il grand tour di grice: impiegato 27/27

 

valitum: Oddly Vitters has a couple of lectures on ‘value,’ that Grice ‘ignored.’ Valitum should be contrasted from‘validum.’ ‘Valid,’ which is cognate with ‘value,’ a noun Grice loved, is used by logicians. In Grice’s generalised alethic-cum-deontic logic, ‘valid’ applies, too. ‘Valid’ is contrasted to the ‘satisfactoriness’ value that attaches directly to the utterance. ‘Valid’ applies to the reasoning, i.e. the sequence of psychological states from the premise to the conclusion. How common and insidious was the talk of a realm of ‘values’ at Oxford in the early 1930s to have Barnes attack it, and Grice defend it? ‘The realm of values’ sounds like an ordinary man’s expression, and surely Oxford never had a Wilson Chair of Metaphysical Axiology.  validum is the correct form out of Roman ‘valeor.’ Grice finds the need for the English equivalent, and plays with constructing the ‘concept’ “to be of value”! There’s also the axiologicum. The root for ‘value’ as ‘axis’ is found in Grice’s favourite book of the Republic, the First! Grice sometimes enjoys sounding pretentious and uses the definite article ‘the’ indiscriminately, just to tease Flew, his tutee, who said that talking of ‘the self’ is just ‘rubbish’. It is different with Grice’s ‘the good’ (to agathon), ‘the rational,’ (to logikon), ‘the valuable’ (valitum), and ‘the axiological’. Of course, whilesticking with ‘value,’ Grice plays with Grecian “τιμή.” Lewis and Short have ‘vălor,’ f. ‘valeo,’ which they render as ‘value,’ adding that it is supposed to translate in Gloss. Lab, Grecian ‘τιμή.’ ‘valor, τιμή, Gloss. Lab.’ ‘Valere,’ which of course algo gives English ‘valid,’ that Grice overuses, is said by Lewis and Short to be cognate with “vis,” “robur,” “fortissimus,” cf. debilis” and they render as “to be strong.” So one has to be careful here. “Axiology” is a German thing, and not used at Clifton or Oxford, where they stick with ‘virtus’ or ‘arete.’ This or that Graeco-Roman philosopher may have explored a generic approach to ‘value.’ Grice somewhat dismisses Hare who in Language of Morals very clearly distinguishes between deontic ‘ought’ and teleological, value-judgemental ‘good.’ For ‘good’ may have an aesthetic use: ‘that painting is good,’ the food is good). The sexist ‘virtus’ of the Romans perhaps did a disservice to Grecian ‘arete,’ but Grice hardly uses ‘arete,’ himself. It is etymologically unrelated to ‘agathon,’ yet rumour has it that ‘arete,’ qua ‘excellence,’ is ‘aristos,’ the superlative of ‘agathon.’ Since Aristotle is into the ‘mesotes,’ Grice worries not. Liddell and Scott have “ἀρετή” and render it simpliciter as “goodness, excellence, of any kind,” adding that “in Hom. esp. of manly qualities”: “ποδῶν ἀρετὴν ἀναφαίνων;” “ἀμείνων παντοίας ἀρετὰς ἠμὲν πόδας ἠδὲ μάχεσθαι καὶ νόον;” so of the gods, “τῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀ. τιμή τε βίη τε;” also of women, “ἀ. εἵνεκα for valour,” “ἀ. ἀπεδείκνυντο,” “displayed brave deeds.”  But when Liddell and Scott give the philosophical references (Plathegel and Ariskant), they do render “ἀρετή,” as ‘value,’ generally, excellence, “ἡ ἀ. τελείωσίς τις” Arist. Met. 1021b20, cf. EN1106a15, etc.; of persons, “ἄνδρα πὺξ ἀρετὰν εὑρόντα,” “τὸ φρονεῖν ἀ. μεγίστη,” “forms of excellence, “μυρίαι ἀνδρῶν ἀ.;” “δικαστοῦ αὕτη ἀ.;” esp. moral virtue, o “κακία,” good nature, kindness, etc. We should not be so concerned about this, were not for the fact that Grice explored Foot, not just on meta-ethics as a ‘suppositional’ imperratives, but  on ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ by Foot, who had edited a reader in meta-ethics for the series of Grice’s friend, Warnock. Grice knows that when he hears the phrases value system, or belief system, he is conversing with a relativist. So he plays jocular here. If a value is not a concept, a value system at least is not what Davidson calls a conceptual scheme. However, in “The conception of value” (henceforth, “Conception”) Grice does argue that value IS a concept, and thus part of the conceptual scheme by Quine. Hilary Putnam congratulates Grice on this in “Fact and value,” crediting Bakeri. e. Judyinto the bargain. While utilitarianism, as exemplified by Bentham, denies that a moral intuition need be taken literally, Bentham assumes the axiological conceptual scheme of hedonistic eudaemonism, with eudaemonia as the maximal value (summum bonum) understood as hedone. The idea of a system of values (cf. system of ends) is meant to unify the goals of the agent in terms of the pursuit of eudæmonia. Grice wants to disgress from naturalism, and the distinction between a description and anything else. Consider the use of ‘rational’ as applied to ‘value.’ A naturalist holds that ‘rational’ can be legitimately apply to the ‘doxastic’ realm, not to the ‘buletic’ realm. A desire (or a ‘value’) a naturalist would say is not something of which ‘rational’ is predicable. Suppose, Grice says, I meet a philosopher who is in the habit of pushing pins into other philosophers. Grice asks the philosopher why he does this. The philosopher says that it gives him pleasure. Grice asks him whether it is the fact that he causes pain that gives him pleasure. The philosopher replies that he does not mind whether he causes pain. What gives him pleasure is the physical sensation of driving a pin into a philosopher’s body. Grice asks him whether he is aware that his actions cause pain. The philosopher says that he is. Grice asks him whether he would not feel pain if others did this to him. The philosopher agrees that he would. I ask him whether he would allow this to happen. He says that he guesses he would seek to prevent it. Grice asks him whether he does not think that others must feel pain when he drives pins into them, and whether he should not do to others what he would try to prevent them from doing to him. The philosopher says that pins driven into him cause him pain and he wishes to prevent this. Pins driven by him into others do not cause him pain, but pleasure, and he therefore wishes to do it. Grice asks him whether the fact that he causes pain to other philosophers does not seem to him to be relevant to the issue of whether it is rationally undesirable to drive pins into people. He says that he does not see what possible difference can pain caused to others, or the absence of it, make to the desirability of deriving pleasure in the way that he does. Grice asks him what it is that gives him pleasure in this particular activity. The philosopher replies that he likes driving pins into a philosopher’s resilient body. Grice asks whether he would derive equal pleasure from driving pins into a tennis ball. The philosopher says that he would derive equal pleasure, that into what he drives his pins, a philosopher or a tennis ball, makes no difference to himthe pleasure is similar, and he is quite prepared to have a tennis ball substituted, but what possible difference can it make whether his pins perforate living men or tennis balls? At this point, Grice begins to suspect that the philosopher is evil. Grice does not feel like agreeing with a naturalist, who reasons that the pin-pushing philosopher is a philosopher with a very different scale of moral values from Grice, that a value not being susceptible to argument, Grice may disagree but not reason with the pin-pushing philosopher. Grice rather sees the pin-pushing philosopher beyond the reach of communication from the world occupied by him. Communication is as unattainable as it is with a philosopher who that he is a doorknob, as in the story by Hoffman. A value enters into the essence of what constitutes a person. The pursuit of a rational end is part of the essence of a person. Grice does not claim any originality for his position (which much to Ariskant), only validity. The implicaturum by Grice is that rationalism and axiology are incompatible, and he wants to cancel that. So the keyword here is rationalistic axiology, in the neo-Kantian continental vein, with a vengeance. Grice arrives at value (validitum, optimum, deeming) via Peirce on meaning. And then there is the truth “value,” a German loan-translation (as value judgment, Werturteil). The sorry story of deontic logic, Grice says, faces Jørgensens dilemma. The dilemma by Jørgensens is best seen as a trilemma, Grice says; viz. Reasoning requires that premise and conclusion have what Boole, Peirce, and Frege call a “truth” value. An imperative dos not have a “truth” value. There may be a reasoning with an imperative as premise or conclusion. A philosopher can reject the first horn and provide an inference mechanism on elementsthe input of the premise and the output of the conclusion -- which are not presupposed to have a “truth” value. A philosopher can reject the second horn and restrict ‘satisfactory’ value to a doxastic embedding a buletic (“He judges he wills…”). A philosopher can reject the third horn, and refuse to explore the desideratum. Grice generalizes over value as the mode-neutral ‘satisfactory.’ Both ‘p’ and “!p” may be satisfactory. ‘.p’ has doxastic value (0/1); ‘!p’ has buletic value  (0/1). The mode marker of the utterance guides the addresse you as to how to read ‘satisfactory.’ Grice’s ‘satisfactory’ is a variation on a theme by Hofstadter and McKinsey, who elaborate a syntax for the imperative mode, using satisfaction. They refer to what they call the ‘satisfaction-function’ of a fiat. A fiat is ‘satisfied’ (as The door is closed may also be said to be satisfied iff the door is closed) iff what is commanded is the case. The fiat ‘Let the door be closed’ is satisfied if the door is closed. An unary or dyadic operator becomes a satisfaction-functor. As Grice puts it, an inferential rule, which flat rationality is the capacity to apply, is not arbitrary. The inferential rule picks out a transition of acceptance in which transmission of ‘satisfactory’ is guaranteed or expected. As Grice notes, since mode marker indicate the species ‘satisfactory’ does. He imports into the object-language ‘It is satisfactory-d/p that’ just in case psi-d/b-p is satisfactory. Alla Tarski, Grice introduces ‘It is acceptable that’: It is acceptable that psi-d/b-p is satisfactory-b/d just in case ‘psi-d/b-p is satisfactory-d/b’ is satisfactory-b/d. Grice goes on to provide a generic value-assignment for satisfactoriness-functors. For coordinators: “φ Λ ψ” is 1-b/d just in case φ is 1-b/d and ψ is 1-b/d. “φ ν ψ”  is 1-b/d just in case one of the pair, φ and ψ, is 1-b/d. For subordinator: “φ⊃ψ” is 1-b/d just in case either φ is 0-b/d or ψ is 0-b/d. There are, however, a number of points to be made. It is not fully clear to Grice just how strong the motivation is for assigning a value to a mode-neutral, generic functor. Also he is assuming symmetry, leaving room for a functor is introduced if a restriction is imposed. Consider a bi-modal utterance. “The beast is filthy and do not touch it” and “The beast is filthy and I shall not touch it” seem all right. The commutated “Do not touch the beast and it is filthy” is dubious. “Touch the beast and it will bite you,” while idiomatic is hardly an imperative, since ‘and’ is hardly a conjunction. “Smith is taking a bath or leave the bath-room door open” is intelligible. The commutated “Leave the bath-room door open or Smith is taking a bath” is less so. In a bi-modal utterance, Grice makes a case for the buletic to be dominant over the doxastic. The crunch comes, however, with one of the four possible unary satisfactoriness-functors, especially with regard to the equivalence of  “~psi-b/d-p” and “psi-b/d-~p). Consider “Let it be that I now put my hand on my head” or  “Let it be that my bicycle faces north” in which neither seems to be either satisfactory or unsatisfactory. And it is a trick to assign a satisfactory value to “~psi-b/d-p” and “~psi-b/d~p.” Do we proscribe this or that form altogether, for every cases? But that would seem to be a pity, since ~!~p seems to be quite promising as a representation for you may (permissive) do alpha that satisfies p; i.e., the utterer explicitly conveys his refusal to prohibit his addressee A doing alpha. Do we disallow embedding of (or iterating) this or that form? But that (again if we use ~!p and ~!~p  to represent may) seems too restrictive. Again, if !p is neither buletically satisfactory nor buletically unsatisfactory (U could care less) do we assign a value other than 1 or 0 to !p (desideratively neuter, 0.5). Or do we say, echoing Quine, that we have a buletically satisfactoriness value gap? These and other such problems would require careful consideration. Yet Grice cannot see that those problems would prove insoluble, any more than this or that analogous problem connected with Strawsons presupposition (Dont arrest the intruder!) are insoluble. In Strawsons case, the difficulty is not so much to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present themselves. Grice takes up the topic of a calculus in connection with the introduction rule and the elimination rule of a modal such as must. We might hope to find, for each member of a certain family of modalities, an introduction rule and an elimination rule which would be analogous to the rules available for classical logical constants. Suggestions are not hard to come by. Let us suppose that we are seeking to provide such a pair of rules for the particular modality of necessity □. For (□,+) Grice considers the following (Grice thinks equivalent) forms: if φ is demonstrable, □φ is demonstrable. Provided φ is dependent on no assumptions, derive φ from □φ. For  (□,-), Grice considers From □φ derive φ. It is to be understood, of course, that the values of the syntactical variable φ would contain either a buletic or a doxastic mode markers. Both !p and .p would be proper substitutes for φ but p would not. Grice wonders: [W]hat should be said of Takeuti’s conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in P’s personalised system that φ, it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ is doxastically satisfactory/establishable. The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ, one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble. For such a rule is not acceptable. φ will be a buletic expression such as Let it be that Smith eats his hat. And my commitment to the idea that Smiths system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting volitively Let Smith eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary, with respect to X, that let X eat his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier. For this person-relativised version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope.  Grice, following Mackie, uses absolutism, as opposed to relativism, which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions (but cf. Hare on Subjectsivism). Grice is concerned with the absence of a thorough discussion of value by English philosophers, other than Hare (and he is only responding to Mackie!). Continental philosophers, by comparison, have a special discipline, axiology, for it! Similarly, a continental-oriented tradition Grice finds in The New World in philosophers of a pragmatist bent, such as Carus. Grice wants to say that rationality is a value, because it is a faculty that a creature (human) displays to adapt and survive to his changing environments. The implicaturum of the title is that values have been considered in the English philosophical tradition, almost alla Nietzsche, to belong to the realm irrational. Grice grants that axiological implicaturum rests on a PRE-rational propension. While Grice could play with “the good” in the New World, as a Lit. Hum. he knew he had to be slightly more serious. The good is one of the values, but what is valuing? Would the New Worlders understand valuing unattached to the pragmatism that defines them? Grice starts by invoking Hume on his bright side: the concept of value, versus the conception of value. Or rather, how the concept of value derives from the conception of value. A distinction that would even please Aquinas (conceptum/conceptio), and the Humeian routine. Some background for his third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what Mackie means when he says that a value is ultimately Subjectsive. What about inter-Subjectsive, and constructively objective? Grice constructs absolute value out of relative value. But once a rational pirot P (henceforth, PGrice liked how it sounded like Locke’s parrot) constructs value, the P assigns absolute status to rationality qua value. The P cannot then choose not to be rational at the risk of ceasing to exist (qua person, or essentially rationally human agent). A human, as opposed to a person, assigns relative value to his rationality. A human is accidentally rational. A person is necessarily so. A distinction seldom made by Aristotle and some of his dumbest followers obsessed with the modal-free adage, Homo rationale animal. Short and Lewis have “hūmānus” (old form: hemona humana et hemonem hominem dicebant, Paul. ex Fest. p. 100 Müll.; cf. homo I.init.), adj., f. “homo,” and which they render as “of or belonging to man, human.” Grice also considers the etymology of ‘person.’ Lewis and Short have ‘persōna,’  according to Gabius Bassus ap. Gell. 5, 7, 1 sq., f. ‘persŏno,’ “to sound through, with the second syllable lengthened.’ Falsa est (finitio), si dicas, Equus est animal rationale: nam est equus animal, sed irrationale, Quint.7,3,24:homo est animal rationale; “nec si mutis finis voluptas, rationalibus quoque: quin immo ex contrario, quia mutis, ideo non rationalibus;” “a rationali ad rationale;” “τὸ λογικόν ζῷον,” ChrysiStoic.3.95; ἀρεταὶ λ., = διανοητικαί, oἠθικαί, Arist. EN1108b9; “λογικός, ή, όν, (λόγος), ζῶον λόγον ἔχον NE, 1098a3-5. λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων, man alone of all animals possesses speech, from the Politics. Grice takes the stratification of values by Hartmann much more seriously than Barnes. Grice plays with rational motivation. He means it seriously. The motivation is the psychological bite, but since it is qualified by rational, it corresponds to the higher more powerful bit of the soul, the rational soul. There are, for Grice, the Grecians, Kantotle and Plathegel, three souls: the vegetal, the animal, and the rational. As a matter of history, Grice reaches value (in its guises of optimum and deeming) via his analysis of meaning by Peirce. Many notions are value-paradeigmatic. The most important of all philosophical notions that of rationality, presupposes objective value as one of its motivations. For Grice, ratio can be understood cognoscendi but also essendi, indeed volendi and fiendi, too. Rational motivation involves a ratio cognoscendi and a ratio volendi; objective, “objectum,” and “objectus,” ūs, m. f. “obicio,” rendered as “a casting before, a putting against, in the way, or opposite, an opposing; or, neutr., a lying before or opposite (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose): dare objectum parmaï, the opposing of the shield” “vestis;” “insula portum efficit objectu laterum,” “by the opposition,” “cum terga flumine, latera objectu paludis tegerentur;” “molis;” “regiones, quæ Tauri montis objectu separantur;” “solem interventu lunæ occultari, lunamque terræ objectu, the interposition,” “eademque terra objectu suo umbram noctemque efficiat;” “al. objecta soli: hi molium objectus (i. e. moles objectas) scandere, the projection,” transf., that which presents itself to the sight, an object, appearance, sight, spectacle;” al. objecto;  and if not categoric. This is analogous to the overuse by Grice of psychoLOGICAL when he just means souly. It is perhaps his use of psychological for souly that leads to take any souly concept as a theoretical concept within a folksy psychoLOGICAL theory. Grice considered the stratification of values, alla Hartmann, unlike Barnes, who dismissed him in five minutes. “Some like Philippa Foot, but Hare is MY man,” Grice would say. “Virtue” ethics was becoming all the fashion, especially around Somerville. Hare was getting irritated by the worse offender, his Anglo-Welsh tutee, originally with a degree from the other place, Williams. Enough for Grice to want to lecture on value, and using Carus as an excuse! Mackie was what Oxonians called a colonial, and a clever one! In fact, Grice quotes from Hares contribution to a volume on Mackie. Hares and Mackies backgrounds could not be more different. Like Grice, Hare was a Lit. Hum., and like Grice, Hare loves the Grundlegung. But unlike Grice and Barnes, Hare would have nothing to say about Stevenson. Philosophers in the play group of Grice never took the critique by Ayer of emotivism seriously. Stevenson is the thing. V. Urmson on the emotive theory of ethics, tracing it to English philosphers like Ogden, Barnes, and Duncan-Jones. Barnes was opposing both Prichard (who was the Whites professor of moral philosophyand more of an interest than Moore is, seeing that Prichard is Barness tutor at Corpus) and Hartmann. Ryle would have nothing to do with Hartmann, but these were the days before Ryle took over Oxford, and forbade any reference to a continental philosopher, even worse if a “Hun.” Grice reaches the notion of value through that of meaning. If Peirce is simplistic, Grice is not. But his ultra-sophisticated analysis ends up being deemed to hold in this or that utterer. And deeming is valuing, as is optimum. While Grice rarely used axiology, he should! A set of three lectures, which are individually identified below. I love Carus! Grice was undecided as to what his Carus lectures were be on. Grice explores meaning under its value optimality guise in Meaning revisited. Grice thinks that a value-paradeigmatic notion allows him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible vicious circle in his approach to semantic and psychological notions. The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the construction, alla Hume, of a value-paradeigmatic notion in general, and value itself. Grice starts by quoting Austin, Hare, and Mackie, of Oxford. The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a philosophical general audience. Most of the second lecture is a subtle exploration by Grice of the categorical imperative of Kant, with which he had struggled in the last Locke lecture in “Aspects,” notably the reduction of the categorical imperative to this or that counsel of prudence with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at eudæmonia. The Carus Lectures are three: on objectivity and value, on relative and absolute value, and on metaphysics and value. The first lecture, on objectivity and value, is a review Inventing right and wrong by Mackie, quoting Hare’s antipathy for a value being ‘objective’. The second lecture, on relative and absolute value, is an exploration on the categorical imperative, and its connection with a prior hypothetical or suppositional imperative. The third lecture, on metaphycis and value, is an eschatological defence of absolute value. The collective citation should be identified by each lecture separately. This is a metaphysical defence by Grice of absolute value. The topic fascinates Grice, and he invents a few routines to cope with it. Humeian projection rationally reconstructs the intuitive concept being of value. Category shift allows to put a value such as the disinterestedness by Smith in grammatical subject position, thus avoiding to answer that the disinterestedness of Smith is in the next room, since it is not the spatio-temporal continuan prote ousia that Smith is. But the most important routine is that of trans-substantatio, or metousiosis. A human reconstructs as a rational personal being, and alla Kantotle, whatever he judges is therefore of absolute value. The issue involves for Grice the introduction of a telos qua aition, causa finalis (final cause), role, or métier. The final cause of a tiger is to tigerise, the final cause of a reasoner is to reason, the final cause of a person is to personise. And this entails absolute value, now metaphysically defended. The justification involves the ideas of end-setting, unweighed rationality, autonomy, and freedom. In something like a shopping list that Grice provides for issues on free. Attention to freedom calls for formidably difficult undertakings including the search for a justification for the adoption or abandonment of an ultimate end. The point is to secure that freedom does not dissolve into compulsion or chance. Grice proposes four items for this shopping list. A first point is that full action calls for strong freedom. Here one has to be careful that since Grice abides by what he calls the Modified Occams Razor in the third James lecture on Some remarks about logic and conversation, he would not like to think of this two (strong freedom and weak freedom) as being different senses of free. Again, his calls for is best understood as presupposes. It may connect with, say, Kanes full-blown examples of decisions in practical settings that call for or presuppose libertarianism. A second point is that the buletic-doxastic justification of action has to accomodate for the fact that we need freedom which is strong. Strong or serious autonomy or freedom ensures that this or that action is represented as directed to this or that end E which are is not merely the agents, but which is also freely or autonomously adopted or pursued by the agent. Grice discusses the case of the gym instructor commanding, Raise your left arm! The serious point then involves this free adoption or free pursuit. Note Grices use of this or that personal-identity pronoun: not merely mine, i.e. not merely the agents, but in privileged-access position. This connects with what Aristotle says of action as being up to me, and Kant’s idea of the transcendental ego. An end is the agents in that the agent adopts it with liberum arbitrium. This or that ground-level desire may be circumstantial. A weak autonomy or freedom satisfactorily accounts for this or that action as directed to an end which is mine. However, a strong autonomy or freedom, and a strong autonomy or freedom only, accounts for this or that action as directed to an end which is mine, but, unlike, say, some ground-level circumstantial desire which may have sprung out of some circumstantial adaptability to a given scenario, is, first, autonomously or freely adopted by the agent, and, second, autonomously or freely pursued by the agent. The use of the disjunctive particle or in the above is of some interest. An agent may autonomously or freely adopt an end, yet not care to pursue it autonomously or freely, even in this strong connotation that autonomous or free sometimes has. A further point relates to causal indeterminacy. Any attempt to remedy this situation by resorting to causal indeterminacy or chance will only infuriate the scientist without aiding the philosopher. This remark by Grice has to be understood casually. For, as it can be shown, this or that scientist may well have resorted to precisely that introduction and in any case have not self-infuriated. The professional tag that is connoted by philosopher should also be seen as best implicated than entailed. A scientist who does resort to the introduction of causal indeterminacy may be eo ipso be putting forward a serious consideration regarding ethics or meta-ethics. In other words, a cursory examination of the views of a scientist like Eddington, beloved by Grice, or this or that moral philosopher like Kane should be born in mind when considering this third point by Grice. The reference by Grice to chance, random, and causal indeterminacy, should best be understood vis-à-vis Aristotles emphasis on tykhe, fatum, to the effect that this or that event may just happen just by accident, which may well open a can of worms for the naive Griceian, but surely not the sophisticated one (cf. his remarks on accidentally, in Prolegomena). A further item in Grices shopping list involves the idea of autonomous or free as a value, or optimum. The specific character of what Grice has as  strong autonomy or freedom may well turn out to consist, Grice hopes, in the idea of this or that action as the outcome of a certain kind of strong valuation  ‒ where this would include the rational selection, as per e.g. rational-decision theory, of this or that ultimate end. What Grice elsewhere calls out-weighed or extrinsically weighed rationality, where rational includes the buletic, of the end and not the means to it. This or that full human action calls for the presence of this or that reason, which require that this or that full human action for which this or that reason accounts should be the outcome of a strong rational valuation. Like a more constructivist approach, this line suggests that this or that action may require, besides strong autonomy or freedom, now also strong valuation. Grice sets to consider how to adapt the buletic-doxastic soul progression to reach these goals. In the case of this or that ultimate end E, justification should be thought of as lying, directly, at least, in this or that outcome, not on the actual phenomenal fulfilment of this or that end, but rather of the, perhaps noumenal, presence qua end. Grice relates to Kants views on the benevolentia or goodwill and malevolentia, or evil will, or illwill. Considers Smiths action of giving Jones a job. Smith may be deemed to have given Jones a job, whether or not Jones actually gets the job. It is Smiths benevolentia, or goodwill, not his beneficentia, that matters. Hence in Short and Lewis, we have “bĕnĕfĭcentĭa,” f. “beneficus,” like “magnificentia” f. magnificus, and “munificentia” f. munificus; Cicero, Off. 1, 7, 20, and which they thus render as “the quality of beneficus, kindness, beneficence, an honorable and kind treatment of others” (omaleficentia, Lact. Ira Dei, 1, 1; several times in the philos. writings of Cicero. Elsewhere rare: quid praestantius bonitate et beneficentiā?” “beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet,” “comitas ac beneficentia,” “uti beneficentiā adversus supplices,”“beneficentia augebat ornabatque subjectsos.” In a more general fashion then, it is the mere presence of an end qua end of a given action that provides the justification of the end, and not its phenomenal satisfaction or fulfilment. Furthermore, the agents having such and such an end, E1, or such and such a combination of ends, E1 and E2, would be justified by showing that the agents having this end exhibits some desirable feature, such as this or that combo being harmonious. For how can one combine ones desire to smoke with ones desire to lead a healthy life? Harmony is one of the six requirements by Grice for an application of happy to the life of Smith. The buletic-doxastic souly ascription is back in business at a higher level. The suggestion would involve an appeal, in the justification of this or that end, to this or that higher-order end which would be realised by having this or that lower, or first-order end of a certain sort. Such valuation of this or that lower-order end lies within reach of a buletic-doxastic souly ascription. Grice has an important caveat at this point. This or that higher-order end involved in the defense would itself stand in need of justification, and the regress might well turn out to be vicious. One is reminded of Watson’s requirement for a thing like freedom or personal identity to overcome this or that alleged counterexample to freewill provided by H. Frankfurt. It is after the laying of a shopping list, as it were, and considerations such as those above that Grice concludes his reflection with a defense of a noumenon, complete with the inner conflict that it brings. Attention to the idea of autonomous and free leads the philosopher to the need to resolve if not dissolve the most important unsolved problem of philosophy, viz. how an agent can be, at the same time, a member of both the phenomenal world and the noumenal world, or, to settle the internal conflict between one part of our rational nature, the doxastic, even scientific, part which seems to call for the universal reign of a deterministic law and the other buletic part which insists that not merely moral responsibility but every variety of rational belief demands exemption from just such a reign. In this lecture, Grice explores freedom and value from a privileged-access incorrigible perspective rather than the creature construction genitorial justification. Axiologyv. axiological.  Valitum -- Fact-value distinction, the apparently fundamental difference between how things are and how they should be. That people obey the law or act honestly or desire money is one thing; that they should is quite another. The first is a matter of fact, the second a matter of value. Hume is usually credited with drawing the distinction when he noticed that one cannot uncontroversially infer an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ the isought gap. From the fact, say, that an action would maximize overall happiness, we cannot legitimately infer that it ought to be done  without the introduction of some so far suppressed evaluative premise. We could secure the inference by assuming that one ought always to do what maximizes overall happiness. But that assumption is evidently evaluative. And any other premise that might link the non-evaluative premises to an evaluative conclusion would look equally evaluative. No matter how detailed and extensive the non-evaluative premises, it seems no evaluative conclusion follows directly and as a matter of logic. Some have replied that at least a few non-evaluative claims do entail evaluative ones. To take one popular example, from the fact that some promise was made, we might it appears legitimately infer that it ought to be kept, other things equal  and this without the introduction of an evaluative premise. Yet many argue that the inference fails, or that the premise is actually evaluative, or that the conclusion is not. Hume himself was both bold and brief about the gap’s significance, claiming simply that paying attention to it “wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason” Treatise of Human Nature. Others have been more expansive. Moore, for instance, in effect relied upon the gap to establish via the open question argument that any attempt to define evaluative terms using non-evaluative ones would commit the naturalistic fallacy. Moore’s main target was the suggestion that ‘good’ means “pleasant” and the fallacy, in this context, is supposed to be misidentifying an evaluative property, being good, with a natural property, being pleasant. Assuming that evaluative terms have meaning, Moore held that some could be defined using others he thought, e.g., that ‘right’ could be defined as “productive of the greatest possible good” and that the rest, though meaningful, must be indefinable terms denoting simple, non-natural, properties. Accepting Moore’s use of the open question argument but rejecting both his non-naturalism and his assumption that evaluative terms must have descriptive meaning, emotivists and prescriptivists e.g. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, and Hare argued that evaluative terms have a role in language other than to denote properties. According to them, the primary role of evaluative language is not to describe, but to prescribe. The logical gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, they argue, establishes both the difference between fact and value and the difference between describing how things are and recommending how they might be. Some naturalists, though, acknowledge the gap and yet maintain that the evaluative claims nonetheless do refer to natural properties. In the process they deny the ontological force of the open question argument and 302 F   302 treat evaluative claims as describing a special class of facts.  Refs.: The main source is The construction of value, the Carus lectures, Clarendon. But there are scattered essays on value and valuing in the Grice Papers. H. P. Grice, “Objectivity and value,” s. V, c. 8-f. 18, “The rational motivation for objective value,” s. V, c. 8-f. 19, “Value,” s. V, c. 9-f. 20; “Value, metaphysics, and teleology,” s. V, c. 9-f. 23, “Values, morals, absolutes, and the metaphysical,” s. V., c. 9-f.  24; “Value sub-systems and the Kantian problem,” s. V. c. 9-ff. 25-27; “Values and rationalism,” s. V, c. 9-f. 28; while the Carus are in the second series, in five folders, s. II, c-2, ff. 12-16, the H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. value, the worth of something. Philosophers have discerned these main forms: intrinsic, instrumental, inherent, and relational value. Intrinsic value may be taken as basic and many of the others defined in terms of it. Among the many attempts to explicate the concept of intrinsic value, some deal primarily with the source of value, while others employ the concept of the “fittingness” or “appropriateness” to it of certain kinds of emotions and desires. The first is favored by Moore and the second by Brentano. Proponents of the first view hold that the intrinsic value of X is the value that X has solely in virtue of its intrinsic nature. Thus, the state of affairs, Smith’s experiencing pleasure, has intrinsic value provided it has value solely in virtue of its intrinsic nature. Followers of the second approach explicate intrinsic value in terms of the sorts of emotions and desires appropriate to a thing “in and for itself” or “for its own sake”. Thus, one might say X has intrinsic value or is intrinsically good if and only if X is worthy of desire in and for itself, or, alternatively, it is fitting or appropriate for anyone to favor X in and for itself. Thus, the state of affairs of Smith’s experiencing pleasure is intrinsically valuable provided that state of affairs is worthy of desire for its own sake, or it is fitting for anyone to favor that state of affairs in and for itself. Concerning the other forms of value, we may say that X has instrumental value if and only if it is a means to, or causally contributes to, something that is intrinsically valuable. If Smith’s experiencing pleasure is intrinsically valuable and his taking a warm bath is a means to, or Valentinus value 948   948 causally contributes to, his being pleased, then his taking a warm bath is instrumentally valuable or “valuable as a means.” Similarly, if health is intrinsically valuable and exercise is a means to health, then exercise is instrumentally valuable. X has inherent value if and only if the experience, awareness, or contemplation of X is intrinsically valuable. If the experience of a beautiful sunset is intrinsically valuable, then the beautiful sunset has inherent value. X has contributory value if and only if X contributes to the value of some whole, W, of which it is a part. If W is a whole that consists of the facts that Smith is pleased and Brown is pleased, then the fact that Smith is pleased contributes to the value of W, and Smith’s being pleased has contributory value. Our example illustrates that something can have contributory value without having instrumental value, for the fact that Smith is pleased is not a means to W and, strictly speaking, it does not bring about or causally contribute to W. Given the distinction between instrumental and contributory value, we may say that certain sorts of experiences and activities can have contributory value if they are part of an intrinsically valuable life and contribute to its value, even though they are not means to it. Finally, we may say that X has relational value if and only if X has value in virtue of bearing some relation to something else. Instrumental, inherent, and contributory value may be construed as forms of relational value. But there are other forms of relational value one might accept, e.g. one might hold that X is valuable for S in virtue of being desired by S or being such that S would desire X were S “fully informed” and “rational.” Some philosophers defend the organicity of intrinsic value. Moore, for example, held that the intrinsic value of a whole is not necessarily equal to the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. According to this view, the presence of an intrinsically good part might lower the intrinsic value of a whole of which it is a part and the presence of an intrinsically bad part might raise the intrinsic value of a whole to which it belongs. Defenders of organicity sometimes point to examples of Mitfreude taking joy or pleasure in another’s joy and Schadenfreude taking joy or pleasure in another’s suffering to illustrate their view. Suppose Jones believes incorrectly that Smith is happy and Brown believes incorrectly that Gray is suffering, but Jones is pleased that Smith is happy and Brown is pleased that Gray is suffering. The former instance of Mitfreude seems intrinsically better than the latter instance of Schadenfreude even though they are both instances of pleasure and neither whole has an intrinsically bad part. The value of each whole is not a “mere sum” of the values of its parts.  Valitum -- axiology: value theory, also called axiology, the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of value and with what kinds of things have value. Construed very broadly, value theory is concerned with all forms of value, such as the aesthetic values of beauty and ugliness, the ethical values of right, wrong, obligation, virtue, and vice, and the epistemic values of justification and lack of justification. Understood more narrowly, value theory is concerned with what is intrinsically valuable or ultimately worthwhile and desirable for its own sake and with the related concepts of instrumental, inherent, and contributive value. When construed very broadly, the study of ethics may be taken as a branch of value theory, but understood more narrowly value theory may be taken as a branch of ethics. In its more narrow form, one of the chief questions of the theory of value is, What is desirable for its own sake? One traditional sort of answer is hedonism. Hedonism is roughly the view that i the only intrinsically good experiences or states of affairs are those containing pleasure, and the only instrinsically bad experiences or states of affairs are those containing pain; ii all experiences or states of affairs that contain more pleasure than pain are intrinsically good and all experiences or states of affairs that contain more pain than pleasure are intrinsically bad; and iii any experience or state of affairs that is intrinsically good is so in virtue of being pleasant or containing pleasure and any experience or state of affairs that is intrinsically bad is so in virtue of being painful or involving pain. Hedonism has been defended by philosophers such as Epicurus, Bentham, Sidgwick, and, with significant qualifications, J. S. Mill. Other philosophers, such as C. I. Lewis, and, perhaps, Brand Blanshard, have held that what is intrinsically or ultimately desirable are experiences that exhibit “satisfactoriness,” where being pleasant is but one form of being satisfying. Other philosophers have recognized a plurality of things other than pleasure or satisfaction as having intrinsic value. Among the value pluralists are Moore, Rashdall, Ross, Brentano, Hartmann, and Scheler. In addition to certain kinds of pleasures, these thinkers count some or all of the following as intrinsically good: consciousness and the flourishing of life, knowledge and insight, moral virtue and virtuous actions, friendship and mutual affection, beauty and aesthetic experience, a just distribution of goods, and self-expression. Many, if not all, of the philosophers mentioned above distinguish between what has value or is desirable for its own sake and what is instrumentally valuable. Furthermore, they hold that what is desirable for its own sake or intrinsically good has a value not dependent on anyone’s having an interest in it. Both of these claims have been challenged by other value theorists. Dewey, for example, criticizes any sharp distinction between what is intrinsically good or good as an end and what is good as a means on the ground that we adopt and abandon ends to the extent that they serve as means to the resolution of conflicting impulses and desires. Perry denies that anything can have value without being an object of interest. Indeed, Perry claims that ‘X is valuable’ means ‘Interest is taken in X’ and that it is a subject’s interest in a thing that confers value on it. Insofar as he holds that the value of a thing is dependent upon a subject’s interest in that thing, Perry’s value theory is a subjective theory and contrasts sharply with objective theories holding that some things have value not dependent on a subject’s interests or attitudes. Some philosophers, dissatisfied with the view that value depends on a subject’s actual interests and theories, have proposed various alternatives, including theories holding that the value of a thing depends on what a subject would desire or have an interest in if he were fully rational or if desires were based on full information. Such theories may be called “counterfactual” desire theories since they take value to be dependent, not upon a subject’s actual interests, but upon what a subject would desire if certain conditions, which do not obtain, were to obtain. Value theory is also concerned with the nature of value. Some philosophers have denied that sentences of the forms ‘X is good’ or ‘X is intrinsically good’ are, strictly speaking, either true or false. As with other forms of ethical discourse, they claim that anyone who utters these sentences is either expressing his emotional attitudes or else prescribing or commending something. Other philosophers hold that such sentences can express what is true or false, but disagree about the nature of value and the meaning of value terms like ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘better’. Some philosophers, such as Moore, hold that in a truth of the form ‘X is intrinsically good’, ‘good’ refers to a simple, unanalyzable, non-natural property, a property not identical with or analyzable by any “natural” property such as being pleasant or being desired. Moore’s view is one form of non-naturalism. Other philosophers, such as Brentano, hold that ‘good’ is a syncategorematic expression; as such it does not refer to a property or relation at all, though it contributes to the meaning of the sentence. Still other philosophers have held that ‘X is good’ and ‘X is intrinsically good’ can be analyzed in natural or non-ethical terms. This sort of naturalism about value is illustrated by Perry, who holds that ‘X is valuable’ means ‘X is an object of interest’. The history of value theory is full of other attempted naturalistic analyses, some of which identify or analyze ‘good’ in terms of pleasure or being the object of rational desire. Many philosophers argue that naturalism is preferable on epistemic grounds. If, e.g., ‘X is valuable’ just means ‘X is an object of interest’, then in order to know whether something is valuable, one need only know whether it is the object of someone’s interest. Our knowledge of value is fundamentally no different in kind from our knowledge of any other empirical fact. This argument, however, is not decisive against non-naturalism, since it is not obvious that there is no synthetic a priori knowledge of the sort Moore takes as the fundamental value cognition. Furthermore, it is not clear that one cannot combine non-naturalism about value with a broadly empirical epistemology, one that takes certain kinds of experience as epistemic grounds for beliefs about value.  Valitum -- valid, having the property that a well-formed formula, argument, argument form, or rule of inference has when it is logically correct in a certain respect. A well-formed formula is valid if it is true under every admissible reinterpretation of its non-logical symbols. If truth-value gaps or multiple truth-values are allowed, ‘true’ here might be replaced by ‘non-false’ or takes a “designated” truth-value. An argument is valid if it is impossible for the premises all to be true and, at the same time, the conclusion false. An argument form schema is valid if every argument of that form is valid. A rule of inference is valid if it cannot lead from all true premises to a false conclusion. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The conception of value,” The Paul Carus Lectures for the American Philosophical Association, published by Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.

