conjunctum: One has to be careful because the scholastic vocabulary
also misleadingly has ‘copulatum’ for this. The ‘copulatum’ should be
restricted to other usages, which Grice elaborates on ‘izzing’ and hazing.
traditional parlance, one ‘pars orationis.’ Aulus Gellius writes; “What the Greeks call
“sympleplegmenon” we call conjunctum or copulatum, copulative sentence. For
example. The Stoic copulative sentence — sumpleplegmenon axioma — is translated
by “conjunctum” or “copulatum,” for example: „P. Scipio, son of Paulus, was a
consul twice and was given the honour of triumph and also performed the
function of censor and was the colleague of L. Mummius during his censorship”.
Here, Aulus Gellius made a noteworthy remark, referring to the value of truth
of the composing propositions ■ (a Stoic problem). In keeping with the Stoics,
he wrote: “If one element of the copulative sentence is false, even if all the
other elements are true, the copulative sentence is false” (“in omni aiitem
conjuncto si unum est mendacium etiamsi, caetera vera sunt, totum esse
mendacium dicitur”). In the identification of ‘and’ with ‘Λ’
there is already a considerable
distortion of the facts. ‘And’ can perform many jobs which ‘Λ’ cannot perform. It can, for instance, be used to couple
nouns (“Tom and William arrived”), or adjectives (“He was hungry and thirsty”),
or adverbs (“He walked slowly and painfully”); while ' . ' can be used only to
couple expressions which could appear as separate sentences. One might be
tempted to say that sentences in which “and” coupled words or phrases, were
short for sentences in which “and” couples clauses; e.g., that “He was hungry
and thirsty” was short for “He was hungry and he was thirsty.” But this is
simply false. We do not say, of anyone who uses sentences like “Tom and William
arrived,” that he is speaking elliptically, or using abbreviations. On the
contrary, it is one of the functions of “and,” to which there is no counterpart
In the case of “.,” to form plural subjects or compound predicates. Of course
it is true of many statements of the forms “x and y” are/* or ' x is /and g \
that they are logically equivalent to corresponding statements of the" form
* x Is /and yisf'oT^x is /and x is g \ But, first, this is a fact about the
use, in certain contexts, of “and,” to
which there corresponds no rule for the use of * . '. And, second, there are
countless contexts for which such an equivalence does not hold; e.g. “Tom and
Mary made friends” is not equivalent to “Tom made friends and Mary made
friends.” They mean, usually, quite different things. But notice that one could
say “Tom and Mary made friends; but not with one another.” The implication of
mutuality in the first phrase is not so strong but that it can be rejected
without self-contradiction; but it is strong enough to make the rejection a
slight shock, a literary effect. Nor does such an equivalence hold if we
replace “made friends” by “met yesterday,” “were conversing,” “got married,” or
“were playing chess.” Even “Tom and William arrived” does not mean the same as
“Tom arrived and William arrived;” for the first suggests “together” and the
second an order of arrival. It might be conceded that “and” has functions which
“ .” has not (e.g., may carry in certain contexts an implication of mutuality
which ‘.’ does not), and yet claimed
that the rules which hold for “and,” where it is used to couple clauses, are
the same as the rules which hold for “.” Even this is not true. By law (11),
" p , q ' is logically equivalent to * q . p ' ; but “They got married and
had a child” or “He set to work and found a job” are by no means logically
equivalent to “They had a child and got married” or “He found a job and set to
work.” One might try to avoid these difficulties by regarding ‘.’ as having the
function, not of ' and ', but of what it looks like, namely a full stop. We
should then have to desist from talking of statements of the forms ' p .q\ * p
. J . r * &CM and talk of sets-of-statements of these forms instead.
But this would not avoid all, though it would avoid some, of the difficulties.
Even in a passage of prose consisting of several indicative sentences, the
order of the sentences may be in general vital to the sense, and in particular,
relevant (in a way ruled out by law (II)) to the truth-conditions of a
set-of-statements made by such a passage. The fact is that, in general, in
ordinary speech and writing, clauses and sentences do not contribute to the truthconditions
of things said by the use of sentences and paragraphs in which they occur, in
any such simple way as that pictured by the truth-tables for the binary
connectives (' D ' * . ', 4 v ', 35 ') of the system, but in far more subtle,
various, and complex ways. But it is precisely the simplicity of the way in
which, by the definition of a truth-function, clauses joined by these
connectives contribute to the truth-conditions of sentences resulting from the
junctions, which makes possible the stylized, mechanical neatness of the
logical system. It will not do to reproach the logician for his divorce from
linguistic realities, any more than it will do to reproach the abstract painter
for not being a representational artist; but one may justly reproach him if he
claims to be a representational artist. An abstract painting may be,
recognizably, a painting of something. And the identification of “.” with
‘and,’ or with a full stop, is not a simple mistake. There is a great deal of
point in comparing them. The interpretation of, and rules for, “.”define a
minimal linguistic operation, which we might call ‘simple conjunction’ and
roughly describe as the joining together of two (or more) statements in the
process of asserting them both (or all). And this is a part of what we often do
with ' and ', and with the full stop. But we do not string together at random
any assertions we consider true; we bring them together, in spoken or written
sentences or paragraphs, only when there is some further reason for the rapprochement,
e.g., when they record successive episodes in a single narrative. And that for
the sake of which we conjoin may confer upon the sentences embodying the
conjunction logical features at variance with the rules for “.” Thus we have
seen that a statement of the form “p and q” may carry an implication of
temporal order incompatible with that carried by the corresponding statement of
the form “q and p.” This is not to deny that statements corresponding to
these, but of the forms ‘pΛq’ and ‘qΛp’would be, if made, logically equivalent; for such
statements would carry no implications, and therefore no incompatible
implications, of temporal order. Nor is it to deny the point, and merit, of the
comparison; the statement of the form ‘pΛq’ means at least a part of what is meant by the corresponding
statement of the form ‘p and q.’ We might say:
the form ‘p q’ is an abstraction from the different uses of the form ‘p
and q.’ Simple conjunction is a minimal
element in colloquial conjunction. We may speak of ‘. ‘ as the conjunctive
sign; and read it, for simplicity's sake, as “and” or “both … and … “I have
already remarked that the divergence between the meanings given to the truth-functional
constants and the meanings of the ordinary conjunctions with which they are
commonly identified is at a minimum in the cases of ' ~ ' and ‘.’ We have seen,
as well, that the remaining constants of the system can be defined in terms of
these two. Other interdefinitions are equally possible. But since ^’ and ‘.’ are more nearly identifiable with ‘not’ and
‘and’ than any other constant with any other English word, I prefer to
emphasize the definability of the remaining constants in terms of ‘ .’ and ‘~.’
It is useful to remember that every rule or law of the system can be expressed
in terms of negation and simple conjunction. The system might, indeed, be
called the System of Negation and Conjunction. Grice lists ‘and’ as the first
binary functor in his response to Strawson. Grice’s conversationalist
hypothesis applies to this central ‘connective.’ Interestingly, in his essay on
Aristotle, and discussing, “French poet,” Grice distinguishes between
conjunction and adjunction. “French” is adjuncted to ‘poet,’ unlike ‘fat’ in
‘fat philosopher.’ And
Grice:substructural logics, metainference, implicature. Grice explores some of
the issues regarding pragmatic enrichment and substructural logics with a
special focus on the first dyadic truth-functor, ‘and.’ In particular,
attention is given to a sub-structural “rule” pertaining to the commutativeness
of conjunction, applying a framework that sees Grice as clarifying the extra
material that must be taken into account, and which will referred to as the ‘implicatum.’
Grice is thus presented as defending a “classical-logical” rule that assigns
commutativeness to conjunction while accounting for Strawson-type alleged
counterexamples to the effect that some utterances of the schema “p and q”
hardly allow for a ‘commutative’ “inference” (“Therefore, q and p”). How to
proceed conservatively while allowing room for pluralism? Embracing the
“classical-logical” syntactic introduction-cum-elimination and semantic
interpretation of “and,” the approach by Cook Wilson in “Statement and
inference” to the inferential métier of “and” is assessed. If Grice grants that
there is some degree of artificiality in speaking of the meaning or sense of
“and,” the polemic brings us to the realm of ‘pragmatic inference,’ now
contrasted to a ‘logical inference.’ The endorsement by Grice of an
‘impoverished’ reading of conjunction appears conservative vis-à-vis not just
Strawson’s ‘informalist’ picture but indeed the formalist frameworks of
relevant, linear, and ordered logic. An external practical decision à la Carnap
is in order, that allows for an enriched, stronger, reading, if not in terms of
a conventional implicatum, as Strawson suggests. A ‘classical-logic’ reading in
terms of a conversational implicatum agrees with Grice’s ‘Bootstrap,’ a
methodological principle constraining the meta-language/object-language divide.
Keywords: conjunction, pragmatic
enrichment, H. Paul Grice, Bootstrap. “[I]n recent years, my disposition to
resort to formalism has markedly diminished. This retreat may well have been
accelerated when, of all people, Hilary Putnam remarked to me that I was too
formal!”H.P. Grice, ‘Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and
opinions of Paul Grice,’ in Grandy & Warner, 1986:61 Keywords:
metainference, substructural logics, classical logic, conjunction, H. Paul
Grice, pragmatic inference; Rudolf Carnap, bootstrap, modernism, formalism,
neotraditionalism, informalism, pragmatics, inference, implicature, extensional
conjunction, intensional conjunction, multiplicative conjunction, additive
conjunction. Grice’s approach consistent with Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism
that allows room for the account put forward by H. Paul Grice in connection
with a specific meta-inference (or second-order “… yields …”) as it may help us
take an ‘external’ practical decision as to how to recapture a structural
‘rule’ of classical logic. The attempt involves a reconsideration, with a
special focus on the sub-structural classical logic rules for conjunction of
Grice’s ultimately metaphilosophical motivation in the opening paragraphs to
“Logic and Conversation.” Grice explores stick the first dyadic truth-functor Grice lists. In
fact, it’s the first alleged divergence, between “p and q” and “p. . q” that
Grice had quotes in “Prolegomena” to motivate his audience, and the example he
brings up vis-à-vis an ‘alleged’ “linguistic offence” (a paradox?) that an
utterer may incur by uttering “He got into bed and took his clothes off, but I
don’t mean to suggest he did it in that order” (Grice 1981:186). Implicata are
cancellable. In the present scheme, which justifies substructural logics, this
amounts to any ‘intensional’ reading of a connective (e. g. ‘and’) being
susceptible of being turned or ‘trans-formed’
into
the correlative extensional one in light of the cancelling clause, which brings
new information to the addressee A. This is hardly problematic if we consider
that sub-structural logics do not aim to capture the ‘semantics’ of a
logical constant, and that the sub-structural logical ‘enrichment’ is relevant,
rather, for the constant’s ‘inferential role.’Neither is it problematic that
the fact that the ‘inferential role’ of a logical constant (such as ‘and’) may
change (allowing this ‘trans-formation’ from classical-logical extensional to
sub-structural logical intension, given new information which will be used by
the addressee A to ‘work out’ the utterer U’s meaning. The obvious, but worthemphasizing, entailment in Grice’s
assertion about the “mistake” shared by Formalism and Informalism is that
FORMALISM (as per the standard presentations of ‘classical logic’) does commit
a mistake! Re-capturing the FORMALISM of classical logic is hardly as direct in
the Griceian programme as one would assume. Grice’s ultimate meta-philosophical
motivation, though, seems to be more in agreement with FORMALISM. Formalism can
repair the mistake, Grice thinks, not by allowing a change in the assigning of
an ‘interpretation’ rule of an empoverished “and” (““p and q” is 1 iff both p
and q are 1, 0 otherwise.” (Cfr. Pap: “Obviously,
I cannot prove that
“(p and q) ≡ (q and p)”
is tautologous (and that
therefore “He got into bed and took off his clothes’ iff ‘he took of his
clothes and got into bed,’) unless I first construct an adequate truth-table defining the use
of “and.” But surely one of the points of constructing such a table is to
‘reproduce’ or capture’ the meaning of ‘and’ in a natural language! The
proposal seems circular!) and a deductive ‘syntactics’ rule,
involving the Gentzen-type elimination of ‘and’ (“ “p and q” yields “p”; and
its reciprocal, “ “p and q” yields “q”.” To avoid commiting the mistake,
formalism must recognise the conversational implicatum ceteris paribus derived
from some constraint of rational co-operation (in particular, the desideratum
or conversational maxim, “be orderly!”) and allow for some syntactical scope
device to make the implicatum obvious, an ‘explicatum,’ almost (without the
need to reinforce “and” into “and then”). In Grice’s examples, it may not even
be a VIOLATION, but a FLOUT, of a conversational maxim or desideratum, within
the observance of an overarching co-operation principle (A violation goes
unnoticed; a flout is a rhetorical device. Cfr. Quintilian’s observation that
Homer would often use “p & q” with the implicatum “but not in that order”
left to the bard’s audience to work out). Grice’s attempt is to recapture
“classical-logic” “and,” however pragmatically ‘enriched,’ shares some features
with other sub-structural logics, since we have allowed for a syntactical tweak
of the ‘inference’ rules; which we do via the pragmatist (rather than
pragmatic) ‘implicatural’ approach to logic, highlighting one pragmatic aspect
of a logic without CUT. Grice grants
that “p and q” should read “p . q” “when [“p . q” is] interpreted in the
classical two-valued way.” His wording is thus consistent with OTHER ways
(notably relevant logic, linear and ordered logic). Grice seems to have as one
of his ‘unspeakable truths’ things like “He got into bed and took his clothes
off,” “said of a man who proceeds otherwise.” After mentioning
“and” “interpreted in the classical two-valued way,” Grice dedicates a
full paragraph to explore the classical
logic’s manifesto. The idea is to provide a SYSTEM that will give us an
algorithm to decide which formulae are theorems. The ‘logical consequence’ (or
“… yields …”) relation is given a precise definition.Grice notes that
“some logicians [whom he does not mention] may at some time have wanted to
claim that there are in fact no such divergences [between “p and q” and “p .
q”]; but such claims, if made at all, have been somewhat rashly made, and those
suspected of making them have been subjected to some pretty rough handling.” “Those who concede that such divergences [do]
exist” are the formalists. “An outline of a not uncharacteristic FORMALIST
position may be given as follows,” Grice notes. We proceed to number the thesis
since it sheds light on what makes a sub-structural logic
sub-structural“Insofar as logicians are concerned with the formulation of very
general patterns of VALID INFERENCE (“… yields…”) the formal device (“p . q”)
possesses a decisive advantage over their natural counterpart (“p and q.”) For
it will be possible to construct in terms of the formal device (“p . q”) a
system of very general formulas, a considerable number of which can be regarded
as, or are closely related to, a pattern of inferences the expression of which
involves the device.”“Such a system may consist of a certain set of simple
formulas that MUST BE ACCEPTABLE if the device has the MEANING (or sense) that
has been ASSIGNED to it, and an indefinite number of further formulas, many of
them less obviously acceptable (“q . p”), each of which can be shown to be
acceptable if the members of the original set are acceptable.”“We have, thus, a
way of handling dubiously acceptable patterns of inference (“q. p,” therefore,
“p. q”) and if, as is sometimes possible, we can apply A DECISION PROCEDURE, we
have an even better way.”“Furthermore, from a PHILOSOPHICAL point of view, the
possession by the natural counterpart (“p and q”) of that element in their
meaning (or sense), which they do NOT share with the corresponding formal
device, is to be regarded as an IMPERFECTION; the element in question is an
undesirable excrescence. For the presence of this element has the result that
the CONCEPT within which it appears cannot be precisely/clearly defined, and
that at least SOME statements involving it cannot, in some circumstances, be
assigned a definite TRUTH VALUE; and the indefiniteness of this concept is not
only objectionable in itself but leaves open the way to METAPHYSICS: we cannot
be certain that the natural-language expression (“p and q”) is METAPHYSICALLY
‘LOADED.’”“For these reasons, the expression, as used in natural speech (“p and
q”), CANNOT be regarded as finally acceptable, and may tum out to be, finally,
not fully intelligible.” “The proper course is to conceive and begin to
construct an IDEAL language, incorporating the formal device (“p . q”), the
sentences of which will be clear, determinate in TRUTH-VALUE, and certifiably
FREE FROM METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS.”“The foundations of SCIENCE will now be
PHILOSOPHICALLY SECURE, since the statements of the scientist will be
EXPRESSIBLE (though not necessarily actually expressed) within this ideal
language.”What kind of enrichment are we talking
about? It may be understood as a third conjunct ptn-l & qtn
& (tn > tn-l) FIRST
CONJUNCT + SECOND CONJUNCT + “TEMPORAL SUCCESSION” p AND THEN q To
buttress the buttressing of ‘and,’ Grice uses ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ for other
operators like ‘disjunction – and his rationale for the Modified Occam’s razor
would be: “A STRONGER SENSE for a truth-functional dyadic operator SHOULD NOT
BE POSTULATED when A WEAK (or minimal) SENSE does, provided we add the
CANCELLABLE IMPLICATUM.” Grice SIMPLIFIES semantics, but there’s no free lunch,
since he now has to explain how the IMPLICATUM arises. Let’s revise the way “and,” the first ‘dyadic’ device in
“Logic and Conversation,” is invoked by Grice in “Prolegomena.” “He got into
bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a someone who took his clothes off and
got into bed.” Cfr. theorems ∧I
= ` ∀ φ ψ• [φ; ψ] |= φ ∧
ψ ∧E = ` ∀
φ ψ• ([φ ∧ ψ] |= φ) ∧ ([φ ∧
ψ] |= ψ)We have: He got into bed and took his clothes off (Grice, 1989:9). He took his clothes off and got into bed (Grice, 1989:9). He got into bed and took his clothes off but I don’t want to
suggest that he did those things in that order (Grice, 1981:186). He first took his clothes off and then got into bed (Grice
1989:9). In invoking Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory, is Grice being
fair? Strawson had noted, provocatively: “[The formula] “p . q’ is
logically equivalent to ‘q . p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had a
child’ or ‘He set to work and found a job’ are by no means logically equivalent
to ‘They had a child and got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’”How
easier things would have gone should Strawson have used the adjective ‘pragmatic’
that he mentions later in his treatise in connection with Grice. Strawson is
sticking with the truth-functionality and thinking of ‘equivalence’ in terms of
‘iff’ – but his remark may be rephrased as involving a notion of ‘inference.’ In
terms of LOGICAL INFERENCE, the premise “He got into bed and took his clothes
off” YIELDS “He took off his clothes and got into bed,” even if that does NOT
‘yield’ in terms of ceteris paribus PRAGMATIC inference. It would have pleased Grice to read the above as: “[The formula] “p . q’ is equivalentL to ‘q .
p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had a child’ or ‘He set to work and
found a job’ are by no means equivalentP to ‘They had a child and
got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’” By appealing to a desideratum of rational co-operative
discourse, “be orderly,” Grice thinks he can restore “and” to its
truth-functional sense, while granting that the re-inforced “then” (or an
alleged extra sense of “temporal succession,” as he has it in “Prolegomena”) is
merely and naturally (if cancellable on occasion) conversationally implicated
(even if under a generalised way) under the assumption that the addressee A
will recognise that the utterer U is observing the desideratum, and is being
orderly. But witness variants to the cancellation (3) above. There is an indifferent,
indeterminate form: He got into bed and took off his clothes, though I don’t
mean to imply that he did that in that order.versus the less indeterminate He
got into bed and took his clothes off, but not in that order. +> i.e. in the
reverse one.Postulating a pragmatic desideratum allows Grice to keep any
standard sub-structural classical rule for “and” and “&” (as s he does when
he goes more formalist in “Vacuous Names,” his tribute to Quine).How are to
interpret the Grice/Strawson ‘rivalry’ in meta-inference? Using Frege’s
assertion “⊦LK” as our operator to read “… yields…” we have:p & q ⊦LK q & p and q & p ⊦LK p & q. In
“Prolegomena,” then, Grice introduces:“B. Examples involve an area of special interest
to me [since he was appointed logic tutor at St. John’s], namely
that of expressions which are candidates for being natural analogues to logical
constants and which may, or may not, ‘diverge’ in meaning [not use] from the
related constants (considered as elements in a classical logic, standardly
interpreted). It has, for example, been suggested that because it would be
incorrect or inappropriate [or misleading, even false?] to say “He got into bed
and took off his clothes” of [someone] who first took off his clothes and then
got into bed, it is part of the meaning [or sense] or part of one meaning
[sub-sense] of “and” to convey temporal succession” (Grice 1989:8). The
explanation in terms of a reference to “be orderly” is mentioned in
“Presupposition and conversational implicature” (Grice 1981:186). Grice notes: “It
has been suggested by [an informalist like] Strawson, in [An] Introduction to
Logical Theory [by changing the title of Strawson’s essay, Grice seems to be
implicating that Strawson need not sound pretentious] that there is a
divergence between the ordinary use or meaning of ‘and’ and the conjunction
sign [“.”] of propositional or predicate calculus because “He took off his
clothes and got into to bed” does not seem to have the same meaning as “He got
into bed and took off his clothes.”” Grice goes on: “[Strawson’s] suggestion here is, of course, that, in order properly
to represent the ordinary use of [the
word] “and,” one would have to allow a special sense (or sub-sense) for [the word] “and” which contained
some reference to the idea that what was
mentioned before [the word] “and” was temporally prior to what was mentioned
after it, and that, on that supposition,
one could deal with this case.”Grice goes on: “[Contra Strawson,] I want to
suggest in reply that it is not necessary
[call him an Occamist, minimalist] if one operates on some general principle
[such as M. O. R., or Modified Occam’s Razor] of keeping down, as far as possible, the number of special sense
[sic] of words that one has to invoke, to give countenance to the
alleged divergence of meaning.” The
constraint is not an arbitrary assignation of sense, but a rational one derived
from the nature of conversation:“It is just that there is a general supposition
[which would be sub-sidiary to the general maxim of Manner or ‘Modus’ (‘be
perspicuous! [sic]’) that one presents one's material in an orderly manner and, if what one is engaged upon is a narration (if
one is talking about events), then the
most orderly manner for a narration of events is an order that corresponds to the order in which they took
place.”Grice concludes: “So, the meaning of the expression ‘He took off his
clothes and he got into bed” and the
corresponding expression with a [classical] logician's constant
"&" [when given a standard two-valued interpretation] (i.e. “He took his clothes off & he got into
bed") would be exactly the same.”Grice’s
indifference with what type of formalism to adopt is obvious: “And, indeed, if
anybody actually used in ordinary speech the "&" as a piece of vocabulary instead of as a formal(ist)
device, and used it to connect together sentences of this type, they would collect just the same
[generalised conversational] implicata as the ordinary English sentences have without any extra explanation
of the meaning of the word ‘and’.” It is
then that Grice goes on to test the ‘cancellability,’ producing the
typical Gricean idiom, above:He took his
clothes off and got into bed but I don't mean to suggest that he did those
things in that order. Grice goes on: “I
should say that I did suggest, in [my essay] on implicature, two sorts of tests by which one might hope to identify a conversational
implicature. [...] I did not mean to suggest that these tests were final, only
that they were useful. One test was the possibility of cancellation; that is to
say, could one without [classical] logical absurdity [when we have a standard
two-valued interpretation], attach a cancellation clause. For instance, could I
say (9)?” Grice: “If that is not a linguistic offense [and ‘false’], or does
not seem to be, then, so far as it goes, it is an indication that what one has
here is a conversational implicature, and that the original [alleged meaning,
sense, or] suggestion of temporal succession [is] not part of the conventional
meaning of the sentence.” Grice (1981, p. 186). Formalising the temporal succession
is never enough but it may help, and (9) becomes (10):p & q and ptn-l &
qtn where “tn-l” is a temporal index
for a time prior to “tn”. It is interesting to note that Chomsky, of all
people, in 1966, a year before Grice’s William James lectures, in Aspects of
the theory of syntax refers to “A [sic] P. Grice” as propounding that temporal
succession be considered implicature (Since this pre-dates the William James
lectures by a year, it was via the seminars at Oxford that reached Chomsky at
MIT via some of Grice’s tutees).Let us revise Urmson’s wording in his treatment
of the ‘clothes’ example, to check if Grice is being influenced by Urmson’s
presentation of the problem to attack Strawson. Urmson notes: “In
formal[ist] logic, the connective[…] ‘and’ [is] always given a minimum
[empoverished] meaning, as [I] have done above, such that any complex
[molecular sentence] formed by the use of [it] alone is [always] a
truth-function of its constituents.”Urmson goes on to sound almost like
Strawson, whose Introduction to Logical Theory he credits. Urmson notes: “In
ordinary discourse the connective[… ‘and]] often [has] a *richer* meaning.”Urmson
must be credited, with this use of ‘richer’ as the father of pragmatic
enRICHment!Urmson goes on: “Thus ‘He took his clothes off and got into bed’
implies temporal succession and has a different meaning from [the impoverished,
unreinforced] ‘He got into bed and took off his clothes.’” Urmson does not play
with Grice’s reinforcement: “He first got into bed and then took his clothes
off.’ Urmson goes on, however, in his concluding remark, to side with Grice
versus Strawson, as he should! Urmson notes: “[Formal(ist) l]ogicians would
justify their use of the minimum [impoverished, unreinforced, weak] meaning by
pointing out that it is the common element in all our uses [or every use] of
‘and.’” (Urmson, 1956:9-10). The
commutativeness of ‘and’ in the examples he gives is rejected by Strawson. How
does Strawson reflect this in his sub-structural rule for ‘and’?
As Humberstone puts it, “It
is possible to define a version of the calculus, which defines most of the
syntax of the logical operators by means of axioms, and which uses only one
inference rule.”Axioms: Let φ, χ and ψ stand for
well-formed formulae. The wff's themselves would not contain any Greek letters,
but only capital Roman letters, connective operators, and parentheses. The
axioms include:ANDFIRST-CONJUNCT: φ ∧ χ → φ and ANDSECOND-CONJUNCT:
φ ∧ χ → χ. Our (13) and (14) correspond to
Gentzen’s “conjunction elimination” (or (& -), as Grice has it in “Vacuous
Names.”). The relation between (13) and
(14) reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. Cfr. Cohen 1971: “Another conversational maxim of Grice's, “be orderly”, is intended to
govern such matters as the formalist can show that it was not appropriate to
postulate a special non-commutative temporal
conjunction.”“The locus classicus for complaints of this nature being Strawson (1952).” Note that
the commutative “and” is derived from Grice’s elimination of conjunction, “p
& q ⊦
p” and “p & q ⊦ q
-- as used by Grice in his system Q.Also note that the truth-evaluation would
be for Grice ‘semantic,’ rather than ‘syntactic’ as the commutative (understood
as part of elimination). Grice has it as: If phi and psi are formulae, “φ and ”
is 1 iff both φ and ψ are true, 0 otherwise. Grice grants that however “baffling” (or misleading)
would be to utter or assert (7) if no one has doubts about the temporal order of the
reported the events, due to the expectation that the utterer is observing the
conversational maxim “be orderly” subsumed under the conversational category of
‘Modus’ (‘be perspicuous! [sic]” – cfr. his earlier desideratum of
conversational clarity). Relevant logic (which was emerging by the time Grice
was delivering his William James lectures) introduces two different formal
signs for ‘conjunction’: the truth-functional conjunction relevant logicians
call ‘extensional’ conjunction, and they represent by (13).
Non-truth-functional conjunction is represented by ‘X’ and termed fusion or
‘intensional’ conjunction:
p ^ q versus p X q.
The truth-table for Strawson’s enriched uses of
“and” is not the standard one, since we require the additional condition that
“p predates q,” or that one conjunct predates the other. Playing with structural and substructural logical rules is
something Carnap would love perhaps more than Grice, and why not, Strawson?
They liked to play with ‘deviant’ logics. For Carnap, the choice of a logic is
a pragmatic ‘external’ decision – vide his principle of tolerance and the
rather extensive bibliography on Carnap as a logic pluralist. For Grice,
classical logic is a choice guided by his respect for ordinary language, WHILE
attempting to PROVOKE the Oxonian establishment by rallying to the defense of
an under-dogma and play the ‘skilful heretic’ (turning a heterodoxy into
dogma). Strawson is usually more difficult to classify! In his contribution to
Grandy & Warner (1986), he grants that Grice’s theory may be ‘more
beautiful,’ and more importantly, seems to suggest that his view be seen as
endorsing Grice’s account of a CONVENTIONAL implicature (For Strawson, ‘if’ (used
for unasserted antecedent and consequence) conventionally implicates the same
inferrability condition that ‘so’ does for asserted equivalents. The
aim is to allow for a logically pluralist thesis, almost alla Carnap about the
‘inferential role’ of a logical constant such as ‘and’, which embraces
‘classical,’ (or ‘formalist,’ or ‘modernist’), relevant, linear and ordered
logic. PLURALISM (versus MONISM) has it that, for any logical constant c (such as “and”), “c” has more
than one *correct* inferential “role.” The pluralist thesis depends on a
specific interpretation of the vocabulary of sub-structural logics. According
to this specific interpretation, a classical logic captures the literal, or
EXPLICIT, explicatum, or truth-functional or truth-conditonal meaning, or what
Grice would have as ‘dictiveness’ of a logical constant. A sub-structural logic
(relevant logic, linear and ordered logic), on the other hand, encodes a
pragmatically,” i.e. not SEMANTICALLY, “-enriched sense” of a logical constant
such as “and.” Is this against the spirit of Grice’s overall thesis as
formulated in his “M. O. R.,” Modified Occam’s Razor, “Senses [of ‘and’] are
not to be multiplied beyond necessity”? But it’s precisely Grice’s Occamism (as
Neale calls it) that is being put into question. At Oxford, at the time, EVERYBODY (except
Grice!) was an informalist. He is coming to the defense of Russell, Oxford’s
underdog! (underdogma!). Plus, it’s important to understand the INFORMALISM
that Grice is attacking – Oxford’s ORTHO-doxy – seriously. Grice is being the
‘skilful HERETIC,’ in the words of his successor as Tutorial Fellow at Oxford,
G. P. Baker. We may proceed by four stages.
First, introduce the philosophical motivation for the pluralist thesis.
It sounds good to be a PLURALIST. Strawson was not. He was an informalist.
Grice was not, he was a post-modernist. But surely we not assuming that one
would want to eat the cake and have it! Second, introduce the calculus for the
different (or ‘deviant,’ as Haack prefers) logics endorsed in the pluralist
thesis – classical itself, relevant, linear and ordered logic. Third, shows how
the different “behaviours” of an item of logical vocabulary (such as “and”) of
each of these logics (and they all have variants for ‘conjunction.’ In the case
of ‘relevant’ logic, beyond Grice’s “&,” or classical conjunction, there is
“extensional conjunction,” FORMALISED as “p X q”, or fusion, and “INTENSIONAL
conjunction,” formalized by “p O q”. These can be, not semantically
(truth-functionally, or truth-conditional, or at the level of the EXPLICATUM),
but pragmatically interpreted (at the level of the IMPLICATUM). Fourth, shows
how the *different* (or ‘deviant,’ or pluralist), or alternative inferential
“roles” (that justifies PLURALISM) that *two* sub-structural logics (say,
Grice’s classical “&” the Strawson’s informalist “and”) attribute to a
logical constant “c” can co-exist – hence pluralism. A particular version of
logical “pluralism” can be argued from the plurality of at least *two* alterative
equally legitimate formalisations of the logical vocabulary, such as the first
dyadic truth-functor, or connective, “and,” which is symbolized by Grice as
“&,” NOT formalized by Strawson (he sticks with “and”) and FORMALISED by
relevant logicians as ‘extensional’ truth-functional conjunction (fision, p X
a) and intentional non-truth-functional conjunction (p O q). In particular, it can be argued that the
apparent “rivalry” between classical logic (what Grice has as Modernism, but he
himself is a post-modernist) and relevant logic (but consider Grice on
Strawson’s “Neo-Traditionalism,” first called INFORMALISM by Grice) can be
resolved, given that both logics capture and formalise normative and legitimate
alternative senses of ‘logical consequence.’ A revision of
the second paragraph to “Logic and Conversation” should do here. We can
distinguish between two operators for “… yields …”: ├ and ├: “A1, A2, … An├MODERNISM/FORMALISM-PAUL B” and “A1, A2, … An├NEO-TRADITIONALISM/INFORMALISM-PETER
B. As Paoli has it: “[U]pholding weakening amounts to failing to
take at face value the [slightly Griceian] expression ‘assertable on the basis
of’.’”Paoli goes on:“If I am in a
position to assert [the conclusion q, “He took his clothes off and got into
bed”] on the basis of the information provided by [the premise p, “He got into
bed and took his clothes off”], I need NOT be in a position to assert the
conclusion P [“He took his clothes off and got into bed”] on the basis of both
p (“He got into bed and took off his clothes” and an extra premise C - where C
is just an idle assumption (“The events took place in the order reported”) ,
irrelevant to my conclusion.”Can we regard Strawson as holding that
UNFORMALISED “and” is an INTENSIONAL CONJUNCTION? Another option is to see Strawson
as holding that the UNFORMALISED “and” can be BOTH truth-functional and
NON-truth-functional (for which case, the use of a different expression, “and
THEN,” is preferred). The Gricean theory of implicature is capable of
explaining this mismatch (bewtween “and” and “&”).Grice argues that the
[truth-conditional, truth-functional] semantics [DICTUM or EXPLICATUM, not
IMPLICATUM – cfr. his retrospective epilogue for his view on DICTIVENESS] of
“and” corresponds [or is identical, hence the name of ‘identity’ thesis versus
‘divergence’ thesis] to the classical “∧,” & of
Russell/Whitehead, and Quine, and Suppes, and that the [truth-functional
semantics of “if [p,] [q]” corresponds to the classical p ⊃
q.” There is scope for any theory capable of resolving or [as Grice would have
it] denying the apparent disagreement [or ‘rivalry’] among two or more logics.”
What Grice does is DENY THE APPARENT DISAGREEMENT. It’s best to keep ‘rivalry’ for the fight of
two ‘warring camps’ like FORMALISM and INFORMALISM, and stick with
‘disagreement’ or ‘divergence’ with reference to specific constants. For
Strawson, being a thorough-bred Oxonian, who perhaps never read the Iliad in
Greek – he was Grice’s PPE student – the RIVALRY is not between TWO different
formalisations, but between the ‘brusque’ formalisation of the FORMALISTS (that
murder his English!) and NO FORMALISATION at all. Grice calls this
‘neo-traditionalist,’ perhaps implicating that the ‘neo-traditionalists’ WOULD
accept some level of formalisation (Aristotle did!) ONLY ONE FORMALISATION, the
Modernism. INFORMALISM or Neo-Traditionalism aims to do WITHOUT formalisation,
if that means using anything, but, say, “and” and “and then”. Talk of SENSES
helps. Strawson may say that “and” has a SENSE which differs from “&,” seeing
that he would find “He drank the poison and died, though I do not mean to imply
in that order” is a CONTRADICTION. That is why Strawson is an
‘ordinary-LANGUAGE philosopher,” and not a logician! (Or should we say, an
‘ordinary-language logician’? His “Introduction to Logical Theory” was the
mandatory reading vademecum for GENERATIONS of Oxonians that had to undergo a
logic course to get their M. A. Lit. Hum.Then there’s what we can call “the
Gricean picture,” only it’s not too clear who painted it!We may agree that
there is an apparent “mismatch,” as opposed to a perfect “match” that Grice
would love! Grice thought with Russell that grammar is a pretty good guide to
logical form. If the utterer says “and” and NOT “and then,” there is no need to
postulate a further SENSE to ‘and.’Russell would criticize Strawson’s attempt
to reject modernist “&” as a surrogate for “and” as Strawson’s attempt to
regress to a stone-age metaphysics. Grice actually at this point, defended
Strawson: “stone-age PHYSICS!” And this relates to “… yields…” and Frege’s
assertion “/-“ as ‘Conclusion follows from Premise’ where ‘Premise yields
Conclusion’ seems more natural in that we preserve the order from premise to
conclusion. We shouldn’t underestimate one crucial feature of an implicatum:
its cancellability, on which Grice expands quite a bit in 1981: “He got into
bed and took his clothes off, although I don’t intend to suggest, in any shape
or form, that he proceed to do those things in the order I’ve just reported!”The
lack of any [fixed, rigid, intolerant] structural rule implies that AN INSTANCE
I1 of the a logical constant (such as “and”) that *violate* any of Grice’s
conversational maxim (here “be orderly!”) associated with the relevant
structural rule [here we may think of ADDITION AND SIMPLIFICATION as two axioms
derived from the Gentzen-type elimination of “and”, or the ‘interpretation’ of
‘p & q’ as 1 iff both p and q are 1, but 0 otherwise] and for which the
derived conversational implicature is false [“He went to bed and took his
clothes off, but not in that order!”] should be distinguished from ANY INSTANCE
I2 that does NOT violate the relevant maxim (“be orderly”) and for which the
conversational IMPLICATUM (“tn > tn-l”) is true.” We may nitpick here.Grice
would rather prefer, ‘when the IMPLICATUM applies.” An implicatum is by
definition cancellable (This is clear when Grice expands in the excursus “A
causal theory of perception.” “I would hardly be said to have IMPLIED that
Smith is hopeless in philosophy should I utter, “He has beautiful handwriting;
I don’t mean to imply he is hopeless in philosophy,” “even if that is precisely
what my addressee ends up thinking!”When it comes to “and,” we are on clearer
ground. The kinds of “and”-implicatures may be captured by a distinction of two
‘uses’ of conjunctions in a single substructural system S that does WITHOUT a
‘structural rule’ such as exchange, contraction or both. Read, relies, very
UNLIKE Strawson, on wo FORMALISATIONS besides “and” (for surely English “and”
does have a ‘form,’ too, pace Strawson) in Relevant Logic: “p ^ q” and “p X
q.” “p ^ q” and “p X q” have each a
different inferential role. If the reason the UTTERER has to assert it – via
the DICTUM or EXPLICATUM [we avoid ‘assert’ seeing that we want logical constants
to trade on ‘imperative contexts,’ too – Grice, “touch the beast and it will
bite you!” -- is the utterer’s belief that Smith took his clothes AND THEN got
into bed, it would be illegitimate, unwarranted, stupid, otiose, incorrect,
inappropriate, to infer that Smith did not do these two things in that order
upon discovering that he in fact DID those things in the order reported. The very discovery that Smith did the things
in the order reported would “just spoil” or unwarrant the derivation that would
justify our use of “… yields …” (¬A ¬(A u B) A ¬B”). As Read notes, we have ADJUNCTION ‘p and q’ follows from p and q
– or p and q yields ‘p and q.’ And we have SIMPLIFICATION: p and q
follow from ‘p and q,’ or ‘p and q’ yields p, and ‘p and q’ yields q.” Stephen
Read: “From adjunction and simplification we can infer, by transitivity, that q
follows from p and q, and so by the Deduction Equivalence, ‘if p, q’ follows
from q.’” “However, […] this has the unacceptable consequence that ‘if’ is
truth-functional.” “How can this
consequence be avoided?” “Many options are open.” “We can reject the
transitivity of entailment, the deduction equivalence, adjunction, or
simplification. Each has been tried; and each seems contrary to intuition.” “We
are again in the paradoxical situation that each of these conceptions seems
intuitively soundly based; yet their combination appears to lead to something
unacceptable.” “Are we nonetheless forced to reject one of these plausible
principles?” “Fortunately, there is a fifth option.” Read: “There is a familiar
truth-functional conjunction, expressed by ‘p and q’, which entails each of p
and q, and so for the falsity (Grice’s 0) of which the falsity of either
conjunct suffices, and the truth of both for the truth of the whole.” “But
there is also a NON-truth-functional conjunction, a SENSE of ‘p and q’ whose
falsity supports the inference from p to ‘~q’.” “These two SENSES of
‘conjunction’ cannot be the same, for, if the ground for asserting ‘not-(p and
q)’ (e.g. “It is not the case that he got into bed and took off his clothes”)
is simply that ‘p’ is false, to learn that p is true, far from enabling one to
proceed to ‘~q’, undercuts the warrant for asserting ‘~(p & q)’ in the
first place.” “In this sense, ‘~(p & q)’ is weaker than both ‘~p’ and ‘~q’,
and does not, even with the addition of p, entail ‘~q’, even though one
possible ground for asserting ‘~(p & q))’, viz ‘~q’, clearly does.” Stephen
Read: “The intensional sense of ‘and’ is often referred to as fusion; I will
use the symbol ‘×’ for it. Others write ‘◦.’”We add some relevant observations
by a palaeo-Griceian: Ryle. Ryle often felt
himself to be an outsider. His remarks on “and” are however illuminating in the
context of our discussion of meta-inference in substructural logic.Ryle writes:
“I have spoken as if our ordinary ‘and’ […] [is] identical with the logical
constant with which the formal logician operates.”“But this is not true.”“The
logician’s ‘and’ […] [is] not our familiar civilian term[…].”“It is [a] conscript
term, in uniform and under military discipline, with memories, indeed, of [its]
previous more free and easy civilian life, though it is not leaving that life
now.”“If you hear on good authority that she took arsenic and fell ill you will
reject the rumour that she fell ill and took arsenic.”“This familiar use of
‘and’ carries with it the temporal notion expressed by ‘and subsequently’ and
even the causal notion expressed by ‘and in consequence.’”“The logician’s
conscript ‘and’ does only its appointed duty – a duty in which ‘she took
arsenic and fell ill’ is an absolute paraphrase of ‘she fell ill and took
arsenic.’ This might be call the minimal force of ‘and.’” (Ryle,, 1954:118).
When we speaks of PRAGMATIC enrichment, we obviously don’t mean SEMANTIC
enrichment. There is a distinction, obviously, between the ‘pragmatic
enrichment’ dimension, as to whether the ‘enriched’ content is IMPLICATED or,
to use a neologism, ‘EX-plicated.’ Or cf. as Kent Bach would prefer,
“IMPLICITATED” (vide his “Implciture.”) Commutative
law: p & q iff q & p. “Axiom AND-1” and “Axiom AND-2” correspond
to "conjunction elimination". The relation between “AND-1” and
“AND-2” reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. A VERY IMPORTANT POINT to consider is Grice’s distinction
between ‘logical inference’ and ‘pragmatic inference.’ He does so in
“Retrospective Epilogue” in 1987. “A few years after the appearance of […]
Introduction to Logical Theory, I was devoting much attention to what might be
loosely called the distinction between logical and pragmatic inferences. …
represented as being a matter not of logical but of pragmatic import.” (Grice
1987:374).Could he be jocular? He is emphasizing the historical role of his
research. He mentions FORMALISM and INFORMALISM and notes that his own interest
in maxims or desiderata of rational discourse arose from his interest to
distinguish between matters of “logical inference” from those of “pragmatic
inference.” Is Grice multiplying ‘inference’ beyond necessity? It would seem so.
So it’s best to try to reformulate his proposal, in agreement with logical
pluralism.By ‘logical inference’ Grice must mean ‘practical/alethic
satisfactoriness-based inference,’ notably the syntactics and semantics
(‘interpretative’) modules of his own System Q. By ‘pragmatic inference’ he
must mean a third module, the pragmatic module, with his desiderata. We may say
that for Grice ‘logical inference’ is deductive (and inductive), while
‘pragmatic inference’ is abductive. Let us apply this to the ‘clothes off’
exampleThe Utterer said: “Smith got into bed and took his clothes off, but I’m
reporting the events in no particular order.” The ‘logical inference’ allows to
treat ‘and’ as “&.” The ‘pragmatic inference’ allows the addressee to
wonder what the utterer is meaning! Cf. Terres on “⊢k” for “logical inference” and “⊢r,” “⊢l,” and “⊢o,” for pragmatic inference, and where the
subscripts “k,” “r,” “l” and “o” stand for ‘classical,’ ‘relevant,’ ‘linear’
and ‘ordered’ logic respectively, with each of the three sub-structural
notions of “follows from” or “… yields …”
require the pragmatic enrichment
of a logical constant, that ‘classical logical’ inference may retain the
‘impoverished’ version (Terres, 2019, Inquiry, p. 13). Grice himself
mentions this normative dimension: “I would like to be able to
think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely
as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE
for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon.”Grice, 1989a, p.48]However, the
fact that we should observe the conversational maxims may not yet be a reason
for endorsing the allegedly ‘deviant’
inferential role of a logical constant in the three sub-structural logics under
examination.The legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ ‘inferential role’ of each constant
in each sub-structural logic emerges, rather from at least two sources.A first
source is a requirement for logic (or reasoning) to be normative: that its
truth-bearers [or satisfactoriness-bearers, to allow for ‘imperative’-mode
inferences) are related to what Grice calls ‘psychological attitudes’ of
‘belief’ (indicative-mode inference) and ‘desire’ (imperative-mode inference)
(Grice, 1975, cfr. Terres, Inquiry, 2019, p. 13). As Steinberg puts it:“Presumably,
if logic is normative for thinking or reasoning, its normative force will stem,
at least in part, from the fact that truth bearers which act as the relata of
our consequence relation and the bearers of other logical properties are
identical to (or at least are very closely related in some other way) to the
objects of thinking or reasoning: the contents of one’s mental states or acts
such as the content of one’s beliefs or inferences, for example.”[Steinberger,
2017a – and cf. Loar’s similar approach when construing Grice’s maxims as
‘empirical generalisations’ of ‘functional states’ for a less committed view of
the embedding of logical and pragmatic inference within the scope of psychological-attitude
ascriptions). A second source for the legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ inferential
role is the fact that the pragmatic enrichment of the logical vocabulary (both
a constant and ‘… yields …) is part, or a ‘rational-construction,’ of our
psychological representation of certain utterances involving the natural
counterparts of those constants. This may NOT involve a new sense of ‘and’ which is
with what Grice is fighting. While the relevant literature emphasizes “reasons
to assert” (vide Table on p. 9, Terres, 2019), it is worth pointing out that
the model should be applicable to what we might broadly construe as ‘deontic’
reasoning (e.g. Grice on “Arrest the intruder!” in Grice 1989, and more
generally his practical syllogisms in Grice 2001). We seem to associate
“assert” with ‘indicative-mode’ versions only of premise and conclusion.
“Reasons to express” or “reasons to make it explicit” may serve as a
generalization to cover both “indicative-mode” and “imperative-mode” versions
of the inferences to hand. When Grice says that, contra Strawson, he wants to
see things in terms of ‘pragmatic inference,’ not ‘logical inference,’ is he
pulling himself up by his own bootstraps? Let us clarify.When thinking of what META-language need be used to
formulate both Grice’s final account vis-à-vis Strawson’s, it is relevant to
mention that Grice once invoked what he called the “Bootstrap” principle. In
the course of considering a ‘fine distinction’ in various levels of conceptual
priority, slightly out of the blue, he adds – this is from “Prejudices and
predilections, which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice,” so expect
some informality, and willingness to amuse: “It is perhaps reasonable to regard
such fine distinctions as indispensable if we are to succeed in the business of
pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps,” Grice writes. And then trust him
to add: “In this connection, it will be relevant for me to say that I once
invented (though I did not establish its validity) a principle which I labelled
as ‘Bootstrap.’” Trust him to call with a good title. “The principle,” Grice
goes on, “laid down that, when one is introducing some primitive concept [such
as conjunction] of a theory [or calculus or system] formulated in an
object-language [G1], one has freedom to use any concept from a
battery of concepts expressible in the meta-language [System G2],
subject to the condition that a *counterpart* of such a concept [say,
‘conjunction’] is sub-sequently definable, or otherwise derivable, in the
object-language [System G1].”Grice concludes by emphasizing the
point of the manoeuvre: “So, the more
economically one introduces a primitive object-language concept, the less of a
task one leaves oneself for the morrow.” [Grice 1986]. With
uncharacteristic humbleness, Grice notes that while he was able to formulate
and label “Bootstrap,” he never cared to establish its ‘validity.’ We hope we
have! “Q. E. D.,” as they say! Cf. Terres, 2019, Inquiry, p. 17: In conclusion,
the pragmatic interpretation of substructural logics may be a new and
interesting research field for the logical pluralist who wishes to endorse
classical and/or substructural logics, but also for the logical monist who aims
to interpret their divergence with a pluralist logician. The possibility is
also open of an interesting dialogue between philosophical logicians and
philosophers of language as they explore the pragmatic contributions of a
logical constant to the meaning of a complete utterance, given that a
substructural logic encodes what has been discussed by philosophers of
language, the enriched ‘explicatum’ of the logical constant. And Grice. References: Werner Abraham, ‘A linguistic approach to metaphor.’ in
Abraham, Ut videam: contributions to an understanding of linguistics. Jeffrey C. Beall
and Greg Restall. ‘Logical consequence,’ in Edward N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2009 edition, 2009. Rudolf Carnap, 1942. Introduction to Semantics.
L.J. Cohen, 1971. Grice on the logical particles
of natural language, in Bar-Hillel, Pragmatics of Natural language, repr. in
Cohen, Language and knowledge.L.J. Cohen, 1977. ‘Can the conversationalist
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knowledge. Davidson, Donald and J. Hintikka (1969). Words and objections:
essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. Bart Geurts, Quantity
implicatures.Bart Geurts and Nausicaa Pouscoulous. Embedded
implicatures?!? Semantics and pragmatics, 2:4–1, 2009.Jean-Yves Girard. Linear
logic: its syntax and semantics. London Mathematical Society Lecture Note
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of Words.H.P. Grice. 1967b. Logic and conversation. Studies in the Way of
Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pages 22–40, 1989.H.P. Grice.
1967c. ‘Indicative conditionals. Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard
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the work of W. V. Quine, edited by Donald Davidson and Jaako Hintikka,
Dordrecht: Reidel. H.P. Grice, 1981. ‘Presupposition and conversational
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conversation,’ in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
non-conventional – When Grice learned that that brilliant Harvardite, D. K.
Lewis, was writing a dissertation under Quine on ‘convention’ he almost
fainted! When he noticed that Lewis was relying rightly on Schelling and mainly
restricting the ‘conventionality’ to the ‘arbitrariness,’ which Grice regarded
as synonym with ‘freedom’ (Willkuere, liber arbitrium), he recovered. For
Lewis, a two-off predicament occurs when you REPEAT. Grice is not interested.
When you repeat, you may rely on some ‘arbitrariness.’ This is usually the
EMISSOR’s auctoritas. As when Humptyy Dumpty was brought to Davidson’s
attention. “Impenetrability!” “I don’t know what that means.” “Well put, Alice,
if that is your name, as you said it was. What I mean by ‘impenetrability’ is
that we rather change the topic, plus it’s tea time, and I feel like having
some eggs.” Grice refers to this as the ‘idion.’ He reminisces when he was in
the bath and designed a full new highway code (“Nobody has yet used it – but
the pleasure was in the semiotic design.”). A second reminiscence pertains to
his writing a full grammar of “Deutero-Esperanto.” “I loved it – because I had
all the power a master needs! I decide what it’s proper!” In the field of the
implicata, Grice uses ‘convention’ casually, mainly to contrast it with HIS
field, the non-conventional. One should not attach importance to this. On
occasion Grice used Frege’s “Farbung,” just to confuse. The sad story is that
Strawson was never convinced by the non-conventional. Being a conventionalist
at heart (vide his “Intention and convention in speech acts,”) and revering
Austin, Strawson opposes Grice’s idea of the ‘non-conventional.’ Note that in
Grice’s general schema for the communicatum, the ‘conventional’ is just ONE
MODE OF CORRELATION between the signum and the signatum, or the communicatum
and the intentum. The ‘conventional’ can be explained, unlike Lewis, in mere
terms of the validatum. Strawson and Wiggins “Cogito; ergo, sum”: What is
explicitly conveyed is: “cogito” and
“sum”. The conjunction “cogito” and “sum” is
not
made an ‘invalidatum’ if the implicated consequence relation, emotionally
expressed by an ‘alas’-like sort of ejaculation, ‘ergo,’ fails to hold. Strawson
and Wiggins give other examples. For some reason, Latin ‘ergo’ becomes the more
structured, “therefore,” which is a composite of ‘there’ and ‘fore.’ Then
there’s the very Hun, “so,” (as in “so so”). Then there’s the “Sie schoene aber
poor,” discussed by Frege --“but,” – and Strawson and Wiggins add a few more
that had Grice elaborating on first-floor versus second-floor. Descartes is on
the first floor. He states “cogito” and he states “sum.” Then he goes to the
second floor, and the screams, “ergo,” or ‘dunc!’” The examples Strawson and
Wiggins give are: “although” (which looks like a subordinating dyadic connector
but not deemed essential by Gazdar’s 16 ones). Then they give an expression
Grice quite explored, “because,” or “for”
as
Grice prefers (‘since it improves on Stevenson), the ejaculation “alas,” and in
its ‘misusage,’ “hopefully.” This is an adverbial that Grice loved: “Probably,
it will rains,” “Desirably, there is icecream.”
conversational
avowal: The phrase is a Ryleism, but
Grice liked it. Grice’s point is with corrigibility or lack thereof. He recalls
his tutorials with Strawson. “I want you to bring me a paper on Friday.” “You
mean The Telegraph?” “You know what I mean.”
“But perhaps you don’t.” Grice’s favourite conversational avowal,
mentioned by Grice, is a declaration of an intention.. Grice starts using the
phrase ‘conversational avowal’ after exploring Ryle’s rather cursory
exploration of them in The Concept of Mind. This is interesting because in
general Grice is an anti-ryleist. The verb is of course ‘to avow,’ which
is ultimately a Latinate from ‘advocare.’ A processes or event of the soul is,
on the official view, supposed to be played out in a private theatre. Such an
event is known directly by the man who has them either through the faculty of
introspection or the ‘phosphorescence’ of consciousness. The subject is,
on this view, incorrigible—his avowals of the state of his soul cannot be
corrected by others—and he is infallible—he cannot be wrong about which states
he is in. The official doctrine mistakenly construes an avowals or a report
of such an episode as issuing from a special sort of observation or perception
of shadowy existents. We should consider some differences between two
sorts of 'conversational' avowals: (i) I feel a tickle and (ii) I feel ill. If
a man feels a tickle, he has a tickle, and if he has a tickle, he feels
it. But if he feels ill, he may not be ill, and if he is ill, he may not
feel ill. Doubtless a man’s feeling ill is some evidence for his being
ill. But feeling a tickle is not evidence for his having a tickle, any more than
striking a blow is evidence for the occurrence of a blow. In ‘feel a tickle’
and ‘strike a blow’, ‘tickle’ and ‘blow’ are cognate accusatives to the verbs
‘feel’ and ‘strike’. The verb and its accusative are two expressions for
the same thing, as are the verbs and their accusatives in ‘I dreamt a dream’
and ‘I asked a question’. But ‘ill’ and ‘capable of climbing the tree’ are not
cognate accusatives to the verb ‘to feel.' So they are not in grammar bound to
signify feelings, as ‘tickle’ is in grammar bound to signify a
feeling. Another purely grammatical point shows the same thing. It is
indifferent whether I say ‘I feel a tickle’ or ‘I have a tickle’; but ‘I have .
. .’ cannot be completed by ‘. . . ill’, (cf. ‘I have an illness’), ‘. . .
capable of climbing the tree’, (cf. I have a capability to climb that tree’) ‘.
. . happy’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of happiness’ or ‘I have happiness in my
life’) or ‘. . . discontented’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of strong discontent
towards behaviourism’). If we try to restore the verbal parallel by bringing in
the appropriate abstract nouns, we find a further incongruity; ‘I feel
happiness’(I feel as though I am experiencing happiness), ‘I feel illness’ (I
feel as though I do have an illness’) or ‘I feel ability to climb the tree’ (I
feel that I am endowed with the capability to climb that tree), if they mean
anything, they do not mean at all what a man means by uttering ‘I feel happy,’
or ‘I feel ill,’ or ‘I feel capable of climbing the tree’. On the other
hand, besides these differences between the different uses of ‘I feel . . .’
there are important CONVERSATIONAL analogies as well. If a man says that
he has a tickle, his co-conversationalist does not ask for his evidence, or
requires him to make quite sure. Announcing a tickle is not proclaiming the
results of an investigation. A tickle is not something established by
careful witnessing, or something inferred from a clue, nor do we praise for his
powers of observation or reasoning a man who let us know that he feels tickles,
tweaks and flutters. Just the same is true of avowals of moods. If a man
makes a conversational contribution, such as‘I feel bored’, or ‘I feel
depressed’, his co-conversationalist does not usually ask him for his evidence,
or request him to make sure. The co-conversationalist may accuse the man of
shamming to him or to himself, but the co-conversationalist does not accuse him
of having been careless in his observations or rash in his inferences, since a
co-conversationalist would not usually think that his conversational avowal is
a report of an observation or a conclusion. He has not been a good or a
bad detective; he has not been a detective at all. Nothing would surprise us
more than to hear him say ‘I feel depressed’ in the alert and judicious tone of
voice of a detective, a microscopist, or a diagnostician, though this tone of
voice is perfectly congruous with the NON-AVOWAL past-tense ‘I WAS feeling
depressed’ or the NON-AVOWAL third-person report, ‘HE feels depressed’. If the
avowal is to do its conversational job, it must be said in a depressed tone of
voice. The conversational avowal must be blurted out to a sympathizer, not
reported to an investigator. Avowing ‘I feel depressed’ is doing one of the
things, viz. one CONVERSATIONAL thing, that depression is the mood to do. It is
not a piece of scientific premiss-providing, but a piece of ‘conversational
moping.’That is why, if the co-conversationalist is suspicious, he does not ask
‘Fact or fiction?’, ‘True or false?’, ‘Reliable or unreliable?’, but ‘Sincere
or shammed?’ The CONVERSATIONAL avowal of moods requires not acumen, but
openness. It comes from the heart, not from the head. It is not
discovery, but voluntary non-concealment. Of course people have to learn how to
use avowal expressions appropriately and they may not learn these lessons very
well. They learn them from ordinary discussions of the moods of others and from
such more fruitful sources as novels and the theatre. They learn from the same
sources how to cheat both other people and themselves by making a sham
conversational avowal in the proper tone of voice and with the other proper
histrionic accompaniments. If we now raise the question ‘How does a man find
out what mood he is in?’ one can answer that if, as may not be the case, he finds
it out at all, he finds it out very much as we find it out. As we have seen, he
does not groan ‘I feel bored’ because he has found out that he is bored, any
more than the sleepy man yawns because he has found out that he is
sleepy. Rather, somewhat as the sleepy man finds out that he is sleepy by
finding, among other things, that he keeps on yawning, so the bored man finds
out that he is bored, if he does find this out, by finding that among other
things he glumly says to others and to himself ‘I feel bored’ and ‘How bored I
feel’. Such a blurted avowal is not merely one fairly reliable index among
others. It is the first and the best index, since being worded and voluntarily
uttered, it is meant to be heard and it is meant to be understood. It calls for
no sleuth-work.In some respects a conversational avowal of a moods, like ‘I
feel cheerful,’ more closely resemble announcements of sensations like ‘I feel
a tickle’ than they resemble utterances like ‘I feel better’ or ‘I feel capable
of climbing the tree’. Just as it would be absurd to say ‘I feel a tickle but
maybe I haven’t one’, so, in ordinary cases, it would be absurd to say ‘I feel
cheerful but maybe I am not’. But there would be no absurdity in saying ‘I FEEL
better but, to judge by the doctor’s attitude, perhaps I am WORSE’, or ‘I do
FEEL as if I am capable of climbing the tree but maybe I cannot climb it.’This
difference can be brought out in another way. Sometimes it is natural to say ‘I
feel AS IF I could eat a horse’, or ‘I feel AS IF my temperature has returned
to normal’. But, more more immediate conversational avowals, it would seldom if
ever be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I were in the dumps’, or ‘I feel AS IF I
were bored’, any more than it would be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I had a pain’.
Not much would be gained by discussing at length why we use ‘feel’ in these
different ways. There are hosts of other ways in which it is also used. I can
say ‘I felt a lump in the mattress’, ‘I felt cold’, ‘I felt queer’, ‘I felt my
jaw-muscles stiffen’, ‘I felt my gorge rise’, ‘I felt my chin with my thumb’,
‘I felt in vain for the lever’, ‘I felt as if something important was about to
happen’, ‘I felt that there was a flaw somewhere in the argument’, ‘I felt
quite at home’, ‘I felt that he was angry’. A feature common to most of
these uses of ‘feel’ is that the utterer does not want further questions to be
put. They would be either unanswerable questions, or unaskable questions. That
he felt it is enough to settle some debates.That he merely felt it is enough to
show that debates should not even begin. Names of moods, then, are not the
names of feelings. But to be in a particular mood is to be in the mood, among
other things, to feel certain sorts of feelings in certain sorts of situations.
To be in a lazy mood, is, among other things, to tend to have sensations of
lassitude in the limbs when jobs have to be done, to have cosy feelings of
relaxation when the deck-chair is resumed, not to have electricity feelings
when the game begins, and so forth. But we are not thinking primarily of
these feelings when we say that we feel lazy; in fact, we seldom pay much heed
to sensations of these kinds, save when they are abnormally acute. Is
a name of a mood a name of an emotion?
