Lexicon griceianum -- in six volumes, vol. iii.

immediate perception Epistemology A distinction between immediate and mediate or indirect perception that originated with Berkeley, and is also called the distinction between direct and indirect awareness. One may say that “I hear a train,” but what one actually hears is a sound. In this case the sound is what a person perceives immediately without any inference, while the train is perceived mediately, for the person may not perceive the train at all but only infer from hearing the sound that there is a train. We have mediate perception only when we have immediate perception, although the immediate perception need not be temporally prior. What, then, is the nature of this distinction between immediate and mediate perception? Different responses are the basis of a division in the philosophy of perception between naive or direct realism on the one hand, and representationalism and phenomenalism on the other. Both representationalism and phenomenalism take this distinction seriously, arguing that the objects of immediate perception are sense-data or senseimpressions, while the objects of mediate perception are physical existents that are represented by the sense-data (representationalism) or are constructed out of sense-data (phenomenalism). Naive or direct realism argues that what we immediately perceive are nothing but the physical objects themselves. According to this theory, both immediate and mediate perception is the acquiring of beliefs about the world by means of senses, and this distinction is not a sharp one. The analysis of immediate perception is indeed a central problem in contemporary philosophy of perception. “Immediate perception, then, is perception which involves no element of inference, while mediate perception does involve such an inference.” D. Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World immortality Philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of mind [from Latin in, not + mors, death] A state of existing eternally or timelessly, specifically regarding personal immortality through the survival of the soul after the death of the body. The immortality of the soul, an ancient idea found in almost every primitive religion, was fully developed in Christianity. It claims that a soul never dies and will be punished or rewarded according to its behavior in the earthly life. Immortality in this sense has served as a presupposition of morality, or, in Kant’s words, “a postulate of pure practical reason.” Metaphysically, the soul’s immortality was elaborated in Plato’s Phaedo. He argued that because the soul is immaterial and simple, in the sense of having no parts, and occupies no space, it can not be decomposed. This kind of argument was influential in the history of philosophy, but it has been opposed by the Aristotelian view that the soul is the form of the body and cannot exist separately. On some views, one’s present body is no more than a temporary home for one’s soul, and one is immortal through reincarnation or transmigration into another body when one’s present body perishes. Plato also claimed that human beings have a natural desire to seek immortality. There are two basic ways of pursuing this end. One is to have bodily offspring, and another, preferred by Plato, is to produce something that is eternal, especially through the discovery of truths. One’s spiritual work can continue to exist in other people’s minds after one’s death. “Immortality means endurance in time, deathless life on this earth.” Arendt, Human Condition impartial spectator, see ideal observer theory impartialism Ethics A tendency reflected in every kind of altruistic moral theory, and especially Kantian ethics. imperialism It advocates the view that moral consideration should be isolated from all forms of partiality and self-concern and emphasizes the universalizability of moral reasons. Moral principles are universally applicable and cannot be principles that favor oneself or those close to one on pain of being rationally unacceptable. Impartialism extensively employs the analogical argument that one should consider events from another person’s point of view and should hypothetically put oneself in the position of those whom one’s acts will affect. “The idea behind the Golden Rule is that of impartialism – that one should make no exception in one’s own favour.” Boer and Lycan, Knowing Who impartiality Ethics, political philosophy If an agent is included in a group with regard to which the issue of impartiality arises, impartiality is the virtue of treating oneself and others on an equal basis. If one is not in the group regarding which one is impartial, impartiality is a virtue of being personally uninvolved with any party in the group. Impartiality is associated with equality, justice, and fairness. It is objective and impersonal. Since it is an essential requirement of moral behavior to consider each individual equally, impartiality is a basic feature of morality. There are various tests of impartiality, such as the Golden Rule, the reverse-role test, the categorical imperative, universalizability, and Rawls’s veil of ignorance. “What is it to be ‘impartial’? It is to take an attitude that would not be changed if positions of individuals involved were reversed, or if the individuals were different from whom they are.” Brandt, Ethical Theory imperative: Originally the mood of sentences that issue commands or requests. Kant took it as the form of moral commands for determining an action in accordance with a certain principle of the will. It is expressed by an ought. According to him, there are fundamentally two kinds of imperatives: the hypothetical and the categorical. A hypothetical imperative commands an action with regard to the agent’s ends. If the end is only possible, it is a problematic or technical imperative, also called a rule of skill. If the end is actual, it is an assertoric imperative, also called a counsel of prudence. A categorical imperative commands an action as an objective necessity in itself, without regard to the agent’s ends, and is also called the apodeictic imperative. It requires that one should act only on maxims that are universalizable. An account of imperatives under Kantian influence is also important for prescriptivism. The philosophy of language is interested in the relationship between this commanding function of imperatives and other functions in language, such as communicating information. Contemporary logicians have attempted to develop an imperative logic. “The conception of an objective principle so far as it constrains a will, is a command (of reason), and the formula of this command is called an imperative.” Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals pure motive, imperfect duty Ethics Kant drew a distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. A perfect duty must be fulfilled under any circumstances and specifies a particular action, while an imperfect duty may be overridden and allows a significant degree of freedom in deciding how to comply with it. A perfect duty, such as the duty not to lie, establishes a necessary goal for an action and is commanded apodeictically. An imperfect duty, such as the duty to support the poor, allows exceptions and various ways in which it may be satisfied. It allows contingently good action under a necessarily good maxim. The distinction can be traced to scholasticism, in which perfect duties could be enforced by external legislation, while imperfect duties could not. “Imperfect duties are, accordingly, only duties of virtue. Fulfilment of them is merit . . . but failure to fulfil them is not in itself culpability . . . but rather mere deficiency in moral worth, unless the subject should make it his principle not to comply with such duties.” Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals imperialism Political philosophy, ethics A term with many senses. In Marxism, imperialism is the world system of political domination and economic exploitation that emerged from the competition amongst highly developed capitalist powers, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Lenin, imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism. On this view, capitalism entered the imperialist phase because surplus capital that could not be absorbed in the home market had to be invested in colonies and other dominated countries. A few imperialist countries divided the world into different spheres of influence. When the balance of the division of the world market was broken, world war resulted. There have been rival accounts of the origin and nature of imperialism. For Kautsky, imperialism is the oppression and exploitation of underdeveloped countries by developed countries. In contemporary ethics, imperialism is mainly used in a cultural sense to characterize the claim that the point of view of one special group, based on nation, culture, race, religion, gender, or other considerations, is privileged. According to a feminist version of this theory, it is cultural imperialism to hold that only the position of white bourgeois men is scientific. “What we mean when we speak of empire or imperialism is the relationship of a hegemonial state to peoples or nations under its control.” Lichtheim, Imperialism impersonal verb Logic, philosophy of language Verbs appearing in sentences such as “It is snowing.” In this kind of sentence the word “it” does not have the logical function of a subject. The speaker does not intend to pick out something it designates. This sort of sentence is a subjectless sentence, and the standard subject-predicate distinction does not apply to it. Hence, the verb in it does not introduce an action performed by a subject, and we never significantly ask, for example, “What is snowing?” “When verbs occur in phrases like ‘It is raining’ or ‘It is freezing’, they are traditionally called ‘impersonal verbs’.” C. Williams, Being, Identity and Truth implication Logic In its ordinary sense, implication is a synonym of entailment, a logical relation between one or a set of premises and a consequence deduced from this premise or set of premises. It is most commonly expressed in sentences of the form “if p then q,” when p is the implying proposition (also called the antecedent or protasis), and q is the implied proposition (also called the consequent or apodasis). Russell and Whitehead used the term material implication to express the relation between the antecedent and consequent of a true conditional proposition, which is symbolized as p ⊃ q or as p → q. In order to avoid the so-called paradoxes of material implication, C. I. Lewis introduced a notion of strict implication, saying that p strictly implies q if and only if it was impossible that p should be true and q false. Other attempts to further clarify the meaning relation between antecedent and consequent include Carnap’s L-implication and the system of entailment. “In order to be able validly to infer the truth of a proposition, we must know that some other proposition is true, and that there is between the two a relation of the sort called ‘implication’, that is that (as we say) the premise ‘implies’ the conclusion.” Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy implicit definition Logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science Also called definition by axioms or definition by postulates. In contrast to an explicit definition, which gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for a term to be applied, an implicit definition of a term does not directly state the extension and intension of a term, but defines the term by showing that it satisfies certain axioms, the validity of which is strictly guaranteed. Thus the axioms of a system of geometry implicitly define the primitive geometrical signs that the axioms contain by delimiting the interpretations of the signs that satisfy it. This notion gains its importance in modern mathematics through the work of Hilbert. For he claims that the quest for explicit definitions for many mathematical terms such as “straight line,” “point,” and “plane” is extremely difficult and that we should define such terms implicitly as whatever entities satisfy the formal axioms formulated by means of them. As a result, although non-Euclidean geometry still uses Euclidean terms such as “point,” “place,” and “straight line,” these terms do not mean the same in the two systems, since they are implicitly defined by the postulate set in which they occur. A similar use of implicit definitions in natural science, in which terms are defined through satisfying the theories in which they are embedded, also raises questions of the stability of meaning in the face of changes in theory. “When the term ‘implicit definition’ is used in connection with formal postulational systems, it refers to a set of formal postulates, i.e. postulates whose extralogical terms, the ‘primitives’ of the system, are not interpreted. Such a set is said to implicitly define the primitive extralogical terms it contains.” Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth importation Logic A principle of inference which states that from the premise “If p, then q and r” [(p→ (q ∧ r)], we can conclude “if p and q, then r” [(p ∧ q) → r]. This inference is a strict implication and can be expressed in propositional logic as [p→ (q ∧ r)] ↔ [(p ∧ q) → r]. The reverse of this inference, which is also valid, is called exportation. “If q implies q, and r implies r, and if p implies that q implies r, then pq implies r. This is the principle of importation.” Russell, Principles of Mathematics impredicative definition Logic, philosophy of mathematics A definition of an object by reference to the totality to which the object belongs. The term is credited to Russell and Poincaré. Both argued that this kind of definition must be banned from the conceptual foundation of mathematics. No totality can contain members defined in terms of itself for they imply a vicious circle and lead to logical paradox. For example, it is an impredicative definition if we define a set A as “the set of all sets that are not members of themselves.” Then if asked whether A is a member of itself or not, the answer is paradoxical, that is, A is a member of itself if and only if A is not a member of itself. This is the famous Russell’s paradox. “It appears that if one were seriously to outlaw all impredicative definitions, that is to say, definitions of an object by reference to a totality which includes itself or object definable only in terms of itself, one would not only have to sacrifice a great deal of accepted mathematics but would also be jeopardising the complete programme of deriving mathematics from Logic.” Ayer, Russell and Moore impression (Hume), see idea (Hume) in and for itself, see in itself inauthenticity, see authenticity incentive Ethics In Kant’s ethics, the subjective ground of desire that provides a subjective end for the will. In contrast, a motive is the objective ground of volition. An incentive is material and sensuous and is related to a particular subject. It does not always conform to the objective conditions of morality and can only supply grounds for hypothetical imperatives. On the other hand, a categorical imperative abstracts from incentives and is applicable to all rational subjects. “From what has gone before it is clear that the purposes which we may have in our actions, as well as their effects regarded as ends and incentives of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditioned and moral worth.” Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals inclination Ethics [from Latin in + clinare, bend, lean] A kind of incentive, disposition, or tendency that will cause certain action. It is rooted in the world of sense and is material and subjective. In Kant’s ethics, inclination is the source of the heteronomy of the will. A will dominated by inclination does not give itself a law and only passively reacts to external stimuli. This is a state of slavery. Inclination cannot be universalized and can only be the basis of a hypothetical imperative. It also contrasts with duty and reason. For Kant, it is crucial to distinguish whether an action stems from duty or from inclination in deciding whether an action has a genuine moral worth, although critics claim that his grounds for moral worth are too austere. “The dependence of the faculty of desire on sensations is called inclination, which accordingly always indicates a need.” Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals incommensurability Philosophy of science Two theories are commensurable if there is common ground to assess or measure their merits and demerits. Some philosophers, such as Popper, have held that science develops through the successive replacement of commensurable theories, that is, old and relatively unsuccessful theories are superseded by new and relatively successful theories. However, in his account of paradigm shifts of scientific revolutions, Kuhn argued that any new paradigm will completely replace and destroy the old one and that they are incommensurable. The component statements of the rival paradigms are mutually untranslatable. They involve different conceptual schemes, different problems, and even alternative logics. The claims of one theory cannot be framed in the language of the other, and the whole network of thought and practice has to be reconstructed. The transition between paradigms involves a breakdown of communication. After a paradigm shift, scientists live in a totally different world. Science does not accumulate truth as time passes, and when a new paradigm replaces an older one, it dismisses all the results obtained within the old paradigm. We do not have common ground for resolving the disputes between different paradigms. This view was further developed by Feyerabend, but faces difficulty in explaining examples of evident continuity in the growth of scientific knowledge. “We have already seen several reasons why the proponents of competing paradigms must fail to make complete contact with each other’s viewpoints. Collectively these reasons have been described as the incommensurability of the preand postrevolutionary normal-scientific traditions.” Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions incompatibilism, see compatibilism incomplete symbol Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language Russell’s term for an expression that has no significance on its own, but which acquires meaning in a context provided by other symbols. An incomplete symbol does not refer to actual objects directly. According to Russell, definite descriptions, class-symbols, and logical fictions are all incomplete symbols. Because appeal to this device removes the necessity to admit a domain of unreal entities, it is an important component of Russell’s theory of descriptions. A full discussion of this term is provided by Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, I, 3. “Thus all phrases (other than propositions) containing the word ‘the’ (in the singular) are incomplete symbols. They have a meaning in use, but not in isolation.” Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica incompleteness, see completeness incompleteness theorem, see Gödel’s theorem incongruent counterpart Metaphysics A counterpart of an object is something that completely resembles it. For example, a left hand is a counterpart of the right hand. Kant set out the argument from incongruent counterparts, which states that counterparts cannot be congruent if, though formally identical, they differ in their relation to absolute space. Even if identical in shape, they cannot change their spatial orientation in a way that would allow one to fit into the limits of the other. Hence, they are incongruent. For example, in three dimensions a right hand cannot occupy the same spatial location as a left hand. This argument depends upon the claim that the properties of space are prior to the relations of bodies. Counterparts have spatial properties not susceptible to any relational analysis. This argument presupposes the Newtonian conception of absolute space and is at odds with the Leibnizian relativist view of space because his relational theory cannot capture the difference of spatial orientation of right and left hands. The problem is taken by some philosophers as proof that space is absolute, while others argue that in different spatial systems incongruent counterparts would be congruent. Incongruent counterparts are also called enantiomorphs (from Greek enantion, opposite + morphe, form). “I shall call a body which is exactly equal and similar to another, but which cannot be enclosed in the same limits as that other, its incongruent counterpart.” Kant, Theoretical Philosophy inconsistent triad, another term for antilogism incontinence Ethics [Greek akrasia, from a, not + kratein, to control or master] A lack of control over oneself, especially over one’s irrational desires. An incontinent man or akrastic does what he knows he ought not to do, or fails to do what he knows he should do. Socrates claimed that virtue is knowledge and that no man voluntarily does evil. He therefore denied the existence of incontinence and took what appeared as incontinence to be a kind of ignorance. Both Plato and Aristotle believed that incontinence exists and considered it to be a matter of great importance to understand how it is possible. Plato’s account emphasized the clash between the different elements in the soul, with incontinence occurring when a person’s emotion or appetite overcomes his reason. Aristotle offered two different interpretations. Along with Plato, he sought to explain incontinence in terms of a psychological conflict, but in a revision of Socrates’ argument he also argued that an incontinent person does not properly know that what he is doing is bad. He knows some of the premises relating to his action only potentially, in the way that men who are asleep, mad, or drunk have knowledge. Aristotle’s complex discussion has been the subject of much interpretation and debate. Incontinence involves an important aspect of the conception of human nature. Its existence shows that sometimes belief is powerless before passion, and that intellect does not always determine will. Philosophers have taken great pains to explain this phenomenon, which separates moral beliefs and moral commitment. “For incontinence makes someone act contrary to what he supposes.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics incorrigible Epistemology, metaphysics A statement or proposition is incorrigible in a strong sense if it is impossible to be mistaken or uncertain about its truth and is incorrigible in a weak sense if it cannot be corrected even if it may be mistaken. An example of the strong sense is given by the so-called basic propositions, which are meant merely to record one’s present experience without relating it to anything else. I cannot doubt propositions such as “I have a headache,” although this statement might be doubted by other persons or by myself at other times. An example for the weak sense is given by our reports of our dreams, which we are not in a position to correct even if they are mistaken. A search for an absolute ground in metaphysics and epistemology is a search for a starting-point that is incorrigible, but it is disputable whether there can be such a point. “I should now agree with those who say that propositions of this kind are ‘incorrigible’, assuming that what is meant by their being incorrigible is that it is impossible to be mistaken about them except in a verbal sense.” Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic independence, logical Logic If neither a sentence S nor its negation not-S is deducible from a set of sentences T, then S is logically independent of T. That is, there is no logical relationship between S and T, and T does not determine the truth-value of either S or not-S. In an axiomatic system, an axiom is generally regarded to be independent of other axioms in the system. Hence independence amounts to non-deducibility. The axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis are regarded as typical independent sentences. “Axiomatists are naturally concerned that their axioms be independent: that none be derivable as a theorem from the rest, and hence dispensable.” Quine, Methods of Logic indeterminacy in law: Also called the no right answer thesis. Lawyers debate about problems of indeterminacy in which the criteria for the application of legal rules are vague or in which a case falls under two or more conflicting rules. Many legal philosophers believe that in these cases it is uncertain which side of a legal dispute is stronger. They claim that legal rules in such hard cases provide no right answer and that informed people can reasonably disagree about them. For natural law theorists, hard cases arise because law is derived from moral principles, but moral principles themselves are sometimes in conflict. For legal positivists, there is indeterminacy because law is derived from the body of past legislation and conventions that cannot be expected always to apply in solving present issues. It is unlikely that a system contains in itself appropriate conflict-resolving rules for all cases. Accordingly, they argue that for hard cases lawyers and judges should develop the law on the basis of moral, social, or other extra-legal arguments. “Where the facts which are legal reasons are indeterminate, through vagueness, open texture, or some other factors, certain legal statements are neither true nor false.” Raz, The Authority of Law “The crucial consideration behind my argument for the indeterminacy of translation was that a statement about the word does not always or usually have a separable fund of empirical consequences that it can call its own.” Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays indeterminacy of translation: Different translators render an alien language into our own language in terms of different translation manuals. These manuals may all fit the totality of known speech dispositions, but are not compatible with each other. It is a natural assumption that in translating the translator discovers as an objective fact that an alien word is synonymous to some word in our language, and that we can decide which manual is correct or better. But Quine challenges this assumption by arguing that there is no matter of fact according to which we may determine which manual is correct. Our choice of the manual is not based on the belief that it alone assigns the true meanings to the expressions of the alien language, but is determined by the utility of the manual in facilitating conversation, that is, by subjective, pragmatic considerations. Any individual linguistic utterance may be given different interpretations. Any manual may fit the facts so long as it conforms to the stimulus meaning, but the stimulus meaning varies according to the context. Physical facts do not determine our talk about synonymy. This indeterminacy of translation leads to the indeterminacy of reference, of truth, and of ontological commitment. The thesis is consistent with Quine’s denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, because this distinction means little if there is no fact of the matter determining whether a sentence in another language should be translated into an analytical or synthetic claim. It is also consistent with Quine’s extensionalism, for it shows that there is no basis for assigning determinate intensional contents to propositions. Because this thesis leads toward a general mistrust of determinate meaning and undermines many of the traditional aspirations of philosophy, it has been the subject of important disputes. On the other hand, Chomsky holds that it adds nothing essential to the accepted view that physical theory is itself indeterminate with regard to all possible empirical evidence. indeterminism Metaphysics, philosophy of science, ethics A theory which claims, in opposition to determinism, that some events just happen without determining causes and that no prior conditions account for them. Such events can be characterized in terms of chance, randomness, or uncertainty. According to quantum mechanics, quantum events at the most fundamental level of reality are of this kind. The indeterminism of modern physics erodes any sharp demarcation between the laws of nature and the special facts of nature. This distinction can be understood only by placing it within the context of statistical laws. The contrast between indeterminism and determinism reflects a difference in the world views held by quantum mechanics and Newtonian physics. Some philosophers apply indeterminism to ethics and suggest that human beings have uncaused free actions, with no antecedent events explaining their choices. It is difficult on this view to explain in what sense we can ascribe an uncaused action to an agent. Answers to this question will help to decide whether freedom is more compatible with random or chance actions or with causally determined ones. “Quantum theory is fundamentally indeterministic in that it does not supply definite predications for the result of measurements.” Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics indicative word Logic, epistemology, philosophy of language An indicative word signifies a sensible object and its properties. Such words include names, words denoting qualities, and words denoting perceptible relations. The meaning of indicative words can be given directly by ostensive definitions. “Words that mean objects may be called ‘indicative’ words.” Russell, Human Knowledge individual indicator terms, another term for egocentric particulars indifference/spontaneity, see spontaneity/indifference indirect perception, see immediate perception indirect realism Epistemology There are two types of perceptual realism, direct and indirect realism. Both claim that the physical world exists independently of perceivers and that the world is as science says it is. While direct realism believes that what we perceive is the physical world itself, indirect realism argues that what we immediately or directly perceive are sense-data, rather than the physical world itself, which can only be perceived indirectly. Thus, indirect realism sets up a field of sense-data between our perception and the physical world. But it contrasts with phenomenalism, for it denies that physical existents are composed out of sense-data. There are two main versions of indirect realism. One, called naive indirect realism, claims that sensedata have all the types of properties that physical objects have. The other, called scientific indirect realism, suggests that physical objects have primary properties, while secondary properties, such as color, smell, and taste, belong only to sense-data. “The dispute between the direct realist and the indirect realist concerns the question of whether we are ever directly aware of the existence and nature of physical objects.” Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology indiscernibility of identicals Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language This principle, also called Leibniz’s law, or the principle of substitutivity, states that for any two objects X and Y, if they are identical, all the properties that belong to X belong also to Y, and vice versa. Everything true of one will be true of the other. Leibniz’s formulation is: “To suppose two things indiscernible is to suppose the same thing under two names.” Leibniz himself argues that there are not in nature two real beings that are indiscernible from one another. Two leaves in a garden can never be found perfectly alike. This principle plays a great role in the contemporary discussion of intentionality. A contrary form may say that if a property is true of one thing but not of the other, they are not identical. But this is not always true in belief contexts or in other referentially opaque contexts. A correlated principle, called the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, is sometimes also included as part of Leibniz’s law. It states that if X and Y have all their properties in common, they are identical. If we shift our focus to language, these principles are related to the principle of extensionality, which states that the names and descriptions of the same object can be substituted for one another in all contexts salva veritate (without changing the truth-value of the statements in which they appear). These principles apply within limits rather than universally, but it is difficult to explain what we should say outside these limits, for example, about intentional contexts, in which substitutivity salva veritate does not hold. “One of the fundamental principles governing identity is that of substitutivity – or, as it might well be called, that of indiscernibility of identicals. It provides that, given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be the same.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View individual Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language, ethics, political philosophy [from Latin individuus, indivisible, employed by Boethius to translate Greek atom, uncuttable or undividable; a single distinct entity or unit which is incapable of being divided actually or conceptually while preserving its identity] In a standard sense, an individual is something that can be individuated, that is, counted or picked out in language and thus be distinguished from other things. In logic, individuals are things that can be subjects of sentences in the first-order predicate calculus, in contrast with predicates or functions. Individuals are often taken to be identical with particulars, but there is a significant difference. All particulars are individuals, but not all individuals are particulars. What we pick out in language are not merely various kinds of particular things, but also general things such as justice, wisdom, beauty. In moral, political, and social thought, an individual is a person, in contrast to a group or society. “So anything whatever can appear as a logical subject, an individual.” Strawson, Individuals individual essence Metaphysics An essence is usually thought to be a property common to a kind of thing, to belong to a species and therefore to be universal. But there is also a tradition, starting from Aristotle’s notion of tode ti (“thisness”), which suggests that each individual member of a given species has its own unique essential property. For instance, Plato is a man. Man is a universal essence that Plato shares with other human beings. However, there might be a property of being Plato that distinguishes Plato from Socrates and Aristotle and from all other human beings. Such an essence is a distinct property that is unique to an object and possessed by nothing else. Duns Scotus called an individual essence haecceity. The idea of individual essence is controversial, but it has been revived in contemporary essentialist discussions of modal logic as the property by which a proper name has a referent. In possible world accounts of modality, an individual essence is the property of X such that in every possible world in which X exists, X has this property, and in no possible world is there is an object distinct from X that has it. “We can even imagine that there is an essential property of being a particular individual, for example, property F, such that it is necessary that, if anything has that property, it is quantitatively identical with Fred. This sort of property is called an individual essence.” R. Martin, The Meaning of Language individual property, see abstract particulars individual term, another expression for singular term individualism Ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of mind Any theory or attitude which holds that individuals rather than wholes composed out of individuals are of central value and have fundamental existence. It claims that an individual can be understood apart from the physical environment, social relations, and historical traditions in which the individual is embedded. The notion of individualism has had different connotations in different stages of history and in different cultures, corresponding respectively to concerns for egoism and self-interest, anarchy, self-assertion, and freedom. In metaphysics, both ancient atomism and logical atomism are individualistic by holding that the world is constructed out of atoms, although their contents are distinct. In epistemology, classical empiricism is individualistic, for it believes that the private experience of individuals is the ultimate source of knowledge. In the philosophy of social science, methodological individualism is the view that inquiry into society should be based on the characteristics of individual persons. In the philosophy of mind, individualism proposes that mental semantic meaning is determined by the intrinsic properties of mental representations and does not depend upon their social and historical settings. This psychological individualism has been challenged by claims that the individuation of mental states involves the world and the linguistic community. Generally, the central areas of the application of individualism have been in ethics and political philosophy. In these areas, individualism is related to the ideas of autonomy and self-development. Ethical individualism claims that only the individual person is the subject of moral predicates and values and the central focus of moral consideration. Hence it contrasts with moral holism. In political philosophy, as an essential feature of political liberalism, individualism claims that the individual is viewed as the bearer of rights, that a government can be legitimately formed only on the basis of the consent of individuals, and that political representation is the representation of individual interests. Society is a logical construction whose aim is to enable its individual members to pursue their respective interests without interference. In opposition to individualism are various versions of holism, such as totalitarianism, collectivism, socialism, and communitarianism. All of these can be viewed as examples of anti-individualism. “It is liberty and equality which are the cardinal ideals of individualism.” Lukes, Individualism individuality Metaphysics [from Latin individuum, a translation of Greek atom, indivisible] The characteristic or property which makes something or someone the individual that it is. Different views result in different applications of the concept of an individual and different accounts of the relationship between individuals and universals. One popular view derived from the etymology of this term explains individuality in terms of indivisibility. Yet there are difficulties in determining what counts as a thing that cannot be divided. Logically, a species cannot be divided into its single members. Physically, a particular thing cannot be divided into its components without losing its nature. Metaphysically, simple entities cannot be divided into parts. The logical sense of indivisibility is compatible with universality and must be distinguished from particularity. Other approaches to the nature of individuality include the view that a thing is individual if it is distinct from other things, that an individual has a particular “thisness,” that an individual has a spatiotemporal identity, that an individual is something that cannot be predicated of anything else, and that an individual is a thing that cannot be instantiated by anything else. In these senses individuality amounts to particularity. The discussion of individuality is related to issues such as the principle of individuation and the discernibility of individuals. “My major claim concerning the intensional analysis of individuality is that, contrary to the standard view among present day philosophers, who interpret individuality as some kind of distinction or difference, individuality must be understood primarily as non-instantiability.” Gracia, Individuality individuative term, another expression for sortal indoctrination Political philosophy, philosophy of religion One of the major aims of the philosophy of education is to distinguish between the superficially similar notions of teaching and indoctrination. While teaching encourages students and learners to develop their rational capacities and to have their own views on various disputed issues, indoctrination is regarded as the activity of conveying dogma to pupils who are expected to accept it without question. The beliefs that are taught are not open to rational criticism from the pupil. They are intended to be implanted in the minds of the students so that their subsequent experience will not change their beliefs. Indoctrination is typically represented in the preaching of religious doctrine or political opinion. It typically involves authoritarian methods and is open to manipulation by interested parties. “Perhaps the least contentious account would be that indoctrination is a form of teaching in which it is intended that certain beliefs should be accepted without question, either because it is thought that they are not only important but unquestionably true, or because, for various reasons, it is thought important that, true or not, they should not be questioned.” T. Moore, Philosophy of Education induction Logic, philosophy of science [from Latin inducere, in, into + ducere, lead, a translation of Aristotle’s epagoge, leading to] For Aristotle, first, a form of reasoning in which we establish a generalization by showing that the reasoning holds for certain instances that are said to fall under it and, secondly, the process by which we apprehend a particular instance as exemplifying an abstract generalization. Nowadays, we call the first kind of reasoning simple or enumerative induction and the second kind induction by intuition. In addition, there is also induction by elimination, which reaches a generalization by eliminating competing generalizations. In induction by enumeration, the fundamental form of induction, the basic process of inference is that, if A 1 is P, A 2 is P, A 3 is P, then all As are P. An enumeration that covers all the instances falling under the generalization is called a complete enumerative induction. Induction is contrasted with deduction, in which a particular conclusion is deduced from a universal premise as a matter of logical necessity. In induction, a universal is derived from what is particular and goes beyond the content of its premises. For this reason induction was called by Peirce ampliative argument. For this reason, the conclusion of an inductive argument is generally probable rather than necessary. The discussion of induction is closely associated with that of probability and confirmation. Francis Bacon, who called his theory of induction a new organon, in contrast to Aristotle’s syllogism, held that all new knowledge must come from some form of induction. J. S. Mill established five canons of induction. Hume proposed the deeply important problem of induction, which claims that we lack adequate grounds to infer from observed regularities to the probable continuance of those regularities. Inductive reasoning is based on the principle of uniformity of nature, according to which events that I have not observed are similar to events that I have observed, but this principle is itself a conclusion based on induction. The rational foundations of inductive reasoning have been a major topic in subsequent philosophy, especially in the empiricist tradition. Anti-inductivism emerged to deny that induction is a rational process. The hypotheticodeductive method was proposed as a rival to inductive method, with Popper claiming that science proceeds by tests of falsification of imaginative hypotheses rather than by inductive confirmation. Goodman put forward his new riddle of induction concerning how an induction could be characterized in terms of an inference to the continuation of previously observed similarities. His “green-grue” example showed that the same inductive process can confirm two opposite generalizations. The debate about the nature and rationality of induction continues. “The so-called method of inductive inference is usually presented as proceeding from specific case to a general hypothesis of which each of the special cases is an ‘instance’ in the sense that it conforms to the general hypothesis in question, and thus constitutes confirming evidence for it.” Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation induction, the problem of Logic, philosophy of science A problem originally formulated by Hume concerning the legitimacy of inductive inference. Typically, induction infers from limited observation that some As are B to the conclusion that all As are B. But how can we rationally accept that such an inference is valid? On what grounds can we claim that the conclusion thus reached is acceptable? The classic response to this problem is that the validity of inductive reasoning is based on the uniformity of nature. This principle of induction claims that the future will resemble the past, and hence a generalization from observed cases is applicable to unobserved cases. But Hume argued that this principle can be justified only by induction and that the justification of induction in terms of the principle thus involves vicious circularity. The answer that Hume provided to the problem is that induction is not a rational inference, but arises from custom and habit. A skeptical interpretation of his account argues that induction needs rational support that custom and habit cannot provide. A naturalistic interpretation of his account claims that our inductive practice does not need any justification outside itself or that custom and habit is all the justification that we need. Recent generations of philosophers have also considered the problem of induction. Reichenbach claimed that induction is a method of reaching posits or conjectures, rather than an inference. Popper held a similar view. Some philosophers try to deny that justification in terms of the uniformity of nature involves circularity, by distinguishing different levels of induction. Goodman has proposed a new riddle of induction, suggesting that an appeal to the uniformity of nature is empty without grounds for preferring some uniformities to others. Some philosophers, including Russell, have held on the grounds of the possibility of knowledge that the justification of induction is a priori. An influential response, initiated by Strawson, suggests that the problem of induction is generated because we assess inductive reasoning by the standards of deductive reasoning, when in fact each of them has its own standard. Inductive reasoning is defeasible reasoning, that is, reasoning which reaches conclusions that can be overturned by further evidence. “But whatever view we take of the problem of induction, it remains true that being able to derive it from some accepted causal law is the strongest justification for believing in the existence of any unobserved event.” Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays induction by elimination Logic, philosophy of science Also called eliminative induction or the method of elimination, a type of inductive reasoning which initially assumes several possible hypotheses for explaining the same phenomenon, and then eliminates those that are countered by new evidence through the progress of observation and experiment. The remaining hypothesis is then taken to be correct. By this procedure we establish an affirmative conclusion by rejecting all the rival hypotheses. The problem with this type of induction is that the number of competing hypotheses might be indefinite and potentially infinite, and hence elimination does not guarantee that the hypothesis surviving from those considered is correct. Neither does it ensure that only one of a finite set of alternatives is correct. Induction by elimination contrasts with induction by enumeration, which infers a general conclusion by enumerating the particular instances of that generalization. “That type of inference in which one of the premises is a disjunction of several general statements, the other premises are singular statements which refute all the members of that disjunction except one, and the conclusion is the only member of the disjunction which is not refuted by the singular premises, is termed induction by elimination.” Ajdukiewicz, Pragmatic Logic induction by enumeration Logic, philosophy of science The inference to a generalization by the simple enumeration of the particular instances of the generalization. When we observe that A 1, A 2, A 3, . . . A n, all have a property B, and that no As have been found not to have B, we infer that all As have the property of B. Induction by enumeration, also called enumerative induction, is thought to be the fundamental form of inductive reasoning. It is non-demonstrative, and the truth of the conclusion is not guaranteed. Different causal factors and different circumstances may lead other As to lack the property B, and hence there is always the possibility of counterexamples. Furthermore, scientists generally have a hypothesis before enumerating its instances, and their active programs of experimental testing go beyond mere enumeration. Induction by enumeration is in contrast with induction by elimination. “Induction by enumeration is any such inference in which a statement of a general regularity is accepted as the conclusion on the strength of accepting statements of particular cases of the regularity.” Ajdukiewicz, Pragmatic Logic induction by intuition Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of science Also called intuitive induction, induction that moves from the observation of a single fact or a few facts to general statements. The implicit universal is exhibited in the clearly known particulars. This is the method of establishing propositions of restricted universality in philosophy, especially in metaphysics. In science, the result of this intuition is tested by further observation. Induction by intuition is an important means of forming hypotheses prior to testing them more systematically. “ ‘Induction by intuition’, or ‘imagination’, the discovery of law by the construction of new concepts on the basis of relatively few observations and the confirming of the law by a great number of observations.” Frank, Philosophy of Science inductive definition, see recursive definition inductivism Philosophy of science A theory of science which holds that scientific knowledge consists of the laws or principles derived by inductive canons from accumulated facts. The knowledge grows if more facts are accumulated. The plausibility of a law increases with the observed numbers of instances of the phenomenon explained by that law. Accordingly what scientists do is to pile up relevant facts and generalize laws and principles from them. Critics of this theory of science claim that it ignores the function of theory and that its account of intellectual discovery and creation is oversimplified. Some philosophers accept Popper’s criticism of inductivism even if they also criticize his own falsificationist theory of science. “The real reason why inductivism is so wrong is that it is so unrealistic. It is an attempt to codify a more or less mythical conception of science.” Harré, The Philosophies of Science ineffability Philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, aesthetics [from Latin ineffabilis, not expressible in words] Many theologians and philosophers believe that God is beyond our description and conceptualization, because human experience is finite and language has its limits. Some metaphysicians claim that the first principle of existence or ultimate reality also resists any linguistic specification, such as Plato’s Form of the Good, and Plotinus’ One. Consequently, some things are ineffable and can only be grasped through mystical intuition or revelation. There are also claims that works of art can convey what is ineffable by showing what can not be said, but critics argue that what can not be said, can not be expressed in any other way. “Perhaps those who call the experience of what is beyond existence and non-existence ineffable merely mean that they cannot adequately describe it to those who have not had it.” Nozick, Philosophical Explanations inegalitarianism, see egalitarianism inequality Political philosophy, philosophy of law, philosophy of social science Differential possession of what is advantageous or desirable by different individuals or groups in political, legal, social, and economic areas. The main aim of egalitarianism is to reject any enforced policies leading to inequality, and to maintain that each individual or group has equal rights to political participation and legal protection. Egalitarianism also tries to narrow the wealth gap between different individuals through welfare and taxation policies. However, because we have natural differences in talent and merit, and because the society and its economic system require a hierarchic organization, it is unlikely that all sorts of inequalities can be eliminated. Accordingly, it becomes a matter of debate whether and to what degree a society is justified in narrowing inequalities. These debates focus on the relations between inequalities and liberty, efficiency, and justice. Some theorists reject the broad egalitarian consensus and argue that in many respects inequality is preferable to equality. “It can be of little practical consequence that one regards inequality as bad – as many do – unless one is generally able to determine if one situation’s inequality is worse than another’s.” Temkin, Inequality inertia Metaphysics, philosophy of science [from Latin inertia, idle, not having its own active powers, or unable to move itself ] For Aristotle, it is part of the nature of motion that it will come to an end. Scholastics developed this idea by claiming that it is the inherent tendency of terrestrial matter to be inert or sluggish. Descartes transformed the notion of inertia to mean the persistence of motion or rest. Other things being equal, matter will continue in a state of uniform motion or rest and change unless externally affected. This is viewed as an early formulation of the Newtonian principle of inertia (the first law of motion): every body maintains its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces imposed upon it. “Inertia is a disposition to resist changes to a body’s state of motion or rest.” Harré, Laws of Nature infallibility Epistemology The impossibility of being mistaken. Some philosophers claim that certain perceptual beliefs, such as “I am in pain,” are infallible and therefore may serve as the basis for justifying other beliefs. But others argue that even in such cases mistakes are possible through applying the wrong concept to a given item. Questions of infallibility have been discussed with the related notion of incorrigibility. An infallible claim cannot be mistaken, while an incorrigible claim cannot be corrected and hence cannot be mistaken. Infallibility is also used for the view that it is impossible for knowledge to be wrong. A requirement that knowledge must be infallible would have the effect of excluding many legitimate questions from debate. Many philosophers do not think that this is acceptable, for it would reject all procedures liable to error and would radically narrow the scope of knowledge. The possibility of knowledge might vanish altogether because if fallibilism is correct, even propositions that we take to be necessary truths are in principle open to error. The notion of the infallibility of knowledge can be traced to Plato’s philosophy and is one type of rationalist ideal. The idea that scientific knowledge should be infallible has been challenged by Popper’s claim that only when a theory can be falsified is it a real scientific theory. infinite and finite “The one feature which is common to all versions of the doctrine that knowledge implies infallibility is that, in order for the concept of knowledge to be applicable, there must not be the possibility of error.” J. Evans, Knowledge and Infallibility inference Logic The procedure of drawing one statement (as a conclusion) from another statement or statements, which have been established to be true or false. Inference is generally divided into deductive inference (from a general rule to a particular instance), and inductive inference (from particular data to a general rule). Abductive inference is sometimes listed as a third type of inference, but is more often regarded as a special case of inductive inference. The conclusion of deductive inference is necessary, while the conclusion of inductive inference is probable. An argument consists of at least one inference. Logic seeks to establish the rules of inference. An inference is valid if it conforms to the given rules, and is invalid if it fails so to conform. “To infer” should be distinguished from “to imply,” for implication can be a relation between propositions themselves, while inference must involve the belief states of an epistemic agent. “Inference is a method by which we arrive at new knowledge, and what is not psychological about it is the relation which allows us to infer correctively.” Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy “The standard presentation of the link between the empirical adequacy and truth of a theory is known as the inference to the best explanation. Since it aims to exploit the truth-conducive virtues of explanation it is most effectively applied to causal explanation.” Kosso, Reading the Book of Nature. inferred entity, another term for metaphysical entity infima species Metaphysics A determinate form of the lowest generality, which does not admit of any further differentiation. The things below infima species are particular instances that are identical in specific nature. An infima species is the common and stable nature of a kind of thing and is therefore the object of definition and knowledge. In Aristotle’s Categories, an infima species is a secondary substance. In his Metaphysics, its ontological status is ambiguous, depending on whether one understands it to be identical with form and also on whether one understands primary substance to be universal form or particular form. But Aristotle claimed that an infima species cannot mark off one individual from another and that matter should be the principle of individuation. “An infima species, or lowest species, if there can be such a thing, would be a sort without any distinct sub-sort instantiating it.” Lowe, Kinds of Being inference to the best explanation Philosophy of science A kind of reasoning that is common in both daily life and science. If we observe that a, b, c, . . . are true, and if there is a hypothesis H which can best explain all these cases, then it is probable that H is true. This is a non-demonstrative deduction, sometimes called a hypothetical deduction. The confirmation of a scientific theory is essentially an inference to the best explanation. This method of reasoning resembles the process that Peirce calls abduction. There are many discussions surrounding this method of reasoning, such as how to make it precise, whether it is really different from inductive reasoning, and what is the criterion for determining which of several competing hypotheses is the best. infinite and finite Logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion [from Latin in, not + finire, to limit, to stop, literally, not to have a limit or end, that is, unlimited, boundless or indeterminate; finire, literally, to have a limit or end. Greek counterparts: apeiron, unlimited or undetermined, peras, limit] A pair of concepts that is widely used in discussing the world, God, mathematics, and space and time. The concepts are used in metaphysical, theological, mathematical, and logical discussions. The question whether the world is infinite or finite is one of the oldest questions of philosophy. The logical nature of infinity and finitude can be traced to Zeno of Elea’s paradoxes of motion. Attempts to solve these paradoxes have stimulated inquiry into the nature of these terms. In general, the Greeks believed that the infinite is incomplete, imperfect, and indeterminate, and therefore put it into the category of the bad, while the finite is complete, perfect, and determinate and belongs to the category of the good. Aristotle discussed these conceptions in detail in his Physics. For him, the world must be finite, and the infinite can only be potential. The distinction between actual and potential infinity was revived in Cantor’s mathematics. In Christian philosophy, the omnipotent God cannot be finite, but is an infinite and eternal being upon whom finite beings are dependent. Hence, contrary to the Greek notion, the infinite is seen as complete and perfect. The world is still finite, but it is conceived to be an imperfect creation of the infinite God. Hegel distinguished between bad infinity and true infinity. Bad infinity is an endless series, like a straight line with no end in either direction. It is simply negative and is distinct from the finite. True infinity is closely associated with the finite. Like a circle, it is finite but unbounded. A thing can be infinite from one perspective, but finite from another. Hegel believed that the finite involves negation or limitation and claimed that the infinite is associated with the negation of a negation. Finite things have to depend on other things for their being, and their negation leads to another negation, producing an affirmation. The development of finite things is also the selfdevelopment of the absolute idea. In Hegel’s sense of being self-contained and autonomous, the absolute idea is the only real true infinity. “Dualism, in putting an insuperable opposition between finite and infinite, fails to note the simple circumstance that the infinite is thereby only one of two, and is reduced to a particular, to which the finite forms the other particular.” Hegel, Logic infinite regress argument Logic An argument that occurs in many different branches of philosophy. An example from metaphysics may be found in Plato, who recognized that if there is one idea for many similar things, then when we consider the idea together with these other things, we may require a further idea, and so on ad infinitum. Plato’s famous Third Man argument is one version of this argument. Aristotle made use of an infinite regress argument in proving the existence of the unmoved mover. He claimed that if everything in motion is moved by a mover, there would be an infinite series of movers. Since this is impossible, there must be an unmoved mover. Aristotle also used the argument in ethics in seeking to show that if every rational action has a goal, there must be a final goal. An infinite regress argument is also used in epistemology. If we are to know a conclusion, we must know its premises, and to know the premises, we must seemingly know the premises of the premises ad infinitum. To avoid this infinite regress, it is claimed that there must be basic and non-demonstrable first principles or foundations that ground the rest of our knowledge. “For it is impossible that there should be an infinite series of movements, each of which is itself moved by something else, since in an infinite series there is no first term.” Aristotle, Physics infinite-valued logic, see many-valued logic informal fallacy Logic The kind of fallacy which does not occur in the logical form or structure of an argument, but is committed in various other ways and can be identified through analysis of its content and its context. Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations was the first systematic study of informal fallacies, although many other forms were added by later authors. Aristotle divided all fallacies into those dependent on language (Latin in dictione) and those outside of language (Latin extra dictionen). Modern logic textbooks accordingly generally divide informal fallacies into fallacies of ambiguity and material fallacies. Fallacies of ambiguity arise from the ambiguity of words or sentences in which ambiguous words occur, such as the fallacies of accent, amphiboly, equivocation, composition, division, and secundum quid. Material fallacies are due to reasons other than the ambiguity of language and are further divided into the fallacies of relevance and insufficient evidence. The fallacy of relevance occurs in those arguments whose premises are logically irrelevant to the truth of the conclusion and are hence incapable of establishing it. Many informal fallacies of this kind have a Latin name of the form “argumentum ad . . . ,” such as in itself argumentum ad baculum, argumentum ad hominem, argumentum ad ignorantiam, argumentum ad misericordiam, argumentum ad populum, and argumentum ad verecundiam. Other forms include the fallacy of the complex question, the genetic fallacy, ignoratio elenchi, petitio principii (begging the question), the slippery slope argument, and the straw man fallacy. The fallacy of insufficient evidence occurs in those arguments whose premises are relevant to the conclusions but are not strong or good enough to establishing the truth of the conclusions, such as the false cause or post hoc fallacy and hasty generalization. This dictionary has a single entry for each of the above fallacies. “Informal fallacies are frequently backed by some motive on the part of the arguer to deceive the reader or listener.” Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic informal logic Logic Also called logical pragmatics. Informal logic investigates the relations of implication arising from subject-matter words and the contents of a discourse. It concerns the nature and function of arguments or assertions in natural language whose richness cannot be exhausted in formal logic. Informal logic is not as precise as formal logic and its findings are relative to given contexts. Its major topics include matters such as incomplete patterns of arguments, conversational implicature, informal fallacies, and rhetorical techniques for persuasion. In contrast, formal logic deals with semantic rather than pragmatic relationships, especially with the entailments arising from the formal or structural words of propositions. While formal logic regards argument as a set of propositions and examines their truth-value, informal logic deals with the use of propositions to carry out the various aims of dialogue in everyday reasoning. Informal logic takes account of the wider context of dialogue and seeks to understand how we legitimately convince or persuade in reasonable discourse. “Generally the theory of informal logic must be based on the concept of question-reply dialogue as a form of interaction between two participants, each representing one side of an argument, on a disputed question.” Walton, Informal Logic informed consent Ethics Informed consent is a moral requirement in medical ethics. In the process of medical treatment, competent patients are entitled to be informed in understandable language of the benefits of the treatment, its possible risks, and the alternative methods of treatment. No treatment should be given without the patient’s voluntary consent on the basis of the information provided. The argument in support of this requirement is that a patient is in principle autonomous and self-determining. Patients have the right to refuse to allow their body to be touched. It is in the interest of the patients to participate in the process of making significant decisions affecting their lives. The problem is that knowing a diagnosis that patients prefer not to know does not necessarily serve their best interests. “The idea of ‘informed consent’ is based on the notion of autonomy . . . Autonomy rests on rationality. It is difficult to act rationally in the absence of relevant information. It is on the basis of benefits, risks and alternatives that we formulate reasons for a course of action.” Lee, Law and Morals Ingarden, Roman (1893–1970) Polish phenomenological philosopher and aesthetician, born in Cracow. Ingarden was a disciple of Husserl, but resisted Husserl’s idealism and sought to combine phenomenology with realism. His ontology assumed that knowing is determined by the objects of cognition, and focused on the analysis of various objects and relationships. His ontology of art asks what it is for a literary work to exist and argues that works of art are pure intentional objects. His important works include The Literary Work of Art (1931), The Controversy over the Existence of the World, (1947–8), and Studies in Aesthetics (1957–8). in itself Metaphysics [German an sich, also translated as by itself or as such] Hegel contrasted in itself with for itself [German für sich]. In itself is essentially or intrinsically potential, unreflective, and underdeveloped, while for itself is actual, reflective, and developed. In itself is implicit and self-identical, while for itself is exteriorized and lies before itself. A baby is rational in itself but not for itself until its rationality is actualized. In and for itself [German an und für sich] is the completely developed state in which in itself and for itself are unified and a thing is at home with itself. A thing develops from beingin-itself to being-for-itself and ends up as beingin-and-for-itself. This development conforms to the Hegelian pattern of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. In this sense, in itself is implicit and does not imply the development of relations to something else. Generally, in itself is not distinguished from for itself or from in and for itself, but is rather contrasted with for us or for others. To call something in itself means that it is at least mainly independent of other things and has its own essence apart from its relations with others. In itself corresponds to Greek kath’hauto or to auto, which Plato uses for his Idea or Form. In this sense, if we consider a thing to be in itself, we take it not to be related to our consciousness. Kant called an object that is beyond our possible experience, but can still be thought, a thing-in-itself [German Ding-an-sich]. “The Notion itself is for us, in the first instance, like the universal that is in itself, and the negative that is for itself, and also the third, that which is both in and for itself, the universal that runs through all the moments of the syllogism; but the third is also the conclusion.” Hegel, Science of Logic innate ideas Epistemology, philosophy of mind There are several views regarding the conception of innate ideas. One takes them to be the ideas which are not derived from experience but which originate in the mind itself. Another holds that they are ideas that are potentially inherent in the mind at birth and are brought out by experience, which renders them manifest in some way. Still another regards them as ideas that we have an innate disposition to form. The concept has a long history. It can be traced to Plato’s theory of recollection, and becomes a pivotal issue in the debate between rationalism and empiricism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with Descartes and Leibniz defending innate ideas and Locke and Hume attacking them. The debate led to Kant’s view that our understanding has a priori categories, which are prerequisites for the organization of experience. The notion was revitalized in the twentieth century by Chomsky, who claims in his analysis of the human linguistic capacity that human beings have an innate universal grammar within them, which is the precondition of language acquisition. “I did . . . observe that there are certain thoughts within me which neither came to me from external objects nor were determined by my will, but which came solely from the power of thinking within me; so I applied the term ‘innate’ to the ideas or notions which are the forms of these thoughts in order to distinguish them from others, which I called ‘adventitious’ or ‘made up’.” Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol. I inner observation, see inner perception inner perception Epistemology, philosophy of mind Franz Brentano claimed that there are two kinds of human perception, external perception through the sense organs and inner or internal perception, which is the awareness of mental acts present in us. While the object of external perception is a physical phenomenon, in particular sensible qualities, the object of internal perception is a mental phenomenon, including presentations, judgments, and acts of will. According to Brentano, internal perception is the basis of psychology. Internal perception is further characterized as being immediate, infallible, and selfevident. “Perception” here translates the German word Wahrnehmung, which literally means to take something to be true. Brentano claims that internal perception is perception in this real sense of the word. Internal perception differs from internal observation or introspection. While introspection directs full attention toward a phenomenon to gain a firm grasp of it, inner perception does not observe and does not take one’s own mental activity as its object. For example, anger is a kind of internal perception, but when an angry person observes his own anger, it will diminish. “Note, however, that we said that inner perception [Wahrnehmung] and not introspection, i.e. inner observation [Beobachtung], constitutes this primary and essential source of psychology.” Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint inner process Philosophy of mind Mental phenomena such as meaning, understanding, remembering, thinking, and knowing are widely considered to be inner processes. They are within the mind, private, incorporeal, invisible, although they have a place in time and some have a temporal extent. In Cartesian dualism, which contrasts the public physical world with the private mental world, these mental phenomena are ascribed to the mental realm and at best have parallel phenomena in the physical world. Wittgenstein characterizes this traditional dualism in terms of “inner/outer,” but believes that this dichotomy itself is problematic. By taking the mind as a world of mental entities, states, processes, or events, it has already considered the mind as something similar to the physical world. According to Wittgenstein, mental phenomena such as inner processes are actually not a realm at all. They should be explained in terms of the grammar of expressions for mental phenomena, a basic feature of which is that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria.” Hence, “inner process,” traditionally understood, is not a suitable term to describe the mental phenomena it was employed to describe, for these “phenomena” are actually not processes. “What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word ‘to remember’.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations inner sense Epistemology A distinction between outer and inner sense depends upon the scholastic distinction between external senses, such as touch and vision, and internal senses, which are directed toward the states of the mind itself. Kant considered these to be two distinct types of sensibility. We use outer sense to represent to ourselves objects outside us, and inner sense to make our own representations the objects of our thought. Kant further distinguished form and matter in both outer and inner sense. The form of outer sense is space, through which external objects are organized in terms of shape, magnitude, and mutual relations. The form of inner sense is time, through which representations of our inner state and the immediate condition of inner appearances are determined. Kant emphasized that inner sense is not the pure apperception of the cogito, for the former is psychological and receptive, while the latter is transcendental and the spontaneous source of synthesis. Although outer sense and inner sense are indispensable, the latter is more fundamental because all representations, whether their objects are internal or external, belong to inner sense. All sensory states are mediated by it. Thus the real contrast is not between outer and inner sense, but between outer and inner sense taken together and inner sense alone. “Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there is nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason innocence, see guilt in obliquo Philosophy of mind A mode of thinking (also called modus oblique) in contrast to in recto (also called modus rectus). According to this account, when a mental act is about a subject in relation to an object, a person is thinking of a subject and an object at the same time. One thinks of the subject in recto and thinks of the object in obliquo. For example, if I am thinking of X who loves flowers, then X is thought in recto and flowers are thought in obliquo. “It is plain that a clarification of the presentation can come about through an analysis of its object both in recto and in obliquo.” Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint in recto, see in obliquo inscrutability of reference Logic, philosophy of language Also referential inscrutability, a collateral thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. Traditionally, meaning and reference are closely associated and even inseparable. In attacking this assumption, Quine claims that in a hypothetical native language the reference of general terms is objectively and behaviorally inscrutable. For example, we have no objective reason for deciding that “gavagai” refers to rabbits instead of to undetached rabbit parts. This relation between us and a remote native language can also be applied to my understanding of my neighbor’s linguistic behavior. Quine concludes that the referents of terms and the range of quantifiers are not determined by physical or behavioral facts. Absolute questions of reference are meaningless, and reference can only be relative to a coordinate system. “The conclusion I draw is the inscrutability of reference. To say what objects someone is talking about is to say no more than how we propose to translate his terms into ours; we are free to vary the decision with a proxy function.” Quine, Theories and Things insolubilia , the term used by medieval logicians for paradoxes institutional theory Aesthetics A theory of art developed by the American philosopher George Dickie, based on Danto’s notion of an artworld. The theory claims that an artwork is an artifact that possesses the status of a candidate for appreciation. This status is conferred by a suitable representative of a formal social institution, that is, the artworld. Accordingly, any artifact can be a work of art so long as it is admitted by the artworld. In other words, art is the consequence of social agreement rather than having intrinsic aesthetic features. In a later version, Dickie claims that a work of art is an artifact created for presentation to a group of persons (the artworld public) who are prepared to some extent to understand artworks. In contrast to the imitation theory, which emphasizes the relation between art and its subject matter, and the expression theory, which stresses the relation of an artwork to its creator, the institutional theory focuses on the established practice of art and its appreciation. The theory has the advantage of highlighting the social context through which art is generated and provided with properties that are not directly exhibited to the senses. Critics of the theory point out that its definition of art is circular, for it explains art in terms of an artworld and explains the artworld in terms of the artifacts it recognizes as art. In addition, critics claim that the theory cannot properly establish the criteria by which the artworld confers upon artifacts the status of candidate for appreciation. “The institutional theory of art concentrates attention on the nonexhibited characteristics that works of art have in virtue of being embedded in an institutional matrix which may be called ‘the artworld’ and argues that these characteristics are essential and defining.” Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic institutional violence, see structural violence instrumentalism Philosophy of science, epistemology An account of the nature of scientific theory, holding that scientific theory does not establish the existence of things and so can be neither true or false. We judge a theory not in terms of its truth or falsity, but in terms of its usefulness. Scientific theory is nothing more than a useful tool or instrument for research. The position was first expressed in the preface to Copernicus’ book De Revolutionibus, with the aim of avoiding conflict with religious orthodoxy by claiming that his heliocentric theory was not to be regarded as true, but merely as a tool. Instrumentalism was developed by Berkeley and Mach and became a major formulation in antirealism. Pragmatism in general is instrumentalist through its claim that all ideas are teleological or instrumental, and its emphasis on the continuity between action and judgment. One version of instrumentalism, associated with John Dewey’s pragmatism, is based on the theory of evolution. Dewey argued that ideas, concepts, and propositions are all tools or instruments for organizing human experience and predicting future consequences. The existence of ideas is bound up with the practical needs of life. He preferred to call this theory experimentalism. Criticism of instrumentalism is that it fails to distinguish real belief from acceptance in an instrumentalist spirit and fails to distinguish an epistemological account of the possession of knowledge from an account of the application of knowledge. “Instrumentalism means a behaviouristic theory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and active; and meanings in intellectual virtue their logical quality are standpoints, attitudes and methods of behaving toward facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification.” Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic integrity: in an ordinary sense, honesty or being upright. In contemporary ethics it is emphasized by Bernard Williams as a fundamental value underlying ethical behavior. It means wholeness or harmony of oneself, that is, a virtue that integrates various parts of life under the guidance of the central value or principle which one has chosen and to which one’s life is committed. It is consistency and continuity across the various dimensions of one’s life and hence amounts to moral identity. Integrity involves the relation between the agent’s sense of self and action. Persons of integrity are loyal to their chosen moral principles, which are in turn central to their self-understanding. Their actions and decisions flow from these internal attitudes, principles, and convictions. They are unwilling to yield them even in the face of great pressure. Opposed to integrity is the state of self-dividedness or disintegration. Plato in his Republic argued that justice is the harmony of soul, and this harmonious state is precisely the state of integrity. One of Williams’s major criticisms of utilitarianism is that it cannot account for human integrity, for in some situations an action may have the best consequences but may violate a moral principle that the agent endorses. If we should act in accordance with the requirements of utilitarian calculation, we might have to abandon the principles to which we are committed, and thus alienate our actions from our beliefs. “. . . we are partially at least not utilitarians, and cannot regard our moral feelings merely as objects of utilitarian value . . . [T]o come to refer to those feelings from a purely utilitarian point of view, that is to say, as happenings outside one’s moral self, is to lose sense of one’s moral identity; to lose, in the most literal way, one’s integrity.” B. Williams, in Smart and Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism: For and Against intellectual love Ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind In Spinoza’s philosophy, the only love with a privileged status. In contrast to ordinary, nonintellectual love for visible and tangible things, intellectual love arises from the intuitive knowledge that God is the cause of all things, a knowledge that involves peace of mind. Intellectual love is directed toward an eternal and infinite thing, and is itself unmingled with any sadness. The human mind should seek for it with all its strength. In a sense, intellectual love is simply an expression of the love of wisdom, that is, philosophy. Spinoza also ascribes it to God himself. God has a kind of self-love that is identical with God’s love for man and man’s love for God. It is a state of joyful self-knowledge. “The intellectual love of God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal.” Spinoza, Ethics intellectual synthesis, see synthesis (Kant) intellectual virtue Ethics, philosophy of mind According to Aristotle, virtue is related to soul rather than body, and the human soul includes a part which has reason in itself and another part which is non-rational but obeys the rational part. He divided virtue into two kinds: the excellence of the exercise of the rational part is intellectual virtue, and the excellence of the exercise of the non-rational part is ethical virtue, also called excellence of character or moral virtue. Ethical virtue has another dimension, because it is cultivated out of social custom and habit. In Nicomachean Ethics, book VI, Aristotle discussed various forms of intellectual virtue, including technical wisdom (craft, techne), theoretical wisdom (science, episteme), wisdom (sophia), understanding (nous), and practical wisdom (phronesis). Aristotle claimed that contemplation, as the activity that expresses theoretical wisdom, is the route to greatest happiness, but he also suggested that a happy life should promote all virtues. How to reconcile these two inconsistent notions of happiness (eudaimonia) has been a matter of continuing controversy. Practical wisdom as a type of intellectual virtue is concerned with good and bad and is intrinsic also to ethical virtue. “Intellectual virtue arises and grows mostly from teaching, and hence needs experience and time.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics intellectus Philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics [Latin, intellect, mind, from the verb interlegere, inter, between + legere, collect, choose] Any power or act of the mind, including the capacity for understanding and the activity of current conscious thought. The exercise of intellect, which differentiates humans from animals, is expressed especially in the use of language. Intellect also specifically includes acts of intuition. As a power of apprehension, judging, and reasoning, it is a part of the mind which contrasts with the will, our capacity for appetite, desire, choice, and action. Echoing Aristotle’s distinction between active reason and passive reason, Aquinas distinguished between intellectus possibilis (possible or receptive mind) and intellectus agens (active mind). Active mind directly knows material things that exist outside the mind. These things are only potentially known, but active mind is the power to make them actually intelligible and provides an object of thinking for itself. Receptive mind is, on the other hand, a capacity for attending to what we have acquired through active mind. “The human intellect (intellectus) does not immediately, in first, apprehending a thing, have complete knowledge; rather, it first apprehends only one aspect of the thing – namely, its whatness, which is the primary and proper object of the intellect – and only then can it understand the properties, accidents and relationships incidental to the things’ essence.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae intelligible object, see intelligible world intelligible world Metaphysics, epistemology [Latin mundus intelligibilis, in contrast to mundus sensibilis, sensible world] For Kant, the sum total of noumena or thingsin-themselves, which are, as members of this world, also called intelligible objects. The intelligible world is conceived to be an essentially rational world, which we can think through pure reason. Although this world is thinkable, we do not know it and cannot even prove whether such a world exists. But as a moral world, a kingdom of ends, it is an area where the moral law is applicable, and its main object is freedom. As space and time are the forms of the sensible world, freedom is held to be the form of the intelligible world. There is much controversy over the meaning and justification of all of these Kantian claims. “The mundus intelligibilis [intelligible world] is nothing but the general concept of a world in general, in which abstraction is made from all conditions of its intuition, and inference to which, therefore, no synthetic proposition, either affirmative or negative, can possibly be asserted.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason intension Logic, philosophy of language What a term means, or the sum of properties comprehended in a term. It is a synonym of connotation and Frege’s sense, in contrast to extension, which is a synonym of denotation or reference. In 1662 the Port Royal Logic introduced the distinction between extension and comprehension; and later Sir William Hamilton replaced comprehension by intension. J. S. Mill replaced this distinction with one between denotation and connotation. Intension is the characteristic that determines the applicability of a term, while extension is the set of objects to which a term is applicable. Different terms with different intensions, such as “unicorn” and “centaur,” can have the same extension, in this case because there are no unicorns and there are no centaurs. Take care to distinguish “intension” from “intention.” The distinction between intension and extension has been applied to predicates, singular terms, sentences, and contexts. Following Frege, the extension of a sentence is its truth-value, while its intension is the thought or proposition that it expresses. An extensional context allows an expression to be replaced by any expression with the same extension without changing the truth-value of the sentence in which it occurs. Replacing an expression in an intensional context by an expression with the same extension risks changing the truth-value of the sentence in which it occurs. Many philosophers try to understand the use of intensional contexts, while others try to eliminate their use. “In logic, the totality of the characteristics of a concept is called its ‘intension’.” Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge intensional logic Logic Formal logic is generally concerned with inference on the basis of the extensions of the concepts, predicate expressions, and propositions employed, and is hence sometimes called extensional logic. It proposes that if two expressions have the same extension and denotation, then they are interchangeable without changing the truthvalue of the propositions in which the expressions occur. But this is not true of propositions containing propositional attitudes (expressed in forms such as “a believes that p,” “a supposes that p,” and “a asserts that p”) and propositions containing modal terms such as necessarily or possibly. In such contexts these expressions are referentially opaque. Intensional logic has been developed to deal with inference strictly upon the meaning or intension of the concepts, predicate expressions, and propositions. It is based on Frege’s distinction of sense and reference, and its major practitioners include Frege, Russell, Church, and Anderson. “In the formal semantics of intentional logic, suppose we take a definite description to designate, in each world, the object which satisfies the description.” Kripke, Naming and Necessity intensionalism Philosophy of language In philosophy of language, the claim that in natural languages there are relationships at an independent level of semantic structure that determine the denotations and truth conditions of expressions, and that they cannot be reduced to the relationships at any other level of semantic structure. This position, which is proposed by Frege and Church, suggests that sense determines reference, but it is challenged by Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction. Intensionalism is opposed by extensionalism, which rejects intensional logic and proposes that we should translate all statements containing intensional notions into statements containing only extensional terms. Recently, a weaker version of intensionalism has been developed. It distinguishes between type-reference (referring expressions as the words and phrases of a language) and tokenreference (referring expressions as utterances or inscriptions of the words and phrases that are produced in the use of language). The weaker version then claims that sense determines type-reference, but not token-reference. “Intensionalism claims that there is sense as well as reference, that sense can be complex, and that as a consequence of sense inclusion, there is special form of necessity, truth, analyticity, and a special form of valid inference, analytic entailment.” Katz, Cogitations intensive magnitude, see extensive magnitude intention Philosophy of mind, philosophy of action A state of mind directed toward action. An action characterized as intentional is done with a certain intention. Anscombe’s Intention and Grice’s Intention and uncertaintiy led to important debates by asking what the relation is between intention as a state of mind and as a characterization of action. Intention is not desire, for what one intends is what one can achieve, while one may desire anything. Nor is intention belief because, unlike belief, intention cannot be judged to be true or false. A traditional approach reduces intention to desire and belief. One intends to do something because one desires this thing and believes that one can achieve it. This reductionist approach has been much criticized recently. Alternatively, some characterize intention as a distinct psychological attitude over and above desire and belief, but what this attitude is has not been explicated. Davidson developed an evaluative notion of intention according to which to intend to do something is to evaluate this conduct as the best. M. Bratman offers a plan notion of intention according to which intention is the crucial ingredient in the notion of plan. A distinction between direct intention (what one intends to do directly) and oblique intention (the foreseen consequence of the directly intended action) can be traced back to Bentham. If an intention is directed at a present action, it is called action-related, and if it is directed at a future action, it is called future-directed. Another dispute concerns how these two kinds of intention are related. The problem of intention is intertwined with many important issues, such as practical reasoning, deliberation, volition, weakness of the will, and action, and is a major theme in the philosophy of mind. “And we may be inclined to say that ‘intention’ has a different sense when we speak of a man’s intentions simpliciter – i.e. what he intends to do – and of his intention in doing or proposing something – what he aims at in it. But in fact it is implausible to say that the word is equivocal as it occurs in these different cases.” Anscombe, Intention intentional fallacy: A term introduced by W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley in 1946, referring to the view that in interpreting and evaluating a work of art, particularly a literary work, we should mainly appeal to the author’s intention in creating the work, that is, the plan or design in the author’s mind. Wimsatt and Beardsley regarded this view as a fallacy because the author’s intention and the work of art are two distinct entities. The author’s private intention can be reliably grasped only through the statement of the author, but this kind of statement is another text open for interpretation. The work of art is public and has properties open to interpretation and assessment whatever the author’s intention. The critics of art should be concerned with the artwork itself rather than the author’s mind, which is irrelevant to the critical assessment of the work. Hence, the intentional fallacy can be classified as a fallacy of irrelevance. Opponents of the notion of the intentional fallacy argue that the sharp distinction between private minds and public artworks depend on an outmoded conception of mind. Some argue that every artwork is open to multiple interpretations. Either we must use the author’s intention to help choose among interpretations or we must accept that there is no such thing as the correct interpretation of a work of art. “Intentional fallacy . . . occurs when the artist’s intentions are given decisive say over the nature of the artwork.” Sorenson, Thought Experiments intentional inexistence, see intentionality; mental phenomenon intentional stance Philosophy of mind A term introduced by Daniel Dennett. In explaining an entity, we appeal either to its actual state determined by its law of nature, or to its designed program. To opt for the first is to adopt the physical stance and to choose the second is to adopt the design stance. But if the entity is too complex to be analyzed properly by these stances, such as a person or a chess-playing computer, we need to adopt an intentional stance, which presupposes that the entity is a rational and conscious agent (whether or not it actually is so), and then predict what it will do given the beliefs and information we ascribe to it. Dennett claims that in terms of this stance we may be able to reconcile the views of a system as a responsible and free agent, and as a complex of physical parts. An entity that is a proper object of the intentional stance might be called an intentional system. “There is a third stance one can adopt toward a system, and that is the intentional stance . . . In the case of a chess playing computer one adopts this stance when one tries to predict its response to one’s move by figuring out what a good or reasonable response would be, given the information the computer has about the situation.” Dennett, Brain Storms intentional system, see intentional stance intentionality Philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, modern European philosophy A characteristic feature of mental and linguistic states, according to which they have an object or content and are thus about something. The problem of intentionality is explicitly formulated in Plato’s Theaetetus with the question how we can think about things which are not. The term was introduced in modern philosophy by Brentano, as the fundamental characteristic of a mental act or consciousness, that is, its directedness toward objects and its reference to a content. Brentano characterized this feature in terms of intentional inexistence (existence-in-mind or immanent objectivity) because the objects of consciousness need not exist and some, like the round square, cannot exist. Intentionality is conceived as a relation between a mental act and an object or content, which is posited as the terminus of a mental act. However, although intentionality is directed toward some object or content, that object need not exist and that content need not be true. Accounting for this feature of intentionality has become a deeply perplexing philosophical issue. Brentano’s student Meinong posited an elaborate array of unusual entities as objects of intentionality as a result of his distinction between the character of an object and its being. Russell’s theory of descriptions attempted to eliminate this ontological proliferation. Husserl took the notion of intentionality from Brentano and turned it into an essential notion of phenomenology. For him, the intentionality of mental acts does not entail that they must have objects. The directedness of an experience is an intrinsic feature, which does not require us to posit an entity to be an object toward which it is directed. For Husserl, a noema gives a mental act its directedness and meaning. Husserl’s study of intentionality has had great influence upon philosophy of language and of mind. Contemporary philosophy of language distinguishes between intentional and non-intentional verbs. As a matter of logic, intentional verbs, like “to desire” or “to believe,” do not require the existence of their objects or the truth of their content, whereas non-intentional verbs, including mental verbs like “to perceive” or “to know,” do require the existence of their objects or the truth of their content. Some philosophers follow Quine in seeking to reduce or eliminate intentionality from our account of the world. “We understand under intentionality the unique peculiarity of experiences ‘to be the consciousness of something’.” Husserl, Ideas interactionism Metaphysics, philosophy of mind A dualist position claiming that although mind and body are two separate substances, they causally affect one another. The mind and the body are two independent things, but throughout life they interact with each other. Interactionism contrasts with another dualist position, parallelism, which denies any causal relationship between mind and body. Descartes appealed to the pineal gland as the locus of mind– body interaction. The difficulties with his account led many of his followers to parallelism. Interactionism is compatible with common sense. However, if mind affects body, it must be through the brain, yet many scientists argue that physiology has not found any non-physical causation in the activity of the brain. Others claim that we cannot understand the workings of the brain without introducing mental states within our theoretical framework. “Interactionism, in the mild sense, is the proposition that some material events occasion mental events and vice versa.” Wisdom, Problems of Mind and Matter internal point of view Philosophy of law For Hart, law is a union of primary rules and secondary rules. As in other rule-governed games, there can be two attitudes toward rules. First, one can take the rules merely as objects of observation and judgment, without accepting them. This is called the external point of view. In contrast, the second attitude is to treat oneself as a participant in the legal system and to appeal to these rules for guidance in one’s own life, taking them as standards for making criticisms, demands, and acknowledgments. From the external point of view, one will make statements such as “In Country X they recognize as law . . . whatever the legislature enacts . . .” This is an external statement. From the internal point of view, one will make statements such as “It is the law that . . .” This is an internal statement. “For it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the ‘external’ and the ‘internal points of view’.” Hart, The Concept of Law internal property, see right (Kant) internal questions Metaphysics, philosophy of language According to Carnap, philosophical problems concerning the existence of entities can be treated as either internal or external. Internal questions arise within a given conceptual framework and are settled by applying the criteria that the framework system supplies. Within the language of that framework, internal questions have the form “Are there Es?,” “E” being the term for the relevant kind of entity. Such questions can receive an analytical answer, whilst questions of the form “Are there Es conforming to such and such conditions?” can be settled either factually or analytically. External questions cannot be settled within a framework, but rather concern the status and legitimacy of the framework itself. The problems of existence raising internal questions should not be subject to dispute, for it is obvious that there are such things as physical objects, numbers, or fictional characters. The reason that they are so debated is that they have been treated as external questions. Carnap suggests that such ontological questions should be interpreted as questions about a decision whether or not to accept a language containing expressions for these particular kinds of entity. The distinction between internal and external questions is challenged as arbitrary, but is defended by Ayer. “Questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework, we call them internal questions; . . . questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, [are] called external questions.” Carnap, Meaning and Necessity internal relation Logic, metaphysics An internal relation affects the nature of the related terms, for the relation is itself a constitutive part of the essence of the objects related. A thing that fails to possess this relation could not be what it is, just as it cannot fail to possess any of its essential properties. An internal relation is contrasted to an external relation, which belongs to individuals accidentally. An individual may have or lack an external relation depending upon contingent circumstances, but neither state will affect its nature because the external relation is not a constituent of its related terms. Bradley is usually taken to hold a doctrine of internal relations, according to which every object is internally related to all other objects and none is independent. As a result, reality is a connected totality, and the existence of every object can be deduced from the other objects. Since the relation of knowing and being known is also internal, the nature of reality can be inferred from the nature of knowledge. This becomes the main target of Moore and Russell in their criticism of absolute idealism and in neo-realism’s criticism of Royce. Russell identifies the doctrine of internal relations with monism. In contrast, he identifies his own logical atomism, which allows only external relations, with pluralism. For Wittgenstein, internal relations are logical relations. “An internal relation is a relation which forms part of the description of a particular, such that the particular would, as it were, lose its identity if it ceased to stand in this relation to some other particular.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy internalism: A theory of epistemic justification, which claims that the justification of one’s belief is determined by one’s actual or potential awareness of the correct cognitive process that generates and sustains the given belief. Accordingly, justification is a function of one’s internal states: one’s perceptual states, memory states, and so on. This has been a major trend since Descartes, who identifies justification with having a reason for thinking that the belief is true. According to this theory, the justification of a belief is determined entirely by subjective characteristics, ignoring external factors, and is therefore opposed to externalism. In the philosophy of language, internalism refers to the position that denies that to understand a sentence is to understand its truth conditions, holding instead that the meaning of a sentence is its use. “[A] justification must always take the form of a convincing series of reasons available to the knower. In contemporary epistemology, this is called ‘internalism’. The externalist, by contrast, insists that a belief can be justified even though the knower is ignorant of that justification.” Maddy, Realism in Mathematics internalism (ethics) Ethics Ethical internalism is a theory concerned with moral motivation. Internalism claims that motivation is internal for the justification of a moral action. Something can be a reason for action only if it is desired by the agent in question. Only if the agent believes that he ought to do something can this obligation be a reason for his action. Internalism intrinsic description hence objects to what is considered to be any psychologically unrealizable moral theory. It has two different versions. One was proposed by Plato, Kant, and their followers, and claims that rational consideration generates motivation, that is, knowing that something is right entails a motive for doing it. This version is also called cognitive or rational internalism. The other version, proposed by Hume, claims that the agent’s desires produce motivation, while his rational beliefs motivate only in a contingent way. However, Hume believed that a combination of desire and belief forms a complete motivating state. This is his belief/desire thesis. Internalism is also called motivational internalism, and is opposed to ethical externalism (also called motivational externalism), which is the view that the justification of an action is separate from its motivation. “Internalism is the view that the presence of a motivation for acting morally is guaranteed by the truth of ethical propositions themselves.” T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism Interpretation: Heidegger distinguished Interpretieren (Interpretation) from Auslegung (interpretation, literally laid out). For him, Interpretation corresponds to understanding as a primordial mode of Dasein’s being and seizes the possibilities opened by understanding. In contrast, interpretation corresponds to cognitive understanding and provides our day-to-day existentiell interpretations. The former grasps the being of all entities, while the latter provides our ordinary accounts of entities. According to Heidegger, Interpretation, as the discovery of the transhistorical and transcultural structures of Dasein, determines interpretation and makes it possible. Philosophical understanding is associated with Interpretation. “Thus by exhibiting the positive phenomenon of the closest everyday Being-in-the-world, we have made it possible to get an insight into the reason why an ontological Interpretation of this state of Being has been missing. This very state of Being, in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers itself up.” Heidegger, Being and Time intersubjectivity: Something is intersubjective if its existence is neither independent of human minds (purely objective) nor dependent upon single minds or subjects (purely subjective), but dependent upon the common features of different minds. Aesthetic properties and Lockean ideas of secondary qualities belong to this category. The intersubjective, which contrasts mainly to the purely subjective, implies a sort of objectivity which derives from the common nature of different minds rather than from the nature of the object itself. Their common and shared nature implies an interaction and communication among different minds or subjects, and this is their intersubjectivity. On this view, a mind not only experiences the existence of other minds, but also carries within it an intention to communicate with these other minds. For Husserl, these features of intersubjectivity indicate that we constitute the world as a shared world (Lebenswelt) rather than a solipsistic one. This view is further developed by Merleau-Ponty, who rejects the traditional dichotomy of subject and object and conceives intersubjectivity as intercorporeity. For analytical philosophy, intersubjectivity is the mutual accessibility between two or more minds. Each of them is aware not only the existence of the other, but also of its intention to convey information to the other. Intersubjectivity is fundamental to rejecting solipsism and proving the existence of other minds. The problem of other minds was at the center of philosophy of mind in the mid twentieth century, but no longer has a dominant role. “The principle of ‘radical’ idealism, namely of always going back to the constitutive acts of transcendental subjectivity, must obviously illuminate the universal horizon consciousness that is the ‘world’ and, above all, the intersubjectivity of this world – although what is constituted in this way, the world as what is common to many individuals, itself includes subjectivity.” Gadamer, Truth and Method intrinsic description Epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language Ayer’s term for a description that is peculiar to a particular event at a particular time. If two events are distinct, their intrinsic descriptions are different. One cannot infer from the description of one event the features and character of the other. Such a description is atomistic, for it does not carry any causal implication and it isolates an event from its actual and potential relations to other objects or events. Intrinsic descriptions are not common in ordinary language, since they are not very informative. Sometimes, this sort of description is thought to be possible only for private and fleeting sense-impressions. Ayer, however, claims that such descriptions are accepted by the empiricist tradition and should be sufficient to give an account of everything that happens. They are confined to the domain of actual facts and underlie Hume’s principle that inference concerning matters of fact is not demonstrative. “I shall introduce the concept of an intrinsic description. I shall say that such a description of the state of a subject S at a particular time t is intrinsic to S at t if and only if nothing follows from it with regard to the state of S at any time other than t, or with regard to the existence of any subject S′ which is distinct from S, in the sense that S and S′ have no common part.” Ayer, Probability and Evidence introspection, from Latin intro, inward, into + specere, look, to look into one’s own mind] Direct awareness of or attending to one’s mental states and activities. Traditionally, introspection is conceived on the model of perception, invoking a faculty of inner sense. While sense-perception enables us to be aware of current happenings in our environment and our body, introspection enables us to be aware of current happenings in our own mind. However, this analogy to sense-perception is questioned in contemporary philosophy of mind. Some philosophers take introspection to be no more than a capacity for making true statements about one’s mental happenings. The Cartesian tradition holds that introspection is a major source of evidence for the existence of a substantial mind. However, Ryle and others have tried to replace introspection with retrospection by claiming that if introspection is a mental activity, and if each mental activity is introspectible, then introspection will involve an infinite regress. The Cartesian tradition also holds that we logically cannot be mistaken about our current mental states, but this view is attacked by many philosophers and psychologists. Introspection is the same as Locke’s reflection. “The technical term ‘introspection’ has been used to denote a supposed species of perception. It was supposed that much as a person may at a particular moment be listening to a flute, savouring a wine, or regarding a waterfall, so he may be ‘regarding’, in a non-optical sense, some current mental states or process of his own.” Ryle, The Concept of Mind introspective awareness, another term for introspection. intuition Epistemology, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, ethics, philosophy of mathematics, logic [from Latin intueri, look at, look upon or inspect] The innate power of the mind to see or directly apprehend truths, without the aid of sensory stimuli, and without prior inference or discussion. It is knowing a particular in a universal in a single flash of insight. Intuitive knowledge is thus distinguished from inferential knowledge. Intuition can be empirical (a direct presentation of sensible objects in the mind), practical (a direct awareness of whether a particular circumstance fits with a general rule), or intellectual (an apprehension of universals, concepts, self-evident truths, or ineffable objects such as God). Practical intuition is a part of practical reason and was discussed by Aristotle in his ethics. Intellectual intuition, or reason’s insight, is a crucial faculty for the rationalist tradition. For Descartes, it is the recognition of the starting-point of deduction. For Spinoza, it is scientific intuition and is the highest of the three modes of knowing. For Kant, it is a type of experience in which the normal antitheses of sense and thought, particular and universal, have been overcome. Intuition plays an important role in mathematics, metaphysics, ethics, and logic, especially with regard to the fundamental concepts and principles of these areas. However, intuition as a faculty is impossible to check. It is viewed by some as non-rational or non-cognitive, and its claim to be a source of knowledge always faces suspicion. Empiricism in general rejects the existence of any faculty of intuition. in vitro fertilization “In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason intuitionism, ethical, see ethics, intuitionistic intuitionism, mathematical Philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language A philosophy of mathematics founded by L. E. J. Brouwer. Influenced by Kantian philosophy, Brouwer claimed that mathematical objects are not mind-independent, but are products of mental construction. Mathematical knowledge lies in our capacity to construct proofs. A mathematical statement is true if and only if a proof can be constructed for it, and it is false if and only if it is shown that a proof cannot be constructed. Because there is a gap between proof and the denial that a proof can be constructed, intuitionism denies the law of the excluded middle and the law of double negation. Mathematical intuitionism is a species of mathematical constructivism and is opposed to the Platonist claim that the existence of mathematical objects is mind-independent. The reasoning of mathematical intuitionism was formalized by Brouwer’s disciple Arend Heyting as intuitionistic logic. Its metaphysical and epistemological ideas have been developed and extended to areas outside mathematics by M. Dummett as anti-realism and the warranted assertibility theory of meaning. “The conceptualist position in the foundations of mathematics is sometimes called intuitionism, in a broad sense of the term. Under stricter usage ‘intuitionism’ refers only to Brouwer and Heyting’s special brand of conceptualism, which suspends the law of the excluded middle.