 

variable: in semantics, a symbol interpreted so as to be associated with a range of values, a set of entities any one of which may be temporarily assigned as a value of the variable. Grice uses more specifically for a variable for a ‘grice,’ a type of extinct pig that existed (‘in the past’) in Northern England“There is a variable number of grices in the backyard, Paul.” An occurrence of a variable in a mathematical or logical expression is a free occurrence if assigning a value is necessary in order for the containing expression to acquire a semantic value  a denotation, truth-value, or other meaning. Suppose a semantic value is assigned to a variable and the same value is attached to a constant as meaning of the same kind; if an expression contains free occurrences of just that variable, the value of the expression for that assignment of value to the variable is standardly taken to be the same as the value of the expression obtained by substituting the constant for all the free occurrences of the variable. A bound occurrence of a variable is one that is not free. Grice: “Strictly, a variable is the opposite of a constant, but a constant variesain’t that paradoxical?” -- H. P. Grice, “The variable and the constant;” H. P. Grice, “Variable and meta-variable,” “Order and variable.”

 

velia -- Velia -- Grice as Eleatic -- School, strictly, two fifth-century B.C. Grecian philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno of Elea. The Ionian Grecian colony of Elea or Hyele in southern Italy became Velia in Roman times and retains that name today. A playful remark by Plato in Sophist 242d gave rise to the notion that Xenophanes of Colophon, who was active in southern Italy and Sicily, was Parmenides’ teacher, had anticipated Parmenides’ views, and founded the Eleatic School. Moreover, Melissus of Samos and according to some ancient sources even the atomist philosopher Leucippus of Abdera came to be regarded as “Eleatics,” in the sense of sharing fundamental views with Parmenides and Zeno. In the broad and traditional use of the term, the Eleatic School characteristically holds that “all is one” and that change and plurality are unreal. So stated, the School’s position is represented best by Melissus. Grice: “Crotone and Velia are the origins of western philosophy, since Greece is eastern!”Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice a Velia,” Villa Grice.

 

venn diagram, a logic diagram invented by the English philosopher J. Venn in which standard form statements the four kinds listed below are represented by two appropriately marked overlapping circles, as follows: Syllogisms are represented by three overlapping circles, as in the examples below. If a few simple rules are followed, e.g. “diagram universal premises first,” then in a valid syllogism diagramming the premises automatically gives a diagram in which the conclusion is represented. In an invalid syllogism diagramming the premises does not automatically give a diagram in which the conclusion is represented, as below. Venn diagrams are less perspicuous for the beginner than Euler diagrams. Grice: “I tried to teach Strawson some Euler first; but English as he is, he said, ‘Stick with Venn.’”Refs.: H. P. Grice, “From Euler to Strawson via Venn: diagramme and impicaturum.”

 

VERVM: verum: Grice: “Cognate with German ‘wahr’” -- there’s the ‘truth table’ and the ‘truth’ -- truth table, a tabular display of one or more truth-functions, truth-functional operators, or representatives of truth-functions or truth-functional operators such as well-formed formulas of propositional logic. In the tabular display, each row displays a possible assignment of truthvalues to the arguments of the truth-functions or truth-functional operators. Thus, the collection of all rows in the table displays all possible assignments of truth-values to these arguments. The following simple truth table represents the truth-functional operators negation and conjunction: truth, coherence theory of truth table 931   931 Because a truth table displays all possible assignments of truth-values to the arguments of a truth-function, truth tables are useful devices for quickly ascertaining logical properties of propositions. If, e.g., all entries in the column of a truth table representing a proposition are T, then the proposition is true for all possible assignments of truth-values to its ultimate constituent propositions; in this sort of case, the proposition is said to be logically or tautologically true: a tautology. If all entries in the column of a truth table representing a proposition are F, then the proposition is false for all possible assignments of truth-values to its ultimate constituent propositions, and the proposition is said to be logically or tautologically false: a contradiction. If a proposition is neither a tautology nor a contradiction, then it is said to be a contingency. The truth table above shows that both Not-P and Pand-Q are contingencies. For the same reason that truth tables are useful devices for ascertaining the logical qualities of single propositions, truth tables are also useful for ascertaining whether arguments are valid or invalid. A valid argument is one such that there is no possibility no row in the relevant truth table in which all its premises are true and its conclusion false. Thus the above truth table shows that the argument ‘P-and-Q; therefore, P’ is valid.  Verum -- truth-value, most narrowly, one of the values T for ‘true’ or F for ‘false’ that a proposition may be considered to have or take on when it is regarded as true or false, respectively. More broadly, a truth-value is any one of a range of values that a proposition may be considered to have when taken to have one of a range of different cognitive or epistemic statuses. For example, some philosophers speak of the truth-value I for ‘indeterminate’ and regard a proposition as having the value I when it is indeterminate whether the proposition is true or false. Logical systems employing a specific number n of truthvalues are said to be n-valued logical systems; the simplest sort of useful logical system has two truth-values, T and F, and accordingly is said to be two-valued. Truth-functions are functions that take truth-values as arguments and that yield truth-values as resultant values. The truthtable method in propositional logic exploits the idea of truth-functions by using tabular displays. Verum -- truth-value semantics, interpretations of formal systems in which the truth-value of a formula rests ultimately only on truth-values that are assigned to its atomic subformulas where ‘subformula’ is suitably defined. The label is due to Hugues Leblanc. On a truth-value interpretation for first-order predicate logic, for example, the formula atomic ExFx is true in a model if and only if all its instances Fm, Fn, . . . are true, where the truth-value of these formulas is simply assigned by the model. On the standard Tarskian or objectual interpretation, by contrast, ExFx is true in a model if and only if every object in the domain of the model is an element of the set that interprets F in the model. Thus a truth-value semantics for predicate logic comprises a substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers and a “non-denotational” interpretation of terms and predicates. If t 1, t 2, . . . are all the terms of some first-order language, then there are objectual models that satisfy the set {Dx-Fx, Ft1, Ft2 . . . .}, but no truth-value interpretations that do. One can ensure that truth-value semantics delivers the standard logic, however, by suitable modifications in the definitions of consistency and consequence. A set G of formulas of language L is said to be consistent, for example, if there is some G' obtained from G by relettering terms such that G' is satisfied by some truth-value assignment, or, alternatively, if there is some language L+ obtained by adding terms to L such that G is satisfied by some truth-value assignment to the atoms of L+. Truth-value semantics is of both technical and philosophical interest. Technically, it allows the completeness of first-order predicate logic and a variety of other formal systems to be obtained in a natural way from that of propositional logic. Philosophically, it dramatizes the fact that the formulas in one’s theories about the world do not, in themselves, determine one’s ontological commitments. It is at least possible to interpret first-order formulas without reference to special truth-table method truth-value semantics 932   932 domains of objects, and higher-order formulas without reference to special domains of relations and properties. The idea of truth-value semantics dates at least to the writings of E. W. Beth on first-order predicate logic in 9 and of K. Schütte on simple type theory in 0. In more recent years similar semantics have been suggested for secondorder logics, modal and tense logics, intuitionistic logic, and set theory. Truth, the quality of those propositions that accord with reality, specifying what is in fact the case. Whereas the aim of a science is to discover which of the propositions in its domain are true i.e., which propositions possess the property of Trinity truth 929   929 truth  the central philosophical concern with truth is to discover the nature of that property. Thus the philosophical question is not What is true? but rather, What is truth?  What is one saying about a proposition in saying that it is true? The importance of this question stems from the variety and depth of the principles in which the concept of truth is deployed. We are tempted to think, e.g., that truth is the proper aim and natural result of scientific inquiry, that true beliefs are useful, that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions that would render it true, and that valid reasoning preserves truth. Therefore insofar as we wish to understand, assess, and refine these epistemological, ethical, semantic, and logical views, some account of the nature of truth would seem to be required. Such a thing, however, has been notoriously elusive. The belief that snow is white owes its truth to a certain feature of the external world: the fact that snow is white. Similarly, the belief that dogs bark is true because of the fact that dogs bark. Such trivial observations lead to what is perhaps the most natural and widely held account of truth, the correspondence theory, according to which a belief statement, sentence, proposition, etc. is true provided there exists a fact corresponding to it. This Aristotelian thesis is unexceptionable in itself. However, if it is to provide a complete theory of truth  and if it is to be more than merely a picturesque way of asserting all instances of ‘the belief that p is true if and only if p’  then it must be supplemented with accounts of what facts are, and what it is for a belief to correspond to a fact; and these are the problems on which the correspondence theory of truth has foundered. A popular alternative to the correspondence theory has been to identify truth with verifiability. This idea can take on various forms. One version involves the further assumption that verification is holistic  i.e., that a belief is verified when it is part of an entire system of beliefs that is consistent and “harmonious.” This is known as the coherence theory of truth and was developed by Bradley and Brand Blanchard. Another version, due to Dummett and Putnam, involves the assumption that there is, for each proposition, some specific procedure for finding out whether one should believe it or not. On this account, to say that a proposition is true is to say that it would be verified by the appropriate procedure. In mathematics this amounts to the identification of truth with provability and is sometimes referred to as intuitionistic truth. Such theories aim to avoid obscure metaphysical notions and explain the close relation between knowability and truth. They appear, however, to overstate the intimacy of that link: for we can easily imagine a statement that, though true, is beyond our power to establish as true. A third major account of truth is James’s pragmatic theory. As we have just seen, the verificationist selects a prominent property of truth and considers it to be the essence of truth. Similarly the pragmatist focuses on another important characteristic  namely, that true beliefs are a good basis for action  and takes this to be the very nature of truth. True assumptions are said to be, by definition, those that provoke actions with desirable results. Again we have an account with a single attractive explanatory feature. But again the central objection is that the relationship it postulates between truth and its alleged analysans  in this case, utility  is implausibly close. Granted, true beliefs tend to foster success. But often actions based on true beliefs lead to disaster, while false assumptions, by pure chance, produce wonderful results. One of the few fairly uncontroversial facts about truth is that the proposition that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white, the proposition that lying is wrong is true if and only if lying is wrong, and so on. Traditional theories of truth acknowledge this fact but regard it as insufficient and, as we have seen, inflate it with some further principle of the form ‘X is true if and only if X has property P’ such as corresponding to reality, verifiability, or being suitable as a basis for action, which is supposed to specify what truth is. A collection of radical alternatives to the traditional theories results from denying the need for any such further specification. For example, one might suppose with Ramsey, Ayer, and Strawson that the basic theory of truth contains nothing more than equivalences of the form, ‘The proposition that p is true if and only if p’ excluding instantiation by sentences such as ‘This proposition is not true’ that generate contradiction. This so-called deflationary theory is best presented following Quine in conjunction with an account of the raison d’être of our notion of truth: namely, that its function is not to describe propositions, as one might naively infer from its syntactic form, but rather to enable us to construct a certain type of generalization. For example, ‘What Einstein said is true’ is intuitively equivalent to the infinite conjunction ‘If Einstein said that nothing goes faster than light, then nothing goes faster than light; and if Einstein said truth truth 930   930 that nuclear weapons should never be built, then nuclear weapons should never be built; . . . and so on.’ But without a truth predicate we could not capture this statement. The deflationist argues, moreover, that all legitimate uses of the truth predicate  including those in science, logic, semantics, and metaphysics  are simply displays of this generalizing function, and that the equivalence schema is just what is needed to explain that function. Within the deflationary camp there are various competing proposals. According to Frege’s socalled redundancy theory, corresponding instances of ‘It is true that p’ and ‘p’ have exactly the same meaning, whereas the minimalist theory assumes merely that such propositions are necessarily equivalent. Other deflationists are skeptical about the existence of propositions and therefore take sentences to be the basic vehicles of truth. Thus the disquotation theory supposes that truth is captured by the disquotation principle, ‘p’ is true if and only if p’. More ambitiously, Tarski does not regard the disquotation principle, also known as Tarski’s T schema, as an adequate theory in itself, but as a specification of what any adequate definition must imply. His own account shows how to give an explicit definition of truth for all the sentences of certain formal languages in terms of the referents of their primitive names and predicates. This is known as the semantic theory of truth. Grice: “From ‘verum’ we have to ‘make’ true, as the Romans put it, ‘verificare’ -- verificatum -- verificationism, a metaphysical theory about what determines meaning: the meaning of a statement consists in its methods of verification. Verificationism thus differs radically from the account that identifies meaning with truth conditions, as is implicit in Frege’s work and explicit in Vitters’s Tractatus and throughout the writings of Davidson. On Davidson’s theory, e.g., the crucial notions for a theory of meaning are truth and falsity. Contemporary verificationists, under the influence of the Oxford philosopher Michael Dummett, propose what they see as a constraint on the concept of truth rather than a criterion of meaningfulness. No foundational place is generally assigned in modern verificationist semantics to corroboration by observation statements; and modern verificationism is not reductionist. Thus, many philosophers read Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” as rejecting verificationism. This is because they fail to notice an important distinction. What Quine rejects is not verificationism but “reductionism,” namely, the theory that there is, for each statement, a corresponding range of verifying conditions determinable a priori. Reductionism is inherently localist with regard to verification; whereas verificationism, as such, is neutral on whether verification is holistic. And, lastly, modern verificationism is, veil of ignorance verificationism 953   953 whereas traditional verificationism never was, connected with revisionism in the philosophy of logic and mathematics e.g., rejecting the principle of bivalence. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The taming of the true.” Porphyry called the verum one of the four transcendental, along with unum, pulchrum and bonumGrice agreed. Grice’s concern with the ‘verum’ is serious. If Quine is right, and logical truth should go, so truth should go. Grice needs ‘true’ to correct a few philosophical mistakes. It is true that Grice sees a horse as a horse, for example. The nuances of the implicaturum are of a lesser concern for Grice than the taming of the true.  The root of Latin ‘vero’ is cognate with an idea Grice loved: that of ‘sincerity.’ The point is more obviously realised lexically in the negative: the fallax versus the mendax. But ‘verum’ had to do with candidumand thus very much cognate with the English that Grice avoided, ‘truth,’ cognate with ‘trust.’ quod non possit ab honestate sejungi The true and simple Good which cannot be separated from honesty, Cicero, Academica, I, 2, but also for the ontological which one can find in Cicero’s tr. Topica, 35 of etumologia ἐτυμολογία by veriloquium. Most contemporary hypotheses propose that verus —and the words signifying true, vrai, vérité, G. wahr, G. Wahrheit — derive from an Indo-European root, *wer, which would retain meanings of to please, pleasing, manifesting benevolence, gifts, services rendered, fidelity, pact. Chantraine Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque links it to the Homeric expression êra pherein ἦϱα φέϱειν, to please, as well as to ἐπίηϱα, ἐπίηϱος, and ἐπιήϱανος, agreeable Odyssey, 19, 343, just like the Roman verus cf. se-vere, without benevolence, the G.  war, and the Russian vera, faith, or verit’ верить, to believe. Pokorny adds to this same theme the Grecian ἑοϱτή, religious feast, cult. And from the same basis have come terms signifying guarantee, protect: Fr.  garir and later garant, G.  Gewähren, Eng. warrant, to grant. According to Chantraine, this root *wer should be distinguished from another root ver-, whence eirô εἴϱω in Grecian , verbum in Roman word in English, etc., and words from the family of vereor, revereor, to fear, to respect, verecundia respectful fear. According to Chantraine, this root *wer should be distinguished from another root ver-, whence eirô εἴϱω in Grecian , verbum in Roman word in English, etc., and words from the family of vereor, revereor, to fear, to respect, verecundia respectful fear. Alfred Ernout does not support this separation. We should recall that plays on the words verum and verbum were common, as Augustine mentions verbum = verum boare, proclaiming the truth, Dialectics 1. P. Florensky, following G. Curtius, “Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie,” also claims a single root for the ensemble of these derivations, including the Sanskrit vratum, sacred act, vow, promise, the Grecian bretas βϱέτας, cult object, wooden idol Aeschylus, Eumenides, v. 258, and the Roman “ver-bum.” The signification of verus must be considered as belonging first to the field of religious ritual and subsequently of juridical formulas: strictly speaking, verus means protected or grounded in the sense of that which is the object of a taboo or consecration Pillar and Ground. Then there’s from the juridical to the philosophical. “Verum” implies a rectification of an adversarial allegation considered to be fraudulent, as is indicated by the original opposition verax/fallax-mendax. It thus signifies the properly founded in fact or in the rules of law: crimen verissimum a well-founded accusation Cicero, In Verrem, 5, 15. In texts of grammar and rhetoric, but also in juridical texts as well, verus and veritas signify the veracity of the rule, inasmuch as it can be distinguished from usage. “Quid verum sit intellego; sed alias ita loquor ut concessum est I know what is correct, but sometimes I avail myself of the variation in usage, Cicero, De oratore, Loeb Classical Library; Consule veritatem: reprehendet; refer ad auris: probabunt If you consult the strict rule of analogy, it will say this practice is wrong, but if you consult the ear, it will approve 1586. The juridical connotation of the word verus and thus of veritas is retained and subsequently reinforced. In the glosses of the Middle Ages, verus signifies legitimate and the Roman sense of the word, legal and authentic or conforming to existing law. One normally finds “verum est” in legal texts to certify that a new rule conforms to preexisting ones Digest, 8, 4, 1. It is this juridical dimension that produces the meaning of verus as authenticated, authentic in contrast to false, imitative, deceiving and thus real as in real cream or a genuine Rolex watch.  The juridical here provides a foundation not only for the moral Verum et simplex bonum. The paradigm of “verum” is not easy to separate from any epistemological dimensions, as is evident in the varied fates of the Indo-European root *wer, from which derives, in addition to vera in Russian, belief, the old Fr.  garir, in the sense of certifying as true, designating as true, whence the participle garant. The evolution of these derived words inscribes G. “wahr,” and “Wahrheit” in a semantic network from which emerge two directions, belief and salvation. Belief. “Wahr” is often linked back, in composite words, to the idea of belief, in the sense of true belief, to take as true. “Wahrsagen,” to predict, “wahr haben,” to admit, agree upon, “für wahr halten,” to hold as true, to believe. This is the term that Kant employs in the Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental theory of method, ch.2, 3 On Opinion, Science, and Belief: “das Fürwahrhalten” is a belief, as a modality of subjectivity, that can be divided into conviction Überzeugung or persuasion Überredung and that is capable of three degrees: opinion Meinung, belief Glaube, and science Wissenschaft. Safeguarding, conservation. Similarly “wahren,” “bewahren” in the sense of to guard, to conserve is linked to “Wahrung” in the sense of defending one’s interests or safeguarding. One might refer to Heidegger’s use of this etymological and semantic relation in reference to Nietzsche. It remains to be said that many common or colloquial expressions, in Fr.  as well as in English, play on the semantic slippages of vrai and real, between the ontological sense and linguistic meanings. Thus in Fr. , c’est pas vrai! does not mean it is false, but rather that it is not reality. In English, the opposite is the case: get real! means come back down to earth, accept the truth. Grice’s main manoeuvre may be seen as intended to crack the crib of reality. For he wants to say some philosophers engaged in conceptual analysis are misled if they think an inappropriate usage reveals a truth-condition. By coining ‘implicaturum,’ his point is to give room for “Emissor E communicates that p,” as opposed to ‘emissum x ‘means’ ‘p.’ Therefore, Grice can claim that an utterance may very well totally baffling and misleading YET TRUE (or otherwise ‘good’), and that in no way that reveals anything about the emissum itself. This is due to the fact that ‘Emissor E communicates that p’ is diaphanous. And one can conjoin what the emissor E communicates to what he explicitly conveys and NOT HAVE the emissor contradicting himself or uttering a falsehood. And that is what in philosophy should count. H. P. Grice was always happy with a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth. It was what Aristotle thought. So why change? The fact that Austin agreed helped. The fact that Strawson applied Austin’s shining new tool of the performatory had him fashion a new shining skid, and that helped, because, once Grice has identified a philosophical mistake, that justifies his role as methodologist in trying to ‘correct’ the mistake. The Old Romans did not have an article. For them it is the unum, the verum, the bonum, and the pulchrum. They were trying to translate the very articled Grecian ‘to alethes,’ ‘to agathon,’ and ‘to kallon.’ Grecian Grice is able to restore the articles. He would use ‘the alethic’ for the ‘verum,’ after von Wright. But occasionally uses the ‘verum’ root. E. g. when his account of ‘personal identity’ was seen to fail to distinguish between a ‘veridical’ memory and a non-veridical one. If it had not been for Strawson’s ‘ditto’ theory to the ‘verum,’ Grice would not have minded much. Like Austin, his inclination was for a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth alla Aristotle and Tarski, applied to the utterance, or ‘expressum.’ So, while we cannot say that an utterer is TRUE, we can say that he is TRUTHFUL, and trustworthy (Anglo-Saxon ‘trust,’ being cognate with ‘true,’ and covering both the credibility and desirability realms. Grice approaches the ‘verum’ in terms of predicate calculus. So we need at least an utterance of the form, ‘the dog is shaggy.’ An utterance of ‘The dog is shaggy’ is true iff the denotatum of ‘the dog’ is a member of the class ‘shaggy.’ So, when it comes to ‘verum,’ Grice feels like ‘solving’ a problem rather than looking for new ones. He thought that Strawson’s controversial ‘ditto’ was enough of a problem ‘to get rid of.’ VERUM. Along with verum, comes the falsum. fallibilism, the doctrine, relative to some significant class of beliefs or propositions, that they are inherently uncertain and possibly mistaken. The most extreme form of the doctrine attributes uncertainty to every belief; more restricted forms attribute it to all empirical beliefs or to beliefs concerning the past, the future, other minds, or the external world. Most contemporary philosophers reject the doctrine in its extreme form, holding that beliefs about such things as elementary logical principles and the character of one’s current feelings cannot possibly be mistaken. Philosophers who reject fallibilism in some form generally insist that certain beliefs are analytically true, self-evident, or intuitively obvious. These means of supporting the infallibility of faculty psychology fallibilism 303   303 some beliefs are now generally discredited. W. V. Quine has cast serious doubt on the very notion of analytic truth, and the appeal to self-evidence or intuitive obviousness is open to the charge that those who officially accept it do not always agree on what is thus evident or obvious there is no objective way of identifying it, and that beliefs said to be self-evident have sometimes been proved false, the causal principle and the axiom of abstraction in set theory being striking examples. In addition to emphasizing the evolution of logical and mathematical principles, fallibilists have supported their position mainly by arguing that the existence and nature of mind-independent objects can legitimately be ascertained only be experimental methods and that such methods can yield conclusions that are, at best, probable rather than certain. false consciousness, 1 lack of clear awareness of the source and significance of one’s beliefs and attitudes concerning society, religion, or values; 2 objectionable forms of ignorance and false belief; 3 dishonest forms of self-deception. Marxists if not Marx use the expression to explain and condemn illusions generated by unfair economic relationships. Thus, workers who are unaware of their alienation, and “happy homemakers” who only dimly sense their dependency and quiet desperation, are molded in their attitudes by economic power relationships that make the status quo seem natural, thereby eclipsing their long-term best interests. Again, religion is construed as an economically driven ideology that functions as an “opiate” blocking clear awareness of human needs. Collingwood interprets false consciousness as self-corrupting untruthfulness in disowning one’s emotions and ideas The Principles of Art, 8.  . false pleasure, pleasure taken in something false. If it is false that Jones is honest, but Smith believes Jones is honest and is pleased that Jones is honest, then Smith’s pleasure is false. If pleasure is construed as an intentional attitude, then the truth or falsity of a pleasure is a function of whether its intentional object obtains. On this view, S’s being pleased that p is a true pleasure if an only if S is pleased that p and p is true. S’s being pleased that p is a false pleasure if and only if S is pleased that p and p is false. Alternatively, Plato uses the expression ‘false pleasure’ to refer to things such as the cessation of pain or neutral states that are neither pleasant nor painful that a subject confuses with genuine or true pleasures. Thus, being released from tight shackles might mistakenly be thought pleasant when it is merely the cessation of a pain. verisimile -- verisimilitude -- truthlikeness, a term introduced by Karl Popper to explicate the idea that one theory may have a better correspondence with reality, or be closer to the truth, or have more verisimilitude, than another theory. Truthlikeness, which combines truth with information content, has to be distinguished from probability, which increases with lack of content. Let T and F be the classes of all true and false sentences, respectively, and A and B deductively closed sets of sentences. According to Popper’s qualitative definition, A is more truthlike than B if and only if B 3 T 0 A 3 T and A 3 F 0 B 3 F, where one of these setinclusions is strict. In particular, when A and B are non-equivalent and both true, A is more truthlike than B if and only if A logically entails B. David Miller and Pavel Tichý proved in 4 that Popper’s definition is not applicable to the comparison of false theories: if A is more truthlike than B, then A must be true. Since the mid-0s, a new approach to truthlikeness has been based upon the concept of similarity: the degree of truthlikeness of a statement A depends on the distances from the states of affairs allowed by A to the true state. In Graham Oddie’s Likeness to Truth 6, this dependence is expressed by the average function; in Ilkka Niiniluoto’s Truthlikeness 7, by the weighted average of the minimum distance and the sum of all distances. The concept of verisimilitude is also used in the epistemic sense to express a rational evaluation of how close to the truth a theory appears to be on available evidence. verificatum: Grice: “Strictly, what is ‘verified’ is therefore ‘made true,’ analytically.” -- see ayerism. Grice would possibly NOT be interested in verificationism had not been for Ayer ‘breaking tradition’ “and other things” with it --. Oppoiste Christian virtuous –ism: falsificationism. Verificationism is one of the twelve temptations Grice finds on his way to the City of Eternal Truth. (Each one has its own entry). Oddly, Boethius was the first verificationist. He use ‘verifico’ performatively. “When I say, ‘verifico’, I verify that what I say is true.” He didn’t mean it as a sophisma (or Griceisma, but it was (mis-)understood as such! “When I was listing the temptations, I thought of calling this ‘Ayerism,’ but then I changed my mind. verification theory of meaning The theory of meaning advocated by the logical positivists and associated with the criterion of verifiability. The latter provides a criterion of meaningfulness for sentences, while the verification theory of meaning specifies the nature of meaning. According to the criterion, a sentence is cognitively meaningful if and only if it is logically possible for it to be verified. The meaning of a sentence is its method of verification, that is, the way in which it can be verified or falsified, particularly by experience. The theory has been challenged because the best formulations still exclude meaningful sentences and allow meaningless sentences. Critics also claim that the theory is a test for meaningfulness rather than a theory of meaning proper. Further, they claim that it fails to recognize that the interconnectedness of language might allow a sentence that cannot itself be verified to be meaningful. “The verification theory of meaning, which dominated the Vienna Circle, was concerned with the meaning and meaningfulness of sentences rather than words.” Quine, Theories and Things verificationism Philosophical method, philosophy of science, philosophy of language A position fundamental to logical positivism, claiming that the meaning of a statement is its method of verification. Accordingly, apparent statements lacking a method of verification, such as those of religion and metaphysics, are meaningless. Theoretical expressions can be defined in terms of the experiences by means of which assertions employing them can be verified. In the philosophy of mind, behaviorism, which tries to reduce unobserved inner states to patterns of behavior, turns out to be a version of verificationism. Some philosophers require conclusive verification for a statement to be meaningful, while others allow any positive evidence to confer meaning. There are disputes whether every statement must be verified separately or theories can be verified as a whole even if some of their statements cannot be individually verified. Attempts to offer a rigorous account of verification have run into difficulties because statements that should be excluded as meaningless nevertheless pass the test of verification and statements that should be allowed as meaningful are excluded. “For over a hundred years, one of the dominant tendencies in the philosophy of science has been verificationism, that is, the doctrine that to know the meaning of a scientific proposition . . . is to know what would be evidence for that proposition.” Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality verisimilitude Philosophy of science [from Latin verisimilar, like the truth] The degree of approximation or closeness to truth of a statement or a theory. Popper defined it in terms of the difference resulting from truth-content minus falsity-content. The truthcontent of a statement is all of its true consequences, while the falsity-content of a statement is all of its false consequences. The aim of science is to find better verisimilitude. One theory has a better verisimilitude than competing theories if it can explain the success of competing theories and can also explain cases where the other theories fail. Popper emphasized that verisimilitude is different from probability. Probability is the degree of logical certainty abstracted from content, while verisimilitude is degree of likeness to truth and combines truth and content. “This suggests that we combine here the ideas of truth and content into onethe idea of a degree of better (or worse) correspondence to truth or of greater (or less) likeness or similarity to truth; or to use a term already mentioned above (in contradistinction to probability) the idea of (degrees of ) verisimilitude.” Popper, Conjectures and Refutations.Refs: Grice, “Rationality and Trust,” Grice, “The alethic.” “P. F. Strawson and the performatory account of ‘true’”, The Grice Papers.

