In Speech Acts: An Essay
in the Philosophy of Language (1969), Searle brings together modified versions
of Frege’s distinctions between the force (F) and content (P) of a sentence,
and between singular reference and predication, Austin’s analysis of speech
acts, and Grice’s analysis of speaker meaning.
Searle explores the
hypothesis that the semantics of a natural language can be regarded as a
conventional realization of underlying constitutive rules and that
illocutionary acts are acts performed in accordance with these rules.
Expression and Meaning (1979) extends this analysis to non-literal and indirect
illocutionary acts, and attempts to explain Donnellan’s referential-attributive
distinction in these terms and proposes an influential taxonomy of five basic
types of illocutionary acts based on the illocutionary point or purpose of the
act, and word-to-world versus world-toword direction of fit. Language and mind.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983) forms the foundation
for the earlier work on speech acts. Now the semantics of a natural language is
seen as the result of the mind (intrinsic intentionality) imposing conditions
of satisfaction or aboutness on objects (expressions in a language), which have
intentionality only derivatively. Perception and action rather than belief are
taken as fundamental. Satisfaction conditions are essentially Fregean (i.e.
general versus singular) and internal – meaning is in the head, relative to a
background of non-intentional states, and relative to a network of other
intentional states. The philosophy of language becomes a branch of the
philosophy of mind. Mind. “Minds, Brains and Programs” (1980) introduced the
famous “Chinese room” argument against strong artificial intelligence – the view
that appropriately programming a machine is sufficient for giving it
intentional states. Suppose a monolingual English-speaker is working in a room
producing Chinese answers to Chinese questions well enough to mimic a
Chinesespeaker, but by following an algorithm written in English. Such a person
does not understand Chinese nor would a computer computing the same algorithm.
This is true for any such algorithms because they are syntactically
individuated and intentional states are semantically individuated. The
Rediscovery of the Mind (1992) continues the attack on the thesis that the
brain is a digital computer, and develops a non-reductive “biological
naturalism” on which intentionality, like the liquidity of water, is a
high-level feature, which is caused by and realized in the brain. Society. The
Construction of Social Reality (1995) develops his realistic worldview,
starting with an independent world of particles and forces, up through
evolutionary biological systems capable of consciousness and intentionality, to
institutions and social facts, which are created when persons impose
status-features on things, which are collectively recognized and accepted. DIRECTION OF FIT, INTENTIONALScotus, John
Duns Searle, John R. 823 823 ITY,
MEANING, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, SPEECH ACT THEORY. R.M.H. second
actualization.ARISTOTLE. secondarily evaluative word.PRESCRIPTIVISM. secondary
process.FREUD. secondary qualities.QUALITIES. secondary rule.HART. secondary
substance.ARISTOTLE. second imposition.IMPOSITION. second intention.IMPOSITION.
second law of thermodynamics.ENTROPY. secondness.PEIRCE. second-order.ORDER.
second-order logic, the logic of languages that contain, in addition to
variables ranging over objects, variables ranging over properties, relations, functions,
or classes of those objects. A model, or interpretation, of a formal language
usually contains a domain of discourse. This domain is what the language is
about, in the model in question. Variables that range over this domain are
called first-order variables. If the language contains only first-order
variables, it is called a first-order language, and it is within the purview of
first-order logic. Some languages also contain variables that range over
properties, relations, functions, or classes of members of the domain of
discourse. These are second-order variables. A language that contains
first-order and second-order variables, and no others, is a secondorder
language. The sentence ‘There is a property shared by all and only prime
numbers’ is straightforwardly rendered in a second-order language, because of
the (bound) variable ranging over properties. There are also properties of
properties, relations of properties, and the like. Consider, e.g., the property
of properties expressed by ‘P has an infinite extension’ or the relation
expressed by ‘P has a smaller extension than Q’. A language with variables
ranging over such items is called thirdorder. This construction can be
continued, producing fourth-order languages, etc. A language is called higher-order
if it is at least second-order. Deductive systems for second-order languages
are obtained from those for first-order languages by adding straightforward
extensions of the axioms and rules concerning quantifiers that bind first-order
variables. There may also be an axiom scheme of comprehension: DPEx(Px S F(x)),
one instance for each formula F that does not contain P free. The scheme
“asserts” that every formula determines the extension of a property. If the
language has variables ranging over functions, there may also be a version of
the axiom of choice: ER(ExDyRxy P DfExRxfx). In standard semantics for
second-order logic, a model of a given language is the same as a model for the
corresponding first-order language. The relation variables range over every
relation over the domain-of-discourse, the function variables range over every
function from the domain to the domain, etc. In non-standard, or Henkin
semantics, each model consists of a domain-ofdiscourse and a specified
collection of relations, functions, etc., on the domain. The latter may not
include every relation or function. The specified collections are the range of
the second-order variables in the model in question. In effect, Henkin
semantics regards second-order languages as multi-sorted, first-order
languages. FORMAL LOGIC, FORMAL
SEMANTICS, PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC. S.Sha. second potentiality.ARISTOTLE. second
Thomism.THOMISM. secundum quid, in a certain respect, or with a qualification.
Fallacies can arise from confusing what is true only secundum quid with what is
true simpliciter (‘without qualification’, ‘absolutely’, ‘on the whole’), or
conversely. Thus a strawberry is red simpliciter (on the whole). But it is
black, not red, with respect to its seeds, secundum quid. By ignoring the distinction,
one might mistakenly infer that the strawberry is both red and not red. Again,
a certain thief is a good cook, secundum quid; but it does not follow that he
is good simpliciter (without qualification). Aristotle was the first to
recognize the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter explicitly, in his
Sophistical Refutations. On the basis of some exceptionally enigmatic remarks
in the same work, the liar paradox was often regarded in the Middle Ages as an
instance of this fallacy. PARADOX.
P.V.S. security strategy.MAXIMIN STRATEGY. seeing, epistemic.DRETSKE. second
actualization seeing, epistemic 824
824 seeing, non-epistemic.DRETSKE. selection.PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY.
self, bundle theory of.BUNDLE THEORY. self-consciousness.DE DICTO, KNOWLEDGE BY
ACQUAINTANCE, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. self-control.AKRASIA. self-deception, (1)
purposeful action to avoid unpleasant truths and painful topics (about oneself
or the world); (2) unintentional processes of denial, avoidance, or biased
perception; (3) mental states resulting from such action or processes, such as
ignorance, false belief, wishful thinking, unjustified opinions, or lack of
clear awareness. Thus, parents tend to exaggerate the virtues of their
children; lovers disregard clear signs of unreciprocated affection; overeaters
rationalize away the need to diet; patients dying of cancer pretend to
themselves that their health is improving. In some contexts ‘self-deception’ is
neutral and implies no criticism. Deceiving oneself can even be desirable,
generating a vital lie that promotes happiness or the ability to cope with
difficulties. In other contexts ‘self-deception’ has negative connotations,
suggesting bad faith, false consciousness, or what Joseph Butler called “inner
hypocrisy” – the refusal to acknowledge our wrongdoing, character flaws, or
onerous responsibilities. Existentialist philosophers, like Kierkegaard,
Heidegger, and most notably Sartre (Being and Nothingness, 1943), denounced
self-deception as an inauthentic (dishonest, cowardly) refusal to confront
painful though significant truths, especially about freedom, responsibility,
and death. Herbert Fingarette, however, argued that self-deception is morally
ambiguous – neither clearly blameworthy nor clearly faultless – because of how
it erodes capacities for acting rationally (Self-Deception, 1969). The idea of
intentionally deceiving oneself seems paradoxical. In deceiving other people I
usually know a truth that guides me as I state the opposite falsehood,
intending thereby to mislead them into believing the falsehood. Five
difficulties seem to prevent me from doing anything like that to myself. (1)
With interpersonal deception, one person knows something that another person
does not. Yet self-deceivers know the truth all along, and so it seems they
cannot use it to make themselves ignorant. One solution is that self-deception
occurs over time, with the initial knowledge becoming gradually eroded. Or
perhaps selfdeceivers only suspect rather than know the truth, and then
disregard relevant evidence. (2) If consciousness implies awareness of one’s
own conscious acts, then a conscious intention to deceive myself would be
self-defeating, for I would remain conscious of the truth I wish to flee.
Sartre’s solution was to view self-deception as spontaneous and not explicitly
reflected upon. Freud’s solution was to conceive of self-deception as
unconscious repression. (3) It seems that self-deceivers believe a truth that
they simultaneously get themselves not to believe, but how is that possible?
Perhaps they keep one of two conflicting beliefs unconscious or not fully
conscious. (4) Self-deception suggests willfully creating beliefs, but that
seems impossible since beliefs cannot voluntarily be chosen. Perhaps beliefs
can be indirectly manipulated by selectively ignoring and attending to
evidence. (5) It seems that one part of a person (the deceiver) manipulates
another part (the victim), but such extreme splits suggest multiple personality
disorders rather than self-deception. Perhaps we are composed of “subselves” –
relatively unified clusters of elements in the personality. Or perhaps at this
point we should jettison interpersonal deception as a model for understanding
self-deception. AKRASIA, FREUD,
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. M.W.M. self-determination, the autonomy possessed by a
community when it is politically independent; in a strict sense, territorial
sovereignty. Within international law, the principle of self-determination
appears to grant every people a right to be self-determining, but there is
controversy over its interpretation. Applied to established states, the
principle calls for recognition of state sovereignty and non-intervention in
internal affairs. By providing for the self-determination of subordinate
communities, however, it can generate demands for secession that conflict with
existing claims of sovereignty. Also, what non-self-governing groups qualify as
beneficiaries? The national interpretation of the principle treats cultural or
national units as the proper claimants, whereas the regional interpretation
confers the right of self-determination upon the populations of well-defined
regions regardless of cultural or national affiliations. This difference
reflects the roots of the principle in the doctrines of nationalism and popular
sovereignty, respectively, but comseeing, non-epistemic self-determination
825 825 plicates its application. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. T.K. self-evidence, the
property of being self-evident. Only true propositions (or truths) are
self-evident, though false propositions can appear to be self-evident. It is
widely held that a true proposition is self-evident if and only if one would be
justified in believing it if one adequately understood it. Some would also
require that self-evident propositions are known if believed on the basis of
such an understanding. Some self-evident propositions are obvious, such as the
proposition that all stags are male, but others are not, since it may take
considerable reflection to achieve an adequate understanding of them. That
slavery is wrong and that there is no knowledge of falsehoods are perhaps
examples of the latter. Not all obvious propositions are self-evident, e.g., it
is obvious that a stone will fall if dropped, but adequate understanding of
that claim does not by itself justify one in believing it. An obvious
proposition is one that immediately seems true for anyone who adequately
understands it, but its obviousness may rest on wellknown and commonly accepted
empirical facts, not on understanding. All analytic propositions are self-evident
but not all self-evident propositions are analytic. The propositions that if A
is older than B, then B is younger than A, and that no object can be red and
green all over at the same time and in the same respects, are arguably
self-evident but not analytic. All self-evident propositions are necessary, for
one could not be justified in believing a contingent proposition simply in
virtue of understanding it. However, not all necessary propositions are
self-evident, e.g., that water is H2O and that temperature is the measure of
the molecular activity in substances are necessary but not self-evident. A
proposition can appear to be selfevident even though it is not. For instance,
the proposition that all unmarried adult males are bachelors will appear self-evident
to many until they consider that the pope is such a male. A proposition may
appear self-evident to some but not to others, even though it must either have
or lack the property of being self-evident. Self-evident propositions are
knowable non-empirically, or a priori, but some propositions knowable a priori
are not self-evident, e.g., certain conclusions of long and difficult chains of
mathematical reasoning. ANALYTIC
–SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION, A PRIORI, KANT, NECESSITY, RATIONALISM. B.R. self-interest
theory.PARFIT. self-justification.EPISTEMOLOGY. self-love.BUTLER, EGOISM.
self-organizing system.COMPUTER THEORY. self-presenting, in the philosophy of
Meinong, having the ability – common to all mental states – to be immediately
present to our thought. In Meinong’s view, no mental state can be presented to
our thought in any other way – e.g., indirectly, via a Lockean “idea of
reflection.” The only way to apprehend a mental state is to experience or “live
through” it. The experience involved in the apprehension of an external object
has thus a double presentational function: (1) via its “content” it presents
the object to our thought; (2) as its own “quasi-content” it presents itself
immediately to our thought. In the contemporary era, Roderick Chisholm has
based his account of empirical knowledge in part on a related concept of the
self-presenting. (In Chisholm’s sense – the definition of which we omit here –
all self-presenting states are mental, but not conversely; for instance, being
depressed because of the death of one’s spouse would not be self-presenting.)
In Chisholm’s epistemology, self-presenting states are a source of certainty in
the following way: if F is a self-presenting state, then to be certain that one
is in state F it is sufficient that one is, and believes oneself to be in state
F. BRENTANO, MEINONG, PHILOSOPHY OF
MIND. R.Ke. self-reference, paradoxes of.RUSSELL, TYPE THEORY. self-referential
incoherence, an internal defect of an assertion or theory, which it possesses
provided that (a) it establishes some requirement that must be met by
assertions or theories, (b) it is itself subject to this requirement, and (c)
it fails to meet the requirement. The most famous example is logical
positivism’s meaning criterion, which requires that all meaningful assertions
be either tautological or empirically verifiable, yet is itself neither. A
possible early example is found in Hume, whose own writings might have been
consigned to the flames had librarians followed his counsel to do so with volumes
that contain neither “abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number” nor
“experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence.” Bold
defiself-evidence self-referential incoherence 826 826 ance was shown by Wittgenstein, who,
realizing that the propositions of the Tractatus did not “picture” the world,
advised the reader to “throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.” An
epistemological example is furnished by any foundationalist theory that
establishes criteria for rational acceptability that the theory itself cannot
meet. HUME, LOGICAL POSITIVISM. W.Has.
self-reproducing automaton, a formal model of self-reproduction of a kind
introduced by von Neumann. He worked with an intuitive robot model and then
with a well-defined cellular automaton model. Imagine a class of robotic
automata made of robot parts and operating in an environment of such parts.
There are computer parts (switches, memory elements, wires), input-output parts
(sensing elements, display elements), action parts (grasping and moving
elements, joining and cutting elements), and straight bars (to maintain
structure and to employ in a storage tape). There are also energy sources that
enable the robots to operate and move around. These five categories of parts
are sufficient for the construction of robots that can make objects of various
kinds, including other robots. These parts also clearly suffice for making a
robot version of any finite automaton. Sensing and acting parts can then be
added to this robot so that it can make an indefinitely expandable storage tape
from straight bars. (A “blank tape” consists of bars joined in sequence, and
the robot stores information on this tape by attaching bars or not at the
junctions.) If its finite automaton part can execute programs and is
sufficiently powerful, such a robot is a universal computing robot (cf. a
universal Turing machine). A universal computing robot can be augmented to form
a universal constructing robot – a robot that can construct any robot, given
its description. Let r be any robot with an indefinitely expandable tape, let
F(r) be the description of its finite part, and let T(r) be the information on
its tape. Now take a universal computing robot and augment it with sensing and
acting devices and with programs so that when F(r) followed by T(r) is written
on its tape, this augmented universal computer performs as follows. First, it
reads the description F(r), finds the needed parts, and constructs the finite
part of r. Second, it makes a blank tape, attaches it to the finite part of r,
and then copies the information T(r) from its own tape onto the new tape. This
augmentation of a universal computing robot is a universal constructor. For
when it starts with the information F(r),T(r) written on its tape, it will construct
a copy of r with T(r) on its tape. Robot self-reproduction results from
applying the universal constructor to itself. Modify the universal constructor
slightly so that when only a description F(r) is written on its tape, it
constructs the finite part of r and then attaches a tape with F(r) written on
it. Call this version of the universal constructor Cu. Now place Cu’s
description F(Cu) on its own tape and start it up. Cu first reads this
description and constructs a copy of the finite part of itself in an empty
region of the cellular space. Then it adds a blank tape to the new construction
and copies F(Cu) onto it. Hence Cu with F(Cu) on its tape has produced another
copy of Cu with F(Cu) on its tape. This is automaton self-reproduction. This
robot model of self-reproduction is very general. To develop the logic of
self-reproduction further, von Neumann first extended the concept of a finite
automaton to that of an infinite cellular automaton consisting of an array or
“space” of cells, each cell containing the same finite automaton. He chose an
infinite checkerboard array for modeling self-reproduction, and he specified a
particular twenty-nine-state automaton for each square (cell). Each automaton
is connected directly to its four contiguous neighbors, and communication
between neighbors takes one or two time-steps. The twenty-nine states of a cell
fall into three categories. There is a blank state to represent the passivity
of an empty area. There are twelve states for switching, storage, and communication,
from which any finite automaton can be constructed in a sufficiently large
region of cells. And there are sixteen states for simulating the activities of
construction and destruction. Von Neumann chose these twenty-nine states in
such a way that an area of non-blank cells could compute and grow, i.e.,
activate a path of cells out to a blank region and convert the cells of that
region into a cellular automaton. A specific cellular automaton is embedded in
this space by the selection of the initial states of a finite area of cells,
all other cells being left blank. A universal computer consists of a
sufficiently powerful finite automaton with a tape. The tape is an indefinitely
long row of cells in which bits are represented by two different cell states. The
finite automaton accesses these cells by means of a construction arm that it
extends back and forth in rows of cells contiguous to the tape. When activated,
this finite automaton will execute programs stored on its tape.
self-reproducing automaton self-reproducing automaton 827 827 A universal constructor results from
augmenting the universal computer (cf. the robot model). Another construction
arm is added, together with a finite automaton controller to operate it. The
controller sends signals into the arm to extend it out to a blank region of the
cellular space, to move around that region, and to change the states of cells
in that region. After the universal constructor has converted the region into a
cellular automaton, it directs the construction arm to activate the new
automaton and then withdraw from it. Cellular automaton selfreproduction
results from applying the universal constructor to itself, as in the robot
model. Cellular automata are now studied extensively by humans working
interactively with computers as abstract models of both physical and organic
systems. (See Arthur W. Burks, “Von Neumann’s Self-Reproducing Automata,” in
Papers of John von Neumann on Computers and Computer Theory, edited by William
Aspray and Arthur Burks, 1987.) The study of artificial life is an outgrowth of
computer simulations of cellular automata and related automata. Cellular
automata organizations are sometimes used in highly parallel computers. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ARTIFICIAL LIFE,
COMPUTER THEORY, TURING MACHINE. A.W.B. Sellars, Roy Wood.NEW REALISM. Sellars,
Wilfrid (1912–89), American philosopher, son of Roy Wood Sellars, and one of
the great systematic philosophers of the century. His most influential and
representative works are “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956) and
“Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” (1960). The Sellarsian system may
be outlined as follows. The myth of the given. Thesis (1): Classical empiricism
(foundationalism) maintains that our belief in the commonsense, objective world
of physical objects is ultimately justified only by the way that world presents
itself in sense experience. Thesis (2): It also typically maintains that sense
experience (a) is not part of that world and (b) is not a form of conceptual
cognition like thinking or believing. Thesis (3): From (1) and (2a) classical
empiricism concludes that our knowledge of the physical world is inferred from
sense experience. Thesis (4): Since inferences derive knowledge from knowledge,
sense experience itself must be a form of knowledge. Theses (1)–(4)
collectively are the doctrine of the given. Each thesis taken individually is
plausible. However, Sellars argues that (2b) and (4) are incompatible if, as he
thinks, knowledge is a kind of conceptual cognition. Concluding that the
doctrine of the given is false, he maintains that classical empiricism is a
myth. The positive system. From an analysis of theoretical explanation in the
physical sciences, Sellars concludes that postulating theoretical entities is
justified only if theoretical laws – nomological generalizations referring to
theoretical entities – are needed to explain particular observable phenomena
for which explanation in terms of exceptionless observation laws is
unavailable. While rejecting any classical empiricist interpretation of
observation, Sellars agrees that some account of non-inferential knowledge is
required to make sense of theoretical explanation thus conceived. He thinks
that utterances made in direct response to sensory stimuli (observational
reports) count as non-inferential knowledge when (a) they possess authority,
i.e., occur in conditions ensuring that they reliably indicate some physical
property (say, shape) in the environment and are accepted by the linguistic
community as possessing this quality; and (b) the utterer has justified belief
that they possess this authority. Sellars claims that some perceptual
conditions induce ordinary people to make observation reports inconsistent with
established explanatory principles of the commonsense framework. We thus might
tend to report spontaneously that an object is green seen in daylight and blue
seen indoors, and yet think it has not undergone any process that could change
its color. Sellars sees in such conflicting tendencies vestiges of a primitive
conceptual framework whose tensions have been partially resolved by introducing
the concept of sense experiences. These experiences count as theoretical
entities, since they are postulated to account for observational phenomena for
which no exceptionless observation laws exist. This example may serve as a
paradigm for a process of theoretical explanation occurring in the framework of
commonsense beliefs that Sellars calls the manifest image, a process that
itself is a model for his theory of the rational dynamics of conceptual change
in both the manifest image and in science – the scientific image. Because the
actual process of conceptual evolution in Homo sapiens may not fit this pattern
of rational dynamics, Sellars treats these dynamics as occurring within certain
hypothetical ideal histories (myths) of the way in which, from certain
conSellars, Roy Wood Sellars, Wilfrid 828
828 ceptually primitive beginnings, one might have come to postulate the
requisite theoretical explanations. The manifest image, like the proto-theories
from which it arose, is itself subject to various tensions ultimately resolved
in the scientific image. Because this latter image contains a metaphysical
theory of material objects and persons that is inconsistent with that of its
predecessor framework, Sellars regards the manifest image as replaced by its
successor. In terms of the Peircean conception of truth that Sellars endorses,
the scientific image is the only true image. In this sense Sellars is a
scientific realist. There is, however, also an important sense in which Sellars
is not a scientific realist: despite discrediting classical empiricism, he
thinks that the intrinsic nature of sense experience gives to conceptualization
more than simply sensory stimulus yet less than the content of knowledge
claims. Inspired by Kant, Sellars treats the manifest image as a Kantian
phenomenal world, a world that exists as a cognitive construction which, though
lacking ideal factual truth, is guided in part by intrinsic features of sense
experience. This is not (analytic) phenomenalism, which Sellars rejects.
Moreover, the special methodological role for sense experience has effects even
within the scientific image itself. Theories of mind, perception, and
semantics. Mind: In the manifest image thoughts are private episodes endowed
with intentionality. Called inner speech, they are theoretical entities whose
causal and intentional properties are modeled, respectively, on inferential and
semantic properties of overt speech. They are introduced within a behaviorist
proto-theory, the Rylean framework, to provide a theoretical explanation for
behavior normally accompanied by linguistically overt reasons. Perception: In
the manifest image sense experiences are sense impressions – states of persons
modeled on two-dimensional, colored physical replicas and introduced in the
theoretical language of the adverbial theory of perception to explain why it
can look as if some perceptible quality is present when it is not. Semantics:
The meaning of a simple predicate p in a language L is the role played in L by
p defined in terms of three sets of linguistic rules: language entry rules,
intralinguistic rules, and language departure rules. This account also supports
a nominalist treatment of abstract entities. Identification of a role for a
token of p in L can be effected demonstratively in the speaker’s language by
saying that p in L is a member of the class of predicates playing the same role
as a demonstrated predicate. Thus a speaker of English might say that ‘rot’ in
German plays the semantic role ‘red’ has in English. Sellars sees science and
metaphysics as autonomous strands in a single web of philosophical inquiry.
Sellarsianism thus presents an important alternative to the view that what is
fundamentally real is determined by the logical structure of scientific
language alone. Sellars also sees ordinary language as expressing a commonsense
framework of beliefs constituting a kind of proto-theory with its own methods,
metaphysics, and theoretical entities. Thus, he also presents an important
alternative to the view that philosophy concerns not what is ultimately real,
but what words like ‘real’ ultimately mean in ordinary language. EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICAL REALISM, ORDINARY
LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY. T.V. semantic atomism.SEMANTIC HOLISM. semantic
completeness.COMPLETENESS. semantic compositionality.MEANING. semantic
consequence.MODAL LOGIC. semantic consistency.CONSISTENCY. semantic holism, a
metaphysical thesis about the nature of representation on which the meaning of
a symbol is relative to the entire system of representations containing it.
Thus, a linguistic expression can have meaning only in the context of a
language; a hypothesis can have significance only in the context of a theory; a
concept can have intentionality only in the context of the belief system.
Holism about content has profoundly influenced virtually every aspect of
contemporary theorizing about language and mind, not only in philosophy, but in
linguistics, literary theory, artificial intelligence, psychology, and
cognitive science. Contemporary semantic holists include Davidson, Quine,
Gilbert Harman, Hartry Field, and Searle. Because semantic holism is a
metaphysical and not a semantic thesis, two theorists might agree about the semantic
facts but disagree about semantic holism. So, e.g., nothing in Tarski’s
writings determines whether the semantic facts expressed by the theorems of an
absolute truth semantic atomism semantic holism 829 829 theory are holistic or not. Yet
Davidson, a semantic holist, argued that the correct form for a semantic theory
for a natural language L is an absolute truth theory for L. Semantic theories,
like other theories, need not wear their metaphysical commitments on their
sleeves. Holism has some startling consequences. Consider this. Franklin D.
Roosevelt (who died when the United States still had just forty-eight states)
did not believe there were fifty states, but I do; semantic holism says that
what ‘state’ means in our mouths depends on the totality of our beliefs about
states, including, therefore, our beliefs about how many states there are. It
seems to follow that he and I must mean different things by ‘state’; hence, if
he says “Alaska is not a state” and I say “Alaska is a state” we are not disagreeing.
This line of argument leads to such surprising declarations as that natural
langauges are not, in general, intertranslatable (Quine, Saussure); that there
may be no fact of the matter about the meanings of texts (Putnam, Derrida); and
that scientific theories that differ in their basic postulates are “empirically
incommensurable” (Paul Feyerabend, Kuhn). For those who find these consequences
of semantic holism unpalatable, there are three mutually exclusive responses:
semantic atomism, semantic molecularism, or semantic nihilism. Semantic
atomists hold that the meaning of any representation (linguistic, mental, or
otherwise) is not determined by the meaning of any other representation.
Historically, Anglo-American philosophers in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries thought that an idea of an X was about X’s in virtue of this idea’s
physically resembling X’s. Resemblance theories are no longer thought viable,
but a number of contemporary semantic atomists still believe that the basic
semantic relation is between a concept and the things to which it applies, and
not one among concepts themselves. These philosophers include Dretske, Dennis
Stampe, Fodor, and Ruth Millikan. Semantic molecularism, like semantic holism,
holds that the meaning of a representation in a language L is determined by its
relationships to the meanings of other expressions in L, but, unlike holism,
not by its relationships to every other expression in L. Semantic molecularists
are committed to the view, contrary to Quine, that for any expression e in a
language L there is an in-principle way of distinguishing between those
representations in L the meanings of which determine the meaning of e and those
representations in L the meanings of which do not determine the meaning of e. Traditionally,
this inprinciple delimitation is supported by an analytic/synthetic
distinction. Those representations in L that are meaning-constituting of e are
analytically connected to e and those that are not meaning-constituting are
synthetically connected to e. Meaning molecularism seems to be the most common
position among those philosophers who reject holism. Contemporary meaning
molecularists include Michael Devitt, Dummett, Ned Block, and John Perry.
Semantic nihilism is perhaps the most radical response to the consequences of
holism. It is the view that, strictly speaking, there are no semantic
properties. Strictly speaking, there are no mental states; words lack meanings.
At least for scientific purposes (and perhaps for other purposes as well) we
must abandon the notion that people are moral or rational agents and that they
act out of their beliefs and desires. Semantic nihilists include among their
ranks Patricia and Paul Churchland, Stephen Stich, Dennett, and, sometimes,
Quine. ANALYTIC–SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION,
MEANING, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. E.L. semantic molecularism.SEMANTIC HOLISM.
semantic nihilism.SEMANTIC HOLISM. semantic paradoxes, a collection of
paradoxes involving the semantic notions of truth, predication, and
definability. The liar paradox is the oldest and most widely known of these,
having been formulated by Eubulides as an objection to Aristotle’s
correspondence theory of truth. In its simplest form, the liar paradox arises
when we try to assess the truth of a sentence or proposition that asserts its
own falsity, e.g.: (A) Sentence (A) is not true. It would seem that sentence
(A) cannot be true, since it can be true only if what it says is the case,
i.e., if it is not true. Thus sentence (A) is not true. But then, since this is
precisely what it claims, it would seem to be true. Several alternative forms
of the liar paradox have been given their own names. The postcard paradox, also
known as a liar cycle, envisions a postcard with sentence (B) on one side and
sentence (C) on the other: (B) The sentence on the other side of this card is
true. semantic molecularism semantic paradoxes 830 830 (C) The sentence on the other side of
this card is false. Here, no consistent assignment of truth-values to the pair
of sentences is possible. In the preface paradox, it is imagined that a book
begins with the claim that at least one sentence in the book is false. This
claim is unproblematically true if some later sentence is false, but if the
remainder of the book contains only truths, the initial sentence appears to be
true if and only if false. The preface paradox is one of many examples of
contingent liars, claims that can either have an unproblematic truth-value or
be paradoxical, depending on the truth-values of various other claims (in this case,
the remaining sentences in the book). Related to the preface paradox is
Epimenedes’ paradox: Epimenedes, himself from Crete, is said to have claimed
that all Cretans are liars. This claim is paradoxical if interpreted to mean
that Cretans always lie, or if interpreted to mean they sometimes lie and if no
other claim made by Epimenedes was a lie. On the former interpretation, this is
a simple variation of the liar paradox; on the latter, it is a form of
contingent liar. Other semantic paradoxes include Berry’s paradox, Richard’s
paradox, and Grelling’s paradox. The first two involve the notion of
definability of numbers. Berry’s paradox begins by noting that names (or
descriptions) of integers consist of finite sequences of syllables. Thus the
three-syllable sequence ‘twenty-five’ names 25, and the seven-syllable sequence
‘the sum of three and seven’ names ten. Now consider the collection of all
sequences of (English) syllables that are less than nineteen syllables long. Of
these, many are nonsensical (‘bababa’) and some make sense but do not name
integers (‘artichoke’), but some do (‘the sum of three and seven’). Since there
are only finitely many English syllables, there are only finitely many of these
sequences, and only finitely many integers named by them. Berry’s paradox
arises when we consider the eighteen-syllable sequence ‘the smallest integer
not nameable in less than nineteen syllables’. This phrase appears to be a
perfectly well-defined description of an integer. But if the phrase names an
integer n, then n is nameable in less than nineteen syllables, and hence is not
described by the phrase. Richard’s paradox constructs a similarly paradoxical
description using what is known as a diagonal construction. Imagine a list of
all finite sequences of letters of the alphabet (plus spaces and punctuation),
ordered as in a dictionary. Prune this list so that it contains only English
definitions of real numbers between 0 and 1. Then consider the definition: “Let
r be the real number between 0 and 1 whose kth decimal place is ) if the kth
decimal place of the number named by the kth member of this list is 1, and 0
otherwise’. This description seems to define a real number that must be
different from any number defined on the list. For example, r cannot be defined
by the 237th member of the list, because r will differ from that number in at
least its 237th decimal place. But if it indeed defines a real number between 0
and 1, then this description should itself be on the list. Yet clearly, it
cannot define a number different from the number defined by itself. Apparently,
the definition defines a real number between 0 and 1 if and only if it does not
appear on the list of such definitions. Grelling’s paradox, also known as the
paradox of heterologicality, involves two predicates defined as follows. Say
that a predicate is “autological” if it applies to itself. Thus ‘polysyllabic’
and ‘short’ are autological, since ‘polysyllabic’ is polysyllabic, and ‘short’
is short. In contrast, a predicate is “heterological” if and only if it is not
autological. The question is whether the predicate ‘heterological’ is
heterological. If our answer is yes, then ‘heterological’ applies to itself –
and so is autological, not heterological. But if our answer is no, then it does
not apply to itself – and so is heterological, once again contradicting our
answer. The semantic paradoxes have led to important work in both logic and the
philosophy of language, most notably by Russell and Tarski. Russell developed
the ramified theory of types as a unified treatment of all the semantic
paradoxes. Russell’s theory of types avoids the paradoxes by introducing
complex syntactic conditions on formulas and on the definition of new
predicates. In the resulting language, definitions like those used in formulating
Berry’s and Richard’s paradoxes turn out to be ill-formed, since they quantify
over collections of expressions that include themselves, violating what Russell
called the vicious circle principle. The theory of types also rules out, on
syntactic grounds, predicates that apply to themselves, or to larger
expressions containing those very same predicates. In this way, the liar
paradox and Grelling’s paradox cannot be constructed within a language
conforming to the theory of types. Tarski’s attention to the liar paradox made
two fundamental contributions to logic: his development of semantic techniques
for defining the truth predicate for formalized languages and his semantic
paradoxes semantic paradoxes 831 831
proof of Tarski’s theorem. Tarskian semantics avoids the liar paradox by
starting with a formal language, call it L, in which no semantic notions are
expressible, and hence in which the liar paradox cannot be formulated. Then
using another language, known as the metalanguage, Tarski applies recursive
techniques to define the predicate true-in-L, which applies to exactly the true
sentences of the original language L. The liar paradox does not arise in the
metalanguage, because the sentence (D) Sentence (D) is not true-in-L. is, if
expressible in the metalanguage, simply true. (It is true because (D) is not a
sentence of L, and so a fortiori not a true sentence of L.) A truth predicate
for the metalanguage can then be defined in yet another language, the
metametalanguage, and so forth, resulting in a sequence of consistent truth
predicates. Tarski’s theorem uses the liar paradox to prove a significant
result in logic. The theorem states that the truth predicate for the
first-order language of arithmetic is not definable in arithmetic. That is, if
we devise a systematic way of representing sentences of arithmetic by numbers,
then it is impossible to define an arithmetical predicate that applies to all
and only those numbers that represent true sentences of arithmetic. The theorem
is proven by showing that if such a predicate were definable, we could
construct a sentence of arithmetic that is true if and only if it is not true:
an arithmetical version of sentence (A), the liar paradox. Both Russell’s and
Tarski’s solutions to the semantic paradoxes have left many philosophers
dissatisfied, since the solutions are basically prescriptions for constructing
languages in which the paradoxes do not arise. But the fact that paradoxes can
be avoided in artificially constructed languages does not itself give a
satisfying explanation of what is going wrong when the paradoxes are
encountered in natural language, or in an artificial language in which they can
be formulated. Most recent work on the liar paradox, following Kripke’s
“Outline of a Theory of Truth” (1975), looks at languages in which the paradox
can be formulated, and tries to provide a consistent account of truth that
preserves as much as possible of the intuitive notion. SET-THEORETIC PARADOXES, TRUTH, TYPE THEORY.
J.Et. semantics.FORMAL SEMANTICS, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. semantics, conceptual
role.MEANING, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. semantics, extensionalist.EXTENSIONALISM.
semantics, Kripke.KRIPKE SEMANTICS. semantics, linguistic.PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE. semantics, non-standard.SECOND-ORDER LOGIC. semantics, outer
domain.FREE LOGIC. semantics, possible worlds.KRIPKE SEMANTICS, POSSIBLE
WORLDS. semantics, situation.POSSIBLE WORLDS. semantics, standard.SECOND-ORDER
LOGIC. semantics, supervaluation.FREE LOGIC. semantics, Tarskian.FORMAL
SEMANTICS. semantics, truth-conditional.MEANING. semantic solipsism.SOLIPSISM.
semantic tableaux.PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC. semantic theory of truth.TRUTH. semantic
truth.TRUTH. semi-order.ORDERING. semiosis (from Greek semeiosis, ‘observation
of signs’), the relation of signification involving the three relata of sign,
object, and mind. Semiotic is the science or study of semiosis. The semiotic of
John of Saint Thomas and of Peirce includes two distinct components: the
relation of signification and the classification of signs. The relation of
signification is genuinely triadic and cannot be reduced to the sum of its
three subordinate dyads: sign-object, sign-mind, object-mind. A sign represents
an object to a mind just as A gives a gift to B. Semiosis is not, as it is
often taken to be, a mere compound of a sign-object dyad and a sign-mind dyad
because these dyads lack the essential intentionality that unites mind with
object; similarly, the gift relation involves not just A giving and B receiving
but, crucially, the intention uniting A and B. semantics semiosis 832 832 In the Scholastic logic of John of
Saint Thomas, the sign-object dyad is a categorial relation (secundum esse),
that is, an essential relation, falling in Aristotle’s category of relation,
while the sign-mind dyad is a transcendental relation (secundum dici), that is,
a relation only in an analogical sense, in a manner of speaking; thus the
formal rationale of semiosis is constituted by the sign-object dyad. By
contrast, in Peirce’s logic, the sign-object dyad and the sign-mind dyad are
each only potential semiosis: thus, the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt were
merely potential signs until the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, just as a
road-marking was a merely potential sign to the driver who overlooked it.
Classifications of signs typically follow from the logic of semiosis. Thus John
of Saint Thomas divides signs according to their relations to their objects
into natural signs (smoke as a sign of fire), customary signs (napkins on the
table as a sign that dinner is imminent), and stipulated signs (as when a
neologism is coined); he also divides signs according to their relations to a
mind. An instrumental sign must first be cognized as an object before it can
signify (e.g., a written word or a symptom); a formal sign, by contrast,
directs the mind to its object without having first been cognized (e.g.,
percepts and concepts). Formal signs are not that which we cognize but that by
which we cognize. All instrumental signs presuppose the action of formal signs
in the semiosis of cognition. Peirce similarly classified signs into three
trichotomies according to their relations with (1) themselves, (2) their
objects, and (3) their interpretants (usually minds); and Charles Morris, who
followed Peirce closely, called the relationship of signs to one another the
syntactical dimension of semiosis, the relationship of signs to their objects
the semantical dimension of semiosis, and the relationship of signs to their
interpreters the pragmatic dimension of semiosis. JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS, PEIRCE, THEORY OF
SIGNS. J.B.M. semiotic.THEORY OF SIGNS. Seneca, Lucius Annaeus.STOICISM.
sensa.PERCEPTION. sensationalism, the belief that all mental states –
particularly cognitive states – are derived, by composition or association,
from sensation. It is often joined to the view that sensations provide the only
evidence for our beliefs, or (more rarely) to the view that statements about
the world can be reduced, without loss, to statements about sensation. Hobbes
was the first important sensationalist in modern times. “There is no conception
in man’s mind,” he wrote, “which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been
begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.”
But the belief gained prominence in the eighteenth century, due largely to the
influence of Locke. Locke himself was not a sensationalist, because he took the
mind’s reflection on its own operations to be an independent source of ideas.
But his distinction between simple and complex ideas was used by eighteenthcentury
sensationalists such as Condillac and Hartley to explain how conceptions that
seem distant from sense might nonetheless be derived from it. And to account
for the particular ways in which simple ideas are in fact combined, Condillac
and Hartley appealed to a second device described by Locke: the association of
ideas. “Elementary” sensations – the building blocks of our mental life – were
held by the sensationalists to be non-voluntary, independent of judgment, free
of interpretation, discrete or atomic, and infallibly known. Nineteenth-century
sensationalists tried to account for perception in terms of such building
blocks; they struggled particularly with the perception of space and time. Late
nineteenth-century critics such as Ward and James advanced powerful arguments
against the reduction of perception to sensation. Perception, they claimed,
involves more than the passive reception (or recombination and association) of
discrete pellets of incorrigible information. They urged a change in perspective
– to a functionalist viewpoint more closely allied with prevailing trends in
biology – from which sensationalism never fully recovered. EMPIRICISM, HOBBES, PERCEPTION. K.P.W.
sense.MEANING. sense, direct.OBLIQUE CONTEXT. sense, indirect.OBLIQUE CONTEXT. sense-data.PERCEPTION.
sense-datum theory.PHENOMENALISM. sense qualia.QUALIA. senses, special.FACULTY
PSYCHOLOGY. semiotic senses, special 833
833 sensibilia (singular: sensibile), as used by Russell, those entities
that no one is (at the moment) perceptually aware of, but that are, in every
other respect, just like the objects of perceptual awareness. If one is a
direct realist and believes that the objects one is aware of in sense
perception are ordinary physical objects, then sensibilia are, of course, just
physical objects of which no one is (at the moment) aware. Assuming (with
common sense) that ordinary objects continue to exist when no one is aware of
them, it follows that sensibilia exist. If, however, one believes (as Russell
did) that what one is aware of in ordinary sense perception is some kind of
idea in the mind, a so-called sense-datum, then sensibilia have a problematic
status. A sensibile then turns out to be an unsensed sense-datum. On some (the
usual) conceptions of sense-data, this is like an unfelt pain, since a
sense-datum’s existence (not as a sense-datum, but as anything at all) depends
on our (someone’s) perception of it. To exist (for such things) is to be
perceived (see Berkeley’s “esse est percipii“). If, however, one extends the
notion of sense-datum (as Moore was inclined to do) to whatever it is of which
one is (directly) aware in sense perception, then sensibilia may or may not
exist. It depends on what – physical objects or ideas in the mind – we are
directly aware of in sense perception (and, of course, on the empirical facts
about whether objects continue to exist when they are not being perceived). If
direct realists are right, horses and trees, when unobserved, are sensibilia.
So are the front surfaces of horses and trees (things Moore once considered to
be sensedata). If the direct realists are wrong, and what we are perceptually
aware of are “ideas in the mind,” then whether or not sensibilia exist depends
on whether or not such ideas can exist apart from any mind. PERCEPTION, RUSSELL. F.D. sensible
intuition.KANT. sensibles, common.ARISTOTLE, SENSUS COMMUNIS. sensibles,
proper.ARISTOTLE. sensibles, special.ARISTOTLE, FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY. sensorium,
the seat and cause of sensation in the brain of humans and other animals. The
term is not part of contemporary psychological parlance; it belongs to
prebehavioral, prescientific psychology, especially of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Only creatures possessed of a sensorium were thought
capable of bodily and perceptual sensations. Some thinkers believed that the
sensorium, when excited, also produced muscular activity and motion. G.A.G.
sensum.PERCEPTION. sensus communis, a cognitive faculty to which the five
senses report. It was first argued for in Aristotle’s On the Soul II.1–2,
though the term ‘common sense’ was first introduced in Scholastic thought.
Aristotle refers to properties such as magnitude that are perceived by more
than one sense as common sensibles. To recognize common sensibles, he claims,
we must possess a single cognitive power to compare such qualities, received
from the different senses, to one another. Augustine says the “inner sense”
judges whether the senses are working properly, and perceives whether the
animal perceives (De libero arbitrio II.3–5). Aquinas (In De anima II, 13.370)
held that it is also by the common sense that we perceive we live. He says the
common sense uses the external senses to know sensible forms, preparing the
sensible species it receives for the operation of the cognitive power, which
recognizes the real thing causing the sensible species. AQUINAS, ARISTOTLE. J.Lo. sentence,
basic.FOUNDATIONALISM. sentential calculus.FORMAL LOGIC. sentential connective,
also called sentential operator, propositional connective, propositional
operator, a word or phrase, such as ‘and’, ‘or’, or ‘if . . . then’, that is
used to construct compound sentences from atomic – i.e., non-compound –
sentences. A sentential connective can be defined formally as an expression
containing blanks, such that when the blanks are replaced with sentences the
result is a compound sentence. Thus, ‘if ——— then ———’ and ‘——— or ———’ are
sentential connectives, since we can replace the blanks with sentences to get
the compound sentences ‘If the sky is clear then we can go swimming’ and ‘We
can go swimming or we can stay home’. Classical logic makes use of
truth-functional connectives only, for which the truth-value of the compound
sentence can be determined uniquely by the truth-value of the sentences that
replace the blanks. The standard truth-functional sensibilia sentential
connective 834 834 connectives are
‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if . . . then’, and ‘if and only if’. There are many
non-truth-functional connectives as well, such as ‘it is possible that ———’ and
‘——— because ———’. FORMAL LOGIC,
OPERATOR, TRUTH TABLE. V.K. sentential operator.SENTENTIAL CONNECTIVE.
sentiment.SENTIMENTALISM. sentimentalism, the theory, prominent in the
eighteenth century, that epistemological or moral relations are derived from
feelings. Although sentimentalism and sensationalism are both empiricist
positions, the latter view has all knowledge built up from sensations,
experiences impinging on the senses. Sentimentalists may allow that ideas
derive from sensations, but hold that some relations between them are derived
internally, that is, from sentiments arising upon reflection. Moral
sentimentalists, such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, argued that the
virtue or vice of a character trait is established by approving or disapproving
sentiments. Hume, the most thoroughgoing sentimentalist, also argued that all
beliefs about the world depend on sentiments. On his analysis, when we form a
belief, we rely on the mind’s causally connecting two experiences, e.g., fire
and heat. But, he notes, such causal connections depend on the notion of
necessity – that the two perceptions will always be so conjoined – and there is
nothing in the perceptions themselves that supplies that notion. The idea of
necessary connection is instead derived from a sentiment: our feeling of
expectation of the one experience upon the other. Likewise, our notions of
substance (the unity of experiences in an object) and of self (the unity of
experiences in a subject) are sentimentbased. But whereas moral sentiments do not
purport to represent the external world, these metaphysical notions of
necessity, substance, and self are “fictions,” creations of the imagination
purporting to represent something in the outside world. HUME, HUTCHESON, MORAL SENSE THEORY,
SENSATIONALISM, SHAFTESBURY. E.S.R. separation, axiom of.AXIOM OF
COMPREHENSION, SET THEORY. separation of law and morals.HART. sequent
calculus.CUT-ELIMINATION THEOREM. set.SET THEORY. set, singleton.SET THEORY.
set, well-ordered.SET-THEORETIC PARADOXES. set-theoretic paradoxes, a
collection of paradoxes that reveal difficulties in certain central notions of
set theory. The best-known of these are Russell’s paradox, Burali-Forti’s
paradox, and Cantor’s paradox. Russell’s paradox, discovered in 1901 by
Bertrand Russell, is the simplest (and so most problematic) of the
set-theoretic paradoxes. Using it, we can derive a contradiction directly from
Cantor’s unrestricted comprehension schema. This schema asserts that for any
formula P(x) containing x as a free variable, there is a set {x _ P(x)} whose
members are exactly those objects that satisfy P(x). To derive the
contradiction, take P(x) to be the formula x 1 x, and let z be the set {x _ x 2
x} whose existence is guaranteed by the comprehension schema. Thus z is the set
whose members are exactly those objects that are not members of themselves. We
now ask whether z is, itself, a member of z. If the answer is yes, then we can
conclude that z must satisfy the criterion of membership in z, i.e., z must not
be a member of z. But if the answer is no, then since z is not a member of
itself, it satisfies the criterion for membership in z, and so z is a member of
z. All modern axiomatizations of set theory avoid Russell’s paradox by
restricting the principles that assert the existence of sets. The simplest
restriction replaces unrestricted comprehension with the separation schema.
Separation asserts that, given any set A and formula P(x), there is a set {x 1
A _ P(x)}, whose members are exactly those members of A that satisfy P(x). If
we now take P(x) to be the formula x 2 x, then separation guarantees the
existence of a set zA % {x 1 A _ x 2 x}. We can then use Russell’s reasoning to
prove the result that zA cannot be a member of the original set A. (If it were
a member of A, then we could prove that it is a member of itself if and only if
it is not a member of itself. Hence it is not a member of A.) But this result
is not problematic, and so the paradox is avoided. The Burali-Forte paradox and
Cantor’s paradox are sometimes known as paradoxes of size, since they show that
some collections are too large to be considered sets. The Burali-Forte paradox,
discovered by Cesare Burali-Forte, is concerned with the set of all ordinal
numbers. In Cantor’s set theory, an ordinal number can be sentential operator
set-theoretic paradoxes 835 835
assigned to any well-ordered set. (A set is wellordered if every subset of the
set has a least element.) But Cantor’s set theory also guarantees the existence
of the set of all ordinals, again due to the unrestricted comprehension schema.
This set of ordinals is well-ordered, and so can be associated with an ordinal
number. But it can be shown that the associated ordinal is greater than any
ordinal in the set, hence greater than any ordinal number. Cantor’s paradox
involves the cardinality of the set of all sets. Cardinality is another notion
of size used in set theory: a set A is said to have greater cardinality than a
set B if and only if B can be mapped one-to-one onto a subset of A but A cannot
be so mapped onto B or any of its subsets. One of Cantor’s fundamental results
was that the set of all subsets of a set A (known as the power set of A) has
greater cardinality than the set A. Applying this result to the set V of all
sets, we can conclude that the power set of V has greater cardinality than V.
But every set in the power set of V is also in V (since V contains all sets),
and so the power set of V cannot have greater cardinality than V. We thus have
a contradiction. Like Russell’s paradox, both of these paradoxes result from
the unrestricted comprehension schema, and are avoided by replacing it with
weaker set-existence principles. Various principles stronger than the
separation schema are needed to get a reasonable set theory, and many alternative
axiomatizations have been proposed. But the lesson of these paradoxes is that
no setexistence principle can entail the existence of the Russell set, the set
of all ordinals, or the set of all sets, on pain of contradiction. SEMANTIC PARADOXES, SET THEORY. J.Et.
set-theoretic reflection principles.REFLECTION PRINCIPLES. set theory, the
study of collections, ranging from familiar examples like a set of
encyclopedias or a deck of cards to mathematical examples like the set of
natural numbers or the set of points on a line or the set of functions from a
set A to another set B. Sets can be specified in two basic ways: by a list
(e.g., {0, 2, 4, 6, 8}) and as the extension of a property (e.g., {x _ x is an
even natural number less than 10}, where this is read ‘the set of all x such
that x is an even natural number less than 10’). The most fundamental relation
in set theory is membership, as in ‘2 is a member of the set of even natural
numbers’ (in symbols: 2 1 {x _ x is an even natural number}). Membership is determinate,
i.e., any candidate for membership in a given set is either in the set or not
in the set, with no room for vagueness or ambiguity. A set’s identity is
completely determined by its members or elements (i.e., sets are extensional
rather than intensional). Thus {x _ x is human} is the same set as {x _ x is a
featherless biped} because they have the same members. The smallest set
possible is the empty or null set, the set with no members. (There cannot be
more than one empty set, by extensionality.) It can be specified, e.g., as {x _
x & x}, but it is most often symbolized as / or { }. A set A is called a
subset of a set B and B a superset of A if every member of A is also a member
of B; in symbols, A 0 B. So, the set of even natural numbers is a subset of the
set of all natural numbers, and any set is a superset of the empty set. The
union of two sets A and B is the set whose members are the members of A and the
members of B – in symbols, A 4 B % {x _ x 1 A or x 1 B} – so the union of the
set of even natural numbers and the set of odd natural numbers is the set of
all natural numbers. The intersection of two sets A and B is the set whose
members are common to both A and B – in symbols, A 3 B % {x _ x 1 A and x 1 B}
– so the intersection of the set of even natural numbers and the set of prime
natural numbers is the singleton set {2}, whose only member is the number 2.
Two sets whose intersection is empty are called disjoint, e.g., the set of even
natural numbers and the set of odd natural numbers. Finally, the difference
between a set A and a set B is the set whose members are members of A but not
members of B – in symbols, A – B % {x _ x 1 A and x 2 B} – so the set of odd
numbers between 5 and 20 minus the set of prime natural numbers is {9, 15}. By
extensionality, the order in which the members of a set are listed is
unimportant, i.e., {1, 2, 3} % {2, 3, 1}. To introduce the concept of ordering,
we need the notion of the ordered pair of a and b – in symbols, (a, b) or . All
that is essential to ordered pairs is that two of them are equal only when
their first entries are equal and their second entries are equal. Various sets
can be used to simulate this behavior, but the version most commonly used is
the Kuratowski ordered pair: (a, b) is defined to be {{a}, {a, b}}. On this
definition, it can indeed be proved that (a, b) % (c, d) if and only if a % c
and b % d. The Cartesian product of two sets A and B is the set of all ordered
pairs whose first entry is in A and whose second entry is B – in symbols, A $ B
% {x _ x % (a, b) for some a 1 A and some b 1 B}. This set-theoretic reflection
principles set theory 836 836 same
technique can be used to form ordered triples – (a, b, c) % ((a, b), c);
ordered fourtuples – (a, b, c, d) % ((a, b, c), d); and by extension, ordered
n-tuples for all finite n. Using only these simple building blocks,
(substitutes for) all the objects of classical mathematics can be constructed
inside set theory. For example, a relation is defined as a set of ordered pairs
– so the successor relation among natural numbers becomes {(0, 1), (1, 2), (2,
3) . . . } – and a function is a relation containing no distinct ordered pairs
of the form (a, b) and (a, c) – so the successor relation is a function. The
natural numbers themselves can be identified with various sequences of sets,
the most common of which are finite von Neumann ordinal numbers: /, {/}, {/,
{/}, {/}, {/}, {/, {/}}}, . . . . (On this definition, 0 % /, 1 % {/}, 2 % {/,
{/}}, etc., each number n has n members, the successor of n is n 4 {n}, and n ‹
m if and only if n 1 m.) Addition and multiplication can be defined for these
numbers, and the Peano axioms proved (from the axioms of set theory; see
below). Negative, rational, real, and complex numbers, geometric spaces, and
more esoteric mathematical objects can all be identified with sets, and the
standard theorems about them proved. In this sense, set theory provides a
foundation for mathematics. Historically, the theory of sets arose in the late
nineteenth century. In his work on the foundations of arithmetic, Frege
identified the natural numbers with the extensions of certain concepts; e.g.,
the number two is the set of all concepts C under which two things fall – in
symbols, 2 % {x _ x is a concept, and there are distinct things a and b which
fall under x, and anything that falls under x is either a or b}. Cantor was led
to consider complex sets of points in the pursuit of a question in the theory
of trigonometric series. To describe the properties of these sets, Cantor
introduced infinite ordinal numbers after the finite ordinals described above.
The first of these, w, is {0, 1, 2, . . .}, now understood in von Neumann’s
terms as the set of all finite ordinals. After w, the successor function yields
w ! 1 % w 4 {w} % {0, 1, 2, . . . n, n + 1, . . . , w}, then w ! 2 % (w ! 1) !
1 % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w , w ! 1}, w ! 3 % (w ! 2) ! 1 % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w, w
! 1, w ! 2}, and so on; after all these comes w ! w % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w, w !
1, w ! 2, . . . , (w ! n), (w ! n) ! 1, . . .}, and the process begins again.
The ordinal numbers are designed to label the positions in an ordering.
Consider, e.g., a reordering of the natural numbers in which the odd numbers
are placed after the evens: 0, 2, 4, 6, . . . 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . . The number 4 is
in the third position of this sequence, and the number 5 is in the (w + 2nd).
