Clifford: Grice was attracted to Clifford’s idea of the ‘ethics
of belief,’ -- philosopher. Educated at King’s , London, and Trinity ,
Cambridge, he began giving public lectures in 1868, when he was appointed a
fellow of Trinity, and in 1870 became professor of applied mathematics at , London. His academic career ended
prematurely when he died of tuberculosis. Clifford is best known for his
rigorous view on the relation between belief and evidence, which, in “The
Ethics of Belief,” he summarized thus: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for
anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence.” He gives this example.
Imagine a shipowner who sends to sea an emigrant ship, although the evidence
raises strong suspicions as to the vessel’s seaworthiness. Ignoring this evidence,
he convinces himself that the ship’s condition is good enough and, after it
sinks and all the passengers die, collects his insurance money without a trace
of guilt. Clifford maintains that the owner had no right to believe in the
soundness of the ship. “He had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it
in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts.” The right Clifford is
alluding to is moral, for what one believes is not a private but a public
affair and may have grave consequences for others. He regards us as morally
obliged to investigate the evidence thoroughly on any occasion, and to withhold
belief if evidential support is lacking. This obligation must be fulfilled
however trivial and insignificant a belief may seem, for a violation of it may
“leave its stamp upon our character forever.” Clifford thus rejected
Catholicism, to which he had subscribed originally, and became an agnostic.
James’s famous essay “The Will to Believe” criticizes Clifford’s view.
According to James, insufficient evidence need not stand in the way of
religious belief, for we have a right to hold beliefs that go beyond the
evidence provided they serve the pursuit of a legitimate goal.
Closure: Grice:
The etymology is convoluted: claudere --- cfr. clausura. Griceian anti-sneak
closure: a set of objects, O, is said
to exhibit closure or to be closed under a given operation, R, provided that
for every object, x, if x is a member of O and x is R-related to any object, y,
then y is a member of O. For example, the set of propositions is closed under
deduction, for if p is a proposition and p entails q, i.e., q is deducible from
p, then q is a proposition simply because only propositions can be entailed by
propositions. In addition, many subsets of the set of propositions are also
closed under deduction. For example, the set of true propositions is closed
under deduction or entailment. Others are not. Under most accounts of belief,
we may fail to believe what is entailed by what we do, in fact, believe. Thus,
if knowledge is some form of true, justified belief, knowledge is not closed
under deduction, for we may fail to believe a proposition entailed by a known
proposition. Nevertheless, there is a related issue that has been the subject
of much debate, namely: Is the set of justified propositions closed under
deduction? Aside from the obvious importance of the answer to that question in
developing an account of justification, there are two important issues in
epistemology that also depend on the answer. Subtleties aside, the so-called
Gettier problem depends in large part upon an affirmative answer to that
question. For, assuming that a proposition can be justified and false, it is
possible to construct cases in which a proposition, say p, is justified, false,
but believed. Now, consider a true proposition, q, which is believed and
entailed by p. If justification is closed under deduction, then q is justified,
true, and believed. But if the only basis for believing q is p, it is clear
that q is not known. Thus, true, justified belief is not sufficient for
knowledge. What response is appropriate to this problem has been a central
issue in epistemology since E. Gettier’s publication of “Is Justified True
Belief Knowledge?” Analysis, 3. Whether justification is closed under deduction
is also crucial when evaluating a common, traditional argument for skepticism.
Consider any person, S, and let p be any proposition ordinarily thought to be
knowable, e.g., that there is a table before S. The argument for skepticism
goes like this: 1 If p is justified for S, then, since p entails q, where q is
‘there is no evil genius making S falsely believe that p’, q is justified for
S. 2 S is not justified in believing q. Therefore, S is not justified in
believing p. The first premise depends upon justification being closed under
deduction.
cocconato: Grice: “I like Coconato – I used to
say that the first task for the historian of Italian philosophy, unless you are
a member of La Crusca, is to decide on the surname – I like Cocconato! He spent
some time in London, as I did – and he shows that the average Italian
philosopher is a nobleman, or vice versa!” – Grice: “Venturi revived Cocconato,
as did the re-issuing of his “Moral Discourses”!” -- “Manhood and unbelief” -- Alberto
Radicati, conte di Passerano e Cocconato (Torino), filosofo. Libero pensatore,
fu il «primo illuminista della penisola», secondo una definizione di Piero
Gobetti. Cocconato matura il suo pensiero anti-clericale nel clima
dell'anticurialismo sabaudo ben presente in alcuni settori della corte di
Vittorio Amedeo II, re di Sardegna. S'ignora tutto della sua prima formazione,
verosimilmente affidata a qualche ecclesiastico. Un infelice matrimonio
precoce, combinato dalle famiglie, lo coinvolge ventenne, e già due volte
padre, in una serie di penosi contrasti il cui significato travalica i
conflitti coniugali. Mentre a prendere le parti della moglie si mobilita il
partito devoto-clericale, Radicati trova sostegno a corte in chi appoggia il re
sabaudo nei suoi conflitti giurisdizionali con la Curia romana. Il
grottesco-ironico racconto della sua «conversion pubblicato a Londra e
ripubblicato con il titolo “A Comical and True Account of the Modern Cannibal's
Religion” induce a datare intorno agli anni venti il precipitare della crisi
della fede cattolica in cui il conte era stato cresciuto. Nell'opuscolo
autobiografico presenta la sua personale vicenda come un caso emblematico di
«uscita dalla minorità. Narra infatti come, a partire dal contrasto tra santoni
bianchi e santoni neri monaci cistercensi e quelli agostinianisui presunti
miracoli operati da un'immagine della Vergine, rinvenuta nel convento
agostiniano, avesse cominciato a vacillare in lui la fede e come, verso i
vent'anni, avesse cominciato anche in campo religioso “a far uso della mia
ragione.”Importante per la sua ulteriore maturazione intellettuale è il viaggio
compiuto nella Francia della "Reggenza" tin cui poté ampliare il
raggio delle sue conoscenze e forse procurarsi testi libertine come La Sagesse
di Charron, l'Hexameron rustique di Vayer o il Traité contre la Médisance di Brosse,
in cui ricorrono motivi che troveranno eco e sviluppo nelle sue opere. Il
suo scritto principaleI discorsi morali, storici e politici redatti su diretto
incarico di Vittorio Amedeo II nel mutato clima conseguente alla ratifica del
Concordato stipulato tra regno sabaudo e Benedetto XIII diverrà anche la
ragione vera del suo esilio. Il conte, che da un riacquisito potere
dell'Inquisizione a Torino deve temere per la sua libertà e per la sua stessa
incolumità, lascia segretamente il Piemonte per dirigersi a Londra, dovendo poi
subire per questa fuga non autorizzata dal sovrano il sequestro e la confisca
dei beni. A Londra pubblica con un discreto successo l'instant book che
ricostruisce i retroscena della recente abdicazione di Vittorio Amedeo II
mentre, al contempo, lavora alla stesura del più audace e radicale dei suoi
scritti, “La Dissertazione filosofica sulla morte,” che, tradotta da JMorgan,
uscirà dai torchi londinesi destando un enorme scandalo. Nella Dissertazione,
che gli costa anche l'esperienza delle carceri della tollerante Inghilterra di
Walpole, propugna il diritto al suicidio e all'eutanasia sullo sfondo di una
esplicita filosofia materialistica che scorge nel Deus sive Natura spinoziano-tolandiano
il suo unico grandioso orizzonte di senso. Nella sua meditazione sulla
morte e sulla liceità del suicidio si inserisce in un dibattito che già
Montesquieu aveva rilanciato nelle Lettere Persiane, riprendendo una
discussione inaugurata nel Seicento da Donne con il suo Biothanatos.
Interessato a proporre un progetto politico che esige come sua prima tappa
essenziale una riforma radicale della cristianità occidentale, capace di
affrancarla dal giogo clericale- o se si vuole, in termini più neutri dal
potere pastorale- la scelta del tema del diritto individuale alla morte non è
scelta casuale per quanto la meditazione sul suicidio non sia priva di elementi
autobiografici. Le chiese cristiane di ogni confessione ritengono infatti un
loro preciso dovere intervenire direttamente nella gestione del trapasso a
quella che esse, in base alla loro fede, considerano la vera vita, quella
ultraterrena. Del resto non solo il mondo cristiano, lo stesso ebraismo e
l'islam, finendo con il recepire come un dogma l'interpretazione agostiniana
del suicidio come omicidio di se stessi, per secoli hanno considerato la morte
volontaria come il più grave e irreparabile dei peccati, suprema manifestazione
di oltranza e ribellione alla volontà divina, mentre le autorità statali, dal
canto loro, si distinguevano per la crudeltà inumana con cui trattavano i
cadaveri dei suicidi e i beni dei loro eredi. Se i Discorsi partivano
dalla morale ricavata essenzialmente da una lettura pauperistico-comunistica
dei Vangeli che faceva di Cristo, al pari di Licurgo, il grande critico
dell'istituto familiare, nonché il fondatore di una democrazia perfetta in cui
non esiste né il mio, né il tuo»per poi occuparsi di politica e concludersi in
concrete proposte riformatrici, nella Dissertazione filosofica fornisce una
risposta alla legittimità del suicidio muovendo da una concezione complessiva
del mondo e dell'esistenza umana. Nonostante il suo titolo, la Dissertazione
filosofica sulla morte non rinnega affatto l'istanza spinoziana che intende la
filosofia quale gioiosa meditatio vitae, apertura mentale a una possibile
transizione da una condizione di servitù a una condizione di più ampia libertà
che è, simultaneamente, incremento della capacità del corpo di comporsi e
ricomporsi con altri corpi per realizzare la sua potenza e ampliare la sua
capacità di comprendere le cose. Definisce l'individualità umana a
partire dalle relazioni che essa intrattiene con il tutto. Per quanto grandezze
infinitesimali noi siamo materia della materia che costituisce l'Universo nella
sua indefinita immensità. La certezza che ci resta, quando ci liberiamo
dall'ignoranza in cui nasciamo e dagli idola tribus, i pregiudizi con cui siamo
allevati, è che noi siamo vicissitudini della materia. La materia a cui pensa
tuttavia nel suo esilio londinese e poi olandese non è lo squalificato sostrato
inerte che dai greci giunge fino a Cartesio che, limitandosi a identificare
materia ed estensione, continua ad aspettarsi dal Dio creatore l'impulso motore
e la creazione continua. Come per il Toland delle Lettere a Serena e del
Pantheisticon, la materia pensata dal Radicati è la materia actuosa che
reingloba nel meccanicismo moderno motivi provenienti dal naturalismo
rinascimentale a cui ineriscono direttamente movimento e autoregolazione.
L'universo è un mondo infinito in perpetuo movimento: in esso nulla continua ad
essere anche solo per un istante la stessa cosa. Le continue alterazioni,
successioni, rivoluzioni e trasmutazioni della materia non incrementano né
diminuiscono tuttavia il grande tutto, come nessuna lettera dell'alfabeto si
aggiunge o si perde per le infinite combinazioni e trasposizioni di essa in
tante diverse parole e linguaggi. La natura, mirabile architetta sa sempre come
utilizzare anche il minimo dei suoi atomi. La fine della nostra individualità
costituita dalla morte non è quindi fine assoluta, perché niente si annichila
nella materia e il principio vitale che ci anima come non è nato con noi
troverà sicuramente altre forme di esplicazione: come la nostra nascita non è
avvenuta dal nulla, non sarà nel nulla che ci dissolveremo.-- è estranea ogni
forma di lirismo e, tuttavia, una concezione non lontana dalla sua rifiorirà in
una delle pagine finali di uno dei maggiori romanzi lirici della modernità, nell'Hyperion
di Hölderlin che fa dire alla sua eroina, Diotima: “Noi moriamo per vivere:
«Oh, certo, i miserabili che non conoscono se non il ciarpame arrabattato dalle
loro mani, che sono esclusivamente servi del bisogno e disprezzano il genio e
non ti venerano, o fanciullesca vita della natura, a ragione possono temere la
morte. Il loro giogo è diventato il loro mondo, non conoscono niente di meglio
della loro schiavitù: c'è forse da stupirsi che temano la libertà divina che ci
offre la morte? Io no! Io l'ho sentita la vita della natura, più alta di tutti
i pensierie anche se diverrò una pianta, sarà poi così grande il danno? Io
sarò. Come potrei mai svanire dalla sfera della vita, in cui l'amore eterno che
è partecipato a tutti, riunifica le nature? come potrei mai sciogliere il
vincolo che riunisce tutti gli esseri?» Opere Antologia di scritti, in
Dal Muratori al Cesarotti. Politici ed economisti del primo Settecento, tomo V,
F. Venturi, Milano-Napoli, Ricciardi, Dodici discorsi morali, storici e
politici, T. Cavallo, Sestri Levante, Gammarò editori, Dissertazione filosofica
sulla morte, T. Cavallo, Pisa, Ets Vite parallele. Maometto e Mosè. Nazareno e
Licurgo, T. Cavallo, Sestri Levante, Gammarò editori, Discorsi morali, istorici
e politici. Il Nazareno e Licurgo messi in parallelo, introduzione di G.
Ricuperati (check); edizione e commento di D. Canestri, Torino, Nino Aragno
Editore, Dissertazione filosofica sulla morte, F. Ieva, Indiana, Milano Piero Gobetti, Risorgimento senza eroi. Studi
sul pensiero nel Risorgimento, Torino, anche in Opere complete P. Spriano,
Torino, Einaudi Franco Venturi, Adalberto Radicati di Passerano, Torino,
Einaudi, Franco Venturi, Settecento
riformatore, I, Torino, Einaudi, Silvia
Berti, Radicati in Olanda. Nuovi documenti sulla sua conversione e su alcuni
suoi manoscritti inediti, in «Rivista Storica Italiana», S. Berti, Radicali ai
margini: materialismo, libero pensiero e diritto al suicidio in Radicati di
Passerano, in «Rivista Storica Italiana», J. I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment.
Philosophy and the Making of Modernity Oxford, Oxford University Press, passim
Tomaso Cavallo, Introduzione a A. Radicati, Dissertazione filosofica sulla
morte, Pisa, Ets, Tomaso Cavallo, Le divergenze parallele. Mosè, Maometto,
Nazareno e Licurgo: impostori e legislatori nell'opera di Alberto Radicati,
introduzione ad A. Radicati, Vite parallele. Maometto e Sosem. Nazareno e
Licurgo, Sestri Levante, Gammarò, Vincenzo Sorella, Un partigiano della ragione
umana, in «I Quaderni di Muscandia», G. Tarantino, “Alternative Hierarchies:
Manhood and Unbelief in Early Modern Europe, in Governing Masculinities:
Regulating Selves and Others in the Early Modern Period, ed. by S. Broomhall
and Jacqueline Van Gent, Ashgate, ,Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Dizionario di storia, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere, M. Cappitti, Le Vite Parallele di Alberto
Radicatisu blog.carmillaonline
cockburn: c. English philosopher and playwright who made a
significant contribution to the debates on ethical rationalism sparked by Clarke’s
Boyle lectures. The major theme of her writings is the nature of moral
obligation. Cockburn displays a consistent, non-doctrinaire philosophical
position, arguing that moral duty is to be rationally deduced from the “nature
and fitness of things” Remarks, 1747 and is not founded primarily in externally
imposed sanctions. Her writings, published anonymously, take the form of
philosophical debates with others, including Samuel Rutherforth, William
Warburton, Isaac Watts, Francis Hutcheson, and Lord Shaftesbury. Her best-known
intervention in contemporary philosophical debate was her able defense of
Locke’s Essay in 1702.
cogitatum -- cogito
ergo sumExample given by Grice of
Descartes’s conventional implicaturum. “What Descartes said was, “je pense;
donc, j’existe.” The ‘donc’ implicaturum is an interesting one to analyse. cited
by Grice in “Descartes on clear and distinct perception.” ‘I think, therefore I
am’, the starting point of Descartes’s system of knowledge. In his Discourse on
the Method 1637, he observes that the proposition ‘I am thinking, therefore I
exist’ je pense, donc je suis is “so firm and sure that the most extravagant
suppositions of the skeptics were incapable of shaking it.” The celebrated
phrase, in its better-known Latin version, also occurs in the Principles of
Philosophy 1644, but is not to be found in the Meditations 1641, though the
latter contains the fullest statement of the reasoning behind Descartes’s
certainty of his own existence.
Cognitumin cognitum
--
cohaesum- cohaerence:
Grice: “All Roman words starting with
co- are a trick. haerĕo , haesi, haesum, 2, v. n.
etym. dub., I.to hang or hold fast, to hang, stick, cleave, cling, adhere, be
fixed, sit fast, remain close to any thing or in any manner (class. and very
freq., esp. in the trop. sense; cf. pendeo); usually constr. with in, the
simple abl. or absol., less freq. with dat., with ad, sub, ex, etc. since
H. P. Grice was a correspondentist, he hated Bradley. -- theory of truth, the view that either the
nature of truth or the sole criterion for determining truth is constituted by a
relation of coherence between the belief or judgment being assessed and other
beliefs or judgments. As a view of the nature of truth, the coherence theory
represents an alternative to the correspondence theory of truth. Whereas the
correspondence theory holds that a belief is true provided it corresponds to
independent reality, the coherence theory holds that it is true provided it
stands in a suitably strong relation of coherence to other beliefs, so that the
believer’s total system of beliefs forms a highly or perhaps perfectly coherent
system. Since, on such a characterization, truth depends entirely on the
internal relations within the system of beliefs, such a conception of truth
seems to lead at once to idealism as regards the nature of reality, and its
main advocates have been proponents of absolute idealism mainly Bradley,
Bosanquet, and Brand Blanshard. A less explicitly metaphysical version of the
coherence theory was also held by certain members of the school of logical
positivism mainly Otto Neurath and Carl Hempel. The nature of the intended
relation of coherence, often characterized metaphorically in terms of the
beliefs in question fitting together or dovetailing with each other, has been
and continues to be a matter of uncertainty and controversy. Despite occasional
misconceptions to the contrary, it is clear that coherence is intended to be a
substantially more demanding relation than mere consistency, involving such
things as inferential and explanatory relations within the system of beliefs.
Perfect or ideal coherence is sometimes described as requiring that every
belief in the system of beliefs entails all the others though it must be
remembered that those offering such a characterization do not restrict
entailments to those that are formal or analytic in character. Since actual
human systems of belief seem inevitably to fall short of perfect coherence,
however that is understood, their truth is usually held to be only approximate
at best, thus leading to the absolute idealist view that truth admits of
degrees. As a view of the criterion of truth, the coherence theory of truth
holds that the sole criterion or standard for determining whether a belief is
true is its coherence with other beliefs or judgments, with the degree of
justification varying with the degree of coherence. Such a view amounts to a
coherence theory of epistemic justification. It was held by most of the
proponents of the coherence theory of the nature of truth, though usually
without distinguishing the two views very clearly. For philosophers who hold
both of these views, the thesis that coherence is the sole criterion of truth
is usually logically prior, and the coherence theory of the nature of truth is
adopted as a consequence, the clearest argument being that only the view that
perfect or ideal coherence is the nature of truth can make sense of the appeal
to degrees of coherence as a criterion of truth. -- coherentism, in epistemology, a theory of
the structure of knowledge or justified beliefs according to which all beliefs
representing knowledge are known or justified in virtue of their relations to
other beliefs, specifically, in virtue of belonging to a coherent system of
beliefs. Assuming that the orthodox account of knowledge is correct at least in
maintaining that justified true belief is necessary for knowledge, we can
identify two kinds of coherence theories of knowledge: those that are
coherentist merely in virtue of incorporating a coherence theory of justification,
and those that are doubly coherentist because they account for both
justification and truth in terms of coherence. What follows will focus on
coherence theories of justification. Historically, coherentism is the most
significant alternative to foundationalism. The latter holds that some beliefs,
basic or foundational beliefs, are justified apart from their relations to
other beliefs, while all other beliefs derive their justification from that of
foundational beliefs. Foundationalism portrays justification as having a
structure like that of a building, with certain beliefs serving as the
foundations and all other beliefs supported by them. Coherentism rejects this
image and pictures justification as having the structure of a raft. Justified
beliefs, like the planks that make up a raft, mutually support one another.
This picture of the coherence theory is due to the positivist Otto Neurath.
Among the positivists, Hempel shared Neurath’s sympathy for coherentism. Other
defenders of coherentism from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were idealists, e.g., Bradley, Bosanquet, and Brand Blanshard. Idealists often
held the sort of double coherence theory mentioned above. The contrast between
foundationalism and coherentism is commonly developed in terms of the regress
argument. If we are asked what justifies one of our beliefs, we
characteristically answer by citing some other belief that supports it, e.g.,
logically or probabilistically. If we are asked about this second belief, we
are likely to cite a third belief, and so on. There are three shapes such an
evidential chain might have: it could go on forever, if could eventually end in
some belief, or it could loop back upon itself, i.e., eventually contain again
a belief that had occurred “higher up” on the chain. Assuming that infinite
chains are not really possible, we are left with a choice between chains that
end and circular chains. According to foundationalists, evidential chains must
eventually end with a foundational belief that is justified, if the belief at
the beginning of the chain is to be justified. Coherentists are then portrayed
as holding that circular chains can yield justified beliefs. This portrayal is,
in a way, correct. But it is also misleading since it suggests that the
disagreement between coherentism and foundationalism is best understood as
concerning only the structure of evidential chains. Talk of evidential chains
in which beliefs that are further down on the chain are responsible for beliefs
that are higher up naturally suggests the idea that just as real chains
transfer forces, evidential chains transfer justification. Foundationalism then
sounds like a real possibility. Foundational beliefs already have
justification, and evidential chains serve to pass the justification along to
other beliefs. But coherentism seems to be a nonstarter, for if no belief in
the chain is justified to begin with, there is nothing to pass along. Altering
the metaphor, we might say that coherentism seems about as likely to succeed as
a bucket brigade that does not end at a well, but simply moves around in a
circle. The coherentist seeks to dispel this appearance by pointing out that
the primary function of evidential chains is not to transfer epistemic status,
such as justification, from belief to belief. Indeed, beliefs are not the
primary locus of justification. Rather, it is whole systems of belief that are
justified or not in the primary sense; individual beliefs are justified in
virtue of their membership in an appropriately structured system of beliefs.
Accordingly, what the coherentist claims is that the appropriate sorts of
evidential chains, which will be circular
indeed, will likely contain numerous circles constitute justified systems of belief. The
individual beliefs within such a system are themselves justified in virtue of
their place in the entire system and not because this status is passed on to
them from beliefs further down some evidential chain in which they figure. One
can, therefore, view coherentism with considerable accuracy as a version of
foundationalism that holds all beliefs to be foundational. From this
perspective, the difference between coherentism and traditional foundationalism
has to do with what accounts for the epistemic status of foundational beliefs,
with traditional foundationalism holding that such beliefs can be justified in
various ways, e.g., by perception or reason, while coherentism insists that the
only way such beliefs can be justified is by being a member of an appropriately
structured system of beliefs. One outstanding problem the coherentist faces is
to specify exactly what constitutes a coherent system of beliefs. Coherence
clearly must involve much more than mere absence of mutually contradictory
beliefs. One way in which beliefs can be logically consistent is by concerning
completely unrelated matters, but such a consistent system of beliefs would not
embody the sort of mutual support that constitutes the core idea of
coherentism. Moreover, one might question whether logical consistency is even
necessary for coherence, e.g., on the basis of the preface paradox. Similar
points can be made regarding efforts to begin an account of coherence with the
idea that beliefs and degrees of belief must correspond to the probability
calculus. So although it is difficult to avoid thinking that such formal
features as logical and probabilistic consistency are significantly involved in
coherence, it is not clear exactly how they are involved. An account of
coherence can be drawn more directly from the following intuitive idea: a
coherent system of belief is one in which each belief is epistemically
supported by the others, where various types of epistemic support are
recognized, e.g., deductive or inductive arguments, or inferences to the best
explanation. There are, however, at least two problems this suggestion does not
address. First, since very small sets of beliefs can be mutually supporting,
the coherentist needs to say something about the scope a system of beliefs must
have to exhibit the sort of coherence required for justification. Second, given
the possibility of small sets of mutually supportive beliefs, it is apparently
possible to build a system of very broad scope out of such small sets of
mutually supportive beliefs by mere conjunction, i.e., without forging any
significant support relations among them. Yet, since the interrelatedness of
all truths does not seem discoverable by analyzing the concept of
justification, the coherentist cannot rule out epistemically isolated
subsystems of belief entirely. So the coherentist must say what sorts of
isolated subsystems of belief are compatible with coherence. The difficulties
involved in specifying a more precise concept of coherence should not be
pressed too vigorously against the coherentist. For one thing, most
foundationalists have been forced to grant coherence a significant role within
their accounts of justification, so no dialectical advantage can be gained by
pressing them. Moreover, only a little reflection is needed to see that nearly
all the difficulties involved in specifying coherence are manifestations within
a specific context of quite general philosophical problems concerning such
matters as induction, explanation, theory choice, the nature of epistemic
support, etc. They are, then, problems that are faced by logicians,
philosophers of science, and epistemologists quite generally, regardless of
whether they are sympathetic to coherentism. Coherentism faces a number of
serious objections. Since according to coherentism justification is determined
solely by the relations among beliefs, it does not seem to be capable of taking
us outside the circle of our beliefs. This fact gives rise to complaints that
coherentism cannot allow for any input from external reality, e.g., via
perception, and that it can neither guarantee nor even claim that it is likely
that coherent systems of belief will make contact with such reality or contain
true beliefs. And while it is widely granted that justified false beliefs are
possible, it is just as widely accepted that there is an important connection
between justification and truth, a connection that rules out accounts according
to which justification is not truth-conducive. These abstractly formulated
complaints can be made more vivid, in the case of the former, by imagining a
person with a coherent system of beliefs that becomes frozen, and fails to
change in the face of ongoing sensory experience; and in the case of the
latter, by pointing out that, barring an unexpected account of coherence, it
seems that a wide variety of coherent systems of belief are possible, systems
that are largely disjoint or even incompatible.
collier: Grice found the Clavis Universalis quite fun (“to
read”). -- English philosopher, a Wiltshire parish priest whose Clavis
Universalis defends a version of immaterialism closely akin to Berkeley’s.
Matter, Collier contends, “exists in, or in dependence on mind.” He
emphatically affirms the existence of bodies, and, like Berkeley, defends
immaterialCoimbra commentaries Collier, Arthur 155 155 ism as the only alternative to
skepticism. Collier grants that bodies seem to be external, but their
“quasi-externeity” is only the effect of God’s will. In Part I of the Clavis
Collier argues as Berkeley had in his New Theory of Vision, 1709 that the
visible world is not external. In Part II he argues as Berkeley had in the
Principles, 1710, and Three Dialogues, 1713 that the external world “is a being
utterly impossible.” Two of Collier’s arguments for the “intrinsic repugnancy”
of the external world resemble Kant’s first and second antinomies. Collier
argues, e.g., that the material world is both finite and infinite; the
contradiction can be avoided, he suggests, only by denying its external
existence. Some scholars suspect that Collier deliberately concealed his debt
to Berkeley; most accept his report that he arrived at his views ten years
before he published them. Collier first refers to Berkeley in letters written
in 171415. In A Specimen of True Philosophy 1730, where he offers an
immaterialist interpretation of the opening verse of Genesis, Collier writes
that “except a single passage or two” in Berkeley’s Dialogues, there is no
other book “which I ever heard of” on the same subject as the Clavis. This is a
puzzling remark on several counts, one being that in the Preface to the
Dialogues, Berkeley describes his earlier books. Collier’s biographer reports
seeing among his papers now lost an outline, dated 1708, on “the question of
the visible world being without us or not,” but he says no more about it. The
biographer concludes that Collier’s independence cannot reasonably be doubted;
perhaps the outline would, if unearthed, establish this.
collingwood: r. g.— Grice: “The most Italian of English Oxonians!
He loved Gentile, Croce, and de Ruggiero!”Grice: “I would not count Collingwood
as a philosopher, really, since his tutor was Carritt!” -- cited by H. P. Grice
in “Metaphysics,” in D. F. Pears, “The nature of metaphysics.”Like Grice,
Collingwood was influenced by J. C. Wilson’s subordinate interrogation. English
philosopher and historian. His father, W. G. Collingwood, John Ruskin’s friend,
secretary, and biographer, at first educated him at home in Coniston and later
sent him to Rugby School and then Oxford. Immediately upon graduating in 2, he was
elected to a fellowship at Pembroke ; except for service with admiralty
intelligence during World War I, he remained at Oxford until 1, when illness
compelled him to retire. Although his Autobiography expresses strong
disapproval of the lines on which, during his lifetime, philosophy at Oxford
developed, he was a varsity “insider.” He was elected to the Waynflete
Professorship, the first to become vacant after he had done enough work to be a
serious candidate. He was also a leading archaeologist of Roman Britain.
Although as a student Collingwood was deeply influenced by the “realist”
teaching of John Cook Wilson, he studied not only the British idealists, but
also Hegel and the contemporary
post-Hegelians. At twenty-three, he published a translation of Croce’s
book on Vico’s philosophy. Religion and Philosophy 6, the first of his attempts
to present orthodox Christianity as philosophically acceptable, has both
idealist and Cook Wilsonian elements. Thereafter the Cook Wilsonian element
steadily diminished. In Speculum Mentis4, he investigated the nature and
ultimate unity of the four special ‘forms of experience’ art, religion, natural science, and
history and their relation to a fifth
comprehensive form philosophy. While all
four, he contended, are necessary to a full human life now, each is a form of
error that is corrected by its less erroneous successor. Philosophy is
error-free but has no content of its own: “The truth is not some perfect system
of philosophy: it is simply the way in which all systems, however perfect,
collapse into nothingness on the discovery that they are only systems.” Some
critics dismissed this enterprise as idealist a description Collingwood
accepted when he wrote, but even those who favored it were disturbed by the
apparent skepticism of its result. A year later, he amplified his views about
art in Outlines of a Philosophy of Art. Since much of what Collingwood went on
to write about philosophy has never been published, and some of it has been
negligently destroyed, his thought after Speculum Mentis is hard to trace. It
will not be definitively established until the more than 3,000 s of his
surviving unpublished manuscripts deposited in the Bodleian Library in 8 have
been thoroughly studied. They were not available to the scholars who published
studies of his philosophy as a whole up to 0. Three trends in how his
philosophy developed, however, are discernible. The first is that as he
continued to investigate the four special forms of experience, he came to
consider each valid in its own right, and not a form of error. As early as 8,
he abandoned the conception of the historical past in Speculum Mentis as simply
a spectacle, alien to the historian’s mind; he now proposed a theory of it as
thoughts explaining past actions that, although occurring in the past, can be
rethought in the present. Not only can the identical thought “enacted” at a
definite time in the past be “reenacted” any number of times after, but it can
be known to be so reenacted if colligation physical evidence survives that can
be shown to be incompatible with other proposed reenactments. In 334 he wrote a
series of lectures posthumously published as The Idea of Nature in which he
renounced his skepticism about whether the quantitative material world can be
known, and inquired why the three constructive periods he recognized in
European scientific thought, the Grecian, the Renaissance, and the modern,
could each advance our knowledge of it as they did. Finally, in 7, returning to
the philosophy of art and taking full account of Croce’s later work, he showed
that imagination expresses emotion and becomes false when it counterfeits
emotion that is not felt; thus he transformed his earlier theory of art as
purely imaginative. His later theories of art and of history remain alive; and
his theory of nature, although corrected by research since his death, was an
advance when published. The second trend was that his conception of philosophy
changed as his treatment of the special forms of experience became less
skeptical. In his beautifully written Essay on Philosophical Method 3, he
argued that philosophy has an object the
ens realissimum as the one, the true, and the good of which the objects of the special forms of
experience are appearances; but that implies what he had ceased to believe,
that the special forms of experience are forms of error. In his Principles of
Art 8 and New Leviathan 2 he denounced the idealist principle of Speculum
Mentis that to abstract is to falsify. Then, in his Essay on Metaphysics 0, he
denied that metaphysics is the science of being qua being, and identified it
with the investigation of the “absolute presuppositions” of the special forms
of experience at definite historical periods. A third trend, which came to
dominate his thought as World War II approached, was to see serious philosophy
as practical, and so as having political implications. He had been, like
Ruskin, a radical Tory, opposed less to liberal or even some socialist measures
than to the bourgeois ethos from which they sprang. Recognizing European
fascism as the barbarism it was, and detesting anti-Semitism, he advocated an
antifascist foreign policy and intervention in the civil war in support of the republic. His
last major publication, The New Leviathan, impressively defends what he called
civilization against what he called barbarism; and although it was neglected by
political theorists after the war was won, the collapse of Communism and the
rise of Islamic states are winning it new readers. Grice: “Collingwood thought of language importantly enough
to dedicate a full seminar at Oxford to it. He entitled it “Language.” The
first section is on “symbol and expression.” Language comes into existence with
imagination, as a feature of experience at the conscious level. . . ‘. . . It
is an imaginative activity whose function is to express emotion. Intel- lectual
language is this same thing intellectualized, or modified so as to express
thought.’ A symbol is established by agreement; but this agreement is
established in a language that already exists. In this way, intellectualized
language ‘presupposes imaginative language or language proper. . . in the
traditional theory of language these relations are reversed, with disastrous
results.’ Children do not learn to speak by being shown things while their
names are uttered; or if they do, it is because (unlike, say, cats) they
already understand the language of pointing and naming. The child may be
accustomed to hearing ‘Hatty off!’ when its bonnet is removed; then the child
may exclaim ‘Hattiaw!’ when it removes its own bonnet and throws it out of the
perambulator. The exclamation is not a symbol, but an expression of
satisfaction at removing the bonnet. The second section is on “Psychical
Expression.” More primitive than linguistic expression is psychical expression:
‘the doing of involuntary and perhaps even wholly unconscious bodily acts [such
as grimac- ing], related in a peculiar way to the emotions [such as pain] they
are said to express.’ A single experience can be analyzed: -- sensum (as an
abdominal gripe), or the field of sensation containing this; ) the emotional
charge on the sensum (as visceral pain); -- the psychical expression (as the
grimace). We can observe and interpret psychical expressions intellectually.
But there is the possibility of emotional contagion, or sympathy, whereby
expressions can also be sensa for others, with their own emotional charges.
Examples are the spread of panic through a crowd, or a dog’s urge to attack the
person who is afraid of it (or the cat that runs from it). Psychical emotions
can be expressed only psychically. But there are emotions of consciousness (as
hatred, love, anger, shame): these are the emotional charges, not on sensa, but
on modes of consciousness, which can be expressed in language or psychically.
Expressed psychically, they have the same analysis as psychical emotions; for
example, -- ‘consciousness of our own
inferiority, ) ‘shame -- ) ‘blushing.’ Shame is not the emotional charge on
the sensa associated with blushing. ‘The common-sense view [that we blush
because we are ashamed] is right, and the James–Lange theory is wrong.’ Emotions
of consciousness can be expressed in two different ways because, more
generally, a ‘higher level [of experience] differs from the lower in having a
new principle of organization; this does not supersede the old, it is
superimposed on it. The lower type of experience is perpetuated in the higher
type’ somewhat as matter is perpetuated, even with a new form. ‘A mode of
consciousness like shame is thus, formally, a mode of consciousness and nothing
else; materially, it is a constellation or synthesis of psychical expe-
riences.’ But consciousness is ‘an activity by which those elements are
combined in this particular way.’ It is not just a new arrangement of those
elements— otherwise the sensa of which shame is the emotional charge would have
been obvious, and the James–Lange theory would not have needed to arise. ‘[E]ach
new level [of experience] must organize itself according to its own principles
before a transition can be made to the next’. Therefore, to move beyond
consciousness to intellect, ‘emotions of consciousness must be formally or
linguistically expressed, not only materially or psychically expressed’. The
third section is on “Imaginative Expression.” Psychical expression is
uncontrollable. At the level of awareness, expressions are experienced ‘as
activities belonging to ourselves and controlled in the same sense as the
emotions they express. ‘Bodily actions expressing certain emotions, insofar as
they come under our control and are conceived by us in our awareness of
controlling them, as our way of expressing these emotions, are language.’ ‘[A]ny
theory of language must begin here.’ The controlled act of expression is
materially the same as psychical expression; the difference is just that it is
done ‘on purpose’. ‘[T]he conversion of impression into idea by the work of
consciousness im- mensely multiplies the emotions that demand expression.’ ‘There
are no unexpressed emotions.’ What are so called are emotions, already
expressed at one level, of which somebody is trying to become conscious. 5From
http://en..org/wiki/James-Lange_theory,
The theory states that within human beings, as a response to experiences in the
world, the autonomic nervous system creates physiological events such as
muscular tension, a rise in heart rate, perspiration, and dryness of the mouth.
Emotions, then, are feelings which come about as a result of these
physiological changes, rather than being their cause. Corresponding to the
series of sensum, emotional charge, psychical expression (as in red color,
fear, start), we have, say, -- ) bonnet removal, ) feeling of triumph, -- cry
of ‘Hattiaw!’ The child imitates the speech of others only when it realizes
that they are speaking. The fourth section is on “Language and Languages.” Language
need not be spoken by the tongue. ‘[T]here is no way of expressing the same
feeling in two different media.’ However, ‘each one of us, whenever he
expresses himself, is doing so with his whole body’, in the ‘original language
of total bodily gesture’—this is the ‘motor side’ of the ‘total imaginative
experience’ identified as art proper in Book I. The sixth section is on “Speaker
and Hearer.” A child’s first utterances are not addressed to anybody. But a
speaker is always -- ness does not begin as a mere self-consciousness. . . the
consciousness of our own existence is also consciousness of the existence of’
other persons. These persons could be cats or trees or shadows: as a form of
thought, consciousness can make mistakes [§ .]. In speaking, we do not
exactly communicate an emotion to a listener. To do this would be to cause the
listener to have a similar emotion; but to compare the emotions, we would need
language. The single experience of expressing emotion has two parts: the
emotion, and the controlled bodily action expressing it. This union of idea
with expression can be considered from two points of view: -- ) we can express
what we feel only because we know it; -- ) we know what we feel because we can
express it. ‘The person to whom speech is addressed is already familiar with
this double situation’. He ‘takes what he hears exactly as if it were speech of
his own. . . and this constructs in himself the idea which those words
express.’ But he attributes the idea to the speaker. This does not presuppose
community of language; it is community of language. If the hearer is to
understand the speaker though, he must have enough expe- rience to have the
impressions from which the ideas of the speaker are derived. (Collingwood’s
footnote to the section title is ‘In this section, whatever is said of speech
is meant of language in general.’) conscious of himself as speaking, so he is a
also a listener. The origin of self-consciousness will not be discussed.
However, ‘Conscious- However, misunderstanding may be the fault of the speaker,
if his consciousness is corrupt. The seventh section is on Language and Thought:
Language is an activity of thought; but if thought is taken in the narrower
sense of intellect, then language expresses not thought, but emotions. However,
these may be the emotions of a thinker. ‘Everything which imagination presents
to itself is a here, a now’. This might be the song of a thrush in May. One may
imagine, alongside this, the January song of the thrush; but at the level of
imagination, the two songs coalesce into one. By thinking, one may analyze the
song into parts—notes; or one may relate it to things not imagined, such as the
January thrush song that one remembers having heard four months ago at dawn
(though one may not remember the song -- to express any kind of thought (again,
in the narrower sense), language must be adapted. The eighth section is on “The
Grammatical Analysis of Language.” This adaptation of language to the
expression of thought is the function or business of the grammarian. ‘I do not
call it purpose, because he does not propose it to himself as a conscious aim’.
The grammarian analyzes, not the activity of language, but ‘speech’ or
‘discourse’, the supposed product of speech. But this product ‘is a
metaphysical fiction. It is supposed to exist only because the theory of
language is approached from the standpoint of the philosophy of craft. . . what
the grammarian is really doing is to think, not about a product of the activity
of speaking, but about the activity itself, distorted in his thoughts about it
by the assumption that it is not an activity, but a product or “thing”. ‘Next,
this “thing” must be scientifically studied; and this involves a double
process. The first stage of this process is to cut the “thing” up into parts.
Some readers will object to this phrase on the ground that I have used a verb
of acting when I ought to have used a verb of thinking. . . [but] philosophical
controversies are not to be settled by a sort of police-regulation governing
people’s choice of words. . . I meant cut. . àBird songs are wonderful to hear;
but I am not sufficiently familiar with them, or I live in the wrong place, to
be able to recognize seasonal variations in them. Looking for my own examples,
I can remember that, last summer, I became drenched in sweat from walking at
midday in the hills above the Aegean coast, before giving a mathematics
lecture; but I need not remember the feeling of the heat.) itself ). Analyzing
and relating are not the only kinds of thought. The point is that. -- ‘The
final process is to devise a scheme of relations between the parts thus
divided. . . a) ‘Lexicography. Every word, as it actually occurs in discourse,
occurs once and once only. . . Thus we get a new fiction: the recurring word’.
‘Meanings’ of words are established in words, so we get another fiction:
synonymity. b) Accidence. The rules whereby a single word is modified into
dominus, domine, dominum are also ‘palpable fictions; for it is notorious that
excep- tions to them occur’. c) Syntax. ‘A grammarian is not a kind of
scientist studying the actual structure of lan- guage; he is a kind of
butcher’. Idioms are another example of how language resists the grammarian’s
efforts. The ninth section is on The Logical Analysis of Language. Logical
technique aims ‘to make language into a perfect vehicle for the expression of
thought.’ It asssumes ‘that the grammatical transformation of language has been
successfully accomplished.’ It makes three further assumptions:) the
propositional assumption that some ‘sentences’ make statements; ) the
principle of homolingual translation whereby one sentence can mean exactly the
same as another (or group of others) in the same language;) logical
preferability: one sentence may be preferred to another that has the same
meaning. The criterion is not ease of understanding (this is the stylist’s
concern), but ease of manipulation by the logician’s technique to suit his
aims. The logician’s modification of language can to some extent be carried
out; but it tries to pull language apart into two things: language proper, and
symbolism. ‘No serious writer or speaker ever utters a thought unless he thinks
it worth uttering...Nor does he ever utter it except with a choice of words,
and in a tone of voice, that express his sense of this importance.’ The problem
is that written words do not show tone of voice. One is tempted to believe that
scientific discourse is what is written; what is spoken is this and something
else, emotional expression. Good logic would show that the logical structure of
a proposition is not clear from its written form. Good literature is written so
(8Collingwood imaginatively describes Dr. Richards, who writes of Tolstoy’s
view of art, ‘This is plainly untrue’, as if he were a cat shaking a drop of
water from its paw. Dr. Richards is Ivor Armstrong Richards, to whose
Principles of Literary Criticism Collingwood refers; ac- cording to http://en..org/wiki/I._A._Richards (accessed
December , ), ‘Richards is regularly considered one of the founders of the
contemporary study of literature in English’.) (In a footnote, Collingwood
mentions an example of Cook Wilson: ‘That building is the Bodleian’ could mean
‘That building is the Bodleian’ or ‘That building is the Bodleian.’ that the
reader cannot help but read it with the right tempo and tone. The proposition,
as a form of words expressing thought and not emotion, is a fictitious entity.
But ‘a second and more difficult thesis’ is that words do not express thought
at all directly; they express the emotional charge on a thought, allowing the
hearer to rediscover the thought ‘whose peculiar emotional tone the speaker has
expressed.’The tenth section is on “Language and Symbolism.” Symbols and
technical terms are invented for unemotional scientific purposes, but they
always acquire emotional expressiveness. ‘Every mathematician knows this.’
Intellectualized language, • as language, expresses emotion, • as symbolism,
has meaning; it points beyond emotion to a thought. ‘The progressive
intellectualization of language, its progressive conversion by the work of
grammar and logic into a scientific symbolism, thus represents not a
progressive drying-up of emotion, but its progressive articulation
and specializa- tion. We are not getting away from an emotional atmosphere into
a dry, rational atmosphere; we are acquiring new emotions and new means of
expressing them.’ Grice: “Collingwood improves on Crocefor one, he makes Croce
understandable at Oxford. Collingwood wants to distinguish between emotion and
expression of emotion. He also speaks of communication of emotion. The keyword
is ‘expression.’ Collingwood distinguishes between uncontrolled manifestation
and controlled manifestation. It is the latter that he dignifies with the term
‘expression.’ He makes an interesting point about the recipient. The recipient
must be in some degree of familiarty with the emotion expressed by the utterer
that the utterer is ‘communicating.’ To communicate is not really like
‘transfer.’ It is not THE SAME EMOTION that gets transferred. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Collingwood,” in
“Metaphysics,” in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics. Luigi Speranza, “A
commentary on the language and conversation section of Collingwood’s “The idea
of language.”
commitment: Grice’s commitment to the 39 Articles. An utterer is committed to those and only those
entities to which the bound variables of his utterance must be capable of
referring in order that the utterance made be true.” Cf. Grice on
substitutional quantification for his feeling Byzantine, and ‘gap’ sign in the
analysis.
common-ground status assignment: While Grice was invited to a symposium on ‘mutual
knowledge,’ he never was for ‘regressive accounts’ of ‘know,’ perhaps because
he had to be different, and the idea of the mutual or common knowledge was the
obvious way to deal with his account of communication. He rejects it and opts
for an anti-sneak clause. In the common-ground he uses the phrase, “What the
eye no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for.” What does he mean? He
means that in the case of some recognizable divergence between the function of
a communication device in a rational calculus and in the vernacular, one may
have to assign ‘common ground status’ to certain features, e. g. [The king of
France is] bald. By using the square brackets, or subscripts, in “Vacuous names
and descriptions,” the material within their scope is ‘immune’ to refutation.
It has some sort of conversational ‘inertia.’ So the divergence, for which
Grice’s heart grieved, is no more to be seen by Grice’s eye. Strwson and
Wiggins view that this is only tentative for Grice. the regulations for
common-ground assignment have to do with general rational constraints on
conversation. Grice is clear in “Causal,” and as Strawson lets us know, he was
already clear in “Introduction” when talking of a ‘pragmatic rule.’ Strawson
states the rule in terms of making your conversational contribution the
logically strongest possible. If we abide
by an imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally giving
and receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by others
in the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the effect,
‘Thou shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou canst
truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’“Causal” provides a more difficult version, because it
deals with non-extensional contexts where ‘strong’ need not be interpreted as
‘logical strength’ in terms of entailment. Common ground status assignment
springs from the principle of conversational helpfulness or conversational
benevolence. What would be the benevolent point of ‘informing’ your addressee
what you KNOW your addressee already knows? It is not even CONCEPTUALLY
possible. You are not ‘informing’ him if you are aware that he knows it. So,
what Strawson later calls the principle of presumption of ignorance and the
principle of the presumption of knowledge are relevant. There is a balance
between the two. If Strawson asks Grice, “Is the king of France bald?” Grice is
entitled to assume that Strawson thinks two things Grice will perceive as
having been assigned a ‘common-ground’ status as uncontroversial topic not
worth conversing about. First, Strawson thinks that there is one king. (∃x)Fx. Second, Strawson thinks that there is
at most one king. (x)(y)((Fx.Fy)⊃ x=y). That the king is bald is NOT assigned common-ground
status, because Grice cannot expect that Strawson thinks that Grice KNOWS that.
Grice symbolises the common-ground status by means of subscripts. He also uses
square-bracekts, so that anything within the scope of the square brackets is
immune to controversy, or as Grice also puts it, conversationally _inert_:
things we don’t talk about.
communication device: Grice: “I shall frequently speak of a ‘device,’ because its etymology
is fascinating.” divisare,
frequentative of Latin dividereGrice:
“So, ultimately, it’s a Platonic notion, since he was into division. The Romans
did not quite need a frequentative for ‘dividere,’ but the Italians did, and
this was passed to the Gallics, and then to the Brits.”Grice always has ‘or
communication devices’ at the tip of his tongue. “Language or communication
devices” (WoW: 284). A device is produced. A device can be misunderstood.
communicatum: With the linguistic turn, as Grice notes, it was all
about ‘language.’ But at Oxford they took a cavalier attitude to language, that
Grice felt like slightly rectifying, while keeping it cavalier as we like it at
Oxford. The colloquialism of ‘mean’ does not translate well in the Graeco-Roman
tradition Grice was educated via his Lit. Hum. (Philos.) and at Clifton.
‘Communicate’ might do. On top, Grice does use ‘communicate’ on various
occasions in WoW. By psi-transmission,
something that belonged in the emissor becomes ‘common property,’ ‘communion’
has been achived. Now the recipient KNOWS that it is raining (shares the belief
with the emissor) and IS GOING to bring that umbrella (has formed a desire). “Communication”
is cognate with ‘communion,’ while conversation is cognate with ‘sex’! When
Grice hightlights the ‘common ground’ in ‘communication’ he is being slightly
rhetorical, so it is good when he weakens the claim from ‘common ground’ to
‘non-trivial.’ A: I’m going to the concert. My uncle’s brother went to that
concert. The emissor cannot presume that his addressee KNEW that he had an
unlce let alone that his uncle had a brother (the emissor’s father). But any
expansion would trigger the wrong implicaturum. One who likes ‘communication’
is refined Strawson (I’m using refined as J. Barnes does it, “turn Plato into
refined Strawson”). Both in his rat-infested example and at the inaugural
lecture at Oxford. Grice, for one, has given us reason to think that, with
sufficient care, and far greater refinement than I have indicated, it is
possible to expound such a concept of communication-intention or, as he calls
it, utterer's meaning, which is proof against objection. it is a commonplace that Grice belongs, as
most philosophers of the twentieth century, to the movement of the linguistic
turn. Short and Lewis have “commūnĭcare,” earlier “conmunicare,” f. communis,
and thus sharing the prefix with “conversare.” Now “communis” is an interesting
lexeme that Grice uses quite centrally in his idea of the ‘common ground’when a
feature of discourse is deemed to have been assigned ‘common-ground status.’
“Communis” features the “cum-” prefix, commūnis (comoinis); f. “con” and root “mu-,”
to bind; Sanscr. mav-; cf.: immunis, munus, moenia. The ‘communicatum’ (as used
by Tammelo in social philosophy) may
well cover what Grice would call the total ‘significatio,’ or ‘significatum.’ Grice
takes this seriously. Let us start then by examining what we mean by ‘linguistic,’
or ‘communication.’ It is curious that while most Griceians overuse
‘communicative’ as applied to ‘intention,’ Grice does not. Communicator’s
intention, at most. This is the Peirce in Grice’s soul. Meaning provides an
excellent springboard for Grice to centre his analysis on psychological or
soul-y verbs as involving the agent and the first person: smoke only
figuratively means fire, and the expression smoke only figuratively (or
metabolically) means that there is fire. It is this or that utterer (say, Grice)
who means, say, by uttering Where theres smoke theres fire, or ubi fumus, ibi
ignis, that where theres smoke theres fire. A means something by uttering
x, an utterance-token is roughly equivalent to utterer U intends the utterance
of x to produce some effect in his addressee A by means of the recognition of
this intention; and we may add that to ask what U means is to ask for a
specification of the intended effectthough, of course, it may not always be
possible to get a straight answer involving a that-clause, for example, a
belief that He does provide a more
specific example involving the that-clause at a later stage. By uttering x, U
means that-ψb-dp ≡ (Ǝφ)(Ǝf)(Ǝc) U utters
x intending x to be such that anyone who has φ think
that x has f, f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, and (Ǝφ') U intends x to be such
that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has
f and that f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that
p, and in view of (Ǝφ') U intending x to be such
that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has
f, and f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that
p, U ψ-s that p, and, for some
substituends of ψb-d, U utters x
intending that, should there actually be anyone who
has φ, he will, via thinking in view of (Ǝφ') U
intending x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via
thinking that x has f, and f is correlated in way c
with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, U ψ-s that
p himself ψ that p, and it is not
the case that, for some inference element E, U intends x to be such
that anyone who has φ both rely on E in coming to ψ, or think that U ψ-s, that p and think that (Ǝφ) U intends x to be
such that anyone who has φ come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that
p without relying on E. Besides St. John The Baptist, and Salome, Grice
cites few Namess in Meaning. But he makes a point about Stevenson! For
Stevenson, smoke means fire. Meaning develops out of an interest by Grice on
the philosophy of Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other
authors, including, besides Peirce himself (!), Ogden, Richards, and Ewing, or
A. C. Virtue is not a fire-shovel Ewing, as Grice calls him, and this or that
cricketer. In the characteristic Oxonian fashion of a Lit. Hum., Grice has no
intention to submit Meaning to publication. Publishing is vulgar. Bennett,
however, guesses that Grice decides to publish it just a year after his Defence
of a dogma. Bennett’s argument is that Defence of a dogma pre-supposes some
notion of meaning. However, a different story may be told, not necessarily
contradicting Bennetts. It is Strawson who submits the essay by Grice to The
Philosophical Review (henceforth, PR) Strawson attends Grices talk on Meaning
for The Oxford Philosophical Society, and likes it. Since In defence of a dogma
was co-written with Strawson, the intention Bennett ascribes to Grice is
Strawsons. Oddly, Strawson later provides a famous alleged counter-example to
Grice on meaning in Intention and convention in speech acts, following J. O.
Urmson’s earlier attack to the sufficiency of Grices analysans -- which has
Grice dedicating a full James lecture (No. 5) to it. there is Strawsons
rat-infested house for which it is insufficient. An interesting fact,
that confused a few, is that Hart quotes from Grices Meaning in his critical
review of Holloway for The Philosophical Quarterly. Hart quotes Grice
pre-dating the publication of Meaning. Harts point is that Holloway should have
gone to Oxford! In Meaning, Grice may be seen as a practitioner of
ordinary-language philosophy: witness his explorations of the factivity (alla
know, remember, or see) or lack thereof of various uses of to mean. The second
part of the essay, for which he became philosophically especially popular,
takes up an intention-based approach to semantic notions. The only authority
Grice cites, in typical Oxonian fashion, is, via Ogden and Barnes, Stevenson,
who, from The New World (and via Yale, too!) defends an emotivist theory of
ethics, and making a few remarks on how to mean is used, with scare quotes, in
something like a causal account (Smoke means fire.). After its publication
Grices account received almost as many alleged counterexamples as
rule-utilitarianism (Harrison), but mostly outside Oxford, and in The New
World. New-World philosophers seem to have seen Grices attempt as reductionist
and as oversimplifying. At Oxford, the sort of counterexample Grice received,
before Strawson, was of the Urmson-type: refined, and subtle. I think your
account leaves bribery behind. On the other hand, in the New World ‒ in what
Grice calls the Latter-Day School of Nominalism, Quine is having troubles with
empiricism. Meaning was repr. in various collections, notably in Philosophical
Logic, ed. by Strawson. It should be remembered that it is Strawson who has the
thing typed and submitted for publication. Why Meaning should be repr. in a
collection on Philosophical Logic only Strawson knows. But Grice does say that
his account may help clarify the meaning of entails! It may be Strawsons implicaturum
that Parkinson should have repr. (and not merely credited) Meaning by Grice in
his series for Oxford on The theory of meaning. The preferred quotation for Griceians
is of course The Oxford Philosophical Society quote, seeing that Grice recalled
the exact year when he gave the talk for the Philosophical Society at Oxford!
It is however, the publication in The Philosophi, rather than the quieter
evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, that occasioned a tirade of
alleged counter-examples by New-World philosophers. Granted, one or two
Oxonians ‒ Urmson and Strawson ‒ fell in! Urmson criticises the sufficiency of
Grices account, by introducing an alleged counter-example involving bribery.
Grice will consider a way out of Urmsons alleged counter-example in his fifth
Wiliam James Lecture, rightly crediting and thanking Urmson for this! Strawsons
alleged counter-example was perhaps slightly more serious, if regressive. It
also involves the sufficiency of Grices analysis. Strawsons rat-infested house
alleged counter-example started a chain which required Grice to avoid,
ultimately, any sneaky intention by way of a recursive clause to the effect
that, for utterer U to have meant that p, all meaning-constitutive intentions
should be above board. But why this obsession by Grice with mean? He is being
funny. Spots surely dont mean, only mean.They dont have a mind. Yet Grice opens
with a specific sample. Those spots mean, to the doctor, that you, dear, have
measles. Mean? Yes, dear, mean, doctors orders. Those spots mean measles. But
how does the doctor know? Cannot he be in the wrong? Not really, mean is
factive, dear! Or so Peirce thought. Grice is amazed that Peirce thought that
some meaning is factive. The hole in this piece of cloth means that a bullet
went through is is one of Peirce’s examples. Surely, as Grice notes, this is an
unhappy example. The hole in the cloth may well have caused by something else,
or fabricated. (Or the postmark means that the letter went through the post.)
Yet, Grice was having Oxonian tutees aware that Peirce was krypto-technical.
Grice chose for one of his pre-Meaning seminars on Peirce’s general theory of
signs, with emphasis on general, and the correspondence of Peirce and Welby.
Peirce, rather than the Vienna circle, becomes, in vein with Grices dissenting
irreverent rationalism, important as a source for Grices attempt to English
Peirce. Grices implicaturum seems to be that Peirce, rather than Ayer, cared
for the subtleties of meaning and sign, never mind a verificationist theory
about them! Peirce ultra-Latinate-cum-Greek taxonomies have Grice very nervous,
though. He knew that his students were proficient in the classics, but still. Grice
thus proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions and sub-divisions (one
sub-division too many) to mean. In the proceedings, he quotes from Ogden,
Richards, and Ewing. In particular, Grice was fascinated by the correspondence of
Peirce with Lady Viola Welby, as repr. by Ogden/Richards in, well, their study
on the meaning of meaning. Grice thought the science of symbolism pretentious,
but then he almost thought Lady Viola Welby slightly pretentious, too, if youve
seen her; beautiful lady. It is via Peirce that Grice explores examples such as
those spots meaning measles. Peirce’s obsession is with weathercocks almost as
Ockham was with circles on wine-barrels. Old-World Grices use of New-World
Peirce is illustrative, thus, of the Oxonian linguistic turn focused on
ordinary language. While Peirce’s background was not philosophical, Grice
thought it comical enough. He would say that Peirce is an amateur, but then he
said the same thing about Mill, whom Grice had to study by heart to get his B.
A. Lit. Hum.! Plus, as Watson commented, what is wrong with amateur? Give me an
amateur philosopher ANY day, if I have to choose from professional Hegel! In
finding Peirce krypo-technical, Grice is ensuing that his tutees, and indeed
any Oxonian philosophy student (he was university lecturer) be aware that to
mean should be more of a priority than this or that jargon by this or that (New
World?) philosopher!? Partly! Grice wanted his students to think on their own,
and draw their own conclusions! Grice cites Ewing, Ogden/Richards, and many
others. Ewing, while Oxford-educated, had ended up at Cambridge (Scruton almost
had him as his tutor) and written some points on Meaninglessness! Those spots
mean measles. Grice finds Peirce krypto-technical and proposes to English him
into an ordinary-language philosopher. Surely it is not important whether we
consider a measles spot a sign, a symbol, or an icon. One might just as well
find a doctor in London who thinks those spots symbolic. If Grice feels like
Englishing Peirce, he does not altogether fail! meaning, reprints, of
Meaning and other essays, a collection of reprints and offprints of Grices
essays. Meaning becomes a central topic of at least two strands in
Retrospective epilogue. The first strand concerns the idea of the centrality of
the utterer. What Grice there calls meaning BY (versus meaning TO), i.e. as he
also puts it, active or agents meaning. Surely he is right in defending an
agent-based account to meaning. Peirce need not, but Grice must, because he is
working with an English root, mean, that is only figurative applicable to
non-agentive items (Smoke means rain). On top, Grice wants to conclude that
only a rational creature (a person) can meanNN properly. Non-human animals may
have a correlate. This is a truly important point for Grice since he surely is
seen as promoting a NON-convention-based approach to meaning, and also
defending from the charge of circularity in the non-semantic account of
propositional attitudes. His final picture is a rationalist one. P1 G
wants to communicate about a danger to P2. This presupposes there IS
a danger (item of reality). Then P1 G believes there is a
danger, and communicates to P2 G2 that there is a danger. This
simple view of conversation as rational co-operation underlies Grices account
of meaning too, now seen as an offshoot of philosophical psychology, and indeed
biology, as he puts it. Meaning as yet another survival mechanism. While he
would never use a cognate like significance in his Oxford Philosophical Society
talk, Grice eventually starts to use such Latinate cognates at a later stage of
his development. In Meaning, Grice does not explain his goal. By sticking with
a root that the Oxford curriculum did not necessarily recognised as
philosophical (amateur Peirce did!), Grice is implicating that he is starting
an ordinary-language botanising on his own repertoire! Grice was amused by the
reliance by Ewing on very Oxonian examples contra Ayer: Surely Virtue aint a
fire-shovel is perfectly meaningful, and if fact true, if, Ill admit, somewhat
misleading and practically purposeless at Cambridge. Again, the dismissal by
Grice of natural meaning is due to the fact that natural meaning prohibits its
use in the first person and followed by a that-clause. ‘I mean-n that p’ sounds
absurd, no communication-function seems in the offing, there is no ‘sign for,’
as Woozley would have it. Grice found, with Suppes, all types of primacy
(ontological, axiological, psychological) in utterers meaning. In Retrospective
epilogue, he goes back to the topic, as he reminisces that it is his
suggestion that there are two allegedly distinguishable meaning concepts, even
if one is meta-bolical, which may be called natural meaning and non-natural
meaning. There is this or that test (notably factivity-entailment vs. cancelation,
but also scare quotes) which may be brought to bear to distinguish one concept
from the other. We may, for example, inquire whether a particular occurrence of
the predicate mean is factive or non-factive, i. e., whether for it to be true
that [so and so] means that p, it does or does not have to be the case that it
is true that p. Again, one may ask whether the use of quotation marks to
enclose the specification of what is meant would be inappropriate or
appropriate. If factivity, as in know, remember, and see, is present and
quotation marks, oratio recta, are be inappropriate, we have a case of natural
meaning. Otherwise the meaning involved is non-natural meaning. We may now ask
whether there is a single overarching idea which lies behind both members of this
dichotomy of uses to which the predicate meaning that seems to be Subjects. If
there is such a central idea it might help to indicate to us which of the two
concepts is in greater need of further analysis and elucidation and in what
direction such elucidation should proceed. Grice confesses that he has only
fairly recently come to believe that there is such an overarching idea and that
it is indeed of some service in the proposed inquiry. The idea behind both uses
of mean is that of consequence, or consequentia, as Hobbes has it. If x means
that p, something which includes p or the idea of p, is a consequence of x. In
the metabolic natural use of meaning that p, p, this or that consequence, is
this or that state of affairs. In the literal, non-metabolic, basic,
non-natural use of meaning that p, (as in Smith means that his neighbour’s
three-year child is an adult), p, this or that consequence is this or that
conception or complexus which involves some other conception. This perhaps
suggests that of the two concepts it is, as it should, non-natural meaning
which is more in need of further elucidation. It seems to be the more
specialised of the pair, and it also seems to be the less determinate. We may,
e. g., ask how this or that conception enters the picture. Or we may ask
whether what enters the picture is the conception itself or its justifiability.
On these counts Grice should look favorably on the idea that, if further
analysis should be required for one of the pair, the notion of non-natural
meaning would be first in line. There are factors which support the suitability
of further analysis for the concept of non-natural meaning. MeaningNN that
p (non-natural meaning) does not look as if it Namess an original feature of
items in the world, for two reasons which are possibly not mutually
independent. One reason is that, given suitable background conditions, meaning,
can be changed by fiat. The second reason is that the presence of meaningNN is
dependent on a framework provided by communication, if that is not too
circular. Communication is in the philosophical lexicon. Lewis and
Short have “commūnĭcātĭo,” f. communicare,"(several times in Cicero,
elsewhere rare), and as they did with negatio and they will with significatio,
Short and Lewis render, unhelpfully, as a making common, imparting,
communicating. largitio et communicatio civitatis;” “quaedam societas et
communicatio utilitatum,” “consilii communicatio, “communicatio sermonis,” criminis
cum pluribus; “communicatio nominum, i. e. the like appellation of several objects;
“juris; “damni; In rhetorics, communicatio, trading on the communis, a figure,
translating Grecian ἀνακοίνωσις, in accordance with which the utterer turns to
his addressee, and, as it were, allows him to take part in the inquiry. It seems
to Grice, then, at least reasonable and possibly even emphatically mandatory,
to treat the claim that a communication vehicle, such as this and that
expression means that p, in this transferred, metaphoric, or meta-bolic use of
means that as being reductively analysable in terms of this or that feature of
this or that utterer, communicator, or user of this or that expression.
The use of meaning that as applied to this or that expression is posterior
to and explicable through the utterer-oriented, or utterer-relativised use,
i.e. involving a reference to this or that communicator or user of this or that
expression. More specifically, one should license a metaphorical use of mean,
where one allows the claim that this or that expression means that p, provided
that this or that utterer, in this or that standard fashion, means that p, i.e.
in terms of this or that souly statee toward this or that propositional
complexus this or that utterer ntends, in a standardly fashion, to produce by
his uttering this or that utterance. That this or that expression means (in
this metaphorical use) that p is thus explicable either in terms of this
or that souly state which is standardly intended to produce in this or that
addressee A by this or that utterer of this or that expression, or in this or
that souly staken up by this or that utterer toward this or that activity or
action of this or that utterer of this or that expression. Meaning was in
the air in Oxfords linguistic turn. Everybody was talking meaning. Grice manages
to quote from Hares early “Mind” essay on the difference between imperatives
and indicatives, also Duncan-Jones on the fugitive proposition, and of
course his beloved Strawson. Grice was also concerned by the fact that in the manoeuvre
of the typical ordinary-language philosopher, there is a constant abuse of
mean. Surely Grice wants to stick with the utterers meaning as the primary use.
Expressions mean only derivatively. To do that, he chose Peirce to see if he
could clarify it with meaning that. Grice knew that the polemic was even
stronger in London, with Ogden and Lady Viola Welby. In the more academic
Oxford milieu, Grice knew that a proper examination of meaning, would lead him,
via Kneale and his researches on the history of semantics, to the topic of
signification that obsessed the modistae (and their modus significandi). For
what does L and S say about about this? This is Grice’s reply to popular Ogden.
They want to know what the meaning of meaning is? Here is the Oxononian
response by Grice, with a vengeance. Grice is not an animist nor a mentalist,
even modest. While he allows for natural phenomena to mean (smoke means
fire), meaning is best ascribed to some utterer, where this meaning is nothing
but the intentions behind his utterance. This is the fifth James lecture.
Grice was careful enough to submit it to PR, since it is a strictly
philosophical development of the views expressed in Meaning which Strawson had
submitted on Grice’s behalf to the same Review and which had had a series of
responses by various philosophers. Among these philosophers is Strawson himself
in Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts, also in
PR. Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay,
including: Urmson, Stampe, Strawson, Schiffer, and
Searle. Strawson is especially relevant since he started a series of
alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of the rat-infested
house. Grice particularly treasured Stampes alleged counter-example
involving his beloved bridge! Avramides earns a D. Phil Oxon. on that, under
Strawson! This is Grices occasion to address some of the criticisms ‒
in the form of alleged counter-examples, typically, as his later reflections on
epagoge versus diagoge note ‒ by Urmson, Strawson, and other
philosophers associated with Oxford, such as Searle, Stampe, and Schiffer. The
final analysandum is pretty complex (of the type that he did find his analysis
of I am hearing a sound complex in Personal identity ‒ hardly an
obstacle for adopting it), it became yet another target of attack by especially
New-World philosophers in the pages of Mind, Nous, and other journals, This is
officially the fifth James lecture. Grice takes up the analysis of meaning he
had presented way back at the Oxford Philosophical Society. Motivated mainly by
the attack by Urmson and by Strawson in Intention and convention in speech
acts, that offered an alleged counter-example to the sufficiency of Grices
analysis, Grice ends up introducing so many intention that he almost trembled.
He ends up seeing meaning as a value-paradeigmatic concept, perhaps never
realisable in a sublunary way. But it is the analysis in this particular essay
where he is at his formal best. He distinguishes between protreptic and
exhibitive utterances, and also modes of correlation (iconic, conventional). He
symbolises the utterer and the addressee, and generalises over the type of
psychological state, attitude, or stance, meaning seems to range (notably
indicative vs. imperative). He formalises the reflexive intention, and more
importantly, the overtness of communication in terms of a self-referential
recursive intention that disallows any sneaky intention to be brought into the
picture of meaning-constitutive intentions. Grice thought he had dealt with
Logic and conversation enough! So he feels of revising his Meaning. After all,
Strawson had had the cheek to publish Meaning by Grice and then go on to
criticize it in Intention and convention in speech acts. So this is Grices
revenge, and he wins! He ends with the most elaborate theory of mean that an
Oxonian could ever hope for. And to provoke the informalists such as Strawson
(and his disciples at Oxfordled by Strawson) he pours existential quantifiers
like the plague! He manages to quote from Urmson, whom he loved! No word on
Peirce, though, who had originated all this! His implicaturum: Im not going to
be reprimanted in informal discussion about my misreading Peirce at Harvard!
The concluding note is about artificial substitutes for iconic representation,
and meaning as a human institution. Very grand. This is Grices metabolical
projection of utterers meaning to apply to anything OTHER than utterers
meaning, notably a token of the utterers expression and a TYPE of the utterers
expression, wholly or in part. Its not like he WANTS to do it, he NEEDS it to
give an account of implicaturum. The phrase utterer is meant to provoke. Grice
thinks that speaker is too narrow. Surely you can mean by just uttering
stuff! This is the sixth James lecture, as published in “Foundations of
Language” (henceforth, “FL”), or “The foundations of language,” as he
preferred. As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that Searle
selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy on the
philosophy of language. It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his
influential Locke lectures. Chomsky takes Grice to be a behaviourist, even
along Skinners lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, repr. in PGRICE. In The
New World, the H. P. is often given in a more simplified form. Grice wants to
keep on playing. In Meaning, he had said x means that p is surely reducible to
utterer U means that p. In this lecture, he lectures us as to how to proceed.
In so doing he invents this or that procedure: some basic, some resultant. When
Chomsky reads the reprint in Searles Philosophy of Language, he cries:
Behaviourist! Skinnerian! It was Suppes who comes to Grices defence. Surely the
way Grice uses expressions like resultant procedure are never meant in the
strict behaviourist way. Suppes concludes that it is much fairer to
characterise Grice as an intentionalist. Published in FL, ed. by Staal, Repr.in
Searle, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford, the sixth James Lecture, FL,
resultant procedure, basic procedure. Staal asked Grice to publish the
sixth James lecture for a newish periodical publication of whose editorial
board he was a member. The fun thing is Grice complied! This is Grices
shaggy-dog story. He does not seem too concerned about resultant procedures. As
he will ll later say, surely I can create Deutero-Esperanto and become its
master! For Grice, the primacy is the idiosyncratic, particularized utterer in
this or that occasion. He knows a philosopher craves for generality, so he
provokes the generality-searcher with divisions and sub-divisions of mean. But
his heart does not seem to be there, and he is just being overformalistic and
technical for the sake of it. I am glad that Putnam, of all people, told me in
an aside, you are being too formal, Grice. I stopped with symbolism since! Communication.
This is Grice’s clearest anti-animist attack by Grice. He had joins Hume in
mocking causing and willing: The decapitation of Charles I as willing Charles
Is death. Language semantics alla Tarski. Grice know sees his former self. If
he was obsessed, after Ayer, with mean, he now wants to see if his explanation
of it (then based on his pre-theoretic intuition) is theoretically advisable in
terms other than dealing with those pre-theoretical facts, i.e. how he deals
with a lexeme like mean. This is a bit like Grice: implicaturum, revisited. An
axiological approach to meaning. Strictly a reprint of Grice, which should be
the preferred citation. The date is given by Grice himself, and he knew! Grice
also composed some notes on Remnants on meaning, by Schiffer. This is a bit
like Grices meaning re-revisited. Schiffer had been Strawsons tutee at Oxford
as a Rhode Scholar in the completion of his D. Phil. on Meaning, Clarendon.