 

villa grice: -- Kept by Luigi Speranza -- Grice kept a nice garden in his cottage on Banbury Road, not far from St. John’s. It was more of a villa than his town house at Harborne. While Grice loved Academia, he also loved non-Academia. He would socialize at the Flag and Lamb, at the Bird and Baby, and the cricket club, at the bridge club, etc. In this way, he goes back to Plato’s idea of an ‘academy,’ established by Plato at his villa outside Athens near the public park and gymnasium known by that name. Although it may not have maintained a continuous tradition, the many and varied philosophers of the Academy all considered themselves Plato’s successors, and all of them celebrated and studied his work. The school survived in some form until A.D. 529, when it was dissolved, along with the other pagan schools, by the Eastern Roman emperor Justinian I. The history of the Academy is divided by some authorities into that of the Old Academy Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and their followers and the New Academy the Skeptical Academy of the third and second centuries B.C.. Others speak of five phases in its history: Old as before, Middle Arcesilaus, New Carneades, Fourth Philo of Larisa, and Fifth Antiochus of Ascalon. For most of its history the Academy was devoted to elucidating doctrines associated with Plato that were not entirely explicit in the dialogues. These “unwritten doctrines” were apparently passed down to his immediate successors and are known to us mainly through the work of Aristotle: there are two opposed first principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad Great and Small; these generate Forms or Ideas which may be identified with numbers, from which in turn come intermediate mathematicals and, at the lowest level, perceptible things Aristotle, Metaphysics I.6. After Plato’s death, the Academy passed to his nephew Speusippus, who led the school until his death. Although his written works have perished, his views on certain main points, along with some quotations, were recorded by surviving authors. Under the influence of late Pythagoreans, Speusippus anticipated Plotinus by holding that the One transcends being, goodness, and even Intellect, and that the Dyad which he identifies with matter is the cause of all beings. To explain the gradations of beings, he posited gradations of matter, and this gave rise to Aristotle’s charge that Speusippus saw the universe as a series of disjointed episodes. Speusippus abandoned the theory of Forms as ideal numbers, and gave heavier emphasis than other Platonists to the mathematicals. Xenocrates who once went with Plato to Sicily, succeeded Speusippus and led the Academy till his own death. Although he was a prolific author, Xenocrates’ works have not survived, and he is known only through the work of other authors. He was induced by Aristotle’s objections to reject Speusippus’s views on some points, and he developed theories that were a major influence on Middle Platonism, as well as on Stoicism. In Xenocrates’ theory the One is Intellect, and the Forms are ideas in the mind of this divine principle; the One is not transcendent, but it resides in an intellectual space above the heavens. While the One is good, the Dyad is evil, and the sublunary world is identified with Hades. Having taken Forms to be mathematical entities, he had no use for intermediate mathematicals. Forms he defined further as paradigmatic causes of regular natural phenomena, and soul as self-moving number. Polemon led the Academy, and was chiefly known for his fine character, which set an example of self-control for his students. The Stoics probably derived their concept of oikeiosis an accommodation to nature from his teaching. After Polemon’s death, his colleague Crates led the Academy until the accession of Arcesilaus. The New Academy arose when Arcesilaus became the leader of the school and turned the dialectical tradition of Plato to the Skeptical aim of suspending belief. The debate between the New Academy and Stoicism dominated philosophical discussion for the next century and a half. On the Academic side the most prominent spokesman was Carneades. In the early years of the first century B.C., Philo of Larisa attempted to reconcile the Old and the New Academy. His pupil, the former Skeptic Antiochus of Ascalon, was enraged by this and broke away to refound the Old Academy. This was the beginning of Middle Platonism. Antiochus’s school was eclectic in combining elements of Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelian philosophy, and is known to us mainly through Cicero’s Academica. Middle Platonism revived the main themes of Speusippus and Xenocrates, but often used Stoic or neo-Pythagorean concepts to explain them. The influence of the Stoic Posidonius was strongly felt on the Academy in this period, and Platonism flourished at centers other than the Academy in Athens, most notably in Alexandria, with Eudorus and Philo of Alexandria. After the death of Philo, the center of interest returned to Athens, where Plutarch of Chaeronia studied with Ammonius at the Academy, although Plutarch spent most of his career at his home in nearby Boeotia. His many philosophical treatises, which are rich sources for the history of philosophy, are gathered under the title Moralia; his interest in ethics and moral education led him to write the Parallel Lives paired biographies of famous Romans and Athenians, for which he is best known. After this period, the Academy ceased to be the name for a species of Platonic philosophy, although the school remained a center for Platonism, and was especially prominent under the leadership of the Neoplatonist Proclus. 

 

villa speranza: the grander sourroundings where the Casino Grice belongsGrice used to call it ‘Villa Grice.’ Villa Speranza counts with an excellent host in the charming A. M. G. -- . Villa Speranza holds a grand swimming pool where Grice would keep his Loeb collection (“Loeb is all you need”)It became known in the neighbourhood as The Swimming-Pool Library. Anna Speranza has been a splendid host and gardener at the Villa.

 

vinadio: Grice: “Of course, Vinadio was bound to be a good dialectician, since the Italian neo-idealists always took Hegel’s Dialektik – or colloquenza, as the count preferred – much more seriously than the most Hegelian of Oxonians! (And I don’t mean Bradley!”) --  Grice: “I like Vinadio; but then I’m English and we like an earl!” – “My favourite of his tracts is the one about dialettica which he understood just as Plato did, only better!” Felice Balbo di Venadio, conte di Venadio, vide, “Il conte di Vinadio” -- (Torino), filosofo. Considerato una delle voci più significative della cultura italiana della prima metà del Novecento. Fu un intellettuale militante cattolico e comunista, impegnato in un vasto progetto di rifondazione della politica nell'immediato secondo dopoguerra.  Nacque a Torino da Enrico Balbo di Vinadio e da Ada Tapparo, in via Bogino 8, nella casa che era stata del conte Cesare Balbo, ministro di casa Savoia nel XIX secolo. Dopo la laurea in Giurisprudenza, partecipò alla seconda guerra mondiale prima come sottufficiale degli Alpini, poi come membro della Resistenza. Fu amico di Natalia Ginzburg, Giulio Einaudi, Alessandro Fè d'Ostiani, Massimo Mila, Paolo Boringhieri, Giaime Pintor e Cesare Pavese. Come consulente della casa torinese Einaudi curò due collane di filosofia. Fu nominato cattedratico di filosofia morale a Roma.  Dal 1951 si raccolse attorno a lui un piccolo gruppo di cattolici comunisti e di cristiano-sociali, molti ispirati dalle idee di Giuseppe Dossetti, per discutere sulla crisi dei valori nella società contemporanea e sui modi di superarla mediante l'impegno sociale. Il suo impegno intellettuale trovò espressione inoltre con i contributi alle riviste Cultura e realtà diretta da Mario Motta e Terza generazione diretta da Ubaldo Scassellati prima e Gianni Baget Bozzo poi (i cui ideatori e collaboratori riconobbero l'ispirazione di Balbo anche se egli vi collaborò solo con un articolo), e nell'attività politica: fu infatti vicino alle organizzazioni della sinistra di ispirazione cattolica e al Partito Comunista.  Egli comprese come il mutamento centrale della società sarebbe avvenuto nel rapporto tra lavoro umano e tecnica. Il 1º marzo 1956 fu assunto all'IRI presso il Servizio problemi del lavoro diretto da Giuseppe Glisenti, e si interessò di formazione del personale. Nel 1960 venne nominato direttore del Centro IRI per lo studio delle funzioni direttive aziendali.  Opere Felice Balbo, L'uomo senza miti, 1945. Felice Balbo, il laboratorio dell'uomo, 1946. Felice Balbo e altri. Studi in memoria di Gioele Solari dei discepoli, Torino, Edizioni Ramella, 1954. Felice Balbo, La sfida storica del comunismo al Cristianesimo e le sue conseguenze filosofico-sociali, Il Mulino, 3,  151–158, 1958. Felice Balbo, Idee per una filosofia dello sviluppo umano, Torino, Boringhieri, 1962. Felice Balbo, Opere, Torino, Boringhieri, 1963. Scritti postumi Felice Balbo, Essere e progresso, 1966. Felice Balbo, Lezioni di etica, Anna Giannatiempo Quinzio, introduzione di Sergio Quinzio, Roma, Edizioni Lavoro, 1988. Felice Balbo, Natalia Ginzburg, Cesare Pavese, Lettere a Ludovica, Archinto, 2008. Note  Giulia Boringhieri, Per un umanesimo scientifico. Storia di libri, di mio padre e di noi, Torino, Einaudi, 26,  978-88-06-20281-1.  Duccio Cavalieri, Scienza economica e umanesimo positivo. Claudio Napoleoni e la critica della ragione economica, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2006.  Giovanni Tassani, La Terza Generazione. Da Dossetti a De Gasperi. Tra Stato e Rivoluzione, Roma, Edizioni Lavoro, 1988  Giovanni Tassani, nota bio-bibliografica in: Felice Balbo, Lezioni di etica, Roma, Edizioni Lavoro, 1988  Giovanni Invitto, Le idee di Felice Balbo. Una filosofia pragmatica dello sviluppo, Il Mulino, Bologna 1979. Giovanni Invitto, La filosofia di Felice Balbo di fronte a fenomenologia ed esistenzialismo, in Giovanni Invitto , Fenomenologia ed esistenzialismo in Italia, Adriatica Salentina, Lecce 1981,  209–214. Giovanni Invitto, Il pensiero di Felice Balbo: una questione aperta, "Italia contemporanea", fasc. 141, 1980,  94–103. Voce: Balbo Felice, Giorgio Campanini e Francesco Traniello  Dizionario storico del movimento cattolico in Italia,  II: I protagonisti, Marietti, Torino 1982,  27–30. Anselmo Grotti, Saggio su Felice Balbo, Boringhieri, Torino 1984 Anselmo Grotti, “Un altro futuro è possibile. Felice Balbo a cento anni dalla nascita” Egeria 4 () Vittorio Possenti, Felice Balbo e la filosofia dell'essere, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1984. Giorgio Campanini e Giovanni Invitto , Felice Balbo tra filosofia e società, Franco Angeli, Milano 1985. Flavia Tricomi, Felice Balbo: per una filosofia come lavoro tecnico non mitico, in Roberto Gatti , La filosofia tra tecnica e mito, Atti del XXIX Congresso Nazionale Società Filosofica Italiana, S. Maria degli AngeliPerugia, Porziuncola, 1987. Giovanni Invitto, Felice Balbo. Il superamento delle ideologie, Roma, Edizioni Studium, 1988. Nicola Ricci, Cattolici e marxismo. Filosofia e politica in Augusto Del Noce, Felice Balbo e Franco Rodano, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2008. Luciano Bazzoli, Felice Balbo. Dal marxismo ad economia umana, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1981 Marcello Mustè, La prassi e il valore. La filosofia dell'essere di Felice Balbo, Roma, Aracne,   Felice Balbo: il cristianesimo nella sfida della “modernità”, di Giuseppe Turbanti, su storiaefuturo.com. Giovanni Invitto, Felice Balbo, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  34, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Filosofi italiani del XX secoloInsegnanti italiani Professore

 

 

 

vio: essential Italian philosopher. Grice was irritated that when ‘vio’ became a saint, the Italians list them under ‘c’. He wrote extensively on freewill, and had a colourful dispute with, of all people, Calvinwell represented in a painting Grice adored. Viotomasso di vio -- cajetan, original name, -- H. P. Grice thinks that Shropshire borrowed his proof for the immortality of the soul from Cajetan -- Tommaso de Vio, prelate and theologian. Born in Gaeta from which he took his name, he entered the Dominican order in 1484 and studied philosophy and theology at Naples, Bologna, and Padua. He became a cardinal in 1517; during the following two years he traveled to G.y, where he engaged in a theological controversy with Luther. His major work is a Commentary on St. Thomas’ Summa of Theology 1508, which promoted a renewal of interest in Scholastic and Thomistic philosophy during the sixteenth century. In agreement with Aquinas, Cajetan places the origin of human knowledge in sense perception. In contrast with Aquinas, he denies that the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as our creator can be proved. Cajetan’s work in logic was based on traditional Aristotelian syllogistic logic but is original in its discussion of the notion of analogy. Cajetan distinguishes three types: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, and analogy of proportion. Whereas he rejected the first two types as improper, he regarded the last as the basic type of analogy and appealed to it in explaining how humans come to know God and how analogical reasoning applied to God and God’s creatures avoids being equivocal. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e de Vio.” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

 

violence: Grice: “I would define ‘violence’ as the use of force to cause physical harm, death, or destruction physical violence;  the causing of severe mental or emotional harm, as through humiliation, deprivation, or brainwashing, whether using force or not psychological violence; more broadly, profaning, desecrating, defiling, or showing disrespect for i.e., “doing violence” to something valued, sacred, or cherished; extreme physical force in the natural world, as in tornados, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Physical violence may be directed against persons, animals, or property.” Grice goes on: “In the first two cases, harm, pain, suffering, and death figure prominently; in the third, illegality or illegitimacy the forceful destruction of property is typically considered violence when it lacks authorization. Psychological violence applies principally to persons. It may be understood as the violation of beings worthy of respect. But it can apply to higher animals as well as in the damaging mental effects of some experimentation, e.g., involving isolation and deprivation. Environmentalists sometimes speak of violence against the environment, implying both destruction and disrespect for the natural world. Sometimes the concept of violence is used to characterize acts or practices of which one morally disapproves. To this extent it has a normative force. But this prejudges whether violence is wrong. One may, on the other hand, regard inflicting harm or death as only prima facie wrong i.e., wrong all other things being equal. This gives violence a normative character, establishing its prima facie wrongness. But it leaves open the ultimate moral justifiability of its use. Established practices of physical or psychological violence  e.g., war, capital punishment  constitute institutionalized violence. So do illegal or extralegal practices like vigilantism, torture, and state terrorism e.g., death squads. Anarchists sometimes regard the courts, prisons, and police essential to maintaining the state as violence. Racism and sexism may be considered institutional violence owing to their associated psychological as well as physical violence. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Causes and reasons.” 

 

virno: essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “Virno, like me, is a semiotician.” Virno (n. Napoli), filosofo.  Paolo Virno (Napoli), filosofo. Di orientamento marxista operaista, docente di filosofia del linguaggio presso il Dipartimento di Filosofia, Comunicazione e Spettacolo dell'Università Roma Tre. Tra i principali esponenti dell'organizzazione della sinistra extraparlamentare Potere Operaio, negli anni '60 e '70 il suo nome ricorse nelle cronache dei cosiddetti "anni di piombo" in Italia. Accusato di appartenere ad una formazione armata eversiva fu arrestato e detenuto in prigione per diversi anni sino alla sua definitiva assoluzione. Nel corso della detenzione elaborò il suo pensiero che trovò espressione nella rivista Luogo comune.  «Democrazia è il fucile in spalla agli operai», slogan attribuito a Potere Operaio «Mi sono formato politicamente a Genova, dove la mia famiglia viveva e io facevo liceo. Genova era esposta all’influenza di Torino, dove vi furono le prime occupazioni nel ’67; quindi nell’estate di quell’anno si mobilitarono gli studenti medi (più vivaci di quelli universitari, che invece erano in contatto con le organizzazioni tradizionai dei partiti, UGI e via dicendo).  Come studenti medi fondammo dunque il Sindacato degli Studenti, che nell’autunno del ’67 fece i primi scioperi su tematiche già sessantottesche, la lotta all’autoritarismo, solidarietà con gli studenti greci dopo il golpe dei colonnelli e quant’altro...nell’autunno del ’68, sempre per un trasferimento della famiglia, sono venuto ad abitare a Roma, e di lì a non molto ho preso contatti e rapporti con il gruppo che sarebbe diventato Potere Operaio, che allora sostanzialmente nella capitale era il gruppo delle facoltà scientifiche... Entro in Potere operaio dopo gli episodi cruciali della primavera ’69 a Torino.»  Negli anni tra il 1970 e il 1972 lavorò a Milano come insegnante all'Alfa Romeo di Arese e all'Innocenti, organizzando anche azioni collettive nelle fabbriche sino alla dissoluzione di Potere operaio nel 1973.  Nel 1977 Virno presentò la sua tesi di laurea sul concetto di lavoro e la teoria della coscienza di Theodor Adorno e partecipò attivamente alle manifestazioni del 1977 ad opera dei lavoratori precari e di altri emarginati. Fondò assieme a Oreste Scalzone e a Franco Piperno la rivista Metropoli organo ideologico del movimento politico.  Nel giugno del 1979, nell'ambito dell'inchiesta giudiziaria nota come "7 aprile", la redazione della rivista viene accusata di appartenere in blocco all'organizzazione eversiva «costituita in più bande armate variamente denominate».  «siamo arrestati io, Castellano, Maesano e Pace (che però sfugge all’arresto, di nuovo, giuro, non per sagacia). Noi siamo arrestati il 6 giugno ’79, poi ci fanno confluire nel 7 aprile, ritroviamo gli altri nel cortile di Rebibbia, nel braccio speciale, stiamo un po’ di mesi lì, poi c’è la diaspora, cioè il Ministero ordina di mandare ognuno di questi detenuti in un carcere speciale diverso, perché ovviamente, tramite avvocati, visite, benché ci fosse il regime di braccio speciale, quello era diventato una specie di luogo in cui si elaboravano documenti, lettere a giornali, si faceva campagna politica, c’erano state delle lotte interne.  Quindi, c’è la diaspora, io vado a Novara, Oreste va a Cuneo, quell’altro va a Favignana, quell’altro ancora da un’altra parte. Comincia questo giro negli speciali, e ci ritroviamo non tutti ma in parte nel carcere di Palmi, inaugurato nell’autunno del ’79, carcere per soli politici o per detenuti comuni completamente politicizzati, una specie di “Kesh”. Là dentro c’era una situazione curiosa, anche molto spettacolare, perché si incontrano assolutamente tutti. Infatti, per un primo periodo con i compagni delle BR o con Alunni o quelli dei NAP, si pensò anche di approfittare di questa situazione per avviare una discussione larga, di carattere "costituente": però, il problema è che anche lì c’è il fatto che i più spregiudicati di loro, come Curcio, erano d’accordo, avevano capito di aver perso l’essenziale, cioè il cambio di paradigma del ’77, cioè il fatto che i giovani operai erano non più riconducibili a quelli del ’69; altri invece no.[...]  Riassumendo in breve, la mia detenzione fu un anno dal ’79 all’80, poi due anni liberi in cui curai la serie continua di Metropoli nell’81, due anni ancora di carcere, condanna a 12 anni in primo grado, un anno di arresti domiciliari ... l’assoluzione (insieme a tanti altri imputati del 7 aprile) fu nell’87, la conferma nell’88.»  La travagliata esperienza politica e esistenziale di questi anni sarà trasfusa da Virno nella pubblicazione di Luogo Comune una rivista dedicata all'analisi della vita nella situazione sociale del "postfordismo".  Nel 1993 Virno lasciò il lavoro di editore della rivista per insegnare filosofia nell'Urbino --  è stato professore invitato all'Montréal e al suo ritorno in Italia occupò la cattedra di filosofia del linguaggio, semiotica ed etica della comunicazione nell'Università della Calabria da dove si trasferirà all'Università Roma Tre.  Pensiero Paolo Virno, convinto della necessità di un nuovo linguaggio della politica che chiarisca le trasformazioni economiche, sociali e culturali che da più di un decennio caratterizzano le società occidentali, introduce nell'opera Grammatica della moltitudine, una riflessione sul contrasto tra i termini di "popolo" e "moltitudine" che generarono una accesa polemica teorico-filosofica nel secolo XVII. Quando avvenne la formazione degli stati nazionali fu il termine popolo a prevalere e Virno si domanda se non sia venuto il tempo di restaurare l'altro concetto.  I primi a discutere sulla contrapposizione di popolo-moltitudine furono Spinoza e Hobbes. Per Spinoza, la "multitudo" è quell'insieme di persone che nell'azione politica e in quella economica, pur agendo collettivamente non perdono il senso della propria individualità, resistendo sempre alla riduzione a unica massa informe com'è nel termine di "popolo". Per Spinoza moltitudine è dunque la base delle libertà civili.  Al contrario Hobbes vede nel concetto di moltitudine, cioè in una pluralità che non si sintetizza nell'uno, il più grave pericolo per l'autorità dello Stato che esercita il «supremo imperio».  «Dopo i secoli del «popolo» e quindi dello Stato (Stato-nazione, Stato centralizzato ecc.), torna infine a manifestarsi la polarità contrapposta, abrogata agli albori della modernità. La moltitudine come ultimo grido della teoria sociale, politica e filosofica? Forse.»  Opere L'idea di mondo. Intelletto pubblico e uso della vita, Editore: Quodlibet,  Saggio sulla negazione. Per una antropologia linguistica, Editore: Bollati Boringhieri,  E così via, all'infinito. Logica e antropologia, Editore: Bollati Boringhieri,  Motto di spirito e azione innovativa. Per una logica del cambiamento, Editore: Bollati Boringhieri, 2005 Quando il verbo si fa carne. Linguaggio e natura umana, Editore: Bollati Boringhieri, Scienze sociali e «natura umana». Facoltà di linguaggio, invariante biologico, rapporti di produzione, Editore: Rubbettino, 2003 Grammatica della moltitudine. Per una analisi delle forme di vita contemporanee, Editore: DeriveApprodi, Esercizi di esodo. Linguaggio e azione politica, Editore: Ombre Corte, 2002 Il ricordo del presente. Saggio sul tempo storico, Editore: Bollati Boringhieri, Parole con parole. Poteri e limiti del linguaggio, Editore: Donzelli, Mondanità. L'idea di «Mondo» tra esperienza sensibile e sfera pubblica, Editore: Manifestolibri, Convenzione e materialismo, Editore: Theoria [Ristampa Editore: DeriveApprodi,   Scheda docenteUniversità Roma Tre  Intervista a Paolo Virno21 aprile 2001  Intervista di P. Virno a Hecceitasweb  «Questo termine è entrato nel linguaggio corrente negli anni '90 per indicare un insieme di caratteristiche economiche, sociali e istituzionali del nostro presente, avvertite [pessimisticamente] come profondamente diverse rispetto al nostro recente passato» e in genere come molto negativamente mutate. (In articolo di Maria Turchetto, Fordismo e postfordismo. Qualche dubbio su alcune "certezze" della sinistra italiana., edito nel n° 67 di Protagonisti)  Grammatica della moltitudine. Per una analisi delle forme di vita contemporanee, ed.DeriveApprodi, Anni di piombo Potere operaio"General intellect". In Zanini, A.; Fadini, U. . Lessico postfordista: dizionario di idee della mutazione. Feltinelli, 2001 (visualizzazione parziale su Google Books; Testo completo in inglese). Virno Giovanni Copertino, sito "Filosofico.net".

 