But finite numbers also perform a cardinal function; they tell us how many
so-andso’s there are. Here the infinite ordinals are less effective. The
natural numbers in their usual order have the same structure as w, but when
they are ordered as above, with the evens before the odds, they take on the
structure of a much larger ordinal, w ! w. But the answer to the question, How
many natural numbers are there? should be the same no matter how they are
arranged. Thus, the transfinite ordinals do not provide a stable measure of the
size of an infinite set. When are two infinite sets of the same size? On the
one hand, the infinite set of even natural numbers seems clearly smaller than
the set of all natural numbers; on the other hand, these two sets can be
brought into one-to-one correspondence via the mapping that matches 0 to 0, 1
to 2, 2 to 4, 3 to 6, and in general, n to 2n. This puzzle had troubled
mathematicians as far back as Galileo, but Cantor took the existence of a
oneto-one correspondence between two sets A and B as the definition of ‘A is
the same size as B’. This coincides with our usual understanding for finite
sets, and it implies that the set of even natural numbers and the set of all
natural numbers and w ! 1 and w! 2 and w ! w and w ! w and many more all have
the same size. Such infinite sets are called countable, and the number of their
elements, the first infinite cardinal number, is F0. Cantor also showed that
the set of all subsets of a set A has a size larger than A itself, so there are
infinite cardinals greater than F0, namely F1, F2, and so on. Unfortunately,
the early set theories were prone to paradoxes. The most famous of these,
Russell’s paradox, arises from consideration of the set R of all sets that are
not members of themselves: is R 1 R? If it is, it isn’t, and if it isn’t, it
is. The Burali-Forti paradox involves the set W of all ordinals: W itself
qualifies as an ordinal, so W 1 W, i.e., W ‹ W. Similar difficulties surface
with the set of all cardinal numbers and the set of all sets. At fault in all
these cases is a seemingly innocuous principle of unlimited comprehension: for
any property P, there is a set {x _ x has P}. Just after the turn of the century,
Zermelo undertook to systematize set theory by codifying its practice in a
series of axioms from which the known derivations of the paradoxes could not be
carried out. He proposed the axioms of extensionality (two sets with the same
members are the same); pairing (for any a and b, there is a set {a, b});
separation (for any set A and property P, there set theory set theory 837 837 is a set {x _ x 1 A and x has P});
power set (for any set A, there is a set {x _ x0 A}); union (for any set of
sets F, there is a set {x _ x 1 A for some A 1 F} – this yields A 4 B, when F %
{A, B} and {A, B} comes from A and B by pairing); infinity (w exists); and
choice (for any set of non-empty sets, there is a set that contains exactly one
member from each). (The axiom of choice has a vast number of equivalents,
including the well-ordering theorem – every set can be well-ordered – and
Zorn’s lemma – if every chain in a partially ordered set has an upper bound,
then the set has a maximal element.) The axiom of separation limits that of
unlimited comprehension by requiring a previously given set A from which
members are separated by the property P; thus troublesome sets like Russell’s
that attempt to collect absolutely all things with P cannot be formed. The most
controversial of Zermelo’s axioms at the time was that of choice, because it
posits the existence of a choice set – a set that “chooses” one from each of
(possibly infinitely many) non-empty sets – without giving any rule for making
the choices. For various philosophical and practical reasons, it is now
accepted without much debate. Fraenkel and Skolem later formalized the axiom of
replacement (if A is a set, and every member a of A is replaced by some b, then
there is a set containing all the b’s), and Skolem made both replacement and
separation more precise by expressing them as schemata of first-order logic.
The final axiom of the contemporary theory is foundation, which guarantees that
sets are formed in a series of stages called the iterative hierarchy (begin with
some non-sets, then form all possible sets of these, then form all possible
sets of the things formed so far, then form all possible sets of these, and so
on). This iterative picture of sets built up in stages contrasts with the older
notion of the extension of a concept; these are sometimes called the
mathematical and the logical notions of collection, respectively. The early
controversy over the paradoxes and the axiom of choice can be traced to the
lack of a clear distinction between these at the time. Zermelo’s first five
axioms (all but choice) plus foundation form a system usually called Z; ZC is Z
with choice added. Z plus replacement is ZF, for Zermelo-Fraenkel, and adding
choice makes ZFC, the theory of sets in most widespread use today. The consistency
of ZFC cannot be proved by standard mathematical means, but decades of
experience with the system and the strong intuitive picture provided by the
iterative conception suggest that it is. Though ZFC is strong enough for all
standard mathematics, it is not enough to answer some natural set-theoretic
questions (e.g., the continuum problem). This has led to a search for new
axioms, such as large cardinal assumptions, but no consensus on these
additional principles has yet been reached.
CANTOR, CLASS, CONTINUUM PROBLEM, GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS,
PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS, SETTHEORETIC PARADOXES. P.Mad. seven emotions
(the).KOREAN PHILOSOPHY. Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove.NEOTAOISM. Sextus
Empiricus (third century A.D.), Greek Skeptic philosopher whose writings are
the chief source of our knowledge about the extreme Skeptic view, Pyrrhonism.
Practically nothing is known about him as a person. He was apparently a medical
doctor and a teacher in a Skeptical school, probably in Alexandria. What has
survived are his Hypotoposes, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and a series of Skeptical
critiques, Against the Dogmatists, questioning the premises and conclusions in
many disciplines, such as physics, mathematics, rhetoric, and ethics. In these
works, Sextus summarized and organized the views of Skeptical arguers before
him. The Outlines starts with an attempt to indicate what Skepticism is, to
explain the terminology employed by the Skeptics, how Pyrrhonian Skepticism
differs from other so-called Skeptical views, and how the usual answers to
Skepticism are rebutted. Sextus points out that the main Hellenistic
philosophies, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Academic Skepticism (which is
presented as a negative dogmatism), claimed that they would bring the adherent
peace of mind, ataraxia. Unfortunately the dogmatic adherent would only become
more perturbed by seeing the Skeptical objections that could be brought against
his or her view. Then, by suspending judgment, epoche, one would find the
tranquillity being sought. Pyrrhonian Skepticism is a kind of mental hygiene or
therapy that cures one of dogmatism or rashness. It is like a purge that cleans
out foul matter as well as itself. To bring about this state of affairs there
are sets of Skeptical arguments that should bring one to suspense of judgment.
The first set are the ten tropes of the earlier Skeptic, Anesidemus. The next
are the five tropes about causality. And lastly are the tropes about the
criterion of knowledge. The ten tropes stress the variability of sense experience
among men seven emotions (the) Sextus Empiricus 838 838 and animals, among men, and within one
individual. The varying and conflicting experiences present conflicts about
what the perceived object is like. Any attempt to judge beyond appearances, to
ascertain that which is non-evident, requires some way of choosing what data to
accept. This requires a criterion. Since there is disagreement about what
criterion to employ, we need a criterion of a criterion, and so on. Either we
accept an arbitrary criterion or we get into an infinite regress. Similarly if
we try to prove anything, we need a criterion of what constitutes a proof. If
we offer a proof of a theory of proof, this will be circular reasoning, or end
up in another infinite regress. Sextus devotes most of his discussion to
challenging Stoic logic, which claimed that evident signs could reveal what is
non-evident. There might be signs that suggested what is temporarily
non-evident, such as smoke indicating that there is a fire, but any supposed
linkage between evident signs and what is non-evident can be challenged and
questioned. Sextus then applies the groups of Skeptical arguments to various
specific subjects – physics, mathematics, music, grammar, ethics – showing that
one should suspend judgment on any knowledge claims in these areas. Sextus
denies that he is saying any of this dogmatically: he is just stating how he
feels at given moments. He hopes that dogmatists sick with a disease, rashness,
will be cured and led to tranquillity no matter how good or bad the Skeptical
arguments might be. SKEPTICISM,
SKEPTICS, STOICISM. R.H.P. Shaftesbury, Lord, in full, Third Earl of
Shaftesbury, title of Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671– 1713), English philosopher and
politician who originated the moral sense theory. He was born at Wimborne St.
Giles, Dorsetshire. As a Country Whig he served in the House of Commons for
three years and later, as earl, monitored meetings of the House of Lords.
Shaftesbury introduced into British moral philosophy the notion of a moral
sense, a mental faculty unique to human beings, involving reflection and
feeling and constituting their ability to discern right and wrong. He sometimes
represents the moral sense as analogous to a purported aesthetic sense, a
special capacity by which we perceive, through our emotions, the proportions
and harmonies of which, on his Platonic view, beauty is composed. For
Shaftesbury, every creature has a “private good or interest,” an end to which
it is naturally disposed by its constitution. But there are other goods as well
– notably, the public good and the good (without qualification) of a sentient
being. An individual creature’s goodness is defined by the tendency of its
“natural affections” to contribute to the “universal system” of nature of which
it is a part – i.e., their tendency to promote the public good. Because human
beings can reflect on actions and affections, including their own and others’,
they experience emotional responses not only to physical stimuli but to these
mental objects as well (e.g., to the thought of one’s compassion or kindness).
Thus, they are capable of perceiving – and acquiring through their actions – a
particular species of goodness, namely, virtue. In the virtuous person, the
person of integrity, natural appetites and affections are in harmony with each
other (wherein lies her private good) and in harmony with the public interest.
Shaftesbury’s attempted reconciliation of selflove and benevolence is in part a
response to the egoism of Hobbes, who argued that everyone is in fact motivated
by self-interest. His defining morality in terms of psychological and public
harmony is also a reaction to the divine voluntarism of his former tutor,
Locke, who held that the laws of nature and morality issue from the will of God.
On Shaftesbury’s view, morality exists independently of religion, but belief in
God serves to produce the highest degree of virtue by nurturing a love for the
universal system. Shaftesbury’s theory led to a general refinement of
eighteenth-century ideas about moral feelings; a theory of the moral sense
emerged, whereby sentiments are – under certain conditions – perceptions of, or
constitutive of, right and wrong. In addition to several essays collected in
three volumes under the title Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times
(second edition, 1714), Shaftesbury also wrote stoical moral and religious
meditations reminiscent of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. His ideas on moral
sentiments exercised considerable influence on the ethical theories of Hutcheson
and Hume, who later worked out in detail their own accounts of the moral
sense. HOBBES, HUME, HUTCHESON, MORAL
SENSE THEORY. E.S.R. shamanism.KOREAN PHILOSOPHY. shan, o, Chinese terms for
‘good’ and ‘evil’, respectively. These are primary concerns for Chinese
philosophers: the Confucianists wanted to do good and get rid of evil, while
the Taoists wanted to go beyond good and evil. In fact the Shaftesbury shan, o
839 839 Taoists presupposed that man
has the ability to reach a higher level of spirituality. Chinese philosophers
often discussed shan and o in relation to human nature. Mencius believed that
nature is good; his opponent Kao Tzu, nature is neither good nor evil; Hsün
Tzu, nature is evil; and Yang Hsiung, nature is both good and evil. Most
Chinese philosophers believed that man is able to do good; they also accepted
evil as something natural that needed no explanation. CONFUCIANISM, HSÜN TZU, MENCIUS, TAOISM, YANG
HSIUNG. S.-h.L. shang ti, Chinese term meaning ‘high ancestor’, ‘God’. Shang ti
– synonymous with t’ien, in the sense of a powerful anthropomorphic entity – is
responsible for such things as the political fortunes of the state. Some
speculate that shang ti was originally only a Shang deity, later identified by
the Chou conquerors with their t’ien. The term shang ti is also used as a
translation of ‘God’. T’IEN. B.W.V.N.
Shang Yang, also called Lord Shang (d. 338 B.C.), Chinese statesman. A prime
minister of Ch’in and prominent Legalist, he emphasized the importance of fa
(law, or more broadly, impartial standards for punishment and reward) to the
sociopolitical order. Shang Yang maintained that agriculture and war were the
keys to a strong state. However, humans are self-interested rational actors.
Their interest to avoid hard work and the risk of death in battle is at odds
with the ruler’s desire for a strong state. Accordingly, the ruler must rely on
harsh punishments and positive rewards to ensure the cooperation of the
people. CHINESE LEGALISM. R.P.P. &
R.T.A. Shankara, also transliterated Sankara and Samkara (A.D. 788–820), Indian
philosopher who founded Advaita Vedanta Hinduism. His major works are the
Brahma-Sutra-Bhafya (a commentary on Badarayana’s Brahma Sutras) and his
Gita-Bhayfa (a commentary on the Bhagavad Gita). He provides a vigorous defense
of mind–body dualism, of the existence of a plurality of minds and
mind-independent physical objects, and of monotheism. Then, on the basis of
appeal to sruti (scripture) – i.e., the Vedas and Upanishads – and an esoteric
enlightenment experience (moksha), he relegates dualism, realism, and theism to
illusion (the level of appearance) in favor of a monism that holds that only
nirguna or qualityless Brahman exists (the level of reality). Some interpreters
read this distinction between levels metaphysically rather than
epistemologically, but this is inconsistent with Shankara’s monism. ADVAITA, VEDANTA. K.E.Y. Shao Yung (1011–77),
Chinese philosopher, a controversial Neo-Confucian figure. His Huangchi
ching-shih (“Ultimate Principles Governing the World”) advances a numerological
interpretation of the I-Ching. Shao noticed that the IChing expresses certain
cosmological features in numerical terms. He concluded that the cosmos itself
must be based on numerical relationships and that the I-Ching is its cipher,
which is why the text can be used to predict the future. One of Shao’s charts
of the I-Ching’s hexagrams came to the attention of Leibniz, who noticed that,
so arranged, they can be construed as describing the numbers 0–63 in binary
expression. Shao probably was not aware of this, and Leibniz interpreted Shao’s
arrangement in reverse order, but they shared the belief that certain numerical
sequences revealed the structure of the cosmos. P.J.I. Sheffer stroke, also
called alternative denial, a binary truth-functor represented by the symbol
‘_’, the logical force of which can be expressed contextually in terms of ‘-’
and ‘&’ by the following definition: p_q % Df -(p & q). The importance
of the Sheffer stroke lies in the fact that it by itself can express any
well-formed expression of truth-functional logic. Thus, since {-,7} forms an
expressively complete set, defining -p as p_p and p 7 q as (p_p) _(q_q)
provides for the possibility of a further reduction of primitive functors to one.
This system of symbols is commonly called the stroke notation. I.Bo. shen,
Chinese term meaning ‘spirit’, ‘spiritual’, ‘numinous’, ‘demonic’. In early
texts, shen is used to mean various nature spirits, with emphasis on the
efficacy of spirits to both know and accomplish (hence one seeks their advice
and aid). Shen came to describe the operations of nature, which accomplishes
its ends with “spiritual” efficacy. In texts like the Chuang Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and
I-Ching, shen no longer refers to an entity but to a state of resonance with
the cosmos. In such a state, the sage can tap into the “spiritual” nature of an
event, situation, person, or text and successfully read, react to, and guide
the course of events. P.J.I. sheng, Chinese term meaning ‘the sage’, ‘sagehood’.
This is the Chinese concept of extraordishang ti sheng 840 840 nary human attainment or perfection.
Philosophical Taoism focuses primarily on sheng as complete attunement or
adaptability to the natural order of events as well as irregular occurrences
and phenomena. Classical Confucianism focuses, on the other hand, on the ideal
unity of Heaven (t’ien) and human beings as having an ethical significance in
resolving human problems. Neo-Confucianism tends to focus on sheng as a
realizable ideal of the universe as a moral community. In Chang Tsai’s words,
“Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as
I finds an intimate place in their midst. . . . All people are my brothers and
sisters, and all things are my companions.” In Confucianism, sheng (the sage)
is often viewed as one who possesses comprehensive knowledge and insights into
the ethical significance of things, events, and human affairs. This ideal of
sheng contrasts with chün-tzu, the paradigmatic individual who embodies basic
ethical virtues (jen, li, i, and chih), but is always liable to error,
especially in responding to changing circumstances of human life. For
Confucius, sheng (sagehood) is more like an abstract, supreme ideal of a
perfect moral personality, an imagined vision rather than a possible objective
of the moral life. He once remarked that he could not ever hope to meet a
sheng-jen (a sage), but only a chün-tzu. For his eminent followers, on the
other hand, e.g., Mencius, Hsün Tzu, and the Neo-Confucians, sheng is a humanly
attainable ideal. CONFUCIANISM, MENCIUS.
A.S.C. Shen Pu-hai (d.337 B.C.), Chinese Legalist philosopher who emphasized
shu, pragmatic methods or techniques of bureaucratic control whereby the ruler
checked the power of officials and ensured their subordination. These
techniques included impartial application of publicly promulgated positive law,
appointment based on merit, mutual surveillance by officials, and most
importantly hsing ming – the assignment of punishment and reward based on the
correspondence between one’s official title or stipulated duties (ming) and
one’s performance (hsing). Law for Shen Pu-hai was one more pragmatic means to
ensure social and bureaucratic order.
HSING, MING. R.P.P. & R.T.A. Shen Tao, also called Shen Tzu
(350?–275? B.C.), Chinese philosopher associated with Legalism, Taoism, and the
Huang–Lao school. Depicted in the Chuang Tzu as a simple-minded naturalist who
believed that one only had to abandon knowledge to follow tao (the Way), Shen
Tao advocated rule by law where laws were to be impartial, publicly
promulgated, and changed only if necessary and then in accordance with tao. His
main contribution to Legalist theory is the notion that the ruler must rely on
shih (political purchase, or the power held by virtue of his position). Shen’s
law is the pragmatic positive law of the Legalists rather than the natural law
of Huang–Lao. HUANG–LAO, TAOISM. R.P.P.
& R.T.A. Shepherd, Mary (d.1847), Scottish philosopher whose main
philosophical works are An Essay on the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824) and
Essays on the Perception of an External Universe (1827). The first addresses
what she takes to be the skeptical consequences of Hume’s account of causation,
but a second target is the use William Lawrence (1783–1867) made of Hume’s
associative account of causation to argue that mental functions are reducible
to physiological ones. The second work focuses on Hume’s alleged skepticism
with regard to the existence of the external world, but she is also concerned to
distinguish her position from Berkeley’s. Shepherd was drawn into a public
controversy with John Fearn, who published some remarks she had sent him on a
book of his, together with his extensive reply. Shepherd replied in an article
in Fraser’s magazine (1832), “Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics,” which deftly
refuted Fearn’s rather condescending attack.
BERKELEY, HUME. M.At. Sherwood, William, also called William Shyreswood
(1200/10–1266/71), English logician who taught logic at Oxford and at Paris
between 1235 and 1250. He was the earliest of the three great “summulist”
writers, the other two (whom he influenced strongly) being Peter of Spain and
Lambert of Auxerre (fl. 1250). His main works are Introductiones in Logicam,
Syncategoremata, De insolubilibus, and Obligationes (some serious doubts have
recently arisen about the authorship of the latter work). Since M. Grabmann
published Sherwood’s Introductiones in 1937, historians of logic have paid
considerable attention to this seminal medieval logician. While the first four
chapters of Introductiones offer the basic ideas of Aristotle’s Organon, and
the last chapter neatly lays out the Sophistical Refutations, the fifth tract
expounds the famous doctrine of the properties of terms: signification, supposition,
conjunction, and appellation – hence the label ‘terminist’ for this sort of
logic. These Shen Pu-hai Sherwood, William 841
841 logico-semantic discussions, together with the discussions of
syncategorematic words, constitute the logica moderna, as opposed to the more
strictly Aristotelian contents of the earlier logica vetus and logica nova. The
doctrine of properties of terms and the analysis of syncategorematic terms,
especially those of ‘all’, ‘no’ and ‘nothing’, ‘only’, ‘not’, ‘begins’ and
‘ceases’, ‘necessarily’, ‘if’, ‘and’, and ‘or’, may be said to constitute
Sherwood’s philosophy of logic. He not only distinguishes categorematic
(descriptive) and syncategorematic (logical) words but also shows how some
terms are used categorematically in some contexts and syncategorematically in
others. He recognizes the importance of the order of words and of the scope of
logical functors; he also anticipates the variety of composite and divided
senses of propositions. Obligationes, if indeed his, attempts to state
conditions under which a formal disputation may take place. De Insolubilibus
deals with paradoxes of self-reference and with ways of solving them.
Understanding Sherwood’s logic is important for understanding the later
medieval developments of logica moderna down to Ockham. I.Bo. shih1, Chinese
term meaning ‘strategic advantage’. Shih was the key and defining idea in the
Militarist philosophers, later appropriated by some of the other classical
schools, including the Legalists (Han Fei Tzu) and the Confucians (Hsün Tzu).
Like ritual practices (li) and speaking (yen), shih is a level of discourse
through which one actively cultivates the leverage and influence of one’s
particular place. In the Military texts, the most familiar metaphor for shih is
the taut trigger on the drawn crossbow, emphasizing advantageous position,
timing, and precision. Shih (like immanental order generally) begins from the
full consideration of the concrete detail. The business of war or effective
government does not occur as some independent and isolated event, but unfolds
within a broad field of unique natural, social, and political conditions
proceeding according to a general pattern that can not only be anticipated but
manipulated to one’s advantage. It is the changing configuration of these
specific conditions that determines one’s place and one’s influence at any
point in time, and gives one a defining disposition. Shih includes intangible
forces such as morale, opportunity, timing, psychology, and logistics. CHINESE LEGALISM, CONFUCIANISM. R.P.P. &
R.T.A. shih2, Chinese term meaning ‘scholar-knight’ and ‘service’. In the
service of the rulers of the “central states” of preimperial China, shih were a
lower echelon of the official nobility responsible for both warfare and matters
at court, including official documentation, ritual protocol, and law. Most of
the early philosophers, trained in the “six arts” of rites, music, archery,
charioteering, writing, and counting, belonged to this stratum. Without
hereditary position, they lived by their wits and their professional skills,
and were responsible for both the intellectual vigor and the enormous social
mobility of Warring States China (403–221 B.C.). SHEN PU-HAI. R.P.P. & R.T.A. ship of
Theseus, the ship of the Greek hero Theseus, which, according to Plutarch
(“Life of Theseus,” 23), the Athenians preserved by gradually replacing its
timbers. A classic debate ensued concerning identity over time. Suppose a
ship’s timbers are replaced one by one over a period of time; at what point, if
any, does it cease to be the same ship? What if the ship’s timbers, on removal,
are used to build a new ship, identical in structure with the first: which ship
has the best claim to be the original ship?
IDENTITY, INDIVIDUATION, PERSONAL IDENTITY. W.J.P. Shpet, Gustav
Gustavovich (1879–1937), leading Russian phenomenologist and highly regarded
student and friend of Husserl. He played a major role in the development of
phenomenology in Russia prior to the revolution. Graduating from Kiev
University in 1906, Shpet accompanied his mentor Chelpanov to Moscow in 1907,
commencing graduate studies at Moscow University (M.A., 1910; Ph.D., 1916). He
attended Husserl’s seminars at Göttingen during 1912–13, out of which developed
a continuing friendship between the two, recorded in correspondence extending
through 1918. In 1914 Shpet published a meditation, Iavlenie i smysl
(Appearance and Sense), inspired by Husserl’s Logical Investigations and,
especially, Ideas I, which had appeared in 1913. Between 1914 and 1927 he
published six additional books on such disparate topics as the concept of
history, Herzen, Russian philosophy, aesthetics, ethnic psychology, and
language. He founded and edited the philosophical yearbook Mysl’ i slovo
(Thought and Word) between 1918 and 1921, publishing an important article on
skepticism in it. He was arrested in 1935 and sentenced to internal exile.
Under these conditions he completed a fine new shih1 Shpet, Gustav Gustavovich
842 842 translation of Hegel’s
Phenomenology into Russian, which was published in 1959. He was executed in
November 1937. HUSSERL, RUSSIAN
PHILOSOPHY. P.T.G. shriek operator.APPENDIX OF SPECIAL SYMBOLS. shu1, Chinese
term for ‘technique of statecraft’. Such techniques were advocated by Shen
Pu-hai and the other Legalist philosophers as instruments of the ruler in power
that would guarantee the stable and efficient operations of government. The
best-known shu include (1) “accountability” (hsing-ming): the duties and
obligations of office are clearly articulated, and at intervals a comparison is
made between stipulated responsibilities (ming) and performance (hsing); (2)
“doing nothing” (wu-wei): the engine of state is constructed so that the
ministers are integral, functioning components guided by clearly promulgated
laws (fa), while the ruler stands aloof as the embodiment of the authority of
government, thereby receiving credit for successes and deflecting blame back to
the officials; (3) “showing nothing” (wu-hsien): by secreting the royal person,
concealing all likes and dislikes, and proffering no opinion, the ruler not
only shields his limitations from public scrutiny, but further encourages a
personal mystique as an ideal invested with a superlative degree of all things
worthwhile. R.P.P. & R.T.A. shu2.CHUNG, SHU. Shyreswood, William.SHERWOOD.
Sidgwick, Henry (1838–1900), English philosopher, economist, and educator. Best
known for The Methods of Ethics(1874), he also wrote the still valuable
Outlines of the History of Ethics (1886), as well as studies of economics,
politics, literature, and alleged psychic phenomena. He was deeply involved in
the founding of the first college for women at Cambridge University, where he
was a professor. In the Methods Sidgwick tried to assess the rationality of the
main ways in which ordinary people go about making moral decisions. He thought
that our common “methods of ethics” fall into three main patterns. One is
articulated by the philosophical theory known as intuitionism. This is the view
that we can just see straight off either what particular act is right or what
binding rule or general principle we ought to follow. Another common method is
spelled out by philosophical egoism, the view that we ought in each act to get
as much good as we can for ourselves. The third widely used method is
represented by utilitarianism, the view that we ought in each case to bring
about as much good as possible for everyone affected. Can any or all of the
methods prescribed by these views be rationally defended? And how are they
related to one another? By framing his philosophical questions in these terms,
Sidgwick made it centrally important to examine the chief philosophical
theories of morality in the light of the commonsense morals of his time. He
thought that no theory wildly at odds with commonsense morality would be
acceptable. Intuitionism, a theory originating with Butler, transmitted by
Reid, and most systematically expounded during the Victorian era by Whewell,
was widely held to be the best available defense of Christian morals. Egoism
was thought by many to be the clearest pattern of practical rationality and was
frequently said to be compatible with Christianity. And J. S. Mill had argued
that utilitarianism was both rational and in accord with common sense. But
whatever their relation to ordinary morality, the theories seemed to be
seriously at odds with one another. Examining all the chief commonsense
precepts and rules of morality, such as that promises ought to be kept,
Sidgwick argued that none is truly self-evident or intuitively certain. Each
fails to guide us at certain points where we expect it to answer our practical
questions. Utilitarianism, he found, could provide a complicated method for
filling these gaps. But what ultimately justifies utilitarianism is certain very
general axioms seen intuitively to be true. Among them are the principles that
what is right in one case must be right in any similar case, and that we ought
to aim at good generally, not just at some particular part of it. Thus
intuitionism and utilitarianism can be reconciled. When taken together they
yield a complete and justifiable method of ethics that is in accord with common
sense. What then of egoism? It can provide as complete a method as
utilitarianism, and it also involves a self-evident axiom. But its results
often contradict those of utilitarianism. Hence there is a serious problem. The
method that instructs us to act always for the good generally and the method
that tells one to act solely for one’s own good are equally rational. Since the
two methods give contradictory directions, while each method rests on
self-evident axioms, it shriek operator Sidgwick, Henry 843 843 seems that practical reason is
fundamentally incoherent. Sidgwick could see no way to solve the problem.
Sidgwick’s bleak conclusion has not been generally accepted, but his Methods is
widely viewed as one of the best works of moral philosophy ever written. His
account of classical utilitarianism is unsurpassed. His discussions of the
general status of morality and of particular moral concepts are enduring models
of clarity and acumen. His insights about the relations between egoism and
utilitarianism have stimulated much valuable research. And his way of framing
moral problems, by asking about the relations between commonsense beliefs and
the best available theories, has set much of the agenda for twentiethcentury
ethics. BUTLER, EGOISM, INTUITION,
UTILITARIANISM. J.B.S. Siger of Brabant (c.1240–84), French philosopher, an
activist in the philosophical and political struggles both within the arts
faculty and between arts and theology at Paris during the 1260s and 1270s. He
is usually regarded as a leader of a “radical Aristotelianism” that owed much
to Liber de causis, to Avicenna, and to Averroes. He taught that everything originates
through a series of emanations from a first cause. The world and each species
(including the human species) are eternal. Human beings share a single active
intellect. There is no good reason to think that Siger advanced the view that
there was a double truth, one in theology and another in natural philosophy. It
is difficult to distinguish Siger’s own views from those he attributes to “the
Philosophers” and thus to know the extent to which he held the heterodox views
he taught as the best interpretation of the prescribed texts in the arts
curriculum. In any case, Siger was summoned before the French Inquisition in
1276, but fled Paris. He was never convicted of heresy, but it seems that the
condemnations at Paris in 1277 were partially directed at his teaching. He was
stabbed to death by his clerk in Orvieto (then the papal seat) in 1284.
C.G.Norm. sign.THEORY OF SIGNS. sign, conventional.THEORY OF SIGNS. sign,
formal.SEMIOSIS. sign, instrumental.SEMIOSIS. sign, natural.THEORY OF SIGNS.
signified.SIGNIFIER. signifier, a vocal sound or a written symbol. The concept
owes its modern formulation to the Swiss linguist Saussure. Rather than using
the older conception of sign and referent, he divided the sign itself into two
interrelated parts, a signifier and a signified. The signified is the concept
and the signifier is either a vocal sound or writing. The relation between the
two, according to Saussure, is entirely arbitrary, in that signifiers tend to
vary with different languages. We can utter or write ‘vache’, ‘cow’, or ‘vaca’,
depending on our native language, and still come up with the same signified
(i.e., concept). SAUSSURE, SEMIOSIS.
M.Ro. signs, theory of.THEORY OF SIGNS. silhak.KOREAN PHILOSOPHY. similarity, exact.IDENTITY.
Simmel, Georg (1858–1918), German philosopher and one of the founders of
sociology as a distinct discipline. Born and educated in Berlin, he was a
popular lecturer at its university. But the unorthodoxy of his interests and
unprofessional writing style probably kept him from being offered a regular
professorship until 1914, and then only at the provincial university of
Strasbourg. He died four years later. His writings ranged from conventional
philosophical topics – with books on ethics, philosophy of history, education,
religion, and the philosophers Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche – to books on
Rembrandt, Goethe, and the philosophy of money. He wrote numerous essays on
various artists and poets, on different cities, and on such themes as love,
adventure, shame, and on being a stranger, as well as on many specifically
sociological topics. Simmel was regarded as a Kulturphilosoph who meditated on
his themes in an insightful and digressive rather than scholarly and systematic
style. Though late in life he sketched a unifying Lebensphilosophie (philosophy
of life) that considers all works and structures of culture as products of
different forms of human experience, Simmel has remained of interest primarily
for a multiplicity of insights into specific topics. R.H.W. simple ordering.ORDERING.
Siger of Brabant simple ordering 844
844 simple supposition.SUPPOSITIO. simple theory of types.TYPE THEORY.
simplicity.CURVE-FITTING PROBLEM, DIVINE ATTRIBUTES, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.
Simplicius (sixth century A.D.), Greek Neoplatonist philosopher born in Cilicia
on the southeast coast of modern Turkey. His surviving works are extensive
commentaries on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, Physics, and Categories, and on the
Encheiridion of Epictetus. The authenticity of the commentary on Aristotle’s On
the Soul attributed to Simplicius has been disputed. He studied with Ammonius
in Alexandria, and with Damascius, the last known head of the Platonist school
in Athens. Justinian closed the school in 529. Two or three years later a group
of philosophers, including Damascius and Simplicius, visited the court of the
Sassanian king Khosrow I (Chosroes) but soon returned to the Byzantine Empire
under a guarantee of their right to maintain their own beliefs. It is generally
agreed that most, if not all, of Simplicius’s extant works date from the period
after his stay with Khosrow. But there is no consensus about where Simplicius
spent his last years (both Athens and Harran have been proposed recently), or
whether he resumed teaching philosophy; his commentaries, unlike most of the
others that survive from that period, are scholarly treatises rather than
classroom expositions. Simplicius’s Aristotle commentaries are the most
valuable extant works in the genre. He is our source for many of the fragments
of the preSocratic philosophers, and he frequently invokes material from
now-lost commentaries and philosophical works. He is a deeply committed
Neoplatonist, convinced that there is no serious conflict between the
philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. The view of earlier scholars that his
Encheiridion commentary embodies a more moderate Platonism associated with
Alexandria is now generally rejected. Simplicius’s virulent defense of the
eternity of the world in response to the attack of the Christian John
Philoponus illustrates the intellectual vitality of paganism at a time when the
Mediterranean world had been officially Christian for about three
centuries. COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE.
I.M. simplification, rule of.CONJUNCTION ELIMINATION. simulation theory, the
view that one represents the mental activities and processes of others by
mentally simulating them, i.e., generating similar activities and processes in
oneself. By simulating them, one can anticipate their product or outcome; or,
where this is already known, test hypotheses about their starting point. For
example, one anticipates the product of another’s theoretical or practical
inferences from given premises by making inferences from the same premises
oneself; or, knowing what the product is, one retroduces the premises. In the
case of practical reasoning, to reason from the same premises would typically
require indexical adjustments, such as shifts in spatial, temporal, and
personal “point of view,” to place oneself in the other’s physical and
epistemic situation insofar as it differs from one’s own. One may also
compensate for the other’s reasoning capacity and level of expertise, if
possible, or modify one’s character and outlook as an actor might, to fit the
other’s background. Such adjustments, even when insufficient for making
decisions in the role of the other, allow one to discriminate between action
options likely to be attractive or unattractive to the agent. One would be
prepared for the former actions and surprised by the latter. The simulation
theory is usually considered an alternative to an assumption (sometimes called
the “theory theory”) that underlies much recent philosophy of mind: that our
commonsense understanding of people rests on a speculative theory, a “folk
psychology” that posits mental states, events, and processes as unobservables
that explain behavior. Some hold that the simulation theory undercuts the
debate between philosophers who consider folk psychology a respectable theory
and those (the eliminative materialists) who reject it. Unlike earlier writing
on empathic understanding and historical reenactment, discussions of the
simulation theory often appeal to empirical findings, particularly experimental
results in developmental psychology. They also theorize about the mechanism
that would accomplish simulation: presumably one that calls up computational
resources ordinarily used for engagement with the world, but runs them
off-line, so that their output is not “endorsed” or acted upon and their inputs
are not limited to those that would regulate one’s own behavior. Although
simulation theorists agree that the ascription of mental states to others
relies chiefly on simulation, they differ on the nature of selfascription. Some
(especially Robert Gordon and simple supposition simulation theory 845 845 Jane Heal, who independently proposed
the theory) give a non-introspectionist account, while others (especially
Goldman) lean toward a more traditional introspectionist account. The
simulation theory has affected developmental psychology as well as branches of
philosophy outside the philosophy of mind, especially aesthetics and philosophy
of the social sciences. Some philosophers believe it sheds light on traditional
topics such as the problem of other minds, referential opacity, broad and
narrow content, and the peculiarities of self-knowledge. EMPATHY, FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, GOLDMAN, PHILOSOPHY
OF MIND, PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS, VERSTEHEN. R.M.G. simulator,
universal.COMPUTER THEORY. simultaneity.RELATIVITY. sin.PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.
sine qua non.CONDITIO SINE QUA NON. single case, problem of the.PROBABILITY,
PROPENSITY. singleton set.SET THEORY. singular causal relation.PHILOSOPHY OF
MIND. singular causal statement.CAUSATION, COVERING LAW MODEL. singular term,
an expression, such as ‘Zeus’, ‘the President’, or ‘my favorite chair’, that
can be the grammatical subject of what is semantically a subject-predicate
sentence. By contrast, a general term, such as ‘table’ or ‘swam’ is one that
can serve in predicative position. It is also often said that a singular term
is a word or phrase that could refer or ostensibly refer, on a given occasion
of use, only to a single object, whereas a general term is predicable of more
than one object. Singular terms are thus the expressions that replace, or are
replaced by, individual variables in applications of such quantifier rules as
universal instantiation and existential generalization or flank ‘%’ in identity
statements. THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS.
G.F.S. Sinn.FREGE. sinsign.PEIRCE. Sittlichkeit.HEGEL. situation ethics, a kind
of anti-theoretical, caseby-case applied ethics in vogue largely in some
European and American religious circles for twenty years or so following World
War II. It is characterized by the insistence that each moral choice must be
determined by one’s particular context or situation – i.e., by a consideration
of the outcomes that various possible courses of action might have, given one’s
situation. To that degree, situation ethics has affinities to both act
utilitarianism and traditional casuistry. But in contrast to utilitarianism,
situation ethics rejects the idea that there are universal or even fixed moral
principles beyond various indeterminate commitments or ideals (e.g., to
Christian love or humanism). In contrast to traditional casuistry, it rejects
the effort to construct general guidelines from a case or to classify the
salient features of a case so that it can be used as a precedent. The
anti-theoretical stance of situation ethics is so thoroughgoing that writers
identified with the position have not carefully described its connections to
consequentialism, existentialism, intuitionism, personalism, pragmatism,
relativism, or any other developed philosophical view to which it appears to
have some affinity. CASUISTRY, ETHICS,
UTILITARIANISM, VIRTUE ETHICS. L.C.B. situation semantics.POSSIBLE WORLDS.
situation theory.MODEL THEORY. Siva, one of the great gods of Hinduism (with
Vishnu and Brahman), auspicious controller of karma and samsara, destroyer but
also giver of life. He is worshiped in Saivism with his consort Sakti. A
variety of deities are regarded in Saivism as forms of Siva, with the
consequence that polytheism is moved substantially toward monotheism. K.E.Y.
six emotions (the).CH’ING. skepticism, in the most common sense, the refusal to
grant that there is any knowledge or justification. Skepticism can be either
partial or total, either practical or theoretical, and, if theoretical, either
moderate or radical, and either of knowledge or of justification. Skepticism is
partial iff (if and only if) it is restricted to particular fields of beliefs
or propositions, and total iff not thus restricted. And if partial, it may be
highly restricted, as is the skepticism for which religion is only opium, or
much more general, as when not only is religion simulator, universal skepticism
846 846 called opium, but also history
bunk and metaphysics meaningless. Skepticism is practical iff it is an attitude
of deliberately withholding both belief and disbelief, accompanied perhaps (but
not necessarily) by commitment to a recommendation for people generally, that
they do likewise. (Practical skepticism can of course be either total or
partial, and if partial it can be more or less general.) Skepticism is
theoretical iff it is a commitment to the belief that there is no knowledge
(justified belief) of a certain kind or of certain kinds. Such theoretical
skepticism comes in several varieties. It is moderate and total iff it holds
that there is no certain superknowledge (superjustified belief) whatsoever, not
even in logic or mathematics, nor through introspection of one’s present
experience. It is radical and total iff it holds that there isn’t even any
ordinary knowledge (justified belief) at all. It is moderate and partial, on
the other hand, iff it holds that there is no certain superknowledge
(superjustified belief) of a certain specific kind K or of certain specific
kinds K1, . . . , Kn (less than the totality of such kinds). It is radical and
partial, finally, iff it holds that there isn’t even any ordinary knowledge
(justified belief) at all of that kind K or of those kinds K1, . . . , Kn.
Greek skepticism can be traced back to Socrates’ epistemic modesty. Suppressed
by the prolific theoretical virtuosity of Plato and Aristotle, such modesty
reasserted itself in the skepticism of the Academy led by Arcesilaus and later
by Carneades. In this period began a long controversy pitting Academic Skeptics
against the Stoics Zeno and (later) Chrysippus, and their followers. Prolonged
controversy, sometimes heated, softened the competing views, but before
agreement congealed Anesidemus broke with the Academy and reclaimed the
arguments and tradition of Pyrrho, who wrote nothing, but whose Skeptic
teachings had been preserved by a student, Timon (in the third century B.C.).
After enduring more than two centuries, neoPyrrhonism was summarized, c.200
A.D., by Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Adversus mathematicos).
Skepticism thus ended as a school, but as a philosophical tradition it has been
influential long after that, and is so even now. It has influenced strongly not
only Cicero (Academica and De natura deorum), St. Augustine (Contra
academicos), and Montaigne (“Apology for Raimund Sebond”), but also the great
historical philosophers of the Western tradition, from Descartes through Hegel.
Both on the Continent and in the Anglophone sphere a new wave of skepticism has
built for decades, with logical positivism, deconstructionism, historicism,
neopragmatism, and relativism, and the writings of Foucault (knowledge as a
mask of power), Derrida (deconstruction), Quine (indeterminacy and
eliminativism), Kuhn (incommensurability), and Rorty (solidarity over
objectivity, edification over inquiry). At the same time a rising tide of books
and articles continues other philosophical traditions in metaphysics,
epistemology, ethics, etc. It is interesting to compare the cognitive
disengagement recommended by practical skepticism with the affective
disengagement dear to stoicism (especially in light of the epistemological controversies
that long divided Academic Skepticism from the Stoa, giving rise to a rivalry
dominant in Hellenistic philosophy). If believing and favoring are positive,
with disbelieving and disfavoring their respective negative counterparts, then
the magnitude of our happiness (positive) or unhappiness (negative) over a
given matter is determined by the product of our belief/disbelief and our
favoring/disfavoring with regard to that same matter. The fear of unhappiness
may lead one stoically to disengage from affective engagement, on either side
of any matter that escapes one’s total control. And this is a kind of practical
affective “skepticism.” Similarly, if believing and truth are positive, with
disbelieving and falsity their respective negative counterparts, then the
magnitude of our correctness (positive) or error (negative) over a given matter
is determined by the product of our belief/disbelief and the truth/falsity with
regard to that same matter (where the positive or negative magnitude of the
truth or falsity at issue may be determined by some measure of “theoretical
importance,” though alternatively one could just assign all truths a value of
!1 and all falsehoods a value of †1). The fear of error may lead one
skeptically to disengage from cognitive engagement, on either side of any
matter that involves risk of error. And this is “practical cognitive
skepticism.” We wish to attain happiness and avoid unhappiness. This leads to
the disengagement of the stoic. We wish to attain the truth and avoid error.
This leads to the disengagement of the skeptic, the practical skeptic. Each
opts for a conservative policy, but one that is surely optional, given just the
reasoning indicated. For in avoiding unhappiness the stoic also forfeits a
corresponding possibility of happiness. And in avoiding error the skeptic also
forfeits a corresponding possibility to grasp a truth. These twin policies
appeal to conservatism in our nature, and will reasonably preskepticism
skepticism 847 847 vail in the lives of
those committed to avoiding risk as a paramount objective. For this very desire
must then be given its due, if we judge it rational. Skepticism is instrumental
in the birth of modern epistemology, and modern philosophy, at the hands of
Descartes, whose skepticism is methodological but sophisticated and well
informed by that of the ancients. Skepticism is also a main force, perhaps the
main force, in the broad sweep of Western philosophy from Descartes through
Hegel. Though preeminent in the history of our subject, skepticism since then
has suffered decades of neglect, and only in recent years has reclaimed much
attention and even applause. Some recent influential discussions go so far as
to grant that we do not know we are not dreaming. But they also insist one can still
know when there is a fire before one. The key is to analyze knowledge as a kind
of appropriate responsiveness to its object truth: what is required is that the
subject “track” through his belief the truth of what he believes. (S tracks the
truth of P iff: S would not believe P if P were false.) Such an analysis of
tracking, when conjoined with the view of knowledge as tracking, enables one to
explain how one can know about the fire even if for all one knows it is just a
dream. The crucial fact here is that even if P logically entails Q, one may
still be able to track the truth of P though unable to track the truth of Q.
(Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 1981.) Many problems arise in the
literature on this approach. One that seems especially troubling is that though
it enables us to understand how contingent knowledge of our surroundings is
possible, the tracking account falls short of enabling an explanation of how
such knowledge on our part is actual. To explain how one knows that there is a
fire before one (F), according to the tracking account one presumably would
invoke one’s tracking the truth of F. But this leads deductively almost
immediately to the claim that one is not dreaming: Not D. And this is not
something one can know, according to the tracking account. So how is one to
explain one’s justification for making that claim? Most troubling of all here
is the fact that one is now cornered by the tracking account into making
combinations of claims of the following form: I am quite sure that p, but I
have no knowledge at all as to whether p. And this seems incoherent. A
Cartesian dream argument that has had much play in recent discussions of
skepticism is made explicit (by Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical
Scepticism, 1984) as follows. One knows that if one knows F then one is not
dreaming, in which case if one really knows F then one must know one is not
dreaming. However, one does not know one is not dreaming. So one does not know
F. Q.E.D. And why does one fail to know one is not dreaming? Because in order
to know it one would need to know that one has passed some test, some empirical
procedure to determine whether one is dreaming. But any such supposed test –
say, pinching oneself – could just be part of a dream, and dreaming one passes
the test would not suffice to show one was not dreaming. However, might one not
actually be witnessing the fire, and passing the test – and be doing this in
wakeful life, not in a dream – and would that not be compatible with one’s
knowing of the fire and of one’s wakefulness? Not so, according to the
argument, since in order to know of the fire one needs prior knowledge of one’s
wakefulness. But in order to know of one’s wakefulness one needs prior
knowledge of the results of the test procedure. But this in turn requires prior
knowledge that one is awake and not dreaming. And we have a vicious circle. We
might well hold that it is possible to know one is not dreaming even in the
absence of any positive test result, or at most in conjunction with coordinate
(not prior) knowledge of such a positive indication. How in that case would one
know of one’s wakefulness? Perhaps one would know it by believing it through
the exercise of a reliable faculty. Perhaps one would know it through its
coherence with the rest of one’s comprehensive and coherent body of beliefs.
Perhaps both. But, it may be urged, if these are the ways one might know of
one’s wakefulness, does not this answer commit us to a theory of the form of A
below? (A) The proposition that p is something one knows (believes justifiably)
if and only if one satisfies conditions C with respect to it. And if so, are we
not caught in a vicious circle by the question as to how we know – what
justifies us in believing – (A) itself? This is far from obvious, since the
requirement that we must submit to some test procedure for wakefulness and know
ourselves to test positively, before we can know ourselves to be awake, is
itself a requirement that seems to lead equally to a principle such as (A). At
least it is not evident why the proposal of the externalist or of the
coherentist as to how we know we are awake should be any more closely related
to a general principle like (A) than is the (foundationalist?) notion
skepticism skepticism 848 848 that in
order to know we are awake we need epistemically prior knowledge that we test
positive in a way that does not presuppose already acquired knowledge of the
external world. The problem of how to justify the likes of (A) is a descendant
of the (in)famous “problem of the criterion,” reclaimed in the sixteenth
century and again in this century (by Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 1966,
1977, and 1988) but much used already by the Skeptics of antiquity under the
title of the diallelus. About explanations of our knowledge or justification in
general of the form indicated by (A), we are told that they are inadequate in a
way revealed by examples like the following. Suppose we want to know how we
know anything at all about the external world, and part of the answer is that
we know the location of our neighbor by knowing the location of her car (in her
driveway). Surely this would be at best the beginning of an answer that might
be satisfactory in the end (if recursive, e.g.), but as it stands it cannot be
satisfactory without supplementation. The objection here is based on a
comparison between two appeals: the appeal of a theorist of knowledge to a
principle like (A) in the course of explaining our knowledge or justification
in general, on one side; and the appeal to the car’s location in explaining our
knowledge of facts about the external world, on the other side. This comparison
is said to be fatal to the ambition to explain our knowledge or justification
in general. But are the appeals relevantly analogous? One important difference
is this. In the example of the car, we explain the presence, in some subject S,
of a piece of knowledge of a certain kind (of the external world) by appeal to
the presence in S of some other piece of knowledge of the very same kind. So
there is an immediate problem if it is our aim to explain how any knowledge of
the sort in question ever comes to be (unless the explication is just
beginning, and is to turn recursive in due course). Now of course (A) is
theoretically ambitious, and in that respect the theorist who gives an answer
of the form of (A) is doing something similar to what must be done by the
protagonist in our car example, someone who is attempting to provide a general
explanation of how any knowledge of a certain kind comes about. Nevertheless,
there is also an important difference, namely that the theorist whose aim it is
to give a general account of the form of (A) need not attribute any knowledge
whatsoever to a subject S in explaining how that subject comes to have a piece
of knowledge (or justified belief). For there is no need to require that the
conditions C appealed to by principle (A) must be conditions that include
attribution of any knowledge at all to the subject in question. It is true that
in claiming that (A) itself meets conditions C, and that it is this which
explains how one knows (A), we do perhaps take ourselves to know (A) or at
least to be justified in believing it. But if so, this is the inevitable lot of
anyone who seriously puts forward any explanation of anything. And it is quite
different from a proposal that part of what explains how something is known or
justifiably believed includes a claim to knowledge or justified belief of the
very same sort. In sum, as in the case of one’s belief that one is awake, the
belief in something of the form of (A) may be said to be known, and in so
saying one does not commit oneself to adducing an ulterior reason in favor of
(A), or even to having such a reason in reserve. One is of course committed to
being justified in believing (A), perhaps even to having knowledge that (A).
But it is not at all clear that the only way to be justified in believing (A)
is by way of adduced reasons in favor of (A), or that one knows (A) only if one
adduces strong enough reasons in its favor. For we often know things in the
absence of such adduced reasons. Thus consider one’s knowledge through memory
of which door one used to come into a room that has more than one open door.
Returning finally to (A), in its case the explanation of how one knows it may,
once again, take the form of an appeal to the justifying power of intellectual
virtues or of coherence – or both. Recent accounts of the nature of thought and
representation undermine a tradition of wholesale doubt about nature, whose
momentum is hard to stop, and threatens to leave the subject alone and
restricted to a solipsism of the present moment. But there may be a way to stop
skepticism early – by questioning the possibility of its being sensibly held,
given what is required for meaningful language and thought. Consider our grasp
of observable shape and color properties that objects around us might have.
Such grasp seems partly constituted by our discriminatory abilities. When we
discern a shape or a color we do so presumably in terms of a distinctive impact
that such a shape or color has on us. We are put systematically into a certain
distinctive state X when we are appropriately related, in good light, with our
eyes open, etc., to the presence in our environment of that shape or color.
What makes one’s distinctive state one of thinking of sphericity rather than
something else, is said to be that it is a state tied by systematic causal
relations to skepticism skepticism 849
849 the presence of sphericity in one’s normal environment. A light now
flickers at the end of the skeptic’s tunnel. In doubt now is the coherence of
traditional skeptical reflection. Indeed, our predecessors in earlier centuries
may have moved in the wrong direction when they attempted a reduction of nature
to the mind. For there is no way to make sense of one’s mind without its
contents, and there is no way to make sense of how one’s mind can have such
contents except by appeal to how one is causally related to one’s environment.
If the very existence of that environment is put in doubt, that cuts the ground
from under one’s ability reasonably to characterize one’s own mind, or to feel
any confidence about its contents. Perhaps, then, one could not be a “brain in
a vat.” Much contemporary thought about language and the requirements for
meaningful language thus suggests that a lot of knowledge must already be in
place for us to be able to think meaningfully about a surrounding reality, so
as to be able to question its very existence. If so, then radical skepticism
answers itself. For if we can so much as understand a radical skepticism about
the existence of our surrounding reality, then we must already know a great
deal about that reality. ACADEMY,
CLOSURE, DESCARTES, EPISTEMOLOGY, FOUNDATIONALISM, JUSTIFICATION, SKEPTICS.
E.S. skepticism, moral.MORAL SKEPTICISM. Skeptics, those ancient thinkers who
developed sets of arguments to show either that no knowledge is possible
(Academic Skepticism) or that there is not sufficient or adequate evidence to
tell if any knowledge is possible. If the latter is the case then these
thinkers advocated suspending judgment on all question concerning knowledge
(Pyrrhonian Skepticism). Academic Skepticism gets its name from the fact that
it was formulated in Plato’s Academy in the third century B.C., starting from
Socrates’ statement, “All I know is that I know nothing.” It was developed by
Arcesilaus (c.268–241) and Carneades (c.213–129), into a series of arguments,
directed principally against the Stoics, purporting to show that nothing can be
known. The Academics posed a series of problems to show that what we think we
know by our senses may be unreliable, and that we cannot be sure about the
reliability of our reasoning. We do not possess a guaranteed standard or
criterion for ascertaining which of our judgments is true or false. Any
purported knowledge claim contains some element that goes beyond immediate
experience. If this claim constituted knowledge we would have to know something
that could not possibly be false. The evidence for the claim would have to be
based on our senses and our reason, both of which are to some degree
unreliable. So the knowledge claim may be false or doubtful, and hence cannot
constitute genuine knowledge. So, the Academics said that nothing is certain.
The best we can attain is probable information. Carneades is supposed to have
developed a form of verification theory and a kind of probabilism, similar in
some ways to that of modern pragmatists and positivists. Academic Skepticism
dominated the philosophizing of Plato’s Academy until the first century B.C.
While Cicero was a student there, the Academy turned from Skepticism to a kind
of eclectic philosophy. Its Skeptical arguments have been preserved in Cicero’s
works, Academia and De natura deorum, in Augustine’s refutation in his Contra
academicos, as well as in the summary presented by Diogenes Laertius in his
lives of the Greek philosophers. Skeptical thinking found another home in the
school of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, probably connected with the Methodic school
of medicine in Alexandria. The Pyrrhonian movement traces its origins to Pyrrho
of Elis (c.360–275 B.C.) and his student Timon (c.315–225 B.C.). The stories
about Pyrrho indicate that he was not a theoretician but a practical doubter
who would not make any judgments that went beyond immediate experience. He is
supposed to have refused to judge if what appeared to be chariots might strike
him, and he was often rescued by his students because he would not make any
commitments. His concerns were apparently ethical. He sought to avoid
unhappiness that might result from accepting any value theory. If the theory
was at all doubtful, accepting it might lead to mental anguish. The theoretical
formulation of Pyrrhonian Skepticism is attributed to Aenesidemus (c.100– 40
B.C.). Pyrrhonists regarded dogmatic philosophers and Academic Skeptics as
asserting too much, the former saying that something can be known and the
latter that nothing can be known. The Pyrrhonists suspended judgments on all
questions on which there was any conflicting evidence, including whether or not
anything could be known. The Pyrrhonists used some of the same kinds of
arguments developed by Arcesilaus and skepticism, moral Skeptics 850 850 Carneades. Aenesidemus and those who
followed after him organized the arguments into sets of “tropes” or ways of
leading to suspense of judgment on various questions. Sets of ten, eight, five,
and two tropes appear in the only surviving writing of the Pyrrhonists, the
works of Sextus Empiricus, a third-century A.D. teacher of Pyrrhonism. Each set
of tropes offers suggestions for suspending judgment about any knowledge claims
that go beyond appearances. The tropes seek to show that for any claim,
evidence for and evidence against it can be offered. The disagreements among human
beings, the variety of human experiences, the fluctuation of human judgments
under differing conditions, illness, drunkenness, etc., all point to the
opposition of evidence for and against each knowledge claim. Any criterion we
employ to sift and weigh the evidence can also be opposed by countercriterion
claims. Given this situation, the Pyrrhonian Skeptics sought to avoid
committing themselves concerning any kind of question. They would not even
commit themselves as to whether the arguments they put forth were sound or not.
For them Skepticism was not a statable theory, but rather an ability or mental
attitude for opposing evidence for and against any knowledge claim that went
beyond what was apparent, that dealt with the non-evident. This opposing produced
an equipollence, a balancing of the opposing evidences, that would lead to
suspending judgment on any question. Suspending judgment led to a state of mind
called “ataraxia,” quietude, peace of mind, or unperturbedness. In such a state
the Skeptic was no longer concerned or worried or disturbed about matters
beyond appearances. The Pyrrhonians averred that Skepticism was a cure for a
disease called “dogmatism” or rashness. The dogmatists made assertions about
the non-evident, and then became disturbed about whether these assertions were
true. The disturbance became a mental disease or disorder. The Pyrrhonians, who
apparently were medical doctors, offered relief by showing the patient how and
why he should suspend judgment instead of dogmatizing. Then the disease would
disappear and the patient would be in a state of tranquillity, the peace of
mind sought by Hellenistic dogmatic philosophers. The Pyrrhonists, unlike the
Academic Skeptics, were not negative dogmatists. The Pyrrhonists said neither
that knowledge is possible nor that it is impossible. They remained seekers,
while allowing the Skeptical arguments and the equipollence of evidences to act
as a purge of dogmatic assertions. The purge eliminates all dogmas as well as
itself. After this the Pyrrhonist lives undogmatically, following natural
inclinations, immediate experience, and the laws and customs of his society,
without ever judging or committing himself to any view about them. In this
state the Pyrrhonist would have no worries, and yet be able to function
naturally and according to law and custom. The Pyrrhonian movement disappeared
during the third century A.D., possibly because it was not considered an
alternative to the powerful religious movements of the time. Only scant traces
of it appear before the Renaissance, when the texts of Sextus and Cicero were
rediscovered and used to formulate a modern skeptical view by such thinkers as
Montaigne and Charron. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS,
SKEPTICISM. R.H.P. Skolem, Thoralf (1887–1963), Norwegian mathematician. A
pioneer of mathematical logic, he made fundamental contributions to recursion
theory, set theory (in particular, the proposal and formulation in 1922 of the
axiom of replacement), and model theory. His most important results for the
philosophy of mathematics are the (Downward) Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (1919,
1922), whose first proof involved putting formulas into Skolem normal form; and
a demonstration (1933–34) of the existence of models of (first-order)
arithmetic not isomorphic to the standard model. Both results exhibit the
extreme non-categoricity that can occur with formulations of mathematical
theories in firstorder logic, and caused Skolem to be skeptical about the use
of formal systems, particularly for set theory, as a foundation for mathematics.
