THESAVRVS GRICEIANVM
H.
P. Grice, St. John’s Oxford
Compiled
by Grice’s Playgroup, The Bodleian
a:
Grice knows that his problem with Strawson is the Square of Opposition (Grice
1989: )So he is well aware of the question about Barbara and Celarent. So this
is the ‘universalis dedicativa.’ Vide below entries for “E” (universalis
abdicative), “I” (particularis dedicativa)
and “O” (particularis abdicative). The square (figura quadrata) is
generated by criss-crossing the two categories, aptly sub-divided, --
‘quantitas’ into universalis and particularis, and qualitaas into dedicativa
and the abdicative. Refs.: Grice 1989
∀: rendered by Grice as “all,” borrowed from Gentzen’s
“All-Zeichen.” (Peano did not use it). Grice is a stickler, and uses the
brackets, (∀x) – Grice thinks
that Whitehead and Russell did perfectly well with their substitutional account
to ‘all,’ “even it that displeased my tutee P. F. Strawson.” Parsons, who Grice
admires, suggests that one treat quantification over predicative classes substitutionally,
and capture “the idea that classes are not“real” independently of the
expression forthem. Grice perceives a difficulty
relating to the allegedly dubious admissibility of propositions as entities. A
perfectly sound, though perhaps somewhat superficial, reply to the objection as
it is presented would be that in any definition of “Emissor E communicates that
p” iff “Emissor E desires that p.” which Grice would be willing to
countenance, 'p' operates simply as a
‘gap sign.’ ‘p’ does appear in the analysandum, and re-appears in the
corresponding analysans. If Grice were to advance the not wholly plausible
thesis that “to feel Byzantine” is just to have a an anti-rylean agitation
which is caused by the thought that Grice is or might *be* Byzantine, it would
surely be ridiculous to criticize Grice on the grounds that Grice saddles
himself with an ontological commitment to feelings, or to modes of feeling. And
why? Well, because, alla Parsons, if a quantifier is covertly involved at all,
it will only be a universal quantifier which in such a case as this is more
than adequately handled by a substitutional account of quantification. Grice’s
situation vis-a-vis the ‘proposition’ is in no way different. There should be
an entry for the inverted E, the first entry under the E.
abderites: Grice was something of a logical atomist, so he used to
refer to himself as a neo-Abderite. The reference being to Democritus and
Leucippus, from Abdera.
abdicative: while one can draw a skull communicating that there is
danger; one can then cross out the skull indicating that there is no danger. So
the emissor communicates that there is no danger. Or rather, the emissor
communicates that it is not the case that there is danger. Since this involves
a ‘that’-clause, it is not unreasonable to speak of a ‘propositio,’ and such
would be ‘abdicativa.’ In his earliest reflections on the topic, Grice draws on
sub-perceptual illustrations rendered more or less as involving two items of
‘propositio dedicativa’ and their negation and privation: ‘The bell tolls in
Gb” and “The pillar box is red.” For the latter, “The pillar box is not blue”
can be uttered as a conclusion (“If the pillar box is red, it is not the case
that the pillar box is blue.”). For the former case, “The bell tolls in Ab” may
do. “If the bell tolls in Gb, it is not the case that the bell tolls in Ab.”
For Grice, the métier of a propositio abidcativa has to do with the abdicatum
of a conjunctum. For a more primitive rationale, Grice does not see the
complete justification. That means that Grice sees that there are OPTIONS TO
introducing a ‘propositio abdicativa’. These options are of two kinds. One is
the ‘stroke.’ If you draw a skull, a stroke, and a skull, you communicate that
it is not the case there is danger. The other involves “other than” or
“incompatible.” Again, drawsing a skull and writing INCOMPATIBLE and drawing
another skull and you communicate that it is not the case that there is danger.
abdicatum: Apuleius makes an analogy that Grice (and the Grecians
before) finds interesting. It is the ‘propositio dedicative’ apophatike’/’propositio
abdicativa’ kataphatike distinction. The ‘abdicatum’ would be the ‘negatum.’ The
‘dedicatum’ would be the ‘affirmatum.’ Apuleius’s terms make the correlation
evident and Grice preferred it to that of ‘affirmatum’ and ‘negatum,’ – “where
the correlation is not that obvious.” So there is the abdicatum, the negatum,
and the negation. ‘Negatum’ and ‘affirmatum’ are actually used when translating
Husserl from the vernacular! For Husserl, Negation negation a noetic modification of
a positing, noematic cancellation every ‘negatum’
an Object posited as existing, reiterated negation; a ‘negatum’ not a
determination produced by reflection; non-being equivalent to being validly
negated. Grice’s interest in ‘not’ as a
unary functor is central. Grice was ablet to tutor Strawson in philosophy in
that famous term. In his “Introduction to logical theory,” Strawson alleges to
show that some logical
‘laws,’ taken together, show that any truth-functional sentence or formula in
which the main constant is “~ “ is the contradictory of the sentence or formula
which results from omitting that sign.” Strawson goes on to say: “A standard
and primary use of “not” in a sentence is to assert the contradictory of the
statement which would be made by the use, in the same context, of the same
sentence without “not.” Of course we must not suppose that the insertion of
“not” anywhere in any sentence always has this effect. “Some bulls are not
dangerous” is not the contradictory of “Some bulls are dangerous.” This is why
the identification of “~” with “it is not the case that” is to be preferred to
its identification with “not” simpliciter. This identification, then, involves
only those minimum departures from the logic of ordinary language which must
always result from the formal logician's activity of codifying rules with the
help of verbal patterns : viz., (i) the adoption of a rigid rule when ordinary
language permits variations and deviations from the standard use (cf. rules “
~(p Λ ~p)”
and “ ~~p ≡ p” and the discussions in
1-8, and 2-9); (ii) that stretching of the sense of ‘exemplify’ which allows,
us, e.g., to regard ‘Tom is not mad’ as well as ‘Not all bulls are dangerous’
as 'exemplifications’ of not-p.’”
Strawson goes on: “So we shall call ‘~’ the negation sign, and read ‘~’as
‘not.’ One might be tempted to suppose that declaring formulae “ ~(p Λ ~p)” and “p v ~p”
laws of the system was the same as saying that, as regards this system, a
statement cannot be both true and false and must be either true or false. But
it is not. The rules that “ ~(p Λ ~p)” and “p v ~p”
are analytic are not rules about ‘true’ and ‘false;’ they are rules about ‘~.;
They say that, given that a statement has one of the two truth-values, then it
is logically impossible for both that statement and the corresponding statement
of the form ‘ ~p’ to be true, and for
both that statement and the corresponding statement of the form ‘~p’ to be
false.” A bit of palæo-Griceian history is
in order. Sheffer, defines ‘not’ and negation in terms of incompatibility in ‘A
set of five independent postulates for Boolean algebras, with application to
logical constants,’ Trans. American Mathematical Society. Grice does refers to
‘the strokes.’ His use of the plural is interesting as a nod to Peirce’s minute
logic in his ‘Boolian [sic] algebra with one constant.’ There is indeed
Peirce’s stroke, or ampheck (↓), Sheffer’s stroke (|, /, ↑), and and Quine’s
stroke (†, strictly Quine’s dagger). Some philosophers prefer to refer to
Peirces Stroke as Peirce’s arrow, or strictly stressed double-edged sword. His
editors disambiguate his ampheck, distinguishing between the dyadic
functor or connective equivalent to Sheffer’s stroke and ‘nor.’ While
Whitehead, Russell, and Witters love Sheffer’s stroke, Hilbert does not: ‘‘p/p’
ist dann gleichbedeutend mit ‘X̄.’ Grice explores primitiveness. It is
possible, to some extent, to qualify this or that device in terms of
primitiveness. As regards ‘not,’ if a communication-system did not contain a
unitary negative device, there would be many things that communicators can now
communicate that they would be then unable to communicate. He has two
important caveats. That would be the case unless, first, the communication-system
contained some very artificial-seeming connective like one or other of the
strokes, and, second, communicators put themselves to a good deal of trouble,
as Plato does in ‘The Sophist’ with ‘diaphoron,’ that Wiggins symbolises with
‘Δ,’ to find, more or less case by case, complicated forms of expression,
not necessarily featuring a connective, but involving such expressions as
‘other than’or ‘incompatible with.’ Grice further refers to Aristotle’s
‘apophasis’ in De Int.17a25. Grice, always lured by the potentiality of a
joint philosophical endeavour, treasures his collaboration with Strawson that
is followed by one with Austin on Cat. and De Int. So what does Aristotle say
in De Int.? Surely Aristotle could have started by referring to Plato’s
Parmenides, aptly analysed by Wiggins. Since Aristotle is more of a don than a
poet, he has to give ‘not’ a name: ‘ἀπόφασις ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος,’a
predication of one thing away from another, i.e. negation of
it. This is Grice’s reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of
this or that negative utterance. His immediate trigger is Ryle’s contribution
on a symposium on Bradley’s idea of an internal relation, where Grice appeals
to Peirce’s incompatibility. ‘The proposition ‘This is red’ is imcompatible
with the proposition, ‘This is not coloured.’ While he uses a souly verb or
predicate for one of them, Grice will go back to the primacy of ‘potching’ at a
later stage. A P potches that the obble is not fang, but feng. It is convenient
to introduce this or that soul-state, ψ, sensing that …, or perceiving that
… Grice works mainly with two scenarios, both involved with the first-person
singular pronoun ‘I’ with which he is obsessed. Grice’s first scenario concerns
a proposition that implies another proposition featuring ‘someone, viz. I,’ the
first-person singular pronoun as subject, a sensory modal verb, and an object,
the proposition, it is not the case that ‘the α is φ1.’
The denotatum of the first-person pronoun perceives that a thing displays this
or the visual sense-datum of a colour, and the corresponding sensory modal
predicate. Via a reductive (but not reductionist) analysis, we get that, by
uttering ‘It is not the case that I see that the pillar box is blue,’ the
utterer U means, i. e. m-intends his addressee A to believe, U he sees that the
pillar box is red. U’s source, reason, ground, knowledge, or belief, upon which
he bases his uttering his utterance is U’s *indirect* mediated actual
experience, belief, or knowledge, linked to a sense-datum φ2 (red)
other than φ1 (blue). Grice’s second scenario concerns a proposition
explicitly featuring the first-person singular pronoun, an introspection,
involving an auditory sense-datum of a noise. Via reductive (but not
reductionist) analysis, we get that, by uttering ‘It is not the case that I
hear that the bell tolls in Gb,’ U means that he lacks the experience of
hearing that the bell tolls simpliciter. U’s source, reason, ground, knowledge,
or belief, upon which he bases his uttering his utterance is the *direct*
unmediated felt absence, or absentia, or privatio or privation, or apophasis,
verified by introspection, of the co-relative ψ, which
Grice links to the absence of the experience, belief, or knowledge, of the
sense-datum, the apophasis of the experience, which is thereby negated. In
either case, Grice’s analysans do not feature ‘not.’ Grice turns back to
the topic in seminars later at Oxford in connection with Strawson’s cursory
treatment of ‘not’ in “Logical Theory.”‘Not’ (and ~.) is the first pair, qua
unary satisfactory-value-functor (unlike this or that dyadic co-ordinate, and,
or, or the dyadic sub-ordinate if) in Grice’s list of this or that vernacular
counterpart attached to this or that formal device. Cf. ‘Smith has not ceased
from eating iron,’ in ‘Causal theory.’ In the fourth James lecture, Grice
explores a role for negation along the lines of Wilson’s Statement and Inference.’
Grice’s ‘Vacuous Names’ contains Gentzen-type syntactic inference rules for
both ‘not’’s introduction (+, ~) and the elimination (-, ~) and the correlative
value assignation. Note that there are correlative rules for Peirce’s arrow.
Grice’s motivation is to qualify ‘not’ with a subscript scope-indicating device
on ~ for a tricky case like ‘The climber of Mt. Everest on hands and knees is
not to atttend the party in his honour.’ The logical form becomes qualified: ‘~2(Marmaduke
Bloggs is coming)1’, or ‘~2(Pegasus flies)1.’
generic formula is ~2p1, which indicates that p is
introduced prior to ~. In the earlier James lectures he used the square bracket
device. The generic formula being ‘~[p],’ where [p] reads that p is assigned
common-ground status. Cancelling the implicata may be trickier. ‘It is not the
case that I hear that the bell tolls because it is under reparation.’ ‘That is
not blue; it’s an optical illusion.’ Cf. Grice on ‘It is an illusion. What is
it?’ Cf. The king of France is not bald because there is no king of France. In
Presupposition, the fourth Urbana lecture, Grice uses square brackets for the
subscript scope indicating device. ‘Do not arrest [the intruder]!,’ the device
meant to assign common-ground status. In ‘Method” Grice plays with the
internalisation of a pre-theoretical concept of not within the scope of ‘ψ.’
In the Kant lectures on “Aspects,” Grice explores ‘not’ within the scope of
this or that mode operator, as in the buletic utterance, ‘Do not arrest the
intruder!’ Is that internal narrow scope, ‘!~p,’ or external wide scope, ‘~!p’?
Grice also touches on this or that mixed-mode utterance, and in connection with
the minor problem of presupposition within the scope of an operator other than
the indicative-mode operator. ‘Smith has not ceased from eating iron, because
Smith does not exist ‒ cf. Hamlet sees that his father is on the rampants, but
the sight is not reciprocated ‒ Macbeth sees that Banquo is near him, but his
vision is not reciprocated. Grice is having in mind Hare’s defense of a
non-doxastic utterance. In his commentary in PGRICE, Grice expands on this
metaphysical construction routine of Humeian projection with the pre-intuitive
concept of ‘not,’ specifying the
different stages the intuitive concept undergoes until it becomes
fully rationally recostructed, as something like a Fregeian sense. In the
centerpiece lecture of the William James set, Grice explores Wilson’s Statement
and inference to assign a métier to ‘not,’ and succeeds in finding one. The
conversational métier of ‘not’ is explained in terms of the conversational
implicatum. By uttering ‘Smith has not been to prison yet,’ U implies that some
utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed an opinion to the contrary. This is
connected by Grice with the ability a rational creature has to possess to
survive. The creature has to be able, as Sheffer notes, to deny this or that.
Grices notable case is the negation of a conjunction. So it may well be that
the most rational role for ‘not’ is not primary in that it is realised once
less primitive operators are introduced. Is there a strict conceptual
distinction, as Grice suggests, between negation and privation? If privation
involves or presupposes negation, one might appeal to something like Modified
Occam’s Razor (M. O. R.), do not multiply negations beyond necessity. In his
choice of examples, Grice seems to be implicating negation for an empirically
verifiable, observational utterance, such as U does not see that the pillar box
is blue not because U does not exist, but on the basis of U’s experiencing,
knowing, believing and indeed seeing that the pillar box is red. This is a
negation, proper, or simpliciter (even if it involves a sense-datum phi2
incompatible with sense-datum phi1. Privation, on the other hand, would be
involved in an utterance arrived via introspection, such as U does not hear
that the bell is ringing on the basis of his knowing that he is aware of the
absence, simpliciter, of an experience to that effect. Aristotle, or some later
Aristotelian, may have made the same distinction, within apophasis between
negation or negatio and privation or privatio. Or not. Of course, Grice is
ultimately looking for the rationale behind the conversational implicatum in
terms of a principle of conversational helpfulness underlying his picture of
conversation as rational co-operation. To use his Pological jargon in Method,
in Pirotese and Griceish There is the P1, who potches that the obble
is not fang, but feng. P1 utters p explicitly conveying that p.
P2 alternatively feels like negating that. By uttering ~p, P2 explicitly
conveys that ~p. P1 volunteers to P2, ~p, explicitly
conveying that ~p. Not raining! Or No bull. You are safe. Surely a rational
creature should be capable to deny this or that, as Grice puts it in Indicative
conditionals. Interestingly, Grice does not consider, as Gazdar does, under
Palmer), he other possible unitary functors (three in a standard binary
assignation of values) – just negation, which reverses the satisfactory-value
of the radix or neustic. In terms of systematics, thus, it is convenient
to regard Grices view on negation and privation as his outlook on the operators
as this or that procedure by the utterer that endows him with this or that
basic expressive, operative power. In this case, the expressive power is
specifically related to his proficiency with not. The proficiency is co-related
with this or that device in general, whose vernacular expression will bear a
formal counterpart. Many of Grices comments addressed to this more general
topic of this or that satisfactoriness-preserving operator apply to not, and thus
raise the question about the explicitum or explicatum of not. A Griceian should
not be confused. The fact that Grice does not explicitly mention not or
negation when exploring the concept of a generic formal device does not mean
that what he says about formal device may not be particularised to apply to not
or negation. His big concession is that Whitehead and Russell (and Peano before
them) are right about the explicitum or explicatum of not being ~, even if
Grice follows Hilbert and Ackermann in dismissing Peirces arrow for pragmatic
reasons. This is what Grice calls the identity thesis to oppose to Strawsons
divergence thesis between not and ~. More formally, by uttering Not-p, U
explicitly conveys that ~p. Any divergence is explained via the implicatum. A
not utterance is horribly uninformative, and not each of them is of
philosophical interest. Grice joked with Bradley and Searles The man in the
next table is not lighting the cigarette with a twenty-dollar bill, the
denotatum of the Subjects being a Texas oilman in his country club. The odd
implicatum is usually to the effect that someone thought otherwise. In terms of
Cook Wilson, the role of not has more to do with the expressive power of a
rational creature to deny a molecular or composite utterance such as p and q
Grice comments that in the case of or, the not may be addressed,
conversationally, to the utterability of the disjunction. His example involves
the logical form Not (p or q). It is not the case that Wilson or Heath will be
prime minister. Theres always hope for Nabarro or Thorpe. The
utterer is, at the level of the implicatum, not now contradicting what his
co-conversationalist has utterered. The utterer is certainly not denying that
Wilson will be Prime Minister. It is, rather, that the utterer U wishes not to
assert or state, say, what his co-conversant has asserted, but, instead, to
substitute a different statement or claim which the utterer U regards as
preferable under the circumstances. Grice calls this substitutive disagreement.
This was a long-standing interest of Grices: an earlier manuscript reads Wilson
or MacMillan will be prime minister. Let us take a closer look at the way
Grice initially rephrases his two scenarios involving not as attached to an
auditory and a visual sense datum. I do not hear that the bell is ringing is
rationally justified by the absence or absentia of the experience of hearing
it. I do not see that the pillar box is blue is rationally justified by U’s sensing
that the pillar box is red. The latter depends on Kant’s concept of the
synthetic a priori with which Grice tests with his childrens playmates. Can a
sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed! Can a pillar box be blue
and red all over? Cf. Ryles’ssymposium on negation with Mabbott, for the
Aristotelian Society, a source for Grices reflexion. Ryle later discussing
Bradleys internal relations, reflects that that the proposition, ‘This pillar
box is only red’ is incompatible with ‘This pillar box is only blue.’ As
bearing this or that conversational implicata, Grices two scenarios can be
re-phrased, unhelpfully, as I am unhearing a noise and That
is unred. The apparently unhelpful point bears however some
importance. It shows that negation and not are not co-extensive. The variants
also demonstrate that the implicatum, qua conversational, rather than
conventional, is non-detachable. Not is hardly primtive pure Anglo-Saxon. It is
the rather convoluted abbreviation of ne-aught. Its ne that counts as the
proper, pure, amorphous Anglo-Saxon negation, as in a member of parliament (if
not a horse) uttering nay. Grices view of conversation as rational
co-operation, as displayed in this or that conversational implicatum
necessitates that the implicatum is never attached to this or that expression.
Here the favoured, but not exclusive expression, is not, since Strawson uses
it. But the vernacular provides a wealth of expressive ways to be negative!
Grice possibly chose negation not because, as with this or that nihilistic
philosopher, such as Schopenhauer, or indeed Parmenides, he finds the concept a
key one. But one may well say that this is the Schopenhauerian or the
Parmenidesian in Griceian. Grice is approaching not in linguistic, empiricist,
or conceptual key. He is applying the new Oxonian methodology: the reductive
analysis alla Russell in terms of logical construction. Grices implies priority
is with by uttering x, by which U explicitly conveys that ~p, U implicitly
conveys that q. The essay thus elaborates on this implicated q. For the record,
nihilism was coined by philosopher Jacobi, while the more primitive
negatio and privatio is each a time-honoured item in the philosophical lexicon,
with which mediaeval this or that speculative grammarian is especially obsessed.
Negatio translates the ‘apophasis’ of Aristotle, and has a pretty pedigreed
history. The philosophical lexicon has nĕgātĭo, f. negare, which L and S,
unhelpfully, render as a denying, denial, negation, Cicero, Sull. 13, 39:
negatio inficiatioque facti, id. Part. 29, 102. L and S go on to add that
negatio is predicated of to the expression that denies, a negative. Grice would
say that L and S should realise that its the utterer who denies. The source L
and S give is ADogm. Plat. 3, p. 32, 38. As for Grices other
word, there is “prīvātĭo,” f. privare, which again unhelpfully, L and
S render as a taking away, privation of a thing. doloris, Cic. Fin.
1, 11, 37, and 38, or pain-free, as Grice might prefer, cf.
zero-tolerance. L and S also cite: 2, 9, 28: culpæ, Gell. 2, 6,
10. The negatio-privatio distinction is attested in Grecian, indeed the
distinction requires its own entry. For it is Boethius who first renders
Aristotle’s ‘hexis’ into ‘habitus’ and Aristotle’s steresis’ into ‘privatio.’
So the the Grecians were never just happy with “ἀπόφασις (A)” and they had to
keep multiplying negations beyond necessity. The noun is from “ἀπόφημι.” Now L
and S unhepfully render the noun as as denial, negation, adding “oκατάφασις,” for
which they cites from The Sophista by Plato (263e), to give then the
definition “ἀπόφασις ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος,” a
predication of one thing away from another,
i.e. negation of it, for which they provide the source that Grice is
relying. on: Arist. Int.17a25, cf. APo. 72a14; ἀπόφασις τινός,
negation, exclusion of a thing, Pl. Cra. 426d; δύο ἀ. μίαν κατάφασιν
ἀποτελοῦσι Luc. Gall.11. If he was not the first to explore
philosophically negation, Grice may be regarded as a philosopher who most
explored negation as occurring in a that-clause followed by a propositional
complexus that contains ~, and as applied to a personal agent, in a lower
branch of philosophical psychology. It is also the basis for his linguistic
botany. He seems to be trying to help other philosopher not to fall in the trap
of thinking that not has a special sense. The utterer means that ~p. In what
ways is that to be interpreted? Grice confessed to never
been impressed by Ayer. The crudities and dogmatisms seemed too pervasive.
Is Grice being an empiricist and a verificationist? Let us go back to This is
not red and I am not hearing a noise. Grices suggestion is that the
incompatible fact offering a solution to this problem is the fact that the
utterer of “Someone, viz. I, does not hear that the bell tolls” is indicating
(and informing) that U merely entertains the positive (affirmative)
proposition, Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls, without having an
attitude of certainty towards it. More generally, Grice is proposing, like
Bradley and indeed Bosanquet, who Grice otherwise regards as a minor
philosopher, a more basic Subjects-predicate utterance. The α is
not β. The utterer states I do not know that α is β if and
only if every present mental or souly process, of mine, has some characteristic
incompatible with the knowledge that α is β. One
may propose a doxastic weaker version, replacing the dogmatic Oxonian know
with believe. Grices view of compatibility is an application of the
Sheffer stroke that Grice will later use in accounts of not. ~p iff p|p or ~p ≡df p|p. But
then, as Grice points out, Sheffer is hardly Griceian. If Pirotese did not
contain a unitary negative device, there would be many things that a P should
be able to express that the P should be unable to express unless Pirotese
contained some very artificially-looking dyadic functor like one or other of
the strokes, or the P put himself to a good deal of trouble to find, more or
less case by case, complicated forms of expression, as Platos Parmenides does,
involving such expressions as other than, or incompatible with. V. Wiggins on
Platos Parmenides in a Griceian key. Such a complicate form of expression would
infringe the principle of conversational helpfulness, notably in its
desideratum of conversational clarity, or conversational perspicuity [sic],
where the sic is Grices seeing that unsensitive Oxonians sometimes mistake
perspicuity for the allegedly, cognate perspicacity (L. perspicacitas, like
perspicuitas, from perspicere). Grice finds the unitary brevity of not-p
attractive. Then theres the pretty Griceian idea of the pregnant proposition.
Im not hearing a nose is pregnant, as Occam has it, with I am hearing a
noise. A scholastic and mediæval philosopher loves to be figurative.
Grices main proposal may be seen as drawing on this or that
verificationist assumption by Ayer, who actually has a later essay on not
falsely connecting it with falsity. Grices proposed better analysis would
please Ayer, had Grice been brought on the right side of the tracks, since it
can be Subjectsed to a process of verification, on the understanding
that either perception through the senses (It is red) or
introspection (Every present mental or souly process of mine ) is each an
empirical phenomenon. But there are subtleties to be drawn. At Oxford, Grices
view on negation will influence philosophers like Wiggins, and in a negative
way, Cohen, who raises the Griceian topic of the occurrence of negation in
embedded clauses, found by Grice to be crucial for the rational genitorial
justification of not as a refutation of the composite p and q), and motivating
Walker with a reply (itself countered by Cohen ‒ Can the conversationalist
hypothesis be defended?). So problems are not absent, as they should not! Grice
re-read Peirces definition or reductive analysis of not and enjoyed it!
Peirce discovers the logical connective Grice calls the Sheffer Stroke, as well
as the related connective nor (also called Joint Denial, and quite
appropriately Peirces Arrow, with other Namess in use being Quines Arrow or
Quines Dagger and today usually symbolized by “/”). The relevant manuscript,
numbered MS 378 in a subsequent edition and titled A Boolian [sic] Algebra with
One Constant, MS 378, was actually destined for discarding and was salvaged for
posterity A fragmentary text by Peirce also shows familiarity with the
remarkable meta-logical characteristics that make a single function
functionally complete, and this is also the case with Peirces unfinished Minute
Logic: these texts are published posthumously. Peirce designates the two truth
functions, nand and nor, by using the symbol “” which he called
ampheck, coining this neologism from the Grecian ἀμφήκης, of equal length in
both directions. Peirces editors disambiguate the use of symbols by
assigning “” to the connective we call Sheffers troke while
preserving the symbol “/” for nor. In MS 378, A Boolian Algebra
with One Constant, by Peirce, tagged “to be discarded” at the Department of
Philosophy at Harvard, Peirce reduces the number of logical operators to one
constant. Peirce states that his notation uses the minimum number of different
signs and shows for the first time the possibility of writing both universal
and particular propositions with but one copula. Peirce’s notation is later
termed Sheffers stroke, and is also well-known as the nand operation, in Peirce’s
terms the operation by which two propositions written in a pair are considered
to be both denied. In the same manuscript, Peirce also discovers what is the
expressive completeness of ‘nor,’ indeed today rightly recognized as the Peirce
arrow. Like Sheffer, of Cornell, independently does later (only to be
dismissed by Hilbert and Ackermann), Peirce understands that these two
connectives can be used to reduce all mathematically definable connectives
(also called primitives and constants) of propositional logic. This means that
all definable connectives of propositional logic can be defined by using only
Sheffers stroke or nor as the single connective. No other connective (or
associated function) that takes one or two variables as inputs has this property.
Standard, two-valued propositional logic has no unary functions that have the
remarkable property of functional completeness. At first blush, availability of
this option ensures that economy of resources can be obtained—at least in terms
of how many functions or connectives are to be included as undefined.
Unfortunately, as Grice, following Hilbert and Ackermann realise, there is a
trade-off between this philosophical semantic gain in economy of symbolic
resources and the pragmatically unwieldy length and rather counterintuitive, to
use Grices phrase, appearance of the formulas that use only the one
connective. It is characteristic of his logical genius, however, and
emblematic of his rather under-appreciated, surely not by Grice, contributions
to the development of semiotics that Peirce grasps the significance of
functional completeness and figure out what truth functions — up to arity 2 —
are functionally complete for two-valued propositional logic, never mind
helping the philosopher to provide a reductive analysis of negation that Grice
is looking for. Strictly, this is the property of weak functional completeness,
given that we disregard whether constants or zero-ary functions like 1 or 0 can
be defined. Peirce subscribes to a semeiotic view, popular in the Old World
with Ogden and Welby, and later Grice, according to which the fundamental
nature and proper tasks of the formal study of communication are defined by the
rules set down for the construction and manipulation of symbolic resources. A proliferation
of symbols for the various connectives that are admitted into the signature of
a logical system suffers from a serious defect on this view. The symbolic
grammar fails to match or represent the logical fact of interdefinability of
the connectives, and reductive analysis of all to one. Peirce is willing
sometimes to accept constructing a formal signature for two-valued
propositional logic by using the two-members set of connectives, which is
minimally functionally complete. This means that these two connectives — or, if
we are to stick to an approach that emphasizes the notational character of
logical analysis, these two symbols —are adequate expressively. Every
mathematically definable connective of the logic can be defined by using only
these two. And the set is minimally functionally complete in that neither of
these connectives can be defined by the other (so, as we say, they are both
independent relative to each other.) The symbol can be viewed
as representing a constant truth function (either unary or binary) that returns
the truth value 0 for any input or inputs. Or it can be regarded as a constant,
which means that it is a zero=ary (zero-input) function, a degenerate function,
which refers to the truth value 0. Although not using, as Grice does, Peanos
terminology, Peirce takes the second option. This set has cardinality 2 (it has
exactly 2 members) but it is not the best we can do. Peirces discovery of what
we have called the Sheffer functions or strokes (anachronistically and unfairly
to Peirce, as Grice notes, but bowing to convention) shows that we can have a
set of cardinality 1 (a one-member set or a so-called singleton) that is
minimally functionally complete with respect to the definable connectives of
two-valued propositional logic. Thus, either one of the following sets can do.
The sets are functionally complete and, because they have only one member each,
we say that the connectives themselves have the property of functional
completeness. / is the symbol of Sheffers stroke or nand and /is the
symbol of the Peirce Arrow or nor. Grice stipulates as such, even though he
does not introduce his grammar formally. It is important to show ow these
functions can define other functions. Algebraically approached, this is a
matter of functional composition In case one wonders why the satisfaction
with defining the connectives of the set that comprises the symbols for
negation, inclusive disjunction, and conjunction, there is an explanation.
There is an easy, although informal, way to show that this set is functionally
complete. It is not minimally functionally complete because nor
and nand are inter-definable. But it is functionally complete. Thus,
showing that one can define these functions suffices for achieving functional
completeness. Definability should be thought as logical equivalence. One
connective can be defined by means of others if and only if the formulae in the
definition (what is defined and what is doing the defining) are logically
equivalent. Presuppose the truth-tabular definitions of the connectives.
Grice enjoyed that. Meanwhile, at Corpus, Grice is involved in serious
philosophical studies under the tutelage of Hardie. While his philosophical
socialising is limited, having been born on the wrong side of the tracks,
first at Corpus, and then at Merton, and ending at St. Johns, Grice fails to
attend the seminal meetings at All Souls held on Thursday evenings by the play
group of the seven (Austin, Ayer, Berlin, Hampshire, MacDermott, MacNabb, and
Woozley). Three of them will join Grice in the new play group after the war:
Austin, Hampshire, and Woozley. But at St. Johns Grice tutors Strawson, and
learns all about the linguistic botany methodology on his return from the navy.
Indeed, his being appointed Strawson as his tutee starts a life-long friendship
and collaboration. There are separate entries for the connectives: conjunction,
disjunction, and conditional. Refs.: Allusions to negation are scattered,
notably in Essay 4 in WoW, but also in “Method in philosophical psychology,”
and “Prejudices and predilections” (repr. in “Conception”), and under semantics
and syntax. There are specific essays of different dates, in s. V, in two
separate folders, in BANC.
absolutum: If we say, emissor E communicates that p, what is its
relatum? Nothing. The theory of communication NEEDS to be relative. To search
for the absolute in the theory of communication is otiose, for in communication
there is an unavoidable relatum, which is the emissor himself. Now Grice is
interested in an emissor that communicates that p is absolute. So we need
absolute and meta-absolute. I.e. if the emissor can communicate that ‘p’ is
absolute, he has more ground to exert his authority into inducing in his
addressee that the addressee believe what he is intended to believe.
The
absolutum is one, unlike Grice’s absoluta, or absolutes. Trust Grice to
pluralise Bradley’s absolute. While it is practical to restore the root of
‘axis’ for Grice’s value (validum, optimum), it is not easy to find a
grecianism for the absolutum absolute. Lewis and Short have “absolvere,” which
they render as
‘to loosen from, to make loose, set free, detach, untie (usu. trop., the fig.
being derived from fetters, qs. a vinculis solvere, like “vinculis exsolvere,”
Plaut. Truc. 3, 4, 10). So that makes sense. Lewis and Short also have “absolutum,” which they render as“absolute, unrestricted,
unconditional,” – as in Cicero: “hoc mihi videor videre, esse quasdam cum
adjunctione necessitudines, quasdam simplices et absolutas” (Inv. 2, 57, 170). Grice
repatedly uses the plural ‘abosolutes,’ and occasionally the singular. Obviously,
Grice has in mind the absolute-relative distinction, not wanting to be seen as
relativist, unless it is a constructionist relativist. Grice refers to Bradley in ‘Prolegomena,’ and has an essay
on the ‘absolutes.’ It is all back to when German philosopher F. Schiller, of
Corpus, publishes “Mind!” Its frontispiece is a portrait of the absolute, “very
much like the Bellman’s completely blank map in The hunting of the snark.” The
absolutum is the sum of all being, an emblem of idealism. Idealism dominates
Oxford for part of Grice’s career. The realist mission, headed by Wilson, is to
clean up philosophy’s act Bradley’s Appearance and reality, mirrors the point of
the snark. Bradley uses the example of a lump of sugar. It all begins to
crumble, In Oxonian parlance, the absolute is a boo-jum, you see. Bradley is
clear here, to irritate Ayer: the absolutum is, put simply, a higher unity, pure
spirit. “It can never and it enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution
and progress.” Especially at Corpus, tutees are aware of Hartmann’s absolutum.
Barnes thinks he can destroy with his emotivism. Hartmann, otherwise a
naturalist, is claims that this or that value exists, not in the realm (Reich)
of nature, but as an ideal essence of a thing, but in a realm which is not
less, but more real than nature. For Hartmann, if a value exists, it is not
relative, but absolute, objective, and rational, and so is a value judgment. Like
Grice, for Hartmann, the relativity dissolves upon conceiving and constructing
a value as an absolutum, not a relativum. The essence of a thing need not
reduce to a contingence. To conceive the essence of a table is to conceive what
the métier of a table. Like Hartmann, Grice is very ‘systematik’ axiologist, and
uses ‘relative’ variously. Already in the Oxford Philosophical Society, Grice
conceives of an utterer’s meaning and his communicatum is notoriously relative.
It is an act of communication relative to an agent. For Grice, there is hardly
a realm of un-constructed reality, so his construction of value as an absolutum
comes as no surprise. Grice is especially irritated by Julie Andrews in Noël
Coward’s “Relative values” and this Oxonian cavalier attitude he perceives in Barnes
and Hare, a pinko simplistic attitude against any absolute. Unlike
Hartmann, Grice adopts not so much a neo-Kantian as an Ariskantian tenet. The
ratiocinative part of the soul of a personal being is designated the proper
judge in the power structure of the soul. Whatever is relative to this
particular creature successfully attains, ipso facto, absolute value. Refs.: For
a good overview of emotivism in Oxford v. Urmson’s The emotive theory of
ethics. Grice, “Values, morals, absolutes, and the metaphysical,” The H. P.
Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), c 9-f. 24, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, University of California, Berkeley.
abstractum: In an emissor draws a skull to communicate that there
is danger, the addressee comes to think that there is danger, in the air. Let’s
formalise that proposition as “The air is dangerous.” Is that abstract? It is:
it involves two predicates which may be said to denote two abstracta: the
property of being air, and the property of being dangerous. So abstracta are unavoidable
in a communicatum, that reaches the sophistication of requiring a
‘that’-clause. The usual phrase in Grice
is ‘abstract’ as adjective and applied to ‘entity’ as anything troublesome to
nominalism. At Oxford, Grice belongs to the class for members whose class have
no members. If class C and class C have the same
members, they are the same. A class xx is a set just in case there is a
class yy such that x∈yx∈y. A
class which is not a set is an improper, not a proper class, or a well-ordered
one, as Burali-Forti puts it in ‘Sulle classi ben ordinate.’ Grice reads Cantor's essay and finds an antinomy on the
third page. He mmediately writes his uncle “I am reading Cantor and find an antinomy.”
The antinomy is obvious and concerns the class of all classes that are not
members of themselves. This obviously leads to a pragmatic contradiction, to
echo Moore, since this class must be and not be a member of itself and not a
member of itself. Grice had access to the Correspondence of Zermelo and re-wrote
the antinomy.Which leads Grice to Austin. For Austin thinks he can lead a
class, and that Saturday morning is a good time for a class of members whose
classes have no members, almost an insult. Grice is hardly attached to
canonicals, not even first-order predicate logic with identity and class
theory. Grice sees extensionalism asa a position imbued with the spirit of nominalism
yet dear to the philosopher particularly impressed by the power of class
theory. But Grice is having in mind the concretum-abstractum distinction, and
as an Aristotelian, he wants to defend a category as an abstractum or
universalium. Lewis and Short have ‘concrescere,’ rendered as ‘to grow together;
hence with the prevailing idea of uniting, and generally of soft or liquid
substances which thicken; to harden, condense, curdle, stiffen, congeal, etc.
(very freq., and class. in prose and poetry).’ For ‘abstractum,’ they have
‘abstrăhere, which they render as ‘to draw away from a place or person, to drag
or pull away.’ The ability to see a horse (hippos) without seeing horseness
(hippotes), as Plato remarks, is a matter of stupidity. Yet, perhaps bue to the
commentary by his editors, Grice feels defensive about proposition. Expanding
on an essay on the propositional complexum,’ the idea is that if we construct a
complexum step by step, in class-theoretical terms, one may not committed to an
‘abstract entity.’ But how unabstract is class theory? Grice hardly attaches to
the canonicals of first-order predicate calculus with identity together with
class theory. An item i is a universalium and 'abstractum' iff i fails to
occupy a region in space and time. This raises a few questions. It is
conceivable that an items that is standardly regarded as an 'abstractum' may
nonetheless occupy a volumes of space and time. The school of latter-day
nominalism is for ever criticised at Oxford, and Grice is no exception. The
topic of the abstractum was already present in Grice’s previous generation, as
in the essay by Ryle on the systematically misleading expression, and the
category reprinted in Flew. For it to be, a particular concretum individuum or
prima substantia has to be something, which is what an abstractum universaium
provides. A universal is part of the ‘essentia’ of the particular. Ariskants
motivation for for coining “to katholou” is doxastic. Aristotle claims that to
have a ‘doxa’ requires there to be an abstract universalium, not apart from (“para”),
but holding of (“kata”) a concretum individuum. Within the “this” (“tode”)
there is an aspect of “something” (“ti.”). Aristotle uses the “hêi” (“qua”) locution,
which plays a crucial role in perceiving. Ariskant’s remark that a particular
horse is always a horse (with a species and a genus) may strike the
non-philosopher as trivial. Grice strongly denies that its triviality is
unenlightening, and he loves to quote from Plato. Liddell and Scott have
“ἱππότης,” rendered as “horse-nature, the concept of horse,” Antisth. et Pl.
ap. Simp.in Cat. 208.30,32, Sch. Arist Id.p.167F. Then there is the ‘commensurate
universal,’ the major premise is a universal proposition. Grice provides a
logical construction of such lexemes as “abstractum” and “universalium,” and
“concretum” and “individuum,” or “atomon” in terms of two relations, “izzing”
and “hazzing.” x is an individuum or atomon iff nothing other than x izzes x. Austin
is Austin, and Strawson is Strawson. Now, x is a primum individuum, proton
atomon, or prima substantia, iff x is an individuum, and nothing hazzes x. One needs to distinguish between a singular
individuum and a particular (“to kathekaston,” particulare) simpliciter. Short
and Lewis have “partĭcŭlāris, e, adj.” which they render, unhelpfully, as
“particular,” but also as “of or concerning a part, partial, particular.”
“Propositiones aliae universales, aliae particulares, ADogm. Plat. 3, p. 35,
34: partĭcŭlārĭter is particularly,
ADogm. Plat. 3, p. 33, 32; opp. “generaliter,” Firm. Math. 1, 5 fin.; opp.
“universaliter,” Aug. Retract. 1, 5 fin. Cf. Strawson, “Particular and
general,” crediting Grice twice; the second time about a fine point of
denotatum: ‘the tallest man that ever lived, lives, or will live.” To define a
‘particular,’ you need to introduce, as Ariskant does, the idea of predication.
(∀x)(x
is an individuum)≡◻(∀y)(y izzes x)⊃(x izzes y). (∀x)(x izz a particulare(≡◻(∀y)(x
izzes predicable of y)⊃(x
izzes y Λ y izzes x). Once we have defined a ‘particular,’ we can go
and define a ‘singulare,’ a ‘tode ti,’ a ‘this what.” (∀x)(x izzes singulare)⊃(x izzes an individuum). There’s
further implicate to come. (∀x)(x izzes a particulare)⊃(x izzes an individuum)). The concern by Grice
with the abstractum as a “universalium in re” can be traced back to his reading
of Aristotle’s Categoriæ, for his Lit. Hum., and later with Austin and
Strawson. Anything but a ‘prima substantia,’ ‒ viz. essence, accident, attribute,
etc. ‒ may be said to belong in the realm of the abstractum or
universalium qua predicable. As such, an abstractum and univeralium is not a
spatio-temporal continuant. However, a category shift or
‘subjectification,’ by Grice allows a universalium as subject. The topic is
approached formally by means of the notion of order. First-order predicate
calculus ranges over this or that spatio-temporal continuant individual, in
Strawson’s use of the term. A higher-order predicate calculus ranges over this
or that abstractum, a feature, and beyond. An abstractum universalium is only referred
to in a second-order predicate calculus. This is Grice’s attempt to approach
Aristkant in pragmatic key. In his exploration of the abstractum, Grice is
challenging extensionalism, so fashionable in the New World within The School
of Latter-Day Nominalists. Grice is careful here since he is well aware that
Bennett has called him a meaning-nominalist. Refs.: For pre-play group
reflections see Ryle’s Categories and Systematically misleading expressions.
Explorations by other members of Grice’s playgroup are Strawson, ‘Particular
and general’ and Warnock, ‘Metaphysics in logic,’ The main work by Grice at
Oxford on the ‘abstractum’ is with Austin (f. 15) and later with Strawson (f.23).
Grice, “Aristotle’s Categoriae,” The H. P. Grice Papers, S. II, c. 6-f. 15 and
c. 6, f. 23, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley.
acceptabilitas: Grice generalizes his desirability and credibility
functions into a single acceptability. Acceptability has obviously degrees.
Grice is thinking of ‘scales’ alla: must, optimal acceptability (for both
modalities), should (medium acceptability), and ought (defeasible
acceptability). He develops the views in The John Locke lectures, having
introduced ‘accept,’ in his BA lecture on ‘Intention and Uncertainty.’ In fact,
much as in “Causal Theory” he has an excursus on ‘Implication,’ here he has,
also in italics, an excursus on “acceptance.” It seems that a degree of analogy
between intending and believing has to be admitted; likewise the presence of a
factual commitment in the case of an expression of intention. We can now use
the term ‘acceptance’ to express a generic concept applying both to cases of
intention and to cases of belief. He who intends to do A and he who believes
that he will do A can both be said to accept (or to accept it as being the
case) that he will do A. We could now attempt to renovate the three-pronged
analysis discussed in Section I, replacing references in that analysis to being
sure or certain that one will do A by references to accepting that one will do
A. We might reasonably hope thereby to escape the objections raised in Section
I, since these objections seemingly centred on special features of the notion of
certainty which would NOT attach to the generic notion of acceptance. Hope that
the renovated analysis will enable us to meet the sceptic will not immediately
be realised, for the sceptic can still as (a) why some cases of acceptance
should be specially dispensed from the need for evidential backing, and (b) if
certain cases are exempt from evidential justification but not from
justification, what sort of justification is here required. Some progress might
be achieved by adopting a different analysis of intention in terms of
acceptance. We might suggest that ‘Grice intends to go to Harborne’ is very
roughly equivalent to the conjunction of ‘Grice accepts-1 that he will go to
Harborne’ and ‘Grice accepts-2 that his going to Harborne will result from the
effect of his acceptance-1 that he will go to Harborne. The idea is that when a
case of acceptance is also a case of belief, the accepter does NOT regard his
acceptance as contributing towards the realisation of the state of affairs the
future the existence of which he accepts; whereas when a case of acceptance is
not a case of belief but a case of intention, he does regard the acceptance as
so contributing. Such an analysis clearly enables us to deal with the sceptic
with regard to this question (a), viz. why some cases of acceptance (those
which are cases of intention) should be specially exempt from the need of
evidential backing. For if my going to Harborne is to depend causally on my
acceptance that I shall-c go, the possession of satisfactory evidence that I
shall-c go will involve possession of the information that I accept that I
shall-c go. Obviously, then, I cannot (though others can) come to accept that I
shall-c go on the basis of satisfactory evidence, for to have such evidence I
should have already to have accepted that I shall-c go. I cannot decide whether
or not to accept-1 that I shall-c go on the strength of evidence which includes
as a datum that I do accept-1 that I shall-c go. Grice grants that we are still
unable to deal with the sceptic as regards question (b), viz. what sort of
justification is available for those cases of acceptance which require
non-evidential justification even though they involve a factual commitment. Though
it is clear that, on this analysis, one must not expect the intender to rely on
evidence for his statements of what he will in fact do, we have not provided
any account of the nature of the non-evidential considerations which may be
adduced to justify such a statement, nor (a fortiori) of the reasons why such
considerations might legitimately thought to succeed in justifying such a
statement. Refs.: Grice, “Intention and uncertainty,” The British Academy, and
BANC, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library.
acceptum: As a meta-ethicist, like Hare, Grice is interested in
providing criteria for acceptability. He proposes three formal
universalizability, conceptual universalizability, and applicational
universalizability. This is Grice’s Golden Rule, which is Biblical in nature. Grice
needs a past participle for a ‘that’-clause of something ‘thought’. He has
‘creditum’ for what is believed, and ‘desideratum’ for what is desired. So
he uses ‘acceptum’ for what is accepted, a neutral form to cover both the
desideratum and the creditum. Short and Lewis have ‘accipio,’ f.
‘capio.’ Grice uses the abbreviation “Acc” for this. As he puts it in the
Locke lectures: "An idea I want to
explore is that we represent the sentences ‘Smith should be recovering his health by now’ and ‘Smith should join
the cricket club’ as having the
following structures. First, a common "rationality" operator
'Acc', to be heard as "it is reasonable that", "it is
acceptABLE that", "it ought to be that", "it
should be that", or in some other similar way.Next, one or other of
two mode operators, which in the case of the first are to be written as '⊢' and in the case of the second are to be
written as '!.’ Finally a 'radical', to be represented by 'r' or some other
lower-case letter. The structure for the second is ‘Acc + ⊢ + r. For the second, ‘Acc + ! + r,’
with each symbol falling within the scope of its predecessor. Grice is not a
psychologist, but he speaks of the ‘soul.’ He was a philosopher engaged in
philosophical psychology. The psychological theory which Grice envisages would
be deficient as a theory to explain behaviour if it did not contain provision
for interests in the ascription of psychological states otherwise than as tools
for explaining and predicting behaviour, interests e. g. on the part of one
creature to be able to ascribe these rather than those psychological states to
another creature because of a concern for the other creature. Within such a
theory it should be possible to derive strong motivations on the part of the
creatures Subjects to the theory against the abandonment of the central
concepts of the theory and so of the theory itself, motivations which the
creatures would or should regard as justified.
Indeed, only from within the framework of such a theory, I think, can
matters of evaluation, and so, of the evaluation of modes of explanation, be
raised at all. If I conjecture aright, then, the entrenched system contains the
materials needed to justify its own entrenchment; whereas no rival system
contains a basis for the justification of anything at all. We should recall
that the first rendering that Liddell and Scott give for “ψυχή” is “life;” the
tripartite division of “ψ., οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρχύτας καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ
Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν ψ. τριμερῆ ἀποφαίνονται, διαιροῦντες εἰς λογισμὸν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ
ἐπιθυμίαν,” Pl.R.439e sqq.; in Arist. “ἡ ψ. τούτοις ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ,
αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει: πότερον δὲ τοὔτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψ. ἢ ψυχῆς
μόριον;” de An.413b11, cf. PA641b4; “ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψ.” Id.de An.434a22,
al.; And Aristotle also has Grice’s favourite, ‘psychic,’ ψυχικός , ή, όν,
“of the soul or life, spiritual, opp. “σωματικός, ἡδοναί” Arist.EN1117b28. The
compound “psichiologia” is first used in "Psichiologia de ratione animae
humanae," (in Bozicevic-Natalis, Vita Marci Maruli Spalatensis). A
footnote in “Method,” repr. in “Conception” dates Grice’s lectures at Princeton.
Grice is forever grateful to Carnap for having coined ‘pirot,’ or having
thought to have coined. Apparently, someone had used the expression before him
to mean some sort of exotic fish. He starts by listing this or that a focal
problem. The first problem is circularity. He refers to the dispositional
behaviouristic analysis by Ryle. The second focal problem is the alleged
analytic status of a psychological law. One problem concerns some respect for
Grice’s own privileged access to this or that state and this or that avowal of
this or that state being incorrigible. The fourth problem concerns the
law-selection. He refers to pessimism. He talks of folk-science. D and C are is
each predicate-constant in some law L in some psychological theory θ. This
or that instantiable of D or C may well be a set or a property or neither.
Grices way of Ramseyified naming: There is just one predicate D, such that
nomological generalization L introducing D via implicit definition in
theory θ obtains. Uniqueness is essential since D is assigned to a
names for a particular instantiable (One can dispense with uniqueness by way of
Ramseyified description discussed under ‘ramseyified description.’) Grice
trusts he is not overstretching Ramsey’s original intention. He applies
Ramsey-naming and Ramsey-describing to pain. He who hollers is in pain. Or
rather, He who is in pain hollers. (Sufficient but not necessary). He rejects
disjunctional physicalism on it sounding harsh, as Berkeley puts it, to say
that Smiths brains being in such and such a state is a case of, say, judging
something to be true on insufficient evidence. He criticises the body-soul
identity thesis on dismissing =s main purpose, to license predicate
transfers. Grice wasnt sure what his presidential address to the American
Philosophical Association will be about. He chose the banal (i.e. the
ordinary-language counterpart of something like a need we ascribe to a squirrel
to gobble nuts) and the bizarre: the philosophers construction of need and
other psychological, now theoretical terms. In the proceedings, Grice
creates the discipline of Pology. He cares to mention philosophers Aristotle,
Lewis, Myro, Witters, Ramsey, Ryle, and a few others. The essay became popular
when, of all people, Block, cited it as a programme in functionalism,
which it is Grices method in functionalist philosophical psychology. Introduces
Pology as a creature-construction discipline. Repr. in “Conception,” it
reached a wider audience. The essay is highly subdivided, and covers a lot of
ground. Grice starts by noting that, contra Ryle, he wants to see psychological
predicates as theoretical concepts. The kind of theory he is having in mind is
folksy. The first creature he introduces to apply his method is Toby, a
squarrel, that is a reconstructed squirrel. Grice gives some principles of
Pirotology. Maxims of rational behaviour compound to form what he calls an
immanuel, of which The Conversational Immanuel is a part. Grice concludes with
a warning against the Devil of Scientism, but acknowledges perhaps he was
giving much too credit to Myros influence on this! “Method”
in “Conception,” philosophical psychology, Pirotology. The Immanuel
section is perhaps the most important from the point of view of conversation as
rational cooperation. For he identifies three types of generality: formal,
applicational, and content-based. Also, he allows for there being different
types of imannuels. Surely one should be the conversational immanuel. Ryle
would say that one can have a manual, yet now know how to use it! And theres
also the Witters-type problem. How do we say that the conversationalist is
following the immanuel? Perhaps the statement is too strong – cf. following a
rule – and Grices problems with resultant and basic procedures, and how the
former derive from the latter! This connects with Chomsky, and in general with
Grices antipathy towards constitutive rules! In “Uncertainty,” Grice warns that
his interpretation of Prichards willing that as a state should not preclude a
physicalist analysis, but in Method it is all against physicalism. In Method, from the mundane to the recondite, he is
playful enough to say that primacy is no big deal, and that, if properly
motivated, he might give a reductive analysis of the buletic in terms of the
doxastic. But his reductive analysis of the doxastic in terms of the buletic
runs as follows: P judges that p iff P wills as follows: given any situation in
which P wills some end E and here are two non-empty classes K1 and
K2 of action types, such that: the performance by P of an
action-type belonging to K1 realises E1 just in
case p obtains, and the performance by the P of an action type belonging to of
K2 will realise E just in case p does not obtain, and here is
no third non-empty class K3 of action types such that the
performance by the P of an action type belonging to will realise E
whether p is true or p is false, in such situation, the P is to will that the P
performs some action type belonging to K1. Creature construction
allows for an account of freedom that will metaphysically justify absolute
value. Frankfurt has become famous for his second-order and
higher-order desires. Grice is exploring similar grounds in what comes out as
his “Method” (originally APA presidential address, now repr. in “Conception”).
Refs.: The obvious source is his “Method,” repr. in “Conception,” but the
keyword: “philosophical psychology” is useful in the Grice papers. There is a
specific essay on the power structure of the soul, The H. P. Grice Collection,
BANC.
accidentia. If there is
accidentia, there is ‘essentia.’ If the Grecians felt like using the prefix
‘syn-‘ for this, why didn’t the Romans use the affix ‘cum-’? There are two:
coincidentia, and concomitantia. For Grice, even English is vague here – to the
point like he felt that ‘have,’ as in ‘have a property’ seems more of a proper
translation of Aristotle’s ‘accidentia.’ Anything else falls under the ‘izz,’
not the ‘hazz.’ Because if the property is not accidental, the subject-item
would just cease to exist, so the essential property is something the subject
item IZZ, not HAZZ. One philosophical mistake: what is essential is not also
accidental. Grice follows Kripke in the account of existence and essence. If
Grice’s essence is his rational nature, if Grice becomes irrational, he ceases to
exist. Not so for any property that Grice has which is NOT essential. An
essential property is the first predicable, in that it is not one of this or
that genus that is redundant. So Grice applies ‘accidental,’ like ‘essential’
to ‘attribute,’ and to attribute is to predicate. An essential attribute is
manifested by an essential predicate. A non-essential predicate is an
accidental attribute. There is the ‘idea’ of the ‘proprium,’ idion, with which
Grice has to struggle a little. For what is the implicatum of a ‘proprium’
ascripition? “Man is a laughing animal.” Why would someone say such an idiocy
in the first place?!
ackrillism – after J. L.
Ackrill, London-born, Oxford-educated tutee of Grice’s. Grice cites him in
“Some reflections on ends and happiness.” The reference is to Ackrill’s
exploration on Aristotle on happiness. Ackrill was Grice’s tutee at St. John’s
where he read, as he should, for the Lit. Hum. (Phil.). Grice instilled on him
a love for Aristotle, which had been instilled on Grice by Scots philosopher
Hardie, Grice’s tutee at THE place to study Lit. Hum., Corpus. Grice regretted
that Ackrill had to *translate* Aristotle. “Of course at Clifton and Corpus,
Hardie never asked me so!” Grice thought that Aristotle was almost being
‘murdered,’ literally, by Ackrill. That’s why Grice would always quote
Aristotle in the Grecian vernacular. An “ackrillism,” then, as Grice used it,
is a way to turn Aristotle from one vernacular to another, “usually with an
Ackrillian effect.”
additum: f. addo ,
dĭdi, dĭtum, 3, v. a. 2. do (addues for addideris, Paul. ex Fest. p. 27 Müll.),addition.
Strawson Wiggins p. 520. The utterer implies something more or different from
what he explicitly conveys. Cfr. Disimplicatum, ‘less’ under ‘different from’
How seriously are we taking the ‘more.’ Not used by Grice. They seem
cross-categorial. If emissor draws a skull and then a cross he means that there
is danger and death in the offing. He crosses the cross, so it means death is
avoidable. Urmson says that Warnock went to bed and took off his boots. He
implicates in that order. So he means MORE than the ‘ampersand.” The “and” is
expanded into “and then.” But in not every case things are so easy that it’s a
matter of adding stuff. Cf. summatum, conjunctum.
additive implicature: By uttering
‘and,’ Russell means the Boolean adition. Whitehead means ‘and then’.
Whithead’s implicatum is ADDITIVE, as opposed to diaphoron. Grice considers the
conceptual possibilities here: One may explicitly convey that p, and implicitly
convey q, where q ADDS to p (e. g. ‘and’ implicates ‘and then’). Sometimes it
does not, “He is a fine fine,” (or a ‘nice fellow,’ Lecture IV) implying, “He
is a scoundrel.” Sometimes it has nothing to do with it, “The weather has been
nice” implying, “you committed a gaffe.” With disimplicatum, you implicate LESS
than you explicitly convey. When did you last see your father? “Yesterday
night, in my drams.” Grice sums this up with the phrase, “more or other.” By
explicitly conveying that p, the emissor implicates MORE OR OTHER than he
explicitly conveys.
agitation: a Byzantine feeling is a Ryleian
agitation. If Grice were to advance the not
wholly plausible thesis that ‘to feel Byzantine’ is just to have a an
anti-rylean agitation which is caused by the thought that Grice is or might
*be* Byzantine, it would surely be ridiculous to criticise Grice on the grounds
that Grice saddles himself with an ontological commitment to feelings, or to
modes of feeling. And why? Well, because, alla Parsons, if a quantifier is
covertly involved at all, it will only be a universal quantifier which in such
a case as this is more than adequately handled by a substitutional account of
quantification. Grice’s situation vis-a-vis the ‘proposition’ is in no way
different. In
the idiolect of Ryle, “a serious student of Grecian philosophy,” as Grice puts
it, ‘emotion’ designates at least three or four different kinds of things,
which Ryle calls an ‘inclination, or ‘motive,’ a ‘mood’, an ‘agitation,’ or a ‘commotion,’
and a ‘feeling.’ An inclination or a mood, including an agitation, is not
occurrences and doest not therefore take place either publicly or privately. It
is a propensity, not an act or state. An inclination is, however, a propensity
of this or that kind, and the kind is important. A feeling, on the other hand,
IS an occurrence, but the place that mention of it should take in a description
of human behaviour is very different from that which the standard theories
accord to it. A susceptibility to a specific agitation is on the same general
footing with an inclination, viz. that each is a general propensity and not an
occurrence. An agitation is not a motive. But an agitation does presuppose a
motive, or rather an agitataion presupposes a behaviour trend of which a motive
is for us the most interesting sort.
There
is however a matter of expression which is the source of some confusion, even
among Oxonian Wilde readers, and that did confuse philosophical psychologists
of the ability of G. F. Stout. An expression may signify both an inclination
and an agitation. But an expression may signify anything but an agitations.
Again, some other expression may signify anything but an inclination. An
expression like ‘uneasy’, ‘anxious’, ‘distressed’, ‘excited’, ‘startled’ always
signifies an agitations. An expression like ‘fond of fishing’, ‘keen on
gardening’, ‘bent on becoming a bishop’ never signifies an agitation. But an
expression like ‘love’, ‘want’, ‘desire’, ‘proud’, ‘eager,’ or many others, stands
sometimes for a simple inclination and sometimes for an agitations which is
resultant upon the inclinations and interferences with the exercise of it. Thus
‘hungry’ for ‘having a good appetite’ means roughly ‘is eating or would eat
heartily and without sauces, etc..’ This is different from ‘hungry’ in which a
person might be said to be ‘too hungry to concentrate on his work’. Hunger in
this second expression is a distress, and requires for its existence the
conjunction of an appetite with the inability to eat. Similarly the way in
which a boy is proud of his school is different from the way in which he is
speechless with pride on being unexpectedly given a place in a school team. To
remove a possible misapprehension, it must be pointed out that an agitation may
be quite agreeable. A man may voluntarily subject himself to suspense, fatigue,
uncertainty, perplexity, fear and surprise in such practices as angling,
rowing, travelling, crossword puzzles, rock-climbing and joking. That a thing
like a thrill, a rapture, a surprise, an amusement and an relief is an
agitation is shown by the fact that we can say that someone is too much
thrilled, amused or relieved to act, think or talk coherently. It
is helpful to notice that, anyhow commonly, the expression which completes ‘pang of . . .’ or ‘chill of . . .’ denotes an
agitation. A feeling, such as a man feeling Byzantine, is intrinsically
connected with an agitation. But a feeling, e. g. of a man who is feeling
Byzantine, is not intrinsically connected with an inclination, save in so far
as the inclination is a factor in the agitation. This is no novel psychological
hypothesis; It is part of the logic of our descriptions of a feeling that a
feeling (such as a man feeling Byzantine) is a sign of an agitation and is not
an exercise of an inclination. A feeling, such as a man feeling Byzantine, in
other words, is not a thing of which it makes sense to ask from what motive it
issues. The same is true, for the same reasons, of any sign of any agitation. This
point shows why we were right to suggest above that a feeling (like a man
feeling Byzantine) does not belong directly to a simple inclination. An
inclination is a certain sort of proneness or readiness to do certain sorts of
things on purpose. These things are therefore describable as being done from
that motive. They are the exercises of the disposition that we call ‘a motive’.
A feeling (such as a man feeling Byzantine) is not from a motive and is
therefore not among the possible exercise of such a propensiy. The widespread
theory that a motive such as vanity, or affection, is in the first instance a
disposition to experience certain specific feeling is therefore absurd. There
may be, of course, a tendency to have a feeling, such as feeling Byzantine;
being vertiginous and rheumatic are such tendencies. But we do not try to
modify a tendency of these kinds by a sermon. What a feeling, such as being
Byzantine, does causally belong to is the agitation. A feeling (such as feeling
Byzantine) is a sign of an agitation in the same sort of way as a stomach-ache
is a sign of indigestion. Roughly, we do not, as the prevalent theory holds,
act purposively because we experience a feeling (such as feeling Byzantine); we
experience a feeling (such as feeling Byzantine), as we wince and shudder,
because we are inhibited from acting purposively.
A
sentimentalist is a man who indulges in this or that induced feeling (such as
feeling Byzantine) without acknowledging the fictitiousness of his agitation.
It seems to be generally supposed that ‘pleasure’ or ‘desire’ is always used to
signify a feeling. And there certainly are feelings which can be described as a
feeling of pleasure or desire. Some thrills, shocks, glows and ticklings are
feelings of delight, surprise, relief and amusement; and things like a
hankering, an itche, a gnawing and a yearning is a sign that something is both
wanted and missed. But the transports, surprises, reliefs and distresses of
which such a feeling is diagnosed, or mis-diagnosed, as a sign is not itself a
feeling. It is an agitation or a mood, just as are the transports and
distresses which a child betrays by his skips and his whimpers. Nostalgia is an
agitation and one which can be called a ‘desire’; but it is not merely a
feeling or series of feelings. There is the sense of ‘pleasure’ in which it is
commonly replaced by such expressions as ‘delight’, ‘transport’, ‘rapture’,
‘exultation’ and ‘joy’. These are expressions of this or that mood signifying this
or that agitation. There are two quite different usages of ‘emotion’, in which
we explain people’s behaviour by reference to emotions. In the first usage of
‘emotion,’ we are referring to the motives or inclinations from which more or
less intelligent actions are done. In a second usage we are referring to a
mood, including the agitation or perturbation of which some aimless movement
may be a sign. In neither of these usages are we asserting or implicating that
the overt behaviour is the effect of a felt turbulence in the agent’s stream of
consciousness. In a third usage of ‘emotion’, pangs and twinges are feelings or
emotions, but they are not, save per accidens, things by reference to which we
explain behaviour. They are things for which diagnoses are required, not things
required for the diagnoses of behaviour. Since a convulsion of merriment is not
the state of mind of the sober experimentalist, the enjoyment of a joke is also
not an introspectible happening. States of mind such as these more or less
violent agitations can be examined only in retrospect. Yet nothing disastrous
follows from this restriction. We are not shorter of information about panic or
amusement than about other states of mind. If retrospection can give us the
data we need for our knowledge of some states of mind, there is no reason why
it should not do so for all. And this is just what seems to be suggested by the
popular phrase ‘to catch oneself doing so and so’. We catch, as we pursue and
overtake, what is already running away from us. I catch myself daydreaming
about a mountain walk after, perhaps very shortly after, I have begun the
daydream; or I catch myself humming a particular air only when the first few
notes have already been hummed. Retrospection, prompt or delayed, is a genuine
process and one which is exempt from the troubles ensuing from the assumption
of multiply divided attention; it is also exempt from the troubles ensuing from
the assumption that violent agitations could be the objects of cool,
contemporary scrutiny. One may be aware that he is whistling ‘Tipperary’ and
not know that he is whistling it in order to give tte appearance of a
sang-froid which he does not feel. Or, again, he may be aware that he is
shamming sang-froid without knowing that the tremors which he is trying to hide
derive from the agitation of a guilty conscience.
altogether nice girl: Or Grice’s altogether nice girl. Grice
quotes from the music-hall ditty, “Every [sic] nice girl loves a sailor”
(WoW:33). He uses this for his account of multiple quantification. There is a
reading where the emissor may implicate that every nice girl is such that he
loves one sailor, viz. Grice. But if the existential quantifier is not made
dominant, the uniqueness is disimplicated. Grice admits that not every
nominalist will be contented with the ‘metaphysical’ status of ‘the altogether
nice girl.’ The ‘one-at-a-time sailor’ is her counterpart. And they inhabit the
class of LOVE.
analytic a priori: R.
A. Wollheim. London-born philosopher, BPhil Oxon, Balliol (under D. Marcus) and
All Souls. Examined by H. P. Grice.
“What’s two times two?” Wollheim treasured that examination. It was in the
context of a discussion of J. S. Mill and I. Kant, for whom addition and
multiplication are ‘synthetic’ – a priori for Kant, a posteriori for Mill.
Grice was trying to provide a counterexample to Mill’s thesis that all comes via
deduction or induction.
animal: pirotese. Durrell’s Family Conversations.
Durrelly’s family conversation. When H. P. Grice was presented with an ‘overview’ of his
oeuvre for PGRICE (Grandy and Warner, 1986), he soon found out. “There’s something missing.” Indeed, there is a very infamous objection,
Grice thought, which is not mentioned by ‘Richards,’ as he abbreviates Richard
Grandy and Richard Warner’s majestically plural ‘overview,’ which seems to
Grice to be one to which Grice must respond. And he shall! The objection Grice
states as follows. One of the leading strands in Grice’s reductive analysis of
the circumstances or scenario in which an emissor (E) communicates that p is
that the scenario, call it “C,” is not to be regarded exclusively, “or even
primarily,” as a ‘feature’ of an E that is using what philosophers of language (since
Plato’s “Cratylus”) have been calling ‘language’ (glossa, la lingua latina, la
lingua italiana, la langue française, the English tongue, de nederlands taal,
die Deutsche Sprache, etc.). The emissum (e) may be an ‘utterance’ which is not
‘linguistic.’ Grice finds the issue crucial after discussing the topic with his
colleague at Berkeley, Davidson. For Davidson reminds Grice: “[t]here is no such
thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers […]
have supposed” (Davidson, 1986: 174). “I’m happy you say ‘many,’ Davidson,”
Grice commented. Grice continues formulating what he
obviously found to be an insidious, fastidious, objection. There are many
instances of “NOTABLY NON-‘linguistic’” vehicles or devices of communication,
within a communication-system, even a one-off system, which fulfil this or that
communication-function. I am using ‘communication-function’ alla Grice (1961:138,
repr. 1989:235).
These vehicles or devices are mostly
syntactically un-structured or amorphous – Grice’s favourite example being a
‘sort of hand-wave’ meaning that it is not the case that the emissor knows the
route or that the emissor is about to leave his addressee (1967:VI, repr. 1989:126).