Viroli: essential Italian philosopher. Actually “Viroli-Cavalieri”? Grice, “I shall be fighting soon.” “The loyalty for one’s country is not based on evidence.”Maurizio Viroli (Forlì), filosofo. Durante il settennato di Carlo Azeglio Ciampi ha servito la Presidenza della Repubblica Italiana. Attualmente è Professore alla Università del Texas ad Austin e all'Università della Svizzera Italiana a Lugano. I suoi campi di ricerca sono la Filosofia politica e la Storia del Pensiero politico. I suoi autori di riferimento sono Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Giuseppe Mazzini, Benedetto Croce, Carlo Rosselli e Nello Rosselli. La sua ricerca si basa sul metodo contestualista di Quentin Skinner a cui ha apportato alcune innovazioni. Il suoi riferimenti politico-ideali sono il Repubblicanesimo e l'Azionismo (Partito d'Azione). Alle numerose pubblicazioni scientifiche affianca l'attività di saggista e quella di editorialista. Collabora e ha collaborato ad alcune testate giornalistiche, tra cui La Stampa, il Sole 24 ORE e Il Fatto Quotidiano. Nel 2008 ha acquisito anche la cittadinanza statunitense.. Maurizio Viroli ha frequentato il Liceo scientifico statale Fulcieri Paulucci di Calboli di Forlì. Come egli stesso racconta nel libro L'autunno della Repubblica, per mantenersi agli studi ha lavorato fin da giovanissimo come garzone di bottega, come cameriere d'albergo e come operaio presso lo zuccherificio della sua città. Di quegli anni dice:" [...] quando ero bambino abitavo a Forlì con i miei genitori, in via Archimede Mellini, in un appartamento angusto e freddissimo, riscaldato soltanto da una stufa a gas tenuta, per la nostra povertà, sempre con la fiammella azzurrognola al minimo."  Al termine degli studi liceali si è iscritto alla facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Bologna. Nel 1976 si è laureato magna cum laude in Filosofia con una tesi dal titolo Metodo e Sistema in Friedrich Engels.  Dal maggio 1976 al maggio 1977 ha svolto il Servizio di leva a Casarsa della Delizia, in Friuli-Venezia Giulia.  Il ritorno alla vita civile è stato all'insegna del precariato. Percepiva un piccolo salario organizzando convegni e lavorando come redattore alla rivista Problemi della transizione presso Istituto Gramsci di Bologna.  Nel 1982 è stato ammesso al dottorato di ricerca presso l'Istituto Universitario Europeo di Firenze. Nel 1985, di fronte alla commissione composta dai Professori Werner Maihofer, Quentin Skinner, Norberto Bobbio, Maurice Cranston, Athanasios Moulakisha, ha discusso la tesi dal titolo La théorie de la société bien ordonnée chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pubblicata prima in francese poi, nel 1988, per la Cambridge University Press con il titolo di Jean Jacques Rousseau and the 'Well-Ordered Society', e nel 1993 per Il Mulino con il titolo Jean-Jacques Rousseau e la teoria della società bene ordinata.  Ha perfezionato la sua formazione svolgendo attività di ricerca al Clare Hall dell'Cambridge e al Max-Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung in Köln.  Posizione accademica Maurizio Viroli è Professore Emerito all'Princeton dal . A Princeton è giunto nel 1987, dopo aver vinto un concorso come Assistant Professor. Nel 1993 ha ottenuto tenured appointment ed è diventato Associate Professor. Nel 1997 è diventato Full Professor .  È Professore di Government all'Università del Texas ad Austin, e di Comunicazione politica all'Università della Svizzera italiana. Dirige il Laboratorio di Studi civili presso l'Università della Svizzera italiana.  Con Letizia Tedeschi (Accademia di Architettura di Mendrisio), Michele Luminati (Lucerna) e Jean-Philippe Garric (Sorbonne Université), nel  ha vinto il finanziamento del FNSNF (Fondo Nazionale Svizzero per la Ricerca Scientifica) per gli anni -2022 con il progetto di ricerca Milan and Ticino (1796-1848): Shaping the Spatiality of a European Capital, che prevede l'impegno di un folto gruppo di ricercatori.  I suoi interessi di studio ruotano intorno alla Filosofia politica e alla Storia del Pensiero politico. Studia il Repubblicanesimo nella sua accezione classica (da Machiavelli a Rousseau) e in quella contemporanea. Si occupa e scrive di religione e politica, di retorica classica, libertà e tirannide, di patriottismo e nazionalismo, di etica civile, di diritti e doveri. Pone particolare attenzione ai fondamenti della convivenza civile. I suoi periodi storici di riferimento sono il Rinascimento, il Risorgimento e l'Antifascismo. I suoi autori di riferimento sono Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Giuseppe Mazzini, Benedetto Croce, Carlo e Nello Rosselli.  Come impegno civile si occupa di Educazione civica e della difesa e dell'attuazione della Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana. Ha collaborato con la Direzione Generale dell'Ufficio Scolastico Regionale per le Marche a progetti di Educazione alla Cittadinanza. Nel 2006 ha fondato e dirige il Master in Civic Education presso l'associazione Ethica di Asti. Ha coordinato e diretto progetti di Educazione civica per la Fondazione per la Scuola della Compagnia di San Paolo. Con il professor Gianni Sinni dirige il progetto Designing Civic Consciousness presso Università degli Studi della Repubblica di San Marino. Dirige il progetto Lezioni di Casa Cervi-Scuola di Etica civile presso Casa Cervi. Ha preso parte attivamente alle campagne referendarie svoltesi in occasione del referendum costituzionale del 2006, contro la riforma proposta dal centro-destra, e del referendum costituzionale del , contro la cosiddetta riforma costituzionale Renzi-Boschi.  Ha collezionato inviti e incarichi di insegnamento presso prestigiose istituzioni culturali internazionali come l'Institute for Advanced Study di Princeton, Georgetown University, Yale University, Harvard University, UCLA, Università Complutense di Madrid, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo di Mendoza, New School for Social Research di New York, Peking University, Pontifica Universitad Catolica del Cile, Cambridge University, University of Brisbane, Columbia University, Queen Mary, University of London, United Arab Emirates University, Università Nazionale Autonoma del Messico, Hebrew University di Gerusalemme, il Collège de France  In Italia ha insegnato presso la Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Università degli Studi di Trento, l'Università del Molise, l'Ferrara, la Scuola Superiore di Catania e l'Università degli Studi di Urbino "Carlo Bo".  Ha collaborato e collabora con istituzioni quali il Collegio di Milano e la Scuola Superiore della Pubblica Amministrazione, Scuola superiore di polizia, Fondazione per la Scuola della Compagnia di San Paolo, il Collegio Carlo Alberto e l'Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani, laFondazione Alcide Cervi presso Casa Cervi.  Ideali politici Maurizio Viroli, nel libro L'autunno della Repubblica, spiega così le sue posizioni politiche "Non sono soltanto uno studioso del repubblicanesimo, mi sento repubblicano. Amo i princìpi fondamentali di questa tradizione e cerco di applicarli nella vita e nell’analisi dei fatti politici e sociali." Più oltre, in riferimento al Presidente Carlo Azeglio Ciampi racconta: "La prima volta che lo incontrai provai la sensazione di trovarmi di fronte ad un uomo di straordinaria energia morale, l’esempio vero della migliore cultura del Risorgimento e dell’azionismo. Rammento ancora le parole che mi disse dopo aver ascoltato con attenzione le mie considerazioni sul significato del concetto di amor di patria: «Quello che lei dice, professore, l’ho sempre sentito e vissuto nella mia coscienza». Fu allora che realizzai che io sono prima uno studioso di repubblicanesimo e poi un repubblicano; Ciampi è repubblicano nell’intimo della coscienza: repubblicano e azionista; anzi, credo, repubblicano perché azionista."  Anche l'Antifascismo é rilevante nel patrimonio ideale di Maurizio Viroli. Ne L'Autunno della Repubblica si legge: "Ho trovato nelle pagine di Benedetto Croce, Carlo Rosselli, Ferruccio Parri, Ernesto Rossi, Piero Calamandreiper citare soltanto i nomi più notinon solo idee e argomenti in perfetta sintonia con il mio antifascismo assoluto e intransigente, ma anche e soprattutto le più convincenti riflessioni sulle ragioni della fragilità della libertà italiana."  Il patriottismo di Maurizio Viroli si oppone al nazionalismo, anzi, ne è l'antidoto. Ancora ne L'Autunno della Repubblica si legge a proposito del libro Per amore della patria: "In Italia abbiamo una tradizione di patriottismo di straordinario valore morale e politico, la migliore che io conosca. Mi riferisco in primo luogo al patriottismo di Giuseppe Mazzini, fondato sul principio che la patria non è il territorio bensì un principio di libertà, e al patriottismo degli antifascisti di «Giustizia e Libertà», concordi nell’affermare che la nostra patria coincide con il mondo morale delle persone libere [...] non era poi idea tanto peregrina sostenere [in Per amore della patria. Patriottismo e nazionalismo nella storia. n.d.r.] che il patriottismo repubblicano potesse essere il mezzo più efficace per combattere la marea del nazionalismo che cominciava a montare. Oggi, credo sia troppo tardi."  Infine, Maurizio Viroli ci spiega il suo relativismo: "Sulle questioni etiche sono stato sempre un convinto relativista, con comprensibile scandalo di molti amici e colleghi. Di fatto, se il dovere esiste soltanto là dove la coscienza morale personale lo riconosce come tale, segue necessariamente che ci sono persone che riconoscono quali loro doveri determinati princìpi, altre che riconoscono quali loro doveri princìpi diversi, se non del tutto opposti. Il pluralismo e il contrasto dei doveri sono sotto gli occhi di tutti. Ad alcuni il dovere indica il servizio e la pratica della carità, ad altri la pura e semplice affermazione di sé stessi, anche a costo di usare altri esseri umani come mezzi. [...] La ragione, tante volte invocata quale guida sicura all’agire umano, non detta i fini ma solo i mezzi. Lo ha spiegato in modo esemplare un filosofo morale completamente dimenticato, Erminio Juvalta: «La ragione per sé non comanda nulla; né l’egoismo, né l’altruismo, né la giustizia. La ragione cerca, e mostra, se le riesce, i mezzi che servono a conservar la vita a chi la vuol conservare, a distruggerla a chi la vuol distruggere; addita ai pietosi le vie della pietà, ai giusti le vie della giustizia, e le vie del proprio tornaconto agli uomini senza scrupoli. Ma l’egoismo non è per sé più ‘razionale’ dell’altruismo, né il regresso più razionale del progresso, né la conservazione dell’individuo più razionale di quella della specie, né l’utile proprio più razionale che l’utile della collettività. Razionali non sono i fini, ma le relazioni dei mezzi ai fini. Ed è così ragionevole che dia la vita per un’idea chi pregia più l’idea che la vita, come che taccia la verità per un ciondolo chi ama più i ciondoli che la verità.»"  Incarichi Istituzionali È stato consulente della Presidenza della Repubblica Italiana per le attività culturali durante il settennato del Presidente Carlo Azeglio Ciampi. Ha collaborato con la Presidenza della Camera dei Deputati durante la presidenza di Luciano Violante. È stato coordinatore del Comitato Nazionale per la Valorizzazione della Cultura della Repubblica presso il Ministero dell'Interno.  È stato Presidente nazionale dell'Associazione Mazziniana Italiana.  Onorificenze Ufficiale dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiananastrino per uniforme ordinariaUfficiale dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiana «Di iniziativa del Presidente della Repubblica» Pubblicazioni Questa voce è da wikificare Questa voce o sezione sull'argomento scrittori non è ancora formattata secondo gli standard. Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le convenzioni di . Segui i suggerimenti del progetto di riferimento. Monografie (con indicazione delle rispettive traduzioni)   Nazionalisti e patrioti, Roma-Bari, Laterza    Etica del servizio e etica del comando, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica.    The Quotable Machiavelli, Princeton, Princeton University Press.  How to choose a leader. Machiavelli’s advice to citizens, Princeton, Princeton University Press.  L’autunno della Repubblica, Roma-Bari, Laterza.    Redeeming The Prince: The Meaning of Machiavelli’s Masterpiece, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Traduzione italiana, La redenzione dell’Italia. Saggio sul «Principe» di Machiavelli, Roma-Bari, Laterza, . Traduzione spagnola, La redención de El príncipe: el significado de la obra maestra de Maquiavelo, Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes: Ediciones Uniandes, .  Il sorriso di Niccolò. Storia di Machiavelli, nuova edizione, Roma-Bari, Laterza.  Scegliere il principe. I consigli di Machiavelli al cittadino elettore, Roma-Bari, Laterza. traduzione spagnola, La elección del príncipe: los consejos de Maquiavelo al ciudadano elector, tradotto da Paula Caballero Sánchez, Barcelona, Paidós, . Traduzione coreana, (Nugu reul ppobaya haneunga), tradotto da Jaejung Gim, 안티고네, Anyang : Antigone, . In uscita la traduzione portoghese.    L’Intransigente, Roma-Bari, Laterza.  Le parole del cittadino, Roma-Bari, Laterza.  La libertà dei servi, Roma-Bari, Laterza (paperback edition: ). Traduzione inglese, The liberty of servants: Berlusconi’s Italy, tradotto da Antony Shugaar, con una nuova prefazione dell'autore, Princeton, Princeton University Press, .  Lo scrittore di ricami, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis.    Come se Dio ci fosse. Religione e libertà nella storia d’Italia, Torino, Einaudi. Traduzione inglese, As If God Existed: Religion and Liberty in the History of Italy, tradotto da Alberto Nones, Princeton, Princeton University Press, .  2008  How to read Machiavelli, Cambridge, Granta. Traduzione italiana, Machiavelli filosofo della libertà, tradotto da Silvia Righini, Roma, Castelvecchi, . Traduzione coreana, How to read, .  L’Italia dei doveri, Milano, Rizzoli. Il Dio di Machiavelli e il problema morale dell’Italia, Roma-Bari, Laterza. Traduzione inglese, Machiavelli’s God, tradotto da Antony Shugaar, Princeton, Princeton University Press, Con Norberto Bobbio, Dialogo intorno alla repubblica, Roma-Bari, Laterza Traduzione spagnola, Diálogo en torno a la república, tradotto da Rosa Ruis Gatell, Barcelona, Tusquets, Traduzione portoghese, Diálogo em Torno da República, tradotto da Daniela Beccaccia Versiani, Rio de Janeiro, Campus Editora (paperback edition con titolo diverso: Direitos e Deveres na República: os Grandes Temas da Política e da Cidadania, Rio de Janeiro, Elsevier, 2007). Traduzione inglese, The Idea of the Republic, tradotto da Allan Cameron, con una nuova introduzione dell'autore, Cambridge, Polity, Traduzione francese, Dialogue autour de la république, tradotto da Guillaume Lagrée, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006. Traduzione (Gong he de li nian), tradotto d Yang Li Feng) (Chang chun  (Jilin Publishing Group LLC), Repubblicanesimo, Roma-Bari, Laterza. Traduzione inglese, Republicanism, tradotto da Anthony Shugaar, New York, Farrar Straus and Giroux, Traduzione tedesca, Die Idee der Republikanischen Freiheit, tradotto da Friederike Hausmann, Zurich, Pendo, Traduzione bulgara, Републиканизъм (Republikanizŭm), Sofia, Ciela, Traduzione coreana,Konghwajuŭi), tradotto da Kyŏng-hŭi Kim and Tong-gyu Kim, Kyŏnggi-do Goyang-si, In’gan Sarang, 2006. Traduzione catalana, Republicanisme, tradotto da Gabriel Genescà Dueñas, Barcelona, Angle, 2007. Traduzione francese, Républicanisme, translated by Christopher Hamel, Paris, Bord de l’eau, . Traduzione araba, al-Fikr al-jumhūrī tradotto da ʻIzz al-Dīn ʻAnāyah, Abū Ẓaby, Hayʼat Abū Ẓaby lil-thaqāfah wa-al-turāth (Kalimah), . Spanish translation, Republicanismo, introduction by Manuel Suárez Cortina, Santander, Universidad de Cantabria, Machiavelli, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  Il sorriso di Niccolò. Storia di Machiavelli, Roma-Bari, Laterza (paperback edition:  pubblicato anche da Milano, Edizioni de Il Giornale, e da Milano, Edizioni de Il Sole 24 Ore, ). traduzione inglese, Niccolò’s Smile. A Biography of Machiavelli, tradotto da Antony Shugaar, New York, Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2000 (paperback edition: 2002). Traduzione spagnola, La sonrisa de Maquiavelo, tradotto da Atilio Pentimalli, Barcelona, Tusquets, pubblicato anche da Barcelona, Folio. Traduzione tedesca, Das Lächeln des Niccolò: Machiavelli und seine Zeit, tradotto da Friederike Hausmann, Zurich-Munich, Pendo (pubblicato anche da Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft e da Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, Traduzione portoghese, O sorriso de Nicolau. História de Maquiavel, tradotto da Valéria Pereira de Silva, São Paulo (Brazil), Estação Liberdade, Traduzione olandese, De glimlach van Niccolo: een biografie van Machiavelli, tradotto da Mieke Geuzebroek and Pietha de Voogd, Amsterdam, Mets & Schilt, (pubblicato anche da Roeselare, Roularta Books, Traduzione svedese, Niccolòs leende: historien om Machiavelli, tradotto da Paul Enoksson, Paul, Stockholm, Atlantis, 2004. Traduzione polacca, Uśmiech Machiavellego, tradotto da Krzysztof Żaboklicki, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo W.A.B., Traduzione giapponese, (Makiaverri no shōgai : Sono bishō no nazo), tradotto da Yoshimi Takeda, Tokyo, Hakusuisha, Traduzione cinese (Shanghai Translation Publishing House), Shanghai, Traduzione araba, Projectemirati.  For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press Traduzione italiana, Per Amore della Patria. Patriottismo e nazionalismo nella storia, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1995 (paperback edition con una nuova introduzione dell'autore: Traduzione spagnola, Por amor a la patria: un ensayo sobre el patriotismo y el nacionalismo, tradotto da Patrick Alfaya MacSchane, Madrid, Acento Editorial, Traduzione turca, Vatan Aşkı: Yurtseverlik ve Milliyetçilik Üzerine Bir Deneme, tradotto da Abdullah Yılmaz, Istanbul, Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1997. Traduzione rumena, Din dragoste de patrie: un eseu despre patriotism și naționalism, Bucureştii, Humanitas, 2002. Traduzione giapponese (Patoriotizumu to nashonarizumu : Jiyū o mamoru sokokuai), tradotto da Rui Satō and Makiko Satō, Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, Traduzione cinese,Guan yu ai guo: Lun ai guo zhu yi yu min zu zhu yi), translated by Shanghai, Shang hai ren min chu ban she), .  From Politics to Reason of State. The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics,  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Traduzione italiana, Dalla politica alla ragion di stato, Roma, Donzelli, Traduzione spagnola, De la política a la razón de estado: la adquisición y transformación del lenguaje politico, tradotto da Sandra Chaparro Martinez, con prefazione di Sandra Chaparro Martinez and Rafael del Águila, Madrid, Akal,  Traduzione cines 1988  La théorie de la société bien ordonnée chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter. Traduzione inglese, Jean Jacques Rousseau and the “Well-Ordered Society”, tradotto da Derek Hanson, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988. traduzione italiana, Jean-Jacques Rousseau e la teoria della società bene ordinata, Bologna, Il Mulino,  L’etica laica di Erminio Juvalta, Milano, Franco Angeli.  Saggi e articoli In uscita  ‘La civiltà statuale’, in Francesco Di Donato (ed.), Cultura civica e civiltà statuale, Bologna, Il Mulino.  ‘Libertà e profezia in Machiavelli’, in Attilio Scuderi (ed.), Machiavelli e i confini del potere, Milano, Mimesis.  ‘La passione civile e la scienza politica di Giovanni Sartori’, in Jorge Islas López (ed.), Homenaje pòstumo: la ciencia política de Giovanni Sartori, Fondo de cultura económica, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City.    ‘Civic religion, Patriotism and Prophecy in early-Modern Italian City-Republics’, in Kurt Almqvist (ed.) Nation, state and empire. Perspectives from the Engelsberg seminar, Stockholm, Axess Publishing AB,  8 ‘Debunking “Machiavellian” Myths’, review of David Johnston, Nadia Urbind Camila Vergara (eds.), Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, , in Law and Liberty,  ‘Machiavelli and Rousseau’, in Thinking with Rousseau: From Machiavelli to Schmitt, ed. by Helena Rosenblatt and Paul Schweigert, Cambridge University Press,   ‘Postfazione’, in Roberto Bertoni, Protagonisti sempre. Un secolo di storia visto con gli occhi dei ragazzi, with a preface by Enrico Letta, Reggio Emilia, Imprimatur.  ‘Realism and prophecy in Machiavelli and in Italian political culture’, The Italianist,  ‘The redeeming Prince’, in Timothy Fuller (ed.), Machiavelli's Legacy. "The Prince" After Five Hundred Years, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press,   ‘Prefazione’, in Carlo Mosca, Il prefetto e l’unità nazionale, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica. ‘Skinner’, ‘God’ and ‘Macaulay’, in Gennaro Sasso and Giorgio Inglese (directors), Enciclopedia machiavelliana, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  ‘Introduction’, new edition of the Vita di Niccolò Machiavelli by Roberto Ridolfi, Roma, Castelvecchi.  ‘Introduction’, new edition of The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli, Roma, Castelvecchi.  ‘Preface’, in Nicolas Maquiavelo, El Principe, Edicion Commemorativa, Mexico City, Taurus.  ‘Preface’, in Leone Ginzburg, La tradizione del Risorgimento, Roma, Castelvecchi.  ‘Se è libero bisogna che creda’, in 5 variazioni sul credere, ed. by Marco Bouchard, Torino, Edizioni Gruppo Abele.    ‘L’attualità del Principe’, in Alessandro Campi (ed.), Il principe di Niccolò Machiavelli e il suo tempo. Roma, Complesso del Vittoriano, Salone centrale, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana.  Review of Corrado Vivanti, ‘Niccolo Machiavelli: An Intellectual Biography’, Renaissance Quarterly, ‘Premessa’, in Antonio Gisondi, La moralità della Resistenza: l’esperienza del partigiano Bosco, Benevento, Associazione Terre dei Gambacorta, ‘Prefazione’, in Fernanda Gallo, Dalla patria allo Stato. Una biografia intellettuale di Bertrando Spaventa, Roma-Bari, Laterza.    ‘Patriotism and European Unity’, in B. Ehrenzeller, C. GreweGomez, A. Kley, M. Kotzur, K. Odendahl, B. Schindler & D. Thürer, (Eds.), Vom Staatsbürger zum Weltbürgerein republikanischer Diskurs in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Drittes Kolloquium der 'Peter Häberle-Stiftung' an der Universität St.Gallen, Zurich/St. Gallen, Dike Verlag.  ‘La costituzione repubblicana: un manuale di educazione civica’, in Ilario Belloni and Marcello Gisondi (eds.), Lessico civico: teorie e pratiche della cittadinanza, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis.  ‘Le origini meridiane del repubblicanesimo’, in Federica Frediani and Fernanda Gallo (eds.), Ethos repubblicano e pensiero meridiano, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis.  ‘La dimensione religiosa del Risorgimento’, in Alberto Melloni (ed.), Cristiani d’Italia. Chiese, società, stato, 1861-, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  ‘La libertà politica è un bene fragile’, Lettera internazionale. Rivista trimestrale europea,  ‘Ragione e passioni nell’educazione civica’, in Ilario Belloni and Rosario Forlenza (eds.), Questioni civiche. Forme, simboli e confini della cittadinanza, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis.  ‘Prefazione’, in Giuseppe Fonseca, La Costituzione: il pilastro di cristallo, Napoli, La scuola di Pitagora. Machiavelli, il carcere, Il Principe’, in Gli anni di Firenze, Roma-Bari, .  ‘The Republican Content of the Italian Constitution’, in La Costituzione ieri e oggi. Roma, Atti dei Convegni Lincei Roma, Bardi.  ‘Etica e diritto: la forza intelligente per sconfiggere la violenza’ in Regione Piemonte, Piano regionale per la prevenzione della violenza contro le donne e per il sostegno alle vittime. ‘Religione e libertà nella Democratie en Amérique’, in Dante Bolognesi e Sauro Mattarelli (eds.), Fra libertà e democrazia: l’eredità di Tocqueville e J. S. Mill, Milano, Franco Angeli.  ‘Una nuova utopia della libertà’, Quaderni del Circolo Rosselli, ‘Machiavelli’s Realism’, Constellations,  ‘Religione/2: Tutte le ragioni del liberalismo’, with Ackerman, Amato, Bassetti, Buruma, Cacciari, Carandini, Crowder, Eder, Parisi, Pombeni, Roman, Schlegel, Schwarzenberg, Taylor, Nadia Urbinati, Reset, Dove Ratzinger sbaglia/Where Ratzinger is mistaken.   ‘Machiavelli oratore’, in Jean-Jacques Marchand (ed.), Machiavelli senza i Medici, scrittura del potere, potere della scrittura. Atti del convegno di Losanna, Roma, Salerno Editrice.  ‘Due concetti di religione civile’, in Maurizio Ridolfi (ed.), Rituali civili: storie nazionali e memorie pubbliche nell’Europa contemporanea, Roma, Gangemi.  ‘Patriottismo e rinascita civile’, Aspenia,  ‘Introduction’, in Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, translated by Peter Bondanella, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  ‘Prefazione’, in Giuseppe Mazzini, Scritti politici, edited by Terenzio Grandi and Augusto Comba, 2nd edition, Torino, UTET.  ‘Introduzione’, in What is a man? Collection of young thouthsChe cos’è l’uomo? Raccolta di giovani pensieri, Senigallia, MIUR, Le Marche.   ‘Repubblicanesimo’, in Norberto Bobbio, Nicola Matteucci and Gianfranco Pasquino (directors), Dizionario di Politica, 3rd edition, Torino, UTET,   ‘Libertà democratica, libertà repubblicana e libertà socialista’, in Thomas Casadei (ed.), Repubblicanesimo democrazia socialismo delle libertà. “Incroci” per una rinnovata cultura politica, Milan, Franco Angeli,  ‘Il lavoro nobilita l’uomo e l’impresa’, Impegno. Mensile di cultura sociale,  ‘Els ideals del republicanisme: república, llibertat, virtut i patriotisme’, Idees: Revista de temes contemporanis,  ‘Libertad republicana y emancipación social’, Revista de la Fundación Juan March,   ‘Republic and Democracy: On Early Modern Origins of Democratic Theory’, in Theodor K. Raab and Ezra Suleiman (eds.), The Making and Unmaking of Democracy. Lessons From History and World Politics, New York and London, Routledge.  ‘Della lontananza’, in Alberto Sinigaglia (ed.), La saggezza del vivere. Tracce di etica, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis.  ‘Repubblicanesimo e Costituzione della Repubblica’ in Maurizio Ridolfi (ed.), Almanacco della Repubblica: storia d’Italia attraverso le tradizioni, le istituzioni e le simbologie repubblicane, Milano, Bruno Mondadori.  ‘Europa contro america?’, Il pensiero mazziniano, ‘Dio nella costituzione’, Il pensiero mazziniano, Con Norberto Bobbio, ‘Berlusconi y el poder oculto. Diálogo con Maurizio Viroli’, Claves de razón práctica, n. 126, 2002,  50-56.  ‘Sul rientro dei savoia’, Il pensiero mazziniano, ‘Scrivere la costituziuone. L’esempio della storia americana’, Il pensiero mazziniano, ‘Il despota e il tiranno si sono fatti furbi’, Il pensiero mazziniano, ‘Il repubblicanesimo di Machiavelli’ and ‘Le ragioni di un dibattito’, in Simonetta Adorni Braccesi and Mario Ascheri (eds.), Politica e cultura nelle repubbliche italiane dal Medioevo all’età moderna: Firenze, Genova, Lucca, Siena, Venezia. Atti del convegno (Siena 1997), Roma, Istituto Storico Italiano per l’età moderna e contemporanea.  ‘El sentido olvidado del patriotismo republicano’, Isegoría: Revista de filosofía moral y política, ‘El patriotismo multicultural’, in Ramón Máiz Suárez (ed.), Construcción de Europa, democracia y globalización,  2, Santiago de Compostela, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela.  ‘El significado de la libertad’, Revista de libros, ‘Giù le mani da Carlo Cattaneo’, Il pensiero mazziniano, ‘Questioni attorno al repubblicanesimo:un dialogo fra Salvatore Veca e Maurizio Viroli’, Il pensiero mazziniano,  ‘Repubblicanesimo, liberalismo e comunitarismo’, Filosofia e questioni pubbliche,   ‘Niccolò Machiavelli’, in Alberto Andreatta and Artemio Enzo Baldini (eds.), Il pensiero politico. Idee, teorie, dottrine. Età moderna, Torino, UTET.  ‘Multicultura e individualismo’, review of Michael Walzer, ‘Tratado sobre la tolerancia’, Revista de libros, ‘Nacionalismo y democracia’, Revista de ciencia política, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile,  .  ‘El significado histórico del patriotismo’, Revista de ciencia política / Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile,  ‘La Repubblica romana’, Il pensiero mazziniano, ‘Repubblicanesimo’, Il pensiero mazziniano,  ‘Rousseau y el derecho natural’, review of Helena Rosenblatt, ‘Rousseau and Geneva. From the First Discourse to the Social Contract’, Revista de libros,  ‘Patriotismo y nacionalismo entre el final del siglo XVIII y los inicios del siglo XIX’, in José María Portillo Valdés and José María Iñurritegui Rodríguez (eds.), Constitución en España: orígenes y destinos.  ‘La sinistra non scordi la Patria’, Il pensiero mazziniano,  ‘I guerrieri di Dio: chi sono i «theoconservatori» che scendono in lotta contro aborto, eutanasia e gay’, La Stampa, April 2.  ‘L’arcipelago progressista: l’orgogliosa cultura liberal, fra battaglie per le minoranze, ambientalismo e progetti per riprendere il New Deal’, La Stampa, April 11.  ‘Un desafío al liberalismo, en nombre de la libertad’, review of Philip Pettit, ‘Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government’, Revista de libros, No. 11 ‘Discussione americana e caso italiano’, in Martha Nussbaum, Gian Enrico Rusconi and Maurizio Viroli (eds.), Piccole patrie, grande mondo, Roma, Donzelli.  Review of Anthony J. Parel, ‘The Machiavellian Cosmos’, Renaissance Quarterly,   ‘Il significato storico della nascita del concetto di Ragion di Stato’, in Enzo Baldini (ed.), Aristotelismo politico e ragion di Stato. Atti del Convegno internazionale di Torino, 11-13 febbraio 1993, Firenze, Olschki.  ‘Patrioti o Traditori?’, L’Indice, April 1995.  ‘Il ritorno della Nazione’, I democratici,   ‘L’etica politica ciceroniana e il suo significato moderno’, Nuova Civiltà delle Macchine, 12, n. 1 (January-March 1994),  197-202.  ‘La cattiva retorica dell’autonomia della politica’, Il Mulino, ‘Politika kot državljanska filozofija’, Časopis za kritiko znanosti,   ‘Nazionalismo e patriottismo’, Il Mulino,  ‘Politics as Civil Philosophy’, in William R. Shea and Antonio Spadafora (eds.), From the Twilight of Probability: Ethics and Politics, Canton (MA), Science History Publications.  ‘The Revolution in the Concept of Politics’, Political Theory,  Review of Sebastian De Grazia, ‘Machiavelli in Hell’, Political Theory, ‘Una filosofia civile tra comunitari e liberali’, Ragioni Critiche,  ‘Introduction’, in Quentin Skinner, Le origini del pensiero politico moderno, Bologna, Il Mulino.  Review of Michael Walzer, ‘The Company of Critics’, L’Indice, n. 3.  ‘Machiavelli and the classical idea of politics’, in Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  1989  ‘Republic and Politics in Machiavelli and Rousseau’, History of Political Thought,  ‘Machiavelli e Rousseau: i dilemmi della politica republicana’, Teoria Politica, ‘The concept of “order” and the language of classical republicanism in Jean Jacques Rousseau’, in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  ‘“Revisionisti” e “ortodossi” nella storia delle idee politiche’, Rivista di filosofia,  ‘La Théorie du Contrat Social et le concept de “Republique” chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau’, Archiv fur Recht-und-Sozialphilosophie,‘Dovere morale e pluralismo etico in Erminio Juvalta’, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia,  ‘La “Morale dei Positivisti” e l’etica del socialismo’, in Paolo Rossi Monti (ed.), L’età del positivismo, Bologna, Il Mulino.  ‘Il Marxismo e l’ideologia del socialismo italiano’, in Georges Labica  l’oeuvre de Marx, un siecle apres, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.  ‘Despotismo e cittadini’, Transizione, Erminio Juvalta e la teoria della giustizia, Rivista di filosofia,  ‘Antonio Labriola “filosofo del socialismo”’, Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, ‘Aspetti della recezione di Engels in Italia. Tra socialismo scientifico e crisi del marxismo’, in Franco Zannino (ed.), L’Antidühring: affermazione e deformazione del marxismo? Annale V della Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso -Issoco, Milano, Franco Angeli.  ‘Il problema dell’etica razionale in Erminio Juvalta’, Studi sulla cultura filosofica italiana tra Ottocento e Novecento, Bologna, CLUEB.  ‘Etica e marxismo. A proposito di una recente discussione’, Problemi della Transizione,  Socialismo e cultura, 'Studi Storici’,   Il dialogo fra Engels e Labriola, ‘Critica marxista’,  ‘Nella crisi del positivismo: la ricerca teorica del «Divenire Sociale» Giornale critico della filosofia italiana,  ‘Filosofia e politica nel “Federico Engels” di Mondolfo’, in Antonio Santucci (ed.), Pensiero antico e pensiero moderno in Mondolfo, Bologna, Cappelli.  Curatele  Con Nerio Alessandri, Wellness. Storia e cultura del vivere bene, Milano, Sperling & Kupfer. Traduzione inglese , Wellness. History and culture of living well, Milano, Sperling & Kupfer,  Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, tradotto da Peter Bondanella, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  Libertà politica e virtù civile. Significati e percorsi del repubblicanesimo classico, Torino, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli.  2Lezioni per la repubblica: la festa è tornata in città, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis.   Con Domenico Losurdo, Ascesa e declino delle repubbliche, Urbino, Quattro Venti. Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza, L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza, L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza, L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza, .Per Amore della patria. Patriottismo e nazionalismo nella storia, Laterza, L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza, L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza, Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato.  Blog ufficiale, su maurizioviroli.blogspot.com.  Opere su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.  Registrazioni di Maurizio Viroli, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale.  issuu.com/edizioni-in-magazine/docs/forli_in_1- pagina personale a Princeton Viroli da Emsf-Enciclopedia multimediale delle scienze filosofiche della RAI Maurizio Viroli, profilo biografico da Ethica Forum Maurizio Viroli, profilo dall'Università della Svizzera italiana Nello Ajello, Quanti servi in giro per l'Italia, recensione a La libertà dei servi, la Repubblica, 6 La libertà dei servi, dal sito dell'Associazione Paolo Sylos Labini La libertà dei servi, recensione del libroBrian Lamb, Intervista su Niccolo's Smile: A Biography of Machiavelli, Booknotes da C-SPAN (video e trascrizione) L'intransigente, con Maurizio Viroli, da Fahrenheit del 22 febbraio , Radio Tre.

 

Virtuosum: Grice: “The etymology of ‘virtue’ is fantastic: it is strictly a bit like ‘manliness,’ only the Romans were never sure who was ‘vir’ and who wasn’t!” -- “virtue is entire”“Do not multiply virtues beyond necessity” -- virtue ethics, also called virtue-based ethics and agent-based ethics, conceptions or theories of morality in which virtues play a central or independent role. Thus, it is more than simply the account of the virtues offered by a given theory. Some take the principal claim of virtue ethics to be about the moral subject  that, in living her life, she should focus her attention on the cultivation of her or others’ virtues. Others take the principal claim to be about the moral theorist  that, in mapping the structure of our moral thought, she should concentrate on the virtues. This latter view can be construed weakly as holding that the moral virtues are no less basic than other moral concepts. In this type of virtue ethics, virtues are independent of other moral concepts in that claims about morally virtuous character or action are, in the main, neither reducible to nor justified on the basis of underlying claims about moral duty or rights, or about what is impersonally valuable. It can also be construed strongly as holding that the moral virtues are more basic than other moral concepts. In such a virtue ethics, virtues are fundamental, i.e., claims about other moral concepts are either reducible to underlying claims about moral virtues or justified on their basis. Forms of virtue ethics predominated in Western philosophy before the Renaissance, most notably in Aristotle, but also in Plato and Aquinas. Several ancient and medieval philosophers endorsed strong versions of virtue ethics. These views focused on character rather than on discrete behavior, identifying illicit behavior with vicious behavior, i.e., conduct that would be seriously out of character for a virtuous person. A virtuous person, in turn, was defined as one with dispositions relevantly linked to human flourishing. On these views, while a person of good character, or someone who carefully observes her, may be able to articulate certain principles or rules by which she guides her conduct or to which, at least, it outwardly conforms, the principles are not an ultimate source of moral justification. On the contrary, they are justified only insofar as the conduct they endorse would be in character for a virtuous person. For Aristotle, the connection between flourishing and virtue seems conceptual. He conceived moral virtues as dispositions to choose under the proper guidance of reason, and defined a flourishing life as one lived in accordance with these virtues. While most accounts of the virtues link them to the flourishing of the virtuous person, there are other possibilities. In principle, the flourishing to which virtue is tied whether causally or conceptually may be either that of the virtuous subject herself, or that of some patient who is a recipient of her virtuous behavior, or that of some larger affected group  the agent’s community, perhaps, or all humanity, or even sentient life in general. For the philosophers of ancient Greece, it was human nature, usually conceived teleologically, that fixed the content of this flourishing. Medieval Christian writers reinterpreted this, stipulating both that the flourishing life to which the virtues lead extends past death, and that human flourishing is not merely the fulfillment of capacities and tendencies inherent in human nature, but is the realization of a divine plan. In late twentieth-century versions of virtue ethics, some theorists have suggested that it is neither to a teleology inherent in human nature nor to the divine will that we should look in determining the content of that flourishing to which the virtues lead. They understand flourishing more as a matter of a person’s living a life that meets the standards of her cultural, historical tradition. In his most general characterization, Aristotle called a thing’s virtues those features of it that made it and its operation good. The moral virtues were what made people live well. This use of ‘making’ is ambiguous. Where he and other premodern thinkers thought the connection between virtues and living well to be conceptual, moral theorists of the modernist era have usually virtue ethics virtue ethics understood it causally. They commonly maintain that a virtue is a character trait that disposes a person to do what can be independently identified as morally required or to effect what is best best for herself, according to some theories; best for others, according to different ones. Benjamin Franklin, e.g., deemed it virtuous for a person to be frugal, because he thought frugality was likely to result in her having a less troubled life. On views of this sort, a lively concern for the welfare of others has moral importance only inasmuch as it tends to motivate people actually to perform helpful actions. In short, benevolence is a virtue because it conduces to beneficent conduct; veracity, because it conduces to truth telling; fidelity, because it conduces to promise keeping; and so on. Reacting to this aspect of modernist philosophy, recent proponents of virtue ethics deny that moral virtues derive from prior determinations of what actions are right or of what states of affairs are best. Some, especially certain theorists of liberalism, assign virtues to what they see as one compartment of moral thought and duties to a separate, and only loosely connected compartment. For them, the life and theory of virtue is autonomous. They hold that virtues and duties have independent sources of justification, with virtues chiefly concerned with the individual’s personal “ideals,” self-image, or conception of her life goals, while duties and rights are thought to derive from social rules regulating interpersonal dealings. Proponents of virtue ethics maintain that it has certain advantages over more modern alternatives. They argue that virtue ethics is properly concrete, because it grounds morality in facts about human nature or about the concrete development of particular cultural traditions, in contrast with modernist attempts to ground morality in subjective preference or in abstract principles of reason. They also claim that virtue ethics is truer to human psychology in concentrating on the less conscious aspects of motivation  on relatively stable dispositions, habits, and long-term goals, for example  where modern ethics focuses on decision making directed by principles and rules. Virtue ethics, some say, offers a more unified and comprehensive conception of moral life, one that extends beyond actions to comprise wants, goals, likes and dislikes, and, in general, what sort of person one is and aims to be. Proponents of virtue ethics also contend that, without the sensitivity and appreciation of their situation and its opportunities that only virtues consistently make available, agents cannot properly apply the rules that modernist ethical theories offer to guide their actions. Nor, in their view, will the agent follow those rules unless her virtues offer her sufficient clarity of purpose and perseverance against temptation. Several objections have been raised against virtue ethics in its most recent forms. Critics contend that it is antiquarian, because it relies on conceptions of human nature whose teleology renders them obsolete; circular, because it allegedly defines right action in terms of virtues while defining virtues in terms of right action; arbitrary and irrelevant to modern society, since there is today no accepted standard either of what constitutes human flourishing or of which dispositions lead to it; of no practical use, because it offers no guidance when virtues seem to conflict; egoistic, in that it ultimately directs the subject’s moral attention to herself rather than to others; and fatalistic, in allowing the morality of one’s behavior to hinge finally on luck in one’s constitution, upbringing, and opportunities. There may be versions of virtue ethics that escape the force of all or most of the objections, but not every form of virtue ethics can claim for itself all the advantages mentioned above.  virtue epistemology, the subfield of epistemology that takes epistemic virtue to be central to understanding justification or knowledge or both. An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other intellectually valuable goal. Following Aristotle, we should distinguish these virtues from such qualities as wisdom or good judgment, which are the intellectual basis of practical  but not necessarily intellectual  success. The importance, and to an extent, the very definition, of this notion depends, however, on larger issues of epistemology. For those who favor a naturalist conception of knowledge say, as belief formed in a “reliable” way, there is reason to call any truth-conducive quality or properly working cognitive mechanism an epistemic virtue. There is no particular reason to limit the epistemic virtues to recognizable personal qualities: a high mathematical aptitude may count as an epistemic virtue. For those who favor a more “normative” conception of knowledge, the corresponding notion of an epistemic virtue or vice will be narrower: it will be tied to personal qualities like impartiality or carelessness whose exercise one would associate with an ethics of belief. H. P. Grice, “Philosophy, like virtue, is entire;” H. P. Grice, “Virtutes non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem,” H. P. Grice, “Aristotle’s mesoteswhere virtue lies.”