The only tolerable reply is that of course they are, in that some people some
of the time use ‘emotion’. But then we must add that in this usage an emotion
is not something that can be segregated from thinking, daydreaming, voluntarily
doing things, grimacing or feeling pangs and itches. To have the emotion, in
this usage, which we ordinarily refer to as ‘being bored’, is to be in the mood
to think certain sorts of thoughts, and not to think other sorts, to yawn and
not to chuckle, to converse with stilted politeness, and not to talk with animation,
to feel flaccid and not to feel resilient. Boredom is not some unique
distinguishable ingredient, scene or feature of all that its victim is doing
and undergoing. Rather it is the temporary complexion of that totality. It is
not like a gust, a sunbeam, a shower or the temperature; it is like the
morning’s weather. An unstudied conversational utterance may embody an
explicit interest phrase, or a conversational avowal, such as ‘I want it’, ‘I
hope so’, ‘That’s what I intend’, ‘I quite dislike it’, ‘Surely I am
depressed’, ‘I do wonder, too’, ‘I guess so’ and ‘I am feeling hungry.’The
surface grammar (if not logical form) makes it tempting to misconstrue all the
utterances as a description. But in its primary employment such a
conversational avowal as ‘I want it’ is not used to convey information.‘I want
it’ is used to make a request or demand. ‘I want it’ is no more meant as a
contribution to general knowledge than ‘please’. For a co-conversationalist to
respond with the tag ‘Do you?’ or worse, as Grice’s tutee, with ‘*how* do you
*know* that you want it?’ is glaringly inappropriate. Nor, in their primary
employment, are conversational avowals such as ‘I hate it’ or ‘That’s what I I
intend’ used for the purpose of telling one’s addressee facts about the
utterer; or else we should not be surprised to hear them uttered in the cool,
informative tones of voice in which one says ‘HE hates it’ and ‘That’s what he
intends’. We expect a conversational avowal, on the contrary, to be spoken in a
revolted and a resolute tone of voice respectively. It is an utterances of a
man in a revolted and resolute frame of mind. A conversational avowal is a
thing said in detestation and resolution and not a thing said in order to
advance biographical knowledge about detestations and resolutions. A man
who notices the unstudied utterances of the utterer, who may or may not be
himself, is, if his interest in the utterer has the appropriate direction,
especially well situated to pass comments upon the qualities and frames of mind
of its author.‘avowal’ as a philosophical lexeme may not invite an immediate
correlate in the Graeco-Roman, ultimately Grecian, tradition. ‘Confessio’
springs to mind, but this is not what Grice is thinking about. He is more
concerned with issues of privileged access and incorrigibility, or
corrigibility, rather, as per the alleged immediacy of a first-person report of
the form, “I feel that …” . Grice does use ‘avowal’ often especially in the
early stages, when the logical scepticism about incorrigibility comes under
attack. Just to be different, Grice is interested in the corrigibility of the
avowal. The issue is of some importance in his account of the act of
communication, and how one can disimplicate what one means. Grice loves to play
with his tutee doubting as to whether he means that p or q. Except at Oxford,
the whole thing has a ridiculous ring to it. I want you to bring me a paper by
Friday. You mean the newspaper? You very well know what I mean. But perhaps you
do not. Are you sure you mean a philosophy paper when you utter, ‘I want you to
bring a paper by Friday’? As Grice notes, in case of self-deception and
egcrateia, it may well be that the utterer does not know what he desires, if
not what he intends, if anything. Freud and Foucault run galore. The topic will
interest a collaborator of Grice’s, Pears, with his concept of ‘motivated
irrationality.’ Grice likes to discuss a category mistake. I may be
categorically mistaken but I am not categorically confused. Now when it comes
to avowal-avowal, it is only natural that if he is interested in Aristotle on
‘hedone,’ Grice would be interested in Aristotle on ‘lupe.’ This is very
philosophical, as Urmson agrees. Can one ‘fake’ pain? Why would one fake pain?
Oddly, this is for Grice the origin of language. Is pleasure just the absence
of pain? Liddell and Soctt have “λύπη” and render it as pain of body, oἡδον;
also, sad plight or condition, but also pain of mind, grief; “ά; δῆγμα δὲ λύπης
οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται; τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίοτον, ὃς λύπας φέρει; ἐρωτικὴ
λ.’ λύπας προσβάλλειν;” “λ. φέρειν τινί; oχαρά.” Oddly, Grice goes back to pain
in Princeton, since it is explored by Smart in his identity thesis. Take
pain. Surely, Grice tells the Princetonians, it sounds harsh, to echo Berkeley,
to say that it is the brain of Smith being in this or that a state which is
justified by insufficient evidence; whereas it surely sounds less harsh that it
is the C-fibres that constitute his ‘pain,’ which he can thereby fake. Grice
distinguishes between a complete unstructured utterance token – “Ouch” – versus
a complete syntactically structured erotetic utterance of the type, “Are you in
pain?”. At the Jowett, Corpus Barnes has read Ogden and says ‘Ouch’ (‘Oh’)
bears an ‘emotional’ or ‘emotive’ communicatum provided there is an intention
there somewhere. Otherwise, no communicatum occurs. But if there is an
intention, the ‘Oh’ can always be a fake. Grice distinguishes between a ‘fake’
and a ‘sneak.’ If U intends A to perceive ‘Oh’ as a fake, U means that he is in
pain. If there is a sneaky intention behind the utterance, which U does NOT
intend his A to recognise, there is no communicatum. Grice criticises emotivism
as rushing ahead to analyse a nuance before exploring what sort of a nuance it
is. Surely there is more to the allegedly ‘pseudo-descriptive’ ‘x is good,’
than U meaning that U emotionally approves of x. In his ‘myth,’ Grice uses pain
magisterially as an excellent example for a privileged-access allegedly
incorrigible avowal, and stage 0 in his creature progression. By uttering
‘Oh!,’ under voluntary control, Barnes means, iconically, that he is in pain.
Pain fall under the broader keyword: emotion, as anger does. Cf. Aristotle on
the emotion in De An., Rhet., and Eth. Nich. Knowing that at Oxford, if you are
a classicist, you are not a philosopher, Grice never explores the Stoic, say,
approach to pain, or lack thereof (“Which is good, since Walter Pater did it
for me!”). Refs.: “Can I have a pain in my tail?” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
conversational benevolence: There is nothing other-oriented about benevolence. What
Grice needs is conversational ALTRUISM, or helpfulness – ‘cooperation’ has the
advantage, with the ‘co-’, of avoiding the ‘mutuality’ aspect, which is crucial
(“What’s the good of helping you – I’m not your servant! – if thou art not
going to help me!” It may be said that when Butler uses ‘benevolentia’ he means
others. “It is usually understood that one is benevolent towards oneself, if
that makes sense.” Grice writes. Then there’s Smith promising Jones a job – and
the problem that comes with it. For Grice, if Smith promised a job to Jones,
and Jones never gets it – “that’s Jones’s problem.” So we need to distinguish
beneficentia and benevolentia. The opposite is malevolentia and maleficientia.
Usually Grice states his maxims as PROHIBITIONS: “Do not say what you believe
to be false” being the wittiest! So, he might just as well have appealed to or
invoked a principle of absence of conversational ill-will. Grice uses
‘conversational benevolence’ narrowly, to refer to the assumption that
conversationalists will agree to make a contribution appropriate to the shared
purposes of the exhcnage. It contrasts with the limiting conversational
self-love, which is again taken narrowly to indicate that conversationalists
are assumed to be conversationally ‘benevolent,’ in the interpretation above,
provided doing that does not get them into unnecessary trouble. The type of rationality
that Grice sees in conversational is one that sees conversation as ‘rational
co-operation.’ So it is obvious that he has to invoke some level of
benevolence. When tutoring his rather egoistic tutees he had to be careful, so
he hastened to add a principle of conversational self-love. It was different
when lecturing outside a tutorial! In fact ‘benevolence’ here is best
understood as ‘altruism’. So, if there is a principle of conversational egoism,
there is a correlative principle of conversational altruism. If Grice uses
‘self-love,’ there is nothing about ‘love,’ in ‘benevolence.’ Butler may have
used ‘other-love’! Even if of course we must start with the Grecians! We must
not forget that Plato and Aristotle despised "autophilia", the
complacency and self-satisfaction making it into the opposite of "epimeleia
heautou” in Plato’s Alcibiades. Similarly, to criticize Socratic ethics as a
form of egoism in opposition to a selfless care of others is inappropriate.
Neither a self-interested seeker of wisdom nor a dangerous teacher of
self-love, Socrates, as the master of epimeleia heautou, is the hinge between
the care of self and others. One has to be careful here. A folk-etymological
connection between ‘foam’ may not be needed – when the Romans had to deal with
Grecian ‘aphrodite.’ This requires that we look for another linguistic botany
for Grecian ‘self-love’ that Grice opposes to ‘benevolentia.’ Hesiod derives
Aphrodite from “ἀφρός,” ‘sea-foam,’ interpreting the name as "risen from
the foam", but most modern scholars regard this as a spurious folk
etymology. Early modern scholars of classical mythology attempted to argue that
Aphrodite's name was of Griceain or Indo-European origin, but these efforts have
now been mostly abandoned. Aphrodite's name is generally accepted to be of
non-Greek, probably Semitic, origin, but its exact derivation cannot be
determined. Scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
accepting Hesiod's "foam" etymology as genuine, analyzed the second
part of Aphrodite's name as -odítē "wanderer" or -dítē
"bright". Janda, also accepting Hesiod's etymology, has argued in
favor of the latter of these interpretations and claims the story of a birth
from the foam as an Indo-European mytheme. Similarly, an Indo-European compound
abʰor-, very" and dʰei- "to shine" have been proposed, also
referring to Eos. Other have argued that these hypotheses are unlikely since
Aphrodite's attributes are entirely different from those of both Eos and the
Vedic deity Ushas.A number of improbable non-Greek etymologies have also been
suggested. One Semitic etymology compares Aphrodite to the Assyrian ‘barīrītu,’
the name of a female demon that appears in Middle Babylonian and Late
Babylonian texts. Hammarström looks to Etruscan, comparing eprϑni
"lord", an Etruscan honorific loaned into Greek as πρύτανις.This
would make the theonym in origin an honorific, "the lady".Most
scholars reject this etymology as implausible, especially since Aphrodite
actually appears in Etruscan in the borrowed form Apru (from Greek Aphrō, clipped
form of Aphrodite). The medieval Etymologicum Magnum offers a highly contrived
etymology, deriving Aphrodite from the compound habrodíaitos (ἁβροδίαιτος),
"she who lives delicately", from habrós and díaita. The alteration
from b to ph is explained as a "familiar" characteristic of Greek
"obvious from the Macedonians". It is much easier with the Romans. Lewis and Short have ‘ămor,’ old form “ămŏs,”
“like honos, labos, colos, etc.’ obviously from ‘amare,’ and which they render
as ‘love,’ as in Grice’s “conversational self-love.” Your tutor will reprimand
you if you spend too much linguistic botany on ‘eros.’ “Go straight to
‘philos.’” But no. There are philosophical usages of ‘eros,’ especially when it
comes to the Grecian philosophers Grice is interested in: Aristotle reading
Plato, which becomes Ariskant reading Plathegel. So, Liddell and Scott have
“ἔρως” which of course is from a verb, or two: “ἕραμαι,” “ἐράω,” and which they
render as “love, mostly of the sexual passion, ““θηλυκρατὴς ἔ.,” “ἐρῶσ᾽ ἔρωτ᾽
ἔκδημον,” “ἔ. τινός love for one, S.Tr.433, “παίδων” E. Ion67, and “generally,
love of a thing, desire for it,” ““πατρῴας γῆς” “δεινὸς εὐκλείας ἔ.” “ἔχειν
ἔμφυτον ἔρωτα περί τι” Plato, Lg. 782e ; “πρὸς τοὺς λόγους” (love of law),
“ἔρωτα σχὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννος γενέσθαι” Hdt.5.32 ; ἔ. ἔχει με c. inf.,
A.Supp.521 ; “θανόντι κείνῳ συνθανεῖν ἔρως μ᾽ ἔχει” S.Fr.953 ; “αὐτοῖς ἦν ἔρως
θρόνους ἐᾶσθαι” Id.OC367 ; ἔ. ἐμπίπτει μοι c. inf., A.Ag.341, cf. Th.6.24 ; εἰς
ἔρωτά τινος ἀφικέσθαι, ἐλθεῖν, Antiph.212.3,Anaxil.21.5 : pl., loves, amours,
“ἀλλοτρίων” Pi.N.3.30 ; “οὐχ ὅσιοι ἔ.” E.Hipp.765 (lyr.) ; “ἔρωτες ἐμᾶς πόλεως”
Ar.Av.1316 (lyr.), etc. ; of dolphins, “πρὸς παῖδας” Arist.HA631a10 :
generally, desires, S.Ant.617 (lyr.). 2. object of love or desire, “ἀπρόσικτοι
ἔρωτες” Pi.N.11.48, cf. Luc.Tim.14. 3. passionate joy, S.Aj.693 (lyr.); the god
of love, Anacr.65, Parm.13, E.Hipp.525 (lyr.), etc.“Έ. ἀνίκατε μάχαν” S.Ant.781
(lyr.) : in pl., Simon.184.3, etc. III. at Nicaea, a funeral wreath, EM379.54.
IV. name of the κλῆρος Ἀφροδίτης, Cat.Cod.Astr.1.168 ; = third κλῆρος,
Paul.Al.K.3; one of the τόποι, Vett.Val.69.16. And they’ll point to you that
the Romans had ‘amor’ AND ‘cupidus’ (which they meant as a transliteration of
epithumia). If for Kant and Grice it is the intention that matters, ill-will
counts. If Smith does not want Jones have a job, Smith has ill-will towards
Jones. This is all Kant and Grice need to call Smith a bad person. It means it
is the ill-will that causes Joness not having a job. A conceptual elucidation.
Interesting from a historical point of view seeing that Grice had introduced a
principle of conversational benevolence (i.e. conversational goodwill) pretty
early. Malevolentia was over-used by Cicero, translating the Grecian. Grice
judges that if Jones fails to get the job that benevolent Smith promised, Smith
may still be deemed, for Kant, if not Aristotle, to have given him the
job. A similar elucidation was carried by Urmson with his idea of
supererogation (heroism and sainthood). For a hero or saint, someones goodwill
but not be good enough! Which does not mean it is ill, either! Refs.: The
source is Grice’s seminar in the first set on ‘Logic and conversation.’ The H.
P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational category: used jocularly by Grice. He knows that Kant has
TWELVE categories, but he keeps lecturing the Harvardites about Kant having
FOUR categories. On top, he finds ‘modus’ boring, and, turned a manierist, changes
the idiom. This is what Austin called a ‘philosophical hack’ searching for some
para-philosophy! One has to be careful here. Grice does speak of this or that
‘conversational category.’ Seeing that he is ‘echoing,’ as he puts it,
Ariskant, we migt just as well have an entry for each of the four. These would
be the category of conversational quantity, the category of conversational
quality, the category of conversational relation, and the category of
conversational modality. Note that in this rephrasing Grice applies
‘conversational’ directly to the category. As Boethius pointed out (and Grice
loved to read Minio-Paullelo’s edition of Boethus’s commentary on the
Categories), the motivation by Aristotle to posit this or that category was
expository. A mind cannot know a multitude of things, so we have to ‘reduce’
things. It is important to note that while ‘quantitas,’ ‘qualitas’ ‘relatio’
and ‘modus’ are used by Kant, he actually augments the number of categories.
These four would be supra-categories. The sub-categories, or categories
themselves turn out to be twelve. Kant proposed 12 categories: unity,
plurality, and totality for concept of quantity; reality, negation, and
limitation, for the concept of quality; inherence and subsistence, cause and
effect, and community for the concept of relation; and
possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, and necessity and
contingency. Kategorien sind nach Kant apriorisch und unmittelbar gegeben.
Sie sind Werkzeuge des Urteilens und Werkzeuge des Denkens. Als solche dienen
sie nur der Anwendung und haben keine Existenz. Sie bestehen somit nur im
menschlichen Verstand. Sie sind nicht an Erfahrung gebunden.[5] Durch ihre Unmittelbarkeit sind sie auch nicht an
Zeichen gebunden.[6] Kants erkenntnistheoretisches Ziel ist es, über
die Bedingungen der Geltungskraft von Urteilen Auskunft zu geben. Ohne diese
Auskunft können zwar vielerlei Urteile gefällt werden, sie müssen dann
allerdings als „systematische Doktrin(en)“ bezeichnet werden.[7] Kant kritisiert damit das rein analytische Denken
der Wissenschaft als falsch und stellt ihm die Notwendigkeit des
synthetisierenden Denkens gegenüber.[8] Kant begründet die Geltungskraft mit dem Transzendentalen Subjekt.[9] Das Transzendentalsubjekt ist dabei ein reiner
Reflexionsbegriff, welcher das synthetisierende Dritte darstellt (wie in
späteren Philosophien Geist (Hegel), Wille, Macht, Sprache und Wert (Marx)),
das nicht durch die Sinne wahrnehmbar ist. Kant sucht hier die Antwort auf die
Frage, wie der Mensch als vernunftbegabtes Wesen konstituiert werden kann,
nicht in der Analyse, sondern in einer Synthesis.[10]Bei Immanuel Kant, der somit als bedeutender Erneuerer der bis dahin
„vorkritischen“ Kategorienlehre gilt, finden sich zwölf „Kategorien der reinen
Vernunft“. Für Kant sind diese Kategorien Verstandesbegriffe, nicht aber Ausdruck des tatsächlichen Seins
der Dinge an sich. Damit wandelt sich die ontologische Sichtweise der Tradition in eine erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtung, weshalb Kants „kritische“
Philosophie (seit der Kritik der
reinen Vernunft) oft
auch als „Kopernikanische
Wende in der
Philosophie“ bezeichnet wird.Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität sind die vier grundlegenden Urteilsfunktionen des
Verstandes, nach denen die Kategorien gebildet werden. Demnach sind z. B.
der Urteilsfunktion „Quantität“ die Kategorien bzw. Urteile „Einheit“,
„Vielheit“ und „Allheit“ untergeordnet, und der Urteilsfunktion „Relation“ die
Urteile der „Ursache“ und der „Wirkung“.Siehe auch: Kritik der
reinen Vernunft und Transzendentale
AnalytikBereits
bei Friedrich
Adolf Trendelenburg findet
man den Hinweis auf die verbreitete Kritik, dass Kant die den Kategorien
zugrunde liegenden Urteilsformen nicht systematisch hergeleitet und damit als
notwendig begründet hat. Einer der Kritikpunkte ist dabei, dass die Kategorien
sich teilweise auf Anschauungen (Einzelheit, Realität, Dasein), teilweise auf
Abstraktionen wie Zusammenfassen, Begrenzen oder Begründen (Vielheit, Allheit,
Negation, Limitation, Möglichkeit, Notwendigkeit) beziehen.
conversational co-öperation: there is a distinction between mutual help and
cooperation. First, the Romans never knew. Their ‘servants’ were ‘help’ – and
this remains in the British usage of ‘civil servant,’ one who helps. Some
philosophical tutees by Hare were often reminded, in the midst of their
presenting their essays, “Excuse me for interrupting, Smith, but have you
considered a career in the civil service?” Then some Romans found Christianism
fashionable, and they were set to translate the Bible. So when this Hebrew
concept appeared, they turned it into ad-judicatum, which was translated by
Wycliff as ‘help.’ Now ‘operatio’ is quite a different animal. It’s the ‘opus’
of the Romans, who also had ‘labor.’ Surely to ‘co-laborate’ is to
‘co-operate.’ There is an idea that ‘operate,’ can be more otiose, in the view
of Rogers Albritton. “He is operating the violin,” was his favourite utterance.
“Possibly his opus 5.” The fact that English needs a hyphen and an umlaut does
not make it very ‘ordinary’ in Austin’s description. Grice is more interested
in the conceptualization of this, notably as it relates to rationality. Can
cooperation NOT be rational? For most libertarians, cooperation IS “irrational,”
rather. But Grice points is subtler. He is concerned with an emissor
communicating that p. The least thing he deserves is a rational recipient.
“Otherwise I might just as well scream to the walls!” Used by Grice WOW:368 –
previously, ‘rational cooperation’ – what cooperation is not rational? Grice
says that if Smith promised Jones a job; Jones doesn’t get it. Smith must be
DEEMED to have given the job to Jones. It’s the intention, as Kant shows, the
pure motive, that matters. Ditto for communication. If Blackburn draws a skull,
he communicates that there is danger. If his addressee fails to recognise the
emissor’s intention the emissor will still be deemed to have communicated that
there is danger. So communication does NOT require co-operation. His analysis
of “emissor communicates that p” is not one of “emissor successfully
communicates that p,” because “communicates” reduces to “intends” not to
‘fulfilled intention.’ Cooperation enters when we go beyond ONE act of
communication. To communicate is to give information and to influence another,
and it is also to receive information and to be influenced by another. When
these communicative objectives are made explicit, helpfulness or cooperation
becomes essential. He uses ‘converational cooperation” and “supreme principle
of conversational cooperation” (369). He uses ‘supreme conversational
principle” of “cooperativeness” (369), to avoid seeing the conversational
imperatives as an unorganized heap of conversational obligations. Another
variant is Grice’s use of “principle of conversational co-operation.” He also
uses “principle of conversational rational co-operation.” Note that irrational
or non-rational co-operation is not an oxymoron. Another expression is
conversational cooperative rationality. So Grice was amused that you can just
as well refer to ‘cooperative rationality” or “rational cooperation,” “a
category shift if ever there was one.”
conversational explicitum: Grice needs the explicatio, or explicit. Because the
mistake the philosopher makes is at the level of the implicatio, as
Nowell-Smith, and C. K. Grant had noted. It is not OBVIOUSLY at the explicit
level. Grice was never interested in the explicit level, and takes a very
cavalier attitude to it. “This brief indication of my use of say leaves it open
whether a man who says (today) Harold Wilson is a great man and another who
says (also today) The British Prime Minister is a great man would, if each knew
that the two singular terms had the same reference, have said the same thing.
But whatever decision is made about this question, the apparatus that I am
about to provide will be capable of accounting for any implicatures that might
depend on the presence of one rather than another of these singular terms in
the sentence uttered. Such implicatures would merely be related to different
maxims.”Rephrase: “A brief indication of my use of ‘the explicit’ leaves it
open whether a man who states (today), ‘Harold Wilson is a great man’ thereby
stating that Wilson is a great man, and another who states (also today),‘The
British Prime Minister is a great man,’ viz. that the Prime Minister is a great
mand, would, if each singular term, ‘the Prime Minister’ and ‘Wilson’ has the
same denotatum (co-relata) have put forward in an explicit fashion the same
propositional complex, and have stated the same thing. On the face of it, it
would seem they have not. But cf. ‘Wilson will be the prime minister’ versus
‘Wilson shall be the prime minister.’ Again, a subtler question arises as to
whether the first emissor who has stated that Wilson will be the next prime
minster and the other one who has stated that Wilson *shall* be the next prime
minster, have both but forward the same proposition. If the futurm indicatum is
ENTAILED by the futurum intentionale, the question is easy to settle. Whatever methodological
decision or stipulation I end up making about the ‘explicitum,’ the apparatus
that I rely on is capable of accounting for any implicatum that might depend on
the presence of this or that singular term in the utterance. Such an implicatum
would merely be related to a different conversational maxims. Urmson has
elaborated on this, “Mrs. Smith’s husband just passed by.” “You mean the
postman! Why did you use such contrived ‘signular term’?” If the emissor draws
a skull what he explicitly conveys is that this is a skull. This is the
EPLICITUM. If he communicates that there is danger, that’s via some further
reasoning. That associates a skull with death. Grice’s example is Grice
displaying his bandaged leg. Strictly, he communicates that he has a bandaged
leg. Second, that his leg is bandaged (the bandage may be fake). And third,
that he cannot play cricket. It all started in Oxford when they started to use
‘imply’ in a sense other than the ‘logical’ one. This got Grice immersed in a
deep exploration of types of ‘implication.’ There is the implicatum, and the
implicitum, both from ‘implico.’ As correlative there is the explicatio, which
yields both the explicatum and the explicitum. Grice has under the desideratum
of conversational clarity that a conversationalist is assumed to make the point
of his conversational contribution ‘explicit.’ So in his polemic with G. A.
Paul, Grice knows that the ‘doubt-or-denial’ condition will be at the level NOT
of the explicitum or explicatum. Surely an implicatum can be CANCELLED
explicitly. Grice uses ‘contextual’ or ‘explicit,’ here but grants that the
‘contextual’ may be subsumed under the ‘explicit.’ It is when the sub-perceptual utterance is copulated
with the formulation of the explicatum of the implicatum that Grice shows G. A.
Paul that the statement is still ‘true,’ and which Grice sees as a
reivindication of the causal theory of perception. In the twenty or so examples
of philosophical mistakes, both in “Causal” and “Prolegomena,” all the mistakes
can be rendered back to the ‘explicatum’ versus ‘implicatum’ distinction.
Unfortunately, each requires a philosophical background to draw all the
‘implications,’ and Grice has been read by people without a philosophical
background who go on to criticise him for ignoring things where he never had
focused his attention on. His priority is to deal with these philosophical
mistakes. He also expects the philosopher to come up with a general
methodological statement. Grice distinguishes between the conversational
explicitum and the conversational explicatum. Grice plays with ‘explicit’ and
‘implicit’ at various places. He often uses ‘explicit’and ‘implicit’
adverbially: the utterer explicitly conveys that p versus the utterer
implicitly conveys that p (hints that p, suggests that p, indicates that p,
implicates that p, implies that p). Grice regards that both dimensions form
part of the total act of signification, accepting as a neutral variant, that
the utterer has signified that p.
conversational game: the expression is used by Grice systematically. He speaks
of players making the conversational move in the conversational game following
the conversational rule, v. rational choice
conversational helpfulness: Was there a Graeco-Roman equivalent for Anglo-Saxon ‘help’?
helpmeet (n.) a ghost word from the 1611 translation of the Bible, where it
originally was a two-word noun-adjective phrase translating Latin adjutorium
simile sibi [Genesis ii.18] as "an help meet for him," and meaning
literally "a helper like himself." See help (n.) + meet (adj.). By
1670s it was hyphenated help-meet and mistaken as a modified noun. Compare
helpmate. The original Hebrew is 'ezer keneghdo. Related entries & more aid (v.) "to assist, help," c.
1400, from Old French aidier "help, assist" (Modern French aider),
from Latin adiutare, frequentative of adiuvare (past participle adiutus)
"to give help to," from ad "to" (see ad-) + iuvare "to
help, assist, give strength, support, sustain," which is from a PIE source
perhaps related to the root of iuvenis "young person" (see young
(adj.)). Related: Aided; aiding. Related entries & more succor (n.) c. 1200, socour, earlier socours
"aid, help," from Anglo-French succors "help, aid," Old
French socors, sucurres "aid, help, assistance" (Modern French
secours), from Medieval Latin succursus "help, assistance," from past
participle of Latin succurrere "run to help, hasten to the aid of,"
from assimilated form of sub "up to" (see sub-) + currere "to run"
(from PIE root *kers- "to run"). Final -s mistaken in English as a
plural inflection and dropped late 13c. Meaning "one who aids or
helps" is from c. 1300. There is a fashion in which to help is to
cooperate, but co-operate, strictly, requires operation by A and operation by
B. We do use cooperate loosely. “She is very cooperative.” “Help” seems less
formal. One can help without ever engaging or honouring the other’s goal. I can
help you buy a house, say. So the principle of conversational cooperation is
stricter and narrower than the principle of conversational helpfulness.
Cooperation involves reciprocity and mutuality in a way that helpfulness does
not. That’s why Grice needs to emphasise that there is an expectation of MUTUAL
helpfulness. One is expected to be helpful, and one expects the other to be
helpful. Grice was doubtful about the implicature of ‘co-operative,’ – after
all, who at Oxford wants a ‘co-operative.’ It sounds anti-Oxonian. So Grice
elaborates on ‘helping others’ and ‘assuming others will help you’ in the event
that we ‘are doing something together.’ Does this equate cooperation, he
wonders. Just in case, he uses ‘helpfulness’ as a variant. There are other
concepts he plays with, notably ‘altruism,’ and ‘benevolence,’ or other-love.’Helpfulness
is Grice’s favourite virtue. Grice is clear that reciprocity is essential here.
One exhibits helpfulness and expects helpfulness from his conversational
partner. He dedicates a set of seven lectures to it, entitled as follows.
Lecture 1, Prolegomena; Lecture 2: Logic and Conversation; Lecture 3: Further
notes on logic and conversation; Lecture 4: Indicative conditionals; Lecture 5:
Us meaning and intentions; Lecture 6: Us meaning, sentence-meaning, and
word-meaning; and Lecture 7: Some models for implicature. I hope they dont
expect me to lecture on James! Grice admired James, but not vice
versa. Grice entitled the set as being Logic and Conversation. That is the
title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was
way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second
lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, The
Logic of Grammar. The content of each lecture is indicated below. In
the first, Grice manages to quote from Witters. In the last, he
didnt! The original set consisted of seven lectures. To wit:
Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation,
Indicative Conditionals, Us meaning and intentions, Us meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word meaning, and Some models for implicature. They were
pretty successful at Oxford. While the notion of an implicatum had been
introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle of
conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of
rationality involved. Observation of the principle of conversational
helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who
cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information,
influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable given that it is conducted
along the lines set by the principle of conversational helpfulness. In
Prolegomena he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a
disregard for the implicatum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor,
Senses are not to be muliplied beyond necessity. In Indicative conditionals he
tackles Strawson on if as not representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell.
The next two lectures on the meaning by the utterer and intentions, and meaning
by the utterer, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning refine his earlier, more
austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the
lectures with an exploration on the relevance of the implicatum to
philosophical psychology. Grice was well aware that many philosophers had
become enamoured with the s. and would love to give it a continuous perusal.
The set is indeed grandiose. It starts with a Prolegomena to set the scene: He
notably quotes himself in it, which helps, but also Strawson, which sort of
justifies the general title. In the second lecture, Logic and Conversation, he
expands on the principle of conversational helpfulness and the explicitum/implicatum
distinction – all very rationalist! The third lecture is otiose in that he
makes fun of Ockham: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The
fourth lecture, on Indicative conditionals, is indeed on MOST of the formal
devices he had mentioned on Lecture II, notably the functors (rather than the
quantifiers and the iota operator, with which he deals in Presupposition and
conversational implicature, since, as he notes, they refer to reference). This
lecture is the centrepiece of the set. In the fifth lecture, he plays with
mean, and discovers that it is attached to the implicatum or the implicitum. In
the sixth lecture, he becomes a nominalist, to use Bennetts phrase, as he deals
with dog and shaggy in terms of this or that resultant procedure. Dont ask me
what they are! Finally, in “Some models for implicature,” he attacks the charge
of circularity, and refers to nineteenth-century explorations on the idea of
thought without language alla Wundt. I dont think a set of James lectures had
even been so comprehensive! Conversational helpfulness. This is Grice at his
methodological best. He was aware that the type of philosophying he was about
to criticise wass a bit dated, but whats wrong with being old-fashioned? While
this may be seen as a development of his views on implicature at that seminal
Oxford seminar, it may also be seen as Grice popularising the views for a
New-World, non-Oxonian audience. A discussion of Oxonian philosophers of
the play group of Grice, notably Austin, Hare, Hart, and Strawson. He adds
himself for good measure (“Causal theory”). Philosophers, even at Oxford, have
to be careful with the attention that is due to general principles of
discourse. Grice quotes philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Ryle,
and some interpreters or practitioners of Oxonian analysis, such as Benjamin
and Searle. He even manages to quote from Witterss Philosophical
investigations, on seeing a banana as a banana. There are further items in the
Grice collection that address Austins manoeuvre, Austin on ifs and cans, Ifs
and cans, : conditional, power. Two of Grices favourites. He opposed
Strawsons view on if. Grice thought that if was the horseshoe of Whitehead and
Russell, provided we add an implicatum to an entailment. The can is merely
dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice! Ifs and cans, intention,
disposition. Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of
free will. Pears had noted that conversational implicature may account for the
conditional perfection (if yields iff). Cf. Ayers on Austin on if and can.
Recall that for Grice the most idiomatic way to express a disposition is with
the Subjectsive mode, the if, and the can ‒ The ice can break. Cf. the mistake:
It is not the case that what you must do, you can do. The can-may distinction
is one Grice played with too. As with will and shall, the attachment of one
mode to one of the lexemes is pretty arbitrary and not etymologically justified
‒ pace Fowler on it being a privilege of this or that Southern Englishman as
Fowler is. If he calls it Prolegomena, he is being jocular. Philosophers
Mistakes would have been too provocative. Benjamin, or rather Broad, erred, and
so did Ryle, and Ludwig Witters, and my friends, Austin (the mater that
wobbled), and in order of seniority, Hart (I heard him defend this about
carefully – stopping at every door in case a dog comes out at breakneck speed),
Hare (To say good is to approve), and Strawson (“Logical theory”: To utter if
p, q is to implicate some inferrability, To say true! is to endorse –
Analysis). If he ends with Searle, he is being jocular. He quotes Searle from
an essay in British philosophy in Lecture I, and from an essay in Philosophy in
America in Lecture V. He loved Searle, and expands on the Texas oilmens club
example! We may think of Grice as a linguistic botanizer or a meta-linguistic
botanizer: his hobby was to collect philosophers mistakes, and he catalogued
them. In Causal theory he produces his first list of seven. The pillar box
seems red to me. One cannot see a dagger as a dagger. Moore didnt know that the
objects before him were his own hands. What is actual is not also possible. For
someone to be called responsible, his action should be condemnable. A cause
must be given only of something abnormal or unusual (cf. ætiology). If you know
it, you dont believe it. In the Prolegomena, the taxonomy is more complicated.
Examples A (the use of an expression, by Austin, Benjamin, Grice, Hart, Ryle,
Wittgenstein), Examples B (Strawson on and, or, and especially if), and
Examples C (Strawson on true and Hare on good – the performative theories). But
even if his taxonomy is more complicated, he makes it more SO by giving other
examples as he goes on to discuss how to assess the philosophical mistake. Cf.
his elaboration on trying, I saw Mrs. Smith cashing a cheque, Trying to cash a
cheque, you mean. Or cf. his remarks on remember, and There is an analogy here
with a case by Wittgenstein. In summary, he wants to say. Its the philosopher
who makes his big mistake. He has detected, as Grice has it, some
conversational nuance. Now he wants to exploit it. But before rushing ahead to
exploit the conversational nuance he has detected, or identified, or collected
in his exercise of linguistic botanising, the philosopher should let us know
with clarity what type of a nuance it is. For Grice wants to know that the
nuance depends on a general principle (of goal-directed behaviour in general,
and most likely rational) governing discourse – that participants in a
conversation should be aware of, and not on some minutiæ that has been
identified by the philosopher making the mistake, unsystematically, and merely
descriptively, and taxonomically, but without ONE drop of explanatory adequacy.
The fact that he directs this to his junior Strawson is the sad thing. The rest
are all Grices seniors! The point is of philosophical interest, rather than
other. And he keeps citing philosophers, Tarski or Ramsey, in the third James
leture, to elaborate the point about true in Prolegomena. He never seems interested
in anything but an item being of philosophical interest, even if that means HIS
and MINE! On top, he is being Oxonian: Only at Oxford my colleagues were so
obsessed, as it has never been seen anywhere else, about the nuances of
conversation. Only they were all making a big mistake in having no clue as to
what the underlying theory of conversation as rational co-operation would
simplify things for them – and how! If I introduce the explicatum as a
concession, I shall hope I will be pardoned! Is Grices intention epagogic, or
diagogic in Prolegomena? Is he trying to educate Strawson, or just delighting
in proving Strawson wrong? We think the former. The fact that he quotes himself
shows that Grice is concerned with something he still sees, and for the rest of
his life will see, as a valid philosophical problem. If philosophy generated no
problems it would be dead. Refs.: The main sources are the two sets on ‘logic
and conversation.’ There are good paraphrases in other essays when he
summarises his own views, as he did at Urbana. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational imperative: The problem with ‘command’ is that for Habermas, it
springs from ‘power,’ and we need to have it sprung from ‘auctoritas,’ rather –
the voice of reason, that is – “Impero” gives also pre-pare. “Imperare,
prepare, etc. What was the Greek for ‘imperative mode’? προστακτική
prostaktike. προσ-τακτικός , ή, όν, A.of or for
commanding, imperative, imperious, τὸ π. [ἡ ψυχή], opp. τὸ ὑπηρετικόν (of the
body), Arist.Top.128b19; “π. τινῶν” Corn.ND16; “λόγος” Plu.2.1037f;
Προστακτικός (sc. λόγος), title of work by Protagoras, D.L.9.55; “βραχυλογία”
Plu.Phoc.5; also of persons, “ἄρχων” Max.Tyr.13.2 (Sup.). II. Gramm., ἡ -κὴ
ἔγκλισις the imperative mood, D.T.638.7, A.D.Synt.31.20; π. ἐκφορὰ τῶν ῥημάτων
ib.69.20; “τὸ π. σχῆμα” Anon.Fig.24; also “τὸ -κόν” D.L. 7.66,67,
Ps.-Plu.Vit.Hom.53. Adv. “-κῶς” in the imperative mood, D.H.4.18,
Sch.Ar.Av.1163.Grice became famous for his ‘maxims,’ which in Nowell-Smith’s
view they are more like rules of etiquette for sylish conversation. As such,
many had been proposed. But Grice proposes them AS A PHILOSOPHER would, and
ONLY TO REBUFF the mistake made by this or that philosopher who would rather
EXPLAIN the phenomenon in terms OTHER than involving as PART OF THE DATA, i. e.
as a datum (as he says) or assumption, that there are these ‘assumptions,’
which guide behaviour. Grice is having in mind Kant’s “Imperativ.” He also uses
‘conversational objective.” In most versions that Grice provides of the
‘general expectations’ of rational discourse, he chooses the obvious imperative
form. On occasion he does use ‘imperative.’ Grice is vague as to the term of
choice for this or that ‘expectation.’ According to Strawson, Grice even once
used ‘conversational rule,’ and he does use ‘conversational rule of the
conversational game of making this or that conversational move.’ Notably, he
also uses ‘conversational principle,’ and ‘conversational desideratum.’ And
‘maxim’! And ‘conversational directive (371), and ‘conversational obligation’
(369). By ‘conversational maxim,’ he means ‘conversational maxim.’ He uses
‘conversational sub-maxim’ very occasionally. He rather uses ‘conversational
super-maxim.’ He uses ‘immanuel,’ and he uses ‘conversational immanuel.’ It is
worth noting that the choice of word influences the exegesis. Loar takes these
things to be ‘empirical generalisations over functional states’! And Grice
agrees that there is a dull, empiricist way, in which these things can be seen
as things people conform to. There is a quasi-contractualist approach to:
things people convene on. And there is an Ariskantian approach: things people
SHOULD abide by. Surely Grice is not requiring that the conversationalists ARE
explicitly or consciously AWARE of these things. There is a principle of effort
of economical reason to cope with that!
conversational implicatum. A joke. Surely if he is going to use ‘implicatum’ in
Roman, this would be ‘implicatum conversationale,’ if there were such thing. And
there were! The Roman is formed from cum- plus ‘verso.’ So there’s Roman
‘conversatio.’ And –alis, ale is a productive suffix. Or implicitum. Grice is being philosophical
and sticking with ‘implicatio’ as used by logicians. Implicitum does not have
much of a philosophical pedigree. But even ‘implicatio’ was not THAT used,
‘consequentia’ was preferred, as in ‘non sequitur, and seguitur, quod
demonstrandumm erat. Strawson criticism of ‘the,’ only tentative by Grice,
unlike ‘if,’ so forgivable! See common-ground status. Grice loved an
implicatum. The use of ‘conversational’ by Grice is NEVER emphatic. In his
detailed, even fastidious, taxonomy of ‘implication,’ he decisively does not
want to have a mere conventional implicatum (as in “She was poor but she was
honest”) as conversational. Not even a “Thank you”, generated by the maxim “be
polite.” That would be an implicatum which is nonconventional and yet NOT
conversational, because ‘be polite’ is NOT a conversational maxim (moral,
aesthetic, and social maxims are not). And an implicature. An elaboration of
his Oxonian seminar on Logic and conversation. Theres a principle of
conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational
candour and a desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of
conversational self-interest clashing with the sub-principle of conversational
benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis
for a conversational implicatum, as his term of art goes. Observation of the
principle of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the
following lines: anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is
supposed to serve ‒ give/receive information, influence/be influenced ‒ should
only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the
assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of
conversational helfpulness, and attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice
takes special care in listing tests for the proof that an implicatum is
conversational in this rather technical usage: a conversational implicatum is
rationally calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or
stance that the addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being
helpful), non-detachable, indeterminate, and very cancellable, thus never part
of the sense and never an entailment of this or that piece of philosophical
vocabulary, in Davidson and Harman, the logic of Grammar, also in Cole and
Morgan, repr. in a revised form in Grice, logic and conversation, the second
James lecture, : principle of conversational helpfulness, implicatum,
cancellability. While the essay was also repr. by Cole and Morgan. Grice
always cites it from the two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar, ed. by
Davidson and Harman. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter
Grice through this essay. A philosopher usually gets first acquainted with his
In defence of a dogma, or Meaning. In Logic and Conversation, Grice
re-utilises the notion of an implicatum and the principle of conversational helpfulness
that he introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. The idea Grice is that
the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational
(reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the
two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive information,
to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it
is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational
helfpulness. Grices point is methodological. He is not at all interested
in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts in
media res, and skips Grices careful list of Oxonian examples of disregard
for the key idea of what a conversant implicates by the conversational
move he makes. His concession is that there is an explicatum or explicitum
(roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This
concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent,
conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by
a few philosophers leaving them confused. I do not know what Davidson and
Harman were thinking when they reprinted just this in The logic of grammar. I
mean: it is obviously in media res. Grice starts with the logical devices, and
never again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and
hyperbole, and surely the philosopher who bought The logic of grammar must be
left puzzled. He has to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion.
Oxonian philosophers would, out of etiquette, hardly quote from unpublished
material! Cohen had to rely on memory, and thats why he got all his Grice
wrong! And so did Strawson in If and the horseshoe. Even Walker responding to
Cohen is relying on memory. Few philosophers quote from The logic of grammar.
At Oxford, everybody knew what Grice was up to. Hare was talking implicature in
Mind, and Pears was talking conversational implicature in Ifs and cans. And
Platts was dedicating a full chapter to “Causal Theory”. It seems the Oxonian
etiquette was to quote from Causal Theory. It was obvious that Grices
implication excursus had to read implicature! In a few dictionaries of
philosophy, such as Hamlyns, under implication, a reference to Grices locus
classicus Causal theory is made – Passmore quotes from Causal theory in Hundred
years of philosophy. Very few Oxonians would care to buy a volume published in
Encino. Not many Oxonian philosophers ever quoted The logic of grammar, though.
At Oxford, Grices implicata remained part of the unwritten doctrines of a few.
And philosophers would not cite a cajoled essay in the references. The
implicatum allows a display of truth-functional Grice. For
substitutional-quantificational Grice we have to wait for his treatment of the.
In Prolegomena, Grice had quoted verbatim from Strawsons infamous idea that
there is a sense of inferrability with if. While the lecture covers much more
than if (He only said if; Oh, no, he said a great deal more than that! the
title was never meant to be original. Grice in fact provides a rational
justification for the three connectives (and, or, and if) and before that, the
unary functor not. Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, not and If,
Sinton on Grice on denials of indicative conditionals, not, if. Strawson
had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whiteheads and Russells
horseshoe, and if. Grice thought Strawsons observations could be understood in
terms of entailment + implicatum (Robbing Peter to Pay Paul). But problems, as
first noted to Grice, by Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope
of the implicatum within the operation of, say, negation. Analogous problems
arise with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, and and or, and
Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon. The qualification
indicative is modal. Ordinary language allows for if utterances to be in modes
other than the imperative. Counter-factual, if you need to be philosophical
krypto-technical, Subjectsive is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a
cavalier to the problem: Surely it wont do to say You couldnt have done that,
since you were in Seattle, to someone who figuratively tells you hes spend the
full summer cleaning the Aegean stables. This, to philosophers, is the
centerpiece of the lectures. Grice takes good care of not, and, or, and
concludes with the if of the title. For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook
Wilson in Statement and Inference. And they all connect with rationality. So he
is using material from his Oxford seminars on the principle of conversational
helpfulness. Plus Cook Wilson makes more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The
last bit, citing Kripke and Dummett, is meant as jocular. What is important is
the teleological approach to the operators, where a note should be made about
dyadicity. In Prolegomena, when he introduces the topic, he omits not (about
which he was almost obsessed!). He just gives an example for and (He went to
bed and took off his dirty boots), one for or (the garden becomes Oxford and
the kitchen becomes London, and the implicatum is in terms, oddly, of ignorance:
My wife is either in town or country,making fun of Town and Country), and if.
His favourite illustration for if is Cock Robin: If the Sparrow did not kill
him, the Lark did! This is because Grice is serious about the erotetic, i.e.
question/answer, format Cook Wilson gives to things, but he manages to bring
Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just to impress! Most importantly, he
introduces the square brackets! Hell use them again in Presupposition and
Conversational Implicature and turns them into subscripts in Vacuous Namess.
This is central. For he wants to impoverish the idea of the implicatum. The
explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is syntactic-cum-pragmatic import.
The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable, and as he knows: what the eye
no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for! The modal
implicatum. Since Grice uses indicative, for the title of his third James
lecture (Indicative Conditionals) surely he implicates subjunctive ‒
i.e. that someone might be thinking that he should give an account of
indicative-cum-subjective. This relates to an example Grice gives in Causal
theory, that he does not reproduce in Prolegomena. Grice states the
philosophical mistake as follows. What is actual is not also
possible. Grice seems to be suggesting that a subjective conditional would
involve one or other of the modalities, he is not interested in exploring. On
the other hand, Mackie has noted that Grices conversationalist hypothesis
(Mackie quotes verbatim from Grices principle of conversational helpfulness)
allows for an explanation of the Subjectsive if that does not involve
Kripke-type paradoxes involving possible worlds, or other. In Causal Theory,
Grice notes that the issue with which he has been mainly concerned may be
thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are
several philosophical theses or dicta which would he thinks need to be examined
in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis
which Grice has been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general
kind. An examples which occurs to me is the following. What is actual is not
also possible. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is
importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for
all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted
by Grices objector seems to Grice to involve a type of manoeuvre which is
characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. He is not
condemning that kind of manoeuvre. He is merely suggesting that to embark on it
without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead
to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure
that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. If was also of
special interest to Grice for many other reasons. He defends a dispositional
account of intending that in terms of ifs and cans. He considers akrasia
conditionally. He explored the hypothetical-categorical distinction in the
buletic mode. He was concerned with therefore as involved with the associated
if of entailment. Refs.: “Implicatum” is introduced in Essay 2 in WoW –
but there are scattered references elsewhere. He often uses the plural
‘implicata’ too, as in “Retrospective Epilogue,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
An implicatum requires a complexum. Frege was the topic of the explorations by
Dummett. A tutee of Grices once brought Dummetts Frege to a tutorial and
told Grice that he intended to explore this. Have you read it? No I
havent, Grice answered. And after a pause, he went on: And I hope I will not.
Hardly promising, the tutee thought. Some authors, including Grice, but
alas, not Frege, have noted some similarities between Grices notion of a
conventional implicature and Freges schematic and genial rambles on colouring.
Aber Farbung, as Frege would state! Grice was more interested in the idea of a
Fregeian sense, but he felt that if he had to play with Freges aber he should!
One of Grices metaphysical construction-routines, the Humeian projection, is
aimed at the generation of concepts, in most cases the rational reconstruction
of an intuitive concept displayed in ordinary discourse. We arrive at something
like a Fregeian sense. Grice exclaimed, with an intonation of Eureka, almost.
And then he went back to Frege. Grices German was good, so he could read
Frege, in the vernacular. For fun, he read Frege to his children (Grices, not
Freges): In einem obliquen Kontext, Frege says, Grice says, kann ja z. B. die
Ersetzung eines „aber durch ein „und, die in einem direkten Kontext keinen
Unterschied des Wahrheitswerts ergibt, einen solchen Unterschied bewirken. Ill
make that easy for you, darlings: und is and, and aber is but. But surely,
Papa, aber is not cognate with but! Its not. That is Anglo-Saxon, for you. But
is strictly Anglo-Saxon short for by-out; we lost aber when we sailed the North
Sea. Grice went on: Damit wird eine Abgrenzung von Sinn und Färbung (oder
Konnotationen) eines Satzes fragwürdig. I. e. he is saying that She was poor
but she was honest only conventionally implicates that there is a contrast
between her poverty and her honesty. I guess he heard the ditty during the War?
Grice ignored that remark, and went on: Appell und Kundgabe wären ferner von
Sinn und Färbung genauer zu unterscheiden. Ich weiß so auf interessante
Bedeutungs Komponenten hin, bemüht sich aber nicht, sie genauer zu
differenzieren, da er letztlich nur betonen will, daß sie in der Sprache der
Logik keine Rolle spielen. They play a role in the lingo, that is! What do?
Stuff like but. But surely they are not rational conversational implicata!? No,
dear, just conventional tricks you can ignore on a nice summer day! Grice
however was never interested in what he dismissively labels the conventional
implicatum. He identifies it because he felt he must! Surely, the way some
Oxonian philosophers learn to use stuff like, on the one hand, and on the
other, (or how Grice learned how to use men and de in Grecian), or so, or
therefore, or but versus and, is just to allow that he would still use imply in
such cases. But surely he wants conversational to stick with rationality:
conversational maxim and converational implicatum only apply to things which
can be justified transcendentally, and not idiosyncrasies of usage! Grice
follows Church in noting that Russell misreads Frege as being guilty of
ignoring the use-mention distinction, when he doesnt. One thing that Grice
minimises is that Freges assertion sign is composite. Tha is why Baker prefers
to use the dot “.” as the doxastic correlative for the buletic sign ! which is
NOT composite. The sign „├‟ is composite. Frege explains his Urteilstrich, the
vertical component of his sign ├ as conveying assertoric force. The principal
role of the horizontal component as such is to prevent the appearance of assertoric
force belonging to a token of what does not express a thought (e.g. the
expression 22). ─p expresses a thought even if p does not.) cf. Hares four
sub-atomic particles: phrastic (dictum), neustic (dictor), tropic, and clistic.
Cf. Grice on the radix controversy: We do not want the “.” in p to become a
vanishing sign. Grices Frege, Frege, Words, and Sentences, Frege, Farbung,
aber. Frege was one of Grices obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or
implicitum, a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness
working in the generation of conversational implicata, that can only mean
progress for philosophy! Fregeian senses are not to be multiplied beyond
necessity. The employment of the routine of Humeian projection may be expected
to deliver for us, as its result, a concept – the concept(ion) of
value, say, in something like a Fregeian sense, rather than an
object. There is also a strong affinity between Freges treatment of
colouring (of the German particle aber, say) and Grices idea of a convetional
implicatum (She was poor, but she was honest,/and her parents were the
same,/till she met a city feller,/and she lost her honest Names, as the vulgar
Great War ditty went). Grice does not seem interested in providing a
philosophical exploration of conventional implicata, and there is a reason for
this. Conventional implicata are not essentially connected, as
conversational implicata are, with rationality. Conventional implicata cannot
be calculable. They have less of a philosophical interest, too, in that they
are not cancellable. Grice sees cancellability as a way to prove some
(contemporary to him, if dated) ordinary-language philosophers who analyse an
expression in terms of sense and entailment, where a cancellable conversational
implicatum is all there is (to it). He mentions Benjamin in Prolegomena,
and is very careful in noting how Benjamin misuses a Fregeian sense. In his
Causal theory, Grice lists another mistake: What is known to be the case is not
believed to be the case. Grice gives pretty few example of a conventional
implicatum: therefore, as in the utterance by Jill: Jack is an Englishman; he
is, therefore, brave. This is interesting because therefore compares to so
which Strawson, in PGRICE, claims is the asserted counterpart to if. But
Strawson is never associated with the type of linguistic botany that Grice is.
Grice also mentions the idiom, on the one hand/on the other hand, in some
detail in “Epilogue”: My aunt was a nurse in the Great War; my sister, on the
other hand, lives on a peak at Darien. Grice thinks that Frege misuses the
use-mention distinction but Russell corrects that. Grice bases this on Church.
And of course he is obsessed with the assertion sign by Frege, which Grice
thinks has one stroke tooo many. The main reference is give above for
‘complexum.’ Those without a philosophical background tend to ignore a joke by
Grice. His echoing Kant in the James is a joke, in the sense that he is using
Katns well-known to be pretty artificial quartet of ontological caegories to
apply to a totally different phenomenon: the taxonomy of the maxims! In his
earlier non-jocular attempts, he applied more philosophical concepts with a
more serious rationale. His key concept, conversation as rational co-operation,
underlies all his attempts. A pretty worked-out model is in terms then of this
central, or overarching principle of conversational helpfulness (where
conversation as cooperation need not be qualified as conversation as rational
co-operation) and being structured by two contrasting sub-principles: the
principle of conversational benevolence (which almost overlaps with the
principle of conversational helpfulness) and the slightly more jocular
principle of conversational self-love. There is something oxymoronic about self-love
being conversational, and this is what leads to replace the two subprinciples
by a principle of conversational helfpulness (as used in WoW:IV) simpliciter.
His desideratum of conversational candour is key. The clash between the
desideratum of conversational candour and the desideratum of conversational
clarity (call them supermaxims) explains why I believe that p (less clear than
p) shows the primacy of candour over clarity. The idea remains of an
overarching principle and a set of more specific guidelines. Non-Oxonian
philosophers would see Grices appeal to this or that guideline as ad hoc, but
not his tutees! Grice finds inspiration in Joseph Butler’s sermon on benevolence
and self-love, in his sermon 9, upon the love of our neighbour, preached on advent
Sunday. And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in
this saying, Namesly, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, Romans xiii.
9. It is commonly observed, that there is a disposition in men to complain
of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they live, as greater
than that of former ones: which is usually followed with this further
observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all times.
Now, to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts of
history: thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly takes different
turns, and some particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages
than in others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the distinction
of the present, to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to
self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly. Upon this account it
seems worth while to inquire, whether private interest is likely to be promoted
in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over
all other principles; "or whether the contracted affection may not
possibly be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own
end, private good?" Repr. in revised form as WOW, I. Grice felt
the need to go back to his explantion (cf. Fisher, Never contradict. Never
explain) of the nuances about seem and cause (“Causal theory”.). Grice uses ‘My
wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom,’ by Smith, as relying on a requirement
of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations on a theme by Grice.
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged. Variations on a theme by Grice. I wish to represent a
certain subclass of non-conventional implicaturcs, which I shall
call conversational implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with
certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what
these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a
general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession
of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of
purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction
may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for
discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite,
or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the
participants, as in a casual conversation. But at each stage, some possible
conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might
then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected
ceteris paribus to observe, viz.: Make your conversational contribution such as
is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this
the co-operative principle. We might then formulate a rough general principle
which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to
observe, viz.: Make your contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative
Principle. Strictly, the principle itself is not co-operative: conversants
are. Less literary variant: Make your move such as is required by the
accepted goal of the conversation in which you are engaged. But why logic and
conversation? Logica had been part of the trivium for ages ‒ Although they
called it dialectica, then. Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by
Strawsons treatment of the formal devices in “Introduction to logical theory”
(henceforth, “Logical theory”), Grice targets these, in their
ordinary-discourse counterparts. Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his
logic tutor – Strawson was following a PPE., and his approach to logic is
practical. His philosophy tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit.
Hum. the situation is different. Grice knows that the Categoriae and De Int. of
his beloved Aristotle are part of the Logical Organon which had been so
influential in the history of philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile
Strawsons observations with the idea that the formal devices reproduce some
sort of explicatum, or explicitum, as identified by Whitehead and Russell in
Principia Mathematica. In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general
features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation. The
alleged divergence between the ordinary-language operators and their formal
counterparts is explained in terms of the conversational implicata, then.
I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to
ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal
device and its alleged ordinary-language counterpart, while still assuming that
U is engaged in a co-operative transaction. The utterer and his
addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation ‒
the exchange of information and the institution of decisions ‒ and
judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and
rational) if conducted under some form of principle of conversational
helpfulness. The observation of a principle of conversational
helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone
who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption
that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational
helpfulness. In titling his seminar Logic and conversation, Grice is
thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal “Logical theory,” that every
Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he never
ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti
Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he
acknwoledges Grices difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the
strength or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses
an adjective that Grice will seldom do, pragmatic. On top, Strawson attributes
the adjective to rule. For Grice, in Strawsons wording, there is this or that
pragmatic rule to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a
weaker conversational move. Strawsons Introduction was published before Grice
aired his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then Grice takes
the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important in that it
is Grices occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as
generating implicata under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes it
obvious that Grices interest is methodological, and not philological. He is not
interest in conversation per se, but only as the source for his principle of
conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational implicatum,
which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his
expression does, a distinction apparently denied by Witters and all too
frequently ignored by Austin. Logic and conversation, an Oxford seminar,
implicatum, principle of conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational
implicature, conversational implicatum. Conversational
Implicature Grices main invention, one which trades on the distinction
between what an utterer implies and what his expression does. A
distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of
all people, Austin. Grice is implicating that Austins sympathies were for
the Subjectsification of Linguistic Nature. Grice remains an obdurate
individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the
conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised,
idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularized. His gives an Oxonian example. I
can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week
by uttering It is raining.Grice notes that since the object of the present
exercise, is to provide a bit of theory which will explain, for a
certain family of cases, why is it that a particular
implicature is present, I would suggest that the final test of
the adequacy and utility of this model should be: can it be used to construct
an explanation of the presence of such an implicature, and is it more
comprehensive and more economical than any rival? is the no
doubt pre-theoretical explanation which one would be prompted to give
of such an implicature consistent with, or better still a favourable pointer
towards the requirements involved in the model? cf. Sidonius: Far otherwise:
whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy, the Stoics,
Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their
own engines; for their heathen followers, if they resist the doctrine and
spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be caught in their own
familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their own toils; the barbed
syllogism of your arguments will hook the glib tongues of the
casuists, and it is you who will tie up their slippery
questions in categorical clews, after the manner of a clever
physician, who, when compelled by reasoned thought, prepares antidotes for
poison even from a serpent.qvin potivs experietvr qvisqve conflixerit stoicos
cynicos peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis propriis qvoqve concvti
machiNamesntis nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati ac sensvi si
repvgnaverint mox te magistro ligati vernaculis implicaturis in retia
sua præcipites implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ propositionis vncatis volvbilem
tergiversantvm lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris categoricis lubricas qvæstiones
tv potivs innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui remedivm contra venena cum ratio
compellit et de serpente conficivnt. If he lectured on Logic and
Conversation on implicature, Grice must have thought that Strawsons area was
central. Yet, as he had done in Causal theory and as he will at Harvard, Grice
kept collecting philosophers mistakes. So its best to see Grice as a
methodologist, and as using logic and conversation as an illustration of his
favourite manoeuvre, indeed, central philosophical manoeuver that gave him a
place in the history of philosophy. Restricting this manoeuvre to just an area
minimises it. On the other hand, there has to be a balance: surely logic and
conversation is a topic of intrinsic interest, and we cannot expect all
philosophers – unless they are Griceians – to keep a broad unitarian view of
philosophy as a virtuous whole. Philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
Destructive implicature to it: Mr. Puddle is our man in æsthetics implicates
that he is not good at it. What is important to Grice is that the mistakes of
these philosophers (notably Strawson!) arise from some linguistic phenomena, or,
since we must use singular expressions this or that linguistic phenomenon. Or
as Grice puts it, it is this or that linguistic phenomenon which provides the
material for the philosopher to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory
of conversation as rational co-operation is posited – technically, as a way to
explain (never merely describe, which Grice found boring ‒ if English, cf.
never explain, never apologise ‒ Jacky Fisher: Never contradict. Never
explain.) these phenomena – his principle of conversational helpfulness and the
idea of a conversational implicatum. The latter is based not so much on
rationality per se, but on the implicit-explicit distinction that he constantly
plays with, since his earlier semiotic-oriented explorations of Peirce. But
back to this or that linguistic phenomenon, while he would make fun of Searle
for providing this or that linguistic phenomenon that no philosopher would ever
feel excited about, Grice himself was a bit of a master in illustrating this a
philosophical point with this or that linguistic phenomenon that would not be
necessarily connected with philosophy. Grice rarely quotes authors, but surely
the section in “Causal theory,” where he lists seven philosophical theses
(which are ripe for an implicatum treatment) would be familiar enough for
anybody to be able to drop a names to attach to each. At Harvard, almost every
example Grice gives of this or that linguistic phenomenon is UN-authored (and
sometimes he expands on his own view of them, just to amuse his audience – and
show how committed to this or that thesis he was), but some are not unauthored.
And they all belong to the linguistic turn: In his three groups of examples,
Grice quotes from Ryle (who thinks he knows about ordinary language), Witters,
Austin (he quotes him in great detail, from Pretending, Plea of excuses, and No
modification without aberration,), Strawson (in “Logical theory” and on Truth
for Analysis), Hart (as I have heard him expand on this), Grice, Searle, and
Benjamin. Grice implicates Hare on ‘good,’ etc. When we mention the
explicit/implicit distinction as source for the implicatum, we are referring to
Grices own wording in Retrospective epilogue where he mentions an utterer as
conveying in some explicit fashion this or that, as opposed to a gentler, more
(midland or southern) English, way, via implicature, or implIciture, if you
mustnt. Cf. Fowler: As a southern Englishman, Ive stopped trying teaching a
northern Englishman the distinction between ought and shall. He seems to get it
always wrong. It may be worth exploring how this connects with rationality. His
point would be that that an assumption that the rational principle of
conversational helpfulness is in order allows P-1 not just to convey in a
direct explicit fashion that p, but in an implicit fashion that q, where q is
the implicatum. The principle of conversational helpfulness as generator of
this or that implicata, to use Grices word (generate). Surely, He took off his
boots and went to bed; I wont say in which order sounds hardly in the vein of
conversational helpfulness – but provided Grice does not see it as logically
incoherent, it is still a rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The point
may be difficult to discern, but you never know. The utterer may be conveying,
Viva Boole. Grices point about rationality is mentioned in his later
Prolegomena, on at least two occasions. Rational behaviour is the phrase he
uses (as applied first to communication and then to discourse) and in stark
opposition with a convention-based approach he rightly associates with Austin.