Sometimes,
a device may exhibit at least “some rudimentary syntactic” structure – as Grice
puts it, giving a nod to Morris’s tripartite semiotics -- in that we may perhaps
distinguish and identify a ‘totum’ or complexum (say, Plato’s ‘logos’) from a
pars or simplex (say, Plato’s ‘onoma’ and ‘rhema’). Grice’s intention-based
reductive analysis of a communicatum, based on Aristotle, Locke, and Peirce, is
designed, indeed its very raison d'être being, to allow for the possibility that a non-“linguistic,” and,
further, indeed a non-“conventional” 'utterance,’ perhaps unrepeatable token,
not even manifesting any degree of syntactic structure, but a block of an
amorphous signal, be within the ‘repertoire’ of ‘procedures,’ perhaps unrepeatable
ones, of this or that organism, or creature, or agent, even if not relying on
any apparatus for communication of the kind that that we may label ‘linguistic’
or otherwise ‘conventional,’ will count as an emissor E ‘doing’ this or that
‘thing,’ thereby ‘communicating’ that p. To provide for this conceptual
scenario, it is plainly necessary, Grice grants, that the key ingredient in any
representation or conceptualization, or reductive analysis of ‘communicating,’
viz. intending that p, for Grice, should be a ‘state’ of the emissor’s “soul”
(Grice is translating Grecian ψυχή
the capacity for which does not require what we may label the ‘possession’ of,
shall we say, ‘faculty,’ of what philosophers since Cratylus have been calling
‘γλῶσσα Ἑλληνίδα,’
‘lingua latina,’ ‘lingua italiana,’ ‘langue française,’ ‘English tongue,’
‘Nederlands taal,’ ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’ (Grice
always congratulated Kant for never distinguishing between ‘die Deutsche
Sprache’ and ‘Sprache’ as ‘eine Fakultät.’). Now
a philosopher, relying on this or that neo-Prichardian reductive analysis of
‘intending that p,’ (Oxonian Grice will quote Oxonian if he can) may not be
willing to allow the possibility of such, shall we grant, pre-linguistic
intending that p, or non-linguistic intending that p. Surely, if the emissor E
realizes that his addressee or recipient R does not ‘share’ say, what the
Germans call ‘die Deutsche Sprache,” E may still communicate, by doing
so-and-so, that such-and-such, viz. p. E may make this sort of hand wave
communicating that E knows the route or that E is about to leave R. Against
that objection, Grice surely wins the day. There’s nothing in Prichard account
of ‘willing that p,’ itself a borrowing from William James (“I will that the
distant table slides over the floor toward me. It does not.”) which is about
‘die Deutsche Sprache.’
But Grice hastens to declare that
winning ‘the’ day may not be winning ‘all’ day. And
that is because of Oxonian philosophy being what it is. Because, as far as
Grice’s Oxonian explorations on communication go, in a succession of
increasingly elaborate moves – ending with a a clause which closes the succession
o-- designed to thwart this or that scenario, later deemed illegitimate,
involving two rational agents where the emissor E relies on an
‘inference-element’ that it is not the case that E intends his recipient R will
recogise – Grice is led to narrow the ‘intending’ the reductive analysis of ‘Emissor
E communicates that p’ to C-intending. Grice expects that whatever may be the case in general with
regard to ‘intending,’ C-intending seems for some reason to Grice to be unsophisticatedly,
viz. plainly, too sophisticated a ‘state’ of a soul (or ψυχή) to be found in an organism, ‘pirot,’ creature, that we may
not want to deem ‘rational,’ or as the Germans would say, a creature that is plainly
destitute of “Die Deutsche Sprache.” We seem to be needing a pirot to be “very
intelligent, indeed rational.” (Who other than Grice would genially combine
Locke with Carnap?). Some may regret, Grice admits, that his unavoidable rear-guard
action just undermines the raison d'etre of his campaign. However, Grice goes on to provide an admittedly brief reply
which will have to suffice under the circumstances. There is SOME limit for
Oxonian debate! A full treatment that would satisfy Grice requires delving deep
into crucial problems about the boundary between vicious and virtuous conceptual
circularity.
Which is promising. It is not something
UNATTAINABLE a priori – and there is nothing wrong with leaving it for the
morrow. It reduces to the philosopher trying to show himself virtuously
circular, if not, like Lear, spherical. But why need the circle be virtuous.
Well, as August would put it, unless a ‘circulus’ is not ‘virtuosus,’ one would
hardly deem it a ‘circulus’ in the first place. A circle is virtuous if it is not a
bad circle. One may even say, with The Carpenter, that, like a cabbage or a
king, if a circle is not virtuous is not even a circle! (Grice 2001:35). In
this case, to borrow from former Oxonian student S. R. Schiffer, we need the
‘virtuous circle’ because we are dealing with ‘a loop’ (Schiffer, 1988:v) -- a
‘conceptual loop,’ that is. Schiffer is not interested in ‘communicating;’ only
‘meaning,’ but his point can be easily transliterated. Schiffer is saying that
‘U,’ or utterer, our ‘E,’ means that p’ surely relies on ‘U intends that p,’
but mind the loop: ‘U intends that p’ may rely on ‘U means that p.’In Grice’s
most generic, third-person terms, we have a creature, call it a pirot, P1,
that, by doing thing D1, communicates that p. We are talking of Grice qua
ethologist, who OBSERVES the scenario. As it happens, Grice’s favourite pirot
is the parrot, and call Grice a snob, but his favourite parrot was Prince
Maurice’s Parrot. Prince Maurice’s Parrot. Grice reads Locke, and adapts it
slightly. “Since I think I may be confident, that, whoever should see a
CREATURE of his own shape or make, though it had no more reason all its life
than a PARROT, would call him still A MAN; or whoever should hear a parrot discourse,
reason, and philosophise, would call or think it nothing but a PARROT; and say,
the one was A DULL IRRATIONAL MAN, and the other A VERY INTELLIGENT RATIONAL
PARROT. “A relation we have in an author of great note, is sufficient to
countenance the supposition of A RATIONAL PARROT. “The author’s words are as
follows.”““I had a mind to know, from Prince Maurice's own mouth, the account
of a common, but much credited story, that I had heard so often from many
others, of a parrot he has, that speaks, and asks, and answers common questions,
like A REASONABLE CREATURE.””““So that those of his train there generally
conclude it to be witchery or possession; and one of his chaplains, would never
from that time endure A PARROT, but says all PARROTS have a devil in them.””““I
had heard many particulars of this story, and as severed by people hard to be
discredited, which made me ask Prince Maurice what there is of it.””““Prince
Maurice says, with his usual plainness and dryness in talk, there is something
true, but a great deal false of what is reported.””““I desired to know of him
what there was of the first. Prince Maurice tells me short and coldly, that he
had HEARD of such A PARROT; and though he believes nothing of it, and it was a
good way off, yet he had so much curiosity as to send for the parrot: that it
was a very great parrot; and when the parrot comes first into the room where
Prince Maurice is, with a great many men about him, the parrot says presently, ‘What
a nice company is here.’”” ““ One of the men asks the parrot, ‘What thinkest
thou that man is?,’ ostending his finger, and pointing to Prince Maurice.”“The
parrot answers, ‘Some general -- or other.’ When the man brings the parrot
close to Prince Maurice, Prince Maurice asks the parrot, ‘D'ou venez-vous?’”““The
parrot answers, ‘De Marinnan.’ Then Prince Maurice goes on, and poses a second
question to the parrot.””““‘A qui estes-vous?’ The Parrot answers: ‘A un
Portugais.’”““Prince Maurice then asks a third question: ‘Que fais-tu la?’““The
parrot answers: “Je garde les poulles.’ Prince Maurice smiles, which pleases
the Parrot.”““Prince Maurice, violating a Griceian maxim, and being just
informed that p, asks whether p. This is incidentally the Prince’s fourth
question to the parrot – the first idiotic one. ‘Vous gardez les poulles?’”” ““The Parrot answers, ‘Oui, moi; et je scai bien faire.’
Then the parrott appeals to Peirce’s iconic system and makes the chuck four or
five times that a man uses to make to chickens when a man calls them. I set
down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said
them to me. I ask Prince Maurice in what ‘tongue’ the parrot speaks.””““Prince
Maurice says that the parrot speaks in the Brazilian tongue.””““ I ask Prince
William whether he understands the Brazilian tongue.”” ““Prince Maurice says:
No, but he has taken care to have TWO interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman
that spoke the Brazilian tongue, and the other a Brazilian that spoke the Dutch
tongue; that Prince Maurice asked them separately and privately, and both of
them AGREED in telling Prince Maurice just the same thing that the parrot had
said.””““I could not but tell this ODD story, because it is so much out of the
way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say
Prince Maurice at least believed himself in all he told me, having ever passed
for a very honest and pious man.””““I leave it to naturalists to reason, and to
other men to believe, as they please upon it. However, it is not, perhaps,
amiss to relieve or enliven a busy scene sometimes with such digressions,
whether to the purpose or no.””Locke takes care “that the reader should have
the story at large in the author's own words, because he seems to me not to
have thought it incredible.”“For it cannot be imagined that so able a man as
he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of
himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to
pin so close, not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince
in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and piety, a story which, if he
himself thought incredible, he could not but also think RIDICULOUS.”“Prince
Maurice, it is plain, who vouches this story, and our author, who relates it
from him, both of them call this talker A PARROT.”Locke asks “any one else who
thinks such a story fit to be told, whether, if this PARROT, and all of its
kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it this one did,-
whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of RATIONAL ANIMALS; but
yet, whether, for all that, they would have been allowed to be MEN, and not
PARROTS?”“For I presume it is not the idea of A THINKING OR RATIONAL BEING
alone that makes the idea of A MAN in most people's sense: but of A BODY, so
and so shaped, joined to it: and if that be the idea of a MAN, the same
successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as THE SAME IMMATERIAL
SPIRIT, go to the making of the same MAN.”So
back to Grice’s pirotology, or Pirotologia. But first a precis Grice needs a
dossier with a précis, so that he can insert the parrot’s conversational
implicata – and Prince Maurice’s. PARROT: What a nice company is here.MAN
(pointing to Prince Maurice): What thinkest thou that man is?PARROT: Some
general -- or other. Grice’s gloss: The he parrot displays what Grice calls
‘up-take.’ The parrot recognizes the man’s c-intention. So far is ability to
display uptake.PRINCE MAURICE: D'ou venez-vous?PARROT: De Marinnan.PRINCE
MAURICE: A qui estes-vous?PARROT: A un Portugais.PRINCE MAURICE: Que fais-tu
la?PARROT: Je garde les poulles.PRINCE MAURICE SMILES and flouts a Griceian
maxim: Vous gardez les poulles?PARROT (losing patience, and grasping the
Prince’s implicature that he doubts it): Oui, moi. Et je scai bien
faire.Grice’s gloss: The Parrott appeals to Peirce’s iconic system and makes
the chuck five times that a man uses to make to chickens when a man calls them.According
to his “most recent speculations” about communication, Grice goes on in his
‘Reply to Richards,’ one should distinguish, as he engages in a bit of
legalese, between two sides of the scenario under conceptual reduction, E
communicates that p. One side is the ‘de facto’ side, a side which, as in name
implies, in fact contains any communication-relevant feature which obtains or
is present in the circumstances. But then there is a ‘de jure’ side to the
scenario, viz. the nested C-intending which is only deemed to be present, as a
vicious circle with good intentions may become a virtuous one. By the ‘nesting,’
Grice means the three sub-intentions, involved in a scenario where Emissor E
communicates that (psi*) p, reducible to the Emissor E c-intending that A recognises
that E psi-s that p.First, there is the ‘exhibitive’ intention, C1. Emissor E
intends A to recognise that A psi-s that p.Second, there is the ‘reflexive’
intention, C2.Emissor intends that A recognise C1 by A recognising C2Third,
there is the ‘openness’ intention, C3. There is no inference-element which is
C-constitutive such that Emissor relies on it and yet does not intend A to
recognise.The “de jure” side to the state of affairs involves self-reference But
since this self-referential circle, a mere ‘loop,’ is meant to BLOCK an utterly
vicious circle of a regressus ad infinitum (or ‘ho eis apeiron ekballon,’ if
you must), the self-referential circle may well be deemed virtuous. The ‘de
jure’ side to the scenario is trying to save state of affairs which in, in
Grice’s words, “infinitely complex,” and such that no reasonable philosopher
should expect to be realised ‘de facto.’ “In which case,” Grice remarks, “it seems
to serve little, if any, purpose” to assume that this very INCONCEIVABLE ‘de
facto’ instantiation of a ‘de jure’ ascription of an emissor communicating that
p would only be detectable, as it isn’t, by appeal to something like ‘die
Deutsche Sprache’!“At its most meagre,” to use Grice’s idiom, the ‘de facto’
side should consist, merely, in any pre-rational ‘counterpart’ to the state of
affairs describable by having an Emissor E communicating that p,This might
amount to no more than making a certain sort of utterance – our doing D1 -- in
order thereby to get some recipient creature R, our second pirot, P2, to think
or want some particular thing, our p. This meagre condition hardly involves
reference to anything like ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’Let’s reformulate the
condition.It’s just a pirot, at a ‘pre-rational’ level. The pirot does a thing
T IN ORDER THEREBY to get some other pirot to think or do some particular
thing. To echo Hare,Die Tur ist geschlossen, ja.Die Tur ist geschlossen,
bitte.Grice continues as a corollary: “Maybe in a less straightforward instance
of “Emissor E communicates that p” there is actually present the C-intention
whose feasibility as an ‘intention’ suggests some ability to use ‘die Deutsche
Sprache.’And if it does, Grice adds, it looks like anything like ‘die Deutsche
Sprache’ ends up being an aid to the conceptualizing about communication, not
communication itself! ReferencesDavidson, Donald
1986. A nice derangement of epitaphs, in Grandy and Warner, pp. 157-74.Durrell,
My family and other animals. Grandy, R. E. and R. O. Warner. 1986.
Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends. Oxford, at
the Clarendon Press. Grice, H. P. 1986. Reply to Richards, in Grandy and
Warner, pp. 45-106Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. London and
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Grice, H. P. 2001. Aspects of
reason. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. Locke, J. 1690. An essay concerning
humane [sic] understanding. Oxford: The Bodleian. Schiffer, S. R. 1988.
Meaning. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.
animatum: Grice thinks of communication as what he
calls ‘soul-to-soul transfer.’ Very Aristotelian. Grice was interested in what he called the
‘rational soul’ (psyche logike). In an act of communication, Emissor
communicates that p, there is a psi involved, therefore a soul, therefore what
the Romans called an ‘anima,’ and the Greeks called the ‘psyche.’ For surely
there can be no psi-transmission without a psi. Grice loved to abbreviate this
as the psi, since Lady Asquith, who was a soul, would not have desired any less
from Grice. Grice, like Plato and Aristotle, holds a tripartite theory of the
soul. Where, ‘part’ (Aristotelian ‘meros’) is taken very seriously. Anything
thought. From ‘psyche,’ anima. Grice uses the symbol of the letter psi here
which he renders as ‘animatum.’ Why Grice prefers ‘soul’ to mind. The
immortality of a the chicken soul. By Shropshire. Shropshire claims that the immortality of the soul is proved by
the fact that, if you cut off a chicken's head, the chicken will run round the
yard for a quarter of an hour before dropping. Grice has an an 'expansion' of
Shropshire's ingenious argument.If the soul is not dependent on the body, it is
immortal. If the soul is dependent on the body, it is dependent on that part of
the body in which it is located. If the soul is located in the body, it is
located in the head. If the chicken's soul were located in its head, the
chicken's soul would be destroyed if the head were rendered inoperative by
removal from the body. The chicken runs round the yard after head-removal. It
could do this only if animated, and controlled by its soul. So the chicken's
soul is not located in, and not dependent on, the chicken's head. So the
chicken's soul is not dependent on the chicken's body. So the chicken's soul is
immortal. end p.11 If the chicken's soul is immortal, a fortiori the human soul
is immortal. So the soul is immortal. The question I now ask myself is this:
why is it that I should be quite prepared to believe that the Harvard students
ascribed their expansion of Botvinnik's proof, or at least some part of it, to
Botvinnik (as what he had in mind), whereas I have no inclination at all to
ascribe any part of my expansion to Shropshire? Considerations which at once
strike me as being likely to be relevant are: (1) that Botvinnik's proof
without doubt contained more steps than Shropshire's claim; (2) that the
expansion of Botvinnik's proof probably imported, as extra premisses, only
propositions which are true, and indeed certain; whereas my expansion imports
premisses which are false or dubious; (3) that Botvinnik was highly intelligent
and an accomplished logician; whereas Shropshire was neither very intelligent
nor very accomplished as a philosopher. No doubt these considerations are
relevant, though one wonders whether one would be much readier to accord
Shropshire's production the title of 'reasoning' if it had contained some
further striking 'deductions', such as that since the soul is immortal moral
principles have absolute validity; and one might also ask whether the effect of
(3) does not nullify that of (2), since, if Shropshire was stupid, why should
not one ascribe to him a reconstructed argument containing plainly unacceptable
premisses? But, mainly, I would like some further light on the following
question: if such considerations as those which I have just mentioned are
relevant, why are they relevant? I should say a word about avowals. The
following contention might be advanced. If you want to know whether someone R,
who has produced what may be an incomplete piece of reasoning, has a particular
completion in mind, the direct way to find out is to ask him. That would settle
the matter. If, however, you are unable to ask him, then indirect methods will
have to be used, which may well be indecisive. Indeterminacy springs merely
from having to rely on indirect methods. I have two comments to make. First: it
end p.12 is far from clear to what extent avowals do settle the matter. Anyone
who has taught philosophy is familiar with the situation in which, under
pressure to expand an argument they have advanced, students, particularly
beginners, make statements which, one is inclined to say, misrepresent their
position. This phenomenon is perhaps accounted for by my much more important
second point: that avowals in this kind of context generally do not have the
character which one might without reflection suppose them to have; they are not
so much reportive as constructive. If I ask someone if he thinks that so-and-so
is a consequence of such-and-such, what I shall receive will be primarily a
defence of this supposition, not a report on what, historically, he had in mind
in making it. We are in general much more interested in whether an inferential
step is a good one to make than we are in what a particular person had in mind
at the actual moment at which he made the step. One might perhaps see an
analogy between avowals in this area and the specification of plans. If someone
has propounded a plan for achieving a certain objective, and I ask him what he
proposes to do in such-and-such a contingency, I expect him to do the best he
can to specify for me a way of meeting that contingency, rather than to give a
historically correct account of what thoughts he had been entertaining. This
feature of what I might call inferential avowals is one for which we shall have
to account.Let us take stock. The thesis which we proposed for examination has
needed emendation twice, once in the face of the possibility of bad reasoning,
and once to allow for informal and incomplete reasoning. The reformulation
needed to accommodate the latter is proving difficult to reach. Let us take s
and s′ to be sequences consisting of a set of premisses and a conclusion (or,
perhaps it would be better to say, a set of propositions and a further
proposition), or a sequence (sorites) of such sequences. (This is not fully
accurate, but will serve.) Let us suppose that x has produced s (in speech or
in thought). Let "formally cogent" mean "having true premisses,
and being such that steps from premisses to conclusions are formally valid".
(1) We cannot define "s is a piece of reasoning by x" as "x
thinks s to be formally cogent", because if s is an incomplete piece of
reasoning s is not, and could not reasonably be thought by x to be, formally
cogent. end p.13 (2) We cannot define "s is a piece of reasoning by
x" as "(∃s′)
(s′ is an expansion of s and s′ is formally cogent)" because (a) it does
not get in the idea that x thinks s′ formally cogent and (b) it would exclude
bad reasoning. (3) We cannot define "s is a piece of reasoning by x"
as "x thinks that (∃s′)
(s′ is an expansion of s and s′ is formally cogent)", for this is too
weak, and would allow as reasoning any case in which x believed (for whatever
reason, or lack of reason) that an informal sequence had some formally cogent
expansion or other. (Compare perhaps Shropshire.).” In Latin indeed, ‘animus’
and ‘anima’ make a world of a difference, as Shropshire well knows. Psyche
transliterates as ‘anima’ only; ‘animus’ the Greeks never felt the need for. Of
course a chicken is an animal, as in man. “Homo animalis rationalis.” Grice
prefers ‘human,’ but sometimes he uses ‘animal,’ as opposed to ‘vegetal,
sometimes, when considering stages of freedom. A stone (mineral) displays a
‘free’ fall, which is metabolical. And then, a vegetable is less free than an
animal, which can move, and a non-human animal (that Grice calls ‘a beast’) is
less free than man, who is a rational animal. Grice notes that back in the day,
when the prince came from a hunt, “I brought some animals,” since these were
‘deer,’ ‘deer’ was taken as meaning ‘animal,’ when the implicatum was very much
cancellable. The Anglo-Saxons soon dropped the ‘deer’ and adopted the Latinate
‘animal.’ They narrowed the use of ‘deer’ for the ‘cervus cervus.’ But not
across the North Sea where the zoo is still called a ‘deer-garden.’ When
Aelfric studied philosophy he once thought man was a rational deer.
Annullability:
a synonym for ‘cancellability,’ used in “Causal.” Perhaps clear than ‘cancel.’
The etymology seems clear, because it involves the negative – “Cancel” seems
like a soft sophisticated way of annulling, render something nix. Short and
Lewis has ‘nullus’ as ne-ullus, not any,
none, no. which is indeed a diminutive for ‘unus,’ [for unulus, dim. of
unus], any, any one (usu. in neg. sentences;
corresp. with aliquis in affirmations).
apagoge:
distinguished by Grice from both ‘epagoge,’ and his favoured ‘diagoge.’ A shifting of the
basis of argument: hence of argument based on a probable or agreed assumption,
Arist.APr.69a20, cf. Anon.in SE65.35; reduction, “ἡ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀ.”
reductio per impossibile, APr. 29b6; “ἡ ἀ. μετάβασίς ἐστιν ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου
προβλήματος ἢ θεωρήματος ἐπ᾽ ἄλλο, οὗ γνωσθέντος ἢ πορισθέντος καὶ τὸ
προκείμενον ἔσται καταφανές” Procl. in Euc.p.212F.; τῶν ἀπορουμένων
διαγραμμάτων τὴν ἀ. ποιήσασθαι ib. p.213F. b. reduction of a disputant (cf. ἀπάγω
v. 1c), “ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀ.” S.E.P.2.234.
aporia: cf. aporetic, cognate with porosity. No
porosity, and you get an impasse. While aware of Baker’s and Deutsch’s
treatment of the ‘aporia’ in Aristotle’s account of ‘philos,’ Grice explores
‘aporia’ in Plato in the Thrasymachus on ‘legal justice’ prior to ‘moral
justice’ in Republic. in Dialectic, question for discussion, difficulty,
puzzle, “ἀπορίᾳ σχόμενος” Pl.Prt.321c; ἀ. ἣν ἀπορεῖς ib.324d; “ἡ ἀ. ἰσότης ἐναντίων
λογισμῶν” Arist. Top.145b1, al.; “ἔχει ἀπορίαν περί τινος” Id.Pol.1285b28; “αἱ
μὲν οὖν ἀ. τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν” Id.EN1146b6; “οὐδεμίαν ποιήσει ἀ.”
Id.Metaph.1085a27; ἀ. λύειν, διαλύειν, Id.MM 1201b1, Metaph.1062b31; “ἀπορίᾳ ἀπορίαν
λύειν” D.S.1.37.Discussion with the
Sophist Thrasymachus can
only lead to aporia.
And the more I trust you, the more I sink into an aporia of
sorts. —Aha! roared Thrasymachus to everyone's surprise. There it is!
Socratic aporia is
back! Charge! neither Socrates' company nor Socrates himself gives any
convincing answer. So, he says, finding himself in a real aporia, he
visits Thrasymachus as
well, and ... I argue that a combination of these means in form
that I call “provocative-aporetic” better accounts for the means that Plato
uses to exert a protreptic effect on readers. Aporia is a simultaneously
intellectual and affective experience, and the way that readers choose to
respond to aporia has a greater protreptic effect than either affective or
intellectual means alone. When Socrates says he can 'transfer' the use of
"just" to things related to the 'soul,' what kind of conversational
game is that? Grice took Socrates's manoeuvre very
seriously.Socrates relies on the tripartite theory of the soul. Plato, actually -- since Socrates is a drammatis persona! In "Philosophical Eschatology, Metaphysics, and Plato's
Republic," H. P. Grice's purpose is to carry out a provocative-aporetic
reading Book I Grice argues that it is a dispute between two ways of
understanding 'just' which causes the aporia when Socrates tries to analyse
'just.' Although Socrates will not argue for the complexity and
tripartition of the soul until Bk. IV, we can at least note the contrast with
Thrasymachus' “idealize user” theory.For Socrates, agents are complex, and
justice coordinates the parts of the agent.For Thrasymachus, agents are simple
“users,” and justice is a tool for use. (2 - 3) Justice makes its
possessor happy; the function (telos, metier) argument. To make the argument
that justice is an excellence (virtus, arete) of soul (psyche) that makes its
possessor happy, Socrates relies on a method for discovering the function
(ἔργον, ergon, 352e1, cf. telos, metier, causa finalis) of any object
whatsoever. Socrates begins by differentiating between an exclusive
functions and an optimal function, so that we may discover the functions in
different types of objects, i.e., natural and artificial objects. We can
say an object performs some function (ergon) if one of the following conditions
holds.If the object is the only one that can do the work in
question, or If it is the object that does that work best.Socrates
then provides examples from different part-whole complexes to make his
point. The eye's exclusive function is to see, because no other organ is
specialized so as to perform just that function. A horse's work is to
carry riders into battle. Even though this might not be a horse's
EXCLUSIVE function, it may be its “optimal” function in that the horse is best
suited or designed by God to the task. Finally, the pruning knife is best
for tending to vines, not because it cannot cut anything else, but because it
is optimally suited for that task. Socrates' use of the pruning knife of
as an example of a thing's function resembles a return to the technē model,
since a craftsman must make the knife for a gardener to Socrates asks,
“Would you define this as the function of a horse and of anything else, as that
which someone does either through that thing alone, or best?” (...τοῦτο ἄν θείης
καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἔργον, ὅ ἄν ἤ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἤ ἄριστα;
352e1-2) Thrasymachus agrees to this definition of function. 91 use.But his use
of the eye — a bodily organ — should dissuade us from this view. One may
use these examples to argue that Socrates is in fact offering a new method to
investigate the nature of justice: 1) Find out what the functions of such
objects are2) determine (by observation, experiment, or even thought
experiment) cases where objects of such a kind perform their functions well and
cases where they perform them poorly; and 3) finally find out the
qualities that enable them to perform such functions well (and in the absence
of which they perform poorly), and these are their virtues.A crucial difference
between this method and technē model of justice lies in the interpretation that
each assigns to the realm of human artifacts. Polemarchus and Thrasymachus
both assume that the technē is unique as a form of knowledge for the power and
control that it offers users. In Polemarchus' case, the technē of justice,
“helping friends and harming enemies,” may be interpreted as a description of a
method for gaining political power within a traditional framework of communal
life, which assumes the oikos as the basic unit of power. Those families
that help their friends and harm their enemies thrive. Thrasymachus, on
the other hand, emphasizes the ways that technai grant users the power to
exploit nature to further their own, distinctively individual ends. Thus,
the shepherd exploits the sheep to make a livelihood for himself. Socrates'
approach differs from these by re-casting “mastery” over nature as submission
to norms that structure the natural world. For example, many factors contribute
to making This points to a distinction Socrates draws in Book X between
producers and users of artifacts. He uses the example of the blacksmith
who makes a bridle and the horseman who uses the bridle to argue that
production and use correspond to two gradations of knowledge (601c). The
ultimate purpose of the example is to provide a metaphor — using the craft
analogy — for identifying gradations of knowledge on a copy-original paradigm
of the form-participant relation. the pruning knife the optimal tool for
cutting vines: the shape of the human hand, the thickness and shape of the
vines, and the metal of the blade. Likewise, in order for horses to
optimally perform their “work,” they must be "healthy" and
strong. The conditions that bring about their "health" and
strength are not up to us, however."Control” only comes about through the
recognition of natural norms. Thus technē is a type of knowledge that
coordinates structures in nature.It is not an unlimited source of
power. Socrates' inclusion of the human soul (psyche) among those things
that have a function is the more controversial aspect of function
argument.Socrates says that the functions (erga) of the soul (psyche)
are “to engage in care-taking, ruling, and deliberation” and, later,
simply that the ergon (or function) of the soul (or psyche) is “to live”
(τὸ ζῆν, "to zen," 353d6). But the difficulty seems to be this:
the functions of pruning knives, horses, and bodily organs are determined with
respect to a limited and fairly unambiguous context that is already defined for
them. But what is this context with respect to the soul (psyche) of a
human individual? One answer might be that the social world — politics —
provides the context that defines the soul's function, just as the needs of the
human organism define the context in which the eye can perform a
function. But here a challenger might reply that in aristocracies,
oligarchies, and democracies, “care-taking, ruling, and deliberation” are
utilized for different ends.In these contexts, individual souls might have
different functions, according to the “needs” that these different regimes
have. Alternatively, one might deny altogether that the human soul has a
function: the distinctive feature of human beings might be their position
“outside” of nature. Thus, even if Socrates' description of the soul's function
is accurate, it is too general to be really informative.Socrates must offer
more details for the function argument to be convincing. Nonetheless, the
idea that justice is a condition that lets the soul perform its functions is
a significant departure from the technē model of justice, and one that
will remain throughout the argument of the Republic. […] τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι (353d3). As far as Bk. I is concerned,
“justice” functions as a place-holder for that condition of the soul which
permits the soul to perform its functions well. What that condition is,
however, remains unknown.For this reason, Plato has Socrates concludes Bk. I by
likening himself to a “glutton” (ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι, 354b1), who takes another
dish before “moderately enjoying the previous” serving (πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου
μετρίως ἀπολαύσαι, 354b2-3). For Socrates wants to know what effects the
optimal condition of soul brings about before knowing what the condition itself
is. Thus Bk. I concludes in "aporia," but not in a way that
betrays the dialogue's lack of unity.The “separatist” thesis concerning Bk. I
goes back to Hermann in "Geschichte und System der Platonischen
Philosophie." One can argue on behalf of the “separatist” view as
well. One can argue against the separatist thesis, even granting some
evidence in favour of the separatist thesis. To the contrary, the
"aporia" clearly foreshadows the argument that Socrates makes about
the soul in Bk. IV, viz. that the soul (psyche) is a complex whole of parts --
an implicatum in the “justice is stronger” argument -- and that 'just' is the
condition that allows this complex whole be integrated to an optimal
degree. Thus, Bk. I does not conclude negatively, but rather provides the
resources for going beyond the "technē" model of justice, which is
the primary cause of Polemarchus's and Thrasymachus's encounter with
"aporia" in Bk. I. Throughout conversation of "The
Republic," Socrates does not really alter the argument he gives for
justice in Bk. I, but rather states the same argument in a different
way. My gratitude to P. N. Moore. Refs: Wise guys and smart
alecks in Republic 1 and 2; Proleptic composition in the Republic, or why Bk. 1
was never a separate dialogue, The Classical Quarterly; "Socrates: ironist
and moral philosopher."
Applicatum. While Bennett uses the rather ‘abusive’
“nominalist” to refer to Grice, Grice isn’t. It’s all about the ‘applied.’
Grice thinks a rational creature – not a parrot, but a rational intelligent
pirot – can have an abstract idea. So there is this “Communication Device,”
with capital C and capital D. The emissor APPLIES it to a given occasion. Cf.
complete and incomplete. What’s the antonym of applied? Plato’s idea!
aretaic: sometimes used by Grice for ‘virtuosum’.
argumentum:
“I thought I saw an argument, it turned to be some soap” (Dodgson). Term that
Grice borrows from (but “never returned” to) Boethius, the Roman philosopher.
Strictly, Grice is interested in the ‘arguer.’ Say Blackburn goes to Grice and,
not knowing Grice speaks English, writes a skull. Blackburn intends Grice to
think that there is danger, somewhere, even deadly danger. So there is arguing
on Blackburn’s part. And there is INTENDED arguing on Blackburn’s recipient,
Grice, as it happens. For Grice, the truth-value of “Blackburn communicates (to
Grice) that there is danger” does not REQUIRE the uptake.” “Why, one must just
as well require that Jones GETS his job to deem Smith having GIVEN it to him if
that’s what he’s promised. The arguer is invoked in a self-psi-transmission.
For he must think P, and he must think C, and he must think that P yields C.
And this thought that C must be CAUSED by the fact that he thinks that P yields
C. -- f. argŭo
, ŭi, ūtum (ŭĭtum, hence arguiturus, Sall. Fragm. ap. Prisc. p. 882 P.), 3, v.
a. cf. ἀργής, white; ἀργός, bright; Sanscr. árgunas, bright; ragatas, white;
and rag, to shine (v. argentum and argilla); after the same analogy we have
clarus, bright; and claro, to make bright, to make evident; and the Engl.
clear, adj., and to clear = to make clear; v. Georg Curtius p. 171. I.
A.. In gen., to make clear, to show, prove, make known, declare, assert,
μηνύειν: “arguo Eam me vidisse intus,” Plaut. Mil. 2, 3, 66: “non ex auditu
arguo,” id. Bacch. 3, 3, 65: “M. Valerius Laevinus ... speculatores, non
legatos, venisse arguebat,” Liv. 30, 23: “degeneres animos timor arguit,” Verg.
A. 4, 13: “amantem et languor et silentium Arguit,” Hor. Epod. 11, 9; id. C. 1,
13, 7.—Pass., in a mid. signif.: “apparet virtus arguiturque malis,” makes
itself known, Ov. Tr. 4, 3, 80: “laudibus arguitur vini vinosus Homerus,”
betrays himself, Hor. Ep. 1, 19, 6.— B. Esp. a. With aliquem, to attempt to
show something, in one's case, against him, to accuse, reprove, censure, charge
with: Indicāsse est detulisse; “arguisse accusāsse et convicisse,” Dig. 50, 16,
197 (cf. Fest. p. 22: Argutum iri in discrimen vocari): tu delinquis, ego
arguar pro malefactis? Enn. (as transl. of Eurip. Iphig. Aul. 384: Εἶτ̓ ἐγὼ
δίκην δῶ σῶν κακῶν ὁ μὴ σφαλείς) ap. Rufin. § “37: servos ipsos neque accuso
neque arguo neque purgo,” Cic. Rosc. Am. 41, 120: “Pergin, sceleste, intendere
hanc arguere?” Plaut. Mil. 2, 4, 27; 2, 2, 32: “hae tabellae te arguunt,” id. Bacch.
4, 6, 10: “an hunc porro tactum sapor arguet oris?” Lucr. 4, 487: “quod adjeci,
non ut arguerem, sed ne arguerer,” Vell. 2, 53, 4: “coram aliquem arguere,”
Liv. 43, 5: “apud praefectum,” Tac. A. 14, 41: “(Deus) arguit te heri,” Vulg.
Gen. 31, 42; ib. Lev. 19, 17; ib. 2 Tim. 4, 2; ib. Apoc. 3, 19 al.— b. With the
cause of complaint in the gen.; abl. with or without de; with in with abl.;
with acc.; with a clause as object; or with ut (cf. Ramsh. p. 326; Zumpt, §
446). (α). With gen.: “malorum facinorum,” Plaut. Ps. 2, 4, 56 (cf. infra,
argutus, B. 2.): “aliquem probri, Stupri, dedecoris,” id. Am. 3, 2, 2: “viros
mortuos summi sceleris,” Cic. Rab. Perd. 9, 26: “aliquem tanti facinoris,” id.
Cael. 1: “criminis,” Tac. H. 1, 48: “furti me arguent,” Vulg. Gen. 30, 33; ib.
Eccl. 11, 8: “repetundarum,” Tac. A. 3, 33: “occupandae rei publicae,” id. ib.
6, 10: “neglegentiae,” Suet. Caes. 53: “noxae,” id. Aug. 67: “veneni in se
comparati,” id. Tib. 49: “socordiae,” id. Claud. 3: “mendacii,” id. Oth. 10:
“timoris,” Verg. A. 11, 384: “sceleris arguemur,” Vulg. 4 Reg. 7, 9; ib. Act.
19, 40 al.— (β). With abl.: “te hoc crimine non arguo,” Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 18;
Nep. Paus. 3 fin.— (γ). With de: “de eo crimine, quo de arguatur,” Cic. Inv 2,
11, 37: “de quibus quoniam verbo arguit, etc.,” id. Rosc. Am. 29 fin.: “Quis
arguet me de peccato?” Vulg. Joan. 8, 46; 16, 8.— (δ). With in with abl. (eccl.
Lat.): “non in sacrificiis tuis arguam te,” Vulg. Psa. 49, 8.—（ε) With acc.: quid
undas Arguit et liquidam molem camposque natantīs? of what does he impeach the
waves? etc., quid being here equivalent to cujus or de quo, Lucr. 6, 405
Munro.—（ζ)
With an inf.-clause as object: “quae (mulier) me arguit Hanc domo ab se
subripuisse,” Plaut. Men. 5, 2, 62; id. Mil. 2, 4, 36: “occidisse patrem Sex.
Roscius arguitur,” Cic. Rosc. Am. 13, 37: “auctor illius injuriae fuisse
arguebatur?” Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 33: “qui sibimet vim ferro intulisse arguebatur,”
Suet. Claud. 16; id. Ner. 33; id. Galb. 7: “me Arguit incepto rerum accessisse
labori,” Ov. M. 13, 297; 15, 504.—（η) With ut, as in
Gr. ὡς (post-Aug. and rare), Suet. Ner. 7: “hunc ut dominum et tyrannum, illum
ut proditorem arguentes,” as being master and tyrant, Just. 22, 3.— II. Transf.
to the thing. 1. To accuse, censure, blame: “ea culpa, quam arguo,” Liv. 1, 28:
“peccata coram omnibus argue,” Vulg. 1 Tim. 5, 20: “tribuni plebis dum arguunt
in C. Caesare regni voluntatem,” Vell. 2, 68; Suet. Tit. 5 fin.:
“taciturnitatem pudoremque quorumdam pro tristitiā et malignitate arguens,” id.
Ner. 23; id. Caes. 75: “arguebat et perperam editos census,” he accused of
giving a false statement of property, census, id. Calig. 38: “primusque
animalia mensis Arguit imponi,” censured, taught that it was wrong, Ov. M. 15,
73: “ut non arguantur opera ejus,” Vulg. Joan. 3, 20.— 2. Trop., to denounce as
false: “quod et ipsum Fenestella arguit,” Suet. Vit. Ter. p. 292 Roth.—With
reference to the person, to refute, confute: “aliquem,” Suet. Calig. 8.—Hence,
argūtus , a, um, P. a. A. Of physical objects, clear. 1. To the sight, bright, glancing,
lively: “manus autem minus arguta, digitis subsequens verba, non exprimens,”
not too much in motion, Cic. de Or. 3, 59, 220 (cf. id. Or. 18, 59: nullae
argutiae digitorum, and Quint. 11, 3, 119-123): “manus inter agendum argutae
admodum et gestuosae,” Gell. 1, 5, 2: “et oculi nimis arguti, quem ad modum
animo affecti sumus, loquuntur,” Cic. Leg. 1, 9, 27: “ocelli,” Ov. Am. 3, 3, 9;
3, 2, 83: “argutum caput,” a head graceful in motion, Verg. G. 3, 80 (breve,
Servius, but this idea is too prosaic): aures breves et argutae, ears that move
quickly (not stiff, rigid), Pall. 4, 13, 2: “argutā in soleā,” in the neat
sandal, Cat. 68, 72.— 2. a.. To the hearing, clear, penetrating, piercing, both
of pleasant and disagreeable sounds, clear-sounding, sharp, noisy, rustling,
whizzing, rattling, clashing, etc. (mostly poet.): linguae, Naev. ap. Non. p.
9, 24: “aves,” Prop. 1, 18, 30: “hirundo,” chirping, Verg. G. 1, 377: “olores,”
tuneful, id. E. 9, 36: ilex, murmuring, rustling (as moved by the wind), id.
ib. 7, 1: “nemus,” id. ib. 8, 22 al.—Hence, a poet. epithet of the musician and
poet, clear-sounding, melodious: “Neaera,” Hor. C. 3, 14, 21: “poëtae,” id. Ep.
2, 2, 90: “fama est arguti Nemesis formosa Tibullus,” Mart. 8, 73, 7: forum,
full of bustle or din, noisy, Ov. A.A. 1, 80: “serra,” grating, Verg. G. 1,
143: “pecten,” rattling, id. ib. 1, 294; id. A. 7, 14 (cf. in Gr. κερκὶς ἀοιδός,
Aristoph. Ranae, v. 1316) al.—Hence, of rattling, prating, verbose discourse:
“sine virtute argutum civem mihi habeam pro preaeficā, etc.,” Plaut. Truc. 2,
6, 14: “[Neque mendaciloquom neque adeo argutum magis],” id. Trin. 1, 2, 163
Ritschl.— b. Trop., of written communications, rattling, wordy, verbose:
“obviam mihi litteras quam argutissimas de omnibus rebus crebro mittas,” Cic.
Att. 6, 5: vereor, ne tibi nimium arguta haec sedulitas videatur, Cael. ap.
Cic. Fam. 8, 1. —Transf. to omens, clear, distinct, conclusive, clearly
indicative, etc.: “sunt qui vel argutissima haec exta esse dicant,” Cic. Div.
2, 12 fin.: “non tibi candidus argutum sternuit omen Amor?” Prop. 2, 3, 24.— 3.
To the smell; sharp, pungent: “odor argutior,” Plin. 15, 3, 4, § 18.— 4. To the
taste; sharp, keen, pungent: “sapor,” Pall. 3, 25, 4; 4, 10, 26.— B. Of mental
qualities. 1. In a good sense, bright, acute, sagacious, witty: “quis illo (sc.
Catone) acerbior in vituperando? in sententiis argutior?” Cic. Brut. 17, 65:
“orator,” id. ib. 70, 247: “poëma facit ita festivum, ita concinnum, ita
elegans, nihil ut fieri possit argutius,” id. Pis. 29; so, “dicta argutissima,”
id. de Or. 2, 61, 250: “sententiae,” id. Opt. Gen. 2: “acumen,” Hor. A. P. 364:
“arguto ficta dolore queri,” dexterously-feigned pain, Prop. 1, 18, 26 al.— 2.
In a bad sense, sly, artful, cunning: “meretrix,” Hor. S. 1, 10, 40: calo. id.
Ep. 1, 14, 42: “milites,” Veg. Mil. 3, 6.—As a pun: ecquid argutus est? is he
cunning? Ch. Malorum facinorum saepissime (i.e. has been accused of), Plaut.
Ps. 2, 4, 56 (v. supra, I. B. a.).—Hence, adv.: argūtē (only in the signif. of
B.). a. Subtly, acutely: “respondere,” Cic. Cael. 8: “conicere,” id. Brut. 14,
53: “dicere,” id. Or. 28, 98.—Comp.: “dicere,” Cic. Brut. 11, 42.— Sup.: “de re
argutissime disputare,” Cic. de Or. 2, 4, 18.— b. Craftily: “obrepere,” Plaut.
Trin. 4, 2, 132; Arn. 5, p. 181.
ariskant: Two of Grice’s
main tutees were respectively Aristotelian and Kantian scholars: Ackrill and
Strawson. Grice, of course, read Ariskant in the vernacular. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Francis Haywood. William Pickering.
1838. critick of pure reason. (first English
translation) Critique
of Pure Reason. Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. 1855 – via Project Gutenberg.Critique of Pure Reason.
Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. 1873.Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Friedrich Max Müller. The Macmillan Company.
1881. (Introduction by Ludwig Noiré)Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. Palgrave Macmillan.
1929. ISBN 1-4039-1194-0. Archived from the
original on 2009-04-27.Critique
of Pure Reason. Translated by Wolfgang Schwartz. Scientia Verlag
und Antiquariat. 1982. ISBN 978-3-5110-9260-3.Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Werner S.
Pluhar. Hackett Publishing. 1996. ISBN 978-0-87220-257-3.Critique of Pure Reason, Abridged. Translated by Werner S.
Pluhar. Hackett Publishing. 1999. ISBN 978-1-6246-6605-6.Critique of Pure Reason.
Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge University
Press. 1999. ISBN 978-0-5216-5729-7.Critique of Pure Reason.
Translated by Marcus Weigelt. Penguin Books. 2007. ISBN 978-0-1404-4747-7. Grice’s
favourite philosopher is Ariskant. One way to approach Grice’s meta-philosophy
is by combining teleology with deontology. Eventually, Grice embraces a
hedonistic eudaimonism, if rationally approved. Grice knows how to tutor in
philosophy: he tutor on Kant as if he is tutoring on Aristotle, and vice versa.
His tutees would say, Here come [sic] Kantotle. Grice is obsessed with
Kantotle. He would teach one or the other as an ethics requirement. Back at
Oxford, the emphasis is of course Aristotle, but he is aware of some trends to
introduce Kant in the Lit.Hum. curriculum, not with much success. Strawson does
his share with the pure reason in Kant in The bounds of sense, but White professors
of moral philosophy are usually not too keen on the critique by Kant of practical
reason. Grice is fascinated that an Irishman, back in 1873, cares to translate
(“for me”) all that Kant has to say about the eudaimonism and hedonism of
Aristotle. An Oxonian philosopher is expected to be a utilitarian, as Hare is,
or a Hegelian, and that is why Grice prefers, heterodoxical as he is, to be a
Kantian rationalist instead. But Grice cannot help being Aristotelian, Hardie
having instilled the “Eth. Nich.” on him at Corpus. While he can’t read Kant in
German, Grice uses Abbott’s Irish vernacular. Note the archaic metaphysic
sic in singular. More Kant. Since Baker can read the vernacular even
less than Grice, it may be good to review the editions. It all starts when
Abbott thinks that his fellow Irishmen are unable to tackle Kant in the
vernacular. Abbott’s thing comes out in 1873: Kant’s critique of practical
reason and other works on the theory of tthics, with Grice quipping. Oddly, I
prefer his other work! Grice collaborates with Baker mainly on work on meta-ethics
seen as an offspring, alla Kant, of philosophical psychology. Akrasia or
egkrateia is one such topic. Baker contributes to PGRICE, a festschrift for
Grice, with an essay on the purity, and alleged lack thereof, of this or that
morally evaluable motive – rhetorically put: do ones motives have to
be pure? For Grice morality cashes out in self-love, self-interest, and desire.
Baker also contributes to a volume on Grice’s honour published by
Palgrave, Meaning and analysis: essays on Grice. Baker organises of a
symposium on the thought of Grice for the APA, the proceedings of which published
in The Journal of Philosophy, with Bennett as chair, contributions by Baker and
Grandy, commented by Stalnaker andWarner. Grice explores with Baker
problems of egcrateia and the reduction of duty to self-love and interest.
Refs.: The obvious keyword is “Kant,” – especially in the Series III on the
doctrines, in collaboration with Baker. There are essays on the Grundlegung,
too. The keyword for “Kantotle,” and the keywords for ‘free,’ and ‘freedom,’
and ‘practical reason,’ and ‘autonomy, are also helpful. Some of this material
in “Actions and events,” “The influence of Kant on Aristotle,” by H. P. Grice,
John Locke Scholar (failed), etc., Oxford (Advisor: J. Dempsey). The H. P.
Grice Papers, BANC.
arbor griceiana: When Kant
introduces the categoric imperative in terms of the ‘maxim’ he does not specify which. He just goes,
irritatingly, “Make the maxim of your conduct a law of nature.” This gave free
rein to Grice to multiply maxims as much as he wished. If he was an occamist
about senses, he certainly was an anti-occamist about maxims. The expression
Strawson and Wiggins use (p. 520) is “ramification.”So Grice needs just ONE
principle – indeed the idea of principles, in plural, is self-contradictory.
For whch ‘first’ is ‘first’? Eventually, he sticks with the principle of
conversational co-operation. And the principle of conversational co-operation,
being Ariskantian, and categoric, even if not ‘moral,’ “ramifies into” the
maxims. This is important. While an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is,’ an
‘ought’ can yield a sub-ought. So whatever obligation the principle brings, the
maxim inherit. The maxim is also stated categoric. But it isn’t. It is a
‘counsel of prudence,’ and hypothetical in nature – So, Grice is just ‘playing
Kant,’ but not ‘being’ Kant. The principle states the GOAL (not happiness,
unless we call it ‘conversational eudaemonia’). In any case, as Hare would
agree, there is ‘deontic derivability.’ So if the principle ramifies into the
maxims, the maxims are ‘deductible’ from the principle. This deductibility is
obvious in terms of from generic to specific. The principle merely enjoins to
make the conversational move as is appropriate. Then, playing with Kant, Grice
chooses FOUR dimensions. Two correspond to the material: the quale and the
quantum. The quale relates to affirmation and negation, and Grice uses ‘false,’
which while hardly conceptually linked to ‘negation,’ it relates in common
parlance. So you have things like a prohibition to say the ‘false’ (But “it is
raining” can be false, and it’s affirmative). The quantum relates to what Grice
calls ‘informative CONTENT.’ He grants that the verb ‘inform’ already ENTAILS
the candour that quality brings. So ‘fortitude’ seems a better way to qualify
this dimension. Make the strongest conversational move. The clash with the
quality is obvious – “provided it’s not false.” The third dimension relates two
two materials. Notably the one by the previous conversationalist and your own.
If A said, “She is an old bag.” B says, “The weather’s been delightful.” By NOT
relating the ‘proposition’ “The weather has been delightful” to “She is an old
bag.” He ‘exploits’ the maxim. This is not a concept in Kant. It mocks Kant.
But yet, ‘relate!’ does follow from the principle of cooperation. So, there is
an UNDERLYING relation, as Hobbes noted, when he discussed a very distantly
related proposition concerning the history of Rome, and expecting the recipient
to “only connect.” So the ‘exploitation’ is ‘superficial,’ and applies to the
explicatum. Yet, the emissor does communicate that the weather has been
delightful. Only there is no point in informing the recipient about it, unless
he is communicating that the co-conversationalist has made a gaffe. Finally,
the category of ‘modus’ Grice restricts to the ‘forma,’ not the ‘materia.’ “Be
perspicuous” is denotically entailed by “Make your move appropriate.” This is
the desideratum of clarity. The point must be ‘explicit.’ This is Strawson and Wiggins way of putting
this. It’s a difficult issue. What the connection is between Grice’s principle
of conversational helpfulness and the attending conversational maxims. Strawson
and Wiggins state that Grice should not feel the burden to make the maxims
‘necessarily independent.’
The
image of the ramification is a good one – Grice called it ‘arbor griceiana.’
Austinian
code, The: The jocular way by Grice to refer to ‘The Master,’ whom he saw
wobble on more than one occasion. Grice has mixed feelings (“or fixed meelings,
if you prefer”) about Austin. Unlike Austin, Grice is a Midlands scholarship
boy, and ends up in Corpus. One outcome of this, as he later reminisced is that
Austin never cared to invite him to the Thursday-evenings at All Souls – “which
was alright, I suppose, in that the number was appropriately restricted to
seven.” But Grice confessed that he thought it was because “he had been born on
the wrong side of the tracks.” After the war, Grice would join what Grice, in
fun, called “the Playgroup,” which was anything BUT. Austin played the School Master,
and let the kindergarten relax in the sun! One reason Grice avoided publication
was the idea that Austin would criticise him. Austin never cared to recognise
Grice’s “Personal Identity,” or less so, “Meaning.” He never mentioned his
“Metaphysics” third programme lecture – but Austin never made it to the
programme. Grice socialized very well with who will be Austin’s custodians, in
alphabetical order, Urmson and Warnock – “two charmers.” Unlike Austin, Urmson
and Warnock were the type of person Austin would philosophise with – and he
would spend hours talking about visa with Warnock. Upon Austin’s demise, Grice
kept with the ‘play group’, which really became one! Grice makes immense
references to Austin. Austin fits Grice to a T, because of the ‘mistakes’ he
engages in. So, it is fair to say that Grice’s motivation for the coinage of
implicature was Austin (“He would too often ignore the distinction between what
a ‘communicator’ communicates and what his expression, if anything, does.”). So
Grice attempts an intention-based account of the communicator’s message. Within
this message, there is ONE aspect that can usually be regarded as being of
‘philosophical interest.’ The ‘unnecessary implicature’ is bound to be taken
Austin as part of the ‘philosophical interesting’ bit when it isn’t. So Grice
is criticizing Austin for providing the wrong analysis for the wrong
analysandum. Grice refers specifically to the essays in “Philosophical Papers,”
notably “Other Minds” and “A Plea for Excuses.” But he makes a passing
reference to “Sense and Sensibilia,” whose tone Grice dislikes, and makes a
borrowing or two from the ‘illocution,’ never calling it by that name. At most,
Grice would adapt Austin’s use of ‘act.’ But his rephrase is ‘conversational
move.’ So Grice would say that by making a conversational ‘move,’ the
conversationalist may be communicating TWO things. He spent some type finding a
way to conceptualise this. He later came with the metaphor of the FIRST-FLOOR
act, the MEZZANINE act, and the SECOND-FLOOR act. This applies to Fregeianisms
like ‘aber,’ but it may well apply to Austinian-code type of utterances.
Austinianism:
Grice felt sorry for Nowell-Smith, whom he calls the ‘straight-man’ for the
comedy double act with Austin at the Play Groups. “I would say ‘on principle’”
– “I would say, ‘no, thanks.” “I don’t understand Donne.” “It’s perfectly clear
to me.” By using Nowell-Sith, Grice is implicating that Austin had little
manners in the ‘play group,’ “And I wasn’t surprised when Nowell-Smith left
Oxford for good, almost.” Not quite, of course. After some time in the
extremely fashionable Canterbury, Nowell-Smith returns to Oxford. Vide:
nowell-smithianism.
ayerism. Born of Swiss
parentage in London, “Freddie” got an Oxford educated, and though he wanted to
be a judge, he read Lit. Hum (Phil.). He spent three months in Vienna, and when
he returned, Grice called him ‘enfant terrible.’ Ayer would later cite Grice in
the Aristotelian symposium on the Causal Theory of Perception. But the type of
subtlety in conversational implicature that Grice is interested goes over
Freddie’s head. (“That,” or he was not interested.” Grice was glad that Oxford
was ready to attack Ayer on philosophical grounds, and he later lists
Positivism as a ‘monster’ on his way to the City of Eternal Truth.
“Verificationism” was anti-Oxonian, in being mainly anti-Bradleyian, who is
recognised by every Oxonian philosopher as “one of the clearest and subtlest
prosists in English, and particularly Oxonian, philosophy.” Ayer later became
the logic professor at Oxford – which is now taught no longer at the
Sub-Faculty of Philosophy, but the Department of Mathematics!
bite off more than you can chew: To bite is the function of the FRONT teeth (incisors and
canines); the back teeth (molars) CHEW, crush, or grind. So the relation is Russellian. 1916 G. B. Shaw Pygmalion 195 The mistake we describe metaphorically as
‘biting off more than they can chew’. a1960 J.
L. Austin Sense & Sensibilia (1962) i. 1 They [sc. doctrines] all bite off more than they can chew. While the NED would not DARE define this obviousness,
the OED does not. to undertake too
much, to be too ambitious – “irrational” simpliciter for Grice (WoW).
Blackburn’s skull. Blackburn's
"one-off predicament" of communicating without a shared language
illustrates how Grice's theory can be applied to iconic signals such as the
drawing of a skull to wam of danger. See his Spreading the Word. III. 112.
bonum: Grice makes fun of Hare n “Language of Morals.” To
what extent is Hare saying that to say ‘x is good’ means ‘I approve of x’? (Strictly:
“To say that something is good is to recommend it”). To say " I approve of x " is in part to do the same thing
as when we say " x is good " a statement of the
form " X
is good" strictly designates " I approve of X "
and suggests " Do so as well". It should be in Part II to
“Language of Morals”. Old Romans did not have an article, so for them it is
unum, bonum, verum, and pulchrum. They were trying to translate the very
articled Grecian things, ‘to agathon,’ ‘to alethes,’ and ‘to kallon.’ The three
references given by Liddell and Scott are good ones. τὸ ἀ., the good,
Epich.171.5, cf. Pl.R.506b, 508e, Arist.Metaph.1091a31, etc. The Grecian Grice
is able to return to the ‘article’. Grice has an early essay on ‘the good,’ and
he uses the same expression at Oxford for the Locke lectures when looking for a
‘desiderative’ equivalent to ‘the true.’ Hare had dedicated the full part of
his “Language of Morals” to ‘good,’ so Grice is well aware of the centrality of
the topic. He was irritated by what he called a performatory approach to the
good, where ‘x is good’ =df. ‘I approve of x.’ Surely that’s a conversational
implicatum. However, in his analysis of reasoning (the demonstratum – since he
uses the adverb ‘demonstrably’ as a marker of pretty much like ‘concusively,’
as applied to both credibility and desirability, we may focus on what Grice
sees as ‘bonum’ as one of the ‘absolutes,’ the absolute in the desirability
realm, as much as the ‘verum’ is the absolute in the credibility realm. Grice
has an excellent argument regarding ‘good.’ His example is ‘cabbage,’ but also
‘sentence.’ Grice’s argument is to turn the disimpicatum into an explicitum. To
know what a ‘cabbage,’ or a formula is, you need to know first what a ‘good’
cabbage is or a ‘well-formed formula,’ is. An ill-formed sentence is not deemed
by Grice a sentence. This means that we define ‘x’ as ‘optimum x.’ This is not
so strange, seeing that ‘optimum’ is actually the superlative of ‘bonum’ (via
the comparative). It does not require very sharp
eyes, but only the willingness to use the eyes one has, to see that our speech
and thought are permeated with the notion of purpose; to say what a certain
kind of thing is is only too frequently partly to say what it is for. This
feature applies to our talk and thought of, for example, ships, shoes, sealing
wax, and kings; and, possibly and perhaps most excitingly, it extends even to
cabbages.“There is a range of cases in which, so far from its being the
case that, typically, one first learns what it is to be a F and then, at the
next stage, learns what criteria distinguish a good F from a F which is less
good, or not good at all, one needs first to learn what it is to be a good F,
and then subsequently to learn what degree of approximation to being a good F
will qualify an item as a F; if the gap between some item x and good Fs is
sufficently horrendous, x is debarred from counting as a F at all, even as a
bad F.”“In the John Locke Lectures, I called a concept which exhibits this
feature as a ‘value-paradeigmatic’ concept. One example of a
value-paradeigmatic concept is the concept of reasoning; another, I now suggest,
is that of sentence. It may well be that the existence of value-oriented
concepts (¢b ¢ 2 . • • . ¢n) depends on the prior existence of pre-rational
concepts ( ¢~, ¢~ . . . . ¢~), such that an item x qualifies for the
application of the concept ¢ 2 if and only if x satisfies a rationally-approved
form or version of the corresponding pre-rational concept ¢'. We have a
(primary) example of a step in reasoning only if we have a transition of a
certain rationally approved kind from one thought or utterance to another.
bootstrap: Grice certainly didn’t have a problem with
meta-langauge paradoxes. Two of his maxims are self refuting and ‘sic’-ed: “be
perspicuous [sic]” and “be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) [sic].” The principle
introduced by Grice in “Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life
and opinions of H. P. Grice,” to limit the power of the meta-language. The
weaker your metalanguage the easier you’ll be able to pull yourself by your own
bootstraps. He uses bootlaces in “Metaphysics, Philosophical Eschatology, and
Plato’s Republic.”
byzantine. This is important since it displays Grice’s
disrespect for stupid traditions. There is Austin trying to lecture what he
derogatorily called ‘philosophical hack’ (“I expect he was being ironic”) into
learning through the Little Oxford Dictionary. HARDLY Grice’s cup of tea.
Austiin, or the ‘master,’ as Grice ironically calls him, could patronize less
patrician play group members, but not him! In any case, Austin grew so
tiresome, that Grice grabbed the Little Dictionary. Austin had gave him license
to go and refute Ryle on ‘feeling’. “So, go and check with the dictionary, to
see howmany things you can feel.” Grice started with the A and got as far as
the last relevant item under the ‘B,” he hoped. “And then I realised it was all
hopeless. A waste. Language botany, indeed!” At a later stage, he grew more
affectionate, especially when seeing that this was part of his armoury (as
Gellner had noted): a temperament, surely not shared by Strawson, for
subtleties and nuances. How Byzantine can Grice feel? Vide ‘agitation.’ Does
feeling Byzantine entail a feeling of BEING Byzantine? originally used of the style of art and architecture developed there
4c.-5c. C.E.; later in reference to the complex, devious, and intriguing
character of the royal court of Constantinople (1937). Bȳzantĭum , ii, n., = Βυζάντιον,I.a city in Thrace, on the Bosphorus, opposite the Asiatic Chalcedon, later
Constantinopolis, now Constantinople; among
the Turks, Istamboul or Stamboul (i.e. εις τὴν πόλιν), Mel. 2, 2, 6; Plin. 4, 11, 18, § 46; 9, 15, 20, § 50 sq.; Nep. Paus. 2, 2; Liv. 38, 16, 3 sq.; Tac. A. 12, 63 sq.; id. H. 2. 83; 3, 47 al.—II. Derivv.A. Bȳzantĭus , a, um, adj., of Byzantium, Byzantine:
“litora,” the Strait of
Constantinople, Ov. Tr. 1, 10, 31: “portus,” Plin. 9, 15, 20, § 51.—Subst.: Bȳ-zantĭi , ōrum, m., the inhabitants of Byzantium, Cic. Prov. Cons. 3, 5; 4, 6 sq.; Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 31, § 76; Nep. Timoth. 1, 2; Liv. 32, 33, 7.—B. Bȳzantĭăcus , a, um, adj., of Byzantium: “lacerti,” Stat. S. 4, 9, 13. — C. Bȳzantīnus , a, um, adj., the same (post-class.): “Lygos,” Aus.
Clar. Urb. 2: “frigora,” Sid. Ep.
7, 17.
cæteris paribus: Strawson and Wiggins: that the principle holds ceteris paribus is a
necessary condition for the very existence of the activity in question.
Central. Grice technically directs his attenetion to this in his “Method”.
There, he tries to introduce “WILLING” as a predicate, i.e. a theoretical
concept which is implicitly defined by the LAW in a THEORY that it occurs. This
theory is ‘psychology,’ but understood as a ‘folk science.’ So the conditionals
are ‘ceteris paribus.’ Schiffer and Cartwright were aware of this. Especially
Cartwright who attended seminars on this with Grice on ‘as if.’ Schiffer was
well aware of the topic via Loar and others. Griceians who were trying to come
up with a theory of content without relying on semantic stuff would involve
‘caeteris paribus’ ‘laws.’ Grice in discussion with Davidson comes to the same
conclusion, hence his “A T C,’ all things considered and prima facie. H. L. A.
Hart, with his concept of ‘defeasibility’ relates. Vide Baker. And obviously
those who regard ‘implicature’ as nonmonotonic.
captainship. Strawson calls Grice his captain. In the
inaugural lecture. . A struggle on what seems to be such a From Meaning and
Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) TRUTH AND MEANING central issue
in philosophy should have something of a Homeric quality; and a Homeric struggle
calls for gods and heroes. I can at least, though tentatively, name some living
captains and benevolent shades: on the one side, say, Grice, Austin, and the
later Wittgenstein; on the other, Chomsky, Frege, and the earlier Wittgenstein.
category of conversational
mode: This is Aristotle’s hexis. This
category posed a special conceptual problem to Grice. Recall that his
categories are invoked only by their power to generate conversational
implciata. But a conversational implicatum is non-detachable. That is, being
based on universalistic principles of general rationality, it cannot attach to
an EXPRESSION, less so to the ‘meaning’ of an EXPRESSION: “if” and “provided”
are REALISATIONS of the concept of the conditionality. Now, the conversational
supra-maxim, ‘be perspicuous’ [sic], is supposed to apply NOT to the content,
or matter, but to the FORM. (Strictly, quantitas and qualitas applies to
matter, RELATIO applies to the link between at least two matters). Grice tweaks
things in such a way that he is happy, and so am I. This is a pun on Aristkant’s
Kategorie (Ammonius, tropos, Boëthius, modus,
Kant Modalitat). Gesichtspuncte der Modalität in assertorische, apodiktische
und problematische hat sich aus der Aristotelischen Eintheilung hervorgebildet
(Anal. Dr. 1, 2): 7@ợc gócois atv n 100 incozy h kỹ kvayxns Úndozav û toù
{VJÉZEo fai Úndozev: Doch geht diese Aristotelische Stelle vielmehr auf die
analogen objectiven Verhältnisse, als auf den subjectiven Gewissheitsgrad. Der
Zusatz Svvatóv, įvsezóuevov, és åviyans, jedoch auch eine adverbiale Bestimmung
wie taméws in dem Satze ý σελήνη ταχέως αποκαθίσταται, heisst bei Ammonius
τρόπος (zu περί ερμ. Cap. 12) und bei Boëthius modus. Kant (Kritik der r. Vern.
§ 9-11; Prolegom. $ 21, Log. § 30) gründet die Eintheilung nach der Modalität
auf die modalen Kategorien: Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit, Dasein und
Nichtsein, Nothwendigkeit und Zufälligkeit, wobei jedoch die Zusammenstellung
der Unmöglichkeit, die eine negative Nothwendigkeit ist, mit der Möglichkeit,
und ebenso der Zufälligkeit, die das nicht als nothwendig erkannte Dasein
bezeichnet, mit der Nothwendigkeit eine Ungenauigkeit enthält: die Erkenntniss
der Unmöglichkeit ist nicht ein problematisches, sondern ein (negativ-)
apodiktisches Urtheil (was Kant in der Anwendung selbst anerkennt, indem er z.
B. Krit. der r. V. S. 191 die Formel: es ist unmöglich etc. als Ausdruck einer
apodiktischen Gewissheit betrachtet), und die Erkenntniss des Zufälligen ist
nicht ein apodiktisches, sondern ein assertorisches Urtheil. Ausserdem aber hat
Kant das subjective und objective Element in den Kategorien der Qualität und
Modalität nicht bestimmt genug unterschieden.
category of
conversational quality: This is
Aristotle’s universal, poiotes. This was originally the desideratum of
conversational candour. At that point, there was no Kantian scheme of
categories in the horizon. Candour Grice arbitrarily contrasts with clarity –
and so the desideratum of conversational candour sometimes clashes with the
desideratum of conversational clarity. One may not be able to provide a less
convoluted utterance (“It is raining”) but use the less clear, but more candid,
“It might be raining, for all I know.” A pun on Aristkan’s Kategorie, poiotes,
qualitas, Qualitat. Expressions which
are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place,
time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly,
examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two
cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white',
'grammatical'.
category of
conversational quantity: This is
Aristotle’s universal, posotes. Grice would often use ‘a fortiori,’ and then it
dawned on him. “All I need is a principle of conversational fortitude. This
will give the Oxonians the Graeco-Roman pedigree they deserve.’ a pun on Ariskant’s Kategorie, posotes,
quantitas, Quantitat. Grice expands this as ‘quantity of information,’ or
‘informative content’ – which then as he recognises overlaps with the category
of conversational quality, because ‘false information’ is a misnomer. Expressions
which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation,
place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning
roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such
terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long'
category of
conversational relation: This is
Aristotle’s ‘pros ti.’ f there are categories of being, and categories of
thought, and categories of expression, surely there is room for the
‘conversational category.’ A pun on Ariskant’s Kategorie (pros ti, ad aliquid,
Relation). Surely a move has to relate to the previous move, and should include
a tag as to what move will relate. Expressions which are in no way composite
signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state,
action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are
'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three
cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double',
'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation.
causatum: Is the causatum involved in the communicatum. Grice
relies on this only in Meaning Revisited, where he presents a transcendental
argument for the justification. This is what is referred in the literature as
“H. P. Grice’s Triangle.” Borrowing from Aristotle in De Interpretatione, Grice
speaks of three corners of the triangle and correspondences obtaining between
them. There’s a psychophysical correspondence between the soul of the emissor,
the soul of the emissee, and the shared experience of the denotata of the
communication device the emissor employs. Then there’s the psychosemiotic
correspondence between the communication device and the state of the soul in
the emissor that is transferred, in a soul-to-soul transfer to the emissee. And
finally, there is a semiophyiscal correspondence between the communication
device and the world. When it comes to the causation, the belief that there is
fire is caused by there being fire. The emissor wants to transfer his belief,
and utters. “Smoke!”. The soul-to-soul transfer is effected. The fire that
caused the smoke that caused the belief in the the emissor now causes a belief
in the emissee. If that’s not a causal account of communication, I don’t know
what it is. Grice is no expressionist in that a solipsistic telementational
model is of no use if there is no ‘hookup’ as he puts it with the world that
causes this ‘shared experience’ that is improved by the existence of a
communication device. Grice’s idea of
‘cause’ is his ‘bite’ on reality. He chooses ‘Phenomenalism’ as an enemy.
Causal realism is at the heart of Grice’s programme. As an Oxonian, he was well
aware that to trust a cause is to be anti-Cambridge, where they follow Hume’s
and Kant’s scepticism. Grice uses ‘cause’ rather casually. His most serious
joke is “Charles I’s decapitation willed his death” – but it is not easy to
trace a philosopher who explicitly claim that ‘to cause’ is ‘to will.’ For in God the means and the end preexist in
the cause as willed together.
Causation figures large in Grice, notably re: the perceptum. The agent
perceives that the pillar box is red. The cause is that the pillar box is red.