The existence of non-standard models is actually a consequence of the
completeness and first incompleteness theorems (Gödel, 1930, 1931), for these
together show that there must be sentences of arithmetic (if consistent) that
are true in the standard model, but false in some other, nonisomorphic model.
However, Skolem’s result describes a general technique for constructing such
models. Skolem’s theorem is now more easily proved using the compactness
theorem, an easy consequence of the completeness theorem. The Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem produces a similar problem of characterization, the Skolem paradox,
pointed out by Skolem in 1922. Roughly, this says that if first-order set
theory has a model, it must also have a countable model whose continuum is a countable
set, and thus apparently non-standard. This does not contraSkolem, Thoralf
Skolem, Thoralf 851 851 dict Cantor’s
theorem, which merely demands that the countable model contain as an element no
function that maps its natural numbers one-toone onto its continuum, although
there must be such a function outside the model. Although usually seen as
limiting first-order logic, this result is extremely fruitful technically,
providing one basis of the proof of the independence of the continuum
hypothesis from the usual axioms of set theory given by Gödel in 1938 and Cohen
in 1963. This connection between independence results and the existence of
countable models was partially foreseen by Skolem in 1922. CANTOR, COMPACTNESS THEOREM, GöDEL’s
INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS, LöWENHEIM-SKOLEM THEOREM, MODEL THEORY. M.H.
Skolem-Löwenheim theorem.LöWENHEIMSKOLEM THEOREM. Skolem normal form.NORMAL
FORM. Skolem’s paradox.LÖWENHEIM-SKOLEM THEOREM, SKOLEM. slave
morality.NIETZSCHE. slippery slope argument, an argument that an action
apparently unobjectionable in itself would set in motion a train of events
leading ultimately to an undesirable outcome. The metaphor portrays one on the
edge of a slippery slope, where taking the first step down will inevitably
cause sliding to the bottom. For example, it is sometimes argued that voluntary
euthanasia should not be legalized because this will lead to killing unwanted
people, e.g. the handicapped or elderly, against their will. In some versions
the argument aims to show that one should intervene to stop an ongoing train of
events; e.g., it has been argued that suppressing a Communist revolution in one
country was necessary to prevent the spread of Communism throughout a whole
region via the so-called domino effect. Slippery slope arguments with dubious
causal assumptions are often classed as fallacies under the general heading of
the fallacy of the false cause. This argument is also sometimes called the
wedge argument. There is some disagreement concerning the breadth of the
category of slippery slope arguments. Some would restrict the term to arguments
with evaluative conclusions, while others construe it more broadly so as to
include other sorites arguments. SORITES
PARADOX, VAGUENESS. W.T. Smart, J(ohn) J(amieson) C(arswell) (b.1920),
British-born Australian philosopher whose name is associated with three
doctrines in particular: the mind–body identity theory, scientific realism, and
utilitarianism. A student of Ryle’s at Oxford, he rejected logical behaviorism
in favor of what came to be known as Australian materialism. This is the view
that mental processes – and, as Armstrong brought Smart to see, mental states –
cannot be explained simply in terms of behavioristic dispositions. In order to
make good sense of how the ordinary person talks of them we have to see them as
brain processes – and states – under other names. Smart developed this identity
theory of mind and brain, under the stimulus of his colleague, U. T. Place, in
“Sensations and Brain Processes” (Philosophical Review, 1959). It became a
mainstay of twentieth-century philosophy. Smart endorsed the materialist
analysis of mind on the grounds that it gave a simple picture that was
consistent with the findings of science. He took a realist view of the claims
of science, rejecting phenomenalism, instrumentalism, and the like, and he
argued that commonsense beliefs should be maintained only so far as they are
plausible in the light of total science. Philosophy and Scientific Realism
(1963) gave forceful expression to this physicalist picture of the world, as
did some later works. He attracted attention in particular for his argument
that if we take science seriously then we have to endorse the four-dimensional
picture of the universe and recognize as an illusion the experience of the
passing of time. He published a number of defenses of utilitarianism, the best
known being his contribution to J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams,
Utilitarianism, For and Against (1973). He gave new life to act utilitarianism
at a time when utilitarians were few and most were attached to rule
utilitarianism or other restricted forms of the doctrine. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, SCIENTIFIC REALISM,
UTILITARIANISM. P.P. Smith, Adam (1723–90), Scottish economist and philosopher,
a founder of modern political economy and a major contributor to ethics and the
psychology of morals. His first published work was The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759). This book immediately made him famous, and earned the praise
of thinkers of the stature of Hume, Burke, and Kant. It sought to answer two
questions: Wherein does virtue consist, and by means of what psychological
principles do we deterSkolem-Löwenheim theorem Smith, Adam 852 852 mine this or that to be virtuous or the
contrary? His answer to the first combined ancient Stoic and Aristotelian views
of virtue with modern views derived from Hutcheson and others. His answer to
the second built on Hume’s theory of sympathy – our ability to put ourselves
imaginatively in the situation of another – as well as on the notion of the
“impartial spectator.” Smith throughout is skeptical about metaphysical and
theological views of virtue and of the psychology of morals. The
self-understanding of reasonable moral actors ought to serve as the moral
philosopher’s guide. Smith’s discussion ranges from the motivation of wealth to
the psychological causes of religious and political fanaticism. Smith’s second
published work, the immensely influential An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations (1776), attempts to explain why free economic,
political, and religious markets are not only more efficient, when properly
regulated, but also more in keeping with nature, more likely to win the
approval of an impartial spectator, than monopolistic alternatives. Taken
together, Smith’s two books attempt to show how virtue and liberty can
complement each other. He shows full awareness of the potentially dehumanizing
force of what was later called “capitalism,” and sought remedies in schemes for
liberal education and properly organized religion. Smith did not live to
complete his system, which was to include an analysis of “natural
jurisprudence.” We possess student notes of his lectures on jurisprudence and
on rhetoric, as well as several impressive essays on the evolution of the
history of science and on the fine arts.
HUME, IDEAL OBSERVER, LIBERALISM, PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS,
SENTIMENTALISM, VIRTUE ETHICS. C.L.G. social action, a subclass of human action
involving the interaction among agents and their mutual orientation, or the
action of groups. While all intelligible actions are in some sense social,
social actions must be directed to others. Talcott Parsons (1902–79) captured
what is distinctive about social action in his concept of “double contingency,”
and similar concepts have been developed by other philosophers and
sociologists, including Weber, Mead, and Wittgenstein. Whereas in monological
action the agents’ fulfilling their purposes depends only on contingent facts
about the world, the success of social action is also contingent on how other
agents react to what the agent does and how that agent reacts to other agents,
and so on. An agent successfully communicates, e.g., not merely by finding some
appropriate expression in an existing symbol system, but also by understanding
how other agents will understand him. Game theory describes and explains
another type of double contingency in its analysis of the interdependency of
choices and strategies among rational agents. Games are also significant in two
other respects. First, they exemplify the cognitive requirements for social
interaction, as in Mead’s analysis of agents’ perspective taking: as a subject
(“I”), I am an object for others (“me”), and can take a third-person
perspective along with others on the interaction itself (“the generalized
other”). Second, games are regulated by shared rules and mediated through
symbolic meanings; Wittgenstein’s private language argument establishes that
rules cannot be followed “privately.” Some philosophers, such as Peter Winch,
conclude from this argument that rule-following is a basic feature of
distinctively social action. Some actions are social in the sense that they can
only be done in groups. Individualists (such as Weber, Jon Elster, and Raimo
Tuomela) believe that these can be analyzed as the sum of the actions of each
individual. But holists (such as Marx, Durkheim, and Margaret Gilbert) reject
this reduction and argue that in social actions agents must see themselves as
members of a collective agent. Holism has stronger or weaker versions: strong
holists, such as Durkheim and Hegel, see the collective subject as singular,
the collective consciousness of a society. Weak holists, such as Gilbert and
Habermas, believe that social actions have plural, rather than singular,
collective subjects. Holists generally establish the plausibility of their view
by referring to larger contexts and sequences of action, such as shared symbol
systems or social institutions. Explanations of social actions thus refer not
only to the mutual expectations of agents, but also to these larger causal
contexts, shared meanings, and mechanisms of coordination. Theories of social
action must then explain the emergence of social order, and proposals range
from Hobbes’s coercive authority to Talcott Parsons’s value consensus about
shared goals among the members of groups.
ACTION THEORY, HOLISM, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, WEBER. J.Bo.
social biology, the understanding of social behavior, especially human social
behavior, from a biological perspective; often connected with the political
philosophy of social Darwinism. social action social biology 853 853 Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species
highlighted the significance of social behavior in organic evolution, and in
the Descent of Man, he showed how significant such behavior is for humans. He
argued that it is a product of natural selection; but it was not until 1964
that the English biologist William Hamilton showed precisely how such behavior
could evolve, namely through “kin selection” as an aid to the biological
wellbeing of close relatives. Since then, other models of explanation have been
proposed, extending the theory to non-relatives. Best known is the
self-describing “reciprocal altruism.” Social biology became notorious in 1975
when Edward O. Wilson published a major treatise on the subject: Sociobiology:
The New Synthesis. Accusations of sexism and racism were leveled because Wilson
suggested that Western social systems are biologically innate, and that in some
respects males are stronger, more aggressive, more naturally promiscuous than
females. Critics argued that all social biology is in fact a manifestation of
social Darwinism, a nineteenthcentury philosophy owing more to Herbert Spencer
than to Charles Darwin, supposedly legitimating extreme laissez-faire economics
and an unbridled societal struggle for existence. Such a charge is extremely
serious, for as Moore pointed out in his Principia Ethica (1903), Spencer
surely commits the naturalistic fallacy, inasmuch as he is attempting to derive
the way that the world ought to be from the way that it is. Naturally enough,
defenders of social biology, or “sociobiology” as it is now better known,
denied vehemently that their science is mere right-wing ideology by another
name. They pointed to many who have drawn very different social conclusions on
the basis of biology. Best known is the Russian anarchist Kropotkin, who argued
that societies are properly based on a biological propensity to mutual aid.
With respect to contemporary debate, it is perhaps fairest to say that
sociobiology, particularly that pertaining to humans, did not always show
sufficient sensitivity toward all societal groups – although certainly there
was never the crude racism of the fascist regimes of the 1930s. However, recent
work is far more careful in these respects. Now, indeed, the study of social
behavior from a biological perspective is one of the most exciting and
forward-moving branches of the life sciences.
DARWINISM, EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY. M.Ru. social choice theory, the theory of the rational action of a
group of agents. Important social choices are typically made over alternative
means of collectively providing goods. These might be goods for individual
members of the group, or more characteristically, public goods, goods such that
no one can be excluded from enjoying their benefits once they are available.
Perhaps the most central aspect of social choice theory concerns rational
individual choice in a social context. Since what is rational for one agent to
do will often depend on what is rational for another to do and vice versa,
these choices take on a strategic dimension. The prisoner’s dilemma illustrates
how it can be very difficult to reconcile individual and collectively rational
decisions, especially in non-dynamic contexts. There are many situations,
particularly in the provision of public goods, however, where simple prisoner’s
dilemmas can be avoided and more manageable coordination problems remain. In
these cases, individuals may find it rational to contractually or
conventionally bind themselves to courses of action that lead to the greater
good of all even though they are not straightforwardly utility-maximizing for
particular individuals. Establishing the rationality of these contracts or
conventions is one of the leading problems of social choice theory, because
coordination can collapse if a rational agent first agrees to cooperate and
then reneges and becomes a free rider on the collective efforts of others.
Other forms of uncooperative behaviors such as violating rules established by
society or being deceptive about one’s preferences pose similar difficulties.
Hobbes attempted to solve these problems by proposing that people would agree
to submit to the authority of a sovereign whose punitive powers would make
uncooperative behavior an unattractive option. It has also been argued that
cooperation is rational if the concept of rationality is extended beyond
utility-maximizing in the right way. Other arguments stress benefits beyond
selfinterest that accrue to cooperators. Another major aspect of social choice
theory concerns the rational action of a powerful central authority, or social
planner, whose mission is to optimize the social good. Although the central
planner may be instituted by rational individual choice, this part of the
theory simply assumes the institution. The planner’s task of making a onetime
allocation of resources to the production of various commodities is tractable
if social good or social utility is known as a function of various commodities.
When the planner must take into account dynamical considerations, the technical
social choice theory social choice theory 854
854 problems are more difficult. This economic growth theory raises
important ethical questions about intergenerational conflict. The assumption of
a social analogue of the individual utility functions is particularly
worrisome. It can be shown formally that taking the results of majority votes
can lead to intransitive social orderings of possible choices and it is,
therefore, a generally unsuitable procedure for the planner to follow.
Moreover, under very general conditions there is no way of aggregating
individual preferences into a consistent social choice function of the kind
needed by the planner. ARROW’S PARADOX,
GAME THEORY, PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS, PRISONER’S DILEMMA. A.N. social
constructivism, also called social constructionism, any of a variety of views
which claim that knowledge in some area is the product of our social practices
and institutions, or of the interactions and negotiations between relevant
social groups. Mild versions hold that social factors shape interpretations of
the world. Stronger versions maintain that the world, or some significant
portion of it, is somehow constituted by theories, practices, and institutions.
Defenders often move from mild to stronger versions by insisting that the world
is accessible to us only through our interpretations, and that the idea of an
independent reality is at best an irrelevant abstraction and at worst
incoherent. (This philosophical position is distinct from, though distantly
related to, a view of the same name in social and developmental psychology,
associated with such figures as Piaget and Lev Vygotsky, which sees learning as
a process in which subjects actively construct knowledge.) Social
constructivism has roots in Kant’s idealism, which claims that we cannot know
things in themselves and that knowledge of the world is possible only by
imposing pre-given categories of thought on otherwise inchoate experience. But
where Kant believed that the categories with which we interpret and thus
construct the world are given a priori, contemporary constructivists believe
that the relevant concepts and associated practices vary from one group or
historical period to another. Since there are no independent standards for
evaluating conceptual schemes, social constructivism leads naturally to
relativism. These views are generally thought to be present in Kuhn’s The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which argues that observation and methods
in science are deeply theory-dependent and that scientists with fundamentally
different assumptions (or paradigms) effectively live in different worlds. Kuhn
thus offers a view of science in opposition to both scientific realism (which
holds that theory-dependent methods can give us knowledge of a
theory-independent world) and empiricism (which draws a sharp line between
theory and observation). Kuhn was reluctant to accept the apparently radical
consequences of his views, but his work has influenced recent social studies of
science, whose proponents frequently embrace both relativism and strong
constructivism. Another influence is the principle of symmetry advocated by
David Bloor and Barry Barnes, which holds that sociologists should explain the
acceptance of scientific views in the same way whether they believe those views
to be true or to be false. This approach is elaborated in the work of Harry
Collins, Steve Woolgar, and others. Constructivist themes are also prominent in
the work of feminist critics of science such as Sandra Harding and Donna
Haraway, and in the complex views of Bruno Latour. Critics, such as Richard
Boyd and Philip Kitcher, while applauding the detailed case studies produced by
constructivists, claim that the positive arguments for constructivism are
fallacious, that it fails to account satisfactorily for actual scientific
practice, and that like other versions of idealism and relativism it is only
dubiously coherent. ANTI-REALISM,
ETHICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY, KANT, KUHN, MATHEMATICAL
CONSTRUCTIVISM, RELATIVISM. P.Gas. social contract, an agreement either between
the people and their ruler, or among the people in a community. The idea of a
social contract has been used in arguments that differ in what they aim to
justify or explain (e.g., the state, conceptions of justice, morality), what
they take the problem of justification to be, and whether or not they
presuppose a moral theory or purport to be a moral theory. Traditionally the
term has been used in arguments that attempt to explain the nature of political
obligation and/or the kind of responsibility that rulers have to their
subjects. Philosophers such as Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant argue
that human beings would find life in a prepolitical “state of nature” (a state
that some argue is also presocietal) so difficult that they would agree –
either with one another or with a social constructivism social contract
855 855 prospective ruler – to the creation
of political institutions that each believes would improve his or her lot. Note
that because the argument explains political or social cohesion as the product
of an agreement among individuals, it makes these individuals conceptually
prior to political or social units. Marx and other socialist and communitarian
thinkers have argued against conceptualizing an individual’s relationship to
her political and social community in this way. Have social contracts in
political societies actually taken place? Hume ridicules the idea that they are
real, and questions what value makebelieve agreements can have as explanations
of actual political obligations. Although many social contract theorists admit
that there is almost never an explicit act of agreement in a community,
nonetheless they maintain that such an agreement is implicitly made when
members of the society engage in certain acts through which they give their
tacit consent to the ruling regime. It is controversial what actions constitute
giving tacit consent: Plato and Locke maintain that the acceptance of benefits
is sufficient to give such consent, but some have argued that it is wrong to
feel obliged to those who foist upon us benefits for which we have not asked.
It is also unclear how much of an obligation a person can be under if he gives
only tacit consent to a regime. How are we to understand the terms of a social
contract establishing a state? When the people agree to obey the ruler, do they
surrender their own power to him, as Hobbes tried to argue? Or do they merely
lend him that power, reserving the right to take it from him if and when they
see fit, as Locke maintained? If power is merely on loan to the ruler,
rebellion against him could be condoned if he violates the conditions of that
loan. But if the people’s grant of power is a surrender, there are no such
conditions, and the people could never be justified in taking back that power
via revolution. Despite controversies surrounding their interpretation, social
contract arguments have been important to the development of modern democratic
states: the idea of the government as the creation of the people, which they
can and should judge and which they have the right to overthrow if they find it
wanting, contributed to the development of democratic forms of polity in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. American and French revolutionaries
explicitly acknowledged their debts to social contract theorists such as Locke
and Rousseau. In the twentieth century, the social contract idea has been used
as a device for defining various moral conceptions (e.g. theories of justice)
by those who find its focus on individuals useful in the development of
theories that argue against views (e.g. utilitarianism) that allow individuals
to be sacrificed for the benefit of the group.
CONTRACTARIANISM, HOBBES, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, ROUSSEAU. J.Ham. social
Darwinism.DARWINISM, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. social epistemology, the study of the
social dimensions or determinants of knowledge, or the ways in which social
factors promote or perturb the quest for knowledge. Some writers use the term
‘knowledge’ loosely, as designating mere belief. On their view social
epistemology should simply describe how social factors influence beliefs,
without concern for the rationality or truth of these beliefs. Many historians
and sociologists of science, e.g., study scientific practices in the same
spirit that anthropologists study native cultures, remaining neutral about the
referential status of scientists’ constructs or the truth-values of their
beliefs. Others try to show that social factors like political or professional
interests are causally operative, and take such findings to debunk any
objectivist pretensions of science. Still other writers retain a normative,
critical dimension in social epistemology, but do not presume that social
practices necessarily undermine objectivity. Even if knowledge is construed as
true or rational belief, social practices might enhance knowledge acquisition.
One social practice is trusting the opinions of authorities, a practice that
can produce truth if the trusted authorities are genuinely authoritative. Such
trust may also be perfectly rational in a complex world, where division of
epistemic labor is required. Even a scientist’s pursuit of extra-epistemic
interests such as professional rewards may not be antithetical to truth in
favorable circumstances. Institutional provisions, e.g., judicial rules of
evidence, provide another example of social factors. Exclusionary rules might
actually serve the cause of truth or accuracy in judgment if the excluded
evidence would tend to mislead or prejudice jurors. EPISTEMOLOGY, MANNHEIM, RELIABILISM. A.I.G.
social ethics.SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. socialism.POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. social
philosophy, broadly the philosophy of socisocial Darwinism social philosophy
856 856 ety, including the philosophy
of social science (and many of its components, e.g., economics and history),
political philosophy, most of what we now think of as ethics, and philosophy of
law. But we may distinguish two narrower senses. In one, it is the conceptual
theory of society, including the theory of the study of society – the common
part of all the philosophical studies mentioned. In the other, it is a
normative study, the part of moral philosophy that concerns social action and
individual involvement with society in general. The central job of social
philosophy in the first of these narrower senses is to articulate the correct
notion or concept of society. This would include formulating a suitable definition
of ‘society’; the question is then which concepts are better for which
purposes, and how they are related. Thus we may distinguish “thin” and “thick”
conceptions of society. The former would identify the least that can be said
before we cease talking about society at all – say, a number of people who
interact, whose actions affect the behavior of their fellows. Thicker
conceptions would then add such things as community rules, goals, customs, and
ideals. An important empirical question is whether any interacting groups ever
do lack such things and what if anything is common to the rules, etc., that
actual societies have. Descriptive social philosophy will obviously border on,
if not merge into, social science itself, e.g. into sociology, social psychology,
or economics. And some outlooks in social philosophy will tend to ally with one
social science as more distinctively typical than others – e.g., the
individualist view looks to economics, the holist to sociology. A major
methodological controversy concerns holism versus individualism. Holism
maintains that (at least some) social groups must be studied as units,
irreducible to their members: we cannot understand a society merely by
understanding the actions and motivations of its members. Individualism denies
that societies are “organisms,” and holds that we can understand society only
in that way. Classic German sociologists (e.g., Weber) distinguished between
Gesellschaft, whose paradigm is the voluntary association, such as a chess
club, whose activities are the coordinated actions of a number of people who
intentionally join that group in order to pursue the purposes that identify it;
and Gemeinschaft, whose members find their identities in that group. Thus, the
French are not a group whose members teamed up with like-minded people to form
French society. They were French before they had separate individual purposes.
The holist views society as essentially a Gemeinschaft. Individualists agree
that there are such groupings but deny that they require a separate kind of
irreducibly collective explanation: to understand the French we must understand
how typical French individuals behave – compared, say, with the Germans, and so
on. The methods of Western economics typify the analytical tendencies of methodological
individualism, showing how we can understand large-scale economic phenomena in
terms of the rational actions of particular economic agents. (Cf. Adam Smith’s
invisible hand thesis: each economic agent seeks only his own good, yet the
result is the macrophenomenal good of the whole.) Another pervasive issue
concerns the role of intentional characterizations and explanations in these
fields. Ordinary people explain behavior by reference to its purposes, and they
formulate these in terms that rely on public rules of language and doubtless
many other rules. To understand society, we must hook onto the
selfunderstanding of the people in that society (this view is termed
Verstehen). Recent work in philosophy of science raises the question whether
intentional concepts can really be fundamental in explaining anything, and
whether we must ultimately conceive people as in some sense material systems,
e.g. as computer-like. Major questions for the program of replicating human
intelligence in data-processing terms (cf. artificial intelligence) are raised
by the symbolic aspects of interaction. Additionally, we should note the
emergence of sociobiology as a potent source of explanations of social
phenomena. Normative social philosophy, in turn, tends inevitably to merge into
either politics or ethics, especially the part of ethics dealing with how
people ought to treat others, especially in large groups, in relation to social
institutions or social structures. This contrasts with ethics in the sense
concerned with how individual people may attain the good life for themselves.
All such theories allot major importance to social relations; but if one’s
theory leaves the individual wide freedom of choice, then a theory of
individually chosen goods will still have a distinctive subject matter. The
normative involvements of social philosophy have paralleled the foregoing in
important ways. Individualists have held that the good of a society must be
analyzed in terms of the goods of its individual members. Of special importance
has been the view that society must respect indisocial philosophy social
philosophy 857 857 vidual rights,
blocking certain actions alleged to promote social good as a whole. Organicist
philosophers such as Hegel hold that it is the other way around: the state or
nation is higher than the individual, who is rightly subordinated to it, and
individuals have fundamental duties toward the groups of which they are
members. Outrightly fascist versions of such views are unpopular today, but
more benign versions continue in modified form, notably by communitarians.
Socialism and especially communism, though focused originally on economic
aspects of society, have characteristically been identified with the organicist
outlook. Their extreme opposite is to be found in the libertarians, who hold
that the right to individual liberty is fundamental in society, and that no
institutions may override that right. Libertarians hold that society ought to
be treated strictly as an association, a Gesellschaft, even though they might
not deny that it is ontogenetically Gemeinschaft. They might agree that
religious groups, e.g., cannot be wholly understood as separate individuals.
Nevertheless, the libertarian holds that religious and cultural practices may
not be interfered with or even supported by society. Libertarians are strong
supporters of free-market economic methods, and opponents of any sort of state
intervention into the affairs of individuals. Social Darwinism, advocating the
“survival of the socially fittest,” has sometimes been associated with the
libertarian view. Insofar as there is any kind of standard view on these
matters, it combines elements of both individualism and holism. Typical social
philosophers today accept that society has duties, not voluntary for individual
members, to support education, health, and some degree of welfare for all. But
they also agree that individual rights are to be respected, especially civil
rights, such as freedom of speech and religion. How to combine these two
apparently disparate sets of ideas into a coherent whole is the problem. (John
Rawls’s celebrated Theory of Justice, 1971, is a contemporary classic that
attempts to do just that.) ETHICS,
METHODOLOGICAL HOLISM, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
J.Na. social sciences, philosophy of the.PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.
Socinianism, an unorthodox Christian religious movement originating in the
sixteenth century from the work of Italian reformer Laelius Socinus (“Sozzini”
in Italian; 1525–62) and his nephew Faustus Socinus (1539–1603). Born in Siena
of a patrician family, Laelius was widely read in theology. Influenced by the
evangelical movement in Italy, he made contact with noted Protestant reformers,
including Calvin and Melanchthon, some of whom questioned his orthodoxy. In
response, he wrote a confession of faith (one of a small number of his writings
to have survived). After Laelius’s death, his work was carried on by his
nephew, Faustus, whose writings (including On the Authority of Scripture, 1570;
On the Savior Jesus Christ, 1578; and On Predestination, 1578) expressed
heterodox views. Faustus believed that Christ’s nature was entirely human, that
souls did not possess immortality by nature (though there would be selective
resurrection for believers), that invocation of Christ in prayer was
permissible but not required, and he argued against predestination. After
publication of his 1578 writings, Faustus was invited to Transylvania and
Poland to engage in a dispute within the Reformed churches there. He decided to
make his permanent residence in Poland, which, through his tireless efforts,
became the center of the Socinian movement. The most important document of this
movement was the Racovian Catechism, published in 1605 (shortly after Faustus’s
death). The Minor church of Poland, centered at Racov, became the focal point
of the movement. Its academy attracted hundreds of students and its publishing
house produced books in many languages defending Socinian ideas. Socinianism,
as represented by the Racovian Catechism and other writings collected by
Faustus’s Polish disciples, involves the views of Laelius and especially
Faustus Socinus, aligned with the anti-Trinitarian views of the Polish Minor
church (founded in 1556). It accepts Christ’s message as the definitive
revelation of God, but regards Christ as human, not divine; rejects the natural
immortality of the soul, but argues for the selective resurrection of the
faithful; rejects the doctrine of the Trinity; emphasizes human free will against
predestinationism; defends pacifism and the separation of church and state; and
argues that reason – not creeds, dogmatic tradition, or church authority – must
be the final interpreter of Scripture. Its view of God is temporalistic: God’s
eternity is existence at all times, not timelessness, and God knows future free
actions only when they occur. (In these respects, the Socinian view of God
anticipates aspects of modern process theology.) Socinianism was suppressed in
Poland in 1658, but it had already spread to other European social sciences,
philosophy of the Socinianism 858 858
countries, including Holland (where it appealed to followers of Arminius) and
England, where it influenced the Cambridge Platonists, Locke, and other
philosophers, as well as scientists like Newton. In England, it also influenced
and was closely associated with the development of Unitarianism. TRINITARIANISM. R.H.K. Socinus,
Faustus.SOCINIANISM. Socinus, Laelus.SOCINIANISM. sociobiology.SOCIAL BIOLOGY.
sociological jurisprudence.JURISPRUDENCE. sociology of knowledge.MANNHEIM.
Socrates (469–399 B.C.), Greek philosopher, the exemplar of the examined life,
best known for his dictum that only such a life is worth living. Although he
wrote nothing, his thoughts and way of life had a profound impact on many of
his contemporaries, and, through Plato’s portrayal of him in his early
writings, he became a major source of inspiration and ideas for later
generations of philosophers. His daily occupation was adversarial public
conversation with anyone willing to argue with him. A man of great intellectual
brilliance, moral integrity, personal magnetism, and physical self-command, he
challenged the moral complacency of his fellow citizens, and embarrassed them
with their inability to answer such questions as What is virtue? – questions
that he thought we must answer, if we are to know how best to live our lives.
His ideas and personality won him a devoted following among the young, but he
was far from universally admired. Formal charges were made against him for
refusing to recognize the gods of the city, introducing other new divinities,
and corrupting the youth. Tried on a single day before a large jury (500 was a
typical size), he was found guilty by a small margin: had thirty jurors voted differently,
he would have been acquitted. The punishment selected by the jury was death and
was administered by means of poison, probably hemlock. Why was he brought to
trial and convicted? Part of the answer lies in Plato’s Apology, which purports
to be the defense Socrates gave at his trial. Here he says that he has for many
years been falsely portrayed as someone whose scientific theories dethrone the
traditional gods and put natural forces in their place, and as someone who
charges a fee for offering private instruction on how to make a weak argument
seem strong in the courtroom. This is the picture of Socrates drawn in a play
of Aristophanes, the Clouds, first presented in 423. It is unlikely that
Aristophanes intended his play as an accurate depiction of Socrates, and the
unscrupulous buffoon found in the Clouds would never have won the devotion of
so serious a moralist as Plato. Aristophanes drew together the assorted
characteristics of various fifth-century thinkers and named this amalgam
“Socrates” because the real Socrates was one of several controversial
intellectuals of the period. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the charges
against Socrates or Aristophanes’ caricature were entirely without foundation.
Both Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Plato’s Euthyphro say that Socrates aroused
suspicion because he thought a certain divine sign or voice appeared to him and
gave him useful instruction about how to act. By claiming a unique and private
source of divine inspiration, Socrates may have been thought to challenge the
city’s exclusive control over religious matters. His willingness to disobey the
city is admitted in Plato’s Apology, where he says that he would have to
disobey a hypothetical order to stop asking his philosophical questions, since
he regards them as serving a religious purpose. In the Euthyphro he seeks a
rational basis for making sacrifices and performing other services to the gods;
but he finds none, and implies that no one else has one. Such a challenge to
traditional religious practice could easily have aroused a suspicion of atheism
and lent credibility to the formal charges against him. Furthermore, Socrates
makes statements in Plato’s early dialogues (and in Xenophon’s Memorabilia)
that could easily have offended the political sensibilities of his
contemporaries. He holds that only those who have given special study to
political matters should make decisions. For politics is a kind of craft, and
in all other crafts only those who have shown their mastery are entrusted with
public responsibilities. Athens was a democracy in which each citizen had an
equal legal right to shape policy, and Socrates’ analogy between the role of an
expert in politics and in other crafts may have been seen as a threat to this
egalitarianism. Doubts about his political allegiance, though not mentioned in
the formal charges against him, could easily have swayed some jurors to vote
against him. Socrates is the subject not only of Plato’s early dialogues but
also of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socinus, Faustus Socrates 859 859 and in many respects their portraits are
consistent with each other. But there are also some important differences. In
the Memorabilia, Socrates teaches whatever a gentleman needs to know for civic
purposes. He is filled with platitudinous advice, and is never perplexed by the
questions he raises; e.g., he knows what the virtues are, equating them with
obedience to the law. His views are not threatening or controversial, and
always receive the assent of his interlocutors. By contrast, Plato’s Socrates
presents himself as a perplexed inquirer who knows only that he knows nothing
about moral matters. His interlocutors are sometimes annoyed by his questions
and threatened by their inability to answer them. And he is sometimes led by
force of argument to controversial conclusions. Such a Socrates could easily
have made enemies, whereas Xenophon’s Socrates is sometimes too “good” to be
true. But it is important to bear in mind that it is only the early works of
Plato that should be read as an accurate depiction of the historical Socrates.
Plato’s own theories, as presented in his middle and late dialogues, enter into
philosophical terrain that had not been explored by the historical Socrates –
even though in the middle (and some of the late) dialogues a figure called
Socrates remains the principal speaker. We are told by Aristotle that Socrates
confined himself to ethical questions, and that he did not postulate a separate
realm of imperceptible and eternal abstract objects called “Forms” or “Ideas.”
Although the figure called Socrates affirms the existence of these objects in
such Platonic dialogues as the Phaedo and the Republic, Aristotle takes this
interlocutor to be a vehicle for Platonic philosophy, and attributes to
Socrates only those positions that we find in Plato’s earlier writing, e.g. in
the Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Ion,
Laches, Lysis, and Protagoras. Socrates focused on moral philosophy almost
exclusively; Plato’s attention was also devoted to the study of metaphysics,
epistemology, physical theory, mathematics, language, and political philosophy.
When we distinguish the philosophies of Socrates and Plato in this way, we find
continuities in their thought – for instance, the questions posed in the early dialogues
receive answers in the Republic – but there are important differences. For
Socrates, being virtuous is a purely intellectual matter: it simply involves
knowing what is good for human beings; once we master this subject, we will act
as we should. Because he equates virtue with knowledge, Socrates frequently
draws analogies between being virtuous and having mastered any ordinary subject
– cooking, building, or geometry, e.g. For mastery of these subjects does not
involve a training of the emotions. By contrast, Plato affirms the existence of
powerful emotional drives that can deflect us from our own good, if they are
not disciplined by reason. He denies Socrates’ assumption that the emotions
will not resist reason, once one comes to understand where one’s own good lies.
Socrates says in Plato’s Apology that the only knowledge he has is that he
knows nothing, but it would be a mistake to infer that he has no convictions
about moral matters – convictions arrived at through a difficult process of
reasoning. He holds that the unexamined life is not worth living, that it is
better to be treated unjustly than to do injustice, that understanding of moral
matters is the only unconditional good, that the virtues are all forms of
knowledge and cannot be separated from each other, that death is not an evil,
that a good person cannot be harmed, that the gods possess the wisdom human
beings lack and never act immorally, and so on. He does not accept these
propositions as articles of faith, but is prepared to defend any of them; for
he can show his interlocutors that their beliefs ought to lead them to accept
these conclusions, paradoxical though they may be. Since Socrates can defend
his beliefs and has subjected them to intellectual scrutiny, why does he
present himself as someone who has no knowledge – excepting the knowledge of
his own ignorance? The answer lies in his assumption that it is only a fully
accomplished expert in any field who can claim knowledge or wisdom of that
field; someone has knowledge of navigational matters, e.g., only if he has
mastered the art of sailing, can answer all inquiries about this subject, and
can train others to do the same. Judged by this high epistemic standard,
Socrates can hardly claim to be a moral expert, for he lacks answers to the
questions he raises, and cannot teach others to be virtuous. Though he has
examined his moral beliefs and can offer reasons for them – an accomplishment
that gives him an overbearing sense of superiority to his contemporaries – he
takes himself to be quite distant from the ideal of moral perfection, which
would involve a thorough understanding of all moral matters. This keen sense of
the moral and intellectual deficiency of all human beings accounts for a great
deal of Socrates’ appeal, just as his arrogant disdain for his fellow citizens
no doubt contributed to his demise. Socrates Socrates 860 860
ARISTOTLE, PLATO, SOCRATIC INTELLECTUALISM. R.Kr. Socratic
intellectualism, the claim that moral goodness or virtue consists exclusively
in a kind of knowledge, with the implication that if one knows what is good and
evil, one cannot fail to be a good person and to act in a morally upright way.
The claim and the term derive from Socrates; a corollary is another claim of
Socrates: there is no moral weakness or akrasia – all wrong action is due to
the agent’s ignorance. Socrates defends this view in Plato’s dialogue
Protagoras. There are two ways to understand Socrates’ view that knowledge of
the good is sufficient for right action. (1) All desires are rational, being
focused on what is believed to be good; thus, an agent who knows what is good
will have no desire to act contrary to that knowledge. (2) There are
non-rational desires, but knowledge of the good has sufficient motivational
power to overcome them. Socratic intellectualism was abandoned by Plato and
Aristotle, both of whom held that emotional makeup is an essential part of
moral character. However, they retained the Socratic idea that there is a kind
of knowledge or wisdom that ensures right action – but this knowledge
presupposes antecedent training and molding of the passions. Socratic
intellectualism was later revived and enjoyed a long life as a key doctrine of
the Stoics. MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM,
SOCRATES, STOICISM. D.T.D. Socratic irony, a form of indirect communication
frequently employed by Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues, chiefly to praise
insincerely the abilities of his interlocutors while revealing their ignorance;
or, to disparage his own abilities, e.g. by denying that he has knowledge.
Interpreters disagree whether Socrates’ self-disparagement is insincere. PLATO, SOCRATES. W.J.P. Socratic
method.SOCRATES. Socratic paradoxes, a collection of theses associated with
Socrates that contradict opinions about moral or practical matters shared by
most people. Although there is no consensus on the precise number of Socratic
paradoxes, each of the following theses has been identified as one. (1) Because
no one desires evil things, anyone who pursues evil things does so
involuntarily. (2) Because virtue is knowledge, anyone who does something
morally wrong does so involuntarily. (3) It is better to be unjustly treated
than to do what is unjust. The first two theses are associated with weakness of
will or akrasia. It is sometimes claimed that the topic of the first thesis is
prudential weakness, whereas that of the second is moral weakness; the
reference to “evil things” in (1) is not limited to things that are morally
evil. Naturally, various competing interpretations of these theses have been
offered. AKRASIA, PLATO, SOCRATES.
A.R.M. soft determinism.FREE WILL PROBLEM. software.COMPUTER THEORY. solipsism,
the doctrine that there exists a firstperson perspective possessing privileged
and irreducible characteristics, in virtue of which we stand in various kinds
of isolation from any other persons or external things that may exist. This
doctrine is associated with but distinct from egocentricism. On one variant of
solipsism (Thomas Nagel’s) we are isolated from other sentient beings because
we can never adequately understand their experience (empathic solipsism).
Another variant depends on the thesis that the meanings or referents of all
words are mental entities uniquely accessible only to the language user
(semantic solipsism). A restricted variant, due to Wittgenstein, asserts that
first-person ascriptions of psychological states have a meaning fundamentally
different from that of second- or thirdperson ascriptions (psychological
solipsism). In extreme forms semantic solipsism can lead to the view that the
only things that can be meaningfully said to exist are ourselves or our mental
states (ontological solipsism). Skepticism about the existence of the world
external to our minds is sometimes considered a form of epistemological
solipsism, since it asserts that we stand in epistemological isolation from
that world, partly as a result of the epistemic priority possessed by
firstperson access to mental states. In addition to these substantive versions
of solipsism, several variants go under the rubric methodological solipsism.
The idea is that when we seek to explain why sentient beings behave in certain
ways by looking to what they believe, desire, hope, and fear, we should
identify these psychological states only with events that occur inside the mind
or brain, not with external events, since the former alone are the proximate
and sufficient causal explanations of bodily behavior. Socratic intellectualism
solipsism 861 861 DESCARTES, EGOCENTRIC PREDICAMENT, PHILOSOPHY
OF MIND, PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT, SKEPTICISM. T.V. Solovyov, Vladimir
(1853–1900), Russian philosopher, theologian, essayist, and poet. In addition
to major treatises and dialogues in speculative philosophy, Solovyov wrote
sensitive literary criticism and influential essays on current social,
political, and ecclesiastical questions. His serious verse is subtle and
delicate; his light verse is rich in comic invention. The mystical image of the
“Divine Sophia,” which Solovyov articulated in theoretical concepts as well as
poetic symbols, powerfully influenced the Russian symbolist poets of the early
twentieth century. His stress on the human role in the “divine-human process”
that creates both cosmic and historical being led to charges of heresy from
Russian Orthodox traditionalists. Solovyov’s rationalistic “justification of
the good” in history, society, and individual life was inspired by Plato,
Spinoza, and especially Hegel. However, at the end of his life Solovyov offered
(in Three Conversations on War, Progress, and the End of History, 1900) a
contrasting apocalyptic vision of historical and cosmic disaster, including the
appearance, in the twenty-first century, of the Antichrist. In ethics, social
philosophy, philosophy of history, and theory of culture, Solovyov was both a
vigorous ecumenist and a “good European” who affirmed the intrinsic value of
both the “individual human person” (Russian lichnost’) and the “individual
nation or people” (narodnost’), but he decisively repudiated the perversions of
these values in egoism and nationalism, respectively. He contrasted the fruits
of English narodnost’ – the works of Shakespeare and Byron, Berkeley and Newton
– with the fruits of English nationalism – the repressive and destructive
expansion of the British Empire. In opposing ethnic, national, and religious
exclusiveness and self-centeredness, Solovyov also, and quite consistently,
opposed the growing xenophobia and antiSemitism of his own time. Since 1988
long-suppressed works by and about Solovyov have been widely republished in Russia,
and fresh interpretations of his philosophy and theology have begun to
appear. RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY. G.L.K. Son
Buddhism.KOREAN PHILOSOPHY. sophia.ARISTOTLE. sophismata (singular: sophisma),
sentences illustrating semantic or logical issues associated with the analysis
of syncategorematic terms, or terms lacking independent signification.
Typically a sophisma was used from the thirteenth century into the sixteenth
century to analyze relations holding between logic or semantics and broader
philosophical issues. For example, the syncategorematic term ‘besides’
(praeter) in ‘Socrates twice sees every man besides Plato’ is ambiguous,
because it could mean ‘On two occasions Socrates sees every-man-but-Plato’ and
also ‘Except for overlooking Plato once, on two occasions Socrates sees every
man’. Roger Bacon used this sophisma to discuss the ambiguity of distribution,
in this case, of the scope of the reference of ‘twice’ and ‘besides’. Sherwood
used the sophisma to illustrate the applicability of his rule of the
distribution of ambiguous syncategoremata, while Pseudo-Peter of Spain uses it
to establish the truth of the rule, ‘If a proposition is in part false, it can
be made true by means of an exception, but not if it is completely false’. In
each case, the philosopher uses the ambiguous signification of the
syncategorematic term to analyze broader logical problems. The sophisma ‘Every
man is of necessity an animal’ has ambiguity through the syncategorematic
‘every’ that leads to broader philosophical problems. In the 1270s, Boethius of
Dacia analyzed this sophisma in terms of its applicability when no man exists.
Is the knowledge derived from understanding the proposition destroyed when the
object known is destroyed? Does ‘man’ signify anything when there are no men?
If we can correctly predicate a genus of a species, is the nature of the genus
in that species something other than, or distinct from, what finally
differentiates the species? In this case, the sophisma proves a useful approach
to addressing metaphysical and epistemological problems central to Scholastic
discourse. BACON, ROGER; SHERWOOD;
SYNCATEGOREMATA. S.E.L. Sophists, any of a number of ancient Greeks, roughly
contemporaneous with Socrates, who professed to teach, for a fee, rhetoric,
philosophy, and how to succeed in life. They typically were itinerants,
visiting much of the Greek world, and gave public exhibitions at Olympia and
Delphi. They were part of the general expansion of Greek learning and of the
changing culture in which the previous informal educational methods were
inadequate. For example, the growing litigiousness of Athenian society demanded
Solovyov, Vladimir Sophists 862 862
instruction in the art of speaking well, which the Sophists helped fulfill. The
Sophists have been portrayed as intellectual charlatans (hence the pejorative
use of ‘sophism’), teaching their sophistical reasoning for money, and (at the
other extreme) as Victorian moralists and educators. The truth is more complex.
They were not a school, and shared no body of opinions. They were typically
concerned with ethics (unlike many earlier philosophers, who emphasized
physical inquiries) and about the relationship between laws and customs (nomos)
and nature (phusis). Protagoras of Abdera (c.490–c.420 B.C.) was the most
famous and perhaps the first Sophist. He visited Athens frequently, and became
a friend of its leader, Pericles; he therefore was invited to draw up a legal
code for the colony of Thurii (444). According to some late reports, he died in
a shipwreck as he was leaving Athens, having been tried for and found guilty of
impiety. (He claimed that he knew nothing about the gods, because of human
limitations and the difficulty of the question.) We have only a few short
quotations from his works. His “Truth” (also known as the “Throws,” i.e., how
to overthrow an opponent’s arguments) begins with his most famous claim:
“Humans are the measure of all things – of things that are, that they are, of
things that are not, that they are not.” That is, there is no objective truth;
the world is for each person as it appears to that person. Of what use, then,
are skills? Skilled people can change others’ perceptions in useful ways. For
example, a doctor can change a sick person’s perceptions so that she is
healthy. Protagoras taught his students to “make the weaker argument the
stronger,” i.e., to alter people’s perceptions about the value of arguments.
(Aristophanes satirizes Protagoras as one who would make unjust arguments
defeat just arguments.) This is true for ethical judgments, too: laws and
customs are simply products of human agreement. But because laws and customs
result from experiences of what is most useful, they should be followed rather
than nature. No perception or judgment is more true than another, but some are more
useful, and those that are more useful should be followed. Gorgias (c.483–376)
was a student of Empedocles. His town, Leontini in Sicily, sent him as an
ambassador to Athens in 427; his visit was a great success, and the Athenians
were amazed at his rhetorical ability. Like other Sophists, he charged for
instruction and gave speeches at religious festivals. Gorgias denied that he
taught virtue; instead, he produced clever speakers. He insisted that different
people have different virtues: for example, women’s virtue differs from men’s.
Since there is no truth (and if there were we couldn’t know it), we must rely
on opinion, and so speakers who can change people’s opinions have great power –
greater than the power produced by any other skill. (In his “Encomium on Helen”
he argues that if she left Menelaus and went with Paris because she was
convinced by speech, she wasn’t responsible for her actions.) Two paraphrases
of Gorgias’s “About What Doesn’t Exist” survive; in this he argues that nothing
exists, that even if something did, we couldn’t know it, and that even if we
could know anything we couldn’t explain it to anyone. We can’t know anything,
because some things we think of do not exist, and so we have no way of judging
whether the things we think of exist. And we can’t express any knowledge we may
have, because no two people can think of the same thing, since the same thing
can’t be in two places, and because we use words in speech, not colors or
shapes or objects. (This may be merely a parody of Parmenides’ argument that
only one thing exists.) Antiphon the Sophist (fifth century) is probably
(although not certainly) to be distinguished from Antiphon the orator (d. 411),
some of whose speeches we possess. We know nothing about his life (if he is distinct
from the orator). In addition to brief quotations in later authors, we have two
papyrus fragments of his “On Truth.” In these he argues that we should follow
laws and customs only if there are witnesses and so our action will affect our
reputation; otherwise, we should follow nature, which is often inconsistent
with following custom. Custom is established by human agreement, and so
disobeying it is detrimental only if others know it is disobeyed, whereas
nature’s demands (unlike those of custom) can’t be ignored with impunity.
Antiphon assumes that rational actions are selfinterested, and that justice
demands actions contrary to self-interest – a position Plato attacks in the
Republic. Antiphon was also a materialist: the nature of a bed is wood, since if
a buried bed could grow it would grow wood, not a bed. His view is one of
Aristotle’s main concerns in the Physics, since Aristotle admits in the
Categories that persistence through change is the best test for substance, but
won’t admit that matter is substance. Hippias (fifth century) was from Elis, in
the Peloponnesus, which used him as an ambasSophists Sophists 863 863 sador. He competed at the festival of
Olympus with both prepared and extemporaneous speeches. He had a phenomenal
memory. Since Plato repeatedly makes fun of him in the two dialogues that bear
his name, he probably was selfimportant and serious. He was a polymath who
claimed he could do anything, including making speeches and clothes; he wrote a
work collecting what he regarded as the best things said by others. According
to one report, he made a mathematical discovery (the quadratrix, the first
curve other than the circle known to the Greeks). In the Protagoras, Plato has
Hippias contrast nature and custom, which often does violence to nature.
Prodicus (fifth century) was from Ceos, in the Cyclades, which frequently
employed him on diplomatic missions. He apparently demanded high fees, but had
two versions of his lecture – one cost fifty drachmas, the other one drachma.
(Socrates jokes that if he could have afforded the fifty-drachma lecture, he
would have learned the truth about the correctness of words, and Aristotle says
that when Prodicus added something exciting to keep his audience’s attention he
called it “slipping in the fifty-drachma lecture for them.”) We have at least
the content of one lecture of his, the “Choice of Heracles,” which consists of
banal moralizing. Prodicus was praised by Socrates for his emphasis on the
right use of words and on distinguishing between synonyms. He also had a
naturalistic view of the origin of theology: useful things were regarded as
gods. H.A.I. Sorel, Georges (1847–1922), French socialist activist and
philosopher best known for his Reflections on Violence (1906), which develops
the notion of revolutionary syndicalism as seen through proletarian violence
and the interpretation of myth. An early proponent of the quasiMarxist position
of gradual democratic reformism, Sorel eventually developed a highly subjective
interpretation of historical materialism that, while retaining a conception of
proletarian revolution, now understood it through myth rather than reason. He
was in large part reacting to the empiricism of the French Enlightenment and
the statistical structuring of sociological studies. In contrast to Marx and
Engels, who held that revolution would occur when the proletariat attained its
own class consciousness through an understanding of its true relationship to
the means of production in capitalist society, Sorel introduced myth rather
than reason as the correct way to interpret social totality. Myth allows for
the necessary reaction to bourgeois rationalism and permits the social theorist
to negate the status quo through the authenticity of revolutionary violence. By
acknowledging the irrationality of the status quo, myth permits the possibility
of social understanding and its necessary reaction, human emancipation through
proletarian revolution. Marxism is myth because it juxtaposes the
irreducibility of capitalist organization to its negation – violent proletarian
revolution. The intermediary stage in this development is radical syndicalism,
which organizes workers into groups opposed to bourgeois authority, instills
the myth of proletarian revolution in the workers, and allows them in postrevolutionary
times to work toward a social arrangement of worker and peasant governance and
collaboration. The vehicle through which all this is accomplished is the
general strike, whose aim, through the justified violence of its ends, is to
facilitate the downfall and ultimate elimination of the bourgeoisie. In doing
so the proletariat will lead society to a classless and harmonious stage in
history. By stressing the notion of spontaneity Sorel thought he had solved the
vexing problems of party and future bureaucracy found in much of the
revolutionary literature of his day. In his later years he was interested in
the writings of both Lenin and Mussolini.
MARXISM, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. J.Bi. sorites, an argument consisting of
categorical propositions that can be represented as (or decomposed into) a
sequence of categorical syllogisms such that the conclusion of each syllogism
except the last one in the sequence is a premise of the next syllogism in the
sequence. An example is ‘All cats are felines; all felines are mammals; all
mammals are warm-blooded animals; therefore, all cats are warm-blooded
animals’. This sorites may be viewed as composed of the two syllogisms ‘All
cats are felines; all felines are mammals; therefore, all cats are mammals’ and
‘All cats are mammals; all mammals are warm-blooded animals; therefore, all
cats are warm-blooded animals’. A sorites is valid if and only if each
categorical syllogism into which it decomposes is valid. In the example, the
sorites decomposes into two syllogisms in (the mood) Barbara; since any
syllogism in Barbara is valid, the sorites is valid. SYLLOGISM. R.W.B. sorites paradox (from Greek
soros, ‘heap’), any of a number of paradoxes about heaps and their Sorel,
Georges sorites paradox 864 864
elements, and more broadly about gradations. A single grain of sand cannot be
arranged so as to form a heap. Moreover, it seems that given a number of grains
insufficient to form a heap, adding just one more grain still does not make a
heap. (If a heap cannot be formed with one grain, it cannot be formed with two;
if a heap cannot be formed with two, it cannot be formed with three; and so
on.) But this seems to lead to the absurdity that however large the number of
grains, it is not large enough to form a heap. A similar paradox can be
developed in the opposite direction. A million grains of sand can certainly be
arranged so as to form a heap, and it is always possible to remove a grain from
a heap in such a way that what is left is also a heap. This seems to lead to
the absurdity that a heap can be formed even from just a single grain. These
paradoxes about heaps were known in antiquity (they are associated with
Eubulides of Miletus, fourth century B.C.), and have since given their name to
a number of similar paradoxes. The loss of a single hair does not make a man
bald, and a man with a million hairs is certainly not bald. This seems to lead
to the absurd conclusion that even a man with no hairs at all is not bald. Or
consider a long painted wall (hundreds of yards or hundreds of miles long). The
left-hand region is clearly painted red, but there is a subtle gradation of
shades and the right-hand region is clearly yellow. A small double window
exposes a small section of the wall at any one time. It is moved progressively
rightward, in such a way that at each move after the initial position the
left-hand segment of the window exposes just the area that was in the previous
position exposed by the right-hand segment. The window is so small relative to
the wall that in no position can you tell any difference in color between the
exposed areas. When the window is at the extreme left, both exposed areas are
certainly red. But as the window moves to the right, the area in the right
segment looks just the same color as the area in the left, which you have
already pronounced to be red. So it seems that one must call it red too. But
then one is led to the absurdity of calling a clearly yellow area red. As some
of these cases suggest, there is a connection with dynamic processes. A tadpole
turns gradually into a frog. Yet if you analyze a motion picture of the
process, it seems that there are no two adjacent frames of which you can say
the earlier shows a tadpole, the later a frog. So it seems that you could
argue: if something is a tadpole at a given moment, it must also be a tadpole
(and not a frog) a millionth of a second later, and this seems to lead to the
absurd conclusion that a tadpole can never turn into a frog. Most responses to
this paradox attempt to deny the “major premise,” the one corresponding to the
claim that if you cannot make a heap with n grains of sand then you cannot make
a heap with n ! 1. The difficulty is that the negation of this premise is
equivalent, in classical logic, to the proposition that there is a sharp cutoff:
that, e.g., there is some number n of grains that are not enough to make a
heap, where n ! 1 are enough to make a heap. The claim of a sharp cutoff may
not be so very implausible for heaps (perhaps for things like grains of sand,
four is the smallest number which can be formed into a heap) but is very
implausible for colors and tadpoles. There are two main kinds of response to
sorites paradoxes. One is to accept that there is in every such case a sharp
cutoff, though typically we do not, and perhaps cannot, know where it is.