Grice is here less interested here as he will be on rationality, but
coooperation as such. Helpfulness as a reasonable expecation (normative?), a
mutual one between decent chaps, as he puts it. His charming decent chap is so
Oxonian. His tutee would expect no less ‒ and indeed no more! A rather obscure
exploration on the connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice
is aware that there is an allegation in the air about a possible vicious circle
in trying to define category of expression in terms of a category of
representation. He does not provide a solution to the problem which hell take
up in his Method in philosophical psychology, in his role of President of the
APA. It is the implicatum behind the lecture that matters, since Grice
will go back to it, notably in the Retrospective Epilogue. For Grice, its all
rational enough. Theres a P, in a situation, say of danger – a bull ‒. He
perceives the bull. The bulls attack causes this perception. Bull! the P1 G1
screams, and causes in P2 G2 a rearguard movement. So where is
the circularity? Some pedants would have it that Bull cannot be understood in a
belief about a bull which is about a bull. Not Grice. It is nice that he
brought back implicature, which had become obliterated in the lectures, back to
title position! But it is also noteworthy, that these are not explicitly
rationalist models for implicature. He had played with a model, and an
explanatory one at that, for implicature, in his Oxford seminar, in terms of a
principle of conversational helpfulness, a desideratum of conversational
clarity, a desideratum of conversational candour, and two sub-principles: a
principle of conversational benevolence, and a principle of conversational
self-interest! Surely Harvard could be spared of the details! Implicature.
Grice disliked a presupposition. BANC also contains a folder for Odd ends:
Urbana and non-Urbana. Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal
calculus. He originally baptised it System Q in honour of Quine. At a
later stage, Myro will re-Names it System G, in a special version, System GHP,
a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G, in gratitude to
Grice. Odd Ends: Urbana and Not Urbana, Odds and ends: Urbana and not
Urbana, or not-Urbana, or Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, or Oddents,
urbane and not urbane, semantics, Urbana lectures. The Urbana lectures are
on language and reality. Grice keeps revising them, as these items
show. Language and reality, The University of Illinois at Urbana, The
Urbana Lectures, Language and reference, language and reality, The Urbana
lectures, University of Illinois at Urbana, language, reference, reality. Grice
favours a transcendental approach to communication. A beliefs by a
communicator worth communicating has to be true. An order by a
communicator worth communicating has to be satisfactory. The fourth lecture is
the one Grice dates in WOW . Smith has not ceased from beating his wife,
presupposition and conversational implicature, in Radical pragmatics, ed. by R.
Cole, repr. in a revised form in Grice, WOW, II, Explorations in semantics and
metaphysics, essay, presupposition and implicature, presupposition,
conversational implicature, implicature, Strawson. Grice: The loyalty examiner
will not summon you, do not worry. The cancellation by Grice could be pretty
subtle. Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate. Grice
goes back to the issue of negation and not. If, Grice notes, is is a matter of
dispute whether the government has a very undercover person who interrogates
those whose loyalty is suspect and who, if he existed, could be legitimately
referred to as the loyalty examiner; and if, further, I am known to be very
sceptical about the existence of such a person, I could perfectly well say to a
plainly loyal person, Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at
any rate, without, Grice would think, being taken to imply that such a
person exists. Further, if the utterer U is well known to disbelieve in the
existence of such a person, though others are inclined to believe in him, when
U finds a man who is apprised of Us position, but who is worried in case he is
summoned, U may try to reassure him by uttering, The loyalty examiner will not
summon you, do not worry. Then it would be clear that U uttered this because U
is sure there is no such person. The lecture was variously reprinted, but the
Urbana should remain the preferred citation. There are divergences in the
various drafts, though. The original source of this exploration was a
seminar. Grice is interested in re-conceptualising Strawsons manoeuvre
regarding presupposition as involving what Grice disregards as a metaphysical
concoction: the truth-value gap. In Grices view, based on a principle of
conversational tailoring that falls under his principle of conversational
helpfulness ‒ indeed under the desideratum of conversational clarity
(be perspicuous [sic]). The king of France is bald entails there is a king of
France; while The king of France aint bald merely implicates it. Grice
much preferred Collingwoods to Strawsons presuppositions! Grice thought, and
rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain
Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawsons idea of the
præ-suppositum. Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with
Quines idea of a truth-value gap. Grice shows that neither the metaphysical
concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the præ-suppositum
is needed. The king of France is bald entails that there is a king of France.
It is part of what U is logically committed to by what he explicitly conveys.
By uttering, The king of France is not bald on the other hand, U merely
implicitly conveys or implicates that there is a king of France. A perfectly
adequate, or impeccable, as Grice prefers, cancellation, abiding with the
principle of conversational helpfulness is in the offing. The king of France
ain’t bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain’t real! Grice
credits Sluga for having pointed out to him the way to deal with the definite
descriptor or definite article or the iota quantifier the formally. One thing
Russell discovered is that the variable denoting function is to be deduced from
the variable propositional function, and is not to be taken as an indefinable.
Russell tries to do without the iota i as an indefinable, but fails. The success
by Russell later, in On denoting, is the source of all his subsequent progress.
The iota quantifier consists of an inverted iota to be read the individuum x,
as in (℩x).F(x). Grice opts for the Whiteheadian-Russellian standard
rendition, in terms of the iota operator. Grices take on Strawson is a strong
one. The king of France is bald; entails there is a king of France, and what
the utterer explicitly conveys is doxastically unsatisfactory. The king of
France aint bald does not. By uttering The king of France aint bald U only
implicates that there is a king of France, and what he explicitly conveys is
doxastically satisfactory. Grice knew he was not exactly robbing Peter to pay
Paul, or did he? It is worth placing the lecture in context. Soon after
delivering in the New World his exploration on the implicatum, Grice has no
better idea than to promote Strawsons philosophy in the New World. Strawson
will later reflect on the colder shores of the Old World, so we know what Grice
had in mind! Strawsons main claim to fame in the New World (and at least Oxford
in the Old World) was his On referring, where he had had the cheek to say that
by uttering, The king of France is not bald, the utterer implies that there is
a king of France (if not that, as Grice has it, that what U explicitly conveys
is doxastically satisfactory. Strawson later changed that to the utterer
presupposes that there is a king of France. So Grice knows what and who he was
dealing with. Grice and Strawson had entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson
was particularly keen on that turn of phrase he learned from Quine, the
truth-value gap. Grice, rather, found it pretty repulsive: Tertium exclusum!
So, Grice goes on to argue that by uttering The king of France is bald, one
entailment of what U explicitly conveys is indeed There is a king of France.
However, in its negative co-relate, things change. By uttering The king of
France aint bald, the utterer merely implicitly conveys or implicates (in a
pretty cancellable format) that there is a king of France. The king of France
aint bald: theres no king of France! The loyalty examiner is like the King of
France, in ways! The piece is crucial for Grices re-introduction of the
square-bracket device: [The king of France] is bald; [The king of France] aint
bald. Whatever falls within the scope of the square brackets is to be read as
having attained common-ground status and therefore, out of the question, to use
Collingwoods jargon! Grice was very familiar with Collingwood on
presupposition, meant as an attack on Ayer. Collingwoods reflections on
presuppositions being either relative or absolute may well lie behind Grices
metaphysical construction of absolute value! The earliest exploration by Grice
on this is his infamous, Smith has not ceased from beating his wife, discussed
by Ewing in Meaninglessness for Mind. Grice goes back to the example in the excursus
on implying that in Causal Theory, and it is best to revisit this source. Note
that in the reprint in WOW Grice does NOT go, one example of presupposition,
which eventually is a type of conversational implicature. Grices antipathy to
Strawsons presupposition is metaphysical: he dislikes the idea of a
satisfactory-value-gap, as he notes in the second paragraph to Logic and
conversation. And his antipathy crossed the buletic-doxastic divide! Using φ to represent a sentence in either mode,
he stipulate that ~φ is satisfactory just in case ⌈φ⌉ is unsatisfactory. A crunch,
as he puts it, becomes obvious: ~ ⊢The king of France is bald may perhaps be
treated as equivalent to ⊢~(The king of
France is bald). But what about ~!Arrest the intruder? What do we say in cases
like, perhaps, Let it be that I now put my hand on my head or Let it be that my
bicycle faces north, in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that
neither !p nor !~p is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory? If !p is neither
satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (if that make sense, which doesnt to me), does
the philosopher assign a third buletically satisfactory value (0.5) to !p
(buletically neuter, or indifferent). Or does the philosopher say that we have
a buletically satisfactory value gap, as Strawson, following Quine, might
prefer? This may require careful consideration; but I cannot see that the
problem proves insoluble, any more than the analogous problem connected with
Strawsons doxastic presupposition is insoluble. The difficulty is not so much
to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present
themselves. The main reference is Essay 2 in WoW, but there are scattered
references elsewhere. Refs.: The main sources are the two
sets of ‘logic and conversation,’ in BANC, but there are scattered essays on
‘implicature’ simpliciter, too -- “Presupposition
and conversational implicature,” c. 2-f. 25; and “Convesational implicature,”
c. 4-f. 9, “Happiness, discipline, and implicatures,” c. 7-f. 6;
“Presupposition and implicature,” c. 9-f. 3, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational manual: conversational iimmanuel, cnversational manual. Before
playing with ‘immanuel,’ Grice does use ‘manual’ more technically. A know-how.
“Surely, I can have a manual, but don’t know how to play bridge.” “That’s not
how I’m using ‘manual.’” It should be pointed out that it’s the visual thing
that influenced. When people (especially non-philosophers) saw the list of
maxims, they thought: “Washington!” “A manual!”. In the Oxford seminrs, Grice
was never so ‘additive.’ His desideratum of conversational clarity, his
desideratum of conversational candour, his principle of conversational
self-love and his principle of conversational benevolence, plus his principle
of conversational helpfulness, were meant as ‘philosophical’ leads to explain
this or that philosophical mistake. The seminars were given for philosophy tutees.
And Grice is playing on the ‘manuals of etiquette’ – conversational etiquette.
If you do not BELONG to this targeted audience, it is likely that you’ll
misconstrue Grice’s point, and you will! Especially R. T. L.!The Gentlemen's
Book of Etiquette and Manual of Politeness Being a Complete Guide for a
Gentleman's Conduct in All His Relations Towards Society by Cecil B. Hartley. Wit
and vivacity are two highly important ingredients in the conversation of a man
in polite society, yet a straining for effect, or forced wit, is in excessively
bad taste. There is no one more insupportable in society than the everlasting
talkers who scatter puns, witticisms, and jokes with so profuse a hand that
they become as tiresome as a comic newspaper, and whose loud laugh at their own
wit drowns other voices which might speak matter more interesting. The really
witty man does not shower forth his wit so indiscriminately; his charm consists
in wielding his powerful weapon delicately and easily, and making each highly
polished witticism come in the right place and moment to be effectual. While
real wit is a most delightful gift, and its use a most charming accomplishment,
it is, like many other bright weapons, dangerous to use too often. You may
wound where you meant only to amuse, and remarks which you mean only in for
general applications, may be construed into personal affronts, so, if you have
the gift, use it wisely, and not too freely. The most important requisite for a
good conversational power is education, and, by this is meant, not merely the
matter you may store in your memory from observation or books, though this is
of vast importance, but it also includes the developing of the mental powers,
and, above all, the comprehension. An English writer says, “A man should be
able, in order to enter into conversation, to catch rapidly the meaning of
anything that is advanced; for instance, though you know nothing of science,
you should not be obliged to stare and be silent, when a man who does
understand it is explaining a new discovery or a new theory; though you have
not read a word of Blackstone, your comprehensive powers should be sufficiently
acute to enable you to take in the statement that may be made of a recent
cause; though you may not have read some particular book, you should be capable
of appreciating the criticism which you hear of it. Without such power—simple
enough, and easily attained by attention and practice, yet too seldom met with
in general society—a conversation which departs from the most ordinary topics
cannot be maintained without the risk of lapsing into a lecture; with such
power, society becomes instructive as well as amusing, and you have no remorse
at an evening’s end at having wasted three or four hours in profitless banter,
or simpering platitudes. This facility of comprehension often startles us in
some women, whose education we know to have been poor, and whose reading is
limited. If they did not rapidly receive your ideas, they could not, therefore,
be fit companions for intellectual men, and it is, perhaps, their consciousness
of a deficiency which leads them to pay the more attention to what you say. It
is this which makes married women so much more agreeable to men of thought than
young ladies, as a rule, can be, for they are accustomed to the society of a
husband, and the effort to be a companion to his mind has engrafted the habit
of attention and ready reply.”
conversational maxim. A beautiful thing about Grice’s conversational maxims is
that surely they do not ‘need to be necessarily’ independent, as Strawson and Wiggins
emphatically put it (p.520). The important thing is other. A conversational
maxim is UNIVERSALISABLE (v. universalierung) into a ‘manual,’ the “Immanuel,”
strictly, the “Conversational Immanuel.” Grice is making fun of those
‘conversational manuals’ for the learning of some European language in the
Grand Tour (as in “Learn Swiss in five easy lessons”). Grice is echoing Kant.
Maximen (subjektive Grundsätze): selbstgesetzte Handlungsregeln, die ein Wollen
ausdrücken, vs. Imperative (objektive Grundsätze): durch praktische Vernunft
bestimmt; Ratschläge, moralisch relevante Grundsätze. („das Gesetz aber ist das
objektive Prinzip, gültig für jedes vernünftige Wesen, und der Grundsatz, nach
dem es handeln soll, d. i. ein Imperativ.“) das Problem ist jedoch die
Subjektivität der Maxime. When considering Grice’s concept of a ‘conversational
maxim,’ one has to be careful. First, he hesitated as to the choice of the
label. He used ‘objective’ and ‘desideratum’ before. And while few cite this,
in WoW:PandCI he adds one – leading the number of maxims to ten, what he called
the ‘conversational catalogue.’ So when exploring the maxims, it is not
necessary to see their dependence on the four functions that Kant tabulated:
quantitas, qualitas, relatio, and modus, or quantity, quality, relation, and
mode (Grice follows Meiklejohn’s translation), but in terms of their own
formulation, one by one. Grice
formulates the overarching principle: “We might then formulate a rough general
principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe,
namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPEHATIVE PIUNCIPLE.”He
then goes on to introduce the concept of a ‘conversational maxim.’“On the
assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may
perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall
certain more specific MAXIMS maxims and
submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance
with the Cooperative Principle.” Note that in his
comparative “more specific maxims,” he is implicating that, in terms of the
force, the principle is a MAXIM. Had he not wanted this implicature, he could
have expressed it as: “On the assumption that some such general principle as
this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or
another of which will fall certain MAXIMS.”
He is
comparing the principle with the maxims in terms of ‘specificity.’ I.e. the
principle is the ‘summun genus,’ as it were, the category is the ‘inferior
genus,’ and the maxim is the ‘species infima.’He is having in mind something
like arbor porphyriana. For why otherwise care to distinguish in the
introductory passage, between ‘maxims and submaxims.’ This use of ‘submaxim’ is
very interesting. Because it is unique. He would rather call the four maxims as
SUPRA-maxims, supermaxim, or supramaxim. And leaving ‘maxim’ for what here he
is calling the submaxim.Note that if one challenges the ‘species infima,’ one
may proceed to distinguish this or that sub-sub-maxim falling under the maxim.
Take “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Since this, as he
grants, applies mainly to informative cases, one may consider that it is
actually a subsubmaxim. The submaxim would be: “Do not say that for which you
are not entitled” (alla Nowell-Smith). And then provide one subsubmaxim for the
desideratum: “Do not give an order which you are not entitled to give” or “Do
not order that for you lack adequate authority,” and the other subsubmaxim for
the creditum: “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”Grice: “Echoing
Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.” Or
Mode. “Manner” may be Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘mode.’ Consider the
exploration of Aristotle on ‘modus’ in Categoriae. It is such a mixed bag that
surely ‘manner’ is not inappropriate!“The category of QUANTITY” – i. e. either
the conversational category of quantity, or as one might prefer, the category
of conversational quantity – “relates to the quantity of information to be
provided,”So it’s not just ANY QUANTUM, as Aristotle or Kant, or Ariskant have it
– just QUANTITY OF INFORMATION, whatever ‘information’ is, and how the quantity
of information is to be assessed. E g. Grice surely shed doubts re: the pillar
box seems red and the pillar box is red. He had till now used ‘strength,’ even
‘logical strength,’ in terms of entailment – and here, neither the
phenomenalist nor the physicalist utterance entail the other.“and under it fall
the following maxims:”That is, he goes straight to the ‘conversational maxim.’
He will provide supermaxim for the other three conversational categories.Why is
the category of conversational quantity lacking a supermaxim?The reason is that
it would seem redundant and verbose: ‘be appropriately informative.’ By having
TWO maxims, he is playing with a weighing in, or balance between one maxim and
the other. Cf.To say the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth.No
more no less.One maximm states the ‘at most,’ the other maxim states the ‘at
least.’One maxim states the ‘maxi,’ the other maxim states the ‘min.’ Together
they state the ‘maximin.’First, “Make your contribution as informative as is
required (for the current purposes of the exchange).”It’s the contribution
which is informative, not the utterer. Cf. “Be as informative as is required.”
Grice implicates that if you make your contribution as informative as is
required YOU are being as informative as is required. But there is a
category-shift here. Grice means, ‘required BY the goal of the exchange).
e.g.How are youFine thanks – the ‘and you’ depends on whether you are willing
to ‘keep the conversation going’ or your general mood. Second, “Do not make
your contribution more informative than is required.”“ (The second maxim is
disputable;”He goes on to give a different reason. But the primary reason is
that “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required” is
ENTAILED by “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange)” – vide R. M. Hare on “Imperative inferences”
IN a diagram:Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange)Therefore, do not make your contribution more
informative than is required (by the current purposes of the exchange).Grice
gives another reason (he will give yet a further one) why the maxim is ‘disputable.’“it
might be said that to be overinformative is not a transgression of the CP but
merely a waste of time.”For both conversationalists, who are thereby abiding by
Ferraro’s law of the least conversational effort.”“A waste of time” relates to
Grice’s previous elaborations on ‘undue effort’ and ‘unnecessary trouble.’He is
proposing a conversational maximin.When he formulates his principle of economy
of rational effort, it is a waste of ‘time and energy.’Here it is just ‘time.’
“Energy” is a more generic concept.“However, it might be answered that such
overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side
issues;”Methinks the lady doth protest too much.His example, “He was in a
blacked out city.”It does not seem to relate to the pillar boxA: What color is
the pillar boxB: It seems red.Such a ‘confusion’ and ‘side issue,’ if so
designed, is part of the implicatum.“and there may also be an indirect effect,
in that the hearers (or addressee) may be misled as a result of thinking that
there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of information.”Cf.
Peter Winch on “H. P. Grice’s Conversational Point.”More boringly, it is part
of the utterer’s INTENTION to provide an excess of information.”This may be
counterproductive, or not.“Meet Mr. Puddle”“Meet Mr. Puddle, our man in
nineteenth-century continental philosophy.”The introducer point: to keep the
conversation going.Effect on Grice: Mr. Puddle is hopeless at
nineteenth-century continental philosophy (OR HE IS BEING UNDERDESCRIBED). One
has to think of philosophically relevant examples here, which is all that Grice
cares for. Malcolm says, “Moore knows it; because he’s seen it!” – Malcolm
implicates that Grice will not take Malcolm’s word. So Malcom needs to provide
the excess of information, and add, to his use of ‘know,’ which Malcolm claims
Moore does not know how to use, the ‘reason’ – If knowledge is justified true
belief, Malcolm is conveying explicitly that Moore knows and ONE OF THE
CONDITIONS for it. Cf.I didn’t know you were pregnant.You still do not. (Here
the cancellation is to the third clause). Grice: “However this may be, there is
perhaps a different [second] reason for doubt about the admission of this
second maxim, viz., that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which
concems relevance.)”He could be a lecturer. His use of ‘later’ entails he knows
in advance what he is going to say. Cf. Foucault:“there is another reason to
doubt. The effect is secured by a maxim concerning relevance.”No “later” about
it!Grice:“Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim” – he forgets to
add, as per obvious, “The category of quality relates to the QUALITY of
information.” In this way, there is some reference to Aristotle’s summumm
genus. PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Cf.
Apuleius and Boethius on QUALITAS of propositio. Dedicatio takes priority over
abdicatio. So one expects one’s co-conversationalist to say that something IS
the case. Note too, that, if he used “more specific maxims and submaxims,” he
means “more specific supermaxims and maxims” – He is following Porophyry in
being confusing! Cf. supramaxim. Grice “-'Try to make your contribution one
that is true' –“This surely requires generality – and Grice spent the next two
decades about it. He introduced the predicate ‘acceptability.’ “Try to make
your contribution one that is acceptable”“True for your statements; good for
your desiderative-mode utterances.”“and two more specific maxims:”“1. Do not say
what you believe to be false.”There is logic here. It is easy to TRY to make
your contribution one that is true.” And it is easy NOT to say what you believe
to be false. Grice is forbidding Kant to have a maxim on us: “Be truthful!”
“Say the true!” “MAKE – don’t just TRY – to make your contribution one that is
true.”“I was only trying.”Cf. Moses, “Try not to kill” “Thou shalt trye not to
kylle.”Grice:“2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”This is
involved with truth. In “Truth and other enigmas,” Dummett claims that truth
is, er, an enigma. For some philosophers, all you can guarantee is that you
have evidence. Lacking evidence for what?The qualification, “adequate,” turns
the maxim slightly otiose. Do not say that for you lack evidence which would
make your contribution not a true one.However, Grice is thinking Gettier. And
Gettier allows that one CAN have ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, and p NOT be true.If we are
talking ‘acceptability’ it’s more ‘ground’ or ‘reason’, rather than ‘evidential
justification.’ Grice is especially obsessed with this, in his explorations on
‘intending,’ where ‘acceptance’ is deemed even in the lack of ‘evidential
justification,’ and leaving him wondering what he means by ‘non-evidential
justification.’“Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, viz.,
'Be relevant.'”The category comes from Aristotle, ‘pros it.’ And ‘re-‘ in
relation is cognate with ‘re-‘ in ‘relevant.’RELATION refers to ‘refer,’ Roman
‘referre.’ But in Anglo-Norman, you do have ‘relate’ qua verb. To ‘refer’ or
‘re-late,’ is to bring y back to x. As Russell well knows in his fight with
Bradley’s theory of ‘relation,’ a relation involves x and y. A relation is a two-place
predicate. What about X = xIs identity a relation, in the case of x = x?Can a
thing relate to itself?In cases where we introduce two variables. The maxim
states that one brings y back to x.“Mrs. Smith is an old windbag.”“The weather
has been delightful for this time of year, hasn’t it.”If INTENDED to mean, “You
ARE ignorant!,” then the conversationalist IS bring back “totally otiose remark
about the weather” to the previous insulting comment.To utter an utterly
irrelevant second move you have to be Andre Breton.“Though the maxim itself is
terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good
deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may
be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact
that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the
treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them
in a later work.”He is having in mind Nowell-Smith, who had ‘be relevant’ as
the most important of the rules of conversational etiquette, or how etiquette becomes
logical. But Nowell-Smith felt overwhelmed by Grice and left for the north, to
settle in the very fashionable Kent. Grice is also having in mind Urmson’s
appositeness (Criteria of intensionality). “Why did you title your painting
“Maga’s Daughter”? She’s your wife!” – and Grice is also having in mind P. F.
Strawson and what Strawson has as the principle of relevance vis-à-vis the
principles of presumption of ignorance and knowledge.So it was in the Oxonian
air.“Finally, under the category of MODE, which I understand as relating not
(like the previous categories) to what is said [THE CONTENT, THE EXPLICITUM,
THE COMMUNICATUM, THE EXPLICATUM] but, rather, to HOW what is said is to be
said,”Grice says that ‘meaning’ is diaphanous. An utterer means that p reduces
to what an utterer means by x. This diaphanousness ‘meaning’ shares with
‘seeing.’ “To expand on the experience of seeing is just to expand on what is
seen.’He is having the form-content distinction.If that is a distinction. This
multi-layered dialectic displays the true nature of the speculative
form/content distinction: all content is form and all form is content, not in a
uniform way, but through being always more or less relatively indifferent or
posited. The Role of the Form/Content
Distinction in Hegel's Science of ...deontologistics.files.wordpress.com ›
2012/01 › formc... PDF Feedback About Featured Snippets Web results The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Researchwww.karger.com › Article › PDF The form-content distinction
is a potentially useful conceptual device for understanding certain
characteristics of moral development. In the most general sense it ... by CG
Levine - 1979 - Cited by 25 - Related articles The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Research ...www.karger.com › Article › Abstract Dec 23, 2009 - The
Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research. Levine C.G.. Author
affiliations. University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. by CG Levine - 1979
- Cited by 25 - Related articles Preschool
children's mastery of the form/content distinction in ...www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov ›
pubmed Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in
communicative tasks. Hedelin L(1), Hjelmquist E. Author information:
(1)Department of Psychology, ... by L Hedelin - 1998 - Cited by 10 - Related
articles Form and Content: An
Introduction to Formal Logic - Digital ...digitalcommons.conncoll.edu › cgi ›
viewcontentPDF terminology has to do with anything. In this context, 'material'
means having to do with content. This is our old friend, the form/content
distinction again. Consider. by DD Turner - 2020 Simmel's Dialectic of Form and Content in
Recent Work in ...www.tandfonline.com › doi › full May 1, 2019 - This suggests
that for Simmel, the form/content distinction was not a dualism; instead, it
was a duality.11 Ronald L. Breiger, “The Duality of ... Are these distinctions between “form” and
“content” intentionally ...www.reddit.com › askphilosophy › comments ›
are_th... The form/content distinction also doesn't quite fit the distinction
between form and matter (say, in Aristotle), although Hegel develops the
distinction between form ... Preschool
Children's Mastery of the Form/Content Distinction ...link.springer.com ›
article Preschoolers' mastery of the form/content distinction in language and
communication, along its contingency on the characteristics of p. by L Hedelin
- 1998 - Cited by 10 - Related articles
Verbal Art: A Philosophy of Literature and Literary Experiencebooks.google.com
› books Even if form and content were in fact inseparable in the sense
indicated, that would not make the form/content distinction unjustified. Form
and matter are clearly ... Anders Pettersson - 2001 - Literary Criticism One Century of Karl Jaspers' General
Psychopathologybooks.google.com › books He then outlines the most important
implications of the form–content distinction in a statement which is identical
in the first three editions, with only minor ... Giovanni Stanghellini, Thomas
Fuchs - 2013 - Medical“I include the supermaxim-'Be perspicuous' –” Or
supramaxim. So the “more specific maxims and submaxims” becomes the clumsier
“supermaxims and maxims”Note that in under the first category it is about
making your contribution, etc. Now it is the utterer himself who has to be
‘perspicuous,’ as it is the utterer who has to be relevant. It’s not the
weaker, “Make your contribution a perspicuous one.” Or “Make your contribution
a relevant one (to the purposes of the exchange).”Knowing that most confound
‘perspicacity’ with ‘perspicuity,’ he added “sic,” but forgot to pronounce it,
in case it was felt as insulting. He has another ‘sic’ under the prolixity
maxim.“and various maxims such as: The “such as” is a colloquialism.Surely it
was added in the ‘lecture’ format. In written, it becomes viz. The fact that
the numbers them makes for ‘such as’ rather disimplicatable. “1. Avoid
obscurity of expression.”Unless you are Heracleitus. THEY told me, Heraclitus,
they told me you were dead, /They
brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remember'd
how often you and I/Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the
sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey
ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales,
awake;/For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take. In a way this is
entailed by “Be perspicuous,” if that means ‘be clear,’ in obtuse English.Be
clearTherefore, or what is the same thing. Thou shalt not not be obscure.2.
Avoid ambiguity.”Except as a trope, or ‘figure, (schema, figura).
“Aequi-vocate, if that will please your clever addressee.” Cf. Parker’s zeugma:
“My apartment was so small, that I've barely enough room to lay a hat and a few
friends“3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”Here he added a ‘sic’ that
he failed to pronounce in case it may felt as insulting. But the idea of a
self-refuting conversational maxim is surely Griceian, in a quessertive way. Since
this concerns FORM rather than CONTENT, it is not meant to overlap with
‘informativeness.’So given that p and q are equally informative, if q is less
brief (longer – ars longa, vita brevis), utter p. This has nothing to do with
logical strength. It is just to be assessed in a SYNTACTICAL way.Vide
“Syntactics in Semiotics”“4. Be orderly.”This involves two moves in the
contribution or ‘turn.’ One cannot be ‘disorderly,’ if one just utters ‘p.’ So
this involves a molecular proposition. The ‘order’ can be of various types.
Indeed, one of Grice’s example is “Jones is between Smith and Williams” – order
of merit or size?‘Between’ is not ambiguous!There is LOGICAL order, which is
prior.But there is a more absolute use of ‘orderly.’ ‘keep your room tidy.’orderly
(adj.) 1570s, "arranged in order," from order (n.) + -ly (1). Meaning
"observant of rule or discipline, not unruly" is from 1590s. Related:
Orderliness.He does not in the lecture give a philosophical example, but later
will in revisiting the Urmson example and indeed Strawson, but mainly Urmson,
“He went to bed and took off his boots,” and indeed Ryle, “She felt frail and
took arsenic.”“And one might need others.”Regarding ‘mode,’ that is. “It is
obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency
than is the observance of others;”Not as per ‘moral’ demands, since he’ll say
these are not MORAL.“a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity
would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said something
he believes to be false.”Except in Oscar Wilde’s circle, where they were
obsessed with commenting on prolixities! Cf. Hare against Kant, “Where is the
prisoner?” “He left [while he is hiding in the attic].”That’s why Grice has the
‘in general.’“Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the
first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme of
the kind I am constructing;”But since ‘should’ is weak, I will. “other maxims
come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is
satisfied.”So the keyword is co-ordination.“While this may be correct, so far
as the generation of implicatures is concerned it seems to play a role not
totally different from the other maxims, and it will be convenient, for the
present at least, to treat it as a member of the list of maxims.”He is having
weighing, and clashing in mind. And he wants a conversationalist to honour
truth over informativeness, which begs the question that as he puts it, ‘false’
“information” is no information.In the earlier lectures, tutoring, or as a
university lecturer, he was sure that his tutee will know that he was
introducing maxims ONLY WITH THE PURPOSE, NEVER TO MORALISE, but as GENERATORS
of implicata – in philosophers’s mistakes.But this manoeuver is only NOW
disclosed. Those without a philosophical background may not realise about this.
“There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral
in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also normally observed by
participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional
implicatures.”He is obviously aware that Émile
DurkheimWill Know that ‘conversational’ is subsumed
under ‘social,’ if not Williamson (perhaps).
– keyword: ‘norm.’ Grice excludes ‘moral’ because while a moral maxim
makes a man ‘good,’ a conversational maxim makes a man a ‘good’
conversationalist. Not because there is a distinction in principle!“The
conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures connected
with them, are specially connected (I hope) with”He had this way with
idioms.Cf. Einstein,“E =, I hope, mc2.”“the particular purposes that talk (and
so, talk exchange)”He is playing Dutch.The English lost the Anglo-Saxon for
‘talk.’ They have ‘language,’ and the Hun has ‘Sprache.’ But only the Dutch
have ‘taal.’So he is distinguishing between the TOOL and the USE of the TOOL.“is
adapted lo serve and is primlarily employed to serve.”The ‘adapted’ is
mechanistic talk. He mentions ‘evolutionarily’ elsewhere. He means ‘the
particular goal language evolved to serve, viz.’ groom.Grooming, Gossip and the
Evolution of Language is a 1996 book by the anthropologist Robin Dunbar, in
which the author argues that language evolved from social grooming. He further
suggests that a stage of this evolution was the telling of gossip, an argument
supported by the observation that language is adapted for storytelling.
The book has been criticised on the grounds that since words are so cheap,
Dunbar's "vocal grooming" would fall short in amounting to an honest signal.
Further, the book provides no compelling story[citation needed] for how
meaningless vocal grooming sounds might become syntactical speech. Thesis
Dunbar argues that gossip does for group-living humans what manual grooming
does for other primates—it allows individuals to service their relationships
and thus maintain their alliances on the basis of the principle: if you scratch
my back, I'll scratch yours. Dunbar argues that as humans began living in
increasingly larger social groups, the task of manually grooming all one's
friends and acquaintances became so time-consuming as to be unaffordable.[1] In
response to this problem, Dunbar argues that humans invented 'a cheap and
ultra-efficient form of grooming'—vocal grooming. To keep allies happy, one now
needs only to 'groom' them with low-cost vocal sounds, servicing multiple
allies simultaneously while keeping both hands free for other tasks. Vocal
grooming then evolved gradually into vocal language—initially in the form of
'gossip'.[1] Dunbar's hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that the
structure of language shows adaptations to the function of narration in
general.[2] Criticism Critics of Dunbar's theory point out that the very
efficiency of "vocal grooming"—the fact that words are so cheap—would
have undermined its capacity to signal honest commitment of the kind conveyed
by time-consuming and costly manual grooming.[3] A further criticism is that
the theory does nothing to explain the crucial transition from vocal
grooming—the production of pleasing but meaningless sounds—to the cognitive
complexities of syntactical speech.[citation needed] References
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language.
London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 9780571173969. OCLC 34546743. von Heiseler,
Till Nikolaus (2014) Language evolved for storytelling in a super-fast
evolution. In: R. L. C. Cartmill, Eds. Evolution of Language. London: World
Scientific, pp. 114-121.
https://www.academia.edu/9648129/LANGUAGE_EVOLVED_FOR_STORYTELLING_IN_A_SUPER-FAST_EVOLUTION
Power, C. 1998. Old wives' tales: the gossip hypothesis and the reliability of
cheap signals. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert Kennedy and C. Knight (eds),
Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 111 29. Categories: 1996 non-fiction
booksAmerican non-fiction booksBooks by Robin DunbarEnglish-language
booksEvolution of languageHarvard University Press booksPopular science
booksGrice: “I have stated my maxims”the maxims“as if this purpose were a
maximally effective exchange of information;”“MAXIMALLY EFFECTIVE”“this
specification is, of course, too narrow,”But who cares?This is slightly sad in
that he is thinking Strawson and forgetting his (Grice’s) own controversy with
G. A. Paul on the sense-datum, for ‘the pillar box seems red’ and ‘the pillar
box is red,’ involving an intensional context, are less amenable to fall under
the maxims.“and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general
purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others.”He has a more
obvious way below:Giving and receving informationInfluencing and being
influenced by others.He never sees the purpose as MAXIMAL INFORMATION, but
maximally effective EXCHANGE of information – does he mean merely ‘transmission.’
It may well be.If I say, “I rain,” I have ex-changed information.I don’t need
anything in return.If so, it makes sense that he is equating INFORMING With INFLUENCING or better DIRECTION your
addresse’s talk.Note that, for all he loved introspection and conversational
avowals, and self-commands, these do not count.It’s informing your addressee
about some state of affairs, and directing his action. Grice is always clear
that the ULTIMATE GOAL is the utterer’s ACTION.“As one of my avowed aims is to
see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational,
behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions
connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in
the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges.”Transaction is a good
one.TRANS-ACTIO“I list briefly one such analog for each conversational
category.”While he uses ‘conversational category,’ he also applies it to the
second bit: ‘category of conversational quantity,’ ‘category of conversational
quality,’ ‘category of conversational relation,’ and ‘category of
conversational mode.’ But it is THIS application that justifies the
sub-specifications.They are not categories of thought or ontological or
‘expression’.His focus is on the category as conversation.His focus is on the
‘conversational category.’“1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car,
I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required; if, e.
g., at a particular stage I need fourscrews, I expect you to hand me four,
rather than two or six. He always passed six, since two will drop.“Make your
contribution neither more nor less informative than is required (for the
purposes of the exchange).”This would have covered the maxi and the min.“NEITHER
MORE NOR LESS” is the formula of effectiveness, and economy, and minimization
of expenditure.“2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not
spurious.”Here again he gives an expansion of the conversational category,
which is more general than ‘try to make your contribution one that is true,’
and the point about the ‘quality of information,’ which he did not make.Perhaps
because it would have led him to realise that ‘false’ information, i.e.
‘information’ which is not genuine and spurious, is not ‘information.’But “Make
your contribution one that is genuine and not spurious.”Be candid.Does not need
a generalization as it covers both informational and directive utterances.“If I
need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not
expect you to hand me salt;”Or you won’t eat the cake.“if I need a spoon, I do
not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”Spurious and genuine are different.In
the ‘trick spoon,’ the conversationalist is just not being SERIOUS.But surely a
maxim, “Be serious” is too serious. – Seriously!“3. Relation. I expect a
partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of
the transaction;”Odd that he would use ‘appropriate,’ which was the topic of
the “Prolegomena,” and what he was supposed to EXPLAIN, not to use in the
explanation.For each of the philosophers making a mistake are giving a judgment
of ‘appropriateness,’ conversational appropriateness. Here it is good that he
relativises the ‘appropriateness’ TO the ‘need’.Grice is not quite sticking to
the etymology of ‘relatio’ and ‘refer,’ bring y back to x. Or he is. Bring y
(your contribution) back to the need x.Odd that he thinks he’ll expand more on
relation, when he did a good bit!“if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do
not expect to be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might
be an appropriate contribution at a later stage).”“I just expect you to be
silent.”“4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is
making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch.” For Lewis,
clarity is not enough!The ‘Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch!’
seems quite different from “Be perspicuous.”“Execute your performance with
reasonable dispatch”Is more like“Execute your performance”And not just STAND
there!A: What time is it B just stands there“These analogies are relevant to
what I regard as a fundamental question about the principle of conversational
helpfulness and its attendant conversational maxims,”For Boethius, it is a
PRINCIPLE because it does not need an answer!“viz., what the basis is for the
assumption which we seem to make, and on which (I hope) it will appear that a
great range of implicatures depend [especially as we keep on EXPLOITING the
rather otiose maxims], that talkers will ingeneral (ceteris paribus and in the
absence of indications to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these
principles prescribe.”Grice really doesn’t care! He is into the EXPLOITING of
the maxim, as in his response to the Scots philosopher G. A. Paul:“Paul, I
surely do not mean to imply that you may end up believing that I have a doubt
about the pillar box being red: it seems red to me, as I have this sense-datum
of ‘redness’ which attaches to me as I am standing in front of the pillar box
in clear daylight.”Grice is EXPLOITING the desideratum, YET STILL SAYING
SOMETHING TRUE, so at least he is not VIOLATING the principle of conversational
helpfulness, or the category of conversational quality, or the desideratum of
conversational candour.And that is what he is concerned with. “A dull but, no doubt at a certain level,
adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that *people*
(not pirots, although perhaps Oxonians, rather than from Malagasy) DO behave in
these ways;”Elinor Ochs was terrified Grice’s maxims are violated – never
exploited, she thought – in Madagascar.“they, i. e. people, or Oxonians, have
learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed,
it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the
habit. It is much easier, for example, to tell the truth than to invent lies.”Effort
again; least effort. And ease. Great Griceian guidelines!“I am, however, enough
of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts,”OR
EXPLAIN.“undeniable though they may be;”BEIGIN OF A THEORY FOR A THEORY – not
the theory for the generation of implicate, but for the theory of conversation.He
is less interested in this than the other. “I would like to be able to think of
the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all
or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to
follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea that
observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness and the conversational
maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter,
with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am
struggling with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation
that you will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my
expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of
indications that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges
seemed to me to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly
distinguish cooperative transactions:”So how is this not
quasi-contractual? He is listing THIS OR
THAT FEATURE that jointly distinguishes a cooperative transaction – all grand
great words.But he wants to say that ‘quasi-contractual’ is NO RATIONAL!He is
playing, as a philosopher, with the very important point of what follows from
what.A1. Conversasation is purposiveA2. Conversation is rationalA3. Conversation
is cooperativeA4. There is such a thing as non-rational cooperation (is there?)So
he is aiming at the fact that the FEATURES that jointly distinguish cooperative
transactions NEED NOT BE PRESENT, and Grice surely does not wish THAT to
demolish his model. If he bases it in general constraints of rationality, the
better.“1. The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car
mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in
conflict-each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the
other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even
if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one,”Is he being logical?“second-order
predicate calculus”“meta-language”He means higher or supervenientOr
‘operative’“, that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with
the transitory conversational interests of the other.”By identify he means
assume.YOU HAVE TO DESIRE what your partner desires.The intersection between your
desirability and your addressee’s desirability is not NULL.And the way to do
this is conditionalIF: You perceive B has Goal G, you assume Goal G. “2. The
contributions of the participants .should be dovetailed, mutually dependent. Unless
it’s one of those seminars by Grice and J. F. Thomson!“3. There is some sort of
understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit)”i.e. implicated
rather than explicated – part of the implicatum, or implicitum, rather than the
explicatum or explicitum.“that, other things being equal, the transaction
should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it
should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else.”This
is especially tricky over the phone (“He never ends!” Or in psychiatric
interviews!)Note that ‘starting doing something else’ may work. E. g. watch
your watch!“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to
some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter
writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.”TWO OPPOSITE EXAMPLES.Fighting is
arguing is competition, adversarial, epagogue, not conversation,
cooperation, friendly, collaborative
venture, and diagoge.Letter writing is usually otiose – “what, with the
tellyphone!” And letter writing is no conversation.“In any case, one feels that
the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience
but himself.”And the talker who is mendacious has primarily let Kant down!”“So
I would like t< be able to show that observance of the principle of
conversational helfpulness and maxims is reasonal de (rational) along the
following lines”That any Aristkantian rationalist would agree to.“: that any
one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption
that they are conducted in general accordance with the principle of
conversational helpfulness and the maxims.”Where the keyword is: profit,
effort, least effort, no energy, no undue effort, no unnecessary trouble. That
conversation is reasonable unless it is unreasonable. That a conversational
exchange should be rational unless it shows features of irrationality.“Whether
any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain;”It’s not clear what the
premises are!Plus, he means DEDUCTIVELY reached? Transcendentally reached?
Empirically reached? Philosophically reached? Conclusively reached? Etc.It
seems the conclusion need not be reached, because we never departed from the
state of the affairs that the conclusion describes.“in any case, I am fairly
sure that I cannot reach it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of
relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”For perhaps “I
don’t want to imply any doubt, but that pillar box seems red.”IS irrelevant,
yet true!“It is now time to show the connection between the principle of
conversational helfpulness and the conversational maxims, on the one hand, and
conversational implicature on the other.”This is clearer in the seminars. The
whole thing was a preamble “A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill
a maxim in various ways, which include the following: 1. He may quietly and unostentatiously
VIOLATE (or fail to observe) a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be liable to
mislead.”And be blamed by Kant.Mislead should not worry Grice, cf. “Misleading,
but true.”The violate (or fail to observe) shows that (1) covers two
specifications. Tom may be unaware that there was such a maxim as to ‘be brief,
avoid unnecessary prolixity, unless you need to eschew obfuscation!”This is
Grice’s anti-Ryleism. He doesn’t want to say that there is KNOWLEDGE of the
maxims. For one may know what the maxims are and fail to observe them “2. He
may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxim and of the principle of
conversational helpfulness; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain
that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, e.
g., I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.” Where is the criminal?I cannot say
more; my lips are sealed.I shall unseal them. What do you mean ‘cannot.’ You
don’t mean ‘may not,’ do you?I think Grice means ‘may not.’Is the universe
finite? Einstein: I cannot say more; my lips are sealed. “3. He may be faced by
a CLASH of maxims [That’s why he needs more than one – or at least two
specifications of the same maxim]: He may be unable, e. g., to fulfill the
first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating
the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say).” Odd
that he doesn’t think this generates implicature: He has obviously studied the
sub-perceptualities here.For usually, a phenomenalist, like Sextus, thinks that
by utteringThe pillar box seems red to me – that is all I have adequate
evidence forHe is conveying that he is unable to answer the question (“What colour
is the pillar box?”) And being as ‘informative’ as is requiredWithout saying
something for which it is not the case that he has or will ever have adequate
evidence.Cf.Student at Koenigsberg to Kant: What’s the noumenon?Kant: My lips
are sealed.It may require some research to list ALL CLASHES.Because each clash
shows some EVALUATION qua reasoning, and it may be all VERY CETERIS
PARIBUS.Cf.Where is the criminal?My lips are sealed.The utterer has NOT opted
out. He has answered, via implicature, that he is not telling. He is being
relevant. He is not telling because he doesn’t want to DISCLOSE the whereabouts
of the alleged criminal, etc. For Kant, this is not a conversation! Odd that
Grice is ‘echoing Kant,’ where Kant would hardly allow a clash with ‘Be truthful!’“4.
He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY fail to fulfill (or observe)
it.Mock? Taunt?The magic flute. Grice’s magic flute.flout (v.) "treat with
disdain or contempt" (transitive), 1550s, intransitive sense "mock,
jeer, scoff" is from 1570s; of uncertain origin; perhaps a special use of
Middle English “flowten,”"to play the flute" (compare Middle Dutch
“fluyten,” "to play the flute," also "to jeer"). Related:
Flouted; flouting.Grice: “One thing we do not know is if the flute came to
England via Holland.”“Or he may, as we may say, ‘play the flute’ with a maxim,
expecting others to be agreeable.”“Or he may, as we might say, ‘play the flute’
with the conversational maxim, expecting others to join with some other musical
instrument – or something – occasionally the same.”“On the assumption that the
speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without violating another
maxim (because oi a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of the
blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead,”This is interesting. It’s the
TRYING to mislead.Grice and G. A. Paul:Grice cannot be claimed to have TRIED to
mislead, and thus deemed to have misled G. A. Paul, even if he had, when he
said, “I hardly think there is any doubt about it, but that pillar box seems
red to me.”“the hearer is faced with a minor problem:”Implicature: This
reasoning is all abductive – to the ‘best’ explanation“How can his saying what
he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall
principle of conversational helfpulness?”This was one of Grice’s conversations
with G. A. Paul:Paul (to Grice): This is what I do not understand, Grice. How
can your saying what you did say be reconciled with the supposition that you
are not going to mislead me?”Unfortunately, on that Saturday, Paul went to the
Irish Sea. Grice “This situation is one that characteristically”There are
others – vide clash, above – but not marked by Grice as one such situation – “gives
rise to a conversational implicature; and when a conversational implicature is
generated”Chomskyan jargon borrowed from Austin (“I don’t see why Austin
admired Chomsky so!”)“in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being
EXPLOITED.”Why not ‘flouted’? Some liked the idea of playing the flute.EXPLOIT
is figurative.Grice exploits a Griceian maxim.exploit
(v.) c. 1400, espleiten, esploiten "to accomplish, achieve, fulfill,"
from Old French esploitier, espleiter "carry out, perform,
accomplish," from esploit (see exploit (n.)). The sense of "use
selfishly" first recorded 1838, from a sense development in French perhaps
from use of the word with reference to mines, etc. (compare exploitation).
Related: Exploited; exploiting.exploit (n.) late 14c., "outcome of an
action," from Old French esploit "a carrying out; achievement,
result; gain, advantage" (12c., Modern French exploit), a very common
word, used in senses of "action, deed, profit, achievement," from
Latin explicitum "a thing settled, ended, or displayed," noun use of
neuter of explicitus, past participle of explicare "unfold, unroll,
disentangle," from ex "out" (see ex-) + plicare "to
fold" (from PIE root *plek- "to plait"). Meaning
"feat, achievement" is c. 1400. Sense evolution is from "unfolding"
to "bringing out" to "having advantage" to
"achievement." Related: Exploits. exploitative (adj.)
"serving for or used in exploitation," 1882, from French exploitatif,
from exploit (see exploit (n.)). Alternative exploitive (by 1859) appears to be
a native formation from exploit + -ive.exploitation (n.) 1803, "productive
working" of something, a positive word among those who used it first,
though regarded as a Gallicism, from French exploitation, noun of action from
exploiter (see exploit (v.)). Bad sense developed 1830s-50s, in part from
influence of French socialist writings (especially Saint Simon), also perhaps
influenced by use of the word in U.S. anti-slavery writing; and exploitation
was hurled in insult at activities it once had crowned as praise. It
follows from this science [conceived by Saint Simon] that the tendency of the
human race is from a state of antagonism to that of an universal peaceful
association -- from the dominating influence of the military spirit to that of
the industriel one; from what they call l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme to
the exploitation of the globe by industry. ["Quarterly Review," April
& July 1831]
Grice: “I am now in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicature.”Not
to provide a reductive analysis. The concept is too dear for me to torture it with
one of my metaphysical routines.”“A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as
if to say) that p”That seems good for the analysandumGrice loves the “by (in,
when)” “(or making as if to). Note the oratio obliqua.Or ‘that’-clause. So this
is not ‘uttering’As in the analysans of ‘meaning that.’“By uttering ‘x’ U means
that p.’The “by” already involves a clause with a ‘that’-clause.So this is not
a report of a physical event.It is a report embued already with intentionality.The
utterer is not just ‘uttering’The utterer is EXPLICITLY conveying that p.We
cannot say MEANING that p.Because Grice uses “mean” as opposed to “explicitly
convey”His borderline scenarios are such,“Keep me company, dear”“If we are to
say that when he uttererd that he means that his wife was to keep him company
or not is all that will count for me to change my definition of ‘mean’ or
not.”Also irony.But here it is more complicated. A man utters, “Grice defeated
Strawson”If he means it ironically, to mean that Strawson defeated Grice, it is
not the case that the utterer MEANT the opposite. He explicitly conveyed that.Grice
considers the Kantian ‘cause and effect,’“If I am dead, I shall have no time
for reading.”He is careful here that the utterer does not explicitly conveys
that he will have no time for reading – because it’s conditioned on he being
dead.“has implicated that q,” “may be said to have conversationally implicated
that q,”So this is a specification alla arbor porphyrana of ‘By explicitly
conveying that p, U implicitly conveys that q.’Where he is adding the second-order
adverb, ‘conversationally.’By explicitly conveying that p, U has implicitly
conveyed that q in a CONVERSATIONAL FASHION” iff or if“PROVIDED THAT”“(1) he is
to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the principle
of conversational helfpulness;”Especially AT LEAST, because he just said that
an implicatum is ‘generated’ (Chomskyan jargon) when AT LEAST A MAXIM IS played the flute.“(2) the
supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to
make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE terms)
consistent with this presumption;”THIS IS THE CRUCIAL CLAUSE – and the one that
not only requires ONE’S RATIONALITY, but the expectation that one’s addressee,
BEING RATIONAL, will expect the utterer to BE RATIONAL.This is the
‘rationalisation’ he refers to in “Retrospective Epilogue.”Note that ‘q’ is
obviously now the content of a state in the utterer’s soul – a desideratum or a
creditum --, at least a CREDITUM, in view of Grice’s view of everything at
least exhibitive and perhaps protreptic --“and (3) the speaker thinks (and
would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the
competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition
mentioned in (2) IS required.”All that jargon about mutuality is a result of
Strawson tutoring Schiffer!“Apply this to my initial example, to B's remark that
C has not yet been to prison.”What made Grice think of such a convoluted example?He
was laughing at Searle for providing non-philosophical examples, and there he
is!“In a suitable setting A might reason as follows:”“(1) B has APPARENTLY
violated – indeed he has played the flute with -- the maxim 'Be relevant' and
so may be regarded as [ALSO] having flouted one of the maxims conjoining
perspicuity,”In previous versions, under the desideratum of conversational
clarity Grice had it that the desideratum included the expectation of this
‘relatedness’ AND that of ‘perspicuity’ (sic). In the above, Grice is stating
that if you are irrelevant (or provide an unrelated contribution) you are not
being perspicuous.But “He hasn’t been to prison” is perspicuous enough.And so is
the link to the question --.Plus, wasn’t perspicuity only to apply to the
‘mode,’ to the ‘form,’ rather than the content.Here it is surely the CONTENT –
that it is not the case that C is a criminal – that triggers it all.So, since
there is a “not,” here this is parallel to the example examined by Strawson in
the footnote to “Logical Theory.”The utterer is saying that it is not the case
that C has been in prison yet.The ‘yet’ makes all the difference, even if a Fregeian
colouring ‘convention’!“It is not the case that C has been in prison” Is, admittedly,
not very perspicuous.“So what, neither has the utterer nor the addressee.”So
there is an equivocation here as to the utterance perhaps not being
perspicuous, while the utterer IS perspicuous.“yet I have no reason to suppose
that he is opting out from the operation of the CP;”Or playing the flute with
my beloved principle of conversational helpfulness.“(2) given the
circumstances, I can regard his irrelevance as only apparent – as when we say
that a plastic flower is not a flower, or to use Austin’s example, “That decoy
duck is surely not a duck! That trick rubber spoon is no spoon! -- if, and only
if, I suppose him to think that C is potentially dishonest;”As many are!The
potentially is the trick.Recall Aristotle: “Will I say that I am potentially
dishonest?! Not me! PLATO was! Theophrastus WILL! Or is it ‘shall’?”“(3) B
knows that I am capable of working out step (2). So B implicates that C is
potentially dishonest.'”Unless he goes on like I go with G. A. Paul, “I do not
mean of course to mean that I mean that he is potentially dishonest, because
although he is, he shouldn’t, or rather, I don’t think you are expecting me to
convey explicitly that he shouln’t or should for that matter.”“The presence of
a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for even if
it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by
an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a
CONVERSATIONAL implicature.”This is the Humpty Dumpty in Grice.Cf. Provide the
sixteen derivational steps in Jane Austen’s Novel remark, “I sense and
sensibilia” – This is what happens sometimes when people who are not philosophers
engage with Grice!For a philosopher, it is clear Grice is not being serious
there. He is mocking an ‘ideal’-language philosopher (as Waissmann called
them). Let’s revise the word:By “counting” he means “DEEM.” He has said that
“She is poor, but she is honest,” is NOT CALCULABLE. So if an argument is not
produced, this may not be a matter of argument.Philosophers are OBSESSED, and
this is Grice’s trick, with ARGUMENT. Recall Grice on Hardie, “Unlike my
father, who was rather blunt, Hardie taught me to ARGUE for this or that
reason.”His mention of “INTUITION” is not perspicuous. He told J. M. Rountree
that meaning is a matter of INTUITION, not a theoretical concept within a
theory.So it’s not like Grice does not trust the intuition. So the point is
TERMINOLOGICAL and methodological. Terminological, in that this is a
specfification of ‘conversationally,’ rather than for cases like “How rude!”
(he just flouted the maxim ‘be polite!’ but ‘be polite’ is not a CONVERSATIONAL
maxim. Is Grice implicating that nonconversational nonconventional implicate
are not calculable? We don’t think so.But he might.I think he will. Because in
the case of ‘aesthetic maxim,’ ‘moral maxim,’ and ‘social maxim’ – such as “be
polite,” – the calculation may involve such degree of gradation that you better
not get Grice started!“it will be a CONVENTIONAL implicature.”OK – So perhaps
he does allow that non-conventional non-conversational implicate ARE
calculable.But he may add:“Unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument,
it will not be a conversational implicature; it will be a conventional
implicature.”Strawson: “And what nonconventional nonconversational implicate?Grice:
You are right, Strawon. Let me modify and refine the point: “It will be a dull,
boring, undetachable, conventional implicatum – OR any of those dull implicate
that follow from (or result – I won’t use ‘generate’) one of those maxims that
I have explicitly said they were NOT conversational maxims.“For surely, there
is something very ‘contradictory-sounding’ to me saying that the implicatum is
involved with the flouting of a maxim which is NOT a conversational maxim, and
yet that the maxim is a CONVERSATIONAL implicature.”“Therefore, I restrict
calculability to CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE, because it involves the
conversational maxims that contributors are expected to be reciprocal; whereas
you’ll agree that Queen Victoria does not need to be abide with ‘be polite,’ as
she frequently did not – “We are not amused, you fools! Only Gilbert and
Sullivan amuse me!””“To work out that a particular CONVERSATIONAL [never mind
nonconversational nonconventional] implicature is present, the hearer will
reply on the following data:”As opposed to ‘sense-datum.’Perhaps assumption,
alla Gettier, is better:“ (1) the conventional meaning of the words used,
together with the identity of any references that may be involved;”WoW Quite a
Bit. This is the reason why Grice entitled WoW his first book.In he hasn’t been
to ‘prison’ we are not using ‘prison’ as Witters does (“My language is my
prison”).Strawson: But is that the CONVENTIONAL meaning? Even for King Alfred?He hasn't been to prisonprison (n.) early 12c., from Old
French prisoun "captivity, imprisonment; prison; prisoner, captive"
(11c., Modern French prison), altered (by influence of pris "taken;"
see prize (n.2)) from earlier preson, from Vulgar Latin *presionem, from Latin
prensionem (nominative prensio), shortening of prehensionem (nominative
*prehensio) "a taking," noun of action from past participle stem of
prehendere "to take" (from prae- "before," see pre-, +
-hendere, from PIE root *ghend- "to seize, take"). "Captivity,"
hence by extension "a place for captives," the MAIN modern sense.”
(There are 34 other unmain ones). He hasn't been to a place for captives
yet.You mean he is one.Cf. He hasn't been to asylum.You mean Foucault?(2) the principle
of conversational helpfulness and this and that conversational maxim;”This is
more crucial seeing that the utterer may utter something which has no
conventional meaning?Cf. Austin, “Don’t ask for the meaning of a word! Less so
for the ‘conventional’ one!”What Grice needs is ‘the letter,’ so he can have
the ‘spirit’ as the implicatum. Or he needs the lines, so he can have the
implicatum as a reading ‘between the lines.’If the utterance is a gesture, like
showing a bandaged leg, or a Neapolitan rude gesture, it is difficult to
distinguish or to identify what is EXPLICITLY conveyed.By showing his bandaged
leg, U EXPLICITLY conveys that he has a bandaged leg. And IMPLICITLY conveys
that he cannot really play cricket.The requirement of ‘denotatum’ is even
tricker, “Swans are beautiful.” Denotata? Quantificational? Substitutional?In
any case, Grice is not being circular in requiring that the addressee should
use as an assumption or datum that U thinks that the expression E is generally
uttered by utterers when they m-intend that p.But there are tricks here.“(3)
the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;”Cf. Grice, “Is there a
general context for a general theory of context?”“(4) other items of background
knowledge;”So you don’t get:How is C getting on at the bank? My lips are sealed
Why do you care Mind your own business. Note that “he hasn’t been to prison
yet” (meaning the tautologous ‘he is potentially dishonest’) is the sort of
tricky answer to a tricky question! In asking, the asker KNOWS that he’ll get
that sort of reply knowing the utterer as he does. “and (5) the fact (or
supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are
available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be
the case.”This is Schiffer reported by Strawson.“A general pattern for the
working out of a conversational implicature might be given as follows:”Again
the abductive argument that any tutee worth of Hardie might expect 'He has said
that p;”Ie explicitly conveys that p.Note the essential oratio obliqua, or
that-clause.“there is no reason to suppose. that he is not observing the
maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness”That is, he is
not a prisoner of war, or anything.“He could not be doing this unless he
thought that q;”Or rather, even if more tautologically still, he could not be
doing so REASONABLY, as Austin would forbid, unless…’ For if the utterer is
IRRATIONAL (or always playing the flute) surely he CAN do it!“he knows (and
knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he
thinks that q IS required;”Assumed MUTUAL RATIONALITY, which Grice fails to
have added as assumption or datum. Cf. paraconsistent logics – “he is using
‘and’ and ‘or’ in a ‘deviant’ logical way, to echo Quine,” – He is an intuitionist,
his name is Dummett.“he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends
me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has
implicated that q.'”The ‘or’ is delightful, for m-intention requires
‘intention,’ but the intention figures in previous positions, so ‘willingess to
allow the addressee to think’ does PERFECTLY FINE! Especially at Oxford where
we are ever so subtle!
conversational
point:
Grice distinguishes between ‘point’ and ‘conversational point.’ “What’s the
good of being quoted by another philosopher on the point of ‘point.’?” But that
is what Winch does. So, as a revenge, Grice elaborated on the point. P. London-born philosopher. He quotes Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s
point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of
one’s remarks – Grice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any
desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t
hesitate to say that it seems red to me” – Surely pointless, but an incredible
truth meant to refute G. A. Paul
conversational reason. With ‘reason,’ Grice is following Ariskant. There’s the
‘ratio’ and there’s the “Vernunft.” “To converse” can mean to have sex (cf.
know) so one has to be careful. Grice is using ‘conversational’ casually.
First, he was aware of the different qualifications for ‘implication’. There is
Nowell-Smith’s contextual implication and C. K. Grant’s ‘pragmatic
implication.’ So he chose ‘conversational implication’ himself. Later, when
narrowing down the notion, he distinguished between ‘conversational
implication’ and ‘non-conversational implication’: “Thank you. B: You’re
welcome.” If B is following the maxim, ‘be polite,’ the implication that he is
pleased he was able to assist his emissor is IMPLICATED but not
conversationally so. It is not a ‘conversational implication.’ Grice needs to
restrict the notion for philosophical purposes. Both for the framework of his
theory (it is easier to justify transcendentally conversational implication
than it is non-conversational implication). Note that ‘I am pleased I was able
to assist’ is CANCELLABLE or defeatible, so that’s not the issue. In any case,
both ‘conversational impication’ and these type of calculable
‘non-conversational’ implication still yielding from some ‘maxim’ (such as ‘be
polite’) Grice covers under the generic “non-conventional” precisely because
they can be defeated. When it comes to NON-DEFEASIBLE implicata, Grice uses
‘conventional implication’ (as in “She was poor but she was honest.”). Grice
did not find these fun. And it shows. Strawson stuck with them, but his
philosophising about them ain’t precisely ‘fun.’ Used in Retrospective, p. 369.
Also: conversational rationality. Surely, “principle of conversational
rationality” sounds otiose. Expectation of mutual rationality sounds better.
