, cæterişúeiumentis.Posterisveròseculispater
Home rus, cuiusscriptisnullumconstatapud Græcos testimonium antiquius,mul toties
calidaruin lauationum mentionem fecit. Præcipuè verò in Odysseæ lib. 8.vbi Poëtaomnium
fermèrituum memoriadignorum obseruátissimus, Thermas indeliciiscommemorat
illisversibus. vic. Homeri lo Aid δωμϊνδαίς τεφίλη, κιθαρίςτε, χοροίτε,
De affiduis primùm venatibus deditos,necminusagrestibus operibusedu
catos, nonaliaferè industriatùm amplificandæ Reipublicę, tùmdefen dendæquùm
opusfuit, præualuiffe, quàmquoddurataiampacislaboribus corpora,facilèquodcunquemilitiæonussustineredidicerant.Inquo
perce lebremhabemus Quintium Cincinnatum, abaratroaddictaturamvocatum. Itemque
C. Fabritium et Curium Dentatum, qui rure ac militiæ laudatissimi, omni Spicula
contorquent, cursuque, ictuquelacescunt, Abhisergoexercitijs, vterant frequentes,
harena, puluereque conspersi, ac fudoreprofusiatqueoleo,vtseminudi
acexertisbrachijs,cruribusque,vel liberosaltemhabitu, quo degebant, vt effent admunia
propriores, necessario lauationes pofcebant. Qua dere, dum adhuc nouitiavrbs
inhis studijs Patres campum Martium vicinum Tyberi, in quo iuventus post
exercitium Lib.1. c.10 armorum, ludorem, pulueremque dilueret, aclassitudinem,cursusquela
borem natandodeponeret. Qui mos vt paulatim èreipsa, & quasi nemine
Lauationes instituentese in ciuitatem ingessit (quem ve plurimum soletese nouo rūrituum
inTyberi, introductio)itatandem crescente indiesiuuentute,armorumquefimulac
exercitiorumaffiduostudio,viamtamfrugiinstitutiaperuit. Sanèin ciuile videri nobilem
ciuitatem in luculentis Auminis aquis quotidielauari;aclaua craid circo Asiaticorum,
& Græcorum moreparandaesse,quæpostexercitia non ad munditiam facerentsolùm,
verumetiam recrearent, maiusque robur laffatis membrisadiungerent.Quod
tamenpropositumlongissimèdistulêre:
nonquideminscitia,autvecordiatamgenerosæciuitatis, sed propter
Antevrbempueri, & priinęuofore iuventus. Exercenturequis, domitant que in puluerecurrus.
Aut acres tendunt arcus, aut lenta lacertis 7. Aeneid. Lauationum Deprimis Thermarum
institutis in vrbe Roma. Aris quidem constar Romanos illos Quirites,antiquosque
Sabinos, satissuntexemplonobis,hæcfuisseilliusseculiftudia. Non pecuniapræua
lere, non forma, nõ ambitiofo hominum comitatu, non stemmatis dignitate
certare: fed totamvimin proprijanimiexcellentia,viribuscorporis,acexa etacura Rei
pub. collocare. Feruebant honestælaudisemulatione ingenia,vt quosarma,&
propria virtus ad prim s ciuitatis honores euexerant, studio, ac laboreæ quarent.
Quare vbi militiæ in externosceffasset occasio, ROMANORUM quasi natiuo instinctu
dediti ad labores, autrurese agrestibus exercebantope-studia. ribus, autaddisciplinamac
roburcorporis, ciuilibus,ijsquevarijs exercita mentis vtebantur: cursu,disco,faltu,
lucta,& pugilatu,natatione, atque armis. Quem more man t è urbem conditam
fuiffe quoue. APUD LATINO antiquissimum, planèilis versibusrepresentauitVergilius.
necessitas. 36 strenuè adolesceret, præclarum habemus Vegetij testimonium,constituisse
gruentem,au&taque fpatio temporis,spectatævrbisinfinitimasterrasautho
Aquaríper ducen.decre ritate; deaquistandem èvicinis montibus, Auuijsquein
vrbem perducen- tum. 1 (vtegoreor) potissimascauffas:Tùm quiaprimiili Patresnontamfrugifu
turumolimhuncritum existimauêre, quàm luxui, ac mollicieiforelenoci nium; id quod
accidisse, posteà declarabitur. Deinde ob aquarum incom moditatem,quarum
incolles,vbitunchabitabantdifficiliserat,& nonsine maximaimpensa,perductio.
Verùmhoc laucitiædesideriovniuersimin dis, duas dis, decreto S. P. Q.
R. publico ftatutum est: quæ & potuum fimul,& laua tionumritui suppeterent.Quod
factum est primùm M. Valerio Max. P. De cio Mure Coss. (authore Plinio) circa 444.
Ab vrbe condita annum, aqua Tyberinarī Appia ex Tusculano per ducta, Censore Appio
Claudio curante. Aquibusté. porusdimif. poribus, Tyberinarum aquarum vsus,adeam
vsque ætatem tàm potu, quá sus. lauacrofrequentiffimus,exolescerepaulatimincepit:aclauationum
simul, atque exercitationis gratia (ut tradit Festus Pompeius) Piscina publica
ad cli Piscina Pub.uium Capitolinum iuxtàTyberimestconstituta.Pofteà
Thermæconstructę. stitut& uationumduntaxat,conftitutæfuerant,haudmagnum
habuêre progressum. Visicùm auctaciuitate, simul atquecrescenteindiesineisiuuentutisapplau.
fu; semper maiorisearum capacitates ratiofuit habenda.& præsertim vbime
dicorum consensu incurationem quoque ægritudinum suscipicæperunt.Ve
rumtamenpostinitiadiuadmodum consuetum fuitangustasfieri,actenebri cosas;nonenimcalidævidebanturnisiobscuræ;quem
admodum fcribitSe necaadLucillum,fuissebalneum Scipionis Aphricani ad Linternum.
Causa verò amplificationis Thermarum præcipua, fuit Palæstrarum adiunctio.
Quippe cùm apud Romanos veteres, ferèvfquead Augustum,nonadeo multa extiterit architecturæ
dignitas, nec adeo fuerit consuetudinis Italicæ.20 (vt desuotemporescripsitVitruuius,&
multoetiampost)cumPalęstrisLa uationes habere coniunctas;contentus quisque
ruralibus exercitationibus, ThermeadvelCampo ipfoMartio,& harenaPlatearum;solasinThermisobibantla
exercitia có uationes. Quo ritu ad imperium vsque Principum perseuerante (vnde
planè stitute. constarepoteritThermas exercitiorum cauffa fuiffeinstructas)vbicunqueali
qua fierent publica edificia, ac populi celebritas,iuxtà constituebantur &
Thermæ.Exemplo primùm Agrippæ clarissimo;qui ob celebritatem admira bilistempli
Pantheon,atqueCampi Martij;iuxtà,Thermas suas extruxit.
SicNeroposteàNeronianassuasiuxtà Agonalem circum, ob Ludos,quiibi
fiebantcelebres,constituit. Necfecus(authoreSuetonio)TitusVespasianus
dedicatoAmphitheatro,Thermas celeriterextruiiussit:nimirùm ad Amphi Palestrari
theatri,& exercitiorum,quæineofiebantcommoditatem.Donectandem cum
Ther.illustratacuniImperijmaiestateArchitecturæperitia,moreGræcorum Palæ mis
coniun-ftræcum Thermis fuêre coniunctæ,vbinimirùm generosa iuuentus,relictis
iamruribus,atqueharenis,simul& exercitationesobirentomnisgeneris,ac
lauarentur.AtquehincnonsolumoperaThermarum fueruntelegantiùsdi. sposita,atque
admodum amplificata, sedtantam etiam promeruerunt o m
niumgratiam,vttotaciuitaspaulatim hancsusceperitconsuetudinem,fre quentare
singulis diebus Thermas, & tàm Senes,quàm consulares,atque
amplissimiordinisviri,necnonartifices,& matronæ.Proveteriinstituto,
acftudiovirium,promunditia,& prosanitate,atqueomnicuracorporum. Romanarum
Thermarum cenfura, atque Magnificentia, Quæ quoniamfrugiinprimis,obeam, quam
dixi causam et ad ritum la.10 Etæ 40 čtio. Cap. 111. A e c ergo initia, atque
hæc incrementa fuerunt thermaru m Romanorum. Primò quidem institutæob ritum
laudabilem,quem exer citium,& vitæratioillorum temporum inuexerat. Deinde
au 30 Therme con Therma auCtæobcommunemvtilitatem,&
magnificatæcumpalestris. Eradfum mam tandem amplitudinem, acmagnificentiamperductęobdelicias.quem
ad modum à nobis ex earum aliqua descriptionem on f trabitur. Quan quam id
quidem, prorei, atq;vrbis magnitudine, haudnostroindigeret testimonio,descriptio
quiMedicinęduntaxatineisinstitutaprofiteremur:nisiminusplenèomnes,curnecela
quide Architecturaconscripserunt, earummaiestatemexpreffiffent. Nam ria.
quiddeVitruuijlibriseliciemus,nisinudaquædam lineamenta,atqueeaqui Invitruvio
dem nonadmodum explicata,paucaquelocabalnearumsuitemporis,quan-censura.
doperangusta,& blactariafiebantbalnea(vtpauloantèexSenecætestimo 10
niodiximus)quæeiusætate,& poftcà maximè, locuminter primasædificio rum
vrbismagnificentiashabuêre?Minusàiuniorum scriptis,quimutatis rebusposttotsecula,acminus
concordibus, quifparfimdeeismeminerunt authoribus;fatissibi,atquelegentibus
fecisseratisunt,sivastamduntaxat Thermarum dixerintmolem,acDedaleioperisinstaradmirarentur,cùm
ta men Romanarum rerum magnitudo cunctarum nationum miracula supera- Medicorum.
uerit, n o n in Thermis folum. Minimè o m n i u m à medicis. Quos turpe h o
dieadrectam lauandiægros institutionem videri deberet hæcignorasse; indi
gnissimumveròproea,quam profitenturGaleniimitationem,quæ vixvlla
essepotestsinehorumrituum notitia, inquibus ferètotaeius doĉtrina versa 20tur. Quam
obremoperæ preciumest, advniuersam instituti nostril rationé, Therme an aliquam
ThermarumVrbanarum,partiumq;ipfarúcensuramfacere.Princi-publicę,an pioThermas
fuissedecreto publico constitutas, (vt eftdictü)non eft dubitan priuata. dum.Nam
idmultæ declarantauthoritatesscriptorum,acmarmoreæ tabu
læ,inquibusvelSenatusconsultaleguntur,vellegespositæinThermis,ve! munera. Quę exmultispofteàritibusdeclarandavenient,vtpotè,inaliquo
publicogaudiosinemercedepræstarisolitas;veloleum gratuitodari.incom muni
veròluctupublicèThermarum vsum interdicisolitum. Imò in priua
tispęnisexéplumlegimusapud Valerium Max.lib.2.Titio pręfectoobigno miniofam deditionem
Calpurnium Cor. Conuictum hominum, & balnearu 30vsuminterdixisse. Verùm
quinegantThermasoperafuiffepublica,memi sedinThermis:quarumhodieamplitudinem,accelebritatem,hac
sancta religioneintroducta, templanostra, ac pia xenodochia immittantur. Quare &
Thermæ Xeniædicte,quæitaapudgræco scognominarifolebant, quasi hospitales,&
gratuitæ, quo cognomina Thermarum publicarum vtitur manı Thermarum
nissedebent magnificos in eis Imperatorum titulos, qui æternitate nomi-
Thermarum nissui, tantioperismagnitudine affectassevidenturacRomanis
suis,velPo- magnitudi Oo pulo gratuito constitutasindicant.Quo planum
fitetiam,easfierioportuis secapacissimas. Non enim in templistuncconsueuit
populus congregari, quæidcircoangustafiebant,acsuisquisqueindigetisacpenatibuseratcon
tentus, Tuniorum, nis ratio. Therma xea 40.Vnde perperam inhistorijsretulit Volaterranus,
quiblice. M.Tulliuspro Cælio legitproSenensibus,cùm nus Francisci Patritij
imitatus, Senias primas verò scripta subSenarummenioria.Inter quam
balneainantiquislegantur, quarummeminititem palatine.,credo fuiffe Palatinas, atquehas
xenias per acpublicas,ademissaria Aque Claudiæ adeaspofteå
Cicero,vbiSex.Rosciusoccisus,authoreeodemSene,earum cura erat publici muneris
Max. ductæ. Necminus ætatem, quails & Cato, & Fabius ca, nobilissimos Aediles
antesuam, acsuaetiam & alij, populum inthermis exigend imunditias gratia receptare
niæ dop H. 2 manutemperare folitos. Balneatorestamenin Plautolegimus,
& pofteain Balneatores M. Tulliopro Celio,quieiministerioaderant.EtIureconsulcus.Instru
et Balneato me nto inquit balneatorio legato, balneatores continentur, quoniam
sinerium lega ti. his balneæ vsum suum præber e non possunt. Producto autem seu
t i s annis instituto ipso ad luxuriam Principum, non solùm capacitatitantæ vrbis
con sultum eft, fed citrà vllam mensuram aut modum,& (vtAmmianus aflimi
Thermarunlat)potiusprouinciaruminftar,quàmvlliusædificijforma Thermascæpe
numerus Ther.Impe runtextruere.Extatinterprimamonumenta,M.Agrippam,inAedilitatis
munere;quodpostconsulatum gessit,gratuitapræbuiffebalnea170.quæ'po steasub
Nerone,vt testator Plinius, ad infinitum auxêre numerum. Sextus autem Aurelius
victorin censu partium vrbis, Thermas, amplissima opera Imperatori axii. nominauit.
Priuatarum verò balnearú, quasad priuatosvsus Ther. Priua qui lautè viuerētsibiinproprijs
domibus compararunt, numerum exeodem ta.
fubducimusferèdcccLx.quassuccinctèperregioneshicrecensebimus.Pri m a s ergo h a
r u m duo deci m n o n eft dubitandum, fuisse Agrippę Thermas, qui Ther. Agripeo dé authore Plinio, imperáte
Augusto eiussocero, multa & egregiainvrbe perfecitopera, ac Thermas
fuaslytostrato,acencaustopinxit,& pauimétaex Neroniana. vitropofuit.
ErantautemvltràCampum Martium adfiniftram templiPan
theon,vbinunclocusvulgòCiambelladicitur,vtquæinCampo & inAgo
naliCircoexercitareturiuuentus,hincTyberisnaturalem aquam,hincverò
calentiuminThermisaquarumhaberetcommoditatem,vbilauaretur.Ineis verocùm neque capacitati,
nequeadeodelicijs consultumfuisset, eodem au. thore, successitquadragesimocirciterpofteàanno
Nero profusiffimusImpe. rator, quiad Agonalem ipsum
CircumsecundasThermassuonomineextru.
xit.Inquibus,vtscribitLampridius,syluasdeputauit;& nonfolùmdulces, Alexandri.sedvelmarinasaquasinterdum,velalbulasperAquæductusAnienisadduci
Hadriani Traiana. eum
fecissememinitSuetonius.PonitidēLampridiusAlexandrinas,abAle xandro Seuero
extructas in C a m p o Martio,quas quidam easdem esse N e r o nianas putant,
quam tanto imperio fastuo- 30 sam,par erathacquoquenoncareresuperbia.InIli&
SerapideMoneta Regione, c ù m Titus Amphitheatrum dedicasser, Thermas iuxtà
celerite rex truxit, Suetonio;quæ tertiæfueruntImperatoriæ,nimirùm
inAmphitheatri celebritatem& commode (vti diximus) & id circo breues. Quartæiuxtàhas
Traianę, quas Traianusobhonorem Suræ, cuiusstudioad imperium perue
nerat,erexit,acTitiThermismaiores,vbiquæextantmiraAquarum rece
ptaculaseptemSalasvulgoappellant.PriuatæveròintotahacRegione Bal cömodianæneę
xxx.In Regione ad Portam Capenam, quintæinordinefuerunt Com &
Seueria-modianę,quarum &AlexandrumSeuerumaffectassenomenvidetur:etiamsi nę.
Antoniana. interpriores,acnoftrosantiquarios,aliquafitdelocis,&
temporibus,& cognominumassignationevarietas.Inquapræterhas,extantalicuiusnomi
nisapud authoresciuium balnea,Torquati,VettijBolani,Mamertini,Aba s c antiani,
Antiochiani, & priuatæ aliæ Balneæ Lxxxv. Sextæ in Circo Maximo Antonianæ, quasmaximas
verè dixeris, Spartianoauthore,quieasm e minitadradicesAuentinicollisAntoninumImperatoremcognomento
Ca racallaminchoasse,perfeciffeveròeundemSeuerum:mirahodie architectu ra,
ratoria. pa. na. Agrippina. Titi.
instauratas. Adhæc P.Victor Hadriani Thermas. Et ex priuatis
BalneisintotahacRegioneLxu11.Eodemtemporeerexitquoq;suasTher-: mas
iuxtàExquilias Agrippina Neronismater
ra,necimitabili,cumPalęstrisconiuncto.Inhac& Varianæ,& Decianępo
sterioresnumeranturaP.Victore,necnonSyriacæaliæcognominatę,& Pri
uatæaliæLXIIII. Seueriquoque nominef uêrein TranītyberinaRegione Scueriane. Thermæ,
eode in Spartiano teste. Necnon Aurelianz,Vopisco. Balneuitem Aureliane.
Ampelidis, Balneum Priscilianæ, & Priuatæ aliæ 1xxxvi. Inter Esquilias
&Montem Celium, apud Titi & Traiani Thermas, PhilippiImp.Thermas
Gordiani. amplifl. ac pofitum estadperpetuamreimemoriaminipsabasylicadistichuin,deAngelis.
20 quodlicànobisestrestitutum. QuæfuerantThermæ,nunctemplum estVirginis,auctor
El Pivs ipsePater,cediteDeliciz. ruptèdicuntur,&PriuatæintotahacRegione
1xxv.Porròrecenseturinli. 30 EsquilijsRegioneOlimpiadisLauacrum,vbisummo
colliculoSanctiLau Vltimæ Cæsarum nomine, Constantinæleguntur ThermæinCliuoMontis
Quirinalis. Quas non reparatas, non d e integro ex tructas à Constantin o e x i
ftimo, cùmvetuftofatis appareant opére. Necnonmarmoreæ tabulætestimo
nio,quodlegitur:HAS CIVILI BELLO DEVAST ATAS QVANT VM PVBLICÆ PATIEBANTUR
ANGVSTIÆ PETRONIVS PERPENNA RE STITVIT. Propèhas L.quoq; PauliBalnea,quæ
vulgòBalncaNapolicor- BalneaPau rentijinPanisperna,monialium ecclesiahodiecelebratur.AdcliuumcollisàOlympiadis.
SuburraAgrippinæNeronis,quod diximusBalneum, & infràNouati ciuis alix
balneæ, vbi S. Pudentianæ est ecclesia. Et Priuatæ aliæ in totum lxxv. Subinde
vede Priuatisreliquisbreuiteragam:erantinquartaRegione,vbi& Templum Pacis, Priuatæ
BalnexLxxv.cum Daphnidisbalneo. InCeli montio xx. InviaLataLXXV. InForoRomano
iXVI.InPiscinaPubli. caxlinn. InP alatioxxvi.PluresinMartialesparsimlegunturThermæ,
Tuccæ,Hetrusci,Grilli,Lupi, Fortunati, Pontij, Seueri, Fausti, Peti,Ti ti, Tigillini,
quarum locanon assignantur. PorròextraVrbem nonminor Thermarum
cultusessedebuit,vtexquarundam preclariscolligimusm onu, Constantina. mentis. Erantad
Hostiam P. Tacij Thermæ,centum Numidicis columnis Thermeer Ooij adscribit Pomponius
Lçtus. Necprocul Gordianorum Domus, quam descri psitIul.Capitolinusadmirandam,ducentascolumnasvnostilohabentem,&
cum Therinisadeolautis,vtprætervrbanas,vixaliæfimileshaberenturin toto orbe
terraru m. In a lta Semita Regione, Viminali colle, Diocletianæ ex - Diocleti.1
1.. tant Thermæ, quasincçperatquidem Diocletianus Imp. cuni ordine exactif
simo, atque amplissimoPalestrarú omnium generum,inquarum opus quadra
gintamilliaChristianorumeum addixisseaccepimus. Ob magnitudinem tamen (v tin Marmorea
tabula legitur)CONSTANTIVS ET MAXIMIANVS OMNICVLTV PERFECTASROMANIS SVIS
DEDICAR.Hę,cùm in fermè ædificio admirandæ permanerent, hodieCartusiensium Mona
tegro sterioSacræ, Pio Iu11.Pont. Max.subtitulo Sanctæ Mariæ de Angelis
magnificèrestaurantur: Curante M. ANTONIO AMV110.S.R.E.CARD. S. Maria exornatæ.
Arpini suas instituitThermas Cicero,scribens ex Asia ad Q. Fra
trem.ErantinLucullano,quænuncFrascativulgòdicitur,LuculliThermæ, vbi nos
integra vidimus Hypocausti vestigia. Ad Baias autem Thermæ Baians.
erantprætervrbanas,supraquàm quisoptarepotuissetvoluptuofiffimæ,na
turaipsaibiaquasvberriinèfuppeditante,gelidas,calidas,& plurifariâfalu
bres,quasfatisinsuishistorijscelebrauimus.Quid verò hìc cęteras Italię pro
sequar Philippi. Trarbem L. haberet? Quinetiam Rusticanas, inquibusfamilia
(vt inquit Columella,& Rusticana. exeoPalladius) ferijssaltemdiebuslauaretur:
nequeenimfrequenteniearū vsum robori corporis operariorum conuenire. Similiterhunc
morem acce Aquarum maris, & portuumcommoditate, aquarumduntaxatsustineretpe-':
nuriam;hacinpartevenisseincertamenquodam modo cum naturavisaest, vtaquarum
quoque essetabundantissima. Itaquecumhocdesiderio,crescen
teindiesinstitutoThermarum,& modò aliaatquealiaadducta multo spatio temporis
in tantam aquæ venêre copiam, vt Augustiætate, Strabone teste,pervrbem,atquecloacasomnesinundareviderentur,&
vni uersæpropemodum ędessubterraneos meatus, syphones,acfistulasvndo
sashaberent.Quo temporeM.AgrippaAugustiipliusgener,quem complura
invrbefecisseconstatopera,cultu,atqueedificiomagnifica;aquarum Cu
ratorperpetuus,authorePlinio,alijscorriuatisatqueemendatis,& alijs nouiter
adductis,septingentos lacus fecit.Pręterea fontes c v,Castella cXXX. 40
Lacusintelligoex Frontino, alueosbreuimuro,inquibusaquæ reciperen tur,&
aliaexalia,vtfiuntapudnos Fontane,Lauacra,Fullonum stagna,
jumentorumaquagia,& huiusmodipublicacommoda. Fontes, quiprimas a c f y n c
e r a s e x Castello funderent aquas, pauciores id circo quàm lacus. C a
stella,certaAquæductuum receptacula, ad MęniaVitruuio,&inviarumdi uortijs,
vbi aquarum facienda esset distributio.Quale etiam num visitur in E r quilijs
Castellum aquæ Claudiæ, indiuortio ad portam Maiorein nunc dictá et adpisse
reliquas Provincias, quibus Romani imperassent, in transcursu diversarum
lectionum obseruauimus. Prætermultas, quaslegimus Romanis anti Lacus in
vr sequarThermas,cùmeatempestatevulgòvilaquælibetdiuitumfuasbalneas
quiores,vtquasprimasinGreciadiximus,inAsia,inSicilia,& apudPersas Hebræorum
DarijThermas,quasPlutarchusdescribitditiffimas, & lautiffimas. EtIose
Hifpanorum phus Hebrçorum Thermas ad Ascalonem, ad Tripolim, ad Damascum, ad
Ptolemaidam. Hispaniaqua calidalauari poftfecundum bellum Punicum à 10
Romanisdidicêre,anteànon consueueruntnisiinfrigidalauari,authorIu stinusHistoricus.Multæ
occurrunt apud authores Thermarum memoriæ,in
Germania,inGallia,inBritannia,aclongè pluraipfarumvestigiavisuntur in Italia, in
quibus vidi sępius per inscitiam etiam doctos virosobstupescere, alij
Theatra,alij Labirinthos, alijmemorandas moles alicuius sepulchri ia
ctantes.Quarum tamenritumlegimusvenisseadeocommunem,vtnonco lonias, &
municipia solum,sednemo dignè tùm Romanam militiam profi terivisusesset,quinon
haberetsuabalnea,& gymnasia, inquibuscommi litonessuiexercerentur. Quod de CleandroTribuno
equitum Commodi Cęs.meminitHerodianus.Indomesticisveròvsibusbalneum
eratviainci-20 bum,vtnotauitArthemidorus.Cuiusreipassimhabentur exempla,quùm ex
itinere,labore,acexercitio quopiam balneum primò ingredi consueue rint,& pofteamolliaquarumfotu
recreatiaccumberent. De aquis vrbanisad vsum Thermarumadductis. Externe. aqua;haud
copiaivrbe bequid. Fontes V Ros
autemRoma,cùmprætercæterasgratias,quibuseamaltissi
musdecorauit,salubritateaëris,situagriadimperium opportuno,zo adportamSanctiLaurentij,quod
pofteàC.Marijtrophæisinsignitum, adhuc illius retinet n o m e n. Porrò fingulis
castellis aquaruin erant propositi Trophça suiCastellarij,vtpræclaroquod Romæ
legitur epitaphiocostat. D. M. Clemen Aquarum propria commoda. Mirariveròlicet inprimis
ipsarum ductuum fabricam, duétuumma dignam planècùm magnitudine operis, tùm
certè publicaipsavtilitate, quęgnitudo. Pluribus mundispectaculisproponendaessevideatur.Molesingens,àdimi
dioferèItaliæquædam perducta,partimexcisisac perforatismontibus, par
30timascendens, partim abimis vallibus perimmensosarcussublata, quibus
Aufeia,& 20 fue xit. Etanteà lib. 31. cap. 3. Clarissima inquit Aqua ruinomniumintotoorbefri
goris, falubritatisquepalmapræconio vrbis Martiaest, inter reliquadeûn
damlociscentum& nouempedesaltitudinismensurantur.Vniuersamverò omnium
censuramitahabuitFrontinus.AltissimusAnioestnouus,Proxima Claudia,Tertiumlocum
tenetIulia,quartum Tepula,dehinc Martia,quæ capiteetiam Claudiælibramæquat,deindeAppia,omnibus
humiliorAllie tina. Primaverò,vtpropinquior,& maximècommoda,Appiaadducta co
ftarexTusculano:Cenfore(vtfupradiximus)Appio Claudio,annovrbisAppiaaqua quæ
perportam Capenam,nuncSanctiSebastiani,inocto vr munera vrbitributa.Vocabaturhæc
quondam Aufeia.Fons autem ipfePico nia. OriturinvltimismontibusPelignorum.TransitMarsos,&
Fucinum La piconia tempus addu tiCæsarum N.SeruoCASTELLARIO Aquæ Claudiæ fecit Claudia
Saba tis& fibi& fuis.Extat Senatus consultum apud Iul. Frontinum,quoaquam
non eratpermissum nisiexcastelloadducere,ne autriui, autfiftulæ publicæ
lacerarentur. PublicisidcircoThermis,propriacastellavidenturfuissecon ftituta: qualiavidemusintegraadDiocletianasThermas,&
adTraianas,mul tipliciopereconcameratas.In Priuatisautemprima Censorum,aut Aedi
liumeratauthoritas,quorum arbitratupermodulos,digiti,velvncięnomi
necertoannuosolutovectigaliconcedebatur. Legequecautum codem te fte,ne
quispriuatus aliam duceret,quàm quæ exlacuredundaret,quam ca ducam vocabant:
& hancipsam non in alium vsum quàm balnearum, aut
fullonicarumdariessesolitam. Omnem aquaminpublicosvsuserogari
debere.Cæterùmquotnumeroessenthæaquæ,quæ,quonomine,& quo tempore,& vnde
adducerentur,breuiterpercurrendumest.ScribitPro copiusIustinianiCæs.fcriba,Romæ
quatuordecim fuisse aquarum ductus, excocto latere,ealatitudine,acprofunditate,
vtferèequesteripsocúequo pereosposseteuadere. Nos Frontinum imitati, qui Nerva imperante
pręfuit hisceoperibus curator perpetuus,& fcriptis cuncta sid
elitermandauit, octo aut nouem suo emissario per ductas dicimus. Quę fuerunt ex
ordine, Appia, Anienisvetus, Martia,Tepula,Claudia,Anienisnouus,Iulia,Allietina,&
virgo:etiamsipofteàduplici,acplurinomine,vtvsueuenit,fuerintcogno minatæ. Nam
poft Frontiniætatem, non aliamlegitur, prętereasfuiss ead ductam, nisieasdem àdiuersis
Imperatoribusautinstauratas, autseductasad bi sRegiones exviginti caftellis distribuebatur.
Quadraginta veròannispo- tus. fteà, exmanubijs PyrrhiRegisEpiri,SpurioGarbilio,L.PapirioCoff.prima
Anienisadductafuit,vtetiamcommodavrbi,& altæoriginissupraTybur.Martiaquę.
Tertia fuit adducta Martia, dicente Plinio lib. 36.c.15.Q.Martius iussusà Se
natu Aquarum Appiæ, & Anienistegulaductusreficere,nouamànomine suo
appellatam, cuniculispermontes actis intràpræturæ cum, Marü. Anienis ve Oo i
1 Triana. cum, Romam non du biè p e t e n s. M o x specum e r s a in Tiburtina
s e a p e r i t n o. uemmillibuspassuumfornicibusftructisperducta.Primuseam
invrbem per ducereauspicatusestAncusMartius,vnus exregibus.Poftea Q.MartiusRex
inprętura, rursus querestituit M. Agrippa. Hæc Plinius. Hancdemum& Traia
namnuncupatam aseritFrontinus,àTraianoinAuentinumvsq;protracta.
QuartafuitTepula,quaabagroLuculli,quéinTusculanoexvarrone legimus Tepula,. Gn. Seruilius
Cepio,L.CasiusLonginusCollin Capitolium perduxêre, via, quæ PortaMaiorhodie appellatur,claristitulis
Cæsarum, Claudij, Claudiaque VespasianiT, iti,& M.Aurelij. EamquidemdestinaueratpriusCaligula,per
& Curiadaduxitveró Claudiusabvsquexxxvi.lapide, viaTiburtina, èfontibus Cæ
Cerulean ruleo,Curtio,atque Albudinocollectam,quibusfæpènominibusscribitur.
Adduxithiç & alteramAnienem,cuiductuiaddifferentiamveteris,Nouus
Aniocognomentumfuitinditum,Frontinoauthore,qui& ipfumpofteàre Fons Albu
ftituit.Concipiturautemperagrum Tyburtinumxx,milliario,operealtili-.
moadPortamEsquilinamadducto.AquamveròIuliamadmiscuitcum Tepu laM.Agrippa,viaLatina,quæabAurelianoiterurmeftituta,eiuscognomen
Juliaquęegassumplit.Ållietinam,quam& Augustam, miratur Frontinus Augustumpro
Aureliana, uidentiffimum Principem per ducere curasse nullius gratiæ,imò &
parum sa Alietina, lubrem,nisi fortecùm opusNaumachiæ aggredereturtransTyberim.
Qui dam ob hoc eam intervrbanas aquas non numerant. DE AQVA VIRGIN E,QVAM
duxitAgrippa,vtPlin,meminitlib.31.c.3.& deinde Claud.Cęs.Pri mum
veròauthorêCaium Cęs. fuisseindicantmarmoreæinscriptiones,quarú 30 vnaineiusaquæductuitalegitur.
Tit.CLAVDIVS DrusifiliusCesarAug. Nominisra-ductusaquæ Virginis destinatosper Cæs.àfundamétisrefecit,
acrestituit.Vir ginis porrò nomen (vt Frontinus scribitnobilis author de aquis
vrbanis ) ad cafum fuithuicaquæ inditum:nam quærentibusa quammilitibus, puellam
vir g u n c u l a m quasdam venas præmonstrasse, ac il as sequu t o s in gentem
a q u ç moduminueniffe.AediculaidcircoVirginisfontiapposita.Quod nomen
posteavidenturadsciuiffe Dianæ, ac Triuiænuncupaffe, quasi Dianæfonsdi Fons Diane
triplex habere dicebatur numen, celebrarisolita, necnon à triplicifonte,qui- 40
bushæcaquaconcipitur. Vel (vtquibusdamplacetantiquarijs) virginisno futurna
menindicasseIuturnam,quam Nymphamsic dictam (testeVarrone) quòd Nympha.
iuuaret,invotisfuisehabitaminfirmis,quiexeaaquabiberent,facramque in via.
simulat que puteum, qui extat, dive Mariæ
Virgini fuisse consecratum, vt r a n In Triuia.
libetquiseiusnominisinterpretationem accipiat,verumtamen eofitmagis
verisimilisnoftrafententiahuncfontemfuissevirginéàDiana,& Triuianun Meuiæ,quæ
dinus, Anio nouns 20 vocant Şaloniam, tio. Vel Triuię. & aqua Diançsacra,quęveteribusvirgohabitaest,&
in Triuijs, vt AQVA autem Virgincquoniamsolahæcadnostramhancætatem Romam
perducitur, altioraliquantosermohabendusest. Eam per cupa Primus aute D thor,
ceretur, 10 Latina dextrorsus,longex1, milliapaff. subterraprius, deinde arcuato
opere. Quinta, ac fausti nominis fuit aqua Claudia,vtinfrontispiciolegiturPortæ
id circo hanc ædemei fuisse constitutamasseruntiuxtaipsum fontem,quam
Sinct.Mar.posteàReligioneintroducta,insuperstitionempræteritiseculiabolendam,
JO est Herculaneus riuus, quem refugiens, virginis n o m e n obtinuit. Hactenus
Ductus lon Plinius. HabetautemductuslongitudinesàcapiteadipsumTriuijfontem,girudo.
spatio a bestàvia Prænestina,dicente Plinio.Marcus Agripa & virginéaddu ”
xitaquamaboctauilapidisdiuerticuloduomilliapafsuú Prænestinavia:iuxtà (vt
Frontinus dimensus est) milliariorum XIIII.n a m vbi fpecus subit montių,
vbicircuitcolles,velvallesæquatarcuatoopere,multoshabetflexus. Pro greditur Anienemfuuium,acintersectaTyburtinavia,
& exinde Nomenta na, & proximè Salariavia; tandeminter Collatinam Portamque
estsalaria, & Puteus Po. Pincianam sub colle Hortulorú, qui est hodie
Sanctæ Trinitatis, ad Trivium litianus vicum exilit fonte. Subitautemeum
collempro fundiffimnospecu,cuiusho die puteus altissimus repertus estin medio
viridario, quod magnifico, ac con spicuointotāvrbem ædificio ibi constituit Cardinalisamplish.
POLITIA. 20NVS,& vtrinqueduæ eiusaquæ marmoreæ inscriptiones.Tı.CLAVDII
nomine. Etquo digno tum fuit magnisilis Romanorum Architectis, erita; omni
futuro seculo memorabile Camilli Agripæ Architecti inventum, salientemsuaptes ponte
facit aqua (impulsam tamen in æreum tubum rotis ræ, primam fanèlaudem
promerentur Sanctiffimi D.nostriPivs IIII.& qui - statim ei successit Pivs
V. Pont. Max. quivirginem ipsam aquam ad Virginisper
pristinamantiquorumformamperducerecurauêre.Quippe lapsu temporum hæcaqua varias
subijt mutationes,& quodmirum eft, vsqueà Plinijtem lutem. Pofte àc raffantibus
in Italiam,& invrbemipsamtotbellis,acvaria rumgentium incursionibus: plana in
historijs monumenta habentur, quæ ductio. Refert Platina, Adrianum patria Romanum
Pont. Max.d omitisiamaf. Adrianiin fi&isque Longobardis, anno falutisnoftræcirciter
MCCLXXVI. Virginis Stauratio. Aquæductum dirutum, cumalijsvrbisaquæ ductibus restituisse.
Donecite rumnonmulto poftdirutus, protantarerum,quæsuccessitcalamitate, nuf
quam prætdr e a videtur fuisse restitutus. Nam quod i n i p s o Trivii fonte
legi Nicolai. tur, Nicholaumv. annoabhinccxII. Virginem fontem restituiffe, planevi
detur is Pontifex haud vllam antiqui ductus huius aquæ partem instauraffe;
sedconfluentesduntaxatèviciniavenascitràpontem Salarium prorefugio vrbis collegiffe,
quæeftminimapars; virgoigitur aqua octauo (vt diximus) est Salonia. Milliario concipitur,vbi
nunc locusà Salone dicitur: Quæcunque fuerithu ius nominis significatio apud
vulgus, quod,vt consueuit huiusinodi aqua run conceptaculafalasdicere,forsan
& hoc obamplitudinem areę Salonem nunc uparit, dicente præsertimFrontino,hunclocumvnde
virgo aqua con- Riuusnúad iicitur, palustrem fuiffe, & vt scaturigines contineret,
lignin operecom-mititur. 40 cupatum, quod nomen ipsum ædis Sancta Maria
invia, vulgari (vt videtur) vocem utila dicitur, pro Sancta Maria in Trivia, vbi multa cum devotione
Beatæ Mariæ Virginis etiam num ea aqua ab infirmis bibitur. De Fonte ergo ipso
quia d huc in Triviæ vico celebris est, non est dubitandum. De origin e a u -
Origo. tem, Pliniusa pertèdicit concipivia Prenestina. FrontinusautemCollatina
ad milliariumoctauum, quæ vtquidam putant,duorumcircitermilliariorü
pore(vtipsememinit )cæpithuius aquæ fimulatque Martiæpenuria: Ambitione (inquit)
ac auaritia in vilas,acsuburbanadetorquentibus publicamsa Artificium per Usurpatio.
Herculews ipsam aquam volubilibus, &
machinis) quæ eximo puteoads ummam planiciem. paffusexilitfonte, actantavbertate,
vt non hortosfolùm,fed & totam quoque subiectam vrbis partem reddat irriguam.
Cuiustam frugiope Agrippe. mu 4 OO 111) munitum, quod nunc quoque visitur
aliqua parte. Iuxtà estriuus Herculaneus. quemtamen non admittit, tùm quia locus
palustris humilisque est, ac v l i g i n e totus obsitus; nec aquæ est satis
vtilis: tùm qui a satis fupe r q; adeam
formam aquæductus Salonia est. Neceum riuum admisisse antiquos,satis apertè de clarantea
Plinij verbaiam allegata. Iuxtàest Herculaneus riuusqué A Salinis refugiens Virginis
nomen obtinuit. Nec secusdimittendaeorum sententia aqua. est,qui ad Salinas
vocatas à Frontino aquas pro Salonia acceperint: cùm hæ longiusinfluantà Salone,
sinistrorsusàvia Præneftina, vcidem Frontinus inquit,passuum
septingentorumoctogintaquævelAppiaaqua,velAppix Appi&origo carestudeat, piètamen
& public vtilitati consulens, opus tàm frugiprofequu Vltimaper tusest, aquamqueVirginem,adeototseculisdesideratam,
hocanno,acmen se MDLxx. decimoseptimo Calen.Septembris, cummaximo totiusvrbis
applausu, ac gaudio perduxit in totum. Consultistamen prius (vt Sapientissimum decet
Principem) Medicis, àquibus & bonitatem aquæ, et vtilitatem, quam præbere posset
huic almæ vrbì re latam comprobauit. Qua dere Naturaem hæc mea eft sententia: Sanè
magnum argumentum bonitatis huius aquæ hoc Qualitates esseexistimo, quòd hæcaquafueritinvsu,
vt nunc quoqueeft, longiffimis seculis. Quippe hæc primas sempermeruit laudes
simulcum aqua Martiain tercæteras vrbisaquas. Authore Pliniolib.eodem
31.cap.3.d.Quantum vir gotactu(hocestfrigore)tantumpræstatMartia
haustu:alternantehocbo tactusintfrigidæ, easnonperinde(laudabiles) &
haustuesse. Hæcs uccinctè Plin. Hác aquam Martialis cognominatcrudam, ilisuerlibus.
Ritussi placeanttibi Laconum, Contentus potesaridovapore 30 te influentium, &
tepidarum, & frigidarum aquarum; hanc specialiter vsu Ab experi- balnei comprobat
frigore, & profrigida, metri causa dixitcrudam. Velcru mentis. Dam intelligas
eum dixisse in comparatione aquæ Martiæ, quæ (vt dictúest) vtilior haultuerat, virgo
tactu. In experimentis, tardius hæccoquit legu mina, accibariareliquaque Tyberisaquęlimpidę,&
Cisternalesaliquę.nimi rum quia fluuialeseiusmodi, inrespectu fontium, omni
exutæsuntcrudita te,ac pluuiales magis aëreæ. Cæterùm hęcaquanullis fontium
aquis vide- 40 turmeritò postponenda. Cætera veròquælegunturaquarumvrbisnomina,
autvariæduntaxatipso nomin e sunt, sicut iam plura ali c u i a quę adduximus
nomina:a u t externę sunt Crabra. Sabatina Lacus Saba saporem, inter vrbanas non
adnumerant. Nec Crabram,quæ erataliaaqua, aquæ,nonvrbanæ. Quomodo quidam
Alfietinam, itavocatamobingratū tis.Amnis Tusculanis,vndeaduehebatur,relicta.NecSabatinam,quamàLacuSa
Larus. batis, qui hodie est amnis Larus, nouissima momnium aquarum
breuimo. Io ductio. Martialis. pars
per Capenam portam, nunc Sancti Sebastiani ducebatur in vrbem. Tota ergo virgo aqua
Saloniaeft, multisvenarum, & riuulorum acquisitionibus (vt Frontini verbisvtar)
obitervsqueinviam Salariamaucta'. Quam Pivs IIII. Pont. Max. vt delectabatur vrbem
suam æternis monumentis, publi cisq; idgenus operibus
adornare,destinauerat.Pivs verò V. Pont. Max.cũ fanèprimùm
orthodoxamfidemnoftramàtotseculihuiuserroribusvendi no, vtquæ
CrudaVirgineMartiaquemergi. Quo nomine haud quidem cruditatisvitioeāhic Poëta
damnare voluit. Sed mirisex tollens laudibus Hetrusci balneum, blandicie
præsertim, & varieta dulo 20 qua q u a n ı diversæ à prædictis
aquæ. Quod vsu c u e n i t in eternis id gen us operibus, perpetuams ibiquisque
memoriamcomparare.ItaqueprimaTherma structuræ exemplo, nulloque integrèscriptoremandataliteris,
nisi obiteràmultis,& controuersè. Etquæobfitaadeovetustissimisiacetruinis,
vt quanquàm peritissimi multi hacętate antiquarij conquisitiffimè studuerint
easinali quamlucem reuocare:nonminortamenadhucrelictafit, magnis etiamingenijsconfusio,
vtquęsparsim dehislegunturauthoritatesscripto rum,cum
paucisquæipsarumapparentreliquijs concordentur. Inprimis
describendaessetixvoypapíce,basisquetantiedificij,quam noftriadverbúPlan
tamrectè appellant: at hæc diuersissima habeturabe aquam tradit Vitruuius,
neceadem dispositioin omnibus Thermis.Porrò, præterfpatiaplatearum, m i n a
esse tantum aut instauratorum, aut insigniu m e o r u n d e m constat, h a u d
ac additos lucos, hortosque immensos, ac Lacus, distinguenda effentloca exercitationum
àbalneis.Acloca propriacuique exercitijgeneriassignanda, vbicominus, acbreuicirco,
vbieminusfierent, sub Diuo, subtecto, in Xi stis. Et quæratio fuisset exercitiorum
in Palestris, & quali aexercitia.Quis vsus præter e a totali a r ú partiu
m: & quæ dispositio, Corycęi E, p h e b ç i, E l ç o thefij, Conisterij, Exhedrarum,
Spheristerij, Xistorum. Etdebalneis, fi singulæ Thermæ plura habebant balnea, at
dubiumnonest,quæ naniratio 30 distinctionis, ancommoditati, an loco, an ordini,
vtcunctis legitur fuisse consultum. An omnibus vnum essetcommune hypocaustum:&
feu vnum comm u n e o m n i b u s, se u c o m m u n e v n i p a r t i t i o n i,
vt verisimile fit, q u o l o c o maximècommodo.Anbinæ& ternæ, quælegunturlauationes,eodem
fie rentbalneo,andiuerso.Etsidiuerso,aneadem pluribusferuiebat,ansin
gulisnouaaqua.Velquæ ratiotàmmiriartificijcalefaciendivna hora tantam aquæ
quantitatem, quæ innumerabili populo sufficeret? Vnde & quo certo
ductutantæ aquæ copia? Quæ ratio erat Pensilium Balnearum, quastantocú applause
Vrbis, & totius Italiæ quosdamintroduxisselegitur? Quibusadid valibus, aut balneis,
aut alueisvtebantur? Etsilabrislapideis(vt quidam pu 4 0 t a n t) quæ videmus
per Vrbem maximis: q u æ e o r u m e r a n t i n balneis dispositiones, &
quo situ ad aquas accipiendas? Etdebalnearijsrebus,quæ fanis expedirent,&
quæęgris. Quiddicamdelauandirituperordines;perætates, perleges,peranni
tempora,peripsaexercitia;acde innumerisdenique id
genuscircunstantijs,quasvelnon scriptasabantiquarijs,velper coniectu ramduntax attentatasà
iunioribus, merispotiùserroribus obscuratas, quàm explicatas invenimus? Quar e
n o s d u m h e c aliqua ex parte revocare in lucem intendimus, &
quævsuimaximè medico opportunasunt, exponere,nullam Fos Veneris 1 rum
instituta, atquemomenta Aquarum ductuum habemus. is fchnographia Thermarum, &dehisquetractandafunt.
Cap.v. Hermas verò per partesliterisinstaurare, haudquaquàm presentis muneris
est. Nec facile esset, pro tantæ molis magnitudine, n õ v n i u s dulorestituit Hadrianus I. Pont. Max.quam & Ciminam interim
appellariin uenio,àCiminoipsomonteinFaliscis, fonteVenerisdeducta.Drusaauté,
Ciminaaqui Annia,Traiana,Antoniana,Seueriana,Alexandrina,& idgenusaliæ,no.
ferè Dubia in Ther. 2 Oov ferèiuniorum positionemfequemur:sedquátum
exrationeillorumrituum, Spacia Thersimulatque
locorum ipsorum diligenti consideratione colligerepotuimus, percurremus. Spatia
in primis Thermarum videmus amplissima: atque ad eo vt quasdam vndeciesmilliespedumtotaarea
continere constet,authore Baptista Alberto in libris de Architectura. In Diocletianis,
quæ inipsaareaappa rentvestigia,præterspatiavndiqueplatearum,&
prætermembra,quæinfe riusacsuperiusvarijsThermarum ministerijsferuiebant,centum
continent partitiones, vario ac nobiliffim oordine. Nec mirum, siconsidereturpublici
çdificijmagnitudo,inquocommunis fueritratiomaximæciuitatisadexer 10 Magnitudo.
c i t i a corporis, ad balneas, ad disciplinas. In i s enim communia er nt studia, tamanimi quàm corporis, necaliaerantartium
gymnasia, vndefæpè apud authores Gymnasia legimus pro balneis. Necminus
addelicias: Nam ratio Gymnasia acresipsaostendit, nonfolùmvsuiinpartibus Thermarumfuiffe
consultum, verumetiamvtiuuentus faciliùsadea studiatraheretur, &
delicijsmaximè, & ornamento cunctarum rerum. Propterea Thermæ neque
digniores occupa
bantvrbislocos,nequeintervilioresfiebantvicos,sedvbilocicapacitas,at Forma Ther
marum,ac partitið. queoperismaiestasrequireret.Vitruuijtamenętatenon videturfuissecon
suetudinis Italicæ (vtipsescribit)magnificareadeo palæstrasac Gymnasia in
Thermis: vtquibus satisad exercitiafacerenttùm Campus ipfeMartius,tùm
Agonalis,totCirci,totplatex,totaliaexercitationumlocapublica, & priuata.
Sed per angustas fieri, & paruas quales Agrippæ Thermas m e m i n i t P l i
nius.Pofteàveroperductoimperiovrbisad luxuriam Principum,non m o dò Græcorum
more constitutæ,sed dilatatæfuêreamplius,distinctaquem e liuslocaexercitationum,acGynınaliaàbalneis.QualesAntonianæ,acDio
cletianædemaioribusextant,acmeliusdispositis:quarum sinunc præsumná
describeremagnitudinem,non tam describere, quàm maiorem partem di gnitatis
earum mihi videbor minuere:sedharum m a x i m è,ad notitiam tanti ritus,
fequarvestigia. In his edificationis eratvaria forma, ac varia dispositio
partium: sed a r e a amplissima, q u æ i n q u a d r u m c l a u s a, tribu s v
e l u t i perpetuis circuitionibusdiuisaesset. In primovndiq;ambitu,quæ
męnioruminftar lib.s. 6. 11. totum edificium claudebant, errant gymnasia
exercitationum, varioordine, quædicemus. In secundo, longèlat eque spatia platearum,Xista,
acPlatano nes, ad exercitiasub diuo. In medio,totaipfamoles Thermarum,quæ sunt
membra balnearum,Atria,simul atq; Xifti, & Palęstrarum amplissimæ porti
cus,vbi (authoreVitruuio) Athletæ perhyberna tempora intectisstadijsexer
cerentur, actranfirentstatim ad balneas, vtdelineataprimùmipfarumbasi,
distinctèmagissingulaexplanabimus, 4marum. Thermæ. Ther.Diocl. 1 Oo
vj Hexedra Lalitudopal. 200 choricen Calidaria FO х NAT MC) V
R a THERMARVM DIOCLE Longitudo Platego Atriolum Die Scola riú BВ Spheriferti H
Tostring 71 Apod TOD Schola Longitudo Ρ
Ι Α ΤΑ Laconica Hexedra Basilica Fngida Topida n uนี" Agaagiâetlume
ORIINS Hexedma Hephebri ATRIVM nPoarttaitciuosnis la карэхэн Spheristerium 200
Hacera Lpatlitudo. 2 Hemicyclus Condste
platego Porucus Tres Stadiate Theatric SET VN M M HT NONES Hexedra
A triolum sperifleriâ Laconicü Coniste Hephebell Hexedra pal. Kesedara
LongituPdloa. odyterium Hypocau Dico Engda Hexedra 'Jių rium Porticus Staduatę
Aquagiấetlume pal. OCCIDENS OS Tres salo ирэхэн ATIOTES TIANARVM ICON. ATRIVM n
Paotrattiicounsis Spenfterum I O O O. Basilica Tepida Frigidai Calidariú
Tõstrina A 5oC Hemicjclus sefala ridium PTENTRIO Scola 1
Departibus Thermarum, acexercitationumlocis. Cap.vi. N PRIMA ergo facie, quæestadmeridiem,tertiamferèpartemmediamoc
cupabat Theatridium. Quæparseratprincipalis,& tanğcaputtotiushuius ædificij:vndeduplicem
(vt quibusdam videtur) habebatvsum;alterum extrinsecus, alterum intrinsecus. Ambitum
enim exterioré ponunt fuisse a r c u a t o opere distinctum,& apertum,quo
exéplo patet, circūcolumnium poftbafilicam Posticã. ecclesiæ Lateranen.Vnde. f.ingrederenturquafiper
Posticum, fiuedextrâverte rentur, fiuefiniftrâ per porticus, apertèvenirentinampliffimam
plateam,ac exindè quò vellent, fiue in palæstras, fiue in balneas. In conspectu
verò interiori ergaplateas,eratTheatrispeciedistinctumcũsedibus,vbi.f.populus,&
maximè nobilessubvmbrameridieisederetadludorūspectacula, quiinplateisexercitij
causa f i e r e n t. Partes verò quæ v t r i n q u e à Theatri d i o p l u r e
s s u n t, a l i q u i b a l n e a putant.Ná quodrotundaformaestvtrinqueinversurisvnum,pinguntessecali
darium,& consequenterponunt vnú Tepidarium,vnum Frigidarium,& vnum
lib.5.c.1 Apodyterium. Nec equidem nega uerim debuisse quæ d ã balnea s e o r f
u m, & q u a l i extra palestras constitui:partimmulieribus,partim
artificibus,&hisquivenien tesàciuitate,statimintrarent,&
quasiextràconspectumpopularemlauarétur, &
abirent.Verütamenhæcnonfuiflebalnea,hauddubièvidetur:nam iuxtàeá ria Sacella.
appictionem,nullus hicvidetur Hypocaufti locus:quoddebuiteffeinmedio, &
communevtriqueordinibalnearum,tefteVitruuio,atinmediohiceftThea
tridiummaximum.Nec eratconsentaneum,vtmébraspectaculieffentStuphæ. Deest &
laconicum,nisifortasse hæc opinio confundat laconicum cũ calidario.
Saterat& vnum Apodyterium comune,vtpotevnum vestibulum balnearum: hicduo
ponuntur. EtprætereaTepidariaduo,cùm tamenidemfitTepidarium,
quodApodyterium.Meliusergomihivideturdicendū,hæc fuiffepartimipfius Theatridij membra,
& partimlocaadvsumAthletarum.i.eorum,quiexercendi essentcoram Theatridio, vtpoteConisteria,Elçotesia,&
quædam apertè in pla team, forsanequorumcarceres. Duo pofthæc Peristiliaquadracaoblonga,hinc
(vt scribit Plin. Lunior de villa sua) exercitationú generibus.Vel Sacella,vtnota
turperædiculasæquisvndiquespatiisstaruarum.hæceratprimæfacieipartitio.
Porròinalterafacie,quæabaquiloneeodemcomensuhuic refpondet, videntur Gymna fuiffe
maiori ex parte Gymnasia, philofophis dicata, ac Rhetoribus, reliquisq; q
studiis literarum de dissent operam.Vtpot epars magis remota àftrepituAthle
tarum,& litucômodiffimo,tùm propteramenitatévnibrarum(erant.n.inhac
plareaPlatanones,vtdicemus)tùm proptergratafontium murmuria, inNataa
tionéipsamcadentiū. Quaproptervisum estpluribusantiquariis, inmediohoc
Vestibulu. Spatioå Septétrione fuifleprincipale vestibule totius huiusæ dificij.
Exquoper40 Hexedre medios Platanones patebat aditus ad Natationem, & hinc, &
hinc in porticus, in & Hemi-basilicas, Diętas, & atria, quæ pofteà dicemus.
Primùm verò àd extra vestibuli, cycli. & àsinistraerant Ex hedræ pluresclausæ
ante plateam, &cusedibus Hemicycli forma, vt disputantes, & tam loquentes,
quàm audientes sese omnes afpicerent: & aliquæpatentes, cellscholænoftræad leuiora
studia. Maioremverò citer 10 Peristilia fia. atq; hincvnum
àTheatridiq,quasipalestræbreues,veldeābulationes.Acinver Spheriste
surisvtrinque,vnum Sphærifterium,quod diximus rotunda forma,cum plurib. 30
Schola. exercitationum. Gymnasticarum continebant partem duæ vtrinque facies
laterales, hinc,atquehinchabebantpartitiones.Ac fuisseeasadexerci quæ conformes
tiadicatasvidetur:tùmquiaplatexhælateraleserantliberæ,& amplæmillecir, citer pedum spatio. T ù m quia membr a ipsa
partim erant Hemicycli aperti cũ sedibus,acvarioornamento,quod apparet,lignorum,acpicturarum:&
partimconisteria,Elæothesia,aliaquemembra advsumAthletarum oppor tuna. Totam
hanc autem primam circunferentiam circundabant continua
porticus,ducentiscolumnisvnostylo. Subinde erantPlatex,amplæ,&.Nam
siædificiorumperfectioproportionibushumani
corporisresponderedebet,vtVitruuiustradit,perfectisfimèresponder in Thermis
Diocletianis, ac melius quàm constituat ex Græcis Vitruvius. Ex Lib. 3. 20
eniminhis Theatridium,vbieratvestibulum,tanquàmcaput: Apodyteriū, pectus:
Hyppocaustum, Stomachus: vmbilicus, maxima, acregalisbasili-Diocletiana
cainmedio: venter, Natatio. Membrorum veròvtrinque, quæfuntbalnea, rummirifica
a t r i a, palæstræ, porticus, Diętæ, basilicæ; æ q u a r a t i o, a c m e n s
u r a e f t, v t b r a a r s et de chiorum, acfæmorum. itavtquæ
exvnatradeturparte,cadem ex alterapa basilicaameniffima,vbiconuenirentomnes, quivelinpalæstrasventuriBasilica.
essent,velinbalneas. Idcircosatisampla,ornatuplastices,acpicturis adhucnitetantiquiflimis.
Hinc rectâ in Diętam, quæerateadem capacitate, fed latiortamen basilica, duplici
columnarum stylotripartita: nam media par
teceuatriolum,erataditusinatriummaximum,& inpalestras: capitaverò
hincatquehincdeunebantinhemicyclis,vbifortasseAthletarum ferrentur iudicia
Circuncolí - liberæ, vt dixi, t à m q u æ a n t è Theatr i d i u m Stadium, nia.,erant
xistum, Platanones, & autem,quæeratanteNatationem enim Xista (authoreVi
maximè estiuas idonea. Fiebant adexercitationes Platani, virentesqueidgenusXista,&Syl
)interduasporticusSylux,quæerant caperentre-ua. truuio situantèNatationem,vndeaquarum
arboresconfitæ,aptissimo autemStadium,itafiguratum,inquit Vitruuius,vtpof
frigeria. PoftXiftum, Athletarum cursus, variaque alia sent h o m i n u m copiæ
fine impedimento hæ omneserantpartitionesquoquo latere,& gym: spectarecertamina.Atque
veròoperismaiestas,erattotamolesinme Stadium nasiorum,& platearum. Summa,acmultimodisearúmē
dio,quæ communes habebatpalæstrascum balneis bris,acmiriartificij,quàm
vtræquelaterales. Inea Porticus riterintelligendafit. Incipiemusautem
àNatatione,quæpatentiffimapars aspiciebatAquilonem:&
exeaàlatereperbasilicas,acdiệtasveniemusin atria,exindeinpalæstrasinteriores,acmaximam
bafilicam,& demum ad balnearum membra. Erat i n q u a m Natatio in re c e s
s u m e d i o a b a q u i l o n e, l o n Natatio. Gitudinedu centorum pedum, latitudinedimidiominus,
ponte,acarcubus bipartitaadinterioresaditus, vbinunc factaestmaiorisaltaris basilica.
Habe batautemàcastelloproximo Aquæ Martiæ emiffarium, quod per occultos tubos ferebatadNatationemipfamaquas.Habebat&
supernèadlongitudi-Emissarium nem fontesvariaspecie,acMusxa,quæ
teftePlinio,expumicibus, acero-aqua Mar fisvetustatefaxisextructa (vt hodie quoque
Romæ sunt in vsu) specusima-tię. g i n e m referebant, ac fiftulis modò apertis,
m o d ò clausis, vario, blandisli moque salientium
aquarumlusu,recentessemperaquasinnatationéipfam Fontes,ac fundebant.
Miriscircùmadhibitisornamentis,quorum etiamnumapparetMufaa
ædiculæfignorum,& statuarum,fontiumquevestigia, & columnarum bases. A
Natatione plura, ac nobilissimamembra: primùmabvtroquecapiteerantPorticusna
amplissimæ porticus conformes, nimirùm & adspectaculaNatationum,&
tationis. adrefrigeriaconstitutæ.Etaliæadaltiorem prospectumporticuspensiles,mi
noristylo.Exeuntibusveròàporticu,tamdextrâ,quam sinistra,eratprimùm fcriptio.
30 Platanones. Dięta. iudicia. I n Atriis era nt Peristilia, hoc est
circü c o l u m n i a, quæ facie b a n t a t r i u m oblongum trecentis
pedibus, latitudine dimidiominus. vbiin Porticu, orie simacum sedibus, quæ
tertiaitem parte longior quàm lata, eratad exercitia Corticum. iuuenumdicata. Sub
dextra Ephebei erat Corticeum,seu Coryceum à Co. Coryceum. ryco, quod videtur pilæ
genus in Galeno 11. de San. tuenda. Seu Choriceum Choriceum dictum, Choreisnimirùm,
ac saltationibus locus proprius. Proximè Frigidarium, locus ventis per flatus, feneftris
amplis. Ab eoqueiterin Spheristeriú ro oblongum, & fimplex, ad pilæ ludum aptissimum.
Adsinistram Elçothesium, Spherifleritquæeratad vnctiones faciendascellaolearia.
SubhocConisterium, vbificcó Elçothelium.puluere, velharenaluctaturiseseconspergerent.
Ab eoqueiterinPropni. Conisteriú. geum, vbi erat in ver u r a porticus Laconicum, quod referemus suo
loco p o Propnigeú. iteà. A Peristilioautem, atrioqueintrantibus ad interiores Palæstras,
erant Talastre in Porticus tres stadiatæ,quas hodie occupat longitudo
ecclesiæ.Ex quibus m e teriores. diaparsamplissima, centumpedumlatitudine, superingentescolumnas,al
Porticusftatissima prominettestudine, cæterùmitafactasecundum Vitruuium, vtilate
Frigidariit. diate. Xistus. ra, quæ
suntvtrinqueadcolumnasmargineshaberent,& qualeshabethodie
viaabHadrianimoleadVaticanumsemitas,nonminuspedum denûm,re
liquaqueplaniciesoctogintapedúm.Itaquivestitiambularentcircùminmar 20
ginibus,non impediebanturàcunctisfeexercentibus.Hæc autemPorticus ziso'sapud
Gręcos vocitatur,in quo Athletæ in tectis stadijs exercerentur.Quę
quoniamexacteeratinmedio,& velutiincordetotiusedificij,vbimaximè
conueniresolebatnobilitasadexercitiahyberna,adambulationes,& adspe
ctacula;cæterasmeritòexceditpartes,tùm magnitudine, tùmregalimaie stateoperis, altiffimisfuperbiffimisqueprominenscolumnis,&
patentissima vndiqueinperistilia, inbalneas,in Hypocaustum,inNatationein,acfuper
nè feneftris illustrator latissimis. 30 præualereassuesceret: deinde ad sanitatemtuendam,quiduofuerant
fines præcipui:& demumaddelicias.InquibusomnibusmutuaBalnearum,atq; Exercitationum
errant beneficia. Nam quantum conferebant balnea lassatis rumque similiter coniunctaeratvtilitas,
acmutuaerantinuicembe Thermarumneficia. Nempe Thermarum
ratioduos,imòtreshabebatfines:primumad
instituta,acdisciplinamiuuentutis,quæficviribuscorporis,honestisquevitæconatibus
fines et Exercita exercitatione, aclaborecorporibusadroburviriumreparandum,&
admun tionum muditiam. Tantundem rependebant vtilitatisexercitia,fine quibus
balnea non tuo beneficia possuntessevtilia,maximèsanis.ItaqueGalenusinlibrisdetuendaSan.mo
Non p i l a, non sollis, non t e p a g a n i c a Thermis Prz. tali parte, eranthæcmembra,situaliquantifperdiuerfoabeo,quem
assignat €phębeum Vitruuius.PrimòEphæbeum, in medio, hoc autem erat Hexædraamplif
Balnearum 1 Bal. Recurel Atria. De exercitatio num generibus, ac preparationibus
ad balnea. Cap. vir. CONSTAT ergo hactenus,balnearum locainThermis,atqueExer
citationumfuisseconiuncta.Idqueoptimaratione,quoniam vtro
dobalneaRecuratoriaviriumessedixit;modò Exercitia Præparatoriaadbal toria. Exerci
nea.Quod frequenter inalijs authoribuslegimus,& succinctèeoEpigram
tatio,Prapa ratoria. mate colligiturMartialis vnde dieta existimat D. Augustinusinconfessionibus,quòd
Bénestaisdivíes,idestquòdan xietatestollat. Ergo vtpro veteriinstitutogenerosæ
Ciuitatis,quam diximus inlaboribusnatam&
educatam,magnaeratomniuminThermiscelebritas; itapro tempore, &
proconditionibuspersonarum,Exercitationeserantva- Exercitatio riæ,&
invarijslocis.QuippealiæinPalestrisfiebant,aliæinXistis,aliæinnumloca. Hexedris,subdioalię,instadio,&
platearumliberofpatio;alięinpluribus fiebantlocis.Necsecusquædamerantcommunes
exercitationes,pueris, senibus,& iuuenibus, vteo carminenotaturà Martiale.
tereolusuum genera,quorum (vt cætera rumrerum viciffitudincs sunt) vix nomi.
Iuuenum 1. De fatu. Præparat, aut nudis
tipitisictushebes. Vara nec iniecto ceromate brachia tendis, Folle decet pueros
ludere, follesenes. Quædam propriæ.Iunioresautlucta,autcursu,autfaltu,autpilaludicriss;Personarum
20 idgenusexercitijscepissentafsuescereinEphebęis.Quemplanèmoremre exercitatio-
presentauit Plautusin Bacchidibus, vbi in personam seuerisenisindicatpue-nes. Rosprimis
vigintianniscum Pedagogo in Palestramantè Solem exorientem veniffefolitos, d.
Βαλανέα Romanorum Puerorum Non harpaftamanu puluerulentarapis.
Vidiffesigiturtum frequentem civitatem,nonfecusatq; hodienossolemus Vite ratio
facrasEcclefiasfestissolennibus, frequentare Thermas. Alios quidem adho nestos,
quos primo instituto proposuimus vitæ conatus.Alios ad sanitatem Ther. tuendam.
Et alios ad oblectamenta tam animi,quàm corporis capienda, pro celebritate illa
populi, pro variarum rerum, ac ludorum spectaculis. Et d e n i que pro
amænitate loci deliciosissimi: vnde barevéesidcirco dictas græca voce Ibi
cursu, luctando, hasta, disco, pugilatu, pila, Saliendo se exercebant, magis q
uam scorto, aut f a u i j s. Fortiori autemiuuentaiis dem quidemexercebantur, velacrioribusetiáple
runqueludis,halteribus,harpafto,& aliquandocęstu.Velarmorum varijs g e n e
ribus in Palestris. Vel in Hippodromis cursu equì, vel agitatu. Athle - Caftus.
t æ v e l s t a d i u m spectante populo de cusrrissent, vela c r i pugilatu
dimicassent, Halteres. cum
cęstibusplumbeis,acbaltheis implicatismanibus,quo grauiùs percu terent.
Alijsaltusimul et halteribus, item plumbeis globulis. Alijinsphę
risterijslusifsent pila, vel foliinplateis, vel Harpasto, pilamaxima.
Senio-Harpastum. resquidam, quorum erat ad sanitatem
præcipuastudia,vtrecensuitGalenus, ambulationeduntaxatantèbalneumcontentierant.
Alijclaralectione, vel Senumexer disputatione in Hemicyclis, velde clamatione oratoria,
vel cantumusico. Alijcitationes. modòvnovtebantur, modòalioperoccasionem, exercitij
genere. Id circos. Defa. tu. nec mirum septies quosdam aliquadielauari solitos,
quod apud Plinium le gitur. Alexander Seuerus, vt meminit Lampridiuspostlectionemoperam
Palęftræ, aut Sphæristerio, aut cursui,aut luctaminibus mollioribus dabat, m o
x venieba t in balneum. Aliis supplebant diurni operris labores, quia d r e
Operari j. creandum lassatum viriumr oburvsuriessent balneo. Cæterùm lenis
exercitationis modus erat ambulatio,quam Senes, & Virigraues,&
imbecilles potiffimùmobibant. Dignioradlaudem,acdisciplinam,eratexercitatioin
Palestris & armiseorum, quirobustisess entviribus. Etquam oriquazíar, hoc
2. Desa.cu. est vmbra t i l e m pugnam, vt interpretatur Gellius, Græci
appellant, divodepce T e u Tirl, ob salubritatem a gymnasticis dictam,Galeno
teste. Innumera præ Рp nomina adposterasætatestransiêre.Necnostræprofessionisestexercitatio
Nostrisecunum singulosmodos,aut genera:quibusiliveteresvterentur, recensê.
livita dif ferensaban tiquis. re, quam partemà Hieronymo Mercuriali, Medico atque
Philosopho scientissimo elucubratam, propediem in luce meditam videbimus.Verùm
exco rum exercitiorum censu, quem fecimus, hanc præcipuam habebimus vtili
tatem, considerantes quàm longè differathic præsens nostri seculi viuendi
modus,& maximèPrincipum,necopportuno pofteros destituemusconfi lio. Sanèvbiillorumtemporum
vitaaffiduisdeditaeratexercitijs,vtpote 10 quæ & fanitatem
conseruarent,& promptiores redderentviresad singula, tàm animi, quam
corporis munera o b e unda; è contra hodie in continuo ocio degitur. Età
Principibus maximè, quiob decorum, ac ampliffimi ordinis maiestatem, semotam à
communi consuetudine degentes vitam;aut curis animi grauibus iugiter tenentur.
Aut siad ludicra aliqui tranfire foleant, ea Exercitianoinertiasunt, tabellæ, alex,
vel Trochinouus modus hàc illuc supermensam stritemporisagitati: inquovitægeneretandemobdefidiain,&
anxietatem,totam breui inertia, cursu vitædeficiant. Quapropter generalisfimum
hoc ac saluberrimum sibi 20 Exercitijnequisqueproponeredebet
institutum,exercitiumnecessariumessead susten cesitas ad vitationem vitæ:
inquire omnes sapientes, variorum quenationum ritussum moconsensu conueniunt. Verùin
quoniam hoc tempore non solùm pluri maveterum exercitiorum generanon funtinvsu,
imòvelipsorum nomina (ut diximus) sunt obscura; necadeoilisvtiessetpoffibile,quinec
Palestras habemus,necThermas,proptereàingratiamnoftrorunPrincipum,aliquot
particularium exercitationumgeneraproponemusexGaleno, atq;alijsan
tiquisauthoribus, quarum multas si non in campis et plateisobirepoterit;
licebitfaltem et incameris et inatrijs,acviridarijsfuis,seruataetiainperso
nægrauitate,percommodèexerceri.Exercitationum (inquitGalenus)com
Exercitatio-pluresdifferentiæinueniuntur. Aliærobustæsunt, & violentę, fiuevehemen
num dife-tes; aliæmediocres,&lenes. Aliæ singulares, aliæcumalio fiunt. Etaliæ
rētiæex Gavni uersas simul corporis exercent partes, aliæ vnam magis,&
aliæalteram. le.2.desan.Vehemens exercitatiodicitur,quę& robusta,&
celerissit:atquehæcmul tergrauequoduistelum iaculari,&
continuatisia&tibusoneremaximo subla tame, pervertere temperaturam
coguntur. Vnde non m i r u m est, q u i p r æ p r o p e r a m accelerentsenectam,
incurrantque facileautinmorbosrenales,autinpoda
gram,autinHemicraniam,aliosqueidgenus affectus,medioquevelutiin fum tuen to,
tash abet differentias. Quædam enim fiuntocylimèagitatis, quædamrobore, acnixu,
quædamfinehis, quædam cum roborepariter & celeritate,& quæ
Exercitatio-damlente.Fodererobustaest,& singularis exercitatio,remigare,discum
nugenera. mittere,mouericeleriter,saltare;idquefineintermissionemaximè. Simili
et ac clivis ambulare.Grauiarmaturatectumceleriteragitari.Continua
tusdiucursus.Et iterfacere.Perfunem manibus apprehensum scandere, modo in
Palestris quo solitum erat puerosexerceri.Velèfune,velperticama nuapprehensa sublimenpendere,acdiutenere.Manibusinpugnum
redu: &tis, iisdemqueprolatis, velinaltumsublatis. Halteribus,feuglobisplus
minusgrauibusleorsumpositis,vtraqueseinflectensmanu attollere.Quæ robustior
erit exercitatio, si qui ad sinistram manum fuerit dextrâ coneturat tollere, &
sinistrà qui ad dexteram. Diuq;,acsępiusidentidem facere.Potest &
foliscruribuserectusacvnolococõsistensceleriterexerceri, modò retrora suminsiliens,
modóinanterioravicifsim crurumvtrunquereferens.Solus
fimiliterexerceriest,summispedibusingredi,tensasqueinsublimemanus,
hancantrorsum, illamretrorsumcelerrimèmouere.Sehumi celeritercir cumuoluere, velsolum,velcumalijs.Cum
alijsverò& citràrobur, & violen tiammultæexercitationesperaguntur.
Vtcursusadmetam constitutam.Vel vibratilisar morum meditatio. Summisinuicem
manibusconcertare.Co nes cú alijs. ryco,& paruapilaludere. Stare, nec
finereseloco dimoueri;quo exercitij genereMilo
Crotoniatescelebratur.Velseerectum,& circumactum 10astantemmutare.Complecti
quempiam manibus,digitisquepectinatimiun ctis,isque diuellere seadnitens.
Medium appræhendere,ac sublatum ceù magnumonusprotendere,&reducere.
Luctaytriusqueluctatorisrobur maximèvtipoteruntSeniores,&
quiadmotumsuntimbecilles. Ambula.Vltimò Fri &tiones suppleant. His omnibus ex
ercitationum generibus,imòinfinitis alijs (vtGalenusinquit)docebant Pædotribæexercendumesse:&
velinPa læstris, velextrà, velinaltopuluere, velconculcato, & firmosolo, &
omni noantèbalneum. Quibus & nosiuxtàpræsentemviuendimodum,siuepro
præparatione, fiquis velit ad balneum,feusinebalneo,vtpleriquehodiefa
tecdicere,quæ situborealifrigidas,acpurasstatimàfontibusadmittebat
aquas.EratenimNatatio (vtidiximus) separataà partibus balnearum: citationes, le
cimus, percommodè vtipoterimus. Sed de exercitationum emolumentis 40 alio loco occurretdicere:
nunc ad describendas balnearum partesin Thermis redibimụs, acaliaineisrequisitaexplicabimus.
De Natatione. Ne i principes autemThermarum partes, primùm de Natatione opor
Cap. vii. Рp ij nimi. Exercitatio. prope rium mem brorum.exercet. Luctaricum
roboreest, ambobus cruribus alter alteriu scrus com plecti, minibus intersesecollatis,
& collo. Manua lteratanquamfunecol
loalteriusiniecta,ipsumqueretrorsumtrahere, acreuellere.Pectoribusex aduers o i
n n i x i, magn o se co n a t u i n uicem retrudere. Ad singulares po r r ò
universalis, attinet electionem, qua parte corporis quis vtivelit, aut indigeat
exerci- particula tatione. Aliæ enim vniuersas simul exercent corporis partes;quo
nomine ludusparuæpilæàGalenoprætercæteracommendatur. Aliæ vnam magis,
aliæalteram exercentpartem, lumbos, crura,brachia, spinam,pulmonē, Deparuepi
thoracem. Itatio, cursusquecrurum exercitationes sunt. Acrocorisini, hoclxludo.
Est festiuæs altationes & Sciamachiæ, crurum, brachiorum,& manuum pro
pria. Lumborum autem, affiduèse inclinare,autpondusaliquod àterra
tollere,autassiduèmanibus sustinere, Spinam transuersim exercet, atollere (vt dictum
est) alternatimhalteres. Thoracis vero et pulmonis suntpro priæ, maximæ Respirationes.
Cor. Celsus inter exercitationes imbecillisto lib.2. c.8. macho conferentes,claramcommendatlectionem.Maximaveròvoxvocis
quoque instrumentaomniapermouet, dilatatque:naturalemexcitatcalo-Clarale&tio.
rem, & quomagisfitafsidua, eomagisvniuersis corporis partibus communicatur,
vtinnostris concionatoribus experimur et in libro de voceà Gale noestproditum. Hoc
genere exercitationum per vocem, quælenessunt, Lenesexer Lufta. Etio,& amo
tioneetiam quimagis validi. Velequitationessufficiantur, gestationesquebulatio.
seucurru, seuproægrotantibusin Scimpodio,& Sellaportatili Cap. 18.
Nimirùmquia singularis eiuserat, acpropriusvsus, non tàm quidemadlaua
Varzac efttionem,quàm ad exercitium. Eftenim Natare laboriosum, quòd itaiacta
quoddam e rerectèAristotelesinProbleumatibus,Natationem,oblaborem,cursuico
parat, aquarum periculaexercerentur. Et Galenus testator de suo tempore, pue 1,
Defa.tu,rosin aquis qumasina's Feudasfacere consueuiffe,idest, quòd prima
fiebantin of Pifcina, Piscina P u aquis pueritiæ rudimenta. Itaque præter Tyberis
commoditatem,propria adhuncritumlocaconstituta fuisseinvrbediximus,quæ
diuersisexplicata nominibusinuenimus, Natationes, Piscinas, Stagna, atque etiam
naumachias, Piscinædi&tæ, quòd & pisces hauddubiècontinerent,
nontamenad vsum piscium, nam ad hoc propriaerantviuaria,sed ad munditiam
seruanda aquarum,& amoenitatem. Videturautem exercitatio numhuiusmodi causa,
primùm constituta fuiffe Piscina publica dieta sub cliuo Capitolino, ad
veniebat populus. Exca& piscinæaliquandofuntdictæparticularesNata
tiones,& labra lapidea, qualia Romæ videmus maxima, nec non portatilia, ac lignea
advsum etiam calidarum aquarum. Quod authoritate constatM. 08 Tullijad Q.Fratrem
desuisbalneis,Latiorem (inquit)piscinamvoluissem,
vbiiactatabrachianonoffenderentur. Hasà Galeno,acalijsGræcisautho x a n u p u s
o ' n ga ribus, modò x o d u a k r í z s a s, mod ò Bari i su p o e edicta s
legimus. Parva autem Solia, Capesupulco peluesquequercus; quam differentiam
planamfaciuot Galeni verba lib.7. Mé πυελοι. Stagna. thodi, vbi ad ventriculis iccitatem
curandam, quæ Hecticamminetur, nata tioneminbalneo factam consulitivteīsnonumerisus,
id eft in piscinis natandocó stitutis, quàmivtotspixpsīsavenoīs. Memorantur porrò
& Neronis Stagna,vbi Amphitheatrumà Martiale poniturinprimis Epigrammatis d.
Hic,vbiconspicuivenerabilisAmphitheatri Erigitur moles Stagna Neronis erant.
Quod tamen stagnumnon plane constatanad natationis usum, anpro Nau stagno circumpofuit,
conseuiffe. Stagnihuiusin Vaticano Naumachiæno Navale Sta minememinit Egelippus
Græcus author, in D. Petri & Pauli martyrologijs. Cæterùm NaumachiapostNatationes&
balneas,altiorisfuitinstitutiquàm Naumachia adnatationem,nec,nifipoftimperiaprincipuminuenta.
Nempe inqua nautici certaminis fieret spectaculum, vel ad disciplinam militarem,
q u ò faci of Finis duplex liùsmilites pericula Aluminum, vel naualis belli, cùın
opus fuisset, possent Naumachię euadere. Sic Polybius refert Romanos primo bello
Punico, quod aduersus Chartaginienses gesturierant, militessuosinnaualidisciplina
exercuisse. Et SuetoniusAugustumcúm effetcótrà Pompeiumiturus, inportuIulioapud
Baias milites in nauali exercitatione tota vna hieme detinuiffe. Vel erat N a u
jucundunfpe Etaculum.
machiævsusaddelectationempopuli,vtcæteraspectacula.Pluraenimerãt q u æ
præberent animo delectationem:primò aluei magnitudo, ac Cyrci c u 1 vivarium. blica. Quam (ut Festus Pompeius est
author) & natatum et exercitationis caussas duo. rat, gnum. xercitium,
tismanibus, accruribusaffiduè, vniuerfæcorporis exercentur partes.Qua Et Oribasiuseaminteraliaexercitationum
generaadnumerat. Imò Natationis in vrbe fuitprimus,acantiquissimus vsus ante
balnea:quando scilicet conftitutæ fuerunt exercitationes in Campo Martio,vbiiuuenes
(te ste Vegetio) puluerem, sudoremque
detergerent, simulatque a d o b e n n d a machiafuerità Nerone constitutum.Vsumtamen
vtrunquepræftarepote Neronis no- sicut& de altero eius nominis meminit
Tacitus,claufifle Neronem in m i n e stagna valle Vaticani spatium, in quo
equos regeret, apud q u e n e m u s, quod navali iusdam OZ
jusdamamplissimiforma,editaadcommoditatem tantiludi,inconspectu maximæciuitatis.
Deinde classisineam, etiammagnarumnauiumintrodu Etio, &
ludusipsecertaminis. Etdemum populicelebritas, & velipsaaqua r u m copia,
atque amænitas, m a r i s i n f t a r tranquillissimi. Et quæ apertis e u
ripistantamvimaquarun vnohaustureciperet,laxaretquefinitospectaculo.Martialis
inquo mouet admirationem aduenæ Martialis,dum sicadulatur Domitiano.locus. Cui lux
primas acrimunerisipsafuit. Ne tedecipiatratibus naualis Enyo (Paruamora est) dices,
hicmodò Pontuserat. Ex quo plane authoritate colligitur, in Cyrcotammarisquàm
terræcelebra In Cyrco rispectaculadebuisse: vbimodòterra (inquit) modòPontuserat.
Quod Naumachia. Cyrci MaximisitusconfirmatinterAuentinnm montem,& Palatinum
de pressus,inquemGabiusæaquæriuus,quemMarianam posteridixerunt,perGabiusaa
petuòinfluit na. na aqua,vtFrontinuseftauthor, quæ fapore,& crafficiemarinamaquam
AugustiNa 2 0 æmulabatur, in q u a faciliùs natat r, t e f t e q u o q u e
Aristotele in Problemati - u m achia: sub colle Hortulorum, ademiffarium aquæ Virginis.
Authore Sueto Domitiani. nio,quiasseritDomitianum circunstructoiuxtà Tyberinilacu
(inter Cain pum Martium scilicet& ipsum collem Hortulorum, vbi nunc iuxtà
Sanctito pluresessentqui exercerentur et quifrequentarent Thermas adca,quă Bal
spectaculaquàm quilauarentur.Eteodemtemporemagnahominum co-nearum.
piaexercebatur,&quivno,&quialioexercitiigenere. Atadbalneasin
trantiumcontinuaficbatsuccessio, nam cùm priores occupassentloca, reli qui (vt scribit
Vitruuius) circunstabant,dum lauarentur. Pleriquesani,ac robusti, poftquàm in
exercitijs incaluissent, nullisferè alijsvtebantur bal
neis(vtinfràmonftrabitur)nisinatatione.Quæ parsidcircoeratamplissi ma,& exercitationibustamsubdialibus;quàm
interniscommodissima. Ve lBalnearum transiffentdunt axat ad balneas calidas, atqueillicoegrelliinsiliebantinfrigisitus.
dam. Summa ergo artificijin balneishæc fuissevidetur, vt in locoessentquả
commodo omnibus seseexercentibus;acmirandiplanè artificijministerijs totaquarum,calidarum
simul,& tepidarum,quæcontinụèexsefunderen turin balneas. Pro commoditate, ac
ratione lauationum, erant omnes ad Рpij meri Et parvndafreti, hic modò
terrafuit. Non credis?spectes dum laxent æquora Martem. ropriè verò ad vsum
naualis certaminis, duæ fuerunt certiffi-qua Maria
inæNaumachiæ.PriinaAugustitransTyberim,adductâobidineamAlfieti
Sylueftriædesapparentvestigia) naualespugnasineo, penè iustarum Claf fiume didisse.
Luxuosissimus Heliogabalus, euripis vino plenis, naumachia Heliogabali. exhibuisse.
Tradit Lampridius. Sed nuncad partes balnearum proprias acMilanius. De partibus
balnearum, esde Milliariis vafisin Hyppocausto. BÀLNEARVM
veròinThermisnoneamvidemuscopiam, quamde BВ exercitationum locis iam diximus.
Ex quo planè videtur, quod m u l n u m pluralo Exercitatio Siquisades longis serus
spectatoraboris, bus. Alteraverò et magis celebris, fuit naumachia, quam Domitianidixi.
mus Apodyteriú seu Tepidarium.
meridiem,vndefolissemperillustrarentur,acfouerenturaspectu. Nam tó:
taeafaciesanteriorerat distincta in duos ordines balnearum, vnusàdextris
Hypocausti,&alteràfiniftris. Etvterqueordo distinguebaturinquatuor Cameras,
conformes vtrinque, ac ita collocatas, vt ex una in aliam Etuplatearum
àsitumeridionaliproposuimus,progressuferèad media pla
eratceùvestibulumregaleApodyterium,seu Tepidarium.Quem lo mirabilem, meritò alterum
noftræ ætatis Trimegistum dixerim. Hinc fini Hypocaustús tror sumn modicus introitus
in Hypocaustum. Sive (vt meliusdicam) super Hypocaustilocum,quirotundaforma,cumopportunishincatquehincmē
Cryptoportibris, nuncprimisNouæEcclesiæfacelisdicatuseft.Totaeniminfràmoles
res. Aftuaria. darum, aliæ frigidarum aquarum ductus, alię calorum æstuaria, aliægrandes
tores (vt vocabulo vtar Iure consulti) curam succédendi ignem habebant in
Thermis. Eratautem vnicum, teste etiam Vitruuio: collocatum tamenin
medio,vtcommuniseiusessetvsusvtrisquecaldarijs,exvnapartevirilibus, 30
exalteramuliebribus.Idqueperopportunaæstuaria,quierantmeatus ab Hypocausto perpetui,
vndecalores occulti in cameras caldariorumipsorum penetrabant. Quod tetigit in primo
Syluarum Papinius Statiusd. Vbilanguidusignisinerrat
dioplacet)æneatamenpatinasubiecta. Quorumidemeratnomencum ca meris
prædictis,vnum caldarium, alterum tepidarium, tertium frigidarių. Legitur item
Milliaria, a magna fortasse capacitate, quali plus millelibrarú aquæ
caperent.Quippeidgenusvasa, teste Vitruuio,maximi aheni inftar, actestudinataadcircinum,itaerantcollocata,
utex tepidarioin caldarium quantum quæ calidæ exisset, infueret, de frigidario in
tepidarium adeundem modum. Atque hinc planum artificium est, in quot a n t
opere laborauimus, quomodo ad communeinvsumtantaaquarum copia exvafisfuppedi
tareturinbalneas. Quod restituoinlucem ex Seneca, quidum adLucillum
miradeliciaruminuentasuitemporisdetrectat,hocafferitobiter. Construiteam,
huiusædificij, concameratainuenitur,acdistinctaaddiuerfosvsus. Aliæ Fornacato. Criptoporticus
erant patentes ad refrigeria in magnis caloribus. Aliä сali 40 IO CUS. 20 cum
laxum, & hilaremdescribit PliniusadApollinarem, hocest,amænum,
acmollisteporis, tùmsolaribusradijsàmeridie illustratum;tùm proximi Hypocausti
vapore laxum:vbi nimirùm ingressuri ad balneas exuebát vestes. Qux
quoniamprimaerat, acnobiliffima Thermarum pars,nobilissimietiá
numapparetartificij. Figura inquadrumoblonga,achemicyclisquaquefa
ciedistinctum,cum aditisvndiqueintercolumniorum,columnisquesuper
nætestudinisaltissimis,quætàmauthoris,quàmoperissummam maiestate ostendunt.
Vnde sapienter hæc pars, proposita est pro prima porticu Ecclesiæà Michaele Angelo
Bonaroto, quem pictura, sculptura et rchitectura cloacæ vnde lauationes exonerarentur,
& aliadenique Hypocaustum,atq; Lib.s.c.10 Hypocaustimembra.EratergoHypocaustum
fornaxinferior,vbifornaca Aedibus,& tenuemvoluunthypocaustavaporem. Vasariatria
SuperHypocaustotriaerant compositavasariaænea, velplumbea (ut Palla Mincepice
Græcis hæc Mirsapíe, Latinis (vt apud Catonem, Senecam, atque Palladium folitum
aditus.Inmedio quidemerat Hypocaustum, vtrinqueveròinversuris La conicum, deinde
consequenter Calidarium,Frigidarium,& tepidarium,vt planèsingula explicabimus.
Principio contram Theatridium, quodinprospe pateret solitumin ipsis milliarijs
dracones, quæerant fistulatavasatubæ instarære tenui, perdecliuemilliariocircundata,vtaquadum
ados draconis con lis canales occultos, q u o r u m aliquæ visæ sunt reliquię
in eruendis ad nouam 2 0 ecclesiam m a c e r i j s: atque ex hinc aquas de duci
s o l i t a s in N atationes, i n F o n sicis organis n o n absimiles. Q u i a
d firmitatem quidem, ac robur faciebant Tubi etepi ipsis v a l ibus: simulatque
artificio ferès i m i l i q u o n o s hodie Romæ nymph e i s s t o m i a.
acviridarijsdamus velarcemusaquas,habebantfiftulasinfra parietes occul tas, q u
æ in cameras balnearum,vbi opportunis locis essent epistomia, infun d e b a n t
aquas. Quod ex eodem Seneca non est dubium, d u m n i m i æ l a u t i t i æ
adscribit, quod continue aqua calida ex sefunderetur in balneas,acrecens
semper, veluti ex calido fonte per cameras transcurreret. Et ex Galeno, vë iam
decamerarum dispositionibus dicemus. De Laconico, esde Solis Balnearum. RDINES
quidembalnearumin Thermisduosdiximus,vtrinque scilicetabhypocausto vnum
testeVitruuio,alterumvirilium,alte Balnea viri. rum muliebrium. Nam vtscribit Gelliuslib.io.cap.3.authoritateVar
ronis2.deAnalogia,Pudornon patiebaturvtrunquesexum simullauari,sed do liadoMu
aquarкт epis t o m i j s, fundebantur. Vbi nota h a r u m ductuum in Balneas
alterum arti 30fícium. Eranttubięne ierecti, tresàdextera et tresàsinistra milliarijs,
m u 40 glomerati specie plurieseundem ignemambiret, pertantumfueretspatij,vasis.
quantum acquirendocalorisatisesset. Quare triplex semper aqua invalis,
acinfinitæcopiæ, calida, tepida,frigida, nam successiuas vasexvase Caldarium
piebataquas.primum quidem,quod caldarium dicebatur,superprimavas.
hypocaustistraturacollocatum, tanquam omnium vasorumvalis, calfa tes, Dracones
i 10 са. Etasperdraconisinuo lucra fundebat aquas. Secundumsuperhoc erat
tepidarium, quod a primi vasis vaporibus modicè incalescebat. Tertium Fri-
Frigidariú. gidarium: vtpotequod frigidass tatimab emissario aquas capiebat et quan
tum subiecta vasa vacuabantur, tantum hoc nouarum aquarum infunde- batfinefine.
Emissarij verò huius obscura quoque ratio est. Nam vide-Emisariaa mus quidemad Thermas
ipsas propria aquarum Castella constituta: qualequarum· extatin Diocletianis poft
palestras orientali parte. Etin Antonianisàt ergo Theatridij admeridiein. Horum
tamen altitude nullibi excedit planiciem bal nearum. Nec vllus est modus, neque
artificij vllius vestigium, insummis Thermarum testudinibus, vndetam altè deduci
potuissent aquæ.Videturita que mihià proximisiliscaftelliscóstructosfuiffeinfràpauimentatotiusm
o Tepidarium lib.io.administris balnearijs veletiam iumento alligato, subleuatæ
aquæinsu ipsihypocausto piscinam infundebantur, quæs ponteposteàinsubie pernamn
rursusin Tepidarium,& conse ĉtumFrigidariumcaderent,& exFrigidario,
quenterinCaldarium,velutidiximus. Vnde plenas emper vasa suis aquis imumcalida,
medium temperata, supremum frigida, quæ per fistulasencas hinc atque hinc in
quolibet vase compactas, versis ad vnum quenque actum Tympana Fistulę aqua ac
alias piscinas. Hinc, tanquam a communi fonte, per rotas ac tymparo t e a c na,
ac id genus alias machinas aquæ hau storias, quas describit Vitruuius
commoditas coniungi desiderabat. Quanquam in hisque post Varronis et post
Vitruvi j ętátem f a &t æ sunt, hæc distinctio non sit mihi ve risimili. Q
a n rum. liebria. do auctoritu exercitationum,ac lautitia inThermis,vix
publicas potuisse virorum frequentiæ sufficere videtur.Itaquepromiscuas potius
ex eo tempo
refuissereor,achonestismulieribussatisfecissepriuatas,velquasprincipes Matronas
constituisse iam scripsimus, Agrippinæ Neronis matris balneas, terke inbal Olympiadis,atquealias.
Cameræ in quoque ordine quaternæ, Laconicum, Calidarium, Frigidarium et Tepidarium.
Velternæ adminus:hoc enim non videturdubitandum,non fuisseThermas vno stylo
vbique,nequevno ordinepartium et tam in publicis quam in priuatis. Et hinc in authoribus
Celsus. Tanta earum inuenitur varietas. Quaternas point Celsus lib. 1. cap. 4.
dum scribit, Sub veste primùm paululumin Tepidario sudare folitos: tùmtranfi-
Galenus. re ad Calidarium, vbi sudabatur largiùs, quod ponitpro Laconico: tumque
aut in calidamd efcendere,autinTepidam;deinde in Frigidam. Easdem C.i72ero qua
λουτρόν Pyriateriit. Hypocaustü point Galenus lib.10..Methodi, a Laconico incipiens:
Primùm enim inquit ingredientis inaë reversantur calido:hinc secundò in aquam
Calidam defcé dunt,quod propriè aoutcovait appellari. Ab hac mox in tertiam
Frigida ibár: & tandem in quarta sudoren detergebant, quod erat tepidarium,
seu Apo dyterium græce dictum. Inquo& Celsusdicit,fenouissimèquiselauissent
abstergere,& vngereconsueuisse. Quem planèordinem& inhis Thermis,
quarum videmus vestigia, seruatum inuenimus. Extat Laconicum adsuda tiones inquoqueprimæfacieiangulo
vnum, idquenonadeomagnum,hu- 200 iusenim partis noneratvsus communis, nequeadeo
necessariusomnibus, vtquibus fatis ad sudandum exercitiafeciffent. Sed imbecillis
proprius et quiminus validiadexercitia,sudoreshocloco
excitabant:subindeintrabát adcæterasbalneas. Nomen autemdeduxità Laconibus: quos
huncritum rium, Laconicum veròc ommuniter omnibus, & Ciceroni quodam loco ad
Sphærifte- Atticum. Suetoniusin Vespasiani Cæs. Vita Sphærifterium hanc partemap-
30 rium. pellat à figuræ rotunditate. Locus quippe concameratus ac rotunda
fpecie, Lib.5.c.10.habens,authore Vitruuio, inhemisphæriolumen,exeoqueclypeumæneú
cathenispendens,percuiusreductiones,acdemissiones perficeretur Suda Clypeus Lationum
temperatura, vaporibusnimirùm ficretentis,veldifflatis. Erat autem huius institutiratio,
vtfcribit Dion in Annalibus, vtfus è intrantesinhac par vfus: t e sudaret et
sub i n d e unctione ad hibita, statim descenderent in frigida. Quod planè
clarius ex Galeno fiet pofteà, ac à Martiali obiter tangitur in Hetrusci
Thermis, ad Oppianuin tribus versibus. tepidum tamen aquarum vaporem potuisse suscipere.
Proinde Celsusineo, affus dixit sudationes lib.z. cap.27. alibi exiccari dixit corpora:
Seneca exani tos .primò instituise, Plutarchusin Alcybiadis Lacedemonijvitaeftteftis.
Græ Calidarium. cialiquando Ilupice Supo's,& nonnullisuTorw50sdictum,ob
igneum ineova Sudatorium.porem:Latinis modo Calidarium,inodò Cella
calidaria,Senecæ Sudato Laconici coni, ncis. mari, ritus si placeant tibi
Laconum Contentus potes arido vapore CrudaVirgine, Martiaquemergi. Vaporíqua
Virginem dixit, & MartiaminhisbalneisRomanasaquas,blandissimifrigo litas in
Laco ris. Videtur autem Laconici aërem,siccum quidem fuisse, atque igneum, Bico.
Galenus & alijmediciinterdum elixari, Oribafius planè aëreferuidu dixit, ac
præhumidum i n Laconico. Quod rationi consonum sit. Nam ex æstuarijs, partim
quidem siccis, ex quibusiaindiximusabhypocaustooccul 10 su tenui calore, diceba t Galenus x. Methodi,
reservatis vniquem eatibus, liquatisque per totum corpus superfluis,sudores, vtilesquemadores
clicere, quæ inęqualias untęquare, cutimlaxare et multa quæsubhac detenta
erant, vacuare. Ex Laconico patet aditus i n Calidarium, quod proprie Calidum So
aoutpór, hocestlauacruindicitur, eodemteste,& calidum Solium. Patetau-lium.
tem hæc pars,duplex magnitudine ad cęteras cameras:vt cuius in balreis maior erat
necessitas, longior in e o f i ebat mora, ac usus frequentior, præsertim
minusvalidis ac imbecillis. Vbi meminisse oportetex Celli verbis, quæ pau Halat
& immodicosextaNeronecalet. Mox tertiolocoeratFrigidarium,seuFrigidumSoliuminquo
aquaexquisi. acviresdensatacutifirmarentur. Qui enim, subdit,hoc modo
àcalidislaua- Vlus. tionibus, sudationibus que laconicis ftatim in frigidam non
descendissent, Paulo post transpirato immoderatius calido innato,totum corpus
frigidius euafiffesentiebant.Quodfanèfrigidælauatiofieriprohibebat,totum semel corpusconftringendo,&constipando,nonsecusatqueaccideresoletcalen
tiferro,quod quùm infrigidammittitur, & refrigeratur,& induratur. Atque
huius rei causa potissimum constatinuenta fuisse balna, pro imbecilliu vm i
delicetcorporumrobore: hoceftvtimbecilla corporapræcalfacerent, itaque ad frigidum
Soliumpræpararent. Adeoquepræualuitsemperfrigidarũvsus,Frigidarum 40vtvixquidam
alijsbalneis vterentur. Carmis Maffiliensis Medicus, etate Neronis prerogativa,
scribit Plinius lib. 29. cap. 1. damnatis prioribus Medicis, ac balneis,
frigidalauarihybernis etiam algoribuspersuasit. Merficęgrosin Lacus.Vide
bamussenes consularesin ostentationem vsquerigentes. Ex frigido tandem Solio erat
exitus in Tepidarium, tepidiscilicetaëris,q uod diximus apodyterium, sive spoliatorium.
Etcratfinisinbalnco.Ancè Tepidarium tamen Cella olearia in Diocletianis commodè
est ut videtur Cella Olearia, eademque Tonstrinæ na. tôs penetrare ignes
in cameras, partim aqueis per suostubos ac spiracula, v a pores misti ad hemisperium
Laconicipetentes,sub curuatura magni clypei
intenuiffimasconuertebanturaspergines,quæimbrium modò super capita Facultates.
corum,qui morabantur in Laconico depluebant. Potest autem hæc prima pars lo
ante retulimus,vel in calidam fieridescensum, vel in tepidam, & quali ad
uno, tenore vtentis arbitrium potuisse temperari. Et Galenus in 3. de an, t u e n d a idem videtur asserere, nimirùmquòd
in Calido Solioaqua, exvafisquæ diximus Miliariorum calidis, tepidis,ac frigidis,
poteratadvsum trifariam tèfrigida, ad hunc videlicet vsu minquit Galenusx.Methodi;vtquæ
fuerantFrigidum.So fòexcalfacta fiue'in lium., anterioribus Solijs, fiucin
exercitijs, hicrefrigerarentur, An balnea calida. fieri, tepidam, aciusto
calidiorem. Quam tamenva ri, nempè temperatam lauationibus, sed in priuatis,vel
non videopotuissefieriinpublicis rietatem, parabatur à Balneatore aqua advsum
pu adpriuatosvsus. Nam in Thermis compara LO Aeftiuo serues vbi piscem tempore
quæris. fortas selocus,vbinimirùmoleaseruarentur,atquevnguenta do Tonstri,aliique
odo blicum,vnotenorecalidaomnibus. Quod declarant authoritates scripto-frigidæ,
alia rum, quialias Thermas appellant frigidas, alias blandas, alias fervidas. Vei
frigidas significauit Martialisinprimo Epigrammatum. In Thermisferua Cecilianetuis.
Idem inx. Neronianas indicat fuisse calidiffimas, eo epigrammate. Temperat hæc
Termas nimios priorhoravapores res cal d a Therme alię resad opportunosvsus,&
quivellentbarbæ,& capillorum cultuivacarent. Unetiones in Eratautem hæc pars
vn ade necessarijs, acessentialibus (ut ita loquuntur) in Thermis, toto ritu
Thermarum, quandohiçmoseratcommunissimus,vtquisque lo tus,simplicis faltem
oleivnctionevteretur,tùmvtsudoresinhiberet,tùm vtfeabextrinsecùsambientisiniuriavendicarepofset.
Hunc enim tenorem in omnibus ferè,quę hùc sparsim adductæ sunt,authoritatibus
obseruabis: primùmlegiturexercitium,deindebalneum,vbifrictiofiebat,&
detersio, inoxstatim frigidæ lauatio, pofteavnctio,posteacibus&
potus,vltimòso mnus. Proinderecolome legissepluriesinvitisPrincipum, ficuti ntermu..10
Oleimunus nerapublica erat Congiarium,erat Recta, erat Sportula,itaoleum
aliquan publicum. do publicè donatum, quoin communi velutigaudio,quisque
frueretur in balneis.Nimirùm vel Thermiscùmprimùmdicatis,velfaftualiquoPrinci
pis.vnctionum verò,quasquisquesibipriuatimdeferebatadbalneum,luxus
legiturinestimabilis.Quidelicatèviuerent,velimbecilles,odoratisvnguen Balnea con
- t i s r e f o u e bant spiritus. Quosdam legimus iu f f i s s e s p a r g i p
a r i e t e s unguento. spersa vn-Vtfimul (equidem puto) & lauarentur, proiectisinalueositaimbutosaquis
ipfis, & vngerentur, fic penetrante exactiùs vnguento, & odorem, virtu
temquesuam diutiusseruante in corpore. Atqueita Caium Principemsoli tum lauari,
testisest Suetonius. Scribit Lampridius Heliogabalum nunquá
inPiscinislauarisolitum,nisiillæcroco, aliisúepreciosisvnguentisperfusæ
fuissent. Velplanè conspersiseo modoadluxum parietibus vtebantur,vedu quis se
parieti confricaret (quod aliqui facere folebant, vt apud Spartianum in Hadrianoleginus)sineministris,acetiam
proprijsmanibusperungilice Balneton ret. Neroautem profusissimus non folùm calidis
balneass pargebatodorib. guentipre-sed& frigidis quoque vnguentislauabatur,
fcribitPlinius.'Recensenturau ciosi. tem hoc in generepræciolamulta,quæ (Galeno
teste) Romanorum lauritia Olea, etvn- inueniffevidetur: vt Mendelium, Cyprinum,
Narcissinum, Susinum, M e guenta pre- galium factum ex balsamo, Regale apud
Reges Parthos primò comparatum. ciofa. Nardinumquoque,quod&
Foliatumdicebatur,Plinio:& alterum Spicatú,
QuodidemNardipisticæpræciosivnguentum legiturinEuangelio.Etitem30 Iasminum
oleum,quododoriscaufla(vtteftiseftDioscorides)non inbal neissolùm,verumetiaminterepulandum
apud Persas,vsurpari consueue. Unguenta in r a t. Dono, e q u i d e m o p i n o
r, et in Xenijs. Quem morem d i u Spartanos, at conuiuijs. Quelonasretin uiffe narrat
Valerius quę, Plinio teste, Diapasmata,quasi conspersoria dixeris, Cyprini
pulueris instar,quohodievtimurodoratissimi;dequoebriam,putidamq;Felceniam
illuditMartialis in primo Epigrammatum, eo carmine. Quid?quod
oletgrauiusmiftumdiapasmatevirus? Apodyterií Vt redeamus ergo ad cameras, Apodyteriumerat
principium, & finisinbal gues. 40 M a x.lib.2. vnguenti, coronarumq uein
conuiuio dandarum, secundismensis.Erat& Oenanthinuminter præciosa. Quorum similia
aliqua apud Paul. Aeginetam legimusvnguenta,atqueolea. Multaquei d genu salia apud
Plinium lib.13.inalabastrisferuarisolita:nunc omnia rarissima, aut que d a m
sub dititi a, vel adulterata, tantæ verò e a tempestate copiæ, vevsuscorum ad
vulgares quoquede fuxerit, quodserioarguit Iuuenalis. Moechis Foliataparantur.
Diapasmara Ad sudores autem propri c o
hibendos, quæda m ficcis constab n t odoribu, neo; eôdem nimirùm
reuertentes, vbiantèbalnearum vestimentacõsignal sent.Idemqueex Galeniverbisplanèintelligiturx.Methodi:hicenim
dum cunctarentur,actergerentur,corpusadhucpersudorem,innoxiè,accitrà
refrigerationem vacuabatur,acinnaturalem redibatmediocritatem. Porrò vana
quorundam controuersia est, ponereAuicen.trescasas(itaenim interpretantur) in
balneo, easque long è aliter dispositas, quam diximus. C u i b i l. cnim dubium
non fuisse balneas vnost ylovbiquenequevno ordine? Defijf setamen pariterapud Arabes
hunc ritum, testator Auerroes in Canticis, acBalnearum
nonmirùmimperfectastùmeoshabuiffebalneas, Nequeinantiquiffimisanidemsły 10exempliseadistinctioquærendaeft:
quando Hippocratisætatenon adeori tè balneaparabantur, quod & ipseinnuit 3.
De ratione victus in morbis acutis. Neque in priuatis multo minus, quas Galenus
aliquando perinde damnat, acincommodas, Depensilibus balneis, ac balneariis rebus.
Uenire potuirationem.Nam si Pensiles balncas intellexeris sublime salueos, Pensile
quid & quæ fu per solario locatæessent, idmagnuninoneft: ficut &
Hortospensi lesvidemus, atquehorrea, acmaiusopus, Thębas Aegyptias pensiles fcribit
Plinius. Audiuiqui id artificiumattribuant Laconico, ècuiussuspensura
lusvbique. ENSILIVM veròbalnearum,celebreduntaxatnomenperuenitad nos, fuis se
eas inter maiora illius seculi blandimenta: cæterùm Cap. xi. n a m e a r u m
fuerit ratio, non facilè ex aut ho r i b u s colligitur. Ponit Valerius Max,interluxuriæexemplalib.9.
CaiumSergium OratamPensiliabal quæ Auicenna neaprimum facereinstituiffe. Idquet
radit Plinius lib.9.cap: Pensilibal 54.L. Crafsi Ora- neurum inui
torisetate,parum anterempub.occupatam.Queminteraliasvoluptates,& torSergius
Ostrearum afferitinueniffe viuaria, nec tamgulæ causaa, quàm auaritiæ, vt Orata.
Quiitamangonizatas vendebat villas. Eadem testator Macrobius3. Saturna lium
cap.15. Porrò venisse eas in gratiam popularem planè oftendit Plinius
lib.26.cap.3.Asclepiadis NeronisMediciçtate:vrbe,inquit,imòveròtota
Italiaimperatrice,tum primùm vsu balnearum pensiliadinfinitumblandien te. Extat
& Annei Senecę censura ad Lucillum,dePensilibusbalneis:qua
vaporesconuersosintenuesaspergines,imbriummodo Aqua pensi supercapitacorum, lis.
q u i lauabantur, depluere diximu s. Vel quem ad modum Aqua Pensilis dicitur z
Fluvius p e n & Auuius Pensilis, ita id balneum Pensile fortasse intelligendum,
exquodi-filis. ximus (authore Seneca, atque Galeno) calidas perpetuò aquas, vel
quales quisquevellet & tepidas & frigidas, velut ex calido fonte depluere,
actran {currerepercameras. Verùm nihililliusblandimentivideoinhis,quam ob rem
populus eascum tanto applausu receperit, & quæ ad authorem adscri: bantur voluptuosiffimum.
Pensiles ergo balneę haud publici videntur fuisse vera balnea instituti, sed in
priuatis extitiffe. Vtquæ priuatum habuêre authorem, & pri-rum Pensi uatamc
aussam,nempèinuentæaddelicias. Necvllumvestigium,nulladeliurnrutio. Hisin Thermispublicismentiohabetur,
Earumveròrationem, inquatanto. perehesitaui,elicioexeodem Plinio, cuidererumantiquarummemoriapri
ma laussupercæterosscriptores,meritòtribuendaest.Pensileenim dicitur rum inqnit
suspensura inuentaest,vtnequid deesset adlautitiam. Hæc ha 3 benturde inuentione,
atquedelicijs Pensilium, quarum tamen non facilèin 40 P suspen
suspenfum,& mobile: qualesipfememinit lib. 19. cap. 5. Tyberij Cesaris
hortos Pensilesmiræ voluptatis,quoshaudquaquam ponitsupersolariolocatos,
sedsuspensos,& mobiles, quos(inquit)singulisdiebuspromouerentadso
lemrotisolitores. Quod idemclarainbalneis authoritate exposuit lib.26.
сар.3.dum Cleophantum Medicum commemorat, authore M. Varrone, alia quoque blandimenta ex cogitaffe,
iam (inquit )suspendendo lectulos, quo rum
iactatuautmorbosextenuaret,autsomnosalliceret. Iambalneasaui
disfimahominumcupiditateinstituendo:easdemscilicet,&suspensas,vtdi
xitlectulos.Quam fententiam confirmantquæmoxpaulòsubiunxitverba, quæ
allegauimus; Anxiam nimis fuisseAsclepiadis, & quorundam eum se."
quentium curan,tum primùm Pensili balnearum vsu ad infinitum blandien te.
Easdem & balnearum suspensurasdixitSeneca. Et ValeriusMax.impen
faleuibusinitijscępta,suspensis calidæaquæ balneis. Vnde fiiam mente co
cipiasvidere hominem inbalneo Pensili,velęgritudine debilem,vel volu
ptuofævitæ,çuiusdulcitepore,acleniiactaræ,& nęnijs,& dulciconcentu
tibiarum,somno& quietiindulgeretur,iamnihilpoterisexcogitaresuauius.
Leftuli non Ex quibus intelligitur, neque lectulorum ritum in
publicisextitisse:sed ho erấtin Therrumquoq;, vtPensiliumbalnearum,priuataratioeffedebuit,maximèegris.
mis. Vtensilia in Neque particulariumquorundam vtensilium,quorum in balneisaliquando
xandrinusPedagogij lib.3.cap.5.consueuiffenobilesanteferreadbalneasva
sainnumerabilia, aurea,atqueargentea,quorum hęcquidem adlauandum, illa ad
vescendum, alia ad propinandum. Quin etiam carbonum craticulas, Syndones.
&cathedras.Syndonestergendosudoripræparatas,maximèægris,memi-.
nusfitpedesdenos,vtgradusinferiorindeauferat,& puluinusduospedes.
Labrainvr-Hactenus Vitruuius. Quare, vtarbitror, labraistalapidea,quæmultavide
bemarmo-muspervrbemmaxima, vicenos& ampliuspedeslongitudine, erantfortaf-40
s e i n priuatis balne s. Vel aliqua fort af f e in Thermis ad magnificentiam
potius operis, ac ornamentum, quàm advsum. Alioquia d publicum vsum nó
videolocum,nequeadeofuiffevidenturcapaciapopulo. Pofteàvitroquæ dam extructafuiffeconftat.
Pauimentorumautem, ac Lythoftrotorum, quibus alveos, atque ipsas cameras a d o
r n a bant, luxus erat inæstimabilis. Quod certe inuentum Agrippæ tefte Plinio
lib. 36. cap. 25. In Thermis, inquit, quas Romæ fecit Agrippa, figlinum opus encaustopinxit,
in reliquis albarioador Sufpenfabal nea, Thermis. mentio fit, quæ pueris
voquisque domino ad balneum ante ferebant. Ut de strigili, quo sudore in detergebant;meminit
Persius eocarmineIronico. Strigiles Ipuer,& Strigiles Crispiniadbalneadefer.
Inęgristamen prostrigilibus,quierantvelofsei,velferrei,velargentei,spon
giavtebantur,Galeno testex.Metho. Idgenuserat& Guttus,quodLe
cythumquoquelegitur,inquoferuabanturoleuni,velaliavnguenta præ 20 30 rea, ciosa
ad balneum. Hydriæ, pelues, alabastri, aliaqueid genusvasa, exau
Vasaaurea.ro,argento, ferro, velinterdum lapidibusquibusdam. Refert Clemens Ale
Labra, nit Galenusx. Methodi. Labraautem ex Vitruuio,& vestigijsipsorumal
ueorum videntur fuiffe extructa in cameris signino opere, atque albario: sic
enimlegiturlib.5.cap.1o. Labrumsubluminefaciendum videtur, nestan tes circumsuisvmbriso
bscurentlucem. Scholasautem labrorumitafieri oportetspaciosas, vtcùm
prioresoccupauerintloca, circumspectantes reli quirectèftare poffint. Aluei autem
latitude inter parieten & pluteumnemi nauit. O nauit. Non dubi èvitreas
facturus cameras, fipriusi dinuentum fuisset. Libro
autem3.cap.12.visasolimscribitBalineasgemmis,acargentostraras,vtnevitres ca
vestigio quidem locus esset. Argento fæminas lauari solitas, argenteis folijs,
meræge m Afiaticori sum missem perin delicijs fuisse apud omnes nationes oftenditur,
hanc par mirans, hydrias, pelues, vnguentorum odores, & alabastros, cunctaauromaditißimg
20 lita, ac miro ornamento instructa; ad socios conuersus, & quasi nimiunı
il DeritibusantiquisinThermisvrbis. Primis ergoThermarum,ac Palæstrarum
institutis,jam partium earum principalium distinctiones,necnon requisitaad
earum vsum magis necessaria tetigimus. De Ritibus verò in eis, atque ordine
publicaemolumentum, quoniam per hæc oblectamenta, assiduafiebatin gymnasijs frequentia,acvarijs,quasdiximuscorporisexercitationibus
af suefiebat iuuentusad armorum industriam,vnde faciliùs posset militiæ labo
res,quando hæc erantprimailliusfeculiftudia, sustinere. Hûc accesserat&
alia causa, quoniam qui tepidescere quodammodo ab honeftis conatibus
cepiffent,perhas delicias retrahebaturà vitijsanimi, sicqueocium, quod
eftomnium malorum fomes, tollebantur, feditionesarcebantur, & omnes
populares corruptelæ. Ex quibus triainter communes ritus videnturesse
manifesta. Primùm si vetustam illam verecundiam, ac Romanum decusrespicias, summam
inThermishonestatemfuisseferuatam. Simaiestatempopu li,omnia ineis fuisse magnifica
& splendida, velutidiximus, & quæ nolentes allicerent, atque etiam
traherent. Sid enique communem causam. Communem, ac liberum earum vnicuique fuiffe
usum. Erat autem hæc balnea- Thermecó. Rum condition communissima, vt singuli balneum
ingressuri Quadrantem solmunes. Uerent balneatori. Quodplanèaliquæpræclarædeclarantauthoritates:
pri Quadrantis mùm M. Tullii pro Cælio, vbi quadrantariam vocat permutationem balnea
em concludam. Asiaticos durante suo imperio luxuofiflimos fuisse, acexeis
Thermalu A Fines, etvti &, probrisseruisse. Pauper fibiquisquevide
eandeinque materiam & cibis seexercentium,aclauationum,haudmirum
esthæcinstitutasempermaioré mis,acar litatesprin habuisseprogressum;siconsideremus
non folùm hincvitæ cip.ilesTher 30 seruare consueuiffe, fanitatem elegantiam
eos, & roburcorporis;sedquod maius eftinre ز gëtostratę. Baturacsordidus (scribit
Seneca ad Lucillum) nisiparietes balnearūmagnis, a c preciocis orbibus refulsissent.
Alexandrina marmor a Numidicis crustis distincta, operose vndique, &
picturæmodo variataçircunlitio, Vitroconditæ cameræ. Aquainper argenteaeffundebantepistomia,
& adhuc (inquit) ple beiasfiftulasloquor. Relinquocum
hisstatuasillicęternitatidestinatas, operatectoria,picturas, speculariorumlapidumluxus,
quiantècameras præbe bantlumina, & columnarn mingentium numerum, alia quetantioperisor
namentasinefine. Atque hocvnotantùmPlutarchiexemplo,quobalneas primùm ad Gręcos,
& exindeadRomanos huncmorem balnearumema nafse,apud veterum
historiarummonumenta clarum est. Cùm ergo Alexa der Magnusdeuicto Dariorerumtandem
Persię, ac imperijeius potitusesset, balneumque, vt sudorem pugnæ leuaret, ingrederetur;
aquarum ductusad-Darij Ther ludens luxum, Hoccine (inquit) imperare erat. Torifieri
solitam. Indicat & cocarmine Horatius, folutio. 1. Saty.3. Qq dum
xuofiffima. Nuditas in Redde pilam,sonatæs Thermarum,luderepergis? Verecundi
ase nudum quisque in balneas exhibere,& etiamin exercitationes. Cuiusreiinteraliafidem
faciuntstatuæ, præsertimvirotum,inqui bus videtur minuere potuisse corporis
gratiam, ac venustatem, si non pudenda etiam fimpliciterenudataessent.
Nonnullitameninterexercitationes,
autfuccinctafibulaprodiresolebant,autsubligaculis,quæ & subligariavo nihil
foluiffe videntur:teste Iuuenali Satir.2.d. Nec pueri credunt, nisiquinondum
ærelauantur. Quorum tamen priuatafieret lauatio, hora extraordinariaquæeratpoftde
cimā, ij pluri precio lauabant, quod indicate o carmine Martialis lib. 10.
Balneapostdecimanılafo, centumq; petuntur Quadrantes, &c. incommunitamen gaudio,
erataliquandohocmunus interalia Principum, ut gratis lavaretur. Antonini Pij exemplo,
quem balneum sinemercede prestitisse, meminitIul. Capitolinus. Sive ergo proveter
iinstituto, fiueproso Sub ligaculo cabant. AuthoreM.Tullio1.offi.Scenicorum
mostantamhabetveterisdi rumvfus. Sciplinæ verecundiam,vtinScenasinesubligaculoprodeatnemo.
40 Tecta tamen non hac,qua debes partelauaris..promi-Cæterùm cum
haclicentiabalnei,videturdiuadmodum perdurassemulie. Eal. Mulierum verecundiam,quænon
promiscuècumvirisintrarentinbalneas,nisi perabusum.Hinctotpriuatarumbalnearumnumerus.Etquædam
viden uerecunda. Subligar. E.. dum tuquadrante lauatum 14.annum, Lauari.
Cædere Syluano porcum, & quadrantelauari. Pueri tamen antè Fibula. Bal
Rexibis,&c. Vituperanseum Principem,quivtvnusdemultisqua drāte lauaretur.
Idem Iuuen.authoritate confirmatur in 6.ybi mulieres quas d a m a r g u i t i m
pudentiæ, q u æ c o m m uniter cum viris auderent, inquit ips e, lutamercede,hocmanifestumest,commune,acperpetuum
fuissein Ther Locai Thermis indultum,vtlocus inbalneo, cuicunque tam
primati,quàm plebeio co mis commu munis esset, atque indifferens. Ex quo
intelligitur Tertulliani similitudo nia. aduersusMarchionem, QUASI LOCVS IN
BALNEIS: quiavidelicetnul li e x merito datur, necto l l i t u r locus in balneis,
iam gratuito constitutis, & T intinnabu - ad usum publicum. Erant autem
tintinnabula in Thermis summo quo p i a m fasti g i o p o s i t a, fære
factitio conflata, quorum s o n i t u populum, sicut i h o d i e adfacra; conuocari
lauandihoraeratsolitum.Tintinnabuluminter Xenias exhibuit Martialis, eo
disticho. Virgine visfolalotusabire domum? Facitadeandem licentiam Suetonijauthoritas,
D. Titum Cæs. admissaple Secum plebebenonnunquamin Thermissuis lavisse. Et Aelij
Spartianialia, Hadrianum
Cæs.tamprobatævitæ,publicèfrequenterselauiconsueuiffecum multis, verecundia
etiam priuatis. Inuafiffe enim consuetudo videtur,ex affiduis il lisexercitijs,
inbalneis. vndefolutohabitu,acseminudiplerunquehominesdegebant,vtnonesset Idem affirmatquodamloco
Clemens Alexandrinus de athletis et martialis si pudor est, transfer subl igar in
faciem. 10 la. Reges lauif. invil. bres. uaret.d. Dum ludit media populospectantepalæstra
Delapsa est misero fibula verpus erat. Et lib.3. Chionemnotat verecundiæ, quæmuliebriainbalneis
contectala tur publicæ fuisse muliebres, ut Agrippinæ Augustæ Neronis matris.
Olym piadisitem balneæ in Suburra. EtquastransTyberim, quasiextràconspe čtum
hominum habuisse Ampelidem,& Priscilianam ex P.Victorerecensui mus. Conqueritur
hac de caussa insuis Amatorijs Propertiusnon eam esse tum Romanis virginibusin balneis
libertatem, quibuscum more Spartano publice liceretcertare, & lauari, hisversibus.
Sed magè virgine itot bona gymnasij. Quòd noninfamesexercetcorporelaudes
cepsbeneinstitutę Reip.lapsus) totossingulisdiebuslauaricepisse.Invniuer 20sum,
qui cunquein exercitijsfuis, autlaboribusdefatigatieffent,vixfanam vitam
putassent, nisibalneasstatimintrarent, vbisudoré,fordespulueremq;
detergerent,acintotum semolliaquarumfoturecrearent. Quoplanèfit,veSeptiesquos
dam lauari. mirumessenondebeat,nequeluxuiadscribendum,quodquidamsepties eadem
dietum lauari consueu erint, quod Plinius in primis refert. Ac posteri scriprores
Commodum Cęf. et Gordianum idasseruntfactitasse. Sicenim intelle
xêrequotienscunqueexercerentur,laffitudinisacrefrictionisvitarepericula,
obstructionestollere,cutis afperitateinlenire,faciei,manuum,ac vniuersi
corporis decorem conciliare. Erant tamen lauandi horæ constitutæ. Scribit
Lauandiho I ul. Capitolinus antem Alexandri Severi tempora numquam Theri n a s
an t è a u 30 roram apertas fuisse, & semper antè solis occasum claudi
consueuiffe. Communiterv erò lauandihora erat a meridie ad vesperum, quando (inquit
Vitruvius lib. 5. cap. 10) maxime calidæ
auræ a spirare incipiunt. Cu i o m n e s a l i æ authoritates consentiunt. Hadrianus
Cęs. (inquit Aelius Spartianus) ante horam octauam inpublico neminem, nisiçgrum,
lauaripassus est: quod erat duashoras poftmeridiem.Vbi operæ præciumest Horarum
apudantiquosHorologiri rationemhabere,quidiemartificialem
quolibetannitemporedistinguebanttusapudan horisduodecim,&no&tenipervigilias.
Horæergoerantinęquales,maiorestiquos.
estate,quialongiorestuncdies;minoreshieme,& proportionecæteristem poribus.Haud
tamen intelligendumest cosà prandiovsosbalneis fuise: Prădijetcę Nam communiter
vir Romanus impransus, autientaculo tantùm primoma-navfus. nerefectus,bonam
dieipartemimpendissetnegocijs:mox àmeridie,àsexta nimirùm ad decimam horam,exercitijs
& balneo;à balneo autem,circa vi gesimamscilicet& secundamhoram,cenabatopiparè.Quam
dieiatqueho rarum partitionemconquisitèin eo Martialis epigrammate comprehensam
habemus. Primasalutantes, atquealteracontinethora, Exercet raucos
tertiacausidicos. Martialis ma 10 CO, Multa tuæ Spartemiramur iura
Palæstræ, Inter luctantes n u d a puella viros. Refert Plutarc
husinterlaudabiles Catonisillius Cenforij mores,hocsum- verecundiă
ma:laudiilicefliffe, quodcùmfilionunquàmlauisset. Imò Val. Max.
fcribitinterafines. deinstitutisantiquis, necpatercum filiopubere, necsočercum
generis lauabatur. Quia interista fancta Vincula, non magis quàm in aliquo
sacra tolo nudaresenefasessecredebatur. Sedtranseamusiamadeosritus, qui com
inunivsuretinebanturin Thermis. Perinitiainstitutihuius,narratSenecaad
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nisfolùm. Cæterùm poft Magni Pompei ętatē (cuiusmemoria notatur præ ra. Qa ij
Ad quintam variosextendit Roma labores, Sexta quieslafis,septimafiniserit.
Sufficitinnonam nitidisoctaua palæstris, Imperat extructos frangerenonatoros.
Hora libellorum decimaest Euphememeorum, Temperatambrosias cùm tuacuradapes.
Octavam verò dieihoram fuisselauationibus propriam,tùm publica,tùm pri M.
Tullius, uata t e s t a n t u r exempla. M. Tullius scrib i t a d Atticum d e
Cesare: Ambulavit inquitinlittore,pofthoram octauamin balneum, vnctusest,
accubuit,edit, bibitq;opiparè. Horam & distinctionem temporum
aliquamadnotamusex Galenus, Galeno v.deSa.tuen.d. Antoninus Imp. cognomento
Pius, ad curam corporis promptifsimus, subbrumabreuibus, f.diebus, sole
Occidente in palestram ingressus, sub indeole operun & tus lauarierat solitus:
in Solstitio autemhora Thermehie-nona, autfummumdecima. Porrò quod legitur apud
aliquos authores,Ther males, eteftimasaliquasfuiseHiemales,
aliquasAestiuas;hæcnoneratcommunisom niumdistinctio,sedquarundam
àcertocoelisitu dispositio. QualesHiema lesfecissetraditVopiscusAurelianum Cæs.in
Transtyberina regione; nimi rum ad meridiem expositæ,apertè solis fouebantur
aspectu, itaq; ad hie males exercitationes aptissimæ. A e quaratione A estivas
in Gordiano Iunior e meminitIul. Capitolinus, quæ in opaco fit uinter montem
Celium & Esqui Bal.vfuspe-lias,gratas estate exercitationibus præftabant
vmbras. Alioquî penes anni nesannitemtempora,vixvllaeratlauandidistinctio,sedbenèpersonarum.
Nam qui cun que lavaban t u r a d exercitium, in different e r t a m h i e m e,
quam estate lauissent, quandocunquescilicetexercerentur.Sanitatisverò&
mundicieicauf sa:quandocunque opusfuisset,velad priuatamcuique consuetudinem,
vt de Telep o Grammaticom e m i n i t Galen. v. de San. t u. qui lauari
consueverat hieme bis mense, estate quater,medijs verò temporibus ter. Et de
Primigene quodam philosopho, quiquadienonlauisset, febricitabatomnino. Adde
liciasautemacvoluptates,velme tacente, priuataquoqueratio essedebuit, 30
&citràvllamaut regulam, autmensuram. Vnde Meridianælauaționes le
Lychniinguntur, atqueetiam antemeridianę,& vespertinæ. Necnon Medicine
introductio. xi,trimixi,polymixi, idestangulorum &luminum,vnius,duorum,trium,
plurium, Devrilitatibus Balnearum esquandoprimum Dalnceinvfum Medicinavenêre.
seruatur;nonaliam legimusfuiffeRome Medicinamsexcentisannis, quàm balnea. Quod
teftatur Pliniuslib. 29.cap.1.Receptos primùm èGræcia Medicos L.Aemilio,
M.Licinio Coff.vxxxv.VrbisRomæ anno. Quádoqui dempetrarierant, nisiquiob
cæliinclementiam crassarenturmorbi.Nam quæ exmalovitæregimine, acextermis
causiseuenirep.
Andrea Baccius. Andrea Bacci. Keywords: i bagni dei romani, De thermis –
thermal baths – philosophy of thermal baths – implicatura ginnastica – le xii
pietro pretiose – storia naturale del vino, bacco – terme romane – il vino e la
filosofia, bacco ed Apollo, le xii pietre pretiose per ordine di dio I sardio
II topatio III smeraldo IV barconchio IV saphhiro VI diaspro VII lingurio VIII
agata IX amethisto X berillo XI chrisolito XII onice – tevere, le tibre au
louvre, i vini. Thermopolium romanum – illustrazione – incisione terme romanae
– natatio – piscina – ginnasio, mercurial, arte ginnastica. -- Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, “Grice e Bacci” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51790323713/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Badaloni – colloquenza – filosofia
italiana
(Livorno). Filosofo. Grice: “I like Badaloni; he never took the ROMAN story of
philosophy – I say story since history, as every Italian knows, is too
pretentious! – seriously until he had to teach it! “Storia del pensiero
filosofico – l’antichita’ is my favourite – because he does his best to
understand Plato’s pragmatics of dialogue as misunderstood by Cicero!” -- Nicola Badaloni, Sindaco di Livorno Durata
mandato19541966 PredecessoreFurio Diaz SuccessoreDino Raugi Nicola Badaloni (detto
Marco) (Livorno). filosofo. Di spiccate convinzioni marxiste, è stato uno
studioso di Giordano Bruno, Tommaso Campanella, Giambattista Vico, Karl Marx,
Antonio Gramsci. All'attività di ricerca
e di docenza presso l'Pisa, dove è stato Preside della Facoltà di Lettere e
Filosofia e ha occupato dal 1966 e per molti lustri la cattedra di Storia della
filosofia, Badaloni ha affiancato un'imponente attività politica nelle file del
movimento operaio, ricoprendo per molti anni la carica di sindaco di Livorno
(dal 1954 al 1966), di presidente dell'Istituto Gramsci, nonché di membro del
Comitato centrale del PCI. I suoi contributi storiografici, salutati fin
dall'esordio dall'apprezzamento di Benedetto Croce hanno messo in luce autori
considerati minori e pensatori inattuali (Niccolò Franco, Gerolamo Fracastoro,
Giovanni Battista Della Porta, Herbert di Cherbury, Antonio Conti) rinnovando
radicalmente, attraverso una collocazione nel contesto storico, grandi figure
viste dalla storiografia idealistica precedente come immerse in una «solitudine
metastorica». Storicismo e filosofia
Nella presentazione dell'ultima pubblicazione di Badaloni nel 2005, Remo Bodei
ha sostenuto che il marxismo, lontano da ogni vulgata, conserva, per lo storico
della filosofia toscano, la sua capacità di strumento di comprensione del
mondo, di erogatore di energie di cambiamento, di guida per lo sviluppo di una
prassi razionale, ancora validi dopo le esperienze del cosiddetto
"socialismo realizzato". Badaloni ha incessantemente ricercato un
legame, nella storia, tra pensiero e azione sociale e sviluppato uno storicismo
di impronta marxista che raccordasse autori lontani nel tempo (come Giordano
Bruno, Gian Battista Vico, Antonio Labriola), ma accomunati dalla tensione al
rinnovamento e alla trasformazione progressiva degli assetti sociali in una
data situazione storica determinata. Così come c'è alterità profonda, ma non
rottura senza legame, tra Hegel e Marx e similmente tra Croce e Gramsci. Altre opere: “Retorica e storicità in Vico”
-- “Inquietudini e fermenti di libertà nel Rinascimento italiano” (ETS, Pisa);
“Appunti intorno alla fama del Bruno”; “Introduzione a Giambattista Vico,
Feltrinelli); “Marxismo come storicismo, Feltrinelli); “Tommaso Campanella”
(Feltrinelli, 'Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato); “Conti. Un abate libero
pensatore tra Newton e Voltaire” (Feltrinelli); “Il marxismo italiano degli
anni Sessanta” (Editori Riuniti); “Labriola politico e filosofo, sta in Critica
marxista, Roma); “Per il comunismo. Questioni di teoria, Einaudi); “Fermenti di
vita intellettuale a Napoli dal 1500 alla metà del 600, sta in Storia di Napoli, Società Editrice Storia di
Napoli); “Cultura e vita civile tra Riforma e Controriforma” (Laterza); “La
storia della cultura, sta in Storia d'Italia, III -(Dal primo Settecento
all'Unità), Einaudi); “Il marxismo di Gramsci. Dal mito alla ricomposizione
politica, Einaudi); “Libertà individuale e uomo collettivo in Gramsci, in
Politica e storia in Gramsci, F. Ferri,
1, Roma, Editori Riuniti-Istituto Gramsci); “Labriola, Croce e Gentile”
(Laterza); “Dialettica del capitale, Editori Riuniti); “Gramsci: la filosofia
della prassi, sta in Antonio Gramsci. La filosofia della prassi come
previsione, in Hobsbawm, E. H., Storia del marxismo” (Torino, Einaudi); “Teoria
della società e dell'economia in A. Labriola, I e II, in Dimensioni”; Forme
della politica e teorie del cambiamento. Scritti e polemiche” (ETS); Movimento
operaio e lotta politica a Livorno”; “Democratici e socialisti in Livorno”
(Nuova Fortezza); “Filosofia della praxis, sta in Gramsci. Le sue idee nel nostro tempo,
Editrice l'Unità, 1987); “Labriola nella cultura europea dell'Ottocento,
Lacaita); “Il problema dell'immanenza nella filosofia politica di Antonio
Gramsci, Quaderni della Fondazione Istituto Gramsci Veneto, Venezia, Arsenale);
“Giordano Bruno. Tra cosmologia ed etica, De Donato); “Laici credenti all'alba
del moderno. La linea Herbert-Vico, Le Monnier-Mondadori); “Inquietudini e
fermenti di libertà nel Rinascimento italiano, Edizioni ETS, Pisa, 2005 Nicola
Badaloni è inoltre coautore di due importanti manuali: Storia della pedagogia, (Laterza); “Il
pensiero filosofico. Storia. Testi. Per le Scuole superiori” (Signorelli
Editore). Notizia della morte sul settimanale Macchianera, su macchianera. Giuliano Campioni, Addio a Nicola Badaloni,
uomo politico e maestro di filosofia, Athenet, n. 12, anno 2005. 16 agosto (archiviato dall'url originale l'11 settembre
)., nel sito del Sistema bibliotecario di ateneo, Pisa. La lezione di Nicola
Badaloni di Giuliano Campioni, professore del Dipartimento di Filosofia
dell'Pisa, 20 gennaio,, in Pisanotizie. Nicola Badaloni, in
TreccaniEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. PredecessoreSindaco di LivornoSuccessoreLivorno-Stemma.svg
Furio Diazdal 1954 al 1966Dino Raugi90637957 Filosofia Politica Politica Categorie: Politici italiani del XX
secoloPolitici italiani del XXI secoloFilosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi.
Nicola Badaloni. Keywords: colloquenza, la retorica di Vico. La storia di Vico,
storia e storicita, campanella, lingua utopica. Bruno, Campanella, Gentile,
Croce, Labriola, Gramsci. badaloni — implicatura
vichiana — libero — biologia filosofica
telesio — vallisneri — lingua utopica di campanella — “retorica e
storicità” — laico — bruno — comune — comunismo — marchetti — vignoli —Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Badaloni” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51790260478/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Baglietto –
dialettica – filosofia italiana – filosofia ligure – Luigi Speranza (Varazze). Filosofo. Grice:
“I like Baglietto; unlike me, he was a consceinious objector, but then we were
fighting on different camps! I love the fact that his first tract is on ‘il
problema del linguaggio’ in Mazzoni – but then he turned from ‘la bella lingua’
to Dutch! And specialized in Kant, but most notably Heidegger – ‘mitsein und
sprache.’ But he also wrote on ‘eros’ and ‘love,’ – which is very Platonic of
him! And of me, since the ground for my theory of conversation is on the
balance between what I call a principle of conversational self-LOVE (or egoism,
if you mustn’t) and a corresponding principle of conversational OTHER-love (or
altruism, if you must, since I prefer tu-ism – ‘thou-ism’).” Claudio Baglietto
(Varazze), filosofo. Di origini
modeste, dopo gli studi liceali presso il Liceo "Chiabrera"di Savona,
studiò Filosofia all'Pisa e si perfezionò presso la Scuola Normale Superiore di
Pisa, allora diretta da Giovanni Gentile. Baglietto fu assistente del filosofo
Armando Carlini. Negli anni pisani sviluppò idee di riforma religiosa e morale,
in contrapposizione al Cattolicesimo e al Fascismo. Insieme ad Aldo Capitini,
Baglietto organizzava riunioni serali in una camera della Normale, cui
partecipavano giovani studenti, divenuti in seguito affermati intellettuali,
come Walter Binni, Giuseppe Dessì, Carlo Ragghianti, Claudio Varese. Così Capitini ricordava l'amico nel suo
saggio Antifascismo tra i giovani (Trapani, 1966): "era una mente limpida
e forte, un carattere disciplinato, uno studioso di prima qualità, una
coscienza sobria, pronta ad impegnarsi, con una forza razionale rara, con
un'evidentissima sanità spirituale. Cominciai a scambiare con lui idee di
riforma religiosa, egli era già staccato dal cattolicesimo, né era fascista. Su
due punti convenivamo facilmente perché ci eravamo diretti ad essi già in un
lavoro personale da anni: un teismo razionale di tipo spiccatamente etico e
kantiano; il metodo Gandhiano della noncollaborazione col male. Si aggiungeva,
strettamente conseguente, la posizione di antifascismo, che Baglietto venne
concretando meglio. Non tenemmo per noi queste idee, le scrivemmo facendo
circolare i dattiloscritti, cominciando quell'uso di diffondere pagine
dattilografate con idee di etica di politica, che continuò per tutto il periodo
clandestino, spesso unendo elenchi di libri da leggere, che fossero accessibili
e implicitamente antifascisti. Invitammo gli amici più vicini a conversazioni
periodiche in una camera della stessa Normale [...]". Ottenuta nel 1932 una borsa per perfezionarsi
presso l'Friburgo in Germania, dove allora insegnava Heidegger, in coerenza con
i suoi ideali di nonviolenza incompatibili col Fascismo, Baglietto decise di
non rientrare più in Italia e rinunciò alla borsa, cosa che scandalizza Gentile
(che aveva garantito per lui presso le autorità per il visto). Anche Delio
Cantimori criticò animatamente la scelta di Baglietto, in particolare nel suo
carteggio con Aldo Capitini e con Claudio Varese, accusando i colleghi
normalisti dissidenti dal Fascismo di mancanza di senso di realismo politico,
nonché di senso dello Stato (fu poi lo stesso Cantimori ad avvisare Gentile della
morte di Baglietto). Lasciata Friburgo,
Baglietto si trasfere quindi a Basilea, dove visse da esule, proseguendo gli
studi e dando lezioni private. Morì nel
1940: è sepolto nel cimitero di Basilea.
Il cammino della filosofia tedesca dell'Ottocento, “Annali della Scuola
Normale di Pisa”, Scritti religiosi. Antifascismo tra i giovani, Celebres,
Trapani); "Kant e l'antifascismo", in Claudio Fontanari e Maria
Chiara Pievatolo, Bollettino italiano di filosofia politica, Pisa37, 1591-4305 (WC ACNP), 7181065539 (archiviato il 5 settembre ).
Ospitato su archiviomarini.sp.unipi. (Saggio inedito di Baglietto, composto a
Basilea e da anni depositato nell'Archivio Marini dell'Pisa) Note. A. Capitini,
L'antifascismo tra i giovani, Celebres, Trapani); Chiantera Stutte, Delio
Cantimori. Un intellettuale del Novecento, Carocci, Roma, che rinvia
soprattutto a Simoncelli, La Normale di Pisa. Tensioni e consenso; Franco
Angeli, Milano); Scritto pubblicato postumo Aldo Capitini. Aldo Capitini Mahatma Gandhi Nonviolenza Claudio Baglietto e la questione morale -- "Phenomology Lab", 2 giugno,.
Claudio Baglietto, Kant e l'antifascismo di Claudio Fontanari, nel sito "Archivio
Marini". Filosofia Università
Università Filosofo Professore1908 1940 Varazze Basilea Nonviolenza Antifascisti
italiani Studenti dell'Pisa. Claudio Baglietto. Keywords. dialettica,
filosofia ligure, baglietto — il kantismo di heidegger — manzoni — filosofia
dell’amore — dialettica —
Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Baglietto” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51790229528/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Baldini – il
linguaggio – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Greve).
Filosofo. Grice: “I like Baldini, but more so does Austin! In his collection of
‘lessons’ (lezioni) on ‘filosofia del linguaggio’ (not just ‘sematnica’ or
‘semiotica’) for the distinguished Firenze-based publisher Nardini, he deals
with Austin, but not me!” Grice: “Baldini fails to realise that I refuted
Austdin – when Baldini opposes ‘filosofese,’ I am reminded of my
non-conventional non-conversational implicata – and Austin’s less happy idea of
a felicity condition for a perlocutionary effect!” Grice: “But what I like about
Baldini is that being Italian, he refers to ‘amore’ in his ‘natural’ history of
AMicizia – which is all that my conversational pragmatics is about: Achilles
and Ayax must share a lot of common ground to be able to play the game of
conversation, and they do!” -- Massimo Baldini (Greve in Chianti), filosofo. Si
è dedicato in particolare alla filosofia della scienza e alla filosofia del
linguaggio. Figlio dello storico Carlo Baldini, laureato in Pedagogia presso
l'Università degli Studi di Firenze nel 1969, nel 1970 è stato nominato
assistente incaricato di Filosofia; l'insegnamento era tenuto da Dario
Antiseri) presso la Facoltà di Magistero dell'Università degli Studi di Siena.
Nel 1975 è diventato professore incaricato di “Storia del pensiero scientifico”
presso la Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di
Perugia. Nel 1980 ha vinto il concorso di professore di prima fascia di
“Filosofia del linguaggio” ed è stato chiamato dall'Bari alla Facoltà di
Lettere e Filosofia. Ha insegnato anche presso l'Università degli Studi di Roma
“La Sapienza” nella Facoltà di Medicina. È stato direttore del Dipartimento di
Filosofia e dell'Istituto di Filosofia presso la Facoltà di Scienze della
formazione all'Università degli Studi di Perugia e direttore della sezione di
Storia della medicina del Dipartimento di Patologia presso l'Università degli
Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”. Nel 1999 è stato chiamato dalla Libera
università internazionale degli studi sociali Guido Carli di Roma per coprire
la cattedra di "Semiotica". Qui ha insegnato anche “Teoria e tecniche
del linguaggio giornalistico e radiotelevisivo” (dal 2004), “Semiotica dei
linguaggi specialistici” (che avrebbe dovuto iniziare nel 2009). Presso la
LUISS ha inoltre rivestito numerosi incarichi accademici: preside della Facoltà
di Scienze Politiche (da giugno 2007); coordinatore del corso di laurea
magistrale in “Comunicazione politica, economica e istituzionale” (dal 2004),
direttore della Scuola superiore di giornalismo (dal 2007) e direttore del Master
di primo livello in “Economia, gestione e marketing dei turismi e dei beni
culturali” (dal 2004). In precedenza, è stato vice preside della Facoltà di
Scienze Politiche (2000-2006), direttore del Dipartimento di Scienze storiche e
socio-politiche (2006-2007), direttore del Centro di ricerche sulla
comunicazione (2003-2007). Tre sono stati gli ambiti di ricerca che più
di altri Massimo Baldini ha coltivato: la filosofia della scienza (con una
particolare attenzione al pensiero dell'epistemologo Karl R. Popper, di cui ha
curato anche alcune opere in edizione italiana), la filosofia del linguaggio,
la semiotica della moda. A partire dagli anni Settanta, Massimo Baldini ha
dedicato numerosi lavori all'epistemologia contemporanea, cogliendone le
possibili applicazioni alla medicina, alla storia della scienza, alla pedagogia
e, infine, alla filosofia politica. Parallelamente, ha rivolto i suoi interessi
anche alla storia della scienza e, in particolare, alla storia della medicina.
Un'attenzione particolare è stata dedicata ai nessi che intercorrono tra
l'epistemologia e la filosofia della politica: sulla scorta delle riflessioni
popperiane, ha riletto il pensiero utopico sia nella sua dimensione storica che
in quella teorica. L'altro grande interesse filosofico di Massimo Baldini
è stata la filosofia del linguaggio. In particolare ha studiato le tesi dei
semanticisti generali, un movimento nato negli Stati Uniti tra le due guerre
mondiali e di cui si era occupato per primo in Italia negli anni Cinquanta Francesco
Barone. L'interesse per la filosofia del linguaggio si è declinato anche in
chiave storica: e alla storia della comunicazione Massimo Baldini ha dedicato
numerose opere. Inoltre, gli studi sulla filosofia del linguaggio si sono
incentrati sull'analisi di alcuni linguaggi specialistici: quello della
pubblicità, quello dei mistici, quello della pubblica amministrazione, quello
dei giornalisti, nonché il tema correlato del silenzio. Tutti questi linguaggi,
sono stati studiati nelle prospettive dell'oscurità e della chiarezza, e
dell'oggettività (soprattutto con riferimento al contesto
dell'informazione). La biblioteca comunale "Carlo e Massimo
Baldini" di Greve in Chianti A partire dalla fine degli anni Novanta,
infine, gli interessi di Massimo Baldini si sono incentrati sul tema della
moda, che egli ha studiato dal punto di vista storico e semiotico, e nelle
diverse componenti della moda vestimentaria e della moda capelli. Tutta
l'attività di ricerca di Massimo Baldini è confluita in numerose opere individuali
e collettive, curatele, introduzioni e prefazioni a testi italiani e stranieri,
traduzioni, nonché nella collaborazione stabile con alcune case editrici e
riviste scientifiche. In particolare, presso l'editore Armando (Roma) ha
diretto le collane Temi del nostro tempo, I maestri del liberalismo, Moda e
mode, I linguaggi della comunicazione; presso l'editore Rubbettino (Soveria
Mannelli) la collana Biblioteca austriaca (con Dario Antiseri, Lorenzo
Infantino e Sergio Ricossa). Menzione a parte merita poi il ricordare che
Baldini è stato ed è rimasto nel corso dei decenni un grande estimatore e
diffusore dell'opera del concittadino grevigiano Domenico Giuliotti, il
"poeta-mistico" o "profeta" Giuliotti, del quale il
nostro ha riedito alcune delle sue maggiori opere per lo più per conto delle
edizioni Logos di Roma, oltre a dedicare al medesimo alcune raccolte di saggi
come "Il più santo dei ribelli. Scritti su Domenico Giuliotti" (1981)
oppure "Giuliotti. Cristiano controcorrente" (ed. EMP, 1996), senza contare
i volumetti preparati per conto della preziosa casa editrice La Locusta di
Vicenza, a partire dal 1977, in consonanza agli interessi espressisi e
sviluppatisi soprattutto a partire dagli anni ottanta, quelli che afferivano ai
connotati e alle 'modalità' del linguaggio dei mistici, o alle relazioni
intercorrenti fra le dimensioni del silenzio-parola-Parola di
Dio-ascolto. È stato altresì membro del Comitato Nazionale per la
Bioetica; membro del comitato scientifico delle riviste L'Arco di Giano, 'Nuova
civiltà delle macchine, Desk. Morì a causa di un infarto mentre si
trovava a cena con alcuni colleghi universitari. Nel per la casa editrice Rubbettino è uscito il
libro La responsabilità del filosofo. Studi in onore di Massimo Baldini Dario
Antiseri con saggi di amici, colleghi, collaboratori e studenti per ricordare
la figura intellettuale e morale di Massimo Baldini a quattro anni dalla
scomparsa. Partecipano all'antologia Tullio De Mauro e Derrick de Kerckhove. Il
primo maggio è stata inaugurata a Greve
in Chianti la Biblioteca comunale "Carlo e Massimo Baldini".
Sulla filosofia del linguaggio «È chiaro che devo preoccuparmi di essere inteso
da tutti perché penso che la chiarezza sia la cortesia del filosofo»
(José Ortega y Gasset, Cos'è la filosofia?) Secondo Baldini scopo del filosofo
e della sua filosofia è essere chiari: scrisse infatti «l'accusa che più
frequentemente viene rivolta alle opere dei filosofi è quella
dell'illegibilità». I filosofi come dimostra nel suo Contro il filosofese e nel
Elogio dell'oscurità e della chiarezza non seguono sempre questa missione ed in
alcuni casi sembra usino volutamente un linguaggio oscuro ed incomprensibile.
Tre dei filosofi più oscuri secondo Baldini, che ricalca in questo anche il
giudizio di Schopenhauer, sono stati Fichte, Hegel e Schelling. Parlando di
Hegel, Baldini riporta il giudizio di uno scritto di Alexandre Koyré che
definisce la lingua di Hegel "incomprensibile e intraducibile".
Citando inoltre il giudizio di Popper scrive: «Troppo spesso, secondo Popper, i
filosofi vengono meno alla virtù della chiarezza. Con l'oscurità sovente
mascherano le tautologie e le banalità che infiorettano i loro discorsi». Henri
Bergson cita l'esempio di Cartesio, di Nicolas Malebranche e di molti altri
filosofi francesi mostrando che idee molto raffinate e profonde possono essere
espresse nel linguaggio ordinario anziché con circonlocuzioni e ridondanze e
termini che sono causa di equivoci. Baldini afferma che «l'oscurità in
filosofia è, dunque, il modo migliore per fingere di spacciare pensieri, mentre
si sta solo spacciando parole, è una maschera che cela spesso il vuoto di
pensiero o la banalità dei pensieri». Nonostante tutto secondo Baldini, non
bisogna giudicare frettolosamente un filosofo, definendolo "oscuro",
a volte può essere una carenza della nostra conoscenza che ci porta a
respingere come vuoto suono, parole che invece, hanno il loro preciso
significato. Scrivere la filosofia in maniera chiara può avere le sue
difficoltà, Nietzsche infatti afferma che «ci vuole meno tempo ad imparare a
scrivere nobilmente che chiaramente» e Ludwig Wittgenstein che celebra a più
riprese la chiarezza, fa autocritica ammettendo in una sua lettera a Russell
che il suo Tractatus logico-philosophicus «è tremendamente oscuro». Quanti
celebrano la chiarezza in filosofia, sanno bene che ogni lettore di testi
filosofici deve fare proprio il consiglio che Wittgenstein dava a Bertrand
Russell, quando questi si lamentava con lui dell'oscurità del trattato, gli
scrisse: «Non credere che tutto ciò in cui tu sei capace di capire consista di
stupidaggini». Invece, un personaggio che volutamente, secondo Baldini, tendeva
a non farsi capire e a sopraffare linguisticamente («fra gli applausi di
ammirazione») i suoi ascoltatori, è stato Armando Verdiglione. Chi si
avventurava nelle sue opere, fa rilevare il filosofo, si imbatteva in frasi
tipo questa: «Sono tratto da un demone a dire, a fare, a scrivere sempre fra
oriente e occidente e fra nord e sud. Senza luogo della parola. Questo demone è
il colore del punto, dello specchio, dello sguardo, della voce: la moneta
stessa. Punto, sembiante, oggetto scientifico, è indotto dalla pulsione,
dall'instaurazione della domanda, dove l'offerta è il pleonasmo», ed ancora:
«Ecco questo primo rinascimento. Primo in quanto procede dal secondo, ovvero
dall'originario. Secondo dunque non in senso ordinale, non in nome del nome.
Non è neppure nuovo, perché non parte dalla corruzione per arrivare
all'utopia». "Oscuro superlinguaggio" e "gargarismi linguistici e
semantici" sono secondo Baldini il risultato della
"verdiglionite" ovvero di chi si muove "sui sentieri del
filosofese". Secondo Baldini quindi la difficoltà di esprimere alcuni
profondi pensieri filosofici non dovrebbe essere amplificata, è vero che ci sono
pensieri filosofici difficili da esprimere in modo semplice, ma è pur vero che
il filosofo che desidera trasmettere la propria filosofia, dovrebbe fare un
onesto sforzo affinché essa sia quanto più possibile comprensibile al proprio
uditorio. Note Sociologi: è morto
Massimo Baldini, semiologo e filosofo, Adnkronos, 11 dicembre 2008 Contro il filosofeseI filosofi e l'abuso
delle parolepag. 43-49 Contro il
filosofeseFichte, Schelling, ed Hegel: i professionisti dell'oscuritàpag.
50-56 Alexandre Koyré, Note sulla lingua
e la terminologia hegeliana, Interpretazioni hegeliane, La Nuova Italia,
Firenze 1980, pag.43 Bertrand Russel.
L'autobiografia 1914-1944, Longanesi, Milano 1969, II, pag. 208 (la lettera è
datata 12 giugno 1919) Armando
Verdiglione, Manifesto del secondo rinascimento, Rizzoli, Milano 198323. Altre
opere: “Epistemologia e storia della scienza” (Ed. Città di vita, Firenze);
“Campanella ed il linguaggio dell’utopia” – “Utopia e ideologia: una rilettura
epistemologica” Ed. Studium, Roma); “Epistemologia contemporanea e clinica
medica” (Ed. Città di vita, Firenze); “Teoria e storia della scienza” (Armando
Editore, Roma); “I fondamenti epistemologici dell'educazione scientifica”
(Armando Editore, Roma); “La semantica generale” (Ed. Città nuova, Roma); “Gli
scienziati ipocriti sinceri: metodologia e storia della scienza” (Armando
Editore, Roma); “La tirannia e il potere delle parole: saggi sulla semantica
generale” (Armando Editore, Roma); “Congetture sull'epistemologia e sulla
storia della scienza” (Armando Editore, Roma); “Epistemologia e pedagogia
dell'errore” (Ed. La Scuola, Brescia); “Il linguaggio dei mistici” (Ed.Queriniana,
Brescia); “Il linguaggio della pubblicità” “La fantaparola” (Armando Editore,
Roma); “Educare all'ascolto, Ed. La Scuola, Brescia); “Parlar chiaro, parlar
oscuro” (Ed. Laterza, Roma Bari); “Lezioni di filosofia del linguaggio” (Ed.
Nardini, Firenze); “Antologia filosofica, Ed. La Scuola, Brescia); “Contro il
filosofese” (Ed. Laterza, Roma-Bari); “Storia della comunicazione, Newton &
Compton, Roma); “La storia delle utopie, Armando Editore, Roma); “Il proverbi
italiano” (Newton & Compton editori s.r.l., Milano); “Karl Popper e
Sherlock Holmes: l'epistemologo, il detective, il medico, lo storico e lo
scienziato” (Armando Editore, Roma); “La medicina: gli uomini e le teorie, Ed.
CLUEB, Bologna); “Il liberalismo, Dio e il mercato” (Armando Editore, Roma);
“L’amicizia” (Armando Editore, Roma); “Introduzione a Karl R. Popper, Armando
Editore, Roma); “Capelli: moda, seduzione, simbologia” (Ed. Peliti, Roma); “Popper
e Benetton: epistemologia per gli imprenditori e gli economisti” (Armando
Editore, Roma); “Elogio dell'oscurità e della chiarezza, LUISS University Press
e Armando Editore, Roma); “Elogio del silenzio e della parola: i filosofi, i
mistici, i poeti, Rubettino Editore, Soveria Mannelli); “I filosofi, le bionde
e le rosse, Armando Editore, Roma); “L'invenzione della moda: le teorie, gli
stilisti, la storia. Armando Editore, Roma); “L'arte della coiffure: i parrucchieri,
la moda e i pittori, Armando Editore, Roma); Popper, Ottone, Scalfari, LUISS
University Press, Roma 2009. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su
Massimo Baldini Scheda dell'Università
LUISS, su docenti.luiss. Filosofia Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del
XXI secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani Professore1947
2008 18 giugno 10 dicembre Greve in Chianti RomaProfessori della Libera
università internazionale degli studi sociali Guido CarliProfessori della
SapienzaRomaProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di PerugiaProfessori
dell'Università degli Studi di SienaProfessori dell'BariStudenti
dell'Università degli Studi di Firenze. In questo contributo intendo
concentrarmi su alcuni aspetti della teoria aristotelica dell’amicizia: il
metodo di indagine attraverso cui è articolata e acquisita, e il suo
significato dialettico e teorico. Il processo conoscitivo, per
Aristotele, è una transizione da ciò che è “primo per noi” a ciò che è “primo per
sé”[1], e l’indagine sull’amicizia non fa eccezione. Il “primo per noi”
contempla la nostra esperienza della cosa intesa in senso ampio, tale da
includere: le prassi linguistiche e ascrittive diffuse[2], le opinioni notevoli
(ἔνδοξα) condivise da tutti o dai più o dai sapienti o da alcuni di essi[3], i
topoi o luoghi comuni consegnati dalla tradizione, i fenomeni intesi come
“fatti della vita”, ovverosia le ordinarie prassi umane, i comportamenti
concreti implicati nelle relazioni di amicizia[4]. Si tratta di un materiale
eterogeneo, variegato, opaco, bisognoso di sintesi e di articolazione
concettuale: il suo trattamento dialettico preliminare sarà orientato anzitutto
a evidenziare le contraddizioni che tale materiale ospita, per poi cercare di
superarle entro una sintesi superiore la quale, attraverso una teorizzazione
positiva ˗ materiata di distinzioni semantiche e concettuali, argomenti,
definizioni ˗ ne salvi gli elementi genuini nella misura del possibile, mostri
l’apparenza delle contraddizioni, e produca così una sorta di “equilibrio
riflettuto” fra il “primo per noi”, da cui pure si sono prese le mosse, e il
“primo per sé”, punto d’arrivo dell’indagine. Una buona teoria dovrà fare
giustizia dei caratteri manifesti dell’oggetto, renderli cioè intellegibili e
inferibili[5]; invece una teoria che negasse questi caratteri, sarebbe ipso
facto una teoria deficitaria, insoddisfacente: non ci riconcilierebbe coi
φαινόμενα, che pure sono il suo originario explanandum. Questa cifra
metodologica va tenuta presente, se si vuole apprezzare in modo non
superficiale la trattazione aristotelica dell’amicizia nelle due Etiche. Perciò
è opportuno partire non da Aristotele, bensì dall’orizzonte teorico-culturale
cui egli si rapporta dialetticamente, nonché dai suoi obbiettivi polemici. Il
significato ordinario di «φιλία» ha un’estensione ben più ampia della nostra
nozione di «amicizia»: oltre all’amicizia propriamente intesa, può denotare
anche l’alleanza politica[6], la vasta gamma dei rapporti sociali, dalle
relazioni parentali e matrimoniali a quelle commerciali, quelle cameratistiche,
quelle amorose ed erotiche; insomma, qualunque interazione umana positiva e non
ostile, fra individui o fra gruppi – ma anche fra uomini e dei[7] – è
denotabile come φιλία. Nella caratterizzazione preliminare che ne offre,
Aristotele attinge ai grandi modelli omerico ed esiodeo, così come ai Sette
Savi, ai tragici, nonché al sapere filosofico dei predecessori (Empedocle,
Eraclito, etc.); ma il punto di riferimento dialettico che, sottotraccia,
orienta l’intera trattazione, è il Liside platonico, la prima indagine
filosofica sistematica dedicata alla φιλία[8], nelle cui note aporie sono
peraltro condensate e portate a tematizzazione le contraddizioni insite nelle
istanze della tradizione pre-filosofica globalmente intesa. Il Liside dunque,
fra gli ἔνδοξα e i λεγόμενα, riveste un ruolo dialettico-polemico primario,
anche se non se ne fa alcun riferimento esplicito. È impossibile in questa sede
tentarne anche solo una cursoria sintesi, ma è necessario individuare perlomeno
quelle aporie di fondo intorno alla φιλία che Aristotele riprende in maniera
puntuale[9]. Una importante aporia (210e-213c), radicata nella dicotomia
attivo/passivo, è articolata intorno alla questione: chi dei due, in una relazione
amicale, è l’amico? Chi ama o chi è amato[10]? Si sonda tutto lo spazio logico
delle possibilità, producendo esiti paradossali (di qui, appunto, lo status di
aporia): se 1) è chi ama, ad essere amico di chi è amato, allora nel caso che
chi è amato odiasse chi lo ama, uno sarebbe amico di chi lo odia! 2) se è chi è
amato, ad essere amico, sarà anche il caso che chi è odiato è nemico, dunque se
qualcuno ama qualcuno che lo odia, allora sarà nemico di un suo amico! 3) se
sono amici o chi ama o chi è amato, indifferentemente, resta fermo che uno
potrebbe essere amico di chi lo odia 4) se sono amici necessariamente entrambi,
allora non potremmo essere “amici” di entità che non ci amano, come la scienza,
o il vino, o i cavalli. L’aporia presuppone l’ampia estensione semantica di
φιλία e di φίλος, che da un lato può avere significato passivo (esser caro a
qualcuno), attivo (essere amico di) o reciproco[11], dall’altro come prefisso
(φίλο-) può comporre termini denotanti amore, passione o apprezzamento per entità
impersonali, che non reciprocano. Ma l’aporia è filosofica, non meramente
linguistica[12]. Una seconda aporia (213d-223b) muove dalla questione se
l’amicizia si dia fra simili o fra dissimili. Se 1) si dà fra simili, allora
anche i malvagi sarebbero amici, ma fra malvagi non si dà vera amicizia
(assunzione qui data per vera)[13]; 2) se si dà non fra simili simpliciter ma
fra simili nell’esser buoni, sorge il problema di come il buono – il quale
basta a se stesso[14] – possa trarre utilità da un altro buono, e viceversa,
quando si era precedentemente stabilito che nessun amico è inutile all’amico
(210c6-8); 3) se si dà fra dissimili contrari, come povero/ricco,
sapiente/ignorante etc., allora, daccapo, l’amico sarà amico del nemico, il
malvagio del buono etc.: amico/nemico e malvagio/buono sono contrari; 4) forse
si dà fra certi dissimili non contrari: chi è intermedio fra buono e cattivo
può amare il buono in virtù della presenza in sé di un “male”, cioè della
privazione di bene di cui è conscio e che lo rende intermedio[15]; così
l’amicizia diventa un caso particolare del desiderio[16], volto strutturalmente
a ciò di cui si è privi. Ma anche qui si ricadrebbe nel caso 1 della Prima
aporia: pare che l’amare unidirezionale e non ricambiato non sia sufficiente
all’amicizia, inoltre il buono sarebbe amato senza amare a sua volta (infatti
l’altro gli è inutile giacché egli ha già il bene presso di sé). A questo
punto viene introdotta l’idea che, se noi cerchiamo nell’amico il bene ma
nessun amico può avere il bene pienamente presso di sé, allora ciò che
cerchiamo negli amici è il «Primo Amico», qualcosa che trascende sia noi che
gli amici stessi, di cui questi ultimi sono apparenze (εἰδώλα)[17]. Le
relazioni amicali sono da ultimo orientate verso qualcosa che trascende
entrambi i relati, secondo una dinamica “ascensionale” segnatamente platonica:
ma così l’amico in carne e ossa parrebbe ridotto a mero luogo di transito di
una tensione desiderante che ascende in direzione di un assoluto ideale.
Riesaminando poi la relazione “orizzontale”, si introduce la nozione di
«affine» (οἰκεῖος): forse la φιλία è rapporto col simile in quanto affine, o
familiare; ma l’affinità pare essere reciproca (se A è affine a B, B è affine
ad A), dunque il buono risulta inservibile a chi è già affine al buono;
inoltre, sono affini anche i malvagi. Anche se la trattazione appare un
poco schematica e talora verbalistica, essa tocca problemi speculativi genuini.
Come ci si aspetta da un dialogo “socratico” di Platone, le aporie non trovano
uno scioglimento, se non la paradossale acquisizione che né amanti né amati, né
simili né dissimili né contrari, né affini, né buoni, possono essere amici[18]!