Another kind of response is to evolve a non-classical logic within which one
can refuse to accept the major premise without being committed to a sharp
cutoff. At present, no such non-classical logic is entirely free of
difficulties. So sorites paradoxes are still taken very seriously by
contemporary philosophers. MANY-VALUED
LOGIC, VAGUENESS. R.M.S. sortal.NATURAL KIND, SORTAL PREDICATE. sortal
predicate, roughly, a predicate whose application to an object says what kind
of object it is and implies conditions for objects of that kind to be
identical. Person, green apple, regular hexagon, and pile of coal would
generally be regarded as sortal predicates, whereas tall, green thing, and coal
would generally be regarded as non-sortal predicates. An explicit and precise
definition of the distinction is hard to come by. Sortal predicates are
sometimes said to be distinguished by the fact that they provide a criterion of
counting or that they do not apply to the parts of the objects to which they
apply, but there are difficulties with each of these characterizations. The
notion figures in recent philosophical discussions on various topics. Robert
Ackermann and others have suggested that any scientific law confirmable by
observation might require the use of sortal predicates. Thus ‘all non-black
things are non-ravens’, while logically equivalent to the putative scientific
law ‘all ravens are black’, is not itself confirmable by observation because
‘non-black’ is not a sortal predicate. David Wiggins and others have discussed
the sortal sortal predicate 865 865
idea that all identity claims are sortal-relative in the sense that an
appropriate response to the claim a % b is always “the same what as b?” John
Wallace has argued that there would be advantages in relativizing the
quantifiers of predicate logic to sortals. ‘All humans are mortal’ would be
rendered Ex[m]Dx, rather than Ex(MxPDx). Crispin Wright has suggested that the
view that natural number is a sortal concept is central to Frege’s (or any
other) number-theoretic platonism. The word ‘sortal’ as a technical term in
philosophy apparently first occurs in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human
Understanding. Locke argues that the so-called essence of a genus or sort
(unlike the real essence of a thing) is merely the abstract idea that the
general or sortal name stands for. But ‘sortal’ has only one occurrence in
Locke’s Essay. Its currency in contemporary philosophical idiom probably should
be credited to P. F. Strawson’s Individuals. The general idea may be traced at
least to the notion of second substance in Aristotle’s Categories. ARISTOTLE, CAUSAL LAW, ESSENTIALISM,
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. S.T.K. Soto, Domingo de (1494–1560), Spanish Dominican
theologian and philosopher. Born in Segovia, he studied in Alcalá de Henares
and Paris, taught at Segovia and Salamanca, and was named official
representative of the Holy Roman Empire at the Council of Trent by Charles V.
Among Soto’s many works, his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and On the
Soul stand out. He also wrote a book on the nature of grace and an important
treatise on law. Soto was one of the early members of the school of Spanish
Thomism, but he did not always follow Aquinas. He rejected the doctrine of the
real distinction between essence and existence and adopted Duns Scotus’s
position that the primary object of human understanding is indeterminate being
in general. Apart from metaphysics and theology, Soto’s philosophy of law and
political theory are historically important. He maintained, contrary to his
teacher Vitoria, that law originates in the understanding rather than in the
will of the legislator. He also distinguished natural from positive law: the
latter arises from the decision of legislators, whereas the former is based on
nature. Soto was a founder of the general theory of international law. AQUINAS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. J.J.E.G. soul,
also called spirit, an entity supposed to be present only in living things,
corresponding to the Greek psyche and Latin anima. Since there seems to be no
material difference between an organism in the last moments of its life and the
organism’s newly dead body, many philosophers since the time of Plato have
claimed that the soul is an immaterial component of an organism. Because only
material things are observed to be subject to dissolution, Plato took the
soul’s immateriality as grounds for its immortality. Neither Plato nor
Aristotle thought that only persons had souls: Aristotle ascribed souls to
animals and plants since they all exhibited some living functions. Unlike
Plato, Aristotle denied the transmigration of souls from one species to another
or from one body to another after death; he was also more skeptical about the
soul’s capacity for disembodiment – roughly, survival and functioning without a
body. Descartes argued that only persons had souls and that the soul’s
immaterial nature made freedom possible even if the human body is subject to
deterministic physical laws. As the subject of thought, memory, emotion,
desire, and action, the soul has been supposed to be an entity that makes
self-consciousness possible, that differentiates simultaneous experiences into
experiences either of the same person or of different persons, and that
accounts for personal identity or a person’s continued identity through time.
Dualists argue that soul and body must be distinct in order to explain
consciousness and the possibility of immortality. Materialists argue that
consciousness is entirely the result of complex physical processes. DESCARTES, PERSONAL IDENTITY, PLATO,
SURVIVAL. W.E.M. soundness, (1) (of an argument) the property of being valid
and having all true premises; (2) (of a logic) the property of being not too
strong in a certain respect. A logic L has weak soundness provided every
theorem of L is valid. And L has strong soundness if for every set G of
sentences, every sentence deducible from G using L is a logical consequence of
G. COMPLETENESS, LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE,
LOGICAL FORM, VALID. G.F.S. soundness, strong.SOUNDNESS. soundness,
weak.SOUNDNESS. sovereignty, divine.DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. space, an extended
manifold of several dimensions, where the number of dimensions corresponds to
the number of variable magnitudes Soto, Domingo de space 866 866 needed to specify a location in the
manifold; in particular, the three-dimensional manifold in which physical
objects are situated and with respect to which their mutual positions and
distances are defined. Ancient Greek atomism defined space as the infinite void
in which atoms move; but whether space is finite or infinite, and whether void
spaces exist, have remained in question. Aristotle described the universe as a
finite plenum and reduced space to the aggregate of all places of physical
things. His view was preeminent until Renaissance Neoplatonism, the Copernican
revolution, and the revival of atomism reintroduced infinite, homogeneous space
as a fundamental cosmological assumption. Further controversy concerned whether
the space assumed by early modern astronomy should be thought of as an
independently existing thing or as an abstraction from the spatial relations of
physical bodies. Interest in the relativity of motion encouraged the latter
view, but Newton pointed out that mechanics presupposes absolute distinctions
among motions, and he concluded that absolute space must be postulated along
with the basic laws of motion (Principia, 1687). Leibniz argued for the
relational view from the identity of indiscernibles: the parts of space are
indistinguishable from one another and therefore cannot be independently
existing things. Relativistic physics has defused the original controversy by
revealing both space and spatial relations as merely observer-dependent
manifestations of the structure of spacetime. Meanwhile, Kant shifted the
metaphysical controversy to epistemological grounds by claiming that space,
with its Euclidean structure, is neither a “thing-in-itself” nor a relation of
thingsin-themselves, but the a priori form of outer intuition. His view was
challenged by the elaboration of non-Euclidean geometries in the nineteenth
century, by Helmholtz’s arguments that both intuitive and physical space are
known through empirical investigation, and finally by the use of non-Euclidean
geometry in the theory of relativity. Precisely what geometrical presuppositions
are inherent in human spatial perception, and what must be learned from
experience, remain subjects of psychological investigation. RELATIVITY, SPACE-TIME, TIME. R.D. space,
absolute.SPACE. space, life.LEWIN. space, mathematical.SPACE. space, phase.STATE.
space, state.STATE. space-time, a four-dimensional continuum combining the
three dimensions of space with time in order to represent motion geometrically.
Each point is the location of an event, all of which together represent “the
world” through time; paths in the continuum (worldlines) represent the
dynamical histories of moving particles, so that straight worldlines correspond
to uniform motions; three-dimensional sections of constant time value
(“spacelike hypersurfaces” or “simultaneity slices”) represent all of space at
a given time. The idea was foreshadowed when Kant represented “the phenomenal
world” as a plane defined by space and time as perpendicular axes (Inaugural
Dissertation, 1770), and when Joseph Louis Lagrange (1736–1814) referred to
mechanics as “the analytic geometry of four dimensions.” But classical
mechanics assumes a universal standard of simultaneity, and so it can treat
space and time separately. The concept of space-time was explicitly developed
only when Einstein criticized absolute simultaneity and made the velocity of
light a universal constant. The mathematician Hermann Minkowski showed in 1908
that the observer-independent structure of special relativity could be
represented by a metric space of four dimensions: observers in relative motion
would disagree on intervals of length and time, but agree on a fourdimensional
interval combining spatial and temporal measurements. Minkowski’s model then
made possible the general theory of relativity, which describes gravity as a curvature
of spacetime in the presence of mass and the paths of falling bodies as the
straightest worldlines in curved space-time.
EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY, SPACE, TIME. R.D. spatiotemporal continuity, a
property of the careers, or space-time paths, of well-behaved objects. Let a
space-time path be a series of possible spatiotemporal positions, each
represented (in a selected coordinate system) by an ordered pair consisting of
a time (its temporal component) and a volume of space (its spatial component).
Such a path will be spatiotemporally continuous provided it is such that,
relative to any inertial frame selected as coordinate system, space, absolute
spatiotemporal continuity 867 867 (1)
for every segment of the series, the temporal components of the members of that
segment form a continuous temporal interval; and (2) for any two members ‹ti,
Vi( and ‹tj, Vj( of the series that differ in their temporal components (ti and
tj), if Vi and Vj (the spatial components) differ in either shape, size, or
location, then between these members of the series there will be a member whose
spatial component is more similar to Vi and Vj in these respects than these are
to each other. This notion is of philosophical interest partly because of its
connections with the notions of identity over time and causality. Putting aside
such qualifications as quantum considerations may require, material objects (at
least macroscopic objects of familiar kinds) apparently cannot undergo
discontinuous change of place, and cannot have temporal gaps in their
histories, and therefore the path through space-time traced by such an object
must apparently be spatiotemporally continuous. More controversial is the claim
that spatiotemporal continuity, together with some continuity with respect to
other properties, is sufficient as well as necessary for the identity of such
objects – e.g., that if a spatiotemporally continuous path is such that the
spatial component of each member of the series is occupied by a table of a
certain description at the time that is the temporal component of that member,
then there is a single table of that description that traces that path. Those
who deny this claim sometimes maintain that it is further required for the
identity of material objects that there be causal and counterfactual dependence
of later states on earlier ones (ceteris paribus, if the table had been
different yesterday, it would be correspondingly different now). Since it
appears that chains of causality must trace spatiotemporally continuous paths,
it may be that insofar as spatiotemporal continuity is required for
transtemporal identity, this is because it is required for transtemporal
causality. PERSONAL IDENTITY, TIME
SLICE. S.Sho. speaker’s meaning.MEANING. special relativity.RELATIVITY. special
senses.ARISTOTLE, FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY. special sensibles.ARISTOTLE, FACULTY
PSYCHOLOGY. species.DEFINITION. species, intentional.AQUINAS, ARISTOTLE.
speciesism.MORAL STATUS. species problem.PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY. specious
present, the supposed time between past and future. The term was first offered
by E. R. Clay in The Alternative: A Study in Psychology (1882), and was cited
by James in Chapter XV of his Principles of Psychology (1890). Clay challenges
the assumption that the “present” as a “datum” is given as “present” to us in
our experience. “The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the
past – a recent past – delusively given as benign time that intervenes between
the past and the future. Let it be named the specious present, and let the past
that is given as being the past be known as the obvious past.” For James, this
position is supportive of his contention that consciousness is a stream and can
be divided into parts only by conceptual addition, i.e., only by our ascribing
past, present, and future to what is, in our actual experience, a seamless
flow. James holds that the “practically cognized present is no knife-edge but a
saddleback,” a sort of “ducatum” which we experience as a whole, and only upon
reflective attention do we “distinguish its beginning from its end.” Whereas
Clay refers to the datum of the present as “delusive,” one might rather say
that it is perpetually elusive, for as we have our experience, now, it is
always bathed retrospectively and prospectively. Contrary to common wisdom, no
single experience ever is had by our consciousness utterly alone, single and
without relations, fore and aft. TIME.
J.J.M. speckled hen.PROBLEM OF THE SPECKLED HEN. spectrum inversion.QUALIA.
speculative philosophy, a form of theorizing that goes beyond verifiable
observation; specifically, a philosophical approach informed by the impulse to
construct a grand narrative of a worldview that encompasses the whole of
reality. Speculative philosophy purports to bind together reflections on the
existence and nature of the cosmos, the psyche, and God. It sets for its goal a
unifying matrix and an overarching system wherespeaker’s meaning speculative
philosophy 868 868 with to comprehend
the considered judgments of cosmology, psychology, and theology. Hegel’s
absolute idealism, particularly as developed in his later thought,
paradigmatically illustrates the requirements for speculative philosophizing.
His system of idealism offered a vision of the unity of the categories of human
thought as they come to realization in and through their opposition to each
other. Speculative thought tends to place a premium on universality, totality,
and unity; and it tends to marginalize the concrete particularities of the
natural and social world. In its aggressive use of the systematic principle,
geared to a unification of human experience, speculative philosophy aspires to
a comprehensive understanding and explanation of the structural interrelations
of the culture spheres of science, morality, art, and religion. HEGEL. C.O.S. speculative reason.PRACTICAL
REASONING. speech act theory, the theory of language use, sometimes called
pragmatics, as opposed to the theory of meaning, or semantics. Based on the
meaning–use distinction, it categorizes systematically the sorts of things that
can be done with words and explicates the ways these are determined,
underdetermined, or undetermined by the meanings of the words used. Relying
further on the distinction between speaker meaning and linguistic meaning, it
aims to characterize the nature of communicative intentions and how they are
expressed and recognized. Speech acts are a species of intentional action. In
general, one and the same utterance may comprise a number of distinct though
related acts, each corresponding to a different intention on the part of the
speaker. Beyond intending to produce a certain sequence of sounds forming a
sentence in English, a person who utters the sentence ‘The door is open’, e.g.,
is likely to be intending to perform, in the terminology of J. L. Austin (How
to Do Things with Words, 1962), (1) the locutionary act of saying (expressing
the proposition) that a certain door is open, (2) the illocutionary act of
making the statement (expressing the belief) that it is open, and (3) the
perlocutionary act of getting his listener to believe that it is open. In so
doing, he may be performing the indirect speech act of requesting
(illocutionary) the listener to close the door and of getting (perlocutionary)
the hearer to close the door. The primary focus of speech act theory is on
illocutionary acts, which may be classified in a variety of ways. Statements,
predictions, and answers exemplify constatives; requests, commands and
permissions are directives; promises, offers, and bets are commissives;
greetings, apologies, and congratulations are acknowledgments. These are all
communicative illocutionary acts, each distinguished by the type of
psychological state expressed by the speaker. Successful communication consists
in the audience’s recognition of the speaker’s intention to be expressing a
certain psychological state with a certain content. Conventional illocutionary
acts, on the other hand, effect or officially affect institutional states of
affairs. Examples of the former are appointing, resigning, sentencing, and
adjourning; examples of the latter are assessing, acquitting, certifying, and
grading. (See Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and
Speech Acts, 1979.) The type of act an utterance exemplifies determines its
illocutionary force. In the example ‘The door is open’, the utterance has the
force of both a statement and a request. The illocutionary force potential of a
sentence is the force or forces with which it can be used literally, e.g., in
the case of the sentence ‘The door is open’, as a statement but not as a
request. The felicity conditions on an illocutionary act pertain not only to
its communicative or institutional success but also to its sincerity,
appropriateness, and effectiveness. An explicit performative utterance is an illocutionary
act performed by uttering an indicative sentence in the simple present tense
with a verb naming the type of act being performed, e.g., ‘I apologize for
everything I did’ and ‘You are requested not to smoke’. The adverb ‘hereby’ may
be used before the performative verb (‘apologize’ and ‘request’ in these
examples) to indicate that the very utterance being made is the vehicle of the
performance of the illocutionary act in question. A good test for
distinguishing illocutionary from perlocutionary acts is to determine whether a
verb naming the act can be used performatively. Austin exploited the phenomenon
of performative utterances to expose the common philosophical error of assuming
that the primary use of language is to make statements. AUSTIN, J. L.; PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. K.B.
Spencer, Herbert
(1820–1903), English philosopher, social reformer, and editor of The Economist.
In epistemology, Spencer adopted the ninespeculative reason Spencer, Herbert
869 869 teenth-century trend toward
positivism: the only reliable knowledge of the universe is to be found in the
sciences. His ethics were utilitarian, following Bentham and J. S. Mill:
pleasure and pain are the criteria of value as signs of happiness or
unhappiness in the individual. His Synthetic Philosophy, expounded in books
written over many years, assumed (both in biology and psychology) the existence
of Lamarckian evolution: given a characteristic environment, every animal
possesses a disposition to make itself into what it will, failing maladaptive
interventions, eventually become. The dispositions gain expression as inherited
acquired habits. Spencer could not accept that species originate by chance
variations and natural selection alone: direct adaptation to environmental
constraints is mainly responsible for biological changes. Evolution also
includes the progression of societies in the direction of a dynamical
equilibrium of individuals: the human condition is perfectible because human
faculties are completely adapted to life in society, implying that evil and
immorality will eventually disappear. His ideas on evolution predated
publication of the major works of Darwin; A. R. Wallace was influenced by his
writings. R.E.B. Speusippus.ACADEMY. Spinoza, Baruch (1632–77), Dutch
metaphysician, epistemologist, psychologist, moral philosopher, political
theorist, and philosopher of religion, generally regarded as one of the most
important figures of seventeenth-century rationalism. Life and works. Born and
educated in the Jewish community of Amsterdam, he forsook his given name
‘Baruch’ in favor of the Latin ‘Benedict’ at the age of twenty-two. Between
1652 and 1656 he studied the philosophy of Descartes in the school of Francis
van den Enden. Having developed unorthodox views of the divine nature (and
having ceased to be fully observant of Jewish practice), he was excommunicated
by the Jewish community in 1656. He spent his entire life in Holland; after
leaving Amsterdam in 1660, he resided successively in Rijnsburg, Voorburg, and
the Hague. He supported himself at least partly through grinding lenses, and
his knowledge of optics involved him in an area of inquiry of great importance
to seventeenth-century science. Acquainted with such leading intellectual
figures as Leibniz, Huygens, and Henry Oldenberg, he declined a professorship
at the University of Heidelberg partly on the grounds that it might interfere
with his intellectual freedom. His premature death at the age of fortyfour was
due to consumption. The only work published under Spinoza’s name during his
lifetime was his Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy (Renati Des Cartes
Principiorum Philosophiae, Pars I et II, 1663), an attempt to recast and
present Parts I and II of Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy in the manner
that Spinoza called geometrical order or geometrical method. Modeled on the
Elements of Euclid and on what Descartes called the method of synthesis,
Spinoza’s “geometrical order” involves an initial set of definitions and
axioms, from which various propositions are demonstrated, with notes or scholia
attached where necessary. This work, which established his credentials as an
expositor of Cartesian philosophy, had its origins in his endeavor to teach
Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy to a private student. Spinoza’s TheologicalPolitical
Treatise (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus) was published anonymously in 1670.
After his death, his close circle of friends published his Posthumous Works
(Opera Postuma, 1677), which included his masterpieces, Ethic, Demonstrated in
Geometrical Order (Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata). The Posthumous Works
also included his early unfinished Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect
(Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione), his later unfinished Political Treatise
(Tractatus Politicus), a Hebrew Grammar, and Correspondence. An unpublished
early work entitled Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being (Korte
Vorhandelung van God, de Mensch en deszelvs Welstand), in many ways a
forerunner of the Ethics, was rediscovered (in copied manuscript) and published
in the nineteenth century. Spinoza’s authorship of two brief scientific
treatises, On the Rainbow and On the Calculation of Chances, is still disputed.
Metaphysics. Spinoza often uses the term ‘God, or Nature’ (“Deus, sive
Natura“), and this identification of God with Nature is at the heart of his
metaphysics. Because of this identification, his philosophy is often regarded
as a version of pantheism and/or naturalism. But although philosophy begins
with metaphysics for Spinoza, his metaphysics is ultimately in the service of
his ethics. Because his naturalized God has no desires or purposes, human
ethics cannot properly be derived from divine command. Rather, Spinozistic
ethics seeks to demonstrate, from an adequate understanding of the divine
nature and its expression in human nature, the way in which human beings can
maximize their advantage. Central to the successful pursuit of this Speusippus
Spinoza, Baruch 870 870 advantage is
adequate knowledge, which leads to increasing control of the passions and to
cooperative action. Spinoza’s ontology, like that of Descartes, consists of
substances, their attributes (which Descartes called principal attributes), and
their modes. In the Ethics, Spinoza defines ‘substance’ as what is “in itself,
and is conceived through itself”; ‘attribute’ as that which “the intellect
perceives of a substance as constituting its essence”; and ‘mode’ as “the
affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which also it is
conceived.” While Descartes had recognized a strict sense in which only God is
a substance, he also recognized a second sense in which there are two kinds of
created substances, each with its own principal attribute: extended substances,
whose only principal attribute is extension; and minds, whose only principal
attribute is thought. Spinoza, in contrast, consistently maintains that there
is only one substance. His metaphysics is thus a form of substantial monism.
This one substance is God, which Spinoza defines as “a being absolutely infinite,
i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each
expresses an eternal and infinite essence.” Thus, whereas Descartes limited
each created substance to one principal attribute, Spinoza claims that the one
substance has infinite attributes, each expressing the divine nature without
limitation in its own way. Of these infinite attributes, however, humans can
comprehend only two: extension and thought. Within each attribute, the modes of
God are of two kinds: infinite modes, which are pervasive features of each
attribute, such as the laws of nature; and finite modes, which are local and
limited modifications of substance. There is an infinite sequence of finite
modes. Descartes regarded a human being as a substantial union of two different
substances, the thinking soul and the extended body, in causal interaction with
each other. Spinoza, in contrast, regards a human being as a finite mode of
God, existing simultaneously in God as a mode of thought and as a mode of
extension. He holds that every mode of extension is literally identical with
the mode of thought that is the “idea of” that mode of extension. Since the
human mind is the idea of the human body, it follows that the human mind and
the human body are literally the same thing, conceived under two different
attributes. Because they are actually identical, there is no causal interaction
between the mind and the body; but there is a complete parallelism between what
occurs in the mind and what occurs in the body. Since every mode of extension
has a corresponding and identical mode of thought (however rudimentary that
might be), Spinoza allows that every mode of extension is “animated to some
degree”; his view is thus a form of panpsychism. Another central feature of
Spinoza’s metaphysics is his necessitarianism, expressed in his claim that
“things could have been produced . . . in no other way, and in no other order”
than that in which they have been produced. He derives this necessitarianism
from his doctrine that God exists necessarily (for which he offers several
arguments, including a version of the ontological argument) and his doctrine
that everything that can follow from the divine nature must necessarily do so.
Thus, although he does not use the term, he accepts a very strong version of
the principle of sufficient reason. At the outset of the Ethics, he defines a
thing as free when its actions are determined by its own nature alone. Only God
– whose actions are determined entirely by the necessity of his own nature, and
for whom nothing is external – is completely free in this sense. Nevertheless,
human beings can achieve a relative freedom to the extent that they live the
kind of life described in the later parts of the Ethics. Hence, Spinoza is a
compatibilist concerning the relation between freedom and determinism. “Freedom
of the will” in any sense that implies a lack of causal determination, however,
is simply an illusion based on ignorance of the true causes of a being’s
actions. The recognition that all occurrences are causally determined, Spinoza
holds, has a positive consolatory power that aids one in controlling the
passions. Epistemology and psychology. Like other rationalists, Spinoza
distinguishes two representational faculties: the imagination and the intellect.
The imagination is a faculty of forming imagistic representations of things,
derived ultimately from the mechanisms of the senses; the intellect is a
faculty of forming adequate, nonimagistic conceptions of things. He also
distinguishes three “kinds of knowledge.” The first or lowest kind he calls
opinion or imagination (opinio, imaginatio). It includes “random or
indeterminate experience” (experientia vaga) and also “hearsay, or knowledge
from mere signs”; it thus depends on the confused and mutilated deliverances of
the senses, and is inadequate. The second kind of knowledge he calls reason
(ratio); it depends on common notions (i.e., features of things that are
“common to all, and equally in the part and in the whole”) or on adequate
knowledge of the properties (as opposed to the Spinoza, Baruch Spinoza, Baruch
871 871 essences) of things. The third
kind of knowledge he calls intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva); it
proceeds from adequate knowledge of the essence or attributes of God to
knowledge of the essence of things, and hence proceeds in the proper order,
from causes to effects. Both the second and third kinds of knowledge are
adequate. The third kind is preferable, however, as involving not only certain
knowledge that something is so, but also knowledge of how and why it is so.
Because there is only one substance – God – the individual things of the world
are not distinguished from one another by any difference of substance. Rather,
among the internal qualitative modifications and differentiations of each
divine attribute, there are patterns that have a tendency to endure; these
constitute individual things. (As they occur within the attribute of extension,
Spinoza calls these patterns fixed proportions of motion and rest.) Although
these individual things are thus modes of the one substance, rather than
substances in their own right, each has a nature or essence describable in
terms of the thing’s particular pattern and its mechanisms for the preservation
of its own being. This tendency toward self-preservation Spinoza calls conatus
(sometimes translated as ‘endeavor’). Every individual thing has some conatus.
An individual thing acts, or is active, to the extent that what occurs can be
explained or understood through its own nature (i.e., its selfpreservatory
mechanism) alone; it is passive to the extent that what happens must be
explained through the nature of other forces impinging on it. Thus, every
thing, to whatever extent it can, actively strives to persevere in its
existence; and whatever aids this self-preservation constitutes that
individual’s advantage. Spinoza’s specifically human psychology is an
application of this more general doctrine of conatus. That application is made
through appeal to several specific characteristics of human beings: they form
imagistic representations of other individuals by means of their senses; they
are sufficiently complex to undergo increases and decreases in their capacity
for action; and they are capable of engaging in reason. The fundamental
concepts of his psychology are desire, which is conatus itself, especially as
one is conscious of it as directed toward attaining a particular object;
pleasure, which is an increase in capacity for action; and pain, which is a
decrease in capacity for action. He defines other emotions in terms of these
basic emotions, as they occur in particular combinations, in particular kinds
of circumstances, with particular kinds of causes, and/or with particular kinds
of objects. When a person is the adequate cause of his or her own emotions,
these emotions are active emotions; otherwise, they are passions. Desire and
pleasure can be either active emotions or passions, depending on the
circumstances; pain, however, can only be a passion. Spinoza does not deny the
phenomenon of altruism: one’s self-preservatory mechanism, and hence one’s
desire, can become focused on a wide variety of objects, including the
well-being of a loved person or object – even to one’s own detriment. However,
because he reduces all human motivation, including altruistic motivation, to
permutations of the endeavor to seek one’s own advantage, his theory is
arguably a form of psychological egoism. Ethics. Spinoza’s ethical theory does
not take the form of a set of moral commands. Rather, he seeks to demonstrate,
by considering human actions and appetites objectively – “just as if it were a
Question of lines, planes, and bodies” – wherein a person’s true advantage
lies. Readers who genuinely grasp the demonstrated truths will, he holds, ipso
facto be motivated, to at least some extent, to live their lives accordingly.
Thus, Spinozistic ethics seeks to show how a person acts when “guided by
reason“; to act in this way is at the same time to act with virtue, or power.
All actions that result from understanding – i.e., all virtuous actions – may
be attributed to strength of character (fortitudo). Such virtuous actions may
be further divided into two classes: those due to tenacity (animositas), or
“the Desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to
preserve his being”; and those due to nobility (generositas), or “the Desire by
which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and
join them to him in friendship.” Thus, the virtuous person does not merely
pursue private advantage, but seeks to cooperate with others; returns love for
hatred; always acts honestly, not deceptively; and seeks to join himself with
others in a political state. Nevertheless, the ultimate reason for aiding
others and joining them to oneself in friendship is that “nothing is more
useful to man than man” – i.e., because doing so is conducive to one’s own
advantage, and particularly to one’s pursuit of knowledge, which is a good that
can be shared without loss. Although Spinoza holds that we generally use the
terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ simply to report subjective appearances – so that we
call “good” whatever we desire, and “evil” whatever we seek to avoid – he
proposes that we Spinoza, Baruch Spinoza, Baruch 872 872 define ‘good’ philosophically as ‘what
we certainly know to be useful to us’, and ‘evil’ as ‘what we certainly know
prevents us from being masters of some good’. Since God is perfect and has no
needs, it follows that nothing is either good or evil for God. Spinoza’s
ultimate appeal to the agent’s advantage arguably renders his ethical theory a
form of ethical egoism, even though he emphasizes the existence of common
shareable goods and the (instrumental) ethical importance of cooperation with
others. However, it is not a form of hedonism; for despite the prominence he
gives to pleasure, the ultimate aim of human action is a higher state of
perfection or capacity for action, of whose increasing attainment pleasure is
only an indicator. A human being whose self-preservatory mechanism is driven or
distorted by external forces is said to be in bondage to the passions; in
contrast, one who successfully pursues only what is truly advantageous, in
consequence of genuine understanding of where that advantage properly lies, is
free. Accordingly, Spinoza also expresses his conception of a virtuous life
guided by reason in terms of an ideal “free man.” Above all, the free man seeks
understanding of himself and of Nature. Adequate knowledge, and particularly
knowledge of the third kind, leads to blessedness, to peace of mind, and to the
intellectual love of God. Blessedness is not a reward for virtue, however, but
rather an integral aspect of the virtuous life. The human mind is itself a part
of the infinite intellect of God, and adequate knowledge is an eternal aspect
of that infinite intellect. Hence, as one gains knowledge, a greater part of
one’s own mind comes to be identified with something that is eternal, and one
becomes less dependent on – and less disturbed by – the local forces of one’s
immediate environment. Accordingly, the free man “thinks of nothing less than
of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death.” Moreover, just
as one’s adequate knowledge is literally an eternal part of the infinite
intellect of God, the resulting blessedness, peace of mind, and intellectual
love are literally aspects of what might be considered God’s own eternal
“emotional” life. Although this endows the free man with a kind of blessed
immortality, it is not a personal immortality, since the sensation and memory
that are essential to personal individuality are not eternal. Rather, the free
man achieves during his lifetime an increasing participation in a body of
adequate knowledge that has itself always been eternal, so that, at death, a
large part of the free man’s mind has become identified with the eternal. It is
thus a kind of “immortality” in which one can participate while one lives, not
merely when one dies. Politics and philosophical theology. Spinoza’s political
theory, like that of Hobbes, treats rights and power as equivalent. Citizens
give up rights to the state for the sake of the protection that the state can
provide. Hobbes, however, regards this social contract as nearly absolute, one
in which citizens give up all of their rights except the right to resist death.
Spinoza, in contrast, emphasizes that citizens cannot give up the right to
pursue their own advantage as they see it, in its full generality; and hence
that the power, and right, of any actual state is always limited by the state’s
practical ability to enforce its dictates so as to alter the citizens’
continuing perception of their own advantage. Furthermore, he has a more
extensive conception of the nature of an individual’s own advantage than
Hobbes, since for him one’s own true advantage lies not merely in fending off
death and pursuing pleasure, but in achieving the adequate knowledge that
brings blessedness and allows one to participate in that which is eternal. In
consequence, Spinoza, unlike Hobbes, recommends a limited, constitutional state
that encourages freedom of expression and religious toleration. Such a state –
itself a kind of individual – best preserves its own being, and provides both
the most stable and the most beneficial form of government for its citizens. In
his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza also takes up popular religion, the
interpretation of Scripture, and their bearing on the well-being of the state.
He characterizes the Old Testament prophets as individuals whose vivid
imaginations produced messages of political value for the ancient Hebrew state.
Using a naturalistic outlook and historical hermeneutic methods that anticipate
the later “higher criticism” of the Bible, he seeks to show that Scriptural
writers themselves consistently treat only justice and charity as essential to
salvation, and hence that dogmatic doxastic requirements are not justified by
Scripture. Popular religion should thus propound only these two requirements,
which it may imaginatively represent, to the minds of the many, as the requirements
for rewards granted by a divine Lawgiver. The few, who are more philosophical,
and who thus rely on intellect, will recognize that the natural laws of human
psychology require charity and justice as conditions of happiness, and that
what the vulgar construe as rewards granted by personal divine intervention are
in fact the natural consequences of a virtuous life. Spinoza, Baruch Spinoza,
Baruch 873 873 Because of his
identificaton of God with Nature and his treatment of popular religion, Spinoza’s
contemporaries often regarded his philosophy as a thinly disguised atheism.
Paradoxically, however, nineteenth-century Romanticism embraced him for his
pantheism; Novalis, e.g., famously characterized him as “the God-intoxicated
man.” In fact, Spinoza ascribes to Nature most of the characteristics that
Western theologians have ascribed to God: Spinozistic Nature is infinite,
eternal, necessarily existing, the object of an ontological argument, the first
cause of all things, all-knowing, and the being whose contemplation produces
blessedness, intellectual love, and participation in a kind of immortality or
eternal life. Spinoza’s claim to affirm the existence of God is therefore no
mere evasion. However, he emphatically denies that God is a person or acts for
purposes; that anything is good or evil from the divine perspective; or that
there is a personal immortality involving memory. In addition to his influence
on the history of biblical criticism and on literature (including not only
Novalis but such writers as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Heine, Shelley, George
Eliot, George Sand, Somerset Maugham, Jorge Luis Borges, and Bernard Malamud),
Spinoza has affected the philosophical outlooks of such diverse
twentieth-century thinkers as Freud and Einstein. Contemporary physicists have
seen in his monistic metaphysics an anticipation of twentieth-century field
metaphysics. More generally, he is a leading intellectual forebear of
twentieth-century determinism and naturalism, and of the mind–body identity
theory. DESCARTES, LEIBNIZ, RATIONALISM.
D.Garr. Spir, Afrikan (1837–90), German philosopher. He served in the Crimean
War as a Russian officer. A non-academic, he published books in German and
French. His major works are Forschung nach der Gewissheit in der Erkenntnis der
Wirklichkeit (Inquiry concerning Certainty in the Knowledge of Actuality, 1869)
and the two-volume Denken und Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer Erneuerung der
kritischen Philosophie (Thought and Actuality: Attempt at a Revival of Critical
Philosophy, 1873). Thought and Actuality presents a metaphysics based on the
radical separation of the apparent world and an absolute reality. All we can
know about the “unconditioned” is that it must conform with the principle of
identity. While retaining the unknowable thing-in-itself of Kant, Spir argued
for the empirical reality of time, which is given to us in immediate experience
and depends on our experience of a succession of differential states. The aim
of philosophy is to reach fundamental and immediate certainties. Of the works
included in his Gesammelte Schriften (1883– 84), only a relatively minor study,
Right and Wrong, was translated into English (in 1954). There are a number of
references to Spir in the writings of Nietzsche, which indicate that some of Nietzsche’s
central notions were influenced, both positively and negatively, by Spir’s
analyses of becoming and temporality, as well as by his concept of the
separation of the world of appearance and the “true world.” G.J.S. spirit.SOUL.
spirit, Absolute.
HEGEL. spissitude.MORE,
HENRY. split brain effects, a wide array of behavioral effects consequent upon
the severing of the cerebral commisures, and generally interpreted as
indicating asymmetry in cerebral functions. The human brain has considerable
left–right functional differentiation, or asymmetry, that affects behavior. The
most obvious example is handedness. By the 1860s Bouillaud, Dax, and Broca had
observed that the effects of unilateral damage indicated that the left
hemisphere was preferentially involved in language. Since the 1960s, this
commitment to functional asymmetry has been reinforced by studies of patients
in whom communication between the hemispheres has been surgically disrupted.
Split brain effects depend on severing the cerebral commisures, and especially
the corpus callosum, which are neural structures mediating communication
between the cerebral hemispheres. Commisurotomies have been performed since the
1940s to control severe epilepsy. This is intended to leave both hemispheres
intact and functioning independently. Beginning in the 1960s, J. E. Bogen, M.
S. Gazzaniga, and R. W. Sperry conducted an array of psychological tests to
evaluate the distinctive abilities of the different hemispheres. Ascertaining
the degree of cerebral asymmetry depends on a carefully controlled experimental
design in which access of the disassociated hemispheres to peripheral cues is
limited. The result has been a wide array of striking results. For example,
patients are unable to match an object such as a key felt in one hand with a
similar object felt in the other; patients are unable to name an object Spir,
Afrikan split brain effects 874 874
held in the left hand, though they can name an object held in the right. Researchers
have concluded that these results confirm a clear lateralization of speech,
writing, and calculation in the left hemisphere (for righthanded patients),
leaving the right hemisphere largely unable to respond in speech or writing,
and typically unable to perform even simple calculations. It is often concluded
that the left hemisphere is specialized for verbal and analytic modes of
thinking, while the right hemisphere is specialized for more spatial and
synthetic modes of thinking. The precise character and extent of these
differences in normal subjects are less clear. R.C.R. spontaneity, liberty
of.FREE WILL PROBLEM, HUME. spread law.
RELEVANCE LOGIC. square
of opposition, a graphic representation of various logical relations among
categorical propositions. (Relations among modal and even among hypothetical
propositions have also been represented on the square.) Two propositions are said
to be each other’s (1) contradictories if exactly one of them must be true and
exactly one false; (2) contraries if they could not both be true although they
could both be false; and (3) subcontraries if at least one of them must be true
although both of them may be true. There is a relation of (4) subalternation of
one proposition, called subaltern, to another called superaltern, if the truth
of the latter implies the truth of the former, but not conversely. Applying
these definitions to the four types of categorical propositions, we find that
SaP and SoP are contradictories, and so are SeP and SiP. SaP and SeP are
contraries. SiP and SoP are subcontraries. SiP is subaltern to SaP, and SoP is
subaltern to SeP. These relations can be represented graphically in a square of
opposition: The four relations on the traditional square are expressed in the
following theses: Contradictories: SaP S -SoP, SeP S -SiP Contraries: -(SaP
& SeP) or SaP P -SeP Subcontraries: SiP 7 SoP Subalterns: SaP P SiP, SeP P
SoP For these relations to hold, an underlying existential assumption must be
satisfied: the terms serving as subjects of propositions must be satisfied, not
empty (e.g., ‘man’ is satisfied and ‘elf’ empty). Only the contradictory
opposition remains without that assumption. Modern interpretations of
categorical propositions exclude the existential assumption; thus, only the
contradictory opposition remains in the square.
SYLLOGISM. I.Bo. square of opposition, modal.CONTINGENT. stadium
paradox.ZENO’S PARADOXES. Stagirite.ARISTOTLE. standard analysis.MATHEMATICAL
ANALYSIS. standard interpretation.FORMAL SEMANTICS. standard model, a term
that, like ‘non-standard model’, is used with regard to theories that
systematize (part of) our knowledge of some mathematical structure, for
instance the structure of natural numbers with addition, multiplication, and
the successor function, or the structure of real numbers with ordering,
addition, and multiplication. Models isomorphic to this intended mathematical
structure are the “standard models” of the theory, while any other,
non-isomorphic, model of the theory is a ‘non-standard’ model. Since Peano
arithmetic is incomplete, it has consistent extensions that have no standard
model. But there are also non-standard, countable models of complete number
theory, the set of all true first-order sentences about natural numbers, as was
first shown by Skolem in 1934. Categorical theories do not have a non-standard
model. It is less clear whether there is a standard model of set theory, although
a countable model would certainly count as non-standard. The Skolem paradox is
that any first-order formulation of set theory, like ZF, due to Zermelo and
Fraenkel, has a countable model, while it seems to assert the existence of
non-countable sets. Many other important mathematical structures cannot be
characterized by a categorical set of first-order axioms, and thus allow
non-standard models. The American philosopher Putnam has argued that this fact
has important implications for the debate about realism in the philosophy of
language. If axioms cannot capture the spontaneity, liberty of standard model
875 875 “intuitive” notion of a set,
what could? Some of his detractors have pointed out that within second-order
logic categorical characterizations are often possible. But Putnam has objected
that the intended interpretation of second-order logic itself is not fixed by
the use of the formalism of second-order logic, where “use” is determined by
the rules of inference for second-order logic we know about. Moreover,
categorical theories are sometimes uninformative.
CATEGORICAL THEORY,
GöDEL’s INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS, SET THEORY. Z.G.S. standard
semantics.SECOND-ORDER LOGIC. state, the way an object or system basically is;
the fundamental, intrinsic properties of an object or system, and the basis of
its other properties. An instantaneous state is a state at a given time. State
variables are constituents of a state whose values may vary with time. In
classical or Newtonian mechanics the instantaneous state of an n-particle
system consists of the positions and momenta (masses multiplied by velocities)
of the n particles at a given time. Other mechanical properties are functions
of those in states. Fundamental and derived properties are often, though possibly
misleadingly, called observables. The set of a system’s possible states can be
represented as an abstract phase space or state space, with dimensions or
coordinates for (the components of) each state variable. In quantum theory,
states do not fix the particular values of observables, only the probabilities
of observables assuming particular values in particular measurement situations.
For positivism or instrumentalism, specifying a quantum state does nothing more
than provide a means for calculating such probabilities. For realism, it does
more – e.g., it refers to the basis of a quantum system’s probabilistic
dispositions or propensities. Vectors in Hilbert spaces represent possible
states, and Hermitian operators on vectors represent observables. DISPOSITION, INSTRUMENTALISM, PROBABILITY,
PROPENSITY, QUANTUM MECHANICS, STATE OF AFFAIRS. D.S. state, liberal theory of
the.LOCKE, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. state, political.POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. state
description.CARNAP. state function.QUANTUM MECHANICS. statement,
basic.FOUNDATIONALISM. statement form.LOGICAL FORM. state of affairs, a
possibility, actuality, or impossibility of the kind expressed by a
nominalization of a declarative sentence. (The declarative sentence ‘This die
comes up six’ can be nominalized either through the construction ‘that this die
comes up six’ or through the likes of ‘this die’s coming up six’. The resulting
nominalizations might be interpreted as naming corresponding propositions or
states of affairs.) States of affairs come in several varieties. Some are
possible states of affairs, or possibilities. Consider the possibility of a
certain die coming up six when rolled next. This possibility is a state of
affairs, as is its “complement” – the die’s not coming up six when rolled next.
There is in addition the state of affairs which conjoins that die’s coming up
six with its not coming up six. And this (contradictory) state of affairs is of
course not a possibility, not a possible state of affairs. Moreover, for every
actual state of affairs there is a non-actual one, its complement. For every
proposition there is hence a state of affairs: possible or impossible, actual
or not. Indeed some consider propositions to be states of affairs. Some take
facts to be actual states of affairs, while others prefer to define them as
true propositions. If propositions are states of affairs, then facts are of
course both actual states of affairs and true propositions. In a very broad
sense, events are just possible states of affairs; in a narrower sense they are
contingent states of affairs; and in a still narrower sense they are contingent
and particular states of affairs, involving just the exemplification of an
nadic property by a sequence of individuals of length n. In a yet narrower
sense events are only those particular and contingent states of affairs that
entail change. A baseball’s remaining round throughout a certain period does
not count as an event in this narrower sense but only as a state of that
baseball, unlike the event of its being hit by a certain bat. CONDITION, PROPOSITION. E.S. state of
nature.HOBBES, LOCKE. state space.STATE. state table.TURING MACHINE. standard
semantics state table 876 876 state
variable.STATE. state verb.ACTION VERB. statistical explanation, an explanation
expressed in an explanatory argument containing premises and conclusions making
claims about statistical probabilities. These arguments include deductions of
less general from more general laws and differ from other such explanations
only insofar as the contents of the laws imply claims about statistical
probability. Most philosophical discussion in the latter half of the twentieth
century has focused on statistical explanation of events rather than laws. This
type of argument was discussed by Ernest Nagel (The Structure of Science, 1961)
under the rubric “probabilistic explanation,” and by Hempel (Aspects of
Scientific Explanation, 1965) as “inductive statistical” explanation. The
explanans contains a statement asserting that a given system responds in one of
several ways specified by a sample space of possible outcomes on a trial or
experiment of some type, and that the statistical probability of an event
(represented by a set of points in the sample space) on the given kind of trial
is also given for each such event. Thus, the statement might assert that the
statistical probability is near 1 of the relative frequency r/n of heads in n
tosses being close to the statistical probability p of heads on a single toss,
where the sample space consists of the 2n possible sequences of heads and tails
in n tosses. Nagel and Hempel understood such statistical probability
statements to be covering laws, so that inductive-statistical explanation and
deductivenomological explanation of events are two species of covering law
explanation. The explanans also contains a claim that an experiment of the kind
mentioned in the statistical assumption has taken place (e.g., the coin has
been tossed n times). The explanandum asserts that an event of some kind has
occurred (e.g., the coin has landed heads approximately r times in the n
tosses). In many cases, the kind of experiment can be described equivalently as
an n-fold repetition of some other kind of experiment (as a thousandfold
repetition of the tossing of a given coin) or as the implementation of the kind
of trial (thousand-fold tossing of the coin) one time. Hence, statistical
explanation of events can always be construed as deriving conclusions about
“single cases” from assumptions about statistical probabilities even when the
concern is to explain mass phenomena. Yet, many authors controversially
contrast statistical explanation in quantum mechanics, which is alleged to
require a singlecase propensity interpretation of statistical probability, with
statistical explanation in statistical mechanics, genetics, and the social
sciences, which allegedly calls for a frequency interpretation. The structure
of the explanatory argument of such statistical explanation has the form of a
direct inference from assumptions about statistical probabilities and the kind
of experiment trial which has taken place to the outcome. One controversial
aspect of direct inference is the problem of the reference class. Since the
early nineteenth century, statistical probability has been understood to be
relative to the way the experiment or trial is described. Authors like J. Venn,
Peirce, R. A. Fisher, and Reichenbach, among many others, have been concerned
with how to decide on which kind of trial to base a direct inference when the
trial under investigation is correctly describable in several ways and the
statistical probabilities of possible outcomes may differ relative to the
different sorts of descriptions. The most comprehensive discussion of this
problem of the reference class is found in the work of H. E. Kyburg (e.g.,
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, 1961). Hempel acknowledged its
importance as an “epistemic ambiguity” in inductive statistical explanation.
Controversy also arises concerning inductive acceptance. May the conclusion of
an explanatory direct inference be a judgment as to the subjective probability
that the outcome event occurred? May a judgment that the outcome event occurred
is inductively “accepted” be made? Is some other mode of assessing the claim
about the outcome appropriate? Hempel’s discussion of the “nonconjunctiveness
of inductivestatistical” explanation derives from Kyburg’s earlier account of
direct inference where high probability is assumed to be sufficient for
acceptance. Non-conjunctiveness has been avoided by abandoning the sufficiency
of high probability (I. Levi, Gambling with Truth, 1967) or by denying that
direct inference in inductive-statistical explanation involves inductive
acceptance at all (R. C. Jeffrey, “Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical
Inference,” in Essays in Honor of C. G. Hempel, 1969). CAUSATION, EXPLANATION. I.L. statistical
independence.PROBABILITY. statistical law.CAUSAL LAW. state variable
statistical law 877 877 statistical
probability.PROBABILITY. Steiner, Rudolf (1861–1925), Austrian spiritualist and
founder of anthroposophy. Trained as a scientist, he edited Goethe’s scientific
writings and prepared the standard edition of his complete works from 1889 to
1896. Steiner’s major work, Die Philosophie der Freiheit, was published in
1894. His Friedrich Nietzsche: Ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit (1895) was
translated in 1960 by Margaret deRis as Friedrich Nietzsche: Fighter for
Freedom. Steiner taught at a workingmen’s college and edited a literary
journal, Magazin für Literatur, in Berlin. In 1901 he embraced a spiritualism
which emphasized a form of knowledge that transcended sensory experience and
was attained by the “higher self.” He held that man had previously been attuned
to spiritual processes by virtue of a dreamlike state of consciousness, but was
diverted from this consciousness by preoccupation with material entities.
Through training, individuals could retrieve their innate capacity to perceive
a spiritual realm. Steiner’s writings on this theme are The Philosophy of
Spiritual Activity (1894), Occult Science: An Outline (1913), On the Riddle of
Man (1916), and On the Riddles of the Soul (1917). His last work was his
autobiography (1924). To advance his teachings, he founded the Anthroposophical
Society (1912) and a school of “spiritual science” called the Goetheanum near
Basel, Switzerland. His work inspired the Waldorf School movement, which
comprises some eighty schools for children. The anthroposophy movement he
established remains active in Europe and the United States. G.J.S. Stephen, Sir
Leslie (1832–1904), English literary critic, editor, intellectual historian,
and philosopher. He was the first chief editor of the great Dictionary of
National Biography, writing hundreds of the entries himself. Brought up in an
intensely religious household, he lost his faith and spent much of his time
trying to construct a moral and intellectual outlook to replace it. His main
works in intellectual history, the two-volume History of English Thought in the
Eighteenth Century (1876) and the three-volume English Utilitarians (1900),
were undertaken as part of this project. So was his one purely philosophical
work, the Science of Ethics (1882), in which he tried to develop an
evolutionary theory of morality. Stephen was impatient of philosophical technicalities.
Hence his treatise on ethics does very little to resolve the problems – some of
them pointed out to him by his friend Henry Sidgwick – with evolutionary
ethics, and does not get beyond the several other works on the subject
published during this period. His histories of thought are sometimes
superficial, and their focus of interest is not ours; but they are still useful
because of their scope and the massive scholarship they put to use. DARWINISM. J.B.S. Stewart, Dugald.SCOTTISH
COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY. Stillingfleet, Edward (1635–99), English divine and
controversialist who first made his name with Irenicum (1659), using
natural-law doctrines to oppose religious sectarianism. His Origines Sacrae
(1662), ostensibly on the superiority of the Scriptural record over other forms
of ancient history, was for its day a learned study in the moral certainty of
historical evidence, the authority of testimony, and the credibility of
miracles. In drawing eclectically on philosophy from antiquity to the Cambridge
Platonists, he was much influenced by the Cartesian theory of ideas, but later
repudiated Cartesianism for its mechanist tendency. For three decades he
pamphleteered on behalf of the moral certainty of orthodox Protestant belief
against what he considered the beliefs “contrary to reason” of Roman
Catholicism. This led to controversy with Unitarian and deist writers who
argued that mysteries like the Trinity were equally contrary to “clear and
distinct” ideas. He was alarmed at the use made of Locke’s “new,” i.e.
nonCartesian, way of ideas by John Toland in Christianity not Mysterious
(1696), and devoted his last years to challenging Locke to prove his orthodoxy.
The debate was largely over the concepts of substance, essence, and person, and
of faith and certainty. Locke gave no quarter in the public controversy, but in
the fourth edition of his Essay (1700) he silently amended some passages that
had provoked Stillingfleet. CAMBRIDGE
PLATONISTS, DEISM, DESCARTES, LOCKE. M.A.St. stipulative definition.DEFINITION.
Stirner, Max, pseudonym of Kasper Schmidt (1805–56), German philosopher who
proposed a theory of radical individualism. Born in Bayreuth, he taught in
Gymnasiums and later at a Berlin academy for women. He translated what became a
standard German version of Smith’s Wealth of Nations and contributed articles
to the Rhenische Zeitung. His most important work was statistical probability
Stirner, Max 878 878 Der Einzige und
sein Eigenthum (1845), translated by Steven T. Byington as The Ego and His Own
(1907). His second book was Die Geschichte der Reaktion (1852). Stirner was in
reaction to Hegel and was for a time associated with the left Hegelians. He
stressed the priority of will and instinct over reason and proposed a radical
anarchic individualism. Each individual is unique, and the independent ego is
the fundamental value and reality. Stirner attacked the state, religious ideas,
and abstractions such as “humanity” as “spectres” that are deceptive illusions,
remnants of erroneous hypostatizations. His defense of egoism is such that the
individual is considered to have no obligations or duties, and especially not
to the state. Encouraging an individual “rebellion” against state domination
and control, Stirner attracted a following among nineteenthand
twentieth-century anarchists. The sole goal of life is the cultivation of
“uniqueness” or “ownness.” Engels and Marx attacked his ideas at length (under
the rubric “Saint Marx”) in The German Ideology. Insofar as his theory of
radical individualism offers no clearly stated ethical requirements, it has
been characterized as a form of nihilistic egoism. HEGEL. G.J.S. stochastic process, a process
that evolves, as time goes by, according to a probabilistic principle rather
than a deterministic principle. Such processes are also called random
processes, but ‘stochastic’ does not imply complete disorderliness. The
principle of evolution governing a stochastic or random process is precise,
though probabilistic, in form. For example, suppose some process unfolds in
discrete successive stages. And suppose that given any initial sequence of
stages, S1, S2, . . . , Sn, there is a precise probability that the next stage
Sn+1 will be state S, a precise probability that it will be SH, and so on for
all possible continuations of the sequence of states. These probabilities are
called transition probabilities. An evolving sequence of this kind is called a
discrete-time stochastic process, or discrete-time random process. A
theoretically important special case occurs when transition probabilities
depend only on the latest stage in the sequence of stages. When an evolving
process has this property it is called a discrete-time Markov process. A simple
example of a discrete-time Markov process is the behavior of a person who keeps
taking either a step forward or a step back according to whether a coin falls
heads or tails; the probabilistic principle of movement is always applied to
the person’s most recent position. The successive stages of a stochastic
process need not be discrete. If they are continuous, they constitute a
“continuous-time” stochastic or random process. The mathematical theory of
stochastic processes has many applications in science and technology. The
evolution of epidemics, the process of soil erosion, and the spread of cracks
in metals have all been given plausible models as stochastic processes, to
mention just a few areas of research.
DETERMINISM, PROBABILITY,
REGRESSION ANALYSIS. T.H. Stoicism, one of the three leading movements
constituting Hellenistic philosophy. Its founder was Zeno of Citium (334–262
B.C.), who was succeeded as school head by Cleanthes (331– 232). But the third
head, Chrysippus (c.280– c.206), was its greatest exponent and most voluminous
writer. These three are the leading representatives of Early Stoicism. No work
by any early Stoic survives intact, except Cleanthes’ short “Hymn to Zeus.”
Otherwise we are dependent on doxography, on isolated quotations, and on
secondary sources, most of them hostile. Nevertheless, a remarkably coherent
account of the system can be assembled. The Stoic world is an ideally good
organism, all of whose parts interact for the benefit of the whole. It is
imbued with divine reason (logos), its entire development providentially
ordained by fate and repeated identically from one world phase to the next in a
never-ending cycle, each phase ending with a conflagration (ekpyrosis). Only
bodies strictly “exist” and can interact. Body is infinitely divisible, and
contains no void. At the lowest level, the world is analyzed into an active
principle, god, and a passive principle, matter, both probably corporeal. Out
of these are generated, at a higher level, the four elements air, fire, earth,
and water, whose own interaction is analogous to that of god and matter: air and
fire, severally or conjointly, are an active rational force called breath
(Greek pneuma, Latin spiritus), while earth and water constitute the passive
substrate on which these act, totally interpenetrating each other thanks to the
non-particulate structure of body and its capacity to be mixed “through and
through.” Most physical analysis is conducted at this higher level, and pneuma
becomes a key concept in physics and biology. A thing’s qualities are
constituted by its pneuma, which has the additional role of giving it
cohestochastic process Stoicism 879 879
sion and thus an essential identity. In inanimate objects this unifying pneuma
is called a hexis (state); in plants it is called physis (nature); and in animals
“soul.” Even qualities of soul, e.g. justice, are portions of pneuma, and they
too are therefore bodies: only thus could they have their evident causal
efficacy. Four incorporeals are admitted: place, void (which surrounds the
world), time, and lekta (see below); these do not strictly “exist” – they lack
the corporeal power of interaction – but as items with some objective standing
in the world they are, at least, “somethings.” Universals, identified with
Plato’s Forms, are treated as concepts (ennoemata), convenient fictions that do
not even earn the status of “somethings.” Stoic ethics is founded on the
principle that only virtue is good, only vice bad. Other things conventionally
assigned a value are “indifferent” (adiaphora), although some, e.g., health,
wealth, and honor, are naturally “preferred” (proegmena), while their opposites
are “dispreferred” (apoproegmena). Even though their possession is irrelevant
to happiness, from birth these indifferents serve as the appropriate subject
matter of our choices, each correct choice being a “proper function” (kathekon)
– not yet a morally good act, but a step toward our eventual end (telos) of
“living in accordance with nature.” As we develop our rationality, the
appropriate choices become more complex, less intuitive. For example, it may
sometimes be more in accordance with nature’s plan to sacrifice your wealth or
health, in which case it becomes your “proper function” to do so. You have a
specific role to play in the world plan, and moral progress (prokope) consists
in learning it. This progress involves widening your natural “affinity”
(oikeiosis): an initial concern for yourself and your parts is later extended
to those close to you, and eventually to all mankind. That is the Stoic route
toward justice. However, justice and the other virtues are actually found only
in the sage, an idealized perfectly rational person totally in tune with the
divine cosmic plan. The Stoics doubted whether any sages existed, although
there was a tendency to treat at least Socrates as having been one. The sage is
totally good, everyone else totally bad, on the paradoxical Stoic principle
that all sins are equal. The sage’s actions, however similar externally to mere
“proper functions,” have an entirely distinct character: they are renamed
‘right actions’ (katorthomata). Acting purely from “right reason,” he is
distinguished by his “freedom from passion” (apatheia): morally wrong impulses,
or passions, are at root intellectual errors of mistaking what is indifferent
for good or bad, whereas the sage’s evaluations are always correct. The sage
alone is happy and truly free, living in perfect harmony with the divine plan.