Critique of conversational reason sounds best! Grice is careful here. When he
provides a reductive analysis of ‘reasoning,’ this goes as follows: the
reasoner reasons from premise to conclusion. That’s the analysandum. What’s the
analysans? At least it involves TWO clauses: If the reasoner reasons from
premise to conclusion, it is assumed that he BELIEVES that the premise obtains;
and he believes that the conclusion obtains. This has to be generalised to
cover the desiderative, using ‘accept.’ He accepts that the premise obtains,
and he accepts that the conclusion obtains. But there is obviously a SECOND
condition: that the conclusion follows from the premise! He uses ‘demonstrably’
for that, or the demonstratum.’ He is open as to what kind of yielding is
involved because he wants to allow for inductive reasoning and abductive
reasoning, not just deductive reasoning. AND THERE IS A TYPICALLY GRICEIAN
third condition, involving CAUSATION. He had used ‘cause’ in reductive analyses
before – if not so much in ‘meaning,’ due to Urmson’s counterexample involving
‘bribery,’ where ‘cause’ does not seem to do – but in his analysis of
‘intending’ for the British Academy. So at Oxford he promotes this THIRD causal
condition as involving that, naturally enough, it is the rasoner’s BELIEF that
demonstrably q follows from p, which CAUSES the reasoner TO BELIEVE (or more
generally, accept) that the conclusion obtains. Grice is happy with that belief
in the validity of the demonstration ‘populates’ the world of alethic beliefs,
and does not concern with generalising that into a generic ‘acceptance.’ The
word ‘rationalist’ is anathema at Oxford, because tutor after tutor has
brainwashed their tutees that the distinction is ‘empiricst-rationalist’ and
that at Oxford we are ‘empiricists.’ So Grice is really being ‘heretic’ here in
the words of G. P. Baker. demonstratum: The Eng. word
“reason” and the Fr. word “raison” are
both formed on the basis of Roman “reor,” to count or calculate, whence think,
believe. The Roman verb translates the Grecian “λέγειν,” two of whose principal
meanings it retains, but only two: count and think. The third principal meaning
of the Grecian term, speak, discourse, which designates a third type of putting
into relation and proportion, is rendered by other Roman series: “dicere”
(originally cognate with ‘deixis,’ and so not necessarily ‘verbal’), “loquor,”
“orationem habere” (the most ‘vocal’ one, as it relates to the ‘mouth,’ cf.
‘orality’) or “sermonem habere,” so that ultimately the Grecian λόγος is
approached by Roman philosophers by means of a syntagm, “ratio et oratio,”
reason and discourse. Each vernacular fragments the meaning of logos into a
greater or lesser. Cf. ‘principium reddendae rationis.’ Rationality functions
as a principle of the intelligibility of the world and history, particularly in
Hegel. Then there’s The Partitions of Reason and Semantic diffractions.
Although there is no language that retains under a single word all the meanings
of logos except by bringing logos into the language in question, the
distribution of these meanings is more or less close to Roman. For the
classical Fr. word “raison,” which
maintains almost all the Roman meanings including the mathematical sense of
proportion, as in “raison d’une série,” or “raison inverse,” a contemporary Fr.
-G. dictionary proposes the following
terms: Vernunft, Verstand rational faculty. This example shows that the whole
of the vocabulary is thus mobilized. Reason and faculties We can distinguish
between two interfering systems. The first designates reason, identified with
thought in general, in its relationship to a bodily and/or mental instance. The
second situates reason in a hierarchy of faculties whose organization it
determines. Regarding the first system, as it is expressed in various
languages, where one will find studies of the main distortions, especially
around the expressions of the Roman ‘anima.’ Philosophers especially emphasize
the ways of designating reason and mind that appear to be the most irreducible
from one language to another. Regarding the second system, and the partitions
that do not coincide. For Grice, ‘to understand’ presupposes ‘rationality – not
for Kant, who sticks with Verstand/Vernunft distinction. Ratio speculatum,
praticatum. From Aristotle to Kant, two great domains of rationality have been
distinguished: theory, or speculative reason, and practice. The lurality of
meanings, each represented by one or more specific words. The first question,
from the point of view of the difference of languages, is thus that of the
breadth of the meaning of “reason” or its equivalents, and of the systems
diffracting the meanings of logos and then of ratio. But another complex of
problems immediately arises. The Roman “ratio” absorbs the meanings of other
Grecian terms, such as νοῦς and διάνοια, which are also translated in other,
more technical ways, such as intellectus; so that reason, in the sense of
rationality, is a comprehensive term, whereas ‘reason’ in the sense of
intellect or understanding is a singular and differentiated faculty. However,
none of the comprehensive terms or systems of opposition coincides with those
of another language, which are moreover changing. Then there’s Reason and
Rationality: man, animal, god. Since Aristotle’s definition of man as an animal
endowed with logos, which Roman writers rendered by “animal rationale” —
omitting the discursive dimension—reason, or the logos, is a specific
difference that defines man by his difference from other living beings and/or
his participation in a divine or cosmic nature. Reason is opposed to madness
understood as de-mentia. More broadly, reason is conceived in terms of
difference from what does not belong to its domain and falls outside its
immediate law, but which man may, in certain ways, share with other animals,
such as sensation, passion, imagination, and possibly memory. Rationality and
the principle of intelligibility. Rationality, defined by the logos, is
connected with logic as the art of speaking and thinking, and with its founding
principles. Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept. Ed. by M. de Wulf and J. Hoffmans. Louvain,
Belg.: Institut supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 191 Hegel, Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Phil.
of Right. Tr. H. Nisbet and
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London: Allen and Unwin, . . Werke. Ed.
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co-operatum: Grice is obsessed with this idea that ‘co-operation’ need
not just be ‘conversational.’ Indeed, his way to justify a ‘rationalist’
approach is through analogy. If he can find ‘co-operative’ traits in behaviour
other than ‘conversational,’ the greater the chance to generalise, and thus
justify. The co-operation would be self-justifying. co-operation. The hyphen in
Strawson and Wiggins (p. 520). Grice found ‘co-operative’ too Marxist, and
would prefer ‘help,’ as in ‘mutual help.’ This element of ‘mutuality’ is
necessary. And it is marked grammatical, with the FIRST person and the SECOND
person. The third need NOT be a person – can be a dog (as in “Fido is shaggy”).
The mututality is necessary in that the emissor’s intention involves the belief
that his recipient is rational. You cannot co-operate with a rock. You cannot
co-operate with a vegetal. You cannot cooperate with a non-rational animal. You
can ONLY cooperate with a co-rational agent. Animal co-operation poses a nice
side to the Griceian idea. Surely the stereotype is a member of species S
cooperating with another specimen of the same species. But then there are great
examples of ‘sym-biosis’: the crane that gets rid off the hippopotamus’s ticks.
Is this cooperation? Is this intentional? If Grice thinks that there is a
‘mechanistically derivable’ explanation,, it isn’t. He did not necessarily buy
‘bio-sociological’ approaches. Which was a problem, because we don’t have much
philosophical seriouis discourse on ‘cooperation’ at the general level Grice is
aiming at. Except in ethics, which is biased. So it is no wonder that Grice had
to rely on ‘meta-ethics’ to even conceptualise the field of cooperation: the
maximin becomes a balance between a principle of conversational egoism and a
principle of conversational altruism. He later found the egoism-tag as
‘understood.’ And his ‘altruism’ became ‘helpfulness,’ became ‘benevolence,’
and became ‘co-operation.’
copulatum: It was an Oxonian exercise to trace the ‘copula.’ “I’ve
been working like a dog, should be sleeping like a log.” Where is the copula:
Lennon is a dog-like worker – Lennon is a potential log-like sleeper.” Grice
uses ‘copula’ in PPQ. The term is
sometimes used ambiguously, for ‘conjunctum.’ A conjunctive is called a
copulative. But Grice obviously narrows down the use of copulatum to izz and
hazz. He is having in mind Strawson.The formula does not allow for differences
in tense and grammatical number; nor for the enormous class of * all
'-sentences which do not contain, as their main verb, the verb * to be '. We
might try to recast the sentences so that they at least fitted into one of the
two patterns * All x is y ' or ' All x are y ' ; but the results would be, as
English, often clumsy andt sometimes absurd. for Aristotle, 'Socrates is a man'
is true "in virtue of his being that thing which constitutes existing for
him (being which constitutes his mode of existence)," Hermann Weidemann,
"In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Predication," p. 84— only so
long as that "being" be taken as an assertion of being per se. But
Weidemann wants to take it merely copulatively. In "Prädikation," p.
1196, he says that when 'is' is used as tertium adiacens it has no meaning by
itself, but merely signifies the connection of subject and predicate. Cf. his
"Aristoteles über das isolierte Aussagenwort," p. 154. H. P. Grice,
"Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being," also rejects an existential
reading of tertium adiacens and pushes for a copulative one. Cf. Alan Code,
"Aristotle: Essence and Accident," pp. 414-7. Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation
between predicates of one subject, but with variation between essential (per
se)predications upon different (indeed categorially different) subjects (such ...eads
me to wonder whether Aristotle may be maintaining not only that the copula exhibits
semantic ...An extended treatment of my views about izzing and hazzing can be found in
Alan. A crucial ... on occasion admit catégorial variation in the sense
of the copulative 'is',
evidently is ... Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with
variation ...with the copulative 'is';
so he rather strangely interprets the last remark. (1017a27-30) as alluding to
semantic multiplicity in
the copula as being. (supposedly)
a consequence of semantic multiplicity in the existential 'is'. This
interpretation seems difficult to defend. When Aristotle says that
predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its
quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be
saying that if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to
some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow,
these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription of these
predicates will undergo corresponding variation"H. P. Grice brings
the question he had considered with J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson at Oxford
about Aristotle’s categories.In “Categoriae,” Aristotle distinguishes two sorts
of case of the application of word or phrase to a range of situations. In one sort
of case, both the word and a single definition (account, “logos”) apply
throughout that range. In the other sort of case, the word but no single
definition applies through the range.These two sorts of case have a different
nature. In the first case, the word is applied synonymously (of better as
“sunonuma” – literally “sun-onuma”, cognomen). In the second case the word is
applied homonymously (or better “homonuma”, or aequi-vocally, literally
“homo-numa.”)Grice notes that a homonymous application has some sort of
sub-division which Aristotle calls "paronymy" (“paronuma”), literally
‘para onuma.’To put it roughly, homonyms have multiple meanings – what Grice
has as “semantic multiplicity.”Synonyms have one meaning or ONE SENSE, but
apply to different kinds of thing.A paronym, such as ‘be,’ derives from other
things of a different kind. Paronyms display a ‘UNIFIED semantic multiplicity,’
if that’s not too oxymoronic: how can the multiplicity be unified while
remaining a multiplicity? Aristotle states, confusingly, that "being is
said in many ways". As Grice notes, ‘good’ (agathon) also is a paronym
that displays unified semantic multiplicity.In Nichomachean Ethics, even more
confusingly, Aristotle says that "good is said in as many ways as being".
He doesn’t number the ways.So the main goal for Grice is to answer the
question: If, as Aristotle suggests, at least some expressions connected with
the notion of "being" exhibit semantic multiplicity, of which
expressions is the suggestion true? Grice faces the question of existential
being and Semantic Multiplicity. Grice stresses that Semantic Multiplicity
of "be" is not only the case
of it interpretation. Other words he wants to know in what way of
interpretation of this word the philosophers can detect the SM. Generally
speaking there are four possible interpretations of "being": First,
"be" is taken to mean "exist.”Second, "be" is taken as
a copula in a predication statement.Third, "be" is taken for
expressing the identity.Fourth, "Being" is considered to be a noun
(equivalent to ‘object' or ‘entity') – subjectification, category shift:
“Smith’s being tall suggests he is an athlete.” (cfr. A. G. N. Flew on the
‘rubbish’ that adding ‘the’ to ‘self’ results in – contra J. R. Jones).
Philosophers have some problems for this kind of theory with separating
interpretations from each other. It is natural for thinkers to unite the first
and the fourth. The object or entity should be the things which already exist.
So the SM would attach to such a noun as "entity" if, and only if, it
also attaches to the word "exist". Furthermore, it seems to be a good
idea to unite the first and the third. In some ways theorist can paraphrase the
word "exist" in the terms of self-identity. Grice gives an example:
“Julius Caesar exists if and only if Julius Caesar is identical for Julius
Caesar.” Cf. Grice on ‘relative identity.’So the philosophers should
investigate SM in two possible interpretations – when "be" is
understood as "exist" and when "be" is understood as
copula. From Aristotle's point of view ‘being’ is predicated of everything.
From this statement, Grice draws the conclusion that "exist" can
apply to every thing, even a square circle.This word should signify a plurality
of universals and exhibits semantic multiplicity. But Grice continue his
analyses and tries to show, that "exist" has not merely SM, but
UNIFIED semantic multiplicity. God forbid that he breaks M. O. R., Modifed
Occam’s Razor – Semantic multiplicies are not to be multiplied unificatory
necessity.”In “Metaphysics,” Aristotle says that whatever things are signified
by the "forms of predication". Philosophers understood the forms of
predication (praedicabilium, praedicamentum) as a category. So in this way
"being" has as many significations as there are forms of predication.
"Be" in this case indicates what a thing is, what is like or how much
it is and ctr. And no reasons to make a difference between two utterances like
"man walks (flourishes)" and "the man is walking
(flourishing)" – cfr. Strawson on no need to have ‘be’ explicitly in the
surface form, which render some utterances absurd. Grice says that it is not a
problem with interpretation of verb-forms like ‘walks' and ‘flourishes' while
we can replace them by expression in a canonical form like ‘is walking' and ‘is
flourishing'. Aristotle names them as canonical in form within the multiplicity
of use of "be" because ‘is’ is not existential, but copulative.Cf.
Descartes, I think therefore I am – I am a res cogitans, ergo I am a res.
"When Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is,
sometimes what is it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its
quantity) and so on, he seems to be saying that, if we consider the range of
predicates which can be applied to some item, for example to a substance like
Socrates or a cow, these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses
of the copula in the ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding
variation" It means that, from Aristotle's point of view, "Socrates
is F" is not an essential predication, where "F" shows the item
in the category C. So the logical form of the proposition “Socrates is F” is
understood as "Socrates has something which is (C) F" where is (C)
represent essential connection to category C. In conclusion it can be said that
the copula is a matter of the logical nature of constant connection expressed
by "has" and a categorical variant relation expressed by essential
"is". So we have both types of interpretation: as existence and as a
copula. (Our gratitude to P. A.
Sobolevsky). ases of ''Unified Semantic Multiplicity''
(USM). Prominent among examples of USM is the application of the word 'be';
according to. Aristotle, “being is said in ... Aristotle and the
alleged multiplicity of being (or something). Grice is all
for focal unity. Or, to echo Jones, if there is semantic multiplicity (homonymy), it is in the end UNIFIED semantic
multiplicity (paronymy). Or something.
corpus: Grice would not have gone to Oxford
had his talent not been in the classics, Greek and Latin. As a Midlander, he
was sent to Corpus. At the time, most of Oxford was oriented towards the
classics, or Lit. Hum. (Philosophia). At some point, each college attained some
stereotypical fame, which Grice detested (“Corpus is for classicists”). By this
time, Grice, after a short stay at Merton, accepted the fellowship at St.
John’s, which was “a different animal.” In them days, there were only two
tutorial fellows in philosophy, Scots Mabbott, and English Grice. But Grice
also was “University Lecturer in Philosophy,” which meant he delivered seminars
for tutees all over Oxford. St. John’s keeps a record of all the tutees by
Grice. They include, alphabetically, a few good names. Why is Corpus so
special? Find out! History of “Corpus Christi.” Cf. St. John’s. Cf. Merton.
Each should have an entry. Corpus is Grice’s alma mater – so crucial. Hardieian: you only have one tutor in your life, and Grice’s
was Hardie. So an exploration on Hardie may be in order. Grice hastens to add
that he only learned ‘form,’ not matter, from Hardie, but the ethical and
Aristotelian approach he also admitted.
cotton onto the implicatum: this is not
cognate with the plant. It’s Welsh, rather.Strawson’s and Wiggins’s example of
the ‘suggestio falsi’ – or alternative to Grice’s tutee example. Since Strawson
and Wiggins are presenting the thing to the ultra-prestigious British Academy,
they thought a ‘tutee’ example would not be prestigious enough. So they have
two philosophers, Strawson and Grice, talking about a third party, another
philosopher, well known by his mood outbursts. They are assessing the third
party’s philosophical abilities at their London club. Strawson volunteers: “And
Smith?”. Grice responds: “If he had a more angelic temperament…” Strawson,
“like a fool, I rushed in – Strawson Wiggins p. 520. The angelic temperament.
To like someone or something; to view someone or something favorably. ... After
we explained our plan again, the rest of the group seemed to cotton onto it. 2. To begin to
understand something. Has nothing to do with cotton 1560s, "to prosper,
succeed;" of things, "to agree, suit, fit," a word of uncertain
origin. Perhaps from Welsh cytuno "consent, agree;" but perhaps
rather a metaphor from cloth-finishing and thus from cotton (n.).
Hensleigh Wedgwood compares cot "a fleece of wool matted together."
Meaning "become closely or intimately associated (with)," is from
1805 via the sense of "to get along together" (of persons), attested
from c. 1600. Related: Cottoned; cottoning.
credibility: While Grice uses ‘probability’ as the correlatum of
desirability, he suggests ‘credibility’ is a better choice. It relates to the
‘creditum.’ Now, what is the generic for ‘trust’ when it comes to the creditum
and the desideratum? An indicative utterance expresses a belief. The utterer is
candid if he holds that belief. “Candid” applies to imperative utterances which
express genuine desires and notably the emissor’s intention that his recipient
will form a ‘desideratum.’ Following
Jeffrey and Davidson, respectively, Grice uses ‘desirability’ and
‘probability,’ but sometimes ‘credibibility,’ realizing that ‘credibility’ is
more symmetrical with ‘desirability’ than ‘probability’ is. Urmson had explored
this in “Parenthetical verbs.” Urmson co-relates, ‘certaintly’ with ‘know’ and
‘probably’ with ‘believe.’ But Urmson adds four further adverbs: “knowingly,”
“unknowingly,” “believably,” and “unbelievably.” Urmson also includes three
more: “uncredibly,” in variation with “incredibly,” and ‘credibly.” The keyword
should be ‘credibility.’
creditum: The Romans were good at this. Notably in negative
contexts. They distinguished between an emissor being fallax and being mendax.
It all has to do with ‘creditum.’ “Creditum’ is vero, more or less along
correspondence-theoretical lines. Used by Grice for the doxastic equivalent of
the buletic or desideratum. A creditum is an implicatum, as Grice defines the
implicatum of the content that an addresse has to assume the utterer BELIEVES
to deem him rational. The ‘creditum’-condition is essential for Grice in his
‘exhibitive’ account to the communication. By uttering “Smoke!”, U means that
there is some if the utterer intends that his addressee BELIEVE that he, the
utterer, is in a state of soul which has the propositional complex there is
smoke. It is worth noting that BELIEF is not needed for the immediate state of
the utterer’s soul: this can always be either a desire or a belief. But a
belief is REQUIRED as the immediate (if not ultimate) response intended by the
utterer that his addressee adapt. It is curious that given the primacy that
Grice held of the desirability over the credibility that many of his
conversational maxims are formulated as imperatives aimed at matters of belief,
conditions and value of credibility, probability and adequate evidence. In the
cases where Grice emphasizes ‘information,’ which one would associate with
‘belief,’ this association may be dropped provided the exhibitive account: you
can always influence or be influenced by others in the institution of a common
decision provided you give and receive the optimal information, or rather,
provided the conversationalists assume that they are engaged in a MAXIMAL
exchange of information. That ‘information’ does not necessarily apply to
‘belief’ is obvious in how complicated an order can get, “Get me a bottle”. “Is
that all?” “No, get me a bottle and make sure that it is of French wine, and
add something to drink the wine with, and drive careful, and give my love to
Rosie.” No belief is explicitly transmitted, yet the order seems informative
enough. Grice sometimes does use ‘informative’ in a strict context involving
credibility. He divides the mode of credibility into informational (when
addressed to others) and indicative (when addressed to self), for in a
self-addressed utterance such as, “I am being silly,” one cannot intend to
inform oneself of something one already knows!
defeasibility. Strawson Wiggins ‘somehwere in the kitchen,’ ‘in one of
the dining-room cupboards’ unless some feature of the context defeats the
implication, there is an implicatum to the effect that the emissor cannot make
a ‘stronger’ move by Grice’s principle of conversational fortitude (“Be ‘a
fortiori’”). Cf. G. P. Baker on H. L. A.
Hart. All very Oxonian. Cf. R. Hall, Oxonian, on ‘Excluders.’ For Strawson and
Wiggins that a principle holds ‘generally, ceteris paribus, is a condition for
the existence of conversation, or of a good conversation. Defeasibility is a
sign of the freedom of the will. The communicators can always opt out. Not a
salivating dog. Note that defeasibility does not apply just to the implicatum.
Since probabilistic demonstrate are uncertain, there is an element of
defeasibility in the EXplicatum of a probabilistic utterance. Levinson’s quote,
“Probability, Defeasibility, and Mode Operators.”
Defensible
– H. P. Grice, “Conceptual analysis and the defensible province of philosophy.”
definitum: Grice lists ‘the’ in his list of communicative devices. He
was interested in the iota operator. After Sluga, he knew there were problems
here. He proposed a quantificational approach alla Whitehead and Russell,
indeed a Whitehead and Russellian expansion in three clauses, with identity,
involved. Why wasn’t Russell not involved with the ‘indefinite’. One would
think because that’s rendered already by (Ex), ‘some (at least one)’. Russell’s interest in definitum is not
philosophical. His background was mathematics, rather --. Grice was obsessed
with ‘aspects’ in verbs. There’s the ‘imperfect’ and the ‘perfect.’ These
translate Aristotle’s ‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos.’ But why the change from “factum”
to “fectum”? So it’s better to turn to ‘definitum,’ and ‘indefinitum, as better
paraphrases of Aristotle’s jargon – keeping in mind we are talking of his
‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos. Aristotle
and telos. In the Met. Y.1048b1835, Aristotle discusses the definition of an
action πϱᾶξις. He distinguishes two kinds of activities: kinêseis ϰινήσεις and
energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι: Only that movement in which the end is present is an
action. E.g., at the same time we are v.ing and have v.n ὁϱᾷ ἅμα, are
understanding and have understood φϱονεῖ, are thinking and have thought noei
kai nenoêken νοεῖ ϰαὶ νενόηϰεν when it is not true that at the same time we are
learning and have learnt ou manthanei kai memathêken οὐ μανθάνει ϰαὶ μεμάθηϰεν,
or are being cured and have been cured oud’ hugiazetai kai hugiastai οὐδ᾿ ὑγιάζεται
ϰαὶ ὑγίασται. At the same time we are living well and have lived well εὖ ζῇ ϰαὶ
εὖ ἔζηϰεν ἅμα, and are happy and have been happy εὐδαιμονεῖ ϰαὶ εὐδαιμόνηϰεν.
Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements ϰινήσεις, and the
other actualities energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι. We v. that the distinctive properties of
these two categories of verbs are provided by relations of inference and
semantic compatibility between the form of the present and the form of the
perfect. In the case of energeiai, there is a relation of inference between the
present and the perfect, in the sense that when someone says I v. we can infer
I have v.n. There is also a relation of semantic compatibility since one can
very well say I have v.n and continue to v.. Thus the two forms—the present and
the perfect— are verifiable at the same time ἅμα, simultaneously. On the other
hand, in the case of kinêseis, the present and the perfect are not verifiable
at the same time. In fact, when someone says I am building a house, we cannot
infer I have built a house, at least in the sense in which the house is
finished. In addition, once the house is finished, one is no longer
constructing it, which means that there is a semantic incompatibility between
the present and the perfect. τέλος, which means both complete action, that is,
end, and limit in competition with πέϱας, plays a crucial role in this
opposition. In the category of energeiai, we have actions proper, that is,
activities that are complete τέλεια because they have an immanent finality ἐνυπάϱχει
τὸ τέλος. In the category of kinêseis, we have imperfect activities ἀτελείς
that do not carry their own end within themselves but are transitive and aim at
realizing something. Thus activities having an external goal that is at the
same time a limit peras do not carry their own goal telos within themselves;
they are directed toward a goal but this goal is not attained during the
activity, but is realized at the end of the activity. And history repeated itself, in the same
terms, regarding Slavic languages, with on the one hand the words perfective
and imperfective, modeled on the Roman opposition and imported to describe an
opposition in which lexicon and grammar are truly interwoven since it is a
question of categories of verbs, which determine the whole organization of
conjugation, and on the other hand the Russian words that are used to
characterize the same categories of verbs, and that signify the accomplished
and the unaccomplished. In the terminological imbroglio, we can once again v.
the effects of a confusion connected with the inability to acknowledge the
autonomy of lexical aspect, or, in the particular case of Slavic languages, the
difficulty of isoRomang the aspectual dimension in the general system of the
language. Nevertheless, the same questions, that of the telos and that of
accomplishment, are at the foundation of the two aspectual dimensions. They are
even so prominent that, alongside the heterogeneous inventory from which we
began, we also find, and almost simultaneously in the aspectual tradition, a
leveling of all differences in favor of two categories that are supposed to be
the categories par excellence of grammatical aspect: the perfective on the one
hand, and the imperfective on the other. However, there is also the continuing
competition of the perfect, another tr. of the same word, perfectum,
designating a category that is not exactly the same as that of the perfective,
and which is, for its part, always a grammatical category, never a lexical
category: one speaks of perfect to designate compound tenses in G. ic
languages, e. g. , of the type I have received
as opposed to I received, which corresponds to the idea that the telos
is not only achieved, but transcended in the constitution of a fixed state,
given as the result of the completion of the process. Two, or three,
grammatical categories that are the same and not the same as the two, three, or
four lexical categories. It is in the name of these categories, and literally
behind their name, that the aspectual descriptions succeeded in being
applicable to all languages, confRomang all the imperfects of all languages and
also the Eng. progressive and the Russian imperfective, all the aorists in all
languages, and aligning perfects, perfectives, the Eng. perfect, the G. Perfekt, the Roman perfectum and the Grecian
perfect. The facts are different, but the words, and the recurrence of a
problematics that v.ms invariable, are too strong. Although it is a matter of
conjugations, the lexicon and the relation to ontological questions are too
influential. The word imperfectum was invented, we
v. a hesitation that is precisely the one that causes a problem here, between
imperfectum and infectum a nonachieved finality, an absence of finality. The
important point is that the whole history of aspectual terminology is constituted
by such exchanges. The invention of the words perfectum and imperfectum itself
proceeds from an enterprise of tr., in which it is a question of taking as a
model, or rephrasing, the Grecian grammarians’ opposition between suntelikos
συντελιϰός and non-suntelikos. However, the difference between the two
terminologies is noticeable. A supine past participle, -fectum, has replaced
telikos, and hence telos, thereby reintroducing, if not tense was tense really
involved in that past participle?, at least the achievement of an act, and
consequently merges with the question of the accomplished. In this operation,
the Stoics’ opposition between suntelikos which would thus designate the choice
of perfects or imperfects and παϱατατιϰός the extensive, in which the question
of the telos is not involved was made symmetrical, introducing into aspectual
terminology a binariness from which we have never recovered. And this
symmetricalization, which sought to describe the organization of a conjugation,
was then modeled on the distinction introduced by Aristotle between tτέλειος
and aἀτελής, which was not grammatical but lexical. This resulted in a new
confusion that is not without foundation because it was already implicit in the
montage constructed by the Grecian philosophers, with on the one hand the telos
used by Aristotle to differentiate types of process, and on the other the same
telos used by the Stoics to structure conjugation. exist in G. , is said to be
primarily a matter of discursive construction with the imparfait forming the
background of a narration, and the past tenses forming the foreground of what
develops and occurs. More recently, this area has been dominated by theories
that situate aspect in a theory of discursive representations cf. Kamp’s
discourse representation theory, and try to reduce it to a matter of discursive
organization: thus the models currently most discussed make the imparfait an
anaphoric mark that repeats an element of the context instead of constructing
an independent referent. Once again the relations are inextricably confused:
the types of discourse clearly have particular aspectual properties we have
already v.n this in connection with aoristic utterances that structure both
aspect and tense differently, and yet all or almost all aspectual forms can
appear anywhere, in all or almost all types of discursive contexts. Thus we
have foregrounded imparfaits, which have been recorded and are sometimes called
narrative imparfaits— e. g. , in an utterance like Trois jours après, il
mourait Three days later, he was dying, where it is a question of narrating a
prominent event, and where the distinction between imparfait and passé simple
becomes more difficult to evaluate. We also find passé composés in narratives,
where they compete with the passé simple: that is why many analysts of the
language consider the passé simple an archaic form that is being abandoned in
favor of the passé composé. The difficulty is clear: it is hard to attach a
given formal procedure to a given enunciative structuration, not only because
enunciative structures are supposed to be compatible with several aspectual
values, but first of all because the formal procedures themselves are all, more
or less broadly, polysemous, their value depending precisely on the context and
thus on the enunciative structure in which they are situated. Here again, this
is commonplace: polysemy is everywhere in languages. But in this case it
affects aspect: it consists precisely in running through aspectual oppositions,
the very ones that are also supposed to be associated with some aspectual
marker. The case of narrative uses of the imparfait v.ms to indicate that the
imparfait can have different aspectual values, of which some are more or less
apparently perfective. The narrative passé composés for instance, Il s’est levé
et il est sorti He got up and went out describe the process in its advent and
thus do not have the same aspectual properties as those that appear in
utterances describing the state resulting from the process e.g., Désolé, en ce
moment il est sorti Sorry, he left just now. Not to mention the presents, which
are highly polysemous in many languages and which, depending on the language,
therefore occupy a more or less extensive aspectual terrain. We are obliged to
note that aspect is at least partially independent of formal procedures, that
it also plays a role elsewhere, in particular, in the enunciative
configuration. teleology: the objectivum. Grice
speaks of the objective as a maxim. This is very Latinate. So if the maxim is
an objective, the goal is the objective, or objectivum. Meaning
"goal, aim" (1881) is from military term objective point (1852),
reflecting a sense evolution in French. This
is an expansion on the desideratum. Cf. ‘desirable,’ and ‘desirability,’ and
‘end.’ Grice feels like introducing goal-oriented conceptual machinery. In a
later stage of his career he ensured that this machinery be seen as NOT
mechanistically derivable. Which is odd seeing that in the ‘progression’ of the
‘soul,’ he allows for talk of adaptiveness and survival which suggest a
mechanist explanation. If an agent has a desideratum that means that, to echo
Bennett, A displays a goal-oriented behaviour, where the goal is the ‘telos.’
Smoke cannot ‘mean’ fire, because smoke doesn’t really behave in a
goal-oriented matter. Grice does play with the idea of finality in nature,
because that would allow him to justify the objectivity of his system. how does
soul originate from matter? Does the vegetal soul have a telos.
Purposive-behaviour is obvious in plants (phototropism). If it is present in
the vegetal soul, it is present in the animal soul. If it is present in the
animal soul, it is present in the rational soul. With each stage, alla
Hartmann, there are distinctions in the specification of the telos. Grice could
be more continental than Scheler! Grices métier. Unity of science was a very
New-World expression that Grice did not quite buy. Grice was brought up in a
world, the Old World, indeed, as he calls it in his Proem to the Locke
lectures, of Snows two cultures. At the time of Grices philosophising,
philosophers such as Winch (who indeed quotes fro Grice) were contesting the
idea that science is unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational
behaviour. Since a philosophical approach to the explanation of rational
behaviour, including conversational behaviour (to account for the
conversational implicata) is his priority, Grice needs to distinguish himself
from those who propose a unified science, which Grice regards as eliminationist
and reductionist. Grice is ambivalent about science and also playful
(philosophia regina scientiarum). Grice seems to presuppose, or implicate,
that, since there is the devil of scientism, science cannot get at teleology.
The devil is in the physiological details, which are irrelevant. The language
Grice uses to describe his Ps as goal-oriented, aimed at survival and
reproduction, seems teleological and somewhat scientific, though. But he means
that ironically! As the scholastics use it, teleology is a science, the science
of telos, or finality (cf. Aristotle on telos aitia, causa finalis. The unity
of science is threatened by teleology, and vice versa. Unified science seeks
for a mechanistically derivable teleology. But Grices sympathies lie for
detached finality. Grice is obsessed with the Greek idea of a telos, as
slightly overused by Aristotle. Grice thinks that some actions are for their
own sake. What is the telos of Oscar Wilde? Can we speak of Oscar Wilde’s
métier? If a tiger is to tigerise, a human is to humanise, and a person is to
personise. Grice thought that teleology is a key philosophical way to contest
mechanism, so popular in The New World. Strictly, and Grice knew this,
teleology is constituted as a discipline. One term that Cicero was unable to
translate! For the philosopher, teleology is that part of philosophy that
studies the realm of the telos. Informally, teleological is opposed to
mechanistic. Grice is interested in the mechanism/teleology debate, indeed jumps
into it, with a goal in mind! Grice finds some New-World philosophers too
mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with the more two-culture atmosphere he was
familiar with at Oxford! Code is the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are
especially concerned in the idea of causa finalis. For Grice only detached
finality poses a threat to Mechanism, as it should! Axiological objectivity is
possible only given finality or purpose in Nature, the admissibility of a final
cause. Refs.: There are specific essays on ‘teleology,’ ‘final cause,’ and
‘finality,’ the The Grice Papers. Some of the material published in “Reply to
Richards” (repr. in “Conception”) and “Actions and events,” The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC.
demonstratum: When Grice tried to conceptualise what ‘communicating’ and
‘smoke means fire’ have in common he came with the idea of ‘consequentia,’ as a
dyadic relation that, eventually, will become triadic, with the missor and the missee
brought into the bargain. “Look that smoke, there must be fire somewhere’ – “By
that handwave, he meant that he was about to leave me.” In any case, Grice’s
arriving at ‘consequentia’ is exactly Hobbes’s idea in “Computatio.’ And
‘con-sequentia’ involves a bit of ‘demonstratio.’ One thing follows the other.
One thing YIELDS the other. The link may be causal (smoke means fire) or
‘communicative’). ‘Rationality’ is one of those words Austin forbids to use.
Grice would venture with ‘reason,’ and better, ‘reasons’ to make it countable,
and good for botanising. Only in the New World, and when he started to get
input from non-philosophers, did Grice explore ‘rationality’ itself. Oxonians
philosophers take it for granted, and do not have to philosophise about it.
Especially those who belong to Grice’s play group of ‘ordinary-language’
philosophers! Oxonian philosophers will quote from the Locke version!
Obviously, while each of the four lectures credits their own entry below, it
may do to reflect on Grices overall aim. Grice structures the lectures in the
form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The first lecture is
intended to provide a bit of linguistic botanising for reasonable, and
rational. In later lectures, Grice tackles reason qua noun. The remaining
lectures are meant to explore what he calls the Aequi-vocality thesis:
must has only one Fregeian that crosses what he calls the buletic-doxastic
divide. He is especially concerned ‒ this being the Kant
lectures ‒ with Kants attempt to reduce the categorical
imperative to a counsel of prudence (Ratschlag der Klugheit), where Kants
prudence is Klugheit, versus skill, as in rule of skill, and even if Kant
defines Klugheit as a skill to attain what is good for oneself ‒
itself divided into privatKlugheit and Weltklugheit. Kant re-introduces the
Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia. While a further lecture on happiness as
the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT strictly part of the either the
Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaemonia may be
regarded as the goal involved in the relevant imperative. “Aspects”, Clarendon,
Stanford, The Kant memorial Lectures, “Aspects,” Clarendon, Some aspects
of reason, Stanford; reason, reasoning, reasons. The lectures were also
delivered as the Locke lectures. Grice is concerned with the reduction of
the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or
suppositional imperative. His main thesis he calls the æqui-vocality
thesis: must has one unique or singular sense, that crosses the
buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide. “Aspects,” Clarendon, Grice, “Aspects,
Clarendon, Locke lecture notes: reason. On “Aspects”. Including extensive
language botany on rational, reasonable, and indeed reason (justificatory,
explanatory, and mixed). At this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany
is indispensable towards the construction of a more systematic explanatory
theory. It is an exploration of a range of uses of reason that leads him
to his Aequi-vocality thesis that must has only one sense; also ‘Aspects of
reason and reasoning,’ in Grice, “Aspects,” Clarendon, the Locke lectures,
the Kant lectures, Stanford, reason, happiness. While Locke hardly
mentions reason, his friend Burthogge does, and profusely! It was slightly
ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures
at Stanford. He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a
Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford. While Grice was a fellow
of St. Johns, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on
reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy. He quotes very many authors,
including Locke! In his proemium, Grice notes that while he was rejected the
Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Lockes
ægis now! When preparing for his second lecture, he had occasion to revise some
earlier drafts dated pretty early, on reasons, Grice, “Aspects,”
Clarendon, reason, reasons. Linguistic analysis on justificatory,
explanatory and mixed uses of reason. While Grice knows that the basic use
of reason is qua verb (reasoner reasons from premise p to conclusion c), he
spends some time in exploring reason as noun. Grice found it a bit of a
roundabout way to approach rationality. However, his distinction between
justificatory and explanatory reason is built upon his linguistic botany on the
use of reason qua noun. Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than
justificatory reason. Explanatory reason explains the behaviour of a
rational agent. Grice is aware of Freud and his rationalizations. An
agent may invoke some reason for his acting which is not legitimate. An
agent may convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the
weather; when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to
Cowes and join the yacht club there. Grice loved an enthymeme. Grices
enthymeme. Grice, the implicit reasoner! As the title of the lecture implies,
Grice takes the verb, to reason, as conceptually prior. A reasoner reasons,
briefly, from a premise to a conclusion. There are types of reason: flat reason
and gradual reason. He famously reports Shropshire, another tutee with Hardie,
and his proof on the immortality of the human soul. Grice makes some remarks on
akrasia as key, too. The first lecture is then dedicated to an elucidation, and
indeed attempt at a conceptual analysis in terms of intentions and doxastic
conditions reasoner R intends that premise P yields conclusion C and believes
his intention will cause his entertaining of the conclusion from his
entertaining the premise. One example of particular interest for a study of the
use of conversational reason in Grice is that of the connection between
implicatum and reasoning. Grice entitles the sub-section of the lecture as Too
good to be reasoning, which is of course a joke. Cf. too much love will kill
you, and Theres no such thing as too much of a good thing (Shakespeare, As you
like it). Grice notes: I have so far been considering difficulties which may
arise from the attempt to find, for all cases of actual reasoning,
reconstructions of sequences of utterances or explicit thoughts which the
reasoner might plausibly be supposed to think of as conforming to some set of
canonical patterns of inference. Grice then turns to a different class of
examples, with regard to which the problem is not that it is difficult to know
how to connect them with canonical patterns, but rather that it is only too
easy (or shall I say trivial) to make the connection. Like some children (not
many), some cases of reasoning are too well behaved for their own good. Suppose
someone says to Grice, and It is very interesting that Grice gives conversational
examples. Jack has arrived, Grice replies, I conclude from that that Jack has
arrived. Or he says Jack has arrived AND Jill has *also* arrived, And Grice
replies, I conclude that Jill has arrived.(via Gentzens
conjunction-elimination). Or he says, My wife is at home. And Grice replies, I
reason from that that someone (viz. your wife) is at home. Is there not
something very strange about the presence in my three replies of the verb
conclude (in example I and II) and the verb reason (in the third example)?
misleading, but doxastically fine, professor! It is true, of course, that if
instead of my first reply I had said (vii) vii. So Jack has arrived, has he?
the strangeness would have been removed. But here so serves not to indicate
that an inference is being made, but rather as part of a not that otiose way of
expressing surprise. One might just as well have said (viii). viii. Well, fancy
that! Now, having spent a sizeable part of his life exploiting it, Grice is not
unaware of the truly fine distinction between a statements being false (or
axiologically satisfactory), and its being true (or axiologically satisfactory)
but otherwise conversationally or pragmatically misleading or inappropriate or
pointless, and, on that account and by such a fine distinction, a statement, or
an utterance, or conversational move which it would be improper (in terms of
the reasonable/rational principle of conversational helfpulness) in one way or
another, to make. It is worth considering Grices reaction to his own distinction.
Entailment is in sight! But Grice does not find himself lured by the idea of
using that distinction here! Because Moores entailment, rather than Grices
implicatum is entailed. Or because explicatu, rather than implicatum is
involved. Suppose, again, that I were to break off the chapter at this point,
and switch suddenly to this argument. ix. I have two hands (here is one hand
and here is another). If had three more hands, I would have five. If I were to
have double that number I would have ten, and if four of them were removed six
would remain. So I would have four more hands than I have now. Is one happy to
describe this performance as reasoning? Depends whos one and whats happy!?
There is, however, little doubt that I have produced a canonically acceptable
chain of statements. So surely that is reasoning, if only conversationally
misleadingly called so. Or suppose that, instead of writing in my customary
free and easy style, I had framed my remarks (or at least the argumentative
portions of my remarks) as a verbal realization, so to speak, of sequences of
steps in strict conformity with the rules of a natural-deduction system of
first-order predicate logic. I give, that is to say, an updated analogue of a
medieval disputation. Implicature. Gentzen is Ockham. Would those brave souls
who continued to read be likely to think of my performance as the production of
reasoning, or would they rather think of it as a crazy formalisation of
reasoning conducted at some previous time? Depends on crazy or formalisation.
One is reminded of Grice telling Strawson, If you cannot formalise, dont say
it; Strawson: Oh, no! If I can formalise it, I shant say it! The points
suggested by this stream of rhetorical questions may be summarized as follows.
Whether the samples presented FAIL to achieve the title of reasoning, and thus
be deemed reasoning, or whether the samples achieve the title, as we may
figuratively put it, by the skin of their teeth, perhaps does not very greatly
matter. For whichever way it is, the samples seem to offend against something
(different things in different cases, Im sure) very central to our conception
of reasoning. So central that Moore would call it entailment! A mechanical
application of a ground rule of inference, or a concatenation thereof, is reluctantly
(if at all) called reasoning. Such a mechanical application may perhaps
legitimately enter into (i.e. form individual steps in) authentic reasonings,
but they are not themselves reasonings, nor is a string of them. There is a
demand that a reasoner should be, to a greater or lesser degree, the author of
his reasonings. Parroted sequences are not reasonings when parroted, though the
very same sequences might be reasoning if not parroted. Ped sequences are
another matter. Some of the examples Grice gives are deficient because they are
aimless or pointless. Reasoning is characteristically addressed to this or that
problem: a small problem, a large problem, a problem within a problem, a clear
problem, a hazy problem, a practical problem, an intellectual problem; but a
problem! A mere flow of ideas minimally qualifies (or can be deemed) as
reasoning, even if it happens to be logically respectable. But if it is
directed, or even monitored (with intervention should it go astray, not only
into fallacy or mistake, but also into such things as conversational
irrelevance or otiosity!), that is another matter! Finicky over-elaboration of
intervening steps is frowned upon, and in extreme cases runs the risk of
forfeiting the title of reasoning. In conversation, such over-elaboration will
offend against this or that conversational maxim, against (presumably) some
suitably formulated maxim conjoining informativeness. As Grice noted with
regard to ‘That pillar box seems red to me.’ That would be baffling if the addressee
fails to detect the communication-point. An utterance is supposed to inform,
and what is the above meant to inform its addressee? In thought, it will be
branded as pedantry or neurotic caution. If a distinction between brooding and
conversing is to be made! At first sight, perhaps, one would have been inclined
to say that greater rather than lesser explicitnessness is a merit. Not that
inexplicitness, or implicatum-status, as it were ‒ is bad, but that, other
things being equal, the more explicitness the better. But now it looks as if
proper explicitness (or explicatum-status) is an Aristotelian mean, or mesotes,
and it would be good some time to enquire what determines where that mean lies.
The burden of the foregoing observations seems to me to be that the provisional
account of reasoning, which has been before us, leaves out something which is
crucially important. What it leaves out is the conception of reasoning, as I
like to see conversation, as a purposive activity, as something with goals and
purposes. The account or picture leaves out, in short, the connection of
reasoning with the will! Moreover, once we avail ourselves of the great family
of additional ideas which the importation of this conception would give us, we
shall be able to deal with the quandary which I laid before you a few minutes
ago. For we could say e.g. that R reasons (informally) from p to c just in case
R thinks that p and intends that, in thinking c, he should be thinking
something which would be the conclusion of a formally valid argument the
premisses of which are a supplementation of p. This will differ from merely
thinking that there exists some formally valid supplementation of a transition
from p to c, which I felt inclined NOT to count as (or deem) reasoning. I have
some hopes that this appeal to the purposiveness or goal-oriented character of
authentic reasoning or good reasoning might be sufficient to dispose of the
quandary on which I have directed it. But I am by no means entirely confident
that this is the case, and so I offer a second possible method of handling the
quandary, one to which I shall return later when I shall attempt to place it in
a larger context. We have available to us (let us suppose) what I might call a
hard way of making inferential moves. We in fact employ this laborious,
step-by-step procedure at least when we are in difficulties, when the course is
not clear, when we have an awkward (or philosophical) audience, and so forth.
An inferential judgement, however, is a normally desirable undertaking for us
only because of its actual or hoped for destinations, and is therefore not
desirable for its own sake (a respect in which, possibly, it may differ from an
inferential capacity). Following the hard way consumes time and energy. These
are in limited supply and it would, therefore, be desirable if occasions for
employing the hard way were minimized. A substitute for the hard way, the quick
way, which is made possible by habituation and intention, is available to us,
and the capacity for it (which is sometimes called intelligence, and is known
to be variable in degree) is a desirable quality. The possibility of making a
good inferential step (there being one to be made), together with such items as
a particular inferers reputation for inferential ability, may determine whether
on a particular occasion we suppose a particular transition to be inferential
(and so to be a case of reasoning) or not. On this account, it is not essential
that there should be a single supplementation of an informal reasoning which is
supposed to be what is overtly in the inferers mind, though quite often there
may be special reasons for supposing this to be the case. So Botvinnik is
properly credited with a case of reasoning, while Shropshire is not. Drawing
from his recollections of an earlier linguistic botany on reason. Grice
distinguishes between justificatory reason and explanatory reason. There is a
special case of mixed reason, explanatory-cum-justificatory. The lecture can be
seen as the way an exercise that Austin took as taxonomic can lead to
explanatory adequacy, too! Bennett is an excellent correspondent. He holds a
very interesting philosophical correspondence with Hare. This is just one f.
with Grices correspondence with Bennett. Oxford don, Christchurh, NZ-born Bennett,
of Magdalen, B. Phil. Oxon. Bennett has an essay on the interpretation of a
formal system under Austin. It is interesting that Bennett was led to consider
the interpretation of a formal system under Austins Play Group. Bennett attends
Grices seminars. He is my favourite philosopher. Bennett quotes Grice in his
Linguistic behaviour. In return, Grice quotes Bennett in the Preface
toWOW. Bennett has an earlier essay on rationality, which evidences that
the topic is key at Grices Oxford. Bennett has studied better than anyone the
way Locke is Griceian. A word or expression does not just stand for idea, but
for the intention of the utterer to stand for it! Grice also enjoyed construal
by Bennett of Grice as a nominalist. Bennett makes a narrow use of the epithet.
Since Grice does distinguish between an utterance-token (x) and an
utterance-type, and considers that the attribution of meaning from token to
type is metabolic, this makes Grice a nominalist. Bennett is one of the few to
follow Kantotle and make him popular on the pages of the Times Literary
Supplement, of all places. Refs.: The locus classicus is “Aspects,” Clarendon.
But there are allusions on ‘reason’ and ‘rationality, in The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC.
de
sensu implicatum: vide casus obliquus. The casus rectus/casus obliquus
distinction. Peter Abelard, Kneale, Grice, Aristotle. Aquinas. de sensu
implicatum. Ariskantian quessertions on de sensu implicate. “My sometimes mischievous friend Richard Grandy once said, in
connection with some other occasion on which I was talking, that to represent
my remarks, it would be necessary to introduce a new form of speech act,
or a new operator, which
was to be called the operator of quessertion. It is to be read as “It is
perhaps possible that someone might assert that . . .” and is to be symbolized
“?├”; possibly it might even be iterable […].
Everything I shall suggest here is highly quessertable.” Grice 1989:297. If Grice had one thing, he had linguistic creativity.
Witness his ‘implicature,’ and his ‘implicatum,’ not to mention his
‘pirotologia.’Sometime, somewhere, in the history of philosophy, a need was
felt by some Griceian philosopher, surely, for numbering intentions. The verb,
denoting the activity, out of which this ‘intention’ sprang was Latin ‘intendere,’
and somewhere, sometime, the need was felt to keep the Latinate /t/ sound, and
sometimes to make it sibilate, /s/. The
source of it all seems to be Aristotle in Soph. Elen., 166a24–166a30, which was
rendered twice om Grecian to Latin. In the second Latinisation, ‘de sensu’
comes into view. Abelard proposes to use ‘de rebus,’ or ‘de re,’ for what the
previous translation had as ‘per divisionem.’ To make the distinction, he also
proposes to use ‘de sensu’ for what the previous translation has as ‘per compositionem,’
and ‘per conjunctionem.’ But what did either mean? It was a subtle question,
indeed. And trust Nicolai Hartmann, in his mediaevalist revival, to add numbers
and a further distinction, now the ‘recte/’oblique’ distinction, and ‘intentio’
being ‘prima,’ ‘seconda,’ ‘tertia,’ and so on, ad infinitum. The proposal is
clear. We need a way to conceptualise first-order propositions. But we also
need to conceptualise ‘that’-clauses. The ‘that’-clause subordination is indeed
open-ended. ‘mean.’ Grice’s motivation in the presentation at the Oxford
Philosophical Society is to offer, as he calls it, a ‘proposal.’ In his words,
notice the emphasis on the Latinate ‘intend,’ – where it occurs, as applied to
an emissor, and as having as content, following that ‘that’-clause, an
‘intensional’ verb like ‘believe,’ which again, involves an ‘intentio tertia,’
now referring to a state back in the emissor expressed by yet another
intensional verb – all long for, ‘you communicate that p if you want your
addressee to realise that you hold this or that propositional attitude with
content p.’ "A meantNN something by x" is
(roughly) equivalent to "A intended the utterance of x to produce some
effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention"; and
we may add that to ask what A meant is to ask for a specification of the
intended effect (though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a
straight answer involving a "that" clause, for example, "a
belief that . . ."). (Grice 1989: 220). Grice’s motivation is to ‘reduce’ “mean”
to what has come to be known in the Griceian [sic] literature as a ‘Griceian’
[sic] ‘reflexive’ intention – he prefers M-intention -- which we will read as
involving an intentio seconda, and indeed intentio tertia, and beyond, which
makes its appearance explicitly in the second clause -- or ‘prong,’ as he’d
prefer -- of his ‘reductive’ analysis. Prong 1 then corresponds to the
intention prima or intention recta: Utterer U intends1 that
Addressee A believes that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ
with content “p.” Prong 2 corresponds to the intentio seconda or
intentio obliqua: Utterer
U intends2 that Addressee A believes (i) on the ‘rational,’ and not
just ‘causal,’ basis of (ii), i.e. of the addressee A’s recognition of the
utterer U’s intentio seconda or intentio obliqua i2, that Addressee
A comes to believe that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with
content “p.” In Grice’s wording, “i2” acts as a ‘reason,’ and not
merely a ‘cause’ for Addressee A’s coming to believe that U holds psychological
state or attitude ψ with content “p”. Kemmerling has used “↝” to represent this
‘reason’ (i1 ↝ i2,
Kemmerling in Grandy/Warner, 1986, cf. Petrus in Petrus 2010). Prong 3 is a
closure prong, now involving a self-reflective third-order intention, there is
no ‘covert’ higher-order intention involved in (i)-(iii). Meaning-constitutive
intentions in utterer u’s meaning that p should be out there ‘in the open,’ or
‘above board,’ to count as having been ‘communicated.Grice quotes only one
author in ‘Meaning’: C. L. Stevenson, who started his career with a degree in
English from Yale. Willing to allow a ‘metabolical’ use of ‘mean’ he
recognises, he scare quotes it: “There is a
sense, to be sure, in which a groan “means“ something, just a reduced
temperature may at times ”mean” convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). This
remark will have Grice later attempting an ‘evolutionary’ model of how an ‘x’
causing ‘y’ may proceed from ‘natural’ to less natural ones. Consider ‘is in
pain.’ A creature is physically hurt, and the expression of pain comes up
naturally as an effect. But if the creature attains rational control over his
expressive behaviour, and the creature is in pain (or expects his addressee A
to think that he is in pain), U can now imitate or replicate, in a something
like a Peirceian iconic mode, the natural behaviour manifested by a spontaneous
response to a hurtful stimulus. The ‘simulated’ pain will be an ‘icon’ of the
natural pain. Grice is getting Peirceian by the day, and he is not telling us!
There are, Grice says, as if to simplify Peirce the most he can, two modes of
representation. The primary one is now the explicitly Peirceian iconic one. The
‘risus naturaliter significat interiorem laetitiam’ of Occam. And then, there’s
the derivative *non*-iconic representation, in that order. The first is, shall
we say, ‘natural,’ and beyond the utterer U’s voluntary control (cf. Darwin on
the expression of emotions in man and animals); the second is not. Grice is
allowing for smoke representing fire, or if one must, alla Stevenson,
‘representing’ it. In Grice’s motivation to along the right lines, his
psychologist austere views of his 1948 ‘Meaning,’ when he rather artificially
disjoins a ‘natural’ “mean” and an ‘artificial’ “mean,” when merely different
‘uses’ stand for what he then thought were senses, he wants now to re-introduce
into philosophical discourse the iconic natural representation or meaning that
he had left aside.If this is part of what he calls a ‘myth,’ even if an
evolutionary one, to account for the emergence of ‘systems of communication,’
it does starts with an utterer U expressing (very much alla Croce or Marty) a
psychological state or attitude ψ by displaying some behavioural pattern in an
unintentional way. Grice is being Wittgensteinian here, and quotes almost
verbatim from Anscombe’s rendition, “No psychological concept except when
backed in behaviour that manifests it.”
If Ockham notes that “Risus naturaliter significat interiorem
laetitiam,” Grice shows this will allow to avoid, also alla Ockham, a polysemy
to ‘mean.’In Grice’s three clauses in his 1948 conceptual analysis of ‘meaning’
– the first clause of exhibitiveness, the second clause of intentio seconda or
reflexivity, and the third clause of communicative overtness, voluntary control
on the part of the utterer U is already in order. Since the utterer’s addressee
A is intended to recognise this, no longer is it required any prior ‘iconic’
association between a simulated behaviour and the behaviour naturally displayed
as a response to a stimulus. This amounts, for Grice to deeming the system of
expression as having become a full system now of intention-based
‘communication.’‘know’’ Intentio seconda or intentio obliqua comes up nicely
when Grice delivers the third William James Lecture, later reprinted as
“Further notes on logic and conversation.” There, Grice targets one type of
anti-Gettier scenario for the use of a factive psychological state or attitude
expressed by a verb like “know,” again followed by a “that”-clause. Grice is
criticisign Austin’s hasty attempt to analyse ‘know’ in terms of the
‘performatory’ ‘guarantee.’ As Grice puts it in “Prolegomena,” “to say ‘I know’
is to give a guarantee.” (Grice 1989:9) which can be traced back to Austin,
although since, as Grice witnessed it, Austin ‘all too frequently ignored’ the
real of emissor’s communicatum, one is never sure. In any case, Grice wants to overcome this
‘performatory’ fallacy, and he expands on the ‘suspect’ example of the
Prolegomena in the Third lecture. Grice’s troubles with ‘know’ were long-dated.
In Causal Theory he lists as the third philosophical mistake, “What is known by
me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case.” (1989: 237).
Uncredited, but he may be having in mind Ryle’s odd characterisations with
terms such as ‘occurrence,’ ‘episode,’ and so on. In the section on ‘stress,’ Grice asks us to
assume that Grice knows that p. The question is whether this claim commits the
philosopher to the further clause, ‘Grice knows that Grice knows that p, and so
on, … to use the scholastic term we started this with, ad infinitum. It is not
that Grice is adverse to a regressive analysis per se. This is, in effect, with
what the third clause or prong in his analysis of ‘meaning’ does – ‘let all
meaning-constitutive intentions be overt, including this one. Indeed, when it comes to meaning or knowing,
we are talking optimal, we are talking ‘virtue.’ Both ‘meaning,’
‘communicating, ‘and ‘knowing,’ represent an ‘ideal,’ value-paradeigmatic
concept – where value, a favourite with Hartmann, appears under the guise of a
noumenon in the topos ouranos that only realises imperfectly in the sub-lunary
world. In the third William James lecture Grice cursorily dismisses these
demanding or restrictive anti-Gettier scenarios as too stipulatory for the
colloquial, ordinary, use – and thus ‘sense’ -- of ‘know.’ The approach Gettier
is cricising ends up being too convoluted, seeing that conversationalists tend
to make a rather loose use of the verb. Grice’s example illustrates linguistic
botanising. So we have Grice bringing the examinee who does know that the
battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815, with hardly conclusive evidence, or any
‘de sensu’ knowledge that the evidence (which he does not have) is conclusive.
Grice grants that, in a specially emphatic utterance of ‘know,’ there might be
a cancellable implicatum to the effect that the knower does have conclusive
evidence for what he alleges to know. Grice’s explicit reference to this
‘regressive nature’ (p. 59) touches on the topic of intention de sensu. Grice
is contesting the strong view, as represented, according to Gettier, by
philosophers ranging from Plato’s Thaetetus to Ayer’s Problem of Empirical
Knowledge (indeed the only two loci Gettier cares to cite in his short essay)
that a claim, “Grice knows that p” entails a claim to the effect that there is
conclusive evidence for p, and which gives Grice a feeling of subjective
certainty, and that Grice knows that there is such conclusive evidence, and so
on, ad infinitum. Grice casts doubts on the intentio de sensu as applied to the
colloquial or ‘ordinary’ uses of ‘know’. If I know that p, must I know that I
know that p? Having just introduced his
“Modified Occam’s Razor” – ‘Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity’
--, Grice doesn’t think so. At this point, however, he adds a characteristic
bracket: “(cf. causal theory).” With that bracket, Grice is allowing that the
denotatum of “p,” qua content of U’s psychological state or attitude of
‘knowing,’ the state-of-affairs itself, as we may put it, should play something
like a causal role in U’s knowing that p. Grice is open-minded as to what type
of link or connection that is. It need not be strictly causal. He is merely
suggesting the open-endness of ‘know in terms of these “further conditions” as
to how Grice ‘comes’ to know that p, and refers to the ‘causal theory,’ as later
developed by philosophers like E. F. Dretske and others. As a linguistic
botanist, Grice is well aware that ‘know,’ like ‘see,’ is what the Kiparskys
(whom Grice refers to) call a ‘factive.’An ascription of “Grice knows that p,”
or, indeed, “Grice sees that p,” (unless Grice hallucinates) entails “p.” The
defeating ‘hallucination’ scenario is key. It involves what Grice calls a
dis-implicatum. The utterer is using ‘know’ or‘see’ in a loose way (and meaning
less, rather than more than he explicitly conveys. Note incidentally, as Grice
later noted in later seminars, how his analysis proves the philosopher’s adage
wrong. Surely what is known by me to be the case is believed by me to be the
case. Any divergence to the contrary is a matter of ‘implicatural’ stress – by
which he means supra-segmentation.‘want’Soon after his delivering the William
James lectures, Grice got involved in a project concerning an evaluation of
Quine’s programme, where again he touches on issues of intentio seconda or
intentio obliqua, and brings us back to Russell and ‘the author of Waverley.’
Grice’s presentation comes out in Words and Objections, edited by Davidson and
Hintikka, a pun on Quine’s Word and Object. Grice’s contribution, ‘Vacuous
Names,’ (later reprinted in part in Ostertag’s volume on Definite descriptions)
concludes with an exploration of “the” phrases, and further on, with some
intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription
of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude. Grice’s choice
of an ascription now notably involves an ‘opaque’ (rather than ‘factive,’ like
‘know’) psychological state or attitude: ‘wanting,’ which he symbolizes as “W.”
Grice considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack
wants someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry
him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him. Grice notes that “there
are clearly at least *two* possible readings” of an utterance like our (i): a
first reading “in which,” as Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii).”
A second reading is one “in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv).”
Grice goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order
predicate calculus. ‘Ja wants that p’ becomes ‘Wjap,’ where ‘ja’
stands for the individual constant “Jack” as a super-script attached to the
predicate standing for Jack’s psychological state or attitude. Grice writes:
“Using the apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent,”
respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an
intentio secunda or intentio obliqua) as ‘(Ǝx)WjaFxja’
and ‘Wja(Ǝx)Fxja.’ Grice then
goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this
second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an
‘intentio seconda.’ Grice notes: “But suppose that Jack wants a specific
individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been “*deceived* into
thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill, though
in fact Joe is an only child.” (The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill with
is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent). Let us recall that
Grice’s main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes, ‘emptiness’! In
these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i) is true only on reading
(vii),” where the existential quantifier occurs within the scope of the
psychological-state or -attitude verb, “but we cannot now represent (ii) or
(iii), with ‘Jill’ being vacuous, by (vi), where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the scope of the
psychological-attitude verb, want, “since [well,] Jill does not really exist,”
except as a figment of Jack’s imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as
‘purely intentionalist,’ and thus favouring by far Suppes’s over Chomsky’s
characterisation of Grice as a mere ‘behaviourist,’ Grice hopes that “we should
be provided with distinct representations for two familiar readings” of, now:
Jack wants Jill to marry him; Jack wants ‘Jill’ to marry him. It is at this
point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted
numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values merely indicate the order of
introduction of the symbol to which it is attached in a deductive schema for
the predicate calculus in question. Only the first notation yields the internal
de sensu reading (where ‘ji’ stands for ‘Jill’): ‘W2ja4F1ji3ja4’
and ‘W3ja4F2ji1ja4.’