Out of that, Grice constructs a whole theory of conversation. Why would someone
just report what a THING SEEMS to him when he has no doubt that it was THE
THING that caused the thing to SEEM red to him? Applying some sort of
helpfulness, it works: the addressee is obviously more interested in what the
thing IS, not what it seems. A sense-datum is not something you can eat. An
apple is. So, the assumption is that a report of what a thing IS is more
relevant than a report about what a thing SEEMS. So, Grice needs to find a rationale that
justifies, ceteris paribus, the utterance of “The thing seems phi.” Following
helpfulness, U utters “The thing seems phi” when the U is not in a position to
say what the thing IS phi. The denial, “The thing is not phi” is in the air,
and also the doubt, “The thing may not be phi.” Most without a philosophical
background who do not take Grice’s joke of echoing Kant’s categories (Kant had
12, not 4!) play with quantitas, qualitas, relatio and modus. Grice in “Causal”
uses ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ but grants he won’t ‘determine’ in what way ‘the thing
seems phi’ is ‘weaker’ than ‘the thing is phi.’ It might well be argued that
it’s STRONGER: the thing SEEEMS TO BE phi.’ In the previous “Introduction to
Logical Theory,” Strawson just refers to Grice’s idea of a ‘pragmatic rule’ to
the effect that one utter the LOGICALLY stronger proposition. Let’s revise
dates. Whereas Grice says that his confidence in the success of “Causal,” he
ventured with Strawson’s “Intro,” Strawson is citing Grice already. Admittedly,
Strawson adds, “in a different context.” But Grice seems pretty sure that “The
thing seems phi” is WEAKER than “The thing is phi.” In 1961 he is VERY CLEAR
that while what he may have said to Strawson that Strawson reported in that footnote
was in terms of LOGICAL STRENGTH (in terms of entailment, for extensional
contexts). In “Causal,” Grice is clear that he does not think LOGICAL STRENGTH
applies to intensional contexts. In later revisions, it is not altogether clear
how he deals with the ‘doubt or denial.’ He seems to have been more interested
in refuting G. A. Paul (qua follower of Witters) than anything else. In his
latest reformulation of the principle, now a conversational category, he is not
specific about phenomenalist reports.
certum: To be certain is to have dis-cerned. Oddly, Grice
‘evolved’ from an interest in the certainty and incorrigibility that ‘ordinary’
and the first-person gives to situations of ‘conversational improbability’ and
indeterminate implicata under conditions of ceteris paribus risk and
uncertainty in survival. “To be certain that p” is for Grice one of those
‘diaphanous’ verbs. While it is best to improve Descartes’s fuzzy lexicon – and
apply ‘certus’ to the emissor, if Grice is asked, “What are you certain of?,”
“I have to answer, ‘p’”. certum:
certitude, from ecclesiastical medieval Roman “certitudo,” designating in
particular Christian conviction, is heir to two meanings of “certum,” one
objective and the other subjective: beyond doubt, fixed, positive, real,
regarding a thing or knowledge, or firm in his resolutions, decided, sure,
authentic, regarding an individual. Although certitudo has no Grecian
equivalent, the Roman verb “cernere,” (cf. discern), from which “certum” is
derived, has the concrete meaning of pass through a sieve, discern, like the
Grecian “ϰρίνειν,” select, sieve, judge, which comes from the same root. Thus
begins the relationship between certitude, judgment, and truth, which since
Descartes has been connected with the problematics of the subject and of
self-certainty. The whole terminological system of truth is thus involved, from
unveiling and adequation to certitude and obviousness. Then there’s Certainty,
Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Linguistic Systems The objective aspect manifests itself first,
“certitudo” translating e. g. the
determined nature of objects or known properties as the commentaries on
Aristotle’s Met. translated into Roman, or the incontestably true nature of
principles. With the revolution of the subject inaugurated by Cartesian Phil. ,
the second aspect comes to the fore: some reasons, ideas, or propositions are
true and certain, or true and evident, but the most certain and the most
evident of all, and thus in a sense the truest, is the certitude of my own existence,
a certainty that the subject attributes to itself: The thematics of certainty
precedes that of consciousness both historically and logically, but it ends up
being incorporated and subordinated by it. Certainty thus becomes a quality or
disposition of the subject that reproduces, in the field of rational knowledge,
the security or assurance that the believer finds in religious faith, and that
shields him from the wavering of the soul. It will be noted that Fr. retains the possibility of reversing the
perspective by exploiting the Roman etymology, as Descartes does in the
Principles of Phil. when he transforms
the certitudo probabilis of the Scholastics Aquinas into moral certainty. On
the other hand, Eng. tends to objectify “certainty” to the maximum in
opposition to belief v. BELIEF, whereas G.
hears in “Gewissheit” the root “wissen,” to know, to have learned and
situates it in a series with Bewusstsein and Gewissen, clearly marking the
constitutive relationship to the subject in opposition to Glaube on the one
hand, and to Wahrheit and Wahrscheinlichkeit lit., appearance of truth, i.e.,
probability on the other. Then there’s Knots of Problems On the relations between certainty and
belief, the modalities of subjective experience. On the relation between
individual certainty and the wise man’s constancy. On the relations between
certainty and truth, the confrontation between subjectivity and objectivity in
the development of knowledge. On the relations between certainty and
probability, the modalities of objective knowledge insofar as it is related to
a subject’s experience. uncertainty.
This is Grice’s principle of uncertainty. One of Grice’s problem is with ‘know’
and ‘certainty.’ He grants that we only know that 2 + 2 = 4. He often
identifies ‘knowledge’ with ‘certainty.’ He does not explore a cancellation
like, “I am certain but I do not know.” The reason being that he defends common
sense against the sceptic, and so his attitude towards certainty has to be very
careful. The second problem is that he wants ‘certainty’ to deal within the
desiderative realm. To do that, he divides an act of intending into two: an act
of accepting and act of willing. The ‘certainty’ is found otiose if the
intender is seen as ‘willing that p’ and accepting that the willing will be the
cause for the desideratum to obtain. n
WoW:141, Grice proposes that ‘A is certain that p’ ENTAILS either ‘A is certain
that he is certain that p, OR AT LEAST that it is not the case that A is UNCERTAIN
that A is certain that p.” ‘Certainly,’ appears to apply to utterances in the
credibility and the desirability realm. Grice sometimes uses ‘to be sure.’ He
notoriously wants to distinguish it from ‘know.’ Grice explores the topic of
incorrigibility and ends up with corrigibility which almost makes a Popperian
out of him. In the end, its all about the converational implciata and
conversation as rational co-operation. Why does P2 should judge that P1 is
being more or less certain about what he is talking? Theres a rationale for
that. Our conversation does not consist of idle remarks. Grices example:
"The Chairman of the British Academy has a corkscrew in his pocket.
Urmsons example: "The king is visiting Oxford tomorrow. Why? Oh, for no
reason at all. As a philosophical psychologist, and an empiricist with realist
tendencies, Grice was obsessed with what he called (in a nod to the Kiparskys)
the factivity of know. Surely, Grices preferred collocation, unlike surely
Ryles, is "Grice knows that p." Grice has no problem in seeing this as
involving three clauses: First, p. Second, Grice believes that p, and third, p
causes Grices belief. No mention of certainty. This is the neo-Prichardian in
Grice, from having been a neo-Stoutian (Stout was obsessed, as a few Oxonians
like Hampshire and Hart were, with certainty). If the three-prong analysis of
know applies to the doxastic, Grices two-prong analysis of intending in
‘Intention and UNcertainty,’ again purposively avoiding certainty, covers the
buletic realm. This does not mean that Grice, however proud he was of his
ignorance of the history of philosophy (He held it as a badge of honour, his
tuteee Strawson recalls), had read some of the philosophical classics to
realise that certainty had been an obsession of what Ryle abusively (as he
himself puts it) called Descartes and the Establishments "official
doctrine"! While ps true in Grices analysis of know is harmless enough,
there obviously is no correlate for ps truth in the buletic case. Grices
example is Grice intending to scratch his head, via his willing that Grice
scratches his head in t2. In this case, as he notes, the doxastic eleent
involves the uniformity of nature, and ones more or less relying that if Grice
had a head to be scratched in t1, he will have a head to be sratched in t2,
when his intention actually GETS satisfied, or fulfilled. Grice was never
worried about buletic satisfaction. As the intentionalist that Suppes showed us
Grice was, Grice is very much happy to say that if Smith intends to give Joness
a job, the facct as to whether Jones actually gets the job is totally
irrelevant for most philosophical purposes. He gets more serious when he is
happier with privileged access than incorrigibility in “Method.” But he is less
strict than Austin. For Austin, "That is a finch implies that the utterer
KNOWS its a finch. While Grice has a maxim, do not say that for which you lack
adequate evidence (Gettiers analysandum) and a super-maxim, try to make
your contribution one that is true, the very phrasing highlights Grices
cavalier to this! Imagine Kant turning on his grave. "Try!?". Grice
is very clever in having try in the super-maxim, and a prohibition as the
maxim, involving falsehood avoidance, "Do not say what you believe to be
false." Even here he is cavalier. "Cf. "Do not say what you KNOW
to be false." If Gettier were wrong, the combo of maxims yields, "Say
what you KNOW," say what you are certain about! Enough for Sextus
Empiricus having one single maxim: "Either utter a phenomenalist
utterance, a question or an order, or keep your mouth shut!." (cf. Grice,
"My lips are sealed," as cooperative or helfpul in ways -- "At
least he is not lying."). Hampshire, in the course of some recent
remarks,l advances the view that self-prediction is (logically) impossible.
When I say I know that I shall do X (as against, e.g., X will happen to me, or
You will do X), I am not contemplating myself, as I might someone else, and
giving tongue to a conjecture about myself and my future acts, as I might be
doing about someone else or about the behaviour ofan animal -for that would be
tantamount (if I understand him rightly) to looking upon myself from outside,
as it were, and treating my own acts as mere caused events. In saying that I
know that I shall do X, I am, on this view, saying that I have decided to do X:
for to predict that I shall in certain circumstances in fact do X or decide to
do X, with no reference to whether or not I have already decided to do it - to
say I can tell you now that I shall in fact act in manner X, although I am, as
a matter of fact, determined to do the very opposite - does not make sense. Any
man who says I know myself too well to believe that, whatever I now decide, I
shall do anything other than X when the circumstances actually arise is in
fact, if I interpret Hampshires views correctly, saying that he does not
really, i.e. seriously, propose to set himself against doing X, that he does
not propose even to try to act otherwise, that he has in fact decided to let
events take their course. For no man who has truly decided to try to avoid X
can, in good faith, predict his own failure to act as he has decided. He may
fail to avoid X, and he may predict this; but he cannot both decide to try to
avoid X and predict that he will not even try to do this; for he can always
try; and he knows this: he knows that this is what distinguishes him from
non-human creatures in nature. To say that he will fail even to try is
tantamount to saying that he has decided not to try. In this sense I know means
I have decided and (Murdoch, Hampshire, Gardiner and Pears, Freedom and
Knowledge, in Pears, Freedom and the Will) cannot in principle be predictive.
That, if I have understood it, is Hampshires position, and I have a good deal
of sympathy with it, for I can see that self-prediction is often an evasive way
of disclaiming responsibility for difficult decisions, while deciding in fact
to let events take their course, disguising this by attributing responsibility
for what occurs to my own allegedly unalterable nature. But I agree with
Hampshires critics in the debate, whom I take to be maintaining that, although
the situation he describes may often occur, yet circumstances may exist in
which it is possible for me both to say that I am, at this moment, resolved not
to do X, and at the same time to predict that I shall do X, because I am not
hopeful that, when the time comes, I shall in fact even so much as try to
resist doing X. I can, in effect, say I know myself well. When the crisis
comes, do not rely on me to help you. I may well run away; although I am at
this moment genuinely resolved not to be cowardly and to do all I can to stay
at your side. My prediction that my resolution will not in fact hold up is
based on knowledge of my own character, and not on my present state of mind; my
prophecy is not a symptom of bad faith (for I am not, at this moment,
vacillating) but, on the contrary, of good faith, of a wish to face the facts.
I assure you in all sincerity that my present intention is to be brave and
resist. Yet you would run a great risk if you relied too much on my present
decision; it would not be fair to conceal my past failures of nerve from you. I
can say this about others, despite the most sincere resolutions on their part,
for I can foretell how in fact they will behave; they can equally predict this
about me. Despite Hampshires plausible and tempting argument, I believe that
such objective self-knowledge is possible and occur. From Descartes to
Stout and back. Stout indeed uses both intention and certainty, and in the
same paragraph. Stout notes that, at the outset, performance falls far short of
intention. Only a certain s. of contractions of certain muscles, in proper
proportions and in a proper order, is capable of realising the end aimed at,
with the maximum of rapidity and certainty, and the minimum of obstruction and
failure, and corresponding effort. At the outset of the process of acquisition,
muscles are contracted which are superfluous, and which therefore operate as
disturbing conditions. Grices immediate trigger, however, is Ayer on sure
that, and having the right to be sure, as his immediate trigger later will be
Hampshire and Hart. Grice had high regard for Hampshires brilliant Thought and
action. He was also concerned with Stouts rather hasty UNphilosophical,
but more scientifically psychologically-oriented remarks about assurance in
practical concerns. He knew too that he was exploring an item of the
philosophers lexicon (certus) that had been brought to the forum when Anscombe
and von Wright translate Witters German expression Gewißheit in Über
Gewißheit as Certainty. The Grecians were never sure about being sure. But
the modernist turn brought by Descartes meant that Grice now had to deal with
incorrigibility and privileged access to this or that P, notably himself (When
I intend to go, I dont have to observe myself, Im on the stage, not in the
audience, or Only I can say I will to London, expressing my intention to do so.
If you say, you will go you are expressing yours! Grice found Descartes
very funny ‒ in a French way. Grice is interested in contesting Ayer and other
Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for certainty. In so
doing, Grice choses Descartess time-honoured criterion of clarity and
distinction, as applied to perception. Grice does NOT quote
Descartes in French! In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two
kinds of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes: (a) objective
certainty: Ordinary-language variant: It is certain that p, whatever
it refers to, cf. Grice, it is an illusion; what is it? (b) Subjective
certainty: Ordinary-language variant: I am certain that p. I
being, of course, Grice, in my bestest days, of course! There are further
items on Descartes in the Grice Collection, notably in the last s. of topics
arranged alphabetically. Grice never cared to publish his views on
Descartes until he found an opportunity to do so when compiling his WOW. Grice
is not interested in an exegesis of Descartess thought. He doesnt care to give
a reference to any edition of Descartess oeuvre. But he plays with certain. It
is certain that p is objective certainty, apparently. I am certain that p is
Subjectsive certainty, rather. Oddly, Grice will turn to UNcertainty as it
connects with intention in his BA lecture. Grices interest in Descartes
connects with Descartess search for a criterion of certainty in terms of
clarity and distinction of this or that perception. Having explored the
philosophy of perception with Warnock, its only natural he wanted to give
Descartess rambles a second and third look! Descartes on clear and distinct
perception, in WOW, II semantics and metaphysics, essay, Descartes on clear and
distinct perception and Malcom on dreaming, perception, Descartes, clear and
distinct perception, Malcolm, dreaming. Descartes meets Malcolm, and vice
versa. Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in WOW, Descartes
on clear and distinct perception, Descartes on clear and distinct perception,
in WOW, part II, semantics and metaphysics, essay. Grice gives a short overview
of Cartesian metaphysics for the BBC 3rd programme. The best example,
Grice thinks, of a metaphysical snob is provided by Descartes, about
whose idea of certainty Grice had philosophised quite a bit, since it is in
total contrast with Moore’s. Descartes is a very scientifically
minded philosopher, with very clear ideas about the proper direction for science. Descartes,
whose middle Names seems to have been Euclid, thinks that mathematics, and in
particular geometry, provides the model for a scientific procedure, or
method. And this determines all of Descartess thinking in two ways. First,
Descartes thinks that the fundamental method in science is the axiomatic
deductive method of geometry, and this Descartes conceives (as Spinoza morality
more geometrico) of as rigorous reasoning from a self-evident axiom (Cogito,
ergo sum.). Second, Descartes thinks that the Subjects matter of physical
science, from mechanics to medicine, must be fundamentally the same as the
Subjects matter of geometry! The only characteristics that the objects studied
by geometry poses are spatial characteristics. So from the point of view of
science in general, the only important features of things in the physical world
were also their spatial characteristics, what he called extensio, res extensa.
Physical science in general is a kind of dynamic, or kinetic, geometry.
Here we have an exclusive preference for a certain type of scientific
method, and a certain type of scientific explanation: the method is deductive,
the type of explanation mechanical. These beliefs about the right way to do
science are exactly reflected in Descartess ontology, one of the two branches
of metaphysics; the other is philosophical eschatology, or the study of
categories), and it is reflected in his doctrine, that is, about what really
exists. Apart from God, the divine substance, Descartes recognises just
two kinds of substance, two types of real entity. First, there is material
substance, or matter; and the belief that the only scientifically important
characteristics of things in the physical world are their spatial
characteristics goes over, in the language of metaphysics, into the doctrine
that these are their only characteristics. Second, and to Ryle’s horror,
Descartes recognizes the mind or soul, or the mental substance, of which the essential
characteristic is thinking; and thinking itself, in its pure form at least, is
conceived of as simply the intuitive grasping of this or that
self-evident axiom and this or that of its deductive consequence. These
restrictive doctrines about reality and knowledge naturally call for
adjustments elsewhere in our ordinary scheme of things. With the help of the
divine substance, these are duly provided. It is not always obvious that
the metaphysicians scheme involves this kind of ontological preference, or
favoritism, or prejudice, or snobbery this tendency, that is, to promote one or
two categories of entity to the rank of the real, or of the ultimately real, to
the exclusion of others, Descartess entia realissima. One is taught at Oxford
that epistemology begins with the Moderns such as Descartes, which is not true.
Grice was concerned with “certain,” which was applied in Old Roman times to
this or that utterer: the person who is made certain in reference to a thing,
certain, sure. Lewis and Short have a few quotes: “certi sumus periisse omnia;”
“num quid nunc es certior?,” “posteritatis, i. e. of posthumous fame,”
“sententiæ,” “judicii,” “certus de suā geniturā;” “damnationis;” “exitii,”
“spei,” “matrimonii,” “certi sumus;” in the phrase “certiorem facere aliquem;”
“de aliquā re, alicujus rei, with a foll, acc. and inf., with a rel.-clause or
absol.;” “to inform, apprise one of a thing: me certiorem face: “ut nos facias
certiores,” “uti Cæsarem de his rebus certiorem faciant;” “qui certiorem me sui
consilii fecit;” “Cæsarem certiorem faciunt, sese non facile ab oppidis vim
hostium prohibere;” “faciam te certiorem quid egerim;” with subj. only,
“milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium,” pass., “quod
crebro certior per me fias de omnibus rebus,” “Cæsar certior factus est, tres
jam copiarum partes Helvetios id flumen transduxisse;” “factus certior, quæ res
gererentur,” “non consulibus certioribus factis,” also in posit., though
rarely; “fac me certum quid tibi est;” “lacrimæ suorum tam subitæ matrem certam
fecere ruinæ,” uncertainty, Grice loved the OED, and its entry for will
was his favourite. But he first had a look to shall. For Grice, "I shall
climb Mt. Everest," is surely a prediction. And then Grice turns to the
auxiliary he prefers, will. Davidson, Intending, R. Grandy and Warner,
PGRICE. “Uncertainty,” “Aspects.” “Conception,” Davidson on intending,
intending and trying, Brandeis.”Method,” in “Conception,” WOW . Hampshire and
Hart. Decision, intention, and certainty, Mind, Harman, Willing and intending
in PGRICE. Practical reasoning. Review of Met.
29. Thought, Princeton, for functionalist approach alla Grice’s
“Method.” Principles of reasoning. Rational action and the extent of intention.
Social theory and practice. Jeffrey, Probability kinematics, in The logic of
decision, cited by Harman in PGRICE. Kahneman and Tversky, Judgement under
uncertainty, Science, cited by Harman in PGRICE. Nisbet and Ross, Human
inference, cited by Harman in PGRICE. Pears, Predicting and deciding. Prichard,
Acting, willing, and desiring, in Moral obligations, Oxford ed. by Urmson Speranza, The Grice Circle Wants You. Stout,
Voluntary action. Mind 5, repr in Studies in philosophy and psychology,
Macmillan, cited by Grice, “Uncertainty.” Urmson, ‘Introduction’ to Prichard’s
‘Moral obligations.’ I shant but Im not certain I wont – Grice. How
uncertain can Grice be? This is the Henriette Herz BA lecture, and as such
published in The Proceedings of the BA. Grice calls himself a
neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few
other philosophers ‒ some of whom he was not necessarily associated
with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably
Pears. Grices motto: Where there is a neo-Prichardian willing, there is a palæo-Griceian
way! Grice quotes Pears, of Christ Church, as the philosopher he found
especially congenial to explore areas in what both called philosophical
psychology, notably the tricky use of intending as displayed by a few
philosophers even in their own circle, such as Hampshire and Hart in Intention,
decision, and certainty. The title of Grices lecture is meant to provoke
that pair of Oxonian philosophers Grice knew so well and who were too ready to
bring in certainty in an area that requires deep philosophical
exploration. This is the Henriette Herz Trust annual lecture. It
means its delivered annually by different philosophers, not always Grice! Grice
had been appointed a FBA earlier, but he took his time to deliver his lecture. With
your lecture, you implicate, Hi! Grice, and indeed Pears, were motivated by
Hampshires and Harts essay on intention and certainty in Mind. Grice knew
Hampshire well, and had actually enjoyed his Thought and Action. He preferred
Hampshires Thought and action to Anscombes Intention. Trust Oxford being what
it is that TWO volumes on intending are published in the same year! Which one
shall I read first? Eventually, neither ‒ immediately. Rather, Grice managed to
unearth some sketchy notes by Prichard (he calls himself a neo-Prichardian)
that Urmson had made available for the Clarendon Press ‒ notably Prichards
essay on willing that. Only a Corpus-Christi genius like Prichard will
distinguish will to, almost unnecessary, from will that, so crucial. For Grice,
wills that , unlike wills to, is
properly generic, in that p, that follows the that-clause, need NOT refer to
the Subjects of the sentence. Surely I can will that Smith wins the match! But
Grice also quotes Anscombe (whom otherwise would not count, although they did
share a discussion panel at the American Philosophical Association) and Kenny,
besides Pears. Of Anscombe, Grice borrows (but never returns) the
direction-of-fit term of art, actually Austinian. From Kenny, Grice borrows
(and returns) the concept of voliting. His most congenial approach was
Pearss. Grice had of course occasion to explore disposition and intention
on earlier occasions. Grice is especially concerned with a dispositional
analysis to intending. He will later reject it in “Uncertainty.” But
that was Grice for you! Grice is especially interested in distinguishing his
views from Ryles over-estimated dispositional account of intention, which Grice
sees as reductionist, and indeed eliminationist, if not boringly behaviourist,
even in analytic key. The logic of dispositions is tricky, as Grice will later
explore in connection with rationality, rational propension or propensity, and
metaphysics, the as if operator). While Grice focuses on uncertainty, he is
trying to be funny. He knew that Oxonians like Hart and Hampshire were obsessed
with certainty. I was so surprised that Hampshire and Hart were claiming
decision and intention are psychological states about which the agent is
certain, that I decided on the spot that that could certainly be a nice
topic for my BA lecture! Grice granted that in some cases, a declaration of an
intention can be authorative in a certain certain way, i. e. as implicating
certainty. But Grice wants us to consider: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb
Mt. Everest. Surely he cant be certain hell succeed. Grice used the
same example at the APA, of all places. To amuse Grice, Davidson, who was
present, said: Surely thats just an implicature! Just?! Grice was
almost furious in his British guarded sort of way. Surely not
just! Pears, who was also present, tried to reconcile: If I may,
Davidson, I think Grice would take it that, if certainty is implicated, the
whole thing becomes too social to be true. They kept discussing
implicature versus entailment. Is certainty entailed then? Cf. Urmson on
certainly vs. knowingly, and believably. Davidson asked. No,
disimplicated! is Grices curt reply. The next day, he explained to
Davidson that he had invented the concept of disimplicature just to tease him,
and just one night before, while musing in the hotel room! Talk of uncertainty
was thus for Grice intimately associated with his concern about the misuse of
know to mean certain, especially in the exegeses that Malcolm made popular
about, of all people, Moore! V. Scepticism and common sense and Moore and
philosophers paradoxes above, and Causal theory and Prolegomena for a summary
of Malcoms misunderstanding Moore! Grice manages to quote from Stouts Voluntary
action and Brecht. And he notes that not all speakers are as sensitive as they
should be (e.g. distinguishing modes, as realised by shall vs. will). He
emphasizes the fact that Prichard has to be given great credit for seeing that
the accurate specification of willing should be willing that and not willing
to. Grice is especially interested in proving Stoutians (like Hampshire and
Hart) wrong by drawing from Aristotles prohairesis-doxa distinction, or in his
parlance, the buletic-doxastic distinction. Grice quotes from Aristotle.
Prohairesis cannot be opinion/doxa. For opinion is thought to relate to all
kinds of things, no less to eternal things and impossible things than to things
in our own power; and it is distinguished by its falsity or truth, not by its
badness or goodness, while choice is distinguished rather by these. Now with
opinion in general perhaps no one even says it is identical. But it is not
identical even with any kind of opinion; for by choosing or deciding, or
prohairesis, what is good or bad we are men of a certain character, which we
are not by holding this or that opinion or doxa. And we choose to get or avoid
something good or bad, but we have opinions about what a thing is or whom it is
good for or how it is good for him; we can hardly be said to opine to get or
avoid anything. And choice is praised for being related to the right object
rather than for being rightly related to it, opinion for being truly related to
its object. And we choose what we best know to be good, but we opine what we do
not quite know; and it is not the same people that are thought to make the best
choices and to have the best opinions, but some are thought to have fairly good
opinions, but by reason of vice to choose what they should not. If opinion
precedes choice or accompanies it, that makes no difference; for it is not this
that we are considering, but whether it is identical with some kind of opinion.
What, then, or what kind of thing is it, since it is none of the things we have
mentioned? It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is voluntary to be an
object of choice. Is it, then, what has been decided on by previous
deliberation? At any rate choice involves a rational principle and thought.
Even the Names seems to suggest that it is what is chosen before other things.
His final analysis of G intends that p is in terms of, B1, a buletic condition,
to the effect that G wills that p, and D2, an attending doxastic condition, to
the effect that G judges that B1 causes p. Grice ends this essay with a nod to
Pears and an open point about the justifiability (other than evidential) for
the acceptability of the agents deciding and intending versus the evidential
justifiability of the agents predicting that what he intends will be satisfied.
It is important to note that in his earlier Disposition and intention, Grice
dedicates the first part to counterfactual if general. This is a logical point.
Then as an account for a psychological souly concept ψ. If G does A, sensory
input, G does B, behavioural output. No ψ without the behavioural output that ψ
is meant to explain. His problem is with the first person. The functionalist I
does not need a black box. The here
would be both incorrigibility and privileged access. Pology only explains their
evolutionary import. Refs.: The main source is his BA lecture on ‘uncertainty,’
but using the keyword ‘certainty’ is useful too. His essay on Descartes in WoW
is important, and sources elsehere in the Grice Papers, such as the predecessor
to the “Uncertainty” lecture in “Disposition and intention,” also his
discussion of avowal (vide references above), incorrigibility and privileged
access in “Method,” repr. in “Conception,” BANC
chiliagon: referred to by Grice in “Some remarks about the
senses.’ In geometry, a chiliagon, or 1000-gon is a polygon with 1,000 sides. Philosophers commonly refer to chiliagons
to illustrate ideas about the nature and workings of thought, meaning, and
mental representation. A chiliagon is a regular
chiliagon Polygon 1000.svg A regular chiliagon Type Regular polygon Edges and
vertices 1000 Schläfli symbol {1000}, t{500}, tt{250}, ttt{125} Coxeter diagram
CDel node 1.pngCDel 10.pngCDel 0x.pngCDel 0x.pngCDel node.png CDel node
1.pngCDel 5.pngCDel 0x.pngCDel 0x.pngCDel node 1.png Symmetry group Dihedral
(D1000), order 2×1000 Internal angle (degrees) 179.64° Dual polygon Self
Properties Convex, cyclic, equilateral, isogonal, isotoxal A whole
regular chiliagon is not visually discernible from a circle. The lower section
is a portion of a regular chiliagon, 200 times as large as the smaller one,
with the vertices highlighted. In geometry, a chiliagon (/ˈkɪliəɡɒn/) or
1000-gon is a polygon with 1,000 sides. Philosophers commonly refer to
chiliagons to illustrate ideas about the nature and workings of thought,
meaning, and mental representation. Contents 1 Regular chiliagon 2
Philosophical application 3 Symmetry 4 Chiliagram 5 See also 6 References
Regular chiliagon A regular chiliagon is represented by Schläfli symbol {1,000}
and can be constructed as a truncated 500-gon, t{500}, or a twice-truncated
250-gon, tt{250}, or a thrice-truncated 125-gon, ttt{125}. The measure of
each internal angle in a regular chiliagon is 179.64°. The area of a regular
chiliagon with sides of length a is given by {\displaystyle
A=250a^{2}\cot {\frac {\pi }{1000}}\simeq 79577.2\,a^{2}}A=250a^{2}\cot
{\frac {\pi }{1000}}\simeq 79577.2\,a^{2} This result differs from the
area of its circumscribed circle by less than 4 parts per million.
Because 1,000 = 23 × 53, the number of sides is neither a product of distinct
Fermat primes nor a power of two. Thus the regular chiliagon is not a
constructible polygon. Indeed, it is not even constructible with the use of
neusis or an angle trisector, as the number of sides is neither a product of
distinct Pierpont primes, nor a product of powers of two and three.
Philosophical application René Descartes uses the chiliagon as an example in
his Sixth Meditation to demonstrate the difference between pure intellection
and imagination. He says that, when one thinks of a chiliagon, he "does
not imagine the thousand sides or see them as if they were present" before
him – as he does when one imagines a triangle, for example. The imagination
constructs a "confused representation," which is no different from
that which it constructs of a myriagon (a polygon with ten thousand sides).
However, he does clearly understand what a chiliagon is, just as he understands
what a triangle is, and he is able to distinguish it from a myriagon.
Therefore, the intellect is not dependent on imagination, Descartes claims, as
it is able to entertain clear and distinct ideas when imagination is unable to.
Philosopher Pierre Gassendi, a contemporary of Descartes, was critical of this
interpretation, believing that while Descartes could imagine a chiliagon, he
could not understand it: one could "perceive that the word 'chiliagon'
signifies a figure with a thousand angles [but] that is just the meaning of the
term, and it does not follow that you understand the thousand angles of the
figure any better than you imagine them." The example of a chiliagon is
also referenced by other philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant. David Hume points
out that it is "impossible for the eye to determine the angles of a
chiliagon to be equal to 1996 right angles, or make any conjecture, that
approaches this proportion."[4] Gottfried Leibniz comments on a use of the
chiliagon by John Locke, noting that one can have an idea of the polygon
without having an image of it, and thus distinguishing ideas from images. Henri
Poincaré uses the chiliagon as evidence that "intuition is not necessarily
founded on the evidence of the senses" because "we can not represent
to ourselves a chiliagon, and yet we reason by intuition on polygons in
general, which include the chiliagon as a particular case." Inspired by Descartes's chiliagon example,
Grice, R. M. Chisholm and other 20th-century philosophers have used similar
examples to make similar points. Chisholm's ‘speckled hen,’ which need not have
a determinate number of speckles to be successfully imagined, is perhaps the
most famous of these. Symmetry The symmetries of a regular chiliagon.
Light blue lines show subgroups of index 2. The 4 boxed subgraphs are
positionally related by index 5 subgroups. The regular chiliagon has Dih1000
dihedral symmetry, order 2000, represented by 1,000 lines of reflection. Dih100
has 15 dihedral subgroups: Dih500, Dih250, Dih125, Dih200, Dih100, Dih50,
Dih25, Dih40, Dih20, Dih10, Dih5, Dih8, Dih4, Dih2, and Dih1. It also has 16
more cyclic symmetries as subgroups: Z1000, Z500, Z250, Z125, Z200, Z100, Z50,
Z25, Z40, Z20, Z10, Z5, Z8, Z4, Z2, and Z1, with Zn representing π/n radian
rotational symmetry. John Conway labels these lower symmetries with a
letter and order of the symmetry follows the letter.[8] He gives d (diagonal)
with mirror lines through vertices, p with mirror lines through edges
(perpendicular), i with mirror lines through both vertices and edges, and g for
rotational symmetry. a1 labels no symmetry. These lower symmetries allow
degrees of freedom in defining irregular chiliagons. Only the g1000 subgroup
has no degrees of freedom but can be seen as directed edges. Chiliagram A
chiliagram is a 1,000-sided star polygon. There are 199 regular forms[9] given
by Schläfli symbols of the form {1000/n}, where n is an integer between 2 and
500 that is coprime to 1,000. There are also 300 regular star figures in the
remaining cases. For example, the regular {1000/499} star polygon is
constructed by 1000 nearly radial edges. Each star vertex has an internal angle
of 0.36 degrees.[10] {1000/499} Star polygon 1000-499.svg Star polygon
1000-499 center.png Central area with moiré patterns See also Myriagon Megagon
Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Language References Meditation VI by
Descartes (English translation). Sepkoski, David (2005). "Nominalism
and constructivism in seventeenth-century mathematical philosophy".
Historia Mathematica. 32: 33–59. doi:10.1016/j.hm.2003.09.002. Immanuel
Kant, "On a Discovery," trans. Henry Allison, in Theoretical
Philosophy After 1791, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath, Cambridge UP, 2002
[Akademie 8:121]. Kant does not actually use a chiliagon as his example,
instead using a 96-sided figure, but he is responding to the same question
raised by Descartes. David Hume, The Philosophical Works of David Hume,
Volume 1, Black and Tait, 1826, p. 101. Jonathan Francis Bennett (2001),
Learning from Six Philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley,
Hume, Volume 2, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198250924, p. 53. Henri
Poincaré (1900) "Intuition and Logic in Mathematics" in William Bragg
Ewald (ed) From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations of
Mathematics, Volume 2, Oxford University Press, 2007, ISBN 0198505361, p.
1015. Roderick Chisholm, "The Problem of the Speckled Hen",
Mind 51 (1942): pp. 368–373. "These problems are all descendants of
Descartes's 'chiliagon' argument in the sixth of his Meditations" (Joseph
Heath, Following the Rules: Practical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint, Oxford:
OUP, 2008, p. 305, note 15). The Symmetries of Things, Chapter 20
199 = 500 cases − 1 (convex) − 100 (multiples of 5) − 250 (multiples of 2) + 50
(multiples of 2 and 5) 0.36 = 180 (1 - 2 /(1000 / 499) ) = 180 ( 1 – 998 /
1000 ) = 180 ( 2 / 1000 ) = 180 / 500 chiliagon vte Polygons (List) Triangles
Acute Equilateral Ideal IsoscelesObtuseRight Quadrilaterals Antiparallelogram Bicentric
CyclicEquidiagonalEx-tangentialHarmonic Isosceles
trapezoidKiteLambertOrthodiagonal Parallelogram Rectangle Right kite Rhombus Saccheri
SquareTangentialTangential trapezoidTrapezoid By number of sides Monogon
(1) Digon (2) Triangle (3) Quadrilateral (4) Pentagon (5) Hexagon (6) Heptagon
(7) Octagon (8) Nonagon (Enneagon, 9) Decagon (10) Hendecagon (11) Dodecagon
(12) Tridecagon (13) Tetradecagon (14) Pentadecagon (15) Hexadecagon (16) Heptadecagon
(17) Octadecagon (18) Enneadecagon (19)Icosagon (20)Icosihenagon [de]
(21)Icosidigon (22) Icositetragon (24) Icosihexagon (26) Icosioctagon (28) Triacontagon
(30) Triacontadigon (32) Triacontatetragon (34) Tetracontagon (40) Tetracontadigon
(42)Tetracontaoctagon (48)Pentacontagon (50) Pentacontahenagon [de] (51) Hexacontagon
(60) Hexacontatetragon (64) Heptacontagon (70)Octacontagon (80) Enneacontagon
(90) Enneacontahexagon (96) Hectogon (100) 120-gon257-gon360-gonChiliagon
(1000) Myriagon (10000) 65537-gonMegagon (1000000) 4294967295-gon [ru;
de]Apeirogon (∞) Star polygons Pentagram Hexagram Heptagram Octagram Enneagram Decagram
Hendecagram Dodecagram Classes Concave Convex Cyclic Equiangular Equilateral Isogonal
Isotoxal Pseudotriangle Regular Simple SkewStar-shaped Tangential Categories:
Polygons1000 (number).
choice, v. rational choice.
commitment: Grice’s commitment to the 39 Articles. An
utterer is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound
variables of his utterance must be capable of referring in order that the
utterance made be true.” Cf. Grice on substitutional quantification for his
feeling Byzantine, and ‘gap’ sign in the analysis.
common-ground status assignment: While
Grice was invited to a symposium on ‘mutual knowledge,’ he never was for
‘regressive accounts’ of ‘know,’ perhaps because he had to be different, and
the idea of the mutual or common knowledge was the obvious way to deal with his
account of communication. He rejects it and opts for an anti-sneak clause. In
the common-ground he uses the phrase, “What the eye no longer sees, the heart
no longer grieves for.” What does he mean? He means that in the case of some
recognizable divergence between the function of a communication device in a
rational calculus and in the vernacular, one may have to assign ‘common ground
status’ to certain features, e. g. [The king of France is] bald. By using the
square brackets, or subscripts, in “Vacuous names and descriptions,” the
material within their scope is ‘immune’ to refutation. It has some sort of
conversational ‘inertia.’ So the divergence, for which Grice’s heart grieved,
is no more to be seen by Grice’s eye. Strwson and Wiggins view that this is
only tentative for Grice. the regulations for common-ground assignment have to
do with general rational constraints on conversation. Grice is clear in
“Causal,” and as Strawson lets us know, he was already clear in “Introduction”
when talking of a ‘pragmatic rule.’ Strawson states the rule in terms of making
your conversational contribution the logically strongest possible. If we abide by an
imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally giving and
receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by others in
the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the effect, ‘Thou
shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou canst
truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’“Causal” provides a more difficult version, because it
deals with non-extensional contexts where ‘strong’ need not be interpreted as
‘logical strength’ in terms of entailment. Common ground status assignment
springs from the principle of conversational helpfulness or conversational
benevolence. What would be the benevolent point of ‘informing’ your addressee
what you KNOW your addressee already knows? It is not even CONCEPTUALLY
possible. You are not ‘informing’ him if you are aware that he knows it. So,
what Strawson later calls the principle of presumption of ignorance and the
principle of the presumption of knowledge are relevant. There is a balance
between the two. If Strawson asks Grice, “Is the king of France bald?” Grice is
entitled to assume that Strawson thinks two things Grice will perceive as
having been assigned a ‘common-ground’ status as uncontroversial topic not
worth conversing about. First, Strawson thinks that there is one king. (∃x)Fx. Second, Strawson thinks that there is at most one
king. (x)(y)((Fx.Fy)⊃ x=y).
That the king is bald is NOT assigned common-ground status, because Grice
cannot expect that Strawson thinks that Grice KNOWS that. Grice symbolises the
common-ground status by means of subscripts. He also uses square-bracekts, so
that anything within the scope of the square brackets is immune to controversy,
or as Grice also puts it, conversationally _inert_: things we don’t talk about.
communication device: Grice always has ‘or
communication devices’ at the tip of his tongue. “Language or communication
devices” (WoW: 284). A device is produced. A device can be misunderstood.
communicatum: With the linguistic turn, as Grice notes, it was all
about ‘language.’ But at Oxford they took a cavalier attitude to language, that
Grice felt like slightly rectifying, while keeping it cavalier as we like it at
Oxford. The colloquialism of ‘mean’ does not translate well in the Graeco-Roman
tradition Grice was educated via his Lit. Hum. (Philos.) and at Clifton. ‘Communicate’
might do. On top, Grice does use ‘communicate’ on various occasions in WoW. By psi-transmission, something that belonged
in the emissor becomes ‘common property,’ ‘communion’ has been achived. Now the
recipient KNOWS that it is raining (shares the belief with the emissor) and IS
GOING to bring that umbrella (has formed a desire). “Communication” is cognate
with ‘communion,’ while conversation is cognate with ‘sex’! When Grice
hightlights the ‘common ground’ in ‘communication’ he is being slightly
rhetorical, so it is good when he weakens the claim from ‘common ground’ to
‘non-trivial.’ A: I’m going to the concert. My uncle’s brother went to that
concert. The emissor cannot presume that his addressee KNEW that he had an
unlce let alone that his uncle had a brother (the emissor’s father). But any
expansion would trigger the wrong implicatum. One who likes ‘communication’ is
refined Strawson (I’m using refined as J. Barnes does it, “turn Plato into
refined Strawson”). Both in his rat-infested example and at the inaugural
lecture at Oxford. Grice, for one, has given us reason to think that, with
sufficient care, and far greater refinement than I have indicated, it is
possible to expound such a concept of communication-intention or, as he calls
it, utterer's meaning, which is proof against objection. it is a commonplace that Grice belongs, as
most philosophers of the twentieth century, to the movement of the linguistic
turn. Short and Lewis have “commūnĭcare,” earlier “conmunicare,” f. communis,
and thus sharing the prefix with “conversare.” Now “communis” is an interesting
lexeme that Grice uses quite centrally in his idea of the ‘common ground’ –
when a feature of discourse is deemed to have been assigned ‘common-ground
status.’ “Communis” features the “cum-” prefix, commūnis (comoinis); f. “con” and
root “mu-,” to bind; Sanscr. mav-; cf.: immunis, munus, moenia. The
‘communicatum’ (as used by Tammelo in
social philosophy) may well cover what Grice would call the total
‘significatio,’ or ‘significatum.’ Grice takes this seriously. Let us start
then by examining what we mean by ‘linguistic,’ or ‘communication.’ It is
curious that while most Griceians overuse ‘communicative’ as applied to
‘intention,’ Grice does not. Communicator’s intention, at most. This is the
Peirce in Grice’s soul. Meaning provides an excellent springboard for Grice to
centre his analysis on psychological or soul-y verbs as involving the agent and
the first person: smoke only figuratively means fire, and the expression smoke
only figuratively (or metabolically) means that there is fire. It is this or
that utterer (say, Grice) who means, say, by uttering Where theres smoke theres
fire, or ubi fumus, ibi ignis, that where theres smoke theres fire. A
means something by uttering x, an utterance-token is roughly equivalent to
utterer U intends the utterance of x to produce some effect in his addressee A
by means of the recognition of this intention; and we may add that to ask what
U means is to ask for a specification of the intended effect - though, of
course, it may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a
that-clause, for example, a belief that
He does provide a more specific example involving the that-clause at a
later stage. By uttering x, U means that-ψb-dp ≡ (Ǝφ)(Ǝf)(Ǝc) U
utters x intending x to be such that anyone who
has φ think that x has f, f is correlated in way c
with ψ-ing that p, and (Ǝφ') U intends x to be such
that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has
f and that f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that
p, and in view of (Ǝφ') U intending x to be such
that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has
f, and f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that
p, U ψ-s that p, and, for some
substituends of ψb-d, U utters x
intending that, should there actually be anyone who
has φ, he will, via thinking in view of (Ǝφ') U
intending x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via
thinking that x has f, and f is correlated in way c
with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, U ψ-s that
p himself ψ that p, and it is not
the case that, for some inference element E, U intends x to be such
that anyone who has φ both rely on E in coming to ψ, or think that U ψ-s, that p and think that (Ǝφ) U intends x to be
such that anyone who has φ come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that
p without relying on E. Besides St. John The Baptist, and Salome, Grice
cites few Namess in Meaning. But he makes a point about Stevenson! For
Stevenson, smoke means fire. Meaning develops out of an interest by Grice on
the philosophy of Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other
authors, including, besides Peirce himself (!), Ogden, Richards, and Ewing, or
A. C. Virtue is not a fire-shovel Ewing, as Grice calls him, and this or that
cricketer. In the characteristic Oxonian fashion of a Lit. Hum., Grice has no
intention to submit Meaning to publication. Publishing is vulgar. Bennett,
however, guesses that Grice decides to publish it just a year after his Defence
of a dogma. Bennett’s argument is that Defence of a dogma pre-supposes some
notion of meaning. However, a different story may be told, not necessarily
contradicting Bennetts. It is Strawson who submits the essay by Grice to The
Philosophical Review (henceforth, PR) Strawson attends Grices talk on Meaning
for The Oxford Philosophical Society, and likes it. Since In defence of a dogma
was co-written with Strawson, the intention Bennett ascribes to Grice is
Strawsons. Oddly, Strawson later provides a famous alleged counter-example to
Grice on meaning in Intention and convention in speech acts, following J. O.
Urmson’s earlier attack to the sufficiency of Grices analysans -- which has
Grice dedicating a full James lecture (No. 5) to it. there is Strawsons
rat-infested house for which it is insufficient. An interesting fact,
that confused a few, is that Hart quotes from Grices Meaning in his critical
review of Holloway for The Philosophical Quarterly. Hart quotes Grice
pre-dating the publication of Meaning. Harts point is that Holloway should have
gone to Oxford! In Meaning, Grice may be seen as a practitioner of
ordinary-language philosophy: witness his explorations of the factivity (alla
know, remember, or see) or lack thereof of various uses of to mean. The second
part of the essay, for which he became philosophically especially popular,
takes up an intention-based approach to semantic notions. The only authority
Grice cites, in typical Oxonian fashion, is, via Ogden and Barnes, Stevenson,
who, from The New World (and via Yale, too!) defends an emotivist theory of ethics,
and making a few remarks on how to mean is used, with scare quotes, in
something like a causal account (Smoke means fire.). After its publication
Grices account received almost as many alleged counterexamples as
rule-utilitarianism (Harrison), but mostly outside Oxford, and in The New
World. New-World philosophers seem to have seen Grices attempt as reductionist
and as oversimplifying. At Oxford, the sort of counterexample Grice received,
before Strawson, was of the Urmson-type: refined, and subtle. I think your
account leaves bribery behind. On the other hand, in the New World ‒ in what
Grice calls the Latter-Day School of Nominalism, Quine is having troubles with
empiricism. Meaning was repr. in various collections, notably in Philosophical
Logic, ed. by Strawson. It should be remembered that it is Strawson who has the
thing typed and submitted for publication. Why Meaning should be repr. in a
collection on Philosophical Logic only Strawson knows. But Grice does say that
his account may help clarify the meaning of entails! It may be Strawsons
implicature that Parkinson should have repr. (and not merely credited) Meaning
by Grice in his series for Oxford on The theory of meaning. The preferred
quotation for Griceians is of course The Oxford Philosophical Society quote, seeing
that Grice recalled the exact year when he gave the talk for the Philosophical
Society at Oxford! It is however, the publication in The Philosophi, rather
than the quieter evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, that occasioned a
tirade of alleged counter-examples by New-World philosophers. Granted, one or
two Oxonians ‒ Urmson and Strawson ‒ fell in! Urmson criticises the sufficiency
of Grices account, by introducing an alleged counter-example involving bribery.
Grice will consider a way out of Urmsons alleged counter-example in his fifth
Wiliam James Lecture, rightly crediting and thanking Urmson for this! Strawsons
alleged counter-example was perhaps slightly more serious, if regressive. It
also involves the sufficiency of Grices analysis. Strawsons rat-infested house
alleged counter-example started a chain which required Grice to avoid,
ultimately, any sneaky intention by way of a recursive clause to the effect
that, for utterer U to have meant that p, all meaning-constitutive intentions
should be above board. But why this obsession by Grice with mean? He is being
funny. Spots surely dont mean, only mean.They dont have a mind. Yet Grice opens
with a specific sample. Those spots mean, to the doctor, that you, dear, have
measles. Mean? Yes, dear, mean, doctors orders. Those spots mean measles. But
how does the doctor know? Cannot he be in the wrong? Not really, mean is
factive, dear! Or so Peirce thought. Grice is amazed that Peirce thought that
some meaning is factive. The hole in this piece of cloth means that a bullet
went through is is one of Peirce’s examples. Surely, as Grice notes, this is an
unhappy example. The hole in the cloth may well have caused by something else,
or fabricated. (Or the postmark means that the letter went through the post.)
Yet, Grice was having Oxonian tutees aware that Peirce was krypto-technical.
Grice chose for one of his pre-Meaning seminars on Peirce’s general theory of
signs, with emphasis on general, and the correspondence of Peirce and Welby. Peirce,
rather than the Vienna circle, becomes, in vein with Grices dissenting
irreverent rationalism, important as a source for Grices attempt to English
Peirce. Grices implicature seems to be that Peirce, rather than Ayer, cared for
the subtleties of meaning and sign, never mind a verificationist theory about
them! Peirce ultra-Latinate-cum-Greek taxonomies have Grice very nervous,
though. He knew that his students were proficient in the classics, but still. Grice
thus proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions and sub-divisions (one
sub-division too many) to mean. In the proceedings, he quotes from Ogden,
Richards, and Ewing. In particular, Grice was fascinated by the correspondence of
Peirce with Lady Viola Welby, as repr. by Ogden/Richards in, well, their study
on the meaning of meaning. Grice thought the science of symbolism pretentious,
but then he almost thought Lady Viola Welby slightly pretentious, too, if youve
seen her; beautiful lady. It is via Peirce that Grice explores examples such as
those spots meaning measles. Peirce’s obsession is with weathercocks almost as
Ockham was with circles on wine-barrels. Old-World Grices use of New-World
Peirce is illustrative, thus, of the Oxonian linguistic turn focused on
ordinary language. While Peirce’s background was not philosophical, Grice
thought it comical enough. He would say that Peirce is an amateur, but then he
said the same thing about Mill, whom Grice had to study by heart to get his B.
A. Lit. Hum.! Plus, as Watson commented, what is wrong with amateur? Give me an
amateur philosopher ANY day, if I have to choose from professional Hegel! In
finding Peirce krypo-technical, Grice is ensuing that his tutees, and indeed
any Oxonian philosophy student (he was university lecturer) be aware that to
mean should be more of a priority than this or that jargon by this or that (New
World?) philosopher!? Partly! Grice wanted his students to think on their own,
and draw their own conclusions! Grice cites Ewing, Ogden/Richards, and many
others. Ewing, while Oxford-educated, had ended up at Cambridge (Scruton almost
had him as his tutor) and written some points on Meaninglessness! Those spots
mean measles. Grice finds Peirce krypto-technical and proposes to English him
into an ordinary-language philosopher. Surely it is not important whether we
consider a measles spot a sign, a symbol, or an icon. One might just as well
find a doctor in London who thinks those spots symbolic. If Grice feels like
Englishing Peirce, he does not altogether fail! meaning, reprints, of Meaning
and other essays, a collection of reprints and offprints of Grices
essays. Meaning becomes a central topic of at least two strands in
Retrospective epilogue. The first strand concerns the idea of the centrality of
the utterer. What Grice there calls meaning BY (versus meaning TO), i.e. as he
also puts it, active or agents meaning. Surely he is right in defending an
agent-based account to meaning. Peirce need not, but Grice must, because he is
working with an English root, mean, that is only figurative applicable to
non-agentive items (Smoke means rain). On top, Grice wants to conclude that
only a rational creature (a person) can meanNN properly. Non-human animals may
have a correlate. This is a truly important point for Grice since he surely is
seen as promoting a NON-convention-based approach to meaning, and also
defending from the charge of circularity in the non-semantic account of
propositional attitudes. His final picture is a rationalist one. P1 G
wants to communicate about a danger to P2. This presupposes there IS
a danger (item of reality). Then P1 G believes there is a
danger, and communicates to P2 G2 that there is a danger. This
simple view of conversation as rational co-operation underlies Grices account
of meaning too, now seen as an offshoot of philosophical psychology, and indeed
biology, as he puts it. Meaning as yet another survival mechanism. While he
would never use a cognate like significance in his Oxford Philosophical Society
talk, Grice eventually starts to use such Latinate cognates at a later stage of
his development. In Meaning, Grice does not explain his goal. By sticking with
a root that the Oxford curriculum did not necessarily recognised as
philosophical (amateur Peirce did!), Grice is implicating that he is starting
an ordinary-language botanising on his own repertoire! Grice was amused by the
reliance by Ewing on very Oxonian examples contra Ayer: Surely Virtue aint a
fire-shovel is perfectly meaningful, and if fact true, if, Ill admit, somewhat
misleading and practically purposeless at Cambridge. Again, the dismissal by
Grice of natural meaning is due to the fact that natural meaning prohibits its
use in the first person and followed by a that-clause. ‘I mean-n that p’ sounds
absurd, no communication-function seems in the offing, there is no ‘sign for,’
as Woozley would have it. Grice found, with Suppes, all types of primacy
(ontological, axiological, psychological) in utterers meaning. In Retrospective
epilogue, he goes back to the topic, as he reminisces that it is his suggestion
that there are two allegedly distinguishable meaning concepts, even if one is
meta-bolical, which may be called natural meaning and non-natural meaning.
There is this or that test (notably factivity-entailment vs. cancelation, but
also scare quotes) which may be brought to bear to distinguish one concept from
the other. We may, for example, inquire whether a particular occurrence of the
predicate mean is factive or non-factive, i. e., whether for it to be true that
[so and so] means that p, it does or does not have to be the case that it is
true that p. Again, one may ask whether the use of quotation marks to enclose
the specification of what is meant would be inappropriate or appropriate. If
factivity, as in know, remember, and see, is present and quotation marks,
oratio recta, are be inappropriate, we have a case of natural meaning.
Otherwise the meaning involved is non-natural meaning. We may now ask whether
there is a single overarching idea which lies behind both members of this
dichotomy of uses to which the predicate meaning that seems to be Subjects. If
there is such a central idea it might help to indicate to us which of the two
concepts is in greater need of further analysis and elucidation and in what
direction such elucidation should proceed. Grice confesses that he has only
fairly recently come to believe that there is such an overarching idea and that
it is indeed of some service in the proposed inquiry. The idea behind both uses
of mean is that of consequence, or consequentia, as Hobbes has it. If x means
that p, something which includes p or the idea of p, is a consequence of x. In
the metabolic natural use of meaning that p, p, this or that consequence, is
this or that state of affairs. In the literal, non-metabolic, basic,
non-natural use of meaning that p, (as in Smith means that his neighbour’s
three-year child is an adult), p, this or that consequence is this or that
conception or complexus which involves some other conception. This perhaps
suggests that of the two concepts it is, as it should, non-natural meaning
which is more in need of further elucidation. It seems to be the more
specialised of the pair, and it also seems to be the less determinate. We may,
e. g., ask how this or that conception enters the picture. Or we may ask whether
what enters the picture is the conception itself or its justifiability. On
these counts Grice should look favorably on the idea that, if further analysis
should be required for one of the pair, the notion of non-natural meaning would
be first in line. There are factors which support the suitability of further
analysis for the concept of non-natural meaning. MeaningNN that
p (non-natural meaning) does not look as if it Namess an original feature of
items in the world, for two reasons which are possibly not mutually
independent. One reason is that, given suitable background conditions, meaning,
can be changed by fiat. The second reason is that the presence of meaningNN is
dependent on a framework provided by communication, if that is not too
circular. Communication is in the philosophical lexicon. Lewis and
Short have “commūnĭcātĭo,” f. communicare,"(several times in Cicero,
elsewhere rare), and as they did with negatio and they will with significatio,
Short and Lewis render, unhelpfully, as a making common, imparting,
communicating. largitio et communicatio civitatis;” “quaedam societas et
communicatio utilitatum,” “consilii communicatio, “communicatio sermonis,” criminis
cum pluribus; “communicatio nominum, i. e. the like appellation of several objects;
“juris; “damni; In rhetorics, communicatio, trading on the communis, a figure,
translating Grecian ἀνακοίνωσις, in accordance with which the utterer turns to
his addressee, and, as it were, allows him to take part in the inquiry. It
seems to Grice, then, at least reasonable and possibly even emphatically
mandatory, to treat the claim that a communication vehicle, such as this and
that expression means that p, in this transferred, metaphoric, or meta-bolic
use of means that as being reductively analysable in terms of this or that
feature of this or that utterer, communicator, or user of this or that expression.
The use of meaning that as applied to this or that expression is posterior
to and explicable through the utterer-oriented, or utterer-relativised use,
i.e. involving a reference to this or that communicator or user of this or that
expression. More specifically, one should license a metaphorical use of mean,
where one allows the claim that this or that expression means that p, provided
that this or that utterer, in this or that standard fashion, means that p, i.e.
in terms of this or that souly statee toward this or that propositional
complexus this or that utterer ntends, in a standardly fashion, to produce by
his uttering this or that utterance. That this or that expression means (in
this metaphorical use) that p is thus explicable either in terms of this
or that souly state which is standardly intended to produce in this or that
addressee A by this or that utterer of this or that expression, or in this or
that souly staken up by this or that utterer toward this or that activity or
action of this or that utterer of this or that expression. Meaning was in
the air in Oxfords linguistic turn. Everybody was talking meaning. Grice
manages to quote from Hares early “Mind” essay on the difference between
imperatives and indicatives, also Duncan-Jones on the fugitive
proposition, and of course his beloved Strawson. Grice was also concerned
by the fact that in the manoeuvre of the typical ordinary-language philosopher,
there is a constant abuse of mean. Surely Grice wants to stick with the
utterers meaning as the primary use. Expressions mean only derivatively. To do
that, he chose Peirce to see if he could clarify it with meaning that. Grice
knew that the polemic was even stronger in London, with Ogden and Lady Viola
Welby. In the more academic Oxford milieu, Grice knew that a proper examination
of meaning, would lead him, via Kneale and his researches on the history of
semantics, to the topic of signification that obsessed the modistae (and their
modus significandi). For what does L and S say about about this? This is
Grice’s reply to popular Ogden. They want to know what the meaning of meaning
is? Here is the Oxononian response by Grice, with a vengeance. Grice is not an
animist nor a mentalist, even modest. While he allows for natural
phenomena to mean (smoke means fire), meaning is best ascribed to some utterer,
where this meaning is nothing but the intentions behind his
utterance. This is the fifth James lecture. Grice was careful enough to
submit it to PR, since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views
expressed in Meaning which Strawson had submitted on Grice’s behalf to the same
Review and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers. Among
these philosophers is Strawson himself in Intention and convention in the the
theory of speech acts, also in PR. Grice quotes from very many other
philosophers in this essay, including: Urmson, Stampe,
Strawson, Schiffer, and Searle. Strawson is especially relevant since
he started a series of alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of
the rat-infested house. Grice particularly treasured Stampes alleged
counter-example involving his beloved bridge! Avramides earns a D. Phil Oxon.
on that, under Strawson! This is Grices occasion to address some of the
criticisms ‒ in the form of alleged counter-examples, typically, as his
later reflections on epagoge versus diagoge note ‒ by Urmson,
Strawson, and other philosophers associated with Oxford, such as Searle,
Stampe, and Schiffer. The final analysandum is pretty complex (of the type that
he did find his analysis of I am hearing a sound complex in Personal
identity ‒ hardly an obstacle for adopting it), it became yet
another target of attack by especially New-World philosophers in the pages of
Mind, Nous, and other journals, This is officially the fifth James lecture.
Grice takes up the analysis of meaning he had presented way back at the Oxford
Philosophical Society. Motivated mainly by the attack by Urmson and by Strawson
in Intention and convention in speech acts, that offered an alleged
counter-example to the sufficiency of Grices analysis, Grice ends up
introducing so many intention that he almost trembled. He ends up seeing
meaning as a value-paradeigmatic concept, perhaps never realisable in a
sublunary way. But it is the analysis in this particular essay where he is at
his formal best. He distinguishes between protreptic and exhibitive utterances,
and also modes of correlation (iconic, conventional). He symbolises the utterer
and the addressee, and generalises over the type of psychological state,
attitude, or stance, meaning seems to range (notably indicative vs.
imperative). He formalises the reflexive intention, and more importantly, the
overtness of communication in terms of a self-referential recursive intention
that disallows any sneaky intention to be brought into the picture of
meaning-constitutive intentions. Grice thought he had dealt with Logic and
conversation enough! So he feels of revising his Meaning. After all, Strawson
had had the cheek to publish Meaning by Grice and then go on to criticize it in
Intention and convention in speech acts. So this is Grices revenge, and he
wins! He ends with the most elaborate theory of mean that an Oxonian could ever
hope for. And to provoke the informalists such as Strawson (and his disciples
at Oxford – led by Strawson) he pours existential quantifiers like the plague!
He manages to quote from Urmson, whom he loved! No word on Peirce, though, who
had originated all this! His implicature: Im not going to be reprimanted in
informal discussion about my misreading Peirce at Harvard! The concluding note
is about artificial substitutes for iconic representation, and meaning as a
human institution. Very grand. This is Grices metabolical projection of
utterers meaning to apply to anything OTHER than utterers meaning, notably a
token of the utterers expression and a TYPE of the utterers expression, wholly
or in part. Its not like he WANTS to do it, he NEEDS it to give an account of
implicatum. The phrase utterer is meant to provoke. Grice thinks that speaker
is too narrow. Surely you can mean by just uttering stuff! This is the
sixth James lecture, as published in “Foundations of Language” (henceforth,
“FL”), or “The foundations of language,” as he preferred. As it happens, it
became a popular lecture, seeing that Searle selected this from the whole set
for his Oxford reading in philosophy on the philosophy of language. It is also
the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential Locke lectures. Chomsky
takes Grice to be a behaviourist, even along Skinners lines, which provoked a
reply by Suppes, repr. in PGRICE. In The New World, the H. P. is often given in
a more simplified form. Grice wants to keep on playing. In Meaning, he had said
x means that p is surely reducible to utterer U means that p. In this lecture,
he lectures us as to how to proceed. In so doing he invents this or that
procedure: some basic, some resultant. When Chomsky reads the reprint in
Searles Philosophy of Language, he cries: Behaviourist! Skinnerian! It was
Suppes who comes to Grices defence. Surely the way Grice uses expressions like
resultant procedure are never meant in the strict behaviourist way. Suppes
concludes that it is much fairer to characterise Grice as an intentionalist.
Published in FL, ed. by Staal, Repr.in Searle, The Philosophy of Language,
Oxford, the sixth James Lecture, FL, resultant procedure, basic
procedure. Staal asked Grice to publish the sixth James lecture for a
newish periodical publication of whose editorial board he was a member. The fun
thing is Grice complied! This is Grices shaggy-dog story. He does not seem too
concerned about resultant procedures. As he will ll later say, surely I can
create Deutero-Esperanto and become its master! For Grice, the primacy is the
idiosyncratic, particularized utterer in this or that occasion. He knows a
philosopher craves for generality, so he provokes the generality-searcher with
divisions and sub-divisions of mean. But his heart does not seem to be there,
and he is just being overformalistic and technical for the sake of it. I am
glad that Putnam, of all people, told me in an aside, you are being too formal,
Grice. I stopped with symbolism since! Communication. This is Grice’s clearest
anti-animist attack by Grice. He had joins Hume in mocking causing and willing:
The decapitation of Charles I as willing Charles Is death. Language semantics
alla Tarski. Grice know sees his former self. If he was obsessed, after Ayer,
with mean, he now wants to see if his explanation of it (then based on his
pre-theoretic intuition) is theoretically advisable in terms other than dealing
with those pre-theoretical facts, i.e. how he deals with a lexeme like mean.
This is a bit like Grice: implicatum, revisited. An axiological approach to
meaning. Strictly a reprint of Grice, which should be the preferred citation.
The date is given by Grice himself, and he knew! Grice also composed some notes
on Remnants on meaning, by Schiffer. This is a bit like Grices meaning
re-revisited. Schiffer had been Strawsons tutee at Oxford as a Rhode Scholar in
the completion of his D. Phil. on Meaning, Clarendon. Eventually, Schiffer
grew sceptic, and let Grice know about it! Grice did not find Schiffers
arguments totally destructive, but saw the positive side to them. Schiffers
arguments should remind any philosopher that the issues he is dealing are
profound and bound to involve much elucidation before they are solved. This is
a bit like Grice: implicatum, revisited. Meaning revisited (an ovious nod to
Evelyn Waughs Yorkshire-set novel) is the title Grice chose for a contribution
to a symposium at Brighton organised by Smith. Meaning revisited (although
Grice has earlier drafts entitled Meaning and philosophical psychology) comprises
three sections. In the first section, Grice is concerned with the application
of his modified Occam’s razor now to the very lexeme, mean. Cf. How many senses
does sense have? Cohen: The Senses of Senses. In the second part, Grice
explores an evolutionary model of creature construction reaching a stage of
non-iconic representation. Finally, in the third section, motivated to solve
what he calls a major problem ‒ versus the minor problem concerning the
transition from the meaning by the utterer to the meaning by the
expression. Grice attempts to construct meaning as a value-paradeigmatic
notion. A version was indeed published in the proceedings of the Brighton symposium,
by Croom Helm, London. Grice has a couple of other drafts with variants on this
title: philosophical psychology and meaning, psychology and meaning. He keeps,
meaningfully, changing the order. It is not arbitrary that the fascinating
exploration by Grice is in three parts. In the first, where he applies his
Modified Occams razor to mean, he is revisiting Stevenson. Smoke means fire and
I mean love, dont need different senses of mean. Stevenson is right when using
scare quotes for smoke ‘meaning’ fire utterance. Grice is very much aware that
that, the rather obtuse terminology of senses, was exactly the terminology he
had adopted in both Meaning and the relevant James lectures (V and VI) at
Harvard! Now, its time to revisit and to echo Graves, say, goodbye to all that!
In the second part he applies Pology. While he knows his audience is not philosophical
‒ it is not Oxford ‒ he thinks they still may get some entertainment! We
have a P feeling pain, simulating it, and finally uttering, I am in pain. In
the concluding section, Grice becomes Plato. He sees meaning as an optimum,
i.e. a value-paradeigmatic notion introducing value in its guise of optimality.
Much like Plato thought circle works in his idiolect. Grice played with various
titles, in the Grice Collection. Theres philosophical psychology and meaning.
The reason is obvious. The lecture is strictly divided in sections, and it is only
natural that Grice kept drafts of this or that section in his collection. In
WOW Grice notes that he re-visited his Meaning re-visited at a later stage, too!
And he meant it! Surely, there is no way to understand the stages of Grice’s
development of his ideas about meaning without Peirce! It is obvious here that
Grice thought that mean two figurative or metabolical extensions of use. Smoke
means fire and Smoke means smoke. The latter is a transferred use in that
impenetrability means lets change the topic if Humpty-Dumpty m-intends that it
and Alice are to change the topic. Why did Grice feel the need to add a
retrospective epilogue? He loved to say that what the “way of words” contains
is neither his first, nor his last word. So trust him to have some intermediate
words to drop. He is at his most casual in the very last section of the
epilogue. The first section is more of a very systematic justification for any
mistake the reader may identify in the offer. The words in the epilogue are
thus very guarded and qualificatory. Just one example about our focus:
conversational implicate and conversation as rational co-operation. He goes
back to Essay 2, but as he notes, this was hardly the first word on the
principle of conversational helpfulness, nor indeed the first occasion where he
actually used implicature. As regards co-operation, the retrospective epilogue
allows him to expand on a causal phrasing in Essay 2, “purposive, indeed
rational.” Seeing in retrospect how the idea of rationality was the one that
appealed philosophers most – since it provides a rationale and justification
for what is otherwise an arbitrary semantic proliferation. Grice then
distinguishes between the thesis that conversation is purposive, and the thesis
that conversation is rational. And, whats more, and in excellent Griceian
phrasing, there are two theses here, too. One thing is to see conversation as
rational, and another, to use his very phrasing, as rational co-operation!
Therefore, when one discusses the secondary literature, one should be attentive
to whether the author is referring to Grices qualifications in the
Retrospective epilogue. Grice is careful to date some items. However, since he
kept rewriting, one has to be careful. These seven folder contain the material
for the compilation. Grice takes the opportunity of the compilation by Harvard
of his WOW, representative of the mid-60s, i. e. past the heyday of
ordinary-language philosophy, to review the idea of philosophical progress in
terms of eight different strands which display, however, a consistent and
distinctive unity. Grice keeps playing with valediction, valedictory,
prospective and retrospective, and the different drafts are all kept in The
Grice Papers. The Retrospective epilogue, is divided into two sections. In the
first section, he provides input for his eight strands, which cover not just
meaning, and the assertion-implication distinction to which he alludes to in
the preface, but for more substantial philosophical issues like the philosophy
of perception, and the defense of common sense realism versus the sceptial
idealist. The concluding section tackles more directly a second theme he had
idenfitied in the preface, which is a methodological one, and his long-standing
defence of ordinary-language philosophy. The section involves a fine
distinction between the Athenian dialectic and the Oxonian dialectic, and tells
the tale about his fairy godmother, G*. As he notes, Grice had dropped a few
words in the preface explaining the ordering of essays in the compilation. He
mentions that he hesitated to follow a suggestion by Bennett that the ordering
of the essays be thematic and chronological. Rather, Grice chooses to
publish the whole set of seven James lectures, what he calls the centerpiece,
as part I. II, the explorations in semantics and metaphysics, is organised more
or less thematically, though. In the Retrospective epilogue, Grice takes up
this observation in the preface that two ideas or themes underlie his Studies:
that of meaning, and assertion vs. implication, and philosophical methodology.
The Retrospective epilogue is thus an exploration on eight strands he
identifies in his own philosophy. Grices choice of strand is careful. For
Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire. All the strands belong to the same
knit, and therefore display some latitudinal, and, he hopes, longitudinal
unity, the latter made evidence by his drawing on the Athenian dialectic as a
foreshadow of the Oxonian dialectic to come, in the heyday of the Oxford school
of analysis, when an interest in the serious study of ordinary language had
never been since and will never be seen again. By these two types of unity,
Grice means the obvious fact that all branches of philosophy (philosophy of
language, or semantics, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology,
metaphysics, axiology, etc.) interact and overlap, and that a historical regard
for ones philosophical predecessors is a must, especially at Oxford. Why is
Grice obsessed with asserting? He is more interested, technically, in the
phrastic, or dictor. Grice sees a unity, indeed, equi-vocality, in the
buletic-doxastic continuum. Asserting is usually associated with the doxastic.