All human lives are predetermined by the providentially designed, all-embracing
causal nexus of fate; yet being the principal causes of their actions, the good
and the bad alike are responsible for them: determinism and morality are fully
compatible. Stoic epistemology defends the existence of cognitive certainty
against the attacks of the New Academy. Belief is described as assent
(synkatathesis) to an impression (phantasia), i.e. taking as true the
propositional content of some perceptual or reflective impression. Certainty
comes through the “cognitive impression” (phantasia kataleptike), a
self-certifying perceptual representation of external fact, claimed to be
commonplace. Out of sets of such impressions we acquire generic conceptions
(prolepseis) and become rational. The highest intellectual state, knowledge
(episteme), in which all cognitions become mutually supporting and hence
“unshakable by reason,” is the prerogative of the wise. Everyone else is in a
state of mere opinion (doxa) or of ignorance. Nevertheless, the cognitive
impression serves as a “criterion of truth” for all. A further important
criterion is prolepseis, also called common conceptions and common notions
(koinai ennoiai), often appealed to in philosophical argument. Although
officially dependent on experience, they often sound more like innate
intuitions, purportedly indubitable. Stoic logic is propositional, by contrast
with Aristotle’s logic of terms. The basic unit is the simple proposition
(axioma), the primary bearer of truth and falsehood. Syllogistic also employs
complex propositions – conditional, conjunctive, and disjunctive – and rests on
five “indemonstrable” inference schemata (to which others can be reduced with
the aid of four rules called themata). All these items belong to the class of
lekta – “sayables” or “expressibles.” Words are bodies (vibrating portions of
air), as are external objects, but predicates like that expressed by ‘ . . .
walks’, and the meanings of whole sentences, e.g., ‘Socrates walks’, are
incorporeal lekta. The structure and content of both thoughts and sentences are
analyzed by mapping them onto lekta, but the lekta are themselves causally
inert. Conventionally, a second phase of the school is distinguished as Middle
Stoicism. It developed largely at Rhodes under Panaetius and Posidonius, both
of whom influenced the presentation of Stoicism in Cicero’s influential
philosophical treatises (mid-first century B.C.). Panaetius Stoicism Stoicism
880 880 (c.185–c.110) softened some
classical Stoic positions, his ethics being more pragmatic and less concerned
with the idealized sage. Posidonius (c.135–c.50) made Stoicism more open to
Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, reviving Plato’s inclusion of irrational
components in the soul. A third phase, Roman Stoicism, is the only Stoic era
whose writings have survived in quantity. It is represented especially by the
younger Seneca (A.D. c.1–65), Epictetus (A.D. c.55–c.135), and Marcus Aurelius
(A.D. 121–80). It continued the trend set by Panaetius, with a strong primary
focus on practical and personal ethics. Many prominent Roman political figures
were Stoics. After the second century A.D. Stoicism as a system fell from
prominence, but its terminology and concepts had by then become an ineradicable
part of ancient thought. Through the writings of Cicero and Seneca, its impact
on the moral and political thought of the Renaissance was immense. CICERO, DOXOGRAPHERS, HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY.
D.N.S. Stoicism, Middle.STOICISM. stone paradox.PARADOXES OF OMNIPOTENCE.
Stout, George Frederick (1860–1944), British psychologist and philosopher. A
student of Ward, he was influenced by Herbart and especially Brentano. He was
editor of Mind (1892–1920). He followed Ward in rejecting associationism and
sensationism, and proposing analysis of mind as activity rather than passivity,
consisting of acts of cognition, feeling, and conation. Stout stressed
attention as the essential function of mind, and argued for the
goal-directedness of all mental activity and behavior, greatly influencing
McDougall’s hormic psychology. He reinterpreted traditional associationist
ideas to emphasize primacy of mental activity; e.g., association by contiguity
– a passive mechanical process imposed on mind – became association by
continuity of attentional interest. With Brentano, he argued that mental
representation involves “thought reference” to a real object known through the
representation that is itself the object of thought, like Locke’s “idea.” In
philosophy he was influenced by Moore and Russell. His major works are Analytic
Psychology (1896) and Manual of Psychology (1899).
ASSOCIATIONISM, BRENTANO,
SENSATIONALISM. T.H.L. St. Petersburg paradox.SAINT PETERSBURG PARADOX.
strategy.GAME THEORY. Straton.PERIPATETIC SCHOOL. Strato of Lampsacus
(c.335–c.267 B.C.), Greek philosopher and polymath nicknamed “the Physicist”
for his innovative ideas in natural science. He succeeded Theophrastus as head
of the Lyceum. Earlier he served as royal tutor in Alexandria, where his
students included Aristarchus, who devised the first heliocentric model. Of
Strato’s many writings only fragments and summaries survive. These show him
criticizing the abstract conceptual analysis of earlier theorists and paying
closer attention to empirical evidence. Among his targets were atomist
arguments that motion is impossible unless there is void, and also Aristotle’s
thesis that matter is fully continuous. Strato argued that no large void occurs
in nature, but that matter is naturally porous, laced with tiny pockets of
void. His investigations of compression and suction were influential in ancient
physiology. In dynamics, he proposed that bodies have no property of lightness
but only more or less weight.
HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY, LYCEUM. S.A.W. Strawson, Sir Peter (b.1919),
British philosopher who has made major contributions to logic, metaphysics, and
the study of Kant. His career has been at Oxford, where he was the leading
philosopher of his generation. His first important work, “On Referring” (1950),
argues that Russell’s theory of descriptions fails to deal properly with the
role of descriptions as “referring expressions” because Russell assumed the
“bogus trichotomy” that sentences are true, false, or meaningless: for
Strawson, sentences with empty descriptions are meaningful but “neither true
nor false” because the general presuppositions governing the use of referring
expressions are not fulfilled. One aspect of this argument was Russell’s
alleged insensitivity to the ordinary use of definite descriptions. The
contrast between the abstract schemata of formal logic and the manifold
richness of the inferences inherent in ordinary language is the central theme
of Strawson’s first book, Introduction to Logical Theory (1952). In Individuals
(1959) Strawson reintroduced metaphysics as a respectable philosophical
discipline after decades of positivist rhetoric. But his project is only
“descriptive” metaphysics – elucidation of the basic features of our own
conceptual scheme – and his arguments are based on the philosophy of language:
“basic” particulars Stoicism, Middle Strawson, Sir Peter 881 881 are those which are basic objects of
reference, and it is the spatiotemporal and sortal conditions for their
identification and reidentification by speakers that constitute the basic
categories. Three arguments are especially famous: (1) even in a purely
auditory world objective reference on the basis of experience requires at least
an analogue of space; (2) because self-reference presupposes reference to
others, persons, conceived as bearers of both physical and psychological
properties, are a type of basic particular; and (3) “feature-placing”
discourse, such as ‘it is snowing here now’, is “the ultimate propositional
level” through which reference to particulars enters discourse. Strawson’s next
book, The Bounds of Sense (1966), provides a critical reading of Kant’s
theoretical philosophy. His aim is to extricate what he sees as the profound truths
concerning the presuppositions of objective experience and judgment that Kant’s
transcendental arguments establish from the mysterious metaphysics of Kant’s
transcendental idealism. Strawson’s critics have argued, however, that the
resulting position is unstable: transcendental arguments can tell us only what
we must suppose to be the case. So if Kant’s idealism, which restricts such
suppositions to things as they appear to us, is abandoned, we can draw
conclusions concerning the way the world itself must be only if we add the
verificationist thesis that ability to make sense of such suppositions requires
ability to verify them. In his next book, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some
Varieties (1985), Strawson conceded this: transcendental arguments belong within
descriptive metaphysics and should not be regarded as attempts to provide an
external justification of our conceptual scheme. In truth no such external
justification is either possible or needed: instead – and here Strawson invokes
Hume rather than Kant – our reasonings come to an end in natural propensities
for belief that are beyond question because they alone make it possible to
raise questions. In a famous earlier paper Strawson had urged much the same
point concerning the free will debate: defenders of our ordinary attitudes of
reproach and gratitude should not seek to ground them in the “panicky
metaphysics” of a supra-causal free will; instead they can and need do no more
than point to our unshakable commitment to these “reactive” attitudes through
which we manifest our attachment to that fundamental category of our conceptual
scheme – persons.
COUNTERFACTUALS,
IMPLICATION. strict duty.KANT. strict identity.IDENTITY. strict
implication.IMPLICATION. strict partial order.ORDERING. stroke notation.SHEFFER
STROKE. strong semantic completeness.COMPLETENESS. strong soundness.SOUNDNESS.
strong supervenience.SUPERVENIENCE. structural ambiguity.AMBIGUITY.
structuralism, a distinctive yet extremely wide range of productive research
conducted in the social and human sciences from the 1950s through the 1970s,
principally in France. It is difficult to describe structuralism as a movement,
because of the methodological constraints exercised by the various disciplines
that came to be influenced by structuralism – e.g., anthropology, philosophy,
literary theory, psychoanalysis, political theory, even mathematics.
Nonetheless, structuralism is generally held to derive its organizing
principles from the early twentieth-century work of Saussure, the founder of
structural linguistics. Arguing against the prevailing historicist and
philological approaches to linguistics, he proposed a “scientific” model of
language, one understood as a closed system of elements and rules that account
for the production and the social communication of meaning. Inspired by
Durkheim’s notion of a “social fact” – that domain of objectivity wherein the
psychological and the social orders converge – Saussure viewed language as the
repository of discursive signs shared by a given linguistic community. The
particular sign is composed of two elements, a phonemic signifier, or
distinctive sound element, and a corresponding meaning, or signified element.
The defining relation between the sign’s sound and meaning components is held
to be arbitrary, i.e., based on conventional association, and not due to any
function of the speaking substrict conditional structuralism 882 882 ject’s personal inclination, or to any
external consideration of reference. What lends specificity or identity to each
particular signifier is its differential relation to the other signifiers in
the greater set; hence, each basic unit of language is itself the product of
differences between other elements within the system. This principle of
differential – and structural – relation was extended by Troubetzkoy to the
order of phonemes, whereby a defining set of vocalic differences underlies the
constitution of all linguistic phonemes. Finally, for Saussure, the closed set
of signs is governed by a system of grammatical, phonemic, and syntactic rules.
Language thus derives its significance from its own autonomous organization,
and this serves to guarantee its communicative function. Since language is the
foremost instance of social sign systems in general, the structural account might
serve as an exemplary model for understanding the very intelligibility of
social systems as such – hence, its obvious relevance to the broader concerns
of the social and human sciences. This implication was raised by Saussure
himself, in his Course on General Linguistics(1916), but it was advanced
dramatically by the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss – who is
generally acknowledged to be the founder of modern structuralism – in his
extensive analyses in the area of social anthropology, beginning with his
Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949). Lévi-Strauss argued that society is
itself organized according to one form or another of significant communication
and exchange – whether this be of information, knowledge, or myths, or even of
its members themselves. The organization of social phenomena could thus be
clarified through a detailed elaboration of their subtending structures, which,
collectively, testify to a deeper and all-inclusive, social rationality. As
with the analysis of language, these social structures would be disclosed, not
by direct observation, but by inference and deduction from the observed
empirical data. Furthermore, since these structures are models of specific
relations, which in turn express the differential properties of the component
elements under investigation, the structural analysis is both readily
formalizable and susceptible to a broad variety of applications. In Britain,
e.g., Edmund Leach pursued these analyses in the domain of social anthropology;
in the United States, Chomsky applied insights of structuralism to linguistic
theory and philosophy of mind; in Italy, Eco conducted extensive structuralist
analyses in the fields of social and literary semiotics. With its
acknowledgment that language is a rule-governed social system of signs, and
that effective communication depends on the resources available to the speaker
from within the codes of language itself, the structuralist approach tends to
be less preoccupied with the more traditional considerations of “subjectivity”
and “history” in its treatment of meaningful discourse. In the
post-structuralism that grew out of this approach, the French philosopher
Foucault, e.g., focused on the generation of the “subject” by the various
epistemic discourses of imitation and representation, as well as on the
institutional roles of knowledge and power in producing and conserving
particular “disciplines” in the natural and social sciences. These disciplines,
Foucault suggested, in turn govern our theoretical and practical notions of
madness, criminality, punishment, sexuality, etc., notions that collectively
serve to “normalize” the individual subject to their determinations. Likewise,
in the domain of psychoanalysis, Lacan drew on the work of Saussure and
Lévi-Strauss to emphasize Freud’s concern with language and to argue that, as a
set of determining codes, language serves to structure the subject’s very
unconscious. Problematically, however, it is the very dynamism of language,
including metaphor, metonymy, condensation, displacement, etc., that introduces
the social symbolic into the constitution of the subject. Althusser applied the
principles of structuralist methodology to his analysis of Marxism, especially
the role played by contradiction in understanding infrastructural and superstructural
formation, i.e., for the constitution of the historical dialectic. His account
followed Marx’s rejection of Feuerbach, at once denying the role of traditional
subjectivity and humanism, and presenting a “scientific” analysis of “historical
materialism,” one that would be anti-historicist in principle but attentive to
the actual political state of affairs. For Althusser, such a philosophical
analysis helped provide an “objective” discernment to the historical
transformation of social reality. The restraint the structuralists extended
toward the traditional views of subjectivity and history dramatically colored
their treatment both of the individuals who are agents of meaningful discourse
and of the linguistically articulable object field in general. This redirection
of research interests (particularly in France, due to the influential work of
Barthes and Michel Serres in the fields of poetics, cultural semiotics, and
communication theory) has resulted in a series of original analyses and also provoked
lively debates between the adherents of structuralist structuralism
structuralism 883 883 methodology and
the more conventionally oriented schools of thought (e.g., phenomenology,
existentialism, Marxism, and empiricist and positivist philosophies of
science). These debates served as an agency to open up subsequent discussions
on deconstruction and postmodernist theory for the philosophical generation of
the 1980s and later. These post-structuralist thinkers were perhaps less
concerned with the organization of social phenomena than with their initial
constitution and subsequent dynamics. Hence, the problematics of the subject
and history – or, in broader terms, temporality itself – were again engaged.
The new discussions were abetted by a more critical appraisal of language and
tended to be antiHegelian in their rejection of the totalizing tendency of
systematic metaphysics. Heidegger’s critique of traditional metaphysics was one
of the major influences in the discussions following structuralism, as was the
reexamination of Nietzsche’s earlier accounts of “genealogy,” his
antiessentialism, and his teaching of a dynamic “will to power.” Additionally,
many poststructuralist philosophers stressed the Freudian notions of the libido
and the unconscious as determining factors in understanding not only the
subject, but the deep rhetorical and affective components of language use. An
astonishing variety of philosophers and critics engaged in the debates
initially framed by the structuralist thinkers of the period, and their
extended responses and critical reappraisals formed the vibrant,
poststructuralist period of French intellectual life. Such figures as Ricoeur,
Emmanuel Levinas, Kristeva, Maurice Blanchot, Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Félix
Guattari, Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Philippe LacoueLabarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy,
and Irigaray inaugurated a series of contemporary reflections that have become
international in scope.
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY, DECONSTRUCTION,
FOUCAULT, HEIDEGGER, LACAN, LYOTARD, POSTMODERN, SAUSSURE. D.Al. structuralism,
mathematical.MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURALISM. structure.GRAMMAR, PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE, TRANSFORMATION RULE. structure, deep.GRAMMAR, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE,
TRANSFORMATION RULE. structure, surface.GRAMMAR, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, TRANSFORMATION
RULE. structure description.CARNAP. stuff.METAPHYSICS. Sturm und Drang.GOETHE.
Suárez, Francisco, also known as Doctor Eximius (1548–1617), Spanish Jesuit
philosopher and theologian. Born in Granada, he studied at Salamanca and taught
there and at Rome, Coimbra, and other leading universities. Suárez’s most
important works are De legibus (“On Law,” 1612), De Deo uno et trino (“On the
Trinity,” 1606), De anima (“On the Soul,” 1621), and the monumental
Disputationes metaphysicae (“Metaphysical Disputations,” 1597). The
Disputationes has a unique place in philosophy, being the first systematic and
comprehensive work of metaphysics written in the West that is not a commentary
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Divided into fifty-four disputations, it discusses
every metaphysical issue known at the time. Its influence was immediate and
lasting and can be seen in the work of Scholastics in both Europe and Latin
America, and of modern philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, and
Schopenhauer. Suárez’s main contributions to philosophy occurred in
metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of law. In all three areas he was
influenced by Aristotle and Aquinas, although he also drew inspiration from
Ockham, Duns Scotus, and others. In metaphysics, Suárez is known for his views
on the nature of metaphysics, being, and individuation. Metaphysics is the
science of “being insofar as it is real being” (ens in quantum ens reale), and
its proper object of study is the object concept of being. This understanding of
the object of metaphysics is often seen as paving the way for early modern
metaphysical theory, in which the object of metaphysics is mental. For Suárez
the concept of being is derived by analogy from the similarity existing among
things. Existing reality for Suárez is composed of individuals: everything that
exists is individual, including substances and their properties, accidents,
principles, and components. He understands individuality as incommunicability,
namely, the inability of individuals to be divided into entities of the same
specific kind as themselves. The principle of individuation is “entity,” which
he identifies with “essence as it exists.” This principle applies both to
substances and their properties, accidents, principles, and components. In
epistemology, two of Suárez’s views stand out: that the intellect knows the
individual through a proper and separate concept without structuralism,
mathematical Suárez, Francisco 884 884
having to turn to reflection, a position that supports an empiricist
epistemology in which, contrary to Thomism, knowledge of the individual is not
mediated through universals; and (2) his view of middle knowledge (scientia
media), the knowledge God has of what every free creature would freely do in
every possible situation. This notion was used by Suárez and Molina to explain
how God can control human actions without violating free will. In philosophy of
law, Suárez was an innovative thinker whose ideas influenced Grotius. For him
law is fundamentally an act of the will rather than a result of an ordinance of
reason, as Aquinas held. Law is divided into eternal, divine, natural, and
human. Human law is based on natural or divine law and is not the result of
human creation.
INDIVIDUATION,
METAPHYSICS. J.J.E.G. subaltern.SQUARE OF OPPOSITION. subcontrary.SQUARE OF
OPPOSITION. subdoxastic, pertaining to states of mind postulated to account for
the production and character of certain apparently non-inferential beliefs.
These were first discussed by Stephen P. Stich in “Beliefs and Subdoxastic
States” (1978). I may form the belief that you are depressed, e.g., on the
basis of subtle cues that I am unable to articulate. The psychological
mechanism responsible for this belief might be thought to harbor information
concerning these cues subdoxastically. Although subdoxastic states resemble
beliefs in certain respects – they incorporate intentional content, they guide
behavior, they can bestow justification on beliefs – they differ from
fullyfledged doxastic states or beliefs in at least two respects. First, as
noted above, subdoxastic states may be largely inaccessible to introspection; I
may be unable to describe, even on reflection, the basis of my belief that you
are depressed. Second, subdoxastic states seem cut off inferentially from an
agent’s corpus of beliefs; my subdoxastic appreciation that your forehead is
creased may contribute to my believing that you are depressed, but, unlike the
belief that your forehead is creased, it need not, in the presence of other
beliefs, lead to further beliefs about your visage. BELIEF. J.F.H. subject.GRAMMAR, LOGICAL
SUBJECT. subjective probability.PROBABILITY. subjective reason.REASONS FOR
ACTION. subjective rightness.OBJECTIVE RIGHTNESS. subjectivism, any
philosophical view that attempts to understand in a subjective manner what at
first glance would seem to be a class of judgments that are objectively either
true or false – i.e., true or false independently of what we believe, want, or
hope. There are two ways of being a subjectivist. In the first way, one can say
that the judgments in question, despite first appearances, are really judgments
about our own attitudes, beliefs, emotions, etc. In the second way, one can
deny that the judgments are true or false at all, arguing instead that they are
disguised commands or expressions of attitudes. In ethics, for example, a
subjective view of the second sort is that moral judgments are simply
expressions of our positive and negative attitudes. This is emotivism.
Prescriptivism is also a subjective view of the second sort; it is the view
that moral judgments are really commands – to say “X is good” is to say,
details aside, “Do X.” Views that make morality ultimately a matter of
conventions (or what we or most people agree to) can also be construed as
subjective theories, albeit of the first type. Subjectivism is not limited to
ethics, however. According to a subjective view of epistemic rationality, the
standards of rational belief are the standards that the individual (or perhaps
most members in the individual’s community) would approve of insofar as they
are interested in believing those propositions that are true and not believing
those propositions that are false. Similarly, phenomenalists can be regarded as
proposing a subjective account of material object statements, since according
to them, such statements are best understood as complex statements about the
course of our experiences. EMOTIVISM,
EPISTEMOLOGY, ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM, IDEAL OBSERVER. R.Fo. subjectivism,
moral.ETHICS. subject–object dichotomy, the distinction between thinkers and
what they think about. The distinction is not exclusive, since subjects can
also be objects, as in reflexive self-conscious thought, which takes the
subject as its intended object. The dichotomy also need not be an exhaustive
distinction in the strong sense that everything is either a subject or an
object, since in a logically possible world in which there are no thinkers,
there may yet be mind-independent subaltern subject–object dichotomy 885 885 things that are neither subjects nor
objects. Whether there are non-thinking things that are not objects of thought
in the actual world depends on whether or not it is sufficient in logic to
intend every individual thing by such thoughts and expressions as ‘We can think
of everything that exists’. The dichotomy is an interimplicative distinction
between thinkers and what they think about, in which each presupposes the
other. If there are no subjects, then neither are there objects in the true
sense, and conversely. A subject–object dichotomy is acknowledged in most
Western philosophical traditions, but emphasized especially in Continental
philosophy, beginning with Kant, and carrying through idealist thought in
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. It is also prominent in
intentionalist philosophy, in the empirical psychology of Brentano, the object
theory of Meinong, Ernst Mally (1879–1944), and Twardowski, and the
transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Subject–object dichotomy is denied by
certain mysticisms, renounced as the philosophical fiction of duality, of which
Cartesian mind–body dualism is a particular instance, and criticized by mystics
as a confusion that prevents mind from recognizing its essential oneness with
the world, thereby contributing to unnecessary intellectual and moral
dilemmas.
BRENTANO, CONTINENTAL
PHILOSOPHY, HUSSERL, INTENTIONALITY, PHENOMENOLOGY. D.J. subjunctive
conditional.COUNTERFACTUALS. sublation.HEGEL. sublime, a feeling brought about
by objects that are infinitely large or vast (such as the heavens or the ocean)
or overwhelmingly powerful (such as a raging torrent, huge mountains, or
precipices). The former (in Kant’s terminology) is the mathematically sublime
and the latter the dynamically sublime. Though the experience of the sublime is
to an important extent unpleasant, it is also accompanied by a certain
pleasure: we enjoy the feeling of being overwhelmed. On Kant’s view, this
pleasure results from an awareness that we have powers of reason that are not
dependent on sensation, but that legislate over sense. The sublime thus
displays both the limitations of sense experience (and hence our feeling of
displeasure) and the power of our own mind (and hence the feeling of pleasure).
The sublime was an especially important concept in the aesthetic theory of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Reflection on it was stimulated by the
appearance of a translation of Longinus’s Peri hypsous (On the Sublime) in
1674. The “postmodern sublime” has in addition emerged in late twentieth
century thought as a basis for raising questions about art. Whereas beauty is
associated with that whose form can be apprehended, the sublime is associated
with the formless, that which is “unpresentable” in sensation. Thus, it is
connected with critiques of “the aesthetic” – understood as that which is
sensuously present – as a way of understanding what is important about art. It
has also been given a political reading, where the sublime connects with
resistance to rule, and beauty connects with conservative acceptance of
existing forms or structures of society.
AESTHETIC PROPERTY,
AESTHETICS, BEAUTY. S.L.F. subset.SET THEORY. subsidiarity, a basic principle
of social order and the common good governing the relations between the higher
and lower associations in a political community. Positively, the principle of
subsidiarity holds that the common good, i.e., the ensemble of social resources
and institutions that facilitate human self-realization, depends on fostering
the free, creative initiatives of individuals and of their voluntary
associations; thus, the state, in addition to its direct role in maintaining
public good (which comprises justice, public peace, and public morality) also
has an indirect role in promoting other aspects of the common good by rendering
assistance (subsidium) to those individuals and associations whose activities
facilitate cooperative human self-realization in work, play, the arts,
sciences, and religion. Negatively, the principle of subsidiarity holds that
higher-level (i.e., more comprehensive) associations – while they must monitor,
regulate, and coordinate – ought not to absorb, replace, or undermine the free
initiatives and activities of lower-level associations and individuals insofar
as these are not contrary to the common good. This presumption favoring free
individual and social initiative has been defended on various grounds, such as
the inefficiency of burdening the state with myriad local concerns, as well as
the corresponding efficiency of unleashing the free, creative potential of
subordinate groups and individuals who build up the shared economic,
scientific, and artistic resources of society. But the deeper ground for this
presumption is the view subjunctive conditional subsidiarity 886 886 that human flourishing depends crucially
on freedom for individual self-direction and for the self-government of
voluntary associations and that human beings flourish best through their own
personal and cooperative initiatives rather than as the passive consumers or
beneficiaries of the initiatives of others.
COMMON GOOD, JUSTICE, LIBERALISM, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. J.B.M.
subsistence (translation of German Bestand), in current philosophy, especially
Meinong’s system, the kind of being that belongs to “ideal” objects (such as
mathematical objects, states of affairs, and abstractions like similarity and
difference). By contrast, the kind of being that belongs to “real” (wirklich)
objects, things of the sorts investigated by the sciences other than psychology
and pure mathematics, is called existence (Existenz). Existence and subsistence
together exhaust the realm of being (Sein). So, e.g., the subsistent ideal
figures whose properties are investigated by geometers do not exist – they are
nowhere to be found in the real world – but it is no less true of them that
they have being than it is of an existent physical object: there are such
figures. Being does not, however, exhaust the realm of objects or things. The
psychological phenomenon of intentionality shows that there are (in some sense
of ‘there are’) objects that neither exist nor subsist. Every intentional state
is directed toward an object. Although one may covet the Hope Diamond or desire
the unification of Europe, one may also covet a non-existent material object or
desire a non-subsistent state of affairs. If one covets a non-existent diamond,
there is (in some sense of ‘there is’) something that one covets – one’s state
of mind has an object – and it has certain properties: it is, e.g., a diamond.
It may therefore be said to inhabit the realm of Sosein (‘being thus’ or
‘predication’ or ‘having properties’), which is the category comprising the
totality of objects. Objects that do not have any sort of being, either
existence or subsistence, belong to non-being (Nichtsein). In general, the
properties of an object do not determine whether it has being or non-being.
(But there are special cases: the round square, by its very nature, cannot
subsist.) Meinong thus maintains that objecthood is ausserseiend, i.e.,
independent of both existence and subsistence.
ABSTRACT ENTITY, MEINONG, METAPHYSICS. P.v.I. sub specie
aeternitatis.SPINOZA. substance, as defined by Aristotle in the Categories,
that which is neither predicable (“sayable”) of anything nor present in
anything as an aspect or property of it. The examples he gives are an
individual man and an individual horse. We can predicate being a horse of
something but not a horse; nor is a horse in something else. He also held that
only substances can remain self-identical through change. All other things are
accidents of substances and exist only as aspects, properties, or relations of
substances, or kinds of substances, which Aristotle called secondary
substances. An example of an accident would be the color of an individual man,
and an example of a secondary substance would be his being a man. For Locke, a
substance is that part of an individual thing in which its properties inhere.
Since we can observe, indeed know, only a thing’s properties, its substance is
unknowable. Locke’s sense is obviously rooted in Aristotle’s but the latter
carries no skeptical implications. In fact, Locke’s sense is closer in meaning
to what Aristotle calls matter, and would be better regarded as a synonym of
‘substratum’, as indeed it is by Locke. Substance may also be conceived as that
which is capable of existing independently of anything else. This sense is also
rooted in Aristotle’s, but, understood quite strictly, leads to Spinoza’s view
that there can be only one substance, namely, the totality of reality or God. A
fourth sense of ‘substance’ is the common, ordinary sense, ‘what a thing is
made of’. This sense is related to Locke’s, but lacks the latter’s skeptical
implications. It also corresponds to what Aristotle meant by matter, at least
proximate matter, e.g., the bronze of a bronze statue (Aristotle analyzes
individual things as composites of matter and form). This notion of matter, or
stuff, has great philosophical importance, because it expresses an idea crucial
to both our ordinary and our scientific understandings of the world.
Philosophers such as Hume who deny the existence of substances hold that
individual things are mere bundles of properties, namely, the properties
ordinarily attributed to them, and usually hold that they are incapable of
change; they are series of momentary events, rather than things enduring
through time. BUNDLE THEORY, PROPERTY.
P.Bu. substance, primary.ARISTOTLE. substance, secondary.ARISTOTLE. substance
causation.AGENT CAUSATION. subsistence substance causation 887 887 substance-function.T’I, YUNG.
substantial form.FORM, HYLOMORPHISM.
substantialism, the view
that the primary, most fundamental entities are substances, everything else
being dependent for its existence on them, either as a property of them or a relation
between them. Different versions of the view would correspond to the different
senses of the word ‘substance’.
SUBSTANCE. P.Bu. substantival causation.CAUSATION.
substantivalism.PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. substantive pluralism.PLURALISM.
substitutability salva veritate.SUBSTITUTIVITY SALVA VERITATE. substitutional
quantification.QUANTIFICATION. substitutivity salva veritate, a condition met
by two expressions when one is substitutable for the other at a certain
occurrence in a sentence and the truth-value (truth or falsity) of the sentence
is necessarily unchanged when the substitution is made. In such a case the two
expressions are said to exhibit substitutivity or substitutability salva
veritate (literally, ‘with truth saved’) with respect to one another in that
context. The expressions are also said to be interchangeable or
intersubstitutable salva veritate in that context. Where it is obvious from a
given discussion that it is the truth-value that is to be preserved, it may be
said that the one expression is substitutable for the other or exhibits
substitutability with respect to the other at that place. Leibniz proposed to
use the universal interchangeability salva veritate of two terms in every
“proposition” in which they occur as a necessary and sufficient condition for
identity – presumably for the identity of the things denoted by the terms.
There are apparent exceptions to this criterion, as Leibniz himself noted. If a
sentence occurs in a context governed by a psychological verb such as ‘believe’
or ‘desire’, by an expression conveying modality (e.g., ‘necessarily’,
‘possibly’), or by certain temporal expressions (such as ‘it will soon be the
case that’), then two terms may denote the same thing but not be
interchangeable within such a sentence. Occurrences of expressions within
quotation marks or where the expressions are both mentioned and used (cf.
Quine’s example, “Giorgione was so-called because of his size”) also exhibit
failure of substitutivity. Frege urged that such failures are to be explained
by the fact that within such contexts an expression does not have its ordinary
denotation but denotes instead either its usual sense or the expression
itself.
QUANTIFYING IN,
REFERENTIALLY TRANSPARENT. C.A.A. substrate.SUBSTANCE. substratum.BERKELEY,
SUBSTANCE. subsumption theory of explanation.COVERING LAW MODEL. sufficient
condition.CONDITION. sufficient reason, principle of.LEIBNIZ. Sufism (from
Arabic fufi, ‘mystic’), Islamic mysticism. The Arabic word is tafawwuf. The
philosophically significant aspects of Sufism are its psychology in its early
phase and its epistemology and ontology in its later phase. The early practices
of asceticism, introspection, and meditation on God and the hereafter as
depicted in the Koran eventually developed in classical Sufism (eighth–eleventh
centuries) into the spiritual journey of the mystic, the successive stages of
which were described with a sophisticated psychological terminology. Sufis
differentiated two levels of spiritual attainment: the first was that of “stations”
(maqamat) that were reached through individual effort, abnegation, and
spiritual exercises (e.g., tawakkul, ‘selfless trust in God’, fabr, ‘patience’,
etc.). The characteristic they all shared was that the Sufi, through an act of
the will and deliberate deeds, suppressed his individual ego and its
concomitant attachment to worldly things and emotions in order to become
receptive to the following level of “states” (ahwal), which were vouchsafed to
him through God’s grace. These culminated in the goal of the mystical quest,
the final states of bliss, which were variously identified by Sufis, according
to their proclivities, as love (mahabba, later ‘ishq), mystical knowledge
(ma‘rifa), and the total loss of ego consciousness and the concomitant absorption
and subsistence in and through God (fana’ and baqa’). The language describing
these stages and states was allusive and symbolical rather than descriptive.
Sufism, which was viewed initially with suspicion by the authorities and the
orthodox, was substance-function Sufism 888
888 integrated into mainstream belief in the eleventh century, primarily
through the work of al-Ghazali (d.1111). After al-Ghazali, the theoretical and
practical aspects of Sufism, which had previously gone hand in hand, developed
in different ways. At the popular level, Sufi practices and instruction were
institutionalized in fraternities and orders that, ever since, have played a
vital role in all Islamic societies, especially among the disenfranchised. Life
in the orders revolved around the regimented initiation of the novices to the
Sufi path by the master. Although theoretical instruction was also given, the
goal of the mystic was primarily achieved by spiritual practices, chiefly the
repetition of religious formulas (dhikr). Among the intellectuals, Sufism
acquired a philosophical gloss and terminology. All the currents of earlier
Sufism, as well as elements of Neoplatonic emanationism drawn from Arabic
philosophy, were integrated into a complex and multifaceted system of “theosophy”
in the monumental work of Ibn ‘Arabi(d.1240). This system rests on the pivotal
concept of “unity of being” (wahdat al-wujud), according to which God is the
only being and the only reality, while the entire creation constitutes a series
of his dynamic and continuous self-manifestations. The individual who combines
in himself the totality of these manifestations to become the prototype of
creation, as well as the medium through which God can be known, is the Perfect
Man, identified with the Prophet Muhammad. The mystic’s quest consists of an
experiential (epistemological) retracing of the levels of manifestations back
to their origin and culminates in the closest possible approximation to the
level of the Perfect Man. Ibn ‘Arabi’s mystical thought, which completely
dominated Sufism, found expression in later times primarily in the poetry of
the various Islamic languages, while certain aspects of it were reintroduced
into Arabic philosophy in Safavid times.
AL-GHAZALI, ARABIC PHILOSOPHY. D.Gu. suicide, assisted.BIOETHICS. summum
bonum (Latin, ‘highest good’), that in relation to which all other things have
at most instrumental value (value only insofar as they are productive of what
is the highest good). Philosophical conceptions of the summum bonum have for
the most part been teleological in character. That is, they have identified the
highest good in terms of some goal or goals that human beings, it is supposed,
pursue by their very nature. These natural goals or ends have differed
considerably. For the theist, this end is God; for the rationalist, it is the
rational comprehension of what is real; for hedonism, it is pleasure; etc. The
highest good, however, need not be teleologically construed. It may simply be
posited, or supposed, that it is known, through some intuitive process, that a
certain type of thing is “intrinsically good.” On such a view, the relevant
contrast is not so much between what is good as an end and what is good as a
means to this end, as between what is good purely in itself and what is good
only in combination with certain other elements (the “extrinsically good”).
Perhaps the best example of such a view of the highest good would be the
position of Moore. Must the summum bonum be just one thing, or one kind of
thing? Yes, to this extent: although one could certainly combine pluralism (the
view that there are many, irreducibly different goods) with an assertion that
the summum bonum is “complex,” the notion of the highest good has typically
been the province of monists (believers in a single good), not pluralists.
J.A.M. summum genus.
GENUS GENERALISSIMUM.
Sung Hsing, also called Sung Tzu (c.360–290 B.C.), Chinese philosopher
associated with Mohism and the Huang–Lao school. He was a member of the
Chi-hsia Academy of Ch’i, a late Warring States center that attracted
intellectuals of every persuasion. His Mohist ideas include an emphasis on
utility, thrift, meritocracy, and a reluctance to wage war. He is praised by
the Taoist Chuang Tzu for his beliefs that one’s essential desires and needs
are few and that one should heed internal cultivation rather than social
judgments. The combination of internal tranquillity and political activism is
characteristic of Huang–Lao thought.
MOHISM. R.P.P. & R.T.A. sunyata (Sanskrit, ‘emptiness’), a property
said by some Indian Buddhist philosophers to be possessed necessarily by
everything that exists. If something is empty it possesses no essential or
inherent nature (svabhava), which is to say that both its existence and its
nature are dependent on things or events other than itself. The thesis
‘everything is empty’ is therefore approximately equivalent to ‘everything is
causally dependent’; the contradictories of these theses were typically argued
by defenders of emptiness to be incoherent and thus not worthy of assent. To
deny emptiness was also taken to require the affirmasuicide, assisted sunyata
889 889 tion of permanence and
non-contingency: if something is non-empty in any respect, it is in just that
respect permanent and non-contingent.
BUDDHISM, MADHYAMIKA, NAGARJUNA. P.J.G. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), Chinese
statesman, founder of the Republic of China in 1911. Educated as a medical
doctor in England, he became a revolutionary to end the reign of the last
dynasty in China. He founded the Nationalist Party and developed the so-called
Three People’s Principles: the nationalist, democratic, and socialist
principles. He claimed to be transmitting the Confucian Way. Sun adopted a
policy of cooperation with the Communists, but his successor Chiang Kai-shek
(1887–1975) broke with them. He is now also honored on the mainland as a
bourgeois social democrat paving the way for the Communist Revolution. CHINESE PHILOSOPHY. S.-h.L.
superaltern.SQUARE OF OPPOSITION. superego.FREUD. supererogation, the property
of going beyond the call of duty. Supererogatory actions are sometimes equated
with actions that are morally good in the sense that they are encouraged by
morality but not required by it. Sometimes they are equated with morally
commendable actions, i.e., actions that indicate a superior moral character. It
is quite common for morally good actions to be morally commendable and vice
versa, so that it is not surprising that these two kinds of supererogatory
actions are not clearly distinguished even though they are quite distinct.
Certain kinds of actions are not normally considered to be morally required,
e.g., giving to charity, though morality certainly encourages doing them.
However, if one is wealthy and gives only a small amount to charity, then, although
one’s act is supererogatory in the sense of being morally good, it is not
supererogatory in the sense of being morally commendable, for it does not
indicate a superior moral character. Certain kinds of actions are normally
morally required, e.g., keeping one’s promises. However, when the harm or risk
of harm of keeping one’s promise is sufficiently great compared to the harm
caused by breaking the promise to excuse breaking the promise, then keeping
one’s promise counts as a supererogatory act in the sense of being morally
commendable. Some versions of consequentialism claim that everyone is always
morally required to act so as to bring about the best consequences. On such a
theory there are no actions that are morally encouraged but not required; thus,
for those holding such theories, if there are supererogatory acts, they must be
morally commendable. Many versions of non-consequentialism also fail to provide
for acts that are morally encouraged but not morally required; thus, if they
allow for supererogatory acts, they must regard them as morally required acts
done at such significant personal cost that one might be excused for not doing
them. The view that all actions are either morally required, morally
prohibited, or morally indifferent makes it impossible to secure a place for
supererogatory acts in the sense of morally good acts. This view that there are
no acts that are morally encouraged but not morally required may be the result
of misleading terminology. Both Kant and Mill distinguish between duties of
perfect obligation and duties of imperfect obligation, acknowledging that a
duty of imperfect obligation does not specify any particular act that one is
morally required to do. However, since they use the term ‘duty’ it is very easy
to view all acts falling under these “duties” as being morally required. One
way of avoiding the view that all morally encouraged acts are morally required
is to avoid the common philosophical misuse of the term ‘duty’. One can replace
‘duties of perfect obligation’ with ‘actions required by moral rules’ and
‘duties of imperfect obligation’ with ‘actions encouraged by moral ideals’.
However, a theory that includes the kinds of acts that are supererogatory in
the sense of being morally good has to distinguish between that sense of
‘supererogatory’ and the sense meaning ‘morally commendable’, i.e., indicating
a superior moral character in the agent. For as pointed out above, not all
morally good acts are morally commendable, nor are all morally commendable acts
morally good, even though a particular act may be supererogatory in both
senses. DUTY, ETHICS, UTILITARIANISM.
B.Ge. superman.NIETZSCHE. supernaturalism.MIRACLE, NATURALISM, THEOLOGICAL
NATURALISM. supernatural theology.THEOLOGIA NATURALIS. superseding
cause.CAUSATION. Sun Yat-sen superseding cause 890 890 superset.SET THEORY. supervaluation.SET
THEORY, VAGUENESS. supervaluations, method of.VAGUENESS. supervaluation
semantics.
FREE LOGIC.
supervenience, a dependence relation between properties or facts of one type,
and properties or facts of another type. Moore, for instance, held that the
property intrinsic value is dependent in the relevant way on certain non-moral
properties (although he did not employ the word ‘supervenience’). As he put it,
“if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree,
then not only must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the
same degree, but also anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances,
possess it in exactly the same degree” (Philosophical Studies, 1922). The
concept of supervenience, as a relation between properties, is essentially
this: Properties of type A are supervenient on properties of type B if and only
if two objects cannot differ with respect to their A-properties without also
differing with respect to their B-properties. Properties that allegedly are
supervenient on others are often called consequential properties, especially in
ethics; the idea is that if something instantiates a moral property, then it
does so in virtue of, i.e., as a (non-causal) consequence of, instantiating
some lower-level property on which the moral property supervenes. In another,
related sense, supervenience is a feature of discourse of one type, vis-à-vis
discourse of another type. The term was so used, again in connection with
morals, by Hare, who wrote: First, let us take that characteristic of “good”
which has been called its supervenience. Suppose that we say, “St. Francis was
a good man.” It is logically impossible to say this and to maintain at the same
time that there might have been another man placed exactly in the same
circumstances as St. Francis, and who behaved in exactly the same way, but who
differed from St. Francis in this respect only, that he was not a good man.
(The Language of Morals, 1952) Here the idea is that it would be a misuse of
moral language, a violation of the “logic of moral discourse,” to apply ‘good’
to one thing but not to something else exactly similar in all pertinent
non-moral respects. Hare is a metaethical irrealist: he denies that there are
moral properties or facts. So for him, moral supervenience is a feature of
moral discourse and judgment, not a relation between properties or facts of two
types. The notion of supervenience has come to be used quite widely in
metaphysics and philosophy of mind, usually in the first sense explained above.
This use was heralded by Davidson in articulating a position about the relation
between physical and mental properties, or statetypes, that eschews the
reducibility of mental properties to physical ones. He wrote: Although the
position I describe denies there are psychophysical laws, it is consistent with
the view that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or
supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to
mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but
differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in some
mental respects without altering in some physical respects. Dependence or
supervenience of this kind does not entail reducibility through law or
definition. (“Mental Events,” 1970) A variety of supervenience theses have been
propounded in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, usually (although not always)
in conjunction with attempts to formulate metaphysical positions that are
naturalistic, in some sense, without being strongly reductionistic. For
instance, it is often asserted that mental properties and facts are
supervenient on neurobiological properties, and/or on physicochemical properties
and facts. And it is often claimed, more generally, that all properties and
facts are supervenient on the properties and facts of the kind described by
physics. Much attention has been directed at how to formulate the desired
supervenience theses, and thus how to characterize supervenience itself. A
distinction has been drawn between weak supervenience, asserting that in any
single possible world w, any two individuals in w that differ in their
A-properties also differ in their B-properties; and strong supervenience,
asserting that for any two individuals i and j, either within a single possible
world or in two distinct ones, if i and j differ in A-properties then they also
differ in Bproperties. It is sometimes alleged that traditional formulations of
supervenience, like Moore’s or Hare’s, articulate only weak supervenience,
whereas strong supervenience is needed to express the relevant kind of
determination or dependence. It is sometimes replied, however, superset
supervenience 891 891 that the traditional
natural-language formulations do in fact express strong supervenience – and
that formalizations expressing mere weak supervenience are mistranslations.
Questions about how best to formulate supervenience theses also arise in
connection with intrinsic and non-intrinsic properties. For instance, the
property being a bank, instantiated by the brick building on Main Street, is
not supervenient on intrinsic physical properties of the building itself;
rather, the building’s having this social-institutional property depends on a
considerably broader range of facts and features, some of which are involved in
subserving the social practice of banking. The term ‘supervenience base’ is
frequently used to denote the range of entities and happenings whose lowerlevel
properties and relations jointly underlie the instantiation of some
higher-level property (like being a bank) by some individual (like the brick
building on Main Street). Supervenience theses are sometimes formulated so as
to smoothly accommodate properties and facts with broad supervenience bases.
For instance, the idea that the physical facts determine all the facts is
sometimes expressed as global supervenience, which asserts that any two
physically possible worlds differing in some respect also differ in some
physical respect. Or, sometimes this idea is expressed as the stronger thesis
of regional supervenience, which asserts that for any two spatiotemporal
regions r and s, either within a single physically possible world or in two
distinct ones, if r and s differ in some intrinsic respect then they also
differ in some intrinsic physical respect.
NATURALISM, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, RESULTANCE. T.E.H. supervenient
behaviorism.PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. suppositio (Latin, ‘supposition’), in the
Middle Ages, reference. The theory of supposition, the central notion in the
theory of proprietates terminorum, was developed in the twelfth century, and
was refined and discussed into early modern times. It has two parts (their
names are a modern convenience). (1) The theory of supposition proper. This
typically divided suppositio into “personal” reference to individuals (not
necessarily to persons, despite the name), “simple” reference to species or
genera, and “material” reference to spoken or written expressions. Thus ‘man’
in ‘Every man is an animal’ has personal supposition, in ‘Man is a species’
simple supposition, and in ‘Man is a monosyllable’ material supposition. The
theory also included an account of how the range of a term’s reference is
affected by tense and by modal factors. (2) The theory of “modes” of personal
supposition. This part of supposition theory divided personal supposition
typically into “discrete” (‘Socrates’ in ‘Socrates is a man’), “determinate”
(‘man’ in ‘Some man is a Greek’), “confused and distributive” (‘man’ in ‘Every
man is an animal’), and “merely confused” (‘animal’ in ‘Every man is an
animal’). The purpose of this second part of the theory is a matter of some
dispute. By the late fourteenth century, it had in some authors become a theory
of quantification. The term ‘suppositio’ was also used in the Middle Ages in
the ordinary sense, to mean ‘assumption’, ‘hypothesis’. P.V.S. supposition,
material.SUPPOSITIO. supposition, personal.SUPPOSITIO. supposition,
simple.SUPPOSITIO. sure-thing principle.ALLAIS’S PARADOX, DECISION THEORY.
surface grammar.GRAMMAR. surface structure.GRAMMAR, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.
surplus value.MARX.
survival, continued
existence after one’s biological death. So understood, survival can pertain
only to beings that are organisms at some time or other, not to beings that are
disembodied at all times (as angels are said to be) or to beings that are embodied
but never as organisms (as might be said of computers). Theories that maintain
that one’s individual consciousness is absorbed into a universal consciousness
after death or that one continues to exist only through one’s descendants,
insofar as they deny one’s own continued existence as an individual, are not
theories of survival. Although survival does not entail immortality or anything
about reward or punishment in an afterlife, many theories of survival
incorporate these features. Theories about survival have expressed differing
attitudes about the importance of the body. supervenient behaviorism survival
892 892 Some philosophers have
maintained that persons cannot survive without their own bodies, typically espousing
a doctrine of resurrection; such a view was held by Aquinas. Others, including
the Pythagoreans, have believed that one can survive in other bodies, allowing
for reincarnation into a body of the same species or even for transmigration
into a body of another species. Some, including Plato and perhaps the
Pythagoreans, have claimed that no body is necessary, and that survival is
fully achieved by one’s escaping embodiment. There is a similar spectrum of
opinion about the importance of one’s mental life. Some, such as Locke, have
supposed that survival of the same person would require memory of one’s having
experienced specific past events. Plato’s doctrine of recollection, in
contrast, supposes that one can survive without any experiential memory; all
that one typically is capable of recollecting are impersonal necessary truths.
Philosophers have tested the relative importance of bodily versus mental
factors by means of various thought experiments, of which the following is
typical. Suppose that a person’s whole mental life – memories, skills, and
character traits – were somehow duplicated into a data bank and erased from the
person, leaving a living radical amnesiac. Suppose further that the person’s
mental life were transcribed into another radically amnesiac body. Has the
person survived, and if so, as whom?
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SOUL. W.E.M. sustaining cause.CAUSATION. sutra (from
Sanskrit sutra, ‘thread’, ‘precept’), a single verse or aphorism of Hindu or
Buddhist teaching, or a collection of them. Written to be memorized, they
provide a means of encoding and transmitting laws and rules of grammar, ritual,
poetic meter, and philosophical disputation. Typically using technical terms
and written so as to be mnemonic, they serve well for passing on information in
an oral tradition. What makes them serviceable for this purpose also makes them
largely unintelligible without commentary. The sutra style is typical in
philosophical traditions. The Brahma-Sutras of Badharana are an example of a
set of sutras regarded as authoritative by Vedanta but interpreted in vastly
different ways by Shankara, Ramanuja, and Madhva. The sutras associated with
Buddhism typically are more expansive than those associated with Hinduism, and
thus more intelligible on their own. The Tripitaka (“Basket of the Teachings”) is
a collection of sutras that Buddhist tradition ascribes to Ananda, who is said
to have recited them from memory at the first Buddhist council; each sutra is
introduced by the words ‘Thus have I heard’. Sutras are associated with
Theravada as well as Mahayana Buddhism and deal with both religious and
philosophical topics. K.E.Y. Swedenborgianism, the theosophy professed by a
worldwide movement established as the New Jerusalem Church in London in 1788 by
the followers of Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772), a Swedish natural philosopher,
visionary, and biblical exegete. Author of geological and cosmological works,
he fused the rationalist (Cartesian) and empiricist (Lockean) legacies into a
natural philosophy (Principia Rerum Naturalium, 1734) that propounded the harmony
of the mechanistic universe with biblical revelation. Inspired by Liebniz,
Malebranche, Platonism, and Neoplatonism, he unfolded a doctrine of
correspondence (A Hieroglyphic Key, 1741) to account for the relation between
body and soul and between the natural and spiritual worlds, and applied it to
biblical exegesis. What attracted the wide following of the “Spirit-Seer” were
his theosophic speculations in the line of Boehme and the mystical, prophetic
tradition in which he excelled (Heavenly Arcana, 1749–56). J.-L.S. Swinburne,
Richard (b.1934), British philosopher of religion and of science. In philosophy
of science, he has contributed to confirmation theory and to the philosophy of
space and time. His work in philosophy of religion is the most ambitious
project in philosophical theology undertaken by a British philosopher in the
twentieth century. Its first part is a trilogy on the coherence and
justification of theistic belief and the rationality of living by that belief:
The Coherence of Theism (1977), The Existence of God (1979), and Faith and
Reason (1981). Since 1985, when Swinburne became Nolloth Professor of the
Philosophy of the Christian Religion at the University of Oxford, he has
written a tetralogy about some of the most central of the distinctively
Christian religious doctrines: Responsibility and Atonement (1989), Revelation
(1992), The Christian God (1994), and Providence and the Problem of Evil
(1998). The most interesting feature of the trilogy is its contribution to
natural theology. Using Bayesian reasoning, Swinburne builds a cumulative case
for theism by arguing that its probability is raised sustaining cause
Swinburne, Richard 893 893 by such
things as the existence of the universe, its order, the existence of
consciousness, human opportunities to do good, the pattern of history, evidence
of miracles, and religious experience. The existence of evil does not count
against the existence of God. On our total evidence theism is more probable
than not. In the tetralogy he explicates and defends such Christian doctrines
as original sin, the Atonement, Heaven, Hell, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and
Providence. He also analyzes the grounds for supposing that some Christian
doctrines are revealed truths, and argues for a Christian theodicy in response
to the problem of evil. BAYESIAN
RATIONALITY, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,
TRINITARIANISM. P.L.Q.
syllogism, in Aristotle’s words, “a discourse in which, a certain thing being
stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from being so”
(Prior Analytics, 24b 18). Three types of syllogism were usually distinguished:
categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. Each will be treated in that order.
The categorical syllogism. This is an argument consisting of three categorical
propositions, two serving as premises and one serving as conclusion. E.g.,
‘Some college students are happy; all college students are high school
graduates; therefore, some high school graduates are happy’. If a syllogism is
valid, the premises must be so related to the conclusion that it is impossible
for both premises to be true and the conclusion false. There are four types of
categorical propositions: universal affirmative or A-propositions – ‘All S are
P’, or ‘SaP’; universal negative or E-propositions – ‘No S are P’, or ‘SeP’;
particular affirmative or I-propositions – ‘Some S are P’, or ‘SiP’; and
particular negative or O-propositions: ‘Some S are not P’, or ‘SoP’. The
mediate basic components of categorical syllogism are terms serving as subjects
or predicates in the premises and the conclusion. There must be three and only
three terms in any categorical syllogism, the major term, the minor term, and
the middle term. Violation of this basic rule of structure is called the
fallacy of four terms (quaternio terminorum); e.g., ‘Whatever is right is
useful; only one of my hands is right; therefore only one of my hands is
useful’. Here ‘right’ does not have the same meaning in its two occurrences; we
therefore have more than three terms and hence no genuine categorical
syllogism. The syllogistic terms are identifiable and definable with reference
to the position they have in a given syllogism. The predicate of the conclusion
is the major term; the subject of the conclusion is the minor term; the term
that appears once in each premise but not in the conclusion is the middle term.
As it is used in various types of categorical propositions, a term is either
distributed (stands for each and every member of its extension) or
undistributed. There is a simple rule regarding the distribution: universal
propositions (SaP and SeP) distribute their subject terms; negative
propositions (SeP and SoP) distribute their predicate terms. No terms are
distributed in an I-proposition. Various sets of rules governing validity of
categorical syllogisms have been offered. The following is a “traditional” set
from the popular Port-Royal Logic (1662). R1: The middle term must be
distributed at least once. Violation: ‘All cats are animals; some animals do
not eat liver; therefore some cats do not eat liver’. The middle term ‘animals’
is not distributed either in the first or minor premise, being the predicate of
an affirmative proposition, nor in the second or major premise, being the
subject of a particular proposition; hence, the fallacy of undistributed
middle. R2: A term cannot be distributed in the conclusion if it is
undistributed in the premises. Violation: ‘All dogs are carnivorous; no flowers
are dogs; therefore, no flowers are carnivorous’. Here the major,
‘carnivorous’, is distributed in the conclusion, being the predicate of a
negative proposition, but not in the premise, serving there as predicate of an
affirmative proposition; hence, the fallacy of illicit major term. Another
violation of R2: ‘All students are happy individuals; no criminals are
students; therefore, no happy individuals are criminals’. Here the minor,
‘happy individuals’, is distributed in the conclusion, but not distributed in
the minor premise; hence the fallacy of illicit minor term. R3: No conclusion
may be drawn from two negative premises. Violation: ‘No dogs are cats; some
dogs do not like liver; therefore, some cats do not like liver’. Here R1 is
satisfied, since the middle term ‘dogs’ is distributed in the minor premise; R2
is satisfied, since both the minor term ‘cats’ as well as the major term
‘things that like liver’ are distributed in the premises and thus no violation
of distribution of terms occurs. It is only by virtue of R3 that we can
proclaim this syllogism to be invalid. R4: A negative conclusion cannot be
drawn where both premises are affirmative. Violation: ‘All educated people take
good care of their children; all syllogism syllogism 894 894 who take good care of their children are
poor; therefore, some poor people are not educated’. Here, it is only by virtue
of the rule of quality, R4, that we can proclaim this syllogism invalid. R5:
The conclusion must follow the weaker premise; i.e., if one of the premises is
negative, the conclusion must be negative, and if one of them is particular,
the conclusion must be particular. R6: From two particular premises nothing
follows. Let us offer an indirect proof for this rule. If both particular
premises are affirmative, no term is distributed and therefore the fallacy of
undistributed middle is inevitable. To avoid it, we have to make one of the
premises negative, which will result in a distributed predicate as middle term.