Note that in the alternative external notation, the individual constant for
“Jill,” ‘ji,’ is introduced prior to ‘want,’ – ‘ji’’s sub-script is 1, while
‘W’’s sub-script is the higher numerical value 3. If Russell could have avowed
of this he would have had that the Prince Regents, by issuing the invitation,
wants to confirm that ‘the author of Waverley’ isN Scott, already having
confirmed that the author of Waverley =M the author of Waverley. Grice warns
Quine. Given that Jill does not exist, only the internal reading “can be true,”
or alethically satisfactory. Similarly, we might imagine an alternative
scenario where the butler informs the Prince: ‘We are sorry to inform Your
Majesty that your invitation was returned: apparently the author of Waverley
does not SEEM to exist.’ Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of
the opaqueness of a verb standing for a psychological state or attitude like
that expressed by ‘wanting’ with one observation that further marks him as an
intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian type. If he justified a loose use of
‘know,’ he is now is ready to allow for ‘existential’ phrases in cases of
‘vacuous’ designata, which however baffling, should not lead a philosopher to
the wrong characterisation of the linguistic phenomena (as it led Austin with
‘know’). Provided such a descriptors occur within an opaque, intensional, de
sensu, psychological-state or attitude verbs, Grice captures the nuances of
‘ordinary’ discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice puts it, we should
also have available to us also three neutral, yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their
isomorphs),” as a philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a
distinction, craves for a generality! “Jill” now becomes “x”: ‘W4ja5Ǝx3F1x2ja5,’
‘Ǝx5W2ja5F1x4ja3’,
and ‘Ǝx5W3ja4F1x2ja4
.’ Since in (xii) the individual variable ‘x’ (ranging over ‘Jill’) “does not
dominate the segment following the ‘(Ǝx)’
quantifier, the formulation does not display any ‘existential’ or de re,
‘force,’ and is suitable therefore for representing the internal readings (ii)
or (iii), “if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to faithfully
represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, for the possibility of expressing the fact that
a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.” At least Grice does not
write, “really,” for he knew that Austin detested a ‘trouser word.’ Grice
concludes that (xi) and (xiii) are derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while
(xii) will be “derivable only” from (ix).‘intend’By this time, Grice had been
made a Fellow of the British Academy and it was about time for the delivery of
the philosophical lecture that goes with it. It only took him six five years.
Grice choses “Intention and uncertainty” as its topic. He was provoked by two
members of his ‘playgroup’ at Oxford, Hart and Hampshire, who in an essay
published in Mind, what Grice finds, again, as he did with the anti-Gettier
cases of ‘know,’ as rather a too strong analysis of ‘intending.’ In his
British-Academy lecture, Grice plays now with the psychological state or
attitude, realised by the verbal form, ‘intend,’ when specifically followed by
a ‘that’-clause, “intends that…,” as an echo of his dealing with “meaning to”
as merely ‘natural.’ He calls himself a neo-Prichardian, reviving this ‘willing
that’ which Urmson had popularised at Oxford, bringing to publication
Prichard’s exploration of William James and his “I will that the distant chair
slides over the floor towards me. It does not.”Grice’s ‘intending that…’ is
notably a practical, boulemaic, or buletic, or desiderative, rather than
alethic or doxastic, psychological state or attitude. It involves not just an
itentum, but an intentum that involves both a desideratum AND a factum – for
the ‘future indicative’ is conceptually involved. Grice claims that, if the
conceptual analysis of “intending that…” is to represent ‘ordinary’ discourse,
shows that it contains, as one of its prongs, in the final ‘neo-Prichardian’
version that Grice gives, also a ‘doxastic’ (rather than ‘factive’ and
‘epistemic’) psychological state or attitude, notably a belief on the part of
the ‘intender’ that his willing that p has a probability greater than 0.5 to
the effect that p be realised. Contra Hart and Hampshire, Grice acknowledges
the investigations by the playgroup member Pears on this topic. Interestingly,
a polemic arose elsewhere with Davidson, who trying to be more Griceian thatn
Grice, sees this doxastic constraint as a mere cancellable implicatum. Grice
grants it may be a dis-implicatum at most, as in loose cases of ‘know,’ or
‘see.’ Grice is adamant in regarding the doxastic component as a conceptual
‘entailment’ in the ‘ordinary’ use of ‘intend,’ unless the verb is used in a
merely ‘disimplicatural,’ loose fashion. Grice’s example, ‘Jill intends to
climb Everest next week,’ when the prohibitive conditions are all to evident to
anyone concerned with such an utterance of (xv), perhaps Jill included, and
‘intends’ has to be read only ‘internally’ and hyperbolically. At this point,
if in “Vacuous Names, he fights with Meinong while enjoying engaging in
emptiness, it should be stressed that Grice gives as an illustration of a
‘disimplicature,’ along with a use of ‘see’ in a Shakespeareian context. ‘See,’ like ‘know,’ or ‘mean,’ exhibit what
Grice calls diaphaneity. So it’s only natural Grice turns his attention to
‘see.’ Grice’s examples are ‘Macbeth saw Banquo’ and ‘Hamlet saw his father on
the ramparts of Elsinore,’ and both involve hallucination! It is worth
comparing the fortune of ‘disimplicature’ with that of ‘implicature.’ Grice
coins ‘to dis-implicate’ as an active verb, for a case where the utterer does
NOT, as in the case of implicature, mean MORE than he says, but LESS. Grice’s
point is a subtle one. It involves his concession on something like an
explicatum, but alsoo on something like Moore’s entailment. If the ‘doxastic
condition’ is entailed by “intending that…,’ an utterer U may STILL use, in an
‘ordinary’ fashion, a strong ‘intending that…’ in a scenario where it is common
ground between the utterer U and his addressee A that the probability of ‘p’
being realised is lower than 0.5. The expression of the psychological state or
attitude is loose, since the utterer is, as it were, dropping an ‘entailment’
that applies in a use of ‘intending that’ where that ‘common-ground’ assumption
is absent. One reason may be echoic. Jill may think that she can succeed in
climbing Mt. Everest; she herself has used ‘intend.’ When that information is
transmitted, the strong psychological verb is kept when the doxastic constraint
is no longer shared by the utterer U and his addressee A (Like an implicatum, a
disimplicatum has to be recognised as such to count as one. No such thing as an ‘unwanted’
disimplicatum.‘motivate’Sometimes, it would seem that, for Grice, the English
philosopher of English ‘ordinary-language’ philosophy, English is not enough!
Grice would amuse at Berkeley seminars, with things like, ‘A pirot potches o as
fang, or potches o and o’ as F-id,’ just to attract his addressee’s attention.
The full passage, in what Grice calls, after Carnap, pirotese, reads: “A pirot
can be said to potch of some obble x as fang or feng; also to cotch of x, or
some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o’
as being fid to one another.” Grice’s deciphering, with ‘pirot,” a tribute to
Carnap – and Locke -- as any agent, and an ‘obble’ as an object. Grice borrows,
but does not return, the ‘pirot’ from Carnap (for whom pirots karulise
elatically – Carnap’s example of a syntactically well-formed formula in
Introduction to Semantics). Grice uses ‘pirotese’ ‘to potch’ as a correlate for
‘perceive,’ such as the factive ‘see’ and ‘to cotch’ as a correlate for the
similarly factive ‘know.’While ‘perceive’ strictly allows for a ‘that’-clause
(as in Grice analysis of “I perceive that the pillar box is red” in “The causal
theory of perception”), for simplificatory purposes, Grice is using ‘to potch’
as applying directly to an object, which Grice rephrases as an ‘obble.’ Since
some perceptual feature or other is required in a predication of ‘perceiving’
and ‘potching,’ ‘feng’ is introduced as a perceptual predicate. And since
pirots should also be allowed to perceive an ‘obble’ o in some relation with
another ‘obble’ o2, Grice introduces the dyadic ‘relational’ feature ‘fid.’ Grice’s exegesis reads: “‘To potch’ is
something like ‘to perceive,’ whereas ‘to cotch’ is something like ‘to think.’
‘Feng’ and ‘fang’ are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives; ‘fid’ is
a possible relation between ‘obbles.’”).
At this point, Grice has been made, trans-territorially, the President
of the American Philosophical Association, and is ready to give his
Presidential Address (now reprinted in his Conception of Value, for Clarendon.
He chooses ‘philosophical psychology’ It’s when Grice goes on to play now with
the neo-Wittgensteinian issues of incorrigibility and privileged access, that
issues of intentio seconda become prominent.
For any psychological attitude ψ1, if U holds it, U holds, as
a matter of what Grice calls ‘genitorial construction,’ a meta-psychological
attitude, ψ2, a seconda intentio if ever there was one, -- Grice
even uses the numeral ‘2’ -- that has, as its content followed the second
‘that’-clause, the very first psychological attitude ψ1. The general
schema being given below, with an instance of specification: ‘ψup ⊃ ψuψup,’
and ‘if U wills that p, U wills that U wills that p.’ The interesting bit, from
the perspective of our exploration of ‘intentio seconda,’ is that, if, alla
Peano, we apply this to itself, as in the anti-Gettier cases Grice discussed
earlier, we end with an ad-infinitum clause. It was Judith Baker, who earned
her doctorate under Grice at Berkeley who sees this clearlier than everyone
(She was a regular contributor to the Kant Society in Germany). Baker’s
publications are, like those of her tutor, scarce. But in a delightful
contribution to the Grice festschrift, “Do one’s motives have to be pure?” (in
Grandy/Warner 1986), Baker explores the crucial importance of that ad-infinitum
chain of intentiones secondæ as it applies to questions of not alethic but
practical value or satisfactoriness. Consider ‘ought’. Grice would say that
‘must’ is aequi-vocal, i.e. it is not that ‘must’ has an alethic ‘sense’ and a
practical ‘sense.’ Only “one” must, if one must! (As Grice jokes, “Who needs
ichthyological necessity?”). Baker notes
that the ad-infinitum chain may explain how ‘duty’ ‘cashes out’ in ‘interest.’
Both Grice and Baker are avowed Kantotelians. By allowing ‘duty’ to cash out in
interest they are merging Aristotle’s utilitarian teleology with Kant’s
deontology, and succeeding! It is possible to symbolize Grice’s and Baker’s
proposal. If there is a “p” SUCH AS, at some point in the iteration of willing
and intentiones secondæ, the agent is not willing to accept it, this blocks the
potential Kantian universalizability of the content of a teleological attitude
“p,” stripping “p” of any absolute value status that it may otherwise attain.In
Grice’s reductive analysis of ‘mean,’ ‘know,’ ‘want,’ ‘intend,’ and ‘motivate,’
we witness the subtlety of his approach that is only made possible from the
recognition of Aristotle’s insight back in “De Sophisticis Elenchis” to Kant’s
explorations on the purity of motives. It should not surprise us. It’s Grice’s
nod, no doubt, to an unjustly neglected philosopher, who should be neglected no
more.ReferencesBlackburn, S. W. 1984. Spreading the words: groundings in the
philosophy of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Darwin, Charles. 1872.
The expression of emotions in man and animals. London: Murray. Grandy, R. E.
and R. O. Warner 1986. Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions,
categories, ends. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grice, H. P. 1948. Meaning, The
Oxford Philosophical Society. Repr. in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1961. The
causal theory of perception, The Aristotelian Society. Repr. in Grice 1989.
Grice, H. P. 1967. Logic and Conversation, The William James lectures. Repr. in
a revised 1987 form in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1969. Vacuous Names, in
Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. Grice, H.
P. 1971. Intention and uncertainty, The British Academy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Grice, H. P. 1975. How pirots karulise elatically: some
simpler ways, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley. Grice, H. P. 1982. Meaning Revisited, in N.
V. Smith, Mutual knowledge. London: Croom Helm, repr. in Grice 1989. Grice,
H.P. 1987. Retrospective epilogue, in Studies in the Way of Words. Grice, H. P.
1989. Studies in the way of words. London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press. Hart, H. L. A. and S. N. Hampshire 1958. Intention, decision,
and certainty, Mind, 67:1-12.Kemmerling, A. M. 1986. Utterer’s meaning
revisited, in Grandy/Warner 1986. Kneale, W. C. and M. Kneale. 1966. The
development of logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Pecocke, C. A. B. 1989. Transcendental Arguments in the Theory of Content: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered
Before the University of Oxford on 16 May 1989. Oxford University Press.
Prichard, H. A. 1968. Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest. Essays and
Lectures, edited by
W. D. Ross and J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University. Stevenson,
C. L. 1944. Ethics and language. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Strawson, P. F. 1964 Intention and convention in speech acts, The Philosophical
Review, repr. in Logico-Linguistic Papers, London, Methuen, 1971, pp. 149-169 as Blackburn puts
it in his discussion of Grice in the intention-based chapter of his “Spreading
the word: groundings in the philosophy of language.” Intentio seconda or
obliqua bears heavily on Grice’s presentation for the Oxford Philosophical
Society. The motivation behind Grice’s analysis pertains to philosophical
methodology. Grice is legitimizing an ascription of ‘mean’ to a rational agent,
such as … a philosopher. This very ascription Grice finds to be ‘seemingly
denied by Wittgenstein’ (Grice 1986). As an exponent of what he would later and
in jest dub “The Post-War Oxonian School of ‘Ordinary-Language’ Philosophy,”
Grice engages in a bit of language botany, and dealing with the intricacies of
‘communicative’ uses of “mean.” Interestingly, and publicly – although a
provision is in order here – Grice acknowledges emotivist Stevenson, who
apparently taught Grice about ‘metabolic’ uses of “mean.” Stevenson, who read
English as a minor at Yale, would not venture to apply ‘mean’ to moans!
Realising it as a colloquial extension, he is allowed to use ‘mean,’ but in
scare quotes only! (“Smith’s reduced temperature ‘means’ that he is is
convalescent.” “There is a sense, to be sure, in
which a groan “means“ something, just a reduced temperature may at times ”mean”
convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). Close enough but no cigar. Stevenson
has ‘groan,’ which at least rhymes with ‘moan.’ (As for the proviso, Grice
never ‘meant’ to ‘publish’ his talk on ‘Meaning,’ but one of his tutees
submitted for publication, and on acceptance, Grice allowed the publication).
In “Meaning” Grice does not provide a conceptual analysis for, ‘by moaning, U
means [simpliciter] that p.’ He will in his “Meaning Revisited” – the
metabolical scare quotes are justified on two counts: ‘By moaning U means that
p’ is legitimized on the basis of the generic ‘x ‘means’ y iff x is a
consequence of y.’ But it is also justified on the basis that there is a
continuum between U’s involuntarily moaning thereby meaning that he is in pain,
and U’s voluntarily moaning, thereby ‘communicating’ that he is in pain.
However, and more importantly for our exploration of the ‘intentum,’ Grice
hastens to add that he does not agree with Stevenson’s purely ‘causal’ account.
The main reason is not ‘anti-naturalistic.’ It is just that Grice sees
Stevenson’s proposal as as involving a vicious circle. Typically, Grice
extrapolates the relevant quote from Stevenson, slightly out of context. Grice
refers to Stevenson’s appeal to "an elaborate process of conditioning
attending … communication."Grice: “If we have to take seriously the second
part of the qualifying phrase ("attending … communication"),
Stevenson’s account of meaning is obviously circular. We might just as well
say, "U means” if “U communicates,” which, though true, is not helpful. It
MIGHT be helpful for Cicero translating from Grecian to Roman: ‘com-municatio’
indeed translates a Grecian turn of phrase involving ‘what is common.’ f.
“con-” and root “mu-,” to bind; cf.: immunis, munus, moenia.’And the suggestion
would be helpful if we say that to ‘communicate,’ or ‘mean,’ is just to bring
some intentum to be allotted ‘common ground,’ because of the psi-transmission
it is shared between the emissor and his intended addressee. This one hopes is
both true AND ‘helpful.’ In any case, Grice’s tutee Strawson later
found Grice’s elucidation of utterer’s meaning to be ‘objection-proof’
(Starwson and Wiggins, 2001) in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions, of an utterer or emissor E meaning that p, by uttering ‘x,’ and appealing
to primary and secondary intentionality. But is Grice’s intentionalism a sort
of behaviourism? Grice denies that in “Method” calling ‘behaviourism’ ‘silly.
Grice further explores intentio obliqua as it pertains to his remarks towards a
general theory of “re-presentation.” The place where this excursus takes place
is crucial. It is his Valediction to his compilation of essays, Studies in the
Way of Words, posthumously published. At this stage, he must have felt that,
what he once regarded krypto-technic in Peirce, is no more! Grice has already
identified in that ‘Valediction’ many strands of his philosophical thought, and
concludes his re-assessment of his ‘philosophy of language’ and semiotics with
an attempt to provide some general remarks about ‘to represent’ in general,
perhaps to counter the allegations of vicious circularity which his approach
had received, seeing that “p” features, as a ‘gap-sign,’ as the content of both
an ‘expression’ and a ‘psychological’ attitude. In trying to reconcile his austere
views on “Meaning,” back in that evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society,
where he distinguished two senses of ‘mean’ (“Smoke ‘means’ fire,” and ““Smoke”
means ‘smoke’”). By focusing on the most general of verbs for a psychological
state or attitude, ‘to represent,’ that even allows for a non-psychological
reading, Grice wants to be seen as answering the challenge of an alleged
vicious circle with which his intention-based approach is usually associated.
The secondary-intentional non-iconic mode of representation rests on a prior
iconic mode and can be understood as ‘pre-conventional,’ without any explicit
recourse to the features we associate with a developed system of communication.
Grice needs no ‘language of thought’ or sermo mentalis alla Ockham there. Grice
allows that one can communicate fully without the need to use what more
conventional philosophers call ‘a language.’ Artists do it all the time! The passage from intentio prima to full
intentio seconda is, for Grice, gradual and complex. Grice means to adhere with
‘ordinary’ discourse, in its implicata and dis-implicaata. The passage also
adhering to a functionalist approach qua ‘method in philosophical psychology,’
as he’d prefer, that needs not to postulate a full-blown ‘linguistic entity’ as
the object of intentional thought. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the
work of C. A. B. Peacocke, who knew Grice from his Oxford days and later joined
his seminars at Berkeley, and who has developed this line of thought in a
better fashion than less careful philosophers. Grice’s programme has
occasionally, and justly, been compared with phenomenological approaches to
expression and communication, such as Marty’s. It is hoped that the previous
notes have shed some light on those aspects where this interface can further be
elaborated. Even as we leave an intentio seconda to resume the discussion for a
longer day. In his explorations on the embedding of intensional concepts, Grice
should be inspirational to philosophers in more than one way, but especially in
the one that he favoured most: the problematicity of it all. As he put it in
another context, when defending absolute value. “Such
a defence of absolute value is of course, bristling with unsolved or
incompletely solved problems. I do not find this thought daunting. If
philosophy generated no new problems it would be dead, because it would be
finished; and if it recurrently regenerated the same old problems it would not
be alive because it could never begin. So those who still look to philosophy
for their bread-and-butter should pray that the supply of new problems never
dries up.” (Grice 1991). In the Graeco-Roman tradition, philosophers started to
use ‘intentio prima,’ ‘intentio secunda,’ ‘intentio tertia,’ and “… ad
infinitum,” as they would put it. In post-war Oxford, English philosopher H. P.
Grice felt the need. The formalist he was, he found subscribing numbers to
embedded intentions has a strong appeal for him. Grice’s main motivation is in
the philosophy of language, but as ancillary towards solving this or that
problem concerning the ‘linguistic’ methodology of his day. To appreciate
Grice’s contribution one need to abstract a little from his own historical
circumstances, or rather, place them in the proper context, and connect it with
the general history of philosophy. As a matter of history, ‘intentio prima,’
or ‘recta,’ as opposed to ‘obliqua,’ is part of Nicolai Hartmann’s ‘mediaeval
revival,’ as a reaction to mediaevalism having made scorn by the likes of
Rabelais that amused D. P. Henry. For the mediaeval philosopher, to use Grice’s
symbolism, was concerned with whether a chimaera could eat ‘I2,’ a
second intention. The mediaeval philosopher’s implicature seems to be that a
chimaera can easily eat ‘I1.’ Such a ‘quaestio subtilissima,’
Rabelais jokes. If ‘I1,’ or, better, for simplificatory purposes, ‘IR’
is a specific state, stance, or attitude of the ‘soul,’ ‘ψ1’ or ‘ψR’
directed towards its ‘de re’ ‘intentum,’ or ‘prae-sentatum,’ of the noumenon,
‘IO,’ ‘intentio obliqua,’ is a state, stance, or attitude of the
‘soul,’ of the same genus, ‘ψ2,’ or ‘ψS’ directed towards
‘ψR,’ its ‘de sensu’ ‘intentum’ now ‘re-prae-sentatum’ of the
phainomenon or ob-jectum (Abelard translates Aristotle’s ‘per divisionem’ as
‘de re’ and ‘per compositionem’ and ‘per conjunctionem’ by ‘de sensu,’ and ‘per
Soph. Elen., Kneale and Kneale, 1966). Grice’s intentionalism has been widely
discussed, but the defense he himself makes of intensionalism (versus
extensionalism) has proved inspiring, as when he assumes as an attending
commentary to his reductive analysis of the state of affairs by which the
emissor communicates that p, that he is putting forward “the legitimacy of
[the] application of [existential generalization] to a statement the expression
of which contains such [an] "intensional" verb[…] as
"intend" (Grice 1989: 116 ). The expression ‘de sensu’ is due to
Abelard, but Russell likes it. While serving as Prince Regent of England in
1815, George IV casually remarks his wish to meet ‘the author of Waverley’ in
the flesh. The Prince was being funny, you see. The prince would not know this,
but when his press becomes embroiled in pecuniary difficulties, Scotts set out
to write a cash-cow. The result is Waverley, a novel which did not name its
author. It is a tale of the last Jacobite rebellion in England, the
“Forty-Five.” The novel meets with considerable success. The next year, Scott.
There follows a sequel, the same general vein.
Mindful of his reputation, Scotts maintains the anonymous habit he
displays with Waverley, and publishes the sequel under “the Author of
Waverley.” The identity “Author of Waverley” = “Scott” is widely rumoured, and
Scott is given the honour of dining with
George, Prince Regent, who had wished to meet “Author of Waverley” in the flesh
for a ‘snug little dinner’ at Carleton, on hearing ‘the author of Waverley’ was
in town. The use of a descriptor may lead to the implicatum that His Majesty is
p’rhaps not sure that ‘the author of Waverley’ has a name, and isR
Scott. Lack of certainty is one thing, yet, to quote from Russell, “an interest
in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of
Europe.” Grice admired Russell profusely and one of his essays is wittily
entitled, “Definite descriptions in Russell and in the Vernacular,” so his
explorations of ‘intentio’ ‘de sensu’ have an intrinsic interest. Keywords: H. Paul Grice, intentio seconda,
implicature, intentionalism, intentum,
intentum de sensu, ‘that’-clause, the recte-oblique distinction. Grice explored
issues of intentum de sensu in various areas. First, ‘meaning.’ Second,
‘knowing.’ Third, ‘wanting.’ Fourth, ‘intending,’ Fifth, pirots, with
incorrigibility and privileged access. Sixth, morality and the regressus.
Seventh, the continuum and the unity. With Grice, it all starts, roughly, when
Grice comes up with a topic for a talk at The Oxford Philosophical Society.The
Society is holding one of those meetings, and Grice thinks of presenting a few
conclusions he had reached at his seminars on C. S. Peirce.What’s the good of
an Oxford don of keeping tidy lecture notes if you will not be able to lecture
to a philosophical addressee? Peirce is the philosopher on whom Grice choses to
lecture. In part, for “not being particularly popular on these shores,” and in
part because Grice noted the ‘heretic’ in Peirce with which he could
identify.Granted, at this stage, Grice disliked the un-Englishness of some of
Peirce’s over-Latinate jargon, what Grice finds the ‘krypto-technic.’ ‘Sign,’
‘symbol,’ ‘icon,’ and the rest of them!Instead, Grice thinks, initially for the
sake of his tutees and students – he was university lecturer -- sticking with
the simpler, ‘ordinary’, short English lexeme ‘mean.’A. M. Kemmerling, of all
people, who wrote the obituary for Grice for Synthese, has precisely cast
doubts on the ‘universal’ validity of Grice’s proposed conceptual reductive
analysis, notably in his Ph.D dissertation on ‘Meinen.’ Note the irony in Kemmerling’s title: Was Grice mit "Meinen" meint - Eine Rekonstruktion der Griceschen
Analyse rationaler Kommunikation.”
Nothing jocular in the subtitle, for this indeed is a reconstruction of
‘rational’ communication. The funny bit is in “Was mit “Meinen” Grice meint”!
In that very phrase, which is rhetorical, and allows for an answer, because
‘meinen’ is both mentioned and used, Kemmerling allows that he is ‘buying’
Grice’s idea that his reductive analysis of ‘mean’ applies to German ‘meinen.’
Kemmerling is also pointing to the ‘primacy’ (to use Suppes’s phrase) of
‘utterer’s’ or ‘emissor’s “communicatum” or ‘Meinung.” Kemmerling advertises
his interest in exploring on what _Grice_ means – by uttering ‘meinen,’ almost!
As Kemmerling notes, German ‘meinen,’ cognate via common Germanic with
English ‘mean,’ (cf. Frisian ‘mein,’ – and Hazzlitt, “Bread, butter, and green
cheese, very good English, very good cheese”) is none other than ‘mean’ that
Grice means. And ‘Grice means’ is the only literal, i. e. non-metabolic use of
the verb Grice allows – as applied to a rational agent, which features in the
subtitle to Kemmerling’s dissertation. Thus one reads in Kluge, “Etymologische
Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, 1881, of “meinen,”
rendered by J. F. Davis as ‘to think, opine, mean,’ from a MHG used to indicate, in Davis’s rendition,
‘to direct one's thoughts to, have in view, aim at, be affected towards a
person, love,’ OHG meinen, meinan, ‘to mean, think, say,
declare.’ = OS mênian,
Du. meenen, OE mœ̂nan, E mean (to this Anglo-Saxon mœ̂nan, cf. prob. moan – I know your meaning from your moaning),
all from WGmc. meinen, mainjan, ‘mênjan,’ and cognate with ‘man,’ ‘to think’ (cf. ‘mahnen,’ ‘Mann,’ and ‘Minne’). Kemmerling
is very apropos, because Grice engaged in philosophical discussion with him, as
testified by his perceptive contribution to P. G. R. I. C. E. (Kemmerling,
1986). On top, in his presentation for the Oxford Philosophical Society, Grice
wants to restrict the philosophical interest to ‘de sensu,’ the ‘that’-clause
(cf. the recte-oblique distinction), viz. not just ‘what Grice means,’ if this
is going to be expaned as ‘something wonderful.’ Not enough for Grice. It has
to be expanded, for the thing to have philosophical interest into a
‘propositional clause,’, an ‘intensional’ context, i. e., ‘Grice means that…’
Grice cavalierly dismisses other use of ‘mean,’ – notably the ubiquitous, ‘mean
to…’ – He will later explain his reason for this. It was after William James
provoked Prichard. For William James uttered: “I will that the distant table
slides on the floor toward me. It doesn’t’. Prichard turns this into the
conceptual priority of ‘will that…’ for which Grice gives him the credit he
deserved at a later lecture now on his being appointed a Fellow of The British
Academy (Grice, 1971). Strictly, what
Grice does in the Oxford Philosophical Socieety presentation is to distinguish
between various ‘mean’ and end up focusing on ‘mean’ as followed by a
‘that’-clause. In the typical Oxonian fashion, that Grice borrows (but never
returns) from J. C. Wilson, Grice has the IO as ‘meaning that
so-and-so’ (Grice, 1989: 217). Grice explicitly displays the primacy of a
reductive analysis of the conceptual circumstances involving an emissor
(Anglo-Saxon ‘utterer’) who ‘means’ that p. It will be a longer ‘shaggy-dog’
story Grice tells when he crosses the divide from ‘propositional’ (p) to
‘predicative’ ascriptions (“By uttering ‘Fido is shaggy,’ Grice means that the
dog is hairy-coated (Grice 1989). Grice notes that ‘metabolically,’ “mean,” at
least in English, can be applied to various other things, sometimes even
involving a ‘that’-clause. “By delivering his budget, the major means that we
will have a hard year.’ Grice finds that ‘but we won’t’ turns him into a
self-contradicter. In Grice’s usage, ‘x ‘means’ y’ iff ‘y is a consequence
[consequentia] of x’ --. Quite a departure from Old Frisian. If Hume’s
objection to the use of the verb ‘cause,’ is that it covers animistic beliefs
(“Charles I’s decapitation willed his death”), English allows for disimplicated
or loose ‘metabolic’ uses of ‘will’ (“It ‘will’ rain”) and ‘mean’ (Grice’s
moaning means that he is in pain).
desideratum:
Grice makes a double use of this. It should be thus two entries. There’s the
conversational desideratum, where a desideratum is like a maxim or an imperative
– and then there are two specific desiderata: the desideratum of conversational
clarity, and the desideratum of conversational candour. Grice was never sure
what adjective to use for the ‘desiderative.’ He liked buletic. He liked
desideratum because it has the co-relate ‘consideratum,’ for belief. He uses ‘deriderative’ and a few more! Of
course what he means is a sub-psychological modality, or rather a ‘soul.’ So he
would apply it ‘primarily’ to the soul, as Plato and Aristotle does. The
‘psyche’, or ‘anima’ is what is ‘desiderativa.’ The Grecians are pretty
confused about this (but ‘boulemaic’ and ‘buletic’ are used), and the Romans
didn’t help. Grice is concerned with a rational-desiderative, that takes a
“that”-clause (or oratio obliqua), and qua constructivist, he is also concerned
with a pre-rational desiderative (he has an essay on “Needs and Wants,” and his
detailed example in “Method” is a squarrel (sic) who needs a nut. On top, while
Grice suggest s that it goes both ways: the doxastic can be given a reductive
analaysis in terms of the buletic, and the buletic in terms of the doxastic, he
only cares to provide the former. Basically, an agent judges that p, if his
willing that p correlates to a state of affairs that satisfies his desires.
Since he does not provide a reductive analysis for Prichard’s willing-that, one
is left wondering. Grice’s position is that ‘willing that…’ attains its ‘sense’
via the specification, as a theoretical concept, in some law in the
folk-science that agents use to explain their behaviour. Grice gets subtler
when he deals with mode-markers for the desiderative: for these are either
utterer-oriented, or addressee-oriented, and they may involve a buletic
attitude itself, or a doxastic attitude. When utterer-addressed, utterer wills
that utterer wills that p. There is no closure here, and indeed, a regressus ad
infinitum is what Grice wants, since this regressus allows him to get
univeersabilisability, in terms of conceptual, formal, and applicational kinds
of generality. In this he is being Kantian, and Hareian. While Grice praises
Kantotle, Aristotle here would stay unashamedly ‘teleological,’ and giving
priority to a will that may not be universalisable, since it’s the
communitarian ‘good’ that matters. what does Grice have to say about our
conversational practice? L and S have “πρᾶξις,” from “πράσσω,” and which they
render as ‘moral action,’ oποίησις, τέχνη;” “oποιότης,” “ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ π.,”
“oοἱ πολιτικοὶ λόγοι;” “ἔργῳ καὶ πράξεσιν, οὐχὶ λόγοις” Id.6.3; ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι
ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, “exhibited in actual life,” action in drama, “oλόγος;
“μία π. ὅλη καὶ τελεία.” With practical Grice means buletic. Praxis involves
acting, and surely Grice presupposes acting. By uttering, i. e. by the act of
uttering, expression x, U m-intends that p. Grice occasionally refers to action
and behaviour as the thing which an ascription of a psychological state
explains. Grice prefers the idiom of soul. Theres the ratiocinative soul.
Within the ratiocinative, theres the executive soul and the merely
administrative soul. Cicero had to translate Aristotle into prudentia, every
time Aristotle talked of phronesis. Grice was aware that the terminology
by Kant can be confusing. Kant used ‘pure’ reason for reason in the doxastic
realm. The critique by Kant of practical reason is hardly symmetrical to
his critique of doxastic reason. Grice, with his æqui-vocality thesis of
must (must crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide), Grice is being more
of a symmetricalist. The buletic, boulomaic, or volitive, is a part of the
soul, as is the doxatic or judicative. And judicative is a trick because there
is such a thing as a value judgement, or an evaluative judgement, which is
hardly doxastic. Grice plays with two co-relative operators: desirability
versus probability. Grice invokes the exhibitive/protreptic distinction he had
introduced in the fifth James lecture, now applied to psychological attitudes
themselves. This Grice’s attempt is to tackle the Kantian problem in the
Grundlegung: how to derive the categorical imperative from a counsel of
prudence. Under the assumption that the protasis is Let the agent be happy,
Grice does not find it obtuse at all to construct a universalisable imperative
out of a mere motive-based counsel of prudence. Grice has an earlier paper on
pleasure which relates. The derivation involves seven steps. Grice
proposes seven steps in the derivation. 1. It is a fundamental law of
psychology that, ceteris paribus, for any creature R, for any P and Q, if R
wills P Λ judges if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 2. Place this
law within the scope of a "willing" operator: R wills for any
P Λ Q, if R wills P Λ judges that if P, P as a result of Q,
R wills Q. 3. wills turns to should. If rational, R will have to block
unsatisfactory (literally) attitudes. R should (qua rational) judge for any
P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory to will that P Λ it is
satisfactory to judge that if P, P as a result of Q, it is sastisfactory to
will that Q. 4. Marking the mode: R should (qua rational) judge for any
P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that !P Λ that if it .P, .P
only as a result of Q, it is satisfactory that !Q. 5. via (p & q
-> r) -> (p -> (q -> r)): R should (qua rational)
judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that if .P, .P only
because Q, i is satisfactory that, if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 6. R
should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if P, P only because p
yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 7. For any P Λ Q if P,
P only because Q yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. Grice was
well aware that a philosopher, at Oxford, needs to be a philosophical
psychologist. So, wanting and needing have to be related to willing. A plant
needs water. A floor needs sweeping. So need is too broad. So is want, a non-Anglo-Saxon
root for God knows what. With willing things get closer to the rational soul.
There is willing in the animal soul. But when it comes to rational willing,
there must be, to echo Pritchard, a conjecture, some doxastic element. You
cannot will to fly, or will that the distant chair slides over the floor toward
you. So not all wants and needs are rational willings, but then nobody said
they would. Grice is interested in emotion in his power structure of the soul.
A need and a want may count as an emotion. Grice was never too interested in
needing and wanting because they do not take a that-clause. He congratulates
Urmson for having introduced him to the brilliant willing that … by Prichard.
Why is it, Grice wonders, that many ascriptions of buletic states take
to-clause, rather than a that-clause? Even mean, as ‘intend.’ In this Grice is
quite different from Austin, who avoids the that-clause. The explanation
by Austin is very obscure, like those of all grammars on the that’-clause, the
‘that’ of ‘oratio obliqua’ is not in every way similar to the ‘that’-clause in
an explicit performative formula. Here the utterer is not reporting his own
‘oratio’ in the first person singular present indicative active. Incidentally,
of course, it is not in the least necessary that an explicit performative verb
should be followed by a ‘that’-clause. In important classes of cases it is
followed by ‘to . . .,’ or by or nothing, e. g. ‘I apologize for…,’ ‘I salute
you.’ Now many of these verbs appear to be quite satisfactory pure
performatives. Irritating though it is to have them as such, linked with
clauses that look like statements, true or false, e. g., when I say ‘I prophesy
that …,’ ‘I concede that …’, ‘I
postulate that …,’ the clause following normally looks just like a statement,
but the verb itself seems to be pure performatives. One may
distinguish the performative opening part, ‘I state that …,’ which makes clear
how the utterance is to be taken, that it is a statement, as distinct from a
prediction, etc.), from the bit in the that-clause which is required to be true
or false. However, there are many cases which, as language stands at present,
we are not able to split into two parts in this way, even though the utterance
seems to have a sort of explicit performative in it. Thus, ‘I liken x to y,’ or
‘I analyse x as y.’ Here we both do the likening and assert that there is a
likeness by means of one compendious phrase of at least a quasi-performative
character. Just to spur us on our way, we may also mention ‘I know that …’, ‘I
believe that …’, etc. How complicated are these examples? We cannot assume that
they are purely descriptive, which has Grice talking of the pseudo-descriptive.
Want etymologically means absence; need should be preferred. The squarrel
(squirrel) Toby needs intake of nuts, and youll soon see gobbling them! There
is not much philosophical bibliography on these two psychological states Grice
is analysing. Their logic is interesting. Smith wants to play
cricket. Smith needs to play cricket. Grice is concerned with
the propositional content attached to the want and need predicate. Wants
that sounds harsh; so does need that. Still, there are propositional
attached to the pair above. Smith plays cricket. Grice took a very
cavalier attitude to what linguists spend their lives analysing. He
thought it was surely not the job of the philosopher, especially from a
prestigious university such as Oxford, to deal with the arbitrariness of
grammatical knots attached to this or that English verb. He rarely used English,
but stuck with ordinary language. Surely, he saw himself in the tradition
of Kantotle, and so, aiming at grand philosophical truths: not conventions of
usage, even his own! 1. Squarrel Toby has a nut, N, in front of him. 2.
Toby is short on squarrel food (observed or assumed), so, 3. Toby wills
squarrel food (by postulate of Folk Pyschological Theory θ connecting
willing with intake of N). 4. Toby prehends a nut as in front (from (1) by
Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ, if it is assumed that nut and in
front are familiar to Toby). 5. Toby joins squarrel food with gobbling, nut,
and in front (i.e. Toby judges gobbling, on nut in front, for squarrel food (by
Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ with the aid of prior
observation. So, from 3, 4 and 5, 6. Tobby gobbles; and since a nut is in front
of him, gobbles the nut in front of him. The system of values of the society to
which the agent belongs forms the external standard for judging the relative
importance of the commitments by the agent. There are three dimensions of
value: universally human, cultural that vary with societies and times; and
personal that vary with individuals. Each dimension has a standard for judging
the adequacy of the relevant values. Human values are adequate if they satisfy
basic needs; cultural values are adequate if they provide a system of values
that sustains the allegiance of the inhabitants of a society; and personal
values are adequate if the conceptions of well‐being
formed out of them enable individuals to live satisfying lives. These values
conflict and our well‐being requires some way of settling their conflicts, but
there is no universal principle for settling the conflicts; it can only be done
by attending to the concrete features of particular conflicts. These features
vary with circumstances and values. Grice reads Porter.The idea of the value
chain is based on the process view of organizations, the idea of seeing a
manufacturing (or service) organization as a system, made up of subsystems each
with inputs, transformation processes and outputs. Inputs, transformation
processes, and outputs involve the acquisition and consumption of resources –
money, labour, materials, equipment, buildings, land, administration and
management. How value chain activities are carried out determines costs and
affects profits.In his choice of value system and value sub-system, Grice is
defending objectivity, since it is usually the axiological relativist who uses
such a pretentious phrasing! More than a value may co-ordinate in a system. One
such is eudæmonia (cf. system of ends). The problem for Kant is the reduction
of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or
suppositional imperative. For Kant, a value tends towards the
Subjectsive. Grice, rather, wants to offer a metaphysical defence of objective
value. Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the Conversational
Immanuel. The keyword to search the H. P. Grice is ‘will,’ and ‘volitional,’
even ‘ill-will,’ (“Metaphysics and ill-will,” s. V, c. 7-f. 28) and ‘benevolence’
(vide below under ‘conversational benevolence”). Also ‘desirability’:
“Modality, desirability, and probability,” s. V, c. 8-ff. 14-15, and the
conference lecture in a different series, “Probability, desirability, and mood
operators,” s. II, c. 2-f.11). Grice
makes systematic use of ‘practical’ to contrast with the ‘alethic,’ too
(“Practical reason,” s. V, c. 9-f.1), The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
desideratum
of conversational candour: tThis includes the maximin. It should be noted that
candour is DESIRABLE. There is a desirability for candour. Candour is not a
given. Ditto for clarity. See conversational desideratum, simpliciter. A
rational desideratum is a desideratum by a rational agent and which he expects
from another rational agent. One should make the strongest move, and on the
other hand try not to mislead.Grice's Oxford "Conversation" Lectures,
1966Grice: Between Self-Love and Benevolence As I was saying (somewhere), Grice
uses "self-love", charmingly qualified with capitals, as "Conversational
Self-Love", and, less charmingly,
"Conversational Benevolence", in lectures advertised at
Oxford, as "Logic and
Conversation" that he gave at Oxford in 1964 as
"University Lecturer in
Philosophy". He also gave seminars on "Conversational helpfulness."
A number of the lectures by Grice include discussion of thetypes of behaviour
people in general exhibit, and thereforethe types of expectations[cfr.
owings]they might bring to a venture such as a conversation.Grice suggests that
people in general both exhibitand EXPECT a certain degree of helpfulness [--
alla Rosenschein, epistemic/boulemaic:If A cognizes that B wills p, then A
wills p.] "from OTHERS" [--
reciprocal vs. reflexive, etc.] usually on the understanding that such
helpfulness does NOT get in the way of particular goals and does not involve
undue effort cf. least effort? - cfr. Hobbes on self-love. It two people, even
complete strangers,are going through a gate, the expectation isthat the FIRST
ONE through will hold thegate open, or at least leave it open, for thesecond.
The expectation is such that todo OTHERWISE without particular reasonwould be
interpreted as RUDE. The type of helpfulness exhibited andexpected in
conversation is more specificbecause of a particular, although not a unique feature
of conversation.It is a COLLABORATIVE venture betweenthe participants.There is
a SHARED aimGrice wonders. His words, Does "helpfulness in something WE ARE
DOING TOGETHER” equate to 'cooperation'?He seems to have decided that it
does. By the later lectures in the series, 'the principle of conversational
helpfulness'has been rebranded the expectation of 'cooperation.' During the
Oxford lectures, Grice develops his account of the precise nature of this
cooperation. It can be seen as governed by certain regularities, or principles,
detailing expected behaviour. The expression'maxim' to describe these
regularities appears relatively late in the lectures.Grice's INITIAL choices of
terms are 'objectives' and 'desiderata'.He was particularly fond of the latter.
He was interested in detailing the desirable forms of behaviour for the purpose
of achieving a joint goal of the conversation. Initially, Grice posits TWO such
desiderata. Those relating to candour on the one hand and clarity on the other.
The desideratum of candour contains his general PRINCIPLE of making the
strongest (MAX) possible statement and, as a LIMITING (MAX) factor on this, the
suggestion that speakers should try not to mislead. (Do not mislead). cfr.
our"We are brothers"-- but not mutual."We are married to each
other". "You _are_ a boor".----The desideratum of conversational
clarity concerns the manner of expression. [His later reference to Modus or
Mode as used by Kant as one of the four
categories] for any conversational contribution. It includes the IMPORTANT
expectations of relevance to understanding and also insists that the main
import of an utterance be clear and explicit. (“Explicate!”) These two factors
are constantly to be WEIGHED against two
FUNDAMENTAL and SOMETIMES COMPETING DEMANDS. Contributions to a conversation
are aimed towards the agreed current purposes by the PRINCIPLE of Conversational
Benevolence. The principle of CONVERSATIONAL SELF-LOVE ensures the assumption
on the part of both participants that neither will go to unnecessary trouble
[LEAST EFFORT] in framing their contribution. This has been a topic of interest
to Noh end. In "Conversational Immanuel" Grice tries different ways
of making sense -- it is very easy to do so -- of Grice's distinctions that go
over the head of some linguists I know! Reasonable versus rational for example.
A Rawlsian distinction of sorts. Rational is too weak. We need 'reasonable'.
So, what sort of reasonableness is that which results from this harmonious, we
hope, clash of self-love and benevolence? Grice tried, wittily, to extend the
purposes of conversation to involve MUTUALLY INFLUENCING EACH OTHER -- a
reciprocal. (WoW, ii). And there's a mythical reconstruction of this in his
"Meaning Revisited" which he contributed to this symposium organised
by N. Smith on Mutua knowledge. But issues remains, we hope. The concept of
‘candour’is especially basic for Grice since it is constitutive of what it
means to identify the ‘significatum.’ As he notes, ‘false’ information is no
information. This is serious, because it has to do with the acceptum. A
contribution which is not trustworthy is not deemed a contribution. It is
conceptually impossible to intend to PROVIDE information if you are aware that
you are not being trustworthy and not conveying it. As for the degree of
explicitness, as Grice puts it. Since in communication in a certain fashion all
must be public, if an idea or thesis is heavily obscured, it can no longer be
regarded as having been propounded. This gives acceptum justification to the
correlative desideratum of conversational clarity. On top, if there is a level
of obscurity, the thing is not deemed to have been a communicatum or
significatum. It is all about confidence, you know. U expects A will find him
confident. Thus we find in Short and Lewis, “confīdo,” wich they render as
“to trust confidently in something,” and also, “confide in, rely firmly upon,
to believe, be assured of,” as an enhancing of “sperare,” in Cicero’s Att. 6,
9, 1. Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation. Urmson develops
this. They phrase in Urmson is "implied claim." Whenever U makes a
conversational contribution in a standard context, there is an implied claim to
U being trustworthy and reasonable. What do Grice and Urmson mean by an
"implied claim"? It is obvious enough, but they both love to expand.
Whenever U utters an expression which can be used to convey truth or falsehood
there is an implied claim to trustworthiness by U, unless the situation shows
that this is not so. U may be acting or reciting or incredulously echoing the
remark of another, or flouting the expectation. This, Grice and Urmson think,
may need an explanation. Suppose that U utters, in an ordinary
circumstance, ‘It will rain tomorrow,’ or ‘It rained yesterday,’ or ‘It is
raining.’ This act carries with it the claim that U should be trusted and
licenses A to believe that it will rain tomorrow. By this is meant that
just as it is understood that no U will give an order unless he is entitled to
give orders, so it is understood that no U will utter a sentence of a kind
which can be used to make a statement unless U is willing to claim that that
statement is true, and hence one would be acting in a misleading manner if one
uttered the sentence if he was not willing to make that claim. Here, the
predicate “implies that …,” Grice, Grant, Moore, Nowell-Smith, and Urmson
hasten to add, is being used in such a way that, if there is a an expectation
that a thing is done in Circumstance C, U implies that C holds if he does the thing.
The point is often made if not always in the terms Grice uses, and it is,
Urmson and Grice believe, in substance uncontroversial. Grice and Urmson wish
to make the point that, when an utterer U deploys a hedge with an indicative
sentence, there is not merely an implied claim that the whole statement is true
but also that is true. The implied or expressed claim by the utterer to
trustworthiness need not be very strong. The whole point of a hedge is to
modify or weaken (if not, as Grice would have it, flout) the claim by U to full
trustworthiness which would be implied by the unhedged assertion. But
even if U utters “He is, I suppose, at home;” or “I guess that the penny
will come down heads," U expresses, or for Urmson plainly implies, with
however little reason, that this is what U accepts as worth the trust by A. Now
Grice and Urmson meet an objection which is made by some philosophers to this
comparison. Grice and Urmson intend to meet the objection by a fairly detailed
examination of the example which they themselves would most likely
choose. In doing this Grice and Urmson further explain the use of a
parenthetical verb. The adverb is "probably" and the verb is “I
believe.” To say, that something is probable, the imaginary objector will say,
is to imply that it is reasonable to believe, that the evidence justifies a
guarded claim for the trust or trustworthiness of U and the truth of the
statement. But to say that someone else, a third person, believes something
does not imply that it is reasonable for U or A to believe it, nor that the
evidence justifies the guarded or implied claim to factivity or truth which U
makes. Therefore, the objector continues, the difference between the use
of “I believe” and “probably” is not, as Grice and Urmson suggest, merely one
of nuance and degree of impersonality. In one case, “probably,” reasonableness
is implied; in the other, “believe,” it is not. This objection is met by Grice
and Urmson. They do so by making a general point. To use the
rational-reasonable distinction in “Conversational implicature” and “Aspects,”
there is an implied claim by U to reasonableness. Further to an implied
claim to trust whenever a sentence is uttered in a standard context, now Grice
and Urmson add, to meet the sceptical objection about the contrast between
“probably” and “I believe” that, whenever U makes a statement in a standard
context there is an implied claim to reasonableness. This contention must be
explained alla Kant. Cf. Strawson on the presumption of conversational
relevance, and Austin, Moore, Nowell-Smith, Grant, and Warnock. To use
Hart’s defeasibility, and Hall’s excluder, unless U is acting or story-telling,
or preface his remarks with some such phrase as “I know Im being silly,
but …” or, “I admit it is unreasonable, but …” it is, Grice and
Urmson think, a presupposition or expectation of communication or conversation
that a communicator will not make a statement, thereby implying this trust,
unless he has some ground, however tenuous, for the statement. To
utter “The King is visiting Oxford tomorrow,” or “The President of the BA has a
corkscrew in his pocket,” and then, when asked why the utterer is uttering
that, to answer “Oh, for no reason at all,” would be to sin,
theologically, against the basic conventions governing the use of discourse.
Grice goes on to provide a Kantian justification for that, hence his amusing
talk of maxims and stuff. Therefore, Urmson and Grice think there is an
implied or expressed claim to reasonableness which goes with all our
statements, i.e. there is a mutual expectation that a communicator will not
make a statement unless he is prepared to claim and defend its reasonablenesss.
Cf. Grice’s desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the
over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly conversational
benevolence-cum-self-love). Grice thinks that the principle of
conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of
conversational self-love. The result is the overarching principle of
conversational helpfulness. Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of
conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide
by. Grice follows some observations by Warnock. The logical grammar
of “trust,” “candour,” “charity,” “sincerity,” “decency,” “honesty,” is subtle,
especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation: giving
and receiving information/influencing and being influenced by others. In both
sub-goals, trust is paramount. The explorations of trust has become an Oxonian
hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but Williams, and
others. Grice’s essay is entitled, “Trust, metaphysics, value.” Trust as a
corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness. In a given
conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is
operating, U is assumed by A to be trustworthy and candid. There are two
modes of trust, which relate to the buletic sub-goal and the doxastic sub-goal
which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures:
giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by
others. In both sub-goals, trust is key. In the doxastic realm, trust
has to do, not so much or only, with truth (with which the expression is
cognate), or satisfactoriness-value, but evidence and probability. In the
buletic realm, there are the dimensions of satisfactoriness-value (‘good’
versus ‘true’), and ‘ground’ versus evidence, which becomes less crucial. But
note that one is trustworthy regarding BOTH the buletic attitude and the
doxastic attitude. Grice mentions this or that buletic attitudes which is not
usually judged in terms of evidential support (“I vow to thee my country.”)
However, in the buletic realm, U is be assumed as trustworthy if U has the
buletic attitude he is expressing. The cheater, the insincere, the dishonest,
the untrustworthy, for Grice is not irrational, just repugnant. How immoral is
the idea that honesty is the best policy? Is Kant right in thinking there is no
right to refrain from trust? Surely it is indecent. For Kant, there is no
motivation or ‘motive,’ pure or impure, behind telling the truth – it’s just a
right, and an obligation – an imperative. Being trustworthy for Kant is
associated with a pure motive. Grice agrees. Decency comes into the picture. An
indecent agent may still be rational, but in such a case, conversation may
still be seen as rational (if not reasonable) and surely not be seen as
rational helpfulness or co-operation, but rational adversarial competition,
rather, a zero-sum game. Grice found the etymology of ‘decent’ too obscure.
Short and Lewis have “dĕcet,” which they deem cognate with Sanscrit “dacas,”
‘fame,’ and Grecian “δοκέω,‘to seem,’ ‘to think,’ and with Latin ‘decus,’
‘dingus.’ As an impersonal verb, Short and Lewis render it as ‘it is seemly,
comely, becoming,; it beseems, behooves, is fitting, suitable, proper (for syn.
v. debeo init.): decere quasi aptum esse consentaneumque tempori et personae,
Cic. Or. 22, 74; cf. also nunc quid aptum sit, hoc est, quid maxime deceat in
oratione videamus, id. de Or. 3, 55, 210 (very freq. and class.; not in
Caesar). Grice’s idea of decency is connected to his explorations on rational
and reasonable. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational. It is
just repulsive. Indecent, in other words. In all this, Grice is concerned
with ordinary language, and treasures Austin questioning Warnock, when Warnock
was pursuing a fellowship at Magdalen. “What would you say the difference is
between ‘Smith plays cricket rather properly’ and ‘Smith plays cricket rather
incorrectly’?” They spent the whole dinner over the subtlety. By desserts,
Warnock was in love with Austin. Cf. Grice on his prim and proper Aunt
Matilda. The exploration by Grice on trust is Warnockian in character, or vice
versa. In “Object of morality,” Warnock has trust as key, as indeed, the very
object of morality. Grice starts to focus on trust in an Oxford seminars on the
implicatum. If there is a desideratum of conversational candour, and the goal
of the principle of conversational helpfulness is that of giving and receiving
information, and influencing and being influenced by others, ‘false’
‘information’ is just no information – Since exhibiteness trumps protrepsis,
this applies to the buletic, too. Grice loved that Latin dictum, “tuus candor.”
He makes an early defence of this in his fatal objection to Malcolm. A
philosopher cannot intentionally instill a falsehood in his tutee, such as
“Decapitation willed the death of Charles I” (the alleged paraphrase of the
paradoxical philosopher saying that ‘causing’ is ‘willing’ and rephrasing
“Decapitation was the cause of the death of Charles I.” There is, for both
Grice and Apel, a transcendental (if weak) justification, not just utilitarian
(honesty as the best policy), as Stalnaker notes in his contribution to the
Grice symposium for APA. Unlike Apel, the transcendental argument is a weak one
in that Grice aims to show that conversation that did not abide by trust would
be unreasonable, but surely still ‘possible.’ It is not a transcendental
justification for the ‘existence’ of conversation simpliciter, but for the
existence of ‘reasonable,’ decent conversation. If we approach charity in the
first person, we trust ourselves that some of our beliefs have to be true, and
that some of our desires have to be satisfactory valid, and we are equally
trusted by our conversational partners. This is Grice’s conversational golden
rule. What would otherwise be the point of holding that conversation is
rational co-operation? What would be the point of conversation simpliciter?
Urmson follows Austin, so Austin’s considerations on this, notably in “Other
minds,” deserve careful examination. Urmson was of course a member of Grice’s
play group, and these are the philosophers that we consider top priority.
Another one was P. H. Nowell-Smith. At least two of his three rules deserve
careful examination. Nowell-Smith notes that this or that ‘rule’ of contextual
implication is not meant to be taken as a ‘rigid rule’. Unlike this or that
rule of entailment, a conversational rule can be broken without the utterer
being involved in self-contradiction or absurdity. When U uses an expression to
make a statement, it is contextually implied that he believes it to be true.
Similarly, when he uses it to perform any of the other jobs for which sentences
are used, it is contextually implied that he is using it for one of the jobs
that it normally does. This rule is often in fact broken. Anti-Kantian lying,
Bernhard-type play-acting, Andersen-type story-telling, and Wildeian irony is
each a case in which U breaks the rule, or flouts the expectation, either
overtly or covertly. But each of these four cases is a secondary use, i.e. a
use to which an expression cannot logically or conceptually be put unless, as
Hart would have it, it has a primary use. There is no limit to the possible
uses to which an expression may be put. In many cases a man makes his point by
deliberately using an expression in a queer way or even using it in the ‘sense’
opposite to its unique normal one, as in irony (“He is a fine friend,” implying
that he is a scoundrel). The distinction between a primary and a secondary use
is important because many an argument used by a philosopher consists in
pointing out some typical example of the way in which some expression E is
used. Such an argument is always illegitimate if the example employed is an
example of a secondary use, however common such a use may be. U contextually
implies that he has what he himself believes to be good reasons for his
statement. Once again, we often break this rule and we have special devices for
indicating when we are breaking it. Phrases such as ‘speaking offhand …,’ 'I do
not really know but …,’ and ‘I should be inclined to say that …,’ are used by
scrupulous persons to warn his addressee that U has not got what seem to him
good reasons for his statement. But unless one of these guarding phrases is
used we are entitled to believe that U believes himself to have good reasons
for his statement and we soon learn to *mistrust* people who habitually
infringe this rule. It is, of course, a mistake to infer from what someone says
categorically that he has in fact good reasons for what he says. If I tell you,
or ‘inform’ to you, that the duck-billed platypus is a bird (because I '
remember ' reading this in a book) I am unreliable; but I am not using language
improperly. But if I tell you this without using one of the guarding phrases
and without having what I think good reasons, I am. What U says may be assumed
to be relevant to the interests of his addressee. This is the most important of
the three rules; unfortunately it is also the most frequently broken. Bores are
more common than liars or careless talkers. This rule is particularly obvious
in the case of answers to questions, since it is assumed that the answer is an
answer. Not all statements are answers to questions; information may be
volunteered. Nevertheless the publication of a text-book on trigonometry
implies that the author believes that there are people who want to learn about trigonometry,
and to give advice implies a belief that the advice is relevant to one’s
addressee's problem. This rule is of the greatest importance for ethics. For
the major problem of ethics is that of bridging the gap between a decisions, an
ought-sentence, an injunction, and a sentence used to give advice on the one
hand and the statements of *fact*, sometime regarding the U’s soul, that
constitute the reasons for these on the other. It is in order to bridge these
gaps that insight into necessary synthetic connexions is invoked. This rule of
contextual implication may help us to show that there is no gap to be bridged
because the reason-giving sentence must turn out to be also *practical* from
the start and not a statement of *fact*, even concerning the state of the U’s
soul, from which a practical sentence can somehow be deduced. This rule is,
therefore, more than a rule of good manners; or rather it shows how, in matters
of ordinary language, rules of good manners shade into logical rules. Unless we
assume that it is being observed we cannot understand the connexions between
decisions, advice, and appraisals and the reasons given in support of them. Refs.: The main reference is in the first set of ‘Logic and
conversation.’ Many keywords are useful, not just ‘candour,’ but notably
‘trust.’ (“Rationality and trust,” c. 9-f. 5, “Trust, metaphysics, and value,”
c. 9-f. 20, and “Aristotle and friendship, rationality, trust, and decency,” c.
6-f. 18), BANC.
desideratum
of conversational clarity. If mutual expectation not to mislead and produce the
stronger contribution are characteristics of candour, expectation of mutual
relevance to interests, and being explicit and clear in your point are two
characteristics of this desideratum. “Candour” and “clarity’ are somewhat
co-relative for Grice. He is interested in identifying this or that
desideratum. By having two of them, he can play. So, how UNCLEAR can a
conversationalist be provided he WANTS to be candid? Candour trumps clarity.
But too much ‘unperspicuity’ may lead to something not being deemed an
‘implicatum’ at all. Grice is especially concerned with philosopher’s
paradoxes. Why would Strawson say that the usage of ‘not,’ ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘if,’
‘if and only if,’ ‘all,’ ‘some (at least one), ‘the,’ do not correspond to the
logician’s use? Questions of candour and clarity interact. Grice’s first
application, which he grants is not original, relates to “The pillar box seems
red” versus “The pillar box is red.” “I would not like to give the false
impression that the pillar box is not red” seems less clear than “The pillar
box is red” – Yet the unperspicuous contributin is still ‘candid,’ in the sense
that it expresses a truth. So one has to be careful. On top, philosophers like
Lewis were using ‘clarity is not enough’ as a battle cry! Grice’s favourite
formulations of the imperatives here are ‘self-contradictory,’ and for which he
uses ‘[sic]’, notably: “Be perspicuous [sic]’ and “Be brief. Avoid unnecessary
prolixity [sic].’
desirability:
This Grice calls the Jeffrey operator. If Urmson likes ‘probably,’ Grice likes
‘desirably.’ This theorem is a corollary of the desirability axiom by Jeffrey,
which is: "If prob XY = 0, for a prima facie PF(A V B) A (x E w)] = PFA A (x E w)] + PfB A
(x El+ w)]. This is the account by Grice of the adaptability of a pirot to its
changeable environs. Grice borrows the notion of probability (henceforth,
“pr”) from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic of the
notion. Grice abbreviates probability by Pr. and compares it to a buletic operator
‘pf,’ ‘for prima facie,’ attached to ‘De’ for desirability. A rational agent
must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his
action. For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial.
Grice symbolises this by d: probability in degree d; probability in degree
d. The topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and
connects with his genitorial programme of creature construction (Pology.): life
as continued operancy. Grice was fascinated with life (Aristotle, bios) because
bios is what provides for Aristotle the definition (not by genus) of
psyche. The steps are as follows. Pf(p ⊃!q)/Pr(p
⊃ q); pf((p1 ^ p2) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^ p2 ⊃q); pf((p1 ^ p2 ^ p3) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^ p2 ^ p3 ^ p4 ⊃q);
pf (all things before me ⊃!q)/pr (all things before me ⊃
q); pf (all things considered ⊃ !q)/pr(all things considered ⊃ q); !q/|- q; G wills !q/G judges q. Strictly, Grice avoids
using the noun probability (other than for the title of this or that lecture).
One has to use the sentence-modifier ‘probably,’ and ‘desirably.’ So the
specific correlative to the buletic prima facie ‘desirably’ is the doxastic ‘probably.’
Grice liked the Roman sound to ‘prima facie,’ ‘at first sight’: “exceptio, quae prima facie justa videatur.” Refs.:
The two main sources are “Probability, desirability, and mood operators,” c.
2-f. 11, and “Modality, desirability and probability,” c. 8-ff. 14-15. But most
of the material is collected in “Aspects,” especially in the third and fourth
lectures. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
deutero-esperanto:
Arbitrariness need not be a two-party thing. E communicates to himself that
there is danger by drawing a skull. Grice genially opposed to the idea of a
convention. He hated a convention. A language is not conventional. Meaning is
not conventional. Communication is not conventional. He was even unhappy with
the account of convention by Lewis in terms of an arbitrary co-ordination.