Since Grice is always ready to generalise his points to cover the buletic
(recall his Meaning, “theres by now no reason to stick to informative cases,”),
it is best to re-define his asserting in terms of the phrastic. This is enough
of a strong point. As Hare would agree, for emotivists like Barnes, say, an
utterance of buletic force may not have any content whatsoever. For Grice,
there is always a content, the proposition which becomes true when the action
is done and the desire is fulfilled or satisfied. Grice quotes from Bennett.
Importantly, Grice focuses on the assertion/non-assertion distinction. He
overlooks the fact that for this or that of his beloved imperative utterance,
asserting is out of the question, but explicitly conveying that p is not.
He needs a dummy to stand for a psychological or souly state, stance, or
attitude of either boule or doxa, to cover the field of the utterer
mode-neutrally conveying explicitly that his addressee A is to entertain that
p. The explicatum or explicitum sometimes does the trick, but sometimes it does
not. It is interesting to review the Names index to the volume, as well as the
Subjects index. This is a huge collection, comprising 14 folders. By contract,
Grice was engaged with Harvard, since it is the President of the College that
holds the copyrights for the James lectures. The title Grice eventually chooses
for his compilation of essays, which goes far beyond the James, although
keeping them as the centerpiece, is a tribute to Locke, who, although obsessed
with his idealist and empiricist new way of ideas, leaves room for both the
laymans and scientists realist way of things, and, more to the point, for this
or that philosophical semiotician to offer this or that study in the way of
words. Early in the linguistic turn minor revolution, the expression the new
way of words, had been used derogatorily. WOW is organised in two parts: Logic
and conversation and the somewhat pretentiously titled Explorations in
semantics and metaphysics, which offers commentary around the centerpiece. It
also includes a Preface and a very rich and inspired Retrospective epilogue.
From part I, the James lectures, only three had not been previously published.
The first unpublished lecture is Prolegomena, which really sets the scene, and
makes one wonder what the few philosophers who quote from The logic of grammar
could have made from the second James lecture taken in isolation. Grice
explores Aristotle’s “to alethes”: “For the true and the false exist with respect
to synthesis and division (peri gar synthesin kai diaireisin esti to pseudos
kai to alethes).” Aristotle insists upon the com-positional form of truth in
several texts: cf. De anima, 430b3 ff.: “in truth and falsity, there is a
certain composition (en hois de kai to pseudos kai to alethes, synthesis tis)”;
cf. also Met. 1027b19 ff.: the true and the false are with respect to (peri)
composition and decomposition (synthesis kai diaresis).” It also shows that
Grices style is meant for public delivery, rather than reading. The second
unpublished lecture is Indicative conditionals. This had been used by a few
philosophers, such as Gazdar, noting that there were many mistakes in the
typescript, for which Grice is not to be blamed. The third is on some models
for implicature. Since this Grice acknowledges is revised, a comparison with
the original handwritten version of the final James lecture retrieves a few
differences From Part II, a few essays had not been published before, but
Grice, nodding to the longitudinal unity of philosophy, is very careful and
proud to date them. Commentary on the individual essays is made under the
appropriate dates. Philosophical correspondence is quite a genre. Hare would
express in a letter to the Librarian for the Oxford Union, “Wiggins does not
want to be understood,” or in a letter to Bennett that Williams is the worse
offender of Kantianism! It was different with Grice. He did not type. And he
wrote only very occasionally! These are four folders with general
correspondence, mainly of the academic kind. At Oxford, Grice would hardly keep
a correspondence, but it was different with the New World, where academia turns
towards the bureaucracy. Grice is not precisely a good, or reliable, as The BA
puts it, correspondent. In the Oxford manner, Grice prefers a face-to-face
interaction, any day. He treasures his Saturday mornings under Austins
guidance, and he himself leads the Play Group after Austins demise, which, as
Owen reminisced, attained a kind of cult status. Oxford is different. As a
tutorial fellow in philosophy, Grice was meant to tutor his students; as a
University Lecturer he was supposed to lecture sometimes other fellowss tutees!
Nothing about this reads: publish or perish! This is just one f. containing
Grices own favourite Griceian references. To the historian of analytic
philosophy, it is of particular interest. It shows which philosophers Grice
respected the most, and which ones the least. As one might expect, even on the
cold shores of Oxford, as one of Grices tutees put it, Grice is cited by
various Oxford philosophers. Perhaps the first to cite Grice in print is his
tutee Strawson, in “Logical Theory.” Early on, Hart quotes Grice on meaning in
his review in The Philosophical Quarterly of Holloways Language and
Intelligence before Meaning had been published. Obviously, once Grice and
Strawson, In defense of a dogma and Grice, Meaning are published by The
Philosophical Review, Grice is discussed profusely. References to the
implicatum start to appear in the literature at Oxford in the mid-1960s, within
the playgroup, as in Hare and Pears. It is particularly intriguing to explore
those philosophers Grice picks up for dialogue, too, and perhaps arrange them
alphabetically, from Austin to Warnock, say. And Griceian philosophical
references, Oxonian or other, as they should, keep counting! The way to search
the Grice Papers here is using alternate keywords, notably “meaning.” “Meaning”
s. II, “Utterer’s meaning and intentions,” s. II, “Utterer’s meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word meaning,” s. II, “Meaning revisited,” s. II. – but
also “Meaning and psychology,” s. V, c.7-ff.
24-25. While Grice uses “signification,” and lectured on Peirce’s
“signs,” “Peirce’s general theory of signs,” (s. V, c. 8-f. 29), he would avoid
such pretentiously sounding expressions. Searching under ‘semantic’ and
‘semantics’ (“Grammar and semantics,” c. 7-f. 5; “Language semantics,” c.
7-f.20, “Basic Pirotese, sentence semantics and syntax,” c. 8-f. 30, “Semantics
of children’s language,” c. 9-f. 10, “Sentence semantics” (c. 9-f. 11);
“Sentence semantics and propositional complexes,” c. 9-f.12, “Syntax and
semantics,” c. 9-ff. 17-18) may help, too. Folder on Schiffer (“Schiffer,” c.
9-f. 9), too.
Completion. Grice speaks of ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete.
Consider “Fido is shaggy.” That’s complete. “Fido” is incomplete – like pig.
“is shaggy” is incomplete. This is Grice’s Platonism, hardly the nominalism
that Bennett abuses Grice with! For the rational pirot (not the parrot) has
access to a theory of complete --. When lecturing on Peirce, Grice referred to
Russell’s excellent idea of improving on Peirce. “Don’t ask for the meaning of
‘red,’ ask for the meaning of ‘x is red.” Cf. Plato, “Don’t try to see
horseness, try to see ‘x is a horse. Don’t be stupid.” Now “x is red” is a bit
incomplete. Surely it can be rendered by the complete, “Something,
je-ne-sais-quoi, to use Hume’s vulgarism, is red.” So, to have an act of
referring without an act of predicating is incomplete. But still useful for
philosophical analysis.
complexum: versus the ‘simplex.’ Grice starts with the simplex. All
he needs is a handwave to ascribe ‘the emissor communicates that he knows the
route.’ The proposition which is being transmitted HAS to be complex: Subject,
“The emissor”, copula, “is,” ‘predicate: “a knower of the route.”Grice allows
for the syntactically unstructured handwave to be ‘ambiguous’ so that the
intention on the emissor’s part involves his belief that the emissee will take
this rather than that proposition as being transmitted: Second complex:
“Subject: Emissor, copula: is, predicate: about to leave the emissee.”Vide the
altogether nice girl, and the one-at-a-time sailor. The topic is essential in
seeing Grice within the British empiricist tradition. Empiricists always loved
a simplex, like ‘red.’ In his notes on ‘Meaning’ and “Peirce,’ Grice notes that
for a ‘simplex’ like “red,” the best way to deal with it is via a Russellian
function, ‘x is red.’ The opposite of ‘simplex’ is of course a ‘complexum.’ hile
Grice does have an essay on the ‘complexum,’ he is mostly being jocular. His
dissection of the proposition proceds by considering ‘the a,’ and its
denotatum, or reference, and ‘is the b,’ which involves then the predication.
This is Grice’s shaggy-dog story. Once we have ‘the dog is shaggy,’ we have a
‘complexum,’ and we can say that the utterer means, by uttering ‘Fido is
shaggy,’ that the dog is hairy-coated. Simple, right? It’s the jocular in
Grice. He is joking on philosophers who look at those representative of the
linguistic turn, and ask, “So what do you have to say about reference and
predication,’ and Grice comes up with an extra-ordinary analysis of what is to
believe that the dog is hairy-coat, and communicating it. In fact, the
‘communicating’ is secondary. Once Grice has gone to metabolitical extension of
‘mean’ to apply to the expression, communication becomes secondary in that it
has to be understood in what Grice calls the ‘atenuated’ usage involving this
or that ‘readiness’ to have this or that procedure, basic or resultant, in
one’s repertoire! Bealer is one of Grices most brilliant tutees in the New
World. The Grice collection contains a full f. of correspondence with
Bealer. Bealer refers to Grice in his influential Clarendon essay on
content. Bealer is concerned with how pragmatic inference may intrude in the
ascription of a psychological, or souly, state, attitude, or stance. Bealer
loves to quote from Grice on definite descriptions in Russell and in the
vernacular, the implicature being that Russell is impenetrable! Bealers mentor
is Grices close collaborator Myro, so he knows what he is talking about. Grice
explored the matter of subperception at Oxford only with G. J. Warnock. Refs.:
The main reference is in ‘Reply to Richards.’ But there is “Sentence semantics
and propositional complexes,” c. 9-f. 12, BANC.
conatum: Aristotle
distinguishes three types of living beings: vegetables, φυτά, which possess
only the ability to nourish themselves τὸ θϱεπτιϰόν; animals, ζαῷ, which
possess the faculty of sensing τὸ αἰσθητιϰόν, which opens onto that of
desiring, τὸ ὀϱεϰτιϰόν, to orektikon, (desdideratum); and man and — he says—any
other similar or superior being, who possess in addition the ability to think,
“τὸ διανοητιϰόν τε ϰαὶ νοῦς.” -- De An., 414a 29-b.orme, the technical Stoic
definition of πάθος, viz. as a particular kind of conation, or impulse
(ορμή). ... 4 ' This definition (amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faeiendae ex ...
emotion and moral self-management in Galen's philosophical psychology', ..cōnātum ,
i, usu. in plur.: cōnāta ,
ōrum, n., v. conor.. The term is used by an the
Wilde Reader at Oxford, that Grice once followed – until he became a
neo-Prichardian instead.(philosophy) The power or act which directs or impels to
effort of any kind, whether muscular or psychical. quotations 1899, George
Frederick Stout, A Manual of Psychology, page
234:Any pleasing
sense-experience, when it has once taken place, will, on subsequent occasions,
give rise to a conation,
when its conditions are only partially repeated...
conceptum: Grice obviously uses Frege’s notion of a ‘concept.’ One of
Grice’s metaphysical routines is meant to produce a logical construction of a
concept or generate a new concept. Aware of the act/product distinction, Grice
distinguishes between the conceptum, or concept, and the conception, or
conceptio. Grice allows that ‘not’ may be a ‘concept,’ so he is not tied to the
‘equine’ idea by Frege of the ‘horse.’ Since an agent can fail to conceive that
his neighbour’s three-year old is an adult, Grice accepts that ‘conceives’ may
take a ‘that’-clause. In ‘ordinary’ language, one does not seem to refer, say,
to the concept that e = mc2, but that may be a failure or ‘ordinary’ language.
In the canonical cat-on-the-mat, we have Grice conceiving that the cat is on
the mat, and also having at least four concepts: the concept of ‘cat,’ the
concept of ‘mat,’ the concept of ‘being on,’ and the concept of the cat being
on the mat.
conditionalis: The conditional is of special interest to Grice because
his ‘impilcature’ has a conditional form. In other words, ‘implicature’ is a
variant on ‘implication,’ and the conditionalis has been called ‘implication’ –
‘even a material one, versus a formal one by Whitehead and Russell. So it is of
special philosophical interest. Since Grice’s overarching interest is
rationality, ‘conditionalis’ features in the passage from premise to
conclusion, deemed tautological: the ‘associated conditional” of a valid piece
of reasoning. “This is an interesting Latinism,” as Grice puts it. For those in
the know, it’s supposed to translate ‘hypothetical,’ that Grice also uses. But
literally, the transliteration of ‘hypothetica’ is ‘sub-positio,’ i.e.
‘suppositio,’ so infamous in the Dark Ages! So one has to be careful. For some
reason, Boethius disliked ‘suppositio,’ and preferred to add to the Latinate
philosophical vocabulary, with ‘conditionalis,’ the hypothetical, versus the
categoric, become the ‘conditionale.’ And the standard was not the Diodoran,
but the Philonian, also known, after Whitehead, as the ‘implicatio materialis.’
While this sounds scholastic, it isn’t. Cicero may have used ‘implicatio
materialis.’ But Whitehead’s and Russell’s motivation is a different one. They
start with the ‘material’, by which they mean a proposition WITH A TRUTH VALUE.
For implication that does not have this restriction, they introduce ‘implicatio
formalis,’ or ‘formal implication.’ In their adverbial ways, it goes p formally
implies q. trictly, propositio conditionalis:
vel substitutive, versus propositio praedicativa in Apuleius. Classical Latin condicio was
confused in Late Latin with conditio "a making," from conditus,
past participle of condere "to put together." The sense
evolution in Latin apparently was from "stipulation" to
"situation, mode of being."
Grice lists ‘if’ as the third binary functor in his response to Strawson. The
relations between “if” and “⊃” have already, but only in part,
been discussed. 1 The sign “⊃” is called the Material Implication
sign a name I shall consider later. Its meaning is given by the rule that any
statement of the form ‘p⊃q’ is false in the case in which the first of its constituent
statements is true and the second false, and is true in every other case
considered in the system; i. e., the falsity of the first constituent statement
or the truth of the second are, equally, sufficient conditions of the truth of
a statement of material implication ; the combination of truth in the first
with falsity in the second is the single, necessary and sufficient, condition
(1 Ch. 2, S. 7) of its falsity. The standard or primary -- the importance of
this qualifying phrase can scarcely be overemphasized. There are uses of “if …
then … ” which do not answer to the
description given here,, or to any other descriptions given in this chapter
-- use of an “if … then …” sentence,
on the other hand, we saw to be in circumstances where, not knowing whether
some statement which could be made by the use of a sentence corresponding in a
certain way to the first clause of the hypothetical is true or not, or
believing it to be false, we nevertheless consider that a step in reasoning
from that statement to a statement related in a similar way to the second
clause would be a sound or reasonable step ; the second statement also being
one of whose truth we are in doubt, or which we believe to be false. Even in
such circumstances as these we may sometimes hesitate to apply the word ‘true’
to hypothetical statements (i.e., statements which could be made by the use of
“if ... then …,” in its standard significance), preferring to call them
reasonable or well-founded ; but if we apply ‘true’ to them at all, it will be
in such circumstances as these. Now one of the sufficient conditions of the
truth of a statement of material implication may very well be fulfilled without
the conditions for the truth, or reasonableness, of the corresponding
hypothetical statement being fulfilled ; i.e., a statement of the form ‘p⊃q’ does not entail the corresponding statement of the form
“if p then q.” But if we are prepared to accept the hypothetical statement, we
must in consistency be prepared to deny the conjunction of the statement
corresponding to the first clause of the sentence used to make the hypothetical
statement with the negation of the statement corresponding to its second clause
; i.e., a statement of the form “if p then q” does entail the corresponding statement
of the form ‘p⊃q.’ The force of “corresponding” needs elucidation. Consider
the three following very ordinary specimens of hypothetical sentences. If the
Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war. If Jones were
in charge, half the staff would have been dismissed. If it rains, the match will
be cancelled. The sentences which could be used to make statements
corresponding in the required sense to the subordinate clauses can be
ascertained by considering what it is that the speaker of each hypothetical
sentence must (in general) be assumed either to be in doubt about or to believe
to be not the case. Thus, for (1) to (8), the corresponding pairs of sentences
are as follows. The Germans invaded England in 1940; they won the war. Jones is
in charge; half the staff has been dismissed. It will rain; the match will be
cancelled. Sentences which could be used to make the statements of material
implication corresponding to the hypothetical statements made by these
sentences can now be framed from these pairs of sentences as follows. The Germans
invaded England in 1940 ⊃ they won the war. Jones is in charge ⊃ half the staff has been, dismissed. It will rain ⊃ the match will be cancelled. The very fact that these
verbal modifications are necessary, in order to obtain from the clauses of the
hypothetical sentence the clauses of the corresponding material implication
sentence is itself a symptom of the radical difference between hypothetical
statements and truth-functional statements. Some detailed differences are also
evident from these examples. The falsity of a statement made by the use of ‘The
Germans invaded England in 1940’ or ‘Jones is in charge’ is a sufficient
condition of the truth of the corresponding statements made by the use of (Ml)
and (M2) ; but not, of course, of the corresponding statements made by the use
of (1) and (2). Otherwise, there would normally be no point in using sentences
like (1) and (2) at all; for these sentences would normally carry – but not
necessarily: one may use the pluperfect or the imperfect subjunctive when one
is simply working out the consequences of an hypothesis which one may be
prepared eventually to accept -- in the tense or mood of the verb, an
implication of the utterer's belief in the falsity of the statements
corresponding to the clauses of the hypothetical. It is not raining is
sufficient to verify a statement made by the use of (MS), but not a
statement made by the use of (3). Its not raining Is also sufficient to verify
a statement made by the use of “It will rain ⊃
the match will not be cancelled.” The formulae ‘p revise ⊃q’ and ‘q revise⊃
q' are consistent with one another, and the joint assertion of corresponding
statements of these forms is equivalent to the assertion of the corresponding
statement of the form * *-~p. But “If it rains, the match will be cancelled” is
inconsistent with “If it rains, the match will not be cancelled,” and their
joint assertion in the same context is self-contradictory. Suppose we call the
statement corresponding to the first clause of a sentence used to make a
hypothetical statement the antecedent of the hypothetical statement; and the
statement corresponding to the second clause, its consequent. It is sometimes
fancied that whereas the futility of identifying conditional statements with
material implications is obvious in those cases where the implication of the
falsity of the antecedent is normally carried by the mood or tense of the verb
(e.g., (I) or (2)), there is something to be said for at least a partial
identification in cases where no such implication is involved, i.e., where the
possibility of the truth of both antecedent and consequent is left open (e.g.,
(3). In cases of the first kind (‘unfulfilled’ or ‘subjunctive’ conditionals)
our attention is directed only to the last two lines of the truth-tables for *
p ⊃ q ', where the antecedent has the truth-value, falsity; and
the suggestion that ‘~p’ entails ‘if p, then q’ is felt to be obviously wrong.
But in cases of the second kind we may inspect also the first two lines, for
the possibility of the antecedent's being fulfilled is left open; and the
suggestion that ‘p . q’ entails ‘if p, then q’ is not felt to be obviously
wrong. This is an illusion, though engendered by a reality. The fulfilment of
both antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement does not show that
the man who made the hypothetical statement was right; for the consequent might
be fulfilled as a result of factors unconnected with, or in spite of, rather
than because of, the fulfilment of the antecedent. We should be prepared to say
that the man who made the hypothetical statement was right only if we were also
prepared to say that the fulfilment of the antecedent was, at least in part,
the explanation of the fulfilment of the consequent. The reality behind the
illusion is complex : en. 3 it is, partly, the fact that, in many cases, the
fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent may provide confirmation for the
view that the existence of states of affairs like those described by the
antecedent is a good reason for expecting states of affairs like those
described by the consequent ; and it is, partly, the fact that a man whosays,
for example, 4 If it rains, the match will be cancelled * makes a prediction
(viz.. that the match will be cancelled) under a proviso (viz., that it rains),
and that the cancellation of the match because of the rain therefore leads us
to say, not only that the reasonableness of the prediction was confirmed, but
also that the prediction itself was confirmed. Because a statement of the form
“p⊃q” does not entail the corresponding statement of the form '
if p, then q ' (in its standard employment), we shall expect to find, and have
found, a divergence between the rules for '⊃'
and the rules for ' if J (in its standard employment). Because ‘if p, then q’
does entail ‘p⊃q,’ we shall also expect to find some degree of parallelism
between the rules; for whatever is entailed by ‘p "3 q’ will be entailed
by ‘if p, then q,’ though not everything which entails ‘p⊃q’ will entail ‘if p, then q.’ Indeed, we find further
parallels than those which follow simply from the facts that ‘if p, then q’
entails ‘p⊃q’ and that entailment is transitive. To laws (19)-(23)
inclusive we find no parallels for ‘if.’ But for (15) (p⊃j).JJ⊃? (16) (P ⊃q).~qZ)~p (17) p'⊃q s ~q1)~p (18) (?⊃j).(?
⊃r) ⊃ (p⊃r) we find that, with certain reservations, 1 the following
parallel laws hold good : (1 The reservations are important. It is, e. g.,
often impossible to apply entailment-rule (iii) directly without obtaining
incorrect or absurd results. Some modification of the structure of the clauses
of the hypothetical is commonly necessary. But formal logic gives us no guide
as to which modifications are required. If we apply rule (iii) to our specimen
hypothetical sentences, without modifying at all the tenses or moods of the
individual clauses, we obtain expressions which are scarcely English. If we
preserve as nearly as possible the tense-mood structure, in the simplest way
consistent with grammatical requirements, we obtain the sentences : If the
Germans had not won the war, they would not have invaded England in
1940.) If half the staff had not been dismissed, Jones would not be in
charge. If the match is not cancelled, it will not rain. But these sentences,
so far from being logically equivalent to the originals, have in each case a
quite different sense. It is possible, at least in some such cases, to frame
sentences of more or less the appropriate pattern for which one can imagine a
use and which do stand in the required logical relationship to the original
sentences (e.g., ‘If it is not the case that half the staff has been dismissed,
then Jones can't be in charge;’ or ‘If the Germans did not win the war, it's
only because they did not invade England in 1940;’ or even (should historical
evidence become improbably scanty), ‘If the Germans did not win the war, it
can't be true that they invaded England in 1940’). These changes reflect
differences in the circumstances in which one might use these, as opposed to
the original, sentences. Thus the sentence beginning ‘If Jones were in charge
…’ would normally, though not necessarily, be used by a man who antecedently
knows that Jones is not in charge : the sentence beginning ‘If it's not the
case that half the staff has been dismissed …’ by a man who is working towards
the conclusion that Jones is not in charge. To say that the sentences are
nevertheless logically equivalent is to point to the fact that the grounds for
accepting either, would, in different circumstances, have been grounds for accepting
the soundness of the move from ‘Jones is in charge’ to ‘Half the staff has been
dismissed.’) (i) (if p, then q; and p)^q
(ii) (if p, then qt and not-g) Dnot-j? (iii) (if p, then f) ⊃ (if not-0, then not-j?) (iv) (if p, then f ; and iff, then
r) ⊃(if j>, then r) (One must remember that calling the
formulae (i)-(iv) is the same as saying that, e.g., in the case of (iii), c if
p, then q ' entails 4 if not-g, then not-j> '.) And similarly we find that,
for some steps which would be invalid for 4 if ', there are corresponding steps
that would be invalid for “⊃,” e. g. (p^q).q :. p are invalid inference-patterns,
and so are if p, then q ; and q /. p if p, then ; and not-j? /. not-f .The
formal analogy here may be described by saying that neither * p 13 q ' nor * if
j?, then q * is a simply convertible formula. We have found many laws (e.g.,
(19)-(23)) which hold for “⊃” and not for “if.” As an example of
a law which holds for “if,” but not for
“⊃,” we may give the analytic formula “ ~[(if p, then q) * (if
p, then not-g)]’. The corresponding formula 4 ~[(P 3 ?) * (j? 3 ~?}]’ is not
analytic, but (el (28)) is equivalent to the contingent formula ‘~~p.’ The
rules to the effect that formulae such as (19)-{23) are analytic are sometimes
referred to as ‘paradoxes of implication.’ This is a misnomer. If ‘⊃’ is taken as identical either with ‘entails’ or, more
widely, with ‘if ... then …’ in its
standard use, the rules are not paradoxical, but simply incorrect. If ‘⊃’ is given the meaning it has in the system of truth functions,
the rules are not paradoxical, but simple and platitudinous consequences of the
meaning given to the symbol. Throughout this section, I have spoken of a
‘primary or standard’ use of “if … then …,” or “if,” of which the main
characteristics were: that for each hypothetical statement made by this use of
“if,” there could be made just one statement which would be the antecedent of
the hypothetical and just one statement which would be its consequent; that the
hypothetical statement is acceptable (true, reasonable) if the antecedent
statement, if made or accepted, would, in the circumstances, be a good ground
or reason for accepting the consequent statement; and that the making of the
hypothetical statement carries the implication either of uncertainty about, or
of disbelief in, the fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent. (1 Not all
uses of * if ', however, exhibit all these characteristics. In particular,
there is a use which has an equal claim to rank as standard and which is
closely connected with the use described, but which does not exhibit the first
characteristic and for which the description of the remainder must consequently
be modified. I have in mind what are sometimes called 'variable' or 'general’
hypothetical : e.g., ‘lf ice is left in the sun, it melts,’ ‘If the side of a
triangle is produced, the exterior angle is equal to the sum of the two
interior and opposite angles ' ; ' If a child is very strictly disciplined in
the nursery, it will develop aggressive tendencies in adult life,’ and so on.
To a statement made by the use of a sentence such as these there corresponds no
single pair of statements which are, respectively, its antecedent and
consequent. On the other 1 There is much more than this to be said about this
way of using ‘if;’ in particular, about the meaning of the question whether the
antecedent would be a good ground or reason for accepting the consequent and
about the exact way in which this question is related to the question of
whether the hypothetical is true {acceptable, reasonable) or not hand, for
every such statement there is an indefinite number of non-general hypothetical
statements which might be called exemplifications, applications, of the
variable hypothetical; e.g., a statement made by the use of the sentence ‘If
this piece of ice is left in the sun, it will melt.’ To the subject of variable
hypothetical I may return later. 1 Two relatively uncommon uses of ‘if’ may be
illustrated respectively by the sentences ‘If he felt embarrassed, he showed no
signs of it’ and ‘If he has passed his exam, I’m a Dutchman (I'll eat my hat,
&c.)’ The sufficient and necessary condition of the truth of a statement
made by the first is that the man referred to showed no sign of embarrassment.
Consequently, such a statement cannot be treated either as a standard
hypothetical or as a material implication. Examples of the second kind are
sometimes erroneously treated as evidence that ‘if’ does, after all, behave
somewhat as ‘⊃’ behaves. The evidence for this is, presumably, the facts
(i) that there is no connexion between antecedent and consequent; (ii) that the
consequent is obviously not (or not to be) fulfilled ; (iii) that the intention
of the speaker is plainly to give emphatic expression to the conviction that
the antecedent is not fulfilled either ; and (iv) the fact that “(p ⊃ q) . ~q” entails “~p.” But this is a strange piece of
logic. For, on any possible interpretation, “if p then q” has, in respect of
(iv), the same logical powers as ‘p⊃q;’
and it is just these logical powers that we are jokingly (or fantastically)
exploiting. It is the absence of connexion referred to in (i) that makes it a
quirk, a verbal flourish, an odd use of ‘if.’ If hypothetical statements were
material implications, the statements would be not a quirkish oddity, but a
linguistic sobriety and a simple truth. Finally, we may note that ‘if’ can be employed not simply in making
statements, but in, e.g., making provisional announcements of intention (e.g.,
‘If it rains, I shall stay at home’) which, like unconditional announcements of
intention, we do not call true or false but describe in some other way. If the
man who utters the quoted sentence leaves home in spite of the rain, we do not
say that what he said was false, though we might say that he lied (never really
intended to stay in) ; or that he changed his mind. There are further uses of
‘if’ which I shall not discuss. 1 v. ch. 7, I. The safest way to read the
material implication sign is, perhaps, ‘not both … and not …’ The material
equivalence sign ‘≡’ has the meaning given by the
following definition : p q =df=⊃/'(p⊃ff).(sOj)'
and the phrase with which it is sometimes identified, viz., ‘if and only if,’
has the meaning given by the following definition: ‘p if and only if q’ =df ‘if
p then g, and if q then p.’ Consequently, the objections which hold against the
identification of ‘p⊃q” with ‘if p then q’ hold with double force against the
identification of “p≡q’ with ‘p if and only if q.’ ‘If’
is of particular interest to Grice. The interest in the ‘if’ is double in
Grice. In doxastic contexts, he needs it for his analysis of ‘intending’
against an ‘if’-based dispositional (i.e. subjective-conditional) analysis. He
is of course, later interested in how Strawson misinterpreted the ‘indicative’
conditional! It is later when he starts to focus on the ‘buletic’ mode marker,
that he wants to reach to Paton’s categorical (i.e. non-hypothetical)
imperative. And in so doing, he has to face the criticism of those Oxonian
philosophers who were sceptical about the very idea of a conditional buletic
(‘conditional command – what kind of a command is that?’. Grice would refere to
the protasis, or antecedent, as a relativiser – where we go again to the
‘absolutum’-‘relativum’ distinction. The conditional is also paramount in
Grice’s criticism of Ryle, where the keyword would rather be ‘disposition.’
Then ther eis the conditional and disposition. Grice is a philosophical
psychologist. Does that make sense? So are Austin (Other Minds), Hampshire
(Dispositions), Pears (Problems in philosophical psychology) and Urmson
(Parentheticals). They are ALL against Ryle’s silly analysis in terms of
single-track disposition" vs. "many-track disposition," and
"semi-disposition." If I hum and walk, I can either hum or walk. But
if I heed mindfully, while an IN-direct sensing may guide me to YOUR soul, a
DIRECT sensing guides me to MY soul. When Ogden consider attacks to meaning,
theres what he calls the psychological, which he ascribes to Locke Grices
attitude towards Ryle is difficult to assess. His most favourable assessment
comes from Retrospective epilogue, but then he is referring to Ryle’s fairy
godmother. Initially, he mentions Ryle as a philosopher engaged in, and
possibly dedicated to the practice of the prevailing Oxonian methodology, i.e.
ordinary-language philosophy. Initially, then, Grice enlists Ryle in
the regiment of ordinary-language philosophers. After introducing Athenian
dialectic and Oxonian dialectic, Grice traces some parallelisms, which should
not surprise. It is tempting to suppose that Oxonian dialectic reproduces some
ideas of Athenian dialectic. It would actually be surprising if there
were no parallels. Ryle was, after all, a skilled and enthusiastic student of
Grecian philosophy. Interestingly, Grice then has Ryles fairy godmother as
proposing the idea that, far from being a basis for rejecting the
analytic-synthetic distinction, opposition that there are initially two
distinct bundles of statements, bearing the labels analytic and synthetic,
lying around in the world of thought waiting to be noticed, provides us with
the key to making the analytic-synthetic distinction acceptable. The
essay has a verificationist ring to it. Recall Ayer and the
verificationists trying to hold water with concepts like fragile and the
problem of counterfactual conditionals vis-a-vis observational and
theoretical concepts. Grices essay has two parts: one on disposition as
such, and the second, the application to a type of psychological
disposition, which would be phenomenalist in a way, or verificationist, in
that it derives from introspection of, shall we say, empirical
phenomena. Grice is going to analyse, I want a sandwich. One person
wrote in his manuscript, there is something with the way Grice goes to work.
Still. Grice says that I want a sandwich (or I will that I eat a sandwich)
is problematic, for analysis, in that it seems to refer to experience that is
essentially private and unverifiable. An analysis of intending that p in terms
of being disposed that p is satisfied solves this. Smith wants a sandwich, or
he wills that he eats a sandwich, much as Toby needs nuts, if Smith opens the
fridge and gets one. Smith is disposed to act such that p is satisfied.
This Grice opposes to the ‘special-episode’ analysis of intending that p. An
utterance like I want a sandwich iff by uttering the utterance, the utterer is
describing this or that private experience, this or that private
sensation. This or that sensation may take the form of a highly specific
souly sate, like what Grice calls a sandwich-wanting-feeling. But then, if
he is not happy with the privacy special-episode analysis, Grice is also
dismissive of Ryles behaviourism in The concept of mind, fresh from
the press, which would describe the utterance in terms purely of this or that observable
response, or behavioural output, provided this or that sensory input. Grice
became friendlier with functionalism after Lewis taught him how. The
problem or crunch is with the first person. Surely, Grice claims, one does not
need to wait to observe oneself heading for the fridge before one is in a
position to know that he is hungry. Grice poses a problem for the
protocol-reporter. You see or observe someone else, Smith, that Smith wants a
sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich. You ask for evidence. But when it
is the agent himself who wants the sandwich, or wills that he eats a
sandwich, Grice melodramatically puts it, I am not in the
audience, not even in the front row of the stalls; I am on the
stage. Genial, as you will agree. Grice then goes on to offer an
analysis of intend, his basic and target attitude, which he has just used to
analyse and rephrase Peirces mean and which does relies on this or that piece
of dispositional evidence, without divorcing itself completely from the privileged
status or access of first-person introspective knowledge. In “Uncertainty,”
Grice weakens his reductive analysis of intending that, from neo-Stoutian,
based on certainty, or assurance, to neo-Prichardian, based on predicting. All
very Oxonian: Stout was the sometime Wilde reader in mental philosophy (a post
usually held by a psychologist, rather than a philosopher ‒ Stouts favourite
philosopher is psychologist James! ‒ and Prichard was Cliftonian and the proper
White chair of moral philosophy. And while in “Uncertainty” he allows that
willing that may receive a physicalist treatment, qua state, hell later turn a
functionalist, discussed under ‘soul, below, in his “Method in
philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre” (henceforth, “Method”),
in the Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association,
repr. in “Conception.” Grice can easily relate to Hamsphires "Thought and
Action," a most influential essay in the Oxonian scene. Rather than Ryle!
And Grice actually addresses further topics on intention drawing on Hampshire,
Hart, and his joint collaboration with Pears. Refs.: The main reference is
Grice’s early essay on disposition and intention, The H. P. Grice. Refs.: The
main published source is Essay 4 in WOW, but there are essays on ‘ifs and
cans,’ so ‘if’ is a good keyword, on ‘entailment,’ and for the connection with
‘intending,’ ‘disposition and intention,’ BANC.
conjunctum: One has to be careful because the scholastic vocabulary
also misleadingly has ‘copulatum’ for this. The ‘copulatum’ should be
restricted to other usages, which Grice elaborates on ‘izzing’ and hazing.
traditional parlance, one ‘pars orationis.’ Aulus Gellius writes; “What the Greeks call
“sympleplegmenon” we call conjunctum or copulatum, copulative sentence. For
example. The Stoic copulative sentence — sumpleplegmenon axioma — is translated
by “conjunctum” or “copulatum,” for example: „P. Scipio, son of Paulus, was a
consul twice and was given the honour of triumph and also performed the
function of censor and was the colleague of L. Mummius during his censorship”.
Here, Aulus Gellius made a noteworthy remark, referring to the value of truth
of the composing propositions ■ (a Stoic problem). In keeping with the Stoics,
he wrote: “If one element of the copulative sentence is false, even if all the
other elements are true, the copulative sentence is false” (“in omni aiitem
conjuncto si unum est mendacium etiamsi, caetera vera sunt, totum esse
mendacium dicitur”). In the identification of ‘and’ with ‘Λ’
there is already a considerable
distortion of the facts. ‘And’ can perform many jobs which ‘Λ’ cannot perform. It can, for instance, be used to couple
nouns (“Tom and William arrived”), or adjectives (“He was hungry and thirsty”),
or adverbs (“He walked slowly and painfully”); while ' . ' can be used only to
couple expressions which could appear as separate sentences. One might be
tempted to say that sentences in which “and” coupled words or phrases, were
short for sentences in which “and” couples clauses; e.g., that “He was hungry
and thirsty” was short for “He was hungry and he was thirsty.” But this is
simply false. We do not say, of anyone who uses sentences like “Tom and William
arrived,” that he is speaking elliptically, or using abbreviations. On the contrary,
it is one of the functions of “and,” to which there is no counterpart In the
case of “.,” to form plural subjects or compound predicates. Of course it is
true of many statements of the forms “x and y” are/* or ' x is /and g \ that
they are logically equivalent to corresponding statements of the" form * x
Is /and yisf'oT^x is /and x is g \ But, first, this is a fact about the use, in
certain contexts, of “and,” to which
there corresponds no rule for the use of * . '. And, second, there are
countless contexts for which such an equivalence does not hold; e.g. “Tom and
Mary made friends” is not equivalent to “Tom made friends and Mary made
friends.” They mean, usually, quite different things. But notice that one could
say “Tom and Mary made friends; but not with one another.” The implication of
mutuality in the first phrase is not so strong but that it can be rejected
without self-contradiction; but it is strong enough to make the rejection a
slight shock, a literary effect. Nor does such an equivalence hold if we
replace “made friends” by “met yesterday,” “were conversing,” “got married,” or
“were playing chess.” Even “Tom and William arrived” does not mean the same as
“Tom arrived and William arrived;” for the first suggests “together” and the
second an order of arrival. It might be conceded that “and” has functions which
“ .” has not (e.g., may carry in certain contexts an implication of mutuality
which ‘.’ does not), and yet claimed
that the rules which hold for “and,” where it is used to couple clauses, are
the same as the rules which hold for “.” Even this is not true. By law (11),
" p , q ' is logically equivalent to * q . p ' ; but “They got married and
had a child” or “He set to work and found a job” are by no means logically
equivalent to “They had a child and got married” or “He found a job and set to
work.” One might try to avoid these difficulties by regarding ‘.’ as having the
function, not of ' and ', but of what it looks like, namely a full stop. We
should then have to desist from talking of statements of the forms ' p .q\ * p
. J . r * &CM and talk of sets-of-statements of these forms instead.
But this would not avoid all, though it would avoid some, of the difficulties.
Even in a passage of prose consisting of several indicative sentences, the
order of the sentences may be in general vital to the sense, and in particular,
relevant (in a way ruled out by law (II)) to the truth-conditions of a
set-of-statements made by such a passage. The fact is that, in general, in
ordinary speech and writing, clauses and sentences do not contribute to the
truthconditions of things said by the use of sentences and paragraphs in which
they occur, in any such simple way as that pictured by the truth-tables for the
binary connectives (' D ' * . ', 4 v ', 35 ') of the system, but in far more
subtle, various, and complex ways. But it is precisely the simplicity of the
way in which, by the definition of a truth-function, clauses joined by these
connectives contribute to the truth-conditions of sentences resulting from the
junctions, which makes possible the stylized, mechanical neatness of the
logical system. It will not do to reproach the logician for his divorce from
linguistic realities, any more than it will do to reproach the abstract painter
for not being a representational artist; but one may justly reproach him if he
claims to be a representational artist. An abstract painting may be,
recognizably, a painting of something. And the identification of “.” with
‘and,’ or with a full stop, is not a simple mistake. There is a great deal of
point in comparing them. The interpretation of, and rules for, “.”define a
minimal linguistic operation, which we might call ‘simple conjunction’ and
roughly describe as the joining together of two (or more) statements in the process
of asserting them both (or all). And this is a part of what we often do with '
and ', and with the full stop. But we do not string together at random any
assertions we consider true; we bring them together, in spoken or written
sentences or paragraphs, only when there is some further reason for the
rapprochement, e.g., when they record successive episodes in a single
narrative. And that for the sake of which we conjoin may confer upon the
sentences embodying the conjunction logical features at variance with the rules
for “.” Thus we have seen that a statement of the form “p and q” may carry an
implication of temporal order incompatible with that carried by the
corresponding statement of the form “q and p.” This is not to deny that
statements corresponding to these, but of the forms ‘pΛq’ and ‘qΛp’would
be, if made, logically equivalent; for such statements would carry no
implications, and therefore no incompatible implications, of temporal order.
Nor is it to deny the point, and merit, of the comparison; the statement of the
form ‘pΛq’ means at least a part of what is
meant by the corresponding statement of the form ‘p and q.’ We might say: the form ‘p q’ is an abstraction from the
different uses of the form ‘p and q.’ Simple conjunction is a minimal element in
colloquial conjunction. We may speak of ‘. ‘ as the conjunctive sign; and read
it, for simplicity's sake, as “and” or “both … and … “I have already remarked
that the divergence between the meanings given to the truth-functional
constants and the meanings of the ordinary conjunctions with which they are
commonly identified is at a minimum in the cases of ' ~ ' and ‘.’ We have seen,
as well, that the remaining constants of the system can be defined in terms of
these two. Other interdefinitions are equally possible. But since ^’ and ‘.’ are more nearly identifiable with ‘not’ and
‘and’ than any other constant with any other English word, I prefer to
emphasize the definability of the remaining constants in terms of ‘ .’ and ‘~.’
It is useful to remember that every rule or law of the system can be expressed
in terms of negation and simple conjunction. The system might, indeed, be
called the System of Negation and Conjunction. Grice lists ‘and’ as the first
binary functor in his response to Strawson. Grice’s conversationalist
hypothesis applies to this central ‘connective.’ Interestingly, in his essay on
Aristotle, and discussing, “French poet,” Grice distinguishes between
conjunction and adjunction. “French” is adjuncted to ‘poet,’ unlike ‘fat’ in
‘fat philosopher.’ And
Grice:substructural logics, metainference, implicature. Grice explores some of
the issues regarding pragmatic enrichment and substructural logics with a
special focus on the first dyadic truth-functor, ‘and.’ In particular,
attention is given to a sub-structural “rule” pertaining to the commutativeness
of conjunction, applying a framework that sees Grice as clarifying the extra
material that must be taken into account, and which will referred to as the
‘implicatum.’ Grice is thus presented as defending a “classical-logical” rule
that assigns commutativeness to conjunction while accounting for Strawson-type
alleged counterexamples to the effect that some utterances of the schema “p and
q” hardly allow for a ‘commutative’ “inference” (“Therefore, q and p”). How to
proceed conservatively while allowing room for pluralism? Embracing the
“classical-logical” syntactic introduction-cum-elimination and semantic
interpretation of “and,” the approach by Cook Wilson in “Statement and
inference” to the inferential métier of “and” is assessed. If Grice grants that
there is some degree of artificiality in speaking of the meaning or sense of
“and,” the polemic brings us to the realm of ‘pragmatic inference,’ now
contrasted to a ‘logical inference.’ The endorsement by Grice of an
‘impoverished’ reading of conjunction appears conservative vis-à-vis not just
Strawson’s ‘informalist’ picture but indeed the formalist frameworks of
relevant, linear, and ordered logic. An external practical decision à la Carnap
is in order, that allows for an enriched, stronger, reading, if not in terms of
a conventional implicatum, as Strawson suggests. A ‘classical-logic’ reading in
terms of a conversational implicatum agrees with Grice’s ‘Bootstrap,’ a
methodological principle constraining the meta-language/object-language divide.
Keywords: conjunction, pragmatic
enrichment, H. Paul Grice, Bootstrap. “[I]n recent years, my disposition to
resort to formalism has markedly diminished. This retreat may well have been
accelerated when, of all people, Hilary Putnam remarked to me that I was too
formal!”H.P. Grice, ‘Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and
opinions of Paul Grice,’ in Grandy & Warner, 1986:61 Keywords:
metainference, substructural logics, classical logic, conjunction, H. Paul
Grice, pragmatic inference; Rudolf Carnap, bootstrap, modernism, formalism,
neotraditionalism, informalism, pragmatics, inference, implicature, extensional
conjunction, intensional conjunction, multiplicative conjunction, additive
conjunction. Grice’s approach consistent with Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism
that allows room for the account put forward by H. Paul Grice in connection
with a specific meta-inference (or second-order “… yields …”) as it may help us
take an ‘external’ practical decision as to how to recapture a structural
‘rule’ of classical logic. The attempt involves a reconsideration, with a
special focus on the sub-structural classical logic rules for conjunction of
Grice’s ultimately metaphilosophical motivation in the opening paragraphs to
“Logic and Conversation.” Grice explores stick the first dyadic truth-functor Grice lists. In
fact, it’s the first alleged divergence, between “p and q” and “p. . q” that
Grice had quotes in “Prolegomena” to motivate his audience, and the example he
brings up vis-à-vis an ‘alleged’ “linguistic offence” (a paradox?) that an
utterer may incur by uttering “He got into bed and took his clothes off, but I
don’t mean to suggest he did it in that order” (Grice 1981:186). Implicata are
cancellable. In the present scheme, which justifies substructural logics, this
amounts to any ‘intensional’ reading of a connective (e. g. ‘and’) being
susceptible of being turned or ‘trans-formed’
into
the correlative extensional one in light of the cancelling clause, which brings
new information to the addressee A. This is hardly problematic if we consider
that sub-structural logics do not aim to capture the ‘semantics’ of a
logical constant, and that the sub-structural logical ‘enrichment’ is relevant,
rather, for the constant’s ‘inferential role.’Neither is it problematic that
the fact that the ‘inferential role’ of a logical constant (such as ‘and’) may
change (allowing this ‘trans-formation’ from classical-logical extensional to
sub-structural logical intension, given new information which will be used by
the addressee A to ‘work out’ the utterer U’s meaning. The obvious, but worthemphasizing, entailment in Grice’s
assertion about the “mistake” shared by Formalism and Informalism is that
FORMALISM (as per the standard presentations of ‘classical logic’) does commit
a mistake! Re-capturing the FORMALISM of classical logic is hardly as direct in
the Griceian programme as one would assume. Grice’s ultimate meta-philosophical
motivation, though, seems to be more in agreement with FORMALISM. Formalism can
repair the mistake, Grice thinks, not by allowing a change in the assigning of
an ‘interpretation’ rule of an empoverished “and” (““p and q” is 1 iff both p
and q are 1, 0 otherwise.” (Cfr. Pap: “Obviously, I cannot prove that
“(p and q) ≡ (q and p)” is tautologous (and that
therefore “He got into bed and took off his clothes’ iff ‘he took of his
clothes and got into bed,’) unless I first
construct an adequate truth-table defining the use of “and.”
But surely one of the points of constructing such a table is to ‘reproduce’ or
capture’ the meaning of ‘and’ in a natural language! The proposal seems
circular!) and a deductive ‘syntactics’ rule,
involving the Gentzen-type elimination of ‘and’ (“ “p and q” yields “p”; and
its reciprocal, “ “p and q” yields “q”.” To avoid commiting the mistake,
formalism must recognise the conversational implicatum ceteris paribus derived
from some constraint of rational co-operation (in particular, the desideratum
or conversational maxim, “be orderly!”) and allow for some syntactical scope
device to make the implicatum obvious, an ‘explicatum,’ almost (without the
need to reinforce “and” into “and then”). In Grice’s examples, it may not even
be a VIOLATION, but a FLOUT, of a conversational maxim or desideratum, within
the observance of an overarching co-operation principle (A violation goes
unnoticed; a flout is a rhetorical device. Cfr. Quintilian’s observation that
Homer would often use “p & q” with the implicatum “but not in that order”
left to the bard’s audience to work out). Grice’s attempt is to recapture
“classical-logic” “and,” however pragmatically ‘enriched,’ shares some features
with other sub-structural logics, since we have allowed for a syntactical tweak
of the ‘inference’ rules; which we do via the pragmatist (rather than
pragmatic) ‘implicatural’ approach to logic, highlighting one pragmatic aspect
of a logic without CUT. Grice grants
that “p and q” should read “p . q” “when [“p . q” is] interpreted in the
classical two-valued way.” His wording is thus consistent with OTHER ways
(notably relevant logic, linear and ordered logic). Grice seems to have as one
of his ‘unspeakable truths’ things like “He got into bed and took his clothes
off,” “said of a man who proceeds otherwise.” After mentioning
“and” “interpreted in the classical two-valued way,” Grice dedicates a
full paragraph to explore the classical
logic’s manifesto. The idea is to provide a SYSTEM that will give us an
algorithm to decide which formulae are theorems. The ‘logical consequence’ (or
“… yields …”) relation is given a precise definition.Grice notes that
“some logicians [whom he does not mention] may at some time have wanted to
claim that there are in fact no such divergences [between “p and q” and “p .
q”]; but such claims, if made at all, have been somewhat rashly made, and those
suspected of making them have been subjected to some pretty rough handling.” “Those who concede that such divergences [do]
exist” are the formalists. “An outline of a not uncharacteristic FORMALIST position
may be given as follows,” Grice notes. We proceed to number the thesis since it
sheds light on what makes a sub-structural logic sub-structural“Insofar as
logicians are concerned with the formulation of very general patterns of VALID
INFERENCE (“… yields…”) the formal device (“p . q”) possesses a decisive
advantage over their natural counterpart (“p and q.”) For it will be possible
to construct in terms of the formal device (“p . q”) a system of very general
formulas, a considerable number of which can be regarded as, or are closely
related to, a pattern of inferences the expression of which involves the
device.”“Such a system may consist of a certain set of simple formulas that
MUST BE ACCEPTABLE if the device has the MEANING (or sense) that has been
ASSIGNED to it, and an indefinite number of further formulas, many of them less
obviously acceptable (“q . p”), each of which can be shown to be acceptable if
the members of the original set are acceptable.”“We have, thus, a way of
handling dubiously acceptable patterns of inference (“q. p,” therefore, “p. q”)
and if, as is sometimes possible, we can apply A DECISION PROCEDURE, we have an
even better way.”“Furthermore, from a PHILOSOPHICAL point of view, the
possession by the natural counterpart (“p and q”) of that element in their
meaning (or sense), which they do NOT share with the corresponding formal
device, is to be regarded as an IMPERFECTION; the element in question is an
undesirable excrescence. For the presence of this element has the result that the
CONCEPT within which it appears cannot be precisely/clearly defined, and that
at least SOME statements involving it cannot, in some circumstances, be
assigned a definite TRUTH VALUE; and the indefiniteness of this concept is not
only objectionable in itself but leaves open the way to METAPHYSICS: we cannot
be certain that the natural-language expression (“p and q”) is METAPHYSICALLY
‘LOADED.’”“For these reasons, the expression, as used in natural speech (“p and
q”), CANNOT be regarded as finally acceptable, and may tum out to be, finally,
not fully intelligible.” “The proper course is to conceive and begin to
construct an IDEAL language, incorporating the formal device (“p . q”), the
sentences of which will be clear, determinate in TRUTH-VALUE, and certifiably
FREE FROM METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS.”“The foundations of SCIENCE will now be
PHILOSOPHICALLY SECURE, since the statements of the scientist will be
EXPRESSIBLE (though not necessarily actually expressed) within this ideal
language.”What kind of enrichment are we talking
about? It may be understood as a third conjunct ptn-l & qtn
& (tn > tn-l) FIRST
CONJUNCT + SECOND CONJUNCT + “TEMPORAL SUCCESSION” p AND THEN q To
buttress the buttressing of ‘and,’ Grice uses ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ for other
operators like ‘disjunction – and his rationale for the Modified Occam’s razor
would be: “A STRONGER SENSE for a truth-functional dyadic operator SHOULD NOT
BE POSTULATED when A WEAK (or minimal) SENSE does, provided we add the
CANCELLABLE IMPLICATUM.” Grice SIMPLIFIES semantics, but there’s no free lunch,
since he now has to explain how the IMPLICATUM arises. Let’s revise the way “and,” the first ‘dyadic’ device in
“Logic and Conversation,” is invoked by Grice in “Prolegomena.” “He got into
bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a someone who took his clothes off and
got into bed.” Cfr. theorems ∧I
= ` ∀ φ ψ• [φ; ψ] |= φ ∧
ψ ∧E = ` ∀
φ ψ• ([φ ∧ ψ] |= φ) ∧ ([φ ∧
ψ] |= ψ)We have: He got into bed and took his clothes off (Grice, 1989:9). He took his clothes off and got into bed (Grice, 1989:9). He got into bed and took his clothes off but I don’t want to
suggest that he did those things in that order (Grice, 1981:186). He first took his clothes off and then got into bed (Grice
1989:9). In invoking Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory, is Grice being
fair? Strawson had noted, provocatively: “[The formula] “p . q’ is
logically equivalent to ‘q . p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had a
child’ or ‘He set to work and found a job’ are by no means logically equivalent
to ‘They had a child and got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’”How
easier things would have gone should Strawson have used the adjective
‘pragmatic’ that he mentions later in his treatise in connection with Grice. Strawson
is sticking with the truth-functionality and thinking of ‘equivalence’ in terms
of ‘iff’ – but his remark may be rephrased as involving a notion of
‘inference.’ In terms of LOGICAL INFERENCE, the premise “He got into bed and
took his clothes off” YIELDS “He took off his clothes and got into bed,” even
if that does NOT ‘yield’ in terms of ceteris paribus PRAGMATIC inference. It
would have pleased Grice to read the
above as: “[The formula] “p . q’ is
equivalentL to ‘q . p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had
a child’ or ‘He set to work and found a job’ are by no means equivalentP
to ‘They had a child and got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’” By appealing to a desideratum of rational co-operative
discourse, “be orderly,” Grice thinks he can restore “and” to its
truth-functional sense, while granting that the re-inforced “then” (or an
alleged extra sense of “temporal succession,” as he has it in “Prolegomena”) is
merely and naturally (if cancellable on occasion) conversationally implicated
(even if under a generalised way) under the assumption that the addressee A
will recognise that the utterer U is observing the desideratum, and is being
orderly. But witness variants to the cancellation (3) above. There is an indifferent,
indeterminate form: He got into bed and took off his clothes, though I don’t
mean to imply that he did that in that order.versus the less indeterminate He
got into bed and took his clothes off, but not in that order. +> i.e. in the
reverse one.Postulating a pragmatic desideratum allows Grice to keep any
standard sub-structural classical rule for “and” and “&” (as s he does when
he goes more formalist in “Vacuous Names,” his tribute to Quine).How are to
interpret the Grice/Strawson ‘rivalry’ in meta-inference? Using Frege’s
assertion “⊦LK” as our operator to read “… yields…” we have:p & q ⊦LK q & p and q & p ⊦LK p & q. In
“Prolegomena,” then, Grice introduces:“B. Examples involve an area of special
interest to me [since he was appointed logic tutor at St. John’s], namely
that of expressions which are candidates for being natural analogues to logical
constants and which may, or may not, ‘diverge’ in meaning [not use] from the
related constants (considered as elements in a classical logic, standardly
interpreted). It has, for example, been suggested that because it would be
incorrect or inappropriate [or misleading, even false?] to say “He got into bed
and took off his clothes” of [someone] who first took off his clothes and then
got into bed, it is part of the meaning [or sense] or part of one meaning
[sub-sense] of “and” to convey temporal succession” (Grice 1989:8). The
explanation in terms of a reference to “be orderly” is mentioned in
“Presupposition and conversational implicature” (Grice 1981:186). Grice notes: “It
has been suggested by [an informalist like] Strawson, in [An] Introduction to
Logical Theory [by changing the title of Strawson’s essay, Grice seems to be
implicating that Strawson need not sound pretentious] that there is a
divergence between the ordinary use or meaning of ‘and’ and the conjunction
sign [“.”] of propositional or predicate calculus because “He took off his
clothes and got into to bed” does not seem to have the same meaning as “He got
into bed and took off his clothes.”” Grice goes on: “[Strawson’s] suggestion here is, of course, that, in order properly
to represent the ordinary use of [the
word] “and,” one would have to allow a special sense (or sub-sense) for [the word] “and” which contained
some reference to the idea that what was
mentioned before [the word] “and” was temporally prior to what was mentioned
after it, and that, on that supposition,
one could deal with this case.”Grice goes on: “[Contra Strawson,] I want to
suggest in reply that it is not necessary
[call him an Occamist, minimalist] if one operates on some general principle
[such as M. O. R., or Modified Occam’s Razor] of keeping down, as far as possible, the number of special sense
[sic] of words that one has to invoke, to give countenance to the
alleged divergence of meaning.” The
constraint is not an arbitrary assignation of sense, but a rational one derived
from the nature of conversation:“It is just that there is a general supposition
[which would be sub-sidiary to the general maxim of Manner or ‘Modus’ (‘be
perspicuous! [sic]’) that one presents one's material in an orderly manner and, if what one is engaged upon is a narration (if
one is talking about events), then the
most orderly manner for a narration of events is an order that corresponds to the order in which they took
place.”Grice concludes: “So, the meaning of the expression ‘He took off his
clothes and he got into bed” and the
corresponding expression with a [classical] logician's constant
"&" [when given a standard two-valued interpretation] (i.e. “He took his clothes off & he got into
bed") would be exactly the same.”Grice’s
indifference with what type of formalism to adopt is obvious: “And, indeed, if
anybody actually used in ordinary speech the "&" as a piece of vocabulary instead of as a formal(ist)
device, and used it to connect together sentences of this type, they would collect just the same
[generalised conversational] implicata as the ordinary English sentences have without any extra explanation
of the meaning of the word ‘and’.” It is
then that Grice goes on to test the ‘cancellability,’ producing the
typical Gricean idiom, above:He took his
clothes off and got into bed but I don't mean to suggest that he did those
things in that order. Grice goes on: “I
should say that I did suggest, in [my essay] on implicature, two sorts of tests by which one might hope to identify a conversational
implicature. [...] I did not mean to suggest that these tests were final, only
that they were useful. One test was the possibility of cancellation; that is to
say, could one without [classical] logical absurdity [when we have a standard
two-valued interpretation], attach a cancellation clause. For instance, could I
say (9)?” Grice: “If that is not a linguistic offense [and ‘false’], or does
not seem to be, then, so far as it goes, it is an indication that what one has
here is a conversational implicature, and that the original [alleged meaning,
sense, or] suggestion of temporal succession [is] not part of the conventional
meaning of the sentence.” Grice (1981, p. 186). Formalising the temporal succession
is never enough but it may help, and (9) becomes (10):p & q and ptn-l &
qtn where “tn-l” is a temporal index
for a time prior to “tn”. It is interesting to note that Chomsky, of all
people, in 1966, a year before Grice’s William James lectures, in Aspects of
the theory of syntax refers to “A [sic] P. Grice” as propounding that temporal
succession be considered implicature (Since this pre-dates the William James
lectures by a year, it was via the seminars at Oxford that reached Chomsky at
MIT via some of Grice’s tutees).Let us revise Urmson’s wording in his treatment
of the ‘clothes’ example, to check if Grice is being influenced by Urmson’s
presentation of the problem to attack Strawson. Urmson notes: “In
formal[ist] logic, the connective[…] ‘and’ [is] always given a minimum
[empoverished] meaning, as [I] have done above, such that any complex
[molecular sentence] formed by the use of [it] alone is [always] a
truth-function of its constituents.”Urmson goes on to sound almost like
Strawson, whose Introduction to Logical Theory he credits. Urmson notes: “In
ordinary discourse the connective[… ‘and]] often [has] a *richer* meaning.”Urmson
must be credited, with this use of ‘richer’ as the father of pragmatic
enRICHment!Urmson goes on: “Thus ‘He took his clothes off and got into bed’
implies temporal succession and has a different meaning from [the impoverished,
unreinforced] ‘He got into bed and took off his clothes.’” Urmson does not play
with Grice’s reinforcement: “He first got into bed and then took his clothes
off.’ Urmson goes on, however, in his concluding remark, to side with Grice
versus Strawson, as he should! Urmson notes: “[Formal(ist) l]ogicians would
justify their use of the minimum [impoverished, unreinforced, weak] meaning by
pointing out that it is the common element in all our uses [or every use] of
‘and.’” (Urmson, 1956:9-10). The
commutativeness of ‘and’ in the examples he gives is rejected by Strawson. How
does Strawson reflect this in his sub-structural rule for ‘and’?
As Humberstone puts it, “It
is possible to define a version of the calculus, which defines most of the
syntax of the logical operators by means of axioms, and which uses only one
inference rule.”Axioms: Let φ, χ and ψ stand for
well-formed formulae. The wff's themselves would not contain any Greek letters,
but only capital Roman letters, connective operators, and parentheses. The
axioms include:ANDFIRST-CONJUNCT: φ ∧ χ → φ and ANDSECOND-CONJUNCT:
φ ∧ χ → χ. Our (13) and (14) correspond to
Gentzen’s “conjunction elimination” (or (& -), as Grice has it in “Vacuous
Names.”). The relation between (13) and
(14) reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. Cfr. Cohen 1971: “Another conversational maxim of Grice's,
“be orderly”, is intended to govern such matters as the
formalist can show that it was not appropriate to postulate a special non-commutative temporal
conjunction.”“The locus classicus for complaints of this nature being Strawson (1952).”
Note that the commutative “and” is derived from Grice’s elimination of
conjunction, “p & q ⊦
p” and “p & q ⊦ q
-- as used by Grice in his system Q.Also note that the truth-evaluation would
be for Grice ‘semantic,’ rather than ‘syntactic’ as the commutative (understood
as part of elimination). Grice has it as: If phi and psi are formulae, “φ and ”
is 1 iff both φ and ψ are true, 0 otherwise. Grice grants
that however “baffling” (or misleading) would be to utter or assert (7)
if no one has doubts about the
temporal order of the reported the events, due to the expectation that the
utterer is observing the conversational maxim “be orderly” subsumed under the
conversational category of ‘Modus’ (‘be perspicuous! [sic]” – cfr. his earlier
desideratum of conversational clarity). Relevant logic (which was emerging by
the time Grice was delivering his William James lectures) introduces two
different formal signs for ‘conjunction’: the truth-functional conjunction
relevant logicians call ‘extensional’ conjunction, and they represent by (13).
Non-truth-functional conjunction is represented by ‘X’ and termed fusion or
‘intensional’ conjunction:
p ^ q versus p X q.
The truth-table for Strawson’s enriched uses of
“and” is not the standard one, since we require the additional condition that
“p predates q,” or that one conjunct predates the other. Playing with structural and substructural logical rules is
something Carnap would love perhaps more than Grice, and why not, Strawson?
They liked to play with ‘deviant’ logics. For Carnap, the choice of a logic is
a pragmatic ‘external’ decision – vide his principle of tolerance and the
rather extensive bibliography on Carnap as a logic pluralist. For Grice,
classical logic is a choice guided by his respect for ordinary language, WHILE
attempting to PROVOKE the Oxonian establishment by rallying to the defense of
an under-dogma and play the ‘skilful heretic’ (turning a heterodoxy into
dogma). Strawson is usually more difficult to classify! In his contribution to
Grandy & Warner (1986), he grants that Grice’s theory may be ‘more
beautiful,’ and more importantly, seems to suggest that his view be seen as
endorsing Grice’s account of a CONVENTIONAL implicature (For Strawson, ‘if’
(used for unasserted antecedent and consequence) conventionally implicates the
same inferrability condition that ‘so’ does for asserted equivalents. The
aim is to allow for a logically pluralist thesis, almost alla Carnap about the
‘inferential role’ of a logical constant such as ‘and’, which embraces
‘classical,’ (or ‘formalist,’ or ‘modernist’), relevant, linear and ordered
logic. PLURALISM (versus MONISM) has it that, for any logical constant c (such as “and”), “c” has more
than one *correct* inferential “role.” The pluralist thesis depends on a
specific interpretation of the vocabulary of sub-structural logics. According
to this specific interpretation, a classical logic captures the literal, or
EXPLICIT, explicatum, or truth-functional or truth-conditonal meaning, or what
Grice would have as ‘dictiveness’ of a logical constant. A sub-structural logic
(relevant logic, linear and ordered logic), on the other hand, encodes a
pragmatically,” i.e. not SEMANTICALLY, “-enriched sense” of a logical constant
such as “and.” Is this against the spirit of Grice’s overall thesis as
formulated in his “M. O. R.,” Modified Occam’s Razor, “Senses [of ‘and’] are
not to be multiplied beyond necessity”? But it’s precisely Grice’s Occamism (as
Neale calls it) that is being put into question. At Oxford, at the time, EVERYBODY (except
Grice!) was an informalist. He is coming to the defense of Russell, Oxford’s
underdog! (underdogma!). Plus, it’s important to understand the INFORMALISM
that Grice is attacking – Oxford’s ORTHO-doxy – seriously. Grice is being the
‘skilful HERETIC,’ in the words of his successor as Tutorial Fellow at Oxford,
G. P. Baker. We may proceed by four stages.
First, introduce the philosophical motivation for the pluralist thesis.
It sounds good to be a PLURALIST. Strawson was not. He was an informalist.
Grice was not, he was a post-modernist. But surely we not assuming that one
would want to eat the cake and have it! Second, introduce the calculus for the
different (or ‘deviant,’ as Haack prefers) logics endorsed in the pluralist
thesis – classical itself, relevant, linear and ordered logic. Third, shows how
the different “behaviours” of an item of logical vocabulary (such as “and”) of
each of these logics (and they all have variants for ‘conjunction.’ In the case
of ‘relevant’ logic, beyond Grice’s “&,” or classical conjunction, there is
“extensional conjunction,” FORMALISED as “p X q”, or fusion, and “INTENSIONAL
conjunction,” formalized by “p O q”. These can be, not semantically
(truth-functionally, or truth-conditional, or at the level of the EXPLICATUM),
but pragmatically interpreted (at the level of the IMPLICATUM). Fourth, shows
how the *different* (or ‘deviant,’ or pluralist), or alternative inferential
“roles” (that justifies PLURALISM) that *two* sub-structural logics (say,
Grice’s classical “&” the Strawson’s informalist “and”) attribute to a
logical constant “c” can co-exist – hence pluralism. A particular version of
logical “pluralism” can be argued from the plurality of at least *two*
alterative equally legitimate formalisations of the logical vocabulary, such as
the first dyadic truth-functor, or connective, “and,” which is symbolized by
Grice as “&,” NOT formalized by Strawson (he sticks with “and”) and
FORMALISED by relevant logicians as ‘extensional’ truth-functional conjunction
(fision, p X a) and intentional non-truth-functional conjunction (p O q). In particular, it can be argued that the
apparent “rivalry” between classical logic (what Grice has as Modernism, but he
himself is a post-modernist) and relevant logic (but consider Grice on
Strawson’s “Neo-Traditionalism,” first called INFORMALISM by Grice) can be
resolved, given that both logics capture and formalise normative and legitimate
alternative senses of ‘logical consequence.’ A revision of
the second paragraph to “Logic and Conversation” should do here. We can
distinguish between two operators for “… yields …”: ├ and ├: “A1, A2, … An├MODERNISM/FORMALISM-PAUL B” and “A1, A2, … An├NEO-TRADITIONALISM/INFORMALISM-PETER
B. As Paoli has it: “[U]pholding weakening amounts to failing to
take at face value the [slightly Griceian] expression ‘assertable on the basis
of’.’”Paoli goes on:“If I am in a
position to assert [the conclusion q, “He took his clothes off and got into
bed”] on the basis of the information provided by [the premise p, “He got into
bed and took his clothes off”], I need NOT be in a position to assert the
conclusion P [“He took his clothes off and got into bed”] on the basis of both
p (“He got into bed and took off his clothes” and an extra premise C - where C
is just an idle assumption (“The events took place in the order reported”) ,
irrelevant to my conclusion.”Can we regard Strawson as holding that
UNFORMALISED “and” is an INTENSIONAL CONJUNCTION? Another option is to see
Strawson as holding that the UNFORMALISED “and” can be BOTH truth-functional
and NON-truth-functional (for which case, the use of a different expression,
“and THEN,” is preferred). The Gricean theory of implicature is capable of
explaining this mismatch (bewtween “and” and “&”).Grice argues that the
[truth-conditional, truth-functional] semantics [DICTUM or EXPLICATUM, not
IMPLICATUM – cfr. his retrospective epilogue for his view on DICTIVENESS] of
“and” corresponds [or is identical, hence the name of ‘identity’ thesis versus
‘divergence’ thesis] to the classical “∧,” & of
Russell/Whitehead, and Quine, and Suppes, and that the [truth-functional
semantics of “if [p,] [q]” corresponds to the classical p ⊃
q.” There is scope for any theory capable of resolving or [as Grice would have
it] denying the apparent disagreement [or ‘rivalry’] among two or more logics.”