Eventually, Schiffer grew sceptic, and let Grice know about it! Grice did not
find Schiffers arguments totally destructive, but saw the positive side to
them. Schiffers arguments should remind any philosopher that the issues he is
dealing are profound and bound to involve much elucidation before they are
solved. This is a bit like Grice: implicaturum, revisited. Meaning revisited
(an ovious nod to Evelyn Waughs Yorkshire-set novel) is the title Grice chose
for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by Smith. Meaning
revisited (although Grice has earlier drafts entitled Meaning and philosophical
psychology) comprises three sections. In the first section, Grice is concerned
with the application of his modified Occam’s razor now to the very lexeme,
mean. Cf. How many senses does sense have? Cohen: The Senses of Senses. In the
second part, Grice explores an evolutionary model of creature construction
reaching a stage of non-iconic representation. Finally, in the third section,
motivated to solve what he calls a major problem ‒ versus the minor
problem concerning the transition from the meaning by the utterer to the
meaning by the expression. Grice attempts to construct meaning as a
value-paradeigmatic notion. A version was indeed published in the proceedings
of the Brighton symposium, by Croom Helm, London. Grice has a couple of other
drafts with variants on this title: philosophical psychology and meaning,
psychology and meaning. He keeps, meaningfully, changing the order. It is not
arbitrary that the fascinating exploration by Grice is in three parts. In the
first, where he applies his Modified Occams razor to mean, he is revisiting
Stevenson. Smoke means fire and I mean love, dont need different senses of
mean. Stevenson is right when using scare quotes for smoke ‘meaning’ fire
utterance. Grice is very much aware that that, the rather obtuse terminology of
senses, was exactly the terminology he had adopted in both Meaning and the
relevant James lectures (V and VI) at Harvard! Now, its time to revisit and to
echo Graves, say, goodbye to all that! In the second part he applies Pology.
While he knows his audience is not philosophical ‒ it is not Oxford ‒ he
thinks they still may get some entertainment! We have a P feeling pain,
simulating it, and finally uttering, I am in pain. In the concluding section,
Grice becomes Plato. He sees meaning as an optimum, i.e. a value-paradeigmatic
notion introducing value in its guise of optimality. Much like Plato thought
circle works in his idiolect. Grice played with various titles, in the Grice
Collection. Theres philosophical psychology and meaning. The reason is obvious.
The lecture is strictly divided in sections, and it is only natural that Grice
kept drafts of this or that section in his collection. In WOW Grice notes that
he re-visited his Meaning re-visited at a later stage, too! And he meant it!
Surely, there is no way to understand the stages of Grice’s development of his
ideas about meaning without Peirce! It is obvious here that Grice thought that
mean two figurative or metabolical extensions of use. Smoke means fire and Smoke
means smoke. The latter is a transferred use in that impenetrability means lets
change the topic if Humpty-Dumpty m-intends that it and Alice are to change the
topic. Why did Grice feel the need to add a retrospective epilogue? He loved to
say that what the “way of words” contains is neither his first, nor his last
word. So trust him to have some intermediate words to drop. He is at his most
casual in the very last section of the epilogue. The first section is more of a
very systematic justification for any mistake the reader may identify in the
offer. The words in the epilogue are thus very guarded and qualificatory. Just
one example about our focus: conversational implicate and conversation as
rational co-operation. He goes back to Essay 2, but as he notes, this was
hardly the first word on the principle of conversational helpfulness, nor
indeed the first occasion where he actually used implicaturum. As regards
co-operation, the retrospective epilogue allows him to expand on a causal
phrasing in Essay 2, “purposive, indeed rational.” Seeing in retrospect how the
idea of rationality was the one that appealed philosophers mostsince it
provides a rationale and justification for what is otherwise an arbitrary
semantic proliferation. Grice then distinguishes between the thesis that
conversation is purposive, and the thesis that conversation is rational. And,
whats more, and in excellent Griceian phrasing, there are two theses here, too.
One thing is to see conversation as rational, and another, to use his very
phrasing, as rational co-operation! Therefore, when one discusses the secondary
literature, one should be attentive to whether the author is referring to
Grices qualifications in the Retrospective epilogue. Grice is careful to date
some items. However, since he kept rewriting, one has to be careful. These
seven folder contain the material for the compilation. Grice takes the
opportunity of the compilation by Harvard of his WOW, representative of the
mid-60s, i. e. past the heyday of ordinary-language philosophy, to review the
idea of philosophical progress in terms of eight different strands which
display, however, a consistent and distinctive unity. Grice keeps playing with
valediction, valedictory, prospective and retrospective, and the different
drafts are all kept in The Grice Papers. The Retrospective epilogue, is divided
into two sections. In the first section, he provides input for his eight strands,
which cover not just meaning, and the assertion-implication distinction to
which he alludes to in the preface, but for more substantial philosophical
issues like the philosophy of perception, and the defense of common sense
realism versus the sceptial idealist. The concluding section tackles more
directly a second theme he had idenfitied in the preface, which is a
methodological one, and his long-standing defence of ordinary-language
philosophy. The section involves a fine distinction between the Athenian
dialectic and the Oxonian dialectic, and tells the tale about his fairy
godmother, G*. As he notes, Grice had dropped a few words in the preface
explaining the ordering of essays in the compilation. He mentions that he
hesitated to follow a suggestion by Bennett that the ordering of the essays be
thematic and chronological. Rather, Grice chooses to publish the whole set
of seven James lectures, what he calls the centerpiece, as part I. II, the
explorations in semantics and metaphysics, is organised more or less
thematically, though. In the Retrospective epilogue, Grice takes up this
observation in the preface that two ideas or themes underlie his Studies: that
of meaning, and assertion vs. implication, and philosophical methodology. The
Retrospective epilogue is thus an exploration on eight strands he identifies in
his own philosophy. Grices choice of strand is careful. For Grice, philosophy,
like virtue, is entire. All the strands belong to the same knit, and therefore
display some latitudinal, and, he hopes, longitudinal unity, the latter made
evidence by his drawing on the Athenian dialectic as a foreshadow of the
Oxonian dialectic to come, in the heyday of the Oxford school of analysis, when
an interest in the serious study of ordinary language had never been since and
will never be seen again. By these two types of unity, Grice means the obvious
fact that all branches of philosophy (philosophy of language, or semantics,
philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, metaphysics, axiology,
etc.) interact and overlap, and that a historical regard for ones philosophical
predecessors is a must, especially at Oxford. Why is Grice obsessed with
asserting? He is more interested, technically, in the phrastic, or dictor.
Grice sees a unity, indeed, equi-vocality, in the buletic-doxastic continuum.
Asserting is usually associated with the doxastic. Since Grice is always ready
to generalise his points to cover the buletic (recall his Meaning, “theres by
now no reason to stick to informative cases,”), it is best to re-define his
asserting in terms of the phrastic. This is enough of a strong point. As Hare
would agree, for emotivists like Barnes, say, an utterance of buletic force may
not have any content whatsoever. For Grice, there is always a content, the proposition
which becomes true when the action is done and the desire is fulfilled or
satisfied. Grice quotes from Bennett. Importantly, Grice focuses on the
assertion/non-assertion distinction. He overlooks the fact that for this or
that of his beloved imperative utterance, asserting is out of the question, but
explicitly conveying that p is not. He needs a dummy to stand for a
psychological or souly state, stance, or attitude of either boule or doxa, to
cover the field of the utterer mode-neutrally conveying explicitly that his
addressee A is to entertain that p. The explicatum or explicitum sometimes does
the trick, but sometimes it does not. It is interesting to review the Names
index to the volume, as well as the Subjects index. This is a huge collection,
comprising 14 folders. By contract, Grice was engaged with Harvard, since it is
the President of the College that holds the copyrights for the James lectures.
The title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays, which goes
far beyond the James, although keeping them as the centerpiece, is a tribute to
Locke, who, although obsessed with his idealist and empiricist new way of
ideas, leaves room for both the laymans and scientists realist way of things,
and, more to the point, for this or that philosophical semiotician to offer
this or that study in the way of words. Early in the linguistic turn minor
revolution, the expression the new way of words, had been used derogatorily.
WOW is organised in two parts: Logic and conversation and the somewhat pretentiously
titled Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, which offers commentary
around the centerpiece. It also includes a Preface and a very rich and inspired
Retrospective epilogue. From part I, the James lectures, only three had not
been previously published. The first unpublished lecture is Prolegomena, which
really sets the scene, and makes one wonder what the few philosophers who quote
from The logic of grammar could have made from the second James lecture taken
in isolation. Grice explores Aristotle’s “to alethes”: “For the true and the
false exist with respect to synthesis and division (peri gar synthesin kai
diaireisin esti to pseudos kai to alethes).” Aristotle insists upon the
com-positional form of truth in several texts: cf. De anima, 430b3 ff.: “in
truth and falsity, there is a certain composition (en hois de kai to pseudos
kai to alethes, synthesis tis)”; cf. also Met. 1027b19 ff.: the true and the
false are with respect to (peri) composition and decomposition (synthesis kai
diaresis).” It also shows that Grices style is meant for public delivery,
rather than reading. The second unpublished lecture is Indicative conditionals.
This had been used by a few philosophers, such as Gazdar, noting that there
were many mistakes in the typescript, for which Grice is not to be blamed. The
third is on some models for implicaturum. Since this Grice acknowledges is
revised, a comparison with the original handwritten version of the final James
lecture retrieves a few differences From Part II, a few essays had not been
published before, but Grice, nodding to the longitudinal unity of philosophy,
is very careful and proud to date them. Commentary on the individual essays
is made under the appropriate dates. Philosophical correspondence is quite a
genre. Hare would express in a letter to the Librarian for the Oxford Union,
“Wiggins does not want to be understood,” or in a letter to Bennett that
Williams is the worse offender of Kantianism! It was different with Grice. He
did not type. And he wrote only very occasionally! These are four folders with
general correspondence, mainly of the academic kind. At Oxford, Grice would
hardly keep a correspondence, but it was different with the New World, where
academia turns towards the bureaucracy. Grice is not precisely a good, or
reliable, as The BA puts it, correspondent. In the Oxford manner, Grice prefers
a face-to-face interaction, any day. He treasures his Saturday mornings under
Austins guidance, and he himself leads the Play Group after Austins demise,
which, as Owen reminisced, attained a kind of cult status. Oxford is different.
As a tutorial fellow in philosophy, Grice was meant to tutor his students; as a
University Lecturer he was supposed to lecture sometimes other fellowss tutees!
Nothing about this reads: publish or perish! This is just one f. containing
Grices own favourite Griceian references. To the historian of analytic
philosophy, it is of particular interest. It shows which philosophers Grice
respected the most, and which ones the least. As one might expect, even on the
cold shores of Oxford, as one of Grices tutees put it, Grice is cited by
various Oxford philosophers. Perhaps the first to cite Grice in print is his
tutee Strawson, in “Logical Theory.” Early on, Hart quotes Grice on meaning in
his review in The Philosophical Quarterly of Holloways Language and
Intelligence before Meaning had been published. Obviously, once Grice and
Strawson, In defense of a dogma and Grice, Meaning are published by The
Philosophical Review, Grice is discussed profusely. References to the implicaturum
start to appear in the literature at Oxford in the mid-1960s, within the playgroup,
as in Hare and Pears. It is particularly intriguing to explore those
philosophers Grice picks up for dialogue, too, and perhaps arrange them
alphabetically, from Austin to Warnock, say. And Griceian philosophical
references, Oxonian or other, as they should, keep counting! The way to search
the Grice Papers here is using alternate keywords, notably “meaning.” “Meaning”
s. II, “Utterer’s meaning and intentions,” s. II, “Utterer’s meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word meaning,” s. II, “Meaning revisited,” s. II.but also
“Meaning and psychology,” s. V, c.7-ff.
24-25. While Grice uses “signification,” and lectured on Peirce’s
“signs,” “Peirce’s general theory of signs,” (s. V, c. 8-f. 29), he would avoid
such pretentiously sounding expressions. Searching under ‘semantic’ and
‘semantics’ (“Grammar and semantics,” c. 7-f. 5; “Language semantics,” c.
7-f.20, “Basic Pirotese, sentence semantics and syntax,” c. 8-f. 30, “Semantics
of children’s language,” c. 9-f. 10, “Sentence semantics” (c. 9-f. 11);
“Sentence semantics and propositional complexes,” c. 9-f.12, “Syntax and
semantics,” c. 9-ff. 17-18) may help, too. Folder on Schiffer (“Schiffer,” c.
9-f. 9), too.
compactum: Grice: “One should distinguish between Grice’s
compact and the compact.” G. R. Grice, the Welsh philosopher, speaks of a
contract as a compact. Grice on the compactness theorem, a theorem for
first-order logic: if every finite subset of a given infinite theory T is
consistent, then the whole theory is consistent. The result is an immediate
consequence of the completeness theorem, for if the theory were not consistent,
a contradiction, say ‘P and not-P’, would be provable from it. But the proof,
being a finitary object, would use only finitely many axioms from T, so this
finite subset of T would be inconsistent. This proof of the compactness theorem
is very general, showing that any language that has a sound and complete system
of inference, where each rule allows only finitely many premises, satisfies the
theorem. This is important because the theorem immediately implies that many
familiar mathematical notions are not expressible in the language in question,
notions like those of a finite set or a well-ordering relation. The compactness
theorem is important for other reasons as well. It is the most frequently
applied result in the study of first-order model theory and has inspired
interesting developments within set theory and its foundations by generating a
search for infinitary languages that obey some analog of the theorem.
completum: incompletum: Grice on completeness, a property that
something typically, a set of axioms, a
logic, a theory, a set of well-formed formulas, a language, or a set of
connectives has when it is strong enough
in some desirable respect. 1 A set of axioms is complete for the logic L if
every theorem of L is provable using those axioms. 2 A logic L has weak
semantical completeness if every valid sentence of the language of L is a
theorem of L. L has strong semantical completeness or is deductively complete
if for every set G of sentences, every logical consequence of G is deducible
from G using L. A propositional logic L is Halldén-complete if whenever A 7 B
is a theorem of L, where A and B share no variables, either A or B is a theorem
of L. And L is Post-complete if L is consistent but no stronger logic for the
same language is consistent. Reference to the “completeness” of a logic,
without further qualification, is almost invariably to either weak or strong
semantical completeness. One curious exception: second-order logic is often
said to be “incomplete,” where what is meant is that it is not axiomatizable. 3
A theory T is negation-complete often simply complete if for every sentence A
of the lancommon notions completeness 162
162 guage of T, either A or its negation is provable in T. And T is
omega-complete if whenever it is provable in T that a property f / holds of
each natural number 0, 1, . . . , it is also provable that every number has f.
Generalizing on this, any set G of well-formed formulas might be called omega
complete if vA[v] is deducible from G whenever A[t] is deducible from G for all
terms t, where A[t] is the result of replacing all free occurrences of v in
A[v] by t. 4 A language L is expressively complete if each of a given class of
items is expressible in L. Usually, the class in question is the class of
twovalued truth-functions. The propositional language whose sole connectives
areand 7 is thus said to be expressively or functionally complete, while that
built up using 7 alone is not, since classical negation is not expressible
therein. Here one might also say that the set {-,7} is expressively or
functionally complete, while {7} is not.
completum“The idea of the
completum is transformational; i. e. that there are components in a meaningful
stringThe unstructured utterance is completeTo speak of an incomplete segment
is quite a step in compositionality.” Grice: “All Roman words starting with
con- are a trick, since they mean togetherness. In this case, plere is to
fill. plĕo ,
ēre, v. n., I.to fill, to fulfil, the root of plenus,
q. v., compleo, expleo, suppleo: “plentur antiqui etiam sine praepositionibus dicebant,” Fest. p. 230 Müll. And then there’s completion. Grice
speaks of ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete. Consider “Fido is shaggy.” That’s
complete. “Fido” is incompletelike pig. “is shaggy” is incomplete. This is
Grice’s Platonism, hardly the nominalism that Bennett abuses Grice with! For
the rational pirot (not the parrot) has access to a theory of complete --. When
lecturing on Peirce, Grice referred to Russell’s excellent idea of improving on
Peirce. “Don’t ask for the meaning of ‘red,’ ask for the meaning of ‘x is red.”
Cf. Plato, “Don’t try to see horseness, try to see ‘x is a horse. Don’t be
stupid.” Now “x is red” is a bit incomplete. Surely it can be rendered by the
complete, “Something, je-ne-sais-quoi, to use Hume’s vulgarism, is red.” So, to
have an act of referring without an act of predicating is incomplete. But still
useful for philosophical analysis.
complexum: Grive: “All Roman words starting with con- are a
trick, since they mean an agreement, in this case, the plexum. -- versus the
‘simplex.’ Grice starts with the simplex. All he needs is a handwave to ascribe
‘the emissor communicates that he knows the route.’ The proposition which is
being transmitted HAS to be complex: Subject, “The emissor”, copula, “is,”
‘predicate: “a knower of the route.”Grice allows for the syntactically
unstructured handwave to be ‘ambiguous’ so that the intention on the emissor’s
part involves his belief that the emissee will take this rather than that
proposition as being transmitted: Second complex: “Subject: Emissor, copula:
is, predicate: about to leave the emissee.”Vide the altogether nice girl, and
the one-at-a-time sailor. The topic is essential in seeing Grice within the
British empiricist tradition. Empiricists always loved a simplex, like ‘red.’
In his notes on ‘Meaning’ and “Peirce,’ Grice notes that for a ‘simplex’ like
“red,” the best way to deal with it is via a Russellian function, ‘x is red.’
The opposite of ‘simplex’ is of course a ‘complexum.’ hile Grice does have an
essay on the ‘complexum,’ he is mostly being jocular. His dissection of the
proposition proceds by considering ‘the a,’ and its denotatum, or reference,
and ‘is the b,’ which involves then the predication. This is Grice’s shaggy-dog
story. Once we have ‘the dog is shaggy,’ we have a ‘complexum,’ and we can say
that the utterer means, by uttering ‘Fido is shaggy,’ that the dog is
hairy-coated. Simple, right? It’s the jocular in Grice. He is joking on
philosophers who look at those representative of the linguistic turn, and ask,
“So what do you have to say about reference and predication,’ and Grice comes
up with an extra-ordinary analysis of what is to believe that the dog is
hairy-coat, and communicating it. In fact, the ‘communicating’ is secondary.
Once Grice has gone to metabolitical extension of ‘mean’ to apply to the
expression, communication becomes secondary in that it has to be understood in
what Grice calls the ‘atenuated’ usage involving this or that ‘readiness’ to
have this or that procedure, basic or resultant, in one’s repertoire! Bealer is
one of Grices most brilliant tutees in the New World. The Grice collection
contains a full f. of correspondence with Bealer. Bealer refers to Grice
in his influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is concerned with how
pragmatic inference may intrude in the ascription of a psychological, or souly,
state, attitude, or stance. Bealer loves to quote from Grice on definite descriptions
in Russell and in the vernacular, the implicaturum being that Russell is
impenetrable! Bealers mentor is Grices close collaborator Myro, so he knows
what he is talking about. Grice explored the matter of subperception at Oxford
only with G. J. Warnock.
conceptus: Grice: “The etymology of ‘conceptus’ is a fascinating one.
For one, all Roman words staring with ‘cum-‘ mean a sort of agreementIn this
case it’s cum- plus capio, as in captus,
capture. Grice obviously uses Frege’s notion of a ‘concept.’ One of Grice’s
metaphysical routines is meant to produce a logical construction of a concept
or generate a new concept. Aware of the act/product distinction, Grice
distinguishes between the conceptum, or concept, and the conception, or
conceptio. Grice allows that ‘not’ may be a ‘concept,’ so he is not tied to the
‘equine’ idea by Frege of the ‘horse.’ Since an agent can fail to conceive that
his neighbour’s three-year old is an adult, Grice accepts that ‘conceives’ may
take a ‘that’-clause. In ‘ordinary’ language, one does not seem to refer, say,
to the concept that e = mc2, but that may be a failure or ‘ordinary’ language.
In the canonical cat-on-the-mat, we have Grice conceiving that the cat is on
the mat, and also having at least four concepts: the concept of ‘cat,’ the
concept of ‘mat,’ the concept of ‘being on,’ and the concept of the cat being
on the mat. Griceian
Meinongianism -- conceivability, capability of being conceived or imagined.
Thus, golden mountains are conceivable; round squares, inconceivable. As
Descartes pointed out, the sort of imaginability required is not the ability to
form mental images. Chiliagons, Cartesian minds, and God are all conceivable,
though none of these can be pictured “in the mind’s eye.” Historical references
include Anselm’s definition of God as “a being than which none greater can be
conceived” and Descartes’s argument for dualism from the conceivability of
disembodied existence. Several of Hume’s arguments rest upon the maxim that
whatever is conceivable is possible. He argued, e.g., that an event can occur
without a cause, since this is conceivable, and his critique of induction
relies on the inference from the conceivability of a change in the course of
nature to its possibility. In response, Reid maintained that to conceive is
merely to understand the meaning of a proposition. Reid argued that
impossibilities are conceivable, since we must be able to understand
falsehoods. Many simply equate conceivability with possibility, so that to say
something is conceivable or inconceivable just is to say that it is possible or
impossible. Such usage is controversial, since conceivability is broadly an
epistemological notion concerning what can be thought, whereas possibility is a
metaphysical notion concerning how things can be. The same controversy can
arise regarding the compossible, or co-possible, where two states of affairs
are compossible provided it is possible that they both obtain, and two propositions
are compossible provided their conjunction is possible. Alternatively, two
things are compossible if and only if there is a possible world containing
both. Leibniz held that two things are compossible provided they can be
ascribed to the same possible world without contradiction. “There are many
possible universes, each collection of compossibles making one of them.” Others
have argued that non-contradiction is sufficient for neither possibility nor
compossibility. The claim that something is inconceivable is usually meant to
suggest more than merely an inability to conceive. It is to say that trying to
conceive results in a phenomenally distinctive mental repugnance, e.g. when one
attempts to conceive of an object that is red and green all over at once. On
this usage the inconceivable might be equated with what one can “just see” to
be impossible. There are two related usages of ‘conceivable’: 1 not
inconceivable in the sense just described; and 2 such that one can “just see”
that the thing in question is possible. Goldbach’s conjecture would seem a
clear example of something conceivable in the first sense, but not the second.
Grice was also interested in conceptualism as an answer to the problem of the
universale. conceptualism, the view that there are no universals and that the
supposed classificatory function of universals is actually served by particular
concepts in the mind. A universal is a property that can be instantiated by
more than one individual thing or particular at the same time; e.g., the shape
of this , if identical with the shape of the next , will be one property
instantiated by two distinct individual things at the same time. If viewed as
located where the s are, then it would be immanent. If viewed as not having
spatiotemporal location itself, but only bearing a connection, usually called
instantiation or exemplification, to things that have such location, then the
shape of this would be transcendent and
presumably would exist even if exemplified by nothing, as Plato seems to have
held. The conceptualist rejects both views by holding that universals are
merely concepts. Most generally, a concept may be understood as a principle of
classification, something that can guide us in determining whether an entity
belongs in a given class or does not. Of course, properties understood as
universals satisfy, trivially, this definition and thus may be called concepts,
as indeed they were by Frege. But the conceptualistic substantive views of
concepts are that concepts are 1 mental representations, often called ideas,
serving their classificatory function presumably by resembling the entities to
be classified; or 2 brain states that serve the same function but presumably
not by resemblance; or 3 general words adjectives, common nouns, verbs or uses
of such words, an entity’s belonging to a certain class being determined by the
applicability to the entity of the appropriate word; or 4 abilities to classify
correctly, whether or not with the aid of an item belonging under 1, 2, or 3.
The traditional conceptualist holds 1. Defenders of 3 would be more properly
called nominalists. In whichever way concepts are understood, and regardless of
whether conceptualism is true, they are obviously essential to our
understanding and knowledge of anything, even at the most basic level of
cognition, namely, recognition. The classic work on the topic is Thinking and
Experience 4 by H. H. Price, who held 4.
conditionalis: Grice: “The etymology of ‘conditionale’ is fascinating. I
wish I knew it.”It is strictly from conditio "a
making," from conditus, past
participle of condere "to put
together,” i.e. cum- plus dare. dāre (do I.obsol., found only in the
compounds, abdo, “condo,”which gives ‘conditio,” confused with ‘con-dicio,” a
putting together taken as a ‘speaking-together,” abscondo, indo, etc.), 1, v.
a. Sanscr. root dhā-, da-dhāmi, set, put, place; Gr. θε-, τίθημι; Ger. thun, thue, that; indeed cognate
with English “do,” “deed,” etc.. The root “dare” in “conditio” is distinct from
1. do, Sanscr. dā, in most of the Arian langg.; cf. Pott. Etym. Forsch. 2, 484;
Corss. Ausspr. 2, 410, “but in Italy the two *seem* to have been confoundedor lumped -- at least in compounds,” Georg Curtius Gr. Etym. p. 254 sq.; cf. Max Müller,
Science of Lang. Ser. 2220, N. Y. ed.; Fick, Vergl. Wört. p. 100. The conditional is of special interest to Grice because his
‘impilcature’ has a conditional form. In other words, ‘implicaturum’ is a
variant on ‘implication,’ and the conditionalis has been called
‘implication’‘even a material one, versus a formal one by Whitehead and
Russell. So it is of special philosophical interest. Since Grice’s overarching
interest is rationality, ‘conditionalis’ features in the passage from premise
to conclusion, deemed tautological: the ‘associated conditional” of a valid
piece of reasoning. “This is an interesting Latinism,” as Grice puts it. For
those in the know, it’s supposed to translate ‘hypothetical,’ that Grice also
uses. But literally, the transliteration of ‘hypothetica’ is ‘sub-positio,’
i.e. ‘suppositio,’ so infamous in the Dark Ages! So one has to be careful. For
some reason, Boethius disliked ‘suppositio,’ and preferred to add to the
Latinate philosophical vocabulary, with ‘conditionalis,’ the hypothetical,
versus the categoric, become the ‘conditionale.’ And the standard was not the
Diodoran, but the Philonian, also known, after Whitehead, as the ‘implicatio
materialis.’ While this sounds scholastic, it ’t. Cicero may have used
‘implicatio materialis.’ But Whitehead’s and Russell’s motivation is a
different one. They start with the ‘material’, by which they mean a proposition
WITH A TRUTH VALUE. For implication that does not have this restriction, they
introduce ‘implicatio formalis,’ or ‘formal implication.’ In their adverbial
ways, it goes p formally implies q. trictly,
propositio conditionalis: vel substitutive, versus propositio praedicativa in
Apuleius. Classical
Latin condicio was
confused in Late Latin with conditio "a making," from conditus,
past participle of condere "to put together." The sense
evolution in Latin apparently was from "stipulation" to
"situation, mode of being."
Grice lists ‘if’ as the third binary functor in his response to Strawson. The
relations between “if” and “⊃” have already, but only in part,
been discussed. 1 The sign “⊃” is called the Material Implication
sign a name I shall consider later. Its meaning is given by the rule that any
statement of the form ‘p⊃q’ is false in the case in which the first of its
constituent statements is true and the second false, and is true in every other
case considered in the system; i. e., the falsity of the first constituent
statement or the truth of the second are, equally, sufficient conditions of the
truth of a statement of material implication ; the combination of truth in the
first with falsity in the second is the single, necessary and sufficient,
condition (1 Ch. 2, S. 7) of its falsity. The standard or primary -- the
importance of this qualifying phrase can scarcely be overemphasized. There are
uses of “if … then … ” which do not
answer to the description given here,, or to any other descriptions given in
this chapter -- use of an “if … then
…” sentence, on the other hand, we saw to be in circumstances where, not
knowing whether some statement which could be made by the use of a sentence
corresponding in a certain way to the first clause of the hypothetical is true
or not, or believing it to be false, we nevertheless consider that a step in
reasoning from that statement to a statement related in a similar way to the
second clause would be a sound or reasonable step ; the second statement also
being one of whose truth we are in doubt, or which we believe to be false. Even
in such circumstances as these we may sometimes hesitate to apply the word
‘true’ to hypothetical statements (i.e., statements which could be made by the
use of “if ... then …,” in its standard significance), preferring to call them
reasonable or well-founded ; but if we apply ‘true’ to them at all, it will be
in such circumstances as these. Now one of the sufficient conditions of the
truth of a statement of material implication may very well be fulfilled without
the conditions for the truth, or reasonableness, of the corresponding
hypothetical statement being fulfilled ; i.e., a statement of the form ‘p⊃q’ does not entail the corresponding statement of the form
“if p then q.” But if we are prepared to accept the hypothetical statement, we
must in consistency be prepared to deny the conjunction of the statement
corresponding to the first clause of the sentence used to make the hypothetical
statement with the negation of the statement corresponding to its second clause
; i.e., a statement of the form “if p then q” does entail the corresponding statement
of the form ‘p⊃q.’ The force of “corresponding” needs elucidation. Consider
the three following very ordinary specimens of hypothetical sentences. If the
Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war. If Jones were
in charge, half the staff would have been dismissed. If it rains, the match
will be cancelled. The sentences which could be used to make statements
corresponding in the required sense to the subordinate clauses can be
ascertained by considering what it is that the speaker of each hypothetical
sentence must (in general) be assumed either to be in doubt about or to believe
to be not the case. Thus, for (1) to (8), the corresponding pairs of sentences
are as follows. The Germans invaded England in 1940; they won the war. Jones is
in charge; half the staff has been dismissed. It will rain; the match will be
cancelled. Sentences which could be used to make the statements of material
implication corresponding to the hypothetical statements made by these
sentences can now be framed from these pairs of sentences as follows. The Germans
invaded England in 1940 ⊃ they won the war. Jones is in charge ⊃ half the staff has been, dismissed. It will rain ⊃ the match will be cancelled. The very fact that these
verbal modifications are necessary, in order to obtain from the clauses of the
hypothetical sentence the clauses of the corresponding material implication
sentence is itself a symptom of the radical difference between hypothetical
statements and truth-functional statements. Some detailed differences are also
evident from these examples. The falsity of a statement made by the use of ‘The
Germans invaded England in 1940’ or ‘Jones is in charge’ is a sufficient
condition of the truth of the corresponding statements made by the use of (Ml)
and (M2) ; but not, of course, of the corresponding statements made by the use
of (1) and (2). Otherwise, there would normally be no point in using sentences
like (1) and (2) at all; for these sentences would normally carrybut not
necessarily: one may use the pluperfect or the imperfect subjunctive when one
is simply working out the consequences of an hypothesis which one may be
prepared eventually to accept -- in the tense or mood of the verb, an
implication of the utterer's belief in the falsity of the statements
corresponding to the clauses of the hypothetical. It is not raining is
sufficient to verify a statement made by the use of (MS), but not a
statementmade by the use of (3). Its not raining Is also sufficient to verify a
statement made by the use of “It will rain ⊃
the match will not be cancelled.” The formulae ‘p revise ⊃q’ and ‘q revise⊃
q' are consistent with one another, and the joint assertion of corresponding
statements of these forms is equivalent to the assertion of the corresponding
statement of the form * *-~p. But “If it rains, the match will be cancelled” is
inconsistent with “If it rains, the match will not be cancelled,” and their
joint assertion in the same context is self-contradictory. Suppose we call the
statement corresponding to the first clause of a sentence used to make a
hypothetical statement the antecedent of the hypothetical statement; and the
statement corresponding to the second clause, its consequent. It is sometimes
fancied that whereas the futility of identifying conditional statements with
material implications is obvious in those cases where the implication of the
falsity of the antecedent is normally carried by the mood or tense of the verb
(e.g., (I) or (2)), there is something to be said for at least a partial
identification in cases where no such implication is involved, i.e., where the
possibility of the truth of both antecedent and consequent is left open (e.g.,
(3). In cases of the first kind (‘unfulfilled’ or ‘subjunctive’ conditionals)
our attention is directed only to the last two lines of the truth-tables for *
p ⊃ q ', where the antecedent has the truth-value, falsity; and
the suggestion that ‘~p’ entails ‘if p, then q’ is felt to be obviously wrong.
But in cases of the second kind we may inspect also the first two lines, for
the possibility of the antecedent's being fulfilled is left open; and the
suggestion that ‘p . q’ entails ‘if p, then q’ is not felt to be obviously
wrong. This is an illusion, though engendered by a reality. The fulfilment of
both antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement does not show that
the man who made the hypothetical statement was right; for the consequent might
be fulfilled as a result of factors unconnected with, or in spite of, rather
than because of, the fulfilment of the antecedent. We should be prepared to say
that the man who made the hypothetical statement was right only if we were also
prepared to say that the fulfilment of the antecedent was, at least in part,
the explanation of the fulfilment of the consequent. The reality behind the
illusion is complex : en. 3 it is, partly, the fact that, in many cases, the
fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent may provide confirmation for the
view that the existence of states of affairs like those described by the
antecedent is a good reason for expecting states of affairs like those
described by the consequent ; and it is, partly, the fact that a man whosays,
for example, 4 If it rains, the match will be cancelled * makes a prediction
(viz.. that the match will be cancelled) under a proviso (viz., that it rains),
and that the cancellation of the match because of the rain therefore leads us
to say, not only that the reasonableness of the prediction was confirmed, but
also that the prediction itself was confirmed. Because a statement of the form
“p⊃q” does not entail the corresponding statement of the form '
if p, then q ' (in its standard employment), we shall expect to find, and have
found, a divergence between the rules for '⊃'
and the rules for ' if J (in its standard employment). Because ‘if p, then q’
does entail ‘p⊃q,’ we shall also expect to find some degree of parallelism
between the rules; for whatever is entailed by ‘p "3 q’ will be entailed
by ‘if p, then q,’ though not everything which entails ‘p⊃q’ will entail ‘if p, then q.’ Indeed, we find further
parallels than those which follow simply from the facts that ‘if p, then q’
entails ‘p⊃q’ and that entailment is transitive. To laws (19)-(23)
inclusive we find no parallels for ‘if.’ But for (15) (p⊃j).JJ⊃? (16) (P ⊃q).~qZ)~p (17) p'⊃q s ~q1)~p (18) (?⊃j).(?
⊃r) ⊃ (p⊃r) we find that, with certain reservations, 1 the following
parallel laws hold good : (1 The reservations are important. It is, e. g.,
often impossible to apply entailment-rule (iii) directly without obtaining
incorrect or absurd results. Some modification of the structure of the clauses
of the hypothetical is commonly necessary. But formal logic gives us no guide
as to which modifications are required. If we apply rule (iii) to our specimen
hypothetical sentences, without modifying at all the tenses or moods of the
individual clauses, we obtain expressions which are scarcely English. If we
preserve as nearly as possible the tense-mood structure, in the simplest way
consistent with grammatical requirements, we obtain the sentences : If the
Germans had not won the war, they would not have invaded England in
1940.) If half the staff had not been dismissed, Jones would not be in
charge. If the match is not cancelled, it will not rain. But these sentences,
so far from being logically equivalent to the originals, have in each case a
quite different sense. It is possible, at least in some such cases, to frame
sentences of more or less the appropriate pattern for which one can imagine a
use and which do stand in the required logical relationship to the original
sentences (e.g., ‘If it is not the case that half the staff has been dismissed,
then Jones can't be in charge;’ or ‘If the Germans did not win the war, it's
only because they did not invade England in 1940;’ or even (should historical
evidence become improbably scanty), ‘If the Germans did not win the war, it
can't be true that they invaded England in 1940’). These changes reflect
differences in the circumstances in which one might use these, as opposed to
the original, sentences. Thus the sentence beginning ‘If Jones were in charge
…’ would normally, though not necessarily, be used by a man who antecedently
knows that Jones is not in charge : the sentence beginning ‘If it's not the
case that half the staff has been dismissed …’ by a man who is working towards
the conclusion that Jones is not in charge. To say that the sentences are
nevertheless logically equivalent is to point to the fact that the grounds for
accepting either, would, in different circumstances, have been grounds for
accepting the soundness of the move from ‘Jones is in charge’ to ‘Half the
staff has been dismissed.’) (i) (if p,
then q; and p)q (ii) (if p, then qt and not-g) Dnot-j? (iii) (if p, then f) ⊃ (if not-0, then not-j?) (iv) (if p, then f ; and iff, then
r) ⊃(if j>, then r) (One must remember that calling the
formulae (i)-(iv) is the same as saying that, e.g., in the case of (iii), c if
p, then q ' entails 4 if not-g, then not-j> '.) And similarly we find that,
for some steps which would be invalid for 4 if ', there are corresponding steps
that would be invalid for “⊃,” e. g. (pq).q :. p are invalid inference-patterns,
and so are if p, then q ; and q /. p if p, then ; and not-j? /. not-f .The
formal analogy here may be described by saying that neither * p 13 q ' nor * if
j?, then q * is a simply convertible formula. We have found many laws (e.g.,
(19)-(23)) which hold for “⊃” and not for “if.” As an example of
a law which holds for “if,” but not for
“⊃,” we may give the analytic formula “ ~[(if p, then q) * (if
p, then not-g)]’. The corresponding formula 4 ~[(P 3 ?) * (j? 3 ~?}]’ is not
analytic, but (el (28)) is equivalent to the contingent formula ‘~~p.’ The
rules to the effect that formulae such as (19)-{23) are analytic are sometimes
referred to as ‘paradoxes of implication.’ This is a momer. If ‘⊃’ is taken as identical either with ‘entails’ or, more
widely, with ‘if ... then …’ in its
standard use, the rules are not paradoxical, but simply incorrect. If ‘⊃’ is given the meaning it has in the system of truth functions,
the rules are not paradoxical, but simple and platitudinous consequences of the
meaning given to the symbol. Throughout this section, I have spoken of a
‘primary or standard’ use of “if … then …,” or “if,” of which the main
characteristics were: that for each hypothetical statement made by this use of
“if,” there could be made just one statement which would be the antecedent of
the hypothetical and just one statement which would be its consequent; that the
hypothetical statement is acceptable (true, reasonable) if the antecedent
statement, if made or accepted, would, in the circumstances, be a good ground
or reason for accepting the consequent statement; and that the making of the
hypothetical statement carries the implication either of uncertainty about, or
of disbelief in, the fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent. (1 Not all
uses of * if ', however, exhibit all these characteristics. In particular,
there is a use which has an equal claim to rank as standard and which is
closely connected with the use described, but which does not exhibit the first
characteristic and for which the description of the remainder must consequently
be modified. I have in mind what are sometimes called 'variable' or 'general’
hypothetical : e.g., ‘lf ice is left in the sun, it melts,’ ‘If the side of a
triangle is produced, the exterior angle is equal to the sum of the two
interior and opposite angles ' ; ' If a child is very strictly disciplined in
the nursery, it will develop aggressive tendencies in adult life,’ and so on.
To a statement made by the use of a sentence such as these there corresponds no
single pair of statements which are, respectively, its antecedent and
consequent. On the other 1 There is much more than this to be said about this
way of using ‘if;’ in particular, about the meaning of the question whether the
antecedent would be a good ground or reason for accepting the consequent and
about the exact way in which this question is related to the question of
whether the hypothetical is true {acceptable, reasonable) or not hand, for
every such statement there is an indefinite number of non-general hypothetical
statements which might be called exemplifications, applications, of the
variable hypothetical; e.g., a statement made by the use of the sentence ‘If
this piece of ice is left in the sun, it will melt.’ To the subject of variable
hypothetical I may return later. 1 Two relatively uncommon uses of ‘if’ may be
illustrated respectively by the sentences ‘If he felt embarrassed, he showed no
signs of it’ and ‘If he has passed his exam, I’m a Dutchman (I'll eat my hat,
&c.)’ The sufficient and necessary condition of the truth of a statement
made by the first is that the man referred to showed no sign of embarrassment.
Consequently, such a statement cannot be treated either as a standard
hypothetical or as a material implication. Examples of the second kind are
sometimes erroneously treated as evidence that ‘if’ does, after all, behave
somewhat as ‘⊃’ behaves. The evidence for this is, presumably, the facts
(i) that there is no connexion between antecedent and consequent; (ii) that the
consequent is obviously not (or not to be) fulfilled ; (iii) that the intention
of the speaker is plainly to give emphatic expression to the conviction that
the antecedent is not fulfilled either ; and (iv) the fact that “(p ⊃ q) . ~q” entails “~p.” But this is a strange piece of
logic. For, on any possible interpretation, “if p then q” has, in respect of
(iv), the same logical powers as ‘p⊃q;’
and it is just these logical powers that we are jokingly (or fantastically)
exploiting. It is the absence of connexion referred to in (i) that makes it a
quirk, a verbal flourish, an odd use of ‘if.’ If hypothetical statements were
material implications, the statements would be not a quirkish oddity, but a
linguistic sobriety and a simple truth. Finally, we may note that ‘if’ can be employed not simply in making
statements, but in, e.g., making provisional announcements of intention (e.g.,
‘If it rains, I shall stay at home’) which, like unconditional announcements of
intention, we do not call true or false but describe in some other way. If the
man who utters the quoted sentence leaves home in spite of the rain, we do not
say that what he said was false, though we might say that he lied (never really
intended to stay in) ; or that he changed his mind. There are further uses of
‘if’ which I shall not discuss. 1 v. ch. 7, I. The safest way to read the
material implication sign is, perhaps, ‘not both … and not …’ The material
equivalence sign ‘≡’ has the meaning given by the
following definition : p q =df=⊃/'(p⊃ff).(sOj)'
and the phrase with which it is sometimes identified, viz., ‘if and only if,’
has the meaning given by the following definition: ‘p if and only if q’ =df ‘if
p then g, and if q then p.’ Consequently, the objections which hold against the
identification of ‘p⊃q” with ‘if p then q’ hold with double force against the
identification of “p≡q’ with ‘p if and only if q.’ ‘If’
is of particular interest to Grice. The interest in the ‘if’ is double in
Grice. In doxastic contexts, he needs it for his analysis of ‘intending’
against an ‘if’-based dispositional (i.e. subjective-conditional) analysis. He
is of course, later interested in how Strawson misinterpreted the ‘indicative’
conditional! It is later when he starts to focus on the ‘buletic’ mode marker,
that he wants to reach to Paton’s categorical (i.e. non-hypothetical)
imperative. And in so doing, he has to face the criticism of those Oxonian
philosophers who were sceptical about the very idea of a conditional buletic
(‘conditional commandwhat kind of a command is that?’. Grice would refere to
the protasis, or antecedent, as a relativiserwhere we go again to the
‘absolutum’-‘relativum’ distinction. The conditional is also paramount in
Grice’s criticism of Ryle, where the keyword would rather be ‘disposition.’
Then ther eis the conditional and disposition. Grice is a philosophical
psychologist. Does that make sense? So are Austin (Other Minds), Hampshire
(Dispositions), Pears (Problems in philosophical psychology) and Urmson
(Parentheticals). They are ALL against Ryle’s silly analysis in terms of
single-track disposition" vs. "many-track disposition," and
"semi-disposition." If I hum and walk, I can either hum or walk. But
if I heed mindfully, while an IN-direct sensing may guide me to YOUR soul, a
DIRECT sensing guides me to MY soul. When Ogden consider attacks to meaning,
theres what he calls the psychological, which he ascribes to Locke Grices
attitude towards Ryle is difficult to assess. His most favourable assessment
comes from Retrospective epilogue, but then he is referring to Ryle’s fairy
godmother. Initially, he mentions Ryle as a philosopher engaged in, and
possibly dedicated to the practice of the prevailing Oxonian methodology, i.e.
ordinary-language philosophy. Initially, then, Grice enlists Ryle in
the regiment of ordinary-language philosophers. After introducing Athenian
dialectic and Oxonian dialectic, Grice traces some parallelisms, which should
not surprise. It is tempting to suppose that Oxonian dialectic reproduces some
ideas of Athenian dialectic. It would actually be surprising if there
were no parallels. Ryle was, after all, a skilled and enthusiastic student of
Grecian philosophy. Interestingly, Grice then has Ryles fairy godmother as
proposing the idea that, far from being a basis for rejecting the
analytic-synthetic distinction, opposition that there are initially two
distinct bundles of statements, bearing the labels analytic and synthetic,
lying around in the world of thought waiting to be noticed, provides us with
the key to making the analytic-synthetic distinction acceptable. The
essay has a verificationist ring to it. Recall Ayer and the
verificationists trying to hold water with concepts like fragile and the
problem of counterfactual conditionals vis-a-vis observational and
theoretical concepts. Grices essay has two parts: one on disposition as
such, and the second, the application to a type of psychological
disposition, which would be phenomenalist in a way, or verificationist, in
that it derives from introspection of, shall we say, empirical
phenomena. Grice is going to analyse, I want a sandwich. One person
wrote in his manuscript, there is something with the way Grice goes to work.
Still. Grice says that I want a sandwich (or I will that I eat a sandwich)
is problematic, for analysis, in that it seems to refer to experience that is
essentially private and unverifiable. An analysis of intending that p in terms
of being disposed that p is satisfied solves this. Smith wants a sandwich, or
he wills that he eats a sandwich, much as Toby needs nuts, if Smith opens the
fridge and gets one. Smith is disposed to act such that p is satisfied.
This Grice opposes to the ‘special-episode’ analysis of intending that p. An
utterance like I want a sandwich iff by uttering the utterance, the utterer is
describing this or that private experience, this or that private
sensation. This or that sensation may take the form of a highly specific
souly sate, like what Grice calls a sandwich-wanting-feeling. But then, if
he is not happy with the privacy special-episode analysis, Grice is also
dismissive of Ryles behaviourism in The concept of mind, fresh from
the press, which would describe the utterance in terms purely of this or
that observable response, or behavioural output, provided this or that
sensory input. Grice became friendlier with functionalism after Lewis taught
him how. The problem or crunch is with the first person. Surely, Grice
claims, one does not need to wait to observe oneself heading for the fridge
before one is in a position to know that he is hungry. Grice poses a
problem for the protocol-reporter. You see or observe someone else, Smith, that
Smith wants a sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich. You ask for evidence.
But when it is the agent himself who wants the sandwich, or wills that he eats
a sandwich, Grice melodramatically puts it, I am not in the
audience, not even in the front row of the stalls; I am on the
stage. Genial, as you will agree. Grice then goes on to offer an
analysis of intend, his basic and target attitude, which he has just used to
analyse and rephrase Peirces mean and which does relies on this or that piece
of dispositional evidence, without divorcing itself completely from the
privileged status or access of first-person introspective knowledge. In “Uncertainty,”
Grice weakens his reductive analysis of intending that, from neo-Stoutian,
based on certainty, or assurance, to neo-Prichardian, based on predicting. All
very Oxonian: Stout was the sometime Wilde reader in mental philosophy (a post
usually held by a psychologist, rather than a philosopher ‒ Stouts favourite
philosopher is psychologist James! ‒ and Prichard was Cliftonian and the proper
White chair of moral philosophy. And while in “Uncertainty” he allows that
willing that may receive a physicalist treatment, qua state, hell later turn a
functionalist, discussed under ‘soul, below, in his “Method in
philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre” (henceforth,
“Method”), in the Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association,
repr. in “Conception.” Grice can easily relate to Hamsphires "Thought and
Action," a most influential essay in the Oxonian scene. Rather than Ryle!
And Grice actually addresses further topics on intention drawing on Hampshire,
Hart, and his joint collaboration with Pears. Refs.: The main reference is
Grice’s early essay on disposition and intention, The H. P. Grice. Refs.: The
main published source is Essay 4 in WOW, but there are essays on ‘ifs and
cans,’ so ‘if’ is a good keyword, on ‘entailment,’ and for the connection with
‘intending,’ ‘disposition and intention,’ BANC.
CVM-FIRMATUM:
Confirmatum: cf.
infirmatum, firmatum -- disconfirmatum -- confirmation, an evidential relation
between evidence and any statement especially a scientific hypothesis that this
evidence supports. It is essential to distinguish two distinct, and
fundamentally different, meanings of the term: 1 the incremental sense, in
which a piece of evidence contributes at least some degree of support to the
hypothesis in question e.g., finding a
fingerprint of the suspect at the scene of the crime lends some weight to the
hypothesis that the suspect is guilty; and 2 the absolute sense, in which a
body of evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis in question e.g., a case presented by a prosecutor making
it practically certain that the suspect is guilty. If one thinks of
confirmation in terms of probability, then evidence that increases the
probability of a hypothesis confirms it incrementally, whereas evidence that
renders a hypothesis highly probable confirms it absolutely. In each of the two
foregoing senses one can distinguish three types of confirmation: i
qualitative, ii quantitative, and iii comparative. i Both examples in the
preceding paragraph illustrate qualitative confirmation, for no numerical
values of the degree of confirmation were mentioned. ii If a gambler, upon
learning that an opponent holds a certain card, asserts that her chance of
winning has increased from 2 /3 to ¾, the claim is an instance of quantitative
incremental confirmation. If a physician states that, on the basis of an X-ray,
the probability that the patient has tuberculosis is .95, that claim
exemplifies quantitative absolute confirmation. In the incremental sense, any
case of quantitative confirmation involves a difference between two probability
values; in the absolute sense, any case of quantitative confirmation involves
only one probability value. iii Comparative confirmation in the incremental
sense would be illustrated if an investigator said that possession of the
murder weapon weighs more heavily against the suspect than does the fingerprint
found at the scene of the crime. Comparative confirmation in the absolute sense
would occur if a prosecutor claimed to have strong cases against two suspects
thought to be involved in a crime, but that the case against one is stronger
than that against the other. Even given recognition of the foregoing six
varieties of confirmation, there is still considerable controversy regarding
its analysis. Some authors claim that quantitative confirmation does not exist;
only qualitative and/or comparative confirmation are possible. Some authors
maintain that confirmation has nothing to do with probability, whereas others known as Bayesians analyze confirmation explicitly in terms of
Bayes’s theorem in the mathematical calculus of probability. Among those who
offer probabilistic analyses there are differences as to which interpretation
of probability is suitable in this context. Popper advocates a concept of
corroboration that differs fundamentally from confirmation. Many real or
apparent paradoxes of confirmation have been posed; the most famous is the
paradox of the ravens. It is plausible to suppose that ‘All ravens are black’
can be incrementally confirmed by the observation of one of its instances,
namely, a black crow. However, ‘All ravens are black’ is logically equivalent
to ‘All non-black things are non-ravens.’ By parity of reasoning, an instance
of this statement, namely, any nonblack non-raven e.g., a white shoe, should
incrementally confirm it. Moreover, the equivalence condition whatever confirms a hypothesis must equally
confirm any statement logically equivalent to it seems eminently reasonable. The result
appears to facilitate indoor ornithology, for the observation of a white shoe
would seem to confirm incrementally the hypothesis that all ravens are black.
Many attempted resolutions of this paradox can be found in the literature.
CVM-IUNCTVM: conjunctum: There is the conjunctum, Grice notes, and the disjunctum,
and the adjunctum, as Myro was (adjunct professor). One has to be careful
because the scholastic vocabulary also misleadingly has ‘copulatum’ for this.
The ‘copulatum’ should be restricted to other usages, which Grice elaborates on
‘izzing’ and hazing. traditional parlance, one ‘pars orationis.’ Aulus Gellius writes; “What the Greeks call
“sympleplegmenon” we call conjunctum or copulatum, copulative sentence. For
example. The Stoic copulative sentence — sumpleplegmenon axioma — is translated
by “conjunctum” or “copulatum,” for example: „P. Scipio, son of Paulus, was a
consul twice and was given the honour of triumph and also performed the
function of censor and was the colleague of L. Mummius during his censorship”.
Here, Aulus Gellius made a noteworthy remark, referring to the value of truth
of the composing propositions ■ (a Stoic problem). In keeping with the Stoics,
he wrote: “If one element of the copulative sentence is false, even if all the
other elements are true, the copulative sentence is false” (“in omni aiitem
conjuncto si unum est mendacium etiamsi, caetera vera sunt, totum esse
mendacium dicitur”). In the identification of ‘and’ with ‘Λ’
there is already a considerable
distortion of the facts. ‘And’ can perform many jobs which ‘Λ’ cannot perform. It can, for instance, be used to couple
nouns (“Tom and William arrived”), or adjectives (“He was hungry and thirsty”),
or adverbs (“He walked slowly and painfully”); while ' . ' can be used only to
couple expressions which could appear as separate sentences. One might be
tempted to say that sentences in which “and” coupled words or phrases, were
short for sentences in which “and” couples clauses; e.g., that “He was hungry
and thirsty” was short for “He was hungry and he was thirsty.” But this is
simply false. We do not say, of anyone who uses sentences like “Tom and William
arrived,” that he is speaking elliptically, or using abbreviations. On the
contrary, it is one of the functions of “and,” to which there is no counterpart
In the case of “.,” to form plural subjects or compound predicates. Of course
it is true of many statements of the forms “x and y” are/* or ' x is /and g \
that they are logically equivalent to corresponding statements of the"
form * x Is /and yisf'oTx is /and x is g \ But, first, this is a fact about the
use, in certain contexts, of “and,” to
which there corresponds no rule for the use of * . '. And, second, there are
countless contexts for which such an equivalence does not hold; e.g. “Tom and
Mary made friends” is not equivalent to “Tom made friends and Mary made
friends.” They mean, usually, quite different things. But notice that one could
say “Tom and Mary made friends; but not with one another.” The implication of mutuality
in the first phrase is not so strong but that it can be rejected without
self-contradiction; but it is strong enough to make the rejection a slight
shock, a literary effect. Nor does such an equivalence hold if we replace “made
friends” by “met yesterday,” “were conversing,” “got married,” or “were playing
chess.” Even “Tom and William arrived” does not mean the same as “Tom arrived
and William arrived;” for the first suggests “together” and the second an order
of arrival. It might be conceded that “and” has functions which “ .” has not
(e.g., may carry in certain contexts an implication of mutuality which ‘.’ does not), and yet claimed that the rules
which hold for “and,” where it is used to couple clauses, are the same as the
rules which hold for “.” Even this is not true. By law (11), " p , q ' is
logically equivalent to * q . p ' ; but “They got married and had a child” or
“He set to work and found a job” are by no means logically equivalent to “They
had a child and got married” or “He found a job and set to work.” One might try
to avoid these difficulties by regarding ‘.’ as having the function, not of '
and ', but of what it looks like, namely a full stop. We should then have to
desist from talking of statements of the forms ' p .q\ * p . J . r * &CM
and talk of sets-of-statements of these forms instead. But this would not
avoid all, though it would avoid some, of the difficulties. Even in a passage
of prose consisting of several indicative sentences, the order of the sentences
may be in general vital to the sense, and in particular, relevant (in a way
ruled out by law (II)) to the truth-conditions of a set-of-statements made by
such a passage. The fact is that, in general, in ordinary speech and writing,
clauses and sentences do not contribute to the truthconditions of things said
by the use of sentences and paragraphs in which they occur, in any such simple
way as that pictured by the truth-tables for the binary connectives (' D ' * .
', 4 v ', 35 ') of the system, but in far more subtle, various, and complex
ways. But it is precisely the simplicity of the way in which, by the definition
of a truth-function, clauses joined by these connectives contribute to the
truth-conditions of sentences resulting from the junctions, which makes
possible the stylized, mechanical neatness of the logical system. It will not
do to reproach the logician for his divorce from linguistic realities, any more
than it will do to reproach the abstract painter for not being a
representational artist; but one may justly reproach him if he claims to be a
representational artist. An abstract painting may be, recognizably, a painting
of something. And the identification of “.” with ‘and,’ or with a full stop, is
not a simple mistake. There is a great deal of point in comparing them. The
interpretation of, and rules for, “.”define a minimal linguistic operation,
which we might call ‘simple conjunction’ and roughly describe as the joining
together of two (or more) statements in the process of asserting them both (or
all). And this is a part of what we often do with ' and ', and with the full
stop. But we do not string together at random any assertions we consider true;
we bring them together, in spoken or written sentences or paragraphs, only when
there is some further reason for the rapprochement, e.g., when they record
successive episodes in a single narrative. And that for the sake of which we
conjoin may confer upon the sentences embodying the conjunction logical
features at variance with the rules for “.” Thus we have seen that a statement
of the form “p and q” may carry an implication of temporal order incompatible
with that carried by the corresponding statement of the form “q and p.” This is
not to deny that statements corresponding to these, but of the forms ‘pΛq’ and ‘qΛp’would
be, if made, logically equivalent; for such statements would carry no
implications, and therefore no incompatible implications, of temporal order.
Nor is it to deny the point, and merit, of the comparison; the statement of the
form ‘pΛq’ means at least a part of what is
meant by the corresponding statement of the form ‘p and q.’ We might say: the form ‘p q’ is an abstraction from the
different uses of the form ‘p and q.’ Simple conjunction is a minimal element in
colloquial conjunction. We may speak of ‘. ‘ as the conjunctive sign; and read
it, for simplicity's sake, as “and” or “both … and … “I have already remarked
that the divergence between the meanings given to the truth-functional
constants and the meanings of the ordinary conjunctions with which they are
commonly identified is at a minimum in the cases of ' ~ ' and ‘.’ We have seen,
as well, that the remaining constants of the system can be defined in terms of
these two. Other interdefinitions are equally possible. But since ’ and ‘.’ are more nearly identifiable with ‘not’ and
‘and’ than any other constant with any other English word, I prefer to
emphasize the definability of the remaining constants in terms of ‘ .’ and ‘~.’
It is useful to remember that every rule or law of the system can be expressed
in terms of negation and simple conjunction. The system might, indeed, be
called the System of Negation and Conjunction. Grice lists ‘and’ as the first
binary functor in his response to Strawson. Grice’s conversationalist
hypothesis applies to this central ‘connective.’ Interestingly, in his essay on
Aristotle, and discussing, “French poet,” Grice distinguishes between
conjunction and adjunction. “French” is adjuncted to ‘poet,’ unlike ‘fat’ in
‘fat philosopher.’ And
Grice:substructural logics, metainference, implicaturum. Grice explores some of
the issues regarding pragmatic enrichment and substructural logics with a
special focus on the first dyadic truth-functor, ‘and.’ In particular,
attention is given to a sub-structural “rule” pertaining to the commutativeness
of conjunction, applying a framework that sees Grice as clarifying the extra
material that must be taken into account, and which will referred to as the ‘implicaturum.’
Grice is thus presented as defending a “classical-logical” rule that assigns
commutativeness to conjunction while accounting for Strawson-type alleged
counterexamples to the effect that some utterances of the schema “p and q”
hardly allow for a ‘commutative’ “inference” (“Therefore, q and p”). How to
proceed conservatively while allowing room for pluralism? Embracing the
“classical-logical” syntactic introduction-cum-elimination and semantic
interpretation of “and,” the approach by Cook Wilson in “Statement and
inference” to the inferential métier of “and” is assessed. If Grice grants that
there is some degree of artificiality in speaking of the meaning or sense of
“and,” the polemic brings us to the realm of ‘pragmatic inference,’ now
contrasted to a ‘logical inference.’ The endorsement by Grice of an
‘impoverished’ reading of conjunction appears conservative vis-à-vis not just
Strawson’s ‘informalist’ picture but indeed the formalist frameworks of
relevant, linear, and ordered logic. An external practical decision à la Carnap
is in order, that allows for an enriched, stronger, reading, if not in terms of
a conventional implicaturum, as Strawson suggests. A ‘classical-logic’ reading
in terms of a conversational implicaturum agrees with Grice’s ‘Bootstrap,’ a
methodological principle constraining the meta-language/object-language divide.
Keywords: conjunction, pragmatic
enrichment, H. Paul Grice, Bootstrap. “[I]n recent years, my disposition to
resort to formalism has markedly diminished. This retreat may well have been
accelerated when, of all people, Hilary Putnam remarked to me that I was too
formal!”H.P. Grice, ‘Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and
opinions of Paul Grice,’ in Grandy & Warner, 1986:61 Keywords:
metainference, substructural logics, classical logic, conjunction, H. Paul
Grice, pragmatic inference; Rudolf Carnap, bootstrap, modernism, formalism,
neotraditionalism, informalism, pragmatics, inference, implicaturum,
extensional conjunction, intensional conjunction, multiplicative conjunction,
additive conjunction. Grice’s approach consistent with Rudolf Carnap’s logical
pluralism that allows room for the account put forward by H. Paul Grice in
connection with a specific meta-inference (or second-order “… yields …”) as it
may help us take an ‘external’ practical decision as to how to recapture a structural
‘rule’ of classical logic. The attempt involves a reconsideration, with a
special focus on the sub-structural classical logic rules for conjunction of
Grice’s ultimately metaphilosophical motivation in the opening paragraphs to
“Logic and Conversation.” Grice explores stick the first dyadic truth-functor Grice lists. In
fact, it’s the first alleged divergence, between “p and q” and “p. . q” that
Grice had quotes in “Prolegomena” to motivate his audience, and the example he
brings up vis-à-vis an ‘alleged’ “linguistic offence” (a paradox?) that an
utterer may incur by uttering “He got into bed and took his clothes off, but I
don’t mean to suggest he did it in that order” (Grice 1981:186). Implicatura are
cancellable. In the present scheme, which justifies substructural logics, this
amounts to any ‘intensional’ reading of a connective (e. g. ‘and’) being
susceptible of being turned or ‘trans-formed’
into
the correlative extensional one in light of the cancelling clause, which brings
new information to the addressee A. This is hardly problematic if we consider
that sub-structural logics do not aim to capture the ‘semantics’ of a
logical constant, and that the sub-structural logical ‘enrichment’ is relevant,
rather, for the constant’s ‘inferential role.’Neither is it problematic that
the fact that the ‘inferential role’ of a logical constant (such as ‘and’) may
change (allowing this ‘trans-formation’ from classical-logical extensional to
sub-structural logical intension, given new information which will be used by
the addressee A to ‘work out’ the utterer U’s meaning. The obvious, but worthemphasizing, entailment in Grice’s
assertion about the “mistake” shared by Formalism and Informalism is that
FORMALISM (as per the standard presentations of ‘classical logic’) does commit
a mistake! Re-capturing the FORMALISM of classical logic is hardly as direct in
the Griceian programme as one would assume. Grice’s ultimate meta-philosophical
motivation, though, seems to be more in agreement with FORMALISM. Formalism can
repair the mistake, Grice thinks, not by allowing a change in the assigning of
an ‘interpretation’ rule of an empoverished “and” (““p and q” is 1 iff both p
and q are 1, 0 otherwise.” (Cfr. Pap: “Obviously, I cannot prove that
“(p and q) ≡ (q and p)” is tautologous (and that
therefore “He got into bed and took off his clothes’ iff ‘he took of his
clothes and got into bed,’) unless I first
construct an adequate truth-table defining the use of “and.”
But surely one of the points of constructing such a table is to ‘reproduce’ or
capture’ the meaning of ‘and’ in a natural language! The proposal seems
circular!) and a deductive ‘syntactics’ rule,
involving the Gentzen-type elimination of ‘and’ (“ “p and q” yields “p”; and
its reciprocal, “ “p and q” yields “q”.” To avoid commiting the mistake,
formalism must recognise the conversational implicaturum ceteris paribus
derived from some constraint of rational co-operation (in particular, the
desideratum or conversational maxim, “be orderly!”) and allow for some
syntactical scope device to make the implicaturum obvious, an ‘explicatum,’
almost (without the need to reinforce “and” into “and then”). In Grice’s
examples, it may not even be a VIOLATION, but a FLOUT, of a conversational
maxim or desideratum, within the observance of an overarching co-operation
principle (A violation goes unnoticed; a flout is a rhetorical device. Cfr.
Quintilian’s observation that Homer would often use “p & q” with the implicaturum
“but not in that order” left to the bard’s audience to work out). Grice’s attempt
is to recapture “classical-logic” “and,” however pragmatically ‘enriched,’
shares some features with other sub-structural logics, since we have allowed
for a syntactical tweak of the ‘inference’ rules; which we do via the
pragmatist (rather than pragmatic) ‘implicatural’ approach to logic,
highlighting one pragmatic aspect of a logic without CUT. Grice grants that “p and q” should read “p .
q” “when [“p . q” is] interpreted in the classical two-valued way.” His wording
is thus consistent with OTHER ways (notably relevant logic, linear and ordered
logic). Grice seems to have as one of his ‘unspeakable truths’ things like “He
got into bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a man who proceeds otherwise.”
After mentioning “and” “interpreted in the classical
two-valued way,” Grice dedicates a full
paragraph to explore the classical logic’s manifesto. The idea is to
provide a SYSTEM that will give us an algorithm to decide which formulae are
theorems. The ‘logical consequence’ (or “… yields …”) relation is given a
precise definition.Grice
notes that “some logicians [whom he does not mention] may at some time have
wanted to claim that there are in fact no such divergences [between “p and q”
and “p . q”]; but such claims, if made at all, have been somewhat rashly made,
and those suspected of making them have been subjected to some pretty rough
handling.” “Those who concede that such
divergences [do] exist” are the formalists. “An outline of a not
uncharacteristic FORMALIST position may be given as follows,” Grice notes. We
proceed to number the thesis since it sheds light on what makes a
sub-structural logic sub-structural“Insofar as logicians are concerned with the
formulation of very general patterns of VALID INFERENCE (“… yields…”) the
formal device (“p . q”) possesses a decisive advantage over their natural
counterpart (“p and q.”) For it will be possible to construct in terms of the
formal device (“p . q”) a system of very general formulas, a considerable
number of which can be regarded as, or are closely related to, a pattern of
inferences the expression of which involves the device.”“Such a system may
consist of a certain set of simple formulas that MUST BE ACCEPTABLE if the
device has the MEANING (or sense) that has been ASSIGNED to it, and an
indefinite number of further formulas, many of them less obviously acceptable (“q
. p”), each of which can be shown to be acceptable if the members of the
original set are acceptable.”“We have, thus, a way of handling dubiously
acceptable patterns of inference (“q. p,” therefore, “p. q”) and if, as is
sometimes possible, we can apply A DECISION PROCEDURE, we have an even better
way.”“Furthermore, from a PHILOSOPHICAL point of view, the possession by the
natural counterpart (“p and q”) of that element in their meaning (or sense),
which they do NOT share with the corresponding formal device, is to be regarded
as an IMPERFECTION; the element in question is an undesirable excrescence. For
the presence of this element has the result that the CONCEPT within which it
appears cannot be precisely/clearly defined, and that at least SOME statements
involving it cannot, in some circumstances, be assigned a definite TRUTH VALUE;
and the indefiniteness of this concept is not only objectionable in itself but
leaves open the way to METAPHYSICS: we cannot be certain that the
natural-language expression (“p and q”) is METAPHYSICALLY ‘LOADED.’”“For these
reasons, the expression, as used in natural speech (“p and q”), CANNOT be
regarded as finally acceptable, and may tum out to be, finally, not fully
intelligible.” “The proper course is to conceive and begin to construct an
IDEAL language, incorporating the formal device (“p . q”), the sentences of
which will be clear, determinate in TRUTH-VALUE, and certifiably FREE FROM
METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS.”“The foundations of SCIENCE will now be
PHILOSOPHICALLY SECURE, since the statements of the scientist will be
EXPRESSIBLE (though not necessarily actually expressed) within this ideal
language.”What kind of enrichment are we talking
about? It may be understood as a third conjunct ptn-l & qtn
& (tn > tn-l) FIRST
CONJUNCT + SECOND CONJUNCT + “TEMPORAL SUCCESSION” p AND THEN q To
buttress the buttressing of ‘and,’ Grice uses ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ for other
operators like ‘disjunctionand his rationale for the Modified Occam’s razor
would be: “A STRONGER SENSE for a truth-functional dyadic operator SHOULD NOT
BE POSTULATED when A WEAK (or minimal) SENSE does, provided we add the
CANCELLABLE IMPLICATURUM.” Grice SIMPLIFIES semantics, but there’s no free
lunch, since he now has to explain how the IMPLICATURUM arises. Let’s revise the way “and,” the first ‘dyadic’ device in
“Logic and Conversation,” is invoked by Grice in “Prolegomena.” “He got into
bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a someone who took his clothes off and
got into bed.” Cfr. theorems ∧I
= ` ∀ φ ψ• [φ; ψ] |= φ ∧
ψ ∧E = ` ∀
φ ψ• ([φ ∧ ψ] |= φ) ∧ ([φ ∧
ψ] |= ψ)We have: He got into bed and took his clothes off (Grice, 1989:9). He took his clothes off and got into bed (Grice, 1989:9). He got into bed and took his clothes off but I don’t want to
suggest that he did those things in that order (Grice, 1981:186). He first took his clothes off and then got into bed (Grice
1989:9). In invoking Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory, is Grice being
fair? Strawson had noted, provocatively: “[The formula] “p . q’ is
logically equivalent to ‘q . p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had a
child’ or ‘He set to work and found a job’ are by no means logically equivalent
to ‘They had a child and got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’”How
easier things would have gone should Strawson have used the adjective
‘pragmatic’ that he mentions later in his treatise in connection with Grice. Strawson
is sticking with the truth-functionality and thinking of ‘equivalence’ in terms
of ‘iff’but his remark may be rephrased as involving a notion of ‘inference.’ In
terms of LOGICAL INFERENCE, the premise “He got into bed and took his clothes
off” YIELDS “He took off his clothes and got into bed,” even if that does NOT
‘yield’ in terms of ceteris paribus PRAGMATIC inference. It would have pleased Grice to read the above as: “[The formula] “p . q’ is equivalentL to ‘q .
p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had a child’ or ‘He set to work and
found a job’ are by no means equivalentP to ‘They had a child and got
married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’” By
appealing to a desideratum of rational co-operative discourse, “be orderly,”
Grice thinks he can restore “and” to its truth-functional sense, while granting
that the re-inforced “then” (or an alleged extra sense of “temporal
succession,” as he has it in “Prolegomena”) is merely and naturally (if
cancellable on occasion) conversationally implicated (even if under a
generalised way) under the assumption that the addressee A will recognise that
the utterer U is observing the desideratum, and is being orderly. But witness
variants to the cancellation (3) above. There is an indifferent, indeterminate
form: He got into bed and took off his clothes, though I don’t mean to imply
that he did that in that order.versus the less indeterminate He got into bed
and took his clothes off, but not in that order. +> i.e. in the reverse
one.Postulating a pragmatic desideratum allows Grice to keep any standard
sub-structural classical rule for “and” and “&” (as s he does when he goes
more formalist in “Vacuous Names,” his tribute to Quine).How are to interpret
the Grice/Strawson ‘rivalry’ in meta-inference? Using Frege’s assertion “⊦LK” as our operator to read “… yields…” we have:p & q ⊦LK q & p and q & p ⊦LK p & q. In
“Prolegomena,” then, Grice introduces:“B. Examples involve an area of special
interest to me [since he was appointed logic tutor at St. John’s], namely
that of expressions which are candidates for being natural analogues to logical
constants and which may, or may not, ‘diverge’ in meaning [not use] from the
related constants (considered as elements in a classical logic, standardly
interpreted). It has, for example, been suggested that because it would be
incorrect or inappropriate [or misleading, even false?] to say “He got into bed
and took off his clothes” of [someone] who first took off his clothes and then
got into bed, it is part of the meaning [or sense] or part of one meaning
[sub-sense] of “and” to convey temporal succession” (Grice 1989:8). The explanation
in terms of a reference to “be orderly” is mentioned in “Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum” (Grice 1981:186). Grice notes: “It has been suggested
by [an informalist like] Strawson, in [An] Introduction to Logical Theory [by
changing the title of Strawson’s essay, Grice seems to be implicating that
Strawson need not sound pretentious] that there is a divergence between the
ordinary use or meaning of ‘and’ and the conjunction sign [“.”] of
propositional or predicate calculus because “He took off his clothes and got
into to bed” does not seem to have the same meaning as “He got into bed and
took off his clothes.”” Grice goes on: “[Strawson’s] suggestion here is, of course, that, in order properly to represent
the ordinary use of [the word] “and,” one would
have to allow a special sense (or
sub-sense) for [the word] “and” which contained some reference to the idea that
what was mentioned before [the word]
“and” was temporally prior to what was mentioned after it, and that, on that
supposition, one could deal with this
case.”Grice goes on: “[Contra Strawson,] I want to suggest in reply that
it is not necessary [call him an Occamist,
minimalist] if one operates on some general principle [such as M. O. R., or Modified
Occam’s Razor] of keeping down, as far as
possible, the number of special sense [sic] of words that one has to
invoke, to give countenance to the alleged divergence of meaning.” The constraint is not an arbitrary assignation
of sense, but a rational one derived from the nature of conversation:“It is
just that there is a general supposition [which would be sub-sidiary to the
general maxim of Manner or ‘Modus’ (‘be perspicuous! [sic]’) that one presents
one's material in an orderly manner and, if what
one is engaged upon is a narration (if one is talking about events), then the most orderly manner for a narration
of events is an order that corresponds to
the order in which they took place.”Grice concludes: “So, the meaning of the
expression ‘He took off his clothes and he got into bed” and the corresponding expression with a [classical] logician's
constant "&" [when given a standard two-valued interpretation]
(i.e. “He took his clothes off & he got into
bed") would be exactly the same.”Grice’s
indifference with what type of formalism to adopt is obvious: “And, indeed, if
anybody actually used in ordinary speech the "&" as a piece of vocabulary instead of as a formal(ist)
device, and used it to connect together sentences of this type, they would collect just the same
[generalised conversational] implicatura as the ordinary English sentences have without any extra explanation
of the meaning of the word ‘and’.” It is
then that Grice goes on to test the ‘cancellability,’ producing the
typical Gricean idiom, above:He took his
clothes off and got into bed but I don't mean to suggest that he did those
things in that order. Grice goes on: “I
should say that I did suggest, in [my essay] on implicaturum, two sorts of tests by which one might hope to identify a conversational implicaturum.