Teniamo dunque a mente questi nodi problematici. 2. La
tassonomia delle amicizie e il suo significato L’amicizia è
studiata nel libro VII dell’Etica Eudemia, e nei libri VIII-IX dell’Etica
Nicomachea[19]. Mentre la trattazione dell’Etica Eudemia risulta più logica e
astratta, quella dell’Etica Nicomachea è più orientata a salvare i fenomeni, è
più empirica e inclusiva: per cogliere i nuclei teorici di fondo, è sensato
muovere dalla prima, e valutare criticamente quando e perché la seconda propone
integrazioni o discostamenti teorici da quella. Sia la Eudemia precedente alla
Nicomachea o meno[20], in essa appare più nitidamente come la trattazione
aristotelica costituisca una sorta di virtuale controcanto filosofico del
Liside platonico[21]. Etica Eudemia VII introduce il soggetto come
specialmente degno di essere indagato: gli ἔνδοξα universalmente diffusi
pongono la φιλία come il fine stesso della politica, come antidoto
all’ingiustizia, come habitus caratteriale rivolto ai buoni, pongono l’amico
come il più grande dei beni esterni (anche in quanto volontariamente scelto) e
l’assenza di amici come il male più terribile[22]. La φιλία è aspetto centrale
dell’etica – soprattutto entro un’etica eudemonistica imperniata sul bene e
sulla felicità – dunque non sorprende che la sua trattazione occupi quasi un
quinto degli scritti etici aristotelici. Ma altre opinioni notevoli non
sono universalmente condivise: per alcuni il simile è amico del simile (Omero,
Empedocle), per altri lo è il contrario del contrario (Esiodo, Euripide,
Eraclito)[23]: sono le opzioni 1 e 3 della Seconda Aporia del Liside, che pure
non viene citato. Si ricordano poi altre opinioni, topoi tradizionali già
ripresi dal Liside: per alcuni non c’è amicizia fra malvagi ma solo fra buoni
(cfr. opzione 1 della Prima Aporia), per altri solo chi è utile può essere
amico (cfr. opzione 2 della Seconda Aporia). Prima di passare alla pars
construens, Aristotele enuncia candidamente il criterio metodologico e lo scopo
dell’indagine: Occorre trovare un’argomentazione che insieme renda
conto (ἀποδώσει) al massimo grado delle opinioni (τά δοκοῦντα) intorno a queste
cose, e anche che sciolga le aporie e le contraddizioni. Ciò avverrà qualora
appaia che le opinioni contrarie sono sostenute con buone ragioni: una tale
argomentazione sarà nel massimo accordo coi fenomeni. E le tesi in contraddizione
risultano mantenersi, se quel che affermano è vero in un senso, ma in un altro
no. (Et. Eud. VII 2, 1235b13-18).[24] Le opinioni diffuse e notevoli non vanno
accolte in modo supino e acritico, ma comprese nelle loro buone ragioni e,
nella misura del possibile, salvate entro una sintesi teorica che superi le
aporie e mostri che le affermazioni apparentemente incompatibili possano essere
vere entrambe, in sensi diversi; così vi sarà anche il massimo accordo coi
φαινόμενα. Questi, i desiderata da soddisfare. Se l’amicizia è desiderio
(altra acquisizione del Liside[25]), il desiderio può essere del piacevole
(appetito) o del buono (volontà)[26], dunque ciascuno di essi ci è «amico» o
caro (φίλον); comunque il piacere si presenta come un bene (o appare tale o è
creduto tale[27]): la prima distinzione da fare è perciò fra bene e bene
apparente (φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν), oggetti del desiderio[28]. La seconda è quella
fra bene incondizionato (ἁπλῶς) e bene per qualcuno[29]: ciò che è buono
simpliciter lo è per l’essere umano in generale, ciò che è tale «per qualcuno»
lo è per certi individui particolari in certe circostanze (per esempio,
un’operazione per un malato); parimenti, vi è un piacevole incondizionato e un
piacevole «per qualcuno» (per esempio, in condizioni fisiche o morali
alterate); Aristotele sostiene che il piacevole incondizionato coincida col
buono incondizionato[30]: ciò che è buono per l’uomo in generale, è anche
piacevole per l’uomo in generale, invece un individuo malato o corrotto troverà
piacevoli cose non oggettivamente buone; né coincideranno il piacevole «per
lui» e il buono «per lui». Un uomo saggio e virtuoso troverà piacevole ciò che
è buono, dunque nel suo caso si identificano bene apparente e bene reale (è
buono ciò che gli appare tale), bene «per lui» e bene incondizionato (ciò che è
bene per lui è buono in generale per l’uomo), nonché bene e piacere: egli è
norma rispetto a ciò che per l’uomo in generale è e deve essere buono e
piacevole, in quanto esprime l’eccellenza della stessa natura umana. A ogni
modo, ciò che motiva un soggetto S deve apparire un bene a S (che lo sia o
meno), e apparire a S un bene per lui (che sia o meno anche un bene in senso
incondizionato)[31]. Ci sono cose per noi buone in quanto le riteniamo
dotate di valore intrinseco, cose per noi buone in quanto le riteniamo utili, e
cose per noi buone in quanto le troviamo piacevoli. Poiché l’amico è un bene
scelto e desiderato ˗ il φιλεῖν è un caso particolare di desiderio ˗ potrà
esserlo per questi tre motivi: come bene in sé, e cioè in quanto è ciò che è e
«per la virtù», o in quanto è ci è utile, o in quanto sia piacevole, «per il
piacere»[32]. Chiariremo successivamente perché il buono in quanto buono,
quando il bene sia l’amico stesso, si identifichi con la sua virtù. Colui
che è amato in base a uno dei tre aspetti suddetti (bene-virtù, utilità,
piacevolezza) diventa un amico ˗ si aggiunge ˗ quando contraccambia l’affetto:
dunque la reciprocità diviene un tratto essenziale dell’amicizia, una sua
condizione necessaria; Aristotele sceglie l’opzione 4 della Prima Aporia del
Liside, ma replica all’obiezione ivi contenuta, secondo cui cose amate come il
vino, i cavalli e la scienza non possono ricambiare, mediante la distinzione
fra φιλία e φίλησις[33]: la seconda è un affetto/desiderio per le cose
inanimate, la prima implica un simile affetto come componente, ma include
necessariamente la reciprocità. Talvolta, una nozione vaga può essere
disambiguata mediante una distinzione semantica, in modo da sciogliere
apparenti contraddizioni e insieme “salvare i fenomeni”. Tuttavia, l’affetto
reciproco sulla base di uno dei tre amabili non è ancora sufficiente perché ci
sia φιλία; tale reciprocità deve essere esplicita, non celata, nota ai due
amici: se amo qualcuno che non lo sa, non siamo amici, nemmeno nel caso lui ami
me e io lo sappia; entrambi devono amarsi l’un l’altro, ed entrambi lo devono
fare in modo manifesto, tale che sia noto all’uno e all’altro. La coscienza di
essere amici è essenziale all’essere amici: qualcuno può credere di essere
amico senza esserlo[34], però nessuno può essere amico di qualcuno senza
credere di esserlo. Se manca la reciprocità, non si ha amicizia ma
«benevolenza» (εὔνοια), cioè desiderio del bene dell’altro; quando quest’ultima
è reciproca e non è celata, allora può divenire amicizia[35]. Le tre
forme di amicizia, rispettivamente basate su virtù, utilità, piacere, secondo
l’Eudemia intrattengono la relazione asimmetrica che Aristotele chiama πρὸς ἓν,
in cui vi è un significato primario o focal meaning cui gli altri, secondari e
derivati, rimandano[36]: l’amicizia a causa della virtù e fondata sul bene è
posta come πρώτη φιλία, «prima amicizia», da cui le altre dipendono dal punto
di vista definitorio. Quindi «φιλία» non denota tre specie di un unico genere,
né è un termine equivoco che denota realtà completamente diverse; è termine
“multivoco”, giacché l’amicizia si dice in molti modi ma in riferimento a un
senso che illumina tutti gli altri, e a cui gli altri si rapportano
necessariamente. Molti critici ritengono che, siccome l’amicizia
“utilitaristica” e quella “edonistica” possono darsi indipendentemente da
quella “virtuosa”, l’idea che esse rimandino necessariamente a quella
“virtuosa” non sarebbe convincente, e proprio per questo sarebbe poi abbandonata
nella Nicomachea[37]. Ma la gerarchizzazione πρὸς ἓν è anzitutto definitoria:
il piacere è un bene apparente (dunque, una declinazione del bene), l’utile è
tale in quanto foriero di bene[38] o di piacere (che, daccapo, è un bene
apparente); dunque i tre amabili sono un bene, un modo di apparire del bene,
una via che porta al bene. Al modo in cui il piacere e l’utilità si definiscono
in rapporto al bene[39] (ma, per Aristotele, non viceversa), così le amicizie
basate sul piacere e l’utile si definiscono in rapporto a quella basata sul
bene come tale: e infatti, come vedremo, ne sono forme imperfette e
difettive. Si noti la pur generica assonanza fra la πρώτη φιλία e il πρῶτον
φίλον, il Primo Amico del Liside: se Platone radica il senso delle relazioni amicali
in un anelito a qualcosa che trascende le amicizie e gli amici stessi
illuminandole, per così dire, dall’alto, Aristotele immanentizza il bene entro
gli amici stessi e le loro relazioni; c’è una amicizia prima, ma non un Amico
primo che si distingua dagli amici empirici e concreti. Il bene che è in gioco
nell’amicizia è ubicato negli amici stessi, è immanente. Qual è la
ragione profonda di questa tripartizione? Si può mostrare in modo puntuale che
si tratta di una risposta alle aporie platoniche: se i platonici pongono come
amicizia solo quella virtuosa, «non riescono a dare conto dei fenomeni»[40],
ove per fenomeni si devono intendere non solo le prassi umane, ma anche gli ἔνδοξα
e i λεγόμενα. Se vi sono tre forme di amicizia, può darsi che alcune opinioni
notevoli e intuizioni siano vere dell’una ma false dell’altra, altre siano vere
dell’altra ma false dell’una, come afferma il passo metodologico succitato. Se
poi a partire da ciascuna delle tre caratterizzazioni si potessero inferire o
congetturare dei rispettivi propria, che coincidano coi rispettivi tratti
manifesti dell’amicizia che parevano aporetici in quanto incompatibili, allora
grazie a questa tassonomia tricotomica le aporie potrebbero essere sciolte,
poiché alcuni di questi tratti caratterizzeranno un tipo di amicizia, alcuni
altri un altro tipo di amicizia. L’amicizia virtuosa, fondata sul bene, è
fra simili in quanto buoni[41]: essa cattura l’opzione 2 della Seconda Aporia
del Liside, nonché l’ideale arcaico, omerico ma anche teognideo e in generale
aristocratico, della φιλία come sodalizio elettivo fra ἀγαθοί; a questo topos
tradizionale, il Socrate del Liside replica che esso è incompatibile con
un’altra idea ben radicata (basata su altri due topoi tradizionali): il buono è
autosufficiente, e un amico gli sarebbe inutile, ma l’amicizia è fondata
proprio sull’utilità reciproca; quest’ultima idea, di matrice esiodea[42] ma
anche un luogo comune confermato dalle prassi umane, non può essere negata, per
Aristotele: sono gli stessi φαινόμενα a mostrare che coloro che intrattengono
relazioni continuative di utilità e soccorso reciproco, si chiamano amici
e si ritengono tali, e così sono dagli altri chiamati e ritenuti. La
contraddizione è apparente, se si postula che l’utilità reciproca è un prerequisito
di una forma di amicizia (quella basata sull’utile) e non dell’altra (quella
basata sul bene). Le relazioni utilitaristiche sono amicizia, sebbene di un
certo tipo; sia queste che quelle fondate sul piacere, possono sussistere anche
fra individui non buoni, persino fra malvagi, sebbene in forma estremamente
labile e instabile: l’opzione 1 della Seconda Aporia del Liside è anch’essa
percorribile, in quanto due individui non “buoni” possono essere amici sulla
base del piacere, e sono simili nella misura in cui condividono certi tipi di
piacere; inoltre, l’intuizione per cui l’amicizia si dà fra contrari come
povero/ricco, sapiente/ignorante etc. ˗ opzione 3 della Seconda Aporia del
Liside ˗ è anch’essa fatta salva, in quanto viene posta come peculiare
all’amicizia utilitaristica, che tipicamente è intrattenuta da individui in
qualche senso contrari (l’uno ha qualcosa che l’altro non ha). Aristotele
riesce a salvare i fenomeni attraverso una distinzione tassonomica
fondamentale, che deve conciliare certe apparenti incompatibilità ma al tempo
stesso preservare una certa unitarietà dell’oggetto: quella di amicizia è una
nozione originariamente ospitale, plurale e polivoca, tanto internamente
differenziata da implicare una demarcazione netta fra l’amicizia virtuosa e le
altre, ma non tanto monolitica da implicare che si escludano dal novero delle
amicizie quelle forme di relazione (utilitaria, edonistica) ordinariamente
denominate così: altrimenti si farebbe violenza al linguaggio e alle “cose
stesse”[43]: a quel “primo per noi” che è lo stesso explanandum
originario. Una delle ragioni per cui l’amicizia virtuosa è detta «prima»
nella Eudemia e poi «perfetta» (τέλεια) nella Nicomachea[44], è che essa è
costitutivamente piacevole, benché non sia fondata sul piacere, e implica la
disposizione alla mutua utilità quando serva, benché non sia fondata
sull’utile: dunque contiene in sé, in certo modo, le altre due. Tuttavia, il
piacere che consegue al bene ed è persino costitutivo di esso, non è lo stesso
piacere che fonda le amicizie edonistiche; il primo è inseparabile dal bene cui
consegue[45], quindi l’integrazione di piacere e utilità nell’amicizia virtuosa
non è da concepirsi come una somma estrinseca o giustapposizione di aspetti
positivi (bene + utilità + piacere). La perfezione di questa amicizia non è una
somma di amicizie imperfette, è originaria completezza. Nella Nicomachea
non vi è traccia della relazione πρὸς ἓν, e la πρώτη φιλία diventa τέλεια
φιλία[46]. Le altre amicizie qui sono dette tali «secondo somiglianza» a quella
perfetta[47]: a mio avviso, al netto della differenza di linguaggio, la
posizione di Aristotele non muta in modo sensibile fra le due opere; la
somiglianza delle amicizie edonistica e utilitaristica a quella perfetta
consiste anche qui nel fatto che quest’ultima è, per entrambi gli amici, utile
e piacevole, dunque contiene quegli aspetti che fondano le amicizie imperfette,
ma non ne è simmetricamente contenuta. Infatti, ciò che è buono è anche utile e
piacevole, mentre ciò che è utile può non essere piacevole e può non essere
buono (né simpliciter, né per l’individuo) – per esempio, se l’individuo è
corrotto e trova per sé utile qualcosa che lo approssima a ciò che non è il suo
bene (anche se egli magari crede che sia il suo bene[48]) – e ciò che è
piacevole può essere inutile o persino dannoso. Questo vale in generale, e a
fortiori vale per gli amici buoni, utili, piacevoli. In realtà, lo stesso
“compito” etico implicitamente affidato all’uomo, gli è affidato anche in
rapporto all’amicizia: l’ideale umano, incarnato dal saggio che ne è norma ed
esempio, è quello di far coincidere ciò che è bene per sé con ciò che è bene in
generale, e ciò che è piacevole per sé con ciò che lo è in generale; si
realizza così anche la coincidenza di bene e piacere, visto che il buono in
generale e il piacevole in generale si identificano per natura[49]. Ciò importa
che occorra anzitutto essere buoni (saggi e virtuosi) e, essendolo, prediligere
le amicizie virtuose (che sono appannaggio dei buoni): esse non ospitano
conflitti strutturali, soprattutto il bene e il piacere – il confliggere dei
quali sopraffà l’acratico – sono adeguati ab origine, nell’amicizia perfetta,
giacché essa è piacevole proprio in quanto buona. Ma ciò non esclude che i
buoni possano intrattenere anche amicizie fondate sul piacere, o
sull’utile[50]: esse però, nell’economia della loro vita, risulteranno
marginali, sia nella quantità che nella qualità. Può sorprenderci il
fatto che alla forma di amicizia più rara e più “inarrivabile” delle tre (i
buoni sono pochi, gli amici a causa del bene ancora meno) venga ascritta una
priorità definitoria, sia essa del tipo πρὸς ἓν o «per somiglianza». Ma per
Aristotele qualunque capacità umana – l’amicizia è una virtù, le virtù sono
capacità acquisite – viene individuata e definita sulla base della sua
eccellenza: è il caso eccellente, in cui un tratto umano è più pienamente
realizzato, che funge da essenza normativa rispetto ai casi difettivi,
deficitari, degradati, imperfetti; per definire, occorre guardare ai casi
migliori, alla modalità in cui una potenzialità è dispiegata ed espressa più
compiutamente, e che misura gli altri casi quasi costituendone un virtuale
dover-essere rispetto a cui essi mostrano la loro manchevolezza. Perciò la
teoria aristotelica presenta al contempo una dimensione descrittiva e una
normativa, fra le quali sussiste una sorta di tensione dialettica. E in effetti
le amicizie fondate sul piacere e sull’utile sono incomplete: vengono
caratterizzate addirittura come amicizie per accidens[51], il che sembra sulle
prime vanificare l’atteggiamento inclusivo adottato da Aristotele come cifra
metodologica, non solo praticata ma persino esplicitata in modo
programmatico[52]. È come se in sede di definizione generale Aristotele fosse interessato
a preservare l’unità della nozione di amicizia nonostante le differenze, ma in
sede di caratterizzazione sinottico-comparativa dei diversi tipi, ponesse
invece l’enfasi sullo iato che separa l’amicizia prima o perfetta dalle altre,
fino a trattare le altre come solo accidentalmente tali. Perché esse sono
caratterizzate come «accidentali»? Chi si ama per l’utile o per il
piacere lo fa «non perché l’individuo amato sia quello che è, ma in quanto è
utile o in quanto è piacevole»[53]: l’utilità e la piacevolezza sono proprietà
relazionali esterne all’essenza dell’amico amato, determinate dagli effetti che
esso ha su chi lo ama, «perché gli uni ne traggono un qualche bene, gli altri
un piacere»[54]; invece l’amicizia basata sulla virtù e la bontà dell’amico
amato, è basata su proprietà intrinseche all’amato, su ciò che da ultimo
l’amato è[55]. Noi siamo il nostro carattere, il nostro carattere è l’insieme
unificato delle nostre virtù, una seconda natura che è frutto prima
dell’educazione e poi delle nostre scelte: noi siamo un sé che sceglie, e i
nostri pensieri, discorsi e azioni manifestano il nostro “sé”. Pertanto,
nell’amicizia perfetta il bene che è in gioco è l’amico stesso che è amato, per
ciò che egli essenzialmente è, mentre il bene che è in gioco nelle altre
amicizie è il bene – nella forma dell’utile o del piacevole – dell’amico che
ama. Anche se l’amicizia è sempre reciproca, resta fermo che nell’amicizia
perfetta il fondamento è, per ciascuno degli amici, l’altro come buono, nelle
altre è invece il proprio bene in quanto utilità o piacere[56]. Nelle amicizie
imperfette la ragione per cui si vuole e persegue il bene dell’altro, resta
radicata nell’interesse proprio come diverso dal bene elargito all’altro e
diverso dall’altro stesso come dotato di valore intrinseco. È questa differenza
radicale a rendere le amicizie imperfette amicizie per accidens: ciò non
implica, si badi, che non siano amicizie[57], bensì che lo sono solo in virtù
del loro somigliare all’amicizia perfetta, seppure in modo difettivo. Ma
l’amicizia fondata sul bene dell’amico non rischia così di risultare
“disinteressata” in un modo psicologicamente implausibile? Solo in apparenza,
in quanto il bene di chi ama è in gioco, ma lo è in quanto coincide col bene
dell’amico: se siamo amici perfetti, siamo entrambi buoni e virtuosi, e il
nostro bene individuale coincide col bene simpliciter: noi, come amici
perfetti, cooperiamo per realizzare il bene in generale[58]; il bene mio e
dell’amico sono voluti – rispettivamente, dall’amico e da me – in conseguenza
del fatto che anzitutto io e l’amico siamo dei beni: se lo siamo l’uno per
l’altro, è perché siamo buoni, siamo dotati di valore intrinseco, e lo
riconosciamo reciprocamente. Non si tratta di una implausibile relazione
puramente altruistica e disinteressata, perché non si fonda – ribadiamolo –
solo sul volere il bene dell’altro, ma anzitutto sull’altro come bene in sé:
voglio e perseguo il bene dell’altro non per altruismo astratto, ma perché
l’altro è un bene. Una nozione comune con cui forse potremmo rendere più chiaro
questo aspetto, è quella di stima. L’amicizia perfetta è fondata sulla stima
reciproca: un amico che stimo per ciò che è e per come è, esemplifica in sé ciò
che è buono, a prescindere da ciò che io posso trarre da lei/lui: «se uno non
gioisce perché l’altro è buono, non c’è la prima amicizia» (1237b4-5). La stima
reciproca presuppone una consonanza di valori, un’intesa su ciò che vale e ciò
che è degno: e visto che i due amici sono virtuosi e buoni, essi valgono e sanno
di valere, per questo valgono anche l’uno per l’altro. Si tratta di una
amicizia in cui coltivare il proprio bene coincide col coltivare l’altro e il
suo bene, e questo coincidere non è accidentale – come accade nelle altre
amicizie – bensì è costitutivo. Invece posso trarre vantaggio da un amico utile
senza stimarlo affatto, così come posso trarre piacere – per esempio,
divertendomici insieme – da qualcuno che non stimo, che non ritengo una persona
buona, degna, valida. L’accidentalità delle amicizie non perfette si
rende perspicua nella loro strutturale instabilità: un rapporto fondato
sull’utilità non avrà più ragion d’essere, qualora uno dei due amici smetta di
essere utile all’altro; i bisogni umani sono cangianti, e tali sono le risorse
altrui per farvi fronte, cosicché anche le relazioni utilitarie sono
essenzialmente mutevoli; lo stesso accade per gli amici secondo il piacere:
cambiano, nel tempo, le fonti del piacere, i “gusti”, e cambiano anche le
capacità altrui di procurarci piacere; l’amicizia piacevole, poi, è precaria
anche perché riguarda tipicamente i giovani, i quali sono di per sé in continuo
cambiamento[59]. Invece la virtù del carattere è cosa stabile: le
amicizie complete sono stabili perché sono fondate sul bene come virtù, che è
costante e non facile a mutare[60]. Il tempo può rendere inutile un amico che
prima era utile, o non più piacevole un amico che lo era, ma difficilmente può
sottrarre a un carattere le virtù, far diventare malvagi i buoni, stolti i
saggi, e dunque minare le basi su cui le relazioni virtuose fra buoni sono
costruite. Per questo l’amicizia completa è specialmente solida, quasi
incrollabile[61], e l’amico virtuoso è un amico «al massimo grado»[62], un
amico «vero»[63]. Un tale amico si renderà utile se può e quando sia
necessario, ma sarà utile perché è un amico, piuttosto che essere amico perché
è utile; e sarà piacevole all’amico, giacché ci risulta tendenzialmente
piacevole frequentare chi stimiamo[64]. Così Aristotele, forte della sua
tassonomia tripartita, deriva dei propria (dei caratteri distintivi) di
ciascuna amicizia, spiegando i fenomeni e riconciliandoci con le comuni
pratiche ascrittive: alcune intuizioni, luoghi comuni e opinioni notevoli sono
vere di un’amicizia, alcune dell’altra. Parlando coi giovani Liside e
Menesseno, Socrate nel Liside si dice desideroso di amicizia più di ogni cosa
al mondo – con una Priamel che restituisce in modo icastico l’idea
dell’amicizia come il più grande dei beni esterni, fatta anch’essa propria da
Aristotele – e invidia ironicamente la loro felicità, visto che sono giovani e
sono diventati amici «in modo facile e rapido»[65]. Si tratta di caustica
ironia, visto che la φιλία che ha a cuore Socrate non è né facile né rapida:
ciò che è dissimulato, è che quella non è verace amicizia, ma altro. Qui c’è
un’aporia in nuce, visto che i giovani che si frequentano, pur con una certa
leggerezza e una conoscenza reciproca non profonda, paiono amici e sono detti
tali, eppure non soddisfano i requisiti della “vera” amicizia non solo secondo
l’idea socratica, ma anche secondo l’opinione diffusa per cui la vera amicizia
è durevole, lenta e difficile a darsi. Aristotele distingue i soggetti delle
attribuzioni incompatibili, salvando la verità di entrambe: l’amicizia
giovanile (per esempio, quella di Liside e Menesseno) è fondata sul piacere, e
ha certi tratti distintivi quali la facilità a prodursi e a decadere,
l’intensità emotiva, e così via; l’amicizia perfetta, tipica degli uomini
maturi (è quella per cui Socrate dice di ardere di desiderio), necessita di una
lunga consuetudine e di una conoscenza reciproca profonda[66], è rara e
appannaggio di pochi, è difficilissima a nascere ma altrettanto difficile a
morire, fondandosi su ciò che in noi vi è di più stabile. Invece, quella utile
caratterizza tipicamente gli anziani, particolarmente bisognosi d’aiuto e
sensibili, per debolezza, al beneficio che può arrecare il mutuo soccorso[67];
inoltre, essa si riscontra nei più, nelle masse, le quali sono più preoccupate
dei benefici personali che del bene e del bello. Fra le amicizie incomplete,
Aristotele ascrive una superiore nobiltà a quella fondata sul piacere, mentre
quella fondata sull’utile è «da bottegai»[68]. In effetti, la condivisione del
piacere è qualcosa di meno strumentale rispetto al trarre vantaggi da qualcuno:
perlomeno il piacere è un fine, non un mezzo; inoltre, il piacere appartiene
alla frequentazione stessa dell’amico, mentre l’utile è a questa completamente
estrinseco: dunque il fondamento dell’amicizia utile è più esteriore e più
contingente di quello dell’amicizia piacevole. Un altro aspetto
problematico del Liside emerge in particolare nella Prima Aporia rispetto alla
polarità attivo/passivo (amante/amato), ma soggiace implicitamente anche ad
altre aporie: l’amicizia sembra implicare uguaglianza e comunanza da un lato, e
differenza e asimmetria dall’altro; si mescolano aspetti tipici del rapporto
pederastico-erotico (amante e amato non sono intercambiabili), aspetti del
rapporto genitoriale, anch’essi per definizione asimmetrici, e relazioni “fra
buoni” simili, potenzialmente simmetriche. Aristotele cerca di articolare
queste istanze entro un quadro più sistematico: la tassonomia delle tre
amicizie si arricchisce di una distinzione trasversale, fra amicizie
simmetriche e amicizie asimmetriche in cui uno è superiore e l’altro
inferiore[69]; la φιλία deve essere reciproca, ma tale reciprocità può essere
simmetrica o asimmetrica (fra superiore e inferiore). I tipi di amicizia sono
dunque sei, giacché si può essere superiori quanto a virtù, a utilità, e a
piacevolezza. La ulteriore distinzione fra amicizie simmetriche e
asimmetriche consente ad Aristotele una esplorazione straordinariamente ricca
dei legami sociali più eterogenei, che assimila alla φιλία e alle sue declinazioni
i rapporti familiari (padre-figlio, marito-moglie, figlio-figlio), i rapporti
politici fra città (in vista dell’utile)[70], gli stessi rapporti fra i
cittadini in rapporto alla loro comunità, i rapporti fra governanti e
governati, le relazioni commerciali, e così via, e indaga le relazioni profonde
fra amicizia, giustizia, concordia, comunità. Non è possibile restituire
nemmeno sommariamente la ricchezza di tali analisi in questo contributo, il
quale si focalizza piuttosto sul significato filosofico e dialettico della
tripartizione in generale: ma fa d’uopo rilevare che le applicazioni di questa
teoria generale sono molteplici e fecondissime. 3. Amicizia
e autosufficienza La tripartizione (con ulteriore dicotomia
trasversale) non scioglie di per sé un nodo aporetico concernente la stessa
amicizia perfetta fra buoni: è l’idea espressa entro il punto 2 della Seconda
Aporia del Liside, per cui chi ha il bene presso di sé è autosufficiente e non
ha bisogno di nulla, dunque l’amicizia di chicchessia gli sarebbe inutile. È
vero che Aristotele ha distinto l’amicizia perfetta da quella utile, ma resta
il problema di comprendere come mai colui che è saggio, virtuoso e buono,
bastando a sé stesso, abbia una qualche motivazione a coltivare un amico,
foss’anche un amico perfetto: «se è felice chi ha la virtù, che bisogno avrà di
un amico?»[71]. L’idea dell’autosufficienza di chi è saggio, virtuoso, felice e
beato, ripresa dal Liside, è un topos tradizionale, quindi ha lo status di ἔνδοξον
ben radicato, di cui va dato conto e di cui va mostrata la compatibilità con la
teoria positiva proposta nonché con altri ἔνδοξα altrettanto ben
attestati. Il problema è affrontato in Etica Eudemia VII 12 e in Etica
Nicomachea IX 9, in maniere parzialmente differenti. L’Eudemia muove
dall’analogia con la condizione divina, paradigma dell’autosufficienza. Ma la
condizione umana può assurgere all’autosufficienza solo nella misura in cui lo
consente la natura dell’uomo, che è animale sociale-politico[72] e può/deve
realizzare questa natura, non quella divina[73]: il bene umano contempla sempre
il rapporto a un’alterità – è καθ’ ἕτερον[74] ˗ quello divino è assoluto
rapporto a sé[75]. L’autosufficienza divina funge da “idea regolativa”, da
norma ideale: l’uomo felice minimizzerà il numero degli amici e si limiterà a
quelli virtuosi, degni di accompagnarsi a lui; proprio il caso di chi non è
obnubilato da bisogni e mancanze, evidenzia il valore intrinseco dell’amicizia
perfetta, perseguita non già per ricevere benefici bensì per fare, dare e
condividere il bene che si possiede. Ma l’argomento successivo – che è molto
complesso e possiamo solo sintetizzare[76] – chiarisce che non si tratta di un
altruismo generico e astratto, in quanto l’amicizia è ingrediente essenziale,
non accessorio, della felicità individuale. Vivere, per l’uomo, è
percepire e conoscere[77], e – prosegue Aristotele ˗ l’aspirazione massima di
ciascuno di noi è, da ultimo, quella di conoscere noi stessi (tesi che rivisita
il celebre monito delfico-socratico); la felicità è costituita dalla conoscenza
di sé in quanto attivi come buoni e virtuosi[78], e la conoscenza di sé passa
per la conoscenza reciproca fra amici: l’amico è «un altro sé»[79], «percepire
l’amico necessariamente è percepire in certo modo sé stesso e conoscere in
certo modo sé stesso»[80]. Condividendo con l’amico i beni, i piaceri e le
attività della vita felice, incrementiamo dunque la conoscenza di noi stessi e
della nostra stessa felicità. La Nicomachea chiarisce la relazione fra il
riconoscimento reciproco degli amici virtuosi e la loro felicità, soprattutto
in un passo speculativamente densissimo: Se l’essere felici
consiste nel vivere e nell’agire, e l’attività dell’uomo dabbene ed eccellente
è per sé virtuosa [..], se poi anche ciò che è familiare/affine (οἰκεῖον) a
qualcuno è tra le cose che lui trova piacevoli, se noi possiamo osservare il
nostro prossimo meglio di noi stessi, e le sue azioni più che le nostre, se le
azioni degli uomini superiori, che siano anche amici, sono fonte di piacere per
i buoni, dato che hanno tutte e due le caratteristiche piacevoli per natura,
allora l’uomo beato avrà bisogno di amici simili a lui, posto che davvero
preferisca osservare azioni buone, e che gli sono proprie, come lo sono le
azioni dell’amico, quando è buono. (Et. Nic. IX 9 1169b31-1170a4)[81] Le
attività di un’esistenza virtuosa e felice sono obbiettivamente piacevoli agli
occhi di un uomo buono, virtuoso e felice a sua volta: vi si rispecchia,
sentendocisi “a casa propria”, e la familiarità determinata da affinità e
prossimità, gli è in sé piacevole. Come si evincerà, la nozione platonica di οἰκεῖον,
introdotta sul finire del Liside come cifra stessa della φιλία, trova una
ripresa puntuale e una valorizzazione speculativa nella teoria aristotelica. Il
prossimo si offre alla nostra conoscenza in modo più trasparente che noi
stessi, giacché la sua distanza da noi lo rende meglio oggettivabile. I due
tratti umani piacevoli per natura sono da un lato la felicità di cui la virtù è
costitutiva, dall’altro la familiarità, che chi è felice è virtuoso riscontra
ed esperisce nel contemplare e cooperare con un’altra esistenza felice e
virtuosa. Le azioni di un nostro amico “perfetto” sono buone e nel contempo ci
sono proprie, cosicché contemplarle è come trovare in esse lo stesso bene che
noi siamo. Potrebbe stupire il riferimento reiterato al tema del piacevole,
quasi che si trattasse di una delle due amicizie non perfette: ma occorre
tenere a mente che il piacevole per natura o ἁπλῶς coincide col bene ἁπλῶς, e
che si tratta di un piacere costitutivo del bene e inseparabile da esso,
piuttosto che di un piacere addizionale ed esteriore rispetto al bene cui
consegue. Se l’altro è sufficientemente prossimo a me, posso de-situarmi e
oggettivarmi riconoscendomi nelle sue azioni, secondo una dialettica complessa
e chiastica di riconoscimento reciproco. «Se l’uomo eccellente si comporta
verso l’amico come si comporta verso di sé, dato che l’amico è un altro se
stesso, allora, così come è desiderabile per ciascuno il suo proprio esserci,
così è desiderabile l’esserci dell’amico, o quasi» (EN IX 9, 1170b5-8). In
questo gioco speculare di identificazioni reciproche, il mio rapporto con
l’altro è mediato del mio rapporto con me stesso[82], l’altro è un «altro me» e
perseguo il suo bene in maniera pressoché equivalente a come perseguo il mio
(quel «quasi» è una concessione al realismo empirico, da cui questa
idealizzazione non vuole disancorarsi); ma è altrettanto vero che il mio
rapporto con me stesso è a sua volta mediato dal mio rapporto con l’altro,
giacché conosco genuinamente me stesso non già con un qualche misterioso atto
introspettivo[83], bensì conoscendo persone simili a me che a loro volta mi
riconoscono simili a sé: questa è la ragione perché v’è bisogno di amici buoni
e virtuosi entro relazioni di amicizia “perfetta”; se la felicità implica
autosufficienza, si tratta di un’autosufficienza umana e non divina, che passa
per l’inclusione del prossimo nella nostra esistenza, e per la cooperazione con
chi scegliamo come degno incarnare il bene e la virtù[84]. Come l’essere amici
non si dà senza il sapere di esserlo anche se si può credere di essere amici
senza esserlo, così l’essere felici (in quanto buoni e virtuosi in attività)
non si dà senza la coscienza di essere felici (in quanto buoni e virtuosi),
anche se è possibile credere di essere felici senza esserlo davvero. E per
sapere chi sono, devo rispecchiarmi in amici simili a me[85]. Ciò importa che
l’uomo beato non avrà bisogno di amici “meramente utili” e “meramente piacevoli”,
invece dovrà avere amici buoni e virtuosi: il topos tradizionale è riscattato
nella sua verità profonda, ma anche oltrepassato in virtù della tripartizione;
in un senso è vero, in un altro no. Essere felici insieme è diverso dal
semplice divertirsi insieme, anche se lo include, ed è diverso dal semplice
aiutarsi l’un l’altro, anche se può includerlo. L’amico perfetto ˗ come
ogni altro autentico bene ˗ è oggetto di scelta razionale[86]. Anche per questo
la teoria aristotelica si distanzia da quella platonica[87]: la φιλία erotica,
già ben presente nel Liside sin dalla sua ambientazione scenica – una palestra,
ove Liside è il «bello del momento» di cui Ippotale è innamorato – viene
relegata da Aristotele a una delle tante forme di φιλία, degna di pochi accenni
espliciti, mentre nel Simposio e nel Fedro, dialoghi ben più elaborati e
costruttivi del Liside, l’eros è la forma di φιλία che viene eletta a oggetto
di indagine paradigmatico. Ma le componenti mistico-estatiche della φιλία
erotica come «follia divina» e frutto di invasamento[88], risultano
completamente marginalizzate entro la teoria aristotelica. L’amicizia più degna
e verace è attività derivante da scelta come desiderio razionale; se la
felicità è attività e i beni che la materiano sono oggetto di scelta, allora
anche l’amicizia, ingrediente costitutivo della vita felice, sarà espressione
di attività, piuttosto che passivo invasamento consistente nell’esser
“posseduti” da uomini o dèi. Il primato etico, fisico e metafisico dell’azione
sulla passione, è anche il primato di un certo tipo d’amore su un cert’altro.
L’amicizia è riportata fra gli amici, e la sua declinazione più eccellente,
normante rispetto alle altre, è caratterizzata secondo la dimensione eticamente
più elevata dell’umano: la ragione che sceglie e governa il desiderio,
piuttosto che esserne governata. L’eros platonico, così bellamente ed
enfaticamente rappresentato nel Simposio e nel Fedro, diventa per Aristotele
solo una delle tante declinazioni possibili di un tipo di amicizia – quella
fondata sul piacere – che è già di per sé incompleta e deficitaria[89].
Secondo l’aporetico excipit del Liside, né amanti né amati, né simili né
dissimili, né contrari né affini, né buoni, possono essere amici[90]; le Etiche
aristoteliche presentano una teoria la quale non solo consente ma anche prevede
che amanti, amati, simili, dissimili, contrari, affini, buoni, e perfino
malvagi possano essere amici; inoltre tale teoria offre le risorse concettuali
per chiarire quali coppie di amici possano e/o debbano avere questo o quel
carattere distintivo, e perché. Spero di avere almeno approssimato il
duplice obbiettivo prefissatomi: mostrare in modo dettagliato e sistematico la
dipendenza polemico-dialettica della teoria aristotelica dal Liside platonico,
e mettere in luce il significato filosofico generale della tripartizione della
φιλία in Aristotele. Bibliografia Adkins,
A.W.K. (1963), ‘Friendship’ and ‘Self-sufficiency’ in Homer and Aristotle,
«Classical Quarterly», 13: 30-45. Annas, J. (1986), Plato and Aristotle on
Friendship and Altruism, «Mind»: 532-554. Berti, E. (1995), Il concetto di
amicizia in Aristotele, in AA.VV., Il concetto di amicizia nella storia
europea, Merano: Istituto di Studi italo-tedesco, 102-135. Bordt, M. (1998),
Platon. Lysys, Übersetzung und Kommentar, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht
Verlag. Calvo Martinez, T. (2007), La unidad de la nocion de philia en
Aristoteles, «Methexis», 20: 63-82 Cooper, J. (1976-1977), Aristotle on the
Forms of Friendship, «Review of Metaphysics», 30: 619-648. Dirlmeier, F.
(1967), Aristoteles Nikomachische Ethik. Überseztz und Kommentiert, Berlin:
Akademie Verlag. Donini, P. (traduzione, introduzione e note a cura di) (1999),
Aristotele. Etica Eudemia, Roma-Bari: Laterza. Ferejohn, M. (1980), Aristotle
on focal meaning and the unity of science, «Phronesis», 25: 117-128
Fortenbaugh, W.W. (1975), Aristotle’s Analysis of Friendship: Function and
Analogy, Resemblance, Focal Meaning, «Phronesis», 20: 51-62. Fraisse, J.C.
(1974), Philia. La notion d’amitiè dans la philosophie antique, Paris: Vrin.
Gomperz, Th. (1903), Griechische Denker, Veit: Leipzig; trad. it. Pensatori
greci (2013), Milano: Bompiani. Kahn, Ch. (1981), Aristotle and Altruism,
«Mind», 90: 20-40. Kahn, Ch. (1996), Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, Oxford:
Oxford University Press. Kosman, A. (2004), Aristotle on the Desirability of
Friends, «Ancient Philosophy», 24, 1: 135-154. Lualdi, M. (1974), Il problema
della philia e il Liside platonico, Milano: CELUC. Natali, C. (traduzione,
introduzione e note a cura di) (1999), Aristotele. Etica Nicomachea, Roma-Bari:
Laterza. Natali, C. (2008), L’amicizia secondo Aristotele, «Bollettino della
società filosofica italiana»: 13-28. Nussbaum, M.C. (1986a), The Vulnerability
of the good human life, in Id., The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge Mass.:
Cambridge University Press, 343-370. Nussbaum, M.C. (1986b), Saving Aristotle’s
Appearances, in Id., The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge Mass.: Cambridge
University Press, 240-261. O’Connor, D.K. (1990), Two Ideals of Friendship,
«History of Philosophy Quarterly», 7: 109-122. Owen, G.E.L. (1960), Logic and
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on Aristotle (1979), vol. 3 (Metaphysics), London: Duckworth, 1-31. Owen, G.E.L.
(1967), ΤΙΘÉΝAΙ ΤΑ ΦΑIΝÓΜΕΝΑ, in Moravcsic, J. (ed.), Aristotle. A Collection
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Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Books VIII and IX, Pakaluk, M. (trans. and with
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the Forms of Friendship in Aristotle, «Apeiron», 1: 53-74. Pizzolato, L.
(1993), L’idea di amicizia nel mondo classico e Cristiano, Torino: Einaudi.
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Trabattoni, F. (a cura di) (2004), Il Liside: un’introduzione all’etica
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(1975), Plato’s Lysis, «Phronesis», 20: 185-198. Vlastos, G. (1981), The
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L’anima del vivente. Vita, cognizione e azione nella psicologia aristotelica,
Milano-Brescia: Morcelliana. Note al testo [1]
Cfr. Phys. I 1: la conoscenza procede da ciò che è più prossimo e più
conoscibile per noi, a ciò che è primo per se o per natura; se tale “risalita”
verso i principi a partire da ciò che ci è immediatamente più vicino è il
metodo della fisica, a fortiori esso si applica all’ambito etico, che è ambito
segnatamente umano: cfr. Et. Nic. I 2, 1095a31-b4, ma anche De An. II 2,
413a11-17 e Met. VII 3, 1029a35-b12. Sul valore epistemologico di questa differenza,
resta decisivo Ruggiu (1965). [2] Per esempio: quando diciamo, tipicamente,
qualcuno «amico» di qualcun altro? Sul rapporto costitutivo fra il
primo-per-noi e il linguaggio, cfr. Wieland (1993). [3] Cfr. Top. I 1, 100 b
21-23; intendo questa definizione di ἔνδοξον come una disgiunzione inclusiva:
se un’opinione è condivisa almeno da uno degli insiemi indicati (tutti, i più,
i sapienti, qualcuno di essi), è un ἔνδοξον, e ciò che lo rende tale può essere
quantitativo, o qualitativo, o entrambi: per esempio, se è condiviso da tutti,
lo sarà anche dai sapienti. [4] Sulla intima connessione fra δοκοῦντα, λεγόμενα
e φαινόμενα, cfr. Owen (1967), Nussbaum (1986b). [5] Cfr. De An. I 1, 402b
16-403a8. [6] Cfr. Herod. III 82, 35 e Tucid. I 137, 4, in cui si trova
l’endiadi «συμμαχίᾳ καὶ φιλία». [7] Nei poemi omerici non vi è il termine φιλία
– le prime occorrenze si trovano in Teognide (Teog. I, 31-38, 53-60, 323-28) –
ma termini analoghi come φιλότης, φίλος sono utilizzati sia a proposito del
rapporto fra uomini che di quello fra uomini e dèi. Sulla φιλία nel mondo
antico, cfr. Pizzolato (1993), Fraisse (1974). [8] Nel Fedro platonico
(228a-e), Socrate confuta un discorso di Lisia sulla φιλία, che Fedro custodiva
sotto il mantello: quindi è verosimile che anche prima della data di
composizione del Liside la φιλία fosse importante oggetto di dibattito e di
riflessione critica. Del resto Giamblico (De Pythagorica Vita, 229-30) e
Diogene Laerzio (Vitae Philosophorum, VIII, 10) attribuiscono già a Pitagora la
prima trattazione filosofica della φιλία. [9] Anche il Fedro e il Simposio si
occupano lungamente della φιλία – l’eros è una forma della φιλία, per Platone
quella più significativa – ma, come cercherò di mostrare, l’indagine
aristotelica dipende sistematicamente dal Liside: per così dire, essa articola
una differente risposta a quelle aporie, rispetto a quella che propone Platone
nel Simposio e nel Fedro. [10] Meglio: se qualcuno sia amico di qualcun altro
in quanto ami o, piuttosto, in quanto sia amato. [11] φίλος + dativo significa
“caro a qualcuno”, φίλος + genitivo indica colui a cui qualcuno è caro, due
individui sono φίλοι, quando sono l’uno “caro” all’altro. [12] Alcuni
interpreti leggono il Liside come un esercizio dialettico, filosoficamente
debole [Versenyi (1975)] o più retorico-sofistico che filosofico [Bordt
(1988)], o dal significato prolettico-introduttivo rispetto ai maturi Simposio
e Fedro [Kahn (1996), ma già Gomperz (2013), Auslage 5, e Willamovitz (1959)];
benché questi due dialoghi successivi ne possano a buon diritto adombrare il
valore intrinseco, tuttavia i temi sollevati dal Liside sono nodi aporetici
sostanziali, e non deve fuorviare il fatto che Socrate mutui il linguaggio e lo
stile argomentativo dal tipo di interlocutore che affronta (per esempio,
“facendo” il sofista col sofista Menesseno, e così via). Per una
interpretazione non riduttiva del Liside e del suo valore speculativo, è
illuminante Trabattoni (2004). [13] Un altro topos tradizionale – per cui la
vera amicizia è fra ἀγαθοί – ricorrente in Platone: per restare all’esempio più
noto, in Resp. I, 351a-e Socrate replica a Trasimaco che fra malvagi e ingiusti
non può esserci alcuna cooperazione né amicizia; era comunque un tema
essenziale per Socrate (cfr. Senofonte, Mem., 2.6 1-7). [14] Sull’ascendenza
omerica di questo topos tradizionale, e sulla sua importanza per Aristotele
(cfr. infra: Par. III), cfr. Adkins (1963). [15] La coscienza del male come
tale è sintomo del fatto che il male è relativo e non assoluto. [16] Qui nel Liside
si tratta di ἐπιθυμία (cfr. 217c). [17] Tralascio qui la questione della
possibile identificazione del Primo Amico col Bene: ciò che rileva, qui, è il
fatto che esso trascenda gli amici concreti, i quali sono tali solo «a parole»
e stanno al Primo amico – che è tale «in realtà» (τῷ ὄντι) – come i mezzi al
fine (cfr. Lys. 220b1-4). [18] Lys 222e1-7. [19] La letteratura sull’amicizia
in Aristotele è sterminata: in luogo di proporre una lunga lista di studi che
comunque sarebbe tutt’altro che esaustiva, nel seguito mi limiterò a citare
alcuni contributi che sono particolarmente pertinenti agli aspetti che
tratterò. Un commento sintetico e preciso a Et. Nic. VIII e IX è Pakaluk
(1998). [20] È il giudizio nettamente prevalente, anche se non unanime. [21] Sul
rapporto fra il Liside e le Etiche aristoteliche riguardo l’amicizia, buoni
spunti si trovano in Annas (1986). [22] Et. Eud. VII 1, 1234b18-1235a4; cfr.
anche Et. Nic. VIII 1. [23] Et. Eud. VII 1, 1155a33-b7. [24] Trad. it.
modificata. [25] Cfr. supra: nota 16. [26] Et. Eud. VII 2, 1235b22-23. [27] C’è
chi crede che il piacere sia un bene, ma c’è anche chi crede che non lo sia
eppure gli appare – porto dalla φαντασία – come se lo fosse. Nell’acratico la
forza della φαντασία sopravanza, nelle scelte pratiche, quella della δόξα. [28]
Il «bene apparente» è qualcosa che appare come bene; ma può anche non esserlo:
tuttavia, anche il bene reale motiva il desiderio solo apparendo come bene.
Dunque «apparente» qui non va affatto interpretato come falsa apparenza. [29]
Et. Eud. VII 2, 1235b30-1236a1. [30] Il piacevole non è l’immediato, ma anche
ciò che non procura dispiacere futuro; Aristotele sa bene che molte cose
dannose possono procurare del piacere immediato. Ma chi non è acratico, conscio
delle conseguenze negative, accorderà il suo desiderio con la sua ragione, e la
motivazione data dall’ipotetico piacere immediato sarà soverchiata dalla
motivazione a evitare danni futuri. [31] Questo punto è più chiaro per come è
presentato in Et. Nic. VIII 2, 1155b23-27. [32] Nelle espressioni δι’ ἀρετὴν,
διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, δι’ ἡδονήν, la preposizione significa a un tempo «in base a»,
«a causa di», «al fine di»: il rispettivo amabile è ciò che causa
quell’amicizia, ciò che ne costituisce il fondamento o ragion d’essere, ciò che
ne rappresenta il fine [su un’idea analoga, cfr. Nussbaum (1986a)]; nei termini
della nota teoria delle quattro cause (dei quattro sensi del διὰ τί, cfr. Phys.
II 3), potremmo plausibilmente intendere il tipo di amabile come causa
efficiente, formale e finale della rispettiva relazione amicale. [33] Cfr. Et.
Nic. VIII 2, 1155b26-31. Mentre la φίλησις è una passione o affezione (πάθος),
la φιλία è uno stato abituale (ἕξις, 1557b28-29). [34] Cfr. Et. Eud. VII 2,
1237b17-23; Et. Nic. VIII 4, 1156b30-33. [35] Vi è discussione sul fatto che
questa caratterizzazione definitoria offra condizioni sufficienti perché
qualcosa sia amicizia, oppure solo condizioni necessarie; propenderei per la
seconda opzione: per esempio, Aristotele ritiene che per diventare amici deve
passare del tempo, e molti scambiano il desiderio di essere amici con
l’amicizia stessa (Et. Eud. VII 2, 1237b12-22); ma se il desiderio è reciproco,
sussiste già benevolenza reciproca non celata, che non è ancora amicizia. [36]
Sul focal meaning cfr. Owen (1963), Ferejohn (1980). L’exemplum princeps è
quello della Metafisica: la sostanza è il focal meaning dell’essere, tutto ciò
che è o è sostanza o rimanda a una sostanza, al modo in cui tutto ciò che è
«sano» rimanda alla salute e tutto ciò che è «medico» alla medicina (cfr. Met.
IV 2, 1003a32-1003b11). [37] Cfr. Fortenbaugh (1975). [38] Può esserlo in modo
mediato, come foriero di un altro utile, al modo in cui qualcosa è mezzo di un
altro mezzo, ma in ultima istanza l’utile è tale perché porta al bene e i mezzi
sono tali perché portano al fine. [39] Per esempio, in De An. III 7, 431a10-13
il piacere è definito come l’essere percettivamente attivi nei confronti del
bene in quanto bene; l’utilità è indefinibile se non come capacità di
avvicinarci a un qualche bene; l’utile sta al bene come il mezzo al fine, e non
vi è modo di definire cosa sia un mezzo, senza chiamare in causa la nozione di
fine. [40] Et. Eud. VII 2, 1236a25-26. [41] Et. Eud. VII 2, 1236b1-2; Et. Nic.
VIII 4, 1156b7-8. [42] Cfr. Esiodo, Opera et dies, 342-360; 707-723. [43]
Chiamare amicizia solo quella prima, equivarrebbe a «violentare i fenomeni»
(βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα, Et. Eud. VII 2, 1236b 22). [44] Et. Nic. VIII 4,
1156b7. [45] La prima amicizia, infatti è quella «secondo virtù e a causa del
piacere della virtù» (EE VII 1238a31-32). [46] Secondo Aspasio (164.3-11), Owen
(1960) e Dirlmeier (1967) vi sarebbe comunque focal meaning e relazione πρὸς ἓν,
ancorché non esplicitata. [47] Et. Nic. VIII 5, 1157a32. [48] Se poi
l’individuo è acratico, potrebbe anche non credere che qualcosa sia il suo
bene, ma perseguirlo perché gli “appare” bene e frequentare individui utili a
qualcosa che egli cerca di procurarsi pur sapendo che non è il suo bene: come
uno che frequentasse un pusher in modo costante per procurarsi della droga,
sapendo di farsi del male ma perseverando nel suo comportamento autodistruttivo
(e nelle frequentazioni relative) per debolezza. [49] Sulla rilevanza della
distinzione fra «bene per qualcuno» e «bene incondizionato» in rapporto alla
teoria delle tre amicizie, insiste doverosamente O’Connor (1990). [50] Et. Nic.
IX 10,1170b20-29. [51] Così, nella Nicomachea (Et. Nic. VIII 2, 1156a17), non
nella Eudemia. [52] Cfr. supra: Par. II, 3. [53] EN VIII 3, 1156 a 16-17. [54]
EN VIII 3, 1156a18-19 [55] Cooper (1977) sostiene che le amicizie accidentali
siano tali perché dipendano da tratti accidentali del carattere dell’amico
amato; Payne (2000) replica che anche i tratti in virtù di cui qualcuno risulta
piacevole o utile possono essere altrettanto essenziali di quelli che lo
rendono virtuoso: gli amici perfetti sarebbero scelti «per sé stessi» in quanto
i loro caratteri virtuosi sono scelti come fine e non come mezzo (per altro).
Ma le letture sono forse componibili: l’esser utile o piacevole, anche se
sopravviene a tratti essenziali del carattere altrui, restano esterni
all’altro, in quanto relazionali in un senso diverso dalla virtù; l’esser buono
è sia essenziale e intrinseco all’amico, che scelto per sé stesso e non per
altro, e rende anche l’amico stesso, che ha quel carattere virtuoso, scelto per
sé stesso e non per altro. Cfr. supra: nota 31. [56] In Et. Eud. VII 7,
1241a5-7 si afferma che «se uno vuole per un altro i beni perché costui gli è
utile, li vorrebbe allora non per quello ma per sé stesso; mentre invece la
benevolenza, proprio come l’amicizia, si ritiene che sia rivolta non a quello
che la prova, ma a colui per il quale la si prova. Pertanto, è chiaro che la
benevolenza è in relazione con l’amicizia etica». Qui pare che solo l’amicizia
etica (=virtuosa) implichi la benevolenza, che però è un costituente della
definizione generale di amicizia. Da passi di questo tenore pare che le
amicizie incomplete non siano amicizie in senso proprio, visto che non
soddisfano la definizione; Aristotele è oscillante, è innegabile che vi sia una
tensione irrisolta fra la sua vocazione inclusiva e lo sforzo di enucleazione
della “vera” amicizia come tipologia normante e assiologicamente sovraordinata,
che non è semplicemente una delle tre amicizie ma quella par excellence, di cui
le altre sono approssimazioni manchevoli. Si può accogliere la lettura di
Walker (1979), per cui l’amicizia perfetta soddisfa criteri più severi, le
altre criteri più laschi. [57] Si pensi alla percezione per accidente (De An.
II 6, III 1): essa è comunque studiata come una modalità genuina di percezione:
le ragioni per cui essa è percezione per accidente non inficiano il fatto di
essere genuinamente un tipo di percezione. [58] I due amici perfetti, in quanto
buoni e virtuosi, realizzano l’eccellenza della natura umana, sono esempi del
bene incondizionato e del piacere incondizionato. [59] Et. Nic. VIII 3,
1156a31-1156b1. [60] Et. Eud. VII 2, 1238a11-30; Et. Nic. VIII 3, 1156b17-32.
[61] Può succedere che l’altro cambi, peggiori, o impazzisca, ma non accade per
lo più. Cfr. Et. Nic. IX 3. [62] Et. Nic. VIII 4, 1156b10. [63] Et. Eud. VII 2,
1236b31. [64] La sventura, poi, può rivelare che un’amicizia che pareva
perfetta era in realtà in vista dell’utile (Et. Eud. VII 2, 1238a19-21). [65]
Lys. 211e-212a. [66] Et. Eud. VII 2, 1237b13-27. [67] Et. Nic. VIII 3,
1156a24-31. [68] Et. Nic. VIII 7, 1158a21. [69] Et. Eud. VII 4; Et. Nic. VIII
8. [70] Et. Eud. VII 9-11, Et. Nic. VIII 12-14. [71] Et. Eud. VII 12, 1244b4-5.
[72] Cfr. Pol. I 1, 1253a10-12; Et. Nic. IX 12, 1169b18-19. [73] Et. Eud. VII
12, 1245b15-16. [74] Et. Nic. 1245b18. [75] Et. Eud. VII 12, 1245b18-19. [76]
Si tratta di una complessità anche filologica, dovuta a corruzioni del testo.
Su ciò, cfr. Kosman (2004). [77] Delle tre anime – nutritivo-riproduttiva,
percettiva, razionale – la percettiva e la razionale sono quelle che
discriminano la realtà (cfr. De An. III 3, 427a17-23); la percettiva, poi, è
intimamente connessa col desiderio e, quindi, con l’azione (cfr. De An. III
9-11). Vivere significa realizzare le proprie capacità naturali e acquisite, il
che per l’uomo implica anzitutto l’esercizio di percezione e pensiero (ove
entrambe vanno concepite come connesse all’azione, in quanto coinvolgono anche
desiderio e intelletto pratico). Su ciò, mi permetto di rimandare a Zucca
(2015), Capp. II e VI. [78] La felicità è «una certa attività dell’anima
secondo virtù completa» (Et. Nic. II 13, 1102a5-6). [79] Et. Eud. VII 12,
1245a30; Et. Nic. IX 9, 1166 a 32, 1170 b 6. [80] Et. Eud. VII 12, 1245a35-7.
[81] Trad. it. modificata. [82] In Et. Eud. VII 6 e in Et. Nic. IX 4 si
argomenta che i tipi di relazione che si hanno con gli altri dipendono dal
rapporto che si ha con sé stessi: chi è buono e virtuoso sarà anche amico di sé
stesso in modo armonico e costante – sebbene si possa parlare di amicizia solo
κατὰ ἀναλογίαν (1240a13), nel caso dell’auto-rapporto – chi è malvagio sarà
incostante e in conflitto con sé stesso, e in senso analogico sarà nemico di sé
stesso. Questa idea non contraddice l’idea per cui la conoscenza di sé passa
per la conoscenza dell’altro (Et. Nic. IX 9), ma anzi la completa: il buono e
virtuoso è felice anzitutto in quanto ha un “sano” rapporto con sé, ma si
conosce e realizza come felice solo in quanto ha un rapporto di riconoscimento
reciproco con amici che hanno, a loro volta, un altrettanto “sano” rapporto con
sé stessi. [83] L’idea di un accesso introspettivo infallibile ed
essenzialmente privato ai nostri propri atti mentali, così tipicamente moderna,
è affatto estranea ad Aristotele. [84] Come è naturale porre l’enfasi sul
valore speculativo intrinseco della teoria, così è altrettanto opportuno
ricordare che l’amicizia perfetta aristotelica resta prerogativa di un
sottoinsieme dei maschi adulti liberi; tuttavia, questa tara storica affetta la
teoria dell’amicizia, per così dire, mediatamente: in quanto restringe a quel
sottoinsieme la capacità di realizzare l’eccellenza morale, precondizione della
relazione d’amicizia perfetta. [85] Non uso la locuzione «sapere chi sono»,
anacronisticamente, come il coglimento di me stesso in quanto individualità
irriducibile, magari ineffabile e inaccessibile ad altri – non è certo questa
sorta di soggettività “novecentesca”, che secondo Aristotele giungerebbe alla coscienza
di sé nell’amicizia – bensì come il venire a conoscenza di che tipo di persona
sono. [86] Come bene intrinseco che trascende il livello del piacevole, è un
amabile oggetto di volontà piuttosto che di appetito (Et. Eud. VII 2,
1235b22-23), e la volontà è desiderio razionale di beni scelti. [87] Un’analisi
sistematica e comparativa delle nozioni di amicizia e amore in Platone e
Aristotele, è Price (1989). Cfr. anche Kahn (1981). [88] Cfr. Phaedr. 265b-c.
[89] La relazione erotica amante/amato, peraltro, è anche meno significativa e
più instabile di altre relazioni fondate sul piacere – dunque, già di per sé
instabili – in quanto in questo caso il piacere «non deriva dalla stessa fonte»
(l’uno gode nell’esser corteggiato, l’altro nel contemplare l’altro, Et. Nic.
VIII 5, 1157a2-10). [90] Lys. 222a3-7. Proverbi, impicatura proverbiale. A
Errare humanum est.jpg Ab amico reconciliato cave. Guardati da un amico
riconciliato.[1] Absit reverentia vero. Bando ai pudori di fronte alla verità.
(Ovidio) Abusus non tollit usum. L'abuso non esclude l'uso.[2] Accidere ex una
scintilla incendia passim. A volte da una sola scintilla scoppia un
incendio.[3] Ad impossibilia nemo tenetur. Nessuno è obbligato a fare
l'impossibile.[4] Adulator propriis commodis tantum suadet L'adulatore tiene di
mira solo i suoi interessi.[5] (Giulio Cesare) Amantis ius iurandum poenam non
habet. Il giuramento dell'innamorato non si può punire.[6] Amicus certus in re
incerta cernitur. Il vero amico si rivela nelle situazioni difficili.[7] (Quinto
Ennio) Amicus omnibus, amicus nemini. Amico di tutti, amico di nessuno.[8]
Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas. Amo Platone, ma amo di più la verità.[9]
(Aristotele) Amor arma ministrat. L'amore procura le armi [agli amanti perché
possano essere grati alla persona amata].[10] (proverbio medievale) Amor
caecus. L'amore è cieco.[11] Amor gignit amorem.[10] Amore genera amore. Amor
tussisque non celatur. L'amore e la tosse non si possono nascondere.[12] Amoris
vulnus sanat idem qui facit. La ferita d'amore la risana chi la fa.[12] Anceps
fortuna belli. Le sorti della guerra sono incerte.[9] (Cicerone) Aquila non
captat muscas. L'aquila non prende mosche.[13] Athenas noctuas mittere.[14]
Mandare nottole ad Atene. Fare cosa inutile e superflua. Ars est celare
artem.[15] La perfezione dell'arte sta nel celarla. Audi, vide, tace, si vis
vivere in pace.[16] Ascolta, guarda e taci, se vuoi vivere in pace. B Barba
virile decus, et sine barba pecus.[17] La barba è decoro dell'uomo e chi è
senza barba è pecoro. Bene qui latuit, bene vixit. Ben visse chi seppe vivere
nell'oscurità.[18] (Ovidio) Beati monoculi in terra caecorum. Beati i monòcoli
nel paese dei ciechi. Bis dat qui cito dat. Dà due volte chi dà presto.[19] Bis
peccat qui crimen negat.[20] È due volte colpevole chi nega la propria colpa.
Bis pueris senes.[21] Il vecchio è due volte fanciullo. Bonis nocet qui malis
parcet. Chi risparmia i malvagi danneggia i buoni.[22] Bonum nomen, bonum
omen.[23] Buon nome, buon augurio. C Caecus non judicat de colore.[24] Il cieco
non giudica i colori. Non si può giudicare ciò che si sottrae alle nostre
attitudini. Caesar non supra grammaticos.[25] Cesare non (ha autorità) sopra i
grammatici. Le persone più altolocate non possono avere autorità se non su
quelle cose di cui s'intendono. Canis caninam non est.[26] Cane non mangia
cane. Carpe diem. Cogli il giorno. (Quinto Orazio Flacco) Caseus est sanus,
quem dat avara manus. Fa bene quel formaggio servito da una mano avara.[27]
Causa patrocinio non bona peior erit. La causa cattiva diventa peggiore col
volerla difendere.[28] (Ovidio) Causa perit iusta, si dextera non sit
onusta.[29] La giusta causa soccombe se la destra non è piena [di denaro]. Cave
a signatis. Guàrdati dai segnati.[28] Antico adagio in odio a coloro che sono
affetti da qualche imperfezione fisica: guerci, zoppi, ecc. Cave tibi ab acquis
silentibus. Guàrdati dalle acque chete.[28] Cavendo tutus.[30] Se sarai cauto,
sarai sicuro. Cogito ergo sum. Penso dunque sono. (Cartesio) Commendatoria
verba non obligant.[31] Le parole di raccomandazione non obbligano. Commune
periculum concordiam paret.[32] Il comune pericolo prepari la concordia.
Consuetudo est altera natura. L'abitudine è una seconda natura.[33] D De
gustibus non est disputandum. Sui gusti non si discute.[34] Difficilis in otio
quies. È difficile esser tranquilli nell'ozio.[35] Dulce bellum inexpertis,
expertus metuit. La guerra è dolce per chi non ne ha esperienza, l'esperto la
teme.[36] (proverbio medievale) Dum caput dolet, caetera membra languent. Quando
duole il capo, tutte le membra languono.[37] Dum Romae consulitur, Saguntum
expugnatur. Mentre a Roma si delibera, Sagunto è espugnata.[38] Dum vinum
intrat exit sapientia.[39] Mentre il vino entra, esce la sapienza. Duo cum
faciunt idem, non est idem.[35] Quando due fanno la stessa cosa, non è più la
stessa cosa. E Errare humanum est, perseverare autem diabolicum.[40] L'errare è
cosa umana, il perseverare nella colpa invece è diabolico. Error hesternus sit
tibi doctor hodiernus.[41] L'errore di ieri ti sia maestro oggi. Est in canitie
ridicula Venus. È ridicolo l'amore di un vecchio.[42] (Proverbio medievale) Est
modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines | quos ultra citraque nequit
consistere rectum. C'è una giusta misura nelle cose, ci sono giusti confini |
al di qua e al di là dei quali non può sussistere la cosa giusta. (Quinto
Orazio Flacco) Ex ungue leonem.[43] Dall'unghia si conosce il leone. Da un atto
compiuto si rivela la forza dell'autore, morale o materiale. Excusatio non
petita fit accusatio manifesta (proverbio medievale)[44] Chi si scusa senza
esserne richiesto s'accusa. F Fabas indulcat fames.[45] La fame addolcisce le
fave. Facile est inventis addere.[46] È facile aggiungere a ciò che è stato
inventato. Facile perit amicitia coacta.[47] Facilmente muore un'amicizia
forzata. Facit experientia cautos.[48] L'esperienza rende cauti. Fac sapias et
liber eris.[49] Fa' di sapere e sarai libero. Felicium omnes sunt cognati.
Tutti sono parenti dei fortunati.[8] Fiat iustitia et pereat mundus. Sia fatta
giustizia e perisca pure il mondo. Frangitur ira gravis cum sit responsio
suavis.[50] Una dolce risposta infrange l'ira. Frustra sapiens qui sibi non
sapet.[51] Inutilmente sa chi non sa per sé. G Gutta cavat lapidem. La goccia
scava la pietra. H Homo longus raro sapiens; sed si sapiens, sapientissimus. Un
uomo lungo (ossia alto) di rado è sapiente; ma se è sapiente, è
sapientissimo.[52] Homo sine pecunia, imago mortis. L'uomo senza danaro è
l'immagine della morte.[53] I Ianuensis ergo mercator. Genovese quindi
mercante.[54] Imperare sibi maximum imperium est. Comandare a sé stessi è la
forma più grande di comando. (Seneca, Lettere a Lucilio, CXIII.30) In magno
mari capiuntur flumine pisces.[55] Nei grandi fiumi si pescano i grandi pesci.
Nei grandi affari si fanno i grossi guadagni. In medio stat virtus. La virtù
sta nel mezzo. (Orazio) In vino veritas. Nel vino c'è la verità. L M Magnum
vectigal parsimonia.[56] La parsimonia è un gran capitale. (Cicerone) Major e
longiquo reverentia.[56] La riverenza è maggiore da lontano. (Tacito) Mala
gallina, malum ovum.[57] Gallina cattiva, uovo cattivo. Mea mihi conscientia
pluris est quam omnium sermo.[58] Per me val più la mia coscienza che il
discorso di tutti. (Cicerone) Medicus curat, natura sanat. Il medico cura ma è
la natura che guarisce.[59] Melius est abundare quam deficere. Meglio abbondare
che trovarsi in scarsezza.[60] Mors tua vita mea.[56] La tua morte è la mia
vita. Mortui non mordent. I morti non mordono[61] [truismo] Mortuo leoni et
lepores insultant. Anche le lepri insultano un leone morto.[62] Multi multa,
nemo omnia novit. Molti sanno molto, nessuno sa tutto.[63] N Natura non facit
saltus. La natura non procede per salti.[64] Naturalia non sunt turpia.[65] Le
cose naturali non sono turpi. Nemo non formosus filius matri. Nessun figlio non
è bello per sua madre.[66] Ne pulsato portam alterius, nisi velis pulsetur et
tua.[67] Non bussare alla porta altrui se non vuoi che bussino alla tua. Nihil
est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu. Nulla è nell'intelligenza che prima
non fosse nel senso[68] Non omne quod licet honestum est.[69] Non tutto ciò che
è lecito è onesto. Non omnibus dormio. Non dormo per tutti.[70] Nomen omen Il
nome è un presagio (v. anche nomina sunt consequentia rerum e conveniunt rebus
nomina saepe suis) (Plauto, Persa, 625) Nomina sunt consequentia rerum. I nomi
sono corrispondenti alle cose. (Giustiniano, Institutiones, 2, 7, 3) O Omne
animal post coitum triste. Tutti gli animali sono mesti dopo il coito.[71] Omne
ignotum pro terribili.[72] Tutto ciò che è ignoto incute paura. Omnia munda
mundis. Per chi è puro tutto è puro. (Paolo di Tarso) Omnia vincit amor.
L'amore vince ogni cosa. (Virgilio, Bucoliche X, 69) Omnia fert aetas. Il tempo
porta via tutte le cose. (Virgilio) Omnis festinatio ex parte diaboli est.[73]
Ogni fretta viene dal diavolo. P Panem et circenses. Pane e giochi [per
distrarre il popolo]. (Giovenale, X 81) Patere quam ipse fecisti legem.[74]
Subisci la legge che tu stesso hai fatta. Pectus est enim quod disertos facit È
infatti il cuore che rende eloquenti (Quintiliano, 10,7,15) Pecunia non olet Il
denaro non puzza (Vespasiano) Per aspera ad astra. Alle stelle [si giunge]
attraverso aspri sentieri.[75] Periculum in mora. Vi è pericolo nel ritardo.
(Tito Livio, Ab urbe condita; XXXVIII, 25) Philosophum non facit barbam.[76] La
barba non fa il filosofo. Primum vivere deinde philosophari (Thomas Hobbes)
Prima vivere, poi fare della filosofia. Q Quando Sol est in Leone, bibe vinum
cum pistone. Quando il sole è in Leone [segno zodiacale], bevi il vino col
pistone [a garganella].[77] Qui aquam Nili bibit rursus bibet.[78] Chi beve
l'acqua del Nilo la berrà di nuovo. È destinato a ritornarvi. Qui asinum non
potest, stratum caedit.[79] Chi non può bastonare l'asino bastona la bardatura.
Qui gladio ferit gladio perit. Chi di spada ferisce di spada perisce.[80] Qui
in pergula natus est, aedes non somniatur. Chi è nato in una capanna, i palazzi
non li vede neanche in sogno. (Petronio, 74,14) Qui jacet in terra non habet
unde cadat. Per chi giace in terra non c'è pericolo di cadere.[81] [truismo]
Qui medice vivit, misere vivit. Chi vive sotto la guida del medico, vive
miseramente.[81] Qui scribit, bis legit. Chi scrive, legge due volte.[82]
Quisque faber fortunae suae. Ognuno è artefice del proprio destino. (Appio
Claudio Cieco) Quod differtur non aufertur Ciò che si dilaziona non lo si
perde[83] Quod non potest diabolus mulier evincit. Ciò che non può il diavolo,
l'ottiene la donna.[84] (proverbio medievale) Quot homines tot sententiae.
Tanti uomini, altrettante opinioni.[85] Quot servi tot hostes. Tanti servi,
tanti nemici.[85] R Re opitulandum, non verbis.[86] L'aiuto va dato con i
fatti, non con le parole. Rem tene, verba sequentur Possiedi l'argomento e le
parole seguiranno. (Marco Porcio Catone) Res satis est nota, plus foetent
stercora mota.[87] È cosa nota: lo sterco più è stuzzicato e più puzza. S Salus
extra Ecclesiam non est[88] Al di fuori della Chiesa non v'è salvezza (Tascio
Cecilio Cipriano, Lettera, 73, 21) Sapiens nihil affirmat quod non probet.[89]
Il saggio nulla afferma che non possa provare. Satis quod sufficit.[90] Ciò che
è sufficiente al bisogno, basta. Semel abas, semper abas.[91] Una volta abate,
sempre abate. Proverbio medioevale, affermante che chi ha vestito una volta
l'abito sacerdotale non può spogliarsi più delle idee e delle abitudini
ecclesiastiche. Significa anche, per estensione, che si conservano sempre le
idee una volta acquistate. Semel in anno licet insanire. Una volta all'anno è
lecito fare follie. (Seneca) Senatores boni viri: senatus autem mala
bestia.[92] I senatori sono brava gente; ma il senato è una cattiva bestia.
Sero venientibus ossa.[93] Per chi viene troppo tardi restano le ossa. Si vis
pacem, para bellum. Se vuoi la pace prepara la guerra. (Vegezio) Sicut mater,
ita et filia eius. Quale la madre, tale anche la figlia.[94] Simia simia est,
etiamsi aurea gestet insignia.[95] La scimmia resta sempre scimmia, anche se
indossa ornamenti d'oro. Sol lucet omnibus.[96] Il sole splende per tutti. Vi
sono delle cose di cui tutti gli uomini possono godere. Sorex suo perit
indicio.[97] Il topo perisce per essersi rivelato da sé. Sublata causa,
tollitur effectum.[98] Soppressa la causa, scompare l'effetto. T Timeo Danaos
et dona ferentes. Io temo comunque i Greci, anche se recano doni. (Publio
Virgilio Marone) U Ubi maior, minor cessat. Dinanzi al più forte, il debole
scompare.[8] Ubi opes, ibi amici. Dove sono le ricchezze, lì sono anche gli
amici.[8] Ubi uber, ibi tuber.[99] Dove è la mammella, ivi è il tumore. Dove
c'è abbondanza, ivi si forma il marciume, la corruzione. V Verba movent,
exempla trahunt.[100] Le parole commuovono, ma gli esempi trascinano. Verba
volant, scripta manent.[101] Le parole volano, gli scritti restano.
Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura succurunt.[102] Le leggi forniscono aiuto
ai vigilanti, non ai dormienti. Vinum lac senum.[103] Il vino è il latte dei
vecchi. Vulgus vult decipi, ergo decipiatur. Il popolo (il mondo) vuole essere
ingannato, e allora sia ingannato.[104] Note
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2005, § 1970. Citato in 2005, p.
248. (DE) Citato in Friedrich Otto
Bittrich, Ägypten und Libyen, Safari-Verlag, Berlino, 1953, p. 7. Citato e tradotto in 2005, § 2167. Dal Vangelo:... tutti quelli che mettono mano
alla spada periranno di spada (Mt 26:52).
Citato in 2005, p. 256. Citato in
2005, p. 258. Citato in Tosi 2017, n.
1174. Citato in De Mauri, p. 171. Citato in 2005, p. 266. Citato e tradotto in 2005, § 2342. Citato e tradotto in 2005, § 2363. Spesso la frase viene attribuita a Cipriano
in una forma diversa: Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus. Citato e tradotto in 2005, § 2415. Citato e tradotto in 2005, § 2421. Citato e tradotto in Lo Forte, § 1034. Citato e tradotto in 2005, § 2457. Citato e tradotto in 2005, § 2472. Citato in 1921, p. 138, § 465. Citato e tradotto in 2005, § 2528. Citato e tradotto in Lo Forte, § 1079. Citato e tradotto in 2005, § 2606. Citato e tradotto in Lo Forte, § 1097. Citato e tradotto in Lo Forte, § 1169. Citato e tradotto in Lo Forte, § 1203. Citato e tradotto in Lo Forte, § 1204. Citato e tradotto in Lo Forte, § 1216. Citato in Proverbi siciliani raccolti e
confrontati con quelli degli altri dialetti d'Italia da Giuseppe Pitrè, Luigi
Pedone Lauriel, Palermo, 1880, vol. IV, p. 140.
Traduzione in voce su Wikipedia. Bibliografia L. De Mauri, 5000 proverbi
e motti latini, seconda edizione, Hoepli, Milano, 2006. ISBN 978-88-203-0992-0
Giuseppe Fumagalli, Chi l'ha detto?, Hoepli, Milano, 1921. Giuseppe Fumagalli,
L'ape latina, Hoepli, Milano, 2005. ISBN 88-203-0033-8 Giacomo Lo Forte, Ad
hoc, Sandron, 1921. Paola Mastellaro, Il libro delle citazioni latine e greche,
Mondadori, Milano, 2012. ISBN 978-88-04-47133-2. Gustavo Benelli, Raccolta di
proverbi, massime morali, aneddoti, ed altro, Carnesecchi, Firenze, 1876. Renzo
Tosi, Dizionario delle sentenze latine e greche, Rizzoli, 2017. Voci correlate
Modi di dire latini Lingua latina Palindromi latini Categorie: Lingua
latinaProverbi per nazione. Proverbi
Exquisite-kfind.png Per approfondire, vedi: Proverbi toscani. A A brigante
brigante e mezzo.[fonte 1] A buon cavalier non manca lancia.[fonte 2] A buon
cavallo non manca sella.[fonte 2] A buon cavallo non occorre dir trotta.[fonte
3] A buon intenditor poche parole.[1][fonte 2] A caldo autunno segue lungo
inverno.[fonte 4] A cane scottato l'acqua fredda par calda.[fonte 5] A cane
vecchio non dargli cuccia.[fonte 2] A carnevale ogni scherzo vale, ma che sia
uno scherzo che sa di sale.[fonte 6] A caval che corre, non abbisognano speroni.[fonte
3] A caval donato non si guarda in bocca.[2][fonte 2] A cavalier novizio,
cavallo senza vizio.[fonte 3] A cavallo d'altri non si dice zoppo.[fonte 3] A
cavallo di fuoco, uomo di paglia, a uomo di paglia, cavallo di fuoco.[fonte 3]
A cavallo giovane, cavalier vecchio.[fonte 3] A caval nuovo cavaliere
vecchio.[fonte 2] A chi batte forte, si apron le porte.[fonte 7] A chi Dio
vuole aiutare, niente gli può nuocere.[fonte 4] A chi fortuna zufola, ha un bel
ballare.[fonte 4] A chi ha abbastanza, non manca nulla.[fonte 4] A chi mangia
sempre polli vien voglia di polenta.[fonte 8] A chi non piace il vino, il
Signore faccia mancar l'acqua.[fonte 8] A chi non può imparare l'abbicì, non si
può dare in mano la Bibbia.[fonte 4] A chi non vuol credere, poco valgono mille
testimoni.[fonte 8] A chi non vuol credere sono inutili tutte le prove.[fonte
8] A chi non vuol far fatiche, il terreno produce ortiche.[fonte 9] A chi
prende moglie ci vogliono due cervelli.[fonte 4] A chi tanto e a chi
niente.[fonte 2] A chi troppo e a chi niente.[fonte 10] A chi ti dà il cappone,
dagli la coscia e l'alone.[fonte 8] A chi ti porge un dito non prendere la
mano.[fonte 2] A chi vuole fare del male non manca l'occasione.[fonte 4] A
ciascun giorno basta la sua pena.[3][fonte 2] A ciascuno sta bene il proprio
abito.[fonte 4] A donna di gran bellezza, dalla poca larghezza.[fonte 4] A duro
ceppo, dura accetta.[fonte 4] A goccia a goccia si scava la pietra.[4][fonte
11] A goccia a goccia s'incava la pietra.[fonte 2] A gran salita, gran
discesa.[fonte 4] A granello a granello si riempie lo staio e si fa il
monte.[fonte 4] A grassa cucina povertà vicina.[fonte 4] A lavar la testa
all'asino si perde il ranno e il sapone.[fonte 12] A lume spento è pari ogni
bellezza.[fonte 4] A mali estremi estremi rimedi.[fonte 1] A muro basso ognuno
ci si appoggia.[fonte 1] A nemico che fugge ponti d'oro.[fonte 1] A ogni
uccello suo nido è bello.[fonte 1] A padre avaro figliuol prodigo.[fonte 13] A
pancia piena si ragiona meglio.[fonte 8] A pagare e a morire c'è sempre
tempo.[fonte 14] A paragone del molto che ignoriamo, è meno di niente quanto
noi sappiamo.[fonte 4] A pazzo relatore, savio ascoltatore.[fonte 8] A pensar
male, s'indovina sempre.[fonte 15] A pensar male ci s'indovina.[fonte 2] A
pentola che bolle, gatta non s'accosta.[fonte 8] A rubar poco si va in galera,
a rubar tanto si fa carriera.[fonte 1] A san Lorenzo il dente la noce già
sente.[fonte 2] A san Martino [11 novembre], apri la botte e assaggia il
vino.[fonte 8] A San Martino ogni mosto è vino.[fonte 16] A san Mattia la neve
va via.[fonte 4] A scherzar con la fiamma, ci si scotta.[fonte 17] A tal
fortezza, tal trincea.[fonte 4] A torto si lagna del mare chi due volte ci
vuole tornare.[fonte 4] A tutto c'è rimedio fuorché alla morte.[fonte 1] A
usanza nuova non correre.[fonte 2] Abbattuto l'albero scompare l'ombra.[fonte
8] Accasa il figlio quando vuoi, e la figlia quando puoi.[fonte 18] Acquista
buona fama e mettiti a dormire.[fonte 4] Ai bugiardi e agli spacconi non è
creduto.[fonte 8] Ai voli troppo alti e repentini sogliono i precipizi esser
vicini.[fonte 19] A voli troppo alti e repentini sogliono i precipizi esser
vicini.[fonte 2] Abate cupido, per un'offerta ne perde cento.[fonte 4] Abate
rigoroso rende i frati penitenti.[fonte 4] Abbi piuttosto il piccolo per amico,
che il grande per nemico.[fonte 8] Abiti stranieri, costumi stranieri; costumi
stranieri, gente straniera; la gente straniera sloggia gli antichi
abitanti.[fonte 4] Abito troppo portato e donna troppo vista vengono presto a
noia.[fonte 4] Abbondanza genera baldanza.[fonte 4] Accade in un'ora quel che
non avviene in mill'anni.[fonte 2] Accade in un'ora quel che non avviene in
cent'anni.[fonte 2] Accendere una candela ai Santi e una al diavolo.[fonte 4]
Accendere una fiaccola per far lume al sole.[fonte 4] Acqua che corre non porta
veleno.[fonte 4] Acqua cheta rompe i ponti.[fonte 16] Acqua di san Lorenzo [10
agosto] venuta per tempo; se alla Madonna viene va ancora bene; tardiva sempre
buona quando arriva.[fonte 2] Acqua e chiacchiere non fanno frittelle.[fonte
20] Acqua lontana non spegne il fuoco.[fonte 21] Acqua passata, non macina
più.[fonte 22] Ad albero vecchio ed a muro cadente, non manca mai edera.[fonte
4] Ad ogni primavera segue un autunno.[fonte 4] Ad ognuno la sua croce.[fonte
23] Ad ognuno pare bello il suo.[fonte 4] Ad un grasso mezzogiorno spesso tien
dietro una cena magra.[fonte 4] Agosto ci matura il grano e il mosto[fonte 16].
Agosto: moglie mia non ti conosco.[5][6][fonte 1] Ai macelli van più bovi che
vitelli.[fonte 2] Ai pazzi ed ai fanciulli, non si deve prometter nulla.[fonte
8] Ai pazzi si dà sempre ragione.[fonte 8] Aiutati che Dio t'aiuta.[fonte 24]
Aiutati che il ciel t'aiuta.[fonte 25] Aiutati che io ti aiuto.[fonte 16] Al
baciarsi presto tien dietro il coricarsi.[fonte 4] Al bisogno si conosce
l'amico.[fonte 1] Al buio la villana è bella quanto la dama.[fonte 2] Al buio,
le donne sono tutte uguali.[fonte 8] Al buio tutti i gatti sono bigi.[fonte 16]
Al confessor, medico e avvocato, non tenere il ver celato.[fonte 26] Al
confessore, al medico e all'avvocato non si tiene il ver celato.[fonte 2] Al
contadin non far sapere quanto è buono il formaggio con le pere.[fonte 1] Al
cuore non si comanda.[fonte 1] Al cuor non si comanda.[fonte 27] Al cazzo non
si comanda.[fonte 2] Al culo non si comanda.[fonte 28] Al destino non si
comanda.[fonte 2] Al tempo non si comanda.[fonte 2] Al tempo e al culo non si
comanda.[fonte 2] Al debole il forte sovente fa torto.[fonte 8] Al fratello
piace più veder la sorella ricca, che farla tale.[fonte 8] Al levar le tende si
conosce il guadagno.[fonte 4] Al gatto che lecca lo spiedo non affidar
arrosto.[fonte 8] Al genio non si danno le ali, ma le si tagliano.[fonte 4] Al
medico, al confessore e all'avvocato, bisogna dire ogni peccato.[fonte 8] Al
povero manca il pane, al ricco l'appetito.[fonte 8] Al primo colpo non cade
l'albero.[fonte 2] Al primo colpo non cade un albero.[fonte 2] Al suono si
riconosce la pignata.[fonte 29] Al villano, se gli porgi il dito, si prende la
mano.[fonte 30] All'A tien dietro il B nel nostro abbicì.[fonte 4] All'eco
spetta l'ultima parola.[fonte 4] All'orsa paion belli i suoi
orsacchiotti.[fonte 8] All'uccello ingordo crepa il gozzo.[fonte 2] All'ultimo
si contano le pecore.[fonte 1] All'umiltà felicità, all'orgoglio
calamità.[fonte 8] Alla fame è presto ridotto chi s'imbarca senza
biscotto.[fonte 4] Alla fine anche le pernici allo spiedo vengono a noia.[fonte
8] Alla fine loda la vita e alla sera loda il giorno.[7][fonte 4] Alla fine
loda la vita e alla sera il giorno.[fonte 2] Alla guerra si va pieno di denari
e si torna pieni di vizi e di pidocchi.[fonte 4] Alle barbe dei pazzi, il
barbiere impara a radere.[fonte 8] Alle volte si crede di trovare il sole
d'agosto e si trova la luna di marzo.[fonte 8] Altri tempi, altri
costumi.[fonte 2] Alzati presto al mattino se vuoi gabbare il tuo vicino.[fonte
8] Ambasciator non porta pena.[fonte 2] Amare e non essere amato è tempo
perso.[fonte 4] Ambasciatore che tarda notizia buona che porta.[fonte 2]
Amicizia che cessa, non fu mai vera.[fonte 4] Amico beneficato, nemico
dichiarato.[fonte 4] Amico di buon tempo mutasi col vento.[fonte 4] Amico di
ventura, molto briga e poco dura.[fonte 31] Ammogliarsi è un piacere che costa
caro.[fonte 4] Amor che nasce di malattia, quando si guarisce passa via.[fonte
8] Amor di nostra vita ultimo inganno.[8][fonte 32] Amor, dispetto, rabbia e
gelosia, sul cuore della donna han signoria.[fonte 8] Amor nuovo va e viene,
amor vecchio si mantiene.[fonte 8] Amor regge il suo regno senza spada.[fonte
32] Amore con amor si paga.[fonte 2] Amore di parentato, amore
interessato.[fonte 4] Amore di villeggiatura poco vale e poco dura.[fonte 2]
Amore di fratello, amore di coltello.[fonte 8] Amore è il vero prezzo con che
si compra amore.[fonte 33] Amore non si compra né si vende.[fonte 33] Amore
onorato, né vergogna né peccato.[fonte 8] Amore scaccia amore.[fonte 4] Anche
fra le spine nascono le rose.[fonte 34] Anche i fanciulli diventano
uomini.[fonte 4] Anche il più verde diventa fieno.[fonte 4] Anche il sole ha le
sue macchie.[fonte 4] Anche l'abate fu prima frate.[fonte 4] Anche l'ambizione
è una fame.[fonte 4] Anche la legna storta dà il fuoco diritto.[fonte 4] Anche
la regina Margherita mangia il pollo con le dita.[fonte 35] Anche le bestie le
ha fatte il Signore.[fonte 8] Anche le colombe hanno il fiele.[fonte 4] Anche
le pulci hanno la tosse.[fonte 2] Anche le uova della gallina nera sono
bianche; ma staremo a vedere se anche i suoi pulcini sono bianchi.[fonte 4]
Anche un giogo dorato pesa.[fonte 8] Andar presto a dormire e alzarsi presto
chiude la porta a molte malattie.[fonte 8] Andar bestia, e tornar bestia, dice
il moro.[fonte 36] Anno nevoso anno fruttuoso.[fonte 16] Anno nuovo vita
nuova.[fonte 1] Approfitta degli errori degli altri, piuttosto che
censurarli.[fonte 4] Aprile dolce dormire.[9][fonte 2] Aprile e maggio sono la
chiave di tutto l'anno.[fonte 4] Aprile ogni goccia un barile.[10][fonte 2]
Aprile piovoso, maggio ventoso, anno fruttuoso.[fonte 4] Ara nel mare e nella
rena semina, chi crede alle parole della femmina.[fonte 8] Arcobaleno porta il
sereno.[fonte 2] Aria rossa o piscia o soffia.[fonte 2] Asino che ha fame
mangia d'ogni strame.[fonte 2] Assai bene balla a chi fortuna suona.[fonte 4]
Assai digiuna chi mal mangia.[fonte 8] Assai domanda chi ben serve e
tace.[fonte 37] Assai domanda chi si lamenta.[fonte 8] Assalto francese e
ritirata spagnola.[fonte 2] Attacca l'asino dove vuole il padrone e, se si
rompe il collo, suo danno.[fonte 1] Avuta la grazia, gabbato lo santo.[fonte 8]
B Bacco, tabacco e Venere riducon l'uomo in cenere.[fonte 2] Ballaremo secondo
che voi suonerete.[fonte 4] Bandiera rotta onor di capitano. Bandiera vecchia
onor di capitano.[fonte 2] Basta un matto per casa.[fonte 8] Batti il ferro
finché è caldo. Batti il ferro quando è caldo.[fonte 1] Bei gatti e grossi
letamai mostrano il buon agricoltore.[fonte 38] Bella cosa presto è
rapita.[fonte 4] Bella in vista, dentro è trista.[fonte 4] Bella ostessa, conti
traditori.[fonte 2] Bella ostessa, brutti conti.[fonte 39] Bell'ostessa, conto
caro.[fonte 40] Bella vigna poca uva.[fonte 2] Bellezza di corpo non è
eredità.[fonte 4] Bellezza e follia vanno spesso in compagnia.[fonte 41] Bello
in fasce brutto in piazza.[fonte 1] Ben sa la botte di qual vino è piena.[fonte
4] Ben si caccia il diavolo, ma Satana ritorna.[fonte 4] Bene per male è
carità, male per bene è crudeltà.[fonte 8] Bene educato, non mentì mai.[fonte
4] Bene perduto è conosciuto.[fonte 4] Beni di fortuna passano come la
luna.[fonte 2] Bevi il vino e lascia andar l'acqua al mulino.[fonte 8] Bisogna
dire pane al pane e vino al vino.[fonte 2] Bisogna far buon viso a cattivo
gioco.[fonte 1] Bisogna fare di necessità virtù.[fonte 2] Bisogna fare il pane
con la farina che si ha.[fonte 4] Bisogna fare la festa quando cade, e prendere
il tempo come viene.[fonte 4] Bisogna fare la festa quando è il santo.[fonte 4]
Bisogna mangiare per vivere e non vivere per mangiare.[fonte 2] Bisogna
prendere gli avvenimenti quando Dio li manda.[fonte 4] Bocca che tace nessuno
l'aiuta.[fonte 2] Bocca che tace mal si può aiutare.[fonte 42] Bocca chiusa ed
occhio aperto non fecero mai male a nessuno.[fonte 4] Botte buona fa buon
vino.[fonte 2] Brutta cosa è il povero superbo e il ricco avaro.[fonte 8]
Brutta di viso ha sotto il paradiso.[fonte 2] Brutto in fasce bello in
piazza.[fonte 1] Buca il marmo fin d'acqua una goccia.[fonte 8] Bue sciolto
lecca per tutto.[fonte 8] Bue fiacco stampa più forte il piede in terra.[fonte
4] Bue vecchio, solco diritto.[fonte 4] Buon fuoco e buon vino, scaldano il mio
camino.[fonte 8] Buon sangue non mente.[fonte 2] Buon tempo e mal tempo non
dura tutto il tempo.[fonte 1] Buon vino e bravura, poco dura.[fonte 8] Buon
vino fa buon sangue.[fonte 1][fonte 8] Buon vino, favola lunga.[fonte 8] Buona fama
presto è perduta.[fonte 4] Buona greppia, buona bestia.[fonte 8] Buona guardia
giova a molte cose.[fonte 4] Buona la forza, migliore l'ingegno.[fonte 4] Buone
parole e pere marce non rompono la testa a nessuno.[fonte 31] Burlando si dice
il vero.[fonte 4] C Cader non può, chi ha la virtù per guida.[fonte 4] Cambiano
i suonatori ma la musica è sempre quella.[fonte 1] Cambiare e migliorare sono
due cose; molto si cambia nel mondo, ma poco si migliora.[fonte 4] Campa
cavallo che l'erba cresce.[fonte 2] Campa, cavallo mio, che l'erba
cresce.[fonte 1] Can che abbaia non morde.[fonte 1] Cane affamato non teme
bastone.[11][fonte 2] Cane e gatta tre ne porta e tre ne allatta.[fonte 8] Cane
non mangia cane.[fonte 43] Cane ringhioso e non forzoso, guai alla sua pelle![fonte
4] Capelli lunghi, cervello corto.[fonte 4] Carta canta e villan dorme.[fonte
1] Casa fatta e vigna posta, non si sa quello che costa.[fonte 44] Casa mia,
casa mia, per piccina che tu sia, tu mi sembri una badia.[fonte 45] Casa mia,
casa mia, benché piccola tu sia, tu mi sembri una badia.[fonte 2] Casa mia,
casa mia, pur piccina che tu sia mi sembri una badia.[fonte 9] Castiga il buono
e si emenderà; castiga il cattivo e peggiorerà.[fonte 4] Cattivo cominciamento,
fine peggiore.[fonte 8] Cavallo da vettura, poco costa e poco dura.[fonte 46]
Cavallo vecchio, tardi muta ambiatura.[fonte 47] Cavolo riscaldato non fu mai
buono.[fonte 2] Cavolo riscaldato, frate sfratato e serva ritornata non furon
mai buoni.[fonte 2] Cento teste, cento cappelli.[fonte 48] Certe macchie ben si
possono grattare ma non togliere.[fonte 4] Cessato il guadagno, cessata
l'amicizia.[fonte 49] Chi a tutti facilmente crede, ingannato si vede.[fonte 4]
Chi accarezza la mula rimedia calci.[fonte 2] Chi accarezza la mula buscherà calci.[fonte
2] Chi accetta l'eredità accetti anche i debiti.[fonte 4] Chi ad altri inganni
tesse, poco bene per sé ordisce.[fonte 4] Chi alza il piede per ogni paglia, si
può rompere facilmente una gamba.[fonte 8] Chi ama me, ama il mio cane.[fonte
50] Chi ara terra bagnata, per tre anni l'ha dissipata.[fonte 51] Chi asino
nasce, asino muore.[fonte 4] Chi balla senza suono, come asino si
ritrova.[fonte 52] Chi ben coltiva il moro, coltiva nel suo campo un gran
tesoro.[fonte 47] Chi ben comincia è a metà dell'opera.[fonte 53] Chi ben
comincia è alla metà dell'opera.[fonte 2] Chi ben comincia è alla metà
dell'opra.[fonte 1] Chi bene semina, bene raccoglie.[fonte 4] Chi beve vin,
campa cent'anni.[fonte 54] Chi beve birra campa cent'anni.[12][fonte 2] Chi
biasima il suo prossimo che è morto, dica il vero, dica il falso, ha sempre
torto.[fonte 4] Chi caccia volentieri trova presto la lepre.[fonte 4] Chi cade
in povertà, perde ogni amico.[fonte 4] Chi cava e non mette, le possessioni si
disfanno.[fonte 55] Chi cavalca o trotta alla china, o non è sua la bestia, o
non la stima.[fonte 8] Chi cento ne fa una ne aspetta.[fonte 1] Chi cerca di
sapere ciò che bolle nella pentola d'altri, ha leccate le sue.[fonte 8] Chi
cerca lealtà e fedeltà nel mondo, non trova che ipocrisia.[fonte 4] Chi cerca,
trova.[13][fonte 2] Chi cerca trova e chi domanda intende.[fonte 2] Chi coglie
acerbo il senno, maturo ha sempre d'ignoranza il frutto.[fonte 8] Chi comincia
in alto, finisce in basso.[fonte 8] Chi compra il superfluo, si prepara a
vendere il necessario.[fonte 56] Chi compra sprezza e chi ha comprato
apprezza.[fonte 2] Chi conserva per l'indomani, conserva per il cane.[fonte 8]
Chi contro Dio getta la pietra, in capo gli torna.[fonte 8] Chi d'estate secca
serpi, nell'inverno mangia anguille.[fonte 4] Chi d'estate vuole stare al
fresco, ci starà anche d'inverno.[fonte 4] Chi da gallina nasce, convien che
razzoli.[fonte 8] Chi da savio operare vuole, pensi al fine.[fonte 4] Chi dà
ghiande non può riavere confetti.[fonte 4] Chi di gallina nasce convien che
razzoli.[fonte 2] Chi dal lotto spera soccorso, mette il pelo come un
orso.[fonte 8] Chi dà per ricevere, non dà nulla.[fonte 8] Chi del vino è
amico, di se stesso è nemico.[fonte 8] Chi di spada ferisce di spada
perisce.[14][fonte 1] Chi di speranza vive disperato muore.[fonte 1] Chi di una
donna brutta s'innamora, lieto con essa invecchia e l'ama ancora.[fonte 8] Chi
di coltel ferisce, di coltel perisce.[fonte 4] Chi di spirito e di talenti è
pieno domina su quelli che ne hanno meno.[fonte 4] Chi dice A arrivi fino alla
Z.[fonte 4] Chi dice A deve dire anche B.[fonte 4] Chi dice donna dice
danno.[fonte 1] Chi dice donna dice guai, chi dice uomo peggio che mai.[fonte
8] Chi dice male, l'indovina quasi sempre.[fonte 4] Chi dice quel che vuole
sente quel che non vorrebbe.[fonte 1] Chi disprezza compra.[fonte 1] Chi
disprezza vuol comprare e chi loda vuol lasciare.[fonte 2] Chi domanda ciò che
non dovrebbe, ode quel che non vorrebbe.[fonte 2] Chi domanda non erra.[fonte
2] Chi domanda non fa errore.[fonte 57] Chi dopo la polenta beve acqua, alza la
gamba e la polenta scappa.[fonte 8] Chi dorme d'agosto dorme a suo costo.[fonte
2] Chi dorme non piglia pesci.[15][fonte 1] Chi è causa del suo mal pianga se
stesso.[16][fonte 1] Chi è bugiardo è ladro.[fonte 4] Chi è destinato alla
forca non annega.[fonte 58] Chi è generoso con la bocca, è avaro col
sacco.[fonte 4] Chi è in difetto è in sospetto.[fonte 1] Chi è mandato dai
farisei è ingannato dai farisei.[fonte 4] Chi è morso dalla serpe, teme la lucertola.[fonte
8] Chi non è savio, paziente e forte si lamenti di sé, non della sorte.[fonte
8] Chi è schiavo delle ambizioni ha mille padroni.[fonte 4] Chi è stato trovato
una volta in frode, si presume vi sia sempre.[fonte 4] Chi è svelto a mangiare è
svelto a lavorare.[fonte 1] Chi è tosato da un usuraio, non mette più
pelo.[fonte 8] Chi è uso all'impiccare, non teme la forca.[fonte 4] Chi fa da
sé fa per tre.[17][fonte 1] Chi fa come il prete dice, va in Paradiso: ma chi
fa come il prete fa, a casa del diavolo se ne va.[18] Chi fa del bene agli
ingrati, Dio lo considera per male.[fonte 4] Chi fa il male odia la luce.[fonte
4] Chi fa l'altrui mestiere, fa la zuppa nel paniere.[fonte 59] Chi fa la
legge, deve conservarla.[fonte 4] Chi fa una legge, deve anche preoccuparsi che
sia eseguita.[fonte 4] Chi fa le fave senza concime le raccoglie senza
baccelli.[fonte 2] Chi fa falla e chi non fa sfarfalla.[fonte 1] Chi fa
un'ingiustizia, la dimentica; chi la riceve, se ne ricorda.[fonte 4] Chi fosse
indovino, sarebbe ricco.[fonte 4] Chi fugge il giudizio, si condanna.[fonte 4]
Chi fugge un matto, ha fatto buona giornata.[fonte 8] Chi getta un seme lo deve
coltivare, se vuol vederlo con il tempo germogliare.[fonte 60] Chi gioca al
lotto, è un gran merlotto.[fonte 8] Chi gioca al lotto, in rovina va di
botto.[fonte 8] Chi gioca al lotto, in rovina va di trotto.[fonte 8] Chi ha
avuto ha avuto e chi ha dato ha dato.[fonte 16]. Chi ha avuto il beneficio, se
lo dimentica.[fonte 4] Chi ha da far con un incostante, tien l'anguilla per la
coda.[fonte 4] Chi ha denti non ha pane e chi ha pane non ha denti.[fonte 1]
Chi ha farina non ha la sacca.[fonte 1] Chi ha fatto ingiuria ad altri, da
altri convien che la sopporti.[fonte 4] Chi ha il capo di cera, non vada al
sole.[fonte 61] Chi ha imbarcato il diavolo, deve stare in sua compagnia.[fonte
4] Chi ha ingegno, lo mostri.[fonte 62] Chi ha per letto la terra, deve
coprirsi col cielo.[fonte 8] Chi ha polvere spara.[fonte 1] Chi ha portato la
tonaca puzza sempre di frate.[fonte 2] Chi ha prete, o parente in corte,
fontana gli risorge.[fonte 63] Chi ha tempo, ha vita.[fonte 64] Chi ha tempo
non aspetti tempo.[fonte 1] Chi ha terra, ha guerra.[fonte 56] Chi ha tutto il
suo in un loco l'ha nel fuoco.[fonte 2] Chi ha un mestiere in mano, dappertutto
trova pane.[fonte 4] Chi il vasto mare intrepido ha solcato, talvolta in piccol
rio muore annegato.[fonte 65] Chi la dura la vince.[fonte 1] Chi la fa
l'aspetti.[fonte 1] Chi lascia la via vecchia per la nuova sa quel che lascia
ma non sa quel che trova.[fonte 1] Chi lascia la via vecchia per la nuova
peggio si trova.[fonte 16] Chi lavora con diligenza, prega due volte.[fonte 4]
Chi lavora, Dio gli dona.[fonte 4] Chi mal semina mal raccoglie.[fonte 1] Chi
male una volta si marita, ne risente tutta la vita.[fonte 4] Chi male vive,
male muore.[fonte 2] Chi maltratta le bestie, non la fa mai bene.[fonte 8] Chi
mangia sempre pan bianco, spesso desidera il nero.[fonte 8] Chi mangia sempre
torta se ne sazia.[fonte 8] Chi mena per primo mena due volte.[fonte 1] Chi
molto parla, spesso falla.[fonte 66] Chi mordere non può non mostri i
denti.[fonte 40] Chi muore giace e chi vive si dà pace.[fonte 1] Chi nasce
afflitto muore sconsolato.[fonte 1] Chi nasce è bello, chi si sposa è buono e
chi muore è santo.[fonte 1] Chi nasce matto non guarisce mai.[fonte 8] Chi
nasce tondo non può morir quadrato.[fonte 57] Chi non ama le bestie, non ama i
cristiani.[fonte 8] Chi non apre la bocca, non le piove dentro.[fonte 4] Chi
non beve in compagnia o è un ladro o è una spia.[fonte 1] Chi non caccia non
prende.[fonte 4] Chi non comincia non finisce.[fonte 1] Chi non crede di esser
matto, è matto davvero.[fonte 8] Chi non crede in Dio, non crede nel
diavolo.[fonte 67] Chi non dà a Cristo, dà al fisco.[fonte 8] Chi non è con me
è contro di me.[fonte 2] Chi non è volpe, dal lupo si guardi, perché ne sarà
preda presto o tardi.[fonte 4] Chi non fu buon soldato, non sarà buon
capitano.[fonte 68] Chi non ha fede, non ne può dare.[fonte 8] Chi non ha il
gatto mantiene i topi e chi ce l'ha li mantiene tutti e due.[fonte 8] Chi non
ha imparato a ubbidire, non saprà mai comandare.[fonte 8] Chi non ha testa
abbia gambe.[fonte 57] Chi non lavora non mangia.[fonte 2] Chi non mangia ha
già mangiato.[fonte 2] Chi non muore si rivede.[fonte 2] Chi non naufragò in
mare, può naufragare in porto.[fonte 8] Chi non può bastonare il cavallo,
bastona la sella.[fonte 4] Chi non risica, non rosica.[fonte 1] Chi non sa
adulare non sa regnare.[fonte 4] Chi non sa fare non sa comandare.[fonte 68] Chi
non sa leggere la sua scrittura è asino di natura.[fonte 69] Chi non sa niente
non è buono a niente.[fonte 4] Chi non sa tacere non sa parlare.[fonte 2] Chi
non sa ubbidire, non sa comandare.[fonte 68] Chi non segue il consiglio dei
genitori, tardi se ne pente.[fonte 4] Chi non semina non raccoglie.[fonte 2]
Chi non si innamora da giovane, si innamora da vecchio.[fonte 8] Chi non trovò
ombra nell'estate, la troverà nell'inverno.[fonte 4] Chi non vuol essere
consigliato, non può essere aiutato.[fonte 4] Chi parla due lingue è doppio
uomo.[fonte 70] Chi pecca in segreto fa la penitenza pubblica.[fonte 8] Chi
pecora si fa, il lupo se la mangia.[fonte 1] Chi per grazia prega, non ha mai
bene.[fonte 4] Chi perde ha sempre torto.[fonte 1] Chi perdona senza dimenticare,
non perdona che metà.[fonte 4] Chi pesca con l'amo d'oro, qualcosa piglia
sempr e.[fonte 8] Chi piglia leone in assenza, teme la talpa in
presenza.[fonte 8] Chi più ha più vuole.[fonte 1] Chi più ha più ne
vorrebbe.[fonte 2] Chi più lavora, meno mangia.[fonte 4] Chi più ne fa è fatto
papa.[fonte 4] Chi più ne ha più ne metta.[fonte 2] Chi più sa meno
crede.[fonte 1] Chi più spende meno spende.[fonte 2] Chi poco sa presto
parla.[fonte 2] Chi porta fiori, porta amore.[fonte 8] Chi predica al deserto,
perde il sermone.[fonte 71] Chi prende l'anguilla per la coda, può dire di non
tenere nulla.[fonte 4] Chi prima arriva meglio alloggia.[fonte 2] Chi prima
nasce prima pasce.[fonte 1] Chi prima non pensa dopo sospira.[fonte 2] Chi
rende male per bene, non vedrà mai partire da casa sua la sciagura.[fonte 8]
Chi ricorda un beneficio, lo rinfaccia.[fonte 4] Chi ride il venerdì piange la
domenica.[fonte 1] Chi rimane in umile stato, non ha da temer caduta.[fonte 8]
Chi ringrazia non vuol obblighi.[fonte 8] Chi ringrazia per una spiga, riceve
una manna.[fonte 8] Chi Roma non vede, nulla crede.[fonte 8] Chi ruba poco,
ruba assai.[fonte 72] Chi rompe paga e i cocci sono suoi.[fonte 1] Chi ruba un
regno è un ladro glorificato, e chi un fazzoletto, un ladro castigato.[fonte 4]
Chi ruba una volta è sempre ladro.[fonte 4] Chi s'accapiglia si piglia.[19] Chi
s'aiuta Iddio l'aiuta.[fonte 1] Chi sa fa e chi non sa insegna.[fonte 1] Chi sa
fare fa e chi non sa fare insegna.[20] Chi sa il gioco non l'insegni.[fonte 1]
Chi sa il trucco non l'insegni.[fonte 1] Chi sa senza Cristo non sa
nulla.[fonte 8] Chi scopre il segreto perde la fede.[fonte 1] Chi semina buon
grano avrà buon pane; chi semina lupino non avrà né pan né vino.[fonte 2] Chi
semina con l'acqua raccoglie col paniere.[fonte 2] Chi semina raccoglie.[fonte
2] Chi semina vento raccoglie tempesta.[21][22][fonte 1] Chi serba serba al
gatto.[fonte 1] Chi si contenta gode.[fonte 1] Chi si diletta di frodare gli
altri, non si deve lamentare se gli altri lo ingannano.[fonte 4] Chi si fa i
fatti suoi campa cent'anni.[fonte 57] Chi si fa un idolo del suo interesse, si
fa un martire della sua integrità.[fonte 73] Chi si fida nel lotto, non mangia
di cotto.[fonte 8] Chi si fida di greco, non ha il cervel seco.[fonte 74] Chi
si guarda dal calcio della mosca, gli tocca quello del cavallo.[fonte 4] Chi si
immagina di essere più di quello che è, si guardi nello specchio.[fonte 4] Chi
si loda si sbroda.[fonte 4] Chi si prende d'amore, si lascia di rabbia.[fonte
8] Chi si scusa si accusa.[fonte 1] Chi si somiglia si piglia.[fonte 2] Chi si
sposa in fretta, stenta adagio.[fonte 75] Chi si umilia sarà esaltato, chi si
esalta sarà umiliato.[fonte 8] Chi si vanta da solo non vale un fagiolo.[fonte
2] Chi si vanta del delitto è due volte delinquente.[fonte 4] Chi siede in
basso, siede bene.[fonte 8] Chi sta tra due selle si trova col culo in
terra.[fonte 2] Chi tace acconsente.[fonte 1][23] Chi tace davanti alla forza,
perde il suo diritto.[fonte 4] Chi tanto e chi niente.[fonte 1] Chi troppo e chi
niente.[fonte 1] Chi tardi arriva male alloggia.[fonte 1] Chi ti dà un osso non
ti vorrebbe morto.[fonte 4] Chi ti vuol male, ti liscia il pelo.[fonte 8] Chi
tiene il letame nel suo letamaio, fa triste il suo pagliaio.[fonte 8] Chi tiene
la scala non è meno reo del ladro.[fonte 76] Chi troppo comincia, poco
finisce.[fonte 77] Chi troppo vuole nulla stringe.[24][fonte 1] Chi trova un
amico trova un tesoro.[fonte 1] Chi uccide i gatti fa male i suoi fatti.[fonte
38] Chi va a caccia non deve lasciare a casa il fucile.[fonte 4] Chi va a Roma
perde la poltrona.[fonte 2] Chi va all'acqua d'agosto, non beve o non vuol bere
il mosto.[fonte 8] Chi va all'osto, perde il posto.[fonte 78] Chi va al mulino
s'infarina.[fonte 1] Chi va con lo zoppo, impara a zoppicare.[fonte 79] Chi va
piano va sano e va lontano. Chi va forte va alla morte.[25][fonte 80] Chi ha
più fretta, più tardi finisce.[fonte 4] Chi fa in fretta fa due volte.[fonte 4]
Chi pesca e ha fretta, spesse volte prende dei granchi.[fonte 4] Chi va via perde
il posto all'osteria.[fonte 81] Chi vanta se stesso e abbassa gli altri, gli
altri abbasseranno lui.[fonte 4] Chi vende a credenza spaccia assai: perde gli
amici e i quattrin non ha mai.[26][fonte 2] Chi dà a credito spaccia assai
perde gli amici e danar non ha mai.[fonte 2] Chi va alla festa e non è
invitato, ben gli sta se ne è scacciato.[fonte 4] Chi vien di raro, gli si fa
festa.[fonte 8] Chi vince ha sempre ragione.[fonte 82] Chi vive in libertà non
tenti il fato.[fonte 4] Chi vive sei giorni nell'oasi, il settimo anela il
deserto.[fonte 8] Chi vivrà vedrà.[fonte 2] Chi vuol d'avena un granaio la
semini di febbraio.[fonte 2] Chi vuol dell'acqua chiara vada alla fonte.[fonte
4] Chi vuol udir novelle, dal barbier si dicon belle.[fonte 8] Chi vuol esser libero,
non metta il collo sotto il giogo.[fonte 8] Chi vuol essere pagato, non
dev'essere ringraziato.[fonte 8] Chi vuol guarire deve soffrire.[fonte 4] Chi
vuol impetrare, la vergogna ha da levare.[fonte 83] Chi vuol lavoro degno assai
ferro e poco legno.[fonte 2] Chi vuol pane, meni letame.[fonte 84] Chi vuol
presto impoverire, chieda prestito all'usuraio.[fonte 8] Chi vuol provar le
pene dell'inferno, la stia in Puglia e all'Aquila d'inverno.[fonte 8] Chi vuol
saper cos'è l'inferno faccia il cuoco d'estate e il carrettiere
d'inverno.[fonte 8] Chi vuol un bel pagliaio lo pianti di febbraio.[fonte 8]
Chi vuol vedere Pisa vada a Genova.[fonte 85] Chi vuole arricchire in un anno,
è impiccato in sei mesi.[fonte 4] Chi vuole assai, non domandi poco.[fonte 86]
Chi vuole essere amato, divenga amabile.[fonte 9] Chi vuole essere sicuro della
sua farina, deve portare egli stesso il sacco al mulino.[fonte 4] Chi vuole i
santi se li preghi.[fonte 1] Chi vuole la figlia accarezzi la madre.[fonte 4]
Chi vuole vada e chi non vuole mandi.[fonte 1] Chiara notte di capodanno, dà
slancio a un buon anno.[fonte 8] Chiodo scaccia chiodo.[fonte 2] Chiodo
schiaccia chiodo.[fonte 9] Chitarra e schioppo fanno andare la casa a
galoppo.[fonte 8] Ci vuole altro che un'accozzaglia di gente per fare un
esercito.[fonte 4] Ci vuole ingegno per governare i pazzi.[fonte 4] Ciascuno è
artefice della sua fortuna.[fonte 2][27] Ciascuno è artefice della propria
fortuna.[fonte 2] Ciascuno porta il suo ingegno al mercato.[fonte 4] Cielo a
pecorelle acqua a catinelle.[fonte 1] Ciò che è male per uno, è bene per un
altro.[fonte 4] Ciò che lo stolto fa in fine, il savio fa in principio.[fonte
87] Ciò che non si può cambiare bisogna saperlo sopportare.[fonte 4] Col fuoco
non si scherza.[fonte 1] Col latino, con un ronzino e con un fiorino si gira il
mondo.[fonte 4] Col nulla non si fa nulla.[fonte 1] Col pane tutti i guai sono
dolci.[fonte 1] Col tempo e con la paglia maturano le nespole.[28][fonte 2] Col
tempo e con la paglia maturano le sorbe e la canaglia.[fonte 2] Colla sola
lealtà, non si pagano i merletti della cuffia.[fonte 4] Come farai, così
avrai.[fonte 4] Come i piedi portano il corpo, così la benevolenza porta
l'anima.[fonte 4] Comincia, che Dio provvede al resto.[fonte 4] Compar di
Puglia, l'un tiene e l'altro spoglia.[fonte 8] Comun servizio ingratitudine
rende.[fonte 8] Con arte e con ingegno, si acquista mezzo regno; e con ingegno
ed arte, si acquista l'altra parte.[fonte 4] Con gli anni crescono gli
affanni.[fonte 8] Con i matti non ci son patti.[fonte 8] Con l'inchiostro, una
mano può innalzare un furfante ed abbassare un galantuomo.[fonte 8] Con la
pazienza la foglia di gelso diventa seta.[fonte 88] Con la pietra si prova
l'oro, con l'oro la donna e con la donna l'uomo.[fonte 8] Con la più alta
libertà, abita la più bassa servitù.[fonte 4] Con le buone maniere si ottiene
tutto.[fonte 89] Con un bicchier di vino si fa un amico.[fonte 8] Con un occhio
si frigge il pesce e con l'altro si guarda il gatto.[fonte 8] Conchiuder lega è
facile, difficile il mantenerla.[fonte 4] Confidenza toglie riverenza.[fonte 4]
Conserva le monete bianche per le giornate nere.[fonte 8] Contadini, scarpe
grosse e cervelli fini.[fonte 1] Contano più i fatti che le parole.[fonte 90]
Contro due donne neanche il diavolo può metterci il becco.[fonte 8] Contro due
non la potrebbe Orlando.[fonte 91] Contro la forza la ragion non vale.[fonte 1]
Contro la nebbia forza no vale.[fonte 4] Coricarsi presto, alzarsi presto,
danno salute, ricchezza e sapienza.[fonte 8] Corpo satollo anima
consolata.[fonte 1] Corpo sazio non crede a digiuno.[fonte 1] Cortesia
schietta, domanda non aspetta.[fonte 92] Corre un pezzo la lepre, un pezzo il
cane; così s'alternano le vicende umane.[fonte 8] Cosa fatta capo ha.[29][fonte
2] Cosa di rado veduta, più cara è tenuta.[fonte 8] Cosa rara, cosa cara.[fonte
8] Cucina grassa, magra eredità.[fonte 4] Cuor contento gran talento.[fonte 93]
Cuor contento il ciel l'aiuta.[fonte 94] Cuor contento il ciel lo guarda.[fonte
2] Cuor contento non sente stento.[fonte 2] D D'aprile ogni goccia val mille
lire.[fonte 2] D'aquila non nasce colomba.[fonte 4] Da colpa nasce colpa.[fonte
4] Da cosa nasce cosa.[fonte 95] Da falsa lingua, cattiva arringa.[fonte 8] Da
Lodi, tutti passan volentieri.[fonte 8] Da un disordine nasce un ordine.[fonte
8] Dagli amici mi guardi Iddio che dai nemici mi guardo io.[fonte 2] Dàgli,
dàgli, le cipolle diventano agli.[fonte 96] Riferito alle insidie che l'amore
riserva alle virtù delle fanciulle. Dai giudici siciliani, vacci coi polli nelle
mani.[fonte 8] Dall'asino non cercar lana.[fonte 4] Dall'opera si conosce il
maestro.[fonte 4] Dall'immagine si conosce il pittore.[fonte 4] Dalla mano si
riconosce l'artista.[fonte 4] Dal canto si conosce l'uccello.[fonte 4] Dal
passato è facile predire il futuro.[fonte 4] Dalla casa si conosce il
padrone.[fonte 4] Danaro e santità, metà della metà.[fonte 8] Denari e santità
metà della metà.[fonte 97] Date a Cesare quel che è di Cesare.[30][fonte 2]
Davanti al cameriere non vi è Eccellenza.[fonte 4] Davanti l'abisso e dietro i
denti di un lupo.[fonte 4] Debole catena muover può gran peso.[fonte 8] Dei
vizi è regina l'avarizia.[fonte 98] Del senno di poi son piene le fosse.[fonte
1] Delle calende non me ne curo purché a san Paolo non faccia scuro.[31][fonte
2] Detto senza fatto, ad ognuno pare un misfatto.[fonte 4] Di buone intenzioni
è lastricato l'inferno.[fonte 99] Di chi è l'asino, lo pigli per la coda.[fonte
4] Di dolore non si muore, ma d'allegrezza sì.[fonte 8] Di maggio si dorme per
assaggio.[32][fonte 2] Di malerba non si fa buon fieno.[fonte 4] Di notte si
ritirano i galantuomini ed escono i birbanti.[fonte 8] Di quello che non ti
interessa, non dire né bene né male.[fonte 4] Di tutte le arti maestro è
l'amore.[fonte 8] Dice la serpe: non mi toccar che non ti tocco.[fonte 8]
Dicembre favaio.[fonte 16] Dicono che è mercante anche chi perde, ma questo
presto ridurrassi al verde.[fonte 100] Dieci ne pensa il topo e cento il
gatto.[fonte 101] Dietro il monte c'è la china.[fonte 2] Dietro il riso viene
il pianto.[fonte 8] Dimmi con chi vai, e ti dirò che fai.[fonte 73] Dimmi con
chi vai, e ti dirò chi sei.[fonte 102] Dio aiuti il povero, perché il ricco può
aiutar se stesso.[fonte 8] Dio dà la piaga e dà anche la medicina.[fonte 4] Dio
guarisce e il medico è ringraziato.[fonte 4] Dio li fa e poi li accoppia.[fonte
1] Dio manda il freddo secondo i panni.[fonte 1] Dio mi guardi da chi studia un
libro solo.[fonte 4] Dio misura il vento all'agnello tosato.[fonte 4] Dio vede
e provvede.[fonte 2] Disse la volpe ai figli: "Quando a tordi, quando a
grilli".[fonte 4] Dolore comunicato è subito scemato.[fonte 4] Domandando
si va a Roma.[fonte 2] Domandare è lecito, rispondere è cortesia.[fonte 2]
Donna al volante, pericolo costante.[fonte 103] Donna adorna, tardi esce e
tardi torna.[fonte 8] Donna baffuta sempre piaciuta.[fonte 2] Donna barbuta,
sempre piaciuta.[fonte 103] Donna barbuta coi sassi si saluta.[fonte 2] Donna
bianca, poco gli manca.[fonte 8] Donna rossa coscia grossa.[fonte 8] Donna che
canti dolcemente in scena, pei giovani inesperti è una sirena.[fonte 8] Donna
che dona, di rado è buona.[fonte 8] Donna che piange, ovver che dolce canti,
son due diversi, ambo possenti incanti.[fonte 8] Donna che sa il latino è rara
cosa, ma guardati dal prenderla in isposa.[fonte 8] Donna e fuoco, toccali
poco.[fonte 8] Donne e motori gioie e dolori.[fonte 104] Donna e vino ubriaca
il grande e il piccolino.[fonte 8] Donna giovane e uomo anziano possono
riempire la casa di figli.[fonte 8] Donna io conosco, ch'è una santa a messa e
che in casa è un'orribil diavolessa.[fonte 8] Donna nana tutta tana.[fonte 2]
Donna nobil per natura è un tesor cheonna savia e bella è preziosa ancsempre
dura.[fonte 8] Donna pelosa, donna virtuosa.[fonte 2] Donna pregata nega,
trascurata prega.[fonte 8] Donna prudente, gioia eccellente.[fonte 8] Dhe in
gonnella.[fonte 8] Donna si lagna, donna si duole, donna s'ammala quando lo
vuole.[fonte 8] Donne e sardine, son buone piccoline.[fonte 8] Donne, danno,
fanno gli uomini e li disfanno.[fonte 8] Dopo desinare non camminare; dopo
cena, con dolce lena.[fonte 4] Dopo e poi son parenti del mai.[fonte 2] Dopo il
dolce vien l'amaro.[fonte 8] Dopo il fatto il consiglio non vale.[fonte 4] Dopo
il fatto viene troppo tardi il pentimento.[fonte 4] Dopo il giorno vien la
notte.[fonte 8] Dopo la grazia di Dio, la miglior cosa è la libertà.[fonte 8]
Dopo la tempesta, il sole.[fonte 8] Dopo le fosche nuvole il sol splende più
fulgido.[fonte 8] Dopo vendemmia, imbuto.[fonte 105] Non bisogna lasciarsi
sfuggire le occasioni favorevoli, chi ha tempo non aspetti tempo. Dove c'è
l'amore, la gamba trascina il piede.[fonte 8] Dove è castigo è disciplina, dove
è pace è gioia.[fonte 4] Dove entra la fortuna, esce l'umiltà.[fonte 8] Dove
l'accidia attecchisce ogni cosa deperisce.[fonte 4] Dove la fedeltà mette le
radici, Dio fa crescere un albero.[fonte 4] Dove non c'è amore, non c'è
umanità.[fonte 8] Dove non c'è fieno, i cavalli mangiano paglia.[fonte 8] Dove
non c'è ordine, c'è disordine.[fonte 8] Dove non si crede né all'inferno né al
paradiso, il diavolo intasca tutte le entrate.[fonte 8] Dove non vi è
educazione, non vi è onore.[fonte 4] Dove non vi sono capelli, male si
pettina.[fonte 4] Dove può il vino non può il silenzio.[fonte 8] Dove regna
Bacco e Amore, Minerva non si lascia vedere.[fonte 4] Dove regna il vino, non
regna il silenzio.[fonte 8] Dove son carogne son corvi.[fonte 8] Dove sono i
pulcini, ivi è l'occhio della chioccia.[fonte 8] Dove vola il cuore, striscia
la ragione.[fonte 8] Due cani che un solo osso hanno, difficilmente in pace
stanno.[fonte 4] Due noci in un sacco e due donne in casa fanno un bel
fracasso.[fonte 8] Due polente insieme non furon mai viste.[fonte 8] Dura più
un carro rotto che uno nuovo.[fonte 4] Duro con duro non fa buon muro.[fonte 106]
E È cattivo sparviero quel che non torna al richiamo.[fonte 8] È difficile far
diventare bianco un moro.[fonte 4] È difficile guardarsi dai ladri di
casa.[fonte 4] È difficile piegare un albero vecchio.[fonte 4] È difficile
zoppicare bene davanti allo sciancato.[fonte 8] È facile lamentarsi quando c'è
chi ascolta.[fonte 8] È impossibile come cavalcare un raggio di sole.[fonte 4]
È impossibile volare senza ali.[fonte 4] È inutile piangere sul latte
versato.[fonte 98] [truismo] È l'acqua che fa l'orto.[fonte 98] L'acqua fa
l'orto.[fonte 98] È la donna che fa l'uomo.[fonte 57] È lieve astuzia ingannar
gelosia, che tutto crede quando è in frenesia.[fonte 4] È meglio avere la cura
di un sacco di pulci che una donna.[fonte 4] È meglio contentarsi che
lamentarsi.[fonte 8] È meglio correggere i propri difetti, che riprendere
quelli degli altri.[fonte 4] È meglio esser digiuno fuori, che satollo in
prigione.[fonte 8] È meglio essere testa d'anguilla che coda di storione.[fonte
8] È meglio essere uccel di bosco, che uccel di gabbia.[fonte 8] È meglio
essere umile a cavallo, che orgoglioso a piedi.[fonte 8] È meglio gelare nella
nuda cameretta della verità, che crogiolarsi nella pelliccia della
menzogna.[fonte 4] È meglio mangiarsi l'eredità, che conservarla per il convento.[fonte
4] È meglio meritar la lode che ottenerla.[fonte 4] È meglio sentir cantare
l'usignolo, che rodere il topo.[fonte 8] È meglio testa di lucertola che coda
di drago.[fonte 8] È meglio un esercito di cervi sotto il comando di un leone,
che un esercito di leoni sotto il comando di un cervo.[fonte 4] È meglio un
leone che mille mosche.[fonte 8] È più facile biasimare, che migliorare.[fonte
4] È più facile lagnarsi, che rimuovere gl'impedimenti.[fonte 8] È più facile
prevenire una malattia che guarirla.[fonte 8] È più facile trovar dolce
l'assenzio, che in mezzo a poche donne il silenzio.[fonte 8] È un bel predicare
il digiuno a corpo pieno.[fonte 4] È una bella risposta quella che si attaglia
ad ogni domanda.[fonte 8] Ebrei e rigattieri, spendono poco e gabbano
volentieri.[fonte 4] Ecco il rimedio per l'ipocondria: mangiare e bere in buona
compagnia.[fonte 8] Errare è umano, perseverare è diabolico.[fonte 107] Errare
è umano, perseverare diabolico.[fonte 2] Sbagliare è umano, perseverare è
diabolico.[fonte 108] Errore non è inganno.[fonte 4] Errore non paga
debito.[fonte 4] Errore riconosciuto conduce alla verità.[fonte 4] Esser dotto
poco vale, quando gli altri non lo sanno.[fonte 8] Èssere più torbo che non è
l'acqua dei maccheroni.[fonte 8] F Fa quel che il prete dice, non quel che il
prete fa.[fonte 1] Fa quello che fanno gli altri, e nessuno si farà beffe di
te.[fonte 4] Faccia bella, anima bella.[fonte 4] Facile è criticare, difficile
è l'arte.[33][fonte 109] Fare debiti non è vergogna, ma pagarli è questione
d'onore.[fonte 4] Fare e disfare, è tutto un lavorare.[fonte 110] Fare l'amore
fa bene all'amore.[fonte 111] Fate del bene al villano, dirà che gli fate del
male.[fonte 8] Fatta la legge trovato l'inganno.[34][fonte 1] Fatti asino e
tutti ti metteranno la soma.[fonte 4] Fatti di miele e ti mangieranno le
mosche.[fonte 4] Fatti le ali e poi vola.[fonte 4] Febbraio, febbraietto mese
corto e maledetto.[35][fonte 2] Felice non è, chi d'esserlo non sa.[fonte 64]
Femmine e galline, se giran troppo si perdono.[fonte 8] Ferita d'amore non
uccide.[fonte 8] Finché c'è vita c'è speranza.[fonte 1] Fino alla morte non si
sa qual è la sorte.[fonte 8] Fidarsi è bene, non fidarsi è meglio.[fonte 1]
Fidati dell'arte, ma non dell'artigiano.[fonte 4] Fino alla bara sempre
s'impara.[fonte 112] Fortezza che parlamenta, è prossima ad arrendersi.[fonte
4] Fortuna cieca, i suoi acceca.[fonte 4] Fortuna instupidisce colui ch'ella
favorisce.[fonte 4] Fortunato al gioco, sfortunato in amore.[fonte 4] Fra
Modesto non fu mai priore.[fonte 8] Fra sepolto tesoro e occulta scienza, non
vi conosco alcuna differenza.[fonte 8] Fra un usuraio e un assassino poco ci
corre.[fonte 8] Frutto precoce facilmente si guasta.[fonte 8] Fuggire l'acqua
sotto la grondaia.[fonte 4] Funghi e poeti: per uno buono dieci cattivi.[fonte
8] G Gallina che non razzola ha già razzolato.[fonte 113] Gallina vecchia fa
buon brodo.[fonte 114] Gallo senza cresta è un cappone, uomo senza barba è un
minchione.[fonte 4] Gatta inguantata non prese mai topo.[fonte 8] Gattini
sventati, fanno gatti posati.[fonte 115] Gatto e donna in casa, cane e uomo
fuori.[fonte 38] Gatto rinchiuso diventa leone.[fonte 8] Gatto scottato
dall'acqua calda, ha paura della fredda.[fonte 4] Gelosia non mette ruga.[fonte
4] Gioco di mano gioco di villano.[fonte 1] Gioia e sciagura sempre non
dura.[fonte 8] Giovani di buon cuore, indoli buone, crescono cattivi per poca
educazione.[fonte 4] Giugno la falce in pugno.[36][fonte 2] Gli abiti e gli
uomini presto invecchiano.[fonte 4] Gli abiti e i costumi sono mutabili.[fonte
4] Gli abiti sono freddi, ma ricevono il calore da chi li porta.[fonte 4] Gli
amori nuovi fanno dimenticare i vecchi.[fonte 4] Gli eredi dell'avaro sono
onnipotenti, perché possono risuscitare i morti.[fonte 4] Gli eretici rubano la
parola di Dio.[fonte 4] Gli errori degli altri sono i nostri migliori
maestri.[fonte 4] Gli errori non si conoscono finché non siano commessi.[fonte
4] Gli errori si pagano.[fonte 8] Gli estremi si toccano.[fonte 4] Gli idoli
separano papa e imperatore.[fonte 4] Gli occhi s'hanno a toccare con le
gomita.[fonte 91] Gli stolti fanno le feste e gli accorti se le godono.[fonte
116] Gli uccelli dalle stesse piume devono stare nello stesso nido.[fonte 8]
Gli uomini onesti non temono né la luce, né il buio.[fonte 8] Gobba a ponente
luna crescente, gobba a levante luna calante.[fonte 2] Gola degli adulatori,
sepolcro aperto.[fonte 117] Gotta inossota, mai fi sanata.[fonte 118] Gran
giustizia, grande offesa.[fonte 4] Grande amore, gran dolore.[fonte 8] Greco in
mare, Greco in tavola, Greco non aver a far seco.[fonte 74] Gru e donne fan
volentieri il nido in alto.[fonte 8] Guardalo, figlia, guardalo tutto, l'uomo
senza denari com'è brutto.[fonte 4] Guardare e non toccare è una cosa da
imparare.[fonte 2] Guardati da chi accende il fuoco e grida poi contro le
fiamme.[fonte 4] Guardati da cane rabbioso e da uomo sospettoso.[fonte 8]
Guardati da chi giura in coscienza.[fonte 8] Guardati da chi non ha cura della
sua reputazione.[fonte 8] Guardati da chi ride e guarda da un'altra
parte.[fonte 8] Guardati da tre cose: da cavallo focoso, da uomo infido e da
donna svergognata.[fonte 8] Guardati da tutte quelle cose che possono nuocere
all'anima e al corpo.[fonte 8] Guardati dai fanciulli che ascoltano: anche i
piccoli vasi hanno orecchie.[fonte 8] Guardati dai matti, dagli ubriachi, dagli
ipocriti e dai minchioni.[fonte 8] Guardati dai tumulti, e non sarai né
testimonio né parte.[fonte 8] Guardati dal diffamare, perché le prove sono
difficili.[fonte 8] Guardati dal vecchio turco e dal giovane serbo.[fonte 119]
Guardati dall'ipocrisia, perché è una cattiva malattia.[fonte 8] Guardati dalla
primavera di gennaio.[fonte 8] Guardati in tua vita di non dare a niun
smentita.[fonte 8] Guerra, peste e carestia, vanno sempre in compagnia.[fonte
120] H Ha cento volte un uomo flemma e giudizio, alla centuna corre al
precipizio.[fonte 65] Ha bel mentir chi vien da lontano.[fonte 76] Ha la
giustizia in mano bilancia e spada, perché il giusto s'innalza e l'empio
cada.[fonte 4] Ha più il ricco in un angolo, che il povero in tutta la
casa.[fonte 8] Ha un buon sapore l'odore del guadagno.[fonte 4] Ha un coraggio
da leone, quello che non fa violenza ai deboli.[fonte 8] Ho veduto assai volte
un piccol male non rispettato, divenir mortale.[fonte 65] I I baci sono come le
ciliegie: uno tira l'altro.[fonte 2] I cani abbaiano come sono nutriti.[fonte
4] I capponi sono buoni in tutte le stagioni.[fonte 8] I cattivi esempi si
imitano facilmente, meno i buoni.[fonte 4] I debiti sono gli eredi più prossimi.[fonte
4] I denari del lotto se ne van di galoppo.[fonte 8] I denari servono al povero
di beneficio, ed all'avaro di gran supplizio.[fonte 4] I desideri non riempiono
il sacco.[fonte 4] I docili non hanno bisogno della verga.[fonte 8] I doni dei
nemici sono pericolosi.[fonte 4] I fanciulli diventano uomini e le ragazze
spose.[fonte 4] I fanciulli e gli ubriachi cadono nelle mani di Dio.[fonte 4] I
figli dei gatti mangiano i topi.[fonte 8] I figli sono la ricchezza dei
poveri.[fonte 18] I figli sono pezzi di cuore.[fonte 2] I fiori tanto profumano
per i poveri come per i ricchi.[fonte 8] I frati non s'inchinano all'abate, ma
al mazzo delle sue chiavi.[fonte 4] I gamberi son buoni nei mesi della
erre.[fonte 8] I gatti e i veri uomini cadono sempre in piedi.[fonte 121] I
genii si incontrano.[fonte 4] I genitori amano i figli, più che i figli i
genitori.[fonte 4] I genovesi risparmiano anche sui numeri: li usano due
volte.[37][fonte 122] I giovani vogliono essere più accorti dei vecchi.[fonte
4] I giuramenti degli innamorati sono come quelli dei marinai.[fonte 4] I
granchi son pieni quando la luna è tonda.[fonte 8] I guai della pentola li sa
il mestolo che li rimescola.[fonte 8] I ladri grandi fanno impiccare i
piccoli.[fonte 4] I loquaci e i vantatori son mal veduti da tutti.[fonte 8] I
matti ed i fanciulli hanno un angelo dalla loro.[fonte 8] I matti fanno le
feste ed i savi le godono.[fonte 4] I medici vogliono essere vecchi, i
farmacisti ricchi ed i barbieri giovani.[fonte 4] "I miei datteri sono più
dolci", dice il vischio che cresce sulla palma.[fonte 8] [wellerismo] I
panni sporchi si lavano in casa.[fonte 123] I paperi vogliono portare a bere le
oche.[fonte 4] I parenti sono come le scarpe: più sono stretti, più fanno
male.[fonte 2] I pazzi crescono senza innaffiarli.[fonte 8] I pazzi e i
fanciulli possono dire quello che vogliono.[fonte 8] I pazzi per lettera sono i
maggiori pazzi.[fonte 124] I pazzi si conoscono dai gesti.[fonte 8] I peccati
di gioventù si piangono in vecchiaia.[fonte 8] I poeti nascono, e gli oratori
si formano.[fonte 8] I poveri cercano il mangiare per lo stomaco; e i ricchi lo
stomaco per mangiare.[fonte 8] I poveri hanno la salute e i ricchi le
medicine.[fonte 8] I pulci di vendemmia li tiene l'uomo e non le femmine.[fonte
125] I ricchi devono consolare i poveri.[fonte 8] I rimproveri del padre fanno
più che le legnate della madre.[fonte 8] I soldi non fanno la felicità.[fonte
2] I veri amici sono come le mosche bianche.[fonte 4] Il bel tempo non viene
mai a noia.[fonte 9] Il ben di un anno se ne va in una bestemmia.[fonte 4] Il
ben fare non è mai tardo.[fonte 4] Il bisognino fa trottar la vecchia.[fonte 2]
Il bue dice cornuto all'asino.[fonte 126] Il bue mangia il fieno perché si
ricorda che è stato erba.[fonte 2] Il buon ordine è figlio del disordine.[fonte
8] Il buon nocchiero muta vela, ma non tramontana.[fonte 8] Il caffè deve
essere caldo come l'inferno, nero come il diavolo, puro come un angelo e dolce
come l'amore.[38][fonte 127] Il caldo delle lenzuola non fa bollire la pentola.[fonte
128] Il cane che ho nutrito è quel che mi morde.[fonte 8] Il cane è il miglior
amico dell'uomo.[fonte 2] Il cane pauroso abbaia più forte.[fonte 4] Il cane
rode l'osso perché non può inghiottirlo.[fonte 4] Il coccodrillo mangia l'uomo
e poi lo piange.[fonte 8] Il colombo che rimane in colombaia è al sicuro dal
falco.[fonte 8] Il colore più caro agli ebrei è il giallo.[fonte 4] Il coraggio
copre l'eroe meglio che lo scudo il codardo.[fonte 8] Il corpo e l'anima ridono
a chi si alza di buon mattino.[fonte 8] Il corvo piange la pecora e poi la
mangia.[fonte 117] Il cuor cattivo rende ingratitudine per beneficio.[fonte 8]
Il cuor magnanimo si piglia con poco amore, e il cuore dello stolto con poca
adulazione.[fonte 8] Il cuore ha le sue ragioni e non intende
ragione.[39][fonte 129] Il dare è onore, il chiedere è dolore.[fonte 8] Il
delitto non si deve tollerare, ma anche meno si deve approvare.[fonte 4] Il
denaro è il nervo della guerra.[fonte 4] Il denaro può molto, ma l'amore può
tutto.[fonte 4] Il diavolo ben si lascia pigliare per la coda, ma non se la
lascia strappare.[fonte 4] Il diavolo fa le pentole ma non i coperchi.[fonte 1]
Il diavolo non è così brutto come lo si dipinge.[fonte 130] Il diavolo vuol
farsi cappuccino.[fonte 2] Il diavolo vuol farsi santo.[fonte 2] Il domandare è
senno, il rispondere è obbligo.[fonte 8] Il dono del cattivo è simile al suo
padrone.[fonte 56] Il dubbio è padre del sapere.[fonte 4] Il fare insegna a
fare.[fonte 4] Il fatto non si può disfare.[fonte 4] Il ferro di cavallo che
risuona, ha bisogno di un chiodo.[fonte 8] Il ferro è duro, ma il fuoco lo
rende morbido.[fonte 4] Il figlio al padre s'assomiglia, alla madre la
figlia.[fonte 4] Il filo sottile facilmente si strappa.[fonte 4] Il fuoco che
non mi scalda, non voglio che mi scotti.[fonte 4] Il fuoco che non mi brucia,
non lo spengo.[fonte 4] Il gatto ama i pesci, ma non vuole bagnarsi le
zampe.[fonte 131] Il gatto brontola sempre, anche quando gode.[fonte 8] Il
gatto che si è bruciato, ha paura anche dell'acqua fredda.[fonte 121] Il gatto
è una tigre domestica.[fonte 8] Il gatto lecca oggi, domani graffia.[fonte 132]
Il gatto non è gatto se non è ladro.[fonte 133] Il gatto non ti accarezza, si
accarezza vicino a te.[fonte 134] Il generoso non ha mai abbastanza denaro.[fonte
4] Il gentiluomo chiede solo il miele, ma la gentildonna vuol anche la
cera.[fonte 8] Il gioco è bello quando dura poco.[fonte 2] Il gioco, il lotto,
la donna e il fuoco non si contentan mai di poco.[fonte 8] Il giudizio è opera
di Dio.[fonte 4] Il grano rado non fa vergogna all'aia.[fonte 135] Il Greco
dice la verità solo una volta all'anno.[fonte 4] Il lamentarsi non riempie
camera vuota.[fonte 8] Il lavorare senza pregare, è una botte senza vino, e oro
senza splendore.[fonte 4] Il lavoro nobilita l'uomo.[fonte 136] Il letto si
chiama rosa, se non si dorme si riposa.[fonte 137] Il lotto è la tassa degli
imbecilli.[fonte 8] Il lotto è un inganno continuo.[fonte 8] Il lupo non caca
agnelli.[fonte 2] Il lupo perde il pelo ma non il vizio.[40][fonte 1] Il lupo
quando acciuffa una pecora, ne guarda già un'altra.[fonte 4] Il magnanimo è
superiore all'ingiuria, all'ingiustizia, al dolore.[fonte 8] Il magnanimo non
ricorre all'astuzia.[fonte 8] Il male che non ha riparo è bene tenerlo
nascosto.[fonte 4] Il male peggiore dei mali è il timore.[fonte 8] Il male
viene in grandi quantità, e se ne va via a poco a poco.[fonte 4] Il matrimonio
è la tomba dell'amore.[fonte 2] Il mattino ha l'oro in bocca.[fonte 138] Le ore
del mattino hanno l'oro in bocca.[fonte 139] Il medico pietoso fa la piaga
puzzolente.[fonte 140] Il medico pietoso fa la piaga verminosa.[fonte 140] Il
meglio è nemico del bene.[fonte 1] Il merlo ingrassa in gabbia, il leone muore
di rabbia.[fonte 8] Il miele non è fatto per gli asini.[fonte 4] Il miglior
tiro ai dadi è non giocarli.[fonte 4] Il molto ringraziare significa chieder
dell'altro.[fonte 8] Il mondo ricompensa come il caprone che dà cornate al suo
padrone.[fonte 8] Il mulino di Dio macina piano ma sottile.[fonte 141] Il nano
è piccolo anche se è sul campanile.[fonte 8] Il passato deve essere maestro
dell'oggi.[fonte 4] Il passato non deve prendere a prestito dall'oggi.[fonte 4]
Il peggior passo è quello dell'uscio.[fonte 2] Il pesce puzza dalla
testa.[fonte 1] Il Piemonte è la sepoltura dei francesi.[fonte 8] Il poeta ben
trova le palme, ma non i datteri.[fonte 8] Il politico bacia con la bocca, e
tira calci con i piedi.[fonte 8] Il Portogallo[41] è piccolo, ma è un pezzo di
zucchero.[fonte 8] Il povero non può e il ricco non vuole.[fonte 8] Il prete,
dove mangia, vi canta.[fonte 142] Il prete vien cantando e va via
zufolando.[fonte 143] Il prete vive ancor un anno dopo morte.[fonte 142] I suoi
familiari continuano ad incassar per un anno i suoi redditi.[42] Il primo amore
non si arrugginisce.[fonte 8] Il primo amore non si scorda mai.[fonte 8] Il
primo anno ci si abbraccia, il secondo si fascia, il terzo anno si ha la
malattia e la cattiva Pasqua.[fonte 4] Il puledro non va all'ambio, se la
cavalla trotta.[fonte 144] Il ramo assomiglia al tronco.[fonte 4] Il ricco ha
tanto bisogno del povero, quanto il povero del ricco.[fonte 8] Il ricco vive,
il povero vivacchia.[fonte 8] Il ringraziare non fa male alla bocca.[fonte 8]
Il ringraziare non paga debito.[fonte 8] Il riso abbonda sulla bocca degli stolti.[fonte
2] Il riso abbonda sulla bocca degli sciocchi.[fonte 145] Il riso nasce
nell'acqua ma deve morire nel vino.[fonte 8] Il sapere è di tutti.[fonte 2] Il
«se» e il «ma» sono due corbellerie da Adamo in qua.[fonte 4] Il silenzio è
d'oro e la parola d'argento.[fonte 1] Il sospirar non vale.[fonte 8] Il
superfluo del ricco è il necessario del povero.[fonte 8] Il tatto è
tattica.[fonte 8] Il tatto è tutto.[fonte 8] Il tempo è denaro.[fonte 146] Il
tempo è un gran medico.[fonte 147] Il tempo scopre tutto, perché è
galantuomo.[fonte 147] Il tempo vola.[fonte 147] Il termine della notte è
l'inizio del giorno.[fonte 8] Il timore fa trottare anche lo zoppo.[fonte 8] Il
troppo gestire è da pazzi.[fonte 8] Il troppo tirare, l'arco fa spezzare.[fonte
4] Il turco ben può divenir un dotto, ma un uomo giammai.[fonte 119] Il ventre
non ha orecchie.[fonte 2] Il vero infermo è quello che non vuol esser
guarito.[fonte 8] Il vino al sapore, il pane al colore.[fonte 8] Il vino è
buono per chi lo sa bere.[fonte 8] Il vino è forte ma il sonno lo vince, ma più
forte d'ogni cosa è la donna.[fonte 8] Il vino è il latte dei vecchi.[fonte 8]
Il vino è mezzo vitto.[fonte 8] Il vino fa ballare i vecchi.[fonte 8] Il vino
la mattina è piombo, a mezzodì argento, la sera oro.[fonte 8] Impara a vivere
lo sciocco a sue spese, il savio a quelle altrui.[fonte 4] Impara l'arte e
mettila da parte.[fonte 1] In amore e in guerra niente regole.[fonte 8] In
bocca chiusa non entran mosche.[fonte 2] In Campania si inganna persino il
diavolo.[fonte 8] In casa del calzolaio non si hanno scarpe.[fonte 4] In cento
libbre di legge, non v'è un'oncia di amore.[fonte 148] In chiesa coi santi e in
taverna coi ghiottoni.[fonte 1] In compagnia prese moglie un frate.[fonte 1] In
febbraio la beccaccia fa il nido.[fonte 8] In Lazio si nasce coi sassi in
mano.[fonte 8] In lunghi viaggi anche la paglia pesa.[fonte 8] In paradiso non
ci si va in carrozza.[fonte 141] In Sardegna non vi son serpenti, né in
Piemonte bestemmie.[fonte 8] In tanta incostanza e quantità delle cose umane,
nulla, se non quello che è passato, è sicuro.[fonte 4] In terra di ciechi,
beato chi ha un occhio.[fonte 36] In terra di ladri, la valigia dinanzi.[fonte
8] In vaso mal lavato, il vino è tosto guastato.[fonte 8] Ingegno e capelli,
crescono soltanto con gli anni.[fonte 4] Insieme non vanno la pudicizia e la
beltà.[fonte 4] Inventare è poco, diffondere l'invenzione è tutto.[fonte 4] L
L'abbaiare dei cani non arriva in cielo.[fonte 4] L'abbondanza non lascia
dormire il ricco.[fonte 4] L'abete che fa ombra crede di fare frutti.[fonte 4]
L'abete cresce in altezza, ma la felce cresce in larghezza.[fonte 4] L'abito
non fa il monaco.[43][fonte 2] L'abuso insegna il vero uso.[fonte 4] L'acqua
cheta rovina i ponti.[fonte 2] L'acqua corre al mare.[fonte 149] L'acqua e il
fuoco sono buoni servitori, ma cattivi padroni.[fonte 4] L'acqua fa male e il
vino fa cantare.[fonte 8] L'acqua fa marcire i pali.[fonte 5] L'acqua fa venire
i ranocchi in corpo.[fonte 150] L'acqua di maggio inganna il villano: par che non
piova e si bagna il gabbano[44].[fonte 2] L'acqua non è fatta per
sposarsi.[fonte 9] L'allegria dei cattivi dura poco.[fonte 8] L'allegria è di
ogni male il rimedio universale.[fonte 4] L'allegria è il balsamo della
vita.[fonte 8] L'allegria fa campare, la passione fa crepare.[fonte 8]
L'allegria piace anche a Dio.[fonte 8] L'allegria scaccia ogni male.[fonte 8]
L'allodola vola in alto, ma fa il suo nido in terra.[fonte 8] L'altezza è mezza
bellezza.[45][fonte 2] L'ambizione e la vendetta muoiono sempre di fame.[fonte
4] L'ambizione è nemica della ragione.[fonte 4] L'amore di carnevale muore in
quaresima.[fonte 8] L'amore è cieco.[fonte 2] L'amore è cieco, ma vede
lontano.[fonte 8] L'amore fa passare il tempo e il tempo fa passare
l'amore.[fonte 8] L'amore non è bello se non è litigarello.[fonte 103] L'amore
non si misura a metri.[fonte 8] L'amore passa dentro la cruna di un ago.[fonte
8] L'amore quanto più è bestia, tanto più sublime.[fonte 32] L'amore scalda il
cuore e l'ira fa il poeta.[fonte 8] L'amore senza baci è pane senza sale.[fonte
8] L'animo fa il nobile e non il sangue.[fonte 8] L'anno produce il raccolto,
non il campo.[fonte 4] L'apparenza inganna.[fonte 1] L'appetito non vuol
salsa.[fonte 151] L'appetito vien mangiando.[fonte 1] L'arancia la mattina è
oro, il giorno argento, la sera è piombo.[fonte 2] Con riferimento a chi fa
fatica a digerire le arance. L'arcobaleno la mattina bagna il becco della
gallina; l'arcobaleno la sera buon tempo mena.[fonte 1] L'arte non ha maggior
nemico dell'ignorante.[fonte 4] L'asino e il mulattiere non hanno lo stesso
pensiero.[fonte 4] L'asino non conosce la coda, se non quando non l'ha
più.[fonte 4] L'assai basta e il troppo guasta.[fonte 1] L'avaro in punto di
morte rimpiange i soldi spesi per la bara.[fonte 8] L'avaro lascia eredi
ridenti.[fonte 4] L'avaro non dorme.[fonte 4] L'avaro non vive, vegeta.[fonte
4] L'avversità che fiacca i cuori deboli, ingagliardisce le anime forti.[fonte
8] L'eccesso degli obblighi può fare perdere un amico.[fonte 4] L'eccesso della
gioia divien tristezza, e l'eccesso del vino ubriachezza.[fonte 8] L'eccezione
conferma la regola.[46][fonte 1] L'eclissi di sole avviene di giorno e non di
notte.[fonte 4] L'edera taciturna si arrampica in cima alla quercia.[fonte 4]
L'elefante non cura il morso delle pulci.[fonte 8] L'elemosina non fa
impoverire.[fonte 4] L'eloquenza del cattivo è falso acume.[fonte 8] L'Epifania
tutte le feste porta via.[47][fonte 1] L'erba del vicino è sempre più
verde.[48][fonte 152] L'erba voglio non cresce nemmeno nel giardino del
re.[fonte 2] L'erba che non voglio, cresce nell'orto.[fonte 4] L'erba non
cresce sulla strada maestra.[fonte 4] L'eredità paterna ai paterni, la materna
ai materni.[fonte 4] L'errore che si confessa è mezzo rimediato.[fonte 4]
L'errore è un cocchiere che conduce sopra una falsa strada.[fonte 4] L'errore è
umano, il perdono divino.[fonte 153] L'esercizio è buon maestro.[fonte 4]
L'esperienza nel mondo conduce alla diffidenza, la diffidenza conduce al
sospetto, il sospetto all'astuzia, l'astuzia alla malvagità e la malvagità a
tutto.[fonte 4] L'esperienza senza il sapere è meglio che il sapere senza
sapienza.[fonte 70] L'estate ce la porta sant'Urbano e l'autunno san
Bartolomeo.[fonte 4] L'estate davanti e l'inverno dietro.[fonte 4] L'estate di
San Martino dura tre giorni e un pochinino.[49][fonte 2] L'estate per chi
lavora, l'inverno per chi dorme.[fonte 4] L'estate è una schiava, l'inverno un
padrone.[fonte 4] L'estate per il povero è migliore dell'inverno.[fonte 4]
L'eternità è una compera lunga.[fonte 4] L'eternità non ha capelli grigi.[fonte
4] L'eterno parlatore né ode né impara.[fonte 4] L'idolo si adora finché non è
infranto.[fonte 4] L'ignorante ha le ali di un'aquila e gli occhi di un
gufo.[fonte 4] L'inchiostro è il mio campo, su cui posso scrivere
valorosamente; la penna, il mio aratro; le parole, la mia semente.[fonte 8]
L'inchiostro è nero, e tinge le dita e la reputazione.[fonte 8] L'inferno e i
tribunali son sempre aperti.[fonte 4] L'ingegno viene con gli anni, e se ne va
con gli anni.[fonte 4] L'ingratitudine converte in ghiaccio il caldo
sangue.[fonte 8] L'ingratitudine è la mano sinistra dell'egoismo.[fonte 8]
L'ingratitudine è un'amara radice da cui crescono amari frutti.[fonte 8]
L'ingratitudine nuoce anche a chi non è reo.[fonte 8] L'ingratitudine taglia i
nervi al beneficio.[fonte 8] L'intelletto è nella testa e non negli anni.[fonte
4] L'intelletto non viene mai prima degli anni.[fonte 4] L'interesse acceca
anche i galantuomini.[fonte 8] L'inverno al fuoco e l'estate all'ombra.[fonte
4] L'invidia è annessa alla felicità.[fonte 4] L'invidia è un gufo che non può
sopportare la luce della prosperità degli altri.[fonte 4] L'invidia è una
bestia che rode le proprie gambe, quando non ha altro da rodere.[fonte 4]
L'invidia somiglia alla gramigna, che mai non muore, e da per tutto
alligna.[fonte 4] L'ipocrisia intasca il denaro, e la verità va mendica.[fonte
4] L'ira senza forza, non vale una scorza.[fonte 4] L'ira turba la mente e
acceca la ragione.[fonte 4] L'Italia è il paese dove corre latte e miele.[fonte
4] L'Italia è un paradiso abitato da demoni.[fonte 4] L'Italia per nascervi, la
Francia per viverci e la Spagna per morirvi.[fonte 4] L'occasione fa l'uomo
ladro.[fonte 1] L'occhio del padrone ingrassa il cavallo.[fonte 1] L'oggi non
deve calunniare il passato.[fonte 4] L'olivo benedetto vuol trovar pulito e
netto.[50][fonte 2] L'ombra di un principe dev'essere la liberalità.[fonte 4]
L'ordine caccia il disordine.[fonte 8] L'ordine è pane, il disordine è
fame.[fonte 8] L'orgoglio crede che il suo uovo abbia due tuorli.[fonte 8]
L'orgoglio è stoltezza, l'umiltà è saviezza.[fonte 8] L'orgoglio fa colazione
con l'abbondanza, pranza con la povertà e cena con la vergogna.[fonte 154]
L'orologio dell'amore ritarda sempre.[fonte 8] L'ospite è come il pesce: dopo
tre giorni puzza.[fonte 2] L'ospite e il pesce dopo tre dì rincresce.[fonte 1]
L'ozio è il padre di tutti i vizi.[fonte 1] L'ozio in gioventù non è la via
della virtù.[fonte 4] L'uguaglianza e misurar tutti con la stessa spanna, è la
legge della morte.[fonte 8] L'umiliarsi è da saggio, l'avvilirsi è da
bestia.[fonte 8] L'umiliazione va dietro al superbo.[fonte 8] L'umiltà è il
miglior modo di evitare l'umiliazione.[fonte 8] L'umiltà è la corona di tutte
le virtù.[fonte 8] L'umiltà è la madre dell'onore.[fonte 8] L'umiltà è una
virtù che adorna tanto la vecchiaia, quanto la gioventù.[fonte 8] L'umiltà
ottiene spesso più dell'alterigia.[fonte 8] L'umiltà sta bene a tutti.[fonte 8]
L'umiltà sta bene con la castità.[fonte 8] L'unione fa la forza.[fonte 1]
L'uomo avaro e l'occhio sono insaziabili.[fonte 4] L'uomo deve tenere aperta la
bocca a lungo prima che c'entri un colombo arrostito.[fonte 4] L'uomo fu creato
per lavorare, come l'uccello per volare.[fonte 4] L'uomo ordisce e la fortuna
tesse.[fonte 1] L'uomo politico accende una candela a Dio e un'altra al
diavolo.[fonte 8] L'uomo per la parola e il bue per le corna.[fonte 1] L'uomo
propone e Dio dispone.[fonte 1] L'uomo propone e la donna dispone.[fonte 2]
L'uomo si conosce al bicchiere.[fonte 4] L'uomo si giudica male
dall'aspetto.[fonte 4] L'usura arricchisce, ma non dura.[fonte 8] L'usura è il
miglior apostolo del diavolo.[fonte 8] L'usura è la figlia primogenita
dell'avarizia.[fonte 8] L'usura è un assassinio.[fonte 8] L'usura è vietata da
Dio.[fonte 8] L'usura veglia quando l'uomo dorme.[fonte 8] L'usuraio
arricchisce col sudor dei poveri.[fonte 8] L'usuraio ha un torchio a
sangue.[fonte 8] L'usuraio ingrassa andando a spasso.[fonte 8] La bestemmia
gira gira torna addosso a chi la tira.[fonte 4] La buona cantina fa il buon
vino.[fonte 8] La buona mamma fa la buona figlia.[fonte 4] La buona sorte ogni
vile cuore fa forte.[fonte 8] La calma è la virtù dei forti.[fonte 2] La
capacità si vede nelle difficoltà.[fonte 4] La carestia è il pane
dell'usuraio.[fonte 4] La carne migliore è quella intorno all'osso.[fonte 4] La
carne senz'osso non fa brodo.[fonte 4] La carrucola non frulla, se non è
unta.[fonte 4] La cattiva sorte porta spesso buona sorte.[fonte 8] La cicala
prima canta e poi muore.[fonte 8] La coda è la più lunga da scorticare.[fonte
1] La comodità fa l'uomo cattivo.[fonte 8] La compassione è la figlia
dell'amore.[fonte 4] La concordia rende forti i deboli.[fonte 8] La contentezza
viene dalle budella.[fonte 1] La corda troppo tesa si spezza.[fonte 1] La
cupidigia rompe il sacco.[fonte 4] La dieta ogni mal quieta.[fonte 155] La
difficoltà sta nell'iniziare.[fonte 4] La diffidenza aguzza gli occhi.[fonte 4]
La diffidenza è la morte dell'amore.[fonte 4] La diffidenza porta più avanti
della fiducia.[fonte 4] La donna a 15 anni scherza, a 20 brilla, a 25 ama, a 30
brama, a 35 sente, a 40 vuole e a 50 paga.[fonte 8] La donna bisogna praticarla
un giorno, un mese e un'estate per sapere che odore sa.[fonte 8] La donna buona
vale una corona.[fonte 8] La donna deve avere tre m: matrona in strada, modesta
in chiesa, massaia in casa.[fonte 8] La donna e l'orto vogliono un sol
padrone.[fonte 8] La donna ha più capricci che ricci.[fonte 8] La donna oziosa
non può essere virtuosa.[fonte 8] La donna per piccola che sia, vince il
diavolo in furberia.[fonte 8] La donna più sciocca vale due uomini.[fonte 8] La
donna troppo in vista, è di facile conquista.[fonte 8] La fame caccia il lupo
dal bosco.[fonte 1] La fame caccia il lupo dalla tana.[fonte 4] La fame spinge
il lupo nel villaggio.[fonte 4] La fame condisce tutte le vivande.[fonte 4] La
fame non vede la muffa nel pane.[fonte 4] La fame è cattiva consigliera.[fonte
1] La fame, gran maestra, anche le bestie addestra.[fonte 4] La fame muta le
fave in mandorle.[fonte 4] La farina del diavolo va tutta in crusca.[fonte 1]
La fedeltà non è mai rimeritata abbastanza, e l'infedeltà mai abbastanza.[fonte
4] La femmina è cosa mobile per natura.[fonte 4] La fine della passione è il
principio del pentimento.[fonte 129] La fortuna aiuta gli audaci.[fonte 2] La
fortuna del savio ha per figliola la modestia.[fonte 8] La fortuna è
cieca.[fonte 2] La fortuna è cieca, ma la sfiga ci vede benissimo.[fonte 108]
La fretta fa rompere la pentola.[fonte 8] La fretta è una cattiva
consigliera.[fonte 108] La furia non fu mai buona.[fonte 4] La gallina del
vicino sembra un fagiano.[fonte 152] La gatta frettolosa fece i gattini
ciechi.[fonte 1] La gatta grassa fa onore alla casa.[fonte 121] La gatta, mette
il piede davanti alla vacca.[fonte 156] La gatta non s'accosta alla pentola che
bolle.[fonte 38] La gatta vorrebbe mangiar pesci, ma non pescare.[fonte 157] La
gelosia della moglie è la via al suo divorzio.[fonte 4] La gelosia è il
peggiore di tutti i mali.[fonte 4] La gelosia è una passione che cerca
avidamente quel che tormenta.[fonte 4] La generosità è un muro che non si può
alzare più alto di quello che arrivano i materiali.[fonte 4] La gente ricca
alleva male i suoi cani, e la gente povera i suoi figlioli.[fonte 8] La gente savia
non si cura di quel che non può avere.[fonte 87] La gioventù fugge, e la
bellezza sfiorisce.[fonte 4] La gioventù vuol fare il suo corso.[fonte 4] La
lealtà se ne è andata dal mondo e la dirittura si è messa a dormire.[fonte 4]
La lega fa forte i deboli.[fonte 4] La liberalità è un muro che non si deve
rizzare più alto di quello che comportino i materiali.[fonte 4] La liberalità
non sta nel dare molto, ma saggiamente.[fonte 4] La libertà del povero è di
lasciarlo mendicare.[fonte 4] La libertà è da Dio; le libertà, dal
diavolo.[fonte 4] La libertà è più cara degli occhi e della vita.[fonte 4] La
libertà fila con le sue mani il filo della sua tenda.[fonte 4] La lingua batte
dove il dente duole.[fonte 1] La lingua non ha osso e sa rompere il dosso.[fonte
4] La lingua spagnola è la più amabile; quando il diavolo tentò Eva, le parlo
in spagnolo.[fonte 8] La lode propria puzza, quella degli amici zoppica.[fonte
4] La luna di gennaio è la luna del vino.[fonte 2] La luna è bugiarda: quando
fa la C diminuisce, e quando fa la D cresce[fonte 158] La luna non cura
l'abbaiar dei cani.[fonte 2] La luna regge il lume ai ladri.[fonte 158] La
luna, se non riscalda, illumina.[fonte 158] La Lombardia è il giardino del
mondo.[fonte 8] La madre del peggio è sempre incinta.[fonte 159] La madre degli
imbecilli è sempre incinta.[fonte 160] La madre dei fessi è sempre
incinta.[fonte 160] La magnificenza spesso copre la povertà.[fonte 4] La mala
erba non muore mai.[fonte 1] La mala nuova la porta il vento.[fonte 1] La
malerba cresce presto.[fonte 2] La malinconia e le cure fanno invecchiare
anzitempo.[fonte 4] La mercanzia rara è meglio che buona.[fonte 8] La miglior
difesa è l'attacco.[fonte 1] La minestra lunga sa di fumo.[fonte 8] La modestia
è il dattero che matura raramente sull'albero della ricchezza.[fonte 8] La
modestia è madre d'ogni creanza.[fonte 8] La moglie è la chiave di casa.[fonte
8] La morte ci rende uguali nella sepoltura, disuguali nell'eternità.[fonte 8]
La necessità aguzza l'ingegno.[fonte 2] La necessità fa più ladri che
galantuomini.[fonte 8] La notte è fatta per gli allocchi.[fonte 8] La notte
porta consiglio.[fonte 1] La novella non è bella, se non c'è la
giuntarella.[fonte 8] La pancia del buongustaio è il cimitero dei cibi
buoni.[fonte 8] La parola del ricco è simile al sole, e quella del povero è
simile al vapore.[fonte 8] La pazienza è la virtù dei forti.[fonte 9] La
pazienza è una buon'erba, ma non nasce in tutti gli orti.[fonte 88] La pecora
che se ne va sola, il lupo la mangia.[fonte 91] La peggio ruota è quella che
stride.[fonte 8] La peggior carne da conoscere è quella dell'uomo.[fonte 4] La
penitenza corre dietro al peccato.[fonte 8] La pentola vuota è quella che
suona.[fonte 8] La pianta si conosce dal frutto.[fonte 1] La pigrizia e
l'impudicizia sono sorelle.[fonte 8] La pittura è una poesia tacita, e la
poesia una pittura loquace.[fonte 8] La più bell'ora per il mangiare è quella
in cui si ha fame.[fonte 8] La polenta è utile per quattro cose: serve da
minestra, serve da pane, sazia e scalda le mani.[fonte 8] La povertà è priva di
molte cose, l'avarizia è priva di tutto.[fonte 56] La prima acqua è quella che
bagna.[fonte 1] La prima gallina che canta ha fatto l'uovo.[fonte 108] La prima
eredità al primo figlio, l'ultima eredità all'ultimo figlio.[fonte 4] La
provvidenza quel che toglie rende.[fonte 4] La pulce che esce di dietro
l'orecchio con il diavolo si consiglia.[fonte 8] La puttana e la lattuga una
stagione dura.[fonte 8] La rana è usa ai pantani, se non ci va oggi ci andrà
domani.[fonte 8] La rana non morde, perché non ha denti.[fonte 8] La rana, o
salta o piscia, ma mai non sbrana.[fonte 8] La razza comincia dalla
bocca.[fonte 8] La roba dei pazzi è la prima ad andarsene.[fonte 8] La ruota
della fortuna gira.[fonte 4] La ruota della fortuna non è sempre una.[fonte 4]
La scorza fa bella la castagna.[fonte 4] La scimmia è sempre scimmia, anche
vestita di seta.[fonte 8] La semplicità senza accortezza è pura pazzia.[fonte
8] La sera leoni e la mattina coglioni.[fonte 2] La sorte è come ognuno se la
fa.[fonte 8] La speranza è cattivo denaro.[fonte 161] La speranza è il pane dei
poveri.[fonte 2] La speranza è il patrimonio dei poveri.[fonte 2] La speranza è
il sogno dell'uomo desto.[fonte 2] La speranza è l'ultima a morire.[fonte 2] La
speranza è la miglior consolazione nella miseria.[fonte 161] La speranza è la
miglior musica del dolore.[fonte 161] La speranza è la ricchezza dei
poveri.[fonte 2] La speranza è sempre verde.[fonte 2] La speranza è un balsamo
per i cuor piagati.[fonte 161] La speranza è un sogno nella veglia.[fonte 2] La
speranza infonde coraggio anche al codardo.[fonte 161] La speranza ingrandisce,
l'esperienza rimpicciolisce.[fonte 57] La superbia è figlia
dell'ignoranza.[fonte 1] La superbia mostra l'ignoranza.[fonte 162] La superbia
va a cavallo e torna a piedi.[fonte 1] La terra è madre di tutti gli uomini ed
anche sepoltura.[fonte 8] La troppa umiltà vien dalla superbia.[fonte 8] La
vanagloria è un fiore che mai non porta frutta.[fonte 163] La vera libertà è
non servire al vizio.[fonte 4] La verità è nel vino.[fonte 8] La verità viene
sempre a galla.[fonte 2] La veste copre gran difetti.[fonte 55] La via
dell'inferno è lastricata di buone intenzioni.[fonte 1] La vipera morta non
morde seno, ma pure fa male coll'odor del veleno.[fonte 8] La virtù sta nel
mezzo.[51][fonte 164] La vita è breve e l'arte è lunga.[52][fonte 55] La vita è
già mezzo trascorsa anziché si sappia che cosa sia.[fonte 165] La volpe si
conosce dalla coda.[fonte 4] Lamentarsi, supplicare e bere acqua è lecito a tutti.[fonte
8] Latte e vino, tossico fino.[fonte 8] Lavora come se avessi a campare ognora,
adora come avessi a morire allora.[fonte 4] Lavoro non ingrassò mai bue.[fonte
4] Le allegrezze non durano.[fonte 8] Le belle penne rendono bello
l'uccello.[fonte 4] Le bellezze durano fino alle porte, la bontà fino alla
morte.[fonte 4] Le braccia e le mani del povero appartengono al ricco.[fonte 8]
Le bugie hanno le gambe corte.[fonte 1] Le bugie sono lo scudo degli uomini
dappoco.[fonte 4] Le chiacchiere non fanno farina.[fonte 1] Le colombe che
rimangono in colombaia, sono sicure dal nibbio.[fonte 8] Le cose lunghe
diventano serpi.[fonte 1] Le cose lunghe prendono vizio.[fonte 1] Le dita della
mano sono disuguali.[fonte 8] Le donne hanno lunghi i capelli e corti i cervelli.[fonte
4] Le donne hanno quattro malattie all'anno, e tre mesi dura ogni
malanno.[fonte 8] Le bestie vanno trattate da bestie.[fonte 8] Le cattive nuove
sono le prime ad arrivare.[fonte 8] Le cattive nuove volano.[fonte 1] Le chiavi
ed i lucchetti non si fanno per le dita fidate.[fonte 8] Le disgrazie non
vengono mai sole.[fonte 1] Le disgrazie sono come le ciliegie: una tira
l'altra.[53] Le donne hanno lunghi i capelli e corti i cervelli.[fonte 166] Le
donne hanno sette anime... e mezza.[fonte 8] Le donne ne sanno una più del
diavolo.[fonte 2] Le donne piglian bene le pulci.[fonte 8] Le lacrime sono le
armi delle donne.[fonte 4] Le leghe e le corde fradice non durano a
lungo.[fonte 4] Le malattie ci dicono quel che siamo.[fonte 88] Le montagne
stanno ferme, gli uomini s'incontrano.[fonte 167] Le ore del mattino hanno
l'oro in bocca.[fonte 1] Le parole sono femmine e i fatti sono maschi.[fonte 1]
Le piante che fruttano troppo presto, si seccano.[fonte 8] Le querce non fanno
limoni.[fonte 2] Le ragazze sono d'oro, le sposate d'argento, le vedove di rame
e le vecchie di latta.[fonte 8] Le rane han perso la coda perché non seppero
chiedere aiuto.[fonte 8] Le rose cascano, le spine restano.[fonte 168] Le teste
di legno fan sempre del chiasso.[fonte 55] Le Trentine vengono giù pollastre e
se ne vanno sù galline.[fonte 8] Le vie della provvidenza sono infinite.[fonte
1] Le vie del Signore sono infinite.[fonte 1] Leggi, rileggi e pondera.[fonte
8] Lingua cheta e fatti parlanti.[fonte 4] Lo sbadiglio non vuol mentire: o che
ha sonno o che vorrebbe dormire, o che ha qualche cosa che non può dire.[fonte
8] Lo scarafaggio corre sempre allo sterco.[fonte 8] Lo scimunito parla col
dito.[fonte 8] Lo scorpione dorme sotto ogni lastra.[fonte 8] Lo smargiasso
ciancia in guerra, il valente combatte muto.[fonte 8] Loda il gran campo e il
piccolo coltiva.[fonte 169] Loda il monte e tieniti al piano.[fonte 2] Loda il
pazzo e fallo saltare, se non è pazzo lo farai diventare.[fonte 8] Lontano
dagli occhi, lontano dal cuore.[fonte 170] Lontan dagli occhi, lontan dal
cuore.[fonte 2] Luna di grappoli a gennaio luna di racimoli a
febbraio.[54][fonte 2] Lunga lingua, corta mano.[fonte 8] Lungo come la
quaresima.[55][fonte 2] Luglio dal gran caldo, bevi bene e batti saldo.[fonte
16] Lungo digiuno caccia la fame.[fonte 4] Lupo non mangia lupo.[fonte 2] M Ma
in premio d'amore amor si rende.[fonte 33] Maggio ortolano, molta paglia e poco
grano.[fonte 16] Maggiore il santo, maggiore la sua umiltà.[fonte 8] Mai gli
uomini sanno essere abbastanza riconoscenti verso gli inventori.[fonte 4] Mal
comune mezzo gaudio.[fonte 2] Mal può rendere ragion del proprio fatto chi
lardo o pesce lascia in guardia al gatto.[fonte 65] Mal si giudica il cavallo
dalla sella.[fonte 3] Male che si vuole non duole.[fonte 9] Male ignoto si teme
doppiamente.[fonte 8] Male non fare, paura non avere.[fonte 2] Male voluto non
fu mai troppo.[fonte 57] Maledetto il ventre che del pan che mangia non si
ricorda niente.[fonte 8] Manca tanto la pazienza ai poveri, quanto la compassione
ai ricchi.[fonte 8] Mangiar molto e far buona digestione, è un privilegio che
han poche persone.[fonte 8] Mano dritta e bocca monda possono andare per tutto
il mondo.[fonte 4] Marinaio genovese, mercante fiorentino.[fonte 8] Martello
d'oro non rompe le porte del cielo.[fonte 47] Marzo è pazzo.[fonte 16] Marzo
pazzerello guarda il sole e prendi l'ombrello.[fonte 2] Marzo molle, gran per
le zolle.[fonte 16] Mazza e pane fanno i figli belli; pane senza mazza fa i
figli pazzi.[fonte 171] Medico vecchio e chirurgo giovane.[fonte 172] Medico
vecchio e medicina nuova.[fonte 2] Chirurgo giovane e medico anziano.[56]
Mediocre bestiame ben pasciuto è di maggior vantaggio che molto bestiame mal
mantenuto.[fonte 173] Meglio andare a letto senza cena, che alzarsi con
debiti.[fonte 4] Meglio aperto rimprovero, che odio segreto.[fonte 8] Meglio
dietro agli uccelli, che dietro ai signori.[fonte 8] Meglio essere ben educato,
che nascere nobile.[fonte 4] Meglio essere invidiati che compatiti.[fonte 174]
Meglio fare la serva in casa propria, che la padrona in casa altrui.[fonte 4]
Meglio fave in libertà, che capponi in schiavitù.[fonte 8] Meglio fringuello in
man che tordo in frasca.[fonte 2] Meglio fringuello in tasca che tordo in
frasca.[fonte 2] Meglio il marito senz'amore, che con gelosia.[fonte 75] Meglio
l'uovo oggi che la gallina domani.[fonte 1] Meglio mangiar carote in pace che
molte pietanze in disunione.[fonte 8] Meglio mendicante che ignorante.[fonte
124] Meglio pane con amore, che gallina con dolore.[fonte 4] Meglio poco che
niente.[fonte 1] Meglio soli che male accompagnati.[fonte 1] Meglio tardi che
mai.[fonte 1] Meglio un asino vivo che un dottore morto.[fonte 1] Meglio un
fiorino guadagnato, che cento ereditati.[fonte 4] Meglio un magro accordo che
una grassa sentenza.[fonte 2] Meglio un morto in casa che un pisano
all'uscio.[fonte 2] Meglio una festa che cento festicciole.[fonte 1] Meglio una
volta arrossire che mille impallidire.[fonte 8] Meglio vivere ben che vivere a
lungo.[fonte 64] Meno siamo meglio stiamo.[fonte 57] Mente lieta, vita quieta e
moderata dieta.[fonte 2] Merito non conosciuto poco vale.[fonte 8] Milan può
far, Milan può dir, ma non può far dell'acqua vin.[fonte 8] Mille errori sono
più facilmente pronunciati che una verità.[fonte 4] Moglie e buoi dei paesi
tuoi.[fonte 1] Donne e buoi dei paesi tuoi.[fonte 2] Mogli che non
contraddicono e galline che facciano le uova d'oro, sono uccelli rari.[fonte 8]
Moglie maglio.[fonte 1] Molte cose si giudicano impossibili a farsi prima che
siano fatte.[fonte 4] Molte mani fanno l'opera leggera.[fonte 4] Molte paglie
unite possono legare un elefante.[fonte 8] Molte volte la belleza più adorabile
si unisce alla stupidaggine più insopportabile.[fonte 4] Molte volte si perde
per negligenza quello che si è guadagnato con giustizia.[fonte 4] Molti hanno
buone carte in mano, ma non le sanno giocare.[fonte 4] Molti inventano oro con
la bocca ed hanno piombo alle mani e ai piedi.[fonte 4] Molti parlano d'Orlando
anche se non videro mai il suo brando.[fonte 8] Molti sfuggono alla pena, ma
non ai rimorsi della coscienza.[fonte 8] Molti si immaginano di avere il
pulcino, che non hanno ancora l'uovo.[fonte 4] Molti si lamentano del buon
tempo.[fonte 8] Molti sono i verseggiatori, pochi i poeti.[fonte 8] Molti
squartano un gatto e giurano che era un leone.[fonte 8] Molti voti fanno
l'abate.[fonte 4] Molto denaro, molti amici.[fonte 4] Molto fumo e poco
arrosto.[fonte 1] Molto può nuocere una piccola negligenza.[fonte 8] Morire di
fame in una madia di pane.[fonte 4] Morta la serpe, spento il veleno.[fonte 8]
Morto un papa se ne fa un altro.[fonte 1] Mulo buon mulo, ma cattiva
bestia.[fonte 8] Muore il ricco, gli fanno il funerale; muore il povero,
nessuno gli dice: vale.[fonte 8] Muove la coda il cane non per te, ma per il
pane.[fonte 4] N Natale con i tuoi, Pasqua con chi vuoi.[fonte 2] Né col
capretto né con l'agnello, si adopera il coltello.[fonte 8] Né di venere, né di
marte non si sposa né si parte, né si dà principio all'arte.[fonte 2] Né donna
né tela al lume di candela.[fonte 8] Ne uccide più la lingua che la
spada.[fonte 2] Ne uccide più la gola che la spada.[fonte 2] Necessità fa legge
e tribunale.[fonte 2] Negli ordini pari, i pareri sono dispari.[fonte 8] Nel
bere e nel camminare si conoscono le donne.[fonte 8] Nel bosco tagliato non ci
stanno assassini.[fonte 8] Nel dubbio astieniti.[fonte 2] Nel monte di Brianza,
senza vin non si danza.[fonte 8] Nel paese degli zoppi, zoppicar non è
vergogna.[fonte 8] Nel regno dei ciechi anche un orbo è re.[fonte 175] Nel regno
dei ciechi anche un guercio è re.[fonte 175] Nel regno di Dio, poveri e ricchi
sono uguali.[fonte 8] Nell'autunno non bisogna più sognare di rose e
tulipani.[fonte 4] Nell'estate si deve pensare all'inverno, e nella gioventù
alla vecchiaia.[fonte 4] Nell'eternità si arriva sempre in tempo.[fonte 4]
Nell'inverno il pazzo sogna rose, e nell'estate il savio le raccoglie.[fonte 4]
Nella botte piccola c'è il buon vino.[fonte 8] Nella felicità ragione,
nell'infelicità pazienza.[fonte 8] Nella gotta, il medico non vede gotta.[fonte
176] Nelle sventure si conosce l'amico.[fonte 1] Nessuna corona è più bella di
quella dell'umiltà.[fonte 8] Nessuna fortezza è così salda che non si lasci
conquistare dall'oro.[fonte 4] Nessuna ingiustizia rimane impunita.[fonte 4] Nessuna
mela è così bella che non abbia qualche difetto.[fonte 4] Nessuna nuova, buona
nuova.[fonte 1] Nessuno è profeta in patria.[57][fonte 177] Nessuno può dare
quello che non ha.[fonte 4] Nessuno può difendersi dalla beffa.[fonte 4] Ne
uccide più Bacco che Marte.[fonte 4] Neve di Dicembre dura fin che dura la
brina.[fonte 8] Niente è più bello di una faccia allegra.[fonte 8] Niuna
guardia è migliore di quella che una donna fa a se stessa.[fonte 4] Non
accettare i rimproveri o consigli da chi educare non seppe i propri
figli.[fonte 4] Non aspettar che l'abete porti pomi.[fonte 4] Non basta esser
galantuomo, bisogna anche esser conosciuto per tale.[fonte 8] Non bisogna fare
il diavolo più nero di quello che è.[fonte 8] Non bisogna fasciarsi il capo
prima di romperselo.[fonte 8] Non bisogna mai usare due pesi e due
misure.[fonte 8] Non bisogna scuotere l'orzo dal sacco prima di avere il
frumento.[fonte 8] Non c'è alcuno così povero che non possa aiutare, né alcuno
così ricco che non abbia bisogno d'aiuto.[fonte 8] Non c'è cosa più triste
sulla terra dell'uomo ingrato.[fonte 8] Non si muove foglia che Dio non
voglia.[fonte 1] Non c'è affanno senza danno.[fonte 4] Non c'è Carnevale senza
luna di febbraio.[fonte 2] Non c'è due senza tre.[fonte 1] Non c'è due senza tre
e il quarto vien da sé.[fonte 2] Non c'è cosa così cattiva che non sia buona a
qualche cosa.[fonte 4] Non c'è eretico che non abbia la sua credenza.[fonte 4]
Non c'è fumo senza arrosto.[fonte 1] Non c'è gallina né gallinaccia che di
gennaio l'uova non faccia.[fonte 2] Non c'è intoppo per avere, più che chiedere
e temere.[fonte 178] Non c'è male senza bene.[fonte 4] Non c'è miglior cieco di
quello che non vuole vedere.[fonte 4] Non c'è pane senza pena.[fonte 1] Non c'è
peggior sordo di chi non vuol sentire.[fonte 2] Non c'è regola senza
eccezioni.[fonte 1] Non c'è rosa senza spine.[fonte 2] Non cade foglia che Dio
non voglia.[fonte 1] Non ci fu mai frettoloso che non fosse pazzo.[fonte 8] Non
ci rimane nessuna vigna da vendemmiare, e né meno nessuna donna da
maritare.[fonte 179] Non credere a donna, quand'anche sia morta.[fonte 4] Non
destare il can che dorme.[fonte 1] Non dire quattro se non l'hai nel
sacco.[fonte 2] Non dire gatto se non ce l'hai nel sacco.[fonte 180] Non è arte
il giocare, ma lo smettere.[fonte 4] Non è bello ciò che è bello, ma è bello
ciò che piace.[fonte 181] Non è bene esser poeta nel villaggio.[fonte 8] Non è
bene riporre denaro in una cassa di cui non si ha la chiave.[fonte 4] Non è col
dire "miel, miel," che la dolcezza viene in bocca.[fonte 117] Non è
contento quel che si lamenta.[fonte 8] Non è in nessun luogo chi è in ogni
luogo.[fonte 4] Non è mai gran gagliardia, senza un ramo di pazzia.[fonte 8]
Non è povero, se non chi si crede tale.[fonte 8] Non è sempre savio chi non sa
esser qualche volta pazzo.[fonte 8] Non è sì tristo cane, che non meni la
coda.[fonte 182] Non è tutto oro quel che luccica.[fonte 183] Non è tutto oro
quel che riluce.[fonte 183] Non esiste amore senza gelosia.[fonte 8] Non fa la
stessa viva sensazione il solletico a tutte le persone.[fonte 8] Non facendo
niente, più pena si sente.[fonte 4] Non far mai bene, non avrai mai male.[fonte
8] Non fare agli altri quello che non vorresti fosse fatto a te.[58][fonte 2]
Non fare il male ch'è peccato, non fare il bene ch'è sprecato.[fonte 1] Non
fare il passo più lungo della gamba.[fonte 2] Non gira il corvo che non sia
vicina la carogna.[fonte 8] Non lodare il bel giorno prima di sera.[fonte 4]
Non mettere il carro davanti ai buoi.[fonte 184] Non mettere il rasoio in mano
a un pazzo.[fonte 8] Non mettere un rasoio in mano a un pazzo.[fonte 185] Non
mi morse mai scorpione, ch'io non mi medicassi col suo olio.[fonte 8] Non
nominar la corda in casa dell'impiccato.[fonte 1] Non ogni abisso ha un
parapetto.[fonte 4] Non ogni lettera va alla posta, non ogni domanda vuole
risposta.[fonte 8] Non pensa il cuore quel che dice la bocca.[fonte 4] Non
perde il cervello se non chi l'ha.[fonte 8] Non rimandare a domani quello che
puoi fare oggi.[fonte 1] Non sempre va d'accordo la campana dell'orologio con
la meridiana.[fonte 8] Non serve dire «Di tal acqua non berrò».[fonte 4] Non si
campa d'aria.[fonte 4] Non si comincia bene se non dal cielo.[fonte 4] Non si
dà fumo senza fuoco.[fonte 4] Non si entra in Paradiso a dispetto dei Santi.[fonte
1] Non si fa niente per niente.[fonte 1] Non si fan nozze coi fichi
secchi.[fonte 186] Non si finisce mai di imparare.[fonte 4] Non si insegna a
nuotare ai pesci.[fonte 4] Non si legge mai libro senza imparare
qualcosa.[fonte 4] Non si possono cavar le castagne dal fuoco colla zampa del
gatto.[fonte 187] Non si può avere la botte piena e la moglie ubriaca.[fonte 1]
Non si può bere e fischiare.[fonte 77] Non si sa mai per chi si lavora.[fonte
4] Non si sta mai tanto bene che non si possa star meglio, né tanto male che
non si possa star meglio.[fonte 8] Non sono cacciatori tutti quelli che portano
il fucile.[fonte 4] Non sono uguali tutti i giorni.[fonte 4] Non ti far povero
a chi non ha da farti ricco.[fonte 8] Non ti fidar d'un tratto, di grazia o di
bontà.[fonte 8] Non ti vantar farfalla, tuo padre era un bruco.[fonte 8] Non
tutte le ciambelle riescono col buco.[fonte 1] Non tutte le lacrime vengono dal
cuor.[fonte 4] Non tutti i matti rompono i piatti.[fonte 8] Non tutti i pazzi
stanno al manicomio.[fonte 8] Non tutti possiamo abitare in piazza.[fonte 8]
Non tutti sono ammalati quelli che sono in letto.[fonte 8] Non tutti sono
infelici come credono.[fonte 8] Non tutti sono infermi quelli che gridano
ahi![fonte 8] Non tutti vedono la serpe che sta nascosta sotto l'erba.[fonte 4]
Non tutto il male vien per nuocere.[fonte 2] Non v'è mai tanta pace in
convento, come quando i frati portano tonache uguali.[fonte 8] Non vi è donna
senza amore.[fonte 8] Non vi è inganno che non si vinca con l'inganno.[fonte 4]
Non vi è lino senza resca, né donna senza pecca.[fonte 4] Non vi è nulla che
ricercando non si possa penetrare.[fonte 4] Non vi è peggior burla che la
vera.[fonte 4] Non vi fu mai gatta che non corresse ai topi.[fonte 8] Non
vendere la pelle dell'orso prima di averlo ucciso.[fonte 1] Non vo' dormire né
fare la guardia.[fonte 4] Notte, amore e vino fanno spesso l'uomo
meschino.[fonte 8] Novembre vinaio.[fonte 16] Nulla è così buono che a lungo
andare non venga a noia.[fonte 8] Nuovo padrone, nuova legge.[fonte 58] Nutri
il corvo e ti caverà gli occhi.[fonte 8] Nutri la serpe in seno, ti renderà
veleno.[fonte 8] O O taci, o di' cosa migliore del silenzio.[59][fonte 8]
Occhio che piange cuore che duole.[fonte 2] Occhio che piange cuore che
sente.[fonte 2] Occhio non vede, cuore non duole.[fonte 2] Occhio per occhio,
dente per dente.[60][fonte 2] Olio di lucerna ogni mal governa.[fonte 2] Oggi a
me domani a te.[fonte 2] Oggi allegria, domani malinconia.[fonte 8] Oggi
creditore, domani debitore.[fonte 8] Oggi fresco e forte, domani nella
morte.[fonte 8] Oggi in figura, domani in sepoltura.[fonte 8] Oggi in pace,
domani in guerra.[fonte 8] Oggi mercante, domani mendicante.[fonte 8] Oggi
pioggia e doman vento, tutto cambia in un momento.[fonte 8] Ogni Abele ha il suo
Caino.[fonte 4] Ogni animale per non morir s'aiuta.[fonte 188] Ogni bel gioco
dura poco.[fonte 1] Ogni bella scarpa diventa ciabatta, ogni bella donna
diventa nonna.[fonte 8] Ogni bene infine svanisce, ma la fama non
perisce.[fonte 4] Ogni cosa ch'è rara, suol essere più cara.[fonte 8] Ogni
disuguaglianza, l'amore uguaglia.[fonte 4] Ogni erba si conosce dal seme.[fonte
4] Ogni fatica merita ricompensa.[fonte 4] Ogni gatta ha il suo febbraio.[fonte
8] Ogni giorno non è festa.[fonte 4] Ogni giorno non si fanno nozze.[fonte 4]
Ogni grillo si crede cavallo.[fonte 8] Ogni lasciata è persa.[fonte 1] Ogni
legno ha il suo tarlo.[fonte 1] Ogni lucciola non è un fuoco.[fonte 8] Ogni
lumaca vede le corna delle altre.[fonte 189] Ogni matto fa il suo atto.[fonte
8] Ogni medaglia ha il suo rovescio.[fonte 1] Ogni pazzo vuol dar
consiglio.[fonte 8] Ogni pelo ha la sua ombra.[fonte 4] Ogni popolo ha il
governo che si merita.[fonte 190] Ogni promessa è debito.[fonte 1] Ogni rana si
crede gran dama.[fonte 8] Ogni rana si crede una Diana.[fonte 8] Ogni scimmia
trova belli i suoi scimmiotti.[fonte 8] Ogni serpe ha il suo veleno.[fonte 8]
Ogni simile ama il suo simile.[fonte 1] Ogni uccello fa il suo verso.[fonte 8]
Ogni uccello canta il suo verso.[fonte 191] Ognun patisce del suo
mestiere.[fonte 192] Ognuno trascura per sé i godimenti dell'arte sua, quasi
venutigli a noia perché ci ha guardato dentro: il cuoco non è mai ghiotto, il
calzolaio va colle scarpe rotte. Ognun per sé e Dio per tutti.[fonte 1] Ognun
vede le proprie oche come cigni.[fonte 8] Ognuno all'arte sua e il lupo alle
pecore.[fonte 2] Ognuno ama sentirsi lodare.[fonte 4] Ognuno che ha un gran
coltello, non è un boia.[fonte 4] Ognuno fa degli errori.[fonte 4] Ognuno
faccia il suo mestiere.[fonte 2] Ognuno ha i suoi gusti.[fonte 193] Ognuno ha
il suo affanno.[fonte 8] Ognuno ha la sua croce.[fonte 1] Ognuno tira l'acqua
al suo mulino.[fonte 2] Orto, uomo morto.[fonte 169] Orzo e paglia fanno il
caval da battaglia.[fonte 8] Ospite raro ospite caro.[fonte 1] Ottobre mostaio.[fonte
16] P Paese che vai usanza che trovi.[fonte 1] Paga il giusto per il
peccatore.[fonte 1] Pancia affamata, vita disperata.[fonte 4] Pancia piena non
crede a digiuno.[fonte 1] Pancia vuota non sente ragioni.[fonte 1] Parla
all'amico come se ti avesse a diventar nemico.[fonte 8] Pane finché dura, vino
con misura.[fonte 194] Parenti, amici, pioggia, dopo tre giorni vengono a
noia.[fonte 8] Parenti serpenti.[fonte 1] Parenti serpenti, cugini assassini,
fratelli coltelli.[fonte 2] Parere e non essere è come filare e non
tessere.[fonte 2] Parlare francese come una vacca spagnola.[fonte 4] Passata la
festa gabbato lo santo.[fonte 1] Passato il fiume scordato il santo.[fonte 4]
Patti chiari, amici cari.[fonte 2] Patti chiari amicizia lunga.[fonte 2] Pazzi
e buffoni hanno pari libertà.[fonte 8] Pazzo è colui che bada ai fatti
altrui.[fonte 8] Pazzo è quel prete che biasima le sue reliquie.[fonte 195]
Pazzo per natura, savio per scrittura.[fonte 8] Peccati vecchi, penitenza
nuova.[fonte 8] Peccato celato è mezzo perdonato.[61][fonte 196] Peccato
confessato è mezzo perdonato.[fonte 8] Per amore anche una donna onesta, può
perdere la testa.[fonte 8] Per chi vuol esser libero, non c'è catena che
tenga.[fonte 8] Per essere amabili, bisogna amare.[fonte 9] Per fare
l'elemosina non manca mai la borsa.[fonte 4] Per il galantuomo non ci sono
leggi.[fonte 8] Per il saggio le lacrime delle donne sono come gocce
salate.[fonte 4] Per imparare qualche cosa, non è mai troppo tardi.[fonte 4]
Per l'abbondanza del cuore la bocca parla.[fonte 4] Per l'oro, l'abate vende il
convento.[fonte 4] Per la santa Candelora[62] dell'inverno siamo fora, ma se
piove o tira vento, dell'inverno siamo dentro.[fonte 2] Per la santa Candelora
se tempesta o se gragnola dell'inverno siamo fora; ma se è sole o solicello
siamo solo a mezzo inverno.[fonte 2] Per natura tutti gli uomini sono simili;
per l'educazione diventano interamente diversi.[fonte 4] Per ogni civetta che
si sente cantare sul tetto, non bisogna metter lutto.[fonte 8] Per quanto alletti
la bellezza di un fiore, nessuno lo coglie se ha cattivo odore.[fonte 4] Per
san Lorenzo la noce è fatta.[fonte 2] Per San Lorenzo la noce si spacca nel
mezzo.[fonte 197] Per san Lorenzo piove dal cielo carbone ardente.[fonte 2] Per
Santa Caterina [25 novembre], le bestie fuori dalla cascina.[fonte 198] Per
trovare ingiustizie non occorrono lanterne.[fonte 4] Per un chiodo si perde un
ferro, e per un ferro un cavallo.[fonte 8] Per un punto Martin perse la
cappa.[63][fonte 2] Per una scopa formano un mercato tre donne e assordan tutto
il vicinato.[fonte 8] Perde le lacrime chi piange davanti al giudice.[fonte 4]
Perdona a tutti, ma non a te.[fonte 199] Perdonare è da uomini, scordare è da
bestie.[fonte 199] Pesce che va all'amo, cerca d'esser gramo.[fonte 8] Pianta a
cui spesso si muta luogo, non prende vigore.[fonte 4] Piccola fiamma non fa
gran luce.[fonte 8] Piccola pietra rovesciar può il carro.[fonte 8] Piccola
scintilla può bruciar la villa.[fonte 8] Piccole ruote portano gran pesi.[fonte
8] Piccolo ago scioglie stretto nodo.[fonte 8] Piglia il bene quando viene, ed
il male quando conviene.[fonte 8] Piove sempre sul bagnato.[fonte 2] Pisa, pesa
per chi posa.[fonte 8] Più alta la condizione, più si deve essere umili.[fonte
8] Più briccone, più fortunato.[fonte 4] Più il fiume è profondo, più scorre il
silenzio.[fonte 4] Più si chiacchiera, meno si ama.[fonte 8] Piuttosto un asino
che porti, che un cavallo che butti in terra.[fonte 87] Poca brigata vita
beata.[fonte 1] Poeta si nasce, oratori si diventa.[fonte 200] Poeti e Santi
campano tutti quanti.[fonte 201] Poeti, pittori e pellegrini a fare e a dire
sono indovini.[fonte 8] Polenta e latte bollito, in quattro salti è
digerito.[fonte 8] Portare frasconi a Vallombrosa.[fonte 4] Prendi la bruna per
amante e la bionda per moglie.[fonte 8] Preghiera di gatto e brontolio di pulce
non arrivano in cielo.[fonte 131] Preghiera umile entra in cielo.[fonte 8]
Presto e bene, raro avviene.[fonte 8] Prete spretato e cavolo riscaldato, non
fu mai buono.[64] Prevedere per provvedere e prevenire.[fonte 202] Prima della
morte non chiamare nessuno felice.[fonte 4] Prima di ammogliarsi bisogna fare
il nido.[fonte 4] Prima di andare alla pesca esamina ben bene la tua
rete.[fonte 8] Prima di domandare, pensa alla risposta.[fonte 203] Prima
lusingare e poi graffiare, è arte dei gatti.[fonte 8] Prodigo e bevitor di
vino, non fa né forno né mulino.[fonte 8] Pugliesi, cento per forca e un per
paese.[fonte 8] Puoi ben drizzare il tenero virgulto, non l'albero già fatto
adulto.[fonte 4] Putto in vino e donna in latino non fecero mai buon
fine.[fonte 4] Q Qual proposta tal risposta.[fonte 1] Qualche intervallo il
pazzo ha di saviezza, qualche intervallo il savio ha di stoltezza.[fonte 8]
Qualche volta anche Omero sonnecchia.[fonte 204] Quale uccello, tale il
nido.[fonte 205] Quand'anche si trapiantassero in paradiso, i cardi non
porterebbero mai rose.[fonte 8] Quando arriva la gloria svanisce la
memoria.[fonte 2] Quando c'è l'esercito, si trova anche il generale.[fonte 4]
Quando c'è la salute c'è tutto.[fonte 57] Quando canta la rana, la pioggia non
è lontana.[fonte 8] Quando ci sono molti galli a cantare non si fa mai
giorno.[fonte 16] Quando è alta la passione, è bassa la ragione.[fonte 206]
Quando è finito il raccolto dei datteri, ciascuno trova da ridire alla
palma.[fonte 8] Quando fischia l'orecchio dritto, il cuore è afflitto;
quando il manco, il cuore è franco.[fonte 8] Quando gli eretici si
accapigliano, la chiesa ha pace.[fonte 4] Quando il colombo ha il gozzo pieno,
le vecce gli sembrano amare.[fonte 8] Quando il culo è avvezzo al peto non si
può tenerlo cheto.[fonte 2] Quando il fanciullo è satollo anche il miele non ha
più gusto.[fonte 4] Quando il fanciullo ha sette anni, la ragione spunta in
lui.[fonte 207] Quando il gatto lecca il pelo viene acqua giù dal cielo.[fonte
38] Quando il gatto non c'è i topi ballano.[fonte 1] Quando il gatto non può
arrivare al lardo dice che è rancido.[fonte 8] Quando il gatto si lecca e si
sfrega le orecchie con la zampina, pioverà prima che sia mattina.[fonte 8]
Quando il gozzo è pieno, le ciliegie sono acerbe.[fonte 8] Quando il grano
ricasca, il contadino si rizza.[fonte 57] Quando il grano va a male, bisogna
ringraziare Dio per la paglia.[fonte 8] Quando il lardo è divorato, poco val
cacciare il gatto.[fonte 8] Quando il mandorlo non frutta, la semente ci va
tutta.[fonte 8] Quando il padrone zoppica, il servo non va diritto.[fonte 8]
Quando il sole splende, non ti curar della luna.[fonte 8] Quando il tempo è
chiaro in autunno, vento nell'inverno.[fonte 4] Quando in autunno sono grassi i
tassi e le lepri, l'inverno è rigoroso.[fonte 4] Quando l'amore è a pezzi non
c'è alcuna colla che lo riappiccichi.[fonte 8] Quando l'angelo diventa diavolo,
non c'è peggior diavolo.[fonte 4] Quando l'avaro muore, il danaro
respira.[fonte 4] Quando l'Italia suona la chitarra, la Spagna le nacchere, la
Francia il liuto, l'Irlanda l'arpa, la Germania la tromba, l'Inghilterra il
violino, l'Olanda il tamburo, nulla è uguale ad esse.[fonte 8] Quando la barba
fa bianchino, lascia la donna e tienti al vino.[fonte 208] Quando la cicala
canta in settembre, non comprare gran da vendere.[fonte 8] Quando la fame entra
dalla porta, l'amore esce dalla finestra.[fonte 8] Quando la grazia di Dio è
nel cuore, gli occhi nuotano nell'allegria.[fonte 4] Quando la guerra comincia
s'apre l'inferno.[fonte 4] Quando la neve si scioglie si scopre la
mondezza.[fonte 1] Quando la pera è matura casca da sé.[fonte 1] Quando la pera
è matura bisogna che caschi.[fonte 16] Quando la radice è tagliata, le foglie
se ne vanno.[fonte 8] Quando la ragione dorme, il cuore scappuccia.[fonte 8]
Quando la luna è bianca il tempo è bello; se è rossa, vuole dire vento; se
pallida, pioggia.[fonte 4] Quando la rana canta il tempo cambia.[fonte 8]
Quando non dice niente, non è dal savio il pazzo differente.[fonte 8] Quando
non sai, frequenta in domandare.[fonte 209] Quando piove col sole le vecchie
fanno l'amore.[fonte 1] Quando piove col sole il diavolo fa l'amore.[fonte 1]
Quando piove col sole le streghe fanno l'amore.[fonte 2] Quando piove col sole
si marita la volpe.[65][fonte 2] Quando piove d'agosto, piove miele e
mosto.[fonte 8] Quando si è in ballo bisogna ballare.[fonte 1] Quando si è
patito si è inclini a compatire.[fonte 4] Quando si mangia non si parla.[fonte
57] Quando sono fidanzate hanno sette mani e una lingua, quando sono sposate
hanno sette lingue e una mano.[fonte 8] Quando un amico chiede, non v'è
domani.[fonte 210] Quando un povero dà al ricco, Dio ride in cielo.[fonte 8]
Quando una cosa è accaduta, poco vale lamentarsi.[fonte 8] Quando viene la
forza, il diritto è morto.[fonte 4] Quanto più è alto il monte, tanto più
profonda la valle.[fonte 4] Quanto più la rana si gonfia, più presto
crepa.[fonte 8] Quanto più se n'ha, tanto più se ne vorrebbe.[fonte 4] Quattro
lumi non s'accendono.[fonte 2] Quattro nuove invenzioni vanta il mondo:
scorticare senza coltello, arrostire senza fuoco, lavare senza sapone, e invece
degli occhiali vedere attraverso le dita.[fonte 4] Quel ch'è innato per natura,
si porta alla sepoltura.[fonte 8] Quel ch'è raro, è stimato.[fonte 8] Quel che
con l'acqua mischia e guasta il vino, merita di bere il mare a capo
chino.[fonte 8] Quel che è disposto in cielo, conviene che sia.[fonte 4] Quel,
che è fatto, è fatto, e non si può fare, che fatto non sia.[fonte 211] Quel che
è fatto è reso.[fonte 2] Quel che non può l'ìngegno, può spesso la
fortuna.[fonte 4] Quel che non puoi pagare col denaro, pagalo almeno col
ringraziamento.[fonte 8] Quel che è gioco per il forte per il debole è
morte.[fonte 8] Quel che si dà al ricco, si ruba al povero.[fonte 8] Quel che
si fa a fin di bene, non dispiace mai a Dio.[fonte 4] Quel che si fa
all'oscuro, appare al sole.[fonte 4] Quel che supera il mio intelletto, lo
lascio stare.[fonte 4] Quella bellezza l'uomo saggio apprezza che dura sempre,
fino alla vecchiaia.[fonte 4] Quelli che hanno meno ingegno, ne hanno da
vendere più degli altri.[fonte 4] Quello che abbaia è il cane sdentato.[fonte
4] Quello che deve durare per l'eternità non si deve scrivere con
l'acqua.[fonte 4] Quello che è accaduto ieri, può accadere oggi.[fonte 4]
Quello che è passato, è scordato.[fonte 4] Quello che ha da essere, sarà.[fonte
4] Quello che non avviene oggi, può avvenire domani.[fonte 4] Quello che non è
stato può essere.[fonte 4] Quello che non può l'intelletto, può spesso il
caso.[fonte 4] Quello che puoi fare oggi, non rimandarlo a domani.[fonte 4]
Quello che si dice all'eco nel bosco, il bosco lo ripete.[fonte 4] Quello che
si impara in gioventù, non si dimentica mai più.[fonte 4] Quello che si usa non
si scusa.[fonte 212] Quello è mio zio, che vuole il bene mio.[fonte 4] Quello è
un fanciullo accorto che conosce suo padre.[fonte 4] Questo devi sapere che la
gelosia di un Arabo è la stessa gelosia.[fonte 4] Quieta non muovere.[fonte 16]
R Raglio d'asino non giunse mai al cielo.[fonte 2] Rana di palude sempre si
salva.[fonte 8] Rane, malsane.[fonte 8] Render nuovi benefici all'ingratitudine
è la virtù di Dio e dei veri uomini grandi.[fonte 8] Ricchezza mal disposta a povertà
s'accosta.[fonte 8] Ricchezze nell'India, sapere in Europa, e pompa fra gli
ottomani.[fonte 8] Ricchi e poveri non portano che un lenzuolo all'altro
mondo.[fonte 8] Ricco e grande fortuna potrà farti, ma mai il comune senso
potrà darti.[fonte 4] Ricorda che il nemico può diventarti amico.[fonte 8] Ride
ben chi ride ultimo.[fonte 2] Ride ben chi ride l'ultimo.[fonte 2] Roba calda
il corpo non salda.[fonte 213] Roba d'altri, tutti scaltri.[fonte 4] Roma, a
chi nulla in cent'anni, a chi molto in tre dì.[fonte 8] Roma non fu fatta in un
giorno.[fonte 2] Roma santa, Aquila bella, Napoli galante.[fonte 214] Rosso di
mattina, pioggia vicina.[fonte 215] Rosso di sera bel tempo si spera; rosso di
mattina acqua vicina.[fonte 2] Rosso di sera, buon tempo si spera; rosso di
mattina mal tempo si avvicina.[fonte 1] Rosso e giallaccio pare bello ad ogni
faccia, verde e turchino si deve essere più che bellino.[fonte 216] Rovo, in
buona terra covo.[fonte 169] S Salta chi può.[fonte 1] San Benedetto[66] la
rondine sotto il tetto.[fonte 2] San Lorenzo dalla gran calura.[fonte 2] San
Pietro abbracciato, Cristo negato.[fonte 4] San Silvestro [31 dicembre] l'oliva
nel canestro.[fonte 2] Sangue giovane sempre spavaldo.[fonte 8] Sasso che
rotola non fa muschio.[fonte 47] Pietra che rotola non fa muschio.[fonte 2]
Sbagliando s'impara.[fonte 1] Scalda più l'amore che mille fuochi.[fonte 8]
Scherza coi fanti e lascia stare i Santi.[fonte 1] Scherzando intorno al lume
che t'invita, farfalla perderai l'ali e la vita.[fonte 65] Scherzo di mano,
scherzo di villano.[fonte 1] Gioco di mano, gioco di villano.[fonte 1] Schiena
di mulo, corso di barca, buon per chi n'accatta.[fonte 8] Scusa non richiesta,
accusa manifesta.[67][fonte 217] Se ari male, peggio mieterai.[fonte 47] Se
fossero buoni i nipoti non si leverebbero dalla vigna.[fonte 218] Se gioventù
sapesse, se vecchiaia potesse.[fonte 167] Se i gatti sapessero volare, le
beccacce sarebbero rare.[fonte 131] Se il coltivatore non è più forte della su'
terra questa finisce per divorarlo.[fonte 47] Se il ladro lasciasse il suo
rubare, non ci sarebbero più forche.[fonte 4] Se il giovane sapesse di quanto
ha bisogno la vecchiaia, chiuderebbe spesso la borsa.[fonte 4] Se il padre di
famiglia è miope, i servi sono ciechi.[fonte 8] Se il piede destro è zoppo, Dio
rafforza il sinistro.[fonte 8] Se il poeta s'erige a oratore predicherà agli
orecchi e non al cuore.[fonte 8] Se il primo bottone hai fatto essere secondo,
tutti sbagliati saranno da cima a fondo.[fonte 4] Se il re sputa sopra un abete
si chiama subito abete reale.[fonte 4] Se il ricco conoscesse la fame del
povero, gli darebbe del suo pane.[fonte 8] Se il ringraziare costasse denaro,
molti se lo terrebbero in tasca.[fonte 8] Se il tuo gatto è ladro non
scacciarlo di casa.[fonte 8] Se il virtuoso è povero, il lodarlo non basta; il
dovere primo è d'aiutarlo.[fonte 8] Se la pazzia fosse dolore, in ogni casa si
sentirebbe stridere.[fonte 8] Se le lattughe lasci in guardia alle oche, al
ritorno ne troverai ben poche.[fonte 219] Se ne vanno gli amori e restano i
dolori.[fonte 4] Se nessuno sa quel che sai, a nulla serve il tuo sapere.[fonte
8] Se non è zuppa è pan bagnato.[fonte 1] Se non hai mai rubato, la parola
ladro non è per te un'ingiuria.[fonte 4] Se occhio non mira, cuor non sospira.[fonte
8] Se ognun spazzasse da casa sua, tutta la città sarebbe netta.[fonte 220] Se
piovesse oro, la gente si stancherebbe a raccoglierlo.[fonte 8] Se son rose
fioriranno.[fonte 1] Se ti vuoi nutrire bene, fai ballare i trentadue.[fonte 8]
Se un fratello compie un omicidio, gli altri non sono responsabili.[fonte 4] Se
vuoi che t'ami, fa' che ti brami.[fonte 8] Se vuoi portare l'uomo a
incretinire, fallo ingelosire.[fonte 4] Segui il filo e troverai il
gomitolo.[fonte 4] Senza denari non canta un cieco.[fonte 1] Senza denari non
si canta messa.[fonte 1] Senza umiltà tutte le virtù sono vizi.[fonte 8] Sempre
ti graffierà chi nacque gatto.[fonte 8] Senza umanità non vi è né virtù, né
vero coraggio, né gloria durevole.[fonte 8] Seren d'inverno e nuvolo d'estate, non
ti fidare.[fonte 4] Sette in un colpo! disse quel sarto che aveva ammazzato
sette mosche.[fonte 8] [wellerismo] Settembre, l'uva è fatta e il fico
pende.[fonte 16] Si bacia il fanciullo a causa della madre, e la madre a causa
del fanciullo.[fonte 4] Si deve alzare di buon'ora chi vuol contentare i suoi
vicini.[fonte 8] Si dice il peccato, ma non il peccatore.[fonte 2] Si mantiene
un esercito per mille giorni, e non se ne fa uso che per un momento.[fonte 4]
Si parla del diavolo e spuntano le corna.[fonte 130] Si può conoscere la tua
opinione dal tuo sbadigliare.[fonte 8] Si può vivere senza fratelli ma non
senza amici.[68] Si stava meglio quando si stava peggio.[69][fonte 2] Sia
l'astrologo che l'indovina ti portano alla rovina.[fonte 4] Sicuro come il pane.[fonte
4] Sin che si vive, s'impara sempre.[fonte 4] Sol gente di mal'affare, bestie e
botte, van fuori di notte.[fonte 221] Son padrone del mondo oggi le donne e
cedon toghe e spade a cuffie e gonne.[fonte 8] Sono meglio cento beffe che un
danno.[fonte 4] Sono sempre gli stracci che vanno all'aria.[fonte 1] Sopra
l'albero caduto ognuno corre a fare legna.[fonte 4] Sopra ogni vino, il greco è
divino.[fonte 8] Sotto la neve pane, sotto l'acqua fame.[fonte 1] Spesso a
chiaro mattino, v'è torbida sera.[fonte 222] Spesso chi commette
un'ingiustizia, ne subisce una peggiore.[fonte 4] Spesso vince più l'umiltà che
il ferro.[fonte 8] Sposa bagnata sposa fortunata.[fonte 223] Stretta la foglia,
larga la via dite la vostra che ho detto la mia.[fonte 2] Larga la foglia,
stretta la via dite la vostra che ho detto la mia.[fonte 2] Stringe più la
camicia che la gonnella.[fonte 4] Studia non per sapere di più, ma per sapere
meglio degli altri.[fonte 224] Studio in gioventù, onore alla vecchiaia.[fonte
4] Sulla pelle della serpe nessuno guarda alle macchie.[fonte 8] Superbia
povera spiace anche al diavolo; umiltà ricca piace anche a Dio.[fonte 8] T
T'annoia il tuo vicino? Prestagli uno zecchino.[fonte 4] Tagliare i capelli con
la pentola.[fonte 225] Tagliarli male. Tal lascia l'arrosto che poi brama il
fumo.[fonte 4] Tale padre, tale figlio.[70][fonte 2] Tanti galli a cantar non
fa mai giorno.[fonte 1] Tanti idoli, tanti templi.[fonte 4] Tanti pochi fanno
un assai.[fonte 226] Tanto fumo e poco arrosto.[fonte 2] Tanto l'amore quanto
il fuoco devono essere attizzati.[fonte 8] Tanto l'amore quanto la minestra di
fagioli vogliono uno sfogo.[fonte 8] Tanto va la gatta al lardo che ci lascia
lo zampino.[fonte 1] Tempo chiaro e dolce a capodanno, assicura bel tempo tutto
l'anno.[fonte 8] Tenga bene a mente un bugiardo quando mente.[fonte 4] Tentar
non nuoce.[fonte 1] Terra assai, terra poca.[fonte 169] Terra bianca, tosto
stanca.[fonte 227] Terra coltivata raccolta sperata.[fonte 2] Terra nera buon
grano mena.[fonte 2] Testa di lucertola, collo di gru, gambe di ragno, pancia
di vacca, groppa di baldracca.[fonte 8] Testa di pazzo non incanutisce
mai.[fonte 8] Tinca di maggio e luccio di settembre.[fonte 8] Tinca in camicia,
luccio in pelliccia.[fonte 8] Tira più un pelo di fica che cento paia di
buoi.[fonte 2] Tira più un capello di donna che cento paia di buoi.[fonte 8]
Tolta la causa, cessato l'effetto.[fonte 8] Tondi l'agnello e lascia il
porcello.[fonte 8] Torinesi e Monferrini, pane, vino e tamburini.[fonte 8] Tra
cani non si mordono.[fonte 1] Tra i due litiganti il terzo gode.[fonte 1] Tra
il dire e il fare c'è di mezzo il mare.[fonte 1] Tra l'incudine e il martello,
mano non metta chi ha cervello.[fonte 4] Tra moglie e marito non mettere il
dito.[fonte 1] Tradimento piace assai, traditor non piace mai.[fonte 148]
Trattar male il povero è il disonor del ricco.[fonte 8] Tre cose cacciano
l'uomo di casa: fumo, goccia e femmina arrabbiata.[fonte 4] Tre cose fanno
l'uomo ammalato: amore, vino e bagno.[fonte 8] Tre cose simili: prete, avvocato
e morte. Il prete toglie dal vivo e dal morto; l'avvocato vuol del diritto e
del torto; e la morte vuole il debole e il forte.[fonte 142] Tre cose sono
rare: un buon melone, un buon amico e una buona moglie.[fonte 8] Tre sono le
meraviglie, Napoli, Roma e la faccia tua.[fonte 228] Trenta monaci e un abate
non farebbero bere un asino per forza.[fonte 4] Triste e guai, chi crede troppo
e chi non crede mai.[fonte 8] Triste quel cane che si lascia prendere la coda
in mano.[fonte 8] Triste quell'estate, che ha saggina e rape.[fonte 8] Tromba
di culo, sanità di corpo.[fonte 213] Troppa manna, nausea.[fonte 8] Troppa
modestia è orgoglio mascherato.[fonte 8] Troppe soddisfazioni tolgono ogni
voglia.[fonte 8] Troppi cuochi guastano la cucina.[fonte 1] Troppo povero e
troppo ricco fa ugual disgrazia.[fonte 8] Tu scherzi col tuo gatto e
l'accarezzi, ma so ben io qual fine avran quei vezzi.[fonte 8] Turchi e
Tartari, flagelli dei popoli.[fonte 229] Tutta la strada non fallisce il saggio
che, accortosi a metà, corregge il viaggio.[fonte 4] Tutte le cose sono
difficili prima di diventar facili.[fonte 70] Tutte le strade portano a
Roma.[fonte 1] Tutte le volpi si ritrovano in pellicceria.[fonte 2] Tutte le
volpi si rivedono in pellicceria.[fonte 2] Tutte le volte che si ride si toglie
un chiodo dalla cassa.[fonte 230] Tutti del pazzo tronco abbiamo un ramo.[fonte
8] Tutti i fiumi vanno al mare.[fonte 1] Tutti i giorni sono buoni per andare a
caccia. ma non per prendere uccelli.[fonte 4] Tutti i guai son guai, ma il guaio
senza pane è il più grosso.[fonte 1] Tutti i gusti son gusti.[fonte 1] Tutti i
mestieri danno il pane.[fonte 231] Tutti i nodi vengono al pettine.[fonte 1]
Tutti i peccati mortali sono femmine.[fonte 8] Tutti i salmi finiscono in
gloria.[fonte 1] Tutti siamo figli di Adamo ed Eva.[fonte 190] Tutto ciò che
dura a lungo annoia.[fonte 8] Tutto è bene quel che finisce bene.[71][fonte 1]
Tutto il cervello non è in una testa.[fonte 4] Tutto il mondo è
paese.[72][fonte 1] Tutto quello che è bianco non è farina.[fonte 4] Tutto
s'accomoda fuorché l'osso del collo.[fonte 31] U Uccellin che mette coda vuol
mangiare a tutte l'ore.[fonte 2] Uccello raro ha nido raro.[fonte 8] Ucci ucci,
sento odor di cristianucci.[fonte 2] Umiltà e cortesia adornano più di una veste
tessuta d'oro.[fonte 8] Un bel tacer non fu mai scritto.[73][fonte 2] Un'anima
magnanima consulta le altre; un'anima volgare disprezza i consigli.[fonte 8]
Un'oncia di allegria vale più di una libbra di tristezza.[fonte 232] Un'ora di
contento sconta cent'anni di tormento.[fonte 233] Un abete non fa
foresta.[fonte 4] Un bell'abito è una lettera di raccomandazione.[fonte 4] Un
buon abate loda sempre il suo convento.[fonte 4] Un buon principio va sempre a
buon fine.[fonte 4] Un cattivo libro ha spesso un buon titolo, ed una fronte
onesta, un cervello ribaldo.[fonte 4] Un cuor magnanimo vuol sempre il bene,
anche se il premio mai non ottiene.[fonte 8] Un esercito senza generale è come
un corpo senz'anima.[fonte 4] Un fido amico, e ricchezze ben acquistate son due
cose rare.[fonte 8] Un fratello aiuta l'altro.[fonte 4] Un granello fa
traboccare la bilancia.[fonte 4] Un granello di polvere fa scoppiare tutta la
bomba.[fonte 4] Un ladro non ruba sempre, ma bisogna guardarsi da lui.[fonte 4]
Un lume è più presto spento che acceso.[fonte 4] Un male tira l'altro.[fonte 4]
Un padre campa cento figli e cento figli non campano un padre.[fonte 2] Un
pazzo ne fa cento.[fonte 8] Un piccolo buco fa affondare un gran
bastimento.[fonte 8] Un povero virtuoso val più di un ricco vizioso.[fonte 8]
Una bella barba e un cuor valente adornano l'uomo.[fonte 4] Una bella giornata
non fa estate.[fonte 4] Una bella lacrima trova facilmente un fazzoletto che la
asciughi.[fonte 4] Una bugia ha bisogno di sette bugie.[fonte 4] Una buona risata
si trasforma tutta in buon sangue.[fonte 232] Una ciliegia tira l'altra.[fonte
2] Una cosa tira l'altra.[fonte 16] Una estate vale più di dieci inverni.[fonte
4] Una parola tira l'altra.[fonte 2] Una e buona.[fonte 16] Una ma buona.[fonte
16] Una fa, due stentano, ma a tre ci vuol la serva.[fonte 8] Una Fenice fra le
donne è quella, che altra donna confessa essere bella.[fonte 8] Una mano lava
l'altra e tutte e due lavano il viso.[fonte 1] Una mela al giorno leva il
medico di torno.[fonte 2] Una ne paga cento.[fonte 1] Una ne paga tutte.[fonte
1] Una rondine non fa primavera.[fonte 1] Un fiore non fa giardino.[fonte 4] Un
fiore non fa primavera.[fonte 4] Una volta corre il cane e una volta la
lepre.[fonte 1] Una volta per uno non fa male a nessuno.[fonte 1] Uno semina,
l'altro raccoglie.[fonte 72] Uno si fa la sorte da sé, l'altro la riceve bell'e
fatta.[fonte 8] Uomo a cavallo, sepoltura aperta.[fonte 2] Uomo avvisato mezzo
salvato.[fonte 1] Uomo da nessuno invidiato, è uomo non fortunato.[fonte 4] Uomo
di vino, non vale un quattrino.[fonte 8] Uomo morto non fa più guerra.[fonte
234] Uomo senza quattrini è un morto che cammina.[fonte 2] Uomo solitario, o
angelo o demone.[fonte 235] Uomo zelante, uomo amante.[fonte 4] L'uomo misero è
un morto che cammina.[fonte 2] Uovo di un'ora, pane di un giorno, vino di un
anno, donna di quindici e amici di trent'anni.[fonte 8] V Va' in piazza vedi e
odi, torna a casa bevi e godi.[fonte 236] Va più di un asino al mercato.[fonte
4] Val più un piacere da farsi che cento di quelli fatti.[fonte 8] Val più una
messa in vita che cento in morte.[fonte 4] Vale più la pratica che la
grammatica.[fonte 1] Vale più un fatto che cento parole.[fonte 237] Vale più un
gusto che un casale.[fonte 1] Vale più un testimone di vista che cento
d'udito.[fonte 2] Vale più uno a fare.[fonte 16] Vanga e zappa non vuol
digiuno.[fonte 47] Vanga piatta poco attacca, vanga ritta terra ricca, vanga
sotto ricca il doppio.[fonte 2] Vecchi doni vogliono nuovi
ringraziamenti.[fonte 8] Vecchiaia d'aquila, giovinezza d'allodola.[fonte 4]
Vedere e non toccare è una cosa da crepare.[fonte 2] Vedere per credere.[fonte
238] Vento fresco mare crespo.[fonte 239] Ventre pieno non crede a
digiuno.[fonte 16] Ventre vuoto non sente ragioni.[fonte 16] Vesti un legno, pare
un regno.[fonte 41] Vi sono dei matti savi, e dei savi matti.[fonte 8] Vicino
alla chiesa lontano da Dio.[fonte 2] Vicino alla serpe c'è il biacco.[fonte 8]
Vigna nel sasso e orto in terren grasso.[fonte 240] Vincere un ambo al lotto è
un malefizio, che più accresce la speranza al vizio.[fonte 8] Vino amaro,
tienilo caro.[fonte 8] Vino battezzato non vale un fiato.[fonte 8] Vino
battezzato, non va al palato.[fonte 8] Vino dentro, senno fuori.[fonte 8] Vino
di fiasco la sera buono e la mattina guasto.[fonte 8] Vino e sdegno fan palese
ogni disegno.[fonte 8] Vino non è buono che non rallegra l'uomo.[fonte 8]
Violenza non dura a lungo.[fonte 241] Vivi e lascia vivere.[fonte 1] Vizio di
natura fino alla fossa dura.[fonte 2] Vizio di natura, fino alla morte dura.[fonte
242] Voglia di lavorar saltami addosso, lavora tu per me che io non
posso.[fonte 243] Voglio piuttosto un asino che mi porti, che un cavallo che mi
getti in terra.[fonte 4] Volpe che dorme, ebreo che giura, donna che piange,
malizie sopraffine colle frange.[fonte 4] Note Cfr. voce dedicata su
Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. Matteo, 6,
34. La locuzione latina gutta cavat lapidem (letteralmente "la
goccia perfora la pietra") venne utilizzata da Tito Lucrezio Caro, Publio
Ovidio Nasone e Albio Tibullo. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. voce
dedicata su Wikipedia. Titolo di un'opera di Achille Campanile del 1930,
passato a proverbio e modo di dire comune. Cfr. Petrarca: «La vita el
fin, e 'l dí loda la sera». Cfr. Giacomo Leopardi: «Amore, | amor, di
nostra vita ultimo inganno, | t'abbandonava». Cfr. voce dedicata su
Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. Giovanni Verga, I
Malavoglia. Slogan pubblicitario degli anni Ottanta. Cfr. Gesù,
Discorso della Montagna: «Cercate e troverete; bussate e vi sarà aperto; perché
chiunque chiede riceve, e chi cerca trova». Cfr. Gesù, Vangelo secondo
Matteo: «Rimetti la spada nel fodero, perché tutti quelli che mettono mano alla
spada periranno di spada». Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr.
voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Citato
in Giovanni Battista Rossi, Conferenze popolari per gli uomini nel tempo degli
esercizi spirituali, Tappi, Torino, 1896, p. 164. Citato nel film Riso
amaro. Citato in Dizionario Italiano Olivetti,
dizionario-italiano.it. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. Libro
di Osea: «E poiché hanno seminato vento | raccoglieranno tempesta». Cfr.
attribuite a Papa Bonifacio VIII: «Qui tacet, consentire videtur». Cfr.
voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr.
Cristoforo Poggiali, Proverbj, motti e sentenze ad uso ed istruzione del
popolo, 1821: «Chi dà a credenza, molte merci spaccia; | Ma un presto
fallimento si procaccia». Cfr. Appio Claudio Cieco, Sententiae: «Quisque
faber fortunae suae.» Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. La frase è
attribuita (Niccolò Machiavelli, Istorie fiorentine, II, 3; Giovanni Villani,
Nuova Cronica, VI, 38) a Mosca dei Lamberti che, nel 1215, a Firenze, convinse
così gli Amidei a uccidere Buondelmonte de' Buondelmonti; dal delitto nacquero
le fazioni dei guelfi e dei ghibellini. Citato anche nella Divina Commedia di
Dante Alighieri (Inferno, 28, 106-108): Gridò: "Ricordera' ti anche del
Mosca, | che disse, lasso!, 'Capo ha cosa fatta', | che fu mal seme per la
gente tosca". È possibile che Mosca dei Lamberti adattò al momento un
proverbio già noto ai suoi tempi (Giuseppe Fumagalli, Chi l'ha detto?, Hoepli,
1921); secondo l'Accademia della Crusca (Dizionario della lingua italiana,
1827) corrisponderebbe al latino «Factum infectum fieri nequit». Cfr.
Gesù, Vangelo secondo Matteo: «Rendete dunque a Cesare quel che è di Cesare e a
Dio quel che è di Dio». Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. voce
dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. Philippe Néricault Destouches, Le Glorieux,
atto II, scena V: «La critique est aisée, et l'art est difficile.». Cfr.
«Facta lex inventa fraus.» Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr.
voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Riferito all'uso di numeri civici di colore
nero per le abitazioni e rosso per gli esercizi commerciali. Cfr. Michail
Aleksandrovič Bakunin: «Il caffè, per esser buono, deve essere nero come la
notte, dolce come l'amore e caldo come l'inferno». Cfr. Blaise Pascal:
«Il cuore ha le sue ragioni che la ragione non conosce». Cfr. voce
dedicata su Wikipedia. Nei dialetti siciliani e nel napoletano l'arancia
viene chiamata portogallo. La spiegazione è in Strafforello, vol. III, p.
329. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Veste da lavoro usata,
specialmente in Toscana, da contadini e operai. Cfr. voce dedicata su
Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su
Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su
Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su
Wikipedia. Cfr. Ippocrate: «La vita è breve, l'arte è lunga, l'occasione
è fugace, l'esperienza è fallace, il giudizio è difficile». Citato in
Dizionario Italiano, dizionario-italiano.it. Cfr. voce dedicata su
Wikipedia. Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. itato in Dizionario
Italiano Olivetti. Cfr. Gesù, Vangelo secondo Luca: «Nessun profeta è ben
accetto in patria». Cfr. Etica della reciprocità. Cfr. anche
Salvator Rosa, iscrizione riportato su un autoritratto: «Aut tace | aut loquere
meliora | silentio.». Questo detto, ripreso dal Libro dell'Esodo («occhio
per occhio, dente per dente, mano per mano, piede per piede, bruciatura per
bruciatura, ferita per ferita, livido per livido»), è chiamato Legge del
taglione. Il proverbio compare in una novella del Decameron di Giovanni
Boccaccio (la quarta della prima giornata). Cfr. Focus storia n. 49, novembre
2010, p. 74. 2 febbraio: in tale giorno la Chiesa cattolica celebra la
presentazione al Tempio di Gesù (Luca 2,22-39), popolarmente chiamata festa
della Candelora, perché in questo giorno si benedicono le candele, simbolo di
Cristo. La festa è anche detta della Purificazione di Maria, perché, secondo
l'usanza ebraica, una donna era considerata impura del sangue mestruale per un
periodo di 40 giorni dopo il parto di un maschio e doveva andare al Tempio per
purificarsi: il 2 febbraio cade appunto 40 giorni dopo il 25 dicembre.
Cfr. voce dedicata su Wikipedia. Citato in Vocabolario degli accademici
della Crusca, vol II, parte 2, Tipografia Galileiana di M. Cellini e c.,
Firenze, 1863, p. 726. Una leggenda simile esiste anche in Giappone: i
demoni-volpe (le kitsune) preferirebbero celebrare i loro matrimoni sotto la
pioggia mentre splende il sole; il regista Akira Kurosawa ne prese spunto per
il primo episodio (Raggi di sole nella pioggia) del film Sogni (1990). 21
marzo, prima della riforma del calendario liturgico del 1969. Cfr.
Proverbio latino medievale: Excusatio non petita, accusatio manifesta.
Citato in Macfarlane, p. 256. Attribuita a Francesco Domenico
Guerrazzi. Cfr. Libro di Ezechiele: «Ecco, ogni esperto di proverbi dovrà
dire questo proverbio a tuo riguardo: Quale la madre, tale la figlia».
Titolo di una commedia di William Shakespeare, scritta fra il 1602 e il 1603.
Cfr. Petronio Arbitro, Satyricon, 45, 4. Cfr. Iacopo Badoer: «Un bel
tacer | mai scritto fu». Fonti Citato ne Il nuovo Zingarelli.
Citato in Lapucci. Citato in Carlo Volpini, 516 proverbi sul cavallo,
Cisalpino-Goliardica, 1984. Citato in Donato. Citato in Max Pfister,
Lessico etimologico italiano, vol. 3, Reichert, 1987. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 14. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 29. Citato in
Selene. Citato in Marino Ferrini, I proverbi dei nonni, Il Leccio,
2002³. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 52. Citato in Schwamenthal, §
78. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 85. Citato in Schwamenthal, §
122. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 123. Citato in Schwamenthal, §
131. Citato in Vocabolario della lingua italiana. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 170. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 118. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 278. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 235. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 242. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 243. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 255. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 281. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 281. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 288. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 290. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 290. Citato in
Castagna 1866, p. 137. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 317. Citato in
Vezio Melegari, Manuale della barzelletta, Mondadori, Milano, 1976, p.
35. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 352. Citato in Francesco Protonotari,
Nuova antologia di scienze, lettere ed arti, volume settimo, Direzione della
nuova antologia, Firenze, 1868, p. 454. Citato in Grisi, p. 34.
Citato in Daniela Schembri Volpe, 101 perché sulla storia di Torino che non puoi
non sapere, Newton Compton Editori, 2018, p. 121. ISBN 978-88-227-2521-9
Citato in Pescetti, p. 123. Citato in Grisi, p. 254. Citato in
Paronuzzi, p. 68. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 585. Citato in Giulio
Franceschi, Proverbi e modi proverbiali italiani, Hoepli, 1908. Citato in
Macfarlane, p. 83. Citato in Grisi, p. 24. Citato in Schwamenthal,
§ 768. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 804. Citato in Schwamenthal, §
805. Citato in Volpini, p. 137. Citato in Francesco Picchianti, Proverbi
italiani, A. Salani, 1886. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 848. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 854. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 878. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 886. Citato in Castagna 1866, p. 172. Citato in
Grisi, p. 113. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 906. Citato in Augusto
Arthaber, Dizionario comparato di proverbi e modi proverbiali, Hoepli,
1972. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 276. Citato in Temistocle
Franceschi, Atlante paremiologico italiano, Edizioni dell'Orso, 2000.
Citato in Macfarlane, p. 214. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 1066.
Citato in Grisi, p. 11. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 171. Citato in
Amadeus Voldben, Il giardino della saggezza, Amedeo Rotondi, 1967. Citato
in Niccolò Tommaseo e Bernardo Bellini, Dizionario della lingua italiana, 1872,
Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, vol. IV, p. 369. Citato in
Macfarlane, p. 281. Citato in Grisi, p. 106. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 1324. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 1365. Citato in
Giuseppe Fumagalli, Chi l'ha detto?, Hoepli, 1921, p. 583. Citato in
Grisi, p. 247. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 194. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 1541. Citato in Emanuel Strauss, Concise Dictionary of
European Proverbs, Routledge, 2013. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 112.
Citato in Giuseppe Giusti, Dizionario dei proverbi italiani. Citato in
Macfarlane, p. 364. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 299. Citato in
Macfarlane, p. 122. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 1742. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 1744. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 1753. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 1754. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 1762. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 1788. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 1796. Citato in
Filippo Moisè, Storia della Toscana dalla fondazione di Firenze fino ai nostri
giorni, V. Batelli e compagni, 1848, p. 73 Citato in Schwamenthal, §
1821. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 476. Citato in Macfarlane, p.
399. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 1933. Citato in Alfani, p. 75.
Citato in Macfarlane, p. 103. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 1994.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2034. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2035.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2047. Citato in Castagna 1866, p. 56. Citato
in Schwamenthal, § 2142. Citato in Paola Guazzotti e Maria Federica
Oddera, Il Grande dizionario dei proverbi italiani, Zanichelli, 2006.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2168. Citato in Grisi, p. 145. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 2245. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2253. Citato in
Valter Boggione, Chi dice donna, POMBA, 2005. Citato in Schwamenthal, §
2357. Citato in Salvatore Battaglia, Grande Dizionario della Lingua
Italiana, VII Grav - Ing, Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, Torino, 1972,
p. 331. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 144. Citato in Grisi, p. 62.
Citato in Donalda Feroldi, Elena Dal Pra, Dizionario analogico della lingua
italiana, Zanichelli, Bologna, 2011. ISBN 9788808090898 Citato in
Giuseppe Pittàno, Frase fatta capo ha. Dizionario dei modi di dire, proverbi e
locuzioni, Zanichelli, 1992. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2610. Citato
in Piero Angela, Ti amerò per sempre: La scienza dell'amore, Mondadori, Milano,
2005, p. 68. ISBN 88-04-51490-6 Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2697.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2769. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2771.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2783. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 231.
Citato in Macfarlane, p. 89. Citato in Florio, lettera G. Citato in
Gutta cavat lapidem. Indagini fraseologiche e paremiologiche, a cura di Elena
Dal Maso, Carmen Navarro, Universitas Studiorum, 2016, Mantova, p. 427.
Citato in Gustavo Strafforello, La sapienza del mondo: ovvero, Dizionario
universale dei proverbi, A.F. Negro, 1883, p.279. Citato in Paronuzzi, p.
72. Citato in Silvia Merialdo, Genova. Una guida, Odòs Libreria Editrice,
Udine, p. 134. ISBN 9788896303559 Citato in Castagna 1869, p. 72.
Citato in Macfarlane, p. 230. Citato in Castagna 1866, p. 178.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 666. Citato in Anna Fata, Lo zen e l'arte di
cucinare, Edizioni Il Punto d'Incontro, Vicenza, 2010, p. 178. ISBN
978-88-8093-714-2 Citato in Salvatore Battaglia, Grande Dizionario della
Lingua Italiana, XII Orad - Pere, Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, Torino,
1984, p. 1065. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 389. Citato in Dizionario
di Italiano, corriere.it, diavolo. Citato in Paronuzzi, p. 70.
Citato in Roberto Allegri, 1001 cose da sapere e da fare con il tuo gatto,
Newton Compton, Roma, 2014, § 100. ISBN 978-88-541-6678-3 Citato in
Brigitte Bulard-Cordeau, Il piccolo libro dei gatti, traduzione di Giovanni
Zucca, Fabbri Editori, Milano, 2012, p. 40. ISBN 978-88-58-66237-3 Citato
in Schwamenthal, § 2784. Citato in Grisi, p. 11. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 3037. Citato in Castagna 1866, p. 151. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 3266. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 4058. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 3274. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 263. Citato in
Strafforello, vol. III, p. 329. Citato in Grisi, p. 211. Citato in
Volpini, p. 47. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 4901. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 5487. Citato in Castagna 1869, p. 291. Citato in
Macfarlane, p. 327. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 211. Citato in Paola
Guazzotti, Maria Federica Oddera, Il grande dizionario dei proverbi italiani,
in riga edizioni, Bologna, 2020. ISBN 9788893642057 Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 440. Citato in Paolo De Nardis, L'invidia. Un rompicapo
per le scienze sociali, Meltemi Editore, 2000, p. 38. ISBN 8883530527
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2555. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 411.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2248. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2779.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2780. Citato in Grisi, p. 130. Citato in
Luigi Pozzoli, Sul respiro di Dio. Commento alle letture festive. Anno B,
Paoline, Milano, 1999, p. 14. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 3129. Citato
in Grisi, p. 265. Citato in Grisi, p. 270. Citato in Macfarlane, p.
412. Citato in Grisi, p. 303. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 311.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 2350. Citato in Ann H. Swenson, Proverbi e modi
proverbiali, Nerbini, 1931. Citato in Grisi, p. 109. Citato in Ugo
Rossi-Ferrini, Proverbi agricoli, I Fermenti, 1931. Citato in Grisi, p.
39. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 3271. Citato in Castagna 1866, p.
18. Citato in Carlo Giuseppe Sisti, Agricoltura pratica della Lombardia,
Milano, 1828, p. 99. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 3296. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 3528. Citato in Florio, lettera N. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 3566. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 3630. Citato in
Castagna 1866, p. 75. Citato in Paronuzzi, p. 66. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 3674. Citato in Pescetti, p. 105. Anche in Arthur
Schopenhauer, Aforismi sulla saggezza della vita, Parenesi e massime, 29.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 3691. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 3723.
Citato in Grisi, p. 191. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 3761. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 3770. Citato in Grisi, p. 270. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 3952. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 310. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 3992. Citato in Alfani, p. 102. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 4019. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 4130. Citato in La
scienza pratica: dizionario di proverbi e sentenze che a utile sociale raccolse
il padre Lorenzo da Volturino, Quaracchi: Tipografia del Collegio di
S.Bonaventura, Firenze, 1894, p. 457. Citato in Focus storia n. 49,
novembre 2010, p. 74. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 4306. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 4352. Citato in Grisi, p. 197. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 4498. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 4499. Citato in
Piero Angela, A cosa serve la politica?, Mondadori, Milano, 2011, p. 145. ISBN 978-88-04-60776-2
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 4568. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 95. Citato
in Schwamenthal, § 4615. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 390. Citato in
Grisi, p. 224. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 4698. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 4757. Citato in Macfarlane, p. 255. Citato in Pescetti,
p. 98. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 4850. Citato in Augusta Forconi,
Le parole del corpo. Modi di dire, frasi proverbiali, proverbi antichi e
moderni del corpo umano, SugarCo, 1987. Citato in Castagna 1866, p.
136. Citato in Castagna 1866, p. 35. Citato in Castagna 1866, p.
24. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 5051. Citato in Castagna 1866, p.
8. Citato in Grisi, p. 78. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 5147.
Citato in Schwamenthal, § 5314. Citato in Grisi, p. 254. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 5385. Citato in Grisi, p. 269. Citato in Salvatore
Battaglia, Grande Dizionario della Lingua Italiana, XII Orad - Pere, Unione
Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, Torino, 1984, p. 1065. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 5454. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 5513. Citato in
Castagna 1866, p. 73. Citato in Gustavo Strafforello, La sapienza del
mondo, ovvero, Dizionario universale dei proverbi, Volume III, A. F. Negro,
1883, p. 701. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 5620. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 5630. Citato in Francesco Grisi, Il grande libro dei
proverbi. Dall'antica saggezza popolare detti e massime per ogni occasione,
Piemme, 1997, p. 12. (EN) Citato in Jerzy Gluski, Proverbs. Proverbes.
Sprichworter. Proverbi. Proverbios. Poslovitsy. A comparative book of English,
French, German, Italian, Spanish and Russian proverbs with a Latin appendix,
Elsevier Pub. Co., 1971, p. 114. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 5721.
Citato in Macfarlane, p. 267. Citato in Novo vocabolario della lingua
italiana, vol. I-II, coi tipi di M. Cellini e C., 1870, p. 312. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 5765. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 5795. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 5817. Citato in Castagna 1866, p. 39. Citato in
Macfarlane, p. 138. Citato in Schwamenthal, § 5924. Citato in
Schwamenthal, § 5932. Bibliografia Augusto Alfani, Proverbi e modi proverbiali,
Tipografia e Libreria Salesiana, Torino, 1882. Niccola Castagna, Proverbi
italiani, Antonio Metitiero, Napoli, 1866. Niccola Castagna, Proverbi italiani,
pe' tipi del Commend. Gaetano Nobile, Napoli, 1869. Elena Donato, Gianni
Palitta, Dizionario dei proverbi, L.I.BER. progetti editoriali, Genova, 1998.
John Florio, Giardino di ricreatione, appresso Thomaso Woodcock, Londra, 1591.
Francesco Grisi, Il grande libro dei proverbi, Piemme, 1997. ISBN 88-384-2710-0
Carlo Lapucci, Dizionario dei proverbi italiani, Mondadori, 2007. David
Macfarlane, The Little Giant Encyclopedia of Proverbs, Sterling, New York,
2001. ISBN 0-08069-7489-3 Alessandro Paronuzzi, José e Renzo Kollmann, Non dire
gatto..., Àncora Editrice, Milano, 2004. ISBN 88-514-0219-1 Orlando Pescetti,
Proverbi italiani. Raccolti, e ridotti sotto a certi capi, e luoghi comuni per
ordine d'alfabeto, Compagnia degli Aspiranti, Verona, 1603. Riccardo
Schwamenthal e Michele L. Straniero, Dizionario dei proverbi italiani e dialettali,
BUR, 2005. ISBN 978-88-58-65738-6 Annarosa Selene, Dizionario dei proverbi, Pan
libri, 2004. ISBN 8872171903 Carlo Volpini, 516 proverbi sul cavallo, Ulrico
Hoepli, Milano, 1896. Aa. Vv., Il nuovo Zingarelli, Zanichelli, 1983. Nicola
Zingarelli, Vocabolario della lingua italiana, Zanichelli Editore, Bologna,
1973. Gustavo Strafforello, La sapienza del mondo: ovvero, Dizionario
universale dei proverbi di tutti i popoli,, vol. III, Augusto Federico Negro,
Torino, stampa 1883. Voci correlate Modi di dire italiani Scioglilingua
italiani Categoria: Proverbi dell'Italia. Massimo Baldini. Keywords:
linguaggio, Campanellese, lingua utopica, fantaparola – phanta-parabola, il
proverbio italiano, amici, implicatura proverbiale, proverbi romani, proverbi
italiani, lezioni di filosofia del linguaggio, con D. Antiseri, indice, grice –
filosofia analica, parte I: filosofia analitica Austin e Grice, parte II tipi
di linguaggio. baldini — implicatura
proverbiale — i amici — das mystisch — filosofia italiana della moda maschile
italiana — haircuts — journalese — journal of the Royal Association of
Philosophy — lingua utopica — Campanellese — Empedocle filosofo poeta —
Lucrezio filosofo poeta — Parmenide filosofo poeta — Eraclito l’oscuro —
vallisneri — fantaparola — gargarismo — trabocchetta — rumore — ingorgo —
aforismo — Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Baldini” – The Swimming-Pool
Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51790817480/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Baldinotti –
filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Palermo). Filosofo. Grice: “I like
Baldinotti; Speranza thinks he is a Griceian, just to oppose to the Italian
received view that he is Lockeian! But I say, he is MORE than either!
Baldinotti can quote from Rousseau, and
the French authors that Locke never cared about! And most importantly, he can
SIMPLIFY and need not appeal to Anglo-Saxonisms as Locke does (what does it
mean that a ‘word’ STANDS for ‘an idea’?” --.” Grice: “In fact, as Speranza
showed at Oxford, one can organize a tutorial on the philosophy of language (he
won’t though – he hardly organises!) just using Balidonotti’s rough Latin of first
chapter of ‘De vocibus’!” “All the
material I rely on in my Oxford 1948 talk on ‘meaning’ for the Philosophical
Society can be found there: ‘vox’ significat affectus animae artificialiter,
lachrymal significat affectum animae naturaliter --.” Grice: “Unless she is a
crocodile, as Speranza remarks!” -- Tutore di metafisica nel ginnasio di Mantova,
pavia, padova. -- Altre opere: “De recta humanae mentis institutione”; Historiae philosphica prima,
et expeditissima adumbratio -- Operationum mentis analysis -- De
elementis humanarum cognitionum -- de perceptione et ideas, earumque adnexis --
de idearum affectionibus, et in primis de realitate, abstractione, universalitate
earumdem -- de simplicitate, compositione, relatione idearum -- de idearum
clartitate, et distinctione, veritate, et perfectione -- DE VOCIBUS -- DE
SYNONIMIS, ET INVERSIONIBUS -- DE VARIETATE LINGUARUM, ET DE MUTUO VOCUM, ET
IDEARUM IFLUXU -- DE USU, ET ABUSU VERBORUM -- DE VERBORUM INTERPRETATIONE --
DE MULTIPLICITI SCRIBENDI RATIONE. -- De humana cognitione -- Humana
cognitionis analysis -- de PROPOSITIONIBUS -- de gradibus humana cognitionis
-- De cognitione probabili -- De cognitionum realitate -- De
extensione humanarum cognitionum -- De impedimentis humanarum cognitionum
-- de humanarum cognitionum instrumentis -- De mentis magnitudine,
et perspicacitate augenda -- De analysi, et definitione -- de ratiocinio
et demonstratione -- De nonnullis argumentorum generibus -- De
inductione et analogia -- De methodo generatim -- De methodo
analytica -- De methodo synthetica -- De principiis -- De
hypothesibus -- De ratione coniectandi probabilia -- De fontibus
humanarum cognitionum -- de conscientia -- de ratione -- De concursu
rationis, et revelationis -- De sensibus, deque recto eorum usu
-- De cognitionibus, et erroribus sensuum -- De observatione, et
experientia -- de auctoritate -- De testibus oculatis, et auritis --
De traditione et monumentis -- De historia -- De librorum
authenticitate,sinceritate, suppositione, interpolatione, corruptione, et de
interpretationibus -- de arte hermeneutica -- “Tentamen”; “De metaphysca generali liber
unicum” De existente et possibili, et deiis, quae qua tenus tale est, ad
utrumque pertinent -- De identitate, similitudine, distinctione -- De
composito, simplici, uno -- De infinito -- De spatio -- De tempore -- De causa
-- De non nullis impropriis causarum generibus -- APPENDIX: De Kantii
philosophandi ratione et placitis, ut ad metaphysicam generalem referuntur. S. Gori Savellini,
Cesare Baldinotti in "Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani", Istituto
dell'Enciclpopedia Italiana, Roma. E. Troilo, Un maestro di Rosmini a Padova,
Cesare Baldinotti in: "Memorie e documenti per la storia della
Padova", Padova, 1922, v. 1,
427–441. Cesare Baldinotti, in
Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. DE
VOCIBUS. Voces nostrum studium,et operam expostulare,fuit iam suo loco (V.
Introd.) observatum.Quae cum sint idearum nostrarum signa, horum tradenda prima
divisio est', qua in naturalia, et artifi cialia distinguuntur. Signum naturale
cum re significata habet nexum ex eius natura derivatum; artificiale vero ex
hominum institutione, et arbitrio aliquam rem significat: lacrymae sunt doloris
signum naturale, voces signum idearum artificiale. Non erit porro alienum
de naturalibus signis advertere, homines non raro ad errorem trahi, dum ex
illisrem significatam inferunt: sunt enim haec signa, vel effectus, qui caussas,
vel caussae quae effectus indicant,ut in signis rerum futurarum. Iidem autem
effectus nunc ab una,nunc ab alia caussa oriun tur;neceadem caussa eosdem
semper effectusgignit; sed multa sunt, quae causarum actionem determinant,
suspendunt, et etiam omnino mutant. Non igitur necessario, et semper SIGNUM
NATURALE rem certam innuit; sed a multi spendet, quod eo una potius,quam alia
ostendatur. SIGNA AFFECTUUM ANIMI SUNT NATURALIA. Eos tamen non semper
denotant,et ille in perpetuo errore versaretur, qui de affectibus ex eorum
signis statueret. Sed ad voces revertamur, quarum origo, indoles, vis, in ideas
et mentis operationes, influxus, usus, abusus, interpretatio leviter
attingenda. Quin imo Reid Rech. sur. l'Entend. tom. I. p.147. arbitratur, eas,
quas dicimus causas, esse tantum RERUM SIGNA.Videmus dumtaxat, quae dam hunc
inter se nexum habere, ut si unum praecedat, aliud illico subsequatur. Id
tantum statuere possumus; non vero in eo, quod prae cedit respectu illius, quod
subsequitur, causalitatem, ut aiunt, inesse, cum haec nullaratione
ostendatur. Inter eas quae non prorsus inutiliter attinguntur, commemorari
possunt potissimum nominum divisiones, ad quarum normam nomen in enunciatione,
vel est subiectum de quo aliquid effertur, vel est praedicatum quod effertur,
vel est concretum, remque significat cum sua forma, vel est ab. Voces
INSTITUTIONIS esse signa nempe ARTIFICIALIA, nec necessarium habere NEXUM
CUM REBUS, ad evidentiam probantmuti, et linguarum varietas. Nam si haberent,
organo tantum vocis impedito, sermonis nullus esset usus, et quae apud omnes
eadem sunt, iis demetiam nominibus appellarentum. Mira autem est non rerum, sed
verborum diversitas; et muti sunt ii, qui surditat elaborant. Nunc vero
videamus, an facultates humanae vocibus AD RES SIGNIFICANDAS INSTITUENDIS sint
pares. An videlicet possint homines linguam aliquam condere. Animi affectus,
sensusque vividi doloris et voluptatis naturalibus quibusdam signis
coniunguntur, iisdemque manifestantur: homines haec facile possunt artificialia
reddere, sinempe observent affectus, quos indicant, nec ea tantum edant
impellente natura, sed consulto, ut quae experiuntur, ceteris manifestent. Quae
signa clamoribus non articulatis, habitu vultus, et gestibus continentur, atque
actionis, quam vocant, linguam conficiunt. Usu autem constat facilem, expeditam
secretam idearum COMMUNICATIONEM hac lingua non obtineri, distantia, et
interposito corpore impediri. Sensim igitur ab ea recedere coguntur homines, ad
eamque feruntur, quae vocis distinctionibus pititur. Hanc ut instituant
clamores naturales in primis pro stractum solamque formam exprimit, vel est
categorematicum quod solum et per se aliquid notat, vel est syncatagorematicum
quod ab alio avulsum nihil certi repraesentat, vel categoricum quod rem categoria
comprehensam obiicit. Sed de his satis, sapiens est non qui multa, sed qui
utilia novit. Negat P. Lamy in Trat. de Ar. log.; et Rousseau disc. sur.
l’ineg. parmi les Hom. parum abesse censet, quin demonstratum sit, fieri
numquam posse, ut lingua ulla suam ab hominibus originem habeat. Ita etiam A.
Encycl. A. lang. His e diametro se se oppouunt Epicurei, quorum hac super re
doctrinam Lucretius l.5. de Nat. rerum exposuit. Diodorus Siculus lib. I. Bibl.
quod nobis possibile, et hypotheticum est, factum habet, omnesque linguas
humanum fuisse inventum putat. Nuperrime in Diss. de ling. orig. ab A. Berol.
an. praemio donata Herder contendit linguas in universum non divinae, sed
humanae prorsus esse institutionis. De hac lingua V. Condil. Gram. part. 1.
lib. 1. Sinensium lingua hanc videtur originem habuisse, ea constat ex
monosyllabis 328., quae pronunciationo variata otficiunt SIGNA, (V.
Condil. 100 -- trahunt, et simul iungunt, rerum etiam externarum
sonos referunt, et imitantur (1), unde voces oriuntur, quae elevatione et
depressione multum distantes aliquo modo gestuum et clamorum vim exprimunt (2).
Atque ita verborum dstinctioni consultum, quantum patitur vocis et auditus
organum rude adhuc et inexercitatum. Subtilius, qui haec disputant, quorum
etiam aures delicatiores, similitudinem quamdam inveniunt inter impressionem a
rebus, et a verbis excitatam. Eamque prolatis ex. gr. vocibus "crux",
"mel", "vepres", "furens",
"turbidus", "languidus" distincte sentiunt. Hinc multae
voces (3). Multae etiam facultate, qua pollemus, per metaphoras sive
transferentiam omnia explicandi, et associandi insensibiles ideas sensibilibus.
Revera verba, quae res insensibiles referunt, metaphorica sive transrelata
omnino sunt. Perpetuo autem usu nomina propria evasere, et vetustate multorum
etymologia sensibilis ita evanuit, ut res pror sus in sua SPIRITUALITATE
relinquant (4). Quin immo eadem verba solum confugiendo ad metaphoras sive
transferentiam poterant fabricari. Externa namque forma carent, etsono res
insensibiles, unde earum no mina desumantur. Ac certe per imagines solum et
similitudines id, quod experimur, aliis, qui illud ipsum non experiuntur,
possumus explicare. Traité des connois. hum. t. II.) Alii monosyllaba Sinensium
numerant 330. Freret sur la lang, des Chin. 214., et signa inde componunt
54509. et 80000. Haec loquendi ratio supponit iudicium aurium subtilissimum.V.
Soave Compendio di Lock. l. III. Ap. al c.I. Hoc facile sibi suadeat quisquis
rerum, quae sonorae sunt, nomina advertat ex gr. "ululare",
"hinnire", "sibilus", "tonitrus",
"stridor", "murmur". Observat Warburthon Ess. sus les
Hierogl. actionis lingua, inventis iam vocibus, homines usos fuisse, Orientales
praesertim, quorum alacritas, et imaginatio vehemens hunc exitum etiam
requirit. Atque exempla permulta ex historia tum sacra, tum profana hanc in rem
profert. Ut recte nomina rebus IMPOSITA sint, quamdam esse debere rerum, et
nominum convenientiam ex ipsa earumdem rerum natura ortam in Cratylo contendit
Plato. Sunt enim, ait ipse, nomina IMITAMENTUM, quemadmodum etiam pictura, et
qui rei speciem in litieras, ac syllabas referre nonnovit, is ineptus nominum
opifexest. Erecentioribus Ioannes Baptista Vico, principii d'una scienza ec.,
de similitudine verborum cum forma rerum multis disseruit. Horum nominum
exempla sint cogitatio, voluntas, desiderium, aliaque huiusmodi. V. Traité de
la Formation mechan. etc. Ch.XII. Quod vero homines, ut boc aliisque
modis ad sermonem formandum aptisutantur, fortius incitat, indigentia est,
maxima rerum omnium magistra. Sermonis etiam utilitas, atque necessitas vix
paucis inventis vocibus sub oculos posita. Hinc multi conatus, ut verborum
numerus augeatur, quos felices reddit cognitionum, et idearum COMMERCIUM
homines inter initum. Haec enim se mutuo fovent, et,ut verba commercium illud
amplificant, ita ex commercio novae vires additae, et nova suppeditata
istrumenta, quibus ars faciendorum et deligendorum verborum perficiatur. Nec
vero sunt verba hominum opus, in quo ipsi nihil aliud, quam arbitrium recte
sequantur. Est enim illa analogia im pressionis, et soni imitatio, quam
pulcherrime in fingendis vocibus sequimur. Est forma, et affectio orgaai vo
eis, a qua earumdem elementa, literae praesertim vocales determinantnr. Sunt
denique derivata, et voces artium, et technicae in hominum libertate haud
repositae, cum illae derivationis naturam imitentur. Hac vero vim, et EFFECTUS
RERUM SIGNIFICENT significent. Duo sunt, quae videntur iam asserta impugnare.
Primum scilicet sermonis institutionem requirere, ut de significatu verborum
conveniatur. Conveniri autem inter eos non posse, qui omni sermone destituti
sunt. Quasi vero nulla alia praeter voces ratio suppetat. Qua explicetur quid
ipsae SIGNIFICENT Percipi enim id. Modum transferendi verba necessitas genuit
inopia coactaet augustiis, post autem delectatio iucunditasque celebravit. Cic.
de Orat. III. 38. Notat et illuminat marime orationem tamquem stellis qui.
busdam verbum translatum Idem ib. 48. Huc faciunt quae de linguarum analogia
subtiliter disserunt Valcke naerius in observatt. academicis, Lennep
inpraelett. academicis et Scheidius in orat. de linguarum analogia ex
analogicis mentis actionibus probata. Sed est etiam unde moveantur homines ad
res alias per multas metaphorice appellandas, eas scilicet quas primum obscure,
et confuse percipiunt. Et enim has meditando earum quamdam similitudinem cum
aliis distincte perceptis intelligunt, quorum proinde nomina ad illa
transferunt. Atque in hoc mirifice dele ctantur luce, quae ex rebus claris, et
distinctis in alias obscuras, et confusas diffunditur. potest ex
circumstantiis, in quibus adhibentur, et ex gestibus, qui pronunciatis
nominibus res indicarent. In eamdem etiam rem conferet illa imitatio, atque
similitudo. Aliud vero erat huiusmodi. Summis viris difficultas maxima se semper
obiecit in linguis ornandis, et perficiendis. Qui ergo fieri potuit, ut homines
plane rudes, atque ferini, communione scilicet cum aliis non exculti ex integro
sermonem con dant? Fieri istud quidem non posset, si de perfecto sermone
contenderetur, in quo non tantum apte expressa, quae ad necessitatem pertinent,
sed etiam, quae ad cultum vitae, et oblectationem. In quo multae orationis
partes, multae leges syntaxis, et inflexionum, multa denique, ut numerus, et
varietas obtineatur. Haec sermoni non absolute necessaria sunt, et vix nomina,
utaiunt, substantiva, et signum aliquod numquam variatum ad verbum auxiliare
sum exprimendum. Quae quidem hominis licet sylvestris facultates non superant.
DE SYNONIMIS, ET INVERSIONIBUS. Multa in qualibet lingua videntur esse
synonima, voces scilicet, quae unam, eamdemque ideam referunt. Dubitari autem
iure potest, an revera sint. Quin potius statuerem ea, quae di cuntur synonima,
eamdem ideam principalem reddere, accessoria vero differre plerumque. Atque hoc
modo inter se differunt "amo", et "diligo";
"peto", et "postulo", "timeo", et
"vereor" V. Condill. Gram. P. I. Ch. XIV. V. Traité de la form.
mechan. du langage V. II. Ch. IX. et suiv. Condillac Traité des connois. hum.
T. II. Grammaire P. I. Ch. I. II., Maupertuis Diss.sur les moyens etc. pour
exprimer leurs idées; Sulzer de l'influence recipr. de la raison, etc. extat in
Ac. Ber. et Vol. IV. opusc. Select. Mediol. Soave Comp. etc. L. III. Ap. al
C.I. Receptum apud logicos novimus, ut nomina tribuant in synonima, quae
secundum unam eamdem que rationem de pluribus usurpantur, et in homonyma quae
rationem naturamque diversam in iis SIGNIFICANT, de quibus adhibentur, Iam vero
homonyma alia dicuntur casu et citra rationem ac temere im. Synonima stricto
sensu accepta, quae nulla idea accessoria differrent, linguae vitium
indicarent. D'Alemb. Elem. de Phil. XIII. Hac de re notandum est, vocibus
duplicem illam ideam subesse. Et, ut praeteream exempla, quis est, qui
non noverit, vocabula quaeque loco, et tempori, et generi s u scepto orationis
non convenire? Quod profecto maxime oritur ex idea accessoria, quae non solum
verba eamdem principalem exprimentia distinguit, sed eorum etiam opportunitatem
deter minat. Quae ergo synonima habentur, ea profecto non iure; namque discrepant
accessoriis illis ideis, quae rerum diversos aspectus, gradus, et relationes,
et adiuncta exprimunt. Imperiti haec apprime synonima reputant, quorum levia
discrimina lin guarum cultores notant. In eo frequenter peccant ex lexicis pene
omnia, quae adolescentes, misere decipiunt. Duplex distinguitur ordo verborum,
et conformatio, naturalis, et artificialis; seu inversa. Porro quem ordinem
habent ideae, idem etiam verborum est: ordo autem idearum, fertur ad modum, quo
in mente sibi succedunt, vel ad earum dependentiam mutuam,ex qua fit,
utaliaealias regant, et explicent, aliae explicentur, atque regantur. Si
primum, ordo, quo exprimuntur ideae, naturalis erit, quando idem, ac ille, qui
in earum successione servatur. Qui quidem in singulis diversus est. Si
secundum, ut ordo sit naturalis, quae alias regunt, vel ab aliis explicantur
praemittendae sunt. Quae reguntur, et alias explicant postponendae. Secus erit
artificialis, seu inversus. Sed unde oritur, quod ordo inversus orationi vim
addat,et siteius quasi lumen quoddam nosque voluptate perfundat? Scilicet
posita, et alia dicuntur ratione, quod rebus tribuantur aliqua inter se
similitudine cohaerentibus. Posteriora haec aptius vocantur analoga, sive
attributionis, quum uni quidem rei primario conveniunt, reliquis secun
dario,sive proportionis,quae pluribus rebus propter proportionem aliquam
accommodantur. Ex hoc fonte methaphorae pleraeque omnesdimanant.
Nonnullarum rerum, atque actionum voces quaedam ex ideis hisce accessoriis
inhonestae, et turpes evadunt; quae ideae si in aliis vocibus omittantur, vel
mutentur,nulla amplius est turpitudo. Unde fit, quod eae. dem res, etverecunde,
etobscoene dicifpossint,etquod ea,quae turpia re non sunt, nominibus, ac verbis
flagitiosa ducamus. vel re. D'Alembert loc. cit. Traité de la form. mech. du
lang. ch. IX n.161. quia eum, quem Rethores MODUM appellant, et numerum
parit; quia imaginationem exercet;quia ideas nimis disiunctas coniungit. Revera
voces ordine inverso positas ad se mutuo referi m u s, ut postulat idearum
ratio. Atque si in periodo multae sint ideae, quae a quadam principalipendeant,
et exiis aliquaehuic praeponantur, postponantur vero aliae, arctius omnes cum
ea coniunguntur. In quo nexu illud praesertim admirabile,quod uno verbo ad
integram sententiam animus revocetur. ET IDEARUM INFLUXU. Varietatem
linguarum,et nos ad confusionem Babylonicam referimus: simul autem liceat
statuere,ex diverso hominum ingenio, et indole,eorumque externis circumstantiis
oriri potuisse, et magna ex parte ortum esse,ut singulae suum -co lorem
habeant. Ac ex confusione illa vocum origines potius, quam ipsaelinguae;quae
perfici sensim debuerunt,etaugeri verborum copia, atque syntaxi, et
inflexionibus moderari. Non una autem in hoc fuit omnium gentium ratio, quod
multis causis tum physicis, cum moralibus tribuendum est. Atque inter eas
recenserem caeli temperiem, non eamdem ubique faciem naturae, rerum aspectus
multiplices, diversas opiniones sive ad civitatem sive ad religionem
pertinentes, regiminis formam, educationem, mores denique et studia. Revera
sermonis vis, copia,et harmonia, et inflexio nationum exprimit characterem,ingenium,atque
culturam;ac eadem linguarum, et gentium fuere semper fata, et vicissitu dines.
QUOD IN ROMANI IMPERII, ET LINGUAE LATINAE ORTU, progressu, et occasu velut sub
oculos positum est. Iunctam, cohaerentem, levem, et aequabiliter fluentem
orationem facit verborum collocatio. de Orat. II. 43. V. D'Alembert Eclair cis.
S. X. Condill. Gram. P. II. ch. XXIV. Art.d'Ecrire L. I. Ch. I. II. V. Traité
de la form. mechan. etc. Ch. IX. INSTITUTIONE DE VARIETATE
LINGUARUM, ET DE MUTUO VOCUM. Sed ex iisdem quoque caussis fit, ut nationes
singulae suas habeant idearum compositiones, et vocibus, quibus aliae carent,
utantur. Inde in interpretando necessitas verborum circuitum saepius adhibendi,
cum non semper verbum e verbo exprimi possit. Indeadeo difficile, libros ex una
in aliam linguam convertere. Atque in hoc lice tomnis cura, et studium ponatur,
adeo singulis linguis suum quoddam inest ingenium, ut nullae fere sint
interpretationes, quae authographi vim, et elegantiam, et nativum splendorem
nequaquam desiderent. Quae quidem eo nos adducunt, ut intelligamus, quem dam
esse posse sermonem, edisci, et percipi omnino facilem. Quem si universalem
veluti linguam cunctae gentes amplecterentur, eo possent mutuum idearum, et
cognitionum commercium inire. Ac difficultas, qua ab hoc impediuntur, ex lin
guarum varietate, et multitudine orta, alia etiam ratione vinci posset,
characteristicam nempe aliquam linguam adhibendo, quae res ipsas, non rerum
voces exprimeret. De bac sermo erit inferius. Interim cum nullus ex hisce modis
adhuc suppetat. Nec ulla spes sit, ut in unum, V. Clericum Art. Crit. tom. I.
part. II. cap. II JII.IV. Linguarum varietas non leve incommodum affert
societati, et progressui scientiarum. Nec enim consultum, ut facile edisci
possent, sed casu magna ex parte conditae, et procurata copia, et ornatus.
Sublatis declinationibus, coniugationibus, et generibus, si substantiva unam
immutabilem terminationem haberent, suam adiectiva, et verba pariter, quae
adverbiorum ope temporibus, et modis distinguerentur. Pullae superessent
regulae grammaticorum, et solius lexici auxilio linguam quam libet
perciperemus. Cumque insuper esset prima illa lingua absurda, et egestate,
atque uniformitatis squalore sordesceret. Maxime erit optandum, ut LATINI
SERMONIS USU conservetur. Locupletissimus namque est hic sermo, electissimis,
et praeclaris verbis abundat, communis hactenus fere fuit omnium eruditorum;
qui eo abiecto, si suam singuli linguam in scribendo usurparent, iam, vel
aliena omnia nescirent, vel in omnium gentium, quae doctrinae laude vel alium
conveniant omnes. Splendescunt, perdiscendis linguis curam, et operam
compellerentur insumere, quam ad rerum cognitionem adipiscendam con tulissent.
Quae hactenus de vocibus dicta sunt, satis ostendunt, easabideis, et cogitandi
modo non parum pendere. Sed magnus etiam est verborum in ideas, et mentis
operationes influxus. Atque in psychologia, si fortasse ad veritatem plane non
sua detur, nullas fere absque verborum usu nos exequi posse. Illud profecto
demonstratur, eo foveri multum, et perfici. Quod probari nunc potest exemplo
mutorum. Earum etiam gentium, quibus signa numerica pro maioribus quantitatibus
deficiant, cetera sint nimis composita. Illi quidem multis omnino ideis
destituuntur, mentisque facultates obtusas habent, nec ad operandum faciles et
expeditas. Hae vero gentes in rebus ARITHMETICIS ne vix quidem progressae sunt.
Tantum signa valent ad humanas cognitiones promovendas vel impediendas. Equidem
arbitror, a veritate abesse longius, qui crederet verba communicationi cum
aliis tantum inservire. Ea menti sistunt obiecta. Nimis composita dividunt. Si
magnifica sint et nobilia, res amplificant, et extollunt. Si humilia, imminuunt,
et deprimunt. V. Laur. Mosheim DISSERT. DE LINGUAE LATINAE CULTURA ET
NECESSITATE V. etiam quae nuperrime Ferrius, et Tiraboschius, Alexander Gorius,
et Clementinus Vannetti in eam habent Alamberti sententiam (Melang. tom. V.)
statuentem bene LATINE scribi non posse, et LATINITATE abiecta studium omne ad
patriam linguam transferentem. Refert Condaminius, quosdam Americae populos,
cum ocesnume rorum supra ternarium non habeant, in hoc arithmeticam eorum
consistere: certevix paucis huiusmodi signis utuntur, iisque ad modum
compositis, ex quofit, ut maiores numeros mente haud comprehendant, et quem
libet ultra vicesimu in indefinite concipiant, atque capillorum numero
comparent.V. De la Condamine Voy. Paw Rech. sur les Americ. tom. II. ch. 27.
Cogitatio, ait Plato in Theaeteto, est sermo,quem mens apud se volvit circa
illa, quae considerat. Cum enim cogitat, secum ipsa disserit adeo, ut cogitatio
sit sine strepitu vocis oratio, aut interior collocutio. Verba sunt veluti
signa algebrica idearum. Brevitati proinde consulunt, multarum idearum
comparationem faciliorem reddunt, mentenique sublevant in consideratione
multarum rerum, atque compositarum: quae verborum utilitates maxime elucentin
modorum mixtorum ideis, quas in nullo exemplari iunctas videmus, sed verbis
exhibentur et comprehenduntur. Verba denique nexus inter ideas augent, eas
facilius, et promptius exsuscitant, distinguunt, quae vix confuse percipe
rentur. Sic technicae in arte pingendi voces omnia alicuius tabulae vitia,
omnemque praestantiam indicant. Quae eos prorsus fugerent, qui illas voces
nequaquam callerent. Quare scientiae, omnesque artes multum debent verborum
inventoribus, ut Linnaeo Botanica; et Ontologia, licet nomenclatione tantum
contineretur, non esset penitus contemnenda. DE USU, ET ABUSU VERBORUM. De
verborum usu, et abusu haec fere a Lokio, aliisque melioris notae Logicis
accepimus. In primis duplicem esse usum verborum. Vel enim eo cogitationes
nobiscum cooferimus, vel aliis exprimimus. Illum jam attigimus capite
superiore, in quo osten debam, maximas utilitates ex hoc interno sermone
profluere. Cum aliis autem utimur verbis,aut in vitae civilis consuetudine,vel
in studio Scientiarum. Inquo praesertim distinctioni, et perspicuitati. Ideae
in primis connexae inter se sunt ex analogia rerum, et ex circumstantiis, in
quibus acquiruntur. Sed insuper verbis etiam unae cum aliis colligantur. Quot
ideas unum verbum saepius excitat? Atque ex verbis haec alia utilitas provenit,
ut in ideiş revocandis, et disponendis ordini, quo a nobis comparatae fuere,non
adstringamur, sed illum qui magis placeat, magisque conveniat iisdem tribuimus.
V. Bonnet Ess. Analyt. ch. XV. V. Sulzer loc. iam citato, Micheaelis de
l'influ. des opin. sur le lang. etc. Condil. Art. de penser. part. 1. ch. II.
STELLINI OSSERVAZIONE SULLE LINGUE tom.V. Soave Comp. di Locke I. III. ap. al
cap. XI. Scilicet, si circa ideas maxime compositas, sertim
versemus, iisdem nomina, quibus appellantur, substituimus. Nimis enimesset
operosum, eetiam impossibile, omnes ideas simplices illas componentes mente
revolvere. Quod etiam confusionem afferret, et, ne idearum relationes
viderentur, obstaret. Haec habitualis, non actualis distincta perceptio est
idea coeca, et symbolica Leibnitii. circa notiones prae 1 litandum est, ne per se
difficilia reddantur difficiliora. Et ne rerum INVESTIGATIONES in aeternas
quaestiones de nomine abeant. Locutionis perspicuitas, atque distinctio maxime
optanda idearum claritatem, et distinctionem desiderat: quomodo enim, quae
confuse percipimus, aliis distincte explicarentur? ad eam confert brevitas, in
qua tamen habendus modus;nam ut nimia verborum copia res obruit, ita eorum
egestas tenebras rebus offundit. Denique cum iis, qui loquuntur confuse,
vitanda fa miliaritas est,qua nihil fortius ad idem vitium contrahendum. Ita
autem verbis utamur,ut unicuique idea determinata re spondeat;dequo,sinobiscum
tantum colloquimur, nos ipsos debemus interrogare; si vero cum aliis,et dubium
sit, an verba ideas claras,etdistinctas in aliorum mentem immittant, tunc ea
dilucide explicanda sunt. Id quidem de nominibus idea rum simplicium praestari
potest (vix autem erit necesse), si observanda proponantur obiecta,quae
significant,etmodus,et circumstantiae indicentur, in quibus eorum ideae
acquiruntur. Nomina vero idearum, quae sint compositae, decla rantur earum
obiectis exhibitis, et addita ipsorum definitione; nec enim omnia attributa
patent sensibus, et multa indolem potentiae habent. Quod si haec obiecta non
existant.Verborum universalium magnus est usus, et maxima utilitas; innumera
enim individua una tantum voce comprehendi mus, quae esset impossibile omnia
suis nominibus distinguere. Esset etiam inutile, quia necii, quibus cum
loquimur, multoque minus illi, quibus aliquid scriptum relinquimus, eadem
indivi dua agnoscunt. ergo. Sed quae circa rectum verborum usum,et eorum
inter pretationem, de qua inferius, praecipienda sunt, separari vix possunt ab
idearum doctrina iam tradita; utrisque enim idem finis, avocationempe ab
erroribus. Inter eaetiam intimus nexus, quantus inter voces, et ideas. Nunc lum,
quae propius ad verba pertinent, quaeque eo loci explicata non sunt. ne actum
agam, so meratio idearum, quas simul reflexione, aut pro arbitrio con iunximus.
fiat enu Vocibus demum abutimur, si quae incertam significa tionem habent, non
definiantur; si definitus sensus mPombaur. Si in rebus scientiarum artes
consectemur oratorias. Namque delectant, et movent, mentemque avertunt a
philosophico rerum examine,quas non accurate,sed ad similitudinem exprimunt. In
verborum sensu commutando peccarunt vehementer scholastici. V. Gassendum in
Exerc. Arist. Exerc. I. Y2. Hic cum Logicis fere omnibus non praecipio,
abstinendum esse a tropis atque figuris:rebus enim permultis vocabula
metaphorica necessario imposita sunt, aliis utiliter, cum ex iis orationi splen
dor accedere videatur.V. Condil. Art. d' écrire lib. II. ch.VI.VIII.
Translationes propter similitudinem transferunt animos,etre. Neque vero minor
utilitas ex verbis notionum;.harum nullum archetypum extra nos invenitur
iunctas exhibens ideas, ex quibus componuntur. Id vero praestant nomina, quae
illas comprehendunt. Sunt denique voces, quas particulas appellant Grammatici;
his utimur, ut ideas, et periodi membra, et periodos ipsas interse coniungamus.
Quisaneusus mirificus est, et ex eo maxime vis tota orationis derivat. Rectus
erit,si m u tuam rerumdependentiam, et relationes diligenter
consideremus. Haecdeusu. Nunc de abusu,quirestat,dicendumest. Iam vero
abutimur verbis, si iis, nullam ideam, aut obscuram associemus, adeo ut inania
sint, et ambigua: in quo non rarum estlabi;etmaxime verba notionum
virtutis,honoris,et simi lium multo pluribus sunt meri soni; obiectum namque
non referunt, quod sensus moveat, nec illud quod referunt in in fantia,
percipimus. Hinc ea absque ulla significatione usurpandi longam consuetudinem
iam contraximus, a qua ut reMilanius, reflexione vehementer nitendum est. Sed
abusus verborum etiam ex ignorantia, et malitia. Scilicet, qui partium studio,
vel anticipata opinione moventur. Qui vulgo avent imponere. Qui difficultatum
pondere haerent et idearum defectu impediuntur. Tunc enim vero ii obscuritatem
affectant, verbis inanibus se se involvunt, nova etiam fundunt, atque
sesquipedalia. Optimum ergo erit, mentem parumper a verbis abstrabere, eamque
in ideas intendere, ne verborum so nitu hallucinemur. DE VERBORUM
INTERPRETATIONE. Ut verba recte interpretemur, advertendum in primis, notiones
eius, a quo adhibentur,'significare. Non igitur suppo natur, omnes iisdem
verbis adnectere easdem ideas, et ipsis rerum realitatem apprime respondere.
Quae qui supponunt, de rebus perperam ex verbis iudicant, et ex propriis
aliorum ideas non bene copiiciunt. Hisce per summa capita indicatis, advertam
in primis, duplicem distingui sensum verborum,proprium scilicet,et tran slatum;namque
verba,aut illam rem exprimunt,cui primum fuere assignata. Vel ex quadam
similitudine cum re ipsis propria eadem verba ad aliam significandam
transferimus. Quod si fiat, sensum habent translatum, secus autem proprium.
Nisi quis sensum proprium alicuius vocabuli accurate perceperit, numquam fieri
poterit, ut translatum assequatur; hic siquidem ad illum refertur. Rerum
praeterea conditionem inspiciet,ex qua oritur, ut quaedam voces potius, quam
aliae, ad res sensu translato exprimendas, electae fuerint. Inde clarius is
sensus patebit ferunt, ac movent huc, et illuc, qui motus cogitationis
celeriter agi tatus per se ipse delectat. de Orat.III.39. Translatio est, cum
verbum in quamdam rem transfertur ex alia; quod propter similitudinem recte
videturposse transferri. Cic. ad Heren. IV. 34. V. D’Alembert Eclaircis., sur
les Elém. de phil.S.IX. Quam vero quisque vocibus notionem subiicit,
arguere tuto possumus, si multa nobis nota sint, eaque invicem conferamus;
loquentis scilicet ingenium,et characterem; affectus, oris habitum; linguae,
quautitur, vim, etindolem; rem,quam tractat; circumstantias, in quibus versatur;
opiniones, religionem, quam sequitur;demum popularium eiusmores, ritus,
consuetudines. Haac enim omnia efficiunt, ut licet verba sint eadem, non tamen
eumdem significatum, eamdemque vim habeant. Nunc vero singula verborum genera
persequar, deque Difficilius assequimur sensum verborum, quae notionibus
respondent; siquidem praeter caussas nominibus rerum existentium communes,
peculiares etiam concurrunt, ex quibus efficitur, ut singuli fere has ideas diverso
modo componant. Nec eadem semper significatio est vocibus orationis par ticulas
exprimentibus; loquentium igitur, vel scribentium affe ctus, et praecipue
contextus consulatur,cum ex iis sit dedu cenda. De nominibus relativis, quid
advertendum in praesen tiarum,ut recte explicentur? Porro id muneris iam
explevi dum agebam de eiusdem generis ideis. Quid de nominibus uni
versalibus,quod paritereoloci, traditum non sit? Illud subiungam,voces
particulares,aliquis,quidem etc. obscuras esse et indeterminatas, nec denotare,
quae, et quanta subiecta sint; universales vero aliquando particulariter esse
sumendas, aliquando non omnia individua generum,sed individuorum omnia
siores esse, iisnonnulla admoneam,ad quae semper in eorum interpretatione
spectemus. Qualitatum sensibilium nomina, colorum nempe, saporum, aliarumque
huiuscemodi, sensationum etiam doloris, et voluptatis, non ita accipienda sunt,
quasi explicent id, quod est in rebus extranos positis. Nostras affectiones,
sensationesque upice indicant, nec vero vim,et quantitatem earumdem. Hanc
experimur, non autem accurate possumus efferre. Fit autem sae pius,ut in
singulis maior,vel minor multiplici gradu sit. Dubitari quidem potest,quin
ipsae sensationes apud aliquos prorsus differant, licet omnes iisdem verbis
utantur. Omnes arborum folia viridia appellant; sed adhuc videndum, utrum haec
vox eamdem omnibus ideam excitet. Quam dubitationem ingerit di versa corporis
temperies, et habitus, nec eadem omnino fabrica sensuum;unde certo
oritur,affectiones easdem aliquibus inten aliis languidiores. Nomina idearum
compositarum non idem apud omnes. Maxime si veteres cum recentioribus confe
rantur.Ne eas igitur ex nostris notionibus interpretemur,sed ex illis quae
ampliores fortasse, vel angustiores. Nominibus substantiarum easdem qualitates
non omnes complectimur. Nulli essentiam primariam,a qua eae nascuntur,et quam
nemo novit. genera significare. Quae quidem ex circumstantiis,
linguarum indole, ingenio, loquendi consuetudine patent dilucide. His fere,quae
adhuc de vocibus disserebam,continentur potiora,ex quibus Grammatica
philosophica conficitur: linguarum singulae suam habent, eaque particularis
Grammatica dicitur. Est vero etiam Grammatica universalis,quae principia
constituit omnibus linguis communia.Notandum superest,syntaxim totam legibus
concordantiae, et regiminis moderari. Illae principio identitatis, hae
principio diversitatis innituntur. DE MULTIPLICI SCRIBENDI RATIONE. Verborum
disputatio manca videretur, si de scribendi rationibus haudquaquam dissererem.
Non igitur una fuit haec ratio apud omnes,nec omnibus temporibus;tamen in eo
con veniebant, quod signis non ore,sed manu expressis,quae mente revolvimus,
manifestarent. Ac, quae fuere adhibitae, pictura, symbolis allegoricis, denique
signis arbitrariis continentur. Pictura, aut unam figuram, aut plures exhibet,
signa arbitraria, aut ideas,aut syllabas,aut litteras verborum significant.
Scripturae, licet ab ea, qua nunc omnes fere gentes utuntur, longe
dissimilis,specimen aliquod hominibus innotuit per imagines, quae sui res
exhibent, et quas conamur exprimere gestibus, et clamoribus, ut iis longinqua
designemus. Ad has imagines adumbrandas urgebat necessitas communicandi cum
absentibus, et praesentibus explicandi id, quod verbis efferri non poterat.
Inde scripturae origo potius, quam ex cura committendi nostras cognitiones
posteritati. Ac homines ex rerumimaginibusidconsiliicepisse,ut illas ad suos
cogitationes enuntiandas delinearent, omnium pene De usu, abusu,
interpretatione verborum videantur Locke Ess, etc. lib.III. Leibnitz
Nouv.Ess,etc. lib.III. Ioannes Clericus art.crit. tom.I. pari.II. V., silubet,
Du Marsais princip. de gram. Condillac gram. D'Alembert Elem.de Phil. XIII. et
Eclaircis. sur les Elem. etc. S.X. Hinc sensim crescere CONVENTIONIS
SIGNA, etomniatan. dem huiusmodi evadere. Quae sola notiones reflexione
perceptas possunt exprimere;quae ob multos rerum aspectus sunt neces saria.
Namque notiones illae nullam imaginem praeseferunt, nec ulla imago diversas
relationes comprehendit, sub quibus res, ut lubet, consideramus. Signa autem,
quae ex CONVENTIONES sunt, optime quidem ab eo constituta fuissent, qui singula
singulis ideis simplicibus destinasset, suaideis universalibus, aliademum
determinationibus individua constituentibus. Enim vero simul iungendo, et apte
componendo haec signa, res omnes possent distincte explicari. Hoc scribendi
modo philosophus tantum uti potest, nempe ille solus, qui probe noverit,
quaenam ideae simplices illas substantiarum, et notionum componant. Quique
etiam adeo individua observaverit, ut ea possit plane describere. Illum
Si V. Paw Recher. sur les Americ. tom. I. part.V. sect.I. Quemadmodum
artis typographicae occasio fuit ars caelatoria et sculptoria, ita occasio scripturae
non inepte ex pictura derivatur. Praesertim quum non aliter pictura sit
obiectorum in oculos incurrentium scriptura, quam scriptură sit obiectorum quae
aures feriunt pictura. Videsis Augustum Heumannum in conspectu reipublicae
literariae cap. III. Signa huiusmodi spectant ad linguae universalis
institutionem. Alia ratio, qua ad eamdem possumus pervenire, indicata, vix est
N. LXXII., LXXXII. V. Soave Comp. di Locke lib. III. cap. XI. append. II., qui
etiam celebriores scriptores recenset, a quibus ea institutio suscepta fuit. V.
Leibnitii historiam, et commend. characteristicae linguae univers. V. Traité de
la Form.etc. ch. XII. XIII. Mémoires de l'Acad.de Berl., ibi Thiebault videtur
succensere Michaelis, et non ita difficilem, nec vero inutilem, et multo minus
perniciosam, quemadmodum ille, censet linguae universalis institutionem, quae
primo illo modo conti. neretur. Sepositis iis,quae de universali lingua
instituenda excogitari subti. vetustarum nationum monumenta, et gentium
sylvestrium usus confirmant. Quae scribendi ratio picturae affinis, cum auctis
cogni tionibus, relationibus, et indigentiis ad omnia exprimenda non non satis
esset apta, paulatim a signis discessum est rerum i m a ginem referentibus, et
huius pars tantum depicta, et plures ideae uno signo manifestatae. nenses
adhibent; proindeque mirum non est, si tanti apud illos sit literas scire. Quae
difficultas effecit, ut nationes pene omnes eum scribendi m o d u m
probaverint, quo non obiecta, non ideas, sed sonos verborum reddunt; ad quem duplici
via perveniri posse declarabam liter possent, splendideque proponi; multo
fuerit satius consilio adquie scere Ludovici Vivis, cuius haec sunt (De
tradendis disciplinis lib.III. verba. Sacrarium est eruditionis lingua,et sive
quid recondendum est,sive promendum velut proma quaedam conda.Et quando
aerarium est eruditionis, ac instrumentum societatis hominum,e re esset generis
humani unam esse linguam, qua omnes nationes communiter ute rentur: si perfici
hoc non posset, saltem qua gentes ac nationes plurimae, certe qua nos
christiani initiati eisdem sacris, et ad commercia et ad peritiam
rerumpropagandam. Peccati enim poenaesttot esse linguas. Eam vero ipsam linguam
oporteret esse cum suavem, tum etiam doctam et facundam. Suavitas est in sono
sivé simplicium verborum ac separatorum, sive coniunctorum. Doctrina est in
apta proprietate appellandarum rerum. Facundia in verborum et formularum
varietate ac copia. Quae omnia effi cerent, ut libenter ea loquerentur
homines,et aptissime possent explicare quae sentirent, multumque per eam
accresceret iudicii. Talis videtur mihi latina lingua ex iis certe quas homines
usurpant, quaeque nobis sunt cognitae. Quod continuo diligenter, ostendit,
eaque tradit quae merito cum disputatione componantur ab Aloisio Lanzio libris
inscriptionum et carminum praefixa. Sinensium alphabetum Typographicum ex
50000. signis constat. V. Mémoir, concernant l'histoire etc. des Chinois parles
mission. tom.X1., Mopertuis ius auget ad 80000. Iaponenses, licetomnino diversa
linguautan tur, quae tamen Sinenses literis consignant,probe intelligunt; adeo
verum est haec signa non rerum voces, sed earum conceptus delineare. V.
Marpertuis loc. Iam. cit.
Cesare Baldinotti. Keywords: signum, genere, segno, genere, segno naturale,
lacrima, segno artificiale, ‘homo’, conventione, imposizione, idea,
ideazionismo, ‘Locki’ – enciclopedismo, illuminismo, ‘discorso sulle lingue’,
propositione, articulazione, logica, grammatica, forma logica, modus
significandi, imitatmento, il Cratilo di Platone. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice
e Baldinotti” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51623117567/in/photolist-2mKwuhr-2mKRpod-2mDKYka
Grice e Balduino – il
vestigio dell’angelo al Campidoglio –
filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Montesardo). Filosofo. Grice: “It is
amusing that when we were lecturing with Sir Peter at Oxford on ‘Categoriae’
and ‘De Interpretatione,’ Girolamo Balduino had done precisely that – AGES
before, in a beautiful beach town of Italy! ‘vir Montesardis,’ –“ Grice:
“Strawson and I, following an advice by Paulello, drew a lot from Balduino’s
commentary – especially of the Peri Hermeneias, the section on the ‘oratio,’
since we were looking for ordinary-language ways to render all the modal
distinctions (indicative, imperative, optative, interrogative, vocative, …)
that Balduino finds so easy to digest – but our Oxonian tutees didn’t!” -- Girolamo Balduino (Montesardo), filosofo. Studiò all'Padova sotto Marco Antonio Passeri
(detto il Genua) e Sperone Speroni, formandosi nell'eclettismo aristotelico
proprio di quella scuola. Nell'anno 1528 insegnò sofistica in quello Studio;
passò poi all'Salerno e all'Napoli.
Nella seconda metà del Cinquecento le sue opere furono occasione di
vivaci dibattiti. Alle sue dottrine si oppose, in particolare, il filosofo
padovano Jacopo Zabarella. Altre opere: “Perì hermeneias”, “De interpretation,
“Dell’interpretazione”; “Quaesita tum naturalia, tum logicalia”. Studi Giovanni Papuli, Girolamo Balduino:
ricerche sulla logica della Scuola di Padova nel Rinascimento, Manduria,
Lacaita, 1967. Giovanni Papuli, Girolamo Balduino e la logica scotistica, in «
Acta Quarti Congressus Scotistici Internationalis », II, Roma, 1978. 257-264. Giovanni Papuli, Dal Balduino allo
Zabarella e al giovane Galilei: scienza e dimostrazioni, in « Bollettino di
storia e filosofia », 10, 1990-1992,
333-65. Raffaele Colapietra,
recensione di Ricerche sulla logica della scuola di Padova nel Rinascimento,
Emeroteca della Provincia di Brindisi. Girolamo Balduino. “De
signis” – It. segnare, notare, segnificare, notificare. Primum oportet ponere
quid sit nomen et quiddam in proæmio, ut propositum suæ considerationis ante
quid verbum cognovit et infra cap. 4. aborationibus rethoricis et poeticis,
atque his quæ affe&us explicant, illam se legit. Item tes cum iste liber
cum tota logicae undem modum cong ordine lint considerandæ quo, ex processu
resolvente com, siderandi participet, qui ut ante monstrani est instrumen
monstrat cum inquit primum b u m etc. vers tum seu organum notificandi. Quid
inter hunc librum quid nomen quid alios differt? Respondetur. Id interesse et,
inter diversos primum, non intentione, cum libros eandem rem eodem. Sed quod primo
exequi instituimus dicit opor versa prædicata propria, de illa cognoscantur. Q
dis eaq. præs cipia quæ ut deus, et prima in omni tempore, loco, et subiecto
dicata ex fine libri facile inveniri possunt demostrationis prin sunt nes mus,
extremum nam ut posuis cellaria. Sed suppositione in hoc libro et finis, rum
conceptarum res et secundum quid. nam tuimus dicata quinq vocem SIGNIficativam
stag are, ut toto, necessario tra verlrum etc. Hæc verbi, orationis, enunciationis
nominis, nis.quibus eædem libro poeticorum est præceptionem tradere finiendo considerant
alterum ut aspernetur et um metrum formandum, bi etc. ponere ergo sumetur non
tanquam res dubia inquirendum sum, verum et constans ponendum primo mento magno
exemplo explicatur artificum idem ligna ut lignum, sit sed ut per seno post.14.
incos unus artifex statua malter, referet tæ, cum suo proprio monius inquiens
est, ad metria positi oest. Ita que non nisi ut enunciativa. Sed de subiecto do
post 27 secund infine. Regulem logicem ponuntur ut notæ 7.orator & poeta
enunciativa orationis codem modo ista des:ante & significativas intendit
idenim definitionem nomini suer, sitione significantes tionis tantum urilitatem
declarat apo demonstra, ad impossibile.primo prior.30. de tione simplici et hæc
porest. Sed demonstratio viriali cuius, extranea autemquod licer hæc omnia
demonstrationis Postremo scientiarum. ne viam atrium et iuxtaponitur uerbo.
Quinto. Magentinus positionis modos modo considerantes est interpretario posis
ab instituto, nomen, aim. Ponere seu constituere. Ammonius has tres particulas legit
cum ergo sunt prædicata propria, affirmationis et negatio m u m ponendum constituat,
alterum appetendum explicaretur oportet definire et fugiat. Poeta ad cocinnum Orator
vero adornatum. Id, quasi istorum quid nominis ad efficiendam. Huic (quam
retuli) rei confidera Averrois, definitio enim inquit Aristotele ingeo navem, alteradarcham
considerandi modo, assentit, Amonius definitiones positiones in arte dicuntur.
Sexto meta.primo.in hoc libro confiderari de oratione, 46.inmagnocóm.
cuiusratio eft. primopoft.17, quam per voces clariores m o prior. primo, syllogismus
est pofitis et concessis et concesso, pri oratio in quaquibusdam attingit.
Magentinus syllogism ducente hac tenus. Paul e re niam fiunt. Quos cis nunc. De
utilitate dicimus ab anima, quæ facile opus suum inquitex proposito patet: ad
de et ex inscriptione cepit ergo tertium modorum quos Ammonius attulit. Su fubic&ti
interpretationem refertur. Quam mitur enim gratia quæri retulimus. nam
enunciatio ad ins ponere, primo prosupposito tendatur tet non simpliciter sic enunciatio
in to, propositum quas per voces clariores NOTIFICARE nostrum esse, de oratione
enunciatiua. Hic autem finis haberinó potest, nisi per hæc præ tertioait igitur
de partibus tractandum est, quid nomen et quid verbum inquiens et Aristotele
verba conne fit.ita res tractatæ alibi differunt. Requires et ens quia propositum
Aristotele quam, necessario. Quona igitur modo feiungi simplicium essential cognoscenda
differentia locus, tamen hic nomen quid ferme omnis explicatur ex proprio fine:
quoniam et uerbum. Juult ergo cum cæteris ista considerat utg; syllogism parte
sefficiantur logicus bus ponere sumendum fore pro definire et definit, ut verum
ftrationi deseruiant,Grammaticus vero voces tis compositas incongruum sermonem
ex elemen, ut congruum, siue oportet ponere, id est definire et falsum
declarant. Et novissime ut demons dissentio latina ac sensum accedens ab
Ariftotele sidiceret. Sed ab his ad Aristotele verba græca et. nam
committereturnugatio possunt? ideo dixit (primum est. Erfide hoc infra fit proprius
considerandi oportet ponere id est
definire, magis ut iudico. Hæc ut bene Ammonius cognoscit. Ac.p fine propositis
nullo modo tamen, ut omnia moveri commune commodum est.id muniter posito.
primotop.nono.Tertio et concello quomodo sumitur procom de mente Ammonii
attulimus gratia explicentur omnibus Aristotele. Quarto pro ea fine ratiocina,
pro proprium est. Locis quos adverbio quod nibuscarentibus pro definitio
positione fieri ex Heracliti sententia via relinquenda non est docentes, fine uia
eius contemplationem medio. secundopofter.46. incommens damus, tenebrisan;
circumfufi more feramur, est igitur enumerat: tray in incertum imperitorum via,
illa quam toti logicæ Aristotele to magno est. coniung nomine et verbo. Pris.primo
poft.2. secundo poft. & ratiocinatione ex hypothesi. Secundo supra retulimus.
& hic accepit sed quem modum Aristotele hic fert. Ex hisitaque patet; Arit,
resconsiderandas acceperit, verbum nullum proj (3 ea considerantur. Quod si
orationem ante etiam posuit et tractavit, non nisi ut genus commune
enunciationis, ad uerbum. O D iii 11 rum ordinem pofuisse) tanquam subie&ta
& tertio prædi num triplex poteftelle consideratio: primo ut absolute Cara,
quideorum, scilicet ponere sive constituere. Sed (ci G gnificant simplices
conceptus. Ita in prædicamentis cons [citorcum primo post.42.in parva commentatione:scieny
fiderantur. aliomodo secundum orationem, ut partes tiasitunius generis fubieéti,
quçcúq; exprimis componitur, sunt enunciationis: f icadhuc librum spectabunt, propter
& partes et PASSIONES horú sunt pse.igitur duo sunt per reaenim (inquit) traduntur
sub rationem nominis: u et er se predicata, substantia sive essentia quæ per definitione,
& biut significant cum tempore aut sine tempore, intulit accidens proprium,
quod per demonlirarionem concluditur. etiam. & tradunturaliahuiuf modi, quæ
ad dictionum secundo post.12. & 20. Inmagno commento.curtantum
pertinentrationem, ut enunciationem conftituunt. sed quid iftorum proposuit? Ad
hoc dicendum mihi uiden quam vistant iuiri ingenium & iudicium semper cum sum
tur:ex primo poft.32.9 res quarüeifecf timperfe&um, & quafiinmente, non
habentuere definitiones. Secundo ponendum quod supra documus, res logicas ut
intrumen ta& organaartium &fcientiarum, ad proprios fines & quod satis
probatum est supra cum a nobis Ammonius notitiam explicandam referri. His datis
patet ad petitios eftr eprehensus. Præter eaut diximus nome et verbum nem
responsio: namdum Aristotele quid prædi & orumponen simplicior asunt decem
vocum conceptibus. Amplius dumpropofuit, &
propriosfinesquiipsorumpropriafer rationoininis & ucrbi, & fi ut
materia adorationemenun rendicuntur accidentia,anteposuilledicetur.sicenimora,
ciatiuampertineant:tamencorumrationesfuntcommu cionem definiens (enunciatilia
(inquiet) nonomnis: sedin nes,nonadorationem tantum contra &æ.ut prædicari
de qua verum et falsum explicatur et nomen quod uoxfitfi vocibus simplicibus
prædicamentorum non possint, licet significatrix. Requirit secundo Ammonius a
quo Sancto Thommas cum divo Thomas in ultimo suo dicto contra Ammonii opis mas accepit.
Side simpliciumuocum essentia in prædica; nionemconsentiam: nomina et uerba in hoc
libro tracta mentistra & auit: cur hic iterum repetits respondet Ammonius.
ri,ut cum tempore aut sine tempore significant, & non solu unum quod supra
tanquam falsum reiecimus. Nam et fi hæc significare dicuntur, sed& alia huius
modi quæperlig verum dicat. Ut robique easdem res subicto, rationetas nent ad
rationem di&tionum. Licet ipse subinferat, utes mendifferentes finiri: nihilo
minus differentia quamaddu nunciationem constituunt. Non solum affirmatigam
enun cit est falsa. Dum inquitin prædicamentis voces (implis ciationem, ut
Ammonius afferebat. Si autemista verba, ces considerariut indicativæ sunt rerum
simplicium. quæ Sancto Thomas referret addi &
tasuperius.utdiceret.qiftainhoc
quandocumtemporismensurasignificant,uerba:quando libro traduntur sub ratione
nominis et uerbi & aliahuius, finetemporecum articulisexplicant, nomina
sunt dicen modi, scilicet tradunturquęadrationempertinent diction da. quandopars
affirmationisuel negationis, dictio: cum num, tuncinternomen, & verbum et di&ionem
distingue autempars syllogismi, terminus. Sed primum inassignay ret. Sed primum
de mente sua verius credo. nam alii tadifferentiadubito: quarationeun quamfiet:
ut subftan teridemdi& umforet contrasequodin, Ammoniumdie siaperleexistens
significari possit cum motu?maxime ximus. Postular Ammonius et Sancto Thomas curaliisoras
cum prædicamentares sint completæina&tu.namquinto tionis partibus missis,
solum nominis et verbi considen metaph.14. septimom et. septimo. primophysic.13.ens
rationem præposuit? addituretiam. quialibropoetico, quod est, aut existeredicitur,
indecemprimasres, seuuo cespartitur: quo ergo significari possunt cum tempore!
nifi diceres ut sunt imperfe et cres, & in motu cum actione, et passione et
generatione lubstantiæ alteratione qualitatis augumento quantitates et ex
accidente mutatione eorum quem ut uo referuntur. Scundo nec dubium solue revidetur
quod dicit. Sed falsum etiam est in prædicamentis rum orationis partes
enumerans, inquit septem elle. Elementum, syllabam,coniun &ionem, nomen,
uerbum, articulum, orationem. Ad hoc breviter respondent alig qui Aristotele omifisse
quediximus, tanquam inutilia et ad rectum poetarum metrum spectancia hic solum
mentioq nem fecisse nominis et verbi: pista sunt necessariæ pars tes
enunciativæ orationis, inquo, Ammonio non aduery voces
considerari,utadfimpliciúrerumcognitionédedu saturnecdiuo Thomas & fi
oratio enunciativa quando que cunt. Sedinftantaliqui. In prædicamentis,
Aristotele finiensin conftetexaliis, nonnecessario,simpliciter,omnitempore,
quit. subftátiadicitur.sedquamuanèrefpondeantexAril. quintometa.14.&
Alexandro Aphrodiseo exponente cognoscant, secundum se inquit vero dicuntur quæcunq;
predicamenti figuras significant aut secundum Boethium quæcunque figuras
predicationis significant. Itaq. Per Aphrodiseus quod a nomine, vel uerbo
deducitur:lig verbum hoc dici et significare res simplices, prædicamen ca ad metaph.
Non logicum pertinent: sed ut decemu04 ces, resmediis CONCEPTIBUS A POSITIONE
SIGNIFICANT logie corum considerationi convenient.Tertio dubito& tan cuti
et legendum, et navigandum alegere et navigareuer bo originem ducunt. Similia
dici possunt de explicatione Alexandri. Quautitur Ammonius dum deuerboconsin
dcrans Aristotele inquit. Verba autem secundum se dicta nomina sunt id est simplex
habent significatum nominis86 eius simplicibus partibus simile, ex quibus constatoratio.
itapro Alexandro dicendum. Aduerbia plurima ex parte quam vanam explicationem
existimo, dictionem, fcili, cet affirmationis partem vocari. Nam quid interest
dicere nomen et verbum vocem esse SIGNIFICATRICEM A PLACITO et afferere nomen
et verbum dictionem esse ihuiusmay deduciauero nomine aut a parte orationis
simpliciquæ nifestum indicium ex Aristotele sumitur. Qui ipsam orationem
definiésait oratio est vox significatrix, cuius ex partibus aliqua separata
significat ut di&tio, verum non ut affirma, tio) ergo idem est dictio, quod
nomen. Ut habet translatio Magentini. Et uerbum. Ergo dictio, orationis communis
pars erit, non affirmatione stantum. Nisi per appropriationem dicatillud. sed
Sancto Thomas vidensuocesalo, gico consideratas non poffe decem simplicissimas resnis
fime diis conceptibus explicare (itaenim secundo intely uim habeat nominis. Et
ita si quando goriatura uerbo, nihil Alexandri et Aristotele sententiæ officit.
Sed cur particis pium, quoquam se pissime in demonstratiuis scientiarum
sermonibus utitur, tam hicquam poeticorum libro relis quit? Ammonius dicit, quia
ad nomen et verbum reduciy tur. Aliiuero (quod idem sft) dicunt.quia pars
comporis ta non simplex orationis dicitur. Quæ responsio magis perspicua et
euidens iudicio meo est. Nam primo pos ter, secundo, præposuit dupliciter præ
cognoscere oportere, leda siue secundæ intentiones dicentur, nonu tres linere
alia någquiasuntprius opinari necesseest. alia vero quid lationibusdenotant. ad
philosophiam naturalem spe&an eft quod dicitur intelligere oportet. sed cum
duas propos tes& metaph.) aliteralseric, fimplicium(inquit)di&tion
nerettresenumerauit. &adhocrespondet Auer,optertia ma ueneratione
sanctitatis probarim:in hactamenre' sponsione dissentio: cum decemuocesnon
solum limy plicesconceptus:sedresmediisconceptibusexplicent: loco,&
subiecto:& non nifirefpe&uhorum.ut pronos men loco proprii nominis.
Adverbium tam hic, quam in libro poeticorum relinquitur, uelquiautAmmonius ait,
modum dicitquo prædicatum incit subiecto. aut ut Грее species
compofitaeftexhis.dicasetiáoduaspræposuit necceffarias signum est q Aristotele
dixit (dupliciter præcognoscere oportet:& quia lunt,opinari neceffe
eft:& quid in telligereoportet.) ad tertiam vero præcognitionemder
scendens,fineullonecessitatisuerboadditoait.(quædam autemutrag:)
namcompofitaquæeffe&am tertiamnas turamnondicuntdistinctama
componentibus,explicatis neceffariispartibus,
coniunctimexhisexplicariintelligun tur:uerum quicquidsitdeArist.
textu&rationequamdi xi: sufficiensrefponfiofit: qhicdefimplicibus partibus
Aristotele loquitur,qualenonestparticipium. Coniuns &ionemomisit,nonquia
inutilis,quoniam.infra(quod ipseconfirmat hic, & fupra contra Boethii
opinionem adduxit) Arist. diuidet orationem enunciatiuam in unam simpliciter
& coniunctione unam: quæ neceffarioconiun &tionemexpoftulat. Necexomisitut
Ammonius et Sancto.Thomas quiapars orationis non est sedparsconne&ensatque
coniungens. quoniam Aristotele coniunctionem poeticælos
cutioniannumerauit,tanquam orationiselementum.Item incap.quarto Auerdicet,q
Syllogismuscöditionaliseft unusperunam copulatiuam.Gifoloriturergodieseft.
ficut predicatiuus est unus per medium terminum. sedhic medius terminus neceffaria
est pars prædicatiui sive CATHEGORICI cay thegoricifyllogismi. ergoconiunétiosyllogismiexpofis
tionefiuehypothetici.Hinc etiam contra eos fequetur inutilemconiun
&ionemnonesse: sed hypotethicofyllor gisino necessariam: ut medium
terminumprædicatiuo lyllogismo.Aliisentiunt proptereaconiun&ionemomiy
filfe:9 de enuntiatione una simpliciter demonftrationi seruienti, nonconiun
& ioneuna considerat. fed hanc reo sponsionem suprareiecimus: earationeq
hicliberetiam ad librum priorum dirigitur,proximam syllogismo hypothetico
positionem seu præmislamelargiens. Itemin
hoclibro,capit.quarto,propofitamenunciationemab aliis oratoriisac poeticis
seligens, in has duas partitur. itidemq; definitaoratione in libro poeticorum
eam in hasdistribuit feudi uisit species. Dicendum igiturnobis uidetur,
proptereahic relictamconiunctionemesse,quia facilis, &Arift.
sufficienserateaparua cognitioquam tradidit in libropoeticorum. Aut
secundodicasquor demonstrativa (cientia. Etsecundo poft.1oo. iuxta ordi niamhic
propofitú est deuocibus neceffario SIGNIFICATRICI nemquem compositiuum aut componentem
appellant, pri bus agere ad interpretationem per voces clariores efficie endam:
quęoémorationemefficiant.namhiclibercom muniaprincipiaexplicat. Dic secundoq in
libro poeticorum cap.septimo, coniunctio fignificationis est expers: quade
causa definitioni, quæ perfectaoratio eft,nondeses Post eaquid eft negatio, o
affirmatio:& Enunciatio, u Oratio, Deinde quidsitnegatio,a affirmatio,o
enunciatio, oratio. mo genus,quid syllogismus,indespeciem,.demonstras
tionemcollegit. Pręponens igitur hic ista duo tangfinem unum integrūperse ex
genere & specie constitutum, primo ait enunciationem, deindeoratione, non
ita per se intenta: nobis innato aminus communi ad communiora. Sed hæc
responsio improbatur quia. Si ordinen obis innato, seu aminus communi &
imperfe &oincipiendum est, cur latus ordo ex accidente euenit, ut quando
gabimperfer &o furnatinitium. quia in libro de animal secundo, tex. tura
Magentino cum universęres (quas universalia dicunt) singulis pr æferantur,
cur hic non primum de oratione & genere, deindede enunciatione affirmatione
& negatione exorsus fit Aris.sed primum a nomine & uerbo:namauta
nobilior iinchoandumerat, aut aremagiscõi, utordone ceffariusseruaretur, non
anobiliori,cum negationem affirmationi prætulerit. nonacommuniori, quiaoratiofuif
setanteponenda. Responderipse. solerequandoq; Arist.
hocfacere,&arecommunioriquæadfingulasresfpes
&antincipere:quomodohicdicitanominefignificante
substantiamfiueeflentiam&auerbofignificanteaction nem,seupassionem,
Ariftot.inchoare:sedquareiftum fecundumneceffariumordinem internegationem&
affir mationem,enunciationem & orationem nonferuauerit,ut
Gbioccultumomifit. Præter ca enunciatio utfinishorum materialium principiorum
prenstantior eft, ergo antepor nendafuisset. Amplius nomen et uerbum,
nonideocom munioraeffedicimus,qfubftantiamautaccidensfignis
ficaredicuntur,sedquoces fignificatiueapositionelunt, non substantiæ aut
accidentis,ut naturæ terminatæ,sed communiter omnium.ratio ergo eftfumpta a
processu re foluente finem in causas & principia prima intra rem.itas
quecum orationem nonomnem, sed inqua est verum et falsum, ideft enunciatiuam, ut
finems peculetur, & hæcex nomine et uerbo, u tmateriis, constituatur necessario
ers go primum dehis ponendum quidf snt: deindecóplebit reliquas partesprocessusresolutiui.sedlubieêtum,utto,
tumpotentiaprimasspeciescontinens,cognofcinonpo teftfinesuis speciebus, ficuttotumconftarenonpotnifiex
suis constituentibus principiismaterialibus:ergodeindede his quæ ad finem
propriú diriguntur, dicendú, quid oratio et enunciatio, ut completes finisele&us
habeatur:quiahęc in affirmationem & negationemdiuiditurincap.4.utpris
mophy.intelligere&scire,ideftintelligerescientificum: quodAuer. finemrerumnaturaliūpofuit.Itemgenuscú
principalisuaspecieunumfinéconstituit,aceaunoproce mio proponuntur&
epilogocolliguntur:utprimoprio rumdesyllogismotradaturus, resoluentemprocessumef
ficiensaprincipalifineinchoauit:dedemonftratione & Propositis
communibus, ut materia, principiis,quæ per se significantiaomnem orationem
conftituunt: nunc de coniun&tis ex hisprincipiis& conftitutis proponit.pri
mumq; ait (Deinde, ut diximusex Ammonio, ordinem
&urumproponitderebusomnibus:deindedeelemétis, denotatprincipiorumconftituentiumadresconstitutas.
&deomnianimapriusquamhacautillaanimaratio (Po f t e a (inquit) quid n
e a t i o affirmati o &c Hic quæris igitur & causa ordinisa dnoscelatiestanotioribus
nobis Diiii gationé affirmationi prætulerit. Ammonius ait
priusnomenperfe&tiusposuit?Iteminsitus,& adnosre
66.asenfuuisusincepit.ut Auer.aitineodem libro.co. 77.& tertio, de anima
de intelle&tu priusquamdesecuny. dum locúmotiuapotentia. fimilitersecundúaccidenseft
ut a comunioribus fiue minus cómunibus proMilanius. N a m de generatione
confiderans de eageneratim sedin ruit: & fi per se non significat (utait
Aristotele licet significa, demonftratio intéditurquamfyllogifmus.Etprimophy.
tionemnonimpediat perfeadhunclibrumnon(per primofinemproponensrerum naturalium primum,dixit.
&at,quietiampersesignificantiaprincipiautmateriasspe
(quoniãintelligere&scirecótingit,)ideftrationemellen culari conftituit.quarenoninutilisquidemcõiun&tioerit:
tiamacnaturamipfarum,indescientiamperdemonstras sednecneceffariaparsfignificans,orationiperse,ideft,
tionemacquisitam ratione& eflentiapofita,& explicata omni
conueniens.oratioautemdiuisainspeciesduas,
perdefinitionem,infineexplicando,nobiliusexplicauit, quas monftrauimus, conjunétionem
a poetica,uteiusparti acmagisintentum.Sedadhucdubiumremanetcurnes utilem,mutuo
accipit. fed ad enunciationem relatam.ut primo priorum,prius TEX.BOETHII.
ordine ad nos relato,ab imperfecto ad perfectum procedit:& tum.negatioenimdiuisionemcontinet,affirmatioautem
in compofitione consistit.negationé igitur affirmationi præposuit, & magis ad
partesaccedir,compositioautem ad totum.Sed(ueniatantiuirifitdi&um
)negatiomagis composita dicitur quam affirmatio, cum additione negan
cisparticulæ,affirmatio efficiatur negatio.Ad rationem orationem quatenus ex
luis materialibus principiis cons harum alterutrapræferatur. Sedcontra
dicimus,pris mo hic liberad demonstrationem dirigitur, utipsefal dem, fic nece
æ de m voces. Quarum autem hæ primum notæ sunt, eædem omnibuspaßionesanimæfunt:&
quas rum hæ fimilitudines, res etiam eædem. Sunt quidem ergo hæc in uoce,earum
in anima paßios admodumnecliter&omnibuscædem,ficneceædemuoces. sentienscum
Magentino) reprehenditura Sueffa. adiu mentum seu commodumin proæmio, nointra&tatupræ
do) secondo phy.tertio.(natura est principium motus et quietis, per se et non
secundum accidens) ita que ex his
positissequiturnegationeminftrumentumexplicanscon fitioneformam eflentiamq;cognoscimus)hoceft.agen
rium& dirigentiumadipsas.) oportetigiturantecogno!
scereeaexquibusestdefinitio:proptereaq iftapræcogni tetur, quææternorumeftnonautemadeaquæpossunt
ponitur. diceretenimilleutilitatemtotiuslibri&fubiecti esse et noneffe.Amplius&fiinuno,quoddepotens
anteponenda, nonutilitatem cognitionis,perquampro tiaadactumeducitur, non effe prius
fit eo, quodeft: pofitad eclarari, ac definiri possunt. meæ etiam rationi
nontamen simpliciter inomni natura: cumea,quępoten responderet. In sequentitextu
commodumqualefitex tia continentur, nonnisiaba&tu, aceoquoduereeftin
plicari: sed quaminordinateacfinearteidfaciat,uides
actumedantur.prætereacap.quartoenunciationemin rintalii, retamenidemcumAmmoniosentit.quiait
Ari. hasduasspeciesdiuidensinquit.(Prima autem oratio docereuellenomen&
uerbumquorumfinitionespromi enunciatiuaeftaffirmatio,deindenegatio)crgoanaloga,
fit, voces significativas esse, quod ifferata uocibus nonli aut per rationem ad
aliud nonç quediuifaparticipaturab gnificantibus, ut scindapfus:docetớ; quæ
inprimis,ac utrii: feddehocfuolocodicemus. ficut Ammoniusdi
proximeabipfisuocibusindicentur. conceptus, fcilicet durumpromittit: Mihiquodueriusprobaturiftudeft,
primo: quorum interuenturesexplicantur.quæomnia, hic affirmationem et
negationem numerariut plures species enunciationis, id est oppositionem
contradictoriam erficientes. Quæinfinefectionis fecundæ,inhoccons
fiftit.utaliquasedeiiciant,deftruant,abiiciant,atque ne gent; inhocautemefficiendopotissimam&inprimis
uimhabetnegatio. Quade causaibiprimumabArift.nu meratur, utsecundodeanima.27.cum
speciesfubie &ti fintplures,exenumerationeipsarumpręcognoscituresse, id
uerum in demoftratione, itidemindefinitionemons quodanteponendumeft,priusquátra&atuscognitioaut
definitiohabeatur. Secundo sciendum primo topic. ofta 10i2. Oppofita secundum contradi&ionemprotenfaals
terumoppofitumexplicare.Et primopoft.o&auo.inan tiquacommentatione,(de omni
eftquod non inquodam quidem fic,in quodam autem non. nec aliquando quis d e m
sic, aliquando quidé non. Jitidem & tex. quinto (scire autem simpliciter opinamur:
fednonfophifticomos nitionis: quafimplici conceptu fine assertioneseucompo
iun&a & diuisa, notioremessequamaffirmationem.nam ta,adeamhabendamnosdiriguntatqzillamexpræno/
attenderefolemus diligentius ad contraria, ut nobisads
uerlancia,quameaquæfuntnobisinnata. hæcautemafs firmatio, illa negatio explicat
perexterna, explicantia tisefficiunt. Arif. igiturquoniamdixit(oportetnoscon
ftituere, fiue ponerequidnomen, & uerbum &c.)&com
muniterhæceruntuoces significatiuæpofitionealięfine quodammodoalterum.sedcumiplespeciesexpropriis
very explicatione, alięcum vero.iccircoiftatriaantemani principiisinternisdefiniuntur,I
uxtaipfarumnaturam, feftat: nesuedefinitionesfineratione&fineeaquamipse
proprietatem, &utadcommunegenusproportionale tradiditarteponantur,at
constituantur.Inhoctextu (euanalogumreferuntur,finiendasuntprimo,modohic
inproæmio negatio præposita numeratur, ut inftrumeng uoces
essesignificatiuas:quod Ammonilis exponens cum
tumefthabensellenorius:secundoautemmodoinfrain Magentinoaitquattuoradhocutilia effe:rem,conceptú,
tra&tatu& propria definition subsequitur.itainfra,intely uocem, &literas.
Amm.autemait Aril.inchoare,nona le&usquandoplineueroeft& falso: circa compositio/
rebus,quæperse,necfimplicessuntneccompofitr:(id
nemenimeftfalfum&uerum.Queruntnouissimecuruo
enimhabentconceptus)sedauocibus,tr"finequibusdis cem omiserit.sedAris.infriadhocrespondebit:utsupra
sciplina& præceptiofierinonpoteft aitą;nullamfacere
etiãanobisfatiseftdi&ú.Proptereaadaliacótendamus. Aristotele de literis mentionem.gnulliusuifuntadproporto
& fiuerafint, diminPombaamen ponunturcum aliammay gis intentam differentiam
(significare scilicet a positione, non natura) relinquat,quamtamenAlex.&Pfelliuspro
sequuntur et in expositione tex. Ammonius A uer.ato
aliinonomittunt.unumergo&idemcumhissentiens, eorumueritatem confirmo. Cumnominisdo&rina&dis
sciplinaexantepositafiuepræexistentifiatcognicicne, ftretur,&
testimonioAuer.confirmetur.primopost.ses cundo.& Arift.primoMetaph.48.&
apudAlex.83.pri motop.quarto.(oportetenimaitArift.exquibuseftde
finitiopræscire,fiueantecognoscere.)& Alex.inquit definitioperomnia nota
& precognita procedit & Averroes primopost. secundo.fic.(etiamuerisimileefteffedispofi
tionem fpecierum prænotionum conceptionis (ideftdefi
unumeorumquædiximusexplicatur,nomen& uerbum primo phy.fecundo.hec
autem quandog imperfe&tiora, TEX. BOETHIL. Suntergoea,quæ
funtinuoceearum,quesuntinanie quandoyperfectiora,minus communia autcõiora.Ma
ma,paßionumnot&,o eaquæ fcribuntur,corum,que gentinusaitq cum
euidentiadixerit,abhistanquáabdi tis&occultisabftinuit.S.Thomas dicit gquiaAril.cępitapar
suntinuoce.Etquemadmodumnecliteræomnibuse&s tibusenumerare:ideo nunc
procedit a partibusad tol adducam dicitur. aliudeffe dicere num note: O quæ
fcribuntur eorum in voce. Et queme
procedere,quiamagissensatasunt.3.deanima30.39., inftrumentum,seu Atat, essemagisminusuecompositam:aliudfinemhabes
paßionesanimesunt,o quarumbæfimilitudines,res quoquecedem.
reutalterumconiungicum altero,autfeiungiabaltero enunciet. secundum concedimus:
sed exillo affirmatio nis naturam magis compositam esse, sequi negamus sed
Magétinus dicitq enumeratis nomine,& uerbo,& aliis eorum
definitionestradendæ erant,quas ponereconstis
tuerat.SedhocAril.nonfacit:sedcaputproponit.quod
nobisadiumentoerit:sedquodfitadiumentumnonexi plicat,necincrepandusame
eritutHerminius(idem negationis potius. Secundorefpódetp in hisquę poffunt
efleXnonefle,priuseftnoneffequodfignificatnegatio,
quamefle,quodexplicataffirmatio:sedutspeciessunt
æquegenusdiuidentes,suntfimulnatura,nihilgrefert Quorum tamenhæc primum notæfunt,eædemomnibus
i ta con lacontemplanda.Quod fiitaest. Curergo iftorum quat
passiones seu conceptions esse omnibus.easdem:idest tuormeminic? Etsiinfralongioribus,nunctamenquod
ellea natura: Expolitoresnonexplicant.quadecausa, ad rem pertinent dicamus,&
brcuiter: finem huius libriin terpretationemesseut fuprapofuimus.hæc autem
utlov gicum inftrumentum & organum cognoscendi,ad expli
cationemrerumdirigitur,actanquamultimum & perfe netemere&
fineullarationeiddrift.pofuiffedicamus. notandum,sextotopi.14.inexplicandispartibus
defini tionisoppofitorum,nontantumopuseffeoppoftiscum
negationepræpofita,fedetiamrebushuiufmodi,quiz
intentumfinemrefertur.interpretatiouerorerumnon
busdefinitiofeudefinitionisparstanquamhabituiconue fit nisi per uoces clariores
significantes a positione, aut perl iteras (cum uoces defuerint) propter eanecresomi
lit, sed tanquam fine multimum&inprimisintentumpor
fuit.tertioenimmera.6.7.meta.23.nemodefineconsuls nit:nam
persehabitusperpriuationesnoscuntur:licet quodammodo (ideftut Commentator primo
pofter, 133.1nmagna commentauone & primorheto.cap.quin toinepitomatibus logicalibus)
explicet alicuigeneriha minum priuatio, atqueoppofitum cum negationepræs
posita,alterummanifeftet.quamobrem topicaloca con ftituunt.Qomnibus,autpluribusitauidentur.Cum
igis turfupraexplicaffet,liocesfignaeffeapofitione,exappo
fat:fedftatuitatq;ponit:sedquomodo& perquæisfinis eueniatde liberat.nam
primo ethico septimo, fifinem tanquam exemplarhabuerimus,magisintelligemusquæ
nobissuntbona.& feptimopoli.13.inprincipio:Duo
funtinquibusomniscommendatiobeneagendiconsiy
fitocumnegationepræmiffa,nunceademexplicatpary ftit.unumutpropofitum
acfinisrecteagendisubiaceat: alterumuteasquæinillum sinemferantactionesinuenia
mus, resigiturhic non relinquuntur sed tanquamfines explicandiponuntur. Nec
literæ fruftraab Arift.nume ranturcumuocumfunganturofficio:hisq;principibus
explicatis,& quæ scribunturapeririintelligimus.huius
enimcaulaquæsuntinuoceconscribimus,utabsentis busuocibus,resconceptascertius,uberius,&firmius
teneremus.quæ enim uox,totphilosophorum,anobis
abfentium,sententiasunquáaperuitadquaseorumlibri nostam
facilcdeduxerunt,utpossemusaliquandoquid
ticulamexoppositopositiuo.passionesenim& respros prereaq
eædemsuntomnibus,naturasunt,nonexarn
bitrio,&pofitione.exoppositouoces,acscripiuræquia non sunteædem,apositione,
no natura significant. Hinc etiam differentia vocum a positione et passionum siue
conceptionum & rerum colligitur. & approbationem intelligat, ex græca
particular aperitur. quædicitiwvwww quorumquidem. Quæparticulacausampropofiti expliscat,
non controuerfiam. Quioaduerba, Ammonius pris
mumobseruat.qcumdeuocibus&literisdiceret Arist. ait. quorumexsignasunt. sed
passions similitudinesre senserinteorum scripta fæpiusrepetentesagnoscere: No
rumuocauit. Quia simulacra rerum naturas,quoadlicet igiturut Ammonius dico
nihilo pusesse scriptis.seddico,
representant.utinpi&uristidetur.inquibusmutarefor magis fuisseconueniens Arift.
nomen& uerbum &c.des mas præsentatas non licet.litin Socratepitto calvo,
fi finireperuocesquæin disciplinis quasaliocertoduce
mo,oculisprominentibus.signauero¾totumha. perdiscimusfacile)primas
tulerunt:quam perscripta: bentabimpofitione,& cogitationenoftra,utinmilitum
quibus peritiocculta cognoscunt,& percepta declarant, signis,& notis diuerfisa;
inftitutis conspicitur.Sedcong Nunc adliteramueniamus ea quæ in uocesunt,cons
traquiasecundopriorum.27.deenthimematetractans. fi stunt,autcontinentur,suntfignaseunorę.ounebonorenim
duo hæc fignificat.(earumpassionum ).i.eorum conces ptuum:quospatitur,ideft,utformisperficiturphantafia,
mens, seuanima,ut Prelliusait.& quem scribuntur SIGNA ac NOTAE funt eorum quæ
in uoce consistunt.Etquemadmo gnificans.quiaidemuerbum,lignum,¬auocatur.
dum necliteræomnibusexdem ficneceædem uoces.} Explicata prima definitionis
particula,núc ad fecundam accedit quoces a positione significant. Idqueapprobat
Arifto.ratione fumptaex oppositocum negation prol tensa. Quodquodammodo notius,
alterum palam facit. primo topic.o &auo, hinc facileconfirmatutexperimen 10
Arist. quodsupradenegationeantepositaaffirmationi docuimus
ratione,fedoppofitumeiquod eftapositione elle,estelleanatura:quæ eadem
omnibusineft.exops positoigiturratioinhuncmodum formetur. ad conclus fionem exfimilinotioriinlitterisinnuendam,
idnatura effediceturquod eftomnibus idem;naturaenim princiy piumeftperse&
deomni:quæigiturnonsuntomnibus eadem,nonnaturasuntautsignificant.anegatione
proy Prætereasihæcdifferentiaueraesset,acillamAristot.ex his uerbis
intenderet,his tantum nominibus pofitis fuffin cienterexplicasset,dum diceret. Propterea
quòd uoces & literæ SIGNA ac NOTAE sunt, a positione significant: passiones
uero & resquiafimilitudinessunt, a natura. Itain finiendo nomine& uerbo
sufficeretsiduntaxatdixisset, nomen&uerbumestnota.nonigituraddendumquog
cesfintapositionefignificantes.& hicomittendumfuils set,quòd uoces&
literæsuntnotæfuesignanoneadem, neidem calu, actemere refricaret. Mihi ita sentiendum
uidetur. Ovuboloy superior NOTAM (NOTARE, NOTIFICARE), SIGNUM (SIGNARE,
SIGNIFICARE), VESTIGIUM dices re. quæ ita dicuntur. quiaut notiora exterius
NOTIFICANT, ac ut VESTIGIA pedum significant. Hoera autem,ideft passiones, sive
conceptiones, non ita: quanuis interius
priæ definitionis ad negationem definiti.hęc propositio, similitudines rerum vocentur:
rem tamen& fiinterius, quia perspicua, approbanda non eft:sed lumiper fenoi
exterius non aperiunt.proptereaigitur uoces et literas fi, tam oportet, alibiquodammodo
declarandam:Allumy gna& notasuocauit,& passionesfimilitudines:quiaille
prio,ideftminorpropositiointextuexoppofitocumne exterius, hæcinteriusmanifestant.
Secundoexdictisfaz gatione præpofitanotioriinliteris.(&quemadmo!
cilereprehenditursyllogismusquemSuellaformauitex
dumnequeliteræomnibuseædem:ficneceædemuol litera.dum afferit Arifto.uelle probare
uoces & literas ces) conclufioconsequetur. Igitur nec voces a natura sig
quumeuarient,apositionehaberi,conceptionesuero& gnificant & nonomnibuseç
demerunt. Quorumaux res, cumnoneuarient,naturaeffe. hoctotumuultelle
tem.;Approbataminoripropofitioneexsimilinotiori præceptum& complexionem
fiueconclufionemadqua inliteris,inquibusidemprædicatuminuenitur.nunc
inferendamait Aristotele intexturatiocinari. Quæcung sunt aliaduo, conceptusfcilicet,
seu passions & resmanis aliorum signa vel notæ, positione fehabent. uultdeinde
festata naturaeffe:& ita ead emomnibus, inquit(ledpal, quòdassumptionem,ideft
minorem Arift.ponatibi.{funt Gones animæ) quarumhædi&æuoces.(primum)nuly
quidemigiturquæsuntinuoce&c.}ideftfed nomina & lointeruentu,noræfunt(hæanimæpassionessuntcæs
uerba. Et scripta suntf sgna et notæ. aliarum, voces, Ccili demomnibus:&
resquarumhæpassionessuntfimilitus c et conceptionum,& (criptauocum:sequiturcóclufiout
dines,etiameædem funt.) Sed cuiusgratiamanifestat putatibi. (qaemadmodumnecliteræeædemficnecuos
Aristot.ipfumdefiniensait,syllogismuseftimperfe&tus: exfignis.ubieodem
uerboutituradexplicandum69 gnum naturale,& fignum apositionc.uana
itidemerit, assignata differentia Magentini. non fita positione ceseædemerunt.}
ubi(fic)ingræcononhaberiaffirmat: tur. Sed primær esponsionispartitio, feudiftinétio,
quo quodmanifeftefalsumeftToosenim (sic) latine significat nammodo fituerainprimosuomembro,supralongios
{&quemadmodum&c.}ait(&)uimhabereinferendifæ ribus disseruimus.cęteratáquamueraprobanus.Seddu
pe consueuisse.Sed obiurgandus est Ammonius:qui lis gnum,& notam
aitapprobationem,ideftprobationem bitabis Vox significatrix est per se genus
nominis & uery bi: igitur vox erit gencris pars communis, per seunum constituens:duoigiturconsequuntur.primúnaturale,unā
perseconftituerecum artificiali,&ensrealecúenteratio, nis:secundopartem
efle intotoniinuscommuni:signifi care,scilicetapositione,effeinuoce,quæeftmagiscomo
munis. Qui modus improprius dicitur eius, quod est in esse.q nomina,& uerb auoces,
& scripta a positionef sgnificent:cum secondo priorum27. In Epiromatibus logica,
libus,derhetoricaperfuafiua,& fyllogismo.cótradičoria
fignaenthimematis& demonstrationis, & topica etiam, non a positione significent. lignum ergo, et
NOTA, commune est ad signum, quod EX ARBITRIO ET inftituto signifiy alioelle. quartophy.Adprimum&finihilhicneceffario
cat,& signumnaturaconsistens.Secundopropriaeiusra
tiocinatioconfutatur:nonenimunusestsyllogismus in textuquen suo arbitratu diuisit,
sedduo. Vnusquonos minaAristot.&uerbauoceseffefignificatiuasdeclarat:
quodamedi&um est Paulo antedum primum in textum hoc modo (quæ suntin voce
sunt notæ et signa) scili, cet significantia exterius (earum quæ sunt in anima
passionum.) minor siue assumptio, utpofitiopersenota,ap
Aris.dubitarem.reslogicasuthabentesesseimperfectum & quafiin cogitatione ut
fubiecto:inuoceutfigno,aliam naturamullam sortitas non effe, quam eamquam anima
probationis nonindigensponetur. Cum nomen & uers exarbitriofinxit: ut ad aliud
fignificandumexteriusrefe bumdefiniet,fednomen&uerbum funtfignaseuuoces:
ratur.ficutea,quæartificummanuseffingunt præterna itaq; maior, ergo &c.propofitioallumptaest,utperseno
turæopis,lignum,scilicetæs,aurumue,nilreliquumha ta. Signum est illa græca particula
(quidem igitur) quæ bent, nisi quodarsuerapersua inftrumenta hocuelillo uel executionisfitnota,
uel fineulla approbationeexpro positis inferens,m e a m sententiam confirmabit
id effe fine approbatione aliqua pofitum. ut communiter affertum
abomnibus:Secundusfyllogismuseritibi.(Etquems admodum &c.) ut secunda pars definitionis
ponatur, significare, scilicet a positione. Quod tanquam perfe notum, nondemonftrat,
sed quia non omnino,cinealiy qua controuerfia eft confeffum.proptereaquodam
modo ex opposito cum negatione præposita manifestat. Quod inscriptis eft manifestius,
apofitionefint;& eui dentiuscóftantiusq;manifestent.Syllogismusigiturerit.
quæ non omnibuseadem suntillanon a natura (quæ in omnibusuno
modoinuenitur:perseidem inomnibus fimiliter operans ) sed a positione sunt,&
fignificant: minorintextu.(Etquemadmodum necliteræomnibus eædem, ficnecuoceseædem.}Itaquemaiorpropofitio
fyllogismiSuessenonestadhanc inferendamconclufios nem,quam nostra
secundaratiocinatiointulit.& quæa Sueffaratiocinationisconclufio&
complexiodicitur, no bisminorsecundisyllogismicumeiusapprobationeex simili
literarum uiderur.nam fine ulla controuerfia (ut bene animaduertitAmmonius)fcripturæ&literæapos
fitione fignificant.licetquodammodo uertaturindus biumannomina&
uerba,nátura,utPlatouideturassere re, anaconfilio, ut Arift.sentit,significaredicantur.
hinc. perseunum conftituit cumuoce,naturaliopereanimaut fequetureum non aduerbaArift.nequefenfum
dicere. dum infecundasuaexpofitione afferit, quam Alexandri & Afpafiieffe
confirmat, hic Aristotele velle colligere similitudi singulare opus naturæ eft,
fedutindiuiduumabartefor matum. Itaquenecprimum sequetur, naturalecumarti
ficialiunum per se constituere: quianonutnaturale,sed néinterscripta et uoces.
Sedqexhocpredicato,fignifica utarteeffectum, formatumcumsuacausaformaliperle
reutnonidem,ideftapofitione:quodnorius,&firmiusin unum efficeredicitur: fimiliterres
logicas et placitum f19 scriptis uidetur. Infertidemdeuocibussignificatiuis,tan
uementisarbitriuminuocecontineri affirmamus:non quamgenereproximonominis&
uerbi et omnium alio tamenutopusnaturæeft, per seunum genus conftituit, rum. Quæritsecundo
Ammonius:cur Arift.nondixer fed tantumutapositione,&confilio, et cogitationefal
cit. uoces sunt signac onceptionum. Sed eaquæ funtin &umeft,utuoxadhocuelilludexplicandumponatur.
Voce irespondet primum: cum triplexfitoratio,concel & ex communiimponentiumconfilioreferatur.Sica
pra, inuoce; inscripto:desecundahicloquiturfecuny mentisrelatione,queinuocead fignificandum
relinquis do respondet, voces naturae dimusficutuidere, audire:
aliudeftergouocesesse,utopusnaturæ,aliudnomis na& uerbaapofitione&
noftracogitatione,quæuoce utuntur,nam.quemadmodum ianua diciturlignum,&
nummusæsuelaurum ex arte, quæ imponitfiguras& tur,uocemnaturæopus,artislogicæinftrumentum,
& opusartificialeperleunum,& adalterumsignang dum relatum conftituitur.
Ex hisadidquodsecuns do consequebaturpatet refponfio. non enim inconuer
nienseftminuscommune,quodformam& a&umdig
characteres:eodemmodo&uocesdicunturnomina, cit,contineriinaliomagiscommuniquodinpotentia
cum alocutoria imagination fingunturacformantur, fie
exiftensperficiacformariabaliopossitminuscommu; gna eorum,quæ
inanimouoluntantur,& talem sunt formamadeptæ:utex positionefignificent.signum
est uoxmutorum articulata,quæquianonexcompofito& institutionealiorum
eft,ideonomen& uerbumnondicis ni.utdeintelle&tu & cogitatiua Auer.opinaturdeanima
altrice,sentiente& rationali.& ex Aristotele confirmaturses
cundodeanima. 30. De forma artis in materia. Poftremo
inuoce,perfe&ioplaciti,seuarbitrii,confilii,&pofitionis,
effetdicendum.sedmetaphyfico& naturalihæcquæftio
difficilisrelinquédaellerbonitatis,tamengratia,quambre uissime poterorefpódebo.
Fed animaduertendumprimo modoeffigiantiaprogenuerit.Hoc,alterumcomitatur,
easdem res logicas,utsecundo intellecta,ad logicam non ut scientiamsedartem
spectare.namearuni,mentisare
bitrium,utexternacausaefficiensassignatur.aquoeffig
ciunturea,quæartium&sciétiarumexplicationiconuer niunt.& inuocibus,acaliisnotioribusregulis
apponun tur.primopost.17. secundopofter.27. Tertioponens dum
octauometaph.16.noneodemmodo,omnium unitatis per se causam requiri. Alia nanque,
quæ matel riæconditionibusuacant,utintelligentiæ fiuementes,fta timens,&
unum perse sunt:Aliaquæ ex materiis cons ftant,unum
persefiunt:qhocidem,quodenspotentia erat;idem
fita&u:efficientetantumeducentedepotens tiaina&um artificialiaperseunum
conftituunt,secundo phy.13. secundode animao&tauo,non cum subie&tout
naturæ indiuiduum eft,fed ut arte formatum, viue effigia tum est: artis,ac
formæ artificialis esse recipiens. causa enimpropriacumsitars,& effe
usartificialequiderit. Ficutcauf apropriaindiuidui& effe& in aturaliseftforma
&fubftátia,effetumigitursubftantiaerit,itaproportione &
fimilitudinequadam,quædeunitate& definitioneres
rumartificialiumdictasunt:fereeademderebuslogicis, &
uocesignificatriceapofitionedicendafunt.non enim quod inuoceexconfilio,&
mentisarbitriopofitumest, quibus quibusuoxipsa, qualiformatur:& denominationeexo
trin.ecussignificareapolitionedicitur,atque,utaiunt, per attributionem placiti,ut
formæ fpecialis, uoci, ut cantibus omnibus,nondefinitecontractisad110men,&
uerbum:nam uoxfignificatiuapartem communitsimam generis nominis & uerbi
& orationis conitituit non pros materiæ sive generi magis communi adsunt. Necincon
prienomen&uerbumtantum: Differentiam aut eniliter ueniens modusellendiinalioeft,minuscommunisinma
rarum abelcmentis quam Ammonius accepitaDionys giscommunifiueformæinmateria,utSuetreuidetur,quo
fio,lumasabArist.inlibrocnim poeticorumait. Eles niamquartophy.23.Primus modusnumeraturpartisin
mentumuocéeffeindiuuduam:ergoproprieinuoce.sed
toto,tecundustotiusinpartibustertiusspecieiingenere, ad sensumpatetliterasparteseorumeflequæscribuntur.
quartusgenerisinspecie,quintusspeciei,leuformęinmai
Quæriturcurpassionesuocauit,&fimilitudinesuelfimu feria &c.NecualetfuaobiectiocontraPorphyrium:
lacra. Ut Ammonius dicit. Sueffarespondet proptereafie fequeretur Arist. Intampaucis
uerbis ambigue dicere. militudinesappellari,qarederiuaniur:passionesuero,
utanimum ipfum perficiunt:conceptus,utprincipilim, &
ratiointelligendi.Sedcontra,quiarecteAmmoniusin
terpretatur,fimulacrarerumdicuntur,nonquiacausa, taarebusutphantafmatibus fiue sensu
perceptis.sed quoniamrerumnaturas,quoadlicet,representant.utin
picturisdemonftrat.in quibus mutare,ac transformare
naturasreprefentatasnonlicet.Prætereaconceptus,nifi
constituanturnouarumrerumuocabula,remiamconcer ptam& cognitam supponunt. Non
igitur proprieprincis piumseuratiocognofcendidicentur:nisiutspecies&
phantasma, ut obiectum alumina intellectusagéus,eftdes puratum, utaiunt,
formatum et illustratum. Item non explicatquem animum passionesperficiant.quianon
mentemperseimpatibilein,utAuer.opinatur.Sedani mam seumentem
phantafticam,ideftexiftentem inphan
tasia,utoprimePselliusexplicauit.attributiueenimmens
quiadudicit.{eaquesuntinuoce. sumiturutparsminus communisintoto,ideftinmagiscommuni.cum
uero fequitur,{funtfignaearumpassionumquæfuntinanima}
nuncfumiturutaccidens& formainsubiecto.Sedcons traquiaæque ipfumin conueniens
hoc fequetur: cumpla citum,fiue confilium,uoci non hæreat denominatione
interna, ideftintrinfecus.sedaconfilioimponentiumaty
tributú,utfigno:Placitumergofiuearbitrium,pactio,& mentiscogitatioeftinuoce
utsigno.non cuiextraanis mæoperationeminhæreat:sedpassionesanimærationa
liconueniuntutactueamformantesacperficientesetiam dum dormimus. Item proprius
modus elrendi in alio maxime dicitur ultimus,utinlocoueluale.aliitrans
lumptiue,ideftpertranslationem,utArift.& Commentator afirmant. Tertio
queritur(quod primo loco quæren dun fuerat) anperuoce,ergoaliquidexpropofitisinfe
rat, anexecutionisfitnota.S.Tho.aitexpræmissiscons cludere,hoc modo.quia
Arift.dixit{oportetponere quidnomen8uerbum&c.}Shęcsuntuocessigniíicatii
caduca&infirmapatibilis,&poftremoinhominesola
mortalis.SedhicprimumquærocurfolumArift.passion num & fimilitudinum
seusimulacrorum meminit:Respo deturcuprincipiointelletusfiuemensphantasticarerum
qualiadumbratas intelligentias & fimilitudinesrecipit, his ut patiens i l
lu f tratur u t patibilis intellectus. Hinc requistur, easfimilitudines,utanimam
perficiuntphantafticam, passionesuocari,perficientes, acillustranteseamnuilo
contrarioantecorrupro. hęmecfimilitudinesdicütur (ut
oítendimusexAmmoniojurrerumnaturasquoadlicet representant.&
conceptus,utabintelle&tupatibiliseu possibiliconcipiuntur,autiam
suntconceptæ.Secundo ponendum intelle&tum patibilem,idestpossibilem ad passiones
& fimilitudines (cum easprimumcócipit) conferri, ut poteftateeftomniailla, tertiodeanima.14.17.
quemadmodum tabulainquanihileftafcriptumfiuefir &um.Indeetiam
sequiturtertio.intellectumsemperesse uerum.tertio de anima 21. ideft non errare.sed
intelles Etussecundoprogressusultracomponitillaspassiones,
utsimpliciaintelle&a:&họcquandoßuerequandog falsecompræhendit (ut
infrasectionequintadatur opis nio falfa) ac
apositione,confilio,fiuearbitrioopinatur. Buntur sunt notæ eorum quæ sunt in voce,
nonautemdi dequibusAlexanderforteait.deeisdemrebusfæpe
uæ:ergooportetuocumsignificationemexponere,seu
rectiusponere.ContraplacetSueffecum græcisomnibus notam
elleexecutionis:Sednecipsequicontradicitdiffi cilerefellitur,nóenimdiuusTho.afirmat(ergo
aliquid supra tra & tatum, seu, ut
ipsia i u n t, colligere supra execustum, sed ex prædi&tisacpræceptisinferre,infraconfidei
randaspræcognitiones.utnosetiam diximus.&itaes xecutionisest nota. proptereanonuniuersatimeftuer
rum(quidemigitur)notam efleexecutionis,quæexan te positis no ntr a haturnam nomen
definiens, nomen (in quitquidemigitureftuox&c.)definitioautem nominis
exantecognitispartibusfequitur.fimilitersecundoprio rumdeenthimematetractans,declarato,&
pofitoquidfis gnumdicatur,intulit(Enthimemaqudemigitureftfyllor
gismusimperfe&us.) sedaliiarbitrantur,ornatuscaufaa
græcisponi.ficanoftrislatinis(quidem enim ) adexory nandam orationem ponuntur:
Mihi Arift.uerba & pro cellumconsideranci,quandoqueepilogi,quandoqexer
cutionis, siue ornatus ellenota uidetur: quodfacileex fuperiore& inferior scriptura,ne
ambigua çftimentur, perspicuum fiet. Quærit Ammonius cur dixerit.quçscri
nosdiuersossensushabere.inquoMagentinusfruftraco natur,Alexandrum
arguere.itaphisensusuarii(quos exuerisfimplicibuscognitis,&
eifdem,acanaturacon dinonsuntliterę &elementasedhorumpartesisecundo
fiftentibusintelle&usconiungit)nonomnibusiidem
Xerit.literæ&elementasuntfignaeorum,quæinuoce: duobusmodisrespondet,primohicArif.denomine&
uerbo,acaliispropositisinproæmiospeculari,cuiusmo aitq
si'uerbumArisadomnemdi&ionemextenditur.lij teræ propric sub his continentur
quem scribuntur,elemens taueroquæ proprie in prolatione consistunt, subhisquę
in uoce. Sed Arift. generatim loquitur de uocibus signifi catiuis ut pars definitioniseftomnium,
quæinproæmio definireproposuit.Sed in libro poeticorum elementum definitur, quoxfitindiuidua:nonomnis,scilicetperse
fignificans:sedexquaintelligibilisuoxfieripoteft.hic uero dixit(eaquæsuntinuoce).i.arbitrium,confilium,
anpassionessimplicesquasdeipsishabemus,easdemres
cognitio,intelligentiasuntfignafignificantia,& intelli fignificare dicantur:
cum semperfintdistinguendeutdie gentiam conceptuun explicantia,nonigiturhiceftfers
uerfasrescontinentes Respondeasaliudeiledicerepaso
mopropriedeelementissxliteris,quæeademsuntre,li fiones primaseffefimilitudineseasdem,idefta
natura cetratione quamdiximusdifferant,leddeuocibusfignifi
constantes,aliudpassionesessenaturalesfimilitudines rempatibilem
affirmamus.primodeanima65.66.tery tiodeanima 20.ratione
phantasiæ,fiuecogitatiue.quæ
funt,licetapositione&opinantiumconfiliopendeant. hispositis,patethorum
duntaxat Arist.meminiffe,quia hæc sola sintuereomnibuseadem, adquæ animacons
paraturutpotestaterecipiens:quamobrem passiones
Arift.appellauit.aliiautemconceptus,autnon iidemdi
cuntur,autadillas,quasdiximuspassiones& fimilitudi,
nes,reducuntur.hæcdehisha&enusquætuncdocenda
eruntcumdeanimadicemus.Deæquiuocisambigunt. idestnaturaconsistenteshabebunt:quibuspluracognos
scunt,& representant, acreferunt.licetuoces (quarum
proprieambiguitasdicitur,nonnaturasinteædem feda positionesignificent:æquoca
enim rem unam cominus nemnon habent: fedtantumuocem.&hçcresponsio,diz
uiThomæ dictis,eftfuita.Sedobiicies utSuella contra
Porphyriumubiuocesfunteædemaconfilio,pofitæ,
easdemprimasconceptionesfineerroreautfalsosignifi,
cant;nonergoambigueloquicontingeret,nequedifting
bis.ubinaminAri.patet,similitudinesinprimisesseres rum simulacra&
naturaliaficutresnatura eædem omnis bus
sunt?Respondeasextertiodeanima.38.animam, quodammodo efficiomnia,cum omnium
formas,aut sensu,autmentesuscipiat:&quiafingulorumformæper animam
cognoscuntur,lapisautem noneftinanima,sed
species&formaeiusprimumlapidemrepresentans.Pri mumergosimilitudines,&speciesrem&lapidemrepre
reautillicArist.dicit.Ad phantasmata intelle&usconfers tur,ut sensus ad
fenfibilia:a quibus natura mouemur:
atqueimpossibiledicitur,quinuisistangamur.Itemne celleArilair,intelligentcm
phantasmara,idefteorumfis militudines,fpeculari tex.39.res autem o narura
constent, tanquam omnibus perspicuum omittatur. Amnionius di de anima }ad
poftremo relatum dixit.cæterum prodig tum de
hiseflein'librisdeanima,fcilicettertio de anir TEX. BOETHIT. De hisueròdictumestinijs,quisuntdeanima,alte
riusenimeftnegocij. eiufdemreiueldiuerfarum.namanaloga,utprimum
offensioadarteriam,fidecófulto&compofitofiat,illac
concipiuntur,diuersacontinent,ordine,comparatione
quacommeatspiritusuoxeft:tussisuero,nonefteauox: seuproportioneadunum
collata.tamen eorum primęin telligentiæfcuconceptioneseædemdicuntur,ideftnatur
ranonarbitriouariæficutuoces:quxcomparatione,reu proportione dicta a positione
significant.simili ratione ambigua, ideftæquiuoca,primasconceptioneseasdem, nus,quicumsignificationealiquaemittitur.)Sedpoftula
quamuis per eadem loca,machinamenta proueniat.quia,
scilicetnonexpropositoaccidit(namaitfinecogitatio
neautconfiliouoxmissa,nonestuox.nam;hocomnino
indefinitioneuociscollocandumeft.quoniamuox eftso in guere
differentes,qui satis ex notis locibus,atque errore, conceptionibus conftituere
poffent, quod fitads sentant, nam intellectus omnium,de rebus fenfibilibus
primum uenit,ex quibus uisa quædam & fimilitudines procreat.ad
quasintelligensfeconuertit.& cum intelli uersariorum consilium,aut quid
ueline Dicas his disting dioneutiopusnoneffe,quibusitahæcnomina suntper
{picua& communia,utquasidomi ab ipsorum pofitione nascantur. Sed his qui
quasi modo nascentes de notissimis rebus atque nominibus hæsitant,nihilq;ab
aliisexplicar tum nouerunt:qua de causa,diftin&tio in bis nominibus
fiet,quæ habentur dubia: quorum res abditæ & arbis trium confilium
plurimarum rerum & conceptum non gie necesse estfimulphantasma aliquod
speculari.phang ialmata enim,sicut sensibiliasunt:præterquam tertiode aninia
39.0 sunt sine materia. fecido natura constant fimi litudines:non
exarbitriopendent:quiaadsimilitudines comparatur patibilis intellectus,ut
natura pure potentia autpoteftaterecipienstertiodeanima.17.14.innatura
enimanimęeftunum naturaagens,alterúnaturapatiens ficutin
omnialianaturamonftratur.17. tertii. Prætes perspicuuin dicitur. A d textum
nunc redeamus. Ex uerbishiscollige.quod supradocuimus(uenforqui dem
igitur)quandog ad exornandam orationem ab Ari. poni,uthic:nilenimexfupracognitisinfert,nequealia
quid exequendum. seutractandumproponit.Queresab Arift.cur istorum naturam
dillerere diligentius & proy prietates omittis?quibusg ab animantibus
instrumentis uocalibusproueniant:pulmone& asperaarteria,aquos ma.39.at
conceptus dicit mentis primi,quid intererit quo minus fint phantasmata:
Respordet an neque alii phantasmata sunt,uerum non finephantasmate tum in rum
primo,uocis materia aer præstatur.ab altero, voces graves et
acutæeffigiemfumunt.& q articulatędicantur a lingua,palato labiis,ac
dentibus ut animæ rationalis motionideseruiunt.curhçcitidemapositionc,alteraa
naturaconfiftant.atquefimilitudinesrerumsintprimum fimulacra,uoces uero
passionum ligna,ac notæ dicans tur:AdhæcomniaputoAristot.respondere.propterea
abeo essereliâa o alteriusestpertra&ationis,ideftad
aliumpertinentmodumconsiderandinaturalemdeani,
ma:nampertra&arequanamrationeistaabaninia,acin
ftrumentiseiusproueniant,anauoluntatependeant,ut operationes,adanimam,suumpropriumprincipiumres
rumuocesprimoresgeneratimsignificare,fedlogicos feruntur,de quibus ut supra
diximus,fecundo de anima. 87.88.89.90.differit.ubiuocem fignificatiuamex ima
ginationeanimæ uoluntaria,Conum appellat:hinc ergo patetuocesessesignificatiuas.sicenimad
interpretatio rum primo conceptus.quod ex definitione Platos
nis(aquoGranımaticiacceperunt)confirmant.nomen
nemdicunturconferretex.88.10.& apositionesignifica re. quia ab imaginatione
significant et voluntate.ut Com mentator&Arist.asserunt.Arist.enimait(oportetanis
matumeffeucrberans)& 90.(& cumimaginationeali
qua,)ideituoluntaria.cuiusrationemadducens,inquit suntinaninia:& quarum
pafsionum equoces primum 114 gnasunt&c.)sedcótra.quiaeodemmodonomendefini,
tura logico, poeta, atque grammatico.id autem(utue rum fit) in definition nominis
declarabimus.secundo fin nisharumuo cum eft idem eiadquemoratioenunciatiua
refertur.hicautemeftinterpretatiorerumconceptarum, quæ idemsuntquod
conceptus:Scotus uero quæstione secunda respondet.conceptus fignificarerem,utfimilitu
do & speciesrei,nonutaccidensanimædicitur,Sednon quæriturhoc,sed
duntaxat,an uoces principaliter,seu uox enim eft quidam sonus fignificatiuus,non
naturali ter,ut significatiuus est fonus refpirati acris.sicuttussis: fed ab
alio libero mouente hunc aerem ad arteriam.) Ing quit etiam Themiftius acute
hunc locum perspiciens hus iusergoaeris(quem spirando reddimus) percussion &
quibusimaginationem pafsiuiintellc tusnomine appels
landamcensuit.tertiodeanima.20.primodeanima.6s. 66. ex quibus tam obscuris
verbis non poteft concludi aliud,nifiquod poftremo deduximus.non enim uideo
quid suadi&a sequatur,fiprimi& aliiaprimis concepti bus non sunt
phantasmata,non tamen sine phantasmate, line quo nihil intelligit animam, nisi
conceptus primo phantasmata representare & necesario: ut intulimus.
Mihiautemuifumeft,fermonemArift.adomniasupra di& a potuisse referri,cuius
uerifimile argumentum poteft esse. dixit{di&um eft,quidem ergo inhisquæ de
ani ma,}ideftlibrisduobus secundo& tertio:utretulimus; non tertio solum ut Ammoniusopinatur.Etutfinemtan
demquærendi faciamus.paucisadhæcadditis,poftres
moquæramusnominafiueuocesanprimofignificent
res,anconceptus?Quidamrespondent,grammaticos finientes quod subftantiam uel
qualitatem significet. & hicArift.quæ inuoce,lignasuntearumpassionumquæ De his
quidem igitur dicemus in hisquedeanimaalte. riusenim estnegocij: &um
hocArift.{Dehisquidem di&um eftinhis,quæ in primis res aut
conceptiones significent. Propterea ues riusadrem,& fenfum
accedés,refpódeo:& nobiscum,8C sinominibus non concinnat suella,re tamé
idem affirmat cumAlexádro. primumpono,uoces,tanquamultimoin? Tentumfiné &
principalius, mediatetamen, fignificareres. & extremum, uoces,an res ipsas
significent {'in cótrariam partemArift.& Comment. (& quæfcribunturfigna&
no iæsunteorumquæinuoce)&liuocesprimosignificant
conceptus,&conceptusprimumres,scripturæergopris mum uocesdeclarant. sedcótrarium,leniuumteltimonio
& experimentomonfiratur. quiascripturahominis& cei
terarumrerumdequibusphilosophidifferunt,utimur,rey c u m ipfarum explicádarum
caufa.præterea epiftola inuen fecundo autem minus principaliter,fed
immediate,con ceptus.quæduoaffertaexemploasciemanifestanturnam ascia
(utinftrumentum) efficitimmediatum.sed principay
leseuprincepsefficiensestartificismanus.quoddeclar
taaffirmatur,utcertioresfaciamusabsentes,siquidesset
ransprimodeanimaoctauo.Themift.ait,qprincipaleac ultimo intentum cognosci &
definiri, indiuiduum dicis tur:fedaliointermediocognito.formauerouniuersalis
finealiomedio: ut tamen ad indiuiduum cognoscens dum refertur. Hæc di&ahisrationibusapprobantur.Id
quodeosscireautnoftraautipsoruminteresset:igiturres poftremo, ut ultimü &
finis,explicari intenduntur. Item fi quæscribunturfignasuntuocum,autearumquæextraani
mam,quodimpossibileeft,autinanima:uocesautemin
animaconceptusdicuntur,quosadrerumexplicationem inprimisuoces significant, adquodsignificandumnouos
referriut sinem supraretulimus. Nunc ade aquæ adduce rumnominum inuentorim posuit.hic
autem ad remexpli candamuoces consticuit.id.n. deuerboconsiderans Aril. &
manifeftansuerbumfignificare,approbat,quiacóftituit intellectu. seduoxprolatahoministunc
conftituit,&quie (cerefacitintelle&tum.noncumadcóceptum:sedadna turamhumanamdeducit.ergouoces,&
nominatanguls timum fineminprimisintentumresexplicabunt.licetins
termediisconceptibus:prætereaprimoelenchorumpris
banturexArift.respondebo.nonfolumquerendumquid philofophusdicat. Sedquidcouenienterrationi&
sententiæ suæ uere opinetur audiendum. Hunc enim in modum. Aristoteles Intelligimus
(quæscribuntur, suntnotæeorumquç
inuoce).i.confilii&arbitriiinuoce.quæsecundointelle &a&
conceptusresexplicantesdicuntur.Sicinterpreteris quæ exArift.adducuntur.(quefcribuntursuntlignaeorü,
quæinuoce).i.explicant(cum voces defuerint) ea, quçex plicantur per voces, quarumuice
fungitur.immediateer go uoces,sednontanquamultimum &extremum,quod mo,uocum
finemdeclaransArist.ait:quoniamresaddil serendumafferrenonpoffumus,utimurnominibusloco
rerum:ad explicationem ergo rerum,cófideratiouocum
referturnonconceptuum,utfinemulcimum.Amplius.4. idemopusexercetcumeo, cuiusuicemgerit,
utdeconsu metaph.28. ratioilliusrei,cuiusnomeneftfignum,defini
tioeftuoxigiturreiperdefinitionemexplicatæ,fignum dicetur.Itemteftimoniofenfuum
confirmatur:quorum clara& certaiudiciasunt, eorumquærationeetiamiudis
cantur.Ad quidenimtam diu expectamus, flagitamusuo le, rege et pro-consule, siue
proregein vollendiscontro uersiis perspicuum est. Scripta autem uocum uicem
exercent. Idem ergoextremum significatum habebunt.expli cationem, scilicet,
conceptarum rerum. Amplius literarum inuentor, ad rerum explicationem direxit, &
Auer.ait(cri cum interpretationem: nisiueriinueniédigratiainrebus,
pturassignificareuerba,ideftfinemedio&fignificatauer
quascognoscere3[cireftatuimus:I denimuolumus& borum,cumforte uocesdefuerint,hæcdequestionibus
ardemusdefideriotangextremum. Adhæc.ficonceptus
suntinftrumentaipsarumuocum.utadrerumnotitiáme diisconceptibusducant.nó igitur
ultimum & extremum que verum ad b u c est. Signum autem huius est, hır c o
c e e ruus enim aliquid significat, fed non dumuerum aliquid, -uel falfum, finonuelese,uelnonesseaddatur,uclfine
pliciter,uelfecundum tempus. Estautemquemadmodum inanimaaliquandoquidem o
falfum. Nomina quidem igituripsa Q uerba consimi liafunteiintelligentiæque
estsinecompositioneo diuie suimus,&rationibusacsensibus,rationemconfirmatibus
fone,uthomouelalbum,quandononaliquidadditur:nes
approbauimus.Pugnabispoftremo,fiuoces,mediiscon
queenimfalfum,nequeuerumadhucest. signumautem ceptibusexplicationem rerum
efficiunt:cum immediate bus ueritas& falfitas inuenitur, hæc autem cnceptus
sunt, non res ipsę. respondeasuerum & falsum inconceptibus, ut in rerum
fimilitudine inueniri:quæadipfarumuerará
rerumcognitionemrefertur.ueruminrebuseft,utincau
fa.inpoftprædicamentiscap.depriori& infinehuiuspri m i libri.itap
attributiue.i.per attributioné & collationem
adres,ueritasinconceptibuserit:uereautem,utincausa, inrebus. Dicespropterquodunúquodątale&
illudma césrefertur,ueasciaadmanusartificum:quodsuprapor fignificatumnon ab
organo sumi oportere:sedultimo explicare conftituunt.nam quod uicem alterius
perficit, dum uerumaliquiduelfalfum;sinonuelesseuel noneffe fatis, ac principale
fignificatumuocum dicétur. Etfiobiicietati quidem
intellectusfincuero,uelfalso,aliquandoautemcuiiam
quisArift.textum,quemretulimus. uocesprimumsignis ficareconceptus:intelligasfinemedio
alio.non tamen,ut necesseesthorumalterumineffe,ficetiaminuoce.Circa
compofitionem.n.odiuifionem,eftuerum,o falfum.No ultimum & extremum
significatun. Nam uoces dicuntur significare conceptus, ut rerii sunt
similitudines.utab ipsis rebus conceptus uenisse ad intelletum dicamus, quas
nouissime, ut finem et ultimum intermedia sconceptibus per voces clariores
NOSCAMUS. Nec secundum eorum argumentum concludet. Voces ea in primis ut finem
significare in quis mina igitur ipsa et verba consimilia sunt ei, qui fine come
gis. Si ergo voces, mediis conceptibus, explicantres, igitur uoces magis et
inprimis conceptus, qresipsasaperient. Dic Aristoteles locum ualere in causa principe.i.principali
non iuuante tanquam instrumento, quomodo conceptus aduo intellecus et cogitation
fine ucrouel falso, aliquando autem cuiiam necesse estalterumhorum inesef, ic,etiam
inuos ce.Circa compositionem enim et divisionem estuerum conceptus, ut accidentia
denotent, nunquam substantiam explicabunt. Paucis, ut supra, respondeas,tocum
propria addatur, uel simpliciter uel secundum tempus et extremo fine intent. Quod
quandoq substantia quando g accidens appellatur. Huic veritati Alexander et
Themistius ascribunt, etc. Ammonius non dissentit. Secundo quæs ritur, an scripturæ
fiue quæ scribuntur, tanquamultimum Magentinus hunc in modum Aristotelis.textum
cum præce denticonne&tit.cum duo sintinueftigata. Primiiquonam modo nominis
& uerbi signification intelligenda ellerutrum TEX. BOETHII. Est autem, quem
ad modum in anima, aliquando positione, divisione est, intellectui. Ut homo, uelale
bum, quando non aliquid additur, neque enim falsum. Ne huius est, quia
“hircocervus” aliquid significat sed none E hæc duofineab
Aristotele, pofita, caulam & finem curitapo ratiocinatur. Quem ad modum in anima
intelle usquando fuerit, non declarant:ut.l. quid nominis partium definir
tionis nominis,& uerbiorationis, enunciatiuæ tang præs cognitionesponag
ntur. Alterum etiam secundodicúrey fello. Non et enim videoubiinueftigauerit
Aristotele inquibus verum et falsum inveniretur. Quod nucquoginueftigare
constituat. Itempugnantiacum Ammon. dicit. aitenim
inanimaeftquandoquerumautfalfum.&itaprobatio Ammonius.per hæc utilitateinad
inftitutæ commentatio, effet minorisibi. Circacain positionem. n.intellectus&
di nis propositum tradi.cum. C. verum et falsum sit in mentis
uifionemeftuerumautfalfum.}conclufioutclaratuncre concepribus&uocibusutsignificantibus,&quodnúcdo
linqueretur.ergoitaeritinuoce.seduerearguitexhypo
cetphilosophusnoninhisfimplicibus:sedcompofitisue theli, nonpotentiacathegoricosyllogismo.nam
cumpos rum&falsumspectari.nonnominibus,nisiutperoratio fitionemquodammodoignotammanifestet,nonfyllogir
n e m enunciatiuam a firmativam coniunctis, vel per negativ uam diuisis, ita gnó
in quit hæc quæ diximus Aristotele docuif m o arguit. Ex quo aliud ignotum
natura concluditur, sed ex hypothesi, ut diximus.& infradicemus. Prætereaut
Commen & Ammonius asserunt.ibi{circacompofitionem enim & diuisionem}non
minorem.sedapprobationem uniuspartisantecedentisapponit. aliquádointellectus
cumuero&falsofit.signumestparticula{enim}quæcau sam
propositidenotat,fcilicet quia uerum & falfum sunt circacompositionem, id
est affirmatione,quaaliquid cum falsum in compofitione et divisione sequuntur
intétiones se:sednuncdocere&inconceptibus&uocibusutsigni?
ficatiuis,falsum & uerum fpe& ari,dum coniunguntur aut diuidunturnonpersesumptis.Addeex
Amm.hæc Aris. nuncdocereutalteramorationispartemantecognoscat.
DicesproMagentinoillaquædixit,ab Amm.ferèaduer bum
fuperioritextusumpfife.cuminquit(cumhæcitaq percaquæ
nuncdicunturtradentur.Iuocesessesignificati was rerum mediis conceptibus:tum
uel maxime quibus in rebus quocunq; fuerit m o d o ueritatem ac falfitatem
scruz tariconuenict)C.inhoctex. Addés ueroquçintextusupe intellectus.i. sunt in
anima,sextometaph.8.ergoeruntin riori confideret ait.(de quibus in præsentia
nobis perpen uocibus seu uerbis significantibus ipsas conceptiones,ut fioest. Utrumin
rebus anmentis conceptibus, an uocibus, Comen. animaduertit. Exhis declaratis etiam
patet,q in aninquibufdam. harumduabus: anetiaminomnibus. telle&usfitaliquandofincueroautfalso,idq;tangexsuo
fiinuocibusqualibushisscilicetcompofitis.nonnomine & uerbo&
prædicamentis,itaincompositisconceptibus qui caufa funtlocum, noperleinsimplicibusneccompo!
fitisrebus) Sed animaduerte quod dixerit(nobisperpésio
uisionez.i.lineueroautfalso.hæcexemplomanifeftatsubs inprçsentiaeft)quod tamen
inferius considerabit.neg dicitab Arifthæcquæ ipse
perpendit,inueftigata.nec'ait InueftigasseAristan significationominis&
uerbisolī,pen deatexuocetantum,anexintelligentiauelrebus:sedquo
cunq;fueritmodo,inhisueritas& falfitaseft,utexplicátis
businftrumétis.hacenimrationeresipfasabiecit.adquas
famenutextremum&finemultimumexplicandas,uoces
tere&nonadmittunt:ergonecdequominus:nistuery & conceptiones animæ referuntur,
q siquispiamhęcquæ bum effeaffirmatum, aut non effe negatum addatur. fim eft fine
uero aut falso, quando cuihorum alteruminesse necesse eft, ita& in uoce: hoctotumeftpropofitiomaior,
affumptio&minoribi.circacompofitionemenim&diui rionemestuerum&
falsum,&noncircasimplicia,itaergo
eritinuoce.Sedcótra:quiaminorhæceffedebuiflet:fed
aliocomponisignificatur,autdiuifioné,idestnegationé,
quaexplicaturprçdicatumasubie&todisiúgi.& uerum & oppositoperspicuúutcorolarium&
cófequensposuitcū ait.{nominaquidemigituripsa& uerbaconsimiliasuntei
intelligentięfiueintellectuiquiestfinecompositione& di ftantię&
accidétis:hominis.C.&albi.utexhisomniaalia prædicamenta intelligatur. quando.n.his
non aliquid ads ditur, fcilicetuerbumprædicatumalbumcumhomine suz
biectoconiungens,nequefalfumnequeuerumadhuceft. Hoc
denominehyrcoceruimanifeftat,nanquehuiusinor di compofita nomina uidentur uerum
aut falsum admity exvocetanti:m,autsolaintelligentin,anexresolumuos ex Anmonio
dicimus non probarit, inutrunqzfitdi&tum. Cesitemper animi sensus rerum
elleinterpretes.Secundo inquibusuerum &falum inuenireiur.quòdnunequoß
idoftendendtiArist.proponit.fedutrunchiltorum reiicio. non
eniinfuprainuestigauit.Sedpofuit,utpersenorum, S.Tho. dicitq postquam
tradiditordinem significationis uocum, hicagitde diuersauocumfignificatione:quarum
quædam uerum & falfumfignificant:quædam non.Sedli
cetuerumdicatur,utdeAmmonioreiulinius:tamenfine
nomina&uerbafignificatiuaefle,cxhocpeaquæsuntin cuiusgratiaistaponantur,fubricuit:Licédumigiturcum
uocefuntfigna& notæsignificantespassionesnullomes diointerie&o,hisautem
mediis, tanquam ultimui,res explicare.prçterea non uideo ubi inuestigarit,an
nominis & uerbifignificatiointelligendaessetexuocetantum,aut intelligentiatantum,autexresolum:fedhocposuit(funt
uæ,quibusetiamdifferebantabaliis:nuncuelleconstitue quidem ergoquęfuntinuoce
&c.utsignificatiofumatur non exuocetantum,nonintelligentia,fedarbitrio,cogni
tione, et CONSILIO et imponentium
consensu, quem in uoce refeuantecognosceredifferétiam, quaoratiodiffertano
mine&uerbo:&quaoratioenunciatiuaaboraroriis8C
poeticisoptantibus&c.separatur.& quoniamquępones reoportet,&
antecognoscere,utpersenota,nõnisialiquo facili instrument innuidebét.nullomodo
demonstrari. proptereaexfimiliseuhypothefi,&cóceflo,acpofitotery
expaétione& confilioreliquerunt.acuociperattributio
nédederunt,atnullamentioeftfaétaderebus,anabeasu
mendaefletsignificationominis,& uerbi,quoniammaxiy m u m esset ignorationis,ac
inscitiæ in Arift.argumentum, firem tam perspicuam,nec dubiain pro occulta
quæliffet tiam definitionis partem & differentiam manifeftat.cũ inz
quit.(esid..)ubi, ',proenim Magentinusuertit.utcaus sam hicassignareuelit.utAmmonius
&.S.Thomas dixerút, acdubia.cuieniniuelrudi dubium uideretur,nomen &
uerbum (quod ut organum & instrumentum significat)a-
rebus,inftrumentisignificatiui&Organicognoscendialte rum,significationem
habere,cum tantü significentur,& nul lomodo significentine ignificare&
explicare,utorgas num logicum uideantur?Item ea significatioerat nomio nis&
uerbiponenda,quæutpræcognitiopartium defini
tionisadeacognoscendadirigeret.hæcautem eftuoxa de quo nuncdifferemus.aitergo
deantecedentesyllogiss miexposito.{ficutuelquemadmodumenimeftinanima intellectus
cogitatio,intelligentia.(vóruceenim ifta signifie
cat.)aliquandoquidemsineuerouelfallo:aliquandouer rocuinecesseesthorum
alteruminesse.}Exhocposito & notioriantecedenteinfertquodammodoignotumin
choantibusconsequens.(ficetiam& inuoce)utsignis& notis conceptuum
erit,aliquando sine uero uel fallout in nominibus&
uerbis,aliquandocuinecesseestiamhorum
alterumineffe:utinorationeenunciatiua,Suellaueroita pofitione fignificans,non
res tantum significata:a uoce er go& intelligentiainvocerelicta,8Ctributafiueattributa
lignificationominis&uerbipident,noarebus.Amplius: Suela (nam licet fupra
male textum Arist.declararit Sucr sa,nuncueritatecoaausidem
dicitquodnosinexplicans do philofophodicebamus)pofitisduabus partibusdefini
tioniscómunibusnomini& uerbo& orationienunciatis pliciter, efle,quamartemutexemplar,adopuseffin
latenus (incaliquiduocum: neceorumquæ in uoce,nout
gendumexteriusafpicit,qopusexartenotioriinmates
finis:cumconceptuspriorfituoce& ueritatequęinuoce
confiftit:nonutagens.quiaresagensest,aquaoratioues
taautfalsauocatur.sednondifficileestAmm.&.S.Tho. sententiam& opinionem,aSuessæargumentisdefendere.
primum, absurdumaffirmat. Conceptus non tangformam ficant: quiinvocetangartificialimateriarelinquütur:quo
esseueriautfalliinuoce,cumnecaliquidfintvocum,nec
cumuiuocessuntnotæ:Exhisrespondemus:rationem eorum
quæsuntinuoce:Peroenimabeocumsupradixe
ritArift.eaquæfuntinuoce&c.nonnifiarbitrium,&pla citum, cogitatiointelligitur:
ut ipse metcum locum interpretans, opinatur: ergo conceptus est aliquid existens
in voce, non utopus naturaleest,sed arte.i. uoluntate: confi&um.