While the co-ordination bit passes rational muster, the arbitrary element is
deemed a necessary condition, and Grice hated that. For Grice there is natural,
and iconic. When a representation ceases to be iconic and becomes, for lack of
a better expression, non-iconic, things get, we may assume conventional. One
form of correlation in his last definition of meaing allows for a conventional
correlation. “Pain!,” the P cries. There is nothing in /pein/ that minimally
resembles the pain the P is suffering. So from his involuntary “Ouch” to his
simulated “Ouch,” he thinks he can say “Pain.” Bennett explored the stages after
that. The dog is shaggy is Grices example. All sorts of resultant procedures
are needed for reference and predication, which may be deemed conventional. One
may refer nonconventionally, by ostension. It seems more difficult to predicate
non-conventionally. But there may be iconic predication. Urquhart promises
twelve parts of speech: each declinable in eleven cases, four numbers, eleven
genders (including god, goddess, man, woman, animal, etc.); and conjugable in
eleven tenses, seven moods, and four voices. The language will translate any
idiom in any other language, without any alteration of the literal sense, but
fully representing the intention. Later, one day, while lying in his bath,
Grice designed deutero-esperanto. The obble is fang may be current only
for Griceian members of the class of utterers. It is only this or that
philosophers practice to utter The obble is fang in such-and-such
circumstances. In this case, the utterer U does have a readiness to utter The
obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances. There is also the scenario in
which The obble is fang is may be conceived by the philosopher not to be deemed
current at all, but the utterance of The obble is feng in such-and-such
circumstances is part of some system of communication which the utterer U
(Lockwith,, Urquart, Wilkins, Edmonds, Grice) has devised but which has never
been put into operation, like the highway code which Grice invent another day
again while lying in his bath. In that case, U does this or that basic or
resultant procedure for the obble is feng in an attenuated but philosophically
legitimate fashion. U has envisaged a possible system of practices which
involve a readiness to utter Example by Grice that does NOT involve a convention
in this usage. Surely Grice can as he indeed did, invent a language, call
it Deutero-Esperanto, Griceish, or Pirotese, which nobody at Oxford ever uses
to communicat. That makes Grice the authority - cf. arkhe, authority,
government (in plural), "authorities" - and Grice can lay down, while
lying in the tub, no doubt - what is proper. A P can be said to potch of
some obble o as fang or as feng. Also to cotch of some obble o, as fang or
feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o as being fid to one
another.” In symbols: (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ potch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^
potch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Ox ^ cotch(x,
y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oz ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, fid(y,z)). Let’s say that Ps (as
Russell and Carnap conceived them) inhabit a world of obbles, material
objects, or things. To potch is something like to perceive; to cotch something
like to think. Feng and fang are possible descriptions, much like our
adjectives. Fid is a possible relation between obbles. Grice provides a
symbolisation for content internalisation. The perceiver or cognitive
Subjects perceives or cognises two objects, x, y, as holding a relation of some
type. There is a higher level that Ps can reach when the object of their
potchings and cotchings is not so much objects but states of affairs. Its
then that the truth-functional operators will be brought to existence “^”:
cotch(p ^ q) “V”: cotch(p v q) “)”: )-cotch(p ) q) A P will be able
to reject a content, refuse-thinking: ~. Cotch(~p). When P1 perceives P2, the
reciprocals get more complicated. P2 cotches that P1!-judges that
p. Grice uses ψ1 for potching and ψ2
for cotching. If P2 is co-operative, and abides by "The Ps Immanuel,"
P2 will honour, in a Kantian benevolent way, his partners goal by adopting
temporarily his partners goal potch(x (portch(y, !p)) ⊃ potch(x, !p). But by then, its hardly simpler
ways. Especially when the Ps outdo their progenitor Carnap as metaphysicians.
The details are under “eschatology,” but the expressions are here “α izzes α.” This
would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. P1 applies it war, and
utters War is war which yields a most peculiar implicature. “if α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ, α izz γ.” This is transitivity, which is
crucial for Ps to overcome Berkeley’s counterexample to Locke, and define their
identity over time. “if α hazzes β, α izzes β.” Or, what is accidental is not
essential. A P may allow that what is essential is accidental while misleading,
is boringly true. “α hazzes β iff α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β.” “If β is a katholou or universalium, β is
an eidos or forma.” For surely Ps need not be stupid to fail to see
squarrelhood. “if α hazzes β ∧ α
izzes a particular, γ≠α ∧ α izz β.” “α izzes predicable
of β iff ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α). “α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α α
izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α). α = β iff α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α. “α izzes an atomon, or individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α
izzes β). “α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α)). α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α). α izzes some-thing ⊃ α
izzes an individuum. α izzes an eidos or forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium); α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α). “ α izzes essentially predicable of α α izzes accidentally
predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β. ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of
β) ⊃ α ≠ β. α izzes an kathekaston or particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum; α izz a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izz α). ~(∃x).(x
izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma) ⊢ α
izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α). x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izzes β); α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β
hazzes α); α izzes a forma ∧ β
izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazzes A); (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ
izzes essentially predicable of α). (∃x)
(∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y
izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing). (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing). α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β
izzes essentially predicable of α). (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ α
izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β. Grice
is following a Leibnizian tradition. A philosophical language is any
constructed language that is constructed from first principles or certain
ideologies. It is considered a type of engineered language.
Philosophical languages were popular in Early Modern times, partly motivated by
the goal of recovering the lost Adamic or Divine language. The term
“ideal language” is sometimes used near-synonymously, though more modern
philosophical languages such as “Toki Pona” are less likely to involve such an
exalted claim of perfection. It may be known as a language of pure
ideology. The axioms and grammars of the languages together differ from
commonly spoken languages today. In most older philosophical languages,
and some newer ones, words are constructed from a limited set of morphemes that
are treated as "elemental" or fundamental. "Philosophical language"
is sometimes used synonymously with "taxonomic language", though more
recently there have been several conlangs constructed on philosophical
principles which are not taxonomic. Vocabularies of oligo-synthetic
communication-systems are made of compound expressions, which are coined from a
small (theoretically minimal) set of morphemes; oligo-isolating
communication-systems, such as Toki Pona, similarly use a limited set of root
words but produce phrases which remain s. of distinct words. Toki Pona is
based on minimalistic simplicity, incorporating elements of Taoism. Láadan is
designed to lexicalize and grammaticalise the concepts and distinctions
important to women, based on muted group theory. A priori languages are
constructed languages where the vocabulary is invented directly, rather than
being derived from other existing languages (as with Esperanto, or Grices
Deutero-Esperanto, or Pirotese or Ido). It all starts when Carnap claims to
know that pritos karulise elatically. Grice as engineer. Pirotese is the
philosophers engaging in Pology. Actually, Pirotese is the lingo the Ps parrot.
Ps karulise elatically. But not all of them. Grice finds that the Pological
talk allows to start from zero. He is constructing a language,
(basic) Pirotese, and the philosophical psychology and world that that language
is supposed to represent or denote. An obble is a Ps object. Grice
introduces potching and cotching. To potch, in Pirotese, is what a P does with
an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is Pirotese for what a P can further do
with an obble: know or cognise it. Cotching, unlike potching, is
factive. Pirotese would not be the first language invented by a
philosopher. Refs.: While the reference to “Deutero-Esperanto’ comes from
“Meaning revisited,” other keywords are useful, notably “Pirotese” and
“Symbolo.” Also keywords like “obble,” and “pirot.” The H. P. Grice Papers,
BANC.
diagoge:
Cf. Grice’s emphasis on the ‘argument’ involved in the conversational
implciatum, though. To work out an impilcatum is to reach it ‘by argument.’ No
argument, no conversational implicatum. But cf. argument in Emissor draws skull
and communicates that there is danger. ARGUMENT involved in that Emissor
intends his addressee WILL REASON. Can the lady communicate to the pigeons that
she is selling ‘twopence a bag’ for their pleasure? Grice contrasted epagoge
with diagoge. Cooperation with competition. Cooperative game with competitive
game. But epagoge is induction, so here we’ll consider his views on probability
and how it contrastds with diagoge. The diagoge is easy to identity: Grice is a
social animal, with the BA, Philosophy, conferences, discussion, The American
Philosophical Association, transcripts by Randall Parker, from the audio-tapes
contained in c. 10 within the same s. IV miscellaneous, Beanfest, transcripts
and audio-cassettes, s. IV, c. 6-f. 8, and f. 10, and s. V, c. 8-f. 4-8 Unfortunately, Parker typed carulise
for karulise, or not. Re: probability, Grice loves to reminisce an anecdote
concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked Mills principles
to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word
play, Grice would speak of not bringing more Grice to your Mill. Mills
System of Logic was part of the reading material for his degree in Lit.
Hum.at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents the best
of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive
methodology. In his Life and opinions he mentions some obscure essays by
Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was interested in Kneales secondary
induction, since Grice saw this as an application of a construction routine.
He was also interested in Keyness notion of a generator property, which he
found metaphysically intriguing. Induction. Induction ‒ Mill’s
Induction, induction, deduction, abduction, Mill. More Grice to the Mill.
Grice loved Hardies playing with Mill’s method of difference with an Oxford
copper. He also quotes Kneale and Keynes on induction. Note that his seven-step
derivation of akrasia relies on an inductive step! Grice was fortunate to
associate with Davidson, whose initial work is on porbability. Grice borrows from
Davidson the idea that inductive probability, or probable, attaches to the
doxastic, while prima facie attaches to desirably, or
desirability. Jeffreys notion of desirability is partition-invariant
in that if a proposition, A, can be expressed as the disjoint disjunction of
both {B1, B2, B3} and {C1, C2, C3}, ∑ Bi ∈ AProb
(Bi ∣∣ A). Des (Bi) = ∑Ci ∈ A
Prob (Ci ∣∣ A). Des (Ci). It follows that applying the rule
of desirability maximization will always lead to the same recommendation,
irrespective of how the decision problem is framed, while an alternative theory
may recommend different courses of action, depending on how the decision
problem is formulated. Here, then, is the analogue of Jeffreys
desirability axiom (D), applied to sentences rather than propositions: (D)
(prob(s and t) = 0 and prob(s or t) "# 0, ⊃ d ( ) prob(s)des(s)+ prob(t)des(t) es s or t
=-"---- prob( s) + prob(t ) (Grice writes prob(s) for the Subjectsive
probability of sand des(s) for the desirability or utility of s.) B. Jeffrey
admits that "desirability" (his terms for evidential value) does not
directly correspond to any single pre-theoretical notion of desire. Instead, it
provides the best systematic explication of the decision theoretic idea, which
is itself our best effort to make precise the intuitive idea of weighing
options. As Jeffrey remarks, it is entirely possibly to desire someone’s love
when you already have it. Therefore, as Grice would follow, Jeffrey has the
desirability operator fall under the scope of the probability operator. The
agents desire that p provided he judges that p does not obtain.
Diagoge/epagoge, Grices audio-files, the audio-files, audio-files of various
lectures and conferences, some seminars with Warner and J. Baker, audio files
of various lectures and conferences. Subjects: epagoge, diagoge. A
previous folder in the collection contains the transcripts. These are the
audio-tapes themselves, obviously not in folder. The kind of metaphysical
argument which I have in mind might be said, perhaps, to exemplify a dia-gogic
or trans-ductive as opposed to epa-gogic or in-ductive approach to
philosophical argumentation. Hence Short and Lewis have, for ‘diagoge,’ the
cognates of ‘trādūco,’ f. transduco. Now, the more emphasis is placed on
justification by elimination of the rival, the greater is the impetus given to
refutation, whether of theses or of people. And perhaps a greater emphasis on a
diagogic procedure, if it could be shown to be justifiable, would have an
eirenic effect. Cf. Aristotle on diagoge, schole, otium. Liddell and Scott
have “διαγωγή,” which they render as “literally carrying across,” -- “τριήρων”
Polyaen.5.2.6, also as “carrying through,” and “hence fig.” “ἡ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν
δ., “taking a person through a subject by instruction, Pl. Ep.343; so, course
of instruction, lectures, ἐν τῇ ἐνεστώσῃ δ. prob. in Phld. Piet.25; also
passing of life, way or course of life, “δ. βίου” Pl. R.344e: abs., Id.
Tht.177a, etc., way of passing time, amusement, “δ. μετὰ παιδιᾶς” Arist. EN
1127b34, cf. 1177a27; “δ. ἐλευθέριος” Id. Pol.1339b5; διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν public
pastimes, ib.1280b37, cf. Plu.126b (pl.). also delay, D.C. 57.3. management,
τῶν πραγμάτων δ. dispatch of business, Id.48.5. IV. station for ships, f. l. in
Hdn.4.2.8. And there are other entries to consider: διαγωγάν: διαίρεσιν,
διανομήν, διέλευσιν. Grice knew what he was talking about! Refs.: The main
sources listed under ‘desirability,’ above. There is a specific essay on
‘probability and life.’ Good keywords, too, are epagoge and induction The H. P.
Grice Papers, BANC.
Diaphaneity
Grice unique in his subtlety. Strawson and Wiggins. 'the quality of being
freely pervious to light; transparency', OED. This is a crucial concept for Grice. He applies it ‘see,’ which
which, after joint endeavours with G. J. Warnock, he was obsessed! Grice
considers the ascription, “Warnock sees that it is raining.” And then he adds,
“And it is true, I see that it is raining, too.” What’s the diference. Then
comes Strawson. “Strawson, you see that it is raining, right?” So we have an
ascription in the first, second, and third persons. When it comes to the
identification of a sense (like vision) via experience or qualia, we are at a
problem, because ‘see,’ allowing for what Ryle calls a ‘conversational avowal,’
that nobody has an authority to distrust, is what Grice calls a ‘diaphanous’
predicate. More formally. That means that “Grice sees that it is raining,” in
terms of experience, cannot really be expanded except by expanding into WHAT IS
that Grice sees, viz. that it is raining. The same with “communicating that p,”
and “meaning that p.”
dictum:
Cf. dictor, and dictivenss. Not necessarily involved with ‘say,’ but with
‘deixis,’ So a dictum is involved in Emissor E drawing a skull, communicating
that there is danger. It is Hare who introduced ‘dictum’ in the Oxonian
philosophical literature in his T. H. Green Essay. Hare distinguishes between
the ‘dictum,’ that the cat is on the mat, from the ‘dictor,’ ‘I state that the
cat is on the mat, yes.’ ‘Cat, on the mat, please.’ Grice often refers to
Hare’s play with words, which he obviously enjoys. In “Epilogue,” Grice
elaborates on the ‘dictum,’ and turns it into ‘dictivitas.’ How does he coin
that word? He starts with Cicero, who has ‘dictivm,’ and creates an abstract
noun to match. Grice needs a concept of a ‘dictum’ ambiguous as it is. Grice
distinguishes between what an Utterer explicitly conveys, e. g. that Strawson
took off his boots and went to bed. Then there’s what Grice implicitly conveys,
to wit: that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed – in that order. Surely
Grice has STATED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Grice has
ASSERTED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. But if Grice were to
order Strawson: “Put on your parachute and jump!” the implicata may differ. By
uttering that utterance, Grice has not asserted or stated anything. So Grice
needs a dummy that will do for indicatives and imperatives. ‘Convey’ usually
does – especially in the modality ‘explicitly’ convey. Because by uttering that
utterance Grice has explicitly conveyed that Strawson is to put on his
parachute and jump. Grice has implicitly conveyd that Strawson is to put on his
parachute and THEN jump, surely.
disgrice: In PGRICE, Kemmerling speaks of disgricing as
the opposite of gricing. The first way to disgrice Kemmerling calls
‘strawsonising.’For Strawson, even the resemblance (for Grice, equivalence in
terms of 'iff' -- cf. his account of what an syntactically structured
non-complete expression) between (G) There is not a single volume in
my uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’and the negatively
existential form (LFG) ~ (Ex)(Ax . ~ Bx)’ is deceptive, ‘It is not
the case that there exists an x such
that x is a book in Grice’s uncle’s library and x is written by an Englishman. FIRST, 'There is not a single volume in uncle’s
library which is not by an English author' --
as normally used, carries the presupposition -- or entails, for Grice -- (G2) Some (at least one) book is in
Grice’s uncle’s library. SECOND, 'There is not a single volume in
Grice’s uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’ is far from being
'entailed' by (G3e) It is not the case that there is some (at least one)
book in my room. If we give ‘There not a
single book in my room which is not by an English author’ the modernist
logical form ‘~ (Ex)(Ax .~ Bx),’ we see
that this is ENTAILED by the
briefer, and indeed logicall stronger (in terms of entailments) ~ (Ex)Ax. So when Grice, with a solemn face, utters, ‘There
is not a single foreign volume in my uncle’s library, to reveal later that the library is empty, Grice should expect
his addressee to get some odd feeling. Surely not the feeling of having been
lied to -- or been confronted with an initial false utterance --, because we have
not. Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort
of communicative outrage." "What you say is outrageous!" This
sounds stronger than it is. An outrage is believed to be an evil deed, offense,
crime; affront, indignity, act not within established or reasonable
limits," of food, drink, dress, speech, etc., from Old French outrage "harm, damage;
insult; criminal behavior; presumption, insolence, overweening" (12c.),
earlier oltrage (11c.),
From Vulgar Latin ‘ultraticum,’
excess," from Latin ultra,
beyond" (from suffixed form of PIE root *al- "beyond"). Etymologically, "the passing
beyond reasonable bounds" in any sense. The meaning narrowed in English
toward violent excesses because of folk etymology from out + rage. Of injuries to feelings,
principles, etc., from outrage, v. outragen,
"to go to excess, act immoderately," from outrage (n.) or from Old
French oultrager. From
1580s with meaning "do violence to, attack, maltreat." Related: Outraged; outraging. But Strawson gets the feeling
of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage.” When
Grice was only trying to tutor him in The Organon. Of course it is not the
case that Grice is explicitly conveying or expressing that there there is some
(at least one) book in his uncle's room. Grice has not said anything
false. Or rather, it is not the case that Grice utters an utterance which
is not alethically or doxastically satisfactory. Yet what Grice gives
Strawson the defeasible, cancellable, license to to assume that Grice
thinks there is at least one book. Unless he goes on to cancel the implicature,
Grice may be deemed to be misleading Strawson. What Grice explicitly conveys to
be true (or false) it is necessary (though not sufficient) that there should at
least one volume in his uncle’s library -- It is not the case that my uncle has
a library and in that library all the books are autochthonous to England, i.e.
it is not the case that Grice’s uncle has a library; for starters, it is not
the case that Grice has a literate uncle. Of this SUBTLE, nuantic, or cloudy or
foggy, "slight or delicate degree of difference in expression, feeling,
opinion, etc.," from Fr. nuance "slight difference, shade of colour,” from nuer "to
shade," from nue "cloud," from Gallo-Roman nuba, from
Latin nubes "a
cloud, mist, vapour," sneudh- "fog," source also of
Avestan snaoda "clouds,"
Latin obnubere "to
veil," Welsh nudd "fog," Greek nython, in
Hesychius "dark, dusky") According to Klein, the French usage is a
reference to "the different colours of the clouds,” in reference to color
or tone, "a slight variation in shade; of music, as a French term in
English -- 'sort' is the relation between ‘There is not a volume in my
uncle's library which is not by an English author,’ and ‘My uncle's library
is not empty. RE-ENTER GRICE. Grice suggested that Strawson see such a fine
point such as that, which Grice had the kindness to call an 'implicatum', the
result of an act of an ‘implicatura’ (they were both attending Kneale’s seminar
on the growth and ungrowth of logic) is irrelevant to the issue of
‘entailment’. It is a 'merely pragmatic’ implicatum, Grice would say, bringing
forward a couple of distinctions: logical/pragmatic point; logical/pragmatic
inference; entailment/implicatum; conveying explicitly/conveying implicitly;
stating/implicating; asserting/implying; what an utterer means/what the
expression 'means' -- but cf. Nowell-Smith, who left Oxford after being
overwhelmed by Grice, "this is how the rules of etiquette inform the rules
of logic -- on the 'rule' of relevance in "Ethics," 1955. If to call
such a point, as Grice does, as "irrelevant to logic" is vacuous in
that it may be interpreted as saying that that such a fine foggy point is not
considered in a modernist formal system of first-order predicate calculus with
identity, this Strawson wishes not to dispute, but to emphasise. Call it his
battle cry! But to 'logic' as concerned with this or that relation between this
or that general class of statement occurring in ordinary use, and the attending
general condition under which this or that statement is correctly called 'true'
or 'false,' this fine foggy nice point would hardly be irrelevant. GRICE'S
FORMALIST (MODERNIST) INTERPRETATION. Some 'pragmatic' consideration, or
assumption, or expectation, a desideratum of conversational conduct obviously underlies
and in fact 'explains' the implicatum, without having to change the ‘sense’ of
Aristotle’s syllogistics in terms of the logical forms of A, E, I, and O. If we
abide by an imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally
giving and receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by
others in the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the
effect, ‘Thou shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou
canst truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’ Assume the
form ‘There is not a single … which is not . . .,’ or ‘It is not the case
that ... there is some (at least one) x that ... is not ... is introduced
in ‘ordinary’ language with the same SENSE as the expression in the
‘ideal’ language, ~(Ex)(Ax and ~Bx). Then prohibition inhibits the utterance of
the form where the utterer can truly and truthfully simply convey
explicitly ‘There is not a single ..., i. e. ~(Ex)(Fx). It is
defeasible prohibition which tends to confer on the overprolixic form ('it is
not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that is not ...') just
that kind of an implicatum which Strawson identifies. But having
detected a nuance in a conversational phenomenon is not the same thing as
rushing ahead to try to explain it BEFORE exploring in some detail what kind of
a nuance it is. The mistake is often commited by Austin, too (in "Other Minds,"
and "A Plea for Excuses"), and by Hart (on 'carefully'), and by Hare
(on "good"), and by Strawson on 'true,' (Analysis), ‘the,’ and 'if --
just to restrict to the play group. Grice tries to respond to anti-sense-datum
in "That pillar box seems red to me,” but Strawson was not listening. The overprolixic form in the ‘ordinary’
language, ‘It is not the case that there is some (at least one x) such that ...
x is not ...’ would tend, if it does not remain otiose, to develop or generate
just that baffling effect in one's addressee ('outrage!') that Strawson identifies,
as opposed to the formal-device in the ‘ideal’ language with which the the
‘ordinary’ language counterpart is co-related. What weakens our resistance
to the negatively existential analysis in this case more than in the case of the
corresponding "All '-sentence is the powerful attraction of the negative
opening phrase There is not …'. To avoid misunderstanding one may
add a point about the neo-traditionalist interpretation of the forms of the traditional
Aristotelian system. Strawson is not claiming that it faithfully
represents this or that intention of the principal exponent of the Square of
Opposition. Appuleius, who knows, was perhaps, more interested in formulating
this or that theorem governing this or that logical relation of this or that
more imposing general statement than this or that everyday general statement
that Strawson considers. Appuleius, who knows, might have
been interested, e. g., in the logical powers of this or that
generalisation, or this or that sentence which approximates more closely to the
desired conditions that if its utterance by anyone, at any time, at any place,
results in a true statement, so does its utterance by anyone else, at any other
time, at any other place. How far the account by the neo-traditionalist
of this or that general sentence of 'ordinary' langauge is adequate for every
generalization may well be under debate. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “In defence of
Appuleius,” BANC.
disimplicatum:
the target is of course Davidson having the cheek to quote Grice’s Henriette
Herz Trust lecture for the BA! Lewis and Short have ‘intendere’ under ‘in-tendo,’
which they render as ‘to stretch out or forth, extend, also to turn ones
attention to, exert one’s self for, to purpose, endeavour,” and finaly as “intend”!
“pergin, sceleste, intendere hanc arguere?” Plaut. Mil. 2, 4, 27 Grices
tends towards claiming that you cannot extend what you dont intend. In the
James lectures, Grice mentions the use of is to mean seem (The tie is red in
this light), and see to mean hallucinate. The reductive analyses of being and
seeing hold. We have here two cases of loose use (or disimplicature). Same now
with his example in “Intention and Uncertainty” (henceforth, “Uncertainty”): Smith
intends to climb Mt. Everest + [common-ground status: this is difficult].
Grices response to Davidsons pretty unfair use of Grices notion of
conversational implicature in Davidsons analysis of intention caught a lot of
interest. Pears loved Grices reply. Implicatum here is out of the question ‒
disimplicatum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is too
social to be true when applied to intending. The doxastic condition is one of
the entailments in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an
implicatum can. If it can be cancelled, it is best seen as a disimplicatum, or
a loose use by an utterer meaning less than what he says or explicitly conveys
to more careful conversants. Grice and Davidson were members of The Grice
and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society. Davidson, not being Oxonian, was
perhaps not acquainted with Grices polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire
(where Grice sided with Pears, rather). Grice and Pears hold a minimalist
approach to intending. On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees
as the same mistake again of building certainty into the concept. Grice
finds that to apply the idea of a conversational implicatum at this point is
too social to be true. Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational
disimplicatum: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and
knees. The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may
involve a loose use of intends. The certainty on the agents part on the
success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt. Davidson was claiming
that the agents belief in the probability of the object of the agents intention
was a mere conversational implicatum on the utterers part. Grice responds
that the ascription of such a belief is an entailment of a strict use of
intend, even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational
disimplicatum, it can be dropped. The addressee will still regard
the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness. Pears
was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending, disimplicature,
disimplicature. Strictly, a section of his reply to Davidson. If Grices claim
to fame is implicature, he finds disimplicature an intriguing notion to capture
those occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include:
a loose use of intending (without the entailment of the doxastic condition),
the uses of see in Shakespeareian contexts (Macbeth saw Banquo, Hamlet saw his
father on the ramparts of Elsinore) and the use of is to mean seems (That tie
is blue under this light, but green otherwise, when both conversants know that
a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with Youre the cream in my
coffee being an utterance where the disimplicature (i.e. entailment dropping)
is total. Disimplicature does not appeal to a new principle of conversational
rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of conversational
helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. In everyday explanation we exploit, as Grice notes,
an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as
the wanting family. This wanting family includes expressions like want, desire,
would like to, is eager to, is anxious to, would mind not…, the idea of appeals to me, is thinking of, etc. As Grice
remarks, The likeness and differences within this wanting family demand careful
attention. In commenting on Davidsons treatment of wanting in
Intending, Grice notes: It seems to Grice that the picture of the soul
suggested by Davidsons treatment of wanting is remarkably tranquil and, one
might almost say, computerized. It is the picture of an ideally decorous board
meeting, at which the various heads of sections advance, from the standpoint of
their particular provinces, the case for or against some proposed course of
action. In the end the chairman passes judgement, effective for action;
normally judiciously, though sometimes he is for one reason or another
over-impressed with the presentation made by some particular member. Grices
soul doesnt seem to him, a lot of the time, to be like that at all. It is more
like a particularly unpleasant department meeting, in which some members shout,
wont listen, and suborn other members to lie on their behalf; while the
chairman, who is often himself under suspicion of cheating, endeavours to
impose some kind of order; frequently to no effect, since sometimes the meeting
breaks up in disorder, sometimes, though it appears to end comfortably, in
reality all sorts of enduring lesions are set up, and sometimes, whatever the outcome
of the meeting, individual members go off and do things unilaterally. Could it
be that Davidson, of the New World, and Grice, of the Old World, have different
idiolects regarding intend? Could well be! It is said that the New World is
prone to hyperbole, so perhaps in Grices more cautious use, intend is
restricted to the conditions HE wants it to restrict it too! Odd that for all
the generosity he displays in Post-war Oxford philosophy (Surely I can help you
analyse you concept of this or that, even if my use of the corresponding
expression does not agree with yours), he goes to attack Davidson, and just for
trying to be nice and apply the conversational implicatum to intend! Genial
Grice! It is natural Davidson, with his naturalistic tendencies, would like to
see intending as merely invoking in a weak fashion the idea of a strong
psychological state as belief. And its natural that Grice hated that! Refs.:
The source is Grice’s comment on Davidson on intending. The H. P. Grice Papers,
BANC.
disjunctum: Strangely enough Ariskant thought
disjunctum, but not conjunctum a categorial related to the category of
‘community’!Aulus Gellius (The Attic Nights, XVI, 8) tells us about this
disjunction: “There also is ■ another type of a^twpa which the Greeks call and
we call disjunctum, disjunctive sentence. Gellius notes that ‘or’ is by default
‘inclusive’: where one or several propositions may be simultaneously true,
without ex- cluding one another, although they may also all be false. Gellius
expands on the non-default reading of exclusive disjunction: pleasure is either
good or bad or it is neither good nor bad (“Aut malum est voluplas, aut bonum,
aul neque bonum, neque malum est”). All the elements of the exclusive
disjunctive exclude one another, and their contradictory elements, Gr.
avTtxs'-p.sva, are incompatible with one another”. “Ex omnibus quae
disjunguntiir, unum esse verum debet, falsa cetera.”Grice lists ‘or’ as the
second binary functor in his response to Strawson. But both Grice and Strawson
agreed that the Oxonian expert on ‘or’ is Wood. Mitchell is good, too, though. The
relations between “v” and “or” (or “either ... or …”) are, on the whole, less
intimate than those between “.” and “and,” but less distant than those between
“D” and “if.” Let us speak of a statement made by coupling two clauses by “or” as
an alternative statement ; and let us speak of the first and second alternatesof
such a statement, on analogy with our talk of the antecedent and consequent of
a hypothetical statement. At a bus-stop, someone might say: “Either we catch
this bus or we shall have to walk all the way home.” He might equally well have
said “If we don't catch this bus, we shall have to walk all the way home.” It
will be seen that the antecedent of the hypothetical statement he might have
made is the negation of the first alternate of the alternative statement he did
make. Obviously, we should not regard our catching the bus as a sufficient
condition of the 'truth' of either statement; if it turns out that the bus we
caught was not the last one, we should say that the man who had made the
statement had been wrong. The truth of one of the alternates is no more a
sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement than the falsity
of the antecedent is a sufficient condition of the truth of the hypothetical
statement. And since 'p"Dpyq' (and, equally, * q"3p v q ') is a law
of the truth-functional system, this fact sufficiently shows a difference
between at least one standard use of “or” and the meaning given to “v.” Now in
all, or almost all, the cases where we are prepared to say something of the
form “p or q,” we are also prepared to say something of the form 4 if not-p,
then q \ And this fact may us to exaggerate the difference between “v” and “or”
to think that, since in some cases, the fulfilment of one alternate is not a
sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement of which It is
an alternate, the fulfilment of one alternate is a sufficient condition of the
truth of an alternative statement. And this is certainly an exaggeration. If
someone says ; “Either it was John or it was Robert but I couldn't tell which,”
we are satisfied of the truth of the alternative statement if either of the
alternates turns out to be true; and we say that the speaker was wrong only if
neither turns out to be true. Here we seem to have a puzzle ; for we seem to be
saying that * Either it was John or it was Robert ' entails 4 If it wasn't
John, it was Robert * and, at the same time, that ‘It was John’ entails the
former, but not the latter. What we are suffering from here is perhaps a
crudity in our notion of entailraent, a difficulty In applying this too
undifferentiated concept to the facts of speech ; or, if we prefer it, an
ambiguity in the notion of a sufficient condition. The statement that it was John
entails the statement that it was either John or Robert in the sense thai it
confirms it; when It turns out to have been John, the man who said that either
It was John or it was Robert is shown to have been right. But the first
statement does not entail the second in the sense that the step ‘It was John,
so it was either John or Robert’ is a logically proper step, unless the person
saying this means by it simply that the alternative statement made previously
was correct, i.e., 'it was one of the two '. For the alternative statement
carries the implication of the speaker's uncertainty as to which of the two it
was, and this implication is inconsistent with the assertion that it was John.
So in this sense of * sufficient condition ', the statement that it was John is
no more a sufficient condition of (no more entails) the statement that it was
either John or Robert than it is a sufficient condition of (entails) the
statement that if it wasn't John, it was Robert. The further resemblance, which
we have already noticed, between the alternative statement and the hypothetical
statement, is that whatever knowledge or experience renders it reasonable to
assert the alternative statement, also renders it reasonable to make the statement
that (under the condition that it wasn't John) it was Robert. But we are less
happy about saying that the hypothetical statement is confirmed by the
discovery that it was John, than we are about saying that the alternative
statement is confirmed by this discovery. For we are inclined to say that the
question of confirmation of the hypothetical statement (as opposed to the
question of its reasonableness or acceptability) arises only if the condition
(that it wasn't John) turns out to be fulfilled. This shows an asymmetry, as
regards confirmation, though not as regards acceptability, between 4 if not p,
then q ' and * if not qy then p ' which is not mirrored in the forms ‘either p
or q’ and ‘either q or p.’ This asymmetry is ignored in the rule that * if not
p, then q ' and ‘if not q, then p’ are logically equivalent, for this rule
regards acceptability rather than confirmation. And rightly. For we may often
discuss the l truth ' of a subjunctive conditional, where the possibility of
confirmation is suggested by the form of words employed to be not envisaged. It
is a not unrelated difference between * if ' sentences and ‘or’ sentences that
whereas, whenever we use one of the latter, we should also be prepared to use
one of the former, the converse does not hold. The cases in which it does not
generally hold are those of subjunctive conditionals. There is no ‘or’ sentence
which would serve as a paraphrase of ‘If the Germans had invaded England in
1940, they would have won the war’ as this sentence would most commonly be
used. And this is connected with the fact that c either . . . or . . .' is
associated with situations involving choice or decision. 4 Either of these
roads leads to Oxford ' does not mean the same as ' Either this road leads to
Oxford or that road does’ ; but both confront us with the necessity of making a
choice. This brings us to a feature of * or ' which, unlike those so far
discussed, is commonly mentioned in discussion of its relation to * v ' ; the
fact, namely, that in certain verbal contexts, ‘either … or …’ plainly carries
the implication ‘and not both . . . and . . .', whereas in other contexts, it
does not. These are sometimes spoken of as, respectively, the exclusive and
inclusive senses of ‘or;’ and, plainly, if we are to identify 4 v’ with either,
it must be the latter. The reason why, unlike others, this feature of the
ordinary use of “or” is commonly mentioned, is that the difference can readily
be accommodated (1 Cf. footnote to p. 86.In the symbolism of the truth-functional
system: It is the difference between “(p y q) .~ (p . q)” (exclusive sense) and
“p v q” (inclusive sense). “Or,” like “and,” is commonly used to join words and
phrases as well as clauses. The 4 mutuality difficulties attending the general
expansion of 4 x and y are/ 5 into * x is /and y is/' do not attend the
expansion of 4 x or y isf into c r Is/or y is/ ? (This is not to say that the
expansion can always correctly be made. We may call “v” the disjunctive sign
and, being warned against taking the reading too seriously, may read it as ‘or.'
While he never approached the topic separately, it’s easy to find remarks about
disjunction in his oeuvre. A veritable genealogy of disjunction can be traced
along Griceian lines. Refs.: Grice uses an illustration involving ‘or’ in the
‘implication’ excursus in “Causal Theory.” But the systematic account comes
from WoW, especially essay 4.
Distributum. DISTRIBUTIO:
undistributed middle: a logical fallacy in traditional syllogistic logic,
resulting from the violation of the rule that the middle term (the term that
appears twice in premises) must be distributed at least once in the premises.
Any syllogism that commits this error is invalid. Consider “All philosophers
are persons,” and “Some persons are bad.” No conclusion follows from these two
premises because “persons” in the first premise is the predicate of an
affirmative proposition, and in the second is the subject of a particular
proposition. Neither of them is distributed. “If in a syllogism the middle term
is distributed in neither premise, we are said to have a fallacy of
undistributed middle.” Keynes, Formal Logic
ditto: cf. verum. Grice disliked Strawson’s ditto
theory in Analysis of ‘true’ as admittive performatory. 1620s, "in the
month of the same name," Tuscan dialectal ditto "(in) the said (month
or year)," literary Italian detto, past participle of dire "to
say," from Latin dicere "speak, tell, say" (from PIE root *deik-
"to show," also "pronounce solemnly"). Italian used
the word to avoid repetition of month names in a series of dates, and in this
sense it was picked up in English. Its generalized meaning of "the
aforesaid, the same thing, same as above" is attested in English by 1670s.
In early 19c. a suit of men's clothes of the same color and material through
was ditto or dittoes (1755). Dittohead, self-description of followers of U.S.
radio personality Rush Limbaugh, attested by 1995. dittoship is from 1869.
dossier:
Grice’s favourite vacuous name is ‘Bellerophon.’ ‘Vacuous names’ is an
essay commissioned by Davison and Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on
the work of W. V. Quine (henceforth, W and O) for Reidel, Dordrecht. “W and O” had
appeared (without Grices contribution) as a special issue of Synthese. Grices
contribution, along with Quines Reply to Grice, appeared only in the reprint of
that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. Grice cites from various
philosophers (and logicians ‒ this was the time when logic was starting to
be taught outside philosophy departments, or sub-faculties), such as Mitchell,
Myro, Mates, Donnellan, Strawson, Grice was particularly
proud to be able to quote Mates by mouth or book. Grice takes the
opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his
syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal
scope. The device in Vacuous Namess is a subscription device to indicate
the ordering of introduction of this or that operation. Grice wants to
give room for utterances of a special existential kind be deemed rational/reasonable,
provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the
addressee to be followed by the utterer. Someone isnt attending the party
organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society. That is Marmaduke
Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees. But who, as it
happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside
Newsletter, “W and O,” vacuous name, identificatory use, non-identificatory
use, subscript device. Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the New-World
impact of the Old-World ideas displayed by Grice and Strawson in their
attack to Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grices and Strawsons sophisticated
version of the paradigm-case argument in Word and Object. Davidson and
Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical publication, to
which Strawson had already contributed. It was only natural, when Davidson and
Hintikka were informed by Reidel of their interest in turning the special issue
into a separate volume, that they would approach the other infamous member of
the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Davidson and Hintikka for “W and O.” Grice
introduces a subscript device to account for implicata of utterances
like Marmaduke Bloggs won’t be attending the party; he was invented by the
journalists. In the later section, he explores identificatory and non
identificatory uses of the without involving himself in the problems
Donnellan did! Some philosophers, notably Ostertag, have found the latter
section the most intriguing bit, and thus Ostertag cared to reprint the section
on Descriptions for his edited MIT volume on the topic. The essay is structured
very systematically with an initial section on a calculus alla Gentzen,
followed by implicata of vacuous Namess such as Marmaduke Bloggs, to end with
definite descriptions, repr. in Ostertag, and psychological predicates. It
is best to focus on a few things here. First his imaginary dialogues on
Marmaduke Bloggs, brilliant! Second, this as a preamble to his Presupposition
and conversational implicature. There is a quantifier phrase, the, and two uses
of it: one is an identificatory use (the haberdasher is clumsy, or THE
haberdasher is clumsy, as Grice prefers) and then theres a derived,
non-identificatory use: the haberdasher (whoever she was! to use Grices and
Mitchells addendum) shows her clumsiness. The use of the numeric subscripts
were complicated enough to delay the publication of this. The whole thing was a
special issue of a journal. Grices contribution came when Reidel turned that
into a volume. Grice later replaced his numeric subscript device by square
brackets. Perhaps the square brackets are not subtle enough, though. Grices
contribution, Vacuous Namess, later repr. in part “Definite descriptions,” ed.
Ostertag, concludes with an exploration of the phrases, and further on, with
some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an
ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or
attitude. Grices choice of an ascription now notably involves an
opaque (rather than factive, like know) psychological state or attitude:
wanting, which he symbolizes as W. At least Grice does not write,
really, for he knew that Austin detested a trouser word! Grice concludes that
(xi) and (xiii) will be derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will
be derivable only from (ix).Grice had been Strawsons logic tutor at St. Johns
(Mabbott was teaching the grand stuff!) and it shows! One topic that especially
concerned Grice relates to the introduction and elimination rules, as he later
searches for generic satisfactoriness. Grice
wonders [W]hat should be said of Takeutis conjecture (roughly)
that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of
the elimination rule? There seems to be
no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells
us that, if it is established in Xs personalized system that φ, then it is
necessary with respect to X that φ is true (establishable). The accompanying
elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a
rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary with
respect to X that φ, then one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ,
we shall be in trouble; for such a rule is not acceptable; φ will be a volitive
expression such as let it be that X eats his hat; and my commitment to the idea
that Xs system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in
accepting (buletically) let X eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule
rather as telling us that, if it is necessary with respect to X that let X eat
his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X,
the situation is easier; for this version of the rule seems inoffensive, even
for Takeuti, we hope. A very interesting concept Grice introduces in the
definite-descriptor section of Vacuous Namess is that of a conversational
dossier, for which he uses δ for a definite descriptor. The key concept is that
of conversational dossier overlap, common ground, or conversational pool. Let
us say that an utterer U has a dossier for a definite description δ if there is
a set of definite descriptions which include δ, all the members of which the
utterer supposes to be satisfied by one and the same item and the utterer U
intends his addressee A to think (via the recognition that A is so intended)
that the utterer U has a dossier for the definite description δ which the
utterer uses, and that the utterer U has specifically selected (or chosen, or
picked) this specific δ from this dossier at least partly in the hope that his
addressee A has his own dossier for δ which overlaps the utterers dossier for δ,
viz. shares a substantial, or in some way specially favoured, su-bset with the
utterers dossier. Its unfortunate that the idea of a dossier is not better
known amog Oxonian philosophers. Unlike approaches to the phenomenon by other
Oxonian philosophers like Grices tutee Strawson and his three principles
(conversational relevance, presumption of conversational knowledge, and
presumption of conversational ignorance) or Urmson and his, apter than
Strawsons, principle of conversational appositeness (Mrs.Smiths husband just delivered
a letter, You mean the postman!?), only Grice took to task the idea of
formalising this in terms of set-theory and philosophical
psychology ‒ note his charming reference to the utterers hope (never
mind intention) that his choice of d from his dossier will overlap with some d
in the dossier of his his addressee. The point of adding whoever he may be for
the non-identificatory is made by Mitchell, of Worcester, in his Griceian
textbook for Hutchinson. Refs.: The main reference is Grice’s “Vacuous names,”
in “W and O” and its attending notes, BANC.
E: the ‘universalis abdicative.’ Cf. Grice on the Square of
Opposition. Grice, “Circling the square of Opposition.”
Ǝ Ǝx. The existential
quantifier. Cited by Grice as translatable by “some (at least one)”. Noting the
divergence that Strawson identified but fails to identify as a conversational
implicatum.
economy: and effort. Grice would often refer to ‘no undue
effort,’ ‘no unnecessary trouble,’ to go into the effort, ‘not worth the
energy,’ and so on. These utilitarian criteria suggest he is more of a
futilitarian than the avowed Kantian he says he is. This Grice also refers to
as ‘maximum,’ ‘maximal,’ optimal. It is part of his principle of economy of
rational effort. Grice leaves it open as how to formulate this. Notably in
“Causal,” he allows that ‘The pillar box seems red” and “The pillar box is red”
are difficult to formalise in terms in which we legitimize the claim or
intuition that ‘The pillar box IS red” is ‘stronger’ than ‘The pillar box seems
red.’ If this were so, it would provide a rational justification for going into
the effort of uttering something STRONGER (and thus less economical, and more
effortful) under the circumstances. As in “My wife is in the kitchen or in the
bedroom, and the house has only two rooms (and no passages, etc.)” the reason
why the conversational implicatum is standardly carried is to be found in the
operation of some such general principle as that giving preference to the
making of a STRONGER rather than a weaker statement in the absence of a reason
for not so doing. The implicatum therefore is not of a part of the meaning of
the expression “seems.” There is however A VERY IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE between
the case of a ‘phenomenalist’ statement (Bar-Hillel it does not count as a
statement) and that of disjunctives, such as “My wife is in the kitchen or ind
the bedroom, and the house has only two rooms (and no passages, etc.).” A
disjunctive is weaker than either of its disjuncts in a straightforward LOGICAL
fashion, viz., a disjunctive is entailed (alla Moore) by, but does not entail,
each of its disjuncts. The statement “The pillar box is red” is NOT STRONGER
than the statement, if a statement it is, “The pillar box seems red,” in this
way. Neither statement entails the other. Grice thinks that he has,
neverthcless a strong inclination to regard the first of these statements as
STRONGER than the second. But Grice leaves it open the ‘determination’ of in
what fashion this might obtain. He suggests that there may be a way to provide
a reductive analysis of ‘strength’ THAT YIELDS that “The pillar box is red” is
a stronger conversational contribution than “The pillar box seems red.”
Recourse to ‘informativeness’ may not do, since Grice is willing to generalise
over the acceptum to cover informative and non-informative cases. While there
is an element of ‘exhibition’ in his account of the communicatum, he might not
be happy with the idea that it is the utterer’s INTENTION to INFORM his
addressee that he, the utterer, INTENDS that his addressee will believe that
he, the utterer, believes that it is raining. “Inform” seems to apply only to
the content of the propositional complexum, and not to the attending ‘animata.’
egcrateia: or temperantia. Cfr mesotes. the geniality of Grice was to explore theoretical akrasia. Grice’s
genius shows in seeing egcrateia and lack thereof as marks of virtue. “C hasn’t
been to prison yet” He is potentially dishonest. But you cannot be HONEST if
you are NOT potentially DISHONEST. Of course, it does not paint a good picture
of the philosopher why he should be obsessed with ‘akrasia,’ when Aristotle
actually opposed the notion to that of ‘enkrateia,’ or ‘continence.’ Surely a
philosopher needs to provide a reductive analysis of ‘continence,’ first; and
the reductive analysis of ‘incontinence’ will follow. Aristotle, as Grice well
knew, is being a Platonist here, so by ‘continence,’ he meant a power structure
of the soul, with the ‘rational’ soul containing the pre-rational or
non-rational soul (animal soul, and vegetal soul). And right he was, too! So, Grice's twist is Έγκράτεια, sic in capitals! Liddell and Scott has it as
‘ἐγκράτεια’ [ρα^], which they render as “mastery over,” as used by Plato in
The Republic: “ἐ. ἑαυτοῦ,” meaning ‘self-control’ (Pl. R.390b; ἐ. ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν control over them, ib.430e, cf. X.Mem.2.1.1, Isoc.1.21; “περί τι” Arist.EN1149a21, al. Liddell
and Scott go on to give a reference to Grice’s beloved “Eth. Nich.” (1145b8) II. abs., self-control, X. Mem.1.5.1, Isoc.3.44, Arist. EN. 1145b8, al., LXX Si.18.30, Act.Ap. 24.25, etc. Richards, an emotivist, as well as Collingwood (in
“Language”) had made a stereotype of the physicist drawing a formula on the
blackboard. “Full of emotion.” So the idea that there is an UN-emotional life
is a fallacy. Emotion pervades the rational life, as does akrasia. Grice was
particularly irritated by the fact that Davidson, who lacked a background in
the humanities and the classics, could think of akrasia as “impossible”! Grice
was never too interested in emotion (or feeling) because while we do say I feel
that the cat is hungry, we also say, Im feeling byzantine. The concept of
emotion needs a philosophical elucidation. Grice was curious about a linguistic
botany for that! Akrasia for Grice covers both buletic-boulomaic and doxastic
versions. The buletic-boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an
emotion. Grice quotes from Kennys essay on emotion. But Grice is looking for
more of a linguistic botany. As it happens, Kennys essay has Griceian
implicata. One problem Grice finds with emotion is that feel that sometimes behaves like thinks that Another is that there is no good Grecian word
for emotio. Kenny, of St. Benets, completed his essay on emotion under
Quinton (who would occasionally give seminars with Grice), and examined by two
members of Grices Play Group: Pears and Gardiner. Kenny connects an emotion to
a feeling, which brings us to Grice on feeling boringly byzantine! Grice
proposes a derivation of akrasia in conditional steps for both
buletic-boulomaic and doxastic akrasia. Liddell
and Scott have “ἐπιθυμία,” which they render as desire, yearning, “ἐ.
ἐκτελέσαι” Hdt.1.32; ἐπιθυμίᾳ by passion, oπρονοίᾳ, generally, appetite, αἱ
κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐ. esp. sexual desire, lust, αἱ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας ἐ.; longing after
a thing, desire of or for it, ὕδατος, τοῦ πιεῖν;” “τοῦ πλέονος;” “τῆς
τιμωρίας;” “τῆς μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν πολιτείας;’ “τῆς παρθενίας;’ “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς ἐλθεῖν;’ ἐν
ἐ. “τινὸς εἶναι;’ “γεγονέναι;” “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς “ἀφικέσθαι θεάσασθαι;” “ἐ. τινὸς
ἐμβαλεῖν τινί;” “ἐ. ἐμποιεῖν ἔς τινα an inclination towards;” =ἐπιθύμημα, object
of desire, ἐπιθυμίας τυχεῖν;” “ἀνδρὸς ἐ., of woman, “πενήτων ἐ., of sleep. There
must be more to emotion, such as philia, than epithumia! cf. Grice on Aristotle
on philos. What is an emotion? Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1; Konstan “Pathos
and Passion” R. Roberts, “Emotion”; W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion; Simo
Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Aristotle, Rhet.
II.2-12; De An., Eth.N., and Top.; Emotions in Plato and Aristotle; Philosophy
of Emotion; Aristotle and the Emotions, De An. II.12 and III 1-3; De Mem. 1;
Rhet. II.5; Scheiter, “Images, Imagination, and Appearances, V. Caston, Why
Aristotle Needs Imagination” M. Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Emotions and Rational
Persuasion, J. Cooper, “An Aristotelian Theory of Emotion, G. Striker, Emotions
in Context: Aristotles Treatment of the Passions in the Rhetoric and his Moral
Psychology." Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric (J. Dow, Aristotles Theory of
the Emotions, Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle PLATO. Aristotle, Rhetoric
I.10-11; Plato Philebus 31b-50e and Republic IV, D. Frede, Mixed feelings in
Aristotles Rhetoric." Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric, J. Moss, “Pictures
and Passions in Plato”; Protagoras 352b-c, Phaedo 83b-84a, Timaeus 69c STOICS The
Hellenistic philosophers; “The Old Stoic Theory of Emotion” The Emotions in Hellenistic
Philosophy, eEmotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian
Temptation, Sorabji, Chrysippus Posidonius Seneca: A High-Level Debate on
Emotion. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic
Ethics M. Graver, Preface and Introduction to Cicero on Emotion: Tusculan
Disputations 3 and 4 M. Graver, Stoicism and emotion. Tusculan Disputations 3
Recommended: Graver, Margaret. "Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the
Stoic Προπάθειαι." Phronesis. Tusculan Disputations; "The Stoic
doctrine of the affections of the soul; The Stoic life: Emotions, duties, and
fate”; Emotion and decision in stoic psychology, The stoics, individual
emotions: anger, friendly feeling, and hatred. Aristotle Rhetoric II.2-3;
Nicomachean Ethics IV.5; Topics 2.7 and 4.5; Konstan, Anger, Pearson, Aristotle
on Desire; Scheiter, Review of Pearsons Aristotle on Desire; S. Leighton,
Aristotles Account of Anger: Narcissism and Illusions of Self‐Sufficiency: The Complex Evaluative World of Aristotles Angry
Man,” Valuing emotions. Aristotle Rhetoric II. 4; Konstan, “Hatred”
Konstan "Aristotle on Anger and the Emotions: the Strategies of
Status." Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, C. Rapp, The
emotional dimension of friendship: notes on Aristotles account of philia in
Rhetoric II 4” Grice endeavours to give an answer to the question whether
and to what extent philia (friendship), as it is treated by Aristotle in Rhet.
II.4, can be considered a genuine emotion as, for example, fear and anger are.
Three anomalies are identified in the definition and the account of philia (and
of the associated verb philein), which suggest a negative response to the
question. However, these anomalies are analysed and explained in terms of the
specific notes of philia in order to show that Rhetoric II4 does allow for a
consideration of friendship as a genuine emotion. Seneca, On Anger (De
Ira) Seneca, On Anger Seneca, On Anger (62-96); K. Vogt, “Anger, Present
Injustice, and Future Revenge in Senecas De Ira” FEAR Aristotle, Rhet. II.5;
Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9 Aristotles Courageous Passions, Platos Laws;
“Pleasure, Pain, and Anticipation in Platos Laws, Book I” Konstan, “Fear”
PITY Aristotle, Rhetoric II. 8-9; Poetics, chs. 6, 9-19 ; Konstan, “Pity”
E. Belfiore, Tragic pleasures: Aristotle on plot and emotion, Konstan,
Aristotle on the Tragic Emotions, The Soul of Tragedy: Essays on Athenian
Drama SHAME Aristotle, Rhet. II.6; Nicomachean Ethics IV.9 Konstan, Shame
J. Moss, Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul, B. Williams, Shame and
Necessity. Aristotle investigates two character traits, continence and
incontinence, that are not as blameworthy as the vices but not as praiseworthy
as the virtues. The Grecian expressions are’enkrateia,’ continence, literally
mastery, and krasia (“incontinence”; literally, lack of mastery. An akratic
person goes against reason as a result of some pathos (emotion, feeling”). Like
the akratic, an enkratic person experiences a feeling that is contrary to
reason; but unlike the akratic, he acts in accordance with reason. His defect
consists solely in the fact that, more than most people, he experiences
passions that conflict with his rational choice. The akratic person has not
only this defect, but has the further flaw that he gives in to feeling rather
than reason more often than the average person.
Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia: “propeteia,” or impetuosity
and “astheneia, or weakness. The person who is weak goes through a process of
deliberation and makes a choice; but rather than act in accordance with his
reasoned choice, he acts under the influence of a passion. By contrast, the
impetuous person does not go through a process of deliberation and does not
make a reasoned choice; he simply acts under the influence of a passion. At the
time of action, the impetuous person experiences no internal conflict. But once
his act has been completed, he regrets what he has done. One could say that he
deliberates, if deliberation were something that post-dated rather than
preceded action; but the thought process he goes through after he acts comes
too late to save him from error. It is
important to bear in mind that when Aristotle talks about impetuosity and
weakness, he is discussing chronic conditions. The impetuous person is someone
who acts emotionally and fails to deliberate not just once or twice but with
some frequency; he makes this error more than most people do. Because of this
pattern in his actions, we would be justified in saying of the impetuous person
that had his passions not prevented him from doing so, he would have
deliberated and chosen an action different from the one he did perform. The two kinds of passions that Aristotle
focuses on, in his treatment of akrasia, are the appetite for pleasure and
anger. Either can lead to impetuosity and weakness. But Aristotle gives pride
of place to the appetite for pleasure as the passion that undermines reason. He
calls the kind of akrasia caused by an appetite for pleasure (hedone)
“unqualified akrasia”—or, as we might say, akrasia simpliciter, “full stop.’
Akrasia caused by anger he considers a qualified form of akrasia and calls it
akrasia ‘with respect to anger.’ We thus have these four forms of akrasia:
impetuosity caused by pleasure, impetuosity caused by anger, weakness caused by
pleasure, weakness caused by anger. It should be noticed that Aristotle’s
treatment of akrasia is heavily influenced by Plato’s tripartite division of
the soul. Plato holds that either the spirited part (which houses anger, as
well as other emotions) or the appetitive part (which houses the desire for
physical pleasures) can disrupt the dictates of reason and result in action
contrary to reason. The same threefold division of the soul can be seen in
Aristotles approach to this topic. Although Aristotle characterizes akrasia and
enkrateia in terms of a conflict between reason and feeling, his detailed
analysis of these states of mind shows that what takes place is best described
in a more complicated way. For the feeling that undermines reason contains some
thought, which may be implicitly general. As Aristotle says, anger “reasoning
as it were that one must fight against such a thing, is immediately provoked.
And although in the next sentence he denies that our appetite for pleasure
works in this way, he earlier had said that there can be a syllogism that
favors pursuing enjoyment: “Everything sweet is pleasant, and this is sweet”
leads to the pursuit of a particular pleasure. Perhaps what he has in mind is
that pleasure can operate in either way: it can prompt action unmediated by a
general premise, or it can prompt us to act on such a syllogism. By contrast,
anger always moves us by presenting itself as a bit of general, although hasty,
reasoning. But of course Aristotle does
not mean that a conflicted person has more than one faculty of reason. Rather
his idea seems to be that in addition to our full-fledged reasoning capacity,
we also have psychological mechanisms that are capable of a limited range of
reasoning. When feeling conflicts with reason, what occurs is better described
as a fight between feeling-allied-with-limited-reasoning and full-fledged
reason. Part of us—reason—can remove itself from the distorting influence of
feeling and consider all relevant factors, positive and negative. But another
part of us—feeling or emotion—has a more limited field of reasoning—and
sometimes it does not even make use of it.
Although “passion” is sometimes used as a translation of Aristotles word
pathos (other alternatives are emotion” and feeling), it is important to bear
in mind that his term does not necessarily designate a strong psychological
force. Anger is a pathos whether it is weak or strong; so too is the appetite
for bodily pleasures. And he clearly indicates that it is possible for an
akratic person to be defeated by a weak pathos—the kind that most people would
easily be able to control. So the general explanation for the occurrence of
akrasia cannot be that the strength of a passion overwhelms reason. Aristotle
should therefore be acquitted of an accusation made against him by Austin in a
well-known footnote to ‘A Plea For Excuses.’ Plato and Aristotle, Austin says,
collapsed all succumbing to temptation into losing control of ourselves — a
mistake illustrated by this example. I am very partial to ice cream, and a
bombe is served divided into segments corresponding one to one with the persons
at High Table. I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing
to temptation and even conceivably (but why necessarily?) going against my
principles. But do I lose control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the
morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious to the consternation of my
colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and even
with finesse. With this, Aristotle can agree. The pathos for the bombe can be a
weak one, and in some people that will be enough to get them to act in a way
that is disapproved by their reason at the very time of action. What is most remarkable about Aristotle’s
discussion of akrasia is that he defends a position close to that of Socrates.
When he first introduces the topic of akrasia, and surveys some of the problems
involved in understanding this phenomenon, he says that Socrates held that
there is no akrasia, and he describes this as a thesis that clearly conflicts
with the appearances (phainomena). Since he says that his goal is to preserve
as many of the appearances as possible, it may come as a surprise that when he
analyzes the conflict between reason and feeling, he arrives at the conclusion
that in a way Socrates was right after all. For, he says, the person who acts
against reason does not have what is thought to be unqualified knowledge; in a
way he has knowledge, but in a way does not.
Aristotle explains what he has in mind by comparing akrasia to the
condition of other people who might be described as knowing in a way, but not
in an unqualified way. His examples are people who are asleep, mad, or drunk;
he also compares the akratic to a student who has just begun to learn a
Subjects, or an actor on the stage. All of these people, he says, can utter the
very words used by those who have knowledge; but their talk does not prove that
they really have knowledge, strictly speaking.
These analogies can be taken to mean that the form of akrasia that
Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity always results from some
diminution of cognitive or intellectual acuity at the moment of action. The
akratic says, at the time of action, that he ought not to indulge in this
particular pleasure at this time. But does he know or even believe that he
should refrain? Aristotle might be taken to reply: yes and no. He has some
degree of recognition that he must not do this now, but not full recognition.
His feeling, even if it is weak, has to some degree prevented him from
completely grasping or affirming the point that he should not do this. And so
in a way Socrates was right. When reason remains unimpaired and unclouded, its
dictates will carry us all the way to action, so long as we are able to
act. But Aristotles agreement with
Socrates is only partial, because he insists on the power of the emotions to
rival, weaken or bypass reason. Emotion challenges reason in all three of these
ways. In both the akratic and the enkratic, it competes with reason for control
over action; even when reason wins, it faces the difficult task of having to
struggle with an internal rival. Second, in the akratic, it temporarily robs
reason of its full acuity, thus handicapping it as a competitor. It is not
merely a rival force, in these cases; it is a force that keeps reason from
fully exercising its power. And third, passion can make someone impetuous; here
its victory over reason is so powerful that the latter does not even enter into
the arena of conscious reflection until it is too late to influence action.
That, at any rate, is one way of interpreting Aristotle’s statements. But it
must be admitted that his remarks are obscure and leave room for alternative
readings. It is possible that when he denies that the akratic has knowledge in
the strict sense, he is simply insisting on the point that no one should be
classified as having practical knowledge unless he actually acts in accordance
with it. A practical knower is not someone who merely has knowledge of general
premises; he must also have knowledge of particulars, and he must actually draw
the conclusion of the syllogism. Perhaps drawing such a conclusion consists in
nothing less than performing the action called for by the major and minor
premises. Since this is something the akratic does not do, he lacks knowledge;
his ignorance is constituted by his error in action. On this reading, there is
no basis for attributing to Aristotle the thesis that the kind of akrasia he
calls weakness is caused by a diminution of intellectual acuity. His
explanation of akrasia is simply that pathos is sometimes a stronger
motivational force than full-fledged reason.
This is a difficult reading to defend, however, for Aristotle says that
after someone experiences a bout of akrasia his ignorance is dissolved and he
becomes a knower again. In context, that appears to be a remark about the form
of akrasia Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity. If so, he is
saying that when an akratic person is Subjects to two conflicting
influences—full-fledged reason versus the minimal rationality of emotion—his
state of knowledge is somehow temporarily undone but is later restored. Here,
knowledge cannot be constituted by the performance of an act, because that is
not the sort of thing that can be restored at a later time. What can be
restored is ones full recognition or affirmation of the fact that this act has
a certain undesirable feature, or that it should not be performed. Aristotle’s
analysis seems to be that both forms of akrasia — weakness and impetuosity
—share a common structure: in each case, ones full affirmation or grasp of what
one should do comes too late. The difference is that in the case of weakness
but not impetuosity, the akratic act is preceded by a full-fledged rational
cognition of what one should do right now. That recognition is briefly and
temporarily diminished by the onset of a less than fully rational affect. There is one other way in which Aristotle’s
treatment of akrasia is close to the Socratic thesis that what people call
akrasia is really ignorance. Aristotle holds that if one is in the special
mental condition that he calls practical wisdom, then one cannot be, nor will
one ever become, an akratic person. For practical wisdom is present only in
those who also possess the ethical virtues, and these qualities require
complete emotional mastery. Anger and appetite are fully in harmony with
reason, if one is practically wise, and so this intellectual virtue is
incompatible with the sort of inner conflict experienced by the akratic person.
Furthermore, one is called practically wise not merely on the basis of what one
believes or knows, but also on the basis of what one does. Therefore, the sort
of knowledge that is lost and regained during a bout of akrasia cannot be
called practical wisdom. It is knowledge only in a loose sense. The low-level
grasp of the ordinary person of what to do is precisely the sort of thing that
can lose its acuity and motivating power, because it was never much of an
intellectual accomplishment to begin with. That is what Aristotle is getting at
when he compares it with the utterances of actors, students, sleepers, drunks,
and madmen. Grice had witnessed how Hare had suffere to try and deal with how
to combine the geniality that “The language of morals” is with his account of
akrasia. Most Oxonians were unhappy with Hares account of akrasia. Its like, in
deontic logic, you cannot actually deal with akrasia. You need buletics. You
need the desiderative, so that you can oppose what is desired with the duty,
even if both concepts are related. “Akrasia” has a nice Grecian touch about it,
and Grice and Hare, as Lit. Hum., rejoiced in being able to explore what
Aristotle had to say about it. They wouldnt go far beyond Aristotle. Plato and
Aristotle were the only Greek philosophers studied for the Lit. Hum. To venture
with the pre-socratics or the hellenistics (even if Aristotle is one) was not
classy enough! Like Pears in Motivated irrationality, Grice allows that
benevolentia may be deemed beneficentia. If Smith has the good will to give
Jones a job, he may be deemed to have given Jones the job, even if Jones never
get it. In buletic akrasia we must consider the conclusion to be desiring what
is not best for the agents own good, never mind if he refrains from doing what
is not best for his own good. Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor. We
shouldnt be saying this, but we are saying it! Grice prefers akrasia, but
he is happy to use the translation by Cicero, also negative, of this:
incontinentia, as if continentia were a virtue! For Grice, the alleged paradox
of akrasia, both alethic and practical, has to be accounted for by a theory of
rationality from the start, and not be deemed a stumbling block. Grice is
interested in both the common-or-garden buletic-boulomaic version of akrasia,
involving the volitive soul ‒ in term of desirability ‒ and doxastic
akrasia, involing the judicative soul proper ‒ in terms of
probability. Grice considers buletic akrasia and doxastic akrasia ‒ the latter
yet distinct from Moores paradox, p but I dont want to believe that p, in
symbols p and ~ψb-dp. Akarsia,
see egcrateia. Refs.: The main references here are in three folders in two
different series. H. P. Grice, “Akrasia,” The H. P. Grice Papers, S. II, c.