[...] I did not mean to suggest that these tests were final, only that they
were useful. One test was the possibility of cancellation; that is to say,
could one without [classical] logical absurdity [when we have a standard
two-valued interpretation], attach a cancellation clause. For instance, could I
say (9)?” Grice: “If that is not a linguistic offense [and ‘false’], or does
not seem to be, then, so far as it goes, it is an indication that what one has
here is a conversational implicaturum, and that the original [alleged meaning,
sense, or] suggestion of temporal succession [is] not part of the conventional
meaning of the sentence.” Grice (1981186). Formalising the temporal succession is
never enough but it may help, and (9) becomes (10):p & q and ptn-l &
qtn where “tn-l” is a temporal index
for a time prior to “tn”. It is interesting to note that Chomsky, of all
people, in 1966, a year before Grice’s William James lectures, in Aspects of
the theory of syntax refers to “A [sic] P. Grice” as propounding that temporal
succession be considered implicaturum (Since this pre-dates the William James
lectures by a year, it was via the seminars at Oxford that reached Chomsky at
MIT via some of Grice’s tutees).Let us revise Urmson’s wording in his treatment
of the ‘clothes’ example, to check if Grice is being influenced by Urmson’s
presentation of the problem to attack Strawson. Urmson notes: “In
formal[ist] logic, the connective[…] ‘and’ [is] always given a minimum
[empoverished] meaning, as [I] have done above, such that any complex
[molecular sentence] formed by the use of [it] alone is [always] a
truth-function of its constituents.”Urmson goes on to sound almost like
Strawson, whose Introduction to Logical Theory he credits. Urmson notes: “In
ordinary discourse the connective[… ‘and]] often [has] a *richer* meaning.”Urmson
must be credited, with this use of ‘richer’ as the father of pragmatic
enRICHment!Urmson goes on: “Thus ‘He took his clothes off and got into bed’
implies temporal succession and has a different meaning from [the impoverished,
unreinforced] ‘He got into bed and took off his clothes.’” Urmson does not play
with Grice’s reinforcement: “He first got into bed and then took his clothes
off.’ Urmson goes on, however, in his concluding remark, to side with Grice
versus Strawson, as he should! Urmson notes: “[Formal(ist) l]ogicians would
justify their use of the minimum [impoverished, unreinforced, weak] meaning by
pointing out that it is the common element in all our uses [or every use] of
‘and.’” (Urmson, 1956:9-10). The
commutativeness of ‘and’ in the examples he gives is rejected by Strawson. How
does Strawson reflect this in his sub-structural rule for ‘and’?
As Humberstone puts it, “It
is possible to define a version of the calculus, which defines most of the
syntax of the logical operators by means of axioms, and which uses only one
inference rule.”Axioms: Let φ, χ and ψ stand for
well-formed formulae. The wff's themselves would not contain any Greek letters,
but only capital Roman letters, connective operators, and parentheses. The
axioms include:ANDFIRST-CONJUNCT: φ ∧ χ → φ and ANDSECOND-CONJUNCT:
φ ∧ χ → χ. Our (13) and correspond to Gentzen’s “conjunction
elimination” (or (& -), as Grice has it in “Vacuous Names.”). The relation between (13) and reflects the commutativity of the conjunction
operator. Cfr. Cohen 1971: “Another
conversational maxim of Grice's, “be
orderly”, is intended to govern such matters as the formalist can
show that it was not appropriate to postulate a special non-commutative temporal
conjunction.”“The locus classicus for complaints of this nature being Strawson (1952).”
Note that the commutative “and” is derived from Grice’s elimination of
conjunction, “p & q ⊦
p” and “p & q ⊦ q
-- as used by Grice in his system Q.Also note that the truth-evaluation would
be for Grice ‘semantic,’ rather than ‘syntactic’ as the commutative (understood
as part of elimination). Grice has it as: If phi and psi are formulae, “φ and ”
is 1 iff both φ and ψ are true, 0 otherwise. Grice grants
that however “baffling” (or misleading) would be to utter or assert (7)
if no one has doubts about the
temporal order of the reported the events, due to the expectation that the
utterer is observing the conversational maxim “be orderly” subsumed under the
conversational category of ‘Modus’ (‘be perspicuous! [sic]”cfr. his earlier
desideratum of conversational clarity). Relevant logic (which was emerging by
the time Grice was delivering his William James lectures) introduces two
different formal signs for ‘conjunction’: the truth-functional conjunction relevant
logicians call ‘extensional’ conjunction, and they represent by (13).
Non-truth-functional conjunction is represented by ‘X’ and termed fusion or
‘intensional’ conjunction:
p q versus p X q.
The truth-table for Strawson’s enriched uses of
“and” is not the standard one, since we require the additional condition that
“p predates q,” or that one conjunct predates the other. Playing with structural and substructural logical rules is
something Carnap would love perhaps more than Grice, and why not, Strawson?
They liked to play with ‘deviant’ logics. For Carnap, the choice of a logic is
a pragmatic ‘external’ decisionvide his principle of tolerance and the rather
extensive bibliography on Carnap as a logic pluralist. For Grice, classical
logic is a choice guided by his respect for ordinary language, WHILE attempting
to PROVOKE the Oxonian establishment by rallying to the defense of an
under-dogma and play the ‘skilful heretic’ (turning a heterodoxy into dogma).
Strawson is usually more difficult to classify! In his contribution to Grandy
& Warner (1986), he grants that Grice’s theory may be ‘more beautiful,’ and
more importantly, seems to suggest that his view be seen as endorsing Grice’s
account of a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum (For Strawson, ‘if’ (used for unasserted
antecedent and consequence) conventionally implicates the same inferrability
condition that ‘so’ does for asserted equivalents. The
aim is to allow for a logically pluralist thesis, almost alla Carnap about the
‘inferential role’ of a logical constant such as ‘and’, which embraces
‘classical,’ (or ‘formalist,’ or ‘modernist’), relevant, linear and ordered
logic. PLURALISM (versus MONISM) has it that, for any logical constant c (such as “and”), “c” has more
than one *correct* inferential “role.” The pluralist thesis depends on a
specific interpretation of the vocabulary of sub-structural logics. According
to this specific interpretation, a classical logic captures the literal, or
EXPLICIT, explicatum, or truth-functional or truth-conditonal meaning, or what
Grice would have as ‘dictiveness’ of a logical constant. A sub-structural logic
(relevant logic, linear and ordered logic), on the other hand, encodes a
pragmatically,” i.e. not SEMANTICALLY, “-enriched sense” of a logical constant
such as “and.” Is this against the spirit of Grice’s overall thesis as
formulated in his “M. O. R.,” Modified Occam’s Razor, “Senses [of ‘and’] are
not to be multiplied beyond necessity”? But it’s precisely Grice’s Occamism (as
Neale calls it) that is being put into question. At Oxford, at the time, EVERYBODY (except
Grice!) was an informalist. He is coming to the defense of Russell, Oxford’s
underdog! (underdogma!). Plus, it’s important to understand the INFORMALISM
that Grice is attackingOxford’s ORTHO-doxyseriously. Grice is being the
‘skilful HERETIC,’ in the words of his successor as Tutorial Fellow at Oxford,
G. P. Baker. We may proceed by four stages.
First, introduce the philosophical motivation for the pluralist thesis.
It sounds good to be a PLURALIST. Strawson was not. He was an informalist.
Grice was not, he was a post-modernist. But surely we not assuming that one
would want to eat the cake and have it! Second, introduce the calculus for the
different (or ‘deviant,’ as Haack prefers) logics endorsed in the pluralist
thesisclassical itself, relevant, linear and ordered logic. Third, shows how
the different “behaviours” of an item of logical vocabulary (such as “and”) of
each of these logics (and they all have variants for ‘conjunction.’ In the case
of ‘relevant’ logic, beyond Grice’s “&,” or classical conjunction, there is
“extensional conjunction,” FORMALISED as “p X q”, or fusion, and “INTENSIONAL
conjunction,” formalized by “p O q”. These can be, not semantically (truth-functionally,
or truth-conditional, or at the level of the EXPLICATUM), but pragmatically
interpreted (at the level of the IMPLICATURUM). Fourth, shows how the
*different* (or ‘deviant,’ or pluralist), or alternative inferential “roles”
(that justifies PLURALISM) that *two* sub-structural logics (say, Grice’s
classical “&” the Strawson’s informalist “and”) attribute to a logical
constant “c” can co-existhence pluralism. A particular version of logical
“pluralism” can be argued from the plurality of at least *two* alterative
equally legitimate formalisations of the logical vocabulary, such as the first
dyadic truth-functor, or connective, “and,” which is symbolized by Grice as
“&,” NOT formalized by Strawson (he sticks with “and”) and FORMALISED by
relevant logicians as ‘extensional’ truth-functional conjunction (fision, p X
a) and intentional non-truth-functional conjunction (p O q). In particular, it can be argued that the
apparent “rivalry” between classical logic (what Grice has as Modernism, but he
himself is a post-modernist) and relevant logic (but consider Grice on
Strawson’s “Neo-Traditionalism,” first called INFORMALISM by Grice) can be
resolved, given that both logics capture and formalise normative and legitimate
alternative senses of ‘logical consequence.’ A revision of
the second paragraph to “Logic and Conversation” should do here. We can
distinguish between two operators for “… yields …”: ├ and ├: “A1, A2, … An├MODERNISM/FORMALISM-PAUL B” and “A1, A2, … An├NEO-TRADITIONALISM/INFORMALISM-PETER
B. As Paoli has it: “[U]pholding weakening amounts to failing to
take at face value the [slightly Griceian] expression ‘assertable on the basis
of’.’”Paoli goes on:“If I am in a
position to assert [the conclusion q, “He took his clothes off and got into
bed”] on the basis of the information provided by [the premise p, “He got into
bed and took his clothes off”], I need NOT be in a position to assert the
conclusion P [“He took his clothes off and got into bed”] on the basis of both
p (“He got into bed and took off his clothes” and an extra premise Cwhere C is
just an idle assumption (“The events took place in the order reported”) ,
irrelevant to my conclusion.”Can we regard Strawson as holding that
UNFORMALISED “and” is an INTENSIONAL CONJUNCTION? Another option is to see
Strawson as holding that the UNFORMALISED “and” can be BOTH truth-functional
and NON-truth-functional (for which case, the use of a different expression,
“and THEN,” is preferred). The Gricean theory of implicaturum is capable of
explaining this mismatch (bewtween “and” and “&”).Grice argues that the
[truth-conditional, truth-functional] semantics [DICTUM or EXPLICATUM, not IMPLICATURUMcfr.
his retrospective epilogue for his view on DICTIVENESS] of “and” corresponds
[or is identical, hence the name of ‘identity’ thesis versus ‘divergence’
thesis] to the classical “∧,” & of Russell/Whitehead, and Quine,
and Suppes, and that the [truth-functional semantics of “if [p,] [q]”
corresponds to the classical p ⊃ q.” There is scope
for any theory capable of resolving or [as Grice would have it] denying the
apparent disagreement [or ‘rivalry’] among two or more logics.” What Grice does
is DENY THE APPARENT DISAGREEMENT. It’s
best to keep ‘rivalry’ for the fight of two ‘warring camps’ like FORMALISM and
INFORMALISM, and stick with ‘disagreement’ or ‘divergence’ with reference to
specific constants. For Strawson, being a thorough-bred Oxonian, who perhaps
never read the Iliad in Greekhe was Grice’s PPE studentthe RIVALRY is not
between TWO different formalisations, but between the ‘brusque’ formalisation
of the FORMALISTS (that murder his English!) and NO FORMALISATION at all. Grice
calls this ‘neo-traditionalist,’ perhaps implicating that the
‘neo-traditionalists’ WOULD accept some level of formalisation (Aristotle did!)
ONLY ONE FORMALISATION, the Modernism. INFORMALISM or Neo-Traditionalism aims
to do WITHOUT formalisation, if that means using anything, but, say, “and” and
“and then”. Talk of SENSES helps. Strawson may say that “and” has a SENSE which
differs from “&,” seeing that he would find “He drank the poison and died,
though I do not mean to imply in that order” is a CONTRADICTION. That is why
Strawson is an ‘ordinary-LANGUAGE philosopher,” and not a logician! (Or should
we say, an ‘ordinary-language logician’? His “Introduction to Logical Theory”
was the mandatory reading vademecum for GENERATIONS of Oxonians that had to
undergo a logic course to get their M. A. Lit. Hum.Then there’s what we can
call “the Gricean picture,” only it’s not too clear who painted it!We may agree
that there is an apparent “mismatch,” as opposed to a perfect “match” that
Grice would love! Grice thought with Russell that grammar is a pretty good
guide to logical form. If the utterer says “and” and NOT “and then,” there is
no need to postulate a further SENSE to ‘and.’Russell would criticize
Strawson’s attempt to reject modernist “&” as a surrogate for “and” as
Strawson’s attempt to regress to a stone-age metaphysics. Grice actually at
this point, defended Strawson: “stone-age PHYSICS!” And this relates to “…
yields…” and Frege’s assertion “/-“ as ‘Conclusion follows from Premise’ where
‘Premise yields Conclusion’ seems more natural in that we preserve the order
from premise to conclusion. We shouldn’t underestimate one crucial feature of
an implicaturum: its cancellability, on which Grice expands quite a bit in
1981: “He got into bed and took his clothes off, although I don’t intend to suggest,
in any shape or form, that he proceed to do those things in the order I’ve just
reported!”The lack of any [fixed, rigid, intolerant] structural rule implies
that AN INSTANCE I1 of the a logical constant (such as “and”) that *violate*
any of Grice’s conversational maxim (here “be orderly!”) associated with the
relevant structural rule [here we may think of ADDITION AND SIMPLIFICATION as
two axioms derived from the Gentzen-type elimination of “and”, or the
‘interpretation’ of ‘p & q’ as 1 iff both p and q are 1, but 0 otherwise]
and for which the derived conversational implicaturum is false [“He went to bed
and took his clothes off, but not in that order!”] should be distinguished from
ANY INSTANCE I2 that does NOT violate the relevant maxim (“be orderly”) and for
which the conversational IMPLICATURUM (“tn > tn-l”) is true.” We may nitpick
here.Grice would rather prefer, ‘when the IMPLICATURUM applies.” An implicaturum
is by definition cancellable (This is clear when Grice expands in the excursus
“A causal theory of perception.” “I would hardly be said to have IMPLIED that
Smith is hopeless in philosophy should I utter, “He has beautiful handwriting;
I don’t mean to imply he is hopeless in philosophy,” “even if that is precisely
what my addressee ends up thinking!”When it comes to “and,” we are on clearer
ground. The kinds of “and”-implicaturums may be captured by a distinction of
two ‘uses’ of conjunctions in a single substructural system S that does WITHOUT
a ‘structural rule’ such as exchange, contraction or both. Read, relies, very
UNLIKE Strawson, on wo FORMALISATIONS besides “and” (for surely English “and”
does have a ‘form,’ too, pace Strawson) in Relevant Logic: “p q” and “p X q.” “p q”
and “p X q” have each a different inferential role. If the reason the UTTERER
has to assert itvia the DICTUM or EXPLICATUM [we avoid ‘assert’ seeing that we
want logical constants to trade on ‘imperative contexts,’ tooGrice, “touch the
beast and it will bite you!” -- is the utterer’s belief that Smith took his
clothes AND THEN got into bed, it would be illegitimate, unwarranted, stupid,
otiose, incorrect, inappropriate, to infer that Smith did not do these two
things in that order upon discovering that he in fact DID those things in the
order reported. The very discovery that
Smith did the things in the order reported would “just spoil” or unwarrant the
derivation that would justify our use of “… yields …” (¬A ¬(A u B) A ¬B”). As Read notes, we have ADJUNCTION ‘p and q’
follows from p and qor p and q yields ‘p and q.’ And we have SIMPLIFICATION: p and q
follow from ‘p and q,’ or ‘p and q’ yields p, and ‘p and q’ yields q.” Stephen
Read: “From adjunction and simplification we can infer, by transitivity, that q
follows from p and q, and so by the Deduction Equivalence, ‘if p, q’ follows
from q.’” “However, […] this has the unacceptable consequence that ‘if’ is
truth-functional.” “How can this
consequence be avoided?” “Many options are open.” “We can reject the
transitivity of entailment, the deduction equivalence, adjunction, or
simplification. Each has been tried; and each seems contrary to intuition.” “We
are again in the paradoxical situation that each of these conceptions seems
intuitively soundly based; yet their combination appears to lead to something
unacceptable.” “Are we nonetheless forced to reject one of these plausible
principles?” “Fortunately, there is a fifth option.” Read: “There is a familiar
truth-functional conjunction, expressed by ‘p and q’, which entails each of p
and q, and so for the falsity (Grice’s 0) of which the falsity of either
conjunct suffices, and the truth of both for the truth of the whole.” “But
there is also a NON-truth-functional conjunction, a SENSE of ‘p and q’ whose
falsity supports the inference from p to ‘~q’.” “These two SENSES of
‘conjunction’ cannot be the same, for, if the ground for asserting ‘not-(p and
q)’ (e.g. “It is not the case that he got into bed and took off his clothes”)
is simply that ‘p’ is false, to learn that p is true, far from enabling one to
proceed to ‘~q’, undercuts the warrant for asserting ‘~(p & q)’ in the
first place.” “In this sense, ‘~(p & q)’ is weaker than both ‘~p’ and ‘~q’,
and does not, even with the addition of p, entail ‘~q’, even though one
possible ground for asserting ‘~(p & q))’, viz ‘~q’, clearly does.” Stephen
Read: “The intensional sense of ‘and’ is often referred to as fusion; I will
use the symbol ‘×’ for it. Others write ‘◦.’”We add some relevant observations
by a palaeo-Griceian: Ryle. Ryle often felt
himself to be an outsider. His remarks on “and” are however illuminating in the
context of our discussion of meta-inference in substructural logic.Ryle writes:
“I have spoken as if our ordinary ‘and’ […] [is] identical with the logical
constant with which the formal logician operates.”“But this is not true.”“The
logician’s ‘and’ […] [is] not our familiar civilian term[…].”“It is [a]
conscript term, in uniform and under military discipline, with memories,
indeed, of [its] previous more free and easy civilian life, though it is not
leaving that life now.”“If you hear on good authority that she took arsenic and
fell ill you will reject the rumour that she fell ill and took arsenic.”“This
familiar use of ‘and’ carries with it the temporal notion expressed by ‘and
subsequently’ and even the causal notion expressed by ‘and in
consequence.’”“The logician’s conscript ‘and’ does only its appointed dutya
duty in which ‘she took arsenic and fell ill’ is an absolute paraphrase of ‘she
fell ill and took arsenic.’ This might be call the minimal force of ‘and.’”
(Ryle,, 1954:118). When we speaks of PRAGMATIC enrichment, we obviously
don’t mean SEMANTIC enrichment. There is a distinction, obviously, between the
‘pragmatic enrichment’ dimension, as to whether the ‘enriched’ content is
IMPLICATED or, to use a neologism, ‘EX-plicated.’ Or cf. as Kent Bach would
prefer, “IMPLICITATED” (vide his “Implciture.”) Commutative
law: p & q iff q & p. “Axiom AND-1” and “Axiom AND-2” correspond
to "conjunction elimination". The relation between “AND-1” and “AND-2”
reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. A VERY IMPORTANT POINT to consider is Grice’s distinction between
‘logical inference’ and ‘pragmatic inference.’ He does so in “Retrospective
Epilogue” in 1987. “A few years after the appearance of […] Introduction to
Logical Theory, I was devoting much attention to what might be loosely called
the distinction between logical and pragmatic inferences. … represented as
being a matter not of logical but of pragmatic import.” (Grice 1987:374).Could he
be jocular? He is emphasizing the historical role of his research. He mentions
FORMALISM and INFORMALISM and notes that his own interest in maxims or
desiderata of rational discourse arose from his interest to distinguish between
matters of “logical inference” from those of “pragmatic inference.” Is Grice
multiplying ‘inference’ beyond necessity? It would seem so. So it’s best to try
to reformulate his proposal, in agreement with logical pluralism.By ‘logical
inference’ Grice must mean ‘practical/alethic satisfactoriness-based
inference,’ notably the syntactics and semantics (‘interpretative’) modules of
his own System Q. By ‘pragmatic inference’ he must mean a third module, the
pragmatic module, with his desiderata. We may say that for Grice ‘logical inference’
is deductive (and inductive), while ‘pragmatic inference’ is abductive. Let us
apply this to the ‘clothes off’ exampleThe Utterer said: “Smith got into bed
and took his clothes off, but I’m reporting the events in no particular order.”
The ‘logical inference’ allows to treat ‘and’ as “&.” The ‘pragmatic
inference’ allows the addressee to wonder what the utterer is meaning! Cf.
Terres on “⊢k” for “logical inference” and “⊢r,” “⊢l,” and “⊢o,” for pragmatic inference, and where the
subscripts “k,” “r,” “l” and “o” stand for ‘classical,’ ‘relevant,’ ‘linear’
and ‘ordered’ logic respectively, with each of the three sub-structural
notions of “follows from” or “… yields …”
require the pragmatic enrichment
of a logical constant, that ‘classical logical’ inference may retain the
‘impoverished’ version (Terres, , Inquiry13). Grice himself
mentions this normative dimension: “I would like to be able to
think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely
as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE
for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon.”Grice, 1989a, p.48]However, the
fact that we should observe the conversational maxims may not yet be a reason
for endorsing the allegedly ‘deviant’
inferential role of a logical constant in the three sub-structural logics under
examination.The legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ ‘inferential role’ of each constant
in each sub-structural logic emerges, rather from at least two sources.A first
source is a requirement for logic (or reasoning) to be normative: that its
truth-bearers [or satisfactoriness-bearers, to allow for ‘imperative’-mode
inferences) are related to what Grice calls ‘psychological attitudes’ of
‘belief’ (indicative-mode inference) and ‘desire’ (imperative-mode inference)
(Grice, 1975, cfr. Terres, Inquiry, 13). As Steinberg puts it:“Presumably, if
logic is normative for thinking or reasoning, its normative force will stem, at
least in part, from the fact that truth bearers which act as the relata of our
consequence relation and the bearers of other logical properties are identical
to (or at least are very closely related in some other way) to the objects of
thinking or reasoning: the contents of one’s mental states or acts such as the
content of one’s beliefs or inferences, for example.”[Steinberger, aand cf.
Loar’s similar approach when construing Grice’s maxims as ‘empirical
generalisations’ of ‘functional states’ for a less committed view of the
embedding of logical and pragmatic inference within the scope of psychological-attitude
ascriptions). A second source for the legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ inferential
role is the fact that the pragmatic enrichment of the logical vocabulary (both
a constant and ‘… yields …) is part, or a ‘rational-construction,’ of our
psychological representation of certain utterances involving the natural
counterparts of those constants. This may NOT involve a new sense of ‘and’ which is
with what Grice is fighting. While the relevant literature emphasizes “reasons
to assert” (vide Table on p. 9, Terres, ), it is worth pointing out that the
model should be applicable to what we might broadly construe as ‘deontic’
reasoning (e.g. Grice on “Arrest the intruder!” in Grice 1989, and more
generally his practical syllogisms in Grice 2001). We seem to associate
“assert” with ‘indicative-mode’ versions only of premise and conclusion.
“Reasons to express” or “reasons to make it explicit” may serve as a
generalization to cover both “indicative-mode” and “imperative-mode” versions
of the inferences to hand. When Grice says that, contra Strawson, he wants to
see things in terms of ‘pragmatic inference,’ not ‘logical inference,’ is he
pulling himself up by his own bootstraps? Let us clarify.When thinking of what META-language need be used to
formulate both Grice’s final account vis-à-vis Strawson’s, it is relevant to
mention that Grice once invoked what he called the “Bootstrap” principle. In
the course of considering a ‘fine distinction’ in various levels of conceptual
priority, slightly out of the blue, he addsthis is from “Prejudices and
predilections, which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice,” so expect
some informality, and willingness to amuse: “It is perhaps reasonable to regard
such fine distinctions as indispensable if we are to succeed in the business of
pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps,” Grice writes. And then trust him
to add: “In this connection, it will be relevant for me to say that I once
invented (though I did not establish its validity) a principle which I labelled
as ‘Bootstrap.’” Trust him to call with a good title. “The principle,” Grice
goes on, “laid down that, when one is introducing some primitive concept [such
as conjunction] of a theory [or calculus or system] formulated in an
object-language [G1], one has freedom to use any concept from a
battery of concepts expressible in the meta-language [System G2],
subject to the condition that a *counterpart* of such a concept [say,
‘conjunction’] is sub-sequently definable, or otherwise derivable, in the
object-language [System G1].”Grice concludes by emphasizing the
point of the manoeuvre: “So, the more
economically one introduces a primitive object-language concept, the less of a
task one leaves oneself for the morrow.” [Grice 1986]. With
uncharacteristic humbleness, Grice notes that while he was able to formulate
and label “Bootstrap,” he never cared to establish its ‘validity.’ We hope we
have! “Q. E. D.,” as they say! Cf. Terres, , Inquiry17: In conclusion, the
pragmatic interpretation of substructural logics may be a new and interesting
research field for the logical pluralist who wishes to endorse classical and/or
substructural logics, but also for the logical monist who aims to interpret
their divergence with a pluralist logician. The possibility is also open of an
interesting dialogue between philosophical logicians and philosophers of
language as they explore the pragmatic contributions of a logical constant to
the meaning of a complete utterance, given that a substructural logic encodes
what has been discussed by philosophers of language, the enriched ‘explicatum’
of the logical constant. And Grice. References: Werner
Abraham, ‘A linguistic approach to metaphor.’ in Abraham, Ut videam:
contributions to an understanding of linguistics. Jeffrey C. Beall
and Greg Restall. ‘Logical consequence,’ in Edward N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2009 edition, 2009. Rudolf Carnap, 1942. Introduction to Semantics.
L.J. Cohen, 1971. Grice on the logical particles
of natural language, in Bar-Hillel, Pragmatics of Natural language, repr. in
Cohen, Language and knowledge.L.J. Cohen, 1977. ‘Can the conversationalist
hypothesis be defended?’ Philosophical Studies, repr. in Cohen, Logic and
knowledge. Davidson, Donald and J. Hintikka (1969). Words and objections:
essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. Bart Geurts, Quantity implicaturums.Bart
Geurts and Nausicaa Pouscoulous. Embedded implicaturums?!? Semantics and
pragmatics, 2:4–1, 2009.Jean-Yves Girard. Linear logic: its syntax and
semantics. London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series, 1–42, 1995.H.P. Grice. 1967a. ‘Prolegomena,’
in Studies in the Way of Words.H.P. Grice. 1967b. Logic and conversation.
Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pages
22–40, 1989.H.P. Grice. 1967c. ‘Indicative conditionals. Studies in the Way of
Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pages 58–85, 1989.H.P. Grice. 1969. ‘Vacuous Names,’ in Words and
objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine, edited by Donald Davidson and
Jaako Hintikka, Dordrecht: Reidel. H.P. Grice, 1981. ‘Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum,’ in Paul Cole, Radical Pragmatics, New York,
Academic Press. H.P. Grice, 1986. ‘Reply to
Richards,’ in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories,
Ends, ed. by Richard Grandy and Richard Warner, Oxford: The Clarendon
Press.H.P. Grice. 2001. Aspects of reason, being the John Locke Lectures
delivered at Oxford, Oxford: Clarendon. H.P. Grice, n.d. ‘Entailment,’ The H.
P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of
California, Berkeley. Loar, B. F. Meaning and mind.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mates, Benson, Elementary Logic. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.George Myro, 1986. ‘Time and identity,’ in Richard Grandy and
Richard Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories,
Ends. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Francesco Paoli, Substructural logic. Arthur
Pap. 1949. ‘Are all necessary propositions analytic?’, repr. in The limits of
logical empiricism.Peacocke, Christopher A. B. (1976), What is a logical
constant? The Journal of Philosophy.Quine, W. V. O. 1969. ‘Reply to H. P.
Grice,’ in Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections: esssays on the work of
W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. Stephen Read, A philosophical approach to
inference. A.Rieger,
A simple theory of conditionals. Analysis, 2006.Robert
van Rooij. . ‘Conversational implicaturums,’Gilbert Ryle. 1954. ‘Formal and
Informal logic,’ in Dilemmas, The Tarner Lectures 1953. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, Chapter 8. Florian
Steinberger. The normative status of logic. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, spring edition, .P. F. Strawson (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory.
London: Methuen.P. F. Strawson (1986). ‘‘If’ and ‘⊃’’
R. Grandy and R. O. Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Intentions,
Categories, Ends, repr. in his “Entity and Identity, and Other Essays. Oxford:
Clarendon PressJ.O. Urmson. Philosophical analysis: its development between the
two world wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. R. C. S. Walker. “Conversational
implicaturum,”
in S. W. Blackburn, Meaning, reference, and necessity. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1975, 133-81A. N.
Whitehead and B. A. W. Russell, 1913. Principia Mathematica. Cambridge
University Press. Conjunctum --
conjunction, the logical operation on a pair of propositions that is typically
indicated by the coordinating conjunction ‘and’. The truth table for
conjunction is Besides ‘and’, other coordinating conjunctions, including ‘but’,
‘however’, ‘moreover’, and ‘although’, can indicate logical conjunction, as can
the semicolon ‘;’ and the comma ‘,’. conjunction
elimination. 1 The argument form ‘A and B; therefore, A or B’ and arguments of
this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer either conjunct
from a conjunction. This is also known as the rule of simplification or
8-elimination. conjunction introduction.
1 The argument form ‘A, B; therefore, A and B’ and arguments of this form. 2
The rule of inference that permits one to infer a conjunction from its two
conjuncts. This is also known as the rule of conjunction introduction, 8-introduction,
or adjunction. Conjunctum -- Why Grice used inverse V as symbol for “and”
Conjunctum -- De Morgan, A. prolific British mathematician, logician, and
philosopher of mathematics and logic. He is remembered chiefly for several
lasting contributions to logic and philosophy of logic, including discovery and
deployment of the concept of universe of discourse, the cofounding of
relational logic, adaptation of what are now known as De Morgan’s laws, and
several terminological innovations including the expression ‘mathematical
induction’. His main logical works, the monograph Formal Logic 1847 and the
series of articles “On the Syllogism” 184662, demonstrate wide historical and
philosophical learning, synoptic vision, penetrating originality, and disarming
objectivity. His relational logic treated a wide variety of inferences
involving propositions whose logical forms were significantly more complex than
those treated in the traditional framework stemming from Aristotle, e.g. ‘If
every doctor is a teacher, then every ancestor of a doctor is an ancestor of a
teacher’. De Morgan’s conception of the infinite variety of logical forms of
propositions vastly widens that of his predecessors and even that of his able
contemporaries such as Boole, Hamilton, Mill, and Whately. De Morgan did as
much as any of his contemporaries toward the creation of modern mathematical
logic. -- De Morgan’s laws, the logical
principlesA 8 B SA 7B,A 7 B SA 8B,-A 8B S A 7 B, and- A 7B S A 8 B, though the
term is occasionally used to cover only the first two. Refs.The main published source is “Studies in the Way of
Words” (henceforth, “WOW”), I (especially Essays 1 and 4), “Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum,” in P. Cole, and the two sets on ‘Logic and
conversation,’ in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
CVM-NECTUM: Connectum: from con-nexusnexus is the
keyconnectionsyntagma –syncategorematacategoremata -- connected, said of a
relation R where, for any two distinct elements x and y of the domain, either
xRy or yRx. R is said to be strongly connected if, for any two elements x and
y, either xRy or yRx, even if x and y are identical. Given the domain of positive
integers, for instance, the relation ‹ is connected, since for any two distinct
numbers a and b, either a ‹ b or b ‹ a. ‹ is not strongly connected, however,
since if a % b we do not have either a ‹ b or b ‹ a. The relation o, however,
is Confucius connected 174 174 strongly
connected, since either a o b or b o a for any two numbers, including the case
where a % b. An example of a relation that is not connected is the subset
relation 0, since it is not true that for any two sets A and B, either A 0 B or
B 0 A. connectionism, an approach to
modeling cognitive systems which utilizes networks of simple processing units
that are inspired by the basic structure of the nervous system. Other names for
this approach are neural network modeling and parallel distributed processing.
Connectionism was pioneered in the period 065 by researchers such as Frank
Rosenblatt and Oliver Selfridge. Interest in using such networks diminished
during the 0s because of limitations encountered by existing networks and the
growing attractiveness of the computer model of the mind according to which the
mind stores symbols in memory and registers and performs computations upon
them. Connectionist models enjoyed a renaissance in the 0s, partly as the
result of the discovery of means of overcoming earlier limitations e.g.,
development of the back-propagation learning algorithm by David Rumelhart,
Geoffrey Hinton, and Ronald Williams, and of the Boltzmann-machine learning
algorithm by David Ackley, Geoffrey Hinton, and Terrence Sejnowski, and partly
as limitations encountered with the computer model rekindled interest in
alternatives. Researchers employing connectionist-type nets are found in a
variety of disciplines including psychology, artificial intelligence,
neuroscience, and physics. There are often major differences in the endeavors
of these researchers: psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers are
interested in using these nets to model cognitive behavior, whereas
neuroscientists often use them to model processing in particular neural
systems. A connectionist system consists of a set of processing units that can
take on activation values. These units are connected so that particular units
can excite or inhibit others. The activation of any particular unit will be
determined by one or more of the following: inputs from outside the system, the
excitations or inhibitions supplied by other units, and the previous activation
of the unit. There are a variety of different architectures invoked in
connectionist systems. In feedforward nets units are clustered into layers and
connections pass activations in a unidirectional manner from a layer of input
units to a layer of output units, possibly passing through one or more layers
of hidden units along the way. In these systems processing requires one pass of
processing through the network. Interactive nets exhibit no directionality of
processing: a given unit may excite or inhibit another unit, and it, or another
unit influenced by it, might excite or inhibit the first unit. A number of
processing cycles will ensue after an input has been given to some or all of
the units until eventually the network settles into one state, or cycles
through a small set of such states. One of the most attractive features of
connectionist networks is their ability to learn. This is accomplished by
adjusting the weights connecting the various units of the system, thereby
altering the manner in which the network responds to inputs. To illustrate the
basic process of connectionist learning, consider a feedforward network with
just two layers of units and one layer of connections. One learning procedure
commonly referred to as the delta rule first requires the network to respond,
using current weights, to an input. The activations on the units of the second
layer are then compared to a set of target activations, and detected
differences are used to adjust the weights coming from active input units. Such
a procedure gradually reduces the difference between the actual response and
the target response. In order to construe such networks as cognitive models it
is necessary to interpret the input and output units. Localist interpretations
treat individual input and output units as representing concepts such as those
found in natural language. Distributed interpretations correlate only patterns
of activation of a number of units with ordinary language concepts. Sometimes
but not always distributed models will interpret individual units as
corresponding to microfeatures. In one interesting variation on distributed representation,
known as coarse coding, each symbol will be assigned to a different subset of
the units of the system, and the symbol will be viewed as active only if a
predefined number of the assigned units are active. A number of features of
connectionist nets make them particularly attractive for modeling cognitive
phenomena in addition to their ability to learn from experience. They are
extremely efficient at pattern-recognition tasks and often generalize very well
from training inputs to similar test inputs. They can often recover complete
patterns from partial inputs, making them good models for content-addressable
memory. Interactive networks are particularly useful in modeling cognitive
tasks in which multiple constraints must be satisfied simultaneously, or in
which the goal is to satisfy competing constraints as well as possible. In a
natural manner they can override some constraints on a problem when it is not
possible to satisfy all, thus treating the constraints as soft. While the
cognitive connectionist models are not intended to model actual neural
processing, they suggest how cognitive processes can be realized in neural
hardware. They also exhibit a feature demonstrated by the brain but difficult
to achieve in symbolic systems: their performance degrades gracefully as units
or connections are disabled or the capacity of the network is exceeded, rather
than crashing. Serious challenges have been raised to the usefulness of
connectionism as a tool for modeling cognition. Many of these challenges have
come from theorists who have focused on the complexities of language,
especially the systematicity exhibited in language. Jerry Fodor and Zenon
Pylyshyn, for example, have emphasized the manner in which the meaning of
complex sentences is built up compositionally from the meaning of components,
and argue both that compositionality applies to thought generally and that it
requires a symbolic system. Therefore, they maintain, while cognitive systems
might be implemented in connectionist nets, these nets do not characterize the
architecture of the cognitive system itself, which must have capacities for
symbol storage and manipulation. Connectionists have developed a variety of
responses to these objections, including emphasizing the importance of cognitive
functions such as pattern recognition, which have not been as successfully
modeled by symbolic systems; challenging the need for symbol processing in
accounting for linguistic behavior; and designing more complex connectionist
architectures, such as recurrent networks, capable of responding to or
producing systematic structures.
CVM-NOTATVM: connotatum –a variation on
notatum, cf. denotatum -- adnotatum,
annotate -- intension -- connotation. 1 The ideas and associations brought to
mind by an expression used in contrast with ‘denotation’ and ‘meaning’. 2 In a
technical use, the properties jointly necessary and sufficient for the correct
application of the expression in question.
SE-QUENS:
Grice: “The ‘se-‘ prefix the “Dizionario etimologico” has as ‘barbaro.’ sequentia: consequentia“In
‘consequentia,’ the ‘con’ is possibly otiose, as cons usually are.” -- consequentialism,
the doctrine that the moral rightness of an act is determined solely by the
goodness of the act’s consequences. Prominent consequentialists include J. S.
Mill, Moore, and Sidgwick. Maximizing versions of consequentialism the most common sort hold that an act is morally right if and only
if it produces the best consequences of those acts available to the agent.
Satisficing consequentialism holds that an act is morally right if and only if
it produces enough good consequences on balance. Consequentialist theories are
often contrasted with deontological ones, such as Kant’s, which hold that the
rightness of an act is determined at least in part by something other than the
goodness of the act’s consequences. A few versions of consequentialism are
agentrelative: that is, they give each agent different aims, so that different
agents’ aims may conflict. For instance, egoistic consequentialism holds that
the moral rightness of an act for an agent depends solely on the goodness of
its consequences for him or her. However, the vast majority of consequentialist
theories have been agent-neutral and consequentialism is often defined in a
more restrictive way so that agentrelative versions do not count as
consequentialist. A doctrine is agent-neutral when it gives to each agent the
same ultimate aims, so that different agents’ aims cannot conflict. For
instance, utilitarianism holds that an act is morally right if and only if it
produces more happiness for the sentient beings it affects than any other act
available to the agent. This gives each agent the same ultimate aim, and so is
agent-neutral. Consequentialist theories differ over what features of acts they
hold to determine their goodness. Utilitarian versions hold that the only
consequences of an act relevant to its goodness are its effects on the
happiness of sentient beings. But some consequentialists hold that the
promotion of other things matters too
achievement, autonomy, knowledge, or fairness, for instance. Thus
utilitarianism, as a maximizing, agent-neutral, happiness-based view is only
one of a broad range of consequentialist theories. consequentia mirabilis, the logical principle
that if a statement follows from its own negation it must be true. Strict
consequentia mirabilis is the principle that if a statement follows logically
from its own negation it is logically true. The principle is often connected
with the paradoxes of strict implication, according to which any statement
follows from a contradiction. Since the negation of a tautology is a
contradiction, every tautology follows from its own negation. However, if every
expression of the form ‘if p then q’ implies ‘not-p or q’ they need not be
equivalent, then from ‘if not-p then p’ we can derive ‘not-not-p or p’ and by
the principles of double negation and repetition derive p. Since all of these rules
are unexceptionable the principle of consequentia mirabilis is also
unexceptionable. It is, however, somewhat counterintuitive, hence the name ‘the
astonishing implication’, which goes back to its medieval discoverers or
rediscoverers.
CVM-SISTENS -- consistens: in traditional
Aristotelian logic, a semantic notion: two or more statements are called
consistent if they are simultaneously true under some interpretation cf., e.g.,
W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, 1870. In modern logic there is a
syntactic definition that also fits complex e.g., mathematical theories
developed since Frege’s Begriffsschrift 1879: a set of statements is called
consistent with respect to a certain logical calculus, if no formula ‘P &
P’ is derivable from those statements by the rules of the calculus; i.e., the
theory is free from contradictions. If these definitions are equivalent for a
logic, we have a significant fact, as the equivalence amounts to the
completeness of its system of rules. The first such completeness theorem was obtained
for sentential or propositional logic by Paul Bernays in 8 in his
Habilitationsschrift that was partially published as Axiomatische Untersuchung
des Aussagen-Kalküls der “Principia Mathematica,” 6 and, independently, by Emil
Post in Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions, 1; the
completeness of predicate logic was proved by Gödel in Die Vollständigkeit der
Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, 0. The crucial step in such proofs
shows that syntactic consistency implies semantic consistency. Cantor applied
the notion of consistency to sets. In a well-known letter to Dedekind 9 he
distinguished between an inconsistent and a consistent multiplicity; the former
is such “that the assumption that all of its elements ‘are together’ leads to a
contradiction,” whereas the elements of the latter “can be thought of without
contradiction as ‘being together.’ “ Cantor had conveyed these distinctions and
their motivation by letter to Hilbert in 7 see W. Purkert and H. J. Ilgauds,
Georg Cantor, 7. Hilbert pointed out explicitly in 4 that Cantor had not given
a rigorous criterion for distinguishing between consistent and inconsistent
multiplicities. Already in his Über den Zahlbegriff 9 Hilbert had suggested a
remedy by giving consistency proofs for suitable axiomatic systems; e.g., to
give the proof of the “existence of the totality of real numbers or in the terminology of G. Cantor the proof of the fact that the system of real
numbers is a consistent complete set” by establishing the consistency of an
axiomatic characterization of the reals
in modern terminology, of the theory of complete, ordered fields. And he
claimed, somewhat indeterminately, that this could be done “by a suitable
modification of familiar methods.” After 4, Hilbert pursued a new way of giving
consistency proofs. This novel way of proceeding, still aiming for the same
goal, was to make use of the formalization of the theory at hand. However, in
the formulation of Hilbert’s Program during the 0s the point of consistency
proofs was no longer to guarantee the existence of suitable sets, but rather to
establish the instrumental usefulness of strong mathematical theories T, like
axiomatic set theory, relative to finitist mathematics. That focus rested on
the observation that the statement formulating the syntactic consistency of T
is equivalent to the reflection principle Pra, ‘s’ P s; here Pr is the finitist
proof predicate for T, s is a finitistically meaningful statement, and ‘s’ its
translation into the language of T. If one could establish finitistically the
consistency of T, one could be sure on
finitist grounds that T is a reliable
instrument for the proof of finitist statements. There are many examples of
significant relative consistency proofs: i non-Euclidean geometry relative to
Euclidean, Euclidean geometry relative to analysis; ii set theory with the
axiom of choice relative to set theory without the axiom of choice, set theory
with the negation of the axiom of choice relative to set theory; iii classical
arithmetic relative to intuitionistic arithmetic, subsystems of classical
analysis relative to intuitionistic theories of constructive ordinals. The
mathematical significance of relative consistency proofs is often brought out
by sharpening them to establish conservative extension results; the latter may
then ensure, e.g., that the theories have the same class of provably total
functions. The initial motivation for such arguments is, however, frequently
philosophical: one wants to guarantee the coherence of the original theory on
an epistemologically distinguished basis.
CVM-STITVM
-- the english constitution: an example
Grice gives of a ‘vacuous name’ -- constitution, a relation between concrete
particulars including objects and events and their parts, according to which at
some time t, a concrete particular is said to be constituted by the sum of its
parts without necessarily being identical with that sum. For instance, at some
specific time t, Mt. Everest is constituted by the various chunks of rock and
other matter that form Everest at t, though at t Everest would still have been
Everest even if, contrary to fact, some particular rock that is part of the sum
had been absent. Hence, although Mt. Everest is not identical to the sum of its
material parts at t, it is constituted by them. The relation of constitution
figures importantly in recent attempts to articulate and defend metaphysical
physicalism naturalism. To capture the idea that all that exists is ultimately
physical, we may say that at the lowest level of reality, there are only
microphysical phenomena, governed by the laws of microphysics, and that all
other objects and events are ultimately constituted by objects and events at
the microphysical level.
CVM-TACTVM --
contactum -- syntactics: cf.
para-tactuma paratactic construction the Romans called a co-ordinatum, a
sub-ordinatum would be hypotaxis. (From syn- and tassein, from PIE, cognate
with ‘tact,’ to touch) -- Being the
gentleman he was, Grice takes a cavlier attitude to ‘syntax’ as something that
someone else must give to him, and right he is. The philosopher should concern
with more important issues. Usually Grice uses ‘unstructured’ to mean
‘syntactically unstructured,’ such as a
handwave. With a handwave, an emissor can rationally explicate and implicate.
vide compositumStrictly, compositum translates Grecian synthesis, rather than
syntaxwhich is better phrased as Latin ‘contactum. Or better combinatumsyntaxis , is, f., = σύνταξις, I.the connection of words, Prisc. 17, 1, 1. When Grice
uses ‘unsructured’ he sometimes expands this into ‘syntactically unstructured.’
Since syntax need not be linguistic, this is an interesting semiotic
perspective by Grice. He is allowing for compositionality in a semotic system
with a comibinatory other than the first, second, and third articulation. The
Latinate is ‘contactum.’ Morris thought he was being bright when he proposed
‘syntactics,’ “long for syntax,” he wrote. syntax, περὶ τῆς ς. τῶν λεγομένων, title of work by Chrysi, Stoic.2.6,
cf. Plu.2.731f (pl.);
“τὴν ς. τῶν ὀνομάτων” Gal.16.736, cf. 720; περὶ συντάξεως, title of work by A.D.; but also, compound forms, Id.Conj.214.7; ποιεῖσθαι μετά τινος τὴν ς. ib.221.19; also, rule
for combination of sounds or letters, τὸ χ (in δέγμενος）“ εἰς γ μετεβλήθη, τῆς ς. οὕτως ἀπαιτούσης” EM252.45, cf. Luc.Jud. Voc.3;
also, connected speech, ἐν τῇ ς. ἐγκλιτέον Sch.Il.16.85.Grice’s presupposition is that a
‘syntactics’ is not enough for a system to be a ‘communication-system’. Nothing
is communicated. With the syntagma, there is no communicatum. Grice loved two
devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the
assignment of common-ground status). Grice is a conservative
(dissenting rationalist) when it comes to syntax and semantics. He hardly uses
pragmatics albeit in a loose way (pragmatic import, pragmatic inference), but
was aware of Morriss triangle. Syntax is presented along the lines of
Gentzen, i.e. a system of natural deduction in terms of inference rules of
introduction and elimination for each formal device. Semantics pertains
rather to Witterss truth-values, i.e. the assignment of a satisfactory-valuation:
the true and the good. A syntactic approach to Grice’s System does not require
value-assignment. The system is constructed alla Gentzen with introduction and
elimination rules which are regarded as syntactic in nature. One can easily
check that the rules statedabove adequately characterise the meaning of
classical conjunction which is true iff both conjuncts are true. Hence the
syntactic deducibility relation coincides with the semantic relation of /=
or logical consequence (or entailment). Refs.: The most direct source is “Vacuous
names,” but the keyword ‘syntax’ is helpful. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
CVM-TEXTVS: context: ‘text’ provides a few nice RomanismsGrice: text,
pre-text, con-text, sub-text --. while Grice jocularly echoes Firth with his
‘context of utterance,’ he thought the theory of context was ‘totally lacking
in context.’ H. P. Grice, “The general theory of context,” -- contextualism,
the view that inferential justification always takes place against a background
of beliefs that are themselves in no way evidentially supported. The view has
not often been defended by name, but Dewey, Popper, Austin, and Vitters are
arguably among its notable exponents. As this list perhaps suggests,
contextualism is closely related to the “relevant alternatives” conception of
justification, according to which claims to knowledge are justified not by
ruling out any and every logically possible way in which what is asserted might
be false or inadequately grounded, but by excluding certain especially relevant
alternatives or epistemic shortcomings, these varying from one context of
inquiry to another. Formally, contextualism resembles foundationalism. But it
differs from traditional, or substantive, foundationalism in two crucial
respects. First, foundationalism insists that basic beliefs be self-justifying
or intrinsically credible. True, for contemporary foundationalists, this
intrinsic credibility need not amount to incorrigibility, as earlier theorists
tended to suppose: but some degree of intrinsic credibility is indispensable
for basic beliefs. Second, substantive foundational theories confine intrinsic
credibility, hence the status of being epistemologically basic, to beliefs of
some fairly narrowly specified kinds. By contrast, contextualists reject all
forms of the doctrine of intrinsic credibility, and in consequence place no
restrictions on the kinds of beliefs that can, in appropriate circumstances,
function as contextually basic. They regard this as a strength of their
position, since explaining and defending attributions of intrinsic credibility
has always been the foundationalist’s main problem. Contextualism is also
distinct from the coherence theory of justification, foundationalism’s
traditional rival. Coherence theorists are as suspicious as contextualists of
the foundationalist’s specified kinds of basic beliefs. But coherentists react
by proposing a radically holistic model of inferential justification, according
to which a belief becomes justified through incorporation into a suitably
coherent overall system of beliefs or “total view.” There are many well-known
problems with this approach: the criteria of coherence have never been very
clearly articulated; it is not clear what satisfying such criteria has to do
with making our beliefs likely to be true; and since it is doubtful whether
anyone has a very clear picture of his system of beliefs as a whole, to insist
that justification involves comparing the merits of competing total views seems
to subject ordinary justificatory practices to severe idealization.
Contextualism, in virtue of its formal affinity with foundationalism, claims to
avoid all such problems. Foundationalists and coherentists are apt to respond
that contextualism reaps these benefits by failing to show how genuinely
epistemic justification is possible. Contextualism, they charge, is finally
indistinguishable from the skeptical view that “justification” depends on
unwarranted assumptions. Even if, in context, these are pragmatically
acceptable, epistemically speaking they are still just assumptions. This
objection raises the question whether contextualists mean to answer the same
questions as more traditional theorists, or answer them in the same way.
Traditional theories of justification are framed so as to respond to highly
general skeptical questions e.g., are we
justified in any of our beliefs about the external world? It may be that
contextualist theories are or should be advanced, not as direct answers to
skepticism, but in conjunction with attempts to diagnose or dissolve
traditional skeptical problems. Contextualists need to show how and why
traditional demands for “global” justification misfire, if they do. If
traditional skeptical problems are taken at face value, it is doubtful whether
contextualism can answer them. Refs.: H.
P. Grice, “The general theory of context;” Speranza, “Context, pretext,
subtext, and text,” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice.
CVM-TINENS -- Continens -- temperans -- TEMPERANTIA,
CONTINENTIAINCONTINENTIA -- -- egcrateia: or temperantia. This is a universal. Strictly, it’s the
agent who has the powerOr part of his soulthe rational soul has the powerhence
Grice’s metaphor of the ‘power structure of the soul.’ Grice is interested in
the linguistic side to it. What’s the use of “Don’t p!” if ‘p’ is out of the
emissee’s rational control? Cf. Pears on egcreateia as ‘irrationality,’ if
motivated. Cfr mesotes. the geniality of
Grice was to explore theoretical akrasia. Grice’s genius shows in seeing
egcrateia and lack thereof as marks of virtue. “C hasn’t been to prison yet” He
is potentially dishonest. But you cannot be HONEST if you are NOT potentially
DISHONEST. Of course, it does not paint a good picture of the philosopher why
he should be obsessed with ‘akrasia,’ when Aristotle actually opposed the
notion to that of ‘enkrateia,’ or ‘continence.’ Surely a philosopher needs to
provide a reductive analysis of ‘continence,’ first; and the reductive analysis
of ‘incontinence’ will follow. Aristotle, as Grice well knew, is being a Platonist
here, so by ‘continence,’ he meant a power structure of the soul, with the
‘rational’ soul containing the pre-rational or non-rational soul (animal soul,
and vegetal soul). And right he was, too! So, Grice's twist is Έγκράτεια, sic in capitals! Liddell and Scott has it as
‘ἐγκράτεια’
[ρα],
which they render as “mastery over,”
as used by Plato in The Republic: “ἐ. ἑαυτοῦ,”
meaning ‘self-control’ (Pl. R.390b; ἐ. ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν control over them, ib.430e,
cf. X.Mem.2.1.1, Isoc.1.21;
“περί τι” Arist.EN1149a21,
al. Liddell and Scott go on to give a reference to Grice’s beloved “Eth. Nich.”
(1145b8) II. abs., self-control, X. Mem.1.5.1, Isoc.3.44, Arist. EN.
1145b8, al., LXX Si.18.30, Act.Ap. 24.25,
etc. Richards, an emotivist, as well as Collingwood (in “Language”) had made a
stereotype of the physicist drawing a formula on the blackboard. “Full of
emotion.” So the idea that there is an UN-emotional life is a fallacy. Emotion
pervades the rational life, as does akrasia. Grice was particularly irritated
by the fact that Davidson, who lacked a background in the humanities and the
classics, could think of akrasia as “impossible”! Grice was never too
interested in emotion (or feeling) because while we do say I feel that the cat
is hungry, we also say, Im feeling byzantine. The concept of emotion needs a
philosophical elucidation. Grice was curious about a linguistic botany for
that! Akrasia for Grice covers both buletic-boulomaic and doxastic versions.
The buletic-boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an emotion. Grice
quotes from Kennys essay on emotion. But Grice is looking for more of a
linguistic botany. As it happens, Kennys essay has Griceian implicatura. One
problem Grice finds with emotion is that feel that sometimes behaves like thinks that Another is that there is no good Grecian word
for emotio. Kenny, of St. Benets, completed his essay on emotion under
Quinton (who would occasionally give seminars with Grice), and examined by two
members of Grices Play Group: Pears and Gardiner. Kenny connects an emotion to
a feeling, which brings us to Grice on feeling boringly byzantine! Grice
proposes a derivation of akrasia in conditional steps for both
buletic-boulomaic and doxastic akrasia.
Liddell and Scott have “ἐπιθυμία,” which they render as desire,
yearning, “ἐ. ἐκτελέσαι” Hdt.1.32; ἐπιθυμίᾳ by passion, oπρονοίᾳ, generally,
appetite, αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐ. esp. sexual desire, lust, αἱ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας ἐ.;
longing after a thing, desire of or for it, ὕδατος, τοῦ πιεῖν;” “τοῦ πλέονος;”
“τῆς τιμωρίας;” “τῆς μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν πολιτείας;’ “τῆς παρθενίας;’ “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς
ἐλθεῖν;’ ἐν ἐ. “τινὸς εἶναι;’ “γεγονέναι;” “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς “ἀφικέσθαι θεάσασθαι;”
“ἐ. τινὸς ἐμβαλεῖν τινί;” “ἐ. ἐμποιεῖν ἔς τινα an inclination towards;”
=ἐπιθύμημα, object of desire, ἐπιθυμίας τυχεῖν;” “ἀνδρὸς ἐ., of woman, “πενήτων
ἐ., of sleep. There must be more to emotion, such as philia, than epithumia!
cf. Grice on Aristotle on philos. What is an emotion? Aristotle, Rhetoric
II.1; Konstan “Pathos and Passion” R. Roberts, “Emotion”; W. Fortenbaugh,
Aristotle on Emotion; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval
Philosophy. Aristotle, Rhet. II.2-12; De An., Eth.N., and Top.; Emotions in
Plato and Aristotle; Philosophy of Emotion; Aristotle and the Emotions, De An.
II.12 and III 1-3; De Mem. 1; Rhet. II.5; Scheiter, “Images, Imagination, and
Appearances, V. Caston, Why Aristotle Needs Imagination” M. Nussbaum,
“Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion, J. Cooper, “An Aristotelian
Theory of Emotion, G. Striker, Emotions in Context: Aristotles Treatment of the
Passions in the Rhetoric and his Moral Psychology." Essays on Aristotles
Rhetoric (J. Dow, Aristotles Theory of the Emotions, Moral Psychology and Human
Action in Aristotle PLATO. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.10-11; Plato Philebus 31b-50e
and Republic IV, D. Frede, Mixed feelings in Aristotles Rhetoric." Essays
on Aristotles Rhetoric, J. Moss, “Pictures and Passions in Plato”; Protagoras
352b-c, Phaedo 83b-84a, Timaeus 69c STOICS The Hellenistic philosophers; “The
Old Stoic Theory of Emotion” The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, eEmotion
and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Sorabji,
Chrysippus Posidonius Seneca: A High-Level Debate on Emotion. Nussbaum, The
Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics M. Graver, Preface
and Introduction to Cicero on Emotion: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 M. Graver,
Stoicism and emotion. Tusculan Disputations 3 Recommended: Graver, Margaret. "Philo
of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι." Phronesis.
Tusculan Disputations; "The Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul;
The Stoic life: Emotions, duties, and fate”; Emotion and decision in stoic
psychology, The stoics, individual emotions: anger, friendly feeling, and
hatred. Aristotle Rhetoric II.2-3; Nicomachean Ethics IV.5; Topics 2.7
and 4.5; Konstan, Anger, Pearson, Aristotle on Desire; Scheiter, Review of
Pearsons Aristotle on Desire; S. Leighton, Aristotles Account of Anger:
Narcissism and Illusions of Self‐Sufficiency: The Complex Evaluative World of Aristotles
Angry Man,” Valuing emotions. Aristotle Rhetoric II. 4; Konstan, “Hatred”
Konstan "Aristotle on Anger and the Emotions: the Strategies of
Status." Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, C. Rapp, The
emotional dimension of friendship: notes on Aristotles account of philia in
Rhetoric II 4” Grice endeavours to give an answer to the question whether
and to what extent philia (friendship), as it is treated by Aristotle in Rhet.
II.4, can be considered a genuine emotion as, for example, fear and anger are.
Three anomalies are identified in the definition and the account of philia (and
of the associated verb philein), which suggest a negative response to the question.
However, these anomalies are analysed and explained in terms of the specific
notes of philia in order to show that Rhetoric II4 does allow for a
consideration of friendship as a genuine emotion. Seneca, On Anger (De
Ira) Seneca, On Anger Seneca, On Anger (62-96); K. Vogt, “Anger, Present
Injustice, and Future Revenge in Senecas De Ira” FEAR Aristotle, Rhet. II.5;
Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9 Aristotles Courageous Passions, Platos Laws;
“Pleasure, Pain, and Anticipation in Platos Laws, Book I” Konstan, “Fear”
PITY Aristotle, Rhetoric II. 8-9; Poetics, chs. 6, 9-19 ; Konstan, “Pity”
E. Belfiore, Tragic pleasures: Aristotle on plot and emotion, Konstan,
Aristotle on the Tragic Emotions, The Soul of Tragedy: Essays on Athenian
Drama SHAME Aristotle, Rhet. II.6; Nicomachean Ethics IV.9 Konstan, Shame
J. Moss, Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul, B. Williams, Shame and
Necessity. Aristotle investigates two character traits, continence and
incontinence, that are not as blameworthy as the vices but not as praiseworthy
as the virtues. The Grecian expressions are’enkrateia,’ continence, literally
mastery, and krasia (“incontinence”; literally, lack of mastery. An akratic
person goes against reason as a result of some pathos (emotion, feeling”). Like
the akratic, an enkratic person experiences a feeling that is contrary to
reason; but unlike the akratic, he acts in accordance with reason. His defect
consists solely in the fact that, more than most people, he experiences
passions that conflict with his rational choice. The akratic person has not
only this defect, but has the further flaw that he gives in to feeling rather
than reason more often than the average person.
Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia: “propeteia,” or
impetuosity and “astheneia, or weakness. The person who is weak goes through a
process of deliberation and makes a choice; but rather than act in accordance
with his reasoned choice, he acts under the influence of a passion. By
contrast, the impetuous person does not go through a process of deliberation
and does not make a reasoned choice; he simply acts under the influence of a
passion. At the time of action, the impetuous person experiences no internal
conflict. But once his act has been completed, he regrets what he has done. One
could say that he deliberates, if deliberation were something that post-dated
rather than preceded action; but the thought process he goes through after he
acts comes too late to save him from error.
It is important to bear in mind that when Aristotle talks about
impetuosity and weakness, he is discussing chronic conditions. The impetuous
person is someone who acts emotionally and fails to deliberate not just once or
twice but with some frequency; he makes this error more than most people do.
Because of this pattern in his actions, we would be justified in saying of the
impetuous person that had his passions not prevented him from doing so, he
would have deliberated and chosen an action different from the one he did
perform. The two kinds of passions that
Aristotle focuses on, in his treatment of akrasia, are the appetite for
pleasure and anger. Either can lead to impetuosity and weakness. But Aristotle
gives pride of place to the appetite for pleasure as the passion that
undermines reason. He calls the kind of akrasia caused by an appetite for
pleasure (hedone) “unqualified akrasia”—or, as we might say, akrasia
simpliciter, “full stop.’ Akrasia caused by anger he considers a qualified form
of akrasia and calls it akrasia ‘with respect to anger.’ We thus have these
four forms of akrasia: impetuosity caused by pleasure, impetuosity caused by
anger, weakness caused by pleasure, weakness caused by anger. It should be
noticed that Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia is heavily influenced by Plato’s
tripartite division of the soul. Plato holds that either the spirited part
(which houses anger, as well as other emotions) or the appetitive part (which
houses the desire for physical pleasures) can disrupt the dictates of reason
and result in action contrary to reason. The same threefold division of the
soul can be seen in Aristotles approach to this topic. Although Aristotle
characterizes akrasia and enkrateia in terms of a conflict between reason and
feeling, his detailed analysis of these states of mind shows that what takes
place is best described in a more complicated way. For the feeling that
undermines reason contains some thought, which may be implicitly general. As
Aristotle says, anger “reasoning as it were that one must fight against such a
thing, is immediately provoked. And although in the next sentence he denies
that our appetite for pleasure works in this way, he earlier had said that
there can be a syllogism that favors pursuing enjoyment: “Everything sweet is
pleasant, and this is sweet” leads to the pursuit of a particular pleasure.
Perhaps what he has in mind is that pleasure can operate in either way: it can
prompt action unmediated by a general premise, or it can prompt us to act on
such a syllogism. By contrast, anger always moves us by presenting itself as a
bit of general, although hasty, reasoning.
But of course Aristotle does not mean that a conflicted person has more
than one faculty of reason. Rather his idea seems to be that in addition to our
full-fledged reasoning capacity, we also have psychological mechanisms that are
capable of a limited range of reasoning. When feeling conflicts with reason,
what occurs is better described as a fight between
feeling-allied-with-limited-reasoning and full-fledged reason. Part of
us—reason—can remove itself from the distorting influence of feeling and
consider all relevant factors, positive and negative. But another part of
us—feeling or emotion—has a more limited field of reasoning—and sometimes it
does not even make use of it. Although
“passion” is sometimes used as a translation of Aristotles word pathos (other
alternatives are emotion” and feeling), it is important to bear in mind that
his term does not necessarily designate a strong psychological force. Anger is
a pathos whether it is weak or strong; so too is the appetite for bodily
pleasures. And he clearly indicates that it is possible for an akratic person
to be defeated by a weak pathos—the kind that most people would easily be able
to control. So the general explanation for the occurrence of akrasia cannot be
that the strength of a passion overwhelms reason. Aristotle should therefore be
acquitted of an accusation made against him by Austin in a well-known footnote
to ‘A Plea For Excuses.’ Plato and Aristotle, Austin says, collapsed all
succumbing to temptation into losing control of ourselves — a mistake
illustrated by this example. I am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is
served divided into segments corresponding one to one with the persons at High
Table. I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing
to temptation and even conceivably (but why necessarily?) going against my
principles. But do I lose control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the
morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious to the consternation of my
colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and even
with finesse. With this, Aristotle can agree. The pathos for the bombe can be a
weak one, and in some people that will be enough to get them to act in a way
that is disapproved by their reason at the very time of action. What is most remarkable about Aristotle’s
discussion of akrasia is that he defends a position close to that of Socrates.
When he first introduces the topic of akrasia, and surveys some of the problems
involved in understanding this phenomenon, he says that Socrates held that
there is no akrasia, and he describes this as a thesis that clearly conflicts
with the appearances (phainomena). Since he says that his goal is to preserve
as many of the appearances as possible, it may come as a surprise that when he
analyzes the conflict between reason and feeling, he arrives at the conclusion
that in a way Socrates was right after all. For, he says, the person who acts
against reason does not have what is thought to be unqualified knowledge; in a
way he has knowledge, but in a way does not.
Aristotle explains what he has in mind by comparing akrasia to the
condition of other people who might be described as knowing in a way, but not
in an unqualified way. His examples are people who are asleep, mad, or drunk;
he also compares the akratic to a student who has just begun to learn a
Subjects, or an actor on the stage. All of these people, he says, can utter the
very words used by those who have knowledge; but their talk does not prove that
they really have knowledge, strictly speaking.
These analogies can be taken to mean that the form of akrasia that
Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity always results from some
diminution of cognitive or intellectual acuity at the moment of action. The
akratic says, at the time of action, that he ought not to indulge in this
particular pleasure at this time. But does he know or even believe that he
should refrain? Aristotle might be taken to reply: yes and no. He has some
degree of recognition that he must not do this now, but not full recognition.
His feeling, even if it is weak, has to some degree prevented him from
completely grasping or affirming the point that he should not do this. And so
in a way Socrates was right. When reason remains unimpaired and unclouded, its
dictates will carry us all the way to action, so long as we are able to
act. But Aristotles agreement with
Socrates is only partial, because he insists on the power of the emotions to
rival, weaken or bypass reason. Emotion challenges reason in all three of these
ways. In both the akratic and the enkratic, it competes with reason for control
over action; even when reason wins, it faces the difficult task of having to
struggle with an internal rival. Second, in the akratic, it temporarily robs
reason of its full acuity, thus handicapping it as a competitor. It is not
merely a rival force, in these cases; it is a force that keeps reason from
fully exercising its power. And third, passion can make someone impetuous; here
its victory over reason is so powerful that the latter does not even enter into
the arena of conscious reflection until it is too late to influence action.
That, at any rate, is one way of interpreting Aristotle’s statements. But it
must be admitted that his remarks are obscure and leave room for alternative
readings. It is possible that when he denies that the akratic has knowledge in
the strict sense, he is simply insisting on the point that no one should be
classified as having practical knowledge unless he actually acts in accordance
with it. A practical knower is not someone who merely has knowledge of general
premises; he must also have knowledge of particulars, and he must actually draw
the conclusion of the syllogism. Perhaps drawing such a conclusion consists in
nothing less than performing the action called for by the major and minor
premises. Since this is something the akratic does not do, he lacks knowledge;
his ignorance is constituted by his error in action. On this reading, there is
no basis for attributing to Aristotle the thesis that the kind of akrasia he
calls weakness is caused by a diminution of intellectual acuity. His
explanation of akrasia is simply that pathos is sometimes a stronger
motivational force than full-fledged reason.
This is a difficult reading to defend, however, for Aristotle says that
after someone experiences a bout of akrasia his ignorance is dissolved and he
becomes a knower again. In context, that appears to be a remark about the form
of akrasia Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity. If so, he is
saying that when an akratic person is Subjects to two conflicting
influences—full-fledged reason versus the minimal rationality of emotion—his
state of knowledge is somehow temporarily undone but is later restored. Here,
knowledge cannot be constituted by the performance of an act, because that is
not the sort of thing that can be restored at a later time. What can be
restored is ones full recognition or affirmation of the fact that this act has
a certain undesirable feature, or that it should not be performed. Aristotle’s
analysis seems to be that both forms of akrasia — weakness and impetuosity
—share a common structure: in each case, ones full affirmation or grasp of what
one should do comes too late. The difference is that in the case of weakness
but not impetuosity, the akratic act is preceded by a full-fledged rational
cognition of what one should do right now. That recognition is briefly and
temporarily diminished by the onset of a less than fully rational affect. There is one other way in which Aristotle’s
treatment of akrasia is close to the Socratic thesis that what people call
akrasia is really ignorance. Aristotle holds that if one is in the special
mental condition that he calls practical wisdom, then one cannot be, nor will
one ever become, an akratic person. For practical wisdom is present only in
those who also possess the ethical virtues, and these qualities require
complete emotional mastery. Anger and appetite are fully in harmony with
reason, if one is practically wise, and so this intellectual virtue is
incompatible with the sort of inner conflict experienced by the akratic person.
Furthermore, one is called practically wise not merely on the basis of what one
believes or knows, but also on the basis of what one does. Therefore, the sort
of knowledge that is lost and regained during a bout of akrasia cannot be
called practical wisdom. It is knowledge only in a loose sense. The low-level
grasp of the ordinary person of what to do is precisely the sort of thing that
can lose its acuity and motivating power, because it was never much of an
intellectual accomplishment to begin with. That is what Aristotle is getting at
when he compares it with the utterances of actors, students, sleepers, drunks,
and madmen. Grice had witnessed how Hare had suffere to try and deal with how
to combine the geniality that “The language of morals” is with his account of
akrasia. Most Oxonians were unhappy with Hares account of akrasia. Its like, in
deontic logic, you cannot actually deal with akrasia. You need buletics. You
need the desiderative, so that you can oppose what is desired with the duty,
even if both concepts are related. “Akrasia” has a nice Grecian touch about it,
and Grice and Hare, as Lit. Hum., rejoiced in being able to explore what
Aristotle had to say about it. They wouldnt go far beyond Aristotle. Plato and
Aristotle were the only Greek philosophers studied for the Lit. Hum. To venture
with the pre-socratics or the hellenistics (even if Aristotle is one) was not
classy enough! Like Pears in Motivated irrationality, Grice allows that
benevolentia may be deemed beneficentia. If Smith has the good will to give
Jones a job, he may be deemed to have given Jones the job, even if Jones never
get it. In buletic akrasia we must consider the conclusion to be desiring what
is not best for the agents own good, never mind if he refrains from doing what
is not best for his own good. Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor. We
shouldnt be saying this, but we are saying it! Grice prefers akrasia, but
he is happy to use the translation by Cicero, also negative, of this:
incontinentia, as if continentia were a virtue! For Grice, the alleged paradox
of akrasia, both alethic and practical, has to be accounted for by a theory of
rationality from the start, and not be deemed a stumbling block. Grice is
interested in both the common-or-garden buletic-boulomaic version of akrasia,
involving the volitive soul ‒ in term of desirability ‒ and doxastic
akrasia, involing the judicative soul proper ‒ in terms of
probability. Grice considers buletic akrasia and doxastic akrasia ‒ the latter
yet distinct from Moores paradox, p but I dont want to believe that p, in
symbols p and ~ψb-dp. Akarsia, see egcrateia. egcrateia: also spelled acrasia, or akrasia,
Grecian term for weakness of will. Akrasia is a character flaw, also called
incontinence, exhibited primarily in intentional behavior that conflicts with
the agent’s own values or principles. Its contrary is enkrateia strength of
will, continence, self-control. Both akrasia and enkrateia, Aristotle says,
“are concerned with what is in excess of the state characteristic of most
people; for the continent abide by their resolutions more, and the incontinent
less, than most people can” Nicomachean Ethics 1152a2527. These resolutions may
be viewed as judgments that it would be best to perform an action of a certain
sort, or better to do one thing than another. Enkrateia, on that view, is the
power kratos to act as one judges best in the face of competing motivation.
Akrasia is a want or deficiency of such power. Aristotle himself limited the
sphere of both states more strictly than is now done, regarding both as
concerned specifically with “pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions
arising through touch and taste” [1150a910]. Philosophers are generally more
interested in incontinent and continent actions than in the corresponding
states of character. Various species of incontinent or akratic behavior may be
distinguished, including incontinent reasoning and akratic belief formation.
The species of akratic behavior that has attracted most attention is
uncompelled, intentional action that conflicts with a better or best judgment
consciously held by the agent at the time of action. If, e.g., while judging it
best not to eat a second piece of pie, you intentionally eat another piece, you
act incontinently provided that your so
acting is uncompelled e.g., your desire for the pie is not irresistible.