Itemipfeconfiteturuocemsignificatiuam,communeges
nusnominisuerbi&orationisenunciatiuęuocari:nõuo
lessuntsimilitudinesrerum.Seddicessecundomenunc cé,utnaturaleopus. ergoutacognitione,
imaginatione pugnantiadicerecumhis,quæanteacontraAnimo.Boe
uoluntariaeffi&taeft:utsignumfitadaliudextraexplican thium,& Scotum diximus:
orationen dariinméte& no dum relatum:Etfecundodeanima90.Averroes et Themist.
tioremesseea,quæinuoceconfiftit.Diximusadhçcartis fumentes ab Arift.asserunt:essentiamuocisinterpretatis
inuentoribusueliaminuentamdocentibus,ineodem no efle percussionem aeris anhelati,
ad membrum quod cana tioremesseartem, acconceptionescūuero& falsoinani dicitur,abexpulfioneanimæimaginatiuæuoluntariæ:&
ma,quamexteriusopuseffictum:ficinpropofito,excong
infraqinessendouocemnecesseestutpercutienshabeat ceptibus rationem coposuit, notioribusapositionesignifi
animamimaginatiuam,8tuoluntatem:effentiaergouol catis:quiquodammodonotiores:utindu&ionesensata
cispendet abipsoconceptu& placitoreliétoapositione patet.infraenim
se&ionequintaexoppositionemaioriin inuoce,tangforma:&uox (uropusnaturæinterpretans
mente, explicatitae! Tein uoce: Item placitum eft caufa, a placito) abanimaetiá,tangagente,
depédet:nam 87.& 90.secundo de anima.percussiorespiratiaerisad uocala
arteriam ab anima (quæinhispartibus) uoxeftutefficien
tecausa.hincCómen.inprincipiocómentiait.(oportet
igiturutpercussioaerisanhelatiabanima,queestisismé præcognitionempartistertiędefinitionisratiocinatur:no
brisadcannam, fitilludquodfacituoc@)&inmediocom
igiturdemonftrationemeffecit.quæadnaturaliterignos menti:(primum enim
mouensinuoce,estanima,imagina tiua& concupiscibilis:& ideouox
eftsonusilliusprimi uolentis& mouentis.)Etq etiamdicipofsitquodammo
dofinisuocum, perspicuum est ex his,quæ fupradocuio mus: fine muocum effè eriam
res conceptas: namorgal na ad eorum opera,tang finem &
ultima,diriguntur.pris mo topic.9.cumnonpropterse,sedpropteralterum exo
petantur:seduocesfignafunt& notæ conceptuú,adquos
explicandosreferimus:finesergomedii,licetnon ultimi tumdir igitur. Secundo post.primo.necillam(utperitus
ad rem per se nota efficere potuit. ne ipse suampręcogni tionum artem
confirmaturusexperimentocontrarioinfir maret.Itidemminimeconsecurionem
ualeredicimus:ra tioexcaufiseftnotioribus,ergodemóftrationempropter quid aut
simpliciter constituereaffirmabitur.quoniam alte rum& pręcipuum demonftratiodi&arequirit.utadigno
tum naturaliter dirigatur, non ad pręcognitionem ponendam, utpersenotam:nam
primopofte.2.veręetiàdefis uocabuntur:Exhisfacileeiusrationibusrespondemus.
nitiones,quidtantumnominisnonuerædefinitionisuim haberedicunturabAuer.utpræcognitionessunt:ita&fi
hæc præcognitio ex caufamonftretur,nonutdemonstras tiua, fedutexfimiliaccepta,&uisa,
&alibideclarata;pros ptereatopica potius,quàmdemonftransuocanda:noto pica,o
fitdubia,autfalfa,immouera,sedhicacceptaalig biuisaphilosopho,&
hicpofita,utcredita:dequo latius ressecundum
feeffedicantur,nótamenapudeosquicon ceprus& res conceptas ignorant:adquarumexplication
nem,utultimum,referuntur. Adtertiamdeagentedico: inquit)exAmmonioait. Primo quiahæcconfi&anomina
rem, agensremotumuocari: aquo intelle&us phantasticus falsum significare uidentur:
ut.S.Tho.ait.Sedcótra.quia fimilitudinéabftrahit:sedanima,utnaturaagens,uocem
ab Aristotele dicitur (fed non dum uerum aut falsum signifi interpretantem (tang
operationem propria mefficit, &lo cant. Nifi effe aut non effe addatur): ergoutrunquefignis
gicotradit:cuilogicuspropriumconsiderandimodum
ficareuidentur.Itemcausaassignandafuiffet,curexem
attribuens,utinftrumentumsignificandi& explicandicon pliscöpositis (que uerum
fignificare potius etiá uidentur) Ad primam,utpatet,
intelligentia,inuoceartecong fi&tareli&ta,eft,utaliquiduocis.i.forma.Ad
secundam Q non fitfinis,nonualet,idpriuseft,ergonon finis:Deus
enimeftpriormotu&creatura,quæadDeicognitionem deducunt,utsigna&
effe&taadsuumfinemcognoscenda directa:fimiliterdicaturdeuocibus, &
ficóceptusprio riaexternareli&um:manifeftumeftargumentumqdixit
Arist.nonuoces:sedeaquæsuntinuoce,suntsignapass fionum&conceptuum,utnaturaliumsimulacrorú&res
rum fimilitudinum.i.cóceptusapositione,(utratio)signi exfimilinotiori,&
fuperiusabArif.pofito,exlibrisdeani maprocessisle: ficutinanima
eftaliquandointelle us fineueroautfalso,aliquandocum horum altero:ita& in uoce:&deuero&
falsoloquitur(utAlex.& Ammo.ac
cæteriboniexpositoresaffirmant)orationisenunciatiuæ, &
denominibusfignificantibusaplacito,nonutnaturas
quamobremuocessignificantcúfiuntnotæ.Necproptes reao
conceptusutcaufedicuntur.quosnomina& uoces tanquamfigna&
effetusimitantur,afferendúeftArif.des monftrantem rationem efficere:namhich ypotheticèad
Deoda nieprimotopic.dicemus. QuæruntcurArift.fis
&aprotulitexemplapotiusquàmuera.Sueflasumens(ut pliciter,quod
præsentis efttemporis.aut secundum tome pus.i.præteritum&
futurumutCom.explicauit. De Am moniiexpositionedicemustunc,cumaddubiaresponden
bimus. QuæritprimúSuessa.qualisnam ratiocinatioAris. fuerit(quéadmodum
inanimaquandoqintelligétiafine ueroautfallo,quandoquehorumalterumnecetleeft in
esse.)respondet.S.Tho.& Ammo. intex.præcedenti,nes liderat,accognoscit: Respondendum
ergoest(uteftdig &um )Arift.exhypothefileu positione,& ex fimili notion
riprocedere: quod (quemadmodum) particuladenotat. dum asimili: sedacausaquamimitatureffe&us,proceder
re.namAmmo.ait:circaenunciatiuamorationemquæ quæsupraetiam Aril.poluit:namproptereauoxfignum
exillorumcomplexuefficitur, uerum et falsum spectari.
¬aexteriusexplicansdicitur,qapositione&intellig ante voces quoq; hæccircaconceptuscósiderari.utqui
causæ uocuinlunt,aquibusconceptusfimplicesfineueris tate, & compofiticum
uero & falsodefignantur & declas tantur: Responsionem improbat Suelta: quia
conceptus non causaueriautfalliinuocetangformasunt:cumnuls duftioncperspicuum eft(utAmnioniusanimaduertit)no
tioremartem Seddices ratione inaliniilieffe&tamexignotisconcludes
re,nanieaexquibushicratiocinatur,extertiodeanima 21. infrasumuntur:hæcautemtanquam
ardua,& inchos antibus difficilia,utphilofophus,& relinquendasupra
nosmonuit:Satishuicrationifaciendumarbitrorexhis, gentiaatqzarbitriopendet:ineo
presertimartific equivoces impofuit: uel ab impositis et Gibi notis nominibus,
regulas logicæ docet:in mente enim artificis& docétis ing E ii
quærimus, ad que causa hæc nondirigitur. Tertio dicit: ut
quçinintelle&usuntfolo.sednefcioquçueritasdicipót,
cuinihilextraresponderinre:cum infra& inpoftpredi camentisdicatur.abeoq
resest,uelnoneftoratiodicitur uerauelf alla remota aūt causa et prima radice, ceterade
ftruinec effe eft. Item Aristotele de vocibus loquitur. Propterea mihi hoc libet
dicere. Hac de causa fiais exemplissuasen tentianicomproballe,o fi&aamer a
positione significant: & ideo magisobuia&
perspicuaacconsuetafuntadexpli candum: utquodámodonotiora,utmagisuulgata,exars
omnemueritatem haberiin compofitione& diuisione.ne excludatur ueritas apud
Platonem in intelligibilibus,& in telligentiisfiuemenubus,& apudArift.desimpliciuming
telligentia et abstractis: fedeam que in pronunciatiuissubs est motibus, scilicet
cum discursu: seu ratiocinatione: quæ perenunciatiuam
fitorationem.&inniotibuspronuna ciatiuis,non invoce solum (intelligas) exiftentibus:fices
nimtextuiArift.& eiusdillisaduersantiadiceret.sedetia ne&diuifionefalsum
& uerumremouerineceffeeft:pro ptereaergodixit,(circacompositionem at causam
noia ret:sed ad nomina in uoce descendens ait:(non significare uerum, aut
falsum): significare enim proprium eftnomi num, quæinuoceacompositionesignificanteconfiftunt.
PetitAmmonius quomodo uerum fit,circacomposicios innueretueritatem non in rebusreperiri:fedinhisetiam,
nem et divisionenelle uerum et falsum. Responder non nonutitur: ficut utiturhis,
quæ falsum significare maxime affirmantur. fecundam causam adducit: utinnueret,
non solum nomina simplicia ad ueritatem explicanda indiges reuerbo sed etiam
ipsa composite. Sed idem est dicendum de nominibus compositis ueris, nosautem de
fictis proprie non bitrio plurimorum: exhistamenfi&lisnominibus, aliaue
ca intelligendasunt. exempla autem innotescendi gratia inuenta, exuulgatis&
consuetistr ad endafunt et lificadi cantur: quibustaméuerum facilius inueniamus,
autinuen tum facilius doceamus: Petit Suella cur Aristotele.dixerit conpositionem
significare cum uero et falso, non autem significare uerum aut falsum i respondet,
hoc differreinter significare uerum et significare cum uero:quias ignificare
ueru potest uere in nomine simplici inueniri:u.g.hoc nomen uerum aut fallum, simplex
verum significat.i. se ipsum: sed significare cum uero,eftfignificare cum uerbi
complexu ut de uerbo dicetur, significare cum tempore, notempus: ut dies et annus
sedlicethęc dubitatione relinquenda foret, cum id quærat,quodinArift.textunoneft:tamenneaus
inmotibus pronunciatiuis, ideftquicaufafuntutper enung ciatiuam orationem pronuncientur,ueritasergoquacon
ditorum ingenia, obuiriau&oritatem fallantur,ponere& cipitur,aut
enunciatur aliquid ineffc alicui,folum circa con pofitionem &
diuifionemeft,utspeciesorationisenuncia tiuæ.dixieam ueritatem
circacompofitionem elle,quæ concipiturinmente,uelexplicaturinuoce,&
quaprædiy catuminesse subiectoaffirmatur:quoniam primotopic.4, loca accidentis
propriè dicuntur,quibus potentes fumus concludere hæc alteriineile:& ideo locaeducentia
uerum enunciative propofitionis dicuntur loca accidentis et veritatis qua aliquid
alicui in esse concipitur vel explicatur:Sci scitatursecüdoAmmonius cur
Aristotele dicens (nomina igitur et uerba consimiliaíunteiqui sine compositione
et divisione est intelleclui exempla protulittantum nommun, non uerborum
dicens, ut “homo” vel “album”. Respondet per hominem nomen: per “album” verbum fumpfiffe:
non eata meninquitratione, qua verbum proprie inferius definitur. Sed quia
Aristotele statuit, omnemvuocem quæt erminum prædicatum facit, verbum appellanda.
Sed responsio hęc improbandauidetur:primum q Arift.nondieetinfraprę
refellereconstitui:non.n.Aristotele dicit compositionem cum uero aut falso significare:
sed ait circa.n. compositionem et divisionem elle veritatem et falsitatem. Item
de “hircoscervi” nomine afferuit. “Chircocervus” aliquid significat, sed non dum
uerum aut falsum) denominibusergoopposiy dicatumu erbum appellandum fore: quod fictiam
dices tum dicit eiquod Suellafingebat: nomina non significare ret, exemplum
albiquod posueratantea, adexplicandum uerum aut falsum, sed significare sine vero
aut salso:Eiusery uere uerbum, inutile videretur:Aliter igitur responden, gore
sponfioin textu Aristotele.infirmatur, cum denominibus dum. His exemplis dicta inchoantibus
comprobandaque compositis neget significare verum aut fallum: differentia etiam
abeo assignatauerbis Aristotele, adversatur Ampliu snec potuisset Aristotele dicere,
compositionem et diuisionem verum significare, na in compositio.i.affirmatio et
divisio.i.negay cumuerbonominibus:tamenutnotaprædicatumcuin ciosumerenturinuoce.quoinfradeorationeenunciatiua
dubieto connectens, dubiumfaciunt, anuerum&failum dicetur. Litoratio significans
verum vel falsum, &inqua fignificent, signum est. Ammoniusetiam tanquam duy
eftuerum& falfumutinfignoexternosignificante:nam oratio in mente, non significate
positione, ut hic intelli, bium quærit de uerbis primæ et secundæ personæ
“ambulO”, “ambulaAS” et in quibus tertia persona et certas statuitur. Git
signum est opde nominibus fimplicibu s& compofitis, line uerbo, intulit
dicens nomina igitur ipsa auteur bacó similia sunt fine compositione et divisione
intellecus. lt homo et album hircocervus quæ et si aliquid simplex significent,
non dum tamen uerum aut falsum hæc autem nomini in voce sunt, noninmente:
quiafiutinmēte essent, ut ningit. quæ veritatis et falsitatis videntur capacia.
Licet nonperfe,fedcomplexuhorumuerborum cũcertispery fonis.nonitadubium eft de nominibus,
dequibusinse acceptishæstat nemo, an veritatem significant aut falsitatem: Quærit
nouissime Ammonius quid intellexerit Aristotele. Per simpliciter, uel secundum tempus
cum ait. (hircocery considerentur, non dicerenturno significare uerum aut
falsum et q effent fimilia intellectui fine compositione& diy uifione: quiaessentipseintelle&us,seuintelligentiafineue
roautfallo:Dicédumigiturinquestionempotiusuerten dumcurdixerit.(circac
compositionem.et divisionem, ut inmentesunt, est verum et falsumj denominibus autem
in uocecorolarieinferens,ait:(fineuerbonondum uerum uusenim
aliquidsignificat:fednondum uerumaliquid
autfalsum,finon,ueleffeuelnonesseaddatur,uelfimpli citeruelfecúdumtempus.) respondet
sermonem Arif.ad eadem referens verba, inquiens: nifi effe addatur fimplicis
ter,ideftnisi effe addaturindefinite& indeterminate significans: ut “Fuit
hircocervus” est, auterit. Non definiens, ac determinansan hodie, sero, anmane,
perendie etc. vel aut falsum significare. Ad quod respondendum, quod fecundum tempus,
ideftnifiaddatur cum aliqua determis propterea vox quando
eftfineuero&fallo, quandoque natione tempori addita præsenti, præterito, uel
futuro, cum his, quia circa compofitionem & divifionem intelle,
sciliceterat,eft,erit,herianno superiori,hodie uel cras, & us eftuerum
& falfum:ex quo intulit de nominibus in autsuccessiuotempore.quam
tamenexplicationemaci uoce,gfintfine uero, X fallo ex eadem causa, pfimiliasing
intellectui fine compofitione et divisione: circa quæuerum cipiens Magentinus uel
in latinum vertens non intellexit: cumpereffef smpliciter et omnino, in,finitoacdetermi
& falsum uersatur, ut caulam, quaposita, uerum aut falsum i ponitur. &
hac remota (ut in nominibusfineaddito uery natotemporeintelligat. Ad tempus uero
et in tempore infinito. tragelaphuserat, uel erit, hęc.n.infinitafunt: fed
bouidetur, quæ fimiliasuntintelligentięfinecompositio eft presentist emporis, aitdefinitumelle:l
iceteft,utdeDeo facilius conftitutamfententiamapprobant:uerbaautein
(utdicetur)quandam compositionemsignificant,quam licetexsenonhabeant, sed exalio,ex
compofitis,fcilicet dicitur infinitum significet: Idem.n.Deus,erat, &eft,
sed in aliis rebus, tempore non definite utimurita. Hinc liquet, igitur erunt: quæ&
fiacu& explicite uerbii, prædicatum et subiectum ut nomina non contineant, illatameneximigit,
ergo& hic per tempusdimpliciter, tempus præsens, 8C per secundum tempus præteritum
uel futurum: quæ pros ptereanuncupantur & lunt, quere tempus prælensciry
cunstant, iuxtas; ipsum ponuntur: propterea dixit,(secun significat, quemadmodum
in oratione quaestequus ferus. Ofitis & precognitis partibus definitionis nominis
ac nunc ad definitione sponendas integrasactotas accedit: sed Ammonius quęrit cur
primo de nomine äde verbo definis dumtempus) quodnonfimpliciter& ina&ueft.
Sedquod.tionem assignet? respondet, proptere a nomen uerbo esse præteriit uel
futurumest: solum præsens simpliciter & in actuest.utre&te. S.'Tho. exposuit:
Nec Sueffe confutatio ualet,& quęliberdifferentiatemporisefttempussecundu
quid:quoniamperaliquidabaliisdifferétiisdiffert:quod autemperpartemeft, fecundumquid,
nonsimplicitertas antepositum, qnomen subftantiả.i. naturam et vim rerum
significat: uerbum uero a&ionematqzaffetioné, quænel Cellario naturam
acuimmouentem supponit. contraarguit
Sueffa.substantianonnisiperaccidentiacognofcitur,prius
ergouerbumdefiniendumqnomen:Ad instantiam,Am Icessedicetur: primoclenchorum.4. Sedĝfalla
hæc fit monius facile diceret substantiam cognoscifinedescribir improbatio patet,
quiaens, cuminsubftantiamens simplisciter diuidatur& accidens, inaĉtumfimpliciter,&
potens tiam secundum quid, nequaquam uere diuideretur: quia per aliquid differ substantia
ab accidente et potentia ab aétu,
&fipropriedifferentiamnonhabeant.Itemratiofal
lit.lihęcspeciesperaliquamdifferentiam (acuprecipue) differt, rrgo per partem.igitursecundum
quid. accidentiautpofteriora.accidentiavero per substantias definiri, ut priores:
fic.n.Aristotele primonaturam.2.phy.quá
motumfiniuit,aquamotus,utperseprincipio,prouenit: & materiam primo phy.81.g
formam.2.phy.2. quæ a materia cuiu nitur& datellelustentatur, Aliteripse respndet,
proptere a nomen uerbo prætulisle, onotiuscft. Et iterbi feconuenireArift.affirmauit,fedenunciationitantu:erunt
igitur enunciationes, cum enunciationispropriumopusef
fignum.sedcópofitionemacueritatemcófignificatquan ficiant: Suellanouariis
Sorticularumdi&tis& improbatis sententiis,hocuisumeft:literas&
nominaquoadprima eorumimpo fitionem, non significarenifiincomplexum, neccum
uero et falso: sedquòd quoadnouăimpositio, nem, fignificare poffunt cum vero et
falso: proptereaqapo incópofitione explicarefineadditouer bonó possunt. Dis
fitione sunt. Nung tamenerunt propositiones autenuncia cas Querbumetsi
compositionem extremorum aétunon tiones: proptereanóualereait, a, significat cum
uero aut dicat, a&tionemtamen, et affectionem significat, quæ causa fallo, ergoenunciatioerit.quoniáinquitoportetinantes
eft, qpredicatumseuappositúsubie&ofiuesuppositocon cedenteaddere.
fignificetexprimaimpofitione,nonau
iungatur,uerbumergolempereftuniocóiungens(apritu temex noua institutione. Sed contrahancaddităconditio
dinesaltem cum inpropofitionenóeft:fedcũsecundum nemexproprioarbitrio. Enúciatio
primaimpofitionefis se, acpurúaccipitur: nominauerosunt composita, seu quæ significat
propriecum vero et falso. Ego ubi est proprium apta sunt pera & tumuerbi
coniungi, proptere a nominapen opus, necessario propriumerit inftrumentum:
neq;enima dentauerbo, quasi formauniéte, & uerbiianoíequasimai nova aliqua
institutione propriú opus a proprio inftrosen teria, qunici habetp uerbum. Ut
materiaaŭt, tempore pre iungipoteft: proptereafi. a.b.c, etc. novis aut
antiquis concedit forma, & prius,utfacilius& ordinenecessitatisnos Giliis&pofitioneimpositasunt,
ad verum et falsum,seu (ut menanteafiniendu. Verbú vero, quniédafunt, prçsuppo
ipfi volunt) cum uero & falso significandú. enunciationes nés, pofterius ut
ignotius & the posterius explicandú: quas quando secundū se,
acpurumdicetur. Ipsum.n.sic purumi nullüueritatis et compositionis, aqua verum
explicatur, est dam, nonperse, sed quam sine compofitis nominibus non est
intelligere. Gi ergo hac de causa nomé præponit uerbo, q notitia verbi in
compositione verū explicantis, non pont, intelligi sine nominibus compositis.
Ita et nomina, uerum illud, quod Ammonius, tempus simpliciter &
omnino, ponentium CONSILIO coplcctuntur. Exemplo similiAmm sus ideftindetinite
et indeterminate significans, appellabat, Ma, gentinus dicit esse tempus
finitum et determinatum. Et parsticula, quam Ammo. adom né temporis
differentiam rer pra, cum dicimus "curro", "curris", nin
git, pluit, complexuhorūuer borum cúcertis intelle&is personis, cú vero et
fallof sgnificant. ferebar, Magentinus ad solum præsens direxit. falsum igir. Keywords: il vestigio
dell’angelo, Campidoglio Inv. # 334, donazione di papa Gregorio, logicalia,
interpretatio, interpretazione, logica, signum, segno, nota, notare, notante,
segnante, notificare, segnante, vestigio, il segno del’angelo, campidoglio, san
michele, vestigo, etym. dub. ves-stigium, foot-print. – segno naturale – segno,
genere e specie – genere: segno. Specie: segno naturale, vestigio, marca,
nota.. segno artifiziae, segnar per posizione, arbitrio, a piacere, consilio. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Balduino” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51790116833/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Banfi – Eurialo
e Niso; ovvero, la tradizione vichiana – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Vimercati).
Filosofo. Grice: “What I like about Banfi is that he is more ‘important’ than
it seems, at least to Italians! He has written bunches, but my favourite are
two: his ‘l’interpretazione’ (Banfi makes a distinction between ‘esegesi,’
‘interpretazione’ and ‘TEORIA dell’interpretazione,’ in a slightly non-Griceian
use of ‘teoria’ – and his essays on ‘eros e prassi,’ for indeed the second
strand (eros e prassi) is the base for the former (interpretazione): unless you
CARE, why interpret – which is indeed, a performance?!” -- Antonio Banfi seenatore
della Repubblica Italiana LegislatureI, II Gruppo parlamentareComunista
CircoscrizioneLombardia Dati generali Partito politicoPartito Comunista
Italiano Titolo di studioLaurea in Lettere UniversitàUniversità Humboldt di
Berlino ProfessioneDocente. torico della filosofia, traduttore, accademico e
politico italiano. Fu sostenitore di un razionalismo aperto e antidogmatico in
grado di attraversare i vari settori dell'animo umano. A lui è intitolato
il Liceo Scientifico con Sezione Classica Aggregata del suo comune natale,
Vimercate. Antonio Banfi nacque a Vimercate, in provincia di
Milano, in un ambiente familiare formatosi su principi cattolici e liberali
della borghesia colta lombarda, nella quale da generazioni combaciavano una
moderna e positiva idea del cattolicesimo e un razionale illuminismo
tecnico-scientifico. La ricca e vasta biblioteca in possesso della famiglia
diventò per il giovane grande stimolo di conoscenza nei suoi studi, quando da
Mantova, dove frequentava il Liceo Virgilio, ritornava a Vimercate, dove
assieme alla famiglia trascorreva le vacanze estive. Nel 1904 incominciò
a frequentare i corsi universitari alla facoltà di lettere della Regia
Accademia scientifico-letteraria di Milano e ottenne, dopo quattro anni, la
laurea con lode, discutendo (con il relatore Francesco Novati) una monografia su
Francesco da Barberino. Incominciò a insegnare all'Istituto Cavalli-Conti
di Milano e contemporaneamente proseguì con grande determinazione gli studi di
filosofia (con Giuseppe Zuccante per la storia della filosofia e Piero
Martinetti per la teoretica); il 29 gennaio 1910 prese la seconda laurea in
filosofia, discutendo con Martinetti una tesi intitolata "Saggi critici
della filosofia della contingenza", contenente tre monografie sul pensiero
di Boutroux, Renouvier e Bergson. Con la borsa di studio attribuita
dall'Istituto Franchetti di Mantova ai laureati meritevoli, Banfi decise di
andare in Germania e iscriversi, con il suo amico Confucio Cotti, alla facoltà
di filosofia della Friedrich Wilhelms Universität di Berlino, dove strinse
amicizia con il socialista Andrea Caffi. Nella primavera del 1911 ritornò in
Italia e partecipò a vari concorsi, ottenendo una supplenza di Filosofia prima
a Lanciano, in seguito a Urbino; per molti anni assunse diversi incarichi in
varie sedi scolastiche. Banfi conobbe una ragazza, la contessa Daria
Malaguzzi Valeri, con la quale dopo poco tempo, il 4 marzo 1916, si unì in
matrimonio civile nel municipio di Bologna. Durante la guerra, già riformato al
servizio di leva, si dedicò con senso di servizio e scrupolosa diligenza
all'insegnamento e, per la penuria di insegnanti richiamati al fronte, oltre
alla sua cattedra fu costretto a ricoprire altri incarichi; solo agli inizi
dell'ultimo anno venne aggregato come soldato semplice all'ufficio annonario
della Prefettura di Alessandria. Nei primi anni del dopoguerra Banfi, pur
non militando nel movimento socialista, assunse in modo molto deciso posizioni
di sinistra e partecipò, come iscritto alla Camera del Lavoro,
all'organizzazione della cultura popolare, diventando in poco tempo una delle
personalità più in vista del mondo culturale democratico alessandrino; venne
nominato anche direttore della biblioteca di Alessandria, da cui fu in seguito
allontanato dal nascente squadrismo fascista. Nel 1925 fu tra i firmatari del
Manifesto degli intellettuali antifascisti, redatto da Benedetto Croce. Nel
1931 Piero Martinetti, che era stato collocato a riposo d'autorità per aver
rifiutato di giurare fedeltà al fascismo, lo propose come suo successore per
l'insegnamento della Storia della Filosofia all'Università degli Studi di
Milano, dove, a partire dal 1941, fu maestro di Rossana Rossanda. Diresse
la rivista Studi filosofici, pubblicata dal 1940 al 1949. Nel secondo
dopoguerra, con le elezioni politiche del 1948, fu eletto per le liste del
Partito comunista,nel Senato della Repubblica. Il mandato fu confermato alle
successive elezioni del 1953. Il razionalismo critico Magnifying glass
icon mgx2.svg Problematicismo. Antonio Banfi può essere considerato il maestro
della corrente filosofica che in Italia si è denominata Razionalismo critico e
che ha avuto anche derivazioni significative nel campo della pedagogia
teoretica con il Problematicismo. In sostanza, usando il concetto kantiano di
ragione, Banfi la considera come la facoltà di un discernimento critico,
analitico, presupposto trascendentale che sistematizza l'esperienza, i dati
empirici, non pervenendo a dogmi o a sistemi di sapere chiusi e assoluti. Il
principio razionale permette di cogliere e comprendere la realtà nelle sue
complesse determinazioni: senza questo principio, che va assunto appunto come
trascendentale, la realtà sarebbe caotica e solo contingente ed esperienziale
oppure interpretata secondo la Metafisica o sistemi di pensiero chiusi e non
problematici come richiesto dalla scienza e in generale dalla complessa
dinamica del mondo umano e naturale. L'apertura della ragione è talmente ampia
che anche le filosofie assolutizzanti vengono poste come possibilità di verità,
seppur parziali ("È bene tener presente che il pensiero non pensa mai il
falso in modo assoluto"). La filosofia è lo strumento indispensabile per
l'analisi critica del reale, non deve tendere a un sapere assoluto, ma porsi il
tema privilegiato della coscienza, purché questa coscienza sia "coscienza
della relatività, della problematicità, della viva dialettica del reale".
Si sfugge al relativismo possibile seguendo le orme di Socrate: l'eticità
prevale quando, non potendo esistere se non come tendenza verità assoluta, le
verità relative sono assunte come problema, cioè come ricerca interrogante e
incessante fondante l'intero processo conoscitivo. Le conclusioni sono, come
nell'ambito scientifico (la scienza è lo strumento pragmatico della ragione, la
filosofia lo strumento teoretico) non false ma possibili, non solo provvisorie,
ma reali. Le categorie che Banfi propone per sintetizzare la sua proposta
filosofica, sono quelle di "sistematica" del sapere, fondata su un
significato antidogmatico della ragione, una "sistematica" aperta per
il rinnovamento critico di tutte le strutture razionali e di un umanesimo
nuovo, radicale, che ponga l'uomo al centro dell'indagine razionale e nella sua
realtà storico-effettuale, che forma la sua coscienza concreta nel mondo reale:
dunque critica alla metafisica ma necessità della filosofia, il sapere
costruttivo garanzia di libertà e concretezza. Il confronto che Banfi predilige
è con gli indirizzi filosofici della prima metà del Novecento, in particolare
la Fenomenologia, il neokantismo di Marburgo, il neopositivismo, l'Esistenzialismo,
ma negli ultimi anni orienta sempre più il suo interesse al Marxismo, di cui
condivide gli assunti fondamentali leggendoli alla luce del suo razionalismo
critico, come si evince dalla raccolta postuma Saggi sul marxismo editi nel
1960. Archivio Si segnalano tre fondi archivistici del pensatore:
"Fondo Antonio Banfi" presso la Biblioteca Panizzi di Reggio Emilia.
L'archivio, insieme con la biblioteca personale di Banfi, dopo la morte del
pensatore venne donato alla provincia di Reggio Emilia insieme con la
costituzione del "Centro studi Antonio Banfi”. In seguito, il Centro si
trasformerà in "Istituto Banfi", con sede a Reggio Emilia. Nel,
l’archivio e la biblioteca personale del filosofo sono stati depositati alla
Biblioteca Panizzi di Reggio Emilia, a seguito di un accordo tra Soprintendenza
Archivistica per l’Emilia-Romagna, Comune e Provincia di Reggio Emilia. La
biblioteca conserva anche l'archivio di Daria Malaguzzi Valeri e l’archivio
delle carte di Clelia Abate, segretaria del Fronte della Cultura e allieva di
Banfi. Archivio "Antonio Banfi e Daria Malaguzzi Valeri" presso la
Biblioteca di Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Milano. Il fondo
archivistico contiene diverse centinaia di documenti conservati da Daria
Malaguzzi Valeri, moglie del filosofo, e da lei usati nella stesura del libro
Umanità, pubblicato nel 1967 per le Edizioni Franco di Reggio Emilia. I
documenti del fondo coprono l'intero arco di vita di Antonio Banfi ma risultano
particolarmente ben rappresentati gli anni giovanili; da segnalare soprattutto
il ricco epistolario con la futura moglie, riferito agli anni compresi tra il
1911 e il 1916, e la corrispondenza con Piero Martinetti, durante la sua
docenza presso la Regia Accademia Filosofico Letteraria di Milano e poi dal suo
ritiro di Spineto. "Archivio privato familiare Antonio Banfi"
conservato presso l'Università degli studi dell'Insubria. Centro Internazionale
Insubrico Carlo Cattaneo e Giulio Preti, riunisce migliaia di lettere,
biglietti, cartoline postali, plichi e buste, conservati in 33 raccoglitori a
loro volta inseriti in 15 buste, per una consistenza di circa 1,5 mi. Gran
parte dell'archivio è costituito dal carteggio tra Antonio Banfi e Daria
Malaguzzi Valeri, sposatisi il 4 luglio 1916. Il rapporto epistolare con la
moglie, infatti, non si limitò alla sfera affettiva e familiare, ma affronta
spesso tematiche filosofiche (ad esempio, la frequentazione di G. Simmel
durante il giovanile soggiorno a Berlino, nel 1909-1911, o la ricezione
dell'opera e la personale conoscenza di E. Husserl) e di attualità, nella
concretezza dei riferimenti a eventi e circostanze del presente e ai rapporti
sociali coltivati da Banfi come pensatore, studioso, organizzatore culturale e
uomo politico. Altre opere: “La filosofia e la vita spirituale” – lo spirito,
l’animo, vita, animo vitale – (Milano, Isis); “Principi di una teoria della
ragione” (Firenze, la Nuova Italia); “Pestalozzi, Firenze, Vallecchi); “Vita di
Galileo Galilei” (Lanciano, R. Carabba); “Sommario di storia della pedagogia”
(Milano, A. Mondadori); “I classici della pedagogia: Rousseau, Pestalozzi,
Capponi, Gabelli, Gentile” (Milano, Mondadori); “Studi filosofici: rivista
trimestrale di filosofia contemporanea” (Milano); “Saggio sul diritto e sullo
Stato, Roma, Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto); “Per un
razionalismo critico, Como, Marzorati); “Lezioni di estetica raccolte Maria
Antonietta Fraschini e Ida Vergani, Milano, Istit. Edit. Cisalpino); “Vita dell'arte,
Milano, Minuziano); “Galileo Galilei” (Milano, Ambrosiana); “L'uomo copernicano,
Milano, A. Mondadori); “La crisi dell'uso dogmatico della ragione, Milano,
Bocca);:La filosofia del settecento, Milano, La Goliardica); “La filosofia
critica di Kant” (Milano, La Goliardica); “La filosofia degli ultimi
cinquant'anni, Milano, La Goliardica); “La ricerca della realtà” (Firenze,
Sansoni); “Saggi sul marxismo, Roma, Editori Riuniti); “Filosofia dell'arte”
(Roma, Editori Riuniti). Note
"Perciò appunto non ho dimenticato i tuoi interessi e sarei lieto che
fossi tu a succedermi, In questo senso ho scritto, richiesto da Castiglioni
stesso, che ora è preside, a Castiglioni. Ho consigliato lui e con lui la
facoltà ad accaparrarsi te per la F.[ilosofia] e Banfi per la St.[oria]
d.[ella] F.[ilosofia]"; Lettera n. 108 Piero Martinetti a Adelchi
Baratono, 21 dicembre 1931, in Piero Martinetti Lettere (1919-1942), Firenze,, 107-108.
Rossanda, Rossana, La ragazza del secolo scorso, Torino, Einaudi,
2005, 52 ss., 9788806143756. Vedi scheda del Senato della RepubblicaI
Legislatura. Vedi scheda del Senato
della RepubblicaII Legislatura. Cit. in
"Il marxismo e la libertà di pensiero", (1954), pubblicato in
"Saggi sul marxismo", Editori Riuniti, 1960, pag.152 A.Banfi, La mia prospettiva filosofica, in La
ricerca della realtà (1959), pag.713
Fondo Banfi Antonio, su SIUSA Sistema Informativo Unificato per le
Soprintendenze Archivistiche. 3 dicembre.
Centro Internazionale Insubrico Carlo Cattaneo e Giulio Preti per la
filosofia, l'epistemologia, le scienze cognitive e la scienza delle scienze
tecniche, su dicom.uninsubria. 3 dicembre.
G. M. Bertin, Banfi, Padova, MILANI, 1943 E. Garin, Cronache di
filosofia italiana (1900-1943), Bari, Laterza,1955 G. M. Bertin, L'idea di
ragione e il pensiero etico-pedagogico di Antonio Banfi, Roma, Armando, 1961.
Fulvio Papi, Il pensiero di Antonio Banfi, Parenti, Firenze 1961. F. Papi,
Banfi Antonio, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 5 (1963), Treccani. A. Erbetta, L'umanesimo
critico di Antonio Banfi, Milano, Marzorati, 1978. Antonio Banfi tre
generazioni dopo. Atti del convegno della Fondazione Corrente, Milano, maggio
1978, Il Saggiatore, Milano 1980. Roselina Salemi, banfiana, Parma, Pratiche, 1982. G.
Scaramuzza, Antonio Banfi. La ragione e l'estetico, Padova, Cleup, 1984 Luciano
Eletti, Il problema della persona in Antonio Banfi, La Nuova Italia, Firenze
1985. 1986. Centenario della nascita di Antonio Banfi, Reggio Emilia, Istituto
Banfi, 1986. Livio Sichirollo, Attualità di Banfi, Urbino, QuattroVenti, 1986.
Francesco Luciani, Incontro con Banfi, Cosenza, Presenze Editrice, 987. G. D.
Neri, Crisi e costruzione della storia. Sviluppi del pensiero di Antonio Banfi,
Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1988 F. Papi, Vita e filosofia. La scuola di Milano:
Banfi, Cantoni, Paci, Preti, Milano, Guerrini, 1990 Paolo Valore,
Trascendentale e idea di ragione. Studi sulla fenomenologia banfiana, Firenze,
La Nuova Italia, 1999. G. Scaramuzza, Crisi come rinnovamento. Scritti
sull'estetica della scuola di Milano, Milano, Unicopli, 2000. Francesco Luciani,
Polemiche della ragione. Gramsci, Banfi, Della Volpe, Cosenza, Arti Grafiche
Barbieri, 2002. Giovambattista Trebisacce, Antonio Banfi e la pedagogia,
Cosenza, Jonia editrice, 2005. F. Papi, Antonio Banfi e la pedagogia, Cosenza,
Jonia editrice, 2005. S. ChiodoG. Scaramuzza (a cura), Ad Antonio Banfi
cinquant'anni dopo, Milano, Unicopli, 2007. A. Vigorelli, La nostra
inquetudine. Martinetti, Banfi, Rebora, Cantoni, Paci, De Martino, Rensi,
Untersteiner, Dal Pra, Segre, Capitini, Milano, B. Mondadori, 2007
Giovambattista Trebisacce, La pedagogia tra razionalismo critico e marxismo,
Roma, Anicia, 2008. D. Assael, Alle origini della scuola di Milano. Martinetti,
Barié, Banfi, Milano, Guerrini, 2009. G. Sacaramuzza, Estetica come filosofia
della musica nella scuola di Milano, Milano, CUEM, 2009. A. Di Miele, Antonio
Banfi Enzo Paci. Crisi, eros, prassi, Milano, Mimesis,. M. Gisondi, Una fede
filosofica. Antonio Banfi negli anni della sua formazione, Roma, Edizioni di
Storia e Letteratura,. A. Crisanti, Banfi a Milano. L'università, l'editoria,
il partito, Milano, Unicopli,. Maria
Corti Antonia Pozzi Luciano Anceschi Rossana Rossanda Pietro Bucalossi Piero
Martinetti Scuola di Milano Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons
Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Antonio Banfi Antonio Banfi, in Dizionario biografico degli
italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Antonio Banfi, su siusa.archivi.beniculturali, Sistema Informativo
Unificato per le Soprintendenze Archivistiche.
Antonio Banfi, su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana. Opere di Antonio Banfi, su openMLOL, Horizons
Unlimited srl. Opere di Antonio Banfi. Antonio Banfi / Antonio Banfi (altra
versione), su senato, Senato della Repubblica.
La morte a Milano del sen. Antonio Banfi articolo del quotidiano La
Stampa, 23 luglio 19577, Archivio storico. Massimo Ferrari, Piero Martinetti e
Antonio Banfi, in Il contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Filosofia,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Marcello Gisondi, La formazione
intellettuale e politica di Antonio Banfi. Tesi di dottorato discussa presso
l’Università Federico II di Napoli (a.a. /) "Antonio Banfi a Milano",
sito della mostra allestita dal 22 maggio al 13 giugno presso la Biblioteca di Filosofia dell'Università
degli Studi di Milano Filosofia Università
Università Filosofo del XX secoloStorici della filosofia
italianiTraduttori italiani 1886 1957 30 settembre 22 luglio Vimercate
MilanoAccademici italiani del XX secoloDirettori di periodici italianiPolitici
italiani del XX secoloProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di
MilanoAntifascisti italianiSenatori della I legislatura della Repubblica
ItalianaSenatori della II legislatura della Repubblica ItalianaStudenti
dell'Università Humboldt di BerlinoTraduttori all'italianoTraduttori dal
franceseTraduttori dal greco all'italianoTraduttori dall'inglese
all'italianoTraduttori dal latinoTraduttori dal tedesco all'italiano. Antonio
Banfi. Keywords. Eurialo e Niso; ovvero, la tradizione vichiana; banfi —
spirito vitale — storiografia filosofica — istituto di storia della filosofia —
ragione e conversazione — criticismo — conversazione con hegel — personalismo —
l’interpersonale — sovranità — lo stato italiano — lo stoicismo romano — enea e
marc’aurelio — acerrima indago — diritto criminale — kantismo —Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, “Grice e Banfi” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51790071803/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Baratono –
stilistica – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Firenze). Filosofo. Grice:
“I like Baratono – especially his ‘stilistica italiana’ – if I were to offer an
English stylistics I would not count as a philosopher – but that’s because
‘English’ is spoken by more than Englishmen, while Italian ain’t!” Grice:
“Baratono thinks he is a sensist alla ‘Giovanni Locke,’ which he possibly is.” Grice:
“In the typical Italian way, instead of focusing on the classics – Roman
philosophy – he read sociology and psychology and came up, in a typically
Italian way, with a ‘sintessi,’ ‘la psicologia del popolo’ alla Wundt.” Grice:
“If Austin punned on sense and sensibility – Baratono takes ‘sensibilia’ VERY
sensibly – as the basis for ‘aesthetics,’ seeing that ‘aesthetikos’ IS
Ciceronian for ‘sensibile’.” – Grice: “Baratono is Griceian in his search for
what he calls the ‘elementary’ – he applies ‘elementary’ to ‘fatto psichico’:
judicativo e volitivo – both based on the ‘sensibile’ – or rather on
probability and desirability – credibility and desirability --. His use of
‘sense’ does not quite fit the Oxonian ‘sense datum,’ since the will is
involved in the sensibile – or, in his wording, it is the anima (or psyche)
that searches for the corpus -- -- The compound is something like the
hylemorphism – the form is sensible – and the volitive (prattica) and
judicative (teoretica) components of the soul operate on this.” -- Fra i maggiori esponenti del Partito
Socialista Italiano nel periodo fra le due guerre. Vive sin dalla giovinezza a Genova, dove
compie i suoi studi. Si laurea in filosofia. Insegna a Genova, Savona,
Cagliari, Milano. Baratono si iscrive al
PSI subito dopo la fondazione e viene eletto consigliere comunale a Savona,
aderendo all'ala intransigente in forte polemica con i riformisti. Entra nella
Direzione nazionale del partito. Alcune battaglie politiche lo vedono emergere
come figura di primo piano del socialismo italiano, come quella che Baratono
porta avanti capeggiando la frazione comunista unitaria al Congresso di
Livorno. L'accettazione con riserva dei 21 punti dell'Internazionale comunista
di Mosca determina la clamorosa scissione e l'uscita dei comunisti dal Partito Socialista.
Presenta al congresso la mozione massimalista. Diviene deputato. Confermato per
la terza volta membro della Direzione socialista, mentre la maggioranza
massimalista si orienta per la scissione dei riformisti, al Congresso di Roma sostiene
fortemente l'unità, anche per il timore dell'affermarsi delle forze fasciste.
Dopo il Congresso di Roma, aderisce al Partito Socialista Unitario e diviene un
assiduo collaboratore di Critica Sociale. Collabora al “Quarto Stato”. Con il
consolidamento del regime fascista, si dedica esclusivamente ai suoi studi
filosofici. Torna all'attività politica
all'indomani della Liberazione, con collaborazioni sull'Avanti! riprendendo i
suoi studi di critica marxista.
Note «Perciò appunto non ho
dimenticato i tuoi interessi e sarei lieto che fossi tu a succedermi, In questo
senso ho scritto, richiesto da Castiglioni stesso, che ora è preside, a
Castiglioni. Ho consigliato lui e con lui la facoltà ad accaparrarsi te per la
F.[ilosofia] e Banfi per la St.[oria] d.[ella] F.[ilosofia]». Lettera n. 108,
Piero Martinetti a Adelchi Baratono, 21 dicembre 1931, in Piero Martinetti
Lettere (1919-1942), Firenze,, 107-108. Fonti Vittorio Mathieu, «BARATONO, Adelchi» in
Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 5, Roma, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1963. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource
Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Adelchi Baratono Collabora a
Wikiquote Citazionio su Adelchi Baratono Collabora a Wikimedia Commons
Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Adelchi Baratono Adelchi Baratono, in Dizionario biografico
degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Adelchi Baratono, su Liber
Liber. Opere di Adelchi Baratono, su
openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Adelchi Baratono,. Adelchi Baratono, su storia.camera, Camera
dei deputati. Filosofi italiani del XX secoloPolitici italiani del XX
secoloAccademici italiani Professore1875 1947Nati l'8 aprile 28 settembre
Firenze GenovaPolitici del Partito Socialista ItalianoDeputati della XXVI
legislatura del Regno d'ItaliaStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di
GenovaProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di GenovaProfessori
dell'Università degli Studi di CagliariProfessori dell'Università degli Studi
di Milano. Critica dei valori ed estetica metafisica. Psicologia critica dei
valori e metafisica estetica. Carissimo Groppali » Nella
tuapubblicazionedaltitoloPsicologia socialeepsic.collettira, trovo rammentato
un mio articolo (comparso nel quarto fascicolo del l'Archivio di
Psic.coll.).con queste parole (pag.29): RASSEGNA DI SOCIOLOGIA E
SCIENZE AFFINI citato;non posso fare comequel buon figliuolo di Renzo
Tramaglino, che, a sentir dire che la sua Lucia era una « bella baggiana »,per
amor dell'epiteto lasciava passare il sostantivo. » Lasciami invece un
po'brontolare contro la seconda parte del tuo giu dizio.E,quantunquein fatto di
scoperte scientifichenessuno sipossa dire assolutamente il primo scopritore,
permettimi di dare al Sighele quelch'èdiSighele,ea me quelchesembramio. »
Perilnostrocaso,lascopertapiùimportante,acuisonogiunti questi autori, è la
semplice constatazione del fatto, che gli atti estrin secanti la emozione d'un
individuo riproducono in altri individui ana loghe emozioni ed atti volontari.
» Ebbene:primaepiùcompletamentediquegliscienziati,loSpencer era pervenuto alla
medesima legge con la sua teorica della simpatia; e per di più aveva spiegato
il fatto diquella suggestione con la ragione sociale, osservando che un atto
emotivo non potrebbe suscitare nei pre senti un sentimento corrispondente se
non vi fosse stata l'esperienza propria o atavica che avesse associato
quell'atto all'emozione reale uni. tamente sofferta; trovandone perciò la
genesi nella convivenza sociale, per essere gl'individui associati sottoposti
alle medesime cause di pia cere e dolore. » Adunque io nel mio studio potevo
passarmi di citare altre teorie, oltre quella spenceriana, quando ridussi il
fenomeno collettivo a feno meno simpatetico. E fin quinon ho fatto,nè ho detto
di fare,nessuna scoperta:ma soltantohoapplicatolaleggespencerianaaunnuovogruppo
di fatti,da Ini non considerati specialmente.Ripeto: ionon ho sostenuto come
mia scoperta, ma ho soltanto accettato e meglio dimostrato, che il fatto
psichico del delirio collettivo ha per sostrato il giuoco delle emo zioni e
rappresentazioni, cioè il fatto simpatetico. » A questa domanda non poteva
rispondere nè il Sighele, che non è mai entrato nel campo della psicologia
generale,nè,come si sa, lo Spen cer e gli associazionisti,che si contentavano
di descrivere il fatto, ridu cendolo a uno schema associativo,ciòche,come
spiegazione,ha ilvalore di una tautologia, senza svelarne il meccanismo, cioè
il rapporto fra gli elementi;né imaterialisti,che nedavanouna
ipoteticaspiegazioneana tomo-fisiologica, senza entrare nella pura psicologia.
>Dall'altraparte,rispondereaquelledomande significatrovarele ragioni ultime
e più generali del fenomeno collettivo; vale a dire, ridurlo completamente. »
Questo ho tentato io di fare; di qui comincia il mio studio genuino. Me ne sono
vantato? ho soltanto asserito che tentavo di muovere un » Il Sighele
intui, che i fatti caratteristici della emozione di una folla si possono
ridurre a qualcosa di più generale,ov'entri quella facoltà dell'imitazione,
quella suggestione, con le quali altri avevano spiegato il contagio morale;
perciò egli, se malnon ricordo,senza nulla aggiun gere diproprio, si riferì
alle teorie di Bordère, Ebrard,Jolly,Tarde, Sergi, Espinas ecc. ecc. » Ho
dunque accettata una legge,o,meglio,ladescrizione di un fatto generale,chesi
potrebbe enunciare cosi: Negli individui associati,la percezione degli
atticorrispondenti alle emozioni di alcuno destando in altri la
rappresentazione di piaceri o dolori analoghi, suscita piaceri o dolori
analoghi e gliatti corrispondenti. > In questo enunciato c'èqualcosa di
mio.Ma non mi curo di metterlo in luce. Piuttosto ti rivolgo la domanda:
osservato il fatto, lo Spencer ne ha trovato la ragione sociologica; ma vi è
qualcuno che ne abbia tro vato la ragione psicologica? Come una
rappresentazione emotiva può diventare un'emozione attuale, condizione e stimolo
di atti volontari? RASSEGNA DI SOCIOLOGIA E SCIENZE AFFINI passo nel
cammino dellapsicologia collettiva:tu puoi scusarmene,perché conosci il
tripudio di chi lavora per la scienza,che oggi è ancor l'unica nostra
ricompensa. »Adunqueilrimanentestudio,larispostaaquelladomandaèmio: » 1.°Mio
nelle premesse,che si riferiscono al libro Ifatti psichiri elementari, dove
dimostravo che: « La legge più generale della psiche è data dalla serie dei
fatti emotivo -conoscitivo -volitivo, quando si con sideri questa come
l'espressione di un rapporto,per cui ilprimo termine rappresenta l'energia
determinante degli altri »; » 3.° Mio nell'applicazione alfenomeno collettivo,
dove le multiple rappresentazioni emotive devono agire sopra ognuno degli
individui come altrettante emozioni reali attenuate, ma accumulate sulla prima;
onde l'esaltazione propria della folla. » Tutte queste tesi sono diverse da
quelle sostenute e dall'intellet tualismo e dal volontarismo. » Riepilogando:
il Sighele giunse a ridurre il fenomeno collettivo a un fatto generale
enunciato come legge; e lo Spencer aveva dato la spie gazione sociologica di
questo fatto: m a, perchè vi fosse una spiegazione psicologica, bisognava aver
trovato non solo l'associazione,ma anche il rapporto tra gli elementi associati;il
quale rapporto di dipendenza, cioè di
condizioneestimolo,doveva,perridurrecompletamentequel fenomeno, coincidere col
rapporto o legge più generale della psiche. Questo ho cer cato difare: e, poi
che in modo particolare avevo stabilita la serie dei fatti psichici veramente
elementari e illoro rapporto,cioèla legge psi cologica generale, anche particolare
doveva riuscire l'inferenza al fenomeno collettivo. » Non posso,egregio e
carissimo amico, riassumere in poche pagine quelloche,agiudiziomio
edaltrui.ègiàtroppostrettamenteriassunto ne'mieilavori.A te,che liconosci, eche
possiedi un forteingegno intuitivo, basterà questo richiamo; e spero che ti
persuaderai, che il Sighele restaugualmente uno de'nostri migliori
scienziati,anche senza regalare a lui,che non ne ha bisegno,quelle due o tre
pagine con le quali si termina il mio studio. » Spero ancora più fervidamente,
che tu non mi dia del noioso e del l'immodesto per questa mia lettera,e che
sempre mi creda il tuo. BARATONO, Adelchi. - Nacque l'8 apr. 1875 a
Firenze dove il padre, Alessandro, originario di Ivrea, si era stabilito dopo
il trasferimento della capitale del regno da Torino. La madre, Ermelinda Rossi,
era fiorentina. La famiglia si fissò definitivamente a Genova, e il B.,
compiuti gli studi classici, frequentò l'università, addottorandosi in lettere
e in filosofia. Suo principale maestro fu A. Asturaro, del cui indirizzo
sociologico il B. risentì nei suoi primi lavori (Sociologia estetica,Civitanova
Marche 1899; Sul problema religioso,in Riv. ital. di sociol.,IV [1900], 4),
così come, successivamente, subì l'influsso di E. Morselli e delle sue lezioni
di psichiatria. Gli interessi psic0logici del B. sono documentati in questo
periodo da numerose pubblicazioni (I fatti psichici elementari, Torino 1900;
Sulla classificazione dei fatti psichici,Bologna 1900; Energia e psiche, in
Riv. di filos. e scienze affini, IV[1902], pp. 27-47, 162-180). Psicologia e
sociologia venivano, poi, naturalmente a fondersi in una wundtiana
"psicologia dei popoli" (Sulla psicologia dei popoli, Genova 1901),
permeata di una filosofia scientificamente concepita. Questo movimento culmina
nei Fondamenti di psicologia sperimentale (Torino 1906), che risentono ancora
dell'influsso positivistico, nella ricerca di una filosofia scientifica, ma
cominciano, al tempo stesso, a rivelare l'originalità filosofica del
Baratono. Contemporaneamente il B. coltivava il proprio gusto estetico
frequentando i circoli letterari, le mostre di pittura, i caffè degli artisti;
a venticinque anni pubblicò un volumetto di versi (Sparvieri,Genova 1900, con
acqueforti di Edoardo De Albertis), che sarà seguito da altre poesie (Lettera -
Notturno - Congedo, 1908), articoli letterari e frammentarie commedie, comparsi
generalmente in Riviera ligure. Questo duplice interesse, psicologico, ed
estetico, accompagnò il B. per tutta la vita, ma non senza trasformarsi
radicalmente, dall'originario positivismo, in una personale forma di
"sensismo", dove tornavano a incontrarsi il significato etimologico e
il significato moderno della parola "estetica". Nel 1911 - l'anno del
congresso internazionale di filosofia di Bologna, a cui il B. partecipò - egli,
che l'anno prima aveva celebrato I funerali del positivismo italiano (in Lavoro
nuovo,5 apr. 1910), pubblicò la Psicologia sintetica,in cui l'aspetto
filosofico e quello scientifico-sperimentale della ricerca erano nettamente
divisi, e la psicologia veniva assegnata al secondo. Conseguita la libera
docenza, il B. tenne corsi e conferenze all'università di Genova - oltre che
all'università popolare - prendendo a interessarsi del problema pedagogico,
strettamente congiunto con quello politico. QuattroDiscorsi sull'educazione
furono da lui riuniti in un volumetto, e alcuni anni dopo uscì la sua opera
fondamentale in materia: Critica e pedagogia dei valori (Palermo 1918).
Dalla politica il B. si era sentito attratto fin dalla prima giovinezza. Le sue
convinzioni etiche lo indussero a militare nelle file del socialismo; tuttavia,
anche nell'attività politica, egli conservò quell'atteggiamento aristocratico e
leggermente distaccato che lo caratterizzava sul piano culturale, ciò che tolse
mordente alla sua azione. Nell'aprile 1919, per le elezioni amministrative,
redasse in collaborazione con E. Gennari un ordine del giorno, votato poi
all'unanimità dal Consiglio nazionale del partito, dove si dichiarava che dei
comuni ci si doveva impadronire per "parálizzare tutti i poteri e tutti i
congegni dello Stato borghese, allo scopo... di accelerare la rivoluzione
proletaria". Rispetto alla rivoluzione russa, il B. si pronunciò contro
l'accettazione senza riserve delle ventuno condizioni poste da Mosca per
l'adesione alla Terza Internazionale, ma fu messo in minoranza nella riunione
della direzione del 28 sett. - 1° ott. 1920. Cercò inoltre di evitare ogni
scissione a sinistra, anche a costo dell'espulsione dei riformisti, che
rappresentavano l'ala destra del partito: questo suo punto di vista, sostenuto
prima e durante il congresso di Livorno (gennaio 1921), trovò tuttavia la via
sbarrata dal successo degli "unitari". Dalla sua dirittura morale il
B. era portato all'intransigenza; era antimassone, respingeva
l'anticlericalismo di maniera, auspicava la libertà dell'insegnamento. Turati
ebbe a definirlo "il filosofo della direzione del partito". Eletto
deputato nella XXVI legislatura, sedette al parlamento nel 1921-22, ma l'avvento
deli fascismo lo costrinse ad abbandonare l'attività politica (nella quale
rientrano anche scritti come Le due facce del marxismo taliano,Milano 1922, e
Fatica senza fatica,Torino 1923). Più fortunata divenne, a, questo punto,
la carriera universitaria. Titolare a Cagliari dal 1924, il B. si occupò, tra
l'altro, di Problemi universitari (Mediterranea,I[1927], 8) e vagheggiò un
progetto Per la riforma della facoltà filos. (Atti della Società ital. per il
progresso delle scienze,XX[1931]), che fu combattuto dal Gentile (Giorn. crit.
d. filos. ital.,XI[1931], pp. 239 s.). Nel '32 il B. passò a Milano, sulla
cattedra di P. Martinetti (che si era ritirato per non prestare giuramento) e
nel ' 38 tornò all'amata Genova, stabilendosi sulla riviera di Sant'Ilario. Qui
riceveva volentieri i suoi studenti e colti visitatori, attratti da una fama,
che, specialmente dopo la pubblicazione di Arte e poesia (Milano 1945), si
estese oltre la cerchia dei filosofi di professione. Riprese l'attività
politica negli ultimi anni, soprattutto in forma di collaborazione a giornali e
di rielaborazione di vecchi scritti di critica marxista. L'ultimo articolo,
L'etica dell'economia marxista, uscì sull'Avanti! alla vigilia della morte, che
avvenne il 28 sett. 1947. Al nome del B. è intitolato l'istituto universitario
di magistero di Genova. La prima formulazione pienamente matura della
filosofia del B. può essere considerata il volume Il mondo sensibile,
introduzione all'estetica (Messina 1934), preparato da alcuni degli scritti
raccolti in Filosofia in margine (Roma 1930); in esso si vuol raggiungere la
"prova esistenziale" della spiritualità del contenuto sensibile.
Contro l'impostazione gnoseologica che soggettivizza il mondo, il B. propugna
un'impostazione estetica che vede nel mondo sensibile, preso per se stesso,
"la forma dell'esistenza". Tale dottrina fu chiamata dal B.
"occasionalismo sensista", in una comunicazione alla sezione
piemontese dell'Istituto di studi filosofici nella primavera del 1940 (Per un
occasionalismo sensista, in Concetto e programma della filosofia d'oggi, Milano
1941, pp. 227-251). La denominazione esprime l'intento di "riflettere
sulla pura forma invece di prenderla quale rappresentazione di altro (soggetto
od oggetto) posto come un contenuto irreducibile a quella forma".
L'esperienza estetica ci mostra che un'ide a pura esiste come forma pura,
sensibilmente, e che questa forma sensibile vale per sé, in un rapporto
formalmente sentito con certezza, che diciamo "verità". Ciò
costituisce un valore sensibile direttamente, diverso sia dal valore del
sensibile (che rappresenta il valore specificamente teoretico) sia dal valore
del sentimento (che rappresenta il valore pratico). L'esserci sensibile
interessa il pensatore o l'uomo pratico solo come ostacolo da superare, ma "riempe
di meraviglia chi guarda il mondo con gli occhi spalancati sol per la gioia di
vedere, e così ne può apprezzare la bellezza". Queste idee sono
esposte dal B. in Arte e poesia,e messe alla prova non solo a contatto con
estetiche come quelle del Burke e del Focillon, a cui il B. scrisse
introduzioni (Milano 1945), ma con la stessa opera poetica, per es. di un
Verlaine, di cui il B. ripubblicò in Italia una raccolta di Poesie,
conintroduzione (Milano 1946). Arte e poesia si conclude con una "apologia
della forma", la quale sembra a torto imprigionare lo spirito e limitare
il valore solo perché, in realtà, lo determina e lo realizza. Rovesciando
l'istanza idealistica, secondo cui il valore sta in un'unità spirituale che si
riduce a "un'esigenza puro-pratica, a una rappresentazione di ciò che non
è", il B. dichiara che l'anima cerca il corpo, non viceversa, che lo
spirito cerca la forma, la filosofia la poesia. Sicché il valore non appare più
la premessa indimostrabile di ogni esistenza, ma il risultato intuitivo della
stessa forma sensibile. Bibl.: F. Della Corte, A. B., in Genova,
XXVI (sett. 1949), pp. 26-29. Sul B. Ipolitico: F. Meda. Il Partito Socialista
Italiano dalla Prima alla Terza Internazionale, Milano 1921, pp. 90-102; I
deputati al Parlamento per la XXVI legislatura, Milano 1922; M. Carrea, Per una
filosofia del socialismo, in Osservatorio, Genova 1946, n. 3; P. Nenni, Storia
di quattro anni (1919-1922), Roma 1946, passim; A. Tasca, Nascita e avvento del
fascismo. L'Italia dal 1918 al 1922, Firenze 1950, pp. 196 s., 361; F.
Turati-A. Kuliscioff, Carteggio. V: Dopoguerra e fascismo (1919-22), a cura di
A. Schiavi, Torino 1953, vedi Indice. Inoltre per alcuni scritti del B., in
Critica Sociale, degli anni 1923-24, vedi Critica Sociale, a cura di M.
Spinella, A. Caracciolo, R. Amaduzzi, G. Petronio, III, Milano 1959, Indici, a
cura di M. T. Lanza. Sul B. filosofo, oltre l'esposizione del proprio pensiero
fatta da lui stesso in Il mio paradosso, in Filosofi ital. contemporanei, Como
1944 (2 ediz. Milano 1946), cfr. U. Spirito, L'idealismo ital. e i suoi
critici, Firenze 1930, pp. 130-141; G. Della Volpe, Crisi dell'estetica
romantica, Messina 1941, pp. 26-31; M. F. Sciacca, Il secolo XX, Milano 1942,
pp. 218-223; G. Faggin, Il formalismo sensista di A. B.,in Riv. crit. di storia
d. filos., I (1946), pp. 189-96; R. Assunto, B. e l'estetica moderna, in
L'Italia che scrive, XXIX (1946), 3, pp. 50-52; G. M. Bertin, L'estetica di
B.,in Studi filosofici,VIII(1947), pp. 136-38; G. Bontadini, Dall'attualismo al
problematicismo, Brescia 1947, pp. 170-187, 254-56; C. Talenti, A. B., Torino
1957 (con bibl.).
Adelchi Baratono. Keywords: stilistica, breviario di stilistica italiana, fatto
psichico elementare, i fatti psichici eleentare, psicologia filosofica,
illuminismo, implicatura luminaria, implicatura escataologica, politica ed
etica, la filosofia al margine: gentile, croce, natura umana, esperienza, il
mondo sensibile, estetica, il bello, il sublime, criticismo, assiologia, hume a
Cremona e torino, spirito, animo, forma logica, l’eneide, riviera ligure,
“Rivera Ligure”. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Baratono” – The Swimming-Pool
Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51789912631/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Barba –
filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Gallipoli). Filosofo. Grice: “I like
Barba, but then I like Gallipoli – and he was born and died there, at Villa
Barba. His main interest was Roman philosophy, which he studied at Naples! –
The Roman occupation in Southern Italy brought ‘a breath of fresh air,’ as
Barba has it, to the old “Grecia Magna” tradition --.” Grice: “Barba is very
clear: ‘Epigrafia filosofica latina,’ o ‘epigrafia filosofica romana’ surely
ain’t Grecian!” -- Figlio di Ernesto,
conduce gli studi a Gallipoli, per poi trasferirsi a Napoli presso il zio,
Tommaso Barba. Tommaso Barba e presidente della Gran Corte. Studia grammatica e
materie letterarie nella scuola di Puoti. Si laurea in Filosofia. Studiare nel
R. Collegio Cerusico e divenne professore di anatomia umana comparata. Insegna
scienze e lettere al ginnasio di Gallipoli e fu sovrintendente scolastico ed
Assessore delegato alla Pubblica Istruzione.
Fu arrestato ed esiliato a causa delle resistenze al governo. I membri
dell'Associazione Democratica posero una scritta: "Nato dal popolo, Per il
popolo si adoperò". A lui fu intitolato il Museo civico di Gallipoli. Note
AnxaEmanuele Barba, su anxa. 21 aprile
13 ottobre ). Scheda sul sito del
Museo Emanuele Barba. Filosofi. Emanuele Barba. Keywords. epigrafia latina,
iscrizione latina, iscrizione greco-romana, la iscrizione di Platone sulla
porta dell’academia, ageometretos medeis eisito, Delville pittore belga
(Libert), a Italia crea ‘L’ecole de Platon,’ per la Sorbonna. I vasi di Barba – gemelli, fratelli siamesi,
ecc. Monete romana, Gallipoli, colonia romana, ‘Proverbi e motti del popolo
gallipolino” – poesie di Barba sulla morte del re d’Italia, risorgimento –
esilato, carcere – la filosofia di Barba, barba filosofo. Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, “Grice e Barba” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51688394612/in/photolist-2mKwwVs-2mKMcL9-2mKDQcp-2mKwqSL-2mKwwoA-2mPxhsE-2mKBEmt-2mKQW9n-2mKwuhr-2mKMJYE-2mKBLhJ-2mKG3XG-2mKT4G5-2mKQDQ5-2mKCdPg-2mKRfHn-2mKxzFL-2mKwv6q-2mKNdog-2mKC3nj-2mKMsLp-2mKH3ZR-2mKF6Rp-2mKArEy-2mKCnei-2mKDteh-2mKgN49-2mPHbXQ-2mKfeSA-2mJWMoD-2mJPC2N-2mJLMNt-2mJq2uE-2mJd7nN-2mJ4GHU-2mJ3q6x-2mGT6p1-2mEuJp2-ErqrPW-CkaHMd-BVh5m5-CntuMM-BRstt1-o3jP2q-nKqBVU-nJyPnZ-o1WCtG-noDCLh-nqpN2n-npidX4
Grice e Barbaro – il
Daniele – filosofia italiana – filosofia veneziana – Luigi Speranza (Venezia). Filosofo. Grice:
“This can be confusing to Oxonians, althou we are familiar with the Hanover
dynasty! Daniele Barbaro, a faitehful nephew, commented on his uncle’s, Ermolao
Barbaro’s, ‘translation’ of Aristotle’s rhetoric – I shouldn’t even be saying
this since it’s implicated in the title where Ermolao features as ‘interprete,’
and the ‘commentarium’ is due to Daniele.” Grice: “On top, Daniele wrote about ‘eloquenza,’
but his comments on his uncle’s vulgarization into latin of Aristotle’s
vulgar-greek (koine) rhetorica – is perhaps more Griceian – since there is
little conversational about Daniele Barbaro’s ‘eloquenza,’ while the rhetoric
(or ‘rettorica,’ as he prefers) is ALL about ‘dialettica’ and dialogue!”
-- Daniele Barbaro patriarca della
Chiesa cattolica Portret van Daniele Barbaro Rijksmuseum SK-A-4011.jpeg
Ritratto di Daniele Barbaro, attorno al 1561-1565, opera di Paolo Veronese,
presso il Rijksmuseum di Amsterdam Template-Patriarch (Latin Rite) Interwoven
with gold.svg Incarichi ricopertiPatriarca
di Aquileia. Nato 8 a Venezia Nominato patriarca 17 dicembre 1550 da papa
Giulio III Deceduto13 aprile 1570 (56 anni) a Venezia. Ritratto da Paolo Veronese,
1562-1570 (Firenze, Palazzo Pitti) Villa
Barbaro a Maser Pratica della
perspettiva, 1569 È noto soprattutto come traduttore e commentatore del
trattato De architectura di Marco Vitruvio Pollione e per il trattato La
pratica della perspettiva. Importanti
furono i suoi studi sulla prospettiva e sulle applicazioni della camera oscura,
dove utilizzò un diaframma per migliorare la resa dell'immagine. Uomo colto e
di ampi interessi, fu amico di Andrea Palladio, Torquato Tasso e Pietro Bembo.
Commissionò a Palladio Villa Barbaro a Maser e a Paolo Veronese numerose opere,
tra cui due suoi ritratti. Daniele
Matteo Alvise Barbaro o Barbarus fu figlio di Francesco di Daniele Barbaro ed
Elena Pisani, figlia del banchiere Alvise Pisani e Cecilia Giustinian. Suo
fratello minore fu l'ambasciatore Marcantonio Barbaro. Barbaro studiò
filosofia, matematica e ottica all'Padova.
Fu ambasciatore della Serenissima presso la corte di Edoardo VI a
Londra, dall'agosto 1549 al febbraio 1551, e come rappresentante di Venezia al
Concilio di Trento. Nipote del patriarca
di Aquileia Giovanni Grimani, fu suo coauditore nella sede patriarcale di Aquileia.
Venne promosso in concistoro a patriarca "eletto" di Aquileia
(coadiutore), con diritto di futura successione, ma non assunse mai la guida
del patriarcato perché morì prima dello zio. All'epoca tale carica era quasi
una questione di famiglia per i Barbaro, infatti furono patriarchi di Aquileia
ben 4 Barbaro fra il 1491 e il 1622:
Ermolao Barbaro il Giovane, patriarca di Aquileia dal 1491 al 1493,
Daniele Barbaro, patriarca di Aquileia, Francesco Barbaro, patriarca di
Aquileia dal 1593 al 1616, Ermolao II Barbaro († 1622), patriarca di Aquileia
dal 1616. Fu forse nominato cardinale in pectore da papa Pio IV nel concistoro
del 26 febbraio 1561 e mai pubblicato.
Solo i Grimani, con cui erano imparentati, occuparono più volte il
patriarcato (ben sei). Partecipò a varie
sedute del Concilio di Trento a partire dal 14 gennaio 1562 fino alla sua
chiusura nel 1563. Atre opere: commentarii
di Aristotele Retorica del suo pro-zio Ermolao Barbaro il Giovane (Venezia); Compendium
scientiae naturalis di Ermolao Barbaro il Giovane (Venezia); Commento
sull’archittetura d Vitruvio, pubblicato col titolo “Dieci libri
dell'architettura di M. Vitruvio” (Venezia). Di essa pubblica anche una
versione in latino intitolata M. Vitruvii de architectura, (Venezia). Le
illustrazioni sono realizzate da Palladio --; un trattato sulla geometria,
prospettiva e scienza della pittura, La pratica della perspettiva (Venezia); un
trattato sulla costruzione delle meridiani, “De Horologiis describendis
libellus” (Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, Cod. Lat. VIII, 42). Più tardi si
scopre che il testo del Barbaro affronta la tecnica di strumenti come
l'astrolabio, il planisfero, il bacolo, il triquetrum, e olometro di Abel
Foullon. Cronache, probabilmente riprese da Giovanni Bembo nella Cronaca Bemba.
Aurea in quinquaginta Davidicos Psalmos doctorum graecorum catena interpretante
Daniele Barbaro electo patriarcha Aquileiensi, Venetiis, apud Georgium de
Caballis. Note La pratica della perspettiva, 1569,
consultabile online (testo italiano + tavole originali) Giuseppe Trebbi, Barbaro Daniele, in Nuovo
Liruti: dizionario biografico dei friulani. 2: l'età veneta. A-C, Forum
editrice universitaria, Udine 2009374
Eubel, Hierarchia Catholica Medii et Recentoris Aevi, III39, che cita
gli Acta camerarii 9, f. 37 e gli Acta vicecancellarii 8, f 7 Louis Cellauro, Daniele Barbaro and
Vitruvius: the architectural theory of a Renaissance humanist and patron,
Papers of the British School at Rome, 72 (2004), 293–329 Pio Paschini, Daniele Barbaro
letterato e prelato veneziano del Cinquecento, Rivista di storia della chiesa
in Italia, 6 73–107. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, History of Aesthetics, III: Modern Aesthetics, edited by D. Petsch,
translated from the Polish by Chester A. Kisiel and John F. Besemeres, The
Hague, Mouton, 1974. Daniele Barbaro, Pratica della perspettiva, In Venetia,
appresso Camillo, & Rutilio Borgominieri fratelli, al Segno di S. Giorgio,
1569. 30 maggio. Robert Devreesse, La chaine sur les psaumes de Daniele Barbaro,
in Revue Biblique, Giovanni Mercati, Il
Niceforo della Catena di Daniele Barbaro e il suo commento del Salterio, in
Biblica, 26, 1945, 153-81.
Storia della fotografia Villa Barbaro Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource
Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Daniele Barbaro Collabora a Wikiquote
Citazionio su Daniele Barbaro Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons
contiene immagini o altri file su Daniele Barbaro Daniele Barbaro, su TreccaniEnciclopedie on
line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Giovanni Vacca, Daniele Barbaro, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Daniele Barbaro, su Enciclopedia Britannica,
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Giuseppe
Alberigo, Daniele Barbaro, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di
Daniele Barbaro, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Daniele Barbaro,.
David M. Cheney, Daniele Barbaro, in Catholic Hierarchy. Daniele Barbaro, su museogalileoMuseo
Galileo, Firenze. 21 ottobre. Daniele Barbaro (15141570), su
mathematica.snsEdizione Nazionale Mathematica Italiana, Pisa, Centro di Ricerca
Matematica Ennio De Giorgi. 21 ottobre.Salvador Miranda, Barbaro, Daniele
Matteo Alvise, su fiu.eduThe Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, Florida
International University. 21 ottobre. PredecessorePatriarca di
AquileiaSuccessorePatriarchNonCardinal PioM.svg Giovanni Grimani17 dicembre
155013 aprile 1570Aloisio Giustiniani4959495 Umanisti italiani 1514 1570. Nati
l'8 febbraio 13 aprile Venezia VeneziaBarbaroPatriarchi di AquileiaAmbasciatori
italiani. DELLA ELOQUENTIA, DIALOGO. INTERLOCVTORI: L'ARTE, LA NATVRA, ET L'ANIMA. R.IO VORREI
VOLENTIERI Natura, che noi disputaßimo insieme, fe però l'ufficio del disputare
alla tua conditio nesi conueniſſe. NAT. Il diſputare é cosa da te ò Arte,
figliuola mia. Ma fe à me stesse l'ammaeſtrarti, di presente direi, che tra il
tuo intendimento, o il mio, alcuna differenza non fuſje, da che dentro ti
venija se il contender meco. AR. Al almeno desidero tale occasione. NAT. Vano,
o dannoso desiderio é il tuo, si perche io non sono mai ociosa, come
perche tu sempre dei non mes no abbracciare il bene che cercare la verità delle
cose. AR. Niena te più migioua, che il bene, ne che il vero più mi diletta. NA.
In questo almeno tu m'assomigli, che ouunque sia, ch'io mi ritrdovi, il vero
sono, o il bene di ciascuna cosa. AR. si, ma tu alla cieca ne vai, e io di tanto amo ogn'uno,
che con deliberato consiglio, o anati veduto fine faccio, lo difar bene. NAT.
Emmipur manifesto che la tua grandezza è di nascondere te stessa quantopuoi, o
di accoſtarti à me. AR. Queſto é,maciò auiene,perche tu prima di me al mondo
ueniſti, o gli huominia'tuoi piaceri aduſaſti, innanzi ch'io ci naſceßi; o
queſta mia imitatione non ti accreſce dignitade alcuna. Percioche,nëla formica
uile animaluzzo e più degna, ne l'huomo meno onorato, ancor che questo quella
imitando, l'eſtate per lo uerno ſiproueda.La mia induſtria, Ò Natura, fa
maggiore il tuo pouero patrimonio. NAT. Che accreſcimento farebbe ella,ſe io
non ti laſciaßi che accreſcere? Tupure,ſe uuoi,ben ſai, che ogni operă preſuppone
il ſoggetto,ſenza il quale nulla ſi può fare. Que fto da me, non da te procede;
oltra che appreſſo giuſto giudice il ſecondo DELL A ſecondo luogo, non che il
primo, ti faria denegato. AR. Giusto à tua ſcelta intendi colui, che te à me
anteponga;ma nonſai che per la età molto ti concedo. NAT. E'mipiace di
ragionare an poco tea coſopra queſta materia, poi che tant'oltra procedutaſei,
che di te con buona equità midolga. Dicoti adunque, che in ordine di onoran za
ne prima ſei, né ſeconda. Ar. Chi adunque à noi ſopraſta? NAT. Chi ne fece
ambedue é il primo.10 ſenza mezo dalui nace qui. Tu doppo me sei. NAT. Adunque
mentono coloro che affer mano, te effer madre uniuerſale, poi chetu ſteſſa non
nieghi eſſere d'altruifattura? NAT. Ad un modo io ſono madre,ad un'altro
figlia. A R. Adunque di te coſa picprestante ſi truoua? NAT. Chi ne dubita? Ma
io per eſſere å gliumaniſentimenti uicina, tutta fiata ſon preferita. AR. Hai
tu conoſcimento di fine alcuno? NAT. Certo no;ma nelgouerno del tutto io ſon drizzata,e
quafi addeſtrata dalpadre mio. AR. In che dunque é ripoſta queſta tud gloria?
NAT. Tanto potente,ſaggio, w buono é ilmio fattore, che la ſua gloria in me
mirabilmente ſoprabonda. AR. Sommi più voltemarauigliata di coteſta tua occulta
uirtù,dalla quale tu ſei cosi gentilmente guidata.jpelefiate mi è uenuto in
animo di cre dere che ella forſe habbia potere di trar mead imitarti diforza;
ergo però diſcorrendo,etpiù dentro penetrando, bo giudicato eſſere gran
famiglianza tra quelprincipio, che ti muoue, &me,ondeper la ſea creta uirtu,non
tua,io mi muouo ad operar come tu fai. Ma poi mi pare,che,ſe il diſcorrere
l'ordinare,e il ridurre àfine le coſeantiue dute, è ufficio mio,io ſia inanzi
di teſtata nel Cielo appreſſo il padre tuo, che egli habbia l'opera mia uſata
in generarti ò produrti NAT. In altra guiſa io faccio le coſe mie tule tue, di
quella del fattor noſtro, chenehafatte, & create.Però guardati dinon giudi
care troppo animoſamente le coſe, figurando le inuiſibili, & occulte per le
uiſibilio manifeſte. Ma perchecosi agramente mi condane ni? ſe in qualunque
modo tu uuoi per le coſe già dette chiamar mi, ò madre, è figlia, o ſorella, ó
amica ſeisforzatadi nominarmi? no mi tutti di congiuntione, amicitia,
oſtrettezza. Egli non ſi uuol có. si correre a furia. AR. Non ti adirare ó
Natura, che io non ho contra te mal uolere, né il finemio é ſtato cattiuo, anzi
per lo tuo ef faltamento ho uoluto raffrenare la mia credenza, che era di
ſapere con qual calamita io tirata fußi ad operare come tu fai,e mi uenu to ben
fatto per lo ragionamento,che éftato fra noi, perche hauen do noi do noi
ritrouata l'origine del noſtro naſcimento,ſiamoſicuré della no ftra nobiltà,
come quella checon la eternità ſipareggi,o dal primo fattore d'ogni coſa
proceda. Ma ben mi duole, & per queſto ti ho chiamata,cheà molte ſciagure
ſia la grandezza mia ſottopoſta.Et quanto maggiore è lo stato mio, tanto àpiù
pericoli mi ueggio eſſer ſoggetta. NAT. Quai ſciagure, oquai pericoliſono
queſti? AR. Saper dei Natura, madre mia, che in tutte le parti delmondo mi
truouo hauer molti miniſtri,de quali neſono alcuni,chemifanno una gran
uergogna, a oltre à ciò miſono di danno infinito, o per lor cagione io ne ſento
male. Perche non indrizzando me al debito fine, anzifieramente in abuſo
ponendomi, come buona, utile, oono reuole cheio ſono,rea,dannofa, &
uituperabilemifanno. Ondegli huomini per mezo mio ingannati da loro, certi de'
loro danni, main certi di chi la colpaſiſia, s'accendono d'ira contra dime, à
guiſa di co loro,che le ſpade,o non glihomicidi punir uoleſſero. NAT. Tu non
ſei ſola nelmale di si fattioltraggi, tutto'l dime ne uengono afe ſai.
Percioche producendo io ogni coſaà beneficio della vita di chi ci naſce,
moltiſciagurati epieni dimal talento, maleufando l'arti ficio loro,empiono
iltutto diconfuſione, auelenando, uccidendo,in, gannando, eoffendendoſenza
riguardo alcuno; e chi ode o xede taliſceleraggini, maledice ogni mia fattura.
A R. Duraper certo ėlaforte noſtra,però che il uolgo cieco, &ignorante non
ſa,chereo non è quello, che in bene uſar ſipuote.Maper uer direzio poco mi
marauiglio, ſe il ueleno auelena,ò il ferrouccide, ma ben grandeam miratione
miporge,quädo il cibo, di cuiſiuiue,cosi ſpeſſo in cattiuo umore ſi conuerte,che
alla morte conduce. Et ciò dico à fine,chetu Sappia quantoiogiuſtamente mi
dolga,che lapiù pretiofa parte,che tupergratia del tuo fattoreall'huomo cõcedi
conla quale egli poſ fan debbia altrui eſſere d'infinito giouamento, cosi ad
offeſa Sia, ex à danno preparata, che niente più. NAT. Chié quelmaluagio
Oingrato,che tal coſa ardiſca di fare? AR. L'Anima, o la più diuina parte di
lei. NAT. Perseguitiamola dunque, o facciamo la citare dinanzi al Tribunal
diuino, Voglio, che ella dica la cauſa ſua. AR. Ma prima uoglio,che infingendo
noi con eſſo lei,tanto la prendiamo che ella dica à noi ogni ſuaeſcufatione.
NAT. Né la giuſtitia del Giudice, né la uerità del fatto, nela tua dignità
ricerca tale inganno,eſſendo quello ſincerißimo,la coſa uerißima, otu quel
la,che del medeſimo errorej, del quale ſei per riprender lei, puoi eſ A 2 Ser
accufatd. A R. Ben di..Ma io altrimenti non ſonouſata difure. Ma eccoti queſta
ingrata,che di molte parti, et eccellenti doni da noi dotata d'alcuna
gratia,che futta le habbiamo,non ſi ricorda,contre mecon me fteſa,o contra te
per li beni, che dato le hai, altiera ſi lieua. Aſcoltiamola alquanto. ANIMA.
Iddio vi ſalui ſorelle amantißime, delle qualiund mi rende atta l'altra mi fa
gagliarda als l'operare. AR. Et te ancora ſecondo il tuo buon uolere, ma dins
ne, che usi tu cercando? AN. Te ſopra tutte le coſe. AR. In parte difficile ti
ſei riuolta, perciò che biſogna, che tu oſſeruicon di ligenzatutte le
operationi, a modi di coteſta noſtra commune amis ca. A N. Hoio ad impiegare
tanta fatica, innanzich'io t'imprens da? AR. Et poſponere a queſta ogni altra
cura,ben che dolcißima cura ti fia, per la ſperanza dello acquiſto, che ne
farai. Ma che parte di me conoſcer deſideri? AN. Indifferentemente,ſe poßibil
fuſſe, tutte le uorrei, tutte le abbraccerei tutte le poſſederei. Ma ora grado
mifia tant'oltre procedere, ch'ioſappia altrui paleſare i cons cetti miei. AR.
Più chiaramente midi quel che uuoi,perche in molte maniere giouar ti poſſo
d'intorno à cosi fatto dimoſtramento di penſieri. Vuoi tu ſapere conqual nodo
di ragione ſi ſtringa ung parola con l'altra quale ſia la concordanza de'
numeridelle per fone, ode' uocaboli delle coſe, et con quai regole dirittamente
fifcri Me? AN. Queſta parte io la preſuppongo. AR. Forſe tu uai cer cando
d'intendere con quale unione una coſa con l'altra conuengd, per poter'à tua
uoglia diſcorrere,argomentare,o foſtenere le cons teſe AN. Né ciò intendo per ora, ma di più
diletteuol parte ho curd. AR. Tu uuoi tutta fiata porgere diletto col parlar
ſoauiſ fimamente,à guiſa di delicata uiuanda acconciandoi numeri,il ſuono, per
l'armonia delle uoci eſprimenti coſe piaceuoli, & grate à i fenfi umani? A
R. 10 uorrei più adentro penetrare, né tanto effer folles cita di piacere alle
orecchie,quanto di giouare all'animo, operò dimmiſe hai più parti, quaſi
figliuole,cui ſi conuenga la cura del ras gionare. AR. Honne, o hauer ne poſſo
ancora molte altre, che nonſono in luce; ma tra le altre una ue n'ba, che non è
leggitima; un'altra la quale bēche leggitima ſid, pure e di tāto riſpetto, che
rare Holte ſilaſcia al mondo compiutamente uedere. La prima in tanto da me é
hauuta per buona, in quanto ella inſegna di conoſcere gli ingan ni del parlare,
e à fuggire i ciurmatori. Laſeconda e da me coſto dita,
&guardatamolto,percheio temo, che gli huomini di malaf fare non la ſuijno.
Et eſſendo ella di bellezza,o di forma ſopra ogni altra eccellente gran
pericolo miſoprafta Jlquale tolga lddio, ma doue non paſſa la maluagità umana:
doue non penetra l'audacia? ego di queſto, poco fa, la Natura, a io ci
doleuumo, et penſauamo,che tu fußi quella tu, che d'ogni male Q uergogna noſtra
fußi l'apporta trice. A N. Perunared eu perfida, che ſi truoua, non crediate di
gratia, che oggi di tutte ſieno tali,perche da me ui prometto,che als tro che
onore non hauerete, AR. Bene, o cosine cape nell’anis mo. Che uuoi tu adunque
da me ſapere? AN. 10 cerco molto, Ò
Arte, à modo mio di posſedere coteſta tua cosi bella, o riguardata figliuola,à
benefitio deipopoli, o delle genti, o à gloria tua, di me,dicui altro cibo più
ſoaue non truouo. AR. Prega tu prima la Natura, che à te conceda corpo ben
diſpoſto, oformato, aſpetto graue, o gentile, uoce chiara, á eſpedita
fianco,modo, o mouimen ti conformialla virtù, che deſideri". Appreſſo poi
à me prometterai congiuramento di non ufare già mai la figliuola mia,uezzofa,
inſos lente, « che tanto uagaſia delle bellezze ſue, che per farſi uaghegs
giare in ogni luogo, in ogni tempo, in ogni propoſito ſenza riſpetto alcuno
compariſca. Et con luſinghe eadulatione dal ben fare le genti, o i popoli
aſcoltanti rimuoua. AN. Se ottimo uolere, fe oneſtédimanda ritruoua luogo
appreſſo di te, o Natura, con ogni af fetto ti priego, chetu mi dia quello
chel'arte mi perſuade, che ti dis mandi, corpo gratiofo,formato,odotato di
quelle parti, che conue nientiſono alualore della figliuola fua. Etſe bene in
alcun tempo io non ti poteßi di tanto donorimeritare,pure non ceſſerò di
eſſertiſem pre obligatißima. NAT. Siati la gratia, che dimandi, conceſſa. A N.
Io tigiuro ó Arte,perquella diuinità, che ſi truoua maggiore, di accoſtumare la
tua figliuola à giouare ouà ben far’altrui, né per modo alcuno permettere, che
ella ſeguagli apperiti diſordinati, ma circoſpetta ſempre, oſempre riguardeuole
compariſca. AR. CO si habbi la chiarezza del ſangue, la libertà, eccellenza
della pas tria, ibeni da gli huomini defiderati, come ciò facendo,alcolmo della
gloria à pochi conceſſa,peruenirai. NA. Felice patria,che di tale, e
tant'huomoſaràfornita. Maqual patria le dareſti tu,ó Ar te? AR. A'mia uogliale
darei quella,in cui le leggi poteſſero piit, che gli huomini, doue la maggior
parte alla commune utilità s'ina drizzaſſe; antica,nobile,illuſtre,e di
quelgouerno, nel quale il bes ne di tutti glialtri gouerniſiconteneffe, qualeforſe
non più che unds'e s'è ritrouata,oſi
ritruoua al mondo, oforſe tu, o Natura,conſentia ſti di prepararle ilpiùſicuro
& comodo luogo, oil piie forte fito, cheueder ſi poſſa,nonmeno al mare che
alla terra uicino,cui di gra tiaſpeciale ancora il Cielo concede priuilegio di
eſſer nimica d'ogni tumulto, o ſeditione,parca,pia,oreligioſa, con inſtitutiottimi
temperata: NA. Troppo di cuore commendi, o lodi queſta tua Città, eforſe à ciò
fare queſto t’induce,che tu in eſſa puoi il tuo ud lore, o la tuaforza
chiaramente dimoſtrare. Ma tu, ó Anima, già ricca di tanti doni, chefatti
t'habbiamo, che dici? A N. Le gratie non ſonopari al uolere,io attendo quello,
che attender dei, &sò lo ſtudio,che tu ſei ſolita di porre nelle coſe
tue;mi& rendo certa, che tuſai ancora, che ritrouando io unatemperatißima
compleßione di corpo,à quella dò la umanaperfettione, o come quella temperanza
cade,cosiſopra di eſſa declina ilmio ualore. Làondeſono alcune co ſe, allequali
io non degno la uita concedere. Ad altre ueramente dos no la uita,ma le
operationi di quella cosi ſono occulte, che in forſe fi ftà di credere ſe in
eſſe la uita ſi truoui. Altre uita,ſenſo, omouis mento da me hanno comealcune
intelligēze, et amore, coſa nobile et ueramente diuina. NAT.
Queſtomipare,checosi ſia map ure als cuna fiata io ueggo, che le anime uan
ſeguitando le compleßioni de' corpi. Onde poiſono alcuni ſdegnoſi, alcuni
manſueti, altriuanno dietro alle apparenze,altrialle fauole più che alla uerità
fi danno, emolti in ogni pruoua, ſoda ex inquiſita ragione uan ricercando. A N.
Et queſto èquello da me tantodeſiderato dono, che e di ſapes re in tal
guiſaſpiegare i concetti miei,ch'io ſatisfaccia à tanta diuer. ſità di nature,
o d'ingegni. NAT. Quando tu ſarai giunta à quel paßo,chetu ſappia per mezo
dell'arte cosi ben gouernarti con ogni maniera di perſone,dotte,roze,ciuili,
barbare, umane, e inumane, allora potrai à tua uoglia mitigar’anco gli adirati,
fpingere i pigri, raffrenare i feroci, ingagliardire i deboli; et di uno in
altro cótrario à uiua forza ogni anima tramutare. A N. Coteſta é und magica
eccellentiſsima. Ma tu Arte,cui è dato di ritrouare alcune uie ragio neuoli di
peruenire alla cognitione di coſe non conoſciute, incomincia da quelle che
facili, en eſpedite ad inuiarmi al deſiderato fine riputes rai. Ar. Cosi
uoglio, o à te farò capo, ó Natura, dinuouo addis mandandoti,di che beni uuoi
tu adornare queſta noſtra nouella ſpoſa? NAT. Hollo già detto, a più aperto ti
diſtinguo,dar le uoglio, ol tre al corpo ben formato unauoce grata, chiara,
eguale, che ogniſuonoageuclmente ſi pieghi, e che ſe ſteſſa inſino all'eſtremo
ſoſtenti. AR. Et io le dimoſtreró parole atte ad eſprimere leggia dramente ogni
concetto,pure,ampie, illuftri, eleganti ſeuere,giocona de,
accoſtumate,ſemplici,uere, tarde, ueloci, ofinalmente tali, che abbracceranno
la uera idea di me in queſtoeſſercitio. Et di più io l'inſegnerò di collocarle
si fattamente inſieme, che diletteranno ſema pre, o non falliranno già mai; or
iu Anima farai ociofa? AN. Hauendo io per gratia di te Natura le coſe
conuenienti, oper tud corteſia ò Arte le parole conformi, farò si, che niuno in
mepotrà de fiderare ne penſamento neſtudio alcuno. NAT. 10 a' ſenſi tuoiſot
toporrò tutte le coſe, dalle quaifacilmēte ti uerrà fatto di prendere argomento
di ragionare. Tu fin tanto non mancherai di diligenza. AR. Paterno, oſaggio
ricordo. Però che con la diligenza ogni giorno teſteſſa auanzerai, ella ti farà
poßibile ogni impoßibilità,ela la é la perfettione, lalode di tutte le opere de
mortalijà cui cons giunte ſono tutte queſte coſe, cura, induftria, penſamento,fatica,eſſer
citio, imitatione de migliori, «il tempo padre d'ogni coſa. Credi adunque à me
quelloche la lunga eſperienza mi haidimoſtrato, cioé, che niente giouano
imieiprecetti,niente le regole,niente gli ammae ſtramenti,ſenza la
diligenza,con la quale oltre alla inuentione, all'ordine delle coſe,otterrai di
accommodar la uoce alle parole, eſpri mendo le umili con baſſo, o rimeſſo
ſuono, le pure coniſchiettezza, le afpre con durezza,abbaſſando, &
inalzando queſto beato inſtrué mento à que' tuoni, che ſaranno conuenienti. An.
Coteſte fono leggi da eſſere oſſeruate allora che io ſarò col corpo congiunta.
Pers cheben ſai chenė lingua, nė uoce habbiamo, nė però egliſi uuoldire cosi ad
ogn'uno,in che maniera tra noi fauelliamo. NAT. 10 ſo be ne, chegli huomini
andrannofauoleggiando di noi, come altre fiate hanno detto chele cannucce
parlarono, ilche é maggior miracolo, che ſe gli Indiani uccelli eſprimono le
uoci umane. A R. Se già col mio aiuto uolarono gli huomini, molte coſe
inſenſate hebbero mo uimento, che marauiglia potranno oggi maiprendere del
parlar nos ſtro? AN. Che debbo dir’io? partita ora dalluogo,oue il parlaa re é
uiſibile, l'intendimento ſenza fauella ſi ſcuopre, muoueſi ſenza luogo,e
s'impara ſenza discorso. AR. Coteſti miracoli, che tu ci narri,ſono ſegno, che
tu non habbia biſogno dell'opera noſtra. AN. Tu di vero, ſeio nella mia
primiera ſimplicità mi rimaneßi. Ma diſcendendo dalpuro o purgato eſſere, o venendo
quaſi ad un'aria infettata e corrotta,molto mi ſento dal mio primo ſtato ria
moſſa. NAT. Peggio ti auerrà meſcolandoticon la masſa matea riile del corpo. A
N. Ad ogni modo mi biſogna ſtar ſottopoſta. AR. Non uſciamo di ſtrada,macome
buoni mercatanti accontiamo inſieme. Haßi dunquefin'ora promeſſa di uoce
eſpedita, di copia di parole, di modo conueniente di accomodar la uoce alle
parole;oraci reſta di affettare le parole alle coſe. Cheditu Natura? NAT. Die
co, ch'egli è più che neceſſario queſto affettamento,ſenzail quale le parole
ſarebbon uane et ſenza frutto, però accreſcendo le doti, che io intendo dare à
coſtei, promettole di dimoſtrarle nelle coſe mie us na certa uerità, alla quale
accoſtandoſi, potrà ſeco tirare ogniforte di gente, o di tale ueritàſenza
dubbioti affermo eſſerne ogn'uno capace. A'R. Già tre corde di queſto liuto
ſono accordate, uoci, parole, a coſe. Reſta, che nelle coſeſi ueda una certa
conuenienza con eſſo teco,ò Anima, e con le parti tue; che ne riſulti la
perfetta e compiutafoauità della deſiderata armonia. Però aiutamia ritros uare
le tue più ſecrete parti, epiù occulte uirtù, acciò cheſi ſappia qual parte di
te, con quai coſe, « con che parole, et con che attione ſi debba muovere. A n.
Piacemi queſta diſpoſitione mirabilmene te ofappi,che auenga;ch'io nonſia ſtata
col corpo già mai, nientes dimeno come nouella ſpoſa nella caſa del padre molte
coſe hoſapute, che mi aueranno quando ciſarò legata. A R. Ora incomincia à dir
mene alcune. AN. Hogià inteſo,che quando io ſarò con eſſo il cor po, molte mie
forze emoltemie uirtù ſi ſcoprirāno,le qualiora non ſi conoſcono. Et prima ne
gli occhi io ſarò il uedere,nell'orecchie l’u dire, nel palato il guſto, per
ogni luogo oparti del corpo faró ſentimento, nel cuore principio diuita,di
ſenſo,etdi mouimento.Ben che ad altra intentione altri riguardando,la origine
di tai coſe ad al tre parti aſſegnerano. In un luogo ſarò fantaſia,in altro
memoriain altro ingegno,et per tutto ſarò anima.Et ſe il corpo fuſſe di tal tem
pra, chegli fuſſe diffoſto à riceuere ogni mis uirtù, farei nelle orecs chie la
uiſte, o ne gli occhi l'udito, quantunque per molti accia denti, che uengono à
i corpi, l'animepouerelle uſar non poſſano le forzeloro, da che nacque
l'opinione di coloro, che dicono "credos no che noi moriamo inſieme col
corpo.Ma io ti giuro per quell'onnis potente maeſtro, che mi fece che
noiſiamoimmortali, oſe ora io fo noſenza il corpo,perche non ſi dee credere che
io reſtar poſlı dapoi, che'l corpoſarà disfatto? AR. Tutto chemolte ragioni aſſai
pro Babiliper l'und ei per l'altra parte mi muouano,pureal modo,che io
Sonoſolita di cercare la uerità delle coſe,io non ſono puntoſicura del la
voſtra immortalità, però rimettendomi à qualche maggior ſapien za, che la mia
non é, mi gioua di credere che noi uiuiate eternaměte. A N. Più oltraiſe fenza
il corpo conoſco,fo ueggio, econoſco di conoſcere,miapropria operatione, che
dirai tu poſcia dello eſſer mio? AR, Ritorniamo al cominciato ragionamento. An.
Ben ti dico ora delle forze mie, perche io conoſco di dentro, e di fuori,
dentro con la fantaſia, col diſcorſo, o con l'intelletto, o ciò si dia
mandavolontà, come quello del ſenſo appetito, il quale hauirtù di
porſiinanzialle coſe diletteuoli, o di fuggire le diſpiaceuoli.La no lontà è
Regind. AR. A'me pare, che tu mi hábbiposto inanzia gli occhi la forma di una
ben'ordinata Republica, nella quale ui ſia il Principe, iCoſiglieri,i
Guardiani, et gli Artefici. Mainfinitamentemi doglio d'alcuni, che per molti
ſecreti auenimenti, de' quali non fan renderealtramente ragione, corrono à
fabricar nomi, che nonſono, et con quegli impauriſcono le genti,aguiſa delle
nutrici,che ſpauenta, no ifanciulli con le fauole, quindi è nato il nome della
Fortuna,cui ca pital nimica io ſempreſonoſtata, nõ percheio creda,che à quel nome
alcuna coſariſponda, maperche mimoleſtalafalſa opinione di colo ro, che non
ſolamente uogliono, che ella ſia una coſa come le altre, che ſono, ma le
attribuiſcono la diuinità. NAT. 10fo bene, che la for tuna non è fattura mia.
ART. Né di me'ancora. An. Molto mea no dimeauezza à coſe stabili e
impermutabili. ART. Laſcida mola dunque andare, o ueggiamo ſe io ti bo
ben’inteſa, due ſono i conſiglieri,per quanto io comprendo,ragione,
&appetito, daiquali commoſſo e perſuaſo,s’induce à fare, eoperare il tutto,
perche ora nė difortuna,nédi uiolenza alcuna ragiono. A N. Senza dub bio,ſe
riguardi al nome, maſaper dei, che ſotto queſto nome di appea tito ſi
comprendono due conſiglieri,l'uno, nel quale è poſto l'iracons dia,che è come
difenſore dell'altro,nelquale è posta lacõcupiſcenza. AR. O diquantimali, e di
quante conteſe l'uno e l'altro de gli appetiti ſuoleſſer ſemenza. An. Queſto
non già auiene pur il dritto gouerno in tirannia non ſi tramuti. Diritto gouer
è quel lo,nel quale,chi deue ubidire, ubidiſce, ochi dee comandare, cos
manda". La ragione adunque di queſta piccola città preceder deue allo
appetito, e non permettere, che egli ad abandonate redini cors sendo, ſeco
dietro la tiri. AR. Moltomipidce quello che tu di,eso B per che 1 jo per
ricompenſa di tal piacere voglioti ſcopriremoltiſecreti, che io bo d'intorno
alle predette coſe.Ma dimmi tu prima queſta una parte, nella quale é riposta la
ragione,diche hai tu inteſo cheella eſſer deb bia adornata? NAT. Diſcienza o di
buona opinione ART, Vero é, per che la ſcienza é ilpiù bello adornamento, che
s'habs bia, al qualeſe s’auicina la buona opinione,ò che gentileabito é que ſto,diche
l'animaſiueſte apparando le ſcienze. Alora ella acquiſta laſua
perfettione,allora ella é pronta à conſeguire il deſiderato fine, & quaſi
ſeſopraſeinnalzando auanza ogni coſa mortale, o ſi cons giungecon la diuinità.Ma
come di coſa precioſa,orara, difficile,or non da noi ora cercata,non ne
ragioniamo, ma ritorniamo alla buong opinione, la quale si come la ſcienza è
una certa cognitione delle cofe occulte, nata da uere og manifeſte cagioni,
cosi eſſa opinione è una incerta notitia,nata da alcune dubbioſe cagioni, alle
quali l'anis ma con timore difallire, odi errare, s'inchina. Per uoler'adunque
ottenere l'intento fuo,é biſognoconoſcere il modo,col quale dapia gliareſi
hanno,o, comeſidice, farſi beneuoli i detti conſiglieri,ac cio che acquiſtata
lagratia loro, l'animaſi muoua àfareleuoglie di chi parla.Muoueſiadunque la
ragioneuol parte,che è nell'anima, că lepruoue, ocon le ragioni; & tal
mouimento s'addimanda inſegna re. Etperche la ragione è uno de'
conſiglieri,prudente,etſuegliato, perd nell'ufficio deŪ'inſegnare é di mestiere
diacuto epronto inten: dimento,mal'appetito in altro modoſimuoue.Il primo, che
è detto Concupiſcibile,richiede una certa piaceuolezzaet cõciliatione. Pero
ciòche cosi di dentro i petti umaniſono da quello tirati. Ilſecondo gli
fpigneàforza, operò cõ eſo egliſiuuole uſare uno impeto, a cui più propriamente
queſto nomedimouimento ſi conuiene, che à gli al tri; e comedebito è lo
inſegnare,cioè il dimoſtrare con ueriſimil pruoua le propoſte coſe, cosi è
onoreuole il conciliare, o neceſſario il muouere. Ma da ogni afficio di queſti
tre peruiene lapropria dileto tatione. An. Io ſo almeno,che altro diletto non
ho che lo apparda re. AR. Et tu prouerai appreſo quanto piacere naſca negliapa
petiti. An. 10 pure ſono auifata cheeſſendo in eßi ripoſte le umaa ne
affettioni, nonpuò eſſere che ſenza riſentimento di dolore ſimuou wano. ART. In
ogni affetto, & mouimento d'animo,dolore, o piso cere ſono compagni.Oruedi
quáto sfrenataſia l'iracondia, oquana to doloroſo ſia l'adirato,et pure
conoſcerai, che lo appetito,et la ime ginatione della vendettaglie piùfoane che
il mele. Ho duucrtito,che nc ELOQVEN Z A. ii negli eſtremi dolori gli huomini
hauuto hanno piacere di dolerſi, ayo il non poter ciò fare, èſtato loro di
doppia doglia cagione, non cbe à loro elettionehaueſſero uoluto l'occaſione di
dolerſi,ma poſti neldo lore; dolce coſa il poter'à lor uoglia ramaricarſi hāno
riputato. Dilet ta ueramente la ſperanza,ma il deſiderio la tormenta. Peßima
coſa è la diſperatione tra tuttigli affetti umani, maſola è ſicura contra la
morte. Mauannetu diſcorrendo nelle altre perturbationi,che trouca rai nella
allegrezza ſteſſa un mancamento diſpiriti, ounatenerez xa, che al pianto ti
condurrà fpele fiate.Però io tiſcuopriròintorno à tai coſe bellißimiſecreti. A
N. sidigratia; percioche queſte mi paiono leuere, epotentifuni, con le quai ſi
tirano l'altrui ate nos ſtre uoglie. A R. 10 ho inſegnato a' mieifedeli,che non
fieno fema pre folleciti d'intorno ad unoaffetto, per fuggire la noia con la
uda rietà dellecoſe, imitando la Natura, la qualeamaſopra modo il udm riare,o
il mutare le coſe ſue. NAT. Vero è, perche chiaramente dei vedere la diuerſità
delle ſtagioniedei tempi, la grandezza co l'ornamento de i cieli, la
moltitudine delle coſe e delle apparenze, ch'io ſonouſata di dare alle coſe
mie. AR. O'quanto io leggo fo pra il tuo libro è Natura;ma non abandoniamo
l'impreſa. Deiaduna que fapereè Animàun'altroſecreto, non meno delſopra detto
bello, degno da eſſere apprezzato. Jo ti dico che tu auuertiſca bene di nõ
ſollecitare con tutte le forze ad unoſteſſo tempo i detti conſiglieri, perche
l'anima trauiata in molti mouimenti, non attende comeſi dee ad un ſolo.L'eſperienza
ti moſtrerà, che ad un'bora né gliocchi, di belißime pitture,né l'orecchie di
ſoauißime confonanze potrai pies: namenteſatiarejma compartendole opere, meglio
aſſai per guſtare i diletti,e i piaceri delſenſo,uederai quanto può
queſtaſeparata pers ſuaſione. Inſegna adunque. Inſegnato che hauerai,muoui,apporta
le facelle, et eccita con gli ſtimolide gli affetti l'animo de gliaſcoltanti.
AN. O' Arte tu ſarai ſempre arte. A n. Et tu anima ſaraiſempre anima. A N.
Eſſendo io anima, o da te ammueſtrata,diuentero Ar te, o tu eſſendo in me Arte,
Anima diventerai. A R. Nuouo miracolo,didue coſe farne una; ma digratia non ci
laſciamo ſuiare dalle occaſioni,che in uero alcuna uolta épiùdifficile la
ſcelta, che la inuentione. Ora foniamo a raccolta, o quaſi ſotto uno ſtendardo
ria duciamo le tue;uirtù, dalle quali fin’ora habbiamo iregali aßiſtenti
ragione, concupiſcenza,oira. Reſta, che andiamo alle altre parti.; AN. Cosi
faremo, o da eſſa memoria ſidarà principio. AR..O B quanto tiſon tenuta in
nomeſuo,che mi giouerebbe duuertiré un'afa fetto di Natura, ſe altra fiata in
quello abbattendomi, la memoris preſta nõ mi diceſse, Eccoti,ò Arte,quello che
ancora uedeſti. Che es ſperienza ſitruouain meſenza di eſſa?chis'accorgerebbe,
che in al. cuna di uoi, ó Anine, io miritrouaßi, ſe non fuſe la memoria come
guardiana, teſoriera ditutte le parti dello ingegno? onde con ues rità ſidice,
Che tanto fa l'huomo, quäto ſiricordaNaſce la memoria dal bene ordinare,
l'ordine dello intendere, odal penſamento, però poſſo io con le imagini in
alcuni luoghi riposte artificioſaméte indura rela memoriadelle coſe. NAT. A
lungo andare tu le ſeipiù toſto di danno, che di prò alcuno,però non mipiace
altro che uno eſſercitio, di eſſa memoria,cheſi fa mandando motte coſe à mente.
A R. Che fai tu di eſſercitio • Natura, l'ordine della quale è ſempre conforme?
il tuo fuoco ſempre tiraall'insù, la tua terra per lo dritto all'ingiù di
fcende, o cot ſuo giuſto peſo al centro rouinando à modo alcuno non fi può
uſare alla ſalita.volgeſiilcielo tutta fiata raggirandoſi in ſe medeſimo, ogni
tua legge e impermutabile, o tutto che i tuoi mona ftri, le tue ſconciature
alcuna volta ci diano da marauigliare, pus ge ſono tue fatture,néſono alla tua
generale intentione repugnanti, mal'Anime da uno in altro cõtrario trapaſſando,
buone di ree,et ree di buonediuengono. NAT. Io conoſco il biſogno in quel modo
che gli occhi comprendono la notte, che é priuatione di luce, ma ben ti
dico,chela memoria da me con molta cura é guardata nella compoſiz tione
dell'huomo. A R. Io l'ho auuertito nel tagliare di eſſo, egomi fono
marauigliata con quanta cura difeſo hai quella parte,nella quale éla memoria
collocata,hauendole dato nella parte di dietro della tes ſta un'oſſo fermo, e
rileuato,che da ogniſtranieraforza nella difens da.Tui in temperata umidità e
la impreſione, e in ſecco proportios nato la ritentione delle coſe. Ma tu
Arima,la cui nobiltà fi fa manife ſta per tante & tali operationi, di ciò
il tuo fattore ne ringratierai, regolando con la ragione i tuoi appetiti,
penſa,ordina, ocon lo eſa fercitio conſerua la memoria quanto puoi,percheciò
facendo,tale di senterai,quale deſideri, e conoſcendo te ſteſſa, conoſcerai
l'altre tue forelle, & come della più onorata di eſſe la tua ragione
ſopraſta alla loro, il tuo dritto deſiderio ſarà lor freno, onde infinita
riputatione acquiſterai,perche di leggieriſicrede à colui,in chiſifida, et
facilmen te ſi fida in chi ſi truoua autorità, w credito, il qual naſce dalla
inte grità,o bontà de' coſtumi, o queſto é,ch'io deſideroſa, fe altra ſi trkowa
E LO QVEN Z A. 13 truoua del bene,temo aſſai non abbattermiin perſonemalungie.AN:
In che potranno ufare la loro malu agità, non eſſendo lor data ſede? ART. Come
io non ti niego,che il uiuer bene,es accoſtumatamente non ſia di gran
giouamento à farſi luogo nel coſpetto degli huomini, e acquiſtarlagratia de gli
aſcoltanti,cosi non ti conſento che l'has uergli dalla ſua,per uirtù, oforza di
parole non ſi poſſa fare. A N. Perche inſegni tu coteſti incanteſimi? A R. Il
mio ualore e tale, che io poſſi in parti contrarie e repugnanti, ſenza che io
deſidero ſcoprire in altruiſimili inganni,e però biſogna conoſcergli, cosila
uerità ſtadi ſopra, ola bugia cade'uinta in terra,cosiſiponfine alle conteſe,
cosi ſi terminano le liti, cosi ſi ammolliſce le durezze degli adirati,
s'attura le rabbie de’ ſeditioſi, ſi ſollieua l'autorità delle leggi caduta
contra il uolere di quegli, che ſtimando l'oro, l'argento, più cheil douere,
& à prezzoſeruendo, poſpongono la ſalute coma mune alla utilità priuata.o
quanto nei publici mali,e nei tempi pe ricoloſi compenſo pigliarſi ſuole dal
parlare digraue et onorato cit. tadino,le cui parole condite diſenno,ſeco hanno
l'alleggiamento d'o gnimalinconia,che gliafflige. An. E dunquegran difetto
d'huos mini da bene? AR. Senza dubbio, o ciò auiene perche la uia dis ritta è
una,male torteſono infinite, però di raro ſi vede tra mortali, chi per la ſola
camini. Ma tuſcordata ti ſei d’un'altrauirtù, la quale per mettere le coſe
dinanzi a gli occhi (il che éſommamente richies ſto)non ha pari.Di queſta uirtù,
perche ella ha grande amicitia co i ſenſi corporali,o é molto confuſa,come
quella, che é lo ſpecchio ges nerale di tuttii ſentimenti umani, o perciò è
detta imaginatione;di queſta uirtù dico, non hauendola tu ancora eſſercitata,
non ne haifin ora alcuna parola mosſa. Io odo dire che nella
imaginationeſirifere bano le imagini, e le apparenze da ſenſi riceuute,et
beneppeſſo in lei cosi ſtranamente tramutarſi che i ſogni non ſono cosi
turbati, et con fuſi, là onde molti ſono detti, o riputati fantaſtici, altri ſi
fanno Re O signori,o talmente par loro eſſere que'tali, che ſi credono di eſ
ſere,che riſo eg compaßione mouono a chigli vede. Alcuni uanno, come ſi dice,in
aria fábricando, et tanto ſi ſtannonel lor penſiero fißi, che forſennati,e
pazzi da tutti creduti ſono. A R. Quanto piùe uanamente ſpender ſi ſuole tal
uirtù, tanto à maggior prò li deue ue farla,& adoperarla. Per queſta
l'huomo prima taleſi fa, qual uuole che altri ſieno. Perche egli prima dentro
diſe ſi propone la coſa, che egli cerca dare ad intendere altrui, con quel
migliore e più eccelslente modo cheſi può, auolendo egli metter’altri a pianto,
non tera rà mai gli occhi aſciutti. Simile forza nella pittura ſi dimoſtra,lo
ar tefice della quale, ogni forma, che egli cerca di far uederenelle ſue tele,
primanella imaginatione fermamente ſi dipinze, o quanto più belli,o gagliarda è
la ſua imaginatione, tantopiù illuſtre, o loda. ta e la ſua pittura.Molte
forme, oſembianze ſono de gli adirati,ma una più eſprimela forza dell'iracondia;
queſta una deue inanzi alle altre eſſer poſta nella fantaſia, o à quela il
pennello e la linguafi deue indrizzare; en cosi tutta fiata il più efficace
modo o di moues re, o di dilettare, ò d'inſegnare por ſi dee
chiragiona,inanzi,accioche egli ſi habbia l'aſcoltatore come deſidera.Et queſta
è la utilità grans de di coteſta tuapericoloſa potenza,pericoloſa
dico,perchemolti no ſanno ufarla à feruigidello intelletto, ocredono, che lo
imaginarſi ſia intendere odiſcorrere. Ma laſciamo queſto da parte;o racco:
gliamo le tue uirtù. Che mi hai tu dato fin'ora? An. Mente,uolons
tà,appetito,memoria,imaginatione. A RT. Molto mi piace.Nella mente, che
uiporremo altro, ſenon buona opinione, con l'ufficio dello inſegnare? Làonde la
uolontà ſi muoua ad abbracciar le coſe. Et nel lo appetito,che ui ſtarà
ſenongli affetti,eccitaticol muouere, &col dilettare, Là onde l'animo ſia
uiolentato à bene eſſequire? Della me. moria non dico altro, né della
imaginatione, percheſono ambedue di ſopra aſſai bene ſtate de noi diſtinte. Ora
bella coſa udirai, oda non eſſer à dietro laſciata. A N. Che mi dirai tu? ART.
Dicoti,che doppo la eſpedita dimoſtratione di tutte le tue parti, fa di meſtiere
di ſapere in qual maniera elleſieno dipoſte à riceuere la impreſione dei loro
oggetti. Perche uana, ofriuolafatica quella ſarebbe, di chi af fettaſſe in
parte al pianto diſpoſta ſenza alcun mezo porre il piacere. Credi tu che eguale
prontezza hauerai allo imparare,et allo adirars ti? Indrizza adunque i tuoi
penſieri à gli ammaeſtramenti, che io ti uoglio dare, oſaperai
comedeueeſſer'apparecchiato l'animo dico. lui che ricerca la pruoua, edi colui
che è pronto all'affettione, imis tando i buoni medici, i quali prima
uannoinueſtigado quai partiſieno guaſte, o quaiſane,eappreſſo, le guaſte uanno
disponendo à rices uere i rimedij conuenienti; e primaleniſcono, e ammolliſcono,
poi apportano la medicina. L'anima adunque, nella quale la ragione fi dee
porre, acciò che dia luogo alle pruoue, et accettar poſſa la buona opinione, e
iſcacciare la contraria,deue eſſere ripoſata, e quieta,et non in modo niuno
affettionata, et trauagliata. Perche eſſendo il piancere,cheha l'anima,
quandoimpara, foauißima coſa, biſognofache ellaſia lontana da ogniturbatione,
operò molto male è conſigliato colui chenel conſigliar'altrui uſa la forza, o
la violenza degli aps petiti, °li affetti,laſciando il ripoſo della
verità daparte; qual contento può riportar colui, che partito dal Senato dica,
per qual ragione ho io aſſentito?perche ho io cosi deliberato?Buona coſa è
l'hauer’alla uerità conſentito,mamiglior'e, ciò hauerfatto ragion neuolmente
più toſto che à forza,perche in tal caſo non pure ſifabe ne,maſiſa di far bene;
di che non è coſa più diletteuole w gioconda. Habbiaſi dunque l'animo ripoſato
di colui cheattende la ragione; queſto ageuolmenteſi può fare, ponendoſiprima
di mezo trail si o il no,come chiſta in dubbio.Però che più prontamëte ſi
prende para tito,et ſi ammette il uero dubitando,che portando ſeco alcuna
opinio ne. Macome diſpoſto ſia lo appetitoalle coſeſueattendi,che loſaprai con
una bella diuiſione degli affetti. Perciò che in eſſo appetito gliaf fetti
ripoſti ſtanno,comet'ho detto. Ogni affetto e d'intorno al male, ò d'intornoal
bene, truouiſi pure lo affetto in qualunque parteſi uos glia. Ecco nel tuo
generoſoſoldato,cui é conceſſo l'adirarſi, opren. der l’armi quando biſogna
dico dello appetito iraſcibile,d'intorno al bene uiſta la ſperanza, e la
diſperatione. Laſperanza é uno aſpetta re il bene, la diſperatione è un
cadimento da quello aſpettare. D'in = torno al maleuiſta l'ira, la manſuetudine,
il timore, ol'audacia. Ira é appetito diuendetta euidente per riceuuto
oltraggio Mania ſuetudine èraffrenamento dell'ira, oambedue queſti affettiſono
in torno almale,difficile,etpreſente.Il timore é un aſpettatione di noia, ouero
un ſoſpetto di eſſere diſonorato.Et queſta ſichiamauergogna. Il primo,ouero é
temperato,ouero eccede la miſura. Dal temperato neuieneil conſiglio,dall'altro
la inconſideratione,il tremore, & altri ſtrani accidenti.Laconfidenza,
«audacia, é contrario affetto. Et queſte perturbationi tutte ſono d'intorno
almale che dee uenire.Nel L'altro appetito, in cui è poſta la concupiſcenza,
d'intorno al bene ui ſta l’amore,il deſiderio, a l'allegrezza. D'intorno al
male l'odio, o l'abominatione, di cui ſegno infelice e la triſtezza, dalla
quale naſce l'inuidia, la emulatione, lo ſdegno, o la compaßione,quando auiene
che la triſtezza detta ſia de i maliouero de i beni altrui. Ma nelle co fe
proprie affligendoſi l'huomo tre alleggiamenti ritruoua. Il primo ė ripoſto nel
proprio ualore, perche niuno ſcelerato é compiutamente aüegro.L'altro è meſſo
nel conſiderare il dritto della ragione, werita 16 D ' Ε ι ι Α fuerità delle
coſe, da che naſce la ſofferenza figliuoladella fortezza. L'ultimo é la
conuerſatione di alcuno amico, perche ne gli amici e ripoſta la ſoauità della
uita. Ritornando adunque allo amore, ti dico, che Amore è uoglia del bene
altrui,eu ſe é mouimento d'animo a far bene, li dimanda gratis. Senonſopporta
concorrenza, geloſia, lela ſopporta ad onefto fine, amicitia. L'inuidia non
uorrebbe, che altri haueſſe bene,ſe benuifuſſe il merito. Lo ſdegno non lo
uorreb be, non ui eſſendo il merito La emulatione il uorrebbe anche per ſe. La
compaßione ſi duole del male altrui, temendo il ſimilenon da uengu á lei. Etciò
ti puòbaſtare in quanto ad una brieue dichiaraz tiore di tutti gli umani
affetti. Ora econueniente, che tu ſappia in che modo à ciaſcuno d'eſſi tu ſia
diſpoſta, acciò che tu ſappia poi als truiſimigliantemente diſporre. Eſſendo
adunque l'appetito uarias mente affettionato, quandoſi ſdegna,quandoinuidia,
quando aborris ſcequando ama, quando teme, quandofpera, equando in altro mo. do
é trauagliato,acommoſſo, aſcolta un bellißimo ſecreto, ilquale non ſolamente à
diſporre gli animi à qualunque affetto è buono, ma in ogni operatione é
neceſſario, & benche oggi mai per uero ammies ſtramento della uita da
ogn'uno ſi dica, RIGVARDA AL F 13 NE, non é però d'ogn’uno l'applicare alle
attioni o opere de' mor tali, cosi belle ſentenza. Laſcerò da canto le coſe,
che non ſpettano alla noſtra intentione,ſolo dirotti quanto io deſidero, che
ſia negli af fetti oſſeruato. Deiſapere che egli ſi truoua una maniera
diparlare, la quale in molte, manifeſte parole effrime la forzı, ey la natura delle
coſe; e quelle molte, omanifeſte parole altro non ſono, che le parti della coſa
eſpreſſa. Queſtamanieradi parlare é detta Diffie nitione. Ora dunque io ti
ammoniſco, che nel muouere gli effetti pri ma tu habbia à riguardare alla
diffinitione di ciaſcuno,come al deſide rato fine. Però cheſe la diffinitione
rinchiude in certi termini la nas turi della coſa propoſta, ſenza dubbio
querrà, che il conoſcitoredel la natura, o delle parti deltutto diffinito,
oeſpreſſo, indrizzerà tutte le forze dello ingegno ſuo, à ciò fare,et tale
aiuto preſterà abon dantißima copia di ragionare, o diſciogliere ogni
occorrente diffi cultà, e durezzé. Eccotiſe ſai, che l'ira é deſiderio di
uendetta per riceuuto oltraggio, o ſe mirerai in queſto fine, non anderai tu
dia ſcorrendo, in qual modo eſſer debbia diſpoſto all'ira colui, che tu uora
rai hauere ſcorucciato? o conchi, oper qualicagione, & quanti modiſieno di
oltraggiare altrui? Et ciòin ogni affetto facendo,non ti farai ſignore, &
poſſeditore dello animo di ciaſcheduno? Et rans to più dimoſtrerai con la uoce,
& co i mouimenti del corpo, te tale. effere, quale uorrai,che altri
ſia,certamente si. La diffinitione adun queé il ſegno,al quale ſi deue
attentamente guardare. Ora inbrieue ti dico dell'ira, che eſſendo ella uoglia
di uendetta,è neceſſario,che lo adirato ſi dolga, o dolendoſi appetiſca alcuna
coſa, dalche naſce,che repugnando altri à gli umani deſiderij, ouero à quelli
alcuno impedi mento ponendo, ouero in qualunquemodo ritardande le uoglie al
trui, porga cigione di adirarſi, cioé di deſiderare uendetta,ilperche nella
ſtanchezza nell'amore, nella pouertà, e ne i biſogni ſonodiſpoſti i petti umani
agramente al dolore cagionato dall'ira, epiù cheſono ideſiderijmaggiori, più
apparecchiati, oprontiſono all'ira, o al furore. Lo hauer male di chi s'attende
ilbene,lo eſſere in poco pre gio tenuto, ò diſubidito, o prezzato, o per
ingratitudine, ò per ingiuria ſenza prò dello ingiuriatore, ſono tutte
diſpoſitioni al predet to mouimento.Giouamolto, oin queſto, & in altri
affetti ſaper. la natura,ilpaeſe, la fortuna, ela conſuetudine di ciaſcheduno.
Se adunque ſi accende nell'ira in tal modo, chië diſonorato, o iſcordas
to,ſenza dubbio acqueterai colui cheſarà onorato, riuerito,ubidito, ammeſſo, et
riputato;ouero, chiſiſarà uendicato,a cuiſarà dimandato perdono con la
confeßione del fallo, incolpando la violenza, enon la uolontà. Deueſi dare
molto al tempo, oalla occaſionein ognicoſa, operò ne' conuiti, ne i diletti,
one igiuochigli umani appetitifoa no più alla manfuetudine inchinati
Dell'amorealtro non tidico, le non che eſſendo eſo soglia del bene altrui,
l'eſſere cagione, mezano, interceſſore, aiutore al bene altrui,diſpone
ageuolmente à tale affets to ciaſcuno. Et perche Amore appreſſo, é una
ſimiglianza, w unios ne di uolere, però coluiſarà più amato, ocon l'animo più
abbrace ciato, il quale dimoſtrerà d'eſſere d'un'animo, o d'una uoglia steſſa
con noi. Ilche nelle allegrezze, one i dolori ſi conoſce, o neį biſoa gni
ancora; non ſolo nelle perſone amate, ma ancora negli amici de gli amici. Allo
Amore riferiſco la Benuoglienza, e l'Amicitia, las quale, ben che affetto non
ſia, pure è nata da eſſo amore, che è uno de gli umani affetti. Qui non é luogo
di più diſtintamente ragionare dell'amicitia; de gli oggetti, delle parti, e
delſine ſuo. Perciò che altroue nei graui ragionamenti di filoſofia ciò ſi
conuiene. Baftiti d'hauere per ora la ſuperficie, el'apparenza. Ritorno adunque
e ti dico,che ipiaceuoli,coloro, cheſidimenticano dell'ingiurie i с faceti,
imanſueti, gli officiofi uerſo i lontani, atti ſono ad eſſer'amati. Peril
cótrario ſapersi chedire intorno all'odio,il quale è ira inſatia: bile, da
uendetta, da tempo,daruina alcuna non mitigato; occulto ine ſidiatore,
ymortale, nato da in giurie o ſoſpetti. Al quale diſpoſte ſono altre nature
più, altre meno, o à megliodiſporle,biſogna ams plificare le ingiurie, «
iſospetti,acciò che nonſoloſi brami una ſema plice uendetta, ma la diſtruttione
della perſona odista. Del timore, odella confidenza, che ne attendi più, ſe di
queſta, ed'ogni altra perturbatione ne i uolumi degliſcrittori, et nelle
pratiche umane'ne Jei per uedere aſſai? Timore e turbation d'animo, nata da
ſoſpetto di futura noia. Et però chi temeſa ó penſa dipotere ageuolmente
eſſer’offeſo, eda chiſpecialmente, ſopraſtando il tempo,es la occas: fione.
Etchiciò non ſoſpetta,non é al timore diſpoſto comeé chi ſem pre éſtato
fortunato, chi ſempre miſero, chi è copioſo d'amici, di ros 64,09di potere,chi
é fuggitoſpeſo dalle ſciag ure, ode pericoli,ego altriſimiglianti;o
que'taliſono confidenti, &audaci. Euui altra maniera di timore, non
didanno,madi biaſimo; alla quale diſpoſtiſos no i giouanetti,i riſpettoſi,
oriuerenti, quelli cheuoglionoeſſer' ha uutiper buoni da ' più uecchi, o da
ſimili, opari. Et però aûa loro preſenzaſonopronti ad arroſire. Non cosi ſono i
vecchi,perche non credono,che di loro altri ſoſpettino quelle coſe, che ſono
ne' giouani, come laſciuie,amori, euanità. Etperche il diſonore è coſa, cheuies
n'altronde, però gli ſpiritidalſangue à quellaparte, che più lo ricer inuiati
ſono.Ladoueil uiſo ſi tignediquel roſſore, cheſi vede. il contrario nei timidi,
nel cuore dei quali il ſangue ſi riſtringe, per ſoccorſo di quella parte, che
teme la offenſione.Nella uergogna ſi abbaſſano gli occhi, come che tolerar
nonſi posſa la preſenza dicos lui, che è giudice de i difetti umani. Queſto è
ne' giouani aſſai buon ſegno di gentil natura. Però che pare, cheuergognandoſi
conoſcas no idifetti, ey habbiano cura di quelli. Non uogliopire diſcorrer’ina
torno all'audacia, allo ſdegno, alla compaßione, alla emulatione, « al la
inuidia. Però che molto ne uedraiſcritto, eragionato da altri. Ben non ti poſſo
tacere del male acerbo, mortale, ch'io uoglio à quella fiera indomita,
eabomineuole dell'inuidia, che all'udir ſolo il nomeſuo, ſtranamentemi muouo.
Lafigura,i modi, ai coſtumi di eſſa ſono da gran poetadeſcritti. Di queſta mi
dolgo, per eſſer quels la, che più regnaneimiei ſeguaci. Là doue il fabro al
fabro, il mes dico al medico,l'uno artefice all'altro, inuidia portano ſempremai.
M4 ca,Md tacciamoora di queſto, e poicheragionatohabbiamo di te, delo le parti
tue,delle quali taci, che in eſſeſi ſtanno,e delle loro difpofia tioni,
addimandiamo la Natura quaicoſe a’quai parti di te conuena gono, acciò che
accordando la foauißima armonia della umana elo quenza con piacere, og
utiledegli aſcoltanti uditi ſiamo apieno por polo raccontare i miracoli della
Natura. ' AN. lo ueggio ben oggia mai' ' Arte, che tuſei quella chefai l'acume,
ò la ſottilezzadell’oca chio mortale nel ſecreto della diuinamentetrapaſſare.
AN. Anzi per te, ó Anima,coteſto mirabile ufficio s'acquiſta, la cui cognitione
tanto apporta di lume, e chiarezzaad ogniprofeßione, o ſcienza, che ucramenteſi
può dire chetuſia ilprincipio d'ogni conoſcimento Etperò chiunqueſtima; ola
uſanza di uno leggierieſſercitio, o il ca fo tanto potere quanto tu, o
io.uagliamo, grandamente s'allontana dal uero. Tu t'abbatterai in un ſecolo
impazzito, d'huomini, i quali s'accoſteranno ad imitare più uno, che l'altro,
olo imitar loro non faràſenon manifeſto rubamento, ſciocchi,oferui imitatori,
che non Sapendo, perche altri s'habbiano acquiſtato il nome, tutta via in ciò
s'affaticano. Altri perche hanno unaſcelta di belle, &ornate pde role
uogliono ad uno ſteſſo tempo fcoprirle accomodando à quelle i concetti loro; ma
che poi ſono cosi rozi, a inetti,cheſenza ordine, Ofuor di tempo le metteranno,
e diranno, Io cosi dißi,perche cosi ha detto alcuno de' più preſtanti.
Queſtiſono gli incomodi delfecom lo. Nat. O`quanto m’increſce perciò eſſere
ſtimatapouera «biſo gnoſa, come che à me manchi alcunafiata,che donare, o che
nel cer care l'altrui teſoro l'huomo perda,ò non conoſca il ſuo. AR. Chi ſempre
ſegue, ſempre ſta di dietro, chi nonua dipari,nõ puòauan zare. Male
hauerebbonofatto i primi inuentori delle coſe, fehae veſſero aſpettato,chiloro
douea farla ſtrada. Et troppo pigro écoe lui, cheſi contenta del ritrouato.
Ionon porgo già mai la mano a chi laſcia, oabandona la naturale inclinatione,
come bene ho ueduto que' ali non conſeguire il deſiderato fine. NAT. Mi turbano
apa preſſo quelli, ò Arte, che tanto di me ſi fidano, che te laſciano à dies
tro". A R. Non ti dißi da principio, chenoi erauamo unite, e che ciò che
appare di uarietà, e diſomiglianza tra noi,e in un principio ricongiunto? Che
miditu? Chiunque opera alcuna coſa da me drizzato, uſa una regola commune,
& uniuerſale, che à molte, diuerſe nature feruendo,quelle uniſce, o lega in
uno artifi cio medeſimo, perche io ſono la conformità,o la ſimiglianza;altri
acuti 20 DELLA ! acutifono, eſuegliati, altriſeueri,& graui,altri
piaceuoli,&eles ganti per natura. Vnaperò e l'arte,una éla uia, che
ciaſcuno al ſuo ſegno conduce. Quando adunque l'arte precede,facile e lo
imitare; lodeuole il rubare, & aperta la ſtrada alſuperare altrui. Et in
tal guiſa bene ſilpendeſenza lo auantarſi di eſſer ricco, a fenza dar ſos:
spittione di uergognoſo furto. Accompagnifi dunque nelle ciuili con teſe il
core, ola ſcrima,cioè la natura, el'arte, ogſi uederanno poi que’miracoli,
ch'io ſo fare. Ma laſciamo tai coſe, e incomincia o Natura, o dimmi, in che
modo le coſe tue fiſtanno, che di eſſe cosi dileggieri gli huominiſiuanno
ingannando NAT. Sappi ò Arte, che ogn'uno che ci naſce, ſeco porta dal
naſcimento ſuo unacerta ins clinatione alla uerità, donde auiene, che inſieme
con glianni creſcens do ella in parteſuole il uero congetturare, laqual
congetturi opis nione più toſtocheſcienza uferai di chiamare. Laſcio la uſanza
mia imitatrice,chefino da primiannirecarſuole molte opinioni, che poi dipenacon
l'altra certezzaſileuano, parlerò di quella ſembianza più toſto, che ſembiante
di uero,cheé atta nata à muouere l'umane mentia far giudicio delle coſe. Dico
adunque, alcune coſeeſſer da ſe ſteſſe manifeſte, chiare, altre, niente da ſe
hanno di lume, edi fplendore,mailluminate da quelleche ſeco hanno la luce, ſi
fannoa? fenſi umanipaleſi; nel primo gradoé il Sole, o tutti que' corpi, che
ſon chiamati luminoſi. Nel ſecondo ſono i corpi coloriti, i quali non hannoin
ſe ſcintilla di chiarezza, ma d'altronde ſono illuminati. Il fimigliante ſi
ritruoua nello intelletto. Iljaale riceuendo alcune coſe diſubito quelle
apprende, og ritiene. Però che quelle ſeco hannoil lume loro, ſe à me ſteſſe il
fabricare de' nomi, io le chiamerei Noti tie, ouero Intendimentiprimi. Ma poi
altre ſono, che non hannoda ſe lume, ó uiuezza alcuna,&però di quelle ſifa
giudicio con ſoſpetto di errare, fe da altro luogo la loro intelligenza non
uiene; quinci ė nata la opinione, la quale come opinione, che ella é, né uera
ſitruoua, ne falfa. Il difetto naſce daquelli uirtù,chepoco dianzi diceſte.Pero
che le coſe mie fono, come ſono,mariceuute nell'anima, e da' ſenſi al la
fantaſia per alcune debili ſembianze traportate, ſtranamente
meſcolate,fannodiuerſe opinioni. Ben’é uero, ch'io non faccio una co ſa tanto
diuerſa da un'altra, che l'huomo dueduto non poſſa alcuna Somiglianza tra eſſe
ritrouare. A R. Molto mi piace che l'animadi ciò nonſia fatta capace, perche
accadendoleſpeſo mutare le opinioni umine, e da uno in altro contrario
traportarle, molto deſtramente biſogna adoperarſi,et diſimiglianza, in
ſimiglianzaà poco a poco pas fando,perchelo errore in eſe ſimiglianze
ſinaſconde, tirar le menti, che no s'aueggono di una in altra ſentenza. An. Et
chi può queſto ageuolmente fare? A R. Chi con diligenza inueftiga la natura
dela le coſe ſottilmente, uedrà in che l'una con l'altra ſi conuenga, ma non
chiamiamo però la opinione incerta,cognitione à queſto ſenſo,checo lui, che ha
opinione ſappiaſempre quella eſſer’incerta, o dubbioſt conoſcenza, ma bene che
in ſe conſiderata, come opinione da chiuna que hauerà il uero ſapere,ſarà
riputataincerta. NAT. O quans to mi nuoce in questo caſo,la uſanza inſieme con
la età creſciuta, lds quale à guiſadimeſtesſa, ferma talmente le coſe nelle
menti umane, che bene ſpeſſo la bugia, più che la uerità in eſi ritruoua luogo.
Et peròcredono molte coſe che nonſono, ouerofe ſono, ad altro modo di quello,
che ſono, uengono giudicate. Etfe pure dirittamente appreſe ſono, altre cagioni
lor danno,che le uere, e quelle ch'io so eſſere in mediati o continuate à gli
effetti. Et queſto auiene quando la ragio ne inchina più al ſenſo che
all'intelletto, « più all'apparenza, che al l'eſſenza. AR. Tu hai più
dell'Arte,o Natura,che di te ſteſſa,cos si bene uai diſtinguendo i tuoi
ragionamenti. NAT. Non te ne ma rauigliare, ò Arte,perche io qual ſono,tale mi
dimoſtro, oſe di me medeſima parlo, cometu uedi io lo faccio in quel modo,
chetu altre uolté hai confeſſato, che io ragionereiſe io fußite. AR. Quello che
io dico, lo dico per amınaeſtramento di coſtei, laqualanche non ſi dee
marduegliare di queſta apparenza del uero. Perciò che è aſſai als l'huomo
ſaggio, che le buoneragioni gliſieno ſemprequelle ſtelle, da quelle ne prenda
la ſimiglianza del uero, che per lo più muoue le umane menti, oin eſſe
ageuolmente ſi pone, al che fare, opportuna, ocomoda coſa é ricordarſi, in che
maniera per lo pulſato l'huomo ſe ſteſſo habbia ingannato, o in qual modo
ancora, e per qual cagione altri ingannatiſi fieno da loro medeſimi, in uero te
ne riderui, uedens do alcuni che penſano, ogni coſa, che precede un'altra,
cffer di quella cigione, ò che lo eſſer fimile ſia il medeſimo. Ne per ciò
direi che l'os pinione fuſe ignoranza,comenon dico, eſſa eſſere ſcienza, perche
la ſcienza e stabilità,o fermata da uero, e infallibile argomento, en la
ignoranza non è di coſe uere. Onde naſce,chela opinione è un abi to mezano tra
il uero intendimento, o l'ignoranza, differente dal dia bitare in queſto che la
opinione piega più in una, che in un'altra par te, il dubitare tiene in egual
bilancia la mente tra l'affermare, o il negare, eye però biſogna riuocare in
dubbio le coſegià ammeſſe,e di mojtrare quäto pericolo ſia il giudicare. Da
queſtone naſcerà la que ſtione, e la dimanda, la quale diſponendo le menti alle
ragioni; quan to leuerà della prima opinione,tanto porrà di quella, che tu
uorrai, o à ciò fare uia non é appreſſo quella che ua per le ſimiglianze delle
coſe.Partipoco,ò Anima,cotesti uirtu? penſi tu,che ſia cosi facile il
perſuadere? ó credi tù chegià biſogni con dritto giudicio, o con ſal do
intendimento penetrare dalla ſuperficie alla profondità delle coſe? A N. Da che
occulta radice l'apparente bellezza dicoteſta tua figli uola,nel
cuiadornameiito la Natura ſola non baſta. NAT, Ora ogniſentimento mi ſi
ſcuopre, ó Anima, da costei, emanifeſta uedo eſſermifatta la cagione,per la
quale molti miei amiciſono diſonorati. ART. Quai ſono coteſti amicituoi? NAT.
Quei, che inueftis gando uanno iſecretimiei, le ripoſte cagioni delle coſe,i
movimenti, le alterationi, &i naſcimenti d'ogni coſa, o che non
ſicontentano di ſtare par pari de gli altri huomini,manobilitando la ſpecie
loro con le dottrine traſcendono i cieli. AR. Che ſtrano accidente può ueni re
à perſone cosi pregiate, come ſono iſeguaci tuoi, ogli amatori della Sapienza,i
quali comerettori delmondo, felicißimi,er beatißis mi eſſer deono riputati?
NAT. Queſti fedeli miei à punto ſonoquel li, che più de gli altri ſono diſonorati.
An. In che coſa? ART. Aſcolta digratia; mentre che gli ſtudioſidi meſi ſtannoſoli,
ein par te ripoſta comeſchiui dell'umano confortio,non é loda • grido onora to,
che con ammiratione delle gentinon gli eſſalti o inalzi infino al cielo. Mapoi
che compareno, et uěgono alla luce,ſono prima da ogn'u no guardati, si per la
eſpettatione già conceputa della virtù loro, si an cora per la nouità
dell'abito, o dell'aſpetto,et del portamento,ogn's no lor tiene gli occhi
addoſſo, a attentamente ſi dimoſtra di uolergli udire. Io non ti potrei
eſprimere con che grauità poi aprono la boca ca, e con che tardezza poimandano
fuori le parole, etquanta ſia la dimora de i loro ragionamenti, i quali poi che
da principio nonſono in teſi dalle genti,comecoſe lontane dalla umana
conuerſatione, non cosi toto uiene lor tolta la credenza, per che purſiattende
coſa miglios respire conforme alla opinionede’uolgari,iquali dalla prima eſpets
tatione inuiati danno i ſeſteßi la colpa del non capire la profondità de'
concetti loro. Mapoi che nel ſeguete ragionare s'accorgono pur in tutto di non
poter’alcuna coſa da que'beati ritrarre, et che ogn'os ra più le coſe
intricate, ar le parole aſcoſe ogni lume d'intelligenza Hanno lor togliendo,
quanto ſcherno, Dio buono, jego quanto riſo ſe ne fanno. AR. Jo grauemente
miſdegno, ó Natura, & mi dolgo di ſimili auenimenti, poi chegli infelici
non fanno drittamente ſtimar le coſe,benchefino al fondodi eſſe paſarſi
credono,maforſe è, cheſtan do eßiſemprein altro, quando poi allo in giù
riguardando ueggono l'altezza loro, a la profondità delle coſe terrene, uanno
uaccillando con gli occhi; ocomparando il cielo alla terra, ſtimano ld terra un
minimo punto, o una bella città un niente che nobiltà, che chiaa rezza diſangue
può eſſere appreſſo coloro, che ſeſteßicon la eterni tà miſurando, tutti da uno
ſteſſo principio uenuti affermano?Che rica chezzaſarà grande appreſocoloro, che
ſi ſtimano poſſeditori del cie. lo? qual prouiſione daſoſtentare i popoli farà
colui il quale quaſipa ſciuto del cibo de i Dei,altro non guſta, altronon
ſente,altronon din fia,cheſempre ſtare alla ſteſſa menſa? ne credono, che
altriſieno in bi sogno? Queſte coſe io direi in loro efcuſatione. Ma che
midiraitu di quelli cheſonoſtudioſi della vita ciuile,ochefanno le cagioni
de’mu. tamenti de i Regni, e delle Rep.le conditioni de principi, gli ufficij
di ciaſcuno,le uirti, gli abiti uirtuoſi? Non credi tu, che queſti ſie no più
auenturati de gli altri? NAT. Peggio, percioche il ſapere ciaſcuna delle dette
coſe,hauer le diffinitionid'ogni uirti, ocoa noſcere diſtintamente ogni buona
qualità,non é aſſai, ma egli biſogna uſar tanto teſoro al governoaltrui per
ſalute, ocomodo uniuerſaa le, e oltre all'uſo hauer parole al preſente maneggio
oalla ciuile uſanza accomodate. ART. Dondeprocede coteſta loro cosi ſot tile
ignoranza: forſe cosi eleggono penſando di eſſer' hauutiper dot
tiæintelligentiparlando in cotalguiſa?Ma questa é una groſſezza infinita,perche
non é piacere, che s'agguagli àquelloche prende ľa ſcoltatore quando impara
&intende ciò che uien detto.Sai tu duns que la cagione di cosi fatto errore?
NAT. Forſe è,perche non ha uendo eſsi alcuna eſperienza della conuerfatione
cittadineſca, fanno quelguidicio dimolti cheſonoſoliti di far d'alcuni pochi,
loro come pagni,co i quali tutto’l giorno con uarie diſputationi argomentando
trapaſſano,ne mai ſono riſoluti. ART. Et io ancora cosi credo, pe rò guardati ó
Anima, di non entrare nel loro no conoſciuto collegio, ò ſe pure ui uorrai
entrare tanto iui dimora,quanto alcun giouamen to ne puoi ritrarreper la ciuile
amminiſtratione. Nel resto pronta, et ſuegliata nel coſpetto degli huomininon
meno alla ſcuola eall'acas demia,che alla piazza,alla corte, o alſenato
intentafarai, o uſans do. D E L L A. doistiche le gi,con mozeme uoci
raptorersi, percbe riund coſa é få mots, creudire ripublicico:lizále uanie dig
esioni, o le Haitat parole di moint, i quali razlo" 2r.do le ébloro per la
Città frendere unsguerra,realize, ne: i mezi di efl: u21 riguardando, riaprindo
le ſcuole de presa deguono, di 7: oro, oargos:ht::opia ficcrente del mondo, o
cercano chifu il primo ins kantore deli'arxi chifrino in Roma trionfale,
cbisitrouo le naui, chui brizla i czasu, et ilere ciance si fatte,cbenc
irfegn2":0,ne dis last250,14.1widojiore della prostione de' daruri, delle
genti, o del *010, col quale s bubbis a fartal guerra. Il percbelo. To poi
auies fie, cbei nero perini,çia deguamente di loro parlando, ſono con grue de
11ratione acoltati. NAT. Cotto e mio dono,percbe ditus to potere affreuz! cusi
mi truono,che wina forzaglimetto irrar ci i tuoi ſegussi. AR. Et forſe corne
sfrenati causlii, gli fai tel mezo del coro pericolare; pero sili eccellente
natura,che ta lorda, sorrei che mi falje l'aiuto rio.percbe meglio, o çik
ficuri aadribs 6290 per lefiziglianze dre coſe. An. Biſogna dunque pik skatie
rigliz- guardare, cbe al wero? A R. Cosi biſcgna; o quedo porriaz slitacels il
facesi, sı il donerci tu fare, o ciaſcuno, che * pis airtai perjuadere, accio
cbe fiso aſcoltato, o inteſo dude geri, lezasli barefeito -Is bagis nga 14.0,
får cbe in ejja las casicae spetto dd zero. Queto per fo cjjere, cbei şià f-
931 babe bis 10 c50 surorit: b4xx.: predoi popoli cbei nácti inges gs. An.
Dizni gratis, çusio é cbegli buozi idaro fede: cazzo, cbe apps uto, nos lo
faze0 percbeloro piace il nero? Ar.. As. Paepiuere già saco: 507 co:cf-:: ta?
Forzz aidake,che il sero lis és glicucuitico? Ax Pacte danese giàceil serezos
bruszni P -T271? AR Perikliois tragises filer cxz. AX. Aja -- 22:04 ks:0
600leri: del bero. Às. SostraTrao Adira.secte lazaratsie sesi tid: acts
indiscrezi!4.cezecklacteaefepie 8222475l4regiaze, o lomatto; c (72.0: 1, o
Resmitironine.cedriersdieedia 2.3 " To RossiradizioroBoricitis 32 2 ciasto
nigirisececeáciless Aires22:22: carte.ro 2:46, 13:3050: 22: 15: 4:15,cheſe la
opinione con la ragioneſarà legata, per modo niuno potrà fuggire,anzifuori
dell’eſſerſuo leggiadramente uſcita nõ più opinio ne,maſcienza ſi potrà
nominare. A N. Dimmi, ſe'l uerifimile e tale ad ogn'unoegualmente. AR. Nó. An.
Che differenza ci fai tu? A R. Grande. Ben'è uero,che quando io dico ueriſimile,
io intendo ciò che pare alla più parte. Ma diſtinguendo dico, la più parte però
effere ode gli huomini ſenza dottrina,o degli huomini letterati. Et altro ſarà
il ueriſimile,che parerà à gli Idioti, altro à iperiti. A M. Inſegnami à
conoſcere queſto uerifimile. AR. Il ſegno della ſimia glianza alcuna fiata ſi
ritruoua in eſſaſuperficie delle coſe, cheſenza diſcorſo di ragione ſono
riceuute,o appreſe daiſenſi umani; da ciò naſce il veriſimile, che pare
egualmente a tutti, come auienedimolte miſture, che's'aſſomigliano à l'oro,
cheſe il giudicio filaſciaſſe al ſenſo ſolo,per oro da ogn’uno ſarebbono
hauute. Alcune uolte il detto fe gno emeſcolato con alcuna ragione,accompagnata
col ſenſo, oque sto é quello, che pare àmo!ti. Speſſo più di ragione, che di
ſenſo ſi mette, e ciò è quello,che pare à i piùſaggi; o quarto più dalſenſo
s'allontana,o s'accoſta la ragione all'intelletto, tanto de' più saggi, edi
pochi ſarà l'apparenza del uero. Ma laſciando coteſte più ina
terneſomiglianzedel uero, bauendo tu àfare. con la moltitudine, quelle
attendi,che a tutti,ò alla partemaggiore appariranno; &co: si ogniforza di
proponimento nelle altrui menti rompendo, farai la uoglia tud. AN.
Queſtomipiace. Ma uorrei, che tu m'inſegnaſi à congetturar quello chepuò eſſere.
Dimmi, ſe n'hai ammaeſtramen to alcuno. A R. Dimandane pur la Natura. AN. Non
n'hai tu ancora poter’alcuno? A r. sibene; ma la Natura operando, Sa meglio
dime,quello che èpoßibile. An. Dimmi tu dunqueò Naz tura,quai coſeeſſer poſſono?
NAT. Tutte quelle il principio delle quali ſi ritruoua. An. Adunque ui ſarà
l'arte deldire, poi che'l prin cipio di lei ſi truoua? ilquale nõ é altro, che
l'ojferuatione,che fu l'Ar te di te ó Nitura. Ar. Che uai tu mettendo in dubbio
quello che fie qui habbiamo fermato? ſegui. NAT. Se quello chepiù importa, ò
che piie uale, ò che ha più difficultà, fiuede, ſenza dubbio il meno
importante, il più debile, il più facile ejer potri. A n. Adunque ſe l'arte
puòridurre gli huomini rozialla uita ciuile, meglio potrà gli ammaeſtrati
inalzare algouerno della Città? A R. T4 pur uti argomentando. AN. Mercé tua,
che giàmiſei fatta familiare. A R. Queſto ſo io, che poſſeduta che io ſono
dalle anime,dimoſtro il. D ualore, 26, D Ε ιι. Α ualore, il piacere, o la
facilità dell'operare. NAT. se può eſſer la cagione, chivieta che lo effetto
non posſa eſſere? et ſe queſtoé, quel la di neceßità ſi haue. Quello che ſegue
dimoſtra,che può eſſere quel lo che antecede. In ſomma ogni coſa può offere, di
cui naturale appeti toſi uegga, o dalla poſibilità delle parti naſce quella del
tutto. Dals l’uniuerſale il particolare, o dal meno quello che più comprendeſi
congettura. Vna metà, il ſimile, il pare ricerca l'altra metà, l'altro Simile,
o l'altro pare. Etſeſenza arteſi puòfar’una coſa molto me glio ſi farà con
artificio, ſe chi meno può opra, chi più può non opes rera egli ancora? Chene
attendi più,ſe queſto ti può eſſere à baſtan za à farti aprire gli occhi è
ritrouare il fonte della eloquenza? AR. Et io già mitruouoſatisfatta in queſta
parte,che alle coſe appar tenenti all'intelletto ſi conuiene; però aquelle io
uorrei,che paſſaßi, lequaliſono da eſſere ne gli appetiti collocate.Et
attendo,che tu quel le brieuemente mi dimoſtri,etdiffiniſca, acciò che l'anima
oggimaicõ. tenta dellaſeconda promeſſa,alla terza,et ultima ſi riuolga. A N.
Per qual cagione, ò Arte,dimanditu le diffinitioni della Natura? ejendo ſuo
carico il diffinire. A R. Perche ora io non attendo le eſquiſite, Oregolate
diffinitioni,maquelle che dalla più parte delle gentiſono ammeſſe, delle
quaiquaſiſenz'artificio ſe ne può formare un numero infinito. An. Tu ſei molto
circoſpetta. AR. Seguiò Natura, féle coſe àgli umaniappetitidi lor natura
piacere, o dispiacere posſo no apportare,òpur l'Anima ne li fa tali. NAT. Senza
dubbio non folo elaAnimaha uirtidi apprendere, ofuggire le coſe, ma in effe
ancora e nonſo cheda eſſer fuggito,ouero abbracciato. Quädo adun que tra la
coſa, o l'animaſi truouaalcuna conformità, allora lo appe tito ſi muoue ad
abbracciarla, o queſto mouimento,ſi può dire, no minar defiderio,ilquale è
appetito di coſa che nõ ſi poßiede,cõforme però à quella uirtù ò parte
dell'anima,che l'appetiſce; ma quando no ui é queſta conformità,tra gli
oggetti, o l'anima,ella gli aborre, o fugge, né ſolamente oue o
anima,oſentimento ſi truoua cotefti ab bracciamenti,e fugheſiueggono,ma doue
occultamente io ſonoſoli ta di operare, doue non éſenſo, ociò faccio con un
ſemplice inſtinto, ilquale al mio poteree tale, quale al tuo é la conoſcenza.
Coteſto in ſtinto ogni coſa conduce alla conſeruatione, o albene; & dalmale
& dalla morte il tutto ritragge quanto può. Maper dirti de gli huo mini,
ſappi, che eſſendo tra le coſe oppoſte, ole parti de gli animi lo ro,conuenienza,quando
auiene,che quelli ſíenopreſenti,oche laſcia no impreſſa la loro qualità,in
quellapartechegli appetiſie, allora ſi genera ildiletto, e l'allegrezzanata
dalla morte delprimo deſides rio, perche poſſedendo la coſa deſiderata, il
diſio è già conuertito in piacere. Ilqualpiacere altro non é,cheadempimento di
uoglie. Tu conoſcerai, cheil guſto tuo bauerà conformità con le coſe dolci; da
queſta nenafcerà l'appetito,auenendo poi,chele coſe dolci uicine fica no à
quella parte,doue il detto ſenſo dimora, eche in eſſa laſcino la lor
qualitàimpreſſa,che é la dolcezza,nonha dubbio,che quella par te nonſia per
bauer diletto, egiocondità. Il ſimigliante uedrai in ogni tua parte, Et per lo
contrario ſi ſente noia, e diſpiacereo nella priuatione delle coſe deſiderate,
o nell'hauere le difformi, oaborrite, ecome il principio di ottenere il bene
era il deſiderio dalla ſperanza accompagnato,cosi il principio di hauere la
noia, era la fuga dal timore commoffa. Etcome nella prima impreſione la
ſperanza in gio is fi conuertiua, cosi nella ſeconda la paura ſi tramutaua in
dolore. Eccoti adunque i quattro principali affetti diuoianime. AN. Vor
reiſaperè,o Natura, in cheſia poſta la conueneuolezza, che é trale coſe, ole
parti mie. NAT. Percheioſono tale in ciaſcuna coſa, quale io mi truouo, però
nelle coſe eſaéripoſta per me; maperche poi auenga,che io tale mi truoui in
ciaſcuna coſa,dimandane chi cos si ab eterno prouid. AR. Or l'anima
tiparetroppo curioſa? ma dimmi quai coſe,à qual parte dell'anima ſono conformi.
NÁT. In fomma il uero é il bene, &per tal cagione, quello che è uero,uien
giu dicato bene. Ar. Che intendi tù bene? NAT. Ciò che daogn'u no,e da ogni
coſa uien deſiderato, &uoluto. A R. Qual bene Ć cercato daữ’intelletto? NA
T. Dimandane coſtei AN. il ſapee re, la
dritta opinione. NAT. Dalla uolontà? AR. Ogniabis to di uirti. NAT. Da gli
appetiti. AR. Ogniutilità ® dilets to AR. Che naſcerà poi, ò Natura, dal deſiderio
ditai coſe? NAT. Lo sforzo, o lo ſtudio de'mortali per conſeguirle. An. Buui
alcuno inganno de gli appetiti intorno al bene, come ui é l'ingan no
dell'intelletto intorno al uero? NAT. Grandissimo. AN. Et come ſe il bene e
cosi conforme all'anima? NAT. Non hai tu udito poco di ſopra, come l'anima era
d'intorno al uero, opure anco il ue to le era molto conueneuole, et
proportionato? AN. Ben'inteſi, che la cognitione del uero era molto confuſa,
riſpetto alla fantaſia. A'R. Cosi é. Et di nuouo ti dico, afferino,che ogn'uno
confufae mente apprende un bene,nelquale par che l'animo s’acqueti,et quels D 2
lo 28 lo deſideri,mapoi da gli appetiti
traportato (come prima era l'intele letto dalla fantaſia ) e aquegli rivolto
ſmarriſce la uera strada di quel bene, al quale ciaſcuno digiugner contende,
moſſo dalla interna forza della Natura. Et in quella ſtrada,orapiù lentamente,
ora più. velocemente camina, troppo è meno amando, et deſiderando quello, che
con miſura dourebbe amare,ò defiderare. Indië nata la ingorda uoglia delle
ricchezze, lo sfrenato appetito dei piaceri, vtalbora la pigritia, om
negligenza dell'ocio; &deſiderando altrilapropria con ſeruatione,
s'inganna, credendo,che il bene altrui,ſia la ruina ſua,oue ro temendo di
perder’i ſuoibeni, fauori,gratie,amiſtà,onori,o lodi, ſi muoue alla
ingiuria,alla inuidis,alla uendetta. Et di qui naſce quello di che tutto di ſi
contende fra' mortali, il giuſto, lo ingiufto,ildouere, l'equità, l'utile,
oaltre coſe, che ſono cagioni di liti, o di conteſe Per il diletto adunque,
& per il comodo, ciaſcuno ſi muoue à fare. Et benefarà quello, alquale ogni
coſaſi riferiſce, ouero ſiriferirebbe, • perragione, o per appetito, o per
natura.Et ciò cheopera, difende, conſerua,accreſce,accompagna, ſegue,ordina,et
ſignifica il bene,bene ſi chiama, operò la felicità, o tutte le parti
ſueſarannobuone, a le uirtie ſopra tutto ſono benidiſua natura
degni,bencheàmoltinon ſono cosi apparenti. Ilpró,l’utile, il piacere ebene,
perche l'utile ė mezo di conſeguire il deſiderio, oil piacereè moltoalla natura
cona forme. A N. Fermati un poco, & dimmi,come non eſſendo beni cosi
apparenti le uirtù de coſtumi,gli huominiſieno uenuti in cognis tione di
quelle: AR. Credi, ó Anima,che ogni maniera di bene, che appare à gli huomini,
éſimiglianza di quel bene, che non appare,e chi uuole drittamente giudicare da
coteſti apparenti beni, potrà ris trouare la uia di peruenire alla cognitione
di quegli, cheſono in ſebe ni, o che fanno la uera, es ſola felicità,più
deſiderata,che conoſciu taima non ſta bene ora difiloſofare intorno a tal coſa.
Baſtiti, ch'io ti ritruoui la uia, per la quale gli huomini ſono andati a
ritrovare i beni dell'animo, o le uirti interiori. Dicoti adunque, che uedendo
i mortali nel corpo umano molte buone conditioni, hanno congetturas to, ancora
nell'animo ritrouarſi alcune ottime qualità, à quelle del cor po in qualche
parte conuenienti. Dimandane la Natura, quali ſieno le doti del corpo,che tu
ſaprai da me poſcia quali ſienogli ornamenti tuoi. AN. Dimmi ò Natura, fe egli
ti piace, diche beni adorni tu i corpi umani? NAT. Prima diſanità, o di
forza,poidi bellezza, O d'integrità diſenſi. An. In checonſiſte la ſanità? Nat.
Nels la. la proportionata meſcolanza degliumori principali, enell'uſo di ej
14,6 queſta proportionata meſcolanza, ueramente ſipuò chiamare una egualità ragioneuole.
ART. Credi tu, o Anima,di eſſer’al corpo inferiore? AN. Non già. ART. Credi
adunque, che in te eſſer deue una certa egualità. Il cui ualore conſiſte
nell'uſo. A N. Quale uuoi tu che ella ſia? AR. Quella che Giuſtitia ſi
chiamna,fers ma, o coſtante volontà di render a ciaſcuno ilſuo. Ma che dici tu
delle forze? NÅT. Dico, la gagliardezzaeſſer’una uirtù del cor po,poſta nel
potere à ſua uoglia abbattere,atterrare,et uolgere ogni alieno impeto con
leggiadria. AR. Bella, aneceſſaris uirtù neli aa nimo. Perqueſto giudicarono ifaggi,eſſer
la fortezza, laquale reſis ſtendo à gli impetidella fortuna,ſola
nė"ſuperbanel bene,ne uile nelle auuerſità ſi dimoſtra, &fola guida
nella militia della uita mortale uin cendo,glorioſamente trionfa. NAT. Che
dirai tu della bellezza del corpo, laquale è una proportione di membra, o di
parti tra ſe ſteſ fe, o col tutto conuenienti dauiuacità di colori, et gentil
gratia acs compagnata? AR. Tumi dipingila temperanza dell'animo,laqua le in ſe
ſteſſa raccolta, ecompoſta,inuera, o proportionata miſura conſiſte, tanto può
di dentro,che di fuorinel corpo il ripoſato, o quieto penſiero uedi, dolce,
ogratioſa maniera ſi conoſce, & quafie una conſonanza di tutte le
conſonanze. NAT. Che coſa trouerai tu nell'anima,conformealla integrità dei
ſenſi, come alla bontà della uiſta, alla perfettione dell'udito, « al
uigored'ogni ſentimento? ART. La prudenza, la quale consiste in saldo, o sincero
conoſcia mento delle attioni umane: A N. Egli mi pare, che io ſia da Dio creata
à fine, che le coſe mie fieno ſcala all'altezza di quello. AR. Che penſitu
altro, ò Natura? NAT. Nulla, ſenon che conchiudo frame, che gli huominiſi ſieno
aueduti delle uirtú interiori per le qua lità eſteriori. AR. Senza dubbio, a
molti anche ſi ſono ingannas ti, oper una ſimiglianza, che hanno le uirtù con
alcuni uitij, se lo Cangiando il nome hanno detto chela tardezza ſia moderata
pruten za,la liberalità ſia la larghezzaſenzamiſura; e cosi all'incontro il
prodigo ſia liberale. Et non hanno conſiderato, eſſergran differenza tra il
ſaper dare, er il non ſaper conſeruare.Et queſto è quel ueriſimi le nei beni,
che muoue ſpeſſo lementi, ogli appetiti umani. Orain brieue
l'ordine,l'ornamento,e la coſtanza delle coſe handimoſtra to le uirtù, ou
appreſſo la concordanza di tutte le operationi, o la grandezza, che le ſopra
feſteſſa inalzają si come in ogni arte, com in ogni 30 DELLA ogni ſcienza
biſogna hauer’alcuna coſa manifesta, e chiara, dalla quale da prima ella naſca,
o s'augumenti,cosinella felicità, bed ta uitaſi richiede, euidentefondamento,preſo
dui benimanifeſti à i ſen ſi umani,dalquale s'argomenti il uero, ottimo fine,
operò dalle predette coſe ſiſtima,quella eſſer felicità, che con proſpero corſo
tracorre,tutta diſeſteſsa, tutta di ſua uoglia, tutta piena,tutta d'ogni parte
abondeuole, ocopioſa, eyd'intorno à tai coſe ricordati ſeme pre della
diffinitione, da unaparte conſiderando, che coſa é bene,di! l'altra
diſtinguendo quello che é del corpo, da quello, che é del’ani mo, e come
ciaſcuno in molte parti ſi diuide.perciò che cosi ne trar: rai quella abondanza
di coſe che tuuorrai,doue meritamente la pres detta parteſi può dar tutta alla
inuentione, laquale e il fondamento della noſtra fábrica. Partidoadunque tutto
quello cheſotto il nome di bene, ò uero, ò apparente ſi conciene, trouerai la
felicità con tutte le ſue parti,o trouerai, che'l fuggire dal maggior male,ſia
bene, et l'acquiſto delmaggior bene, « il contrario delmale; & queſto, pera
che molti s'affaticano, e che i nimici lodano alcuna fiata.Et che ſifa ſenza
incomodo, feſa, fatica, ò tempo, ſe é diſiderato; ofinalmente tutto è
bene,uero, apparente, v dubbio, quello che uiene deſiderato. A N. Che dirai tu
del piacere? AR. Grande ueramente è la fore za del piacere, & del dipiacere,
percheſin da fanciulli ſi uede, che il tuttoſi fa per tai contrarietà. Et s'io
uoleßi pienamente ragionarti, io non finirei cosi toſto, però di eſſo alcune
brieui ſentenze io ti pros pongo,dalle quaiſe ne ritrarrà quella ſimigliäza di
uero, che in tai be niſi può trarre. Dicotiadunque,che quelle coſe grate ſono,
dipid= cere,che ſono alla natura conformi,come hai diſopra ſentito; pero à
ciaſcheduno grato ſarà quello,à che eglidi natura ſua ſaràinchinas toje per la
medeſima ragione,foaue,et gioconda coſa é la conſuetudi ne, come quella
chemolto alla natura ſi confaccia. Perche quello, che speſſo,et per lo più
ſifa, è molto uicino a quello che ſempre ſi ſuolfa re. Caro e quello,che non ſi
trde per forza,perche la forza é contra natura, onde i trauagli,lecure, e ogni
maniera diſtudio, odi pens ſiero,che turbi la quiete dell'animo, perche é
uiolēto,arrecca moleſtia o diſpiacere. Seforſe la conſuetudine non
l'ammolliſce. Cosi per con trario il diletto, il giuoco, il ripoſo,la ſicurezza
ilſuono, et la rimeßio ne, come coſe di ogni neceßitá lotane. Néſolo col ſenſo
uicino ſiprende piacere delle coſepreſenti, ma con la memoria,con la
ſperanza,del lequali una riguarda le paſſate, l'altra le future.Lepaſſate apportano
nella ricordatione aſſai diletto,perche la imaginatione le fa quaſi pres
ſeriti, e ſe erano graui, o noioſe, con lieto, o piaceuol fine fatte ſos no
dolci, eſoauile coſe buoneche hanno à uenire nello ſferare con fortano, comele
preſenti nel goderle,ouero nel imaginarle, ilche ſuos le à gliamantiuenire,
iquali non hanno ripoſo ſenon quanto penſano alle coſe diſiderate. Lauittoria ė
foauißima coſa, ó lo auanzare il compagno, or però ogni maniera digiuoco ſuol
dilettare la caccia, l'uccelare, la peſcagione, et appreſſo l'onore,ogni
gratitudine, ogniri uerenza,inſin l'adulatione piace infinitamente. Lo imparare
ancora é coſa piaceuole, onde la imitatione delle coſe è giocondiſſima, tutto
che le coſe imitate non dilettino, perche nõ la coſa eſpreſſa,malo sfor zo, e
il contraſto dell'arte ſuol dilettare. Indi è nato, che la pittura, le statue,o
l'opre finte aggradano chi li mira. Ne più ti uoglio af faticare,o Anima,in
dimoſtrarti,quello cheda te, et in te prouerai ef ſendo con eſſo il corpo.o
quanto ti fia dipiacere il dominar’ultrui il comandare il ridurre à compimento
le coſe incominciate, il veder riu ſcire ogni tua deliberatione, e finalmente
tutto quello, che al bene t’indrizzerà,ò dal male ti ritrarrà. AN. Se queste
coſe ſono buo ne, come tu di, per qual cagione ſipuò errare nel deſiderarle,
nel cercarle? A R. Due mouimenti,ò Anima in te conoſcerai, l'uno de' quali da
eſſa Natura riceuerai, e l'altro riporterai teco. Nel primo niuno errore puoi
commettere,perche non è colpa tua, che alcuna co ſa ſi truoui,che ti diletti;
ma nelſecondo ageuolmente puoi cadere, eſſendo in tua mano il freno di non
conſentire cosi à pieno à quella prima voglia&, non riguardare alla
ragione, che con certo conſiglio al gouerno de'primi appetiti guidar tidee.
Maperche per lo primo, O naturalemouimento gli huominifanno il più delle loro
operatio ni però debbonoeſſer ueriſimilmente guidati,o é creduto per lo più,
che ciaſcuno faccia con deliberatione quello cheegli fa, ſeguendo il primo
inſtinto; néſi conſidera che in teſi truoua uirtá libera, o po tente,dalla
quale ognilode, o ogni biaſimo procede. Etacciò che el la ſiapiù
drittamentegouernata, eccoti l'autorità delle ſacre leggi, nella quale è poſta
la ſalute, e la correttione d'ogniumano errore. Contra le quaichiunquepreſume
di opporſi, dal proprio conſiglio abandonato, è dato in preda alle ſue proprie
uoglie,e ſottoposto ale la pend, come quello cheiniquo, o ingiuſto ſia. Ora in
brieue ti dico, che eſſendo eſſe leggi nelle rep. àgli animi quaſi medicine
delle loro infirmità, o rimedijà i loro errori, biſogna ſapere ogni maniera di gouerno, gouerno, in che eglipiù fermo fia,da che
uegna il cadimento di quels lo, et quanti ſienoi contrarij ſuoi,per poteralla
cõmune utilità con le Sante inſtitutioniliberamente prouedere. NAT. Matu non
dimo ſtri, ò Arte, che alcune leggi ſono eterne, er immutabili, non da gli
huomini ſecondo gli ſtati loro ordinate, ma dallo editto diuino, o da me
inuiolabili ſtatuite, communi,& uniuerſali à tutte le genti, lequai non più
allo Indiano,cheallo Ethiope,eguali, in ogniſecolo, in ogni luogo ſi Sogliono
ritrouare, non ne igrandiuolumiſpiunati da' morta li,manel libro della eternità
impreſſe,et ſigillate in ciaſcuno che ci na ſce. AR. Coteſte leggi,ó Natura,non
ſono ritrouamenti umani, né ſecondo le occaſioniformate, ma eterne, econtinuate
ad un modo in permutabile, del quale non tocca à me il ragionare, «pint é
quella ch'io non dico di eſſe, o forſe quella equità,dichefpeſoſi ragiona, al
tro nonė, che la leggeſcritta nel cuore d'ogn'uno per correttione di quella
cheè poſta per commune uolere di ciaſcun popolo. An. Dun que nelle umane
leggiſi truoua errore? AR. Nongià, ma ben può eſſereche ilfondatoredi eſſe al
tutto non proueda,et chenon conſide ri molte coſe,lequaiperalcuno accidente,
come, che molti ne ſieno fanno uariare i giudicij, e in queſto caſo la equità,
& l'oneſtà può aſſai, operò molto prudente, oqueduto biſogna cheſia,
chiunque forma le fante leggi, « che il più che può tolga il potere à gli huos
mini di giudicare da ſe ſteßi. Però cheben ſai, quantopericoloſopra ſtà nel
giudicio, riſpetto allo amore, all'odio, e ognialtra perturbae tione umana.
Matempo è, cheſi dia fine à queſta parte, perche aſſai sé detto d'intorno alle
uirtù dell'anima,e d'intorno alle coſe appars tenenti ad eſſa, si di quelle che
allo intelletto, come di quelle, che ape partengono allo appetito. In quanto
che elle hanno ſimiglianza del uero, delbene, dj appartengono alla inuentione.
A N. Tutto che ó Arte, inanzi à gli occhimiſieno le coſe, che tu m'hai
dimoſtras te, hauendole tu ſopra la Natura delle coſe ſtabilite,pur uorrei ſapes
re alcunſecreto, come diſopra molti me n'hai ſcoperti, quando tra noi ſi
ragionaua delle parti mie. AR. Io non per naſconderti alcu na coſa miſon
taciuta, maperche eglimipare, cheda te ſteſſa potrai ogni ripoſte bellezza
conſiderare, uedere, che da que' beni che di ſopra habbiamo diſtinti,naſcono
treparti principali dello artificio no ſtro. Però che ſe il bene é utile,nenaſce
quella parte, che é posta nel conſigliare, laquale ſi uſa neiſenati. Se'l fine
è giuſto, quell'altrapare te, che delle ingiurie ciuili,ò criminalitra i popoli
fa mentione, felfie ne 1 1 ne é honeſto, allora ampia, o magnifica materia
ſipreſta di lodare nelle pompe, et ne i trionfi le opere glorioſe, ma il ualore
delgraue, o riputato Cittadino,primanel ben fare,poi nel ben conſigliareſi di
moſtra. AN. Diche coſa più ſi conſiglia? AR. Di quello, che: più abbraccia
l'utile uniuerſale. Etprima d'intorno al corpo delle uettouaglie, odel uiuere
per ſoſtenimento di ogn'uno, odella difen fione per ſicurtà de i popoli, delle
ricchezze perſoſtenere la difes Ja. Dapoi delle ſacre leggi, e della religione
per ottenere l'ultis mo, o deſiderato fine. ANI. Che ſi ricerca nel conſigliare?
ART. Prudenza, beneuolenza, animo, ſecretezza, e celeris, tà nello eſſequire. A
N. Gli ineſperti adunque,imaligni, i timis di, i uani, i pigri huomini, non ſono
atti al conſigliare: ART. Non già. Necoloro, che non ſanno conſigliare ſe
ſteßi. Ma odi: alcuni ſecretidi queſta parte, forſe non uditi fin'ora. Vuoi tu
ſapere un modo mirabile di conoſcere glianimi de' mortali? AN. Queſto eil tutto.
A R. Sappi,checiò, che ſecreto nell’hkomo ſi truoua, forza cheſia in alcun
ſentimento di eſſo,ò di dentro, o difuori.Sentis, mento chiamo ora ogniparte di
te ó Anima. Et però uolendo tu ri trouar coteſto ſecreto, tenterai ogni
ſentimento, perche quando es toccherai quella parte,nella qualee ripoſto il
ſecreto di alcuno, o pia ceuole, ò noioſo,che egli fi fia,ſenza dubbiomanderà
fuorialcuniſea gni,comemeſſaggieridelle uoglie ſue,ocon alcuneſimiglianze dimo
ſtrerà quello,che egli ſipenſa di haueredétro diſe naſcoſo; aguiſa di una corda
chealſegno tirata di un'altra; quandoritruoua la conſon: nanza,ſimuque, a ſuona
di pari armoniacon quella.Da queſta reues, latione dipende la uittoria, eu
l'onore di chi parla nel coſpetto degli huomini.Etqueſto è un ſecreto ripoſto
aſſai, wodegno di penſamento.. L'altro è, che a conoſcereil giuſto, e lo
ingiuſto,biſogna riguardas re al fire,alquale ciaſcuna coſa deueeſſer
meritamente riferita, pera, che quando ſia, che dal debito fine alcuna coſa ſi
rimuoua, allora ne ng ſce la ingiuria,la quale éuna eſpreſſa maniera di
ingiuſtitia. Aqueſta ingiuria altri ſono più diſpoſti a farla, che à patirla,altri
per lo cons, trario. Et questo biſogna conſiderare per potere in quella parte
uas lere, ii cuifinalgiudicio rizuarda il giuſto, o l'ingiuſto. Altri ſes creti
ui ſono, ma io mi riſeruo là doue della applicatione ragiones remo, cioè
quandoſi dirà il mododi porre le coſe nell'anima. Ma che marauiglia è queſta?
doue é gita l'Anima, ò Natura? Perche te ne ridi tu? come ſono ingannata? come
tolto mi viene il poter ſeguire E l'incominciato ragionamento? NAT. Aſpetta ó
Arte,non titurs bare, toſto merrà, con chi tu habbi à ragionare. Ora uoglio che
noi ci tramutiamo, o che cifacciamopalpabili, o viſibili. AR. Che
mutationimiusi predicando? NAT. Taci, attendi. Eccomi qui di corpo,e di
formaumana. AR, Guardami ancora tu, ch'io ſo no trafigurata,à chimiſomigli tu o
Natura? NAT. Io non ſaprei à coſa alcuna ſimigliartijmubene io uedo, che tu hai
molto del graue nell'aſpetto, e nello andare, onel uestire,et à pena io
ardiſcofiſarti. gliocchi à doſſo. Et mi viene una certa tenerezza di lagrimare.
A R. Coteſto é ſegno,che tu mi ami et riueriſci;et tanto più ch'io ti ſcorgo un
certo roſſore nel uolto, e ti odo ſopirare. Ma che ti pare de gli occhi miei?
NAT. Tu haideldiuinoin eßi,come cheſieno di coloa re celeſte, o di luce
penetrante. A R. Et de capelli,chedi tu? delle ciglia? NAT. Quelli ſono neri, a
queſte rare, e di oneſta grandezza. ART. Saitu di cheſieno ſegni le predette
coſe? NAT. Non già,ma bene ſtimo, che tu t'habbifigurata in quel mo do
difuori,che tuſei di dentro, cioè piena d'intelletto, edi capacità ftudiofa
delbene,folerte,er ſuegliata comeſei. A R. Tudi il ues ro, e dipiù il naſo
aquilino, le orecchie egualiil collo brieue, il pete tolargo, le ſpalle große,
le braccia, le palme, ø i diti lunghi, tuttiſou no ſogni euidenti dello eſſer
mio. NAT. Ma tunonſei peròtroppo grande,bencheiltuo mouimento ſia tardo, elo
ſtarediritto, chedie moſtrino te manſueta, umana, a piaceuole. Ar. Se non fuſſe
il mio continuo penſamento, mi uedreſti ancora più allegra. Ma guarda
quantiſtrumentiadoperar mi conuiene perporre in opra quello che io nella mente
diſegno. NAT. 10 ſono dite più ſemplice, o piis ſchietta comeuedi. AR. Tu mifai
ridere con tante mammelle. NAT. A punto io fo ridere ogni coſa per tante mie
mammelle, pero che credi tu, chelefemine, noni maſchi habbiano tai parti? AR:
Perche le femine ſono quelle chepartoriſcono, però biſo gna, che come eſſe
danno la uita, cosi diano il notrimento,etperò han no le dette parti come
iſtrumenti della nodritione. NAT. Quans te adunque nedebbo hauer’io, eſſendo
madre dituttele coſe? AR. Tu hairagione,ma chi é quel giouane cosi bello, che
incontro ne uie ne? NAT. L'anima,che poco dianzi era ſola,ora è accompagnata
col corpo. AR. Chemiracoli fai tu ò Natura? NAT. Credi tu Arte ſapere ogni coſa?