 

vis: When in a Latinate mood, Grice would refer to a ‘vis’ of an expression. Apparently, ‘vis’ is cognate with ‘validum,’ transf., of abstr. things, force, notion, meaning, sense, import, nature, essence (cf. significatio): “id, in quo est omnis vis amicitiae,” Cic. Lael. 4, 15: “eloquentiae vis et natura,” id. Or. 31, 112: “vis honesti (with natura),” id. Off. 1, 6, 18; cf. id. Fin. 1, 16, 50: “virtutis,” id. Fam. 9, 16, 5: “quae est alia vis legis?” id. Dom. 20, 53: “vis, natura, genera verborum et simplicium et copulatorum,” i.e. the sense, signification, id. Or. 32, 115: “vis verbi,” id. Inv. 1, 13, 17; id. Balb. 8, 21: “quae vis insit in his paucis verbis, si attendes, si attendes, intelleges,” id. Fam. 6, 2, 3: “quae vis subjecta sit vocibus,” id. Fin. 2, 2, 6: “nominis,” id. Top. 8, 35: μετωνυμία, cujus vis est, pro eo, quod dicitur, causam, propter quam dicitur, ponere, Quint. 8, 6, 23.

 

vital lie: Grice: “I would define a vital life as an instance of self-deception or lying to oneself when it fosters hope, confidence, self-esteem, mental health, or creativity; or any false belief or unjustified attitude that helps people cope with difficulties; or  a lie to other people designed to promote their wellbeing; e.. g.: self-deceiving optimism about one’s prospects for success in work or personal relationships may generate hope, mobilize energy, enrich life’s meaning, and increase chances for success. Grice considers the optimism law as basic in folk-psychology. Ibsen dramatises “life-lies” as essential for happiness The Wild Duck, and O’Neill portrays “pipe dreams” as necessary crutches The Iceman Cometh. Nietzsche endorsed “pious illusions” or “holy fictions” about the past that liberate individuals and societies from shame and guilt On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life. In Problems of belief, Schiller praised normal degrees of vanity and self-conceit because they support selfesteem. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “Optimism,” in “Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.”

vittielo: essential Italian philosopher. Vincenzo Vitiello (n. Napoli), filosofo. È stato Professore di Filosofia teoretica all'Salerno. Studioso di Vico, dell'idealismo tedesco e del pensiero di Friedrich Nietzsche e Martin Heidegger in rapporto con la filosofia greca e la tradizione cristiana, ha elaborato una teoria ermeneutica, la "Topologia", fondata su una reinterpretazione del concetto di spazio come orizzonte trascendentale dell'operare umano. Gli sviluppi recenti della topologia riguardano in particolare la genealogia del linguaggio e del tempo. Ha affrontato più volte il tema della fede, da un punto di vista laico, collaborando con teologi quali Bruno Forte e Piero Coda.  Ha fondato la rivista di filosofia Paradosso,  di cui è stato condirettore con Massimo Cacciari, Umberto Curi, Sergio Givone, Carlo Sini e Giacomo Marramao. Collabora all'annuario Filosofia, edito da Laterza, e a numerose altre riviste specialistiche del settore filosofico, tra cui aut aut. Dirige la rivista di filosofia Il pensiero. Ha collaborato all'Annuario Filosofia, curato da Gianni Vattimo, e all'Annuario Europeo sulla Religione, curato da Jacques Derrida e Gianni Vattimo. Scrive su Teoria, Celan-Jahrbuch (Heidelberg), ER. Revista de Filosofía (Barcellona), Revista de Occidente (Madrid), Sileno (Madrid), Criterio (Buenos Aires) ed altre ancora. Ha svolto un'intensa attività pubblicistica su quotidiani e periodici italiani.  Ha tenuto cicli di conferenze e seminari in Europa (Germania, Francia, Spagna, Croazia), negli USA (New York, Chicago), e in America latina (Messico, Argentina). Suoi scritti sono stati tradotti in tedesco, francese, inglese e spagnolo.  Opere Monografie Filosofia della pratica e dottrina politica in Benedetto Croce, Napoli,  Etica e liberalismo nel pensiero di B. Croce, Napoli,  Il carattere discorsivo del conoscere, Napoli, Carlo Antoni interprete di Croce, Napoli, Storiografia e storia nel pensiero di Benedetto Croce, Libreria Scientifica Editrice, Napoli, Feeling e relation nella filosofia del conoscere di David Hume, Napoli, 1968 Storiografia e storia nel pensiero di Benedetto Croce, Napoli, Heidegger: il nulla e la fondazione della storicità, Argalia, Urbino, Dialettica ed ermeneutica: Hegel e Heidegger, Guida, Napoli, Utopia del nichilismo, Guida, Napoli, Studi Heideggeriani, Roma, Ethos ed eros in Hegel e Kant, ESI, Napoli, Logica e storia in Hegel (in collaborazione con R. Racinato), Napoli,  Bertrando Spaventa ed il problema del cominciamento, Guida, Napoli La palabra hendida, Barcellona, Hegel e la comprensione della modernità, Topologia del moderno, Marietti, Genova, La voce riflessa. Logica ed etica della contraddizione, Lanfranchi, Milano,  Elogio dello spazio. Ermeneutica e topologia, Bompiani, Milano, Cristianesimo senza redenzione, Laterza, Roma-Bari, Non dividere il sì dal no. Tra filosofia e letteratura, Laterza, Roma-Bari, Filosofia teoretica: le domande fondamentali: percorsi e interpretazioni, Milano, La favola di Cadmo, Laterza, Roma-Bari Vico e la topologia, Cronopio, Napoli La vita e il suo oltre. Dialogo sulla morte (in collaborazione con Bruno Forte), Roma  Il Dio possibile, esperienze di cristianesimo, Città Nuova, Roma Hegel in Italia, Milano  Dire Dio in segreto, Roma Cristianesimo e nichilismo: Dostoevskij-Heidegger, Morcelliana, Brescia Estetica e ascesi, Modena, E pose la tenda in mezzo a noi, AlboVersorio, Il Decalogo. Ricordati di Santificare le feste (in dialogo con Emanuele Severino),  I tempi della poesia. Ieri/oggi, Mimesis, Milano Dipingere Dio (con Bruno Forte e Serena Nono), AlboVersorio, Vico. Storia, linguaggio, natura, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma  Ripensare il cristianesimo-De Europa, Ananke, Oblio e memoria del sacro, Moretti & Vitali, Bergamo Grammatiche del pensiero. Dalla kenosi dell'io alla logica della seconda persona, Edizioni ETS, Celan Heidegger (con Félix Duque), Mimesis,  I comandamenti. Non dire falsa testimonianza, Il Mulino,  L'ethos della topologia. Un itinerario di pensiero, Le Lettere, Firenze  Paolo e l'Europa. Cristianesimo e filosofia (con G. Rossé), Città Nuova, Roma L'immagine infranta. Linguaggio e mondo da Vico a Pollock, Bompiani, Milano  Articoli (parziale) Vico: tra storia e natura, in aut aut,  Complessità e aporie del moderno, in Filosofia politica, Dall'ermeneutica alla topologia, in aut aut,  Goethe interprete della modernità, in aut aut, Per amicizia: Epochè e metafora, in aut aut, Sentire le Radici, la Terra stessa, in aut aut, Andrea Zanzotto, ovvero: la poesia come genealogia della parola in aut aut, Enrico Redaelli, Il nodo dei nodi. L'esercizio del pensiero in Vattimo, Vitiello, Sini, Edizioni ETS, Pisa, Luoghi del pensare. Contributi in onore di Vitiello, Mimesis Edizioni, Milano,Vitiello, scheda personale e link ai contributi per l'EMSF-Enciclopedia multimediale delle scienze filosofiche di RAI Educational Intervista a Vitiello di Federico Lijoi, nel sito "Filosofia.it". l

 

volition – voluntas – volle -- cf. desideratum. a mental event involved with the initiation of action. ‘To will’ is sometimes taken to be the corresponding verb form of ‘volition’. The concept of volition is rooted in modern philosophy; contemporary philosophers have transformed it by identifying volitions with ordinary mental events, such as intentions, or beliefs plus desires. Volitions, especially in contemporary guises, are often taken to be complex mental events consisting of cognitive, affective, and conative elements. The conative element is the impetus  the underlying motivation  for the action. A velleity is a conative element insufficient by itself to initiate action. The will is a faculty, or set of abilities, that yields the mental events involved in initiating action. There are three primary theories about the role of volitions in action. The first is a reductive account in which action is identified with the entire causal sequence of the mental event the volition causing the bodily behavior. J. S. Mill, for example, says: “Now what is action? Not one thing, but a series of two things: the state of mind called a volition, followed by an effect. . . . [T]he two together constitute the action” Logic. Mary’s raising her arm is Mary’s mental state causing her arm to rise. Neither Mary’s volitional state nor her arm’s rising are themselves actions; rather, the entire causal sequence the “causing” is the action. The primary difficulty for this account is maintaining its reductive status. There is no way to delineate volition and the resultant bodily behavior without referring to action. There are two non-reductive accounts, one that identifies the action with the initiating volition and another that identifies the action with the effect of the volition. In the former, a volition is the action, and bodily movements are mere causal consequences. Berkeley advocates this view: “The Mind . . . is to be accounted active in . . . so far forth as volition is included. . . . In plucking this flower I am active, because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition” Three Dialogues. In this century, Prichard is associated with this theory: “to act is really to will something” Moral Obligation, 9, where willing is sui generis though at other places Prichard equates willing with the action of mentally setting oneself to do something. In this sense, a volition is an act of will. This account has come under attack by Ryle Concept of Mind. Ryle argues that it leads to a vicious regress, in that to will to do something, one must will to will to do it, and so on. It has been countered that the regress collapses; there is nothing beyond willing that one must do in order to will. Another criticism of Ryle’s, which is more telling, is that ‘volition’ is an obscurantic term of art; “[volition] is an artificial concept. We have to study certain specialist theories in order to find out how it is to be manipulated. . . . [It is like] ‘phlogiston’ and ‘animal spirits’ . . . [which] have now no utility” Concept of Mind. Another approach, the causal theory of action, identifies an action with the causal consequences of volition. Locke, e.g., says: “Volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. . . . [V]olition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby . . . the mind endeavors to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power” Essay concerning Human Understanding. This is a functional account, since an event is an action in virtue of its causal role. Mary’s arm rising is Mary’s action of raising her arm in virtue of being caused by her willing to raise it. If her arm’s rising had been caused by a nervous twitch, it would not be action, even if the bodily movements were photographically the same. In response to Ryle’s charge of obscurantism, contemporary causal theorists tend to identify volitions with ordinary mental events. For example, Davidson takes the cause of actions to be beliefs plus desires and Wilfrid Sellars takes volitions to be intentions to do something here and now. Despite its plausibility, however, the causal theory faces two difficult problems: the first is purported counterexamples based on wayward causal chains connecting the antecedent mental event and the bodily movements; the second is provision of an enlightening account of these mental events, e.g. intending, that does justice to the conative element. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “A. J. P. Kenny on voliting.”

 

volpe. Essential Italian philosopher. Galvano della Volpe (Imola), filosofo.  Si laurea in filosofia con Mondolfo al Bologna, insegnando dapprima Storia e Filosofia presso il liceo bolognese "Luigi Galvani" e il liceo "Dante Alighieri" a Ravenna. Storia della Filosofia ed Estetica presso l'Messina.  Legato inizialmente alla tradizione gentiliana, dedica gran parte dei propri lavori giovanili e della prima maturità a questioni strettamente teoretiche e storico-filosofiche, attestandosi infine su posizioni fortemente anti-idealistiche. Approda così attraverso la rivalutazione dell'empirismo a un umanesimo positivo di ispirazione marxista, mantenendo un'impostazione fondamentalmente dialettico-materialistica in costante confronto critico e polemico soprattutto con la dialettica hegeliana e l'idealismo post-hegeliano, ma anche con le correnti positivistiche contemporanee (positivismo logico e neo-empirismo) e con l'esistenzialismo tanto laico (Heidegger, ma soprattutto Jaspers) quanto religioso (Berdjaev e Marcel).  Questa svolta filosofica, testimoniata dal Discorso sull'ineguaglianza, lo conduce a un sempre maggiore interesse per i problemi della filosofia politica e dell'etica, considerati comunque in stretto rapporto con le questioni teoretiche (logiche e gnoseologiche). Non abbandona comunque i propri interessi storico-filosofici, rivolgendoli principalmente alle opere postume di Marx e alla storia dell'estetica. Tra gli scritti della maturità quello che oltre ad aver avuto più ampia diffusione rappresenta il più perspicuo esempio della capacità dell'autore di muoversi con piena consapevolezza critica tra i piani teoretico, storico e politico è senz'altro il saggio Rousseau e Marx. Per della Volpe il concetto di libertà implicitamente contenuto nel pensiero marxiano è perfettamente integrabile con quello esplicitamente formulato da Rousseau, il quale quindi non sarebbe da considerarsi né tra i teorici della rivoluzione borghese né tra i nostalgici di una società parcellizzata in piccolissime unità politiche cittadine, ma tra i più attuali preconizzatori della società senza classi o egualitaria.  Un altro dei punti nodali del pensiero di della Volpe è il tentativo di elaborare una teoria estetica rigorosamente materialistica. Egli sottolinea il ruolo delle caratteristiche strutturali e del processo sociale di produzione delle opere d'arte nella formazione del giudizio estetico e in forte polemica con la dottrina crociana dell'intuizione, da lui considerata in continuità con la tradizione romantica e misticheggiante dell'Ottocento, elabora il concetto di gusto come principale fonte del giudizio estetico stesso. In complesso la sua opera presenta nell'ambito del marxismo e della cultura filosofica italiani una posizione originale e controcorrente, ripresa negli anni sessanta dal più noto dei suoi allievi, ovvero Lucio Colletti.  Opere L'idealismo dell'atto e il problema delle categorie, Bologna, Zanichelli, Le origini e la formazione della dialettica hegeliana, I, Hegel romantico e mistico  Firenze, Le Monnier, Il misticismo speculativo di maestro Eckhart nei suoi rapporti storici, Bologna, Cappelli, La filosofia dell'esperienza di David Hume,  Firenze, Sansoni, Fondamenti di una filosofia dell'espressione, Bologna, Meridiani, Il principio di contraddizione e il concetto di sostanza prima in Aristotele. Contributo a una critica dei pensieri logici, Bologna, Azzoguidi, Crisi dell'estetica romantica, Messina, D'Anna,  Critica dei principi logici, Messina, D'Anna, Discorso sull'ineguaglianza. Con due saggi sull'etica dell'esistenzialismo, Roma, Ciuni, La teoria marxista dell'emancipazione umana. Saggio sulla trasmutazione marxista dei valori, Messina, Ferrara, La libertà comunista. Saggio di una critica della ragion “pura” pratica, Messina, Ferrara,  Studi sulla dialettica mistificata, I, Marx e lo stato moderno rappresentativo, Bologna, UPEB, Per la teoria di un umanesimo positivo. Studi e documenti sulla dialettica materialistica, Bologna, Zuffi,  Logica come scienza positiva, Messina-Firenze, D'Anna, Eckhart o della filosofia mistica, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1Poetica del Cinquecento. La poetica aristotelica nei commenti essenziali degli ultimi umanisti italiani con annotazioni e un saggio introduttivo, Bari, Laterza,Il verosimile filmico e altri scritti di Estetica, Roma, Edizioni Filmcritica,  Roma, La nuova sinistra, Rousseau e Marx e altri saggi di critica materialistica, Roma, Editori Riuniti,Critica del gusto, Milano, Feltrinelli, Chiave della dialettica storica, Roma, Samonà e Savelli,  Umanesimo positivo e emancipazione marxista, Milano, Sugar, Critica dell'ideologia contemporanea. Saggi di teoria dialettica, Roma, Editori Riuniti, Schizzo di una storia del gusto, Roma, Editori Riuniti, Opere, Ignazio Ambrogio, Roma, Editori Riuniti, Carlo Violi, Galvano della Volpe: testi e studi  introduzione di Nicolao Merker, La Libra, Messina Nicolao Merker, DELLA VOLPE, Galvano, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Galvano della Volpe, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Galvano della Volpe, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Galvano della Volpe, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Opere di Galvano della Volpe, . Galvano della Volpe, su Goodreads. 

 

volpi: essential Italian philosopher. Volpi (n. Vicenza), filoso. “Wild clarity” in Heidegger! Franco Volpi (filosofo)   Franco Volpi Franco Volpi (Vicenza), filosofo. Storico della filosofia, fu Professore di storia della filosofia a Padova e insegnò in varie università europee, canadesi e latinoamericane. Borsista della Fondazione Alexander von Humboldt di Bonn, membro dell'"Institut International de Philosophie" di Parigi, dell'Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti e dell'Accademia Olimpica di Vicenza, fu insignito dei premi "Montecchio" e "Nietzsche.” Tra le sue numerose pubblicazioni: Heidegger e Brentano, La rinascita della filosofia pratica in Germania, Heidegger e Aristotele,  Il nichilismo (tradotto in varie lingue), Guida a Heidegger,  I prossimi Titani. Conversazioni con Jünger (con Antonio Gnoli), Dizionario delle opere filosofiche, Il Dio degli acidi. Conversazioni con Albert Hofmann (con A. Gnoli), L'ultimo sciamano. Conversazioni heideggeriane (con A. Gnoli), Storia della filosofia dall'antichità a oggi (con Enrico Berti).  Per Adelphi curò opere di Schopenhauer, Heidegger e Carl Schmitt. Collaborò al quotidiano "la Repubblica" e occasionalmente alla "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung".  Mentre era in sella alla sua bicicletta a San Germano dei Berici, venne investito da un'auto e cadde in coma irreversibile. Morì il giorno successivo. Fu commemorato dal preside Paolo Bettiolo assieme a tutto il corpo docente dell'Padova.  Le sue ceneri sono al cimitero Carpaneda di Creazzo.  Note  Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti  Lorenzo Parolin, Commozione al Bo per l'addio a Volpi Il Giornale di Vicenza, Opere principali Heidegger e Brentano. L'aristotelismo e il problema dell'univocità dell'essere nella formazione filosofica del giovane Martin Heidegger, Cedam, Padova, La rinascita della filosofia pratica in Germania, Francisci, Albano/Padova, in:Filosofia pratica e scienza politica, Francisci, Abano/Padova, (con Carlo Natali, Laura Iseppi, Claudio Pacchiani) Heidegger e Aristotele, Daphne, Padova,  (ristampa Bari, Laterza, ) Lexikon der philosophischen Werke, Kröner, Stuttgart, Sulla fortuna del concetto di decadence nella cultura tedesca: Nietzsche e le sue fonti francesi, "Filosofia politica",Il nichilismo, Biblioteca Universale Laterza, Laterza, Roma-Bari,   trad. port. O niilismo, Edicoes Loyola, Sao Paulo, Guida a Heidegger, Laterza, Roma-Bari Hegel e i suoi critici, Per i licei e gli istituti magistrali, Laterza, Roma-Bari, Ángel Xolocotzi, La aventura de interpretar: los impulsos filosóficos de Franco Volpi, México D.F., Eón,  Francisco de Lara López, Entre fenomenología y hermenéutica: in Memoriam Franco Volpi, Madrid, Plaza y Valdés, . Franco Volpi interprete del pensiero contemporaneo, Atti dell'incontro internazionale di studio, Padova, Vicenza, Accademia Olimpica,  Ricordando Franco Volpi filosofo: Atti dell'Incontro internazionale, Lavarone, Comune di Lavarone,  Franco Volpi: il pudore del pensiero, Brescia, Morcelliana, Opere di Franco Volpi, Franco Volpi [Breve biografia con elenco pubblicazioni e traduzioni], su istitutoveneto.it, Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti. Essere, tempo, esistenza, lezione-intervista concessa dal prof. Franco Volpi all'Associazione Asia, sul valore e la funzione della filosofia, e sul significato e lo statuto di Essere e tempo di Heidegger.

 

volpicelli: essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “I read with intereset his early “Nature and spirit.” At that time at Oxford, there was not much of an Oxford spirit, so it spirited me.” Arnaldo Volpicelli (Roma),  filosofo. Fratello maggiore di Luigi Volpicelli. Prese parte come sottotenente alla prima guerra mondiale. Si laureò prima in Giurisprudenza e poi in Filosofia nel 1923. Allievo di Giovanni Gentile, fu docente prima alle Urbino e Pisa e alla Sapienza di Roma di Filosofia del diritto e poi di Dottrina dello Stato. Seguace del pensiero di Santi Romano, Fu, con Ugo Spirito, un teorico del "corporativismo integrale". Fu direttore delle riviste "Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica" e, con Giuseppe Bottai, di "Archivio di studi corporative,” Epurato dall'insegnamento alla caduta del fascismo, fu poi reintegrato, insegnando alla Facoltà di Scienze politiche. Opere: Natura e spirito, L'educazione politica dell'Italia,  I presupposti scientifici dell'ordinamento corporativo, Corporativismo e scienza giuridica, La certezza del diritto e la crisi odierna,Dizionario di Filosofia  Giovanni Franchi, Arnaldo Volpicelli Per una teoria dell'autogoverno, ESI, Napoli, Carlotta Latini, Arnaldo Volpicelli, in Il contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Diritto, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, .  Arnaldo Volpicelli, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.

 

voltaggio: essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “I enjoyed “What Leibniz actually saidand not just implicated.” “He also clarified Husserl to me.”  Francesco Voltaggio, detto Franco (Palermo, 29 settembre 1934), è un filosofo, storico della scienza e della medicina italiano.  Ha studiato presso l'Roma La Sapienza, dove ha avuto come amici e colleghi Gabriele Giannantoni, Ari Derecin, Enzo Siciliano, Muzi Epifani e Ester Fano, per poi laurearsi con Carlo Antoni.  Ha insegnato nelle Roma (“La Sapienza”), Mogadiscio e Macerata. Già caporedattore della rivista Sapere, ha collaborato fra gli altri con Il manifesto, Lettera Internazionale (di cui è socio fondatore), Apeiron, Janus e Medical. Consulente scientifico della Fondazione SigmaTau di Roma e dell'Istituto Psiconanalitico per le Ricerche Sociali (IPRS), è membro permanente del “Workshop internazionale di Storia, Filosofia e Antropologia della Medicina” di Senigallia.  Il figlio Stefano è un noto sceneggiatore cinematografico e televisivo.  Opere originali: Fondamenti della logica di Husserl, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità; Fondamenti della funzione critica, Roma; Che cosa ha veramente detto Leibniz, Roma, Ubaldini; Bernard Bolzano e la dottrina della scienza, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità; I filosofi e la storia: per le scuole medie superiori, Milano, Principato; L'arte della guarigione nelle culture umane, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri; Il medico nel bosco, Roma, Di Renzo Editore; La medicina come scienza filosofica (Collana Lezioni Italiane), Roma, Laterza; Italia Mediterranea. I flussi migratori nelle principali città rivierasche, Roma, Edizioni Edup; Antigone tradita. Una contraddizione della modernità: libertà e Stato nazionale (), Roma, Editori Internazionali Riuniti. Volumi curati Bernard Bolzano: I paradossi dell'infinito, Prefazione e Appendice FV, Milano, Feltrinelli; Gerard Radnitzky: Epistemologia e politica della ricerca, FV., Roma, Armando; Conrad Hal Waddington: L'evoluzione di un evoluzionista, FV., Roma, Armando; Michael Polanyi: La conoscenza inespressa, FV., Roma, Armando; Yves Christen: L'ora della sociobiologia, FV, Roma, Armando; W. I. B. Beveridge: L'arte della ricerca scientifica, FV, (Roma, Armando; David C. McClelland: Il potere: processi e strutture: un'analisi dall'interno, FV, Roma, Armando; Gerard Radnitsky et al: Progresso e razionalita della scienza Gerard Radnitzky, Gunnar Andersson ; prefazione di Francesco Barone; traduzione e premessa di FV, (Armando, Roma; Donald Philip Verene: Vico: La Scienza della fantasia; con prefazione di Vittorio Mathieu, FV, 1984, Armando, Roma; Gerald Holton: L'intelligenza scientifica: un'indagine sull'immaginazione creatrice dello scienziato, FV, Roma, Armando; Filosofi per la pace / Jeremy Bentham... [et al.], Daniele Archibugi e FV, Roma, Editori Riuniti; Galeno: Trattato sulla bile nera, FV,Torino, Nino Aragno Editore.  Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Voltaggio: what Leibniz implicatedas explicated by Grice.” H. P. Grice, “Voltaggio,” BANC MSS 90/135 c.

 

voluntas -- voluntarism: -- W. James: “I will that the chair slides over the floor toward me. It doesn’t.” cf. Grice on the volitivedesiderative -- any philosophical view that makes our ability to control the phenomena in question an essential part of the correct understanding of those phenomena. Thus, ethical voluntarism is the doctrine that the standards that define right and wrong conduct are in some sense chosen by us. Doxastic voluntarism is the doctrine that we have extensive control over what we believe; we choose what to believe. A special case of doxastic voluntarism is theological voluntarism, which implies that religious belief requires a substantial element of choice; the evidence alone cannot decide the issue. This is a view that is closely associated with Pascal, Kierkegaard, and James. Historical voluntarism is the doctrine that the human will is a major factor in history. Such views contrast with Marxist views of history. Metaphysical voluntarism is the doctrine, linked with Schopenhauer, that the fundamental organizing principle of the world is not the incarnation of a rational or a moral order but rather the will, which for Schopenhauer is an ultimately meaningless striving for survival, to be found in all of nature.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The will”

 

vyse: an unfortunate example by Grice. He wants to give an ambiguous sentence, “Strawson is caught in the grip of a vice.” Oddly, in The New World, Webster noticed this, and favoured the spelling ‘vyse.’ “But what Webster fails,” Grice adds, “to note, is that ‘vice’ and ‘vyse’ ARE cognate, hence no need for double talk!” “They both can be traced to ‘violence.’” Sir Cecil Vyse happens to be a character in Forster’s “A room with a view,” which gives a triple ambiguity, to “Strawson was caught in the grip of a Vyse.” Vyse was wonderfully played by Daniel Day Lewis in the film. “What is your profession, Mister Vyse?” Vyse: “Must one have a profeesion?”Vyse’s favourite motto applies to Grice, “Ingelese italianato, diavolo incarnate.”Grice: “Stupidly, when this is reversed the implicature is lost.

 

ward: j. English philosopher and psychologist. Influenced by Lotze, Herbart, and Brentano, Ward sharply criticized Bain’s associationism and its allied nineteenth-century reductive naturalism. His psychology rejected the associationists’ sensationism, which regarded mind as passive, capable only of sensory receptivity and composed solely of cognitive presentations. Ward emphasized the mind’s inherent activity, asserting, like Kant, the prior existence of an inferred but necessarily existing ego or subject capable of feeling and, most importantly, of conation, shaping both experience and behavior by the willful exercise of attention. Ward’s psychology stresses attention and will. In his metaphysics, Ward resisted the naturalists’ mechanistic materialism, proposing instead a teleological spiritualistic monism. While his criticisms of associationism and naturalism were telling, Ward was a transitional figure whose positive influence is limited, if we except H. P. Grice who follows him to a T. Although sympathetic to scientific psychologyhe founded scientific psychology in Britain by establishing a psychology laboratory he, with his student Stout, represented the beginning of armchair psychology at Oxford, which Grice adored. Through Stout he influenced the hormic psychology of McDougall, and Grice who calls himself a Stoutian (“until Prichard converted me”). Ward’s major work is “Psychology” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., 1886), reworked as Psychological Principles (1918). “one of the most philosophical psychologists England (if not Oxford) ever produced!”H. P. Grice -- cited by H. P. Grice. -- English philosopher. Influenced by Lotze, Herbart, and Brentano, Ward sharply criticized Bain’s associationism and its allied nineteenth-century reductive naturalism. His psychology rejected the associationists’ sensationism, which regarded mind as passive, capable only of sensory receptivity and composed solely of cognitive presentations. Ward emphasized the mind’s inherent activity, asserting, like Kant, the prior existence of an inferred but necessarily existing ego or subject capable of feeling and, most importantly, of conation, shaping both experience and behavior by the willful exercise of attention. Ward’s psychology stresses attention and will. In his metaphysics, Ward resisted the naturalists’ mechanistic materialism, proposing instead a teleological spiritualistic monism. While his criticisms of associationism and naturalism were telling, Ward was a transitional figure whose positive influence is limited, if we except H. P. Grice who follows him to a T. Although sympathetic to scientific psychology  he founded scientific psychology in Britain by establishing a psychology laboratory   he, with his student Stout, represented the beginning of armchair psychology at Oxford, which Grice adored. Through Stout he influenced the hormic psychology of McDougall, and Grice who calls himself a Stoutian “until Prichard converted me”. Ward’s major work is “Psychology” Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., 6, reworked as Psychological Principles 8. 