Socrates denied that such action is possible, thereby creating one of the
Socratic paradoxes. In “unorthodox” instances of akratic action, a deed
manifests weakness of will even though it accords with the agent’s better
judgment. A boy who decides, against his better judgment, to participate in a
certain dangerous prank, might owing to
an avoidable failure of nerve fail to
execute his decision. In such a case, some would claim, his failure to act on
his decision manifests weakness of will or akrasia. If, instead, he masters his
fear, his participating in the prank might manifest strength of will, even
though his so acting conflicts with his better judgment. The occurrence of
akratic actions seems to be a fact of life. Unlike many such apparent facts,
this one has received considerable philosophical scrutiny for nearly two and a
half millennia. A major source of the interest is clear: akratic action raises
difficult questions about the connection between thought and action, a
connection of paramount importance for most philosophical theories of the
explanation of intentional behavior. Insofar as moral theory does not float
free of evidence about the etiology of human behavior, the tough questions
arise there as well. Ostensible akratic action, then, occupies a philosophical
space in the intersection of the philosophy of mind and moral theory. Refs.: The main references here are in three
folders in two different series. H. P. Grice, “Akrasia,” The H. P. Grice
Papers, S. II, c. 2-ff. 22-23 and S. V, c. 6-f. 32, BANC.
continental
breakfast:
Grice enjoyed a continental breakfast at Oxford, and an English breakfast in
RomeAs for ‘continental’ “philosophy,” Grice applied it to the gradually
changing spectrum of philosophical views that in the twentieth century
developed in Continental Europe and that are notably different from the various
forms of analytic philosophy that during the same period flourished at Oxford.
Immediately after World War II the expression “philosophie continentale” was
more or less synonymous with ‘phenomenology’. The latter term, already used earlier
in G. idealism, received a completely new meaning in the work of Husserl. Later
on “phainomenologie” was also applied, often with substantial changes in
meaning, to the thought of a great number of other Continental philosophers
such as Scheler, Alexander Pfander, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and Nicolai Hartmann.
For Husserl the aim of philosophy is to prepare humankind for a genuinely
philosophical form of life, in and through which each human being gives him- or
herself a rule through reason. Since the Renaissance, many philosophers have
tried in vain to materialize this aim. In Husserl’s view, the reason was that
philosophers failed to use the proper philosophical method. Husserl’s
phenomenology was meant to provide philosophy with the method needed. Among
those deeply influenced by Husserl’s ideas the so-called existentialists must
be mentioned first. If ‘existentialism’ is construed strictly, it refers mainly
to the philosophy of Sartre and Beauvoir. In a very broad sense
‘existentialism’ refers to the ideas of an entire group of thinkers influenced
methodologically by Husserl and in content by Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre, or
Merleau-Ponty, and one may go and include S. N. Hampshire into the bargain. In
this case one often speaks of existential phenomenology. When Heidegger’s
philosophy became better known at Oxford, ‘continental philosophy’ received
again a new meaning. From Heidegger’s first publication, Being and Time 7, it
was clear that his conception of phenomenology differs from that of Husserl in
several important respects. That is why he qualified the term and spoke of
hermeneutic phenomenology and clarified the expression by examining the
“original” meaning of the Grecian words from which the term was formed. In his
view phenomenology must try “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself
in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” Heidegger applied the
method first to the mode of being of man with the aim of approaching the
question concerning the meaning of being itself through this phenomenological
interpretation. Of those who took their point of departure from Heidegger, but
also tried to go beyond him, Gadamer and Ricoeur must be mentioned. The
structuralist movement in France added another connotation to ‘Continental
philosophy’. The term structuralism above all refers to an activity, a way of
knowing, speaking, and acting that extends over a number of distinguished
domains of human activity: linguistics, aesthetics, anthropology, psychology,
psychoanalysis, mathematics, philosophy of science, and philosophy itself.
Structuralism, which became a fashion in Paris and later in Western Europe
generally, reached its high point on the Continent between 0 and 0. It was
inspired by ideas first formulated by Russian formalism 626 and Czech
structuralism 640, but also by ideas derived from the works of Marx and Freud.
In France Foucault, Barthes, Althusser, and Derrida were the leading figures.
Structuralism is not a new philosophical movement; it must be characterized by
structuralist activity, which is meant to evoke ever new objects. This can be
done in a constructive and a reconstructive manner, but these two ways of
evoking objects can never be separated. One finds the constructive aspect
primarily in structuralist aesthetics and linguistics, whereas the
reconstructive aspect is more apparent in philosophical reflections upon the
structuralist activity. Influenced by Nietzschean ideas, structuralism later
developed in a number of directions, including poststructuralism; in this
context the works of Gilles Deleuze, Lyotard, Irigaray, and Kristeva must be
mentioned. After 0 ‘Continental philosophy’ received again a new connotation:
deconstruction. At first deconstruction presented itself as a reaction against
philosophical hermeneutics, even though both deconstruction and hermeneutics
claim their origin in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology.
The leading philosopher of the movement is Derrida, who at first tried to think
along phenomenological and structuralist lines. Derrida formulated his “final”
view in a linguistic form that is both complex and suggestive. It is not easy
in a few sentences to state what deconstruction is. Generally speaking one can
say that what is being deconstructed is texts; they are deconstructed to show
that there are conflicting conceptions of meaning and implication in every text
so that it is never possible definitively to show what a text really means.
Derrida’s own deconstructive work is concerned mainly with philosophical texts,
whereas others apply the “method” predominantly to literary texts. What
according to Derrida distinguished philosophy is its reluctance to face the
fact that it, too, is a product of linguistic and rhetorical figures.
Deconstruction is here that process of close reading that focuses on those
elements where philosophers in their work try to erase all knowledge of its own
linguistic and rhetorical dimensions. It has been said that if construction
typifies modern thinking, then deconstruction is the mode of thinking that radically
tries to overcome modernity. Yet this view is simplistic, since one also
deconstructs Plato and many other thinkers and philosophers of the premodern
age. People concerned with social and political philosophy who have sought
affiliation with Continental philosophy often appeal to the so-called critical
theory of the Frankfurt School in general, and to Habermas’s theory of
communicative action in particular. Habermas’s view, like the position of the
Frankfurt School in general, is philosophically eclectic. It tries to bring
into harmony ideas derived from Kant, G. idealism, and Marx, as well as ideas
from the sociology of knowledge and the social sciences. Habermas believes that
his theory makes it possible to develop a communication community without
alienation that is guided by reason in such a way that the community can stand
freely in regard to the objectively given reality. Critics have pointed out
that in order to make this theory work Habermas must substantiate a number of
assumptions that until now he has not been able to justify.
CVM-TINGENS
-- Grice’s contingency planning‘contingens.’ “What is actual is not also
possible” “What is necessary is not also contingent” -- contingent, neither
impossible nor necessary; i.e., both possible and non-necessary. The modal
property of being contingent is attributable to a proposition, state of affairs,
event, or more debatably an object. Muddles about the relationship
between this and other modal properties have abounded ever since Aristotle, who
initially conflated contingency with possibility but later realized that
something that is possible may also be necessary, whereas something that is
contingent cannot be necessary. Even today many philosophers are not clear
about the “opposition” between contingency and necessity, mistakenly supposing
them to be contradictory notions probably because within the domain of true
propositions the contingent and the necessary are indeed both exclusive and
exhaustive of one another. But the contradictory of ‘necessary’ is
‘non-necessary’; that of ‘contingent’ is ‘non-contingent’, as the following
extended modal square of opposition shows: These logico-syntactical
relationships are preserved through various semantical interpretations, such as
those involving: a the logical modalities proposition P is logically contingent
just when P is neither a logical truth nor a logical falsehood; b the causal or
physical modalities state of affairs or event E is physically contingent just
when E is neither physically necessary nor physically impossible; and c the
deontic modalities act A is morally indeterminate just when A is neither
morally obligatory nor morally forbidden. In none of these cases does
‘contingent’ mean ‘dependent,’ as in the phrase ‘is contingent upon’. Yet just
such a notion of contingency seems to feature prominently in certain
formulations of the cosmological argument, all created objects being said to be
contingent beings and God alone to be a necessary or non-contingent being.
Conceptual clarity is not furthered by assimilating this sense of ‘contingent’
to the others.
CONTRA-POSITVUM
-- contrapositum:
-- in Grecian, ‘antithesis’cfr. Hegel’s triad: thesis/antithesis,/synthesis. --
the immediate logical operation on any
categorical proposition that is accomplished by first forming the complements
of both the subject term and the predicate term of that proposition and then
interchanging these complemented terms. Thus, contraposition applied to the
categorical proposition ‘All cats are felines’ yields ‘All non-felines are
non-cats’, where ‘nonfeline’ and ‘non-cat’ are, respectively, the complements
or complementary terms of ‘feline’ and ‘cat’. The result of applying
contraposition to a categorical proposition is said to be the contrapositive of
that proposition. contraries, any pair
of propositions that cannot both be true but can both be false; derivatively,
any pair of properties that cannot both apply to a thing but that can both fail
to apply to a thing. Thus the propositions ‘This object is red all over’ and
‘This object is green all over’ are contraries, as are the properties of being
red all over and being green all over. Traditionally, it was considered that
the categorical A-proposition ‘All S’s are P’s’ and the categorical
E-proposition ‘No S’s are P’s’ were contraries; but according to De Morgan and
most subsequent logicians, these two propositions are both true when there are
no S’s at all, so that modern logicians do not usually regard the categorical
A- and E-propositions as being true contraries.
contravalid, designating a proposition P in a logical system such that
every proposition in the system is a consequence of P. In most of the typical
and familiar logical systems, contravalidity coincides with
self-contradictoriness.
CONTRA-RUOLO
-- CONTROLLO – Grice: “A ‘bruto francecismo, da lasciare!” – the “Dizionario
etimologico” has it!” – Grice: “The etymology is fascinating: counter-role –
cfr. Italian ruolo, rullo. voluntary and rational control: the power structure
of the soul -- Grice’s intersubjective conversational control, -- for Grice
only what is under one’s control is communicatedspots mean measles only
metaphorically, the spots don’t communicate measles. An involuntary cry does
not ‘mean.’ Only a simulated cry of pain is a vehicle by which an emissor may
mean that he is in pain. an apparently causal phenomenon closely akin to power
and important for such topics as intentional action, freedom, and moral
responsibility. Depending upon the control you had over the event, your finding
a friend’s stolen car may or may not be an intentional action, a free action,
or an action for which you deserve moral credit. Control seems to be a causal
phenomenon. Try to imagine controlling a car, say, without causing anything. If
you cause nothing, you have no effect on the car, and one does not control a
thing on which one has no effect. But control need not be causally
deterministic. Even if a genuine randomizer in your car’s steering mechanism
gives you only a 99 percent chance of making turns you try to make, you still
have considerable control in that sphere. Some philosophers claim that we have
no control over anything if causal determinism is true. That claim is false.
When you drive your car, you normally are in control of its speed and
direction, even if our world happens to be deterministic.
CONVERSAZIONE
-- conversational avowal: The
phrase is a Ryleism, but Grice liked it. Grice’s point is with corrigibility or
lack thereof. He recalls his tutorials with Strawson. “I want you to bring me a
paper on Friday.” “You mean The Telegraph?” “You know what I mean.” “But perhaps you don’t.” Grice’s
favourite conversational avowal, mentioned by Grice, is a declaration of an
intention.. Grice starts using the phrase ‘conversational avowal’ after
exploring Ryle’s rather cursory exploration of them in The Concept of
Mind. This is interesting because in general Grice is an
anti-ryleist. The verb is of course ‘to avow,’ which is ultimately a
Latinate from ‘advocare.’ A processes or event of the soul is, on the official
view, supposed to be played out in a private theatre. Such an event is known directly
by the man who has them either through the faculty of introspection or the
‘phosphorescence’ of consciousness. The subject is, on this view,
incorrigible—his avowals of the state of his soul cannot be corrected by
others—and he is infallible—he cannot be wrong about which states he is
in. The official doctrine mistakenly construes an avowals or a report of
such an episode as issuing from a special sort of observation or perception of
shadowy existents. We should consider some differences between two sorts
of 'conversational' avowals: (i) I feel a tickle and (ii) I feel ill. If a man
feels a tickle, he has a tickle, and if he has a tickle, he feels it. But
if he feels ill, he may not be ill, and if he is ill, he may not feel
ill. Doubtless a man’s feeling ill is some evidence for his being ill. But
feeling a tickle is not evidence for his having a tickle, any more than
striking a blow is evidence for the occurrence of a blow. In ‘feel a tickle’
and ‘strike a blow’, ‘tickle’ and ‘blow’ are cognate accusatives to the verbs
‘feel’ and ‘strike’. The verb and its accusative are two expressions for
the same thing, as are the verbs and their accusatives in ‘I dreamt a dream’
and ‘I asked a question’. But ‘ill’ and ‘capable of climbing the tree’ are not
cognate accusatives to the verb ‘to feel.' So they are not in grammar bound to
signify feelings, as ‘tickle’ is in grammar bound to signify a
feeling. Another purely grammatical point shows the same thing. It is
indifferent whether I say ‘I feel a tickle’ or ‘I have a tickle’; but ‘I have .
. .’ cannot be completed by ‘. . . ill’, (cf. ‘I have an illness’), ‘. . .
capable of climbing the tree’, (cf. I have a capability to climb that tree’) ‘.
. . happy’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of happiness’ or ‘I have happiness in my
life’) or ‘. . . discontented’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of strong discontent
towards behaviourism’). If we try to restore the verbal parallel by bringing in
the appropriate abstract nouns, we find a further incongruity; ‘I feel
happiness’(I feel as though I am experiencing happiness), ‘I feel illness’ (I
feel as though I do have an illness’) or ‘I feel ability to climb the tree’ (I
feel that I am endowed with the capability to climb that tree), if they mean
anything, they do not mean at all what a man means by uttering ‘I feel happy,’
or ‘I feel ill,’ or ‘I feel capable of climbing the tree’. On the other
hand, besides these differences between the different uses of ‘I feel . . .’
there are important CONVERSATIONAL analogies as well. If a man says that
he has a tickle, his co-conversationalist does not ask for his evidence, or
requires him to make quite sure. Announcing a tickle is not proclaiming the
results of an investigation. A tickle is not something established by
careful witnessing, or something inferred from a clue, nor do we praise for his
powers of observation or reasoning a man who let us know that he feels tickles,
tweaks and flutters. Just the same is true of avowals of moods. If a man
makes a conversational contribution, such as‘I feel bored’, or ‘I feel
depressed’, his co-conversationalist does not usually ask him for his evidence,
or request him to make sure. The co-conversationalist may accuse the man of
shamming to him or to himself, but the co-conversationalist does not accuse him
of having been careless in his observations or rash in his inferences, since a
co-conversationalist would not usually think that his conversational avowal is
a report of an observation or a conclusion. He has not been a good or a
bad detective; he has not been a detective at all. Nothing would surprise us
more than to hear him say ‘I feel depressed’ in the alert and judicious tone of
voice of a detective, a microscopist, or a diagnostician, though this tone of
voice is perfectly congruous with the NON-AVOWAL past-tense ‘I WAS feeling
depressed’ or the NON-AVOWAL third-person report, ‘HE feels depressed’. If the
avowal is to do its conversational job, it must be said in a depressed tone of
voice. The conversational avowal must be blurted out to a sympathizer, not reported
to an investigator. Avowing ‘I feel depressed’ is doing one of the things, viz.
one CONVERSATIONAL thing, that depression is the mood to do. It is not a piece
of scientific premiss-providing, but a piece of ‘conversational moping.’That is
why, if the co-conversationalist is suspicious, he does not ask ‘Fact or
fiction?’, ‘True or false?’, ‘Reliable or unreliable?’, but ‘Sincere or
shammed?’ The CONVERSATIONAL avowal of moods requires not acumen, but
openness. It comes from the heart, not from the head. It is not
discovery, but voluntary non-concealment. Of course people have to learn how to
use avowal expressions appropriately and they may not learn these lessons very
well. They learn them from ordinary discussions of the moods of others and from
such more fruitful sources as novels and the theatre. They learn from the same
sources how to cheat both other people and themselves by making a sham
conversational avowal in the proper tone of voice and with the other proper
histrionic accompaniments. If we now raise the question ‘How does a man find
out what mood he is in?’ one can answer that if, as may not be the case, he
finds it out at all, he finds it out very much as we find it out. As we have
seen, he does not groan ‘I feel bored’ because he has found out that he is
bored, any more than the sleepy man yawns because he has found out that he is
sleepy. Rather, somewhat as the sleepy man finds out that he is sleepy by
finding, among other things, that he keeps on yawning, so the bored man finds
out that he is bored, if he does find this out, by finding that among other
things he glumly says to others and to himself ‘I feel bored’ and ‘How bored I
feel’. Such a blurted avowal is not merely one fairly reliable index among
others. It is the first and the best index, since being worded and voluntarily
uttered, it is meant to be heard and it is meant to be understood. It calls for
no sleuth-work.In some respects a conversational avowal of a moods, like ‘I
feel cheerful,’ more closely resemble announcements of sensations like ‘I feel
a tickle’ than they resemble utterances like ‘I feel better’ or ‘I feel capable
of climbing the tree’. Just as it would be absurd to say ‘I feel a tickle but
maybe I haven’t one’, so, in ordinary cases, it would be absurd to say ‘I feel
cheerful but maybe I am not’. But there would be no absurdity in saying ‘I FEEL
better but, to judge by the doctor’s attitude, perhaps I am WORSE’, or ‘I do
FEEL as if I am capable of climbing the tree but maybe I cannot climb it.’This
difference can be brought out in another way. Sometimes it is natural to say ‘I
feel AS IF I could eat a horse’, or ‘I feel AS IF my temperature has returned
to normal’. But, more more immediate conversational avowals, it would seldom if
ever be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I were in the dumps’, or ‘I feel AS IF I
were bored’, any more than it would be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I had a
pain’. Not much would be gained by discussing at length why we use ‘feel’ in
these different ways. There are hosts of other ways in which it is also used. I
can say ‘I felt a lump in the mattress’, ‘I felt cold’, ‘I felt queer’, ‘I felt
my jaw-muscles stiffen’, ‘I felt my gorge rise’, ‘I felt my chin with my
thumb’, ‘I felt in vain for the lever’, ‘I felt as if something important was
about to happen’, ‘I felt that there was a flaw somewhere in the argument’, ‘I
felt quite at home’, ‘I felt that he was angry’. A feature common to most
of these uses of ‘feel’ is that the utterer does not want further questions to
be put. They would be either unanswerable questions, or unaskable questions.
That he felt it is enough to settle some debates.That he merely felt it is
enough to show that debates should not even begin. Names of moods, then, are
not the names of feelings. But to be in a particular mood is to be in the mood,
among other things, to feel certain sorts of feelings in certain sorts of
situations. To be in a lazy mood, is, among other things, to tend to have
sensations of lassitude in the limbs when jobs have to be done, to have cosy
feelings of relaxation when the deck-chair is resumed, not to have electricity
feelings when the game begins, and so forth. But we are not thinking
primarily of these feelings when we say that we feel lazy; in fact, we seldom
pay much heed to sensations of these kinds, save when they are abnormally
acute. Is a name of a mood a name
of an emotion? The only tolerable reply is that of course they are, in that
some people some of the time use ‘emotion’. But then we must add that in this
usage an emotion is not something that can be segregated from thinking,
daydreaming, voluntarily doing things, grimacing or feeling pangs and itches.
To have the emotion, in this usage, which we ordinarily refer to as ‘being
bored’, is to be in the mood to think certain sorts of thoughts, and not to
think other sorts, to yawn and not to chuckle, to converse with stilted
politeness, and not to talk with animation, to feel flaccid and not to feel
resilient. Boredom is not some unique distinguishable ingredient, scene or
feature of all that its victim is doing and undergoing. Rather it is the
temporary complexion of that totality. It is not like a gust, a sunbeam, a
shower or the temperature; it is like the morning’s weather. An unstudied
conversational utterance may embody an explicit interest phrase, or a
conversational avowal, such as ‘I want it’, ‘I hope so’, ‘That’s what I
intend’, ‘I quite dislike it’, ‘Surely I am depressed’, ‘I do wonder, too’, ‘I
guess so’ and ‘I am feeling hungry.’The surface grammar (if not logical form)
makes it tempting to misconstrue all the utterances as a description. But in
its primary employment such a conversational avowal as ‘I want it’ is not used
to convey information.‘I want it’ is used to make a request or demand. ‘I want
it’ is no more meant as a contribution to general knowledge than ‘please’. For
a co-conversationalist to respond with the tag ‘Do you?’ or worse, as Grice’s
tutee, with ‘*how* do you *know* that you want it?’ is glaringly inappropriate.
Nor, in their primary employment, are conversational avowals such as ‘I hate
it’ or ‘That’s what I I intend’ used for the purpose of telling one’s addressee
facts about the utterer; or else we should not be surprised to hear them
uttered in the cool, informative tones of voice in which one says ‘HE hates it’
and ‘That’s what he intends’. We expect a conversational avowal, on the
contrary, to be spoken in a revolted and a resolute tone of voice respectively.
It is an utterances of a man in a revolted and resolute frame of mind. A
conversational avowal is a thing said in detestation and resolution and not a
thing said in order to advance biographical knowledge about detestations and
resolutions. A man who notices the unstudied utterances of the utterer,
who may or may not be himself, is, if his interest in the utterer has the
appropriate direction, especially well situated to pass comments upon the
qualities and frames of mind of its author.‘avowal’ as a philosophical lexeme
may not invite an immediate correlate in the Graeco-Roman, ultimately Grecian,
tradition. ‘Confessio’ springs to mind, but this is not what Grice is thinking
about. He is more concerned with issues of privileged access and
incorrigibility, or corrigibility, rather, as per the alleged immediacy of a
first-person report of the form, “I feel that …” . Grice does use ‘avowal’
often especially in the early stages, when the logical scepticism about
incorrigibility comes under attack. Just to be different, Grice is interested
in the corrigibility of the avowal. The issue is of some importance in his
account of the act of communication, and how one can disimplicate what one
means. Grice loves to play with his tutee doubting as to whether he means that
p or q. Except at Oxford, the whole thing has a ridiculous ring to it. I want
you to bring me a paper by Friday. You mean the newspaper? You very well know
what I mean. But perhaps you do not. Are you sure you mean a philosophy paper
when you utter, ‘I want you to bring a paper by Friday’? As Grice notes, in
case of self-deception and egcrateia, it may well be that the utterer does not
know what he desires, if not what he intends, if anything. Freud and Foucault
run galore. The topic will interest a collaborator of Grice’s, Pears, with his
concept of ‘motivated irrationality.’ Grice likes to discuss a category
mistake. I may be categorically mistaken but I am not categorically
confused. Now when it comes to avowal-avowal, it is only natural that if he is
interested in Aristotle on ‘hedone,’ Grice would be interested in
Aristotle on ‘lupe.’ This is very philosophical, as Urmson agrees. Can one
‘fake’ pain? Why would one fake pain? Oddly, this is for Grice the origin of
language. Is pleasure just the absence of pain? Liddell and Soctt have “λύπη”
and render it as pain of body, oἡδον; also, sad plight or condition, but also
pain of mind, grief; “ά; δῆγμα δὲ λύπης οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται; τί γὰρ
καλὸν ζῆν βίοτον, ὃς λύπας φέρει; ἐρωτικὴ λ.’ λύπας προσβάλλειν;” “λ. φέρειν
τινί; oχαρά.” Oddly, Grice goes back to pain in Princeton, since it is explored
by Smart in his identity thesis. Take pain. Surely, Grice tells the
Princetonians, it sounds harsh, to echo Berkeley, to say that it is the brain
of Smith being in this or that a state which is justified by insufficient
evidence; whereas it surely sounds less harsh that it is the C-fibres that
constitute his ‘pain,’ which he can thereby fake. Grice distinguishes between a
complete unstructured utterance token“Ouch”versus a complete syntactically
structured erotetic utterance of the type, “Are you in pain?”. At the Jowett,
Corpus Barnes has read Ogden and says ‘Ouch’ (‘Oh’) bears an ‘emotional’ or
‘emotive’ communicatum provided there is an intention there somewhere.
Otherwise, no communicatum occurs. But if there is an intention, the ‘Oh’ can
always be a fake. Grice distinguishes between a ‘fake’ and a ‘sneak.’ If U
intends A to perceive ‘Oh’ as a fake, U means that he is in pain. If there is a
sneaky intention behind the utterance, which U does NOT intend his A to
recognise, there is no communicatum. Grice criticises emotivism as rushing
ahead to analyse a nuance before exploring what sort of a nuance it is. Surely
there is more to the allegedly ‘pseudo-descriptive’ ‘x is good,’ than U meaning
that U emotionally approves of x. In his ‘myth,’ Grice uses pain magisterially
as an excellent example for a privileged-access allegedly incorrigible avowal,
and stage 0 in his creature progression. By uttering ‘Oh!,’ under voluntary
control, Barnes means, iconically, that he is in pain. Pain fall under the
broader keyword: emotion, as anger does. Cf. Aristotle on the emotion in De
An., Rhet., and Eth. Nich. Knowing that at Oxford, if you are a classicist, you
are not a philosopher, Grice never explores the Stoic, say, approach to pain,
or lack thereof (“Which is good, since Walter Pater did it for me!”). Refs.:
“Can I have a pain in my tail?” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
CONVERSAZIONE
-- conversational game theory: Grice: “It was Austin who made me see
the philosophy of football!” -- Grice for ‘homo ludens’. In “Logic and
conversation,” Grice uses the phrases, “the game of conversation,”
“conversational game,” “conversational move,” “the conversational rules,”so he
knew he was echoing Neumann and Morgenstern. J. Hintikka, “Grice and game
theory.” the theory of the structure of, and the rational procedures (or
strategies) for performing in, games or game-like human interactions. Although
there are forerunners, game theory is virtually invented by Neumann and
Morgenstern. Its most striking feature is its compact representation of
interactions of at least two players; e. g. two players may face two choices
each, and in combination these choices produce four possible outcomes. Actual
choices are of strategies, not of outcomes, although it is assessments of
outcomes that recommend this or that procedure, maxim, imperative, or strategy.
To do well in a game, even for each player to do well, as is often possible,
generally requires taking the other player’s position, interest, and goal, into
account. Hence, to evaluate an imperative or rule or strategiy directly,
without reference to the outcomes they might produce in interaction with
others, is conspicuously perverse. It is not surprising, therefore, that in
meta-ethics, game theory has been preeminently applied to utilitarianianism. As
the numbers of players and rational procedure, guideline or strategies rise,
the complexity of the game of conversation increases geometrically. If players
have *2* strategies each and each ranks the four possible outcomes without
ties, there are already *78* strategically distinct conversations. Even minor
real-life interactions may have astronomically greater complexity. Grice once
complained to Hintikka that this makes game theory ‘useless,’ or ‘otiose.’
Alternatively, one can note that this makes it realistic and helps us
understand why real-life choices are at least as complex as they sometimes
seem. To complicate matters further, conversationalists can choose over
probabilistic combinations of their pure rational guidelines or strategies.
Hence, the original 4 outcomes in a simple 2 $ 2 game define a continuum of
potential outcomes. After noting the structure of the game of conversation, one
might then be struck by an immediate implication of this mere description. A
rational agent may be supposed to attempt to maximize his potential or expected
outcome in the game of conversation. But as there are at least two players in
the game of conversation, in general conversationalists cannot all maximize
simultaneously over their expected outcomes while assuming that all others are
doing likewise. This is an analytical principle. In general, we cannot maximize
over two functions simultaneously. The general notion of the greatest good of
the greatest number, e. g., is incoherent. Hence, in inter-active choice
contexts, the simple notion of economic rationality is incoherent. Virtually
all of early game theory was dedicated to finding an alternative principle for
resolving conversational game interactions. There are now many of what Grice
calls a “solution theory,” most of which are about this or that outcome rather
than this or that rational guideline or strategy they stipulate which outcomes
or range of outcomes is game-theoretically “rational.” There is little
consensus on how to generalize from the ordinary rationality of merely choosing
more rather than less and of displaying consistent preferences to the general
choice of strategies in games. A pay-off in early game theory is almost always
represented in a cardinal, transferable utility. A transferable utility is an
odd notion that is evidently introduced to avoid the disdain with which
philosophers then treated interpersonal comparisons of utility. It seems to be
analogous to money. One could say that the theory is one of wealth
maximization. In the early theory, the “rationality” conditions are as
follows.In general, if the sums of the pay-offs to each players in various
outcomes differ, it is assumed that a rational player will manage to divide the
largest possible payoff with the other player. 2 No rational agent will accept
a payoff below the “security level” obtainable even if all the other player or
players really form a coalition against the individual. Sometimes it is also
assumed that no group of players will rationally accept less than it could get
as its group security level but in some
games, no outcome can meet this condition. This is an odd combination of
elements. The collective elements are plausibly thought of as merely
predictive. If we individually wish to do well, we should combine efforts to
help us do best AS A CONVERSATIONAL DYAD. But what we want is a theory that
converts two individual preferences into one collective resultGrice’s
conversational shared goal of influencing and being influenced by others.
Unfortunately, to put a move doing just this in the foundations of the theory
is question-begging. Our fundamental burden is to determine whether a theory of
subjective rationality MAY produce an inter-subjectively good result, not to
stipulate that it must. In the theory with cardinal, additive payoffs, we can
divide games. There is the constant-sum game, in which the sum of all players’
payoffs in each outcome is a constant, and variable sum games. A zero-sum games
is a special case of a constant sum game. Two-player constant sum games are
games of pure conversational ‘conflict.’ Each player’s gain is the other’s
loss. In constant sum games with more than two players and in all variable sum
games, there is generally reason for coalition formation to improve payoffs to
members of the coalition. A game without transferable utility, such as a games
in which players have only ordinal preferences, may be characterized as a game
of pure conflict or of pure co-ordination (or co-operation) when players’
preference orderings over outcomes are, respectively, opposite or identical, or
as games of mixed motive when their orderings are partly the same and partly
reversed. Grice’s nalysis of such games is evidently less tractable than that
of games with cardinal, additive utility, and their theory is only beginning to
be extensively developed by Griceians. Despite the apparent circularity of the
rationality assumptions of early game theory, it is the game theorists’
prisoner’s dilemma that makes clear that compelling subjectivistic principles
of choice can produce an inter-subjective deficient outcome. This game given
its catchy but inapt name. If they play it in isolation from any other interaction
between them, two players in this game can each do what seems individually best
and reach an outcome that both consider inferior to the outcome that results
from making opposite strategy choices. Even with the knowledge that this is the
problem they face, the players still have incentive to choose the strategies
that jointly produce the inferior outcome. The prisoner’s dilemma involves both
coordination (or co-operation) and conflict. It has played a central role in
discussions of Griceian conversational pragmatics. Games that predominantly
involve coordination (or cooperation), such as when we coordinate in all
driving on the right or all on the left, have a similarly central role. The
understanding of both classes of games has been read into the philosophy of
Hobbes and Hume and into “mutual advantage” theories of justice.
CONVERSAZIONE – BENEVOLENZA
CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational benevolence:
benevolentia, beneficentia, malevolentia, maleficentia -- . In Grice it’s not
benevolence per se but as a force in a two-force model, with self-love on the
other side. The fact that he later subsumed everything under ONE concept: that
of co-operation (first helpfulness) testifies that he is placing more
conceptual strength on ‘benevolence’ than ‘self love.’ But the self-love’
remains in all the caveats and provisos that Grice keeps guarding his claims
with: ‘ceteris paribus,’ ‘provided there’s not much effort involved,’ ‘if no
unnecessary trouble arises,’ and so on. It’s never benevolence simpliciter or
tout court. When it comes to co-operation, the self-love remains: the mutual
goal of that co-operation is in the active and the passive voiceYou expect me
to be helpful as much as I expect you to be helpful. We are in this together.
The active/passive voice formulation is emphatic in Grice: informing AND BEING
INFORMED; influencing AND BEING INFLUENCED. The self-love goes: I won’t inform
you unless you’ll inform me. I won’t influence you unless you influence me. The
‘influence’ bit does not seem to cooperative. But the ‘inform’ side does. By
‘inform,’ the idea is that the psi-transmission concerns a true belief. “I’ll
be truthful if you will.” This is the sort of thing that Nietzsche found
repugnant and identified with the golden rule was totally immoral.It was felt
by Russell to be immoral enough that he cared to mention in a letter to The
Times about how abusive Nietzsche can beyet what a gem “Beyond good and evil”
still is! In the hypocritical milieu that Grice expects his tuttees know they
are engaged in, Grice does not find Nietzsche pointing to a repugnant fact, but
a practical, even jocular way of taking meta-ethics in a light way. There is
nothing other-oriented about benevolence. What Grice needs is conversational
ALTRUISM, or helpfulness‘cooperation’ has the advantage, with the ‘co-’, of
avoiding the ‘mutuality’ aspect, which is crucial (“What’s the good of helping
youI’m not your servant!if thou art not going to help me!” It may be said that
when Butler uses ‘benevolentia’ he means others. “It is usually understood that
one is benevolent towards oneself, if that makes sense.” Grice writes. Then
there’s Smith promising Jones a joband the problem that comes with it. For
Grice, if Smith promised a job to Jones, and Jones never gets it“that’s Jones’s
problem.” So we need to distinguish beneficentia and benevolentia. The opposite
is malevolentia and maleficientia. Usually Grice states his maxims as
PROHIBITIONS: “Do not say what you believe to be false” being the wittiest! So,
he might just as well have appealed to or invoked a principle of absence of
conversational ill-will. Grice uses ‘conversational benevolence’ narrowly, to
refer to the assumption that conversationalists will agree to make a
contribution appropriate to the shared purposes of the exhcnage. It contrasts
with the limiting conversational self-love, which is again taken narrowly to
indicate that conversationalists are assumed to be conversationally
‘benevolent,’ in the interpretation above, provided doing that does not get
them into unnecessary trouble. The type of rationality that Grice sees in
conversational is one that sees conversation as ‘rational co-operation.’ So it
is obvious that he has to invoke some level of benevolence. When tutoring his
rather egoistic tutees he had to be careful, so he hastened to add a principle
of conversational self-love. It was different when lecturing outside a
tutorial! In fact ‘benevolence’ here is best understood as ‘altruism’. So, if
there is a principle of conversational egoism, there is a correlative principle
of conversational altruism. If Grice uses ‘self-love,’ there is nothing about
‘love,’ in ‘benevolence.’ Butler may have used ‘other-love’! Even if of course
we must start with the Grecians! We must not forget that Plato and Aristotle
despised "autophilia", the complacency and self-satisfaction making
it into the opposite of "epimeleia heautou” in Plato’s Alcibiades.
Similarly, to criticize Socratic ethics as a form of egoism in opposition to a
selfless care of others is inappropriate. Neither a self-interested seeker of
wisdom nor a dangerous teacher of self-love, Socrates, as the master of
epimeleia heautou, is the hinge between the care of self and others. One has to
be careful here. A folk-etymological connection between ‘foam’ may not be
neededwhen the Romans had to deal with Grecian ‘aphrodite.’ This requires that
we look for another linguistic botany for Grecian ‘self-love’ that Grice
opposes to ‘benevolentia.’ Hesiod derives Aphrodite from “ἀφρός,” ‘sea-foam,’ interpreting
the name as "risen from the foam", but most modern scholars regard
this as a spurious folk etymology. Early modern scholars of classical mythology
attempted to argue that Aphrodite's name was of Griceain or Indo-European
origin, but these efforts have now been mostly abandoned. Aphrodite's name is
generally accepted to be of non-Greek, probably Semitic, origin, but its exact
derivation cannot be determined. Scholars in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, accepting Hesiod's "foam" etymology as genuine,
analyzed the second part of Aphrodite's name as -odítē "wanderer" or -dítē
"bright". Janda, also accepting Hesiod's etymology, has argued in
favor of the latter of these interpretations and claims the story of a birth
from the foam as an Indo-European mytheme. Similarly, an Indo-European compound
abʰor-, very" and dʰei- "to shine" have been proposed, also
referring to Eos. Other have argued that these hypotheses are unlikely since
Aphrodite's attributes are entirely different from those of both Eos and the
Vedic deity Ushas.A number of improbable non-Greek etymologies have also been
suggested. One Semitic etymology compares Aphrodite to the Assyrian ‘barīrītu,’
the name of a female demon that appears in Middle Babylonian and Late
Babylonian texts. Hammarström looks to Etruscan, comparing eprϑni
"lord", an Etruscan honorific loaned into Greek as πρύτανις.This
would make the theonym in origin an honorific, "the lady".Most
scholars reject this etymology as implausible, especially since Aphrodite
actually appears in Etruscan in the borrowed form Apru (from Greek Aphrō, clipped
form of Aphrodite). The medieval Etymologicum Magnum offers a highly contrived
etymology, deriving Aphrodite from the compound habrodíaitos (ἁβροδίαιτος),
"she who lives delicately", from habrós and díaita. The alteration
from b to ph is explained as a "familiar" characteristic of Greek
"obvious from the Macedonians". It is much easier with the Romans. Lewis and Short have ‘ămor,’ old form “ămŏs,”
“like honos, labos, colos, etc.’ obviously from ‘amare,’ and which they render
as ‘love,’ as in Grice’s “conversational self-love.” Your tutor will reprimand
you if you spend too much linguistic botany on ‘eros.’ “Go straight to
‘philos.’” But no. There are philosophical usages of ‘eros,’ especially when it
comes to the Grecian philosophers Grice is interested in: Aristotle reading
Plato, which becomes Ariskant reading Plathegel. So, Liddell and Scott have
“ἔρως” which of course is from a verb, or two: “ἕραμαι,” “ἐράω,” and which they
render as “love, mostly of the sexual passion, ““θηλυκρατὴς ἔ.,” “ἐρῶσ᾽ ἔρωτ᾽
ἔκδημον,” “ἔ. τινός love for one, S.Tr.433, “παίδων” E. Ion67, and “generally,
love of a thing, desire for it,” ““πατρῴας γῆς” “δεινὸς εὐκλείας ἔ.” “ἔχειν
ἔμφυτον ἔρωτα περί τι” Plato, Lg. 782e ; “πρὸς τοὺς λόγους” (love of law),
“ἔρωτα σχὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννος γενέσθαι” Hdt.5.32 ; ἔ. ἔχει με c. inf.,
A.Su521 ; “θανόντι κείνῳ συνθανεῖν ἔρως μ᾽ ἔχει” S.Fr.953 ; “αὐτοῖς ἦν ἔρως
θρόνους ἐᾶσθαι” Id.OC367 ; ἔ. ἐμπίπτει μοι c. inf., A.Ag.341, cf. Th.6.24 ; εἰς
ἔρωτά τινος ἀφικέσθαι, ἐλθεῖν, Antiph.212.3,Anaxil.21.5 : pl., loves, amours,
“ἀλλοτρίων” Pi.N.3.30 ; “οὐχ ὅσιοι ἔ.” E.Hi765 (lyr.) ; “ἔρωτες ἐμᾶς πόλεως”
Ar.Av.1316 (lyr.), etc. ; of dolphins, “πρὸς παῖδας” Arist.HA631a10 :
generally, desires, S.Ant.617 (lyr.). 2. object of love or desire, “ἀπρόσικτοι
ἔρωτες” Pi.N.11.48, cf. Luc.Tim.14. 3. passionate joy, S.Aj.693 (lyr.); the god
of love, Anacr.65, Parm.13, E.Hi525 (lyr.), etc.“Έ. ἀνίκατε μάχαν” S.Ant.781
(lyr.) : in pl., Simon.184.3, etc. III. at Nicaea, a funeral wreath, EM379.54.
IV. name of the κλῆρος Ἀφροδίτης, Cat.Cod.Astr.1.168 ; = third κλῆρος,
Paul.Al.K.3; one of the τόποι, Vett.Val.69.16. And they’ll point to you that
the Romans had ‘amor’ AND ‘cupidus’ (which they meant as a transliteration of
epithumia). If for Kant and Grice it is the intention that matters, ill-will
counts. If Smith does not want Jones have a job, Smith has ill-will towards
Jones. This is all Kant and Grice need to call Smith a bad person. It means it
is the ill-will that causes Joness not having a job. A conceptual elucidation.
Interesting from a historical point of view seeing that Grice had introduced a
principle of conversational benevolence (i.e. conversational goodwill) pretty
early. Malevolentia was over-used by Cicero, translating the Grecian. Grice
judges that if Jones fails to get the job that benevolent Smith promised, Smith
may still be deemed, for Kant, if not Aristotle, to have given him the
job. A similar elucidation was carried by Urmson with his idea of
supererogation (heroism and sainthood). For a hero or saint, someones goodwill
but not be good enough! Which does not mean it is ill, either! Conversational
benevolence -- Self-love Philosophical theology -- Edwards, J., philosopher and
theologian. He was educated at Yale, preached in New York City, and in 1729
assumed a Congregational pastorate in Northampton, Massachusetts, where he
became a leader in the Great Awakening. Because of a dispute with his
parishioners over qualifications for communion, he was forced to leave in 1750.
In 1751, he took charge of congregations in Stockbridge, a frontier town sixty
miles to the west. He was elected third president of Princeton in 1757 but died
shortly after inauguration. Edwards deeply influenced Congregational and
Presbyterian theology in America for over a century, but had little impact on
philosophy. Interest in him revived in the middle of the twentieth century,
first among literary scholars and theologians and later among philosophers.
While most of Edwards’s published work defends the Puritan version of Calvinist
orthodoxy, his notebooks reveal an interest in philosophical problems for their
own sake. Although he was indebted to Continental rationalists like
Malebranche, to the Cambridge Platonists, and especially to Locke, his own
contributions are sophisticated and original. The doctrine of God’s absolute
sovereignty is explicated by occasionalism, a subjective idealism similar to
Berkeley’s, and phenomenalism. According to Edwards, what are “vulgarly” called
causal relations are mere constant conjunctions. True causes necessitate their
effects. Since God’s will alone meets this condition, God is the only true
cause. He is also the only true substance. Physical objects are collections of
ideas of color, shape, and other “corporeal” qualities. Finite minds are series
of “thoughts” or “perceptions.” Any substance underlying perceptions, thoughts,
and “corporeal ideas” must be something that “subsists by itself, stands
underneath, and keeps up” physical and mental qualities. As the only thing that
does so, God is the only real substance. As the only true cause and the only
real substance, God is “in effect being in general.” God creates to communicate
his glory. Since God’s internal glory is constituted by his infinite knowledge
of, love of, and delight in himself as the highest good, his “communication ad
extra” consists in the knowledge of, love of, and joy in himself which he
bestows upon creatures. The essence of God’s internal and external glory is
“holiness” or “true benevolence,” a disinterested love of being in general
i.e., of God and the beings dependent on him. Holiness constitutes “true
beauty,” a divine splendor or radiance of which “secondary” ordinary beauty is
an imperfect image. God is thus supremely beautiful and the world is suffused
with his loveliness. Vindications of Calvinist conceptions of sin and grace are
found in Freedom of the Will 1754 and Original Sin 1758. The former includes
sophisticated defenses of theological determinism and compatibilism. The latter
contains arguments for occasionalism and interesting discussions of identity.
Edwards thinks that natural laws determine kinds or species, and kinds or
species determine criteria of identity. Since the laws of nature depend on
God’s “arbitrary” decision, God establishes criteria of identity. He can thus,
e.g., constitute Adam and his posterity as “one thing.” Edwards’s religious
epistemology is developed in A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections 1746
and On the Nature of True Virtue 1765. The conversion experience involves the
acquisition of a “new sense of the heart.” Its core is the mind’s apprehension
of a “new simple idea,” the idea of “true beauty.” This idea is needed to
properly understand theological truths. True Virtue also provides the fullest
account of Edwards’s ethics a moral
sense theory that identifies virtue with benevolence. Although indebted to
contemporaries like Hutcheson, Edwards criticizes their attempts to construct
ethics on secular foundations. True benevolence embraces being in general.
Since God is, in effect, being in general, its essence is the love of God. A
love restricted to family, nation, humanity, or other “private systems” is a
form of self-love. Refs.: The source is Grice’s seminar in the first set on
‘Logic and conversation.’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
CONVERSAZIONE
-- CATEGORIA – CATEGORIA CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational category: -- Greek
‘categoria,’ Cicero couldn’t translate it and kept it as ‘categoria,’. Cf Kant ‘categoric versus hypotheticum or
conditionale -- used jocularly by Grice. But can it be used non-jocularly? How
can the concept of ‘category,’ literally, apply to what Grice says it applies,
so that we have, assuming Kant is using ‘quantity,’ ‘quality,’ ‘relation’ and
‘mode,’ as SUPRA-categories (functions, strictly) for his twelve categories?
Let’s revise, the quantity applies to the quantification (in Frege’s terms) or
what Boethius applied to Aristotle’s posotesand there are three categories involved,
but the three deal with the ‘quantum: ‘every,’ ‘some,’ and ‘one.’ ‘some’
Russell would call an indefinite. Strictly, if Grice wants to have a category
of conversational quantityit should relate to the ‘form’ of the ‘conversational
move.’ “Every nice girl loves a sailor” would be the one with most ‘quantity.’
Grice sees a problem there, and would have that rather translated as ‘The
altogether nice girl loves the one-at-a-time sailor.’ But that would be the
most conversational move displaying ‘most quantity.’ (It can be argued it ’t).
When it comes to the category of conversational quality, the three categories
by Kant under the ‘function’ of qualitas involves the well known trio, the
affirmative, the negative, and the infinite. In terms of the ‘quality’ of a
conversational move, it may be argued that a move in negative form (as in
Grice, “I’m not hearing any noise,” “That pillar box is not blue” seem to
provide ‘less’ quality than the affirmative counterparts. But as in quantity,
it is not sure Kant has some ordering in mind. It seems he does. It seems he
ascribes more value to the first category in each of the four functions. When
it comes to the category of conversational relation, the connection with Kant
could be done. Since this involves the categoric, the hypothetic, and the
disjunctive. So here we may think that a conversational move will be either a
categoric responseA: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B: The weather has been
delightful. Or a hypothetical. A: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B: If that’s what
you think. Or a dijunctive: Mrs. Smith is a wind bag. B: Or she is not. When it
comes, lastly, to the category of conversational mode, we have just three
strict categories under this ‘function’ in Kant, which relate to the strength
of the copula: ‘must be,’ must not be’ and ‘may.’ A conversational move that
states a necessity would be the expected move. “You must do it.” Impossibility
involves negation, so it is more problematic. And ‘may be’ is an open
conversational move. So there IS a way to justify the use of ‘conversational
category’ to apply to the four functions that Kant decides the Aristotelian
categories may subsumed into. He knows that Kant has TWELVE categories, but he
keeps lecturing the Harvardites about Kant having FOUR categories. On top, he
finds ‘modus’ boring, and, turned a manierist, changes the idiom. This is what
Austin called a ‘philosophical hack’ searching for some para-philosophy! One
has to be careful here. Grice does speak of this or that ‘conversational
category.’ Seeing that he is ‘echoing,’ as he puts it, Ariskant, we migt just
as well have an entry for each of the four. These would be the category of conversational
quantity, the category of conversational quality, the category of
conversational relation, and the category of conversational modality. Note that
in this rephrasing Grice applies ‘conversational’ directly to the category. As
Boethius pointed out (and Grice loved to read Minio-Paullelo’s edition of
Boethus’s commentary on the Categories), the motivation by Aristotle to posit
this or that category was expository. A mind cannot know a multitude of things,
so we have to ‘reduce’ things. It is important to note that while ‘quantitas,’
‘qualitas’ ‘relatio’ and ‘modus’ are used by Kant, he actually augments the
number of categories. These four would be supra-categories. The sub-categories,
or categories themselves turn out to be twelve. Kant proposed 12 categories:
unity, plurality, and totality for concept of quantity; reality, negation, and
limitation, for the concept of quality; inherence and subsistence, cause and
effect, and community for the concept of relation; and
possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, and necessity and
contingency. Kategorien sind nach Kant apriorisch und unmittelbar gegeben.
Sie sind Werkzeuge des Urteilens und Werkzeuge des Denkens. Als solche dienen
sie nur der Anwendung und haben keine Existenz. Sie bestehen somit nur im
menschlichen Verstand. Sie sind nicht an Erfahrung gebunden. Durch ihre
Unmittelbarkeit sind sie auch nicht an Zeichen gebunden. Kants
erkenntnistheoretisches Ziel ist es, über die Bedingungen der Geltungskraft von
Urteilen Auskunft zu geben. Ohne diese Auskunft können zwar vielerlei Urteile
gefällt werden, sie müssen dann allerdings als „systematische Doktrin“
bezeichnet werden. Kant
kritisiert damit das rein analytische Denken der Wissenschaft als falsch und
stellt ihm die Notwendigkeit des synthetisierenden Denkens gegenüber. Kant
begründet die Geltungskraft mit dem Transzendentalen Subjekt. Das
Transzendentalsubjekt ist dabei ein reiner Reflexionsbegriff, welcher das
synthetisierende Dritte darstellt (wie in späteren Philosophien Geist (Hegel),
Wille, Macht, Sprache und Wert (Marx)), das nicht durch die Sinne wahrnehmbar
ist. Kant sucht hier die Antwort auf die Frage, wie der Mensch als vernunftbegabtes
Wesen konstituiert werden kann, nicht in der Analyse, sondern in einer
Synthesis.Bei Immanuel Kant, der somit als
bedeutender Erneuerer der bis dahin „vorkritischen“ Kategorienlehre gilt,
finden sich zwölf „Kategorien der reinen Vernunft“. Für Kant sind diese
Kategorien Verstandesbegriffe,
nicht aber Ausdruck des tatsächlichen Seins der Dinge an sich.
Damit wandelt sich die ontologische Sichtweise
der Tradition in eine erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtung,
weshalb Kants „kritische“ Philosophie (seit der Kritik der reinen Vernunft)
oft auch als „Kopernikanische Wende in
der Philosophie“ bezeichnet wird.Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität sind die vier
grundlegenden Urteilsfunktionen des Verstandes, nach denen die Kategorien
gebildet werden. Demnach sind z. B. der Urteilsfunktion „Quantität“ die
Kategorien bzw. Urteile „Einheit“, „Vielheit“ und „Allheit“ untergeordnet, und
der Urteilsfunktion „Relation“ die Urteile der „Ursache“ und der „Wirkung“.Siehe auch: Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Transzendentale AnalytikBereits
bei Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg findet
man den Hinweis auf die verbreitete Kritik, dass Kant die den Kategorien
zugrunde liegenden Urteilsformen nicht systematisch hergeleitet und damit als
notwendig begründet hat. Einer der Kritikpunkte ist dabei, dass die Kategorien
sich teilweise auf Anschauungen (Einzelheit, Realität, Dasein), teilweise auf
Abstraktionen wie Zusammenfassen, Begrenzen oder Begründen (Vielheit, Allheit,
Negation, Limitation, Möglichkeit, Notwendigkeit) beziehen.
CVM-PACTUM
-- CONVERSAZIONE – IL PATTO CONVERSAZIONALE – patto, compatto. conversational
compact:
conversational pact in Grice’s conversational quasi-contractualism, contractarianism,
a family of moral and political theories that make use of the idea of a social
contract. Traditionally English philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke used the
social contract idea to justify certain conceptions of the state. In the
twentieth century philosophers such as G. R. Grice, H. P. Grice, and John Rawls
have used the social contract notion (‘quasi-contractualism’ in Grice’s sense) to
define and defend moral conceptions both conceptions of political justice and
individual morality, often but not always doing so in addition to developing
social contract theories of the state. The term ‘contractarian’ most often
applies to this second type of theory. There are two kinds of moral argument
that the contract image has spawned, the first rooted in Hobbes and the second
rooted in Kant. Hobbesians start by insisting that what is valuable is what a person
desires or prefers, not what he ought to desire or prefer for no such
prescriptively powerful object exists; and rational action is action that
achieves or maximizes the satisfaction of desires or preferences. They go on to
insist that moral action is rational for a person to perform if and only if
such action advances the satisfaction of his desires or preferences. And they
argue that because moral action leads to peaceful and harmonious living
conducive to the satisfaction of almost everyone’s desires or preferences,
moral actions are rational for almost everyone and thus “mutually agreeable.”
But Hobbesians believe that, to ensure that no cooperative person becomes the
prey of immoral aggressors, moral actions must be the conventional norms in a
community, so that each person can expect that if she behaves cooperatively,
others will do so too. These conventions constitute the institution of morality
in a society. So the Hobbesian moral theory is committed to the idea that
morality is a human-made institution, which is justified only to the extent
that it effectively furthers human interests. Hobbesians explain the existence
of morality in society by appealing to the convention-creating activities of
human beings, while arguing that the justification of morality in any human
society depends upon how well its moral conventions serve individuals’ desires
or preferences. By considering “what we could agree to” if we reappraised and
redid the cooperative conventions in our society, we can determine the extent
to which our present conventions are “mutually agreeable” and so rational for
us to accept and act on. Thus, Hobbesians invoke both actual agreements or
rather, conventions and hypothetical agreements which involve considering what
conventions would be “mutually agreeable” at different points in their theory;
the former are what they believe our moral life consists in; the latter are
what they believe our moral life should consist in i.e., what our actual moral life should
model. So the notion of the contract does not do justificational work by itself
in the Hobbesian moral theory: this term is used only metaphorically. What we
“could agree to” has moral force for the Hobbesians not because make-believe
promises in hypothetical worlds have any binding force but because this sort of
agreement is a device that merely reveals how the agreed-upon outcome is
rational for all of us. In particular, thinking about “what we could all agree
to” allows us to construct a deduction of practical reason to determine what policies
are mutually advantageous. The second kind of contractarian theory is derived
from the moral theorizing of Kant. In his later writings Kant proposed that the
“idea” of the “Original Contract” could be used to determine what policies for
a society would be just. When Kant asks “What could people agree to?,” he is
not trying to justify actions or policies by invoking, in any literal sense,
the consent of the people. Only the consent of real people can be legitimating,
and Kant talks about hypothetical agreements made by hypothetical people. But
he does believe these make-believe agreements have moral force for us because
the process by which these people reach agreement is morally revealing. Kant’s
contracting process has been further developed by subsequent philosophers, such
as Rawls, who concentrates on defining the hypothetical people who are supposed
to make this agreement so that their reasoning will not be tarnished by
immorality, injustice, or prejudice, thus ensuring that the outcome of their joint
deliberations will be morally sound. Those contractarians who disagree with
Rawls define the contracting parties in different ways, thereby getting
different results. The Kantians’ social contract is therefore a device used in
their theorizing to reveal what is just or what is moral. So like Hobbesians,
their contract talk is really just a way of reasoning that allows us to work
out conceptual answers to moral problems. But whereas the Hobbesians’ use of
contract language expresses the fact that, on their view, morality is a human
invention which if it is well invented ought to be mutually advantageous, the
Kantians’ use of the contract language is meant to show that moral principles
and conceptions are provable theorems derived from a morally revealing and
authoritative reasoning process or “moral proof procedure” that makes use of
the social contract idea. Both kinds of contractarian theory are
individualistic, in the sense that they assume that moral and political
policies must be justified with respect to, and answer the needs of,
individuals. Accordingly, these theories have been criticized by communitarian
philosophers, who argue that moral and political policies can and should be
decided on the basis of what is best for a community. They are also attacked by
utilitarian theorists, whose criterion of morality is the maximization of the
utility of the community, and not the mutual satisfaction of the needs or
preferences of individuals. Contractarians respond that whereas utilitarianism
fails to take seriously the distinction between persons, contractarian theories
make moral and political policies answerable to the legitimate interests and
needs of individuals, which, contra the communitarians, they take to be the
starting point of moral theorizing.
CONVERSAZIONE – COOPERAZIONE
CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational co-öperation: Grice is perfectly right that ‘helpfulness’ does not
‘equate’ cooperation. His earlier principle of conversational helpfulness
becomes the principle of conversational co-operation.Tthere is a distinction
between mutual help and cooperation. First, the Romans never knew. Their
‘servants’ were ‘help’and this remains in the British usage of ‘civil servant,’
one who helps. Some philosophical tutees by Hare were often reminded, in the
midst of their presenting their essays, “Excuse me for interrupting, Smith, but
have you considered a career in the civil service?” Then some Romans found
Christianism fashionable, and they were set to translate the Bible. So when
this Hebrew concept appeared, they turned it into ad-judicatum, which was
translated by Wycliff as ‘help.’ Now ‘operatio’ is quite a different animal.
It’s the ‘opus’ of the Romans, who also had ‘labor.’ Surely to ‘co-laborate’ is
to ‘co-operate.’ There is an idea that ‘operate,’ can be more otiose, in the
view of Rogers Albritton. “He is operating the violin,” was his favourite
utterance. “Possibly his opus 5.” The fact that English needs a hyphen and an
umlaut does not make it very ‘ordinary’ in Austin’s description. Grice is more
interested in the conceptualization of this, notably as it relates to
rationality. Can cooperation NOT be rational? For most libertarians,
cooperation IS “irrational,” rather. But Grice points is subtler. He is
concerned with an emissor communicating that p. The least thing he deserves is
a rational recipient. “Otherwise I might just as well scream to the walls!” Used
by Grice WOW:368previously, ‘rational cooperation’what cooperation is not
rational? Grice says that if Smith promised Jones a job; Jones doesn’t get it.
Smith must be DEEMED to have given the job to Jones. It’s the intention, as
Kant shows, the pure motive, that matters. Ditto for communication. If
Blackburn draws a skull, he communicates that there is danger. If his addressee
fails to recognise the emissor’s intention the emissor will still be deemed to
have communicated that there is danger. So communication does NOT require
co-operation. His analysis of “emissor communicates that p” is not one of
“emissor successfully communicates that p,” because “communicates” reduces to
“intends” not to ‘fulfilled intention.’ Cooperation enters when we go beyond
ONE act of communication. To communicate is to give information and to
influence another, and it is also to receive information and to be influenced
by another. When these communicative objectives are made explicit, helpfulness
or cooperation becomes essential. He uses ‘converational cooperation” and
“supreme principle of conversational cooperation” (369). He uses ‘supreme
conversational principle” of “cooperativeness” (369), to avoid seeing the
conversational imperatives as an unorganized heap of conversational
obligations. Another variant is Grice’s use of “principle of conversational
co-operation.” He also uses “principle of conversational rational
co-operation.” Note that irrational or non-rational co-operation is not an
oxymoron. Another expression is conversational cooperative rationality. So
Grice was amused that you can just as well refer to ‘cooperative rationality”
or “rational cooperation,” “a category shift if ever there was one.”
EX PLICATUM -- CONVERSAZIONE –
SPIEGATO CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational explicaturum – explicitirum -- cf.
the implicaturum and the
impliciturmimplicatura/implicituraimplicaturm-impliciturm -- To be explicit is bad
manners at Oxford if not in Paris or MIT. The thing is to imply! Englishmen are
best at implyingtheir love for understatement is unequalled in the world. Grice
needs the explicatio, or explicit. Because the mistake the philosopher makes is
at the level of the implicatio, as Nowell-Smith, and C. K. Grant had noted. It
is not OBVIOUSLY at the explicit level. Grice was never interested in the
explicit level, and takes a very cavalier attitude to it. “This brief
indication of my use of say leaves it open whether a man who says (today)
Harold Wilson is a great man and another who says (also today) The British
Prime Minister is a great man would, if each knew that the two singular terms
had the same reference, have said the same thing. But whatever decision is made
about this question, the apparatus that I am about to provide will be capable
of accounting for any implicaturums that might depend on the presence of one
rather than another of these singular terms in the sentence uttered. Such implicaturums
would merely be related to different maxims.”Rephrase: “A brief indication of
my use of ‘the explicit’ leaves it open whether a man who states (today), ‘Harold
Wilson is a great man’ thereby stating that Wilson is a great man, and another
who states (also today),‘The British Prime Minister is a great man,’ viz. that
the Prime Minister is a great mand, would, if each singular term, ‘the Prime
Minister’ and ‘Wilson’ has the same denotatum (co-relata) have put forward in
an explicit fashion the same propositional complex, and have stated the same
thing. On the face of it, it would seem they have not. But cf. ‘Wilson will be
the prime minister’ versus ‘Wilson shall be the prime minister.’ Again, a
subtler question arises as to whether the first emissor who has stated that
Wilson will be the next prime minster and the other one who has stated that
Wilson *shall* be the next prime minster, have both but forward the same
proposition. If the futurm indicatum is ENTAILED by the futurum intentionale,
the question is easy to settle. Whatever methodological decision or stipulation
I end up making about the ‘explicitum,’ the apparatus that I rely on is capable
of accounting for any implicaturum that might depend on the presence of this or
that singular term in the utterance. Such an implicaturum would merely be
related to a different conversational maxims. Urmson has elaborated on this,
“Mrs. Smith’s husband just passed by.” “You mean the postman! Why did you use
such contrived ‘signular term’?” If the emissor draws a skull what he
explicitly conveys is that this is a skull. This is the EPLICITUM. If he
communicates that there is danger, that’s via some further reasoning. That
associates a skull with death. Grice’s example is Grice displaying his bandaged
leg. Strictly, he communicates that he has a bandaged leg. Second, that his leg
is bandaged (the bandage may be fake). And third, that he cannot play cricket. It
all started in Oxford when they started to use ‘imply’ in a sense other than
the ‘logical’ one. This got Grice immersed in a deep exploration of types of
‘implication.’ There is the implicaturum, and the implicitum, both from
‘implico.’ As correlative there is the explicatio, which yields both the
explicatum and the explicitum. Grice has under the desideratum of
conversational clarity that a conversationalist is assumed to make the point of
his conversational contribution ‘explicit.’ So in his polemic with G. A. Paul,
Grice knows that the ‘doubt-or-denial’ condition will be at the level NOT of
the explicitum or explicatum. Surely an implicaturum can be CANCELLED
explicitly. Grice uses ‘contextual’ or ‘explicit,’ here but grants that the
‘contextual’ may be subsumed under the ‘explicit.’ It is when the sub-perceptual utterance is
copulated with the formulation of the explicatum of the implicaturum that Grice
shows G. A. Paul that the statement is still ‘true,’ and which Grice sees as a
reivindication of the causal theory of perception. In the twenty or so examples
of philosophical mistakes, both in “Causal” and “Prolegomena,” all the mistakes
can be rendered back to the ‘explicatum’ versus ‘implicaturum’ distinction.
Unfortunately, each requires a philosophical background to draw all the
‘implications,’ and Grice has been read by people without a philosophical
background who go on to criticise him for ignoring things where he never had
focused his attention on. His priority is to deal with these philosophical
mistakes. He also expects the philosopher to come up with a general
methodological statement. Grice distinguishes between the conversational
explicitum and the conversational explicatum. Grice plays with ‘explicit’ and
‘implicit’ at various places. He often uses ‘explicit’and ‘implicit’
adverbially: the utterer explicitly conveys that p versus the utterer
implicitly conveys that p (hints that p, suggests that p, indicates that p,
implicates that p, implies that p). Grice regards that both dimensions form part
of the total act of signification, accepting as a neutral variant, that the
utterer has signified that p.
CONVERSAZIONE – GIOCCO -- conversational
game: In a conversational game, you
don’t say “The pillar box seems red” if you know it IS red. So, philosophers at
Oxford (like Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hampshire, and Hart) are all victims of
ignoring the rules of the game, and just not understanding that a game is being
played. the expression is used by Grice
systematically. He speaks of players making the conversational move in the
conversational game following the conversational rule, v. rational choice
CONVERSAZIONE
– NEGOZIAZIONE -- conversational haggle -- bargaining theory, the branch of game
theory that treats agreements, e.g., wage agreements between labor and
management. In the simplest bargaining problems there are two bargainers. They
can jointly realize various outcomes, including the outcome that occurs if they
fail to reach an agreement, i.e. if they fail to help each other or co-operate.
Each bargainer assigns a certain amount of utility to each outcome. The
question is, what outcome will they realise if each conversationalist is rational?
Methods of solving bargaining problems are controversial. The best-known
proposals are Grice’s and Nash’s and Kalai and Smorodinsky’s. Grice proposes
that if you want to get a true answer to your question, you should give a true
answer to you co-conversationalist’s question (“ceteris paribus”). Nash
proposes maximizing the product of utility gains with respect to the
disagreement point. Kalai and Smorodinsky propose maximsiing utility gains with
respect to the disagreement point, subject to the constraint that the ratio of
utility gains equals the ratio of greatest possible gains. These three methods
of selecting an outcome have been axiomatically characterized. For each method,
there are certain axioms of outcome selection such that that method alone
satisfies the axioms. The axioms incorporate principles of rationality from
cooperative game theory. They focus on features of outcomes rather than
bargaining strategies. For example, one axiom requires that the outcome
selected be Pareto-optimal, i.e., be an outcome such that no alternative is
better for one of the bargainers and not worse for the other. A bargaining
problem may become more complicated in several ways. First, there may be more
than two bargainers (“Suppose Austin joins in.”). If unanimity is not required
for beneficial agreements, splinter groups or co-alitions may form. Second, the
protocol for offers, counte-roffers (“Where does C live?” “Why do you want to
know?”) etc., may be relevant. Then principles of *non-cooperative* but
competitive game theory concerning war strategies (“l’art de la guerre”) are
needed to justify this or that solution. Third, the context of a bargaining
problem may be relevant. For instance, opportunities for side payments,
differences in bargaining power, and interpersonal comparisons of utility may
influence the solution. Fourth, simplifying assumptions, such as the assumption
that bargainers have complete information about their bargaining situation, may
be discarded. Bargaining theory is part of the philosophical study of rationality.
It is also important in ethics as a foundation for contractarian theories of
morality and for certain theories of distributive justice.
CONVERSAZIONE – AIUTO
CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational helpfulness.
It’s not clear if ‘helpfulness’ has a Graeco-Roman counterpart! The Grecians
and the Romans could be VERY individualistic!adiuvare, (adiuare, old
for adiūverare), iūtus, āre,” which Lewis and Short render as “to help, assist,
aid, support, further, sustain. “fortīs fortuna adiuvat, T.: maerorem orationis
meae lacrimis suis: suā sponte eos, N.: pennis adiutus amoris, O.: in his
causis: alqm ad percipiendam virtutem: si quid te adiuero, poet ap. C.: ut alqd
consequamur, adiuvisti: multum eorum opinionem adiuvabat, quod, etc., Cs.—With
ellips. of obj, to be of assistance, help: ad verum probandum: non multum, Cs.:
quam ad rem humilitas adiuvat, is convenient, Cs.—Supin. acc.: Nectanebin
adiutum profectus, N.—P. pass.: adiutus a Demosthene, N.—Fig.: clamore militem,
cheer, L.: adiuvat hoc quoque, this too is useful, H.: curā adiuvat illam
(formam), sets off his beauty, O.
Grice is right that ‘cooperation’ does NOT equate ‘helpfulness’ and he
appropriately changes his earlier
principle of conversational helpfulness to a principle of conversational
co-operation. Was there a Graeco-Roman equivalent for Anglo-Saxon ‘help’?
helpmeet (n.) a ghost word from the 1611 translation of the Bible, where it
originally was a two-word noun-adjective phrase translating Latin adjutorium
simile sibi [Genesis ii.18] as "an help meet for him," and meaning
literally "a helper like himself." See help (n.) + meet (adj.). By
1670s it was hyphenated help-meet and mistaken as a modified noun. Compare
helpmate. The original Hebrew is 'ezer keneghdo. Related entries &
more aid (v.) "to assist,
help," c. 1400, from Old French aidier "help, assist" (Modern
French aider), from Latin adiutare, frequentative of adiuvare (past participle
adiutus) "to give help to," from ad "to" (see ad-) + iuvare
"to help, assist, give strength, support, sustain," which is from a
PIE source perhaps related to the root of iuvenis "young person" (see
young (adj.)). Related: Aided; aiding. Related entries & more succor (n.) c. 1200, socour, earlier socours
"aid, help," from Anglo-French succors "help, aid," Old
French socors, sucurres "aid, help, assistance" (Modern French
secours), from Medieval Latin succursus "help, assistance," from past
participle of Latin succurrere "run to help, hasten to the aid of,"
from assimilated form of sub "up to" (see sub-) + currere "to
run" (from PIE root *kers- "to run"). Final -s mistaken in
English as a plural inflection and dropped late 13c. Meaning "one who aids
or helps" is from c. 1300. There is a fashion in which to help is to
cooperate, but co-operate, strictly, requires operation by A and operation by
B. We do use cooperate loosely. “She is very cooperative.” “Help” seems less
formal. One can help without ever engaging or honouring the other’s goal. I can
help you buy a house, say. So the principle of conversational cooperation is
stricter and narrower than the principle of conversational helpfulness.
Cooperation involves reciprocity and mutuality in a way that helpfulness does
not. That’s why Grice needs to emphasise that there is an expectation of MUTUAL
helpfulness. One is expected to be helpful, and one expects the other to be
helpful. Grice was doubtful about the implicaturum of ‘co-operative,’after all,
who at Oxford wants a ‘co-operative.’ It sounds anti-Oxonian. So Grice
elaborates on ‘helping others’ and ‘assuming others will help you’ in the event
that we ‘are doing something together.’ Does this equate cooperation, he wonders.
Just in case, he uses ‘helpfulness’ as a variant. There are other concepts he
plays with, notably ‘altruism,’ and ‘benevolence,’ or other-love.’Helpfulness
is Grice’s favourite virtue. Grice is clear that reciprocity is essential here.
One exhibits helpfulness and expects helpfulness from his conversational
partner. He dedicates a set of seven lectures to it, entitled as follows.
Lecture 1, Prolegomena; Lecture 2: Logic and Conversation; Lecture 3: Further
notes on logic and conversation; Lecture 4: Indicative conditionals; Lecture 5:
Us meaning and intentions; Lecture 6: Us meaning, sentence-meaning, and
word-meaning; and Lecture 7: Some models for implicaturum. I hope they dont
expect me to lecture on James! Grice admired James, but not vice
versa. Grice entitled the set as being Logic and Conversation. That is the
title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was
way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second
lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, The
Logic of Grammar. The content of each lecture is indicated below. In
the first, Grice manages to quote from Witters. In the last, he
didnt! The original set consisted of seven lectures. To wit:
Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation,
Indicative Conditionals, Us meaning and intentions, Us meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word meaning, and Some models for implicaturum. They were
pretty successful at Oxford. While the notion of an implicaturum had been
introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle of
conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of
rationality involved. Observation of the principle of conversational
helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who
cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information,
influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable given that it is conducted
along the lines set by the principle of conversational helpfulness. In
Prolegomena he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a
disregard for the implicaturum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor, Senses
are not to be muliplied beyond necessity. In Indicative conditionals he tackles
Strawson on if as not representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell. The
next two lectures on the meaning by the utterer and intentions, and meaning by
the utterer, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning refine his earlier, more
austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the
lectures with an exploration on the relevance of the implicaturum to
philosophical psychology. Grice was well aware that many philosophers had
become enamoured with the s. and would love to give it a continuous perusal.
The set is indeed grandiose. It starts with a Prolegomena to set the scene: He
notably quotes himself in it, which helps, but also Strawson, which sort of
justifies the general title. In the second lecture, Logic and Conversation, he
expands on the principle of conversational helpfulness and the explicitum/implicaturum
distinctionall very rationalist! The third lecture is otiose in that he makes
fun of Ockham: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The fourth
lecture, on Indicative conditionals, is indeed on MOST of the formal devices he
had mentioned on Lecture II, notably the functors (rather than the quantifiers
and the iota operator, with which he deals in Presupposition and conversational
implicaturum, since, as he notes, they refer to reference). This lecture is the
centrepiece of the set. In the fifth lecture, he plays with mean, and discovers
that it is attached to the implicaturum or the implicitum. In the sixth
lecture, he becomes a nominalist, to use Bennetts phrase, as he deals with dog
and shaggy in terms of this or that resultant procedure. Dont ask me what they
are! Finally, in “Some models for implicaturum,” he attacks the charge of
circularity, and refers to nineteenth-century explorations on the idea of
thought without language alla Wundt. I dont think a set of James lectures had
even been so comprehensive! Conversational helpfulness. This is Grice at his
methodological best. He was aware that the type of philosophying he was about
to criticise wass a bit dated, but whats wrong with being old-fashioned? While
this may be seen as a development of his views on implicaturum at that seminal
Oxford seminar, it may also be seen as Grice popularising the views for a
New-World, non-Oxonian audience. A discussion of Oxonian philosophers of
the play group of Grice, notably Austin, Hare, Hart, and Strawson. He adds
himself for good measure (“Causal theory”). Philosophers, even at Oxford, have
to be careful with the attention that is due to general principles of
discourse. Grice quotes philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Ryle,
and some interpreters or practitioners of Oxonian analysis, such as Benjamin
and Searle. He even manages to quote from Witterss Philosophical
investigations, on seeing a banana as a banana. There are further items in the
Grice collection that address Austins manoeuvre, Austin on ifs and cans, Ifs
and cans, : conditional, power. Two of Grices favourites. He opposed
Strawsons view on if. Grice thought that if was the horseshoe of Whitehead and
Russell, provided we add an implicaturum to an entailment. The can is
merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice! Ifs and cans, intention,
disposition. Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of
free will. Pears had noted that conversational implicaturum may account for the
conditional perfection (if yields iff). Cf. Ayers on Austin on if and can.