What Grice does is DENY THE APPARENT DISAGREEMENT. It’s best to keep ‘rivalry’ for the fight of
two ‘warring camps’ like FORMALISM and INFORMALISM, and stick with
‘disagreement’ or ‘divergence’ with reference to specific constants. For
Strawson, being a thorough-bred Oxonian, who perhaps never read the Iliad in
Greek – he was Grice’s PPE student – the RIVALRY is not between TWO different
formalisations, but between the ‘brusque’ formalisation of the FORMALISTS (that
murder his English!) and NO FORMALISATION at all. Grice calls this
‘neo-traditionalist,’ perhaps implicating that the ‘neo-traditionalists’ WOULD
accept some level of formalisation (Aristotle did!) ONLY ONE FORMALISATION, the
Modernism. INFORMALISM or Neo-Traditionalism aims to do WITHOUT formalisation,
if that means using anything, but, say, “and” and “and then”. Talk of SENSES
helps. Strawson may say that “and” has a SENSE which differs from “&,”
seeing that he would find “He drank the poison and died, though I do not mean
to imply in that order” is a CONTRADICTION. That is why Strawson is an
‘ordinary-LANGUAGE philosopher,” and not a logician! (Or should we say, an
‘ordinary-language logician’? His “Introduction to Logical Theory” was the
mandatory reading vademecum for GENERATIONS of Oxonians that had to undergo a
logic course to get their M. A. Lit. Hum.Then there’s what we can call “the
Gricean picture,” only it’s not too clear who painted it!We may agree that
there is an apparent “mismatch,” as opposed to a perfect “match” that Grice
would love! Grice thought with Russell that grammar is a pretty good guide to
logical form. If the utterer says “and” and NOT “and then,” there is no need to
postulate a further SENSE to ‘and.’Russell would criticize Strawson’s attempt
to reject modernist “&” as a surrogate for “and” as Strawson’s attempt to
regress to a stone-age metaphysics. Grice actually at this point, defended
Strawson: “stone-age PHYSICS!” And this relates to “… yields…” and Frege’s
assertion “/-“ as ‘Conclusion follows from Premise’ where ‘Premise yields
Conclusion’ seems more natural in that we preserve the order from premise to
conclusion. We shouldn’t underestimate one crucial feature of an implicatum:
its cancellability, on which Grice expands quite a bit in 1981: “He got into
bed and took his clothes off, although I don’t intend to suggest, in any shape
or form, that he proceed to do those things in the order I’ve just reported!”The
lack of any [fixed, rigid, intolerant] structural rule implies that AN INSTANCE
I1 of the a logical constant (such as “and”) that *violate* any of Grice’s
conversational maxim (here “be orderly!”) associated with the relevant
structural rule [here we may think of ADDITION AND SIMPLIFICATION as two axioms
derived from the Gentzen-type elimination of “and”, or the ‘interpretation’ of
‘p & q’ as 1 iff both p and q are 1, but 0 otherwise] and for which the
derived conversational implicature is false [“He went to bed and took his
clothes off, but not in that order!”] should be distinguished from ANY INSTANCE
I2 that does NOT violate the relevant maxim (“be orderly”) and for which the
conversational IMPLICATUM (“tn > tn-l”) is true.” We may nitpick here.Grice
would rather prefer, ‘when the IMPLICATUM applies.” An implicatum is by
definition cancellable (This is clear when Grice expands in the excursus “A
causal theory of perception.” “I would hardly be said to have IMPLIED that
Smith is hopeless in philosophy should I utter, “He has beautiful handwriting;
I don’t mean to imply he is hopeless in philosophy,” “even if that is precisely
what my addressee ends up thinking!”When it comes to “and,” we are on clearer
ground. The kinds of “and”-implicatures may be captured by a distinction of two
‘uses’ of conjunctions in a single substructural system S that does WITHOUT a
‘structural rule’ such as exchange, contraction or both. Read, relies, very
UNLIKE Strawson, on wo FORMALISATIONS besides “and” (for surely English “and”
does have a ‘form,’ too, pace Strawson) in Relevant Logic: “p ^ q” and “p X q.” “p ^ q” and “p X q” have each a different
inferential role. If the reason the UTTERER has to assert it – via the DICTUM
or EXPLICATUM [we avoid ‘assert’ seeing that we want logical constants to trade
on ‘imperative contexts,’ too – Grice, “touch the beast and it will bite you!”
-- is the utterer’s belief that Smith took his clothes AND THEN got into bed,
it would be illegitimate, unwarranted, stupid, otiose, incorrect,
inappropriate, to infer that Smith did not do these two things in that order
upon discovering that he in fact DID those things in the order reported. The very discovery that Smith did the things
in the order reported would “just spoil” or unwarrant the derivation that would
justify our use of “… yields …” (¬A ¬(A u B) A ¬B”). As Read notes, we have ADJUNCTION ‘p and q’ follows from p and q
– or p and q yields ‘p and q.’ And we have SIMPLIFICATION: p and q
follow from ‘p and q,’ or ‘p and q’ yields p, and ‘p and q’ yields q.” Stephen
Read: “From adjunction and simplification we can infer, by transitivity, that q
follows from p and q, and so by the Deduction Equivalence, ‘if p, q’ follows
from q.’” “However, […] this has the unacceptable consequence that ‘if’ is
truth-functional.” “How can this
consequence be avoided?” “Many options are open.” “We can reject the
transitivity of entailment, the deduction equivalence, adjunction, or
simplification. Each has been tried; and each seems contrary to intuition.” “We
are again in the paradoxical situation that each of these conceptions seems
intuitively soundly based; yet their combination appears to lead to something
unacceptable.” “Are we nonetheless forced to reject one of these plausible
principles?” “Fortunately, there is a fifth option.” Read: “There is a familiar
truth-functional conjunction, expressed by ‘p and q’, which entails each of p
and q, and so for the falsity (Grice’s 0) of which the falsity of either
conjunct suffices, and the truth of both for the truth of the whole.” “But
there is also a NON-truth-functional conjunction, a SENSE of ‘p and q’ whose
falsity supports the inference from p to ‘~q’.” “These two SENSES of
‘conjunction’ cannot be the same, for, if the ground for asserting ‘not-(p and
q)’ (e.g. “It is not the case that he got into bed and took off his clothes”)
is simply that ‘p’ is false, to learn that p is true, far from enabling one to
proceed to ‘~q’, undercuts the warrant for asserting ‘~(p & q)’ in the
first place.” “In this sense, ‘~(p & q)’ is weaker than both ‘~p’ and ‘~q’,
and does not, even with the addition of p, entail ‘~q’, even though one
possible ground for asserting ‘~(p & q))’, viz ‘~q’, clearly does.” Stephen
Read: “The intensional sense of ‘and’ is often referred to as fusion; I will
use the symbol ‘×’ for it. Others write ‘◦.’”We add some relevant observations
by a palaeo-Griceian: Ryle. Ryle often felt
himself to be an outsider. His remarks on “and” are however illuminating in the
context of our discussion of meta-inference in substructural logic.Ryle writes:
“I have spoken as if our ordinary ‘and’ […] [is] identical with the logical
constant with which the formal logician operates.”“But this is not true.”“The
logician’s ‘and’ […] [is] not our familiar civilian term[…].”“It is [a]
conscript term, in uniform and under military discipline, with memories, indeed,
of [its] previous more free and easy civilian life, though it is not leaving
that life now.”“If you hear on good authority that she took arsenic and fell
ill you will reject the rumour that she fell ill and took arsenic.”“This
familiar use of ‘and’ carries with it the temporal notion expressed by ‘and
subsequently’ and even the causal notion expressed by ‘and in
consequence.’”“The logician’s conscript ‘and’ does only its appointed duty – a
duty in which ‘she took arsenic and fell ill’ is an absolute paraphrase of ‘she
fell ill and took arsenic.’ This might be call the minimal force of ‘and.’”
(Ryle,, 1954:118). When we speaks of PRAGMATIC enrichment, we obviously
don’t mean SEMANTIC enrichment. There is a distinction, obviously, between the
‘pragmatic enrichment’ dimension, as to whether the ‘enriched’ content is
IMPLICATED or, to use a neologism, ‘EX-plicated.’ Or cf. as Kent Bach would
prefer, “IMPLICITATED” (vide his “Implciture.”) Commutative
law: p & q iff q & p. “Axiom AND-1” and “Axiom AND-2” correspond
to "conjunction elimination". The relation between “AND-1” and
“AND-2” reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. A VERY IMPORTANT POINT to consider is Grice’s
distinction between ‘logical inference’ and ‘pragmatic inference.’ He does so
in “Retrospective Epilogue” in 1987. “A few years after the appearance of […]
Introduction to Logical Theory, I was devoting much attention to what might be
loosely called the distinction between logical and pragmatic inferences. …
represented as being a matter not of logical but of pragmatic import.” (Grice
1987:374).Could he be jocular? He is emphasizing the historical role of his
research. He mentions FORMALISM and INFORMALISM and notes that his own interest
in maxims or desiderata of rational discourse arose from his interest to
distinguish between matters of “logical inference” from those of “pragmatic
inference.” Is Grice multiplying ‘inference’ beyond necessity? It would seem
so. So it’s best to try to reformulate his proposal, in agreement with logical
pluralism.By ‘logical inference’ Grice must mean ‘practical/alethic
satisfactoriness-based inference,’ notably the syntactics and semantics
(‘interpretative’) modules of his own System Q. By ‘pragmatic inference’ he
must mean a third module, the pragmatic module, with his desiderata. We may say
that for Grice ‘logical inference’ is deductive (and inductive), while
‘pragmatic inference’ is abductive. Let us apply this to the ‘clothes off’
exampleThe Utterer said: “Smith got into bed and took his clothes off, but I’m
reporting the events in no particular order.” The ‘logical inference’ allows to
treat ‘and’ as “&.” The ‘pragmatic inference’ allows the addressee to
wonder what the utterer is meaning! Cf. Terres on “⊢k” for “logical inference” and “⊢r,” “⊢l,” and “⊢o,” for pragmatic inference, and where the
subscripts “k,” “r,” “l” and “o” stand for ‘classical,’ ‘relevant,’ ‘linear’
and ‘ordered’ logic respectively, with each of the three sub-structural
notions of “follows from” or “… yields …”
require the pragmatic enrichment
of a logical constant, that ‘classical logical’ inference may retain the
‘impoverished’ version (Terres, 2019, Inquiry, p. 13). Grice himself
mentions this normative dimension: “I would like to be able to
think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely
as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE
for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon.”Grice, 1989a, p.48]However, the
fact that we should observe the conversational maxims may not yet be a reason
for endorsing the allegedly ‘deviant’
inferential role of a logical constant in the three sub-structural logics under
examination.The legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ ‘inferential role’ of each constant
in each sub-structural logic emerges, rather from at least two sources.A first
source is a requirement for logic (or reasoning) to be normative: that its
truth-bearers [or satisfactoriness-bearers, to allow for ‘imperative’-mode
inferences) are related to what Grice calls ‘psychological attitudes’ of
‘belief’ (indicative-mode inference) and ‘desire’ (imperative-mode inference)
(Grice, 1975, cfr. Terres, Inquiry, 2019, p. 13). As Steinberg puts it:“Presumably,
if logic is normative for thinking or reasoning, its normative force will stem,
at least in part, from the fact that truth bearers which act as the relata of
our consequence relation and the bearers of other logical properties are
identical to (or at least are very closely related in some other way) to the
objects of thinking or reasoning: the contents of one’s mental states or acts
such as the content of one’s beliefs or inferences, for example.”[Steinberger,
2017a – and cf. Loar’s similar approach when construing Grice’s maxims as
‘empirical generalisations’ of ‘functional states’ for a less committed view of
the embedding of logical and pragmatic inference within the scope of psychological-attitude
ascriptions). A second source for the legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ inferential
role is the fact that the pragmatic enrichment of the logical vocabulary (both
a constant and ‘… yields …) is part, or a ‘rational-construction,’ of our
psychological representation of certain utterances involving the natural
counterparts of those constants. This may NOT involve a new sense of ‘and’ which is
with what Grice is fighting. While the relevant literature emphasizes “reasons
to assert” (vide Table on p. 9, Terres, 2019), it is worth pointing out that
the model should be applicable to what we might broadly construe as ‘deontic’
reasoning (e.g. Grice on “Arrest the intruder!” in Grice 1989, and more
generally his practical syllogisms in Grice 2001). We seem to associate
“assert” with ‘indicative-mode’ versions only of premise and conclusion.
“Reasons to express” or “reasons to make it explicit” may serve as a generalization
to cover both “indicative-mode” and “imperative-mode” versions of the
inferences to hand. When Grice says that, contra Strawson, he wants to see
things in terms of ‘pragmatic inference,’ not ‘logical inference,’ is he
pulling himself up by his own bootstraps? Let us clarify.When thinking of what META-language need be used to
formulate both Grice’s final account vis-à-vis Strawson’s, it is relevant to
mention that Grice once invoked what he called the “Bootstrap” principle. In
the course of considering a ‘fine distinction’ in various levels of conceptual
priority, slightly out of the blue, he adds – this is from “Prejudices and
predilections, which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice,” so expect
some informality, and willingness to amuse: “It is perhaps reasonable to regard
such fine distinctions as indispensable if we are to succeed in the business of
pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps,” Grice writes. And then trust him
to add: “In this connection, it will be relevant for me to say that I once
invented (though I did not establish its validity) a principle which I labelled
as ‘Bootstrap.’” Trust him to call with a good title. “The principle,” Grice
goes on, “laid down that, when one is introducing some primitive concept [such
as conjunction] of a theory [or calculus or system] formulated in an
object-language [G1], one has freedom to use any concept from a
battery of concepts expressible in the meta-language [System G2],
subject to the condition that a *counterpart* of such a concept [say,
‘conjunction’] is sub-sequently definable, or otherwise derivable, in the
object-language [System G1].”Grice concludes by emphasizing the
point of the manoeuvre: “So, the more
economically one introduces a primitive object-language concept, the less of a
task one leaves oneself for the morrow.” [Grice 1986]. With
uncharacteristic humbleness, Grice notes that while he was able to formulate
and label “Bootstrap,” he never cared to establish its ‘validity.’ We hope we
have! “Q. E. D.,” as they say! Cf. Terres, 2019, Inquiry, p. 17: In conclusion,
the pragmatic interpretation of substructural logics may be a new and
interesting research field for the logical pluralist who wishes to endorse
classical and/or substructural logics, but also for the logical monist who aims
to interpret their divergence with a pluralist logician. The possibility is
also open of an interesting dialogue between philosophical logicians and
philosophers of language as they explore the pragmatic contributions of a
logical constant to the meaning of a complete utterance, given that a
substructural logic encodes what has been discussed by philosophers of
language, the enriched ‘explicatum’ of the logical constant. And Grice. References: Werner Abraham, ‘A linguistic approach to metaphor.’ in
Abraham, Ut videam: contributions to an understanding of linguistics. Jeffrey C. Beall
and Greg Restall. ‘Logical consequence,’ in Edward N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2009 edition, 2009. Rudolf Carnap, 1942. Introduction to Semantics.
L.J. Cohen, 1971. Grice on the logical particles
of natural language, in Bar-Hillel, Pragmatics of Natural language, repr. in
Cohen, Language and knowledge.L.J. Cohen, 1977. ‘Can the conversationalist
hypothesis be defended?’ Philosophical Studies, repr. in Cohen, Logic and
knowledge. Davidson, Donald and J. Hintikka (1969). Words and objections:
essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. Bart Geurts, Quantity
implicatures.Bart Geurts and Nausicaa Pouscoulous. Embedded implicatures?!?
Semantics and pragmatics, 2:4–1, 2009.Jean-Yves Girard. Linear logic: its
syntax and semantics. London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series, pp.
1–42, 1995.H.P. Grice. 1967a. ‘Prolegomena,’ in Studies in the Way of
Words.H.P. Grice. 1967b. Logic and conversation. Studies in the Way of Words,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pages 22–40, 1989.H.P. Grice. 1967c.
‘Indicative conditionals. Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, pages 58–85, 1989.H.P.
Grice. 1969. ‘Vacuous Names,’ in Words and objections: essays on the work of W.
V. Quine, edited by Donald Davidson and Jaako Hintikka, Dordrecht: Reidel. H.P.
Grice, 1981. ‘Presupposition and conversational implicature,’ in Paul Cole,
Radical Pragmatics, New York, Academic Press. H.P. Grice, 1986. ‘Reply to Richards,’ in Philosophical
Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, ed. by Richard Grandy and
Richard Warner, Oxford: The Clarendon Press.H.P. Grice. 2001. Aspects of
reason, being the John Locke Lectures delivered at Oxford, Oxford: Clarendon.
H.P. Grice, n.d. ‘Entailment,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Loar, B. F. Meaning and mind. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Mates, Benson, Elementary Logic. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.George Myro, 1986. ‘Time and identity,’ in Richard Grandy and Richard
Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.
Oxford: Clarendon Press. Francesco Paoli, Substructural logic. Arthur Pap.
1949. ‘Are all necessary propositions analytic?’, repr. in The limits of
logical empiricism.Peacocke, Christopher A. B. (1976), What is a logical
constant? The Journal of Philosophy.Quine, W. V. O. 1969. ‘Reply to H. P.
Grice,’ in Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections: esssays on the work of
W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. Stephen Read, A philosophical approach to
inference. A.Rieger,
A simple theory of conditionals. Analysis, 2006.Robert
van Rooij. 2010. ‘Conversational implicatures,’Gilbert
Ryle. 1954. ‘Formal and Informal logic,’ in Dilemmas, The Tarner Lectures 1953.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 8.
Florian
Steinberger. The normative status of logic. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, spring 2017 edition, 2017.P.
F. Strawson (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen.P. F.
Strawson (1986). ‘‘If’ and ‘⊃’’ R. Grandy and R. O. Warner, Philosophical Grounds of
Rationality, Intentions, Categories, Ends, repr. in his “Entity and Identity,
and Other Essays. Oxford: Clarendon PressJ.O. Urmson. Philosophical analysis:
its development between the two world wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. R.
C. S. Walker. “Conversational implicature,” in S. W. Blackburn, Meaning, reference,
and necessity. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 133-81A. N.
Whitehead and B. A. W. Russell, 1913. Principia Mathematica. Cambridge
University Press. Refs.The main published source is “Studies in the Way of
Words” (henceforth, “WOW”), I (especially Essays 1 and 4), “Presupposition and
conversational implicature,” in P. Cole, and the two sets on ‘Logic and
conversation,’ in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational
avowal: The phrase is a Ryleism, but
Grice liked it. Grice’s point is with corrigibility or lack thereof. He recalls
his tutorials with Strawson. “I want you to bring me a paper on Friday.” “You
mean The Telegraph?” “You know what I mean.”
“But perhaps you don’t.” Grice’s favourite conversational avowal,
mentioned by Grice, is a declaration of an intention.. Grice starts using the
phrase ‘conversational avowal’ after exploring Ryle’s rather cursory
exploration of them in The Concept of Mind. This is interesting because in
general Grice is an anti-ryleist. The verb is of course ‘to avow,’ which
is ultimately a Latinate from ‘advocare.’ A processes or event of the soul is,
on the official view, supposed to be played out in a private theatre. Such an
event is known directly by the man who has them either through the faculty of
introspection or the ‘phosphorescence’ of consciousness. The subject is,
on this view, incorrigible—his avowals of the state of his soul cannot be
corrected by others—and he is infallible—he cannot be wrong about which states
he is in. The official doctrine mistakenly construes an avowals or a
report of such an episode as issuing from a special sort of observation or
perception of shadowy existents. We should consider some differences
between two sorts of 'conversational' avowals: (i) I feel a tickle and (ii) I
feel ill. If a man feels a tickle, he has a tickle, and if he has a tickle, he
feels it. But if he feels ill, he may not be ill, and if he is ill, he may
not feel ill. Doubtless a man’s feeling ill is some evidence for his being
ill. But feeling a tickle is not evidence for his having a tickle, any more
than striking a blow is evidence for the occurrence of a blow. In ‘feel a
tickle’ and ‘strike a blow’, ‘tickle’ and ‘blow’ are cognate accusatives to the
verbs ‘feel’ and ‘strike’. The verb and its accusative are two expressions
for the same thing, as are the verbs and their accusatives in ‘I dreamt a
dream’ and ‘I asked a question’. But ‘ill’ and ‘capable of climbing the tree’
are not cognate accusatives to the verb ‘to feel.' So they are not in grammar
bound to signify feelings, as ‘tickle’ is in grammar bound to signify a
feeling. Another purely grammatical point shows the same thing. It is
indifferent whether I say ‘I feel a tickle’ or ‘I have a tickle’; but ‘I have .
. .’ cannot be completed by ‘. . . ill’, (cf. ‘I have an illness’), ‘. . .
capable of climbing the tree’, (cf. I have a capability to climb that tree’) ‘.
. . happy’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of happiness’ or ‘I have happiness in my
life’) or ‘. . . discontented’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of strong discontent
towards behaviourism’). If we try to restore the verbal parallel by bringing in
the appropriate abstract nouns, we find a further incongruity; ‘I feel
happiness’(I feel as though I am experiencing happiness), ‘I feel illness’ (I
feel as though I do have an illness’) or ‘I feel ability to climb the tree’ (I
feel that I am endowed with the capability to climb that tree), if they mean
anything, they do not mean at all what a man means by uttering ‘I feel happy,’
or ‘I feel ill,’ or ‘I feel capable of climbing the tree’. On the other
hand, besides these differences between the different uses of ‘I feel . . .’
there are important CONVERSATIONAL analogies as well. If a man says that
he has a tickle, his co-conversationalist does not ask for his evidence, or
requires him to make quite sure. Announcing a tickle is not proclaiming the
results of an investigation. A tickle is not something established by
careful witnessing, or something inferred from a clue, nor do we praise for his
powers of observation or reasoning a man who let us know that he feels tickles,
tweaks and flutters. Just the same is true of avowals of moods. If a man
makes a conversational contribution, such as‘I feel bored’, or ‘I feel depressed’,
his co-conversationalist does not usually ask him for his evidence, or request
him to make sure. The co-conversationalist may accuse the man of shamming to
him or to himself, but the co-conversationalist does not accuse him of having
been careless in his observations or rash in his inferences, since a
co-conversationalist would not usually think that his conversational avowal is
a report of an observation or a conclusion. He has not been a good or a
bad detective; he has not been a detective at all. Nothing would surprise us
more than to hear him say ‘I feel depressed’ in the alert and judicious tone of
voice of a detective, a microscopist, or a diagnostician, though this tone of
voice is perfectly congruous with the NON-AVOWAL past-tense ‘I WAS feeling depressed’
or the NON-AVOWAL third-person report, ‘HE feels depressed’. If the avowal is
to do its conversational job, it must be said in a depressed tone of voice. The
conversational avowal must be blurted out to a sympathizer, not reported to an
investigator. Avowing ‘I feel depressed’ is doing one of the things, viz. one
CONVERSATIONAL thing, that depression is the mood to do. It is not a piece of
scientific premiss-providing, but a piece of ‘conversational moping.’That is
why, if the co-conversationalist is suspicious, he does not ask ‘Fact or
fiction?’, ‘True or false?’, ‘Reliable or unreliable?’, but ‘Sincere or
shammed?’ The CONVERSATIONAL avowal of moods requires not acumen, but
openness. It comes from the heart, not from the head. It is not
discovery, but voluntary non-concealment. Of course people have to learn how to
use avowal expressions appropriately and they may not learn these lessons very
well. They learn them from ordinary discussions of the moods of others and from
such more fruitful sources as novels and the theatre. They learn from the same
sources how to cheat both other people and themselves by making a sham
conversational avowal in the proper tone of voice and with the other proper
histrionic accompaniments. If we now raise the question ‘How does a man find
out what mood he is in?’ one can answer that if, as may not be the case, he
finds it out at all, he finds it out very much as we find it out. As we have
seen, he does not groan ‘I feel bored’ because he has found out that he is
bored, any more than the sleepy man yawns because he has found out that he is
sleepy. Rather, somewhat as the sleepy man finds out that he is sleepy by
finding, among other things, that he keeps on yawning, so the bored man finds
out that he is bored, if he does find this out, by finding that among other
things he glumly says to others and to himself ‘I feel bored’ and ‘How bored I
feel’. Such a blurted avowal is not merely one fairly reliable index among
others. It is the first and the best index, since being worded and voluntarily
uttered, it is meant to be heard and it is meant to be understood. It calls for
no sleuth-work.In some respects a conversational avowal of a moods, like ‘I
feel cheerful,’ more closely resemble announcements of sensations like ‘I feel
a tickle’ than they resemble utterances like ‘I feel better’ or ‘I feel capable
of climbing the tree’. Just as it would be absurd to say ‘I feel a tickle but
maybe I haven’t one’, so, in ordinary cases, it would be absurd to say ‘I feel
cheerful but maybe I am not’. But there would be no absurdity in saying ‘I FEEL
better but, to judge by the doctor’s attitude, perhaps I am WORSE’, or ‘I do
FEEL as if I am capable of climbing the tree but maybe I cannot climb it.’This
difference can be brought out in another way. Sometimes it is natural to say ‘I
feel AS IF I could eat a horse’, or ‘I feel AS IF my temperature has returned
to normal’. But, more more immediate conversational avowals, it would seldom if
ever be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I were in the dumps’, or ‘I feel AS IF I
were bored’, any more than it would be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I had a
pain’. Not much would be gained by discussing at length why we use ‘feel’ in
these different ways. There are hosts of other ways in which it is also used. I
can say ‘I felt a lump in the mattress’, ‘I felt cold’, ‘I felt queer’, ‘I felt
my jaw-muscles stiffen’, ‘I felt my gorge rise’, ‘I felt my chin with my
thumb’, ‘I felt in vain for the lever’, ‘I felt as if something important was
about to happen’, ‘I felt that there was a flaw somewhere in the argument’, ‘I
felt quite at home’, ‘I felt that he was angry’. A feature common to most
of these uses of ‘feel’ is that the utterer does not want further questions to
be put. They would be either unanswerable questions, or unaskable questions.
That he felt it is enough to settle some debates.That he merely felt it is
enough to show that debates should not even begin. Names of moods, then, are
not the names of feelings. But to be in a particular mood is to be in the mood,
among other things, to feel certain sorts of feelings in certain sorts of
situations. To be in a lazy mood, is, among other things, to tend to have
sensations of lassitude in the limbs when jobs have to be done, to have cosy
feelings of relaxation when the deck-chair is resumed, not to have electricity
feelings when the game begins, and so forth. But we are not thinking
primarily of these feelings when we say that we feel lazy; in fact, we seldom
pay much heed to sensations of these kinds, save when they are abnormally
acute. Is a name of a mood a name
of an emotion? The only tolerable reply is that of course they are, in that
some people some of the time use ‘emotion’. But then we must add that in this
usage an emotion is not something that can be segregated from thinking,
daydreaming, voluntarily doing things, grimacing or feeling pangs and itches.
To have the emotion, in this usage, which we ordinarily refer to as ‘being
bored’, is to be in the mood to think certain sorts of thoughts, and not to
think other sorts, to yawn and not to chuckle, to converse with stilted
politeness, and not to talk with animation, to feel flaccid and not to feel
resilient. Boredom is not some unique distinguishable ingredient, scene or
feature of all that its victim is doing and undergoing. Rather it is the
temporary complexion of that totality. It is not like a gust, a sunbeam, a
shower or the temperature; it is like the morning’s weather. An unstudied
conversational utterance may embody an explicit interest phrase, or a conversational
avowal, such as ‘I want it’, ‘I hope so’, ‘That’s what I intend’, ‘I quite
dislike it’, ‘Surely I am depressed’, ‘I do wonder, too’, ‘I guess so’ and ‘I
am feeling hungry.’The surface grammar (if not logical form) makes it tempting
to misconstrue all the utterances as a description. But in its primary
employment such a conversational avowal as ‘I want it’ is not used to convey
information.‘I want it’ is used to make a request or demand. ‘I want it’ is no
more meant as a contribution to general knowledge than ‘please’. For a
co-conversationalist to respond with the tag ‘Do you?’ or worse, as Grice’s
tutee, with ‘*how* do you *know* that you want it?’ is glaringly inappropriate.
Nor, in their primary employment, are conversational avowals such as ‘I hate
it’ or ‘That’s what I I intend’ used for the purpose of telling one’s addressee
facts about the utterer; or else we should not be surprised to hear them
uttered in the cool, informative tones of voice in which one says ‘HE hates it’
and ‘That’s what he intends’. We expect a conversational avowal, on the
contrary, to be spoken in a revolted and a resolute tone of voice respectively.
It is an utterances of a man in a revolted and resolute frame of mind. A
conversational avowal is a thing said in detestation and resolution and not a
thing said in order to advance biographical knowledge about detestations and
resolutions. A man who notices the unstudied utterances of the utterer,
who may or may not be himself, is, if his interest in the utterer has the appropriate
direction, especially well situated to pass comments upon the qualities and
frames of mind of its author.‘avowal’ as a philosophical lexeme may not invite
an immediate correlate in the Graeco-Roman, ultimately Grecian, tradition.
‘Confessio’ springs to mind, but this is not what Grice is thinking about. He
is more concerned with issues of privileged access and incorrigibility, or
corrigibility, rather, as per the alleged immediacy of a first-person report of
the form, “I feel that …” . Grice does use ‘avowal’ often especially in the
early stages, when the logical scepticism about incorrigibility comes under
attack. Just to be different, Grice is interested in the corrigibility of the
avowal. The issue is of some importance in his account of the act of
communication, and how one can disimplicate what one means. Grice loves to play
with his tutee doubting as to whether he means that p or q. Except at Oxford,
the whole thing has a ridiculous ring to it. I want you to bring me a paper by
Friday. You mean the newspaper? You very well know what I mean. But perhaps you
do not. Are you sure you mean a philosophy paper when you utter, ‘I want you to
bring a paper by Friday’? As Grice notes, in case of self-deception and
egcrateia, it may well be that the utterer does not know what he desires, if
not what he intends, if anything. Freud and Foucault run galore. The topic will
interest a collaborator of Grice’s, Pears, with his concept of ‘motivated
irrationality.’ Grice likes to discuss a category mistake. I may be
categorically mistaken but I am not categorically confused. Now when it comes
to avowal-avowal, it is only natural that if he is interested in Aristotle on
‘hedone,’ Grice would be interested in Aristotle on ‘lupe.’ This is very
philosophical, as Urmson agrees. Can one ‘fake’ pain? Why would one fake pain?
Oddly, this is for Grice the origin of language. Is pleasure just the absence
of pain? Liddell and Soctt have “λύπη” and render it as pain of body, oἡδον;
also, sad plight or condition, but also pain of mind, grief; “ά; δῆγμα δὲ λύπης
οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται; τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίοτον, ὃς λύπας φέρει; ἐρωτικὴ
λ.’ λύπας προσβάλλειν;” “λ. φέρειν τινί; oχαρά.” Oddly, Grice goes back to pain
in Princeton, since it is explored by Smart in his identity thesis. Take
pain. Surely, Grice tells the Princetonians, it sounds harsh, to echo Berkeley,
to say that it is the brain of Smith being in this or that a state which is
justified by insufficient evidence; whereas it surely sounds less harsh that it
is the C-fibres that constitute his ‘pain,’ which he can thereby fake. Grice
distinguishes between a complete unstructured utterance token – “Ouch” – versus
a complete syntactically structured erotetic utterance of the type, “Are you in
pain?”. At the Jowett, Corpus Barnes has read Ogden and says ‘Ouch’ (‘Oh’)
bears an ‘emotional’ or ‘emotive’ communicatum provided there is an intention
there somewhere. Otherwise, no communicatum occurs. But if there is an
intention, the ‘Oh’ can always be a fake. Grice distinguishes between a ‘fake’
and a ‘sneak.’ If U intends A to perceive ‘Oh’ as a fake, U means that he is in
pain. If there is a sneaky intention behind the utterance, which U does NOT
intend his A to recognise, there is no communicatum. Grice criticises emotivism
as rushing ahead to analyse a nuance before exploring what sort of a nuance it
is. Surely there is more to the allegedly ‘pseudo-descriptive’ ‘x is good,’
than U meaning that U emotionally approves of x. In his ‘myth,’ Grice uses pain
magisterially as an excellent example for a privileged-access allegedly
incorrigible avowal, and stage 0 in his creature progression. By uttering
‘Oh!,’ under voluntary control, Barnes means, iconically, that he is in pain.
Pain fall under the broader keyword: emotion, as anger does. Cf. Aristotle on
the emotion in De An., Rhet., and Eth. Nich. Knowing that at Oxford, if you are
a classicist, you are not a philosopher, Grice never explores the Stoic, say,
approach to pain, or lack thereof (“Which is good, since Walter Pater did it
for me!”). Refs.: “Can I have a pain in my tail?” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
conversational benevolence: In Grice it’s not benevolence per se but as a force in a
two-force model, with self-love on the other side. The fact that he later
subsumed everything under ONE concept: that of co-operation (first helpfulness)
testifies that he is placing more conceptual strength on ‘benevolence’ than
‘self love.’ But the self-love’ remains in all the caveats and provisos that
Grice keeps guarding his claims with: ‘ceteris paribus,’ ‘provided there’s not
much effort involved,’ ‘if no unnecessary trouble arises,’ and so on. It’s
never benevolence simpliciter or tout court. When it comes to co-operation, the
self-love remains: the mutual goal of that co-operation is in the active and
the passive voice – You expect me to be helpful as much as I expect you to be
helpful. We are in this together. The active/passive voice formulation is
emphatic in Grice: informing AND BEING INFORMED; influencing AND BEING
INFLUENCED. The self-love goes: I won’t inform you unless you’ll inform me. I
won’t influence you unless you influence me. The ‘influence’ bit does not seem
to cooperative. But the ‘inform’ side does. By ‘inform,’ the idea is that the
psi-transmission concerns a true belief. “I’ll be truthful if you will.” This
is the sort of thing that Nietzsche found repugnant and identified with the
golden rule was totally immoral. – It was felt by Russell to be immoral enough
that he cared to mention in a letter to The Times about how abusive Nietzsche
can be – yet what a gem “Beyond good and evil” still is! In the hypocritical
milieu that Grice expects his tuttees know they are engaged in, Grice does not
find Nietzsche pointing to a repugnant fact, but a practical, even jocular way
of taking meta-ethics in a light way. There is nothing other-oriented about
benevolence. What Grice needs is conversational ALTRUISM, or helpfulness –
‘cooperation’ has the advantage, with the ‘co-’, of avoiding the ‘mutuality’
aspect, which is crucial (“What’s the good of helping you – I’m not your
servant! – if thou art not going to help me!” It may be said that when Butler
uses ‘benevolentia’ he means others. “It is usually understood that one is
benevolent towards oneself, if that makes sense.” Grice writes. Then there’s
Smith promising Jones a job – and the problem that comes with it. For Grice, if
Smith promised a job to Jones, and Jones never gets it – “that’s Jones’s
problem.” So we need to distinguish beneficentia and benevolentia. The opposite
is malevolentia and maleficientia. Usually Grice states his maxims as
PROHIBITIONS: “Do not say what you believe to be false” being the wittiest! So,
he might just as well have appealed to or invoked a principle of absence of
conversational ill-will. Grice uses ‘conversational benevolence’ narrowly, to
refer to the assumption that conversationalists will agree to make a
contribution appropriate to the shared purposes of the exhcnage. It contrasts
with the limiting conversational self-love, which is again taken narrowly to
indicate that conversationalists are assumed to be conversationally
‘benevolent,’ in the interpretation above, provided doing that does not get
them into unnecessary trouble. The type of rationality that Grice sees in
conversational is one that sees conversation as ‘rational co-operation.’ So it
is obvious that he has to invoke some level of benevolence. When tutoring his
rather egoistic tutees he had to be careful, so he hastened to add a principle
of conversational self-love. It was different when lecturing outside a
tutorial! In fact ‘benevolence’ here is best understood as ‘altruism’. So, if
there is a principle of conversational egoism, there is a correlative principle
of conversational altruism. If Grice uses ‘self-love,’ there is nothing about
‘love,’ in ‘benevolence.’ Butler may have used ‘other-love’! Even if of course
we must start with the Grecians! We must not forget that Plato and Aristotle
despised "autophilia", the complacency and self-satisfaction making
it into the opposite of "epimeleia heautou” in Plato’s Alcibiades.
Similarly, to criticize Socratic ethics as a form of egoism in opposition to a
selfless care of others is inappropriate. Neither a self-interested seeker of
wisdom nor a dangerous teacher of self-love, Socrates, as the master of
epimeleia heautou, is the hinge between the care of self and others. One has to
be careful here. A folk-etymological connection between ‘foam’ may not be
needed – when the Romans had to deal with Grecian ‘aphrodite.’ This requires
that we look for another linguistic botany for Grecian ‘self-love’ that Grice
opposes to ‘benevolentia.’ Hesiod derives Aphrodite from “ἀφρός,” ‘sea-foam,’ interpreting
the name as "risen from the foam", but most modern scholars regard
this as a spurious folk etymology. Early modern scholars of classical mythology
attempted to argue that Aphrodite's name was of Griceain or Indo-European
origin, but these efforts have now been mostly abandoned. Aphrodite's name is
generally accepted to be of non-Greek, probably Semitic, origin, but its exact
derivation cannot be determined. Scholars in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, accepting Hesiod's "foam" etymology as genuine,
analyzed the second part of Aphrodite's name as -odítē "wanderer" or -dítē
"bright". Janda, also accepting Hesiod's etymology, has argued in
favor of the latter of these interpretations and claims the story of a birth
from the foam as an Indo-European mytheme. Similarly, an Indo-European compound
abʰor-, very" and dʰei- "to shine" have been proposed, also
referring to Eos. Other have argued that these hypotheses are unlikely since
Aphrodite's attributes are entirely different from those of both Eos and the
Vedic deity Ushas.A number of improbable non-Greek etymologies have also been
suggested. One Semitic etymology compares Aphrodite to the Assyrian ‘barīrītu,’
the name of a female demon that appears in Middle Babylonian and Late
Babylonian texts. Hammarström looks to Etruscan, comparing eprϑni
"lord", an Etruscan honorific loaned into Greek as πρύτανις.This
would make the theonym in origin an honorific, "the lady".Most
scholars reject this etymology as implausible, especially since Aphrodite
actually appears in Etruscan in the borrowed form Apru (from Greek Aphrō, clipped
form of Aphrodite). The medieval Etymologicum Magnum offers a highly contrived
etymology, deriving Aphrodite from the compound habrodíaitos (ἁβροδίαιτος),
"she who lives delicately", from habrós and díaita. The alteration
from b to ph is explained as a "familiar" characteristic of Greek
"obvious from the Macedonians". It is much easier with the Romans. Lewis and Short have ‘ămor,’ old form “ămŏs,”
“like honos, labos, colos, etc.’ obviously from ‘amare,’ and which they render
as ‘love,’ as in Grice’s “conversational self-love.” Your tutor will reprimand
you if you spend too much linguistic botany on ‘eros.’ “Go straight to
‘philos.’” But no. There are philosophical usages of ‘eros,’ especially when it
comes to the Grecian philosophers Grice is interested in: Aristotle reading
Plato, which becomes Ariskant reading Plathegel. So, Liddell and Scott have
“ἔρως” which of course is from a verb, or two: “ἕραμαι,” “ἐράω,” and which they
render as “love, mostly of the sexual passion, ““θηλυκρατὴς ἔ.,” “ἐρῶσ᾽ ἔρωτ᾽
ἔκδημον,” “ἔ. τινός love for one, S.Tr.433, “παίδων” E. Ion67, and “generally,
love of a thing, desire for it,” ““πατρῴας γῆς” “δεινὸς εὐκλείας ἔ.” “ἔχειν
ἔμφυτον ἔρωτα περί τι” Plato, Lg. 782e ; “πρὸς τοὺς λόγους” (love of law),
“ἔρωτα σχὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννος γενέσθαι” Hdt.5.32 ; ἔ. ἔχει με c. inf.,
A.Supp.521 ; “θανόντι κείνῳ συνθανεῖν ἔρως μ᾽ ἔχει” S.Fr.953 ; “αὐτοῖς ἦν ἔρως
θρόνους ἐᾶσθαι” Id.OC367 ; ἔ. ἐμπίπτει μοι c. inf., A.Ag.341, cf. Th.6.24 ; εἰς
ἔρωτά τινος ἀφικέσθαι, ἐλθεῖν, Antiph.212.3,Anaxil.21.5 : pl., loves, amours,
“ἀλλοτρίων” Pi.N.3.30 ; “οὐχ ὅσιοι ἔ.” E.Hipp.765 (lyr.) ; “ἔρωτες ἐμᾶς πόλεως”
Ar.Av.1316 (lyr.), etc. ; of dolphins, “πρὸς παῖδας” Arist.HA631a10 :
generally, desires, S.Ant.617 (lyr.). 2. object of love or desire, “ἀπρόσικτοι
ἔρωτες” Pi.N.11.48, cf. Luc.Tim.14. 3. passionate joy, S.Aj.693 (lyr.); the god
of love, Anacr.65, Parm.13, E.Hipp.525 (lyr.), etc.“Έ. ἀνίκατε μάχαν” S.Ant.781
(lyr.) : in pl., Simon.184.3, etc. III. at Nicaea, a funeral wreath, EM379.54.
IV. name of the κλῆρος Ἀφροδίτης, Cat.Cod.Astr.1.168 ; = third κλῆρος,
Paul.Al.K.3; one of the τόποι, Vett.Val.69.16. And they’ll point to you that
the Romans had ‘amor’ AND ‘cupidus’ (which they meant as a transliteration of
epithumia). If for Kant and Grice it is the intention that matters, ill-will
counts. If Smith does not want Jones have a job, Smith has ill-will towards
Jones. This is all Kant and Grice need to call Smith a bad person. It means it
is the ill-will that causes Joness not having a job. A conceptual elucidation.
Interesting from a historical point of view seeing that Grice had introduced a
principle of conversational benevolence (i.e. conversational goodwill) pretty
early. Malevolentia was over-used by Cicero, translating the Grecian. Grice
judges that if Jones fails to get the job that benevolent Smith promised, Smith
may still be deemed, for Kant, if not Aristotle, to have given him the
job. A similar elucidation was carried by Urmson with his idea of
supererogation (heroism and sainthood). For a hero or saint, someones goodwill
but not be good enough! Which does not mean it is ill, either! Refs.: The
source is Grice’s seminar in the first set on ‘Logic and conversation.’ The H.
P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational category: used jocularly by Grice. But can it be used
non-jocularly? How can the concept of ‘category,’ literally, apply to what
Grice says it applies, so that we have, assuming Kant is using ‘quantity,’
‘quality,’ ‘relation’ and ‘mode,’ as SUPRA-categories (functions, strictly) for
his twelve categories? Let’s revise, the quantity applies to the quantification
(in Frege’s terms) or what Boethius applied to Aristotle’s posotes – and there
are three categories involved, but the three deal with the ‘quantum: ‘every,’
‘some,’ and ‘one.’ ‘some’ Russell would call an indefinite. Strictly, if Grice
wants to have a category of conversational quantity – it should relate to the
‘form’ of the ‘conversational move.’ “Every nice girl loves a sailor” would be
the one with most ‘quantity.’ Grice sees a problem there, and would have that
rather translated as ‘The altogether nice girl loves the one-at-a-time sailor.’
But that would be the most conversational move displaying ‘most quantity.’ (It
can be argued it isn’t). When it comes to the category of conversational
quality, the three categories by Kant under the ‘function’ of qualitas involves
the well known trio, the affirmative, the negative, and the infinite. In terms
of the ‘quality’ of a conversational move, it may be argued that a move in
negative form (as in Grice, “I’m not hearing any noise,” “That pillar box is
not blue” seem to provide ‘less’ quality than the affirmative counterparts. But
as in quantity, it is not sure Kant has some ordering in mind. It seems he
does. It seems he ascribes more value to the first category in each of the four
functions. When it comes to the category of conversational relation, the
connection with Kant could be done. Since this involves the categoric, the
hypothetic, and the disjunctive. So here we may think that a conversational
move will be either a categoric response – A: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B: The
weather has been delightful. Or a hypothetical. A: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B:
If that’s what you think. Or a dijunctive: Mrs. Smith is a wind bag. B: Or she
is not. When it comes, lastly, to the category of conversational mode, we have
just three strict categories under this ‘function’ in Kant, which relate to the
strength of the copula: ‘must be,’ must not be’ and ‘may.’ A conversational
move that states a necessity would be the expected move. “You must do it.”
Impossibility involves negation, so it is more problematic. And ‘may be’ is an
open conversational move. So there IS a way to justify the use of
‘conversational category’ to apply to the four functions that Kant decides the
Aristotelian categories may subsumed into. He knows that Kant has TWELVE
categories, but he keeps lecturing the Harvardites about Kant having FOUR
categories. On top, he finds ‘modus’ boring, and, turned a manierist, changes
the idiom. This is what Austin called a ‘philosophical hack’ searching for some
para-philosophy! One has to be careful here. Grice does speak of this or that
‘conversational category.’ Seeing that he is ‘echoing,’ as he puts it,
Ariskant, we migt just as well have an entry for each of the four. These would
be the category of conversational quantity, the category of conversational
quality, the category of conversational relation, and the category of
conversational modality. Note that in this rephrasing Grice applies
‘conversational’ directly to the category. As Boethius pointed out (and Grice
loved to read Minio-Paullelo’s edition of Boethus’s commentary on the
Categories), the motivation by Aristotle to posit this or that category was
expository. A mind cannot know a multitude of things, so we have to ‘reduce’
things. It is important to note that while ‘quantitas,’ ‘qualitas’ ‘relatio’
and ‘modus’ are used by Kant, he actually augments the number of categories.
These four would be supra-categories. The sub-categories, or categories
themselves turn out to be twelve. Kant proposed 12 categories: unity,
plurality, and totality for concept of quantity; reality, negation, and
limitation, for the concept of quality; inherence and subsistence, cause and
effect, and community for the concept of relation; and
possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, and necessity and
contingency. Kategorien sind nach Kant apriorisch und unmittelbar gegeben.
Sie sind Werkzeuge des Urteilens und Werkzeuge des Denkens. Als solche dienen
sie nur der Anwendung und haben keine Existenz. Sie bestehen somit nur im
menschlichen Verstand. Sie sind nicht an Erfahrung gebunden.[5] Durch ihre Unmittelbarkeit sind sie auch nicht an
Zeichen gebunden.[6] Kants erkenntnistheoretisches Ziel ist es, über
die Bedingungen der Geltungskraft von Urteilen Auskunft zu geben. Ohne diese
Auskunft können zwar vielerlei Urteile gefällt werden, sie müssen dann
allerdings als „systematische Doktrin(en)“ bezeichnet werden.[7] Kant kritisiert damit das rein analytische Denken
der Wissenschaft als falsch und stellt ihm die Notwendigkeit des synthetisierenden
Denkens gegenüber.[8] Kant begründet die Geltungskraft mit dem Transzendentalen Subjekt.[9] Das Transzendentalsubjekt ist dabei ein reiner
Reflexionsbegriff, welcher das synthetisierende Dritte darstellt (wie in
späteren Philosophien Geist (Hegel), Wille, Macht, Sprache und Wert (Marx)),
das nicht durch die Sinne wahrnehmbar ist. Kant sucht hier die Antwort auf die
Frage, wie der Mensch als vernunftbegabtes Wesen konstituiert werden kann,
nicht in der Analyse, sondern in einer Synthesis.[10]Bei Immanuel Kant, der somit als bedeutender Erneuerer der bis dahin
„vorkritischen“ Kategorienlehre gilt, finden sich zwölf „Kategorien der reinen
Vernunft“. Für Kant sind diese Kategorien Verstandesbegriffe, nicht aber Ausdruck des tatsächlichen Seins der Dinge an sich. Damit wandelt sich die ontologische Sichtweise der Tradition in eine erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtung, weshalb Kants „kritische“
Philosophie (seit der Kritik der
reinen Vernunft) oft
auch als „Kopernikanische
Wende in der
Philosophie“ bezeichnet wird.Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität sind die vier grundlegenden Urteilsfunktionen des
Verstandes, nach denen die Kategorien gebildet werden. Demnach sind z. B.
der Urteilsfunktion „Quantität“ die Kategorien bzw. Urteile „Einheit“,
„Vielheit“ und „Allheit“ untergeordnet, und der Urteilsfunktion „Relation“ die
Urteile der „Ursache“ und der „Wirkung“.Siehe auch: Kritik der
reinen Vernunft und Transzendentale
AnalytikBereits
bei Friedrich
Adolf Trendelenburg findet
man den Hinweis auf die verbreitete Kritik, dass Kant die den Kategorien
zugrunde liegenden Urteilsformen nicht systematisch hergeleitet und damit als
notwendig begründet hat. Einer der Kritikpunkte ist dabei, dass die Kategorien
sich teilweise auf Anschauungen (Einzelheit, Realität, Dasein), teilweise auf
Abstraktionen wie Zusammenfassen, Begrenzen oder Begründen (Vielheit, Allheit,
Negation, Limitation, Möglichkeit, Notwendigkeit) beziehen.
conversational co-öperation: Grice is perfectly right that ‘helpfulness’ does not
‘equate’ cooperation. His earlier principle of conversational helpfulness
becomes the principle of conversational co-operation.Tthere is a distinction
between mutual help and cooperation. First, the Romans never knew. Their
‘servants’ were ‘help’ – and this remains in the British usage of ‘civil
servant,’ one who helps. Some philosophical tutees by Hare were often reminded,
in the midst of their presenting their essays, “Excuse me for interrupting,
Smith, but have you considered a career in the civil service?” Then some Romans
found Christianism fashionable, and they were set to translate the Bible. So
when this Hebrew concept appeared, they turned it into ad-judicatum, which was
translated by Wycliff as ‘help.’ Now ‘operatio’ is quite a different animal.
It’s the ‘opus’ of the Romans, who also had ‘labor.’ Surely to ‘co-laborate’ is
to ‘co-operate.’ There is an idea that ‘operate,’ can be more otiose, in the
view of Rogers Albritton. “He is operating the violin,” was his favourite
utterance. “Possibly his opus 5.” The fact that English needs a hyphen and an
umlaut does not make it very ‘ordinary’ in Austin’s description. Grice is more
interested in the conceptualization of this, notably as it relates to
rationality. Can cooperation NOT be rational? For most libertarians,
cooperation IS “irrational,” rather. But Grice points is subtler. He is
concerned with an emissor communicating that p. The least thing he deserves is
a rational recipient. “Otherwise I might just as well scream to the walls!” Used
by Grice WOW:368 – previously, ‘rational cooperation’ – what cooperation is not
rational? Grice says that if Smith promised Jones a job; Jones doesn’t get it.
Smith must be DEEMED to have given the job to Jones. It’s the intention, as
Kant shows, the pure motive, that matters. Ditto for communication. If
Blackburn draws a skull, he communicates that there is danger. If his addressee
fails to recognise the emissor’s intention the emissor will still be deemed to
have communicated that there is danger. So communication does NOT require
co-operation. His analysis of “emissor communicates that p” is not one of
“emissor successfully communicates that p,” because “communicates” reduces to
“intends” not to ‘fulfilled intention.’ Cooperation enters when we go beyond
ONE act of communication. To communicate is to give information and to
influence another, and it is also to receive information and to be influenced
by another. When these communicative objectives are made explicit, helpfulness
or cooperation becomes essential. He uses ‘converational cooperation” and
“supreme principle of conversational cooperation” (369). He uses ‘supreme
conversational principle” of “cooperativeness” (369), to avoid seeing the
conversational imperatives as an unorganized heap of conversational
obligations. Another variant is Grice’s use of “principle of conversational
co-operation.” He also uses “principle of conversational rational
co-operation.” Note that irrational or non-rational co-operation is not an
oxymoron. Another expression is conversational cooperative rationality. So
Grice was amused that you can just as well refer to ‘cooperative rationality”
or “rational cooperation,” “a category shift if ever there was one.”
conversational explicitum: To be explicit is bad manners at Oxford if not in Paris or
MIT. The thing is to imply! Englishmen are best at implying – their love for
understatement is unequalled in the world. Grice needs the explicatio, or
explicit. Because the mistake the philosopher makes is at the level of the
implicatio, as Nowell-Smith, and C. K. Grant had noted. It is not OBVIOUSLY at
the explicit level. Grice was never interested in the explicit level, and takes
a very cavalier attitude to it. “This brief indication of my use of say leaves
it open whether a man who says (today) Harold Wilson is a great man and another
who says (also today) The British Prime Minister is a great man would, if each
knew that the two singular terms had the same reference, have said the same
thing. But whatever decision is made about this question, the apparatus that I
am about to provide will be capable of accounting for any implicatures that
might depend on the presence of one rather than another of these singular terms
in the sentence uttered. Such implicatures would merely be related to different
maxims.”Rephrase: “A brief indication of my use of ‘the explicit’ leaves it
open whether a man who states (today), ‘Harold Wilson is a great man’ thereby
stating that Wilson is a great man, and another who states (also today),‘The
British Prime Minister is a great man,’ viz. that the Prime Minister is a great
mand, would, if each singular term, ‘the Prime Minister’ and ‘Wilson’ has the
same denotatum (co-relata) have put forward in an explicit fashion the same propositional
complex, and have stated the same thing. On the face of it, it would seem they
have not. But cf. ‘Wilson will be the prime minister’ versus ‘Wilson shall be
the prime minister.’ Again, a subtler question arises as to whether the first
emissor who has stated that Wilson will be the next prime minster and the other
one who has stated that Wilson *shall* be the next prime minster, have both but
forward the same proposition. If the futurm indicatum is ENTAILED by the
futurum intentionale, the question is easy to settle. Whatever methodological
decision or stipulation I end up making about the ‘explicitum,’ the apparatus
that I rely on is capable of accounting for any implicatum that might depend on
the presence of this or that singular term in the utterance. Such an implicatum
would merely be related to a different conversational maxims. Urmson has
elaborated on this, “Mrs. Smith’s husband just passed by.” “You mean the
postman! Why did you use such contrived ‘signular term’?” If the emissor draws
a skull what he explicitly conveys is that this is a skull. This is the
EPLICITUM. If he communicates that there is danger, that’s via some further
reasoning. That associates a skull with death. Grice’s example is Grice
displaying his bandaged leg. Strictly, he communicates that he has a bandaged
leg. Second, that his leg is bandaged (the bandage may be fake). And third,
that he cannot play cricket. It all started in Oxford when they started to use
‘imply’ in a sense other than the ‘logical’ one. This got Grice immersed in a
deep exploration of types of ‘implication.’ There is the implicatum, and the
implicitum, both from ‘implico.’ As correlative there is the explicatio, which
yields both the explicatum and the explicitum. Grice has under the desideratum
of conversational clarity that a conversationalist is assumed to make the point
of his conversational contribution ‘explicit.’ So in his polemic with G. A.
Paul, Grice knows that the ‘doubt-or-denial’ condition will be at the level NOT
of the explicitum or explicatum. Surely an implicatum can be CANCELLED
explicitly. Grice uses ‘contextual’ or ‘explicit,’ here but grants that the
‘contextual’ may be subsumed under the ‘explicit.’ It is when the sub-perceptual utterance is
copulated with the formulation of the explicatum of the implicatum that Grice
shows G. A. Paul that the statement is still ‘true,’ and which Grice sees as a
reivindication of the causal theory of perception. In the twenty or so examples
of philosophical mistakes, both in “Causal” and “Prolegomena,” all the mistakes
can be rendered back to the ‘explicatum’ versus ‘implicatum’ distinction.
Unfortunately, each requires a philosophical background to draw all the
‘implications,’ and Grice has been read by people without a philosophical
background who go on to criticise him for ignoring things where he never had
focused his attention on. His priority is to deal with these philosophical
mistakes. He also expects the philosopher to come up with a general
methodological statement. Grice distinguishes between the conversational
explicitum and the conversational explicatum. Grice plays with ‘explicit’ and
‘implicit’ at various places. He often uses ‘explicit’and ‘implicit’
adverbially: the utterer explicitly conveys that p versus the utterer
implicitly conveys that p (hints that p, suggests that p, indicates that p,
implicates that p, implies that p). Grice regards that both dimensions form
part of the total act of signification, accepting as a neutral variant, that
the utterer has signified that p.
conversational game: In a conversational game, you don’t say “The pillar box
seems red” if you know it IS red. So, philosophers at Oxford (like Austin,
Strawson, Hare, Hampshire, and Hart) are all victims of ignoring the rules of
the game, and just not understanding that a game is being played. the expression is used by Grice
systematically. He speaks of players making the conversational move in the
conversational game following the conversational rule, v. rational choice
conversational helpfulness: Grice is right that ‘cooperation’ does NOT equate
‘helpfulness’ and he appropriately changes
his earlier principle of conversational helpfulness to a principle of
conversational co-operation. Was there a Graeco-Roman equivalent for
Anglo-Saxon ‘help’? helpmeet (n.) a ghost word from the 1611 translation of the
Bible, where it originally was a two-word noun-adjective phrase translating
Latin adjutorium simile sibi [Genesis ii.18] as "an help meet for
him," and meaning literally "a helper like himself." See help
(n.) + meet (adj.). By 1670s it was hyphenated help-meet and mistaken as a
modified noun. Compare helpmate. The original Hebrew is 'ezer keneghdo. Related
entries & more aid (v.) "to
assist, help," c. 1400, from Old French aidier "help, assist"
(Modern French aider), from Latin adiutare, frequentative of adiuvare (past
participle adiutus) "to give help to," from ad "to" (see
ad-) + iuvare "to help, assist, give strength, support, sustain,"
which is from a PIE source perhaps related to the root of iuvenis "young
person" (see young (adj.)). Related: Aided; aiding. Related entries &
more succor (n.) c. 1200, socour,
earlier socours "aid, help," from Anglo-French succors "help,
aid," Old French socors, sucurres "aid, help, assistance"
(Modern French secours), from Medieval Latin succursus "help,
assistance," from past participle of Latin succurrere "run to help,
hasten to the aid of," from assimilated form of sub "up to" (see
sub-) + currere "to run" (from PIE root *kers- "to run").
Final -s mistaken in English as a plural inflection and dropped late 13c.
Meaning "one who aids or helps" is from c. 1300. There is a fashion
in which to help is to cooperate, but co-operate, strictly, requires operation
by A and operation by B. We do use cooperate loosely. “She is very cooperative.”
“Help” seems less formal. One can help without ever engaging or honouring the
other’s goal. I can help you buy a house, say. So the principle of
conversational cooperation is stricter and narrower than the principle of
conversational helpfulness. Cooperation involves reciprocity and mutuality in a
way that helpfulness does not. That’s why Grice needs to emphasise that there
is an expectation of MUTUAL helpfulness. One is expected to be helpful, and one
expects the other to be helpful. Grice was doubtful about the implicature of
‘co-operative,’ – after all, who at Oxford wants a ‘co-operative.’ It sounds
anti-Oxonian. So Grice elaborates on ‘helping others’ and ‘assuming others will
help you’ in the event that we ‘are doing something together.’ Does this equate
cooperation, he wonders. Just in case, he uses ‘helpfulness’ as a variant.
There are other concepts he plays with, notably ‘altruism,’ and ‘benevolence,’
or other-love.’Helpfulness is Grice’s favourite virtue. Grice is clear that
reciprocity is essential here. One exhibits helpfulness and expects helpfulness
from his conversational partner. He dedicates a set of seven lectures to it,
entitled as follows. Lecture 1, Prolegomena; Lecture 2: Logic and Conversation;
Lecture 3: Further notes on logic and conversation; Lecture 4: Indicative
conditionals; Lecture 5: Us meaning and intentions; Lecture 6: Us meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word-meaning; and Lecture 7: Some models for implicature.
I hope they dont expect me to lecture on James! Grice admired James, but
not vice versa. Grice entitled the set as being Logic and Conversation.
That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing
that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second
lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, The
Logic of Grammar. The content of each lecture is indicated below. In
the first, Grice manages to quote from Witters. In the last, he
didnt! The original set consisted of seven lectures. To wit:
Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation,
Indicative Conditionals, Us meaning and intentions, Us meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word meaning, and Some models for implicature. They were
pretty successful at Oxford. While the notion of an implicatum had been
introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle of
conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of
rationality involved. Observation of the principle of conversational
helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who
cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information,
influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable given that it is conducted
along the lines set by the principle of conversational helpfulness. In
Prolegomena he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a
disregard for the implicatum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor,
Senses are not to be muliplied beyond necessity. In Indicative conditionals he
tackles Strawson on if as not representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell.
The next two lectures on the meaning by the utterer and intentions, and meaning
by the utterer, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning refine his earlier, more
austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the
lectures with an exploration on the relevance of the implicatum to
philosophical psychology. Grice was well aware that many philosophers had
become enamoured with the s. and would love to give it a continuous perusal.
The set is indeed grandiose. It starts with a Prolegomena to set the scene: He
notably quotes himself in it, which helps, but also Strawson, which sort of
justifies the general title. In the second lecture, Logic and Conversation, he
expands on the principle of conversational helpfulness and the
explicitum/implicatum distinction – all very rationalist! The third lecture is
otiose in that he makes fun of Ockham: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond
necessity. The fourth lecture, on Indicative conditionals, is indeed on MOST of
the formal devices he had mentioned on Lecture II, notably the functors (rather
than the quantifiers and the iota operator, with which he deals in
Presupposition and conversational implicature, since, as he notes, they refer
to reference). This lecture is the centrepiece of the set. In the fifth
lecture, he plays with mean, and discovers that it is attached to the
implicatum or the implicitum. In the sixth lecture, he becomes a nominalist, to
use Bennetts phrase, as he deals with dog and shaggy in terms of this or that
resultant procedure. Dont ask me what they are! Finally, in “Some models for
implicature,” he attacks the charge of circularity, and refers to
nineteenth-century explorations on the idea of thought without language alla
Wundt. I dont think a set of James lectures had even been so comprehensive!
Conversational helpfulness. This is Grice at his methodological best. He was
aware that the type of philosophying he was about to criticise wass a bit
dated, but whats wrong with being old-fashioned? While this may be seen as a
development of his views on implicature at that seminal Oxford seminar, it may also
be seen as Grice popularising the views for a New-World, non-Oxonian
audience. A discussion of Oxonian philosophers of the play group of Grice,
notably Austin, Hare, Hart, and Strawson. He adds himself for good measure
(“Causal theory”). Philosophers, even at Oxford, have to be careful with the
attention that is due to general principles of discourse. Grice quotes
philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Ryle, and some interpreters or
practitioners of Oxonian analysis, such as Benjamin and Searle. He even manages
to quote from Witterss Philosophical investigations, on seeing a banana as a
banana. There are further items in the Grice collection that address Austins
manoeuvre, Austin on ifs and cans, Ifs and cans, : conditional,
power. Two of Grices favourites. He opposed Strawsons view on if.
Grice thought that if was the horseshoe of Whitehead and Russell, provided we
add an implicatum to an entailment. The can is merely dispositional, if
not alla Ryle, alla Grice! Ifs and cans, intention, disposition. Austin
had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of free will. Pears had
noted that conversational implicature may account for the conditional
perfection (if yields iff). Cf. Ayers on Austin on if and can. Recall that
for Grice the most idiomatic way to express a disposition is with the
Subjectsive mode, the if, and the can ‒ The ice can break. Cf. the mistake: It
is not the case that what you must do, you can do. The can-may distinction is
one Grice played with too. As with will and shall, the attachment of one mode
to one of the lexemes is pretty arbitrary and not etymologically justified ‒
pace Fowler on it being a privilege of this or that Southern Englishman as
Fowler is. If he calls it Prolegomena, he is being jocular. Philosophers Mistakes
would have been too provocative. Benjamin, or rather Broad, erred, and so did
Ryle, and Ludwig Witters, and my friends, Austin (the mater that wobbled), and
in order of seniority, Hart (I heard him defend this about carefully – stopping
at every door in case a dog comes out at breakneck speed), Hare (To say good is
to approve), and Strawson (“Logical theory”: To utter if p, q is to implicate
some inferrability, To say true! is to endorse – Analysis). If he ends with
Searle, he is being jocular. He quotes Searle from an essay in British
philosophy in Lecture I, and from an essay in Philosophy in America in Lecture
V. He loved Searle, and expands on the Texas oilmens club example! We may think
of Grice as a linguistic botanizer or a meta-linguistic botanizer: his hobby
was to collect philosophers mistakes, and he catalogued them. In Causal theory
he produces his first list of seven. The pillar box seems red to me. One cannot
see a dagger as a dagger. Moore didnt know that the objects before him were his
own hands. What is actual is not also possible. For someone to be called
responsible, his action should be condemnable. A cause must be given only of
something abnormal or unusual (cf. ætiology). If you know it, you dont believe
it. In the Prolegomena, the taxonomy is more complicated. Examples A (the use
of an expression, by Austin, Benjamin, Grice, Hart, Ryle, Wittgenstein),
Examples B (Strawson on and, or, and especially if), and Examples C (Strawson
on true and Hare on good – the performative theories). But even if his taxonomy
is more complicated, he makes it more SO by giving other examples as he goes on
to discuss how to assess the philosophical mistake. Cf. his elaboration on
trying, I saw Mrs. Smith cashing a cheque, Trying to cash a cheque, you mean.
Or cf. his remarks on remember, and There is an analogy here with a case by
Wittgenstein. In summary, he wants to say. Its the philosopher who makes his
big mistake. He has detected, as Grice has it, some conversational nuance. Now
he wants to exploit it. But before rushing ahead to exploit the conversational
nuance he has detected, or identified, or collected in his exercise of
linguistic botanising, the philosopher should let us know with clarity what
type of a nuance it is. For Grice wants to know that the nuance depends on a
general principle (of goal-directed behaviour in general, and most likely
rational) governing discourse – that participants in a conversation should be
aware of, and not on some minutiæ that has been identified by the philosopher making
the mistake, unsystematically, and merely descriptively, and taxonomically, but
without ONE drop of explanatory adequacy. The fact that he directs this to his
junior Strawson is the sad thing. The rest are all Grices seniors! The point is
of philosophical interest, rather than other. And he keeps citing philosophers,
Tarski or Ramsey, in the third James leture, to elaborate the point about true
in Prolegomena. He never seems interested in anything but an item being of
philosophical interest, even if that means HIS and MINE! On top, he is being
Oxonian: Only at Oxford my colleagues were so obsessed, as it has never been
seen anywhere else, about the nuances of conversation. Only they were all
making a big mistake in having no clue as to what the underlying theory of
conversation as rational co-operation would simplify things for them – and how!
If I introduce the explicatum as a concession, I shall hope I will be pardoned!
Is Grices intention epagogic, or diagogic in Prolegomena? Is he trying to
educate Strawson, or just delighting in proving Strawson wrong? We think the
former. The fact that he quotes himself shows that Grice is concerned with
something he still sees, and for the rest of his life will see, as a valid
philosophical problem. If philosophy generated no problems it would be dead.
Refs.: The main sources are the two sets on ‘logic and conversation.’ There are
good paraphrases in other essays when he summarises his own views, as he did at
Urbana. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational imperative: The problem with ‘command’ is that for Habermas, it
springs from ‘power,’ and we need to have it sprung from ‘auctoritas,’ rather –
the voice of reason, that is – “Impero” gives also pre-pare. “Imperare,
prepare, etc. What was the Greek for ‘imperative mode’? προστακτική
prostaktike. προσ-τακτικός , ή, όν, A.of or for
commanding, imperative, imperious, τὸ π. [ἡ ψυχή], opp. τὸ ὑπηρετικόν (of the
body), Arist.Top.128b19; “π. τινῶν” Corn.ND16; “λόγος” Plu.2.1037f;
Προστακτικός (sc. λόγος), title of work by Protagoras, D.L.9.55; “βραχυλογία”
Plu.Phoc.5; also of persons, “ἄρχων” Max.Tyr.13.2 (Sup.). II. Gramm., ἡ -κὴ
ἔγκλισις the imperative mood, D.T.638.7, A.D.Synt.31.20; π. ἐκφορὰ τῶν ῥημάτων
ib.69.20; “τὸ π. σχῆμα” Anon.Fig.24; also “τὸ -κόν” D.L. 7.66,67, Ps.-Plu.Vit.Hom.53.
Adv. “-κῶς” in the imperative mood, D.H.4.18, Sch.Ar.Av.1163.Grice became
famous for his ‘maxims,’ which in Nowell-Smith’s view they are more like rules
of etiquette for sylish conversation. As such, many had been proposed. But
Grice proposes them AS A PHILOSOPHER would, and ONLY TO REBUFF the mistake made
by this or that philosopher who would rather EXPLAIN the phenomenon in terms
OTHER than involving as PART OF THE DATA, i. e. as a datum (as he says) or
assumption, that there are these ‘assumptions,’ which guide behaviour. Grice is
having in mind Kant’s “Imperativ.” He also uses ‘conversational objective.” In
most versions that Grice provides of the ‘general expectations’ of rational
discourse, he chooses the obvious imperative form. On occasion he does use
‘imperative.’ Grice is vague as to the term of choice for this or that
‘expectation.’ According to Strawson, Grice even once used ‘conversational
rule,’ and he does use ‘conversational rule of the conversational game of
making this or that conversational move.’ Notably, he also uses ‘conversational
principle,’ and ‘conversational desideratum.’ And ‘maxim’! And ‘conversational
directive (371), and ‘conversational obligation’ (369). By ‘conversational
maxim,’ he means ‘conversational maxim.’ He uses ‘conversational sub-maxim’
very occasionally. He rather uses ‘conversational super-maxim.’ He uses
‘immanuel,’ and he uses ‘conversational immanuel.’ It is worth noting that the
choice of word influences the exegesis. Loar takes these things to be ‘empirical
generalisations over functional states’! And Grice agrees that there is a dull,
empiricist way, in which these things can be seen as things people conform to.