 

warnock:  Irish philosopher, born in the north of England (“He was so Irish, I could sing ‘Danny Boy’ to him all day longDame Mary Warnock). “One of my most intelligent collaborators.” Unlike any other of the collaborators, Warnock had what Grice calls “the gift for botanising.” They would spend hours on the philosophy of perception. His other English collaborators were, in alphabetic order: Pears, Strawson, and Thomson. And you can see the difference. Thomson was pretty obscure. Pears was a closet Vittersian. And Strawson was ‘to the point.’ With Warnock, Grice could ramble at ease. Warnock became the custodian of Austin’s heritage which somehow annoyed Grice. But the Warnock that Grice enjoyed most was the Warnock-while-the-SchoolMaster-Austin-was-around. Because they could play. And NOT in the play group, which was “anything but.” But Grice would philosophise on ‘perception,’ and especially ‘see’with Warnock. Their idiolects differed. Warnock, being Irish, was more creative, and less conservative. So it was good for Warnock to have Grice to harness him! Through Warnock, Grice got to discuss a few things with Urmson, the co-custodian of Austin’s legacy. But again, most of the discussions with Urmson were before Austin’s demise. Urmson and Warnock are the co-editors of Austin’s “Philosophical Papers.” Would Austin have accepted? Who knows. The essays were more or less easily available. Still. warnockianism: Grice: “I told Warnock, ‘How clever language is!” “He agreed, for we realised that language makes all the distinctions you need, and when you feel there is one missing, language allows you to introduce it!” --. Refs.: H. P. Grice and G. J. Warnock, The philosophy of perceptionFolderBANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

 

weapon: Grice’s shining new tool. The funny thing is that his tutee Strawson didn’t allow him to play with it ONCE! Or weapon. Grice refers to the implicaturum as a philosopher’s tool, and that the fun comes in the application. Strawson and Wiggins p. 522, reminds us of Austin. Austin used to say that when a philosopher “forges a new weapon, he is also fshioning new skids to put under his feet.” It is perhaps inappropriate that a memorial should mention this, but here they were, the memorialists. They were suggesting that Grice forged a shining new tool, the implicaturum, or implicaturumrather, he proposed a rational explanation for the distinction between what an emissor means (e. g., that p) and what anything else may be said, ‘metabolically,’ to “mean.” Suggesting an analogy with J. L. Austin and his infelicitious notion of infelicity, which found him fashioning a shining new skid, the memorialists suggest the same for Gricebut of course the analogy does not apply.

 

well-formed formula (Villa Grice: formula).  For Grice, an otiositysurely an ill-formed formula is an oxymoron -- a grammatically wellformed sentence or structured predicate of an artificial language of the sort studied by logicians. A well-formed formula is sometimes known as a wff pronounced ‘woof’ or simply a formula. Delineating the formulas of a language involves providing it with a syntax or grammar, composed of both a vocabulary a specification of the symbols from which the language is to be built, sorted into grammatical categories and formation rules a purely formal or syntactical specification of which strings of symbols are grammatically well-formed and which are not. Formulas are classified as either open or closed, depending on whether or not they contain free variables variables not bound by quantifiers. Closed formulas, such as x Fx / Gx, are sentences, the potential bearers of truth-values. Open formulas, such as Fx / Gx, are handled in any of three ways. On some accounts, these formulas are on a par with closed ones, the free variables being treated as names. On others, open formulas are structured predicates, the free variables being treated as place holders for terms. And on still other accounts, the free variables are regarded as implicitly bound by universal quantifiers, again making open formulas sentences. 

 

“what-is-hinted” -- hint hinting. Don’t expect Cicero used this. It’s Germanic and related to ‘hunt,’ to ‘seize.’ As if you throw something in the air, and expect your recipient will seize it. Grice spends quite a long section in “Retrospective epilogue” to elucidate “Emissor E communicates that p via a hint,” versus “Emissor E communicates that p via a suggestion.” Some level of explicitness (vide candour) is necessary. If it is too obscure it cannot be held to have been ‘communicated’ in the first place! Cf. Holdcroft, “Some forms of indirect communication” for the Journal of Rhetoric. Grice had to do a bit of linguistic botany for his “E implicates that p”: To do duty for ‘imply,’ suggest, indicate, hint, mean, -- “etc.” indirectly or implicitly convey.

 

what the eye no longer sees the heart no longer grieves for. Grice. Vide sytactics. Grice played with ‘elimination rules’ for his scope device. Once applied, Grice said: “What the eye no longer sees the heart no longer grieves for.” “As they say,” he added.

 

whewell: English philosopher of science. He was a master of Trinity , Cambridge. Francis Bacon’s early work on induction was furthered by Whewell, J. F. W. Herschel, and J. S. Mill, who attempted to create a logic of welfare economics Whewell, William 970   970 induction, a methodology that can both discover generalizations about experience and prove them to be necessary. Whewell’s theory of scientific method is based on his reading of the history of the inductive sciences. He thought that induction began with a non-inferential act, the superimposition of an idea on data, a “colligation,” a way of seeing facts in a “new light.” Colligations generalize over data, and must satisfy three “tests of truth.” First, colligations must be empirically adequate; they must account for the given data. Any number of ideas may be adequate to explain given data, so a more severe test is required. Second, because colligations introduce generalizations, they must apply to events or properties of objects not yet given: they must provide successful predictions, thereby enlarging the evidence in favor of the colligation. Third, the best inductions are those where evidence for various hypotheses originally thought to cover unrelated kinds of data “jumps together,” providing a consilience of inductions. Consilience characterizes those theories achieving large measures of simplicity, generality, unification, and deductive strength. Furthermore, consilience is a test of the necessary truth of theories, which implies that what many regard as merely pragmatic virtues of theories like simplicity and unifying force have an epistemic status. Whewell thus provides a strong argument for scientific realism. Whewell’s examples of consilient theories are Newton’s theory of universal gravitation, which covers phenomena as seemingly diverse as the motions of the heavenly bodies and the motions of the tides, and the undulatory theory of light, which explains both the polarization of light by crystals and the colors of fringes. There is evidence that Whewell’s methodology was employed by Maxwell, who designed the influential Cavendish Laboratories at Cambridge. Peirce and Mach favored Whewell’s account of method over Mill’s empiricist theory of induction. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “From induction to deduction, via abduction.”

 

whistle. If you can’t say it you can’t whistle it eitherBut you can implicate it. “To say” takes a ‘that’-clause. “To implicate” takes a ‘that’-clause. Grice: “ ‘To whisle’ takes a ‘that’-clause, “By whistling, E communicates that he intends his emissee to be there.” “Whistle and I’ll be there”Houseman to a Shropshire farmer.

 

whitehead: cited by H. P. Grice, a. n., philosopher of science, educated first at the Sherborne School in Dorsetshire and then at Trinity , Cambridge, Whitehead emerged as a first-class mathematician with a rich general background. In 5 he became a fellow of Trinity  and remained there in a teaching role until 0. In the early 0s Bertrand Russell entered Trinity  as a student in mathematics; by the beginning of the new century Russell had become not only a student and friend but a colleague of Whitehead’s at Trinity . Each had written a first book on algebra Whitehead’s A Treatise on Universal Algebra won him election to the Royal Society in 3. When they discovered that their projected second books largely overlapped, they undertook a collaboration on a volume that they estimated would take about a year to write; in fact, it was a decade later that the three volumes of their ground-breaking Principia Mathematica appeared, launching symbolic logic in its modern form. In the second decade of this century Whitehead and Russell drifted apart; their responses to World War I differed radically, and their intellectual interests and orientations diverged. Whitehead’s London period 024 is often viewed as the second phase of a three-phase career. His association with the  of London involved him in practical issues affecting the character of working-class education. For a decade Whitehead held a professorship at the Imperial  of Science and Technology and also served as dean of the Faculty of Science in the , chair of the Academic Council which managed educational affairs in London, and chair of the council that managed Goldsmith’s . His book The Aims of Education 8 is a collection of essays largely growing out of reflections on the experiences of these years. Intellectually, Whitehead’s interests were moving toward issues in the philosophy of science. In the years 922 he published An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, The Concept of Nature, and The Principle of Relativity  the third led to his later 1 election as a fellow of the British Academy. In 4, at the age of sixty-three, Whitehead made a dramatic move, both geographically and intellectually, to launch phase three of his career: never having formally studied philosophy in his life, he agreed to become professor of philosophy at Harvard , a position he held until retirement in 7. The accompanying intellectual shift was a move from philosophy of science to metaphysics. The earlier investigations had assumed the self-containedness of nature: “nature is closed to mind.” The philosophy of nature examined nature at the level of abstraction entailed by this assumption. Whitehead had come to regard philosophy as “the critic of abstractions,” a notion introduced in Science and the Modern World 5. This book traced the intertwined emergence of Newtonian science and its philosophical presuppositions. It noted that with the development of the theory of relativity in the twentieth century, scientific understanding had left behind the Newtonian conceptuality that had generated the still-dominant philosophical assumptions, and that those philosophical assumptions considered in themselves had become inadequate to explicate our full concrete experience. Philosophy as the critic of abstractions must recognize the limitations of a stance that assumes that nature is closed to mind, and must push deeper, beyond such an abstraction, to create a scheme of ideas more in harmony with scientific developments and able to do justice to human beings as part of nature. Science and the Modern World merely outlines what such a philosophy might be; in 9 Whitehead published his magnum opus, titled Process and Reality. In this volume, subtitled “An Essay in Cosmology,” his metaphysical understanding is given its final form. It is customary to regard this book as the central document of what has become known as process philosophy, though Whitehead himself frequently spoke of his system of ideas as the philosophy of organism. Process and Reality begins with a sentence that sheds a great deal of light upon Whitehead’s metaphysical orientation: “These lectures are based upon a recurrence to that phase of philosophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume.” Descartes, adapting the classical notion of substance to his own purposes, begins a “phase of philosophic thought” by assuming there are two distinct, utterly different kinds of substance, mind and matter, each requiring nothing but itself in order to exist. This assumption launches the reign of epistemology within philosophy: if knowing begins with the experiencing of a mental substance capable of existing by itself and cut off from everything external to it, then the philosophical challenge is to try to justify the claim to establish contact with a reality external to it. The phrase “and ended with Hume” expresses Whitehead’s conviction that Hume and more elegantly, he notes, Santayana showed that if one begins with Descartes’s metaphysical assumptions, skepticism is inevitable. Contemporary philosophers have talked about the end of philosophy. From Whitehead’s perspective such talk presupposes a far too narrow view of the nature of philosophy. It is true that a phase of philosophy has ended, a phase dominated by epistemology. Whitehead’s response is to offer the dictum that all epistemological difficulties are at bottom only camouflaged metaphysical difficulties. One must return to that moment of Cartesian beginning and replace the substance metaphysics with an orientation that avoids the epistemological trap, meshes harmoniously with the scientific understandings that have displaced the much simpler physics of Descartes’s day, and is consonant with the facts of evolution. These are the considerations that generate Whitehead’s fundamental metaphysical category, the category of an actual occasion. An actual occasion is not an enduring, substantial entity. Rather, it is a process of becoming, a process of weaving together the “prehensions” a primitive form of ‘apprehension’ meant to indicate a “taking account of,” or “feeling,” devoid of conscious awareness of the actual occasions that are in the immediate past. Whitehead calls this process of weaving together the inheritances of the past “concrescence.” An actual entity is its process of concrescence, its process of growing together into a unified perspective on its immediate past. The seeds of Whitehead’s epistemological realism are planted in these fundamental first moves: “The philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant’s philosophy. . . . For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world.” It is customary to compare an actual occasion with a Leibnizian monad, with the caveat that whereas a monad is windowless, an actual occasion is “all window.” It is as though one were to take Aristotle’s system of categories and ask what would result if the category of substance were displaced from its position of preeminence by the category of relation  the result would, mutatis mutandis, be an understanding of being somewhat on the model of a Whiteheadian actual occasion. In moving from Descartes’s dualism of mental substance and material substance to his own notion of an actual entity, Whitehead has been doing philosophy conceived of as the critique of abstractions. He holds that both mind and matter are abstractions from the concretely real. They are important abstractions, necessary for everyday thought and, of supreme importance, absolutely essential in enabling the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries to accomplish their magnificent advances in scientific thinking. Indeed, Whitehead, in his philosophy of science phase, by proceeding as though “nature is closed to mind,” was operating with those selfsame abstractions. He came to see that while these abstractions were indispensable for certain kinds of investigations, they were, at the philosophical level, as Hume had demonstrated, a disaster. In considering mind and matter to be ontological ultimates, Descartes had committed what Whitehead termed the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The category of an actual occasion designates the fully real, the fully concrete. The challenge for such an orientation, the challenge that Process and Reality is designed to meet, is so to describe actual occasions that it is intelligible how collections of actual occasions, termed “nexus” or societies, emerge, exhibiting the characteristics we find associated with “minds” and “material structures.” Perhaps most significantly, if this challenge is met successfully, biology will be placed, in the eyes of philosophy, on an even footing with physics; metaphysics will do justice both to human beings and to human beings as a part of nature; and such vexing contemporary problem areas as animal rights and environmental ethics will appear in a new light. Whitehead’s last two books, Adventures of Ideas 3 and Modes of Thought 8, are less technical and more lyrical than is Process and Reality. Adventures of Ideas is clearly the more significant of these two. It presents a philosophical study of the notion of civilization. It holds that the social changes in a civilization are driven by two sorts of forces: brute, senseless agencies of compulsion on the one hand, and formulated aspirations and articulated beliefs on the other. These two sorts of forces are epitomized by barbarians and Christianity in the ancient Roman world and by steam and democracy in the world of the industrial revolution. Whitehead’s focal point in Adventures of Ideas is aspirations, beliefs, and ideals as instruments of change. In particular, he is concerned to articulate the ideals and aspirations appropriate to our own era. The character of such ideals and aspirations at any moment is limited by the philosophical understandings available at that moment, because in their struggle for release and efficacy such ideals and aspirations can appear only in the forms permitted by the available philosophical discourse. In the final section of Adventures of Ideas Whitehead presents a statement of ideals and aspirations fit for our era as his own philosophy of organism allows them to take shape and be articulated. The notions of beauty, truth, adventure, zest, Eros, and peace are given a content drawn from the technical understandings elaborated in Process and Reality. But in Adventures of Ideas a less technical language is used, a language reminiscent of the poetic imagery found in the style of Plato’s Republic, a language making the ideas accessible to readers who have not mastered Process and Reality, but at the same time far richer and more meaningful to those who have. Whitehead notes in Adventures of Ideas that Plato’s later thought “circles round the interweaving of seven main notions, namely, The Ideas, The Physical Elements, The Psyche, The Eros, The Harmony, The Mathematical Relations, The Receptacle. These notions are as important for us now, as they were then at the dawn of the modern world, when civilizations of the old type were dying.” Whitehead uses these notions in quite novel and modern ways; one who is unfamiliar with his metaphysics can get something of what he means as he speaks of the Eros of the Universe, but if one is familiar from Process and Reality with the notions of the Primordial Nature of God and the Consequent Nature of God then one sees much deeper into the meanings present in Adventures of Ideas. Whitehead was not religious in any narrow, doctrinal, sectarian sense. He explicitly likened his stance to that of Aristotle, dispassionately considering the requirements of his metaphysical system as they refer to the question of the existence and nature of God. Whitehead’s thoughts on these matters are most fully developed in Chapter 11 of Science and the Modern World, in the final chapter of Process and Reality, and in Religion in the Making 6. These thoughts are expressed at a high level of generality. Perhaps because of this, a large part of the interest generated by Whitehead’s thought has been within the community of theologians. His ideas fairly beg for elaboration and development in the context of particular modes of religious understanding. It is as though many modern theologians, recalling the relation between the theology of Aquinas and the metaphysics of Aristotle, cannot resist the temptation to play Aquinas to Whitehead’s Aristotle. Process theology, or Neo-Classical Theology as it is referred to by Hartshorne, one of its leading practitioners, has been the arena within which a great deal of clarification and development of Whitehead’s ideas has occurred. Whitehead was a gentle man, soft-spoken, never overbearing or threatening. He constantly encouraged students to step out on their own, to develop their creative capacities. His concern not to inhibit students made him a notoriously easy grader; it was said that an A-minus in one of his courses was equivalent to failure. Lucien Price’s Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead chronicles many evenings of discussion in the Whitehead household. He there described Whitehead as follows: his face, serene, luminous, often smiling, the complexion pink and white, the eyes brilliant blue, clear and candid as a child’s yet with the depth of the sage, often laughing or twinkling with humour. And there was his figure, slender, frail, and bent with its lifetime of a scholar’s toil. Always benign, there was not a grain of ill will anywhere in him; for all his formidable armament, never a wounding word.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Definite descriptions in Whitehead and Russell and in the vernacular,” “Definite descriptions in Whitethead’s and Russell’s formalese and in Strawson’s vernacular” -- BANC.

 

weiner kraus -- Vienna Circle  vide ayerism -- a group of philosophers and scientists who met periodically for discussions in Vienna from 2 to 8 and who proposed a self-consciously revolutionary conception of scientific knowledge. The Circle was initiated by the mathematician Hans Hahn to continue a prewar forum with the physicist Philip Frank and the social scientist Otto Neurath after the arrival in Vienna of Moritz Schlick, a philosopher who had studied with Max Planck. Carnap joined in 6 from 1 in Prague; other members included Herbert Feigl from 0 in Iowa, Friedrich Waismann, Bergmann, Viktor Kraft, and Bela von Juhos. Viennese associates of the Circle included Kurt Gödel, Karl Menger, Felix Kaufmann, and Edgar Zilsel. Popper was not a member or associate. During its formative period the Circle’s activities were confined to discussion meetings many on Vitters’s Tractatus. In 9 the Circle entered its public period with the formation of the Verein Ernst Mach, the publication of its manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis by Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath tr. in Neurath, Empiricism and Sociology, 3, and the first of a series of philosophical monographs edited by Frank and Schlick. It also began collaboration with the independent but broadly like-minded Berlin “Society of Empirical Philosophy,” including Reichenbach, Kurt Grelling, Kurt Lewin, Friedrich Kraus, Walter Dubislav, Hempel, and Richard von Mises: the groups together organized their first public conferences in Prague and Königsberg, acquired editorship of a philosophical journal renamed Erkenntnis, and later organized the international Unity of Science congresses. The death and dispersion of key members from 4 onward Hahn died in 4, Neurath left for Holland in 4, Carnap left for the United States in 5, Schlick died in 6 did not mean the extinction of Vienna Circle philosophy. Through the subsequent work of earlier visitors Ayer, Ernest Nagel, Quine and members and collaborators who emigrated to the United States Carnap, Feigl, Frank, Hempel, and Reichenbach, the logical positivism of the Circle Reichenbach and Neurath independently preferred “logical empiricism” strongly influenced the development of analytic philosophy. The Circle’s discussions concerned the philosophy of formal and physical science, and even though their individual publications ranged much wider, it is the attitude toward science that defines the Circle within the philosophical movements of central Europe at the time. The Circle rejected the need for a specifically philosophical epistemology that bestowed justification on knowledge claims from beyond science itself. In this, the Circle may also have drawn on a distinct Austrian tradition a thesis of its historian Neurath: in most of G.y, science and philosophy had parted ways during the nineteenth century. Starting with Helmholtz, of course, there also arose a movement that sought to distinguish the scientific respectability of the Kantian tradition from the speculations of G. idealism, yet after 0 neo-Kantians insisted on the autonomy of epistemology, disparaging earlier fellow travelers as “positivist.” Yet the program of reducing the knowledge claim of science and providing legitimations to what’s left found wide favor with the more empirical-minded like Mach. Comprehensive description, not explanation, of natural phenomena became the task for theorists who no longer looked to philosophy for foundations, but found them in the utility of their preferred empirical procedures. Along with the positivists, the Vienna Circle thought uneconomical the Kantian answer to the question of the possibility of objectivity, the synthetic a priori. Moreover, the Vienna Circle and its conventionalist precursors Poincaré and Duhem saw them contradicted by the results of formal science. Riemann’s geometries showed that questions about the geometry of physical space were open to more than one answer: Was physical space Euclidean or non-Euclidean? It fell to Einstein and the pre-Circle Schlick Space and Time in Contemporary Physics, 7 to argue that relativity theory showed the untenability of Kant’s conception of space and time as forever fixed synthetic a priori forms of intuition. Yet Frege’s anti-psychologistic critique had also shown empiricism unable to account for knowledge of arithmetic and the conventionalists had ended the positivist dream of a theory of experiential elements that bridged the gap between descriptions of fact and general principles of science. How, then, could the Vienna Circle defend the claim  under attack as just one worldview among others  that science provides knowledge? The Circle confronted the problem of constitutive conventions. As befitted their self-image beyond Kant and Mach, they found their paradigmatic answer in the theory of relativity: they thought that irreducible conventions of measurement with wide-ranging implications were sharply separable from pure facts like point coincidences. Empirical theories were viewed as logical structures of statements freely created, yet accountable to experiential input via their predictive consequences identifiable by observation. The Vienna Circle defended empiricism by the reconceptualization of the relation between a priori and a posteriori inquiries. First, in a manner sympathetic to Frege’s and Russell’s doctrine of logicism and guided by Vitters’s notion of tautology, arithmetic was considered a part of logic and treated as entirely analytical, without any empirical content; its truth was held to be exhausted by what is provable from the premises and rules of a formal symbolic system. Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language, 4, assimilated Gödel’s incompleteness result by claiming that not every such proof could be demonstrated in those systems themselves which are powerful enough to represent classical arithmetic. The synthetic a priori was not needed for formal science because all of its results were non-synthetic. Second, the Circle adopted verificationism: supposedly empirical concepts whose applicability was indiscernible were excluded from science. The terms for unobservables were to be reconstructed by logical operations from the observational terms. Only if such reconstructions were provided did the more theoretical parts of science retain their empirical character. Just what kind of reduction was aimed for was not always clear and earlier radical positions were gradually weakened; Reichenbach instead considered the relation between observational and theoretical statements to be probabilistic. Empirical science needed no synthetic a priori either; all of its statements were a posteriori. Combined with the view that the analysis of the logical form of expressions allowed for the exact determination of their combinatorial value, verificationism was to exhibit the knowledge claims of science and eliminate metaphysics. Whatever meaning did not survive identification with the scientific was deemed irrelevant to knowledge claims Reichenbach did not share this view either. Since the Circle also observed the then long-discussed ban on issuing unconditional value statements in science, its metaethical positions may be broadly characterized as endorsing noncognitivism. Its members were not simply emotivists, however, holding that value judgments were mere expressions of feeling, but sought to distinguish the factual and evaluative contents of value judgments. Those who, like Schlick Questions of Ethics, 0, engaged in metaethics, distinguished the expressive component x desires y of value judgments from their implied descriptive component doing zfurthers aim y and held that the demand inherent in moral principles possessed validity if the implied description was true and the expressed desire was endorsed. This analysis of normative concepts did not render them meaningless but allowed for psychological and sociological studies of ethical systems; Menger’s formal variant Morality, Decision and Social Organization, 4 proved influential for decision theory. The semiotic view that knowledge required structured representations was developed in close contact with foundational research in mathematics and depended on the “new” logic of Frege, Russell, and Vitters, out of which quantification theory was emerging. Major new results were quickly integrated albeit controversially and Carnap’s works reflect the development of the conception of logic itself. In his Logical Syntax he adopted the “Principle of Tolerance” vis-à-vis the question of the foundation of the formal sciences: the choice of logics and languages was conventional and constrained, apart from the demand for consistency, only by pragmatic considerations. The proposed language form and its difference from alternatives simply had to be stated as exactly as possible: whether a logico-linguistic framework as a whole correctly represented reality was a cognitively meaningless question. Yet what was the status of the verifiability principle? Carnap’s suggestion that it represents not a discovery but a proposal for future scientific language use deserves to be taken seriously, for it not only characterizes his own conventionalism, but also amplifies the Circle’s linguistic turn, according to which all philosophy concerned ways of representing, rather than the nature of the represented. What the Vienna Circle “discovered” was how much of science was conventional: its verificationism was a proposal for accommodating the creativity of scientific theorizing without accommodating idealism. Whether an empirical claim in order to be meaningful needed to be actually verified or only potentially verifiable, or fallible or only potentially testable, and whether so by current or only by future means, became matters of discussion during the 0s. Equally important for the question whether the Circle’s conventionalism avoided idealism and metaphysics were the issues of the status of theoretical discourse about unobservables and the nature of science’s empirical foundation. The view suggested in Schlick’s early General Theory of Knowledge 8, 2d. ed. 5 and Frank’s The Causal Law and its Limitations 2 and elaborated in Carnap’s “Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science” in Foundations of the Unity of Science I.1, 8 characterized the theoretical language as an uninterpreted calculus that is related to the fully interpreted observational language only by partial definitions. Did such an instrumentalism require for its empirical anchor the sharp separation of observational from theoretical terms? Could such a separation even be maintained? Consider the unity of science thesis. According to the methodological version, endorsed by all members, all of science abides by the same criteria: no basic methodological differences separate the natural from the social or cultural sciences Geisteswissenschaften as claimed by those who distinguish between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’. According to the metalinguistic version, all objects of scientific knowledge could in principle be comprehended by the same “universal” language. Physicalism asserts that this is the language that speaks of physical objects. While everybody in the Circle endorsed physicalism in this sense, the understanding of its importance varied, as became clear in the socalled protocol sentence debate. The nomological version of the unity thesis was only later clearly distinguished: whether all scientific laws could be reduced to those of physics was another matter on which Neurath came to differ. Ostensively, this debate concerned the question of the form, content, and epistemological status of scientific evidence statements. Schlick’s unrevisable “affirmations” talked about phenomenal states in statements not themselves part of the language of science “The Foundation of Knowledge,” 4, tr. in Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism. Carnap’s preference changed from unrevisable statements in a primitive methodologically solipsistic protocol language that were fallibly translatable into the physicalistic system language 1; see Unity of Science, 4, via arbitrary revisable statements of that system language that are taken as temporary resting points in testing 2, to revisable statements in the scientific observation language 5; see “Testability and Meaning,” Philosophy of Science, 637. These changes were partly prompted by Neurath, whose own revisable “protocol statements” spoke, amongst other matters, of the relation between observers and the observed in a “universal slang” that mixed expressions of the physicalistically cleansed colloquial and the high scientific languages “Protocol Statements,”  tr. in Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism. Ultimately, these proposals answered to different projects. Since all agreed that all statements of science were hypothetical, the questions of their “foundation” concerned rather the very nature of Vienna Circle philosophy. For Schlick philosophy became the activity of meaning determination inspired by Vitters; Carnap pursued it as the rational reconstruction of knowledge claims concerned only with what Reichenbach called the “context of justification” its logical aspects, not the “context of discovery”; and Neurath replaced philosophy altogether with a naturalistic, interdisciplinary, empirical inquiry into science as a distinctive discursive practice, precluding the orthodox conception of the unity of science. The Vienna Circle was neither a monolithic nor a necessarily reductionist philosophical movement, and quick assimilation to the tradition of British empiricism mistakes its struggles with the formcontent dichotomy for foundationalism, when instead sophisticated responses to the question of the presuppositions of their own theories of knowledge were being developed. In its time and place, the Circle was a minority voice; the sociopolitical dimension of its theories  stressed more by some Neurath than others Schlick  as a renewal of Enlightenment thought, ultimately against the rising tide of Blutund-Boden metaphysics, is gaining recognition. After the celebrated “death” of reductionist logical positivism in the 0s the historical Vienna Circle is reemerging as a multifaceted object of the history of analytical philosophy itself, revealing in nuce different strands of reasoning still significant for postpositivist theory of science. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “What Freddie brought us from Vienna.”

 

williams: “There are many Williams in Oxford, but only one “B. A. O., “ as he pretentiously went by!”H. P. Grice. B. A. O. London-born Welsh philosopher who has made major contributions to many fields but is primarily known as a moral philosopher. His approach to ethics, set out in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 5, is characterized by a wide-ranging skepticism, directed mainly at the capacity of academic moral philosophy to further the aim of reflectively living an ethical life. One line of skeptical argument attacks the very idea of practical reason. Attributions of practical reasons to a particular agent must, in Williams’s view, be attributions of states that can potentially explain the agent’s action. Therefore such reasons must be either within the agent’s existing set of motivations or within the revised set of motivations that the agent would acquire upon sound reasoning. Williams argues from these minimal assumptions that this view of reasons as internal reasons undermines the idea of reason itself being a source of authority over practice. Williams’s connected skepticism about the claims of moral realism is based both on his general stance toward realism and on his view of the nature of modern societies. In opposition to internal realism, Williams has consistently argued that reflection on our conception of the world allows one to develop a conception of the world maximally independent of our peculiar ways of conceptualizing reality  an absolute conception of the world. Such absoluteness is, he argues, an inappropriate aspiration for ethical thought. Our ethical thinking is better viewed as one way of structuring a form of ethical life than as the ethical truth about how life is best lived. The pervasive reflectiveness and radical pluralism of modern societies makes them inhospitable contexts for viewing ethical concepts as making knowledge available to groups of concept users. Modernity has produced at the level of theory a distortion of our ethical practice, namely a conception of the morality system. This view is reductionist, is focused centrally on obligations, and rests on various fictions about responsibility and blame that Williams challenges in such works as Shame and Necessity 3. Much academic moral philosophy, in his view, is shaped by the covert influence of the morality system, and such distinctively modern outlooks as Kantianism and utilitarianism monopolize the terms of contemporary debate with insufficient attention to their origin in a distorted view of the ethical. Williams’s views are not skeptical through and through; he retains a commitment to the values of truth, truthfulness in a life, and individualism. His most recent work, which thematizes the long-implicit influence of Nietzsche on his ethical philosophy, explicitly offers a vindicatory “genealogical” narrative for these ideals.

 

willkür, v.  Hobson’s choice. Grice: “‘will-kuer’ is a fascinating German expression, literally will-care’.”

 

wilson’s ultimate counterexample to Grice -- Grice’s counterexample“the ultimate counter-example” -- counterinstance, also called counterexample. 1 A particular instance of an argument form that has all true premises but a false conclusion, thereby showing that the form is not universally valid. The argument form ‘p 7 q,p / , ~q’, for example, is shown to be invalid by the counterinstance ‘Grass is either red or green; Grass is not red; Therefore, grass is not green’. 2 A particular false instance of a statement form, which demonstrates that the form is not a logical truth. A counterinstance to the form ‘p 7 q / p’, for example, would be the statement ‘If grass is either red or green, then grass is red’. 3 A particular example that demonstrates that a universal generalization is false. The universal statement ‘All large cities in the United States are east of the Mississippi’ is shown to be false by the counterinstance of San Francisco, which is a large city in the United States that is not east of the Mississippi. V.K. counterpart theory, a theory that analyzes statements about what is possible and impossible for individuals statements of de re modality in terms of what holds of counterparts of those individuals in other possible worlds, a thing’s counterparts being individuals that resemble it without being identical with it. The name ‘counterpart theory’ was coined by David Lewis, the theory’s principal exponent. Whereas some theories analyze ‘Mrs. Simpson might have been queen of England’ as ‘In some possible world, Mrs. Simpson is queen of England’, counterpart theory analyzes it as ‘In some possible world, a counterpart of Mrs. Simpson is queen of a counterpart of England’. The chief motivation for counterpart theory is a combination of two views: a de re modality should be given a possible worlds analysis, and b each actual individual exists only in the actual world, and hence cannot exist with different properties in other possible worlds. Counterpart theory provides an analysis that allows ‘Mrs. Simpson might have been queen’ to be true compatibly with a and b. For Mrs. Simpson’s counterparts in other possible worlds, in those worlds where she herself does not exist, may have regal properties that the actual Mrs. Simpson lacks. Counterpart theory is perhaps prefigured in Leibniz’s theory of possibility. 

 

wilson: this is the way to quote J. C. Wilson. Grice loved him, and thanked Farquarhson for editing his papers. A favourite with Grice and Collingwood. In the chapter on “Language” in “The idea of art,” Collingwood refers to the infamous, “That building is the Bodelian.”which may repreeent two propositions: one as an answer to what building is that? The other as an answer to Which building is the Bodleian? Grice would consider that the distinction is impilcatural, and that stress is merely implicaturaland only one proposition is at stakedo not multiply propositions beyond necessity. not to be confused with wilson, author of “Grice: The ultimate counterexample” -- Oxonian philosopher, like Grice. Cook Wilson studied with T. H. Green before becoming Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford and leading the Oxford reaction against the then entrenched absolute idealism. More influential as a tutor than as a writer, his major oeuvre, Statement and Inference, was posthumously reconstructed from drafts of papers, philosophical correspondence, and an extensive set of often inconsistent lectures for his logic courses. A staunch critic of Whitehead’s mathematical logic, Wilson conceived of logic as the study of thinking, an activity unified by the fact that thinking either is knowledge or depends on knowledge “What we know we kow”. Wilson claims that knowledge involves apprehending an object that in most cases is independent of the act of apprehension and that knowledge is indefinable without circularity, views he defended by appealing to common usage. Many of Wilson’s ideas are disseminated by H. W. B. Joseph, especially in his “Logic.” Rejecting “symbolic logic,” Joseph attempts to reinvigorate traditional logic conceived along Wilsonian lines. To do so Joseph combined a careful exposition of Aristotle with insights drawn from idealistic logicians. Besides Joseph, Wilson decisively influenced a generation of Oxford philosophers including Prichard and Ross, and Grice who explores the ‘interrogative subordination’ in the account of ‘if.’ “Who killed Cock Robin”.