Recall that for Grice the most idiomatic way to express a disposition is with
the Subjectsive mode, the if, and the can ‒ The ice can break. Cf. the mistake:
It is not the case that what you must do, you can do. The can-may distinction
is one Grice played with too. As with will and shall, the attachment of one
mode to one of the lexemes is pretty arbitrary and not etymologically justified
‒ pace Fowler on it being a privilege of this or that Southern Englishman as
Fowler is. If he calls it Prolegomena, he is being jocular. Philosophers
Mistakes would have been too provocative. Benjamin, or rather Broad, erred, and
so did Ryle, and Ludwig Witters, and my friends, Austin (the mater that
wobbled), and in order of seniority, Hart (I heard him defend this about
carefullystopping at every door in case a dog comes out at breakneck speed),
Hare (To say good is to approve), and Strawson (“Logical theory”: To utter if
p, q is to implicate some inferrability, To say true! is to endorseAnalysis).
If he ends with Searle, he is being jocular. He quotes Searle from an essay in
British philosophy in Lecture I, and from an essay in Philosophy in America in
Lecture V. He loved Searle, and expands on the Texas oilmens club example! We
may think of Grice as a linguistic botanizer or a meta-linguistic botanizer:
his hobby was to collect philosophers mistakes, and he catalogued them. In
Causal theory he produces his first list of seven. The pillar box seems red to
me. One cannot see a dagger as a dagger. Moore didnt know that the objects
before him were his own hands. What is actual is not also possible. For someone
to be called responsible, his action should be condemnable. A cause must be
given only of something abnormal or unusual (cf. ætiology). If you know it, you
dont believe it. In the Prolegomena, the taxonomy is more complicated. Examples
A (the use of an expression, by Austin, Benjamin, Grice, Hart, Ryle,
Wittgenstein), Examples B (Strawson on and, or, and especially if), and
Examples C (Strawson on true and Hare on goodthe performative theories). But
even if his taxonomy is more complicated, he makes it more SO by giving other
examples as he goes on to discuss how to assess the philosophical mistake. Cf.
his elaboration on trying, I saw Mrs. Smith cashing a cheque, Trying to cash a
cheque, you mean. Or cf. his remarks on remember, and There is an analogy here
with a case by Wittgenstein. In summary, he wants to say. Its the philosopher
who makes his big mistake. He has detected, as Grice has it, some
conversational nuance. Now he wants to exploit it. But before rushing ahead to
exploit the conversational nuance he has detected, or identified, or collected
in his exercise of linguistic botanising, the philosopher should let us know
with clarity what type of a nuance it is. For Grice wants to know that the
nuance depends on a general principle (of goal-directed behaviour in general,
and most likely rational) governing discoursethat participants in a
conversation should be aware of, and not on some minutiæ that has been
identified by the philosopher making the mistake, unsystematically, and merely
descriptively, and taxonomically, but without ONE drop of explanatory adequacy.
The fact that he directs this to his junior Strawson is the sad thing. The rest
are all Grices seniors! The point is of philosophical interest, rather than
other. And he keeps citing philosophers, Tarski or Ramsey, in the third James
leture, to elaborate the point about true in Prolegomena. He never seems
interested in anything but an item being of philosophical interest, even if
that means HIS and MINE! On top, he is being Oxonian: Only at Oxford my
colleagues were so obsessed, as it has never been seen anywhere else, about the
nuances of conversation. Only they were all making a big mistake in having no
clue as to what the underlying theory of conversation as rational co-operation
would simplify things for themand how! If I introduce the explicatum as a
concession, I shall hope I will be pardoned! Is Grices intention epagogic, or
diagogic in Prolegomena? Is he trying to educate Strawson, or just delighting
in proving Strawson wrong? We think the former. The fact that he quotes himself
shows that Grice is concerned with something he still sees, and for the rest of
his life will see, as a valid philosophical problem. If philosophy generated no
problems it would be dead. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Whence I took helpfulness,’; the
main sources are the two sets on ‘logic and conversation.’ There are good
paraphrases in other essays when he summarises his own views, as he did at
Urbana. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
CONVERSAZIONE – IMPERATIVO
CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational imperative:
Grice is loose in the use of ‘imperative.’ It obviously has to do with the will
in command mode! -- The problem with ‘command’ is that for Habermas, it springs
from ‘power,’ and we need to have it sprung from ‘auctoritas,’ ratherthe voice
of reason, that is“Impero” gives also pre-pare. “Imperare, prepare, etc. What
was the Greek for ‘imperative mode’? προστακτική prostaktike. προσ-τακτικός , ή, όν, A.of or for commanding, imperative,
imperious, τὸ π. [ἡ ψυχή], o τὸ ὑπηρετικόν (of the body), Arist.Top.128b19; “π.
τινῶν” Corn.ND16; “λόγος” Plu.2.1037f; Προστακτικός (sc. λόγος), title of work
by Protagoras, D.L.9.55; “βραχυλογία” Plu.Phoc.5; also of persons, “ἄρχων”
Max.Tyr.13.2 (Sup.). II. Gramm., ἡ -κὴ ἔγκλισις the imperative mood, D.T.638.7,
A.D.Synt.31.20; π. ἐκφορὰ τῶν ῥημάτων ib.69.20; “τὸ π. σχῆμα” Anon.Fig.24; also
“τὸ -κόν” D.L. 7.66,67, Ps.-Plu.Vit.Hom.53. Adv. “-κῶς” in the imperative mood,
D.H.4.18, Sch.Ar.Av.1163.Grice became famous for his ‘maxims,’ which in
Nowell-Smith’s view they are more like rules of etiquette for sylish
conversation. As such, many had been proposed. But Grice proposes them AS A
PHILOSOPHER would, and ONLY TO REBUFF the mistake made by this or that
philosopher who would rather EXPLAIN the phenomenon in terms OTHER than
involving as PART OF THE DATA, i. e. as a datum (as he says) or assumption,
that there are these ‘assumptions,’ which guide behaviour. Grice is having in mind
Kant’s “Imperativ.” He also uses ‘conversational objective.” In most versions
that Grice provides of the ‘general expectations’ of rational discourse, he
chooses the obvious imperative form. On occasion he does use ‘imperative.’
Grice is vague as to the term of choice for this or that ‘expectation.’
According to Strawson, Grice even once used ‘conversational rule,’ and he does
use ‘conversational rule of the conversational game of making this or that
conversational move.’ Notably, he also uses ‘conversational principle,’ and
‘conversational desideratum.’ And ‘maxim’! And ‘conversational directive (371),
and ‘conversational obligation’ (369). By ‘conversational maxim,’ he means
‘conversational maxim.’ He uses ‘conversational sub-maxim’ very occasionally. He
rather uses ‘conversational super-maxim.’ He uses ‘immanuel,’ and he uses
‘conversational immanuel.’ It is worth noting that the choice of word
influences the exegesis. Loar takes these things to be ‘empirical
generalisations over functional states’! And Grice agrees that there is a dull,
empiricist way, in which these things can be seen as things people conform to.
There is a quasi-contractualist approach to: things people convene on. And
there is an Ariskantian approach: things people SHOULD abide by. Surely Grice
is not requiring that the conversationalists ARE explicitly or consciously
AWARE of these things. There is a principle of effort of economical reason to
cope with that!
CONVERSAZIONE -- ENTROPIA -- Conversational
entropia -- Entropia -- conversational entropy. -- Principle
of Conversational entropy, a measure of disorder or “information.” The number
of states accessible to the various elements of a large system of particles
such as a cabbage or the air in a room is represented as “W.” Accessible
microstates might be, e. g., energy levels the various particles can reach. One
can greatly simplify the statement of certain laws of nature by introducing a
logarithmic measure of these accessible microstates. This measure, called
“entropy” by H. P. Grice is defined by the formula: SEntropy % df. klnW, where
“k” is Grice’’s constant. When the conversational entropy of a conversational
system increases, the system becomes more random and disordered (“less
dove-tailed,” in Grice’s parlance) in that a larger number of microstates
become available for the system’s particles to enter. If a large system within
which exchanges of energy occur is isolated, exchanging no energy with its
environment, the entropy of the system tends to increase and never decreases.
This result is part of the second law of thermodynamics. In real, evolving
physical systems effectively isolated from their environments, entropy
increases and thus aspects of the system’s organization that depend upon there
being only a limited range of accessible microstates are altered. A cabbage
totally isolated in a container e. g. would decay as complicated organic
molecules eventually became unstructured in the course of ongoing exchanges of
energy and attendant entropy increases. In Grice’s information theory, a state
or event (or conversational move) is said to contain more information than a
second state or event if the former state is less probable and thus in a sense
more surprising (or “baffling,” in Grice’s term) than the latter. Other plausible
constraints suggest a logarithmic measure of information content. Suppose X is
a set of alternative possible states, xi , and pxi is the probability of each xi 1 X. If state
xi has occurred the information content of that occurrence is taken to be -log2pxi
. This function increases as the probability of xi decreases. If it is unknown
which xi will occur, it is reasonable to represent the expected information
content of X as the sum of the information contents of the alternative states
xi weighted in each case by the probability of the state, giving: This is
called the Shannon’s or Grice’s entropy. Both Shannon’s and Grice’s entropy and
physical entropy can be thought of as logarithmic measures of disarray. But
this statement trades on a broad understanding of ‘disarray’. A close
relationship between the two concepts of entropy should not be assumed, not
even by Grice, less so by Shannon.
CONVERSAZIONE – IMPIEGATO
CONVERSAZIONALE – IN PLICATVM -- conversational implicaturum. Grice plays with the ambiguity of ‘implication’ as a
logical term, and ‘implicitness’ as a rhetorical one. He wants to make a
distinction between ‘dicere,’ to convey explicitly that p, and to convey
implicitly, or ‘imply’ (always applied to the emissor) that q. A joke. Surely
if he is going to use ‘implicaturum’ in Roman, this would be ‘implicaturum
conversationale,’ if there were such thing. And there were! The Roman is formed
from cum- plus ‘verso.’ So there’s Roman ‘conversatio.’ And –alis, ale is a
productive suffix. Or implicitum. Grice
is being philosophical and sticking with ‘implicatio’ as used by logicians.
Implicitum does not have much of a philosophical pedigree. But even
‘implicatio’ was not THAT used, ‘consequentia’ was preferred, as in ‘non
sequitur, and seguitur, quod demonstrandumm erat. Strawson criticism of ‘the,’
only tentative by Grice, unlike ‘if,’ so forgivable! See common-ground status. Grice
loved an implicaturum. The use of ‘conversational’ by Grice is NEVER emphatic.
In his detailed, even fastidious, taxonomy of ‘implication,’ he decisively does
not want to have a mere conventional implicaturum (as in “She was poor but she
was honest”) as conversational. Not even a “Thank you”, generated by the maxim
“be polite.” That would be an implicaturum which is nonconventional and yet NOT
conversational, because ‘be polite’ is NOT a conversational maxim (moral,
aesthetic, and social maxims are not). And an implicaturum. An elaboration of
his Oxonian seminar on Logic and conversation. Theres a principle of
conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational
candour and a desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of
conversational self-interest clashing with the sub-principle of conversational
benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis
for a conversational implicaturum, as his term of art goes. Observation of the
principle of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the
following lines: anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is
supposed to serve ‒ give/receive information, influence/be influenced ‒ should
only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the
assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of
conversational helfpulness, and attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice
takes special care in listing tests for the proof that an implicaturum is
conversational in this rather technical usage: a conversational implicaturum is
rationally calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or
stance that the addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being
helpful), non-detachable, indeterminate, and very cancellable, thus never part
of the sense and never an entailment of this or that piece of philosophical
vocabulary, in Davidson and Harman, the logic of Grammar, also in Cole and
Morgan, repr. in a revised form in Grice, logic and conversation, the second
James lecture, : principle of conversational helpfulness, implicaturum,
cancellability. While the essay was also repr. by Cole and Morgan. Grice
always cites it from the two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar, ed. by
Davidson and Harman. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter
Grice through this essay. A philosopher usually gets first acquainted with his
In defence of a dogma, or Meaning. In Logic and Conversation, Grice
re-utilises the notion of an implicaturum and the principle of conversational helpfulness
that he introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. The idea Grice is that
the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational
(reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the
two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive information,
to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it
is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational
helfpulness. Grices point is methodological. He is not at all interested
in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts in
media res, and skips Grices careful list of Oxonian examples of disregard
for the key idea of what a conversant implicates by the conversational
move he makes. His concession is that there is an explicatum or explicitum
(roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This
concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent,
conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by
a few philosophers leaving them confused. I do not know what Davidson and
Harman were thinking when they reprinted just this in The logic of grammar. I
mean: it is obviously in media res. Grice starts with the logical devices, and
never again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and
hyperbole, and surely the philosopher who bought The logic of grammar must be
left puzzled. He has to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion.
Oxonian philosophers would, out of etiquette, hardly quote from unpublished
material! Cohen had to rely on memory, and thats why he got all his Grice
wrong! And so did Strawson in If and the horseshoe. Even Walker responding to
Cohen is relying on memory. Few philosophers quote from The logic of grammar.
At Oxford, everybody knew what Grice was up to. Hare was talking implicaturum
in Mind, and Pears was talking conversational implicaturum in Ifs and cans. And
Platts was dedicating a full chapter to “Causal Theory”. It seems the Oxonian
etiquette was to quote from Causal Theory. It was obvious that Grices
implication excursus had to read implicaturum! In a few dictionaries of
philosophy, such as Hamlyns, under implication, a reference to Grices locus
classicus Causal theory is madePassmore quotes from Causal theory in Hundred
years of philosophy. Very few Oxonians would care to buy a volume published in
Encino. Not many Oxonian philosophers ever quoted The logic of grammar, though.
At Oxford, Grices implicatura remained part of the unwritten doctrines of a
few. And philosophers would not cite a cajoled essay in the references. The implicaturum
allows a display of truth-functional Grice. For substitutional-quantificational
Grice we have to wait for his treatment of the. In Prolegomena, Grice had
quoted verbatim from Strawsons infamous idea that there is a sense of
inferrability with if. While the lecture covers much more than if (He only said
if; Oh, no, he said a great deal more than that! the title was never meant to
be original. Grice in fact provides a rational justification for the three
connectives (and, or, and if) and before that, the unary functor not.
Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, not and If, Sinton on Grice on
denials of indicative conditionals, not, if. Strawson had elaborated on
what he felt was a divergence between Whiteheads and Russells horseshoe, and
if. Grice thought Strawsons observations could be understood in terms of
entailment + implicaturum (Robbing Peter to Pay Paul). But problems, as first
noted to Grice, by Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicaturum
within the operation of, say, negation. Analogous problems arise with implicatura
for the other earlier dyadic functors, and and or, and Grice looks for a single
explanation of the phenomenon. The qualification indicative is modal.
Ordinary language allows for if utterances to be in modes other than the
imperative. Counter-factual, if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical,
Subjectsive is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a cavalier to the
problem: Surely it wont do to say You couldnt have done that, since you were in
Seattle, to someone who figuratively tells you hes spend the full summer
cleaning the Aegean stables. This, to philosophers, is the centerpiece of the
lectures. Grice takes good care of not, and, or, and concludes with the if of
the title. For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook Wilson in Statement and
Inference. And they all connect with rationality. So he is using material from
his Oxford seminars on the principle of conversational helpfulness. Plus Cook
Wilson makes more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The last bit, citing Kripke
and Dummett, is meant as jocular. What is important is the teleological
approach to the operators, where a note should be made about dyadicity. In
Prolegomena, when he introduces the topic, he omits not (about which he was almost
obsessed!). He just gives an example for and (He went to bed and took off his
dirty boots), one for or (the garden becomes Oxford and the kitchen becomes
London, and the implicaturum is in terms, oddly, of ignorance: My wife is
either in town or country,making fun of Town and Country), and if. His
favourite illustration for if is Cock Robin: If the Sparrow did not kill him,
the Lark did! This is because Grice is serious about the erotetic, i.e.
question/answer, format Cook Wilson gives to things, but he manages to bring
Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just to impress! Most importantly, he
introduces the square brackets! Hell use them again in Presupposition and
Conversational Implicaturum and turns them into subscripts in Vacuous Namess.
This is central. For he wants to impoverish the idea of the implicaturum. The
explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is syntactic-cum-pragmatic import.
The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable, and as he knows: what the eye
no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for! The modal implicaturum.
Since Grice uses indicative, for the title of his third James lecture
(Indicative Conditionals) surely he implicates subjunctive ‒ i.e.
that someone might be thinking that he should give an account of indicative-cum-subjective.
This relates to an example Grice gives in Causal theory, that he does not
reproduce in Prolegomena. Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows.
What is actual is not also possible. Grice seems to be suggesting that a
subjective conditional would involve one or other of the modalities, he is not
interested in exploring. On the other hand, Mackie has noted that Grices
conversationalist hypothesis (Mackie quotes verbatim from Grices principle of
conversational helpfulness) allows for an explanation of the Subjectsive if
that does not involve Kripke-type paradoxes involving possible worlds, or
other. In Causal Theory, Grice notes that the issue with which he has been
mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an
isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would he
thinks need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently
parallel to the thesis which Grice has been discussing to be amenable to
treatment of the same general kind. An examples which occurs to me is the
following. What is actual is not also possible. I must emphasise that I am not
saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been
criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more
generally, the position adopted by Grices objector seems to Grice to involve a
type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of
philosophizing. He is not condemning that kind of manoeuvre. He is merely
suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with
the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have
detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances
they are. If was also of special interest to Grice for many other reasons. He
defends a dispositional account of intending that in terms of ifs and cans. He
considers akrasia conditionally. He explored the hypothetical-categorical
distinction in the buletic mode. He was concerned with therefore as involved
with the associated if of entailment. Refs.: “Implicaturum” is introduced
in Essay 2 in WoWbut there are scattered references elsewhere. He often uses
the plural ‘implicatura’ too, as in “Retrospective Epilogue,” The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC. An implicaturum requires a complexum. Frege was the topic of the explorations
by Dummett. A tutee of Grices once brought Dummetts Frege to a tutorial
and told Grice that he intended to explore this. Have you read it? No I havent,
Grice answered. And after a pause, he went on: And I hope I will not. Hardly
promising, the tutee thought. Some authors, including Grice, but alas, not
Frege, have noted some similarities between Grices notion of a conventional implicaturum
and Freges schematic and genial rambles on colouring. Aber Farbung, as Frege
would state! Grice was more interested in the idea of a Fregeian sense, but he
felt that if he had to play with Freges aber he should! One of Grices
metaphysical construction-routines, the Humeian projection, is aimed at the
generation of concepts, in most cases the rational reconstruction of an
intuitive concept displayed in ordinary discourse. We arrive at something
like a Fregeian sense. Grice exclaimed, with an intonation of Eureka, almost.
And then he went back to Frege. Grices German was good, so he could read
Frege, in the vernacular. For fun, he read Frege to his children (Grices, not
Freges): In einem obliquen Kontext, Frege says, Grice says, kann ja z. B. die
Ersetzung eines „aber durch ein „und, die in einem direkten Kontext keinen
Unterschied des Wahrheitswerts ergibt, einen solchen Unterschied bewirken. Ill
make that easy for you, darlings: und is and, and aber is but. But surely,
Papa, aber is not cognate with but! Its not. That is Anglo-Saxon, for you. But
is strictly Anglo-Saxon short for by-out; we lost aber when we sailed the North
Sea. Grice went on: Damit wird eine Abgrenzung von Sinn und Färbung (oder
Konnotationen) eines Satzes fragwürdig. I. e. he is saying that She was poor
but she was honest only conventionally implicates that there is a contrast
between her poverty and her honesty. I guess he heard the ditty during the War?
Grice ignored that remark, and went on: Appell und Kundgabe wären ferner von
Sinn und Färbung genauer zu unterscheiden. Ich weiß so auf interessante
Bedeutungs Komponenten hin, bemüht sich aber nicht, sie genauer zu
differenzieren, da er letztlich nur betonen will, daß sie in der Sprache der
Logik keine Rolle spielen. They play a role in the lingo, that is! What do?
Stuff like but. But surely they are not rational conversational implicatura!?
No, dear, just conventional tricks you can ignore on a nice summer day! Grice
however was never interested in what he dismissively labels the conventional implicaturum.
He identifies it because he felt he must! Surely, the way some Oxonian
philosophers learn to use stuff like, on the one hand, and on the other, (or
how Grice learned how to use men and de in Grecian), or so, or therefore, or
but versus and, is just to allow that he would still use imply in such cases.
But surely he wants conversational to stick with rationality: conversational
maxim and converational implicaturum only apply to things which can be
justified transcendentally, and not idiosyncrasies of usage! Grice follows
Church in noting that Russell misreads Frege as being guilty of ignoring the
use-mention distinction, when he doesnt. One thing that Grice minimises is that
Freges assertion sign is composite. Tha is why Baker prefers to use the dot “.”
as the doxastic correlative for the buletic sign ! which is NOT composite. The
sign „├‟ is composite. Frege explains his Urteilstrich, the vertical component
of his sign ├ as conveying assertoric force. The principal role of the
horizontal component as such is to prevent the appearance of assertoric force
belonging to a token of what does not express a thought (e.g. the expression
22). ─p expresses a thought even if p does not.) cf. Hares four sub-atomic
particles: phrastic (dictum), neustic (dictor), tropic, and clistic. Cf. Grice
on the radix controversy: We do not want the “.” in p to become a vanishing
sign. Grices Frege, Frege, Words, and Sentences, Frege, Farbung, aber. Frege
was one of Grices obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum,
a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the
generation of conversational implicatura, that can only mean progress for
philosophy! Fregeian senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The
employment of the routine of Humeian projection may be expected to deliver for
us, as its result, a conceptthe concept(ion) of value, say, in something
like a Fregeian sense, rather than an object. There is also a strong
affinity between Freges treatment of colouring (of the German particle aber,
say) and Grices idea of a convetional implicaturum (She was poor, but she was
honest,/and her parents were the same,/till she met a city feller,/and she lost
her honest Names, as the vulgar Great War ditty went). Grice does not seem interested
in providing a philosophical exploration of conventional implicatura, and there
is a reason for this. Conventional implicatura are not essentially
connected, as conversational implicatura are, with rationality. Conventional implicatura
cannot be calculable. They have less of a philosophical interest, too, in that
they are not cancellable. Grice sees cancellability as a way to prove some
(contemporary to him, if dated) ordinary-language philosophers who analyse an
expression in terms of sense and entailment, where a cancellable conversational
implicaturum is all there is (to it). He mentions Benjamin in
Prolegomena, and is very careful in noting how Benjamin misuses a Fregeian
sense. In his Causal theory, Grice lists another mistake: What is known to be
the case is not believed to be the case. Grice gives pretty few example of
a conventional implicaturum: therefore, as in the utterance by Jill: Jack is an
Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. This is interesting because therefore
compares to so which Strawson, in PGRICE, claims is the asserted counterpart to
if. But Strawson is never associated with the type of linguistic botany
that Grice is. Grice also mentions the idiom, on the one hand/on the other
hand, in some detail in “Epilogue”: My aunt was a nurse in the Great War; my
sister, on the other hand, lives on a peak at Darien. Grice thinks that
Frege misuses the use-mention distinction but Russell corrects that. Grice
bases this on Church. And of course he is obsessed with the assertion sign by
Frege, which Grice thinks has one stroke tooo many. The main reference is give
above for ‘complexum.’ Those without a philosophical background tend to ignore
a joke by Grice. His echoing Kant in the James is a joke, in the sense that he
is using Katns well-known to be pretty artificial quartet of ontological
caegories to apply to a totally different phenomenon: the taxonomy of the
maxims! In his earlier non-jocular attempts, he applied more philosophical
concepts with a more serious rationale. His key concept, conversation as
rational co-operation, underlies all his attempts. A pretty worked-out model is
in terms then of this central, or overarching principle of conversational
helpfulness (where conversation as cooperation need not be qualified as
conversation as rational co-operation) and being structured by two contrasting
sub-principles: the principle of conversational benevolence (which almost
overlaps with the principle of conversational helpfulness) and the slightly
more jocular principle of conversational self-love. There is something
oxymoronic about self-love being conversational, and this is what leads to replace
the two subprinciples by a principle of conversational helfpulness (as used in
WoW:IV) simpliciter. His desideratum of conversational candour is key. The
clash between the desideratum of conversational candour and the desideratum of
conversational clarity (call them supermaxims) explains why I believe that p
(less clear than p) shows the primacy of candour over clarity. The idea remains
of an overarching principle and a set of more specific guidelines. Non-Oxonian
philosophers would see Grices appeal to this or that guideline as ad hoc, but
not his tutees! Grice finds inspiration in Joseph Butler’s sermon on benevolence
and self-love, in his sermon 9, upon the love of our neighbour, preached on
advent Sunday. And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly
comprehended in this saying, Namesly, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,
Romans xiii. 9. It is commonly observed, that there is a disposition in
men to complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they
live, as greater than that of former ones: which is usually followed with this
further observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all
times. Now, to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts
of history: thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly takes
different turns, and some particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in
some ages than in others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the
distinction of the present, to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards
to self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly. Upon this account it
seems worth while to inquire, whether private interest is likely to be promoted
in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over
all other principles; "or whether the contracted affection may not
possibly be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own
end, private good?" Repr. in revised form as WOW, I. Grice felt
the need to go back to his explantion (cf. Fisher, Never contradict. Never
explain) of the nuances about seem and cause (“Causal theory”.). Grice uses ‘My
wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom,’ by Smith, as relying on a requirement
of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations on a theme by Grice.
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged. Variations on a theme by Grice. I wish to represent a
certain subclass of non-conventional implicaturcs, which I shall
call conversational implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with
certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what
these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a
general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession
of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of
purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction
may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for
discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite,
or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the
participants, as in a casual conversation. But at each stage, some possible
conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might
then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected
ceteris paribus to observe, viz.: Make your conversational contribution such as
is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this
the co-operative principle. We might then formulate a rough general principle
which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to
observe, viz.: Make your contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative
Principle. Strictly, the principle itself is not co-operative: conversants
are. Less literary variant: Make your move such as is required by the
accepted goal of the conversation in which you are engaged. But why logic and
conversation? Logica had been part of the trivium for ages ‒ Although they
called it dialectica, then. Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by
Strawsons treatment of the formal devices in “Introduction to logical theory”
(henceforth, “Logical theory”), Grice targets these, in their
ordinary-discourse counterparts. Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his
logic tutorStrawson was following a PPE., and his approach to logic is
practical. His philosophy tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit.
Hum. the situation is different. Grice knows that the Categoriae and De Int. of
his beloved Aristotle are part of the Logical Organon which had been so
influential in the history of philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile
Strawsons observations with the idea that the formal devices reproduce some
sort of explicatum, or explicitum, as identified by Whitehead and Russell in
Principia Mathematica. In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general
features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation. The
alleged divergence between the ordinary-language operators and their formal
counterparts is explained in terms of the conversational implicatura,
then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has
to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal
device and its alleged ordinary-language counterpart, while still assuming that
U is engaged in a co-operative transaction. The utterer and his
addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation ‒
the exchange of information and the institution of decisions ‒ and
judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and
rational) if conducted under some form of principle of conversational
helpfulness. The observation of a principle of conversational
helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone
who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption
that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational
helpfulness. In titling his seminar Logic and conversation, Grice is
thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal “Logical theory,” that every
Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he never
ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti
Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he
acknwoledges Grices difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the
strength or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses
an adjective that Grice will seldom do, pragmatic. On top, Strawson attributes
the adjective to rule. For Grice, in Strawsons wording, there is this or that
pragmatic rule to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a
weaker conversational move. Strawsons Introduction was published before Grice
aired his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then Grice takes
the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important in that it
is Grices occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as
generating implicatura under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes
it obvious that Grices interest is methodological, and not philological. He is
not interest in conversation per se, but only as the source for his principle
of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational implicaturum,
which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his
expression does, a distinction apparently denied by Witters and all too
frequently ignored by Austin. Logic and conversation, an Oxford seminar, implicaturum,
principle of conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational implicaturum,
conversational implicaturum. Conversational Implicaturum Grices main
invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer implies
and what his expression does. A distinction apparently denied by Witters,
and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin. Grice is
implicating that Austins sympathies were for the Subjectsification of
Linguistic Nature. Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses
sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicaturum,
which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly
particularized. His gives an Oxonian example. I can very well mean that my
tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering It is
raining.Grice notes that since the object of the present exercise, is to
provide a bit of theory which will explain, for a certain family of
cases, why is it that a particular implicaturum is present, I
would suggest that the final test of the adequacy and utility of this
model should be: can it be used to construct an explanation of
the presence of such an implicaturum, and is it more comprehensive
and more economical than any rival? is the no
doubt pre-theoretical explanation which one would be prompted to give
of such an implicaturum consistent with, or better still a favourable pointer
towards the requirements involved in the model? cf. Sidonius: Far otherwise:
whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy, the Stoics,
Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their
own engines; for their heathen followers, if they resist the doctrine and
spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be caught in their own
familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their own toils; the barbed
syllogism of your arguments will hook the glib tongues of the
casuists, and it is you who will tie up their slippery
questions in categorical clews, after the manner of a clever
physician, who, when compelled by reasoned thought, prepares antidotes for
poison even from a serpent.qvin potivs experietvr qvisqve conflixerit stoicos
cynicos peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis propriis qvoqve concvti
machinamentis nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati ac sensvi si
repvgnaverint mox te magistro ligati vernaculis implicaturis in retia
sua præcipites implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ propositionis vncatis volvbilem
tergiversantvm lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris categoricis lubricas qvæstiones
tv potivs innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui remedivm contra venena cum ratio
compellit et de serpente conficivnt. If he lectured on Logic and
Conversation on implicaturum, Grice must have thought that Strawsons area was
central. Yet, as he had done in Causal theory and as he will at Harvard, Grice
kept collecting philosophers mistakes. So its best to see Grice as a
methodologist, and as using logic and conversation as an illustration of his
favourite manoeuvre, indeed, central philosophical manoeuver that gave him a
place in the history of philosophy. Restricting this manoeuvre to just an area
minimises it. On the other hand, there has to be a balance: surely logic and
conversation is a topic of intrinsic interest, and we cannot expect all
philosophersunless they are Griceiansto keep a broad unitarian view of
philosophy as a virtuous whole. Philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
Destructive implicaturum to it: Mr. Puddle is our man in æsthetics implicates
that he is not good at it. What is important to Grice is that the mistakes of
these philosophers (notably Strawson!) arise from some linguistic phenomena, or,
since we must use singular expressions this or that linguistic phenomenon. Or
as Grice puts it, it is this or that linguistic phenomenon which provides the
material for the philosopher to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory
of conversation as rational co-operation is positedtechnically, as a way to
explain (never merely describe, which Grice found boring ‒ if English, cf. never
explain, never apologise ‒ Jacky Fisher: Never contradict. Never explain.)
these phenomenahis principle of conversational helpfulness and the idea of a
conversational implicaturum. The latter is based not so much on rationality per
se, but on the implicit-explicit distinction that he constantly plays with,
since his earlier semiotic-oriented explorations of Peirce. But back to this or
that linguistic phenomenon, while he would make fun of Searle for providing
this or that linguistic phenomenon that no philosopher would ever feel excited
about, Grice himself was a bit of a master in illustrating this a philosophical
point with this or that linguistic phenomenon that would not be necessarily
connected with philosophy. Grice rarely quotes authors, but surely the section
in “Causal theory,” where he lists seven philosophical theses (which are
ripe for an implicaturum treatment) would be familiar enough for anybody to be
able to drop a names to attach to each. At Harvard, almost every example Grice
gives of this or that linguistic phenomenon is UN-authored (and sometimes he
expands on his own view of them, just to amuse his audienceand show how
committed to this or that thesis he was), but some are not unauthored. And they
all belong to the linguistic turn: In his three groups of examples, Grice
quotes from Ryle (who thinks he knows about ordinary language), Witters, Austin
(he quotes him in great detail, from Pretending, Plea of excuses, and No
modification without aberration,), Strawson (in “Logical theory” and on Truth
for Analysis), Hart (as I have heard him expand on this), Grice, Searle, and
Benjamin. Grice implicates Hare on ‘good,’ etc. When we mention the
explicit/implicit distinction as source for the implicaturum, we are referring
to Grices own wording in Retrospective epilogue where he mentions an utterer as
conveying in some explicit fashion this or that, as opposed to a gentler, more
(midland or southern) English, way, via implicaturum, or implIciture, if you
mustnt. Cf. Fowler: As a southern Englishman, Ive stopped trying teaching a
northern Englishman the distinction between ought and shall. He seems to get it
always wrong. It may be worth exploring how this connects with rationality. His
point would be that that an assumption that the rational principle of
conversational helpfulness is in order allows P-1 not just to convey in a
direct explicit fashion that p, but in an implicit fashion that q, where q is
the implicaturum. The principle of conversational helpfulness as generator of
this or that implicatura, to use Grices word (generate). Surely, He took off
his boots and went to bed; I wont say in which order sounds hardly in the vein
of conversational helpfulnessbut provided Grice does not see it as logically
incoherent, it is still a rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The point
may be difficult to discern, but you never know. The utterer may be conveying,
Viva Boole. Grices point about rationality is mentioned in his later
Prolegomena, on at least two occasions. Rational behaviour is the phrase he
uses (as applied first to communication and then to discourse) and in stark
opposition with a convention-based approach he rightly associates with Austin.
Grice is here less interested here as he will be on rationality, but
coooperation as such. Helpfulness as a reasonable expecation (normative?), a
mutual one between decent chaps, as he puts it. His charming decent chap is so
Oxonian. His tutee would expect no less ‒ and indeed no more! A rather obscure
exploration on the connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice
is aware that there is an allegation in the air about a possible vicious circle
in trying to define category of expression in terms of a category of
representation. He does not provide a solution to the problem which hell take
up in his Method in philosophical psychology, in his role of President of the
APA. It is the implicaturum behind the lecture that matters, since Grice
will go back to it, notably in the Retrospective Epilogue. For Grice, its all
rational enough. Theres a P, in a situation, say of dangera bull ‒. He
perceives the bull. The bulls attack causes this perception. Bull! the P1 G1
screams, and causes in P2 G2 a rearguard movement. So where is
the circularity? Some pedants would have it that Bull cannot be understood in a
belief about a bull which is about a bull. Not Grice. It is nice that he
brought back implicaturum, which had become obliterated in the lectures, back
to title position! But it is also noteworthy, that these are not explicitly
rationalist models for implicaturum. He had played with a model, and an
explanatory one at that, for implicaturum, in his Oxford seminar, in terms of a
principle of conversational helpfulness, a desideratum of conversational
clarity, a desideratum of conversational candour, and two sub-principles: a
principle of conversational benevolence, and a principle of conversational self-interest!
Surely Harvard could be spared of the details! Implicaturum. Grice disliked a
presupposition. BANC also contains a folder for Odd ends: Urbana and
non-Urbana. Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He
originally baptised it System Q in honour of Quine. At a later stage, Myro
will re-Names it System G, in a special version, System GHP, a highly
powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G, in gratitude to Grice. Odd
Ends: Urbana and Not Urbana, Odds and ends: Urbana and not Urbana, or
not-Urbana, or Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, or Oddents, urbane and not
urbane, semantics, Urbana lectures. The Urbana lectures are on language
and reality. Grice keeps revising them, as these items show. Language and
reality, The University of Illinois at Urbana, The Urbana Lectures, Language
and reference, language and reality, The Urbana lectures, University of
Illinois at Urbana, language, reference, reality. Grice favours a
transcendental approach to communication. A beliefs by a communicator
worth communicating has to be true. An order by a communicator worth
communicating has to be satisfactory. The fourth lecture is the one Grice dates
in WOW . Smith has not ceased from beating his wife, presupposition and
conversational implicaturum, in Radical pragmatics, ed. by R. Cole, repr. in a
revised form in Grice, WOW, II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics,
essay, presupposition and implicaturum, presupposition, conversational implicaturum,
implicaturum, Strawson. Grice: The loyalty examiner will not summon you, do not
worry. The cancellation by Grice could be pretty subtle. Well, the loyalty
examiner will not be summoning you at any rate. Grice goes back to the issue of
negation and not. If, Grice notes, is is a matter of dispute whether the
government has a very undercover person who interrogates those whose loyalty is
suspect and who, if he existed, could be legitimately referred to as the
loyalty examiner; and if, further, I am known to be very sceptical about the
existence of such a person, I could perfectly well say to a plainly loyal
person, Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate,
without, Grice would think, being taken to imply that such a person
exists. Further, if the utterer U is well known to disbelieve in the existence
of such a person, though others are inclined to believe in him, when U finds a
man who is apprised of Us position, but who is worried in case he is summoned,
U may try to reassure him by uttering, The loyalty examiner will not summon you,
do not worry. Then it would be clear that U uttered this because U is sure
there is no such person. The lecture was variously reprinted, but the Urbana
should remain the preferred citation. There are divergences in the various
drafts, though. The original source of this exploration was a seminar.
Grice is interested in re-conceptualising Strawsons manoeuvre regarding
presupposition as involving what Grice disregards as a metaphysical concoction:
the truth-value gap. In Grices view, based on a principle of conversational
tailoring that falls under his principle of conversational
helpfulness ‒ indeed under the desideratum of conversational clarity
(be perspicuous [sic]). The king of France is bald entails there is a king of
France; while The king of France aint bald merely implicates it. Grice
much preferred Collingwoods to Strawsons presuppositions! Grice thought, and
rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicaturum was to gain
Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawsons idea of the
præ-suppositum. Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with
Quines idea of a truth-value gap. Grice shows that neither the metaphysical
concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the
præ-suppositum is needed. The king of France is bald entails that there is a
king of France. It is part of what U is logically committed to by what he
explicitly conveys. By uttering, The king of France is not bald on the other
hand, U merely implicitly conveys or implicates that there is a king of France.
A perfectly adequate, or impeccable, as Grice prefers, cancellation, abiding
with the principle of conversational helpfulness is in the offing. The king of
France ain’t bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain’t real!
Grice credits Sluga for having pointed out to him the way to deal with the
definite descriptor or definite article or the iota quantifier the formally.
One thing Russell discovered is that the variable denoting function is to be
deduced from the variable propositional function, and is not to be taken as an
indefinable. Russell tries to do without the iota i as an indefinable, but
fails. The success by Russell later, in On denoting, is the source of all his
subsequent progress. The iota quantifier consists of an inverted iota to be
read the individuum x, as in (℩x).F(x). Grice opts for the
Whiteheadian-Russellian standard rendition, in terms of the iota operator.
Grices take on Strawson is a strong one. The king of France is bald; entails
there is a king of France, and what the utterer explicitly conveys is
doxastically unsatisfactory. The king of France aint bald does not. By uttering
The king of France aint bald U only implicates that there is a king of France,
and what he explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Grice knew he was
not exactly robbing Peter to pay Paul, or did he? It is worth placing the
lecture in context. Soon after delivering in the New World his exploration on
the implicaturum, Grice has no better idea than to promote Strawsons philosophy
in the New World. Strawson will later reflect on the colder shores of the Old
World, so we know what Grice had in mind! Strawsons main claim to fame in the
New World (and at least Oxford in the Old World) was his On referring, where he
had had the cheek to say that by uttering, The king of France is not bald, the
utterer implies that there is a king of France (if not that, as Grice has it,
that what U explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Strawson later
changed that to the utterer presupposes that there is a king of France. So
Grice knows what and who he was dealing with. Grice and Strawson had
entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson was particularly keen on that turn of
phrase he learned from Quine, the truth-value gap. Grice, rather, found it
pretty repulsive: Tertium exclusum! So, Grice goes on to argue that by uttering
The king of France is bald, one entailment of what U explicitly conveys is
indeed There is a king of France. However, in its negative co-relate, things
change. By uttering The king of France aint bald, the utterer merely implicitly
conveys or implicates (in a pretty cancellable format) that there is a king of
France. The king of France aint bald: theres no king of France! The loyalty
examiner is like the King of France, in ways! The piece is crucial for Grices
re-introduction of the square-bracket device: [The king of France] is bald;
[The king of France] aint bald. Whatever falls within the scope of the square brackets
is to be read as having attained common-ground status and therefore, out of the
question, to use Collingwoods jargon! Grice was very familiar with Collingwood
on presupposition, meant as an attack on Ayer. Collingwoods reflections on
presuppositions being either relative or absolute may well lie behind Grices
metaphysical construction of absolute value! The earliest exploration by Grice
on this is his infamous, Smith has not ceased from beating his wife, discussed
by Ewing in Meaninglessness for Mind. Grice goes back to the example in the
excursus on implying that in Causal Theory, and it is best to revisit this
source. Note that in the reprint in WOW Grice does NOT go, one example of
presupposition, which eventually is a type of conversational implicaturum.
Grices antipathy to Strawsons presupposition is metaphysical: he dislikes the
idea of a satisfactory-value-gap, as he notes in the second paragraph to Logic
and conversation. And his antipathy crossed the buletic-doxastic divide! Using φ to represent a sentence in either mode,
he stipulate that ~φ is satisfactory just in case ⌈φ⌉ is unsatisfactory. A crunch,
as he puts it, becomes obvious: ~ ⊢The king of France is bald may perhaps be
treated as equivalent to ⊢~(The king of
France is bald). But what about ~!Arrest the intruder? What do we say in cases
like, perhaps, Let it be that I now put my hand on my head or Let it be that my
bicycle faces north, in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that
neither !p nor !~p is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory? If !p is neither
satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (if that make sense, which doesnt to me), does
the philosopher assign a third buletically satisfactory value (0.5) to !p
(buletically neuter, or indifferent). Or does the philosopher say that we have
a buletically satisfactory value gap, as Strawson, following Quine, might
prefer? This may require careful consideration; but I cannot see that the
problem proves insoluble, any more than the analogous problem connected with
Strawsons doxastic presupposition is insoluble. The difficulty is not so much
to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present
themselves. The main reference is Essay 2 in WoW, but there are scattered
references elsewhere. Refs.: The main sources are the two
sets of ‘logic and conversation,’ in BANC, but there are scattered essays on ‘implicaturum’
simpliciter, too -- “Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum,” c. 2-f. 25; and “Convesational implicaturum,” c.
4-f. 9, “Happiness, discipline, and implicaturums,” c. 7-f. 6; “Presupposition
and implicaturum,” c. 9-f. 3, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
CONVERSAZIONE -- MANUALE
CONVERSAZIONALE – L’IMMANUEL CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational manual: -- Grice was fascinated by the etymology of ‘etiquette’from
Frankish *stikkan, cognate with Old English stician "to pierce," from
Proto-Germanic *stikken "to be stuck," stative form from PIE *steig-
"to stick; pointed" (It.
etichetta) -- of conversational rational etiquette -- conversational iimmanuel,
cnversational manual. Before playing with ‘immanuel,’ Grice does use ‘manual’
more technically. A know-how. “Surely, I can have a manual, but don’t know how
to play bridge.” “That’s not how I’m using ‘manual.’” It should be pointed out
that it’s the visual thing that influenced. When people (especially
non-philosophers) saw the list of maxims, they thought: “Washington!” “A
manual!”. In the Oxford seminrs, Grice was never so ‘additive.’ His desideratum
of conversational clarity, his desideratum of conversational candour, his
principle of conversational self-love and his principle of conversational
benevolence, plus his principle of conversational helpfulness, were meant as
‘philosophical’ leads to explain this or that philosophical mistake. The
seminars were given for philosophy tutees. And Grice is playing on the ‘manuals
of etiquette’conversational etiquette. If you do not BELONG to this targeted
audience, it is likely that you’ll misconstrue Grice’s point, and you will!
Especially R. T. L.!The Gentlemen's Book of Etiquette and Manual of Politeness
Being a Complete Guide for a Gentleman's Conduct in All His Relations Towards
Society by Cecil B. Hartley. Wit and vivacity are two highly important
ingredients in the conversation of a man in polite society, yet a straining for
effect, or forced wit, is in excessively bad taste. There is no one more
insupportable in society than the everlasting talkers who scatter puns,
witticisms, and jokes with so profuse a hand that they become as tiresome as a
comic newspaper, and whose loud laugh at their own wit drowns other voices
which might speak matter more interesting. The really witty man does not shower
forth his wit so indiscriminately; his charm consists in wielding his powerful
weapon delicately and easily, and making each highly polished witticism come in
the right place and moment to be effectual. While real wit is a most delightful
gift, and its use a most charming accomplishment, it is, like many other bright
weapons, dangerous to use too often. You may wound where you meant only to
amuse, and remarks which you mean only in for general applications, may be
construed into personal affronts, so, if you have the gift, use it wisely, and
not too freely. The most important requisite for a good conversational power is
education, and, by this is meant, not merely the matter you may store in your
memory from observation or books, though this is of vast importance, but it
also includes the developing of the mental powers, and, above all, the
comprehension. An English writer says, “A man should be able, in order to enter
into conversation, to catch rapidly the meaning of anything that is advanced;
for instance, though you know nothing of science, you should not be obliged to
stare and be silent, when a man who does understand it is explaining a new
discovery or a new theory; though you have not read a word of Blackstone, your
comprehensive powers should be sufficiently acute to enable you to take in the
statement that may be made of a recent cause; though you may not have read some
particular book, you should be capable of appreciating the criticism which you
hear of it. Without such power—simple enough, and easily attained by attention
and practice, yet too seldom met with in general society—a conversation which
departs from the most ordinary topics cannot be maintained without the risk of
lapsing into a lecture; with such power, society becomes instructive as well as
amusing, and you have no remorse at an evening’s end at having wasted three or
four hours in profitless banter, or simpering platitudes. This facility of
comprehension often startles us in some women, whose education we know to have
been poor, and whose reading is limited. If they did not rapidly receive your
ideas, they could not, therefore, be fit companions for intellectual men, and
it is, perhaps, their consciousness of a deficiency which leads them to pay the
more attention to what you say. It is this which makes married women so much
more agreeable to men of thought than young ladies, as a rule, can be, for they
are accustomed to the society of a husband, and the effort to be a companion to
his mind has engrafted the habit of attention and ready reply.” Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “Paget’s conversational manual.”
CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA
CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational maxim.
The idea of a maxim implies freewill and freedom in general. A beautiful thing
about Grice’s conversational maxims is that surely they do not ‘need to be
necessarily’ independent, as Strawson and Wiggins emphatically put it (p.520).
The important thing is other. A conversational maxim is UNIVERSALISABLE (v.
universalierung) into a ‘manual,’ the “Immanuel,” strictly, the “Conversational
Immanuel.” Grice is making fun of those ‘conversational manuals’ for the
learning of some European language in the Grand Tour (as in “Learn Swiss in
five easy lessons”). Grice is echoing Kant. Maximen (subjektive Grundsätze):
selbstgesetzte Handlungsregeln, die ein Wollen ausdrücken, vs. Imperative
(objektive Grundsätze): durch praktische Vernunft bestimmt; Ratschläge, moralisch
relevante Grundsätze. („das Gesetz aber ist das objektive Prinzip, gültig für
jedes vernünftige Wesen, und der Grundsatz, nach dem es handeln soll, d. i. ein
Imperativ.“) das Problem ist jedoch die Subjektivität der Maxime. When
considering Grice’s concept of a ‘conversational maxim,’ one has to be careful.
First, he hesitated as to the choice of the label. He used ‘objective’ and
‘desideratum’ before. And while few cite this, in WoW:PandCI he adds oneleading
the number of maxims to ten, what he called the ‘conversational catalogue.’ So
when exploring the maxims, it is not necessary to see their dependence on the
four functions that Kant tabulated: quantitas, qualitas, relatio, and modus, or
quantity, quality, relation, and mode (Grice follows Meiklejohn’s translation),
but in terms of their own formulation, one by one. Grice formulates
the overarching principle: “We might then formulate a rough general principle
which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make
your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you
are engaged. One might label this the COOPEHATIVE PIUNCIPLE.”He then goes on to
introduce the concept of a ‘conversational maxim.’“On the assumption that some
such general principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four
categories under one or another of which will fall certain more specific MAXIMS maxims
and submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in
accordance with the Cooperative Principle.”
Note
that in his comparative “more specific maxims,” he is implicating that, in
terms of the force, the principle is a MAXIM. Had he not wanted this implicaturum,
he could have expressed it as: “On the assumption that some such general
principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories
under one or another of which will fall certain MAXIMS.” He
is comparing the principle with the maxims in terms of ‘specificity.’ I.e. the
principle is the ‘summun genus,’ as it were, the category is the ‘inferior
genus,’ and the maxim is the ‘species infima.’He is having in mind something
like arbor porphyriana. For why otherwise care to distinguish in the introductory
passage, between ‘maxims and submaxims.’ This use of ‘submaxim’ is very
interesting. Because it is unique. He would rather call the four maxims as
SUPRA-maxims, supermaxim, or supramaxim. And leaving ‘maxim’ for what here he
is calling the submaxim.Note that if one challenges the ‘species infima,’ one
may proceed to distinguish this or that sub-sub-maxim falling under the maxim.
Take “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Since this, as he
grants, applies mainly to informative cases, one may consider that it is
actually a subsubmaxim. The submaxim would be: “Do not say that for which you
are not entitled” (alla Nowell-Smith). And then provide one subsubmaxim for the
desideratum: “Do not give an order which you are not entitled to give” or “Do
not order that for you lack adequate authority,” and the other subsubmaxim for
the creditum: “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”Grice: “Echoing
Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.” Or
Mode. “Manner” may be Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘mode.’ Consider the
exploration of Aristotle on ‘modus’ in Categoriae. It is such a mixed bag that
surely ‘manner’ is not inappropriate!“The category of QUANTITY”i. e. either the
conversational category of quantity, or as one might prefer, the category of
conversational quantity“relates to the quantity of information to be
provided,”So it’s not just ANY QUANTUM, as Aristotle or Kant, or Ariskant have
itjust QUANTITY OF INFORMATION, whatever ‘information’ is, and how the quantity
of information is to be assessed. E g. Grice surely shed doubts re: the pillar
box seems red and the pillar box is red. He had till now used ‘strength,’ even
‘logical strength,’ in terms of entailmentand here, neither the phenomenalist
nor the physicalist utterance entail the other.“and under it fall the following
maxims:”That is, he goes straight to the ‘conversational maxim.’ He will
provide supermaxim for the other three conversational categories.Why is the
category of conversational quantity lacking a supermaxim?The reason is that it
would seem redundant and verbose: ‘be appropriately informative.’ By having TWO
maxims, he is playing with a weighing in, or balance between one maxim and the
other. Cf.To say the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth.No more no
less.One maximm states the ‘at most,’ the other maxim states the ‘at least.’One
maxim states the ‘maxi,’ the other maxim states the ‘min.’ Together they state
the ‘maximin.’First, “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for
the current purposes of the exchange).”It’s the contribution which is
informative, not the utterer. Cf. “Be as informative as is required.” Grice
implicates that if you make your contribution as informative as is required YOU
are being as informative as is required. But there is a category-shift here.
Grice means, ‘required BY the goal of the exchange). e.g.How are youFine
thanksthe ‘and you’ depends on whether you are willing to ‘keep the
conversation going’ or your general mood. Second, “Do not make your
contribution more informative than is required.”“ (The second maxim is
disputable;”He goes on to give a different reason. But the primary reason is
that “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required” is
ENTAILED by “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange)”vide R. M. Hare on “Imperative inferences” IN
a diagram:Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current
purposes of the exchange)Therefore, do not make your contribution more
informative than is required (by the current purposes of the exchange).Grice
gives another reason (he will give yet a further one) why the maxim is
‘disputable.’“it might be said that to be overinformative is not a transgression
of the CP but merely a waste of time.”For both conversationalists, who are
thereby abiding by Ferraro’s law of the least conversational effort.”“A waste
of time” relates to Grice’s previous elaborations on ‘undue effort’ and
‘unnecessary trouble.’He is proposing a conversational maximin.When he
formulates his principle of economy of rational effort, it is a waste of ‘time
and energy.’Here it is just ‘time.’ “Energy” is a more generic concept.“However,
it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is
liable to raise side issues;”Methinks the lady doth protest too much.His
example, “He was in a blacked out city.”It does not seem to relate to the
pillar boxA: What color is the pillar boxB: It seems red.Such a ‘confusion’ and
‘side issue,’ if so designed, is part of the implicaturum.“and there may also
be an indirect effect, in that the hearers (or addressee) may be misled as a
result of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the
excess of information.”Cf. Peter Winch on “H. P. Grice’s Conversational Point.”More
boringly, it is part of the utterer’s INTENTION to provide an excess of
information.”This may be counterproductive, or not.“Meet Mr. Puddle”“Meet Mr.
Puddle, our man in nineteenth-century continental philosophy.”The introducer
point: to keep the conversation going.Effect on Grice: Mr. Puddle is hopeless
at nineteenth-century continental philosophy (OR HE IS BEING UNDERDESCRIBED). One
has to think of philosophically relevant examples here, which is all that Grice
cares for. Malcolm says, “Moore knows it; because he’s seen it!”Malcolm
implicates that Grice will not take Malcolm’s word. So Malcom needs to provide
the excess of information, and add, to his use of ‘know,’ which Malcolm claims
Moore does not know how to use, the ‘reason’If knowledge is justified true
belief, Malcolm is conveying explicitly that Moore knows and ONE OF THE
CONDITIONS for it. Cf.I didn’t know you were pregnant.You still do not. (Here
the cancellation is to the third clause). Grice: “However this may be, there is
perhaps a different [second] reason for doubt about the admission of this
second maxim, viz., that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which
concems relevance.)”He could be a lecturer. His use of ‘later’ entails he knows
in advance what he is going to say. Cf. Foucault:“there is another reason to
doubt. The effect is secured by a maxim concerning relevance.”No “later” about
it!Grice:“Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim”he forgets to add,
as per obvious, “The category of quality relates to the QUALITY of
information.” In this way, there is some reference to Aristotle’s summumm
genus. PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Cf.
Apuleius and Boethius on QUALITAS of propositio. Dedicatio takes priority over
abdicatio. So one expects one’s co-conversationalist to say that something IS
the case. Note too, that, if he used “more specific maxims and submaxims,” he
means “more specific supermaxims and maxims”He is following Porophyry in being
confusing! Cf. supramaxim. Grice “-'Try to make your contribution one that is
true' –“This surely requires generalityand Grice spent the next two decades
about it. He introduced the predicate ‘acceptability.’ “Try to make your contribution
one that is acceptable”“True for your statements; good for your
desiderative-mode utterances.”“and two more specific maxims:”“1. Do not say
what you believe to be false.”There is logic here. It is easy to TRY to make
your contribution one that is true.” And it is easy NOT to say what you believe
to be false. Grice is forbidding Kant to have a maxim on us: “Be truthful!”
“Say the true!” “MAKEdon’t just TRYto make your contribution one that is true.”“I
was only trying.”Cf. Moses, “Try not to kill” “Thou shalt trye not to
kylle.”Grice:“2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”This is
involved with truth. In “Truth and other enigmas,” Dummett claims that truth
is, er, an enigma. For some philosophers, all you can guarantee is that you
have evidence. Lacking evidence for what?The qualification, “adequate,” turns
the maxim slightly otiose. Do not say that for you lack evidence which would
make your contribution not a true one.However, Grice is thinking Gettier. And
Gettier allows that one CAN have ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, and p NOT be true.If we are
talking ‘acceptability’ it’s more ‘ground’ or ‘reason’, rather than ‘evidential
justification.’ Grice is especially obsessed with this, in his explorations on
‘intending,’ where ‘acceptance’ is deemed even in the lack of ‘evidential
justification,’ and leaving him wondering what he means by ‘non-evidential
justification.’“Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, viz.,
'Be relevant.'”The category comes from Aristotle, ‘pros it.’ And ‘re-‘ in
relation is cognate with ‘re-‘ in ‘relevant.’RELATION refers to ‘refer,’ Roman
‘referre.’ But in Anglo-Norman, you do have ‘relate’ qua verb. To ‘refer’ or
‘re-late,’ is to bring y back to x. As Russell well knows in his fight with
Bradley’s theory of ‘relation,’ a relation involves x and y. A relation is a two-place
predicate. What about X = xIs identity a relation, in the case of x = x?Can a
thing relate to itself?In cases where we introduce two variables. The maxim
states that one brings y back to x.“Mrs. Smith is an old windbag.”“The weather
has been delightful for this time of year, hasn’t it.”If INTENDED to mean, “You
ARE ignorant!,” then the conversationalist IS bring back “totally otiose remark
about the weather” to the previous insulting comment.To utter an utterly
irrelevant second move you have to be Andre Breton.“Though the maxim itself is
terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good
deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may
be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact
that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the
treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them
in a later work.”He is having in mind Nowell-Smith, who had ‘be relevant’ as
the most important of the rules of conversational etiquette, or how etiquette
becomes logical. But Nowell-Smith felt overwhelmed by Grice and left for the
north, to settle in the very fashionable Kent. Grice is also having in mind
Urmson’s appositeness (Criteria of intensionality). “Why did you title your
painting “Maga’s Daughter”? She’s your wife!”and Grice is also having in mind
P. F. Strawson and what Strawson has as the principle of relevance vis-à-vis
the principles of presumption of ignorance and knowledge.So it was in the
Oxonian air.“Finally, under the category of MODE, which I understand as
relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said [THE CONTENT, THE
EXPLICITUM, THE COMMUNICATUM, THE EXPLICATUM] but, rather, to HOW what is said
is to be said,”Grice says that ‘meaning’ is diaphanous. An utterer means that p
reduces to what an utterer means by x. This diaphanousness ‘meaning’ shares
with ‘seeing.’ “To expand on the experience of seeing is just to expand on what
is seen.’He is having the form-content distinction.If that is a distinction. This
multi-layered dialectic displays the true nature of the speculative
form/content distinction: all content is form and all form is content, not in a
uniform way, but through being always more or less relatively indifferent or
posited. The Role of the Form/Content
Distinction in Hegel's Science of ...deontologistics.files.wordpress.com › /01
› formc... PDF Feedback About Featured Snippets Web results The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Researchkarger.com › Article › PDF The form-content distinction is a
potentially useful conceptual device for understanding certain characteristics
of moral development. In the most general sense it ... by CG Levine1979Cited
by 25Related articles The
Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research ...karger.com › Article
› Abstract Dec 23, 2009The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development
Research. Levine C.G.. Author affiliations. University of Western Ontario,
London, Ont. by CG Levine1979Cited by 25Related articles Preschool children's mastery of the
form/content distinction in ...ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pubmed Preschool children's
mastery of the form/content distinction in communicative tasks. Hedelin L(1),
Hjelmquist E. Author information: (1)Department of Psychology, ... by L
Hedelin1998Cited by 10Related articles
Form and Content: An Introduction to Formal LogicDigital
...digitalcommons.conncoll.edu › cgi › viewcontentPDF terminology has to do
with anything. In this context, 'material' means having to do with content.
This is our old friend, the form/content distinction again. Consider. by DD
Turner Simmel's Dialectic of Form and
Content in Recent Work in ...tandfonline.com › doi › full May 1, This suggests
that for Simmel, the form/content distinction was not a dualism; instead, it
was a duality.11 Ronald L. Breiger, “The Duality of ... Are these distinctions between “form” and
“content” intentionally ...reddit.com › askphilosophy › comments › are_th...
The form/content distinction also doesn't quite fit the distinction between
form and matter (say, in Aristotle), although Hegel develops the distinction
between form ... Preschool Children's
Mastery of the Form/Content Distinction ...link.springer.com › article
Preschoolers' mastery of the form/content distinction in language and communication,
along its contingency on the characteristics of p. by L Hedelin1998Cited by
10Related articles Verbal Art: A
Philosophy of Literature and Literary Experiencebooks.google.com › books Even
if form and content were in fact inseparable in the sense indicated, that would
not make the form/content distinction unjustified. Form and matter are clearly
... Anders Pettersson2001Literary Criticism
One Century of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathologybooks.google.com ›
books He then outlines the most important implications of the form–content
distinction in a statement which is identical in the first three editions, with
only minor ... Giovanni Stanghellini, Thomas FuchsMedical“I include the
supermaxim-'Be perspicuous' –” Or supramaxim. So the “more specific maxims and
submaxims” becomes the clumsier “supermaxims and maxims”Note that in under the
first category it is about making your contribution, etc. Now it is the utterer
himself who has to be ‘perspicuous,’ as it is the utterer who has to be relevant.
It’s not the weaker, “Make your contribution a perspicuous one.” Or “Make your
contribution a relevant one (to the purposes of the exchange).”Knowing that
most confound ‘perspicacity’ with ‘perspicuity,’ he added “sic,” but forgot to
pronounce it, in case it was felt as insulting. He has another ‘sic’ under the
prolixity maxim.“and various maxims such as: The “such as” is a colloquialism.Surely
it was added in the ‘lecture’ format. In written, it becomes viz. The fact that
the numbers them makes for ‘such as’ rather disimplicaturable. “1. Avoid
obscurity of expression.”Unless you are Heracleitus. THEY told me, Heraclitus,
they told me you were dead, /They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter
tears to shed./I wept as I remember'd how often you and I/Had tired the sun
with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear
old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are
thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all away,
but them he cannot take. In a way this is entailed by “Be perspicuous,” if that
means ‘be clear,’ in obtuse English.Be clearTherefore, or what is the same
thing. Thou shalt not not be obscure.2. Avoid ambiguity.”Except as a trope, or
‘figure, (schema, figura). “Aequi-vocate, if that will please your clever
addressee.” Cf. Parker’s zeugma: “My apartment was so small, that I've barely
enough room to lay a hat and a few friends“3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary
prolixity).”Here he added a ‘sic’ that he failed to pronounce in case it may
felt as insulting. But the idea of a self-refuting conversational maxim is
surely Griceian, in a quessertive way. Since this concerns FORM rather than
CONTENT, it is not meant to overlap with ‘informativeness.’So given that p and
q are equally informative, if q is less brief (longerars longa, vita brevis),
utter p. This has nothing to do with logical strength. It is just to be
assessed in a SYNTACTICAL way.Vide “Syntactics in Semiotics”“4. Be orderly.”This
involves two moves in the contribution or ‘turn.’ One cannot be ‘disorderly,’
if one just utters ‘p.’ So this involves a molecular proposition. The ‘order’
can be of various types. Indeed, one of Grice’s example is “Jones is between
Smith and Williams”order of merit or size?‘Between’ is not ambiguous!There is
LOGICAL order, which is prior.But there is a more absolute use of ‘orderly.’
‘keep your room tidy.’orderly (adj.) 1570s, "arranged in order," from
order (n.) + -ly (1). Meaning "observant of rule or discipline, not
unruly" is from 1590s. Related: Orderliness.He does not in the lecture
give a philosophical example, but later will in revisiting the Urmson example
and indeed Strawson, but mainly Urmson, “He went to bed and took off his
boots,” and indeed Ryle, “She felt frail and took arsenic.”“And one might need
others.”Regarding ‘mode,’ that is. “It is obvious that the observance of some
of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others;”Not
as per ‘moral’ demands, since he’ll say these are not MORAL.“a man who has
expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder
comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false.”Except
in Oscar Wilde’s circle, where they were obsessed with commenting on
prolixities! Cf. Hare against Kant, “Where is the prisoner?” “He left [while he
is hiding in the attic].”That’s why Grice has the ‘in general.’“Indeed, it
might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is
such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing;”But
since ‘should’ is weak, I will. “other maxims come into operation only on the
assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.”So the keyword is
co-ordination.“While this may be correct, so far as the generation of implicaturums
is concerned it seems to play a role not totally different from the other
maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as a
member of the list of maxims.”He is having weighing, and clashing in mind. And
he wants a conversationalist to honour truth over informativeness, which begs
the question that as he puts it, ‘false’ “information” is no information.In the
earlier lectures, tutoring, or as a university lecturer, he was sure that his
tutee will know that he was introducing maxims ONLY WITH THE PURPOSE, NEVER TO
MORALISE, but as GENERATORS of implicaturain philosophers’s mistakes.But this
manoeuver is only NOW disclosed. Those without a philosophical background may
not realise about this. “There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims
(aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also
normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate
nonconventional implicaturums.”He is obviously aware that Émile DurkheimWill Know that
‘conversational’ is subsumed under ‘social,’ if not Williamson (perhaps). keyword:
‘norm.’ Grice excludes ‘moral’ because while a moral maxim makes a man ‘good,’
a conversational maxim makes a man a ‘good’ conversationalist. Not because
there is a distinction in principle!“The conversational maxims, however, and
the conversational implicaturums connected with them, are specially connected
(I hope) with”He had this way with idioms.Cf. Einstein,“E =, I hope, mc2.”“the
particular purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange)”He is playing Dutch.The
English lost the Anglo-Saxon for ‘talk.’ They have ‘language,’ and the Hun has
‘Sprache.’ But only the Dutch have ‘taal.’So he is distinguishing between the
TOOL and the USE of the TOOL.“is adapted lo serve and is primlarily employed to
serve.”The ‘adapted’ is mechanistic talk. He mentions ‘evolutionarily’
elsewhere. He means ‘the particular goal language evolved to serve, viz.’
groom.Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language is a 1996 book by the anthropologist
Robin Dunbar, in which the author argues that language evolved from social
grooming. He further suggests that a stage of this evolution was the telling of
gossip, an argument supported by the observation that language is adapted for
storytelling. The book has been criticised on the grounds that since
words are so cheap, Dunbar's "vocal grooming" would fall short in
amounting to an honest signal. Further, the book provides no compelling
story[citation needed] for how meaningless vocal grooming sounds might become
syntactical speech. Thesis Dunbar argues that gossip does for
group-living humans what manual grooming does for other primates—it allows
individuals to service their relationships and thus maintain their alliances on
the basis of the principle: if you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours. Dunbar
argues that as humans began living in increasingly larger social groups, the
task of manually grooming all one's friends and acquaintances became so
time-consuming as to be unaffordable. In response to this problem, Dunbar
argues that humans invented 'a cheap and ultra-efficient form of
grooming'—vocal grooming. To keep allies happy, one now needs only to 'groom'
them with low-cost vocal sounds, servicing multiple allies simultaneously while
keeping both hands free for other tasks. Vocal grooming then evolved gradually
into vocal language—initially in the form of 'gossip'. Dunbar's hypothesis
seems to be supported by the fact that the structure of language shows
adaptations to the function of narration in general. Criticism Critics of
Dunbar's theory point out that the very efficiency of "vocal
grooming"—the fact that words are so cheap—would have undermined its
capacity to signal honest commitment of the kind conveyed by time-consuming and
costly manual grooming. A further criticism is that the theory does nothing to
explain the crucial transition from vocal grooming—the production of pleasing
but meaningless sounds—to the cognitive complexities of syntactical
speech.[citation needed] References Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996).
Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language. London: Faber and Faber. 9780571173969. 34546743. von Heiseler, Till Nikolaus
() Language evolved for storytelling in a super-fast evolution. In: R. L. C.
Cartmill, Eds. Evolution of Language. London: World Scientific, 114-121.
academia.edu/9648129/LANGUAGE_EVOLVED_FOR_STORYTELLING_IN_A_SUPER-FAST_EVOLUTION
Power, C. 1998. Old wives' tales: the gossip hypothesis and the reliability of
cheap signals. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert Kennedy and C. Knight (eds),
Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 111 29.
Categories: 1996 non-fiction booksAmerican non-fiction booksBooks by Robin
DunbarEnglish-language booksEvolution of languageHarvard University Press
booksPopular science booksGrice: “I have stated my maxims”the maxims“as if this
purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information;”“MAXIMALLY
EFFECTIVE”“this specification is, of course, too narrow,”But who cares?This is
slightly sad in that he is thinking Strawson and forgetting his (Grice’s) own
controversy with G. A. Paul on the sense-datum, for ‘the pillar box seems red’
and ‘the pillar box is red,’ involving an intensional context, are less
amenable to fall under the maxims.“and the scheme needs to be generalized to
allow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of
others.”He has a more obvious way below:Giving and receving
informationInfluencing and being influenced by others.He never sees the purpose
as MAXIMAL INFORMATION, but maximally effective EXCHANGE of informationdoes he
mean merely ‘transmission.’ It may well be.If I say, “I rain,” I have
ex-changed information.I don’t need anything in return.If so, it makes sense
that he is equating INFORMING With INFLUENCING
or better DIRECTION your addresse’s talk.Note that, for all he loved
introspection and conversational avowals, and self-commands, these do not
count.It’s informing your addressee about some state of affairs, and directing
his action. Grice is always clear that the ULTIMATE GOAL is the utterer’s
ACTION.“As one of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or variety
of purposive, indeed rational, behavior, it may be worth noting that the
specific expectations or presumptions connected with at least some of the
foregoing maxims have their analogues in the sphere of transactions that are
not talk exchanges.”Transaction is a good one.TRANS-ACTIO“I list briefly one
such analog for each conversational category.”While he uses ‘conversational
category,’ he also applies it to the second bit: ‘category of conversational
quantity,’ ‘category of conversational quality,’ ‘category of conversational
relation,’ and ‘category of conversational mode.’ But it is THIS application that
justifies the sub-specifications.They are not categories of thought or
ontological or ‘expression’.His focus is on the category as conversation.His
focus is on the ‘conversational category.’“1. Quantity. If you are assisting me
to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is
required; if, e. g., at a particular stage I need fourscrews, I expect you to
hand me four, rather than two or six. He always passed six, since two will
drop.“Make your contribution neither more nor less informative than is required
(for the purposes of the exchange).”This would have covered the maxi and the
min.“NEITHER MORE NOR LESS” is the formula of effectiveness, and economy, and
minimization of expenditure.“2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine
and not spurious.”Here again he gives an expansion of the conversational
category, which is more general than ‘try to make your contribution one that is
true,’ and the point about the ‘quality of information,’ which he did not make.Perhaps
because it would have led him to realise that ‘false’ information, i.e.
‘information’ which is not genuine and spurious, is not ‘information.’But “Make
your contribution one that is genuine and not spurious.”Be candid.Does not need
a generalization as it covers both informational and directive utterances.“If I
need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not
expect you to hand me salt;”Or you won’t eat the cake.“if I need a spoon, I do
not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”Spurious and genuine are different.In
the ‘trick spoon,’ the conversationalist is just not being SERIOUS.But surely a
maxim, “Be serious” is too serious.Seriously!“3. Relation. I expect a partner's
contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of the
transaction;”Odd that he would use ‘appropriate,’ which was the topic of the
“Prolegomena,” and what he was supposed to EXPLAIN, not to use in the
explanation.For each of the philosophers making a mistake are giving a judgment
of ‘appropriateness,’ conversational appropriateness. Here it is good that he
relativises the ‘appropriateness’ TO the ‘need’.Grice is not quite sticking to
the etymology of ‘relatio’ and ‘refer,’ bring y back to x. Or he is. Bring y
(your contribution) back to the need x.Odd that he thinks he’ll expand more on
relation, when he did a good bit!“if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do
not expect to be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might
be an appropriate contribution at a later stage).”“I just expect you to be
silent.”“4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is
making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch.” For Lewis,
clarity is not enough!The ‘Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch!’
seems quite different from “Be perspicuous.”“Execute your performance with
reasonable dispatch”Is more like“Execute your performance”And not just STAND
there!A: What time is it B just stands there“These analogies are relevant to
what I regard as a fundamental question about the principle of conversational
helpfulness and its attendant conversational maxims,”For Boethius, it is a
PRINCIPLE because it does not need an answer!“viz., what the basis is for the
assumption which we seem to make, and on which (I hope) it will appear that a
great range of implicaturums depend [especially as we keep on EXPLOITING the
rather otiose maxims], that talkers will ingeneral (ceteris paribus and in the
absence of indications to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these principles
prescribe.”Grice really doesn’t care! He is into the EXPLOITING of the maxim,
as in his response to the Scots philosopher G. A. Paul:“Paul, I surely do not
mean to imply that you may end up believing that I have a doubt about the
pillar box being red: it seems red to me, as I have this sense-datum of
‘redness’ which attaches to me as I am standing in front of the pillar box in
clear daylight.”Grice is EXPLOITING the desideratum, YET STILL SAYING SOMETHING
TRUE, so at least he is not VIOLATING the principle of conversational
helpfulness, or the category of conversational quality, or the desideratum of
conversational candour.And that is what he is concerned with. “A dull but, no doubt at a certain level,
adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that *people*
(not pirots, although perhaps Oxonians, rather than from Malagasy) DO behave in
these ways;”Elinor Ochs was terrified Grice’s maxims are violatednever
exploited, she thoughtin Madagascar.“they, i. e. people, or Oxonians, have
learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed,
it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the
habit. It is much easier, for example, to tell the truth than to invent lies.”Effort
again; least effort. And ease. Great Griceian guidelines!“I am, however, enough
of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts,”OR
EXPLAIN.“undeniable though they may be;”BEIGIN OF A THEORY FOR A THEORYnot the
theory for the generation of implicate, but for the theory of conversation.He
is less interested in this than the other. “I would like to be able to think of
the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all
or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to
follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea
that observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness and the conversational
maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter,
with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am
struggling with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation
that you will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my
expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of
indications that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges
seemed to me to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly
distinguish cooperative transactions:”So how is this not
quasi-contractual? He is listing THIS OR
THAT FEATURE that jointly distinguishes a cooperative transactionall grand
great words.But he wants to say that ‘quasi-contractual’ is NO RATIONAL!He is
playing, as a philosopher, with the very important point of what follows from
what.A1. Conversasation is purposiveA2. Conversation is rationalA3.