AR. 10 fo bene quello, che credo, ſo che le genti non crederanno queſte
mutationi, che tu o io facciamo. NAT. E LO QVENZA. NAT. Pochi ſono i ueri
Sauij., però non diamo orecchie al uolgo. Eccoti il deſiderato aſpetto,
conſidera o miſura le parti fue, che ria trouerai bella,o proportionata
compoſitione. Ar. Che carne gen tile, odelicata, non però troppo molle, guarda
chedignità,che maa niera chefronte allegra, « ſignorile,chipotrà dire che egli
nonhab bia ad eſſere pieno di coſtumi, o d'ingegno? NAT. Ben ſai,che io gli ho
la promeſſa ſeruata in tutto. ART. Rallegromi ueramen. te, o mi pare, che tu
ſeimolto miglior maeſtra di me, ma che nome gli daremo?.NAT. Quello che
conuengaà chi lo fece. ART. Io ne ho poco che fare. NAT. Anzi tugli hai dato,
& darai il miglior'eſſere;ben’è uero,ch'io ne ho la parte mia, o il mie
fattore la ſua. ART. Chiamiamolo dunque DINARDO. NAT. Perche? AR. Perche Dio,
Natura, & Arte il donarono. NAT. Tu mi allegri con tal fabrica di nomi. A
R. In molte lingue io ho queſto potere, il quale e poco da gli huomini
conoſciuto. NAT. Mipiace, ma perche non l'hai tu dacapo a piedi minutamente
miſurato? AR. Micuſui lo hauerglidimoſtrato, che la oratione eſſer dee.comeil
corpo umano, o hauere principio,mezo, & fine.Etche le partiſue deono
corriſpondere à ſejteſe, al tutto con dignità,e decoro? Et si comenel capo ſono
tutti i ſentimenti del corpo, cosi nel principio eller deono ripoſti i
ſentimentidella oratione. A lui pofciaſtarà di ore dinar la predetta
materiafecondo il biſogno,facédolo auuertito, che i teftimonij delle opere de’
mortaliſono le coſe che ſtanno d'intorno à quelli. Et però mi gioua di
nominarle circostanze, percioche fa cendo,o operando l'huomo alcuna coſa, ha
ſempre inanzi,ò apprefe ſo il tempo,il luogo,le perſone, il modo, ilfine, le
quaicoſe fanno fede ſe l'operaſua è buona, orea. Da coteſta conſideratione, ſi
ſtima chi ragiond, e con chi,ſe è la occaſione di dire ſe in questo, o in quel
luo, goſtarà bene di parlareſe ilfine è buono,et altre coſe,alle opere ap
pertenēti. Ma tu gratioſißimo Giouane, che con tăto fauore delcielo ſeinato,ti
ricorderai tu quelle coſe che dette habbiamo fin'ora? Non titurbure,cheio ſono
l'Arte, e queſta è la Natura,con la quale tu, eſſendo Anima ragionaſti. Din. In
che maniera ſono le coſe ſchiette, oignude, oin che forma ſono le compoſte,che
cosi uiſiete mutate, piacemi di hauerui riconoſciute, o cosi uiaffermo di
ricordarmi di quanto s'è detto. ART. 1o non mipoſſo ſatiare di guardarti. NAT.
Che giouanezze ſono queſte? ART. Non ti dolere, o Natura, che la bellezza delle
opere tue ſia da me riguardata con E 2 marauiglia. NAT. Poi che io à tale fon
uenuta, che pienas mente ho ſatisfatto al deſiderio tuo, e chef Anima pronta
s'è die moſtrata, comincia tu ancora ò Arte ad inſegnarci ilmodo, col quale
applichiamo le coſe all'Anima. Et perché non più aſtratte ſiamo,ma compoſte,però
voglio,che con le eſperienze degli ingegni altrui, eo con glieſempi,cheſono
oſtaggi della verità, e con l'uſo quotidiano, tu ti rivolga à darci ad
intendere la forza dell'eloquenza umana. AR. Cosifarò.Ma tu ò Dinardo,
preſteraimi udienza, enon las ſciare à dietro coſa, ch'io ti dica.
Marauiglioſae ueramente la förs za ola uirti della fauella umana. Perciò
cheoltre alla intentione de i concetti e delle uoglie di uoi mortali, che per
eſſa ſi fuole con bes neficio univerſale, &euidente diletto appaleſare, non
é in uoi ſentis mento alcuno,l'appettito del quale non ſia da quellafieramente
eccia tato, e commoſſo; a chi uoleſſe di ciò prender debito argomento.
ogn'hora,che ueniſſe bene, riguardando à i modi,cheſiuſano tra uoi,
ritrouerebbe le coſe à i ſenſi ſottopoſte alcuna uolta effere di minor uirtù in
muovere ciaſcuna il ſenſoſuo,che il parlare, qualhora egli fia con
bello,efficace, es maeſtreuole modoformato, ofabricato, o appreſo doppo alcuna
più profonda cõſideratione, conoſcerebbeese fere quaſi infinito il valore di
eſſo parlare,come che ſolo allo intellets to dimoſtri la ſoſtanza, ela ragione
delle coſe, it che à niuno altro. ſentimento, quantunque la Naturaſempre atutti
liberaliſima ſtata fia,né é,në fu,nefarà conceſſo già mai. Quante cofe del
cielo, quante delle intelligenze, quante di Dio per mezo della lingua, ſenza
l'aiuto de gliocchiò d'altro ſentimento ſi fanno? Il parlare èſolo dimoſtras
tore della ſoſtanza, ilparlare e ſolo per uniuerfale miniſtro dell'aniæ ma,
ilparlare é ſolo ſtrumento della ragione, ma onde é o Dinardo, che ne
gliquenimenti,et ne gli atti degli huomini tanta forza diſcens da nelle parole?
DIN. Credo ueramente, cheeſſendocidato da eſſa Natura ilparlare (come tu dici
)affine,che le noſtre biſogne, ino. ftri penſieri altrui manifestiamo,
granpotere in quella fauella debe ba eſſere,la quale da uero, &ſaldo
intendimento, e da sforzes uole diſiderio procedendo,tale difuori apparirà,
quale di dentro nele l'animo dimorando ſtaraſi. AR T. Ben di. Eſſendo adunque
le pas role come oſtaggi delle uoglie, o de concetti, bifogna, come tra ' sis
gnori auiene,dare gli oſtaggi alle perſone conuenienti, e però prens dendo noi
dintorno al parlare quelmiglior partito, che ſi conviene, soglio,che picde
inanzipie mettendo or, gentilmente più oltre pafé fando ritrouiamo le maniere,
egli aſpetti della oratione, oconfia deriamo quale parlamento à qual coſa,età
qualperſonaficonuenga. DIN. Di, ch'io t'aſcolto. A R. Non è dubbio, che
riportando il parlare per gli orrecchi alle anime de gli aſcoltanti, la forza
dello intendere, o del uolere, biſogna in queſto viaggio dar mouimento,et modo
ad eſſo parlare. Perciòche lo intendimento ó la uoglia nell'anis ma ſi
ripoſano, o iui come nel ſuo caro nido dimorano, ne ſi potreba bono da quello
ſenza ragione, et artificio, dipartire. Al che fare accõa ciamente uoglioin
prima che in ciaſcuna forma, o maniera dell'orda tioneſi truoui il
concettodelle coſe inteſe,ca deſiderate, ilquale par oraſia detto, ey nominato
SENTENZA. Appreſſo uoglio, che ci ſia lo artificio dileuare la sentenza
dalluogoſuo, & là doue farà biſoa gno, leggiadramente portarla, perche
ſimigliando la ſentenza al ris poſo, e all'anima, diremo, che l'artificio sia
la machina, il modo conueniente di leuare il peſo della ſentenza dalla
menteumana Ma perche ſiuede, che l'anima uſa le forzeſue, oadopra il corpo come
ſtrumento,peròà ciaſcunaforma dell'oratione appreſſo l'artificio, Ry la
sentenza, le ſidarà parole, e uoci,per mezo delle qualipotrà l’q. nima delle
fentenze la ſuauirtù, leforzeſue gentilmente adopea rare. Ma perche aſpetto
alcuno non ſipotrà vedere, oueſieno le pare ti, la compoſitione di eſſe, il
colore,icontorni, oifinimentideltutta, deſidero condonar alle parole iſuoi
colori, il ſito, o le partiquaſi membra, o iſuoitermini, accioche altri allo
aſpetto, o alla forma conoſca quali oſtaggiſienodati dall'anima dei i ſuoi
ripofti, & fecreti intendimenti. Chiameremo dunque i colori figure, le
parti membra, il ſito compoſitione, il finimento chiuſa o termine della
oratione. Et perche uanafatica ſarebbe la noſtra, le haueßimo folamente formas
to si bella creaturaaffine che ella ſifteſle, népunto ſimoueffe, pexo come uiuo
s'intendequel corpo,cui mouimēto e conceſſo,cosidaremo al noſtro parlare il ſuo
paſſo,ò uero ilſuo corſo, il qualeſifarà col ri pofo dialcune parti, ecol
mouiméto di alcune altre,come farſi uede ne gli animali, o perche con altro
mouimentoſi muoue uno adirata, con altro un manſueto, o altro é il paſſo
d'huomograue, & atteme pato, altro d'un leggiero, & ancorafreſco di età,perònello
ſpatio, per lo quale hauerà da correre, o caminare la oratione, uoglio che ſi
conoſcaogniinterna qualità delle coſe perlo mouimento, e per lo ris poſo delle
parti delfermone, ewe perchediſopra habbiamo dato à cias fcunaparte il nome che
à formar una manieradiparlaméto ſi richies de däremo ancora à queſta ultima il
nomeſuo,si ueramente che il ripos fo, yo il mouimento delle parti ſotto
unoſteſſo uocabolo ſi rinchiuda, poi chiamato fia ó Numero, onumeroſo
componimento. Din, Qual Dedato potrebbecosi belle figure,afare,
adornare,comefai tu ò Arte ! Raccolgofin tanto quelloche io ho da te ſentito
fin’ora,odi * co,che tu uuoi, che la oratione habbia una qualità,checonuenga
alle *coſe,o alle perfoneſoggette, o queſta iſteſſa qualità, formaá maa
inierazò guiſa dimandi. Ari Cosić, Din. Tuuuoi appreſſo, che ciaſcunaforma
primieramente habbia la ſuaſentenza, che altro non è che il concetto della
coſa,dapoi l'artificio, che é il modo di les * uarla dalluogo ſuo,ne queſto ti
baſta, a però uuoi ire grandamente fi conſideri con quai parole ſi posſa pixi
acconciamente ragionare, a eſprimere la occulta uirtù delle fentenze,diſponendo
quelle parole,e dando loro iſuoicolori, o finalmente rinchiudendole in alcuni
ter "mini acciocheſieno alla ſentenza eguali,come l'Anina à tutto il cor.
Spo, oaciaſcuna parte dare il fuonumeroſo, e miſuratomouimeto, checol ripoſo, o
con la uelocità del tempo preſente ſi miſuri.A RT. Cosi u'ho detto D'IN:
Ognicoſamipare d'intendereragioneuol mente,ſolo che tu uoglia dichiararmi alquanto
d'intorno a questo numero ſo componimento, che NvMERo hai nominato. Et io fon
diſpoſta àfarlo, sueramente,ch'io uoglio prima partitamente ragionare, ego
diſtinguerele maniere,e le forme predette., decioche tu fappia ilnumero
diciaſcuna determinatione. Dico adunque,lapris smaguila,esla prima formadouer
eſſere la chiarezza,la qualeſotto dife contiene la purità, ola eleganzadel dire,
anzi più preſto da queſtemaniere ne riſultala cagione,che nel primo luogoſi
riponga queſta forma perche niuna coſa più ſi ricerca, ò ſi diſideradachi
jagiond, cheil laſciarſi intendere, ilche altramente non ſi può fare fenzá la
purita del dire, la mondezza, la quale oggi uoglio, che ELEGANZA fi
chiamidanoi.Ma percheſpeſſo auiene, chesforzans doſi alcuni di
eſfer’inteſi,cadono in forma umile, ego dimeſſa molto les cuando, otogliendo
della dignità, della grandezza del parlare, però appreſſo la predetta
forma,fi'dirà della grandezza, o grauità della oratione, la quale damoltealtre
forineprocede, che ſono ques ste, Mueftd, Comprenſione, Afprezza;
Veemenzt,splendore,viuacie tài boppo la chiarezza, e la grandezza del dire a
mepare che ſi conuenga conoſcer’un'altra forma; ta quate tutto il corpo della
os rationecon la conuenienza delle parti,ornamento,osgratia recando, bella
ELOVENZA. 39 bella, en miſurata ſimoſtra, v però mi gioua di nominarldBellezzi,
alla quale un'altra formaſidarà, uolubile, preſta,perche tèggiaa dramente ſi
muoua, leggiadramente dico å fine, chene troppo sciolta, né troppo legtta
ſiueggia.Et ſe la chiard, a la grande, ela bella, o la ueloce forma ſono tanto
richieſte, quanto previ dá te ſteſſo cona ſiderare chediremo noi di quella,
nella qual ſi dimoſtrano imodi, i coſtumi delle perſone? Et diquell'altra,chefa
credere ogni coſa, che fi dice esser uerißima? Certo non meno queste, che
quelle eſſerticare deuriano,quando in queſte ſta ripoſta ogni riputatione di
chi parla; et ogni credenza delle coſe,cosi uoglio nominar quella forma,la quae
le ſecondo le nature, & gli abiti delle genti ua ragionando ſotto della
quale è la ſimplicità, la giocondità, o l'acutezza; e quels l'altra ancora, che
uerità ſi dimanda, ſono forme, ſenza le quali morta, e ſpenta ſarebbe la
oratione. Et in queſto numero ſono chiuſe le maniere, o le guiſe, delle quali
alcune haueranno le loro ſentenze, &i loro artificij, e l'altre parti
diſtinte, es ſes parate dalle altre; alcune comunicando inſieme, ſi confarànno,
o nelle ſentenze,ò nello artificio, ò nelle parole, ò nelle figure;o nel reſto,
cos me chiaramente uedrai. Queſte uoglio, chetu da feſteſe, come ſemplici forme
riguardi diſtinte l'una dall'altra. Perciò che non quel lo
cheſitruoua,maquelloche può eſſere,uoglio che tra te medeſimo rivolgendo conſideri,
e ciaſcuna forma, come tale, ew tale conoſchi. DIN. Io t'intendo, Tu vuoi,
ch'io sappia considerare ogni guisa di oratione in se stessa, onde poi a scelta
mia io possa questa con quella,et quella con altra meſcolando, di più
ſempliciformarne una bella.coinin poſitione. AR. Che credi tu,che uaglia
poicoteſta meſcolanza,che nella purità ritenga grandezza,a peſo, nella
ſemplicità,forzkiego fplendore, et habbianella grandezza delbello, e
diletteuole,mache afþramente piaceuole,e piaceuolmente aſpra ſi dimoſtri,
pungendo; gungendo, comeſi dice,ad un'horafteli, &facendo, chequello,che è
nelle ſentenze ampio, o ripieno,ſia nello artificio ampio, ad leggida dro? Et
in tal modo accompagnando le figure d'unaforma con le pas role d'un'altra,dipiù
contrarij (coſa alla natura medeſima riputatd. impoßibile)farne una
amoreuolefratellanza, onde poiqueſto genes roſo accozzamento di coſe repugnanti
empia ogn’unodimarauiglia. DIN: Non mi accender pir di gratia,diquello che io
ſono, cos minciami oggimai à formare ciaſcheduna delle dette maniere, accion
che io ueda il fine della deſiderata catena dell'anima delle coſe, e del
parlare. DE Ï Ï Á parlare. A R. Bendi. Dei dunque ſapere che comenell'Anima,al.
tra parte è quella che apprende la ragione,alfra quella, che é da gli effetti
commoſſi, come dicemmo, o nellaNatura altre ſono le coſe allo inſegnare altreal
muouere appartenenti, cosi alcune formedels la orationeſaranno, le quali
conuerranno alle coſe dello intelletto,als cune alle coſe della uoglia, odello
appetito, o quando queſto non fuſſe, né uia, nė ragione alcunaſarebbe di poter
acconciamente indurs re opinione è affettione con la forza della fuuella. Però
auuertiſci, che nel trattamento delle forme da te ſtesſo potrai intendere qual
forma à qual coſaſi confaccia. DIN. Ricorditi difarmi ogni coſa chiara con
glieſſempi, eio mi obligo di leggerli ſecondola occaſio ne,in qualunque libro
di queſti,che tu uorrai. Ma prima deſidero ſa per alcuna coſa d'intornoal
Numero, o numeroſo componimento. ART. Laſciati à me guidare cheil tutto ſaperai
ſecondo il biſogno. Sappi adunque, è Dinardo, chequalhora alcuno ſi rivolga à
conſi= derare il modo, es la ragione del medicare, che ritrouando alcus na
bella coſa nella medicina, uoglia giudicioſamente applicarla all’are te del
dire, non è dubbio, che egli non ſia per uedere tra la medicina, o l'arte di
che ſiragiona,grandiſsima ſimiglianza. Ecco la medicina cerca di indurre
ſanità, oue ella non ė, ò di conſeruarla doue ella fi truoua.Ilſimile fa
queſt'arte,d'intorno alla buonaopinione, perche conogni ſtudio s'affitica di
metterla,ò di mantenerla oue ſia biſogno. La medicina conoſce qual parte del
corpo con qualrimedio eſſer debs bia riſanata, o preferuata,cosi queſt'arte
opracon l'anima, e con le partiſue con le formedel parlare.La medicina
quantopiù può fugge la noia chepotrebbe alcuno medicamento
recar'atl'infermo,con mele ò con zucchero, ò con altra coperta mitigando il
peßimoſapore, ego l'odore delle medicine, ne da queſta gentilezza ſi parte la
mia figlis uola, cercandodinon offendere quelſentimento,che prende iſuoi ris
medij,il qualſentimento é negli orrecchi ripoſto,per le qualiſotto la ſoauità
delſuono fa trapaſſar’inſino all'anima la opinione, quantun que ſia di coſa
dalla Natura aborrita. Etfinalmente la medicina nelle ſue compoſitioni alcune
coſe ui mette, non tanto gioueuoli alle parti offeſe, quanto preſte
apportatrici delle uirtù dell'altre coſe al luogo infermo, il chequãtoſi
conuenga all'artificiofa fauella,non ti posſo in poca hora dichiarare, perche
troppo grande é la forza delſuo nus meroſo componimento; il quale portando ſeco
ageuolißimamente il ualor delle parole, o delle ſentenze,paſa,e penetra per
ogni parte dell'anima,deſ leroſa di queſta foauicà, e benche gli orecchi del
uolgo neſentano aſſai, non è però da dimandare alcuno Idiota,onde ella proceda,
ò come ſi faccia, perche queſto giudicio è più proprio dell'intelletto, che
delſentimento umano. Giudicando adunque, o conſiderando lo intendente huomo
quale ſia la cagione, che le parole più ad un modo, che ad un'altro diſposte
fieno diletteuolio numeroſe, ritrüoua iltutto eſſere alla Natura, quanto alſuo
principio, conueniente, ma quanto alla perfettione non cosi; però che io ne ho
grandißima parte.Et perche tuſappia quello che la Nde tura, a quello che io ti
poßiamo prestare,dico,che la Natura ha posto alls cor nelle orecchie ilſuo
piacere & diletto, uuole chequelle affaticate fi folleuino con la ſoauità,
a dolcezza del dire; al che fare niuna coſa è più potente nel uostro ragionare,
che'l numero, ola fosnità delle parole. Il qual numero biſogna, che di ſua
uoglia uegna nella oratione, si perchefa oratione, e non muſica,si perfuggir la
fofpitione dello artificio, la quae le con luſingheuole inganno pare, che
uoglia abbagliar l’animo de gli aſcol tanti, operò leua loro ogni perſuaſione,
o fede. Ma quando con ine certo, & non conoſciuto numero,dolce però, e
foaue,ſi compone il parld. -mento, oſi lega inſieme il faſcio della ſentenza,
& del'intendimento,fena za dubbio il tutto con credenza, o diletto ſi
riceue. Fuggafi dunque il ucrſo, « ogni regola continouata del uerſo;
continouata dico, peroche lo ſteſſo numero più volte replicato facilmente
ſiriconoſce, o fache gli os recchi aſpettanti l'ordinato, « conſueto ritorno,
più alſuono,che alſentia mentoſi diano,coſa aſſai chiara, oatteſa ne i uerſi,il
numero de' quali ufae to,e conoſciuto,più dall'arte,che dalla Natura
procedente. Ma percheſenza legge di numero alcuno, o ſciolta del tutto non dee
restare l'oratione, che oſcura, cu piaccuole ne rimarrebbe,però numeroſa o
compoſta ella fi dis fidera grandemente. Ora da che naſca, o per qual cagione
diuerſamente offer conuenga numeroſa l'oratione, quanto à me s'appartiene dirò
bries uemente,dichiarando prima,che coſa ſia NVMERO, ò numeroſo come ponimento.
DIN. Queſto ordine à meſommamente diletta,però di cuore ti prie go,che più
diſtintamente che puoi,me lo dimostri. A R. La neceßità uuole, che le parole
ſieno pari alla ſentenza,perche à queſto fine ſi ragiona,comeſi è
detto,accioche quanto habbiamo di dene troſi dimoſtri di fuori,doue mancando o
accreſcendo parole, o il concetto interno non ſarebbeeſpreſſo, come nella mente
dimora, ò il parlar ſarebbe ociofo,ò mancheuole.Maperche la ſentenza nell'anima
è finita Otermina ta,però debbon’eſſerfinite,os terminate in quantità le
parole, che laſenten F DEELLA za dimostrano. Laqual quantità inſieme ragunata,
Giro, o circuito nos mineremo ilquale altro non ſarà,chepieno operfetto abbracciamento
del la ſentenza. Questo abbracciamento di pari accompagnando la uirtù di ef la
ſentenza,puòhauere una ò piu parti, o maggiori, o minori, ſecondo le parti
della ſentenza;@ ciaſcuna parte é composta di parole, oſi chiama Membro, ó
Nodo; osi come ogni parte del corpo ha il ſuo principio, il ſuofine, e il ſuo
mezo, o il corpomedeſimo e terminato, & finitocosi, le parti dello
abbracciamento, welfo abbracciamento ſarà finito, otermina to. In tutto queſto
ſpatio adunque,che è tra il principio,il fine di ciaſcu na parte, e tra il
cominciamento, es la chiuſa,che s'è detto chiamarſigia ro,ė forza,che la lingua
alcuna uolta s'adagi,o ſi ripoſi ſecondo il biſoa gno,oſi muoua più ueloce,ò
piu tarda ſecondo laqualità del concetto. Et questo ripoſo, oqueſto mouimento,miſurato
col tempo del proferire, para toriſce ilnumero, del qual ragioniamo,uero
figliuolo della compoſitione, o de i termini del parlare, omoltopiu nel
fine,chenel cominciamento e più apparente ne gli eſtremi chenel mezo.Etperche
di eſſo Numero gli orecchi fanno giudicio in quanto al ſentimento del piacere,
o del diſpiaa cere,per eſſer naturale à ciaſcuno la dilettatione de' ſenſi,
ol'intellettofos lo come ti dißi,ne cerca la cagione però, hauendoſifin'ora in
parte dimoſtra to quello cheall'intelletto s'appartiene,in parte dico,perciò
che l'intelletto in questo caſo molto alle orecchie deferiſce, odiuerſe maniere
hanno dia uerfo numero.Però cominciando a trattare delle forme del dire daremo
a ciaſcheduno il ſuo numeroſo componimento,o con effempi ancora ritroue remo
quello che con ragioneſfarà dimostrato. DIN. Molto bene auif di farmicapace di
questa magnifica oillus ſtre compoſitione; però ſegui,che con maggior
deſiderio, cheprima,fono apparecchiato di aſcoltarti,perche mi pare,che ora tu facci
di me pruoua marauiglioſa. AR: La primaformae nominata Chiarezza,laqual naſce
da purità, og da eleganza,come s'è detto. Pero eſſendo ella quaſi un tutto,
acciò che meglio ſi manifeſti,ſidirà delle parti fue,&prima della mondezza
opile rità,poidella ſcelta, o eleganza. Deefl dunque dare allapurità del dire
quelle ſentenze, le qualiſono di piana intelligenza, & non hanno biſogno di
piu conſideratione,come per lo pia fono,o effer deono le narrationi delle co fe,come
qui. Leggi. DIN. Tancredi, Principe di Salerno, fu Signore affai umano, di
benigno aſpetto. AR. Eccoti, che ſenza alcuna fatica di diſcorſo ogni mediocre
in. gigno gegropuò capire ilſentimento
della ſentenzagià letta, come ancora in questi uerfi.Leggi. DIN. Io ſon
Manfredi, Nipote di Coſtanza Imperatrice. Et molti eſſempi ſono della purità
nelle nouelle, la ſentenza delle quali per la maggior parte è molto alla uolgar’intelligenzafottopo
sta,pur che partitamenteſa ciaſcheduna inſe conſiderata, percio che pua re
nonſarebbono, quando adalcun fineſi riguardaſſe, oueroaltro attendes fero per
fornir'il ſentimento loro, comeſe in questa guifa ſi diceſſe. Eſſendo Tancredi
principe di Salerno Signore aſſai umano, per che queſta ſentenza non ſarebbe
terminata,o finita,douendo attendere a quel io, che ſegue, o però più preſto
oſcura ſarebbe chemonda enetta. Non aſpetti adunque altro intendimento,chi
uuoleſſer puro nella ſentenza, las quale stando nell'anima,dee cljer con
tal'artificio leuata, che ſolaſi tirifuo riga come di dentro dimostra il
concetto,cosi di fuori fa fatto paleſe,ſen. za alcun accidente che quella
accompagni,o conſegua. Et però daquesta formaſia bandita ogni circoſtanza di
tempo diluogo, di perſona,o di mo. do,ò d'altro auenimento.Vedi questa parte
quanto, é pura nella ſentenza: DIN. La quale percioche egli,sicomei mercatanti
fanno, andava molto in tornoapoco con lei dimoraua, s'inamoród’uno giovane
chiamato Roberto. AR. Non lascia eſſer pura cotesta sentenza, quel
trammezamento, che dice, percioche egli,si come i mercatanti fanno,andaua molto
intorno, o questo adiuiene,perche ſospeſoſi tiene l'animo, di chi ode. Fuggi
adunque ogni raccoglimento ſe uuoi eſſere nel tuo dir mondo, &neto;
&narra le co Se partitamente come ſtanno,ma de i raccoglimenti quãti,o
quali ſieno, dirà poi.Delle parole ueramente con le quali ſi dee uestire 'la
purità breue ammaeſtramento ſi daràperche, tutte le parole,piane,facili,ufitate,
bricui, O communi ſonoall'anima della purità molto proportionate, onde le trae
portate,le ſtraniere,le lunghe, & quelle, che la lingua pena à proferire, o
l'intelletto a capirefono dalla purità lontane,però purisſime ſono queste. DIN.
Cheà me pareuaeßer’in una bella, « diletteuole ſelua,& in quella andar
cacciando ehauer preſo una cauriola, parcami, che ella fuſſepiu che la neue
bianca,or in brieueſpatio diucniſſe si mia domeſtica, che punto da me nonſi
partiua,tutta uia à meparcua hauerla, si cara, cbe accio che da me non
partiſſe,le mi pareua nella gola hauer meſſo un cola no d'oro,e quella con una
catena d'oro tener con le mani. ARTE Non è poco hauer giudicio di ritrouar le
parole adognima niera conformii,mamolto più ſi deue auuertir' nel diſporle, o
colorirle,on de ne naſce il deſiderato aſpetto.Et però ſappi che la figura
delle parole,al la puritàſottopoſte,é il dritto,ecco. DIN. Nicolò Cornacchini
fu nostro cittadino,o ricco huomo. ARTE Et quiancora DIN. Aſolo adunqueuago, «
piaceuole caſtello poſto ne gli eſtremi gioghi delle nostre Alpiſopra il
Triuigiano ecfi come ogn’uno deeſapere) Arneſe della reina di Cipri. ARTE Non
cosipuro ſarebbe ſe da gli obliqui caſi haueſſe comine ciato, Dicendo,Di Aſolo,uago
& piaceuole caſtello poſſe ditrice fu la Reie na di Cipri. Ma puro e per la
figura del dritto, auegna che ſecondo quella: parola puro non ſia,doue ſi dice
Arneſe,uoce ſtraniera, ancora nello are. tificio non é puro per quello
tramezamento, che dice (si come ogn’uno dee ſapere) o per quelle circoſtanze
del caſtello uago, piaceuole, pera che ritarda il ſentimentode gli aſcoltanti,
oui mette le circonſtanze del luogo. DI N. Dunque erra chi uolendo cßer puro
uſa parole non pure, artificio,ò figura d'altra maniera,della oratione? ÁR:
Errerebbe ſe egli credeſſe,otentaſſe d'eſſere in ogni parte puro, &netto,
& non uſaſſe quello che ſi conuiene,ma non erra uolendo alla pu rità del
dire porgere «grandezza o dignità.Ma ancora uoglio che ogni maniera ſia in ſe
ſteſſa conſiderata, e però lapurità del dire haurà le. parti ſue distinte,os
ſeparate dalle altre;nė ſolamente il dritto è figura, di questaforma, o
maniera,ma anche ogni altro colore, che ſia contrario als la comprenſione della
quale ſi dirà poi,ora trattiamo delſito, odellacom poſitione delle parole, Dico
nella purità,cs mondezza del dire douerſi met: tere le parole inſieme con quel
modo,che piu uicino ſia al fauellare, uſitae coſenza molta cura,caffettatione
ſemplicemente quantoſi può. Et si cos me in ciaſcheduna parola di queſta forma
biſognaua leuar'ogni durczza, Cogni difficultà di lettere,o di ſillabe,accioche
la uoce di ſuono e quale, temperato, « non impedito ufciſſe fuori,cosi nella
compoſitione biſos gna guardare di acconciare talmente, che pine tosto nate,
che fabricate appariſcano,come nello eſempio già letto del ſogno ſi conoſceud.
Conſided ra tu poi la forza, & lofpirito di ciaſcuna lettera, e di ciaſcuna
fillaba, come la natura in tutte ha posto la ſuapiaceuolezza, durezza, &
tifa rai queſto giudice del ſuono delleparole, della loro diſpoſitione,ucdi che
la A ſi forma nella più profonda parte del petto,o eſce poifuori con alta восс,
uoce,riſonante,onde lo ſpirito di eſſa grande,oſonoroffente,odi laſe guente,
ch'é,B. LA B é puraſnella,deſpedita,come è afpra'la C.quando è fine della
fillaba,ISA C, órauca quando è posta inanzi la A à la V come per lo contrario e
di dolce,ſpeſſo, o pieno ſuono,precedendo alla I. @alla E.co. me qui.Salabetto
mio dolce iomi ti raccomado o cosicome la mia perſona è al piacer tuo, cosi é
ciò che ciė, o cio che per me ſi può fare al comando tuo. Conſidera poi da te
ſteſſo il restante delle lettere, in che maniera eſſa natura diſua propria
qualità ha ciaſcuna dotata, & uederai onde nde ſce più questa,chequella
compoſitione.Le parti, &le membra, della purie. rità effer deono
breui,& ciaſcuna dee terminar'ilſuo ſentimento,non ritar: dando con
lunghezza de' giri, o di raccoglimenti la intelligenza del poe polo,come qui, D.
Suol’eſſere a' nauiganti caro,qualhora da oſcuro o fortuneuole nembofofpinti
errano,otrauagliano la lor uia,colſegnodella indiana pie tra,ritrouare la
trammontana, in modo che qual uentoſoffi conoſcendo,non Ria lor tolto il
potere, & uela,ogouerno,là doue eßi di giugner procaca ciano,ò almeno doue
più la loro ſaluezza ueggiono, indirizzare. Bifox gna parimente in minoreſpatio
raccogliere il ſentimento di ciaſcuna para te,oueſt uuole eſſer puro, ofare in
questo modo,benche le parolefieno ale quanto dure.Leggi. DIN. Chino di Tacco
piglia l'Abbatedi Clugni,a medicalo del ma le di ſtomaco, « poi il
laſcia,L'abbate ritorna, in corte di Roma,o il rico cilia con Bonifatio Papa,o
fallofriere dell'oſpedale. A R. Etnel uerſo ancora eſſer dee la predetta norma
oſſeruata,come, qui. Leggi. DIN. Pace non trouo,e non ho da farguerra, E temo,
eſpero, & ardo, e for’un ghiaccio. Ilche non quiene in queſta altra parte.
DIN. Voi, ch'aſcoltate in rimeſparſe il ſuono. Perciò che ilſenſo è troppo
ritardato,o con lunghißime parti rattenuto. Haſi dunque della purità quello
chebiſogna d'intorno alle ſentenze, allo artificio, aile parole, alla figura,
alla compoſitione, & alle parti di cſa. Reſta,che ſi tratti del numero,
& del finimento,cioè della chiuſa,odel ter mine della ſentenza,o delle
parti ſue.Dico adunque, che nello andare, ego nello ſpatio di queſta forma non
ſi dee eſſere néueloce,ne tardo, mateme perato, & ne i ripoſi,one i
mouimenti, operche il numero naſce dalla compoſitione,co dal fine,peròſapendo
quale eßer dee la compoſitione dele parole, quale il fineztutto quello,cheſotto
di queſte partiſ contiene darà ad intender quellocheſi è detto, perche quantoſi
ricerca alla com pofitione ſi é dichiarito reſta che ſidica del
finimento.ogniſentenza, ogni giro puòfinire,ò in alcunaparola tronca,oin parola
piena,ſienoque ſte parole,ò di due,ò di tre,ò di piu ſilabe,o ancora di una. Le
parolepie ne,e compiute ò ſonoſdrucciolofe, & uolubili,o ſalde,oferme,
opers che non ſoloRidce conſiderar l'eſtrema parola di tutta la chiuſa, ma anco
la uicina, o proſima,però partitamente ſi dirà di ciaſcun finimento al luo go
ſuo.Comeadunque uoglia la purità terminare le chiuſeſue, aſſai chiaro ofer
dee.Perciò cheaßimigliandoſi elle al dire cotidiano,fuggirà il fine del le
parole tronche, comeſono quelle andò,corfuftarà,o C.perche le mede. fime dee
nella diſpoſitione fuggire,come ramarico, o render florido. Et A contenterà di
quelfine,cheper lo più la Natura a’uolgari dimostra,ma io non uoglio, che con
tanta religioneſifiniſca in parole piene, &perfete te,fuggendo le
tronche,ole fdruccioloſe,che alcuna uolta nonſimetta fie nealtrimenti alſuo parlare,perche
quello cheſi dice, ſi dice per la mage gior parte de ifinimenti,e delle chiuſe
della purità. Da questi adunque odalla diſpoſitione riſorge quella miſura,che
noi numero addimandiamo. Eſſendo adunque lachiuſa ſimile alla dispoſitione, «la
diſpoſitione non isforzeuole,matemperata,& naturale,fcguita che il numero
dell'uno, o, dell'altro figliuoloſarà, à quelle fomigliante.Ben'è uero,che
laforza di cia fcuna manierà,e ripoſta piu toſto nelle altre parti,che nel
numero, eccetto, che nella bellezza,douc l'ornamento,e il numero grandementeſ
cerca, as molto piùè ne i uerfi, « nella poeſia,che altroue, o questo dico,
acciò che fu non metta piu ſtudio,doue nonbiſogna riportandoti a gli orecchi,
il giudicio delle quali da eſſa natura é ſommamente aiutato. Ecco adunque, è
Dinardo,quanto giouala mondezza, opurità del dire alla chiarezza; ma perche
questa ſempliceforma non può daſefola si chiaramente parlae re che non
uiſiaqualche impedimento,però biſogna ouunque le ſia di aiua. to mestieri,con
la eleganza aiutarla, come con maniera chepiù un modo, che un'altro, piu questo
ordineche quello ſecondo il biſogno adoprando eleg ge et fouegna alla
ſemplicepurità del dire,ilqual'aiuto èpiù presto nell'ar. tificio, che nelle
ſentenze ripoſto. Però che ella ſi sforzafar ogni ſentenza chiara
&aperta,non che le pure già dichiarite di ſopra. Parliamo adune que della
cleganza,o prima dello artificio, colquale ella lcuar fuole ogni sentenza nella
mente riposta. AR. La ceeganza e maniera, che porta chiarezza à tutte le
maniere della oratione, operò non tanto alla purità, dove ella manca soccorre, quanto
à ciascaduna forma opra intelligenza, o facilità, daqueſto nasce, che la
eleganza dalla purità del dire in alcuna coſa é differente. Perciò che la
purità da ſe ſteſſa è chiara,oaperta,ma la eleganza nella grandezza, e
magnificenza del dire ecomeun sole, che ogni oſcurità, che per quella poteſſe
uenire, leua,o diſgombra,o però in ogniſentenza ella può molto, si con l'artificio
fuo, si co i colori,«le figure.L'artificio adunque di les uare ogniſentenza
dallo intelletto,acciò che ella ſia inteſa, cogni auuerti. mento innanzi fatto
di quello che ft ha da ragionare. Leggi. DIN. Canterò com’io uißi in libertade
Mentre Amor nel mio albergo à ſdegno s'hebbe Poiſeguirò si come à luim'increbbe
Troppo altamente: AR. ilſimigliante R fa nella proſa,comequi. DI N. Mipiace à
condiſcendere à conſigli d'huomini, de' quai dicena do mi conuerràfar due coſe
molto a' miei costumi contrarie,l'una fia alqua to me comendare, &l'altra
il biaſimare alquanto altrui, maprioche dal uc ro nė dall'una,ne dall'altra non
intendo partirmi ilpurfarò. AR. Vedi quanto gentilmente | sbriga lo intelletto
dello aſcoltare con tali auuertimenti,Appreſſo i quali aſſai bello artificio,
s'intende quela to,che per chiarezza dialcune coſe altre ne narra fenza le
quali non ſi in tenderebbe ageuolmente il reſtante.Leggi. DIN. Ma per trattar
del ben, ch'io vi trovai, Diró de l'altre coſe,ch'io ui ho ſcorte. AR. Se il poeta
qui non doueſſe dimostrare le pene de dannati e i tormenti di quegli,che ſono
in diſgratia di Dio, non haur ebbe potuto dare ad intendere facilmente il
beneche ne riuſci poi,per hauer lo inferno cers Cato.Ecco qui dalla medeſima
neceßità costretto quest'altro deſcriue la pee ſtifera mortalità peruenuta
nella egregia Città di Firenze,auuertendo pri ma chi legge,in queſto modo. DIN.
Mapercioche qualefuße la cagione,perche le coſe che appref fo
Rileggeranno,aueniſſeno,non ſi poteua ſenza queſta rammemoratione dimoſtrare,quafi
dineceßità coſtretto à ſcriuerla miconduco. A R. Ecco qui ancora un'altra bella
preparatione di coſe,fatta per le uare ogni impedimento,chepoteſſe
offendereilrimanente. DIN. Ma io mi ti uoglio unpoco ſcuſare,che di que' tempi,
che tu te n'andaſti alcuneuolte ci uoleſti uenire, e non poteſti,alcune ci
uenisti, onon fosti cosi lietamente veduto,comefoleui,& oltre à questo di
ciòche io al termine promeſſo,non ti rendei gli tuoi danari, AR. In fine ogni
precedente auifo, & ogni ordine di coſe, e ſecondo, che elte ſon
fatte,narrandole,ė artificio ſcelto, & elegante,però tutte le propofitoni
de' poeti ſono elegantißime. Leggi. DIN. Veramente quant’io del regno fanto Ne
la mia mente poteifar teſoro Sarà ora materia del mio canto, AR. E qui ancora
DIN. Et canterò di quel ſecondo regno, Que l'umanoſpirito ſi purga E di
ſalir’alCiel diuenta degno. ART. il fimigliante modo è oſſeruato ne i principij
di ogni nouelld, come da tefteſſo uedrai.Suole ancora la Eleganza porre
artificioſamente le oppoſitioni con le riſpoſte partitamentecome qui. Leggi.
DIN. Saranno per auentura alcuni di uoi, che diranno,ch'io habbia nello
ſcriuere queste nouelle troppo licenza usata. ART. Eccola dimanda ſeguita la
ſolutione. DIN. La qual coſa io niego,percioche niuna coſa esi difoneſta, che
con oneſte parole dicendola ſi diſdica ad alcuno. ART. Et cosi di paripaſſo
alle obiettioni riſponde, benche altre fide te inſiemepostohabbia ogni accuſa
di ſefatta, opoi s'habbiafcufato, ma quelmodo non ha dello elegante,comeilpredetto
poſe prima le oppoſitioni tutte inſieme allora quando diſſe, Leggi. DIN. Sono
adunque, diſcrete Donne, stati alcuni, che queſte nouelle leggendo hanno detto
cheuoi mipiacete troppo, eche oneſta coſa nonė, che io tanto diletto prenda di
piacerui e di confolarui.Et alcuni han dete to peggio,di coinmendarui,come io
fo.Altri più maturamente moſtrando di uoler dire,hannodetto, che alla mia età
non stà bene l'andar'omai dietro queſte coſe, cice à ragionare di Donne,o à
compiacer loro.Et molti molto te neri della miafamamoſirandoſi dicono,ch'io
farei più ſauiamente,àſtarmi con le Mufe in Parnaſo,che con queſte ciance
meſcolarmi tra uoi.Etſon di quegli ancora,che più difpettoſamente,che
ſauiamente parlando,hannodete to,cl’io farei più diſcrettamente à penſare,donde
io poteßi hauer del pae ne, che dietro a queste fraſche andarmi paſcendo di
uento. Et certi altri,in altra guiſa eſſere state le coſe da me
raccontateui,che come io le ui porgo s'ingegnano in detrimento della mia fatica
di dimostrare. AR. In queſto luogo molte accuſe contra dello autoreſi mettono,
pri ma che ad alcunaſi riſponda, ilche non è cosi elegante,comeilprimoartife
cio,ben che in tanta confuſione egli ſtudiaſſe di eſſer chiaro, cinteſo, eso
auiſaſje quiſaſſe auanti lo aſcoltante,come fa doue dice,roppo alquanto dalle
predet te oppoſitioni,perche non di ſubito riſponde, ilche ancora é dalia
cleganza lontano. Ma leggi. DIN. Ma quanti, ch'io uegna à far la riſpoſta ad
alcuno,mipiace in fauore di me raccontare, non una nouella intera,ma parte di
una. AR. Et ne poeti ancora fi oſferua,ſecondoche meglio lor ben uiene di fare
cosifatti partimenti.Vedi. DIN. Tu argomenti,ſe'lbuon uoler dura, La uiolenza
altrui,per qual cagione Di meritar mi ſcema la miſura? A R.Queſta éuna
propoſta,alla quale ſecondo l'arte della eleganzaſ doueá prinia riſponderemaſi
è poſta ancora la ſeconda, doueſeguita. DIN. Ancor di dubitar ti dà cagione Parer
tornarſi l'anima àleſtelle. Secondo la ſententia di Platone. AR. Ben che tu
ueda qui le propoſte effer'inſieme collocate, non è per ròſenza cleganza quella
parte,per quello cheſegue. DIN. Queſteſon le question,che nel tuo uelle Pontano
egualemente, e però pria Tratterò quella chepiù ba di felle. ART. In queſto
luogo non tanto la eleganza dimoſtra lo artificio fuo per lo auuertimentofatto
di quelloche ſi dee dire, quanto per la elettione di riſpondere prima ad una
domanda,che ad un'altra.Euui ancora un'altro artificio della ſceltezza,ilqualeè
quando ſi ripiglia quello,che ſi è detto, et ſi dimostra,di che poi ſi ba da
dire,come in queſti luoghiſegnati. DIN. Ma hauereinſino à qui detto della
preſente nouella, uoglio che mi basti,o à coloro riuolgermi,a' quali ho la
nouella raccontata. Ilqual luogo acciò chemeglio quelloche è
detto,equellocheſegue, co me stefje ui moſtrerò. AR. Aſaiſi èdetto fin qui,con
che arte la eleganza leua dalla mente ogni ſenienza,oraſi dirà con quai parole
più acconciamente ella ragioni, oquesto brieuemente ſi farà.Vſa la eleganza le
medeſime parole, che la purità,chiare,piane,natie,o tali,che niuna durezza in eſe
ſi truoui. Et perònonſono eleganti,né con eleganza diſposte le parole che
dicono, Amen due ſopra gli mal trattiſtracci caddero à terra,&quelle, Non
curandofar gli falſ, o quelle che nellapurità dicemmo,Ghino di Tacco piglia
l'Abba te di Clugni.Da quelloche ſi è detto delle parole, tu puoi uedere
chedalla difpofitione di eſſe,le parti,i finimenti, &il numerononſono dalla
purità lontani, DELLA lontani,anziſonole coſe steſſe. Leggerai,come
gentilměteſi sbriga dalle co fe,come brieuemente rinchiuda il ſentimento, come
puramente elegga, o temperatamenteſi muoua questa nouella di Ricciardo de'
Manardi,otro uerai parole parti, chiuſe,numerio fiti diparole purißime,
oelegantisſa me. Ma le figure di queſtaforma fono diuerſe molte, tra lequali
ottiene il primo luogo la ordinatione, laquale è unafigura,che da quello cheſi
dia ce,dimostra altro ſeguirne, come qui. DÍN. Et accioche quello chemi par
difare,conoſciate,oper conſes guente aggiugnere, o menomare poßiate à uoſtro
piacere,con pocheparo le we lo intendo di dimostrare. AR. Et ancora qui della
fortunaparlando. DIN. Le quai noiſcioccamente nostre chiamiamo,ſeno nelle ſue
ma ni, oper conſeguente da lei ſecondo ilſuo occulto giuditio ſenza alcuna po
ſa, d'uno in altro,o d'altro in uno fucceßiuamente ſenza alcun conoſciuto
ordine da noi,eſſer da lei permutate. AR. Egli ſf ordina, come ſi è detto anco
nel proporre di quante coſe fha da dire,con lo auuertimento di dire prima una
coſa,o poi un'altra.Il che inquanto abbraccia più coſe,ė Comprenſionedella
qualeſi dirà. Main quanto diſpone, acconcia allo intendimento,epuro,eleganteo
chiaro.Al trafiguraèſcelta,eelegante,oltra la predetta nominata Partitione, lde
quale Afa,quando noi,due coſe è piùſepariamo parlando, come qui. DIN. Et il
tacere,oil parlareoggimai mi ſonoegualmente diſcari, perciò che nè quello
debbo,ne questo poſſo. AR. In molti modipuòpartitamente ragionare,come qui con
mola ti efſempi ſi dimostra. DIN. Tra per la forza della peftifera mortalità,
per lo eſſeremol ti infermimalſeruiti,& abbandonati. AR: Etqui ancora. DIN.
Et tra che egli s'accorſe, si come huomo, che molto aueduto erd, Otrache da
alcuno fu informato,trouò dal maggiore al minore Co. ART. Etaltroue. DIN.
Carißime dore,siper le parolede fauijhuomini udite, o si per le cofe da me molte
uedute or lette. AR. Appresso le dette figureit ripigliamento è bellißimo
colore della eleganza, come quelloche alla obliuione,alla oſcuritafoccorra, in
quca ſto modo, DIN: E perche mifogliate immantenente Del ben,che adkor’adhor
l’anima fente? Dico che ad hord ad bora, Vostra mercede, iofento in mezo l'alma
Vna dolcezza inufitata e noua AR. Et nella proſa, come qui. - DIN.
Ilchemanifestamente potrà apparire nella nouella, laquale dl raccontare
intendo,manifeſtamente dico,non il giuditio di Dio, maquello de gli
huominiſeguitando. · AR. Queſto ripigliamento appreſſo la chiarezza e di non
poco peſo alla oratione, come figura molto uicina al raddoppiamento, ilquale è
di for za marauiglioſanell'arte deldire,o,òinterpretado,ò interrogado,ò riſpon
dendodi ſubito alla eleganzaconuerrà grandemente.Etper contrarioRfan ra nella
oſcurità,la quale naſce da confuſione,& diſordine, nel’animofia tà, o ne
gli affetti grandementeſi ricerca,perche in eſil'animo dallo ema pito
traportato ogni coſa difordina,o la mente confonde. E adunque la confufione
alla ſcelta,& elegante oratione contraria,come la meſcolanza, alla purità,
da ambedue, cioè confufione, meſcolanza, naſce la oſcurità, come da quell'altre
due la chiarezza del dire. Della quale pora uoglio che à baſtazaſa detto,o
dimoſtrato.Resta chefi ragioni del la grădezzadel dire,acciò che il pericolo
della baſſezza,odell'umilità,che Hella chiarezza ciſopraſta,con l'autorità della
orationeſ leui in tuttó. DELLA GRANDEZZA DEL DIRE, prima della Maeſtà. ESSEND'O
la grandezza del dire unamaniera, che oltra l'uſato modo di ragionare inalza, ø
follicuala oratione, è di neceßità di molte parti compoſta delle quali altre
faranno daſe ſteße altreinſieme alcune co fe raccommunandofaranno un tutto
magnifico, generoſo. E adunque la grandezzafatta dalla maestà,dalla
comprenſionedalla ucemenza, dalla ui uacità,dallo ſplendore,o dall'apprezza.La
maeſtà, ola comprenſione da ſeſtanno,ohanno le parti loro dall'altre
ſeparate.Etperò di clje prima di rò, poi dell'altre partitamente. La maestà del
dire é maniera conueniente alle coſe grandi,o Rfa quan do di eſſe con dignità,o
ornamento ſi ragiona.Leſentenze ueramentedela la maeſtàſono prima quelleche appartengono
à Dio, o alle diuine coſe,co uerità e decoro efpreffe,come queſte.Leggi, DIN.
Conueneuole coſa è carißimeDonne,che in ciaſcuna coſa, che l'huomo fa,dallo
ammirabile,oſanto nome di colui,ilquale di tuttofufate tore, le diaprincipio.
AR. AR. Dapoi,le coſe appartenenti alla
natura umana, come qui. Leggi. DIN. Natural ragione è di ciaſcuno che ci naſce,
la ſua uita quantū que può,aiutare,e conferuare, & difendere. ART. Et
appreſſo quelle,oue le ſecrete cagioni delle coſe inuestigane do, & dimoſtrando
ſt uanno,lequai poco appartengono alla uita ciuile, po co dico, perche alcuna
uolta ſi diconoperfare alcuna fede à quellochedicia mo,come qui. DI N. Andiamo
adunque,& bene duenturoſamente aſſagliamo la nde ue, che Iddio alla noſtra
impreſa fauorcuole ſenza uento prestarle,la citien ferma. AR: La maeſtà è uſata
per lo più ne i proemij delle nouelle. Perció che in eßi fi contiene il
fine,perlo qualeſi racconta il tutto,& percheil fi ne, per utile,a
giouamento de gli huomini ſi ricerca,però di coſe al uiucre appartenenti con
grandezza maeſtaſiragiona.Leggi queſto principio, come è pieno di alta,o degna
ſentenza. DIN. Credefi permolti filoſofanti,che ciò che s'adopra de mortali,
Rade gli Dij immortali diſpoſitione,& prouedimento. AR. Degne adunque di
riuerenzaſono le coſe di Dio, però chiunque di quelle altramente ragiona,ė
dalla maeſtà del dire lontano, perche chida ramente da te comprenderai,che
niuna maeſtàſi truoua là,doue il mutamē to in Angelo, d’un frate ſi narra,
&doue in alcuni altri luoghi non ſi dicon no coſe alla religione
conformi,con quella uerità e decoro, che ſi conuica ne, &però aliena dalla
maeſtà équcũa comparatione,chedice, DIN. Si come eterna uita é ueder Dio, Ne
più ſ brama,né bramarpiulice, Cosi me, Donna, il uoi ueder, felice Fa in queſtobreue,
efrale uiuer mio: AR. Lo affetto di chi ragiona ſcuſa chiunque parla in tal
modo, pere che lo acceſo deſiderio acciecal'intelletto,ela lingua come di ebbri
uacil la,ofa dire che gli Angeli aſpettano di uedere il bel uiſo delle amate
los rou che la preſenza di quelle adorna il Paradiſo, altre coſe,le quai pe rò
ſotto altra form !,che questa ſi riduranno.Sarà dunque ſeuera,o degna, epiena
di maeſtà la ſeguente ſentenza. DIN. La gloria di colui che tutto mouc Per
l'uniuerjo penetra, e riſplende In una parte più, e meno altroue. ART. Et per
la più parte degno e il preſente poema,dalquale aj na turali, co umane,o diuine
ſentenze,ſecondo la macià delle coſe leggendo
ne ritrarrai, come qui, DIN. Le coſe tutte quante Hann'ordine tra loro,e
queſto è forma Che l'uniuerfo à Diofaſomigliante. Qui ueggion l'altre creature
l'orma De l'eterno ualore, ilqualefine, Al qual'èfatta la toccata forma. A R.
Et finalmente pieniſono i uolumi de i buoniſcrittori. Leggi. DI. ciaſcuno, che
bene, o onestamente unol uiuere, dee in quan topuò, fuggire ogni cagione,
laquale ad altrimenti fare il potere cons durre AR. Et qui, D I N.Manifesta
coſa è cheogni giuſto Re,primo oſſeruatore dee eſſe re delle leggifatte da lui.
AR. Baſtiti queſto d'intorno alle ſentenze della formapredetta. Ord, con che
artificio dal lor ſoggiorno leuareſi debbano,intenderai.Percheadū que piene di
maestà ſono quelleſentenze,che di Dio, & delle diuine coſe, delle
umane,& naturali, peròfanno con fiducia O certezza è afferman do,ò
negando,ſarà l'artificio della maestà. Negando,come qui. DIN. Ne
creator,necreatura mai Cominciòci, figliuolfu ſenzaamore O ' natural, o
d'animo, e tu'l ſai. AR. Affermando,come qui, DIN. Lo natural fu ſempre ſenza
errore Ma l'altro puote errar, per mal'oggetto oper poco, ò per troppo di
vigore. A R. Leggi pure,chenon mancano effempi. DIN. Le coſe, che alferuigio di
Dio N fanno, deono far tutte nete tamente. AR. Et qui, DIN. Chiunque fouente fa
male,egli certamente non é Iddio,& chii que Iddio e,egliſenza dubbio non
puòfar male. AR. Laeſpreßione ha gran forza nell'artificio di quella forma com
me qui. DIN. Veramente fiam noi poluere eombra, Veramente la uoglia cieca,e
ingorda, Veramente fallaceè la ſperanza, AR. Et qui ancora DIN. 57 DE LL A DIN.
Nel ciel, che più de la ſua luce prende, Fu'io, euidi coſe, che ridire Nésà, ne
può, chi di la sù diſcende. A R. Hanno in queſta forma le allegorie peſo, or
forzagrandißima, eperò le ſacre lettere di allegorie ſono ripiene,etutto il
preſente poema è quaſi una continuata allegoria,coſa molto alla ſuamaeſtà
diprofitto,co d'ornamento, &però la leonza,il leone,la lupa, e tutto quello
chein tute ta l'opera gli appariſce,èuna raunanza di allegorie, degna « grande
for pra modo.Conſidera come queſt'altro poeta uolendo innalzar le coſe baſe,
Qumili grandemente ſi dà alle allegorie,facendo con quelle i cotidiani aue
nimenti si grandi apparire che ifatti d'arme, ole coſe marauiglioſe di na tura
si grandi nonſono.Ecco, DIN. Quando dal proprio ſito ſi rimoue L'arbor, che
amogià Febo in corpo umano, Soſpira e fudaà l'opera Vulcano, Per rinfreſcar
l'afpre ſaette à Gioue. AR. Questa grandezza di coſa, altro non uuol dire,ſenon,che
nel partiredi un luogo ad un'altro della donnafua, fieramente era il Cielo tura
bato da uenti, « da tempefta.Et cosi il reſtante di questo fonetto, omolti de
gli altri,che ſeguono per l'artificio delle allegorie,ode gli enigmi, mis
rabili appariſcono,à chi gli legge.ENIGM Iſono modi oſcuri di dire, come qui,
Fortuna, chi t'intende, non t'intende, Efa chiſei,chi non ſa chi tufa. Tale
adunque é l'artificio della maestà. Reſta óra à dirſi delle altre par tijeg
prima delle parole.Sono alcune lettere, lequali fanno leparole ampie, e di
ſpirito sforzeuole,come la A la 0,però quelle parole, che ſono di tai
lettere,odiRllabe di eſſe fatte,ſaranno alla maestà del dire conucnicne
tißime,tanto più diforza haueranno,quanto auanzeranno le duefillas be,odi
maggiorſignificatione faranne.come qui. DIN. Quel, che infinita prouidenza, o
arte, Moſtrò nel ſuo mirabil magistero, Che creò questo, e quell'altro emiſpero,
E manſueto più Givue, che Marte. ART. Et ancora in un'altro luogo.
Perſeguendomi Amor’al loco uſato Ristretto, in guiſa d'huom, ch'aſpetta guirra,
Che prouede,e ipaßi intorno ferra, Di mici antichi penſier mi saua armato. AR.
Sono ancora le parole traportate,di grandezza, e maestà mdo rauiglioſa, «perche
molti credono il loro dritto pagare,ſe degni, ogran di riputando,poi gonfi fono
o freddiper la troppa licenza,cbe piglia no nel trasferire,però alcuna coſa ti
ſcoprirò d'intorno alle traslationi, bel lage degna,o di profitto non mediocre.
Voglio,che dalla bruttezza del uitio ſpauentatoda quello alla uirtù ti
riuolga,o però di quelli dirò, i qua li cosi gonfiamente,o cosi freddamente
parlando, come fanno,ſono da ogni ſaldo giuditio abborriti. Alcuni di queſti
hanno ardire di fingere,odi co por nomi,oparoleſenza alcuno raffrenamento di
conſideratione,chiamar do il Cielo oculoſo,il mare ueligante, la terra
granifera, o di queſte s'eme piono ifogli.Altri danno à nomi ſtranieri,dalla
antichità rifiutati,nuoui, oſcuri,o di niunſentimento,coſa fpenta,o
agghiacciata,comeeßiſono, che uuoi tu più freddo,che'l continuare in fimili
inuentioni? Tuſei l'ombra del l'angustia,il diadema della mestitia,un'atto
fatale,o si fatti.Peccano mola ti dando ad ognicoſa i loro aggiunti, ilche
quando nonſifa per diletto, o con circonfpettione,come per condimento del
dire,affettato,inſipido,o rin creſceuoleſ truoua, comeſe in luogo diſudoreſi
diceſſe,il liquoredelle car niperlo caldo ſtillato,o non le feſte,ma la
celebrità delle feſte,ne i triona fi,ma la grandezza de i trionfi,&alere
gonfiezze, ilqual uitio in alcuni ė ucnuto al fommo,o però parlandoeßi più che
pocticamente & fuor di të po,fannocoſe degne di riſo, o di compaßione,fono
oſcuri &ociofiſatiano, Orincreſcono fieramente.Leggi. DIN. Potrei,poſcia
che il vento della licentia datami di ragionare ba tanto inantifpinta la naue
del mio parlamentoper l'ampio pelago di si fat ta materia,conducerui
distintamente à uedere checoſa è difpofitione. AR. 1o mene rido di tai
coſe,guarda quanto meglio ſi èdetto qui nel uerfo, o con più modestia. DIN.
O'uoi, che ſete in piccioletta barca, Defideroft d'aſcoltar ſeguiti Retro almio
legno,che cantando uarca, Tornate à riveder inoſtri liti Non ui mettete in
pelago, cheforſe Perdendo me rimarreſteſmarriti. AR. Ecco,chedi più ampia
materia ragionaua il Poeta, & non diffe la naue del ſuo parlamento,o
altroue diſſe, Per correr miglior’acqua alza le uele Ormai la nauicella delmio
ingegno Che laſcia retro à ſe mar si crudele, Etquandopurepiù arditamenteegli
baueſſe alcuna traslatione uſata, dico,che egli era Poeta, o hauea ſotto la
penna materia,ſe altra ne è,gră dißima, o d'ogni parte degna; o poteua ben
laſciarſi portare(dirò cosi) dal uento della licenza,ma uedi ancora nella proſa
in miglior modo ridotta laſopradetta traslatione. DIN. Madonna,aſſai
m'aggrada,poi che ui piace, per questo campo aperto Wlibero, nel quale la
uoštra Magnificenza ci ha meßi,del nouella. re,d'eſſer colci, che corra il
primo arringo. AR. Ma riuolgiti à queste fredde,çocioſe maniere,& leggi,
DIN. La real conditione del quale ſaria stata di più felice uita,odi più beata
memoria,che uerun'altra mai,ſe il generoſo della bontà di lui,hax uelle men
creduto al maligno della fraudealtrui. AR. E' ancora più ſpento qui. DIN. Nel
finedelle parole cadendogli giù per le gote alcune lagrie me non men groſſe,che
calde, le compaßioni delle ſuepietadi transformaro. no l'ira in manſuetudine.
1. AR. Di che giudicio dotati,di che eſperienza ammaestrati,e di quan ta gratia
eſſer deono adornati coloro, i quali uogliono traportare le paro. le nate à
ſignificar’una coſa, alla di chiaratione d'un'altra, nonſi può cosi brieuemente
eſporre.Baſtiti per tuo ammaeſtramento,che tu fugga le ridic cole,perche ſono
de' comici,le gonfie, percheſonode' tragici, le austere dure,perchenon ſono
euidenti, & infine quelleche dallalunga ſi uanno tra endo,comeſe alcuno
chiamaſſe la ſapienza lo ſteccato della anima, l'acqua loſpecchiodi Narciſo, ò
che diceſſe le faccende qui uerdeggiano,o altre coſe sifatte. Biſogna adunque
deriuare le parole da coſe facili,& di pres fta intelligenza, con queste i
due pocti le loro fittioni mirabilmente innale zarono, delle quali piene ormai
ne ſono tutte le carte.Alte parole appreſſo ſi odono quelle del nome,or del
uerbo partecipi comeAmante, Ardente,co quelle ancora Andando,
Vergognando,percheſono di ampio o largo fpiris to.Et nel loro andare
ſonoadagiate graui. Et di queſta ſia detto aſſai. Ora con quai colori, ofigure
adornar ſi debba la maeſtà delle parole,ſi di rà,o prima,che alle coſe clgne
unafalda confirmatione del proprio gilidi tio, come un fermo tratto di pennello,rileua
mirabilmente la oratione.Pere che non è uera grandezza quella, della qualeſi
tiene alcuna dubitanza,cu però grande è quella parte. Leggi. DIN. Chi il
commendò mai tanto, quanto tu il commendaui in tutte quelle coſe laudeuoli,di
che ualoroſo huomodee eſſer commendato? certo. certo non a torto. AR. Ma quel
giuditio,cheſeguc,ė fatto con timore na dubbioſamente te proferito,però non ha
del grande,benche al modeſto dire, grandemente fi conuegna. DIN. Che ſe i miei
occhi non mi ingannarono,niuna laude da te data glifu, ch'io lui operarla,o più
mirabilmente chele tue parole non poteca no eſprimere,non uedeßi. ART.
Conſidera quanto togliedella maeſtà di quel ſonetto,che con mincia,
Perſeguendomi Amoral loco uſato, quel timido o ſoſpetto giudicio che dice,
quella che ſe'l giudicio mio non erra,Era più degna d'immortaa le ſtato,Et
tanto più quanto quest'ultimo uerfo non ha quelſuono,che gli al tri hanno.Douea
ſenza temenza giudicare ancora questo autore. Leggi, DIN. Et perciò che la
gratitudine,ſecondo ch'io credo,fra l'altre uir tùėfommamente da commandare. AR.
Perche la ſentenza è degna, a ricercaua un colore,che terminaf se il ſentimento.Nequesta
figura ſolamentealla maeſtàſ conuiene, ma tut te quelle che alla purità
ſirichieggono,delle quai di ſopra ſe ne è detto afa ſai.Et ciò ſifa,perche la
maestànon entri in tumidezza, o cada (diroco. si )in quella infermità che
idropiſia é nominata. Le parti, le membra eſſer deono bricui ſenza alcuna
lunghezza di giriyil che ſi uede ne'ſauij huomini, iquali breuißimamente uanno
raccom gliendo le coſe loro in fentenza, & detti,come oracoli.Leggi, DI N.
Giuſtitia moſſe il mio alto fattore. Fecemi la diuina potestade, Laſommaſapientia,e'l
primo amore. A R. Et qui ancora. DIN. Iſon Beatrice, che tifaccio andare, Vegno
dal loco oue tornar diſo, Amor mi moſſe, che mifa parlare. ART. Etqui. DIN. Gli
animi noſtri ſono eterni,perche difuggeuole uaghezza gli inebriate.Mirate uoi
come belle creature ci ſiamo,o penſate quanto dee of ſer bello colui, di cui
noi ſiamo miniſtre. AR. Inſomma,degno è ilſeguenteparlare in ogni ſua parte.
Leggi, DIN. Et queſto altrimenti non ſi fa,che à quello Iddio gli noſiri ani mi
riuolgendo,che ce gli ha dati. Ilchefarai tufigliuolo,ſe me udirai, o
penſerai,che eſſo tutto queſtoſacro tempio,chenoi mondo chiamiamo,di ſe
empiendolo hafabricato. ART. AR. Et qui ancora dicoſeumane. DIN. La uirti
primieramente noi,che tuttinaſcemmo, o naſciamo equali,ne distire,o quegli, che
di lei maggior parte haucuano, o adopee rauano, nobili furon detti, e il
rimanente rimafe non nobile. A R. La diſpoſitione o il ſito delle parole nella
maestà del dire dee tal mente ordinarji,che non ui ſia concorſo di uocaboli,
onde la bocca ſi apra ſconciamente. Voglio poi,che le paroleſdruccioloſe, con
più libertà uilica no,che nella parità, o tal ſuono eſſe legate inſieme diano,
quale ft deſides raua,che da ſe steſſo diſciolte faceſſero.Il ſimileſi dice
nella chiuſa, o nel finimento,operò il fine in parole manche non deeper alcun
modo hde uer loco in questa forma, deſidero la uarietà de' finimenti,o de i
princia pi, ma fieno di parole cheauanzino le dueſilabe, oquello cheper la più
ſarà tale in tutto il giro,farà il numero, che in queſtaforma ft ricere ca.
Leggi tutto il ſopra detto effempio, che ciò chen'ho detto, chiaramena' te
wedrai. Et ciò della maeſtà ti può bastare. Eſſendo la comprenſione alla grane
dezza del dire comela eleganza alla chiarezza, e eſſendoſi della male stà detto,
come di forma, che da ſemedeſima di tutte le ſueparti era cone tenta, nè ad
altra maniera, Òſentenze,ò numeri,ò parole, ò artificio, o ale": tra
qualità concedeuia,nėda altri alcuna coſa pigliaua, non è fuori dira. gione che
ſi dica ora della comprenſione, uera, ounicaforma da folleuare ogui baiſao
umile maniera della oratione. Et pero delleſueſentenze fi dirà prima, poi delle
altre parti. Le ſentenze di queſta forma,ſono quel le, che chiamano altro
ſentimento, o che raccolgono,operò in queſtapar te la comprenſione è oppoſta
alla purità del dire,nella quale dicemmo,non eſſer’alcuno raccoglimento.
Raccoglimento intendo,quando quello che piis i riſtringe nel meno,come una coſa
commune in generale, alla ſpecialità ė ristretto. Leggi, Certißima coſa é
adunque,ò Donne, che di tutte le perturbationi dell’d nimo,niuna coſa é cosi
noceuole, cosi graue, niuna cosiforzeuole o nio. lenta,niuna che cosi ci
commoud,ogiri,comequellafa,che noi amore chia mia mo. Eccoti che la
perturbatione è un genere commune ſotto il quale ſi rac coglie l'amore, che è
una ſpecie di perturbatione. Raccoglieſi ancora lo in determinato v oſcuro,allo
aperto & terminato,comequi. Molte nouelle,dilettoſe Denne à douer dar
principio à cosi lieta gior. nata,come questa ſarà,per douere eſſere da me
raccontate miſi parano das uanti,delle quali una più nell'animo me ne piace. Et
qui ancora molto più lines. $ 9 fi uede per due raccoglimenti. Et come che à
ciaſcuna perſona stia bene, à coloro maßimamente éria chieſto,li quali già
hanno di conforto hauuto mestieri, & hannolo trouato in altrui.Fra quali ſe
alcuno mai ne hebbe,ò gli fu caro,ò già ne riceuette piacere io ſono uno di
quegli. Riduceſt tutto il tutto alla parte ſia quel tutto è del tempo, ò del
luogo, ò d'altra coſa. Del tempo,come qui, · 10 amaiſempre,ey amo forte ancora.
Del luogo ancora, come qui, In Frioli,paeſe quantunque freddo,lieto di belle
montagnedipiù fiumi e di chiarefontane,è una terra chiamata Vdine. Suole
ogniſentenza, che chiama o ricerca ſentimento alcuno, eſſere di quella forma,o
appreſſo tutte quelle che alla purità ſono repugnanti nelle quali ogni
circostanza di luogo,di tempo dimodo, oogni accidente, che
preceda,accompagni,ófegua,alle coſe ſiſuoleaggiugnere.Come fe egli R diceſſe in
queſta guiſa, in sù la meza notte con molti'armati al luogo del le
guardieſoprauenne,fdegnato per la ingiuria fattagli il precedente gior no.Ecco
checon molte circostanze ſi narra il fatto,oR amplifica mirabil mente la
coſa.Come in queluerſo ancora, Giouane incauto,diſarmató, e ſolo. Chiamano
altroſentimento alcuni in questo modo, Ma si come àlui piacque,il quale eſſendo
egli infinito, diede per legge incommutabile à tutte le coſe mondane bauer fine,
il mio amore oltre ad ogn'altro feruente,o il quale. AR. Non legger piùche da
teſteſſo poi nel predetto luogo potraiper comprenſione eabbracciamento uedere
tantagrandezza di oratione che niente più. Abbracciano alcuneſentenze
mirabilmente,o ſono quelle, che la ragio nedella coſa in ſe ſteſſe ritengono,come
s’io diceßi,L'ira de'mortali immor tale eſſer non dee,e queſta, Aſai dimanda
chi feruendo tace. Et quell'altra. Un bel morir tutta la uita onord.
Etſimiglianti. Senza timor uiue chi le leggi teme.: Che il perder tempo, à chi
più sàpiù piace. Queste fonole ſentenze,che abbracciano a comprendono, ma
l'arte H 2 difolleuareè prima in ogni tramezamento. Leggi, Alla qual coſa
fare(come'chein ciaſcuna età stia bene il leggere « l'u dire le giouenili coſe,
& c. Etſopra l'altre questa. Percioche non amare,come che ſia,in uoſtra
stagione nonſi può, quane doſi uede, che da Natura inſieme col uiuere a tutti
gli huomini è dato, cbe ciaſcuno alcuna coſa ſempre ami, oſempre diſii,pure io,
che giouane fono, gligiouani buomini,« le giouani donne conforto oinuito.
Maggiormente queſti tramezamenti inalzano la oratione comeuedi, i quali uanno
meſcolando le ragioni con le coſe, o fanno la oratione ampia ecircondotia, o
uſanſiſpeſſo da queſto Autore nelle fentenze baſſe, co me qui, Le quai coſe,quantunque
molto affettuoſamente le diceſſe, conuertite in uentocome le piu delleſue impreſefaceano,tornarono
in uano. AR. Lo andare per gli gradi raccogliendo,ė artificio di quella fora
md, come qui, Figliuola miaio credo,che gran noiaſa ad una bella edelicata
donna come uoi ſiete,bauere per marito un mentecatto,ma molto maggiore la cre
do eſſere d'hauere un geloſo. Et queſta ancora. Leggi, Drmare ciaſcheduna delle
dette maniere, accion che io ueda il fine della deſiderata catena dell'anima
delle coſe, e del parlare. 40 DE Ï Ï Á parlare. A R. Bendi. Dei dunque ſapere
che comenell'Anima,al. tra parte è quella che apprende la ragione,alfra quella,
che é da gli effetti commoſſi, come dicemmo, o nellaNatura altre ſono le coſe
allo inſegnare altreal muouere appartenenti, cosi alcune formedels la
orationeſaranno, le quali conuerranno alle coſe dello intelletto,als cune alle
coſe della uoglia, odello appetito, o quando queſto non fuſſe, né uia, nė
ragione alcunaſarebbe di poter acconciamente indurs re opinione è affettione
con la forza della fuuella. Però auuertiſci, che nel trattamento delle forme da
te ſtesſo potrai intendere qual forma à qual coſaſi confaccia. DIN. Ricorditi
difarmi ogni coſa chiara con glieſſempi, eio mi obligo di leggerli ſecondola
occaſio ne,in qualunque libro di queſti,che tu uorrai. Ma prima deſidero ſa per
alcuna coſa d'intornoal Numero, o numeroſo componimento. ART. Laſciati à me
guidare cheil tutto ſaperai ſecondo il biſogno. Sappi adunque, è Dinardo,
chequalhora alcuno ſi rivolga à conſi= derare il modo, es la ragione del
medicare, che ritrouando alcus na bella coſa nella medicina, uoglia
giudicioſamente applicarla all’are te del dire, non è dubbio, che egli non ſia
per uedere tra la medicina, o l'arte di che ſiragiona,grandiſsima ſimiglianza.
Ecco la medicina cerca di indurre ſanità, oue ella non ė, ò di conſeruarla doue
ella fi truoua.Ilſimile fa queſt'arte,d'intorno alla buonaopinione, perche
conogni ſtudio s'affitica di metterla,ò di mantenerla oue ſia biſogno. La
medicina conoſce qual parte del corpo con qualrimedio eſſer debs bia riſanata,
o preferuata,cosi queſt'arte opracon l'anima, e con le partiſue con le formedel
parlare.La medicina quantopiù può fugge la noia chepotrebbe alcuno medicamento
recar'atl'infermo,con mele ò con zucchero, ò con altra coperta mitigando il
peßimoſapore, ego l'odore delle medicine, ne da queſta gentilezza ſi parte la
mia figlis uola, cercandodinon offendere quelſentimento,che prende iſuoi ris
medij,il qualſentimento é negli orrecchi ripoſto,per le qualiſotto la ſoauità
delſuono fa trapaſſar’inſino all'anima la opinione, quantun que ſia di coſa
dalla Natura aborrita. Etfinalmente la medicina nelle ſue compoſitioni alcune
coſe ui mette, non tanto gioueuoli alle parti offeſe, quanto preſte
apportatrici delle uirtù dell'altre coſe al luogo infermo, il chequãtoſi
conuenga all'artificiofa fauella,non ti posſo in poca hora dichiarare, perche
troppo grande é la forza delſuo nus meroſo componimento; il quale portando ſeco
ageuolißimamente il ualor delle parole, o delle ſentenze,paſa,e penetra per
ogni parte dell'anima,deſ leroſa di queſta foauicà, e benche gli orecchi del
uolgo neſentano aſſai, non è però da dimandare alcuno Idiota,onde ella proceda,
ò come ſi faccia, perche queſto giudicio è più proprio dell'intelletto, che
delſentimento umano. Giudicando adunque, o conſiderando lo intendente huomo
quale ſia la cagione, che le parole più ad un modo, che ad un'altro diſposte
fieno diletteuolio numeroſe, ritrüoua iltutto eſſere alla Natura, quanto alſuo
principio, conueniente, ma quanto alla perfettione non cosi; però che io ne ho
grandißima parte.Et perche tuſappia quello che la Nde tura, a quello che io ti
poßiamo prestare,dico,che la Natura ha posto alls cor nelle orecchie ilſuo
piacere & diletto, uuole chequelle affaticate fi folleuino con la ſoauità,
a dolcezza del dire; al che fare niuna coſa è più potente nel uostro ragionare,
che'l numero, ola fosnità delle parole. Il qual numero biſogna, che di ſua
uoglia uegna nella oratione, si perchefa oratione, e non muſica,si perfuggir la
fofpitione dello artificio, la quae le con luſingheuole inganno pare, che
uoglia abbagliar l’animo de gli aſcol tanti, operò leua loro ogni perſuaſione,
o fede. Ma quando con ine certo, & non conoſciuto numero,dolce però, e
foaue,ſi compone il parld. -mento, oſi lega inſieme il faſcio della ſentenza,
& del'intendimento,fena za dubbio il tutto con credenza, o diletto ſi
riceue. Fuggafi dunque il ucrſo, « ogni regola continouata del uerſo;
continouata dico, peroche lo ſteſſo numero più volte replicato facilmente
ſiriconoſce, o fache gli os recchi aſpettanti l'ordinato, « conſueto ritorno,
più alſuono,che alſentia mentoſi diano,coſa aſſai chiara, oatteſa ne i uerſi,il
numero de' quali ufae to,e conoſciuto,più dall'arte,che dalla Natura procedente.
Ma percheſenza legge di numero alcuno, o ſciolta del tutto non dee restare
l'oratione, che oſcura, cu piaccuole ne rimarrebbe,però numeroſa o compoſta
ella fi dis fidera grandemente. Ora da che naſca, o per qual cagione
diuerſamente offer conuenga numeroſa l'oratione, quanto à me s'appartiene dirò
bries uemente,dichiarando prima,che coſa ſia NVMERO, ò numeroſo come ponimento.
DIN. Queſto ordine à meſommamente diletta,però di cuore ti prie go,che più
diſtintamente che puoi,me lo dimostri. A R. La neceßità uuole, che le parole
ſieno pari alla ſentenza,perche à queſto fine ſi ragiona,comeſi è
detto,accioche quanto habbiamo di dene troſi dimoſtri di fuori,doue mancando o
accreſcendo parole, o il concetto interno non ſarebbeeſpreſſo, come nella mente
dimora, ò il parlar ſarebbe ociofo,ò mancheuole.Maperche la ſentenza nell'anima
è finita Otermina ta,però debbon’eſſerfinite,os terminate in quantità le
parole, che la sentenza dimostrano. Laqual quantità inſieme ragunata, Giro, o
circuito nos mineremo ilquale altro non ſarà,chepieno operfetto abbracciamento
del la ſentenza. Questo abbracciamento di pari accompagnando la uirtù di ef la
ſentenza,puòhauere una ò piu parti, o maggiori, o minori, ſecondo le parti
della ſentenza;@ ciaſcuna parte é composta di parole, oſi chiama Membro, ó
Nodo; osi come ogni parte del corpo ha il ſuo principio, il ſuofine, e il ſuo
mezo, o il corpomedeſimo e terminato, & finitocosi, le parti dello
abbracciamento, welfo abbracciamento ſarà finito, otermina to. In tutto queſto
ſpatio adunque,che è tra il principio,il fine di ciaſcu na parte, e tra il
cominciamento, es la chiuſa,che s'è detto chiamarſigia ro,ė forza,che la lingua
alcuna uolta s'adagi,o ſi ripoſi ſecondo il biſoa gno,oſi muoua più ueloce,ò
piu tarda ſecondo laqualità del concetto. Et questo ripoſo, oqueſto mouimento,miſurato
col tempo del proferire, para toriſce ilnumero, del qual ragioniamo,uero
figliuolo della compoſitione, o de i termini del parlare, omoltopiu nel
fine,chenel cominciamento e più apparente ne gli eſtremi chenel mezo.Etperche
di eſſo Numero gli orecchi fanno giudicio in quanto al ſentimento del piacere,
o del diſpiaa cere,per eſſer naturale à ciaſcuno la dilettatione de' ſenſi,
ol'intellettofos lo come ti dißi,ne cerca la cagione però, hauendoſifin'ora in
parte dimoſtra to quello cheall'intelletto s'appartiene,in parte dico,perciò
che l'intelletto in questo caſo molto alle orecchie deferiſce, odiuerſe maniere
hanno dia uerfo numero.Però cominciando a trattare delle forme del dire daremo
a ciaſcheduno il ſuo numeroſo componimento,o con effempi ancora ritroue remo
quello che con ragioneſfarà dimostrato. DIN. Molto bene auif di farmicapace di
questa magnifica oillus ſtre compoſitione; però ſegui,che con maggior
deſiderio, cheprima,fono apparecchiato di aſcoltarti,perche mi pare,che ora tu
facci di me pruoua marauiglioſa. AR: La primaformae nominata Chiarezza,laqual
naſce da purità, og da eleganza,come s'è detto. Pero eſſendo ella quaſi un
tutto, acciò che meglio ſi manifeſti,ſidirà delle parti fue,&prima della
mondezza opile rità,poidella ſcelta, o eleganza. Deefl dunque dare allapurità
del dire quelle ſentenze, le qualiſono di piana intelligenza, & non hanno
biſogno di piu conſideratione,come per lo pia fono,o effer deono le narrationi
delle co fe,come qui. Leggi. DIN. Tancredi, Principe di Salerno, fu Signore
affai umano, di benigno aſpetto. A R. Eccoti, che ſenza alcuna fatica di
diſcorſo ogni mediocre in. gigno gegropuò capire ilſentimento della ſentenzagià
letta, come ancora in questi uerfi.Leggi. DIN. Io ſon Manfredi, Nipote di
Coſtanza Imperatrice. ART. Et molti essempi ſono della purità nelle nouelle, la
ſentenza delle quali per la maggior parte è molto alla uolgar’intelligenzafottopo
sta,pur che partitamenteſa ciaſcheduna inſe conſiderata, percio che pua re
nonſarebbono, quando adalcun fineſi riguardaſſe, oueroaltro attendes fero per
fornir'il ſentimento loro, comeſe in questa guifa ſi diceſſe. Eſſendo Tancredi
principe di Salerno Signore aſſai umano, per che queſta ſentenza non ſarebbe
terminata,o finita,douendo attendere a quel io, che ſegue, o però più preſto
oſcura ſarebbe chemonda enetta. Non aſpetti adunque altro intendimento,chi
uuoleſſer puro nella ſentenza, las quale stando nell'anima,dee cljer con
tal'artificio leuata, che ſolaſi tirifuo riga come di dentro dimostra il
concetto,cosi di fuori fa fatto paleſe,ſen. za alcun accidente che quella
accompagni,o conſegua. Et però daquesta formaſia bandita ogni circoſtanza di
tempo diluogo, di perſona,o di mo. do,ò d'altro auenimento.Vedi questa parte
quanto, é pura nella ſentenza: DIN. La quale percioche egli,sicomei mercatanti
fanno, andava molto in tornoapoco con lei dimoraua,s'inamoród’uno giouane
chiama to Roberto. AR. Non laſcia eſſer pura cotestaſentenza,quel trammezamento,che
dice,percioche egli,si come i mercatanti fanno,andaua molto intorno, o questo
adiuiene,perche ſospeſoſi tiene l'animo, di chi ode. Fuggi adunque ogni
raccoglimento ſe uuoi eſſere nel tuo dir mondo, &neto; &narra le co Se
partitamente come ſtanno,ma de i raccoglimenti quãti,o quali ſieno, dirà
poi.Delle parole ueramente con le quali ſi dee uestire 'la purità breue
ammaeſtramento ſi daràperche, tutte le parole,piane,facili,ufitate, bricui, O
communi ſonoall'anima della purità molto proportionate, onde le trae portate,le
ſtraniere,le lunghe, & quelle, che la lingua pena à proferire, o
l'intelletto a capirefono dalla purità lontane,però purisſime ſono queste. DIN.
Cheà me pareuaeßer’in una bella, « diletteuole ſelua,& in quella andar
cacciando ehauer preſo una cauriola, parcami, che ella fuſſepiu che la neue
bianca,or in brieueſpatio diucniſſe si mia domeſtica, che punto da me nonſi
partiua,tutta uia à meparcua hauerla, si cara, cbe accio che da me non
partiſſe,le mi pareua nella gola hauer meſſo un cola no d'oro,e quella con una
catena d'oro tener con le mani. F 2 ARTE Non è poco hauer giudicio di ritrouar
le parole adognima niera conformii,mamolto più ſi deue auuertir' nel diſporle,
o colorirle,on de ne naſce il deſiderato aſpetto.Et però ſappi che la figura
delle parole,al la puritàſottopoſte,é il dritto,ecco. DIN. Nicolò Cornacchini
fu nostro cittadino,o ricco huomo. ARTE Et quiancora DIN. Aſolo adunqueuago, «
piaceuole caſtello poſto ne gli eſtremi gioghi delle nostre Alpiſopra il
Triuigiano ecfi come ogn’uno deeſapere) Arneſe della reina di Cipri. ARTE Non
cosipuro ſarebbe ſe da gli obliqui caſi haueſſe comine ciato, Dicendo,DiAſolo,uago
&piaceuole caſtello poſſeditrice fu la Reie na di Cipri. Ma puro e per la
figura del dritto, auegna che ſecondo quella: parola puro non ſia,doue ſi dice
Arneſe,uoce ſtraniera, ancora nello are. tificio non é puro per quello
tramezamento, che dice (si come ogn’uno dee ſapere) o per quelle circoſtanze
del caſtello uago, piaceuole, pera che ritarda il ſentimentode gli aſcoltanti,
oui mette le circonſtanze del luogo. DI N. Dunque erra chi uolendo cßer puro
uſa parole non pure, artificio,ò figura d'altra maniera,della oratione? ÁR:
Errerebbe ſe egli credeſſe,otentaſſe d'eſſere in ogni parte puro, &netto,
& non uſaſſe quello che ſi conuiene,ma non erra uolendo alla pu rità del
dire porgere «grandezza o dignità.Ma ancora uoglio che ogni maniera ſia in ſe
ſteſſa conſiderata, e però lapurità del dire haurà le. parti ſue distinte,os
ſeparate dalle altre;nė ſolamente il dritto è figura, di questaforma, o
maniera,ma anche ogni altro colore, che ſia contrario als la comprenſione della
quale ſi dirà poi,ora trattiamo delſito, odellacom poſitione delle parole, Dico
nella purità,cs mondezza del dire douerſi met: tere le parole inſieme con quel
modo,che piu uicino ſia al fauellare, uſitae coſenza molta cura,caffettatione
ſemplicemente quantoſi può. Et si cos me in ciaſcheduna parola di queſta forma
biſognaua leuar'ogni durczza, Cogni difficultà di lettere,o di ſillabe,accioche
la uoce di ſuono e quale, temperato, « non impedito ufciſſe fuori,cosi nella
compoſitione biſos gna guardare di acconciare talmente, che pine tosto nate,
che fabricate appariſcano,come nello eſempio già letto del ſogno ſi conoſceud.
Conſided ra tu poi la forza, & lofpirito di ciaſcuna lettera, e di ciaſcuna
fillaba, come la natura in tutte ha posto la ſuapiaceuolezza, durezza, &
tifa rai queſto giudice del ſuono delleparole, della loro diſpoſitione,ucdi che
la A ſi forma nella più profonda parte del petto,o eſce poifuori con alta
uoce,riſonante,onde lo ſpirito di eſſa grande,oſonoroffente,odi laſe guente,
ch'é,B. LA B é puraſnella,deſpedita,come è afpra'la C.quando è fine della
fillaba,ISA C, órauca quando è posta inanzi la A à la V come per lo contrario e
di dolce,ſpeſſo, o pieno ſuono,precedendo alla I. @alla E.co. me qui.Salabetto
mio dolce iomi ti raccomado o cosicome la mia perſona è al piacer tuo, cosi é
ciò che ciė, o cio che per me ſi può fare al comando tuo. Conſidera poi da te
ſteſſo il restante delle lettere, in che maniera eſſa natura diſua propria
qualità ha ciaſcuna dotata, & uederai onde nde ſce più questa,chequella
compoſitione.Le parti, &le membra, della purie. rità effer deono
breui,& ciaſcuna dee terminar'ilſuo ſentimento,non ritar: dando con
lunghezza de' giri, o di raccoglimenti la intelligenza del poe polo,come qui,
D. Suol’eſſere a' nauiganti caro,qualhora da oſcuro o fortuneuole nembofofpinti
errano,otrauagliano la lor uia,colſegnodella indiana pie tra,ritrouare la
trammontana, in modo che qual uentoſoffi conoſcendo,non Ria lor tolto il
potere, & uela,ogouerno,là doue eßi di giugner procaca ciano,ò almeno doue
più la loro ſaluezza ueggiono, indirizzare. Bifox gna parimente in minoreſpatio
raccogliere il ſentimento di ciaſcuna para te,oueſt uuole eſſer puro, ofare in
questo modo,benche le parolefieno ale quanto dure.Leggi. DIN. Chino di Tacco
piglia l'Abbatedi Clugni,a medicalo del ma le di ſtomaco, « poi il
laſcia,L'abbate ritorna, in corte di Roma,o il rico cilia con Bonifatio Papa,o
fallofriere dell'oſpedale. A R. Etnel uerſo ancora eſſer dee la predetta norma
oſſeruata,come, qui. Leggi. DIN. Pace non trouo,e non ho da farguerra, E temo,
eſpero, & ardo, e for’un ghiaccio. Ilche non quiene in queſta altra parte.
DIN. Voi, ch'aſcoltate in rimeſparſe il ſuono. Perciò che ilſenſo è troppo
ritardato,o con lunghißime parti rattenuto. Haſi dunque della purità quello
chebiſogna d'intorno alle ſentenze, allo artificio, aile parole, alla figura,
alla compoſitione, & alle parti di cſa. Reſta,che ſi tratti del numero,
& del finimento,cioè della chiuſa,odel ter mine della ſentenza,o delle
parti ſue.Dico adunque, che nello andare, ego nello ſpatio di queſta forma non
ſi dee eſſere néueloce,ne tardo, mateme perato, & ne i ripoſi,one i
mouimenti, operche il numero naſce dalla compoſitione,co dal fine,peròſapendo
quale eßer dee la compoſitione delelc le parole, quale il fineztutto quello,cheſotto
di queſte partiſ contiene darà ad intender quellocheſi è detto, perche quantoſi
ricerca alla com pofitione ſi é dichiarito reſta che ſidica del
finimento.ogniſentenza, ogni giro puòfinire,ò in alcunaparola tronca,oin parola
piena,ſienoque ſte parole,ò di due,ò di tre,ò di piu ſilabe,o ancora di una. Le
parolepie ne,e compiute ò ſonoſdrucciolofe, & uolubili,o ſalde,oferme,
opers che non ſoloRidce conſiderar l'eſtrema parola di tutta la chiuſa, ma anco
la uicina, o proſima,però partitamente ſi dirà di ciaſcun finimento al luo go
ſuo.Comeadunque uoglia la purità terminare le chiuſeſue, aſſai chiaro ofer
dee.Perciò cheaßimigliandoſi elle al dire cotidiano,fuggirà il fine del le
parole tronche, comeſono quelle andò,corfuftarà,o C.perche le mede. fime dee
nella diſpoſitione fuggire,come ramarico, o render florido. Et A contenterà di
quelfine,cheper lo più la Natura a’uolgari dimostra,ma io non uoglio, che con
tanta religioneſifiniſca in parole piene, &perfete te,fuggendo le
tronche,ole fdruccioloſe,che alcuna uolta nonſimetta fie nealtrimenti alſuo
parlare,perche quello cheſi dice, ſi dice per la mage gior parte de
ifinimenti,e delle chiuſe della purità. Da questi adunque odalla diſpoſitione
riſorge quella miſura,che noi numero addimandiamo. Eſſendo adunque lachiuſa
ſimile alla diſpoſitione, «la diſpoſitione non isforzeuole,matemperata,&
naturale,fcguita che il numero dell'uno, o, dell'altro figliuoloſarà, à quelle
fomigliante.Ben'è uero,che laforza di cia fcuna manierà,e ripoſta piu toſto
nelle altre parti,che nel numero, eccetto, che nella bellezza,douc
l'ornamento,e il numero grandementeſ cerca, as molto piùè ne i uerfi, « nella
poeſia,che altroue, o questo dico, acciò che fu non metta piu ſtudio,doue
nonbiſogna riportandoti a gli orecchi,il giudicio delle quali da eſſa natura é
ſommamente aiutato. Ecco adunque, è Dinardo,quanto giouala mondezza, opurità
del dire alla chiarezza; ma perche questa ſempliceforma non può daſefola si
chiaramente parlae re che non uiſiaqualche impedimento,però biſogna ouunque le
ſia di aiua. to mestieri,con la eleganza aiutarla, come con maniera chepiù un
modo, che un'altro,piu questo ordineche quello ſecondo il biſogno adoprando
eleg ge et fouegna alla ſemplicepurità del dire,ilqual'aiuto èpiù presto
nell'ar. tificio, che nelle ſentenze ripoſto. Però che ella ſi sforzafar ogni
ſentenza chiara &aperta,non che le pure già dichiarite di ſopra. Parliamo
adune que della cleganza,o prima dello artificio,colquale ella lcuar fuole ogni
ſentenza nella mente riposta. AR. La cleganza e maniera,cheportachiarezza à
tutte le maniere della oratione, operò non tanto alla purità, douc ella manca
foccorre, quanto à ciaſcaduna forma opra intelligenza, o facilità,daqueſto
nafce, che la eleganza dalla purità del dire in alcuna coſa é differente.Perciò
che la purità da ſe ſteſſa è chiara,oaperta,ma la eleganza nella grandezza, e
magnificenza del dire ecomeun ſole, che ogni oſcurità, che per quella poteſſe
uenire, leua,o diſgombra,o però in ogniſentenza ella può molto, si con
l'artificio fuo, si co i colori,«le figure.L'artificio adunque di les uare
ogniſentenza dallo intelletto,acciò che ella ſia inteſa, cogni auuerti. mento
innanzi fatto di quello che ft ha da ragionare. Leggi. DIN. Canterò com’io uißi
in libertade Mentre Amor nel mio albergo à ſdegno s'hebbe Poiſeguirò si come à
luim'increbbe Troppo altamente: AR. ilſimigliante R fa nella proſa,comequi. DI
N. Mipiace à condiſcendere à conſigli d'huomini, de' quai dicena do mi
conuerràfar due coſe molto a' miei costumi contrarie,l'una fia alqua to me
comendare, &l'altra il biaſimare alquanto altrui, maprioche dal uc ro nė
dall'una,ne dall'altra non intendo partirmi ilpurfarò. AR. Vedi quanto
gentilmente | sbriga lo intelletto dello aſcoltare con tali
auuertimenti,Appreſſo i quali aſſai bello artificio, s'intende quela to,che per
chiarezza dialcune coſe altre ne narra fenza le quali non ſi in tenderebbe ageuolmente
il reſtante.Leggi. DIN. Maper trattar del ben, ch'io ui trouai, Diró de l'altre
coſe,ch'io ui ho ſcorte. A R. Se il poeta qui non doueſſe dimostrare le pene de
dannati e i tormenti di quegli,che ſono in diſgratia di Dio, non haurebbepotuto
dare ad intendere facilmente il beneche ne riuſci poi,per hauer lo inferno cers
Cato.Ecco qui dalla medeſima neceßità costretto quest'altro deſcriue la pee
ſtifera mortalità peruenuta nella egregia Città di Firenze, avvertendo pri ma
chi legge,in queſto modo. DIN. Mapercioche qualefuße la cagione,perche le coſe
che appref fo Rileggeranno,aueniſſeno,non ſi poteua ſenza queſta rammemoratione
dimoſtrare,quafi dineceßità coſtretto à ſcriuerla miconduco. A R. Ecco qui
ancora un'altra bella preparatione di coſe,fatta per le uare ogni
impedimento,chepoteſſe offendereilrimanente. DIN. Ma io mi ti uoglio unpoco
ſcuſare,che di que' tempi, che tu te n'andaſti alcuneuolte ci uoleſti uenire, e
non poteſti,alcune ci uenisti, onon fosti cosi lietamente
veduto,comefoleui,& oltre à questo di ciòche io al termine promeſſo,non ti
rendei gli tuoi danari, AR. In fine ogni precedente auifo, & ogni ordine di
coſe, e ſecondo, che elte ſon fatte,narrandole,ė artificio ſcelto, &
elegante,però tutte le propofitoni de' poeti ſono elegantißime. Leggi. DIN. Veramente
quant’io del regno fanto Ne la mia mente poteifar teſoro Sarà ora materia del
mio canto, AR. E qui ancora DIN. Et canterò di quel ſecondo regno, Que
l'umanoſpirito ſi purga E di ſalir’alCiel diuenta degno. ART. il simigliante
modo è oſſeruato ne i principij di ogni nouelld, come da tefteſſo uedrai.Suole
ancora la Eleganza porre artificioſamente le oppoſitioni con le riſpoſte
partitamentecome qui. Leggi. DIN. Saranno per auentura alcuni di uoi, che
diranno,ch'io habbia nello ſcriuere queste nouelle troppolicenza uſata. ART.
Eccola dimanda ſeguita la ſolutione. DIN. La qual coſa io niego,percioche niuna
coſa esi difoneſta, che con oneſte parole dicendola ſi diſdica ad alcuno. ART.
Et cosi di paripaſſo alle obiettioni riſponde, benche altre fide te
inſiemepostohabbia ogni accuſa di ſefatta, opoi s'habbiafcufato, ma quelmodo
non ha dello elegante,comeilpredetto poſe prima le oppoſitioni tutte inſieme
allora quando diſſe, Leggi. DIN. Sono adunque, diſcrete Donne, stati alcuni,
che queſte nouelle leggendo hanno detto cheuoi mipiacete troppo, eche oneſta
coſa nonė, che io tanto diletto prenda di piacerui e di confolarui.Et alcuni
han dete to peggio,di coinmendarui,come io fo.Altri più maturamente moſtrando
di uoler dire,hannodetto, che alla mia età non stà bene l'andar'omai dietro
queſte coſe, cice à ragionare di Donne,o à compiacer loro.Et molti molto te
neri della miafamamoſirandoſi dicono,ch'io farei più ſauiamente,àſtarmi con le
Mufe in Parnaſo,che con queſte ciance meſcolarmi tra uoi.Etſon di quegli
ancora,che più difpettoſamente,che ſauiamente parlando,hannodete to,cl’io farei
più diſcrettamente à penſare,donde io poteßi hauer del pae ne, che dietro a
queste fraſche andarmi paſcendo di uento. Et certi altri,in altra guiſa eſſere
state le coſe da me raccontateui,che come io le ui porgo s'ingegnano in
detrimento della mia fatica di dimostrare. AR. In queſto luogo molte accuſe
contra dello autoreſi mettono, pri ma che ad alcunaſi riſponda, ilche non è
cosi elegante,comeilprimoartife cio,ben che in tanta confuſione egli ſtudiaſſe
di eſſer chiaro, cinteſo, eso auiſaſje quiſaſſe auanti lo aſcoltante,come fa
doue dice,roppo alquanto dalle predet te oppoſitioni,perche non di ſubito
riſponde, ilche ancora é dalia cleganza lontano. Ma leggi. DIN. Ma quanti,
ch'io uegna à far la riſpoſta ad alcuno,mipiace in fauore di me raccontare, non
una nouella intera,ma parte di una. A R. Et ne poeti ancora fi
oſferua,ſecondoche meglio lor ben uiene di fare cosifatti partimenti.Vedi. DIN.
Tu argomenti,ſe'lbuon uoler dura, La uiolenza altrui,per qual cagione Di
meritar mi ſcema la miſura? AR.Queſta éuna propoſta,alla quale ſecondo l'arte
della eleganzaſ doueá prinia riſponderemaſi è poſta ancora la ſeconda,
doueſeguita. DIN. Ancor di dubitar ti dà cagione Parer tornarſi l'anima
àleſtelle Secondo la ſententia di Platone. AR. Ben che tu ueda qui le propoſte
effer'inſieme collocate, non è per ròſenza cleganza quella parte,per quello
cheſegue. DIN. Queſteſon le question,che nel tuo uelle Pontano egualemente, e
però pria Tratterò quella chepiù ba di felle. ART. In queſto luogo non tanto la
eleganza dimoſtra lo artificio fuo per lo auuertimentofatto di quelloche ſi dee
dire, quanto per la elettione di riſpondere prima ad una domanda,che ad
un'altra.Euui ancora un'altro artificio della ſceltezza,ilqualeè quando ſi
ripiglia quello,che ſi è detto, et ſi dimostra,di che poi ſi ba da dire,come in
queſti luoghiſegnati. DIN. Ma hauereinſino à qui detto della preſente nouella,
uoglio che mi basti,o à coloro riuolgermi,a' quali ho la nouella raccontata.
Ilqual luogo acciò chemeglio quelloche è detto,equellocheſegue, co me stefje ui
moſtrerò. AR. Aſaiſi èdetto fin qui,con che arte la eleganza leuarmare
ciaſcheduna delle dette maniere, accion che io ueda il fine della deſiderata
catena dell'anima delle coſe, e del parlare. DE Ï Ï Á parlare. AR. Bendi.
Dei dunque ſapere che comenell'Anima,al. tra parte è quella che apprende la
ragione,alfra quella, che é da gli effetti commoſſi, come dicemmo, o
nellaNatura altre ſono le coſe allo inſegnare altreal muouere appartenenti,
cosi alcune formedels la orationeſaranno, le quali conuerranno alle coſe dello
intelletto,als cune alle coſe della uoglia, odello appetito, o quando queſto
non fuſſe, né uia, nė ragione alcunaſarebbe di poter acconciamente indurs re
opinione è affettione con la forza della fuuella. Però auuertiſci, che nel
trattamento delle forme da te ſtesſo potrai intendere qual forma à qual coſaſi
confaccia. DIN. Ricorditi difarmi ogni coſa chiara con glieſſempi, eio mi
obligo di leggerli ſecondola occaſio ne,in qualunque libro di queſti,che tu
uorrai. Ma prima deſidero ſa per alcuna coſa d'intornoal Numero, o numeroſo
componimento. Laſciati à me guidare cheil tutto ſaperai ſecondo il biſogno.
Sappi adunque, è Dinardo, chequalhora alcuno ſi rivolga à conſi= derare il
modo, es la ragione del medicare, che ritrouando alcus na bella coſa nella
medicina, uoglia giudicioſamente applicarla all’are te del dire, non è dubbio,
che egli non ſia per uedere tra la medicina, o l'arte di che
ſiragiona,grandiſsima ſimiglianza. Ecco la medicina cerca di indurre ſanità,
oue ella non ė, ò di conſeruarla doue ella fi truoua.Ilſimile fa queſt'arte,d'intorno
alla buonaopinione, perche conogni ſtudio s'affitica di metterla,ò di
mantenerla oue ſia biſogno. La medicina conoſce qual parte del corpo con
qualrimedio eſſer debs bia riſanata, o preferuata,cosi queſt'arte opracon
l'anima, e con le partiſue con le formedel parlare.La medicina quantopiù può
fugge la noia chepotrebbe alcuno medicamento recar'atl'infermo,con mele ò con
zucchero, ò con altra coperta mitigando il peßimoſapore, ego l'odore delle
medicine, ne da queſta gentilezza ſi parte la mia figlis uola, cercandodinon offendere
quelſentimento,che prende iſuoi ris medij,il qualſentimento é negli orrecchi
ripoſto,per le qualiſotto la ſoauità delſuono fa trapaſſar’inſino all'anima la
opinione, quantun que ſia di coſa dalla Natura aborrita. Etfinalmente la
medicina nelle ſue compoſitioni alcune coſe ui mette, non tanto gioueuoli alle
parti offeſe, quanto preſte apportatrici delle uirtù dell'altre coſe al luogo
infermo, il chequãtoſi conuenga all'artificiofa fauella,non ti posſo in poca
hora dichiarare, perche troppo grande é la forza delſuo nus meroſo componimento;
il quale portando ſeco ageuolißimamente il ualor delle parole, o delle
ſentenze,paſa,e penetra per ogni parte dell'anima,deſ leroſa di queſta foauicà,
e benche gli orecchi del uolgo neſentano aſſai, non è però da dimandare alcuno
Idiota,onde ella proceda, ò come ſi faccia, perche queſto giudicio è più
proprio dell'intelletto, che delſentimento umano. Giudicando adunque, o
conſiderando lo intendente huomo quale ſia la cagione, che le parole più ad un
modo, che ad un'altro diſposte fieno diletteuolio numeroſe, ritrüoua iltutto
eſſere alla Natura, quanto alſuo principio, conueniente, ma quanto alla
perfettione non cosi; però che io ne ho grandißima parte.Et perche tuſappia
quello che la Nde tura, a quello che io ti poßiamo prestare,dico,che la Natura
ha posto alls cor nelle orecchie ilſuo piacere & diletto, uuole chequelle
affaticate fi folleuino con la ſoauità, a dolcezza del dire; al che fare niuna
coſa è più potente nel uostro ragionare, che'l numero, ola fosnità delle
parole. Il qual numero biſogna, che di ſua uoglia uegna nella oratione, si
perchefa oratione, e non muſica,si perfuggir la fofpitione dello artificio, la
quae le con luſingheuole inganno pare, che uoglia abbagliar l’animo de gli
aſcol tanti, operò leua loro ogni perſuaſione, o fede. Ma quando con ine certo,
& non conoſciuto numero,dolce però, e foaue,ſi compone il parlamento, oſi
lega inſieme il faſcio della ſentenza, & del'intendimento,fena za dubbio il
tutto con credenza, o diletto ſi riceue. Fuggafi dunque il ucrſo, « ogni regola
continouata del uerſo; continouata dico, peroche lo ſteſſo numero più volte
replicato facilmente ſiriconoſce, o fache gli os recchi aſpettanti l'ordinato,
« conſueto ritorno, più alſuono,che alſentia mentoſi diano,coſa aſſai chiara,
oatteſa ne i uerſi,il numero de' quali ufae to,e conoſciuto,più dall'arte,che
dalla Natura procedente. Ma percheſenza legge di numero alcuno, o ſciolta del
tutto non dee restare l'oratione, che oſcura, cu piaccuole ne rimarrebbe,però
numeroſa o compoſta ella fi dis fidera grandemente. Ora da che naſca, o per
qual cagione diuerſamente offer conuenga numeroſa l'oratione, quanto à me
s'appartiene dirò bries uemente,dichiarando prima,che coſa ſia NVMERO, ò
numeroſo come ponimento. DIN. Queſto ordine à meſommamente diletta,però di
cuore ti prie go,che più diſtintamente che puoi,me lo dimostri. A R. La
neceßità uuole, che le parole ſieno pari alla ſentenza,perche à queſto fine ſi
ragiona,comeſi è detto,accioche quanto habbiamo di dene troſi dimoſtri di fuori,doue
mancando o accreſcendo parole, o il concetto interno non ſarebbeeſpreſſo, come
nella mente dimora, ò il parlar ſarebbe ociofo,ò mancheuole.Maperche la
ſentenza nell'anima è finita Otermina ta,però debbon’eſſerfinite,os terminate
in quantità le parole, che laſenten F DEELLA za dimostrano. Laqual quantità
inſieme ragunata, Giro, o circuito nos mineremo ilquale altro non ſarà,chepieno
operfetto abbracciamento del la ſentenza. Questo abbracciamento di pari
accompagnando la uirtù di ef la ſentenza,puòhauere una ò piu parti, o maggiori,
o minori, ſecondo le parti della ſentenza;@ ciaſcuna parte é composta di
parole, oſi chiama Membro, ó Nodo; osi come ogni parte del corpo ha il ſuo
principio, il ſuofine, e il ſuo mezo, o il corpomedeſimo e terminato, &
finitocosi, le parti dello abbracciamento, welfo abbracciamento ſarà finito,
otermina to. In tutto queſto ſpatio adunque,che è tra il principio,il fine di
ciaſcu na parte, e tra il cominciamento, es la chiuſa,che s'è detto
chiamarſigia ro,ė forza,che la lingua alcuna uolta s'adagi,o ſi ripoſi ſecondo
il biſoa gno,oſi muoua più ueloce,ò piu tarda ſecondo laqualità del concetto.
Et questo ripoſo, oqueſto mouimento,miſurato col tempo del proferire, para
toriſce ilnumero, del qual ragioniamo,uero figliuolo della compoſitione, o de i
termini del parlare, omoltopiu nel fine,chenel cominciamento e più apparente ne
gli eſtremi chenel mezo.Etperche di eſſo Numero gli orecchi fanno giudicio in
quanto al ſentimento del piacere, o del diſpiaa cere,per eſſer naturale à
ciaſcuno la dilettatione de' ſenſi, ol'intellettofos lo come ti dißi,ne cerca
la cagione però, hauendoſifin'ora in parte dimoſtra to quello cheall'intelletto
s'appartiene,in parte dico,perciò che l'intelletto in questo caſo molto alle
orecchie deferiſce, odiuerſe maniere hanno dia uerfo numero.Però cominciando a
trattare delle forme del dire daremo a ciaſcheduno il ſuo numeroſo
componimento,o con effempi ancora ritroue remo quello che con ragioneſfarà
dimostrato. DIN. Molto bene auif di farmicapace di questa magnifica oillus ſtre
compoſitione; però ſegui,che con maggior deſiderio, cheprima,fono apparecchiato
di aſcoltarti,perche mi pare,che ora tu facci di me pruoua marauiglioſa. AR: La
primaformae nominata Chiarezza,laqual naſce da purità, og da eleganza,come s'è
detto. Pero eſſendo ella quaſi un tutto, acciò che meglio ſi manifeſti,ſidirà
delle parti fue,&prima della mondezza opile rità,poidella ſcelta, o
eleganza. Deefl dunque dare allapurità del dire quelle ſentenze, le qualiſono
di piana intelligenza, & non hanno biſogno di piu conſideratione,come per
lo pia fono,o effer deono le narrationi delle co fe,come qui. Leggi. DIN.
Tancredi, Principe di Salerno, fu Signore affai umano, di benigno aſpetto. AR.
Eccoti, che ſenza alcuna fatica di diſcorſo ogni mediocre in. gigno. gegropuò
capire ilſentimento della ſentenzagià letta, come ancora in questi uerfi.
Leggi. DIN. Io son Manfredi, Nipote di Costanza Imperatrice. ART. Et molti
eſſempi ſono della purità nelle nouelle, la ſentenza delle quali per la maggior
parte è molto alla uolgar’intelligenzafottopo sta,pur che partitamenteſa
ciaſcheduna inſe conſiderata, percio che pua re nonſarebbono, quando adalcun
fineſi riguardaſſe, oueroaltro attendes fero per fornir'il ſentimento loro,
comeſe in questa guifa ſi diceſſe. Eſſendo Tancredi principe di Salerno Signore
aſſai umano, per che queſta ſentenza non ſarebbe terminata,o finita,douendo
attendere a quel io, che ſegue, o però più preſto oſcura ſarebbe chemonda
enetta. Non aſpetti adunque altro intendimento,chi uuoleſſer puro nella
ſentenza, las quale stando nell'anima,dee cljer con tal'artificio leuata, che
ſolaſi tirifuo riga come di dentro dimostra il concetto,cosi di fuori fa fatto
paleſe,ſen. za alcun accidente che quella accompagni,o conſegua. Et però
daquesta formaſia bandita ogni circoſtanza di tempo diluogo, di perſona,o di mo.
do,ò d'altro auenimento.Vedi questa parte quanto, é pura nella sentenza: DIN.
La quale percioche egli,sicomei mercatanti fanno, andava molto in tornoapoco
con lei dimoraua,s'inamoród’uno giouane chiama to Roberto. AR. Non laſcia eſſer
pura cotestaſentenza,quel trammezamento,che dice,percioche egli,si come i
mercatanti fanno,andaua molto intorno, o questo adiuiene,perche ſospeſoſi tiene
l'animo, di chi ode. Fuggi adunque ogni raccoglimento ſe uuoi eſſere nel tuo
dir mondo, &neto; &narra le co Se partitamente come ſtanno,ma de i
raccoglimenti quãti,o quali ſieno, dirà poi.Delle parole ueramente con le quali
ſi dee uestire 'la purità breue ammaeſtramento ſi daràperche, tutte le
parole,piane,facili,ufitate, bricui, O communi ſonoall'anima della purità molto
proportionate, onde le trae portate,le ſtraniere,le lunghe, & quelle, che
la lingua pena à proferire, o l'intelletto a capirefono dalla purità lontane,però
purisſime ſono queste. DIN. Cheà me pareuaeßer’in una bella, diletteuole ſelua,&
in quella andar cacciando ehauer preſo una cauriola, parcami, che ella fuſſepiu
che la neue bianca,or in brieueſpatio diucniſſe si mia domeſtica, che punto da
me nonſi partiua,tutta uia à meparcua hauerla, si cara, cbe accio che da me non
partiſſe,le mi pareua nella gola hauer meſſo un cola no d'oro,e quella con una
catena d'oro tener con le mani. F 2 AR DEL LOA: ARTE Non è poco hauer giudicio
di ritrouar le parole adognima niera conformii,mamolto più ſi deue auuertir'
nel diſporle, o colorirle,on de ne naſce il deſiderato aſpetto.Et però ſappi
che la figura delle parole,al la puritàſottopoſte,é il dritto,ecco. DIN. Nicolò
Cornacchini fu nostro cittadino,o ricco huomo. ARTE Et quiancora DIN. Aſolo
adunqueuago, « piaceuole caſtello poſto ne gli eſtremi gioghi delle nostre
Alpiſopra il Triuigiano ecfi come ogn’uno deeſapere) Arneſe della reina di
Cipri. ARTE Non cosipuro ſarebbe ſe da gli obliqui caſi haueſſe comine ciato, Dicendo,
DiAſolo,uago &piaceuole caſtello poſſeditrice fu la Reie na di Cipri. Ma
puro e per la figura del dritto, auegna che ſecondo quella: parola puro non ſia,doue
ſi dice Arneſe,uoce ſtraniera, ancora nello are. tificio non é puro per quello
tramezamento, che dice (si come ogn’uno dee ſapere) o per quelle circoſtanze
del caſtello uago, piaceuole, pera che ritarda il ſentimentode gli aſcoltanti,
oui mette le circonſtanze del luogo. DI N. Dunque erra chi uolendo cßer puro
uſa parole non pure, artificio,ò figura d'altra maniera,della oratione? ÁR:
Errerebbe ſe egli credeſſe,otentaſſe d'eſſere in ogni parte puro, &netto,
& non uſaſſe quello che ſi conuiene,ma non erra uolendo alla pu rità del
dire porgere «grandezza o dignità.Ma ancora uoglio che ogni maniera ſia in ſe
ſteſſa conſiderata, e però lapurità del dire haurà le. parti ſue distinte,os
ſeparate dalle altre;nė ſolamente il dritto è figura, di questaforma, o
maniera,ma anche ogni altro colore, che ſia contrario als la comprenſione della
quale ſi dirà poi,ora trattiamo delſito, odellacom poſitione delle parole, Dico
nella purità,cs mondezza del dire douerſi met: tere le parole inſieme con quel
modo,che piu uicino ſia al fauellare, uſitae coſenza molta cura,caffettatione
ſemplicemente quantoſi può. Et si cos me in ciaſcheduna parola di queſta forma
biſognaua leuar'ogni durczza, Cogni difficultà di lettere,o di ſillabe,accioche
la uoce di ſuono e quale, temperato, « non impedito ufciſſe fuori,cosi nella
compoſitione biſos gna guardare di acconciare talmente, che pine tosto nate,
che fabricate appariſcano,come nello eſempio già letto del ſogno ſi conoſceud.
Conſided ra tu poi la forza, & lofpirito di ciaſcuna lettera, e di ciaſcuna
fillaba, come la natura in tutte ha posto la ſuapiaceuolezza, durezza, &
tifa rai queſto giudice del ſuono delleparole, della loro diſpoſitione,ucdi che
la A ſi forma nella più profonda parte del petto,o eſce poifuori con alta восс,
uoce,riſonante,onde lo ſpirito di eſſa grande,oſonoroffente,odi laſe guente,
ch'é,B. LA B é puraſnella,deſpedita,come è afpra'la C.quando è fine della
fillaba,ISA C, órauca quando è posta inanzi la A à la V come per lo contrario e
di dolce,ſpeſſo, o pieno ſuono,precedendo alla I. @alla E.co. me qui.Salabetto
mio dolce iomi ti raccomado o cosicome la mia perſona è al piacer tuo, cosi é
ciò che ciė, o cio che per me ſi può fare al comando tuo. Conſidera poi da te
ſteſſo il restante delle lettere, in che maniera eſſa natura diſua propria
qualità ha ciaſcuna dotata, & uederai onde nde ſce più questa,chequella
compoſitione.Le parti, &le membra, della purie. rità effer deono
breui,& ciaſcuna dee terminar'ilſuo ſentimento,non ritar: dando con
lunghezza de' giri, o di raccoglimenti la intelligenza del poe polo,come qui,
D. Suol’essere a' nauiganti caro,qualhora da oſcuro o fortuneuole nembofofpinti
errano,otrauagliano la lor uia,colſegnodella indiana pie tra,ritrouare la
trammontana, in modo che qual uentoſoffi conoſcendo,non Ria lor tolto il
potere, & uela,ogouerno,là doue eßi di giugner procaca ciano,ò almeno doue
più la loro ſaluezza ueggiono, indirizzare. Bifox gna parimente in minoreſpatio
raccogliere il ſentimento di ciaſcuna para te,oueſt uuole eſſer puro, ofare in
questo modo,benche le parolefieno ale quanto dure.Leggi. DIN. Chino di Tacco
piglia l'Abbatedi Clugni,a medicalo del ma le di ſtomaco, « poi il
laſcia,L'abbate ritorna, in corte di Roma,o il rico cilia con Bonifatio Papa,o
fallofriere dell'oſpedale. A R. Etnel uerſo ancora eſſer dee la predetta norma
oſſeruata,come, qui. Leggi. DIN. Pace non trouo,e non ho da farguerra, E temo,
eſpero, & ardo, e for’un ghiaccio. Ilche non quiene in queſta altra parte.
DIN. Voi, ch'aſcoltate in rimeſparſe il ſuono. Perciò che ilſenſo è troppo
ritardato,o con lunghißime parti rattenuto. Haſi dunque della purità quello
chebiſogna d'intorno alle ſentenze, allo artificio, aile parole, alla figura,
alla compoſitione, & alle parti di cſa. Reſta,che ſi tratti del numero,
& del finimento,cioè della chiuſa,odel ter mine della ſentenza,o delle
parti ſue.Dico adunque, che nello andare, ego nello ſpatio di queſta forma non
ſi dee eſſere néueloce,ne tardo, mateme perato, & ne i ripoſi,one i
mouimenti, operche il numero naſce dalla compoſitione,co dal fine,peròſapendo
quale eßer dee la compoſitione delelc le parole, quale il fineztutto
quello,cheſotto di queſte partiſ contiene darà ad intender quellocheſi è detto,
perche quantoſi ricerca alla com pofitione ſi é dichiarito reſta che ſidica del
finimento.ogniſentenza, ogni giro puòfinire,ò in alcunaparola tronca,oin parola
piena,ſienoque ſte parole,ò di due,ò di tre,ò di piu ſilabe,o ancora di una. Le
parolepie ne,e compiute ò ſonoſdrucciolofe, & uolubili,o ſalde,oferme,
opers che non ſoloRidce conſiderar l'eſtrema parola di tutta la chiuſa, ma anco
la uicina, o proſima,però partitamente ſi dirà di ciaſcun finimento al luo go
ſuo.Comeadunque uoglia la purità terminare le chiuſeſue, aſſai chiaro ofer
dee.Perciò cheaßimigliandoſi elle al dire cotidiano,fuggirà il fine del le
parole tronche, comeſono quelle andò,corfuftarà,o C.perche le mede. fime dee
nella diſpoſitione fuggire,come ramarico, o render florido. Et A contenterà di
quelfine,cheper lo più la Natura a’uolgari dimostra,ma io non uoglio, che con
tanta religioneſifiniſca in parole piene, &perfete te,fuggendo le
tronche,ole fdruccioloſe,che alcuna uolta nonſimetta fie nealtrimenti alſuo
parlare,perche quello cheſi dice, ſi dice per la mage gior parte de
ifinimenti,e delle chiuſe della purità. Da questi adunque odalla diſpoſitione
riſorge quella miſura,che noi numero addimandiamo. Eſſendo adunque lachiuſa
ſimile alla diſpoſitione, «la diſpoſitione non isforzeuole,matemperata,&
naturale,fcguita che il numero dell'uno, o, dell'altro figliuoloſarà, à quelle
fomigliante.Ben'è uero,che laforza di cia fcuna manierà,e ripoſta piu toſto
nelle altre parti,che nel numero, eccetto, che nella bellezza,douc
l'ornamento,e il numero grandementeſ cerca, as molto piùè ne i uerfi, « nella
poeſia,che altroue, o questo dico, acciò che fu non metta piu ſtudio,doue
nonbiſogna riportandoti a gli orecchi,il giu. dicio delle quali da eſſa natura
é ſommamente aiutato. Ecco adunque, è Dinardo,quanto giouala mondezza, opurità
del dire alla chiarezza; ma perche questa ſempliceforma non può daſefola si
chiaramente parlae re che non uiſiaqualche impedimento,però biſogna ouunque le
ſia di aiua. to mestieri,con la eleganza aiutarla, come con maniera chepiù un
modo, che un'altro,piu questo ordineche quello ſecondo il biſogno adoprando
eleg ge et fouegna alla ſemplicepurità del dire,ilqual'aiuto èpiù presto
nell'ar. tificio, che nelle ſentenze ripoſto. Però che ella ſi sforzafar ogni
ſentenza chiara &aperta,non che le pure già dichiarite di ſopra. Parliamo
adune que della cleganza,o prima dello artificio,colquale ella lcuar fuole ogni
ſentenza nella mente riposta. AR. La cleganza e maniera,cheportachiarezza à
tutte le maniere della oratione, operò non tanto alla purità, douc ella manca
foccorre, quanto à ciaſcaduna forma opra intelligenza, o facilità,daqueſto
nafce, che la eleganza dalla purità del dire in alcuna coſa é differente.Perciò
che la purità da ſe ſteſſa è chiara,oaperta,ma la eleganza nella grandezza, e
magnificenza del dire ecomeun ſole, che ogni oſcurità, che per quella poteſſe
uenire, leua,o diſgombra,o però in ogniſentenza ella può molto, si con
l'artificio fuo, si co i colori,«le figure.L'artificio adunque di les uare
ogniſentenza dallo intelletto,acciò che ella ſia inteſa, cogni auuerti. mento
innanzi fatto di quello che ft ha da ragionare. Leggi. DIN. Canterò com’io uißi
in libertade Mentre Amor nel mio albergo à ſdegno s'hebbe Poiſeguirò si come à
luim'increbbe Troppo altamente: AR. ilſimigliante R fa nella proſa,comequi. DI
N. Mipiace à condiſcendere à conſigli d'huomini, de' quai dicena do mi
conuerràfar due coſe molto a' miei costumi contrarie,l'una fia alqua to me
comendare, &l'altra il biaſimare alquanto altrui, maprioche dal uc ro nė
dall'una,ne dall'altra non intendo partirmi ilpurfarò. AR. Vedi quanto
gentilmente | sbriga lo intelletto dello aſcoltare con tali
auuertimenti,Appreſſo i quali aſſai bello artificio, s'intende quela to,che per
chiarezza dialcune coſe altre ne narra fenza le quali non ſi in tenderebbe ageuolmente
il reſtante.Leggi. DIN. Maper trattar del ben,ch'io ui trouai, Diró de l'altre
coſe,ch'io ui ho ſcorte. A R. Se il poeta qui non doueſſe dimostrare le pene de
dannati e i tormenti di quegli,che ſono in diſgratia di Dio, non haurebbepotuto
dare ad intendere facilmente il beneche ne riuſci poi,per hauer lo inferno cers
Cato.Ecco qui dalla medeſima neceßità costretto quest'altro deſcriue la pee
ſtifera mortalità peruenuta nella egregia Città di Firenze,auuertendo pri ma
chi legge,in queſto modo. DIN. Mapercioche qualefuße la cagione,perche le coſe
che appref fo Rileggeranno,aueniſſeno,non ſi poteua ſenza queſta rammemoratione
dimoſtrare,quafi dineceßità coſtretto à ſcriuerla miconduco. A R. Ecco qui
ancora un'altra bella preparatione di coſe,fatta per le uare ogni
impedimento,chepoteſſe offendereilrimanente. DIN. Ma io mi ti uoglio unpoco
ſcuſare,che di que' tempi, che tu te n'andaſti alcuneuolte ci uoleſti uenire, e
non poteſti,alcune ci uenisti, onon fosti cosi lietamente
veduto,comefoleui,& oltre à questo di ciòche io al termine promeſſo,non ti
rendei gli tuoi danari, AR. In fine ogni precedente auifo, & ogni ordine di
coſe, e ſecondo, che elte ſon fatte,narrandole,ė artificio ſcelto, &
elegante,però tutte le propofitoni de' poeti ſono elegantißime. Leggi. DIN.
Veramente quant’io del regno fanto Ne la mia mente poteifar teſoro Sarà ora
materia del mio canto, AR. E qui ancora DIN. Et canterò di quel ſecondo regno,
Que l'umanoſpirito ſi purga E di ſalir’alCiel diuenta degno. ART. il
fimigliante modo è oſſeruato ne i principij di ogni nouelld, come da tefteſſo
uedrai.Suole ancora la Eleganza porre artificioſamente le oppoſitioni con le
riſpoſte partitamentecome qui. Leggi. DIN. Saranno per auentura alcuni di uoi,
che diranno,ch'io habbia nello ſcriuere queste nouelle troppolicenza uſata.
ART. Eccola dimanda ſeguita la ſolutione. DIN. La qual coſa io niego,percioche
niuna coſa esi difoneſta, che con oneſte parole dicendola ſi diſdica ad alcuno.
ART. Et cosi di paripaſſo alle obiettioni riſponde, benche altre fide te
inſiemepostohabbia ogni accuſa di ſefatta, opoi s'habbiafcufato, ma quelmodo
non ha dello elegante,comeilpredetto poſe prima le oppoſitioni tutte inſieme
allora quando diſſe, Leggi. DIN. Sono adunque, diſcrete Donne, stati alcuni,
che queſte nouelle leggendo hanno detto cheuoi mipiacete troppo, eche oneſta
coſa nonė, che io tanto diletto prenda di piacerui e di confolarui.Et alcuni
han dete to peggio,di coinmendarui,come io fo.Altri più maturamente moſtrando
di uoler dire,hannodetto, che alla mia età non stà bene l'andar'omai dietro
queſte coſe, cice à ragionare di Donne,o à compiacer loro.Et molti molto te
neri della miafamamoſirandoſi dicono,ch'io farei più ſauiamente,àſtarmi con le
Mufe in Parnaſo,che con queſte ciance meſcolarmi tra uoi.Etſon di quegli
ancora,che più difpettoſamente,che ſauiamente parlando,hannodete to,cl’io farei
più diſcrettamente à penſare,donde io poteßi hauer del pae ne, che dietro a
queste fraſche andarmi paſcendo di uento. Et certi altri,in altra guiſa eſſere
state le coſe da me raccontateui,che come io le ui porgo s'ingegnano in
detrimento della mia fatica di dimostrare. AR. In queſto luogo molte accuſe
contra dello autoreſi mettono, pri ma che ad alcunaſi riſponda, ilche non è
cosi elegante,comeilprimoartife cio,ben che in tanta confuſione egli ſtudiaſſe
di eſſer chiaro, cinteſo, eso auiſaſje quiſaſſe auanti lo aſcoltante,come fa
doue dice,roppo alquanto dalle predet te oppoſitioni,perche non di ſubito
riſponde, ilche ancora é dalia cleganza lontano. Ma leggi. DIN. Ma quanti,
ch'io uegna à far la riſpoſta ad alcuno,mipiace in fauore di me raccontare, non
una nouella intera,ma parte di una. Et ne poeti ancora fi oſferua,ſecondoche
meglio lor ben uiene di fare cosifatti partimenti.Vedi. DIN. Tu
argomenti,ſe'lbuon uoler dura, La uiolenza altrui,per qual cagione Di meritar
mi ſcema la miſura? A R.Queſta éuna propoſta,alla quale ſecondo l'arte della
eleganzaſ doueá prinia riſponderemaſi è poſta ancora la ſeconda,
doueſeguita. Ancor di dubitar ti dà
cagione Parer tornarſi l'anima àleſtelle Secondo la ſententia di Platone. AR.
Ben che tu ueda qui le propoſte effer'inſieme collocate, non è per ròſenza
cleganza quella parte,per quello cheſegue. DIN. Queſteſon le question,che nel
tuo uelle Pontano egualemente, e però pria Tratterò quella chepiù ba di felle.
In queſto luogo non tanto la eleganza dimoſtra lo artificio fuo per lo
auuertimentofatto di quelloche ſi dee dire, quanto per la elettione di
riſpondere prima ad una domanda,che ad un'altra.Euui ancora un'altro artificio
della ſceltezza,ilqualeè quando ſi ripiglia quello,che ſi è detto, et ſi
dimostra,di che poi ſi ba da dire,come in queſti luoghiſegnati. DIN. Ma
hauereinſino à qui detto della preſente nouella, uoglio che mi basti,o à coloro
riuolgermi,a' quali ho la nouella raccontata. Ilqual luogo acciò chemeglio
quelloche è detto,equellocheſegue, co me stefje ui moſtrerò. AR. Aſaiſi èdetto
fin qui,con che arte la eleganza leuarmare ciaſcheduna delle dette maniere,
accion che io ueda il fine della deſiderata catena dell'anima delle coſe, e del
parlare. A R. Bendi. Dei dunque ſapere che comenell'Anima,al. tra parte è
quella che apprende la ragione,alfra quella, che é da gli effetti commoſſi,
come dicemmo, o nellaNatura altre ſono le coſe allo inſegnare altreal muouere
appartenenti, cosi alcune formedels la orationeſaranno, le quali conuerranno
alle coſe dello intelletto,als cune alle coſe della uoglia, odello appetito, o
quando queſto non fuſſe, né uia, nė ragione alcunaſarebbe di poter
acconciamente indurs re opinione è affettione con la forza della fuuella. Però
auuertiſci, che nel trattamento delle forme da te ſtesſo potrai intendere qual
forma à qual coſaſi confaccia. DIN. Ricorditi difarmi ogni coſa chiara con
glieſſempi, eio mi obligo di leggerli ſecondola occaſio ne,in qualunque libro
di queſti,che tu uorrai. Ma prima deſidero ſa per alcuna coſa d'intornoal
Numero, o numeroſo componimento. ART. Laſciati à me guidare cheil tutto ſaperai
ſecondo il biſogno. Sappi adunque, è Dinardo, chequalhora alcuno ſi rivolga à
conſi= derare il modo, es la ragione del medicare, che ritrouando alcus na
bella coſa nella medicina, uoglia giudicioſamente applicarla all’are te del
dire, non è dubbio, che egli non ſia per uedere tra la medicina, o l'arte di
che ſiragiona,grandiſsima ſimiglianza. Ecco la medicina cerca di indurre
ſanità, oue ella non ė, ò di conſeruarla doue ella fi truoua.Ilſimile fa
queſt'arte,d'intorno alla buonaopinione, perche conogni ſtudio s'affitica di
metterla,ò di mantenerla oue ſia biſogno. La medicina conoſce qual parte del
corpo con qualrimedio eſſer debs bia riſanata, o preferuata,cosi queſt'arte
opracon l'anima, e con le partiſue con le formedel parlare.La medicina
quantopiù può fugge la noia chepotrebbe alcuno medicamento
recar'atl'infermo,con mele ò con zucchero, ò con altra coperta mitigando il
peßimoſapore, ego l'odore delle medicine, ne da queſta gentilezza ſi parte la
mia figlis uola, cercandodinon offendere quelſentimento,che prende iſuoi ris
medij,il qualſentimento é negli orrecchi ripoſto,per le qualiſotto la ſoauità
delſuono fa trapaſſar’inſino all'anima la opinione, quantun que ſia di coſa
dalla Natura aborrita. Etfinalmente la medicina nelle ſue compoſitioni alcune
coſe ui mette, non tanto gioueuoli alle parti offeſe, quanto preſte
apportatrici delle uirtù dell'altre coſe al luogo infermo, il chequãtoſi
conuenga all'artificiofa fauella,non ti posſo in poca hora dichiarare, perche
troppo grande é la forza delſuo nus meroſo componimento; il quale portando ſeco
ageuolißimamente il ualor delle parole, o delle ſentenze,paſa,e penetra per
ogni parte dell'anima Ειοο ν Ε Ν Ζ Α. dell'anima,deſ leroſa di queſta foauicà,
e benche gli orecchi del uolgo neſentano aſſai, non è però da dimandare alcuno
Idiota,onde ella proceda, ò come ſi faccia, perche queſto giudicio è più
proprio dell'intelletto, che delſentimento umano. Giudicando adunque, o
conſiderando lo intendente huomo quale ſia la cagione, che le parole più ad un
modo, che ad un'altro diſposte fieno diletteuolio numeroſe, ritrüoua iltutto
eſſere alla Natura, quanto alſuo principio, conueniente, ma quanto alla
perfettione non cosi; però che io ne ho grandißima parte.Et perche tuſappia
quello che la Nde tura, a quello che io ti poßiamo prestare,dico,che la Natura
ha posto alls cor nelle orecchie ilſuo piacere & diletto, uuole chequelle
affaticate fi folleuino con la ſoauità, a dolcezza del dire; al che fare niuna
coſa è più potente nel uostro ragionare, che'l numero, ola fosnità delle
parole. Il qual numero biſogna, che di ſua uoglia uegna nella oratione, si
perchefa oratione, e non muſica,si perfuggir la fofpitione dello artificio, la
quae le con luſingheuole inganno pare, che uoglia abbagliar l’animo de gli
aſcol tanti, operò leua loro ogni perſuaſione, o fede. Ma quando con ine certo,
& non conoſciuto numero,dolce però, e foaue,ſi compone il parld. -mento,
oſi lega inſieme il faſcio della ſentenza, & del'intendimento,fena za
dubbio il tutto con credenza, o diletto ſi riceue. Fuggafi dunque il ucrſo, «
ogni regola continouata del uerſo; continouata dico, peroche lo ſteſſo numero
più volte replicato facilmente ſiriconoſce, o fache gli os recchi aſpettanti
l'ordinato, « conſueto ritorno, più alſuono,che alſentia mentoſi diano,coſa
aſſai chiara, oatteſa ne i uerſi,il numero de' quali ufae to,e conoſciuto,più
dall'arte,che dalla Natura procedente. Ma percheſenza legge di numero alcuno, o
ſciolta del tutto non dee restare l'oratione, che oſcura, cu piaccuole ne
rimarrebbe,però numeroſa o compoſta ella fi dis fidera grandemente. Ora da che
naſca, o per qual cagione diuerſamente offer conuenga numeroſa l'oratione,
quanto à me s'appartiene dirò bries uemente,dichiarando prima,che coſa ſia
NVMERO, ò numeroſo come ponimento. DIN. Queſto ordine à meſommamente
diletta,però di cuore ti prie go,che più diſtintamente che puoi,me lo dimostri.
AR. La neceßità uuole, che le parole ſieno pari alla ſentenza,perche à queſto
fine ſi ragiona,comeſi è detto,accioche quanto habbiamo di dene troſi dimoſtri
di fuori,doue mancando o accreſcendo parole, o il concetto interno non
ſarebbeeſpreſſo, come nella mente dimora, ò il parlar sarebbe ocioso, ò
mancheuole. Maperche la ſentenza nell'anima è finita Otermina ta,però
debbon’eſſerfinite,os terminate in quantità le parole, che laſentenza
dimostrano. Laqual quantità inſieme ragunata, Giro, o circuito nos mineremo
ilquale altro non ſarà,chepieno operfetto abbracciamento del la ſentenza.
Questo abbracciamento di pari accompagnando la uirtù di ef la
ſentenza,puòhauere una ò piu parti, o maggiori, o minori, ſecondo le parti
della ſentenza;@ ciaſcuna parte é composta di parole, oſi chiama Membro, ó
Nodo; osi come ogni parte del corpo ha il ſuo principio, il ſuofine, e il ſuo
mezo, o il corpomedeſimo e terminato, & finitocosi, le parti dello
abbracciamento, welfo abbracciamento ſarà finito, otermina to. In tutto queſto
ſpatio adunque,che è tra il principio,il fine di ciaſcu na parte, e tra il
cominciamento, es la chiuſa,che s'è detto chiamarſigia ro,ė forza,che la lingua
alcuna uolta s'adagi,o ſi ripoſi ſecondo il biſoa gno,oſi muoua più ueloce,ò
piu tarda ſecondo laqualità del concetto. Et questo ripoſo, oqueſto mouimento,miſurato
col tempo del proferire, para toriſce ilnumero, del qual ragioniamo,uero
figliuolo della compoſitione, o de i termini del parlare, omoltopiu nel
fine,chenel cominciamento e più apparente ne gli eſtremi chenel mezo.Etperche
di eſſo Numero gli orecchi fanno giudicio in quanto al ſentimento del piacere,
o del diſpiaa cere,per eſſer naturale à ciaſcuno la dilettatione de' ſenſi,
ol'intellettofos lo come ti dißi,ne cerca la cagione però, hauendoſifin'ora in
parte dimoſtra to quello cheall'intelletto s'appartiene,in parte dico,perciò
che l'intelletto in questo caſo molto alle orecchie deferiſce, odiuerſe maniere
hanno dia uerfo numero.Però cominciando a trattare delle forme del dire daremo
a ciaſcheduno il ſuo numeroſo componimento,o con effempi ancora ritroue remo
quello che con ragioneſfarà dimostrato. DIN. Molto bene auif di farmicapace di
questa magnifica oillus ſtre compoſitione; però ſegui,che con maggior
deſiderio, cheprima,fono apparecchiato di aſcoltarti,perche mi pare,che ora tu
facci di me pruoua marauiglioſa. AR: La primaformae nominata Chiarezza,laqual
naſce da purità, og da eleganza,come s'è detto. Pero eſſendo ella quaſi un
tutto, acciò che meglio ſi manifeſti,ſidirà delle parti fue,&prima della
mondezza opile rità,poidella ſcelta, o eleganza. Deefl dunque dare allapurità
del dire quelle ſentenze, le qualiſono di piana intelligenza, & non hanno
biſogno di piu conſideratione,come per lo pia fono,o effer deono le narrationi
delle co fe,come qui. Leggi. DIN. Tancredi, Principe di Salerno, fu Signore
affai umano, di benigno aſpetto. AR. Eccoti, che ſenza alcuna fatica di
diſcorſo ogni mediocre in. gigno gegropuò capire ilſentimento della ſentenzagià
letta, come ancora in questi uerfi.Leggi. DIN. Io ſon Manfredi, Nipote di
Coſtanza Imperatrice. ART. Et molti eſſempi ſono della purità nelle nouelle, la
ſentenza delle quali per la maggior parte è molto alla
uolgar’intelligenzafottopo sta,pur che partitamenteſa ciaſcheduna inſe
conſiderata, percio che pua re nonſarebbono, quando adalcun fineſi riguardaſſe,
oueroaltro attendes fero per fornir'il ſentimento loro, comeſe in questa guifa
ſi diceſſe. Eſſendo Tancredi principe di Salerno Signore aſſai umano, per che
queſta ſentenza non ſarebbe terminata,o finita,douendo attendere a quel io, che
ſegue, o però più preſto oſcura ſarebbe chemonda enetta. Non aſpetti adunque
altro intendimento,chi uuoleſſer puro nella ſentenza, las quale stando
nell'anima,dee cljer con tal'artificio leuata, che ſolaſi tirifuo riga come di
dentro dimostra il concetto,cosi di fuori fa fatto paleſe,ſen. za alcun
accidente che quella accompagni,o conſegua. Et però daquesta formaſia bandita
ogni circoſtanza di tempo diluogo, di perſona,o di mo. do,ò d'altro
auenimento.Vedi questa parte quanto, é pura nella ſentenza: DIN. La quale
percioche egli,sicomei mercatanti fanno, andava molto in tornoapoco con lei
dimoraua,s'inamoród’uno giouane chiama to Roberto. AR. Non laſcia eſſer pura
cotestaſentenza,quel trammezamento,che dice,percioche egli,si come i mercatanti
fanno,andaua molto intorno, o questo adiuiene,perche ſospeſoſi tiene l'animo,
di chi ode. Fuggi adunque ogni raccoglimento ſe uuoi eſſere nel tuo dir mondo,
&neto; &narra le co Se partitamente come ſtanno,ma de i raccoglimenti
quãti,o quali ſieno, dirà poi.Delle parole ueramente con le quali ſi dee
uestire 'la purità breue ammaeſtramento ſi daràperche, tutte le
parole,piane,facili,ufitate, bricui, O communi ſonoall'anima della purità molto
proportionate, onde le trae portate,le ſtraniere,le lunghe, & quelle, che
la lingua pena à proferire, o l'intelletto a capirefono dalla purità lontane,però
purisſime ſono queste. DIN. Cheà me pareva eßer’in una bella, diletteuole ſelua,&
in quella andar cacciando ehauer preſo una cauriola, parcami, che ella fuſſepiu
che la neue bianca,or in brieueſpatio diucniſſe si mia domeſtica, che punto da
me nonſi partiua,tutta uia à meparcua hauerla, si cara, cbe accio che da me non
partiſſe,le mi pareua nella gola hauer meſſo un cola no d'oro,e quella con una
catena d'oro tener con le mani. F 2 ARTE Non è poco hauer giudicio di ritrouar
le parole adognima niera conformii,mamolto più ſi deue auuertir' nel diſporle,
o colorirle,on de ne naſce il deſiderato aſpetto.Et però ſappi che la figura
delle parole,al la puritàſottopoſte,é il dritto,ecco. DIN. Nicolò Cornacchini
fu nostro cittadino,o ricco huomo. ARTE Et quiancora DIN. A solo adunqueuago, «
piaceuole caſtello poſto ne gli eſtremi gioghi delle nostre Alpiſopra il
Triuigiano ecfi come ogn’uno deeſapere) Arneſe della reina di Cipri. ARTE Non
cosipuro ſarebbe ſe da gli obliqui caſi haueſſe comine ciato, Dicendo,DiAſolo,uago
&piaceuole caſtello poſſeditrice fu la Reie na di Cipri. Ma puro e per la
figura del dritto, auegna che ſecondo quella: parola puro non ſia,doue ſi dice
Arneſe,uoce ſtraniera, ancora nello are. tificio non é puro per quello
tramezamento, che dice (si come ogn’uno dee ſapere) o per quelle circoſtanze
del caſtello uago, piaceuole, pera che ritarda il ſentimentode gli aſcoltanti,
oui mette le circonſtanze del luogo. DI N. Dunque erra chi uolendo cßer puro
uſa parole non pure, artificio,ò figura d'altra maniera,della oratione? ÁR:
Errerebbe ſe egli credeſſe,otentaſſe d'eſſere in ogni parte puro, &netto,
& non uſaſſe quello che ſi conuiene,ma non erra uolendo alla pu rità del
dire porgere «grandezza o dignità.Ma ancora uoglio che ogni maniera ſia in ſe
ſteſſa conſiderata, e però lapurità del dire haurà le. parti ſue distinte,os
ſeparate dalle altre;nė ſolamente il dritto è figura, di questaforma, o
maniera,ma anche ogni altro colore, che ſia contrario als la comprenſione della
quale ſi dirà poi,ora trattiamo delſito, odellacom poſitione delle parole, Dico
nella purità,cs mondezza del dire douerſi met: tere le parole inſieme con quel
modo,che piu uicino ſia al fauellare, uſitae coſenza molta cura,caffettatione
ſemplicemente quantoſi può. Et si cos me in ciaſcheduna parola di queſta forma
biſognaua leuar'ogni durczza, Cogni difficultà di lettere,o di ſillabe,accioche
la uoce di ſuono e quale, temperato, « non impedito ufciſſe fuori,cosi nella
compoſitione biſos gna guardare di acconciare talmente, che pine tosto nate,
che fabricate appariſcano,come nello eſempio già letto del ſogno ſi conoſceud.
Conſided ra tu poi la forza, & lofpirito di ciaſcuna lettera, e di ciaſcuna
fillaba, come la natura in tutte ha posto la ſuapiaceuolezza, durezza, &
tifa rai queſto giudice del ſuono delleparole, della loro diſpoſitione,ucdi che
la A ſi forma nella più profonda parte del petto,o eſce poifuori con alta
восс, uoce,riſonante,onde lo ſpirito di eſſa grande,oſonoroffente,odi
laſe guente, ch'é,B. LA B é puraſnella,deſpedita,come è afpra'la C.quando è
fine della fillaba,ISA C, órauca quando è posta inanzi la A à la V come per lo
contrario e di dolce,ſpeſſo, o pieno ſuono,precedendo alla I. @alla E.co. me
qui.Salabetto mio dolce iomi ti raccomado o cosicome la mia perſona è al piacer
tuo, cosi é ciò che ciė, o cio che per me ſi può fare al comando tuo. Conſidera
poi da te ſteſſo il restante delle lettere, in che maniera eſſa natura diſua
propria qualità ha ciaſcuna dotata, & uederai onde nde ſce più
questa,chequella compoſitione.Le parti, &le membra, della purie. rità effer
deono breui,& ciaſcuna dee terminar'ilſuo ſentimento,non ritar: dando con
lunghezza de' giri, o di raccoglimenti la intelligenza del poe polo,come qui,
D. Suol’eſſere a' nauiganti caro,qualhora da oſcuro o fortuneuole nembofofpinti
errano,otrauagliano la lor uia,colſegnodella indiana pie tra,ritrouare la
trammontana, in modo che qual uentoſoffi conoſcendo,non Ria lor tolto il
potere, & uela,ogouerno,là doue eßi di giugner procaca ciano,ò almeno doue
più la loro ſaluezza ueggiono, indirizzare. Bifox gna parimente in minoreſpatio
raccogliere il ſentimento di ciaſcuna para te,oueſt uuole eſſer puro, ofare in
questo modo,benche le parolefieno ale quanto dure.Leggi. DIN. Chino di Tacco
piglia l'Abbatedi Clugni,a medicalo del ma le di ſtomaco, « poi il
laſcia,L'abbate ritorna, in corte di Roma,o il rico cilia con Bonifatio Papa,o
fallofriere dell'oſpedale. A R. Etnel uerſo ancora eſſer dee la predetta norma
oſſeruata,come, qui. Leggi. DIN. Pace non trouo,e non ho da farguerra, E temo,
eſpero, & ardo, e for’un ghiaccio. Ilche non quiene in queſta altra parte.
DIN. Voi, ch'aſcoltate in rimeſparſe il ſuono. Perciò che ilſenſo è troppo
ritardato,o con lunghißime parti rattenuto. Haſi dunque della purità quello
chebiſogna d'intorno alle ſentenze, allo artificio, aile parole, alla figura,
alla compoſitione, & alle parti di cſa. Reſta,che ſi tratti del numero,
& del finimento,cioè della chiuſa,odel ter mine della ſentenza,o delle
parti ſue.Dico adunque, che nello andare, ego nello ſpatio di queſta forma non
ſi dee eſſere néueloce,ne tardo, mateme perato, & ne i ripoſi,one i
mouimenti, operche il numero naſce dalla compoſitione,co dal fine,peròſapendo
quale eßer dee la compoſitione delelc le parole, quale il fineztutto
quello,cheſotto di queſte partiſ contiene darà ad intender quellocheſi è detto,
perche quantoſi ricerca alla com pofitione ſi é dichiarito reſta che ſidica del
finimento.ogniſentenza, ogni giro puòfinire,ò in alcunaparola tronca,oin parola
piena,ſienoque ſte parole,ò di due,ò di tre,ò di piu ſilabe,o ancora di una. Le
parolepie ne,e compiute ò ſonoſdrucciolofe, & uolubili,o ſalde,oferme,
opers che non ſoloRidce conſiderar l'eſtrema parola di tutta la chiuſa, ma anco
la uicina, o proſima,però partitamente ſi dirà di ciaſcun finimento al luo go
ſuo.Comeadunque uoglia la purità terminare le chiuſeſue, aſſai chiaro ofer
dee.Perciò cheaßimigliandoſi elle al dire cotidiano,fuggirà il fine del le
parole tronche, comeſono quelle andò,corfuftarà, o C.perche le mede. fime dee
nella diſpoſitione fuggire,come ramarico, o render florido. Et A contenterà di
quelfine,cheper lo più la Natura a’uolgari dimostra,ma io non uoglio, che con
tanta religioneſifiniſca in parole piene, &perfete te,fuggendo le
tronche,ole fdruccioloſe,che alcuna uolta nonſimetta fie nealtrimenti alſuo
parlare,perche quello cheſi dice, ſi dice per la mage gior parte de
ifinimenti,e delle chiuſe della purità. Da questi adunque odalla diſpoſitione
riſorge quella miſura,che noi numero addimandiamo. Eſſendo adunque lachiuſa ſimile
alla diſpoſitione, «la diſpoſitione non isforzeuole,matemperata,&
naturale,fcguita che il numero dell'uno, o, dell'altro figliuoloſarà, à quelle
fomigliante.Ben'è uero,che laforza di cia fcuna manierà,e ripoſta piu toſto
nelle altre parti,che nel numero, eccetto, che nella bellezza,douc
l'ornamento,e il numero grandementeſ cerca, as molto piùè ne i uerfi, « nella
poeſia,che altroue, o questo dico, acciò che fu non metta piu ſtudio,doue
nonbiſogna riportandoti a gli orecchi,il giu. dicio delle quali da eſſa natura
é ſommamente aiutato. Ecco adunque, è Dinardo,quanto giouala mondezza, opurità
del dire alla chiarezza; ma perche questa ſempliceforma non può daſefola si
chiaramente parlae re che non uiſiaqualche impedimento,però biſogna ouunque le
ſia di aiua. to mestieri,con la eleganza aiutarla, come con maniera chepiù un
modo, che un'altro,piu questo ordineche quello ſecondo il biſogno adoprando
eleg ge et fouegna alla ſemplicepurità del dire,ilqual'aiuto èpiù presto
nell'ar. tificio, che nelle ſentenze ripoſto. Però che ella ſi sforzafar ogni
ſentenza chiara &aperta,non che le pure già dichiarite di ſopra. Parliamo
adune que della cleganza,o prima dello artificio,colquale ella lcuar fuole ogni
ſentenza nella mente riposta. AR. La cleganza e maniera,cheportachiarezza à
tutte le maniere della oratione, operò non tanto alla purità, douc ella manca
foccorre, quanto à ciaſcaduna forma opra intelligenza, o facilità,daqueſto
nafce, che la eleganza dalla purità del dire in alcuna coſa é differente.Perciò
che la purità da ſe ſteſſa è chiara,oaperta,ma la eleganza nella grandezza, e
magnificenza del dire ecomeun ſole, che ogni oſcurità, che per quella poteſſe
uenire, leua,o diſgombra,o però in ogniſentenza ella può molto, si con
l'artificio fuo, si co i colori,«le figure.L'artificio adunque di les uare
ogniſentenza dallo intelletto,acciò che ella ſia inteſa, cogni auuerti. mento
innanzi fatto di quello che ft ha da ragionare. Leggi. DIN. Canterò com’io uißi
in libertade Mentre Amor nel mio albergo à ſdegno s'hebbe Poiſeguirò si come à
luim'increbbe Troppo altamente: AR. ilſimigliante R fa nella proſa,comequi. DIN.
Mipiace à condiſcendere à conſigli d'huomini, de' quai dicena do mi conuerràfar
due coſe molto a' miei costumi contrarie,l'una fia alqua to me comendare,
&l'altra il biaſimare alquanto altrui, maprioche dal uc ro nė dall'una,ne
dall'altra non intendo partirmi ilpurfarò. AR. Vedi quanto gentilmente | sbriga
lo intelletto dello aſcoltare con tali auuertimenti,Appreſſo i quali aſſai
bello artificio, s'intende quela to,che per chiarezza dialcune coſe altre ne
narra fenza le quali non ſi in tenderebbe ageuolmente il reſtante.Leggi. DIN.
Maper trattar del ben,ch'io ui trouai, Diró de l'altre coſe,ch'io ui ho ſcorte.
A R. Se il poeta qui non doueſſe dimostrare le pene de dannati e i tormenti di
quegli,che ſono in diſgratia di Dio, non haurebbepotuto dare ad intendere
facilmente il beneche ne riuſci poi,per hauer lo inferno cers Cato.Ecco qui
dalla medeſima neceßità costretto quest'altro deſcriue la pee ſtifera mortalità
peruenuta nella egregia Città di Firenze,auuertendo pri ma chi legge,in queſto
modo. DIN. Mapercioche qualefuße la cagione,perche le coſe che appref fo
Rileggeranno,aueniſſeno,non ſi poteua ſenza queſta rammemoratione dimoſtrare,quafi
dineceßità coſtretto à ſcriuerla miconduco. AR. Ecco qui ancora un'altra bella
preparatione di coſe,fatta per le uare ogni impedimento,chepoteſſe
offendereilrimanente. DIN. Ma io mi ti uoglio unpoco ſcuſare,che di que' tempi,
che tu te n'andaſti alcuneuolte ci uoleſti uenire, e non poteſti,alcune ci
uenisti, onon fosti cosi lietamente veduto,comefoleui,& oltre à questo di
ciòche io al termine promeſſo,non ti rendei gli tuoi danari. AR. In fine ogni
precedente auifo, & ogni ordine di coſe, e ſecondo, che elte ſon
fatte,narrandole,ė artificio ſcelto, & elegante,però tutte le propofitoni
de' poeti ſono elegantißime. Leggi. DIN. Veramente quant’io del regno fanto Ne
la mia mente poteifar teſoro Sarà ora materia del mio canto, AR. E qui ancora
DIN. Et canterò di quel ſecondo regno, Que l'umanoſpirito ſi purga E di
ſalir’alCiel diuenta degno. ART. il fimigliante modo è oſſeruato ne i principij
di ogni nouelld, come da tefteſſo uedrai.Suole ancora la Eleganza porre artificioſamente
le oppoſitioni con le riſpoſte partitamentecome qui. Leggi. DIN. Saranno per
auentura alcuni di uoi, che diranno,ch'io habbia nello ſcriuere queste nouelle
troppolicenza uſata. ART. Eccola dimanda ſeguita la ſolutione. DIN. La qual
coſa io niego,percioche niuna coſa esi difoneſta, che con oneſte parole
dicendola ſi diſdica ad alcuno. ART. Et cosi di paripaſſo alle obiettioni
riſponde, benche altre fide te inſiemepostohabbia ogni accuſa di ſefatta, opoi
s'habbiafcufato, ma quelmodo non ha dello elegante,comeilpredetto poſe prima le
oppoſitioni tutte inſieme allora quando diſſe, Leggi. DIN. Sono adunque,
diſcrete Donne, stati alcuni, che queſte nouelle leggendo hanno detto cheuoi
mipiacete troppo, eche oneſta coſa nonė, che io tanto diletto prenda di
piacerui e di confolarui.Et alcuni han dete to peggio,di coinmendarui,come io
fo.Altri più maturamente moſtrando di uoler dire,hannodetto, che alla mia età
non stà bene l'andar'omai dietro queſte coſe, cice à ragionare di Donne,o à
compiacer loro.Et molti molto te neri della miafamamoſirandoſi dicono,ch'io
farei più ſauiamente,àſtarmi con le Mufe in Parnaſo,che con queſte ciance
meſcolarmi tra uoi.Etſon di quegli ancora,che più difpettoſamente,che
ſauiamente parlando,hannodete to,cl’io farei più diſcrettamente à penſare,donde
io poteßi hauer del pae ne, che dietro a queste fraſche andarmi paſcendo di
uento. Et certi altri,in altra guiſa eſſere state le coſe da me
raccontateui,che come io le ui porgo s'ingegnano in detrimento della mia fatica
di dimostrare. AR. In queſto luogo molte accuſe contra dello autoreſi mettono,
pri ma che ad alcunaſi riſponda, ilche non è cosi elegante,comeilprimoartife
cio,ben che in tanta confuſione egli ſtudiaſſe di eſſer chiaro, cinteſo, eso
auiſaſje quiſaſſe auanti lo aſcoltante,come fa doue dice,roppo alquanto dalle
predet te oppoſitioni,perche non di ſubito riſponde, ilche ancora é dalia
cleganza lontano. Ma leggi. DIN. Ma quanti, ch'io uegna à far la riſpoſta ad
alcuno,mipiace in fauore di me raccontare, non una nouella intera,ma parte di
una. A R. Et ne poeti ancora fi oſferua,ſecondoche meglio lor ben uiene di fare
cosifatti partimenti.Vedi. DIN. Tu argomenti,ſe'lbuon uoler dura, La uiolenza
altrui,per qual cagione Di meritar mi ſcema la miſura? A R.Queſta éuna
propoſta,alla quale ſecondo l'arte della eleganzaſ doueá prinia riſponderemaſi
è poſta ancora la ſeconda, doueſeguita. DIN. Ancor di dubitar ti dà cagione
Parer tornarſi l'anima àleſtelle Secondo la ſententia di Platone. A R. Ben che
tu ueda qui le propoſte effer'inſieme collocate, non è per ròſenza cleganza
quella parte,per quello cheſegue. DIN. Queſteſon le question,che nel tuo uelle
Pontano egualemente, e però pria Tratterò quella chepiù ba di felle. ART. In
queſto luogo non tanto la eleganza dimoſtra lo artificio fuo per lo
auuertimentofatto di quelloche ſi dee dire, quanto per la elettione di
riſpondere prima ad una domanda,che ad un'altra.Euui ancora un'altro artificio
della ſceltezza,ilqualeè quando ſi ripiglia quello,che ſi è detto, et ſi
dimostra,di che poi ſi ba da dire,come in queſti luoghiſegnati. DIN. Ma
hauereinſino à qui detto della preſente nouella, uoglio che mi basti,o à coloro
riuolgermi,a' quali ho la nouella raccontata. Ilqual luogo acciò chemeglio
quelloche è detto,equellocheſegue, co me stefje ui moſtrerò. AR. Aſaiſi èdetto
fin qui,con che arte la eleganza leuarmare ciaſcheduna delle dette maniere,
accion che io ueda il fine della deſiderata catena dell'anima delle coſe, e del
parlare. 40 DE Ï Ï Á parlare. A R. Bendi. Dei dunque ſapere che comenell'Anima,al.
tra parte è quella che apprende la ragione,alfra quella, che é da gli effetti
commoſſi, come dicemmo, o nellaNatura altre ſono le coſe allo inſegnare altreal
muouere appartenenti, cosi alcune formedels la orationeſaranno, le quali
conuerranno alle coſe dello intelletto,als cune alle coſe della uoglia, odello
appetito, o quando queſto non fuſſe, né uia, nė ragione alcunaſarebbe di poter
acconciamente indurs re opinione è affettione con la forza della fuuella. Però
auuertiſci, che nel trattamento delle forme da te ſtesſo potrai intendere qual
forma à qual coſaſi confaccia. DIN. Ricorditi difarmi ogni coſa chiara con
glieſſempi, eio mi obligo di leggerli ſecondola occaſio ne,in qualunque libro
di queſti,che tu uorrai. Ma prima deſidero ſa per alcuna coſa d'intornoal Numero,
o numeroſo componimento. ART. Laſciati à me guidare cheil tutto ſaperai ſecondo
il biſogno. Sappi adunque, è Dinardo, chequalhora alcuno ſi rivolga à conſi=
derare il modo, es la ragione del medicare, che ritrouando alcus na bella coſa
nella medicina, uoglia giudicioſamente applicarla all’are te del dire, non è
dubbio, che egli non ſia per uedere tra la medicina, o l'arte di che
ſiragiona,grandiſsima ſimiglianza. Ecco la medicina cerca di indurre ſanità,
oue ella non ė, ò di conſeruarla doue ella fi truoua.Ilſimile fa queſt'arte,d'intorno
alla buonaopinione, perche conogni ſtudio s'affitica di metterla,ò di
mantenerla oue ſia biſogno. La medicina conoſce qual parte del corpo con
qualrimedio eſſer debs bia riſanata, o preferuata,cosi queſt'arte opracon
l'anima, e con le partiſue con le formedel parlare.La medicina quantopiù può
fugge la noia chepotrebbe alcuno medicamento recar'atl'infermo,con mele ò con
zucchero, ò con altra coperta mitigando il peßimoſapore, ego l'odore delle
medicine, ne da queſta gentilezza ſi parte la mia figlis uola, cercandodinon
offendere quelſentimento,che prende iſuoi ris medij,il qualſentimento é negli
orrecchi ripoſto,per le qualiſotto la ſoauità delſuono fa trapaſſar’inſino all'anima
la opinione, quantun que ſia di coſa dalla Natura aborrita. Etfinalmente la
medicina nelle ſue compoſitioni alcune coſe ui mette, non tanto gioueuoli alle
parti offeſe, quanto preſte apportatrici delle uirtù dell'altre coſe al luogo
infermo, il chequãtoſi conuenga all'artificiofa fauella,non ti posſo in poca
hora dichiarare, perche troppo grande é la forza delſuo nus meroſo componimento;
il quale portando ſeco ageuolißimamente il ualor delle parole, o delle
ſentenze,paſa,e penetra per ogni parte dell'anima,deſ leroſa di queſta foauicà,
e benche gli orecchi del uolgo neſentano aſſai, non è però da dimandare alcuno
Idiota,onde ella proceda, ò come ſi faccia, perche queſto giudicio è più
proprio dell'intelletto, che delſentimento umano. Giudicando adunque, o
conſiderando lo intendente huomo quale ſia la cagione, che le parole più ad un
modo, che ad un'altro diſposte fieno diletteuolio numeroſe, ritrüoua iltutto
eſſere alla Natura, quanto alſuo principio, conueniente, ma quanto alla
perfettione non cosi; però che io ne ho grandißima parte.Et perche tuſappia
quello che la Nde tura, a quello che io ti poßiamo prestare,dico,che la Natura
ha posto alls cor nelle orecchie ilſuo piacere & diletto, vuole chequelle
affaticate fi folleuino con la ſoauità, a dolcezza del dire; al che fare niuna
coſa è più potente nel uostro ragionare, che'l numero, ola fosnità delle
parole. Il qual numero biſogna, che di ſua uoglia uegna nella oratione, si
perchefa oratione, e non muſica,si perfuggir la fofpitione dello artificio, la
quae le con luſingheuole inganno pare, che uoglia abbagliar l’animo de gli
aſcol tanti, operò leua loro ogni perſuaſione, o fede. Ma quando con ine certo,
& non conoſciuto numero,dolce però, e foaue,ſi compone il parld. -mento,
oſi lega inſieme il faſcio della ſentenza, & dell’intendimento, fena za
dubbio il tutto con credenza, o diletto ſi riceue. Fuggafi dunque il ucrſo, «
ogni regola continouata del uerſo; continouata dico, peroche lo ſteſſo numero
più volte replicato facilmente ſiriconoſce, o fache gli os recchi aſpettanti
l'ordinato, « conſueto ritorno, più alſuono,che alſentia mentoſi diano,coſa
aſſai chiara, oatteſa ne i uerſi,il numero de' quali ufae to,e conoſciuto,più
dall'arte,che dalla Natura procedente. Ma percheſenza legge di numero alcuno, o
ſciolta del tutto non dee restare l'oratione, che oſcura, cu piaccuole ne
rimarrebbe,però numeroſa o compoſta ella fi dis fidera grandemente. Ora da che
naſca, o per qual cagione diuerſamente offer conuenga numeroſa l'oratione,
quanto à me s'appartiene dirò bries uemente,dichiarando prima,che coſa ſia
NVMERO, ò numeroſo come ponimento. DIN. Queſto ordine à meſommamente
diletta,però di cuore ti prie go,che più diſtintamente che puoi,me lo dimostri.
A R. La neceßità uuole, che le parole ſieno pari alla ſentenza,perche à queſto
fine ſi ragiona,comeſi è detto,accioche quanto habbiamo di dene troſi dimoſtri
di fuori,doue mancando o accreſcendo parole, o il concetto interno non ſarebbeeſpreſſo,
come nella mente dimora, ò il parlar ſarebbe ociofo,ò mancheuole.Maperche la
ſentenza nell'anima è finita Otermina ta,però debbon’eſſerfinite,os terminate
in quantità le parole, che la sentenza dimostrano. Laqual quantità inſieme
ragunata, Giro, o circuito nos mineremo ilquale altro non ſarà,chepieno
operfetto abbracciamento del la ſentenza. Questo abbracciamento di pari
accompagnando la uirtù di ef la ſentenza,puòhauere una ò piu parti, o maggiori,
o minori, ſecondo le parti della ſentenza;@ ciaſcuna parte é composta di
parole, oſi chiama Membro, ó Nodo; osi come ogni parte del corpo ha il ſuo
principio, il ſuofine, e il ſuo mezo, o il corpomedeſimo e terminato, &
finitocosi, le parti dello abbracciamento, welfo abbracciamento ſarà finito,
otermina to. In tutto queſto ſpatio adunque,che è tra il principio,il fine di
ciaſcu na parte, e tra il cominciamento, es la chiuſa,che s'è detto
chiamarſigia ro,ė forza,che la lingua alcuna uolta s'adagi,o ſi ripoſi ſecondo
il biſoa gno,oſi muoua più ueloce,ò piu tarda ſecondo laqualità del concetto.
Et questo ripoſo, oqueſto mouimento,miſurato col tempo del proferire, para
toriſce ilnumero, del qual ragioniamo,uero figliuolo della compoſitione, o de i
termini del parlare, omoltopiu nel fine,chenel cominciamento e più apparente ne
gli eſtremi chenel mezo.Etperche di eſſo Numero gli orecchi fanno giudicio in
quanto al ſentimento del piacere, o del diſpiaa cere,per eſſer naturale à
ciaſcuno la dilettatione de' ſenſi, ol'intellettofos lo come ti dißi,ne cerca
la cagione però, hauendoſifin'ora in parte dimoſtra to quello cheall'intelletto
s'appartiene,in parte dico,perciò che l'intelletto in questo caſo molto alle
orecchie deferiſce, odiuerſe maniere hanno dia uerfo numero.Però cominciando a
trattare delle forme del dire daremo a ciaſcheduno il ſuo numeroſo
componimento,o con effempi ancora ritroue remo quello che con ragioneſfarà
dimostrato. DIN. Molto bene auif di farmicapace di questa magnifica oillus ſtre
compoſitione; però ſegui,che con maggior deſiderio, cheprima,fono apparecchiato
di aſcoltarti,perche mi pare,che ora tu facci di me pruoua marauiglioſa. AR: La
primaformae nominata Chiarezza,laqual naſce da purità, og da eleganza,come s'è
detto. Pero eſſendo ella quaſi un tutto, acciò che meglio ſi manifeſti,ſidirà
delle parti fue,&prima della mondezza opile rità,poidella ſcelta, o
eleganza. Deefl dunque dare allapurità del dire quelle ſentenze, le qualiſono
di piana intelligenza, & non hanno biſogno di piu conſideratione,come per
lo pia fono,o effer deono le narrationi delle co fe,come qui. Leggi. DIN.
Tancredi, Principe di Salerno, fu Signore affai umano, di benigno aſpetto. A R.
Eccoti, che ſenza alcuna fatica di diſcorſo ogni mediocre in. gigno gegropuò
capire ilſentimento della ſentenzagià letta, come ancora in questi uerfi.Leggi.
DIN. Io ſon Manfredi, Nipote di Coſtanza Imperatrice. ART. Et molti eſſempi
ſono della purità nelle nouelle, la ſentenza delle quali per la maggior parte è
molto alla uolgar’intelligenzafottopo sta,pur che partitamenteſa ciaſcheduna
inſe conſiderata, percio che pua re nonſarebbono, quando adalcun fineſi
riguardaſſe, oueroaltro attendes fero per fornir'il ſentimento loro, comeſe in
questa guifa ſi diceſſe. Eſſendo Tancredi principe di Salerno Signore aſſai
umano, per che queſta ſentenza non ſarebbe terminata,o finita,douendo attendere
a quel io, che ſegue, o però più preſto oſcura ſarebbe chemonda enetta. Non
aſpetti adunque altro intendimento,chi uuoleſſer puro nella ſentenza, las quale
stando nell'anima,dee cljer con tal'artificio leuata, che ſolaſi tirifuo riga
come di dentro dimostra il concetto,cosi di fuori fa fatto paleſe,ſen. za alcun
accidente che quella accompagni,o conſegua. Et però daquesta formaſia bandita
ogni circoſtanza di tempo diluogo, di perſona,o di mo. do,ò d'altro
auenimento.Vedi questa parte quanto, é pura nella ſentenza: DIN. La quale
percioche egli,sicomei mercatanti fanno, andava molto in tornoapoco con lei
dimoraua,s'inamoród’uno giouane chiama to Roberto. AR. Non laſcia eſſer pura
cotestaſentenza,quel trammezamento,che dice,percioche egli,si come i mercatanti
fanno,andaua molto intorno, o questo adiuiene,perche ſospeſoſi tiene l'animo,
di chi ode. Fuggi adunque ogni raccoglimento ſe uuoi eſſere nel tuo dir mondo,
&neto; &narra le co Se partitamente come ſtanno,ma de i raccoglimenti
quãti,o quali ſieno, dirà poi.Delle parole ueramente con le quali ſi dee
uestire 'la purità breue ammaeſtramento ſi daràperche, tutte le
parole,piane,facili,ufitate, bricui, O communi ſonoall'anima della purità molto
proportionate, onde le trae portate,le ſtraniere,le lunghe, & quelle, che
la lingua pena à proferire, o l'intelletto a capirefono dalla purità lontane,però
purisſime ſono queste. DIN. Cheà me pareuaeßer’in una bella, diletteuole ſelua,&
in quella andar cacciando ehauer preſo una cauriola, parcami, che ella fuſſepiu
che la neue bianca,or in brieueſpatio diucniſſe si mia domeſtica, che punto da
me nonſi partiua,tutta uia à meparcua hauerla, si cara, cbe accio che da me non
partiſſe,le mi pareua nella gola hauer meſſo un cola no d'oro,e quella con una
catena d'oro tener con le mani. F 2 AR ARTE Non è poco hauer giudicio di
ritrouar le parole adognima niera conformii,mamolto più ſi deue auuertir' nel diſporle,
o colorirle,on de ne naſce il deſiderato aſpetto.Et però ſappi che la figura
delle parole,al la puritàſottopoſte,é il dritto,ecco. DIN. Nicolò Cornacchini
fu nostro cittadino,o ricco huomo. ARTE Et quiancora DIN. Aſolo adunqueuago, «
piaceuole caſtello poſto ne gli eſtremi gioghi delle nostre Alpiſopra il
Triuigiano ecfi come ogn’uno deeſapere) Arneſe della reina di Cipri. ARTE Non
cosipuro ſarebbe ſe da gli obliqui caſi haueſſe comine ciato, Dicendo,DiAſolo,uago
&piaceuole caſtello poſſeditrice fu la Reie na di Cipri. Ma puro e per la
figura del dritto, auegna che ſecondo quella: parola puro non ſia, doue ſi dice
Arneſe,uoce straniera, ancora nello are. tificio non é puro per quello
tramezamento, che dice (si come ogn’uno dee ſapere) o per quelle circoſtanze
del caſtello uago, piaceuole, pera che ritarda il ſentimentode gli aſcoltanti,
oui mette le circonſtanze del luogo. DI N. Dunque erra chi uolendo cßer puro
uſa parole non pure, artificio,ò figura d'altra maniera,della oratione? ÁR:
Errerebbe ſe egli credeſſe,otentaſſe d'eſſere in ogni parte puro, &netto,
& non uſaſſe quello che ſi conuiene,ma non erra uolendo alla pu rità del
dire porgere «grandezza o dignità.Ma ancora uoglio che ogni maniera ſia in ſe
ſteſſa conſiderata, e però lapurità del dire haurà le. parti ſue distinte,os
ſeparate dalle altre;nė ſolamente il dritto è figura, di questaforma, o
maniera,ma anche ogni altro colore, che ſia contrario als la comprenſione della
quale ſi dirà poi,ora trattiamo delſito, odellacom poſitione delle parole, Dico
nella purità,cs mondezza del dire douerſi met: tere le parole inſieme con quel
modo,che piu uicino ſia al fauellare, uſitae coſenza molta cura,caffettatione
ſemplicemente quantoſi può. Et si cos me in ciaſcheduna parola di queſta forma
biſognaua leuar'ogni durczza, Cogni difficultà di lettere,o di ſillabe,accioche
la uoce di ſuono e quale, temperato, « non impedito ufciſſe fuori,cosi nella
compoſitione biſos gna guardare di acconciare talmente, che pine tosto nate,
che fabricate appariſcano,come nello eſempio già letto del ſogno ſi conoſceud.
Conſided ra tu poi la forza, & lofpirito di ciaſcuna lettera, e di ciaſcuna
fillaba, come la natura in tutte ha posto la ſuapiaceuolezza, durezza, &
tifa rai queſto giudice del ſuono delleparole, della loro diſpoſitione,ucdi che
la A ſi forma nella più profonda parte del petto,o eſce poifuori con alta voce,riſonante,onde
lo ſpirito di essa grande,oſonoroffente,odi laſe guente, ch'é,B. LA B é
puraſnella,deſpedita,come è afpra'la C.quando è fine della fillaba,ISA C,
órauca quando è posta inanzi la A à la V come per lo contrario e di
dolce,ſpeſſo, o pieno ſuono,precedendo alla I. @alla E.co. me qui.Salabetto mio
dolce iomi ti raccomado o cosicome la mia perſona è al piacer tuo, cosi é ciò
che ciė, o cio che per me ſi può fare al comando tuo. Conſidera poi da te
ſteſſo il restante delle lettere, in che maniera eſſa natura diſua propria
qualità ha ciaſcuna dotata, & uederai onde nde ſce più questa,chequella
compoſitione.Le parti, &le membra, della purie. rità effer deono
breui,& ciaſcuna dee terminar'ilſuo ſentimento,non ritar: dando con
lunghezza de' giri, o di raccoglimenti la intelligenza del poe polo,come qui,
D. Suol’eſſere a' nauiganti caro,qualhora da oſcuro o fortuneuole nembofofpinti
errano,otrauagliano la lor uia,colſegnodella indiana pie tra,ritrouare la
trammontana, in modo che qual uentoſoffi conoſcendo,non Ria lor tolto il
potere, & uela,ogouerno,là doue eßi di giugner procaca ciano,ò almeno doue
più la loro ſaluezza ueggiono, indirizzare. Bifox gna parimente in minoreſpatio
raccogliere il ſentimento di ciaſcuna para te,oueſt uuole eſſer puro, ofare in
questo modo,benche le parolefieno ale quanto dure.Leggi. DIN. Chino di Tacco
piglia l'Abbatedi Clugni,a medicalo del ma le di ſtomaco, « poi il
laſcia,L'abbate ritorna, in corte di Roma,o il rico cilia con Bonifatio Papa,o
fallofriere dell'oſpedale. A R. Etnel uerſo ancora eſſer dee la predetta norma
oſſeruata,come, qui. Leggi. DIN. Pace non trouo,e non ho da farguerra, E temo,
eſpero, & ardo, e for’un ghiaccio. Ilche non quiene in queſta altra parte.
DIN. Voi, ch'aſcoltate in rimeſparſe il ſuono. Perciò che ilſenſo è troppo
ritardato,o con lunghißime parti rattenuto. Haſi dunque della purità quello
chebiſogna d'intorno alle ſentenze, allo artificio, aile parole, alla figura,
alla compoſitione, & alle parti di cſa. Reſta,che ſi tratti del numero,
& del finimento,cioè della chiuſa,odel ter mine della ſentenza,o delle
parti ſue.Dico adunque, che nello andare, ego nello ſpatio di queſta forma non
ſi dee eſſere néueloce,ne tardo, mateme perato, & ne i ripoſi,one i
mouimenti, operche il numero naſce dalla compoſitione,co dal fine,peròſapendo
quale eßer dee la compoſitione delelc le parole, quale il fineztutto
quello,cheſotto di queſte partiſ contiene darà ad intender quellocheſi è detto,
perche quantoſi ricerca alla com pofitione ſi é dichiarito reſta che ſidica del
finimento.ogniſentenza, ogni giro puòfinire,ò in alcunaparola tronca,oin parola
piena,ſienoque ſte parole,ò di due,ò di tre,ò di piu ſilabe,o ancora di una. Le
parolepie ne,e compiute ò ſonoſdrucciolofe, & uolubili,o ſalde,oferme,
opers che non ſoloRidce conſiderar l'eſtrema parola di tutta la chiuſa, ma anco
la uicina, o proſima,però partitamente ſi dirà di ciaſcun finimento al luo go
ſuo.Comeadunque uoglia la purità terminare le chiuſeſue, aſſai chiaro ofer
dee.Perciò cheaßimigliandoſi elle al dire cotidiano,fuggirà il fine del le
parole tronche, comeſono quelle andò,corfuftarà,o C.perche le mede. fime dee
nella diſpoſitione fuggire,come ramarico, o render florido. Et A contenterà di
quelfine,cheper lo più la Natura a’uolgari dimostra,ma io non uoglio, che con
tanta religioneſifiniſca in parole piene, &perfete te,fuggendo le
tronche,ole fdruccioloſe,che alcuna uolta nonſimetta fie nealtrimenti alſuo
parlare,perche quello cheſi dice, ſi dice per la mage gior parte de
ifinimenti,e delle chiuſe della purità. Da questi adunque odalla diſpoſitione
riſorge quella miſura,che noi numero addimandiamo. Eſſendo adunque lachiuſa
ſimile alla diſpoſitione, «la diſpoſitione non isforzeuole,matemperata,&
naturale,fcguita che il numero dell'uno, o, dell'altro figliuoloſarà, à quelle
fomigliante. Ben'è vero,che laforza di cia fcuna manierà,e ripoſta piu toſto
nelle altre parti,che nel numero, eccetto, che nella bellezza,douc
l'ornamento,e il numero grandementeſ cerca, as molto piùè ne i uerfi, nella
poeſia,che altroue, o questo dico, acciò che fu non metta piu ſtudio,doue
nonbiſogna riportandoti a gli orecchi,il giu. dicio delle quali da eſſa natura
é ſommamente aiutato. Ecco adunque, è Dinardo,quanto giouala mondezza, opurità
del dire alla chiarezza; ma perche questa ſempliceforma non può daſefola si
chiaramente parlae re che non uiſiaqualche impedimento,però biſogna ouunque le
ſia di aiua. to mestieri,con la eleganza aiutarla, come con maniera chepiù un
modo, che un'altro,piu questo ordineche quello ſecondo il biſogno adoprando
eleg ge et fouegna alla ſemplicepurità del dire,ilqual'aiuto èpiù presto
nell'ar. tificio, che nelle ſentenze ripoſto. Però che ella ſi sforzafar ogni
ſentenza chiara &aperta,non che le pure già dichiarite di ſopra. Parliamo
adune que della cleganza,o prima dello artificio,colquale ella lcuar fuole ogni
ſentenza nella mente riposta. AR. La cleganza e maniera,cheportachiarezza à
tutte le maniere della oratione, operò non tanto alla purità, douc ella manca
foccorre, quanto à ciaſcaduna forma opra intelligenza, o facilità,daqueſto
nafce, che la eleganza dalla purità del dire in alcuna coſa é differente.Perciò
che la purità da ſe ſteſſa è chiara,oaperta,ma la eleganza nella grandezza, e
magnificenza del dire ecomeun ſole, che ogni oſcurità, che per quella poteſſe
uenire, leua,o diſgombra,o però in ogniſentenza ella può molto, si con
l'artificio fuo, si co i colori,«le figure.L'artificio adunque di les uare
ogniſentenza dallo intelletto,acciò che ella ſia inteſa, cogni auuerti. mento
innanzi fatto di quello che ft ha da ragionare. Leggi. DIN. Canterò com’io uißi
in libertade Mentre Amor nel mio albergo à ſdegno s'hebbe Poi seguirò si come à
luim'increbbe Troppo altamente: AR. ilſimigliante R fa nella proſa,comequi. DIN.