 

winchism: After P. WinchLondon-born philosopher. He quotes  Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of one’s remarksGrice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t hesitate to say that it seems red to me”Surely pointless, but an incredible truth meant to refute G. A. Paul!” Winch translated Vitters’s “little essay on value” which Grice “did not use for [his] essay on the conception of value.” (“Kultur und Wert.”). Grice: “Not contented with natural science, Winch wants a social one!”

 

winspeare: winspeare, filosofo italiano. winspeare: essential Italian philosopher“My Italian friends do not consider me Italian, though!”His ancestors were from Yorkshire in a bad timeHenry VIII. “So the king’s option was clear: either your head off or move to CapriI chose the second.” (n. Portici), filosofo. Delle confessioni spontanee de' rei, Stamp. Simoniana, Napoli  Storia degli abusi feudali, Tip. Trani, Napoli  Voti de' napolitani, s.e., Napoli  La voce di Napodano, o sia Quarta illustrazione del patto di Capuana e Nido, Tip. Trani, Napoli  I libri delle leggi di Cicerone volgarizzati, Tip. Trani, Napoli  Delle chiese ricettizie del Regno. Dissertazione, Tip. Trani, Napoli  Saggi di filosofia intellettuale, Tip. Trani, Napoli  Dissertazioni legali, G. Winspeare, Tip. Agrelli, Napoli  La colonia perpetua ed i diritti feudali aboliti, Tip. Pesole, Napoli. Grice: “Hailing remotely from the Catholic North Riding of Yorkshire and settling in the most beautiful coastline in the world, Winspeare knew all you need to know about Cudworth, and what he calls ‘percezione.’ I would call him an Oxonian.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Winspeare, Speranza, Napoli, and me!”The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft.

 

wodeham: “If Adam of Wodeham was called Wodeham, I should, by the same token, be called “Harborne””H. P. Grice. Oxonian philosopher, like Grice. Adam de English Franciscan philosopher-theologian who lectured on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at London, Norwich, and Oxford. His published works include the Tractatus de indivisibilibus; his Lectura secunda Norwich lectures; and an abbreviation of his Oxford lectures by Henry Totting of Oyta, published by John Major. Wodeham’s main work, the Oxford lectures, themselves remain unpublished. A brilliant interpreter of Duns Scotus, whose original manuscripts he consulted, Wodeham deemed Duns Scotus the greatest Franciscan doctor. William Ockham, Wodeham’s teacher, was the other great influence on Wodeham’s philosophical theology. Wodeham defended Ockham’s views against attacks mounted by Walter Chatton; he also wrote the prologue to Ockham’s Summa logicae. Wodeham’s own influence rivaled that of Ockham. Among the authors he strongly influenced are Gregory of Rimini, John of Mirecourt, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Pierre d’Ailly, Peter Ceffons, Alfonso Vargas, Peter of Candia Alexander V, Henry Totting of Oyta, and John Major. Wodeham’s theological works were written for an audience with a very sophisticated understanding of current issues in semantics, logic, and medieval mathematical physics. Contrary to Duns Scotus and Ockham, Wodeham argued that the sensitive and intellective souls were not distinct. He further develops the theory of intuitive cognition, distinguishing intellectual intuition of our own acts of intellect, will, and memory from sensory intuition of external objects. Scientific knowledge based on experience can be based on intuition, according to Wodeham. He distinguishes different grades of evidence, and allows that sensory perceptions may be mistaken. Nonetheless, they can form the basis for scientific knowledge, since they are reliable; mistakes can be corrected by reason and experience. In semantic theory, Wodeham defends the view that the immediate object of scientific knowledge is the complexe significabile, that which the conclusion is designed to signify. Oxonian philosopher, like Grice. Adam de (c. 1295–1358), English Franciscan philosopher- who lectured on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at Oxford. His oeuvre includes a “Tractatus de indivisibilibus, divisum in cinque partibus”; his “Lectura secunda”  and “Lecturae Oxonienses” as transcribed by Henry Totting of Oyta, and published by John Major. Wodeham’s main work, like Grice’s, the Oxford lectures, themselves remain only partially published. A brilliant interpreter of Duns Scotus, whose original manuscripts he consulted in his main unpublication, Wodeham deems Duns Scotus the greatest Franciscan doctor. Occam, Wodeham’s teacher, is the other great influence on Wodeham (“I treasure the razor he gave me for my birthday.”) Wodeham defends his tutor Ockham’s views against attacks mounted by Walter Chatton. Grice was familiar with Wodeham (“from Wodeham, as it happens”) because he wrote the prologue to Ockham’s Summa logicae. Wodeham’s own influence rivals that of Ockham. Among the authors he strongly influenced are Gregory of Rimini, John of Mirecourt, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Pierre d’Ailly, Peter Ceffons, Alfonso Vargas, Peter of Candia (Alexander V), Henry Totting of Oyta, John Major, and lastly, but certainly not leastly, H. P. Grice. Wodeham’s lectures were composed for tutees with a very sophisticated understanding of current issues in semantics, logic, and mathematical physics. Contrary to Duns Scotus and Occam, Wodeham arguesand this is borrowed by Grice -- that the sensitive and intellective souls are not distinct (vide Grice, “The power structure of the soul”). Wodeham further develops the theory of intuitive cognition, distinguishing intellectual intuition of our own acts of intellect, will, and memory from sensory intuition of external objects. This is developed by Grice in his contrast of “I am not hearing a noise,” and “That is not blue.” Thus, knowledge based on experience can be based on intuition, according to Wodeham. Wodeham goes on to distinguishs different grades (or degrees, as Grice prefers, which Grice symbolises as ‘d’) of evidence (for credibility and desirability) and allows that this or that sensory perception may be mistaken (“but if all were, we are in trouble’). Nonetheless, they can form the basis for knowledge, since they are, caeteris paribus, reliable. “A mistake can always be corrected by reason and experience. In semantic and pragmatic theories, Wodeham defends the view that the immediate object of knowledge is what he calls the “complexum significabile,” that which the conclusion is designed to signify. wodeham, adam. Obviously born at Wodeham, or Woodham as the current spelling goes (“But I prefer the old, vide Occam”Grice). Like Gregorio da Rimini, obsessed with the complexe significabile, “which has obvious connections with what I call the propositional complexus.”

 

wollaston: when Grice is in a humorous mood, or mode, as he prefers, he cites Wollaston at large! Wollaston is notorious for arguing that the immorality of this or that action lies in an utterer who describes it implicating a false proposition. Wollaston maintains that there is harmony between reason (or truth) and happiness. Therefore, any ction that contradict truth through misrepresentation thereby frustrates human happiness and is thus “plain evil.” Wollaston gives the example of Willard [Quine] who, to pay Paul [Grice], robs Peter [Strawspm] stealing his watch.  Grice comments: “In falsely epresenting Strawson’s watch as his own, Willard makes the act wrong, even if he did it to pay me what he owed me.” Wollaston’s views, particularly his taking morality to consist in universal and necessary truths, were influenced by the rationalists Ralph Cudworth and Clarke. Among his many critics the most famous is, as Grice would expect, Hume, who contends that Wollaston’s theory implies an absurdity (“unless you disimplicate it in the bud.”). For Hume, any action concealed from public view (e.g., adultery) conveys (or ‘explicates’) no false proposition and therefore is not immoral, since one can annul it, to use Grice’s jargon. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Wollaston and the longitudinal unity of philosophy.” cited by H. P. Grice. English moralist notorious for arguing that the immorality of actions lies in their implying false propositions. An assistant headmaster who later took priestly orders, Wollaston maintains in his one published work, The Religion of Nature Delineated 1722, that the foundations of religion and morality are mutually dependent. God has preestablished a harmony between reason or truth and happiness, so that actions that contradict truth through misrepresentation thereby frustrate human happiness and are thus evil. For instance, if a person steals another’s watch, her falsely representing the watch as her own makes the act wrong. Wollaston’s views, particularly his taking morality to consist in universal and necessary truths, were influenced by the rationalists Ralph Cudworth and Clarke. Among his many critics the most famous was Hume, who contends that Wollaston’s theory implies an absurdity: any action concealed from public view e.g., adultery conveys no false proposition and therefore is not immoral. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Why bother with Wollaston?” BANC.

 

wollheim: R. A. London-born philosopher of Eastern-European ancestry, BPhil Oxon, Balliol (under D. Marcus) and All Souls.  Examined by H. P. Grice. “What’s two times two?” Wollheim treasured that examination. It was in the context of a discussion of J. S. Mill and I. Kant, for whom addition and multiplication are ‘synthetic’a priori for Kant, a posteriori for Mill. Grice was trying to provide a counterexample to Mill’s thesis that all comes via deduction or induction. Refs.: I. C. Dengler and Luigi Speranza, “Wollheilm and Grice,” for the Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

 

woodianism: Roy Hudd: “Not to be confused with the woodianisms of Victoria Wood.” -- Grice loved O. P. Wood, as anyone at Oxford dideven those who disliked Ryle! Refs.: H. P. Grice, “O. P. Wood and some remarks about the senses,” --  O. P. Wood, “Implicatura in Hereford,” for The Swimming-Pool Library, custodian: Luigi SperanzaVilla Grice, Liguria, Italia.

 

woozleyianism: R. M. Harnish discussed H. P. Grice’s implicaturum with A. D. Woozley. Woozley would know because he had been in contact with Grice since for ever. Woozley had a closer contact with Austin, since, unlike Grice, ‘being from the right side of the tracks,’ he socialized with Austin in what Berlin pretentiously calls the ‘early beginnings of Oxford philosophy,’ as if the Middle Ages never happened. Woozley edited Reid, that Grice read, or reed. Since the first way to approach Grice’s philosophy is with his colleagues at his Play Group, Woozley plays a crucial role. Grice: “While Woozley would attend Austin’s Sat. morns., he wouldn’t say muchin fact, he seldom said much.” Refs.: R. M. Harnish and A. D. Woozley, “Implicatura,” for The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

 

wyclif: “It never ceased to amaze me how Wyclif was able to find Anglo-Saxon terms for all the “Biblia Vulgata”!”H. P. Grice. English Griceian philosophical theologian and religious reformer. He worked for most of his life in Oxford as a secular clerk, teaching philosophy and writing extensively in the field. The mode of thought expressed in his surviving works is one of extreme realism, and in this his thought fostered the split of Bohemian, later Hussite, philosophy from that of the G. masters teaching in Prague. His worldline philosophical summa was most influential for his teaching on universals, but also dealt extensively with the question of determinism; these issues underlay his later handling of the questions of the Eucharist and of the identity of the church respectively. His influence on English philosophy was severely curtailed by the growing hostility of the church to his ideas, the condemnation of many of his tenets, the persecution of his followers, and the destruction of his writings. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “The problem of universals: from Bologna to Oxford,” Villa Grice.

 

x: Grice: “I use ‘x’ to mean ‘token,’ and ‘X’ to mean ‘type.’” Grice: “The idea is to use ‘x,’ ‘y,’ and ‘z.’” “In an early tutorial, Strawson asked me, ‘What if we need four, don?” Strawson later reminisced: “My question stuck with Grice, and he never again used x, y, and z, but x1, x2, x3, …, xn“That will teach you a lesson,” he said.”

 

x-question: Grice: “I prefer the idea of a qu-question. It sounds like a stammeras in do-do-dodgson, but it ain’t!” --.

 

Xy-question. Grice: “This would be a qu-1-qu-2 question, as in “He’s meeting a woman this evening?” “Who and where?” “His wife, in his home,”where ‘who and where?” is a qu-1 and qu-2 question.

 

Xyz-question. “He is meeting a woman this evening.” “Who, who, and where?” “Smith, his wife, his home.”

 

X1-x2-x3-…xn-question: Grice: “Since in theory the number of variables in a conversational remark is almost infinite“but never infinite,” as Peano remarksI shall use numerical subscripts. “Letters are nice, but numbers are nicer.”

 

Xmas: Grice: “The implicature of the “X” is the cross where allegedly Jesus died.”

 

y: Grice: “I shall use ‘y’ as a second variable; and z as a third, if need be.”

 

yog and zog: Grice: “This is my paradox on ‘si’‘if’All philosophers have a paradox named after them, and I thought it was high time to name a paradox after me.” --. “My inspiration was Carroll’s “What the tortoise said to Achilles.” Trust me to go to the defense of the underdog, or undertortoise!” “Achilles had enough praise by the Romans!” -- “If” (Cicero’s ‘si’) is a problem for Grice. “Especially in it being the only subordinate particle I have seriously explored.” According to Strawson and Wiggins, this was Grice having forged his shining new toolthe distinction between ‘By emitting x, An emissor coomunicates that p” and “The emissum x ‘means’ ‘p.’ Apply that to ‘if.’ In Strawson and Wiggins’s precis, for Grice, ‘p yields q’ is part of the conversational implicaturumfor Strawson and Wiggins it is part of the conventional implicaturum. They agree on ‘p  horseshoe q’ being the explicit emissum or explicatum in “Emissor explicitly conveys and communicates that p horseshoe q.” For Grice, the implicaturum, which, being conversational is cancellable, is calculated on the assumption that the addressee can work out that the emissor has non-truth-functional grounds for the making of any stronger claim. For Strawson, that non-truth-functional reason is precisely ‘p yields q,’ which leads Strawson to think that the thing is not cancellable and conventionally implicated. If Strawson were right that this is Grice forging a new shining tool to crack the crib of reality and fashioning thereby a new shining skid under his metaphysical feet, it would be almost the second use of the tool!  This is an expansion by Grice on the implicaturum of a ‘propositio conditionalis.’ Grice, feeling paradoxical, invites us to suppose a scenario involving ‘if.’ He takes it as a proof that his account of the conversational implicaturum of ‘if’ is, as Strawson did not agree, correct, and that what an utterer explicitly conveys by ‘if p, q’ is ‘p > q.’  that two chess players, Yog and Zog, play 100 games under the following conditions. Yog is white nine of ten times. There are no draws.  And the results are:  Yog, when white, won 80 of 90 games. Yog, when black, won zero of ten games.  This implies that:  8/9 times, if Yog was white, Yog won. 1/2 of the time, if Yog lost, Yog was black.  9/10 that either Yog wasnt white or he won.  From these statements, it might appear one could make these deductions by contraposition and conditional disjunction: If Yog was white, then 1/2 of the time Yog won. 9/10 times, if Yog was white, then he won.  But both propositions are untrue. They contradict the assumption. In fact, they do not provide enough information to use Bayesian reasoning to reach those conclusions. That might be clearer if the propositions had instead been stated differently. When Yog was white, Yog won 8/9 times. No information is given about when Yog was black. When Yog lost, Yog was black 1/2 the time. No information is given about when Yog won. (9/10 times, either Yog was black and won, Yog was black and lost, or Yog was white and won. No information is provided on how the 9/10 is divided among those three situations. The paradox by Grice shows that the exact meaning of statements involving conditionals and probabilities is more complicated than may be obvious on casual examination. Refs.: Grice’s interest with ‘if’ surely started after he carefully read the section on ‘if’ and the horseshoe in Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory. He was later to review his attack on Strawson in view of Strawson’s defense in ‘If and the horseshoe.’ The polemic was pretty much solved as a matter of different intuitions: what Grice sees as a conversational implicaturum, Strawson does see as an ‘implicaturum,’ but a non-defeasible onewhat Grice would qualify as ‘conventional.’ Grice leaves room for an implicaturum to be nonconversational and yet nonconventional, but it is not worth trying to fit Strawson’s suggestion in this slot, since Strawson, unlike Grice, has nothing against a convention. Grice was motivated to formulate his ‘paradox,’ seeing that Strawson was saying that the so-called ‘paradoxes’ of ‘entailment’ and ‘implication’ are a momer. “They are not paradoxical; they are false!” Grice has specific essays on both the paradoxes of entailment and the paradoxes of implication-. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The University of California, Berkeley.

 

zabarella: zabarella (n. padova), filosofo. Grice: “Zabarella is what I would call a proto-Griceain.” In fact, at Villa Grice, Grice was often called the English Zabarella, after philosopher Jacopo Zabarella, of Padova. Zabarella produces extensive commentaries on Grice’s favourite tract by Aristotle, “De Anima,” and Physica and also discussed some Aristotelian interpreters. However, Zabarella’s most original contribution is his work in semantics, “Opera logica.” Zabarella regards semantics as a preliminary study that provides the tools necessary for philosophical analysis. Two such tools are what Zabarella calls “order” (cf. Grice, ‘be orderly’). Another tool is what Zabarella calls “ method.” Order teaches us how to organize the content of a discipline to apprehend it more easily. Method teaches us how to draw a syllogistic inference. Zabarella reduces the varieties of orders and methods classified by other interpreters to compositive order, and resolutive order, and composite method and and resolutive method. The compositive order from a principle to this or that corollary applies to this or that speculative, alethic or theoretical discipline. The ‘resolutive’ order, from a desired end to the means appropriate to its achievement applies to this or that practical discipline, such as ‘pragmatics’ understood as a manual of rules of etiquette. This much is already in Aristotle. However, Zabarella offers an original analysis of ‘method.’ The compositive method infers a particular consequence or corollary from a ‘generic’ principle. The ‘resolutive’ method INFERS an originating gneric principle from this or that particular consequence, corollary, or instantiantion, as in inductive reasoning or in reasoning from effect to cause. Zabarella’s terminology influenced Galileo’s mechanics, and has been applied to Grice’s inference of the principle of conversational co-operation out from the only evidence which Grice has, which is this or that ‘dyadic’ exchange, as he calls it. In Grice’s case, his corpus is intentionally limited to conversations between two philosophers: A: What’s that? B: A pillar box? A: What colour is it? B: Seems red to me. From such an exchange, Grice infers the principle of conversational co-operation. It clashes when a cancellation (or as Grice prefers, an annulation) is on sight: “I surely don’t mean to imply that it MIGHT actually be red.” “Then why be so guarded? I thought you were cooperating.”H. P. Grice. “We can regard Jacopo as an Aristotelian philosopher who taught at the  of Padua. He wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and On the Soul and also discussed other interpreters such as Averroes. However, his most original contribution was his work in logic, Opera logica 1578. Zabarella regards logic as a preliminary study that provides the tools necessary for philosophical analysis. Two such tools are order and method: order teaches us how to organize the content of a discipline to apprehend it more easily; method teaches us how to draw syllogistic inferences. Zabarella reduces the varieties of orders and methods classified by other interpreters to compositive and resolutive orders and methods. The compositive order from first principles to their consequences applies to theoretical disciplines. The resolutive order from a desired end to means appropriate to its achievement applies to practical disciplines. This much was already in Aristotle. Zabarella offers an original analysis of method. The compositive method infers particular consequences from general principles. The resolutive method infers originating principles from particular consequences, as in inductive reasoning or in reasoning from effect to cause. It has been suggested that Zabarella’s terminology might have influenced Galileo’s mechanics. Grice liked to recite Zabarella’s works by heart. Opera Logica, Venezia; De methodis; De regressu, Venezia; Tabula logicae, Venezia; In duos Aristotelis libros Posteriores Analyticos commentarii, Venezia; De doctrinae ordine apologia, Venezia; De naturalis scientiae constitutione, Venezia; De rebus naturalibus, Venezia; In libros Aristotelis Physicorum commentarii, Venezia; Opera Physica, Francoforte; De generatione et corruptione et Meteorologica commentarii, Francoforte; In tres libros Aristotelis De anima commentarii, Venezia. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, Notes on I Tatti’s edition of Zabarella, “On methods,” -- H. P. Grice, “Zabarella,” Speranza, “Grice and Zabarella,” Villa Grice.

 

zamboni. Grice: “Not everybody knows his zamboni.” There’s Giorgio Zamboni.

 

zamboni: Essential Italian philosopher. Giovanni Zamboni (n. Verona), filosofo.  Zamboni. Herbert Spencer:  commemorazione e polemica, tip. Garagnani, Bologna,  La filosofia neo-scolastica secondo un professore positivista, Tip. vescovile G. Marchiori,Verona, Il valore scientifico del positivismo di Roberto Ardigò e della sua “conversione”, Verona, La dottrina morale e la psicologia del volere nel testo di etica di un discepolo dell’Ardigò, Società Editrice Veronese, Verona, La gnoseologia dell’atto come fondamento della filosofia dell’essere. Saggio di interpretazione sistematica delle dottrine gnoseologiche di S. Tommaso d’Aquino, Milano, Introduzione al corso di gnoseologia pura, Soc. Ed. Vita e Pensiero (Tip. S. Giuseppe), Milano, L' origine delle idee: breve saggio analitico introspettivo, proposto alla riflessione personale degli studenti... , Società editrice veronese, Verona, Sistema di gnoseologia e di morale: basi teoretiche per esegesi e critica dei classici della filosofia moderna ,Editrice Studium, Roma,Studi esegetici, critici, comparativi sulla «Critica della Ragione pura», La tipografica veronese, Verona,  Metafisica e gnoseologia, Risposta a Mons. Francesco Olgiati, La Tipografica Veronese, Verona, Il realismo critico della gnoseologia pura. Risposta al «Caso Zamboni» (P. A. Gemelli, Mons. F. Olgiati e P. A. Rossi), Verona, Realismo Metafisica Personalità (Rilievi Note Discussioni), La Tipografica Veronese, Verona, 1937. La persona umana. Soggetto autocosciente nell’esperienza integrale. Termine della gnoseologia. Base della metafisica, Verona, Giulietti G., Vita e pensiero, Milano, Precisazioni e complementi ai testi scolastici. 1. La Religione naturale e l’essenza della Religione Cristiana, La tipografica veronese, Verona. La «filosofia dell’esperienza immediata, elementare, integrale» per la completa autoconsapevolezza dello spirito umano, La Tipografica Veronese, Verona, Itinerario filosofico dalla propria coscienza all’esistenza di Dio, La Tipografica Veronese, Verona (parte dell’opera fu pubblicata autonomamente). Teodicea, Rodella A., Vita veronese, Verona, La dottrina della coscienza immediata (struttura funzionale della psiche umana) è la scienza positiva fondamentale, La tipografica veronese, Verona, Dizionario filosofico; introduzione e note di Ferdinando L. Marcolungo, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, Idee e giudizi, Marcolungo F.L., IPL ,Milano, L' io e le nozioni soprasensibili; introdotta da Giovanni Giulietti ; curata da Giovanni Giulietti e Albarosa Vighi Zonzini, IPL, Milano Corso di gnoseologia pura elementare. 1.1, Spazio, tempo, percezione intellettiva; introdotta e curata da Ferdinando L. Marcolungo ; presentazione di Giovanni Giulietti, IPL, Milano, Corso di gnoseologia pura elementare, Idee e giudizi; Ferdinando L. Marcolungo, IPL, Milano,  Corso di gnoseologia pura elementare. L' io e le nozioni soprasensibili; introdotta da Giovanni Giulietti; curata da Giovanni Giulietti e Albarosa Vighi Zonzini, IPL, Milano,  Giuseppe Zamboni : autobiografia di una personalità integrale, Serio De Guidi,Archivio storico Curia diocesana, Verona, Studi sulla Critica della ragione pura; Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo, QuiEdit,Verona, . Sistema di gnoseologia e di morale; Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo, QuiEdit, Verona, . Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Gnoseologia,” The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, Bancroft, University of California, Berkeley.

 

zanini: Essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “There are some resemblances between what Zanini intelligently calls “the rhetorics, sic in plural, of truth, and my idea of theoretical argument as a sort of deep down practical argument.” Adelino Zanini (Legnago), filosofo. Laureato in filosofia all'Padova con Umberto Curi, è stato borsista presso la Fondazione L. Einaudi di Torino, ove ha studiato con Siro Lombardini. È professore di Filosofia politica e di Etica economica presso l'Università Politecnica delle Marche. I suoi studi sono indirizzati, in particolare, al rapporto tra pensiero politico e scienza economica tra 1700 e secondo '900. È tra i principali interpreti italiani del pensiero di Adam Smith e di Joseph Schumpeter.  Opere principali Filosofie del soggetto. Soggettività e costituzione, Ila Palma, Palermo, Keynes: una provocazione metodologica, Bertani, Verona, Schumpeter impolitico, Istituto della Enciclopedia ItalianaTreccani, Roma Il moderno come residuo. Dieci lemmi, Pellicani, Roma 1989; Genesi imperfetta. Il governo delle passioni in Adam Smith, Giappichelli, Torino, Modernità e nomadismo, Calusca, Padova; Adam Smith. Economia, morale, diritto, B. Mondadori, Milano (II edizione, Liberilibri, Macerata, ). Macchine di pensiero. Schumpeter, Keynes, Marx, Ombre corte, Verona; oseph A. Schumpeter, B. Mondadori, Milano, Lessico postfordista, (cura con U. Fadini), Feltrinelli, Milano Retoriche della verità. Stupore ed evento, Mimesis Edizioni, Milano Filosofia economica. Fondamenti economici e categorie politiche, Bollati-Boringhieri, Torino(tr. ingl., Peter Lang, Oxford); L'ordine del discorso economico. Linguaggio delle ricchezze e pratiche di governo in Michel Foucault, Ombre corte, Verona . Principi e forme delle scienze sociali. Cinque studi su Schumpeter, Il Mulino, Bologna .  A. Graziano, Adam Smith ou les passions de l'homme moderne. Sur deux ouvrages de Adelino Zanini, “Critique”, A. Negri, Una traccia per gli anni settanta, “Belfagor”, E. Garin, L'etica della simpatia, “L'indice”, A. Salanti, L'economia politica come critica della società (capitalistica): note sparse a Adelino Zanini, Filosofia Economia. Fondamenti economici e categorie politiche, “Quaderni del Dipartimento di Ingegneria gestionale”,  Università degli studi di Bergamo. S. Caruso, Alla ricerca della filosofia economica, “Storia del pensiero economico”,  Fumagalli, Sfera politica e sfera economica: un difficile rapporto. A proposito di "Filosofia economica" di Adelino Zanini, “Economia politica”,  Opere di Adelino Zanini, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Adelino Zanini, .  Registrazioni di Adelino Zanini, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale.  Pagina docente nel sito dell'Università Politecnica delle Marche, su univpm.it. Adelino Zanini in SWIFSito web italiano per la filosofia, su swif.uniba.it.  l'8 gennaio  (archiviato dall'url originale l'8 gennaio ). Intervista ad Adelino Zanini su J.A. Schumpeter. Video Mediaset, su video.mediaset.it. Legnago. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice and Zanini: the rhetorics of truth,” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia; H. P. Grice, “Zanini,” The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, University of California, Berkeley.

 

zanotti: zanotti (n. bologna), filosofo. Della forza dei corpi che chiamiamo viva; Filosofia morale; De viribus centralibus, Bononiae, Lelio dalla Volpe; Ragionamento sopra la filosofia; Paradossi; Epistolario. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Zanotti and me,” The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

 

zimara: Essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “Zimara shows that Aristotle was popular not just in Oxford!” -- zimara (n. Galatina), filosofo. Marcantonio o Marco Antonio Zimara o Zimarra (San Pietro in Galatina, filosofo. Marcantonio o Marco Antonio Zimara, si laureò in medicina e filosofia all'Padova e vi insegnò. Sindaco di Galatina,  si recò a Napoli per difendere la città dai soprusi dei Duchi Castriota.. Insegnò filosofia a Salerno con la stesura di una guida alle opere di Aristotele. Curò la pubblicazione di alcune opere del grande filosofo tedesco e dottore della Chiesa Alberto Magno e di Giovanni di Jandun   Dizionario di filosofia, riferimenti in .  Vedi Delio Cantimori in Enciclopedia Italiana, riferimenti in .  Opere : Zimara Marcantonio, Questio de primo cognito, Papie, Iacob de Burgofranco impresse, Studi  Galatinesi illustri, Guida Biografica, TorGraf Galatina, Galatina 1998. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Marcantonio Zimara  Marcantonio Zimara, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Marcantonio Zimara, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Marcantonio Zimara, .  Zimara, Marco Antonio, in Dizionario di filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Grice: “It’s amazing how much Zimara loved Aristotle.”Refs.: H. P. Grice, The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c.