Conversation is cooperativeA4. There is such a thing as non-rational cooperation
(is there?)So he is aiming at the fact that the FEATURES that jointly
distinguish cooperative transactions NEED NOT BE PRESENT, and Grice surely does
not wish THAT to demolish his model. If he bases it in general constraints of
rationality, the better.“1. The participants have some common immediate aim,
like getting a car mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent
and even in conflict-each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off,
leaving the other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common
aim even if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one,”Is he being
logical?“second-order predicate calculus”“meta-language”He means higher or
supervenientOr ‘operative’“, that each party should, for the time being,
identify himself with the transitory conversational interests of the other.”By
identify he means assume.YOU HAVE TO DESIRE what your partner desires.The
intersection between your desirability and your addressee’s desirability is not
NULL.And the way to do this is conditionalIF: You perceive B has Goal G, you
assume Goal G. “2. The contributions of the participants .should be dovetailed,
mutually dependent. Unless it’s one of those seminars by Grice and J. F.
Thomson!“3. There is some sort of understanding (which may be explicit but
which is often tacit)”i.e. implicated rather than explicatedpart of the implicaturum,
or implicitum, rather than the explicatum or explicitum.“that, other things
being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both
parties are agreeable that it should terminate. You do not just shove off or
start doing something else.”This is especially tricky over the phone (“He never
ends!” Or in psychiatric interviews!)Note that ‘starting doing something else’
may work. E. g. watch your watch!“But while some such quasi-contractual basis
as this may apply to some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like
quarreling and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.”TWO OPPOSITE
EXAMPLES.Fighting is arguing is competition, adversarial, epagogue, not
conversation, cooperation, friendly,
collaborative venture, and diagoge.Letter writing is usually otiose“what, with
the tellyphone!” And letter writing is no conversation.“In any case, one feels
that the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his
audience but himself.”And the talker who is mendacious has primarily let Kant
down!”“So I would like t< be able to show that observance of the principle
of conversational helfpulness and maxims is reasonal de (rational) along the
following lines”That any Aristkantian rationalist would agree to.“: that any
one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption
that they are conducted in general accordance with the principle of
conversational helpfulness and the maxims.”Where the keyword is: profit,
effort, least effort, no energy, no undue effort, no unnecessary trouble. That
conversation is reasonable unless it is unreasonable. That a conversational
exchange should be rational unless it shows features of irrationality.“Whether
any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain;”It’s not clear what the
premises are!Plus, he means DEDUCTIVELY reached? Transcendentally reached?
Empirically reached? Philosophically reached? Conclusively reached? Etc.It
seems the conclusion need not be reached, because we never departed from the
state of the affairs that the conclusion describes.“in any case, I am fairly
sure that I cannot reach it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of
relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”For perhaps “I
don’t want to imply any doubt, but that pillar box seems red.”IS irrelevant,
yet true!“It is now time to show the connection between the principle of
conversational helfpulness and the conversational maxims, on the one hand, and
conversational implicaturum on the other.”This is clearer in the seminars. The
whole thing was a preamble “A participant in a talk exchange may fail to
fulfill a maxim in various ways, which include the following: 1. He may quietly
and unostentatiously VIOLATE (or fail to observe) a maxim; if so, in some cases
he will be liable to mislead.”And be blamed by Kant.Mislead should not worry
Grice, cf. “Misleading, but true.”The violate (or fail to observe) shows that
(1) covers two specifications. Tom may be unaware that there was such a maxim
as to ‘be brief, avoid unnecessary prolixity, unless you need to eschew
obfuscation!”This is Grice’s anti-Ryleism. He doesn’t want to say that there is
KNOWLEDGE of the maxims. For one may know what the maxims are and fail to
observe them “2. He may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxim and of the
principle of conversational helpfulness; he may say, indicate, or allow it to
become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires.
He may say, e. g., I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.” Where is the
criminal?I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.I shall unseal them. What do you
mean ‘cannot.’ You don’t mean ‘may not,’ do you?I think Grice means ‘may not.’Is
the universe finite? Einstein: I cannot say more; my lips are sealed. “3. He
may be faced by a CLASH of maxims [That’s why he needs more than oneor at least
two specifications of the same maxim]: He may be unable, e. g., to fulfill the
first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating
the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say).” Odd
that he doesn’t think this generates implicaturum: He has obviously studied the
sub-perceptualities here.For usually, a phenomenalist, like Sextus, thinks that
by utteringThe pillar box seems red to methat is all I have adequate evidence
forHe is conveying that he is unable to answer the question (“What colour is
the pillar box?”) And being as ‘informative’ as is requiredWithout saying
something for which it is not the case that he has or will ever have adequate
evidence.Cf.Student at Koenigsberg to Kant: What’s the noumenon?Kant: My lips
are sealed.It may require some research to list ALL CLASHES.Because each clash
shows some EVALUATION qua reasoning, and it may be all VERY CETERIS
PARIBUS.Cf.Where is the criminal?My lips are sealed.The utterer has NOT opted
out. He has answered, via implicaturum, that he is not telling. He is being
relevant. He is not telling because he doesn’t want to DISCLOSE the whereabouts
of the alleged criminal, etc. For Kant, this is not a conversation! Odd that
Grice is ‘echoing Kant,’ where Kant would hardly allow a clash with ‘Be
truthful!’“4. He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY fail to fulfill (or
observe) it.Mock? Taunt?The magic flute. Grice’s magic flute.flout (v.)
"treat with disdain or contempt" (transitive), 1550s, intransitive
sense "mock, jeer, scoff" is from 1570s; of uncertain origin; perhaps
a special use of Middle English “flowten,”"to play the flute"
(compare Middle Dutch “fluyten,” "to play the flute," also "to
jeer"). Related: Flouted; flouting.Grice: “One thing we do not know is if
the flute came to England via Holland.”“Or he may, as we may say, ‘play the
flute’ with a maxim, expecting others to be agreeable.”“Or he may, as we might
say, ‘play the flute’ with the conversational maxim, expecting others to join
with some other musical instrumentor somethingoccasionally the same.”“On the
assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without
violating another maxim (because oi a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in
view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead,”This is interesting.
It’s the TRYING to mislead.Grice and G. A. Paul:Grice cannot be claimed to have
TRIED to mislead, and thus deemed to have misled G. A. Paul, even if he had,
when he said, “I hardly think there is any doubt about it, but that pillar box
seems red to me.”“the hearer is faced with a minor problem:”Implicaturum: This
reasoning is all abductiveto the ‘best’ explanation“How can his saying what he
did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall
principle of conversational helfpulness?”This was one of Grice’s conversations
with G. A. Paul:Paul (to Grice): This is what I do not understand, Grice. How
can your saying what you did say be reconciled with the supposition that you
are not going to mislead me?”Unfortunately, on that Saturday, Paul went to the
Irish Sea. Grice “This situation is one that characteristically”There are
othersvide clash, abovebut not marked by Grice as one such situation“gives rise
to a conversational implicaturum; and when a conversational implicaturum is
generated”Chomskyan jargon borrowed from Austin (“I don’t see why Austin
admired Chomsky so!”)“in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being
EXPLOITED.”Why not ‘flouted’? Some liked the idea of playing the flute.EXPLOIT
is figurative.Grice exploits a Griceian maxim.exploit
(v.) c. 1400, espleiten, esploiten "to accomplish, achieve, fulfill,"
from Old French esploitier, espleiter "carry out, perform,
accomplish," from esploit (see exploit (n.)). The sense of "use
selfishly" first recorded 1838, from a sense development in French perhaps
from use of the word with reference to mines, etc. (compare exploitation).
Related: Exploited; exploiting.exploit (n.) late 14c., "outcome of an
action," from Old French esploit "a carrying out; achievement,
result; gain, advantage" (12c., Modern French exploit), a very common word,
used in senses of "action, deed, profit, achievement," from Latin
explicitum "a thing settled, ended, or displayed," noun use of neuter
of explicitus, past participle of explicare "unfold, unroll,
disentangle," from ex "out" (see ex-) + plicare "to fold"
(from PIE root *plek- "to plait"). Meaning "feat,
achievement" is c. 1400. Sense evolution is from "unfolding" to
"bringing out" to "having advantage" to
"achievement." Related: Exploits. exploitative (adj.)
"serving for or used in exploitation," 1882, from French exploitatif,
from exploit (see exploit (n.)). Alternative exploitive (by 1859) appears to be
a native formation from exploit + -ive.exploitation (n.) 1803, "productive
working" of something, a positive word among those who used it first,
though regarded as a Gallicism, from French exploitation, noun of action from
exploiter (see exploit (v.)). Bad sense developed 1830s-50s, in part from
influence of French socialist writings (especially Saint Simon), also perhaps
influenced by use of the word in U.S. anti-slavery writing; and exploitation
was hurled in insult at activities it once had crowned as praise. It
follows from this science [conceived by Saint Simon] that the tendency of the
human race is from a state of antagonism to that of an universal peaceful
association -- from the dominating influence of the military spirit to that of
the industriel one; from what they call l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme
to the exploitation of the globe by industry. ["Quarterly Review,"
April & July 1831]
Grice: “I am now in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicaturum.”Not
to provide a reductive analysis. The concept is too dear for me to torture it
with one of my metaphysical routines.”“A man who, by (in, when) saying (or
making as if to say) that p”That seems good for the analysandumGrice loves the
“by (in, when)” “(or making as if to). Note the oratio obliqua.Or
‘that’-clause. So this is not ‘uttering’As in the analysans of ‘meaning that.’“By
uttering ‘x’ U means that p.’The “by” already involves a clause with a
‘that’-clause.So this is not a report of a physical event.It is a report embued
already with intentionality.The utterer is not just ‘uttering’The utterer is
EXPLICITLY conveying that p.We cannot say MEANING that p.Because Grice uses
“mean” as opposed to “explicitly convey”His borderline scenarios are such,“Keep
me company, dear”“If we are to say that when he uttererd that he means that his
wife was to keep him company or not is all that will count for me to change my
definition of ‘mean’ or not.”Also irony.But here it is more complicated. A man
utters, “Grice defeated Strawson”If he means it ironically, to mean that
Strawson defeated Grice, it is not the case that the utterer MEANT the opposite.
He explicitly conveyed that.Grice considers the Kantian ‘cause and effect,’“If
I am dead, I shall have no time for reading.”He is careful here that the
utterer does not explicitly conveys that he will have no time for
readingbecause it’s conditioned on he being dead.“has implicated that q,” “may
be said to have conversationally implicated that q,”So this is a specification
alla arbor porphyrana of ‘By explicitly conveying that p, U implicitly conveys
that q.’Where he is adding the second-order adverb, ‘conversationally.’By
explicitly conveying that p, U has implicitly conveyed that q in a CONVERSATIONAL
FASHION” iff or if“PROVIDED THAT”“(1) he is to be presumed to be observing the
conversational maxims, or at least the principle of conversational
helfpulness;”Especially AT LEAST, because he just said that an implicaturum is
‘generated’ (Chomskyan jargon) when AT
LEAST A MAXIM IS played the flute.“(2) the supposition that he is aware that,
or thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or making as if to
say p (or doing so in THOSE terms) consistent with this presumption;”THIS IS
THE CRUCIAL CLAUSEand the one that not only requires ONE’S RATIONALITY, but the
expectation that one’s addressee, BEING RATIONAL, will expect the utterer to BE
RATIONAL.This is the ‘rationalisation’ he refers to in “Retrospective
Epilogue.”Note that ‘q’ is obviously now the content of a state in the
utterer’s soula desideratum or a creditum --, at least a CREDITUM, in view of
Grice’s view of everything at least exhibitive and perhaps protreptic --“and (3)
the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker
thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) IS required.”All that jargon
about mutuality is a result of Strawson tutoring Schiffer!“Apply this to my
initial example, to B's remark that C has not yet been to prison.”What made
Grice think of such a convoluted example?He was laughing at Searle for
providing non-philosophical examples, and there he is!“In a suitable setting A
might reason as follows:”“(1) B has APPARENTLY violatedindeed he has played the
flute with -- the maxim 'Be relevant' and so may be regarded as [ALSO] having
flouted one of the maxims conjoining perspicuity,”In previous versions, under
the desideratum of conversational clarity Grice had it that the desideratum
included the expectation of this ‘relatedness’ AND that of ‘perspicuity’ (sic).
In the above, Grice is stating that if you are irrelevant (or provide an
unrelated contribution) you are not being perspicuous.But “He hasn’t been to
prison” is perspicuous enough.And so is the link to the question --.Plus,
wasn’t perspicuity only to apply to the ‘mode,’ to the ‘form,’ rather than the
content.Here it is surely the CONTENTthat it is not the case that C is a
criminalthat triggers it all.So, since there is a “not,” here this is parallel
to the example examined by Strawson in the footnote to “Logical Theory.”The
utterer is saying that it is not the case that C has been in prison yet.The ‘yet’
makes all the difference, even if a Fregeian colouring ‘convention’!“It is not
the case that C has been in prison” Is, admittedly, not very perspicuous.“So
what, neither has the utterer nor the addressee.”So there is an equivocation
here as to the utterance perhaps not being perspicuous, while the utterer IS
perspicuous.“yet I have no reason to suppose that he is opting out from the
operation of the CP;”Or playing the flute with my beloved principle of
conversational helpfulness.“(2) given the circumstances, I can regard his
irrelevance as only apparentas when we say that a plastic flower is not a
flower, or to use Austin’s example, “That decoy duck is surely not a duck! That
trick rubber spoon is no spoon! -- if, and only if, I suppose him to think that
C is potentially dishonest;”As many are!The potentially is the trick.Recall
Aristotle: “Will I say that I am potentially dishonest?! Not me! PLATO was!
Theophrastus WILL! Or is it ‘shall’?”“(3) B knows that I am capable of working
out step (2). So B implicates that C is potentially dishonest.'”Unless he goes
on like I go with G. A. Paul, “I do not mean of course to mean that I mean that
he is potentially dishonest, because although he is, he shouldn’t, or rather, I
don’t think you are expecting me to convey explicitly that he shouln’t or
should for that matter.”“The presence of a conversational implicaturum must be
capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped,
unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicaturum (if
present at all) will not count as a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”This is the
Humpty Dumpty in Grice.Cf. Provide the sixteen derivational steps in Jane
Austen’s Novel remark, “I sense and sensibilia”This is what happens sometimes
when people who are not philosophers engage with Grice!For a philosopher, it is
clear Grice is not being serious there. He is mocking an ‘ideal’-language
philosopher (as Waissmann called them). Let’s revise the word:By “counting” he
means “DEEM.” He has said that “She is poor, but she is honest,” is NOT
CALCULABLE. So if an argument is not produced, this may not be a matter of
argument.Philosophers are OBSESSED, and this is Grice’s trick, with ARGUMENT.
Recall Grice on Hardie, “Unlike my father, who was rather blunt, Hardie taught
me to ARGUE for this or that reason.”His mention of “INTUITION” is not
perspicuous. He told J. M. Rountree that meaning is a matter of INTUITION, not
a theoretical concept within a theory.So it’s not like Grice does not trust the
intuition. So the point is TERMINOLOGICAL and methodological. Terminological,
in that this is a specfification of ‘conversationally,’ rather than for cases
like “How rude!” (he just flouted the maxim ‘be polite!’ but ‘be polite’ is not
a CONVERSATIONAL maxim. Is Grice implicating that nonconversational
nonconventional implicate are not calculable? We don’t think so.But he might.I
think he will. Because in the case of ‘aesthetic maxim,’ ‘moral maxim,’ and
‘social maxim’such as “be polite,”the calculation may involve such degree of
gradation that you better not get Grice started!“it will be a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum.”OKSo
perhaps he does allow that non-conventional non-conversational implicate ARE
calculable.But he may add:“Unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument,
it will not be a conversational implicaturum; it will be a conventional implicaturum.”Strawson:
“And what nonconventional nonconversational implicate?Grice: You are right,
Strawon. Let me modify and refine the point: “It will be a dull, boring, undetachable,
conventional implicaturumOR any of those dull implicate that follow from (or
resultI won’t use ‘generate’) one of those maxims that I have explicitly said
they were NOT conversational maxims.“For surely, there is something very
‘contradictory-sounding’ to me saying that the implicaturum is involved with
the flouting of a maxim which is NOT a conversational maxim, and yet that the
maxim is a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”“Therefore, I restrict calculability to
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURUM, because it involves the conversational maxims that
contributors are expected to be reciprocal; whereas you’ll agree that Queen
Victoria does not need to be abide with ‘be polite,’ as she frequently did
not“We are not amused, you fools! Only Gilbert and Sullivan amuse me!””“To work
out that a particular CONVERSATIONAL [never mind nonconversational
nonconventional] implicaturum is present, the hearer will reply on the
following data:”As opposed to ‘sense-datum.’Perhaps assumption, alla Gettier,
is better:“ (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the
identity of any references that may be involved;”WoW Quite a Bit. This is the
reason why Grice entitled WoW his first book.In he hasn’t been to ‘prison’ we
are not using ‘prison’ as Witters does (“My language is my prison”).Strawson:
But is that the CONVENTIONAL meaning? Even for King Alfred?He hasn't been to prisonprison (n.) early 12c., from Old
French prisoun "captivity, imprisonment; prison; prisoner, captive"
(11c., Modern French prison), altered (by influence of pris "taken;"
see prize (n.2)) from earlier preson, from Vulgar Latin *presionem, from Latin
prensionem (nominative prensio), shortening of prehensionem (nominative
*prehensio) "a taking," noun of action from past participle stem of
prehendere "to take" (from prae- "before," see pre-, +
-hendere, from PIE root *ghend- "to seize,
take"). "Captivity," hence by extension "a place for
captives," the MAIN modern sense.” (There are 34 other unmain ones). He
hasn't been to a place for captives yet.You mean he is one.Cf. He hasn't
been to asylum.You mean Foucault?(2) the principle of conversational
helpfulness and this and that conversational maxim;”This is more crucial seeing
that the utterer may utter something which has no conventional meaning?Cf.
Austin, “Don’t ask for the meaning of a word! Less so for the ‘conventional’
one!”What Grice needs is ‘the letter,’ so he can have the ‘spirit’ as the implicaturum.
Or he needs the lines, so he can have the implicaturum as a reading ‘between the
lines.’If the utterance is a gesture, like showing a bandaged leg, or a
Neapolitan rude gesture, it is difficult to distinguish or to identify what is
EXPLICITLY conveyed.By showing his bandaged leg, U EXPLICITLY conveys that he
has a bandaged leg. And IMPLICITLY conveys that he cannot really play cricket.The
requirement of ‘denotatum’ is even tricker, “Swans are beautiful.” Denotata? Quantificational?
Substitutional?In any case, Grice is not being circular in requiring that the
addressee should use as an assumption or datum that U thinks that the
expression E is generally uttered by utterers when they m-intend that p.But
there are tricks here.“(3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;”Cf.
Grice, “Is there a general context for a general theory of context?”“(4) other
items of background knowledge;”So you don’t get:How is C getting on at the
bank? My lips are sealed Why do you care Mind your own business. Note that “he
hasn’t been to prison yet” (meaning the tautologous ‘he is potentially dishonest’)
is the sort of tricky answer to a tricky question! In asking, the asker KNOWS
that he’ll get that sort of reply knowing the utterer as he does. “and (5) the
fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous
headings are available to both participants and both participants know or
assume this to be the case.”This is Schiffer reported by Strawson.“A general
pattern for the working out of a conversational implicaturum might be given as
follows:”Again the abductive argument that any tutee worth of Hardie might
expect 'He has said that p;”Ie explicitly conveys that p.Note the essential
oratio obliqua, or that-clause.“there is no reason to suppose. that he is not
observing the maxims, or at least the principle of conversational
helpfulness”That is, he is not a prisoner of war, or anything.“He could not be
doing this unless he thought that q;”Or rather, even if more tautologically
still, he could not be doing so REASONABLY, as Austin would forbid, unless…’
For if the utterer is IRRATIONAL (or always playing the flute) surely he CAN do
it!“he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the
supposition that he thinks that q IS required;”Assumed MUTUAL RATIONALITY,
which Grice fails to have added as assumption or datum. Cf. paraconsistent
logics“he is using ‘and’ and ‘or’ in a ‘deviant’ logical way, to echo Quine,”He
is an intuitionist, his name is Dummett.“he has done nothing to stop me
thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to
think, that q; and so he has implicated that q.'”The ‘or’ is delightful, for
m-intention requires ‘intention,’ but the intention figures in previous
positions, so ‘willingess to allow the addressee to think’ does PERFECTLY FINE!
Especially at Oxford where we are ever so subtle!
CONVERSAZIONE – COMPASSIONE
CONVERSAZIONALE -- Conversational compassion -- conversational empathy: sympathyempathycompassion -- principle of conversational
empathy -- Principle
of Conversational Empathya term devised by Grice for the expectation a
conversationalist has that his co-partner will honour his conversational goal,
however transitory. imaginative projection into another person’s situation,
especially for vicarious capture of its emotional and motivational qualities.
The term is an English rendering by the Anglo psychologist E. G. Titchener,
1867 7 of the G. Einfühlung, made popular by Theodore Lipps 18514, which also
covered imaginative identification with inanimate objects of aesthetic
contemplation. Under ‘sympathy’, many aspects were earlier discussed by Hume,
Adam Smith, and other Scottish philosophers. Empathy has been considered a
precondition of ethical thinking and a major contributor to social bonding and
altruism, mental state attribution, language use, and translation. The relevant
spectrum of phenomena includes automatic and often subliminal motor mimicry of
the expressions or manifestations of another’s real or feigned emotion, pain,
or pleasure; emotional contagion, by which one “catches” another’s apparent emotion,
often unconsciously and without reference to its cause or “object”; conscious
and unconscious mimicry of direction of gaze, with consequent transfer of
attention from the other’s response to its cause; and conscious or unconscious
role-taking, which reconstructs in imagination with or without imagery aspects
of the other’s situation as the other “perceives” it.
CONVERSAZIONE
– UNIGUITA -- AMBIGUITA – MASSIMA CONVERSAZIONALE EVITAZIONE DELL’AMBIGUITA
-- conversational maxim of ambiguity
avoidance, the:
Grice thought that there should be a way to characterise each maxim other than
by its formulation. “It’s a good exercise to grasp the concept behind the
maxim.” Quality relates to Strength or Fortitutde, the first to “at least,” the second to “at most.” For
Quality, he has a supra-maxim, “of trust”the two maxims are “maxim of candour”
and “maxim of evidence”. Under relation, “maxim of relevance.” Under manner,
suprapaxim “maxim of perspicuity” and four maxims, the first is exactly the
same as the supramaxim, “maxim of percpicuity” now becomes “maxim of obscurity
avoidance”or “maxim of clarity”obscure and clear are exact oppositesperspicuous
[sic] is more of a trick. The second maxin under mode is this one of ambiguity
avoidanceperhaps there should be a positive way to express this: be univocal.
Do not be equivocal. Do not equivocate, univocate! The next two, plus the extra
one that makes this a cataloguethe next is ‘maxim of brevity’ or
“conversational maxim of unnecessary prolixity avoidance,” here we see the
‘sic’: “Grice’s maxim of conversational brevity, or of avoidance of
conversationally unnecessary prolixity.” The next is “maxim of order”and the
one that makes this a decalogue: “maxim of conversational tailoring” --. a
phonological or orthographic form having multiple meanings senses, characters,
semantic representations assigned by the language system. A lexical ambiguity
occurs when a lexical item word is assigned multiple meanings by the language.
It includes a homonymy, i.e., distinct lexical items having the same sound or
form but different senses
‘knight’/’night’, ‘lead’ n./‘lead’ v., ‘bear’ n./‘bear’ v.; and b
polysemy, i.e., a single lexical item having multiple senses ‘lamb’ the animal/‘lamb’ the flesh, ‘window’
glass/‘window’ opening. The distinction between homonymy and polysemy is
problematic. A structural ambiguity occurs when a phrase or sentence is
correlated by the grammar of the language with distinct constituent structures
phrase markers or sequences of phrase markers. Example: ‘Competent women and
men should apply’ ‘[NP[NPCompetent
women] and men] . . .’ vs. ‘[NPCompetent[NPwomen and men]] . . .’, where ‘NP’
stands for ‘noun phrase’. A scope ambiguity is a structural ambiguity deriving
from alternative interpretations of scopes of operators see below. Examples:
‘Walt will diet and exercise only if his doctor approves’ sentence operator scope: doctor’s approval is
a necessary condition for both diet and exercise wide scope ‘only if’ vs. approval
necessary for exercise but not for dieting wide scope ‘and’; ‘Bertie has a
theory about every occurrence’
quantifier scope: one grand theory explaining all occurrences ‘a theory’
having wide scope over ‘every occurrence’ vs. all occurrences explained by
several theories together ‘every occurrence’ having wide scope. The scope of an
operator is the shortest full subformula to which the operator is attached.
Thus, in `A & B C’, the scope of ‘&’ is ‘A & B’. For natural
languages, the scope of an operator is what it C-commands. X C-commands Y in a
tree diagram provided the first branching node that dominates X also dominates
Y. An occurrence of an operator has wide scope relative to that of another
operator provided the scope of the former properly includes scope of the
latter. Examples: in ‘~A & B’, ’-’ has wide scope over ‘&’; in ‘Dx Ey
Fxy’, the existential quantifier has wide scope over the universal quantifier.
A pragmatic ambiguity is duality of use resting on pragmatic principles such as
those which underlie reference and conversational implicaturum; e.g., depending
on contextual variables, ‘I don’t know that he’s right’ can express doubt or
merely the denial of genuine knowledge.
CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA DELL’INFORMAZIONE
MAXIMIN: maxim of conversational maximin informativeness: a maxim combining the
maximum and the minimum.
CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELL’ INFORMATIVITA
CONVERSAZIONALE MASSIMA: maxim of maximal conversational informativeness: a
maxim only dealing with the ‘maximum,’ not the ‘minimum,’ which is a problem
for Grice. “Why regulate volunteerness?”
CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELL’INFORMATIVITA
CONVERSAZIONALE MINIMA: maxim of minimal conversational informativeness: maxim
dealing with the minimum, not the maximum.
CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLA CONFIDENZA
CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational trust: Grice preferred ‘trust’ to
‘truth.’ Grice: “One of the few useful items in the English philosophical
vocabulary: a word that encompasses the volitional and the non-volitional. Of
course, the same could be said of ‘verum,’ cognate with German ‘wahr.’
CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLA VERICITA
CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational veracity: Grice: “When I’m feeling
Latinate, you’ll hear me refer to this as the maxim of conversational
veracityThe Romans distinguished the verax and the mendax. I don’t.”
CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLL’ADEQUAZIONE
EVIDENZIALE CONVERSAZIONALE: maxim of conversational evidential adequacy:
Grice: “We need a maxim to ensure adequate evidencethis would be otiose in the
volitionalbut then we can always generalise the ‘evidence’ to ‘ground,’ or
reason, which is what my American tutee, R. J. Fogelin, did.
CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLA RELAZIONE
CONVERSAZIONE -- maxim of conversational relevance: Grice: “Personally, I
prefer ‘relation,’ but Strawson doesn’t. But then Strawson thinks this is
‘unimportant.’ Not to me, ‘relevant,’ like ‘important,’ are the most unrelevant
and unimportant pieces, especially as abused by an Oxford philosopher who
should know better!”
CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA DEL MODO
CONVERSAZIONALE – MASSIMA DELLA “PERSPICUITA” [sic] CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of
conversational perspicuity: Grice: “D. H. Lewis made me ‘hate’ clarity“clarity
is not enoughplus, it’s metaphorical? How can I render clear what is
essentially obscure? In fact, I would go on to say that the task of the
philosopher is to dramatise the mundane, to render obscure what seems clear.
Perspicuity is unclear enough and will do fine.”
CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLA CLARITA
CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational clarity, or maxim of conversational
obscurity avoidance: Grice: “It might be said that ‘be perspicuous’ YIELDS
‘avoid obscurity,’ alla ‘be clear, don’t be obscure.’ But I prefer to be
repetitive, if not AS repetitive as the Jewish Godthe Jews have more than ten
commandments!”
CONVERSAZIONE: maxim of conversational
ambiguity avoidance, maxim of conversational equivocation avoidance, maxim of
conversational univocity: Grice: “This is a teaser, as how ‘ambiguous’ can
‘ambiguous’ be? And why should I dumb down my wit to help my addressee? Dorothy
Parker never did!”
CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA DELL’EVITAZIONE D’EFFORZO -- maxim of conversational brevity or maxim of conversationally unnecessary prolixity avoidance: Grice: “I would call it maxim of redundancy.” “Or maxim of redundancy avoidance,” or maxim of conversational entropy.” A: Did you watch the programme?Grice: A friend suggested this to me. B: No, I was in a blacked-out city. Versus “No, I was in New York, which was blacked-out. Grice: "In response to my exploration on conversation, I was given an example by a fellow playgroup member which seems to me, as far as it goes, to provide a welcome kind of support for the picture I am putting forward in that it appears to exhibit a kind of interaction between the members of my list of conversational maxims to which I had not really paid due attention — perhaps for the matter not really concerning directly philosophical methodology.” Suppose that it is generally known that Oxford and London were blacked out the day prior. The following conversation takes place: A: Did Smith see the show on the bobby box last night? Grice: “It will be CONVERSATIONALLY unobjectionable for B, who knows that Smith was in London, to reply, B: No, he was in a blacked-out city. "B could have said that Smith was in *London*, thereby providing a further piece of information.” “However, I should like to be able to argue that, in preferring the conversational move featuring the indefinite descriptor, ‘a blacked-out city' B implicates (or communicates the implicaturum) (by the maxims prescribing relation and redundancy avoidance) a more appropriate piece of information, viz., why_ Smith was prevented from seeing the ‘show’ on the bobby box.” "B could have provided BOTH pieces of information, in an over-prolixic version of the above: ‘Smith was in London , which, as every schoolboy knows, was blacked-out yesterday.” — thereby insulting A. But THE ***GAIN****, as Bentham would put it, would have been **INSUFFICIENT** to **JUSTIFY** the additional conversational **COST**.” “Or so I think.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bobby-box implicatura.” CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA DELL’ORDINE
CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational order: Grice: “Order is vague: first
is the generalised, then the particularized.” By “the very particularized,”
Grice means ‘temporal ordered sequence.” E. g. “Were I to say, Lady Ogilvy
fainted and took arsenic, Strawson would get a different feeling if I were to
utter instead, ‘Lady Ogilvy took arsenic and fainted.’”
CONVERSAZIONE -- MASSIMA DEL CORTE CONVERSAZIONALE
-- maxim of conversational tailoring: ‘The king of France is not baldFrance is
a monarchy.”
CONVERSAZIONE
– PUNTO CONVERSAZIONALE – “PUNTO, NON VERITA” -- conversational point: Grice
distinguishes between ‘point’ and ‘conversational point.’ “What’s the good of
being quoted by another philosopher on the point of ‘point.’?” But that is what
Winch does. So, as a revenge, Grice elaborated on the point. P. London-born philosopher. He quotes Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s
point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of
one’s remarksGrice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any
desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t
hesitate to say that it seems red to me”Surely pointless, but an incredible
truth meant to refute G. A. Paul
CONVERSAZIONE: POSTULATO CONVERSAZIONALE
-- “conversational postulate”an otiosity deviced by Lakoff and Gordon (or
Gordon and Lakoff) after Carnap’s infamous meaning postulate, a sentence that
specifies part or all of the meaning of a predicate. Meaning postulates would
thus include explicit, contextual, and recursive definitions, reduction
sentences for dispositional predicates, and, more generally, any sentences
stating how the extensions of predicates are interrelated by virtue of the
meanings of those predicates. For example, any reduction sentence of the form
(x) (x has f / (x is malleable S x has y)) could be a meaning postulate for the
predicate ‘is malleable’. The notion of a meaning postulate was introduced by
Carnap, whose original interest stemmed from a desire to explicate sentences
that are analytic (“true by virtue of meaning”) but not logically true. Where G
is a set of such postulates, one could say that A is analytic with respect to G
if and only if A is a logical consequence of G. On this account, e.g., the
sentence ‘Jake is not a married bachelor’ is analytic with respect to {’All
bachelors are unmarried’}.
CONVERSAZIONE – RAGIONE
CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational reason,
or ‘dialogical reason.’ With ‘reason,’ Grice is following Ariskant. There’s the
‘ratio’ and there’s the “Vernunft.” “To converse” can mean to have sex (cf.
know) so one has to be careful. Grice is using ‘conversational’ casually.
First, he was aware of the different qualifications for ‘implication’. There is
Nowell-Smith’s contextual implication and C. K. Grant’s ‘pragmatic
implication.’ So he chose ‘conversational implication’ himself. Later, when
narrowing down the notion, he distinguished between ‘conversational
implication’ and ‘non-conversational implication’: “Thank you. B: You’re
welcome.” If B is following the maxim, ‘be polite,’ the implication that he is
pleased he was able to assist his emissor is IMPLICATED but not
conversationally so. It is not a ‘conversational implication.’ Grice needs to
restrict the notion for philosophical purposes. Both for the framework of his
theory (it is easier to justify transcendentally conversational implication
than it is non-conversational implication). Note that ‘I am pleased I was able
to assist’ is CANCELLABLE or defeatible, so that’s not the issue. In any case,
both ‘conversational impication’ and these type of calculable
‘non-conversational’ implication still yielding from some ‘maxim’ (such as ‘be
polite’) Grice covers under the generic “non-conventional” precisely because
they can be defeated. When it comes to NON-DEFEASIBLE implicatura, Grice uses
‘conventional implication’ (as in “She was poor but she was honest.”). Grice
did not find these fun. And it shows. Strawson stuck with them, but his
philosophising about them ain’t precisely ‘fun.’ Used in Retrospective369. Also:
conversational rationality. Surely, “principle of conversational rationality”
sounds otiose. Expectation of mutual rationality sounds better. Critique of
conversational reason sounds best! Grice is careful here. When he provides a
reductive analysis of ‘reasoning,’ this goes as follows: the reasoner reasons
from premise to conclusion. That’s the analysandum. What’s the analysans? At
least it involves TWO clauses: If the reasoner reasons from premise to
conclusion, it is assumed that he BELIEVES that the premise obtains; and he
believes that the conclusion obtains. This has to be generalised to cover the
desiderative, using ‘accept.’ He accepts that the premise obtains, and he
accepts that the conclusion obtains. But there is obviously a SECOND condition:
that the conclusion follows from the premise! He uses ‘demonstrably’ for that,
or the demonstratum.’ He is open as to what kind of yielding is involved
because he wants to allow for inductive reasoning and abductive reasoning, not
just deductive reasoning. AND THERE IS A TYPICALLY GRICEIAN third condition,
involving CAUSATION. He had used ‘cause’ in reductive analyses beforeif not so
much in ‘meaning,’ due to Urmson’s counterexample involving ‘bribery,’ where
‘cause’ does not seem to dobut in his analysis of ‘intending’ for the British
Academy. So at Oxford he promotes this THIRD causal condition as involving
that, naturally enough, it is the rasoner’s BELIEF that demonstrably q follows
from p, which CAUSES the reasoner TO BELIEVE (or more generally, accept) that
the conclusion obtains. Grice is happy with that belief in the validity of the
demonstration ‘populates’ the world of alethic beliefs, and does not concern
with generalising that into a generic ‘acceptance.’ The word ‘rationalist’ is
anathema at Oxford, because tutor after tutor has brainwashed their tutees that
the distinction is ‘empiricst-rationalist’ and that at Oxford we are
‘empiricists.’ So Grice is really being ‘heretic’ here in the words of G. P.
Baker. demonstratum: The Eng. word
“reason” and the Fr. word “raison” are
both formed on the basis of Roman “reor,” to count or calculate, whence think,
believe. The Roman verb translates the Grecian “λέγειν,” two of whose principal
meanings it retains, but only two: count and think. The third principal meaning
of the Grecian term, speak, discourse, which designates a third type of putting
into relation and proportion, is rendered by other Roman series: “dicere”
(originally cognate with ‘deixis,’ and so not necessarily ‘verbal’), “loquor,”
“orationem habere” (the most ‘vocal’ one, as it relates to the ‘mouth,’ cf.
‘orality’) or “sermonem habere,” so that ultimately the Grecian λόγος is
approached by Roman philosophers by means of a syntagm, “ratio et oratio,”
reason and discourse. Each vernacular fragments the meaning of logos into a
greater or lesser. Cf. ‘principium reddendae rationis.’ Rationality functions
as a principle of the intelligibility of the world and history, particularly in
Hegel. Then there’s The Partitions of Reason and Semantic diffractions.
Although there is no language that retains under a single word all the meanings
of logos except by bringing logos into the language in question, the
distribution of these meanings is more or less close to Roman. For the
classical Fr. word “raison,” which
maintains almost all the Roman meanings including the mathematical sense of
proportion, as in “raison d’une série,” or “raison inverse,” a contemporary Fr.
-G. dictionary proposes the following
terms: Vernunft, Verstand rational faculty. This example shows that the whole
of the vocabulary is thus mobilized. Reason and faculties We can distinguish
between two interfering systems. The first designates reason, identified with
thought in general, in its relationship to a bodily and/or mental instance. The
second situates reason in a hierarchy of faculties whose organization it
determines. Regarding the first system, as it is expressed in various
languages, where one will find studies of the main distortions, especially
around the expressions of the Roman ‘anima.’ Philosophers especially emphasize
the ways of designating reason and mind that appear to be the most irreducible
from one language to another. Regarding the second system, and the partitions
that do not coincide. For Grice, ‘to understand’ presupposes ‘rationalitynot
for Kant, who sticks with Verstand/Vernunft distinction. Ratio speculatum,
praticatum. From Aristotle to Kant, two great domains of rationality have been
distinguished: theory, or speculative reason, and practice. The lurality of
meanings, each represented by one or more specific words. The first question,
from the point of view of the difference of languages, is thus that of the
breadth of the meaning of “reason” or its equivalents, and of the systems
diffracting the meanings of logos and then of ratio. But another complex of
problems immediately arises. The Roman “ratio” absorbs the meanings of other
Grecian terms, such as νοῦς and διάνοια, which are also translated in other,
more technical ways, such as intellectus; so that reason, in the sense of
rationality, is a comprehensive term, whereas ‘reason’ in the sense of
intellect or understanding is a singular and differentiated faculty. However,
none of the comprehensive terms or systems of opposition coincides with those
of another language, which are moreover changing. Then there’s Reason and
Rationality: man, animal, god. Since Aristotle’s definition of man as an animal
endowed with logos, which Roman writers rendered by “animal rationale” —
omitting the discursive dimension—reason, or the logos, is a specific
difference that defines man by his difference from other living beings and/or
his participation in a divine or cosmic nature. Reason is opposed to madness
understood as de-mentia. More broadly, reason is conceived in terms of difference
from what does not belong to its domain and falls outside its immediate law,
but which man may, in certain ways, share with other animals, such as
sensation, passion, imagination, and possibly memory. Rationality and the
principle of intelligibility. Rationality, defined by the logos, is connected
with logic as the art of speaking and thinking, and with its founding
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CONVERSAZIONE
– LA CONFIDENZA CONVERSAZIONALE – PRINZIPIO DELLA CONFIDENZA CONVERSAZIONALE --
conversational trustworthinessor just trust. Principle of Conversational
trustworthiness -- Conversational desideratum of maximal evidence, information
bearing on the truth or falsity of a proposition. In philosophical discussions,
a person’s evidence is generally taken to be all the information a person has,
positive or negative, relevant to a proposition. The notion of evidence used in
philosophy thus differs from the ordinary notion according to which physical
objects, such as a strand of hair or a drop of blood, counts as evidence. One’s
information about such objects could be evidence in the philosophical sense.
The concept of evidence plays a central role in our understanding of knowledge
and rationality. According to a traditional and widely held view, one has
knowledge only when one has a true belief based on very strong evidence.
Rational belief is belief based on adequate evidence, even if that evidence
falls short of what is needed for knowledge. Many traditional philosophical
debates, such as those about our knowledge of the external world, the
rationality of religious belief, and the rational basis for moral judgments,
are largely about whether the evidence we have in these areas is sufficient to
yield knowledge or rational belief. The senses are a primary source of
evidence. Thus, for most, if not all, of our beliefs, ultimately our evidence
traces back to sensory experience. Other sources of evidence include memory and
the testimony of others. Of course, both of these sources rely on the senses in
one way or another. According to rationalist views, we can also get evidence
for some propositions through mere reason or reflection, and so reason is an
additional source of evidence. The evidence one has for a belief may be
conclusive or inconclusive. Conclusive evidence is so strong as to rule out all
possibility of error. The discussions of skepticism show clearly that we lack
conclusive evidence for our beliefs about the external world, about the past,
about other minds, and about nearly any other topic. Thus, an individual’s
perceptual experiences provide only inconclusive evidence for beliefs about the
external world since such experiences can be deceptive or hallucinatory.
Inconclusive, or prima facie, evidence can always be defeated or overridden by
subsequently acquired evidence, as, e.g., when testimonial evidence in favor of
a proposition is overridden by the evidence provided by subsequent
experiences. evidentialism, in the
philosophy of religion, the view that religious beliefs can be rationally
accepted only if they are supported by one’s “total evidence,” understood to
mean all the other propositions one knows or justifiably believes to be true.
Evidentialists typically add that, in order to be rational, one’s degree of
belief should be proportioned to the strength of the evidential support.
Evidentialism was formulated by Locke as a weapon against the sectarians of his
day and has since been used by Clifford among many others to attack religious
belief in general. A milder form of evidentialism is found in Aquinas, who,
unlike Clifford, thinks religion can meet the evidentialist challenge. A
contrasting view is fideism, best understood as the claim that one’s
fundamental religious convictions are not subject to independent rational
assessment. A reason often given for this is that devotion to God should be
one’s “ultimate concern,” and to subject faith to the judgment of reason is to
place reason above God and make of it an idol. Proponents of fideism include
Tertullian, Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, and some Vittersians. A third view, which
as yet lacks a generally accepted label, may be termed experientialism; it
asserts that some religious beliefs are directly justified by religious
experience. Experientialism differs from evidentialism in holding that
religious beliefs can be rational without being supported by inferences from
other beliefs one holds; thus theistic arguments are superfluous, whether or
not there are any sound ones available. But experientialism is not fideism; it
holds that religious beliefs may be directly grounded in religious experience
wtihout the mediation of other beliefs, and may be rationally warranted on that
account, just as perceptual beliefs are directly grounded in perceptual
experience. Recent examples of experientialism are found in Plantinga’s “Reformed
Epistemology,” which asserts that religious beliefs grounded in experience can
be “properly basic,” and in the contention of Alston that in religious
experience the subject may be “perceiving God.”
converse. 1 Narrowly, the result of the
immediate logical operation called conversion on any categorical proposition,
accomplished by interchanging the subject term and the predicate term of that
proposition. Thus, the converse of the categorical proposition ‘All cats are
felines’ is ‘All felines are cats’. 2 More broadly, the proposition obtained
from a given ‘if . . . then . . .’ conditional proposition by interchanging the
antecedent and the consequent clauses, i.e., the propositions following the
‘if’ and the ‘then’, respectively; also, the argument obtained from an argument
of the form ‘P; therefore Q’ by interchanging the premise and the
conclusion. converse, outer and inner,
respectively, the result of “converting” the two “terms” or the relation verb
of a relational sentence. The outer converse of ‘Abe helps Ben’ is ‘Ben helps
Abe’ and the inner converse is ‘Abe is helped by Ben’. In simple, or atomic,
sentences the outer and inner converses express logically equivalent
propositions, and thus in these cases no informational ambiguity arises from
the adjunction of ‘and conversely’ or ‘but not conversely’, despite the fact
that such adjunction does not indicate which, if either, of the two converses
intended is meant. However, in complex, or quantified, relational sentences
such as ‘Every integer precedes some integer’ genuine informational ambiguity
is produced. Under normal interpretations of the respective sentences, the
outer converse expresses the false proposition that some integer precedes every
integer, the inner converse expresses the true proposition that every integer
is preceded by some integer. More complicated considerations apply in cases of
quantified doubly relational sentences such as ‘Every integer precedes every
integer exceeding it’. The concept of scope explains such structural ambiguity:
in the sentence ‘Every integer precedes some integer and conversely’,
‘conversely’ taken in the outer sense has wide scope, whereas taken in the
inner sense it has narrow scope.
convey: used in index to WoW. Etymology is
funny. From con-viacum-via, go on the road with.
coonway: a., english
philosopher whose Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae 1690;
English translation, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy,
1692 proposes a monistic ontology in which all created things are modes of one
spiritual substance emanating from God. This substance is made up of an
infinite number of hierarchically arranged spirits, which she calls monads.
Matter is congealed spirit. Motion is conceived not dynamically but vitally.
Lady Conway’s scheme entails a moral explanation of pain and the possibility of
universal salvation. She repudiates the dualism of both Descartes and her
teacher, Henry More, as well as the materialism of Hobbes and Spinoza. The work
shows the influence of cabalism and affinities with the thought of the mentor
of her last years, Francis Mercurius van Helmont, through whom her philosophy
became known to Leibniz.
CVM-AD-IUTUM – coadiuvare -- co-operatum: Grice previously used ‘help’which has a Graeco-Roman
counterpart -- Grice is very right in noting that ‘helpfulness’ does not
‘equate’ cooperation. Correspondingly he changed the principle of
conversational helpfulness into the principle of conversational co-operation.
He also points that one has to distinguish between the general theisis that
conversation is rational from the thesis that the particular form of
rationality that conversation takes is cooperative rationality, which most
libertarians take as ‘irrationality’ personified, almost! Grice is obsessed
with this idea that ‘co-operation’ need not just be ‘conversational.’ Indeed,
his way to justify a ‘rationalist’ approach is through analogy. If he can find
‘co-operative’ traits in behaviour other than ‘conversational,’ the greater the
chance to generalise, and thus justify. The co-operation would be
self-justifying. co-operation. The hyphen in Strawson and Wiggins (p. 520). Grice
found ‘co-operative’ too Marxist, and would prefer ‘help,’ as in ‘mutual help.’
This element of ‘mutuality’ is necessary. And it is marked grammatical, with
the FIRST person and the SECOND person. The third need NOT be a personcan be a
dog (as in “Fido is shaggy”). The mututality is necessary in that the emissor’s
intention involves the belief that his recipient is rational. You cannot
co-operate with a rock. You cannot co-operate with a vegetal. You cannot
cooperate with a non-rational animal. You can ONLY cooperate with a co-rational
agent. Animal co-operation poses a nice side to the Griceian idea. Surely the
stereotype is a member of species S cooperating with another specimen of the
same species. But then there are great examples of ‘sym-biosis’: the crane that
gets rid off the hippopotamus’s ticks. Is this cooperation? Is this
intentional? If Grice thinks that there is a ‘mechanistically derivable’
explanation,, it ’t. He did not necessarily buy ‘bio-sociological’ approaches.
Which was a problem, because we don’t have much philosophical seriouis
discourse on ‘cooperation’ at the general level Grice is aiming at. Except in
ethics, which is biased. So it is no wonder that Grice had to rely on
‘meta-ethics’ to even conceptualise the field of cooperation: the maximin
becomes a balance between a principle of conversational egoism and a principle
of conversational altruism. He later found the egoism-tag as ‘understood.’ And
his ‘altruism’ became ‘helpfulness,’ became ‘benevolence,’ and became
‘co-operation.’
CVM-AG -- copulatum: It was an Oxonian exercise to trace the ‘copula.’ “I’ve
been working like a dog, should be sleeping like a log.” Where is the copula:
Lennon is a dog-like workerLennon is a potential log-like sleeper.” Grice uses
‘copula’ in PPQ. The term is sometimes used
ambiguously, for ‘conjunctum.’ A conjunctive is called a copulative. But Grice
obviously narrows down the use of copulatum to izz and hazz. He is having in
mind Strawson.The
formula does not allow for differences in tense and grammatical number; nor for
the enormous class of * all '-sentences which do not contain, as their main
verb, the verb * to be '. We might try to recast the sentences so that they at
least fitted into one of the two patterns * All x is y ' or ' All x are y ' ;
but the results would be, as English, often clumsy andt sometimes absurd. for
Aristotle, 'Socrates is a man' is true "in virtue of his being that thing
which constitutes existing for him (being which constitutes his mode of
existence)," Hermann Weidemann, "In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of
Predication," p. 84— only so long as that "being" be taken as an
assertion of being per se. But Weidemann wants to take it merely copulatively.
In "Prädikation," p. 1196, he says that when 'is' is used as tertium adiacens
it has no meaning by itself, but merely signifies the connection of subject and
predicate. Cf. his "Aristoteles über das isolierte Aussagenwort," p.
154. H. P. Grice, "Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being," also
rejects an existential reading of tertium adiacens and pushes for a copulative
one. Cf. Alan Code, "Aristotle: Essence and Accident," 414-7. Aristotle
has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation between
predicates of one subject, but with variation between essential (per
se)predications upon different (indeed categorially different) subjects (such ...eads
me to wonder whether Aristotle may be maintaining not only that the copula exhibits
semantic ...An extended treatment of my views about izzing and hazzing can
be found in Alan. A crucial ... on occasion admit catégorial variation in
the sense of the copulative 'is', evidently is ... Aristotle has
connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation ...with
the copulative 'is';
so he rather strangely interprets the last remark. (1017a27-30) as alluding to
semantic multiplicity in
the copula as being.
(supposedly) a consequence of semantic multiplicity in the existential
'is'. This interpretation seems difficult to defend. When Aristotle says that
predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its
quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be
saying that if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to
some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow,
these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription
of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation"H. P.
Grice brings the question he had considered with J. L. Austin and P. F.
Strawson at Oxford about Aristotle’s categories.In “Categoriae,” Aristotle
distinguishes two sorts of case of the application of word or phrase to a range
of situations. In one sort of case, both the word and a single definition
(account, “logos”) apply throughout that range. In the other sort of case, the
word but no single definition applies through the range.These two sorts of case
have a different nature. In the first case, the word is applied synonymously
(of better as “sunonuma”literally “sun-onuma”, cognomen). In the second case
the word is applied homonymously (or better “homonuma”, or aequi-vocally,
literally “homo-numa.”)Grice notes that a homonymous application has some sort
of sub-division which Aristotle calls "paronymy" (“paronuma”),
literally ‘para onuma.’To put it roughly, homonyms have multiple meaningswhat
Grice has as “semantic multiplicity.”Synonyms have one meaning or ONE SENSE,
but apply to different kinds of thing.A paronym, such as ‘be,’ derives from
other things of a different kind. Paronyms display a ‘UNIFIED semantic
multiplicity,’ if that’s not too oxymoronic: how can the multiplicity be
unified while remaining a multiplicity? Aristotle states, confusingly, that
"being is said in many ways". As Grice notes, ‘good’ (agathon) also
is a paronym that displays unified semantic multiplicity.In Nichomachean
Ethics, even more confusingly, Aristotle says that "good is said in as
many ways as being". He doesn’t number the ways.So the main goal for Grice
is to answer the question: If, as Aristotle suggests, at least some expressions
connected with the notion of "being" exhibit semantic multiplicity,
of which expressions is the suggestion true? Grice faces the question of
existential being and Semantic Multiplicity. Grice stresses that Semantic Multiplicity
of "be" is not only the case
of it interpretation. Other words he wants to know in what way of
interpretation of this word the philosophers can detect the SM. Generally
speaking there are four possible interpretations of "being": First,
"be" is taken to mean "exist.”Second, "be" is taken as
a copula in a predication statement.Third, "be" is taken for
expressing the identity.Fourth, "Being" is considered to be a noun
(equivalent to ‘object' or ‘entity')subjectification, category shift: “Smith’s
being tall suggests he is an athlete.” (cfr. A. G. N. Flew on the ‘rubbish’
that adding ‘the’ to ‘self’ results incontra J. R. Jones). Philosophers have
some problems for this kind of theory with separating interpretations from each
other. It is natural for thinkers to unite the first and the fourth. The object
or entity should be the things which already exist. So the SM would attach to
such a noun as "entity" if, and only if, it also attaches to the word
"exist". Furthermore, it seems to be a good idea to unite the first
and the third. In some ways theorist can paraphrase the word "exist"
in the terms of self-identity. Grice gives an example: “Julius Caesar exists if
and only if Julius Caesar is identical for Julius Caesar.” Cf. Grice on
‘relative identity.’So the philosophers should investigate SM in two possible
interpretationswhen "be" is understood as "exist" and when
"be" is understood as copula. From Aristotle's point of view ‘being’
is predicated of everything. From this statement, Grice draws the conclusion
that "exist" can apply to every thing, even a square circle.This word
should signify a plurality of universals and exhibits semantic multiplicity.
But Grice continue his analyses and tries to show, that "exist" has
not merely SM, but UNIFIED semantic multiplicity. God forbid that he breaks M.
O. R., Modifed Occam’s RazorSemantic multiplicies are not to be multiplied
unificatory necessity.”In “Metaphysics,” Aristotle says that whatever things
are signified by the "forms of predication". Philosophers understood
the forms of predication (praedicabilium, praedicamentum) as a category. So in
this way "being" has as many significations as there are forms of
predication. "Be" in this case indicates what a thing is, what is
like or how much it is and ctr. And no reasons to make a difference between two
utterances like "man walks (flourishes)" and "the man is walking
(flourishing)"cfr. Strawson on no need to have ‘be’ explicitly in the
surface form, which render some utterances absurd. Grice says that it is not a
problem with interpretation of verb-forms like ‘walks' and ‘flourishes' while
we can replace them by expression in a canonical form like ‘is walking' and ‘is
flourishing'. Aristotle names them as canonical in form within the multiplicity
of use of "be" because ‘is’ is not existential, but copulative.Cf.
Descartes, I think therefore I amI am a res cogitans, ergo I am a res.
"When Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is,
sometimes what is it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity)
and so on, he seems to be saying that, if we consider the range of predicates
which can be applied to some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or
a cow, these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the
copula in the ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding
variation" It means that, from Aristotle's point of view, "Socrates
is F" is not an essential predication, where "F" shows the item
in the category C. So the logical form of the proposition “Socrates is F” is
understood as "Socrates has something which is (C) F" where is (C)
represent essential connection to category C. In conclusion it can be said that
the copula is a matter of the logical nature of constant connection expressed
by "has" and a categorical variant relation expressed by essential
"is". So we have both types of interpretation: as existence and as a
copula. (Our gratitude to P. A.
Sobolevsky). ases of ''Unified Semantic
Multiplicity'' (USM). Prominent among examples of USM is the
application of the word 'be'; according to. Aristotle, “being is said
in ... Aristotle and the alleged multiplicity of being (or
something). Grice is all for focal unity. Or, to echo Jones, if there is semantic
multiplicity (homonymy), it is in the
end UNIFIED semantic multiplicity (paronymy). Or something. CopulaH. P. Grice
on Aristotle on the copula (“Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”) --
copula, in logic, a form of the verb ‘to be’ that joins subject and predicate
in singular and categorical propositions. In ‘George is wealthy’ and ‘Swans are
beautiful’, e.g., ‘is’ and ‘are’, respectively, are copulas. Not all
occurrences of forms of ‘be’ count as copulas. In sentences such as ‘There are
51 states’, ‘are’ is not a copula, since it does not join a subject and a
predicate, but occurs simply as a part of the quantifier term ‘there are’.
corpus: -- Grice’s alma mater; he later
became a Hamsworth scholar at Merton and finally fellow of St. John’s.. Grice
would not have gone to Oxford had his talent not been in the classics, Greek
and Latin. As a Midlander, he was sent to Corpus. At the time, most of Oxford
was oriented towards the classics, or Lit. Hum. (Philosophia). At some point,
each college attained some stereotypical fame, which Grice detested (“Corpus is
for classicists”). By this time, Grice, after a short stay at Merton, accepted
the fellowship at St. John’s, which was “a different animal.” In them days,
there were only two tutorial fellows in philosophy, Scots Mabbott, and English
Grice. But Grice also was “University Lecturer in Philosophy,” which meant he
delivered seminars for tutees all over Oxford. St. John’s keeps a record of all
the tutees by Grice. They include, alphabetically, a few good names. Why is
Corpus so special? Find out! History of “Corpus Christi.” Cf. St. John’s. Cf.
Merton. Each should have an entry. Corpus is Grice’s alma materso crucial. Hardieian: you only have one tutor in your life, and Grice’s
was Hardie. So an exploration on Hardie may be in order. Grice hastens to add
that he only learned ‘form,’ not matter, from Hardie, but the ethical and
Aristotelian approach he also admitted. Corpus -- Grice, “Personal identity”soul
and body -- disembodiment, the immaterial state of existence of a person who
previously had a body. Disembodiment is thus to be distinguished from
nonembodiment or immateriality. God and angels, if they exist, are
non-embodied, or immaterial. By contrast, if human beings continue to exist
after their bodies die, then they are disembodied. As this example suggests,
disembodiment is typically discussed in the context of immortality or survival
of death. It presupposes a view according to which persons are souls or some
sort of immaterial entity that is capable of existing apart from a body.
Whether it is possible for a person to become disembodied is a matter of
controversy. Most philosophers who believe that this is possible assume that a
disembodied person is conscious, but it is not obvious that this should be the
case. Corpus -- Grice’s body --
embodiment, the bodily aspects of human subjectivity. Embodiment is the central
theme in European phenomenology, with its most extensive treatment in the works
of Maurice MerleauPonty. Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment distinguishes
between “the objective body,” which is the body regarded as a physiological
entity, and “the phenomenal body,” which is not just some body, some particular
physiological entity, but my or your body as I or you experience it. Of course,
it is possible to experience one’s own body as a physiological entity. But this
is not typically the case. Typically, I experience my body tacitly as a unified
potential or capacity for doing this and that
typing this sentence, scratching that itch, etc. Moreover, this sense
that I have of my own motor capacities expressed, say, as a kind of bodily
confidence does not depend on an understanding of the physiological processes
involved in performing the action in question. The distinction between the objective
and phenomenal body is central to understanding the phenomenological treatment
of embodiment. Embodiment is not a concept that pertains to the body grasped as
a physiological entity. Rather it pertains to the phenomenal body and to the
role it plays in our object-directed experiences.
COSMOS – COSMOLOGICIA -- cosmologicum. Grice systematized metaphysics quite carefully. He
distinguished between eschatology (or the theory of categories) and ontology
proper. Within ontology, there is ‘ontologia generalis’ and ‘ontologia
specialis.’ There are at least two branches of ‘ontologia specialis’:
‘cosmologia’ and ‘anthropologia.’ Grice would often refer to the ‘world’ in
toto. For example, in “Meaning revisited,” when he speaks of the ‘triangle’:
world-denotatum; signum-emissor, and soul. Grice was never a solipsist, and
most of his theories are ‘causal’ in nature, including that of meaning and
perception. As such, he was constantly fighting against acosmism. While not one
of his twelve labours, he took a liking for the coinage. ‘Acosmism’ is formed
in analogy to ‘atheism,’ meaning the denial of the ultimate reality of the
world. Ernst Platner used it in 1776 to describe Spinoza’s philosophy, arguing
that Spinoza did not intend to deny “the existence of the Godhead, but the
existence of the world.” Maimon, Fichte, Hegel, and others make the same claim.
By the time of Feuerbach it was also used to characterize a basic feature of
Christianity: the denial of the world or worldliness. Cosmologicum -- emanationism, a doctrine
about the origin and ontological structure of the world, most frequently
associated with Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, according to which everything
else that exists is an emanation from a primordial unity, called by Plotinus
“the One.” The first product of emanation from the One is Intelligence noûs, a
realm resembling Plato’s world of Forms. From Intelligence emanates Soul
psuche, conceived as an active principle that imposes, insofar as that is
possible, the rational structure of Intelligence on the matter that emanates
from Soul. The process of emanation is typically conceived to be necessary and
timeless: although Soul, for instance, proceeds from Intelligence, the notion
of procession is one of logical dependence rather than temporal sequence. The
One remains unaffected and undiminished by emanation: Plotinus likens the One
to the sun, which necessarily emits light from its naturally infinite abundance
without suffering change or loss of its own substance. Although emanationism influenced
some Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thinkers, it was incompatible with those
theistic doctrines of divine activity that maintained that God’s creative
choice and the world thus created were contingent, and that God can, if he
chooses, interact directly with individual creatures.
CILIBERTO: Grice:
“I like Cilberto; he philosophised on Machiavelli – in an interesting way:
confronting his ‘reason’ with the ‘irrational’; myself, I have not explored the
irrational, too much – but I suppose Strawson might implicate that everything I
say ON reason is an implicature on the irrational – Ciliberto uses the
vernacular for the ‘irratinal,’ to wit: pazzia!” -- Michele Ciliberto (Napoli),
filosofo. Uno dei massimi esperti del pensiero di Giordano Bruno. Nato a
Napoli nel 1945, si è formato alla Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Firenze
ed è stato allievo di Eugenio Garin, con cui si è laureato nel 1968 discutendo
una tesi sulla fortuna di Niccolò Machiavelli. Dopo la laurea ha lavorato per
alcuni anni come borsista presso il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, diretto da
Tullio Gregory, per il quale ha preparato il Lessico di Giordano Bruno edito
nel 1979. Nominato nel 1971 assistente alla cattedra di Storia della filosofia
della Facoltà di Lettere dell'Firenze tenuta da Eugenio Garin e da Paolo Rossi,
ha insegnato a vario titolo prima nella stessa Università, poi in quelle di
Trieste e di Pisa, dove ha diretto, dal 1996 al 2002, il Dipartimento di
Filosofia. Dal 2002 insegna Storia della filosofia moderna e contemporanea alla
Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Nella Scuola Normale ha ricoperto vari
incarichi tra cui la presidenza della Classe di Lettere e Filosofia, la
direzione del Centro di Filosofia, la presidenza delle Edizioni della Normale.
Dal 1996 è Presidente dell'Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento di
Firenze. Dal 1998 è presidente di IRISAssociazione di Biblioteche
Storico-Artistiche e Umanistiche di Firenze. È stato presidente dei Comitati
nazionali per le celebrazioni di Giordano Bruno, Marsilio Ficino, Benedetto
Varchi, Giovanni Della Casa e Lodovico Castelvetro. Ha fatto parte del
Consiglio Nazionale per i Beni culturali, fa parte del comitato direttivo del
Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani e del consiglio scientifico dell’Istituto
dell’Enciclopedia italiana; è membro dell’Advisory Committee della Tatti
Renaissance Library della Harvard University e del comitato dei garanti della
Fondazione Gramsci. È direttore scientifico dell’edizione delle opere latine di
Giordano Bruno per la casa editrice Adelphi e ha coordinato l’enciclopedia
Giordano Bruno. Parole, concetti, immagini e i volumi Il contributo italiano
alla storia del pensiero. Filosofia e Croce e Gentile. La cultura italiana e
l’Europa per l’Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana. Dirige la rivista
Rinascimento, oltre a far parte del comitato scientifico della Rivista di
storia della filosofia, del Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, degli
Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Classe di Lettere, di Dianoia,
di Philosophia e di Studi storici. È socio nazionale dell’Accademia dei
Lincei. Pensiero Al centro dell’attività scientifica di Michele Ciliberto
sono tre problemi: 1. la filosofia del Rinascimento con speciale attenzione
all’opera e alle figure di Giordano Brunoal quale ha dedicato molti lavorie di
Niccolò Machiavelli; 2. la filosofia contemporanea, in modo particolare la
‘tradizione’ italiana (Gramsci, Croce, Gentile, Cantimori, Garin). 3. la
filosofia politica e in maniera specifica la crisi della democrazia rappresentativa.
Opere Il Rinascimento. Storia di un dibattito, Firenze, La Nuova Italia,
1975. 8822104749 Intellettuali e
fascismo. Saggio su Delio Cantimori, Bari, De Donato, 1977. Lessico di Giordano
Bruno, Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo & Bizzarri, 1979, 2 voll. 9788822228468 Come lavorava Gramsci. Varianti
vichiane, Livorno, 1980. Filosofia e politica nel Novecento italiano. Da
Labriola a «Società», Bari, De Donato, 1982. La ruota del tempo.
Interpretazione di Giordano Bruno, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1986, 2000. Giordano
Bruno, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1990, 2000. Introduzione a Bruno, Roma-Bari,
Laterza, 1996, 2000. Umbra profunda. Studi su Giordano Bruno, Roma, Edizioni di
Storia e Letteratura, 1999.
978-88-8711-443-0 Figure in chiaroscuro. Filosofia e storiografia nel
Novecento, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2001. 88-2225-129-6 Il dialogo recitato.
Preliminari a una nuova edizione del Bruno volgare, Firenze, Olschki, 2002 (con
N. Tirinnanzi). L'occhio di Atteone. Nuovi studi su Giordano Bruno, Roma, Edizioni
di Storia e Letteratura, 2002, 2004.
88--8498-039-9 Pensare per contrari. Disincanto e utopia nel
Rinascimento, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2005. 978-88-8498-264-3 Giordano Bruno. Il teatro
della vita, Milano, Mondadori, 2007, 2008.
978-88-4207-337-6 Biblioteca laica. Il pensiero libero dell'Italia
moderna, Roma-Bari, Laterza 2008.
978-88-4209-982-6 La democrazia dispotica, Roma-Bari, Laterza . 978-88-4209-464-7 Eugenio Garin. Un
intellettuale nel Novecento, Roma-Bari, Laterza . 978-88-4209-709-9 Giordano Bruno. Parole
concetti immagini, M. Ciliberto, 3 voll., Edizioni della Normale, Pisa . 978-88-7642-479-3 Croce e Gentile. La cultura
italiana e l'Europa, (direzione) Istituto dell'Enciclopedia italiana Treccani,
. Rinascimento, Pisa, Edizioni della Normale .
978-88-7642-563-9 Il nuovo Umanesimo, Roma-Bari, Laterza, . 978-88-5812-738-4 Niccolò Machiavelli.
Ragione e pazzia, Roma-Bari, Laterza, .
978-88-5813-417-7 Il sapiente furore. Vita di Giordano Bruno, Collana
gli Adelphi n.589, Milano, Adelphi, ,
978-88-459-3483-4. Note Ciliberto, Michele, su treccani.it. Michele Ciliberto, Lessico di Giordano Bruno,
in Lessico intellettuale europeo, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1979, 9788822228468. Scuola Normale Superiore, su sns.it. Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento,
su insr.it. IRIS Associazione di
biblioteche, su iris-firenze.org. Mibac,
su librari.beniculturali.it. Mibac, su
librari.beniculturali.it. Mibac, su
librari.beniculturali.it. Mibac, su
librari.beniculturali.it. Mibac, su
librari.beniculturali.it. Biografico, su
treccani.it. Chi siamo, su
treccani.it. Fondazione Gramsci, su
fondazionegramsci.org. INSR, su
insr.it. Edizioni della Normale, su
edizioni.sns.it. Enciclopedia italiana ,
su iris.unica.it. Croce e Gentile. La
cultura italiana e l'Europa, su radioradicale.it. Olschki, su olschki.it. Franco Angeli, su ojs.francoangeli.it. Comitato Editoriale degli Annali Lettere SNS,
su annalilettere.sns.it. Comitato
scientifico Dianoia, su dianoia.it.
Comitato scientifico Studi storici, su fondazionegramsci.org. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, su
lincei.it. Giordano Bruno Rinascimento
Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio
su Michele Ciliberto Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene
immagini o altri file su Michele Ciliberto
Michele Ciliberto, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Registrazioni
di Michele Ciliberto, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale. Pagina di Michele Ciliberto sul sito della
Sns, su sns.it. 24 ottobre 5 novembre ).
Il sito dell'Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, su insr.it. Filosofia
Rinascimento Rinascimento Filosofo del
XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloStorici italiani del XX secoloStorici
italiani Professore1945 16 luglio NapoliAccademici dei LinceiStudenti
dell'Università degli Studi di FirenzeProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di
FirenzeProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di TriesteProfessori
dell'PisaProfessori della Scuola Normale SuperioreSaggisti italiani del XX
secoloSaggisti italiani del XXI secoloStorici della filosofia italiani
CIMATTI not
Cinatti: Grice:
“I like Cimatti – for one, he develops a biological semiotics, and he takes
seriously the issue that man IS an animal -- -- and has thus philosophised on
animality!” -- Felice Cimatti (Roma), filosofo. Laureato in filosofia alla
Sapienza, con una tesi sui linguaggi animali, relatore Tullio De Mauro,
correlatore Alberto Oliverio, insegna Filosofia del Linguaggio e Filosofia
italiana contemporanea all'Università della Calabria ad Arcavacata di
Rende. Ha condotto e conduce, per Rai
Radio 3, i programmi radiofonici Fahrenheit, dedicato ai libri e alle idee, e
Uomini e Profeti, programma di approfondimento di temi religiosi e filosofici.
Il 26 maggio ha ricevuto il Premio
Musatti conferito dalla Società Psicoanalitica Italiana. Dal partecipa al programma televisivo Zettel, per
Rai Cultura. È condirettore, assieme a
Francesca Piazza e Alfredo Paternoster, della Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del
Linguaggio. È figlio del poeta Pietro
Cimatti e della pittrice Laura Giometti.
Opere Linguaggio ed esperienza visiva, 1997, Rende, Centro Editoriale e
Librario. La scimmia che si parla. Linguaggio, autocoscienza e libertà nell'animale
umano, 2000, Bollati Boringhieri Nel segno del cerchio. L'ontologia semiotica
di Giorgio Prodi, 2000, Manifestolibri La mente silenziosa. Come pensano gli
animali non umani, 2000, Editori Riuniti)
88-359-5160-7 Mente e linguaggio negli animali. Introduzione alla
zoosemiotica cognitiva, 2002, Carocci editore,
88-430-2343-8 Il senso della mente. Per una critica del cognitivismo
2004, Bollati Boringhieri Mente, segno e vita. Elementi di filosofia per Scienze
della comunicazione, 2004, Carocci editore Il volto e la parola. Per una
psicologia dell'apparenza, 2007, Quodlibet, Il possibile ed il reale. Il sacro dopo la
morte di Dio, 2009, Codice Edizioni,
978-88-7578-122-4. Bollettino Filosofico. Linguaggio ed emozioni, 2009,
Aracne 978-88-548-2417-1 con Marco
Tullio Liuzza e Anna Maria Borghi, Lingue, corpo, pensiero: le ricerche
contemporanee, Carocci,. Naturalmente comunisti. Politica, linguaggio ed
economia , Bruno Mondadori.
978-88-6159-521-7. La vita che verrà. Biopolitica per Homo sapiens, , ombre
corte, Filosofia della psicoanalisi. Un'introduzione in ventuno passi, Silvia
Vizzardelli e Felice Cimatti, , Quodlibet,
978-88-7462-472-0 Filosofia dell'animalità, Laterza, , 978-88-581-0941-0 Corpo, linguaggio e
psicoanalisi, Felice Cimatti e Alberto Luchetti, , Quodlibet, con Leonardo Caffo, A come Animale: voci per
un bestiario dei sentimenti, Bompiani, , Il taglio. Linguaggio e pulsione di morte,
Quodlibet, , 978-88-7462-731-8.
Filosofie del linguaggio. Storie, autori, concetti, Felice Cimatti e Francesca
Piazza, Carocci, , Psicoanimot, La psicoanalisi e l'animalità,
Felice Cimatti, Graphe.it, ,
978-88-9372-007-6 Sguardi animali, Mimesis , 978-88-575-4506-6 Per una filosofia del
reale, Bollati Boringhieri, , La vita
estrinseca. Dopo il linguaggio, Orthotes, Salerno, , A Biosemiotic Ontology.