Mipiace à condiſcendere à conſigli d'huomini, de' quai dicena do mi conuerràfar
due coſe molto a' miei costumi contrarie,l'una fia alqua to me comendare, &l'altra
il biaſimare alquanto altrui, maprioche dal uc ro nė dall'una,ne dall'altra non
intendo partirmi ilpurfarò. AR. Vedi quanto gentilmente | sbriga lo intelletto
dello aſcoltare con tali auuertimenti,Appreſſo i quali aſſai bello artificio,
s'intende quela to,che per chiarezza dialcune coſe altre ne narra fenza le
quali non ſi in tenderebbe ageuolmente il reſtante.Leggi. DIN. Maper trattar
del ben,ch'io ui trouai, Diró de l'altre coſe,ch'io ui ho ſcorte. AR. Se il
poeta qui non doueſſe dimostrare le pene de dannati e i tormenti di quegli,che
ſono in diſgratia di Dio, non haurebbepotuto dare ad intendere facilmente il
beneche ne riuſci poi,per hauer lo inferno cers Cato.Ecco qui dalla medeſima
neceßità costretto quest'altro deſcriue la pee ſtifera mortalità peruenuta
nella egregia Città di Firenze,auuertendo pri ma chi legge,in queſto modo. DIN.
Mapercioche qualefuße la cagione,perche le coſe che appref fo
Rileggeranno,aueniſſeno,non ſi poteua ſenza queſta rammemoratione dimoſtrare,quafi
dineceßità coſtretto à ſcriuerla miconduco. A R. Ecco qui ancora un'altra bella
preparatione di coſe,fatta per le uare ogni impedimento,chepoteſſe
offendereilrimanente. DIN. Ma io mi ti uoglio unpoco ſcuſare,che di que' tempi,
che tu te n'andaſti alcuneuolte ci uoleſti uenire, e non poteſti,alcune ci
uenisti, onon fosti cosi lietamente veduto,comefoleui,& oltre à questo di
ciòche io al termine promeſſo,non ti rendei gli tuoi danari, AR. AR. In fine
ogni precedente auifo, & ogni ordine di coſe, e ſecondo, che elte ſon
fatte,narrandole,ė artificio ſcelto, & elegante,però tutte le propofitoni
de' poeti ſono elegantißime. Leggi. DIN. Veramente quant’io del regno fanto Ne
la mia mente poteifar teſoro Sarà ora materia del mio canto, AR. E qui ancora
DIN. Et canterò di quel ſecondo regno, Que l'umanoſpirito ſi purga E di
ſalir’alCiel diuenta degno. ART. il fimigliante modo è oſſeruato ne i principij
di ogni nouelld, come da tefteſſo uedrai.Suole ancora la Eleganza porre
artificioſamente le oppoſitioni con le riſpoſte partitamentecome qui. Leggi.
DIN. Saranno per auentura alcuni di uoi, che diranno,ch'io habbia nello
ſcriuere queste nouelle troppolicenza uſata. ART. Eccola dimanda ſeguita la
ſolutione. DIN. La qual coſa io niego,percioche niuna coſa esi difoneſta, che
con oneſte parole dicendola ſi diſdica ad alcuno. ART. Et cosi di paripaſſo
alle obiettioni riſponde, benche altre fide te inſiemepostohabbia ogni accuſa
di ſefatta, opoi s'habbiafcufato, ma quelmodo non ha dello
elegante,comeilpredetto poſe prima le oppoſitioni tutte inſieme allora quando
diſſe, Leggi. DIN. Sono adunque, diſcrete Donne, stati alcuni, che queſte
nouelle leggendo hanno detto cheuoi mipiacete troppo, eche oneſta coſa nonė,
che io tanto diletto prenda di piacerui e di confolarui.Et alcuni han dete to
peggio,di coinmendarui,come io fo.Altri più maturamente moſtrando di uoler
dire,hannodetto, che alla mia età non stà bene l'andar'omai dietro queſte coſe,
cice à ragionare di Donne,o à compiacer loro.Et molti molto te neri della
miafamamoſirandoſi dicono,ch'io farei più ſauiamente,àſtarmi con le Mufe in
Parnaſo,che con queſte ciance meſcolarmi tra uoi.Etſon di quegli ancora,che più
difpettoſamente,che ſauiamente parlando,hannodete to,cl’io farei più
diſcrettamente à penſare,donde io poteßi hauer del pae ne, che dietro a queste
fraſche andarmi paſcendo di uento. Et certi altri,in altra guiſa eſſere state
le coſe da me raccontateui,che come io le ui porgo s'ingegnano in detrimento
della mia fatica di dimostrare. AR. In queſto luogo molte accuſe contra dello
autoreſi mettono, pri ma che ad alcunaſi riſponda, ilche non è cosi elegante,comeilprimoartife
cio,ben che in tanta confuſione egli ſtudiaſſe di eſſer chiaro, cinteſo, eso
auiſaſje quiſaſſe auanti lo aſcoltante,come fa doue dice,roppo alquanto dalle
predet te oppoſitioni,perche non di ſubito riſponde, ilche ancora é dalia
cleganza lontano. Ma leggi. DIN. Ma quanti, ch'io uegna à far la riſpoſta ad
alcuno,mipiace in fauore di me raccontare, non una nouella intera,ma parte di
una. A R. Et ne poeti ancora fi oſferua,ſecondoche meglio lor ben uiene di fare
cosifatti partimenti.Vedi. DIN. Tu argomenti,ſe'lbuon uoler dura, La uiolenza
altrui,per qual cagione Di meritar mi ſcema la miſura? AR. Queſta éuna
propoſta,alla quale ſecondo l'arte della eleganzaſ doueá prinia riſponderemaſi
è poſta ancora la ſeconda, doueſeguita. DIN. Ancor di dubitar ti dà cagione
Parer tornarſi l'anima àleſtelle Secondo la ſententia di Platone. A R. Ben che
tu ueda qui le propoſte effer'inſieme collocate, non è per ròſenza cleganza
quella parte,per quello cheſegue. DIN. Queſteſon le question,che nel tuo uelle
Pontano egualemente, e però pria Tratterò quella chepiù ba di felle. ART. In
queſto luogo non tanto la eleganza dimoſtra lo artificio fuo per lo
auuertimentofatto di quelloche ſi dee dire, quanto per la elettione di
riſpondere prima ad una domanda,che ad un'altra.Euui ancora un'altro artificio
della ſceltezza,ilqualeè quando ſi ripiglia quello,che ſi è detto, et ſi
dimostra,di che poi ſi ba da dire,come in queſti luoghiſegnati. DIN. Ma
hauereinſino à qui detto della preſente nouella, uoglio che mi basti,o à coloro
riuolgermi,a' quali ho la nouella raccontata. Ilqual luogo acciò chemeglio
quelloche è detto,equellocheſegue, co me stefje ui moſtrerò. AR. Aſaiſi èdetto
fin qui,con che arte la eleganza leuadato per ſostegno la grandezza o
magnificenza del dire,cosi nella grandezza è pericolo di uſcire in forma che
non habbis ornamento, proportione,o peròſe le darà per miſura, o bellezzafua
unaforma diligente,accurata,o ben composta, laquale in termini conuc. nienti
richiudendo l'ampiezza della oratione,o ſangue, o colore amabi le en gratioſo
le donerà,ondeil tutto miſurato, & temperato marauigliofan mente ſipotrà
uedere.Questa forma nėſentenze, ne artificio ſeparato dal l'altreforme ritiene,ma
ogniſuaforza nelle parole,nelſito di oſſe, ne i luo mi,onelle altre parti e
ripoſta.Seperò dare non le uogliamo quellefenten ze, che acuti fono,o diſottile
intendimentodelle qualiſi dirà poi. Le paro le adunque di queſtaforma ſono le
foaui,leggiadre,bricui, difacile intelli. genza,iſchiette,o con gran
circoſpettione traportate. Perciò che le trasla tioni in queſtaforma eſſer
deono rarißime, o lefigure di questa miſurata Oben compoſta manieraſono le
repetitioni. Leggi, Per meſ ua ne la Città dolente, Per me ſi ua ne l'eterno dolore,
Per mefi ua tra la perduta gente. AR. E molto bella eornata queſta figura, os
tanto più ha di ornde mento,quantoquello che ſi replica,augumenta,o creſce.
Come qui. Amor, che à cor gentil ratto s'apprende, Preſe costui de la bella
perſona Che mifu tolta,e'l modo ancor m'offende. Amor che a nullo amato
amarperdona, Mipreſe del coſtui piacer si forte Che, come uedi ancornon
m'abbandona. amor conduſſe noi ad una morte. A R. Se alla repetitione
aggiugnerai la interrogatione, ſenza dubbio tu entrerai nella maniera forte
ucemente comequi. Qual'amore,qual ricchezza,qualparentado baurebbe le lagrime,
o i K sospiri pospiri di Tito con tanta efficaciafatti à Gilppo nelcuorfentire,
che egli perciò la bellaſpoſa,gentile,&amata da lui haueße fatta diuenir di
Tito, fe non coſtei? Quai leggi.Quaimi nacce?oc. AR. Tu da te stesſo poi quanto
ornata ſa ducemente queſta parte conſiderando uedrai; tanto più ſeappreſo le
dettefigure ancora ui porrai la conuerſione della quale di ſopra s'è detto.Nėti
marauigliarefe(una me defimafiguraſia da altrefigure ornata willustrata.Pero
che la lingua di queſtiornamenti é capacißima. Laſcia che à fuo modo altri
ragioni, tu neſarai giudice,ola coſa iſteſſa te lo dimostra. La conversione
adunque è figura di queſta idea, a Rſuol fare quando in quella ſteſſa parola
pià membri ſ laſciano terminare,come nello eſempio ora letto. Bella è ancora la
ritornatacheſi fa quando la parola cheſegue, comincia da quella in che la
precedente finiſce,come qui. Leggi, Di me medeſmo meco miuergogno. Et qui, Et confoauepaſſo
a campi difcefa,per l'ampia pianura sùper le rua giadoſe erbe in fine à tanto
che, & c. AR. O uero in questo modo. Infiammò contramegli animi tutti, Egli
infiammati infiammar si Auguſto, che lieti onor tornaro in tristi lutti. AR. Et
ancora il Bifquizzo come nell'uno Poeta ſi dicra Ch'io fuiper ritornar più
uolte uolto, Et l'altro. Il fiorir queſte innanzi tempo tempio. Da poi la
predetta ui ſono anco altre ornatisſimefigure, come è illoro aſcendimento,ala
tradottione o altre. Lo ascendimento R fa quando le parti che
ſeguono,cominciano dalle parole medeſime,nelle quali uan tere minando le parti
precedenti,con questa conditione che ſi mutino, le cadenze di esse parole. Come
qui, Nel dir l'andar,ne l'andar lui più lento. AR. Ouero in queſt'altromodo.
Luſca, io non poſſo credereche queſte parole uengano dalla mia donnd, eperciò
guarda quello che tu di.Et ſe pure da lei ueniſfono,non credo che con l'animo
fermo dire le tifaccia.Etſe pure con l'animo le diceſſe, il mio Rignore mi fa
più onorecheio non merito: A R. La tradottione ė figura,che replicando la
steſſa parola,nonfolde mente dimoſtra la intentione di chi parla,ma
mirabil'ornamento accreſce oue ella ſtruoud.come qui, Laurd, che'l uerde
lauro,e l'aureo crine. AR. Molto diligente as accurata figura e quella cheſifa
quädo due, • più partifraſecongiunteſi ſogliono proferire.Leggi, Et utile
conſiglio potrannopigliare, & conoſcere quello che fa dáfug gire,o che ſia
fimilmente da ſeguitare. AR. Et qui, A cui grandi ey rade,o à cui minute pelje.
AR. Forza ė,che onunque in una bella,& adornata figura s'abbatta un bel
giuditio, egli conoſca es ſenta dentro difealcuna dolcezza; com meſe uno udirà
in questo modo ragionare. Riſpoſemi non huomo,huomo giàfui, E li parentimiei
furon Lombardi, Mantovani per patriambedui, Nacqui ſub Iulio ancor che foſſe
tardi, E uißi à Romaſotto il buon ’Auguſto, Al tempo de gli dei falſie bugiardi
Poetafui,e cantaidi quel giusto Figliuol d'Anchife,che uenne da Troia, Poi
che'lſuperbo Ilion fu combuſto. AR. Non ſentirai tu per queſta diſgiuntione,per
la quale ogni parte ſotto ilſuo uerbo è rinchiuſa,una diligenza gentile del
Pocta:si comelà,do we dice, Io ſon Beatrice,che ti faccio andare, Vegno dal
loco, oue tornar diſſo, Amor mi molle,che mifa parlare. Et molto piùſe nella
proſa detto ritrouaſi A que' tempi che i noſtri maggiorihaueano l'occhio al
gouerno di que ſta Republica,eta riconoſciuta la uirtù de'buoni, dauanſ i
compenſi dei danni riceuuti per la patria,chi robaua il publico,era castigato;
fioriua dia na giouentù dedita alla mercantia, oucro alle lettere, laſciauaſi
il facerdos: tio, la militia da' noſtri queſta,per che i cittadini non
pigliaſſero l'arme contrafe ſtoßi,quello,acciochefuſſero più finceri i parenti
afar giudicio delle coſe importanti. ART. Vedi,che narrando partitamente,
oſenza congiugnimene to alcuno, il parlareè ſpedito, la figura ornata,
odiletteuole ſopramo do il ſuono di eßa oratione. Al cui ornamento il traportar
delle parti di oßa gioua mirabilmente, come quando ſi dice, Al costei foco,alcolei
grido. K 2 Giouin Giouinettopoß'io nel coſtui regno. Et qui. Vſate le colei
bellezze. In queſto caſo nonf dee di tanto leuar dall'ordine loro le parole,
che la ſentenza oſcura deuenti,come diſſe, Che i belli,onde miſtruggo,occhi mi
co la, di che èquaſ piena quella canzone. Verdi panni,ſanguigni,oſcuri,operſ.
Bello alquanto èquel tranſportamento chedice. Or non odio per lei, per
mepietade Cerco, che quel non uo,questo non poſſo. Concedeſ però a '
Poetimaggior licenza per riſpetto della neceßità del uerfo,nel quale ancora più
ampio luogo fanno gli ornamenti che nella profa.pure non èche del bello
nonhabbiano aſſai quelle figure, che per le negationi affermano,come s'egliſi
diceffe, io nol niego, cioè io il confefe fo.Et quella,non è alcuno,che nol
creda,cioè ogn’uno il crede.Poi non taca que,cioè parlò, e diſſe. Suole ancora
chi fcriue amaggior bellezza circoſcriuendo le coſe, con più parole,quello che
conuna può eſprimere come qui, Era giàl'hora,che uolge il deſio, A'nauiganti,e
inteneriſceil core, Il di,che han detto à i dolci amici,A Dio, AR. Et cosiA
chiama il Sole Pianeta,che distingué l'hore, e diceft. laprudenza di Mario,la
fapienzadi Catonein luogo di dire Mario prila dente, o Catone faggio,&éappreßo
bella figurala innouatione i com me qui, Parte preſ in battaglia,e parte
ucciſt. Et quia Taciti ſolieſenza compagnia, N'andauan l'un dinanzi e l'altro
dopo. AR. Ecco come la bellezza ogni formaabbelifce,ne per tanto auenga che
ella moltefigure, molti lumidimoſtre,di quelle ſolamenteſt contene ta,ma
ſtudioſa del diletto sforza di ragionare uariamente. Là onde per fuggir la
fatietà con mirabile artificio è uſata di uariare la oratione. Et questo
ſuolfare primieramente doppo molte uoci di piene «ſonore lettere
ponendonealcune dibaſſe U rimeſſe.Dapoifuggendo la continuatagiacia tura de gli
accentiſopra una medeſimafillaba,ora nelle ultime,ora in quet le,che uanno
innanzi adeffe gliſopramette,o di più in mezo delle lunghe le corte parole
framettendo gratia &adornamento le giunge. Bella coſa ė si come tra
cittadini vedere gli ſtranieri, cosi tra le nostre parole alcuna adirai che
alicna fa,o meſcolare le ifquifite con alcuna detle popolari, le BMOWE huone
con le uſate, finalmente la elettiöne in queſta parte può aſai, la quale
ritrouandofi in ſaldo w ſottilgiudicio, dimoſtra in un'eſſere tutto quello che
col conſiglio di molti eletto a ricolto effer potrebbe però non degnale
uili,ſcaccia le brutte,fugge le aſpre, abbracciale eleganti ſceglie
leſignificanti, o con copia marauigliofa uaria la difpofitione, i të
pi,ilnumeroje i finimenti;nė di pari lunghezza formeràle parti delparlaa
re,nėripiglierà una'steßa figura,un tempo medeſimo,un modo Amile, una perfona
pari,ma quaſi un'adorno pratola oratione di molta varietà fora mando, diletto,
o gioia,recherà ſempremai.Leggiprima qui, comeil Poce ta i medeſimi nomi non
ridice in uno steßo luogo. Io credo checi credette,ch'io credeßi, Che tante
uoci uſciße da quei bronchi, Da genti cheper noiſi naſcondeffc., Però diſſe il
maeſtro,ſe tu tronchi Qualchefrafchetta d'una deste piante, Penſter c'hai
ffaran tutti monchi. Allor porfi la mano un poco duante, E colfi un ramufcel da
un gran pruno, E'l tronco fuo gridò perche miſchiante. Da chefattofupoi
diſanguebruno, Rincominciò à gridar,per che mi ſterpiš Non hai tu ſpirto di
pietade alcuno? Huominifummo, oorfemfatti sterpi, Ben douerebbe la tua man più
pia, seſtatefoßim'anime di ferpi? Comed'un ſtizzo uerde,che arfo Ria, Dal'un de
lati cheda l'altro geme, Bi cigolaper uento che ua uia. Cosi di quella ſcheggia
ufciua inſteme, Parole,e ſangue,ond'io laſciai la cima Cadere,e dette come
l'huom che teme. A R. Tu puoiuederein quanti modiilPoeta ha uoluto variar
leparon ko con quanta felicità egli lo habbia ottenuto. Il che in molti luoghi
può in elo uedere.si come là,doue parlando del lago gelato, lo chiamaora
ghiaccio,era uetro, ora gelozora groſſo,o duro uello,ora ghiaccio, ora geld ti
guazzi, ora eterno uzzo,oragelata,ora cristallo orafaſcia gelata, ora fredda
crostázora lagrime inuetriate, &fimili altre parole ufa variando il poema.
Il fimigliante hannofatto,fono perfare tutti gliſcrittori di non D B 1 L me.
Leggerai mirabili eſſempi della narietà in tanti principij di giornar Odi
nouelle cheſono in quell'autore, o leggerai anco l'ultima parte del ſecondo
libro di quest'altro che comincia. Che andiamo noipure tutta uia di molti
amanti et diletti ragionando. Maė tempo di ritornar’omai alle altre parti della
formapredetta,ope ró d'intorno alle membra dei ſapere chela lunghezza di eſſe
in queſtafor. ma èpix deſiderata,chela breuità ocortezza,non però uoglio, che
si lo ftremo ti fermi,macon più disteſe parti che nella eleganza uorrei,che
leſue ſentenze liportaſjero,che le parole di effe in tal guiſa ſi
collocaſſero,et ſ terminajſe queüa oratione,che uariate alſopradetto modoil
faſtidio o la satietà ſi fuggiſſe, oin grado ogni sprezzata coſa ci ueniſſe. Il
numero al uerfo uicino in questaforma ci uuole,il qual numero primaſarà di quel
la maniera,che di ſopra ti ho detto, cioè ripoſo o mouimento, ouero tempo di
proferire,ò da poi di un'altra,che ora io ti dimoſtrerò. Perciò chemolto bene
all'oratione può dar formanumeroſa et bella, la qualeſia nata da ue na certa
neceßità delle coſe ben composte, o conſiderate, come il contra. porre i
contrarij, o le coſe diſcordi l'una all'altra con miſura corriſpone
denti,ritrouare i ſimiliipari, o altre coſe ſomiglianti à queste,delle quali
partitamente e con eßempio ne dirò, Sono alcune membra,ò nodi della
oratione,iquali hanno le lor ſentenze oppofte,ma con una corriſpondenza tra
loro mirabile temperate. Ilprimo cfſempioſarà di quello che ſi chiama Pare,il
qualeſi fa quando le parti che Äihanno à corriſpondere ſono quaſi di pare
numero di ſilabe, odi tempi, quafi dico,però che queſta parità di ſillabe, o di
tempi con ſaldo intendie mento o giuditiodeue eſſereſtimata, et nõ del tutto
pari.L'eßempio di que ſta forma e questo. Dou’elladifonestamente amica ti fu,
ch'ella oneſtamente tua moglie diuenga. ART. Nel predetto effempio in duemodi
ſiuede effer fatta numero, ſa la oratione primaper la parità delle ſillabe,la
quale nelle parti ſi uede poi per la contrarietà corriſpɔndenteperche amica
omoglie,ſono contra rij, oneftamente o difonestamente fo:10 contrarij,
oppoſti,ſolodi pari ud queſto. Leggi, Quiui à niunoſi cerca inganno,a niunoſifa
ingiuria. ART. I contrarij adunque fanno la orationeoffer numeroſa,come an cora
qui, Et di gran lunga é da eleggerpiù toſto il poco oſaporito, che il mola to o
infipido. ART. tornare. 2 ! TAR. Ne i ſimili ancora cade il numeroſo concento
in modochequando in fimil ſuono la chiuſa finiſce,ne rinſulta il numero. Quel
roſſore, che in altri ha creduto gittare,ſopra di ſe l'ha ſentito A R. Speſſo
auiene,che per fuggire il ſoſpetto di cotesto artificio, la fimiglianza de
ifinimenti delle parole in mezo delle parti ſi ponga, com me qui, Poi
ueggendo,che questoſuo, conſumamento,più tosto che emendamento della cattiuità
del marito potrebbe eſſere. Et qui. Che più dispettosamente,che
fauiamente,parlando. Molti eſempi ritrouerai da teſteſſo di queste numeroſe
maniere, nate dalla corriſpondenza delle parti.Ora vorrei, che bene aucrtißi di
non re. plicare piùuolte cotesti adornamenti,di non affettar tanto la conſonana
za delle parti,che cadeßi in fastidio,ouero infospetto de gli aſcoltanti. Et
per queſta reggerai medeſimamente il uerfo,nel quale caduto in più luoghi Ruede
l'autore delle nouelle,il quale à mepare che di ciò molto curato nõ habbia.Beneuero,che
con mirabile perfettione riempie le parti ele měs bra della ſua fauella quando
diuide i nodi de' ſuoi giri in tre parti, come qui Percioche niun'altro diletto,niun'altro
diporto, niun'altra confolatione laſciata ti ha la tua eſtremafortuna.Etqui, Et
ſe qualunque di quelle fuſſe in Salomone,ò in Aristotile,ò in Seneca, 'haurebbe
forzadi guastar'ogni lorſenno,ogni lor uirtů, ogni lor ſantità. Et qui.
Maquantoſenfante, quanto poderoſe,di quantoben cagion le fore ze d'Amore,&
c. Conſidera la distintione de' membri in quella nouella, doue introduce to
ſcolare,la uedoua,perche cosirichiedeua la dotta perſona dello ſcolare. AR. E
degno di conſideratione il numero delle fillabe, chenelle parti, che hanno à
riſpondere l'una all'altra,ſ mette. Perciò che quando una pare te di troppo
l'altra auanzaſſe,non ne ſeguiterebbe alcuna numeroſa compo Rtione,però buone
onumeroſe appaiono eſſer queſte. Accioche come per nobiltà d'animo dall'altre
diuiſe fiete, cosi ancora per eccelentia di coſtumiſpartite dall'altre ui
dimostriate. ART. Maqui appare alquanto lunghetta la riſpondenza, &la die
fagguaglianza demembri.Leggi. Quanto piùſ parla de' fattidellafortuna,tantopiù
à chi uuole lefue co fe ben riguardare,ne reſta da poter dire, ÄR. ART. Può
eſfer’ancora,che non ſi gusti il numeroper la lunghezza delleſueparti,benche
fieno quaſi paricomequi, Egli auieneſpeſſo, che sicomela fortunafotto uili
artialcuna uolta grandi teſori di uirtù naſconde,cosi ancoraſotto turpißime
forme d'huo. miniſtruowa marauiglioſ ingegni dalla natura eſſere stati ripoſti.
AR. S'io ti uoleßi ogni coſa moſtrare d'intorno alla bellezza del dire, troppo
ritarderei gli ſtudij che hai afare,o pocoti laſcerei da eſercia tarti
d'intorno allaeloquéza umana.Peròp trapaſſare alle altre forme,par lerò della ueloce
e pronta maniera della oratione; la forza della quale è nello artificio,più
tosto,onelleſeguenti parti,che nelle ſentenze riposta. L'artificio adunque
della prestezza eà brieui dimande brieuementeria fpondere.Leggi. S'amor non
èche èdunque quel ch'ioſento?:: Ma s'egliè amor,per Dio che coſa è quale? Se
buona,ond'ċ l'effetto afpro e mortale? Se ria,ondési dolce ogni tormento? ART.
Ouero il fare molte dimande, con forze di ſpirito obrer uits: Non era egli
nobile giouane? Non era egli tra gli altri ſuoi cittadini bello? Non eraegli
valorofo in quelle coſe che d' giouani s'appartengono? Non amato? Non bauuto
caro?Non uolentieri ueduto da ogni huomo? AR. Le membra,quaſ parole eſſerdeono
bricui «uolubili, oche pa ia che in eſſe fail monimento del parlar noſtro,
oltre alla ſignificatione delle parole nelle quali ėripoſta la forza dela
efpreßione di ogni forma. Leggi. Soli bastano, accompagnati creſcono, und mille
nefå, odelle mille in brieue tempo mille ne naſcono,per ciaſcuna ſono aſpettate
giocondißime,no aſpettate uenturoſe, ſono cari ageuoli,ma diſageuolivia più
care inquanto le uittoric acquiſtate con alcuna fatica fanno il trionfo
maggiore, donare, rubbare,guadagnare,guiderdonare,ragionare,ſoſpirare,
lagrimare, rotte, reintegrate,prime ſeconde,falje,o uere,lunghe bricui, tutte
fonodiletteuo li tutte ſono gratiofe. AR. Vedi che mouimento apporti ſeco
questo parlamento, il quale quando l'huomo è riſcaldato s'aſcolta con
marauiglia delle genti. Confia Ate anco nellaforzadelleparole, o nelſuono,
onella compoſitione. com mequi. E già uenia sì per le torbid onde, Vn fracaſſo
d'un ſuon pien difpauento, Per cui tremauan' amendue le ſponde, Non altramente
fatti,che d'un uento: Impetuofo per gli auuerſardori, Chefier la ſeluaſenza alcun
rattento Gli ramiſchianta,abbatte, e porta i fiori Dinanzipolucroſo uaſuperbo
Etfafuggir lefiere e gli pastori. ART. Tanto uoglio che tu ſappia della
preſtezza del dire. Perciò che date medeſimopuoi comprendere quanto «
ilconcorſo delle uocali,ore forezza delle fillabe pa lontana da questa
forma,esfapere che ogni ina dugio di proferire, ogni raccoglimento,ogni giro,
impediſce il mouimento fuo. Reſta adunque a dire della formaaccostumata,o delle
fueparti, la. quale e, cheſi conuiene alle cocoalle perſone in tal modo
chequello che ſi chiama Decoro, molJa chiaramente ſi uedaEt però la detta forma
ſota to di ſe quattro maniere principaliſ uede contenere. La primaė la unilta
ubaſſezza. L'altra é la piaceuolezza o il diletto. La terza e l'acutezza Uprontezza.
Et l'ultima la moderatezza della oration. Delle quai fore menecessariamente in
queſta forma si ragiona, perche cosi porta la natua rade gli huomini,i quali sono
ó uili, o riputati, è piaceuoli, o moderati. La bajezze dangue e forma infima,
e dimessa del dire, alle roze, o idiote persone convenicnte, à femine,
fanciulli non diſdiceuole: da Comici, rie chieſta ouſata pia toſto che da
Oratori,o eloquenti buomini,o piu tom Ho nelle cauſe de priuati, che ne i
communiconſigli ricercata,quando uor rai attribuire il parlar a quella perſona,
cui non ſidifdice la baffizza. Cá dono in queſta ſimplicita di dire i paſtori,
aquelli che le coſe.boſcarecce Man deſcriuendo,o però le ſentenze di
queſtaformaſonopiu baſſe Qumi li, opiùfacili che quelle della purità oſcioltezza
del dire. Là onde ala cuni giuramenti ſciocchi à qneſtamaniera ſi confanno. O
Calandrino mio dolce, culor del corpo mio, quanto tempo t'ho defide
Tatob’dauerti edi poterti tenere a mio fenno.Tu m'hai con le piaccuoa lezza
tuațratto il filo delacamicia, tu m'hai aggrattigliato il cuore con la tua
ribecca. Può egli eſſer che io titenga? Leggeraila tutta, otutto che in questa
formauiſabaſſezza, non è però ela ſenza artificio, percioche per dimoſlrarla
pulefe,fi fuole alcuna fista minutamente ogni coſa deſcriuere,u ogni
particolarità chia rire, introdurre alcune ſcioccheriſpoſte, ò ſemplici
contentioni di coſe, che non rileuano con detti, le ſentenze de quali ſono
grandi, ma le parole ſciocche, at rozze. Leggi. L Cominciò à dire ch'egli era
gentilhuomo per procuratore, roy. Begli bauea diſcudi più di milantanouefenza
quellich'egli hauea àdarealtri che erano anzi piùche meno e che egliſapeus tale
coſe fare; ct dire che domine pure unquanche. ART.. A tuo agio nie leggerai
ilrestante,mauedi la contentione: Guatatala un poco in cagneſco per
amoreuolezza la riniorchiaua '; ege ella cotale ſaluatichetta, facédo uiſtadi
non auederſene andaua pure oltra in contengo. Seguita che tutta ëbaſſa per li
giuramenti, per le beffe, con per alcuni rabbuffi, come qui. Vedi bestial buomo
che ardiſce, là doue io Pid, parlar prima di me, laſcia dir à me, Et alla reina
riuolta diſſe,Madonna, costui mi uuol far. conoſcer la moglie di Sicofanta,ne
più ne meno come scio con lei ufata nor, fußi, che mi uuol dar' à uedere chela
notte prima che Sicofanta giacque con lei meſſer Mazza entraffe in monte nero
per forza,e con ſpargie mento di fangue oio vi dicoche non é ucro,anzi u’entró
pacificamente: La deſcrittione del fante di fracipolld;& della
fante,ėbaſſa,er propria di queſta formaa alcuni lameti cô parole ufitate &
popolari. Leggi. Dime,oimė Giãnel mio io fon morta,ecco ilmarito mio,chetri fto
il faccia Dio,che ſi tornò, « non ſo che queſto ſi uoglia dire. ART. Et alcuni
prouerbiemodiſono dimeßi. Leggi.: Et cosi al mododeluillan matto doppo il danno
fece il patto, muoia. foldo, oniua amore, e tutta la brigata. ART. Dalle
fentenze di queſta forma ſipuò far congettura quai parole, ochenumero,
oquaichiuſe ad effali conuengonc, Però cheari tificioſamente da ogni artificio
lontana offer deue ogni ſua parte, & imie tare la ſemplicità, ogroſſezza
delle perſone. Io non uorrci queſtaforma in unpocma grande, o genoroſo; o
dubito che per questa ragione da ale cuni ripreſo noſia uno de i
piùcarifigliuoli ch'io habbia,ilqualefpeſo per dire ognicoſaminutamente cade in
parole baßißime,come quando dife. Vn’amme non faria potuto dirſt, Quero.
Etmentre che la giù con l'occhio cerco, o quello che ſegue Trale gambe pendeuan
le minuggia La corata parea, e il tristo ſacco. Et il reſto. E non uidi già mai
menare ſtregghia A ragazzo aſpettato daſignorfo, Et la doue diſſe che Tencuan
bor done alle ſue rime. Md ora al diletto paſſando, dirò, che per diletto de
gli aſcoltanti ale cuna uolta l'oratione ad una forma s'inchina la quale tutta
e riposta nellä, bautentione delpoeta,però gioconda
diletteuolemanieras'addimanda ĝrellache la ſemplice edimeſſa alquanto più
rileua ealla fauola, ó fala uoloſa narratione ſi uolge. Là onde leſentenze di
questa formafaranno contrarie alla forma della dignità del dire; &però
diletteuoli o gior conde ſono quelle, doue ragionano inſieme la Diſcordia,
oGioue, o in quel dialogo d'Amore, oue R dimostra in che guiſa difcendeſſe fra
more tali Amore.Sonoanco grate,ga dolci quelle ſentenze chehanno quelle coſe ntinutamente
deſcritte, lequali per natura loro hanno onde piacere difense timenti umani, es
però la deſcrittione dell'amenißima valle delle Donne a molto grata ad udire.
Conſidererai di quanta dolcezzaſia ſtato amaeſtro Simone il ragionaméto di
Bruno, quando egli deſcriſſe la brigata, che giudi in corſo,og de i loro
follazzi, opiaceri,e delle altre coſe diletteuoli che egli uedeus in udiua. Ma
è bene che tu ſappia, come di quelle coſe, che a ſenſi ſono ſottoposte, alcune
fono oneste, alcune diſoneste. Le diſor Heiste ſe paleſamentesi ſcuoprono co
iloroproprij uocaboli, offender for gliono le caſte orecchie;benche non
offendano quelliche nė di dirle, ne di farle R logliono tergognare,maſe con
diſcretomodoleggiadramente cura prono la bruttezza loro,non pure non perdono il
diletto quando ſono inteſe, ma molto più di ſoauird ſeco recano à gli
aſcoltanti: Narra lo amore di due cognatiilpoetaDante,o uolendo il finedieſſo
quantopiù poteua onestan mente ſcoprir diffe. Quel giorno pia non ui legemmo
auante, cioé attena demmo ad altro che à legger quello, che fu cagione del
nostro amore, o cosi quá lo l'altro poeta diſſe, Con lei fuß'io da cheparte il
ſole. E non ci Medeß'altri che le ſtelle.Ocosi in mille modi ó per le coſe
antecedenti, • per quelle cheſeguono,eſſendo meno diſoneste,le
difoneſtißimèappalefar ft poſſono ne è pocalode dichi ſcriuezin tale occaſione
abbattědofi,ſenza offen fione anzi con diletto delle oneſte perſone deſcriuer
le coſe meno che oneſte. Intělaſi adunque la coſa, ofuggaſi la bruttezza delle parole,o
in queſto modo ſarà foaue, &diletteuole il parlar uoſtro. Alquale gli
amori,le bele lezze de i luoghi,igiardinizi prati,i fiori le fontane,la prima
uera, le pite ture, o altre coſe piaceuoli aggiungendoſi,ſenzadubbio ſi
dimoſtrerà la predetta forma,della quale anco di ſopras é detto aſſai, quando
del diletto, della gioia tiragionxi,che naturalinēte inuouc ogni coſa creata.
Et cosi ſecondo l'affettione di ciaſcuno ſi porge ſolazzo opiacere col
ragionare. L'artificio,et le parole della giocõdità tolteſono dalla
primaformadel dire chiamata purità, onettezza. Voglio bene in queſto paſſo,che
co più licen zoufigliaggiunti,ſegno e che i pocti loſtudio de' quali è proprio
il dilet? tare, allora più dilettano quando più belli;eacconiodatiaggiunti-
fono? wfati di porre ne' verſi loro, ecco Leggi. L & Giace nella fommità di
Partenio,non'umile monte della pastorale Arct. dia,un diletteuolepiano di
ampiezza non molto patioſo,peròche'l ſito del luogo nol conſente ma,di minuta,
o uerdisſima, crbetta si ripieno, cbe fe: le lafciue pecorelle congli auidi
morſi non uipafceffero,ui ſi potrebbe dom gni tempo ritrouar merdura. ART.
Tutti i principii delle giornateſono à proua fatti per dileta tarc, eperò inshi
13 ziunti uiſono meſcolati come tu potrai uedere. Egli lliſuole anchora
interporre de i ucrſi per. dilettare, ma con destro modo, Perciò che non
mipareche bence ſtia, che la compoſitionc babbia del uer fo come qui. Cofi
detto, et riſposto,e contentato, doppo, un brieue.filentio di ciaſcuno. ART.
Ecco che nella proſa ui è il uerlo,ſenza quel propoſito che: io ti diceua,però,
biſogna rompere i ucrſi con alcuna parola,eccoti uer: foc, Postbaueafine alſuo
ragionamento, madicendo. Pofthauca fine Lau, retta.al ſuo.ragionamento non è
più verſo, benche queſto.autore altrowe: non foſſeſchifatodal uerfo,come quando
diſſe. Poſcia che molto commendata l'hebbe, Disleale, o spregiuro, e traditore,
Etpoi con un ſospir aſſai penſoſo, Luogo moltoſolingo, ofuor. dimano.. Et
questi uerſi quanto ſono migliori,tanto più ſono da.cſfer fuggiti nel fic lo
della oratione,fenon quando,o per eſſempio, o per autoritade, o per di: letto
ſono tolti da poeti. Ora delle figure di questa faperai,che alla giocondaforma,
oltra le fi gure che alla purità,Q umiltà. conuengono quelle ancora non
disd.cono, che alla bellezza ſi danno,o peròle membra pari di ſimili cadimenti
le rime, i biſguizzi, itramutamenti; i circoli, le uoci.ſimiglianti, il
fingeri: de i nomi ſonofigure di questaforma. Leggi i ſimili cadimenti.
Tranquilla lite de'giudicanti ristora.le fettche gucrreggianti, in quel le con
le ſeuereleggi de gli huomini, la pisceuolezza della natura,meſcoa. lando a
queſti nel mezo de gli nocentisſimi guerreggiantipure, ø inno.. centisfime paci
recando. Nellefſempio letto ui troucrai anco la bellezza di contrari, la parità
de'membri, perche niente ci uicta,che una ſtela figura da molti lumi ancora
illuminata, fi poffa fare illuſtre e luminoſa. Laura, che il ucrde lauro,c
l'aurco crine.. Eſcherzo di upci ſimiglianti. Il mormorar dett'onde,bisbiglio,
ſpruzza.. reribombo,gracidare, fonoparolefinte,cha con diletto cfprimeno il
fatto, ecco quando colui diffe,Filli, Filli,fonando
tutti i calami, parue ueram mente che i calami fuſſono tocchi col fiato di
dettopaftore, o quello ſem zafar motto alcuno. Rimafu quella di coſtui che
diſſe. Tanto d'intorno à quel più bello, quanto pià de Thumido fenting di
quello, Et perpiù adornamento et diletto, diſſe anco. L'acqua laquale alla ſua
capacità ſoprabondaua. Et comei falli meritano punitione, Cosi i beneficii
meritano guidero: done. Nella rima è pofta. la dolcezza de' Poeti di questa
lingua, dallaqual.rima chi ardiſſe ò tentaſje per alcun mododidipartirf, toſto
ſi pentirebbe. Le rimepiùuicine fono più dolci: Qucta licenzadel
rimaremoderatamente Bplglia de proſatori, purche di affettata dilettatione:
disoneſto ſegno non porga. Voglio bene la compoſitione di questa forma,numeroſa
epiù al uerſo uicina che l'altre, ma il uerfo per ogni modo le tolgo. Guarda
con chefacilità ſipotrebbe coteſta proſa alla dolcezza deluerfo ridurre.Leg.
Vna fede medeſimatraloro per le menti unafermezza, unoamore in agni faſo, in:ogni
tronco,inognirina,,uede l'amante la faccia dolce delld. fua.belladonna,o ella
quella del ſuoſignore. Ma.ora non: voglio che tantoti piaccia la forma predetta
che tralaſcian do la dignità,o grandezzadeldire, procuri.con ogni ſtudio il
diletto piacere cheda quella fola procede, Perciò che io non uorrei che alcuna.
parte del tuo ragionamento ſenza piacer s udiſſe, di.che l'aſcolta,ilqual pia
cere naſce ancora. dalla Idea dell'altreforme, o dalle orecchie allo animo,
trapaſſando ogni parte di eſſo fparge di diletto marauiglioſo, perche moe.
uendo diletta, o dilettando li mouc, inſegnando ſimilmente fi.moue,,
odiletta.in quanto che lo inſegnare il mouere,o il dilettare, ſono opera. tioni
non distinte l'una dall'altra. Mi. laſciamo queſta quiſtione. ad altro, tempo,
o ancora nonstiamo troppo in.questa forma tutta.di altra confla deratione, come
quella.cbe al Posta.grandemente conuenga, alquale pocta. i giuochi, po le coſe
ridicole ſi confanno, operò di. cße ora non te ne dia 60, e tanto piu adietro
di buon cuore ti laſcerà queſta matcria ', quanto di: ſacopioſamente damoltine
è ſtato ſcritto,etragionato. Larifponfione: ad ogni parte è anco figura di
diletto. Leggi. Laquale ciiba fattinc i corpi.delicate,o morbide, negli animi.
timide opaurofe,ne le menti benignc, opietoſe, obacci dute le corporalifora ze
leggieri, le uoci piacsuoli, o imouimenti de imembrifoaui.. Ms or a pasfiamo
all'acutezza del.dire, forma inucro egregia. &. piùalto penfamentoche altra
meriteuple. Peroche ella contiene le ſentenza fic,deltuttocontrarioalla umiltà,
«baffezza della oratione, ej in uero altro dicendo,altro intende.Percioche è
dicoſeche hanno in ſeforza,et uds Forela onde lo artificiaė proferire le
alteodifficili intentioni pianaměte, o con facilità, e le umili &abictte
che paianoalte,o degne: onde i primo modo é,quandofi piglia una parola in altra
ſignificatione che nella ufata confueta maniera,ne pcro e meno conuencuole et
propriafe gli wiguardaalla forza della uoce,che la uſala, « conſucta, come qui.
Non creda donna Berta oſer Martino * -Prueden un furar altro offerine. 9.
Wedergli dentro al conſiglio diuino. Che quel puo furger,oquel può cadere. C:
il secondo modo e quello cheſi fa non
mettendo la parola, doueela berie Starebbe, ilche abufione s'addimanda; come ė
à dire allegrezza inſanabile, in luogo di dire allegrezza grandißima. Seguita
il terzo modo di porre. una þarola pia uolte'., ma che ſempre ſia ad un modo
istefjo pigliata, come dicendo,ſecglimuore, morirà tutto, perche uiuendo non
uiue.Vſaſi ancora biquestaforma un altro artificio aljai degno di
conſideratione ilquale ft fa quando il parlare ſi fa pieno ditraslationi,o per
la moltitudine di quelle lifa ogn'horpiùmanifesto. Leggi. Eeleggi fon,ma
chiponmanoad eſſe Nullo, percheil paſtor, che precede i Ruminar può,manon ha
l'ugne. foffe, Perche la gente che ſua guida uede ** Pur à quel bel ferir on
fella é ghiotta Di quelfi paſce, opiù oltre non chiede. ART. Et in queſto altro
loco ancora Nel mezo del camin di noſtra uita Mi ritrouai in unaſelua oſcura
Che la diritta uia craſinarita. ART. Acuti ſono ancora quei rimedij,che uanno
quafi medicando le dile rezte delle Tralationi con alcune altre piu chiare,
ecco dire il fiato della morte é duratralatione. Ma dire della morte, e ſpigne
col ſuo fiato il noe ſtro lume,e acutamente raddolcita la aſprezza fua. O
qui.Con altezza di: animo propoſe di calcar la miſeria della fori una.Voglio
ancora,che acuto fa ilporre inanzi yliocchi le coſe con bella colligatione di
ſignificantißia me parole,Vuoi tu ucdere la celerità del tempo. Leggi. a
Delaurco albergo con l'aurora istanzi E to 1vs K $ *** siratto ufciua it ſol
cinto di raggi, Che detto baureſt',.' Apur corcò dianzi. Jo uidi il ghiaccio, e
li preſſo la rofa, Quaſi in un tempo il granfreddo, e ilgran caldo. Che pure
udendo par mirabil cofa Veggo la fuga del miouiuerpresta. Anzi di tutti, et nel
fuggir delſole, La ruina del mondo manifesta Voi tu uedere dipinta la oſcurità.
Leggi. Buio d'inferno, o di notte priuata D'ogni pianeta ſotto pouer ciclo
Quant'eſſer puo di nuuol tenebrata: ART.No ſolaměte leparolefanno l'effetto,ma
te fllabe, et le lettere steffe Vedi quáte fiate uie replicata la quinta
lettera come lēte baſſa,co oſcura. Sotto queſtaforma i beidetti ſi coprendono,
et quei mottiurbani,che co dimeſe parole dicono altißime coſe.Là onde alcune
ſentēze, la ragione delle quali in effe ſi conticnejacute ſono, o di ſuegliato
ingegno ſegnimanifesti. come à dire, le minacce fon arme del minacciato. sēdotu
huomo penſa alle coſe humane o offendo mortale nõ hauerl'odio immortale, o
quello.Rade volte è ſenza effetto quello che uuole ciaſcuna delle parti. Queſte
ſono le parti principali dellaforma ſublime; & acuta,nellealtre haida
ſeguitare la purità o eleganza del dire. Ma della Modestia,o Circonfpettione
del parlarenelquale conſiſte quanta gratia tuti puoi con gli aſcoltanti acqui
Atare,dirò,pregandoti caraméte,che tu uoglia questaſopra tutte l'altre ele
gere,abbracciare,et fauorire in ogni tuo ragionamēto. Modesta è adunque quella
forma del dire che le proprie coſe abbaſſando innalza le altrui, o quaſi cede e
toglierſi laſcia del ſuo, il che opinione acquista di grābone tade appreſſo chi
ode.Le ſentezedi quellafono quelle che dimostrano l'ani mo di chi parla alieno
dalle contētioni, il deſiderio di fuggire, o terminar le coteſe,ildiſpiacere
d'accufar altrui, il poter dimoſtrar maggiorpeccati dell'auuerfario,«nõfarlo,et
quello che ſi fafarlo sforzatamēté,ė astretto dalla uerità,o p no laſciar
opprimere gl'innocēti,uerfo de'quali,chi dice, A deue dimostrare cõ queſta
formaofficiofo,et benigne,comefece coſtui. Leggi. Mi piace condiſcendere a'
conſigli de gli huomini,de quai die cendo mi conuerrà far due coſe molto a'
miei coſtumi contrarie;luna fia al quanto me commendare o l'altra il biaſmar
alquanto altrui,o auilire. ART. Molti huomini eccellenti nelle lodi, che date
hanno a i loro cittadini uſati ſono di dire, uoi faceſte, uoi uinceste,mánel
dimoſtrare alcana coſa meno che oneſta de' fatti loro,hanno detto per
modeftia.Noi perdesſimo, noi malefi portasſimo,noialquantoimprudentemente to
gließimo la guerra. A questeſentenzeſi aggiugne l'artificio, ilquale con Rate
nel dire di fero delle proprie coſe modeſtamente, con dubitatione
facendolegrditamente minoridiquellocheſono;eſcuſando per lo contras rio gli
auuerfarii,oucro con ragione,conalquanto di timore accufando li,permettendoli
alcuna coſa a fuomodoin loro diffeſa pronuntiare,acció sonſi dia ſoſpetto al
giudice dioffer contentiofo,& amicodelle liti, in que ſto caſo voglio,che
tu uſ parole baſſe, et pure, oquelle che hanno manco forza nelle tue lodijonel
biaſimo de gli auuerfari, però quelle figure a questaformaſono accomodate,nellequali
con deliberato conſiglio alcuna coſaſ pretermette,quiſando però l'aſcoltante di
tale deliberationc.Inbrie ue ti dico, cbe la disſimulatione, che ironia
s'addimanda, quenga, che ale cuna volta morda cu pungasėperò artificio,o figura
di queſta materia,nel laqual alcuni Greci riuſcirono mirabilmente.
Lacorrettione, oil giudi cio con timore ſonocolori di questa idea. Come quando
ſi dice, S'io nca sn'inganno,s’io non erro, cosi mipare,ofimiglianti modi, i
quali quanto più banno del leggiadro, tanto più dilettano,o fanno l'effetto,
che ſi ricer 14. La correttione e in quel luogo. Si come prima cagione di
queſto peccato, fe peccato é, perciò che io t'accerto. ART. Et la
disſimulatione iui. Godi Fiorenza, poi che ſei si grande. ART. Belmodo e
modešto é quando o il biaſimo, o la lote ſi fa dar da una terza perſona, perche
meno ha d'innidia il teſtimonio altrui, che'l noftro, operò in queſto Poeta nel
dire la origine fua, uedrai modestia ma rauiglioft, Leggi ancora qui.
Nobilisfime giouuni, à confolatione delle quai io mi ſono meſſo à cosi lunga
fatica io mi creda aiutandomi la diuina gratis ſi come io auiſo, per gli uostri
pictofi preghi non gia per i mei mcriti quello compiutamente ha Herfornito, che
io nel principio della preſente opera promiſi di douer far. ART. Etil principio
della quarta giornata i ripieno di queſti modi. Ma tempo è di ucnire all'ultima
forma di queſto ordine, ma prima in die gnità o perfettione,comequella, ſenza
laquale niuna delle altre può nel l'animo entrare de gli aſcoltanti,dico della
uerità, a laquale benche la moc desta e dimeſſaforma piu che l'altre
s'auicinano,nientedimeno non è da di Te,che ella debbia dall'altre offer
abbandonata, imperoche non è opinione, òaffetto,che ſenza eſſa indurre ſi
poſſa, queſta fa credere che cofiſia,come Adice,questa moſtra l'animo di
chiragions, queſta èfrutto diquella uir ta che tùche noi chiamiamo
imaginatione,cosi potente nel porre le coſe dinanzid gli occhi,et cosi efficace
ad ottenere ogni nostra intenţione.Dimoftrafl adia que l'aniino di chi parla in
questo modo,cioèſenzamezo alcuno rompendo in uno effetto,perche la natura in
queſta guiſa ui diſpone chequandoſiete iņuno affetto ſenza altra ragione in
quello entrando le dimoſtrate, cosi l'a ra,lo ſdegno, il diſo, il dolore,o
ogniaccidente ſi fa paleſe. In ſommaſe je fidate,o diffidate, c teneteſperanza
d'alcuna coſa ſe allegrezza uimuoue 'ò noia alcuna,ueracißimi pareranno gli
affetti uoftri,ſe da quello che defe derateſenza porui tempo di mezo
cominciante. Leggi. Fiamma del ciel si le tue trecce pioua Equi doue il Poeta
dimanda aiuto Quando uidi costui nel gran diferto. Miferere di me cridai à lui.
A R. Come qui è uitiofo, doue un nụncio corre al palazzo à dan nog ua alla
Regina della preſa della città, es ardere etſaccheggiare ogni coſa, o
incomincia con lunga narratione,dicendo, id ui dirò diffuſamente il tutto. Ma
ritorniamo, hauendo il Porta di mandato aiuto à Virgiliopiù bricue che può gli
da notitia diſco perche l'affetto lo pronaua à chiedergli pohc cagione egli ſi
trouaſje in quel luo. soſeluaggio,dice. Ma tu perche ritorni à tanta noia? Etfa
maggiore il ſuo affetto replia çando, perche non fali il dilettoſo monte. Là
onde poiil Poeta pien di mara uiglia di ueder Virgilio, non gli riſponde, ma dà
loco allo affetto,et dicca Leggi. orſe tu quel Virgilio, equella fonte, Che
parge di parlar si largo fiume, Ripoſi lui con uergognofa fronte, Et piu
ritornando all'effetto di primajo de gli altri Poeti onor',e tume. AR. Vedi
comele Diſcordia con Gioue'adirata in tal modo comincia. Parti Gioue,che io, la
qualeprodußi,et conſeruo il mondo,degna fia di doc uer’eßer biaſmata da
ciaſcaduno. AR. Serbati in questo caſo à dimostrare che inte più uaglia la
natur ra,che l'arte, o otterrai la credenza del uero che tu uuoi. Dire con
uolubi li parolc é ſegno di uerità, l'infigner d'hauerſi ſcordato, il
dimostrare die ſere dall'artificio lontario, o lo ejer dulla ucrità commoſſo,il
correggerſ daſeſteſſo,lo cſclamare in alcune parti quafi rapito dal uero, o
finalmene, te una diligente traſcuragine, & una traſcurata diligentia può
far’apparenza diuero.Ecco quanto bene appare,ola modeftia, ola verità ufar la
Discordia,doue dice, Etſel mio eſſere pien di miſeria mi ci rende in diſpetto
l'effer Dea (coa me tuſei ) onata al gentilißimo modo delfangue two pieghi il
tuo anis mo ad aſcoltarmi benignamente. oRati' stato ilmio minacciare più tos
fto fegno di diſperatione, che cagion d'odio è di ſdegno che tu mi debbi
portare. AR. Et poco dipoi. Io parlerò Gioueaffine di farti pietoſo alla mia
miſeria,non con animo d'effer lodatacome eloquente;muoue il dolor la mia
lingua,parte,et diſpone a fuo modo le mie parole, o quale id'l ſento nel core
tale,à te uegnia allos recchie,cheſenza offer altramente artificioſa,Oornata,affai
ti perſuaderà l'oration mia à dolerti di me,la qualedi tanto nonſon
conformeallo affan nocleoue quello continuamente m’afflige,queſta toſto fi
finirà, o ad ogni richiesta tua s'interromperà,però che qualunque uolta cofa
dirò, che mena zogna ti paia ſon contenta di dichiararla,accioche picciolo
error nel prin cipio nonſi faccia grande alla fine: AR. Vedi quanto efficaci
ſtenote eſclamationi. O‘Amor quanti, o quali ſono le tue forze: AR. Et là doue
dice, o felici anime,alle quali in unmedeſimo di auer re il feruente amore o la
mortal uita terminare,o piú felicife inſieme ad uno medeſimoluogo n'antaſte, o
felicissimi fe nell'altra uitaſi ama.com toi vi amate; come di qua faceste.
Questa eſclamationefa parere la cofa uera, ilfalimento bella, la ſentent za
degna,o grande,le parole aſpra, o acerba, oil numero fplendida,o generoſa.Al
predetto artificio s'aggiungono le parole conuenienti alle cos feale appre
nell'ira, le pure, o le fimplici nella comuniſeratione. Leggi. Ahi dolcißimo
albergo di tutti imiei piaceri,maledetta fia la crudeltà di colui checon gli
occhi della fronte or mi tifa uedcre. Affai m'ora con quelli dellu
mēteriguardarti à ciaſcun’hora.Tu hai il tuo corſo finito, et di tale,come la
fortuna tel concedette tiſe ſpacciato.Venuto ſe alla fine,alla quale ciaſcun
corre,laſciate hai le miſerie del mondo, o le fatiche. AR. Conſidera le
parti,le parole, o le figure di questa forma nella effempio ora letto, ote
ſimili uſorai nelle occaſioni che ti ucrranno, et uce derai uſcirne opora
maraniglioſa. Vodi che cömiferatione ſi truoua in que fe parole. Caro mio
signore, fe la tua anima oralcmiclagrimc uede, oniuno i conoſcimentoóſentimento
doppo la partita di quella rimane a corpi,rice. dei benignemoute l'ultimo dono
di colei, laquale tu uiuendo cotato amasti. Vedi ancora qui la ſomiglianzadel
ucro grandemente adopraſi in rio fpondere alle coſe,che potriano eſſer
dimandate. Andreuccio,io ſuno molto certa, che tu ti marauigli, & delle
carezze,le qualiiori.fo.a delle mie lagrime;si come colui chenon miconoſci,oper
quentura mai ricordar nonm'udisti,matu udirai toſto coſa, la quale più tifarà
forſe marauigliare, si come è ch'io ſia tua ſorella. AR. Eccoti,che con una
coſa più incredibile fa parere il falſo eſer aero. Vſafi questo modo nel
raccontare,nello amplificar le lodi, ouero i uituperii delle genti,ouero in
narrare le coſe fuori dell'ordine naturali,e rare.Con una antiucduta
eſcuſatio::e,come qui, Carißime Donne à me ſipara dinanzi a doucrmifi far
raccontare una uerità,che ba troppopiù di quello che ella
fu,dimenzognaſembianza. AR. Vera in ſoiamaè quella formadel dire, nella quale
confiderata la natura delle coſe la uarietà de gli affetri,la uſanza del uiucre,
con prue denza,riguardo dimostra le coſe fuggendo il coſpetto dello artificio,
& però molto leggiadramente fidce procedere nell'accurata, obella forme del
dire nella quale più vale il numero etl'artificio, che nell'altre.Sicno dun que
gli ſpirtidi questa forma partiper tutto il corpo,accompagnati dal Sanguedella
bellezza,odal mouimento della celerità del dire,che facila menteſi otterrà il
deſiderato fine.Ne gl'affetti grandi,bricui ficno le mem bra,uiusci le parole,nel
resto il giudi.io di chi parla habbia luogo.Et qui Na ilfine delleformc o
maniere del direin quanto che di ciaſcuna partie samente ſi può dirc. Ma non sarà
il finedi eſſe in quanto biſognaſapereil modo di uſarle,et Accomodarle nella
ciuilc oratione. Perciò che colui ne oratore,ne erudito parcrebbe ilquale come
nouel cfſercitaßcle predette maniere daſe steſſe ignude, o inconipote,onde
l'artefuafi manifestaffs, oegli di abomincus defatietà, ct fastidio ricmpicſſe
le orecchie, o gli animi de gli aſcoltanti, Bella coſa é adunque il meſcolare
inſieme le predette forme, o farne una ortima miſtura,dalla quale n'uſcirà
l'ottima,o uniuerſale idea della oratio nc;appreſſo la qualeſarà quellà, che
mancherà alquanto da quella ottima meſcolanza,cosi di grado in gradofcemundo
ilterzo,il quarto, o l'ul timo luogo occuperà l'oratore. Della prima operfetta
compofitione dela leformeio non ti trouerei per ls uerità chi in questa lingua
potefje, pere che gli ſcrittori di efla hanno hauutaaltra
intētione,cheformarela città M dincica dineſca minicra,ben che per quello ch'io
ſtimo,non anderà molto,che alcu noci naſcerà atto a questa grandezza,alla quale
più tosto manca la fatie ča,che il modo.Ora in quale forma debbia abondarc la
eloquenzafaperaiz per che la chiarezza,la ucrità, quella cheaccoſtumata ſi
chiama, fono le formeprincipali di tutta la manicra ciuile.Dapoi appreſſo io
amerei la celerità del dire con quelle forme poi,che alla grandezzafi danno,
tra le quali io eleggerei la comprenſione.Le altre ueramenteſecondo il tempo;
er la occafione reggendomi abbraccerei con quella ſcelta, con quella di
fcretione che uolentieri,ut non isforzate păreſſero ucnire riel parlar mio
Ben'è uero, che molte ſono le intentioni de gli huomini, equelle con dilia
genza offer dcono confiderate.Chi uuole de i ſecretidi natura parlare, bo delle
coſe morali dee abondar'in grandezza senza alcuno volubile movimeto. Chi
ueramente cerca narrare ifatti de mortali,comeſi fa nella iſtoria, elleggerà la
ſchiettezza,ocleganza,nella quale è ripoſto l'ordine delle co fe,cu dei tempi,a
riguarderà primai conſigli,ale deliberationi, poi le attioni, o ifatti,o
finalmente gli auenimentio fucceßi.Neiconſigli di moſtrerà quelloche deue cffer
lodato,o quello che merita biaſimo nelle at tioni,i fatti,ole parole,ilmodo, il
fine. Et ne ifucceßi dimostrerà ció the alla uirtù,o ciò che alla fortunafi
deve attribuire.Chi ne ifenati uud l'esprimere la forza dell’eloquenza,perche
il peſo delle coſe ſară poſto fore. pra lepalle di chiragiona,biſognaabondare
in grandezza,o dignità, di mostrar cura openſamento,il che non uale ne i
giudicij, ſe non ſono di coi. Le graui,aimportanti,perche in eſſe più
fimplicità,baſſezzaſi ricerca, eſſendo quegli per lo più di coſe edi
buominipriuati. Nel difendere, ale fai uale la forma accoſtumata,obalfa,ſe non
quando arditamente il fatto Rinega. Poco ancora ui ſi vedrà di uolubile,o
presto mouimento. Ma non. cosi nello accuſare,douc oajpro, uecmente,o uiuo cſer
dee l'accuſato re. Chi lola. fi dee dare alla bellezza,o al diletto, o
apprezzare lo fplene dore fenza ucсmenza, o celerità. Et in brieuc,biſogna
aprir gli occhi; eje nello imitare i dotti,o eccclenti huomini.ſi richiede
conſiderare; di che for ma eßt ſieno più abondanti,o di che meno;accioche
ſapendoper qual caz glorie eß istatilicno tali,ancora non ſia tolto il potere à
gli studioſi di ace coſtarſi loro, o aguagliarli,o le poßibilc é,che pureé
paßibile al modo già detto di ſuperargli. Et chi.pure non uoleſſe la
fatica,poteße almeno giudicare i loro fecreti. Molti, o minuti ſono i precetti
d'intorno a questo offercitio,maio non uoglio più affaticarmi,effendo quegli in
molti,o gran di uolumi ordinatamente ripoſti,oltra che ilnostro diſcorſo à
niunopuò på rere terc imperfitto,quando egli uoglia la noſtra intentione
riguardare,laqua le è stata di fare i fondamenti della eloquenza, auuertire di
quanta co gnitione elſer debbia chi à quella ſi dona; sopra i quali fondamenti
ſono for date l'articelle de' maeſtri, o gli esercitij de' giovanetti. Baſtiti,
ô Dinare do,che tu ſia giunto là, doue di giugnere deſideraui,o che tu habbi
ueduto un circolo della tanto deſiderata cognitione. Però che dalle parti
dell'anie ma incominciaſti,o in eſſe ſei ritornato,hauendo il corſo tuo ſopra
di natů ra, ci sopradi me fornito, come sopra due rote di quel carro,cheper lo
apet to cielo ti condurrà uittorioſo, o trionfante. Daniele Matteo Alvise
Barbaro. Daniele Barbaro. Keywords: archittetura, palladio, prospettiva,
retorica, ordine cronologico: Ermolao Barbaro il vecchio – Ermolao Barbaro il
giovane – Daniele Barbaro – Temisto, index nominorum, interpretazione e
commentario di Barbaro sul commentario di Tesmisto sull’analitica posteriora –
manoscritto, Bologna. Manoscritto delle ‘Adnotationes ad analyticos priores’ –
commentario diretto su Aristoele e no via Temisto – Villa Barbaro – lezione
privati di Barbaro sull’organon di Aristotele – analytica priora e analytica
posteriora, non al studio GENERALE, ma alla sua propria villa!. Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, “Grice e Barbaro” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51716107284/in/photolist-2mRuuqB-2mRcn9c-2mQHwBB-2mN8Hgb-2mNb8t7-2mMYyW9-2mLMX6P-2mLLR3n-2mLMUtQ-2mLMWGH-2mLMVmX-2mLJQmk-2mLJQRd-2mLMULU-2mLLRgi-2mKQDQ5-2mLMXqw-2mKwuhr-2mKBLhJ-2mKCdPg-2mKArEy-2mKH3ZR-2mKDteh-2mJWMoD-2mJq2uE-2mJ4GHU-CkaHMd-BVh5m5-CntuMM-BRstt1-o3jP2q-nKqBVU-nJyPnZ-o1WCtG-noDCLh-nqpN2n-npidX4-nmQUvH-noiVeB-nnFBEg-nmPeYK-nn8tfW-nmR6a7-mwamdR-mw9SoV-mwbCd5-mw9U98-mwbymC-ihDHCu-ihh9Aj
Grice e Barbaro – il vecchio –
filosofia italiana – filosofia veneziana – Luigi Speranza (Venezia). Filosofo. Umanista --. Grice: “As much as Speranza LOVES
Daniele Barbaro, I prefer Ermolao Barbaro; after all, he was his uncle – I
mean, Ermolao was Daniele’s uncle – and therefore HE taught HIM; I mean,
Ermolao, as a good philosophical uncle, taught the ‘minor’ (literally, since he
was his junior) Barbaro.” "Some like Barbaro, but Barbaro's MY man." Ermolao Barbaro detto il
Vecchio. Umanista e vescovo cattolico italiano. Sendo stato uomo
degnissimo, m'è paruto farne alcuna menzione nel numero di tanti singulari
uomini, acciocché la fama di sì degno uomo non perisca (Vespasiano da Bisticci,
Vite di uomini illustri del secolo XV). Ancora bambino comincia a studiare
lettere conVeronese, e il successo di quest'accoppiata allievo-maestro fu tale
che tradusse in latino le favole d’Esopo. Fece poi i suoi studi universitari a
Padova dove si laurea. Successivamente si trasfee a Roma dove entrò al servizio
della cancelleria papale. La sua carriera nella curia romana fu così fulminea
che Eugenio IV lo nomina protonotario apostolico e gli concesse la diocesi di
Treviso. Il rapporto con il pontefice, però, si interruppe bruscamente quando,
dopo che gli era stata promessa la nomina a vescovo di Bergamo, il papa assegna
il posto a Foscari. Lascia Roma e viaggiò per l'Italia ma, dopo una serie
di peregrinazioni, tornò a lavorare in curia. Si trasfere poi a Verona dove
Niccolò V lo designa vescovo e dove si sistemò in pianta stabile, tranne una
breve parentesi a Perugia come governatore. Messer Ermolao Barbaro, gentiluomo
viniziano, fu fatto vescovo di Verona da papa Eugenio, per le sue virtù. Ebbe
notizia di ragione canonica e civile, ed ebbe universale perizia di teologia, e
di questi istudi d'umanità; ed ebbe nello scrivere ottimo stile. Fu di
buonissimi costumi, e nel tempo di papa Eugenio si ritornò a Verona al suo
vescovado, e attese con ogni diligenza alla cura, e vi accrebbe assai e onorò e
multiplicò il culto divino. Era umanissimo con ognuno. Ridusse nel suo tempo il
vescovado in buonissimo ordine, così nello spirituale come nel temporale. Aveva
in casa sua alcuni dotti uomini, in modo che sempre vi si disputava o ragionava
di lettere; ed era la sua casa governata, come si richiede una casa d'uno degno
prelato. S'egli compose (che credo di sì) non ho notizia alcuna. Compose. Nulla
se ne ha alle stampe trattane qualche lettera, ma più opuscoli manoscritti se
ne hanno in alcune biblioteche, e fra essi la traduzione della Vita di S.
Anastasio scritta da Eusebio di Cesarea. Note
Vespasiano da Bisticci, Vite di uomini illustri del secolo XV, ed.
Barbera-Bianchi, Firenze. Girolamo Tiraboschi, Storia della letteratura
italiana, ed. Firenze, Vol. VI, pag. 808
Società storica lombarda, Archivio storico lombardo, ser.4:v.7, L'Umanesimo
umbro: Atti del IX Convegno di studi umbri. Gubbio, 22-23 settembre, 1974,
Perugia, 1977, pag. 199 Vespasiano da
Bisticci, cit. pag. 195 Girolamo
Tiraboschi, cit. pag. 808 Opere (alcune moderne edizioni italiane)
Ermolao Barbaro il Vecchio. Orationes contra poetas. Epistolae. Edizione
critica a cura di Giorgio Ronconi. 16x24 cm, pp VIII+186. Firenze: Sansoni,
1972. Pubblicazioni della Facolta di Magistero dell'Universita di Padova Ermolao
Barbaro il Vecchio. Aesopi Fabulae. A cura di Cristina Cocco. 22 cm, pp 186.
Genova: D.AR.FI.CL.ET., Trad. italiana a fronte Hermolao Barbaro seniore
interprete. Aesopi fabulae. A cura di Cristina Cocco, 25 cm, pp 155, Firenze:
Sismel-Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2007. Il ritorno dei classici nell'umanesimo.
Edizione nazionale delle traduzioni dei testi greci in eta umanistica e
rinascimentale.9788884502506 Bibliografia Girolamo Tiraboschi, Storia della
letteratura italiana, Vol. VI, ed. Firenze, 1819. Vespasiano da Bisticci, Vite
di uomini illustri del secolo XV, ed. Barbera-Bianchi, Firenze, 1859. Pio
Paschini, Tre illustri prelati del Rinascimento: Ermolao Barbaro, Adriano
Castellesi, Giovanni Grimani, Roma, Facultas Theologica Pontificii Athenaei Lateranensis,
1957. Emilio Bigi, Ermolao Barbaro, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,
Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. URL consultato il 6 luglio 2018.
Voci correlate Ermolao Barbaro il Giovane Collegamenti esterniDavid M. Cheney,
Ermolao Barbaro il Vecchio, in Catholic Hierarchy. Predecessore Vescovo di
TrevisoSuccessoreBishopCoA PioM.svg Lodovico Barbo1443-1453Marino
ContariniPredecessoreVescovo di VeronaSuccessoreBishopCoA PioM.svg Francesco
Condulmer1453-1471Giovanni Michiel · SBN IT\ICCU\MILV\110912 · LCCNn95090012 ·
GND (DE) 102417849 · BNF (FR) cb146202310 (data) · NLA35968113 · BAV495/27788 ·
WorldCat Identitieslccn-n95090012 Biografie Portale Biografie Cattolicesimo
Portale Cattolicesimo Treviso Portale Treviso Venezia Portale Venezia
Categorie: Umanisti italianiVescovi cattolici italiani del XV secoloNati nel
1410Morti nel 1471Nati a VeneziaMorti a VeneziaBarbaroVescovi di TrevisoVescovi
di VeronaTraduttori dal greco al latino. Ermolao Barbaro, il vecchio. Keywords.
Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Barbaro” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51702111083/in/photolist-2mRcn9c-2mQHwBB-2mN8Hgb-2mNb8t7-2mMYyW9-2mLJQmk-2mLMXqw-2mLMX6P-2mLLRgi-2mLLR3n-2mLMUtQ-2mLJQRd-2mLMVmX-2mLMWGH-2mLMULU-2mKwwoA-2mKCdPg-2mKwuhr-2mKQDQ5-2mKBLhJ-2mKH3ZR-2mKArEy-2mKDteh-2mJWMoD-2mJq2uE-2mJ4GHU-CkaHMd-BVh5m5-CntuMM-BRstt1-nKqBVU-o3jP2q-nJyPnZ-o1WCtG-noDCLh-nqpN2n-npidX4-nmQUvH-noiVeB-nnFBEg-nmPeYK-nn8tfW-nmR6a7-mwamdR-mwbCd5-mw9SoV-mw9U98-mwbymC-ihDHCu-ihh9Aj
Grice e Barbaro – il
giovane – filosofia veneziana – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Venezia). Filosofo.
Grice; “Very good.”, ermolao – the younger – il giovane, non il vecchio -- "Speranza
likes Ermolao Barbaro the Younger, but Ermolao Barbaro The Elder is MY
man." -- H.G. Ermolao Barbaro il
Giovane. Avea profondamente meditato sopra i doveri che impone il carattere di
legato a chi lo sostiene e sopra le avvertenze che devono servirgli di norma
nella pratica degli affari, ónde servir con vantaggio il proprio governo e
riportare onore anche da quello presso di cui risiede. Ei ne ha indicate le
tracce in un pregevolissimo opuscolo in
cui la prudenza apparisce compagna della onestà del candore, ed è venuto a
delineare in certa guisa il suo ritratto. Ma lo stesso suo merito fu a lui
cagione di grave calamità. Cardinale di Santa Romana Chiesa Hermolaus Barbarus Ritratto
di Ermolao Barbaro, opera di Theodor de Bry. Patriarca di Aquileia. Ordinato
presbitero. Nominato patriarca da papa Alessandro VI. Consacrato patriarca. Creato
cardinal da papa Innocenzo VIII. Ermolao Barbaro detto "Il giovane"
-- è stato un umanista, patriarca cattolico e diplomatico italiano, al servizio
della Repubblica di Venezia. Comincia l'educazione elementare con il padre
Zaccaria Barbaro, politico e diplomatico veneziano, poi in tenerissima età e
mandato a Verona dal pro-zio Ermolao Barbaro, vescovo della città e umanista di
fama, per studiare lettere latine con Bosso. Per perfezionarsi passa a Roma
dove ha come insegnanti prima Leto e poi Gaza. Un cursus studiorum concluso con
successo. E laureato poeta, a Verona, da Federico III. Segue a Napoli il padre,
titolare dell'ambasciata veneziana, e proprio nella città partenopea scrive la
sua prima opera ovvero il “De Caelibatu”. Traduce tutto Temistio, pubblicato poi, in
parafrasi. Tornato in Veneto consegue a Padova il dottorato in arti e quello in
diritto civile e canonico. Subito dopo fu nominato titolare della cattedra di
etica. Come professore insegna soprattutto sulla Nicomachea di Aristotele,
mettendo in guardia i suoi studenti dalle traduzioni in latino di Aristotele e
predicando il ritorno alla traduzione diretta dal greco, proprio come face lui.
Sono infatti di quegli anni i commentari all'Etica e alla Politica e la traduzione
della Retorica. Abbandonato l'insegnamento
accompagna nuovamente il padre in missione diplomatica a Roma. E promosso
senatore della Repubblica di Venezia e ma stavolta in veste ufficiale, si reca
a Milano con il padre per una nuova ambasceria. Il primo incarico
diplomatico arriva quando, insieme a Trevisano, rappresenta a Bruges la
Serenissima in occasione dei festeggiamenti per l'incoronazione a ‘re dei romani’
di Massimiliano d'Asburgo e nell'occasione fu investito cavaliere. Dopo
un'esperienza come savio di terraferma, e finalmente nominato ambasciatore residente
a Milano dove si accredita e rimane in carica. Venne creato cardinale in
pectore d’Innocenzo VIII nel concistoro, ma non venne mai pubblicato. L'ottima
gestione della legazione veneziana a Milano, in tempi davvero turbolenti come
quelli della reggenza di Ludovico il Moro, gli vale un anno dopo la nomina ad
ambasciatore a Roma alla corte d’Innocenzo VIII. Ed e qui che avvenne la
catastrofe. Il giorno dopo la morte del patriarca di Aquileia Marco
Barbo, Ermolao erasi recato all'udienza del papa, per fare istanza acciocché
fosse differita la nomina del patriarca successore, finché il senato non gli e
ne avesse presentato, secondo il consueto, la nomina. Ma il papa, senza punto badare
a cotesta istanza, nomina lui appunto in patriarca di Aquileja; aggiungendogli,
essere questa grazia una giusta ricompensa al suo sapere ed alla sua virtù. Il
Barbaro in sulle prime si rifiutò dall'accettare la dignità, che il pontefice
conferivagli; ma quando Innocenzo gli e lo comandò in virtù di santa
ubbidienza, si vide costretto a sottomettervisi ed obbedire. Allora il papa
sull'istante lo vestì del rocchetto, di cui, per darglielo, si spogliò uno dei
cardinali colà presenti; e poscia in pieno concistoro fu preconizzato patriarca
di questa Chiesa. La procedura era rigorosamente contraria alle leggi della
repubblica che vietavano ai propri ambasciatori, senza la previa autorizzazione
del senato, di ricevere incarichi o nomine dai principi presso i quali erano
accreditati. Allora, per giustificare la violazione procedurale, il Papa
scrisse una lettera al Doge chiedendogli di confermare la nomina, ma il
Consiglio dei Dieci, competente in materia, delibera comunque che Barbaro deve
rinunciare al patriarcato. Cosa che, dopo un po' di tira e molla, prontamente fa.
Scelse, per farla più solenne, la circostanza del giovedì santo alla presenza
del papa e di tutto il sacro collegio. Ma il papa non la volle accettare. Né
l'obbedienza sua agli ordini del senato basta per anco a giustificarlo. Poco
avveduto, non pensa di spedirne a Venezia la stessa sua dimissione al senato,
ad onta dell'opposizione del pontefice; mostrandosi dal canto suo per tal guisa
fedele ed obbediente alle leggi del suo governo. Più avrebbe inoltre dovuto
lasciar Roma e ritornare a Venezia. Ov'egli si fosse regolato così, l'affare
avrebbe cangiato di aspetto, e sarebbesi ridotta ad una semplice controversia
di giurisdizione tra la corte di Roma e la Repubblica di Venezia. Ma essendo
rimasto in quella capitale, ad onta della fatta rinunzia, né avendone dato
avviso al senato, egli fu riputato veramente colpevole in faccia alla legge, e
perciò costrinse il senato ad usare verso di lui ogni misura di rigore. Come
risultato di questo pasticcio fu bandito perennemente dalla repubblica e
interdetto da qualsiasi ufficio pubblico e privato. Quanto al patriarcato di
Aquileia, tecnicamente, ne rimase titolare ma il senato oltre ad avergli
impedito, con l'esilio, di recarvisi fisicamente, ne congelò le rendite
patriarcali e nomina Donato in suo vece, anche se la nomina non fu ratificata
dal papa. Ne deriva una situazione di stallo, durante la quale la diocesi
patriarcale fu amministrata da Valaresso (anche Valleresso), vescovo di
Capodistria, con il titolo di Governatore generale. Barbaro rimase a Roma
dove decise di dedicarsi a tempo pieno ai suoi studi. Pparticolarmente
importanti, oltre alla composizione di Orationes et Carmina in latino e alla
pubblicazione delle “Castigationes Plinianae,” disputazioni scientifiche sulle
imprecisioni e sulle invenzioni della Naturalis historia di Plinio, sono l’epistolario filosofico che si scambiò
con Poliziano e Pico, che, insieme, costituirono un vero e proprio
«triumvirato, a que' giorni potente e celebratissimo nelle scienze e nelle
lettere. E sventuratamente colto dalla pestilenza che serpeggia nell'agro
romano. Giunta a Firenze la nuova del suo pericolo trafisse altamente il cuore
dei due suoi celebri amici Poliziano e Pico. Si lagnavano essi che la sua
perdita seco involge il destino delle buone lettere, sembrando loro che in un
sol uomo pericolasse l'onere delle cose romane. Pico anzi volle tentar di
soccorrerlo, inviandogli col mezzo di suo corriere un antidoto ch'ei medesimo
componeva e che credeva atto a domare il morbo pestilenziale. Ma quando arriva
a Roma l'espresso, era di già passato tra gli estinti. Note De Legato, recuperato dal cardinal Quirini da
un codice della Vaticana e stampato per la prima volta nelle annotazioni alla
Deca II della sua Thiara et purpura veneta
Giovanni Battista Corniani, Camillo Ugoni, Stefano Ticozzi, I secoli
della letteratura italiana dopo il suo risorgimento, Torino, 1855, Vol.
II,132 Contemporaries of Erasmus, op. cit.91 Bruno Figliuolo, Il Diplomatico E Il
Trattatista: Ermolao Barbaro Ambasciatore Della Serenissima, Napoli, Guida
Editori, 1999,19 Saverio Bettinelli,
Risorgimento d'Italia negli studj, nelle arti, e ne' costumi dopo il mille,
Bassano, 1786, parte I,219 S.
Bettinelli, cit.219 Antonino Poppi,
Ricerche sulla teologia e la scienza nella scuola padovana del Cinque e
Seicento, Rubbertino, 2001,54 Vittore
Branca, La sapienza civile: Studi Sull'umanesimo a Venezia, Firenze,
1988,67 Eugenio Albèri, Relazioni degli
ambasciatori veneti al Senato, Firenze, 1846, Vol. VII,26 Giuseppe Cappelletti, Le chiese d'Italia della
loro origine sino ai nostri giorni, Venezia, 1851, Vol. VIII,512-513
Giuseppe Cappelletti, op. cit.516 Jacopo
Bernardi, Ermolao Barbaro o la scienza del pensiero dal secolo decimoquinto a
noi, Venezia, 1851,12 I secoli della
letteratura italiana, op. cit.134-135 Bibliografia Saverio Bettinelli,
Risorgimento d'Italia negli studj, nelle arti, e ne' costumi dopo il mille,
Bassano, 1786 Eugenio Albèri, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato,
Firenze, 1846 Giuseppe Cappelletti, Le chiese d'Italia della loro origine sino
ai nostri giorni, Vol. VIII, Venezia, 1851 Jacopo Bernardi, Ermolao Barbaro o
la scienza del pensiero dal secolo decimoquinto a noi, Venezia, 1851 Giovanni
Battista Corniani, Camillo Ugoni, Stefano Ticozzi, I secoli della letteratura
italiana dopo il suo risorgimento, Torino, 1855 Vittore Branca, La sapienza
civile: Studi Sull'umanesimo a Venezia, Firenze, 1988 Bruno Figliuolo, Il
Diplomatico E Il Trattatista: Ermolao Barbaro Ambasciatore Della Serenissima,
Napoli, Guida Editori, 1999 Antonino Poppi, Ricerche sulla teologia e la
scienza nella scuola padovana del Cinque e Seicento, Rubbertino, 2001Thomas
Brian Deutscher, Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the
Renaissance and Reformation, University of Toronto Press, 2003 Altri progetti
Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Ermolao
Barbaro il Giovane Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene
immagini o altri file su Ermolao Barbaro il Giovane Collegamenti esterni
Ermolao Barbaro il Giovane, su Treccani – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.Ermolao Barbaro il Giovane, in Enciclopedia
Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.Opere di Ermolao Barbaro il
Giovane, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.Opere di Ermolao Barbaro il
Giovane, su Open Library, Internet Archive.David M. Cheney, Ermolao Barbaro il
Giovane, in Catholic Hierarchy.Salvador Miranda, BARBARO, iuniore, Ermolao, su
fiu.edu – The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, Florida International University.
Ermolao Barbaro, in Treccani – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Emilio Bigi, BARBARO, Ermolao, in Dizionario biografico degli
italiani, vol. 6, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1964.PredecessorePatriarca
di AquileiaSuccessorePatriarchNonCardinal PioM.svg Marco Barbo7 marzo 1491 - 2
maggio 1493Nicolò Donà Controllo di autoritàVIAF54942062 · ISNI0000 0001
2133 7866 · SBN IT\ICCU\MILV\088873 · LCCNn80137686 · GND (DE) 118657119 · BNF
(FR) cb121940202 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1216846 (data) · NLA35180637 ·
BAV495/46340 · CERL cnp01329886 · WorldCat Identitieslccn-n80137686 Biografie
Portale Biografie: accedi alle voci di Wikipedia che trattano di biografie
Categorie: Umanisti italianiPatriarchi cattolici italianiDiplomatici italianiNati
nel 1454Morti nel 1493Nati il 21 maggioMorti il 14 giugnoNati a VeneziaMorti a
RomaBarbaroAmbasciatori italianiPatriarchi di AquileiaTraduttori dal greco al
latino[altre] Ermolao Barbaro. Keywords: il celibato, lettera a Pico, lettera a
Poliziano, traduzione della retorica, commentario all’etica nicomachea,
comentario alla politica. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Barbaro” – The
Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51702720210/in/photolist-2mRcn9c-2mQHwBB-2mN8Hgb-2mNb8t7-2mMYyW9-2mLJQmk-2mLMXqw-2mLMX6P-2mLLRgi-2mLLR3n-2mLMUtQ-2mLJQRd-2mLMVmX-2mLMWGH-2mLMULU-2mKwwoA-2mKCdPg-2mKwuhr-2mKQDQ5-2mKBLhJ-2mKH3ZR-2mKArEy-2mKDteh-2mJWMoD-2mJq2uE-2mJ4GHU-CkaHMd-BVh5m5-CntuMM-BRstt1-nKqBVU-o3jP2q-nJyPnZ-o1WCtG-noDCLh-nqpN2n-npidX4-nmQUvH-noiVeB-nnFBEg-nmPeYK-nn8tfW-nmR6a7-mwamdR-mwbCd5-mw9SoV-mw9U98-mwbymC-ihDHCu-ihh9Aj
Grice e Barcellona – i
soggeti e le norme – filosofia siciliana – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Catania). Filosofo. Grice:
“Perhaps my favourite by Barcellona is “I soggetti e le norme” – vide my
conversational norms – and ‘soggeto’ of course relates to ‘intersoggetivita,’ a
pet concept of Italian phenomenology!” Grice: “Of course, for us British
subjects (to the Queen), the idea of ‘soggeti’ cannot quite make sense! But
Barcellona’s point is fascinating: the Romans did have the concept of a
sub-iectum and an ob-iectum: they like a symmetrical expression formation, too!
Barcellona shows that we have to speak of ‘soggetti’ to get intersoggetivita –
and then the norma – a very Roman concept, which as J. L. Austin said
(following John Austin), does not quite translate as ‘norm’ – “We don’t use
‘norm’ in ordinary language.””
Barcellona shows that it is ‘I soggetti’ i. e. at least a dyad that
makes ‘the noi trascendentale’ adding up ‘l’io trascendentale’ with ‘il tu
trascendentale’ and ‘l’altro trascendentale’ that we get the norm. Barcellona
got to the idea after seeing the French film, ‘l’un et l’autre’!” -- Pietro Barcellona, deputato della Repubblica
Italiana LegislatureVIII Gruppo parlamentarePCI Dati generali Partito politicoPartito
Comunista Italiano Titolo di studioLaurea in giurisprudenza ProfessioneDocente
universitario Pietro Barcellona (Catania ),
filosofo. È stato docente di diritto privato e di filosofia del diritto
presso la facoltà di giurisprudenza dell'Catania. È stato membro del Consiglio
superiore della magistratura. Si laurea
in Giurisprudenza nel 1959. Nel 1963 consegue la libera docenza in Diritto
Civile e insegna a Messina. Dal 1976 al 1979 è componente del Consiglio
Superiore della Magistratura. Ha diretto il Centro per la Riforma dello Stato,
fondato con Pietro Ingrao. Nel 1979 è
stato eletto deputato nelle file del Partito Comunista Italiano ed è stato
membro della commissione giustizia della Camera fino al 1983. A causa della sua formazione teorica
materialista, ha suscitato nel molto
scalpore la sua conversione raccontata nel libro Incontro con Gesù. Docente emerito di filosofia del diritto
all'Catania. Altre opere: “Diritto privato e processo economico” (Jovene
Editore); “L'uso alternativo del diritto, Laterza); “Stato e giuristi tra crisi
e riforma, De Donato, Bari); “Stato e mercato tra monopolio e democrazia, De
Donato); “La Repubblica in trasformazione. Problemi istituzionali del caso
italiano, De Donato); “Oltre lo Stato sociale: economia e politica nella crisi
dello Stato keynesiano, De Donato); “I soggetti e l’intersoggetivo della norma”
(Giuffrè); “L'individualismo proprietario, Bollati Boringhieri); “L'egoismo
maturo e la follia del capitale, Bollati Boringhieri); “Il Capitale come puro
spirito: un fantasma si aggira per il mondo, Editori Riuniti); “Il ritorno del
legame sociale, Bollati Boringhieri); “Lo spazio della politica. Tecnica e democrazia,
Editori Riuniti); “Dallo Stato sociale allo Stato immaginario. Critica della
ragione funzionalista (Bollati Boringhieri); “Laicità. Una sfida per il terzo
millennio, Argo); “Diritto privato società moderna, Jovene); L'individuo sociale,
Costa & Nolan); “Politica e passioni. Proposte per un dibattito, Bollati
Boringhieri); “Il declino dello Stato. Riflessioni di fine secolo sulla crisi
del progetto moderno, Ed. Dedalo); “Quale politica per il Terzo millennio?, Ed.
Dedalo); “L'individuo e la comunità” (Edizioni Lavoro); “Le passioni negate.
Globalismo e diritti umani, Città Aperta); “Le istituzioni del diritto privato
contemporaneo, Jovene); “Tensioni metropolitane, Città Aperta); “I diritti
umani tra politica, filosofia e storia, A. Guida); “La strategia dell'anima,
Città Aperta); “Diritto senza società. Dal disincanto all'indifferenza, Ed.
Dedalo); “Fine della storia e mondo come sistema. Tesi sulla post-modernità,
Ed. Dedalo, “Il suicidio dell'Europa. Dalla coscienza infelice all'edonismo
cognitivo, Ed. Dedalo); “Critica della ragion laica, Città Aperta); “Diagnosi
del presente, Bonanno); “La parola perduta. Tra polis greca e cyberspazio, Ed.
Dedalo); “L'epoca del postumano, Città Aperta); “La lotta tra diritto e
giustizia, Marietti); “Il furto dell'anima. La narrazione post-umana, Ed. Dedalo);
“L'ineludibile questione di Dio, Marietti); “L'oracolo di Delfi e L'isola delle
capre, Marietti, Elogio del discorso
inutile. La parola gratuita, Ed. Dedalo); “Viaggio nel Bel Paese. Tra nostalgia
e speranza, Città Aperta); “Incontro con Gesù, Marietti); “Declinazioni
futuro/passato. Poesie, Prova d'autore, Il sapere affettivo, Diabasis); “Il
desiderio impossibile, Prova d'autore”; “Passaggio d'epoca. L'Italia al tempo della
crisi, Marietti); La speranza contro la paura, Marietti); “L'occidente tra
libertà e tecnica, Saletta dell'Uva); “Parole potere, Castelvecchi,. Sottopelle.
La storia, gli affetti, Castelvecchi); La sfida della modernità, La Scuola,. 978-88-350-3599-2 Pietro Barcellona e la
pittura Una delle più grandi passioni di Pietro Barcellona, è stata senza ombra
di dubbio la pittura. Comincia a dipingere all'età di 20 anni. Due sue opere si
trovano in esposizione permanente presso il "Museo dei Castelli
Romani". Un suo quadro fa parte della collezione permanente della
Salerniana, Galleria Civica d'Arte Contemporanea "Giuseppe
Perricone". Vanta diverse personali:
1959"Mostra Città di Catania"; 1997"Galleria Arte
Club" di Catania, con testi critici di Manlio Sgalambro e Salvo Di
Stefano; 2001"Galleria Arte Club" di Catania. Espone un nucleo di
ventiquattro opere sul tema "La città della donna" con testo critico
di Giuseppe Frazzetto; 2002"Tensioni metropolitane" presso
"Fondazione Luigi Di Sarro" di Roma; 2002"Galleria
Quadrifoglio" di Siracusa; 2002"Fondazione Filiberto Menna" di
Salerno; 2003"Mitologia del quotidiano" presso "Galleria La
Borgognona" di Roma, con testi in catalogo di Simonetta Lux e Domenico
Guzzi; 2003"Contrasti" presso "Galleria Tornabuoni" di
Firenze, con testo in catalogo di Fabio Fornaciai e dello stesso Barcellona;
2004"Museo dell'Infiorata" di Genzano; 2006"L'impossibile
completezza" presso il "Museo Laboratorio di Arte Contemporanea"
di Roma, Patrizia Ferri e Mario de Candia; "Il desiderio impossibile"
presso "Le Ciminiere", Sala C2, di Catania, con testo critico di
Mario Grasso. Saggi sull'opera di Pietro Barcellona Su Pietro Barcellona, ovvero, riverberi del
meno, Atti del Convegno di Studi su alcune opere di Pietro Barcellona, Mario
Grasso. Prova d'Autore,.
978-88-6282-154-4 W. Magnoni, Persona e società: linee di etica sociale
a partire da alcune provocazioni di Norberto Bobbio, Glossa Edizioni,
Milano, M. De CandiaFerri, Pietro
Barcellona raccontato dai suoi amici, Gangemi, 2006. 978-88-492-0933-4 T. Greco, Modernità,
diritto e legame sociale, in «Materiali per una storia della cultura
giuridica», XXXI (2001), n. 2, 517–541.
S. Pegorin, Emergenza Antropologica. Pietro Barcellona e la lotta in difesa
dell’umano Riconoscimenti Il 29 marzo, il Comune di Misterbianco (CT) gli
intitola una piazza. Note Pietro Barcellona, su CameraVIII legislatura,
Parlamento italiano. "Pietro
Barcellona: Mi converto, dal Partito Comunista a Gesù Archiviato il 18
maggio in.", Ragusa News. l'Unità, 11 maggio 2003: "Pietro
Barcellona, Il Piacere di
Dipingere"//archiviostorico.unita/cgi-bin/highlightPdf.cgi?t=ebook& file=/golpdf/uni_2003_05.pdf/
11CUL31A.PDF&query=Andrea%20 carugati Archiviato il 4 marzo in.
Corriere della Sera, 1º febbraio 2006. Omaggio a Pietro Barcellona
pittore, giurista e filosofo.//archivio storico.corriere/2006/febbraio/01/ Omaggio_Pietro_Barcellona_pittore_giurista_co_10_06017.shtml Inaugurata la piazza intitolata al prof.
Pietro Barcellona | Misterbianco.COM Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio
su Pietro Barcellona Napolitano: Pietro
Barcellona fu un protagonista in Italia. Messaggio del Colle ai funerali del
giurista, ex parlamentare Pci e membro laico del Csm[collegamento interrotto]
articolo pubblicato da La Sicilia, 9 settembre, sito lasicilia. Filosofi
italiani del XX secoloFilosofi. Pietro Barcellona. Keywords: i soggeti e le
norme, filosofia siciliana, Barcellona, comune di Messina. Conte di Barcellona,
lo stato imaginario, i soggeti, l’intersoggetivo della norma, communita intersoggetiva,
discorso futilitario, societas, communitas, socius, seguire, ‘follow’,
Toennies, communitario, stato keynesiano, stato imaginario, anima smartita,
conflitto e cooperazione sociale, anima smarrita, communitas, immunitas,
sociale, societas, discorso inutile, Grice, end of conversation, goal of
conversation, deutero-esperanto, linguaggio privato, i soggeti,
l’intersoggetivo. --. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Barcellona” – The
Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51790203619/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Barié – Enea –
filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Milano). Filosofo. Grice: “”My favourite
of Barié’s is his parody of Apel: “il noi trascendentale”!” -- I like Barié; he
commited suicide, which is not that rare among philosophers – same percentage
than the general population – cf. Durkheim, “Le suicide: a sociological
enquiry,””. Grice: “Barié tried to play with the idea of the transcendental,
and he did – he applied it first to “I” (‘l’io trascendentale’). When I wrote
my thing on personal identity, I preferred the pronoun ‘someone,’ to stand for
‘I’, ‘thou,’ and the allegedy THIRD ‘person,’ ‘he.’ – Barié has also edited
Vico’’scienza nuova,’ and provided a ‘compendium’ of the SYSTEMATIC kind,
favoured by some, of the history of philosophy, with sections on ‘roman’
philosophy (“l’epicureanismo romano,” “lo stoicism romano,”) --.” Grice: “Perhaps the closes Barié comes to me is in his ‘The concept of the
‘transcendental,’ since I struggled with that in “Prejudices and
predilections,” where I feign to think that perhaps ‘transcendental’ is too
transcendental an expression and should be replaced by ‘metaphysical,’ but my
tutee, Sir Peter, being more of a Bariéian, disagreed wholeheartedly!” – Grice:
“I cherish Apel’s comment on Barié: “Surely, if we are going to have ‘l’io
trascendentale,’ we need at least ‘l’altro trascendentale,’ or as I prefer ‘il
tu trascendentale.’” Partendo da posizioni kantiane pervenne a una posizione da
lui stesso definita neotrascendentalismo, scuola di pensiero di cui fu il fondatore.
Nato il 19 ottobre 1894, si avviò agli studi di diritto che concluse solo a
seguito del primo conflitto mondiale, che lo vide impegnato inizialmente come
ufficiale di cavalleria e poi come aviatore. Nel 1924 ottenne la laurea in
filosofia. Inizialmente attestato su
posizioni kantiane (La dottrina matematica di Kant nell'interpretazione dei
matematici moderni, 1924, e La posizione gnoseologica della matematica, 1925),
nel corso del suo progredire intellettuale Barié perviene a una posizione
filosofica critica nei confronti della dottrina kantiana. Di questo passaggio è
emblematica l'opera Oltre la Critica, del 1929, che mette in luce le difficoltà
della dottrina precedentemente sostenuta.
Il periodo metafisico Oltre la critica segna il punto di svolta
dell'attività filosofico-intellettuale di Barié, che comincia a sviluppare un interesse
metafisico, forse dovuto all'influenza di Piero Martinetti, del quale era stato
allievo. In questo senso il filosofo, nel suo primo approccio alla metafisica,
si pone su un binario che era già stato di Spinoza, salvo poi rendersi conto
del fatto che anche la posizione spinoziana è in realtà insufficiente per
tentare di risolvere il dilemma della relazione essere-pensiero. Si ha quindi
l'approdo di Barié al pensiero leibniziano, testimoniato dell'opera del 1933 La
spiritualità dell'essere e Leibniz.
L'approdo al neotrascendentalismo e Il Pensiero Libero docente dal 1929,
ottiene la cattedra universitaria nel 1933 spostandosi di conseguenza a Genova,
Roma e infine Milano, nella cui università succede al suo maestro Martinetti
nella cattedra di filosofia teoretica. Consapevole del fatto che, per quanto
superata, la lezione antidogmatica di Kant non poteva essere completamente
ignorata, Barié inizia una profonda revisione del proprio sistema teoretico che
lo porta a diminuire drasticamente le sue pubblicazioni (di questo periodo sono
il Compendio sistematico di storia della filosofia, 1937, e Descartes, 1947) e
che culmina con la pubblicazione de L'io trascendentale (1948). Nel 1950 fonda
l'istituto di filosofia dell'Milano con lo scopo di renderlo centro propulsivo
di una discussione filosofico-culturale con le realtà filosofiche del tempo che
si sarebbero confrontate con la nuova visione di Barié, adesso orientato verso
una concezione di filosofia come metafisica, ossia di metafisica quale causa
della realtà sensibile e del pensiero. Con lo stesso scopo nacque nel 1956 la
rivista Il Pensiero. Altre opere: “La posizione gnoseologica della matematica –
e dell’arimmetica in particolare” 7 + 5 = 12” (Torino, Bocca); “Oltre la
critica della ragione e del giudizio, il criticismo (Milano, Libreria editrice
lombarda); “Spirito e anima: La spiritualità dell'essere e Leibniz” (Padova, MILANI);
“Compendio sistematico di storia della filosofia con particolare attenzione
alla filosofia romana sino Cicerone” (Torino, Paravia); “L'io trascendentale
non-psicologico” (Milano-Messina, G. Principato); “Il concetto trascendentale”
“Il trascendentale” (Milano, Veronelli. Note Atti del V Congresso Internazionale di
Filosofia, Napoli, 1924 riproduzione
fotografica (p.1-109) da OpalLibri antichi
riproduzione fotografica (p.110-202)
Davide Assael, Giovanni Emanuele Bariè, Milano, CUEM, 2008. Davide
Assael, "Il neotrascendentalismo di Giovanni Emanuele Barié", in
Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, 2009; (4),
731–759. Davide Assael, Alle origini della scuola di Milano: Martinetti,
Barié, Banfi, Guerini e associati, Milano, 2009. Milano Accademia scientifico-letteraria di
Milano Università degli Studi di Milano Scuola di Milano Giovanni Emanuele Barié, su TreccaniEnciclopedie
on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Giovanni Emanuele Barié, su sapere, De Agostini. Giovanni Emanuele Barié, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Giovanni Emanuele Barié, su
openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Filosofia
Università Università. Giovanni Emanuele
Barié. Keywords: Enea, lo stoicism romano, Enea, eroe romano, eroe stoico,
Catone, il noi trascendentale, vico, storia vichiana, arimmetica. Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, “Grice e Barié” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51789801666/in/dateposted-public/
Grice e Baricelli –
filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (San Marco dei Cavoti). Filosofo. rice:
“Italian philosophers can be eccentric; Baricelli started commenting Plato but
his masterpiece is a philosophical tract on sweat, as experienced by the
athletes Plato was familiar with!”Medico, chimico e filosofo di fama italiana
ed europea, Giulio Cesare Barricelli- nacque a San Marco dei Cavoti nel 1574 (o
1575) e fu da molti, pure erroneamente, ritenuto originario di Benevento o di
San Marco Argentano in Calabria. Erudito
e studioso di poliedriche attitudini e capacità, studiò medicina e si interessò
di filosofia, tanto che ancora giovanissimo fu autore di commenti alle opere di
Platone, mentre nel pubblicò l'opera in quattro libri De hydronosa natura sive
de sudore umani corporis, sulla natura e la terapia della sudorazione umana,
nelscrisse l’Hortulus genialis, edito a Colonia e Ginevra ove raccolse antidoti
e sudi sulle intossicazioni, e successivamente diede alle stampe il Thesaurus
secretorum, opera in cui sono elencate le cure ed i rimedi per svariate
malattie e problematiche quotidiane. Nel
1623 pubblicò poi un trattato sull'uso del siero del latte e del burro come
medicamento, intitolato De lactis, seri, butyri facultatibus et usu, e nello
stesso anno gli fu conferita la cittadinanza beneventana. Cultore di studi
umanistici Barricelli scrisse anche alcuni epigrammi latini e morì in Benevento
tra il 1638 ed il 1640. A San Marco dei
Cavoti, nel corso degli anni, gli vennero intitolati un antico circolo
ricreativo (sec.XIX-XX), la scuola elementare (1942) ed infine la strada ove si
trovava l'abitazione in cui visse, già denominata Via Pastocchia, che ospita
anche un monumento in suo onore, opera dello scultore Giulio Calandro
(1989). A proposito dell'intitolazione
della scuola, su espressa richiesta dell'allora commissario prefettizio Mario
Jelardi, l'insigne storico Alfredo Zazo propose la seguente epigrafe che ne
riassume le doti i meriti: A GIULIO
CESARE BARRICELLI CHE DEL RINASCIMENTO EBBE LO SPRITO INFORMATORE E LA VASTA
ATTIVITA' PROFUSE NEL CAMPO DELLA SCIENZA MEDICA DELLE LETTERE E DELLE SPECULAZIONI
FILOSOFICHE IL COMUNE DI SAN MARCO DEI CAVOTI A RICORDO ED INCITAMENTO PER LE
GENERAZIONI CHE IN QUESTA SCUOLA SI EDUCANO NEL FERVORE E NELLA FEDE DEI NUOVI
GRANDI, AUSPICATI DESTINI DELLA PATRIA XXVIII OTTOBRE 1942XX E.F. Opere. “De hydronosa natura sive de sudore
umani corporis”; “Hortulus genialis”; “Thesaurus secretorum De lactis, seri,
butyri facultatibus et usu. Alfredo Zazo, Dizionario bio-bibliografico del
Sannio, Napoli, Angelo Fuschetto, Giulio Cesare Baricelli, 1989 Andrea Jelardi,
Dizionario biografico dei Sammarchesi, Benevento. nis
Hortuli Genialise RERVM MEMORABILI VM, QVAE IN HORTVLO Geniali continentur
elenchus. A Beſton accenfus,perpetuòarder. A cos. 12. poribus effe &tus procreari.
Admirandumauxiliuin advefica calculum, qwo abſque inciſione diffoluitur de
expurgatur. 211. • Alapides renum vefica frangendos mirabile remedium. 204
Ammantium lac ab alimentis recipere qualita tem. 174 Agricola nonſemel
tempeftates e Serenitates pre dicunt. Abſyntbiumroborat ventry Abfynthij Romani
mira i 170 Abſalonformararus. Acorescapitis bufonefanartit Achatis
lapidismirabilis Acetum ad i &tus venenosov Acetiſcyllitici miraoperato
371. Adam eratſapiennriſsimus Aegyptiſ in annimenfura 233 Aegyptiorum opinio de
elementis. Isbe Aepyptij in morborum -Chrafacileadiguem recara 178 Aemorrhagia(electumprefidiuna:
176. (Aegypti hierogliphicis vacabant, 2085 Aegyptiorumarcana ait quartanam Aegyptijregesopera
magnifica do admiranda an. Liquitus conftruxiffe.zi. Aegye MONACENSIS. REGLA
BIBLIOTHECA Tunt. Aegyptiorum in condiendiscorporibus obferuatio. Levis
ſalubritatem ad vite produktionem maxå moperè videmusconducere. 34 Aegyptiorum
Auditim ir lapidis á vefsica extra Sione Aegyptij quomodoignea prefidia
component Aerisnatura quomodo nofcatur Afflictionem tribuere intellettum.
Agricolafilicibus in horreis cur vtantur. 200 Agricola cwufdam interitus.
Alexandri mors.quo veneno fuexit caufata Alexandri ſudoredolens. 197 Alexandri
uder.fanguineus. Alexandrimagnanimitas in ftudiofos Amazones mammas dextras ſecabant.
Amoris originis controuerfia Amantes surfacile irafcantur, Ambarum vi
ebrietatemfaciat. 307 Animalia quadam Arni tempora pradicero. 224 An
transformatio realis detur. An animal in igne viuere poſsie. 18 Anni computum
diuerfimode fa &tum Animalia ex putri materia non ſemper extitiffe.
Anicularum quarundam facinona. Antimony in vitrum redu & io. Anuli Bubali
ad gramphum vtiles: 98 Anularis digitus cordi amicus. 100 Antora napello
inimiciſsima. 175 Anginaprafocatina vt compefcatur. 197 Animalia a vteerikus
Dis dicata, 226 58 Anguil 214 290 306 343 120 Anguillarum cum Aquilone affe
&tus Animantiumcobur à cominé oritur. Anni climacterici quales.
Annibalisſtratagema in boftes. Anniprefagia à quercus galiis: Ancitodorum
aliquor obferuationes. 171 A priteftium virtus mirabilis. 162 Apri ægrotantes
hederam quarunt. Api efum infauftum veteribus, 165 Apri dentes adanginan
dompleuritidem vtiles Apes imminente pluuia adalucaria redeunt Apiumri
usherbafcelerata; Apum mirabilisſagacitasdan officium Aqua mirabilis ad
viſusdefectum Aquilinumlapidem partum accelerare, 126 Aquafrigidaqualiter
apparetur. 314 Arcades qualiter annum computabant. 39 Archelai Regis in populos
immanitasi go Arboris ficusmirabilisnatura: Arietislingualantium ostendit.
Araneorum reła in medicina vfurpata Arbores quandoquein lapides mutati. 90
Artemiſia quando in radicibus carbonem producati Articulares dolores quomodo
curentur. Archelaus Rexaſtronomie ignarus Ariſtotelis opinio demularum ortu.
Ariftotelis rerum indagator, Ariſtolochia piſces ftupidosfacit. Archelaus
turrim incombuſtibilem fecit: Aſphaltirisla 'usmirabilis natura, Apronomia
medicis neceſaria Ararum vomitu humores expurgat. Aparagor um 2u corporis
nitorem producit. 245 Afphespropè halico ibum fiupidi. 272 Aſparagi vi mirabiliter
erefcant. 279 Ap.dum natura qualis. Athenien esfacerdotes cicutam comedebant
Atrila canis instarlatrabat Athenienfium ura erga fiicos Aues vfu Taxi nigra fiunt.
Auri vfus in medicina Aufonij locus de mecha uxore Afilici odor vermesgignis Bafilijanhabitat
pelicudinibm Aphrice Ibid. Bafilifcum haudàgallo excludi. Bardana mira vis in
affe& u uteri. Bituminis vis in hiſterica paſs. Braſsica, dorura fimul
fatahereunt. Bruta aliquot lafciuiffe in fominas, Bryonia mira virtus in
affe&tu-matricis. Braſsica fuccus contra ibrietatem. Britânnurum præfidium
in furiofos. Bubuloftercore colicam,anari. Bufonis lapis cóntra vinena. Bufonis.mira
propriet as in Aſcite. Arnes dura utfiant teneriores. Canes.obmutefcunt vmbra
Hyena. Capramaximèepilepſia tentatur, Capillorum defluussm laudano curare Cani Canicula
exortum à veteribus previſum, Carnes cocta,quomodo crude videantur. 161 Canes
fabrorum exiguos habent lienes Cancri vini quomodo co &tifimulentur Capre in
luftinis montibuseuomunt Capilli noftri plantis affimilantur Caftratilienem,
dan vitella ouorum deglutire ne. queunt. Cauſtica remedia,qualia adftrumas Caryophillgte
vis adcorporismacular. 287 Caftorei teftespropèrenes adeffe Caminus quo fumum
non emittet, Calphurnius beftia uxores dormientes necabat.33% Catelli membrorum
dolores confopiunt, Cacodamonem mali nnncijpraſagiumattuliffe.32 Calendula
folis amica. 341 Capiuacceiopinio de menftruofanguine Cantharidum mira vis
nocendi Carthaginienfium prefidium ad deftillationes in. fantium. Cati.cerebrum
hominesdementat. Cornilacrymaſworesſuſcitat, Corui renouantnr eſos ferpenris Cervi
carnes ad vita produftionen. 107 Cepamab Hyppocrate deteftari. (109 Ceruorum
vita longiſsima 281 Cerius Alatus Francorum inſignie Cerninum penem.conceptum
facere. Ceraforum aqua epilecticis vtiliſsima 348 Chamedrij mira vis ad
lienofos Chalcanti vfus quidoperetur Chymici forebantapud veteres: Cibm ܫܐ 306
Chuslapidusquomodo apparetur. Cicutam uterinum furorem domare Cicuta virginum
mammas detumat. 344 Cynorrhodi radix ad hydrophobiam Cyminum hominibupallorem
inducere. Cyprinorum vfuspodlagricis infeftus. 135 Cyprini officulü caluarisad
spilefiä mirabile Clarorum virorumexitus. Lorui morientiúm fæditatem fentiunt,
1j2 Colicu dolor quomodofanetur. 88 Collegium veterum pro tuendaſanitate. ) 2OS
Cotoneorumfeminaadcombufta. 208 Confedtio fenibuspraftantiſſima Corpusutglabrum
reddipofit Corpora venenatá vtnofcantur. 24% Coralline vis adlumbricos Corniplanta
hydrophobiam ſuſcitat Consensus de disensus animantium Corneliu Celji valetudinis
precepta. Creationis mundi opiniones. 10 Croci metallorum.compofitio.: 29%
Crinesmulierum qua via denfiores fiant Cupreff folia Strumas auferre. Cur fit
vtquis clauos vomere videatur. Cucumeres oleum abborrent. Cur quiti impronisè moriantur.
D. Ature flores Defunium capillorum ab hydrargiro, Demoris afturia apud indos.
IS Democrittfedulitas in olei caritare. Demofthenes quomodocuraffet lingue
impedimen 14.290. Denti. 306 174 Dentium dolores bufonis tibia janari: 10%
Dentium ftupor àportulacaremouetur Dentium dolores paſtinaca marina radio
conquieſterr Defipientia mulieribus familiaris, Digiti annularis ſympathia. 160
E. EBura quoartificiocolorentur. Ebriy variafufcipiunt deliria, 312 Echini
ſagacitas in ventorum mutationibus. 41 Elephant's in fæminam mirusamor. 81 Empiricorumremedi4periculofa
Epistola quomodo in ouo celetur Equam grauidam marem admittere. Equagrauida
fomas occiditur,abortit Equorum teftes ad ſecundas depellendas praftan.
tiſsimi. 317 Equusphaleris accinctus acrior.fot. 363 71 Asies rugata quomodo
emendentur. Faciem hominis diuerfimode alterari, 42 Familia in Creta mire
faſcinatrices Faces ardentes ex Betula corticibus. * 339 Fætor extin &ta
lucerna grauidisperniciofu, 48 Febricitantium fitis qualiter compefcatur Febrem
à quodum pifceillico exitari. 194 Fæmina aliquot inrares mutate,, 160 Fæmina
pruritu corripiuntur in pudendis in prima menftriornm eruptione. -Fæcula
Brionie in affecte vteri Feniculorum femina aliquando exitialia Filij Filij â
parentibus figna recipiunt. Ficorum efumfudoremparerefætidum Filices ab agris qualiter exterminentur.
Flores in Aegypto fine odore. 145 Flamma quomodo in aqua excitetur. 176 Fluuij
aliquot mirabilis natura. Fructum vinearum, iumentorumg interitus pre ſagium Ferarum
natura in hominibus mirum in modum deft. 8a Fons mirabilis apud Garamantes. 299
Frigida post pharmacü exhihita, felici fucceffu Fraxinum ferpentibus inimicum:
Furiofi in pleniluno,magis infaniunt. Futi vulnera quomodo curentur. Fungi ubi
in lapides mutentur. 90 fumus hydrargiri quid efficiat Galenu,Medicorum
princeps Aline appenfo milui capite furisunt. 188 Galega, defcordij vis contra
peftem. Gallinarum.stercus adfungorum viru. 276 Gallinarum adeps quomodo diu
ſeruetw.. 28% Gallina quomodofæcunda fiant. Gentium.don populorum ingenia. 17€
Germanorum mos circa coitum. 72 Gigantes quando in orbe fuerint, Gymnofophifta
apud Indos mirabiles. Grauidationis muliersus affertio. 7 % Grauida mulieres
marein admittunt. 73 Grauida conceptü quomodo valeant occisltare. 22
Grauidaaliquando fætupariuntfine vnguibus. Gra 200 Greuide mulieres curpallida.
139 Greci de Iudeorum monumentis nihiladduxe 189 H. Auftulus aqua matutinus
falubris. Heclaignis aqua nutritur Hemicrania Gagate fubmouetur. 133 Homicrania
à carduo benedi&to fanythr. 216 Herfetes ceroro tabacci coufanari.
Hellebori nigti ele&tio in Anticris. Hederam cumvino habere diſcordiam Hemorrboidailisherbe
mira virtus, 340 Hellebori nigriextra & nm. 160 Hybernie
miraaerisſalubritas, Hidropsà viridi lacerto confanata Hydrophobosè poto catuli
congulo aquam illico ap petere. Hippocratis opinio de balbisdefe&tiua, 74
Hydrargiri minera quomodo reperiatur. Hyppiatriquo studioftellas albas in
equorum fu cis confingant Hydrophobia rara dicuffion 54 Hydrargiri mira natura..183
Hydrargirum remedium eft advermes. Hydrargirum utilead celidolorem Hydrargirumremedium
in pofte. Hydrargirum defluuium capillorum facere. Hominis vite longitudinis
breuitatis figna, Homo repertus mira vaftitatis. 170 Hominumcur
aliquotfubtilioris, vel graffiorisin. genijfiant. 187 Homines Principis vitam
imitantur. 17 320 326 Horai. 61 Homines inuenti miragracilitatis. 245 Hominis
compofitionismirabilia Hominesquomodo fiant abfemy. 327 Hominum corpora olim
vafta Ibis in degyptofolum moratur, Ignispraſidra admorbos fele &ta. 303
Infantes à quibusnutricibm ladandi. 23 Infantis inumbilicum animaduerfio. Indi
ante Hiſpanorum tranfitum variolas baud paffi funt. 88 Infania ex folano
fyluatico quomodo emondetur.85 Indus quidam longiffime vite. Infantes
eiulareautoladein mammillu, Infantium ruptura ut curentur. 100 Infantes
vipreferuentur ab epilepfie. Infantes ànutricibus mores recipere 270 Infantis
umbilicum conceptum facere. 334 Inser Lupum eAgnum diſcordia. Inter brafficam,
de vitesfympathis. 338 Iumenta clitellaria fibilo, cantu á laboribus fubleuari Aminas
aris& vitrileo extrahi Lapidis ignem redensis compofitio. Lapathiam camas
duras,teneruofacit, Lacerta apudIndosmira magnitudinis, Lu,fanguisaliquandopluers
viſs. Lepusannis decemviueredicitur. Letargicos à Satureia vigiles fieri.
Leonardi vatri de partu opinio. 102 237 Leones Leonesaftatttertianam patiuntur.
348 Leporumnonomnes hermaphrodui, 294 Leo timet Gallung. ISO Linteaapud Indos
igne depurari, Littera aurei coloris quomodofiant: Lignum èviſco Latum
diſcutita Lienem adcorporis turpitudinem valere 191 Lolium praun inducit
ſyptomata. 86 Lolij nocumenta Aceto fanari. Ibid. Lups afpe&tu homines
obmuteſcunt. Irupi pauci reperiuntur,ones autem multa Zapi quomodo ouibus
nacere nequeant., 106. Lumaca lapispartum,accelerat Ludi in
conuinijsfeftiuiquales, 19 Lupi,canes, doFeles ut curentur, 175 Lupi in fenio
ſerpentesin renibus.generant. 234 Luna confinusad inferiora, mirabilis. 236 Lue
gallica canis infeftus 243 Lumbricosquandoquegenerari virulentos MAmirimum
vitulum àfulmine non ladi, izg Aris yubri admiranda: Maleficas artesir
Septentr. exerceri 176 Mascitius, quàm fæmina animatur, 182
Maritimarumtempestatumprafagia Maculanigre in morbisquid portendant.
Mădragoravitibus infundit vim ſoporiferam:214 Mares in mammillisſapè
Lachabent.. 323 Marina pallinace radiusad dentiumdelores yti lis. Mommarum sum
vtero ſympathis Medicinepraktamsia quanta fit.. Menftrualisfanguinis immanita,
92 Medea an fuerit venefica. 138 Memoriaquo prafidio augeatur. 138 Mercury
pojisura in hominūnatiuitatibus, quan tum valeat. Mergorum i anferum proprietas
contraHydropho biam.. 49 Mellis vfu vita vtiliffimus. 285 Medicina multa
abanimalibus capta. Meſpulilignum ab ab ortu preferuat. Menftrua plerifqs
fæminis in fenio. Mirabiles in hominibusproprietates dari. Mithridates
inculpatè venena bibebat. Mithridatis antidotum ad venena. Mirafontis
inEpgroproprietas, 285 Mille pedum preparatio adcalculos. 223 Mille folium
aduulnera conſolidanda. Morborumprauorum natura, 69 Morus planta prudentiffima.
Morfusquidam à cane rabido latrauit. 1893 Mors inArthritide quandofuccedat. 190
Mures futurorum praſcj. Muftela cur rutam comedat. Multa prafidia ab animalibus
homines accepije. 316 Mulierum capilli quomodo in vermes mutentur.zo Monftruofa
Dæmonis apparitio. Mulieres pregnantes vt nofcantur. Muftella
fanguisadepilepfiam. 197 Mundi creatio.ornatus. Mullus sterilisatem producit.
167 Mulierum pinguedoſuamis. 22 67 Mutin 140 Mulieresrarò inebriantur.
Mulorumgenuspropagare nequit. Mulieresin. Ponto animalibus.nocentes. 247 N: 64
392 Natura presidentia in brutis.. Natsuitates.hominum quando ob'eruende 230
Natura arcanaprovira producenda. Neronis crudelitas quoque pads a nutrice
wiginem fumpfit. 26. Nero Tapfiam magnificauit. Nereides, Sirene lepe vifa fust:
Nili proprietu admiranda 10 Niues rubentes in Armenie. Nodi in vmbilico
infantis quid sotentas Nuxairiftica quomodofiat vigore for 1 1 20 % 139 O
Learum fterilitatis preſagium: olei, vini,fegetumquefterilitatis prefagium.
olei balneumproconkulfis laudatum. aleun amigdalarum dulcinm advariolarum
veftigia probibendu. olea Minerka a yeteribu dicata: 114 slei cinemani
raracampofis. 194 elina olinarum oleum adunguium pannas. tur. Par 200 Oleum
latris colicum affe& um domato 108 Oleum lixiuio miftum albeſcit. 332.
Opthalmia aliquando.folo afpe & u communicar 203 @ris
ulceraquomodofanemtur: Oryalus viſu auriginoſos.sanat.. 203: Orestis cadauer
odto cubitorum. fa de corde Cersui.corina uznena.. Oxes capite
mouentpluuialmininente. Quesalba ubi nigrefiant. 352 P Arimdi
difficultasquandoqueà curto umbi lco prouenit. Paracelfafalſaopinio
dehomunculipartu. 108 Panaritiumqualiter illico fanetur. Parthi, Scytheque quo
venenofagittas linjrent.318 Pestilentitemporeinter precipua præfidia.neris 18
Aifcatio fummum iudicatur. Papauer agreſte contra pleuritidem, Papauer
ſolisfpheraminfequitur, Perfa.aliis coquinas replebant: Pediculicorpora
morientium relinquunt 79 Beftem ex occulta antipashia oriti. 147 Penna Ibidis
ſerpentes-terret, 339 Perniones:quomodo fanentur: Phalangii'ueneni opera.
Phrensuci cur fortiſsimifint, Phrenetidem exnigro-corallio quiefcere 146
Bhreneticialiquando mirabilia loqui. Pharmacum dare, quando periculofum. 242
Philomenaà vipera deuoratut. 288 jot 3.1 $ 276 1:59 Pifa 102 Piſces
marinifalubres, japidi, Pifiesfrixi quomodo in venenum tranfeunt. 72 Pici
mirandulani ingenium; 183 Picem cum oleo habere colligantiam Pici opinio de fcientiarum
varietate. 16 Portulæca foment contra lumbricosa Plurimamèterra furfum rapi
iterumque deorfumi cumpluuiis precipitarz. 333 Polypodijmira viscontra cancrosa
239 Porri caputquomodo augeri pofsit: 25+ Potentia imaginatiua in conceptu
mirabilis. 295. Planta fimileseffe&tu fimiles, vinute... 77 % Pluvia
imminentisprofagia. Plumburglans in coli dolorepraffans. Prognoftica
tempestatis pluusoſa. Prafodiam mirabile ad calculos 337 Preſedia admiranda
inangina. Pfli, do Marfi ferpentibus amici. Pulchritudo, deformitas afpeétuo
quid portono. dat. 175 Pulchritudo corporis quo termino confitna. $. Euella à
teneris veneno odusara. 36 Pulſus deficientes anfemper mali, 140 Queen Vanium
profit neris puritasin peffe. 103 Wartanarii improuifo rimore fananiky. Mr. Qua
via volucrumpennacolorentur. 199 Quartana quomododebellerur. *****
Quibuscorpusflorsfcit,his lien decrefcit. 219 Quo artificio es aduratur. 153
QuorumdamiAnimalium vitalongitado 117 Quorumdam animalium naturl. Quorumdam
homină virtutes, & ornamenta. 196 quo artificio mares ab. uxoribus.
[tyfcipere vales 235 Quo Artificio duriſsimafaxa frangerevaleamus.30 Quomodo in
urdieriſomasexcitari valeamus.341 mks. R Aneterreftris oleum aditrumas !
Rexbarbarumcidoniatum gravidisfummum medicamentum. 263 Rerum Sympathiam in
aliquot brutis Admirabi. lem effe;. 113 Rută inter alexiteria medicaméta
cõnumerari, 49 Rores marini virtus miranda, 123 Ruta mira. vis contra venenum.
S jabbarici junijmiraproprietas, Sanguis menftruus quandoque ex oculis velgingi
uis excluditur, 77 Salis prunelle virtus,de compofitio. 149 Sartyriam carnofum
venerems excitat,flaccidum vero extinguat. 706 Sanguis menstrualisexucis,
ſcarabais venenū. 218 Sanguis caninus hydrophobis vtilis. Saliua
bominisfcorpionesnecat. 317 Scarabei miraproprietas. 280 Scarabai cornuti vis
in febre ciendo. 223 Sciffure laborum.usmanuum remed. 262 Scythe quomodo
diuabfque cibo vivant: 3:32 Berpentesquibus fufficibusarceantur.
Sene&tutisincommodah Sepermusinter mafculos meră retinet virtutã.226 14 128
Serpeniums ona, velgenitura in pornfumptaSerpenting gignunt. 319 Singulis
quopatto cohibeatar, Socij Diomedis in volucres conneri. Solis confuxm ad
inferiora maximus. Solatri potencia contra parafitos. 40 fomniorsuspreſagia à
Deoconcedi. 238 Sodami -Gomorrbi fruétus vari. 342 Solis defe & us quomodo
comprehendatur. 343 Spurij robuftiores legitimis fuus. 95 Spe& acula
veterum vbi celebratamagis. Spuweis epilepticis non femper filo Spatiuwvil e
fecundum Acryptias. Stygis Arcadiemortifera natura. Sirumarum mirum remediusa.
100 Strumaper vrisano quandoquepurgalai 257 Sterilituin bomine ytdiriwratur
SAMIremedium temporepeffu. 210 Succinum parium mulieris accelerare, Syrupus
fpinæ infeftorie ad temelusume. SS SwimeisterSidera calidißima. T. sbacci vw
apud Iudos. 15 Talpeoleum ad Aruma. 257 Taurifanguis inter VEREBANwerari. 29
Taurilapillu veſice contracalcules. Taum Philoſopbw famen cabiberet. Ferro lenonia
contra ventna. Tbagfia mira vis in facillasi. SO Thappa 319 274 T 93 138 213
105 - Thapſia veſsicas, do ademata excitat. 9 Torpedinismira vis in capitis
dolores. Trauli,cobalbi,do femilingues unde finns. Tuberum efufrequenti
hominescadunt. 13? Aleriane vis contra epilepfiam, V Variola,morbilli
affe&tmnoni, 74 Verruce quomodo extirpentur. Verbena vis in capitis
doloresi Verbena virtus contra frumas. 89 Vermium in corporibus hominum varia
figura 18 periuntur. 93 Vermes rubei in cerebro adnati. 134 Verbafci florss
Sole aecedente decidunt, 137 Veterum fepulchra mitèconftrudia. 158 Veterum
ruditasdo, in foribendovarietas. 197 Vena ſarustella ſpleneticis auxiliatrix
Veterum in nuptiisconfuetudo. 275 Veteres equoram lacrymas admirabantur. 192
Venenumà diſsimili extinguigecontra, 309 Vermes in cordis.capſula exorti, 322
Ventorum mutationes ab Echmo previderi. 41 Vifusacies,in quibus
fueritadmiranda. Víres collapſa odoribus reſarciri poffunt. 47 Vitrioli, com
fulphurisoleumad vermes. Vipera catellosfuosparit,utnutrit. 60 Vipera inter
ſerpentes fola parit animal vinã.ibe Viperamorſus Hellebori nigri radicibus
fanan. Vinum pro Afthmate ſele&tum Vito longena quomodo apparemme. 361 zur.
Vina Vina alba quomodo rubra fant, Virginitatismulierum figna. Vitrum quo modo
diuidarur. Vinum venenatumquibus profuerit. 29L Vinum à veteribusfeminis
interdi & um. 304 Vifcum quercinum epilepticis falutare. 318 Vitri puluerem
calculus comminuere. 344 Vimivſus elephanticisfalutaris. 325 Vlcera formicantia
quomodo breui fanentur. 59 Vricornu proprietas, bet cognitio. Volatilium,piſciumque
fecunditatispreſagia. Vrtica folia ſalutem, vel mortem informi in lotio
prefagiunf. DeMedicinepraftantia. Edicina decçio demiſla eft: ita
Mercurius Trifmegiftus apud Aegyptiosſapientiſsi. profectoad fluxilis natura
goltre remedium Deus altiſsimus ho minibus conceſſit; vt fanitatem conſer.
uare, &perditam recuperare commodè valeamus. lofa autemà vitæ conftituto
termino, & à morte nequaquam viuen. sia omninoliberare; ſedcorpora à cor
suptione, & feftinadiſſolutione præfer uarepotius iudicatur. Amazonescur
mammasdextras refecauerint. Mazones illæ, tantum à ſcriptori bus celebratæ,propterea
fibi má. mas dextras refecari curabant, vt magis A armis HORTYLYS GERIAITS.
armis gerendis aptæ fierent; vel potius Demannum, & brachiorum impedire •
tur motus. Mihi zutem Galeni opinio 7. Aphor. 43.ex fententia Hippoc. admo dum
placet; qui has mulieres id feciffe aferuit, vt manus dextra robuftior cua
detet.Hocautem à ratione alienum mi. nimèeft, quippe nutrimentum,quod in mammam
dextram à natura diſtribui debebat,totum in manum, & brachium immittebatur.
Strab. lib. 11. Olearum fterilitatis prefagium. Ergiliarum occultatio, &
emerso Sucularum tempeftuofi fideris, fi pluuiofam tempeftatémouerit, &
vitis, &olei germinationé fuffocabit.Ex hac cauſa Democritus olei præuifa
caricate, magna vilitate oliuas in toto co tractu coemit, mirantibus,
quipaupertatem, do & rinam, & quietem homini oble & a. mento
cffeſciebant: at vt apparuit cau. fa, & ingens dinitiarum acceffio,reftituis
mercedem, contentusleita probaffe, 0. pes fibi in promptu eflc cum vellet. Ex
Fran, luncino in Sphæra. V IVLII CÆSARIS BARL. CELLI & SANCTO MARCO,
Do&oris Medici, & Philofophi, Hortulus Genialis. DeMedicinepraffantia.
Edicina decçio demifla eft: ita Mercurius Triſmegiſtus apud Aegyptios
ſapientiſsi musfcriptum reliquit. Hát profecto ad fluxilis natura noltre
remèdium Deus altiſsimus ho minibus conceffit; vt fanitatem confere uare, &
perditam recuperare commodè valeamus. lofa autem à vitæ conftituto termino,
& à morte nequaquam viuen. sia omnino liberare; fed corpora à cor ruptionc,
&feftina diſſolutionepræfer uarepotius iudicatur. Amazones cur
mammasdextras refecauerint. AMiszonesilla, tantum àfcriptori.. mas dextras
reſccaricurabant,vt magis armis HORTVLVS GERIATS. armis gerendis aptæ fierent;
vel potius De manuum, & brachiorum impedire tur motus.Mihi autem Galeni
opinio 7. Aphor. 43.exfententia Hippoc. admo. dum placet; qui has mulieres id
feciffe aferuit, vt manus dextra robuftior cua deret.Hocautem à ratione alienum
mi. nimé eft, quippe nutrimentum, quod in mammam dextram à natura diſtribui
debebat,totum in manum, & brachium immittebatur. Strab. lib.11. Olearum
fterilitatis præfagius. Ergiliarum occultatio, & emerGo Sucularum
tempeftuofi fideris, fi pluuiofam tempeſtatemouerit, & vitis, & olei
germinationé fuffocabit. Ex bas cauſa Democritusolei præuifa caritate, magna
vilitate oliuas in toto co tracta coemit, mirantibus, quipaupertatem, do &
rinam, & quietem homini oble & a mento effe ſciebant: at vt apparuit
cau. $ a, & ingens dinitiarum acceffio,reftituit mercedem, contentusleita
probaffe, o pes Sbi in promptu effe cumi vellet. Ex Frap, lundino in Sphæra. V
BA KICELLI O aqua Nili, Nilifluminisproprietas uædam aquæ reperiuntur, quæ fæ.
cunditatem proprietate quadam inducere celebrantur: ita eſt quæ ſua vi nitroſa,
vt voluit Seneca 3. Natur. quæſt. natura. fæpè vteros per petua fterilitate
occluſos aperuit, & conceptumfecit: Vnde mulieres in AE gypto,vtfcripfit
Ariſtot.quinos, & qua ternos frequenrer fætus edunt; ratio non alteri
tribuitur, quàm Nili aquæ, quæ illis in potu familiariſlima eſt. De
Mundicreatione. N qua Anni parte Müdus à Deo crea tusfuiflet,diſcordes interſe
ſcriptores funt, vt Hebræi, Iſmaelitæ, Chaldæi, Arabes,Aegyptij,Græci, &
Latini.Mula ti enim in Aeftate, nonnulli in vere,alij verò in Autumno conditum
fuifle con tendunt. Moyles fuiſſe in Autumno affe. rere videtur, cum in Geneli
dicat, Ger minet terra berbam virentem, &facientem emen, Glignum pomifera
faciens fru &tung iuxta YO & TVLVS GENIALIS. iuxtágenusfuum.Ex
Aegyptijs nonnulli A eſtate creatum afferunt. Inter Latinos Cardinalis
Aliacenfis vere nouo condi tum voluit.Inſuper variant,quia Plane tas aliquot
afferunt in mundi principio fuiſſe creatos in fuis domibus: Solem ſci licet in
Leone, Lunam in Cancro, Martē in Scorpione, Saturnum in Capricorno, Venerem in
Libra,Mercurium in Virgi ne, Iouem in Sagittario. Alij, Planetas volunt, in
fuis altitudinibus, præter Mercuriú,omnes fuiffe collocatos. Que autem opinio
fit verior, D.Thomas 4 fons dif. 2. artic. 8. videnduseft. Murium fagacias.
Vres ex ônibus animalbusquo dám do cognofcuntur. Cum enim domus aliqua
conſenuit, &ruinamaliquam iamcom minatur, primi ſentiunt; & reli &
is fuis cauernis, priſtiniſque fiabitationibus, domum relinquunt, properè
fugientes, aliudque domiciliú quærunt. Aelianus de var, hift.lib.z.&
Leuisius Lempius do fest. nat. Pluuja Mamodofuturorum præcij effe SARICELLI
Pluuioſa tempeftatis Prognoſtics. ' Ergiliarum occafus matutinus, lo nubile
Coelo accidat, hyené plu. uiofam denunciat,fi fermo Cælo,alpe ram.Sic
Veneris,aut Martis per Pleiades tranfitus aliquot dicbus pluuioſam ciet
tempeftarem.Saturnus inſuper cum cor pore, aut radijs ad a &turum accedit,
i dem minatur.Ex Plinio,óobferuat.Stadi. Agricola non femel tempeftates, &
f renitates predicant. Vltos profe & o cognoui pafto res, plerofquc
agricolas, quiin prædicédislerenitatibus, & tépeftatib. magnæ mihi erant
admirationi,quare tanquamcnriofus fciſcitabar, qua via, &ordinc
hęcſcirent?ratus forfan fimpli ces, &idiotas non poflc tanta certitudi. ne
futura prænoſcerc;nifi vel Dei mu. nere, vel Demonisa & uid fieret. Exre
latu diuerfas ftellarum conftellationes abijs experientia cognitas, no & u,
ani. maduerti:quarüobferuatione vera pre M dicunt HORT TITS GENIALIS. dicunt.
Experti enim ſupt Pleiades in Autumno, quæ in principio no&is ori. untur
cum Marte, velVenere mouere tempeftatem. Aréturum non fine gran dine emergere.
Hadorum ortum & oc. cafum tempeftatem pluvioſam in regio. nibus noftris
prænunciare; & alia, quæ in promptu tales habent, licet alijs no minibus
hæc fidera nominent. Quare mirum non eft, priores ftellarum per fcrutatores
circa carum prædi& iones multa nobis reliquiffe,cum id ſapientia, &
obferuatione perfecerint, quod iam idiotæ fine magiftro facere valent.
Valeriana miraviscótra epilephan. leriana ſylueftris, quęlpontènal.
citur,præter innumeras, quæ ab au & oribus ei tribuuntur virtutes, hancia
diù, in multis, atque in fe ipfo Fabius Columna in bifter, plant. expertam ape
suit,vt ſemel,velbis radicis puluerisco chlearij dimidium cumvino,aqualadte,
aut alio quouis decétifucco & proggro sicómcditate, & ætate fumptü,epilep
Valeri Ga correptos liberet. Extirpatur ante quam caulem edat, &
puerisexhibetur, & preſertim infantibus, qui morbo hoc facilè laborant.
Retulit auctor ſe multis puerulis lac propinafle; multiſ“; amicis donodediffe:
qui deinde diuino prius numine glorificato, puluerehuiusplan tæ illis reftitutá
fanitatem affirmarunt. Transformationes hominumin beſtia as noneffe reales.
Vædá monſtruoſæ hominü tranſ formationes in beſtias à multis au Storibus
fcribuntur; & inter alias, de il la Maga famoſiffima Circe, quæ ſocios
Vlysis in deftiasfertur mutaffe: de Ar codibus, qui forte ducti tranſnatabant
quoddam ftagnum atq; ibi conuerteba tur in Lupos: de Diomedis ſocijs, qui in
voluitres conuerſi ſunt, plurima'addu cunt. Hoc non fabuloſo mendacio,fed
hiftorica affirmatione multi confirmat, vt in fpec. natut.Gib. Vincentius
Beluacenſis retulit. Aflerunt enim (vt ajtSolinus )velmagiciscantibus, vel her
barum veneficio in feras corpora tranſ formari. Dicunt in experimento Neuros
populos Aeftatis tempore in lupos mu tari, deinde fpatio, quod his attributun
eft exacto, inpriſtinam faciem reuerti, Anautem huiuſmodi trasformatiorea. lis
ſit vel illufivè facta àDemone,D.Au guft.lib. 18. de ciuit. Dei ita nodum enu.
cleauit: Quod transformationes homi numinbruta animalia,quæ dicuntur ar te
Dæmonum faétę,non fuerint fecun dum veritatem; fed folum fecundum apparentiam.
Quippe opus hoc tantum Deieft; vt in Concil, lacro A Acyrano fancitum eft. •
Demonis aftutia apud Indos. Erba, quam Tabacchum appella mus, apud Occidentales
Iodos in magno cratpretio.Cum eniminter hos dere graui agebatur,ad
Sacerdotemil. lico accedebat,quitotuoegotiúexpone bát. Sacerdos auté corá illis
fronde, vel furculum Tabacchiſumebat, qua carbo. nibus inic & ta, fumum
peros, & nares ex. cipiebat, & inftar mortuiin terrá cade bat. Paulo
poſt conſumptis fumivirto bus in cerebro, reſponsa, ſed ambigua, prout Dæmones
perilluſiones, & fimu Jachra fuggefferant, populo dabat;qua tanquam
religioſa, & veriſsima cunati recipiebant. Ita profi eto hominum ini. micus
Gentiles decipere confueuerat. Monardes de rebus Indicis. Quid
Picusdefcientiarum varietate fentiret. CH *Vm quodam die Ioannes Picus Mi
Urandula de fcientiarum varierate diſſereret,in Hebrçorú,inquii,Philofo phia,
omnia funtveluti quodam numi ne facra, & in maieftate veritatisabdita Ceu
prodigia quædam, & arcana myfte sia. In Græcorum veròdifciplinis, in genium,
acumen, & omnigena eruditio apparet, vt nulla vnquam gens fuerit, quæ
dicendi copia, & ingenij elegancia cam illis poffitconferri.InRomanaved sò
Academia, ca ferè omnia, quæad ci. witaté, & vitæ morespertinent,
&graui. *, & copiosè funt explicata,ac magni fica NORTÝ Ers GENIALIS.
P. ficè diđa. Sic ve grauitas maximè Roo manis, &
imperijmaieftas,Grçcisinge nium, &acumen; Hebræis do & rina fe. cretior,
& quaſi diuinitasaſiribi poſsit, Crinitus da honeft. diſcipl. lib.g.
Subditos, Principis vitam vtpluri. mumimitari Rincipis vitam fubditi maximopere
imitantur. Hinc fa & um eft,vt ex Philofophica vita Marci Imperatoris,
magnum virorum doctorum prouentu ærasilla tulerit. Solent enim plerumque
homines vitam Principis æmulari iux. ta illud Platonis à Tullio in epift.ad Lé
tulum reperitü: Quales fum in Republica Principes,sales folers effe
cines.Quapropter ex bonitate Principis Marci, plurimila philoſophari
finxerunr,vt abeo ditarë. tur. Ex Herodiano, & Xiphilino. Rutam allium
ferpentibuset werfari. Vtä odor,allija; ferpentibus max ex teftimonio Ariſtotelis
9.de.biſtor. animal.c. 6. habemus muſtelam, cum dimicatura eft cum ſerpentibus,
rutam comedere. Hac etiam ratione ducti Perfæ(auctore Simone Sethi ) coquinas
allijs replebāt, vt ipfasà ferpentiú contagio tuerentur. Animaliaoriri, &
viuere poſſe in ig ne compertum eft. Agna admiratione dignum eſt illud, quod ab
Ariſt. s.de hiftor. animal.6.19.adducitur; animalia ſcilicet oriri, & viuere
in igne,cum elementum hoc omnia comburat: & nullatenus pu treſcat. In
Cypro, inquit, infulaærarijs fornacibusvbi, Calcites lapis ingeftus compluribus
diebus crematur,beſtiola in medio igne naſcuntur pennatæ,paulo mufcisgrandibus
maiores, quæ per igne Saliant, & ambulent. Equidem fià tanto viro hocnon
aperiretur; vix credere homincs auderent, cum totum rationi aduerſetur; fed
hæc, & alia maiora à po fentiſlimanatura fieri poſſunt, 10 Lacus HORTVLvs
GENIALIS. C Lachs Affhaltitis mirabilis natura. Yommemoratione dignum puto
Alphaltitis lacus naturam expo nere.Salfus ille quidem,ac ſterilis eft,fed
tanta leuitate, vt etiam, quæ grauiſſima ſunt,in eum iacta fluitent:nec
quiſquam demergi in profundum ne de induſtria quidemfacilè poſſit.Denique
Veſpaſia mus, qui eius viſendica uſa illucaccelle sat, iuſfit quoſdam natandi
infcios, vin &is poſt terga manibus, in altum deijci, & euenit omnibus,
vt tanquam vi fpiri. tus farſum repulfi, deluper Auitarent. Joſepbas lib. 5.de
bello Iudaicri.9. Piſces marinos falubriores, & fapidi. ores efe fluminum
piſcibus. lices, tum pidiores, tum falubriores ſunt ijs, qui in fuminibus,
ftagnis, lacubus, auc riuulis viuunt.Salfedo enim duriorem facit carnem, &
fubtilioris fubftantiæ. Contra in piſcibus, qui ſunt in fiumini bus, &perinde
eorú caro excrementitia eſt muccoſa, & infuauis. Vndeapud Co. lumellam
extat lepidum didū. Philip pus cum ad Numidam hofpitem deue niſlet, & fibi
è vicino fluminelupi for moſum appofitúdeguftaffet,ex puiſſet guc dixit: Peream
ni piſcem putauerim ! vſque adco à Tyberino,velmarino dif. ferre putauit, vt
illum piſcis nomine in. dignum iudicauerit. Mulieris cinni fogant ſerpentes, da
in vermesmutantMr. ulierum capilli, quibustantopere gaudent, & pro quorum
ſtructu ra in exornandis multum conſumunt te. poris,cremáei, ferpentes abigere
vifi sūt: fin autem in aquam inijciantur, in ver mes non diù retenti
commutantur. Plurimos homines aqui per tenebras, de per lucem vidiffe. Erum
natura opulentiſsima admi ſus aciem,oculoſgue ſplendentes pręſti tit; vt multi
felium more noctu vagari liberè potuerint. Legitur de Alexandro per tenebras
æquè,ac per lucem vidiſſe; viſum adco acerrimum habuit Galenus, quod in lomnis,
patefactis repentè pal pebris, magnamante oculos lucer via debat, vtiplede ſe
fidem facit lib. 7.Hip port. Go Platon, plac.6.4. At mirabilior erat
TiberijCeſaris proprietas; qui in tenebris exactè videbat;de qua re adeo
admiratur Tranquillus, vt id pro mira culo ſcribat. Cibusfapidiſsimus quomodo
apparetur. Viſapidissimum cibum habere de liderat, Gallinaceos pullos, qui la
&te & panis micis laginati lipt, in menſa procuret, ij profe &to
præſtantiſsimum ſaporem exhibent, mireque cum palate ineunt gratiam. Andereriam
carycis nu tritus, tum ad medicinam, tum ad gula faporem eſt optimus, &
piçlertim iccur. Vnde non mirum L in Inſula Hiſpa niola apud Indos, porci
harundinibus zacchari faginatitantæ, ſapiditatis, & bonitatis ſint, vt
febricitantibus etiam exhibeantur, Gigan eft muccofa, & infuauis.Vndeapud
Co. lumellam extat lepidum di& ú. Philip puis cum ad Numidam hofpitem deuc
niſlet, & fibi è vicino flumine lupi for mo ſum appofitú
deguftafſet,exfpuillet guc dixit: Peream ni piſcem putauerim ! vſque,adco à
Tyberino,velmarino dif. ferre putauit, vt illum piſcis nomine in. dignum
iudicauerit. Mulieris cinni fogant ferpentes, do in vermes mutantur. ulierum
capilli,quibustantopere gaudent, & pro quorum ſtructu rain exornandis
multum confumunt té poris,cremári,ſerpentesabigere vifi sūt: fin autem in
aquaminijciantur, in ver. mes non diù retenti commutantur. Plurimos homines
aqui per tenebras, acper lucem vidiffe. REErum natura opulentilsima admi randam
fæpiſsimè hominibus vi. ſus aciem,oculoſque ſplendentes pręſti tit; vt multi
felium more noctu vagari liberè potuerint. Legitur de Alexandro per tenebras
æquè, ac per lucem vidiſſe; viſum adco acerrimum habuit Galenus, quod in
fomnis, patefactis repentè pal pebris, magnamante oculos lucern vi. debat,
vtipfe de ſe fidem facit lib. 7.Hip porr. Platon. plac.6. 4. At mirabilior erat
Tiberij Ceſaris proprietas; qui in tenebris exactè videbat; dequa re adeo
admiratur Tranquillus, void pro mira culo fcribat. Cibusſapidiſsimus quomodo
apparetur. QlideraGallinaceos, pullos,quila &e & panismicis
laginatiſipt, in menſa procuret, ij profe &to præſtantiſsimum ſaporem
exhibent, mireque cum palato ineunt gratiam. Anderetiam carycis nu tritus, tum
ad medicinam, tumad gulæ faporem eſt optimus, & pięlertim iecur. Vnde non
mirum G in Inſula Hiſpa niola apud Indos, porci harundinibus zacchari
faginatitantæ, ſapiditatis, & bonitatis ſint, vt febricitantibus etiam
exhibeantur, Gigantes in orbequando fuerint? G. Igantum foboles paulo ante Dilu
(uium apparuit, patet hoc in Geneſi c.6.quando ingreſſi ſunt blijDei ad fili as
hominum: poſt autem Diluuium aliqui fueruntgigantes, qui tamen non multo
tempore durauerunt. Bonitas e nim naturæ (vt inquit Abulenfis c. 3:
Deuteronomij) in cibis, & afpectu cæli ad terran habitatam remen humanum in
tanta virtute continebat, vt tanti robo ris, & ftaturæ homines ætas illa
produ. ceret; Poftea paulatim deficiente natu, ra,tanquam ad fenium múdus ifte
decli. nauit, & humana corpora cum viribus minorata funt. Adfacies mulierü
rugatas ſelectum præfidium. (N gratiam rugatarum mulierum, & quæ maculas in
viſu fortitæ fuerint, quo ſenium, turpitudinemque faciei abfcondere valcant,
optimum adduca mus præſidium. Alumen tritum, & cum recentis oui albumine
agitatum,ſi dein de I HORTVLVS GENIALIS. 1 de ferbuerit in olla,& { patula
ligno coti nuo mouebitur,in vnguenti ſpiſfitudi nem tranſit. Hoc f biduo, vel
triduo facies mane & vefperi collinitur, non modò emaculari & erugari,
verum ſum mepulchram &gratam eam reddi ani maduertent. Maxima eft folis
excellentia, do in hec inferiorainfluxus. Am maximè Homerus Solis natura, &
excellentiam admirabatur, vt illú Deorú patré,hominūá; vocauerit. Ipfe
enimomniú aftrorú Rex eft, & tempora cuncta moderatur: annos,menfes, &
di os diſtinguit, & efficit; nos fua luce læti ficamur, & eiuscalore
ſanamur. Ipfe vi. rentes herbas, & terræ nafcentia germi. narefacit, &
flores redolere. Ipſefruges, producit, fructusmaturat, aerem puri ficat, lucem
affert, tenebraſque repellit, elementa tranſmutat,animalia gignit, gemmaſque
pretiofas cum admirandis viribus ex terræ viſceribus mira virtute spitøre
facit, Hominųm ipſe, cum ho mine BARACRILI Gigantes in orbequandofuerint?
Glucos Igantum foboles paulo ante Dilu (uium apparuit, patet hoc in Genefi
c.6.quando ingreſſi funt alijDeiad fili as hominum: poſt autem Diluvium aliqui
fueruntgigantes, qui tamen non multo tempore durauerunt. Bonitas e nim naturæ (vt
inquit Abulenfis 6. 3. Deuteronomy )in cibis, & aſpectu cæliad terran
habitatam femen humanum in tanta virtute continebat, vt tanti robo ris, &
ftaturæ homines ætas illa produ ceret; Poftea paulatim deficiente natu, ra,tanquam
ad fenium müdus iſte decli. nauit, & humana corpora cum viribus minorata
ſunt. Adfacies mulierürugat asſeleétum præfidium. Ngratiam rugatarum mulierum,
& quæ maculas in viſu fortitæ fuerint, quo ſenium, turpitudinemque faciei
abſcondere valcant, optimum adduca mus præſidium. Alumen tritum, & cum
recentis oui albumine agitatum, fi dein de I HORTVLVS GENIALIS, de ferbuerit in
olla, & ſpacula ligno coti nuo mouebitur,in vnguenti fpiffitudi nem
tranfit. Hoc ſi biduo, vel triduo facies mane & vefperi collinitur, non
modò emaculæri & erugari, verum ſum mepulchram &gratam eam reddi ani.
maduertent. Maxima eft folis excellentia, din hec inferior ainfluxus** TO Am
maximè Homerus Solis natura, & excellentiam admirabatur, vtillu Deorú patré,hominúý;
vocauerit. Ipſe enim omniú aftrorú Rex eft, & tempora cunctamoderatur:
annos,menſes, & di es diftinguit, & efficit; nos fua luce læti.
ficamur, & eius calore ſanamur. Ipfe vi. rentes herbas, & terræ
nafcentia germi. nare facit, & flores redolere. Ipſe fruges producit,
fructus maturat, aerem puri ficat, lucem affert, tenebraſque repellit, elementa
tranſmutat,animalia gignit, gemmaſque pretiofas cum admirandis viribus ex terræ
vifceribus mira virtute qpicere facit, Hominum ipſe, çum ho mine BARICELLI
minegenerat,& tandem quicquid in ter ra oritur, & occidit, corrumpitur
&ge neratur, in eius poteftate eft:fic ait Ari ſtot.z.degener.d corrupt.
quod propter acceſsú, &receffum Solis in circulo ob liquo,fiuntgenerationes,
&corruptio pes. Hæc, & alia tali lideri Creator om. pium largituseft.
Falfißimum eft Salamandramin igne viuere pole. B Ariftotelc, &
Aeliano,Salaman dram non modò in igne viuere, verum etiam illum extinguere
proditú eſt. His ſuffragatur Plinius lib.io.c. 67. qui tantum alleruit
Salamandræ rigore elle,vt igné glaciei ad inſtar extinguat, Hi autem
famigeratiſſimi viri dormi. tare videntur, cum omnia & comburi, &
conſumi ab igne poſle iudicentur, Falſum ergo axioma eſt;breuique fpatio
animalillud, antequã comburatur, licet rigidiffimú foret, in igne viuere
verifia mile eft.Totú hocexperientia innotuit. Narrat enim Matthiolusin
lib.2.6.56.Dia foridisin agro Tridentino,Veris,& Au. Tumpi tempore,maximam
Salamandra rum copiam reperiri,fe autem,vtexpe rimentum caperet eius, quodde
Sala mandra vulgo fertur, plurimas in igne conieciſſe, fed eas prorſus
exarſifle,bre uique penitus eſſeconſumptas. Sabbaticifluuj admirada proprietas.
I Nter Arcas, & Raphandas ciuitates (teſtimonio Iofephi.7.de bel. Iudaico )
regni Agrippę, Sabbaticus fluuius repe ritur, ita à leptimo die, quem ludzire
ligiosè colunt, appellatus. Hic copiofus fluit, nec meatu ſegniseſt,
mirabilemg; naturam obtinuit, liquidem interpofitis lex diebusà fonte luo
deficit,audumq; & ficcum alueum relinquit. Quod auté mirabilius eft, nulla
mutatione facta ſeptimo die fimilis exoritur, talemque continuo ordinem
obferuare pro certo ab omnibus cognitum eft. Quam fitexitiofumpro lattandisine
Fantibus vitioſas eligerenutrices. Vtrices pro lactádis puerulis ma lis moribus
imbutas, vitiofas, in. B eptas, crudeles vel ſuperbas reijciendas exiſtimo:
mites autem, benè moratas, fine vitio, & prudentes cligendas. Pueri enim ex
ijs educati ob acceptum nutri mentum à parentum natura recedunt, & 1 ad
nutricisvitia, vel prudentiam aliquá inclinationem habent. Indelegitur Ne Pi
ronem crudeliffimum à fuis progenito ribus longè degeneraffe(quamuis pravá
inclinationem vincerepotuiſſer) ijenim benigniffimi fuerant: ipſe autem à crue
delillima nutrice lactatus, & connutri tus, propriam matrem interfecit.
Menſtrualisfanguinis mulierum immanitas. Aximum contagium in mulieris i ei F
credidit.Refert enim nouellas vites eius pernecari contactu,rutam, &
hederam illico mori, apesta & is aluearijs fugere, lina nigrefcere, aciem
in cultris tonſor rum hebetari, æs graue virus & ærugi nem contrahere:
equas, li lint grauidæ, ta &tas abortire,multaque alia pernicio famala ex
illius contactw fieri tradidit. Sed longe à veritate diftar hic auctor:
cuiuslibet enimmulierisfanguinēmen i ftruum virulentum effe falfamum eſt,
quippe in ſana muliere, non differt & Yanguis à fanguine vitiumque illius
in i quantitate tantum perliftit,vtbenè Ca piuacceusin fua Praxi recenſuit,
fecus eft in morboſa muliere, ex menftruali enim iſtius fanguine
nõmodopericula, quæà Plinio adducuntur, eueniunt, ve - rum etiam alia. Equidem
canes epoto · menſtruo in rabiem vertuntur. Homi nes in he & icā, &
phthiſim, fià veneficis, eis in potu tribuitur, deueniunt: Oleze contacte
ſterili fcunt. Alia ctiam ex il lius virulentia contingunt, quæ reticere melius
eſt. Frigidumpotumpoſt pharmacum af fumptum magnæ vtilitatis afue tis fuiſſe.
Egrotabat oliin in Sicilia Prorex Ioannes à Vega: ſumptoque Phar maco ſegniter
purgationem habebat. Medicusfamiliaris, vtaluum irritaret, juris pulli ſine
ſale pararú cyathum co B 2 A ram Principe habebat; illumque nau. ſeantem, &
tale brodium abhor. rentem, vtebiberet exorabat. Super ueniens autem Philippus
Ingraſsia, iua ris vice, libram aquæ frigidæ cum vn cia zuccarimediocris
albedinis propi. mauit. Erat enim ille frigidæ potioni af fuetus,atqueiecore
percalidus. At frigi. da cpota, deſtructa eft confeſtim naufea fedatilque
nonnullis in ore ventriculi morſibus, talem è veftigio purgationé feliciter
perfecit, vt gratias referre In graffiæ pro tali frigidæ potione,cupiens,
argenteum illud vas,in quo repofita fri gida fuerat, pretij aureorum nummo. rum
quinquaginta, gratiſsimo animo donauerit. Ingraff. de.frig.por.poft medic.
Verrucas cuiufdam animalculi liquo reperfanari. Eferam quod mihi in Apuliæ quo
dam loco, circa verrucas fucceflit. Expetebat à me quidá nobilis, qui ma. nusà
verrucis nimis deturbatas habebat aliquod pro illis abigendis præſidium. Ego
coram nonnullis multa,quæ aliàs RII veriſſimaefle comprobaueram,illicon it'o
fulebam.Inter hosrufticusquidam ino to pináter,fe ele &tiffimum habere remedia
pro ijs penitus dirimendis non rogatus I. faſſus eſt. Sciſcitor quale fit,
animalcu Di lum eſſe dixit: ad experimentum veni Before mus, ægro confentiente.
Ruſticus ani. i malculum inuenit. Hoc'in floribns 1. Eringij, & Cichorez
æftiuo tempore uk moratur,eft coloris calaſsini, cum ma of culis rubeis, &
quodammodo aſsimila tur proportionecorporiscantharidiyli y cet paruulum ſit.
Acceperat aliquot 12 i- fticus, & ſingula in ſingulis verrucis d... * gitis
exprexit: exibat liquor quidam, o manus intumuit, & doluit,fed cum mo.
derantia: intra tres dies detumuit, & fana facta eſt, nec verrucę
ampliusviſę ſunt. Tauriſanguinem inter lethalia vene na connumerari. Nter
atrociſsima, & fuffocantia ve nena Tauriſanguinem recenter epo tum
connumeramus; congelatur enim 2. in ventriculo, reſpirationemqueimpe s diens,
hominem fuffocat. Themiſtocles B 3 Athe Inesta Athenienfis tanti veneni
tentauit expen rimentum. Hic enim ciuium inuidia à Patria relegatus,ad
Artaxerxem confu git, à quo diues factus eſt.Dum autem in patriam ingratiam
Artaxerxis pugnare cogeretur,in Dianæ téplo,hauſto Tauri fanguine, vitam cum
morte commuta uit.Ex Plutarcbe. Quo artificio duriſsim afaxafrangen re
valeamus. Aris ſaxa non alia re frangendag quam larido accenfo retulit Ola
us.Hoc equidem rationi conſentaneum efle ducimus, cum pinguehumidum,fax lique
commiftum illud fit, ob id enim flamma potens & acris eſt diùque ma net.
Annibal verò dum Alpium rupes, ingreſſurus Italiam, comminuereopta ret, faxa
potentiſsimo igne concalefacta; acerrimoacetohumectabat;:ita enim ea
molliebãtur,& in fruſta cædebátur, fra ctioniq; facilior erat locus.ex Tiro
Liuip. De lapidis Asbeſti mirabilivirtutes LAsbeſtos lapis,qué Arabia, &
Arcadia producit, fi verus & probus fuerit,femel accenſus perpetuam flammam
retinere videtur.ExhocGentilestemplorú cane delabra conficere folebant, clarè
ani maduertentes fortiſsimam flammam & i * inextinguibilem elucere,
quęnecabima bribus,nec tempeſtatibus extingueba tur. D. Auguſtinus
lib.21.deCiuit.Deiz. Athenis Veneris Phanum fuiſſe referty in quo de di&to
lapide lucernæ conſtru Etæfuerant,quæ aliqua intemperie ex tingui minimè
poterant. Aegypti Reges opera magnifica, &admirane da Antiquitus
conftruxiſle. Pera ab Aegypti Regibus conſtria & a omni admiratione digna
ſem per exiſtimaui. Hi porrò Labyrinthoi rum,Pyramidümqueprimifuerunt au &
tores, & Mauſolea fepulchra, & Obe. Hifcos erexerunt, Ferunt admiffo
faci: nore, Pheronem Regem è veftigio vi-, Cum amififfe,decennioquecæcum
-fúiſle. Vndecimo autem anno ab vrbe Buci, accepto Oraculo, quod viſum reci
peret, fi oculos mulieris, quæ tantum B 4 lui ſui viri amplexibus contenta
fuiſſet, cum terorumque virorum expers, lotio ab luiſet. Hic ante omnia vxoris
lotiura tentauit, cum autem nihil cerneret in. finitarum mulierum vrinam
experiri voluit; viſuque recuperato, præter eam (vxorem enim eandem duxit
)cuius lo tio vilum accepit, omnes concremauit. 'Abea autem calamitate
liberatus, cup alia in alijs templis donaria pofuit, om nia egregia ad memorię
diuturnitatem, tum maximè memorabilia,ac fpe &tacu lo dignain templo Solis
gemina faxa, quosobelos vocant à figuraverucēzenam cubitorum longitudinis,octonum
lati tudinis. Pelõdor. Virg.ex Herod. lib.z. Cacodamonem malinuncijpræfagium
aliquando attuliffe. Arcus Brutus cumexercitu ex A Gia nocte media &
profunda dum fplendidum erat lumen, & filentium vndique caftra tenebat,
multa fecum memoria recolebat. Cum autem ad fe venire aliquem præſentiret,
intentus MarcusBrutuscumexercituexA intentus ad introitum afpiciens,horren dam,
& monſtruolam corporis feri & terribilis ſibi aſliſtere imaginem reſpex
it.Quis (inquit)interrogans erutus,ho minum, aut Deorum es,quid tibi vis?
quidad nos veniſti?Murmurans ille,tu. us Ô Brute(dixit)malus genius ſum, in
Philippis me videbis. Tum brufus nihil perterritus, Videbo, reſpondit,cogita.
bundusqueaccubuit. Verum Caſsiana cognita clade deinde, cogitationeſque fuas
videns, & fpes fallaces ſublapſas re tro referrifin Philippis fibiipfi
mortem coniciuit.Ex Plutarcbo. olei, vini,ſegetumgſterilitatis prafagia. Irij
vefpertinus occaſus, fi biduoana teuertat, vel fequatur Plenilunium, fegeti
rubiginem,&foreftentibus vre. dinem pronunciat. Procionis occafus
veſpertinus,fi interlunio eueniat, flores ti yiti, & oleu germinanti
iniuriam ex vredine adfert.Aquilæ verfpertinus ex. ortus, & Arduri occalus,
in Pleniluniú B S incidit, & olei& vivi ſterilitatem, vtros quetum
florente denunciat Ex Iunitino - deris falubritatem advitæproduction anem
maximopere videmuscon: ducere.. N Hybernia quaſdam Infulas, ir quia bus homines
longiſsimæ vitæ funt, re periri compertum eſt,tanta eft enim ibi: aeris
ſalubritas,vtvita humanalongiſsi me producatur, Cum autem ad maxia. mam
ſenectutem homines deueniunt, deficiente pauliſper humido radicali, caloris
naturalis opera, quia anima pro-. pter complexionis bonitatem recedere: nequit,
in corpore magni ſuſcitantur dolores: Idcirco illius regionis homie nes poft
diuturnos labores, vitam aber forrétes, longèà propria regione fede portari
procurant;præſertimque ad lo. cum minus falubrem, vbifaciliter mon n'antur.
Abulenfis in Genef.c.2.6. Anania: in Vnis.Fabrica. Linica.magna proprietatisapud!
indos fiering 1 Maximi valoris lintea ex Asbeſti. no lino,& Amiancho lapide
con texere Indiani fo !ent. Hæc in ignem; proie & a flammam quidem
concipiunt, detrimentumautem nullum recipiunto Cum autem vſu commaculata Indi
hæc lintea depurare coguntur, (ſpreto more noſtro )non aqua,non cinere, vel
ſmege mate vtuntur; fed in ignem proijciunt:: certiſsimoexperimento perdocti ab
eo non cóluni modò; ſed potius-exempta. fplendeſcere,nihilqueillis deperire.
Ta.. le Carolum V..Imperatorem nonnulli habuiffe ferunt. Mizaldus. Hominibus
àgraui valetudine opa preffis varias hominum figuras appa: rnilleſepißime,
expertum oft. Ignum ſpeculatione illud fempers primuntur valetudine ex affe
&to cere. bro, an actu Demonis figare diuerſçapa pareant? Quippèno ſemel
audiui, non. mullos. Dæmanes,alios verò fæminas. B 6 vidiſſe, vt inter cæteros
Alexander ab Alexandro de ſe teſtatur. Cum (inquit) Romæ
ægravaletudineoppreffus eſſem iaceremque in lectulo,fpeciem mulieris eleganti
formamibiplanè vigilanti ap paruiſſe confiteor, quam cum infpicerem diù
cogitabundus,&tacitus fui, repu tans nunquid ego falfà imagine captus,
aliter,atque res eſſetafpicerem,cumque meos ſenſus. vigere, & figuram illam
pufquam à me dilabi viderem, quæ nam illa effet interrogaui, quæ tum fubridens
& ea quæ acceperat verba reſpondens, quaſi me planè derideret, cum diù me
fuiſſet intuita diſceſlit. Quomodo au hæcfiani in lib. 1. de pita hominis difa
fusè enucleamus. Hydropes lethales multoties ab occul. tis,abditiſq
præfidiisdifparuiſſe. Vltiequidem morbinon à me dicorum remedijs, fed à caufis
abditis curati funt.Refert Schenkius l.be 3.obferuat. Medicinal, Chriſtophorum
quendamin deſperata hyeme, ab hs drope lethali hac via fanatum fuifle. Illi
dormienti in Sole aprico lacertus viri. dis occurrit in laxatumque eius finum
irrepfit, & toto cotempore, quo dormi. it,per tumentem,nudatumqueventrem
oberrauit. Poft horam expergefa & us lacertum in ſinu ſubfultare animaduer
tit, quem veluci homini amicum & in noxium dimilit. Huic ab eo tempore
hydropicus tumoromnis,citra alia re media intra paucosdies ſubſedit, & diſ
paruit. Quicafus mirabilis eft: & non minori admiratione dignus, Bufonis
fylueftris, quam fit proprietas. Hoc e nim animal fi per ventrem fcinditur,
& fuper renes hidropici ligatur, aquofita tem per vias vrina, quæ in
Aſcitelupet abundat,mirabiliter educit.Hoc VVie rus expertuseft,Napaulli
ſecreto rema dio hydropicorum aquas Colubri a quatici lapide ventriapplicato
ſenfim abfumunt. Infuper vituli marini pelle aquam corpori fuffulam Hermolaus
Barbarustolli prodidit. Cæca igitur,& abdita via multos hoc morbo ſanari
comperimus. B7 Mediana 38 BARICEL II Medeamà veneficiorum calumnia a Diogene
fuilevindicatam., moriæ ſcriptoresmandarunt,Meo. deam illam concelebratam
magicis arti bus, maximam dediffe operam, ijſque latiſsime fúille
inſtructam.Hic.n.apud Srobæum dicebat,Medeam fapientem, non veneficam fuifle,
que acceptis mole libus, & effæminatishominum corpo, ribus confirmabat ipfa
gymnaſijs,acex ercitationibus, & robulta vigentiaque reddebat.Hinc, vt
veriſimile eft,faina emanauit, quod illa coquendo carnes hominibus ivuentutem
reftitueret, Si. enim ad ea, quæ de ipfa dicuntur, quod nocturnis horis coram
Luna proftrata maleficia fuo nudato corpore pararet, refpicimus, vt patet per
Seneca in Tras gæd.7.Quod vero alia attinet de quie bus ipſam accuſent, neſcio
quomodo. ab infamia eam liberare valeamus. ImPlenilunio vtplurimum furioſos:
vehementius infanire Luna dum Soli opponitur, vehementius furiofos infanire
obſerua-: mus: tunc enim ex. fuperabundantium humortin copia-cerebrum ad
cranium vique intumeſcit,eofque ad furiam du.. cit.Hac (vt reor) caufa,
furioſos Britan. ni luna quarta decimaverberibus affli.,
gunt,conſiderantesſailicet ſanguinem, & fpiritum tunc temporis
efferuefcere.. Verbera.autem non fine ratione ad talie um ſalutem conferre
videntur; vt enim larga proſperitas ad inſaniam homines, ducere potenseft:ſic
dolor, & calamitas, prudentiam inducere conſueuit: quod, fapientiæPrinceps
perbellè fignificauit: dum dixit, affli &tionem tribuere intele lectum.Bodinus
in tbeat.net, Annicomputumdimēſuramàquin bufdamnationibusrudiordine
fuiffeconstructiuni Noi.certus modusapud felos Ar gyptiosfemper fuit, eorum
enim Sacerdotes ab Abrahamoedocti,& verá anni-menſura, & Solis curſumcogno.,
frese fcere valuerunt. Apud alias nationes di ípari numero, parique errore
annus no tatus eft:fiquidem Arcades trium men. fium annum faciebát. Lauinij
tredecim. Acananes fex.Gręci reliqui 314.diebus. Romulus annum decem menſibus,
qui 304.dicbus conficiebatur ordinauit.Hic å Martio incipiebat,eo quod Marti
fuo genitori credito, menſem hunc dicaue rat.Numa poft Romulum quinquagin. ta
dies computo huic addidit, annum. que conſtituit 354.diebus. At. C.Cæſar
Aegyptios imitatus, ad curſum Solis, quidiebus365.& quadrante conſtituie
tur,annum dirigereftuduit. Céſorinus, & Suetonius. Solatri maioris, e
Serpent arie mio norispotentiacontraparafitos mirabilis eft. Irabilis profecto
Solatri maio. ris, fiue herbæ Bella donna radicis potentia eft: fi enim
contrita, & exiccata vnius ſcrupuli pondere per horas ſex vino
infunditur,illudque facacolatura uno homini potui datur,vt illecibum guftare
nequeat,efficiet. Hoc paraſitis idoneum eft remedium,hi'enim aperto
ore,tanquãomnia deuoraturi,in menſa cófident;fed hac via pænas luent, quip pè
alios vidcbunt comedentes, ipſi ta men inſtar Tantaliin menſa fameſcent. Vnde
apud conuiuas ridiculi, & confuſi apparebunt.Sanantur hiconfeftim ace to
bibito.Idem facit radix Aron, fiuc -minoris Serpentariæ in acetarijs recens
contrita;qui enim guſtauerit, apparebit Suffocari cibumque relinquet. Sanatur
hie allio comefto. Ventorum ortum,occafumque terre
AremEchinuinmirafagacitatehomi nibuspraſagire. *ErreftrisEchini,
quiautumnalitě. pore in vineis, dumoſilque fpinis verfari præcipuè conſueuit,
in ortu oc cafuque ventorum præfagiendo mira l'eft fagacitas.Horum porrò
latibula du obusconftru &ta foraminibus, quorum alterum Boream, alterum
verò Auftrú reſpiciat,conſtructa reperiuntur. Pre fentientes autem Boream
Auſtrum,ali umve ventum fufHaturum, longè abe orum ortu, vnum vel alterum
cauernæ meatum obturant; ventorum enim cog nitio-ijs innata eft, vtab ipſisſe
tueri va Jeant.Hoc ordine Venatores Echinorú Jatibula, eorumque fagacitatem
cond derantes, nulla ſtellarum obferuatione habita, fed folum ex cauernarum mea.
tibus clauſis,velapertisVentorú indagia nem cófequentur. Ex Plutarcho in
Dialog. Animi pudorem, timoremque hu. manorumcorporum diuerfimoda faciem
alterare. agna inter animi pudorem, & ti morem cum vtrumque fit triſti. riæ
foboles, videturdiſparitas:quippe in pudorehomines facie rubefcunt,timen tes
verò pallefcunt. Natura(vt inquit Macrobius 7. Saturn. ), cum quid ei oc currit
honeſto pudore dignum, imum petendo penetrat ſanguinem,quo conto moto
diffuſoque cutis tingitur,rubora; saluitur, Thelelius auté (vt ex Taſſone
citatur M HORIVLVS GENIALIS. 43 citatur) faciem in pudore,voluit affe &iū
recipere, & proinde erubeſcere. Hocà ratione alienum haud eft, fiquidem vo
lunt Philoſophi naturam pudoretacta, fanguinem,inftar velamenti ante fe ten
dere.Experientia infuperhoc docet, e rubeſcentes enim manum fibi ante faci. em
frequenter opponunt. At timentes palleſcunt,quia natura cũ quid extrinſe.
teoccurrens metuit, in profundum de. mergitur: ita &noscum timemus,late
bras quærimus, & loca occulta, Natura itaque defcendens,vt lateat,fanguinem
fecum trahit, quo demerſo dilutior cuti. humor remanet,pallorqueſuccedit.
Animaliaex putrigenita materit inmundiprimordio minimè fuiffe. Væ ex putri
materia generantur, ſex animalium genera communi ter exiſtunt. Quædam enim, vt
bibio nes, quæ ſunt minutifsima animalia,ex vini exhalationibusfiunt,vt
papiliones ex aqua.Quædã ex humorú corruptio pibus proueniunt: vt vermes in
fter core,velciſternis. Quædam ex cadaue ribus, vt apes ex iumentis:crabrones,fi
ue muſcægrandes,quæ volando ſonant. Scarabæi liue mufcæ virides ex equis, vel
canibus mortuis: fcorpius de caucti mortui carnibus:ſerpens de medulla ſpi næ
humanæ. Quædam ex lignorum pu tredine, vt teredines, qui lunt vermek intra
ligna, quando non abſcinduntur tempore debito, exorti. Quædam ex fructuum
corruptione, vt girguliones ex fabis. Quædam ex herbarum corrup tela,
vttinex.Hçc autem in mundiprin cipio immediatè à Deo creata fuiſſe, nulla ratio
confiteri cogit,cum ipſa na turaliter ex corruptione procedant;poſt autem mundi
exordium huiuſmodi ex corruptelis generationes eueniſſe verili mile eft;Deus
tamen feminarias cauſas horum materijs indidit, fine quibusori. ri non
potuiſſent.Abulenfis in Genefi 6.2. Defygis Arcadia mortifera natura,
Alexandrimorte. Circa HORTVLVS Gerialis. ferunt, ille, CircaNonacrinin Arcadia,fons
quidá teperitur è petraexoriés, quęStyx ab in colis appellatur, tantæ mortiferæ
natu rę, vt ſumma celeritate corrúpat corpo ra. Equidemprotinus hauſta (Seneca
teſtimonio 3 quaft.natur.)induratur,in Itarque gypſi ſub humore conftringitur,
& ligat viſcera.Quia autem, nec odore, nec fapore notabilis eft,fæpè
fallit, nec ea epota,amplius remedio locus eft.Fe runt nonære,non ferro, non
teſta aquí huiuſmodi continere,necaliter quam in equi vngula ferri poſſe. Huius
vemeni potu,magnumAlexandrum in Babylo. nia fuiſſeextin & um multi
ſcriptoresre medico,ob aquę feritatem in media po tione repentè veluti telo
confixusinge muit; elatuſque (vt ait Iuſtinus) è conui yio ſemianimis, tanto
dolore cruciatus eft,vt ferrum in remedia poſceret, & è tałtu hominum velut
vulnere indole. fceret. Achores tineafque capitis,ex bufonis oleofeliciter
fanari. Dum 46 BARICELLI prope Luceriam Apuliæ ſemel me dicinam faceren, ibi
quendam achori bus,tineiſque per multos annos turpi. ter affe & um,cui
varia fuerant applicata temedia,omnia tamen inutiliter, prop termorbi
reſiſtentiam repperi. Tande noſtro conſilio hicele &tè ex pharmaco
purgatus, folum linimento ex oleo in quo ad exactam co &tionem Bufo fue
Rana terreſtris ebullierat, optime cura tus eft, quippe fimplici hoc remedio
per paucosdies in capitevtens, fanus, & capillatus fa & us eſt; durante
autem lini mento piliersortui,vulſellis à chirurgo extirpabantur. De Cerui
lachryma, eiuſque in ciendo fudore potentia. Antæ creditur elle efficaciæ Cerui
lachryma in Tudoreciendo, vt' li grana quinque vel ſex potui dětur, totü corpus
fere folui iudicemus.De hac lo quens.Abinzoar lib. I.tra &. 13.6.6. le tria
grana Azir filio Regij magiſtri equitum in lacte, vel aqua cucurbitæ,
vel.roſatæ exhibuiſle:retulit,illumque à virulento ictero liberaffe.Hæcautem in
Ceruis ante ceptelmum annum (teſti monio Scaligeri)nulla eft,temporis au tem
proceſſu generatur, & in iuglandis molemaccreſcit.Dicitur magnam habe read
venenum efficaciam, vt in Afia fe Hiciſsimo fucceflu fæpè experiuntur. Vires
infirmorum collapſas, odoribus refarciripoffe. Nfirmorum deperditas vires non
potionibus modò,verum atqueodo, ribus reftaurari pofſe obſesuatum eft. Aiunt
enim Democritú in dies aliquot, amicorumgratia pomi odore vitam fic bi
prorogalle. Hinc multi panem cali dum vino odorifero immerfum nari
busadmouentægrorum, quem a tem. poribus, & coſtis cataplafmatis more imponimus,vtique
vires egrigie reſti tuimus.ConciliatorApponenſis mori. búdá vitá, ex croco,
& caſtoreo cótuſis, vinoq; cómiſtis producere fecófueuifle tefta. 48
BARICELLI teftatur,ſenibuſque eam compofitioné exhibuiſſe, nullatenus olfa
& u magis quam potu profuiſſe.Ferreriuslib.2.Me thod. De olei Balnei
mirifica in morbis præftantia. O Lei Balneum, vt Herodotus anti
quiſsimusmedicusprodidit, quià diuturnis affliguntur febribus, à laſsitu dine,
vel neruoſarum partium dolori bus oppreſsis,conuulfis, & vrinæ, fup preſsis
laudatiſsimum,ac ſalutare efic remedium experimur. Vidit huius pre ſidij
experientiam Heurnius in quoda extenuato, ac ferè exhauſto, dumeflet
Patauij:illum enim validiſsima occupa uerat conuulfio,at tepidi olei pleno vafe
immerſus,ac fotus fanuseuafit.In lib.no ftro de Hydron.nat. Adam & fuos
contemporaneos, perfc. etiſsimamrerumnaturalium ha buiffe cognitionem. Nter
aliasrationes, quas Abulenſis in Genef.in c.f.de longiſsima vitæ pri. morum
parentum,quiannum ferè mila Jeſimum ateingebant,retulit,hácaddux
it;quod'Adam'rerum naturalium perfe Etamà Deo cognitionem habuit.Intele lexit
enimfru & uum, herbarum,lapidú, lignorum, animalium, mineraliumque
virtutes, & do&rinam, quibus vita hv mana diutius conſeruari poterat;
quæ omnia contemporaneos,(vt ipfi etiam vitam producerent longiſsimèJedocuit.
