"zweckrationalität," from Grice's Dictionary --.

zweckrationalität: H. P. Grice used the vernacular here, since he found it tricky to look for the Oxonian for ‘Zweck.’ As he was reading Weber, Grice realises that one of the main theoretical goals of Weber’s work is to understand how a social process (such as a conversation, seen as a two-player game) become “rationalized,” taking up certain themes of philosophy of history since Hegel as part of social theory. Conversation, as part of culture, e.g., becomes ‘rationalised’ in the process of the “disenchantment of a world views” in the West, a process that Weber thinks has “universal significance.” But because of his goal-oriented theory of action and his non-cognitivism in ethics, Weber sees rationalization, like Grice, and unlike, say, Habermas, exclusively in terms of the spread of purposive, or MEANS–ends rationality (“Zweckrationalität”). Rational action means choosing the most effective MEANS of achieving one’s goals and implies judging the consequences of one’s actions and choices. In contrast, value rationality (“Wertrationalität,” that Grice translates as ‘worth-rationality’) consists of any action oriented to this or that ultimate END, where considerations of consequences are irrelevant. Although such action is rational insofar as it directs and organises human conduct, the choice of this or that end, or this or that value itself cannot be, for Weber, unlike Grice, a matter for rational or scientific judgment. Indeed, for Weber this means that politics is the sphere for the struggle between at least two of this or that irreducibly competing ultimate end, where “gods and demons fight it out” and charismatic leaders invent new gods and values.