There is a quasi-contractualist approach to: things people convene on. And
there is an Ariskantian approach: things people SHOULD abide by. Surely Grice
is not requiring that the conversationalists ARE explicitly or consciously
AWARE of these things. There is a principle of effort of economical reason to
cope with that!
conversational implicatum. A joke. Surely if he is going to use ‘implicatum’ in
Roman, this would be ‘implicatum conversationale,’ if there were such thing. And
there were! The Roman is formed from cum- plus ‘verso.’ So there’s Roman
‘conversatio.’ And –alis, ale is a productive suffix. Or implicitum. Grice is being philosophical
and sticking with ‘implicatio’ as used by logicians. Implicitum does not have
much of a philosophical pedigree. But even ‘implicatio’ was not THAT used,
‘consequentia’ was preferred, as in ‘non sequitur, and seguitur, quod
demonstrandumm erat. Strawson criticism of ‘the,’ only tentative by Grice,
unlike ‘if,’ so forgivable! See common-ground status. Grice loved an
implicatum. The use of ‘conversational’ by Grice is NEVER emphatic. In his
detailed, even fastidious, taxonomy of ‘implication,’ he decisively does not
want to have a mere conventional implicatum (as in “She was poor but she was
honest”) as conversational. Not even a “Thank you”, generated by the maxim “be
polite.” That would be an implicatum which is nonconventional and yet NOT
conversational, because ‘be polite’ is NOT a conversational maxim (moral,
aesthetic, and social maxims are not). And an implicature. An elaboration of
his Oxonian seminar on Logic and conversation. Theres a principle of
conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational
candour and a desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of
conversational self-interest clashing with the sub-principle of conversational
benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis
for a conversational implicatum, as his term of art goes. Observation of the
principle of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the
following lines: anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is
supposed to serve ‒ give/receive information, influence/be influenced ‒ should
only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the
assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of conversational
helfpulness, and attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice takes special
care in listing tests for the proof that an implicatum is conversational in
this rather technical usage: a conversational implicatum is rationally
calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or stance that
the addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being helpful),
non-detachable, indeterminate, and very cancellable, thus never part of the
sense and never an entailment of this or that piece of philosophical
vocabulary, in Davidson and Harman, the logic of Grammar, also in Cole and
Morgan, repr. in a revised form in Grice, logic and conversation, the second
James lecture, : principle of conversational helpfulness, implicatum,
cancellability. While the essay was also repr. by Cole and Morgan. Grice
always cites it from the two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar, ed. by
Davidson and Harman. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter
Grice through this essay. A philosopher usually gets first acquainted with his
In defence of a dogma, or Meaning. In Logic and Conversation, Grice
re-utilises the notion of an implicatum and the principle of conversational helpfulness
that he introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. The idea Grice is that
the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational
(reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the
two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive information,
to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it
is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational
helfpulness. Grices point is methodological. He is not at all interested
in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts in
media res, and skips Grices careful list of Oxonian examples of disregard
for the key idea of what a conversant implicates by the conversational
move he makes. His concession is that there is an explicatum or explicitum
(roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This
concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent,
conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by
a few philosophers leaving them confused. I do not know what Davidson and
Harman were thinking when they reprinted just this in The logic of grammar. I
mean: it is obviously in media res. Grice starts with the logical devices, and
never again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and
hyperbole, and surely the philosopher who bought The logic of grammar must be
left puzzled. He has to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion.
Oxonian philosophers would, out of etiquette, hardly quote from unpublished
material! Cohen had to rely on memory, and thats why he got all his Grice
wrong! And so did Strawson in If and the horseshoe. Even Walker responding to
Cohen is relying on memory. Few philosophers quote from The logic of grammar. At
Oxford, everybody knew what Grice was up to. Hare was talking implicature in
Mind, and Pears was talking conversational implicature in Ifs and cans. And
Platts was dedicating a full chapter to “Causal Theory”. It seems the Oxonian
etiquette was to quote from Causal Theory. It was obvious that Grices
implication excursus had to read implicature! In a few dictionaries of
philosophy, such as Hamlyns, under implication, a reference to Grices locus
classicus Causal theory is made – Passmore quotes from Causal theory in Hundred
years of philosophy. Very few Oxonians would care to buy a volume published in
Encino. Not many Oxonian philosophers ever quoted The logic of grammar, though.
At Oxford, Grices implicata remained part of the unwritten doctrines of a few.
And philosophers would not cite a cajoled essay in the references. The
implicatum allows a display of truth-functional Grice. For
substitutional-quantificational Grice we have to wait for his treatment of the.
In Prolegomena, Grice had quoted verbatim from Strawsons infamous idea that
there is a sense of inferrability with if. While the lecture covers much more
than if (He only said if; Oh, no, he said a great deal more than that! the
title was never meant to be original. Grice in fact provides a rational justification
for the three connectives (and, or, and if) and before that, the unary functor
not. Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, not and If, Sinton on Grice
on denials of indicative conditionals, not, if. Strawson had elaborated on
what he felt was a divergence between Whiteheads and Russells horseshoe, and
if. Grice thought Strawsons observations could be understood in terms of
entailment + implicatum (Robbing Peter to Pay Paul). But problems, as first
noted to Grice, by Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the
implicatum within the operation of, say, negation. Analogous problems arise
with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, and and or, and Grice
looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon. The qualification
indicative is modal. Ordinary language allows for if utterances to be in modes
other than the imperative. Counter-factual, if you need to be philosophical
krypto-technical, Subjectsive is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a
cavalier to the problem: Surely it wont do to say You couldnt have done that,
since you were in Seattle, to someone who figuratively tells you hes spend the
full summer cleaning the Aegean stables. This, to philosophers, is the
centerpiece of the lectures. Grice takes good care of not, and, or, and
concludes with the if of the title. For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook
Wilson in Statement and Inference. And they all connect with rationality. So he
is using material from his Oxford seminars on the principle of conversational
helpfulness. Plus Cook Wilson makes more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The
last bit, citing Kripke and Dummett, is meant as jocular. What is important is
the teleological approach to the operators, where a note should be made about
dyadicity. In Prolegomena, when he introduces the topic, he omits not (about
which he was almost obsessed!). He just gives an example for and (He went to
bed and took off his dirty boots), one for or (the garden becomes Oxford and
the kitchen becomes London, and the implicatum is in terms, oddly, of ignorance:
My wife is either in town or country,making fun of Town and Country), and if.
His favourite illustration for if is Cock Robin: If the Sparrow did not kill
him, the Lark did! This is because Grice is serious about the erotetic, i.e.
question/answer, format Cook Wilson gives to things, but he manages to bring
Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just to impress! Most importantly, he
introduces the square brackets! Hell use them again in Presupposition and
Conversational Implicature and turns them into subscripts in Vacuous Namess.
This is central. For he wants to impoverish the idea of the implicatum. The
explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is syntactic-cum-pragmatic import.
The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable, and as he knows: what the eye
no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for! The modal
implicatum. Since Grice uses indicative, for the title of his third James
lecture (Indicative Conditionals) surely he implicates subjunctive ‒
i.e. that someone might be thinking that he should give an account of
indicative-cum-subjective. This relates to an example Grice gives in Causal
theory, that he does not reproduce in Prolegomena. Grice states the
philosophical mistake as follows. What is actual is not also
possible. Grice seems to be suggesting that a subjective conditional would
involve one or other of the modalities, he is not interested in exploring. On
the other hand, Mackie has noted that Grices conversationalist hypothesis
(Mackie quotes verbatim from Grices principle of conversational helpfulness)
allows for an explanation of the Subjectsive if that does not involve
Kripke-type paradoxes involving possible worlds, or other. In Causal Theory,
Grice notes that the issue with which he has been mainly concerned may be
thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are
several philosophical theses or dicta which would he thinks need to be examined
in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which
Grice has been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind.
An examples which occurs to me is the following. What is actual is not also
possible. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is
importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for
all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted
by Grices objector seems to Grice to involve a type of manoeuvre which is
characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. He is not
condemning that kind of manoeuvre. He is merely suggesting that to embark on it
without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead
to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure
that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. If was also of
special interest to Grice for many other reasons. He defends a dispositional
account of intending that in terms of ifs and cans. He considers akrasia
conditionally. He explored the hypothetical-categorical distinction in the
buletic mode. He was concerned with therefore as involved with the associated
if of entailment. Refs.: “Implicatum” is introduced in Essay 2 in WoW –
but there are scattered references elsewhere. He often uses the plural
‘implicata’ too, as in “Retrospective Epilogue,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
An implicatum requires a complexum. Frege was the topic of the explorations by
Dummett. A tutee of Grices once brought Dummetts Frege to a tutorial and
told Grice that he intended to explore this. Have you read it? No I
havent, Grice answered. And after a pause, he went on: And I hope I will not.
Hardly promising, the tutee thought. Some authors, including Grice, but
alas, not Frege, have noted some similarities between Grices notion of a
conventional implicature and Freges schematic and genial rambles on colouring.
Aber Farbung, as Frege would state! Grice was more interested in the idea of a
Fregeian sense, but he felt that if he had to play with Freges aber he should!
One of Grices metaphysical construction-routines, the Humeian projection, is
aimed at the generation of concepts, in most cases the rational reconstruction
of an intuitive concept displayed in ordinary discourse. We arrive at something
like a Fregeian sense. Grice exclaimed, with an intonation of Eureka, almost.
And then he went back to Frege. Grices German was good, so he could read
Frege, in the vernacular. For fun, he read Frege to his children (Grices, not
Freges): In einem obliquen Kontext, Frege says, Grice says, kann ja z. B. die
Ersetzung eines „aber durch ein „und, die in einem direkten Kontext keinen
Unterschied des Wahrheitswerts ergibt, einen solchen Unterschied bewirken. Ill
make that easy for you, darlings: und is and, and aber is but. But surely,
Papa, aber is not cognate with but! Its not. That is Anglo-Saxon, for you. But
is strictly Anglo-Saxon short for by-out; we lost aber when we sailed the North
Sea. Grice went on: Damit wird eine Abgrenzung von Sinn und Färbung (oder
Konnotationen) eines Satzes fragwürdig. I. e. he is saying that She was poor
but she was honest only conventionally implicates that there is a contrast
between her poverty and her honesty. I guess he heard the ditty during the War?
Grice ignored that remark, and went on: Appell und Kundgabe wären ferner von
Sinn und Färbung genauer zu unterscheiden. Ich weiß so auf interessante
Bedeutungs Komponenten hin, bemüht sich aber nicht, sie genauer zu
differenzieren, da er letztlich nur betonen will, daß sie in der Sprache der
Logik keine Rolle spielen. They play a role in the lingo, that is! What do?
Stuff like but. But surely they are not rational conversational implicata!? No,
dear, just conventional tricks you can ignore on a nice summer day! Grice
however was never interested in what he dismissively labels the conventional
implicatum. He identifies it because he felt he must! Surely, the way some
Oxonian philosophers learn to use stuff like, on the one hand, and on the
other, (or how Grice learned how to use men and de in Grecian), or so, or
therefore, or but versus and, is just to allow that he would still use imply in
such cases. But surely he wants conversational to stick with rationality:
conversational maxim and converational implicatum only apply to things which can
be justified transcendentally, and not idiosyncrasies of usage! Grice follows
Church in noting that Russell misreads Frege as being guilty of ignoring the
use-mention distinction, when he doesnt. One thing that Grice minimises is that
Freges assertion sign is composite. Tha is why Baker prefers to use the dot “.”
as the doxastic correlative for the buletic sign ! which is NOT composite. The
sign „├‟ is composite. Frege explains his Urteilstrich, the vertical component
of his sign ├ as conveying assertoric force. The principal role of the
horizontal component as such is to prevent the appearance of assertoric force
belonging to a token of what does not express a thought (e.g. the expression
22). ─p expresses a thought even if p does not.) cf. Hares four sub-atomic
particles: phrastic (dictum), neustic (dictor), tropic, and clistic. Cf. Grice
on the radix controversy: We do not want the “.” in p to become a vanishing
sign. Grices Frege, Frege, Words, and Sentences, Frege, Farbung, aber. Frege
was one of Grices obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum,
a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the
generation of conversational implicata, that can only mean progress for
philosophy! Fregeian senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The
employment of the routine of Humeian projection may be expected to deliver for
us, as its result, a concept – the concept(ion) of value, say, in
something like a Fregeian sense, rather than an object. There is also a
strong affinity between Freges treatment of colouring (of the German particle
aber, say) and Grices idea of a convetional implicatum (She was poor, but she
was honest,/and her parents were the same,/till she met a city feller,/and she
lost her honest Names, as the vulgar Great War ditty went). Grice does not seem
interested in providing a philosophical exploration of conventional implicata,
and there is a reason for this. Conventional implicata are not essentially
connected, as conversational implicata are, with rationality. Conventional
implicata cannot be calculable. They have less of a philosophical interest,
too, in that they are not cancellable. Grice sees cancellability as a way to
prove some (contemporary to him, if dated) ordinary-language philosophers who analyse
an expression in terms of sense and entailment, where a cancellable
conversational implicatum is all there is (to it). He mentions Benjamin in
Prolegomena, and is very careful in noting how Benjamin misuses a Fregeian
sense. In his Causal theory, Grice lists another mistake: What is known to be
the case is not believed to be the case. Grice gives pretty few example of
a conventional implicatum: therefore, as in the utterance by Jill: Jack is an
Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. This is interesting because therefore
compares to so which Strawson, in PGRICE, claims is the asserted counterpart to
if. But Strawson is never associated with the type of linguistic botany
that Grice is. Grice also mentions the idiom, on the one hand/on the other
hand, in some detail in “Epilogue”: My aunt was a nurse in the Great War; my
sister, on the other hand, lives on a peak at Darien. Grice thinks that
Frege misuses the use-mention distinction but Russell corrects that. Grice
bases this on Church. And of course he is obsessed with the assertion sign by
Frege, which Grice thinks has one stroke tooo many. The main reference is give
above for ‘complexum.’ Those without a philosophical background tend to ignore
a joke by Grice. His echoing Kant in the James is a joke, in the sense that he
is using Katns well-known to be pretty artificial quartet of ontological
caegories to apply to a totally different phenomenon: the taxonomy of the
maxims! In his earlier non-jocular attempts, he applied more philosophical
concepts with a more serious rationale. His key concept, conversation as
rational co-operation, underlies all his attempts. A pretty worked-out model is
in terms then of this central, or overarching principle of conversational
helpfulness (where conversation as cooperation need not be qualified as
conversation as rational co-operation) and being structured by two contrasting
sub-principles: the principle of conversational benevolence (which almost
overlaps with the principle of conversational helpfulness) and the slightly
more jocular principle of conversational self-love. There is something
oxymoronic about self-love being conversational, and this is what leads to
replace the two subprinciples by a principle of conversational helfpulness (as
used in WoW:IV) simpliciter. His desideratum of conversational candour is key.
The clash between the desideratum of conversational candour and the desideratum
of conversational clarity (call them supermaxims) explains why I believe that p
(less clear than p) shows the primacy of candour over clarity. The idea remains
of an overarching principle and a set of more specific guidelines. Non-Oxonian
philosophers would see Grices appeal to this or that guideline as ad hoc, but
not his tutees! Grice finds inspiration in Joseph Butler’s sermon on benevolence
and self-love, in his sermon 9, upon the love of our neighbour, preached on
advent Sunday. And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly
comprehended in this saying, Namesly, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,
Romans xiii. 9. It is commonly observed, that there is a disposition in
men to complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they
live, as greater than that of former ones: which is usually followed with this
further observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all
times. Now, to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts
of history: thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly takes
different turns, and some particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in
some ages than in others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the
distinction of the present, to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards
to self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly. Upon this account it
seems worth while to inquire, whether private interest is likely to be promoted
in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over
all other principles; "or whether the contracted affection may not
possibly be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own
end, private good?" Repr. in revised form as WOW, I. Grice felt
the need to go back to his explantion (cf. Fisher, Never contradict. Never
explain) of the nuances about seem and cause (“Causal theory”.). Grice uses ‘My
wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom,’ by Smith, as relying on a requirement
of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations on a theme by Grice.
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged. Variations on a theme by Grice. I wish to represent a
certain subclass of non-conventional implicaturcs, which I shall
call conversational implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with
certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what
these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a
general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession
of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of
purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction
may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for
discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite,
or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the
participants, as in a casual conversation. But at each stage, some possible
conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might
then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected
ceteris paribus to observe, viz.: Make your conversational contribution such as
is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this
the co-operative principle. We might then formulate a rough general principle
which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to
observe, viz.: Make your contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative
Principle. Strictly, the principle itself is not co-operative: conversants
are. Less literary variant: Make your move such as is required by the
accepted goal of the conversation in which you are engaged. But why logic and
conversation? Logica had been part of the trivium for ages ‒ Although they
called it dialectica, then. Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by
Strawsons treatment of the formal devices in “Introduction to logical theory”
(henceforth, “Logical theory”), Grice targets these, in their
ordinary-discourse counterparts. Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his
logic tutor – Strawson was following a PPE., and his approach to logic is
practical. His philosophy tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit.
Hum. the situation is different. Grice knows that the Categoriae and De Int. of
his beloved Aristotle are part of the Logical Organon which had been so
influential in the history of philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile
Strawsons observations with the idea that the formal devices reproduce some
sort of explicatum, or explicitum, as identified by Whitehead and Russell in
Principia Mathematica. In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general
features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation. The alleged
divergence between the ordinary-language operators and their formal
counterparts is explained in terms of the conversational implicata, then.
I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to
ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal
device and its alleged ordinary-language counterpart, while still assuming that
U is engaged in a co-operative transaction. The utterer and his
addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation ‒
the exchange of information and the institution of decisions ‒ and
judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and
rational) if conducted under some form of principle of conversational
helpfulness. The observation of a principle of conversational
helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone
who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption
that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational
helpfulness. In titling his seminar Logic and conversation, Grice is
thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal “Logical theory,” that every
Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he never
ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti
Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he
acknwoledges Grices difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the
strength or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses
an adjective that Grice will seldom do, pragmatic. On top, Strawson attributes
the adjective to rule. For Grice, in Strawsons wording, there is this or that
pragmatic rule to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a
weaker conversational move. Strawsons Introduction was published before Grice
aired his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then Grice takes
the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important in that it
is Grices occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as
generating implicata under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes it
obvious that Grices interest is methodological, and not philological. He is not
interest in conversation per se, but only as the source for his principle of
conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational implicatum,
which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his
expression does, a distinction apparently denied by Witters and all too
frequently ignored by Austin. Logic and conversation, an Oxford seminar,
implicatum, principle of conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational
implicature, conversational implicatum. Conversational
Implicature Grices main invention, one which trades on the distinction between
what an utterer implies and what his expression does. A distinction
apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people,
Austin. Grice is implicating that Austins sympathies were for the
Subjectsification of Linguistic Nature. Grice remains an obdurate
individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the
conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised,
idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularized. His gives an Oxonian example. I
can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week
by uttering It is raining.Grice notes that since the object of the present
exercise, is to provide a bit of theory which will explain, for a
certain family of cases, why is it that a particular
implicature is present, I would suggest that the final test of
the adequacy and utility of this model should be: can it be used to construct
an explanation of the presence of such an implicature, and is it more
comprehensive and more economical than any rival? is the no
doubt pre-theoretical explanation which one would be prompted to give
of such an implicature consistent with, or better still a favourable pointer
towards the requirements involved in the model? cf. Sidonius: Far otherwise:
whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy, the Stoics,
Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their
own engines; for their heathen followers, if they resist the doctrine and
spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be caught in their own
familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their own toils; the barbed
syllogism of your arguments will hook the glib tongues of the
casuists, and it is you who will tie up their slippery questions
in categorical clews, after the manner of a clever physician, who,
when compelled by reasoned thought, prepares antidotes for poison even from a
serpent.qvin potivs experietvr qvisqve conflixerit stoicos cynicos
peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis propriis qvoqve concvti machiNamesntis
nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati ac sensvi si repvgnaverint mox te
magistro ligati vernaculis implicaturis in retia sua præcipites
implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ propositionis vncatis volvbilem tergiversantvm
lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris categoricis lubricas qvæstiones tv potivs
innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui remedivm contra venena cum ratio compellit et
de serpente conficivnt. If he lectured on Logic and Conversation on
implicature, Grice must have thought that Strawsons area was central. Yet, as
he had done in Causal theory and as he will at Harvard, Grice kept collecting
philosophers mistakes. So its best to see Grice as a methodologist, and as
using logic and conversation as an illustration of his favourite manoeuvre,
indeed, central philosophical manoeuver that gave him a place in the history of
philosophy. Restricting this manoeuvre to just an area minimises it. On the
other hand, there has to be a balance: surely logic and conversation is a topic
of intrinsic interest, and we cannot expect all philosophers – unless they are
Griceians – to keep a broad unitarian view of philosophy as a virtuous
whole. Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. Destructive implicature to it: Mr.
Puddle is our man in æsthetics implicates that he is not good at it. What is
important to Grice is that the mistakes of these philosophers (notably
Strawson!) arise from some linguistic phenomena, or, since we must use singular
expressions this or that linguistic phenomenon. Or as Grice puts it, it is this
or that linguistic phenomenon which provides the material for the philosopher
to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory of conversation as rational
co-operation is posited – technically, as a way to explain (never merely
describe, which Grice found boring ‒ if English, cf. never explain, never
apologise ‒ Jacky Fisher: Never contradict. Never explain.) these phenomena –
his principle of conversational helpfulness and the idea of a conversational
implicatum. The latter is based not so much on rationality per se, but on the
implicit-explicit distinction that he constantly plays with, since his earlier
semiotic-oriented explorations of Peirce. But back to this or that linguistic
phenomenon, while he would make fun of Searle for providing this or that
linguistic phenomenon that no philosopher would ever feel excited about, Grice
himself was a bit of a master in illustrating this a philosophical point with
this or that linguistic phenomenon that would not be necessarily connected with
philosophy. Grice rarely quotes authors, but surely the section in “Causal
theory,” where he lists seven philosophical theses (which are ripe for an
implicatum treatment) would be familiar enough for anybody to be able to drop a
names to attach to each. At Harvard, almost every example Grice gives of this
or that linguistic phenomenon is UN-authored (and sometimes he expands on his
own view of them, just to amuse his audience – and show how committed to this
or that thesis he was), but some are not unauthored. And they all belong to the
linguistic turn: In his three groups of examples, Grice quotes from Ryle (who
thinks he knows about ordinary language), Witters, Austin (he quotes him in
great detail, from Pretending, Plea of excuses, and No modification without
aberration,), Strawson (in “Logical theory” and on Truth for Analysis), Hart
(as I have heard him expand on this), Grice, Searle, and Benjamin. Grice
implicates Hare on ‘good,’ etc. When we mention the explicit/implicit
distinction as source for the implicatum, we are referring to Grices own
wording in Retrospective epilogue where he mentions an utterer as conveying in
some explicit fashion this or that, as opposed to a gentler, more (midland or
southern) English, way, via implicature, or implIciture, if you mustnt. Cf.
Fowler: As a southern Englishman, Ive stopped trying teaching a northern
Englishman the distinction between ought and shall. He seems to get it always
wrong. It may be worth exploring how this connects with rationality. His point
would be that that an assumption that the rational principle of conversational
helpfulness is in order allows P-1 not just to convey in a direct explicit
fashion that p, but in an implicit fashion that q, where q is the implicatum.
The principle of conversational helpfulness as generator of this or that
implicata, to use Grices word (generate). Surely, He took off his boots and
went to bed; I wont say in which order sounds hardly in the vein of
conversational helpfulness – but provided Grice does not see it as logically
incoherent, it is still a rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The point
may be difficult to discern, but you never know. The utterer may be conveying,
Viva Boole. Grices point about rationality is mentioned in his later
Prolegomena, on at least two occasions. Rational behaviour is the phrase he
uses (as applied first to communication and then to discourse) and in stark
opposition with a convention-based approach he rightly associates with Austin.
Grice is here less interested here as he will be on rationality, but
coooperation as such. Helpfulness as a reasonable expecation (normative?), a
mutual one between decent chaps, as he puts it. His charming decent chap is so
Oxonian. His tutee would expect no less ‒ and indeed no more! A rather obscure
exploration on the connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice
is aware that there is an allegation in the air about a possible vicious circle
in trying to define category of expression in terms of a category of
representation. He does not provide a solution to the problem which hell take
up in his Method in philosophical psychology, in his role of President of the
APA. It is the implicatum behind the lecture that matters, since Grice
will go back to it, notably in the Retrospective Epilogue. For Grice, its all
rational enough. Theres a P, in a situation, say of danger – a bull ‒. He
perceives the bull. The bulls attack causes this perception. Bull! the P1 G1
screams, and causes in P2 G2 a rearguard movement. So where is
the circularity? Some pedants would have it that Bull cannot be understood in a
belief about a bull which is about a bull. Not Grice. It is nice that he
brought back implicature, which had become obliterated in the lectures, back to
title position! But it is also noteworthy, that these are not explicitly rationalist
models for implicature. He had played with a model, and an explanatory one at
that, for implicature, in his Oxford seminar, in terms of a principle of
conversational helpfulness, a desideratum of conversational clarity, a
desideratum of conversational candour, and two sub-principles: a principle of
conversational benevolence, and a principle of conversational self-interest!
Surely Harvard could be spared of the details! Implicature. Grice disliked a
presupposition. BANC also contains a folder for Odd ends: Urbana and
non-Urbana. Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He
originally baptised it System Q in honour of Quine. At a later stage, Myro
will re-Names it System G, in a special version, System GHP, a highly
powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G, in gratitude to Grice. Odd
Ends: Urbana and Not Urbana, Odds and ends: Urbana and not Urbana, or
not-Urbana, or Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, or Oddents, urbane and not
urbane, semantics, Urbana lectures. The Urbana lectures are on language
and reality. Grice keeps revising them, as these items show. Language and
reality, The University of Illinois at Urbana, The Urbana Lectures, Language
and reference, language and reality, The Urbana lectures, University of
Illinois at Urbana, language, reference, reality. Grice favours a
transcendental approach to communication. A beliefs by a communicator
worth communicating has to be true. An order by a communicator worth
communicating has to be satisfactory. The fourth lecture is the one Grice dates
in WOW . Smith has not ceased from beating his wife, presupposition and
conversational implicature, in Radical pragmatics, ed. by R. Cole, repr. in a
revised form in Grice, WOW, II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics,
essay, presupposition and implicature, presupposition, conversational
implicature, implicature, Strawson. Grice: The loyalty examiner will not summon
you, do not worry. The cancellation by Grice could be pretty subtle. Well, the
loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate. Grice goes back to the
issue of negation and not. If, Grice notes, is is a matter of dispute whether
the government has a very undercover person who interrogates those whose
loyalty is suspect and who, if he existed, could be legitimately referred to as
the loyalty examiner; and if, further, I am known to be very sceptical about
the existence of such a person, I could perfectly well say to a plainly loyal
person, Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate,
without, Grice would think, being taken to imply that such a person
exists. Further, if the utterer U is well known to disbelieve in the existence
of such a person, though others are inclined to believe in him, when U finds a
man who is apprised of Us position, but who is worried in case he is summoned,
U may try to reassure him by uttering, The loyalty examiner will not summon
you, do not worry. Then it would be clear that U uttered this because U is sure
there is no such person. The lecture was variously reprinted, but the Urbana
should remain the preferred citation. There are divergences in the various
drafts, though. The original source of this exploration was a seminar.
Grice is interested in re-conceptualising Strawsons manoeuvre regarding
presupposition as involving what Grice disregards as a metaphysical concoction:
the truth-value gap. In Grices view, based on a principle of conversational
tailoring that falls under his principle of conversational
helpfulness ‒ indeed under the desideratum of conversational clarity
(be perspicuous [sic]). The king of France is bald entails there is a king of
France; while The king of France aint bald merely implicates it. Grice
much preferred Collingwoods to Strawsons presuppositions! Grice thought, and
rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian
currency, it should supersede Strawsons idea of the præ-suppositum.
Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quines idea of a
truth-value gap. Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a
truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the præ-suppositum is needed. The
king of France is bald entails that there is a king of France. It is part of
what U is logically committed to by what he explicitly conveys. By uttering,
The king of France is not bald on the other hand, U merely implicitly conveys
or implicates that there is a king of France. A perfectly adequate, or
impeccable, as Grice prefers, cancellation, abiding with the principle of
conversational helpfulness is in the offing. The king of France ain’t bald.
What made you think he is? For starters, he ain’t real! Grice credits Sluga for
having pointed out to him the way to deal with the definite descriptor or
definite article or the iota quantifier the formally. One thing Russell
discovered is that the variable denoting function is to be deduced from the
variable propositional function, and is not to be taken as an indefinable.
Russell tries to do without the iota i as an indefinable, but fails. The success
by Russell later, in On denoting, is the source of all his subsequent progress.
The iota quantifier consists of an inverted iota to be read the individuum x,
as in (℩x).F(x). Grice opts for the Whiteheadian-Russellian standard
rendition, in terms of the iota operator. Grices take on Strawson is a strong
one. The king of France is bald; entails there is a king of France, and what
the utterer explicitly conveys is doxastically unsatisfactory. The king of
France aint bald does not. By uttering The king of France aint bald U only
implicates that there is a king of France, and what he explicitly conveys is
doxastically satisfactory. Grice knew he was not exactly robbing Peter to pay
Paul, or did he? It is worth placing the lecture in context. Soon after
delivering in the New World his exploration on the implicatum, Grice has no
better idea than to promote Strawsons philosophy in the New World. Strawson
will later reflect on the colder shores of the Old World, so we know what Grice
had in mind! Strawsons main claim to fame in the New World (and at least Oxford
in the Old World) was his On referring, where he had had the cheek to say that
by uttering, The king of France is not bald, the utterer implies that there is
a king of France (if not that, as Grice has it, that what U explicitly conveys
is doxastically satisfactory. Strawson later changed that to the utterer
presupposes that there is a king of France. So Grice knows what and who he was
dealing with. Grice and Strawson had entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson
was particularly keen on that turn of phrase he learned from Quine, the
truth-value gap. Grice, rather, found it pretty repulsive: Tertium exclusum!
So, Grice goes on to argue that by uttering The king of France is bald, one
entailment of what U explicitly conveys is indeed There is a king of France.
However, in its negative co-relate, things change. By uttering The king of
France aint bald, the utterer merely implicitly conveys or implicates (in a
pretty cancellable format) that there is a king of France. The king of France
aint bald: theres no king of France! The loyalty examiner is like the King of
France, in ways! The piece is crucial for Grices re-introduction of the
square-bracket device: [The king of France] is bald; [The king of France] aint
bald. Whatever falls within the scope of the square brackets is to be read as
having attained common-ground status and therefore, out of the question, to use
Collingwoods jargon! Grice was very familiar with Collingwood on
presupposition, meant as an attack on Ayer. Collingwoods reflections on
presuppositions being either relative or absolute may well lie behind Grices
metaphysical construction of absolute value! The earliest exploration by Grice
on this is his infamous, Smith has not ceased from beating his wife, discussed
by Ewing in Meaninglessness for Mind. Grice goes back to the example in the
excursus on implying that in Causal Theory, and it is best to revisit this
source. Note that in the reprint in WOW Grice does NOT go, one example of
presupposition, which eventually is a type of conversational implicature. Grices
antipathy to Strawsons presupposition is metaphysical: he dislikes the idea of
a satisfactory-value-gap, as he notes in the second paragraph to Logic and
conversation. And his antipathy crossed the buletic-doxastic divide! Using φ to represent a sentence in either mode,
he stipulate that ~φ is satisfactory just in case ⌈φ⌉ is unsatisfactory. A crunch,
as he puts it, becomes obvious: ~ ⊢The king of France is bald may perhaps be
treated as equivalent to ⊢~(The king of
France is bald). But what about ~!Arrest the intruder? What do we say in cases
like, perhaps, Let it be that I now put my hand on my head or Let it be that my
bicycle faces north, in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that
neither !p nor !~p is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory? If !p is neither
satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (if that make sense, which doesnt to me), does
the philosopher assign a third buletically satisfactory value (0.5) to !p
(buletically neuter, or indifferent). Or does the philosopher say that we have
a buletically satisfactory value gap, as Strawson, following Quine, might
prefer? This may require careful consideration; but I cannot see that the
problem proves insoluble, any more than the analogous problem connected with
Strawsons doxastic presupposition is insoluble. The difficulty is not so much
to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present
themselves. The main reference is Essay 2 in WoW, but there are scattered
references elsewhere. Refs.: The main sources are the two
sets of ‘logic and conversation,’ in BANC, but there are scattered essays on
‘implicature’ simpliciter, too -- “Presupposition
and conversational implicature,” c. 2-f. 25; and “Convesational implicature,”
c. 4-f. 9, “Happiness, discipline, and implicatures,” c. 7-f. 6;
“Presupposition and implicature,” c. 9-f. 3, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational manual: of conversational rational etiquette -- conversational iimmanuel,
cnversational manual. Before playing with ‘immanuel,’ Grice does use ‘manual’
more technically. A know-how. “Surely, I can have a manual, but don’t know how
to play bridge.” “That’s not how I’m using ‘manual.’” It should be pointed out
that it’s the visual thing that influenced. When people (especially non-philosophers)
saw the list of maxims, they thought: “Washington!” “A manual!”. In the Oxford
seminrs, Grice was never so ‘additive.’ His desideratum of conversational
clarity, his desideratum of conversational candour, his principle of
conversational self-love and his principle of conversational benevolence, plus
his principle of conversational helpfulness, were meant as ‘philosophical’
leads to explain this or that philosophical mistake. The seminars were given
for philosophy tutees. And Grice is playing on the ‘manuals of etiquette’ –
conversational etiquette. If you do not BELONG to this targeted audience, it is
likely that you’ll misconstrue Grice’s point, and you will! Especially R. T.
L.!The Gentlemen's Book of Etiquette and Manual of Politeness Being a Complete
Guide for a Gentleman's Conduct in All His Relations Towards Society by Cecil
B. Hartley. Wit and vivacity are two highly important ingredients in the
conversation of a man in polite society, yet a straining for effect, or forced
wit, is in excessively bad taste. There is no one more insupportable in society
than the everlasting talkers who scatter puns, witticisms, and jokes with so
profuse a hand that they become as tiresome as a comic newspaper, and whose
loud laugh at their own wit drowns other voices which might speak matter more
interesting. The really witty man does not shower forth his wit so
indiscriminately; his charm consists in wielding his powerful weapon delicately
and easily, and making each highly polished witticism come in the right place
and moment to be effectual. While real wit is a most delightful gift, and its
use a most charming accomplishment, it is, like many other bright weapons,
dangerous to use too often. You may wound where you meant only to amuse, and
remarks which you mean only in for general applications, may be construed into
personal affronts, so, if you have the gift, use it wisely, and not too freely.
The most important requisite for a good conversational power is education, and,
by this is meant, not merely the matter you may store in your memory from
observation or books, though this is of vast importance, but it also includes
the developing of the mental powers, and, above all, the comprehension. An
English writer says, “A man should be able, in order to enter into conversation,
to catch rapidly the meaning of anything that is advanced; for instance, though
you know nothing of science, you should not be obliged to stare and be silent,
when a man who does understand it is explaining a new discovery or a new
theory; though you have not read a word of Blackstone, your comprehensive
powers should be sufficiently acute to enable you to take in the statement that
may be made of a recent cause; though you may not have read some particular
book, you should be capable of appreciating the criticism which you hear of it.
Without such power—simple enough, and easily attained by attention and
practice, yet too seldom met with in general society—a conversation which
departs from the most ordinary topics cannot be maintained without the risk of
lapsing into a lecture; with such power, society becomes instructive as well as
amusing, and you have no remorse at an evening’s end at having wasted three or
four hours in profitless banter, or simpering platitudes. This facility of
comprehension often startles us in some women, whose education we know to have
been poor, and whose reading is limited. If they did not rapidly receive your
ideas, they could not, therefore, be fit companions for intellectual men, and
it is, perhaps, their consciousness of a deficiency which leads them to pay the
more attention to what you say. It is this which makes married women so much
more agreeable to men of thought than young ladies, as a rule, can be, for they
are accustomed to the society of a husband, and the effort to be a companion to
his mind has engrafted the habit of attention and ready reply.”
conversational maxim. The idea of a maxim implies freewill and freedom in
general. A beautiful thing about Grice’s conversational maxims is that surely
they do not ‘need to be necessarily’ independent, as Strawson and Wiggins emphatically
put it (p.520). The important thing is other. A conversational maxim is
UNIVERSALISABLE (v. universalierung) into a ‘manual,’ the “Immanuel,” strictly,
the “Conversational Immanuel.” Grice is making fun of those ‘conversational
manuals’ for the learning of some European language in the Grand Tour (as in
“Learn Swiss in five easy lessons”). Grice is echoing Kant. Maximen (subjektive
Grundsätze): selbstgesetzte Handlungsregeln, die ein Wollen ausdrücken, vs.
Imperative (objektive Grundsätze): durch praktische Vernunft bestimmt;
Ratschläge, moralisch relevante Grundsätze. („das Gesetz aber ist das objektive
Prinzip, gültig für jedes vernünftige Wesen, und der Grundsatz, nach dem es handeln
soll, d. i. ein Imperativ.“) das Problem ist jedoch die Subjektivität der
Maxime. When considering Grice’s concept of a ‘conversational maxim,’ one has
to be careful. First, he hesitated as to the choice of the label. He used
‘objective’ and ‘desideratum’ before. And while few cite this, in WoW:PandCI he
adds one – leading the number of maxims to ten, what he called the
‘conversational catalogue.’ So when exploring the maxims, it is not necessary
to see their dependence on the four functions that Kant tabulated: quantitas,
qualitas, relatio, and modus, or quantity, quality, relation, and mode (Grice
follows Meiklejohn’s translation), but in terms of their own formulation, one
by one. Grice
formulates the overarching principle: “We might then formulate a rough general
principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe,
namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPEHATIVE PIUNCIPLE.”He
then goes on to introduce the concept of a ‘conversational maxim.’“On the
assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may
perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall
certain more specific MAXIMS maxims and
submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance
with the Cooperative Principle.” Note that in his
comparative “more specific maxims,” he is implicating that, in terms of the
force, the principle is a MAXIM. Had he not wanted this implicature, he could
have expressed it as: “On the assumption that some such general principle as
this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or
another of which will fall certain MAXIMS.”
He is
comparing the principle with the maxims in terms of ‘specificity.’ I.e. the
principle is the ‘summun genus,’ as it were, the category is the ‘inferior
genus,’ and the maxim is the ‘species infima.’He is having in mind something
like arbor porphyriana. For why otherwise care to distinguish in the
introductory passage, between ‘maxims and submaxims.’ This use of ‘submaxim’ is
very interesting. Because it is unique. He would rather call the four maxims as
SUPRA-maxims, supermaxim, or supramaxim. And leaving ‘maxim’ for what here he
is calling the submaxim.Note that if one challenges the ‘species infima,’ one
may proceed to distinguish this or that sub-sub-maxim falling under the maxim.
Take “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Since this, as he
grants, applies mainly to informative cases, one may consider that it is
actually a subsubmaxim. The submaxim would be: “Do not say that for which you
are not entitled” (alla Nowell-Smith). And then provide one subsubmaxim for the
desideratum: “Do not give an order which you are not entitled to give” or “Do
not order that for you lack adequate authority,” and the other subsubmaxim for
the creditum: “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”Grice: “Echoing
Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.” Or
Mode. “Manner” may be Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘mode.’ Consider the
exploration of Aristotle on ‘modus’ in Categoriae. It is such a mixed bag that
surely ‘manner’ is not inappropriate!“The category of QUANTITY” – i. e. either
the conversational category of quantity, or as one might prefer, the category
of conversational quantity – “relates to the quantity of information to be
provided,”So it’s not just ANY QUANTUM, as Aristotle or Kant, or Ariskant have
it – just QUANTITY OF INFORMATION, whatever ‘information’ is, and how the
quantity of information is to be assessed. E g. Grice surely shed doubts re:
the pillar box seems red and the pillar box is red. He had till now used
‘strength,’ even ‘logical strength,’ in terms of entailment – and here, neither
the phenomenalist nor the physicalist utterance entail the other.“and under it
fall the following maxims:”That is, he goes straight to the ‘conversational maxim.’
He will provide supermaxim for the other three conversational categories.Why is
the category of conversational quantity lacking a supermaxim?The reason is that
it would seem redundant and verbose: ‘be appropriately informative.’ By having
TWO maxims, he is playing with a weighing in, or balance between one maxim and
the other. Cf.To say the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth.No
more no less.One maximm states the ‘at most,’ the other maxim states the ‘at
least.’One maxim states the ‘maxi,’ the other maxim states the ‘min.’ Together
they state the ‘maximin.’First, “Make your contribution as informative as is
required (for the current purposes of the exchange).”It’s the contribution
which is informative, not the utterer. Cf. “Be as informative as is required.”
Grice implicates that if you make your contribution as informative as is
required YOU are being as informative as is required. But there is a
category-shift here. Grice means, ‘required BY the goal of the exchange).
e.g.How are youFine thanks – the ‘and you’ depends on whether you are willing
to ‘keep the conversation going’ or your general mood. Second, “Do not make
your contribution more informative than is required.”“ (The second maxim is
disputable;”He goes on to give a different reason. But the primary reason is
that “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required” is
ENTAILED by “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange)” – vide R. M. Hare on “Imperative inferences”
IN a diagram:Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange)Therefore, do not make your contribution more
informative than is required (by the current purposes of the exchange).Grice
gives another reason (he will give yet a further one) why the maxim is
‘disputable.’“it might be said that to be overinformative is not a
transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time.”For both
conversationalists, who are thereby abiding by Ferraro’s law of the least
conversational effort.”“A waste of time” relates to Grice’s previous
elaborations on ‘undue effort’ and ‘unnecessary trouble.’He is proposing a
conversational maximin.When he formulates his principle of economy of rational
effort, it is a waste of ‘time and energy.’Here it is just ‘time.’ “Energy” is
a more generic concept.“However, it might be answered that such
overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side
issues;”Methinks the lady doth protest too much.His example, “He was in a
blacked out city.”It does not seem to relate to the pillar boxA: What color is
the pillar boxB: It seems red.Such a ‘confusion’ and ‘side issue,’ if so
designed, is part of the implicatum.“and there may also be an indirect effect,
in that the hearers (or addressee) may be misled as a result of thinking that
there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of information.”Cf.
Peter Winch on “H. P. Grice’s Conversational Point.”More boringly, it is part
of the utterer’s INTENTION to provide an excess of information.”This may be
counterproductive, or not.“Meet Mr. Puddle”“Meet Mr. Puddle, our man in
nineteenth-century continental philosophy.”The introducer point: to keep the
conversation going.Effect on Grice: Mr. Puddle is hopeless at
nineteenth-century continental philosophy (OR HE IS BEING UNDERDESCRIBED). One
has to think of philosophically relevant examples here, which is all that Grice
cares for. Malcolm says, “Moore knows it; because he’s seen it!” – Malcolm
implicates that Grice will not take Malcolm’s word. So Malcom needs to provide
the excess of information, and add, to his use of ‘know,’ which Malcolm claims
Moore does not know how to use, the ‘reason’ – If knowledge is justified true
belief, Malcolm is conveying explicitly that Moore knows and ONE OF THE
CONDITIONS for it. Cf.I didn’t know you were pregnant.You still do not. (Here
the cancellation is to the third clause). Grice: “However this may be, there is
perhaps a different [second] reason for doubt about the admission of this
second maxim, viz., that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which
concems relevance.)”He could be a lecturer. His use of ‘later’ entails he knows
in advance what he is going to say. Cf. Foucault:“there is another reason to
doubt. The effect is secured by a maxim concerning relevance.”No “later” about
it!Grice:“Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim” – he forgets to
add, as per obvious, “The category of quality relates to the QUALITY of
information.” In this way, there is some reference to Aristotle’s summumm
genus. PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Cf.
Apuleius and Boethius on QUALITAS of propositio. Dedicatio takes priority over
abdicatio. So one expects one’s co-conversationalist to say that something IS
the case. Note too, that, if he used “more specific maxims and submaxims,” he
means “more specific supermaxims and maxims” – He is following Porophyry in
being confusing! Cf. supramaxim. Grice “-'Try to make your contribution one
that is true' –“This surely requires generality – and Grice spent the next two
decades about it. He introduced the predicate ‘acceptability.’ “Try to make
your contribution one that is acceptable”“True for your statements; good for
your desiderative-mode utterances.”“and two more specific maxims:”“1. Do not say
what you believe to be false.”There is logic here. It is easy to TRY to make
your contribution one that is true.” And it is easy NOT to say what you believe
to be false. Grice is forbidding Kant to have a maxim on us: “Be truthful!” “Say
the true!” “MAKE – don’t just TRY – to make your contribution one that is
true.”“I was only trying.”Cf. Moses, “Try not to kill” “Thou shalt trye not to
kylle.”Grice:“2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”This is
involved with truth. In “Truth and other enigmas,” Dummett claims that truth
is, er, an enigma. For some philosophers, all you can guarantee is that you
have evidence. Lacking evidence for what?The qualification, “adequate,” turns
the maxim slightly otiose. Do not say that for you lack evidence which would
make your contribution not a true one.However, Grice is thinking Gettier. And
Gettier allows that one CAN have ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, and p NOT be true.If we are
talking ‘acceptability’ it’s more ‘ground’ or ‘reason’, rather than ‘evidential
justification.’ Grice is especially obsessed with this, in his explorations on
‘intending,’ where ‘acceptance’ is deemed even in the lack of ‘evidential
justification,’ and leaving him wondering what he means by ‘non-evidential
justification.’“Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, viz.,
'Be relevant.'”The category comes from Aristotle, ‘pros it.’ And ‘re-‘ in
relation is cognate with ‘re-‘ in ‘relevant.’RELATION refers to ‘refer,’ Roman
‘referre.’ But in Anglo-Norman, you do have ‘relate’ qua verb. To ‘refer’ or
‘re-late,’ is to bring y back to x. As Russell well knows in his fight with
Bradley’s theory of ‘relation,’ a relation involves x and y. A relation is a two-place
predicate. What about X = xIs identity a relation, in the case of x = x?Can a
thing relate to itself?In cases where we introduce two variables. The maxim
states that one brings y back to x.“Mrs. Smith is an old windbag.”“The weather
has been delightful for this time of year, hasn’t it.”If INTENDED to mean, “You
ARE ignorant!,” then the conversationalist IS bring back “totally otiose remark
about the weather” to the previous insulting comment.To utter an utterly
irrelevant second move you have to be Andre Breton.“Though the maxim itself is
terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good
deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may
be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact
that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the
treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them
in a later work.”He is having in mind Nowell-Smith, who had ‘be relevant’ as
the most important of the rules of conversational etiquette, or how etiquette
becomes logical. But Nowell-Smith felt overwhelmed by Grice and left for the
north, to settle in the very fashionable Kent. Grice is also having in mind
Urmson’s appositeness (Criteria of intensionality). “Why did you title your
painting “Maga’s Daughter”? She’s your wife!” – and Grice is also having in
mind P. F. Strawson and what Strawson has as the principle of relevance
vis-à-vis the principles of presumption of ignorance and knowledge.So it was in
the Oxonian air.“Finally, under the category of MODE, which I understand as
relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said [THE CONTENT, THE
EXPLICITUM, THE COMMUNICATUM, THE EXPLICATUM] but, rather, to HOW what is said
is to be said,”Grice says that ‘meaning’ is diaphanous. An utterer means that p
reduces to what an utterer means by x. This diaphanousness ‘meaning’ shares
with ‘seeing.’ “To expand on the experience of seeing is just to expand on what
is seen.’He is having the form-content distinction.If that is a distinction. This
multi-layered dialectic displays the true nature of the speculative
form/content distinction: all content is form and all form is content, not in a
uniform way, but through being always more or less relatively indifferent or
posited. The Role of the Form/Content
Distinction in Hegel's Science of ...deontologistics.files.wordpress.com ›
2012/01 › formc... PDF Feedback About Featured Snippets Web results The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Researchwww.karger.com › Article › PDF The form-content distinction
is a potentially useful conceptual device for understanding certain
characteristics of moral development. In the most general sense it ... by CG
Levine - 1979 - Cited by 25 - Related articles The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Research ...www.karger.com › Article › Abstract Dec 23, 2009 - The
Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research. Levine C.G.. Author
affiliations. University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. by CG Levine - 1979
- Cited by 25 - Related articles
Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in
...www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pubmed Preschool children's mastery of the
form/content distinction in communicative tasks. Hedelin L(1), Hjelmquist E.
Author information: (1)Department of Psychology, ... by L Hedelin - 1998 -
Cited by 10 - Related articles Form
and Content: An Introduction to Formal Logic - Digital
...digitalcommons.conncoll.edu › cgi › viewcontentPDF terminology has to do
with anything. In this context, 'material' means having to do with content.
This is our old friend, the form/content distinction again. Consider. by DD
Turner - 2020 Simmel's Dialectic of
Form and Content in Recent Work in ...www.tandfonline.com › doi › full May 1,
2019 - This suggests that for Simmel, the form/content distinction was not a
dualism; instead, it was a duality.11 Ronald L. Breiger, “The Duality of
... Are these distinctions between
“form” and “content” intentionally ...www.reddit.com › askphilosophy › comments
› are_th... The form/content distinction also doesn't quite fit the distinction
between form and matter (say, in Aristotle), although Hegel develops the
distinction between form ... Preschool
Children's Mastery of the Form/Content Distinction ...link.springer.com ›
article Preschoolers' mastery of the form/content distinction in language and
communication, along its contingency on the characteristics of p. by L Hedelin
- 1998 - Cited by 10 - Related articles
Verbal Art: A Philosophy of Literature and Literary Experiencebooks.google.com
› books Even if form and content were in fact inseparable in the sense
indicated, that would not make the form/content distinction unjustified. Form
and matter are clearly ... Anders Pettersson - 2001 - Literary Criticism One Century of Karl Jaspers' General
Psychopathologybooks.google.com › books He then outlines the most important
implications of the form–content distinction in a statement which is identical
in the first three editions, with only minor ... Giovanni Stanghellini, Thomas
Fuchs - 2013 - Medical“I include the supermaxim-'Be perspicuous' –” Or
supramaxim. So the “more specific maxims and submaxims” becomes the clumsier
“supermaxims and maxims”Note that in under the first category it is about
making your contribution, etc. Now it is the utterer himself who has to be
‘perspicuous,’ as it is the utterer who has to be relevant. It’s not the
weaker, “Make your contribution a perspicuous one.” Or “Make your contribution
a relevant one (to the purposes of the exchange).”Knowing that most confound
‘perspicacity’ with ‘perspicuity,’ he added “sic,” but forgot to pronounce it,
in case it was felt as insulting. He has another ‘sic’ under the prolixity
maxim.“and various maxims such as: The “such as” is a colloquialism.Surely it
was added in the ‘lecture’ format. In written, it becomes viz. The fact that
the numbers them makes for ‘such as’ rather disimplicatable. “1. Avoid
obscurity of expression.”Unless you are Heracleitus. THEY told me, Heraclitus,
they told me you were dead, /They
brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remember'd
how often you and I/Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the
sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey
ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales,
awake;/For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take. In a way this is
entailed by “Be perspicuous,” if that means ‘be clear,’ in obtuse English.Be
clearTherefore, or what is the same thing. Thou shalt not not be obscure.2.
Avoid ambiguity.”Except as a trope, or ‘figure, (schema, figura).
“Aequi-vocate, if that will please your clever addressee.” Cf. Parker’s zeugma:
“My apartment was so small, that I've barely enough room to lay a hat and a few
friends“3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”Here he added a ‘sic’ that
he failed to pronounce in case it may felt as insulting. But the idea of a
self-refuting conversational maxim is surely Griceian, in a quessertive way. Since
this concerns FORM rather than CONTENT, it is not meant to overlap with
‘informativeness.’So given that p and q are equally informative, if q is less
brief (longer – ars longa, vita brevis), utter p. This has nothing to do with
logical strength. It is just to be assessed in a SYNTACTICAL way.Vide
“Syntactics in Semiotics”“4. Be orderly.”This involves two moves in the
contribution or ‘turn.’ One cannot be ‘disorderly,’ if one just utters ‘p.’ So
this involves a molecular proposition. The ‘order’ can be of various types. Indeed,
one of Grice’s example is “Jones is between Smith and Williams” – order of
merit or size?‘Between’ is not ambiguous!There is LOGICAL order, which is
prior.But there is a more absolute use of ‘orderly.’ ‘keep your room tidy.’orderly
(adj.) 1570s, "arranged in order," from order (n.) + -ly (1). Meaning
"observant of rule or discipline, not unruly" is from 1590s. Related:
Orderliness.He does not in the lecture give a philosophical example, but later
will in revisiting the Urmson example and indeed Strawson, but mainly Urmson,
“He went to bed and took off his boots,” and indeed Ryle, “She felt frail and
took arsenic.”“And one might need others.”Regarding ‘mode,’ that is. “It is
obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency
than is the observance of others;”Not as per ‘moral’ demands, since he’ll say
these are not MORAL.“a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity
would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said something
he believes to be false.”Except in Oscar Wilde’s circle, where they were
obsessed with commenting on prolixities! Cf. Hare against Kant, “Where is the
prisoner?” “He left [while he is hiding in the attic].”That’s why Grice has the
‘in general.’“Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the
first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme of
the kind I am constructing;”But since ‘should’ is weak, I will. “other maxims
come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is
satisfied.”So the keyword is co-ordination.“While this may be correct, so far
as the generation of implicatures is concerned it seems to play a role not
totally different from the other maxims, and it will be convenient, for the
present at least, to treat it as a member of the list of maxims.”He is having
weighing, and clashing in mind. And he wants a conversationalist to honour
truth over informativeness, which begs the question that as he puts it, ‘false’
“information” is no information.In the earlier lectures, tutoring, or as a
university lecturer, he was sure that his tutee will know that he was
introducing maxims ONLY WITH THE PURPOSE, NEVER TO MORALISE, but as GENERATORS
of implicata – in philosophers’s mistakes.But this manoeuver is only NOW disclosed.
Those without a philosophical background may not realise about this. “There
are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in
character), such as 'Be polite', that are also normally observed by
participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional
implicatures.”He is obviously aware that Émile
DurkheimWill Know that ‘conversational’ is subsumed
under ‘social,’ if not Williamson (perhaps).
– keyword: ‘norm.’ Grice excludes ‘moral’ because while a moral maxim
makes a man ‘good,’ a conversational maxim makes a man a ‘good’
conversationalist. Not because there is a distinction in principle!“The
conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures connected
with them, are specially connected (I hope) with”He had this way with
idioms.Cf. Einstein,“E =, I hope, mc2.”“the particular purposes that talk (and
so, talk exchange)”He is playing Dutch.The English lost the Anglo-Saxon for
‘talk.’ They have ‘language,’ and the Hun has ‘Sprache.’ But only the Dutch
have ‘taal.’So he is distinguishing between the TOOL and the USE of the TOOL.“is
adapted lo serve and is primlarily employed to serve.”The ‘adapted’ is
mechanistic talk. He mentions ‘evolutionarily’ elsewhere. He means ‘the
particular goal language evolved to serve, viz.’ groom.Grooming, Gossip and the
Evolution of Language is a 1996 book by the anthropologist Robin Dunbar, in
which the author argues that language evolved from social grooming. He further
suggests that a stage of this evolution was the telling of gossip, an argument
supported by the observation that language is adapted for storytelling.
The book has been criticised on the grounds that since words are so cheap,
Dunbar's "vocal grooming" would fall short in amounting to an honest
signal. Further, the book provides no compelling story[citation needed] for how
meaningless vocal grooming sounds might become syntactical speech. Thesis
Dunbar argues that gossip does for group-living humans what manual grooming
does for other primates—it allows individuals to service their relationships
and thus maintain their alliances on the basis of the principle: if you scratch
my back, I'll scratch yours. Dunbar argues that as humans began living in
increasingly larger social groups, the task of manually grooming all one's
friends and acquaintances became so time-consuming as to be unaffordable.[1] In
response to this problem, Dunbar argues that humans invented 'a cheap and
ultra-efficient form of grooming'—vocal grooming. To keep allies happy, one now
needs only to 'groom' them with low-cost vocal sounds, servicing multiple
allies simultaneously while keeping both hands free for other tasks. Vocal
grooming then evolved gradually into vocal language—initially in the form of
'gossip'.[1] Dunbar's hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that the
structure of language shows adaptations to the function of narration in
general.[2] Criticism Critics of Dunbar's theory point out that the very
efficiency of "vocal grooming"—the fact that words are so cheap—would
have undermined its capacity to signal honest commitment of the kind conveyed
by time-consuming and costly manual grooming.[3] A further criticism is that
the theory does nothing to explain the crucial transition from vocal
grooming—the production of pleasing but meaningless sounds—to the cognitive
complexities of syntactical speech.[citation needed] References
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language.
London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 9780571173969. OCLC 34546743. von Heiseler,
Till Nikolaus (2014) Language evolved for storytelling in a super-fast
evolution. In: R. L. C. Cartmill, Eds. Evolution of Language. London: World
Scientific, pp. 114-121.
https://www.academia.edu/9648129/LANGUAGE_EVOLVED_FOR_STORYTELLING_IN_A_SUPER-FAST_EVOLUTION
Power, C. 1998. Old wives' tales: the gossip hypothesis and the reliability of
cheap signals. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert Kennedy and C. Knight (eds),
Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 111 29. Categories: 1996 non-fiction
booksAmerican non-fiction booksBooks by Robin DunbarEnglish-language
booksEvolution of languageHarvard University Press booksPopular science
booksGrice: “I have stated my maxims”the maxims“as if this purpose were a
maximally effective exchange of information;”“MAXIMALLY EFFECTIVE”“this
specification is, of course, too narrow,”But who cares?This is slightly sad in
that he is thinking Strawson and forgetting his (Grice’s) own controversy with
G. A. Paul on the sense-datum, for ‘the pillar box seems red’ and ‘the pillar
box is red,’ involving an intensional context, are less amenable to fall under
the maxims.“and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general
purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others.”He has a more
obvious way below:Giving and receving informationInfluencing and being
influenced by others.He never sees the purpose as MAXIMAL INFORMATION, but
maximally effective EXCHANGE of information – does he mean merely ‘transmission.’
It may well be.If I say, “I rain,” I have ex-changed information.I don’t need
anything in return.If so, it makes sense that he is equating INFORMING With INFLUENCING or better DIRECTION your
addresse’s talk.Note that, for all he loved introspection and conversational
avowals, and self-commands, these do not count.It’s informing your addressee
about some state of affairs, and directing his action. Grice is always clear
that the ULTIMATE GOAL is the utterer’s ACTION.“As one of my avowed aims is to
see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational,
behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions
connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in
the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges.”Transaction is a good
one.TRANS-ACTIO“I list briefly one such analog for each conversational
category.”While he uses ‘conversational category,’ he also applies it to the
second bit: ‘category of conversational quantity,’ ‘category of conversational
quality,’ ‘category of conversational relation,’ and ‘category of
conversational mode.’ But it is THIS application that justifies the
sub-specifications.They are not categories of thought or ontological or
‘expression’.His focus is on the category as conversation.His focus is on the
‘conversational category.’“1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car,
I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required; if, e.
g., at a particular stage I need fourscrews, I expect you to hand me four,
rather than two or six. He always passed six, since two will drop.“Make your
contribution neither more nor less informative than is required (for the
purposes of the exchange).”This would have covered the maxi and the min.“NEITHER
MORE NOR LESS” is the formula of effectiveness, and economy, and minimization
of expenditure.“2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not
spurious.”Here again he gives an expansion of the conversational category,
which is more general than ‘try to make your contribution one that is true,’
and the point about the ‘quality of information,’ which he did not make.Perhaps
because it would have led him to realise that ‘false’ information, i.e.
‘information’ which is not genuine and spurious, is not ‘information.’But “Make
your contribution one that is genuine and not spurious.”Be candid.Does not need
a generalization as it covers both informational and directive utterances.“If I
need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not
expect you to hand me salt;”Or you won’t eat the cake.“if I need a spoon, I do
not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”Spurious and genuine are different.In
the ‘trick spoon,’ the conversationalist is just not being SERIOUS.But surely a
maxim, “Be serious” is too serious. – Seriously!“3. Relation. I expect a
partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of
the transaction;”Odd that he would use ‘appropriate,’ which was the topic of
the “Prolegomena,” and what he was supposed to EXPLAIN, not to use in the
explanation.For each of the philosophers making a mistake are giving a judgment
of ‘appropriateness,’ conversational appropriateness. Here it is good that he
relativises the ‘appropriateness’ TO the ‘need’.Grice is not quite sticking to
the etymology of ‘relatio’ and ‘refer,’ bring y back to x. Or he is. Bring y
(your contribution) back to the need x.Odd that he thinks he’ll expand more on
relation, when he did a good bit!“if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do
not expect to be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might
be an appropriate contribution at a later stage).”“I just expect you to be
silent.”“4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is
making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch.” For Lewis,
clarity is not enough!The ‘Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch!’
seems quite different from “Be perspicuous.”“Execute your performance with
reasonable dispatch”Is more like“Execute your performance”And not just STAND
there!A: What time is it B just stands there“These analogies are relevant to
what I regard as a fundamental question about the principle of conversational
helpfulness and its attendant conversational maxims,”For Boethius, it is a
PRINCIPLE because it does not need an answer!“viz., what the basis is for the
assumption which we seem to make, and on which (I hope) it will appear that a
great range of implicatures depend [especially as we keep on EXPLOITING the
rather otiose maxims], that talkers will ingeneral (ceteris paribus and in the
absence of indications to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these
principles prescribe.”Grice really doesn’t care! He is into the EXPLOITING of
the maxim, as in his response to the Scots philosopher G. A. Paul:“Paul, I
surely do not mean to imply that you may end up believing that I have a doubt
about the pillar box being red: it seems red to me, as I have this sense-datum
of ‘redness’ which attaches to me as I am standing in front of the pillar box
in clear daylight.”Grice is EXPLOITING the desideratum, YET STILL SAYING
SOMETHING TRUE, so at least he is not VIOLATING the principle of conversational
helpfulness, or the category of conversational quality, or the desideratum of
conversational candour.And that is what he is concerned with. “A dull but, no doubt at a certain level,
adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that *people*
(not pirots, although perhaps Oxonians, rather than from Malagasy) DO behave in
these ways;”Elinor Ochs was terrified Grice’s maxims are violated – never
exploited, she thought – in Madagascar.“they, i. e. people, or Oxonians, have
learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed,
it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the
habit. It is much easier, for example, to tell the truth than to invent lies.”Effort
again; least effort. And ease. Great Griceian guidelines!“I am, however, enough
of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts,”OR
EXPLAIN.“undeniable though they may be;”BEIGIN OF A THEORY FOR A THEORY – not
the theory for the generation of implicate, but for the theory of conversation.He
is less interested in this than the other. “I would like to be able to think of
the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all
or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to
follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea
that observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness and the conversational
maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter,
with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am
struggling with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation
that you will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my
expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of
indications that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges
seemed to me to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly
distinguish cooperative transactions:”So how is this not
quasi-contractual? He is listing THIS OR
THAT FEATURE that jointly distinguishes a cooperative transaction – all grand
great words.But he wants to say that ‘quasi-contractual’ is NO RATIONAL!He is
playing, as a philosopher, with the very important point of what follows from
what.A1. Conversasation is purposiveA2. Conversation is rationalA3.
Conversation is cooperativeA4. There is such a thing as non-rational
cooperation (is there?)So he is aiming at the fact that the FEATURES that
jointly distinguish cooperative transactions NEED NOT BE PRESENT, and Grice
surely does not wish THAT to demolish his model. If he bases it in general
constraints of rationality, the better.“1. The participants have some common
immediate aim, like getting a car mended; their ultimate aims may, of course,
be independent and even in conflict-each may want to get the car mended in order
to drive off, leaving the other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges,
there is a common aim even if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a
second-order one,”Is he being logical?“second-order predicate
calculus”“meta-language”He means higher or supervenientOr ‘operative’“, that
each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the transitory
conversational interests of the other.”By identify he means assume.YOU HAVE TO
DESIRE what your partner desires.The intersection between your desirability and
your addressee’s desirability is not NULL.And the way to do this is conditionalIF:
You perceive B has Goal G, you assume Goal G. “2. The contributions of the
participants .should be dovetailed, mutually dependent. Unless it’s one of
those seminars by Grice and J. F. Thomson!“3. There is some sort of
understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit)”i.e. implicated
rather than explicated – part of the implicatum, or implicitum, rather than the
explicatum or explicitum.“that, other things being equal, the transaction
should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it
should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else.”This
is especially tricky over the phone (“He never ends!” Or in psychiatric
interviews!)Note that ‘starting doing something else’ may work. E. g. watch
your watch!“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to
some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter
writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.”TWO OPPOSITE EXAMPLES.Fighting is
arguing is competition, adversarial, epagogue, not conversation,
cooperation, friendly, collaborative
venture, and diagoge.Letter writing is usually otiose – “what, with the
tellyphone!” And letter writing is no conversation.“In any case, one feels that
the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience
but himself.”And the talker who is mendacious has primarily let Kant down!”“So
I would like t< be able to show that observance of the principle of
conversational helfpulness and maxims is reasonal de (rational) along the
following lines”That any Aristkantian rationalist would agree to.“: that any
one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g.,
giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others)
must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption
that they are conducted in general accordance with the principle of
conversational helpfulness and the maxims.”Where the keyword is: profit,
effort, least effort, no energy, no undue effort, no unnecessary trouble. That
conversation is reasonable unless it is unreasonable. That a conversational
exchange should be rational unless it shows features of irrationality.“Whether
any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain;”It’s not clear what the
premises are!Plus, he means DEDUCTIVELY reached? Transcendentally reached?
Empirically reached? Philosophically reached? Conclusively reached? Etc.It
seems the conclusion need not be reached, because we never departed from the
state of the affairs that the conclusion describes.“in any case, I am fairly
sure that I cannot reach it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of
relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”For perhaps “I
don’t want to imply any doubt, but that pillar box seems red.”IS irrelevant,
yet true!“It is now time to show the connection between the principle of
conversational helfpulness and the conversational maxims, on the one hand, and
conversational implicature on the other.”This is clearer in the seminars. The
whole thing was a preamble “A participant in a talk exchange may fail to
fulfill a maxim in various ways, which include the following: 1. He may quietly
and unostentatiously VIOLATE (or fail to observe) a maxim; if so, in some cases
he will be liable to mislead.”And be blamed by Kant.Mislead should not worry
Grice, cf. “Misleading, but true.”The violate (or fail to observe) shows that
(1) covers two specifications. Tom may be unaware that there was such a maxim
as to ‘be brief, avoid unnecessary prolixity, unless you need to eschew
obfuscation!”This is Grice’s anti-Ryleism. He doesn’t want to say that there is
KNOWLEDGE of the maxims. For one may know what the maxims are and fail to
observe them “2. He may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxim and of the
principle of conversational helpfulness; he may say, indicate, or allow it to
become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires.
He may say, e. g., I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.” Where is the
criminal?I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.I shall unseal them. What do you
mean ‘cannot.’ You don’t mean ‘may not,’ do you?I think Grice means ‘may
not.’Is the universe finite? Einstein: I cannot say more; my lips are sealed. “3.
He may be faced by a CLASH of maxims [That’s why he needs more than one – or at
least two specifications of the same maxim]: He may be unable, e. g., to
fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without
violating the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you
say).” Odd that he doesn’t think this generates implicature: He has obviously studied
the sub-perceptualities here.For usually, a phenomenalist, like Sextus, thinks
that by utteringThe pillar box seems red to me – that is all I have adequate
evidence forHe is conveying that he is unable to answer the question (“What
colour is the pillar box?”) And being as ‘informative’ as is requiredWithout
saying something for which it is not the case that he has or will ever have
adequate evidence.Cf.Student at Koenigsberg to Kant: What’s the noumenon?Kant:
My lips are sealed.It may require some research to list ALL CLASHES.Because
each clash shows some EVALUATION qua reasoning, and it may be all VERY CETERIS
PARIBUS.Cf.Where is the criminal?My lips are sealed.The utterer has NOT opted
out. He has answered, via implicature, that he is not telling. He is being
relevant. He is not telling because he doesn’t want to DISCLOSE the whereabouts
of the alleged criminal, etc. For Kant, this is not a conversation! Odd that
Grice is ‘echoing Kant,’ where Kant would hardly allow a clash with ‘Be
truthful!’“4. He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY fail to fulfill (or
observe) it.Mock? Taunt?The magic flute. Grice’s magic flute.flout (v.)
"treat with disdain or contempt" (transitive), 1550s, intransitive
sense "mock, jeer, scoff" is from 1570s; of uncertain origin; perhaps
a special use of Middle English “flowten,”"to play the flute"
(compare Middle Dutch “fluyten,” "to play the flute," also "to
jeer"). Related: Flouted; flouting.Grice: “One thing we do not know is if
the flute came to England via Holland.”“Or he may, as we may say, ‘play the
flute’ with a maxim, expecting others to be agreeable.”“Or he may, as we might
say, ‘play the flute’ with the conversational maxim, expecting others to join
with some other musical instrument – or something – occasionally the same.”“On
the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so
without violating another maxim (because oi a clash), is not opting out, and is
not, in view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead,”This is
interesting. It’s the TRYING to mislead.Grice and G. A. Paul:Grice cannot be
claimed to have TRIED to mislead, and thus deemed to have misled G. A. Paul,
even if he had, when he said, “I hardly think there is any doubt about it, but
that pillar box seems red to me.”“the hearer is faced with a minor problem:”Implicature:
This reasoning is all abductive – to the ‘best’ explanation“How can his saying
what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the
overall principle of conversational helfpulness?”This was one of Grice’s
conversations with G. A. Paul:Paul (to Grice): This is what I do not
understand, Grice. How can your saying what you did say be reconciled with the
supposition that you are not going to mislead me?”Unfortunately, on that Saturday,
Paul went to the Irish Sea. Grice “This situation is one that
characteristically”There are others – vide clash, above – but not marked by
Grice as one such situation – “gives rise to a conversational implicature; and
when a conversational implicature is generated”Chomskyan jargon borrowed from
Austin (“I don’t see why Austin admired Chomsky so!”)“in this way, I shall say
that a maxim is being EXPLOITED.”Why not ‘flouted’? Some liked the idea of
playing the flute.EXPLOIT is figurative.Grice exploits a Griceian maxim.exploit (v.) c. 1400, espleiten, esploiten "to
accomplish, achieve, fulfill," from Old French esploitier, espleiter
"carry out, perform, accomplish," from esploit (see exploit (n.)).