Hæc autem cognitio, & ex diluuio, & gérium diuifione perdita
eft.Reperiun turtamenin præfentiarum multa mira bilia,naturęque ſecretiſsima
apud ſapi entes, à temporuminiuria foslitan vin dicata; quæ aliquando hominesvidentes
aut audientes, tanquam lupernaturalia opera admirantur Rutaminter alexiteria
medicamenta connumerari: Nteralexipharmaca præſidia, Rutam minimęconditionis
haud efſc perhia bent,fiquidem ieiuno ftomacho come fta multos à
veneņiviçulentia liberaſſe C. degi BARICE ILI legitur. Dehac Athenæus in
3.Deipn.la. quens, Archelaum Ponti Regem fuos populos veneno interimete confue
uifie fcribit, illos autem à quibufdam edo &tos, ob id antequam è domibus
ea grederentur,quotidieRutam cdere fo litos à Tyrannicrudelitate.le.defendiffe.
Solaſuſpenſione, capitiscruciatus verbenam mitigare. Trabilis eft Verbenæ
proprietas M.in dolore capitis mitigando; 'fi quidem à Petro Foreſto traditur
hoc folo præſidio quendam fuifle perſana tum.Ille netlis remedijs, quamuis opti
mis curari potuerat,non venæ ſectione, non ſcrupis digerentibus, neque steco
&tis pilulis,cucurbitulis, nec alijs topic cis auxilijs. Cum autem nulla
iuuarent semedia,ad collum Verbenaviridisafe penſa eſt, & fanus fa & us
eft,lib.9.ebſer.3. Detkapſie virtute in fugillatis faci nandis,Neronisquecalle.
ditate. Nero Imperator in ſui Imperij ex 36 ordio Thapfiam,eiuſque excellé to
tiam magnificauit; Ille quidem dumno. & u incederet incognitus, & in
multos impetus faceret,nå ſemel facies fugitla Do ta,cutifq;livida,piftula; ab
illis fuerat. L. Confeftim hic,ex Thapfia,thure, & cem ra
commiſta,linimento ljuentem vifum collinibat,quopræſidio antelucem à fe da
ſugillationeliberabatur; dum autem die in populiconſpectu, faciem fanam
oftenderet,facinoris ſui famam, & igno. miniam occultabat. Ex Durante in
Her. 25 g. barie. I je obſtétricibus animaduerfio. præcidendo diligentia
adhibenda eft;quippefi ni mium curtè vmbilicus religatur,ætatis progreſſu
pariédi conatumreftringere, imminenti vitę periculo,poteſt. Ex M46 mbiaCornace.
De arboris ficusmirabili natura. I coctu faciles habere deſideramus, in arbore
ficus eas ſuſpendemus, ita votum noftrum procul dubio aſſeque mur: credo
forſitan ob acutum, & incil: uú odorem, quem arbor Ipirat id cauſa
ri;velforſitan occulta cæcaque proprie tate.At quod mirabiliusin huius arbo.
ris natura eft, Taurum indomitum, fe rumque in eodem alligatum manfuef cere
tradunt. Neſcio autem annaturali via propter-odorem,an aliqua antipa thia, quæ
inter talia exiftat hoc eueniat. Audiui tamenà multis vtrumqueexpe rientia
fuille confirmatum. Quomodoà vitriolo arislaminas.ex. trahere valeamus. Lui
momenti illa cognitio, quomodo à vitrioloæris lamellę extrahantur,ape riam
modum, qua facilitate id affequi valeamus.Bulliatur Romanumvitrio. lum in olla
cú aquafontis: in eaque cha lybis lamina per horæ quaternionem demergatur:
extrahito demum chaly bem, ipſumenim lamellis æris inftar suginis colligatum
habebis, quęculcro radende fút, vt alias chalybem immera. gere
pofsisznouaſquelamellas extrahe.. re. fiquidem tamdiù corradi poterunt, quouſq;
Vätrioli portio in aqua fuerit. Arrigat aures ingeniofus; quia ex hoc: minimo
principio multa, precipuèinre: medica, yrilia aſſequetur. oléum vitrioli,&fulphuris
rostris: lumbricos plurimumvalere. NITlfi magnis experimentis præſtana tiſsimum
remedium ad puerors i lumbricoscomprobalſem,haud audia. rem hic inter arcana
ſele &tà fóre repezia nendum confiteri: quippe tanta eft eiuss virtus,&
potentia, vt mortuos ferè pur erosè vermibus ad vitam trahat. Hic: induſtria
paratur,In libris ſingulis aque fontis oleifulphuris, vel vitrioli chimi.. cè
extractorum, aliquotguttulaadden dæ funt,ita vt aqua acidula frat, quæ pu
eris,natuque maioribus danda eft diù noctuque ad placitum,.e & enim præſtaa
tiſsimæ virtutis 0 T! 10 Da DeCaraba mirabili virtute invuula cafum,Amygdalaruamque
tu. mores ArtinusRulandusvirin chimicis M celeberrimus in Amygdalarum
inflāmatiene, & tumore, vuulæquecaſu ex humoribus à capite fluentibus exci
tatis ſola Carabâmirabiliaparauit-Prie mo fuffimétum cófuebat,hoc modo ex.
ceptü.Accipiebat Carabæ albiff. drach. 7.qua redacta in puluerem craſsiorem,
& carbonibus impofita,fumus per infa dibulum,ore excipiebatur ab ægro mar.
ne,meridie, & veſperi, multa vtilitate, Accipiebatetiam fermenti veteris
vnc.. & quam moreemplaftri linteolo indu cebat, afperfoque Carabæ albæ pul
uere vertici imponebat per diem,per noctem vero fequétem recens applica bat.
Quibus paucis remedijs, &ex fola: quaſi Carabayquam plurimos à fauci um
tumoribus, vuulæque cafu,Amyg dalarumque inflámationibus oppreſlos perſanauit.
Ex eiusCurationibus. Spina HorTvivs GENIALIS Spine infeftoriæ Baccas" ad.
Tenaf mumexfalfapituita expertiſsimum verumque ad illum exiftere remedium. St
mihi remedium pro Tenafmodo quadam fortafle mille kominum, qui endemiali fere
morbo hic ſugebant per fanafle quam citiſsime. Syrupum ex Baccis fpinæ ceruinæ,
fiue infectorice: Aromatario parariiufferam. Hæinfine: O & obris, cum bene
maturuerint, collie guntur, exprefloque fucco cum melle vel Zuccaro ad
formamfyrupi ducitur: additurque in fine maſticis, velzinzibes sis, anih, vel
cinamomiad drach.j.vet? in maiori dofi, fi libuerit.Datur hic fy rup.ab vnce
vſque ad duas cumpauco vino dilutus,abitemijs datur cum aqua cinamomi:epoto,
cibatur eger,parceta men, & ieiuno ftomacho, præcipiturque ne
dormiat.Equidem vna die fanaturę ger, foluitur enim aluus,abfque mole tia,
& excretis féroſis.viſcidilg; humorib. Tolo hoc preſidio integrè liberatur
C Ariet mo Arietis linguam futurum in
ouibus milanitium,commonftrare.. M Irantur multi Virgilium in 3.. nere, vt
linguam paftores conſpicere debeant, deſinant autem admirari, cau ſam enim
adducimus ex Plinio, quipro pterea Arietum ora introſpici à pafto ribus voluit,
quia cuius coloris ijlin guam habuerint, tále in fætibus gene randis
forelanitium. Audiui à multis, hocyeriſsimum reperiri. Ouis enim e. tam cum
vterum gerit,fi linguam habueritnigram nigrum pariet agnum, fi albam album,
& fic de aliis coloribus. Ridiculüm eft quod fertur; Bafilifcum
àGalliouoexclwdi.. On modo à plebeiis verum atq;: à nonnullis ftudiofis,
Bafilifcum: abouo galli veteris connaſci perhibe tur. Fingunthi ex aliquorum
fcriptorú teſtimonio, quos eriam ego perlegia: Gallo decrepito, quiſeptimum,
aut no.. olm, vel ad fummum decimum quar.. Na tum annum agat, ex putrefacto
ſemine, aut humorum illuuie altiuo tempore, ouum conflári, ex quo ab eodemfoto (vt
à Gallinis alia fouentur oua ) Bafi... liſcusoriatur.Sed hoc animal nemo vio
dit,habitat enim (auctóre Plinio ) in Aphricæ folitudinibus: proinde hæc creo
dere difficile eſt. Inſuper ſi hanc fpecie em mafculinam poſſe fætare conceſſum.
eflet, contingeret etiam inalijs, quod minimèobſeruamus. Mihi aliquotoua: in
experimentum à mulierculis allata fünt, dicentibusGallum peperiſſe: erát
oblonga,& in caudam ſerpentis quibuſ dá nodulis terminabátur:at hæc à
Gallie nisex plurium ouorum minutorů col ligatura (cu kuperfætatione,non autem
a Gallis fieri dixi. Homines ex impromiſo Lupi afpects: veluti mutosdo;
attonitos fieri. Vlgatiſsimum illud eft, hominesex improuiſo Lupi aſpectuadeo
mutos& attonitos fieri,vt nec fari, nec vociferari valeant. A Lupiquadá prietate
id fieri aſlerunt, contenderse tes Lupum,fiprior obuium quempiam
conſpexeritillico vocem adimere, can demque illum luere pænarn,ſiab homis ne
prius videatur. Ad hænugæ ſuot.Si quidem ex terribilişimprouiloqueLu.. pi aſpe
&tu,homines terreri, timoteque concutiqveriſimile eft: ex timore autem:
valido mébra frigefieri ex raptu ad in teriora fpirituum,inde corporis, &
ar.. tuum fieri impedimentu, vociſque pri uationem mirum non eft.Alijalia fin
gunt, mihi autem hęc omnia ad folum timorem,tanquamad caufam proporti Onatam
reducere viſum eſt.. Multa facinoraàMagisanicalis perpetrari pole. Etulit
Leonardus Vairus lib.1.de: Faſcino multas hac noftra tempe fate exiſtere
aniculas, quarum impurie tate,nonpaucos effaſcinari pueros illofa quenonmodoin
grauiſsimum incidere diſcrimen,verum etiam acerbam fæpiſe fimè ſubire mortem.
Pecudes inſuper: partuqalacte priuari,equospacreſcene R Falcin Cquote &
emorislegetes abſque fructu colligi, arbores arefcere;ac denique omnia per ſum
ire quandoque videri, AFucovulnera illata,Muſcis contri tisbreuifpatio
perſanari.. " Vm quadam die apud amicos alie, quot cómorarer,& læti in
měla de more varia confabularemur; ecce vous ex ijs in ſuperiori labro à Fuco
animali vulneratur,quo morſu ſtatim intumuit vulnus,cum maximo patientis
dolore, Amici in riſum ſoli, patientismedelam minimeprocurabant.Ego quidem
alias morfus hos curafle recordabar; quare confeftim, vt nonnullas muſcas
feruus meus caperet, iulli, quas contritas, dum fupermorfū
impofuiſset,breuidolorie datuseſt;.tumorq, cúmaximapatientis lætitia;aliorúg,
admiratione detumuit, Quafacilitate vlcera formicantia dan cacoëthica
fanarivaleant. Vidam amicus meus, cumir Hya pochondrijs,vicera formicátia,pra
maque, quæ à nonnullis vermes dicun Q tur,paffus eſſet, ſauitatcm,poftmultat do
& ifsimis medicis tētạta remedia, ac. quirere non potuit:ylcera enim licet
fac pari viderentur;renouationem tamen continuo recipiebanta,Vltimò poftan..
nos,& menfes in empiricum chirurgum incidit:quipaucorum dierum ſpatioita
hominem perſänauit. Abluebat primo vlcera albo vino,tum ex - patellis -mari-.
nis puluerem, fiue cinerem Ex Corici bus(exemptis interioribus) couſperge-.
bat,vltimoherba marina vlcera coope riebat; faſciaque premebat, femel in die
hoc vſus remedio vigintidierum fpatio, ægerconualuit. Procurauit arcanum a..
micus, & mihi fideliter communicauit, Fallſsimumeft, quod fertur Viperă o
coitu mafculumoccidere,ipfamque asfuis.catultsinpartunecarie LAG Grauiſsimis au
& oribusaffirma, mine) maſculi caput'abſcindere (ille.n.. infæminæ os caput
inferit ) & fic củoca. sidere, ſed poenam täti facti illam luere. ſiquia fiquidem
Viperinicaruliconcepti, gra-. Jiores facti vifceramatris cofrodunt,e am que
occidunt. Sic voluit Plinius lib. 10.&Nicander in Thoriacis, quare Vipe.
ram aiunt diciab co, quod vi pereat,aut vipariat.vtrumque autem falfifsimum
effe, & experientia, & grauiſsimorum e. tiam ſcriptorum auctoritate
cognitum eſt.Apollonius apud Philoftratum Vi... peram aliquando viſam fuiffe
catulos ſuos; quos peperiſſet lambere, & expolire aſſeruit. Bodinus in
nat.theatr.lib. 33 in Gallia,ad Clapum Pictauorú flumen, vbi Viperæfrequentiores
ſunt, vtriuſq. fexus viperas lagenis vitreis inclufas fu iffe reculit;illafque
peperife, & conce piſle vtroq; parente fuperſtite, Matthi olurs ex.
Obferuatione FerdinandiIm perati Neapol.Pharmacopolæ Viperam parere catulos
ſuos, & non occidiafts-, ruit;catuloſque-non viſcera matris,led membranas
quibns incladuntur diſrúa pere. Quarerectiusſentimus,fi Vipera non à vi
parere,vel perire dicimus,fed quafit quaſ Viuiparam, quod non oua, vtcæ.. teri
ſerpentes, ſed viuum animal pariat. Iraulos, balbos, & femilingues fieri ob
nimiam cerebri bumiditatem, VA communiseft fententia ab expe
rientiaalienumreperitur. Rauli, & Balbi non ob cerebri hus midam
intemperiem fiunt, vt ferè omnes autumant; inueniuntur enim hi' modo
calidi,modo frigidi,modo humi di,vel ficci, vt & reliqui, qui nec Traus
li,nec Balbi funt;imò & hi modo (putis " abundant; modo ijs
carent:quare non ob bumiditatem nimiam cerebri buiure modi Traulos-& Balbos
fieri, fed obt varietatem mearuum, in intrimentis; pertinentibusad locutionem
exiftenti um, docuit experientia.Porrò Trauli, qui literam R.exprimere nequcunt,
in media palatiregione, vbi quartum eſt osfuperiorismaxilta, duo inueniuntur
foramina, quæ nullo modo adeo aperta & obuia sút, vt ijs, qui optime
loquútur, Balbis veròiuxta dentes maioraobſer. samus foramina,per quæ ſtillans
pitui ta,linguamque irrigans in parte illa an. teriori,bleſam locutionem facit;;
vnde bleſi, & ſemilingues fiunt: quod fi hæc non eflent haud balbutarent,
licet à ca pite copiofa defcéderet pituita, vtmul tis contingit, quiex hac
tamné balbi non fiunt.Quare fententiaHippocratis2.A phor.32.malè verificatur,
cum afferit, balbos ob frigidam, humidamque ca pitis intemperiem fluxu tentari:
Auxio. enim talis & Balbis, & non Balbis fuc cedit: concurrit tamen hæc
fluxio, vt caufa remota, qua aliquando cum pro zima,dicitur affe &tum
facere poffe, fi. iunctatuerit:: fola autem facere nequit. vemale Hippocrates,&
alijopinati ſunt ExSanctorio Sander.de pit.en.lib.3. Morbosperniciofos;
velmortem,veb affectus longitudineminducere. Jana ciuitate, & in circum
vicinis propè Neapolim perniciofifsimi orto funtmorbi,vbiſectis aliquibus corpo,
tibus, eorum Ventriculus bilis copiaz, vitellinæ plenus inuentuseft, eiuſque:
tunicæ, & inteſtina eodem colore per tincta viſa ſunt. Meatusqui ad fellis;
chiftim protendit, ab humoribuscraf fis, viſcoſis, & tenacibus obftru &
us ea. rat. Fellis veſica diſſecta, bilis flaua haud inuenta eſt; fed eius vice
atra, & inſtar atramenti nigerrima.Hepar quo ad externam partem album erat,
in in terna autem nigrum, &atrum, veluti carbo accenſus, & extindus.
Langueno tes,in febrium initio,vomitu, &nauſea, moleftabantur. Eorum lotia
craſla icte. rica, & fubrubra ſemper erant. Omnes. ferè erant icterici,
& longo tempore,ſi: qui euadebant,indigebant, vt fanitatem acquirerent, Ex
-Io. Bapt:Cauallario deMore bo Nolano, ſeu demorbo epidemiali Lupicur
paucireperiantur, ouess autem multa Tidetur quafi abftrufum illud quxar, aucs
autem multæ?'profecto in partu plures lupaedit catulos,quamouis,quæ vnicum, vt
plurimum parit; Inſuper o. ues, & agni in hominú alimoniam con tinuo
occiduntur; luporum autem caro eſui apta non probatur; nihilominus Q. ues-agni,
& arietes ſemper in maioriny mero reperiuntur, quă lupi.Huius cau fa, prima
eftDei bonitas, qui tam imma ne animal in eius ſpecie excrefcere non permittit,
in facra enim Gen. c. 7.Noe, vt ex omnibus animantibusnūdis fepa, tena, &
feptenamaſculum, & foeminam in arcam tolleret monituseft:ex immu dis vero
duo, & duomaſculum, & foe minam. Secunda cauſa luporum eft faga citas,
& in propriam ſpeciemimmanitas. Hi enim;cum rationesviuedi deficiunt, ob
cibi inopiam in multo numero con ueniunt:atque in circulo vnus poft aliú
currit;vt apud vulgum á villicisparatur ludus,diciturque Řotalupo;primusau
tem,qui viribus deſtirutus, currere ne. quit &in terram cadit,fit aliorum
cibus, renouaturque ludus ad omnium faturi taté.Hæceſt poitísimaratio huius
ſpeci Vhelin ei decremen i, alius enim comedit alii um. Ex Aeliano vt reor,
Antimonij in vitrum reductio, eiuſ quevires in medicina. 7ltri ſtibium,quod in
longis, & dif ficilibus morbis propinatur, in e. pilepfia fcilicet,melarcholia,podagra,
elephanticis, reſolutione, in febribus quotidianis,tertianis, &
quartanis,peſti fentia correptis, venenatis, hydropicis, tæphaleis, ictericis,
& fimilibus; robu ſtis tamen corporibus, ita præparatur. Stibiū, quod ex
auri fodinis colligitur, in puluerem tenuiflimum contunditur, teriturq; &
fupra ignem in fi &tilio, rude ferrea,aut cochleari continuo agitando
vritur, vſquedum omnis humor,ac fu mus euaneſcat, quod in ſex,aut octo ho rarum
fpatio expeditur:deinde calx có teritur, carilloque impoſita,in fornacē inter
candentes carbones collocatur, & igne luculentiſsimo vrgetur,dū liqueſ. cat
picisiftar,poftea ſuper marnorfun ditur,atq; fic ex Stibij vncirs duodecim,
vitri ipfius hyacinthi modo pellucidi, wacja M vncias quinque coliges.
Andernacus Co ment-z.Dialog.7.de nou. vet.med. Solo Metronchita auxilio
mulieres offepragnantes (omiſsis ceterisindio cys)experimur. Vlta apud
fcriptores, quibusin primis menfibus mulieré præge nantem comprehendere
valeamus, inu. dicia reperiuntur.Dienntmulti,lorij tab. fpe &tione grauidas
nofci;fillud album, clarumque fuerit,in eoque atomi afcen dentes, &
defcendentesapparuerint. Alt ex ſuppreſsis menſibus,deie &to appeti. tu,vomitu,
& nauſea ante prandiumid conſequuntur.Nonnulliex la & te in.ma
millis,ex arterijs gulæ fi plus iuſto pul fant,ex lentiginibus,fi in mulieris
facie oriútur,ex tumefa & is mámillis, & a ful co earú capitú colore
pregnátes venatur. Cæteri tú ex his, tú ex pódese circa pe dé,ex: vmbilici
egreſſu, ſiin dies fit ma ior, ex tumefa &tis venis, quæ vidétur in nariú
angulis iuxta lachrimalia. Obfte trices.digitisexperiútur an vteriorificiáfue-fat
claufum, vel apertum, ex claufo te nim grauidationem patefaciunt. Non défunt
alij, qui Hippocratis Aphorifs mis confiſi hydromel, & fuffumigia e x
periuntur,epoto enim hydromelle poſt cenam, fi tormina fequentur arguunt
prægnantem eſſe mulierem.-Siilia fuf fumigio acuta per pudenda vfa fuerit,
fiadnaresodores non perueniunt ', in dicant vtero eſſe gerentem.Hæc autem
figna, quia pathognomica non funt ve lúti futilia reijcimus,& tanquam
abſurdaad meros Empiricos committimus. Nonenim ex lótij afpe & u vere mulie
rem efle prægnantem diuinare poſlumus,nam meatus vrinarius cum vtero:
nihilcommunehabet,lotijque claritasy; albedo,& bulloſa granula in eo,poflunt
morbosetiam ſignificare, vtin cachochimo corpore ſæpius obſeruamus; hoc itaque
indicium prægnantium verum non eſt:Nonexmenſibus ſuppreſsis,nó ex vomita,
&nauſea, ſiue appetitus de iectione hoc conſequimur: quia affc & i
oneshęc ex multiscaufis, in m ulieribus, quæ pregnantes non funt, affe
&tiones e uenirepoffunt. Non ex lacte in mam millis; quia id etiá virgines
habere pof Lunt,vt voluit Hippocr.Inſuper inult mulieresin primis
menfibuslacinon ha bent: lacergo non eſt grauidationis ved irum indicium
Pulſatio arteriarum gule, ſolito crebrior conceptum peculiariter haud
arguit,quia ex retentismenfibus, {plenis & ventris tumore & ex pituita
in -pe &tore colle &ta etiam fieri poteft.Len tigenes non in folo
conceptuapparent,:: quippeſignumihoc,neque omnibus,nes queſemper competit,
& in nonprægnā. tibusetiamifta fiunt.Mammillæ tumes fa &tæ,earumque capitum
fuſcus color, communiafignafunt &retentis menfi bus,&
prægnantibus.Pondus circa pe & en,non in grauidismodò fed, in rete tis
menfibus, in mola, & veficæ calculo obſeruatur, Ymbilici egreffusex mul 6
tis caufis præter naturam fieripoteſt,nó ergo peculiare grauidarú indicium eft,
Yenæ tumefadęin nariú angulis iuxta lachrimalia, non in grauidis.modo ap 7 parent,
fed in quolibet abdomin's &fplenis tumore,& in occlulis menfi bus.
Obſtetrices anatomiæ ignaræ de queunt intimumVteri orificium tange sc,licetmanibuscontractent,illud
enim valdeà labijs matricis diftás eft,ipfe au té externá Vteri tantummodo
orifici um tractare poffunt, quod femper, & grauidis, & non grauidis
apertum ma net, experimentum Hippocratisde hy dromelle, & acuto luftumigio
non æter næveritatis eft, vtGalenus & Auicenna comprobarunt. His itaque
indicijs vere conceptum explorari non pofle expla natumeft.cognoſcimus tamen
ſigno e uidenti & infallibili indicio prægnan tes mulieresin
primismenfibusMitren chitæ fue Specilli, quo liquores in Vte rum
inijciuntur,auxilio.hoc apud vete. resin magno vſu erat. Profecto;li illius in
foramen Vteriexternum apicemin. mittimus, quod fumma cum dexterita te finiftræ
manusdigito indice inuenie. mus non enim quilibet inexpertus in yenirefciet,
eft ſiquidem externum V. çeri foramé in vuluæ apice particula obe longa, &
duriuſcula, quæ exigui penis puerorum exprimit imaginem)ſi ex pice ſpecilli
liquor aliquis fuauiſsimus ficut efle vini tenuiſsimi pauxillumine forte
exiſtente coneep'u fequatur:abt ortus) exprimitur, breui tractu votum I
affequemur, Sienim obturatum eſt in timum vteri foramen, quod fit concep tu
pera & o liquor Vterum non ingredi gur,& mulier faftidij njhil
perfentiet. Sin autem ex intromiſlo liquore velli, cationem paruam pertulerit
mulier: quod facile fiet ex maximo ſenſu parti um vteri,vưiquegrauida non erit;
& V teri intimum foramenapertum reperiea tür, vt experientia liquoris
oftendet. Sand.Sanctor.lib.1.de vitand error. Periculofum eft pifces frixesin
humido locarefor matos fomedere; Nter magna venena piſciú frixorú,
quireſeruantur inhumido, vel qui Aeterint cooperti calido vaſculo, eſus eft;bi
enim in lethiferú cómutantur ver nenú, &fymptomata pernicioforú fun gorum
corporibus inferút, quæ quan doq; non ftatim,ſed poft diem, vel bi duum eueniunt:
oportet igitur frixos pifces in loco aperto,vtfrigeant, demita tere, fi
venenimalitiam cupimus euita re.Ex ArnoldoVittan.lib.de venenis, 10. Lałtis
balneum procorporis decoratie onemultum præftare. Pud veteres lactis Balneum
max A idve vu, illiusfiquidem lotione,corpora, & candore, & venuſta te
vigebant. Hinc memoriæ proditum eſt Poppeiam Neronis vxorem quin gentas ſecum
aſellas ducere conſueuifle, quarü lacte,vt candefieret, totü corpus
balneabatur. Mercurialis de Decoratione. Germantantiquitùs corporis firmi
tadinimaximèvacabant. M Agna profe &to faude Germano rum conſuetudo,digna
iudicatur in corporum hominum vigore confir mando:ijenim legem habuerunt,neant
te ætatis vigelimum annum, quiſpianti Venereis amplexibus commiſceretur, recte
exiftimantes corporum viresà nim mis tempeſtivo coitu eneruari.Cefar 6. de
belloGalico. Fæminas vtero gerentes, libenter: marem admittere:bruta autem
grauida nequaquam. ! Olie Vam diſsideatmulier à brutis gra uidationis tempore,
bene nouit A rift.7.de biſt. animal. cap. 4. Hæc enim ſigrauida clt, marem
admittit,brutoru vero omniumſola equa coitum patitur à conceptų, reliqua
autemminime. Ma nifeftifsimum eſthoc in ſpeciehumana mulierem grauidam coitum
pati, & ap petere. Cicutam,vterinum furoremex ": tinguere. Icet cicuta
inter frigida connume. retur venena, præcipuè quæ in quis, &lacubus
inuenitur,furoris tamen vterini, fiue Satyriaſis remedium it. Hic affectus Veneris
eſt immoderatus appetitus, cum vteriardore, & delirio, Narrat Diuus
Baſilius quaſdam vidifle fæminas, quæ Cicutæ potione rabioſas capiditates
extinxerunt.Hoc legiturs. Liebe Homil.fup.Hexaemeron,cuiusverbanotr nulli
intelligunt de ciborum appetitu, ego tamen potiusadfurorem vterinum, &ad
renereos incentiuosappetitus de ducerem, cuius auxilio compefcuntur: quippe
Athenienſes facerdotes cicutæ vfu,libidinisincendia extinguere con
ſueuiſſeproditum eſt. Variolas &morbillosmorbos effe no yos, &
hereditaria, &paterna prom prietate vagari. Agna eft difcordia inter
feripto, origine. Aflerunt multi, hos fub nomi neexanthematum, veteres
intellexiſſe, cauſaſque illorum reliquias efle excre mentifanguinis menftrui,
quo nutriun fur fætusin vtero, & naturam, fiue calo. remnaturalem, ita
exprimunt materiá, & efficientem. Alij minimeà veteribus fuille cognitos
volunt, digladiantur que:num vitio.coli,vel ab internis cor. poris principijs
apparuerint: quippe Arabes, quorú tempore cæpiffe hic mor buscreditur, eos
peftem efle, fierique in pefte, & à corrupto cælo contendunt. de Equidem
ante Arabum tempora nul lus-reperitur au & or, à quo morbos hos LT aut
generatos, aut clare explicatos ha beamus.Proptereamulti latini, &non nulli
inter ipſos Arabes, propter labem menſtrualem, lactis corruptionem, vi &tus
rationem, & alias cauſas fieri fcrip ferunt.In tanta rerú difficultate,
& ob > fcuritate.Hieronymus Mercurialis vir d octiſsimus, hosefle
morbos hæridita o rios,ortúqueà cæli vitio temporeſcrip e torum Arabum, &
proinde à veteribus haud fuifle cognitos enucleauit. Adhu ius viri opinionem
libenter deuenie, quippęſi à menftruivitio, homines in ficerentur, quia hocab
Euæ peccato à mundiorigine fempiternum fuit,debu iffent homines hac menftruorum
labe conta&i ſemper Variolas, & Morbillos pari,tamcn vec inprimaætate,
nec poſt Noe,nec ante ſcriptores Arabes quem piam hos habuiſle, apertè legitur.
Aperiunt iſtorú fundamentum efleiro walidú bruta fanguinea,hæc enim (teſti
monio Arift.6.de hiſtor.animal. 18. ) mé ſtruas purgationes habent, & inter
cæte. ra Equus,Canis, & Alinus,tamen hæc à Variolis, & Morbillis non
tentantur. At quodhuius reimagis negotium conua lidat,eft,Indosante
Hifpanorútranſitú nequaquã Variolas paſſos, dirco non à reliquiis nutrimentià
menſtruo fangui ne,velab iſtius excremento ortú ducunt Morbilli; quia ſià tali
fuifsét variolarú, morbillorúq; origines,vtiq;ij hos mor bos experti fuiſſent.
Legitur apud Ra mufiúIndiæ incolas,vitioCęliplurimos Variolis fuiffe extinctos,
eoq;tempore, quo noftriáb illis gallicam luem accepe runt, cordemmet viciſsim à
noftris Va riolas, & Morbillos recepiſſe.Suntergo hi morbi noui à Cælo
productiprimò, cuius vitio adco homines fædati funt, vtin pofterosper
hæreditatem maliſée minarias cauſas tranſmittant, proinde morbi hæreditarij
dici merentur, quia paterna proprietate vagantur. Ex Mer. caridi. A1 th
Dearaneorum telis,earumque ufuo inmedicina. Iro artificio Araneus telas ordi M
tur, quibusmufcaspro vi&u ta. piat, hasad Tertianę febris circuitusde
pellendos,multi præftantes, & celébres tempeftatis noſtremedici,non fine
feli ci fucceflu in vfum præſtitere:fiquidem exiis, & populeo vnguento
pilulas pam rant,corporiſque locis,horisaliquot an, - te acceſsionem,in quibus
arteriariume uidens deprehenditur pulfátio, colligātas &relinquunt; indė
votum conſequun. tur. Ioannes Moibanus. - Natur& cautela inmenftrualimulier
rum fanguine purgandomaxi-, ma eft, MalenAgna eſt, in depurandis femina rum
corporibus à menſtruali luc, naturæ fagacitas; quippe fi oculos habuerit
meatus, quibus lingulis men fibus illam deponere conſueuerit,nouas adi illius
expulfionem vias molitur. Proptera.multæ, ex oculis cruentas, laie.
chrymas,aliæ ex narium venis farguinis profluuium emisêre,nonnullæ ſputa ru
bentia pafſæ ſuntin menftruorum cefla tione.Ipfein quadam ancilla noſtra, cui
menſtrua occlufa erant, ex gingiuisſan guinem profundere obferuati.Atquod
magnam infert admirationem, multæ per minimum manusdigitum,& per an nularem
fingulis menfibusfanguinis fu. fionem habuerunt,vt in religiofa qua dama
foeminanon menſtruante ter in fin niſtra manu Ludouicus Mercatus fami. geratus
medicus obferuauit. Inter rutam do braſsicam nullam imao effe antipathiam.
Xſèriptoribus in re ruſtica malti, fi. fecus rutam feratur, braſsicam illico
arefcere tradunt. Aliam von adducant cauſam, & rationem, quam antipathiam,
& diſparitatem quandam inter talium naturam.F utile autem eſt hotum argua.
mentum, nulla enim inter rutam, & braſsicam.contrarietas eft, quia tamen
alte. Elec NO altera prope alteram
areſcit, id in cauſam eſle poteft,quiavtraque calida, & ficca - eft, inde
facile euenire poteft, vt ob humiditátis inopiam altera, vel amba i ariditate
perdantur. Pediculos morientium corpora miris Jagacitate relinquere. on leue à
Medicis præfagium à pediculis in grauibus hominum valetudinibusſumitur. Hi
profe &to in moritüris; quandờadeo intenfà eft huis morum corruptela, ve
calor innaus re foluatur, vel putreſcat, circaventricule regionem, vel
fub-mento, vbi maior eft " ealiditas congregantur,parteſque extrbó mas,
tanquam calore proprio orbatasderelinquunt. Quodcalorem proprium penitus
exſolui cognouerint, ab infirmi corpore mira celeritate longius abeſle:
confpiciuntur. Lemnius. De Achatis lapidismirabili. natura A Chates lapis, qui
ex India fertur, tum coloribus diuerſis, tum ve D4 piss TA m nis variari confpicitur, ex quorum in..
terſectione diuerlæ imagines multoties, fabricamtur.Quod autem mirabilius eft,
nuncferarum genera, flores, aut nemo ra,nuncvolucres, autRegum naturales, hic
lapis portendir effigies: quippe fer tur in Achate Pyrrhi Regis, & capuri,
& feptem arbores in quadam planitie ap parentes extitiſſe, Ex Camillo
Leonardo de. lapidib. Ferarum natura in hominibus mie rum in modum deteftanda..
On eſt à ratione alienum, quod de Attila circumfertur, quod Canis more
latraſſet: quippe Ioannes; Langius clari nominis medicus ab equi-. tibusComitis
Palatini feaudiuifle retu lit, quod in Auftria homine, qui latra. tu,ac curlus
pernicitatecumcanibus co tenderet, & cũillisin ſyluis illæfus ve
naretur,vidiffent. Hæcauténaturaabfq; dubio deteſtanda eft, quippe tales. im
manes ſunt, & in hominum occiſiones procliues, vtAttila crudeliſsimus fuit,
NRege in es Ees & in viuentium cædes pronus, à quo tot Vrbes, & populi
vaſtati ſunt.. Non modòinfæminaslaſcinire homi: nesverum, etiam brutacernuntur.
Omines laſciuire in fæminas, nec nouum,nec inauditum eft cum anebo fub humana
fpecie contineantur. Quod autem bruta in eafdem laſciuiant, mirabile
eft,Plutarchus in Dialog. Ele phantem in Alexandria fæminam qua- - dam,quæ coronas
ſutiles componebat, fuiffeque Ariſtophano Grammatico rio ualem, adamaſſe
retulit: A micę,per pla team tranſiens Elephas,&poma, & frum & us
donabat, multiſque indicijs, & a morem, & ad fervitutem promptitudi nem
declarabat,læpeque à latereafside bat, & laſciuè mammarum loca tange
bat,Serpens etiam quidam (teſtimonio eiuſdem )puellam ardentiſsimè adama uit,no
& u ad illam accedebat, placide. - que amplectebatur, &à latere dormie
bat, luce autem aduentante nulla illata kelione diſcedebat.Parentes,ne à ſerpé
tele. t n itas te læderetur, aliò puellam afportarunt: Ille autem ad amicam
vltimo peruenit, quá nonmorefolito'amplexa,ſed qui dam amantium ira in illam
irruit, ma nuſquepuellæ nodis vinciens,caudæ exe tremitate amicæ tibias
verberebat, profecto præreritę fügæ,atqueablentiæ: iniuriam vlcifci videbatur:
Quomodofamine vterogerentes: conceptumvaleantoccultare. Aximam Sabini cuiuſdam
Roe mani vxoris in occultando conceptu referam ſagacitatem, quo præfi dioaliæ
confimiliter,fi optabuntfæmiö. næ à conceptionis.indicijs faciliter oe
cultabuntur.Illa quidé dû aliæ mulieres; fecum lauabantur ventris tumorem ce..
Jare cupiens, vnguento, quo ruffas, & aureascomas.reddebat,ab vtero corpus
vniuerſumlinire folebat. Illius erat vis pinguitudinem, ſiue carnis inffationem,
aut laxitatem efficere, propterea com. Go: lange in corporis particulis
vtebatur, Hlud tumeftumrepletumque redde MA bat, ventriſque tumorem '
occultabat. Parabatur(vt' puto )'vnguentum ex res bus rubificairtibus,&
puftulas inducend tibus,calcefcilicet,auripigmento, tiap s. fia, &
lulphure, hæc enim alijs rebus co --- mifta veteres ad capillorum cultum cad 1
piebát,ſin a.in aliqua corporisparticula applicantur ex magna caloris vijaut hu
mores ex alto ad fummum:trahuntur; aut ipfis fuſis.gignuntur:flatus cutis,
& extima corporisſuperficies attollitur, & in maiorem molem ducitur.Ex
Plutarc... inlib - epwTikā. Fructuum, vinearum,iumentorumga interitus praſagium.
Agnun à mori germinatione ca Lpiturpræſagium, mörus enim. ideo à Theophraſto
prudentiſsima vocatur, quia omnium nouiſsima gera minat, & pruinis non
tangitur: Idcirco fructus, & Vineæ à mori germia minationeà pruinis liberi
fünt. Ea tam menquando à pruina lædi contingit(fia: D G quidemosi M Ty & fiquidem
læſam in Aegypto, vt in pſala mo77 legimusMoyfis, tempore prodia tur fuiſſe
)Colimaximamarguitintema periem,& proinde fructuum, vinearum. que interitum
declarat.Atmaius ab vl. mo &perſicopræfagium capimus, quip pèvlmi, &
perfici, folia, præter tempus decidentia,peftem inomniiumentorű,. &pecuino
genere præfagiűt. Ex Cardano., Fætoremextinéta, lucerna vteroge
Trentibus,infeftumeffe,& ini. micuin... Dor extinctæ lucernægrauis,adeo tur,
vt in abortum faciliter conducat. Id: alleruit Ariſtot.8.de hiſt. animal.c.24.
vbi non modo mulierés grauidas,,verú. didit.Profecto malus odor fi odor. fi
prægnana. tjú corpora ingreditur, quia fætus im becilliseft, & à quolibet
alteråtur,facili negotio inficitur, eius caro tenerrima, & ſpiritus inde
abortusſequitur.. At no Kemelextinctalucernæ fætor perniciē. quoque Ila He 4 i
quoquc hominibus attulit, vt carbones in cameris teſtudinatis facere accenficó.
fueuerunt. Duos monachos retulit Pe. trus Foreftus in obferunt. medicin..cum
nodu cellam ceruiliariamintrașent, vt fæcem cbullientem exportarent,(fortè
candela extincta )cum exitum non inue nirent,ſuffocatosfuiffe,ac mancmortu. os
effe inuentos. Infania,&furori àfolanofluatico contrattis vinum
potentiſsimnmfora gulare eſe prafidium. Olamur. fyluaticum, quodà multis
Belladonna dicitur,tantæ eft immani tatis,vtinlaniam, &furorem hominibus
eiusacinos.comedentibusinducat, AC cidit cuidam (referente. Hieron. Trago dib.i.hiftor.
ftirp.) quiin fylua plantam vi. derat talis calus: hicmultos decerpfit acinos,
& deuorauit: altera verò die in tantam inſaniam,& furorem deuenit, vt
plerique illum à Dæmone obſeſlú cre derent.Intellecto tamenmorbo, vinum fortiſsimumà.
Trago illi propinatum Spelaria D? esto) eft, quo facto conſopitus,paulòpoft con
ualuit, & abfquelslione vixit, Lolium tritico ", alýſque cerealibus:
commiftum varia hominibusfymptom mata attulille. Anis,in quo- lolium fuerit,
ſtuporem quendam,ac veluti temulentiam efi tantibusparit cum fòmno inexpugna.
bili.Id Gatenus afferuit lib.1.de Aliment: facult.Etenim (inquit )cum anni
confti tutio praua afiquando fuiffet, lolium tritico affatim ispaſci contigit,
quo haud feparato, quod paucus effet tritici prouentus ftatim quidem multis
caput dolere cæpit ineunte æſtate in cutemula torum,qui comederant vlcera;
& alia fymptomatafunt fubfequuta, quæ fuc corum.prauitatem indicabant,
Lolijta. mennocumento acetum efle præſenta Deum remedium iudicatur. Quare tum
Htritico,tum abalijs feminibus cerealio busdiligenterloliumfeparandum eſt.
Scorpio Scorpioidem herbam Scorpionum: iltus feliciter fanara. Irabilis eft
herbæ Scorpioidis in: M Scorpiones potentia,illi quidem huius tactu,exocculta
diſcordia exani. mantur, &intermoriuntur, tantam in ter eosanthiphatiam
natura indidit.As' quodmirabilius eſt exanimati Scorpi. ones,fi Hellebori albi
radice tanguntur; ad vitamreuocantur. Propterea.Scorpi oides,Scorpionum ictibus
impoſita fe liciter & citilsimè illorum virus mor, - tificat,viculque
perſanat ex, cuius prz. tentancain illos virtute à Scorpione now. men fumpfit,
& Scorpioidesdi&ta eft. Mirabilesin biomiwibus proprietatesquase doger
adfuiffe. Dmiranda profe &to in homini bus quandoque vifa funt. Regem
Pyrrhum aiuntpollicemindextro pede natura habuifle, cuius, taču lies nelis
medebatur: bunc cremari eum religae A réliquo corpore haud potuifle perhibet..
De Samplone legitur infacrisLitteris, quod in capillitio mirabilem contineret
virtutem, qua aduerfis quibuslibet re fiftere audebat. Veſpaſianūtactu.&
fali ua, & fine his quandoquenon paucis af feátibusmedicatumeffe
tradunt.Ego e. quidem idiotam cognoui hominē, qui Ipuitione ſola in osinfirmi
ranulas per fanabat, &licet primoafpe & u a&u De Monisid perfeciffe
dubitauerim, quieui tamen,cum fimpliciter curamagere illú: cognouerim. Dolorem
colicum Bubulo ftercore per Sanari. Agnam Bubulo ſtercori" dolorem colicum
fanandi indidit efficaciamquippè apud fcriptores legi, & à fide dignis
audiuiffe viris afferit Geſnerus, illius potu complures ruſti.. cos fuiſſe
liberatos,qui enim ftercus ari dú in iuſculo bibit, ftatim fanatur. Hinc apud
multos mosortus eft,vt nonnulli nonmodo ipſum excremét aridum,ve rum. 1 E1 uum recens, & expreflum iufculis ebi
bant, & melius habeant. Ego quidéru fticis tantummodo remedium præbe rem,
nobilibus vero, ne nausean indu cerem,non auderem,cum nobiliora pro ijs
habeamus præfidia, ſufficerent tali.. bus ex eodem ftercore cataplafmata, vt
enim reor,ex proprietate tale auxilium colico dolore vexatis,ſubire confueuit.
Epilepſiamfrumafqueverbena ako xilio evaneſcere. Aturalis Magiæ
profeſſoresverbes: nam (Sole Arietemi ) colle & am graniſque pæoniæ
fociatam, contritam, & ex vino albo hauftam per colato, epilepticosinftar
miraculi fana. re prodidere.Hoc exHermetetraditur. Nop.minoreft ejuſdem radicis
efficacia, quippe collo eius appenfa, qui ſtrumas, patitur,mirū,ac infperatum
adfert pra fidiumReferunt Aſtrologi hanc Vene ri effe dicatú, ffrumaſque delere,quod
Veneri ancilletur, quæ collo præeft, propter Taurum eius domicilium.. Ex.
Durante inHerb. N 1 1 1 1 i Arbores quandoque in lapides commutantur: N Danico
mari, iuxta Lubecenfem vrbem Alberti Magni'ætate, arboris ramus inkientus eft
cum Nido, & pullis, qui cum in lapidem omnes, cum arboré & nido eflent
conuerfi,purpureum ta = men,(vtipfe retulit Jadhuc colorem fa um retinebant.
Georgius Agricola eti am memoriæ tradidit,in Elpogano tra étu, iuxta oppidum à
Falconibus cog nominatum, Abietes integras cum cor tice in lapides verſås elle,atque,
quod maius eft, in rimisetiam porphyritidem Japidem continuifle, quod maximè
foc Tertiſsimæ naturæ operibus tribuen dum eſt. Bardanamaiorcum mulieris piero
magnam baber ſympathiami quæ MPerfomatia diciturinmulieris yra rum, magnaque
eft cum illo eius fym. pathia, quippe illius foliun lämmo ca. pite geftatum
matricem furſum tollit, fub planta pedis deorſum. Propterea huiufmodipræfidium
aduerſus matri cis ſuffocationes,præcipitationes, ac tiſo locationes
præſtantiſsimum à multis iudicatur. Ex Mizaldo, Quomodo literas axrei
colorispinger. valeanks. VI T literas aurei coloris habere pole fimus,auri
ſolia quot libuerit, eli gemus quibns mellis tres vel quatuor guttas
miſcebimus, hæc infimul conte renda funt. ad vnguenti fpiſsitudinem, in
ofleoque vaſculo conferuanda, Cum autem ad ſcribendum.huiuſmodi mir ftura vti
volumus,aquæ gemmaræ ali quid addendum eſt; vt operi liquorap tior exiftat:ita
profe & ò litteras habebi. musincomparabiles. Ex Alex. Pedemono Lano.
Qyomodoveftigia; & défórmitates vario lis,&morbillis bomines poſsint.
euitari. Ne 92 E morbillos. in facie,
corporeque hominum remaneant, expertifsimum apud me, quod in publicam
vtilitatem placuit aperire,eftpreſidium,quo vten tes pueri puella
quedeformidate, quæ ab ijs relinquitur, carebunt. Cum va riolæ,
fiuemorbillimartruerint, & in medio oculi quafi albicantes enricu erint,
quod eft fignum bonæ matura tionis,omni die bis oleo amygdalarum dulcium recers.
expreffo plura leuiter oblinire oportet, donecexſiccentur, ita profe & ò,
vt fæpius experiri libuit, ve Itigia non remanebunt; & quod melius
eft,oleum hoc'excoriatas variolasmira. bilíter ad fanitatem perducit. Quantum
in hominibus: vfus vene norum valeat. Ithridates fæpè veneno epoto, adeo
venenorum tis auxilijs corpus diſpoſuit,vtcitra of fenfam venena ebiberet. Cum
autem à Pompeio profiigatus eſſet,atque in ex trema:I trema fortunæ miſeria
conſtitutus, è vi e taillæſus diſcedere feſtinabat, quaprop ter venenum hauſit,
& pluſquam fatis eſſet,nectamen emori potuit,cum con tinuus venenorum vſus
in hominum naturam pertranſeat.Ex Plinio. Inhominibus vermes figura maximè
differunt. V 23 5 admodum funt differentes, quippe in quodam Antoniano
CanonicoMon tanus obſeruauit.Hiccolico dolore tor quebatur, cuius moleftia Hierameram
deuorauit,vermemque deiecit.Erat ille viridis, figura lacerti, ſed craſsior,
hirfu. tusq;, & pedibus quatuor innexus.Breui tempore à fera propulſa,
canonicus obia ic:contra illa in vitrea phiala aql a plena, per menſes aliquot
viua ſuperſtitit. Ex codemMontano lib.4.6.19. Calculusrenum, veficæque in homi
mibus, quopacto confumi valeat. Lapil t
Apillus, qui in Tauri veſica,men {e Maio reperitur, magnam habet in conſumendo
calculo efficacia. Hic fi vino imponitur, mutato paululum ſa pore, colorem croceum
contrahit. De hocvino quotidierecens effufo, donec lapis vino impofitusomnino
conſum peus lit, à calculo infirmos bibere opor. tet. Hac enim ratione, nó modo
calculú comminui, verum etiam conſumi mul. tos experientia edocuit. Ex
Quercetane. Filiosà parentibusfignum aliquod recipere, vulgatifsimumet. "
Ilii omnes patrium aliquid, aut aui tum ad vnguema retinere folent,ver Tucam
ſcilicet, vel cicatricem, vel effi giem,velmores, autmanuum lineas.In domo
noftra omnes à parentibus verru cam in brachio habuimus, & Marcellus filius
meus ex me confimiliter. Proue niunt hæc à feminum miſcela, ſpiritu
umquevtriuſq; parentis ſeminaliú,auo rumq; effuſione. Proptera etiá ſuccedit,
File (fire fi feminain filiorum generatione benc mifcentur,atque in minimas partesiun
guntur) vt fætus robuſti euadant. Hac enim rationefpurij robuftiores exiſtunt
quoniam ob amoris vehementiam, ve triuſque ſemina multum, beneque.co.
ráiſcentur:Ex Cardano de subtit. go D: Marerubrùm in plantisproducendis terre
vigorem obtinuiffe videtur, to Adel D mare rubrum afbos nulla in terra prouenit,præter
fpinam, quç dipras vocatur. hęc autem propter fer uores, &aquę penuriam
rara etiam eſt, quippe non nifi quarto, quintoue anno pluit, & tuncquidem
impetuoſe, breai quam te?mpore. At- in mariexeunt plantz, cat quelaurum &
oleam appellant.Läu rus arię fimilis in toto eft, olea folio ta tum fru &
um oleę proximuin his noftris oliuis parit, & lachrymam -emittit,ex qua
medici, Irftendo fanguini medica Hentủ compopunt: Cú auteaquỵ plures inceflerit,fúgi
iuxta mare quodãin loco crum HM erumpunt,qui Sole tacti, in lapidem co
mutantur. Ex Tbeophr.in 4. de hift.plan. Incapillorum defluuio ex Hydrargynı
lac epotum peculiare iudicatur auxilium.. rifabris capillorum defluuium in
ducere conſueuit, aliaque ſymptomata; quæ tales in mortis pericula conducunt.
Pro huius immanitate, vtiin potu capri no lacte, illudque cum pane commede
re,fingulare & expertum eft remedium; quippe ſedata illius vi,atque
potentia,à veneni morte liberanturægri, & piliite rum nafcuntur. Ex Foreſto
in obſeruat.med. Inter Lupum, Agnum maximam effe antipathiam. Tantralis
difcordia,vt ipfisemor., tuis in eorum chordis id etiä eluceſcat. Si enim ex
Lupi, Agnique inteſtinis, chordæ conficiuntur, in inftrumentis muſicis
applicatas minime concentum vocefque lonoras reddere,fed continuo tadas Bo ta
&tas dillonare obſeruatum eft:at quod mirabilius eſt, agninas chordas à
Lupi funiculis corrodi, & confumi, fi fimul n repofitæ fuerint,comprobatum
eſt. I demde Aquilæ, &anſerum plumis fer tur, Aquilæ enim pluma naturali
antia pathia anſerinas poſitæ interplamas, vt docuit experientia eas conlumunt
& corrodunt, Quadam pro Epilepſia admiranda reperiun. RiaabHoratio Augenio
ioluiscá. (ult.pro epilepfia curanda magne efficacię proponuntur remedia. Primo
lococarbo eftille odoratus, qui fub Ar timiſiç radicibusęſtiuo folftitio
colligi tur, quiper dies40.infirmis,aliquocon ucnienti liquore exhibendus eft
mane ieiuno ſtomacho.confircor ego cuidam, epileptico huiuſmodi remedium ada
modumprofuiſſeSecundo loco,Mufte lę fanguis adducitur, hic pręſtantiſsi. mus
proepilepfia ſananda cenſetur,au. joris experimento, vidit enim fanatum E
epilep probauit, fanari confueuit. Colligitur epilepticum fupra 25.annum,ſolo
huius fanguinis vfu potati ſcilicet ftatim at queè venis exiſtadvoc.ij. cum
vnaacer. ti:Vltimo loco tefticuli Apri,aut faltem Verris fiueSuis
domeſtici-Venere vtéris; &tefticuliGalliexiccati in furno mira biles
cenfentur;hi in puluerem tenuiſsi. mèredađi, cum zuccaro mifcentur, & decem
continuis diebus epilepticis ad drach.tres,cum aqualettonicæfelici cũ
fuccefsu.exhibent. Flatuofam inmembrisconuulfionem lignoce peſcoperfanari,
Onoulſio illa, quęà flatu in mufcus lis, & membrisoritur cum dolore, Chanc
noftrirampham,ſiue gramphum.yo cát)nodis ligneis à viſco, quod in quer.
cubus'adnafcitur, vt experientia com С. viſcuin aftiuo tempore,Sole in Lepois
fickere commorante,tunc enim perfectia onis complementumadeptum eft, Dc. bent
nodi ligneiillius, loco patienti fu perponi, vtitarimfiatus: diffugiat,pio gui
ficco, renuiq; prædirum eftlignum, * aut occulta ratione, vtvoluirCardanus
Confiteor,multis taleprælidium ad pre feruationem meconfuluiſie,votumque $
fuiſſe aſſequutosſola iſtius ligni tuſpen y fone. Annult ex bubalorum cornibus
| huiufmodi etiam dolores prohibere multa experientia, ex eodem Cardano i
obferuati ſunt. Quomodo nonnullorum animalium vent num corpora vostra
ingrediatur. Pedido Halangium cum aliquem momor. dit, quamuisparuum fit
animal,ex. - iftimare tamen debemus, venenum ex ipſius ore, primo quidem in
ſuperfici em,deinde vero in totum corpus defer ri, Præterea marina turturis,
ficuti, & terreni Scorpionis aculeus, quamuis ir extremam illam
acutiſsimamque par temfiniatur, vbi nullum foramen eft, per quod venenum deijci
pofsit,neceffe en eft vt excogitemus ſúbftantiá quianda ineſſe illi,aut
fpirituale,autAgidam,qnz E vt mole minima, ita facultate eft quam
maxima.Siquidécú nuper fuiſſet quida ict Scorpione, videormihi eſle(inquit)
percuſſus grandine:eratque omninofri gidus,frigidoq;fudore perfufus.Quip pe vbi
exicta parte,pertotam iplamce leriter diſtributa fuerit venenivis,con tingiteam,
endemrurſus.contactu,in fingulas ſubiectarumei partium recipi: mox ex illis
inalias continuas, done: in aliquam peruenerit principe:quo tem forémortis
periculum inftar. Ad hanc remin primis conferunt vincula parti bus fupernis
inie & a, abſciſsioque pare tium venenatarum. Noui equidem ru fticum,quiepoto
è viperis medicamen to, reſciſlo priusdigito euafit, ficut, & alium
quendamqui ſola ſectione circa medicamen eſt liberatus. Hac Galat. 3. deloc.
aff. Mirabile ad Strumas gurturis, ramicem, Adem44 Yemedium. Dmirandum remedium
ad ſtru. A mas. Cupreſsi foljaneque teneri. ora,neque duriora in puluerem com
di minties, tortiuo vino confperges, atque ita volutabis, dum in fæcis corpus
coe TH ant, inde fruma, velramex indecitur, pe tertio primum die foluitur
medicamen tum, contractum locum inuenies, quidie o gitis-exprimidebec rurfus ad
tres dies idem pharmacum applicabis,eodemque modofolues,&exprimes;feptimodie,
vel ad fummum pono, ſtrumæ velut miraculo abolebuntur. Valet etiam ada
ramicégutturis, parotidas,omnemdur se ritiem, & ædemata. Hie tollerininhere
fit.Chirurg.6... Peftilenti tempore in:er pracipua-prafidia: aeris re&tificatio
fummum iudicatur. Mnilaudedignus, omniq; decore admirandus Hippocratesiudican
dus eft,qui peſtem illam ex AEthiopia ad Græciam venientem, non aliorepu lit
auxilio, quá aeris purificatione.Præ cepit enim,vt per totam ciuitatem ignes
accenderétur; qui non è fimplici folum materia,fed etiã beneolenti conftarent. Qua
propter, & coronas odoriferas, florefquearomata,vnguenta pinguiſsi magrati
odoris, & alia iucundosodores fpirantia, ciues igniſpargebant, quo paa Eto
aer purusfa & useft,& ijà peſte tuti fuerunt. Ea fuit magni Hippocratis
dia ligentia. Ex Galeno. Portaldara fenuinis contra lumbricas: magna
estefficacia. Nlumbricis necandis nonmodòPon tulacz aqua ftillatitia aptiſsima
iudi.. catur,verum etiam illius femen.Narrat enin: Arnaldus Villanoua, quendam
puerum, dum effet in mortis periculo Conſtitutuspropter lumbricorum mula
titudinem drach.jem. feminis Portula cæ cum lacte fumpfiffe,atque lumbricas
multos emiſiſke,fuiffequeliberatum. Quorundam animalium vita terminus con.
ftitutus,quis fit. epusannis decem viuere fertur, & Catus totidem. Capra o
& o. Afinus triginta.Quisdecem: fed vir gregisfæpè quindecim. Canis
quatuordecim, & quandoque vigintiTaurus. quindecim. Bos,quia
caftratus,viginţi. Sus, & Pauo viginti quinque.Equus-vigioti,&non
punquam triginta, inuenti funt, quiad quinquageſimum peruenerint.Colum biodo,
vti etiam Turtures. Perdix vi. ginti quinque, vt &Palumbus, qui non nunquam
ad quadrageſimumperuenit. Ex Alberto Låddoloresarticulares electuariano
mirabile. Periam electuarium illud mirabia le, quo ego in doloribusiun
&tura rum, & in arthritide cum felici fucceffua nor femel vfus fum.
Huius auctor Pem trus Bayrus eft,licetipfe Galenicompofitionem efle dicat in
-lib.18: fuæ Praski. Confiteor fubito ſoluere finemoleſtia, ignitum caloré
extinguere, & membra patientis adeo contemperare, vtmultas viderim,
endédie, qua pharmacum acce. perant, à ſella ad locú propriúſine alte rius
auxilio languētes redire. Capiútur Hermos Qua propter, & coronas odoriferas
į floreſquearomata, vnguenta pinguiſsi magrati odoris, & alia
iucundosodores fpirantia, ciues igni ſpargebant,quo paa cro aer purus fa &
useft, &ijà peftetuti fuerunt. Ea fuit magni Hippocratis dia ligentia. Ex
Galeno.. Portulara feminis contra lumbricos. magna est efficacia. Nlumbricis
necandis nonmoddPon tulacæ aqua ftillatitia aptiſsima iudim. catur,verum etiam
illius femen. Narrat enin: Arnaldus Villanoua, quendam puerum, dum eſſet in
mortis periculo! Conſtitutuspropter lumbricorum mula titudinem drach.jem.
feminis Portula cæ cum lacte ſumpfiffe,atque lumbricas multos
emifiſke,fuifíeque liberatum. * Quorundam animalium vita terminus.com ftitutus,quis
fit. epusannis decem viuere fertur, & Catus totidem. Capraodo. Alinus
triginta.Quisdecem: fed virgregis læpè. quin io rabia quindecim. Canis
quatuordecim, & quandoqueviginti.Taurus quindecim. Bos,quia
caſtratus,viginti. Sus, & Pauo viginti quinque.Equus-viginti, & non
punquam triginta, inuentiſuật, qui ad quinquagefimum peruenerint.Colum biodo,
veietiam Turtures, Perdix vi. ginti quinque, vt &Palumbus, qui nons nunquam
ad quadrageſimum peruenit. Ex Alberto Laddolores articulares electisarianos mirabile.
le,quo ego in doloribus iun & tura rum, & in arthritide cum felici
fucceffu non femel vfus fum. Huius auctor Pew trus Bayrus eft, licetipſe
Galenicompo fitionem efle dicat in lib.18. fuæ Brasti. Confiteor ſubito ſoluere
ſinemoleſtia, ignitum caloré extinguere, & membra patientis adeo
contemperare,vtmultos viderim,eadédie,quapharmacum acce perant, àſella ad locú
propriú fine alte rius auxilio languētes redire. Capiútur Hermodactylorum
alborum à cordis fuperiorimundatorum, & Diagridii an..
drach.ij.cofti,cymini,zinziberis,cario phyllorum an.dracij.trita, &
cribellata conficianturcum fyrupo fa & o exmelle, & vinoalbo inuicem
coctis,donec ſyru. pi bene codi formam recipiant. Dofis eſtà drach. ij.ad drac.
iiij.fecundum in firmi tolerantiam. Auctorconfitetur ter ab huiuſmodi doloribus
fuiffe correp tum,& femperinaurora huiusele & uarij (quod Diacoftum
vocat )vnc.ſem, acces piſſe, & in vna die conualuiffe. Ego dia-. gridium in
minoridofi,exhibuifemper & beneſucceſsit. Periculofumeft Bafilicum
continues adorari. Vantį ſit periculi, herbæ Baſilica frequens odoratus
plenus,ex Hol Jerij exacta obferuationeperfpicitur. Quidam enim Italus ex
continuo eius odoratuin vehementes, &longos inci-. dit dolores capitis ex
Scorpionein cere bro epato,cuius caufa morsconfequuta eft ck Ratio apud aliquot
huius euentus,ea potiſsima eft, quod Bafilici folia ſub te. ftafi & ili
putrefaéta in Scorpiones mu tentur, ex quo arguunt, frequentem o. doratum
animalcula quædam Scorpio onuminftàr, in cerebro geocrare. Vte cumque tamen
fit, Bafilici odoratus ad Syncopim, & animi hominum deliquia, mirumin modum
prodelle compertum cfts Piſcem Torpedinem, dolores capitis àcaufa calida
feliciter fanare. Nter fele & a, & quae dolores capitis à caula calida
auferunt remedia,Tor. pedo piſcis eft. Aitenim Celfus, quem ſequutus eft
Seribonius Largus, huius Puciscapiti affricatu,adeo tales dolores remoueri vtin
pofteru redire nequeant. Cauſa torpedinis qualitas eft,ipfa enim viua in mari,
& procul, & à longin $ quo velfi haftá; virgaveattingatur,tor porem
piſcatoris mébrisinduceredici. tur, vt Plinius lib.23.prodidit. Idcirco
etMatthiolus dixit) mirum non eft huiuſmodi affe& us, quodam ftupore:
feliciter ſola confricatione fanare. Queex occulta natura proprietate fiunt,
mirabilia videri. Aturæ arcana femper hominibus, admirationem præſticere:ratio
eſt,, quia caufas ignoramusproprias, & pro.. pterea in ſpeculandis his ce
pitamus, necaliud nobisreftat, quam føla admi. ratio. Quis enim non admiratur,
cur: Hyænæ vmbræ conta & u, canesobmya. teſcant?Cur Eryngium ore Capræſum.
ptum totum gregem fiftat? CurGallina, appenfo miluicapite nunquam quiefcea. re
valeant? Curappenſo allij flueſtris capite in ouis collo, quz in grege omnes
antecedat, Lupi ouibus nocere neque.. ant? Profe &to hæc mirabilia funt,
& in refum fympathias, & antipathias, & na-. turæ arcana
reducuntur. Nonnulla animaliareiuuenefcere: proditur. Agnum natura quibuſdam
anie. inalibus pro fene&tute euitandai, COA conceſsit releuamer, Ceruus
enim elu, ſerpentum renouari dicitur, quippès dum fentit fene&tute fe
grauari, ſpiritu, per nares è cauernis ſerpentes extrahit, fuperataque veneni
pernicie,illorum: pabuloreparatur.Colubri quoque alijq; ferpentes quoniamper
hybernas latebras. vifum obſcurari ſentiunt, primo vere, maratro, feu feniculo
feſe affricát,illud, que comedunt, ita vifum recuperant, &, exacuunt, &
vetuſta tunica depoſitag pelleque priori reiuuenelcere dicuntur.. Qgorandam
animalium carnes ad vitæ lorem. gitudinem palere. Longifsima vita aliquorum
ami.. malium vel eorum proprietate, multi fapientés vitæ longitudinem in
hominibusinuenire conati funt,volunt enim carnium efu longæ vitæ animali um,vită
poffe produci, re& ecenſulen. tes ſolidá nutrimentă,multú,diùq nutri R,
& à morbis defendere. Hac ratione Ceruicarnesprecipuè iuuenisadlógitu L6 dinem
vitæ valere autumant, Reculit Plinius quafdam nouifle principes fæ
minas,omnibus diebus Cerui carnes de paſtas, & longo ævo febribus, caruiffe..
Dioſcorides lib.z.longam ſençđuter cos agere dixit, qui Viperę carnibus,
veſcuntur.Propterea Pliniuslib.13»An tonium Muſam Cæſaris Augufti medi cum
dicebat, Viperas in cibis ijs dediffen qui ab vlceribus incurabilibus affligea
bantur,ratus hoc auxilium, vitam illis, producere,atque omnesſanafle.Exlib.3;
Conuiuij noftilitterarij. Abfürdan, ridiculain effe Paracelli opic. nionem,de
homunculi inpbialia vitrea g !.. meratione, de partu. NPara Onmodo
ridicula,ledinfanda eft: Paracelfi, damnatæ memoriæ opi-. niode
homymauliconceptione, & partu.. Scripſitenimex feminehumano in ama pulla
vitrea. conie & o:;: & aliquandiù: fub cquino, fuma, Itabulato, homun-.
Cului culum gencrari. Vt autem hanc hypo.. thefimfaliam ille impiusdoceret, exo
uo fumpfit conie &turam,quod cum op ſeruaret in loco calido concludipofle,
& ex eo tandem pulliim excludi, perſuaſit hoc idem in humano ſemine in
vitreo vaſculo reclufo poffe contingere. Sed vana, & fabulofa ſunt eius
figmenta, fi-. quidem ex putrefa& o femine, in an. pulla fub fimo recondita
talis homun.. culi partus fieri nequit, qualis enim eft cauſa,çaliseffe &
us conſequitur,proinde ex putrefacto nihil,piſi corruptum ori.. tur. Infuper in
fetusconceptu,vt ex fa. ais:diuiniverbidecretis capitur,ſemen virumque viri:
&mulieris concurrere opuseft,præterhęęconceptio haud ori turniſi. fuerit
vterus benetemperatus, tanquam hortulus à Deo deftinatus ad hanc prolem, cui
fanguis maternns fi mulaffluar: quippè fi.materni- fanguinis
deficeretappulfus,necfemenaugeri,nec ali planıę inftar, necpartes conformari
pollenr,, vt omnium philofophorum E. 7 conſenlus eft. Ad hæc inter fætum, &
vtero gerentem fympathia quædami requiritur, vr calorem, & nutrimená. tum à
matre recipiat, & à fætu viuena te inatsis calor augeatur: & abia' ad
cona coctionem, & produ &tionem feliciter fuccedant. Quæ omnia fallain
effe Pas tacelfi coniecturam atgtrunt: ille enim non perfpexit in ouofemen,
exquo puls dus fit, fimulcum alimento vernaculo conferri, & in teſta per fe
porracea tans quam invteroquidemconcludi; ex qua pullus ali, & refpirare
pofsit Semen vero humanum caloris, & fpiritus Cu iuſdam viuifici particeps,
&conforss quorum vi, & beneficio fir generatio, antequam in vitream
ampullam per funderetur, eodem temporis veſtigio exhalaret, & conceptio
euanefceret: Hue aceedit, quod deeſt fanguis, quo femen nutritur, &
augetur. Adde quod per ampullam vitream, fub fimo recon ditam tetas fpirare
nequiret confuta.. maergofunt Paracelfiftarum fomnia,& fabula fabulofa
eorum magiftri conie & ura; & vana de homunculi partu affertio. Ex.
Georgio Bertino Campano. In Armenia nines rúbentes fieri. Iues omnes(fublata
philofophand tium ratione)albæ funt, & ita ius d cat fenſus, vtnon immcrito
Plinius lib. 17. capite z: niuem vocaverit cæle ftiumaquarum ſpumam.
Nihilominus Euftachius Homeri interpres, in Ara menia niues rubentes confpici
retulit. Harumcolorçm multi fapientes rummi Aantes, non natura niues rubentes
fieri, fed accidentaliter illic voluere. Illa enim loca minio luxuriant, cuius
colo re ex halātiones, è quibus in Armenia ninesgenerantur, pallutæ, rubedincm.
acquirunti. Pro quartana febrejſalitaremedia. A Rnaldus Villanoua pra fecreto
ha. buit in febrequarrapaexhibere taxi barbaſsi radicem ex vino per dúashoras.
mote acceſsioné, & Dominus osdecorde: Ceruiad drach. Itidemex vino
alterator di& amocretico,ſaluta,chamedrio,chamæpithio, &myrrha ex fucco
abfynthit ad ſcrup.ij.caftorei eriam, & bituminis anſcrup. ij. ex vino:
Alij,vt quartanam excutiant, infirmis dum in acceſsione affliguntur, timorem ex
improuifo incu tiunt. Proptera Titus Liuius fcripfit, Quin & umFabiuin
Maximum in con fictu febre quartana fuille liberatum... Terra Lemonia contra
venena miram: babet efficaciam. Nterpræſtantiſsima auxilia contra venena,terra
Lemniaconnumeratur, quæ ad Cantharides,& adLeporem ma rinú adeò pręſtat, vt
quadam proprie. tate, deuorata, omnevenenum per vomitum expellat, quemadmodum
mul tis experimentis hæc omnia didicifle. Galenusconfitetur, Lumacalapidem,partümulierum
facilitati. Icitur Lumaca, lapidem nobiliſsi.. me virtutis in capitcretinere,
qué fi trio I tritum ftranguriofis liquore aliquo conuenienti dederis, vrinam
foluere, i breuiterq; fanare comprobatum eft. AL mirabilem
baberingrauidamulierecó. Senfum:quippe appenfam fi ſecum por tauerit,in abortum
minimè incidet, fin autem tempore partus tritam,cum vino capiet,multa
facilitate pariet: fiquidem lapides himeatusmuèaperiunt, è qui-. bus fætui
facilior datur tranfitus. Ex: Ifidoro.. Kamum fympathian in aliquet bruto
mirabilem. elle Izaldus lib. 1. arcan: &Podinus: lib.3,theat.nat.obſeruatű,exper
tumque audiuiſſe aiunt,Vaccam,Quem Equam, Afellam, Canem Suem, Felem; fimiliaq,
foeminei generis animalia do meſtica, & manfueta, dum vtero gerunt,
autinterire, autabortum parere, fi mas ex quo conceperunt,ma&tetur
autocci.. datur,tam valida eft,ac vehemens-illo rum inter fe fympathia. Hoc
autem an verum fit,confiteor, menondum fuiffe expertum.. oletno Oleam -arborem
puritatis virginitate of amantifsimam. Liva fimanuvirginea plantatur, &
educatur,,vberiores fructus præbe redicitur:, vſque adeo puritatis eſtamā
tiſsima, & labis nefcia. Hacde cauſa, ve Teor,abantiquis ſapientibus olea,
Mi neruæ dicata, & confecrata füit. Audiui equidem àmultis, alearum à
laſciuis mulieribus non femel fuifle collectas fructus,calq; fequenti amo parum
fru & ificaſſe,ExCarolo Stephanointideraruftia Aftronomiam Medicis effe
neceffariam. PRudens Phyſicus Aftronomiam in telligere debet, aliter perfe&
usMe dicus effe nequit.Cum autem ægros -Cųe rare intendet, Lunam afpicereoporte
bit, fi enim plena cſt,crefcitfanguis, & humiditas in homine, &
beftiis, & me dulla in plantis, ita voluit Hippocr.inl. dediſciplina
Mahemas: qui apud Galore peritur.Cum ergo quis in morbum in ciderit,fi Luna è
combuſtione exit,tunc iei creſcit infirmitas vfque ad oppofitio bis gradum, quo
tempore per a &to cceli themateaſpicienda Luna eſt,an cum alia quo
planetarum ſocietur fortunato, vel & infortunato;numin malovelbonofue.
titalpe & u; & an dominúdomus mortis. afpexerit; ita enim de morte,
& vita; de morbi longitudine, & breuitate infire morum accuratiusconie
&turarepoterit.. Ex Hippers. 10ak. Ganjucto. Saturni,Martiſque coniun
tionem inTauro, Bobuspeftilentiam pradicere futuram. A. Strologorum ex
multaobſeruan tia decretum eft, cum Saturnus. Hupiter,& Mars, vel iftorum
duo fimul iun &ti fuerint ſub humano figno, cona. currenti ad eam ftellarum
fixarun vea Denoforum animalium afpe & u,morbos peftilentes hominibus effc
futuros. Ex diuerſitate autem Zodiaci brutis quan doque contagium appariturum,
faluis hominibus. Vnde notat Auguftinus Sueſſanus in comment.Apotelaſmatum Pro.
Lomai,non multis ante annis,obferualle, cum SaturniMartiſque coniun & io in
Tauro horrendiſsima frigora'excitallet, magnam Bobus calamitatem eueniffe. Ques
autem licet imbecilliores, füper tites tamen fuiffe. In Boues tamen pe ffis
illa defçuit propter cceleſte fignum, ad quod terreftris Bos refertur. Quæfi
fuiffet in Ariete, forfitam in Oues graf fata effet. Anno 1479. in figno humano
Martis, & Saturni fuit coniunctio (tefti monio Ficini ) & peftis
crudeliſsima ho mines inuafit,,vt& prius anno1408. & omnium peſsimaanno
1345. ex trium Planetarium infimul conjun & ione. suffiiu bituminismulieres
ab byfterice '. 3 Vltis experimentis comproba audio,, lieres ab vtero
ſuffocatas lubitòad ſanie. tatem reuocari, & quod mirabiliuseft, Hyſterică
extemplobituméacceſsionen corrigere, fiue crudum, fiue vſtum mu. licrum naribus
admoueatur. Propterea mulieres,quętali pafsioni obnoxięfunt lans paſsione liberari.
CA lana exceptum, fiue goſsipiocolloap penſum,Medicorum conflio (Mizaldo ·
auctore ) in romullis locis habent, vt e, crebo olfactu paroxyſmum arceant.
Cantharides quandoque ſolo olfa & u fangui. nens, veltactuècorpore
euacuajſe. Antharidumvis, & venenú in fane guine purgando per vrinam, apud
paucos incognita eft, quippe in potui ex ceptas non modò veſicam exulcerare,
verumatque fuffocationes, & horrenda ſymtomatainducerecomprobatum eft. Imò
tantæ feritatis funt, vt quandoqué & tactu,vel olfactu hec efficiant,vt cui
damchirurgo Mediolani ſucceſsit, qui bis fanguinisprofluuio correptus fuit per
vrinam,folum portando cauterium ex cantharidibus in Byrfa. Ex Micbarle
Rafraljo. Podeortum fit adagium, Naniga Anticres. } MXneotericisMedicis,nigrum
Vlta obſertatione &à prioribus, & neotericis, helleborum ad infanos,
& mente captos peculiare auxilium eſſe, probatum eſt. Huiuspotio licet
periculoſa fit, cú cau telatamen fumpta, mirabiliter ijs pro deffevidetur.
Hellebori virtutem De. moſthenes innuere volebat, dum acti. onem mouens
Aeſchini, vt ſeſe pur. garet helleboro dicebat.Hoc in Anti. cyris duabus
ele&tiſsimum, & magniva. loris naſcitur, quo nauigare oportere a dagium,
quiab intania Canari cupit vt Strabo lib.9.Geograph,loquitur. Hinc Stephanus
deHelleboro loquens addit, Anticorenſem quempiã fuiſſe, quiHer çulem dato
Helleboro infania libera uerit, Grauidas simio fale prentes, parerifetus fine
vnguibus. Noneftàratione aliepum, quodab Ariſtot.dicitur 7 de biftor.animal.c.4
mulieresgrauidas, fi nimio ſale in cibis vſæ fuerint,fætusparere finc vnguibus
vngues enim,vt dixit Hipporc.in lib.de care FOS. 1 Carnibusex glutinoſa, &
viſcida materia geperátør,hincaecedenteGalitorum v. Tu,materia illa viſcida
adeo attenuatur, &adimitur, vtfacilè illorum ortusde. ficiat.Comprobatur
hocetiam in ladá, tibus, quibusex aſsiduo, & nimio ſali torum vſu,lacomne,
paulatim deficere conſueuit. Oui badiin conuiuijsiucundi,feftiuiquelas beantur.
N conuiuijs profecto,vt hilariter'iu: Du { 11 X G 3 epulétur,tron femel ludi
aliquotper io cum apparantur qui omnes in iftanti um riſus, &cathihnos
mutantur. Inter multoshi erunt Feftiui:Si lintea;& map pæ calchanti puluere
confricantur, qui foti fe deterſerint ea parte nigrifient;li ceti lintea prius
candidiſsima apparue. sint.Si cultri fuccocolocynthidis, vela fòe ta &
ifuerit,amara oíaex ijs incita le tiétur:ex afla fætida autem cuncta fæti da
audientur:Si fuperpaſtillos nuper e fixos inſtrumétorü chordas minutim in
difasproieceris inftar vermium à calore V contracte apparebunt, naufeamque rei
inſcijs mouebunt. quibus vinum potui dabitur,cui caftancarum cruftæſubtili ter
tritæ fuerint inie & xà ventris «crepi tibusſollicitabuntur. De
amorisorigine aliquet controuerfia. OlentesPhyfici amoris originem, velpotius
furoris amatorijreperi te indaginem,ex correſpondenti homi num complexione, leu
verius ex con formi ipfius fanguinis qualitate,nempe calida proficiſcivolunt,
hancenim como plexionem valde amorem gignere af firmarunt, Aſtrologi inter eos
amorem exiſtere aiunt, qui in codem aftrorum gradu conſiſtunt,vel qui in aliqua
con Itellatione ex æquo participant, & con formes ſunt,tunc enim fe
redamare có. fingunt. Alij Philoſophi amorem naſci afferuerút, quoties noftra
luminainde. fideratumobic&um conijcimus,voluat cnim quoſdam fpiritus ex
ſubtiliſsimo, puriſsimoque fanguine cordis noftri in rem concupitam exhalare,
acque ocyſsi * IN me ad mè ad oculos noſtros recurrere, ibique a in
vapores'& 'humores refolui,quifen. fim ad correlapſi, diffuſiq;per corpus,
in oculis, rei dilectæ quandam idem, inſtar fimulachri, & imaginis,non
aliter, quam in fpeculo macula permanet ve nenofi oculi, vel menſtruatæ,auriginoſi,
aut fimili aliquo morbo infecti, impri munt.Hacde caufa miſerum amafium, hiſce
nouisille &tum fpiritibus,qui natu ralem fuam fedem repetunt, & ad cor
permeant, perditam libertatem fuam dolere, lamentarique cogi affirma. Nonnulli
autem naturalis fcientiæ ad. 'modum ftudiofi,cum multa de amoris fcaturigine
eſſent imaginati;nec veram tam furiofi morbi originem inuenif. fent: in
hæcproruperunt:Amorem effe neſcio quid,natum neſcio vnde, qui vee wit neſcio
quomodo, &accendit nefcio quo pa&to,certam aliquam rem, &per ſonam.
Hominem apud Indos longiſsimam pitam babuiſſe. F Apud Lufitanicæhiſtoricæ
fecènti ores ſcriptores(interquos eft Fer din. Caſtanneda:)fidei probatiſsimę,
longa narratione, & certa, cuidam nobia li,apud Indosannorū, quibus vixit
tre. to centorum, & quadraginta fpatio,iuuenis tæ florem ter exaruiffe,
& ter refloruiffe: inuenimus:atque ex cuiuſdam Epifcopi relatu
nouiterpercurrimus.(Hocprofe to mirabile eft, & paucifsimis à Deo conceſſum.
At non minori admiratione illud dignum eft,quod à Langio de Or benouoproditur,inſulam
quádam fu. ifle repertam, Bonicam nomine,in qua fontis reperiatur ſcaturigo
cuius aqua vino preciofior fenium epota in iuuen tutem cómPomba. Ex lib.
1.debominis vita, vbi de Priorifla anu facta, & reiuueneſs eente fcribitur.
Hydrargyriminer aquomodo inueniatur. Ńter metallica ônia,hydrargyro ex
cellétius vix inueniri aliud cryditur, cum ad infinita tale accómodetur.Soler
tiinduftria opus eſt, vt vbi eius mineræ fit ſcaturigo coniectores deprehendant;
propterea menſbus Aprilis, & Maiiſub aurora, ſereno autem cælo afcendétes,
vapores in montibus fpe & ant; ſi enim inftar nebulæ fuerint, non altius
feat tollentis,fed humillimæ, ac quaſi terrae ad hærentis, argenti viuiibi
ſedem eſſe allequuntur. Ex Cardanode Subtil. Aqua mirabilis pro viſus
obfuritate. Periam aquam, quam ſcribuntre ſtituiſſe viſum cęco nouem anno.
rum.R.ſucci apij,feniculi, verbenæ,cha medryos, pimpinellæ, Garyophilatæ,
Caluię,chelidonię,rutę,centinodię,mor { usgallinæ,garyophyllorum, farinæ vo.
latilisan.vnc.j. piperis craſsiuſculètrití, nucis muſchatę,ligni aloes an.drach.
iij. Omnia imergătur in vrina pueri, & lex: ta partevini maluatici.
Bulliátbreuite pore, tú exprime,& percola.Repone va le vitreo benè
obturato.Hora sóni fingu. las guttas ſingulis oculis inftilla. Holler. Roris
marinipraftantiſstma'virtutes, Lanta illa, quam Romani, & Itali Roſmarinum
dicunt, inter plantas: nobiliſsima eft, magiſque quam ex F 2 iſtimetur
excellens, quamuis mulcitu. dine, & frequétia vilefcat.Eftenim fem per
virens,nulli nocens, & multis infir mitatibus inimica maximè comitiali
morbo, quiferè dæmoniacuseſt. Radix eius cum melle purgatvlcera, tormini. bus
medetur, & medendis ferpentum i & ibus cum vino bibitur.Prodeſt etiam
contra morbum Regium in vino cum pipere. Et tanto contra maiora mala præualet,
quanto maiori gaudet tutela, & fauore cæleſti, à quo omnis virtus
confouetur. Naturefagacitas in difficillimis morbus fac mandis magna ift. Agna
eft naturæ fagacitas in ali quot morbis ſanandis,qui medi. corum auxilijs
perdifficilc eft,vt ad fa nitatem perducantur. Ketulit Alexan. der Veronenſis
lib.2. Anatem.c.9.tr ulie rem Venetam,acum crinalem, qua cirri capillorum intorquentur,
quatuor die gitorum longitudine ore detinuiſle, dú obdormiſceret, fomnoque
ſopitam de M glutif Etv ghuiuifle: decimo autem menſe, quod m mirabile eſt, per
vrinam eminxiffe.Lan. Er gius etiá in alia iuuencula,quæ aciculam deuorauerat,
id etiam eueniffe fcribit, e Naturæigitur induſtria maxima eſt. * Lapidis
compofitio ignē fricationereddernisi. Ricatione cuiuſdam lapidis facilli
meignem excutere poterimus. Hæc eius eft compoſitio. Capimus ſkyracis, calamitæ,
ſulphuris, calcis viue, picise an.drach. iij. Camphorædrach.j,Alpalit. dre iij
critahæc pobanturinvalesce Teoroptimèconcoctecca Hapidécouertátur.Hic panno
fricatusu ceditur,fputo veròemoritur.ExRole! Naturam beftis,ad corporis t
ütelammulta remedia indicaffe. PlurimaşürNaturæ beneficiaquebê ftiis fuiffe
conceffa legimus.Hæcpro fectoruminans Plutarchus, præadmi. rationeinextaſin
raptus,Maturan mulo.. to plura in pecudes, quam in hominem contuliffe dixit.
Quippefibeſtijs Fors bus accidit.Naturamoxantidotum in F dicauit. Hinc Palumbes,
monedula, merulę,perdices, Lauri folijs deguftatis humores fuperfluos
expurgant. Lupi, Canes,Feles ſięgrotant,vel li excreme torum colluuie ftomachum,
vel viſcera oppleta fentiunt, gramina comedunt ra, re perfufa,herbam frumenti,
&rapiſtru decerpunt:quibus ſtomachum, aluumg; exonerant.Columbæ,turtures,pullique
gallinacei in morbis heliofelinum degu far. Teſtudincs morſus ſibi in flictos
ci cuta perfạnant.Cerui volnerati dictami paſtufagittas, excutiunt.Ivuiteladůmu
res venatur, ruta ſe munire confueuit,. vc validiuseosoppugnet. Vrlimandra-. *
goram quærunt in mala valetudine. A. priauté egrotanteshedera ſe colligunt.,
Ceteraverò animalia pro virę tutela di uerfa alia retinent auxilia.Ex
Arifter.pl njo,Nipho,&aliis. Lapidem Aetitem mulierum partus. accelerare.
Maison Agnam intulitnatura Aetitilapi. diin partu prægnantium accele rando
efficaciam: quippefiearum coxis argento cóuolutus partu inſtante fuerit
ligatus, miram ytero generabit láxitam tem,ex qua prægnantesfacilius parient.
Ab Aquilis pręlidium hoc'captum reorg illa enim dum arctiores ſe ſentiunt &
oua cum difficultate pariunt, Ae titem quærunt, ex quo laxiori matricis
orificio facto,leniusoua excernūt.Hinc Aeritis S-apis, Aquilinus di & us
eft, quiaz Aquilă hos in nidum portant,ibiq;verii reperiuntur. Intellexi ex
feminis, pria marias aliquot hos lapides in vſu,& pre cio habere,beneratas
partuslaboresfu Bleuare. Hellebori nigriradićem, Viperemorfus in bon Aysſanare.
(N magna æſtimatione apud multosis Helleborinigri radix habetur, ipſa enim
inter carnem, & pellem iumentià Vipera demorfiinſerta proculdubio faa -
mat.Confiteor profe &to fubulcum qué dam porcorú numerüigne perfico, fiue
cryſipelate peftilenti pollutum (hunc morbum vulgares, eo quod porcorum caput
in excreſcentiamagná deuenit,apo pellap (męobſeruante adfanitatéducti funt..
pellant Capoatto.) fola huius radice om.. nes incolumes feruaffe.In porcorum
au. ribus cultello circulum ad viuum fane guinem formabat,deindecentro,ex ſtye.
lo ferro perforato,radicisfruſtulum éfo. fingebat, ad paftumý;porcosmittebat,
ita equidemſolo học auxilio, omnes Hippiatros in equorum faciepitorum euul,
maculas albasfacere. N hominum canitie frequentescapil. larum euulfiones, vt
nonnulliin viu habent,vituperantur, eo quod illorum cuulſa niaior
generaturcmitics:Hippia atri enim cum maculas albas in equo-... tum facie
fingere intendunt, frequeno tiſsime pilosextirpant, qua continuata
euulſione,pilos excreſcere albos exper tum eft. Queapud Veteresmagis
erantcelebrata: pectaculam Nterorbis terręcelebrata {pe& aculag, Mauſolæum,
hoceft: 9.Maufoli ſepul chrum ES Noun
ehrum;Coloſſus folis apudRhodiosios uisOlympici fimulachturm,quodPhidias
-fecitex ebore:MuriBabylonis,quos ex. citauit Regina Semiramis; Pyramides in
Aegypto; Obeliſcus in via nobiliſsima Babylone à Regina ſupradicta erectus,
Rodigingso Marinum Vitulum à Cåeli fulmine non mo leftari. O pauci ſunt
ſcriptores,quiMaria num Vitulum, (multa obferuatiu. one peracta) à fulmine
incolumem effe perhibent.Propterea Seuerum Imperaitorem Lecticam fuam
Vitulimarinico riocontégi voluiſſe legimus,hoc enim animal ex marinis, à Cæli
fulminemio nimè percuti audiuerat. Inde fa &tum elte vt veteres,
pauidi,pefulmine ferirena tur, tabernacula ex iftiuspellibus con-.. tecta
retinerent,ita profecto àCæli fula. mine præſeruari poflcputabant. ExPline.
Captaminter bruta maxima Epilepsia tentari: Ippocratesin lib. de facro -morbou:
H Fs (si liber ille genuinus eius est) vt ab ' Èpilepſia homines præferuari
valeant monet, neque in caprina pelle decum. bendum effe,neq; eandemgeſtare
opor tere,beneratus tale animal; maximè ab Epilepſia tentari. Hocetiam
Plutarchus rerum naturalium perfcrutator indefef ſusaſleruit:propterea
veteresSacerdotes ab eius carne,ve morbida,abftinuiffe fe runtur, neguitantibus
aut tangențibus. modo, aliquid eiusmorbi induceretur.. Dinum in Asthmatisçura
ſele &tiſsimim.". V TInum pro fanando Aſthmate ab, mo, quo pater eius
cum fælici ſemper: fucceflu vſus eſt,adducitur. Habet yie. ni dulcis, quaie
potiſsimùm Verpacia eft,non craſsi,ſedtepuis,mellicraticoctii an, lib.decem:puluer.
Foliorum Tabe. bacciexicc.in vmbra vnc.j radicum polypodii quercini
recentis,acminutiſ.. fimeconcili ync.iij.radicum hellenij re..
motomcditullio,& inciſarum unc. iij..:? macerentur horis 48.poftea
verocolentur per manicam Hippocratis vocatam, conſeruetur vinum inloco frigido.
Dá - tur vnc. vj. pro vice; ſingulis diebus,; horis ante prandium quinque.
Homines a phrenttide correptos sania fortiores fierii On pauci admirantur, cur
homi. nesphreneticiflicet in ſanitate debiles fuerint prius ) ipfis fanis
fortiores: euadant?Equidem à morbi naturato- · tum procedere verendum non eft:
cum autem in phrenitide magis, ob exficca- - tionem lædantur nerui fenſitui,
quam motiui, nulli dubium eft, tales quo ad motum ipſis ſanis fortiores, &
debilio. res, quo ad virtutem fenfitiuam fieri;: ratio omnium eft,quia
operationes,ner uorum fenfitiuorum humiditate magis perficiuntur: fecusmotiui.
Huicadiun gitur, quod phrenetici (mente læſa ). doloremnon fentiunt,idcirco
fortiores.com Ek Arculano. Tuberum efufrequenti, bomines in epile Pliam incidere.
2 M2Aximopere (ve valuit Simeon Zethus) ſuberum continuattis v fus vituperatur:
adeo enim hornines crebro eorú eſu afticiuntur, vtepilepti ci;vel apoplectici
fiant. Apud veteres autem in pretio habebantur,illifq; cum Colo quandam
affinitatem,nec niſi to. nante loue nafai, credidit antiquitas.. Vnde
Iuuenalis: Facient optat atonitrus CHAS - Offri de corde Cerui à morfibus
venenofas;hos minespreferu476. Irabilis eſt profecto oſsiculorum, proprietas,
quæ in Ceruorum; corde reperiuntur;geſtata enim ad præ feruandiim à beftiarum
venenofarum morſibus, & i & ibusmaximeproſunt. In officinis tanquam
præſtantiſsimum an.. ridotum contra venenum, & febres pe tulentes,hxc eſſa
conſeruatur, &cum feelicifucceffu mediciindiesad hæc valere experiuntur::
multi tamen pre. ofic.cordis ceruipi, os.bubulum tradunt in magnam languentium
perniciem, & ped.com M propi HORTVLVSGENIALIS 133 eterمه 27 that medicorum
afamiam.Ex Alexan.fro Be Pedido. Hemicranian lapide Gegatisſummoueri. MW Vleo
experimento Democritus: Hemicranian, lapidis Gagatis ſo'a ad collum appenfione
tolli com.. probauis fcribit enim huiufmodi lapi. dem geftatum ſeinperniagis
ponderare, quam antequam appendatur: quafi in eo quædam attrahendi in fe fe
humo. rem,à quo dolor in parte cranij fufcitam. tar proprietasreperiatur.Mercurialis.
Epilepritof non perpetuoconcidere nee quefpumam facere. Vicomitiali morbo
laborátnánili in magoa ventrico !orum cerebriz cralo s humoribus obftru &
ione conci dere, & fpumam ferre confueuerunt: ſe cus vero in alijs cauſis,
vtin quadapu.. ella Aretina Beniuenius obferuauit. In cidit illa in Epilepfiam,
tamen neque concidebat,pequeexorefpumam emito. tebat. Sedſtanscaput hinc indecücere
wice uice, ac fi quid infpicere vellet
mous bat; nihil interim loquens, nihil fenti ens.Cum auté ad fe reuerteretur,
inter rogata quid egiflet, penitus ignorabat. Cauſam Beniuenius exiſtimauit,
quod non caderet quod contra & io, & tenfio ad cerebrum non
ferretur,cumfolus va por ſurſum aſcenderet: ex quonullor gore cerebrum ipfum
intentum, abot dinatis motibus-reliqua membra pre feruare potuit. Vermes rubros
in hominum cerebro, in qua dam epidemia natos effe. y Beneuenti,cum multi
ignoto morbo decederent è vita, medici tandem, hoc morbo quedam mortuum
incidere voluerunt, & in huius cerebro vermem cubeum breuem inuenerunt,
quem cum mulrismedicamentis vermesoccidendi vim habétibus interficere
nequiuiſſent, fruſta raphani inciſa in vino-maluatico vltimo decoxerunt,quo vermis
occilus eft,atque hoc eodem remedio deinde - mili morbo, quali epidemico affe
& i omness. Omnes curabantur. Foreftusex lib.Corne tỷ Roterodam. Capillorum
defluuium ex Laudano curari. TOn femel morboacuto egrotantia bus (-ſiad
fanitatem reducuntur è capite capillos decidere expertumelt. His facilliinè
fuccurritur huiufmodilia nimento, quo 'capillorum defluuium non folum amouetur
verú etiam amiſsi irerum renouantur. Laudanum cum vi. ño, & oleo rofato ad
decentem vnguen ti fpiſsitudinem coquitur, quo caput v niuerfum linitur;
breuique capillatum redditur, Ex Bayro.. An empiricis tradararemedia,mortem !
non paucis:attulije.. ftrum baudelt, remedia, quæ ab Kempricis adhibentur,
morté aliquádo hominibus attulife, ij a. nulla ra. tione, nullaq;
methodofuffulti, fed fola experiméti indagine,nec caufasmorbo Tum verè
cognoſcere,nec ordine auxilia applicare poſiúnt.Proptereamilesquida
inmorboinueteratoluinepotis,quicapi. Member Aximopere (ve valuit Simeon
MZethus) ſuberum.continuattis V.. fus vituperatur: adeo enim, hornines crebro
eorú cſuafticiuntur,vtepilepti ci;vel apoplectici fiatt. Apud veteres autem in
pretio habebantur, illiſq; cum Colo quandam affinicatem, necniſi toe. nante
loue nafai, credidit antiquitas.. Vinde Iuuenalis: Facient opfataronitrua,
Cen45 -offi de corde Ceuiàmorfibus venenofisshos minespreferuatge -Irabilis eſt
protecto oſsiculorum, proprietas, quæin Ceruorum corde reperiuntur;geſtata
enimadpræ • Tóruandum à beſtiárum venenofarum I morſibus, & i&
ibusmaximeproſunt.In officinis tanquam præſtantiſsimum an-. ridotum contra
venenum, & febres pe.. bilentes, hæcoſſa conſeruatur, & cum. foelici
fucceffumcdiciindiesad hæc va lere experiuntur:: (multi tamen pro. ofic.cordis
ceruidi, osbubulumtradunt in magnam languentium perniciem, & M pedice medicorum
afamiam.Ex Alz xan.fro Bem nedido. Hemicranian laide Gagatia ummoueri. Viro
experimento Democritus Hemicraniam, lapidisGagatis fola ad collum appenfione
tolli com.. probauis fcribit enim huiufmodi lapi. dem geſtatum
ſempernagisponderare, quam antequam appendatur: quafi in eo quædam attrahendi
in fe fe humo rem,à quodolor in parte cranij ſuſcita.. tar
proprietasreperiatur.Mercurialis. -Epileptites nonperpetuo concidere nee que
fpumam facere, Vicomitiali morbo laborát nánili in magoa ventricolorum cerebria
crais humoribus obftruatione eonci dere, & fpumam ferre confueuerunt: ſe
cus vero in alijs caufis, vt in quadá pu ella Aretina Beniuenius obferuauit. In
cidit illa in Epilepfiam, tamen neque concidebat,pequeexore fpumam emit tebat.
Sed ftans caput hinc inde cucere vice, ac fi quid inſpicere vellet mout
bat;nihil interim loquens, nihil fenti ens.Cum auté ad fe reuerteretur,inter
rogata quid egiflet, penitus ignorabat. Caufam Beniucnius exiſtimauit, quod non
caderet quod contra & io, & tenfio ad cerebrum non ferretur, cum
folusva por ſurſum aſcenderet: ex quo nullori gorecerebrum ipfum intentum, ab
of dinatis motibussreliqua membra præ feruare potuit, Vermes rubros in hominum
cerebro, in quae dam epidemia natos effe., Beneuenti, cum multi ignoto morbo;
decederent è vita, medici tandem, hoc morbo quedam mortuum incidere voluerunt,
& in huius cerebro vermem rubeum breuem inuenerunt, quem cum
multismedicamentis vermesoccidendi vim habétibus interficere nequiuiſſent,
fruſta raphani inciſa in vino maluatico vltimo decoxerunt, quo vermis occiſus
eft,atque hoc eodem remedio deinde se smili.morbo, quali epidemico affe &
ij, omnes Nous ) omnes curabantur. Foreftusex lib.Corne-, i Roterodam.
Capillorum defluuium ex Laudano curari. "Onfemel morboacuto egrotantia bus
(-ſiad fanitatem reducuntur ) è capite capillos decidere expertumelt. His
facillimèfuccurritur huiufmodilia nimento, quo capillorum defluuium non ſolum
amouetur verű etiam amiſsi irerum renouantur. Laudanum cum vi. ño, & oleo
rofato ad decentem vnguen ti fpiſsitudinem coquitur, quo caput y niuerfum
linitur, breuique capillatum redditur, Ex Bayro.. An empiricis
tradararemedia,mortem ! non paucis:attulife: ftrum baudelt, remedia, quæ ab
tempricis adhibentur, mortéali quádo hominibusattulife,ijn. nulla ra. tione,
nullaq; methodo fuffulti, fed fola experiméti-indagine,neccaulas morbo. Tum
verè cognoſcere,nec ordine auxilia applicarepoflunt.Propterea miles quidā.
igjorbo inueteratoluinepotis,quicapi N + 136 tis achoribus erat fædatus,
finecautio. os,more empiricorum,nec ætate obfer uata, vnguentum ex arſenico,
ſulphure viridiæris, femine ſinapis confe&tum capiti appofuit;ita enim ex
quodam lio bro remedium collegerat, & mane ſee quenti puer ille, qui erat
duodecim an norum, in lecto mortuus inuentus eſt. Hi profe& o fru & us
empiricorum ſunt. ExValefio.. Triplici auxilio homines longauam vitam Af
quirerepofle. Ifi hominum frequens luxus exo NA vita
songior,ſaniorquevideretur,hi ay tem in luxum,epulas, & otia effuli, vix
trigefimum exceduntannum, abſque. fene & utis aliquo veftigio,vita enim los.
gæua,non luxu,& profufione nimia, fed triplici tantum remediocomparatur;fie
quidem pareitas cibi, & potus, bonus cibus,& moderatum exercitiummorta
- lium vitam, ex Philoſophorum decre to,producere valebunt.Bartholom.Males **
Dino Gagorio. Nmin Quo paéto fingultum
cohibere valeamus. Onleui angaſtia angultum ho• mines cruciare quandoque vide
mus adeò quod multiin longiſsimā via. giliam huiuſmodi affe & u ducti funt,
Multi funt, quieximprouifo timorem ſingultientibus incuitientes,votum alle
quumtur: alij verò auricularidigito ito bentintus aures diu confricari;Lyfimam
chus tamen apud Platonem, fternuta. mento afperfione aquæ frigidæ, & re
{pirationis coñibitionefingultum cxčke ti propalauit. Quopado plebrios, tincios
en admiration nem -dustus. Plebeiprofe &to qui populi parsfino plicior
eft,ex leuifsima occaſione fa. cilè in admirationé ducuntur. Si optas autem vt
adftantes credantvel magico Çarmine, vel quodammiraculo te open. rari, manècum
Verbaſcum flores aperit æſtiuo tempore, iispræſentibus leniter moueto plantam:
flores enim paulatim decidunt, & exiccatur, cum magno ile. lorum ftupore,
fiquidem illius plantæ hæceſt proprietas, vt (Sole accedente ) flores decidant.
Quod fi magis irridere velis inutiliter aliquid murmurabis, vt admiratio
excrefcat, vltimòtandemor mpia in rifum finiantur. Ex Porta. Memoriam è thure
epoto maximè Augeri. Maximo hominibusadiumento eſt firma memoria, triftitiæ
verò, & Jabori, imbecillitas, iis præſertim, qui bonarum litterarum ftudio
incúberec ptant. Ita autem cófirmatur.Thus albife Gmuin in pollinem attritum,&
cú vino, li hyemsfuerit,velaqua deco & ionis paſ fularü, fięſtas;epotum,inLunęaugmen.
to,oriente Sole, necnonmeridie, & oC- t caſu, mirum in modum memoriam aya
gere fertur. Ex Rafi. Quo pačtofamis importunitascohibeatur: Vis Taurum
Philoſophum, eiufq; mendo famisimpetu? profe& o dumfa. maemaximèmoleſtabatur,
eius importurnitatem, compreſsis hypochondriis & ventris ſtri & ione
compefcebat. Apud. Aulum Gellium. Mulierem grauidationis tempore pallefcere.,
debilioremque effe. TOnlinerationemulieres, quoté pore vterum gerunt, virore
pallia dæ fiunt, purus enim illarú fanguiscono tinuò ex corpore deftillat,
& in vterum à natura demittitur, vtfætú tú nutriat; tú eius procuret
augmentü.Cum autem ipfis paucior in corpore-refideat fanguis neceſſe eſt fieri
pallidas, atq; alienos ci Bos appetere.In ſuper exco,quia fanguis folitusipfis
minuitur,debiliores fieri ne celle eſt. ExHippocr. lib. 1. de morb.mulier..
Myrifticam nucem à vira geftat am, vigo rofiorem fieri. MIrabilis eft
nucismyriſtice, quava cant muſcatam, cum homine fym pathia: ſi enim à
viro.geftatur, nomodò vigore proprium cóferuare, verù etiam
turgere,magifq;fucculentam, & ſpecio ſam ficrialkunāt, pręfertim
fiiuuenilis adultæque ætatis homines circumferát Ex Liuinio Lem. Hepaticos,
Gtienoſos decodochamading fanari. INter præſtantiſsima remedia, quæ I
hepaticis, & lienofis adhibentur pri mum Chaniædrium locum retinet: fie nim
ex aceto deco & a,per pluresdies ex. hibetur,hepaticos,atquelienoſos pro.
culdubio fanat: multisequidem experi mentis comprobatum eft tale decoctí
viſceraab infar &tu liberare:propterea ini febribus chronicis, eo quod
obitruction tres mire abigat, fdelici fùcceffo à multis: pro fingulari ſecreto
audio vſurpari. Pulfus deficientes,&intermittentes in ix. uenibus mortem
prædicere, O Vanti timoris in languentibus,pul sus deficientes, vermiculantes,
& formicantes exiſtant,apud Medicos notiſsimum eſt: ij enim ex proſtrata natura
exorti,exitiú efle in foribus aftédūt. In. termittentes autem duorúpulfuum ſpa
tie tio,non modò in omnibus fufpe & i ha bentur, verum etiam omnibus maxime
iuuenibus exitiofifunt; diſséticGalenus, qui in pueris, &fenibus non ita
fore ti mendos afleruit.Huius rei habuitexse. rimentum Proſper Alpinus in
Iacobo Antonio Cortulo octuagenario,pleuri. tiro, & febreardente vexato,
cui pulfus fuerunt cùm intermittentcs, tum defi cientes; tamen ille citò
conualuit.lib.s. de med. method. Mitbridatis Regis, ad venena maximum Antidotum.
D Euico Mithridato Rege maximo, in eiusArcanis Pompeius inuenifle in peculiari
commentario ipfius manu exarato compofitionem antidoti dici Inr.Cóftabat ex
duabus nucibus ficcis ite ficis totidem, & ruræ folijs viginti fimul
tritis, addito falisgrano.Si aliquis hoc iciunus allumeret, rullum ei venenum
nociturum illa die affirmabat, Ex Plinio. ONO Slidera Quo artificio offa,
velebora colorari valeant. I offa,vel ebora coloratahabere de lideramus,ca in
primis oportet abim munditiis purgare; deinde in aluminis aquadecoquere,tum
demumin vrină, vel calcis aquam in qua diffolutum fit verzioum, rubrica, aut
cæruleus color, fiue alius quem volumus immittere, & vna iterum coquere.Cum
autem perfri gerata in eodem etiam liquore fuerint, extrahenda ſunt; &
pulchra, & bellè tin eta habebimus. Alexius Pedemont. BRICA Bryonieradicio
è vinoalbo decoctum, hyfte. ricam paſsiorem reprimere. Ryonia in
fedandamulierum hyſte rica paſsione,egregiam habere vir tutem multis
experimentis dicitur.Ex multis obſeruationibus in quadam mu liere, quæ quotidie
ferè per multos an nos hocaffectu laborauerat, à Matthio lo experta eft. Hæccum
ſemelper heb. domadam, cius confilio, ſub fccti ingressum, vinum album, in quo
ip fius radicis vncia efferbuerat, hauſſet ex illa paſsione optimè conualuit.
Ne tamen amplius in fuffocationes deueni ret vteri,perannum integrum hoc me
dicamento vía eſt, nec morbus iterum recidiuauit. Quo fuffitu Serpentes
venenati à domibus, velpradiis arceantur. Vlta equidem reperiuntur, quo rum
ſuffitus adco o diolus eſt, vtà loco, vbi is. fiat,penitus arçeantur. Scribit
Florentinus in Geo pon. Venenatam feram numquam accef luram, vbi adepsceruinus,
aut radix Centaurij maioris, autLapisGagates aurDictamus creticus,aut Aquilæ,
vel Milui fimus cú ftyrace miftus fuffatur. Ex Gal. autem habemus in lib.de
med. fac. parab.ad Solonem.Pyretrum, ful phur,cornu ceruinum, pinguedinem,&
pulmonem Afini accenfum,ac fuffitum, cuncta animalia venenoſa efficaciter fu -
gare compertum elle. Herpetes exedentesTabucoicereto felicitors Sanuri.
Terorymus Aquapenders inl.:.de Tumoy prenat.6.20.5xedcotes her petes teſtatur
curaſſe quoad totum cor pus, ex ſero Caprino expurgatione con fecta,fæpèautem
cum fa !fæ parille de co & ione:partes affectas aquis therma lbus D.Petri
lauabat,vltimoiis, felici cum fucceſfu ſequens admouitCeratú. R.Succi Tabacci,
ſeu herbæ Reginæ vnc. iij.Ceræ citrinæ nouiſsime.vnc. ij.Refie næpinivnc.j.
Rofinz Tyerebintinæ vnc.j.Oleimyrtini quantum fuffic. pro formando Ceroto. Vina
alba, qua induſtrie inrubramu tentur. A Lba vina abſque vllo detrimento in
rubra(auctore Mizaldo ) tatim Conuertuntur,lipuluerem mellisad du rilsimă
conliltentiam deco&i, & ficcati in vinum albuin proiecerimus, &
tran Suaſandomiſcuerimus,Idautem minori faſtidio efficier lapathorum radix, fi
re cens, vel ficca in vinum mittitur. Flores in Aegyptoprope Nilum inode tar os
exiftere. O Dorin ficco fundatur, eidemq; in nititur;hinceuenit(auctore Theop.
6.de cauf.plantar.) vt fru & us agreſtesvro - banis ſui generis
odoratiores,eo quod - ficciores exiſtant vrbanis,habeátur.Heç quoq; caufa
eft,quod in Aegypto mini mèodorati flores naſcantur;vt n. Plini - us prodidit,
Aegypti aer à Aumine Nile tum nebulofus, tum roſciduseſt: cuius cauſa odor in
foribusadimitur. Abfynthium ventriculum roborare ſo lum adftri& ione.
Vantam Abſynthium in roboran do ventriculo vim retineat,in mul. tis locis à
Galeno exprimitur:bancau tem virtutem non ab amaritudinem fed propter adftri
& tionem abfynthio inefle verfimilc eſt. Conſtat hoc totum ab eius fucci
natura, qui corroborandi facultate deſtituitur, ex eo, quod ter rez partes, in
quibus adſtringendi vis poſita eſt, ab ipſo feparantur. Succus itaque folum
amarulentiamhabet, quz tantum abeft, vt ventriculum roboret, fed vt potius
illum infeſter. Ex epote Chalcantho, albos pilos è capi te decidere. Icet
Chalcanthi, fiuc vitrioli vſus, e reſumpti, apudGalenum ſuſpeatus habeatur: à
multis tamen audio maximè commendari. Inter graues fcriptores, Rbaſes eft,qui
29. Continentis, 6.24. ſe habuifle amicum quendam ſcribit; qui potata vitrioli
drachma, propènoctem pilos omnes, quos in capite habebatal bos, abiecit.Res
profe &to mira eft, pbrenitidem ex nigro Coralio felicitar Sanari. Oralium
nigrum, quod Antipallas, fiue Antipatkes dicitur,inPhrenitide morbo corrigendo,
& fanando perquá Airam habere facultatem exiſtimatur. Hoc nigerrimi.coloris
eft, & ob varie. tatem in magno precio tenetur, & cótra huiuſ HORTvĆvs
G & NI ALIS. 14h ** Merete huiuſmodi affectum tanquam præftan tiſsimům
remedium vſurpatur. Ex Ense lio de Gemmis lib. 3: Lethargicosà Satureia capiti
admota excitari. Vltis experimentis obſeruatum reperio,Satureiam cumfloribus
vino incoctam, & calentem occipitiad. #motam, Lethargicosdifficili ac
pertina E ci sono oppreſlos, ac veluti raptos exci tare, & reuocare.Vt
autem curæ folici $, or fit exitushuius decoctiguttæ aliquot fe infirmiauribus
inftillandæ funt. Hana diſchius. I peftilentias quasdam occulta anispat hia ho
minum corpora depafcere. M Vlta reperiuntur,quæ occulta qua dam antipathia, cun
&tis hominis bus aduerfantur. Huiuſmodi fuit aura illa peſtilens, quæ ex
arcula aurea in quá miles forte quidam inciderát (referente Iulio Capitolino )
in Babylonia orta eft, Ex hac nata fertur peſtilentia, quæ in - de Parthos
orbemý; compleuit. Huic haud abfimilis, vel prauior vtique fuit G peſtisilla,
quæ anno 1348.ab oriente in cipiens (teſte Guidone Cauliacenſi ) vniucrlum fere
orbem peruagata eſt, tảntaq; lauitie peragrabat, vt vix quar ta hominum pars
ſuperſtes euaferit. Bra M. Infantes eiulare quoties lar, nutricum mammas
papillas pangit. Slidua experientia comperimus f A mammasnutricum, &
papillas lancinat, & pungit,quippead infanculos tunc nu trices redire
videntur ftatim; cum pa pillarum mordicationem, ſiue vellica. tionem ſentiunt.
Duplici autem id fieri caufa credendum eft; vel quia quo tem porecoctionem
infantulus perfecit, eo dem momento nutricis vbera complen. tur, vel quia
tutela Angeli Cuftodisin fantis nutricem ad officium, leuiſsima vellicatione
follicitat.Hoc verius vide. tur eo,quod modo citiusmodo tardin fanteseiulant:
& vtriuſq; ſtatus non lem per idem eft. Ex Bodino lib.3.Theanatu. Sales Han
7 Salis Prunella virtus, &compofitio. al prunella,ob fingularem vim do
lores mitigandià quauiscaufacalida &inflammatione excitatos, quam reti-,
net, a nodynum minerale à chymicis apo pellatur. Eius compoſitio talis eſt:Para
tur ex,nitro optimo; quod in cruſibulo. funditur, paulatim ſuperinijciendo flom
res ſulphuris,quieiuspingaedinem tole Junt, idqueadeo pellucidum, purum que
reddunt; vt fi luper lapidemmar moreum effundas; omninò clarum, &
dlaphanuin appareat vitri inſtar: quod? đšinde Sal ſjuelapis
prunelle.dicitur,Sa lutare eit remediú ad ardentiſsimills febrem Hungaris
familiaré extinguento - dam, & edomandam:cuius ferocia tana' ta eſt, vt
ægrotantium linguas prorſus nigras, & prunis ardentibusfimiles ef ficiat.
Cum autem tanti ſymptomatislę. vitia extinguatarhuius vlu,leniatur, &
opprimatur: Sal prunellæ apellatus eft. Eft præterea idem remedium magnum
diureticum,& diaphoreticum. Querceta mus in Pharmacopes. 63 Hy ilico appetere.
1 adduxeram: qui Leonem, Gallum ve.. Hydrophobos è poto Catuli coagulo aquami
Iris laudibusCatuli coagulum in Aetio, ex tollitur: Illud enim fi femel tantum
ex aceto Hydrophobici guftauerint;ſta rim eos,aquæ pofus cupiditatem capere: ob
id medicamentum hoc præftantiſsi muth iudicamus, in huiuſmodi enim afa fe &
u, nulla falus ſalubrior iudicatur, quam aquæ potus: quo deficiente,mors in
foribus ſemper eſte Cur Leo Gallum timeat abfolutaz " izquifitio.
CVVmquodam die Cercelliani gra tia apud Carolum Cifellum luriſ conſult.
clariſsimum, meique amiciſsi. mum effem, forteinter nosde Gallina tura orta
fuir diſputatio; illa preſertim, cur Leo illum timeret? Pro dubii folu. tione
Ficinú inlib. z. de vit a celit. compar: reri ſcripfit, eo quod in ordine
Phoebeo, Gallus eſt Leone ſuperior. Hoc etiá ex Proclo confirmare volui, qui, Apollinca
Dæmonem;qui alias fub Leonis figura apparuerat, ftatim obiecoGallo diſpa ruiffe
prodidit. Ifle-autem quia bonarú Jiteraum citra legalem fcientiam admo
dumftudiofus et contraria rationeLeo i. nis timorem euenire contendebat. Ada
ducebat Leonardum Vairum in lib. 1. de Fafcino, quiex Gallorum oculis ſemina i
quædam, ac fpiritus exire profitetur gr I quibus Leonib'dolor,acmeror incredia
bilis inčuciatur, inde veluti effafciñatas ritere.Ego quidem licera Lucretio
hac etiam opinionem fuftentari viditlemi tamen poft,pleraque vltro, cirroque
inter nios de re hac ventilata;confeſſus füi apud me neutram opinionem vide ti
validam. Vbienim naturales rationes præualēt,nec ad Aftrologicas,nec adoc
cultascófugiendium eft.Leonesquoniá bile faya, & copiacaloris abundant,faci
le fit,vt ex fonoraGalli voce comoucka tur:ita profecto Canesex leui etiam al 2,
G4 terius 30 D 3 BARICEL II terius latratu faciunt. Infuperrubicun da Galli
criſta,flammæinftar rutilantis, primo afpectu,colorisratione,bilem in Leonibus
celeri motu excitat, vt panni rubri armenta quædam fugare, & mo
uerefolent,inde fit, vt quodammodo Leones &afpe&tum, & Gallivocem
ti meant. Haud tamen credendum eft in iis (ledato primo impetu ) perpetuotimo.
rem ex hac beftiola durare, & induci poffe. Corues, morientium feditatem
ſentire, ob id fuperte&um infirmorum crocitare. Orui, quia hominibus
meliorem habent odoratum, vt voluitÀrift, corporis morituri fætidum odorem de
longe fentiunt: fecus eft in hominibus, licet prope maneant. Propterea ſuper te
& um infirmiCorui volitant, &cro. citant, quando eius corruptio,
&fædi tas magna eft, vt ea paſcantur: huiufmo dienim animalium genusrerum
foeti darummaximeauidum eſt; quibus pa fcitur: Charlie [ citur: idcirco in
bellis, &in peftilenti tempore, cum corpora mortuorum vel hominum
velarimaliū humi ia&a funt; Coruorucopiaprcualet.Homines vulga tes, &
quiparú prudétes funt;dů Coruos crocitantes fuper te &tum infirmiaſpici
unt, illum moridebere afferunt:hoc au. tem falfum eft: ii enim tantum fæditaté
inſequuntur. Sæpè tamen Déus permit tit Dæmonesin Coruorum, & aliorum animalium
forma ſuper domos: vel in domibusmorientiúapparere, quando be ftialiter
vixerút. Et Bernardino de Buftis. Quo artificio es aduratur, ut cinnaba.
ricolorem acquiraté Iæsvífum colore cinnabari, & ad ru bedinem verlum
habere volueris, o quemadmodum vult Diofcorides; AC i cipe
æristaminascuttricoftę profundas: non ſint autemęris alias fufi, quia in hoc
ſemper ſtannum commiſtum eſt, Has e ſuper ignitos carbones apta, cum autem i
illæ rubeſcere incipient,ſulphurispul.. uerem tenuiſsimum leniter deſuper có iicito,
Sleepin ijáto', videbisenim (cellante fulphuris Máma) Pris (quamu'as euidenter
extra hi,& euelli.Tumodol.perfe & e nó pol. Te cuelli cognoueris,
addito ſulphur. remtoties, quouſque lamulæ eradicari videantur:caue tamen
nevrantur, & ad nigredinem vergant. Extinéta tandem Sulphuris flamma, &
refrigeratis lami. nis;æris rubei ſquamulas habebis magni valoris,quasloco
Hydrargyri præcipi-. tati in medicamentis recipies alias aut tem huius vires
apudGalen. & Dioſco videto. Theodorus Ga4, quedinfelicitertex Arist,',
deHydrophobia conuerterit, à crimine abfoluitur. Heodorus Gaza vir do &
iffimus, dumArift.tex.8.de hiftor,animal.c. 22 traduceret,omnia animantia
voluit à Cane rabidodemorfa, ip - rabiem ági,. ac mori, excepto homine. Hoc
autem qqantum ſit falfum,quotidianademon Strát obferuantia. Homines n. demor
fi; in rabiem aguntur, & pereunt; niſi Tectè curentur, vtcuidam (pauci sunt
menses) hic iuueni accidit, quià Canc rabido in manu demorfus, nullo adhibi, to
to medico, fed folum circulatoribus com fiſus, in 40.die in furorem deuenit;
quo temporelicetme parentes vocaffent,fas s &o tamen
preſagio,quodbreuimorere I retur, tanquam deploratū reliqui. Hęc
igiturTheodoritradu & io pleroſq; in vi rioslabyrinthos deduxit:multin.,tum
i vtGazá defenderent,tum iavtArifto telem ab erroris ſuſpicione vindicarent,
textum ita acceperunt animantia omnia à cane rabido correpta interire, hominē 3
verò folum abſque periculo non ferua. rizita expoſuitIulius Pollux. Alii verès
inter quos eft Leonicenus, textum malè fuifle conuerfum, veleſle depra suatum
contendunt, & fic loco a pocos i legendum mpirs afferunt, quafi ho
mocorreptus, &in rabiem, & mortem deueniret, fed non ita citiùs, vt
ceteris animalibuscontingit.Hic fenfus quoad - negotij veritaté ver
eſt,quiahômo pro i pter oprimú téperamétum, tardius, qua: cætera violatur:tamen
Ariſtotelisinten. 2 tionen 856 BA'R ICELLI tio neutiquam eſt ipfe enim ex
profeſſo hominem à rabie, & morte ſeruari fcri pſit,cuius textů Gaza
fideliter traduxit, neque deprauatum, neque commutan dum exiſtimo, quia mens
Philoſophi peruerteretur. Vtauté Ariftopinjoom nibus innoceľçat; hydrophobiamin
ho minemorbum elle nouum, illiuſq;tem peftateincognitum proponimus,ex quo iure
expofuit animantia omnia é: Canis rabie emori, homine excepto,quia hæc lues in
homine nondú innotuerat. Con-. firmat opinionem noftram Plutarchus 8.
Sympoſiacorum, in probl.9. dum exfen tentia AthenodoriMedici ſcripfit, hy
drophobiam eſſe morbum nouum, atq; apparuiſſe tempore Aſclepiadis, qui Sub Pompeio
Romæ claruit. Confir mant etiam hoc Scriptores ante Aſcle piadem,
quideHydrophobia mentio. nem aliquam haud faciunt:e od lima. nifeſtum fuiffet,
non video cur lub fie lentio tantum morbum occultaſſent, E go quidem
Hydrophobiam antiquitus haud extitiſſe,perſuaderemihi nonpof fum:innotuiſſe
autem veriſimile eft, nó ob aliud, niſi quia morbushic non ſtaa tim à
vulnereaperitur: Siquidem multi in 40.die rabiunt, aliqui poft fextum,
autoctauum menfem,vel etiam poſtane num, vt fcribit Gal. Auicenna adnota -
uitpoftfeptimum; Albertus poft duo decim.Propterea antiquitus,&precipue
Ariſtotelis tempeftate,huius morbi cau fa nóaduertebatur à Medicis innoteſce
bat quidem aquę timor taméàcanisvul nere & tabiem, & illa praua
ſymptoma ta oriri imaginabantur: idcirco Ariſto teles etiam, interillos,
hominem com morſum à canerabido,necrabidum fi eri,nec emori ſcripfit. Alai
radicem pro expurg andis vomitu te nacibushumoribus à ventriculo,effico cißimum
eleremedium. Vanta Git Affari radicis non modo in ciendo yon: itu,verum etiam
in expurgandis àventriculo. & ab eius par tibus, humoribus craſsis &
tenacibus ef ficacia,fapientum aliquot edocuit obler: uatio: fiquidem multinon
folum in vis tiis ventriculi, ſed etiam in quartanafea bre, aliisque longis
affectibushac eua cuationefeliciſsimo cũfucceflu va funt.. Præparatur è
fcrup.ij.aut Drach.j.radio cis Affari, quæ in hydromelite, aut para fularum
decocto fit diſſoluta, cuitan - tillum cinamomi, &firupi violar. ade
iicitur. Ex Fernelio. In conftruendis ſepulebris veteresfuiffeadu! modum
diligentes... Xáca Veteres in conftruendis fer Epulchris, webantur
diligentia:id circo admiratione maxima dignum eft illud, quodà Ludouico
Vluenarratur memoria patrum fuorum fepulhrim fuifleerutum, in quo ardens lucerna
inuenta eft.Hæcibidem (vt infcriptio ata * teftabatur Jante
Ann.M.D.condita'erat, - & poſita: manibusautēcontreccata, ex templo in
puluerécóuerſa eſt.Ex Langit. Ganicula exortum à veteribus maxime fuiße
obferuatum. Canis cAničulæ exortus antiquitus à prifcis ex eius colore, deami
ſtatu côtecturam capiebant. Illan, fiobfcurior, & veluti: caliginofa
oriebatur, graui, & peftilenté foreannu;ficlara & pellucida ſalubre ac
proſperu predicebant.Heraclides Põticubi. Aegyptiorum de'quatuor elementis
opinio. Vatuor elementa feceruntAegy, & fæmiam conftituunt. Aerem marem
iudicant,quà ventus eft, feminā, quà ne bulofus, &iners. A quam
virilevocant mare,mulieréómnem aliam.Ignévocát maſculum;qya arder fáma; &
fæminami quà luct;& innoxius eft tactu. Terram fortioré marem
vocent;faxiscautibusq; fæminçnomen aſsignant, tractabili ad culturam. L:
Senecakb.z.Natur. Quaft. Pbreneticos aliquandomirabilia loqui. Mirabile eft,
quod aliquádoin Phre« neticisobfcruamus,isturum enim, aliquot(benè inflammato
cerebro )}in guaLatinaloqui vel carmina cóponere cum. BARICIILI cum prius
fuerint eorum igna viſ funt, fed quod mirabilius eſt, Nicolaus Flo rentinus
refert, fe fratrem phrenericum habuiffe, qui futura pradixit, quæ euer nerunt,
ita vt eius prædictiones magna ex parte poftea veræ inuentæ fuerint:de quibus
tamen fanusexiftens,nullam ha: bebat cognitionem. Infantium rupturn; qua via
Sanare: valeamus. Vltis obferuationibus, nullum remedium; Salubrius infantium
rnpturis inueniri expertum eſt, quam extritis cochleis, thure, &oui
albumine emplaftrum confectum. Hoc enim fi pare in affi &tæ apponitur,&
infantes eo temporinlecto detinétur miram in fa nando' affectu retinet
efficaciam. Ex Matthiolo. Digitum anularem, maximam cum cords retinere ſympathiam.
Valem anularis digituscum corde habeat confenfum, in animi defe & ibus,
& in fyncope experimur. Qui e. nim à talibus paſsionibus vexantur,vel.
licato articulo anularis digiti,feu medi. ci, vel attritu auri ad eundem cum
croci momento eriguntur. Per hunc prefecto vis quædamrefocillatrix ad cor perue
nit,ex qua ab animidefe & u collapſi vi gorantur, & in priftinam
valetudinem redeunt. Ex Lennio. Carnes code quomodo cruda vje deantur. N lautis
conuitiis,nevoraces gulofi que carnes coctas comedant, ticarti ficium
parabimus.Excipitur:leporis,aut agni ſanguis, quem congelatum, & fico.
catum in puluerem comminuemus,hic: fi fuper carnes coetas fpargitur ftatim
foluitur, illæq; colorem proprium mu tantes ſanguinofæ videbuntur, venau
feabundus, reijcias. In comeffationi.. bus contra paraſitoshoc eſt ele
&tumra medium. Ex Vuerckero... Adoris plcera, labiorumque fciffuras exper
HomasThomaiusin Idea fuivirida rij, Nicolaum Zannonem Chirur. gum THI 16.2
BARTICE L L 1", guim Rauennæ retulit, mirabili fucceffu: &
artificio,oris, gingiuarum linguæ,&: palari, nulla alia re, quam radicis
penta phyon, fiue quinque foliorum decocto vlcera fanare,atque labiorum
fciffuras linimento,ex oleoamygdalarum dulci-, um, cera, &maſtice, quam
breuiſsimè adianitatem perducere. Exapri tefticulis,fterilitatem in bomi nibus
remoueri. MA Agnaeft vxoratis inquietudo, & Gerileſque exiſtere:
propterea.vt à xan to infortunio liberentur, prolemq; ha beant,peraliquot dies
ieiuno ſtamacho vir, & vxor cum iure galli veteristeſti culorumapri,que
verrisin vmbra exico catorum puluerem capiant:ita profectò. breui tempore
optatumadipiſcentur, vt in multisfterilibus ex quacunq; cau « fa non ſemel
expertum eft.Ex Democrito. Bufonistibiisdentium doloreseuanefcere.'. Nter
maximos cruciatus à quibus; dolo. HORTVLVS GENIA IJS, 163
doloresperniciofiſsimiexiſtimătur,ad? cò quod multi & in animideliquia,&
in manias deuenerint, multi etiam in vitę deſperationem.Huius doloris remedio.
um in odioſo & abominabili animali natura repoſuit. Aperiam hoc arcanum
maximum. Tibiæ Bufonis, fiue' ranz terreſtris à carnibus mundatæ, fi fuper
dentes condolences fricabuntur,imme diatè dolorem remonent; adeoque cru ciatus
ceffabit, vt quafi in dentium ſum perficie dolor collocatusvideatur. Ex. perire
modo, & fruere tanti arcani theo fauro. Ex Florauanté. Cepam ab
Hippocratemaximèdeteftario ' £pam Hippocrates afpeétu inagis, quam efú
coinmendauit, viſu bonā, elu malam elle dicens. Idcirco lucubram tionibus,
& litterarum ftuţiis addi& is fùmmècauenda eft: oculos enim vitiati
&viſum obtenebrat,bilemque exacuit.. Villicis, & folloribus, qui
literis non ind. cumbunt huius eſús maximè collauda tur: eius enim calore vires
ad opera exercitanda magnopere excitantur.Ex Plinio.. C Anima 164 B1: 1 c: L L
/, Animalibus naturam non modo terra, perum etiam fi um pra termino
conftituiffe. Agna fuit conftituendis terrarum terminis, & fitu quibufdam
animalibus: ne simul vbique viuentia, & hominibus & fibi ipfis perpetuo
effent nocumento. Pro pterea animalium pleraque in diuersű à proprio addu
&ta fitum vtplurimum ægrotant, & moriuntur. Hinccolligi musin Meda,
Sylva Italia, non niſiin: parte repeririglires. In OlympoMaceo doniæ monte Lupi
minimè habitant, nec in Creta Infüla. In Africa nec Vrfig. nec Apri, nec Cerui,
necCapreæ viden tur: In Illyria, Thracia, & Epiro Afini paruigenerantur: In
Scythica terraa.. tem, &Celtica neclunti Alini, nec vio. uunt Leones in
Europa, Pantheræ in Aſia, Ibisin Aegypto lolum commora tur. In Creta: nec
Vulpes, nec Vrfifunt, necaliud animal maleficum pręter Pha langium. In Ebulo
Cuniculi non funt, [catent HORTVLVS GENIALIS 165 1 FO 11 [ catent in Hiſpania,
& Balearibus, In Seripho inſula Ranæ ſuntmutæ,illæ au tem fialiò
transferuntur, vocales fiunt. In Italia mures aranei venenati ſunt hos tamé
regio vltcrior Apenninohaud generat. Ceruiin Hellesponto ad alie nos fines non
commeant. In Ithaca illati lepores no viuunt. Sunt & alia animalia quæ in
determinatis locis, &non vbiqi viuunt, & generantur. Apjefum in menfis
apud Veteres infauftum extitiffe. X veteribus maiores nullum A pij genus in
cibis admittere folebant defun &torum enim epulis feralibus ab ipſis erat
dicatum, vtex Chryfippo Pli nius retulit. Multiautem non folum ex hoc, quia
ſepulchra coronabantur,Api umà veteribus fuiſle damnatum à men ſis, fed etiam
quia eius eſu viſus dimis nuitur, & Epilepſia generatur autumát: vnde à
Mcdicis nutrices moneri conſue lo, (frequenti enim huius vſu, lactum
decrementum, tum malam recipit qua titatem ECO 9. i > 166 BARICELLI Samen
litatem )vt ab Apio abſtineant,ne lacté tes in morbum comitialem proni fiant.
Dicunt in eorum caulibus nonnulli cru diti ſcriptores vermiculos naſci, eoſque
fterilefcere, qui comederint in vtroque fexu: Satyri teſticulum carnofiorem
Veneris in. cendia excitæreflaccidum vero extinguere. Atyrium; quod Canis
teſticulos vo cant,magnæ apud fapientes eſt conſi derationis:in hoc enim,tum
Venerem excitandi,tum reprimendi à natura vi. detur eſſe remedium collocatum.
Quip pè maior planta bubulus, quiplenior, & mollior eft,ex ſuperflua
&ventola eius humiditate, in potu aſſumptus Veneris incendia excitate
cóſueuit: minor verò, qui flaccidior, & aridior eft illa reprime
re,Veneremque extinguerevidetur. Ob id(vt aiunt) in Theſſalia mulieres molle
teſticulum in la &te caprino ad ſtimulan. doscoitus,& bibere,& hominibus
inpo tu;præparare ſolent.Quod autem in Sa tyrio mirabilius eft,aiunt, alterú
alterius in poo HORTVLVSGENIALIS. 167 Sier o in potu ſumptų potentiam &
efficaciam refoluerezlı vterque teſticulusvpà exhi betur. Sterilitatem
hominibus,à fterilibus animali " bespoffe prouenire. I verum eſt, quod ab
Athenæo pro dicur,Malluin ter in vita parere,relis quoque tempore fterilem
efle, quod in eius vtero naſcantur vermiculi, à quibus femendeuoratur non
abfque rationeex iftius naturahomines pofle fterileſcere. Terpſicles apud
eundem dicebat.Mul lus enim fi viuusin vino fuerit fuffoca. arus,atque id vir
biberitçrei venerea -o peram darenon poffe creditur, quod ex 3 Plinio etiam
confirmatur, qui veneris incendia extinguere fcripſit. " 5.
Cynorhodiradicem ad Hydropbobiam pluri mum valere. Dmorſum canis rabidi vnicum
" A Pemedii,quodá oraculoroperti proponit Pliniuslib.8.cap.41. Hæc radix
Hlueftris roſæ eft, quæ Cynorhoda apl pellatur.NarratB.Fulgofius de quadam s
fæmina quæ per ſomniú admonita eft, vt 12 Hvide vtradicem Cynorhodi filio à
cane ra. bido demorſo, & aquas iam metuenti præberet, quæ ftatim ex
Hifpania affer ri curauit radice qua Hydrophobicus ce, lerrimè fanitati fuit
reftitutus. Ex Gem. m4Cofmacrit. lib.1. ap 6. Hominis vitam quibusfignis long
am,velbres nem metiamur. Ominis vita pomo perfimilis effe videtur; quod aut
maturum,deci. dit Spóte,aut ante iniuria tempeſtatum, ventorumue impetu
deijcitur. Vitae breuis figna colligimus, raros dentes, prelongos digitos,ac
plumbeum habere colorem. Contra longæ, incuruos hu meros, nares amplas, &
tria ſigna primis contraria, multos ſcilicet dentes, breues digitos, craſfosque
atque clarum reti. nere colorein Forcius. Extra£tum Hellebori nigri ad morbos
inue ter atosmagnaeffe praftantia. N thrities atqueaffectibus inueteratis,
iiſque potiſsimum, qui ex atro, & meo lancho HORTVLVS GENIALIS. 169 T! ta ļ
lancholico humore excitantur, extra Ecü migriHellebori,remedium praſtancil
efimum femper clle inueni.Capianturnie gr Hellebori radices à fordibus purga tæ,
& in pila terantur groſſo modo: in fundantur vino albo,& in vafe terreo
e bulliantur quousquc radices benè emol liantur, quo facto prælo
exprimantur,& iterum in vaſe terreo leniter ebulliat (deic & is tamen
radicibs) quod fucrit expreſsum. Acquiret fuccus (piſsitudi nem inftar picis,
quicum modico cinna. somo,& pulucre aniſorum miſcendus eft. Dofis in
grandioribuseft fcrup.ſem. in minoribusà granis quatuor vſque ad ſex. Datur cum
zuccaro in forma pilalar. Confiteor in obſtructionibus, in c pilepticis, retentione
menftruorum ex cralforum humorum infarctu, & in alijs inueteratis
affectibus, mirabiles huius remedij fucceflus vid.Conficitur eti, am extra
& um fine expreſsionc, & cffi. - Cacifsimum cſt. AdLejenem induratum
ejufqueobfrationen efficacifsimaprafidia TE 3 Inte 170 BARICELLI Nter ea
remedia, quelienem, &fple. neticos ab obſtru &tionibus liberare reperta
sút,mihi femper ex voto fuccef GtAbſinthijRomanideco &tum,ieiuno ftomacho
epocú,quod à Cornelio Cel fo fummècoromendatur:Vt autem eura felicior ſuccedat
poft cibum,aqua Fabri ferrarij; in qua pluries ignitum ferrum extindum fit,
Lienoſis præbenda eft. Experientia id totum manifeftauit, ani Talia enim apud
huiulmodi fabrose nutrita, ob eiuspotum, exiguos habere lienes obferuatur.
Beniuenius, ciuem Florentinum per feptennium ſplenis fcirro malè affe & um
curaffe gloriatur, atque ſolo eſucapparorum, & aqua per lanalle.Debenttamé
hæc remedia mul to tempore vfurpari,vtfcopú attingat. Hominem quendam fuiffe
repertum, mira vaftitatis,&ingluuiei. NdixeratMaximilianusCæſar Ann, MDX
I.apud Auguſtú comitia: quã. do illi vir quidam, prodigiofæ vaftita tis, &
craſsitudinis oblatus eft;at in illo incredibilis, & inſatiabilis erat
ingluuies itavt integrű virtulü crudun,vel ouem IMDEE HORTVLVS GENIALIS. 171 UN
It incođá vna vice deuoraret, nec taméfa. mem expleta diceret. Ferunt(vt
Surius) hominēBorealibus regionibus ortú fuiſ fe, vbiob locorú frigora folent
homines elleedaciores.Hoc taménon folú in Scp tentrionalibus partibus,verú
etiam alibi bi repertú cft:Voraces n.fupramodú fuifle referunt Aeliano auctore
lib.3.de var. hift.) Pityreú Phrygem, Cambeten Ly dium,Charidamcleonymu,Pifandrum,
Charippum,Mithridatem, Ponticum.Et e Anaxilas comicus dicit, Cefiam quendā
infinitæ voracitatis extitifle. Antidot erum aliquet contra penenum ab
ſeruationes. Rcareca Viperamorfus, per impofi tioné tormentille à campo penſili
colle etę,illico liberatus eſt,Altercum ingen ti dolore, & ardore
premeretur fuper | dextra spatula, & ita angeretur, vt vix ſe s
pedibuscontinere, oculis videre, & lo. qui poſſet, veritus neà fcorpione
eller comorſus,oleum bibit,multú vomuit,& à dolore leuatus eft, & quod
mirabilius, Ha in ſpatula nihil erat
ſigni,vbi prius fue rat dolor.Quidametiamà fimili dolore, & tremore
correptus ex aflumpto Bolo armeno cum aceto ſubito cuafit.Puellus etiam
putredinem timens, & vermes al fumpfit Scordeum, &liber fa & us
eft. Ex Franci.Thomaſio depeste. Quoartificio Cancri pixiextemplo sodi vi
deantur. Inum ſublimatum, fiue aqua vita magnam habet efficaciam ia rubi
ficandis cancris viuis: propterea fi vis homines in admirationem dicere,accipe
viuos Cancros atque in vino fubliaato fubmergas, ita enim confeftim ruber
cent,acli perco &ti eflent cantaeft illius aquæ caliditas, & energia,vt
inſtar ignis exardeſcat: admiratio tamen indenaſci cur, quod rubefa &
i,& viui ab aqua e. cmpti ambulent. Quorradoflamme excit etw inagha. I
calcem non extin & am accipias,Sul & lalnitrum in partes æquales, ac
bene omnia fimul ailccas, puluis perabitur, qui forqui in aqua proiectus
inflammabitur, ac ducem reddet: quod parui mométi haud Berit,prçcipuè ſinodu
luce indigebis.Po e terit id fieri in valčulo aqua pleno, vt™ quidá amicusmeus
dū no & u in itinere lefſerexpertus eft,qui totum mihi fideliter
comunicauit. 9 vbivigent morbi, ibi maximè remedia oriri. M.Agna eft Naturę
prouidentia ia ado iuuandis hominibus,quippè obſeros suatú eft,vbi aliquimorbi
copiosè vaga. ctur, ibi remedia accomodataad illlorum exterminiūnaſci voluiffe.Hincinaphri
bea, quę ferpentú eft feracißima,aromata? tanquã eorű veneno antidota,oriuntura
In Argo Scorpiones plurimi videntur; propterea ibi Locuſta adverſus Scorpio.
nesinſurgensnafcitur: ApudIndos Os cidentales Gallica lucs viget,ibi lignum
SanaaGuaiacum di& á exoritur, & il. lincad nosdefertur.Catharides
veneno ierodunt:ex illis remediú caput, alias & e pedes earum exiftere
obferuamus.Quia Stellionibus mordentur, iiſdem in potu Ghana fumptis,fanantur
Crocodili adeps, fi in ipfius vicera inftillatur,ſuo veneno me deri videtur.
Scorpiones,Draco mari. nus, & Paſtinaca contriti, & eorum pla gis
impofiti,procul dubio fanánt. Na. pellusmortiferum venenum eft, vbita men
nafcitur,ibi Antorareperitur.cuius radices cốntra Napelliperniciem,fingu Jare
ſuntpræfidium. Animantium lac ab alimentis recipere gut litatem. Lacomnein
animantium corporibus alimeati recipere qualitatem adeo verum et vt
demonftratione nonegeat: liquidem nutrices ex prauo in vidure giminenon ſemel
infecifle infantesvifa funt,hac etiá caufa lacin ijs modò.craf fum,modò
liquidum,aut ferofum cer nitur,eo quod cibusaut craffus, aut in eiſsius
fuerit,modò infantium cóftrin git aluum,modò ſoluit,quod vel con ſtringentia
vel foluentia nutrices come derint,Hocin pecoribus etiam manife ftum eft:in
locis enim vbi hæc fcamoniú Helleborum,aut mercurialem comedit, vtiq; lacomne
ventré,& ftomachūſub vertit: quemadmodú Dioſcorides in Iul ftinis moribus
contingere prodidit: vbi ficapre albúveratrū pro pabulo habue i fint, primo
foliorúpaftueunmere, & ea rá lacnauſea n epotứcreare atq; ftoma
chúvomitionibus offendere ait: Cum a.. adftringétibus pabulis,robore,lentiſcogs
frondibus oleagincis, & terebintho pe cus hocveſcitur, lac ſtomacho accómoe
datiſsimügenerare veriſimile eft. Ex pulcbritudine, da deformitate aſpoetuse'
mures viuentibus coniectusari. MAgmá nobis afpe&tus pulchritudo
veldeformitasnon folurn in homin I nib,fed etiã animalibus,& plátis
preſtaci cóiectură,qua benignos vel prauosmon res & naturas veoarifolemus;
intuitu nó pulchri corporiszfpeciofiq; afpe &tusmité naturam, benignofq;moresin
homine illo perfiſtere conieéturamus: contrain I deformicorpore,turpiafpe &
u timemus. enim neſcio quid calliditatis, & malitie i In animalibus
laudamus catellos, canes Venaticos, & ſagaces, venamur in eis benignam naturam,
& mites mores: (6.. tra in Maloſsis,inLupis,Pantheris, & fi milibus,
timemus crudelitatem, maliti am, & voracitatem. In plantisex pul chritudine
venamur falutares naturas, ex deformitate autem noxias, Rola,Li lium, &
Iris nobis præftát argumentum, quamplurimis pollere virtutibus: con tra Cicutam,
Aconitum, Napellum.ex deformitate enim plantarumhuiuſmo di,mortem nobis
poſſeinducere arbitra arur. Ex Poria in pbyſiognom. 1: partibus Septemrionalibu
sdeficitate tes exaceri. Laus Magnus de gentibus Septena. rrionalibus loquens:
Sunt (inquit ) Biariniidololatrę, & hamaxobii,Scytha. rum more,atquein
falcinandis homini.. bus inftru & iſsimi; quippè oculorum, aut verborum,
aut alicuius alterius rei maleficio, homines fæpe ad extremam maciem deducút
& tabefcêdo perdunt.. In hamorrhagia fele&tißimum praſidium. Nfluxu
fanguinis narium copioſople.. 5i9; & in animi deliquia, & fyncopim
deur.. perati intercant. A periam quod mihi deueniunt, multoties etiam tanti
peri cali bicmorbus eft,vtægrià ſalute deb u,fem * per adhibere profuit.Burſa
paftoris co I trita, ficum ouialbugine, & aceto,com i mifta fuerit, &
frontiapplicatur, confe * ftim fanguis conftringitur;ve mihinon £ femel in
infirmorumcuracontigit. Vi in febricitantibus fitis, lingua ardor compefcatur.
Nfebricitantiú querimonijs ex ſiti, & linguæ ardoribus, Criſtalli vfus
inter præcipua iudicatur remedium. It lad enim fi diù in aqua frigida agitatur,
&ore deindedetinetur, fitim & calore corrigit, atque linguam humectat:
ma ioris tamen virtutis eft lapis albus, qui in lysacis capite reperitur. hic
porrò ſub lingua agitatus non modo fitim ca loremquerefrenat; verum etiam
faliva in ore excitat: vnde febricitátibus,& ma kimè, fiticuloſis prælentaneum
iudicae tur effe præadium. Ex Lemnio. Skolen Al ignis prefidia fuiſsimè in
morbis CW AX: dis Aegypties TerueTATE. Var Aegyptij admodum proclives in
languentium cura,adignea prælia dia eligeada,propterea vftione vtuntur
afthmatelaborantibus,in ſtomacho frie gido,humidoque ab humorumque dea Auxu,
&facibus repleto,Hepar,& Lic nem obduratum, &refrigeratum,multa cum
vtilitate inucunt; Hydropicos ſub vmbilico, &fub hypochondrio finiftro
linea petia ignita adurunt. In doloribus dorfi,lumborum,colli, & orenium
arti culorum,in ſpina dorli,lumbis,collo, & alijs partibusdolore
cruciatis,hocpræſi-. dium frequentant, In tumoribus à crue. dis, pituitofisquc
humoribus generatis ad ignem confugiunt, tanquam auxiliú quod citò multosmorbos
curet, inopia queproprium efle autumant. Ex Alpines de Medic. Aeg opri.. Centium,
& populorum ingenia bifuris, prouerbäs: excogitari.. Vlius Scaligeri vir
acutiſsimi inge nij,Gentium,& populorum naturas tum ex hiſtorijs, tum ex
prouerbijs, at que ex ore vulgi ita excepir. Alanoruto luxus:Africanorum
perfidia: Europeorü acritas.Mótani afperi. Campeſtres mol
liores,deſides.Maritimi prædones, mi ftis tamen moribus: eadem ratione In
fulani quoqueſunt.Indimobiles, inge nioſ, magiæ ſtudioſi,numcro fidenteso
Affyrij,Syri ſuperſtitioſi. Perſæ, Medi Baštriani,Pyrrhi,Scythæ,Sibi,Phryges, Cares,Cappadoces,Armeni,Pamphilij,
mercenarij, atquealijsbellicoſi, Aegyp tiz ignaui,molles, ſtolidi, pauidi.
Afria cres infidi,inquieti.Aethiopesanimofi, pertinaces, vitæ mortifque iuxta
con temptores. Thraces,Myfi,Arabes,Mo. ſchouitæ, Pæones, Hungari,prædones.
Illyrij, Liburni,Dalmatrz, iactabundi, Germani fortes, limplices, animarum
prodigi, veri amici, verique hoſtes,Sue. tij.Noruegij.Grunlandi, Gorri, beluæ,
Scoti non ininus. Angliperfidi, inflati, feri,contemptorës,ftolidi,amentes, in
ertes, in hoſpitales,immanes. Itali con Atatores irrifores,fa &tioſi,
alieni fibiip kis bellicofi,coacti,ferui vine (cruiant, E H Dci 318 ! CEL: 1: 1:
Dei contéptores. Galli ad rem attenti, mobiles,leues,humapi,hoſpitales,'pro-.
digi,lauri,bellicoli,hoftium contempto ges,atque idcirco ſui negligentes, impa
rati, audaces, cedentes labori, equites, omnium longè optimi.Hifpanis vi&
us, afper domi,alienis menfis largi, alacres, bibaces,loquacesyia & abjadi
lor 3.Poc-, tices. SCMabaum,Solis Lunaque coniunčtionen piuentibus oftendere.
Irabile eft, quod à natura Scara-. bæus animal notifsimúedidicit, omnibus enim
Solis, L'unaque coitum apertè demonftrat.Hicex bibulo fter core pilulam ab
ortu, ad occaſum totá. döverlans, in orbis imaginem effingit, quam
xxviii.diebus peracta humiicro beobruit ibique candiu abfcondit, dum
ZodiacuniLunaambiens fiat interme.. itiis,& fileat:tum foueamaperit, &
fide-. THM coniunctionem denuncians,nouam pralem cdit: hæc enim eft iftius
beſtio la necalia nafcendi origo Ex Mizeldo.i. exo # Bobilin 2x Quorundam aimalistu natur &..
Oseft conftans, afinus piger,equus: libidineincenditur, petitąue impe.. tnosè
femellam;lupusmiteſcerenequit; Vulpes inſidiola, aſtuta callida: Ceruus
timidus;Formicalaborioſa:Apis parca: Canis gratioſus, ad amicitiam propēlus,
Leoſolitarius,expers focietatis,nunqua pabulum externum admittens, tanta vocis
magnitudine, aut fonitu, vt ſolo Tugitu celerrimaanimantia profternat; Visſa
pigerrima,ſolitaria,corporegraui, compacto, indiftin & o: Panthera vehea
menis,& ad impetus faciendospropenfa, pernixoyedi& a quaſitota
fera.Anguis fæniculi paſtu oculorum lippitudinem carat: Formica temporishyberni
pabu lum æfiate condit:Item - fides in canibus, in elephante manſuetudo,ftudium
ore of natus in Pauone, çura vocis amanæ ſuam, uiſque in Lufcinia.Forciuss.
Cervorum vitam,eße lengisimam. Piabat Magnus Alexander poſteria -jari, Ceruorum
vitæ loogicudinem oftenders,propterea multoscapi iuſsit, quibus aureos torques
in collo in neđi voluit: in ijs temporis curri culum erat expreffum,
&Alexandri deo creturn; illorum aliquot poft centum annosab Alexádri morte
capti fuerunt, qui adhuc ætatis ſenium minimè pręfe ferebant.Ex Plinio.
Mafculinum fuum citius in ptero, gianfo mining animeri.. X omnium ferè
Scriptorum opi nionemaremfætum citiùs in vtero, quam fæminam animari capitur,
aiunt enim marem io dextra parte matricis ex feminecalidiori concipifæminam:
verò ex ſemine frigido, ſiue minus calido in finiftra partematricis,
quæcomparatiuè ad alteram frigida eft.Hincmasdie40. foemina verò 80.vel90..vt
plurimuma nimaridicitur:quod frigidum tardum fit,&pigrum in ſua operatione:
calidum. autem velox: idcircò virtutem forma tricem invno femine velocius,
& citius mébra organizare, & formare, quam in alio obferuamus. Ex
DominicoTbolofano fuper Leuit.cap. 1 o. Pici HORTVLVS GENIALIS 183
PictMirandulaniingenium, quam maximè collaudatum. A,&, +
PiciMirandulani,& ingenium, & & multiplicem do & rinam
collaudabant, & miro ordine extollebant:Quando(in quit Picus) ron eft,vthac
in re mihi,aut meo ingenio velitisbiandiri: quin refpi.. cite potius afsiduis
vigilijs, atq; lucu brationibus,quàm noftro ingenio plau 9 dendum: & fimul
aſpicite fupelle & ilem noftram,atque librorum thefauros:oité I debat porro
Picus bibliothecam egre. gio ornatuconſtructam,atque omnigem nis libris ex
varia eruditione refertam. Ex Crimite InHydrargyro onnis metallica Supernatare.
Akreexcepto. Ercij,vel fi mauis, Argenti viui; proprietas mirabilis cit, quòd,
omnia mineralia ferè,vtplumbum, fer Tum, æs, & alia ponderotiſsima(excepto.
auro )in eo fuperpatent: aurum ditem, * fundum petir, & eius recipit, cola
rem, quiignis tantùm opeabfumitut & in fumú mali odoris refoluitur. Hu. jus
nidor, & virulentia nauſeam, nocu mentumque adftantibus inducit: inde
membra ſtuporem recipiunt, & nerui relaxantur; vt fæpifsimèip inauratorio
bus obferuatur. Ex Lem. oleicinnamomai rara o pretiofa como pofitio,plerisque
incognita. Icinnamomiolcum ad diuerfas infira: mitates parare optabimus caperec
portet, cinnamomicontriti lib.j.quam adinftar liquid: pultis cum oleo amyg-:
dalarum dulcium commiſcere ftude bimus, tum demum duodecim dierum ſpatio in
loco tepido clauſo vaſculo fituabimus, poftmodum ex torculari totam id
exprimatur fortiter: hac ett nim methodo oleum, odoris,.coloris, &
faporiscinnamomihabebimusad vo tum. Hocadvires reparandas, & Vio letudinem
conferuandam rarum eft ro medium, prodeft parturientibus, & in ftomacho
debilitatotam interius,quàna exterius vfurpatur; ngritudines frigi 18g A E das
arcet, & in partibus corporis ro u borandis eft tantæ efficaciæ, vt vix ale
v toruin conſimile inueniatur remedium.. e Marimum Herinaechin
tempeftates:mariti w pracognofcere. Dmiranda profecto: eft' Marini Herinacei
proprietas: hic paruus pifciculus eſt, nullatenus tranquillita tis tempore
naturali propenſione futu ram præcognoſcit tempeftatem. Ea im. minente ita fe
præparat: faburram fa cit, lapidem ore percipiens, ne maris flu &
us,vndaqueimpetuofæ facile eum diocodimouere, atque huc illuc in pellere
valeant. Nautæ id afpicientes: fucuram tempeftatem à piſciculo hoce. do &
ti percipiunt, ob id anchoras & fue. des, & fe ipfos parant,
tempeſtatibus maris reſiſtere poſsint.Ex D.Ambrofia, Miracuimdam fontis in
Epiro Proprietasi A naturz proprietas illius fontis, qui in Epiro (vbi Dodonæi
louis tema. plum olim inftru &tú erat, quacaufa hic faces facer di &tus
eft ) inuenitur. Ille fri. gidus eft, & immerſas faces, ſicut cx teri
extinguitcum: autemfine igne pro culadmouentur,mirabiliter accedit, A bulenfis
fuperGeref.cap. 13. de hoc menti onem facit, afferitque huiuſmodi pro prietatis
cognitionem Adam, & conté poraneis fuiffe apertam, diluviogue &
gentiumdifperfione effle perditam.vide Pomponium Melam. mHecla ignem emiffum,ficcis.extingui,
to que verò nutriri. Dmirationem, &fidem omnem ſuperaret, ignem ab aqua
nutriri, & non extinguiintelligere,nifiGeorgi us Agricola,vif noftræ
tempeftatis me moria dignus,oculatus adfuiffet in He cla.Narrat hic in Inſula
Irlandia mon tem nomine Heclam exiftere,, ex quo ignis emittitur,vt hodie in
Vulcanopro. pe Siciliam,Sicaniam dicam, & Puteo lis in loco vocato le
Fumarole, obſer uamus. Ille autem à cæteris diſsimilis ficcis extinguitur, aqua
verò alitur. Ex lib:noftro de Hydrom:Naty. Hominum aliquot fubtilioris, plerofque
au tem groſsioris ingenij adeffe. Ropterea Aftrologi, & præcipuè Al.
bumas,hominum aliquos fubtilioris i ingenij,aliquosverò groſsioris inueniri
volunt: quia in eorum natiuitate Mer. curius, vel bonam,vel malam habet pòa'
fituram.In quorú enim natiuitate Mer. curius in domo,velexaltatione Solis fue
sit, ij ſunt ingenio prædici; fi verò fuerit + in domo Lunæ, nafcuntur
groſsioresor Ptolemæus, Bropoſ. 70. in quorum ortu | Luna reſpicit Mercuriú,
fapientes fieri voluit;contra autem amentes:quiaLuna virtutes naturales
infundit,Mercurius verò rationales:vnde eum virtutes naa turales,quibus
corpusguberdatur, rati onem reſpiciunt, ille nafcitur sapiens; cùm autem non
refpiciunt, amens. Hac etiam de cauſa efficitur mentis hebes, & obliuiofus,
qui in natiuitate Mercurium babuerit retrogradum: fi enim dire &tus
fuerit,ingenijceleris fiet. HancAſtrolo. gi ducunt rationem, quòd ftellæ nóim.
peditæ,luas faciant naturales operatio nes; oppoſitum autem,fiimpediuntur.
Hisdecaufis frequenter Aſtrologosve sa pronoſticare de moribus hominiume"
accidit; non quòd ita neceſſariò eue. niant, fi homo per voluntatem, ratico pis
legem magis, quam ſenſusſequi vo luerit:fed quia pronuseſt ad ſequendum
appetitum fenfitiuum, in quo Aſtra influunt. Raxael. Matr. in Addit. Bartol..
Bibyl. Galenum omniumporiamcorporis, folum perfe& ifsimè inter veteres,
morbos Caraffe. Ratapud Aegyptiosinuiolabile de cretum, vt fingulis morbis,
finguli adhiberentur medici. Hinc illorum 0. cularii, auricularij, &
alterius,morbo rum nomenclaturæ aliquot vocabantur: arbitrabantur enim fieri
non pofle, vt v nus omnium curarum difciplinam re&tè teneret; quamuis in
vnadoctus habere tur, vt BaptiftaFulgofuslib. 2. adnota uit. Galenus tamen
illic temporis inter veteres, naturæ miraculum, omnium corporis humani partium,
tanquamfa. E pientiſsimus,morbusperfe& ifsimè fo lus curare nouit. In
lib.de Pet. Art.Med.c.2. Grecos feriptores de Iudeorum monumenti rutibi
pertractafle Riſteas, cuiushodielibellus extat de Translatione In terpretum,refert;
Ptolomeum Philadel phum, fecundum Aegypti Regem poft Alexandrum, quæluille ex
Demetrio Phalereo, quem ille inſtruendæ biblio thecæ præfecerat, curGræci
ſcriptores,.nullá dehiftoriis, &monumétis ludæo rummentionem feciſſent
reſpondiffe autem Demetrium, tentafle quidem id facere Theopompu,&
Theode&tem,no biles in primis fcriptores, & quedá ex lu.. dæorum
monumentis ioleruiſle fcriptis fuis: fed mox taméluifſe temeritatis pe
nas:illum enim amentia: hunc cæcitate diuinituspercuflum; ſed poftea mali fui
caufam agnofccntes, & ex animo dolen tes, placato Deo,ſanitari elle
reſtitutos. Eufebius lib.8 De Prapar. Euang. A Cane qido demo- fum, inftarCanis
la traffe proditumeft. Ex corrupta imaginatiua non femel à cane rapido commorh
latrare vifi funt:cognouit enim NicolausFlorenti nus quendam, quià cane rapido
morſus, curationem vulneris minimè quæfiuit; exercuit hic per dies 35.negotia
ſua abſ. que læſjone, maneautéfequentis diei è lecto ſurgens retrò vxorem ſuam
inftar canis ſtetic, cæpico;pofteam latrare: dú autemab illa
reprehenderetur,lubridés ſurrexit, idque pluries eadé die reperi uit. Serò
corrupta ex eius ratio, & die 40.mortuusà morſu illato repertus eft. In
Arthritidey Chiragra, quando mors fuccedas. Arò mortem in Athritide, & Chi
R corporis ignobilibus humor refideat; hinc (nouo haud fuperueniente morbo)
tales àmortis periculo, vexatidoloribus vindicantur. Has tamen mori com pertum
eft, quando circa finiftrum pectoris finum, cui cordis turbinatus mucro ſubeſt
humorum colluuies den cumbat,atque Gniſtræ manus digitus an Bulan Di mularis nodum acquirat, ac valde intu i
meſcat.ex Lemnis. Lienen ad -corporis tarpitudimem maximè Talere,
Vantacoloristurpitudine,qui ab in dicuntur,exiſtant, in dies obſervamus, non
modò in illius obftru &tionibus, verùm atqueScirrhis, alijſque tumori -
ribus. Hioc iure dicebat Galenus z.de Natur. Facult. Quibus corpus florefcit,
his lienem decreſcere,ac vice verla,qui bus lien creſcic, illis corpus
tabeſcere, & o vitiofis repleri humoribus. Caufa om nium eft, quòd lien ab
infar &tu fa & us imbecillis,nequit(fa &ta humorum ſeparatione in
Hepate) melancholicum fuc cumad ſe attrahere: hinc demiflus ille cum fanguine
corporisatro colore ani. bitum maculat. Iumenta clitellaria in itinare fibilo,
da Cana In à laboribus fubleuni. Vlicęconcencusſongriſ numeri maximè homines
delectant, ob id multi & cymbala, & alia muſica inftrumenta
frequentant, vt animus à mæftitiis fubleuetur. Hac coniectura obferuatum eft:iumenta
clitellaria in la boribus, & itinere, cantu, & libilo al
leuari:propterea mulones, vt muli, ce seraqueiumenta dicellaria,& tarcinam,
& alia onera minus laboriosè fentiant, tincionabulorum torques in illorú
col. lisfufpendunt, quorum fonitu, huiuſ modi valdedele &tari cognouerunt,
& perinde refici, & à laſsitudinc fubleyari. Ex Vairo kb.z.da Fafcine,
Mafalas nigras in acutis morbis apparentes, exitium prefagics. Neer ligna,
mortem languentiuni, quæ præſagiunt in febris acutis, illud maxime obſeruatu
iudicaui dignū, quod à Sauonarola multa experientia com probatum eft. Sienim
infacie, ſeu genis ægrerum,maculæ nigræ obortæ contpi cientur,prcculdubio
languentis exitium minantur,quippè venenofæ, & peftiferę materiæ in corpore
predominiú redun dere arguunt, ex quo mors ſubſequitur. Has IS HORTVLVS
GENIALIS 193 2 Has cum obſeruaſiet Sauonarola, ex tali ľ prognognoſtico,magnumhonorem
fua ifle confequutum refert. Acetum adictus venenofos epotumplurimum valere. X
Cornelij Celli obferuatione ace tum pertum eſt:quippecùm puer quidam ab j.
afpide ictus eſſet, & partim ob ipſum vulaus,partim ob immodicos æftus,
fiti premeretur,cum in locis ficcis aliumhu morem nó reperiret,acetum, quod
fortè ſecum habebat, ebibit, & liberatus eſt: coniecturandum eft acetum, quamuis
refrigerandi vim habeat, habere etiam difsipandi,quo fit, vt terra reſperſa co
spumet. Propterea eadem vi veriſimia le eft, fpifleſcentem quoq; intus humo.
rem hominis, ab eo diſcuti, & fic dari fanitatem, lib.s.de ictu afpidis. A
quodam piſtisgenere febrem illico ex citari. N Arota flumine Inſulæ Zeilã quod.
dam piſais genus reperiri referunt, quod manuapprehéfum febrem accen, 1 dat.Equidem
piſcesillic neutiquam el culenti ſunt, liceat flumen fitpiſcofiſsi mum, qui
tamen piſcem febrium appel fatum retigerit,confeftini à febre corri pitur;ſed
quod mirabilius eſt, demiſſo piſce, ftatim liberauit.Cardanus, & 566 lig.in
Exercit. Fæminas in maresfuiße commutatas fabulo fum non est. Pudmultosauctores
ex pluribus obferuationibus notatum reperio, foeminas in mares quandoque commu
taras fuifle:referam folum, quod tempo reFerdinandi I.RegisNeapolisfueceſsit.
Erat Salerni quidarn Ludouicus Guara rea, à quo quinque filiæ fufceptæ funt,
quarum natu maioribus duabus, alteri Francifcæ, & alteri Carolæ erat nomen.
Hæ ambæ cùm perueniffent addecimu quintum annum,in mares mutatę funt: ijs enim
genitalia membrainſtar marių eruperunt,mutatoquehabitu pro mari bushabiciſunt:
Franciſcus, &Carolus nuncupati.Ex Fulgoro. Sene & utis incommodatam
corporis quàm Animai NKINGT ANTUT: Quanta fint in fenibus, & corporis,
& animi incommoda, non modò à Scriptoribus, verùm arquecontinua,ob
feruatione experimar,vt iure afferere libeat,hanc hominis poftremam ætatis $
partem miferrimam iudicari. Mortales enim cùm ad fene &tutem perueniunt *
cor eorum affcum eſt,caput tremulú, (piritus languidus, anhelitus færidus,
frons caperata, corpus recuruum, nares mucores deftillant, vifus debilitatur, i
capilli decidunt, dentesputreſcunt. In fuper ſenes ſunt iracundi, inexorabiles,
moroſi,nimis creduli, rarò obliuiſcun. tur iniuriarum,laudantveteres, prælen
tia damnant,triſtes ſunt, languidi, iniu cundi, &
alperi:ſuntauari,ſuſpiciofi, o. neroli,difficiles.Exquibus fene &tutem
fentina, & cloacam efleomnium ford ú, & immunditiarum ætatis noftræ
confia tendum eft.Ex Lauren. Cupero. + Magnum Alexandrum, corporis ſudorem ha
buiffe redoleni em. Rat Magnus Alexander tam re & a humorúarmo I 2 nia, E
196 BARICELLI nia, & temperamento conftitutus, vee iusanhelitus odorem
balſamiexpiraret; imò fudor, quem è corpore emittebat, tanta ſuauitate, &
fragrantia redolebat, vt quoties eiuspori recluderentur, gra tiſsimis odoribus
perfufus crederetur. Quod autem mirabile, & difficile credi tu eft,cadauer
eius tam fuauiterſpira bat, vt aromaticis ſpeciebus repletum efle
iudicauerint.. Ex Quinto Curtio,& lib. noftro de Hydron.Natur. Diuerfe
quorundam hominum virtutes, ornamentA. P tibus,tumanimi magnificentia col.
laudantur,omnes in paucis earum per. fe &tionem, confirmant. Porrò Ablalo
nisformam, & pulchritudinem extol lunt:robur, &fortitudinem Sampfonis:
fapientiam Salomonis: agilitatem, & celeritaté Afaelis:diuitias, & opes
Creo G: liberalitatem Alexandri:vigorem, & dexteritatem Hectoris:
eloquentiam Homeri: fortuuam Augufti: Iuftitiam Traiani: zelum Ciceronis. Veteran
Baderoase no canna, & in papyro penna fcribebate Veterim ruditas,
&infcribendo vari Arbara equidem,& mifera erat ve teruminfcribendo
ruditas:ij enim primò in cinere, deindein corticibus, & folijsarborum,pofterin
lapidibus,mox in lauri folijs, exinde in laminis plum beis,conſequenter in
pergameno, & tan dem in papyro fcribere politiſant.Erat præterea illis in
modo fcribendi, ins Itrumentorum diuerfitas: in petrisenim:. ftylo ferreo, in
folijs penicillo, in cinere digito,incorticibus cultro in pergame. Eorum etiam
atramentum varium erat, primum fuit liquor pifcis illius, quem nos ſepiam
appellamus;deinde mororú fuccus;ad hæcex fuligine caminorum; mox eft fynopica
rubrica,aut minio; vl. timò tandem ex galla,gummi,, & vitrio o lo fieri
cófueuit. Bx Strabonede situOrbis. $ InAngira prauosatiuspilulami rabiles
Periamnunc pilulas meas maxi mæ efficacia, quibus in angina 3 prafo А pręfocatiua
à cratsis frigidiſý; humori bus exorta, ſéper cu felicifucceeflu vfus fum.Interalias
obſeruationes, in quibus tale medicamétum libuit experiri, luc cefsit calus in
R. Petro de Stephano Archipresbytero Cercelli, qui ferè fufa focatuserat, quare
vocatus anno 16156 vt eius ſaluti confulerem; cognito mora bo, quòd ex craſla
& viſcida à capite de ftillatione fieret, pilulas meas in aurora
exhibui,non fine loſephi de Simoncin medicinaDo&oris, mei collegæ admis.
ratione, qui rennebat quodammodo. medicamentum. Eratpilularum come pofitio ex
trochis, alandahal, & Aloes an.Scrup.Sem.j.Diagrid.Scrup.Sem.cú ſyrup.de
líquiritia conficitur maſſa. Ex hac plurimępilulæ,vtfacilius æger de glutiret,
confe&tæ fupe:Hisdeglutitis, iuriscicerum fubitò cya mbum propine. re foleo,quemadmodum
in hoc feci, qui fine moleſtia euacuauit, & breui delituit dolor &
gulętumor,benè reſpirauit,be nècomedit, & vna die fanus factus eft,
cummaxima multorum admiration & lgtigia. His pilulis vfus eftGalenus ad
linguam tumefactam, vi lib. 14. Method s med. ſcriptum reliquit: Capitis noftri
capillos, plant arumnatura mo ximè aRimilari. M Agnácapitisnoftris
capillicumplá tis retinent fimilitudine: quemaddum n.plantę nónullæ humoris
defe& u. inarefcétes contabeſcút,aliç verò alienis naturæ ipfarum humoribus
occurſantes: o pereunt; fic &capitis noftricapillisaccia: -1 dit:vel n.ex
humiditatisdefe & u,quanu. triútur; vel ex eiuſdé prauitate corrum- 3
puntut, & decidunt.inc defluuiú & alir eapillorūdefe& us in
cap'oriútur.Ex Gal. Qya dia volucrum pennits varite coloribus tirgere valeamus:
I volucrú pennas variisco !oribus tin--, gere 1 ter abluereoportet; mox in aqua
alumi.. nis decoquere,atq; du calent,in aquá cro co colorarā, ſi flauas eas
cupimus, conii. * ciemus:lina.cæruleas, in fuccú, aut vinü acinorú ſambuci vel
ebuli.In diluto fio. ris æris virides fiunt: codémodo colore minij,atraméti,
alteriusue coloristin &tas habebimus. Agric Poftulanie,à meluannesBerardinus Agricolas,
Filicibus pro frumentoconfervant do in borreis pri. Oftulauit Mazzocca à
Vitulano,magna expe cationis adoleſcens, ob flagrantem in ſtudia amorem, cuius
familjaritas apud me gratiſsima eft:CurAgricolę pto fru mento conſeruando,
filicibus pro ftra gulis in horreis vtantur; Equidem hu ius ingenium, &
animi indolem fepè de miratus fum: proptera in recurioſiſsima complacere
volui.Vtuntur Agricolæ fie 1 cibus in horreis, vt cerealia à corrupte la
præferuent: quippè filix à proprietate generationi obeft, hinc agrifilice pleni
reputantur fteriles. Hinc filix epota ne cat vermes, &ex aluo deiicit: in
grauie dis necar fætum, mulieresque reddit ſteriles: quapropter multa ratione
agria cula (1.cet tanti arcaniline ignari) filio cibus pro frumentorum
ſtragulis vtun ter: quia illorum corruptioni maxime refiftuor. Terrestres
Lumbrices digitorum panaricium: fanats. Panae sol PAnaricium in latere vnguium accidit,
&interapoftemata numeratur,quod tantum inducitdoloris, vt patiens, ne. que
diu, nequenoctu dormire valeat. Prohuiuscuratione, & dolorislenitione
multimultafcribunt: egoprofe & dcer. tiſsimo experiméto multoties compro
baui, lumbricos terreſtres viuos ſuper pánaricium alligatos,præfertim in prin.
cipio,mirabilitet apoftemacompefcere, & fanare, vt vix diei fpatium affe
&tus pertranſeat. € Galega, atqueScordimir am,contra lüemo peffifentemefe
efficaciam. M Trabile obſeruamus Galege, & Scordii efle virtutem cótra
febres malignas, & peſtilentes; fi quis enim Galegęfoliainacetariis,
autcarniú iure femetindiefumplerit,afebre hactutus, & incolumis
præferuabitur. Idem (Gam leni teſtimonio ) Scordium efficere pro batum
eft:fiquidem ex.veterum quorú, dammonumentis aduerfus putredinem Scordium
fingulare effe. remedium tra đitur, vt j.de Antid.capaz. legimus:nam Is cum nteremptorumcadauerain
pręliog multosdies infepulta máſillent; quęcund que ſuper ſcordium.fortè
fortuna cocia derant, multò minùs aliis computrue. runt; ea præfertim
particula,qua(cerdi um attigerant:ob quáremomnibus per ſuaſum eft,tam reptilium
venenisquàm noxiis medicamétis quæ corpusputred ſcere faciunt, fcordum
aduerfari. Anni bal. Camil En. Nodos. in infantis ombilico filiorumrume-, rum
haud oftendere. * - 103 Pleriqueexnodis inkantis primènato bliorum numerum ex
eadem matre: naſciturumcognoſcere profirenturthoc autem caretratione;fæpèenim
fit, vt illa moriarur, aut cafta viuat:vel plutesge neret filios, & pariat,
quàm nodorum numerus exiſtat;fiue plures viros habeat: è quibuscum alio plures,
cum alio paung ciores filios fuſcipiat. Proptereà certio. kiratione afferendum,in
nodorum vm bilici primi infantis coniectura, exiſtin, mosfæcundosvteros
plerumque plures ! nodosininfátis parerevmbilicofteriles; miebe autem paucos,
eofque non ad vnguem diſtincos, vt frequens obſtetricum obą feruatio
demonftrat, & vt euentui hæc talia, vtplurimum concordare.viden i tur. Ex
Carda. 8.de Oryalum quem ſolo afpeétu auriginoſosbom. mines ſanare. Irabile
eſt, quod de Oryalo aue ecircumfertur. Hæc potrò talem dicitur fuiſle naturam
ſortita, vt icteria cum affectum, à quo homines plerum que moleſtantur, ad ſe
valeat ſolo oculorum afpectu attrahere; proinde vocao tur I &teribus,fiue
Galgulus à multis, ab ' Ariſt. autéin biftor.animal.Goryon. Sed 1 quod
mirabilius eft, auriginofus homo ab alite viſus fanatur,ales verò moritur.
Homines, quandoque ſolo intuitu Ophtbaho miam contrahere. Vita obieruatione
animaduerti Ophthalmiam fiue lippitudinis morbũ quádoq; contagiosú elle, &
folo perinde afpe & uab hominibuscontrahi:: oculi enim tunc adeò
perniciofam vim. $ retineat, xt in alios propriumaffectum, 6 ciacus ejaculari valeant. Pulchra ratione hoc
Vairuslib.j.de Fafci, quomodofieri por fit, differuit:Siquidem animus malèaffe
& us fuum quoque corpusmalè habet; ob id fianimusaliquomcrore, aut vi. tio
afficitur,colores.corporisetiam im mutar:ſi enimab inuidiacentatur,pallo re,
&croceoscolore corpus. inficit. Inde fitetiam,winuidia tabefcentes,ftocle.
Jos.inaliquem. liuentes.defigunt, animi fimul venenum vibrent, & quafivirule..
tis iaculis confodiant.Proptereamirumi non-ef, hominesaliquando ſolo.aſpe &
uindippitudinemincideres,vt Hieron nymus, Thomafiusmedicusinſignis, (dú ipfe
Neapoli ftudijs.vacarem ) defeipfo. teftatus eft. Adlapidessenum,din
neficefrangendos mine rabile remedium.. Vidam -medicus ecuditus, ad lapin
desfrangendostanquam admiran dium.parauit cibum,cuiusefficaciam a.
dedimirabilem eſle cognouit,včad.lapi.. desexpellendos non folumà renibus,&
retisa;ſed etiamab anulo comedentis, efficacius remedium haud confedus fu.
erit.Paraturex hepate, pulmone, reni. bus,tefticulis cum priapo hirci, quæ cú
& croco, cinnamomo, & mellemifcentur, ac ijs hirci inteſtina
implentur.Doſis fint duæ, aut tres.buccella Res porrò mon ftruofa,faveraeft.Ex.Micbaele
Pafebl. lib. 1.Metbed.Meck. Veterum medicornmpro conferuanda Sanin tate
collegium lans Rifx potentiſsimus Afiæ, & Syrie, quialter Alexanderdi
&tus fum, it (vt ex Ariftiin libisecret.fiuede Regin.
Principa.habetur)medicos præftantiores exregionibus Indiæ, GregiæMediæ,, ac aliarum
mundi parcium congregauit, quibus impofuit,vttalem inuenirent medicinam, qua fi
homo vteretur, nec. medicis,nec adia: mediciņa indigeret, pollicitufque fuitRex
dirüsimus maxi mumpræmiumefle daturum.Illi autem pro maturèconfülendo e rrium
dierum fpatio postulato collegiú iniuére. Mox ad Regem cùmomnes cffent
requiſiti Sanages Grocus Medicinæ peritiſsimus, qui pręter ceterosdo &
trina & fciētiarua tilabat omniú conſenſu Regiindicauit, quòd fumere quoủibet
manè aquábisplez noore,efficiat,vt homo fanusperfiftat, &alia haud
indigeatmedicina.blocpro feccò à rationealienu non eft:vtenim in Arabum,
Græcorumque antiquifsimis voluminibus inuenitur,aqua ponderofitatis ratione ad
ftomachi fundum ten dit,auget calorem, & citiùs comprimit, & digerit
cibos, digeftionig; maximè au: xiliarur,ceteriſk; mébris corporispluri
múconducit. Fabrorú exemploid torú inquiritur, quiin accenſoscarbones mo dicum
aquæ conijciunt,vt ignis vi'maioriaccendatur.Idcirco binos aquæclear ræ hauftus
manè potare, menfe Iunio præſertim, propter choleram reprimen dam, multum
confert ad fanitatem cone feruandam. EfBurtbolam. Moles in lib. de;
ſanit.tuer.. Alexandrum Magnum fudorem fanguineum in pugna habuiſſe. * Vdare
fanguinem puruminteradri Skadar randa, quæ rard luccedunt,puimera. SUT 1 tur:vbenim in aliquot fudorex láguinis i
iclore cruentus corpore malè affecto,: vifuseft; & is nequaquam
fineadmiratie one, & iftuporezita di illeexputo danguis:
nexortusfuerit,atquein corpore fano; ) vtique maiorem præſtat-negotijcaufam
inueftigandi cupiditatem; vt futiſsimè nobisinlib.de Hydraniofazatura.olimedia
to pertraétatuet Referam nunc quod, Magno: Alexandro euenit; dum eſſet in
extremevitae pcriculo conftitutus.Is cũ, in pugna quadamedererum fumma cum
Indis.decertaters lub @ diarioque milisere
deititueretoMilqucadedcholera:luccés, [useftzvékotocorpore purú languinédes
fudauerit; Barbariſgulecotus igneis filáns misardere vifus fit.Hocautemtantum
ijs terroris-ingcfsit, vt fe Alexandra.com mittere coactant, Lüpathium rantie
darworetaſtas,tenetrier mas, efung aprusreddere. Rat apud veteres Lapathiorum
vfus, pecu liare,eft,vt carnes; &vedulia cú hiselixata vel link dugaa
yesulta, & coriacea,terit titatem, & mollitiemacquirant.Propte. rea,quòdcibos
concoctu faciles przſta, bant,& aluumemolliebant à vecerum à mélis
raròhujuſmodi abfuifle legimus. Catoncorum feminum:muccaginem combusa fionibus
maximèopitulai Nter præftantifsimaauxilia, quæ có buftionibus: adhibentur',
feminun cotoneorum muccagipesretinent prin cipatum. Referam:Petri Foreſti in
pro prio filio experimentum, Ille matri obo. fequioſus,,cümtefta carbone ignito
re pletamkappostaret,cecidit & igneoculos. combuftitit: Putem cum temen
cotone. orum in quâ raſaceam coniecifset,atq;
muccagineoculosiçpiusabluiffet;mira culi-infarpuer-comualuitabfq; combus
ftionis veſtigio. Hoc etiãauxilio in f. milibus cafibus feliciſsimè ſemper vsű
fuiffe,idemconfirmat, In lib.6. Obf. Medo Aegyptiospermotas figuras,fenfus,or.
rummemoriameffingereconfueuiffe. A Egyptiorum fcientia,quia inter
cæterasprecelleroreratapud ve teres, (illa enim ab Abrahan originem habuit)
dcirco,& rudimento, &Hiero glyphicis ferè occulra indicabatur. Si à qui
illorum primi per figuras animaliú (CornelijTaciti teftimonio)léfusmétis
elfingebant, & antiquifsimamonumera humanæ memoriælaxis impreſla cer.
auntur, & literarum inuentores perhi. bentur. Hinc in quibufdam Obeliſcis:
- látcerę reperiuntur,quæRegum illorum diuitias, acpotentiamdeclarant. Per a -
pis enim fpeciemmella conficientis Re. gem oftendebant. Siquem memorem s
fignificare volebant; leporem aut vul. pemauritis auribus, quod fummieſlent
auditus,& inlignismemoriæ,effingebát: fi veròmalum crocodilum:fi velocem,
vel rem citò factam,accipitrem; quonis hæc aliarum fermè auium fit velociſsie
ma. Si inuidum, anguillam, quòd cum piſcibus fit intociabilis.Si iuſtum,oculü:
Gliberalem, dextram manum, digitis paſsis:fiauarunn,ijfdem compreſsis.Per
inſtrumenta quædam, & membra hu. mana pleraque fcribe Jant. De bis vide Pie
arium, Diodorum, Srabonem. lum ritatem,
&mollitiem acquirant.Propte. rea, quddcibos concoctu faciles præſta,
bant,& aluumemolliebant à veterum à mėlis raròhujuſmodi abfuifle legimus.