The Philosophy of Giorgio Prodi, Springer, Berlin, , 978-3-319-97903-8 Abbecedario del reale,
Felice Cimatti e Alex Pagliardini, Quodlibet, Macerata , La fabbrica del ricordo, Il Mulino , 978-88-15-28658-1 Unbecoming Human.
Philosophy of Animality after Deleuze, Edinburgh University Press , 978-1-4744-4339-5 Narrativa Senza colpa , ,
Marcos y Marcos) 37ª giornata in C'è un grande prato verde. 38 scrittori raccontano
il campionato di calcio /13, Carlo D'Amicis, , Manni Editori “Dopo la natura”,
not.neroeditions.com/i-bambini-del-compost/ Attività artistica Bestie 13
febbraio , Bestie, presso la Galleria M.A.D., via Giovanni Pierluigi da
Palestrina, 62-64-66 Roma. Partecipazione alla mostra Il mondoinfine, presso la
Galleria Nazionale d’Arte Moderna e Contemporanea di Roma dal 13/12/ al 23/1/.
Note Dipartimento di filosofia, su
dipfilosofia.unical.it. 29 settembre 4
giugno ). Radio Tre Archiviato il 30
agosto in . Premio Cesare Musatti a Felice Cimatti, su
spiweb.it. 29 settembre . Zettel Direzione, su rifl.unical.it. 29 settembre
. Storni / Starlings Semiotica Animalità Filosofia del linguaggio
Psicoanalisi Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons
contiene immagini o altri file su Felice Cimatti Opere di Felice Cimatti, su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Filosofia
Letteratura Letteratura Filosofo del XX
secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1959 20 settembre RomaSemiologi italiani
CIONE – Grice: “I love
Cione; my favourite is “The age of Daedalus – which reminds me of Gilbert’s
statuette and the Italian model who posed for him – the story of a failure!”
Grice: “But Cione philosophised on various other subjects as well, such as
Leibniz, and of course, Croce – in his case, first-hand knowledge! – and
mysticism, and Mussolini, and the rest of them – He thinks there is a
Neapolitan dialectic, and really is in love with his environs – his study of
‘romantic Naples’ reminds me of my rules of conversational etiquette! – especially
the illustrations involving gentleman-lady interaction!” -- Domenico Edmondo
Cione (Napoli), filosofio. Di tendenze socialiste, e in un primo momento
antifasciste, è stato allievo di studi di Benedetto Croce. Perseguitato della
prima ora dal Fascismo, viene rinchiuso nel campo di Colfiorito di Foligno e
poi mandato al confino a Montemurro.
Adesione alla Repubblica Sociale Italiana Attratto dal nuovo indirizzo
espresso dal Manifesto di Verona, aderisce alla Repubblica Sociale Italiana.
Chiede e ottiene il consenso di Benito Mussolini (il quale si rende
esplicitamente concorde) per la costituzione di una formazione politica
indipendente dal Partito Fascista Repubblicano, denominata in un primo momento
Raggruppamento Nazionale Repubblicano Socialista e, in seguito, Partito
Repubblicano Socialista Italiano. A tale
formazione politica, su suggerimento dello stesso Mussolini, sarà concessa
anche la pubblicazione di un quotidiano L'Italia del Popolo. Il Duce però non
aveva nessuna fiducia né nell'uomo, né nell'impresa, tanto che durante una
conversazione con l'ambasciatore Rudolf Rahnpreoccupato per una possibile apertura
"a sinistra" del capo del fascismoebbe a dichiarare: «Per ingannare i nostri avversari ho
lasciato, non appena ho pensato che il nuovo fascismo in Italia fosse
abbastanza forte, che alcune controcorrenti dicessero la loro, tra l’altro ho
permesso che si formasse un gruppo di opposizione sotto la guida del professor
Cione. Il professor Cione non ha una gran testa, e non avrà successo. Ma la
gente che ora sta cercando di crearsi un alibi si raccoglierà intorno a lui e
quindi sarà perduta per il Comitato di liberazione che è molto più
pericoloso.» () Attività politica nel
dopoguerra Salvatosi dalle epurazioni partigiane nel dopoguerra, si costruirà
una carriera politica nell'Italia repubblicana. Dal 1946 al 1949 militò nel
Fronte dell'Uomo Qualunque; successivamente, quando il partito di Guglielmo
Giannini si sciolse, entrò nel Movimento Sociale Italiano e nel 1952 venne
eletto consigliere e poi assessore della giunta di Achille Lauro. Nel 1953 si
candidò al Senato con la lista della fiamma nel colleggio di Afragola ma
ottenne il 7.8% dei voti e non fueletto. Deluso dai missini, aderì alla
Democrazia Cristiana, senza però svolgere una militanza attiva nel partito.
Negli ultimi anni di vita cercò di conciliare il messaggio di papa Giovanni
XXIII con le aperture di Nikita Kruscev oltre la "cortina di
ferro". Opere Juan de Valdés: la
sua vita e il suo pensiero religioso con una completa delle opere del Valdés e degli scritti
intorno a lui, Laterza editore, 1938 (2ª ed. Fiorentino, 1963) Francesco de
Sanctis, Ed. Giuseppe Principato, 1938 L'opera filosofica, coautore Franco
Laterza, Laterza editore, 1942 Napoli romantica, 1830-1848, Gruppo Editoriale
Domus, 1944 L'estetica di Francesco De Sanctis, Pennetti Casoni Editore, 1945
Dal de Sanctis al novecento, Garzanti, 1941 (2ª ed. Pennetti Casoni Editore,
1945) Nazionalismo sociale: l'idea corporativa come interpretazione della
storia, Achille Celli Editore, 1950 Napoli e Malaparte, Editore Pellerano-Del
Gaudio, 1950 Storia della repubblica sociale italiana, Ed. Latinità, 1951
Benedetto Croce, coll. "I Marmi", Longanesi, 1953 crociana, Fratelli Bocca, 1956 Francesco de
Sanctis ed i suoi tempi, Montanino, 1960 Questa Europa, M. Mele, 1962 Fascino
del mondo arabo: dal Marocco alla Persia, Cappelli Editore, 1962 Benedetto
Croce ed il pensiero contemporaneo, Loganesi editore, 1963 Fede e ragione nella
storia: filosofia della religione e storia degli ideali religiosi
dell'Occidente, Cappelli Editore, 1963 La Cina d'oggi, Filippine, Formosa,
Giappone, Editore Ceschina, 1965 Leibniz, Libreria scientifica editrice, 1964
Narrativa del Novecento, Istituto editoriale del Mezzogiorno, 1965 Curatele
Francesco De Sanctis, Un viaggio elettorale, Bompiani, 1943 Note
//treccani.it/enciclopedia/domenico-edmondo-cione_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ A. Spinosa, Mussolini. Il fascino di un
dittatore, Mondadori, Milano, 1989, pag. 293
Senato 07/06/1953 Area ITALIA Regione CAMPANIA Collegio AFRAGOLA,
elezionistorico.interno.gov.it.
Manifesto di Verona Raggruppamento Nazionale Repubblicano Socialista
Repubblica Sociale Italiana Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su
Edmondo Cione Opere di Edmondo Cione sul
web (da Google book search) Gennaro Incarnato, «CIONE, Domenico Edmondo» in
Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 25, Roma, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1981. Repubblichini d'opposizione. Storia. Un ex
allievo di Croce negli ultimi mesi di Salò crea un "partito contro"
su suggerimento del ministro dell'Educazione Biggini di Silvio Bertoldi,
Corriere della Sera, 30 gennaio 199530, Archivio storico. Biografie
Biografie Fascismo Fascismo
Politica Politica Categorie: Storici
della filosofia italianiStorici italiani del XX secoloCritici letterari
italiani Professore1908 1965 9 giugno 19 giugno Napoli NapoliAccademici
italiani del XX secoloPersonalità della Repubblica Sociale ItalianaPolitici
della Democrazia CristianaPolitici del Partito Nazionale FascistaPolitici
italiani del XX secoloProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico
II
COCO: Grice: “Typically,
while in the Italian North, Conte can play with words, in the Italian South,
Coco must work for the workers! Is conversation a work? I think so – lavoro –
In the ‘codice civile’ or rather the ‘codice’ of the civil laws – there is a
section on ‘lavoro’, and a title on ‘co-operativa’, short for ‘cooperative
society’ – This is all due to Coco – It sounds slightly fascist, and he did
write a little tract with ‘fascist’ in the subtitle! – Coco is a
performativist, so he understands that ius must ‘constitute’ and define: so he
goes on to analyse what I’ve been analysing too – what is to cooperate – in a
common task or ‘lavoro’ – what is ‘mutuality’ – what are the requirements for
mutuality, and so on – It’s not as legalese and boring as it sounds! And it provides
a framework for my pragmatics – since a lawyer, and especially a Griceian one,
can be VERY SMART! Coco is!” -- Nicola
Coco Presidente della prima sezione civile della Corte Suprema di Cassazione
Durata mandato19381948 Presidente aggiunto del Tribunale Supremo delle Acque
Durata mandato19371938 Consigliere della Corte di Cassazione Durata mandato19301937
Segretario generale dell'Associazione Generale fra i Magistrati d'Italia Nicola
Coco (Umbriatico), filosofo. Dal punto
di vista sistematico fu molto vicino alla visione del grundnorm, teoria
elaborata in passato dal filosofo e giurista austriaco Hans Kelsen. Figlio di Luigi, di professione farmacista,
e di Teresina Morelli, napoletana e insegnante di pianoforte diplomatasi al
conservatorio di San Pietro a Majella a Napoli, si laureò in Giurisprudenza ed
iniziò la carriera giudiziaria nel 1906, a soli 24 anni, con la nomina a
Pretore di Lagonegro. Nel 1910 fu
Pretore di Moliterno, per poi essere nominato Sostituto procuratore del Re a
Cassino. Nel 1917 venne trasferito alla
Regia Procura di Roma, ove vi rimarrà fino al 1923, anno della sua nomina a
sostituto Procuratore Generale presso la Corte d'appello di Roma. In quello
stesso anno sarà, insieme a Gaetano Azzariti, tra i principali fondatori e
promotori dell'Ufficio del Massimario.
Nel 1924 ottenne la cattedra di Filosofia del diritto penale
all'Università degli Studi "La Sapienza" di Roma. Consigliere della Corte di Cassazione dal
1930 al 1937, venne poi nominato Procuratore generale del Re presso la Corte
d'appello di Cagliari, senza però esercitare mai quella funzione; fu invece
presidente aggiunto del Tribunale Supremo delle Acque fino al 1938, quando
ricevette la nomina a Presidente della prima sezione civile della Corte Suprema
di Cassazione. Fu noto soprattutto per
aver partecipato ai lavori di stesura del nuovo codice civile italiano nonché
del codice di procedura civile, entrambi entrati in vigore nel 1942. Si occupò
prevalentemente della stesura di leggi in materia di contratti, obbligazioni,
diritto del lavoro, ecc. Nicola Coco si
spense a Roma il 3 maggio 1948. Opere
Gli eclettismi contemporanei e le lezioni di filosofia del diritto, Lagonegro,
M. Tancredi & Figli, 1909; Una quistione di diritto transitorio in tema di
farmacie, Milano, Società Editrice Libraria, 1914; Sull'ultimo capoverso
dell'art. 375 del codice penale, Milano, Società Editrice Libraria, 1916; Luce
di pensiero italico nelle tenebre della guerra, Cassino, Soc. Tip. Ed.
Meridionale, 1917; Per la tradizione giuridica italiana, Milano, Società
Editrice Libraria, 1918; Saggio filosofico sulla corporazione fascista, Roma,
Edizioni del diritto del lavoro, 1927; Sulla costituzione di parte civile delle
associazioni sindacali, Roma, Edizioni del diritto del lavoro, 1928; Corso di
diritto internazionale (recensita da Santi Romano, seconda edizione riveduta ed
ampliata), Padova, CEDAM, 1929; Intorno alla pregiudiziale penale nel giudizio
del lavoro, Roma, U.S.I.L.A., 1932; Raffaele Garofalo, Napoli, SIEM, 1934; Il
contratto collettivo di lavoro e le imprese cooperative, Roma, s.n., 1935; Una
inchiesta sulla criminalità in Francia, Napoli, SIEM, 1936. Onorificenze
Commendatore dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaronastrino per uniforme
ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaro «Su iniziativa
del Re d'Italia Vittorio Emanuele III» — Roma, 6 gennaio 1940 Grande ufficiale
dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italianastrino per uniforme ordinariaGrande
ufficiale dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italia «Su iniziativa del Re d'Italia
Vittorio Emanuele III» — Roma, 28 settembre 1938 Note AnnuarioCamera dei fasci e delle
corporazioni, 1941409 Rivista penale.
Rassegna di dottrina, legislazione, giurisprudenza, Roma, Libreria del
Littorio, 1938, 345 e 773 Rivista di diritto pubblico. La giustizia
amministrativa, 40, Roma, Società per la
Rivista di diritto pubblico e la Giustizia amministrativa, 1948327 Una vita per il Diritto Giusto, su
sentieridigitali.it. 27 gennaio . La
giustizia penale. Rivista critica settimanale di giurisprudenza, dottrina e
legislazione, Società editoriale del periodico La giustizia penale, 191431 Tale trasferimento avvenne per via di un
suggerimento pervenutogli al Re dagli allora procuratori presso la Corte d'appello
di Napoli Salvatore Pagliano e Giacomo Calabria. La giustizia tributaria. Dottrina,
giurisprudenza, legislazione, Città di Castello, Società tipografica Leonardo
da Vinci, 194689 Cfr. Gazzetta Ufficiale
del Regno d'Italia n°. 219 del 18 settembre 1940 Cfr. Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia
n°. 140 del 16 giugno 1939 La scuola
positiva. Rivista di diritto e procedura penale, Milano, Vallardi, 1931. Corte suprema di cassazione Codice civile
italiano Codice di procedura civile italiano
Nicola Coco, insigne magistrato e giurista della nobile Terra di
Calabria, su attualita.it. 26 gennaio . ilosofia Storia Storia Università Università Categorie: Magistrati
italianiGiuristi italiani del XX secoloInsegnanti italiani Professore1882 1948
2 ottobre 3 maggio Umbriatico RomaFilosofi italiani del XX secoloStorici
italiani del XX secoloProfessori della SapienzaRomaGrandi ufficiali dell'Ordine
della Corona d'ItaliaCommendatori dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e
LazzaroGiudici della Corte suprema di cassazione
CODRONCHI – Grice: “One would
underestimate Codronchi if it were not for the fact that he wrote a smartest
little tracts on the two ways I see conversation as: ‘game’ and ‘contract.’ In
“Logic and conversation’ I do confess to having been attracted for a while to a
‘quasi-contractualist’ approach to conversation alla Grice (i. e., G. R. Grice)
– and I’m not sure the reason I give there for rejecting the view is valid, or
strong enough! As for ‘games’ – of course conversation is a game – but I never
took that too seriously – perhaps because Austin was obsessed with games and
rules of games – and the subject was worn out for me – when Hintikka came along
all he did was talk about ‘dialogue games’! – I do use ‘game’ terminology – and
cf. ‘contract bridge!” – such as ‘conversational move,’ ‘converaational rule’
of the ‘conversational game’ – and conversational ‘players’ – “Only this or
that ‘move’ will be appropriate’, and so on.” Nicola Codronchi (Imola) filosofo.
Saggio filosofico, 1783 (Milano, Fondazione Mansutti). Appartenente alla
nobiltà, dopo la laurea in giurisprudenza prosegue gli studi approfondendo la
matematica spinto dal padre Innocenzo Codronchi. In seguito entra alla corte
del regno di Napoli, prima con Ferdinando I e poi con Giuseppe Bonaparte, da
cui ottiene la nomina a consigliere di Stato. Le sue opere più celebri sono un
trattato sull'etica e il Saggio filosofico su i contratti e giochi d'azzardo
(1783), in cui affronta con semplicità l'argomento del calcolo delle
probabilità. Codronchi distingue in tre classi di contratti aleatori: quelli in
cui è noto il rapporto tra eventi favorevoli contrari, quelli in cui questo
rapporto è fondato sull'esperienza, quelli in cui il rapporto si basa su leggi
sicure e in parte sull'esperienza. Il 9
maggio 1784 divenne socio dell'Accademia delle scienze di Torino. Fondazione Mansutti, Quaderni di sicurtà.
Documenti di storia dell'assicurazione, M. Bonomelli, schede bibliografiche di
C. Di Battista, note critiche di F. Mansutti. Milano: Electa, , 110–111 Note
Nicola CODRONCHI, su accademiadellescienze.it. 28 agosto . Altri
progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o
altri file su Nicola Codronchi Opere di
Nicola Codronchi, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Biografie
Biografie Storia Storia Filosofo
del XVIII secoloFilosofi italiani del XIX secoloEconomisti italiani 1751 1818
Imola Napoli
COLAZZA: Grice: “Having gone
to Clifton, I love Colazza – he is into ‘iniziazione’ – specially in the
equites of ancient Rome, but not much different from mine!” -- Giovanni
Colazza, noto anche con lo pseudonimo di Leo (Roma3), filosofo. Nato in una famiglia dell'alta borghesia
romana, da cui ricevette un'educazione cattolica, fu istruito agli studi
umanistici e si laureò nel 1902 in medicina e chirurgia all'università La
Sapienza. Cultore dell'esoterismo e
delle dottrine massoniche e teosofiche, verso le quali nutriva interessi che
condivideva col suo compagno di studi Giovanni Amendola, come lui membro della
sezione italiana della Società teosofica, fondata nel 1902, diretta da Isabel
Cooper-Oackley. Negli ambienti teosofici ebbe modo di conoscere il fondatore
dell'antroposofia Rudolf Steiner tramite la sua amicizia con la moglie di
questi, Marie von Sivers, che glielo presentò personalmente a Roma in piazza di
Spagna nel 1911. In occasione di quell'incontro, Steiner gli consegnò il libro
sull'Iniziazione da lui scritto, tradotto in francese. Secondo la testimonianza
della baronessa Olga de Grünewald, Steiner sarebbe venuto in Italia «a
conoscere il dottor Colazza perché questi gli era stato indicato dal Mondo
Spirituale» con l'intento di affidargli la guida del movimento antroposofico in
Italia. In quegli anni Colazza fondò
così uno dei primi Gruppi di Studi antroposofici in Italia, che chiamò
«Novalis», tenuto a battesimo dallo stesso Steiner, con il quale continuò a
restare in contatto recandosi annualmente a Dornach, sede principale del
movimento. Sempre secondo la testimonianza della de Grünewald, Colazza «non
solo era il discepolo più caro a Rudolf Steiner, ma la figura più elevata dopo
di lui». Dall'incontro con l'antroposofia Colazza apprese l'esigenza di seguire
pratiche spirituali di concentrazione adatte al contesto occidentale ed
all'epoca attuale, molto diverse dai metodi orientali ritenuti ormai anacronistici,
coltivando in particolare la «via del pensiero cosciente». Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svgEsercizi di
Rudolf Steiner per lo sviluppo spirituale. Colazza prese parte come volontario
alla prima guerra mondiale, dove fu in trincea come medico ufficiale di
campo. Continuò in seguito la sua
attività di medico, anche presso ambasciate straniere, dedicandosi in
particolare alla cura dei bambini poveri, che secondo la testimonianza di un
suo discepolo, Enrico Pappacena, accoglieva gratuitamente nella sua abitazione
romana. Dal 1927 al 1929 fu membro del
gruppo di Ur, diretto da Julius Evola, presso il quale scrisse diversi articoli
sulla rivista Ur, pubblicandoli con lo pseudonimo di Leo, rivista i cui
contenuti appariranno in seguito in forma di libro intitolato Introduzione alla
Magia come scienza dell'Io, edito da Mediterranee. Dagli anni quaranta tenne inoltre numerose
conferenze, tra cui un ciclo sul saggio di Steiner L'Iniziazione, che fu
raccolto e pubblicato postumo dalla casa editrice Tilopa nel 1992, col titolo
Dell'iniziazione. Fra i suoi più
illustri discepoli vi fu Massimo Scaligero.
Opere Dell'Iniziazione, Tilopa, 1992 Introduzione alla magia, in
collaborazione col gruppo di Ur (1ª 1955), 3 voll., Edizioni Mediterranee, 1987
Note Nel 1905 sarebbe stato iniziato
alla massoneria nella loggia Roma del Grande Oriente d'Italia, all'interno
della quale sarebbe divenuto compagno, e quindi maestro nel 1907, per poi
presumibilmente uscirne nel 1908.
Giovanni Colazza, articolo di Piero Cammerinesi. Massimo Scaligero, Dallo Yoga alla
Rosacroce, 86-87, Roma, Perseo,
1972. Massimo Scaligero, Dallo Yoga alla
Rosacroce, 85-86, Roma, Perseo,
1972. Giovanni Colazza l'asceta
adamantino, articolo dal sito di Econatroposophia. Enrico Pappacena, Di alcuni cultori della
scienza dello spirito, Bari, 1971.
Julius Evola e l'esperienza del Gruppo di Ur. La storia
"occulta" dell'Italia del Novecento, articolo di Stefano Arcella su
"Hera", settembre .
Presumibilmente in omaggio al suo segno zodiacale, il Leone. Antroposofia Gruppo di Ur Conferenza inedita di Giovanni Colazza Piero
Cammerinesi, "Giovanni Colazza" su liberopensare.com V D M
Antroposofia Filosofia Filosofo del XX secoloEsoteristi italiani 1877 1953 9
agosto 16 febbraio RomaTeosofi italianiAntroposofi italianiErmetisti
italianiMassoni
COLECCHI – Grice: “What I
love about Colecchi is that while he was a bad Kantian, he was an excellent
Vicoian!” -- Ottavio Colecchi
Pescocostanzo: targa commemorativa Ottavio Colecchi (Pescocostanzo)
filosofo. Casa natale di Ottavio
Colecchi, sulla via omonima Nacque a Pescocostanzo nel 1773. Si dedicò dapprima
alla teologia e divenne frate domenicano presso il convento di Ortona, dove
subì diverse perquisizioni da parte dell'Inquisizione per la sua tacita simpatia
verso gli ideali rivoluzionari. Nel 1809, a causa della soppressione degli
ordini religiosi, fu costretto ad abbandonare l'abito religioso. Insegnante di
matematica presso la Reale Accademia Militare della Nunziatella intorno al
1812, dopo la caduta di Murat, venne mandato in missione in Russia, dove si
dedicò all'insegnamento della Filosofia e della Matematica. Al ritorno, nel
1817, soggiornò a Königsberg, in Germania, dove ebbe modo di conoscere l'opera
di Immanuel Kant. Fu uno dei primi filosofi italiani a studiare Kant in lingua
originale. Rientrato in Italia, fondò a
Napoli una scuola privata di filosofia ed ebbe tra i suoi allievi i fratelli
Spaventa, Bertrando e Silvio, Francesco De Sanctis, Luigi Settembrini e Camillo
Caracciolo. Il suo merito principale fu quello di essere, insieme a Pasquale
Galluppi, il primo assertore del criticismo kantiano nell'Italia
meridionale. Oggi una targa è posta
sulla sua casa natale in via del Convento (oggi via Colecchi); a lui è dedicata
la biblioteca pubblica e un busto nella piazzetta tra via Colecchi e via Mastri
Lombardi. Opere Se la sola analisi sia
un mezzo d'invenzione, o s'inventi colla sintesi ancora? Memoria di Ottavio
Colecchi, «Progresso», V, 1836,
XIV, 213-228. Saggio sulle leggi
del pensiere, «Progresso», VI, 1837,
XVI, 161-192. Sulla analisi e
sulla sintesi. Teorica di V. Cousin. Suo esame, «Progresso», VI, 1837, XVII,
189-216. Sulla legge morale, «Progresso», VIII, 1838, XX,
145-159; XXI, 5-33; VIII, 1839, XXII,
161-175; XXIII, 5-26;
XXIV, 5-27, 225-240. Sulle leggi
della ragione, «Progresso», IX, 1840,
XXV, 169-186. Ora in Quistioni
filosofiche, 325-346. Se il raziocinio
sia essenzialmente diverso dalla intuizione, «Ore solitarie», ottobre 1840, f.
10, 289-299; e «Giornale abruzzese», VI,
ottobre 1841, XX, n. 57, 15-36. Se nell'invenzione eserciti maggior
influenza la sintesi o l'analisi, «Giornale abruzzese», VI, marzo 1841, XVII, n. 51,
143-154. Se li giudizi necessari sieno solamente gli analitici,
«Giornale abruzzese», VI, aprile 1841,
XVIII, n. 52, 26-33. Se quella,
che un moderno scrittore di logica appella identità formale del raziocinio, sia
valevole a convertire il raziocinio empirico in raziocinio misto?, «Giornale
abruzzese», VI, maggio 1841, XVIII, n.
53, 65-74. Principii sui quali poggia il
raziocinio quando classifica e quando istruisce, secondo un moderno scrittore
di logica, «Giornale abruzzese», VI, giugno 1841, XIX, n. 56,
24-29. Quistioni ideologiche, «Giornale abruzzese», VI, novembre
1841, XX, n. 59, 100-114. Se diasi una logica pura, ed una
logica mista, «Lucifero», IV, 1841, n. 8,
63-64. Se le idee soggettive non altro sieno che idee di rapporti,
«Museo», II, 1842, IV, 3-8. Sulle idee dello spazio e del tempo,
«Museo», II, 1842, IV, 97-109. Quistione relativa al primo problema
di filosofiaSe le nostre sensazioni sieno esterne di lor natura, o tali
diventino in forza de' giudizi abituali?,«Progr.», n.s., 1843, I, 43-58.
Sopra alcune quistioni le più importanti della filosofia. Osservazioni critiche,
«Giambattista Vico», 1857, I, fasc.
3, 335-397; II, fasc. I,
123-136; III, fasc. I, 68-96. Ora in Quistioni filosofiche, 771-874. Scritti inediti (Psicologia, Logica
applicata, Ideologia, Frammento apologetico), in G. Gentile, Dal Genovesi al
Galluppi. Ricerche storiche, Edizioni della Critica, Napoli 1903, [345]-374; e in Storia della filosofia
italiana dal Genovesi al Galluppi, II,
Firenze 19372, 211-249. Sopra alcune
quistioni le più importanti della filosofia. Osservazioni critiche di Ottavio
Colecchi, 2 voll., Tip. «All'insegna di Aldo Manuzio», Napoli 1843. Rist.
anastatica: Quistioni filosofiche, a cura dell'Istituto italiano per gli studi
filosofici, con introd. di F. Tessitore, Procaccini, Napoli 1980, 892 E. Pessina, Quadro storico dei sistemi
filosofici, Milano 1845, 259-261. P. G.
Falcocchio, Necrologia di Ottavio Colecchi, in «Poliorama pittoresco», XII
(1848), 357-358. N. M. Zappi, Elogio
funebre di Ottavio Colecchi, Chieti 1848. B. Spaventa, Studi sopra la filosofia
di Hegel, Torino 1850. L. Settembrini, Lezioni di letteratura italiana, III,
Napoli 1876419. F. Fiorentino, Scritti vari di letteratura, filosofia e
critica, Napoli 1877, 474-475. A. De
Nino, Briciole letterarie, I, Lanciano 1884,
57-61. F. De Sanctis, La lettereratura italiana nel secolo XIX, Napoli
1897, 185, 230. S. Marchi, Il sistema
filosofico di Ottavio Colecchi (filosofo abruzzese), Tip. Sociale di A. Eliseo,
L'Aquila 190055. F. Amodeo, Ottavio Colecchi, in «Atti della Accademia
Pontaniana», XLVII (1917), memoria n. 3. C. Imperatore, Ottavio Colecchi,
filosofo e matematico abruzzese, I, Discussioni biografiche e documenti
inediti, Ravenna 1920. A. Zazo, L'istruzione pubblica e privata nel Napoletano
(1760-1860), Città di Castello 1927,
234-235. G. Sabatini, Ottavio Colecchi filosofo e matematico: nuove
notizie e nuovi documenti, in «Rassegna abruzzese di storia e d'arte», IV
(1928), 19-94. G. Gentile, Storia della
filosofia italiana dal Genovesi al Galluppi,
II, Milano 1930, 138-249. E.
Codignola, Pedagogisti ed educatori, Milano 1939, 141-142. A. Capograssi, Nuovi documenti
sull'accusa di ateismo ad Ottavio Colecchi, in «Samnium», XIII (1940), 73-89. P. Romano, Un antagonista del
Galluppi: Ottavio Colecchi, in «Archivio storico per la Calabria e la Lucania»,
XIII (1944), 157-170. A. Cristallini,
Ottavio Colecchi, un filosofo da riscoprire, Padova 1968. G. Oldrini, La
cultura filosofica napoletana dell'Ottocento, Bari 1973, 158-163. E. Garin, Storia della filosofia
italiana, III, Torino 1978, 1091-1093. F. Tessitore, Colecchi e gli
scettici, in Introduzione a Quistioni filosofiche, Napoli 1980. G. Cacciatore,
Vico e Kant nella filosofia di Ottavio Colecchi, in «Bollettino del Centro di
studi vichiani», XII-XIII, 1982-1983,
63-99. G. Sabatini, Io e Ottavio Colecchi. Narrazione biografica in
forma di anamnesi, Japadre Editore, L'Aquila-Roma 2008. Roberto Grita, «COLECCHI, Ottavio» in
Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 26, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1982. Filosofia Matematica
Matematica Filosofo del XIX secoloMatematici italiani Professore1773
1848 18 settembre 28 agosto Pescocostanzo NapoliDomenicani italianiEx
domenicani
COLLETTI: Grice:
“I like Colletti – he takes political philosophy seriously unlike we of the
Lit. Hum, not PPE school, at Oxford! But then he is a Roman and has all the
Orazi and Curiazi traditions!” –Lucio Colletti.jpg Deputato della Repubblica
Italiana Durata mandato9 maggio 19963 novembre 2001 LegislatureXIII, XIV Gruppo
parlamentareForza Italia CircoscrizioneLombardia 1 e Veneto 2 Incarichi
parlamentari Componente del Comitato di vigilanza sull'attività di
documentazione (XIII legislatura) Componente della III Commissione permanente
Esteri (XIII legislatura) Componente della IV Commissione permanente Difesa
(XIV legislatura) Sito istituzionale Dati generali Partito politicoPdA
(1943-1947) PCI (1947-1964) Indipendente (1964-1994) FI (1994-2001) Titolo di
studiolaurea in lettere e filosofia UniversitàUniversità degli Studi di Messina
e Università “La Sapienza” Professionedocente universitario Lucio Colletti
(Roma) filosofo. Partigiano, aderente prima al Partito d'Azione e poi al
Partito Comunista Italiano, dopo la laurea in filosofia insegnò Storia della
filosofia e Filosofia teoretica all'Università La Sapienza di
Roma. Allievo di Galvano Della Volpe, militò nel PCI fino al 1964, anno in
cui uscì dal partito su posizioni di sinistra radicale. Quindi fondò e diresse
il periodico La Sinistra (1966-1967). Pubblicò nel 1969 il volume Il marxismo
e Hegel che rinnovò in profondità gli studi marxisti occidentali. La sua crisi
teorica, a lungo maturata, fu testimoniata dalla celebre Intervista
politico-filosofica del (1974), apparsa dapprima sulla rivista inglese New Left
Review e poi in volume presso i tipi della Casa editrice Laterza, volume con
cui l'allora direttore editoriale Enrico Mistretta iniziò l'innovativa serie
dei libri-intervista. Laterza fu per Lucio Colletti l'editore di riferimento, e
per molti anni ne fu anche consulente. Nel 1971 era stato tra i firmatari della
lettera aperta pubblicata sul settimanale L'Espresso sul caso Pinelli e di
un'altra pubblicata ad ottobre su Lotta Continua in cui esprimeva solidarietà
verso alcuni militanti e direttori responsabili del giornale, inquisiti per istigazione
a delinquere per il contenuto di alcuni articoli. Intellettuale molto
apprezzato dalla sinistra italiana, dal 1974 al 1978 pensò di lasciare l'Italia
e di trasferirsi in Svizzera, rivolgendo sempre più le sue letture filosofiche
al mondo anglosassone del neoempirismo, anche su sollecitazione di quel suo
amico e sodale che da allora fu Marcello Pera. Negli anni ottanta portò alle
estreme conclusioni il processo di revisione della sua ideologia, che lo
condusse dapprima a collaborare con Mondoperaio (rivista ufficiale del Partito
Socialista Italiano) e, in seguito, ad aderire alla recente formazione politica
di Silvio Berlusconi, Forza Italia, nelle cui liste fu eletto deputato nelle
elezioni politiche del 1996 e del 2001. Morì per un malore durante un
bagno alle Terme di Calidario a Venturina, venendo poi sepolto nel cimitero del
Verano di Roma. Opere Il marxismo e Hegel, in Lenin, Quaderni filosofici,
Milano, Feltrinelli, 1958. Ideologia e società, Bari, Laterza, 1969. Il
marxismo e Hegel, Bari, Laterza, 1969. Il futuro del capitalismo. Crollo o
sviluppo?, e con Claudio Napoleoni, Bari, Laterza, 1970. Intervista
politico-filosofica, con un saggio su Marxismo e dialettica, Roma-Bari,
Laterza, 1974. Il marxismo e il "crollo" del capitalismo, a cura di,
Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1975. Tra marxismo e no, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1979. Tramonto
dell'ideologia. [Le ideologie dal '68 a oggi; Dialettica e non-contraddizione;
Kelsen e il marxismo], Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1980. Crisi delle ideologie.
Intervista politico-filosofica, Il marxismo del XX secolo, Le ideologie dal '68
a oggi, Milano, Club degli editori, 1981. Pagine di filosofia e politica,
Milano, Rizzoli, 1989. 88-17-85214-7. La
logica di Benedetto Croce, Lungro di Cosenza, Marco, 1992. 88-85350-25-9. Fine della filosofia e altri
saggi, Roma, Ideazione, 1996.
88-86812-14-0. Lezioni tedesche. Con Kant, alla ricerca di un'etica
laica, Roma, Liberal, 2008.
88-88835-26-1. Note È morto Lucio
Colletti voce "contro" di Forza Italia, su repubblica.it, 3 novembre
2001. Camera dei Deputati, Gruppo
Parlamentare di Forza Italia, Ricordo di Lucio Colletti, Roma, Stampa e
servizi, 2001 Orlando Tambosi, Perché il marxismo ha fallito Lucio Colletti e
la storia di una grande illusione, Milano, Mondadori, 2001. 88-04-48844-1 Ministero per i beni e le
attività culturali, Lucio Colletti: il cammino di un filosofo contemporaneo
(1924-2001), Roma, Essetre, 2003 Pino Bongiorno, Aldo G. Ricci, Lucio Colletti
scienza e libertà, Roma, Ideazione, 2004.
88-88800-17-4. Cristina Corradi, Storia dei marxismi in Italia, Roma,
Manifestolibri, 2005, 124–138. 88-7285-386-9. Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikiquote Citazionio su Lucio Colletti
Collétti, Lucio la voce nella Treccani.it L'Enciclopedia Italiana. il
20/07/ Lucio Colletti, su Camera.itXIII legislatura, Parlamento italiano. Lucio
Colletti, su Camera.itXIV legislatura, Parlamento italiano. La storia di Lucio
Colletti di Costanzo Preve, nel sito Kelebek Filosofia Politica Politica Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi
italiani del XXI secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del
XXI secoloPolitici italiani del XX secoloPolitici italiani Professore1924
2001Nati l'8 dicembre 3 novembre Roma Venturina TermePolitici del Partito
d'AzionePolitici del Partito Comunista ItalianoPolitici di Forza Italia
(1994)Deputati della XIII legislatura della Repubblica ItalianaDeputati della
XIV legislatura della Repubblica ItalianaSepolti nel cimitero del
VeranoStudenti della SapienzaRomaProfessori della SapienzaRomaFondatori di
riviste italianeDirettori di periodici italiani
COLLI: Grice: “I love Colli – his
‘filosofia dell’espressione’ is much more serious than my ramblings, well
meant, though, on Peirce! I was only trying to be fashionable! At Oxford, they
loved my lecture on ‘meaning,’ which got me into ‘implying,’ and eventually,
‘expressing.’ – My unity developed – Colli was born with it!” -- Giorgio Colli (Torino) filosofo. Ha insegnato
per trent'anni Storia della filosofia antica all'Pisa. Giorgio Colli
discendeva da una facoltosa famiglia torinese. Il padre, Giuseppe, amministrò
il quotidiano La Stampa ai tempi di Alfredo Frassati, incarico dal quale fu poi
estromesso all'indomani della marcia su Roma, su ordine di Benito Mussolini,
per mettere alla direzione del quotidiano lo scrittore Curzio Malaparte. Dopo
la Liberazione fu nominato amministratore del Corriere della Sera, dove restò
per sedici anni. Colli frequentò in giovane età l'Istituto Principessa
Clotilde di Savoia, e successivamente concluse gli studi presso l'Torino, laureandosi
in giurisprudenza l'11 luglio 1939, relatore Gioele Solari, discutendo una tesi
in filosofia del diritto e filosofia politica dal titolo Politicità ellenica e
Platone, sullo sviluppo storico del pensiero politico di Platone, ampie parti
della quale furono pubblicate a cura dello stesso Gioele Solari. Studioso
schivo e appartato, lontano da correnti di pensiero "in voga", fedele
a Nietzsche e Schopenhauer, scorse nell'antica sapienza presocratica
l'autentico "logos" a cui ritornare. Lo stile di scrittura,
profondo e costellato di aforismi taglienti, era caratterizzato da
un'attenzione maniacale alla musicalità del testo e della parola. Questa dote
musicale emerge con chiarezza dalle letture di alcuni passi di Colli recitati
da Carmelo Bene. Filosofia dell'espressione Magnifying glass icon
mgx2.svgFilosofia dell'espressione. La sua opera principale è Filosofia
dell'espressione (1969), che fornisce, mediante una complessa teoria delle
categorie e della deduzione, un'interpretazione della totalità della manifestazione
come "espressione" di qualcosa (l'immediatezza) che sfugge alla presa
della conoscenza. Comunque, Colli ritiene che sia possibile riguadagnare il
fondamento metafisico del mondo portando il discorso filosofico ai suoi estremi
limiti e "(di)mostrando" la natura derivata del logos. Bisogna quindi
fare i conti con Filosofia dell'espressione se non si vuole scambiare Colli
solo per un geniale interprete di Schopenhauer e di Nietzsche. Contributi
alla storia della filosofia Colli, oltre che filosofo, fu anche apprezzato
traduttore dell'Organon di Aristotele e della Critica della ragion pura di Kant
nonché docente di Storia della filosofia antica all'Pisa e direttore di collana
per diverse case editrici (Einaudi, Boringhieri, Adelphi). Come storico della
filosofia, è stato particolarmente importante il suo contributo storico,
filologico e critico esercitato su autori come Aristotele, Kant, Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche. Sapienza greca Tra i contributi alla storia della filosofia
antica vanno ricordati i tre volumi sulla Sapienza greca, opera rimasta
incompiuta a causa della sua morte. In essa sono raccolti i frammenti dei
presocratici e vengono analizzati l'orfismo, i misteri eleusini e i culti delle
divinità greche, in particolare Dioniso e Apollo, come forme alogiche di
sapienza. Al tentativo di interpretare gli enigmi di questi culti, fra i quali
quelli oracolari, viene fatta risalire l'origine remota della dialettica e
della filosofia, di cui Colli si occupa anche in altri libri. Edizione
critica delle opere di Nietzsche A lui si deve anche la prima e fondamentale
edizione critica delle opere e degli epistolari di Friedrich Nietzsche,
condotta insieme al suo principale allievo Mazzino Montinari. Questa ultima
operazione rappresenta senza dubbio uno dei più grandi meriti della coppia
Colli-Montinari. In particolare la pubblicazione in edizione critica della
"Volontà di potenza" evidenziò come la versione pubblicata nel 1906
da Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche (sorella del celebre filosofo tedesco) presentava
numerose e discutibili manipolazioni in chiave razzista e xenofoba totalmente
assenti nell'originale e introdotte volutamente dalla Förster. L'edizione
critica delle opere nietzschiane diede avvio ad una profonda revisione degli
studi su questo filosofo e in particolare mise in discussione molte
interpretazioni che, proprio partendo dalla lettura "falsata" della
Volontà di Potenza del 1906, sostenevano la vicinanza di questo autore a quelle
correnti di “destra” che sarebbero poi sfociate successivamente nella esperienza
del nazismo. Tuttavia questo progetto editoriale fu connotato da molteplici
difficoltà. In primo luogo Colli, non avendo alcun contatto con gli ambienti
politici, difficilmente sarebbe riuscito ad accedere all'archivio Nietzsche di
Weimar, dove erano conservati la gran parte dei manoscritti originali del
filosofo tedesco. Negli anni Sessanta infatti, quando il progetto fu concepito,
Weimar apparteneva alla Repubblica Democratica Tedesca la quale attraverso
numerosi "escamotage" burocratici di fatto impediva agli studiosi
occidentali di accedere in qualsiasi modo alle Istituzione della DDR. Questo
problema fu risolto dal fatto che Montinari, a differenza del suo maestro, era
iscritto al PCI e anzi proprio attraverso di esso riuscì ad ottenere dai responsabili
culturali del partito comunista della Germania orientale i permessi necessari
per studiare nell'archivio Nietzsche. Un'ulteriore difficoltà fu determinata
dal fatto che la casa editrice Einaudi, con la quale Colli e Montinari
iniziarono a definire la pubblicazione delle opere nietzschiane decise
all'improvviso, probabilmente per ragioni politiche, di non dare alle stampe le
opere del "nazista" Nietzsche che invece furono poi accolte dalla
casa editrice Adelphi, fondata alla fine degli anni Cinquanta da un ex
einaudiano come Luciano Foà.[senza fonte] Note Valerio Meattini,
Colli Giorgio, in Annuario dell'Università degli studi di Pisa per l'anno
accademico 1978-1979 on line sul Sistema bibliotecario di ateneo Modi di vivereGiorgio Colli. Una conoscenza
per cambiare la vita, su youtube.com.
Vedi Luigi Anzalone, Giuliano Minichiello, Lo Specchio di Dioniso. Saggi
su Giorgio Colli, Edizioni Dedalo, Bari, 1984, pag. 22. Per Boringhieri diresse l'Enciclopedia di
autori classici, con la collaborazione, tra gli altri, di Mazzino Montinari,
Sossio Giametta, Gigliola Pasquinelli, Giuliana Lanata; a quest'ultima si deve
traduzione e commento di opere del medico greco Ippocrate di Coo, Boringhieri,
Torino, 1961 Giorgio Colli, La sapienza
greca IDioniso, Apollo, Eleusi, Orfeo, Museo, Iperborei, Enigma. Adelphi,
Milano, Giorgio Colli, Dopo Nietzsche.
Adelphi, Milano, Giorgio Colli, La nascita della filosofia. Adelphi, Milano, Opere
principali Filosofia dell'espressione. Adelphi, Milano, Dopo Nietzsche. Adelphi,
Milano,La nascita della filosofia. Adelphi, Milano, La sapienza greca IDioniso,
Apollo, Eleusi, Orfeo, Museo, Iperborei, Enigma. Adelphi, Milano, La sapienza
greca IIEpimenide, Ferecide, Talete, Anassimandro, Anassimene, Onomacrito.
Adelphi, Milano, La sapienza greca IIIEraclito. Adelphi, Milano, Scritti su
Nietzsche. Adelphi, Milano, La ragione errabonda. Quaderni postumi. Adelphi, Milano
Per una enciclopedia di autori classici. Adelphi, Milano, La Natura ama
nascondersiPhysis kryptesthai philei. Adelphi, Milano, Zenone di Elea. Lezioni
1964-1965. Adelphi, Milano, Gorgia e Parmenide. Lezioni 1965-1967. Adelphi, Milano,
Introduzione a Osservazioni su Diofanto di Pierre de Fermat. Bollati
Boringhieri, Torino, 1 Platone politico. Adelphi, Milano, Filosofi sovrumani.
Adelphi, Milano, Apollineo e dionisiaco. Adelphi, Milano, Empedocle. Adelphi,
Milano, Traduzioni Kurt Hildebrandt, Platone: la lotta dello spirito per la
potenza, Einaudi, Torino 1947 Karl Löwith, Da Hegel a Nietzsche, Einaudi,
Torino 1949 Aristotele, Organon, Einaudi, Torino 1955 Immanuel Kant, Critica
della ragion pura, a cura e tr. di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, Torino, Immanuel Kant, Critica della ragion pura, a
cura e tr. di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1976 Platone, Simposio, Giorgio
Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1979 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga e paralipomena I,
Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1981 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga e paralipomena
II, Giorgio Colli e Mario Carpitella, tr. di Mazzino Montinari ed Eva Amendola
Kühn, Adelphi, Milano 1983 Immanuel Kant, Critica della ragion pura, a cura e
tr. di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1995 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga e
paralipomena, Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1998 Aristotele, Organon, Giorgio
Colli, Adelphi, Milano, Opere complete di Friedrich Nietzsche (Classici
Adelphi) I, tomo 1: Scritti giovanili
1856-1864, Giuliano Campioni e Mario Carpitella, tr. di Mario Carpitella,
Adelphi, Milano 1998 I, tomo 2: Scritti
giovanili 1865-1869, Giuliano Campioni e Mario Carpitella, Adelphi, Milano
2001 III, tomo 1: La nascita della
tragediaConsiderazioni inattuali, I-III, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr.
di Mazzino Montinari e Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1972 III, tomo 2: La filosofia nell'epoca tragica
dei Greci e Scritti dal 1870 al 1873, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di
Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano Frammenti postumi 1869-1874, Mario Carpitella,
tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 1989 III, tomo 3, parte 2°: Frammenti postumi
1869-1874, Mario Carpitella, tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude,
Adelphi, Milano 1992 IV, tomo 1: Richard
Wagner a BayreuthConsiderazioni inattuali, IVFrammenti postumi (1875-1876),
Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari e
Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1967
IV, tomo 2: Umano, troppo umano, I e Frammenti postumi, Giorgio Colli e
Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano,
Umano, troppo umano, IIFrammenti postumi, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari,
tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1967 V, tomo 1: Aurora e Frammenti postumi
(1879-1881), Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e
Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano Idilli
di MessinaLa gaia scienzaFrammenti postumi (1881-1882), Giorgio Colli e Mazzino
Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano
1965 VI, tomo 1: Così parlò Zarathustra,
Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari, Adelphi, Milano
1968 VI, tomo 2: Al di là del bene e del
male e Genealogia della morale, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di
Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1968
VI, tomo 3: Il caso WagnerCrepuscolo degli idoliL'anticristoEcce
homoNietzsche contra Wagner, Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Roberto
Calasso e Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1970 VI, tomo 4: Ditirambi di Dioniso e Poesie
postume (1882-1888), Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Giorgio Colli,
Adelphi, Milano 1982 VII, tomo 1, parte
1°: Frammenti postumi, Mazzino Montinari e Mario Carpitella, tr. di Mazzino
Montinari e Leonardo Amoroso, Adelphi, Milano 1982 VII, tomo 1, parte 2°: Frammenti postumi
1882-1884, Mazzino Montinari e Mario Carpitella, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Leonardo
Amoroso, Adelphi, Milano 1986 VII, tomo
2: Frammenti postumi 1884, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino
Montinari, Adelphi, Milano 1976 VII,
tomo 3: Frammenti postumi, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Sossio
Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1975 VIII,
tomo 1: Frammenti postumi 1885-1887, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di
Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1975
VIII, tomo 2: Frammenti postumi 1887-1888, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino
Montinari, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1971 VIII, tomo 3: Frammenti postumi 1888-1889,
Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1974
Epistolario di Friedrich Nietzsche (Classici Adelphi) I: Epistolario 1850-1869, Giorgio Colli e
Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Maria Ludovica Pampaloni Fama, Adelphi, Milano
1977 II: Epistolario 1869-1874, Giorgio
Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano
1981 III: Epistolario 1875-1879,
Giuliano Campioni e Federico Gerratana, tr. di Maria Ludovica Pampaloni Fama,
Adelphi, Milano 1995 IV: Epistolario
1880-1884, Giuliano Campioni, tr. di Mario Carpitella e Maria Ludovica
Pampaloni Fama, Adelphi, Milano 2004 Opere di Friedrich Nietzsche (Piccola
Biblioteca Adelphi) Sull'utilità e il danno della storia per la vita, tr. di
Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1974 Sull'avvenire delle nostre scuole, tr. di
Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1975 Così parlò Zarathustra, tr. di Mazzino
Montinari, Adelphi, Milano Al di là del bene e del male, tr. di Ferruccio
Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1977 L'anticristo, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi,
Milano La gaia scienza e Idilli di Messina, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi,
Milano La mia vita, tr. Mario
Carpitella, Adelphi, Milano 1977 La nascita della tragedia, tr. di Sossio
Giametta, Adelphi, Milano Aurora, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1978
Scritti su Wagner, traduzione di Ferruccio Masini e Sossio Giametta, Adelphi,
Milano 1979 Umano, troppo umano, I, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano Umano,
troppo umano, II, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano Ditirambi di Dioniso
e Poesie postume, tr. di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1982 Crepuscolo degli
idoli, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1983 David Strauss, l'uomo di
fede e lo scrittore, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1983 Genealogia della
morale, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano Schopenhauer come educatore,
tr. di Mazzino Montinari, Adelphi, Milano 1985 Ecce homo, Roberto Calasso,
Adelphi, Milano 1991 88-459-0861-5 La
filosofia nell'epoca tragica dei Greci e Scritti tr. di Giorgio Colli, Milano
Adelphi Frammenti postumi I, Giuliano Campioni, Mario Carpitella e Federico
Gerratana, tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 2004
Frammenti postumi II, Giuliano Campioni, Mario Carpitella e Federico Gerratana,
tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano, Frammenti postumi
III, Giuliano Campioni, Mario Carpitella e Federico Gerratana, tr. di Giorgio
Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 2005 Frammenti postumi IV,
Giuliano Campioni, Mario Carpitella e Federico Gerratana, tr. di Giorgio Colli
e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 2005 Lettere da Torino, Giuliano
Campioni, tr. di Vivetta Vivarelli, Adelphi, Milano 2008 Frammenti postumi V,
Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari, Giuliano Campioni e Maria Cristina Fornari,
tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano, Il servizio divino
dei greci, Manfred Posani Löwenstein, Adelphi, Milano critica Luigi Anzalone, Giuliano
Minichiello, Lo Specchio di Dioniso. Saggi su Giorgio Colli, Edizioni Dedalo,
Bari, 1984, 978-88-220-6040-2 Maurizio
Rossi, Colli come educatore, Cartostampa, Castelfranco Veneto, Luigi Cimmino,
COLLI, Giorgio, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, 34, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1988. 5 novembre . Giuliana
Lanata, articolo in Esercizi di memoria, Levante Editori, Bari, 1989, più il
piano di Colli per l'Enciclopedia da lui curata per Boringhieri, Torino. Fausto
Moriani, Invito alla lettura di... Giorgio Colli, in « Abstracta » Fausto
Moriani, Implicazioni estetiche nell'opera di Giorgio Colli, in Le grandi
correnti dell'estetica novecentesca, G. Marchianò, Guerini, Milano, Andrea
Pistoia, Misura e dismisura. Per una rappresentazione di Giorgio Colli, ERGA,
Genova, Giuseppe Auteri, Giorgio Colli e l'enigma greco, CUECM, Catania 2000.
Federica Montevecchi, Giorgio Colli. Biografia intellettuale, Bollati
Boringhieri, Torino, Lexicon.org (Voce Giorgio Colli di Federica
Montevecchilessico danese per il XXI secolo) Enrico Colli, I termini di
apollineo e dionisiaco nello sviluppo del pensiero di Giorgio Colli, in
Clemente Tafuri e David Beronio, Teatro Akropolis. Testimonianze ricerca
azioni, vol II, AkropolisLibri, Genova, . Marco de Paoli,Giorgio Colli e i
Greci: annotazioni su alcune traduzioni, in "Episteme", Mimesis
Edizioni, Milano, , n. 5, 85–105.
Federica Montevecchi, Sull'Empedocle di Giorgio Colli, Luca Sossella Editore,
Roma, Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikiquote Citazionio su Giorgio Colli
Giorgio Colli, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Giorgio Colli, in Enciclopedia
Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Giorgio Colli, .
Giorgio Colli, su Goodreads. Archivio
Giorgio Colli, su giorgiocolli.it. Centro interdipartimentale Colli-Montinari,
su centronietzsche.net. Lexicon.org (Voce Giorgio Colli di Federica
Montevecchilessico danese per il XXI secolo) Un ricordo di Valerio Meattini, su
biblio.adm.unipi.it:8081 16 settembre 2007). Filosofia Letteratura Letteratura Filosofo del XX secoloStorici
della filosofia italianiAccademici italiani Professore gennaio 6 gennaio Torino
FiesoleGrecisti italianiTraduttori italianiTraduttori dal greco
all'italianoTraduttori dal tedesco all'italianoStorici della filosofia
anticaTraduttori all'italianoStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di
TorinoProfessori dell'PisaFriedrich Nietzsche
COLLINI – Grice: “If you love
birds, you love Collini – he loved ‘pterodattili,’ though and made nice
drawings of them, as they fought with ‘uomini’!” -- Cosimo Alessandro Collini (Firenze), filosofo. Lo Pterodactylus descritto da Collini. Collini
era discendente di una nobile famiglia fiorentina. Abbandonò gli studi di
giurisprudenza all'Pisa, e dopo la morte del padre si trasferì prima a Coira e
poi a Berlino, dove conobbe Voltaire e divenne suo segretario. Dopo la rottura
tra Voltaire e Federico il Grande, Collini si trasferì a Francoforte sul
Meno e qui fu invitato dal Principe
elettore Carlo Teodoro di iera per rispondere agli eventuali scontri visti tra
il Voltaire e il Principe. Collini venne descritto come un uomo scontroso,
spesso in litigio con la nipote del filosofo, Madame Denis. Dopo la rottura con
Voltaire, Collini venne accusato di furto di un manoscritto del filosofo
francese dopo una perquisizione della stanza privata; si trattava di un libro
(intitolato "Mon séjour auprès de Voltaire"), che raccontava della
vita di Voltaire trascorsa con Collini, il quale venne poi pubblicato . I
rapporti tra i Voltaire migliorarono, dopo il licenziamento. In seguito, Collini venne nominato direttore
del Gabinetto di storia naturale di Mannheim ("Naturalienkabinetts")
. A Collini si deve la descrizione iniziale dello Pterodactylus, un rettile
volante, o pterosauro, vissuto nel Giurassico superiore, circa 145 milioni di
anni fa, il cui fossile fu rinvenuto ad Eichstätt. La descrizione del rettile
fu poi completata con maggiore accuratezza da Georges Cuvier. Negli ultimi anni, Collini denunciò
ampiamente il fanatismo durante le Guerre rivoluzionarie francesi in Europa e difese
tutti i reperti del Gabinetto dalle distruzioni, reperti che furono poi
trasferiti, quattro anni dopo, a Monaco di iera. Fonte: F.R. De Angelis,
Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, riferimenti in . Vedi .
Francesca Romana De Angelis, COLLINI, Cosimo Alessandro, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, 27, Roma,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1982. 24 giugno . Altri progetti Collabora
a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Cosimo Alessandro
Collini Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o
altri file su Cosimo Alessandro Collini
Mon séjour auprès de Voltaire et lettres inedites que m'écrivit cet
homme célèbre jusqu'à la dernière année de sa vie, 1807. Testo digitalizzato in
, sito "archive.org".
COLOMBE: Grice: “If you
love stars, as any philosopher must – vide Thales! – you LOVE Ludovico who
refuted Kepler’s idea that the thing next to the serpentary’s foot was a
‘star,’ never mind ‘nova’!” -- Ludovico
delle Colombe o Colombo (Firenze), filosofo> Noto per essere stato uno
strenuo avversario di Galilei. Non
sappiamo quasi nulla della sua vita, ma restano diverse sue opere, nelle quali
difende le dottrine aristoteliche con un particolare disinteresse sia verso le
nuove osservazioni sia verso la coerenza logica. Scrisse un discorso sulla nuova stella
apparsasostenendo che si trattava di una stella non nuova, ma esistente da
sempre. Scrisse un discorso Contro il moto della Terra. Per conciliare le osservazioni di Galileo
sulle irregolarità della superficie lunare con la concezione aristotelica della
perfetta sfericità dei corpi celesti sostenne che le valli e gli spazi tra i
monti della Luna fossero colmati da un materiale perfetto e invisibile. Contrario
all'idrostatica archimedea recuperata da Galileo, nel suo Discorso apologetico,
sostenne che il galleggiare o l'affondare dei corpi dipendesse dalla loro
forma. Nella conclusione del discorso usò anche una metafora di questa teoria,
affermando che le ragioni dell'avversario per essere troppo argute e sottili
vanno a fondo senza speranza di ritornare a galla, mentre quelle di Aristotele,
per essere di forma larga e quadrata, non possono affondare in nessun modo. Sono
rimaste anche lettere tra il Delle Colombe e Galileo, che stimava pochissimo il
suo avversario, che aveva soprannominato Pippione. Vari accenni a questo
personaggio sono nella corrispondenza tra Galileo e i suoi amici. M. Muccillo
in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, riferimenti in . Giorgio Abetti, Amici e nemici di Galileo,
Milano, Bompiani. Aristotelismo Galileo Galilei. M. Muccillo, «DELLE COLOMBE
(Colombo), Ludovico», in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Roma, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
COLOMBO – Grice: “I love
Colombo as I love Wilde – I mean, the sponsor of the Wilde Lectures on Natural
Religion! Colombo wonders, ‘can ‘theologian’ be written under ‘profession’?
Surely, like me, Colombo distinguishes between theologian and philosophical
theologian – if there is no such distinction, and I’m not sure there is –
perhaps there shouldn’t be, Colombo would say, the ‘philosophical’ in my
‘philosophical eschatology’ is totally otiose and anti-Griceian!” -- Giuseppe
Colombo (filosofo) Abbozzo Questa voce
sull'argomento filosofi italiani è solo un abbozzo. Contribuisci a migliorarla
secondo le convenzioni di . Giuseppe Colombo (Milano, 1950) è un filosofo e
accademico italiano. Docente presso l'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di
Milano, è autore di studi sulla storia della filosofia italiana (si è occupato
di Antonio Rosmini, Piero Martinetti e Galvano Della Volpe) e sulla filosofia
cristiana (Anselmo d'Aosta e Rosmini stesso), oltre che di contributi nei campi
della metafisica e dell'antropologia.
Opere Della Volpe premarxista. L'attualismo e l'estetica, Studium, Roma
1979. Scienza e morale nel marxismo di Galvano Della Volpe, CUSL, Milano 1983.
Pietra angolare. Introduzione all'insegnamento sociale della Chiesa,
CUSL-Centro Toniolo, Milano-Verona 1983. Conoscenza di Dio e antropologia,
Massimo, Milano 1988. Ontologismo e trascendenza di Dio. Note a proposito di
una recente teoria, in "Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica", anno
LXXXI, luglio-settembre 1989, 478-491.
Introduzione al pensiero di sant'Anselmo d'Aosta, Mursia, Milano 1990. Piero
Martinetti. I maestri in persona, "Rivista di filosofia
neoscolastica" anno LXXXVIII, gennaio-marzo 1996, n. 1, 35-94. Il cristianesimo di Kierkegaard e la
modernità, in "Per la filosofia", anno XIII, n. 38,
settembre-dicembre 1996, 50-57. La
svolta antropologica in Antonio Rosmini: il Cristo centro di convergenza
totale, in "Per la filosofia", anno XIV, n.41, settembre-dicembre
1997, 17-25. La correttezza dei nomi nel
Cratilo di Platone, in Le origini del
linguaggio (Celestian Milani), Demetra, Verona 1999 61-78. Il riordino dei cicli scolastici, in
"Quaderno di Iter", supplemento al n. 6 di "Iter Scuola cultura
società", settembre-dicembre 1999,
35-38. La filosofia come soteriologia: L'avventura spirituale e
intellettuale di Piero Martinetti, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2005. Il giusto
prezzo della felicità, Edizioni ISU-Università Cattolica, Milano 2005.
Antropologia ed etica, EDUCatt, Milano .
Anselmo d'Aosta Galvano Della Volpe Piero Martinetti Antonio Rosmini Filosofia
Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloAccademici italiani del
XX secoloAccademici italiani Professore1950 Milano
COLONNA:
colonnae.
– there is already an entry for this; in Italian it is ‘Egidio Colonna’ -- giles di roma, Rome, original name, a member
of the order of the Hermits of St. Augustine, he studied arts at Augustinian
house and theology at the varsity in Paris but was censured by the theology
faculty and denied a license to teach as tutor. Owing to the intervention of
Pope Honorius IV, he later returned from Italy to Paris to teach theology, was
appointed general of his order, and became archbishop of Bourges. Colonna both
defends and criticizes views of Aquinas. He held that essence and existence are
really distinct in creatures, but described them as “things”; that prime matter
cannot exist without some substantial form; and, early in his career, that an
eternally created world is possible. He defended only one substantial form in
composites, including man. Grice adds: “Colonna supported Pope Boniface VIII in
his quarrel with Philip IV of Franc eand that was a bad choice.” The Latin is
EGIDIVS COLUMNA – The “Corriere” has an article as his book being a bestseller
of the Low Middle Ages!” Cosnisder the claims here: ‘essence and existence are
really distinct in creatures – and each is a thing – prime matter cannot exist
without substantial forml – eternal and created world is not a contradiction –
there is only ONE substantial form in compostes, including man. Grice: “Must say
I LOVE Colonna, or COLVMNA as the printing goes – of course the “Corriere della
Sera” hastens to add that he wassn’t one! In any case, my favourite of his
tracts is of course the one on Aristotle!” -- Egidio Romano, O.E.S.A.
arcivescovo della Chiesa cattolica Filip4 Gilles de Rome.jpg Egidio Romano e
Filippo il Bello (miniatura di un codice medievale).
Template-Archbishop.svg Incarichi ricopertiArcivescovo di
Bourges Natotra il 1243 e il 1247, Roma Nominato arcivescovo25
aprile 1295 Deceduto22 dicembre 1316, Roma Manuale Egidio Romano,
latinizzato come Ægidius Romanus, indicato anche come Egidio Colonna (Roma),
filosofo. Dopo la sua morte, gli furono tributati i titoli onorifici di Doctor
fundatissimus e Theologorum princeps. Fu discepolo d'Aquino.
Insegnò filosofia prima di diventare generale degli agostiniani e arcivescovo
di Bourges. Fu inoltre il precettore di Filippo il Bello per il quale scrisse
il trattato De regimine principum, sostenendo l'efficacia della monarchia come
forma di governo.Colonna è considerato tra i più autorevoli teologi di
ispirazione agostiniana, attivo anche nella vita intellettuale e politica in un
contesto culturale ed istituzionale travagliato da frequenti ed aspre polemiche
sul problema del rapporto tra potere temporale e potere spirituale. Questo
filosofo è generalmente ricordato, insieme al prediletto allievo Giacomo da
Viterbo, per il contributo nella redazione della celebre bolla Unam Sanctam del
1302 di Papa Bonifacio VIII e per il ruolo significativo che assunse il Maestro
degli Eremitani di Sant'Agostino quale autore del De Ecclesiastica potestate e,
dunque, quale teorico famoso e autorevole della plenitudo potestatis
pontificia. In Egidio Romano rileviamo subito una compresenza del duplice
atteggiamento dottrinale e politico; infatti è possibile rintracciare, fra le
opere giovanili, il De regimine principum, opera scritta per Filippo il Bello e
di ispirazione aristotelico-tomista inerente alla naturalità dello Stato,
erigendola a difensore della potestas regale. Nel De Ecclesiastica potestate,
invece, Colonna afferma la superiorità del sacerdotium rispetto al regnum,
distinguendosi quale rappresentante della teocrazia papale. La riscoperta
di Aristotele e l'agostinismo politico In seguito alle condanne di Étienne
Tempier del 1277, Egidio difende la tesi di Tommaso, per la sua qualifica di
Baccalaureus formatus, ma, proprio a causa delle condanne stesse, viene sospeso
dall'insegnamento. In quegli anni, gli avversari del papato trovano nel
pensiero di Aristotele gli strumenti per svolgere un'analisi politica che metta
in discussione la sacralità del potere. Dall'altra parte troviamo l'influenza
della corrente speculativa dell'agostinismo politico (ossia quel fenomeno,
tipicamente medioevale, di compenetrazione fra Stato e Chiesa, all'interno del
quale Agostino viene a giocare un ruolo fondamentale dal momento che l'apporto
teorico del suo De Civitate Dei conduce a confusioni inevitabili fra il piano
spirituale della Civitas Dei Caelestis e il piano temporale della vita terrena
che è Civitas Peregrina), che ripropone la teoria delle “due città” e riafferma
la superiorità del sacerdotium rispetto al regnum, costituendo un vero e
proprio “partito del Papa”. Egidio rivendica la Plenitudo potestatis come
proprietà costitutiva dell'auctoritas del Papa in quanto homo spiritualis.
Egidio sostituisce al concetto agostiniano di ecclesia, quello di regnum al
fine di estendere gli ambiti del potere del sovrano ecclesiastico. Il sovrano
ecclesiastico (il Papa) dovrebbe esercitare la sua sovranità anche sul potere
temporale al fine di garantire l'ordine mediante una forma di dominium che
coincida con la sua stessa missione spirituale. Opere Frontespizio
delle In secundum librum sententiarum quaestiones L'edizione critica dell'opera
omnia è stata intrapresa, per Leo S. Olschki, (Aegidii Romani opera omnia,
collana Corpus Philosophorum Medii AeviTesti e Studi), dal gruppo di ricerca di
Francesco Del Punta. Quaestio de
gradibus formarum, Ottaviano Scoto (eredi), Boneto Locatello, 1502. In secundum librum sententiarum quaestiones, 1, Francesco Ziletti, 1581. In secundum librum sententiarum
quaestiones, 2, Francesco Ziletti,
1581. Opere, Antonio Blado, 1555. In libros De physico auditu Aristotelis
commentaria, Ottaviano Scoto (eredi), Boneto Locatello, De materia coeli, Girolamo
Duranti, 1493. Quodlibeta, Domenico de
Lapi. Colonna, in Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Roberto Lambertini, Giles of
Rome, in Edward N. Zalta , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center for the
Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford, . Charles F. Briggs e Peter S. Eardley , A
Companion to Giles of Rome, Leiden, Brill, . Silvia Donati, Studi per una
cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano: I. Le opere prima del 1285: I commenti
aristotelici. "Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica
medievale", I/1, 1990, pagg. 1-112. Gian Carlo Garfagnini, Egidio Romano,
in Il contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Filosofia, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, . Francesco Del Punta-S. Donati-C. Luna, Egidio
Romano, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Roma, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Filippo Cancelli, Egidio Romano, in Enciclopedia
dantesca, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970. Papa Bonifacio VIII Teocrazia Altri progetti
Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Egidio Romano
Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Egidio Romano Collabora a Wikimedia Commons
Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Egidio Romano Egidio Romano, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on
line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Ugo Mariani, Egidio Romano, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Egidio Romano, su Enciclopedia Britannica,
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. (DE)
Egidio Romano, su ALCUIN, Ratisbona. Opere di Egidio Romano, su openMLOL, Horizons
Unlimited srl. su Egidio Romano, su
Les Archives de littérature du Moyen Âge. Egidio Romano, in Catholic
Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company. David M. Cheney, Egidio Romano, in
Catholic Hierarchy. Roberto Lambertini, Giles of Rome, in Edward N. Zalta ,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center for the Study of Language and
Information (CSLI), Stanford. Biografia a cura dell'associazione
storico-culturale S. Agostino, su cassiciaco.it. PredecessoreArcivescovo
metropolita di BourgesSuccessoreArchbishopPallium PioM.svg Simone di Beaulieu25
aprile 129522 dicembre 1316Raynaud de La Porte Filosofia Medioevo Medioevo Categorie: Arcivescovi cattolici
italiani del XIII secoloArcivescovi cattolici italiani del XIV secoloTeologi
italianiFilosofi italiani del XIII secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1316 22
dicembre Romad AvignoneScolasticiFilosofi cattoliciScrittori medievali in
lingua latina
COLONNELLO: Grice: “I like
Colonnello; as a typical Italian philosopher, he has philosophised about ‘all,’
from, first, of course, Croce, to the ‘tedesci’! – But also about ‘guilt,’ and
my favourite, the ‘transcendentale,’ which in Italian, for lack of ‘n’ becomes
‘trascendentale’ – how many? Colonnello thinks more than one, if the plural is
of any guide!” Pio Colonnello (Benevento),
filosofo. Ha conseguito la laurea in Filosofia, in Giurisprudenza e in Lettere.
Nell'anno accademico 1973/74 è stato borsista presso l'Istituto Italiano per
gli Studi Storici, fondato da Benedetto Croce, in Napoli. Già docente nei Licei
e Ginnasi, nel 1980 ha conseguito il ruolo di ricercatore universitario presso
l'Napoli "Federico II". Dal 2001 insegna presso l'Università della
Calabria, dapprima come Professore Associato e quindi, dal 2005, come Ordinario
di Filosofia Teoretica. Collabora a
diversi periodici e riviste filosofiche tra cui: Kant Studien, Criterio,
Filosofia Oggi, Nord e Sud, Sapienza, Choros, Studi Kantiani, Zeitschrift für
philosophische Forschung, The Journal of Value Inquiry (rivista di cui è anche
Consulting Editor). È membro del Comitato scientifico di autorevoli riviste
filosofiche. È Visiting Professor nella
Universidad Autónoma de Mèxico, nella Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
(Città del Messico) e nella California State UniversityNorthridge Los Angeles.
Ha organizzato Convegni e Congressi nazionali e internazionali. Ha ricevuto per due volte il "Premio
della Cultura" della Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri. Ha ricevuto il
premio della Cultura "Salvatore Valitutti". Pio Colonnello ha privilegiato alcuni filoni
di ricerca: l'indagine su temi e autori compresi nell'arco tra criticismo
trascendentale e pensiero fenomenologico (da Kant a Husserl); la riflessione
sui problemi fondamentali della filosofia dell'esistenza e dell'ermeneutica
contemporanea (Heidegger, Jaspers, Ricœur, Pareyson, Arendt); lo studio di
alcune posizioni dello storicismo contemporaneo tra Europa e America (Croce,
Ortega y Gasset, Gaos, Ímaz, Nicol, Dussel). La sua proposta è verificare
l'interazione, in chiave storico-critica, dei temi fondamentali del kantismo,
della fenomenologia husserliana e di quelli della filosofia
dell'esistenza. Heidegger interprete di
Kant, Studio Editoriale di Cultura, Genova. Croce e i vociani, Studio
Editoriale di Cultura, Genova 1984. Tempo e necessità, Japadre, L'Aquila-Roma
1987. Tra fenomenologia e filosofia dell'esistenza. Saggio su José Gaos,
Morano, Napoli 1990 (tradotto in inglese e in spagnolo: The Philosophy of José
Gaos, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta; Entre fenomenologia y filosofia de la
existencia. Ensayo sobre José Gaos, Jitajanfora Morelia Editorial, Morelia
México 2006). La questione della colpa tra filosofia dell'esistenza ed
ermeneutica, Loffredo, Napoli 1995. Percorsi di confine. Analisi dell'esistenza
e filosofia della libertà, Luciano, Napoli 1999. Croce e Dewey oggi (in
collaborazione con G. Spadafora), Bibliopolis, Napoli 2002. Ragione e
rivelazione (in collaborazione con P. Giustiniani), Borla, Roma 2003.
Melanconia ed esistenza, Luciano, Napoli 2003. Filosofia e politica in America
latina (Pio Colonnello), Armando, Roma, Itinerari di filosofia ispanoamericana,
Armando, Roma 2007. Storia esistenza liberta. Rileggendo Croce, Armando, Roma
2009. Martin Heidegger e Hannah Arendt, Guida, Napoli 2009 (tradotto in
spagnolo: Martin Heidegger y Hannah Arendt, Ediciones del Signo, Buenos Aires ;
tradotto in francese: Martin Heidegger à Hannah Arendt. Lettre jamais écrite,
Editions Mimesis Philosophie, Paris ). Orizzonti del trascendentale, Mimesis,
Milano . Il soggetto riflesso. Itinerari del corpo e della mente (Pio
Colonnello), Mimesis, Milano . Fenomenologie e visioni del mondo. Tra mente e
corpo (Pio Colonnello), Mimesis, Milano . Fenomenologia e patografia del
ricordo, Mimesis, Milano-Udine (tradotto
in inglese: Phenomenology and Pathography of Memory, Mimesis International,
). Filosofia latinoamericana Curriculum, su polaris.unical.it 2Elenco
pubblicazioni, su polaris.unical.it 22 luglio ). Pagina personale, su
dipfilosofia.unical.it
COLORNI: Grice:
“To understand the passion in Italian philosophy, as the passion I experienced
with Austin in the postwar and with Hardie on the golfcourse in the good old
days, one has to understand Colorni – he was a socialist, and thus an
empiriociritic! He found opposition in the Gentileians. Oddly, Colroni’s main
interest is the ‘monad,’ but he also explored what we would at Oxford call
‘science’ – rather than philosophy. Lay the blame on his tutor at Milano!”