 

zini : zini (n. Firenze), filosofo. Proprietà individuale o proprietà collettiva?, Torino, Fratelli Bocca; Il pentimento e la morale ascetica, Torino, Bocca; Giustizia: storia d'una idea, Torino, F.lli Bocca  -- cf. Grice, “Justice in Plato’s Republic,” “Social justice,” The Grice Papers; La morale al bivio, Torino, Fratelli Bocca; La doppia maschera dell'universo: filosofia del tempo e dello spazio, Torino, Fratelli Bocca; Il congresso dei morti, Roma, Libreria editrice del Partito comunista d'Italia, ed. con introduzione di Giancarlo Bergami e prefazione di Nerio Nesi, Calabritto, Mattia&Fortunato; Poesia e verità, Milano, Corbaccio, I fratelli nemici: dialoghi e miti moderni, Torino, Einaudi; La tragedia del proletariato in Italia: diario, Prefazione di Giancarlo Bergami, Milano, Feltrinelli; Appunti di vita torinese, Firenze, Olschki  Pagine di vita torinese: note del diario, Torino, Centro studi piemontesi. Grice enjoyed Zini’s approach. “His essay on justice is divided into six parts. The first is ‘the real and the ideal” (‘il relae e l’ideale”); the second is “La giustizia come idea ed emozione” (Fairness as idea and as emotion), the first is “I fruit del lavoro e la loro distribuzione scondo giustizia” (The fruits of labour and their distribution according to fairness”), the fourth is “Libertà od egualiglianza,”Grice: “Note the ‘od,’ which need not be exclusive.”The fifth is “Analisis del merito,” an analysis of merit, and the last is “La pena riparatrice”the punishment that teaches.”Grice: “In liberty or freedom versus equality, Zini approaches the Roman attitude, rather brusque to those Anglo-Saxon attitudes!” -- Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Justice from Plato to Zini: the history of an idea, alla Berlin,” Luigi Speranza, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia, The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

 

zolla: Essential Italian philosopher. zolla è un filosofo italiano. Etica e estetica, Spaziani, Torino Eclissi dell'intellettuale, Bompiani, Milano Volgarità e dolore, Bompiani, Milano Le origini del trascendentalismo, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma Storia del fantasticare, Bompiani, Milano Le potenze dell'anima: morfologia dello spirito nella storia della cultura, anatomia dell'uomo spirituale, Bompiani, Milano I letterati e lo sciamano, Bompiani, Milano Che cos'è la tradizione? Bompiani, Milano Le meraviglie della natura: introduzione all'alchimia, Bompiani, Milano Archetipi, Marsilio, Venezia L'androgino: l'umana nostalgia dell'interezza, Red, Como Incontro con l'androgino: l'esperienza della completezza sessuale, Como Aure: i luoghi e i riti, Marsilio, Venezia L'amante invisibile: l'erotica sciamanica nelle religioni, nella letteratura e nella legittimazione politica, Marsilio, Venezia Il sincretismo, Guida, Napoli Verità segrete esposte in evidenza: sincretismo e fantasia, contemplazione e esotericità, Marsilio, Venezia Tre discorsi metafisici, Guida, Napoli Uscite dal mondo, Adelphi, Milano La luce. La ricerca del sacro, Tallone, Alpignano Ioan Petru Culianu, Tallone, Alpignano Lo stupore infantile, Adelphi, Milano Le tre vie, Adelphi, Milano Un destino itinerante: conversazioni tra Oriente e Occidente con Doriano Fasoli, Marsilio, Venezia La nube del telaio: Ragione e irrazionalità tra Oriente e Occidente, Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, Milano La filosofia perenne. L'incontro fra le tradizioni d'Oriente e d'Occidente, Mondadori, Milano Catabasi e Anastasi, Tallone, Alpignano Discesa all'Ade e resurrezione, Adelphi, Milano Minuetto all'inferno, Einaudi, Torino Cecilia o la disattenzione, Garzanti, Milano I moralisti moderni, Garzanti, Milano (con Alberto Moravia) Saggi, Bompiani, Milano La psicanalisi, Garzanti, Milano Emily Dickinson, Selected Poems and Letters, Mursia, Milano Il Marchese de Sade, Le opere. Scelte e presentate da Elémire Zolla, Longanesi & C., Milano I mistici, Garzanti, Milano Herman Melville, Clarel, Einaudi, Torino; nuova ed. Adelphi, Milano Nathaniel Hawthorne, Settimio Felton o l'elisir di lunga vita, Neri Pozza, Vicenza 1966; poi Garzanti, Milano Il superuomo e i suoi simboli nelle letterature moderne, La Nuova Italia, Firenze Pavel Florenskij, Le porte regali. Saggio sull'icona, Adelphi, Milano Novecento: Lucarini, Roma L'esotismo nella letteratura, La Nuova Italia L'esotismo nelle letterature moderne, Liguori, Napoli Il dio dell'ebbrezza: antologia dei moderni dionisiaci, Einaudi, Torino Conoscenza religiosa, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma Gli arcani del potere: elzeviri, Rizzoli, Milano 2009 Gli usi dell'immaginazione e il declino dell’Occidente, A.I.R.E.Z., Montepulciano Filosofia perenne e mente naturale, Venezia Il serpente di bronzo. Scritti antesignani di critica sociale, Venezia Civiltà indigene, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma Archetipi. Aure. Verità segrete. Dioniso errante. Tutto ciò che conosciamo ignorandolo, Marsilio, Venezia  (contiene Archetipi, Aure e Verità segrete esposte in evidenza, e l'introduzione all'antologia Il dio dell'ebbrezza) Le tre vie. Soluzioni sovrumane, Grazia Marchianò, Marsilio, Venezia. Refs.: H. P. Grice, The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

 

zorzi: Essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “For some reason, in the Veneto area, they cannot pronounce the /dg/, which becomes /z./ as everyone who is familiar with Giorgoneas used by Quine, would know! –“ zorzi (n. ) è un filosofo.  L'armonia del mondo, S. Campanini, "Il Pensiero Occidentale", Bompiani, Milano De harmonia mundi, pref. C. Vasoli, Lavis-Firenze, La Finestra editrice-Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze. L'Elegante Poema & Commento sopra il Poema, J.-F. Maillard, ArchéEdidit, MilanoParis. S. Onda, Le vicende costruttive della chiesa e del convento. Il progetto di Jacopo Sansovino e il «memoriale» di Francesco Zorzi; Le teorie ermetiche di frate Zorzi, in La chiesa di San Francesco della Vigna e il convento dei Frati Minori, Venezia (Edizione a cura della Parrocchia di San Francesco della Vigna), Venezia; Saverio Campanini, Zorzi's Criticism of the Vulgata: Hebraica Veritas or Mendosa Traductio? in G. Busi (ed.), Hebrew to Latin, Latin to Hebrew. The Mirroring of Two Cultures in the Age of Humanism, Berlin Studies in Judaism 1, N. Aragno Editore, Torino; Saverio Campanini, Ein unbekannter Kommentar zum „Hohelied“ aus der kabbalistischen Schule von Francesco Zorzi: Edition und Kommentar, in G. FrankA. HallackerS. Lalla (edd.), Erzählende Vernunft, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, Saverio Campanini, Le fonti ebraiche del De Harmonia mundi di Francesco Zorzi, in «Annali di Ca' Foscari»; G. Busi, Francesco Zorzi. A Methodical Dreamer, in The Christian Kabbalah. Jewish Mystical Books and their Christian Interpreters, ed. J. Dan, Harvard. S. Campanini, Haophan betoc haophan. La struttura simbolica del De Harmonia mundi di Francesco Zorzi, in «Materia Giudaica». Alfonso Vesentini Argento. Il cardinale e l'architetto. Girolamo Aleandro e il rinascimento adriatico veneziano. Apostrofo edizioni-Pieve San Giacomo-Cremona; S. Campanini, Ein christlicher Kabbalist liest Ficino: Francesco Zorzi, in J. Eming und M. Dallapiazza unter Mitarbeit von F. Quenstedt und T. Renz, Marsilio Ficino in Deutschland und Italien. Renaissance-Magie zwischen Wissenschaft und Literatur, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden. Refs.: H. P. Grice, The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

 

zucca: zucca (n. Villaurbana), filosofo. Grice: “I like his surname. Mine means ‘pig.’ His means ‘punpkin.’!” --. L'uomo e l'infinito, Imola, Tipografia sociale; Il lamento del genio, parodia, Sassari, Gallizzi; Dopo il dolore, canto, Chiari, Rivetti; Il grande enigma, Modena, Formiggini; Le lotte dell'individuo, “Rivista di Filosofia”: Le lotte dell'individuo, Modena, Formiggini; Essere e non essere, “Rivista di Filosofia”; Essere e non essere, Roma, Formiggini; Pensieri, “Rivista sarda; Leggenda e realtà, “Rivista sarda”, “Ardigò e il vescovo di Mantova (un'intervista nel sogno), Roma, Rivista sarda; “Ardigò e il vescovo di Mantova (un'intervista nel sogno),’ Roma, Ferri; Un filosofo di un filosofo, “Mediterranea”;  I rapporti fra l'individuo e l'universo, Padova, Cedam. Refs.: H. P. Grice, The Grice Papers, BANC, MSS The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

 

zuccarelli: Grice: “Not really a philosopher, but someone involved in the death of one!” “Nonostante i dubbi, la questione venne ben presto chiusa; secondo l'incaricato Zuccarelli, era plausibile che quelli fossero parte dei resti di Leopardi. Il medico parla esplicitamente di aver rinvenuto una parte di rachide e una di sterno entrambe deviate.”

 

zubiena: Grice: “I would call him the Italian Parkinson – Like G. W. H. Parkinson, he edited a volume on ‘semantics’, and I would also call him the Italiaann A. G. N. Flew. Like Flew he edited a volume on “Langauge and philosophy.”” enrico castelli gattinara di zubiena (n. Torino), filosofo. Professore a Roma. Ha fondato l'Archivio di Filosofia e ha organizzato i "Colloqui Castelli"—Grice: “He should have called them Zubiana”) incontri che riuniscono filosofi per discutere temi di filosofia della religione, Vicina all'esistenzialismo, la sua opera, partita da posizioni spiritualiste, si caratterizza per uno stile filosofico dal tratto autobiografico. Si è interessato di temi legati al rapporto tra ragione, arte e religione; e ha introdotto il dibattito sulla demitizzazione. Nel suo pensiero convergono suggestioni tratte da Agostino, Kierkegaard, Lev Isaakovič Šestov, Heidegger, in una ricerca volta a delineare una teologia della storia sulla base della considerazione del tema del peccato originale. Nei Colloqui, nati dall'intento di contribuire ad una rinascita culturale dell'Europa, convennero in Italia personalità di rilievo della scena filosofica religiosa, teologica, ontologica, fenomenologica ed ermeneutica. Vi fecero la loro comparsa Gouhier, Breton, Brun, Bruaire, Tilliette, Lacan, Ricœur, Lévinas, Ellul, Argan, Starobinski, Benveniste, Eco, Scholem, Vahanian, Giannini. Ha preso il suo posto, come organizzatore dei Colloqui e direttore dell'Archivio di Filosofia, Marco Maria Olivetti. Panikkar fu suo grande amico e collaboratore.  Principali pubblicazioni; Il tempo esaurito, Ed. della Bussola, Roma, 1947. Existentialisme théologique, Herman & Co., Paris 1948. I presupposti di una teologia della storia, Cedam, Padova 1952. Il demoniaco nell'arte, Electa, Milano, 1952; rist. Bollati Borighieri, Torino 2007. Pensieri e giornate, Cedam, Padova, 1963. Simboli e Immagini, Edizioni Rinascimento, Roma, 1966. I presupposti di una teologia della storia, Cedam, Padova 1968. Il tempo invertebrato, Cedam, Padova 1969. I paradossi del senso comune, Cedam, Padova, La critica della demitizzazione, Cedam, Padova, Il tempo inqualificabile, Cedam, Padova, Diari, Cedam, Biblioteca dell'Archivio di Filosofia, Padova,  sul pensiero filosofico di Castelli Marco Maria Olivetti, Enrico Castelli in E. CORETHW.M. NEIDLG. PFLIGERDORFFER , La filosofia cristiana nei secoli XIX e XX, Edizione italiana G. Mura e G. Penzo, Città Nuova, Roma, Pietro Prini, L'esistenzialismo teologico di Enrico Castelli, in Pietro Prini, La filosofia cattolica italiana del Novecento, Laterza, Roma-Bari, Enciclopedia Treccani  SapienzaRoma, su archivio.uniroma1.it. Filosofia della religione Esistenzialismo Teologia razionale  Istituzioni collegate, su filosofia.uniroma1.it. Archivio di filosofia, su libraweb.net. Livio Sichirollo, «CASTELLI GATTINARA di Zubiena, Enrico» in Enciclopedia Italiana, Appendice, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Enrico Castelli, su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana. Opere di Enrico Castelli. Refs.: Luigi Speranza: “Grice, Flew, Parkinson, and Zubiena,” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria.

 

Dedicated to A. M. G. -- Grice loved Italian philosophy, and Oxford philosophy! Because he loved Roman philosophy. There are many keys to the classical Roman philosophical tradition, which later becomes the Italian philosophical influence (e. g. Boethius, or Boezio, as the Italians call him)  in the oeuvre of H. P. Grice. Most manuals about this philosopherGrice, that is, not Boezio--  lack alas the required expertise on Roman and Italian philosophywith which Grice was so well acquainted with since his days at Clifton and later at Corpus for his Lit. Hum. The following thesaurus is meant to fill that gap. More than a dictionary this is what Roger Bacon would call an abecedarium philosophicumabecedarium griceianum, if you want. There are no proper names in this alphabetum, so you won’t find an entry for Grice, but one for Griceian.  Luigi Speranza, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.  Dedicated to A. M. G. A: SUBJECT INDEX: ABDICATVMABSOLVTVMACTUM -- ANIMA -- A: NAME INDEX: FILOSOFO ITALIANO: ABANOABBÀ -- ABBAGNANOABBRIACCARSIACCETTOACHILLINI -- ACITOACONZIO -- ACQUASPARTA -- ACQUISTOD’ -- ACRI -- ADDIEGO-D’ADORNOAGAMBEN -- AGAZZI-Em -- AGAZZI-EvAGOSTINO -- AGOSTINO-D’AGRESTA -- AGRIGENTOAJELLO—ALBERGANO -- ALBERTIALBERTIALBERTINIALDEROTTIALEMANNOALFIERI -- ALFONSO-D’ -- ALGAROTTIALICI -- ALIGHIERI  -- ALIOTTAALLEGRETTIALLIEVO -- ALLMEYER-FAZIO -- ALTAN-TullioAMADUZZIAMANTEA -- AMBROGIO  -- AMBROSOLINIAMERIOAMIDEIAMUCOANCESCHIANDINA -- ANDREA-D’ANDRIAANGELIANGIULLI -- ANNUNZIO-D’ANTISERIANTONI -- ANTONINI -- AOSTAAPPOLINARE -- AQUINOARCAISARANGIOARCAISARCHIBUGIARCHIDIACONO -- ARCO-L’ -- ARDIGÒAREARENA -- ARIMINO-GregoDaARMETTAARRIGHETIASSUNTOASTORINIAURELIO -- AURELIO-- AUSTINJLAZEGLIOAZULAI -- NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: -- AARON -- ACKRILL (Grice’s tutee at St. John’s)AELFRIC -- AUSTIN (collaborator with H. P. Grice) -- AYER (Anglo-Jewish)  B: SUBJECT INDEX: BULETIC -- B: NAME INDEX: -- FILOSOFO ITALIANO: BACCHINBACCIBADALONIBAFFABAGLIETTOBALBOBALDINIBALDINOTTIBALDUINOBANFIBARATONOBARBABARBAROBARCELLONABARIEBARICELLIBARLAAMBARONCELLI -- BARONE-F -- BARONE-GBARSIO BARTOLI BARZAGHIBARZELLOTTIBATTAGLIABAUSOLABAZZANELLABECCARIABECCHIBEDESCHIBELLEOBEDONIBELLONIBELLUTOBENARDIBENCIVENGA -- BENE-DelBENEDETTOBENINCASABENVENUTOBENVENUTTIBERNARDIBERNARDO -- BERNERIBERTIBERTINARIABERTOBIANCOBOBBIOBOCCADIFERRO -- BOCCANEGRABOCCHI -- BODEIBOELLA -- BOEZIOBOLANOBONATELLIBONAVINOBONCINELLIBONIOLOBONOMIBONOMOBONTADINIBONTEMPELLIBONVECCHIObordon (scaligero) -- BORELLI-D -- BORRELI-PBORSABOTEROBOTTABOTTIROLLIBOTTONI -- BOVIO -- BOZZELLI -- BOZZETTIBRANCIFORTE -- BRANDALISEBRECCIABRESSANI -- BRUNETTO LATINIBRUNI -- BRUNOBUONAFEDE -- BUONAMICIBUONARROTIBUONASANTIBUONSANTOBURGIOBURTIGLIONEB: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHBACON-R BACON-F BOSTOCK (Grice’s tutee at St. John’s)BRADLEYBRAITHWAITEBROAD C: SUBJECT INDEX: CONCEPTVS -- C: NAME INDEX: ITALIANOCABEO -- CACCIARI  -- CACCIATORECAFFARELLICAFFICAFFOCALBOLI-PaulucciDiCalboli -- CALDERONICALOGEROCALOPRESECAMBRIACAMILLACAMMARATACAMPA-RCAMPA-RCAMPAILLA -- CAMPANELLACANTONICAPITINICAPIZZICAPOCASALECAPOCCI  -- CAPOGRASSICAPORALICAPPELLETTICAPRACAPUA-DiCARABELLESECARACCIOLOCARAMELLACARAMELLOCARANDOCARAVITA --  CARBONARACARBONECARBONICARCANOCARCHIACARDANOCARDIACARDONECARIFICARLECARLINICARO-DeCARRAVETTACARULLICASALE—GiovanniDaCASALEGNOCASANOVACASATICASINICASOTTI -- CASTELLI -- CASSIODOROCASTRUCCICATALFANOCATARA-LetieriCATENACATTANEO-CCATTANEO-MCATTANI-DaDiacetoCATUCCICAVALCANTICAVALIERICAVALLOCAZZANIGACECCATOCEDRONICELLUCCICENTICENTOFANTICEREBOTANICERETTICERONETTICERRONICERTANICERUTICERUTTICERVICESACESARINI-SforzaCESENA-MicheleDaCHERCHICHIAPPELLICHIAROMONTECHIAVACCI -- CHIOCCHETTICHIODICHITTI -- CICERONECILIBERTOCINATTICIONECOCOCODRONCHICOLAZZACOLECCHICOLLETTICOLLICOLLINI-CosimoCOLOMBECOLOMBO -- COLONNACOLONNELLOCOLORNICONTECONTESTABILESchinella-Conti, Antonio -- CONTI-AngeloCONTI-AugustoCONTRICORBELLINICORDESCHICORLEOCORNELIOCORRADOCORSINICORTESECORVAGLIACOSICOSMACINICOSIMO-Collini?COSMI-DeCOSSOTTINICOSTACOSTA-IICOSTANZI -- COTTRONEOCOTTACREDARO -- CREMONINICRESPICRESPO -- CROCECURCIO-CorradoCURICUSANICUTELLIC: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHCOLLINGWOOD D: SUBJECT INDEX: DEMONSTRATUM -- D: NAME INDEXITALIANDalmassoDandoloDaniele -- Annunzio/AnnunziDatiDelficoMDelfinoFedericoDeliaDelminioDeloguDemariaDemetrioDesideriDianoDionDionigiDisertoriDodaroDomaninDonàDonatelliDonatiDondiDorflesDoriaDottarelliDuniDusoD: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: DUMMETT E: SUBJECT INDEX: EXPLICATVM -- E: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN: -- ECOENESIDEMO -- EMILIANIEMOENRIQUESENTREVESA ENZO EPICOCO -- EPITTETOERCOLE-D’ESPOSITO -- EVOLAE: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH. F: SUBJECT INDEX -- F: NAME INDEXITALIANO -- FABRIFABROFAGGINFALCIGLIA-DaSaleniGFALLARMONICA -- FALZEAFANO -- FARDELLA –-- FASSOFAZIO -- FAZZINIFELICEFERDINANDOFiorettiFERGNANIFernando (Epifanio) -- FERRABINOFERRANDO -- FERRARIFERRARIFERRARISFERRARIS-DeFERRETTIFERRI --  FICINOFIDANZAFIGLIUCCIFILANGIERI –– FILLIPIS-DeFINESCHI -- FIOREFIORMONTEFIORENTINOFIORETTIFISICHELLAFLORIDIFonnesuForneroForlìJacopoDaFormaggioFornariFracastoroFrancescoDiFranchiniFranciFrancia(ToraldodiFrancia) -- FranziniFrixioneFrontinoFrosiniFusaroFuschi -- F: NAME INDEXENGLISHMEN: FLEWG: SUBJECT INDEX: GOAL-ORIENTED BEHAVIOURGRAMMARGESTUREGUSTUMGUSTATUM -- G: NAME INDEX: FILOSOFO ITALIANO:Gaetani Gagliardi Galeffi GalianiGalileiGalimbertiGalliGalloGalliGalloGalluppiGalvanoGangaleGarboDinoDelGarganiGarinGarroniEmilioGarroniStefanoGattiGelliGemmisDeGenoveseGenovesiGentile -- GentileGentileMarinoGentiliGerratanaGeymonatGhezziGhisleriGiacchéGiacomoGiacomoDiGiandomenicoDiGiamettaGiamnettiGianiNGianiRGiannantoniGiannettoGiannoneGiobertiGioiaGiorelloGiorgiGiorgiDePiierPaoloGiorgiDeRaffaeleGiovanniDeBiagioGiraldiGirardiGirgentiGirottiGiudiceGiudiceDelGiudiceLo --  Giuliano (imperatore) --  GiussaniGiussoGivoneGobettiGobboGonnellaGorettiGoriGramsciGrandiGrassiErnestoGrassiLGrataroliGraziaDe -- Gregorio-da-RiminiGregorioIlGrandeGregory -- Grice, H. P.GrifferoGrimaldiCGrimaldiDGrimaldiFGruppiGuastelaGuicciardiniGiuducciGuzziGuzzo G: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian tutors)GARDINERGRICEH: -- PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX: HABITVSHERMENEUTICHOC -- H: NAME INDEXITALIANFILOSOFO ITALIANO -- DON’T EXPECT AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER HERE: but you’ll find one: Hoesle.- Hampshire, S. N.-- Hare, R. M. -- Hart, H. L. A. -- Hillel ben SamuelHösle -- H: NAME INDEXENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy dons) male ENGLISH OXONIAN PHILOSOPHERHALESOWENHAMPSHIREHARE -- HARTI: PHILOSOPIHCAL SUBJECT INDEX: IN-, philosophical prefix. Notably in “in plicaturum.” Antonym: ex-; INTER-, philosophical prefixIUSthe basis for all philosophy of right, or philosophical jurisprudence -- I: NAME INDEXFILOSOFO ITALIANO: IaconoIlluminatiIncardonaInfantino -- IorioD’I: NAME INDEXmale ENGLISH OXONIAN PHILOSOPHERJ: PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEXNone: because all “J” words in Italian came from “I” words in Roman, as in ius, etc. J: NAME INDEX: FILOSOFO ITALIANO: jadelli -- JajaJammelli  JerocadesJervolinoJavèlliJoriJuliaJuvaltaJ: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian tutors) male ENGLISH OXONIAN PHILOSOPHER.Other (provided cited by Grice or Speranza): Jevons, Johnson. k: PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEXSperanza: “I cannot find any pedigreed Roman vocabulary with ‘k’ since this is barbaric!” -- K: NAME INDEX: FILOSOFO ITALIANO (none!) -- K: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy dons)maleENGLISHOXONIANPHILOSOPHER:Kneale.Other(eithercitedbyGriceorSperanza):Kneale KNEAL L: PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX -- L: NAME INDEXLIGATUMLEXLECTUMLEKTONLOGOSLIBER -- FILOSOFO ITALIANOLabriolaLagallaLallaDeLamannaLamiLampronti -- Landi (Rossi-Landi)LandinoLanducci -- Lanza(vVasto) –– Latini -- LazzarelliLecaldanoLeonLeoniLeonicoLeopardiGLeopardiMLevi –Lettieri --  LetieriLiberatoreLiceti  LiguoriDeLillaLiviLimentaniLimoneLodoviciLodovici --  LombardiLombardiaLombardoLonganoLosanoLosurdoLottieriLucaLucrezioLuporiniLuzzagoLuzzattoL: NAME INDEXENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy dons)male ENGLISH OXONIAN PHILOSOPHER: LOCKE M: SUBJECT INDEX: MATERIAMATERIALISMUS -- MENS -- MENTATUMMENTALISMENTITUMMENTITURAMENTATURAMENTATURUMMOS -- M: NAME INDEXITALIAN: MachiavelliMaderaMaffetoneMagalottiMaggiMagiMagnaniMagniMainardini -- MaistreMalatestaMalfitanoMalipiero -- Mamiani (Rovere) -- Mamini (v. Rovere)ManciniMangioneManfrediManiconeManneliMantovaniMarassiMarcaMarcaFrancDellaMarchesiniGMarchesiniRMarchettMarchiMarchiDeMarconiMarianoMarinMarlianiMarottaMarramaoMarsiliMarsilioMarsilioPadovaMartelliMartinettiMartiniMartinoMartinoDeMarzanoMasciMasiMassarentiMastriMassoloMastrofiniMasulloMatassiMateraAlanoDa --Mathieu --– MaturiMauriziMazzantiniMazzarellaMazzeiMazziniMazzoniMedigoEliaDelMeisDeMelandri MelchiorreMelliMercurialeMerkerMessereMicaloriMiccoliMiccolisMichelstaedterMieliMiglioMiragliaMisefariModioMoisoMoleschottMondinMondolfo (his son is a brilliant architect)MontaniMonteDelMontefoschi –MontinariMonti-MontiMoramarcoMoraviaMordacciMordecaiMorelliMorettiG– Mori -- MoriggiMoscaMottaDellaAvogadroMotterliniMusattiMustè -- M: NAME INDEXENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy dons) N: SUBJECT INDEX: NATURANATURALISMNOTUM -- N: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN: Nannini –– NardiNatoliNegri– NeriNesiNicolettiNifoNizolioNoce --   NolaNorciaNotoNovaro -- Nowell-SmithH. (vide under “Smith”) -- N: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy dons)NOWELL-SMITH O: SUBJECT INDEX: OB- prefix, OB-JAECTUM. “ALS OB”“OB” cognate with “IF”“OTHER” “OR”Italian “O,” “OD” “OVVERO.” -- O: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN  -- OconeOddiOffrediOlgiatiOlivettiOliviOpocherOrdineOrestanoOrioli –Ornato –OrsiD’OrtesOtrantoNicolaDiOttavianoO: NAME INDEXENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy dons) P: SUBJECT INDEX: prae-, prefix (antonym: post-), pro- (antonym: retro-), prefix, post- prefix,  PRAEDICATVM -- PERSONPOSSE -- PROBABILITYPROPOSITVM -- P: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN: PacePacePaciPadovaMarsilioDaPadovaniPaganiPaganiniPaganoPaggiPagliaroPalazzaniPanellaPanunzioSergioPanunzioSilvano --– Paolino -- PapiParaviaParetoPareysonParinettoParrasioParriniPascoliPasser-RadicatiDiPasser -- PasseriPasiniPasqualinoPasqualottoPassavantiPasseriPasseriniPastorePatriziPeano -- Pears, D. F.PecoraroPelacaniAntonioPelacaniBagioPellegriniPennisiPeraPeregalliPergolaPaoloDellaPerniolaPeronePersioPessinaPetrarcaPetronePezzarossaPezzellaPianaPiccolominiPicoPicoPieralisiPievaniPigliaruPigliucciPiovaniPirandelloPirroPitagora (Crotone)PizziPizzornoPlebePoggiPojeroGiusAmatoPoliPoliteoPollastriPomisPomponazziPontara -- Ponte (DaPonte)Ponzio -- PonzioPortaPorzioPorzioPortaDella –PossentiPozzaDallaPozzo --- PraDalPrepostinoPrestipinoPretiPrevePriniProdiProsperoPucciPuccinotti PunzoPurgottiP: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: PEARS (Grice’s collaborator) Q: SUBJECT INDEX: QUIDDITAS, QV- Grice’s term for an x-question.the interrogative nature obvious in ‘quale’ and ‘quantum.’  Q: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN: -- Quarta -- Quattromani -- Quinto -- Q: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: QUINTON (Grice’s collaborator) R: SUBJECT INDEX: radix, ratio, res. R: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: RaguseRaimondiRaioRealeReggioReghiniReginaRenierRensiRestaRestainoRicasoliRietaMosèbI -- Da RignanoRicordiRighettiRignanoRigobelloRiminiGregorioDaRinaldiniRiondatoRipaGiovanniDaRiversoRoccoRodanoRomagnosiRomanoBrunoRomanoJudahbMRomanoEgidioRoncagliaRonchiRoccoRosattiRoselliRosminiRosselliCRosselliNRossettiRossiARossiFrancescodellaMarca -- RossiMRossiP –RossoRotaRotondiRovattiRovattiRovellaRovereRucellaiRuffoloRuggieroDeRuscaRusconiRutaR: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: RYLE S: SUBJECT INDEX: sub-, prefx. As in substance, substratum. SIGNUM, SIGNATUMSIGNATURASEMEIONSOMA-SEMASPIRITUSSPERANZASPEMESPERATUMSTRAWSONISE -- S: NAME INDEX ITALIAN:  SacchiSacheliSaittaSalutatiSamuel -- SanctisSanseverinoSantilliSantorioSantucciSanzoSarloDeSarnoSarpi -- SassoSavaScalaScalfari -– ScaranoScaravelliScarpelliSciaccaGSciaccaMSchinellaScupoliSelvatico-Estense -- SemerariSemmolaSenofane -- Senone (Velia)SerraSettaraSeverino -- Sforza-CesariniSforzaSgalambroSicilianiSignaBoncompagnoSimioniSimoneSimoniSiniSiracusaAlcaldinoSirenioSoaveSolariSoleriSomenziSordiSerfainoSoriaDeSorrentinoSotione -- Sozzini -- SpadaroSpartiSpaventaSpedalieriSperanzaSperanza, UgoSperanza, AlessandroSperanza, EttoreSperanza, GianniSperanza, PaolaSperanza, Anna-MariaSperanza-GhersiSperanza -- SperoniSpinelliFSpinelliTSpiritoSpisaniSraffa -- StabileStefaniniStellaStelliniSterlichSteuco -- StrawsonF.—Strozzi -- Szecchi -- S: NAME INDEX ENGLISH: SIBLEY -- STRAWSON -- T: SUBJECT INDEX: TRANSCENDENTALETEMPUSTROPOSTOPOSTELOSTELICThomason -- T: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: TaddioTagliabueTagliagambeTaglialatelaTagliapietraTamburinoTafuriTarantinoFTarantinoGTari -- TartarottiTataranniTassoTelesioTertulliano -- TessitoreTravisTestaThaulero -- TilgherTimossiTincaniToccoToderiniTolomeiTomatisTomeo -- TomitanoTornoliaTorricelliTrabuccoTragellaTrapèTrasci -- TrevesTriaTrincheriTrissinoTroiloTrontiTulelliTurcoTuroldoTuveri -- T: NAME INDEX ENGLISH: THOMSON (Grice’s collaborator) -- TURING TOULMIN U: SUBJECT INDEX: USEUSUSUSATUM -- U: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: UBALDIUbaldiUnicorno -- Urmson, J. O.-- U: NAME INDEX ENGLISH: URMSON (Grice’s collaborator) V: PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX: VAGUM, VARIABILIS,  V: NAME INDEX  -- ITALIAN V: FILOSOFO ITALIANO: VACCAVACCARINOVACCARO -- VAILATIVALENT -- VALENTINOVALERI -- VALLAVALLAURI-LuigiLombardiVALLETTAVALOREVALPERGA-DiCaluso -- VANINIVANNI -- VANNINIVARISCO -- VARRONE -- VARZIVASAVASALLO(Nicla)VASTARINI –- VATTIMOVECA– VEDOVELLI -- VEGETTI -- VENANZIO –VENEZIA -- VENTURA --  VERAVERCELLONEVERDIGLIONEVERNIAVERONELLI -- VERRECHIA -- VERRI  --  VESEY -- VIANOVIAZZI -- VICO (n.Napoli)VIERIVIGNAVIGNOLI -- VIOVIOTTO -- VIRNO  -- VIROLI-Cavalieri? -- VITIELLO-Vincenzo?VOLPE-DellaVOLPIVolpicelliVoltaggio -- V: NAME INDEX ENGLISH: -- VESEYOther: Grice’s club member: VandervekenW: PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX: WORLDWELTWAHRWORTHWISE -- W: DON’T EXPECT AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER WITH THIS BARBARIC LETTER“but actually you shall find one, although he wasn’t even sure where his surname came! Winspeare!” (Grice)WarnockWinspeare -- W: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: WARNOCK (Grice’s collaborator)WILSON -- X: SUBJECT INDEX: -- X: NAME INDEX: XENOPHANESXENOPHONXMASY: SUBJECT INDEX: YOG-AND-ZOG Z: PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX: ZEIGARNICK -- ZETTELZWECKRATIONALITÄTZ NAME INDEX: FILOSOFI ITALIANI: -- ZABARELLAZAMBONI-GioZAMBONI-GiuZANINI -- ZANOTTIZECCHI ZIMARA -- ZINI -- ZOLLA -- ZORZI (Giorgi)ZUCCAZUCCARELLIZUBIENA ENGLISH  OTHER: ZOROASTROReferences (Following the tradition of H. P. Grice’s Playgroup, only Oxonian English-born male philosophers of Grice’s generation listed): Abano, Pietro D’ (n. d.). Filosofia. Abbà.  Abbagnano, N. Dizionario di filosofia. Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia.Austin, J. L. Philosophical papers, edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Austin, J. L. Sense and sensibilia, reconstructed from manuscript notes by G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Austin, J. L. How to do things with words, ed. by J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Blackburn, S. W. Spreading the word. Oxford. Bostock, D. Logic.Croce, B.  EsteticaFlew, A. G. N. Logic and language. Oxford: Blackwell.Galileo, ScienzaGentile, Storia della filosofiaGhersi, A. M. Griceiana. Grice, H. P. Studies in the Way of WordsGrice, H. P. Negation and privationGrice, H. P. The conception of value. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.Grice, H. P. Aspects of reason, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.Grice, H. P., D. F. Pears, and P. F. Strawson, ‘Metaphysics,’ in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics. London: Macmillan. Hampshire, S. N. Thought and action. London: Chatto and Windus.Hampshire, S. N. and H. L. A. Hart, Intention, decision, and certainty. Mind. Hare, R. M. The language of morals. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.Hart, H. L. A. ReviewofHolloway, The Philosophical Quarterly’Leonardi, FilosofiaMachiavelli, Il principeMondolfo, Storia della filosofiaNowell-SmithH. Ethics. Middlesex: PenguinPears, D. F. Philosophical psychology. London: Duckworth. Pears, D. F. Motivated irrationality.Pears, D. F. and H. P. Grice, The philosophy of action.Speranza, Minutes of H. P. Grice’s Play-GroupThe Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia. StrawsonF. Introduction to Logical Theory.StrawsonF. Logico-Linguistic Papers.StrawsonF. and H. P. Grice, In defense of a dogma.StrawsonF. and H. P. Grice, CategoriesStrawsonF. and H. P. Grice, Meaning.Thomson, J. F. and H. P. Grice, The philosophy of action.Urmson, J. O. Philosophical Analysis: its development between the two wars.Vico, Scienza nuovaWarnock, G. J. The object of moralityWarnock, G. J. Language and MoralsWinspeare, Il libro delle leggi di Cicerone.Winspeare, FilosofiaPalazzo d’Acquaviva, Via Atri. Woozley, A. D. On H. P. Grice.(A. M. G. is Anna Maria GhersiGhersi instilled and keeps instillingnever ceases to instill -- in Luigi Speranza a love for philosophy), The Gricce Club. Zabarella, De regressu, I Tatti.Zabarella, De methodis, I Tatii.Zamboni, Giorgio. Grice: “Described himself as a philosopher.”Zamboni, G. Gnoseoloogia pura.Zanetti, A.Retoriche della veritàZanotti, La vita e lo vivo. Zimara, De primo cognitoCommentaria ad AristotelemZini, Giustizia: storia d’una idealiberta od …Zolla, L’androgino. Zorzi, L’armonia del mondo. Zucca, L’uomo e l’infinito.Zuccarelli, “La morte di Leopardi.”