Cotoncorsimfeminum -muccaginemcombuso fionibus maximè opitulari. Nter
præftantiſsimaauxilia, quæ có. buftionibus adhibentur',, feminum, cotoneorum
muccagines retinent prin cipatum.Referam:PetriForeſti in pro prio filio
experimentum. Illematri obo... fequiofus,cum teſtá carbone ignito re pletamkappúrtaret
cecidit& igncoculos, combuft Pitemaeumtemen cotone. orum iniquárafáceam
conieciſset,atq; muccagineocalosiçpiusabluiffet;mira. culiinffarpuce
-Conualuitabſq; combus ftionis veftigio. Hoc etiãauxilio in fi milibus cafibus
feliciſsimè femper vsű fuiffe,idem confirmat, In lib.6.obf. Medo
Aegyptiospermotasid pguras, fenfus, re rum memoriam effingere confueuiffe.
Aegyptiorum fcientia,quia inter teres, (illa enim ab Abraham originem habuit)
dcirco,& rudimenen,& Hiero glyphicis ferè occulta indicabatur. Si qui
illorum primi per figuras animaliú 5 (CornelijTaciti teftimonio )jēlusmétis -
elfingebant, & antiquifsimamonuméta humanæ memoriæfaxis impreſia cer.
auntur, & literarum inuentoresperhi. bentur. Hinc in quibufdam Obeliſcis
látceręreperiuntur,quæ Regum illorum diuitias, ac potentiam declarant. Per a
pis enim fpeciem mella conficientis Re. gem oftendebant. Si quem memorem
ſignificare volebant; leporem aut vul pem auritisauribus, quod fummieſſent
auditus, & inlignis memoriæ,effingebát: fi veròmalum crocodilum: lì velocem,
vel rem citò factam,accipitrem;quonis bec aliarum fermè auium fit velociſsi
ma.Si inuidum, anguillam,quòd cum piſcibus fitinfociabilis.Si iuftum, oculu: G
liberalem, dextram manum, digitis paſsis:fi auaruin ijfdem compreſsis. Per
inſtrumenta quædam, & membra hu. mana pleraque fcribe vant. De bis vide
Pie. crium,Diadorum,cSrabonem. Quamethodo peftilenti tempore àluenos tueri
yalcancus. Retiofa,acbreuis theriaca reperitur, qua homines ab aere peſtilenti,
ad jun & o vitę regimine,præferuari poſsúr: Sumuntur caricæ,nuces iuglandæ,
folia rutæ, &iuni peri baccæ pondereæquali, confundanturfimul, atq cum
aceto ro faceo, vel communi diffoluantur; mox per pannum colentur, fuauiterg;
expri mantur;ſuccus verò, qui percolabit,fero uetur: vnúenim iftius cochleare,
mane ieiuno ftomacho ſumptum,non finit illa die hominemà peſtilentia corripi.
Ex Alpbane de Pefter Olivarum oleum unguium pun &tura mira biliter fanare.
IN fedando dolore vnguium expun, Aurisacu,vel ferro,atq; iisperſanan dis,nullam
remedium oleo oliuarum fa lubrius inuenitur; confiteor multa oba
feruatione,multisa; experimentis id toa tum comprobaffe. Honefta mulier; ac
vnicè dilecta, Laura de Otaro, mea vxor cariſsima, no femel, dum varia-ad femi liæornamentum,acu
contexerer, in vn guibus digitorum pun&a eft; limplicita menoleo oliuarumio
puncturiscollini to;&dolor confeftim euanuit, & falus introducta
eſt.Ego profe & ò ſemel pun. aus ferri cufpide ſubter pollicisvngue com
ſanguinis effufione, fubitò ad lini mentum ex oliuarum oleo, antequam
aquamtetigiſſem,deueni;quo adhibita dolor delituit,atque vulnus vnà breui ter,
& conſolidationé, & fanitatéhabuito Admirandüauxiliü ad vefica calculã,quoabt
que inciſione diffoluitur,& expurgtur. Nter admiranda auxilia, quæ ad cal
INTE culoſos adhibentur, connumerandum iudico remedium, à do &tiſsimo Hora
tio A ugenio experimento confirmatú in epiftolis addu& um,quo abfque inci
fione in vefica multorum Japides com minuit,& expurgauit.Réferam qua via
id, innotuita Aegrotabat calculo veſicæ cuiuſdam Typographi filius Romæ poft
varia aſſumpta remedia,cùm nulla lub fequutá noſlet ytilitatem,fecaricupidus;
de pretio cû Nurfino artificecóuenerate propterea Sacerdotem iufsit accerf ri,
vt ſumptis Ecclefiæ facramentis, fex le &tione moreretur, animæ fuiffet
confultum.Religiofus ex focietate Iefu, audita confeſsione, proponit illi phare
macum,de quo in leipfo, & in alijs peri culum fecerat: expeririæger voluit,
& magna aſsiſtentium admiratione fana s:Pharmacum ita erat concinnatum.
Puluerris Millepedum præparar,drach, i.ad fummum Scrup.iiij.aquæ vitæ vnc.
Sem.iuris cicerum rub.vnc. ix.velx.ca piatæger calidum,horis quinque ante
prandium. Efectus medicamenti talis fuit. Horarin duarum fpatio totum corpus
incalefcebat, anguſtiabatur z grotus fitiebat, ac ferè loco ſtare non
poterat,aliquandocirca pubem dolores vrgebant.Vrina hora quinta cceperunt
cralsiores:feddi,fed non multæ.Secunda die à pharmaco contingebant eadem, fedvrinæcopioſiores,
& craſsiores.Ter tia labulumapparuit multum. Septima tandem adeò plena
fabulo vifæ funt, ve rectequis diceret,easnihil efte quamfabulum aqua
diflolutum: omnia in me liorem ftatum redigebantur, ita vt, qui
proximèincididebebat, liber abomni malo nona fuerit die. Miliepedum ad
calculosRenum VP fuca preparatio. PRæparantur Millepedes ad Renum Velicæque
calculos talimodo r.Az fellorumquam volueris quantitatem, vinoquealbogeneroſo
abluito diligen ter, mox in ollam copiicito nouam, vi tro obductam, lutoque
aliquopiam ile lam incruſtato, demú in furno exiccen tur,ita vt poſsit in
tenuem puluerem rc. digi; tumverò affunde vini ciufdem gee neroli quantum
poterunt imbibere, & rurfus exiccato, ac tertiò imbibito & exiccato vt
ſupra,quartò veròpuluerem irrorato aqua fragarum deſtillationis &olei
exCalchanto Scrup.j. permifce to inuicem, & exiccato rurſus: vbi verò fic
fuerit exiccatum in tenuiſsimumque puluerem redactum,feruetur in vale vi. treo,aureo,yelargento.
Es codem. Frequentem ficoram efum fudorem parere abominabilem. Licetficorumvfus
multa hominibus commoda părturiat; ran & ij citifsi mè nutriunt, &
impinguant corpora, aluum emolliunt, & per vrinas, & per ambitum
corporis non pauca excernunt excrementa: tamen eorum continuus, & frequens
vfus fudorem generat abomi. nabilem, & corporis fæditatem; indici um huius
rei eft, quòd illorum eſu pe diculorum copia innaſcitur. Hinc apud Rhodiginum
lib.6.Antiquar. teet. Anchie molum, & Moſchuni Sophiſtas,legitur tota vita
fuiſſe hydropotas,acficis modò folitos veſci, & tamen robuſtos extitiflc,
ſed adeò fætentes,vt propter abomina bilem fudorem certatim in balneis aba.
liis excluderentur. Mulieres eximiam, &fuauemrerinete pinguedinem. Orpora
mulierum fuauiori, & ma: ori fulciuntur pinguedine, quàm hominium ipſa,quæ
profe& ò ob ſiccitaa tis, dominium,minùshumidi, & oleofia C ttatis
retinere videntur. Propterea apud Plutarchú 3.Sympol -4.habemus, vbi mul sta
cadauera promifcuè erất cóburenda, veterú tempeftate, temper decévirorú vnú
mulier brcímiſceri ſolitú: qualiil lud vnú tantú ſuppeditaret pīguedin is, vt
cętera faciliùs cócremari valuiſsent, Aſtu demonum, mirabiles in hominum.cor
poribus effectus procreari.: ribus Dæmonis aftu cffectus con ců, ſpiciuntur, vt
quando quis euomat am icus, clauos, pilos,oflamagna: vel quòd plumæ in lecto
fint ingeniofifsimè con ferta:multæ enim de iis obferuationes apud Hieronymum
Mengum in Malleo Maleficar. Paul:Grillandum, & Delrium reperiuntur. Quomodo
autem hæc fieri pofsint, talis eft ratio: aut enim ifta funt Diaboli
illufiones,ita quòd ea videátur, quz vera non funt, fiue per a&iua natu
ralia hoc efficiétia, ſiueper acrifiam,fiue per aeriscondenfationem;aut funt
vera; quippe Diabolusinuifibiliter huiuſmodi in hominis ftomacho intulit, &
exinde viſbi. Emin viſibiliter
educit,licet ram magna vide antur; nam &ea diuidere, & integrare poteft
faltem apparenter,eò quòd loca ſiter huiuſmodi corpora, & partes eorú, ad
nutum moueantur, & ad inuicem con glutinéter,Deo non impediente. Summa
Sylueftrina de Malefic. Carduum Benedi& um ab Hemicrania homi. nes
preferuare. X India Carduum Benedi& um pri mùmomniumad Imperatorem Fri
dericum honoris gratia fuiſle miſſum multi hiſtorici autumant, quod miris
laudibus, ob peculiares eius virtutes, planta hæccelebrabatur,&obidà mula
tis Carduus Sanctus dicitur. Hæcenim venena lupcrai, &confert cùm vlceri
bus, tùm vulneribus, eft præfentaneum remediumad peftem, necat vermes, &
vtero prcdeft, & in cibo, & potu viit pata, ab immenfoillo præferuat
capitis dolore, quemHemicraniam vocant. Ex Trago. Infantes preferuari Apoplexia.Epilepfia
fumpto prime fyropo de Cichor.cum Rhabar. vei Corallio, aut ſucco Rute. tibus
morbus epilepticus,apud au * Etores noftros paſsim legitur, ob id af. feetus
hic vocanturà nonnullis iLorbus * puerilis, liue mater puerorum: Vtau iem cùm
ab Epileplia, cùm apoplexia ghi præferuari valeant, multa obſerua tioneexpertum
eft,iis,antequam lacgu ftent, in primo ortu prebendo fyropum in cichorea cum
Rhabarbaro drach. ii.ab $ hacluepræſeruari,vt Nicolaus Florer - tinus fatetur.
Arnaldus Villanoua Co mit rallium laudat:nam fi diligenter triti të y Scrup.Sem,
infans hauſerit cum lacte, antequam aliquid guſtat, nunquam in Epilepſiam
incurrere obſeruauit. Ego quidem Marcello,Hieronymo, &Mare i co Antonio
filiolis meis ſuccũ ruiæ cum modico auro ad ſcrup. ii. cuilibet dedi, antcquam
lac guſtarent, &gratia Deiab Epileplia immunes exiſtunt.Helionora, K. quæ nunc
ablactatur, feremortua nata eft fumptoque & ieiunato paruo cochle airo
ſyropi de Cihor. cum Rhabar.re uixit, epilepfiam nunquam adhuc palla eft.
Menſtrualem mulieris fanguinema Tontta # nimaliaefe venenum. Nter naturæ arcana
reponendum eſſe iudicaui,quodàMetrodoro Sceptio traditur
demulierismenftrualifangui ne.Mulieres fiquidem fimenſtruationis ſpatio nudatæ
ſegetes ambiunt, erucas, vermiculos,fcarabços,ac alia noxia ani malcula
decidere faciunt. Tale enim à natura ijs virus inuentum eft.Non folú autem
huiuſmodi animalculis menftru alis mulierum fanguis nocere creditur, verùm
atque grandioribus; quippè cao pes, ex Plinij teftimonio menftruofan guine
guſtato, in rabiemutari vifi funt, quorú morſus inter difficillimos mora ſus
fanatu reputatur. At de re hac fupe riùsaliàs tractauimus. Thapfiam veficas,do
ademata corporifuper poftam excitare. Magna profectò eft Thapſiæ effi cacia in
veficis, & ædematibus ge nerandis,idcirco à nonnullis in peftife Eris
febribus vbi veficantia neceffaria súc cum felici ſucceſſu vſurpari audio.Cùm
autem corporis locum aliquem inflare quis deſiderat, veloſtentationis, vel cu o
riofitatis gracia, ponatur Thapfia in low i co conftituta:ibi enim breui
veſicas, & ædemata excitabit; vt tandem citra læ fionem id ſuccedat & breui
etiam fol jů uantur, cheriacam linire, vel curninum, i aut acerü fuperponere
oportet. Ex Car dano lib.8.devaret. | Antivfum inmedicinapro conferuanda va
letudine mirabilem obtinera proprie Mlimbi Irabilis efficaciæ aurum in medi
Lcina eſt:quippe innumeras illud pro corporis tuenda fanitate retinet vir.?
tutes.Eiusvſusin vino maximèexcellit capiunturpropterea aurilamellæ, quæ
ignitętoties in vino extinguútur,donec ferueat iſtud,mox colatur, &
vſuiſerua tur. Vigum bocpotatum ventriculo imbecillo fuccurrit, concoctionem ad
iuuat,foedum colorem emédat, & prin. cipalia membra coroborat, &
rcſarcia. Proinde obferuatum reperio,cor ab illo roborari prauos humores calore
fuo abi fumi,vitales ſpiritusclarificari, hepatia que plurimum prodeffe fua
virtute ile lius vſum. Multi certiſsimo experimen, to huiufmodi vinum vitam
prolongare cognouerunt,fpiritufque fynceros face re,atque virestotius corporis
renouare Nonnulli leproſis multum conducere Scribunt,ve ex Mizaldo, &
Zacharia à Puteo capitur. Quercetanus Auri falia in aliqua betonicæ,autabfinthij
confer lacommiſta, ac deglutita ſua fpecifica facultate vétriculú corroborare
fcripfit, Aliquot animalia ex nature eorumfimili tudine à veteribusfais Dầsfuiffe
dicat. veterum infania in rum falſa religione: quippe,& i nimalibus cultum
reddidiffe,infinitis ae lijs federibus, & naturalibusrebuscircú. fórtur.
Inter alia, quædago apud eos PO animalia erant, quæ ex naturæ illorum
proprietate, & fimilitudine, vtreor, ali quibus Dijs reperiuntur fuisſe
dicata. Hinc Canis Diana { ace: eft, Aquila lo 1 ui, Tigris Baccho,Pawo
luponi,LeoCy beli,EquusNeptuno,Cygnus Apollini, Anguis Aeſculapio, CoruusPhoebo
A finus Libero,GallusMarti,Colúba Vara neri,No& ua Mineruæ, Lupus Marti,
Anſer Iunoni,Soli Phenix.Ex Fonio. Veri V nicornu proprietas, eiusque cognisio,
Erum Vnicornu, quod in febribus peftiferis propinatur languentibus veilitate
maxima,in fyncopemaximo. Pere prodeffe videtur.Illud auté non ex eo
cognofcitur, quòd bullas excitet, vt plerique hominum ignari perſuaſi ſunt:
hocenim quodlibet cornu etiam facit: fed alia, diuerfaque methodo. Hoc eſt
præcipuum experimentum. Si ſcobem eius củ arſenicogallina,turturi,aut co
lumbædeuorandum dabimus, fi fuper Itesmanſerit, vel vnicornuftatim poft
arſenicum fumptum datum fuerit)verí K 3 & legitimum Vnicornu pronuntiabi
mus. Alii in aurificis fornacem demit. tunt, fiodorem cornu à ſe emittet,ve
rumefle prędicapt.Nonnulli experime toʻreferunt, quòd in vftionepon omni no
comburaturſed, augeatur potius minimeque in vſtione fætorem cornu *habeat, tt
in cornu ceruinioexperirilor elet. Ex Føreſto. Oxo artificio mulierum cinni
crocei euadant. CApillorum cullui mulieresmaximè vacát, illud autem
iisoprabilìus eft, vt Aauitiem acquirant. Referam mo dum, quo votum aflequi
poſsint. Su mito Rhabarbarifabæ magnitudinem, fæniGræci, croci fylueftris,
liquiri tiæ tabacci, corticum aranciorum quan.. titatem adtui libitum, paleæ
triticæ ft. militer, his quernum cinerem addito,, & incoquito, vt
tribusdigitisdefcen dat aqua, inde lauentur capilli: tanta enim fauitie“
redundabunt, vt illos aurcos eſledicas.,. Ex Porta in Phitogn. tipios A4
itib...Adexcitandum in fenibus nauralem caló lorem, eorum; vires deperdit
assenquandika confectio præftantiſsima. "Heſauris profecta comparanda eſt,
Marſilio Fici 4. no, in lib.z.devita producenda, Medicina Magorum appellatur,
quippe ſpiritus, naturalem, vitalem, & animalem fouet, confirmat,&
Toborat; & proptereaſenie bus præſtantiſsima eſt. Conſtat hæcex
thurisvnc.ij. myrrhæ vnc,j. auri in fo lia ducti drach. fem. contundere fimul į
tria oportet, atque aureo quodam mero confundere, & in pilulas ducere. Sumi
kä tur huius-mifturæ portiuncula inaurora ieiuno ſtomacho; in æftarecum aqua:
roſacea; in hyeme verò cum exiguo Quomodo febris in aliquo confeftim induci
palent.. VI febrem in aliquo velad oftentatio.. nem, vel ad remedium, curioſi
tatemque inducereoptabimus,(fiquidem in conuulfionibus, parakyſi, aliisque
frigidis affe & ibus,non parumaliquádo K4 febrew meri potu. 14 Sheh febrem excitare profuit, ) Scarabe cor buti in
oleo decoquantur, illogue arte ria brachialis iniungatur: tanta enim eſt corum
potentia, vt confeftim febris, & accenſiones corporis criantur. Ex Car
Nuno. Amultis animalibus anni tempora precognoſci. Tdcntur profe & ò
plerac; animalia anni temporaprecognoſcere:fiqui dem ex corum inſtinctu, illa
homines commentiuntur. Grues enim autumni tempore ad loca calida peruolant, hye
mis frigora fugientes. Hirundines ver nali tempeftate ad regiones noftras re
meant. Ficedulæ, coturnices. aliaque multa volucria, in anni temporibus,pa bula
commutare,aliaque loca adire con ſpiciuntur. Hæc autem non Ver, Autu mnum,vel
Hyemem dire & è præſentiút, quemadmodum nonnulli falsò ſibi per fuafi funt;
fed verius ex facta alteratio neà calido, vel frigido in eorum corpo ribus,fiue
occulta qualitate,has viciſsi sudines facere cognouerunt. Am ago Amantis ex
leuiſsima quidemoccafione sie furcenfere folent.: Viperditè amant,leui alioqui
mo mento iraici videntur: ratiohuius rei eft, quiainiurias, licet leues, graues
iudicant. Grauefiquidem exiftimatur, vtilleiniuriam in te committat, cui ma
ximeplacere ftudeas. Cæterùm quem admodum fubitò dolet», qui contra fui habitus
propenfionem facere quippiam conátur; ita &amantem facere conſpi cimas;moxtamen
rixarum,& odisper nätde, rurfusque fupplex iugumſubacta ceruice repofcit.Ex
Leona dojachine, IN Plenilunio, Nouilunio Pharmaci ex bibitionem àMedicis
maximè deteftai. Vlra rationc à Medicis in. Pleni junio, & Nouilunio
Pharmacam ehitatur: fiquidem Luna,cùm interme Hriseftzomhiijo caret
lumine,atqueſub radijs lotaribus ia &ta, & proinde ſolica caret
humiditate, quo fit vt corpora ne ftra magis licca maneant, & virtusteten
trix robuftior exiſtat. Idcirco fin No puilunio ipharmacum ægris exhibetur;a K
5 abfquedubio humores noxiosagitabit, atqueob retentricis facultatis inobedie.
entiam parum euacuabit.InPlenitapig ob Lunç porentiam corpora noftu yali de
calefcunt,humoresque augetur,Hing In pleniluniis no &tesicalidioreselle ex
perimur,cuius caufa, cailorem à centro ad circumferentiam attrahi, verilmile:
eſt's quas propter fihumores, corporis: noftriad ambitum tendunt, procul dus
bio pharmacum improbatur:illudenim à circumferencia ad centrum trahitmg. tumque
natureperuertit, quo facilefut cedit;vt virtus kadetur,&humorumsys
tiacuatio,velmale,veldeprauana.coring gat: Ex loann,de Pitch
19continuatamaſculorum generatione Jep, LR timanm mirabilembakere virtutem.:
TIG apud multos fcriptores repe rifles, feptimun mafculum com tinuatæ
generationis mirabilem habere virtutem interhæc noftra embammata minimehoc
adieciſlem. Volunt enim quando aliquis ſeptem filios maſculos Continuatim &
inter eos fæminam nul, Quod autem in
Hydrargiro mirabile pullam ſuſcipiat, ſeptimum mirabilem virtutem & ftrumas,
& alios plerofque effe & us retinere ſanandi, An autem ve rum fit,
ncſcio,cupio tamen à fapienti bus experiri. Forum Hydrargiri, fuperpofito
yclamine, 1: in molem Mercuriimatari, Yrifices dum valamineralla inau. rare
cupiunt, Hydrargiro pro bo peremoliendo vtuntur; illud autem in igneimpofitumin
fætores grauem, & fætidas exhalationesreſoluitur,pernici--- ofas quidem,
niſi abijscautè'euitantur. iudicatur, eft iftud, ſiſuper illius fumá linteolum
extendimus, in quo colligi. poſsit, vtique in argentum viuum fu moſitas illa
icerum conuertitur, & Hya, drargiram renouatur. Experimur hoc. etiam in
carbonum fumofitatibus in traffas fuligines reuertuntur, licet die uerfimodè ab
Hydrargiro,Ex Lemnie. Eæculas Bryonia viera mundificando mirane babere pirtutem.
5 K Singularis profe & ò fæcularum Bryo. niæ,tum pro matrice muodificanda,
tum ad hiſtoricas ipſius paſsionesſanan das eſt efficacia:quippe ex multis
expe. rimentis comprobatum eft,in huiuſmo di affiEtibus curadis inter
remedia,prin cipatum habere. Referam ipfarum con ſtructionem, Exprimatur pręło
ex Bry onix conciſis radicibus, & contufis fuca cus.crit primò
turbulétus,idcirco in va ſe aliquo afferuādus eft, vefæcalisma. teria
ſubſideat: detineatur in locofrigi doper paucosdies; in hoc enim fpatio
finclinato vaſculo,viturbulenta aguia) Separetur, & proijciatur) fæces
albiſsi mas inſtar amyli in fundo inueniemus quas iterum in pluribusvafculis
vitreis, aut terreis diuiſasin vmbra vt, exiccen tur feruabimus;ita
protectòintra paucas horaşexiccabitur, & formáanjyli acqui rarexpreſlum,
quã Bryonize foculá no minamus.Hac fingipoſſunt pilulex.aut xij. granorum
pondere, & cú palico ca ſtorci, & alfęferidę ſummü; ac precipuú. aratur
remediú cótra affcctusnarratos. Fæculæ huiufmodi etiamfi diffoluütur, inaqua
florum faþarú pro fuco ad orna tum mulierum,paneaſque defendas ef ficacifsimæ
funt.Ex Quercerano, Miſaldo, &Zubariaà Puted. Millefolium ad conſolidande
vulnera misam babere potentiam. Lurimis experimentis comprobatú audioMillefólij
virtutem ad vulne rum coitionem, indielğue nouis obſer: uationibus
confirmari.Referam folum quod ab Hellerioin Chirurg.adnotatur. Cuidam deciſus
naſus erat,qua osin car tilaginem definit: Ruſticus propenden tem partem
alteridigitis coniunxit,her bam tuſam,& èvino nigro tritam,quod Millefolium
appellant,impegit, rudius omnia colligauit, vede celerrimè reſti. tit fanguis profuens,
& vulnus pulchra e cicatrice brcui coijt. Chymicam aztem, reterum tem;
eftate floruiſe. Pud Veteres i maximo prctio ars p !eriſq;illiusftudio
vacabátur:inginte s A K7 enim diuitiarum copias illa methodo homines
componebant,quibus ditiores facti cum Regibus bellum adibant.Pro. pterca
DiocletianumCæſarem legitur poftquam Achillem Aegyptiorum Du cem o &
omenſcsin Alexandria obſeſsú: profligaflet, omneschymicæ artis libros,
diligenti ſtudio conquiſitos, deflagral. fe: pereparatis opibus, Romanisfacilè.
repugnarent. Ex Suidt, oOrolio. Quoartificio corpus glabrum reddi: poßit L Itet
varüs modis corpus depilatum; &glabrum reddipoſsit,nulla tamen via
præftantior eft,Varronis teftimo nio, quàm loca lauare aqua; vbi Bufo nes
decocti fint,donecad tertiam redcat: - quippè- fi tali decocto corpus Jauetur,
proculdubio glabrum,&fine pilis had bebitur.. Natiuitatis hominum tempora à
multis: obferuari On leuis profectò eſt.multorem: ſcriptorum obſeruatio in
homia. EN lp mum natiuitatis tempore: à multis enim occafiopibus temperamenta
corú. variant, &plerique àrnaturæ terminis, roaximédiftrahantur.
Porròquiinipfor terremotus i momento nafcuntur femper patent in tonitru ſemper
lan guidifumo qardenet Cometa coex ar... dendi complexjoneargentesfuntainter's
Lühiikempordebiles cuadunt, vel fals, temi Ariſtotelis teftimonio ) melan-;
eholici, & atrabile laborantes. Hydárrgýrum non effe vendnum in paura:
fumptums quam itme', fed adver: mes nes andas exiftere remedium ydrargyrum, vel
fimauisargenti vionm, quodà multis venenum exiftimatur, feliciſsimo fucceflu
contra vermes exbibeturjzáptægue certitudi-. nis illud in Hiſpania reputatur,
vtmu lienes, tenellis pueris, quila ĉçis vomi.. ty laborant, ad quantitatern
granorum trium in propria fubftantia propinare audgár:bacn, via morbuscellare
videtur: frequen A Hedmare frequentatisexperimentis. Ego quidem viduam mulierem
curani, quæ nouem dierum fpatio vomitibus continuis ex vermibuslaborauerat,
& ferè triduono comederatznec cibum retinere valuerat. Haiccùm fcrup.ij.
bydrargyri mortifica tii, cum tantillo adoniipropinaffem abfque vlla moleſtia
peraluum centum, & pluresemifitvermes, &eademdie lis berata eft, &
folita exercuit domi, & foris negotia,magna profe & ò parentum ſemper
eventu, domique continuò a quamhabeo, in quaHydrargyrum, in. furum retineo,
illaa que puerulis pro vermibus libentiſsimèconcedo, nec ad hucquempiam ex illo
noxiam recepifle expertus ſum. Vfuseft hoc remedioad
vermesmecandos,MatthiolusHoratius, Augenius, & plerique alii celebres viri,
qui omnes huiusauxilii maximè extol. lunt beneficium. Datur pueris in lub:
ftantia Scrup. ji grandioribus Scrup.ij. vel drach.j. Corrigitur illud, &
nrore ficatur in mortario vitreo cum zuccaro rubeo: ibi enim tam diù conteritur,
vt in partes inuiſibiles diffoluatur; ne au tem in priſtinam formam iterum
redeat, * olei amigdal,dulc.gurtulas binas adde re oportet, & cum zuccaro
rof. violato, vel cidoniato ieiuno ftomacho languen mtibus propinatur.Sciant
igitur curioſiin hac dofi nullum præbere periculum,in # maiori tamen non
dedi,neque concede tem:licet apud Aufonium Epigram.10. o legatur hydrargyrum
contra medicinas venenofas valere. * Datura flores, com ſemper, hominem in
ri(was; concitane. M ! Tra eſt Daturæ potentia in faſcinan.. dis, vt ita dicam,
hominum men tibus, adeò quòd, qui illiusflores, vel Temen ſumpſerit, à riſu,
cachinnisque non defiftat,donec més alienata ex plan tæ viribus in priſtinem
redeat tempera mentum, Apud Indos à furibus Datura vfurpatur;fores enim, vel
femen in ci bos eorum, quosdepredari volunt, exhi. bent, & in mentis
alienationé, & in riſum 2. conci. MA
it concitant: ita profecto furádi parantin duftriam.Durat illorum riſus, &
mentis error, viginti quatuor horarumtermipc.. Ex Gozdab Horto. Lupesſenio
confectos in renibus venenoſosgeo net areſerpentes. Agnum profectò in
præſentiarü arcanum aperio, multis hucuſ. que incognitum de luporum natura. Il
lud eft,cur à Lupis animalia commorfa modòfanentur,modòautemmoriantur..
Anquòdluporum aliqui venenoſi, ali qui verò ſine veneno exiftant?Equidem
CarolusStephanus lib7 Jus Agricult.cap.i. ſe obſerualle fatetur, ib Luporum
fenum renibus,primò ferpentes vno pede.Jona giores, & breuiores, qui
temporisſpa tio venenauſsimi effecti,Lupum enecás. Hac via facilius nobis
tribuiturconie &tura deLuporum morfibus.Si enimle piiuuenes fuerint,
animahaa, momor derint, ex benigniori eorum natura, mortem baud
inferunt,vtmultoties ob feruamus, niſifortè.vulnera in principi buscorporis
fuerint locis, vel tá grádia, vimori neceflc fit.Sin auté ſenio fuerint confe
& i,proculdubio leuiſsimo morſu animalianecabút,propter peculiare ve nenum
inLupo delitefcens,quod víu ve nit,vtpieraq; præmorla animalium, vel moriantur,
velmembrum morſum pu treſcat, vtfaltem difficillimè curetur. Ex. Gaſp Benkino.
Qualiartificio ab vxoribus homines mafcu losfilios fufcipere pale ant. Vita à
Scriptoribus ad marium M reperimus:hæcautem præcipua, & ve riora effe
exiftimaui.Primovthomo ex exceatur,folidiorig;vtatur cibo,atq; ra rius cócubat:
ita n. & calidius & fpiflius fe. méeuadit,fita; prolificum, &
aptiſsimum ad marium conceptum. Secundo mater, & incongreffu fuper
latusdextrum recubat & à coitu confeftim fuper illud conqui elcat: Siquidem
Hippocratesmaſculosin dextris,fæminas verò in finiſtris genera-. ri ſcripſit.In
dextris enim ab Hepate fo. uetur ſemen,quod eſt calidum: in ſini. ftris autem à
liene frigido quoquo pa.; do refrigeratur, & ad fæminarunt 3 conceptum'præparatur.Tertiò
ſpiranti tibus Aquilonibus concubant, Auſtris vero defiftát:Aquilo enim admares
fuf. cipiendos accommodatiſsimum eft,Au fter verò ad fæmellas. Capimus huius
rei ab ouibus experimentum, quæ fiflá. te Aquilone concipiunt, marem ferunt;
Auſtro autem foeminam. Multi, inter quos Cardanus eft,ad marium concep tum
Mercurialis maſculæ elum extol lunt,hæc duos quafi coleos pro feminie bus
habet, & ab vtroq; coniuge depaſta, marem inducere occulte vi exiftimatur.
Magnumele in hac inferiora Lune con fluxum. Trabilis profectò eft Lunæ vis in
hæc inferiora: ipfa enim noctes illuminat, & fuper humida poteſtatem
haber,marisfluxus, & refluxus per quae draturasfuas intētiùs, &
remifliùs facit; quippèdum oritur,maria intumeſcunt, & in æftuariafluunt,
quoufque ad circu. lum meridianum illa perueniat; cùm autem ad occafum inclinat,
Oceanus ab æftuarijsrefluit ingurgites; quando ſub M Orizonte, percurrit,mare
ad confueca æftuaria conuertitur, quoad nocte me dia meridiei circulum Luna
atringat; poſtremdcùm ad Orienté tendit,Ocea Rusquoque ad folitos alueos
regurgitat. Ipſa in Agricultura rebus dicitur do, mina;propterea antiqui
gentiles, qui in terræcultura proficere optabant, Lund libamina ſpecialiter
obtuliſſe dicuntur; y ocabatur Diana, ſiue Latonia virgo, aut Plutonia coniux
velProſerpin. Leonardi asri deOdtimeftri pariu ſenten tiamdebilem effe. Peculatur
Vairus in lib. 2.de Faſcino, Cur partus odimeſtris vitalis mini mè lit,innuit
hic, vir alioquin doctus, talem partum non viuere, ob femen im perfectum:quia
non datur ſemen (vtar guit )quod ad illud tempus fætu procre. are valeat:
ſicutin genere triticiquod dam eft,quod tribus menſibusgignitur; quoddam verò,
quod nouem menſibus: fed debile eft huius fundamentum, quá do in Hifpania,
& Aegypto o & imeltres partusões vitales efle perhibcãt:Potior ergo
concluſionis ratio requiritur,quam nos alibi tábgemus. somniarumprofagizà Deo
diuinare, aliqus bus bominibus concedi. On omnibusfomniorum diuina N
doconcellavidetur,fed quibusà Deo ex ſpeciali gratia permittitur. Qui anim
fomnia proprio ingenio diuirare intendunt (dempta fomniorum intere pretatione,
quæ & caulis naturalibus in naſcitur, quorum præfagium ad media cos
pertinet) aut cæcutiunt, & delirant; aut dæmonum fallacijs inuoluuntur.
Iofeph apud Pharaonem, & Daniela pud Regem Chaldæorum (vt infacris habemus)
quia diuina afflati erant ſapi entia, fomnia diuinabant.Propterea mi niftris
fuis Pharaonem audita fui fom. nijinterpretatione,dixifle legitur: Num
inueirepoterimustalem virum, quifpiriru Deiplenusfit? & Rex Babylonis ad
Da. nielem:Audiui de te,queviäm fpiritum De orum habeas, ce
ſcientia,inselligentiaq, as Sapientia amplioresinuentafunsin tq.ExTa úello. Inter
Polypodium, & Cancrosmagxam in. eſſe antipathiam. Axima videtur inter
polybodie M, i quòd fi polypodiumſuper cancirú abie ceris viuum, breuiſpatio
tum pedum cortices,cum vngues ille eijcier:tanca eft i iſtius plantæ in illum
particularis viru 3 lentia,& efficacia.Ex Mashioto, Ć Dengan Ibidis,
ferpentesattonitos reddere. Irabilis eſt ibidis pennarumvis M contra ſerpentes,
quippe fi illius penna ad illorum quempiam inijcitur, Confeſtim in
veſtigiogreffus hæret: ad mirabiliustamé eft, quòd ſerpens quer pis
frondibuscontacta moriatur, quare circulatores aftantibus mirabilia fæpè
protrahere à racione inconucniens elle a non debet:multa enim iis funt, quæ ad
i mirandaiudicantur:quemadmodum eft Viperam viſo Fago perterri:experimé. "
to enim probatum eſt, illiusramo ante hocanimal iniecto, veluti attonitú fie
si, nec ampliusmoueri Hoc etiá cuenic Gha. ti ſi barundine feuilsime percutitur:
fin verò iterum eadem vipera incutitur confirmari videtur, & fugam repentè
adire. Mulieres rard inebriari, acbrd autem ſenes, Ontrariam naturam ſenile
corpus, Contd & muliebre fortita funt:ob id mulie. res rarò ab ebrietate
corripi afpicimus, crebò tamen'ſencs. Mulier quidem hu mida eft, vtà cutis
cenitate,& fplendo re.comperimus, fenex contra ſiccus, cucis
afperitas&ſqualor confirmat. M11, lier ex aſsiduis purgationibus fuperfluú
exonerat; ſenex autem ex corporis duri. tie,luperfluanonexcernit.Mulieriscor.
pus, quia variis purgationibus crat de putatum, pluribus foraminibus fuit có
fertum; non ſic ſenis corpus,propterea naturales meatus à corporis ſiccitate,
& duricie potiùs obſerantur. Hæc funt în caula, vt ebrii fenes facilè fiant,
muº lieres verò perquàm rard. Nam fià mu. liere largè vinumfuerit hauſtum,
illud magnam mulieris humiditatem incidens,vtiq;vimluam perdit; dilutiulý; fit,
& cerebriſedem non petit: nam per. varia foramina mulieris illius vapor re
Currit, & celeriter eius fortitudo euanel cit.In ſenibus vinum
contrarietatem no recipit: quia corpusillorum ficcum eſt; ob id vinum firmiter
adhæret, cerebría que petit, quia in durioribus membris; & aridis(vt ita
dică ) exhalatio nulla fit: hincab ebrietate facilècapiücur. Ex MA crobio
7.Saturn. Qua induſtria in vrgenti fomno, quis vac leat excitari. Agnus
Alexander,vt ingerendo imperio, occupatior eſſet,magnú contra ſomnum excogitauit
remedium, quoſi quis vtetur,facilèin ſomni graui tate excitari valebit. Ille
Vas æneu pro pè lectum conſtituebat, & pilamæneam fiue argenteam manu
compreſſam ha bebat,brachiumque ſuper vas illud ap tè componebat,vt pila in
ſomno elapſa in æneum procideret, & à fonitu excita retur, &
furgeret.Mira equidé fuit hu. ias ingenij dexteritas, licet hæc Alexandri
dormitatio potius quàm fomnus dici poſsit.Ex Ammiano Marcellino. Quibusfignü
corpora venenata cognoſci yaleant. L Icet venenorum genera multa fint, ex quo
difficile fit omnia figna repe rire,quibus cognofci valeant,afferam ta men qua
mcthodo corpora, quæ venenü fumpferint,intelligere poſsimus. Porrò magna fit in
corpore commotio, dum quis venenum hauferit;præcipuè fiillud calidæ fuerit
naturę:doloribus enim va lidis,atqueacutis in ſtomacho, & inte kinis
torbonibus languens cruciabitur, præcordiorum fentiet anguſtiam, fati gabitur
vomitu,& fuxu ventris, ſudor fuſcirabitur in fronte cum vultu frigi do:
colorægri erit pallidus, pulſus de bilis, inzqualis, & inordinatus,fynco pi,
&animi deliquiis affligetur. Hæchi omania, vel in maiori parte fuccedunt, o
porter celerrimèinggris.vomitum pro uocare, vt aflumptum vencnum eiicia ur. Ex
pal.Vilan. Luem Gallicam non modò homines,fed canes etiam inuidere. Tanta eft
morbi Gallici quandoque immanitas, vt non modò ex vno lan guente,vel
reſpiratione,tactu, autcom merci oplures homines ea lue polluan tur; verùm
atque canes, ſi vicera, vel vnguenta infirini lingere potuerint.Ex I perientia
hoc edocuit; viſus eft enim & quidam canis Gallica lue captus, quihe I
riſui emplaſtra linxerat. Ex obformatore if Iulii Scaligeri. 6. Poet. Quotermi
nocorporis hominispulchritudo conftitui debeat. Arii equidem funt Scriptores in
conſtituendo termino longitudi nis, & latitudiniscorporis pulchri:ihter
quos, ſententia loannis Goropii, in fua Gigantomachia, magis acceptanda vide
tur à fapientibus:colligit exHomeride Creto longitudinem hominis pulchri de
bere eſſe quatuor cubitorum, latitudi nem verò vnius cubiti. Cymrinum bominibus
palliditatem corporis inducere. More Multa profectd ſunt, quæ vultus colorem
hominum deflorare ob ſeruantur: fiquidem panis hordeacęi v fus facit homines
pallidos.Ex Ariftot. A quælutulentæ potus, vſus ſalitorum, & immoderata
Venus valde colorem de. turbant: inter ea tamen, quæ ex proprie. tate
decolerare putantur, Cyminivſus, &olfactus eſt. Duo enim de hoc exem pla
habentur apud Plin.lib.20.C.24.V. num fe &tatorum Portij latronis, qui, ve
illius imitarenturpallorem,cymino fre quenter vtebátur:alterum eſt Iulij Vine
dicis,qui, vt Neronen falleret,palloré Sibicymino conciliabat. Ex Mercurialide
Decorat. Regem Archelaum maximè Aſtronomie fi iffe imperitum. T
minibusneceffariaiudicatur,vt malè ciuitates, refpublicas;hominumo; cætus fine
illorumobſeruatione ij con leruare valeant.Vtique horum ope té pora,annos,
menſes, & horas metimur, &ſine his in, varia labyrintha inuolui mus mur.Hoc
apertè ille imperitus Aſtrono miæ Rex Archelaus oftendit,qui (vt vi ri ſummæ
fidei fcriptú reliquerunt) ob Solis Eclipfim,cuius caulam ignorabat, *
tantotimore correptus eft,vt regiam is clauferit,filium totonderit, iudicia è
fo ro fuftulerit, & iuriſdi& ionem penitts en intermiſerit: vltimum
enim orbis diem. eſſe arbitrabatur.Ex Magino. Mira grecilitatis quofdam bomines
fuilfe repertos. X Aeliano,& Athençoquofdam ho mines extremæ gracilitatis
fuiſſe * colligimus:legitur enim quendá Arche ftratum vatem fuiſſe, qui captus
ab ho ftibus tantæ gracilitatis repertus eſt, vt cùmlanci apponeretur, pondus
vnius obolihabuiſſet,quod incredibile,& ferè ridiculum exiftimatur.Philetas
Couse. tiaminuentuseft, quem ex gracilitate E vſque adeò inualidum fuiffe
fcribunt, vt ne à vento deijceretur, pondera ferrea pedibus, & foleis
geftare coge { retur, Anguit. Emine Anguillas cumAquilone mirambabere fyme
putbiam. Trabilis profe & ò conſenſus eſt, quem Anguillæ cum Aquiloni.. bus
habent: ipfis enim ſpirantibus fex. dies fine cibo, & aqua has viuere
fertur; cum Auftrisautem diſſentiunt, quippe his flátibus diu ſine cibo, &
aqua illæ vi.. uere non poflunt. Ex Bodino in Theat. Aſparagorum vſum corporis
facere pitorem. Nter ea,quæ nitorem; &pulchritudia nem tur, Aſparagorum
vfusconnumeratur, cuius efficacia à multis in corpore colo.. rando ferè
mirabilis iudicatur. Aſpara.. gi fætentem reddunt arinam, & perilla pratos
corporis expurganthumores:eb: id mirum non eft,fi,ijs euacuatis,corpus reliquum
non modò odoratum redda tur, ſed etiam nitidum, & coloratum: quippeex
humorum prauorum conge. rie, & palliditas, & defloreſcentia nobis
jonaſcitur, quibus ceflantibus, ceſat de. formitas, & colornitidus
exoritur. Ex Auicenna. Picem cum oleo; maximam babere colli gantiam. E X
congeneri ferènatura Picem, Rea ſinam, & hujuſmodi, magnam cum oleo
affinitatem retinereobferuamus:fi manus enim pice, vel refina fædantur vtique
eas oleum extergit,idque ob col": Tigantiam oritur. Oleum furfur tollit,
furfur aqua eluit; aquam demumlintco: ficcamus.Ex Cardino Mularumgenuse
propriapecieminime propag ari: MVlasequidem,& monftraconfimis lia,nec
parere,nechium genus prou pagare obferuamus:id fieri aiuntmulti;. ab
improportionato generandi tempe ramento: veriùs tamen cum Bodino in
Theau.Natur: hot contingere exiftimo, une fpecierú fit infinitas: natura enim
in finitatem abhorret. Ariſtoteles in Syria fupra Phænicesmulas parere ſcriplīt;
& Theophraſtus in Cappadocia illas genus 3, propagare voluit:tamen hoc
veriſimile haud eſt. Propterea magis credendum reor, in illis locis Aſinarum
quoddams: genus oriri mulabus conſimile, potiùs, quàm mulas, quarum partus à
noftris. prodigiofus, & funeftus effe dicitur, vt Iulius Obſeq.inlib de
prodig: adnotauit. Leones, Sole in Leone'peragrante,a'febribus, moleftari:
Irabileeſt, quod in Leonumfpecie contingit,dum Sol Leonis cælefte fignum
ingreditur:ijenim à febre tertia.. na in toto fyderis fpatio excruciantur:a deà
quòd fateri oportet, talium genus cum hoc fydere antipathiam habere &
tertianam recipere'; proinde Leoninaà multis hæcfeprisapperiatur,bene iudi.
cantibus, Leonemeſſe peculiarem. Leo. nes hoc temporetertio quoque die paſo
cuntur,neciemel etiam accidit, vt bidu um,veltriduum inediam ſufferāt, Ster
custunc ficciſsimum, & vrinam fatente excernunt,vt Ariſtotelesadnotatum re
liquit.Aiuntmulti, hocà natura forſitan eſſe factum,vt ferociſsimæ beſtiæ quo quo
pacto cohiberetur impetus, & à fre quentiori rapina coerceretur. Quo
HORIVLVS GENLADIS. 149 Quo artificio in fenibus barbas, albofque cam
pillosdenigrare pale amus. Eferam notabilem miſturam qua, ' R Jeant.Sumito
lixiuij communis quantú volueris, decoque in eo faluiæ, & lauri folia cum
corticibusiuglandium viri. dium; mox laua, aut ablue madefa &ta fpongia:ita
enimnigredinem compara bis, quæ diu durabit, &lætaberis effectu. Ex Porta:
Mergum,& Anferem aquaticum in Hydrsa phobiam plurimum valere Ntercuncta
animalia adnotauit Arie ftoteles Anſerem aquaticum folùm non rabire, ob id à
multis huius efum in Hydrophobia maximè celebrarur: mirifico autem experimento
contra ram. bidi canis morlus valere dicitur Mergus qui in aquis &
maridegit, quippe ab Ace. tio,eius eſu Hydrophobosillicoaquam efflagitare
narratur. Lacertasmira magnitudinisapud Indos iz... Meniria NInfula Sancti
Thomę, quçdam La IN Ls certæ ſpécies miræ reperitur magnitu dinis,quæ admodum
illius gentibus fa miliaris, eft.In Ioſula etiam Capraria,, quæ vna èFortunatis
eft, ingentis ma gnitudinis hæc animalia cerpūrur;habis tatores autépro ijs
interficiendis, bom. bardis,fiue ſolopetis,alijfque bellicis in. ftrumentis
vtuntur. Ex Amate Luſsin Dia. ofcer. In educandis iuuenibus, miran fulle aibe:
niexfium induftriam. Moser Oserat Athenientum in iuvenum educatione, vtij
cothurnicibus, fio uc qualeis, aut gallis pugnantibus ftudi. an
impendcrent:Solent enim hiermo. di volucres,vfquead extremam virium defeâionem
certare. Qulo exemplo ad ſubeundapericula; & vulnera contem merida,
ifamınabant iuuencs increpan tès au:bus minus ingenioſos effe homi. nes, non
debere.Exsotino apud Lucianum Serpentum eumapudl kudosfrequentari.. NCuba
Inſula penes Indos,ferpentes loua totius corporis ipecie, ac forma prediti
inueniuntur,quippe ſelquipedis IM I plerumque longitudine exiftunt,& ex
terra, & aqua viuunt:Quod autem apud illas rationes mirabilius videtur
inlay tioribusmenfis, horum animalium e fum,tanquam ibum ſapidiſsimum free
quentari.Fx Petro Bembo. Quomifico,Po ticaput; inmiram intumeſcentiam
redderevaleamus. NterAgriculturæ arcana, non infimi momenti methodus eſt,
quaporri cam put in tumorem magnum reddere poro Gimus.Aperiam abftrufum
artificium:Si enim porri caput,arundine, vel ligneo ſtylo pupugeris,atq;
raporum,vel cucu- merum fomen vti foramine occultaueris proculdubio propria
capeo in tan tamtumorem deuenire, vtid prodigio- fum iudicetur, Ex Mizaldo.
Iwer Fraxinum, &Serpentes miram adeffe Antipathiami Raxini fuccus ad
ferpentum morfuss mirabili fuccelu à medicis vſurpa nec fine ratione: hanc enim
plans tam Serpentes, ex occulta antipathia ji miro odio infequuntur: fiquidem
illius L6 yobras OX tur, 252 BARICELLI vmbras tùm matutinas,tùm veſpertinas
euitant,& lógiusaufugiunt. Retulit Pli nius lib. 16.cap. 13.ex fraxino
experi. mentum quòd figyrum frondibus fra xini,& igne apparatur, in cuius
medio ſerpens lit proiectus,procul dubio ferá in ignempotius, quàm in fraxinu
aufu gere:tantusefthorum diffenfus, &co. culta ſerpentum inimicitia.,
Virginitatem in mulieribus, qua viaexperizi: paleamus. L Apathiū maius in
aperienda mulica rum virginitate aftantibus magnam retinet efficaciam: ſi enim
ex huius folijs faraturfuffumigium,fiue hęc fuper ig. nitos carbones
inijciuntur,vteffument, vbi mulierum fit corona, cum odor ad pudenda mulieris
perueniet, illius bon. nitatem,vel malitiam oftendet: quippe fi viro copulata
fuerit,abfque dubio v rinabit, fim verò fuerit virgo,vrina po tiùs
conftringitur, quam emictatur.Ide etiam faccre autumant,lignum Agallo chum,
fiue Xiloaloem, vel femen portu-, acæ fi fuper carbonesiniecta,adeò effu ment
HORTVLVS GENIALIS. 253 L ment, vt ad pudenda mulieris odor va leat penetrare:
mouetur enim in deflo ratis vrina quantò citiùs, fecùs verò in
virginibus.Ex.Perta. Quomodo ex duabus aquis claris, lac effings re illud
valeamus.quod Virginale Pocatur. Ac illud,quodà pleriſque ob colo Cris
ſimilitudinem,liue ex nouo ori gine, Virginale appellatur, ex duabus, aquis
artificiosè corifedis exoritur ad multa equidem corporis mala yti. Lifsimum..
Eius modus talis eft. Su mito lithargyrij in puluerem redacti Vnc.ija
acetialbivnc.si.commiſta infi-, mul per filtram lineum deſtillato, & a quam
clară habebis.Vtautem alteram componas, fumito Salis gemmæ Vnc.), Aquæ cómunis,
fiuepluuialis claræ Vnc. Mimiketo fimul, & fic bimas habebisa quas magni
valoris. Cùm verò vel ad oftentationem, vel curioſitaré fiue ne. celsitatem lac
Virginale conficere opta bis,aquas vtrafque coniungesfimul mil cendogita
profectò confeftim laquor la L7 Ereus BA RICE E L'T M deus ſuſcitabitur, qui
Virgineusvoca. tur.Verrucæ in manibus fi hoc lacte per dies aliquot
beneconfricantur, euanef cunt. Impetigines,omneſq; faciei macu. læ,rubores,
& ex foleardores, hoclini. mento facillimè curantur. Caftrates lienem,velonorum
vitellós durios? res deglutire non poffe. Irabilc elt i: lud,quod in caftratis,
circa cibum obferuatur: hi enim nec lienem,nec duriores ouorum vitels
losdeglutirepoffunt, vt frequentiſsima apud multosinoleuirexperientia.Retulit
Bodinus in ſuoTbea.tales priùs fame fe necari pati, quàin lienem vorare por
fe.Huius reialia non creditur effe ratio, quã xſophagiiſtorú ex nimia adipecoão
| guftatio, & cóftri& io; cũ auté lienis fub-. Itātia spõgiofa
&flatuoſa fit,atq; in mã. ducationemagis infletur;facile fit, vtiji i ex
ælophagi anguftia talem cibum deo to glutire nequeant. Eadem ratio eftino uerum
vitellisdurioribus', qui ex ſuba Itantia glutinoſa,per anguftum non facie la
tranſeunt. Spatium humanæ vita, centum annorum fom cundum degyptios
compenſariin. teruallo. in. * " Vriofa magis, quàm veritari confo näns
mihi videtur Aegyptiorum aliquotopinio,dehominum vitęmenfu, ra:quippe illorú
multi, qui medcata cadauera feruart conſueuerant, ex quada conic & ura à
cordis humani ponderede fumpta in eam deuenerefententiam, ho. minisviram centum
annorum fpatio de Gniri.Sumebant experimentum in cora poribus, quæ fine
labemoriebantur; ho rumenim anniculi duarum drachmarú. pondtrisgcorretinere
videbantur, bini quatuor;& fic in iingulis annis, quo in anno quinquagelimo
bomines centum. drachmiscor in pondere retinere affiras mabant:à quinquagefimo
binas: dracha mas fingulisannis decreſcere, atque à cordis pondere detrahi,
minuijè dicea. bant, &fic in anno centefimo ad primum, fui ponderis:
fecundum iftorum conie... awan,corredibat.Ex Teicntio / arrone.. 256 BARICELLI
Claro Pblibotomiam ex vena ſaluatella, pleneticis: plurimumprodeffe.
"VrabatGalenus ſpleneticum qué dam;& cumdiù (vtipfe narrat)de illius
cura eſſet ſollicitus,atque diligen. ter remedia quæreret quadam nođeſó
niauit,fe in infirmo de vena faluatella, quæ eft interminimú,& annularem ma
nus digitos ſäguinétrahere; quod fecit, & fanatus illeeſt. Hoc diuinæ
bonitati tribuendúexiſtimo, quæ multoties, ho mines per bonosfpiritus dirigit,
vt ca perficiant, quæ in corpornm valetudine concernuntur.Ex Bartbol.Sibylla.
Gymnoſophiftas apud indosmire,viſus, &in genij dexteritatis inueniri.
MIIrabile profectò illud eft; quod de -Gymnoſophiſtis quibusdam apud Indos
narratur. Hienim ab exortu, vf quead Solis occaſū; oculis contentiscan.
didiſsimi fyderis orbē intuentur,inglo bo igneo rimantes fecreta quædam,a
renilgue feruentibus perpetem diem al ternis pedibusinfiftunt.Ex Solino. Qui
HORTVLVS GENIALIS, ' Quibus auxilysforumarum materia,per pri nis
paleasensachari. Bseruatum eft huiufmodi præfi O sibus euaneſcere.Adhibentur
primò in firmis aliquot clyfteria, ex fucco bryo niæ, & mercurialis,oleo,
& fale concin nata, quibus patiens tum gelu, tum ma. terias.viſcidas
copiosè purgari videbi. tur:mox cum oleo amygdalaru dulciū, vel mali aurantij
coleis, manè dilucu.. lo, cantharidum præparatarum grana quinque,velſex iuxta
corporis naturama. capiet.Cantharides autem per horas 24.. in aceto
infundantur,deindeexiccentur, &in puluerem reddantur.Hic enim ea.
rumpræparationis modus eſt. Huiul modiauxilijsftrumarummaterias, vri pas
euacuari compertum eft., Obferua uit hocDo & orPhyficusJoannes Domi. nicus
Donnus,cuitis familiaritas,animi queindoleseſt mihiſemper gratiſsima, mihique
tale remedium communicauit; robuſtis tamen corporibus folú adhibe ducéleo: ex
illius enim experiméto do lors BARCE- 1 II! lores ad inftar parturientis circa
pe &tine tale præſidium commouereaudiui. Alijs etiam modis, & auxilijs
(trupęcurătur, quippe fioleo,in quo rana terreſtris,tal pa vellacerto, (vulgò
dicitur racano )fi ue lacerta magna vocata ebullierit, diú ftrumæ,purgato
corpore, liniantur,abf que dubioexiccátur, & euaneſcunt.Het animalia viua
prius in oleo fuffocantur, cùm ad carnium ab oſsibus ſeparationé ebulliunt,
& oleum mirabile ad ftrumas componitur. Nonpulliad earum extir. pationem
caufticis vtunturmedicamen tis, quorú potentia caro aperitur, & ftru
mæetiacuantur.Componuntur hęc talia ex arſenici fublimati drach.j. lithargyrij
aur. & aluminis roccean.drach.ij.fabari vftulatur:numero quinq; hæc in
pulue. rem reda & a cum frumenti farina,aceto que acerrimo mifcentur, &
fit malfa, è qua orbiculi, vel plancentulæ formantur & exiccantur in Sole,
vel furno,admoué tur fuper ſtrumas, &fpatio horarum24. opus perficiunt,
Alexandri Magni magnanimitas in pofteros: ftudiofas. MVlta ratione Alexander
Macedo Magnusdi& us eft',cùm eius excel lentia non modò in litteris
apparuerit.. Ille quidem, vt Ariftoteles de animali bus
hiftoriasfcriberet,multa liberalitate in pofterum vtilitatem, octingenti auri
talenta, cum tribus hominum millibus dedit, vt fyluas,aularia, & viuaria,
omnis. generis diſquirerét, & opusab ipio per.. ficeretur.Illi autem per
Europain,Afriw. - Cam, & Afiam peragrantes,multa anima: tium gencra ad
Ariſtotelem attulerunt, quarum difle & ionibus, de vniuerfa fen? rè horum
natura accuratiſsimè Philofon phus fcribere potuit.Ex loanne Bodeno. I WA
Mulieres quafdam in oculis, equi effigiem, pel: geminaspupilas babere compertum
eft. NO On rarò quædam mulicres magæ reperiuntur, quæ vt plurimum a-. niculæ
funt, hominibus, animalibusý; vilu,nocentės. Solent hæ in fingulia, acut 160
BARICELLI oculis, velgeminam habere pupillam, (vt HieronymusMengus de Arte Exe
orciſt. adnotauit ) vel equi effigiem, quemadmodùm nonnullas Pontumin colentes
habuiſſe legitur. Referuntex iftarum oculis quofdam emittiradios, qui non ſecus
iacula & ſagitrę pro homi num cordibus faſcinandis exiftunt, ità profe
& ò totü pernicioſa quadam qua litate corpus inficiūt,breuique velnullo
temporis conſumpto interuallo,homie nes,bruta,ſegetes,arbores polluunt, &
ad interitum tæpè deducunt. sanguinem caninum HydrophobosCupareba PotumAutumant
Galenus N Serapio,& pleriq;fapiêtes,fangui nis canini potu,
canisrabidimorſum ca. rari teftantur: quæautem fit ratio,apud hos non legitur.
Referam tamen, quæ àMarſilio Ficino in lib. z. de Vit.produc. adducitur. Ego
opinor (inquit) ſali ziam canis rabidi venenoſam, impreſ fam hominis
pedilæſo,per venas paula tim ad corafcendere more veneni, nifi quid HORTVLVS
GENIALIS: 261 quid in tereadiſtrahat.Si igitur interim canis alterius fanguinem
ille biberit,fan guis illecrudus ad multashoras natat in ftomacho, eum denique velutperegrie
- num deie & uro per alium. Interea cani. pus languis ifte,faliuam caniná
fuperio ra membra prenſantem, priufquam ad præcordia veniat, deriuat ad
ftomachű: ná &in canino ſanguine virtus eft ad faa liuamcanis attrahendam,
& in ſaliuavia ciſsim viftus ad fimilem fanguinem proſequendum. Venenum
igitur à cor defemotum, fanguiniqueimbibitum, in aluo natanti, vnà cum ſanguine
per inferiora deducitur, hominemque ita relinquit incolumen. Corallinam, ad
puerorum vermes necandos maximè laudari. COMOrallinæ, quam plerique muſcum
marinum appellant, in puerorum ť vermibusnccandis,miraeft virtus, & cf.
ficacia.Hanccirculatores in plateis vene dere folent,talegue remedium ad lum
bricorum internecionem, fummis lau. dibus extollunt. Profectò à veritate in hoc
262 BARICELLI hoc negotio haud abſuot:hoc enim cão teris medicamentis, in
rehacaccommo datis,excellétius eft:experimento fiqui. dem comprobatum eft non
modòlum. bricos interficeretale præfidium; verùm atque eadem die, cùin
aſtantium admi ratione, oxpellere, vtiure dixit Mat thiolus, quòd quandoque
viſus fit puer, quiex aſſumpra huiuspulueris drachma, a centum vermes
excreuerit. Qua induſtria, labioram,meruum, capia tamgmamilarum
citifsimèfifuras fanate vale anus. Periam ele &tiſsimum præfidium, A tumque
mamillarum fiffuris feliciſsimo fucceflu fere millies vfus fum. Sumiro
lithargyrii argent, myrrhæ, zinziberis an,vncj.redigantur omnia in puluerem
fubtilif. & ex cera recenti, melle,& oleo oliuarum ad fuffic. fiat
vnguentú. Vfus talis eft: primò liniantur fifluræ ex hu mana ſaliua, mox
defuper in tela exten fum applicetur vnguentum,ita cquidem paucis diebus
fanantur, Rhabarbarum cidoniatan, y terogerensabs que periculoalue exonerare.
IN graudis mulier bus, cùm grandi inorbo affliguntur, magna cautela ſo lent
medici medicamenta cuacuantiae ligere: vel enimhaud porrigunt,ne con Ceptum
diſperdant, & matrem occidant; velmitiſsima, & benigniſsima excogi
tant, & propinant. Multi Rhabarbarum ob eius caliditatem, & amarulentiă
recu fát: ſed perperá quidé, quádo illud cido nio Correptú, inter ele&
ifsima &benig piſsima connumerari debeat, Rcferam i qua induftria à
Ludouico Mercato,viro celeberrimo,prçparetur.Sumanturcoto nea, ab interraneis
repurgata, tes diuifa, (ſed fuperftite pellicula, quæ valde eft odorata) in
aquadonec tabuc rint ebulliant: mox per linteum colata, & exprefla,
optimolaccaro coquantur, & dumid fit,adiicies ad lib.j. huius con
diturz,vnc.j.Rhabarbari. Doſis cuius fit vnc.j.vel Aliud cidoniatum compo
nitur, quod eftgratius, & abfq; moleftia efficacius euacuat. Diuidatur
cidopium &fub God &in par 1 (264 & fublatis feminibuscủfolliculis,
parti um ciuitates puluere optimi Rhabar, negligenter triti,ac Drach.j.velj.-
aut ij.imp cátur, vel, ſi affectus poftulaueri agarici tantundem, vel foliorum
ſene; mox vniantur cidonij partes, papyro que inuoluantur, & ligata in
clibano,vel furnello coquantur ad perfe &tam co & i onem;poftremò abie
&tis medicamentis internis, pulpa manducetur. Hoc pro fe & ò medicinæ
genus fecurè cuacuat, & viſcera omnia corroborat. Animantium robur animi, à
femine inge terari. Vanta fit feminis efficacia, in aoda. cia hominibus
comparanda, nullo aliomedio ſecuriùs cognoſcitur, quàm caſtratorum natură
compéfare.Hipro fextò ſtatim atque teftibus priuantur, animi robur amittunt,
atque máſueſcár: fiquidem & à fpirituumcopia, & calore potiſsimùm
naſcitur audacia, quæ in teſtium natura valde { pongiola ge. merantur, & ab
ijs in corpus deferuntur.Ob id Galenus,in lib.1.de femine,le méSolicóparauit,
quod ſuo fulgoreorbe illuſtrat;iuxta cuius fulgorcs ſemē,& ipi rituú,&
caloris potentia, ferè corpusil luſtrare admonemur.Hinc Aegyptijſa
pientiſsimi,cum Regem fractum, hebe temq; repreſentare volebant,meritò Ti.
phonem caſtratum pictabant benè ani maduertentes,nil poſle verius hominem
infirmum oftendere,quàin hominem fie nc ſemine. Aegyptiorum aliquot ad
Quartanam febrens ſecreta experimenta. х bris quartanas Aegyptis familiaria
ſunt, hoc pro ſele &tiſsimo remedio ha bent,ægrotisdeco &tum ex menta
para. tum ad femilibram,calidum cum (polio ſerpentis puluerizatibinisdrachmisan
te accefsionem per horam propinare.A, lij cum decocto affati temporeacceſsio
nisvomitum procurant cum felici fuo. ceffu.Sunt & nonnulli,quiante acceſsio
nem pilularum drachmam exhibent. M He exagarici,gentianę,caftorei,mytrhe, rutæ
an, drach.ij.piperis longi,calamia romatici,crocian. fcrup.iv.theriacæ an tiquæ
drach. iij.conftant, & cum ſyrupo de granat. dulcib.conficiuntur. Aliis ve
ſitatiùs eft,exhibere drach. agarici,cum myrrhæ ſcrupulo, diſſoluram in pulegi
deco & o, Ex Alpino de Medic. Aegyp. Auesbacciarum taxi eſu nigro colore
fieri. Axus inter plontas virulentiam ha bere maximam videtur: quienim fub
iftius vmbra dormire audebit, in grauem affe & ionem incidet. In baccis
autem venenum potiſsimum viget.nam à viris comeftæ,ventris profluuia, atque
funefta pericula mouent: boues illarum vfu moriútur, quemadmodum &peco ra,ffortè
has comederint, Aues verò iftarum eſu minimè moriuntur, penna rum autem color
in nigrediné mutatus, Chelidonium Lapidem MIT APN epilepfiam baberepirtutcm.
VIItrus Chelidonii lapidis à pleriſque maximè extollitur: prelentaneum enim
Epilepticis réputatur remedium, adeò quòd non pauci iſtius vſu à tanta morbi
forociate liberati funt. Feruntin. Autumni principio,Luna creſcente, hũc lapidem
à ventre hirundinis extrahi, & contricum aliquo liquore epilepticis in
potum propinari:quippe facultatem re tinere dicitur, tenacem, & vifcidum hu
morem, qui caufa caducimorbi eſt exica candi. Multi,chelidonium non folùm elu,
fed etiam ſola ſuſpenſione, Epilep ticos à proprietate ſanare contendunt, Ex
Lomnio. Miram interafpides, & halic acabum inejſe Antipathiam. Irabilem
natura inter alpides, & halicacabum, quemaiorem veſi cariam inuenit
diſlenſum, & antipathi am:ijenim, fi iuxtà huiuſmodi plantæ radices quoquo
pacto corpora admoue rint,tanta ſtupiditate, & fomnolétia cor Tipiontur, vt
amplius nequeant excitari. Ariftotelem rerumcaufis maximum noſcena dis
adhibuiffe ftudium M M 2 Erat Aristoteles adeò cauſarum re, Erum cognitionis
ftudiofus,vedie cilè quiefceret, nifiad quæfitum exas ctum ſcrutinium deueniret:
ob id cumà. graui valetudineopprimeretur,atq; me dicus citra morbicausa,pleraq;
vetaret, fertur(teſtimonio Polybij ) sc.medico dixiſſe:Nemecures,vt bubulcú,
& for forem; fed prius caufas ediſſere, & ita pre ceptistuis facilè
memorigeratum habe bis.Cum autem in Chalcide exularet;ati que Euripi, qui inter
Aulidem Bcotia portum,& Eubeam infulam ſuntaugu iti freti,feptiesinterdiu
noctuq;alternis fluctibus ſtato tempore refluerent, ille maris recurſus
excogitans,atque caulam reddere non valens, tanto mærore affe & us eft,vtmorti
occumberet. Ex Iufting Martyr. Infates a nutricib mores,& téperiē recipere,
nfantes profe & ò à nutričibus non foi lùm circa temperiem, fed etiam mo
res multum recipere videntur.Ob id fat pienterà veteribus,Romulum à lupafu.
idela &tatum, proditum eſt, velhocfinx I ering HORTVLVS GENIALIS 26 erint,
vel vera narrauerint; fuit enimRo mulus ferinis moribus, callidus, fortif
limus, & incommodipatientifsimus.At præter hunc,multosà feris enutriros,
& educatos legimus; num autem hoc ijs, ex animi feritate fuerit tributum
peſcio. Scribitur Cyrum à cane fuiſſe nutritum, TelephumHerculis,filiumà
cerua,Pelia Neptuni filium abequa, Alexandrum Priamià vulpe,A egiſthum à
capra,quo rum inores,apudScriptoresnoti ſunt,vt apertènofcamus, quid nutrices
infanti bus afferant.Equidem quià capra lactá tur,ftulti fiunt, &
fälaces;& ita hircuselt;. quare ex hac conie & ura tales euadere in..
fantes, quales fuerint& nutrices com perimus;fed mores virtute animi mode
fari poffunt. Qdo artificio vitrum diuidere valeamus. Icet vitrú folum ab
adamante, cùm plicabile haud fit, diuidiinueniatur, tamen alia induſtria etiam
compertú eft illud poſle diuidi,vt Cardanusrecenſuit Hic eft modus: Filum
fulphure, & oleo irabue, L M3 370 imbue,locum circunda,accende, repete,
donec locus optimècalefcat;mox confe ftim alio filo, aqua frigida madefa&to
circundato, & vitro in eo loco fractum, &diuiſum habebis.Ego quidéalio
artie ficio, & fecuriori vitrum, diuido,caſug; hoc mihi notuit. Habebat
quadam die cyathum vitri vino ſublimato,fiue aqua vitæfemiplenum, ad
curiofitatem non nullorum amicorum,a quamin flammá, accenfa candela,reddidi, vt
vinum fub. limatum accendi folet, confuiripta all tem flamma, cyathusin medio
diuifus eſt,atque co potiſsimùm loco, quema qua fupernatans attingebat.Ita ex
curio. loexperimento, vitruin diuidere apud alios amicosnon lemel valuir
Gallinaceum ftercusà fungorum virulentia bomines tueri. ' Vngorummalitia,ex
multorum ex.. perimento, pleroſquevita priuauit quia autem homines ab illorum
elu ob luxus abſtinere nequeunt,referam quid àGaleno,tanquam arcanum,pro
iſtorú. Fe virulentia extirpanda,leu ſuperanda ada notetur.Erat in Myſia
medicus quiho mines penè ſuffocatos ab elu fungorum ad vitam ducebat, remedioa;
tanquam arcano quodam vtebatur: huncprecibus exorauit, vt tantum auxilium
aperireta Stercus gallinaceum ille adduxit, quo contrito ad- læuorem vtebatur,
& cum: oxycrato,autoxymelite propinabat in firmis, qui celeriter
omnesadiutiſunt. Hoc vſus fuitmox in quibuſdam Vr- r banis Galenus, & verum
inuenit: nain: qui præfocabantur, paulò poftvome bant pituitofum humoré omninò
cral hiſsimum, & exindeplanè liberati funt. Infuper Myſius ille vtebatur
huiuſmodi præſidio in diutinoColi dolorecú oxyo melite,propinato vino, velaqua,
cum felicifsimo fucceffu lob id Galenus ex Bolilongo dolore fpafmo correptos,ta
li remedio quoſdam perſanauit: nam & hoc colicum doloremaufert, qui caufa
ſpaſmi eſt.Ex Gal.16.simplic.cap.io. Varia deliramenta di vini
potentißimipotua.r exoriri. M 41 Multa Vlta equidem deliria in ijs,quia vino
potentiſsimo inebriantur, fecundùm humorum in corpore prædo-. minium ſuſcitari
ſolent:quippe iltorum nonnulliin riſum maximum mouentur, aliqui plorant,pleriq;
vociferantur, alij. profund ſsimo lomno quiefcunt.Refert Alphinus,in lib.de
medic, degypt. muliere quandam à vini potu largiori ebriam, primònimis euafifle
hilarem,atq; in ho.. mines la ciuiffe, quoscomplectebatur, & ofculis
tenebat;moxèrifu, & cantu, ad ram, & furias deueniffe ex quibus fami..
liares eam pertimentes, præcauebant;de. inumin mæftitiam,vtdefun &tos lamě.
tabili voce deploraret;poftremò à fom. no oppreflam,omnem ebrietatem digef fiffe.Caufa
omnium eft, quia vinum pri mòcalefacit,fecundò adurit,tertiò refri gerat; ſi
potésfuerit, & immodeſte poti. Ego profe & ò quendam cognoui, qui a pud
Marchionem primum Sancti Marci dominum meum erat in culina,vt lances vaſaque
culinaria in dies-collueret; vo cabant Iulium Colauentre. Hic epoto vino grandi,
quodBeneuento pro domi 13 ni menſa forebatur in tam immanemde uenit ebrietaté,
vt Dæmoniacus appare ret,os,manufq; extorquebat,in fe ipfum fæuicbat, ia
&tabatq; membra, & infinita agebat deliramenta. Aulæ Sacerdos fa cris
libris accingebatur ad exorcizandú hominem: quando vocatus, ebrium illi effe
faffus fum,meoqueiuſſu ferula,mo Te puerorum, circa nates,flagelliſá; con
tačius, breui ebrietatem dereliquit. Syrium inter fydera.calidißime exiſtere
matuth., Riente Syrio tantum aëris concipi.. præ ardore langueſcant;canes in
rabiem trahuntur;furiunt viperx, & ferpétes; ftuant mariajaer occultam
nocendi qua. fitatem recipit;ſemina, ia era ſub tali ſy dere,minimènafcuntur:
talis profectò eft Syrij natura. Exlib.2.de Hydr.natur. Viterum in nuptis
mulieribus varios fuiffe mores, o confuetudines.. 3 MS Non 274 BARICELL ): N.DE
dumprima On vna equidem apud Veteresin. nuptis fæminis erat confuetudo: quippe
conſueuerát homines in finuPer. fico, littoreg;Orientali, Virgines nobi. les
nubiles haud deflorare, nifi brachijs, margaritarıım ļineis ornatæ incederent::
ab id illæ in magņo.erantprecio.Deſije. a nuncmosille, & margaritæ vilius
illice. muntur.E « Garzi4 ab Horto. Catullus, in nuptijs Pelei, Tetbidw, aliam
natat con ſuetudinem, Virgo nupta, noctecun marito erat concubituva, ita tra
& abatur:ante coitum eiuscollinen.. fura filo circumdato meníurabatur,mae
nèhocrepetebant,quòd fi latius, quam vt filo comprehenderent, collum inueni
ebant, defloratam ça nocte cenfebant:ſin: Vitò dibilomaius,integram, aut antea.
fuille deuịrginatam habebant. Aļijalias. habuere confuetudines. Pupauetagrefte
mirabiliter Pleuriticum mere bum fanare, Efeet Galenuspapaueradolores miti gare,
atq; interanodyna reponiina multis locis referat;tamen agrelte,pleu, ritiden
HORTVLVS GENIALIS 275 ritidem,in lib deremed paras.facil.confel, - fus eſt
perſanare. Aperiam quodà mo nacho empirico mirabili fucceflu in hoc morbo fa
& um vidi.Hic folia & ſemina agreſtis papaueris,in vmbra exiccata,ſe
cum continuo deferebat:cum autê quis laterali morbo infeftabatur, eius confr
lio ſanguinem à brachio ſecundum ca 1 nones extrahi curabat,mox deco&ú fo
liorum in brodio pulli collatum, cum drach.j.velj- iplius papaueris ſeminis capillamentorum,
quæ poft colaturam addebãtur,capiebat tepidè, & ieiunio * ſtomacho. In loco
doloris hæc Epithe. cata adhibebantur.Parabantur ex pul yere roris marini,
& ſalis,farina, & aqua" tres placentulæ,quæ ſuper calido latere in
firmam ſubſtantiam ducebantur: hiss locus,epithematis inſtar,fouebatur, &
breui tim dolor euanefcebat, tum etiá: apoftema rupebatur, & infirmus ad
fa. lutem magna admiratione priftinam rew. dibát, Corni plantam,
Singuinarie,vel SörbiHydrom phobiam curatam fufcitare. 1.1 ter 276 BARICE ILI
INE Je Nterrerum admiranda, connumera tur aliquot plantarum energia, quæ
ſopitam, atque curatam in hominibus Hydrophobiam ſuſcitare, & renouare
couſueuere. Pluries etenim obferuatum reperio à Canerabidocommorfos, fi plă tam
corni, yel fanguinariæ tetigerintan. te annum exa & um, velfub forbo dor
mierint, ineuitabiliter in rabiem incide. Tę. Salius in lib.de affe&. part,
virus hoc potius à toto ſubſtantia, quàmàtempe ramenti ratione ſufçitari
prodidit; nec enim à taląu, necab vmbra intemperi es introducipoteſt.
Itaquemirabileelt, ab iis lopitam rabiem renouari, quod. fieri non poſſet, niſicum
rabidalue, ha plantæ aliquam haberent antipathiamy cuius alia potior haud
adduci poterit ratio, quam tetigimus, quod huiufmodi a proprietate
hocperficiant. Qua induſtria penenum illumptum deſcen.. diffe ad gibbum Hepatis
pèlinteftina. rognoſcere valeamus... iquopropinato,nullamajor me dicis, difficultas
exoritur, quam veneni refidentiam reperire, vtritè ca adhibe antur pręfidia,
quæ talia oppugnare re perta ſunt. Si enim venenum fuerit in ſtomacho,vomitum
proderit excitare; fecus autem,li tranſiuerit hepatis regio nes,Hiceft modus.
Ponaturoui vitellus cumalbugine, cum infirmi lotioin ma tula;fiinfra
paucashorasnigrefcit, & fee tet, venenum adiecoris gibbú peruenit; Tip verò
rugetur,çitrinefcat, & non fæte at, inteſtina haudtranfiuit. Hinc indica
tionem corradimus, veneno ad inteſtina Traiecto,non conferre vomitum prouo
care, ExBAYTO. Plantas peduconfimiles;congeneres retine YENİKHI€s. MVltis
experimentiscomprobatum Teperio,plátas,fruticelý; ligna, quę quadã aſpectus
ſimilitudine cóueniunt, congeneres retinere vires.Sic multi mea dicorum
peritiſsimi locolingniGuaiaci, Buxo vtuntur;loco falſę parillæ,ſmilace it
aſpera, loco ſaſſafras, žylucftrifoeniculo; pro polypodio, filicecligunt;
protipfa M 7 na nyhor leum pro
myrto,liguitrů; pro ea buio,fambucum;pro china radicem no ftræ arundinis;pro
Rhabarbaro, hippo lapathú.Hçcn.facie corporeg; aſsimilá. túr,proindecöſimiles
vires habere exia ftimatur. Exlib.noftro de Hydran. Natur. Inter Arundinem.
Fräcem,may nam inefſe extipathiam. Aturali quodam odio inter ſe Fi lix,
&Afando diſsidere videntur: moritur enim filix, quæ ab arundinem: plantis
circundatur; & arundo quæ à fio licum virgultis: quo dudi experimen to
agricolæ, arundinis folia in colendis agris, vomeribus alligant, perſuaſi ab
iſtorūdiſſenlu, ſilices ab agris extrudere, &,vt audio votum in dies
conſequütur. Apri dentem ad Cynanchen, Pleuritiden mirabiliter valere. Agna eft
efficacia dentis Apriin NA ! uis eius oleo linino excipitur, ac locus affe
&tus tangatur cum pennę' extremitaa: tę,cx Arnaldo, & Auicenna habetur,bảo
morbum præfeptiſsimè curari.In curan da pleuritidenon minor eft virtus eius.
propterea folent practicantes admiſcere tum fyrupis,tum electuarijs huiufinodi
dentis puluerem,benèpoſcentes ab oc ! culta,&aperta proprietate talem pulue
rem prodeſſe: quippè extenuādi, & exic, candi vim habet. De hocdente mirum.
feribitur;occiſo enim Apro recentar,ip fius détes adeo feruere referüt, yt
capil losadmotos nonnunquam comburant. Id accidit., quia Apricalór magous eſt;
dumý; occiditur, ira & exercitatione fer uefcit; proinde dentespropter
denſam ſubſtantiam, magnamrecipiunrcalidita tem,cuius indicium ipmaeſt.
Aparagos ju arundineros fatosmirabiliter ex. crefcere. FAximuseft inter
arundines, & af par gos naturalis cófenſus;idcir... Iragos, &
pulchriores, & core pore?s atq; ſapidiores habere op tabit,ue, arundinetis
leminare procu rabitquippe ex naturali ſympathia mi rum in modum excreſcere,
& germinare, animaduertet. Meani co qui MVltis profe& ò notiſsima eft,
an Viero gerentes eſu cotoneorum induftrios; acuri ingenij parere filios..
Mirab Trabile eft illud, quodà multis de cotoncorum proprietate affirmari audio:
ſi enim.grauidæ mulieres,quàm læpius cotones-comedere folitæ fuerint, filios
& induſtrios, & maximaingenij pårere dicuntur:fiquidem cotoneis mia ram
hanc facultatem ineffe credunt. A. liud autem mirum in ijsreperiri apud
Mizaldum legi,grauidas mulieres háud parere, velfalte difficulter fætum ede
re,ſi in cubiculo, quotempore partus fuerint,cotosca feruauerint: credo ex
eorum conftringentiodore, velocculta. rationeid euenire. Heder am cum vinomiram
habere diſcordiam. tipathia, quæ inter hederam, & vinuinànatura infita eft;
fi enim ex hc deræ trunco cratera componitur, in qua vinum dilutumfuerit
impofitum,pro cul dubio vinum confeftim effluesfun detur aqua verò intus
retinebitur,adeò vini impatiens hedera exiſtimatur.Hoc ducti experimento
nonnulli in vinise mendis hederæ poculis vtuntur: ita e quidem num purum, vel
dilutum vi num exiftat;examinani, & cognoſcunt, Volatilium
piſciumg;fecunditatis,Ginteria. Tuprafagia. Oletin quibuſdam annis animanti bus
quædam peculiaris peſtis graſſa ri;hinc fit,ve (liannus valde pluuioſus
extiterit(auium, volatilium, bombycú ſericeorum,araneorum,erucarum,inte.. ritum
videamus;piſcium verò ftirpiúq;: fertilitatem, & valetudinem.Annus ay. tem
ficcusvolatilibus (apibus excepris) falutaris iudicatur;piſcibus verò perni...
ciofius:ficut enim in angulto aere, obim. pediram reſpirationein,fuffocamur,
vi. uereque nequimus;ita piſces in anguſtis aquis concluſi diu vicam agere mini
mè poſſunt. Gallinarum adipem(accharo obuolutam,vor modò a corruptela
preferuari;verùm atque oleum redderepretiofis fimun. Mira BARICELLI Mina Ira
equidem eft facchari virtus, in conferuandis àcorruptela adi pibus. Cum quadam
hyemePrudenria filiamea gallinarum adipes collegiſſeter acfaccharo albo benè
conuolutasin va ſculorepofuiflet,æftate ſubſequenti, il lud oleo femiplenum
reperit, adeòpel lucido, vtcumad medeferret excellen tius haud inueniri poffe
iudicaui. Hoc licet illa pro exornandis capillisvtere tur, tamen pro mitigandis
corporis do loribus,pro carnis (cabritie tollenda, ae liifque infirmitatibus
vtiliſsimum effe į cenfeo:Quod autem mirabiliusiudicaui: adipes illas:poft
multos annos conſerua.. tas, eodem colore,atqueodore, quo re-: centesin vafculo
fuerunt claufæ anim aducrti. A quodam Chirurgo amicoet ia nintellexi,humanam
adipem faccha. ro conuolutam;per longifsima tempo ra à carie, & rancido
præferuari: quodiſi. ita eſt, credo in omnibusanimantiumde. dipibus id euenire.Qrare
Magpatú cor pora condienda melius faccharo imple. ta, quàm aromatibus pofle
conſeruari crederem;eò magis, quia hoc præſidio, corpora in propriocolore, vi
deadipe dixi perfifterent. Cucameres naturali odżo oleumabborreres - aquam verò
appetere. INteſtina iudicatur diſcordia, quæ in, ter cucumeres, & oleum
ineft: nam, & ijaquam,appetere.à lege naturæ viden. tur.Proinde virentes, atque
è propriis. plancis pendentes, vafcula ff aqua plena ſübterhabuerint,adeò
longius extrahús, tur, vtaquam inſequiex certitudine ex. iſtimentur; fin autem
oleum fub his fue. rit eie & tum procul dubio in feipfos, ve Juti vncus,
retrahuntur;fiquidem ij olei impatientes ex naturali antipathia co
gnofcuntur.ExMatthiolo, Mandragoram pitibusapplántatam,vim il tis infundere
ſoporiferam. T Antam habét Mandragora inducena, di ſoporem efficaciam, vteius
pom vel comeſta, vel odorata,quandoque ca taphoram exuſçirent. Illud autem mi
rabilc eft, vitibus Mandragoram com plantatam, propriam iis naturam infun-.
dere, adeò quòd vinum ex huiuſmodi: confectum ſophrem bibentibusinduce
reconſueuerit, vt Rhodiginus adnota-, uit. De Mandragora Iulius Frontinus
hiſtoriam feripſit Strathagemwoz.Arn balà Carthaginenfibus cõrra Afrosmit. ſus
fuerat, qui cùn ſciret gentem illam vini auidam eſſe,in quibuldam vini do liis,
quæ in caſtris habebat, Mandragore copiam coniecit,indeleui comiſſo bello, ex
induſtria celsit, fugamque ſimulauit. Barbari,occupatis caltris,auidèmedica.
tum merũ cùmhaufiffent, in captapho ram lapſi ſunt, & ab Annibale
trucidatia: Quando, Aegypti mortuorum corpora come dire foleant: E condiendis
mortuorum corporibus, Aegyptiorum ex monumena tis multa, tum ab Hérodoto, tum à
Cæ. Jio Rhodigino exempla afferuntur. Ae gyptii enimmortuoscondiunt, atq; do mi
feruant: Ageſilai cadauer cera condi. tum fuit, yt & Perfæ facere folent;
Alex andri corpus melle colitum eſt. Apud Iudæos exmyrrha, & aloe cadauera
con diebantar,vé apud Ioanné Euangeliſtam cap. Iceportabile
equindependenciaenels C. 19. legimus: quippeNicodemus myr rhæ, & alocs ad
libras fermè centum mi. furam fecit pro corpore Ieſu Saluatoris noftri
condiendo. Magorum eratmos, non humare fuorum corpora, nifià fer - ris ante
laniata forent: Affyriorum Re gure fepulchra in paludibus condita fu ile
tradunt. Mellis vſum, vita hominibus inducere diuturnitatem. Nenarrabili
equidem potentia mel, corruptione cuſtodire valeret, à natura
productúeft:propterea Plinius l.20.maximè huius virtutem ad miratur,
ClaudioqueCæſari Hippocen taurum, exAegyptoin melleallatum, vt citra cariem
eſlet, commendauit: nam & hoc corpora computraſcere non ſinit; fiquidem
multi fenium longum mulſi tantum intinctu tolerauêre.Celebre eft mellis
exemplum in Pollione, qui cen tefimum annů excefsit: hicenim ab Au. gufto
interrogatus, qua ratione, &ani mi, & corporis vigorem, maximè cuſto
difíet,hocreſpódiſſe fertur:Melle intus, foris oleo. Proditur etiam Corficæ in
fulæ populos, ex aſsiduo mellis vfu, vi. tæ acquirere diuturnitatem, cuius rei
li cet Diodorus non comprobet exemplu eò quòd mel Corficú peſsimum cente at,
tamen non per hoc vſum mellis ad vi tæ produ & ionem improbauit. Gulinas
ouaparere quolibet anni temporefi femina urtica, velcanabisin cibis habuerint.
Scripſit Ariftoteles6.de Hiftor.animal. cap. 1, Gallinas toto anno oua parere,
exceptis duobus menlibus brumalibus. Hoctamen tempore, quo à fætura deti ftunt,
ferninis vrtica, & canabis auxilio faciliter gallinæ fæcundantur:fienim in
cibis iſtorum ſemina Ticca comederit, procul dubio tota hyemis tempeſtate, non
modò calidis temporibus oua pari ent. Hæc profectò earum corpora cale. faciunt,
& ad fæcunditatem diſponunt. Curyepbylatam infantium maculas è corpo Olent
tenella infantium corpora, dű vtero exiftunt materno, maculis 0 pore extricare.
Solenereexiftuntmaterno, quibusdam, næuis, lituris, veruciſque, quæ à matris
imaginatione fiunt, com maculari: hæcporrò quali ſigilla impri muntur,
&difficulter poft ortum elui poſluņi. Pro iis delendis principatum
habetCaryophyllata, cuius vis,& po tétia in huiuſmodi maculis extricandis,
mirabilis iudicatur.Sumitur enim plan ta hæc cum ſuis radicibus in fine menfis
Maij, quo tempore virtus vigorofror eſt atque à terreitate emundata, in alem
bicco deftillatur, mox ex aqua ſtil lata infantium lituræ maculæque Tæpius
lauantur, abſque dubio, eua. Deſcunt. Vrrica folia in lotio infirmi cuftodita,
vitam, vel interitumpreſagire. Ira equidem, ex abdito naturæ eſcrutinio, in
vica,morteq; infirmi praſagienda, vrticæ virtus,&potentia eft. Si enim
recensplanta extirpatur, ac -24.horarum ſpatio ia ægri lotio aderua tur,
vtiquefiviridis colore permanebit ex multorum experimentis,falutem, & vitam
infirmiſignificare dicitur:fin auté haud A cantu haud viridis
cuſtoditur,colorema; mura bit,mortem, velgrauepericulum deno tare, Ex Caftore
Durante. Philomelam axem miro conſenſu à viperade. pafci. Vis Philomela cx
cantu dulciſsi mo omnibus cognita eft; incogni tus autemeiusconfenſus eſt, quoà
Vipe rà depaſci permittit:dum enim ſub ar bore,in quacantans auis fuerit,
viperam viderit paulatim ex illa defcendit,&ad viperam accedit, vt illi
fiteſca. Ex Thoma Tomai. Caftorem fià canibus inuaditur, minimè te fticulos
fibi amputare. Linius,Solinus, & grauiſsimorú Scri ptorum multi,caftorem
fibi teſticu. los amputare referunt, quoties venato tes ipfum canibus
aggrediuntur quafi confcius exiſtat,quod(ijs reciſis ) à mof tis periculo ſit
ereptus; fiquidem vena tores hæc infequuntur animalia, vt ex his
accipiant,quodad medicinam vſur patur.' Rci autem veritate hi om. nes grauiter
errant; quippe caftor, Ppioru testiculi iuxta ſpinam inclufi funt, vt multis ex
anatome obferuatum. eſtiſte rum error ex velicis quibuſdam ortus eft, quæ in
vtroque, maſculo & fæmina, loco teſticulorum pendent, flauo plenæ liquore
ad medicinam vſurpatæ. Has vocant caſtereum aromatarii, teſticuii autem minimè
lunt. Quo atsficio miliciæ Duces, vt hoftes offen danti gnemmiſsilem
perniciofum -con ponere valeant. APeriam potentiſsimiigpis miſsilis, fiue
artificiari compoſitionem,cuius potentia tanta eft, vt eiusminimaItilla non
modò hominem viuum, verùmat que ferrum comburere valeat. Sumun turſandaracæ
factitiæ lib. 1o. ſulphuris viui lib.4.oleiè rafa, fiue ex adipealbur ni
ftillari lib. 2. ſalinitrifib.j. thuris lib.j.camphoræ vnc.6.vini ſublimati, fi
ue aquævitæ optiinę vnc.14.Omniahọc lento igne bene mifceátur; deinde fupa
obuoluta, atque accenſa in ollis, in ho ſtes inijciuntur. Ignishic, infernalis
di citur,tum ex eo,quòd mirabilia agat; tū N atque ex Paracelfi impij
ceſtimonio, qui retulit fc à quodam Dæmone fuille hunc ignem edocum. Demoſthmen
lingua duritiem, quibuſdama Lapillis confregiffe. DEmetrius
Phalereusalloquutus.com, quomodo fibi curaſſet linguæ impedi menta ſciſcitatus
eft.Habebat enim ille linguam duram, & ſcabram, &proinde adoratoriam
exercitationem impoten. tiſsimam ). Sanatam refpondit atque la. xatam fuiffe
linguam raſpondit ex non nullis lapillisoreretentis, quibus loqui
conabatur.Cuius Demofthenis præfidi í um difficilem habentibus loquutionem
faluberrimum iudico, vtexpeditius fer mo citari valeat.Ex Plutarcho. Vinum
quoddam àferpentibus venenatum, pleroſque àdifficillimis morbisconfanaffe.
Trabilise{t hiltoria,quęáProlpe Milocro Alpino,lib.4.de Medic.Method. de vino à
ſerpentibus venenato affertur In cella vinaria quidem ciuis Ferrariz inter alia,vinidolium
habebat, quod (i ne operculo diù apertum extiterat: - & proinde
compluresſerpentes,quos vul gus angues, & anzasappellant,ingreſsi in vinum
ſuffocati, & putrefa& i fuerát. Multiægroti ex febribuschronicis; atq;
difficillimis vexati morbis ignari,quod ſerpétes in eomortuielent, vinum à ci
ue emebant illud, quod guſtui gratum iudicabant, & breui fanati ſunt. Alij
ab huius viniſama ſuaui, cum paucos dies bibillent,itidem lanati funt, &
poft hos alijitidem eodem modo fere innumeri. Quare vinidominus tantæ vini
faculta tis admiratusvinum e dolio torum edu xit, & ferpétes complures ſemi
putridos inuenit,qui ré manifeſtá planè fecerunt. Veteres equorum lacrymas
inter auguria recepiſſe. Agnifaciebant veteres equorum Llachrymas, atq; ex ijs
auguriun vaniſsimumrecipiebant.Propterea ante Cæfaris mortem ad Rubiconemcqui
dedicati ab eo flebant,idquemagno au gurio excerptum eſt. Illorum autem N 2 inanitas,ſiue
ruditas vt ita loquar, mani feftiffima nobiseft:fiquidétépeftate no ftra fæpius
equos collachrymātes afpici mus, necperinde ex ijs alicui ſiniſtri quid
accidereobſeruamus. Vt ipſe non Semelexpertusfum, æftate potiſsimum equos lachrymari
conſpexi, idcirco vel illorum naturá efle,velmorbú iudicaui. Crocimerallorum
compofitio. Fferam Quercetani, Croci metal. Jorumcompoſitionem, qui potens
medicamentum tam vomitiuum, quàm purgatiuum fimul eſt, variisque affecti bus
accommodatum. Præparatur cum zquis partibus MagnefiæSaturninæ, & Nitri
inuicem mixtis, & inflammatis in quodã crucibulo vt vtar artis vocabulis,
& remanebit quædam materia calcina ta in colore Hepatis, quz puluerizata,
rubicunda apparet inſtarcroci Martis, quæque dulcoranda eft: Doris -grana x.
vel xij.cum vino,aut ațio liquore. Hominis compoſitionis mirabilia. Ntet
mirabilia, quæin hominis com I pofitionecontingunt,illud quidem mirum HORTVLVS
GENIALIS. 293 mirum eft,quòd tali corporis fit colla tusproportione,vt partes
omnes pera. que toti cópofito correſpondeat. Licet auto in eius ftatuia nec
certa nec deter, minatareperiatur mēſura;ex hominibo enim
aliquibreues,aliquilongi ſunt;la pienus nihilominus perfectioré homi. nis
ſtaturam è ſex pedibus cóftareiudi cauerunt, vel quod ſaltem feptem non
trárcédar.Interproportiones voluit Vi truuius cubitum quartam partem totius
corporis exiftere; eandemſ;penſurat. eſſed capitis vertice, ad pectorisinitisko
Manus longitudo à cõiun &tione ad mee dijdigiti extremūcorporisdecimapars:
eft.Facies à capillorum radicibus ad ex® tremum barbę,eade eſt menſura.Maior
pollicis coiú & io,oris eftaltitudo.Tota manustotius faciei menfura eft,
Maior iudicisconiun &tio,frontiset altitudo, cilijs fcilicet ad capillorum
radices; cæ teræ autem iftius coniun & iones, nafi longitudinem
oftendunt:Hominisproe funditas, ſi ſub brachiis, pe& ore, & hu
merismeluratur,ftaturæ illiusmedietas: 3 reperi 292 BARICE I 1.1 inanitas,ſiue
ruditas vt ita loquar,mani. feftiffimanobiseft:fiquide tépeftate no ftrafæpius
equos collachrymātes afpici mus, necperindeex ijsalicui finiftri quidaccidere
obſeruamus. Vt ipfe non femelexpertus fum, æftatepotiſsimum equos lachrymari
conſpexi, idcirco vel illorum natura efle, velmorbú iudicaui. Crocimet
allorumscompofitio. Fferam Quercetani, Crocí metal. A medicamentum tam
vomitiuum,quàm -purgatiuum fimul eſt, variisque affecti busaccommodatum.
Præparatur cuin zquis partibus Magneſiæ Saturninz, & Nitri inuicem mixtis,
& inflammatis in quodá crucibulo vt vtar artis vocabulis, & remanebit
quædam materia calcina ta in colore Hepatis,quz puluerizata,
rubicundaapparetinftar croci Martis, quæque dulcoranda eſt: Dofis -grana x..
vel xij.cum vino,aut alio liquore. Hominis compofitionis mirabilia. I'
poſitione contingunt, illud quidem mirum mirtim eft,quod tali corporis fit
colla tus proportione,vt partes omnes pera quetoti copofito correfpondeat.
Licet autē in eius ſtatura nec certa,nec deter, minata reperiatur mēſura;ex
hominibe enim aliquibreues,aliquilongi ſunt; la pienas nihilominus perfectiorë
homi nisſtaturam è ſex pedibus cóftareiudi cauerunt, vel quod faltem feptem non
trárcédat.Inter proportiones voluitVi truuius cubitum quartam partem totius
corporis exiftere;eandemg;menfurami eſea capitisvertice, ad gedorisinitiúko
Manuslongitudo à cõiun & ionead mes dijdigiti extrema corporis decimapars:
eft.Facies à capillorum radicibus ad ex tremum Barbę,eadé eſt menſura.Maior
polliciscóiú & io,oris eftaltitudo.Tota manustotius facieimenfura eft,
Maior Indicisconiun & io,frontisettaltitudo,a cilijs fcilicet ad capillorum
radices; cæ teræ autem iftius coniunctiones, naf longitudinem oftendunt:Hominisprop
funditas, fifub brachiis,pe & ore, & hu merisméluratur, ftaturæ
illiusmedietas. 3 rreperitur. Cæteræ partes cum aliistra. bentrationem,vtſuperius
tetigimus. Apedumnaturam mirabilem effe. IN Neer terreftria animalia,Aſpidum ne,
tura mirabilis iudicatur. Ex his enim mas & fæmina infimul vitam agunt, ta.
tula; amoris affectus inter ambdsinge ritur, vtfi cafu illorum alter occiditur
viuens occiforem infequi, quouſque fo dj,necem vlciſcatur,hauddeſinat.Quod
autem mirabilius eft,ex Plinij, & Ifidori Teſtimonio, occulta proprietate
occiío on noicit,(talem ifs natura indidit ) igi quemIrruit, licet in quantovis
hominu agmine reperiatur. Præceptum ergoo. mnibus eflc velim,vtocciſo iſtorum
ani malium quopiã,celeri fugaiter occiſor arripiat,ne à compare animali veneno
fiſsimoinfeftetur, Leporesomneshaudeffe bermaphroditos,con traVeterum opinionem.
Mneslepores vtriufq; lcxusexiſte re voluerunt Veteres, quod & M. Varro
ctiam tradidit. Error tamen eſt, vt diuturna docuit experientia, quama feulos fculos
à fæminis lexu eſſe diſcreros cognitum cft. Porrò tantorum inſcitia, abhoc, vt
reor,ortaeft, quia in leporum genere lępius, quàm in aliis animantibus
hermaphroditos reperimus: inde Hee brei naturæ arcana intimiùsſubodors tes,
leporéfæminino vocabulo léper ex planarunt,ARNEBETH, eò quòd in iis
foemineusſexuspræualet magis.Rej ve ritate noomncs hermaphroditiſunt,vt ex
peritiſsimis venatoribus audiui; exic & ione multorum cognoui,ficut.com iam
Bodinus edoctus fuit,vtivrhluth confitetur. Equidem Hermaphrodig plurimi
funt,fedfæcunditatem fervita. rumminimè recinéignecmares vnquam vtero gerunt,
necminus fuperfætant. Mirabilen eße Imaginationis po tentiam n vtero gerentibus
imaginationis po tentia apertè cognoſcitur.Si enim illæ inter virorum amplexus,
& fuauia,ali quid intensè cogitauerint, facilè in in.. fántium
corporisexternis partibus imax ginata imprimunt. Hinc variæ rerum formar Ire N forme,næui,lituræ, verrucæ, & alia figa na
in infantibus impreſſa conlpicimus, Lingmultæ ex leporum obeutu fætuse-, dunt
ſciſſolabello,aliæ fimis naribus,ore diftorto, vultumonftruofo,labris turpè
prominentibus,corporedifformi,ocu-, liſq; horrendis infantes genérant: quia
conceptus, vel grauidationis tempore, turpia,monſtruoſa,& horribilia fixa
co gitatione excogitarunt-Fæminisidcirce, præſertim nuptis,pulchrasimaginesda
mihaberecófulerem,atq;à turpibus av effe,ne pręuia imaginatione fætus mó.
Atruoſos, turpefá; concipiant. Veteres, Climaftericos annos admodum ti muiffe.
1 A mationis apud Aſtronomos exi ſtunt &re vera videtur in quolibet anni
feptenario quædam hominis mutation deò quod, ficuti in morbis dies criticos
timemus,ita in vita hominum annosClin mactericos,qui à multis ſcalares dicun
tui, quòd gradatim eueniant.Sunthi an ni, 7.14.21.28.35.42.49.56.63.70.77.81
91.Inte hos annos 49.63. magis periculosos credunt; quiaconſtant è feptenario,
duplici, &nouenario complicato,obfero uatumq; àgrauibus auctoribusreperio,
maioremhominum partem io anno 63. moricontingere.Idcirco hos veteres ada
modumpertinebant,&, vt capiturin Gellio lib. Auguftus itaſcripfit ad Ça ium
nepotem:Spero te lætum, &bene uolum celebraffe, quartum & fexagefi
mumannum natalem meum:nam,vt vi des,Elimactericum communem fenio rum omnium,
tertium & 'fexageſimum annum euafimus. Dehis tractatum edi dit Iofephus de
Roſsi à Sulmona vtilem &jucundum. fMundiprimordiisinter homines, es ferpema
tes antiparhiaminfurrexiffe. IRRreconciliabile odium eft, quod inter
homines,& ferpérescadit,adeò, quòd expauefcit homo fi ferpentem inuenit,
antvidet;magis autem fæmina: fiquidé obſeruatum audio gravidam mulierem (vifo
ferpéte )præ timore abortire.Hu. ius difcordia illa ratio potiſsima eft
quodàmundiprimordijs ínterkanc, & QUnca Semuan -illum Gt ſtatuta
inimicitia, & irreparaa bile odium, quo altera-, alteram fpecia em
inſequatur. Carolum V I. Francorum Regem, Ceruum 4 latumpro infigniprimò
habuiße. Iluanettum Rex Carolus venandi cauſa fe contulerat, canum latratibus
excitatusin fugam Ceruus, æneam tore. quem collogerere viſuseſt, quem vena
bulis,aut ferro appeti Rex prohibens,in calles, & retia compellit.Erarin
torque latinis litteris infcriptum:HocmeCçſar donauit. Exeotempore Caroluserua
alatum pro inſigni habuit; &alii,regibus inſignijs (quęlilijsaurcis tribus
conftát) circa latera, Ceruos duos apponere con fueuerunt. Gaguilis in vita
Carol. V I. HANC. Reg. Insaanimantia confenfum, &difcas diane ineffe.
Vllidubium inter animantia fym pathiam, & antipathiam efle inter trpiantes
ſubditur: fiquidem muſtelam miro eiulatu in bufonis os deuorandam
inueherelegimus; & bufonern in ferpen Npathi Lisa I tis,botræ vocati, os
ingredi.Inſuperci cutam, fturno eſle cibum; homini vero venenum in dies
obſeruamus: atqueveo Fatrum cotumices nutrire, hominem autem lædere non eft
ambiguum. Senaterem quendam, exconiuge liberos ſur dos, &mutosfufcepiffe
omnes. nature. omnesex, &mutos ſuſcipi,itaequidem à Fernelio obferuatum eft
in quodā Senatore.Cre didit Ambianus huius reiobfcuram, & cæcam eſſe
rationem, mihi autem altera fubeft, quæa Phyficis minimè differt: fi quidem
auditio grauis, atque ſurditas quæ à natalibus viſa fit à conformatio nis vitio
exoriens, hæreditarios mor bosgenerare creditur, & perinde libe ros,
exhuiuſmodivitioſis,ſurdos, &muin tos excitari:fæpè autem non in filiis,ſed
! in nepotibus hæclues oriri videtur. Apud Garamantes. mirabilem fonterros
obferuari, Dmiranda profe& ò, eft fontis il.com ARJiusproprietas, quiin
oppido Der 1 bris apud Garamantes reperitur. Hices nim die friget, no&c
verò æftuat; adeò quòd memoratu incredibile videtur, quomodoin tambreui
temporis fpatio tantam natura ſui faciat varietatem. Equidem, quinoéte fontem
afpicit, ibi flammasignefqueæternos exiſtere cres dit:quiautem die hyemales
ſpectat: fca. tebras, vtique fontem perpetuò rigere exiſtimat. Propterea Debris
apud mudi nationes inclyta eſt: eius enim aqua qualitatem excæleſti
vertigine,mutare confpiciuntur.Ex Solino. Quo artificio Caminus per ſuperiorem
"api cem ſolum fumum emittere valeat. N Caminorum fru & ura,.non modi
aim tufferimus laboris, ne ignis fi molimtesin nos ipfos erumpant: fiqu. dem in
ventorum mutationc facile fit, vt fumi quandoque potius defcendant;
quàmadapicem aſcendant: ventorum enimvisillos deprimit, deſcenderequc
percaminum cogit. Egotale ad fumi ferlum impulfionem excogitaui artif. simm.Struktur
Caminus, cuiusfuperius fafti. zor faftigiu rotundú fit,ibique foramen la
pidibus fi &tilibus conſtructum fit: mox ahenum inſtar tympani ex-ære, in
cuius latere feneſtella extracta ſit, fuper lapi des affigito: ftylifớ
ferreisfubcingito; ita tamen,ve intus vagari, mouerique commodèpoſsitapta demum
fuper fer reos ftylos, & lebeten?' ex ære infuper vexillum,quod feneftellam
fubiec dia recto habeat,taliq;induſtria,vtin quo libet vexilli motu, moueatur,
& calda riumin gyrum,ita profe & ò è feneſtella, ventis
oppofita,fumuserumpet, & non deſcendet.Pleriq;, vt fpero, huit noftro
fcruinio,ineliorem addent Atructuram. meamque opinionem noníſpernent.
Adconftruendum celerrime Horologium muncrabile in paritte. Ncoritruendis,
pingendiſque ſolari, bus Horvlogiis, non modo lintā me ridianam,opuseft
imienire, vthorarum tempus fidele reperiamus, rerum atque Ortum, & Occalum,
Borcam, &All ftrum cum Aquinoctia, & Solftitia: in is.n.
Solarismotusquarnaxime variat. N 7 Ego quidem, vt labores fugiamus, tale
excogitaui artificium.Globum planum. extabula lignea formato in cuius medio
ftylus ferreus ſitus fit;diuidito mox glo. bum lineis,ex centro ad extremum du
cendo illius in 24,portiones, demumin globiapice horas ſignato, &vltimo in
patiete contra Solis radios affigito. Vt auté ex Solaribus vmbris diei, horas
ve nari poſsis,Horologium portatile afpici. conglobumý; ad horam illam accommo.
dato:ita profectò,abfq;alio auxilio, ce ferrimèHorologiumvmbratile in pari cre
habebis.In Aequinoctijs, & Solftitijs 1 eodem portatilis Horologijauxilio,fa.
cillimè ad horarum æqualitatem globů reducere poterimus. Infancium pir uitam, è
capitefluerem, quo artificio Chartaginenſes fiftere procurandTing, Xinfantium
pituita, in capiteredú. dante,plerique fuecedunt morbi in. ter alios, morbus
comitialis exoritur, qui à multis puerilis vocatur, quòd ijs,ve plurinum,eueniat..
Vt autem infantes ab huiuſmodi pręſèruarent Pæni, illorú vedas capitis lana
ſuecida inurere,pitu. itainý; fuentem hoc præfidio compefa cere conſueuerunt.
Athiopes infantes te ditos,ab ipſo quoq; natali die,in fronte adurút,ita profe
& ò tumcapitis, tumo culorü humorfiftitur. Apud Inſubress. ex teſtimonio
Mercurialis, & pleroſque populos,veícribit Scipio Mercurius,l ditos
infantes fetonein collo muniunt, quod falutáre experti funt aduerſus mor.
bos,qui à capite Huunt, Inmise rasis pluuie,quapotiora ixdiceniny præfagia.
pluuiam imminentem,tum ex Gallo rum cantu intempeſtiuo,tum ex fre quenti
cornicis crocitarione multi præ dicunt.Hisautem addendum puto muf cas(ca
imminente)pulice's, pleraqzani malcula à furore vexari, intentula;mer il dere:hæc
enini à vaporum inaerem ctc. rationc à radijs falar bus perturbantur. Infuper (pluuia
imminente )odoris fra. grátia in floribus sétitur;apes ad alueária -
sedcut;bufones, vermeſi;èterraakédut 304 BARICELLI Brina vifa eft per dies
præcedentes; catti manibus caput, quafi linientes, compri munt;
ouescapitacommotient:afini hu miles habent aures; ftercora fumát, ma legue
olent.Horum omniumratio, va poresàSole exhumidisfublatifunt:pro. inde
animalia,cerebra humida habentia, nonnulla magis extorquentur. Vinum à
Verrribus fuiffe mulieribus inter di& um. Agna fuitVeterum à vinivfuab.
Itinentia:illudautem adeò muli. eribus erat interdi & um,vtcapitale iudi.
cium inirct,quæ vinum biberet. Porrò inoleuit confuetudo,vtcognati, & affi.
mes, mulieres ofcularentur, ore explo rantes, an ex vinum bibiffent. Idem ve
fusMafsilienfibus, Mileliis, pluribus; Græcorum, &Barbarorum gentibusin,.
valuit, apud quos muliereshydropota, & viri erant abftemiz: Intermemoran da
illor um temporum,EgnatiusMetel fus, vxorem, quod vinum biberet,fufte necafe
dicitur. Quo artifii io è plumbo Antimonii flores ex Habere paleamase Ape nij,
fiue Stibinon femel extrahere Periam artem,qua flores Antimo à plumbo valui,
quo præſidioin multis corporis affe & ionibus feliciſsimo euétu voor.Capito
Plumbicampanam, è qua aromatarij rofarum aquam ftillatitiam extrahunt; hæc
habet æris fundum: tu verò txargilla eligito,quodacerrimoa etto fupra
medietatem implendum con fuilo,eaq; induſtria,qua rofæ ftillantur, in aceti
deftillatione carbonibus bene ignitisagendum cít:caue tamen, ne totus fillet
acetum, ne aqua extracta vftioné fentiat.Hæcaqua auri colore eft, fapore xerò
facchari, & mellis; mirabilis tamen tum in potu, tum extrinfecè vfurpata,
ob ftib j flores ex plumbo extre & os. vomitu, & aluo purgat, ob id
frigidis affectionibus,obſtructionibusý; vtiliſ. fima': In vlceribus putridis,
fætidis acoribus, ſcabie, herpere exedente, & aliis huiuſmodi,maximi eſt
valoris.Doe ſis in potu ſît vnc.ij. Deforisad placitū. Clarorum virorum exitum
aliquot inte felicem fuiffe Aniene fluuio Aeneas poft tot vi. & orias,
torque clara facinora periiffe dicitur: nec diſsimilisRomulo, Cæfari,
Alexandro,Annibali,Scipioni, Iugur thæ,Mithridati, atque alijs innumeris mors ſucceſsit:per
quàm n. pauci viriex iis, qui clari,atque illuſtres tum virturi bus, tum
fortuna habiti funt, quos non infælix exitus,tanq: á pro exemolo,fós
offentäuérit porterial text caligero. Defipientiam, mulierum natuefamiliarem
indicati. MVlieres vtero gerèntes,fiàphrenia tide capiuntur,Galeni teftimonio,
rarò confanefcere legimus, vt fcribit tamen Cælius Aur.femper minus graui
ter,minuſquc periculosè, quam viri,mu lieres ægrotant.Hoc autem, vt Merci.
sialis opinatur,ab alia ratione continge re non poteft, quam ab ipfarum natura,
cuius familiarius eft defipere,quam viri. Mirabile Annibalis, contra Romanos
nauala fratagemia. Nfolita,& mirabilis Annibalis milita Eisafutia contra
Romanos iudicarur: hic enim bello naturali cum iis dimica. curus, cum impares
vires habere anim aduerteret,rale ſtratagema inuenit. Ser pentibus,
quorumvenenumconfeftim enecat,pleraſq;ollas impleuit,opertasq; repente in
hoftes iaculatus cít, quorum ictibus plurimi cecidere.Hifceftratage matibus vir
hic tanquam alter ſerperis, multoties hoftium manus effugere con fucuit.Ex
Gdenoin lib.de tbet.Akrijon Ambarum cum vino alicui exbibitum, cena
feftiminducere ebrietaisn. Mbarum, quod à vulgo Ambrageye ſea
vocatur,fomiſsisatiopam falfos opinionib & bituminofis fontibus,qui in
maris profunditate exiftunt, oritur, Hocautem primòliquidum eft,cùm ve rò
aquarum impetu ſurfum rapitur, ex aerisfrigiditatecondenſatur, & Amban rum
fir:Siquidem in maris concauo, ple raq; mollia,teneraque obfèruantur, &
interalia Coralliú, quod ex aqua exea ptum, citiſsimè lapideſeit. In Ambaro
illud mirabileiudicatur, quod ab alique antequam vinum hauriat,odoratum, ina sttar
ebrii eladat: cum vinoa, propina tū,confeſtim notabiléinducere ebrieta tem
multis experimentis eft comproba. tum. Ex Simeone Sethi Greco auctore. oleam
Lathyris Tympaniam, Colicas, affe& iones mirabiliter ſanare. Irabile quidem,quod
è Cataputię -ſeminibus extrahitur, oleum eft, quippein expellendismorbis,qui à
filao tu luccile;frigidis oriuntur, principem habet locum.Contundantur huius
ſemi na, atq; in aquatam diùebulliant,vt ex cocta videantur;mox oleum in aqua
fu pernatans cochleari colligendúeft. Mos eft apudIndos tale oleum cómodius per
decoctionem, quàm expreſsionem cola ligere.Vfurpaturhocfeliciſsimofuccef. fuin
Tympania,colicis, iliaciſq;dolori. bus,ftomachiaffe & ione,aurium furdita
te,atq, in iis morbis,qui à ſuccis frigidis, fatua;fiunt. Huius gutta aliquo
lique re in potu ſumpta aquam citrinam euan euat,in articulorumq; doloribus
pitui tam, humoreſque frigidos. Extrinfecè vfurpatur in omni Hydropis ſpecie:
vbi HORTVLVS GENIALIS 309 vbi tamen flatuofitas viget, maximam in expellenda
proprietatem habere vi detur. Ex Don Garzia ab Horto. Verenum à diſsimili
extingui; à fimili vero angeri. Hocpropriumelle veneni,àfapien Lrioribus
proditur, à diſsimili ex. tingui, & a ſimili augeri, & robuſtius fi
erizea propter non femel à perfidisho minibus exhibita venena nullius valo
risfuifleobſeruatum eft,cùmeadiſsimi libusfuerint fociata. Aconitú, & Napel
lus miram retinent vim necandi, com pefcitur accamen corum potentia à ve neno
diſsimili, ex quorum diſsimilitu dine,vtriuſq;vis hebetatur.Mira eftAu. fonii
hiſtoria de vxore mæcha, quzma rito venenum propinauerat, vt a. illud robuftius
effet, Hydrargyrum miſcuit ex quo toxici virtusdempta eft, & vir immunis
euafit. Hoc epigrammate ille monftrat; Texica Zelotypadedit vxor mecha marito,
Necfatis ad mortem, credidit effe datum: Miſcuit HA Mifcuit agente lethaliapandera viui,
Cogeret vt celerem visgemindanecem. Digid at ber fiquis faciunt difiseta
venenü; Ansideram fumet,quiſociala bibet. Ergo inter fefe dum noxia pocula
cortant, Cele lethalisnoxafalurifora Protinus,Go Vacuos duipetiêre receffiua,
Lubrica deie& is,quaria nota cibis. Quanpia cura Deumprodeft crudelier
vxor, Elçüm fata voluns,bina venena juuans. Cornelij Celfy de valetudine
fanorum bomsi num conferuandatutißimapræcepta. Nter grauiſsimosmedicos,&
fcripto res,nemo eft,qui in conſeruáda fano rum hominú fanitate oculatior
exiſtat. Afferă ciusverba ', ytfaluberrima iſtius præcepta rectius
intelligantur.Sanus ho mo,qui,&bene valet, & ſuæ (pontis eft, nullis
obligare fe legibusdebet, ac neq; medico,ncq; dcalipta egere.Húcoportet varium
habere vitæ genus, modo ruri eſſe,modòin vrbe,fæpiuſý; in agro: na uigare,
venari,quiefcere interdum: fed frequentius fe exercere.Siquidé ignauia corpus
hebetat labor firmat; illa matură lepc ſenectute,hic longăadoleſcentiá reddir.
Prodefteciâincerdúbalnco interdú,aquis frigidisyti;modòvngi,modòipsú negli
gere:nullú cibigenus fugere,quopopu. lus-vtatur:interdú in cóuiuio eſie, inter.
dum ab eo ſe retrahere:modò plus iufto, modò no ampliusaffumere:bis die poti us
quàm femel cibú capere, & fèper quá plurimum,dummodo hunc concoquat. Secl
vt huiusgenerisexercitationes cibi queneceſſarij ſunt;ficathletici, ſuperua.
cui. Nam, & intermiſſus propter ciui. les aliquas neceſsitates ordo
exercitati. onis,corpusaffligit, & ea corpora, quæ more eorum repleta
funt,celerrimè, & fenelcunt, & ægrotant. Hæc firmis ſer: uapda fune,cauendumquene
inſecunda valecudine, aduerfæ præſidia cenſum mantur.Ex lib.i. Socrati à
familiariDeironcde Plasonis indole Somnium fuiffe immiſſum. Solene
quandoq;malifpiritus homi nibus fomnia ingerere futurarum re rú, vel Dei
permiflione, vel vt nos ipfos dedecipiant. Hinc Socratem legimus, vidiffe per
ſomnium,oloris pullum ſibi in gremio plumefcere, qui continuò exorcispennis
& expanfisalis, in altum aduolans, fua tiſsimos cantus edebat. Poftridie
Pla tone adducto, hic eft (inquit ) Cygnus, quem ego præterita nocte cam
fuauiter canentem fomno videram. Hocfomnium, ve fcribit Henricus de Aſsia, à
fpirira fa. I miliari, ſub forma Cygni, quem Athe nienſesVeneri dicarunt, fuit
immiſsum Socrati, vt Platonem in diſciplinam re ceperit ', à quo, quum ipſe
uilil ſcrie ptum reliquerit, dulciſsimi ipfius & Caluberrimai fermones
proderentur, Magia ſeu inc antatianis ris. Onmeras eſſe præftigias, quæ magica?
arte efficiuntur; multis exemplis notum eft, fed vno in primis, quod deſcribere
vifum eft. Rufticus quidam magnis doloribus ventriculi vexaba tur:: quos etfi
variis, medicameutis depellere cogar zur illi tamen non 1 ceffarunt, fed potius
in dies recrudeſcere vifi funt. Quare agricola doloruin impati ens, cultello
ſibi guttur abfcidit. Dum au tem tertio die mortuus ad fepulchrum ef ferretur,
à duobus chirurgisin magna ho. minum frequentia, illius ventriculus iraci. fus
eſt. In ee (res mira, & prodigiofa ) lignum teres, & oblongum,quatuor
excha. lybe cultri, partim acuti, partim ferræ in. ftar dentari, ac duo
ferramenta aſpera re. perta fuerunt:quorum fingulaſpithamęlos gitudinem
excedebant. Aderat, &capillo. rum inuolucrum globi inftar. Credibileen
fanè, hęcin ventriculi cauitate congeſta fu iffe, non alia arte, quàm Dæmonis
aftu,& dolo. Quo artificio epiftolam, in ouo celatam alicui afcribere
valeamus Nter ſcripturarum furtiuarum arcana non infinum locum tenere exiftimo,
in ouo epiftolam celare, atq; amico ſcribere, Videbis enim oui putamen illæſum,
mun. dung; illo tamen exempto, difruptos; cha paeteres apparebunt. Aperiam
ſecretum. S? Atramento, ex gallis, alumine &aceto con. fecto, in ouicortice
literas ſignabis, votum pffequeris. Has oportet in Sole calente ex ccare, mox
ouum in muria concoquere ita enim à cortice characteres euaneſcune, & ad
interna gradiuntur:ſiquidem putami. ne exempto, notæ oui durato albumine in
ueniunturEx.Carolo Stephano. In aquafrigida captanda maximum veterum
fuiffeftudium. Aximam antiqui curam adhibebát, vt aquam frigidam pro ætatis in.
cendio temperando conferuarent: quareex niuibus eam parabant, vt Athenæusretulit.
Dequa re perbellè loquebacur Seneca, & panas montium in voluptates
transferunt, Alexandrini aquam Soletepentem, in fene ftris ad ventorum incurfus
exponebant, vt poctu frigeſceret;manè autem inte Solis or ruin hani ponebant,
folijſque lactucæ, ac que pampinis iniectis frigidam tuebantur.
HocGalen.parrat.6. Epidemior. Plasarchu: 6.Sympus cotibus & filicibus aquæ
inietti hoc fieri fcripfit. Neronis autem in re har ftudium nobiliſsimum fuiffe
proditur: ise genim, vtninis voluptate, ablque njuisia iniuria fruererur,
feruentem aquam vitro immifiam in niues refrige jarimandabat:Ex Heur nie. Ecua Fæminas
in prima menftruorum eruptione in Venerem maximè incitari. e Erunpune,fceminis
bera exurgunt:Pana guis ille,inftar occifi animalis videtur, atq; in maiori
copia erumpit, cùm vbera ad du os digitos prominent, que tempore puella rum
vocem in grauiorem mutari confpici. mus, Illud autem maximè adnotandum eft, in
prima menſtruorum eruptione puellas in pudendis,valida tentigine, prurituque
core ripi,ex quo ad Venerem incitantur: quare per tempus illud cautè cuſtodiri
exiſtimo. Ex Arift.7.de Hift.anim. Qua induſtria Aegypti lapides à
vefica,abfiga incifione extrahant. Irabile quidem eſt Aegyptiorum ftudium in
extrahendo lapide à ve fica abſque inciſione, quando noftrates me dici,
lapidarij ſine illa facerenequeant, idque cum magno languentium vicę periculo.
Hiligneam cannulam accipiunt, octo di. gitorum longitudine, & digiti
pollicis latia tudine in opere abfoluendo. Hanc colisca nali admouent,
fortiterque infufflant;neau. tem flatus ad interioraperueniat, extre. mū
pudendimánu altera perftringunt, fo. samen deinde cannulæ claudunt, vt virga 0
% cabang M N eagalisiotumeſcat, latiorq; fiar. Quo facto miniſter digitoin ano
pofito, lapidem pau Jatim ad canalem virgæ, atq; in eius vasex tremun deducit.
Quivbipræputio lapidem appropinquare ſentit,cannulam à virgæ ca nali fortiter,
impetug; amouet, & lapis ex. trahitur. Ex Alpino. Mult a praſidia ab
animalibus, bomines accepiffe. On pauca equidem præſidia funt, quæ ad hominum
tutelam ab animalibus accepta ſunt. Chelidoniæenim virtutein ad oculorum morbos
ab Hirundine accepi. mus, quæ hanc conquirit herbam,vt furorú filiorum oculos,
vel vitiatos, vel.cæcos cu rer, Fæoiculi virtutem ad eandep tutelam ab'anguibus
didicimus, Ab Ibide, quæ in ftar Ciconię auis eft, clyftris vſum habui mus: nam
& illa roftre marinamaquam al lumere folet, illoſ; pro clyfteri vtitur, vt
ventrem nimis onuftum exonerare valeat. Inſuper marinus equus, Hyppopot mus di
etus, venarum fectionein nos docuit: illef. quidem mala oppreffus -valetudine,
ad re center fuccifas arundines graditur, acutio. riſ;cuſpidefanguinem è
cryrjuin venis adi mit. Quod autem in hocmirabile eft, vela guinem cohibeat, in
fimo, vel cono volutatur, & ica vitam tuetur, & fanguinem fim ftit. Ex
Plinio, alis. Equorum teft:cilos ad ſecundas depellendas miram babere pirt
utern. Ingularis profecto Equi teſticulorum ad nulierum fecundasdepellendas eft
pro prietas, adeò, quod teftatur Genſerus in e pift. Rufticum quendam,
quinquaginta in puerperis feliciter hoc vſum fuiſſe reme dio. Vfus eit &
Horatius Augerius in plu. ribus mirabili euentu: præſtantiſsimuin id circo à
grauibus auctoribus indicatur re ne diun),nam, & pluribusiam deploratis pro
fuit.Capiunturteſticuli equ: caftrati,& tria ftillatim conciſi in forno
exiccantur, quorü puluis quantum capitur tribusdigitis è jure bibendas datur in
neceſsitate; idé; fi opus eit, bis, auc ter reperitur. Humanam faliuam
Scorpiones interimere. Ominum faliua Scorpionibus infe ttiſsimum venenum eít,
adeò quòd ca tacti confeftim intereanc. Porrò ijs, ſaliua fora ſubſtancia
aduerfaelt, ve Galenus lib.io fimp, medic. experimento confeffus eft; ist. nim
à fola faliua morientem vidit Scorpio. nem, id; celeriter patientem à faliua
elue riencium, aut fit jentium; tard autem ab 3 illis,qui cibo, potuque fuerant
impleti,ina. liis autem proportione, Apium riſus,bominesridendo interfi. cere.
Scelerata eft herba quæ Apiamrifusdicia cur, quod ridendo homines interficiar:
fi quis enim gnftauerit ieiunus vtique ridendo exanimabitur, vt
Apuleiusteftatus eft: Ex hacillud adagium ortum habuit:Sardonius siſus; nam
& Sardonia eriam vocatur.Porrò on ex rifu, qui hác guftauerint, moriuntur
fed potius,vt placet Saluſtio neruos labio rum, & orismuſculosillius, qui
eam come dit, contrahere facit,adeò, vtridendo mori videatur. Qua induſtria
Partbi, Scytheque Sagittarum aciem venenajunt: AR'thorum, Scytarumque toxicum,
quo fagicrarum acies inungi folebant, humano fanguine, & viperinaſanie
confta bat, tantæquc feritatis erat hoc venenum, ve leui tactu animal
interimerer, Equidem Scythæ viperas recenter enixas venantur, eaſque
diesal.quoccontabelcere finunt, do necip fapien putre.cane, mox com visus
hominis fanguine in ollam effuſo, eam ex quifite coopertam; fimoque obrutam com
putrefcere finunt, cuius demum.1. ick or fan. PAT fanguini ſupernatans, fiue
ferum cuni vipe rarum faniecommixtum lethale Scytharum toxicum eft. Ex Arift.
Plinio, & Langio. Succinumpterogerentibus exbibitum, mire partum
accelerare. Mvicis experimentis comprobariaudio ſuccinum parturientibus drach.
ſemis pondere ex vipo albo potui dátum, mirè par tuin accelerare. Hoc eriam
facit eius oleum, fi gutta tantum ex aqua verbenæ parturienti
propinatur.Quidātamen medicusHetrufcus (Fallopii teftimonio
)exhibebatfcrup.i.bora• cis in decoctomatricariæ, velfabinæ diffolu tæ
difficulter parientib.mirag; faciebat: bre ui enim temporis fpatio feetus,vel
viuus,vel mortuns egrediebatur. Habebat ille medi euis pro arcano præftantiſsimum
hoc auxili um tamen neſcio quomodo postea fuerit de fetum. Ex Andernaco
Serpentum oua genituramí per imprudētiam in petu haufta,ſerpentesin corpe ribus
procreare: Dmiranda fuccedunt quandoq; fym dem imprudenter cum ea femina, vel
ova ſerpentú hauriuntur, è quibus moxſerpentes generantur. Genſerus in lib 2.
hift animal cap, de Ranis Rubetis, bufones in ventriculis in reftinifq; hominum
haufta eorum genitura, fieri, &nutriri probauit. Iacobus Manlius, in
lib.experim.in cuiuſdam equitis, exhau * Ita cuiufdam lacunæ aqua, vbi
erantſemina Serpentum, in ventriculo plures angues fu. iflegenicos prodidit:
quibus per internalla extractis, medicorum auxiliis, fanus factus eft. Leuinus
Lemnius Vermiculos cauda tos, atg; infolita forma beſtiolas vomitu ciectas nouit.
In nonnullis lacertas à phar. maco fuifle eductas obferuatum eft, vt Gé.
maCoſmocrit vidit. Quare maxima in a quæ potu hominibus opus eſt animaduerfi.
one huiufinodi exhanftis, pernicies corpo. Tis conſequatur. In deſperato coli
dolore Hydrargyruin, v4. glandem plumbeamexbibitam, multos confanaffe. Irabile
videtur, Hydrargyrum,quod à mulis venenum reputatur, in der. peraro coli'dolore
exhibitum, plurimun prodell:. Equidem Marianus Sanctus, ex multorum confilio,
qui ab hoc lethali mor bo fanati fint, fuadet, fi obstructio perfeue rauerit,
& fæces per os extrudantur, hau fire cum aqua fola argenti viui libras tres,
Probat hic exratione vinetuin feu duplicatű inteltinum Hydrargyri pondere
explicari, fæces detrudi,vermelý; fi ibi fuerint interi. mi, &ægrum
liberari. Haud ab hoc difsi mili auxilio quidam nobilis, poft alia ten tata ad
morbi huiuſinodi acerbita tem ma. chinamenta, liberatus eft. Hic hauftis olei
amygdalarum dulcium fine igne extraćti vnc. iij.cum vino albo, &aqua
parietariæ mixcis, mox deuorata glande pluoibea ar gento viuo illita, planè à
colico cruciatit euafit, illamque exano abſquelaborerede didjt. Ex Pareo lib.
16. Infæniculorumfeminibus, vim quando que exitialem deliteſcere. Grauibus
ſcriptoribus comprobatur, ſerpentes fæniculorum elu, &fene ctam
exuere,&oculorum aciem rnonare. Hinc iis affricantur oculi anguium, vt vo.
tum affequantur, Ex attritu foeniculorum feminibus, praya quædam imprimitur qua
litas, è qua venenati producuntur vermi. culi,quorum eſu multi in peſsima
deuene. runt ſymptomata, &ab alexiteriis rarò ad iusj funt, tanta huius
veneni potentia eft. Quare foeniculorum ymbelli,antequam co. medantur,
aperiantur, & diligenter concu, tjantur, vtå vermibus emundentur. Præ, OS
Habis A A ſtabit al quantifper in frigida macerare. Ex Balthajaro Pifanello,
Noua admirandag; prafidia, ad Ang i nam, gutturules apoflemata. Fferanı
fingularia auxilia, è quibus ex grauiſsimis fcriptoribus, ad anginam &
gutturis apoſtemata mirabilia contigiffe proditur.Lignum hederæ ad gutturis
apoſte. mata à proprietate valere fcribit Ioannes Marquardus: quippe obſeruatum
eft, come dentem excochlearihederæ ligneo, fiue bi. bencem in aliquo ipfius
vafe ligneo, num quam, vel raro in gutturis, vel vuulæ apo. temaińcurrere,
Rubeta cocta, &pro em plaftroSynachicis impoſita,cófefim liberat.
Vermes.quandog, in cordis capſula pro creari, è quibus mors ſubitanea
pleriſqueexoritur. Abulofum haud eft, vermes in cordege: nerari. Hoc enim
Melues docet, Holle rius, Marth. Cornax, Alexius Pedemonta. nus, & alij
loan, Hebenftrit, in lib. de Pette, Principem quendam ex morbi fæuitia peri
iffe narrar, cuius cadauere diffecto, vermis albus præacito roſtello, eoq;
corneo præ. ditus, cordi adhęreſcere deprehenfus eft. Exmedicis, ſucco alii
feram hanc, tanquain ex indubitato remedio, interimi probatü eft. Petrus
Sphererius (vt ScheukinsBarratti lem
fiorentinum morte fubitanea correpti, atq; diſſecatum obferuauit, in cuius
cordis caplula vermis viuus repertus fuit. Aiunt multi certiſsimo
experimenco-ficco allii,ra phani, & nafturtii hos vermes pecari, qui, ex
teſtimonio Pedemontani, in corde deli teſcentes,ſyncopim, Epilepfian, &
mortem inferre folent. Mares pleroſque in mamillis, mulierum instar, lac
producere. Icet marium mamillæ fpiffa carne in fuiffe productum obferuatum eft.
Nouit hoc Arift. vtlib. 1. dehiſt. animal. docuit. Veſali us non femel id
confpexiffe in 1: 4. 15. Anat. commemorat, & Hieronymus Eugubius in libell,
de lacte: fic & Cardanus,lib. 1. de Sub til. qui ianuæ vidit Antonium
Denzium, è cuius mamillis lactis tantum profluebat, vt infantem fernè lactàre
potuiffet. At hifto ria, quæ affertur ab Alex. Benedicto mira. bilis eft:
aitenim, Syrum quendam,mortua coniuge, è qua infans ſupererar, ybera filio admouiffe,
ècuius ſuctu tanta lactiscopia i pupillam manauit, vt exinde loco matris nn
trire valuerit. Ego quidem in duobus filiis meis, in primis diebus à partu
obferuaui, ab obftetrice.mamillas cofrectatas, lacimpulſo (magno multorum
ftupore) emififfe: idậ; in aliis etiam infantibus contpexi, Lumbricosquandoque
tantaprocreari pi Tulentia, vt interior a corporis perfurare valeant. Nfanda
equidé fymptomata à vermibus aliquando proueniunt: refert enim Om bibonus, lib.
4. de morb. infant. Lumbricos ex vmbilico cuiuſdam erupiffe. Tralliani
teſtimonio habemus, hæc animalia ob ali menti inopiam inteftina laceraffe,
fuiffe ob ſeruatum. Id etiam ab Aegineta confirma tur: jofuper Hollerius
confpexit, vermes per inguina, & vmbilicum prorupifle. Ma. gna igitur cura
opus eſt in horum redua dantia, ne interioracorporis valeant lace fare, A
Infamis vmbilicam, & Ceruinumpenem mirabiliter conceptumfacere. Lexander
Benedictus, 1.30. de curand. morbis,vmbilicü infantis, qui fponte caditquoquo,
modo in ciboſumprú, fiigno rauerit mulier,adconceptum facere, pro.
didit;illumg; in brachialibus à muliere ge ftacuin conceptum inhibere eredir.
Cerui. aum inſuper penena aridum, & in fari. namredactum, oboli pondere, à
coitu forminis datum; procul dubio ad concipien. dum prodeffe experimento
probat, Baueri. us tamen conf: 50.vterum ceruinum fingu lari dote ad conceptum
valere prædicat, Vlmi vſum, recentem Elephantiafim curare fuiffe obferuatum.
Inquam certum remedium, Vimi vfus in curanda recenti Elephantiaſi à laco. bo
Douinero, lib.Tic.7. prædicatur. Vidit enim adoleſcentem tali affetu laboranté,
& decoctionis Vimi vſu (factis faciendis ) conualuiffe. Ea equidem pro omni
potu vte barur in quolibet paſtu, cum pauco vino al. bo, &cantiſudores
mouebantur graueolen tes, vt vix illos cuftodes ferre poffent. Ita viſcera
purgabantur, &magaa yrinæ copia excernebatur, quibus excretionibus fanus
factus eft. Cyprinorum efum podagricis elle infeflum. Vamuis inter piſces,
Cyprinusnobi. lifsimus exiftimetur, cum optimum præbeat nutrimentum,
exquiſitiſsimigsexi Atat faporis; tamen podagricis infeftuin ef. fe obferuatum
eft. Nouit enim podagroſum Iulius Alexandrinus (vt retulit lib. 15.6. 6.. de
salubr. ) cui Cyprinorum efu pinguium, parata érat femper podagra, ve in manu
illi th effet, eo pacto accerfere, cùm vellet. G Puluere pellis leporine,
perniones à Sep tentrionalibusfanari. Laus, lib. 2. Rerum Septentrionalium,,
tilsimè perniones experiri fcripfit, qui mor bus, non aliis ab iis fanatur
remediis, quàm puluere pellis leporinæ. Plinius verò Rapú domeſticum feruen's
calcaneis impofitúla. nareretulit. Ego ex Carolo Séephano, inlib. de Ragraria,
in quodam expertus ſum reme dium, & bene fucceflit. Accipit ille, ficos
crematos, è quorum puluere, & cera yngné tum parat;hoc pernionibus
impofitum bre uiliberat patientes. Hydrargyrum loco amuletigeftatum à pefte
faſcinog corpora defendere. Arfilius Ficinus, & P. Droerus, in lib. M,
fienim auellana perforatur, &extracto in. teriori nucleocum acicula,
argento viuote pletur, & collo fuspenditur; mirum in mo dum à peſte corpora
tuta reddit: ira profe etò à peftifera lue fæniente fe defenderuut multi. Hoc
eriam præfidio mulieres lactan. tes, à faſcivatricibus, ne lac fic ademptum,
quo infantes alendi funt, præferuari poffe, i Thomas Iordanus, in libe dePefte,
prodidit. - Q " ppe multis experimentis obferuatum re, tulit (hoc fecum
geſtao - ullas prorſus laga. ruin, lamiarú aut ftriguin infidias lacrátibus
nocere. CNICO Meſpili lignum,collo appenfum grauidas ab abo orth preferuare. Wm
quadam æſtate apud D. Ioannem Nicolaumn Cucillum Brancacium, mei amantifsimun,
ytpuerum curarem interef ſem, fortè inter me, & Doininam D. Man. já Cotoneam
e Toleris, eius vxorē, de abor tus præſeruatione, tunc vtero gerentem, có:
uentum est. Retulit domina hæc Meſpili li gnum collo appenfum mirè ab abortu
gra uidasdefendere;idq; millies à fuis maiori bus foiffe expertum. Confiteor in
plerifq;, tale lignum fuifle à me expertum, atq;certú, & rarum remedium
ſemper inueniffe fe: fi quidein multæ aborrientes, & dolore, & fã.
guinis fluxu (appeofo ligno reſtrictæ ſunt, &ab abortuſeruatæ, adeò
quòdined parti cularem virtutem abortú prohibendiinefile seor, Qua
induftriabomines abſtemios reddere valeamus. Vleis experimentis comprobatum re
perio Anguillas, vel Mullos in vino M fuffo peri sfuffocatos vini faftidium
inducere: & enim ex eo bibant homines, procul dubio abfte mii fiunt.
Infuper philoſtratus in vita Apol loni, ona noćtuæ elxaca, & infantibus pro
cibo allata, hydropotos in tota vita illos reddere ſcripſit. Mizaldus, Ragam
viridem, ex iis, quæ in fontibus ſaliunt, viuam in vi. no fuffocatam, idem
efficere, fi tale vinum potetur, prodidit. Rotundam Ariſtolochiam mirè piſces
ftu pidos reddere. Ira eſt Ariſtolochiæ virtis in piſces: ipfa enim illos odore
ad fe al licit,moxftupidos reddit. Proprerea fi eius radicem contritam, calciq;
commiſtam, fiue eius decoctionem cum calce pacato flumine aut maris littore
piſcatores confpergent, piſces agminatim confluere videbunt. Ili autem puluere
deguftata, veluti examina ti ſupernatantes capientur. Puellam veneno ab
infantia nutritam, Alexandro ab Indorum Rege fuiße miffam. Ndorum Rex Alexandri
fortunæ inuidés, vt illum interimeret, miræ pulchritudi nis mifit puellam,
ratus forfitan Alexandru confeftim cum ea concubiturum. Illa au tem Nappelli
veneno ferè à cunabulis erat educata, propterea more Serpentum ſcin tillances
habebat oculos. Hos Ariftotelesar piciens, caue tibi ab hac (dixit ) 6 Alexan
der; nam virus peftilentiſsimum alit, vode tibi exitium paratur. Poft paucos
dies pleri q; proci huius commercio venenari periere ex quo Ariſtotelis
praſagium mirabile fuit iudicatum. Ex Auerroe. Quale fitigneum prafidium,
quodin morbis ab Aegyptis, & * Arab.bus vfurpatur. N lib. deMedicina
Aegyptiorum prodi. dit Alpinus, quo pacto illiin morbis cor. pora adurant.
Accipiunteniin lineam peti. am cubiti longitudine, latitudine verò tri um
digitorum, quam ad formam pyramydis aptant goſsipioque implent; ipfius latior
pars, parti adurendæ applicatur, alterumg; capuc accendunt, comburió; cam dia
per miteant, ye faſciculus crematur. Continuò ramen dum cutis vritur, ferro
circumcirca accingunt carné,ne caloris incendio aliqua oriatur inflammatio.Hocinfuperinuolucro
parando obſeruant, vein medio meatus ex iftar fafciculi: ita enim euentatio fue
refa piratio aliqua paratur, In vftione autem per aćta offium medulla in carneaduſta,
quoad eſchara cadat yantur.Hic vrendi modusAe. gyptiis &, Arabibus familiaris
eft. Olim in Creta familiasquaſdam mirè faſes: natricesadfuiffe A quoſdam, tum
fæminas in hiſce parti bus animalibus, pueriſque laudando faſci num attuliffe:
adeo quodij;fiad ouile, por cileque quodpiam adiuiffent,confeftim in teritum
pleriſque produxiffe: Quare mirum haud eft, quod legitur in Creta quaſdam fa.
milias adfuiffe, quæ laudando faſcinum is. ferebant. His profectonatura quædam
ferè venenofa efficitur, & ex oculis inde fpiritus efflant
venenatos,quibusanimalia,pueri, & grandiores faſcino maculantur. Laudando
autem venenum promptiusoperatur: fiqui dem laus propria, gaudium affert, quo
cordis fpirituumque dilaratio oritur, & veneno. a ditus præparatur.Ex
Fracaſtorio - de fymp. sta Antypat.rer. Cyprint verticis oſsiculum mirabiliter
Epilep. ticisfubuenire. N Cyprini caluarix vertice quoddam re peritur ofsiculum
triangulare lapidisin ftar, quod in curanda Epilepſia; principeng loců
obtinereaiunt. Táta enim efficacia epi lepticicis fubuenit, vt morbusis numquam
reuertatur,Hoc, vbifuturæ in vertice calua six Cyprinicômitrútur intus fubfiftit,prop
I cerea terea ſi illa capello penetratur, ſtacim fora profilit,Andernacushoc
ofsiculum nummi Germanici cruciferi appellati,magnitudine exiſtere prodidit,atque
ſalutare eſſe Epilep fiæ remedium, Calphurnius Bestia Romanus qua pia vxores
dormientes interemerit. Nonnulliex veteribus in venenisnofçé & dili gentiam
inter alia Aconitum venenorus omnium elle ocyfsimam comprobarlot: fi quidem
tactis huiufinoti veneno genitali bus lexus faninini animaliuin, eodem die
mortem inferre viſiun eft.Hacvia Calphur nius beitia, veditaretur forſiçan, vxores
dor mientes interemit, de quo à M.Cæcilio ac cufatus eft.Hincilla -atiox
peroratio eius in digito mertuas. Confimili induftria Ladica laus Neapolis Rex,
cum cuiuſdam medici Prochytami filiam adamaret, cum eaque concumberet,
Florentinorum confilio ex cinctus eſt, AcetoStitillitieo Bythagoram vitam
longiſsi meproduxiße. Afecit:feripfit enim eius viulongāhonia nes vitá
conſequi, & vfquead eius extremum: finem permanere integrè, & dextra
valetu dine.lole cu quinquagefimum ageret awaum hoc remedio vfus eft &eius vfu ad centefi.
muum, & decimum ſeptimum productus et integer & nulla vnquam aduerfa
valetudine tentatus: cuius optimam facultatem admira. tus, confanguineis co
umuuicauit, vt illings vfum haberent. Oleiom lixiuio mixtum in lattis fpeciem
tran fire. ' rmè experimen: o oleum lixiuio mixtú, fi diuag retur,in lactis
ſpeciem tranfire, comprobatum eſt: eft enim lixiuium tenue, atque calidum,oleum
autem cum aêreum fit à lixiuio attenuatur, & proinde aerem con cipit,ex qua
albedoiunaſcitur. In aquis etis am, quæ diu agitantur,lactis ſpecies quædam
exoritur ex confimili induſtria. huius indi. In cium ſpuma eft, quæ cun fic
tenuis, aérem concipit, & dealbatur, Ex Cardano. Quainduftria Scythe abſque
cibo, potu per plures diesexiftant. Miraett herba Scythicæ operatio, qua scythæ
per plures diesfiue cibo, po - tuque viliere dicuntur. Hanc ij circa Boeri. am
inueniuntcreſcentem, & ad famem ficou timque tolerandam vtuntur: fi quidem
guftu dulcis, vt liquiritia eft, & in ore detenta fa mis, fitifq; fenfum
habetar, Idem apud cales C: Hippice præſtat, eò quòd hæc planta equis confini
HORTVLVSGENIALIS 333 confimilem generet effectum. Aiuntmulci, Scythas his
herbis duodesos eriam dies, fac mem, &ſicim non ſentire.Ex Martbiolo.
Catellos calorem natiuum augere, membros rumque dolores conſopire. P Ro
excitando nativo calore, membro. rumque cruciatibus demulcendis, Carelo li
præſtantiſsimi(Galeni teſtimonio,7. Me thod med.)exiſtimantur:illorun autem hu.
ius naturæ haud omnes habentur, fed ijpræ cipuè,quibus pilus concolor eft.
Propterea in Chiragra, podagra, & in omni Arthri. tis fpecie cruciatus,
quamlibet efferatos, parti affectæ adhibitos s præſtantiſsime confopire àmalcis
comprobatuni repe ris. plurima è terra furſumtapi, iterumque deorfum cum pluuis
pracips tari, Aximam yellera,rang,vermiculi,lapil li,ligna,vabijgeneris
frumentacealac, fanguis, & id genus alia terræ permixta, quæ cum pluuijs
quandoque præcipitari afpici. mus,, nobis præftant admiracionem, adeo quod à
cafu infolito plerique perterriti, Cæli mipas metuunt; Celiat aixen admira. tio,fi
eorúcauſas penfitamus:hæc enim pri mo 334 BARICELLI mò ventorum effluuijs,
ventorumque inipe tu terræ permixta furfum feruntur,mox cum pluuijs iterum
deſcendunt. Propterea nec ſemper mirum,autinſolens à ſapientibusiu dicatur: CorneliusGemma,
inCoſmitriticaca 6.hæc caufas legitimas à coeleftibus Syzygi. is habere
prodidit: fed tamen eo vſque pro gredi ſoiere,cum fpecie fua, tum magnitu
dine,vt etiam in portentis principem inue niant locum, Cum Pſylis, &Marfis,
Serpentes haudbabere inimicitiam. M Irabile eft, Serpentes, quià mundi pri
uerfam,inimicitiainque iniuere,cum - Pſyl lis, & Marfis nec odium nec
difconuenienti am retinere, Neceſſe ctenim elt, ve ijs aliqua miftio non omnino
contraria oriatur,auto dor, autaliud, è quo fpecies minus ingraca videatur; ita
profecto inter homines ipſos. criam contingit: quandoque enim fine cauſa
nonnullos odimus,alios amamus,prout re sum.fpecies ad animam noſtram perue.
niunte, quibus conuenientiam, & diſconnenientiain capta mus. Ex Fracastor
rian - ) Oling HORTVLVSGENIALIS. 339 Olim vasta, ego robuſtafuifle bominuincor
pora. Vamuis Plinius,cæteriq;ſcriptores, ho ninum corpora, robur, vitam ſemper
imminui conquerantur;tamen olim Gigan ces extitiffe, &vaſta hominum
fuillecorpo. ra negandum non eft.D.Auguftinus lib.15.de Ciuit.Dei.dentem
gigantis in quodam flu mine inuentum fuiffe prodidit,quiminutim diuiſus,centum
ex noftris dentes ſuperabas. De Pailante ſcribitur admirandum.Hic Ae neam
contra Turnum Regem Rutilorum adiuuit, mortuustandem, & fepultus, vbi nunc
Roma eft, (reference Solino)Anno O. atingefimo poft Chriftum Dominum dam
quiædam ædificia Romefierentcafu in ſepul chro quo arte mirabili cum lucerna
ardenti códitus erat, inuétus eft, & integer erectus altitudinem nuricapite
excellebat.Quid de Aiace, & quid de Turno; & de ingenti,faxo,
quodvterque in hoftem conjecir, referatur nouúhaud eſt.Quid tandem de Oreſte,
filio Agamemnonis,cuiuscadauer oéto cub tirá longitudinem excedebat, atque de
alijs in numerisdicatur,apud fcriptores reperitur. Idcirco præter ftirpem
giganteam,quæ poft diluuiumimminuca eft, alia corpora vastitatem & robur
maximum retinuiffe conce. dendum eft; in præfentiarum verò homi. num corpora
huiuſmodi comparata, tam pufilla funt, vt præ illis inania effe videan tur. Ex
Helinando Chronographo. Equum Phaleris accin&tum pulcbris, acri oremfieri.,
chris ornantur phaleris, tum acriores, tum pulchriores iudicentur. Eſt de his
cla. rum exemplum de Bucephalo Alexandri, qui phaleris accioétus Regijs neminem
præter Alexandrum (teftimonio Aeliani) ad fe aſcendere paciebatur, &
quoderat 18 illo mirabilius, veaſcenſus facilior effet, demittebatur cum
dominus equitare vole bat.Phaleris autem remotis,quilibet medi. aftinus
aſcendere, &tractare poterat. Ego quidem domimulam habeo,cuius tanta eft
ſagacitas,vt fi feruus meus ephipium parat, habenafque illa humilis,demiffa,
& quafi gaudens perfiſtic,viAernatur, hilariſque in. cedit, & acrior:
fin autem clitellas, calcitro fa, indomita, feraque confeftim fit, necta lem
ſarcinam, niſi vinctis pedibus ferre ſu Atinet, adeò quòd feruus ab opere
defiftere cogitur. Exitiofißimum effe homini,ſub Lunaradijs ſomnum facere.
Vnæproprium eft,in hæc inferiora hu miditatem immittere: quare exitioſum
elt,lub eius radijs diu dormire; quippè dor mientes obleruatum eft ægrè
excitari, atque proximos infanis fieri, Lunæ vires in lignis, quæ ad ædificia
colliguntur,potiſsimum ex perimur:conciſa enim Luna creſcente, funt ferè
emollira per humoris conceptionem, idcirco tanquam inepta à fabricis reijciun
rur. Agricola 'experimento cognouerunt, fruméta de agris in Lunæ diminutione
colo lecta diutius ficca permanere. Hæc à veterie bus Lucina vocabatur, & à
parturientibus inuocabatur: Lunæ enim diftendere rimas corporis,meatibuſgue
viam dare munus eft: propterea, tale ſydus partui ſalutare, illum.
queaccelerare putabant. Archelaum,Mithridatispræfe&tum, ligneam turrim
incombuſtibilem confeiffe. Dmiranduin profectò iudicatum eft
AArchelai,Mithridatispræfe&ti,cótra Syllam commentum:hic enim turrim ligue.
ain iocombuſtibilem condidit,quam fruftra ille incendere conabatur. Erat
currista. bulata alumine collinita, in ijs autem cruſta durior erat obducta,
& alumen, plumbique albi 238 BARICELLI E albicineres pigmentis copioſè
commifti: quia induſtria ab igne feruata ſunt. Confio mili artificio,Ceſar ex
larigna materia cir. ca Padum,Caftellum etiarn conftruxit, Ex Lemnio. Viſcum
quercinum fola fufpenfioneEpilepti. cis fubuenire. X grauibusfcriptoribusmultiorbicua
losè viſco querciofola ſuſpenſione vulgari filo transfixos idem præftare in 2
molienda,& præcauendaepilepfia tradunt, quod peonię maſculæ radix,aut
ſmaragdus è collopendens efficere creditur, Reculit Iacchinus in Epilepticerum
curatione, fe mel ea ratione,qua ligno guaiaco vtimur, Viſcum quercinum per
dies 40. propinafre, & profuiffe quidem, non tamen Worbum
abituliffe,nequelicuilleiterum id temedij iofaciliori morbo experiri.
Isterbraſsicam o vites maxisnum ineſe dif fenfum. Focabilis equidem difcordia
inter braſsicam, & vites reperitur, propte reade Reruftica fapientes
fcriptores, VICCE à braſsica offendi, deterioreſque & fucco, &odore, fi
ſecusplancatur, fieri prodidere. Experimento hoc comperitur:nam gerinen
ijspropius cu accellerit, auerſü ab inimico Notabilis compulſum odore
retrograditur. Infuper G inollam, vbi braſsica elixatur, vini vel mi nimum
conijcitur, quippe nec braſsica cona coqui vnquam poterit, & quod
mirabilius eft, colorem proprium amitter. Hacmotira tione ſapiéres,ebriis
braſsicæ ſucçú propinát, quo ebrietas ſubitò foluitur. Conuiuates pa riter, ne
à vini copia potenciaģ; offendantur (Germanorum inftar ) braſsicam crudam primò
comedere debent: ita enim viruna ad ſatietatem, abfq; ebrietaris periculo haua
rire valebunt. Cati nigerrimiefum cerebrum, homines dementare, Ericulofum eft,
verſicoloris, &maximè nigerrimicati cerebrum alicui efirm prz bere: ad
iufaniam enim homines ducit, & quod peius, cerebri meatus obftruit, ſpiri.
Etuſý; impedit animales, Inter fcriptores Per trusApoinenfis, huius efuadeò io
ſanirehow' mines dixit,vt præftigiis quafiobnoxii videa antur. Ponzertus
pariter cati pilos venenoſos eſſe prodidit, citly; anhelitumfebrem heoti cam
induccre. Exbetulacorticibus, ardentesfaces comparari Etulæ cortices non modò
ignem confe. tim recipiunt, verùm atque flammam pariung Mha pariunt ardentem; quo fit, vepleriq;
faces, pro noctis obſcuritate fuganda, ex iis com. ponaot, bene rati lucidiorem
has flammam, quãpini fædam parere: ex liquore autem picis inſtar, qui dum
vtuntur deftillat, oriri hociu dicatur, cuius natura cùm facile accendatur,
mirum haud eft: talem effectum producere. Hæmorrhoidalemn berbam contactu Hamer
rboides fünare. Ira eft Hæmorrhoidalis vis, & poté. tia in perfanandis
Hæmorrhoides: fi enimhuius radicibus, Hæmorrhoidales do lentes tanguntur, atq;
illæ per diem circa fe. mur ferantur, & mox in camino fumanti (afpendantur,
procul dubio effectusfanatur: fiquidé Hæmorrhoides que atq; radices ex iccărur,
fiaccelcıyor: qua caufa herba ab effe ctu nomen deduxir, nec immeritò: namin
iftarum infiammatione, &doloribus, fi hu us radices contufæ applicantur,
confeftim, & dolor, & inflammatio mulcentur. Ex Ex Tante. Marine
Paltinuca radium,identium do loresmitigare. entium dolores multis experimentis
ex Marinæ pattinacæ radio mitigari vifi func; huius eniin radio, qui in piſcis
cauda cpa, situr, dentes tanguntur, & gingina ſcari. ! x herbis non paucæ
Ecale ſcar ficantur, quo præſidio quan cítiſsime dolor euanefcit. Prodidit
Dioſcorides, lib. 2,64p. 9. radiuin hunc dentes frangere, & e
urcare.quomodo autem hoc perficiat docu it Plinius lib. 3. cap 4. Conteritur
enim is, & cum Helleboro albo miſcetur, quorin miſtura fi dentes illiti
fuerint, fine vexatio ne extrahuntur, Plerasg, berbas, Solisexortum, &
occafuma ostendere, Solis ortum, & OC cafum noffe videntur tantaq;huius
lyde. ris ſectandi,talibus auiditas nafcitur, vt Gr. miter inter kas, &
folem magnam in ſe lym pathiam credamus. Profe&to fos calendula in Solis
ortu aperitur, &in occafii clauditur; ex quo villicorum horologium à nuleis
di citur. Sequuntur Solis fphæram non modo papauer, & illudtithymalli
genus, quod vo. cant helioſcopon; ſed etiam malua, lupini & cichorea;
intenſius autem Lotus herba re ctatur, &exortum quotidianum, &occafum noſcit.
Hæc (Theophrafti teitimonio ) cau lem, &florem veſpere mergit, & circa
me. diam noctem tota in lacum irruit, & adeo occulcatur, vt nec manu
admiffa quis valeat inuenire, verciturmox panlatimg; erigitur, &in Solis
exortu extra aquas confirrgit; for P 3 reing Temą; aperit, & patefacit, caliterá; etiam
num confulit, vc alièab aqua abeffe videa quarum Sodo Qualssin Sodomi, &
Gomorriveſtigiso riantur fru & us. LtiſsimiDei decreto quinq; vrbes 211a
ciquicus incentæ ſunt wuum, & Gomorrhum præftantifsimæ fiudj erbantur.Harum
in fauillis quædam noſcú. tur veſtigia; Giquidem cæleftis ignis reliquiæ adhuc
perfiftunt. Quod autem illic admira bile perfpicitur.viridancia fpectantur
poma, formaci vuarum racemi, nec quis elt, qui e dendi haud cupiditatem habeat:
illa. autem manibus capta faciſcunt, & in cinerem refol. uuntur,
fumuggsexcitant, quafiadhucarde ant. Ex Egeſippalib. 4. Magnam inter vterun,
ammasinef Seſympathiam. On exiguus inter mulierum vterum, & mammas
contéplatur confenfus: quip pe alterum alterius pathema oftendere on laruamus,
A venis inter has partes coniunctis maximè ratio ošteditoriri ſympathiá:ex iis
e nim materias ab vtrifq; contentis transferring &exonerari experimur.In
menftruorum re dundantia Cucurbitula fub mammisappofita, fluxum cohiberi ab
Hippocrate docemur, Lactis copia in
puerperis dum magna grauit q; fuerit, die feptimo puerperii octauo, 10 nog; in
vterum à naturaefunditur. Suppreisi menfes in virginibus, & viduis caftis,
non femel io mammasrefiliunt, & la & tis copiam fuſcitant. In mulierum
pubertate accedente menftruo vtramq; parteni creſcere vidernus. Quo artificio
Solis defectumfirmiter com prehendere paleamus. Aria induſtria pleriq; conantur
folis defectam deprehendere;hocautem có pertum eft, artificio illius
defectionem fir miter apprehendi, Pelues hora inſtanti capi. antur, quæ non
aqua, fed aut oleo, aút pice implendæ ſunt; ratio enim fuadet, humorem pinguem
non facile curbari, atq; imagines perinde, quas recipit conſernare. Equidem in
magines in liquido & immoto tantum appa rereconfueuerunt, propterea in
olen, & pi. ce, commodius, & firmius, quomodo Luna Solilc opponat,
& illum abſcondat accipere poterimus. Ex Seneca in Natur. Quaft.
Virginummammillarum tumorem acis cuta impediria Ac inter alias, cicuta pollet
efficacia, vt contufa cum vmbeila, atq; virginü B H mammillis impofita, tumorem,
& excref centiam valeat prohibere; fortaffe nutrimé cum impedit, quo minus
augeantur, vt in pu crorun tefticulis fuccedit, fi hæc adhibetur: ijenim
reatibus alimenti obtufis facilè ex iccantur. Aperiani in hoc loco quod à Bon
doletio nultis experimentis comprobatum Teperio de piſce Squarina: hicenim
mulie. rum mammis fuperpofitus, illas adeò con. ftringit, ve virginum mammillæ
appareant; credunt multi in genitalibus eundem fimili ter effectum producere.
Quercusgallis, anniprafagia comparari. Napoleon Onmodò à Plinio, verùm atq; à
plea riſq; rei rufticæ ſcriptoribus obſerua tum fuiffe comperio, à gallis
quercus maio sibus præfagium aliud anni, quodapud vece res in magno fuiſſe
pretio,&opinione legi. tur. Aperiuntur gallæ, quando integræ funt, ibig;
muſca, aranea, aut vermiculus repe. ritur: fiquidem planta hæc in gallis
huiuſmo di aninialium gignere confueuit. Si mufca volar, angi fertilitatem
& bellum futurum præſagiunt; ſin vermiculus repit, annonæ carentiam
arguunt; fi autem aranea profiliet fummam caritatem, & peftilentes affectus
prædicunt. His ego adderem, præfagia hu. iufmodi, fi Deo placuerit, confimiles
ſecta. tur elientus. Vitri puluerem, calculos comminuere. ron folum Galenus,
fed Anicenna, & mouendos vitri puluerem excollunt quomo do autem hæc fieret,
plurimum infudiui; tandem quæ ab Abecizoare componitur,mihi ex voto ſucceſsit,
& vitrum adurere didici. Capitur vieri albi, & perſpicui fruftulum,
quod terebinthina coll nire oporter totum, nyox tandiù in prunis detinere,
veexcandel. cat; hoc demum in aqua exſtinguicur, ſepti. eſg; iteratur, primò
tamen linitur, fecundò cxcoquitur, vltimò extinguitur; quo peracto, vitrum
conteritur, & in puluerem lubciliſsi mum mutacur. Propinamus languentibus
au rei pondus vel drach.j. cum vino albo, & ef ficaciter calculos comminui
experimur. Quo artificio aëris naturimexplorare valeamus. Eris qualitatem,
& naturam cum ex plorare libuerit, fpongia bene ficca, atq; munda ſèreno
cælo per noctem fub diuo exponenda eft; illa eniin fiſicca mane fuerit, ficcu's
P5 АБЫ liceus & aër erit; fi
humecta,nimbolus; fi anoll cervda,humidus,acroridus Inſuper ft recente pané
eadem induftria expofueris, di corrupto,ficuin contrahere videbitur;à fic co,
fiec ficcus;ab Humido aucem, à ftacu pro prionon mutabitur.Siaër fuerit
peftilens, carnesexpofitæ corrumpuntur,atque colo rem mutant;fic eciam &
adipes.Siaércraf fus erit,patebit in marmore, & filicibus, qnę in cali
natura admodum madere folent; cós tra verò in aere'tenui, liges humidus eſſet,
hę enim in tali con ica humeſcunt. Ex CATO dano. Quali fratagemate homines,
mortui Š videantur. Vltis experimétis confirmatum repe rio fublimatum, ffue
aqua vitæ cum fale miſce tur, ac in patina (ſublata qualibet alia lua ce )
accenditur in cabiculo, nocturno tem pore, vbi homines reperiantur; fiquidem
ipfi immobiles fuerint, fpeciem mortuorús repræſentabunt. Pleriq; vt Aethiopes
fin gant, lucernam accendunt oleo plenam, cum quo ſepia atramentum fit dilucum,
fi we calchantuni, aut ærugo, nec fine ratio ne:oftédit enim,lux eorû colores,
quæ in iis sát quæaccédācur: oportet tamen iu cubi culorcliquas luces adimere,
Nerein VA No Nereidesfaciehumana dy venufta, prezi que fuifferepertas Ereides,
quas vulgus Birenas appela lat, plurimæ in locis maritimisinué tę funt;quodauté
cátusdulcedine nauigātes hein foporem perliciant, & capiant,nos. in lib. 1.
de Hominis vita, abundedifferui mus, vbi de Tritonibus, Nereidibus, ho. minibuſqs
in maridegēribas, quos marinos vocant tractatur; Poetarumq; fabulæ eno. dantur,
Vidithas Theodorus Gaza & Gee orgius Trapezont ius, homines nagnæ e
ruditionis: Gaza in Pelepomeno exorta maris tempeftate, Nereidem proiectain in
lidcore reperije viuentem, & fpirantem, ynleu hrniano, facie decora,
corpore fqua mis hirto ad pubem vſq, cætera autem ia locuftæcaudam definebant:
ad hanc viſen dam magnus fuit concurſus, illa tamen e vac maefta, crebrog,
ſuſpirio fatigata & frequentia hominum circumdata gemitus dedit &
lacrymas emiſit,quibusmacus mi. fericordia,ad mare deduxit, vbimagno im petu
fluctus fecauit, & ex oculis omnium cuanuit. Quid Trapezontius, pleriqs.
alii viderint, in loco cita. to narrauimus De Apunx natura, earumque mirabiliſa
gacitate. Tu quidem anceps fui in fcrutanda A pummellificatione,foetu, &
cera:nam & apud auctores magna reperitur controuer. fia, num illæ ge nerent,
& aliundeprolem habeant.Poft auem exactum fcrutinium cu iufdam amici va
lido experimento Ariftoter lis opinionem veram eflecomprobaui;fiqui dem Apese
floribus fauos conftruunt, exar borum lacryma ceram fingunt, & mella ex
aëris'rore captant.Hæ primum fauos confi. ciunt,mox fotin collocant, ore
calidum ſpirantes,vt vitain recipiat.Mellificanræfta. te, & autūno cibi
caufa;mel autem autinale cleatius eft.Foetus in vere ferotino debilis fit: nã
& naiori ex parte emoritur. Multi aiunt oliuas, & examinum copiam
cógenerem ha. bere nataram: nam fi altera augetur, alcera abundans fit: fi vna
deficit,altera deprimitur ratio eft:nam mella ficcitates augent;lobo. lem verò
imbres; quofit, vt ſimuloliuæ, & sopia examinam fit. Vinorum aliquot
existere genera natura mirabilis. R aliquot vinorum genera mirabilis naturæ
quod? co A quod vua & guftu, & fenfuà cæteris minime diſcrepanr, nec
vinum á ymis; tamen quod Heracliam Arcadiæ fit, viros reddicinfancs epotum,
& mulieres fteriles: & apudcabyni. am Achaiæ abortum facic: & in
Thiffo vi num quoddam lomaum producit; quoddam verò, vigiliam Ex Tbeophraſto
lib.9. Plant. Quoartificio ignem manibus abſque læfione tractare valeamus. Pud
plerofque fcriptores inueni, ig nem fine læſione poffe tractari, fi tri.
tomaluauiſco cum ouorum albumine, ma.. nus liniuntur,ac defuper alumen
inducitur.. Hoc autem experimentuin à Magno Alber to captum eſt, apud quem
aliud legitur hu. ius negotijartificium:fi enim Ichthyocolle, & aluminis
æquales partes capiuntur, & ad inuicem commiſcentur, fiacetum his ſuper
funditur; quicquidtali miſcellanea illitum in ignem proijcitur, vtique non
comburie tür. Menftrua in ſenio ferèquibufdam fæminés 46 cidere. Vàm fallax fit
tum Ariſtotelis, tum ali orum iudicium,quodin mulieribuscir ca quadragefimum
annum,fiue quinquagefi mum menftrua deficiant, quotidiana demone strat
experiencia. Mulierem hic cognoui, Qyour P7 Victoriam nomine, eamque honeftam
& bene morigeratamshuic in anno 45.méftrua ceffarunt, & faufta
valetudine vixit,cum au tem fexagefimum ferè annum attingeret, ce teilli menfes
rubei,bonique coloris redie. De vberague, quæ priusflaccida erant,more:
virginum turgidula facta ſunt lactifque tan ta copia impleta,vt impulſu
ferretur: quarez, vt puerulú filiæ fuæ lactaret àmeadmonita eft. Alteram
cognoui, quæ vfque ad annum 65.femper menftrua paffa, & hodie viuit, &
menftrua fingulis menfibus fuentia habet Hæcautem raròcontingunt..
Bufonislapidem contra venena mirabileinha bere virtutem. Pleriſque lcriptoribus
excollitur lapiss ille terreſtrisinuenitur: ſiquidem contra venena folo
contactu valere expertü eft; propterea inflationes abeftijs venenatis illatas
diſcute re, venenúq; elicere aiut.Scribit Lemnius, tu mores, & dolores ex
forieibus,araneis, vel pis,fcarabeis,gliribus, aliifuevenenofis 2. nimalibus
caufatos fclo lapidis blaul do attritu.euanef cere HORTVLVS GENIALIST 1 Aquarum
Fluuios natur& mirabilis repe $ rire. N multis locis aquarum exortas, mira
cfficaciæ inuenirilegimus Scribit Arift. in terra Aſsirithidæ aquas naſci, quas
cum oues biberint,moxgs inierint, nigros agnos generare. In Arandria dnos
ineffe fluuios ad.. notauit, quorum alter candorem, alter nio gritiem facit
pecoribas:at Scamander am gis, quem Homerus Xanthuniappellauit, fia uas reddere
oues creditur. Mirabilers in concepta imaginationis effe per rentiam
Maginationis potentiam tam miram effe Phyfici confitentur ve viſa per cóceptum
in partu fæpiſsimè eluceſcant. Referam hi ftoriain admirandam ex Ludouico Vives
12; de Ciuit.Dei de huius negotio conſcriptam In Brabantia Buſco ducis quædam
vrbs eft, in qua more eiufdem Prouinciæ quodam die rempli vrbis feſtum
celebratur, quo tempore varii ludi apparantur.Sunt aliquot, qui ſtato die
diuorum perſonas induunt:nönulli vera Dæmonů.Ex his vnus cū viſa puella
exarfif. fet, & demúfaltado ſe ſe recepiſſet, & apreprā Vt er at
perfonatus vxore fua in le &tum con. ieciſiet,ſe exeaDanonem gignere velle
di.. cells D cens, concubuit, &
concepit inulier: clim autem in partuinfantem peperiffet,'s fimul ac primum
editus eft, Calcitare cæpit forma, quali Dæ nones pinguntur. Dentium.stupores à
portulaca confeftim amoueri: Entium ftupores,qui ab acidis.edulijs Connarci
confueuere,ex aqua aut luc co, vel frondibus portulacæ commanfis, quam
citifsimèdiffoluuntur.Ipfe cum qua-. damæftate cùm fiti maxima, tùm dentium:
ftupore affligeretur,cömanfis ipfius frondi bus, &à fit, &à ftupore
fubito liberatussú, Ab amico quodam audiui parculacæ fuccúi collinitum,abfque
dubio verrucas exter minare,mihiautem experiundi locus haudi adhuc datus eft.
Ex Aphrodiſeo, Ceraferum aquam ftillatitiam in Epilepfia ! fummumeſſeremedium.
Ninitis experimentis Ceraſorum aquam 10 laccurrendis Epilepticis conprebari
reperio propierea à loanneAgricola in lib.. Herbar.maximèetiam extollitur. Qua
pro vita producenda inter arcana natu 12 connumerentur. APudreru naturalium
(crucatores acer rimos inueni, idque in arcanis conſer wari Hellebori nigri
fólia Saccharo cómilta degluci INTHE HORT:VL VSGEN I AL-deglutientem ad
iuglandis magnitudinenia in offenſam valetudinem, ad ſenectutem vſ. que
conſeruari.InfuperSilicem ignitum lin. teiſque parum madidis inuolutum,& pedi.
bus applicitum,pernicioſos valetudinis vaki pores extrahere. Quoartificio in
mulieribuscrinesdenfiores, copiofiores comparare paluamus. Nter ſelectiſsima
prælidia, quæ ad capil lorum copiam generaodam ineffe cre duntur,Maluæ radix
connumerari poteft:: fi enim caput mulierum livinio lauatur in quo elixa fit
maluæ radix, & deinde fucco maluæ crines, inungantur, profecto ya bercim
prouenient, & cicila fimé. Giulio Cesare Baricelli (n. San Marco dei
Cavoti) è un filosofo. De hydronosa natura sive de sudore umani corporis
Hortulus genialis Thesaurus secretorum De lactis, seri, butyri facultatibus et
usu Indice baricelli — implicatura sudorosa — de hydronosa
natura — de medicinae praestantiae — amazones cur mammas dextras resecaverint —
olearum sterilitatis praesagium — nili flumines proprietas — de mundi creatione
— murium sagacitas — pluviosa tempestatis prognostica — agricolas non semper
tempestates et serenitates praedictunt — valeriana miravis contra epilepsiam —
transformationes hominum in bestias non esse reales — daemonis astutia apud
indos — quid picus de scientiarum varietatis sentiret — subditos
principis vitam ut plurium imitari — rutam et allium serpentibus adversari —
animalis oriri et vivere posse in igne compertum est — lacus asphaltritis mirabilis
naturae — pisces marinos salubriores et rapidiores fulminibis esse — mulieris
— hominos — cibus — gigantes in orbem — mulieres — excellentia —
falsissimum est salamandran in igne vivere posse — sabbatici — lactandis
infantibus — menstrualis — pharmacum — animal — tauri — faxa — aegypti reges —
sterilitatis praesagia — aeris salubritatem — lintea — hominibus — hydropes —
plenilunio — nationibus — romulus — serpentaria — echinum — animi pudorem —
animalia — alexandri morti — sanari — cervi sudori — vires — balnei — adam —
rutam — verbenam — anima — aeris — sulphuris — caraba — baccas — linguam
— galli — homines — magis — fuco — cacoethica — vipera — traulos — morbos
— lupi — vitrum — pregnantes — periculo — pro corporis — corporum hominum —
utero — paterna — araneus telas — menstruali — rutam — corpora — achatis —
hominibus — hominem — utero — praesagium — utero — tritico — scorpionum —
hominibus — bubulo — epilepsiam — arbores lapides — bardana — literas —
homines — hominibus — hominibus — filios parentibus signum — mare rebrum —
hydrargyri — lupum — epilepsia — flatu — corpora — pestilenti — efficacia —
animalium — seminis — basilicum — torpedinem — animalia — armenia — febre —
lumaca — amantissimam — astronomiam — martisque — passione — cantharides —
adagium — parere fetus — iucundi —de amoris origine — aqua — virtutes —
sagacitas — lapidis — naturam — partus — amorfus — equorum — spectacula —
marinum vitulum — epilepsia — vinum — homines — homines — cervi — gagatis —
epilepticos — hominum — laudano — mortem — pacto — a viro — hepaticos — mortem
— mithridatis — ossa — bryonia — herpetes — vina alba — flores — absynthium —
chalcantho — coralio — lethargicos — infantes — prunellae — catuli — gallum —
corios — artificio — theodorus — radicem — dilligentes — canicula — quatuor
elementis — phreneticos — digitum — carnes — vicera — testiculis — dentium
— hippocrate — animalibus — apii — satyrii testiculum — hominibus —
radicem — hominis — extractum — praesidia — hominem — antidotorum — cancri — quomodo
— morbi — animantium — pulchritudine — septentrionalibum — hemorraghia —
lingua ardor — aegyptios — gentium — solis — animalium — cervorum — masculinum
fetum — mirandulani — hydrargyro — incognita — tempestates — epiro — hecla —
hominum — galenum — graecos — cane — athritide — lionem — iumenta — acutis —
acetum — piscis — foeminas — corporis — alexandrum — hominum — ruditas —
angina — capillos — volucrum — agricolas — galege — infantis — oryalum —
homines — lapides — collegium — alexandrum — laparhiorum — feminum — aegyptios
— methodo — olivarum — admirandu — millepedum — frequentem — mulieres —
daemonum — carduum — infantes — menstrualem — corpori — medicina — animalia —
unicornu — mulierum — naturalem — febris — precognosci — medicis — masculorum —
hydrargiri — bryonia — consolidanda — chymicam — corpus — hominum — venenum —
semen — lupos — homines — luna — leonardi — hominibus — polypidium — ibidis —
mulieres — industria — corpora — gallicam — hominis — hominibus — regem —
homines — aquilone — usum — usum — oleo — genus — leones — artificio — mergum —
lacertas — educandis — artificio — serpentes — virginitatem — virginale —
vitellos — humana vita — vena — materia — alexandri — mulieres — hydrophobos —
puerorum — labiorum — utero — semine — aegyptorum — taxi — epilepsiam —
aspides — infantes — vitrum — homines — vini — syrium — nuptis — agreste —
hydrophobiam — hepatis — viventes — arundinem — cynanchem — parere filios —
vino — praesagia — gallinarum — aquam — mandragoram — corpora — vita
hominibus — semina — infantium — vitam — philomelam — castorem — duces — lingua
— vinum — equorum — croci — hominis — aspidum — hermaphroditos — imaginationis
potentian — climactericos — inter homines — carolum — animantia — liberos —
garamantes — caminus — horologium — infantium — praesagia — vinum — virorum —
familiarem — romanos — ambarum — tympaniam — venenum — toxica — socrati —
magia — epistolam — aqua frigida — menstruorum — lapides — homines — testiculos
— humanam salivam — homines ridendo — parthi — partum accelerare —
serpentum — hydrargyrum — vim — anginam — vermes — mamillis — lumbricos —
infantis — elephantiasim — cyprinorum — leporine — hydrargyrum — gravidas —
homines abstemios — aristolochiam — alexandro — morbis — creta — cyprini —
calphurnius bestia romanus — aceto — oleum — scythae — catellos — plurima —
martis — robusta hominum corpora — equum — homini lunae — mithridiatu — viscum
— vites — betulae — haemorrhoidalem — dentium dolores — sodomi — uterum — solis
— virginum — praesagia — vitri — aeris — homines — facie humana — apum natura —
vinorum — ignem — menstrua — virtutem — aquarum — in conceptu imaginationis
esse potentiam — dentium stupores — epilepsia — pro vita producenda —
mulieribus —
Giulio Cesare Baricelli. Keywords: sweat, il sudore umano, sudore e la regola,
stirgilo, amore, Socrate, Aristotele, controversia sull’origine del sentiment
dell’amore, Socrate, l’idea di causa in Aristotele. Refs.: Luigi Speranza,
“Grice e Baricelli” – The Swimming-Pool Library. https://www.flickr.com/photos/102162703@N02/51691256836/in/photolist-2mKMcL9
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