-- Eugenio Colorni (Milano) filosofo. Oltre
che per le sue opere filosofiche, Colorni è noto come uno dei massimi promotori
del federalismo europeo: mentre era confinato, in quanto socialista e
antifascista, nell'isola di Ventotene, partecipò con Altiero Spinelli ed
Ernesto Rossi, anch'essi lì confinati, alla scrittura del Manifesto per
un’Europa libera e unita, che poi da quel luogo prese il nome. In seguito,
nella Roma occupata dai nazisti, curò l'introduzione e la pubblicazione
clandestina di questo documento fondamentale per lo sviluppo dell'idea federalista
europea. Colorni nacque a Milano il 22 aprile del 1909 da una famiglia
ebraica. Il padre, Alberto Colorni, era un commerciante originario di Mantova,
mentre la madre, Clara Pontecorvo, milanese di famiglia pisana, era zia del
fisico nucleare Bruno Pontecorvo, del regista Gillo, del genetista Guido e del
giurista Tullio Ascarelli. Si sposò con Ursula Hirschman, un'ebrea tedesca,
sorella dell'economista Albert O. Hirschmann, e da cui ebbe 3 figlie: Silvia,
Renata e Eva Colorni. Formazione Colorni frequentò il Liceo Ginnasio
Statale Alessandro Manzoni di Milano. Durante gli anni del liceo, si appassionò
al Breviario di estetica di Benedetto Croce. La sua formazione
adolescenzialecome raccontò egli stesso nella Malattia filosoficafu influenzata
dal rapporto intrattenuto con i cugini Enrico, Enzo ed Emilio Sereni, tutti più
grandi di lui. Fu Enzo, che era un convinto socialista sionista, ad esercitare
su di lui una forte influenza ideale e religiosa, tanto da far avvicinare il
quattordicenne Eugenio, seppur per breve tempo, al sionismo. Nel 1926 si
iscrisse presso la facoltà milanese di Lettere e filosofia. Giuseppe Antonio
Borgese e Piero Martinetti furono suoi insegnanti prediletti. Col secondo dei
due si laureò in filosofia nel 1930, discutendo una tesi su Sviluppo e
significato dell'individualismo leibniziano; a Leibniz dedicherà poi gran parte
dei suoi studi. Durante il periodo universitario, strinse amicizia con
Guido Piovene, che sarà giornalista e scrittore, amicizia che però verrà
interrotta nel 1931 per via di certi articoli anti-semitici scritti dallo
stesso Piovene su L'Ambrosiano. In quel periodo, Colorni partecipò all'attività
dei Gruppi goliardici per la libertà di Lelio Basso e Rodolfo Morandi.
Nel 1928, sotto lo pseudonimo di G. Rosenberg, pubblicò su Pietre, la rivista
di Basso, un articolo sull'estetica di Roberto Ardigò. Nel 1930 si accostò alla
divisione milanese del movimento anti-fascista Giustizia e Libertà; collaborò
in seguito col nucleo giellista torinese, che fece capo prima a Leone Ginzburg
e poi a Vittorio Foa. Nel 1931 incontrò Benedetto Croce, con il quale
discusse a lungo. Nello stesso anno, compì un viaggio di studi in
Germania, a Berlino, dove conobbe la futura compagna Ursula, che sposò nel
1935. Dal 1931, cominciò a scrivere recensioni ed articoli per Il
Convegno, La Cultura, Civiltà Moderna, Solaria e la Rivista di filosofia di
Martinetti. Nel 1932 pubblicò, presso la società editrice "La
Cultura" di Milano, uno studio critico su L'estetica di Croce. Tra
il 1932 ed il 1933, fu lettore d'italiano presso l'Marburgo; con l'avvento del
nazismo in Germania, fu costretto a tornare in Italia. Nel 1933, conclusa
la tesi di perfezionamento sulla filosofia giovanile di Leibniz, vinse il
concorso per l'insegnamento di storia e filosofia nei licei; dopo una prima
assegnazione al liceo Grattoni di Voghera, nel 1934 ottenne la cattedra di
filosofia e pedagogia all'istituto magistrale "Giosuè Carducci" di
Trieste; qui conobbe e frequentò, fra gli altri, Umberto Saba (ritratto poi in
Un poeta) ed anche Pier Antonio Quarantotti Gambini, Bruno Pincherle ed Eugenio
Curiel. Nel 1934, nella collana scolastica che Giovanni Gentile diresse
per Sansoni, pubblicò una traduzione della Monadologia di Leibniz, preceduta da
una lunga introduzione intitolata Esposizione antologica del sistema
leibniziano. Come scrisse Eugenio Garin, «Leibniz lo costrinse ad affrontare
studi di logica e di matematica, a rimettere in discussione il modo stesso di
concepire la scienza, e i rapporti fra scienza e filosofia. [...] Ripartì da
Kant e dalla problematica kantiana, e meditò sulle conseguenze che la fisica
teorica e la psicanalisi potevano avere per la dissoluzione di impostazioni
filosofiche tradizionali». Quando, come si legge in Un poeta, Umberto
Saba gli domanderà «Perché fa filosofia?», Colorni concluse: «Da quel giorno,
io non faccio più filosofia», o come ebbe a dire lo stesso Garin, «In realtà
non era la filosofia che rifiutava, ma un orientamento legato a quell'idealismo
di cui erano seguaci [...] Croce come Gentile e Martinetti». Attività
politica A partire dal 1935, Colorni intensificò il proprio impegno politico
contro il regime fascista. Quando una riuscita operazione di polizia, nel
maggio del 1935, portò all'arresto di quasi tutto il direttivo giellista
torinese, prese contatto con il Centro interno socialista, costituito
clandestinamente a Milano nell'estate del 1934 da Rodolfo Morandi, Lelio Basso,
Lucio Mario Luzzatto, Bruno Maffi e altri, come organismo di collegamento dei
socialisti in Italia. Nell'aprile del 1937, dopo gli arresti di Luzzato e
Morandi, Colorni divenne, di fatto, il responsabile del Centro.
Nell'estate del 1937, in occasione del "IX Congresso internazionale di
filosofia" di Parigi, ebbe modo d'incontrare di persona Carlo Rosselli, Angelo
Tasca, Pietro Nenni ed altri esponenti della direzione del PSI, del quale entrò
poi a far parte, mantenendosi su un'originale posizione autonomista. Con vari
pseudonimi, ma soprattutto con quello di Agostini, tra il 1936 ed il 1937,
pubblicò importanti articoli su Politica socialista e sul Nuovo Avanti.
L'8 settembre del 1938, all'inizio della campagna razziale promossa dal regime,
fu arrestato dall'OVRA a Trieste, in quanto ebreo ed anti-fascista militante,
venendo pertanto rinchiuso nel carcere di Varese. I giornali pubblicarono la
notizia con gran risalto, sottolineando che egli «di razza ebraica, manteneva
rapporti di natura politica con altri ebrei residenti in Italia e all'estero»;
in questa campagna giornalistica contro di lui si distinsero, con articoli di
particolare livore anti-semita, Il Piccolo di Trieste ed il Corriere della
Sera. La sottolineatura sul "complotto ebraico" serviva a
giustificare la legislazione anti-semita appena varata in Italia dal regime,
per potersi così allineare alla linea politica seguita dagli alleati nazisti.
Il Tribunale speciale non riuscì però ad imbastire un formale processo nei suoi
confronti. Venne quindi assegnato al confino per la durata massima, ovvero
cinque anni. Il confino a Ventotene Dal gennaio del 1939 all'ottobre del
1941, Colorni fu confinato nell'isola di Ventotene, dove proseguì i suoi studi
filosofico-scientifici e discusse intensamente con gli altri compagni
confinati, Ernesto Rossi, Manlio Rossi Doria e Altiero Spinelli: un'eco fedele
di quelle discussioni si ritrova nei sette Dialoghi di Commodo, scritti in
collaborazione con Spinelli e pubblicati postumi. Risale a questo periodo
la sua adesione alle idee federaliste europee propugnate da Spinelli e Rossi,
con i quali, nel 1941, partecipò alla stesura del Manifesto per un’Europa
libera e unita, meglio noto come Manifesto di Ventotene. Nel 1944, a Roma, nel
mezzo della lotta partigiana, Colorni riuscì a pubblicare clandestinamente un
volumetto dal titolo Problemi della Federazione Europea, che raccoglieva il
Manifesto ed altri scritti sul tema dello stesso Spinelli. Nella sua
"Prefazione" al Manifesto, auspicò la nascita di una politica
federalista europea di respiro universalista, come scenario democraticamente
praticabile dopo la catastrofe della guerra. In tale ottica, la creazione di
una federazione di Stati europei era da lui considerata come condizione
indispensabile per un profondo rinnovamento sociale, anche per iniziativa
popolare, che partendo dagli enti territoriali avrebbe coinvolto tutta l’Italia
e, quindi, l’intera Europa. Circa le dinamiche che portarono alla stesura
del Manifesto, è generalmente ricondotto ai soli Spinelli e Rossi il contributo
maggioritario del testo, sebbene, alcuni recenti studi storiografici, abbiano
seriamente rivalutato il suo ruolo: «Di trinità si tratta, e lo spirito
santo della situazione è Eugenio Colorni, che partecipò alle discussioni
preparatorie alla stesura del Manifesto assieme a poche altre persone, ed ebbe
una parte di rilievo, soprattutto nella funzione di stimolo e di critica, dal
suo punto di vista di socialista autonomista, verso i due autori del documento,
fino al suo trasferimento a Melfi, nell'ottobre del 1941, benché comunque i
contatti non cessassero del tutto» (Pietro S. Graglia.) Nell'ottobre del
1941, grazie anche all'intervento di Giovanni Gentile, riuscí ad essere
trasferito a Melfi, in provincia di Potenza, dove, nonostante lo stretto
controllo della polizia, riuscì ad avere contatti con alcuni degli
anti-fascisti locali. Nel 1942, assieme con Ludovico Geymonat, elaborò il
progetto di una rivista di metodologia scientifica. La resistenza romana
e l'assassinio Il 6 maggio del 1943 riuscì a fuggire da Melfi, rifugiandosi a
Roma, dove visse da latitante. Dopo la capitolazione di Mussolini, il 25
luglio del 1943, si dedicò all'organizzazione del Partito Socialista Italiano
di Unità Proletaria, nato nell'agosto dalla fusione del PSI col giovane gruppo
del Movimento di Unità Proletaria. Tra il 27 e il 28 agosto partecipò,
assieme ad Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, Ursula Hirschmann, Manlio Rossi
Doria, Giorgio Braccialarghe e Vittorio Foa, in casa dello scienzato azionista
Mario Alberto Rollier a Milano, alla riunione che diede vita al Movimento
Federalista Europeo. Il movimento adottò come proprio programma il
"Manifesto di Ventotene". A seguito dell'8 settembre, svolse
nella capitale un'intensissima attività nelle file della Resistenza: prese
parte alla direzione del PSIUP e s'impegnò a fondo nella ricostruzione della
Federazione Giovanile Socialista Italiana e nella formazione partigiana della
prima brigata Matteotti. «[...] io ero da poco stato nominato segretario
della Federazione Giovanile Socialista per suggerimento e per decisione di
Sandro Pertini, che era membro della segreteria del partito in quell'epoca.
Avevamo organizzato una... chiamiamola brigata, anche se era un gruppo armato
che era comandato da Eugenio Colorni che poi è stato assassinato alla vigilia
della liberazione di Roma [...]» (Matteo Matteotti) Fu redattore capo
dell'Avanti! clandestino; così Sandro Pertini ricordò il suo impegno per la
stampa del giornale socialista: «Ricordare l'Avanti! clandestino di Roma
vuol dire ricordare prima di tutto due nostri compagni che a forte ingegno
univano una fede purissima, entrambi caduti sotto il piombo fascista: Eugenio
Colorni e Mario Fioretti. Ricordo come Colorni, mio indimenticabile fratello
d'elezione, si prodigasse per far sì che l'Avanti! uscisse regolarmente. Egli
in persona, correndo rischi di ogni sorta, non solo scriveva gli articoli
principali, ma ne curava la stampa e la distribuzione, aiutato in questo da
Mario Fioretti, anima ardente e generoso apostolo del Socialismo. A questo
compito cui si sentiva particolarmente portato per la preparazione e la
capacità della sua mente, Colorni dedicava tutto se stesso, senza tuttavia
tralasciare anche i più modesti incarichi nell'organizzazione politica e
militare del nostro Partito. Egli amava profondamente il giornale e sognava di
dirigerne la redazione nostra a Liberazione avvenuta e se non fosse stato
strappato dalla ferocia fascista, egli sarebbe stato il primo redattore capo
dell'Avanti! in Roma liberata e oggi ne sarebbe il suo direttore, sorretto in
questo suo compito non solo dal suo forte ingegno e dalla sua vasta cultura, ma
anche dalla sua profonda onestà e da quel senso di giustizia che ha sempre
guidato le sue azioni. Per opera sua e di Mario Fioretti, l'Avanti! era tra i
giornali clandestini quello che aveva più mordente e che sapeva porre con più
chiarezza i problemi riguardanti le masse lavoratrici. La sua pubblicazione
veniva attesa con ansia e non solo da noi, ma da molti appartenenti ad altri
partiti, i quali nell'Avanti! vedevano meglio interpretati i loro
interessi..» Il 22 gennaio del 1944, nella Roma occupata dalle forze
naziste, in una tipografia nascosta di Monte Mario, fece stampare 500 copie di
un libriccino di 125 pagine intitolato Problemi della Federazione Europea,
contenente il "Manifesto di Ventotene". Il 28 maggio del 1944, pochi
giorni prima della liberazione della capitale, venne fermato in via Livorno da
una pattuglia di militi fascisti della famigerata banda Koch: tentò di fuggire,
ma fu raggiunto e ferito gravemente da tre colpi di pistola. Trasportato
all'Ospedale San Giovanni, morì il 30 maggio, a soli 35 anni, sotto la falsa
identità di Franco Tanzi. Nel 1946 gli fu conferita la medaglia d'oro al
valor militare alla memoria. È sepolto al Cimitero Monumentale di Milano,
nella tomba di famiglia. Onorificenze Medaglia d'oro al valor militarenastrino
per uniforme ordinariaMedaglia d'oro al valor militare «Indomito assertore
della libertà, confinato durante la dominazione fascista, evadeva audacemente
dedicandosi quindi a rischiose attività cospirative. Durante la lotta
antinazista, organizzato il centro militare del Partito Socialista Italiano,
dirigeva animosamente partecipandovi, primo fra i primi, una intensa, continua
e micidiale azione di guerriglia e di sabotaggio. Scoperto e circondato da
nazisti li affrontò da solo, combattendo con estremo ardimento, finché travolto
dal numero, cadde nell'impari gloriosa lotta.» — Roma, 28 maggio 1944.
Commemorazioni Nel , in occasione del 70º anniversario della morte, il Comune
di Melfi, la locale Sezione ANPI e l'Associazione "Francesco Saverio Nitti"
hanno celebrato la Festa della Liberazione dedicando la ricorrenza del 25
aprile al ricordo della figura e dell'opera di Eugenio Colorni. In via
Livorno a Roma, luogo dove Colorni venne ferito a morte, vennero poste tre
lapidi in suo ricordo, che furono distrutte da atti vandalici. Delle tre lapidi
esistenti, una, posta nel 1982 dalla III Circoscrizione del Comune di Roma è
semilleggibile perché scurita dal tempo, un'altra, posta nel 1978 dal Partito
Socialista Italiano, è spaccata in due e un'ultima, posta nel 2004 sempre dalla
III Circoscrizione del Comune di Roma, contiene un errore. Note Numerosi sono i riferimenti a Colorni nel
carteggio tra i fratelli Sereni: Cfr. Enzo Sereni, Emilio Sereni, Politica e
utopia. Lettere 1926-1943, D. Bidussa e M. G. Meriggi, La Nuova Italia,
2000. Stefano Miccolis, Eugenio Colorni
ventenne e Croce, Relazione tenuta al convegno su «Eugenio Colorni e la cultura
italiana fra le due guerre» (Milano, 15-16 ottobre 2009), organizzato dal
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, pubblicata in Belfagor: rassegna di varia
umanità, anno LXV, n. 4, 31 luglio (n.
388), (Firenze: L. S. Olschki,
)416. cfr. la biografia di Eugenio
Colorni nel sito web dell'ANPI cfr.
Commissione di Trieste, ordinanza contro Eugenio Colorni ("Attività
antifascista"). In: Adriano Dal Pont, Simonetta Carolini, L'Italia al
confino 1926-1943. Le ordinanze di assegnazione al confino emesse dalle
Commissioni provinciali dal novembre 1926 al luglio 1943, Milano 1983
(ANPPIA/La Pietra), II620 cfr. Pietro S. Graglia, Colorni, Spinelli e
il federalismo europeo, in Eugenio Colorni dall'antifascismo all'europeismo
socialista e federalista, Maurizio Degl'Innocenti, Lacaita, Intervista di Sonia
Schmidt ad Altiero Spinelli, Democratici Nel Mondo, 1982. 21 agosto 4 marzo ).
cfr. Enzo Cicchino, Dopo mezzo secolo l'incontro con i protagonisti,
1994, in Adattamento ed elaborazione dall'intervista originale a, Matteo
Matteotti, partigiano, figlio del defunto Giacomo, realizzata dal regista Enzo
Cicchino e andata in onda durante una puntata del programma televisivo della
RAI Mixer di Giovanni Minoli. cfr.
Sandro Pertini, Cinquantenario dell'Avanti!, numero unico del 25 dicembre 1946,
riprodotto nel sito web del Centro Espositivo "Sandro Pertini" di
Firenze. cfr. Ugo Intini, L’unità
europea e i pericoli del post fascismo, in Il Mattino del 23 marzo , riprodotto
in Avanti!online del 23 marzo vicino
piazza Bologna, nel quartiere Nomentano di Roma
Comune di Milano, App di ricerca defunti Not 2 4get. Quirinale.it.
cfr. 70º della morte di Eugenio Colorni nel sito web dell'ANPI. chieracostui.com, foto delle tre lapidi. Scritti, Norberto Bobbio, la Nuova Italia,
Firenze, 1975 Il coraggio dell'innocenza, Luca Meldolesi, La Città del Sole
(Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici), Napoli, 1998 Un poeta e altri
racconti, con prefazione di Claudio Magris, Il Melangolo, Genova, 2002 La
malattia della metafisica. Scritti filosofici e autobiografici, Geri Cerchiai,
Einaudi, Torino, 2009 Fonti Elvira Gencarelli, Profilo politico di Eugenio
Colorni, in «Mondo Operaio», n. 7, luglio 1974,
49–54 Elvira Gencarelli, Eugenio Colorni, voce in Il Movimento Operaio
Italiano. Dizionario Biografico, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1976, II,
74–81 Leo Solari, Eugenio Colorni. Ieri e sempre, Marsilio, Venezia,
1980 Eugenio Garin, Colorni, Eugenio, in «Dizionario Biografico degli
Italiani», XXVII, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia italiana, Roma, 1982 Norberto
Bobbio, Maestri e compagni, Passigli Editori, Firenze, 1984 Nunzio Dell'Erba,
L'itinerario politico di Eugenio Colorni, in Id., Il socialismo riformista tra
politica e cultura, Franco Angeli, Milano 1990,
135–150 Massimo Orlandi, Il socialismo federalista di Eugenio Colorni,
tesi di laurea (inedita), Università degli studi di Firenze, Anno Accademico
1991-1992 Gaetano Arfé, Eugenio Colorni, l'antifascista, l'europeista, in ,
Matteotti, Buozzi, Colorni. Perché vissero, perché vivono, Franco Angeli,
Milano, 1996, 58–77 Sandro Gerbi, Tempi
di malafede. Una storia italiana tra fascismo e dopoguerra. Guido Piovene ed
Eugenio Colorni, Einaudi, Torino 1999 e Hoepli, Milano, . Geri Cerchiai,
L'itinerario filosofico di Eugenio Colorni, in «Rivista di Storia della
Filosofia», n. 3, 2002 Stefano Miccolis, Eugenio Colorni ventenne e Croce, in
«Belfagor», 4, LXV, 31 luglio , 415–434
Geri Cerchiai, Alcune riflessioni su Eugenio Colorni, in «Rivista di Storia
della Filosofia», LXVII , 351–360.
Michele Strazza, Melfi terra di confino. Il confino a Melfi durante il
fascismo, Melfi, Tarsia, 2002. Maurizio Degl'Innocenti , Eugenio Colorni
dall'antifascismo all'europeismo socialista e federalista, Lacaita, Altiero
Spinelli Ernesto Rossi Manifesto di Ventotene Antifascismo Movimento
Federalista Europeo Resistenza ebraica Ursula Hirschmann Altri progetti
Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Eugenio
Colorni Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Eugenio Colorni Eugenio Colorni, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie
on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Eugenio Colorni, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Eugenio Colorni, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Eugenio Colorni, su Liber Liber.
Opere di Eugenio Colorni, . Roma: lapide
commemorativa in via Livorno, su chieracostui.com. V D M Antifascismo V D M
Resistenza romana V D M Logo MFE.svg Federalismo europeo Flag of Europe.svg Filosofi
italiani del XX secoloPolitici italiani del XX secoloAntifascisti italiani 1909
1944 22 aprile 30 maggio Milano RomaAssassinati con arma da fuocoBrigate
MatteottiEbrei italianiMedaglie d'oro al valor militarePartigiani
italianiStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di MilanoPolitici del Partito
Socialista ItalianoSepolti nel Cimitero Monumentale di Milano
CONTE: Grice: “Must say I love Conte – he has almost the same talent for linguistic
coinage that I do! In Italy ‘filosofia del diritto’ is much more respectable a
discipline that it is at Oxford! But Conte managed to keep it philosophically
interesting for the philosopher’s philosopher that I am!” “Conte proves that
moral philosophy is at the heart of philosopohy qua-uni-virtue – for the
critique of reason must include the buletic – and that’s all that Conte
dedicates his philosophy too! Into the bargain, he expands into concepts like
sacrifice, punishment, ‘fiducia’ (my principle of conversational trust), and so
much more!” “He plays with language the way only Heidegger did in German and I
in English!” -- -- Grice: “Conte is what
I – and Italians – would call a ‘Griceian conversationali pragmaticist.’” Amedeo Giovanni Conte (Pavia)
filosofo. Dopo aver conseguito la maturità classica presso il liceo classico
"Ugo Foscolo" di Pavia, proseguì gli studi presso Pavia, quale alunno
del Collegio Ghislieri. Si laureò con una tesi in Filosofia del diritto. Dopo
la laurea, studiò Logica matematica all'Münster e Filosofia all'Freiburg im
Breisgau. Sposò Maria-Elisabeth ed ha
avuto neuna figlia, Adelheid. Tenne il primo corso italiano di Logica deontica,
presso il Collegio Ghislieri di Pavia. Conseguì la libera docenza a Torino,
sotto la guida di Bobbio. Insegnò Teoria generale del diritto e Filosofia del
diritto, sempre all'Pavia. Fu socio (classe di scienze morali) dell'Accademia
Nazionale dei Lincei e dell'Istituto
Lombardo Accademia di Scienze e Lettere.
Conte si occupò prevalentemente di semiotica (in particolare: di
semiotica dei performativi) e di deontica filosofica. Le sue ricerche di
deontica filosofica si dividono in due insiemi: ricerche di deontica e ricerche
sulla deontica. Delle prime fanno parte le ricerche sulle regole
eidetico-costitutive, le ricerche sulla validità deontica, le ricerche sulla
logica del linguaggio normativo, le ricerche sull'ontologia del normativo, le
ricerche sulla pragmatic conversazionale – alla Grice -- del linguaggio
normativo. Delle ricerche sulla deontica fanno invece parte le ricerche
teoretiche di metadeontica (ricerche sullo statuto della deontica) e le
ricerche storiografiche di storia della deontica. Come scrive Conte stesso: "Queste ricerche
sono come punti d'una circonferenza, punti accomunati dalla relazione
intercorrente tra ognuno di essi ed un altro punto (il centro), che sulla
circonferenza stessa non appare." A connettere le ricerche di Conte è la
loro relazione con una domanda fondamentale: "In che cosa consiste quel
déon, dal quale la deontica prende il nome, e del quale la deontica è
teoria?" Opere scientifiche
Ricerche in tema d'interpretazione analogica. Pavia, Tipografia del Libro, Saggio
sulla completezza degli ordinamenti giuridici. Torino, Giappichelli, Primi
argomenti per una critica del normativismo. Pavia, Tipografia del Libro,
Ricerca d'un paradosso deontico. Pavia, Tipografia del Libro, Deontische Logik
und Semantik (con Risto Hilpinen e Georg Henrik von Wright). Wiesbaden,
Athenaion, 1977. Nove studi sul linguaggio normativo. Torino, Giappichelli,
1985. Filosofia del linguaggio normativo. I. Studi 1965-1981. Torino,
Giappichelli, 1989. Filosofia del linguaggio normativo. II. Studi 1982-1994.
Con una lettera di Norberto Bobbio. Torino, Giappichelli, 1995. Filosofia
dell'ordinamento normativo. Studi 1957-1968. Torino, Giappichelli, 1997.
Filosofia del linguaggio normativo. III. Studi 1995-Torino, Giappichelli. Filosofia
del diritto (con Paolo Di Lucia, Luigi Ferrajoli, Mario Jori). Milano, Cortina.
Ricerche di Filosofia del diritto (con Paolo Di Lucia, Antonio Incampo,
Giuseppe Lorini, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel, Wojciech Żełaniec). Torino,
Giappichelli. Res ex nomine. Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica. Sociologia
filosofica del diritto. Torino, Giappichelli, . Adelaster. Il nome del vero. Milano,
LED, . È inventore del genere letterario da lui chiamato "eidogramma"
ed autore di numerosi eidogrammi, solo parzialmente éditi: Nella parola. Osnago,
Pulcinoelefante,Kenningar. Bari, Adriatica. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei.
Elenco dei soci, su lincei.it. Amedeo Giovanni Conte, "Per una critica
della ragione deontica" (introduzione alla Filosofia del linguaggio
normativo). Scheda nel sito della Pavia Centro
di filosofia sociale. Pragmatica. Filosofia del diritto Logica deontica
Ontologia Performativo (atto verbale) Pragmatica Semiotica Semantica Filosofia Filosofo
del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloAccademici italiani del XX
secoloAccademici italiani Professore, Accademici dei LinceiFilosofi del
dirittoMembri dell'Istituto Lombardo Accademia di Scienze e LettereProfessori
dell'Università degli Studi di PaviaStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di
PadovaStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di PaviaStudenti dell'Friburgo
CONTESTABILE Grice: “I love
Contestabile; I love a philosopher with a sense of humour! At Oxford, it has
become increasingly difficult to laugh at people’s surnames! But ‘grice’ means
‘pig,’ in Norwegian! – Anyway, Contestabile contests a revisionist account of
Bruno’s life – “surely he wasn’t a coward – I know because of his links with
the Campanella whom my family supported in his fight against the furriners!” --
Domenico Contestabile, filosofo. Contestabile: «Cacciato con una telefonata»
Intervista di Dino Martirano, Corriere della sera. Con il Psi non ho ricoperto
grandi incarichi ma ho avuto l'onore di essere stato amico di Craxi. Mi
mancherà la politica ma non è una tragedia. Torno ai miei studi, alla[filosofia
medioevale. Mi mancheranno certi momenti. Io, che ero stato nel Psi fin quando
nel '92 la procura della Repubblica lo ha sciolto, ricordo bene i mesi
trascorsi al ministero della Giustizia: col ministro Biondi fummo i
protagonisti del tentativo fallito, però generoso, di riportare la giustizia
sui binari della normalità. Sciolto il partito [Psi], chi si è fatto
maomettano, chi ebreo, chi cattolico. Però sempre socialisti siamo rimasti.
CONTI: Grice: “Conti is a
good one – he reminds me of Bosanquet and Pater – the decadents in Italy came AFTER
them at Oxford! Conti philosophised on many aesthetic subjects, such as man,
masculinity, and maleness --!” Angelo Conti (Roma), filosofo. La casa di Angelo Conti ad Arpino Nato a Roma
in una famiglia originaria di Arpino, dove frequentò il locale liceo, studiò
medicina, senza però arrivare alla laurea. Preferì occuparsi di musica, di
storia dell'arte e di letteratura, ma soprattutto di filosofia estetica,
scrivendo saggi critici per riviste quali Capitan Fracassa, Cronaca bizantina e
a cominciare dal 1882 per La Tribuna e La Tribuna illustrata, sotto lo
pseudonimo di Doctor Mysticus. Fu amico del pittore Adolfo De Carolis e di
Gabriele D'Annunzio, che lo citò nel suo romanzo Giovanni Episcopo e si ispirò
a lui per il personaggio di Daniele Glauro de Il fuoco. Nel 1893 lavorò a Firenze presso la Galleria
degli Uffizi, collaborando al Marzocco, poi nel 1894 a Venezia presso
l'Accademia di Belle Arti. Nella città lagunare Conti conobbe Eleonora Duse,
con la quale ebbe frequenti scambi epistolari. Qui scrisse Giorgione, un saggio
d'arte ed estetica sul pittore veneto.
Tornato a Firenze, nel 1900 uscì La beata riva, raccolta di saggi che
delineavano la sua concezione critica ed estetica, ispirata dichiaratamente a
Platone, Kant e Schopenhauer. La prefazione fu curata da Gabriele D'Annunzio,
il quale scriveva di stimare molto il Conti e di ammirare il suo ascetismo
estetico. Dal 1901 ricoprì l'incarico di
direttore delle Antichità e Belle Arti di Roma, fino al 1925, anno in cui si
trasferì a Napoli come direttore della Reggia di Capodimonte. Nelle sue opere si ispirò alle poetiche di
Walter Pater e John Ruskin. Opere
Giorgione, Firenze, F.lli Alinari, 1894. Catalogo delle regie gallerie di
Venezia, Venezia, Tip. L. Merlo, 1895. La beata riva, Milano, F.lli Treves,
1900. Sul fiume del tempo, Napoli, R. Ricciardi, 1907. Dopo il canto delle
Sirene, Napoli, R. Ricciardi, 1911. Domenico Morelli, Napoli, Edizioni d'arte
Renzo Ruggiero, 1927. San Francesco, con un saggio di Giovanni Papini, Firenze,
Vallecchi, 1931. Virgilio dolcissimo padre, Napoli, R. Ricciardi, 1931.
Curiosità Mario Praz ha scritto che il suo maestro Ernesto Giacomo Parodi era
solito leggere La beata riva di Conti prima di addormentarsi; quando morì, la
lettura non era stata ancora terminata.
Note Vedi M. Carlino, Dizionario
Biografico degli Italiani, riferimenti in .
Angela Guidotti, Forme del tragico nel teatro italiano del Novecento.
Modelli della tradizione e riscritture originali, Pisa, ETS42. Mario Praz, Romantici, vittoriani, decadenti
e museo dannunziano, in Bellezza e bizzarria, I Meridiani, Milano, Mondadori,
2002635. Benedetto Croce, La letteratura
della nuova Italia, Volume VI, Bari, Laterza, 1940. Marcello Carlino, CONTI,
Angelo, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, 28, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1983. 18 giugno . Altri progetti
Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Angelo Conti Angelo Conti, in Enciclopedia Italiana,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Angelo Conti, su siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it, Sistema Informativo
Unificato per le Soprintendenze Archivistiche.
Opere di Angelo Conti, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di
Angelo Conti, . A. Conti, Due disegni di
Rembrandt nella Pinacoteca di Napoli, Bollettino d'Arte, 9, 1907 A. Conti, Due
conviti di Mattia Preti, Bollettino d'Arte.
conti: Grice: “Conti is a good one; for one he is a
‘patrizio veneziano,’ for another he like Alexander Pope and detests Newton!
(Italian temper there!) – My favourite are his “Dialoghi filosofici,’ full of
implicata as they are!” -- Antonio
Schinella Conti (Padova), filosofo. Famoso per essere stato arbitro nella
controversia tra Leibniz e Newton, circa l'invenzione del calcolo
infinitesimale. Fu a lungo a Parigi dove
si legò in amicizia con Charles Francois Du Fay, noto per gli esperimenti
fisici che conduceva all'Accademia delle Scienze. Una volta tornato in Italia, si ritirò a vita
sedentaria tra Padova e Venezia. Di lui esiste una statua in Prato della Valle,
opera dello scultore padovano Felice Chiereghin, che venne eretta da Carolina
de' Conti. Scrisse trattati riguardanti
la struttura della tragedia, e nel caso del Trattato dei fantasmi poetici, discusse
la funzione dei cori. Tra le sue tragedie, la più significativa fu il Giulio
Cesare. Ne scrisse altre tre, tutte di soggetto romano: Marco Bruto, Giunio
Bruto, e Druso (1748). Apparvero a
Firenze in volume unico le quattro opere teatrali, accompagnate ciascuna da una
prefazione dell'autore. Opere Antonio
Schinella Conti, [Opere]. 1, In Venezia, presso Giambatista Pasquali, Antonio
Schinella Conti, [Opere]. 2, In Venezia, presso Giambatista Pasquali, 1756. Antonio
Schinella Conti, Versioni poetiche, Bari, Laterza, 1966. Giovanna Scianatico, Il secolo neoclassico.
Antonio Conti e la lezione di Gian Vincenzo Gravina, in "Esperienze
Letterarie", a. XXXVI, , n. 2, 3–21.
Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a
Antonio Schinella Conti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons
contiene immagini o altri file su Antonio Schinella Conti Antonio Schinella Conti, su
Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Giulio Natali, Antonio Schinella Conti, in
Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Giovanna Gronda, Antonio Schinella Conti, in
Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Antonio Schinella Conti, su
openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Antonio Schinella Conti, . Spartiti
o libretti di Antonio Schinella Conti, su International Music Score Library
Project, Project Petrucci LLC. Le
quattro tragedie composte dal signor abate Antonio Conti patrizio veneto,
Firenze, 1751, Appresso Andrea Bonducci, su books.google.it. Refs.: Speranza,
“Calcolo finitesimale e calcolo infinitesimale.”
CONTI. Grice: “Conti is a
good one – a historian of philosophy, or rather a philosophical historian – I
never know! – his chapter on the Greek embassy that brought philosophy to Rome
is stimulating!” -- Villa di castello,
sede dell'accademia della crusca, busto di augusto conti.jpg Busto di Augusto
Conti presso la sede dell'Accademia della Crusca Deputato del Regno d'Italia
LegislatureIX, X Gruppo parlamentarecattolici-liberali Sito istituzionale Dati
generali Titolo di studioLaurea in giurisprudenza ProfessionePedagogista Augusto Conti, Mezzobusto ed epigrafeSan
Miniato, Palazzo Comunale. Augusto Conti (San Miniato) filosofo. AConti nacque
a San Pietro alle Fonti di San Miniato al Tedesco da famiglia oriunda
livornese. Studiò a Siena e Pisa; in questa Università aggredì un professore da
lui ritenuto reazionario. Fu espulso dall'ateneo e passò alcuni mesi in
carcere. Dopo quell'episodio fu costretto a completare gli studi fuori dal
Granducato di Toscana. Si trasferì dunque nel Ducato di Lucca e all'Lucca si
laureò in legge. Fu combattente a Montanara con i volontari toscani; insegnò a
Lucca, a Pisa e nell'Istituto superiore di Firenze. Insigne filosofo cristiano,
scrittore di pregio, pedagogista, collaborò con Raffaello Lambruschini al
periodico La famiglia e la scuola. Il 31
marzo del 1869, per i suoi meriti letterari e scientifici, fu chiamato a sedere
nel Collegio dei Residenti dell'Accademia della Crusca; in seguito ne ricoprì
più volte l'Arciconsolato. Fu il filosofo della bellezza, che definì stare fra
il vero e il buono, e li collegava come il mezzo tra il principio e fine. Ebbe
stile classico e le sue opere a volte sono apprezzate più per l'eleganza della
prosa che per il contenuto. A Firenze fu
a lungo consigliere superiore della pubblica istruzione e collaborò con
l'architetto Emilio De Fabris per la definizione dell'apparato ornamentale
della facciata di Santa Maria del Fiore.
Alcune sue opere Cose di storia e d'arte; Evidenza, amore e fede, o i
criteri della filosofia, discorsi e dialoghi. Famiglia, patria, Dio, o i tre
amori (1887). I discorsi del tempo in un viaggio in Italia (1867): in ogni
città coglie occasione per un insegnamento civile; a Venezia il capitolo sulla
religione, a Milano sullo stato, ecc. Il bello nel vero, o estetica. Il buono
nel vero, o morale e diritto naturale. Illustrazione delle sculture e dei
mosaici sulla facciata del Duomo di Firenze (1887). Il vero nell'ordine (1876),
o ontologia e logica. L'armonia delle cose, o antropologia; cercò di costruire
una metafisica fondata sulla relazione, l'armonia, l'ordine; ha capitoli
sull'educazione religiosa, civile e private; Letteratura e patria, collana di
ricordi nazionali; Nuovi discorsi del tempo, o famiglia, Patria, Dio Religione
ed arte, collana di ricordi nazionali. Storia della filosofia, molto
accreditata. Sveglie dell'anima. Il Messia redentore vaticinato, uomo dei
dolori, re della gloria. La mia corona del rosario. Ai figli del popolo,
consigli. Giovanni Duprè o Dell'arte, 2 dialoghi. Evidenza, amore e fede o i
criteri della filosofia (1858), lezioni e dialoghi sulla filosofia cristiana;
lavoro scientifico e popolare, e discorsi sulla storia della filosofia, accordo
della filosofia con la tradizione; discussione sulla filosofia e la fede. La
filosofia di Dante. La bellezza qual mezzo potente di educazione. Note Nella stessa seduta era eletto Socio
residente anche Terenzio Mamiani. Cfr. "La Rassegna nazionale", La
prima volta dal 1873 al 1883 e poi dal 1897 fino alla morte. C. Cresti, M. Cozzi, G. Carapelli, Il Duomo
di Firenze; L'avventura della facciata, Firenze; Giovanni Casati, Dizionario
degli scrittori d'Italia dalle origini fino ai viventi, Romolo Ghirlanda
Editore, Milano, 1926-1934. Mario Themelly, «CONTI, Augusto» in Dizionario
Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 28, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1983. Grande Dizionario Enciclopedico UTET (Fedele), Torino, UTET,
1992, volume V, alla voce. Facciata di
Santa Maria del Fiore Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene
una pagina dedicata a Augusto Conti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Augusto
Conti Augusto Conti, su
Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Augusto Conti, in Dizionario biografico degli
italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Augusto Conti, su accademicidellacrusca.org, Accademia della Crusca. Opere di Augusto Conti, su openMLOL, Horizons
Unlimited srl. Opere di Augusto Conti, . Augusto Conti, su storia.camera.it,
Camera dei deputati. Filosofia. Deputati
della IX legislatura del Regno d'ItaliaDeputati della X legislatura del Regno
d'Italia
CONTRI: Grice:
“I like Contri – he reminds me of my days at Rossall! Of course Contri is
interested in Hegel – “a la ricerca del segreto sofisma di Hegel” – and
attempts to reveal it as Stirling never could! But Contri is also interested in
‘il bello’ – being an Italian! – The interesting thing is that he goes back to
Italy – Aquino! He has a good exploration on ‘verum’ in Aquino, too, which
reminds me of Bristol, Revisited!” -- Siro
Contri (Cazzano di Tramigna), filosofo. Allievo diZamboni. Elaborò una
minuziosa critica al pensiero logico di Hegel di cui mise in rilievo le
incongruenze gnoseologiche e metodologiche che portano alla errata concezione
hegeliana della realtà come vita dell'idea. Rovesciando l'immanentismo
hegeliano, Contri scoprì un mondo di realtà sviluppando una concezione della
filosofia della storia che denominò storiosofia. Siro anagraficamente
Luigi Sirio Contri nacque a Cazzano di Tramigna (Verona). Fu alunno del
Collegio Don Mazza di Verona riservato a studenti indigenti dotati e
meritevoli, si diplomò allo storico Liceo classico Scipione Maffei . Partecipò
alla prima guerra mondiale e cadde prigioniero nel 1918 e trattenuto a
Dunaszerdahely nella attuale Slovacchia. Nel 1921 si laureò a Padova in
Filosofia. Nel 1923 entrò nella redazione del quotidiano di Bologna
L'Avvenire d'Italia. Fu discepolo fervente di Giuseppe Zamboni, di cui accolse
e sostenne la dottrina della gnoseologia pura. In alcune occasioni Il Contri si
descrisse come elaboratore in contemporanea al suo maestro Zamboni di alcune
teorie, collegate all’estetica ma non solo. Insegnò storia e filosofia al Liceo
classico S. Luigi di Bologna dei P.P. Barnabiti. Intensificò l’attività di
pubblicista e collaborò con il Corriere d'Italia, Il popolo veneto di Padova,
L'Avvenire d'Italia, Il Carroccio, Il Nuovo cittadino e la La rivista
pedagogica. Tenne conferenze, alcune delle quali furono pubblicate, al “Circolo
di Cultura” di Bologna. La polemica in difesa della Gnoseologia Pura di
Giuseppe Zamboni e la rivista Criterion Nel 1931 in difesa e sostegno a
Giuseppe Zamboni iniziò una vivace polemica con l'Università Cattolica di
Milano in particolare contro Padre Agostino Gemelli, Francesco Olgiati e Amato
Masnovo. Uno dei primi atti dello scontro filosofico fu la conferenza al
Circolo di Cultura di Bologna su La filosofia scolastica in Italia nell'ora
presente. A cui seguì la risposta firmata da Olgiati. Nel 1932 Zamboni, il
maestro e amico di Contri, fu espulso da Gemelli con il supporto di Olgiati e
Masnovo, dall'Università Cattolica con la motivazione di allontanamento dalla
ortodossia tomistica e con accusa di non conformità al Magistero della Dottrina
Cattolica Romana. Ad alcuni testi di Zamboni fu tolto l’imprimatur. Molti anni
più tardi queste accuse sollevate a Zamboni risultarono errate e Zamboni fu
riabilitato anche se tardivamente con la testimonianza di personalità quali
Sofia Vanni Rovighi. Contri pubblicò la Lettera a S. Santità Pio XI
sull'interpretazione di S. Tommaso in prosecuzione della lunga polemica
promossa dal Contri contro i rappresentanti dell'Università Cattolica di
Milano. Li accusò di mantenere una posizione chiusa a ogni proposta di
rinnovamento del pensiero cattolico, mantenendolo ancorato ad un tomismo
corretto ma non più sufficiente ad interpretare le dinamiche innovazioni della
società industriale e di dare una adeguata interpretazione della storia. Contrì
definì la posizione della Cattolica con il termine da lui coniato di
“archeoscolastica”. La posizione “archeoscolastica” della Cattolica di Milano,
di una conoscenza indimostrata, a priori, dell’ente era bersaglio di critiche
da parte di filosofi cristiani e non che la ritenevano inadeguata nell’ambito
del pensiero moderno. Contri sostenne che la dimostrazione della conoscenza
dell’ente data dalla Gnoseologia Pura di Zamboni superava definitivamente tali
critiche e ridava certezza dimostrata della conoscenza e dell’esistenza di
Dio. Sul giornale di Milano L'Ambrosiano, numeri 5, 8, 10, 15, 29,
Contri accusò di plagio Padre Agostino Gemelli per aver pubblicato nella
monografia Il mio contributo alla filosofia neoscolastica (Milano, 1926) pagine
già scritte da Desiré Mercier e da Morice De Wulf, senza indicare le citazioni.
Gemelli diede le dimissioni da Rettore della Università Cattolica ma rimase in
carica. Successivamente a questo episodio, Contri fu licenziato come insegnante
dal Liceo classico S. Luigi dei P.P. Barnabiti di Bologna. Il prof. Ferdinando
Napoli, Generale dei Barnabiti, cultore di scienze naturali, venne depennato
dalla Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze, allora presieduta dal Gemelli. Venne
dato ordine ai giornali cattolici di non pubblicare più articoli a firma di
Siro Contri. Nel 1933 Contri, continuando la difesa della dottrina del
suo maestro Zamboni, fondò la rivista quadrimestrale di polemica e di dottrina
neoscolastica “Criterion”. La rivista di cui Contri era il direttore
responsabile fu pubblicata dal 1933 al 1941. Il confronto con l’Università
Cattolica di Milano continuò negli anni successivi con relazioni a numerosi
congressi di cui Contri diede resoconto sulla rivista. Contri tornò
all’insegnamento nel 1934 quando fu nominato titolare di cattedra, al liceo
classico di Ivrea.Nel 1936 incontrò Irene Baggio con cui si unì in matrimonio e
ebbe tre figli. La Genesi fenomenologica della Logica hegeliana Sulla
rivista Criterion apparvero intanto i primi Saggi del Contri sui suoi studi
hegeliani che prelusero all'opera definitiva del '38, '39, '40: La Genesi
fenomenologica della Logica hegeliana. L’opera fu pubblicata sulla rivista
Criterion a capitoli a partire dal gennaio 1938 e l’ultima parte nel
1941. La compromissione con il Fascismo dal 1942 al 1945 Dal 1942 al 1945
Siro Contri partecipò attivamente agli organi culturali del fascismo e a frange
cattoliche aderenti al partito fascista. Durante la svolta fascista, giudicata
da alcuni autori” tardiva ed oggettivamente incomprensibile”, Contri scrisse su
giornali quali Il Secolo Fascista, Quadrivio, Il Regime Fascista, Il meridiano
di Roma e La Crociata Italica. Contri si avvalse della tribuna offerta da
queste testate per promuovere i suoi studi filosofici e criticò filosoficamente
un, da lui definito, pensiero ebraico negli scritti di Spinoza, Durkeheim e
Bergson. Dal 25 aprile 1945, dopo la guerra, per questa sua compromissione
politica con il fascismo Contri fu sospeso dall’insegnamento. La
storiosofia Dal 1947 Contri riprese il ruolo di insegnate presso il Liceo
classico Giuseppe Parini di Milano e tenne conferenze su studi hegeliani e
biblici. Nel 1948 sorse una disputa con Giuseppe Zamboni in seguito
all'articolo Il campo della gnoseologia, il campo della storiosofia, Verona,
1948, in risposta alla pubblicazione del Contri Dallo storicismo alla
storiosofia, Verona, Albarelli, 1947. Il carteggio Controversia Zamboni-Contri
è conservato presso la Biblioteca Capitolare di Verona. Nel 1952 fu
docente in Storia della filosofia all'Milano. Prese parte attiva a congressi
tomistici internazionali e a congressi rosminiani. Dal 1957 partecipò
attivamente alla “Missione di Milano”, lanciata dall’allora Arcivescovo di
Milano, Giovanni Battista Montini. Come riconoscimenti ai suoi studi nel
1958 conseguì alcuni premi fra i quali uno indetto dall'Angelicum sul tema
“Quid est veritas”, e una segnalazione all'Accademia dei Lincei per l'opera:
Punti di trascendenza nell'immanentismo hegeliano, Milano, LSU, 1955. Nel
1968 andò in pensione e morì a Pegli nel 1969. Pensiero L'adesione alla
gnoseologia di Giuseppe Zamboni Siro Contri fu discepolo e, secondo Gaetano
Peretti, geniale continuatore di Giuseppe Zamboni. Contri così potrebbe
definire la situazione filosofica di oggi: "Il mondo del pensiero, perduta
la bussola non teologica d'orientamento, è costituito da una miriade di
metafisiche che cozzano le une contro le altre tanto da definirsi che
heghelianicamente come il divenire in sè, che è puro fenomenismo." A
tale fenomenismo corrispondono molteplici fenomenologie. Per esempio quella di
Martin Heidegger, afferma: "il reale è un solo, una totalità
onniafferrante (Hegel direbbe begriff), tanto come essere quanto come
niente". Anche Hidegger poi tenta la via della salvezza ammettendo la
realtà del mondo esterno come di un che, che resiste al soggetto, ponendosi nel
solco del pensiero di Zamboni. In questo modo Hidegger ha toccato "il
problema che si volle e che si vuole eludere: la realtà del mondo esterno.
Esistono queste realtà, come la mia realtà, indipendentemente dal
pensarle?" Per dare risposta a questo interrogativo cruciale,
secondo Siro Contri è necessaria la gnoseologia pura di Giuseppe Zamboni.
Il filosofo veronese Giuseppe Zamboni, secondo Contri, scoprì la risoluzione
definitiva del problema della certezza della conoscenza umana, con la
fondazione della gnoseologia pura. Essa permise di risolvere il problema
dell'esistenza di Dio, riavvalorando criticamente le cinque vie della
dimostrazione di S.Tommaso d'Aquino. Sono meriti del metodo filosofico di
Zamboni il poter affermare "la sostanzialità del mio io personale, la mia
realtà individua e dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio, trascendente,
personale". Il metodo zamboniano distingue gli elementi della
conoscenza umana tra sensazioni, che sono sempre oggettive, e stati d'animo e
tra questi "quello stato d'animo che è anche atto: l'attenzione". Gli
stati d'animo sono sempre soggettivi. Nel tentativo di fare una descrizione
sintetica del metodo zamboniano Gaetano Peretti così scrisse: Zamboni
"riesce a cogliere la realtà del proprio io, nei suoi atti e stati. Essi
sono reali, perché immediatamente presenti all'io, e se sono reali gli
accidenti dell'io, perché essi sono modo di essere dell'io, reale è l'io, come
sostanza, cui essi ineriscono. Perciò dall'immediata certezza della realtà
degli accidenti di un ente si giunge alla certezza della realtà sostanziale
dell'io." La critica alla posizione della neoscolastica di Gemelli,
Olgiati e Masnovo sulla conoscenza indimostrata dell'ente e la soluzione
tramite la gnoseologia pura di Zamboni La descrizione di Peretti, continua
affrontando il tema della dimostrazione della realtà dell'ente:" Si fonda
così nell'esperienza immediata ed integrale il concetto di ente, che non è più necessario
assumere acriticamente, come qualcosa di razionalmente immediato, pena
l'impossibilità di una logica razionale. L'assunzione acritica del concetto di
ente è propria del neotomismo dell'Università Cattolica, che in un suo autore,
Amato Masnovo, perviene alla sua massima teorizzazione nel "mio hic et
nunc diveniente atto di pensiero". Ma con questo l'ente è solo pensato e
ammesso acriticamente come pensiero, è un presupposto, mentre nella gnoseologia
zamboniana è il risultato di un processo di astrazione, che deriva da una
realtà immediatamente presente all'autocoscienza dell'io, che non ha la natura
del pensiero, non è pensiero essa stessa, ma qualcosa di diverso. Si può
pertanto uscire dalla formula logica della ragion sufficiente, che è sempre e comunque
razionalista e riduce al razionalismo anche il neotomismo. Nell'ambito
dell'esperienza immediata ed integrale si scopre invece non la ragion
sufficiente, ma la sufficienza ad esistere o no. E la fondazione ed il
ripensamento delle prove dell'esistenza di Dio, e in particolare della terza
via tomistica, diventano inoppugnabili. Nessuno più può dubitare dell'esistenza
del sufficiente ad esistere, che è Dio." Secondo Peretti la
fondazione gnoseologica della metafisica è il più grande merito di Giuseppe
Zamboni. L'ambiente filosofico dell'Università Cattolica non accettò la
gnoseologia zamboniana e fondò la metafisica sul concetto di ente, assunto
acriticamente, come un presupposto indimostrabile. Esso finì per identificarsi
con l'ente di ragione, non sfuggendo all'insidia hegeliana, che lo aveva
dialettizzato sia come essenza che come esistenza. La dialettica negativa di
Hegel produsse ben presto nella corrente neotomista di Milano (ma anche in
altre università cattoliche) i suoi effetti devastanti. Siro Contri, aveva
messo in guardia i neotomisti dalla fraus hegeliana, che si svela nell'antitesi
come negazione. La critica alla logica di Hegel e la storiosofia Seguendo
la metodologia gnoseologica zamboniana, Siro Contri ha affrontato Hegel, il "padre
del fenomenismo" compiendo una minuziosa e sistematica analisi della
fenomenologia hegeliana. Dopo averle individuate ha messo in rilievo le
incongruenze gnoseologiche e perciò metodologiche degli scritti e del pensiero
di Hegel, che sfocia nella concezione della realtà come vita dell'idea,
presentandola "come uno svolgimento dialettico del begiff, come qualche
cosa che non mai in sé, ma diviene eternamente in sé e per sé".
Contri resa evidente questa impostazione, anima del fenomenismo, e scoperta
nella deficienza gnoseologica e pertanto metodologica, derivata
dall'impostazione razionalista ed empirista che al fondo dello stesso
criticismo, rovescia l'immanentismo hegeliano, che si gli scopre non più come
mondo di idee, ma di realtà, di cui ognuna è altro del suo altro, in un ordito
cosmologico, di cui la storia dell'uomo rappresenta l'essenza. Ed ecco la
storiosofia contriana, che reclama, al posto dell'immanentismo
gnoseologicamente insostenibile, la trascendenza della trama di questo ordito,
che a questo punto in sé e per sé non può più essere spiegato (si ricordi che
l'anima della spiegazione hegeliana è la "negazione"!). Tale
trascendenza prova l'esistenza di un Dio trascendente, che ha concepito la
trama creando le realtà ordito di questa trama, di realtà in reciproca
relazione, in cui non c'è membro che sia fermo. In questo ordine si risolvono
in modo nuovo i rapporti tra le realtà, che per esempio tra l'anima e il corpo,
superando così gli scogli di una spinosa questione di eredità aristotelica, di grande
importanza anche oggi, in cui le realtà terrene e spirituali non trovano la
sintesi equilibratrice. La storiosofia contriana rappresenta uno sviluppo
realizzato da Contri del metodo di Zamboni, considerandolo la via per rinnovare
tutta la filosofia "poiché esso non è storicismo filosofico, non è
naturalismo, è avanti positivistico, non è speculazione, ma metodo appunto, (
metodo) che da secoli la filosofia europea ha cercato, perdendolo oggi nella disperazione
del momento." Opere: Il problema della verità in San Tommaso
d'Aquino: passi scelti dalla Somma Teologica e da altre opere tomistiche con
introduzione, inquadramento e interpretazione del dott. Siro Contri, Torino,
SEI; Aspetti caratteristici di gnoseologia pura, Bologna, L.Cappelli; Verso
l'armonia del pensiero, Bologna; Il tomismo e il pensiero moderno secondo le
recenti parole del Pontefice, Bologna, Coop. tipografica Azzoguidi; Sintesi di
gnoseologia pura, Bologna, Coop. tipografica Azzoguidi; L'A.B.C. della filosofia del bello, Firenze,
Libreria Editrice Fiorentina; La filosofia scolastica in Italia nell' era
presente, op. I, Bologna, Cuppini; La
filosofia scolastica nell'era presente (dedicata a Giulio Canella), op.
II,Bologna, ed. Galleri; Piccola enciclopedia filosofica: sintesi organica
elementare di filosofia dell'ente e del pensiero, Bologna, C. Galleri; Lettera
a S. Santità Papa Pio 11. sull'interpretazione di S. Tommaso, Bologna, Stab.
tip. Felsineo; Un confronto istruttivo: Mercier, Gemelli, De Wulf ed altri ancora,
Bologna, C. Galleri; Pane al pane: riassunto d'una situazione, Bologna,
Costantino Gallera; Filosofia e
Cattolicesimo: neoscolastici e archeoscolastici, sulla rivista Italia
letteraria; Alla ricerca del segreto di Hegel, Bologna, La Grafolita; Pedagogia
mussoliniana: dai discorsi del duce, Bologna, La Diana scolastica; Giuseppe
Zamboni e la sua gnoseologia pura di A. Hilckmann . Il segreto di Hegel di S.
Contri, Bologna, Stabilimento Tipografico Felsineo; Riassunto della mia
interpretazione di Hegel, Ivrea, ed. Criterion; La genesi fenomenologica della
logica hegeliana, Bologna, ed.Criterion; Ambrogino o della neoscolastica, dialogo
filosofico, Bologna; La soluzione del nodo centrale della filosofia della
storia, Bologna, Criterion; Complementi di storiosofia, Bologna, Criterion; Punti
di storiosofia, Bologna, Criterion; Lettera a S.S. Pio XII sulla filosofia
della storia, Bologna, Criterion; Il Reiner Begriff (=concetto puro) hegeliano
ed una recensione gesuitica, Bologna, Criterion; Dallo storicismo alla
storiosofia. Lettura prima, Verona, Albarelli; I tre chiasmi della storia del
pensiero filosofico. Inquadratura unitotale della controversia sulla
storiosofia, Milano, ed. Criterion; L'attualità del Rosmini, Domodossola, La
cartografica C. Antonioli; L'ispirazione
divina della S. Scrittura secondo l'interpretazione storiosofica, Milano,
Criterion; La sapienza di Salomone,
Milano, ed. Criterion; La riforma della metafisica, Milano, ed. Criterion; L'attualità
della filosofia medioevale. Raggiungere la forma nuova, Fiera Letteraria;
Punti di trascendenza nell'immanentismo hegeliano, alla luce della momentalità
storiosofica, Milano, Libreria Editrice Scientifico Universitaria; Il pensiero
filosofico di Rosmini, Milano, Centro di cultura religiosa; Posizioni dello
spiritualismo Cristiano: La dottrina della poieticita in un quadro rosminiano,
Domodossola, Tip. La cartografica C. Antonioli; Assiologia ed estetica,
Theorein, n. 2, 1956. 1957 Posizione dello spiritualismo cristiano. La dottrina
della poieticità, in un quadro rosminiano, Rivista rosminiana, n. 1, 1957.
Heidegger in una luce rosminiana: la favola di Igino e il sentimento
fondamentale, Domodossola, La cartografica, 1958 Missione di Milano. Chiosa
storico-filosofica, Ragguaglio, 1958 Heidegger in una luce rosminiana,
Rivista rosminiana, 1958 La coscienza infelice nella filosofia hegeliana,
Palermo, Manfredi, 1961 Husserl edito e Husserl inedito, Palermo, Manfredi,
1961 Kierkegaard: profeta laico dell'interiorità umana. Saggi di una poetica
vichiana, Milano, Il ragguaglio librario, 1962 La fenomenologia dello spirito
di G. Hegel, Rivista rosminiana, n.1, 1962. L'unità del pensiero filosofico,
Sapienza, n. 5-6, 1962 Il pluralismo filosofico nell'ambito di una concezione
cristiana, Sapienza, n. 3, 1965 In margine al centenario dantesco, Sapienza, n.
4, 1965 La negazione come principio metodologico di unificazione speculativa,
Theorein, n. 2-3, 1967 Vita e pensiero di Hegel, Rivista rosminiana, n. 1, 1967
Possibilità di un accordo tra la dottrina rosminiana del sentimento
fondamentale e le concezioni moderne sull'inconscio, Rivista
rosminiana, n. 2, 1968 Morale e religione nella Fenomenologia dello spirito di
G. Hegel, Palermo, Mori, 1968 Parallelo tra Hegel e Rosmini, Palermo, Mori,
1970 (postumo) Metafisica e storia, Palermo, Mori, 1970 (postumo). Il
sofisma di Hegel. Siro Contri a cura e con due saggi di Irene Baggio, Milano,
Jaca book, 1989 (postumo). Letteratura su Siro Contri Olgiati E., Il caso
Contri, in Rivista di Filosofia neoscolastica271, maggio-giugno 1931 Bizzarri
R., Gnoseologia e pedagogia in alcuni scrittori contemporanei, Milano, estratto
da Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica, 1932-34 Zamboni G., Lettera sulla
collaborazione e sulle coincidenze, Verona, 5 maggio 1941 Zamboni G., Il campo della
gnoseologia, il campo della storiosofia, Verona, 1948 G.R., Lo spirito delle
lingue semitiche, Aevum, Milano, gennaio, febbraio 1956. Scarlato G., La
riforma della metafisica, Idea, Roma, 5 agosto 1956 Il Merito, annuario dei
premi e dei premiati d'Italia, Siro Contri,
509, 1958 Demetrio da Crema, La questione del mondo esterno nella
filosofia di G. Zamboni, Milano, Centro di Studi Cappuccini Lombardi, 1965 Tosi
G., Ricordo del prof. S. Contri, Note mazziane, n. 1, 87, 1969 Nicolaci
G. , La propedeutica metafisica hegeliana al problema del pensare e la lettura
rosminiana di S. Contri, Theorein, Palermo, anno VI, 1969 Peretti G., S. Contri
tra gnoseologia e storiosofia, in Theorein , n. 2, 65 e ss, 1969 Peretti G., In ricordo di Siro
Contri , in L'Arena, 26 gennaio 1969 Giunta P., Punti di trascendenza in S.
Contri, in Sophia, gennaio-giugno 1972 Scalabiella S., S. Contri contestò la
teologia, in Tribuna politica, 25 marzo 1973 Marcolungo F. L., Metafisica e
Storia, in Verona Fedele, 24 novembre 1974 Peretti G., Mons. Zamboni a
cent'anni dalla nascita, Verona Fedele, 12 ottobre 1975 Dordoni A., Crociata
Italica, Fascismo e religione nella Repubblica di Salò, Milano, Sugar, 1976
Baggio I., Temi e fonti della filosofia del Contri, in Rivista rosminiana,
fasc. II, 1981 Baggio I., Contri e la Neoscolastica, in Rivista rosminiana,
fasc. II, 1983 Recensioni Redanò U., Italia che scrive, Roma, febbraio 1955.
Repetto T., Il secolo XIX, Genova, 16 marzo 1955. Peretti G., Bollettino
trimestrale Don Nicola Mazza, Verona, aprile 1955 Ciravegna M., estratto da
Nuova rivista storica, fase. I, 1955 Peretti M., Giornale di
metafisica, Genova, luglio-settembre 1955 Declou S.J., Revue
Philosophique de Louvain, 440–444,
agosto 1955 Raimondi P.,Corriere della Liguria, 19 marzo 1955 Amerio F.,
Humanitas, marzo 1956 Scarlata G., Sophia, Roma, luglio-dicembre 1965 Coccia
A., OFM. Como, estratto dalla rivista Miscellanea francescana, Roma. 60 fase. 3-4,
436–38, 1969 Peretti M., Rassegna di pedagogia, 244–47, luglio-dicembre 1971 Miscellanea
Francescana, Roma, fase. 3-4, 483–86,
1971 Agosti V., Humanitas, giugno 1972 Amerio F., Pontificio Ateneo Salesiano,
2 luglio 1972. Ferrero G., Giornale di metafisica, dicembre 1972 Note
Gaetano Peretti, In ricordo di Siro Contri, in L'Arena, Verona, 26 gennaio
19696. Francesco Olgiati, Il caso
Contri, in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica,
23, n. 3, 1931, 271-278 (archiviato
dall'originale). Siro Contri, (Circa il
volume di Croce 'La storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915'), tratto da «L'Avvenire
d'Italia»Patrimonio dell'Archivio storico Senato della Repubblica, su
patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto .
Siro Contri, L'Estetica di Benedetto Croce, tratto da «Il carroccio» (1a
parte)Patrimonio dell'Archivio storico Senato della Repubblica, su
patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto .
Siro Contri, Ricerca e dottrina, tratto da «Il Nuovo cittadino» (Circa
il volume di Zamboni 'Sistema di gnoseologia e morale')Patrimonio dell'Archivio
storico Senato della Repubblica, su patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto
. Siro Contri, Il sofisma di Hegel, 1ª ed., Jaca Book, 1989,
©1988237, 88-16-95055-2, 32350261. 2 agosto . Sina, Mario,, Studi su John Locke e su altri
pensatori cristiani agli albori del secolo dei lumi, 978-88-343-2278-9, 900470701. 23 agosto . «( in
riferimento ad Agostino Gemelli )...Certi gestiscriveva la Vanni Rovighiche gli
furono rimproverati come acquiescenza al potere politico fascista (e furono ben
pochi in confronto a quelli di molti altri) furono dettati dalla preoccupazione
di difendere la sua Università dalla minaccia di chiusura da parte del potere
politico, minaccia tutt’altro che immaginaria. E forse fu il timore di fronte
alle obiezioni di un’altra autorità, quella ecclesiastica, che gli premeva ben
più di quella politica, a indurlo ad allontanare dall’Università un uomo di
grande ingegno e di purezza adamantina: Giuseppe Zamboni, un gesto che non può
non essergli rimproverato e che lasciò anche a noi allora studenti dell’amaro
in bocca.». Alberto Soave, Azione
Cattolica. Lotta intorno alla filosofia neoscolastica, su Antonio Gramsci: I
QUADERNI DEL CARCERE, 18 settembre . 2 agosto .
Siro Contri, (Circa il volume di Croce 'La storia come pensiero e come
azione'), tratto da «Criterion»Patrimonio dell'Archivio storico Senato della
Repubblica, su patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto . Redazione, Inaugurazione ad Asti dei corsi
della Università Popolare, in La Stampa, 2 aprile 19448 (archiviato
dall'originale). «...Siro Contri Presidente dell' Istituto di Cultura
Fascista...». Siro Contri, Un grande
traduttore, tratto da «Il regime fascista» (circa Novelli)Patrimonio
dell'Archivio storico Senato della Repubblica, su
patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto .
Annarosa Dordoni, Crociata italica : fascismo e religione nella
repubblica di Salò : gennaio 1944-aprile 1945, Milano, Sugar Co. Se Edizioni,
1976. Foto di classe, su
liceoparini.edu.it. 2 agosto . «Foto di Classe al Liceo classico Giuseppe
Parini con il professor Siro Contri nel 1952». Gaetano Peretti, Siro
Contri tra gnoseologia e storiosofia, in Theorein, n. 2, 196965. Gaetano
Peretti, Mons. Zamboni a cent'anni dalla nascita, in Verona Fedele, Verona, 12
ottobre 1975. Gaetano Peretti, Maria Tu
qui...!, Verona, Copygraph, F. L. Marcolungo, Metafisica e Storia, in Verona
Fedele, 24 novembre 19746. Gaetano
Peretti, In ricordo di Siro Contri, in L'Arena, 26 gennaio 19696. Giuseppe Zamboni Gaetano Peretti Neotomismo
Gnoseologia Filosofia della storia Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Filosofia
Categorie: Accademici italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1898
1969 27 maggioFilosofi cattoliciPersonalità del cattolicesimo
CORBELLINI: Grice: “I like
Corbellini; of course he has to defend science versus what he calls – alla
Popper? – ‘pseudoscenza’ in Italy, which he calls ‘il paese della pseudoscenza’
– I thought that was Oxford!” -- Gilberto
Corbellini (Cadeo), filosofo. I sui interessi filosofichi riguardano la storia
della medicina e la bioetica. Corbellini è Professore di storia della medicina
e insegna bioetica alla Sapienza Roma, dove è anche direttore del Museo di
storia della medicinaDipartimento di medicina molecolare. Laureatosi in filosofia della scienza con una
tesi sull'epistemologia evoluzionistica di Donald Campbell, Konrad Lorenz e
Karl Popper, è dottore di ricerca in sanità pubblica. I suoi primi interessi di
studio hanno riguardato la storia e la filosofia della biologia
evoluzionistica, delle immunoscienze e delle neuroscienze, per includere poi
anche lo studio della storia della malaria e della malariologia in Italia,
delle ricadute della genetica molecolare in medicina, delle implicazioni del
pensiero evoluzionistico darwiniano per la medicina e l'evoluzione della
pedagogia medica. L'approccio storico-epistemologico
all'evoluzione del pensiero medico ha trovato una sintesi nella ricostruzione
della storia delle idee di salute e malattia e delle trasformazioni
metodologiche a cui è andata incontro la ricerca delle spiegazioni causali
delle patologie (Storia e teorie della salute e della malattia, Carocci ). La sua ricerca si è orientata anche verso
l'esame delle radici storiche e culturali delle controversie bioetiche. Nei
suoi libri, articoli e interventi pubblici difende un'idea non confessionale
della bioetica, che ha radici filosofiche in uno scetticismo morale radicale,
naturalistico e non relativista (Bioetica per perplessi. Una guida ragionata,
Mondadori con Chiara Lalli). Sulla base
delle esperienze maturate come divulgatore e commentatore di temi scientifici
nei mezzi di informazione, ha coltivato anche un interesse per la percezione
sociale della scienza e per il ruolo della cultura scientifica nella
costruzione dei valori civili della modernità. In Scienza, quindi democrazia
(Einaudi ) sostiene che l'invenzione e l'espansione del metodo scientifico
hanno consentito e favorito l'evoluzione del libero mercato e della stato di
diritto, ovvero che la scienza ha funzionano come catalizzatore nella
costruzione e manutenzione dei valori critico-cognitivi e morali che rendono
possibile il funzionamento dei sistemi liberaldemocratici. Collabora regolarmente, dal 1997, al
supplemento culturale Domenica del Sole 24 Ore. È stato per dieci anni
copresidente dell'Associazione Luca Coscioni per la Libertà di Ricerca
Scientifica, è presidente della Fondazione Antonio Ruberti, ha fondato e
codiretto la rivista di cultura scientifica “darwin” e ha fatto parte,
dimettendosi dopo un anno, del Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica. Il 7 aprile
è stato nominato direttore del Dipartimento di scienze sociali e umane,
patrimonio culturale (Dsu) del Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerca, subentrando a
Riccardo Pozzo. Libri Nel Paese della
Pseudoscienza. Perché i pregiudizi minacciano la nostra libertà. Milano,
Feltrinelli, . Cavie? Sperimentazione e diritti animali (con Chiara Lalli),
Bologna, Il Mulino, ; Tutta colpa del cervello: un'introduzione alla neuroetica
(con Elisabetta Sirgiovanni), Milano, Mondadori Università, ; Scienza, Torino,
Bollati Boringhieri, ; Dalla cura alla scienza (con Maria Conforti e Valentina
Gazzaniga), Milano, Encyclomedia Publishers, ; Scienza, quindi democrazia,
Torino, Einaudi, ; Perché gli scienziati non sono pericolosi, Milano,
Longanesi, 2009; La razionalità negata. Psichiatria e antipsichiatria in Italia
(con Giovanni Jervis), Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2008; EBM. Medicina basata
sull'evoluzione, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2007; Bi(blio)etica (con Pino Donghi e
Armando Massarenti), Torino, Einaudi, 2006; Breve storia delle idee di salute e
malattia, Roma, Carocci, 2004; Le grammatiche del vivente. Storia della
biologia e della medicina molecolare, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1999; L'evoluzione
del pensiero immunologico, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1990. Note Nominato il
nuovo direttore Dsu-Cnr | Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, su cnr.it. 20
aprile . Libro insignito del Premio
Nazionale di Divulgazione Scientifica //cnr.it/news/index/news/id/5961 e del
Premio alla Cultura Mario Tiengo da AISD (Associazione Italiana per lo Studio
del Dolore) Bioetica Epistemologia Altri
progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o
altri file su Gilberto Corbellini Opere
di Gilberto Corbellini, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Gilberto
Corbellini, . Registrazioni di Gilberto
Corbellini, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale. Scheda (al 22/10/) nel sito della Facoltà di
Farmacia e Medicina. Corso di Laurea in BiotecnologieSapienza Roma, su
biotecnologie.frm.uniroma1.it (archiviato il 22 ottobre ). «Paura degli Ogm?
Agricoltori manipolati». L'opinione del piacentino Gilberto Corbellini, docente
di bioetica alla Sapienza di Elena Salini, La cronaca di Piacenza, 27 marzo 2.
Sito "salmone.org". Per una bioetica non difensiva, di Gilberto
Corbellini, Ie Italianieuropei, 1º aprile 2003, sito
"italianieuropei.it" La puntata del settimanale di informazione
culturale di Rai Cinque "Terza Pagina" con gli interventi di Gilberto
Corbellini 12 febbraio Filosofia Medicina
Medicina Università Università Filosofo
del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloAccademici italiani del XX
secoloAccademici italiani del XXI secoloSaggisti italiani del XX secoloSaggisti
italiani Professore1958 22 febbraio CadeoAttivisti
italianiEpistemologiProfessori della SapienzaRomaStorici della medicinaStudenti
della SapienzaRoma
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