The sense of "use selfishly" first recorded 1838, from a sense
development in French perhaps from use of the word with reference to mines,
etc. (compare exploitation). Related: Exploited; exploiting.exploit (n.) late
14c., "outcome of an action," from Old French esploit "a
carrying out; achievement, result; gain, advantage" (12c., Modern French
exploit), a very common word, used in senses of "action, deed, profit,
achievement," from Latin explicitum "a thing settled, ended, or
displayed," noun use of neuter of explicitus, past participle of explicare
"unfold, unroll, disentangle," from ex "out" (see ex-) +
plicare "to fold" (from PIE root *plek- "to plait").
Meaning "feat, achievement" is c. 1400. Sense evolution is from
"unfolding" to "bringing out" to "having
advantage" to "achievement." Related: Exploits. exploitative
(adj.) "serving for or used in exploitation," 1882, from French
exploitatif, from exploit (see exploit (n.)). Alternative exploitive (by 1859)
appears to be a native formation from exploit + -ive.exploitation (n.) 1803,
"productive working" of something, a positive word among those who
used it first, though regarded as a Gallicism, from French exploitation, noun
of action from exploiter (see exploit (v.)). Bad sense developed 1830s-50s, in
part from influence of French socialist writings (especially Saint Simon), also
perhaps influenced by use of the word in U.S. anti-slavery writing; and
exploitation was hurled in insult at activities it once had crowned as
praise. It follows from this science [conceived by Saint Simon] that the
tendency of the human race is from a state of antagonism to that of an
universal peaceful association -- from the dominating influence of the military
spirit to that of the industriel one; from what they call l'exploitation de
l'homme par l'homme to the exploitation of the globe by industry.
["Quarterly Review," April & July 1831] Grice: “I am now
in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicature.”Not to
provide a reductive analysis. The concept is too dear for me to torture it with
one of my metaphysical routines.”“A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as
if to say) that p”That seems good for the analysandumGrice loves the “by (in,
when)” “(or making as if to). Note the oratio obliqua.Or ‘that’-clause. So this
is not ‘uttering’As in the analysans of ‘meaning that.’“By uttering ‘x’ U means
that p.’The “by” already involves a clause with a ‘that’-clause.So this is not
a report of a physical event.It is a report embued already with intentionality.The
utterer is not just ‘uttering’The utterer is EXPLICITLY conveying that p.We
cannot say MEANING that p.Because Grice uses “mean” as opposed to “explicitly
convey”His borderline scenarios are such,“Keep me company, dear”“If we are to
say that when he uttererd that he means that his wife was to keep him company or
not is all that will count for me to change my definition of ‘mean’ or
not.”Also irony.But here it is more complicated. A man utters, “Grice defeated
Strawson”If he means it ironically, to mean that Strawson defeated Grice, it is
not the case that the utterer MEANT the opposite. He explicitly conveyed that.Grice
considers the Kantian ‘cause and effect,’“If I am dead, I shall have no time
for reading.”He is careful here that the utterer does not explicitly conveys
that he will have no time for reading – because it’s conditioned on he being
dead.“has implicated that q,” “may be said to have conversationally implicated
that q,”So this is a specification alla arbor porphyrana of ‘By explicitly
conveying that p, U implicitly conveys that q.’Where he is adding the second-order
adverb, ‘conversationally.’By explicitly conveying that p, U has implicitly
conveyed that q in a CONVERSATIONAL FASHION” iff or if“PROVIDED THAT”“(1) he is
to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the principle
of conversational helfpulness;”Especially AT LEAST, because he just said that
an implicatum is ‘generated’ (Chomskyan jargon) when AT LEAST A MAXIM IS played the flute.“(2) the
supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make
his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE terms) consistent
with this presumption;”THIS IS THE CRUCIAL CLAUSE – and the one that not only
requires ONE’S RATIONALITY, but the expectation that one’s addressee, BEING
RATIONAL, will expect the utterer to BE RATIONAL.This is the ‘rationalisation’
he refers to in “Retrospective Epilogue.”Note that ‘q’ is obviously now the
content of a state in the utterer’s soul – a desideratum or a creditum --, at
least a CREDITUM, in view of Grice’s view of everything at least exhibitive and
perhaps protreptic --“and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer
to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the
hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2)
IS required.”All that jargon about mutuality is a result of Strawson tutoring
Schiffer!“Apply this to my initial example, to B's remark that C has not yet
been to prison.”What made Grice think of such a convoluted example?He was
laughing at Searle for providing non-philosophical examples, and there he is!“In
a suitable setting A might reason as follows:”“(1) B has APPARENTLY violated –
indeed he has played the flute with -- the maxim 'Be relevant' and so may be
regarded as [ALSO] having flouted one of the maxims conjoining perspicuity,”In
previous versions, under the desideratum of conversational clarity Grice had it
that the desideratum included the expectation of this ‘relatedness’ AND that of
‘perspicuity’ (sic). In the above, Grice is stating that if you are irrelevant
(or provide an unrelated contribution) you are not being perspicuous.But “He
hasn’t been to prison” is perspicuous enough.And so is the link to the question
--.Plus, wasn’t perspicuity only to apply to the ‘mode,’ to the ‘form,’ rather
than the content.Here it is surely the CONTENT – that it is not the case that C
is a criminal – that triggers it all.So, since there is a “not,” here this is
parallel to the example examined by Strawson in the footnote to “Logical
Theory.”The utterer is saying that it is not the case that C has been in prison
yet.The ‘yet’ makes all the difference, even if a Fregeian colouring
‘convention’!“It is not the case that C has been in prison” Is, admittedly, not
very perspicuous.“So what, neither has the utterer nor the addressee.”So there
is an equivocation here as to the utterance perhaps not being perspicuous,
while the utterer IS perspicuous.“yet I have no reason to suppose that he is
opting out from the operation of the CP;”Or playing the flute with my beloved
principle of conversational helpfulness.“(2) given the circumstances, I can
regard his irrelevance as only apparent – as when we say that a plastic flower
is not a flower, or to use Austin’s example, “That decoy duck is surely not a
duck! That trick rubber spoon is no spoon! -- if, and only if, I suppose him to
think that C is potentially dishonest;”As many are!The potentially is the
trick.Recall Aristotle: “Will I say that I am potentially dishonest?! Not me!
PLATO was! Theophrastus WILL! Or is it ‘shall’?”“(3) B knows that I am capable
of working out step (2). So B implicates that C is potentially dishonest.'”Unless
he goes on like I go with G. A. Paul, “I do not mean of course to mean that I
mean that he is potentially dishonest, because although he is, he shouldn’t, or
rather, I don’t think you are expecting me to convey explicitly that he shouln’t
or should for that matter.”“The presence of a conversational implicature must
be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively
grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature
(if present at all) will not count as a CONVERSATIONAL implicature.”This is the
Humpty Dumpty in Grice.Cf. Provide the sixteen derivational steps in Jane
Austen’s Novel remark, “I sense and sensibilia” – This is what happens
sometimes when people who are not philosophers engage with Grice!For a
philosopher, it is clear Grice is not being serious there. He is mocking an
‘ideal’-language philosopher (as Waissmann called them). Let’s revise the
word:By “counting” he means “DEEM.” He has said that “She is poor, but she is
honest,” is NOT CALCULABLE. So if an argument is not produced, this may not be
a matter of argument.Philosophers are OBSESSED, and this is Grice’s trick, with
ARGUMENT. Recall Grice on Hardie, “Unlike my father, who was rather blunt,
Hardie taught me to ARGUE for this or that reason.”His mention of “INTUITION”
is not perspicuous. He told J. M. Rountree that meaning is a matter of
INTUITION, not a theoretical concept within a theory.So it’s not like Grice
does not trust the intuition. So the point is TERMINOLOGICAL and
methodological. Terminological, in that this is a specfification of
‘conversationally,’ rather than for cases like “How rude!” (he just flouted the
maxim ‘be polite!’ but ‘be polite’ is not a CONVERSATIONAL maxim. Is Grice
implicating that nonconversational nonconventional implicate are not
calculable? We don’t think so.But he might.I think he will. Because in the case
of ‘aesthetic maxim,’ ‘moral maxim,’ and ‘social maxim’ – such as “be polite,”
– the calculation may involve such degree of gradation that you better not get
Grice started!“it will be a CONVENTIONAL implicature.”OK – So perhaps he does
allow that non-conventional non-conversational implicate ARE calculable.But he
may add:“Unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, it will not be a
conversational implicature; it will be a conventional implicature.”Strawson:
“And what nonconventional nonconversational implicate?Grice: You are right,
Strawon. Let me modify and refine the point: “It will be a dull, boring,
undetachable, conventional implicatum – OR any of those dull implicate that
follow from (or result – I won’t use ‘generate’) one of those maxims that I
have explicitly said they were NOT conversational maxims.“For surely, there is
something very ‘contradictory-sounding’ to me saying that the implicatum is
involved with the flouting of a maxim which is NOT a conversational maxim, and
yet that the maxim is a CONVERSATIONAL implicature.”“Therefore, I restrict
calculability to CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE, because it involves the
conversational maxims that contributors are expected to be reciprocal; whereas
you’ll agree that Queen Victoria does not need to be abide with ‘be polite,’ as
she frequently did not – “We are not amused, you fools! Only Gilbert and
Sullivan amuse me!””“To work out that a particular CONVERSATIONAL [never mind
nonconversational nonconventional] implicature is present, the hearer will
reply on the following data:”As opposed to ‘sense-datum.’Perhaps assumption,
alla Gettier, is better:“ (1) the conventional meaning of the words used,
together with the identity of any references that may be involved;”WoW Quite a
Bit. This is the reason why Grice entitled WoW his first book.In he hasn’t been
to ‘prison’ we are not using ‘prison’ as Witters does (“My language is my
prison”).Strawson: But is that the CONVENTIONAL meaning? Even for King Alfred?He hasn't been to prisonprison (n.) early 12c., from Old
French prisoun "captivity, imprisonment; prison; prisoner, captive"
(11c., Modern French prison), altered (by influence of pris "taken;"
see prize (n.2)) from earlier preson, from Vulgar Latin *presionem, from Latin
prensionem (nominative prensio), shortening of prehensionem (nominative *prehensio)
"a taking," noun of action from past participle stem of prehendere
"to take" (from prae- "before," see pre-, + -hendere, from
PIE root *ghend- "to seize, take"). "Captivity," hence
by extension "a place for captives," the MAIN modern sense.” (There
are 34 other unmain ones). He hasn't been to a place for captives yet.You mean
he is one.Cf. He hasn't been to asylum.You mean Foucault?(2) the principle
of conversational helpfulness and this and that conversational maxim;”This is
more crucial seeing that the utterer may utter something which has no
conventional meaning?Cf. Austin, “Don’t ask for the meaning of a word! Less so
for the ‘conventional’ one!”What Grice needs is ‘the letter,’ so he can have
the ‘spirit’ as the implicatum. Or he needs the lines, so he can have the
implicatum as a reading ‘between the lines.’If the utterance is a gesture, like
showing a bandaged leg, or a Neapolitan rude gesture, it is difficult to
distinguish or to identify what is EXPLICITLY conveyed.By showing his bandaged leg,
U EXPLICITLY conveys that he has a bandaged leg. And IMPLICITLY conveys that he
cannot really play cricket.The requirement of ‘denotatum’ is even tricker,
“Swans are beautiful.” Denotata? Quantificational? Substitutional?In any case,
Grice is not being circular in requiring that the addressee should use as an
assumption or datum that U thinks that the expression E is generally uttered by
utterers when they m-intend that p.But there are tricks here.“(3) the context,
linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;”Cf. Grice, “Is there a general
context for a general theory of context?”“(4) other items of background
knowledge;”So you don’t get:How is C getting on at the bank? My lips are sealed
Why do you care Mind your own business. Note that “he hasn’t been to prison
yet” (meaning the tautologous ‘he is potentially dishonest’) is the sort of
tricky answer to a tricky question! In asking, the asker KNOWS that he’ll get
that sort of reply knowing the utterer as he does. “and (5) the fact (or
supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are
available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be
the case.”This is Schiffer reported by Strawson.“A general pattern for the
working out of a conversational implicature might be given as follows:”Again
the abductive argument that any tutee worth of Hardie might expect 'He has said
that p;”Ie explicitly conveys that p.Note the essential oratio obliqua, or
that-clause.“there is no reason to suppose. that he is not observing the
maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness”That is, he is
not a prisoner of war, or anything.“He could not be doing this unless he
thought that q;”Or rather, even if more tautologically still, he could not be
doing so REASONABLY, as Austin would forbid, unless…’ For if the utterer is
IRRATIONAL (or always playing the flute) surely he CAN do it!“he knows (and
knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he
thinks that q IS required;”Assumed MUTUAL RATIONALITY, which Grice fails to
have added as assumption or datum. Cf. paraconsistent logics – “he is using
‘and’ and ‘or’ in a ‘deviant’ logical way, to echo Quine,” – He is an intuitionist,
his name is Dummett.“he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends
me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has
implicated that q.'”The ‘or’ is delightful, for m-intention requires
‘intention,’ but the intention figures in previous positions, so ‘willingess to
allow the addressee to think’ does PERFECTLY FINE! Especially at Oxford where
we are ever so subtle!
conversational
point:
Grice distinguishes between ‘point’ and ‘conversational point.’ “What’s the
good of being quoted by another philosopher on the point of ‘point.’?” But that
is what Winch does. So, as a revenge, Grice elaborated on the point. P. London-born philosopher. He quotes Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s
point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of
one’s remarks – Grice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any
desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t
hesitate to say that it seems red to me” – Surely pointless, but an incredible
truth meant to refute G. A. Paul
conversational reason. With ‘reason,’ Grice is following Ariskant. There’s the
‘ratio’ and there’s the “Vernunft.” “To converse” can mean to have sex (cf.
know) so one has to be careful. Grice is using ‘conversational’ casually.
First, he was aware of the different qualifications for ‘implication’. There is
Nowell-Smith’s contextual implication and C. K. Grant’s ‘pragmatic
implication.’ So he chose ‘conversational implication’ himself. Later, when
narrowing down the notion, he distinguished between ‘conversational
implication’ and ‘non-conversational implication’: “Thank you. B: You’re
welcome.” If B is following the maxim, ‘be polite,’ the implication that he is
pleased he was able to assist his emissor is IMPLICATED but not
conversationally so. It is not a ‘conversational implication.’ Grice needs to
restrict the notion for philosophical purposes. Both for the framework of his
theory (it is easier to justify transcendentally conversational implication
than it is non-conversational implication). Note that ‘I am pleased I was able
to assist’ is CANCELLABLE or defeatible, so that’s not the issue. In any case,
both ‘conversational impication’ and these type of calculable
‘non-conversational’ implication still yielding from some ‘maxim’ (such as ‘be
polite’) Grice covers under the generic “non-conventional” precisely because
they can be defeated. When it comes to NON-DEFEASIBLE implicata, Grice uses
‘conventional implication’ (as in “She was poor but she was honest.”). Grice
did not find these fun. And it shows. Strawson stuck with them, but his
philosophising about them ain’t precisely ‘fun.’ Used in Retrospective, p. 369.
Also: conversational rationality. Surely, “principle of conversational
rationality” sounds otiose. Expectation of mutual rationality sounds better. Critique
of conversational reason sounds best! Grice is careful here. When he provides a
reductive analysis of ‘reasoning,’ this goes as follows: the reasoner reasons
from premise to conclusion. That’s the analysandum. What’s the analysans? At
least it involves TWO clauses: If the reasoner reasons from premise to
conclusion, it is assumed that he BELIEVES that the premise obtains; and he
believes that the conclusion obtains. This has to be generalised to cover the
desiderative, using ‘accept.’ He accepts that the premise obtains, and he
accepts that the conclusion obtains. But there is obviously a SECOND condition:
that the conclusion follows from the premise! He uses ‘demonstrably’ for that,
or the demonstratum.’ He is open as to what kind of yielding is involved
because he wants to allow for inductive reasoning and abductive reasoning, not
just deductive reasoning. AND THERE IS A TYPICALLY GRICEIAN third condition,
involving CAUSATION. He had used ‘cause’ in reductive analyses before – if not
so much in ‘meaning,’ due to Urmson’s counterexample involving ‘bribery,’ where
‘cause’ does not seem to do – but in his analysis of ‘intending’ for the
British Academy. So at Oxford he promotes this THIRD causal condition as
involving that, naturally enough, it is the rasoner’s BELIEF that demonstrably
q follows from p, which CAUSES the reasoner TO BELIEVE (or more generally,
accept) that the conclusion obtains. Grice is happy with that belief in the
validity of the demonstration ‘populates’ the world of alethic beliefs, and
does not concern with generalising that into a generic ‘acceptance.’ The word
‘rationalist’ is anathema at Oxford, because tutor after tutor has brainwashed
their tutees that the distinction is ‘empiricst-rationalist’ and that at Oxford
we are ‘empiricists.’ So Grice is really being ‘heretic’ here in the words of
G. P. Baker. demonstratum: The Eng. word
“reason” and the Fr. word “raison” are
both formed on the basis of Roman “reor,” to count or calculate, whence think,
believe. The Roman verb translates the Grecian “λέγειν,” two of whose principal
meanings it retains, but only two: count and think. The third principal meaning
of the Grecian term, speak, discourse, which designates a third type of putting
into relation and proportion, is rendered by other Roman series: “dicere”
(originally cognate with ‘deixis,’ and so not necessarily ‘verbal’), “loquor,”
“orationem habere” (the most ‘vocal’ one, as it relates to the ‘mouth,’ cf.
‘orality’) or “sermonem habere,” so that ultimately the Grecian λόγος is approached
by Roman philosophers by means of a syntagm, “ratio et oratio,” reason and
discourse. Each vernacular fragments the meaning of logos into a greater or
lesser. Cf. ‘principium reddendae rationis.’ Rationality functions as a
principle of the intelligibility of the world and history, particularly in
Hegel. Then there’s The Partitions of Reason and Semantic diffractions.
Although there is no language that retains under a single word all the meanings
of logos except by bringing logos into the language in question, the
distribution of these meanings is more or less close to Roman. For the
classical Fr. word “raison,” which
maintains almost all the Roman meanings including the mathematical sense of
proportion, as in “raison d’une série,” or “raison inverse,” a contemporary Fr.
-G. dictionary proposes the following
terms: Vernunft, Verstand rational faculty. This example shows that the whole
of the vocabulary is thus mobilized. Reason and faculties We can distinguish between
two interfering systems. The first designates reason, identified with thought
in general, in its relationship to a bodily and/or mental instance. The second
situates reason in a hierarchy of faculties whose organization it determines.
Regarding the first system, as it is expressed in various languages, where one
will find studies of the main distortions, especially around the expressions of
the Roman ‘anima.’ Philosophers especially emphasize the ways of designating
reason and mind that appear to be the most irreducible from one language to
another. Regarding the second system, and the partitions that do not coincide.
For Grice, ‘to understand’ presupposes ‘rationality – not for Kant, who sticks
with Verstand/Vernunft distinction. Ratio speculatum, praticatum. From
Aristotle to Kant, two great domains of rationality have been distinguished:
theory, or speculative reason, and practice. The lurality of meanings, each
represented by one or more specific words. The first question, from the point
of view of the difference of languages, is thus that of the breadth of the
meaning of “reason” or its equivalents, and of the systems diffracting the
meanings of logos and then of ratio. But another complex of problems
immediately arises. The Roman “ratio” absorbs the meanings of other Grecian
terms, such as νοῦς and διάνοια, which are also translated in other, more
technical ways, such as intellectus; so that reason, in the sense of
rationality, is a comprehensive term, whereas ‘reason’ in the sense of
intellect or understanding is a singular and differentiated faculty. However,
none of the comprehensive terms or systems of opposition coincides with those
of another language, which are moreover changing. Then there’s Reason and
Rationality: man, animal, god. Since Aristotle’s definition of man as an animal
endowed with logos, which Roman writers rendered by “animal rationale” —
omitting the discursive dimension—reason, or the logos, is a specific
difference that defines man by his difference from other living beings and/or
his participation in a divine or cosmic nature. Reason is opposed to madness
understood as de-mentia. More broadly, reason is conceived in terms of
difference from what does not belong to its domain and falls outside its
immediate law, but which man may, in certain ways, share with other animals,
such as sensation, passion, imagination, and possibly memory. Rationality and
the principle of intelligibility. Rationality, defined by the logos, is
connected with logic as the art of speaking and thinking, and with its founding
principles. Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept. Ed. by M. de Wulf and J. Hoffmans. Louvain,
Belg.: Institut supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 191 Hegel, Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Phil.
of Right. Tr. H. Nisbet and
ed. by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge
, . . Science of LogiTr. V. Miller.
London: Allen and Unwin, . . Werke. Ed.
by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. 20 vols. FrankfuSuhrkamp, .
Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Tr. Albert Hofstadter Bloomington: Indiana , . .
Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington:
Indiana , . Hume, D. . A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. by D.
Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford , . Kant, Immanuel.
Critique of Practical Reason. Translated and ed. by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge , . .
Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd ed. Tr. N.
Kemp-Smith. : Macmillan, 193 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Opuscules et fragments
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de France, 190 Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms, . . Philosophical Essays.
Translated and ed. by Roger Ariew and
Dan Garber. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, . . Philosophical Papers and Letters.
2nd ed. Ed. and Tr. Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht, Neth.: D.
Reidel, . . Die philosophischen Schriften. Ed.
by I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 187590. Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms,
. . Leibnizens mathematische Schriften. Ed. by I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 18496 .
Textes inédits d’après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque provinciale de
Hanovre. Ed. by Gaston Gru2 vols. :
Presses Universitaires de France, 194 Locke, J.. An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding. Ed. by P. H. Nidditch.
Oxford: Clarendon, . Micraelius, J. . Lexicon philosophicum terminorum
philosophis usitatorum. 2nd ed. Stettin, 166 Paulus, J.. Henri de Gand: Essai
sur les tendances de sa métaphysique. : Vrin, 193 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm
Joseph. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Ed.
by Jörg Jantzen, T. Buchheim,
Jochem Hennigfeld, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Siegbert Peetz. 40 vols.
StuttgaFrommann-Holzboog, . . Of the I as the Principle of Phil. , or On the
Unconditional in Human Knowledge. In The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four
Early Essays 17949 Translated with commentary by F. Marti. Lewisburg, PA:
Bucknell , . Spinoza, Baruch. Complete Works. With tr.s by Samuel Shirley.
Ed. by Michael L. Morgan. Indianapolis,
IN: Hackett, . . Oper2nd ed. Ed. by
Gebhardt. 5 vols. Heidelberg: Carl Winters.
Convey—used in index to WoW. Etymology is
funny. From con-via – cum-via, go on the road with.
co-operatum: Grice is very right in noting that ‘helpfulness’ does not
‘equate’ cooperation. Correspondingly he changed the principle of
conversational helpfulness into the principle of conversational co-operation.
He also points that one has to distinguish between the general theisis that
conversation is rational from the thesis that the particular form of
rationality that conversation takes is cooperative rationality, which most
libertarians take as ‘irrationality’ personified, almost! Grice is obsessed
with this idea that ‘co-operation’ need not just be ‘conversational.’ Indeed,
his way to justify a ‘rationalist’ approach is through analogy. If he can find
‘co-operative’ traits in behaviour other than ‘conversational,’ the greater the
chance to generalise, and thus justify. The co-operation would be
self-justifying. co-operation. The hyphen in Strawson and Wiggins (p. 520). Grice
found ‘co-operative’ too Marxist, and would prefer ‘help,’ as in ‘mutual help.’
This element of ‘mutuality’ is necessary. And it is marked grammatical, with
the FIRST person and the SECOND person. The third need NOT be a person – can be
a dog (as in “Fido is shaggy”). The mututality is necessary in that the
emissor’s intention involves the belief that his recipient is rational. You
cannot co-operate with a rock. You cannot co-operate with a vegetal. You cannot
cooperate with a non-rational animal. You can ONLY cooperate with a co-rational
agent. Animal co-operation poses a nice side to the Griceian idea. Surely the
stereotype is a member of species S cooperating with another specimen of the
same species. But then there are great examples of ‘sym-biosis’: the crane that
gets rid off the hippopotamus’s ticks. Is this cooperation? Is this
intentional? If Grice thinks that there is a ‘mechanistically derivable’
explanation,, it isn’t. He did not necessarily buy ‘bio-sociological’
approaches. Which was a problem, because we don’t have much philosophical
seriouis discourse on ‘cooperation’ at the general level Grice is aiming at.
Except in ethics, which is biased. So it is no wonder that Grice had to rely on
‘meta-ethics’ to even conceptualise the field of cooperation: the maximin
becomes a balance between a principle of conversational egoism and a principle
of conversational altruism. He later found the egoism-tag as ‘understood.’ And
his ‘altruism’ became ‘helpfulness,’ became ‘benevolence,’ and became
‘co-operation.’
copulatum: It was an Oxonian exercise to trace the ‘copula.’ “I’ve
been working like a dog, should be sleeping like a log.” Where is the copula:
Lennon is a dog-like worker – Lennon is a potential log-like sleeper.” Grice
uses ‘copula’ in PPQ. The term is
sometimes used ambiguously, for ‘conjunctum.’ A conjunctive is called a
copulative. But Grice obviously narrows down the use of copulatum to izz and
hazz. He is having in mind Strawson.The formula does not allow for differences
in tense and grammatical number; nor for the enormous class of * all
'-sentences which do not contain, as their main verb, the verb * to be '. We
might try to recast the sentences so that they at least fitted into one of the
two patterns * All x is y ' or ' All x are y ' ; but the results would be, as
English, often clumsy andt sometimes absurd. for Aristotle, 'Socrates is a man'
is true "in virtue of his being that thing which constitutes existing for
him (being which constitutes his mode of existence)," Hermann Weidemann,
"In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Predication," p. 84— only so
long as that "being" be taken as an assertion of being per se. But
Weidemann wants to take it merely copulatively. In "Prädikation," p.
1196, he says that when 'is' is used as tertium adiacens it has no meaning by
itself, but merely signifies the connection of subject and predicate. Cf. his
"Aristoteles über das isolierte Aussagenwort," p. 154. H. P. Grice,
"Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being," also rejects an existential
reading of tertium adiacens and pushes for a copulative one. Cf. Alan Code,
"Aristotle: Essence and Accident," pp. 414-7. Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not
with variation between predicates of one subject, but with variation between
essential (per se)predications upon different (indeed categorially
different) subjects (such ...eads
me to wonder whether Aristotle may be maintaining not only that the copula exhibits
semantic ...An extended treatment of my views about izzing and hazzing can
be found in Alan. A crucial ... on occasion admit catégorial variation in
the sense of the copulative 'is', evidently is ... Aristotle has connected
the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation ...with
the copulative 'is';
so he rather strangely interprets the last remark. (1017a27-30) as alluding to
semantic multiplicity in
the copula as being.
(supposedly) a consequence of semantic multiplicity in the existential
'is'. This interpretation seems difficult to defend. When Aristotle says that
predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its
quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be
saying that if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to
some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow,
these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription
of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation"H. P.
Grice brings the question he had considered with J. L. Austin and P. F.
Strawson at Oxford about Aristotle’s categories.In “Categoriae,” Aristotle
distinguishes two sorts of case of the application of word or phrase to a range
of situations. In one sort of case, both the word and a single definition
(account, “logos”) apply throughout that range. In the other sort of case, the
word but no single definition applies through the range.These two sorts of case
have a different nature. In the first case, the word is applied synonymously
(of better as “sunonuma” – literally “sun-onuma”, cognomen). In the second case
the word is applied homonymously (or better “homonuma”, or aequi-vocally,
literally “homo-numa.”)Grice notes that a homonymous application has some sort
of sub-division which Aristotle calls "paronymy" (“paronuma”),
literally ‘para onuma.’To put it roughly, homonyms have multiple meanings –
what Grice has as “semantic multiplicity.”Synonyms have one meaning or ONE
SENSE, but apply to different kinds of thing.A paronym, such as ‘be,’ derives
from other things of a different kind. Paronyms display a ‘UNIFIED semantic
multiplicity,’ if that’s not too oxymoronic: how can the multiplicity be
unified while remaining a multiplicity? Aristotle states, confusingly, that
"being is said in many ways". As Grice notes, ‘good’ (agathon) also
is a paronym that displays unified semantic multiplicity.In Nichomachean
Ethics, even more confusingly, Aristotle says that "good is said in as
many ways as being". He doesn’t number the ways.So the main goal for Grice
is to answer the question: If, as Aristotle suggests, at least some expressions
connected with the notion of "being" exhibit semantic multiplicity,
of which expressions is the suggestion true? Grice faces the question of
existential being and Semantic Multiplicity. Grice stresses that Semantic
Multiplicity of "be" is not
only the case of it interpretation. Other words he wants to know in what way of
interpretation of this word the philosophers can detect the SM. Generally
speaking there are four possible interpretations of "being": First,
"be" is taken to mean "exist.”Second, "be" is taken as
a copula in a predication statement.Third, "be" is taken for
expressing the identity.Fourth, "Being" is considered to be a noun
(equivalent to ‘object' or ‘entity') – subjectification, category shift:
“Smith’s being tall suggests he is an athlete.” (cfr. A. G. N. Flew on the
‘rubbish’ that adding ‘the’ to ‘self’ results in – contra J. R. Jones).
Philosophers have some problems for this kind of theory with separating
interpretations from each other. It is natural for thinkers to unite the first
and the fourth. The object or entity should be the things which already exist.
So the SM would attach to such a noun as "entity" if, and only if, it
also attaches to the word "exist". Furthermore, it seems to be a good
idea to unite the first and the third. In some ways theorist can paraphrase the
word "exist" in the terms of self-identity. Grice gives an example:
“Julius Caesar exists if and only if Julius Caesar is identical for Julius
Caesar.” Cf. Grice on ‘relative identity.’So the philosophers should
investigate SM in two possible interpretations – when "be" is
understood as "exist" and when "be" is understood as
copula. From Aristotle's point of view ‘being’ is predicated of everything.
From this statement, Grice draws the conclusion that "exist" can
apply to every thing, even a square circle.This word should signify a plurality
of universals and exhibits semantic multiplicity. But Grice continue his
analyses and tries to show, that "exist" has not merely SM, but
UNIFIED semantic multiplicity. God forbid that he breaks M. O. R., Modifed
Occam’s Razor – Semantic multiplicies are not to be multiplied unificatory
necessity.”In “Metaphysics,” Aristotle says that whatever things are signified
by the "forms of predication". Philosophers understood the forms of
predication (praedicabilium, praedicamentum) as a category. So in this way
"being" has as many significations as there are forms of predication.
"Be" in this case indicates what a thing is, what is like or how much
it is and ctr. And no reasons to make a difference between two utterances like
"man walks (flourishes)" and "the man is walking (flourishing)"
– cfr. Strawson on no need to have ‘be’ explicitly in the surface form, which
render some utterances absurd. Grice says that it is not a problem with
interpretation of verb-forms like ‘walks' and ‘flourishes' while we can replace
them by expression in a canonical form like ‘is walking' and ‘is flourishing'.
Aristotle names them as canonical in form within the multiplicity of use of
"be" because ‘is’ is not existential, but copulative.Cf. Descartes, I
think therefore I am – I am a res cogitans, ergo I am a res. "When
Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is
it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he
seems to be saying that, if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied
to some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow, these
predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the
ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation" It
means that, from Aristotle's point of view, "Socrates is F" is not an
essential predication, where "F" shows the item in the category C. So
the logical form of the proposition “Socrates is F” is understood as
"Socrates has something which is (C) F" where is (C) represent
essential connection to category C. In conclusion it can be said that the
copula is a matter of the logical nature of constant connection expressed by
"has" and a categorical variant relation expressed by essential
"is". So we have both types of interpretation: as existence and as a
copula. (Our gratitude to P. A.
Sobolevsky). ases of ''Unified Semantic
Multiplicity'' (USM). Prominent among examples of USM is the
application of the word 'be'; according to. Aristotle, “being is said
in ... Aristotle and the alleged multiplicity of being (or
something). Grice is all for focal unity. Or, to echo Jones, if there is semantic
multiplicity (homonymy), it is in the
end UNIFIED semantic multiplicity (paronymy). Or something.
corpus: Grice would not have gone to Oxford
had his talent not been in the classics, Greek and Latin. As a Midlander, he
was sent to Corpus. At the time, most of Oxford was oriented towards the
classics, or Lit. Hum. (Philosophia). At some point, each college attained some
stereotypical fame, which Grice detested (“Corpus is for classicists”). By this
time, Grice, after a short stay at Merton, accepted the fellowship at St.
John’s, which was “a different animal.” In them days, there were only two
tutorial fellows in philosophy, Scots Mabbott, and English Grice. But Grice
also was “University Lecturer in Philosophy,” which meant he delivered seminars
for tutees all over Oxford. St. John’s keeps a record of all the tutees by
Grice. They include, alphabetically, a few good names. Why is Corpus so
special? Find out! History of “Corpus Christi.” Cf. St. John’s. Cf. Merton.
Each should have an entry. Corpus is Grice’s alma mater – so crucial. Hardieian: you only have one tutor in your life, and Grice’s
was Hardie. So an exploration on Hardie may be in order. Grice hastens to add
that he only learned ‘form,’ not matter, from Hardie, but the ethical and
Aristotelian approach he also admitted.
cotton onto the implicatum: this is not
cognate with the plant. It’s Welsh, rather.Strawson’s and Wiggins’s example of
the ‘suggestio falsi’ – or alternative to Grice’s tutee example. Since Strawson
and Wiggins are presenting the thing to the ultra-prestigious British Academy,
they thought a ‘tutee’ example would not be prestigious enough. So they have
two philosophers, Strawson and Grice, talking about a third party, another
philosopher, well known by his mood outbursts. They are assessing the third
party’s philosophical abilities at their London club. Strawson volunteers: “And
Smith?”. Grice responds: “If he had a more angelic temperament…” Strawson,
“like a fool, I rushed in – Strawson Wiggins p. 520. The angelic temperament.
To like someone or something; to view someone or something favorably. ... After
we explained our plan again, the rest of the group seemed to cotton onto it. 2. To begin to
understand something. Has nothing to do with cotton 1560s, "to prosper,
succeed;" of things, "to agree, suit, fit," a word of uncertain
origin. Perhaps from Welsh cytuno "consent, agree;" but perhaps
rather a metaphor from cloth-finishing and thus from cotton (n.).
Hensleigh Wedgwood compares cot "a fleece of wool matted together."
Meaning "become closely or intimately associated (with)," is from
1805 via the sense of "to get along together" (of persons), attested
from c. 1600. Related: Cottoned; cottoning.
credibility: While Grice uses ‘probability’ as the correlatum of
desirability, he suggests ‘credibility’ is a better choice. It relates to the
‘creditum.’ Now, what is the generic for ‘trust’ when it comes to the creditum
and the desideratum? An indicative utterance expresses a belief. The utterer is
candid if he holds that belief. “Candid” applies to imperative utterances which
express genuine desires and notably the emissor’s intention that his recipient
will form a ‘desideratum.’ Following Jeffrey
and Davidson, respectively, Grice uses ‘desirability’ and ‘probability,’ but
sometimes ‘credibibility,’ realizing that ‘credibility’ is more symmetrical
with ‘desirability’ than ‘probability’ is. Urmson had explored this in
“Parenthetical verbs.” Urmson co-relates, ‘certaintly’ with ‘know’ and
‘probably’ with ‘believe.’ But Urmson adds four further adverbs: “knowingly,”
“unknowingly,” “believably,” and “unbelievably.” Urmson also includes three
more: “uncredibly,” in variation with “incredibly,” and ‘credibly.” The keyword
should be ‘credibility.’
creditum: The Romans were good at this. Notably in negative
contexts. They distinguished between an emissor being fallax and being mendax.
It all has to do with ‘creditum.’ “Creditum’ is vero, more or less along
correspondence-theoretical lines. Used by Grice for the doxastic equivalent of
the buletic or desideratum. A creditum is an implicatum, as Grice defines the
implicatum of the content that an addresse has to assume the utterer BELIEVES
to deem him rational. The ‘creditum’-condition is essential for Grice in his
‘exhibitive’ account to the communication. By uttering “Smoke!”, U means that
there is some if the utterer intends that his addressee BELIEVE that he, the
utterer, is in a state of soul which has the propositional complex there is
smoke. It is worth noting that BELIEF is not needed for the immediate state of
the utterer’s soul: this can always be either a desire or a belief. But a
belief is REQUIRED as the immediate (if not ultimate) response intended by the
utterer that his addressee adapt. It is curious that given the primacy that
Grice held of the desirability over the credibility that many of his
conversational maxims are formulated as imperatives aimed at matters of belief,
conditions and value of credibility, probability and adequate evidence. In the
cases where Grice emphasizes ‘information,’ which one would associate with
‘belief,’ this association may be dropped provided the exhibitive account: you
can always influence or be influenced by others in the institution of a common
decision provided you give and receive the optimal information, or rather,
provided the conversationalists assume that they are engaged in a MAXIMAL
exchange of information. That ‘information’ does not necessarily apply to
‘belief’ is obvious in how complicated an order can get, “Get me a bottle”. “Is
that all?” “No, get me a bottle and make sure that it is of French wine, and
add something to drink the wine with, and drive careful, and give my love to
Rosie.” No belief is explicitly transmitted, yet the order seems informative
enough. Grice sometimes does use ‘informative’ in a strict context involving
credibility. He divides the mode of credibility into informational (when
addressed to others) and indicative (when addressed to self), for in a
self-addressed utterance such as, “I am being silly,” one cannot intend to
inform oneself of something one already knows!
defeasibility. Strawson Wiggins ‘somehwere in the kitchen,’ ‘in one of
the dining-room cupboards’ unless some feature of the context defeats the
implication, there is an implicatum to the effect that the emissor cannot make
a ‘stronger’ move by Grice’s principle of conversational fortitude (“Be ‘a
fortiori’”). Cf. G. P. Baker on H. L. A.
Hart. All very Oxonian. Cf. R. Hall, Oxonian, on ‘Excluders.’ For Strawson and
Wiggins that a principle holds ‘generally, ceteris paribus, is a condition for
the existence of conversation, or of a good conversation. Defeasibility is a
sign of the freedom of the will. The communicators can always opt out. Not a
salivating dog. Note that defeasibility does not apply just to the implicatum.
Since probabilistic demonstrate are uncertain, there is an element of
defeasibility in the EXplicatum of a probabilistic utterance. Levinson’s quote,
“Probability, Defeasibility, and Mode Operators.”
defensible
– H. P. Grice, “Conceptual analysis and the defensible province of philosophy.”
Grice uses the ‘territorial’ province, and the further implicature is that
conceptual analysis as the province of philosophy is a defensible one. Grice
thinks it is.
definitum: Grice lists ‘the’ in his list of communicative devices. He
was interested in the iota operator. After Sluga, he knew there were problems
here. He proposed a quantificational approach alla Whitehead and Russell,
indeed a Whitehead and Russellian expansion in three clauses, with identity,
involved. Why wasn’t Russell not involved with the ‘indefinite’. One would
think because that’s rendered already by (Ex), ‘some (at least one)’. Russell’s interest in definitum is not
philosophical. His background was mathematics, rather --. Grice was obsessed
with ‘aspects’ in verbs. There’s the ‘imperfect’ and the ‘perfect.’ These
translate Aristotle’s ‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos.’ But why the change from “factum”
to “fectum”? So it’s better to turn to ‘definitum,’ and ‘indefinitum, as better
paraphrases of Aristotle’s jargon – keeping in mind we are talking of his
‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos. Aristotle
and telos. In the Met. Y.1048b1835, Aristotle discusses the definition of an
action πϱᾶξις. He distinguishes two kinds of activities: kinêseis ϰινήσεις and
energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι: Only that movement in which the end is present is an
action. E.g., at the same time we are v.ing and have v.n ὁϱᾷ ἅμα, are
understanding and have understood φϱονεῖ, are thinking and have thought noei
kai nenoêken νοεῖ ϰαὶ νενόηϰεν when it is not true that at the same time we are
learning and have learnt ou manthanei kai memathêken οὐ μανθάνει ϰαὶ μεμάθηϰεν,
or are being cured and have been cured oud’ hugiazetai kai hugiastai οὐδ᾿ ὑγιάζεται
ϰαὶ ὑγίασται. At the same time we are living well and have lived well εὖ ζῇ ϰαὶ
εὖ ἔζηϰεν ἅμα, and are happy and have been happy εὐδαιμονεῖ ϰαὶ εὐδαιμόνηϰεν.
Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements ϰινήσεις, and the
other actualities energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι. We v. that the distinctive properties of
these two categories of verbs are provided by relations of inference and
semantic compatibility between the form of the present and the form of the
perfect. In the case of energeiai, there is a relation of inference between the
present and the perfect, in the sense that when someone says I v. we can infer
I have v.n. There is also a relation of semantic compatibility since one can
very well say I have v.n and continue to v.. Thus the two forms—the present and
the perfect— are verifiable at the same time ἅμα, simultaneously. On the other
hand, in the case of kinêseis, the present and the perfect are not verifiable
at the same time. In fact, when someone says I am building a house, we cannot
infer I have built a house, at least in the sense in which the house is
finished. In addition, once the house is finished, one is no longer
constructing it, which means that there is a semantic incompatibility between
the present and the perfect. τέλος, which means both complete action, that is,
end, and limit in competition with πέϱας, plays a crucial role in this
opposition. In the category of energeiai, we have actions proper, that is,
activities that are complete τέλεια because they have an immanent finality ἐνυπάϱχει
τὸ τέλος. In the category of kinêseis, we have imperfect activities ἀτελείς
that do not carry their own end within themselves but are transitive and aim at
realizing something. Thus activities having an external goal that is at the
same time a limit peras do not carry their own goal telos within themselves;
they are directed toward a goal but this goal is not attained during the
activity, but is realized at the end of the activity. And history repeated itself, in the same
terms, regarding Slavic languages, with on the one hand the words perfective
and imperfective, modeled on the Roman opposition and imported to describe an
opposition in which lexicon and grammar are truly interwoven since it is a question
of categories of verbs, which determine the whole organization of conjugation,
and on the other hand the Russian words that are used to characterize the same
categories of verbs, and that signify the accomplished and the unaccomplished.
In the terminological imbroglio, we can once again v. the effects of a
confusion connected with the inability to acknowledge the autonomy of lexical
aspect, or, in the particular case of Slavic languages, the difficulty of
isoRomang the aspectual dimension in the general system of the language.
Nevertheless, the same questions, that of the telos and that of accomplishment,
are at the foundation of the two aspectual dimensions. They are even so
prominent that, alongside the heterogeneous inventory from which we began, we also
find, and almost simultaneously in the aspectual tradition, a leveling of all
differences in favor of two categories that are supposed to be the categories
par excellence of grammatical aspect: the perfective on the one hand, and the
imperfective on the other. However, there is also the continuing competition of
the perfect, another tr. of the same word, perfectum, designating a category
that is not exactly the same as that of the perfective, and which is, for its
part, always a grammatical category, never a lexical category: one speaks of
perfect to designate compound tenses in G. ic languages, e. g. , of the type I
have received as opposed to I received,
which corresponds to the idea that the telos is not only achieved, but
transcended in the constitution of a fixed state, given as the result of the
completion of the process. Two, or three, grammatical categories that are the
same and not the same as the two, three, or four lexical categories. It is in
the name of these categories, and literally behind their name, that the
aspectual descriptions succeeded in being applicable to all languages,
confRomang all the imperfects of all languages and also the Eng. progressive
and the Russian imperfective, all the aorists in all languages, and aligning
perfects, perfectives, the Eng. perfect, the G.
Perfekt, the Roman perfectum and the Grecian perfect. The facts are
different, but the words, and the recurrence of a problematics that v.ms
invariable, are too strong. Although it is a matter of conjugations, the lexicon
and the relation to ontological questions are too influential. The
word imperfectum was invented, we v. a hesitation that is precisely the one
that causes a problem here, between imperfectum and infectum a nonachieved
finality, an absence of finality. The important point is that the whole history
of aspectual terminology is constituted by such exchanges. The invention of the
words perfectum and imperfectum itself proceeds from an enterprise of tr., in
which it is a question of taking as a model, or rephrasing, the Grecian
grammarians’ opposition between suntelikos συντελιϰός and non-suntelikos.
However, the difference between the two terminologies is noticeable. A supine
past participle, -fectum, has replaced telikos, and hence telos, thereby
reintroducing, if not tense was tense really involved in that past participle?,
at least the achievement of an act, and consequently merges with the question
of the accomplished. In this operation, the Stoics’ opposition between
suntelikos which would thus designate the choice of perfects or imperfects and
παϱατατιϰός the extensive, in which the question of the telos is not involved
was made symmetrical, introducing into aspectual terminology a binariness from
which we have never recovered. And this symmetricalization, which sought to
describe the organization of a conjugation, was then modeled on the distinction
introduced by Aristotle between tτέλειος and aἀτελής, which was not grammatical
but lexical. This resulted in a new confusion that is not without foundation
because it was already implicit in the montage constructed by the Grecian
philosophers, with on the one hand the telos used by Aristotle to differentiate
types of process, and on the other the same telos used by the Stoics to
structure conjugation. exist in G. , is said to be primarily a matter of
discursive construction with the imparfait forming the background of a
narration, and the past tenses forming the foreground of what develops and
occurs. More recently, this area has been dominated by theories that situate
aspect in a theory of discursive representations cf. Kamp’s discourse
representation theory, and try to reduce it to a matter of discursive
organization: thus the models currently most discussed make the imparfait an
anaphoric mark that repeats an element of the context instead of constructing
an independent referent. Once again the relations are inextricably confused:
the types of discourse clearly have particular aspectual properties we have
already v.n this in connection with aoristic utterances that structure both
aspect and tense differently, and yet all or almost all aspectual forms can
appear anywhere, in all or almost all types of discursive contexts. Thus we
have foregrounded imparfaits, which have been recorded and are sometimes called
narrative imparfaits— e. g. , in an utterance like Trois jours après, il
mourait Three days later, he was dying, where it is a question of narrating a
prominent event, and where the distinction between imparfait and passé simple
becomes more difficult to evaluate. We also find passé composés in narratives,
where they compete with the passé simple: that is why many analysts of the
language consider the passé simple an archaic form that is being abandoned in
favor of the passé composé. The difficulty is clear: it is hard to attach a
given formal procedure to a given enunciative structuration, not only because
enunciative structures are supposed to be compatible with several aspectual
values, but first of all because the formal procedures themselves are all, more
or less broadly, polysemous, their value depending precisely on the context and
thus on the enunciative structure in which they are situated. Here again, this
is commonplace: polysemy is everywhere in languages. But in this case it
affects aspect: it consists precisely in running through aspectual oppositions,
the very ones that are also supposed to be associated with some aspectual
marker. The case of narrative uses of the imparfait v.ms to indicate that the
imparfait can have different aspectual values, of which some are more or less
apparently perfective. The narrative passé composés for instance, Il s’est levé
et il est sorti He got up and went out describe the process in its advent and
thus do not have the same aspectual properties as those that appear in
utterances describing the state resulting from the process e.g., Désolé, en ce
moment il est sorti Sorry, he left just now. Not to mention the presents, which
are highly polysemous in many languages and which, depending on the language,
therefore occupy a more or less extensive aspectual terrain. We are obliged to
note that aspect is at least partially independent of formal procedures, that
it also plays a role elsewhere, in particular, in the enunciative
configuration. teleology: the objectivum. Grice
speaks of the objective as a maxim. This is very Latinate. So if the maxim is
an objective, the goal is the objective, or objectivum. Meaning
"goal, aim" (1881) is from military term objective point (1852),
reflecting a sense evolution in French. This
is an expansion on the desideratum. Cf. ‘desirable,’ and ‘desirability,’ and
‘end.’ Grice feels like introducing goal-oriented conceptual machinery. In a
later stage of his career he ensured that this machinery be seen as NOT
mechanistically derivable. Which is odd seeing that in the ‘progression’ of the
‘soul,’ he allows for talk of adaptiveness and survival which suggest a
mechanist explanation. If an agent has a desideratum that means that, to echo
Bennett, A displays a goal-oriented behaviour, where the goal is the ‘telos.’
Smoke cannot ‘mean’ fire, because smoke doesn’t really behave in a
goal-oriented matter. Grice does play with the idea of finality in nature,
because that would allow him to justify the objectivity of his system. how does
soul originate from matter? Does the vegetal soul have a telos.
Purposive-behaviour is obvious in plants (phototropism). If it is present in
the vegetal soul, it is present in the animal soul. If it is present in the
animal soul, it is present in the rational soul. With each stage, alla
Hartmann, there are distinctions in the specification of the telos. Grice could
be more continental than Scheler! Grices métier. Unity of science was a very
New-World expression that Grice did not quite buy. Grice was brought up in a world,
the Old World, indeed, as he calls it in his Proem to the Locke lectures, of
Snows two cultures. At the time of Grices philosophising, philosophers such as
Winch (who indeed quotes fro Grice) were contesting the idea that science is
unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a
philosophical approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including
conversational behaviour (to account for the conversational implicata) is his
priority, Grice needs to distinguish himself from those who propose a unified
science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist. Grice is
ambivalent about science and also playful (philosophia regina scientiarum).
Grice seems to presuppose, or implicate, that, since there is the devil of scientism,
science cannot get at teleology. The devil is in the physiological details,
which are irrelevant. The language Grice uses to describe his Ps as
goal-oriented, aimed at survival and reproduction, seems teleological and
somewhat scientific, though. But he means that ironically! As the scholastics
use it, teleology is a science, the science of telos, or finality (cf.
Aristotle on telos aitia, causa finalis. The unity of science is threatened by
teleology, and vice versa. Unified science seeks for a mechanistically
derivable teleology. But Grices sympathies lie for detached finality. Grice is
obsessed with the Greek idea of a telos, as slightly overused by Aristotle.
Grice thinks that some actions are for their own sake. What is the telos of
Oscar Wilde? Can we speak of Oscar Wilde’s métier? If a tiger is to tigerise, a
human is to humanise, and a person is to personise. Grice thought that
teleology is a key philosophical way to contest mechanism, so popular in The
New World. Strictly, and Grice knew this, teleology is constituted as a
discipline. One term that Cicero was unable to translate! For the philosopher,
teleology is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the telos.
Informally, teleological is opposed to mechanistic. Grice is interested in the
mechanism/teleology debate, indeed jumps into it, with a goal in mind! Grice
finds some New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with
the more two-culture atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford! Code is the
Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of causa
finalis. For Grice only detached finality poses a threat to Mechanism, as it
should! Axiological objectivity is possible only given finality or purpose in
Nature, the admissibility of a final cause. Refs.: There are specific essays on
‘teleology,’ ‘final cause,’ and ‘finality,’ the The Grice Papers. Some of the
material published in “Reply to Richards” (repr. in “Conception”) and “Actions
and events,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
demonstratum: Cf. illatum – In act of communication, Grice’s focus is on
the reasoning on the emissor’s part. This is end-means. The conversational
moves is the most effectively designed move. The potential uptake by the
emissee is also taken into the consideration by the emissor. And actual uptake
is not of philosophical importance. hen Grice tried to conceptualise what
‘communicating’ and ‘smoke means fire’ have in common he came with the idea of
‘consequentia,’ as a dyadic relation that, eventually, will become triadic, with
the missor and the missee brought into the bargain. “Look that smoke, there
must be fire somewhere’ – “By that handwave, he meant that he was about to
leave me.” In any case, Grice’s arriving at ‘consequentia’ is exactly Hobbes’s
idea in “Computatio.’ And ‘con-sequentia’ involves a bit of ‘demonstratio.’ One
thing follows the other. One thing YIELDS the other. The link may be causal
(smoke means fire) or ‘communicative’). ‘Rationality’ is one of those words
Austin forbids to use. Grice would venture with ‘reason,’ and better, ‘reasons’
to make it countable, and good for botanising. Only in the New World, and when
he started to get input from non-philosophers, did Grice explore ‘rationality’
itself. Oxonians philosophers take it for granted, and do not have to
philosophise about it. Especially those who belong to Grice’s play group of
‘ordinary-language’ philosophers! Oxonian philosophers will quote from the
Locke version! Obviously, while each of the four lectures credits their own
entry below, it may do to reflect on Grices overall aim. Grice structures the
lectures in the form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The
first lecture is intended to provide a bit of linguistic botanising for
reasonable, and rational. In later lectures, Grice tackles reason qua
noun. The remaining lectures are meant to explore what he calls the
Aequi-vocality thesis: must has only one Fregeian that crosses what he calls
the buletic-doxastic divide. He is especially concerned ‒ this being
the Kant lectures ‒ with Kants attempt to reduce the
categorical imperative to a counsel of prudence (Ratschlag der Klugheit), where
Kants prudence is Klugheit, versus skill, as in rule of skill, and even if Kant
defines Klugheit as a skill to attain what is good for oneself ‒
itself divided into privatKlugheit and Weltklugheit. Kant re-introduces the
Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia. While a further lecture on happiness as
the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT strictly part of the either the
Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaemonia may be
regarded as the goal involved in the relevant
imperative. “Aspects”, Clarendon, Stanford, The Kant memorial
Lectures, “Aspects,” Clarendon, Some aspects of reason, Stanford; reason,
reasoning, reasons. The lectures were also delivered as the Locke
lectures. Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical
imperative to the hypothetical or suppositional imperative. His main
thesis he calls the æqui-vocality thesis: must has one unique or singular
sense, that crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide. “Aspects,”
Clarendon, Grice, “Aspects, Clarendon, Locke lecture notes: reason. On
“Aspects”. Including extensive language botany on rational, reasonable, and
indeed reason (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed). At this point,
Grice notes that linguistic botany is indispensable towards the construction of
a more systematic explanatory theory. It is an exploration of a range of
uses of reason that leads him to his Aequi-vocality thesis that must has only
one sense; also ‘Aspects of reason and reasoning,’ in Grice, “Aspects,”
Clarendon, the Locke lectures, the Kant lectures, Stanford, reason,
happiness. While Locke hardly mentions reason, his friend Burthogge does,
and profusely! It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these
lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford. He was honoured to
be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a Locke lecture you have to be
*visiting* Oxford. While Grice was a fellow of St. Johns, he was still
most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of
Philosophy. He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his proemium,
Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day,
he was extremely happy to be under Lockes ægis now! When preparing for his
second lecture, he had occasion to revise some earlier drafts dated pretty
early, on reasons, Grice, “Aspects,” Clarendon, reason,
reasons. Linguistic analysis on justificatory, explanatory and mixed uses
of reason. While Grice knows that the basic use of reason is qua verb
(reasoner reasons from premise p to conclusion c), he spends some time in
exploring reason as noun. Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to
approach rationality. However, his distinction between justificatory and
explanatory reason is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of reason qua
noun. Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than justificatory
reason. Explanatory reason explains the behaviour of a rational
agent. Grice is aware of Freud and his rationalizations. An agent may
invoke some reason for his acting which is not legitimate. An agent may
convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the weather;
when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and
join the yacht club there. Grice loved an enthymeme. Grices enthymeme. Grice,
the implicit reasoner! As the title of the lecture implies, Grice takes the
verb, to reason, as conceptually prior. A reasoner reasons, briefly, from a
premise to a conclusion. There are types of reason: flat reason and gradual
reason. He famously reports Shropshire, another tutee with Hardie, and his
proof on the immortality of the human soul. Grice makes some remarks on akrasia
as key, too. The first lecture is then dedicated to an elucidation, and indeed
attempt at a conceptual analysis in terms of intentions and doxastic conditions
reasoner R intends that premise P yields conclusion C and believes his
intention will cause his entertaining of the conclusion from his entertaining
the premise. One example of particular interest for a study of the use of
conversational reason in Grice is that of the connection between implicatum and
reasoning. Grice entitles the sub-section of the lecture as Too good to be
reasoning, which is of course a joke. Cf. too much love will kill you, and
Theres no such thing as too much of a good thing (Shakespeare, As you like it).
Grice notes: I have so far been considering difficulties which may arise from
the attempt to find, for all cases of actual reasoning, reconstructions of
sequences of utterances or explicit thoughts which the reasoner might plausibly
be supposed to think of as conforming to some set of canonical patterns of
inference. Grice then turns to a different class of examples, with regard to
which the problem is not that it is difficult to know how to connect them with
canonical patterns, but rather that it is only too easy (or shall I say
trivial) to make the connection. Like some children (not many), some cases of
reasoning are too well behaved for their own good. Suppose someone says to
Grice, and It is very interesting that Grice gives conversational examples.
Jack has arrived, Grice replies, I conclude from that that Jack has arrived. Or
he says Jack has arrived AND Jill has *also* arrived, And Grice replies, I
conclude that Jill has arrived.(via Gentzens conjunction-elimination). Or he
says, My wife is at home. And Grice replies, I reason from that that someone
(viz. your wife) is at home. Is there not something very strange about the
presence in my three replies of the verb conclude (in example I and II) and the
verb reason (in the third example)? misleading, but doxastically fine,
professor! It is true, of course, that if instead of my first reply I had said
(vii) vii. So Jack has arrived, has he? the strangeness would have been
removed. But here so serves not to indicate that an inference is being made,
but rather as part of a not that otiose way of expressing surprise. One might
just as well have said (viii). viii. Well, fancy that! Now, having spent a
sizeable part of his life exploiting it, Grice is not unaware of the truly fine
distinction between a statements being false (or axiologically satisfactory),
and its being true (or axiologically satisfactory) but otherwise
conversationally or pragmatically misleading or inappropriate or pointless,
and, on that account and by such a fine distinction, a statement, or an
utterance, or conversational move which it would be improper (in terms of the
reasonable/rational principle of conversational helfpulness) in one way or
another, to make. It is worth considering Grices reaction to his own
distinction. Entailment is in sight! But Grice does not find himself lured by
the idea of using that distinction here! Because Moores entailment, rather than
Grices implicatum is entailed. Or because explicatu, rather than implicatum is
involved. Suppose, again, that I were to break off the chapter at this point,
and switch suddenly to this argument. ix. I have two hands (here is one hand
and here is another). If had three more hands, I would have five. If I were to
have double that number I would have ten, and if four of them were removed six
would remain. So I would have four more hands than I have now. Is one happy to
describe this performance as reasoning? Depends whos one and whats happy!?
There is, however, little doubt that I have produced a canonically acceptable
chain of statements. So surely that is reasoning, if only conversationally
misleadingly called so. Or suppose that, instead of writing in my customary free
and easy style, I had framed my remarks (or at least the argumentative portions
of my remarks) as a verbal realization, so to speak, of sequences of steps in
strict conformity with the rules of a natural-deduction system of first-order
predicate logic. I give, that is to say, an updated analogue of a medieval
disputation. Implicature. Gentzen is Ockham. Would those brave souls who
continued to read be likely to think of my performance as the production of
reasoning, or would they rather think of it as a crazy formalisation of
reasoning conducted at some previous time? Depends on crazy or formalisation.
One is reminded of Grice telling Strawson, If you cannot formalise, dont say
it; Strawson: Oh, no! If I can formalise it, I shant say it! The points suggested
by this stream of rhetorical questions may be summarized as follows. Whether
the samples presented FAIL to achieve the title of reasoning, and thus be
deemed reasoning, or whether the samples achieve the title, as we may
figuratively put it, by the skin of their teeth, perhaps does not very greatly
matter. For whichever way it is, the samples seem to offend against something
(different things in different cases, Im sure) very central to our conception
of reasoning. So central that Moore would call it entailment! A mechanical
application of a ground rule of inference, or a concatenation thereof, is
reluctantly (if at all) called reasoning. Such a mechanical application may
perhaps legitimately enter into (i.e. form individual steps in) authentic reasonings,
but they are not themselves reasonings, nor is a string of them. There is a
demand that a reasoner should be, to a greater or lesser degree, the author of
his reasonings. Parroted sequences are not reasonings when parroted, though the
very same sequences might be reasoning if not parroted. Ped sequences are
another matter. Some of the examples Grice gives are deficient because they are
aimless or pointless. Reasoning is characteristically addressed to this or that
problem: a small problem, a large problem, a problem within a problem, a clear
problem, a hazy problem, a practical problem, an intellectual problem; but a
problem! A mere flow of ideas minimally qualifies (or can be deemed) as
reasoning, even if it happens to be logically respectable. But if it is
directed, or even monitored (with intervention should it go astray, not only
into fallacy or mistake, but also into such things as conversational
irrelevance or otiosity!), that is another matter! Finicky over-elaboration of
intervening steps is frowned upon, and in extreme cases runs the risk of
forfeiting the title of reasoning. In conversation, such over-elaboration will
offend against this or that conversational maxim, against (presumably) some
suitably formulated maxim conjoining informativeness. As Grice noted with
regard to ‘That pillar box seems red to me.’ That would be baffling if the
addressee fails to detect the communication-point. An utterance is supposed to
inform, and what is the above meant to inform its addressee? In thought, it will
be branded as pedantry or neurotic caution. If a distinction between brooding
and conversing is to be made! At first sight, perhaps, one would have been
inclined to say that greater rather than lesser explicitnessness is a merit.
Not that inexplicitness, or implicatum-status, as it were ‒ is bad, but that,
other things being equal, the more explicitness the better. But now it looks as
if proper explicitness (or explicatum-status) is an Aristotelian mean, or
mesotes, and it would be good some time to enquire what determines where that
mean lies. The burden of the foregoing observations seems to me to be that the
provisional account of reasoning, which has been before us, leaves out
something which is crucially important. What it leaves out is the conception of
reasoning, as I like to see conversation, as a purposive activity, as something
with goals and purposes. The account or picture leaves out, in short, the
connection of reasoning with the will! Moreover, once we avail ourselves of the
great family of additional ideas which the importation of this conception would
give us, we shall be able to deal with the quandary which I laid before you a
few minutes ago. For we could say e.g. that R reasons (informally) from p to c
just in case R thinks that p and intends that, in thinking c, he should be
thinking something which would be the conclusion of a formally valid argument
the premisses of which are a supplementation of p. This will differ from merely
thinking that there exists some formally valid supplementation of a transition
from p to c, which I felt inclined NOT to count as (or deem) reasoning. I have
some hopes that this appeal to the purposiveness or goal-oriented character of
authentic reasoning or good reasoning might be sufficient to dispose of the quandary
on which I have directed it. But I am by no means entirely confident that this
is the case, and so I offer a second possible method of handling the quandary,
one to which I shall return later when I shall attempt to place it in a larger
context. We have available to us (let us suppose) what I might call a hard way
of making inferential moves. We in fact employ this laborious, step-by-step
procedure at least when we are in difficulties, when the course is not clear,
when we have an awkward (or philosophical) audience, and so forth. An
inferential judgement, however, is a normally desirable undertaking for us only
because of its actual or hoped for destinations, and is therefore not desirable
for its own sake (a respect in which, possibly, it may differ from an
inferential capacity). Following the hard way consumes time and energy. These
are in limited supply and it would, therefore, be desirable if occasions for
employing the hard way were minimized. A substitute for the hard way, the quick
way, which is made possible by habituation and intention, is available to us,
and the capacity for it (which is sometimes called intelligence, and is known
to be variable in degree) is a desirable quality. The possibility of making a
good inferential step (there being one to be made), together with such items as
a particular inferers reputation for inferential ability, may determine whether
on a particular occasion we suppose a particular transition to be inferential
(and so to be a case of reasoning) or not. On this account, it is not essential
that there should be a single supplementation of an informal reasoning which is
supposed to be what is overtly in the inferers mind, though quite often there
may be special reasons for supposing this to be the case. So Botvinnik is
properly credited with a case of reasoning, while Shropshire is not. Drawing
from his recollections of an earlier linguistic botany on reason. Grice
distinguishes between justificatory reason and explanatory reason. There is a
special case of mixed reason, explanatory-cum-justificatory. The lecture can be
seen as the way an exercise that Austin took as taxonomic can lead to
explanatory adequacy, too! Bennett is an excellent correspondent. He holds a
very interesting philosophical correspondence with Hare. This is just one f.
with Grices correspondence with Bennett. Oxford don, Christchurh, NZ-born
Bennett, of Magdalen, B. Phil. Oxon. Bennett has an essay on the interpretation
of a formal system under Austin. It is interesting that Bennett was led to
consider the interpretation of a formal system under Austins Play Group.
Bennett attends Grices seminars. He is my favourite philosopher. Bennett quotes
Grice in his Linguistic behaviour. In return, Grice quotes Bennett in the
Preface toWOW. Bennett has an earlier essay on rationality, which
evidences that the topic is key at Grices Oxford. Bennett has studied better
than anyone the way Locke is Griceian. A word or expression does not just stand
for idea, but for the intention of the utterer to stand for it! Grice also
enjoyed construal by Bennett of Grice as a nominalist. Bennett makes a narrow
use of the epithet. Since Grice does distinguish between an utterance-token (x)
and an utterance-type, and considers that the attribution of meaning from token
to type is metabolic, this makes Grice a nominalist. Bennett is one of the few
to follow Kantotle and make him popular on the pages of the Times Literary
Supplement, of all places. Refs.: The locus classicus is “Aspects,” Clarendon.
But there are allusions on ‘reason’ and ‘rationality, in The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC.
de
sensu implicatum: vide casus obliquus. The casus rectus/casus obliquus
distinction. Peter Abelard, Kneale, Grice, Aristotle. Aquinas. de sensu
implicatum. Ariskantian quessertions on de sensu implicate. “My sometimes mischievous friend Richard Grandy once
said, in connection with some other occasion on which I was talking, that to
represent my remarks, it would be necessary to introduce a new form of
speech act, or a new operator, which was to be called the operator of
quessertion. It is to be read as “It is perhaps possible that someone might
assert that . . .” and is to be symbolized “?├”; possibly it
might even be iterable […]. Everything I shall
suggest here is highly quessertable.” Grice 1989:297. If Grice had one thing, he had linguistic creativity.
Witness his ‘implicature,’ and his ‘implicatum,’ not to mention his
‘pirotologia.’Sometime, somewhere, in the history of philosophy, a need was
felt by some Griceian philosopher, surely, for numbering intentions. The verb,
denoting the activity, out of which this ‘intention’ sprang was Latin
‘intendere,’ and somewhere, sometime, the need was felt to keep the Latinate
/t/ sound, and sometimes to make it sibilate, /s/. The source of it all seems to be Aristotle in
Soph.
Elen., 166a24–166a30, which was rendered twice om Grecian to Latin. In the
second Latinisation, ‘de sensu’ comes into view. Abelard proposes to use ‘de
rebus,’ or ‘de re,’ for what the previous translation had as ‘per divisionem.’
To make the distinction, he also proposes to use ‘de sensu’ for what the
previous translation has as ‘per compositionem,’ and ‘per conjunctionem.’ But
what did either mean? It was a subtle question, indeed. And trust Nicolai
Hartmann, in his mediaevalist revival, to add numbers and a further
distinction, now the ‘recte/’oblique’ distinction, and ‘intentio’ being
‘prima,’ ‘seconda,’ ‘tertia,’ and so on, ad infinitum. The proposal is clear.
