H. P. Grice, "Sender and Sendee"

V. UTTERER'S OCCASION-MEANING IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AUDIENCE There are various examples of utterances by which the utterer could correctly be said to have meant something (to have meant that so-and-so), such that there is no actual person or set of persons whom the utterer is addressing and in whom he intends to induce a response. The range of these examples includes, or might be thought to include, such items as the posting of notices, like "Keep out" or "This bridge is dangerous," entries in diaries, the writing of notes to clarify one's thoughts when working on some problem, soliloquizing, rehearsing a part in a projected conversation, and silent thinking. At least some of these examples are unprovided for in the definitions so far proposed. The examples which my account should cover fall into three groups: (a) Utterances for which the utterer thinks there may (now or later) be an audience. U may think that some particular person, for example, himself at a future date in the case of a diary entry, may (but also may not) encounter U's utterance; or U may think that there may or may not be some person or other who is or will be an auditor of his utterance. (b) Utterances which the utterer knows not to be addressed to any actual audience, but which the utterer pretends to address to some particular person or type of person, or which he thinks of as being addressed to some imagined audience or type of audience (as in the rehearsal of a speech or of his part in a projected conversation). (c) Utterances (including "internal" utterances) with respect to which the utterer neither thinks it possible that there may be an actual audience nor imagines himself as addressing an audience, but nevertheless intends his utterance to be such that it would induce a certain sort of response in a certain perhaps fairly indefinite kind of audience were it the case that such an audience was present. In the case of silent thinking the idea of the presence of an audience will have to be interpreted liberally, as being the idea of there being an audience for a public counterpart of the '74 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS utterer's internal speech. In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that some cases of verbal thinking fall outside the scope of my account. When verbal thoughts merely pass through my head as distinct from being "framed" by me, it is inappropriate to talk of me as having meant something by them; I am, perhaps, in such cases more like a listener than a speaker. I shall propose a final redefinition which I hope will account for the examples which need to be accounted for, and which will allow as special cases the range of examples in which there is, and it is known by the utterer that there is, an actual audience. This redefinition will be relatively informal; I could present a more formal version which would gain in precision at the cost of ease of comprehension. Let "p" (and k') range over properties of persons (possible audiences); appropriate substituends for "O" (and i') will include such diverse expressions as "is a passer-by," "is a passer-by who sees this notice," "is a native English speaker," "is identical with Jones." As will be seen, for U to mean something it will have to be possible to identify the value of "/" (which may be fairly indeterminate) which U has in mind; but we do not have to determine the range from which U makes a selection. Redefinition V "U meant by uttering x that *iP" is true iff (30) (3f (3c): I. U uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who has q would think that (i) x hasf (2) f is correlated in way c with M-ing that p (3) (3 0'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has b' would think, via thinking (i) and (2), that U4's that p (4) in view of (3), U O's that p; and II. (operative only for certain substituends for "*4") U uttered x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has 0, he would via thinking (4), himself a that p; '75 H. P. GRICE and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has 0 will both (i') rely on E in coming to O+ that p and (2') think that (3k'): Uintends x to be such that anyone who has O' will come to /+ that p without relying on E. Notes: (X) "i+" is to be read as "p" if Clause II is operative, and as "think that UO's" if Clause II is non-operative. (2) We need to use both "i" and "i'," since we do not wish to require that U should intend his possible audience to think of U's possible audience under the same description as U does himself. Explanatory comments: (i) It is essential that the intention which is specified in Clause II should be specified as U's intention "that should there be anyone who has 0, he would (will) . . ." rather than, analogously with Clauses I and II, as U's intention "that x should be such that, should anyone be 0, he would ... ." If we adopt the latter specification, we shall be open to an objection raised by Schiffer, as can be shown with the aid of an example of the same kind as his. Suppose that, infuriated by an afternoon with my mother-inlaw, when I am alone after her departure I relieve my feelings by saying, aloud and passionately, "Don't you ever come near me again." It will no doubt be essential to my momentary well-being that I should speak with the intention that my remark be such that were my mother-in-law present, she would form the intention not to come near me again. It would, however, be unacceptable if it were represented as following from my having this intention that I meant that she was never to come near me again; for it is false that, in the circumstances, I meant this by my remark. The redefinition as formulated avoids this difficulty. (2) Suppose that in accordance with the definiens of the latest redefinition, (30): U intends x to be such that anyone who is f will think ... , and suppose that the value of "O" which U has in mind is the property of being identical with a particular person A. Then it will follow that U intends A to think . . . ; and given the further 176 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS condition, fulfilled in any normal case, that U intends A to think that he (A) is the intended audience, we are assured of the truth of a statement from which the definiens of IV(B) is inferrible by the rule of existential generalization (assuming the legitimacy of this application of E. G. to a statement the expression of which contains such "intensional" verbs as "intend" and "think"). I think it can also be shown that, for any case in which there is an actual audience who knows that he is the intended audience, if the definiens IV(B) is true then the definiens of V will be true. If that is so, given that redefinition V is correct, for any normal case in which there is an actual audience the fulfillment of the definiens of IV(B) will constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for U's having meant that *1p. VI.