But by R5, the conclusion must then be negative; thus, the major term will be
distributed in the conclusion. To avoid violating R2, we must distribute that
term in the major premise. It could not be in the position of subject term,
since only universal propositions distribute their subject term and, by
hypothesis, both premises are particular. But we could not use the same
negative premise used to distribute the middle term; we must make the other
particular premise negative. But then we violate R3. Thus, any attempt to make
a syllogism with two particular premises valid will violate one or more basic
rules of syllogism. (This set of rules assumes that A- and Epropositions have
existential import and hence that an I- or an O-proposition may legitimately be
drawn from a set of exclusively universal premises.) Categorical syllogisms are
classified according to figure and mood. The figure of a categorical syllogism
refers to the schema determined by the possible position of the middle term in
relation to the major and minor terms. In “modern logic,” four syllogistic
figures are recognized. Using ‘M’ for middle term, ‘P’ for major term, and ‘S’ for
minor term, they can be depicted as follows: Aristotle recognized only three
syllogistic figures. He seems to have taken into account just the two premises
and the extension of the three terms occurring in them, and then asked what
conclusion, if any, can be derived from those premises. It turns out, then,
that his procedure leaves room for three figures only: one in which the M term
is the subject of one and predicate of the other premise; another in which the
M term is predicated in both premises; and a third one in which the M term is
the subject in both premises. Medievals followed him, although all considered
the so-called inverted first (i.e., moods of the first figure with their
conclusion converted either simply or per accidens) to be legitimate also. Some
medievals (e.g., Albalag) and most moderns since Leibniz recognize a fourth
figure as a distinct figure, considering syllogistic terms on the basis not of
their extension but of their position in the conclusion, the S term of the
conclusion being defined as the minor term and the P term being defined as the
major term. The mood of a categorical syllogism refers to the configuration of
types of categorical propositions determined on the basis of the quality and
quantity of the propositions serving as premises and conclusion of any given
syllogism; e.g., ‘No animals are plants; all cats are animals; therefore no
cats are plants’, ‘(MeP, SaM /, SeP)’, is a syllogism in the mood EAE in the
first figure. ‘All metals conduct electricity; no stones conduct electricity;
therefore no stones are metals’, ‘(PaM, SeM /, SeP)’, is the mood AEE in the
second figure. In the four syllogistic figures there are 256 possible moods,
but only 24 are valid (only 19 in modern logic, on the ground of a
non-existential treatment of A- and E-propositions). As a mnemonic device and
to facilitate reference, names have been assigned to the valid moods, with each
vowel representing the type of categorical proposition. William Sherwood and
Peter of Spain offered the famous list designed to help students to remember
which moods in any given figure are valid and how the “inevident” moods in the
second and third figures are provable by reduction to those in the first
figure: barbara, celarent, darii, ferio (direct Fig. 1); baralipton, celantes,
dabitis, fapesmo, frisesomorum (indirect Fig. 1); cesare, camestres, festino,
baroco (Fig. 2); darapti, felapton, disamis, datisi, bocardo, ferison (Fig. 3).
The hypothetical syllogism. The pure hypothetical syllogism is an argument in
which both the premises and the conclusion are hypothetical, i.e. conditional,
propositions; e.g., ‘If the sun is shining, it is warm; if it is warm, the
plants will grow; therefore if the sun is shining, the plants will grow’.
Symbolically, this argument form can be represented by ‘A P B, B P C /, A P C’.
It was not recognized as such by Aristotle, but Aristotle’s pupil Theophrastus
foreshadowed it, even syllogism syllogism 895
895 though it is not clear from his example of it – ‘If man is, animal
is; if animal is, then substance is; if therefore man is, substance is’ –
whether this was seen to be a principle of term logic or a principle of
propositional logic. It was the MegaricStoic philosophers and Boethius who
fully recognized hypothetical propositions and syllogisms as principles of the
most general theory of deduction. Mixed hypothetical syllogisms are arguments
consisting of a hypothetical premise and a categorical premise, and inferring a
categorical proposition; e.g., ‘If the sun is shining, the plants will grow;
the sun is shining; therefore the plants will grow’. Symbolically, this is
represented by ‘P P Q, P /, Q’. This argument form was explicitly formulated in
ancient times by the Stoics as one of the “indemonstrables” and is now known as
modus ponens. Another equally basic form of mixed hypothetical syllogism is ‘P
P Q, -Q /, ~P’, known as modus tollens. The disjunctive syllogism. This is an
argument in which the leading premise is a disjunction, the other premise being
a denial of one of the alternatives, concluding to the remaining alternative;
e.g., ‘It is raining or I will go for a walk; but it is not raining; therefore
I will go for a walk’. It is not always clear whether the ‘or’ of the
disjunctive premise is inclusive or exclusive. Symbolic logic removes the
ambiguity by using two different symbols and thus clearly distinguishes between
inclusive or weak disjunction, ‘P 7 Q’, which is true provided not both
alternatives are false, and exclusive or strong disjunction, ‘P W Q’, which is
true provided exactly one alternative is true and exactly one false. The
definition of ‘disjunctive syllogism’ presupposes that the lead premise is an
inclusive or weak disjunction, on the basis of which two forms are valid: ‘P 7
Q, -P /, Q’ and ‘P 7 Q, -Q /, P’. If the disjunctive premise is exclusive, we
have four valid argument forms, and we should speak here of an exclusive
disjunctive syllogism. This is defined as an argument in which either from an
exclusive disjunction and the denial of one of its disjuncts we infer the
remaining disjunct – ’P W Q, -P /,Q’, and ‘P W Q, -Q /, P’ (modus tollendo
ponens); or else, from an exclusive disjunction and one of its disjuncts we
infer the denial of the remaining disjunct – ’P W Q, P /, -Q’, and ‘P W Q, Q
/,-P’ (modus ponendo tollens). I.Bo. syllogism, demonstrative.ARISTOTLE.
syllogism, practical.PRACTICAL REASONING. symbol.PEIRCE, SYNCATEGOREMATA.
symbol, complete.SYNCATEGOREMATA. symbol, improper.SYNCATEGOREMATA. symbol,
incomplete.SYNCATEGOREMATA. symbol, primitive.LOGISTIC SYSTEM. symbol,
proper.SYNCATEGOREMATA. symbolic logic.FORMAL LOGIC. symmetrical.RELATION.
symmetry.PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. symmetry thesis.
COVERING LAW MODEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. symptom.CRITERION. synaesthesia, a conscious experience
in which qualities normally associated with one sensory modality are or seem to
be sensed in another. Examples include auditory and tactile visions such as
“loud sunlight” and “soft moonlight” as well as visual bodily sensations such
as “dark thoughts” and “bright smiles.” Two features of synaesthesia are of
philosophic interest. First, the experience may be used to judge the
appropriateness of sensory metaphors and similes, such as Baudelaire’s “sweet
as oboes.” The metaphor is appropriate just when oboes sound sweet. Second,
synaesthesia challenges the manner in which common sense distinguishes among
the external senses. It is commonly acknowledged that taste, e.g., is not only
unlike hearing, smell, or any other sense, but differs from them because taste
involves gustatory rather than auditory experiences. In synaesthesia, however,
one might taste sounds (sweet-sounding oboes). G.A.G. syncategoremata, (1) in
grammar, words that cannot serve by themselves as subjects or predicates of
categorical propositions. The opposite is categoremata, words that can do this.
For example, ‘and’, ‘if’, ‘every’, ‘because’, ‘insofar’, and ‘under’ are
syncategorematic terms, whereas ‘dog’, ‘smooth’, and ‘sings’ are categorematic
ones. This usage comes from the fifth-century Latin grammarian Priscian. It
seems to have been the original way of drawing the distinction, and to have
persisted through later periods along syllogism, demonstrative syncategoremata
896 896 with other usages described
below. (2) In medieval logic from the twelfth century on, the distinction was
drawn semantically. Categoremata are words that have a (definite) independent
signification. Syncategoremata do not have any independent signification (or,
according to some authors, not a definite one anyway), but acquire a signification
only when used in a proposition together with categoremata. The examples used
above work here as well. (3) Medieval logic distinguished not only
categorematic and syncategorematic words, but also categorematic and
syncategorematic uses of a single word. The most important is the word ‘is’,
which can be used both categorematically to make an existence claim (‘Socrates
is’ in the sense ‘Socrates exists’) or syncategorematically as a copula
(‘Socrates is a philosopher’). But other words were treated this way too. Thus
‘whole’ was said to be used syncategorematically as a kind of quantifier in
‘The whole surface is white’ (from which it follows that each part of the
surface is white), but categorematically in ‘The whole surface is two square
feet in area’ (from which it does not follow that each part of the surface is
two square feet in area). (4) In medieval logic, again, syncategoremata were
sometimes taken to include words that can serve by themselves as subjects or
predicates of categorical propositions, but may interfere with standard logical
inference patterns when they do. The most notorious example is the word
‘nothing’. If nothing is better than eternal bliss and tepid tea is better than
nothing, still it does not follow (by the transitivity of ‘better than’) that
tepid tea is better than eternal bliss. Again, consider the verb ‘begins’.
Everything red is colored, but not everything that begins to be red begins to
be colored (it might have been some other color earlier). Such words were classified
as syncategorematic because an analysis (called an expositio) of propositions
containing them reveals implicit syncategoremata in sense (1) or perhaps (2).
Thus an analysis of ‘The apple begins to be red’ would include the claim that
it was not red earlier, and ‘not’ is syncategorematic in both senses (1) and
(2). (5) In modern logic, sense (2) is extended to apply to all logical
symbols, not just to words in natural languages. In this usage, categoremata
are also called “proper symbols” or “complete symbols,” while syncategoremata
are called “improper symbols” or “incomplete symbols.” In the terminology of
modern formal semantics, the meaning of categoremata is fixed by the models for
the language, whereas the meaning of syncategoremata is fixed by specifying
truth conditions for the various formulas of the language in terms of the
models. FORMAL SEMANTICS,
QUANTIFICATION, SYLLOGISM. P.V.S. syncategorematic.LOGICAL FORM,
SYNCATEGOREMATA. synderesis, in medieval moral theology, conscience. St. Jerome
used the term, and it became a fixture because of Peter Lombard’s inclusion of
it in his Sentences. Despite this origin, ‘synderesis’ is distinguished from
‘conscience’ by Aquinas, for whom synderesis is the quasi-habitual grasp of the
most common principles of the moral order (i.e., natural law), whereas
conscience is the application of such knowledge to fleeting and unrepeatable
circumstances. ’Conscience’ is ambiguous in the way in which ‘knowledge’ is:
knowledge can be the mental state of the knower or what the knower knows. But
‘conscience’, like ‘synderesis’, is typically used for the mental state.
Sometimes, however, conscience is taken to include general moral knowledge as
well as its application here and now; but the content of synderesis is the most
general precepts, whereas the content of conscience, if general knowledge, will
be less general precepts. Since conscience can be erroneous, the question
arises as to whether synderesis and its object, natural law precepts, can be
obscured and forgotten because of bad behavior or upbringing. Aquinas held that
while great attrition can take place, such common moral knowledge cannot be
wholly expunged from the human mind. This is a version of the Aristotelian
doctrine that there are starting points of knowledge so easily grasped that the
grasping of them is a defining mark of the human being. However perversely the
human agent behaves there will remain not only the comprehensive realization
that good is to be done and evil avoided, but also the recognition of some
substantive human goods. AQUINAS,
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS. R.M. syndicalism.SOREL. synechism.PEIRCE, TYCHISM.
synergism, in Christian soteriology, the cooperation within human consciousness
of free will and divine grace in the processes of conversion and regeneration.
Synergism became an issue in sixteenth-century Lutheranism during a controversy
prompted by Philip Melanchthon (1497– syncategorematic synergism 897 897 1569). Under the influence of Erasmus,
Melanchthon mentioned, in the 1533 edition of his Common Places, three causes
of good actions: “the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will.” Advocated by
Pfeffinger, a Philipist, synergism was attacked by the orthodox,
predestinarian, and monergist party, Amsdorf and Flacius, who retorted with
Gnesio-Lutheranism. The ensuing Formula of Concord (1577) officialized
monergism. Synergism occupies a middle position between uncritical trust in
human noetic and salvific capacity (Pelagianism and deism) and exclusive trust
in divine agency (Calvinist and Lutheran fideism). Catholicism, Arminianism,
Anglicanism, Methodism, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberal
Protestantism have professed versions of synergism. ERASMUS, FIDEISM, JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.
J.-L.S. synergy.SYNERGISM. synonymous definition.DEFINITION. synonymy.MEANING.
syntactic ambiguity.AMBIGUITY. syntactic consistency.CONSISTENCY. syntactic
term.GRAMMAR. syntax.GRAMMAR. syntax, logical.LOGICAL SYNTAX. synthesis.HEGEL.
synthetic.ANALYTIC–SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION. synthetic a priori.A PRIORI, KANT. Syrian
school.MIDDLE PLATONISM. Syrianus.COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE, MIDDLE PLATONISM.
system, axiomatic.AXIOMATIC METHOD. system, interpretive.OPERATIONALISM.
system, logical.FORMAL SEMANTICS, LOGISTIC SYSTEM. systems analysis.COGNITIVE
SCIENCE, COMPUTER THEORY, SYSTEMS THEORY.
systems theory, the
transdisciplinary study of the abstract organization of phenomena, independent
of their substance, type, or spatial or temporal scale of existence. It
investigates both the principles common to all complex entities and the
(usually mathematical) models that can be used to describe them. Systems theory
was proposed in the 1940s by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy and furthered
by Ross Ashby (Introduction to Cybernetics, 1956). Von Bertalanffy was both
reacting against reductionism and attempting to revive the unity of science. He
emphasized that real systems are open to, and interact with, their
environments, and that they can acquire qualitatively new properties through
emergence, resulting in continual evolution. Rather than reduce an entity (e.g.
the human body) to the properties of its parts or elements (e.g. organs or
cells), systems theory focuses on the arrangement of and relations among the
parts that connect them into a whole (cf. holism). This particular organization
determines a system, which is independent of the concrete substance of the
elements (e.g. particles, cells, transistors, people). Thus, the same concepts
and principles of organization underlie the different disciplines (physics,
biology, technology, sociology, etc.), providing a basis for their unification.
Systems concepts include: system– environment boundary, input, output, process,
state, hierarchy, goal-directedness, and information. The developments of
systems theory are diverse (Klir, Facets of Systems Science, 1991), including
conceptual foundations and philosophy (e.g. the philosophies of Bunge, Bahm,
and Laszlo); mathematical modeling and information theory (e.g. the work of
Mesarovic and Klir); and practical applications. Mathematical systems theory
arose from the development of isomorphies between the models of electrical
circuits and other systems. Applications include engineering, computing,
ecology, management, and family psychotherapy. Systems analysis, developed
independently of systems theory, applies systems principles to aid a decision
maker with problems of identifying, reconstructing, optimizing, and controlling
a system (usually a socio-technical organization), while taking into account
multiple objectives, constraints, and resources. It aims to specify possible
courses of action, together with their risks, costs, and benefits. Systems
theory is closely connected to cybernetics, and also to system dynamics, which
models changes in a network of synergy systems theory 898 898 coupled variables (e.g. the “world
dynamics” models of Jay Forrester and the Club of Rome). Related ideas are used
in the emerging “sciences of complexity,” studying self-organization and
heterogeneous networks of interacting actors, and associated domains such as
far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, chaotic dynamics, artificial life,
artificial intelligence, neural networks, and computer modeling and
simulation.
T
Ta-hsüeh, a part of the
Chinese Confucian classic Book of Rites whose title is standardly translated as
Great Learning. Chu Hsi significantly amended the text (composed in the third
or second century B.C.) and elevated it to the status of an independent classic
as one of the Four Books. He regarded it as a quotation from Confucius and a
commentary by Confucius’s disciple Tseng-tzu, but neither his emendations nor
his interpretation of the text is beyond dispute. The Ta-hsüeh instructs a
ruler in how to bring order to his state by self-cultivation. Much discussion
of the text revolves around the phrase ko wu, which describes the first step in
self-cultivation but is left undefined. The Ta-hsüeh claims that one’s
virtuousness or viciousness is necessarily evident to others, and that virtue
manifests itself first in one’s familial relationships, which then serve as an
exemplar of order in both families and the state. CONFUCIANISM. B.W.V.N.
Tai Chen (1724–77),
Chinese philologist, philosopher, mathematician, and astronomer. A prominent
member of the K’ao-cheng (evidential research) School, Tai attacked the
Neo-Confucian dualism of li (pattern) and ch’i (ether), insisting that li is
simply the orderly structure of ch’i. In terms of ethics, li consists of
“feelings that do not err.” In his Meng-tzu tzu-yi shu-cheng (“Meanings of
Terms in the Mencius Explained and Attested”), Tai argues for the need to move
from mere yi-chien (opinions) to pu-te chih-yi (undeviating standards) by
applying the Confucian golden rule – not as a formal principle determining
right action but as a winnowing procedure that culls out improper desires and
allows only proper ones to inform one’s actions. Beginning with tzu jan
(natural) desires, one tests their universalizability with the golden rule,
thereby identifying those that accord with what is pi-jan (necessary). One spontaneously
k’o (approves of) the “necessary,” and Tai claims this is what Mencius
describes as the “joy” of moral action.
MENCIUS. P.J.I. t’ai-chi, Chinese term meaning ‘Great Ultimate’, an idea
first developed in the “Appended Remarks” of the I-Ching, where it is said that
in the system of Change there is the Great Ultimate. It generates the Two Modes
(yin and yang); the Two Modes generate the Four Forms (major and minor yin and
yang); and the Four Forms generate the Eight Trigrams. In his “Explanation of the
Diagram of the Great Ultimate,” Chou Tunyi (1017–73) spoke of “Non-ultimate
(wu-chi) and also the Great Ultimate!” He generated controversies. Chu Hsi
(1130–1200) approved Chou’s formulation and interpreted t’ai-chi as li
(principle), which is formless on the one hand and has principle on the other
hand. CH’IEN, K’UN; CHOU TUN-YI; CHU
HSI. S.-h.L.
T’ang Chün-i (1909–78),
Chinese philosopher, a leading contemporary New Confucian and cofounder, with
Ch’ien Mu, of New Asia College in Hong Kong in 1949. He acknowledged that it
was through the influence of Hsiung Shih-li that he could see the true insights
in Chinese philosophy. He drafted a manifesto published in 1958 and signed by
Carsun Chang (1887–1969), Hsü Fu-kuan, and Mou Tsung-san. They criticized current
sinological studies as superficial and inadequate, and maintained that China
must learn science and democracy from the West, but the West must also learn
human-heartedness and love of harmony and peace from Chinese culture. CH’IEN MU, CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, HSIUNG
SHIH-LI, HSÜ FU-KUAN. S.-h.L. T’an Ssu-t’ung (1864–98), Chinese philosopher of
the late Ching dynasty, a close associate of K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao.
He was a syncretist who lumped together Confucianism, Mohism, Taoism, Buddhism,
Christianity, and Western science. His book on Jen-hsüeh (philosophy of
humanity) identified humanity with ether, a cosmic force, and gave a new
interpreta900 T 900 tion to the unity
between nature and humanity. Jen for him is the source of all existence and
creatures; it is none other than reality itself. He participated in the Hundred
Days Reform in 1898 and died a martyr. His personal example inspired many
revolutionaries afterward. KANG YU-WEI,
LIANG CH’I-CH’AO. S.-h.L. tao, Chinese term meaning ‘path’, ‘way’, ‘account’.
From the sense of a literal path, road, or way, the term comes to mean a way of
doing something (e.g., living one’s life or organizing society), especially the
way advocated by a particular individual or school of thought (“the way of the
Master,” “the way of the Mohists,” etc.). Frequently, it refers to the way of
doing something, the right way (e.g., “The Way has not been put into practice
for a long time”). Tao also came to refer to the linguistic account that
embodies or describes a way. Finally, in some texts the tao is a metaphysical
entity. For example, in Neo-Confucianism, tao is identified with li
(principle). In some contexts it is difficult to tell what sense is
intended. LI1, NEO-CONFUCIANISM.
B.W.V.N. tao-hsin, jen-hsin, Chinese terms used by NeoConfucian philosophers to
contrast the mind according to the Way (tao-hsin) and the mind according to
man’s artificial, selfish desires (jenhsin). When one responds spontaneously
without making discrimination, one is acting according to the Way. One is
naturally happy, sad, angry, and joyful as circumstances require. But when
one’s self is alienated from the Way, one works only for self-interest, and the
emotions and desires are excessive and deviate from the Mean. In the Confucian
tradition sages and worthies take Heaven as their model, while common people
are urged to take chün-tzu (the superior men) as their model. NEO-CONFUCIANISM; T’IEN LI, JEN-YÜ. S.-h.L.
Taoism, a Chinese philosophy identified with the Tao-chia (School of the Way),
represented by Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu. The term may also refer to the Huang–Lao
School; Neo-Taoists, such as Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang; and Tao-chiao, a diverse
religious movement. Only the Tao-chia is discussed here. The school derives its
name from the word tao (Way), a term used by Chinese thinkers of almost every
persuasion. Taoists were the first to use the term to describe the
comprehensive structure and dynamic of the cosmos. Taoists believe that (1)
there is a way the world should be, a way that, in some deep sense, it is; (2)
human beings can understand this and need to have and follow such knowledge if
they and the world are to exist in harmony; and (3) the world was once in such
a state. Most early Chinese thinkers shared similar beliefs, but Taoists are
distinct in claiming that the Way is not codifiable, indeed is ineffable.
Taoists thus are metaphysical and ethical realists, but epistemological
skeptics of an unusual sort, being language skeptics. Taoists further deny that
one can strive successfully to attain the Way; Taoist self-cultivation is a
process not of accumulation but of paring away. One must unweave the social
fabric, forsake one’s cultural conditioning, and abandon rational thought, to
be led instead by one’s tzu jan (spontaneous) inclinations. With a hsü
(tenuous) mind, one then will perceive the li (pattern) of the cosmos and live
by wu wei (non-action). Though sharing a strong family resemblance, the Taoisms
of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu are distinct. Lao Tzu advocates a primitive utopianism
in which people enjoy the simple life of small agrarian communities,
indifferent to what is happening in the neighboring village. Having abandoned
cultural achievements such as writing, they keep accounts by knotting cords.
Lao Tzu blames human “cleverness,” which imposes the “human” on the “Heavenly,”
for most of what is bad in the world. For him, a notion like beauty gives rise
to its opposite and only serves to increase anxiety and dissatisfaction;
extolling a virtue, such as benevolence, only encourages people to affect it
hypocritically. Lao Tzu advocates “turning back” to the time when intellect was
young and still obedient to intuition and instinct. To accomplish this, the
Taoist sage must rule and enforce this view upon the clever, if they should
“dare to act.” Chuang Tzu emphasizes changing oneself more than changing
society. He too is a kind of anti-rationalist and sees wisdom as a “knowing
how” rather than a “knowing that.” He invokes a repertoire of skillful
individuals as exemplars of the Way. Such individuals engage the world through
a knack that eludes definitive description and display all the Taoist virtues.
Their minds are hsü (empty) of preconceptions, and so they perceive the li
(pattern) in each situation. They respond spontaneously and so are tzu jan;
they don’t force things and so practice wu wei. In accord with the tao, they
lead a frictionless existence; they “walk without touching the ground.” NEO-TAOISM, TAO. P.J.I. tao Taoism 901 901 Tao Te Ching.LAO TZU. tao-t’ung, Chinese
term meaning ‘the orthodox line of transmission of the Way’. According to Chu
Hsi (1130–1200), the first to use this term, the line of transmission can be
traced back to ancient sage-emperors, Confucius and Mencius. The line was
broken since Mencius and was only revived by the Ch’eng brothers in the Sung
dynasty. The interesting feature is that the line has excluded important
Confucian scholars such as Hsün Tzu (fl. 298–238 B.C.) and Tung Chungshu
(c.179–c.104 B.C.). The idea of tao-t’ung can be traced back to Han Yü
(768–824) and Mencius. CHU HSI,
CONFUCIANISM, CONFUCIUS, HAN YÜ, HSÜN TZU, MENCIUS, NEOCONFUCIANISM, TUNG
CHUNG-SHU. S.-h.L. Tarski, Alfred (1901–83), Polish-born American
mathematician, logician, and philosopher of logic famous for his investigations
of the concepts of truth and consequence conducted in the 1930s. His analysis
of the concept of truth in syntactically precise, fully interpreted languages
resulted in a definition of truth and an articulate defense of the
correspondence theory of truth. Sentences of the following kind are now known
as Tarskian biconditionals: ‘The sentence “Every perfect number is even” is
true if and only if every perfect number is even.’ One of Tarski’s major
philosophical insights is that each Tarskian biconditional is, in his words, a
partial definition of truth and, consequently, all Tarskian biconditionals
whose right-hand sides exhaust the sentences of a given formal language
together constitute an implicit definition of ‘true’ as applicable to sentences
of that given formal language. This insight, because of its penetrating depth
and disarming simplicity, has become a staple of modern analytic philosophy.
Moreover, it in effect reduced the philosophical problem of defining truth to
the logical problem of constructing a single sentence having the form of a
definition and having as consequences each of the Tarskian biconditionals.
Tarski’s solution to this problem is the famous Tarski truth definition,
versions of which appear in virtually every mathematical logic text. Tarski’s
second most widely recognized philosophical achievement was his analysis and
explication of the concept of consequence. Consequence is interdefinable with
validity as applied to arguments: a given conclusion is a consequence of a
given premise-set if and only if the argument composed of the given conclusion
and the given premise-set is valid; conversely, a given argument is valid if
and only if its conclusion is a consequence of its premise-set. Shortly after
discovering the truth definition, Tarski presented his “no-countermodels”
definition of consequence: a given sentence is a consequence of a given set of
sentences if and only if every model of the set is a model of the sentence (in
other words, if and only if there is no way to reinterpret the non-logical
terms in such a way as to render the sentence false while rendering all
sentences in the set true). As Quine has emphasized, this definition reduces
the modal notion of logical necessity to a combination of syntactic and
semantic concepts, thus avoiding reference to modalities and/or to “possible
worlds.” After Tarski’s definitive work on truth and on consequence he devoted
his energies largely to more purely mathematical work. For example, in answer
to Gödel’s proof that arithmetic is incomplete and undecidable, Tarski showed
that algebra and geometry are both complete and decidable. Tarski’s truth
definition and his consequence definition are found in his 1956 collection
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (2d ed., 1983): article VIII, pp. 152–278,
contains the truth definition; article XVI, pp. 409–20, contains the
consequence definition. His published articles, nearly 3,000 s in all, have
been available together since 1986 in the four-volume Alfred Tarski, Collected
Papers, edited by S. Givant and R. McKenzie.
GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS, LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE, TRUTH. J.Cor.
Tarskian biconditional.CONVENTION T, TARSKI. Tarskian
satisfaction.SATISFACTION. Tarskian semantics.FORMAL SEMANTICS. Tarski’s
theorem.SEMANTIC PARADOXES. Tarski’s (T) schema.TRUTH. task verb.
ACTION VERB. tautology, a
proposition whose negation is inconsistent, or (self-) contradictory, e.g.
‘Socrates is Socrates’, ‘Every human is either male or nonmale’, ‘No human is
both male and non-male’, ‘Every human is identical to itself’, ‘If Socrates is
human then Socrates is human’. A proposition that is (or is logically
equivalent to) the negation of a tautology is called a (self-)contradiction.
According to classical logic, the property of being Tao Te Ching tautology 902 902 implied by its own negation is a
necessary and sufficient condition for being a tautology and the property of
implying its own negation is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a
contradiction. Tautologies are logically necessary and contradictions are
logically impossible. Epistemically, every proposition that can be known to be
true by purely logical reasoning is a tautology and every proposition that can
be known to be false by purely logical reasoning is a contradiction. The
converses of these two statements are both controversial among classical
logicians. Every proposition in the same logical form as a tautology is a
tautology and every proposition in the same logical form as a contradiction is
a contradiction. For this reason sometimes a tautology is said to be true in
virtue of form and a contradiction is said to be false in virtue of form; being
a tautology and being a contradiction (tautologousness and contradictoriness)
are formal properties. Since the logical form of a proposition is determined by
its logical terms (‘every’, ‘some’, ‘is’, etc.), a tautology is sometimes said
to be true in virtue of its logical terms and likewise mutatis mutandis for a
contradiction. Since tautologies do not exclude any logical possibilities they are
sometimes said to be “empty” or “uninformative”; and there is a tendency even
to deny that they are genuine propositions and that knowledge of them is
genuine knowledge. Since each contradiction “includes” (implies) all logical
possibilities (which of course are jointly inconsistent), contradictions are
sometimes said to be “overinformative.” Tautologies and contradictions are
sometimes said to be “useless,” but for opposite reasons. More precisely,
according to classical logic, being implied by each and every proposition is
necessary and sufficient for being a tautology and, coordinately, implying each
and every proposition is necessary and sufficient for being a contradiction.
Certain developments in mathematical logic, especially model theory and modal
logic, seem to support use of Leibniz’s expression ‘true in all possible
worlds’ in connection with tautologies. There is a special subclass of
tautologies called truth-functional tautologies that are true in virtue of a
special subclass of logical terms called truthfunctional connectives (‘and’,
‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if’, etc.). Some logical writings use ‘tautology’ exclusively for
truth-functional tautologies and thus replace “tautology” in its broad sense by
another expression, e.g. ‘logical truth’. Tarski, Gödel, Russell, and many
other logicians have used the word in its broad sense, but use of it in its
narrow sense is widespread and entirely acceptable. Propositions known to be
tautologies are often given as examples of a priori knowledge. In philosophy of
mathematics, the logistic hypothesis of logicism is the proposition that every
true proposition of pure mathematics is a tautology. Some writers make a sharp
distinction between the formal property of being a tautology and the non-formal
metalogical property of being a law of logic. For example, ‘One is one’ is not
metalogical but it is a tautology, whereas ‘No tautology is a contradiction’ is
metalogical but is not a tautology. LAWS
OF THOUGHT, LOGICAL FORM, LOGICISM. J.Cor. Taylor, Charles (b.1931), Canadian
philosopher and historian of modernity. Taylor was educated at McGill and
Oxford and has taught primarily at these universities. His work has a broadly
analytic character, although he has consistently opposed the naturalistic and
reductionist tendencies that were associated with the positivist domination of
analytic philosophy during the 1950s and 1960s. He was, for example, a strong
opponent of behaviorism and defended the essentially interpretive nature of the
social sciences against efforts to reduce their methodology to that of the
natural sciences. Taylor has also done important work on the histiory of
philosophy, particularly on Hegel, and has connected his work with that of
Continental philosophers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. He has contributed
to political theory and written on contemporary political issues such as
multiculturalism (in, e.g., The Ethics of Authenticity, 1991), often with
specific reference to Canadian politics. He has also taken an active political
role in Quebec. Taylor’s most important work, Sources of the Self (1989), is a
historical and critical study of the emergence of the modern concept of the
self. Like many other critics of modernity, Taylor rejects modern tendencies to
construe personal identity in entirely scientific or naturalistic terms,
arguing that these construals lead to a view of the self that can make no sense
of our undeniable experience of ourselves as moral agents. He develops this
critique in a historical mode through discussion of the radical Enlightenment’s
(e.g., Locke’s) reduction of the self to an atomic individual, essentially
disengaged from everything except its own ideas and desires. But unlike many
critics, Taylor also finds in modernity other, richer sources for a conception
of the self. These include the idea of the self’s inwardness, traceable as far
back as Augustine Taylor, Charles Taylor, Charles 903 903 but developed in a distinctively modern
way by Montaigne and Descartes; the affirmation of ordinary life (and of
ourselves as participants in it), particularly associated with the Reformation;
and the expressivism (of, e.g., the Romantics) for which the self fulfills
itself by embracing and articulating the voice of nature present in its depths.
Taylor thinks that these sources constitute a modern self that, unlike the
“punctual self” of the radical Enlightenment, is a meaningful ethical agent. He
suggests, nonetheless, that an adequate conception of the modern self will
further require a relation of human inwardness to God. This suggestion so far
remains undeveloped.
Taylor, Harriet
(1807–58), English feminist and writer. She was the wife of J. S. Mill, who
called her the “most admirable person” he had ever met; but according to her
critics, Taylor was “a stupid woman” with “a knack for repeating prettily what
J.S.M. said.” Although Mill may have exaggerated her moral and intellectual
virtues, her writings on marriage, the enfranchisement of women, and toleration
did influence his Subjection of Women and On Liberty. In The Enfranchisement of
Women, Taylor rejected the reigning “angel in the house” ideal of woman. She
argued that confining women to the house impeded both sexes’ development.
Taylor was a feminist philosopher in her own right, who argued even more
strongly than Mill that women are entitled to the same educational, legal, and
economic opportunities that men enjoy. R.T. te, Chinese term meaning ‘moral
charisma’ or ‘virtue’. In its earliest use, te is the quality bestowed on a
ruler by Heaven (t’ien) which makes his subjects willingly follow him. Rule by
te is traditionally thought to be not just ethically preferable to rule by
force but also more effective instrumentally. It is a necessary condition for
having te that one be ethically exemplary, but traditional thinkers differ over
whether being virtuous is also sufficient for the bestowal of te, and whether
the bestowal of te makes one even more virtuous. Te soon came also to refer to
virtue, in the sense of either a disposition that contributes to human
flourishing (benevolence, courage, etc.) or the specific excellence of any kind
of thing. B.W.V.N. techne (Greek, ‘art’, ‘craft’), a human skill based on
general principles and capable of being taught. In this sense, a manual craft
such as carpentry is a techne, but so are sciences such as medicine and
arithmetic. According to Plato (Gorgias 501a), a genuine techne understands its
subject matter and can give a rational account of its activity. Aristotle
(Metaphysics I.1) distinguishes technefrom experience on the grounds that techne
involves knowledge of universals and causes, and can be taught. Sometimes
‘techne’ is restricted to the productive (as opposed to theoretical and
practical) arts, as at Nicomachean Ethics VI.4. Techne and its products are
often contrasted with physis, nature (Physics II.1).
ARISTOTLE, PHYSIS, PLATO.
W.J.P. Teichmüller, Gustav (1832–88), German philosopher who contributed to the
history of philosophy and developed a theory of knowledge and a metaphysical
conception based on these historical studies. Born in Braunschweig, he taught
at Göttingen and Basel and was influenced by Lotze and Leibniz. His major works
are Aristotelische Forschungen (Aristotelian Investigations, 1867–73) and Die
wirkliche und scheinbar Welt (The Actual and the Apparent World, 1882). His
other works are Ueber die Unsterblichkeit der Seele (1874), Studien zur
Geschichte der Begriffe (1874), Darwinismus und Philosophie (1877), Ueber das
Wesen der Liebe (1879), Religionsphilosophie (1886), and the posthumously
published Neue Grundlegung der Psychologie und Logik (1889). Teichmüller
maintained that the self of immediate experience, the “I,” is the most
fundamental reality and that the conceptual world is a projection of its
constituting activity. On the basis of his studies in the history of
metaphysics and his sympathies with Leibniz’s monadology, he held that each
metaphysical system contained partial truths and construed each metaphysical
standpoint as a perspective on a complex reality. Thinking of both metaphysical
interpretations of reality and the subjectivity of individual immediate
experience, Teichmüller christened his own philosophical position
“perspectivism.” His work influenced later European thought through its impact
on the philosophical reflections of Nietzsche, who was probably influenced by
him in the development of his perspectival theory of knowledge. LEIBNIZ, LOTZE. G.J.S. Teilhard de Chardin,
Pierre (1881–1955), French paleontologist, Jesuit priest, and philosopher. His
Taylor, Harriet Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre 904 904 philosophical work, while published only
posthumously, was vigorously discussed throughout his career. His writings
generated considerable controversy within the church, since one of his
principal concerns was to bring about a forceful yet generous reconciliation
between the traditional Christian dogma and the dramatic advances yielded by
modern science. His philosophy consisted of systematic reflections on
cosmology, biology, physics, anthropology, social theory, and theology –
reflections guided, he maintained, by his fascination with the nature of life,
energy, and matter, and by his profound respect for human spirituality.
Teilhard was educated in philosophy and mathematics at the Jesuit college of
Mongré, near Lyons. He entered the Jesuit order at the age of eighteen and was
ordained a priest in 1911. He went on to study at Aix-en-Provence, Laval, and
Caen, as well as on the Isle of Jersey and at Hastings, England. Returning to
Paris after the war, he studied biology, geology, and paleontology at the
Museum of Natural History and at the Institut Catholique, receiving a doctoral
degree in geology in 1922. In 1923, shortly after appointment to the faculty of
geology at the Institut Catholique, he took leave to pursue field research in
China. His research resulted in the discovery, in 1929, of Peking man
(Sinanthropus pekinensis) – which he saw as “perhaps the next to the last step
traceable between the anthropoids and man.” It was during this period that
Teilhard began to compose one of his major theoretical works, The Phenomenon of
Man (1955), in which he stressed the deep continuity of evolutionary
development and the emergence of humanity from the animal realm. He argued that
received evolutionary theory was fully compatible with Christian doctrine.
Indeed, it is the synthesis of evolutionary theory with his own Christian
theology that perhaps best characterizes the broad tenor of his thought.
Starting with the very inception of the evolutionary trajectory, i.e., with
what he termed the “Alpha point” of creation, Teilhard’s general theory resists
any absolute disjunction between the inorganic and organic. Indeed, matter and
spirit are two “stages” or “aspects” of the same cosmic stuff. These
transitions from one state to another may be said to correspond to those
between the somatic and psychic, the exterior and interior, according to the
state of relative development, organization, and complexity. Hence, for
Teilhard, much as for Bergson (whose work greatly influenced him), evolutionary
development is characterized by a progression from the simplest components of
matter and energy (what he termed the lithosphere), through the organization of
flora and fauna (the biosphere), to the complex formations of sentient and
cognitive human life (the noosphere). In this sense, evolution is a
“progressive spiritualization of matter.” He held this to be an orthogenetic
process, one of “directed evolution” or “Genesis,” by which matter would
irreversibly metamorphose itself, in a process of involution and complexification,
toward the psychic. Specifically, Teilhard’s account sought to overcome what he
saw as a prescientific worldview, one based on a largely antiquated and
indefensible metaphysical dualism. By accomplishing this, he hoped to realize a
productive convergence of science and religion. The end of evolution, what he
termed “the Omega point,” would be the full presence of Christ, embodied in a
universal human society. Many have tended to see a Christian pantheism
expressed in such views. Teilhard himself stressed a profoundly personalist,
spiritual perspective, drawn not only from the theological tradition of
Thomism, but from that of Pauline Neoplatonism and Christian mysticism as well
– especially that tradition extending from Meister Eckhart through Cardinal
Bérulle and Malebranche. D.Al. telekinesis.PARAPSYCHOLOGY.
teleofunctionalism.FODOR. teleological argument.PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.
teleological ethics.ETHICS. teleological explanation.TELEOLOGY. teleological
law.CAUSAL LAW. teleological suspension of the ethical.
KIERKEGAARD. teleology,
the philosophical doctrine that all of nature, or at least intentional agents,
are goaldirected or functionally organized. Plato first suggested that the
organization of the natural world can be understood by comparing it to the
behavior of an intentional agent – external teleology. For example, human
beings can anticipate the future and behave in ways calculated to realize their
telekinesis teleology 905 905
intentions. Aristotle invested nature itself with goals – internal teleology.
Each kind has its own final cause, and entities are so constructed that they
tend to realize this goal. Heavenly bodies travel as nearly as they are able in
perfect circles because that is their nature, while horses give rise to other horses
because that is their nature. Natural theologians combined these two
teleological perspectives to explain all phenomena by reference to the
intentions of a beneficent, omniscient, all-powerful God. God so constructed
the world that each entity is invested with the tendency to fulfill its own
God-given nature. Darwin explained the teleological character of the living
world non-teleologically. The evolutionary process is not itself teleological,
but it gives rise to functionally organized systems and intentional agents.
Present-day philosophers acknowledge intentional behavior and functional
organization but attempt to explain both without reference to a supernatural
agent or internal natures of the more metaphysical sort. Instead, they define
‘function’ cybernetically, in terms of persistence toward a goal state under
varying conditions, or etiologically, in terms of the contribution that a
structure or action makes to the realization of a goal state. These definitions
confront a battery of counterexamples designed to show that the condition
mentioned is either not necessary, not sufficient, or both; e.g., missing goal
objects, too many goals, or functional equivalents. The trend has been to
decrease the scope of teleological explanations from all of nature, to the
organization of those entities that arise through natural selection, to their
final refuge in the behavior of human beings. Behaviorists have attempted to
eliminate this last vestige of teleology. Just as natural selection makes the
attribution of goals for biological species redundant, the selection of
behavior in terms of its consequences is designed to make any reference to
intentions on the part of human beings unnecessary. MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION. D.L.H.
telepathy.PARAPSYCHOLOGY. Telesio, Bernardino (1509–88), Italian philosopher
whose early scientific empiricism influenced Francis Bacon and Galileo. He
studied in Padua, where he completed his doctorate in 1535, and practiced
philosophy in Naples and Cosenza without holding any academic position. His
major work, the nine volumes of De rerum natura iuxta propria principia (“On
the Nature of Things According to Their Principles,” 1586), contains an attempt
to interpret nature on the basis of its own principles, which Telesio
identifies with the two incorporeal active forces of heat and cold, and the
corporeal and passive physical substratum. As the two active forces permeate
all of nature and are endowed with sensation, Telesio argues that all of nature
possesses some degree of sensation. Human beings share with animals a material
substance produced by heat and coming into existence with the body, called
spirit. They are also given a mind by God. Telesio knew both the Averroistic
and the Alexandrist interpretations of Aristotle. However, he broke with both,
criticizing Aristotle’s Physics and claiming that nature is investigated better
by the senses than by the intellect. P.Gar. telishment, punishment of one
suspected of wrongdoing, but whom the authorities know to be innocent, imposed
as a deterrent to future wrongdoers. Telishment is thus not punishment insofar
as punishment requires that the recipient’s harsh treatment be deserved.
Telishment is classically given as one of the thought experiments challenging
utilitarianism (and more broadly, consequentialism) as a theory of ethics, for
such a theory seems to justify telishment on some occasions.
PUNISHMENT. M.S.M. telos,
ancient Greek term meaning ‘end’ or ‘purpose’. Telos is a key concept not only
in Greek ethics but also in Greek science. The purpose of a human being is a
good life, and human activities are evaluated according to whether they lead to
or manifest this telos. Plants, animals, and even inanimate objects were also
thought to have a telos through which their activities and relations could be
understood and evaluated. Though a telos could be something that transcends
human activities and sensible things, as Plato thought, it need not be anything
apart from nature. Aristotle, e.g., identified the telos of a sensible thing
with its immanent form. It follows that the purpose of the thing is simply to
be what it is and that, in general, a thing pursues its purpose when it
endeavors to preserve itself. Aristotle’s view shows that ‘purpose in nature’
need not mean a higher purpose beyond nature. Yet, his immanent purpose does
not exclude “higher” purposes, and Aristotelian teleology was pressed into
service by medieval thinkers as a framework for understanding God’s agency
through nature. Thinkers in the modern period argued against the prominent role
accorded to telos by ancient telepathy telos 906 906 and medieval thinkers, and they replaced
it with analyses in terms of mechanism and law. E.C.H. temperance.CARDINAL
VIRTUES. template.COGNITIVE SCIENCE. temporal becoming.TIME. tensed identity.IDENTITY.
tense logic, an extension of classical logic introduced by Arthur Prior (Past,
Present, and Future, 1967), involving operators P and F for the past and future
tenses, or ‘it was the case that . . .’ and ‘it will be the case that . . .’.
Classical or mathematical logic was developed as a logic of unchanging
mathematical truth, and can be applied to tensed discourse only by artificial
regimentation inspired by mathematical physics, introducing quantification over
“times” or “instants.” Thus ‘It will have been the case that p,’ which Prior
represents simply as FPp, classical logic represents as ‘There [exists] an
instant t and there [exists] an instant tH such that t [is] later than the
present and tH [is] earlier than t, and at tH it [is] the case that pH, or
DtDtH (t o‹t8tH ‹t8p(tH)), where the brackets indicate that the verbs are to be
understood as tenseless. Prior’s motives were in part linguistic (to produce a
formalization less removed from natural language than the classical) and in
part metaphysical (to avoid ontological commitment to such entities as
instants). Much effort was devoted to finding tense-logical principles
equivalent to various classical assertions about the structure of the
earlier–later order among instants; e.g., ‘Between any two instants there is
another instant’ corresponds to the validity of the axioms Pp P PPp and Fp P
FFp. Less is expressible using P and F than is expressible with explicit
quantification over instants, and further operators for ‘since’ and ‘until’ or
‘now’ and ‘then’ have been introduced by Hans Kamp and others. These are
especially important in combination with quantification, as in ‘When he was in
power, all who now condemn him then praised him.’ As tense is closely related
to mood, so tense logic is closely related to modal logic. (As Kripke models
for modal logic consist each of a set X of “worlds” and a relation R of ‘x is
an alternative to y’, so for tense logic they consist each of a set X of
“instants” and a relation R of ‘x is earlier than y’: Thus instants, banished
from the syntax or proof theory, reappear in the semantics or model theory.)
Modality and tense are both involved in the issue of future contingents, and
one of Prior’s motives was a desire to produce a formalism in which the views
on this topic of ancient, medieval, and early modern logicians (from Aristotle
with his “sea fight tomorrow” and Diodorus Cronos with his “Master Argument”
through Ockham to Peirce) could be represented. The most important precursor to
Prior’s work on tense logic was that on many-valued logics by Lukasiewicz,
which was motivated largely by the problem of future contingents. Also related
to tense and mood is aspect, and modifications to represent this grammatical
category (evaluating formulas at periods rather than instants of time) have
also been introduced. Like modal logic, tense logic has been the object of
intensive study in theoretical computer science, especially in connection with
attempts to develop languages in which properties of programs can be expressed
and proved; variants of tense logic (under such labels as “dynamic logic” or
“process logic”) have thus been extensively developed for technological rather
than philosophical motives. FUTURE
CONTINGENTS, MANYVALUED LOGIC. J.Bur. Teresa of Ávila, Saint (1515–82), Spanish
religious, mystic, and author of spiritual treatises. Having entered the
Carmelite order at Ávila at twenty-two, Teresa spent the next twenty-five years
seeking guidance in the practice of prayer. Despite variously inept spiritual
advisers, she seems to have undergone a number of mystical experiences and to
have made increasingly important discoveries about interior life. After 1560
Teresa took on a public role by attaching herself to the reforming party within
the Spanish Carmelites. Her remaining years were occupied with the reform, in
which she was associated most famously with John of the Cross. She also
composed several works, including a spiritual autobiography (the Vida) and two
masterpieces of spirituality, the Way of Perfection and the Interior Castle.
The latter two, but especially the Castle, offer philosophical suggestions
about the soul’s passions, activities, faculties, and ground. Their principal
motive is to teach the reader how to progress, by successive surrender, toward the
divine Trinity dwelling at the soul’s center. M.D.J. term.RELATION, RUSSELL,
SYLLOGISM. term, major.SYLLOGISM. temperance term, major 907 907 term, minor.SYLLOGISM. term,
observation.PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. term, transcendental.TRANSCENDENTALS. terminist
logic, a school of logic originating in twelfth-century Europe and dominant in
the universities until its demise in the humanistic reforms. Its chief goal was
the elucidation of the logical form (the “exposition”) of propositions advanced
in the context of Scholastic disputation. Its central theory concerned the
properties of terms, especially supposition, and did the work of modern
quantification theory. Important logicians in the school include Peter of
Spain, William Sherwood, Walter Burley, William Heytesbury, and Paul of
Venice.
BURLEY, HEYTESBURY, PAUL
OF VENICE, PETER OF SPAIN, SHERWOOD. J.Lo. terminus ad quem.TERMINUS A QUO.
terminus a quo (Latin, ‘term from which’), the starting point of some process.
The terminus ad quem is the ending point. For example, change is a process that
begins from some state (the terminus a quo) and proceeds to some state at which
it ends (the terminus ad quem). In particular, in the ripening of an apple, the
green apple is the terminus a quo and the red apple is the terminus ad quem.
A.P.M. tertiary qualities.QUALITIES. Tertullian (A.D. c.155–c.240), Latin
theologian, an early father of the Christian church. A layman from Carthage, he
laid the conceptual and linguistic basis for the doctrine of the Trinity.
Though appearing hostile to philosophy (“What has Athens to do with
Jerusalem?”) and to rationality (“It is certain because it is impossible”),
Tertullian was steeped in Stoicism. He denounced all eclecticism not governed
by the normative tradition of Christian doctrine, yet commonly used
philosophical argument and Stoic concepts (e.g., the corporeality of God and
the soul). Despite insisting on the sole authority of the New Testament
apostles, he joined with Montanism, which taught that the Holy Spirit was still
inspiring prophecy concerning moral discipline. Reflecting this interest in the
Spirit, Tertullian pondered the distinctions (to which he gave the neologism
trinitas) within God. God is one “substance” but three “persons”: a plurality
without division. The Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct, but share equally
in the one Godhead. This threeness is manifest only in the “economy” of God’s
temporal action toward the world; later orthodoxy (e.g. Athanasius, Basil the
Great, Augustine), would postulate a Triunity that is eternal and “immanent,”
i.e., internal to God’s being.
MONTANISM, STOICISM,
TRINITARIANISM. A.E.L. testability, in the sciences, capacity of a theory to
undergo experimental testing. Theories in the natural sciences are regularly
subjected to experimental tests involving detailed and rigorous control of
variable factors. Not naive observation of the workings of nature, but
disciplined, designed intervention in such workings, is the hallmark of
testability. Logically regarded, testing takes the form of seeking confirmation
of theories by obtaining positive test results. We can represent a theory as a
conjunction of a hypothesis and a statement of initial conditions, (H • A).
This conjunction deductively entails testable or observational consequences O.
Hence, (H • A) P O. If O obtains, (H • A) is said to be confirmed, or rendered
probable. But such confirmation is not decisive; O may be entailed by, and
hence explained by, many other theories. For this reason, Popper insisted that
the testability of theories should seek disconfirmations or falsifications. The
logical schema (H • A) P O not-O not-(H • A) is deductively valid, hence
apparently decisive. On this view, science progresses, not by finding the
truth, but by discarding the false. Testability becomes falsifiability. This
deductive schema (modus tollens) is also employed in the analysis of crucial
tests. Consider two hypotheses H1 and H2, both introduced to explain some
phenomenon. H1 predicts that for some test condition C, we have the test result
‘if C then e1’, and H2, the result ‘if C then e2’, where e1 and e2 are
logically incompatible. If experiment falsifies ‘if C then e1’ (e1 does not
actually occur as a test result), the hypothesis H1 is false, which implies
that H2 is true. It was originally supposed that the experiments of J. B. L.
Foucault constituted a decisive falsification of the corpuscular theory of the
nature of light, and thus provided a decisive establishment of the truth of its
rival, the wave theory of light. This account of crucial experiments neglects
certain points in logic and also the role of auxiliary hypotheses in science.
As Duhem pointed term, minor testability 908
908 out, rarely, if ever, does a hypothesis face the facts in isolation
from other supporting assumptions. Furthermore, it is a fact of logic that the
falsification of a conjunction of a hypothesis and its auxiliary assumptions
and initial conditions (not-(H • A)) is logically equivalent to (not-H or
not-A), and the test result itself provides no warrant for choosing which
alternative to reject. Duhem further suggested that rejection of any component
part of a complex theory is based on extra-evidential considerations (factors
like simplicity and fruitfulness) and cannot be forced by negative test results.
Acceptance of Duhem’s view led Quine to suggest that a theory must face the
tribunal of experience en bloc; no single hypothesis can be tested in
isolation. Original conceptions of testability and falsifiability construed
scientific method as hypothetico-deductive. Difficulties with these
reconstructions of the logic of experiment have led philosophers of science to
favor an explication of empirical support based on the logic of
probability. CRUCIAL EXPERIMENT, DUHEM,
HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE METHOD, PROBABILITY. R.E.B.
testimony, an act of
telling, including all assertions apparently intended to impart information,
regardless of social setting. In an extended sense personal letters and
messages, books, and other published material purporting to contain factual
information also constitute testimony. Testimony may be sincere or insincere,
and may express knowledge or baseless prejudice. When it expresses knowledge,
and it is rightly believed, this knowledge is disseminated to its recipients,
near or remote. Secondhand knowledge can be passed on further, producing long
chains of testimony; but these chains always begin with the report of an
eyewitness or expert. In any social group with a common language there is
potential for the sharing, through testimony, of the fruits of individuals’
idiosyncratic acquisition of knowledge through perception and inference. In
advanced societies specialization in the gathering and production of knowledge
and its wider dissemination through spoken and written testimony is a fundamental
socioepistemic fact, and a very large part of each person’s body of knowledge
and belief stems from testimony. Thus the question when a person may properly
believe what another tells her, and what grounds her epistemic entitlement to
do so, is a crucial one in epistemology. Reductionists about testimony insist
that this entitlement must derive from our entitlement to believe what we
perceive to be so, and to draw inferences from this according to familiar
general principles. (See e.g., Hume’s classic discussion, in his Enquiry into
Human Understanding, section X.) On this view, I can perceive that someone has
told me that p, but can thereby come to know that p only by means of an
inference – one that goes via additional, empirically grounded knowledge of the
trustworthiness of that person. Anti-reductionists insist, by contrast, that
there is a general entitlement to believe what one is told just as such –
defeated by knowledge of one’s informant’s lack of trustworthiness (her
mendacity or incompetence), but not needing to be bolstered positively by
empirically based knowledge of her trustworthiness. Anti-reductionists thus see
testimony as an autonomous source of knowledge on a par with perception,
inference, and memory. One argument adduced for anti-reductionism is
transcendental: We have many beliefs acquired from testimony, and these beliefs
are knowledge; their status as knowledge cannot be accounted for in the way
required by the reductionist – that is, the reliability of testimony cannot be
independently confirmed; therefore the reductionist’s insistence on this is
mistaken. However, while it is perhaps true that the reliability of all the
beliefs one has that depend on past testimony cannot be simultaneously
confirmed, one can certainly sometimes ascertain, without circularity, that a
specific assertion by a particular person is likely to be correct – if,
e.g.,one’s own experience has established that that person has a good track
record of reliability about that kind of thing.
EPISTEMOLOGY, HUME, INFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE. E.F. Tetens, Johann Nicolas
(1736–1807), German philosopher and psychologist, sometimes called the German
Locke. After his studies in Rostock and Copenhagen, he taught at Bützow and
Kiel (until 1789). He had a second successful career as a public servant in
Denmark (1790–1807) that did not leave him time for philosophical work. Tetens
was one of the most important German philosophers between Wolff and Kant. Like
Kant, whom he significantly influenced, Tetens attempted to find a middle way
between empiricism and rationalism. His most important work, the Philosophische
Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung (“Philosophical Essays
on Human Nature and its Development,” 1777), is indicative of the state of
philosophical discustestimony Tetens, Johann Nicolas 909 909 sion in Germany before Kant’s Critique
of Pure Reason. Tetens, who followed the “psychological method” of Locke,
tended toward a naturalism, like that of Hume. However, Tetens made a more
radical distinction between reason and sensation than Hume allowed and
attempted to show how basic rational principles guarantee the objectivity of
human knowledge. M.K. Tetractys.