2-ff. 22-23 and S. V, c. 6-f. 32, BANC.
See
index to all Grice’s books with index – the first three of them.
Einheitswissenschaft: Used by Grice ironically. While he was totally
ANTI-Einheitwisseschaft, he was ALL for einheitsphilosophie! The phrase is used by Grice in a more causal
way. He uses the expression ‘unity of science’ vis-à-vis the topic of
teleology. Note that ‘einheitswissenschaft,’ literally translates as
unity-science – there is nothing about ‘making’ if one, which is what –fied
implies. The reason why ‘einheitswissenschaft’ was transliterated as ‘unified
science’ was that Neurath thought that ‘unity-science’ would be a yes-yes in
New England, most New Englanders being Unitarians, but they would like to
include Theology there, ‘into the bargain.’ “Die Einheit von
Wissenschaft.” Die Einheit
der Wissenschaft und die neopositivistische Theorie der „Einheitswissenschaft”. O.
Neurath, „Einheit der Wissenschaft als
Aufgabe“,Einheitswissenschaft oder Einheit der Wissenschaft? | Frank
F Vierter Internationaler Kongress für Einheit der Wissenschaft, Cambridge 1938 ... Einheitswissenschaft als
Basis der Wissenschaftsgeschichte (pp. positivists held that no essential
differences in aim and method exist between the various branches of science.
The scientists of all disciplines should collaborate closely with each other
and should unify the vocabulary of sciences by logical analysis. According to
this view, there is no sharp demarcation
between natural sciences and social sciences.
In particular, to establish universal laws in the social sciences may be
difficult in practice, but it is not impossible in principle. Through Otto
Neurath, this ideal of scientific unity became a program for logical
positivists, who published a series of books in Vienna under the heading
Unified Science. After the dissolution of the Vienna Circle, Neurath renamed
the official journal Erkenntnis as The Journal of Unified Science, and planned
to continue publication of a series of works in the United States under the
general title The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. He thought
that the work would be similar in historical importance to the
eighteenth-century French Encyclopédie under the direction of Diderot.
Unfortunately, this work was never completed, although Carnap and Morris
published some volumes originally prepared for it under the title Foundations
of the Unity of Science. “We have repeatedly pointed out that the formation of
the constructional system as a whole is the task of unified science.” Carnap,
The Logical Structure of the World.
emissum
-- Emissor. Grice’s utterer, but turned Griceian, To emit, to translate some
Gricism or other. Cf. proffer.
Emissum.
emissor-emissum distinction. Frequently ignored by Austin. Grice usually
formulates it ‘roughly.’ Strawson for some reason denied the reducibility of
the emissum to the emissor. Vide his footnote in his Inaugural lecture at
Oxford. it
is a truth implicitly acknowledged by communication theorists themselves --
this acknowledgement is is certainly implicit in Grice's distinction between
what speakers actually say, in a favored sense of 'say', and what they imply
(see "Utterer's Meaning, SentenceMeaning and Word-Meaning," in Foundations
of Language, 1968) -- that in almost all the things we should count as
sentences there is a substantial central core of meaning which is explicable
either in terms of truth-conditions or in terms of some related notion quite
simply derivable from that of a truth-condition, for example the notion, as we
might call it, of a compliance condition in the case of an imperative sentence
or a fulfillment-condition in the case of an optative. If we suppose,
therefore, that an account can be given of the notion of a truthcondition
itself, an account which is indeed independent of reference to
communicationintention, then we may reasonably think that the greater part of
the task of a general theory of meaning has been accomplished without such
reference. So let us see if we can rephrase the distinction for a one-off
predicament. By drawing a skull, Blackburn communicates to his fellow
Pembrokite that there is danger around. The proposition is ‘There is danger
around’. Of the claims, one is literal; the other metabolical. Blackburn means
that there is danger around. Blackburn communicates that there is danger
around, possibly leading to death. The emissum, Blackburn’s drawing of the
skull ‘means’ that there is danger around. Since the fact that Blackburn
communicates that p is diaphanous, we have yet another way of posing the
distinction: Blackburn communicates that there is danger around. What is
communicated by Blackburn – his emissum – is true. Note that in this diaphanous
change from ‘Blackburn communicates that there is danger around’ and ‘What
Blackburn communicates, viz. that there is danger around, is true’ we have
progressed quite a bit. There are ways of involving ‘true’ in the first stage.
Blackburn communicates that there is danger around, and he communicates
something true. In the classical languages, this is done in the accusative
case.
emissum. emit. V. emissor. A good verb used by Grice. It gives us
‘emitter, and it is more Graeco-Roman than his ‘utterer,’ which Cicero would
think a barbarism.
emotum: the emotum, the motum. Grice enjoyed a bit of history of
philosophy. Cf. conatum. And Urmson’s company helped. Urmson produced a
brilliant study of the ‘emotive’ theory of ethics, which is indeed linguistic
and based on Ogden. Diog. Laert. of Zeno of Citium. πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα,
"πολλοί σου καταγελῶσιν," "ἀλλ ἐγώ," ἔφη, "οὐ κατα-
γελῶμαι; to the question, who is a friend?, Zeno’s answer is, ‘a second self
(alter ego). One direct way to approach friend is via emotion, as
Aristotle did, and found it aporetic as did Grice. Aristotle discusses philia
in Eth. Nich. but it is in Rhet. where he allows for phulia to be an emotion.
Grice was very fortunate to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardies
lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees! Grice is
concerned with the rather cryptic view by Aristotle of the friend (philos,
amicus) as the alter ego. In Grices cooperative, concerted, view of
things, a friend in need is a friend indeed! Grice is interested in Aristotle
finding himself in an aporia. In Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix, Aristotle poses the
question whether the happy man will need friends or not. Kosman correctly
identifies this question as asking not whether friends are necessary in order
to achieve eudæmonia, but why we require friends even when we are happy. The
question is not why we need friends to become happy, but why we need friends
when we are happy, since the eudæmon must be self-sufficient. Philia is
required for the flourishing of the life of practical virtue. The solution by
Aristotle to the aporia here, however, points to the requirement of friendships
even for the philosopher, in his life of theoretical virtue. The olution by
Aristotle to the aporia in Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix is opaque, and the
corresponding passage in Eudeiman Ethics VII.xii is scarcely better. Aristotle
thinks he has found the solution to this aporia. We must take two things into
consideration, that life is desirable and also that the good is, and thence
that it is desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself as it belongs
to them. If then, of such a pair of corresponding s. there is always one s. of
the desirable, and the known and the perceived are in general constituted by
their participation in the nature of the determined, so that to wish to
perceive ones self is to wish oneself to be of a certain definite
character,—since, then we are not in ourselves possessed of each such
characters, but only in participation in these qualities in perceiving and
knowing—for the perceiver becomes perceived in that way in respect in which he
first perceives, and according to the way in which and the object which he
perceives; and the knower becomes known in the same way— therefore it is for
this reason that one always desires to live, because one always desires to
know; and this is because he himself wishes to be the object known. Refs.:
There is an essay on “Emotions and akrasia,” but the topic is scattered in
various places, such as Grice’s reply to Davidson on intending. Grice has an
essay on ‘Kant and friendship,’ too, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
English
futilitarians, The: Bergmann’s pun on H. P. Grice and
J. L. Austin. from futile. Cf. conversational futilitarianism. Can there be a
futilitarian theory of communication? Grice’s! The issue is a complex one. Some
may interpret Grice’s theory as resting “on Kantian grounds.” Not everybody was
present at Grice’s seminars at Oxford on helpfulness, where he discusses the kind
of reasoning that a participant to a conversation will display in assuming that
his co-conversationalist is being conversationally helpful, conversationally
benevolent, conversationally ‘altruist,’ almost, and conversationally, well,
co-operative. So, as to the basis for this. We can simplify the scenario by
using the plural. A conversationalist assumes that his co-conversationalist is
being co-operative on Kantian grounds. What are the alternatives, if any? One
can re-describe “Kantian grounds” as “moral grounds.” Conversationalists abide
with the principle of conversational helpfulness on Kantian, moral grounds.
Kant wrote the “Critique of practical reason,” so Kant would allow for a
rephrase of this as follows. Conversationalists abide with the principle of
conversational helpfulness on practical, indeed moral, grounds – which is the
topic of Grice’s last Kant lecture at Stanford. How to turn a ‘counsel of
prudence,’ which is ‘practical’ into something that covers Kant’s “Kategorische
Imperativ.” And then there’s the utilitarian. Utilitarianism IS a moral theory,
or a meta-ethical theory. So one would have to allow for the possibility that
conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on
“utilitarian grounds,” which would be “practical grounds,” AND “moral grounds,”
if not Kantian grounds. In any case, the topic WAS raised, and indeed, for
someone like Grice who wrote on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘happiness,’ it does not seem
futilitarian to see him as a futilitarian. Unfortunately, you need a serious
philosophical background to appreciate all this, since it touches on the very
serious, or ‘deep,’ as Grice would say, “and fascinating,” suburbia or
practicality. But surely the keyword ‘utilitarian’ as per “conversationalists
abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on utilitarian grounds” is
a possibility. Cf. Grice’s reference to the ‘least effort,’ and in the Oxford
lectures on helpfulness to a conversationalist not getting involved in “undue
effort,” or getting into “unnecessary trouble.” “Undue effort” is ‘forbidden’
by the desideratum of conversational candour; the ‘unnecessary trouble’ is
balanced by the ‘principle of conversational self-love.’ And I don’t think Kant
would ever considered loving himself! Grice being keen on neuter adjectives, he
saw the ‘utile’ at the root of utilitarianism. There is much ‘of value’ in the
old Roman concept of ‘utile.’ Lewis and Short have it as Neutr. absol.:
ūtĭle , is, n., what is useful, the useful: omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit
utile dulci, Hor. A. P. 343: “bonus atque fidus Judex honestum praetulit
utili,” id. C. 4, 9, 41: “utilium tardus provisor,” id. A. P. 164: “sententiae
de utilibus honestisque,” Quint. 3, 8, 13; cf. id. 1, 2, 29. —Ultimately, Grice’s meta-ethics, like Hare’s, Nowell-Smith’s,
Austin’s, Hampshire’s, and Warnock’s derives into a qualified utilitarianism,
with notions of agreeableness and eudaemonia being crucial. Grice well knows
that for Aristotle pleasure is just one out of the three sources for phulia;
the others being profit, and virtue. As an English utilitarian, or English
futilitarian, Grice plays with Griceian pleasures. Democritus, as Grice
remarks, seems to be the earliest philosopher to have categorically embraced a
hedonistic philosophy. Democritus claims that the supreme goal of life is
contentment or cheerfulness, stating that joy and sorrow are the distinguishing
mark of things beneficial and harmful. The Cyrenaics are an ultra-hedonist
Grecoam school of philosophy founded by Aristippus. Many of the principles of
the school were set by his grandson, Aristippus the Younger, and Theodorus. The
Cyrenaic school is one of the earliest Socratic schools. The Cyrenaics teach
that the only intrinsic ‘agathon’ is pleasure ‘hedone,’ which means not just
the absence of pain, but a positively enjoyable momentary sensation. A physical
pleasure is stronger than a pleasure of anticipation or memory. The Cyrenaics
do, however, recognize the value of social obligation, and that pleasure may be
gained from altruism. The Cyrenaic school dies out within a century, and is
replaced by Epicureanism. The Cyrenaics are known for their sceptical
epistemology. The Cyrenaics reduce logic to a basic doctrine concerning the
criterion of truth. The Cyrenaics think that one can only know with certainty
his immediate sense-experience, e. g., that he is having a sweet sensation. But
one can know nothing about the nature of the object that causes this sensation,
e.g., that honey is sweet. The Cyrenaics also deny that we can have knowledge
of what the experience of others are like. All knowledge is immediate
sensation. Sensation is a motion which is purely subjective, and is painful,
indifferent or pleasant, according as it is violent, tranquil or gentle.
Further, sensation is entirely individual and can in no way be described as
constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only
possible criterion of knowledge and of conduct. The way of being affected is
alone knowable. Thus the sole aim for everyone should be pleasure. Cyrenaicism
deduces a single, universal aim for all which is pleasure. Furthermore, feeling
is momentary and homogeneous. It follows that past and future pleasure have no
real existence for us, and that in present pleasure there is no distinction of
kind. Socrates speaks of the higher pleasure of the intellect. The Cyrenaics
denies the validity of this distinction and say that bodily pleasure (hedone
somatike), being more simple and more intense, is preferable. Momentary
pleasure, preferably of a physical kind, is the only good for a human. However,
an action which gives immediate pleasure can create more than their equivalent
of pain. The wise person should be in control (egcrateia) of pleasure rather
than be enslaved to it, otherwise pain results, and this requires judgement to
evaluate this or that pleasure of life. Regard should be paid to law and
custom, because even though neither law nor custom have an intrinsic value on
its own, violating law or custom leads to an unpleasant penalty being imposed
by others. Likewise, friendship and justice are useful because of the pleasure
they provide. Thus the Cyrenaics believe in the hedonistic value of social
obligation and altruistic behaviour. Epicureanism is a system of
philosophy based upon the teachings of Epicurus, an atomic materialist,
following in the steps of Democritus and Leucippus. Epicurus’s materialism
leads him to a general stance against superstition or the idea of divine
intervention. Following Aristippus, Epicurus believes that the greatest good is
to seek modest, sustainable pleasure in the form of a state of tranquility and
freedom from fear (ataraxia) and absence of bodily pain (aponia) through
knowledge of the workings of the world and the limits of desire. The
combination of these two states, ataraxia and aponia, is supposed to constitute
happiness in its highest form. Although Epicureanism is a form of hedonism,
insofar as it declares pleasure as the sole intrinsic good, its conception of
absence of pain as the greatest pleasure and its advocacy of a simple life make
it different from hedonism as it is commonly understood. In the Epicurean view,
the highest pleasure (tranquility and freedom from fear) is obtained by
knowledge, friendship and living a virtuous and temperate life. Epicurus lauds the
enjoyment of a simple pleasure, by which he means abstaining from the bodily
desire, such as sex and the appetite, verging on asceticism. Epicurus argues
that when eating, one should not eat too richly, for it could lead to
dissatisfaction later, such as the grim realization that one could not afford
such delicacies in the future. Likewise, sex could lead to increased lust and
dissatisfaction with the sexual partner. Epicurus does not articulate a broad
system of social ethics that has survived but had a unique version of the
golden rule. It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living
wisely and well and justly, agreeing neither to harm nor be harmed, and it is
impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life.
Epicureanism is originally a challenge to Platonism, though later it became the
main opponent of Stoicism. Epicurus and his followers shun politics. After the
death of Epicurus, his school is headed by Hermarchus. Later many Epicurean
societies flourish in the Late Hellenistic era and during the Roman era, such
as those in Antiochia, Alexandria, Rhodes and Ercolano. The poet Lucretius is
its most known Roman proponent. By the end of the Roman Empire, having
undergone attack and repression, Epicureanism has all but died out, and would
be resurrected in the seventeenth century by the atomist Pierre Gassendi. Some
writings by Epicurus have survived. Some scholars consider the epic poem “De
natura rerum” by Lucretius to present in one unified work the core arguments and
theories of Epicureanism. Many of the papyrus scrolls unearthed at the Villa of
the Papyri at Herculaneum are Epicurean texts. At least some are thought to
have belonged to the Epicurean Philodemus. Cf. Barnes on epicures and
connoiseurs. Many a controversy arising out of this or that value judgement is
settled by saying, ‘I like it and you don’t, and that s the end of the matter.’
I am content to adopt this solution of the difficulty on matters such as food
and drink. Even here, though, we admit the existence of epicures and
connoisseurs.Why are we not content to accept the same solution on every matter
where value is concerned? The reason I am not so content lies in the fact that
the action of one man dictated by his approval of something is frequently incompatible
with the action of another man dictated by his approval of something. This
is obviously philosophical, especially for the Grecian hedonistic Epicureians
made popular by Marius and Walter Pater at Oxford. L and S have "ἡδονή,”
also “ἁδονά,” or in a chorus in tragedy, “ἡδονά,” ultimately from
"ἥδομαι,” which they render it as “enjoyment, pleasure,” “prop. of sensual
pleasure.” αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡ. Plato,
Republic, 328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1151a13; αἱ περὶ πότους καὶ περὶ
ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Plato, Republic, 389e; but also ἀκοῆς ἡ; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl. R.
582b; of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις
ἡ.; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι, to give way to pleasure; Pl. Lg. 727c; κότερα
ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ; shall I speak truly or so as to humour you? εἰ ὑμῖν
ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ, “one feels pleasure at the
thought that …” ; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to be satisfied with; ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει;
ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), of a temple; δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν; ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ.; πρὸς ἡ. Λέγειν, “to speak
so as to please another”; δημηγορεῖν; οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα; πάντα
πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας; later πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι; καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν κλύειν; καθ᾽
ἡδονήν ἐστί μοι; καθ᾽ ἡ. τι δρᾶν, ποιεῖν; καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ πράγματα
ἐνδιδόναι; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι, it is a pleasure or delight to another; ἐν ἡδονῇ
ἔχειν τινάς, to take pleasure in them; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, oοἱ λυπηροί; μεθ᾽
ἡδονῆς; ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ; ἡδονᾷ with pleasure; a pleasure; ἡδοναὶ
τραγημάτων sweetmeats; plural., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts. In
Ionic philosophers, taste, flavour, usually joined with χροιή. Note that
Aristotle uses somatike hedone. As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee
of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well aware of the centrality of hedone
in Aristotles system. Pleasure is sometimes rendered “placitum,” as in “ad
placitum,” in scholastic philosophy, but that is because scholastic philosophy
is not as Hellenic as it should be. Actually, Grice prefers “agreeable.” One of
Grices requisites for an ascription of eudaemonia (to have a fairy godmother)
precisely has the system of ends an agent chooses to realise to be an agreeable
one. One form or mode of agreeableness, Grice notes, is, unless counteracted,
automatically attached to the attainment of an object of desire, such
attainment being routinely a source of satisfaction. The generation of such a
satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for preferring one system of
ends to another. However, some other mode of agreeableness, such as e. g. being
a source of delight, which is not routinely associated with the fulfilment of
this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of other features
relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and another. Further,
a system of ends the operation of which is especially agreeable is stable not
only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the somewhat weakening effect
of ‘egcrateia,’ incontinence, or akrasia, if you mustn’t. A disturbing
influence, as Aristotle knows from experience, is more surely met by a
principle in consort with a supporting attraction than by the principle alone.
Grices favourite hedonistic implicatum was “please,” as in “please, please me,”
by The Beatles. While Grice claims to love
Kantotle, he cannot hide his greater reverence for Aristotle, instilled early
on at Corpus. An Oxonian need not recite Kant in what during the Second World
War was referred to as the Hun, and while Aristotle was a no-no at Clifton
(koine!), Hardie makes Grice love him. With eudaemonia, Grice finds a perfect
synthetic futilitarian concept to balance his innate analytic tendencies. There
is Grecian eudaemonism and there is Griceian eudaemonism. L and S are not too
helpful. They have “εὐδαιμονία” (Ion. –ιη), which they render not as happiness,
but as “prosperity, good fortune, opulence;” “χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ
εὐ.;” of countries; “μοῖρ᾽ εὐδαιμονίας.” In a second use, the expression
is indeed rendered as “true, full happiness;” “εὐ. οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ᾽
ἐν χρυσῷ; εὐ. ψυχῆς, oκακοδαιμονίη, cf. Pl. Def. 412d, Arist. EN 1095a18,
sometimes personified as a divinity. There is eudaemonia and there is
kakodaemonia. Of course, Grice’s locus classicus is EN 1095a18, which is
Grice’s fairy godmother, almost. Cf. Austin on agathon and eudaimonia in
Aristotle’s ethics, unearthed by Urmson and Warnock, a response to an essay by
Prichard in “Philosophy” on the meaning of agathon in Aristotle’s ethics. Pritchard
argues that Aristotle regards “agathon” to mean conducive to “eudaemonia,” and,
consequently, that Aristotle maintains that every deliberate action stems,
ultimately, from the desire for eudaemonia. Austin finds fault with this.
First, agathon in Aristotle does not have a single usage, and a fortiori not
the one Pritchard suggests. Second, if one has to summarise the usage of
“agathon” in one phrase, “being desired” cannot fulfil this function, for there
are other objects of desire besides “τό άγαθόν,” even if Davidson would
disagree. Prichard endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In
some contexts, “agathon” seems to mean simply that being desired or an ultimate
or non‐ultimate end or aim
of a person. In other contexts, “αγαθον” takes on a normative quality. For his
statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we
pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as “a
good.” Prichard argues that by "αγαθον" Aristotle actually means,
except in the Nicomachean Ethics, conducive to eudaemonia, and holds that when
a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to attain eudaemonia.
Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both
thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of man’s ultimate aim.
Grice takes life seriously: philosophical biology. He even writes an essay
entitled “Philosophy of life,” listed is in PGRICE. Grice bases his thought on
his tutee Ackrill’s Dawes Hicks essay for the BA, who quotes extensively from
Hardie. Grice also reviews that “serious student of Greek philosophy,” Austin,
in his response to Prichard, Grice’s fairy godmother. Much the most plausible
conjecture regarding what Grecian eudaimonia means is that eudaemonia is to be understood
as the name for that state or condition which one’s good dæmon would, if he
could, ensure for one. One’s good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to
one, solely by concern for one’s eudaemonia, well-being or happiness. To change
the idiom, eudæmonia is the general characterisation of what a full-time and
unhampered fairy godmother would secure for one. Grice is concerned with the
specific system of ends that eudaemonia consists for Ariskant. Grice borrows,
but never returns, some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. Johns, Ackrill.
Ackrills point is about the etymological basis for eudaemonia, from eudaemon,
the good dæmon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be
disimplicated, and taken literally. Grice concludes with a set of ends that
justify our ascription of eudaemonia to the agent. For Grice, as for Kantotle,
telos and eudaemonia are related in subtle ways. For eudaemonia we cannot deal
with just one end, but a system of ends, although such a system may be a
singleton. Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising end so that a
particular ascription of an end may entail an ascription of eudaemonia. Grice
follows the textual criticism of his tutee Ackrill, in connection with the
Socratic point that eudaemonia is literally related to the eudaemon. In PGRICE
Warner explores Grice’s concept of eudaemonia. Warner is especially helpful
with the third difficult Carus lecture by Grice, a metaphysical defence of
absolute value. Warner connects with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of
perception seen in an evolutionary light and the Kantotelian idea of
eudaemonia. In response to Warner’s overview of the oeuvre of Grice for the
festschrift that Warner co-edited with Grandy, Grice refers to the editors
collectively as Richards. While he feels he has to use “happiness,” Grice is
always having Aristotle’s eudaemonia in mind. The implicatum of Smith is
‘happy’ is more complex than Kantotle thinks. Austen knew. For Emma, you decide
if youre happy. Ultimately, for Grice, the rational life is the happy life.
Grice took life seriously: philosophical biology! Grice is clear when
reprinting the Descartes essay in WOW, where he does quote from Descartes
sources quite a bit, even if he implicates he is no Cartesian scholar – what
Oxonian would? It concerns certainty. And certainty is originally
Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian, in parts. Ayer says that to know is to
assure that one is certain or sure. So he could connect. Grice will at various
stages of his development play and explore this authoritative voice of
introspection: incorrigibility and privileged access. He surely wants to say
that a declaration of an intention is authoritative. And Grice plays with
meaning, too when provoking Malcolm in a don recollection: Grice: I want you to
bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a
philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know? Are you certain you mean that?
Grice finds not being certain about what one means Strawsonian and otiose.
Tutees. Grice loved to place himself in the role of the philosophical hack,
dealing with his tutees inabilities, a whole week long – until he could find
refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday morning. Now, the logical form
of certain is a trick. Grice would symbolize it as numbering of operators. If
G ψs p, G ψs ψs p, and G ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit
like certainty. But not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers
something like a backing for it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty?
He doesnt think so. Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological
attitude, state or stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to
deliver his BA lecture he chooses ‘intention and uncertainty’ as its topic,
just to provoke. Not surprisingly, the “Uncertainty” piece opens with the
sceptics challenge. And he will not conclude that the intender is certain. Only
that theres some good chance (p ˃0.5) that what he intends will get through!
When there is a will, there is a way, when there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing,
there is a palæo-Griceian way-ing! Perhaps by know Moore means certain. Grice
was amused by the fact that Moore thought that he knew that behind the curtains
at the lecture hall at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, there was a
window, when there wasnt. He uses Moores misuse of know – according to Malcolm
– both in Causal theory and Prolegomena. And of course this relates to the
topic of the sceptics implicature, above, with the two essays Scepticism and
Common sense and Moore and Philosophers Paradoxes repr. partially in WOW. With
regard to certainty, it is interesting to compare it, as Grice does, not so
much with privileged access, but with incorrigibility. Do we not
have privileged access to our own beliefs and desires? And, worse still,
may it not be true that at least some of our avowals of our beliefs and
desires are incorrigible? One of Grices problems is, as he puts it,
how to accommodate privileged access and,
maybe, incorrigibility. This or that a second-order state may be, in some
fashion, incorrigible. On the contrary, for Grice, this or that
lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged
access. Note that while he is happy to allow privileged access to
lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or
second-order may, in some fashion, be said to count as an incorrigible avowal.
It rains. P judges it rains (privileged access). P judges that P judges that it
rains (incorrigible). The justification is conversational. It rains says the P,
or expresses the P. Grice wants to be able to say that if a P expresses that p,
the P judges2 that p. If the P expresses that it rains, the P
judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order,
higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to
be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick
with judging here. Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones. If P
expresses !p, P ψ-s2 that !p. His second-order, higher-order buletic
state is incorrigible (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a third-order
buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a matter only of
privileged access. For a study of conversation as rational co-operation
this utilitarian revival modifies the standard exegesis of Grice as purely
Kantian, and has him more in agreement with the general Oxonian meta-ethical
scene. Refs.: Under ‘futilitarianism,’ we cover Grice’s views on ‘pleasure’ (he
has an essay on “Pleasure,”) and “eudaemonia” (He has an essay on ‘happiness’);
other leads are given under ‘grecianism,’ since this is the Grecian side to
Grice’s Ariskant; for specific essays on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘eudaimonia,’ the
keywords ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ are useful. A good source is the essay on
happiness in “Aspects,” which combines ‘eudaemonia’ and ‘agreebleness,’ his
futilitarianism turned Kantotelian. BANC.
entailment:
“entailment” is not as figurative as it sounds: it inovolves property and
limitation -- “Paradoxes of entailment,” “Paradoxes of implication.” Philo and
his teacher. Grice is not sure about ‘implicatum.’ The quote by Moore, 1919
being:"It might be suggested that we should say "p ent q"
'means' "p ) q AND this proposition is an instance of a formal
implication, which is not merely true but self-evident, like the laws of formal
logic." This proposed definitions would avoid the paradoxes involved in
Strachey's definition, since such true formal implications as 'All the persons
in this room are more than five years old' are certainly not self-evident; and,
so far as I can see, it may state something which is in fact true of p and q,
whenever and only whenp ent q. I do not myself think that it gives the meaning
of 'p ent q,' since the kind of relation which I see to hold between the
premises and a conclusion of a syllogism seems to me one which is purely
'objective' in the sense that no psychological term, such as is involved in the
meaning of 'self-evident' is involved in its definition (it it has one). I am
not, however, concerned to dispute that some such definition of "p ent
q" as this may be true." --- and so on. So, it is apparently all
Strachey's fault. This
view as to what φA . ent . ψA means has, for instance, if I understand him
rightly, been asserted by Mr. O. Strachey in Mind, N.S., 93; since he asserts
that, in his opinion, this is what Professor C. I. Lewis means by “φA strictly
implies ψA,” and undoubtedly what Professor Lewis means by this is what I mean
by φA . ent . ψA. And the same view has been frequently suggested (though I do
not know that he has actually asserted it) by Mr. Russell himself (e.g.,
Principia Mathematica, p. 21). I 1903 B. Russell Princ.
Math. ii. 14 How far formal implication is definable in terms
of implication simply, or material implication as it may be called,
is a difficult question. Source : Principles : Chapter III. Implication and Formal Implication.
– Source : Principia, page 7 : "When it is necessary explicitly to
discriminate "implication" [i.e. "if p, then q" ] from
"formal implication," it is called "material implication."
– Source : Principia, page 20 : "When an implication, say ϕx.⊃.ψx, is said to
hold always, i.e. when (x):ϕx.⊃.ψx, we shall say that ϕx formally implies ψx"Many logicians did use ‘implicatum’ not necessarily to mean
‘conversational implicatum,’ but as the result of ‘implicatio’. ‘Implicatio’
was often identified with the Megarian or Philonian ‘if.’ Why? thought that we
probably did need an entailment. The symposium was held in New York with Dana
Scott and R. K. Meyer. The notion had been mis-introduced (according to
Strawson) in the philosophical literature by Moore. Grice is especially
interested in the entailment + implicatum pair. A philosophical expression may
be said to be co-related to an entailment (which is rendered in terms of a
reductive analysis). However, the use of the expression may co-relate to
this or that implicatum which is rendered reasonable in the light of the assumption
by the addressee that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of
conversational helfpulness. Grice thinks many philosophers take an implicatum
as an entailment when they surely shouldnt! Grice was more interested than
Strawson was in the coinage by Moore of entailment for logical consequence. As
an analyst, Grice knew that a true conceptual analysis needs to be reductive
(if not reductionist). The prongs the analyst lists are thus entailments of the
concept in question. Philosophers, however, may misidentify what is an
entailment for an implicature, or vice versa. Initially, Grice was interested
in the second family of cases. With his coinage of disimplicature, Grice
expands his interest to cover the first family of cases, too. Grice remains a
philosophical methodologist. He is not so much concerned with any area or
discipline or philosophical concept per se (unless its rationality), but with
the misuses of some tools in the philosophy of language as committed by some of
his colleagues at Oxford. While entailment, was, for Strawson mis-introduced in
the philosophical literature by Moore, entailment seems to be less involved in
paradoxes than if is. Grice connects the two, as indeed his tutee Strawson did!
As it happens, Strawsons Necessary propositions and entailment statements is
his very first published essay, with Mind, a re-write of an unpublication
unwritten elsewhere, and which Grice read. The relation of consequence may be
considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise. Grices Bootstrap is
a principle designed to impoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can
succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own! Grice then takes a
look at Strawsons very first publication (an unpublication he had written
elsewhere). Grice finds Strawson thought he could provide a simple solution to
the so-called paradoxes of entailment. At the time, Grice and Strawson were
pretty sure that nobody then accepted, if indeed anyone ever did and did make,
the identification of the relation symbolised by the horseshoe with the
relation which Moore calls entailment, p⊃q,
i. e. ~(pΛ~q) is rejected as an analysis of p entails q because it involves
this or that allegedly paradoxical implicatum, as that any false proposition
entails any proposition and any true proposition is entailed by any
proposition. It is a commonplace that Lewiss amendment had consequences
scarcely less paradoxical in terms of the implicata. For if p is impossible,
i.e. self-contradictory, it is impossible that p and ~q. And if q is
necessary, ~q is impossible and it is impossible that p and ~q; i. e., if p
entails q means it is impossible that p and ~q any necessary proposition is
entailed by any proposition and any self-contradictory proposition entails any
proposition. On the other hand, Lewiss definition of entailment (i.e. of the
relation which holds from p to q whenever q is deducible from p) obviously
commends itself in some respects. Now, it is clear that the emphasis laid on
the expression-mentioning character of the intensional contingent statement by
writing pΛ~q is impossible instead of It is impossible that p and ~q does not
avoid the alleged paradoxes of entailment. But it is equally clear that the
addition of some provision does avoid them. One may proposes that one
should use “entails” such that no necessary statement and no negation of a
necessary statement can significantly be said to entail or be entailed by any
statement; i. e. the function p entails q cannot take necessary or
self-contradictory statements as arguments. The expression p entails q is to be
used to mean p⊃q is necessary, and neither p nor q is either necessary or
self-contradictory, or pΛ~q is impossible and neither p nor q, nor either of
their contradictories, is necessary. Thus, the paradoxes are avoided. For let
us assume that p1 expresses a contingent, and q1 a necessary, proposition. p1
and ~q1 is now impossible because ~q1 is impossible. But q1 is necessary. So,
by that provision, p1 does not entail q1. We may avoid the paradoxical
assertion that p1 entails q2 as merely falling into the equally paradoxical assertion
that p1 entails q1 is necessary. For: If q is necessary, q is necessary is,
though true, not necessary, but a contingent intensional (Latinate) statement.
This becomes part of the philosophers lexicon: intensĭo, f. intendo, which L
and S render as a stretching out, straining, effort. E. g. oculorum,
Scrib. Comp. 255. Also an intensifying, increase. Calorem suum (sol)
intensionibus ac remissionibus temperando fovet,” Sen. Q. N. 7, 1, 3. The tune:
“gravis, media, acuta,” Censor. 12. Hence:~(q is necessary) is, though
false, possible. Hence “p1Λ~(q1 is necessary)” is, though false, possible.
Hence p1 does NOT entail q1 is necessary. Thus, by adopting the view that an
entailment statement, and other intensional statements, are non-necessary, and
that no necessary statement or its contradictory can entail or be entailed by
any statement, Strawson thinks he can avoid the paradox that a necessary
proposition is entailed by any proposition, and indeed all the other associated
paradoxes of entailment. Grice objected that Strawsons cure was worse than
Moores disease! The denial that a necessary proposition can entail or be
entailed by any proposition, and, therefore, that necessary propositions can be
related to each other by the entailment-relation, is too high a price to pay
for the solution of the paradoxes. And here is where Grices implicature is
meant to do the trick! Or not! When Levinson proposed + for conversationally
implicature, he is thinking of contrasting it with ⊢. But things aint that easy.
Even the grammar is more complicated: By uttering He is an adult, U explicitly
conveys that he is an adult. What U explicitly conveys entails that he is not a
child. What U implies is that he should be treated accordingly. Refs.: One
good reference is the essay on “Paradoxes of entailment,” in the Grice papers;
also his contribution to a symposium for the APA under a separate series, The
H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
Eschatologicum.
From Greek, 5. in the Logic of Arist., τὰ ἔ. are the last or lowest species, Metaph.1059b26,
or individuals, ib.998b16,
cf. AP0.96b12, al.; “τὸ ἔ. ἄτομον” Metaph.1058b10. b. ὁ ἔ. ὅρος the minor term of a syllogism, EN1147b14. c. last
step in geom. analysis or ultimate condition of action, “τὸ ἔ. ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως” de An.433a16. II. Adv. -τως to the uttermost, exceedingly, “πῦρ ἐ. καίει” Hp.de Arte8;
“ἐ. διαμάχεσθαι” Arist.HA613a11 ;
“ἐ. φιλοπόλεμος” X.An.2.6.1 ;
“φοβοῦμαί σ᾽ ἐ.” Men.912, cf. Epicur.Ep. 1p.31U. b. -τως διακεῖσθαι to
be at the last extremity, Plb.1.24.2, D.S.18.48 ; “ἔχειν” Ev.Marc.5.23 ;
“ἀπορεῖν” Phld.Oec.p.72J. 2. so ἐς τὸ ἔ.,=ἐσχάτως, Hdt.7.229; “εἰς τὰ ἔ.” X.HG5.4.33 ;
“εἰς τὰ ἔ. μάλα” Id.Lac.1.2 ;
“τὸ ἔ.” finally, in
the end, Pl.Grg.473c ;
but, τὸ ἔ. what is
worst of all, ib.508d.
Why ontology is not enough. The philosopher needs to PLAY with cross-categorial
barriers. He is an eschatologist. Socrates was. being and good, for Aristotle
and Grice cover all. Good was a favourite of Moore and Hare, as Barnes was well
aware! Like Barnes, Grice dislikes Prichards analysis of good. He leans towards
the emotion-based approach by Ogden. If Grice, like Humpty Dumpty, opposes the
Establishment with his meaning liberalism (what a word means is what I mean by
uttering it), he certainly should be concerned with category shifts. Plus,
Grice was a closet Platonist. As Plato once remarked, having the ability to see
horses but not horsehood (ἱππότης) is a mark of stupidity – rendered by Liddell and Scott as “horse-nature, the
concept of horse” (Antisth. et Pl. ap. Simp.in Cat.208.30,32,
Sch.AristId.p.167F). Grice would endure the flinty
experience of giving joint seminars at Oxford with Austin on the first two
books of Aristotles Organon, Categoriae, and De Int. Grice finds the use of a
category, κατηγορία, by Aristotle a bit of a geniality. Aristotle is using
legalese, from kata, against, on, and agoreuô [ἀγορεύω], speak in public),
and uses it to designate both the prosecution in a trial and the
attribution in a logical proposition, i. e., the questions that must be asked
with regard to a Subjects, and the answers that can be given. As a
representative of the linguistic turn in philosophy, Grice is attracted to the
idea that a category can thus be understood variously, as applying to the realm
of reality (ontology), but also to the philosophy of language (category of
expression) and to philosophical psychology (category of
representation). Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very
separate, shall we say, categories: his explorations with Austin (very
serious), and those with Strawson (more congenial). Where is Smiths altruism?
Nowhere to be seen. Should we say it is idle (otiose) to speak of altruism? No,
it is just an attribute, which, via category shift, can be made the Subjects of
your sentence, Strawson. It is not spatio-temporal, though, right. Not
really. ‒ I do not particularly like your trouser words. The essay
is easy to date since Grice notes that Strawson reproduced some of the details in
his Individuals, which we can very well date. Grice thought Aristotle was the
best! Or at any rate almost as good as Kantotle! Aristotle saw Categoriæ, along
with De Int. as part of his Organon. However, philosophers of language
tend to explore these topics without a consideration of the later parts of the
Organon dealing with the syllogism, the tropes, and the topics ‒ the boring
bits! The reason Grice is attracted to the Aristotelian category (as Austin and
Strawson equally were) is that category allows for a linguistic-turn reading.
Plus, its a nice, pretentious (in the Oxonian way) piece of philosophical
jargon! Aristotle couldnt find category in the koine, so he had to coin it.
While meant by Aristotle in a primarily ontological way, Oxonian philosophers
hasten to add that a category of expression, as Grice puts it, is just as valid
a topic for philosophical exploration. His tutee Strawson will actually publish
a book on Subjects and predicate in grammar! (Trivial, Strawson!). Grice will
later add an intermediary category, which is the Subjects of his philosophical
psychology. As such, a category can be construed ontologically, or
representationally: the latter involving philosophical psychological concepts,
and expressions themselves. For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and
Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford (Only the
poor learn at Oxford ‒ Arnold), there are (at least ‒ at most?) ten
categories. Grice doesnt (really) care about the number. But the first are
important. Actually the very first: theres substantia prima, such as Grice. And
then theres substantia secunda, such as Grices rationality. The essentia. Then
there are various types of attributes. But, as Grice sharply notes, even
substantia secunda may be regarded as an attribute. Grices favourite game with
Strawson was indeed Category Shift, or Subjects-ification, as Strawson
preferred. Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute. We would
have substantia prima AND attribute, which in turn gets divided into essential,
the izzing, and non-essential, the hazzing. While Austin is not so fun to play
with, Strawson is. Smith is a very altruist person. Where is his altruism?
Nowhere to be seen, really. Yet we may sensically speak of Smiths altruism. It
is just a matter of a category shift. Grice scores. Grice is slightly
disappointed, but he perfectly understands, that Strawson, who footnotes Grice
as the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic in Introduction to
logical lheory, fails to acknowledge that most of the research in Strawsons
Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics derives from
the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations at joint
seminars with Grice. Grice later elaborates on this with Code, who is keen on
Grices other game, the hazz and the hazz not, the izz. But then tutor from whom
I never ceased to learn about metaphysics sounds slightlier clumsier, as far as
the implicature goes. Categories, the Grice-Myro theory of identity, Relative
identity, Grice on =, identity, notes, with Myro, metaphysics, philosophy, with
Code, Grice izz Grice – or izz he? The idea that = is unqualified requires
qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didnt. Grice
wants to allow for It is the case that a = b /t1 and it is not the case that a
= b /t2. The idea is intuitive, but philosophers of a Leibnizian bent are too
accustomed to deal with = as an absolute. Grice applies this to human vs.
person. A human may be identical to a person, but cease to be so. Indeed,
Grices earlier attempt to produce a reductive analsysis of I may be seen as
remedying a circularity he detected in Locke about same. Cf. Wiggins, Sameness
and substance. Grice makes Peano feel deeply Griceian, as Grice lists his =
postulates, here for consideration. And if you wondered why Grice prefers
Latinate individuum to the Grecian. The Grecian is “ἄτομον,” in logic, rendered
by L and S as ‘individual, of terms,’ Pl. Sph. 229d; of the εἶδος or forma,
Arist. Metaph.1034a8, de An. 414b27.2. individual, Id. APo. 96b11, al.: as a
subst., τό ἄτομον, Id. Cat. 1b6, 3a38, Metaph.1058a18 (pl.), Plot. 6.2.2,
al. subst.; latinised from Grecian. Lewis and Short have “indīvĭdŭum,” an atom,
indivisible particle: ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni
affirmat, Cic. Ac. 2, 17 fin.: ne individuum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahive
non possit, id. N. D. 3, 12, 29. Note the use of individuum in alethic
modalities for necessity and possibility, starting with (11). ⊢ (α izzes α). This would be the principle of
non-contradiction or identity. Grice applies it to war: War is war, as yielding
a most peculiar implicature. (α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ) ⊃ α
izzes γ. This above is transitivity, which is crucial for Grices tackling of
Reids counterexample to Locke (and which according to Flew in Locke on personal
identity was predated by Berkeley. α hazzes β ⊃ ~(α izzes β). Or, what is accidental is not essential.
Grice allows that what is essential is accidental is, while misleading,
true. ⊢ α hazzes β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(α hazzes x ∧ x
izzes β) ⊢ (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes a forma). This above defines a universalium as
a forma, or eidos. (α hazzes β ∧ α
izzes a particular) ⊃ (∃γ).(γ≠α ∧ α izzes β) ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α) ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α ⊢ α
izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α) α = β ⊃⊂ α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α ⊢ α izzes an individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β) ⊢ α
izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α)); α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α) ⊢ α izzes some-thing ⊃ α
izzes an individuum. ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium) 16. ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α) ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of α ⊢ α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β; ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β 20. α izzes a particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum. ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α) 22. ⊢~
(∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x
izzes a forma) α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x
izzes α) x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izz β) ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α
izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazz α); α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazz A) ⊢ (α
izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ
izzes essentially predicable of α) ⊢ (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y
izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing); (∀β)(β
izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing) ⊢ α
izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β
izzes essentially predicable of α); (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β)⊃ α izzes non-essentially or
accidentally predicable of β. The use of this or that doxastic modality,
necessity and possibility, starting above, make this a good place to consider
one philosophical mistake Grice mentions in “Causal theory.” What is actual is
not also possible. Cf. What is essential is also accidental. He is criticising
a contemporary, if possible considered dated in the New World, form of
ordinary-language philosophy, where the philosopher detects a nuance, and
embarks risking colliding with the facts, rushing ahead to exploit it before he
can clarify it! Grice liked to see his explorations on = as belonging to metaphysics,
as the s. on his Doctrines at the Grice
Collection testifies. While Grice presupposes the use of = in his treatment of
the king of France, he also explores a relativisation of =. His motivation was
an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against Strawsons criterion
of space-time continuancy for the identification of the substantia prima. Grice
wants to apply = to cases were the time continuancy is made explicit. This
yields that a=b in scenario S, but that it may not be the case that a = b in a
second scenario S. Myro had an occasion to expand on Grices views in his
contribution on the topic for PGRICE. Myro mentions his System Ghp, a highly
powerful/hopefully plausible version of Grices System Q, in gratitude to to
Grice. Grice explored also the logic of izzing and hazzing with Code. Grice and
Myro developed a Geach-type of qualified identity. The formal aspects were
developed by Myro, and also by Code. Grice discussed Wigginss Sameness and
substance, rather than Geach. Cf. Wiggins and Strawson on Grice for the BA. At
Oxford, Grice was more or less given free rein to teach what he wanted. He
found the New World slightly disconcerting at first. At Oxford, he expected his
tutees to be willing to read the classics in the vernacular Greek. His approach
to teaching was diagogic, as Socratess! Even in his details of izzing and
hazzing. Greek enough to me!, as a student recalled! correspondence with Code,
Grice sees in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an
exploration of Aristotles underlying logic of essential and non-essential
predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as izzing and
hazing, izzing and hazzing, Code on the significance of the middle book in
Aristotles Met. , Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book. Very middle.
Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to
air this! The organisation of Aristotle’s metaphysics was a topic of much
concern for Grice. With Code, Grice coined izzing and hazzing to refer to
essential and non-essential attribution. Izzing and hazzing, “Aristotle on the
multiplicity of being” (henceforth, “Aristotle”) PPQ, Aristotle on multiplicity, “The Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly” (henceforth, “PPQ,” posthumously ed. by Loar,
Aristotle, multiplicity, izzing, hazzing, being, good, Code. Grice offers a
thorough discussion of Owens treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the snares
of ontology. Grice distinguishes between izzing and hazzing, which he thinks
help in clarifying, more axiomatico, what Aristotle is getting at with his
remarks on essential versus non-essential predication. Surely, for Grice,
being, nor indeed good, should not be multiplied beyond necessity,
but izzing and hazzing are already multiplied. The Grice Papers contains
drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication by Loar in memoriam
Grice. Note that the Grice Papers contains a typically Griceian un-publication,
entitled Aristotle and multiplicity simpliciter. Rather than Aristotle on,
as the title for the PPQ piece goes. Note also that, since its
multiplicity simpliciter, it refers to Aristotle on two key ideas: being and
the good. As Code notes in his contribution to PGRICE, Grice first
presents his thoughts on izzing and hazzing publicly at Vancouver. Jones has
developed the axiomatic treatment favoured by Grice. For Grice there is
multiplicity in both being and good (ton agathon), both accountable in terms of
conversational implicata, of course. If in Prolegomena, Grice was interested in
criticising himself, in essays of historical nature like these, Grice is seeing
Aristotles Athenian dialectic as a foreshadow of the Oxonian dialectic, and
treating him as an equal. Grice is yielding his razor: senses are not to
be multiplied beyond necessity. But then Aristotle is talking about
the multiplicity of is and is good. Surely, there are ways to turn
Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be! There is a further item in
the Grice collection that combines Aristotle on being with Aristotle on good,
which is relevant in connection with this. Aristotle on being and good
(ἀγαθόν). Aristotle, being, good (agathon), ἀγαθός. As from this f.,
the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with Aristotle, Grice will
explore Aristotle on being or is and good (ἀγαθός) in explorations with Code.
Grice comes up with izzing and hazzing as the two counterparts to Aristotles
views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication. Grices views
on Aristotle on the good (strictly, there is no need to restrict Arisstotles
use to the neuter form, since he employs ἀγαθός) connect with Grices
Aristotelian idea of eudaemonia, that he explores elsewhere. Strictly:
Aristotle on being and the good. If that had been Grices case, he would have
used the definite article. Otherwise, good may well translate as masculine,
ἀγαθός ‒the agathetic implicatum. He plays with Dodgson, cabbages and
kings. For what is a good cabbage as opposed to a cabbage? It does not
require very sharp eyes, but only our willingness to use the eyes one has, to
see that speech is permeated with the notion of purpose. To say what a
certain kind of thing is is only too frequently partly to say that it is for. This
feature applies to talk of, e. g., ships, shoes, sailing wax, and kings;
and, possibly and perhaps most excitingly, it extends even to cabbages!
Although Grice suspects Urmson might disagree. v. Grice on Urmsons
apples. Grice at his jocular best. If he is going to be a Kantian, he
will. He uses Kantian jargon to present his theory of conversation. This he
does only at Harvard. The implicature being that talking of vaguer assumptions
of helpfulness would not sound too convincing. So he has the maxim, the super-maxim,
and the sub-maxim. A principle and a maxim is Kantian enough. But when he
actually echoes Kant, is when he introduces what he later calls the
conversational categories – the keyword here is conversational category, as
categoria is used by Aristotle and Kant ‒ or Kantotle. Grice surely
knew that, say, his Category of Conversational Modality had nothing to do with
the Kantian Category of Modality. Still, he stuck with the idea of four
categories (versus Aristotles ten, eight or seven, as the text you consult may
tell you): category of conversational quantity (which at Oxford he had
formulated in much vaguer terms like strength and informativeness and
entailment), the category of conversational quality (keyword: principle of
conversational trust), and the category of conversational relation, where again
Kants relation has nothing to do with the maxim Grice associates with this
category. In any case, his Kantian joke may be helpful when considering the
centrality of the concept category simpliciter that Grice had to fight with
with his pupils at Oxford – he was lucky to have Austin and Strawson as
co-lecturers! Grice was irritated by L and S defining kategoria as category. I
guess I knew that. He agreed with their second shot, predicable. Ultimately,
Grices concern with category is his concern with person, or prote ousia, as
used by Aristotle, and as giving a rationale to Grices agency-based approach to
the philosophical enterprise. Aristotle used kategorein in the sense
of to predicate, assert something of something, and kategoria. The prote
ousia is exemplified by o tis anthropos. It is obvious that Grice wants to
approach Aristotles semantics and Aristotles metaphysics at one fell swoop.
Grice reads Aristotles Met. , and finds it understandable. Consider the
adjective French (which Aristotle does NOT consider) ‒ as it occurs in phrases
such as Michel Foucault is a French citizen. Grice is not a French
citizen. Michel Foucault once wrote a nice French poem. Urmson once wrote
a nice French essay on pragmatics. Michel Foucault was a French
professor. Michel Foucault is a French professor. Michel Foucault
is a French professor of philosophy. The following features are perhaps
significant. The appearance of the adjective French, or Byzantine, as the
case might be ‒ cf. I’m feeling French tonight. In these phrases is what
Grice has as adjunctive rather than conjunctive, or attributive. A French poem
is not necessarily something which combines the separate features of being a
poem and being French, as a tall philosopher would simply combine the features
of being tall and of being a philosopher. French in French poem,
occurs adverbially. French citizen standardly means citizen of
France. French poem standardly means poem in French. But it is a mistake to
suppose that this fact implies that there is this or that meaning, or, worse,
this or that Fregeian sense, of the expression French. In any case, only
metaphorically or metabolically can we say that French means this or that or
has sense. An utterer means. An utterer makes sense. Cf. R. Pauls doubts about
capitalizing major. French means, and figuratively at that, only one thing,
viz. of or pertaining to France. And English only means of or
pertaining to England. French may be what Grice (unfollowing his remarks on
The general theory of context) call context-sensitive. One might indeed
say, if you like, that while French means ‒ or means only this or that, or that
its only sense is this or that, French still means, again figuratively, a
variety of things. French means-in-context of or pertaining to
France. Symbolise that as expression E means-in-context that p.
Expression E means-in-context C2 that p2. Relative
to Context C1 French means of France; as in the phrase French
citizen. Relative to context C2, French means in the French language, as in the phrase,
French poem ‒ whereas history does not behave, like this. Whether the
focal item is a universal or a particular is, contra Aristotle, quite
irrelevant to the question of what this or that related adjective means, or
what its sense is. The medical art is no more what an utterer means when he
utters the adjective medical, as is France what an utterer means by the
adjective French. While the attachment of this or that context may suggest an
interpretation in context of this or that expression as uttered by the utterer
U, it need not be the case that such a suggestion is indefeasible. It
might be e.g. that French poem would have to mean, poem composed in French,
unless there were counter indications, that brings the utterer and the
addressee to a different context C3. In which case, perhaps
what the utterer means by French poem is poem composed by a French competitor
in this or that competition. For French professor there would be two
obvious things an utterer might mean. Disambiguation will depend on the
wider expression-context or in the situational context attaching to
the this or that circumstance of utterance. Eschatology. Some like Hegel, but
Collingwoods *my* man! ‒ Grice. Grice participated in two consecutive
evenings of the s. of programmes on metaphysics organised by Pears. Actually,
charming Pears felt pretentious enough to label the meetings to be about the
nature of metaphysics! Grice ends up discussing, as he should, Collingwood on
presupposition. Met. remained a
favourite topic for Grices philosophical explorations, as it is evident from
his essay on Met. , Philosophical Eschatology, and Platos Republic, repr. in
his WOW . Possibly Hardie is to blame, since he hardly tutored Grice on
metaphysics! Grices two BBC lectures are typically dated in tone. It was the
(good ole) days when philosophers thought they could educate the non-elite by
dropping Namess like Collingwood and stuff! The Third Programme was extremely
popular, especially among the uneducated ones at London, as Pears almost put
it, as it was a way for Londoners to get to know what is going on down at
Oxford, the only place an uneducated (or educated, for that matter) Londoner at
the time was interested in displaying some interest about! I mean, Johnson is
right: if a man is tired of the nature of metaphysics, he is tired of life!
Since the authorship is Grice, Strawson, and Pears, Met. , in Pears, The Nature
of Met., The BBC Third Programme, it is somewhat difficult to identify what
paragraphs were actually read by Grice (and which ones by Pears and which ones
by Strawson). But trust the sharp Griceian to detect the correct implicature!
There are many (too many) other items covered by these two lectures: Kant,
Aristotle, in no particular order. And in The Grice Collection, for that
matter, that cover the field of metaphysics. In the New World, as a sort of
tutor in the graduate programme, Grice was expected to cover the discipline at
various seminars. Only I dislike discipline! Perhaps his clearest exposition is
in the opening section of his Met. , philosophical eschatology, and Platos
Republic, repr. in his WOW , where he states, bluntly that all you need is metaphysics! metaphysics, Miscellaneous,
metaphysics notes, Grice would possible see metaphysics as a class – category
figuring large. He was concerned with the methodological aspects of the
metaphysical enterprise, since he was enough of a relativist to allow for one
metaphysical scheme to apply to one area of discourse (one of Eddingtons
tables) and another metaphysical scheme to apply to another (Eddingtons other
table). In the third programme for the BBC Grice especially enjoyed criticising
John Wisdoms innovative look at metaphysics as a bunch of self-evident
falsehoods (Were all alone). Grice focuses on Wisdom on the knowledge of other
minds. He also discusses Collingwoods presuppositions, and Bradley on the
reality-appearance distinction. Grices reference to Wisdom was due to Ewings
treatment of Wisdom on metaphysics. Grices main motivation here is defending
metaphysics against Ayer. Ayer thought to win more Oxonian philosophers than he
did at Oxford, but he was soon back in London. Post-war Oxford had become
conservative and would not stand to the nonsense of Ayers claiming that
metaphysics is nonsense, especially, as Ayers implicature also was, that
philosophy is nonsense! Perhaps the best summary of Griceian metaphysics is his
From Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics. It’s an
ontological answer that one must give to Grices metabolic operation from
utterers meaning to expression meaning, Grice had been interested in the
methodology of metaphysics since his Oxford days. He counts as one
memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for the BBC
Third Programme on The nature of metaphysics with the organiser, Pears, and his
former tutee, Strawson on the panel. Grice was particularly keen on
Collingwoods views on metaphysical presuppositions, both absolute and
relative! Grice also considers John Wisdoms view of the metaphysical
proposition as a blatant falsehood. Grice considers Bradleys Hegelian
metaphysics of the absolute, in Appearance and reality. Refs.: While Grice’s
choice was ‘eschatology,’ as per WoW, Essay, other keywords are useful, notably
“metaphysics,” “ontology,” “theorizing,” and “theory-theory,” in The H. P.
Grice Papers, BANC.
explicatum:
What is the difference, etymologically, between
explicate and explain? Well, explain is from ‘explanare,’ which gives
‘explanatum’ – II. Trop.,
of speech, to make plain or clear, to explain (class.: “syn.: explico, expono, interpretor): qualis differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intelligi quam explanari potest,” Cic. Off. 1, 27, 94; cf. Quint. 5, 10, 4: “rem latentem explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretando, etc.,” Cic. Brut. 42, 152: “explanare apertiusque dicere aliquid,” id. Fin. 2, 19, 60: “docere et explanare,” id. Off. 1, 28, 101: “aliquid conjecturā,” id. de Or. 2, 69, 280: “rem,” id. Or. 24, 80: “quem amicum tuum ais fuisse istum, explana mihi,” Ter.
Ph. 2, 3, 33: “de cujus hominis moribus pauca prius explananda sunt, quam initium narrandi faciam,” Sall. C. 4, 5.—Pass.impers.: “juxta quod flumen, aut ubi fuerit, non satis explanatur,” Plin. 6, 23, 26, § 97.—2. To utter
distinctly: “et ille juravit, expressit, explanavitque verba, quibus, etc.,” Plin.
Pan. 64, 3.Hence, explānātus ,
a, um, P. a. (acc. to II.), plain, distinct (rare): “claritas in voce, in lingua etiam explanata vocum impressio,” i. e. an
articulate pronunciation, Cic. Ac. 1, 5, 19: parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus,
Sen. de Ira, 1, 1, 4. Adv. ex-plānāte , plainly, clearly, distinctly:
“scriptum,” Gell. 16, 8, 3.—Comp.: “ut definire rem cum explanatius, tum etiam uberius (opp. presse et anguste),” Cic. Or. 33, 117.
Cr. Occam. M. O. R. the necessity is explanatory necessity. Senses or
conventional implicatata (not reachable by ‘argument’) and Strawson do not
explain. G. A. Paul does not explain. Unlike Austin, who was in love with a
taxonomy, Grice loved an explanation. “Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῶν πάντων ὕδωρ ὑπεστήσατο, καὶ
τὸν κόσμον ἔμψυχον καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη. “Arkhen de ton panton hudor
hupestesato.” Thales’s doctrine is that water is the universal primary
substance, and that the world is animate and full of divinities. “Ἀλλὰ Θαλῆς
μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ φησὶν εἶναι (διὸ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ᾽
ὕδατος ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι), λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν τὴν
τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸ δ᾽
ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πάντων) – διά τε δὴ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόληψιν λαβὼν
ταύτην καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντων τὰ σπέρματα τὴν φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν, τὸ δ᾽ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴν
τῆς φύσεως εἶναι τοῖς ὑγροῖς. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους καὶ πολὺ
πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας οὕτως οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως
ὑπολαβεῖν‧
Ὠκεανόν τε γὰρ καὶ Τηθὺν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας [Hom. Ξ 201], καὶ τὸν
ὅρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν‧ τιμιώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον, ὅρκος δὲ τὸ τιμιώτατόν
ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν [984a] ἀρχαία τις αὕτη καὶ παλαιὰ τετύχηκεν οὖσα περὶ τῆς
φύσεως ἡ δόξα, τάχ᾽ ἂν ἄδηλον εἴη, Θαλῆς μέντοι λέγεται οὕτως ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς
πρώτης αἰτίας. (Ἵππωνα γὰρ οὐκ ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε θεῖναι μετὰ τούτων διὰ τὴν
εὐτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας)‧
Ἀναξιμένης δὲ ἀέρα καὶ Διογένης πρότερον ὕδατος καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι τῶν
ἁπλῶν σωμάτων.” De caelo: “Οἱ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος κεῖσθαι [sc. τὴν γὴν]. τοῦτον γὰρ
ἀρχαιότατον παρειλήφαμεν τὸν λόγον, ὅν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θαλῆν τὸν Μιλήσιον, ὡς διὰ
τὸ πλωτὴν εἶναι μένουσαν ὥσπερ ξύλον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐπ᾽
ἀέρος μὲν οὐθὲν πέφυκε μένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος), ὥσπερ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὄντα
περὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ ὀχοῦντος τὴν γῆν‧ οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ πέφυκε μένειν μετέωρον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπί τινός
[294b] ἐστιν. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἀὴρ ὕδατος κουφότερον, καὶ γῆς ὕδωρ‧ ὥστε πῶς οἷόν τε τὸ κουφότερον κατωτέρω κεῖσθαι τοῦ
βαρυτέρου τὴν φύσιν; ἔτι δ᾽ εἴπερ ὅλη πέφυκε μένειν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
τῶν μορίων ἕκαστον [αὐτῆς]‧
νῦν δ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται τοῦτο γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχὸν μόριον φέρεται εἰς βυθόν,
καὶ θᾶττον τὸ μεῖζον. The problem of the nature of matter, and its
transformation into the myriad things of which the universe is made, engaged
the natural philosophers, commencing with Thales. For his hypothesis to be
credible, it was essential that he could explain how all things could come into
being from water, and return ultimately to the originating material. It is inherent
in Thaless hypotheses that water had the potentiality to change to the myriad
things of which the universe is made, the botanical, physiological,
meteorological and geological states. In Timaeus, 49B-C, Plato had Timaeus
relate a cyclic process. The passage commences with that which we now call
“water” and describes a theory which was possibly that of Thales. Thales would
have recognized evaporation, and have been familiar with traditional views,
such as the nutritive capacity of mist and ancient theories about spontaneous
generation, phenomena which he may have observed, just as Aristotle believed
he, himself had, and about which Diodorus Siculus, Epicurus (ap. Censorinus,
D.N. IV.9), Lucretius (De Rerum Natura) and Ovid (Met. I.416-437) wrote. When
Aristotle reported Thales’s pronouncement that the primary principle is water,
he made a precise statement: Thales says that it [the nature of things] is
water, but he became tentative when he proposed reasons which might have
justified Thaless decision. Thales’s supposition may have arisen from
observation. It is Aristotle’s opinion that Thales may have observed, that the
nurture of all creatures is moist, and that warmth itself is generated from
moisture and lives by it; and that from which all things come to be is their
first principle. Then, Aristotles tone changed towards greater confidence. He
declared: Besides this, another reason for the supposition would be that the
semina of all things have a moist nature. In continuing the criticism of
Thales, Aristotle wrote: That from which all things come to be is their first
principle (Metaph. 983 b25). Simple
metallurgy had been practised long before Thales presented his hypotheses, so
Thales knew that heat could return metals to a liquid state. Water exhibits
sensible changes more obviously than any of the other so-called elements, and
can readily be observed in the three states of liquid, vapour and ice. The
understanding that water could generate into earth is basic to Thaless watery
thesis. At Miletus it could readily be observed that water had the capacity to
thicken into earth. Miletus stood on the Gulf of Lade through which the
Maeander river emptied its waters. Within living memory, older Milesians had
witnessed the island of Lade increasing in size within the Gulf, and the river
banks encroaching into the river to such an extent that at Priene, across the
gulf from Miletus the warehouses had to be rebuilt closer to the waters edge.