We need a way to conceptualise first-order propositions. But we also need to
conceptualise ‘that’-clauses. The ‘that’-clause subordination is indeed
open-ended. ‘mean.’ Grice’s motivation in the presentation at the Oxford
Philosophical Society is to offer, as he calls it, a ‘proposal.’ In his words,
notice the emphasis on the Latinate ‘intend,’ – where it occurs, as applied to
an emissor, and as having as content, following that ‘that’-clause, an
‘intensional’ verb like ‘believe,’ which again, involves an ‘intentio tertia,’
now referring to a state back in the emissor expressed by yet another
intensional verb – all long for, ‘you communicate that p if you want your
addressee to realise that you hold this or that propositional attitude with
content p.’ "A meantNN something by x" is
(roughly) equivalent to "A intended the utterance of x to produce some
effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention"; and
we may add that to ask what A meant is to ask for a specification of the
intended effect (though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a
straight answer involving a "that" clause, for example, "a
belief that . . ."). (Grice 1989: 220). Grice’s motivation is to ‘reduce’ “mean”
to what has come to be known in the Griceian [sic] literature as a ‘Griceian’
[sic] ‘reflexive’ intention – he prefers M-intention -- which we will read as
involving an intentio seconda, and indeed intentio tertia, and beyond, which
makes its appearance explicitly in the second clause -- or ‘prong,’ as he’d
prefer -- of his ‘reductive’ analysis. Prong 1 then corresponds to the
intention prima or intention recta: Utterer U intends1 that
Addressee A believes that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ
with content “p.” Prong 2 corresponds to the intentio seconda or
intentio obliqua: Utterer
U intends2 that Addressee A believes (i) on the ‘rational,’ and not
just ‘causal,’ basis of (ii), i.e. of the addressee A’s recognition of the
utterer U’s intentio seconda or intentio obliqua i2, that Addressee
A comes to believe that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with
content “p.” In Grice’s wording, “i2” acts as a ‘reason,’ and not
merely a ‘cause’ for Addressee A’s coming to believe that U holds psychological
state or attitude ψ with content “p”. Kemmerling has used “↝” to represent this
‘reason’ (i1 ↝ i2,
Kemmerling in Grandy/Warner, 1986, cf. Petrus in Petrus 2010). Prong 3 is a
closure prong, now involving a self-reflective third-order intention, there is
no ‘covert’ higher-order intention involved in (i)-(iii). Meaning-constitutive
intentions in utterer u’s meaning that p should be out there ‘in the open,’ or ‘above
board,’ to count as having been ‘communicated.Grice quotes only one author in
‘Meaning’: C. L. Stevenson, who started his career with a degree in English
from Yale. Willing to allow a ‘metabolical’ use of ‘mean’ he recognises, he
scare quotes it: “There is a sense, to be sure,
in which a groan “means“ something, just a reduced temperature may at times
”mean” convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). This remark will have Grice
later attempting an ‘evolutionary’ model of how an ‘x’ causing ‘y’ may proceed
from ‘natural’ to less natural ones. Consider ‘is in pain.’ A creature is
physically hurt, and the expression of pain comes up naturally as an effect.
But if the creature attains rational control over his expressive behaviour, and
the creature is in pain (or expects his addressee A to think that he is in
pain), U can now imitate or replicate, in a something like a Peirceian iconic
mode, the natural behaviour manifested by a spontaneous response to a hurtful
stimulus. The ‘simulated’ pain will be an ‘icon’ of the natural pain. Grice is
getting Peirceian by the day, and he is not telling us! There are, Grice says,
as if to simplify Peirce the most he can, two modes of representation. The
primary one is now the explicitly Peirceian iconic one. The ‘risus naturaliter
significat interiorem laetitiam’ of Occam. And then, there’s the derivative
*non*-iconic representation, in that order. The first is, shall we say,
‘natural,’ and beyond the utterer U’s voluntary control (cf. Darwin on the
expression of emotions in man and animals); the second is not. Grice is
allowing for smoke representing fire, or if one must, alla Stevenson,
‘representing’ it. In Grice’s motivation to along the right lines, his
psychologist austere views of his 1948 ‘Meaning,’ when he rather artificially
disjoins a ‘natural’ “mean” and an ‘artificial’ “mean,” when merely different
‘uses’ stand for what he then thought were senses, he wants now to re-introduce
into philosophical discourse the iconic natural representation or meaning that
he had left aside.If this is part of what he calls a ‘myth,’ even if an
evolutionary one, to account for the emergence of ‘systems of communication,’
it does starts with an utterer U expressing (very much alla Croce or Marty) a
psychological state or attitude ψ by displaying some behavioural pattern in an
unintentional way. Grice is being Wittgensteinian here, and quotes almost
verbatim from Anscombe’s rendition, “No psychological concept except when
backed in behaviour that manifests it.”
If Ockham notes that “Risus naturaliter significat interiorem
laetitiam,” Grice shows this will allow to avoid, also alla Ockham, a polysemy
to ‘mean.’In Grice’s three clauses in his 1948 conceptual analysis of ‘meaning’
– the first clause of exhibitiveness, the second clause of intentio seconda or
reflexivity, and the third clause of communicative overtness, voluntary control
on the part of the utterer U is already in order. Since the utterer’s addressee
A is intended to recognise this, no longer is it required any prior ‘iconic’
association between a simulated behaviour and the behaviour naturally displayed
as a response to a stimulus. This amounts, for Grice to deeming the system of
expression as having become a full system now of intention-based
‘communication.’‘know’’ Intentio seconda or intentio obliqua comes up nicely
when Grice delivers the third William James Lecture, later reprinted as
“Further notes on logic and conversation.” There, Grice targets one type of
anti-Gettier scenario for the use of a factive psychological state or attitude
expressed by a verb like “know,” again followed by a “that”-clause. Grice is
criticisign Austin’s hasty attempt to analyse ‘know’ in terms of the
‘performatory’ ‘guarantee.’ As Grice puts it in “Prolegomena,” “to say ‘I know’
is to give a guarantee.” (Grice 1989:9) which can be traced back to Austin,
although since, as Grice witnessed it, Austin ‘all too frequently ignored’ the
real of emissor’s communicatum, one is never sure. In any case, Grice wants to overcome this
‘performatory’ fallacy, and he expands on the ‘suspect’ example of the
Prolegomena in the Third lecture. Grice’s troubles with ‘know’ were long-dated.
In Causal Theory he lists as the third philosophical mistake, “What is known by
me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case.” (1989: 237).
Uncredited, but he may be having in mind Ryle’s odd characterisations with
terms such as ‘occurrence,’ ‘episode,’ and so on. In the section on ‘stress,’ Grice asks us to
assume that Grice knows that p. The question is whether this claim commits the
philosopher to the further clause, ‘Grice knows that Grice knows that p, and so
on, … to use the scholastic term we started this with, ad infinitum. It is not
that Grice is adverse to a regressive analysis per se. This is, in effect, with
what the third clause or prong in his analysis of ‘meaning’ does – ‘let all
meaning-constitutive intentions be overt, including this one. Indeed, when it comes to meaning or knowing,
we are talking optimal, we are talking ‘virtue.’ Both ‘meaning,’
‘communicating, ‘and ‘knowing,’ represent an ‘ideal,’ value-paradeigmatic
concept – where value, a favourite with Hartmann, appears under the guise of a
noumenon in the topos ouranos that only realises imperfectly in the sub-lunary
world. In the third William James lecture Grice cursorily dismisses these
demanding or restrictive anti-Gettier scenarios as too stipulatory for the
colloquial, ordinary, use – and thus ‘sense’ -- of ‘know.’ The approach Gettier
is cricising ends up being too convoluted, seeing that conversationalists tend
to make a rather loose use of the verb. Grice’s example illustrates linguistic
botanising. So we have Grice bringing the examinee who does know that the
battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815, with hardly conclusive evidence, or any
‘de sensu’ knowledge that the evidence (which he does not have) is conclusive.
Grice grants that, in a specially emphatic utterance of ‘know,’ there might be
a cancellable implicatum to the effect that the knower does have conclusive
evidence for what he alleges to know. Grice’s explicit reference to this
‘regressive nature’ (p. 59) touches on the topic of intention de sensu. Grice
is contesting the strong view, as represented, according to Gettier, by
philosophers ranging from Plato’s Thaetetus to Ayer’s Problem of Empirical
Knowledge (indeed the only two loci Gettier cares to cite in his short essay)
that a claim, “Grice knows that p” entails a claim to the effect that there is
conclusive evidence for p, and which gives Grice a feeling of subjective
certainty, and that Grice knows that there is such conclusive evidence, and so
on, ad infinitum. Grice casts doubts on the intentio de sensu as applied to the
colloquial or ‘ordinary’ uses of ‘know’. If I know that p, must I know that I
know that p? Having just introduced his
“Modified Occam’s Razor” – ‘Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity’
--, Grice doesn’t think so. At this point, however, he adds a characteristic
bracket: “(cf. causal theory).” With that bracket, Grice is allowing that the
denotatum of “p,” qua content of U’s psychological state or attitude of
‘knowing,’ the state-of-affairs itself, as we may put it, should play something
like a causal role in U’s knowing that p. Grice is open-minded as to what type
of link or connection that is. It need not be strictly causal. He is merely
suggesting the open-endness of ‘know in terms of these “further conditions” as
to how Grice ‘comes’ to know that p, and refers to the ‘causal theory,’ as
later developed by philosophers like E. F. Dretske and others. As a linguistic
botanist, Grice is well aware that ‘know,’ like ‘see,’ is what the Kiparskys
(whom Grice refers to) call a ‘factive.’An ascription of “Grice knows that p,”
or, indeed, “Grice sees that p,” (unless Grice hallucinates) entails “p.” The
defeating ‘hallucination’ scenario is key. It involves what Grice calls a
dis-implicatum. The utterer is using ‘know’ or‘see’ in a loose way (and meaning
less, rather than more than he explicitly conveys. Note incidentally, as Grice
later noted in later seminars, how his analysis proves the philosopher’s adage
wrong. Surely what is known by me to be the case is believed by me to be the
case. Any divergence to the contrary is a matter of ‘implicatural’ stress – by
which he means supra-segmentation.‘want’Soon after his delivering the William
James lectures, Grice got involved in a project concerning an evaluation of
Quine’s programme, where again he touches on issues of intentio seconda or
intentio obliqua, and brings us back to Russell and ‘the author of Waverley.’
Grice’s presentation comes out in Words and Objections, edited by Davidson and
Hintikka, a pun on Quine’s Word and Object. Grice’s contribution, ‘Vacuous
Names,’ (later reprinted in part in Ostertag’s volume on Definite descriptions)
concludes with an exploration of “the” phrases, and further on, with some
intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription
of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude. Grice’s choice
of an ascription now notably involves an ‘opaque’ (rather than ‘factive,’ like
‘know’) psychological state or attitude: ‘wanting,’ which he symbolizes as “W.”
Grice considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack
wants someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry
him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him. Grice notes that “there
are clearly at least *two* possible readings” of an utterance like our (i): a
first reading “in which,” as Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii).”
A second reading is one “in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv).”
Grice goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order
predicate calculus. ‘Ja wants that p’ becomes ‘Wjap,’ where ‘ja’
stands for the individual constant “Jack” as a super-script attached to the
predicate standing for Jack’s psychological state or attitude. Grice writes:
“Using the apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent,”
respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an
intentio secunda or intentio obliqua) as ‘(Ǝx)WjaFxja’
and ‘Wja(Ǝx)Fxja.’ Grice then
goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this
second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an
‘intentio seconda.’ Grice notes: “But suppose that Jack wants a specific
individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been “*deceived* into
thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill, though
in fact Joe is an only child.” (The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill with
is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent). Let us recall that
Grice’s main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes, ‘emptiness’! In
these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i) is true only on reading
(vii),” where the existential quantifier occurs within the scope of the
psychological-state or -attitude verb, “but we cannot now represent (ii) or
(iii), with ‘Jill’ being vacuous, by (vi), where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the scope of the
psychological-attitude verb, want, “since [well,] Jill does not really exist,”
except as a figment of Jack’s imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as
‘purely intentionalist,’ and thus favouring by far Suppes’s over Chomsky’s
characterisation of Grice as a mere ‘behaviourist,’ Grice hopes that “we should
be provided with distinct representations for two familiar readings” of, now:
Jack wants Jill to marry him; Jack wants ‘Jill’ to marry him. It is at this
point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted
numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values merely indicate the order of
introduction of the symbol to which it is attached in a deductive schema for
the predicate calculus in question. Only the first notation yields the internal
de sensu reading (where ‘ji’ stands for ‘Jill’): ‘W2ja4F1ji3ja4’
and ‘W3ja4F2ji1ja4.’
Note that in the alternative external notation, the individual constant for
“Jill,” ‘ji,’ is introduced prior to ‘want,’ – ‘ji’’s sub-script is 1, while
‘W’’s sub-script is the higher numerical value 3. If Russell could have avowed
of this he would have had that the Prince Regents, by issuing the invitation,
wants to confirm that ‘the author of Waverley’ isN Scott, already having
confirmed that the author of Waverley =M the author of Waverley. Grice warns
Quine. Given that Jill does not exist, only the internal reading “can be true,”
or alethically satisfactory. Similarly, we might imagine an alternative
scenario where the butler informs the Prince: ‘We are sorry to inform Your
Majesty that your invitation was returned: apparently the author of Waverley
does not SEEM to exist.’ Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of
the opaqueness of a verb standing for a psychological state or attitude like
that expressed by ‘wanting’ with one observation that further marks him as an
intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian type. If he justified a loose use of
‘know,’ he is now is ready to allow for ‘existential’ phrases in cases of ‘vacuous’
designata, which however baffling, should not lead a philosopher to the wrong
characterisation of the linguistic phenomena (as it led Austin with ‘know’).
Provided such a descriptors occur within an opaque, intensional, de sensu,
psychological-state or attitude verbs, Grice captures the nuances of ‘ordinary’
discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice puts it, we should also have
available to us also three neutral, yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs),” as a
philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a
generality! “Jill” now becomes “x”: ‘W4ja5Ǝx3F1x2ja5,’
‘Ǝx5W2ja5F1x4ja3’,
and ‘Ǝx5W3ja4F1x2ja4
.’ Since in (xii) the individual variable ‘x’ (ranging over ‘Jill’) “does not
dominate the segment following the ‘(Ǝx)’
quantifier, the formulation does not display any ‘existential’ or de re,
‘force,’ and is suitable therefore for representing the internal readings (ii)
or (iii), “if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to faithfully
represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, for the possibility of expressing the fact that
a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.” At least Grice does not
write, “really,” for he knew that Austin detested a ‘trouser word.’ Grice
concludes that (xi) and (xiii) are derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while
(xii) will be “derivable only” from (ix).‘intend’By this time, Grice had been
made a Fellow of the British Academy and it was about time for the delivery of
the philosophical lecture that goes with it. It only took him six five years.
Grice choses “Intention and uncertainty” as its topic. He was provoked by two
members of his ‘playgroup’ at Oxford, Hart and Hampshire, who in an essay
published in Mind, what Grice finds, again, as he did with the anti-Gettier
cases of ‘know,’ as rather a too strong analysis of ‘intending.’ In his
British-Academy lecture, Grice plays now with the psychological state or
attitude, realised by the verbal form, ‘intend,’ when specifically followed by
a ‘that’-clause, “intends that…,” as an echo of his dealing with “meaning to”
as merely ‘natural.’ He calls himself a neo-Prichardian, reviving this ‘willing
that’ which Urmson had popularised at Oxford, bringing to publication
Prichard’s exploration of William James and his “I will that the distant chair
slides over the floor towards me. It does not.”Grice’s ‘intending that…’ is
notably a practical, boulemaic, or buletic, or desiderative, rather than
alethic or doxastic, psychological state or attitude. It involves not just an itentum,
but an intentum that involves both a desideratum AND a factum – for the ‘future
indicative’ is conceptually involved. Grice claims that, if the conceptual
analysis of “intending that…” is to represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, shows that
it contains, as one of its prongs, in the final ‘neo-Prichardian’ version that
Grice gives, also a ‘doxastic’ (rather than ‘factive’ and ‘epistemic’)
psychological state or attitude, notably a belief on the part of the ‘intender’
that his willing that p has a probability greater than 0.5 to the effect that p
be realised. Contra Hart and Hampshire, Grice acknowledges the investigations
by the playgroup member Pears on this topic. Interestingly, a polemic arose
elsewhere with Davidson, who trying to be more Griceian thatn Grice, sees this
doxastic constraint as a mere cancellable implicatum. Grice grants it may be a
dis-implicatum at most, as in loose cases of ‘know,’ or ‘see.’ Grice is adamant
in regarding the doxastic component as a conceptual ‘entailment’ in the
‘ordinary’ use of ‘intend,’ unless the verb is used in a merely
‘disimplicatural,’ loose fashion. Grice’s example, ‘Jill intends to climb
Everest next week,’ when the prohibitive conditions are all to evident to
anyone concerned with such an utterance of (xv), perhaps Jill included, and
‘intends’ has to be read only ‘internally’ and hyperbolically. At this point,
if in “Vacuous Names, he fights with Meinong while enjoying engaging in
emptiness, it should be stressed that Grice gives as an illustration of a
‘disimplicature,’ along with a use of ‘see’ in a Shakespeareian context. ‘See,’ like ‘know,’ or ‘mean,’ exhibit what
Grice calls diaphaneity. So it’s only natural Grice turns his attention to
‘see.’ Grice’s examples are ‘Macbeth saw Banquo’ and ‘Hamlet saw his father on
the ramparts of Elsinore,’ and both involve hallucination! It is worth
comparing the fortune of ‘disimplicature’ with that of ‘implicature.’ Grice
coins ‘to dis-implicate’ as an active verb, for a case where the utterer does
NOT, as in the case of implicature, mean MORE than he says, but LESS. Grice’s
point is a subtle one. It involves his concession on something like an
explicatum, but alsoo on something like Moore’s entailment. If the ‘doxastic
condition’ is entailed by “intending that…,’ an utterer U may STILL use, in an
‘ordinary’ fashion, a strong ‘intending that…’ in a scenario where it is common
ground between the utterer U and his addressee A that the probability of ‘p’
being realised is lower than 0.5. The expression of the psychological state or
attitude is loose, since the utterer is, as it were, dropping an ‘entailment’
that applies in a use of ‘intending that’ where that ‘common-ground’ assumption
is absent. One reason may be echoic. Jill may think that she can succeed in
climbing Mt. Everest; she herself has used ‘intend.’ When that information is
transmitted, the strong psychological verb is kept when the doxastic constraint
is no longer shared by the utterer U and his addressee A (Like an implicatum, a
disimplicatum has to be recognised as such to count as one. No such thing as an ‘unwanted’
disimplicatum.‘motivate’Sometimes, it would seem that, for Grice, the English
philosopher of English ‘ordinary-language’ philosophy, English is not enough!
Grice would amuse at Berkeley seminars, with things like, ‘A pirot potches o as
fang, or potches o and o’ as F-id,’ just to attract his addressee’s attention.
The full passage, in what Grice calls, after Carnap, pirotese, reads: “A pirot
can be said to potch of some obble x as fang or feng; also to cotch of x, or
some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o’
as being fid to one another.” Grice’s deciphering, with ‘pirot,” a tribute to
Carnap – and Locke -- as any agent, and an ‘obble’ as an object. Grice borrows,
but does not return, the ‘pirot’ from Carnap (for whom pirots karulise
elatically – Carnap’s example of a syntactically well-formed formula in
Introduction to Semantics). Grice uses ‘pirotese’ ‘to potch’ as a correlate for
‘perceive,’ such as the factive ‘see’ and ‘to cotch’ as a correlate for the
similarly factive ‘know.’While ‘perceive’ strictly allows for a ‘that’-clause
(as in Grice analysis of “I perceive that the pillar box is red” in “The causal
theory of perception”), for simplificatory purposes, Grice is using ‘to potch’
as applying directly to an object, which Grice rephrases as an ‘obble.’ Since
some perceptual feature or other is required in a predication of ‘perceiving’
and ‘potching,’ ‘feng’ is introduced as a perceptual predicate. And since pirots
should also be allowed to perceive an ‘obble’ o in some relation with another
‘obble’ o2, Grice introduces the dyadic ‘relational’ feature ‘fid.’ Grice’s exegesis reads: “‘To potch’ is
something like ‘to perceive,’ whereas ‘to cotch’ is something like ‘to think.’
‘Feng’ and ‘fang’ are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives; ‘fid’ is
a possible relation between ‘obbles.’”).
At this point, Grice has been made, trans-territorially, the President
of the American Philosophical Association, and is ready to give his
Presidential Address (now reprinted in his Conception of Value, for Clarendon.
He chooses ‘philosophical psychology’ It’s when Grice goes on to play now with
the neo-Wittgensteinian issues of incorrigibility and privileged access, that
issues of intentio seconda become prominent.
For any psychological attitude ψ1, if U holds it, U holds, as
a matter of what Grice calls ‘genitorial construction,’ a meta-psychological
attitude, ψ2, a seconda intentio if ever there was one, -- Grice
even uses the numeral ‘2’ -- that has, as its content followed the second
‘that’-clause, the very first psychological attitude ψ1. The general
schema being given below, with an instance of specification: ‘ψup ⊃ ψuψup,’
and ‘if U wills that p, U wills that U wills that p.’ The interesting bit, from
the perspective of our exploration of ‘intentio seconda,’ is that, if, alla
Peano, we apply this to itself, as in the anti-Gettier cases Grice discussed
earlier, we end with an ad-infinitum clause. It was Judith Baker, who earned
her doctorate under Grice at Berkeley who sees this clearlier than everyone
(She was a regular contributor to the Kant Society in Germany). Baker’s
publications are, like those of her tutor, scarce. But in a delightful
contribution to the Grice festschrift, “Do one’s motives have to be pure?” (in
Grandy/Warner 1986), Baker explores the crucial importance of that ad-infinitum
chain of intentiones secondæ as it applies to questions of not alethic but
practical value or satisfactoriness. Consider ‘ought’. Grice would say that
‘must’ is aequi-vocal, i.e. it is not that ‘must’ has an alethic ‘sense’ and a
practical ‘sense.’ Only “one” must, if one must! (As Grice jokes, “Who needs
ichthyological necessity?”). Baker notes
that the ad-infinitum chain may explain how ‘duty’ ‘cashes out’ in ‘interest.’
Both Grice and Baker are avowed Kantotelians. By allowing ‘duty’ to cash out in
interest they are merging Aristotle’s utilitarian teleology with Kant’s
deontology, and succeeding! It is possible to symbolize Grice’s and Baker’s
proposal. If there is a “p” SUCH AS, at some point in the iteration of willing
and intentiones secondæ, the agent is not willing to accept it, this blocks the
potential Kantian universalizability of the content of a teleological attitude “p,”
stripping “p” of any absolute value status that it may otherwise attain.In
Grice’s reductive analysis of ‘mean,’ ‘know,’ ‘want,’ ‘intend,’ and ‘motivate,’
we witness the subtlety of his approach that is only made possible from the
recognition of Aristotle’s insight back in “De Sophisticis Elenchis” to Kant’s
explorations on the purity of motives. It should not surprise us. It’s Grice’s
nod, no doubt, to an unjustly neglected philosopher, who should be neglected no
more.ReferencesBlackburn, S. W. 1984. Spreading the words: groundings in the
philosophy of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Darwin, Charles. 1872.
The expression of emotions in man and animals. London: Murray. Grandy, R. E.
and R. O. Warner 1986. Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions,
categories, ends. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grice, H. P. 1948. Meaning, The
Oxford Philosophical Society. Repr. in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1961. The
causal theory of perception, The Aristotelian Society. Repr. in Grice 1989.
Grice, H. P. 1967. Logic and Conversation, The William James lectures. Repr. in
a revised 1987 form in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1969. Vacuous Names, in
Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. Grice, H.
P. 1971. Intention and uncertainty, The British Academy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Grice, H. P. 1975. How pirots karulise elatically: some
simpler ways, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley. Grice, H. P. 1982. Meaning Revisited, in N.
V. Smith, Mutual knowledge. London: Croom Helm, repr. in Grice 1989. Grice,
H.P. 1987. Retrospective epilogue, in Studies in the Way of Words. Grice, H. P.
1989. Studies in the way of words. London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press. Hart, H. L. A. and S. N. Hampshire 1958. Intention, decision,
and certainty, Mind, 67:1-12.Kemmerling, A. M. 1986. Utterer’s meaning
revisited, in Grandy/Warner 1986. Kneale, W. C. and M. Kneale. 1966. The
development of logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Pecocke, C. A. B. 1989. Transcendental Arguments in the Theory of Content: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered
Before the University of Oxford on 16 May 1989. Oxford University Press.
Prichard, H. A. 1968. Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest. Essays and
Lectures, edited by
W. D. Ross and J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University. Stevenson,
C. L. 1944. Ethics and language. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Strawson, P. F. 1964 Intention and convention in speech acts, The Philosophical
Review, repr. in Logico-Linguistic Papers, London, Methuen, 1971, pp. 149-169 as Blackburn puts
it in his discussion of Grice in the intention-based chapter of his “Spreading
the word: groundings in the philosophy of language.” Intentio seconda or
obliqua bears heavily on Grice’s presentation for the Oxford Philosophical
Society. The motivation behind Grice’s analysis pertains to philosophical
methodology. Grice is legitimizing an ascription of ‘mean’ to a rational agent,
such as … a philosopher. This very ascription Grice finds to be ‘seemingly
denied by Wittgenstein’ (Grice 1986). As an exponent of what he would later and
in jest dub “The Post-War Oxonian School of ‘Ordinary-Language’ Philosophy,”
Grice engages in a bit of language botany, and dealing with the intricacies of ‘communicative’
uses of “mean.” Interestingly, and publicly – although a provision is in order
here – Grice acknowledges emotivist Stevenson, who apparently taught Grice
about ‘metabolic’ uses of “mean.” Stevenson, who read English as a minor at
Yale, would not venture to apply ‘mean’ to moans! Realising it as a colloquial
extension, he is allowed to use ‘mean,’ but in scare quotes only! (“Smith’s
reduced temperature ‘means’ that he is is convalescent.” “There is a sense, to be sure, in which a groan
“means“ something, just a reduced temperature may at times ”mean”
convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). Close enough but no cigar. Stevenson
has ‘groan,’ which at least rhymes with ‘moan.’ (As for the proviso, Grice
never ‘meant’ to ‘publish’ his talk on ‘Meaning,’ but one of his tutees
submitted for publication, and on acceptance, Grice allowed the publication).
In “Meaning” Grice does not provide a conceptual analysis for, ‘by moaning, U
means [simpliciter] that p.’ He will in his “Meaning Revisited” – the metabolical
scare quotes are justified on two counts: ‘By moaning U means that p’ is
legitimized on the basis of the generic ‘x ‘means’ y iff x is a consequence of
y.’ But it is also justified on the basis that there is a continuum between U’s
involuntarily moaning thereby meaning that he is in pain, and U’s voluntarily
moaning, thereby ‘communicating’ that he is in pain. However, and more
importantly for our exploration of the ‘intentum,’ Grice hastens to add that he
does not agree with Stevenson’s purely ‘causal’ account. The main reason is not
‘anti-naturalistic.’ It is just that Grice sees Stevenson’s proposal as as
involving a vicious circle. Typically, Grice extrapolates the relevant quote
from Stevenson, slightly out of context. Grice refers to Stevenson’s appeal to
"an elaborate process of conditioning attending …
communication."Grice: “If we have to take seriously the second part of the
qualifying phrase ("attending … communication"), Stevenson’s account
of meaning is obviously circular. We might just as well say, "U means” if
“U communicates,” which, though true, is not helpful. It MIGHT be helpful for
Cicero translating from Grecian to Roman: ‘com-municatio’ indeed translates a
Grecian turn of phrase involving ‘what is common.’ f. “con-” and root “mu-,” to
bind; cf.: immunis, munus, moenia.’And the suggestion would be helpful if we
say that to ‘communicate,’ or ‘mean,’ is just to bring some intentum to be
allotted ‘common ground,’ because of the psi-transmission it is shared between
the emissor and his intended addressee. This one hopes is both true AND
‘helpful.’ In any case, Grice’s tutee Strawson later
found Grice’s elucidation of utterer’s meaning to be ‘objection-proof’
(Starwson and Wiggins, 2001) in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions, of an utterer or emissor E meaning that p, by uttering ‘x,’ and
appealing to primary and secondary intentionality. But is Grice’s
intentionalism a sort of behaviourism? Grice denies that in “Method” calling
‘behaviourism’ ‘silly. Grice further explores intentio obliqua as it pertains
to his remarks towards a general theory of “re-presentation.” The place where
this excursus takes place is crucial. It is his Valediction to his compilation
of essays, Studies in the Way of Words, posthumously published. At this stage,
he must have felt that, what he once regarded krypto-technic in Peirce, is no
more! Grice has already identified in that ‘Valediction’ many strands of his
philosophical thought, and concludes his re-assessment of his ‘philosophy of
language’ and semiotics with an attempt to provide some general remarks about
‘to represent’ in general, perhaps to counter the allegations of vicious
circularity which his approach had received, seeing that “p” features, as a
‘gap-sign,’ as the content of both an ‘expression’ and a ‘psychological’
attitude. In trying to reconcile his austere views on “Meaning,” back in that
evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, where he distinguished two senses
of ‘mean’ (“Smoke ‘means’ fire,” and ““Smoke” means ‘smoke’”). By focusing on
the most general of verbs for a psychological state or attitude, ‘to
represent,’ that even allows for a non-psychological reading, Grice wants to be
seen as answering the challenge of an alleged vicious circle with which his
intention-based approach is usually associated. The secondary-intentional
non-iconic mode of representation rests on a prior iconic mode and can be
understood as ‘pre-conventional,’ without any explicit recourse to the features
we associate with a developed system of communication. Grice needs no ‘language
of thought’ or sermo mentalis alla Ockham there. Grice allows that one can
communicate fully without the need to use what more conventional philosophers
call ‘a language.’ Artists do it all the time!
The passage from intentio prima to full intentio seconda is, for Grice,
gradual and complex. Grice means to adhere with ‘ordinary’ discourse, in its
implicata and dis-implicaata. The passage also adhering to a functionalist
approach qua ‘method in philosophical psychology,’ as he’d prefer, that needs
not to postulate a full-blown ‘linguistic entity’ as the object of intentional
thought. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the work of C. A. B. Peacocke,
who knew Grice from his Oxford days and later joined his seminars at Berkeley,
and who has developed this line of thought in a better fashion than less
careful philosophers. Grice’s programme has occasionally, and justly, been
compared with phenomenological approaches to expression and communication, such
as Marty’s. It is hoped that the previous notes have shed some light on those
aspects where this interface can further be elaborated. Even as we leave an
intentio seconda to resume the discussion for a longer day. In his explorations
on the embedding of intensional concepts, Grice should be inspirational to
philosophers in more than one way, but especially in the one that he favoured
most: the problematicity of it all. As he put it in another context, when
defending absolute value. “Such a defence of absolute value is
of course, bristling with unsolved or incompletely solved problems. I do not
find this thought daunting. If philosophy generated no new problems it would be
dead, because it would be finished; and if it recurrently regenerated the same
old problems it would not be alive because it could never begin. So those who
still look to philosophy for their bread-and-butter should pray that the supply
of new problems never dries up.” (Grice 1991). In the Graeco-Roman tradition,
philosophers started to use ‘intentio prima,’ ‘intentio secunda,’ ‘intentio
tertia,’ and “… ad infinitum,” as they would put it. In post-war Oxford,
English philosopher H. P. Grice felt the need. The formalist he was, he found
subscribing numbers to embedded intentions has a strong appeal for him. Grice’s
main motivation is in the philosophy of language, but as ancillary towards
solving this or that problem concerning the ‘linguistic’ methodology of his
day. To appreciate Grice’s contribution one need to abstract a little from his
own historical circumstances, or rather, place them in the proper context, and
connect it with the general history of philosophy. As a matter of
history, ‘intentio prima,’ or ‘recta,’ as opposed to ‘obliqua,’ is part of
Nicolai Hartmann’s ‘mediaeval revival,’ as a reaction to mediaevalism having
made scorn by the likes of Rabelais that amused D. P. Henry. For the mediaeval
philosopher, to use Grice’s symbolism, was concerned with whether a chimaera
could eat ‘I2,’ a second intention. The mediaeval philosopher’s
implicature seems to be that a chimaera can easily eat ‘I1.’ Such a
‘quaestio subtilissima,’ Rabelais jokes. If ‘I1,’ or, better, for
simplificatory purposes, ‘IR’ is a specific state, stance, or
attitude of the ‘soul,’ ‘ψ1’ or ‘ψR’ directed towards
its ‘de re’ ‘intentum,’ or ‘prae-sentatum,’ of the noumenon, ‘IO,’
‘intentio obliqua,’ is a state, stance, or attitude of the ‘soul,’ of the same
genus, ‘ψ2,’ or ‘ψS’ directed towards ‘ψR,’
its ‘de sensu’ ‘intentum’ now ‘re-prae-sentatum’ of the phainomenon or
ob-jectum (Abelard translates Aristotle’s ‘per divisionem’ as ‘de re’ and ‘per
compositionem’ and ‘per conjunctionem’ by ‘de sensu,’ and ‘per Soph. Elen.,
Kneale and Kneale, 1966). Grice’s intentionalism has been widely discussed, but
the defense he himself makes of intensionalism (versus extensionalism) has
proved inspiring, as when he assumes as an attending commentary to his
reductive analysis of the state of affairs by which the emissor communicates
that p, that he is putting forward “the legitimacy of [the] application of
[existential generalization] to a statement the expression of which contains
such [an] "intensional" verb[…] as "intend" (Grice 1989:
116 ). The expression ‘de sensu’ is due to Abelard, but Russell likes it. While
serving as Prince Regent of England in 1815, George IV casually remarks his
wish to meet ‘the author of Waverley’ in the flesh. The Prince was being funny,
you see. The prince would not know this, but when his press becomes embroiled
in pecuniary difficulties, Scotts set out to write a cash-cow. The result is
Waverley, a novel which did not name its author. It is a tale of the last
Jacobite rebellion in England, the “Forty-Five.” The novel meets with
considerable success. The next year, Scott. There follows a sequel, the same
general vein. Mindful of his reputation,
Scotts maintains the anonymous habit he displays with Waverley, and publishes the
sequel under “the Author of Waverley.” The identity “Author of Waverley” =
“Scott” is widely rumoured, and Scott is
given the honour of dining with George, Prince Regent, who had wished to
meet “Author of Waverley” in the flesh for a ‘snug little dinner’ at Carleton,
on hearing ‘the author of Waverley’ was in town. The use of a descriptor may
lead to the implicatum that His Majesty is p’rhaps not sure that ‘the author of
Waverley’ has a name, and isR Scott. Lack of certainty is one thing,
yet, to quote from Russell, “an interest in the law of identity can hardly be
attributed to the first gentleman of Europe.” Grice admired Russell profusely
and one of his essays is wittily entitled, “Definite descriptions in Russell
and in the Vernacular,” so his explorations of ‘intentio’ ‘de sensu’ have an
intrinsic interest. Keywords: H. Paul
Grice, intentio seconda, implicature, intentionalism, intentum, intentum de sensu, ‘that’-clause, the
recte-oblique distinction. Grice explored issues of intentum de sensu in
various areas. First, ‘meaning.’ Second, ‘knowing.’ Third, ‘wanting.’ Fourth,
‘intending,’ Fifth, pirots, with incorrigibility and privileged access. Sixth,
morality and the regressus. Seventh, the continuum and the unity. With Grice, it all
starts, roughly, when Grice comes up with a topic for a talk at The Oxford
Philosophical Society.The Society is holding one of those meetings, and Grice
thinks of presenting a few conclusions he had reached at his seminars on C. S.
Peirce.What’s the good of an Oxford don of keeping tidy lecture notes if you will
not be able to lecture to a philosophical addressee? Peirce is the philosopher
on whom Grice choses to lecture. In part, for “not being particularly popular
on these shores,” and in part because Grice noted the ‘heretic’ in Peirce with
which he could identify.Granted, at this stage, Grice disliked the
un-Englishness of some of Peirce’s over-Latinate jargon, what Grice finds the
‘krypto-technic.’ ‘Sign,’ ‘symbol,’ ‘icon,’ and the rest of them!Instead, Grice
thinks, initially for the sake of his tutees and students – he was university
lecturer -- sticking with the simpler, ‘ordinary’, short English lexeme
‘mean.’A. M. Kemmerling, of all people, who wrote the obituary for Grice for
Synthese, has precisely cast doubts on the ‘universal’ validity of Grice’s proposed
conceptual reductive analysis, notably in his Ph.D dissertation on
‘Meinen.’ Note the irony in Kemmerling’s
title: Was Grice mit "Meinen"
meint - Eine Rekonstruktion der Griceschen Analyse rationaler Kommunikation.” Nothing jocular in the
subtitle, for this indeed is a reconstruction of ‘rational’ communication. The
funny bit is in “Was mit “Meinen” Grice meint”! In that very phrase, which is
rhetorical, and allows for an answer, because ‘meinen’ is both mentioned and
used, Kemmerling allows that he is ‘buying’ Grice’s idea that his reductive
analysis of ‘mean’ applies to German ‘meinen.’ Kemmerling is also pointing to
the ‘primacy’ (to use Suppes’s phrase) of ‘utterer’s’ or ‘emissor’s
“communicatum” or ‘Meinung.” Kemmerling advertises his interest in exploring on
what _Grice_ means – by uttering ‘meinen,’ almost! As Kemmerling notes,
German ‘meinen,’ cognate via common Germanic with English ‘mean,’ (cf. Frisian
‘mein,’ – and Hazzlitt, “Bread, butter, and green cheese, very good English,
very good cheese”) is none other than ‘mean’ that Grice means. And ‘Grice
means’ is the only literal, i. e. non-metabolic use of the verb Grice allows –
as applied to a rational agent, which features in the subtitle to Kemmerling’s
dissertation. Thus one reads in Kluge, “Etymologische Wörterbuch
der deutschen Sprache, 1881, of “meinen,”
rendered by J. F. Davis as ‘to think, opine, mean,’ from a MHG used to indicate, in Davis’s rendition,
‘to direct one's thoughts to, have in view, aim at, be affected towards a
person, love,’ OHG meinen, meinan, ‘to mean, think, say,
declare.’ = OS mênian,
Du. meenen, OE mœ̂nan, E mean (to this Anglo-Saxon mœ̂nan, cf. prob. moan – I know your meaning from your moaning),
all from WGmc. meinen, mainjan, ‘mênjan,’ and cognate with ‘man,’ ‘to think’ (cf. ‘mahnen,’ ‘Mann,’ and ‘Minne’). Kemmerling is
very apropos, because Grice engaged in philosophical discussion with him, as
testified by his perceptive contribution to P. G. R. I. C. E. (Kemmerling,
1986). On top, in his presentation for the Oxford Philosophical Society, Grice
wants to restrict the philosophical interest to ‘de sensu,’ the ‘that’-clause
(cf. the recte-oblique distinction), viz. not just ‘what Grice means,’ if this
is going to be expaned as ‘something wonderful.’ Not enough for Grice. It has
to be expanded, for the thing to have philosophical interest into a
‘propositional clause,’, an ‘intensional’ context, i. e., ‘Grice means that…’
Grice cavalierly dismisses other use of ‘mean,’ – notably the ubiquitous, ‘mean
to…’ – He will later explain his reason for this. It was after William James
provoked Prichard. For William James uttered: “I will that the distant table
slides on the floor toward me. It doesn’t’. Prichard turns this into the conceptual
priority of ‘will that…’ for which Grice gives him the credit he deserved at a
later lecture now on his being appointed a Fellow of The British Academy
(Grice, 1971). Strictly, what Grice does
in the Oxford Philosophical Socieety presentation is to distinguish between
various ‘mean’ and end up focusing on ‘mean’ as followed by a ‘that’-clause. In
the typical Oxonian fashion, that Grice borrows (but never returns) from J. C.
Wilson, Grice has the IO as ‘meaning that so-and-so’ (Grice, 1989:
217). Grice explicitly displays the primacy of a reductive analysis of the
conceptual circumstances involving an emissor (Anglo-Saxon ‘utterer’) who
‘means’ that p. It will be a longer ‘shaggy-dog’ story Grice tells when he
crosses the divide from ‘propositional’ (p) to ‘predicative’ ascriptions (“By
uttering ‘Fido is shaggy,’ Grice means that the dog is hairy-coated (Grice
1989). Grice notes that ‘metabolically,’ “mean,” at least in English, can be
applied to various other things, sometimes even involving a ‘that’-clause. “By
delivering his budget, the major means that we will have a hard year.’ Grice
finds that ‘but we won’t’ turns him into a self-contradicter. In Grice’s usage,
‘x ‘means’ y’ iff ‘y is a consequence [consequentia] of x’ --. Quite a
departure from Old Frisian. If Hume’s objection to the use of the verb ‘cause,’
is that it covers animistic beliefs (“Charles I’s decapitation willed his
death”), English allows for disimplicated or loose ‘metabolic’ uses of ‘will’
(“It ‘will’ rain”) and ‘mean’ (Grice’s moaning means that he is in pain).
desideratum:
Grice makes a double use of this. It should be thus two entries. There’s the
conversational desideratum, where a desideratum is like a maxim or an
imperative – and then there are two specific desiderata: the desideratum of
conversational clarity, and the desideratum of conversational candour. Grice
was never sure what adjective to use for the ‘desiderative.’ He liked buletic.
He liked desideratum because it has the co-relate ‘consideratum,’ for
belief. He uses ‘deriderative’ and a few
more! Of course what he means is a sub-psychological modality, or rather a
‘soul.’ So he would apply it ‘primarily’ to the soul, as Plato and Aristotle
does. The ‘psyche’, or ‘anima’ is what is ‘desiderativa.’ The Grecians are pretty
confused about this (but ‘boulemaic’ and ‘buletic’ are used), and the Romans
didn’t help. Grice is concerned with a rational-desiderative, that takes a
“that”-clause (or oratio obliqua), and qua constructivist, he is also concerned
with a pre-rational desiderative (he has an essay on “Needs and Wants,” and his
detailed example in “Method” is a squarrel (sic) who needs a nut. On top, while
Grice suggest s that it goes both ways: the doxastic can be given a reductive
analaysis in terms of the buletic, and the buletic in terms of the doxastic, he
only cares to provide the former. Basically, an agent judges that p, if his
willing that p correlates to a state of affairs that satisfies his desires.
Since he does not provide a reductive analysis for Prichard’s willing-that, one
is left wondering. Grice’s position is that ‘willing that…’ attains its ‘sense’
via the specification, as a theoretical concept, in some law in the
folk-science that agents use to explain their behaviour. Grice gets subtler
when he deals with mode-markers for the desiderative: for these are either
utterer-oriented, or addressee-oriented, and they may involve a buletic
attitude itself, or a doxastic attitude. When utterer-addressed, utterer wills
that utterer wills that p. There is no closure here, and indeed, a regressus ad
infinitum is what Grice wants, since this regressus allows him to get
univeersabilisability, in terms of conceptual, formal, and applicational kinds
of generality. In this he is being Kantian, and Hareian. While Grice praises
Kantotle, Aristotle here would stay unashamedly ‘teleological,’ and giving
priority to a will that may not be universalisable, since it’s the
communitarian ‘good’ that matters. what does Grice have to say about our
conversational practice? L and S have “πρᾶξις,” from “πράσσω,” and which they
render as ‘moral action,’ oποίησις, τέχνη;” “oποιότης,” “ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ π.,”
“oοἱ πολιτικοὶ λόγοι;” “ἔργῳ καὶ πράξεσιν, οὐχὶ λόγοις” Id.6.3; ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι
ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, “exhibited in actual life,” action in drama, “oλόγος;
“μία π. ὅλη καὶ τελεία.” With practical Grice means buletic. Praxis involves
acting, and surely Grice presupposes acting. By uttering, i. e. by the act of
uttering, expression x, U m-intends that p. Grice occasionally refers to action
and behaviour as the thing which an ascription of a psychological state
explains. Grice prefers the idiom of soul. Theres the ratiocinative soul.
Within the ratiocinative, theres the executive soul and the merely
administrative soul. Cicero had to translate Aristotle into prudentia, every
time Aristotle talked of phronesis. Grice was aware that the terminology
by Kant can be confusing. Kant used ‘pure’ reason for reason in the doxastic
realm. The critique by Kant of practical reason is hardly symmetrical to
his critique of doxastic reason. Grice, with his æqui-vocality thesis of
must (must crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide), Grice is being more
of a symmetricalist. The buletic, boulomaic, or volitive, is a part of the
soul, as is the doxatic or judicative. And judicative is a trick because there
is such a thing as a value judgement, or an evaluative judgement, which is
hardly doxastic. Grice plays with two co-relative operators: desirability
versus probability. Grice invokes the exhibitive/protreptic distinction he had
introduced in the fifth James lecture, now applied to psychological attitudes
themselves. This Grice’s attempt is to tackle the Kantian problem in the
Grundlegung: how to derive the categorical imperative from a counsel of prudence.
Under the assumption that the protasis is Let the agent be happy, Grice does
not find it obtuse at all to construct a universalisable imperative out of a
mere motive-based counsel of prudence. Grice has an earlier paper on pleasure
which relates. The derivation involves seven steps. Grice proposes seven
steps in the derivation. 1. It is a fundamental law of psychology that, ceteris
paribus, for any creature R, for any P and Q, if R wills P Λ judges
if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 2. Place this law within the scope of a
"willing" operator: R wills for any P Λ Q, if R wills
P Λ judges that if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 3. wills turns
to should. If rational, R will have to block unsatisfactory (literally)
attitudes. R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is
satisfactory to will that P Λ it is satisfactory to judge that if P,
P as a result of Q, it is sastisfactory to will that Q. 4. Marking the mode: R
should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that
!P Λ that if it .P, .P only as a result of Q, it is satisfactory that
!Q. 5. via (p & q -> r) -> (p -> (q -> r)):
R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory
that if .P, .P only because Q, i is satisfactory that, if let it be that P, let
it be that Q. 6. R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if P, P
only because p yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 7. For any
P Λ Q if P, P only because Q yields if let it be that P, let it be
that Q. Grice was well aware that a philosopher, at Oxford, needs to be a
philosophical psychologist. So, wanting and needing have to be related to
willing. A plant needs water. A floor needs sweeping. So need is too broad. So
is want, a non-Anglo-Saxon root for God knows what. With willing things get
closer to the rational soul. There is willing in the animal soul. But when it
comes to rational willing, there must be, to echo Pritchard, a conjecture, some
doxastic element. You cannot will to fly, or will that the distant chair slides
over the floor toward you. So not all wants and needs are rational willings,
but then nobody said they would. Grice is interested in emotion in his power
structure of the soul. A need and a want may count as an emotion. Grice was
never too interested in needing and wanting because they do not take a
that-clause. He congratulates Urmson for having introduced him to the brilliant
willing that … by Prichard. Why is it, Grice wonders, that many ascriptions of
buletic states take to-clause, rather than a that-clause? Even mean, as
‘intend.’ In this Grice is quite different from Austin, who avoids the
that-clause. The explanation by Austin is very obscure, like those of all
grammars on the that’-clause, the ‘that’ of ‘oratio obliqua’ is not in every
way similar to the ‘that’-clause in an explicit performative formula. Here the
utterer is not reporting his own ‘oratio’ in the first person singular present
indicative active. Incidentally, of course, it is not in the least necessary
that an explicit performative verb should be followed by a ‘that’-clause. In
important classes of cases it is followed by ‘to . . .,’ or by or nothing, e.
g. ‘I apologize for…,’ ‘I salute you.’ Now many of these verbs appear to be
quite satisfactory pure performatives. Irritating though it is to have them as
such, linked with clauses that look like statements, true or false, e. g., when
I say ‘I prophesy that …,’ ‘I concede that …’,
‘I postulate that …,’ the clause following normally looks just like a
statement, but the verb itself seems to be pure performatives. One
may distinguish the performative opening part, ‘I state that …,’ which makes
clear how the utterance is to be taken, that it is a statement, as distinct
from a prediction, etc.), from the bit in the that-clause which is required to
be true or false. However, there are many cases which, as language stands at
present, we are not able to split into two parts in this way, even though the
utterance seems to have a sort of explicit performative in it. Thus, ‘I liken x
to y,’ or ‘I analyse x as y.’ Here we both do the likening and assert that
there is a likeness by means of one compendious phrase of at least a
quasi-performative character. Just to spur us on our way, we may also mention
‘I know that …’, ‘I believe that …’, etc. How complicated are these examples?
We cannot assume that they are purely descriptive, which has Grice talking of
the pseudo-descriptive. Want etymologically means absence; need should be
preferred. The squarrel (squirrel) Toby needs intake of nuts, and youll soon
see gobbling them! There is not much philosophical bibliography on these two
psychological states Grice is analysing. Their logic is interesting. Smith
wants to play cricket. Smith needs to play cricket. Grice is
concerned with the propositional content attached to the want and need
predicate. Wants that sounds harsh; so does need that. Still, there
are propositional attached to the pair above. Smith plays cricket. Grice
took a very cavalier attitude to what linguists spend their lives analysing. He
thought it was surely not the job of the philosopher, especially from a
prestigious university such as Oxford, to deal with the arbitrariness of
grammatical knots attached to this or that English verb. He rarely used
English, but stuck with ordinary language. Surely, he saw himself in the
tradition of Kantotle, and so, aiming at grand philosophical truths: not
conventions of usage, even his own! 1. Squarrel Toby has a nut, N, in
front of him. 2. Toby is short on squarrel food (observed or assumed), so, 3.
Toby wills squarrel food (by postulate of Folk Pyschological
Theory θ connecting willing with intake of N). 4. Toby prehends a nut
as in front (from (1) by Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ, if it
is assumed that nut and in front are familiar to Toby). 5. Toby joins squarrel
food with gobbling, nut, and in front (i.e. Toby judges gobbling, on nut in
front, for squarrel food (by Postulate of Folk Psychological
Theory θ with the aid of prior observation. So, from 3, 4 and 5, 6.
Tobby gobbles; and since a nut is in front of him, gobbles the nut in front of
him. The system of values of the society to which the agent belongs forms the
external standard for judging the relative importance of the commitments by the
agent. There are three dimensions of value: universally human, cultural that
vary with societies and times; and personal that vary with individuals. Each
dimension has a standard for judging the adequacy of the relevant values. Human
values are adequate if they satisfy basic needs; cultural values are adequate if
they provide a system of values that sustains the allegiance of the inhabitants
of a society; and personal values are adequate if the conceptions of well‐being formed out of them enable individuals to live
satisfying lives. These values conflict and our well‐being requires some way of settling their conflicts, but
there is no universal principle for settling the conflicts; it can only be done
by attending to the concrete features of particular conflicts. These features
vary with circumstances and values. Grice reads Porter.The idea of the value
chain is based on the process view of organizations, the idea of seeing a
manufacturing (or service) organization as a system, made up of subsystems each
with inputs, transformation processes and outputs. Inputs, transformation
processes, and outputs involve the acquisition and consumption of resources –
money, labour, materials, equipment, buildings, land, administration and
management. How value chain activities are carried out determines costs and
affects profits.In his choice of value system and value sub-system, Grice is
defending objectivity, since it is usually the axiological relativist who uses
such a pretentious phrasing! More than a value may co-ordinate in a system. One
such is eudæmonia (cf. system of ends). The problem for Kant is the reduction
of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or
suppositional imperative. For Kant, a value tends towards the
Subjectsive. Grice, rather, wants to offer a metaphysical defence of objective
value. Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the Conversational
Immanuel. The keyword to search the H. P. Grice is ‘will,’ and ‘volitional,’
even ‘ill-will,’ (“Metaphysics and ill-will,” s. V, c. 7-f. 28) and
‘benevolence’ (vide below under ‘conversational benevolence”). Also
‘desirability’: “Modality, desirability, and probability,” s. V, c. 8-ff.
14-15, and the conference lecture in a different series, “Probability,
desirability, and mood operators,” s. II, c. 2-f.11). Grice makes systematic use of ‘practical’ to
contrast with the ‘alethic,’ too (“Practical reason,” s. V, c. 9-f.1), The H.
P. Grice Papers, BANC.
desideratum of conversational
candour: The term ‘desideratum’ has to be
taken seriously. It involves freedom. This includes the maximin. It should be
noted that candour is DESIRABLE. There is a desirability for candour. Candour
is not a given. Ditto for clarity. See conversational desideratum, simpliciter.
A rational desideratum is a desideratum by a rational agent and which he
expects from another rational agent. One should make the strongest move, and on
the other hand try not to mislead.Grice's Oxford "Conversation"
Lectures, 1966Grice: Between Self-Love and Benevolence As I was saying
(somewhere), Grice uses "self-love", charmingly qualified with capitals, as "Conversational
Self-Love", and, less charmingly,
"Conversational Benevolence", in lectures advertised at
Oxford, as "Logic and Conversation"
that he gave at Oxford in 1964 as "University Lecturer in Philosophy". He also gave
seminars on "Conversational helpfulness." A number of the lectures by
Grice include discussion of thetypes of behaviour people in general exhibit,
and thereforethe types of expectations[cfr. owings]they might bring to a
venture such as a conversation.Grice suggests that people in general both
exhibitand EXPECT a certain degree of helpfulness [-- alla Rosenschein,
epistemic/boulemaic:If A cognizes that B wills p, then A wills p.] "from OTHERS" [-- reciprocal vs.
reflexive, etc.] usually on the understanding that such helpfulness does NOT
get in the way of particular goals and does not involve undue effort cf. least
effort? - cfr. Hobbes on self-love. It two people, even complete strangers,are
going through a gate, the expectation isthat the FIRST ONE through will hold
thegate open, or at least leave it open, for thesecond. The expectation is such
that todo OTHERWISE without particular reasonwould be interpreted as RUDE. The
type of helpfulness exhibited andexpected in conversation is more
specificbecause of a particular, although not a unique feature of
conversation.It is a COLLABORATIVE venture betweenthe participants.There is a
SHARED aimGrice wonders. His words, Does "helpfulness in something WE ARE
DOING TOGETHER” equate to 'cooperation'?He seems to have decided that it
does. By the later lectures in the series, 'the principle of conversational
helpfulness'has been rebranded the expectation of 'cooperation.' During the
Oxford lectures, Grice develops his account of the precise nature of this
cooperation. It can be seen as governed by certain regularities, or principles,
detailing expected behaviour. The expression'maxim' to describe these
regularities appears relatively late in the lectures.Grice's INITIAL choices of
terms are 'objectives' and 'desiderata'.He was particularly fond of the latter.
He was interested in detailing the desirable forms of behaviour for the purpose
of achieving a joint goal of the conversation. Initially, Grice posits TWO such
desiderata. Those relating to candour on the one hand and clarity on the other.
The desideratum of candour contains his general PRINCIPLE of making the
strongest (MAX) possible statement and, as a LIMITING (MAX) factor on this, the
suggestion that speakers should try not to mislead. (Do not mislead). cfr.
our"We are brothers"-- but not mutual."We are married to each
other". "You _are_ a boor".----The desideratum of conversational
clarity concerns the manner of expression. [His later reference to Modus or
Mode as used by Kant as one of the four
categories] for any conversational contribution. It includes the IMPORTANT
expectations of relevance to understanding and also insists that the main
import of an utterance be clear and explicit. (“Explicate!”) These two factors
are constantly to be WEIGHED against two
FUNDAMENTAL and SOMETIMES COMPETING DEMANDS. Contributions to a conversation
are aimed towards the agreed current purposes by the PRINCIPLE of Conversational
Benevolence. The principle of CONVERSATIONAL SELF-LOVE ensures the assumption
on the part of both participants that neither will go to unnecessary trouble
[LEAST EFFORT] in framing their contribution. This has been a topic of interest
to Noh end. In "Conversational Immanuel" Grice tries different ways
of making sense -- it is very easy to do so -- of Grice's distinctions that go
over the head of some linguists I know! Reasonable versus rational for example.
A Rawlsian distinction of sorts. Rational is too weak. We need 'reasonable'.
So, what sort of reasonableness is that which results from this harmonious, we
hope, clash of self-love and benevolence? Grice tried, wittily, to extend the
purposes of conversation to involve MUTUALLY INFLUENCING EACH OTHER -- a
reciprocal. (WoW, ii). And there's a mythical reconstruction of this in his
"Meaning Revisited" which he contributed to this symposium organised
by N. Smith on Mutua knowledge. But issues remains, we hope. The concept of
‘candour’is especially basic for Grice since it is constitutive of what it
means to identify the ‘significatum.’ As he notes, ‘false’ information is no information.
This is serious, because it has to do with the acceptum. A contribution which
is not trustworthy is not deemed a contribution. It is conceptually impossible
to intend to PROVIDE information if you are aware that you are not being
trustworthy and not conveying it. As for the degree of explicitness, as Grice
puts it. Since in communication in a certain fashion all must be public, if an
idea or thesis is heavily obscured, it can no longer be regarded as having been
propounded. This gives acceptum justification to the correlative desideratum of
conversational clarity. On top, if there is a level of obscurity, the thing is
not deemed to have been a communicatum or significatum. It is all about
confidence, you know. U expects A will find him confident. Thus we find in
Short and Lewis, “confīdo,” wich they render as “to trust confidently in
something,” and also, “confide in, rely firmly upon, to believe, be assured
of,” as an enhancing of “sperare,” in Cicero’s Att. 6, 9, 1. Trust and
rationality are pre-requisites of conversation. Urmson develops this. They
phrase in Urmson is "implied claim." Whenever U makes a
conversational contribution in a standard context, there is an implied claim to
U being trustworthy and reasonable. What do Grice and Urmson mean by an
"implied claim"? It is obvious enough, but they both love to expand.
Whenever U utters an expression which can be used to convey truth or falsehood
there is an implied claim to trustworthiness by U, unless the situation shows
that this is not so. U may be acting or reciting or incredulously echoing the
remark of another, or flouting the expectation. This, Grice and Urmson think,
may need an explanation. Suppose that U utters, in an ordinary
circumstance, ‘It will rain tomorrow,’ or ‘It rained yesterday,’ or ‘It is
raining.’ This act carries with it the claim that U should be trusted and
licenses A to believe that it will rain tomorrow. By this is meant that
just as it is understood that no U will give an order unless he is entitled to
give orders, so it is understood that no U will utter a sentence of a kind
which can be used to make a statement unless U is willing to claim that that
statement is true, and hence one would be acting in a misleading manner if one
uttered the sentence if he was not willing to make that claim. Here, the
predicate “implies that …,” Grice, Grant, Moore, Nowell-Smith, and Urmson
hasten to add, is being used in such a way that, if there is a an expectation
that a thing is done in Circumstance C, U implies that C holds if he does the
thing. The point is often made if not always in the terms Grice uses, and it
is, Urmson and Grice believe, in substance uncontroversial. Grice and Urmson
wish to make the point that, when an utterer U deploys a hedge with an
indicative sentence, there is not merely an implied claim that the whole
statement is true but also that is true. The implied or expressed claim by
the utterer to trustworthiness need not be very strong. The whole point of
a hedge is to modify or weaken (if not, as Grice would have it, flout) the
claim by U to full trustworthiness which would be implied by the unhedged
assertion. But even if U utters “He is, I suppose, at home;” or “I
guess that the penny will come down heads," U expresses, or for
Urmson plainly implies, with however little reason, that this is what U accepts
as worth the trust by A. Now Grice and Urmson meet an objection which is made
by some philosophers to this comparison. Grice and Urmson intend to meet the
objection by a fairly detailed examination of the example which they themselves
would most likely choose. In doing this Grice and Urmson further explain
the use of a parenthetical verb. The adverb is "probably" and
the verb is “I believe.” To say, that something is probable, the imaginary
objector will say, is to imply that it is reasonable to believe, that the
evidence justifies a guarded claim for the trust or trustworthiness of U and
the truth of the statement. But to say that someone else, a third person,
believes something does not imply that it is reasonable for U or A to believe
it, nor that the evidence justifies the guarded or implied claim to factivity
or truth which U makes. Therefore, the objector continues, the difference
between the use of “I believe” and “probably” is not, as Grice and Urmson suggest,
merely one of nuance and degree of impersonality. In one case, “probably,”
reasonableness is implied; in the other, “believe,” it is not. This objection
is met by Grice and Urmson. They do so by making a general point. To use
the rational-reasonable distinction in “Conversational implicature” and
“Aspects,” there is an implied claim by U to reasonableness. Further to
an implied claim to trust whenever a sentence is uttered in a standard context,
now Grice and Urmson add, to meet the sceptical objection about the contrast
between “probably” and “I believe” that, whenever U makes a statement in a
standard context there is an implied claim to reasonableness. This contention
must be explained alla Kant. Cf. Strawson on the presumption of conversational
relevance, and Austin, Moore, Nowell-Smith, Grant, and Warnock. To use
Hart’s defeasibility, and Hall’s excluder, unless U is acting or story-telling,
or preface his remarks with some such phrase as “I know Im being silly,
but …” or, “I admit it is unreasonable, but …” it is, Grice and
Urmson think, a presupposition or expectation of communication or conversation
that a communicator will not make a statement, thereby implying this trust,
unless he has some ground, however tenuous, for the statement. To utter
“The King is visiting Oxford tomorrow,” or “The President of the BA has a
corkscrew in his pocket,” and then, when asked why the utterer is uttering
that, to answer “Oh, for no reason at all,” would be to sin,
theologically, against the basic conventions governing the use of discourse.
Grice goes on to provide a Kantian justification for that, hence his amusing
talk of maxims and stuff. Therefore, Urmson and Grice think there is an
implied or expressed claim to reasonableness which goes with all
our statements, i.e. there is a mutual expectation that a communicator will not
make a statement unless he is prepared to claim and defend its reasonablenesss.
Cf. Grice’s desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the
over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly conversational
benevolence-cum-self-love). Grice thinks that the principle of
conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of
conversational self-love. The result is the overarching principle of
conversational helpfulness. Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of
conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide
by. Grice follows some observations by Warnock. The logical grammar
of “trust,” “candour,” “charity,” “sincerity,” “decency,” “honesty,” is subtle,
especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation: giving
and receiving information/influencing and being influenced by others. In both
sub-goals, trust is paramount. The explorations of trust has become an Oxonian
hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but Williams, and
others. Grice’s essay is entitled, “Trust, metaphysics, value.” Trust as a
corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness. In a given
conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is
operating, U is assumed by A to be trustworthy and candid. There are two
modes of trust, which relate to the buletic sub-goal and the doxastic sub-goal
which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures:
giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by
others. In both sub-goals, trust is key. In the doxastic realm, trust
has to do, not so much or only, with truth (with which the expression is cognate),
or satisfactoriness-value, but evidence and probability. In the buletic realm,
there are the dimensions of satisfactoriness-value (‘good’ versus ‘true’), and
‘ground’ versus evidence, which becomes less crucial. But note that one is
trustworthy regarding BOTH the buletic attitude and the doxastic attitude.
Grice mentions this or that buletic attitudes which is not usually judged in
terms of evidential support (“I vow to thee my country.”) However, in the
buletic realm, U is be assumed as trustworthy if U has the buletic attitude he
is expressing. The cheater, the insincere, the dishonest, the untrustworthy,
for Grice is not irrational, just repugnant. How immoral is the idea that
honesty is the best policy? Is Kant right in thinking there is no right to
refrain from trust? Surely it is indecent. For Kant, there is no motivation or
‘motive,’ pure or impure, behind telling the truth – it’s just a right, and an
obligation – an imperative. Being trustworthy for Kant is associated with a
pure motive. Grice agrees. Decency comes into the picture. An indecent agent
may still be rational, but in such a case, conversation may still be seen as
rational (if not reasonable) and surely not be seen as rational helpfulness or
co-operation, but rational adversarial competition, rather, a zero-sum game.
Grice found the etymology of ‘decent’ too obscure. Short and Lewis have
“dĕcet,” which they deem cognate with Sanscrit “dacas,” ‘fame,’ and Grecian
“δοκέω,‘to seem,’ ‘to think,’ and with Latin ‘decus,’ ‘dingus.’ As an
impersonal verb, Short and Lewis render it as ‘it is seemly, comely, becoming,;
it beseems, behooves, is fitting, suitable, proper (for syn. v. debeo init.):
decere quasi aptum esse consentaneumque tempori et personae, Cic. Or. 22, 74;
cf. also nunc quid aptum sit, hoc est, quid maxime deceat in oratione videamus,
id. de Or. 3, 55, 210 (very freq. and class.; not in Caesar). Grice’s idea of
decency is connected to his explorations on rational and reasonable. To cheat
may be neither unreasonable nor rational. It is just repulsive. Indecent,
in other words. In all this, Grice is concerned with ordinary language,
and treasures Austin questioning Warnock, when Warnock was pursuing a
fellowship at Magdalen. “What would you say the difference is between ‘Smith
plays cricket rather properly’ and ‘Smith plays cricket rather incorrectly’?”
They spent the whole dinner over the subtlety. By desserts, Warnock was in love
with Austin. Cf. Grice on his prim and proper Aunt Matilda. The
exploration by Grice on trust is Warnockian in character, or vice versa. In
“Object of morality,” Warnock has trust as key, as indeed, the very object of
morality. Grice starts to focus on trust in an Oxford seminars on the
implicatum. If there is a desideratum of conversational candour, and the goal
of the principle of conversational helpfulness is that of giving and receiving
information, and influencing and being influenced by others, ‘false’
‘information’ is just no information – Since exhibiteness trumps protrepsis,
this applies to the buletic, too. Grice loved that Latin dictum, “tuus candor.”
He makes an early defence of this in his fatal objection to Malcolm. A
philosopher cannot intentionally instill a falsehood in his tutee, such as
“Decapitation willed the death of Charles I” (the alleged paraphrase of the
paradoxical philosopher saying that ‘causing’ is ‘willing’ and rephrasing
“Decapitation was the cause of the death of Charles I.” There is, for both
Grice and Apel, a transcendental (if weak) justification, not just utilitarian
(honesty as the best policy), as Stalnaker notes in his contribution to the
Grice symposium for APA. Unlike Apel, the transcendental argument is a weak one
in that Grice aims to show that conversation that did not abide by trust would
be unreasonable, but surely still ‘possible.’ It is not a transcendental
justification for the ‘existence’ of conversation simpliciter, but for the
existence of ‘reasonable,’ decent conversation. If we approach charity in the
first person, we trust ourselves that some of our beliefs have to be true, and
that some of our desires have to be satisfactory valid, and we are equally
trusted by our conversational partners. This is Grice’s conversational golden
rule. What would otherwise be the point of holding that conversation is
rational co-operation? What would be the point of conversation simpliciter?
Urmson follows Austin, so Austin’s considerations on this, notably in “Other
minds,” deserve careful examination. Urmson was of course a member of Grice’s
play group, and these are the philosophers that we consider top priority.
Another one was P. H. Nowell-Smith. At least two of his three rules deserve
careful examination. Nowell-Smith notes that this or that ‘rule’ of contextual
implication is not meant to be taken as a ‘rigid rule’. Unlike this or that
rule of entailment, a conversational rule can be broken without the utterer
being involved in self-contradiction or absurdity. When U uses an expression to
make a statement, it is contextually implied that he believes it to be true.
Similarly, when he uses it to perform any of the other jobs for which sentences
are used, it is contextually implied that he is using it for one of the jobs
that it normally does. This rule is often in fact broken. Anti-Kantian lying,
Bernhard-type play-acting, Andersen-type story-telling, and Wildeian irony is
each a case in which U breaks the rule, or flouts the expectation, either
overtly or covertly. But each of these four cases is a secondary use, i.e. a
use to which an expression cannot logically or conceptually be put unless, as
Hart would have it, it has a primary use. There is no limit to the possible
uses to which an expression may be put. In many cases a man makes his point by
deliberately using an expression in a queer way or even using it in the ‘sense’
opposite to its unique normal one, as in irony (“He is a fine friend,” implying
that he is a scoundrel). The distinction between a primary and a secondary use
is important because many an argument used by a philosopher consists in
pointing out some typical example of the way in which some expression E is
used. Such an argument is always illegitimate if the example employed is an
example of a secondary use, however common such a use may be. U contextually
implies that he has what he himself believes to be good reasons for his statement.
Once again, we often break this rule and we have special devices for indicating
when we are breaking it. Phrases such as ‘speaking offhand …,’ 'I do not really
know but …,’ and ‘I should be inclined to say that …,’ are used by scrupulous
persons to warn his addressee that U has not got what seem to him good reasons
for his statement. But unless one of these guarding phrases is used we are
entitled to believe that U believes himself to have good reasons for his
statement and we soon learn to *mistrust* people who habitually infringe this
rule. It is, of course, a mistake to infer from what someone says categorically
that he has in fact good reasons for what he says. If I tell you, or ‘inform’
to you, that the duck-billed platypus is a bird (because I ' remember ' reading
this in a book) I am unreliable; but I am not using language improperly. But if
I tell you this without using one of the guarding phrases and without having
what I think good reasons, I am. What U says may be assumed to be relevant to
the interests of his addressee. This is the most important of the three rules;
unfortunately it is also the most frequently broken. Bores are more common than
liars or careless talkers. This rule is particularly obvious in the case of
answers to questions, since it is assumed that the answer is an answer. Not all
statements are answers to questions; information may be volunteered.
Nevertheless the publication of a text-book on trigonometry implies that the
author believes that there are people who want to learn about trigonometry, and
to give advice implies a belief that the advice is relevant to one’s
addressee's problem. This rule is of the greatest importance for ethics. For
the major problem of ethics is that of bridging the gap between a decisions, an
ought-sentence, an injunction, and a sentence used to give advice on the one
hand and the statements of *fact*, sometime regarding the U’s soul, that
constitute the reasons for these on the other. It is in order to bridge these
gaps that insight into necessary synthetic connexions is invoked. This rule of
contextual implication may help us to show that there is no gap to be bridged
because the reason-giving sentence must turn out to be also *practical* from
the start and not a statement of *fact*, even concerning the state of the U’s
soul, from which a practical sentence can somehow be deduced. This rule is,
therefore, more than a rule of good manners; or rather it shows how, in matters
of ordinary language, rules of good manners shade into logical rules. Unless we
assume that it is being observed we cannot understand the connexions between
decisions, advice, and appraisals and the reasons given in support of them. Refs.: The main reference is in the first set of ‘Logic and
conversation.’ Many keywords are useful, not just ‘candour,’ but notably
‘trust.’ (“Rationality and trust,” c. 9-f. 5, “Trust, metaphysics, and value,”
c. 9-f. 20, and “Aristotle and friendship, rationality, trust, and decency,” c.
6-f. 18), BANC.
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