PYTHAGORAS. Thales of
Miletus (fl. c.585 B.C.), Greek philosopher who was regarded as one of the
Seven Sages of Greece. He was also considered the first philosopher, founder of
the Milesians. Thales is also reputed to have been an engineer, astronomer,
mathematician, and statesman. His doctrines even early Greek sources know only
by hearsay: he said that water is the arche, and that the earth floats on water
like a raft. The magnet has a soul, and all things are full of the gods.
Thales’ attempt to explain natural phenomena in natural rather than exclusively
supernatural terms bore fruit in his follower Anaximander. PRE-SOCRATICS. D.W.G. thema (plural:
themata), in Stoic logic, a ground rule used to reduce argument forms to basic
forms. The Stoics analyzed arguments by their form (schema, or tropos). They represented
forms using numbers to represent claims; for example, ‘if the first, the
second; but the first; therefore the second’. Some forms were undemonstrable;
others were reduced to the undemonstrable argument forms by ground rules
(themata); e.g., if R follows from P & Q, -Q follows from P & -R. The
five undemonstrable arguments are: (1) modus ponens; (2) modus tollens; (3) not
both (P and Q), P, so not-Q; (4) P or Q but not both, P, so not-Q; and (5)
disjunctive syllogism. The evidence about the four ground rules is incomplete,
but a sound and consistent system for propositional logic can be developed that
is consistent with the evidence we have. (See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the
Philosophers, 776–81, for an introduction to the Stoic theory of arguments;
other evidence is more scattered.) DOXOGRAPHERS, FORMAL LOGIC, LOGICAL FORM,
STOICISM. H.A.I. Themistius.
COMMENTARIES ON
ARISTOTLE. theodicy (from Greek theos, ‘God’, and dike, ‘justice’), a defense
of the justice or goodness of God in the face of doubts or objections arising
from the phenomena of evil in the world (‘evil’ refers here to bad states of
affairs of any sort). Many types of theodicy have been proposed and vigorously
debated; only a few can be sketched here. (1) It has been argued that evils are
logically necessary for greater goods (e.g., hardships for the full
exemplification of certain virtues), so that even an omnipotent being (roughly,
one whose power has no logically contingent limits) would have a morally
sufficient reason to cause or permit the evils in order to obtain the goods.
Leibniz, in his Theodicy (1710), proposed a particularly comprehensive theodicy
of this type. On his view, God had adequate reason to bring into existence the
actual world, despite all its evils, because it is the best of all possible
worlds, and all actual evils are essential ingredients in it, so that omitting
any of them would spoil the design of the whole. Aside from issues about
whether actual evils are in fact necessary for greater goods, this approach
faces the question whether it assumes wrongly that the end justifies the means.
(2) An important type of theodicy traces some or all evils to sinful free
actions of humans or other beings (such as angels) created by God. Proponents
of this approach assume that free action in creatures is of great value and is
logically incompatible with divine causal control of the creatures’ actions. It
follows that God’s not intervening to prevent sins is necessary, though the
sins themselves are not, to the good of created freedom. This is proposed as a
morally sufficient reason for God’s not preventing them. It is a major task for
this type of theodicy to explain why God would permit those evils that are not
themselves free choices of creatures but are at most consequences of such
choices. (3) Another type of theodicy, both ancient and currently influential
among theologians, though less congenial to orthodox traditions in the major
theistic religions, proposes to defend God’s goodness by abandoning the
doctrine that God is omnipotent. On this view, God is causally, rather than
logically, unable to prevent many evils while pursuing sufficiently great
goods. A principal sponsor of this approach at present is the movement known as
process theology, inspired by Whitehead; it depends on a complex metaphysical
theory about the nature of causal relationships. (4) Other theodicies focus
more on outcomes than on origins. Some religious beliefs suggest that God will
turn out to have been very good to created persons by virtue of gifts
(especially religious gifts, such as communion with God as supreme Good) that
may be bestowed in a life Tetractys theodicy 910 910 after death or in religious experience
in the present life. This approach may be combined with one of the other types
of theodicy, or adopted by people who think that God’s reasons for permitting
evils are beyond our finding out. DIVINE
ATTRIBUTES, FREE WILL PROBLEM, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, PROCESS THEOLOGY. R.M.A.
Theodorus.CYRENAICS. theologia naturalis (Latin, ‘natural theology’), theology
that uses the methods of investigation and standards of rationality of any
other area of philosophy. Traditionally, the central problems of natural
theology are proofs for the existence of God and the problem of evil. In
contrast with natural theology, supernatural theology uses methods that are
supposedly revealed by God and accepts as fact beliefs that are similarly
outside the realm of rational acceptability. Relying on a prophet or a pope to
settle factual questions would be acceptable to supernatural, but not to natural,
theology. Nothing prevents a natural theologian from analyzing concepts that
can be used sanguinely by supernatural theologians, e.g., revelation, miracles,
infallibility, and the doctrine of the Trinity. Theologians often work in both
areas, as did, e.g., Anselm and Aquinas. For his brilliant critiques of
traditional theology, Hume deserves the title of “natural
anti-theologian.” PHILOSOPHY OF
RELIGION. A.P.M. theological creationism.PREEXISTENCE. theological naturalism,
the attempt to develop a naturalistic conception of God. As a philosophical
position, naturalism holds (1) that the only reliable methods of knowing what
there is are methods continuous with those of the developed sciences, and (2)
that the application of those methods supports the view that the constituents
of reality are either physical or are causally dependent on physical things and
their modifications. Since supernaturalism affirms that God is purely spiritual
and causally independent of physical things, naturalists hold that either belief
in God must be abandoned as rationally unsupported or the concept of God must
be reconstituted consistently with naturalism. Earlier attempts to do the
latter include the work of Feuerbach and Comte. In twentieth-century American
naturalism the most significant attempts to develop a naturalistic conception
of God are due to Dewey and Henry Nelson Wieman (1884–1975). In A Common Faith
Dewey proposed a view of God as the unity of ideal ends resulting from human
imagination, ends arousing us to desire and action. Supernaturalism, he argued,
was the product of a primitive need to convert the objects of desire, the
greatest ideals, into an already existing reality. In contrast to Dewey, Wieman
insisted on viewing God as a process in the natural world that leads to the
best that humans can achieve if they but submit to its working in their lives.
In his earlier work he viewed God as a cosmic process that not only works for
human good but is what actually produced human life. Later he identified God
with creative interchange, a process that occurs only within already existing
human communities. While Wieman’s God is not a human creation, as are Dewey’s
ideal ends, it is difficult to see how love and devotion are appropriate to a
natural process that works as it does without thought or purpose. Thus, while
Dewey’s God (ideal ends) lacks creative power but may well qualify as an object
of love and devotion, Wieman’s God (a process in nature) is capable of creative
power but, while worthy of our care and attention, does not seem to qualify as
an object of love and devotion. Neither view, then, satisfies the two
fundamental features associated with the traditional idea of God: possessing
creative power and being an appropriate object of supreme love and devotion. NATURALISM, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, PROCESS
THEOLOGY. W.L.R. theological virtues.AQUINAS. theological
voluntarism.VOLUNTARISM. theology, natural.PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, THEOLOGIA
NATURALIS.
theoretical reason, in
its traditional sense, a faculty or capacity whose province is theoretical
knowledge or inquiry; more broadly, the faculty concerned with ascertaining
truth of any kind (also sometimes called speculative reason). In Book 6 of his
Metaphysics, Aristotle identifies mathematics, physics, and theology as the
subject matter of theoretical reason. Theoretical reason is traditionally
distinguished from practical reason, a faculty exercised in determining guides
to good conduct and in deliberating about proper courses of action. Aristotle
contrasts it, as well, with productive reason, which is concerned with
“making”: shipbuilding, sculpting, healing, and the like. Kant distinguishes
theoretical reason not only from practical reason but also (sometimes) from the
faculty of understanding, in which the categories originate. Theoretical
reason, possessed of its own a priori concepts (“ideas of reason”), regulates
the activities of the understanding. It presupposes a systematic unity in
nature, sets the goal for scientific inquiry, and determines the “criterion of
empirical truth” (Critique of Pure Reason). Theoretical reason, on Kant’s
conception, seeks an explanatory “completeness” and an “unconditionedness” of
being that transcend what is possible in experience. Reason, as a faculty or
capacity, may be regarded as a hybrid composed of theoretical and practical
reason (broadly construed) or as a unity having both theoretical and practical
functions. Some commentators take Aristotle to embrace the former conception
and Kant the latter. Reason is contrasted sometimes with experience, sometimes
with emotion and desire, sometimes with faith. Its presence in human beings has
often been regarded as constituting the primary difference between human and
non-human animals; and reason is sometimes represented as a divine element in
human nature. Socrates, in Plato’s Philebus, portrays reason as “the king of
heaven and earth.” Hobbes, in his Leviathan, paints a more sobering picture,
contending that reason, “when we reckon it among the faculties of the mind, . .
. is nothing but reckoning – that is, adding and subtracting – of the
consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our
thoughts.”
.
theoretical term, a term
occurring in a scientific theory that purports to make reference to an
unobservable entity (e.g., ‘electron’), property (e.g., ‘the monatomicity of a
molecule’), or relation (‘greater electrical resistance’). The qualification ‘purports
to’ is required because instrumentalists deny that any such unobservables
exist; nevertheless, they acknowledge that a scientific theory, such as the
atomic theory of matter, may be a useful tool for organizing our knowledge of
observables and predicting future experiences. Scientific realists, in
contrast, maintain that at least some of the theoretical terms (e.g., ‘quark’
or ‘neutrino’) actually denote entities that are not directly observable – they
hold, i.e., that such things exist. For either group, theoretical terms are
contrasted with such observational terms as ‘rope’, ‘smooth’, and ‘louder
than’, which refer to observable entities, properties, or relations. Much
philosophical controversy has centered on how to draw the distinction between the
observable and the unobservable. Did Galileo observe the moons of Jupiter with
his telescope? Do we observe bacteria under a microscope? Do physicists observe
electrons in bubble chambers? Do astronomers observe the supernova explosions
with neutrino counters? Do we observe ordinary material objects, or are
sense-data the only observables? Are there any observational terms at all, or
are all terms theory-laden? Another important meaning of ‘theoretical term’
occurs if one regards a scientific theory as a semiformal axiomatic system. It
is then natural to think of its vocabulary as divided into three parts, (i)
terms of logic and mathematics, (ii) terms drawn from ordinary language or from
other theories, and (iii) theoretical terms that constitute the special
vocabulary of that particular theory. Thermodynamics, e.g., employs (i) terms
for numbers and mathematical operations, (ii) such terms as ‘pressure’ and
‘volume’ that are common to many branches of physics, and (iii) such special
thermodynamical terms as ‘temperature’, ‘heat’, and ‘entropy’. In this second
sense, a theoretical term need not even purport to refer to unobservables. For
example, although special equipment is necessary for its precise
quantitatheoretical entity theoretical term 912 912 tive measurement, temperature is an
observable property. Even if theories are not regarded as axiomatic systems,
their technical terms can be considered theoretical. Such terms need not
purport to refer to unobservables, nor be the exclusive property of one particular
theory. In some cases, e.g., ‘work’ in physics, an ordinary word is used in the
theory with a meaning that departs significantly from its ordinary use. Serious
questions have been raised about the meaning of theoretical terms. Some
philosophers have insisted that, to be meaningful, they must be given
operational definitions. Others have appealed to coordinative definitions to
secure at least partial interpretation of axiomatic theories. The verifiability
criterion has been invoked to secure the meaningfulness of scientific theories
containing such terms. A theoretical concept (or construct) is a concept
expressed by a theoretical term in any of the foregoing senses. The term
‘theoretical entity’ has often been used to refer to unobservables, but this
usage is confusing, in part because, without introducing any special
vocabulary, we can talk about objects too small to be perceived directly –
e.g., spheres of gamboge (a yellow resin) less than 10–6 meters in diameter,
which figured in a historically important experiment by Jean Perrin. OPERATIONALISM, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. W.C.S.
theoretical underdetermination.OPERATIONALISM, THEORY-LADEN. theoria.ARISTOTLE.
theory, scientific.PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.
theory-laden, dependent
on theory; specifically, involving a theoretical interpretation of what is
perceived or recorded. In the heyday of logical empiricism it was thought, by
Carnap and others, that a rigid distinction could be drawn between
observational and theoretical terms. Later, N. R. Hanson, Paul Feyerabend, and
others questioned this distinction, arguing that perhaps all observations are
theory-laden either because our perception of the world is colored by
perceptual, linguistic, and cultural differences or because no attempt to
distinguish sharply between observation and theory has been successful. This
shift brings a host of philosophical problems. If we accept the idea of radical
theoryladenness, relativism of theory choice becomes possible, for, given rival
theories each of which conditions its own observational evidence, the choice
between them would seem to have to be made on extra-evidential grounds, since
no theory-neutral observations are available. In its most perplexing form,
relativism holds that, theory-ladenness being granted, one theory is as good as
any other, so far as the relationship of theory to evidence is concerned.
Relativists couple the thesis of theory-ladenness with the alleged fact of the
underdetermination of a theory by its observational evidence, which yields the
idea that any number of alternative theories can be supported by the same
evidence. The question becomes one of what it is that constrains choices
between theories. If theory-laden observations cannot constrain such choices,
the individual subjective preferences of scientists, or rules of fraternal
behavior agreed upon by groups of scientists, become the operative constraints.
The logic of confirmation seems to be intrinsically contaminated by both
idiosyncratic and social factors, posing a threat to the very idea of
scientific rationality. CONFIRMATION,
EPISTEMOLOGY, HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE METHOD, INCOMMENSURABILITY, TESTABILITY.
R.E.B. theory of appearing, the theory that to perceive an object is simply for
that object to appear (present itself) to one as being a certain way, e.g.,
looking round or like a rock, smelling vinegary, sounding raucous, or tasting
bitter. Nearly everyone would accept this formulation on some interpretation.
But the theory takes this to be a rock-bottom characterization of perception, and
not further analyzable. It takes “appearing to subject S as so-and-so” as a
basic, irreducible relation, one readily identifiable in experience but not
subject to definition in other terms. The theory preserves the idea that in
normal perception we are directly aware of objects in the physical environment,
not aware of them through non-physical sense-data, sensory impressions, or
other intermediaries. When a tree looks to me a certain way, it is the tree and
nothing else of which I am directly aware. That involves “having” a sensory
experience, but that experience just consists of the tree’s looking a certain
way to me. After enjoying a certain currency early in this century the theory
was largely abandoned under the impact of criticisms by Price, Broad, and
Chisholm. The most widely advertised difficulty theoretical underdetermination
theory of appearing 913 913 is this.
What is it that appears to the subject in completely hallucinatory experience?
Perhaps the greatest strength of the theory is its fidelity to what perceptual
experience seems to be.
theory of descriptions,
an analysis, initially developed by Russell, of sentences containing
descriptions. Descriptions include indefinite descriptions such as ‘an
elephant’ and definite descriptions such as ‘the positive square root of four’.
On Russell’s analysis, descriptions are “incomplete symbols” that are
meaningful only in the context of other symbols, i.e., only in the context of
the sentences containing them. Although the words ‘the first president of the
United States’ appear to constitute a singular term that picks out a particular
individual, much as the name ‘George Washington’ does, Russell held that
descriptions are not referring expressions, and that they are “analyzed out” in
a proper specification of the logical form of the sentences in which they
occur. The grammatical form of ‘The first president of the United States is
tall’ is simply misleading as to its logical form. According to Russell’s
analysis of indefinite descriptions, the sentence ‘I saw a man’ asserts that
there is at least one thing that is a man, and I saw that thing – symbolically,
(Ex) (Mx & Sx). The role of the apparent singular term ‘a man’ is taken
over by the existential quantifier ‘(Ex)’ and the variables it binds, and the
apparent singular term disappears on analysis. A sentence containing a definite
description, such as ‘The present king of France is bald’, is taken to make
three claims: that at least one thing is a present king of France, that at most
one thing is a present king of France, and that that thing is bald –
symbolically, (Ex) {[Fx & (y) (Fy / y % x)] & Bx}. Again, the apparent
referring expression ‘the present king of France’ is analyzed away, with its
role carried out by the quantifiers and variables in the symbolic
representation of the logical form of the sentence in which it occurs. No
element in that representation is a singular referring expression. Russell held
that this analysis solves at least three difficult puzzles posed by
descriptions. The first is how it could be true that George IV wished to know
whether Scott was the author of Waverly, but false that George IV wished to
know whether Scott was Scott. Since Scott is the author of Waverly, we should
apparently be able to substitute ‘Scott’ for ‘the author of Waverly’ and infer
the second sentence from the first, but we cannot. On Russell’s analysis,
‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly’ does not,
when properly understood, contain an expression ‘the author of Waverly’ for
which the name ‘Scott’ can be substituted. The second puzzle concerns the law
of excluded middle, which rules that either ‘The present king of France is
bald’ or ‘The present king of France is not bald’ must be true; the problem is
that neither the list of bald men nor that of non-bald men contains an entry
for the present king of France. Russell’s solution is that ‘The present king of
France is not bald’ is indeed true if it is understood as ‘It is not the case
that there is exactly one thing that is now King of France and is bald’, i.e.,
as -(Ex) {Fx & (y) {[Fy / y % x)] & Bx}. The final puzzle is how ‘There
is no present king of France’ or ‘The present king of France does not exist’
can be true – if ‘the present king of France’ is a referring expression that
picks out something, how can we truly deny that that thing exists? Since
descriptions are not referring expressions on Russell’s theory, it is easy for
him to show that the negation of the claim that there is at least and at most
(i.e., exactly) one present king of France, -(Ex) [Fx & (y) (Fy / y % x)],
is true. Strawson offered the first real challenge to Russell’s theory, arguing
that ‘The present king of France is bald’ does not entail but instead
presupposes ‘There is a present king of France’, so that the former is not
falsified by the falsity of the latter, but is instead deprived of a
truth-value. Strawson argued for the natural view that definite descriptions
are indeed referring expressions, used to single something out for predication.
More recently, Keith Donnellan argued that both Russell and Strawson ignored
the fact that definite descriptions have two uses. Used attributively, a
definite description is intended to say something about whatever it is true of,
and when a sentence is so used it conforms to Russell’s analysis. Used
referentially, a definite description is intended to single something out, but
may not correctly describe it. For example, seeing an inebriated man in a
policeman’s uniform, one might say, “The cop on the corner is drunk!” Donnellan
would say that even if the person were a drunken actor dressed as a policeman,
the speaker would have referred to him and truly said of him that he was drunk.
If it is for some reason crucial that the description be correct, as it might be
if one said, “The cop on the corner has the authority to issue speeding
tickets,” the use is attributive; and because ‘the cop on the corner’ does not
describe anyone correctly, no one has been said to have the authority to issue
speeding tickets. Donnellan criticized Russell for overlooking referential uses
of theory of descriptions theory of descriptions 914 914 descriptions, and Strawson for both
failing to acknowledge attributive uses and maintaining that with referential
uses one can refer to something with a definite description only if the
description is true of it. Discussion of Strawson’s and Donnellan’s criticisms
is ongoing, and has provoked very useful work in both semantics and speech act
theory, and on the distinctions between semantics and pragmatics and between
semantic reference and speaker’s reference, among others.
CAUSAL THEORY OF PROPER
NAMES, PRESUPPOSITION, RUSSELL. R.B. theory of effluxes.DEMOCRITUS. theory of
Forms.PLATO. theory of frequency.PROBABILITY. theory of relativity.RELATIVITY.
theory of signs, the philosophical and scientific theory of
information-carrying entities, communication, and information transmission. The
term ‘semiotic’ was introduced by Locke for the science of signs and
signification. The term became more widely used as a result of the influential
work of Peirce and Charles Morris. With regard to linguistic signs, three areas
of semiotic were distinguished: pragmatics – the study of the way people,
animals, or machines such as computers use signs; semantics – the study of the
relations between signs and their meanings, abstracting from their use; and
syntax – the study of the relations among signs themselves, abstracting both
from use and from meaning. In Europe, the near-equivalent term ‘semiology’ was
introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure, the Swiss linguist. Broadly, a sign is any
information-carrying entity, including linguistic and animal signaling tokens,
maps, road signs, diagrams, pictures, models, etc. Examples include smoke as a
sign of fire, and a red light at a highway intersection as a sign to stop.
Linguistically, vocal aspects of speech such as prosodic features (intonation,
stress) and paralinguistic features (loudness and tone, gestures, facial
expressions, etc.), as well as words and sentences, are signs in the most
general sense. Peirce defined a sign as “something that stands for something in
some respect or capacity.” Among signs, he distinguished symbols, icons, and
indices. A symbol, or conventional sign, is a sign, typical of natural language
forms, that lacks any significant relevant physical correspondence with or
resemblance to the entities to which the form refers (manifested by the fact
that quite different forms may refer to the same class of objects), and for
which there is no correlation between the occurrence of the sign and its
referent. An index, or natural sign, is a sign whose occurrence is causally or
statistically correlated with occurrences of its referent, and whose production
is not intentional. Thus, yawning is a natural sign of sleepiness; a bird call
may be a natural sign of alarm. Linguistically, loudness with a rising pitch is
a sign of anger. An icon is a sign whose form corresponds to or resembles its
referent or a characteristic of its referent. For instance, a tailor’s swatch
is an icon by being a sign that resembles a fabric in color, pattern, and
texture. A linguistic example is onomatopoeia – as with ‘buzz’. In general,
there are conventional and cultural aspects to a sign being an icon.
GRAMMAR, MEANING,
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, SEMIOSIS. W.K.W. theory of types.TYPE THEORY. theory
theory.SIMULATION THEORY.
Theosophy, any
philosophical mysticism, especially those that purport to be mathematically or
scientifically based, such as Pythagoreanism, Neoplatonism, or gnosticism.
Vedic Hinduism, and certain aspects of Buddhism, Taoism, and Islamic Sufism,
can also be considered theosophical. In narrower senses, ‘theosophy’ may refer
to the philosophy of Swedenborg, Steiner, or Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky
(1831–91). Swedenborg’s theosophy originally consisted of a rationalistic
cosmology, inspired by certain elements of Cartesian and Leibnizian philosophy,
and a Christian mysticism. Swedenborg labored to explain the interconnections
between soul and body. Steiner’s theosophy is a reaction to standard scientific
theory. It purports to be as rigorous as ordinary science, but superior to it
by incorporating spiritual truths about reality. According to his theosophy,
reality is organic and evolving by its own resource. Genuine knowledge is
intuitive, not discursive. Madame Blavatsky founded the Theosophical Society in
1875. Her views were eclectic, but were strongly influenced by mystical
elements of Indian philosophy.
MYSTICISM, STEINER, SWEDENBORGIANISM. A.P.M. theory of effluxes
theosophy 915 915 Theravada
Buddhism.BUDDHISM. thermodynamics, first law of.ENTROPY. thermodynamics, second
law of.ENTROPY. thesis.HEGEL. theurgy.NEOPLATONISM. thing.METAPHYSICS.
thing-in-itself.KANT. Third Man argument.PLATO. thirdness.PEIRCE. thisness.HAECCEITY.
Thomas Aquinas.AQUINAS.
Thomism, the theology and
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The term is applied broadly to various thinkers
from different periods who were heavily influenced by Aquinas’s thought in
their own philosophizing and theologizing. Here three different eras and three
different groups of thinkers will be distinguished: those who supported
Aquinas’s thought in the fifty years or so following his death in 1274; certain
highly skilled interpreters and commentators who flourished during the period
of “Second Thomism” (sixteenth–seventeenth centuries); and various late
nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers who have been deeply influenced in
their own work by Aquinas. Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Thomism. Although
Aquinas’s genius was recognized by many during his own lifetime, a number of
his views were immediately contested by other Scholastic thinkers.
Controversies ranged, e.g., over his defense of only one substantial form in
human beings; his claim that prime matter is purely potential and cannot,
therefore, be kept in existence without some substantial form, even by divine
power; his emphasis on the role of the human intellect in the act of choice;
his espousal of a real distinction betweeen the soul and its powers; and his
defense of some kind of objective or “real” rather than a merely mind-dependent
composition of essence and act of existing (esse) in creatures. Some of
Aquinas’s positions were included directly or indirectly in the 219
propositions condemned by Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris in 1277, and his
defense of one single substantial form in man was condemned by Archbishop
Robert Kilwardby at Oxford in 1277, with renewed prohibitions by his successor
as archbishop of Canterbury, John Peckham, in 1284 and 1286. Only after
Aquinas’s canonization in 1323 were the Paris prohibitions revoked insofar as
they touched on his teaching (in 1325). Even within his own Dominican order,
disagreement about some of his views developed within the first decades after
his death, notwithstanding the order’s highly sympathetic espousal of his
cause. Early English Dominican defenders of his general views included William
Hothum (d.1298), Richard Knapwell (d.c.1288), Robert Orford (b. after 1250,
fl.1290–95), Thomas Sutton (d. c.1315?), and William Macclesfield (d.1303).
French Dominican Thomists included Bernard of Trilia (d.1292), Giles of
Lessines in present-day Belgium (d.c.1304?), John Quidort of Paris (d. 1306),
Bernard of Auvergne (d. after 1307), Hervé Nédélec (d.1323), Armand of Bellevue
(fl. 1316–34), and William Peter Godin (d.1336). The secular master at Paris,
Peter of Auvergne (d. 1304), while remaining very independent in his own views,
knew Aquinas’s thought well and completed some of his commentaries on
Aristotle. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Thomism. Sometimes known as the
period of Second Thomism, this revival gained impetus from the early
fifteenth-century writer John Capreolus (1380–1444) in his Defenses of Thomas’s
Theology (Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae), a commentary on the Sentences. A
number of fifteenth-century Dominican and secular teachers in German
universities also contributed: Kaspar Grunwald (Freiburg); Cornelius Sneek and
John Stoppe (in Rostock); Leonard of Brixental (Vienna); Gerard of Heerenberg,
Lambert of Heerenberg, and John Versor (all at Cologne); Gerhard of Elten; and
in Belgium Denis the Carthusian. Outstanding among various sixteenth-century
commentators on Thomas were Tommaso de Vio (Cardinal) Cajetan, Francis
Sylvester of Ferrara, Francisco de Vitoria (Salamanca), and Francisco’s
disciples Domingo de Soto and Melchior Cano. Most important among early
seventeenth-century Thomists was John of St. Thomas, who lectured at Piacenza,
Madrid, and Alcalá, and is best known for his Cursus philosophicus and his
Cursus theologicus. Theravada Buddhism Thomism 916 916 The nineteenth- and twentieth-century
revival. By the early to mid-nineteenth century the study of Aquinas had been
largely abandoned outside Dominican circles, and in most Roman Catholic
colleges and seminaries a kind of Cartesian and Suarezian Scholasticism was
taught. Long before he became Pope Leo XIII, Joachim Pecci and his brother
Joseph had taken steps to introduce the teaching of Thomistic philosophy at the
diocesan seminary at Perugia in 1846. Earlier efforts in this direction had
been made by Vincenzo Buzzetti (1778–1824), by Buzzetti’s students Serafino and
Domenico Sordi, and by Taparelli d’Aglezio, who became director of the Collegio
Romano (Gregorian University) in 1824. Leo’s encyclical Aeterni Patris(1879)
marked an official effort on the part of the Roman Catholic church to foster
the study of the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas. The intent was to
draw upon Aquinas’s original writings in order to prepare students of
philosophy and theology to deal with problems raised by contemporary thought.
The Leonine Commission was established to publish a critical edition of all of
Aquinas’s writings; this effort continues today. Important centers of Thomistic
studies developed, such as the Higher Institute of Philosophy at Louvain
(founded by Cardinal Mercier), the Dominican School of Saulchoir in France, and
the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. Different groups of
Roman, Belgian, and French Jesuits acknowledged a deep indebtedness to Aquinas
for their personal philosophical reflections. There was also a concentration of
effort in the United States at universities such as The Catholic University of
America, St. Louis University, Notre Dame, Fordham, Marquette, and Boston
College, to mention but a few, and by the Dominicans at River Forest. A great
weakness of many of the nineteenthand twentieth-century Latin manuals produced
during this effort was a lack of historical sensitivity and expertise, which
resulted in an unreal and highly abstract presentation of an
“Aristotelian-Thomistic” philosophy. This weakness was largely offset by the
development of solid historical research both in the thought of Aquinas and in
medieval philosophy and theology in general, championed by scholars such as H.
Denifle, M. De Wulf, M. Grabmann, P. Mandonnet, F. Van Steenberghen, E. Gilson
and many of his students at Toronto, and by a host of more recent and
contemporary scholars. Much of this historical work continues today both within
and without Catholic scholarly circles. At the same time, remarkable diversity
in interpreting Aquinas’s thought has emerged on the part of many
twentieth-century scholars. Witness, e.g., the heavy influence of Cajetan and
John of St. Thomas on the Thomism of Maritain; the much more historically
grounded approaches developed in quite different ways by Gilson and F. Van
Steenberghen; the emphasis on the metaphysics of participation in Aquinas in
the very different presentations by L. Geiger and C. Fabro; the emphasis on
existence (esse) promoted by Gilson and many others but resisted by still other
interpreters; the movement known as Transcendental Thomism, originally inspired
by P. Rousselot and by J. Marechal (in dialogue with Kant); and the long
controversy about the appropriateness of describing Thomas’s philosophy (and
that of other medievals) as a Christian philosophy. An increasing number of
non-Catholic thinkers are currently directing considerable attention to
Aquinas, and the varying backgrounds they bring to his texts will undoubtedly
result in still other interesting interpretations and applications of his
thought to contemporary concerns.
AQUINAS, GILSON, JOHN OF
SAINT THOMAS, MARITAIN, NEO-THOMISM. J.F.W. Thomson, Judith Jarvis (b.1929),
American analytic philosopher best known for her contribution to moral
philosophy and for her paper “A Defense of Abortion” (1971). Thomson has taught
at M.I.T. since 1964. Her work is centrally concerned with issues in moral
philosophy, most notably questions regarding rights, and with issues in
metaphysics such as the identity across time of people and the ontology of
events. Her Acts and Other Events (1977) is a study of human action and
provides an analysis of the part– whole relation among events. “A Defense of
Abortion” has not only influenced much later work on this topic but is one of
the most widely discussed papers in contemporary philosophy. By appeal to
imaginative scenarios analogous to pregnancy, Thomson argues that even if the
fetus is assumed to be a person, its rights are in many circumstances
outweighed by the rights of the pregnant woman. Thus the paper advances an
argument for a right to abortion that does not turn upon the question of
whether the fetus is a person. Several of Thomson’s essays, including
“Preferential Hiring” (1973), “The Right to Privacy” (1975), and “Killing,
Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem” (1976), address the questions of what
constitutes Thomson, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Judith Jarvis 917 917 an infringement of rights and when it is
morally permissible to infringe a right. These are collected in Rights,
Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory (1986). Thomson’s The Realm of
Rights (1990) offers a systematic account of human rights, addressing first what
it is to have a right and second which rights we have. Thomson’s work is
distinguished by its exceptionally lucid style and its reliance on highly
inventive examples. The centrality of examples to her work reflects a
methodological conviction that our views about actual and imagined cases
provide the data for moral theorizing.
ACTION THEORY, ETHICS, RIGHTS. A.E.B.
Thoreau, Henry David
(1817–62), American naturalist and writer. Born in Concord, Massachusetts, he
attended Harvard (1833–37) and then returned to Concord to study nature and
write, making a frugal living as a schoolteacher, land surveyor, and pencil
maker. Commentators have emphasized three aspects of his life: his love and
penetrating study of the flora and fauna of the Concord area, recorded with
philosophical reflections in Walden (1854); his continuous pursuit of
simplicity in the externals of life, thus avoiding a life of “quiet
desperation”; and his acts of civil disobedience. The last item has been
somewhat overemphasized; not paying a poll tax by way of protest was not
original with Thoreau. However, his essay “Resistance to Civil Government”
immortalized his protest and influenced people like Gandhi and Martin Luther
King, Jr., in later years. Thoreau eventually helped runaway slaves at
considerable risk; still, he considered himself a student of nature and not a
reformer. TRANSCENDENTALISM. E.H.M.
thought, language of.MEANING, MENTALESE, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. thought
experiment, a technique for testing a hypothesis by imagining a situation and
what would be said about it (or more rarely, happen in it). This technique is
often used by philosophers to argue for (or against) a hypothesis about the
meaning or applicability of a concept. For example, Locke imagined a switch of
minds between a prince and a cobbler as a way to argue that personal identity
is based on continuity of memory, not continuity of the body. To argue for the
relativity of simultaneity, Einstein imagined two observers – one on a train,
the other beside it – who observed lightning bolts. And according to some
scholars, Galileo only imagined the experiment of tying two five-pound weights
together with a fine string in order to argue that heavier bodies do not fall
faster. Thought experiments of this last type are rare because they can be used
only when one is thoroughly familiar with the outcome of the imagined
situation. J.A.K. Thrasymachus (fl. 427 B.C.), Greek Sophist from Bithynia who
is known mainly as a character in Book I of Plato’s Republic. He traveled and
taught extensively throughout the Greek world, and was well known in Athens as
a teacher and as the author of treatises on rhetoric. Innovative in his style,
he was credited with inventing the “middle style” of rhetoric. The only
surviving fragment of a speech by Thrasymachus was written for delivery by an
Athenian citizen in the assembly, at a time when Athens was not faring well in
the Peloponnesian War; it shows him concerned with the efficiency of
government, pleading with the Athenians to recognize their common interests and
give up their factionalism. Our only other source for his views on political
matters is Plato’s Republic, which most scholars accept as presenting at least
a half-truth about Thrasymachus. There, Thrasymachus is represented as a foil
to Socrates, claiming that justice is only what benefits the stronger, i.e.,
the rulers. From the point of view of those who are ruled, then, justice always
serves the interest of someone else, and rulers who seek their own advantage
are unjust. SOPHISTS. P.Wo. Three
Profound Treatises.NEO-TAOISM. three-valued logic.MANY-VALUED LOGIC. Three
Ways.BONAVENTURE. threshold, absolute.FECHNER. threshold, relative.FECHNER.
t’i, yung, Chinese terms often rendered into English as ‘substance’ and
‘function’, respectively. Ch’eng Yi (1033–1107), in the preface to his
Commentary to the Book of Changes, says: “Substance (t’i) and function (yung)
come from the same source, and there is no gap between the manifest and the
hidden.” Such thought is characteristic of the Chinese way of thinking. Chu Hsi
(1130–1200) applied the pair of concepts to his theory of human nature; he
maintained that jen (humanity) is nature, substance, while love is Thoreau,
Henry David t’i, yung 918 918 feeling,
function. In the late Ch’ing dynasty (1644–1912) Chang Chih-tung (1837–1909)
advocated Chinese learning for t’i and Western learning for yung. CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, CHU HSI. S.-h.L. t’ien,
Chinese term meaning ‘heaven’, ‘sky’. T’ien has a range of uses running from
the most to the least anthropomorphic. At one extreme, t’ien is identified with
shang ti. T’ien can be spoken of as having desires and engaging in purposive
actions, such as bestowing the Mandate of Heaven (t’ien ming). T’ien ming has a
political and an ethical use. It can be the mandate to rule given to a virtuous
individual. It can also be the moral requirements that apply to each
individual, especially as these are embodied in one’s nature. At the other
extreme, thinkers such as Hsün-Tzu identify t’ien with the natural order. Even in
texts where t’ien is sometimes used anthropomorphically, it can also be used as
synonymous with ming (in the sense of fate), or simply refer to the sky. After
the introduction of Buddhism into China, the phrase ‘Hall of Heaven’ (t’ien
t’ang) is used to refer to the paradise awaiting some souls after death. CHUNG-YUNG, HSING, MING, SHANG TI. B.W.V.N.
t’ien-jen ho-i, Chinese term for the relationship between t’ien (Heaven) and
human beings. Most ancient Chinese philosophers agreed on the ideal t’ien-jen
ho-i: the unity and harmony of Heaven or the natural order of events and human
affairs. They differed on the means of achieving this ideal vision. The
Taoists, Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, focused on adaptability to all natural
occurrences without human intervention. The Confucians stressed the cultivation
of virtues such as jen (benevolence), i (rightness), and li (propriety), both
in the rulers and the people. Some later Confucians, along with Mo Tzu,
emphasized the mutual influence and response or interaction of Heaven and
humans. Perhaps the most distinctive Confucian conception is Hsün Tzu’s thesis
that Heaven provides resources for completion by human efforts. A.S.C. t’ien
li, jen-yü, Chinese terms literally meaning ‘heavenly principles’ and ‘human
desires’, respectively. Sung–Ming Neo-Confucian philosophers believed that
Heaven enables us to understand principles and to act according to them.
Therefore we must try our best to preserve heavenly principles and eliminate
human desires. When hungry, one must eat; this is acting according to t’ien li.
But when one craves gourmet food, the only thing one cares about is
gratification of desire; this is jen-yü. Neo-Confucian philosophers were not
teaching asceticism; they only urged us not to be slaves of our excessive,
unnatural, artificial, “human” desires.
NEO-CONFUCIANISM;
TAO-HSIN, JEN-HSIN. S.-h.L. t’ien ming.MING. Tillers.HSü HSING. Tillich, Paul
(1886–1965), German-born American philosopher and theologian. Born in
Starzeddel, eastern Germany, he was educated in philosophy and theology and
ordained in the Prussian Evangelical Church in 1912. He served as an army
chaplain during World War I and later taught at Berlin, Marburg, Dresden,
Leipzig, and Frankfurt. In November 1933, following suspension from his teaching
post by the Nazis, he emigrated to the United States, where he taught at
Columbia and Union Theological Seminary until 1955, and then at Harvard and
Chicago until his death. A popular preacher and speaker, he developed a wide
audience in the United States through such writings as The Protestant Era
(1948), Systematic Theology (three volumes: 1951, 1957, 1963), The Courage to
Be (1952), and Dynamics of Faith (1957). His sometimes unconventional
lifestyle, as well as his syncretic yet original thought, moved “on the
boundary” between theology and other elements of culture – especially art,
literature, political thought, and depth psychology – in the belief that
religion should relate to the whole extent, and the very depths, of human
existence. Tillich’s thought, despite its distinctive “ontological” vocabulary,
was greatly influenced by the voluntaristic tradition from Augustine through
Schelling, Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. It was a systematic
theology that sought to state fresh Christian answers to deep existential
questions raised by individuals and cultures – his method of correlation. Every
age has its distinctive kairos, “crisis” or “fullness of time,” the right time
for creative thought and action. In Weimar Germany, Tillich found the times
ripe for religious socialism. In post–World War II America, he focused more on
psychological themes: in the midst of anxiety over death, meaninglessness, and
guilt, everyone seeks the courage to be, which comes only by avoiding the abyss
of non-being (welling up in the demonic) and by placing one’s unconditional
faith – ultit’ien Tillich, Paul 919 919
mate concern – not in any particular being (e.g. God) but in Being-Itself (“the
God above God,” the ground of being). This is essentially the Protestant
principle, which prohibits lodging ultimate concern in any finite and limited
reality (including state, race, and religious institutions and symbols).
Tillich was especially influential after World War II. He represented for many
a welcome critical openness to the spiritual depths of modern culture, opposing
both demonic idolatry of this world (as in National Socialism) and sectarian
denial of cultural resources for faith (as in Barthian neo-orthodoxy).
time, “a moving image of
eternity” (Plato); “the number of movements in respect of the before and after”
(Aristotle); “the Life of the Soul in movement as it passes from one stage of
act or experience to another” (Plotinus); “a present of things past, memory, a
present of things present, sight, and a present of things future, expectation”
(Augustine). These definitions, like all attempts to encapsulate the essence of
time in some neat formula, are unhelpfully circular because they employ
temporal notions. Although time might be too basic to admit of definition,
there still are many questions about time that philosophers have made some
progress in answering by analysis both of how we ordinarily experience and talk
about time, and of the deliverances of science, thereby clarifying and
deepening our understanding of what time is. What follows gives a sample of
some of the more important of these issues. Temporal becoming and the A- and
B-theories of time. According to the B-theory, time consists in nothing but a
fixed “B-series” of events running from earlier to later. The A-theory requires
that these events also form an “A-series” going from the future through the
present into the past and, moreover, shift in respect to these determinations.
The latter sort of change, commonly referred to as “temporal becoming,” gives
rise to well-known perplexities concerning both what does the shifting and the
sort of shift involved. Often it is said that it is the present or now that
shifts to ever-later times. This quickly leads to absurdity. ‘The present’ and
‘now’, like ‘this time’, are used to refer to a moment of time. Thus, to say
that the present shifts to later times entails that this very moment of time –
the present – will become some other moment of time and thus cease to be
identical with itself! Sometimes the entity that shifts is the property of
nowness or presentness. The problem is that every event has this property at
some time, namely when it occurs. Thus, what must qualify some event as being
now simpliciter is its having the property of nowness now; and this is the
start of an infinite regress that is vicious because at each stage we are left
with an unexpurgated use of ‘now’, the very term that was supposed to be
analyzed in terms of the property of nowness. If events are to change from
being future to present and from present to past, as is required by temporal
becoming, they must do so in relation to some mysterious transcendent entity,
since temporal relations between events and/or times cannot change. The nature
of the shift is equally perplexing, for it must occur at a particular rate; but
a rate of change involves a comparison between one kind of change and a change
of time. Herein, it is change of time that is compared to change of time,
resulting in the seeming tautology that time passes or shifts at the rate of
one second per second, surely an absurdity since this is not a rate of change
at all. Broad attempted to skirt these perplexities by saying that becoming is
sui generis and thereby defies analysis, which puts him on the side of the
mystically inclined Bergson who thought that it could be known only through an
act of ineffable intuition. To escape the clutches of both perplexity and
mysticism, as well as to satisfy the demand of science to view the world
non-perspectivally, the B-theory attempted to reduce the A-series to the
B-series via a linguistic reduction in which a temporal indexical proposition
reporting an event as past, present, or future is shown to be identical with a
non-indexical proposition reporting a relation of precedence or simultaneity
between it and another event or time. It is generally conceded that such a
reduction fails, since, in general, no indexical proposition is identical with
any non-indexical one, this being due to the fact that one can have a
propositional attitude toward one of them that is not had to the other; e.g., I
can believe that it is now raining without believing that it rains
(tenselessly) at t 7. The friends of becoming have drawn the wrong moral from
this failure – that there is a mysterious Mr. X out there doing “The Shift.”
They have overlooked the fact that two sentences can express different
propositions and yet report one and the same event or state of affairs; e.g.,
‘This time time 920 920 is water’ and
‘this is a collection of H2O molecules’, though differing in sense, report the
same state of affairs – this being water is nothing but this being a collection
of H2O molecules. It could be claimed that the same holds for the appropriate
use of indexical and non-indexical sentences; the tokening at t 7 of ‘Georgie
flies at this time (at present)’ is coreporting with the non-synonymous
‘Georgie flies (tenselessly) at t 7’, since Georgie’s flying at this time is
the same event as Georgie’s flying at t 7, given that this time is t 7. This
effects the same ontological reduction of the becoming of events to their
bearing temporal relations to each other as does the linguistic reduction. The
“coreporting reduction” also shows the absurdity of the “psychological
reduction” according to which an event’s being present, etc., requires a
relation to a perceiver, whereas an event’s having a temporal relation to
another event or time does not require a relation to a perceiver. Given that
Georgie’s flying at this time is identical with Georgie’s flying at t 7, it follows
that one and the same event both does and does not have the property of
requiring relation to a perceiver, thereby violating Leibniz’s law that
identicals are indiscernible. Continuous versus discrete time. Assume that the
instants of time are linearly ordered by the relation R of ‘earlier than’. To
say that this order is continuous is, first, to imply the property of density
or infinite divisibility: for any instants i 1 and i 2 such that Ri1i 2, there
is a third instant i 3, such that Ri1i 3 and Ri3i 2. But continuity implies
something more since density allows for “gaps” between the instants, as with
the rational numbers. (Think of R as the ‘less than’ relation and the i n as
rationals.) To rule out gaps and thereby assure genuine continuity it is necessary
to require in addition to density that every convergent sequence of instants
has a limit. To make this precise one needs a distance measure d( , ) on pairs
of instants, where d(i m, i n) is interpreted as the lapse of time between i m
and i n. The requirement of continuity proper is then that for any sequence i l
, i 2, i 3, . . . , of instants, if d(i m i n) P 0 as m, n P C, there is a
limit instant i ø such that d(i n, iø ) P 0 as n P C. The analogous property
obviously fails for the rationals. But taking the completion of the rationals
by adding in the limit points of convergent sequences yields the real number
line, a genuine continuum. Numerous objections have been raised to the idea of
time as a continuum and to the very notion of the continuum itself. Thus, it
was objected that time cannot be composed of durationless instants since a
stack of such instants cannot produce a non-zero duration. Modern measure
theory resolves this objection. Leibniz held that a continuum cannot be
composed of points since the points in any (finite closed) interval can be put
in one-to-one correspondence with a smaller subinterval, contradicting the
axiom that the whole is greater than any proper part. What Leibniz took to be a
contradictory feature is now taken to be a defining feature of infinite
collections or totalities. Modern-day Zenoians, while granting the viability of
the mathematical doctrine of the continuum and even the usefulness of its
employment in physical theory, will deny the possibility of its applying to
real-life changes. Whitehead gave an analogue of Zeno’s paradox of the
dichotomy to show that a thing cannot endure in a continuous manner. For if (i
1, i 2) is the interval over which the thing is supposed to endure, then the
thing would first have to endure until the instant i 3, halfway between i 1 and
i 2; but before it can endure until i 3, it must first endure until the instant
i 4 halfway between i 1 and i 3, etc. The seductiveness of this paradox rests
upon an implicit anthropomorphic demand that the operations of nature must be
understood in terms of concepts of human agency. Herein it is the demand that
the physicist’s description of a continuous change, such as a runner traversing
a unit spatial distance by performing an infinity of runs of ever-decreasing
distance, could be used as an action-guiding recipe for performing this feat,
which, of course, is impossible since it does not specify any initial or final
doing, as recipes that guide human actions must. But to make this
anthropomorphic demand explicit renders this deployment of the dichotomy, as
well as the arguments against the possibility of performing a “supertask,”
dubious. Anti-realists might deny that we are committed to real-life change
being continuous by our acceptance of a physical theory that employs principles
of mathematical continuity, but this is quite different from the Zenoian claim
that it is impossible for such change to be continuous. To maintain that time
is discrete would require not only abandoning the continuum but also the
density property as well. Giving up either conflicts with the intuition that
time is one-dimensional. (For an explanation of how the topological analysis of
dimensionality entails that the dimension of a discrete space is 0, see W.
Hurewicz, Dimension Theory, 1941.) The philotime time 921 921 sophical and physics literatures contain
speculations about a discrete time built of “chronons” or temporal atoms, but
thus far such hypothetical entities have not been incorporated into a
satisfactory theory. Absolute versus relative and relational time. In a
scholium to the Principia, Newton declared that “Absolute, true and
mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, flows equably without
relation to anything external.” There are at least five interrelated senses in
which time was absolute for Newton. First, he thought that there was a
frame-independent relation of simultaneity for events. Second, he thought that
there was a frame-independent measure of duration for non-simultaneous events.
He used ‘flows equably’ not to refer to the above sort of mysterious “temporal
becoming,” but instead to connote the second sense of absoluteness and partly
to indicate two further kinds of absoluteness. To appreciate the latter, note
that ‘flows equably’ is modified by ‘without relation to anything external’.
Here Newton was asserting (third sense of ‘absolute’) that the lapse of time
between two events would be what it is even if the distribution and motions of
material bodies were different. He was also presupposing a related form of
absoluteness (fourth sense) according to which the metric of time is intrinsic
to the temporal interval. Leibniz’s philosophy of time placed him in agreement
with Newton as regards the first two senses of ‘absolute’, which assert the
non-relative or frame-independent nature of time. However, Leibniz was very
much opposed to Newton on the fourth sense of ‘absolute’. According to
Leibniz’s relational conception of time, any talk about the length of a
temporal interval must be unpacked in terms of talk about the relation of the
interval to an extrinsic metric standard. Furthermore, Leibniz used his
principles of sufficient reason and identity of indiscernibles to argue against
a fifth sense of ‘absolute’, implicit in Newton’s philosophy of time, according
to which time is a substratum in which physical events are situated. On the
contrary, the relational view holds that time is nothing over and above the
structure of relations of events. Einstein’s special and general theories of
relativity have direct bearing on parts of these controversies. The special
theory necessitates the abandonment of frame-independent notions of
simultaneity and duration. For any pair of spacelike related events in
Minkowski space-time there is an inertial frame in which the events are
simultaneous, another frame in which the first event is temporally prior, and
still a third in which the second event is temporally prior. And the temporal
interval between two timelike related events depends on the worldline connecting
them. In fact, for any e ( 0, no matter how small, there is a worldline
connecting the events whose proper length is less than e. (This is the essence
of the so-called twin paradox.) The general theory of relativity abandons the
third sense of absoluteness since it entails that the metrical structure of
space-time covaries with the distribution of mass-energy in a manner specified
by Einstein’s field equations. But the heart of the absolute–relational
controversy – as focused by the fourth and fifth senses of ‘absolute’ – is not
settled by relativistic considerations. Indeed, opponents from both sides of
the debate claim to find support for their positions in the special and general
theories.
time slice, a temporal
part or stage of any concrete particular that exists for some interval of time;
a three-dimensional cross section of a fourdimensional object. To think of an
object as consisting of time slices or temporal stages is to think of it as
related to time in much the way that it is related to space: as extending
through time as well as space, rather than as enduring through it. Just as an
object made up of spatial parts is thought of as a whole made up of parts that
exist at different locations, so an object made up of time slices is thought of
as a whole made up of parts or stages that exist at successive times; hence,
just as a spatial whole is only partly present in any space that does not
include all its spatial parts, so a whole made up of time slices is only partly
present in any stretch of time that does not include all its temporal parts. A
continuant, by contrast, is most commonly understood to be a particular that
endures through time, i.e., that is wholly present at each moment at which it
exists. To conceive of an object as a continuant is to conceive of it as
related to time in a very different way from that in which it is related to
space. A continuant does not extend through time as well as space; it does not
exist at different times by virtue of the existence of successive parts of it at
those times; it is the continuant itself that is wholly present at each such
time. To conceive an object as a continuant, therefore, is to conceive it as
not made time lag argument time slice 922
922 up of temporal stages, or time slices, at all. There is another,
less common, use of ‘continuant’ in which a continuant is understood to be any
particular that exists for some stretch of time, regardless of whether it is
the whole of the particular or only some part of it that is present at each
moment of the particular’s existence. According to this usage, an entity that
is made up of time slices would be a kind of continuant rather than some other
kind of particular. Philosophers have disputed whether ordinary objects such as
cabbages and kings endure through time (are continuants) or only extend through
time (are sequences of time slices). Some argue that to understand the
possibility of change one must think of such objects as sequences of time
slices; others argue that for the same reason one must think of such objects as
continuants. If an object changes, it comes to be different from itself. Some
argue that this would be possible only if an object consisted of distinct,
successive stages; so that change would simply consist in the differences among
the successive temporal parts of an object. Others argue that this view would
make change impossible; that differences among the successive temporal parts of
a thing would no more imply the thing had changed than differences among its
spatial parts would. METAPHYSICS,
WHITEHEAD. P.F. Timon of Philius.SKEPTICS. Tindal, Matthew.DEISM. Tisberi,
William.
HEYTESBURY. token.ACTION
THEORY, TYPE–TOKEN DISTINCTION. token epiphenomenalism.PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.
token physicalism.PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. token-reflexive, an expression that
refers to itself in an act of speech or writing, such as ‘this token’. The term
was coined by Reichenbach, who conjectured that all indexicals, all expressions
whose semantic value depends partly on features of the context of utterance,
are tokenreflexive and definable in terms of the phrase ‘this token’. He
suggested that ‘I’ means the same as ‘the person who utters this token’, ‘now’
means the same as ‘the time at which this token is uttered’, ‘this table’ means
the same as ‘the table pointed to by a gesture accompanying this token’, and so
forth. (Russell made a somewhat similar suggestion in his discussion of
egocentric particulars.) Reichenbach’s conjecture is widely regarded as false;
although ‘I’ does pick out the person using it, it is not synonymous with ‘the
person who utters this token’. If it were, as David Kaplan observes, ‘If no one
were to utter this token, I would not exist’ would be true. EGOCENTRIC PARTICULAR, INDEXICAL. R.B.
token-token
identity.PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. Toletus, Francisco (1532–96), Spanish Jesuit
theologian and philosopher. Born in Córdoba, he studied at Valencia, Salamanca,
and Rome, and became the first Jesuit cardinal in 1594. He composed
commentaries on several of Aristotle’s works and a commentary on Aquinas’s
Summa theologiae. Toletus followed a Thomistic line, but departed from Thomism
in some details. He held that individuals are directly apprehended by the
intellect and that the agent intellect is the same power as the possible
intellect. He rejected the Thomistic doctrines of the real distinction between
essence and existence and of individuation by designated matter; for Toletus
individuation results from form.
AQUINAS. J.J.E.G. tonk, a sentential connective whose meaning and logic
are completely characterized by the two rules (or axioms) (1) [P P (P tonk Q)]
and (2) [(P tonk Q) P Q]. If (1) and (2) are added to any normal system, then
every Q can be derived from any P. Arthur Prior invented ‘tonk’ to show that
deductive validity must not be conceived as depending solely on arbitrary
syntactically defined rules or axioms. We may prohibit ‘tonk’ on the ground
that it is not a natural, independently meaningful notion, but we may also
prohibit it on purely syntactical grounds. E.g., we may require that, for every
connective C, the C-introduction rule [(xxx) P (. . . C . . .)] and the
C-elimination rule [( - - - C - - -) P (yyy)] be such that the (yyy) is part of
(xxx) or is related to (xxx) in some other syntactical way. RELEVANCE LOGIC. D.H. Timon of Philius tonk
923 923 top-down.COGNITIVE SCIENCE.
topic-neutral, noncommittal between two or more ontological interpretations of
a term. J. J. C. Smart (in 1959) suggested that introspective reports can be
taken as topic-neutral: composed of terms neutral between “dualistic
metaphysics” and “materialistic metaphysics.” When one asserts, e.g., that one
has a yellowish-orange afterimage, this is tantamount to saying ‘There is
something going on that is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am
awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me, i.e.,
when I really see an orange’. The italicized phrase is, in Smart’s terms,
topic-neutral; it refers to an event, while remaining noncommittal about
whether it is material or immaterial. The term has not always been restricted
to neutrality regarding dualism and materialism. Smart suggests that
topic-neutral descriptions are composed of “quasi-logical” words, and hence
would be suitable for any occasion where a relatively noncommittal expression
of a view is required. PHILOSOPHY OF
MIND. D.C.D. topics, the analysis of common strategies of argumentation, later
a genre of literature analyzing syllogistic reasoning. Aristotle considered the
analysis of types of argument, or “topics,” the best means of describing the
art of dialectical reasoning; he also used the term to refer to the principle
underlying the strategy’s production of an argument. Later classical
commentators on Aristotle, particularly Latin rhetoricians like Cicero,
developed Aristotle’s discussions of the theory of dialectical reasoning into a
philosophical form. Boethius’s work on topics exemplifies the later classical
expansion of the scope of topics literature. For him, a topic is either a
self-evidently true universal generalization, also called a “maximal
proposition,” or a differentia, a member of the set of a maximal proposition’s
characteristics that determine its genus and species. Man is a rational animal
is a maximal proposition, and like from genus, the differentia that characterizes
the maximal proposition as concerning genera, it is a topic. Because he
believed dialectical reasoning leads to categorical, not conditional,
conclusions, Boethius felt that the discovery of an argument entailed
discovering a middle term uniting the two, previously unjoined terms of the
conclusion. Differentiae are the genera of these middle terms, and one
constructs arguments by choosing differentiae, thereby determining the middle
term leading to the conclusion. In the eleventh century, Boethius’s logical
structure of maximal propositions and differentiae was used to study
hypothetical syllogisms, while twelfth-century theorists like Abelard extended
the applicability of topics structure to the categorical syllogism. By the
thirteenth century, Peter of Spain, Robert Kilwardby, and Boethius of Dacia
applied topics structure exclusively to the categorical syllogism, principally
those with non-necessary, probable premises. Within a century, discussion of
topics structure to evaluate syllogistic reasoning was subsumed by consequences
literature, which described implication, entailment, and inference relations
between propositions. While the theory of consequences as an approach to
understanding relations between propositions is grounded in Boethian, and
perhaps Stoic, logic, it became prominent only in the later thirteenth century
with Burley’s recognition of the logical significance of propositional
logic.
toxin puzzle, a puzzle
about intention and practical rationality posed by Gregory Kavka. A trustworthy
billionaire offers you a million dollars for intending tonight to drink a
certain toxin tomorrow. You are convinced that he can tell what you intend
independently of what you do. The toxin would make you painfully ill for a day,
but you need to drink it to get the money. Constraints on the formation of a
prize-winning intention include prohibitions against “gimmicks,” “external
incentives,” and forgetting relevant details. For example, you will not receive
the money if you have a hypnotist “implant the intention” or hire a hit man to
kill you should you not drink the toxin. If, by midnight tonight, without
violating any rules, you form an intention to drink the toxin tomorrow, you
will find a million dollars in your bank account when you awake tomorrow
morning. You probably would drink the toxin for a million dollars. But can you,
without violating the rules, intend tonight to drink it tomorrow? Apparently,
you have no reason to drink it and an excellent reason not to drink it.