The ruins of the once prosperous city-port of Miletus are now ten kilometres
distant from the coast and the Island of Lade now forms part of a rich
agricultural plain. There would have been opportunity to observe other areas
where earth generated from water, for example, the deltas of the Halys, the
Ister, about which Hesiod wrote (Theogony, 341), now called the Danube, the
Tigris-Euphrates, and almost certainly the Nile. This coming-into-being of land
would have provided substantiation of Thaless doctrine. To Thales water held
the potentialities for the nourishment and generation of the entire cosmos.
Aëtius attributed to Thales the concept that even the very fire of the sun and
the stars, and indeed the cosmos itself is nourished by evaporation of the
waters (Aëtius, Placita). It is not
known how Thales explained his watery thesis, but Aristotle believed that the
reasons he proposed were probably the persuasive factors in Thaless
considerations. Thales gave no role to the Olympian gods. Belief in generation
of earth from water was not proven to be wrong until A.D. 1769 following
experiments of Antoine Lavoisier, and spontaneous generation was not disproved
until the nineteenth century as a result of the work of Louis Pasteur.The first
philosophical explanation of the world was speculative not practical. has its
intelligibility in being identified with one of its parts (the world is water).
First philosophical explanation for Universe human is rational and the world in
independent; He said the arché is water; Monist: He believed reality is
one Thales of Miletus, first philosophical
explanation of the origin and nature of justice (and Why after all, did a Thales is Water.” Without the millions of species
that make up the biosphere, and the billions of interactions between them that
go on day by day,.Oddly, Grice had spent some time on x-questions in the Kant
lectures. And why is an x-question. A philosophical explanation of
conversation. A philosophical explanation of implicature. Description vs.
explanation. Grice quotes from Fisher, Never contradict. Never explain.
Taxonomy, is worse than explanation, always. Grice is exploring the
taxonomy-description vs. explanation dichotomy. He would often criticise
ordinary-language philosopher Austin for spending too much valuable time on
linguistic botany, without an aim in his head. Instead, his inclination, a
dissenting one, is to look for the big picture of it all, and disregard a
piece-meal analysis. Conversation is a good example. While Austin would
Subjectsify Language (Linguistic Nature), Grice rather places rationality squarely
on the behaviour displayed by utterers as they make conversational moves that
their addressees will judge as rational along specific lines. Observation
of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along
the following lines: anyone who cares about the two goals which are central to
conversation, viz. giving and receiving information, and influencing and being
influenced by others, is expected to have an interest in taking part in a
conversation which will only be profitable (if not possible) under the
assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of
conversational helpfulness. Grice is not interested in conversation per se, but
as a basis for a theory that explains the mistakes ordinary-language
philosophers are making. The case of What is known to be the case is not
believed to be the case. Refs.: One good source is the “Prejudices and
predilections.” Also the first set of ‘Logic and conversation.” There is also
an essay on the ‘that’ versus the ‘why.’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
Explicatum.
While ‘implicare’ developed into vulgar Engish as ‘employ,’ “it’s funny
explicature did not develop into ‘exploy.’”A logical construction is an
explication. A reductive analysis is an explication. Cf. Grice on Reductionism
as a bete noire, sometimes misquoted as Reductivism. Grice used both
‘explanation’ and ‘explication’, so one has to be careful. When he said that he
looked for a theory that would explain conversation or the implicatum, he did
not mean explication.
expressum:
The
oppositum is the impressum, or sense-datum. In a functionalist model, you have
perceptual INPUT and behavioural OUTPUT, the expressum. In between, the black
box of the soul. Darwin, Eckman. Drawing
a skull meaning there is danger. cf. impressum. Inside out. Expression
of Impressions. As an empiricist, Grice was into ‘impress.’ But it’s always
good to have a correlatum. Grice liked an abbreviation, especially because he
loved subscripts. So, he starts to analyse the ‘ordinary-language’ philosohper’s
mistake by using a few symbols: there’s the phrase, or utterance, and there’s
the expression, for which Grice uses ‘e’ for a ‘token,’ and ‘E’ for a type. So,
suppose we are considering Hart’s use of ‘carefully.’ ‘Carefully’ would be the
‘expression,’ occurring within an utterance. Surely, since Grice uses
‘expression’ in that way, he also uses to say what Hart is doing, Hart is
expressing. Grice notes that ‘expressing’ may be too strong. Hart is expressing
the belief THAT if you utter an utterance containing the ‘expression’
‘carefully,’ there is an implicatum to the effect that the agent referred to is
taking RATIONAL steps towards something. IRRATIONAL behaviour does not count as
‘careful’ behaviour. Grice uses the same abbreviations in discussing philosophy
as the ‘conceptual analysis’ of this or that expression. It is all different
with Ogden, Collingwood, and Croce, that Collingwood loved! "Ideas, we may say generally, are
symbols, as serving to express some actual moment or phase of experience and
guiding towards fuller actualization of what is, or seems to be, involved in
its existence or MEANING . That no idea is ever wholly adequate MEANS that the
suggestiveness of experience is inexhaustible" Forsyth, English
Philosophy, 1910, . Thus the significance of sound, the meaning of an utterance
is here identical with the active response to surroundings and with the natural
expression of emotions According to Husserl, the function of expression is only
directly and immediately adapted to what is usually described as the meaning
(Bedeutung) or the sense (Sinn) of the speech or parts of speech. Only because
the meaning associated with a wordsowid expresses something, is that word-sound
called 'expres- sion' (Ideen, p. 256 f). "Between the ,nearnng and the
what is meant, or what it expresses, there exists an essential relation,
because the meaning is the expression of the meant through its own content
(Gehalt) What is meant (dieses Bedeutete) lies in the 'object' of the thought
or speech. We must therefore distinguish these three-Word, Meaning, Object
"1 Geyser, Gp cit p z8 PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a
watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompresso These complexities are
mentioned here to show how vague are most of the terms which are commonly
thought satisfactory in this topic. Such a word as 'understand' is, unless
specially treated, far too vague to serve except provisionally or at levels of
discourse where a real understanding of the matter (in the reference sense) is
not possible. The multiple functions of speech will be classified and discussed
in the following chapter. There it will be seen that the expression of the
speaker's intention is one of the five regular language functions. Grice hated
Austin’s joke, the utteratum, “I use ‘utterance’ only as equivalent to
'utteratum;' for 'utteratio' I use ‘the issue of an utterance,’” so he needed
something for ‘what is said’ in general, not just linguistic, ‘what is
expressed,’ what is explicitly conveyed,’ ex-prĭmo , pressi, pressum, 3, v. a.
premo. express (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose; “freq. in the elder Pliny):
(faber) et ungues exprimet et molles imitabitur aere capillos,” Hor. A. P. 33;
cf.: “alicujus furorem ... verecundiae ruborem,” Plin. 34, 14, 40, § 140:
“expressa in cera ex anulo imago,” Plaut. Ps. 1, 1, 54: “imaginem hominis gypso
e facie ipsa,” Plin. 35, 12, 44, § 153; cf.: “effigiem de signis,” id. ib.:
“optime Herculem Delphis et Alexandrum, etc.,” id. 34, 8, 19, § 66 et saep.:
“vestis stricta et singulos artus exprimens,” exhibiting, showing, Tac. G. 17:
“pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos exercitatio expressit,” has well
developed, made muscular, Quint. 8, 3, 10.
Farquharsonism
– Grice enjoyed reading Cook Wilson, and was grateful to A S L Farquharson for
making that possible.
find play – where Grice’s implicature
finds play Strawson Wiggins p. 523
Freges Sättigung: Frege’s original Sinn. Fregeian
saturation. Grice was once at the Bodleian assisting Austin in his translation
of Frege’s Grundlegung – and browsing through the old-style library fiches,
Grice exclaims: “All these essays in German journals about Fregeian saturation
can surely saturate one!’ Austin was not amused. Neben mathematischen und
physikalischen Vorlesungen sowie einer in Philosophie hat Frege in Jena
Vorlesungen in Chemie besucht und in diesem Fach auch an einem einsemestrigen
Praktikum teilgenommen. In seiner wohlbekannten Rede über Bindung und Sättigung
von Ausdrücken klingt davon noch etwas nach.Betrachten wir nun die Konsequenzen
der Fregeschen Auffassung der prädikativen Natur der Begriffe. Hierfür ist es
zunächst erforderlich, abschließend einige Besonderheiten anzumerken, die
daraus folgen, daß auch Begriffsausdrücke bedeutungsvoll sein sollen. Zunächst
hatten wir ja mit Hilfe der Analogie festgestellt, daß in einem Satz dasjenige,
was Begriffsausdrücke bedeuten, denselben ontologischen Status haben muß wie
das, was Eigennamen bedeuten. Insofern scheinen sowohl Eigennamen als auch
Begriffsausdrücke jeweils bestimmte (wenn auch hinsichtlich ihrer Sättigung
oder Bindungsfähigkeit unterschiedene) Entitäten als Bedeutung zu haben. Und
Frege erklärt auch explizit „Begriff ist Bedeutung eines Prädikates“ [BG, 198].
Frege’s
distinction between saturated expressions and unsaturated expressions
corresponds to the distinction between objects and concepts. A saturated
expression refers to an object or argument and has a complete sense in itself,
while an unsaturated expression refers to a concept or function and does not
have a complete sense. For example, in the sentence “Socrates is the teacher of
Plato,” “Socrates” and “Plato” are proper names and are saturated, while “. . .
is the teacher of . . .” is unsaturated, for it has empty spaces that must be filled with
saturated expressions before it gains a complete sense. “Statements in general
. . . can be imagined to be split up into two parts; one complete in itself,
and the other in need of supplementation, or ‘unsaturated’.” Frege, “Function
and Concept,” Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege.
freedom:
Like identity, crucial in philosophy in covering everything. E cannot
communicate that p, unless E is FREE. An amoeba cannot communicate thatp. End
setting, unweighed rationality, rationality about the ends, autonomy. Grice was
especially concerned with Kants having brought back the old Greek idea of
eleutheria for philosophical discussion. Refs.: the obvious keywords are “freedom”
and “free,” but most of the material is in “Actions and events,” in PPQ, and
below under ‘kantianism’ – The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.Bratman, of
Stanford, much influenced by Grice (at Berkeley then) thanks to their
Hands-Across-the-Bay programme, helps us to understand this Pological
progression towards the idea of strong autonomy or freedom. Recall that Grices
Ps combine Lockes very intelligent parrots with Russells and Carnaps
nonsensical Ps of which nothing we are told other than they karulise elatically.
Grices purpose is to give a little thought to a question. What are the general
principles exemplified, in creature-construction, in progressing from one type
of P to a higher type? What kinds of steps are being made? The kinds of step
with which Grice deals are those which culminate in a licence to include,
within the specification of the content of the psychological state of this or
that type of P, a range of expressions which would be inappropriate with
respect to this lower-type P. Such expressions include this or that connective,
this or that quantifier, this or that temporal modifier, this or that mode
indicator, this or that modal operator, and (importantly) this or that
expression to refer to this or that souly state like … judges that … and … will that … This or
that expression, that is, the availability of which leads to the structural
enrichment of the specification of content. In general, these steps will be
ones by which this or that item or idea which has, initially, a legitimate place
outside the scope of this or that souly instantiable (or, if you will, the
expressions for which occur legitimately outside the scope of this or that
souly predicate) come to have a legitimate place within the scope of such an
instantiable, a step by which, one might say, this or that item or ideas comes
to be internalised. Grice is disposed to regard as prototypical the sort of
natural disposition or propension which Hume attributes to a person, and which
is very important to Hume, viz. the tendency of the soul to spread itself upon
objects, i.e. to project into the world items which, properly or primitively
considered, is a feature of this or that souly state. Grice sets out in stages
the application of aspects of the genitorial programme. We then start with a
zero-order, with a P equipped to satisfy unnested, or logically amorphous,
judging and willing, i.e. whose contents do not involve judging or willing. We
soon reach our first P, G1. It would be advantageous to a P0 if
it could have this or that judging and this or that willing, which relate to
its own judging or willing. Such G1 could be equipped to
control or regulate its own judgings and willings. It will presumably be
already constituted so as to conform to the law that, cæteris paribus, if it wills
that p and judge that ~p, if it can, it makes it the case that p in its soul To
give it some control over its judgings and willings, we need only extend the
application of this law to the Ps judging and willing. We equip the P so that,
cæteris paribus, if it wills that it is not the case that it wills that p and
it judges that they do will that p, if it can, it makes it the case that it
does not will that p. And we somehow ensure that sometimes it can do this. It
may be that the installation of this kind of control would go hand in had with
the installation of the capacity for evaluation. Now, unlike it is the case
with a G1, a G2s intentional effort depends on the motivational strength of its
considered desire at the time of action. There is a process by which this or
that conflicting considered desire motivates action as a broadly causal
process, a process that reveals motivational strength. But a G2 might itself
try to weigh considerations provided by such a conflicting desire B1 and B2 in
deliberation about this or that pro and this or that con of various
alternatives. In the simplest case, such weighing treats each of the things
desired as a prima facie justifying end. In the face of conflict, it weighs
this and that desired end, where the weights correspond to the motivational
strength of the associated considered desire. The outcome of such deliberation,
Aristotle’s prohairesis, matches the outcome of the causal motivational process
envisioned in the description of G2. But, since the weights it invokes
in such deliberation correspond to the motivational strength of this or that
relevant considered desire (though perhaps not to the motivational strength of
this or that relevant considered desire), the resultant activitiy matches those
of a corresponding G2 (each of whose desires, we are assuming,
are considered). To be more realistic, we might limit ourselves to saying that
a P2 has the capacity to make the transition from this or that
unconsidered desire to this or that considered desire, but does not always do
this. But it will keep the discussion more manageable to simplify and to
suppose that each desire is considered. We shall not want this G2 to depend, in
each will and act in ways that reveal the motivational strength of this or that
considered desire at the time of action, but for a G3 it will
also be the case that in this or that, though not each) case, it acts on the
basis of how it weights this or that end favoured by this or that conflicting
considered desire. This or that considered desire will concern matters that
cannot be achieved simply by action at a single time. E. g. G3 may want to
nurture a vegetable garden, or build a house. Such matters will require
organized and coordinated action that extends over time. What the G3 does now
will depend not only on what it now desires but also on what it now expects it
will do later given what it does now. It needs a way of settling now what it
will do later given what it does now. The point is even clearer when we remind
ourselves that G3 is not alone. It is, we may assume, one of some number of G3;
and in many cases it needs to coordinate what it does with what other G3 do so
as to achieve ends desired by all participants, itself included. These
costs are magnified for G4 whose various plans are interwoven so that a change
in one element can have significant ripple effects that will need to be
considered. Let us suppose that the general strategies G4 has for responding to
new information about its circumstances are sensitive to these kinds of costs. Promoting
in the long run the satisfaction of its considered desires and preferences. G4 is
a somewhat sophisticated planning agent but it has a problem. It can expect
that its desires and preferences may well change over time and undermine its
efforts at organizing and coordinating its activities over time. Perhaps in
many cases this is due to the kind of temporal discounting. So for example G4
may have a plan to exercise every day but may tend to prefer a sequence of not
exercising on the present day but exercising all days in the future, to a
uniform sequence the present day included. At the end of the day it returns to
its earlier considered preference in favour of exercising on each and every
day. Though G4, unlike G3, has the capacity to settle on prior plans
or plaices concerning exercise, this capacity does not yet help in such a case.
A creature whose plans were stable in ways in part shaped by such a no-regret
principle would be more likely than G4 to resist temporary temptations. So
let us build such a principle into the stability of the plans of a G5, whose
plans and policies are not derived solely from facts about its limits of time,
attention, and the like. It is also grounded in the central concerns of a
planning agent with its own future, concerns that lend special significance to
anticipated future regret. So let us add to G5 the capacity and disposition to
arrive at such hierarchies of higher-order desires concerning its
will. This gives us creature G6. There is a problem with G6, one that has
been much discussed. It is not clear why a higher-order desire ‒
even a higher-order desire that a certain desire be ones will ‒ is
not simply one more desire in the pool of desires (Berkeley Gods will problem).
Why does it have the authority to constitute or ensure the agents (i. e. the
creatures) endorsement or rejection of a first-order desire? Applied to G6 this
is the question of whether, by virtue solely of its hierarchies of desires, it
really does succeed in taking its own stand of endorsement or rejection of
various first-order desires. Since it was the ability to take its own stand
that we are trying to provide in the move to P6, we need some
response to this challenge. The basic point is that G6 is not
merely a time-slice agent. It is, rather, and understands itself to be, a
temporally persisting planning agent, one who begins, and continues, and
completes temporally extended projects. On a broadly Lockean view, its
persistence over time consists in relevant psychological continuities (e.g., the
persistence of attitudes of belief and intention) and connections (e.g., memory
of a past event, or the later intentional execution of an intention formed
earlier). Certain attitudes have as a primary role the constitution and support
of such Lockean continuities and connections. In particular, policies that
favour or reject various desires have it as their role to constitute and
support various continuities both of ordinary desires and of the politicos
themselves. For this reason such policies are not merely additional wiggles in
the psychic stew. Instead, these policies have a claim to help determine where
the agent ‒ i.e., the temporally persisting agent ‒ stands with respect to
its desires, or so it seems to me reasonable to say. The psychology of G7 continues
to have the hierarchical structure of pro-attitudes introduced with G6. The
difference is that the higher-order pro-attitudes of G6 were simply
characterized as desires in a broad, generic sense, and no appeal was made to
the distinctive species of pro-attitude constituted by plan-like attitudes.
That is the sense in which the psychology of G7 is an extension of the
psychology of G6. Let us then give G7 such higher-order policies with the
capacity to take a stand with respect to its desires by arriving at relevant
higher-order policies concerning the functioning of those desires over time. G7 exhibits
a merger of hierarchical and planning structures. Appealing to planning theory
and ground in connection to the temporally extended structure of agency to be
ones will. G7 has higher-order policies that favour or challenge motivational
roles of its considered desires. When G7 engages in deliberative weighing of
conflicting, desired ends it seems that the assigned weights should reflect the
policies that determine where it stands with respect to relevant desires. But
the policies we have so far appealed to ‒ policies concerning what desires are
to be ones will ‒ do not quite address this concern. The problem is that one
can in certain cases have policies concerning which desires are to motivate and
yet these not be policies that accord what those desires are for a
corresponding justifying role in deliberation. G8. A solution is to give our
creature, G8, the capacity to arrive at policies that express
its commitment to be motivated by a desire by way of its treatment of that
desire as providing, in deliberation, a justifying end for action. G8 has
policies for treating (or not treating) certain desires as providing justifying
ends, as, in this way, reason-providing, in motivationally effective
deliberation. Let us call such policies self-governing policies. We will
suppose that these policies are mutually compatible and do not challenge each
other. In this way G8 involves an extension of structures already present in
G7. The grounds on which G8 arrives at (and on occasion revises) such
self-governing policies will be many and varied. We can see these policies as
crystallizing complex pressures and concerns, some of which are grounded in
other policies or desires. These self-governing policies may be tentative and
will normally not be immune to change. If we ask what G8 values in this case,
the answer seems to be: what it values is constituted in part by its
higher-order self-governing policies. In particular, it values exercise over
nonexercise even right now, and even given that it has a considered, though
temporary, preference to the contrary. Unlike lower Ps, what P8 now
values is not simply a matter of its present, considered desires and
preferences. Now this model of P8 seems in relevant aspects to be a partial)
model of us, in our better moments, of course. So we arrive at the conjecture
that one important kind of valuing of which we are capable involves, in the
cited ways, both our first-order desires and our higher order self-governing
policies. In an important sub-class of cases our valuing involves reflexive
polices that are both first-order policies of action and higher-order policies
to treat the first-order policy as reason providing in motivationally effective
deliberation. This may seem odd. Valuing seems normally to be a first-order
attitude. One values honesty, say. The proposal is that an important kind of
valuing involves higher-order policies. Does this mean that, strictly speaking,
what one values (in this sense) is itself a desire ‒ not honesty, say, but a
desire for honesty? No, it does not. What I value in the present case is
honesty; but, on the theory, my valuing honesty in art consists in certain
higher-order self-governing policies. An agents reflective valuing involves a
kind of higher-order willing. Freud challenged the power structure of the soul
in Plato: it is the libido that takes control, not the logos. Grice takes up
this polemic. Aristotle takes up Platos challenge, each type of soul is united
to the next by the idea of life. The animal soul, between the vegetative and
the rational, is not detachable.
futurum indicativum: cf. H. P. Grice and
D. F. Pears, “Predicting and deciding.” The future is essentially involved in
“E communicates that p,” i. e. E, the emissor, intends that his addressee, in a
time later than t, will come to believe this or that. Grice is especially concerned with the future
for his analysis of the communicatum. “Close the door!” By uttering “Close the
door!,” U means that A is to close the door – in the future. So Grice spends
HOURS exploring how one can have justification to have an intention about a
future event. Grice is aware of the ‘shall.’ Grice uses ‘shall’ in the first
person to mean wha the calls ‘futurum indicativum.’ (He considers the case of
the ‘shall’ in the second and third persons in his analysis of mode). What are
the conditions for the use of “shall” in the first person. “I shall close the
door” may be predictable. It is in the indicative mode. “Thou shalt close the
door,” and “He shall close the door” are in the imperative mode, or rather they
correspond to the ‘futurum intentionale.’
Since Grice is an analytic
philosopher, he specifies the analysis in the third person (“U means that…”)
one has to be careful. For ‘futurum indicativum’ we have ‘shall’ in the first
person, and ‘will’ in the second and third persons. So for the first group, U
means that he will go. In the second group, U means that his addressee or a
third party shall go. Grice adopts a subscript variant, stick with ‘will,’ but
add the mode afterwards: so will-ind. will be ‘futurum indicativum,’ and
will-int. will be futurum intentionale. The OED has it as “shall,”
and defines as a Germanic preterite-present strong verb. In Old English,
it is “sceal,” and which the OED renders as “to owe (money,” 1425 Hoccleve Min.
Poems, The leeste ferthyng þat y men shal. To owe (allegiance); 1649 And by
that feyth I shal to god and yow; followed by an infinitive, without to. Except
for a few instances of shall will, shall may (mowe), "shall conne" in
the 15th c., the infinitive after shall is always either that of a principal
verb or of have or be; The present tense shall; in general statements of what
is right or becoming, = ought, superseded by the past subjunctive should; in
OE. the subjunctive present sometimes occurs in this use; 1460 Fortescue Abs.
and Lim. Mon. The king shall often times send his judges to punish rioters and
risers. 1562 Legh Armory; Whether are Roundells of all suche coloures, as ye
haue spoken of here before? or shall they be Namesd Roundelles of those
coloures? In OE. and occas. in Middle English used to express necessity of
various kinds. For the many shades of meaning in Old English see Bosworth and
Toller), = must, "must needs", "have to", "am
compelled to", etc.; in stating a necessary condition: = `will have to,
`must (if something else is to happen). 1596 Shaks. Merch. V. i. i. 116 You
shall seeke all day ere you finde them, & when you haue them they are
not worth the search. 1605 Shaks. Lear. He that parts vs, shall bring a Brand
from Heauen. c In hypothetical clause, accompanying the statement of a
necessary condition: = `is to. 1612 Bacon Ess., Greatn. Kingd., Neither must
they be too much broken of it, if they shall be preserued in vigor; ndicating
what is appointed or settled to take place = the mod. `is to, `am to, etc. 1600
Shaks. A.Y.L. What is he that shall buy his flocke and pasture? 1625 in Ellis
Orig. Lett. Ser. "Tomorrow His Majesty will be present to begin the Parliament which is thought
shall be removed to Oxford; in commands or instructions; n the second person,
“shall” is equivalent to an imperative. Chiefly in Biblical language, of divine
commandments, rendering the jussive future of the Hebrew and Vulgate. In Old
English the imperative mode is used in the ten commandments. 1382 Wyclif Exod.
Thow shalt not tak the Names of the Lord thi God in veyn. So Coverdale, etc. b)
In expositions: you shall understand, etc. (that). c) In the formula you shall
excuse (pardon) me. (now "must"). 1595 Shaks. John. Your Grace shall
pardon me, I will not backe. 1630 R. Johnsons Kingd. and Commw. 191 You shall
excuse me, for I eat no flesh on Fridayes; n the *third* person. 1744 in Atkyns
Chanc. Cases (1782) III. 166 The words shall and may in general acts of
parliament, or in private constitutions, are to be construed imperatively, they
must remove them; in the second and third persons, expressing the determination
by the Griceian utterer to bring about some action, event, or state of things
in the future, or (occasionally) to refrain from hindering what is otherwise
certain to take place, or is intended by another person; n the second person.
1891 J. S. Winter Lumley. If you would rather not stay then, you shall go down
to South Kensington Square then; in third person. 1591 Shaks. Two Gent. Verona
shall not hold thee. 1604 Shaks. Oth. If there be any cunning Crueltie, That
can torment him much, It shall be his. 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley xiv, `Oh, yes,
sir, she shall come back, said the nurse. `Ill take care of that. `I will come
back, said Vere; in special interrogative uses, a) in the *first* person, used
in questions to which the expected answer is a command, direction, or counsel,
or a resolve on the speakers own part. a) in questions introduced by an
interrogative pronoun (in oblique case), adverb, or adverbial phrase. 1600
Fairfax Tasso. What shall we doe? shall we be gouernd still, By this false
hand? 1865 Kingsley Herew. Where shall we stow the mare? b) in categorical
questions, often expressing indignant reprobation of a suggested course of
action, the implication (or implicature, or entailment) being that only a
negative (or, with negative question an affirmative) answer is conceivable.
1611 Shaks. Wint. T. Shall I draw the Curtaine? 1802 Wordsw. To the Cuckoo i, O
Cuckoo! shall I call thee Bird, Or but a wandering Voice? 1891 J. S. Winter
Lumley `Are you driving, or shall I call you a cab? `Oh, no; Im driving,
thanks. c) In *ironical* affirmative in exclamatory sentence, equivalent to the
above interrogative use, cf. Ger. soll. 1741 Richardson Pamela, A pretty thing
truly! Here I, a poor helpless Girl, raised from Poverty and Distress, shall
put on Lady-airs to a Gentlewoman born. d) to stand shall I, shall I (later
shill I, shall I: v. shilly-shally), to be at shall I, shall I (not): to be
vacillating, to shilly-shally. 1674 R. Godfrey Inj. and Ab. Physic Such
Medicines. that will not stand shall I? shall I? but will fall to work on the
Disease presently. b Similarly in the *third* person, where the Subjects
represents or includes the utterer, or when the utterer is placing himself at
anothers point of view. 1610 Shaks. Temp., Hast thou (which art but aire) a
touch, a feeling Of their afflictions, and shall not my selfe, One of their
kinde be kindlier moud then thou art? In the second and third person, where the
expected answer is a decision on the part of the utterer or of some person
OTHER than the Subjects. The question often serves as an impassioned repudiation
of a suggestion (or implicature) that something shall be permitted. 1450 Merlin
`What shal be his Names? `I will, quod she, `that it haue Names after my fader.
1600 Shaks. A.Y.L.; What shall he haue that kild the Deare? 1737 Alexander
Pope, translating Horaces Epistle, And say, to which shall our applause belong,
this new court jargon, or the good old song? 1812 Crabbe Tales, Shall a wife
complain? In indirect question. 1865 Kingsley Herew, Let her say what shall be
done with it; as a mere auxiliary, forming, with present infinitive, the
future, and (with perfect infinitive) the future perfect tense. In Old English,
the notion of the future tense is ordinarily expressed by the present tense. To
prevent ambiguity, wile (will) is not unfrequently used as a future auxiliary,
sometimes retaining no trace of its initial usage, connected with the faculty
of volition, and cognate indeed with volition. On the other hand, sceal
(shall), even when rendering a Latin future, can hardly be said to have been
ever a mere future tense-sign in Old English. It always expressed something of
its original notion of obligation or necessity, so Hampshire is wrong in saying
I shall climb Mt. Everest is predictable. In Middle English, the present early
ceases to be commonly employed in futural usage, and the future is expressed by
shall or will, the former being much more common. The usage as to the
choice between the two auxiliaries, shall and will, has varied from time to
time. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, with Wallis, mere
predictable futurity is expressed in the *first* person by shall, in the second
and third by will, and vice versa. In oratio obliqua, usage allows either the
retention of the auxiliary actually used by the original utterer, or the
substitution of that which is appropriate to the point of view of the uttering
reporting; in Old English, ‘sceal,; while retaining its primary usage, serves
as a tense-sign in announcing a future event as fated or divinely decreed, cf.
Those spots mean measle. Hence shall has always been the auxiliary used, in all
persons, for prophetic or oracular announcements of the future, and for solemn
assertions of the certainty of a future event. 1577 in Allen Martyrdom Campion;
The queene neither ever was, nor is, nor ever shall be the head of the Church
of England. 1601 Shaks. Jul. C. Now do I Prophesie. A Curse shall light vpon
the limbes of men. b In the first person, "shall" has, from the early
ME. period, been the normal auxiliary for expressing mere futurity, without any
adventitious notion. (a) Of events conceived as independent of the volition of
the utterer. To use will in these cases is now a mark of, not
public-school-educated Oxonian, but Scottish, Irish, provincial, or
extra-British idiom. 1595 in Cath. Rec. Soc. Publ. V. 357 My frend, yow and I
shall play no more at Tables now. 1605 Shaks. Macb. When shall we three meet
againe? 1613 Shaks. Hen. VIII, Then wee shall haue em, Talke vs to silence.
1852 Mrs. Stowe Uncle Toms C.; `But what if you dont hit? `I shall hit, said
George coolly; of voluntary action or its intended result. Here I shall or we
shall is always admissible except where the notion of a present, as
distinguished from a previous, decision or consent is to be expressed, in which
case ‘will’ shall be used. Further, I shall often expresses a determination
insisted on in spite of opposition. In the 16th c. and earlier, I shall often
occurs where I will would now be used. 1559 W. Cunningham Cosmogr. Glasse, This
now shall I alway kepe surely in memorye. 1601 Shaks. Alls Well; Informe him so
tis our will he should.-I shall my liege. 1885 Ruskin On Old Road, note:
Henceforward I shall continue to spell `Ryme without our wrongly added h. c In
the *second* person, shall as a mere future auxiliary appears never to have
been usual, but in categorical questions it is normal, e.g. Shall you miss your
train? I am afraid you will. d In the *third* person, superseded by will,
except when anothers statement or expectation respecting himself is reported in
the third person, e.g. He conveys that he shall not have time to write. Even in
this case will is still not uncommon, but in some contexts leads to serious
ambiguity. It might be therefore preferable, to some, to use ‘he shall’ as the
indirect rendering of ‘I shall.’ 1489 Caxton Sonnes of Aymon ii. 64 Yf your
fader come agayn from the courte, he shall wyll yelde you to the kynge
Charlemayne. 1799 J. Robertson Agric. Perth, The effect of the statute
labour has always been, now is, and
probably shall continue to be, less productive than it might. Down to the
eighteenth century, shall, the auxiliary appropriate to the first person, is
sometimes used when the utterer refers to himself in the third person. Cf. the
formula: `And your petitioner shall ever pray. 1798 Kemble Let. in Pearsons
Catal. Mr. Kemble presents his respectful compliments to the Proprietors of the
`Monthly Mirror, and shall have great pleasure at being at all able to aid
them; in negative, or virtually negative, and interrogative use, shall often =
will be able to. 1600 Shaks. Sonn. lxv: How with this rage shall beautie hold a
plea. g) Used after a hypothetical clause or an imperative sentence in a
statementsof a result to be expected from some action or occurrence. Now (exc.
in the *first* person) usually replaced by will. But shall survives in literary
use. 1851 Dasent Jest and Earnest, Visit Rome and you shall find him [the Pope]
mere carrion. h) In clause expressing the object of a promise, or of an
expectation accompanied by hope or fear, now only where shall is the ordinary
future auxiliary, but down to the nineteenth century shall is often preferred
to will in the second and third persons. 1628 in Ellis Orig. Lett. Ser., He is
confident that the blood of Christ shall wash away his sins. 1654 E. Nicholas in
N. Papers, I hope neither your Cosen Wat. Montagu nor Walsingham shall be permitted to
discourse with the D. of Gloucester; in impersonal phrases,
"it shall be well, needful", etc. (to do so and so). (now
"will"). j) shall be, added to a future date in clauses measuring
time. 1617 Sir T. Wentworth in Fortescue Papers. To which purpose my late Lord
Chancelour gave his direction about the 3. of Decembre shallbe-two-yeares; in
the idiomatic use of the future to denote what ordinarily or occasionally occurs
under specified conditions, shall was formerly the usual auxiliary. In the
*second* and *third* persons, this is now somewhat formal or rhetorical.
Ordinary language substitutes will or may. Often in antithetic statements
coupled by an adversative conjunction or by and with adversative force. a in
the first person. 1712 Steele Spect. In spite of all my Care, I shall every now
and then have a saucy Rascal ride by reconnoitring under my Windows. b) in the *second* person.
1852 Spencer Ess. After knowing him for years, you shall suddenly discover that
your friends nose is slightly awry. c) in the *third* person. 1793 W. Roberts
Looker-On, One man shall approve the same thing that another man shall condemn.
1870 M. Arnold St. Paul and Prot. It may well happen that a man who lives and
thrives under a monarchy shall yet theoretically disapprove the principle of
monarchy. Usage No. 10: in hypothetical, relative, and temporal clauses
denoting a future contingency, the future auxiliary is shall for all persons alike.
Where no ambiguity results, however, the present tense is commonly used for the
future, and the perfect for the future-perfect. The use of shall, when not
required for clearness, is, Grice grants, apt to sound pedantic by non
Oxonians. Formerly sometimes used to express the sense of a present
subjunctive. a) in hypothetical clauses. (shall I = if I shall) 1680 New
Hampsh. Prov. Papers, If any Christian shall speak contempteously of the Holy
Scriptures, such person shall be
punished. b) in relative clauses, where the antecedent denotes an as yet
undetermined person or thing: 1811 Southey Let., The minister who shall first
become a believer in that book will
obtain a higher reputation than ever statesman did before him. 1874 R. Congreve
Ess. We extend our sympathies to the unborn generations which shall follow us
on this earth; in temporal clauses: 1830 Laws of Cricket in Nyren Yng.
Cricketers Tutor, If in striking, or at any other time, while the ball shall be
in play, both his feet be over the popping-crease; in clauses expressing the
purposed result of some action, or the object of a desire, intention, command,
or request, often admitting of being replaced by may. In Old English, and
occasionally as late as the seventeenth century, the present subjunctive was
used exactly as in Latin. a) in final clause usually introduced by that. In
this use modern idiom prefers should (22 a): see quot. 1611 below, and the
appended remarks. 1879 M. Pattison Milton At the age of nine and twenty, Milton
has already determined that this lifework shall be an epic poem; in relative
clause: 1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. iv. 40: As Gardeners doe with Ordure hide those
Roots that shall first spring. The choice between should and would follows the
same as shall and will as future auxiliaries, except that should must sometimes
be avoided on account of liability to be misinterpreted as = `ought to. In
present usage, should occurs mainly in the first person. In the other persons
it follows the use of shall. III Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses. Usage
No. 24: with ellipsis of verb of motion: = `shall go; he use is common in OHG.
and OS., and in later HG., LG., and Du. In the Scandinavian languages it is
also common, and instances occur in MSw.] 1596 Shaks. 1 Hen. IV, That with our
small coniunction we should on. 1598 Shaks. Merry W. If the bottome were as
deepe as hell, I shold down; n questions, what shall = `what shall (it) profit,
`what good shall (I) do. Usage No. 26: with the sense `is due, `is proper, `is
to be given or applied. Cf. G. soll. Usage No. 27: a) with ellipsis of active
infinitive to be supplied from the context. 1892 Mrs. H. Ward David Grieve,
`No, indeed, I havnt got all I want, said Lucy `I never shall, neither; if I
shall. Now dial. 1390 Gower Conf. II. 96: Doun knelende on mi kne I take leve,
and if I schal, I kisse hire. 1390 Gower Conf., II. 96: I wolde kisse hire
eftsones if I scholde. 1871 Earle Philol. Engl. Tongue 203: The familiar
proposal to carry a basket, I will if I shall, that is, I am willing if you will
command me; I will if so required. 1886 W. Somerset Word-bk. Ill warn our Tomll
do it vor ee, nif he shall-i.e. if you wish. c) with generalized ellipsis in
proverbial phrase: needs must that needs shall = `he must whom fate compels.
Usage No. 28: a) with ellipsis of do (not occurring in the context). 1477
Norton Ord. Alch., O King that shall These Workes! b) the place of the inf. is
sometimes supplied by that or so placed at the beginning of the sentence. The
construction may be regarded as an ellipsis of "do". It is distinct
from the use (belonging to 27) in which so has the sense of `thus, `likewise,
or `also. In the latter there is usually inversion, as so shall I. 1888 J. S.
Winter Bootles Childr. iv: I should like to see her now shes grown up. `So you shall.
Usage No. 29: with ellipsis of be or passive inf., or with so in place of this
(where the preceding context has is, was, etc.). 1615 J. Chamberlain in Crt.
And Times Jas.; He is not yet executed, nor I hear not when he shall. Surely he
may not will that he be executed.
futurum
intentionale: The future figures more prominently than anything because in
“Emissor communicates that p” there is the FUTURE ESSENTIAL. The emissor
intends that his addressee in a time later than the present will do this or
that. While Grice is always looking to cross the credibility/desirability
divide, there is a feature that is difficult to cross in the bridge of asses.
This is the shall vs. will. Grice is aware that ‘will,’ in the FIRST person, is
not a matter of prediction. When Grice says “I will go to Harborne,” that’s not
a prediction. He firmly contrasts it with “I shall go to Harborne” which is a
perfect prediction in the indicative mode. “I will go to Harborne” is in the
‘futurum intentionale.’ Grice is also aware that in the SECOND and THIRD
persons, ‘will’ reports something that the utterer must judge unpredictable. An
utterance like “Thou wilt go to London” and “He will go to London” is in the
‘futurum indicativus.’ This is one nuance that Prichard forgets in the analysis
of ‘willing’ that Grice eventually adopts. Prichard uses ‘will’ derivatively,
and followed by a ‘that’-clause. Prichard quotes from the New-World, where the
dialect is slightly different. For William James had said, “I will that the
distant table slides over the floor toward me. And it does not.” Since James is
using ‘will’ in the first person, the utterance is indeed NOT in the
indicative, but the ‘intentional’ mode. In the case of the ‘communicatum,’
things get complicated, since U intends that A will believe that… In which
case, U’s intention (and thus will) is directed towards the ‘will’ of his
addressee, too, even if it is merely to adopt a ‘belief.’ So what would be the
primary uses of the ‘will.’ In the first person, “I will go to Harborne” is in
the futurum intentionale. It is used to report the utterer’s will. In the
second and third person – “Thou will go to Harborne” and “He will go to
Harborne,” the utterer uses the futurum indicativum and utters a statement
which is predictable. Since analytic
philosophers specify the analysis in the third person (“U means that…”) one has
to be careful. For ‘futurum intentionale’ we have ‘will’ in the first person,
and ‘shall’ in the second and third persons. So for the first group, U means
that he SHALL go. In the second group, U means that his addressee or a third
party WILL go. Grice adopts a subscript variant, stick with ‘will,’ but add the
mode afterwards: so will-ind. will be ‘futurum indicativum,’ and will-int. will
be futurum intentionale. Grice distinguishes the ‘futurum imperativum.’ This may
be seen as a sub-class of the ‘futurum intentionale,’ as applied to the second
and third persons, to avoid the idea that one can issue a ‘self-command.’ Grice
has a futurum imperativum, in Latin ending in -tō(te), used to request someone
to do something, or if something else happens first. “Sī quid acciderit,
scrībitō. If anything happens, write to me' (Cicero). ‘Ubi nōs lāverimus,
lavātō.’ 'When*we* have finished washing, *you* get washed.’ (Terence). ‘Crūdam
si edēs, in acētum intinguitō.’ ‘If you eat cabbage raw, dip it in vinegar.’
(Cato). ‘Rīdētō multum quī tē, Sextille, cinaedum dīxerit et digitum porrigitō
medium.’ 'Laugh loudly at anyone who calls you camp, Sextillus, and stick up
your middle finger at him.' (Martial).
In Latin, some verbs have only a futurum imperativum, e. g., scītō 'know',
mementō 'remember'. In Latin, there is also a third person imperative also
ending in -tō, plural -ntō exists. It is used in very formal contexts such as
laws. ‘Iūsta imperia suntō, īsque cīvēs pārentō.’ 'Orders must be just, and
citizens must obey them' (Cicero). Other ways of expressing a command or
request are made with expressions such as cūrā ut 'take care to...', fac ut
'see to it that...' or cavē nē 'be careful that you don't...' Cūrā ut valeās.
'Make sure you keep well' (Cicero). Oddly, in Roman, the futurum indicativum
can be used for a polite commands. ‘Pīliae salūtem dīcēs et Atticae.’ 'Will you please give my regards to Pilia and
Attica?' (Cicero. The OED has will, would. It is traced to Old English willan,
pres.t. wille, willaþ, pa. t. wolde. Grice was especially interested to check
Jamess and Prichards use of willing that, Prichards shall will and the
will/shall distinction; the present tense will; transitive uses, with simple
obj. or obj. clause; occas. intr. 1 trans. with simple obj.: desire, wish for,
have a mind to, `want (something); sometimes implying also `intend, purpose.
1601 Shaks. (title) Twelfe Night, Or what you will. 1654 Whitlock Zootomia 44
Will what befalleth, and befall what will. 1734 tr. Rollins Anc. Hist. V. 31 He
that can do what ever he will is in great danger of willing what he ought not.
b intr. with well or ill, or trans. with sbs. of similar meaning (e.g. good,
health), usually with dat. of person: Wish (or intend) well or ill (to some
one), feel or cherish good-will or ill-will. Obs. (cf. will v.2 1 b). See also
well-willing; to will well that: to be willing that. 1483 Caxton Gold. Leg. I
wyl wel that thou say, and yf thou say ony good, thou shalt be pesybly herde.
Usage No. 2: trans. with obj. clause (with vb. in pres. subj., or in
periphrastic form with should), or acc. and inf.: Desire, wish; sometimes
implying also `intend, purpose (that something be done or happen). 1548 Hutten
Sum of Diuinitie K viij, God wylle all men to be saued; enoting expression
(usually authoritative) of a wish or intention: Determine, decree, ordain,
enjoin, give order (that something be done). 1528 Cromwell in Merriman Life and
Lett. (1902) I. 320 His grace then wille that thellection of a new Dean shalbe
emonges them of the colledge; spec. in a direction or instruction in ones will
or testament; hence, to direct by will (that something be done). 1820 Giffords
Compl. Engl. Lawyer. I do hereby will and direct that my executrix..do excuse
and release the said sum of 100l. to him;
figurative usage. of an abstract thing (e.g. reason, law): Demands,
requires. 1597 Shaks. 2 Hen. IV, Our Battaile is more full of Namess then yours
Then Reason will, our hearts should be as good. Usage No. 4 transf. (from 2).
Intends to express, means; affirms, maintains. 1602 Dolman La Primaud. Fr.
Acad. Hee will that this authority should be for a principle of demonstration.
2 With dependent infinitive (normally without "to"); desire to, wish
to, have a mind to (do something); often also implying intention. 1697 Ctess
DAunoys Trav. I will not write to you often, because I will always have a stock
of News to tell you, which..is pretty long in picking up. 1704 Locke Hum.
Und. The great Encomiasts of the
Chineses, do all to a man agree and will convince us that the Sect of the
Literati are Atheists. 6 In relation to anothers desire or requirement, or to
an obligation of some kind: Am (is, are) disposed or willing to, consent to;
†in early use sometimes = deign or condescend to.With the (rare and obs.)
imper. use, as in quot. 1490, cf. b and the corresponding negative use in 12 b.
1921 Times Lit. Suppl. 10 Feb. 88/3 Literature thrives where people will read
what they do not agree with, if it is good. b In 2nd person, interrog., or in a
dependent clause after beg or the like, expressing a request (usually
courteous; with emphasis, impatient). 1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. i. 47 Will you
shogge off? 1605 1878 Hardy Ret. Native v. iii, O, O, O,..O, will you have
done! Usage No. 7 Expressing voluntary action, or conscious intention directed
to the doing of what is expressed by the principal verb (without temporal
reference as in 11, and without emphasis as in 10): = choose to (choose v. B. 3
a). The proper word for this idea, which cannot be so precisely expressed by
any other. 1685 Baxter Paraphr., When God will tell us we shall know. Usage No.
8 Expressing natural disposition to do something, and hence habitual action:
Has the habit, or `a way, of --ing; is addicted or accustomed to --ing;
habitually does; sometimes connoting `may be expected to (cf. 15). 1865 Ruskin
Sesame, Men, by their nature, are prone to fight; they will fight for any
cause, or for none; expressing potentiality, capacity, or sufficiency: Can,
may, is able to, is capable of --ing; is (large) enough or sufficient to.†it
will not be: it cannot be done or brought to pass; it is all in vain. So, †will
it not be? 1833 N. Arnott Physics, The heart will beat after removal from the
body. Usage No. 10 As a strengthening of sense 7, expressing determination,
persistence, and the like (without temporal reference as in 11); purposes to,
is determined to. 1539 Bible (Great) Isa. lxvi. 6, I heare ye voyce of the
Lorde, that wyll rewarde, etc; recompence his enemyes; emphatically. Is fully
determined to; insists on or persists in --ing: sometimes with mixture of sense
8. (In 1st pers. with implication of futurity, as a strengthening of sense 11
a. Also fig. = must inevitably, is sure to. 1892 E. Reeves Homeward Bound viii.
239, I have spent 6,000 francs to come here..and I will see it! c In phr. of
ironical or critical force referring to anothers assertion or opinion. Now
arch. exc. in will have it; 1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI, This is a Riddling Merchant
for the nonce, He will be here, and yet he is not here. 1728 Chambers Cycl.,
Honey, Some naturalists will have honey to be of a different quality, according
to the difference of the flowers..the bees suck it from. Also, as auxiliary of
the future tense with implication (entailment rather than cancellable
implicatum) of intention, thus distinguished from ‘shall,’ v. B. 8, where see
note); in 1st person: sometimes in slightly stronger sense = intend to, mean
to. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L., To morrow will we be married. 1607 Shaks. Cor., Ile run
away Till I am bigger, but then Ile fight. 1777 Clara Reeve Champion of Virtue,
Never fear it..I will speak to Joseph about it. b In 2nd and 3rd pers., in
questions or indirect statements. 1839 Lane Arab. Nts., I will cure thee without giving thee to drink
any potion When King Yoonán heard his words, he..said.., How wilt thou do this?
c will do (with omission of "I"): an expression of willingness to
carry out a request. Cf. wilco. colloq. 1967 L. White Crimshaw Memorandum, `And
find out where the bastard was `Will do, Jim said. 13 In 1st pers., expressing
immediate intention: "I will" = `I am now going to, `I proceed at
once to. 1885 Mrs. Alexander At Bay, Very well; I will wish you good-evening. b
In 1st pers. pl., expressing a proposal: we will (†wule we) = `let us. 1798
Coleridge Nightingale 4 Come, we will rest on this old mossy bridge!, c
figurative, as in It will rain, (in 3rd pers.) of a thing: Is ready to, is on
the point of --ing. 1225 Ancr. R. A treou þet wule uallen, me underset hit mid
on oðer treou. 14 In 2nd and 3rd pers., as auxiliary expressing mere futurity,
forming (with pres. inf.) the future, and (with pf. inf.) the future pf. tense:
corresponding to "shall" in the 1st pers. (see note s.v. shall v. B.
8). 1847 Tennyson Princess iii. 12 Rest, rest, on mothers breast, Father will
come to thee soon. b As auxiliary of future substituted for the imper. in mild
injunctions or requests. 1876 Ruskin St. Marks Rest. That they should use their
own balances, weights, and measures; (not by any means false ones, you will
please to observe). 15 As auxiliary of future expressing a contingent event, or
a result to be expected, in a supposed case or under particular conditions
(with the condition expressed by a conditional, temporal, or imper. clause, or
otherwise implied). 1861 M. Pattison Ess.
The lover of the Elizabethan drama will readily recal many such
allusions; b with pers.sSubjects (usually 1st pers. sing.), expressing a
voluntary act or choice in a supposed case, or a conditional promise or
undertaking: esp. in asseverations, e.g. I will die sooner than, I’ll be hanged
if, etc.). 1898 H. S. Merriman Rodens Corner. But I will be hanged if I see
what it all means, now; xpressing a determinate or necessary consequence
(without the notion of futurity). 1887 Fowler Deductive Logic, From what has
been said it will be seen that I do not agree with Mr. Mill. Mod. If, in a
syllogism, the middle term be not distributed in either premiss, there will be
no conclusion; ith the notion of futurity obscured or lost: = will prove or
turn out to, will be found on inquiry to; may be supposed to, presumably does.
Hence (chiefly Sc. and north. dial.) in estimates of amount, or in uncertain or
approximate statements, the future becoming equivalent to a present with
qualification: e.g. it will be = `I think it is or `it is about; what will that
be? = `what do you think that is? 1584 Hornby Priory in Craven Gloss. Where on
40 Acres there will be xiij.s. iv.d. per acre yerely for rent. 1791 Grose Olio
(1792) 106, I believe he will be an Irishman. 1791 Grose Olio. C. How far is it
to Dumfries? W. It will be twenty miles. 1812 Brackenridge Views Louisiana, The
agriculture of this territory will be very similar to that of Kentucky. 1876
Whitby Gloss. sThis word we have only once heard, and that will be twenty years
ago. 16 Used where "shall" is now the normal auxiliary, chiefly in
expressing mere futurity: since 17th c. almost exclusively in Scottish, Irish,
provincial, or extra-British use (see shall. 1602 Shaks. Ham. I will win for
him if I can: if not, Ile gaine nothing but my shame, and the odde hits. 1825
Scott in Lockhart Ballantyne-humbug. I expect we will have some good singing.
1875 E. H. Dering Sherborne. `Will I start, sir? asked the Irish groom. Usage
No. 3 Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses; n absol. use, or with ellipsis of
obj. clause as in 2: in meaning corresponding to senses 5-7.if you will is
sometimes used parenthetically to qualify a word or phrase: = `if you wish it
to be so called, `if you choose or prefer to call it so. 1696 Whiston The.
Earth. Gravity depends entirely on the constant and efficacious, and, if you
will, the supernatural and miraculous Influence of Almighty God. 1876 Ruskin
St. Marks Rest. Very savage! monstrous! if you will. b In parenthetic phr. if God
will (†also will God, rarely God will), God willing: if it be the will of God,
`D.V.In OE. Gode willi&asg.ende (will v.2) = L. Deo volente. 1716
Strype in Thoresbys Lett. Next week, God willing, I take my journey to my
Rectory in Sussex; fig. Demands, requires (absol. or ellipt. use of 3 c). 1511
Reg. Privy Seal Scot. That na seculare personis have intrometting with thaim
uther wais than law will; I will well: I assent, `I should think so indeed.
(Cf. F. je veux bien.) Usage No. 18: with ellipsis of a vb. of motion. 1885
Bridges Eros and Psyche Aug. I will to thee oer the stream afloat. Usage No.
19: with ellipsis of active inf. to be supplied from the context. 1836 Dickens
Sk. Boz, Steam Excurs., `Will you go on deck? `No, I will not. This was said with
a most determined air. 1853 Dickens Bleak Ho. lii, I cant believe it. Its not
that I dont or I wont. I cant! 1885 Mrs. Alexander Valeries Fate vi, `Do you
know that all the people in the house will think it very shocking of me to walk
with you?.. `The deuce they will!; With generalized ellipsis, esp. in
proverbial saying (now usually as in quot. 1562, with will for would). 1639 J.
Clarke Paroem. 237 He that may and will not, when he would he shall not. c With
so or that substituted for the omitted inf. phr.: now usually placed at the
beginning of the sentence. 1596 Shaks. Tam. Shr. Hor. I promist we would beare
his charge of wooing Gremio. And so we wil. d Idiomatically used in a
qualifying phr. with relative, equivalent to a phr. with indef. relative in -ever;
often with a thing as subj., becoming a mere synonym of may: e.g. shout as loud
as you will = `however loud you (choose to) shout; come what will = `whatever
may come; be that as it will = `however that may be. 1732 Pope Mor. Ess. The
ruling Passion, be it what it will, The ruling Passion conquers Reason still.
20 With ellipsis of pass. inf. A. 1774 Goldsm. Surv. Exp. Philos. The airs
force is compounded of its swiftness and density, and as these are encreased,
so will the force of the wind; in const. where the ellipsis may be either of an
obj. clause or of an inf. a In a disjunctive qualifying clause or phr. usually
parenthetic, as whether he will or no, will he or not, (with pron. omitted)
will or no, (with or omitted) will he will he not, will he nill he (see VI.
below and willy-nilly), etc.In quot. 1592 vaguely = `one way or another, `in
any case. For the distinction between should and would, v. note s.v. shall; in
a noun-clause expressing the object of desire, advice, or request, usually with
a person as subj., implying voluntary action as the desired end: thus
distinguished from should, which may be used when the persons will is not in
view. Also (almost always after wish) with a thing as Subjects, in which case
should can never be substituted because it would suggest the idea of command or
compulsion instead of mere desire. Cf. shall; will; willest; willeth; wills;
willed (wIld); also: willian, willi, wyll, wille, wil, will, willode, will,
wyllede, wylled, willyd, ied, -it, -id, willed; wijld, wilde, wild, willid,
-yd, wylled,willet, willed; willd(e, wild., OE. willian wk. vb. = German
“willen.” f. will sb.1, 1 trans. to wish, desire; sometimes with implication of
intention: = will. 1400 Lat. and Eng. Prov. He þt a lytul me 3euyth to me
wyllyth optat longe lyffe. 1548 Udall, etc. Erasm. Par. Matt. v. 21-24 Who so
euer hath gotten to hymselfe the charitie of the gospell, whyche wylleth wel to
them that wylleth yll. 1581 A. Hall Iliad, By Mineruas helpe, who willes you
all the ill she may. A. 1875 Tennyson Q. Mary i. iv, A great party in the state
Wills me to wed her; To assert, affirm: = will v.1 B. 4. 1614 Selden Titles
Hon. None of this excludes Vnction before, but only wils him the first
annointed by the Pope. 2 a to direct by ones will or testament (that something
be done, or something to be done); to dispose of by will; to bequeath or
devise; to determine by the will; to attempt to cause, aim at effecting by
exercise of will; to set the mind with conscious intention to the performance
or occurrence of something; to choose or decide to do something, or that
something shall be done or happen. Const. with simple obj., acc. and inf.,
simple inf. (now always with to), or obj. clause; also absol. or intr. (with as
or so). Nearly coinciding in meaning with will v.1 7, but with more explicit
reference to the mental process of volition. 1630 Prynne Anti-Armin. 119 He had
onely a power, not to fall into sinne vnlesse he willed it. 1667 Milton P.L. So
absolute she seems..that what she wills to do or say, Seems wisest. 1710 J.
Clarke tr. Rohaults Nat. Philos. If I will to move my Arm, it is presently
moved. 1712 Berkeley Pass. Obed. He that willeth the end, doth will the
necessary means conducive to that end. 1837 Carlyle Fr. Rev. All shall be as
God wills. 1880 Meredith Tragic Com. So great, heroical, giant-like, that what
he wills must be. 1896 Housman Shropsh. Lad xxx, Others, I am not the first,
Have willed more mischief than they durst; intr. to exercise the will; to
perform the mental act of volition. 1594 Hooker Eccl. Pol. To will, is to bend
our soules to the hauing or doing of that which they see to be good. 1830
Mackintosh Eth. Philos. Wks.. But what could induce such a being to will or to
act? 1867 A. P. Forbes Explan. Is this infinitely powerful and intelligent
Being free? wills He? loves He? c trans. To bring or get (into, out of, etc.)
by exercise of will. 1850 L. Hunt Table-t. (1882) 184 Victims of opium have
been known to be unable to will themselves out of the chair in which they were
sitting. d To control (another person), or induce (another) to do something, by
the mere exercise of ones will, as in hypnotism. 1882 Proc. Soc. Psych.
Research I. The one to be `willed would go to the other end of the house, if
desired, whilst we agreed upon the thing to be done. 1886 19th Cent. They are
what is called `willed to do certain things desired by the ladies or gentlemen
who have hold of them. 1897 A. Lang Dreams & Ghosts iii. 59 A young
lady, who believed that she could play the `willing game successfully without
touching the person `willed; to express or communicate ones will or wish with
regard to something, with various shades of meaning, cf. will, v.1 3.,
specifically: a to enjoin, order; to decree, ordain, a) with personal obj.,
usually with inf. or clause. 1481 Cov. Leet Bk. 496 We desire and also will you
that vnto oure seid seruaunt ye yeue your aid. 1547 Edw. VI in Rymer Foedera,
We Wyll and Commaunde yowe to Procede in the seid Matters. 1568 Grafton Chron.,
Their sute was smally regarded, and shortly after they were willed to silence.
1588 Lambarde Eiren. If a man do lie in awaite to rob me, and (drawing his
sword upon me) he willeth me to deliver my money. 1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI We doe
no otherwise then wee are willd. 1596 Nashe Saffron Walden P 4, Vp he was had
and.willed to deliuer vp his weapon. 1656 Hales Gold. Rem. The King in the
Gospel, that made a Feast, and..willed his servants to go out to the high-ways
side. 1799 Nelson in Nicolas Disp., Willing and requiring all Officers and men
to obey you; 1565 Cooper Thesaurus s.v. Classicum, By sounde of trumpet to will
scilence. 1612 Bacon Ess., Of Empire. It is common with Princes (saith Tacitus)
to will contradictories. 1697 Dryden Æneis i. 112 Tis yours, O Queen! to will
The Work, which Duty binds me to fulfil. 1877 Tennyson Harold vi. i, Get thou
into thy cloister as the king Willd it.; to pray, request, entreat; = desire v.
6. 1454 Paston Lett. Suppl. As for the questyon that ye wylled me to aske my
lord, I fond hym yet at no good leyser. 1564 Haward tr. Eutropius. The Romaines
sent ambassadoures to him, to wyll him to cease from battayle. 1581 A. Hall
Iliad, His errand done, as he was willde, he toke his flight from thence. 1631
[Mabbe] Celestina. Did I not will you I should not be wakened? 1690 Dryden
Amphitryon i. i, He has sent me to will and require you to make a swinging long
Night for him; fig. of a thing, to require, demand; also, to induce, persuade a
person to do something. 1445 in Anglia. Constaunce willeth also that thou doo
noughte with weyke corage. Cable and Baugh note that one important s. of
prescriptions that now form part of all our grammars -- that governing the use
of will and shall -- has its origin in this period. Previous to 1622 no grammar
recognized any distinction between will and shall. In 1653 Wallis in his
Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae states in Latin and for the benefit of Europeans
that Subjectsive intention is expressed by will in the first person, by shall
in the second and third, while simple factual indicative predictable futurity
is expressed by shall in the first person, by will in the second and third. It
is not until the second half of the eighteenth century that the use in
questions and subordinate clauses is explicitly defined. In 1755 Johnson, in
his Dictionary, states the rule for questions, and in 1765 William Ward, in his
Grammar, draws up for the first time the full set of prescriptions that
underlies, with individual variations, the rules found in later tracts. Wards
pronouncements are not followed generally by other grammarians until Lindley
Murray gives them greater currency in 1795. Since about 1825 they have often
been repeated in grammars, v. Fries, The periphrastic future with will and
shall. Will qua modal auxiliary never had an s. The absence of conjugation is a
very old common Germanic phenomenon. OE 3rd person present indicative of willan
(and of the preterite-present verbs) is not distinct from the 1st person
present indicative. That dates back at least to CGmc, or further if one looks
just as the forms and ignore tense and/or mood). Re: Prichard: "Prichard
wills that he go to London. This is Prichards example, admired by Grice
("but I expect not pleasing to Maucaulays ears"). The -s is
introduced to indicate a difference between the modal and main verb use (as in
Prichard and Grice) of will. In fact, will, qua modal, has never been used with
a to-infinitive. OE uses present-tense forms to refer to future events as well
as willan and sculan. willan would give a volitional nuance; sculan, an obligational
nuance. Its difficult to find an example of weorthan used to express the
future, but that doesnt mean it didnt happen. In insensitive utterers, will has
very little of volition about it, unless one follows Walliss observation
for for I will vs. I shall. Most probably use ll, or be going to for the
future.
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