Seemingly, you will infer from this that you will eschew drinking the toxin,
and believing that you will top-down toxin puzzle 924 924 eschew drinking it seems inconsistent
with intending to drink it. Even so, there are several reports in the
philosophical literature of (possible) people who struck it rich when offered
the toxin deal! ACTION THEORY,
INTENTION, PRACTICAL REASONING. A.R.M.
Toynbee,
Arnold.PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. tracking.NOZICK, RELIABILISM, SKEPTICISM.
Tractarian.ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, WITTGENSTEIN. traducianism.CREATION EX NIHILO,
PREEXISTENCE. transcendence, broadly, the property of rising out of or above
other things (virtually always understood figuratively); in philosophy, the
property of being, in some way, of a higher order. A being, such as God, may be
said to be transcendent in the sense of being not merely superior, but
incomparably superior, to other things, in any sort of perfection. God’s
transcendence, or being outside or beyond the world, is also contrasted, and by
some thinkers combined, with God’s immanence, or existence within the world. In
medieval philosophy of logic, terms such as ‘being’ and ‘one’, which did not
belong uniquely to any one of the Aristotelian categories or types of
predication (such as substance, quality, and relation), but could be predicated
of things belonging to any (or to none) of them, were called transcendental. In
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, principles that profess (wrongly) to take us
beyond the limits of any possible experience are called transcendent; whereas
anything belonging to non-empirical thought that establishes, and draws
consequences from, the possibility and limits of experience may be called
transcendental. Thus a transcendental argument (in a sense still current) is
one that proceeds from premises about the way in which experience is possible
to conclusions about what must be true of any experienced world.
Transcendentalism was a philosophical or religious movement in
mid-nineteenth-century New England, characterized, in the thought of its
leading representative, Ralph Waldo Emerson, by belief in a transcendent
(spiritual and divine) principle in human nature.
EMERSON, IMMANENCE, KANT,
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT,
TRANSCENDENTALISM. R.M.A.
transcendental.KANT, TRANSCENDENCE. transcendental analytic.KANT.
transcendental argument, an argument that elucidates the conditions for the
possibility of some fundamental phenomenon whose existence is unchallenged or
uncontroversial in the philosophical context in which the argument is propounded.
Such an argument proceeds deductively, from a premise asserting the existence
of some basic phenomenon (such as meaningful discourse, conceptualization of
objective states of affairs, or the practice of making promises), to a
conclusion asserting the existence of some interesting, substantive enabling
conditions for that phenomenon. The term derives from Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason, which gives several such arguments. The paradigmatic Kantian
transcendental argument is the “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts
of Understanding.” Kant argued there that the objective validity of certain
pure, or a priori, concepts (the “categories”) is a condition for the
possibility of experience. Among the concepts allegedly required for having
experience are those of substance and cause. Their apriority consists in the
fact that instances of these concepts are not directly given in sense
experience in the manner of instances of empirical concepts such as red. This
fact gave rise to the skepticism of Hume concerning the very coherence of such
alleged a priori concepts. Now if these concepts do have objective validity, as
Kant endeavored to prove in opposition to Hume, then the world contains genuine
instances of the concepts. In a transcendental argument concerning the
conditions for the possibility of experience, it is crucial that some feature
entailed by the having of experience is identified. Then it is argued that
experience could not have this feature without satisfying some substantive
conditions. In the Transcendental Deduction, the feature of experience on which
Kant concentrates is the ability of a subject of experience to be aware of
several distinct inner states as all belonging to a single consciousness. There
is no general agreement on how Kant’s argument actually unfolded, though it
seems clear to most that he focused on the role of the categories in the
synthesis or combination of one’s inner states in judgments, where such
synthesis is said to be required for one’s awareness of the states as being all
equally one’s own states. Another famous Kantian transcendental argument – the
“Refutation of Idealism” in the CriToynbee, Arnold transcendental argument
925 925 tique of Pure Reason – shares a
noteworthy trait with the Transcendental Deduction. The Refutation proceeds
from the premise that one is conscious of one’s own existence as determined in
time, i.e., knows the temporal order of some of one’s inner states. According
to the Refutation, a condition for the possibility of such knowledge is one’s consciousness
of the existence of objects located outside oneself in space. If one is indeed
so conscious, that would refute the skeptical view, formulated by Descartes,
that one lacks knowledge of the existence of a spatial world distinct from
one’s mind and its inner states. Both of the Kantian transcendental arguments
we have considered, then, conclude that the falsity of some skeptical view is a
condition for the possibility of some phenomenon whose existence is
acknowledged even by the skeptic (the having of experience; knowledge of
temporal facts about one’s own inner states). Thus, we can isolate an
interesting subclass of transcendental arguments: those which are
anti-skeptical in nature. Barry Stroud has raised the question whether such
arguments depend on some sort of suppressed verificationism according to which
the existence of language or conceptualization requires the availability of the
knowledge that the skeptic questions (since verificationism has it that
meaningful sentences expressing coherent concepts, e.g., ‘There are tables’,
must be verifiable by what is given in sense experience). Dependence on a
highly controversial premise is undesirable in itself. Further, Stroud argued,
such a dependence would render superfluous whatever other content the
anti-skeptical transcendental argument might embody (since the suppressed
premise alone would refute the skeptic). There is no general agreement on
whether Stroud’s doubts about anti-skeptical transcendental arguments are well
founded. It is not obvious whether the doubts apply to arguments that do not
proceed from a premise asserting the existence of language or
conceptualization, but instead conform more closely to the Kantian model. Even
so, no anti-skeptical transcendental argument has been widely accepted. This is
evidently due to the difficulty of uncovering substantive enabling conditions
for phenomena that even a skeptic will countenance. KANT, SKEPTICISM. A.B. transcendental
deduction.KANT. transcendental dialectic.DIALECTIC. transcendental ego.KANT.
transcendentalia.TRANSCENDENTALS. transcendental idealism.KANT.
transcendentalism, a
religious-philosophical viewpoint held by a group of New England intellectuals,
of whom Emerson, Thoreau, and Theodore Parker were the most important. A
distinction taken over from Samuel Taylor Coleridge was the only bond that
universally united the members of the Transcendental Club, founded in 1836: the
distinction between the understanding and reason, the former providing
uncertain knowledge of appearances, the latter a priori knowledge of necessary
truths gained through intuition. The transcendentalists insisted that
philosophical truth could be reached only by reason, a capacity common to all
people unless destroyed by living a life of externals and accepting as true
only secondhand traditional beliefs. On almost every other point there were
disagreements. Emerson was an idealist, while Parker was a natural realist –
they simply had conflicting a priori intuitions. Emerson, Thoreau, and Parker
rejected the supernatural aspects of Christianity, pointing out its
unmistakable parochial nature and sociological development; while James Marsh,
Frederick Henry Hedge, and Caleb Henry remained in the Christian fold. The
influences on the transcendentalists differed widely and explain the diversity
of opinion. For example, Emerson was influenced by the Platonic tradition,
German Romanticism, Eastern religions, and nature poets, while Parker was
influenced by modern science, the Scottish realism of Reid and Cousin (which also
emphasized a priori intuitions), and the German Higher Critics. Emerson,
Thoreau, and Parker were also bonded by negative beliefs. They not only
rejected Calvinism but Unitarianism as well; they rejected the ordinary concept
of material success and put in its place an Aristotelian type of
selfrealization that emphasized the rational and moral self as the essence of
humanity and decried idiosyncratic self-realization that admires what is unique
in people as constituting their real value.
EMERSON, THOREAU. E.H.M.
transcendental number.MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS. transcendentals, also called
transcendentalia, terms or concepts that apply to all things regardless of the
things’ ontological kind or category. transcendental deduction transcendentals
926 926 Terms or concepts of this sort
are transcendental in the sense that they transcend or are superordinate to all
classificatory categories. The classical doctrine of the transcendentals,
developed in detail in the later Middle Ages, presupposes an Aristotelian ontology
according to which all beings are substances or accidents classifiable within
one of the ten highest genera, the ten Aristotelian categories. In this scheme
being (Greek on, Latin ens) is not itself one of the categories since all
categories mark out kinds of being. But neither is it a category above the ten
categories of substance and accidents, an ultimate genus of which the ten
categories are species. This is because being is homonymous or equivocal, i.e.,
there is no single generic property or nature shared by members of each
category in virtue of which they are beings. The ten categories identify ten
irreducible, most basic ways of being. Being, then, transcends the categorial
structure of the world: anything at all that is ontologically classifiable is a
being, and to say of anything that it is a being is not to identify it as a
member of some kind distinct from other kinds of things. According to this
classical doctrine, being is the primary transcendental, but there are other
terms or concepts that transcend the categories in a similar way. The most
commonly recognized transcendentals other than being are one (unum), true
(verum), and good (bonum), though some medieval philosophers also recognized
thing (res), something (aliquid), and beautiful (pulchrum). These other terms
or concepts are transcendental because the ontological ground of their
application to a given thing is precisely the same as the ontological ground in
virtue of which that thing can be called a being. For example, for a thing with
a certain nature to be good is for it to perform well the activity that
specifies it as a thing of that nature, and to perform this activity well is to
have actualized that nature to a certain extent. But for a thing to have
actualized its nature to some extent is just what it is for the thing to have
being. So the actualities or properties in virtue of which a thing is good are
precisely those in virtue of which it has being. Given this account, medieval
philosophers held that transcendental terms are convertible (convertuntur) or
extensionally equivalent (idem secundum supposita). They are not synonymous,
however, since they are intensionally distinct (differunt secundum rationem).
These secondary transcendentals are sometimes characterized as attributes
(passiones) of being that are necessarily concomitant with it. In the modern
period, the notion of the transcendental is associated primarily with Kant, who
made ‘transcendental’ a central technical term in his philosophy. For Kant the
term no longer signifies that which transcends categorial classification but
that which transcends our experience in the sense of providing its ground or
structure. Kant allows, e.g., that the pure forms of intuition (space and time)
and the pure concepts of understanding (categories such as substance and cause)
are transcendental in this sense. Forms and concepts of this sort constitute
the conditions of the possibility of experience. ARISTOTLE, KANT. S.Ma. transcendental
subjectivity.MERLEAU-PONTY. transcendental terms.TRANSCENDENTALS. transeunt
causation.
transfinite number, in
set theory, an infinite cardinal or ordinal number. transformational grammar.GRAMMAR.
transformation rule, an axiom-schema or rule of inference. A transformation
rule is thus a rule for transforming a (possibly empty) set of wellformed
formulas into a formula, where that rule operates only upon syntactic
information. It was this conception of an axiom-schema and rule of inference
that was one of the keys to creating a genuinely rigorous science of deductive
reasoning. In the 1950s, the idea was imported into linguistics, giving rise to
the notion of a transformational rule. Such a rule transforms tree structures
into tree structures, taking one from the deep structure of a sentence, which
determines its semantic interpretation, to the surface structure of that
sentence, which determines its phonetic interpretation. GRAMMAR, LOGISTIC SYSTEM. G.F.S.
transitive.RELATION. transitive closure.ANCESTRAL. translation,
radical.INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION. transcendental subjectivity translation,
radical 927 927 transparent.
REFERENTIALLY
TRANSPARENT. transparent context.REFERENTIALLY TRANSPARENT. transubstantiation,
change of one substance into another. Aristotelian metaphysics distinguishes
between substances and the accidents that inhere in them; thus, Socrates is a
substance and being snub-nosed is one of his accidents. The Roman Catholic and
Eastern Orthodox churches appeal to transubstantiation to explain how Jesus
Christ becomes really present in the Eucharist when the consecration takes
place: the whole substances of the bread and wine are transformed into the body
and blood of Christ, but the accidents of the bread and wine such as their
shape, color, and taste persist after the transformation. This seems to commit
its adherents to holding that these persisting accidents subsequently either
inhere in Christ or do not inhere in any substance. Luther proposed an
alternative explanation in terms of consubstantiation that avoids this hard
choice: the substances of the bread and wine coexist in the Eucharist with the
body and blood of Christ after the consecration; they are united but each
remains unchanged. P.L.Q. transvaluation of values.NIETZSCHE.
transversality,
transcendence of the sovereignty of identity or self-sameness by recognizing
the alterity of the Other as Unterschied – to use Heidegger’s term – which
signifies the sense of relatedness by way of difference. An innovative idea
employed and appropriated by such diverse philosophers as Merleau-Ponty,
Sartre, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, transversality is meant to replace
the Eurocentric formulation of truth as universal in an age when the world is
said to be rushing toward the global village. Universality has been a
Eurocentric idea because what is particular in the West is universalized,
whereas what is particular elsewhere remains particularized. Since its center
is everywhere and its circumference nowhere, truth is polycentric and
correlative. Particularly noteworthy is the American phenomenologist Calvin O.
Schrag’s attempt to appropriate transversality by splitting the difference
between the two extremes of absolutism and relativism on the one hand and
modernity’s totalizing practices and postmodernity’s fragmentary tendencies on
the other.
Arbor porphyriana: a structure generated from the logical and metaphysical
apparatus of Aristotle’s Categories, as systematized by Porphyry and later
writers. A tree in the category of substance begins with substance as its
highest genus and divides that genus into mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive subordinate genera by means of a pair of opposites, called
differentiae, yielding, e.g., corporeal substance and incorporeal substance.
The process of division by differentiae continues until a lowest species is
reached, a species that cannot be divided further. The species “human being” is
said to be a lowest species whose derivation can be recaptured from the formula
“mortal, rational, sensitive, animate, corporeal substance.” ARISTOTLE, INFIMA SPECIES, PORPHYRY. W.E.M.
trichotomous.RELATION. trichotomy, law of.CHOICE SEQUENCE, RELATION.
Trinitarianism, the theological doctrine that God consists of three persons.
The persons who constitute the Holy Trinity are the Father; the Son, who is
Jesus Christ; and the Holy Spirit (or Holy Ghost). The doctrine states that each
of these three persons is God and yet they are not three Gods but one God.
According to a traditional formulation, the three persons are but one
substance. In the opinion of Aquinas, the existence of God can be proved by
human reason, but the existence of the three persons cannot be proved and is
known only by revelation. According to Christian tradition, revelation contains
information about the relations among the three persons, and these relations
ground proper attributes of each that distinguish them from one another. Thus,
since the Father begets the Son, a proper attribute of the Father is paternity
and a proper attribute of the Son is filiation. Procession transparent
Trinitarianism 928 928 (or spiration)
is a proper attribute of the Holy Spirit. A disagreement about procession has
contributed to dividing Eastern and Western Christianity. The Eastern Orthodox
church teaches that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. A
theory of double procession according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from
the Father and the Son has been widely accepted in the West. This disagreement
is known as the filioque (‘and the Son’) controversy because it arose from the
fact that adding this Latin phrase to the Nicene Creed became acceptable in the
West but not in the East. Unitarianism denies that God consists of three
persons and so is committed to denying the divinity of Jesus. The monotheistic
faiths of Judaism and Islam are unitarian, but there are unitarians who
consider themselves Christians.
Troeltsch, Ernst
(1865–1923), German philosopher and historian whose primary aim was to provide
a scientific foundation for theology. Educated at Erlangen, Göttingen (under
Ritschl and Lagarde), and Berlin, he initially taught theology at Heidelberg
and later philosophy in Berlin. He launched the school of history of religion
with his epoch-making “On Historical and Dogmatical Method in Theology” (1896).
His contributions to theology (The Religious Apriori, 1904), philosophy,
sociology, and history (Historicism and Its Problems, 1922) were vastly
influential. Troeltsch claimed that only a philosophy of religion drawn from
the history and development of religious consciousness could strengthen the
standing of the science of religion among the sciences and advance the
Christian strategy against materialism, naturalism, skepticism, aestheticism,
and pantheism. His historical masterpiece, Protestantism and Progress (1906),
argues that early Protestantism was a modified medieval Catholicism that
delayed the development of modern culture. As a sociologist, he addressed, in
The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches (1912), the twofold issue of
whether religious beliefs and movements are conditioned by external factors and
whether, in turn, they affect society and culture. From Christian social
history he inferred three types of “sociological self-formation of the
Christian idea”: the church, the sect, and the mystic. J.-L.S.
trope, in recent
philosophical usage, an “abstract particular”; an instance of a property
occurring at a particular place and time, such as the color of the cover of
this book or this . The whiteness of this
and the whiteness of the previous
are two distinct tropes, identical neither with the universal whiteness
that is instantiated in both s, nor with the
itself; although the whiteness of this
cannot exist independently of this , this could be dyed some other color. A number of
writers, perhaps beginning with D. C. Williams, have argued that tropes must be
included in our ontology if we are to achieve an adequate metaphysics. More
generally, a trope is a figure of speech, or the use of an expression in a
figurative or nonliteral sense. Metaphor and irony, e.g., fall under the
category of tropes. If you are helping someone move a glass table but drop your
end, and your companion says, “Well, you’ve certainly been a big help,” her
utterance is probably ironical, with the intended meaning that you have been no
help. One important question is whether, in order to account for the ironical use
of this sentence, we must suppose that it has an ironical meaning in addition
to its literal meaning. Quite generally, does a sentence usable to express two
different metaphors have, in addition to its literal meaning, two metaphorical
meanings – and another if it can be hyperbolic, and so forth? Many philosophers
and other theorists from Aristotle on have answered yes, and postulated such
figurative meanings in addition to literal sentence meaning. Recently,
philosophers loath to multiply sentence meanings have denied that sentences have
any non-literal meanings.Their burden is to explain how, e.g., a sentence can
be used ironically if it does not have an ironical sense or meaning. Such
philosophers disagree on whether tropes are to be explained semantically or
pragmatically. A semantic account might hypothesize that tropes are generated
by violations of semantical rules. An important pragmatic approach is Grice’s
suggestion that tropes can be subsumed under the more general phenomenon of
conversational implicature.
truth, the quality of
those propositions that accord with reality, specifying what is in fact the
case. Whereas the aim of a science is to discover which of the propositions in
its domain are true i.e., which propositions possess the property of Trinity
truth 929 929 truth – the central
philosophical concern with truth is to discover the nature of that property.
Thus the philosophical question is not What is true? but rather, What is truth?
– What is one saying about a proposition in saying that it is true? The
importance of this question stems from the variety and depth of the principles
in which the concept of truth is deployed. We are tempted to think, e.g., that
truth is the proper aim and natural result of scientific inquiry, that true beliefs
are useful, that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions that
would render it true, and that valid reasoning preserves truth. Therefore
insofar as we wish to understand, assess, and refine these epistemological,
ethical, semantic, and logical views, some account of the nature of truth would
seem to be required. Such a thing, however, has been notoriously elusive. The
belief that snow is white owes its truth to a certain feature of the external
world: the fact that snow is white. Similarly, the belief that dogs bark is
true because of the fact that dogs bark. Such trivial observations lead to what
is perhaps the most natural and widely held account of truth, the
correspondence theory, according to which a belief (statement, sentence, proposition,
etc.) is true provided there exists a fact corresponding to it. This
Aristotelian thesis is unexceptionable in itself. However, if it is to provide
a complete theory of truth – and if it is to be more than merely a picturesque
way of asserting all instances of ‘the belief that p is true if and only if p’
– then it must be supplemented with accounts of what facts are, and what it is
for a belief to correspond to a fact; and these are the problems on which the
correspondence theory of truth has foundered. A popular alternative to the
correspondence theory has been to identify truth with verifiability. This idea
can take on various forms. One version involves the further assumption that
verification is holistic – i.e., that a belief is verified when it is part of
an entire system of beliefs that is consistent and “harmonious.” This is known
as the coherence theory of truth and was developed by Bradley and Brand
Blanchard. Another version, due to Dummett and Putnam, involves the assumption
that there is, for each proposition, some specific procedure for finding out
whether one should believe it or not. On this account, to say that a
proposition is true is to say that it would be verified by the appropriate
procedure. In mathematics this amounts to the identification of truth with
provability and is sometimes referred to as intuitionistic truth. Such theories
aim to avoid obscure metaphysical notions and explain the close relation
between knowability and truth. They appear, however, to overstate the intimacy
of that link: for we can easily imagine a statement that, though true, is
beyond our power to establish as true. A third major account of truth is
James’s pragmatic theory. As we have just seen, the verificationist selects a
prominent property of truth and considers it to be the essence of truth.
Similarly the pragmatist focuses on another important characteristic – namely,
that true beliefs are a good basis for action – and takes this to be the very
nature of truth. True assumptions are said to be, by definition, those that
provoke actions with desirable results. Again we have an account with a single
attractive explanatory feature. But again the central objection is that the
relationship it postulates between truth and its alleged analysans – in this
case, utility – is implausibly close. Granted, true beliefs tend to foster
success. But often actions based on true beliefs lead to disaster, while false
assumptions, by pure chance, produce wonderful results. One of the few fairly
uncontroversial facts about truth is that the proposition that snow is white is
true if and only if snow is white, the proposition that lying is wrong is true
if and only if lying is wrong, and so on. Traditional theories of truth
acknowledge this fact but regard it as insufficient and, as we have seen,
inflate it with some further principle of the form ‘X is true if and only if X
has property P’ (such as corresponding to reality, verifiability, or being
suitable as a basis for action), which is supposed to specify what truth is. A
collection of radical alternatives to the traditional theories results from
denying the need for any such further specification. For example, one might
suppose (with Ramsey, Ayer, and Strawson) that the basic theory of truth
contains nothing more than equivalences of the form, ‘The proposition that p is
true if and only if p’ (excluding instantiation by sentences such as ‘This
proposition is not true’ that generate contradiction). This so-called
deflationary theory is best presented (following Quine) in conjunction with an
account of the raison d’être of our notion of truth: namely, that its function
is not to describe propositions, as one might naively infer from its syntactic
form, but rather to enable us to construct a certain type of generalization.
For example, ‘What Einstein said is true’ is intuitively equivalent to the
infinite conjunction ‘If Einstein said that nothing goes faster than light,
then nothing goes faster than light; and if Einstein said truth truth 930 930 that nuclear weapons should never be
built, then nuclear weapons should never be built; . . . and so on.’ But
without a truth predicate we could not capture this statement. The deflationist
argues, moreover, that all legitimate uses of the truth predicate – including
those in science, logic, semantics, and metaphysics – are simply displays of
this generalizing function, and that the equivalence schema is just what is
needed to explain that function. Within the deflationary camp there are various
competing proposals. According to Frege’s socalled redundancy theory,
corresponding instances of ‘It is true that p’ and ‘p’ have exactly the same
meaning, whereas the minimalist theory assumes merely that such propositions
are necessarily equivalent. Other deflationists are skeptical about the existence
of propositions and therefore take sentences to be the basic vehicles of truth.
Thus the disquotation theory supposes that truth is captured by the
disquotation principle, ‘p’ is true if and only if p’. More ambitiously, Tarski
does not regard the disquotation principle, also known as Tarski’s (T) schema,
as an adequate theory in itself, but as a specification of what any adequate
definition must imply. His own account shows how to give an explicit definition
of truth for all the sentences of certain formal languages in terms of the
referents of their primitive names and predicates. This is known as the
semantic theory of truth. .
truthlikeness, a term introduced by Karl
Popper in 1960 to explicate the idea that one theory may have a better
correspondence with reality, or be closer to the truth, or have more
verisimilitude, than another theory. Truthlikeness, which combines truth with
information content, has to be distinguished from probability, which increases
with lack of content. Let T and F be the classes of all true and false
sentences, respectively, and A and B deductively closed sets of sentences.
According to Popper’s qualitative definition, A is more truthlike than B if and
only if B 3 T 0 A 3 T and A 3 F 0 B 3 F, where one of these setinclusions is
strict. In particular, when A and B are non-equivalent and both true, A is more
truthlike than B if and only if A logically entails B. David Miller and Pavel
Tichý proved in 1974 that Popper’s definition is not applicable to the
comparison of false theories: if A is more truthlike than B, then A must be
true. Since the mid-1970s, a new approach to truthlikeness has been based upon
the concept of similarity: the degree of truthlikeness of a statement A depends
on the distances from the states of affairs allowed by A to the true state. In
Graham Oddie’s Likeness to Truth (1986), this dependence is expressed by the
average function; in Ilkka Niiniluoto’s Truthlikeness (1987), by the weighted
average of the minimum distance and the sum of all distances. The concept of
verisimilitude is also used in the epistemic sense to express a rational
evaluation of how close to the truth a theory appears to be on available
evidence. CONFIRMATION, INFORMATION
THEORY, INSTRUMENTALISM, PROBABILITY. I.N. truthmaker principle.ARMSTRONG.
truth predicate.SEMANTIC PARADOXES. truth table, a tabular display of one or
more truth-functions, truth-functional operators, or representatives of
truth-functions or truth-functional operators (such as well-formed formulas of
propositional logic). In the tabular display, each row displays a possible
assignment of truthvalues to the arguments of the truth-functions or
truth-functional operators. Thus, the collection of all rows in the table
displays all possible assignments of truth-values to these arguments. The
following simple truth table represents the truth-functional operators negation
and conjunction: truth, coherence theory of truth table 931 931 Because a truth table displays all
possible assignments of truth-values to the arguments of a truth-function,
truth tables are useful devices for quickly ascertaining logical properties of
propositions. If, e.g., all entries in the column of a truth table representing
a proposition are T, then the proposition is true for all possible assignments
of truth-values to its ultimate constituent propositions; in this sort of case,
the proposition is said to be logically or tautologically true: a tautology. If
all entries in the column of a truth table representing a proposition are F,
then the proposition is false for all possible assignments of truth-values to
its ultimate constituent propositions, and the proposition is said to be
logically or tautologically false: a contradiction. If a proposition is neither
a tautology nor a contradiction, then it is said to be a contingency. The truth
table above shows that both Not-P and Pand-Q are contingencies. For the same
reason that truth tables are useful devices for ascertaining the logical
qualities of single propositions, truth tables are also useful for ascertaining
whether arguments are valid or invalid. A valid argument is one such that there
is no possibility (no row in the relevant truth table) in which all its
premises are true and its conclusion false. Thus the above truth table shows
that the argument ‘P-and-Q; therefore, P’ is valid.
truth-value, most
narrowly, one of the values T (for ‘true’) or F (for ‘false’) that a
proposition may be considered to have or take on when it is regarded as true or
false, respectively. More broadly, a truth-value is any one of a range of
values that a proposition may be considered to have when taken to have one of a
range of different cognitive or epistemic statuses. For example, some
philosophers speak of the truth-value I (for ‘indeterminate’) and regard a proposition
as having the value I when it is indeterminate whether the proposition is true
or false. Logical systems employing a specific number n of truthvalues are said
to be n-valued logical systems; the simplest sort of useful logical system has
two truth-values, T and F, and accordingly is said to be two-valued.
Truth-functions are functions that take truth-values as arguments and that
yield truth-values as resultant values. The truthtable method in propositional
logic exploits the idea of truth-functions by using tabular displays.
truth-value semantics,
interpretations of formal systems in which the truth-value of a formula rests
ultimately only on truth-values that are assigned to its atomic subformulas
(where ‘subformula’ is suitably defined). The label is due to Hugues Leblanc.
On a truth-value interpretation for first-order predicate logic, for example,
the formula atomic ExFx is true in a model if and only if all its instances Fm,
Fn, . . . are true, where the truth-value of these formulas is simply assigned
by the model. On the standard Tarskian or objectual interpretation, by
contrast, ExFx is true in a model if and only if every object in the domain of
the model is an element of the set that interprets F in the model. Thus a
truth-value semantics for predicate logic comprises a substitutional
interpretation of the quantifiers and a “non-denotational” interpretation of
terms and predicates. If t 1, t 2, . . . are all the terms of some first-order
language, then there are objectual models that satisfy the set {Dx-Fx, Ft1, Ft2
. . . .}, but no truth-value interpretations that do. One can ensure that
truth-value semantics delivers the standard logic, however, by suitable
modifications in the definitions of consistency and consequence. A set G of
formulas of language L is said to be consistent, for example, if there is some
G' obtained from G by relettering terms such that G' is satisfied by some
truth-value assignment, or, alternatively, if there is some language L+
obtained by adding terms to L such that G is satisfied by some truth-value
assignment to the atoms of L+. Truth-value semantics is of both technical and
philosophical interest. Technically, it allows the completeness of first-order
predicate logic and a variety of other formal systems to be obtained in a
natural way from that of propositional logic. Philosophically, it dramatizes
the fact that the formulas in one’s theories about the world do not, in
themselves, determine one’s ontological commitments. It is at least possible to
interpret first-order formulas without reference to special truth-table method
truth-value semantics 932 932 domains
of objects, and higher-order formulas without reference to special domains of
relations and properties. The idea of truth-value semantics dates at least to
the writings of E. W. Beth on first-order predicate logic in 1959 and of K.
Schütte on simple type theory in 1960. In more recent years similar semantics
have been suggested for secondorder logics, modal and tense logics,
intuitionistic logic, and set theory.
FORMAL SEMANTICS, MEANING, QUANTIFICATION, TRUTH TABLE. S.T.K.
Tsou Yen (350?–270?
B.C.), Chinese cosmologist, a member of the Chi-hsia Academy and influential
political figure who applied yin–yang fivephases thinking to dynastic cycles.
Tsou Yen believed that the natural order, the human order, and the relation
between the two were all governed and made intelligible by the dynamic
interplay among yin–yang and the five phases (wu-hsing: earth, wood, metal,
fire, and water). He gained political fame for his idea that the rise and fall
of dynasties are correlated with the five phases and accord with the same
cyclical pattern: earth, wood, metal, fire, and water. Thus, the reign of the
Yellow Emperor, correlated with the earth phase, was followed by the Hsia
(wood), the Shang (metal), and the Chou (fire) dynasties. Tsou Yen predicted
that the ascendancy of the water phase would signal the end of the Chou and the
beginning of a new dynasty. CHINESE
PHILOSOPHY. R.P.P. & R.T.A. Tung Chung-shu (c.179–c.104 B.C.), Chinese
philosopher, a Han scholar famous for his answers to questions by Emperor Wu,
which were instrumental in making Confucianism the state doctrine in 136 B.C.
He wrote Ch’un-ch’iu fan-lu (“Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals”),
in which he read moral messages from historical events recorded in the classic
in such a way that they could be applied to future history. Tung’s teachings
were actually quite different from those of Confucius and Mencius. He believed
that Heaven and the Way do not change, and he taught the so-called Three Bonds,
according to which the ruler, the father, and the husband are to be the
standards of the ruled, the son, and the wife. These added a conservative ring
to Confucianism, so that the rulers were happy to use it in combination with
Legalist practice to create a state Confucianism. He also incorporated many
ideas from the yin–yang school in his philosophy. He believed that history goes
in cycles, the five powers (wood, fire, earth, metal, water) succeed each
other, and there is a strict correlation between natural affairs and human
affairs. He saw natural disasters as warning signs for the rulers to cultivate
virtues and not to abuse their powers.
Turing machine, an
abstract automaton or imagined computer consisting of a finite automaton
operating an indefinitely long storage tape. The finite automaton provides the
computing power of the machine. The tape is used for input, output, and
calculation workspace; in the case of the universal Turing machine, it also
specifies another Turing machine. Initially, only a finite number of squares of
the tape are marked with symbols, while the rest are blank. The finite
automaton part of the machine has a finite number of internal states and
operates discretely, at times t % 0, 1, 2, . . . . At each time-step the
automaton examines the tape square under its tape head, possibly changes what
is there, moves the tape left or right, and then changes its internal state.
The law governing this sequence of actions is deterministic and is defined in a
state table. For each internal state and each tape symbol (or blank) under the
tape head, the state table describes the tape action performed by the machine
and gives the next internal state of the machine. Since a machine has only a
finite number of internal states and of tape symbols, the state table of a
machine is finite in length and can be stored on a tape. There is a universal
Turing machine Mu that can simulate every Turing machine (including itself):
when the state table of any machine M is written on the tape of Mu, the
universal machine Mu will perform the same input-output computation that M
performs. Mu does this by using the state table of M to calculate M’s complete
history for any given input. Turing machines may be thought of as conceptual
devices for enumerating the elements of an infinite set (e.g., the theorems of
a formal language), or as decision machines (e.g., deciding of any
truth-functional formula whether it is a tautology). A. M. Turing showed that
there are welldefined logical tasks that cannot be carried out by any machine;
in particular, no machine can solve the halting problem. Tsou Yen Turing
machine 933 933 Turing’s definition of
a machine was theoretical; it was not a practical specification for a machine.
After the modern electronic computer was invented, he proposed a test for
judging whether there is a computer that is behaviorally equivalent to a human
in reasoning and intellectual creative power. The Turing test is a “black box”
type of experiment that Turing proposed as a way of deciding whether a computer
can think. Two rooms are fitted with the same input-output equipment going to
an outside experimenter. A person is placed in one room and a programmed
electronic computer in the other, each in communication with the experimenter.
By issuing instructions and asking questions, the experimenter tries to decide
which room has the computer and which the human. If the experimenter cannot
tell, that outcome is strong evidence that the computer can think as well as
the person. More directly, it shows that the computer and the human are
equivalent for all the behaviors tested. Since the computer is a finite
automaton, perhaps the most significant test task is that of doing creative
mathematics about the non-enumerable infinite.
Turnbull, George
(1698–1748), Scottish moral sense philosopher and educational theorist. He was
briefly a philosophy regent at Aberdeen (1721–27) and a teacher of Reid. His
Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy (1740) and Discourse upon the
Nature and Origin of Moral and Civil Laws (1741) show him as the most
systematic of those who aimed to recast moral philosophy on a Newtonian model,
deriving moral laws “experimentally” from human psychology. In A Treatise on
Ancient Painting (1740), Observations Upon Liberal Education (1742), and some
smaller works, he extolled history and the arts as propaedeutic to the teaching
of virtue and natural religion. MORAL
SENSE THEORY. M.A.St. Twardowski.ACT-OBJECT PSYCHOLOGY, POLISH LOGIC. Twin-Earth,
a fictitious planet first visited by Hilary Putnam in a thought experiment
designed to show, among other things, that “ ‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head”
(“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” 1975). Twin-Earth is exactly like Earth with one
notable exception: ponds, rivers, and ice trays on Twin-Earth contain, not H2O,
but XYZ, a liquid superficially indistinguishable from water but with a
different chemical constitution. According to Putnam, although some inhabitants
of Twin-Earth closely resemble inhabitants of Earth, ‘water’, when uttered by a
Twin-Earthling, does not mean water. Water is H2O, and, on Twin-Earth, the word
‘water’ designates a different substance, XYZ, Twin-water. The moral drawn by
Putnam is that the meanings of at least some of our words, and the significance
of some of our thoughts, depend, in part, on how things stand outside our
heads. Two “molecular duplicates,” two agents with qualitatively similar mental
lives, might mean very different things by their utterances and think very different
thoughts. Although Twin-Earth has become a popular stopping-off place for
philosophers en route to theories of meaning and mental content, others regard
Twin-Earth as hopelessly remote, doubting that useful conclusions can be drawn
about our Earthly circumstances from research conducted there. MEANING, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. J.F.H.
tychism (from Greek tyche, ‘chance’), Peirce’s doctrine that there is absolute
chance in the universe and its fundamental laws are probabilistic and inexact.
Peirce’s tychism is part of his evolutionary cosmology, according to which all
regularities of nature are products of growth and development, i.e., results of
evolution. The laws of nature develop over time and become increasingly rigid
and exact; the apparently deterministic laws of physics are limiting cases of
the basic, probabilistic laws. Underlying all other laws is “the tendency of
all things to take habits”; Peirce calls this the Law of Habit. In his
cosmology his tychism is associated with synechism, the doctrine of the
continuity of nature. His synechism involves the doctrine of the continuity of
mind and matter; Peirce sometimes expressed this view by saying that “matter is
effete mind.” R.Hi. type.ACTION THEORY, DARWINISM, DETERMINISM, TYPE THEORY,
TYPE–TOKEN DISTINCTION.
type
epiphenomenalism.PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. type physicalism.PHYSICALISM. types,
simple theory of.TYPE THEORY. types, theory of.TYPE THEORY. Turing machine
functionalism types, theory of 934 934
type theory, broadly, any theory according to which the things that exist fall
into natural, perhaps mutually exclusive, categories or types. In most modern
discussions, ‘type theory’ refers to the theory of logical types first sketched
by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). It is a theory of logical
types insofar as it purports only to classify things into the most general
categories that must be presupposed by an adequate logical theory. Russell
proposed his theory in response to his discovery of the now-famous paradox that
bears his name. The paradox is this. Common sense suggests that some classes
are members of themselves (e.g., the class of all classes), while others are
not (e.g., the class of philosophers). Let R be the class whose membership
consists of exactly those classes of the latter sort, i.e., those that are not
members of themselves. Is R a member of itself? If so, then it is a member of
the class of all classes that are not members of themselves, and hence is not a
member of itself. If, on the other hand, it is not a member of itself, then it
satisfies its own membership conditions, and hence is a member of itself after
all. Either way there is a contradiction. The source of the paradox, Russell
suggested, is the assumption that classes and their members form a single, homogeneous
logical type. To the contrary, he proposed that the logical universe is
stratified into a regimented hierarchy of types. Individuals constitute the
lowest type in the hierarchy, type 0. (For purposes of exposition, individuals
can be taken to be ordinary objects like chairs and persons.) Type 1 consists
of classes of individuals, type 2 of classes of classes of individuals, type 3
classes of classes of classes of individuals, and so on. Unlike the homogeneous
universe, then, in the type hierarchy the members of a given class must all be
drawn from a single logical type n, and the class itself must reside in the
next higher type n ! 1. (Russell’s sketch in the Principles differs from this
account in certain details.) Russell’s paradox cannot arise in this conception
of the universe of classes. Because the members of a class must all be of the
same logical type, there is no such class as R, whose definition cuts across
all types. Rather, there is only, for each type n, the class Rn of all non-self-membered
classes of that type. Since Rn itself is of type n ! 1, the paradox breaks
down: from the assumption that Rn is not a member of itself (as in fact it is
not in the type hierarchy), it no longer follows that it satisfies its own
membership conditions, since those conditions apply only to objects of type n.
Most formal type theories, including Russell’s own, enforce the class
membership restrictions of simple type theory syntactically such that a can be
asserted to be a member of b only if b is of the next higher type than a. In
such theories, the definition of R, hence the paradox itself, cannot even be
expressed. Numerous paradoxes remain unscathed by the simple type hierarchy. Of
these, the most prominent are the semantic paradoxes, so called because they
explicitly involve semantic notions like truth, as in the following version of
the liar paradox. Suppose Epimenides asserts that all the propositions he
asserts today are false; suppose also that that is the only proposition he
asserts today. It follows immediately that, under those conditions, the
proposition he asserts is true if and only if it is false. To address such
paradoxes, Russell was led to the more refined and substantially more
complicated system known as ramified type theory, developed in detail in his
1908 paper “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types.” In the
ramified theory, propositions and properties (or propositional functions, in
Russell’s jargon) come to play the central roles in the type-theoretic
universe. Propositions are best construed as the metaphysical and semantical
counterparts of sentences – what sentences express – and properties as the
counterparts of “open sentences” like ‘x is a philosopher’ that contain a
variable ‘x’ in place of a noun phrase. To distinguish linguistic expressions
from their semantic counterparts, the property expressed by, say, ‘x is a
philosopher’, will be denoted by ‘x ^ is a philosopher’, and the proposition
expressed by ‘Aristotle is a philosopher’ will be denoted by ‘Aristotle is a
philosopher’. A property . . .x ^ . . . is said to be true of an individual a
if . . . a . . . is a true proposition, and false of a if . . . a . . . is a
false proposition (where ‘. . . a . . .’ is the result of replacing ‘x ^ ’ with
‘a’ in ‘. . . x ^ . . .’). So, e.g., x ^ is a philosopher is true of Aristotle.
The range of significance of a property P is the collection of objects of which
P is true or false. a is a possible argument for P if it is in P’s range of
significance. In the ramified theory, the hierarchy of classes is supplanted by
a hierarchy of properties: first, properties of individuals (i.e., properties
whose range of significance is restricted to individuals), then properties of
properties of individuals, and so on. Parallel to the simple theory, then, the
type of a property must exceed the type of its possible arguments by one. Thus,
Russell’s paradox with R now in the guise of the property x ^ is a property
that is not true of itself – is avoided along analogous lines. Following the French
mathematician Henri Poincaré, Russell traced the type theory type theory
935 935 source of the semantic
paradoxes to a kind of illicit self-reference. So, for example, in the liar
paradox, Epimenides ostensibly asserts a proposition p about all propositions,
p itself among them, namely that they are false if asserted by him today. p
thus refers to itself in the sense that it – or more exactly, the sentence that
expresses it – quantifies over (i.e., refers generally to all or some of the
elements of) a collection of entities among which p itself is included. The
source of semantic paradox thus isolated, Russell formulated the vicious circle
principle (VCP), which proscribes all such self-reference in properties and
propositions generally. The liar proposition p and its ilk were thus
effectively banished from the realm of legitimate propositions and so the
semantic paradoxes could not arise. Wedded to the restrictions of simple type
theory, the VCP generates a ramified hierarchy based on a more complicated form
of typing. The key notion is that of an object’s order. The order of an
individual, like its type, is 0. However, the order of a property must exceed
the order not only of its possible arguments, as in simple type theory, but
also the orders of the things it quantifies over. Thus, type 1 properties like
x ^ is a philosopher and x ^ is as wise as all other philosophers are
first-order properties, since they are true of and, in the second instance,
quantify over, individuals only. Properties like these whose order exceeds the
order of their possible arguments by one are called predicative, and are of the
lowest possible order relative to their range of significance. Consider, by
contrast, the property (call it Q) x ^ has all the (first-order) properties of
a great philosopher. Like those above, Q also is a property of individuals.
However, since Q quantifies over first-order properties, by the VDP, it cannot
be counted among them. Accordingly, in the ramified hierarchy, Q is a
second-order property of individuals, and hence non-predicative (or
impredicative). Like Q, the property x ^ is a (first-order) property of all
great philosophers is also second-order, since its range of significance
consists of objects of order 1 (and it quantifies only over objects of order
0); but since it is a property of first-order properties, it is predicative. In
like manner it is possible to define third-order properties of individuals,
third-order properties of first-order properties, third-order properties of
second-order properties of individuals, third-order properties of secondorder
properties of first-order properties, and then, in the same fashion,
fourth-order properties, fifth-order properties, and so on ad infinitum. A
serious shortcoming of ramified type theory, from Russell’s perspective, is
that it is an inadequate foundation for classical mathematics. The most
prominent difficulty is that many classical theorems appeal to definitions
that, though consistent, violate the VCP. For instance, a wellknown theorem of real
analysis asserts that every bounded set of real numbers has a least upper
bound. In the ramified theory, real numbers are identified with certain
predicative properties of rationals. Under such an identification, the usual
procedure is to define the least upper bound of a bounded set S of reals to be
the property (call it b) some real number in S is true of x ^ , and then prove
that this property is itself a real number with the requisite characteristics.
However, b quantifies over the real numbers. Hence, by the VCP, b cannot itself
be taken to be a real number: although of the same type as the reals, and
although true of the right things, b must be assigned a higher order than the
reals. So, contrary to the classical theorem, S fails to have a least upper
bound. Russell introduced a special axiom to obviate this difficulty: the axiom
of reducibility. Reducibility says, in effect, that for any property P, there
is a predicative property Q that is true of exactly the same things as P.
Reducibility thus assures that there is a predicative property bH true of the
same rational numbers as b. Since the reals are predicative, hence of the same
order as bH, it turns out that bH is a real number, and hence that S has a
least upper bound after all, as required by the classical theorem. The general
role of reducibility is thus to undo the draconian mathematical effects of
ramification without undermining its capacity to fend off the semantic
paradoxes.
type–token distinction,
as drawn by Peirce, the contrast between a category and a member of that
category. An individual or token is said to exemplify a type; it possesses the
property that characterizes that type. In philosophy this distinction is often
applied to linguistic expressions and to mental states, but it can be applied
also to objects, events, properties, and states of affairs. Related to it are
the distinctions between type and token individuation and between qualitative
and numerical identity. Distinct tokens of the same type, such as two ants, may
be qualitatively identical but cannot be numerically identical. Irrespective of
the controversial metaphysical view that every individual has an essence, a
type type theory, ramified type–token distinction 936 936 to which it belongs essentially, every
individual belongs to many types, although for a certain theoretical or
practical purpose it may belong to one particularly salient type (e.g., the
entomologist’s Formicidae or the picnicker’s buttinsky). The type–token
distinction as applied in the philosophy of language marks the difference
between linguistic expressions, such as words and sentences, which are the
subject of linguistics, and the products of acts of writing or speaking (the
subject of speech act theory). Confusing the two can lead to conflating matters
of speaker meaning withmatters of word or sentence meaning (as noted by Grice).
An expression is a linguistic type and can be used over and over, whereas a
token of a type can be produced only once, though of course it may be
reproduced (copied). A writer composes an essay (a type) and produces a
manuscript (a token), of which there might be many copies (more tokens). A
token of a type is not the same as an occurrence of a type. In the previous
sentence there are two occurrences of the word ‘type’; in each inscription of
that sentence, there are two tokens of that word. In philosophy of mind the
type–token distinction underlies the contrast between two forms of physicalism,
the type–type identity theory or type physicalism and the token–token identity
theory or token physicalism. ACTION
THEORY, PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. K.B. type-type identity.PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.
tzu jan, Chinese term meaning ‘naturally’, ‘spontaneity’, or ‘so-of-itself’. It
is a Taoist term of art describing the ideal state of agents and quality of
actions. A coordinate concept is wu wei (nonaction), particularly in the Tao Te
Ching. Taoists seek to eliminate the rational “human” perspective and return to
spontaneous “Heavenly” inclinations. Actions then will be unself-conscious, and
we and what we do will be tzu jan (spontaneous). Wang Ch’ung presents an early
critique of this Taoist notion in chapter 54 of his Lun Heng. Later thinkers
appropriate the term to support their own positions. For example,
Neo-Confucians regard particular familial and social obligations as tzu jan, as
are certain virtuous inclinations.
NEO-TAOISM, TAOISM. P.J.I.
type-type identity tzu
jan 937 937 Übermensch.NIETZSCHE.
Udana.NYAYA-VAISHESIKA. Unamuno, Miguel de (1864–1936), Spanish philosopher,
scholar, and writer. Born in Bilbao, he studied in Bilbao and Madrid and taught
Greek and philosophy in Salamanca. His open criticism of the Spanish government
led to dismissal from the university and exile (1924–30) and, again, to
dismissal from the rectorship in 1936. Unamuno is an important figure in
Spanish letters. Like Ortega y Gasset, his aim was to capture life in its
complex emotional and intellectual dimensions rather than to describe the world
scientifically. Thus, he favored fiction as a medium for his ideas and may be
considered a precursor of existentialism. He wrote several philosophically
significant novels, a commentary on Don Quijote (1905), and some poetry and
drama; his philosophical ideas are most explicitly stated in Del sentimiento
trágico de la vida (“The Tragic Sense of Life,” 1913). Unamuno perceived a
tragic sense permeating human life, a sense arising from our desire for
immortality and from the certainty of death. In this predicament man must
abandon all pretense
of rationalism and embrace faith. Faith
characterizes the authentic life, while reason leads to despair, but faith can
never completely displace reason. Torn between the two, we can find hope only
in faith; for reason deals only with abstractions, while we are “flesh and
bones” and can find fulfillment only through commitment to an ideal. J.J.E.G.
unary quantifier.PLURALITIVE LOGIC. uncertainty principle.PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE, QUANTUM MECHANICS. unconscious.FREUD, JUNG. uncountable.CANTOR.
undecidable.CONVENTIONALISM. undefeated.EPISTEMOLOGY. undemonstrable
argument.THEMA. underdetermination, perceptual.FIGURE– GROUND.
underdetermination, theoretical.OPERATIONALISM, THEORY-LADEN.
underdetermination thesis.PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. understanding.DILTHEY,
EXPLANATION, VERSTEHEN. understanding, categories of the.KANT. unexpected
examination paradox, a paradox about belief and prediction. One version is as
follows: It seems that a teacher could both make, and act on, the following
announcement to his class: “Sometime during the next week I will set you an
examination, but at breakfast time on the day it will occur, you will have no
good reason to expect that it will occur on that day.” If he announces this on
Friday, could he not do what he said he would by, say, setting the examination
on the following Wednesday? The paradox is that there is an argument purporting
to show that there could not be an unexpected examination of this kind. For let
us suppose that the teacher will carry out his threat, in both its parts; i.e.,
he will set an examination, and it will be unexpected. Then he cannot set the
examination on Friday (assuming this to be the last possible day of the week).
For, by the time Friday breakfast arrives, and we know that all the previous
days have been examination-free, we would have every reason to expect the
examination to occur on Friday. So leaving the examination until Friday is
inconsistent with setting an unexpected examination. For similar reasons, the
examination cannot be held on Thursday. Given our previous conclusion that it
cannot be delayed until Friday, we would know, when Thursday morning came, and
the previous days had been examination-free, that it would have to be held on
Thursday. So if it were held on Thursday it would not be unexpected. So it
cannot be held on Thursday. Similar reasoning sup938 U 938 posedly shows that there is no day of
the week on which it can be held, and so supposedly shows that the supposition
that the teacher can carry out his threat must be rejected. This is
paradoxical, for it seems plain that the teacher can carry out his threat.
uniformity of nature, a
state of affairs thought to be required if induction is to be justified. For
example, inductively strong arguments, such as ‘The sun has risen every day in
the past; therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow’, are thought to presuppose
that nature is uniform in the sense that the future will resemble the past, in
this case with respect to the diurnal cycle. The Scottish empiricist Hume was
the first to make explicit that the uniformity of nature is a substantial
assumption in inductive reasoning. Hume argued that, because the belief that
the future will resemble the past cannot be grounded in experience – for the
future is as yet unobserved – induction cannot be rationally justified; appeal
to it in defense of induction is either question-begging or illicitly
metaphysical. Francis Bacon’s “induction by enumeration” and J. S. Mill’s “five
methods of experimental inquiry” presuppose that nature is uniform. Whewell
appealed to the uniformity of nature in order to account for the “consilience
of inductions,” the tendency of a hypothesis to explain data different from
those it was originally introduced to explain. For reasons similar to Hume’s,
Popper holds that our belief in the uniformity of nature is a matter of faith.
Reichenbach held that although this belief cannot be justified in advance of
any instance of inductive reasoning, its presupposition is vindicated by
successful inductions. It has proved difficult to formulate a philosophical statement
of the uniformity of nature that is both coherent and informative. It appears
contradictory to say that nature is uniform in all respects, because inductive
inferences always mark differences of some sort (e.g., from present to future,
from observed to unobserved, etc.), and it seems trivial to say that nature is
uniform in some respects, because any two states of nature, no matter how
different, will be similar in some respect. Not all observed regularities in
the world (or in data) are taken to support successful inductive reasoning; not
all uniformities are, to use Goodman’s term, “projectible.” Philosophers of
science have therefore proposed various rules of projectibility, involving such
notions as simplicity and explanatory power, in an attempt to distinguish those
observed patterns that support successful inductions (and thus are taken to
represent genuine causal relations) from those that are accidental or
spurious.
unity in diversity, in
aesthetics, the principle that the parts of the aesthetic object must cohere or
hang together while at the same time being different enough to allow for the
object to be complex. This principle defines an important formal requirement
used in judging aesthetic objects. If an object has insufficient unity (e.g., a
collection of color patches with no recognizable patterns of any sort), it is
chaotic or lacks harmony; it is more a collection than one object. But if it
has insufficient diversity (e.g., a canvas consisting entirely of one color
with no internal differentiations), it is monotonous. Thus, the formal pattern
desired in an aesthetic object is that of complex parts that differ
significantly from each other but fit together to form one interdependent whole
such that the character or meaning of the whole would be changed by the change
of any part.
unity of science, a
situation in which all branches of empirical science form a coherent system
called unified science. Unified science is sometimes extended to include formal
sciences (e.g., branches of logic and mathematics). ‘Unity of science’ is also
used to refer to a research program aimed at unified science. Interest in the
unity of science has a long history with many roots, including ancient atomism
and the work of the French Encyclopedists. In the twentieth century this
interest was prominent in logical empiricism (see Otto Neurath et al.,
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. I, 1938). Logical
empiricists originally conceived of unified science in terms of a unified
language of science, in particular, a universal observation language. All laws
and theoretical statements in any branch of science were to be translatable
into such an observation language, or else be appropriately related to
sentences of this language. In unified science unity of science 939 939 addition to encountering technical
difficulties with the observational–theoretical distinction, this conception of
unified science also leaves open the possibility that phenomena of one branch
may require special concepts and hypotheses that are explanatorily independent
of other branches. Another concept of unity of science requires that all
branches of science be combined by the intertheoretic reduction of the theories
of all non-basic branches to one basic theory (usually assumed to be some
future physics). These reductions may proceed stepwise; an oversimplified
example would be reduction of psychology to biology, together with reductions
of biology to chemistry and chemistry to physics. The conditions for reducing
theory T2 to theory T1 are complex, but include identification of the ontology
of T2 with that of T1, along with explanation of the laws of T2 by laws of T1
together with appropriate connecting sentences. These conditions for reduction
can be supplemented with conditions for the unity of the basic theory, to
produce a general research program for the unification of science (see Robert
L. Causey, Unity of Science, 1977). Adopting this research program does not
commit one to the proposition that complete unification will ever be achieved;
the latter is primarily an empirical proposition. This program has been
criticized, and some have argued that reductions are impossible for particular
pairs of theories, or that some branches of science are autonomous. For
example, some writers have defended a view of autonomous biology, according to
which biological science is not reducible to the physical sciences. Vitalism
postulated non-physical attributes or vital forces that were supposed to be
present in living organisms. More recent neovitalistic positions avoid these
postulates, but attempt to give empirical reasons against the feasibility of
reducing biology. Other, sometimes a priori, arguments have been given against
the reducibility of psychology to physiology and of the social sciences to
psychology. These disputes indicate the continuing intellectual significance of
the idea of unity of science and the broad range of issues it encompasses.
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