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View. of mental operations and that the truth of a mathematical statement is its provability, that is, the mental construction that would represent a proof of it. A mathematical statement is true if and only if we have a proof of it. Accordingly, no definite truth-table can be given for its connectives because a truth-table is based on the law of the excluded middle (or the principle of bivalence), which holds that a statement must be either true or false, whether or not we know it to be true or false. But intuitionist logic claims that if we do not have a proof of a statement or a denial that it can be proved, then we cannot say that it is true or false. Hence it rejects the law of the excluded middle as a theorem. It diverges from classical logic also by denying other laws of negation. Intuitionist logic is closely related to anti-realism, which does not admit any mindindependent truth. “What is called intuitionist logic differs from the classical two-valued logic primarily over its treatment of negation.” Bostock, Intermediate Logic intuitive induction, another expression for induction by intuition inversion Logic In traditional logic a form of immediate inference from a single premise, in which the subject of the inferred proposition is the contradictory of the subject of the premise. The original proposition is called the inverted, and the inferred proposition is called the inverse. “Inversion may be defined as a process of immediate inference in which from a given proposition another proposition is inferred having for its subject the contradictory of the original subject.” Keynes, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic intuitionist logic Logic A system of principles to formalize the types of reasoning allowed by mathematical intuitionism, after which this logic is named. It denies the principles of classical logic, which are not countenanced by mathematical intuitionism. In its most important formation, it is a calculus developed by Arend Heyting in 1930, inspired by his teacher Brouwer. It supposes that mathematical objects are products in vitro fertilization Ethics [Latin in vitro, in glass, in contrast to in vivo, in a living organism; normally abbreviated IVF, also called extra-human fertilization] A technique for fertilizing an egg outside the body and then implanting it in the womb of the woman providing it, or in the womb of another women, to develop into a fetus and a baby. The procedure was first carried out successfully for a human mother by the British scientists R. Edwards and P. Steptoe in 1978 and has now become a standard treatment for some forms of human infertility. Babies produced by this method are sometimes called test-tube babies, but the progress of the pregnancies and the children that are born are perfectly normal. Much ethical controversy has arisen because IVF has extended the range of human reproduction and has opened the way to surrogate motherhood and, more recently, to the possible genetic manipulation of embryos. Many theorists would welcome the correction of serious genetically based illnesses, but they would reject manipulation concerning gender, intelligence, strength, or appearance. The justification for these intuitive choices is difficult to determine. Some feminists view IVF as a means of liberating women from biological inequality, while others consider that it reinforces the male domination of female bodies. The debate is still going on about the conditions under which fertilization in vitro should be permitted. “ ‘In vitro’ is Latin for ‘in glass’; so ‘in vitro fertilization’ simply means that the fertilization takes place in glass.” Singer and Wells, The Reproduction Revolution. some cases, not all auditors are intended to grasp the irony. Irony can also involve distancing oneself from what one is saying. In dramatic irony, some characters do not understand what the audience or other characters understand. In historical irony, events reverse expectations, sometimes in a way that seems morally appropriate. Socratic irony also involves a tension or contrast, based on the actual or affected ignorance of Socrates in the early dialogues of Plato. Socrates found flaws in the arguments of his interlocutors and pushed the argument forward, but he claimed that he himself did not know or did not have an answer for the question under discussion. In Greek culture, this sort of irony was regarded as negative. In modern philosophy, various kinds of irony have been important in the works of Hegel, the romantics, and Kierkegaard. Irony has also been discussed in the philosophy of language. “Here we have the well-known Socratic irony, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you.” Plato, Republic I-proposition, see A-proposition Irigaray, Luce (1932– ) Belgian-born French feminist philosopher and psychoanalyst, born in Blaton, attached to the Centre National de Recherches Scientifique and lecturer at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. Irigaray argues that the feminine is excluded from the cultural unconscious by the cultural repression studied by Lacan’s psychoanalysis and by the metaphysical repression that is the focus of Derrida’s deconstruction. She has developed a feminist philosophy of sexual difference and proposes a liberation of both men and women from the distortions of their gender roles. Her main works include Speculum of the Other Woman (1974) and Je, Tu, Nous: Towards a Culture of Difference (1990). irony Philosophical method [from Greek eironeia, dissembling] In simple cases, irony is the use of an expression to imply the opposite of its literal meaning, for example by calling a stupid answer a smart reply. In irrationalism Epistemology, metaphysics [Latin ir, not] Irrationalism in philosophy does not reject the role of reason entirely, but it rejects the claim that the function of reason is unlimited or supreme. In many areas, such as the first principles of a study, the ultimate ground of human existence, and the profoundest religious truths, reason cannot grasp the truth. Hence, according to different versions of irrationalism, we must appeal to non-logical and unmediated modes of cognition, such as intuition, immediate experience, and faith, to gain the truth, and must also take culture and tradition into account. Many philosophers who are the chief proponents of reason, such as Plato, Aquinas, and Kant, realized the limits of rational activity. Much religious philosophy, especially fideism, claims that reason plays at most a subordinate role in understanding. Nietzsche and the existentialists criticized the Enlightenment claim of the superiority of reason, a view taken up in a different context by contemporary postmodernists. “The issue about irrationalism can be sharpened by noting that when the pragmatist says: ‘All that is/ought gap can be done to explicate “truth”, “knowledge”, “morality”, “virtue” is to refer us back to the concrete details of the culture in which these terms grew up and developed’, the defender of the Enlightenment takes him to be saying ‘truth and virtue are simply what a community agrees that they are’.” Rorty, “Pragmatism, Relativism, Irrationalism,” Proceedings and Address of the American Philosophical Association 53 irrationality Epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action The incorrect use of information for attaining truth or achieving practical goals. An irrational action violates normal and standard processes of deliberation without any justification in terms of reason. The discussion of how practical or theoretical irrationality is possible is often focused on the issues of self-deception and weakness of will. In addition to philosophical discussion of how irrationality is possible, there are psychological or sociological attempts to characterize and explain the processes of irrationality. Irrational thought and action may be overtly deranged and obsessive, but need not be so, and we have varying insight into our own irrationality. Irrationality has been seen positively as a source of creativity as well as negatively as a danger to reason. “Irrationality is a failure to make proper use of material already in the mind.” Pears, Motivated Irrationality irrealism Metaphysics, ethics A word coined in the 1980s in both metaphysics and moral theory, but the idea can be traced to Hume’s skepticism, which denies the possibility of knowledge of a physical reality beyond our senses. Irrealism declares that there is no objective reality and hence realism is not right. But in the meantime irrealism does not commit itself to any existing forms of anti-realism. It holds that it is impossible for us even to form the idea of a body that has a continued existence independent of our minds, let alone any idea of the inner structure and invisible constitution of such a body. It does not accept that realism and anti-realism exhaust all the possible views. It questions whether we can establish a discourse that conforms to the somewhat minimal constraints of syntax and the discipline called for by the applicability of truth-predicates. “Irrealism does not hold that everything or even anything is irreal, but sees the world melting into versions making worlds, finds ontology evanescent, and inquires into what makes a version right and a world well-built.” Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters irreflexive, see reflexive is Logic, metaphysics The third-person singular form of the verb “to be,” generally held to have three distinct senses: (1) the copulative sense with the syntactical function of joining subjects to predicates in sentences, for example, “This house is white”; (2) the sense expressing identity, for example, “The Morning Star is the Evening Star”; and (3) the existential sense, for example, “There is a house.” There are also other attempts to classify the meaning of “is.” There have been disputes over whether these senses are connected, whether some of them can be reduced to others or are really irreducibly different. Many contemporary analytical philosophers, especially Wittgenstein and the logical positivists, argue that traditional metaphysics is wrong to take being (the participle of to be) as a subject-matter, because doing so confuses the copulative sense and the existential sense of “is.” “Thus the word ‘is’ figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus is/ought gap: Also called the fact/value gap or Hume’s law, initially drawn by David Hume as a logical distinction between factual statements, which describe how the world is, and value judgments, which prescribe how the world ought to be. Factual statements are seen as value-free, and value judgments are seen as evaluative or normative. Description and evaluation are thought to be different activities. Hence we cannot deduce a moral judgment from a non-moral one. Ought cannot be inferred from is. There is no logical bridge between fact and value. It is further inferred that ethical terms or properties cannot be defined by non-ethical or natural terms or properties. Otherwise, to use Moore’s terminology, we commit a naturalistic fallacy. This dichotomy has been held by many moral philosophers, including Mill, Kant, Moore, and Hare, to be a datum, but its validity has been challenged by others who claim that the recognition of fact is itself a value-laden activity, and that a moral judgment also has descriptive meaning. The soundness of this distinction has been the focus of the debates between naturalism and anti-naturalism and between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. John Searle and others have tried to show how we can derive an ought statement from is statements. “I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.” Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature isomorphism Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language [from Greek isos, equal + morph, form or shape] The structural identity or one-to-one correspondence of properties between two propositions or two systems. In Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, a proposition is a picture that is isomorphic with a corresponding possible state of affairs. This is the core point in his picture theory. In its stronger version, it suggests that not only the names but also the significant relations between the names will stand in a relation of reference to the world. In its weaker version, it suggests that only relational facts will be symbolized by relational sentences, with no requirement that the significant relation in such a sentence will have reference to a relation in the world. It is sometimes argued that Wittgenstein’s thought develops from the stronger version to a weaker one. Carnap claims that if two sentences are logically equivalent, and have the same number of corresponding components, they are intensionally isomorphic. They not only have the same intension, but also are equivalent in analytical meaning. “Isomorphism, or that structural identity, is a relation between interpreted languages . . . To say of two systems that they are isomorphic is to say that they have the same structure (logical form).” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy isotheneia, Greek equipollence] Greek skeptics use it to refer to the phenomenon where two arguments which express opposite views about the same problem possess the same strength and credibility. It thus results in a state of mental suspense existing in order not to disturb the balance between pro or contra arguments. Skeptics set up many incompatible but equally valid arguments in order to show that dogmatism is not adequate. There is no sufficient ground for holding that either the pro or contra argument justifies a decision about what is true, or even about what is more probable. In terms of isotheneia, a skeptic retains his general suspension of mind and attains peace of mind. “The sceptic is inclined to try to preserve isothenia, that is, to look for counterarguments and counter counterarguments.” Naess, Scepticism I–Thou Metaphysics, modern European philosophy For Martin Buber, one of the two main relationships exists between oneself and another person or thing. I–Thou (or I–You) stands in contrast to I–It. Thou may be either human or not human. I–Thou is a mutual and reciprocal relation, involving personal engagement and dialogue. I is for Thou, and Thou is for I. In this relationship, Thou is not an object to be manipulated, but something responding to the I in its individuality, something which the I must address with all that is most intimate and personal in oneself. The I becomes I by virtue of having a relationship to a Thou. Different I–Thou relationships generate different Is. An I–Thou relationship is always present. “The basic word I–You can be spoken only with one’s whole being. The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I require a You to become, becoming I, I say You.” Buber, I and Thou Jackson, Frank (1943– ) Australian philosopher of mind, logic, and metaphysics, born in Melbourne, Professor of Philosophy, Australian National University. Jackson argued for a representative theory of perception and introduced the influential knowledge argument in support of qualia. He follows Grice in distinguishing between the truth-conditions and the assertability conditions of material conditionals to explain why we do not always assert material conditionals when their truth-conditions are fulfilled. His major works include Perception: A Representative Theory (1977) and Conditionals (1987). Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (1743–1819) German philosopher of feeling, born in Düsseldorf, President of the Academy of Sciences in Munich. Jacobi rejected the use of pure reason in philosophy as leading to Spinozistic pantheism, and argued from his reading of Hume for the necessity of irrational belief and faith. He accepted Kant’s practical philosophy but argued against Kant’s conception of reason. His main works include Edward Allwill’s Collected Letters (1776) and David Hume on Belief (1787). to believe and what it means for an idea to be meaningful and true. His account of the “will to believe” held that where we lack a rational basis to choose between alternatives, our belief can legitimately be decided by emotional consequences. An idea is true if the results of accepting the idea are good. Truth is made rather than discovered, although the invention of truth is conventional rather than arbitrary. Philosophy involves temperament and personal attitudes toward the world and is not merely a logic for seeking solutions to a set of problems. He saw the history of philosophy as a battle between tough-minded philosophers (who reject everything aside from facts as false) and the tender-minded ones (who value certain principles more than facts), although James sought to reconcile these approaches in his own work. His accounts of the “stream of consciousness” and of emotion have had great influence. His major works include The Principles of Psychology (1890), The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897), The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), Pragmatism (1907), A Pluralistic Universe (1909), The Meaning of Truth (1909), and Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912). James, William (1842–1910) American pragmatist philosopher and psychologist, born in New York City and taught mainly at Harvard. James developed pragmatism from Peirce’s theory of meaning to become a metaphysics of truth and meaning. He sought to determine what it means James–Lange view Philosophy of mind The view that emotions are feelings generated by characteristic bodily changes in response to external stimuli. Hence emotion follows bodily changes rather than, as the traditional position holds, causes them. We are afraid because we tremble, and we feel sorry because we cry, rather than the contrary. This view was proposed independently by the American philosopher William James in 1884 and the Danish anatomist Carl G. Lange in 1895. Psychologically, this claim helped to put the study of emotion on the basis of a naturalist inquiry rather than on the traditional basis of introspection. Philosophically, this thesis opened a new era for the discussion of the relationship between reason and emotion. “The famous James–Lange theory – developed by the American psychologist William James and the Danish physician C. G. Lange – asserted, that one did not feel the inner cause of emotion, but simply some part of the emotional behaviour itself.” Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour Jansenism Philosophy of religion A philosophical and religious movement named after the Dutch Theologian Cornelius Otto Jansen (1585–1638). The movement was inspired by Augustine’s anti-Pelagian teachings and theology of grace. Its other major defenders included Antoine Arnauld and Abbé de Saint-Cyran. The movement had its center in the Convent of Port-Royal. Jansenism flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Western Europe, especially in France. Characteristic features included extreme predestinarianism and moral austerity. Jansenist determinism held that we cannot fulfill God’s commands without divine grace, but cannot resist grace if it is offered. Sin is possible even for the righteous without interior freedom of choice through insufficient grace. The virtues of pagans are only vices. The Jansenist doctrine was condemned as heretical by Pope Innocent X, and the Jansenist community was dissolved in 1709. The influence of the movement, which influenced the thinking of Pascal, continued into the nineteenth century. Jansenism is also remembered because of the Port-Royal Logic that was developed by its followers. “Jansenism . . . was an authentic catholic belief: it based itself on St. Augustine and would not quit the City of God, the universal church. None the less it was a subjective religion, which stresses ‘grace’ above ‘works’.” Brailsford, Voltaire Jaspers, Karl (1883–1969) German existentialist philosopher, born in Oldenburg, worked mainly in Heidelberg and Basle. Jaspers’s magnum opus is Philosophie, 3 vols. (1932). Other works include Psychology of World Views (1919), Man in the Modern Age (1932), Reason and Existence (1935), The Question of German Guilt (1946), On Truth (1947), On the Conditions and Possibilities of a New Humanism (1957), and numerous monographs on various intellectual figures in history. His philosophy was influenced by his early training in psychology. Jaspers criticized what he saw as the excessive prominence of science and technology in contemporary life and argued that genuine philosophical problems, arising directly from personal existence, should aim to explicate human existence. His philosophy sought the nature of one’s authentic inner self or Existenz. Existenz is not an external object, but is unique and subjective. It is the experience of the infinity of possibilities and a striving to transcend one’s ordinary existence. Freedom of choice is central to man, and man is always more than he can ever be said to be. The ultimate and indefinite limits of being that we experience in all its fullness and richness is “the encompassing.” Jaspers was also a major historian of philosophy. Jevons, William Stanley (1835–82) English economist and logician, born in Liverpool, Professor at University of Manchester and University College, London. Jevons was an intellectual pioneer in many fields. He developed a mathematical economics and theory of utility, adapted a simplified Boolean logic, and produced a logical machine that foreshadowed the modern computer. He challenges Mill’s account of induction with a hypothetico-deductive method in science and a subjective theory of probability. His main works include Pure Logic (1864) and Principles of Science (1874). Johnson, W(illiam) E(rnest) (1858–1931) English logician, born in Cambridge, taught in Cambridge. Johnson was a philosophical logician concerned with the normative study of thought. His work focused on the proposition and discussed differences between formal implication and inference, between formal constitutive syntactic and semantic conditions and informal epistemic pragmatic conditions in logical theory, and between logical premises and logical principles. His account of inductive inference led to a discussion of space, time, and causality, and he introduced discussions of determinants and determinables and ostensive definition. His main work is Logic, 3 vols. (1921–4). joint method of agreement and difference Logic The third of Mill’s five inductive methods, after the method of agreement and the method of difference. A phenomenon, P, occurs both in circumstances A and B. These two circumstances differ in every aspect except the factor E. Furthermore, P does not occur in the circumstances C and D, and C and D differ in every aspect except that they both do not have E. Thus, we may conclude that E stands in a causal relationship with the phenomenon P. The method proceeds by ascertaining the difference between the cases in which the phenomenon is present and those in which it is absent. What we uncover through this method is both a sufficient and a necessary condition for the phenomenon under investigation. “This method may be called the indirect method of difference, or the joint method of agreement and difference, and consists in a double employment of the method of agreement, each proof being independent of the other, and corroborating it.” The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. VII judgeable content Logic Frege’s term for what is thought and asserted when we make an assertion. It is prefixed by the content-stroke: 2. The judgeable content merges the thought expressed and its truth-value. It contrasts to the unjudgeable content, which is its constituent. Together they form the conceptual content. For Frege, judgeable content is a state of affairs, an entity rather than an act of making a judgment or assertion. It is an abstract entity existing independently of our judging it and is the object of judgment. If different sentences have the same assertions, they express the same judgeable content and conceptual content. Logic is the science of the relations among conceptual contents. “. . . the content of what follows the content-stroke must always be a possible content of judgement.” Frege, Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege judgment Logic, philosophy of mind A sentence by which something is affirmed or denied. Different sentences can express the same judgment, and the same sentence can also express different judgments. Certainly, not all sentences are judgments. A judgment, like a proposition, is characteristically used to make a true or false claim, and judgments are verbally expressed in propositions. Judgments and propositions are often used interchangeably, although judgment has a psychological or metaphysical tone, while proposition has a symbolic and material tone. To judge is to have a mental state, which is a propositional attitude. It has been a matter of debate how to understand the capacity of the mind to form judgments. For Frege, to judge is to acknowledge a thought as true. Judgment is made manifest by a sentence uttered with assertive force, but one can grasp and express a thought without acknowledging it as true, that is, without judging it. “A judgement expressed in language is precisely what is meant by a proposition.” Keynes, Formal Logic judgment of obligation Ethics A judgment that tells us what is right to do or what we ought to do, such as “It is not right to cheat” or “you ought to follow your teacher’s advice”. These judgments are directly related to our conduct and they are also called deontic judgments. Judgments of obligation contrast to judgments of value, which are not directly relevant to our behavior or action but concern persons and motives. Judgments of value tell us what is good or what has value, for example, “Freedom is a valuable thing.” They also tell us who is responsible or blameworthy. They are also called “aretaic judgments.” In teleological ethics such as utilitarianism, since the right thing to do is the action that has the best consequences, a judgment of obligation depends upon a judgment of value. But in non-teleological ethics, which is not concerned with the consequences of actions, there is no such a connection. “In some of our moral judgements, we say that a certain action or kind of action is morally right, wrong, obligatory or a duty, or ought or ought not to be done. In others we talk . . . about persons, motives, intentions, traits of character, and the like . . . I shall call the former judgements of moral obligation or deontic judgements, and the latter judgements of moral value or aretaic judgements.” Frankena, Ethics judgment of taste, see aesthetic judgment judgment of value, see judgment of obligation judgment stroke, see assertion-sign Jung, Carl Gustav (1875–1961) Swiss psychoanalyst, born in Kesswil. Jung was influenced by Sigmund Freud, with whom he collaborated from 1907 to 1912, before splitting with Freud and founding his own school of “analytic psychology.” Jung’s psychoanalysis focused on the conflicts and tensions in the individual’s personality rather than on repressed sexuality. Personalities can be classified as introvert, tending to withdraw from the external world, and extrovert, tending to outgoing sociable engagement. The unconscious is both individual, based on one’s own life history, and collective, based on inherited tendencies of human experience. He applied his theory of the collective unconscious to the study of mythology and religion and to exploring relations between archetypal patterns of the unconscious and symbols in human culture. Major works include The Psychology of the Unconscious (1911–12), Symbols of Transformation (1912), Psychic Energy (1928), Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious (1934), Psychology and Religion (1937), The Undiscovered Self (1957), and his autobiography, The Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1962). jurisprudence, see philosophy of law jus ad bellum, see just war jus in bello, see just war jus talionis, see lex talionis just war Ethics, political philosophy Originally, a Catholic notion involving the claim that the use of force is legitimate for punishing external evil-doers, and now a major topic in political philosophy regarding the morality of the use of force for political purposes. Traditionally, a theory of just war involved two conditions: a just cause for a war (Latin jus ad bellum) and a just means of war (Latin jus in bello). With respect to the first condition, contemporary theorists claim that a war can only be justified if it is a response to aggression, either to defend the borders of one’s own country or to rescue another country from aggression. The use of force must be the last resort, and the war must be undertaken with the goal of establishing peace. The right of national self-defense is derived analogically from an individual’s right of self-defense. But the extent to which this analogy may be sustained is a matter of controversy. It is not clear whether it is permissible to take thousands of lives for the sake of defending a piece of land. With regard to the second condition, the main requirement is that war should be proportionate to the wrong suffered. All the means that cause gratuitous or otherwise unnecessary destruction should be avoided. More important, noncombatants, especially innocent civilians, must be immune from attack. They should be protected as far as possible from the ravages of war and should enjoy protection from direct and intentional harm. The problem is that in the practice of modern war it is difficult to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Furthermore, many combatants are also innocent. The theory of what makes a war just changes and adapts to the particular needs of time and place and the changing character of war. New technologies of mass destruction, such as atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, would inevitably kill a great many innocent civilians if used in a war. For this reason, they are widely regarded as morally unacceptable in a just war. Similarly, genocide is universally condemned as an aim or consequence of war. “The traditional theory of just war contains inter alia certain doctrines as to who may and who may not bear arms in war; otherwise its three main theses are as follows: a war to be just must be initiated and led by the proper authority, must be fought for a just cause with right intentions, and must not use illicit means.” Teichman, Pacifism and the Just War justification justice, Greek dikaion, from dike, a suit in law; the Latin equivalent is justum, from jussum, that which has been ordered. Etymologically, justice is the prescribed manner of doing things, which should be enforced by authority] From its origin, justice has concerned both fair dealing and righteousness. In law, justice is the sum of principles and rules that ought to be followed. Hence, a system of law is also called a system of justice. In moral and political philosophy, justice is roughly equivalent to fairness or equity. It is just to treat people in proportion to their relevant differences, and justice is a virtue concerning relationships among individuals and between individuals and societies. As a principle of social order giving individuals their due, justice demands that the rights of individuals are not violated by other members of society or by the state. Plato in his Republic defined justice as the harmonious order between different elements of the soul, or between different classes of society. Aristotle’s distinction between distributive justice (the correct allocation of scarce resources) and rectificatory justice (the rectification of injustice by punishing offences) is still of fundamental importance. Since seeking justice involves seeking social order and stability, justice has been a central topic in moral and political philosophy. Hume’s conventionalism, social contract theory, utilitarianism, and Rawls’s rational choice of principles in an original position are some of the significant attempts to justify the principles of justice. When the established pattern of social norms is basically fair, justice serves as a principle to protect this order. When the existing order is not fair, justice becomes a principle of reform calling for social revision. Contemporary discussions of justice surround Rawls’s theory of justice. On this account, the essence of justice is fairness. Inequality in the distribution of primary goods or social values can be accepted only if it improves the situation of everyone, especially of the least advantaged. Otherwise inequality is simply unjust. This general conception of justice leads to Rawls’s fully articulated conception, which comprises two principles of justice. The first principle gives priority to equal liberty and the second principle deals with equality of opportunity and the just distribution of goods. The general notion summarizes the common point in the two principles and shares their orientation. Since Rawls focuses on the two principles rather than on this general notion, there has been a dispute about whether this general notion is a substantive notion of justice or merely a pattern of reasoning leading to a determinate concept. Many aspects of this account of justice have led to important methodological and substantive discussion and the development of rival positions. “It will be recalled that the general conception of justice as fairness requires that all primary social goods be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution would be to everyone’s advantage.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice justification Epistemology, ethics, philosophy of science Whatever is provided as grounds to prove or defend one’s claim or conduct. If a principle or a position is deduced from relevant premises, it is said to be justifiably inferred. To seek justification for a statement or action is the fundamental characteristic of a rational being, although there is controversy over what counts as reliable justification. Justification is especially required in epistemology and science in order to meet the challenge of skepticism. Epistemological justification has two senses. One is called objective justification and is concerned with what we should believe given what is in fact true, and is thus identified with truth. The other is the subjective sense, which is to determine what we should or should not believe given what we actually do believe, regardless of whether or not it is objectively correct. The latter is the ordinary sense of the term. It requires that we specify the norms under which we may hold a belief. To determine what to believe is a fundamental problem for epistemology, and justification is a necessary condition for knowledge. For a long time, historically, philosophers agreed that knowledge is justified true belief. But this analysis has been challenged by E. Gettier in his famous Gettier’s problem. “Justification, on most views, aims at producing something else: rational or justified belief.” Nozick, Philosophical Explanations justificationism Philosophy of science Popper divided philosophy into two main groups. One proposes justificationism, which holds that science is the quest for justification, certainty, or probability. These philosophers also support verificationism, which identifies knowledge with verified or proven knowledge. A belief is acceptable only if it can be confirmed or verified by positive observation and experience and past evidence renders future happenings probable. Popper criticized this position as unscientific and proposed a rival program of falsificationism, which claims that the rationality of science does not seek justification or verification, but seeks to test theories through attempted refutation. We can never establish certainty for a theory, and only theories which are falsifiable are scientific. “The members of the first group – the verificationists or justificationists – hold, roughly speaking, that whatever cannot be supported by positive reasons is unworthy of being believed, or even of being taken into consideration.” Popper, Conjectures and Refutations kalon, the Greek word for beauty. Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804) German philosopher, born in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad), educated and taught at the University of Königsberg. Kant’s monumental position in the history of philosophy was established through his “critical philosophy,” a system that profoundly shaped later work in almost every field of philosophy. The nature of knowledge and the nature of morality were two major concerns of his philosophical thinking. Kant’s masterpiece, Critique of Pure Reason (1781; 2nd edn. 1787), examined the cognitive powers of the mind in order to answer the question of how experience is possible. Kant launched what he called his “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy, which replaces the traditional assumption that all our knowledge must conform to objects with the claim that objects must conform to our knowledge. Theoretical knowledge must involve both sensibility and understanding and is possible solely through a fundamental role for synthetic a priori judgments. To explain how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, Kant argued for the existence of a priori intuitions (space and time) in sensibility and a priori concepts (categories) in understanding. These intuitions and concepts, rather than being empirically discovered, constitute the basic forms necessary for having any experience. This account sought to reconcile and overcome the limited doctrines of Leibniz’s or Wolff’s rationalism and Hume’s empiricism. Kant argued that the conflicting views of traditional metaphysics were inevitably generated by the tendency of pure reason to go beyond the limits of sensory experience, where it cannot provide knowledge. Kant sought to replace traditional metaphysics by a transcendental metaphysics based on the justification of the categories. Although this metaphysics denied traditional knowledge claims, it allowed for faith in the existence of God and room for human freedom. The Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysics (1783) outlines the main argument of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s duty-based moral philosophy, with its vision of the rational self-legislation of free and autonomous agents, has been the major rival of utilitarian consequentialism and Aristotelian virtue ethics in modern ethical thinking. The supreme principle of his moral system is the “Categorical Imperative,” which in various formulations requires the universality of moral judgments, respect for humanity in oneself and others as ends-inthemselves, and action as autonomous members of a moral community or “kingdom of ends.” Kant’s moral theory is delineated in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). In his Critique of Judgement (1790), Kant claimed that aesthetical judgments ( judgment of taste), although lacking the objectivity of theoretical judgments and ethical judgments, have subjective universal validity. This third Critique also deals with natural teleology and shows the unity of his system. Other works from his critical period include Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Law (1786), Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), and Opus Postumum. Kant’s pre-critical writings and lectures on a variety of philosophical subjects also repay attention. Kantian ethics: Kant’s ethics and other ethical systems which follow it in at least some fundamental aspects. Contemporary Kantian moral philosophers include John Rawls, Alan Donagan, Alan Gewirth, and, to some degree, R. M. Hare. The general characteristics of a Kantian ethics are as follows: (1) Universalism and formalism. The search for a single or a few supreme moral principles or laws, which are abstract and universal, to govern all rational beings regardless of their particular and historical circumstances. (2) Rationalism. These principles and laws are formed from reason alone, independent of our desires and emotions. (3) Autonomy. These principles express the rational agency or freedom of human beings. (4) The emphasis on obligation or duty. The moral value of our behavior is determined in terms of its conformity with the universal moral principles. (5) A realm of ends. Human beings must be respected as ends rather than as mere means, and the creation of a kingdom of ends is the priority of human activity. Kantian ethics is a target of the contemporary anti-theory movement and is criticized for ignoring differences in social and historical situation, for excluding human emotion and desire, for ignoring moral luck, underestimating the value of virtue, and rejecting practical intuition. “Whatever may be true of Kant, it would seem that, at least among the present-day linguistic analysts who have tried to adapt certain features of Kantian ethics to their purposes, the effect has been made to recognise the purely formal features of moral laws, without attempting to explain and account for such features in terms of the peculiar nature and constitution of rational, moral beings.” Veatch, For an Ontology of Morals Kantianism Philosophical method All philosophical thought that developed out of the spirit and themes of Kant’s critical philosophy. Although such developments moved in different directions, they all originated from aspects of Kant’s philosophy or dealt with the same topics in different interpretations. Some followers demanded that we go back to Kant, but many others tried to go beyond Kant. Fichte elaborated the Kantian notion of the transcendental subject and led German idealism toward Schelling and Hegel, on the one hand, and Schopenhauer, on the other. The neo-Kantian movement dominated German philosophy for several decades from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. Kant’s account of the self, including the central notion of the transcendental unity of apperception, not only inspired the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, but also figured prominently in discussions of personal identity and consciousness in analytical philosophy. Kantian ethics and utilitarianism have been the two major trends of moral thinking. Kant’s theory of experience, the limitations he placed on reason, his account of space, time, and mathematics, his notion of things-in-themselves, his account of synthetic a priori judgments, his theory of categories, his conception of the categorical imperative, his distinction between theoretical and practical reason, and his account of judgment were significantly discussed by major successors in diverse schools. Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics is essentially a Kantian project. There has been much recent sympathetic interpretation of Kantian moral theory. In other ways as well, Kant’s philosophy has been a principal source of modern and contemporary philosophy. The neo-Kantian Liebmann described the situation in this way: “You can philosophize with Kant, or you can philosophize against Kant, but you cannot philosophize without Kant”. “Kantianism would still maintain that in the long run observed variations are to be conceived of as modifications in something absolutely constant, and that science advances precisely by seeking out this enduring or constant something.” Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge Kaplan, David (1933– ) American logician and philosopher of language, born in Los Angeles, Professor of Philosophy at University of California at Los Angeles. Kaplan has moved from a Fregean position to criticism of Frege in developing important insights into the theory of reference and singular propositions in the context of intensional and modal logic, with implications for metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. He has also produced influential discussions of referential opacity, naming and describing, quantifiers, demonstratives, and indexical terms. His main papers include “Quantifying in” (1968) and “ ‘Demonstratives’ and ‘Afterthoughts’ ” (1989). katalepsis, Greek term for apprehension Kelsen, Hans (1881–1973) Austrian-American legal positivist philosopher of law, born in Prague, Professor at Universities of Vienna, Cologne, and Prague, Harvard University and University of California, Berkeley. Kelsen proposed a pure theory of law that is independent of ethics, politics, and the social sciences. He conceived law as a hierarchical system of norms in which each norm is validated by others, with the whole system resting on a Grundnorm or basic norm that is presupposed by legal thinking. His major works include General Theory of Law and State (1949), Principles of International Law (1967), Pure Theory of Law (1967), and General Theory of Norms (1991). Kenny, Sir Anthony (1931– ) British philosopher of mind and religion and historian of philosophy, born in Liverpool, Fellow and Master of Balliol College, Oxford. Kenny’s training in scholastic philosophy and theology and in analytic philosophy provides a breadth of reference and historical sense that is lacking in the work of many analytic philosophers. He has used analysis to expound and criticize the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas and ancient and medieval philosophy to explore contemporary questions, especially in the philosophy of mind. His major works include Action, Emotion and Will (1963), The Anatomy of the Soul (1973), and Will, Freedom and Power (1975). Keynes, John Maynard, Baron Keynes of Tilton (1883–1946) British economist, probability theorist and moral philosopher, born in Cambridge, Fellow of King’s College, Cambridge and many official posts. Keynes is famous for his economic theory and its justification for the intervention of the state in economic affairs. His most important philosophical work offers an objective theory of probability as a relation among propositions. His main works include A Treatise on Probability (1921) and The General Theory of Employment, Money and Interest (1936). Kierkegaard, Søren (1813–55) Danish philosopher, born in Copenhagen, a founder of existentialism. Kierkegaard attacked Hegelian rationalism on the grounds that it dissolves concrete individual existence into abstraction. He sought to develop an alternative “either/or” philosophy of free choice and subjectivity. Philosophy is to understand the existence of the individual. To exist is to choose one’s own way to live and to constitute one’s self. A choice is not a matter of rational reflection, but is generated by passion and without criterion. Human life faces choice at three stages: the hedonismcentered aesthetic life, the duty-centered ethical life, and the religious life. To move from the ethical life to the religious life, one needs a leap of faith. Kierkegaard extensively analyzed religious concepts, such as faith, choice, love, despair, and dread. His major books include On the Concept of Irony (1841), Either/Or (1843), Fear and Trembling (1843), Philosophical Fragments (1844), Stages on Life’s Way (1845), Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), and The Sickness unto Death (1849). killing Ethics Action which ends a life. Killing a human being has always been regarded as the greatest moral evil, and the right to life has been regarded as the most fundamental human right. The injunction not to kill an innocent person is the oldest and most universal moral maxim. In ancient societies, this maxim applied only to one’s own community. Under Christianity, it was extended to all human beings, because all humans were regarded as having an immortal soul. Modern moral theory justifies the inviolability of human life in terms of our human dignity as rational beings. Traditionally, killing has been justified only in a just war and as capital punishment, although both of these grounds have been challenged. The principle that forbids killing provides fundamental support for the antiabortion and anti-euthanasia movements. Disputes in this area have led to controversies about the scope and limits of this principle. Contemporary animal rights campaigners attempt to extend the principle to protect sentient non-human animals and claim, controversially, that killing animals is morally wrong. “Killing in self-defence is an exception to a general rule making killing punishable.” Hart, Punishment and Responsibility kinesis Metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy [Greek, change, movement or motion] Aristotle sometimes restricted kinesis to non-substantial changes in a continuing thing, including change of place, qualitative change, or quantitative change, while using gignesthai for substantial change and metabole for change which includes both kinesis and gignesthai. But these distinctions were not always observed, and on many occasions the words were used interchangeably. Aristotle also contrasted kinesis with energeia (activity). According to this distinction, kinesis is movement having an end outside itself and incomplete until its end is achieved. In contrast, energeia is movement containing its end within itself and complete throughout the movement. Writing a book is kinesis because it is not complete until the end it achieved, while writing is energeia because without a definite endpoint it is complete throughout. For this reason, as soon as I can say that I am writing I can also say that I have written, but I cannot say that I have written the book as soon as I can say that I am writing the book. However, Aristotle sometimes treated kinesis as a species of energeia. “For every kinesis (motion) is incomplete – making thin, learning, walking, building; these are kineses, and incomplete at that.” Aristotle, Metaphysics kingdom of darkness Philosophy of religion In the New Testament, the kingdom of darkness was believed to be led by Satan, and is also called the kingdom of Satan. In Hobbes’s philosophy, it refers to all errors or obstacles that interfere with a person’s salvation. In Leviathan, IV, Hobbes lists the following categories of errors: misinterpreting the Bible (particularly in the doctrines of Catholic Papists and Presbyterians); the influence of pagan mythology (demonology, the belief in demons) upon Christianity (such as the imported ideas of Greek philosophy in Christianity); and misinterpreting the history and traditions of Christianity. The kingdom of darkness stands in contrast to the kingdom of God, which includes a natural kingdom in which the laws are promulgated by human reason, although commanded by God, and a prophetic kingdom in which the laws are promulgated through prophets. “The kingdom of darkness . . . is nothing else but a confederacy of deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in his present world, endeavour by dark, and erroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light, both of nature, and of the Gospell; and so to dis-prepare them for the kingdom of God to come.” Hobbes, Leviathan kingdom of ends Ethics For Kant, a kingdom is a systematic conjunction of rational beings under common laws, and the kingdom of ends is an ideal union or world in which each rational being is treated as an end rather than merely as a means to an end, and each pursues his ends in conformity to the requirements of the universal law, which he has freely made. According to one version of Kant’s categorical imperative, a rational being must always regard himself as a legislator in a kingdom of ends. Such a kingdom abstracts from the personal differences between rational beings and also from the content of their private ends, for in this world each pursues his own interests in ways that not only do not conflict with the purposes of others, but also assist their purposes. It is actually nothing other than the highest good (summum bonum) and is therefore an ideal or intelligible world (mundus intelligibilis), which serves as a regulation for testing practical maxims. This notion also enabled Kant to take God as the sovereign head legislating in this moral kingdom of ends. It thus provided the basis for a moral proof of the existence of God, in the sense that the concept of God is alleged to be necessary to make our moral life intelligible. “For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as an end in himself. Hereby arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom that may be called a kingdom of ends (certainly only as an ideal).” about natural necessities. His main works are Probability and Induction (1949) and The Development of Logic (with Martha Kneale) (1962). Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals knower paradox Logic A self-referential paradox, first formulated by Kaplan and Montague, similar to the liar paradox. There is a sentence S, which says that “the negation of this sentence is known to be true”. If S is true, its negation should be true; but if its negation is true, S cannot be true and must be false. On the other hand, if its negation is true, since this is what S says, S must be true. Hence S is both true and false. There are various solutions to this paradox, although none is free from difficulty. Among the solutions, the most influential one appeals to a distinction between different classes of knowing, that is, between knowing in the metalanguage and knowing in the object language. Another influential proposal is that sentences of this kind do not have truth-values. The existence of this paradox sets certain constraints upon any formalized theory of language. kingdom of God, see kingdom of darkness KK-thesis Logic, epistemology The thesis that knowing that p entails that the subject knows that he knows that p. Taking K to represent knowing, the thesis can be symbolized as “Kp→KKp”. The thesis is internalist and can be traced to Plato and Aristotle. Schopenhauer explicitly emphasized that my knowing and my knowing that I know are inseparable. Jaakko Hintikka introduced this claim into contemporary epistemology and argues for its truth. The thesis holds that knowledge cannot be implicit. What counts as proper knowledge must be evident to the subject itself. Accordingly, if an agent does not know the process that gives rise to a belief, the belief is unjustified. But some philosophers deny the validity of this thesis on the grounds that it leads to regress. For if I know only when I know that I know, then I know that I know only when I know that I know that I know, and so on. It is also claimed that knowing is first-order knowledge, while knowing that one knows is second-order knowledge. These are different things. If the KK-thesis is false, a proposition may be known without it being known that it is known. “What is sometimes called ‘the KK thesis’ . . . holds that in order to know something, you must at the same time know that you know it.” Carruthers, Human Knowledge and Human Nature Kneale, W. C., Liverpool-born philosopher, Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford and Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Oxford. Kneale is best known for the scholarly knowledge and clear exposition of the history of logic that he produced with his wife. Although Aristotle and Frege are the most important figures in this history, the work drew attention to other important developments in Greek, medieval, and modern logic. Kneale’s examination of probability and induction develops his own theories, especially that laws of nature are modal propositions “In view of certain obvious analogies with the well-known paradox of the liar, we call the paradox . . . [the paradox of ] the knower.” Montague, Formal Philosophy knowing how Philosophy of mind, philosophy of action Ryle distinguishes between knowing how and knowing that, with the aim of demolishing the Cartesian account of intelligence. Knowing how is to know how to do something correctly and concerns the ability to organize and exploit truths when discovered. It is basically a way of behaving or performing, a disposition to do something efficiently. Knowing that, on the other hand, is knowledge that such and such is the case, knowledge of this or that truth, the state of being in possession of information. Knowing that is factual knowledge that comprises the stock of truths that the mind can acquire and retain. In the Cartesian tradition, intellectual operations are thought to be the core of mental conduct, and they are thought to be mainly the acts of cognition, that is, of knowing that. The tradition assimilates knowing how to knowing that by arguing that intelligent performance involves the observance of rules and the application of these rules. Ryle argues in contrast that intellectual activities are chiefly cases of knowing how, and that knowing how is logically prior to knowing that. In many intelligent performances the rules or criteria are unformulated. Furthermore, if intellectual operations must refer to a rule and if the formulation of the rule itself involves intellectual operations, an infinite regress will arise. Thus, factual knowledge and theorizing on the basis of such knowledge is not the core of intelligence and not the fundamental form of mental life. To say that people have minds is to say that they are able and prone to do certain things. Thus Ryle substitutes for the Cartesian concept of intelligence, a dispositional analysis of intellectual activities. “ ‘Intelligent’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘intellectual’; or ‘knowing how’ in terms of ‘knowing that’; ‘thinking what I am doing’ does not connote ‘both thinking what to do and doing it’.” Ryle, The Concept of Mind knowing that, see knowing how knowledge Epistemology Epistemology is the systematic inquiry into knowledge, its nature, possibility, kinds, and scope. Knowledge has been distinguished into various species on different grounds, such as propositional and non-propositional knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance and by description, a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and knowing how and knowing that, among others. What is the common definition for all these kinds of knowledge? Starting from Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, knowledge has been thought to consist in three necessary conditions: belief, truth, and justification. Traditionally, the focus is on the nature of justification. Epistemologists are divided into advocates of foundationalism, coherentism, and contextualism, each of which has various versions. In 1963 Gettier showed that these three conditions do not really explain what knowledge is. For I may hold a justified belief which is true but which I believe to be true only as a matter of luck. Such a belief cannot count as knowledge. Epistemology since then has been debating whether the original conditions need to be modified, or whether further conditions must be introduced. The causal theory of knowledge claims that knowledge should be analyzed as true belief where there is a causal connection between that belief and the state or event represented by that belief. Reliabilism suggests that knowledge should be analyzed as true belief acquired by a reliable method or procedure. The position which proposes that the conditions that distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge must be available to the subject is internalism, while the position which does not insist such an awareness is externalism. “To know is to have a belief that tracks the truth. Knowledge is a particular way of being connected to the world, having a specific real factual connection to the world: tracking it.” Nozick, Philosophical Explanations knowledge argument Philosophy of mind, epistemology An argument introduced by the Australian philosopher Frank Jackson against the thesis of physicalism. Physicalism states that to know a mental state and event is to know the information about the relevant nervous system. A colorblind person, however, does not know what it is like to see a red thing until he is cured and can see the thing himself. The information about his brain remains unchanged, yet his qualia become different when he gains color vision. The same point can extend to other senses, such as tasting or hearing, and can apply to the sensations and experiences of a physically normal person in varying circumstances. This indicates that physicalism leaves something out. Certain sensations and perceptual experiences cannot be reduced to states of the brain because complete physical knowledge does not provide knowledge of qualia. “The polemical strength of the knowledge argument is that it is so hard to deny the central claim that one can have all the physical information without having all the information there is to have.” Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32 knowledge by acquaintance, see knowledge by description knowledge by description Epistemology Russell distinguished between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. The latter, sometimes simply called acquaintance, is a dyadic relation between a knowing subject and an object of direct awareness (that is, awareness without the mediation of any process of inference or any knowledge of truth). The objects of acquaintance include particulars like sense-data, memories, and our own awareness of objects. They also include universals like redness and roundness, the awareness of which Russell called conceiving. Physical objects and other minds, on the contrary, are known by description. Description is of two kinds: ambiguous description, which is conveyed by any phrase of the form “a so-and-so,” and definite description, which is conveyed by any phrase of the form “the so-and-so.” Acquaintance is knowledge of things, while description is knowledge of truths. Russell’s theory of definite descriptions analyzes such descriptions to avoid the apparent need to posit special entities as their objects when they do not succeed in picking out actual objects. “We have acquaintance with sense-data, with many universals and possibly with ourselves, but not with physical objects or other minds . . . Our knowledge of physical objects and of other minds is only knowledge by description.” Russell, Mysticism and Logic knowledge de dicto, see knowledge de re knowledge de re Logic, epistemology Of a specific object, knowledge that it has a certain property or stands in certain relation, such as “Beijing is the capital city of China.” If this object is oneself, and the subject knows it, then the knowledge is knowledge de se, which is usually expressed in the form of “I am . . .” or “I have . . .” In contrast is “knowledge de dicto,” which is about a fact or proposition rather than about a specific object. For example, “There is a capital city in China.” A person who knows this fact does not necessarily know that this capital is Beijing. “The definition of the concept of de re knowledge is comparatively simple: X is known by S to be F = def There is a proposition which is known by S and which implies X to be F.” Chisholm, Person and Object knowledge de se, see knowledge de re knowledge of matters of fact, see knowledge of relations of ideas knowledge of relations of ideas Logic, epistemology Hume distinguished between knowledge of matters of fact and knowledge of the relations of ideas. Some knowledge depends upon the relations of ideas, and a statement that expresses such knowledge will not fall into contradiction. Knowledge of relations of ideas can be discovered either by intuition or through deduction. On the other hand, for statements expressing knowledge of matters of fact, the contraries are possible, and this kind of knowledge is based on experience and the relation of cause and effect. Hume sometimes also characterized the difference between these two kinds of knowledge as a distinction between knowledge and probability. Hume’s distinction was foreshadowed by Leibniz’s distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact, or between necessary and contingent truths. Hume, in turn, provided the precursor of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Because Kant held that some synthetic judgments can be known a priori, Hume’s distinction is more directly comparable to the logical positivists’ distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. “All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to relations of ideas, and matter of fact.” Hume, Enquiries kosmos Ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of science [Greek, cosmos] Etymologically kosmos means good order, but its meaning is extended to refer to the ordered universe, for the Greeks observed that the major cosmic events are marked by their regular order. For them, order meant arrangement, structural perfection, and beauty. In contrast to apeiron (unbounded), kosmos is finite both in space and in time, having an origin and an end; a limited kosmos must have telos (end) and be teleion (complete) and living. Greek philosophy started by thinking about how a kosmos is generated and how all the changes maintain their orders. “We must say that this kosmos is a living, intelligent animal.” Plato, Timaeus Kotarbinski, Tadeusz (1886–1981) Polish nominalist philosopher and logician, Professor at the Universites of Warsaw and Lodz and President of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Kotarbinski developed a radical nominalism that he called “reism” to distinguish between genuine names that designate bodies and apparent names that appear to refer to things such as properties, numbers, mental states, and events, but can be eliminated from discourse. His praxiology systematized ethical prescriptions under general principles aiming to protect others from suffering. His major works include Gnosiology (1929) and Praxiology: The Science of Efficient Action (1955). Kripke, Saul (1940– ) American logician and philosopher of language and metaphysics, born in New York, Professor of Philosophy at Rockefeller and Princeton Universities. Kripke provided a possible-world semantics for modal logic and drew a range of conclusions from this framework concerning identity, reference, logical and natural necessity, a posteriori necessary propositions, meaning, names, descriptions, essences, natural kinds, and the mind–body problem. He has made important contributions to the understanding of intuitionist logic, the theory of quantification and the theory of truth, and a skeptical reading of Wittgenstein on meaning and following a rule. His major works include Naming and Necessity (1980) and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Kuhn, Thomas (1922–97) American philosopher of science, born in Cincinnati, Ohio. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962; 2nd edn. 1970), Kuhn developed a theory of paradigms and paradigm shifts to explain scientific change. A paradigm is a set of related beliefs, values, and practices shared by a scientific community, which is used in periods of normal science as a model to solve problems. Scientific revolutions occur when unsolved problems accumulate within an old paradigm, leading to its replacement by an incommensurable new paradigm. This theory challenged the traditional claim that the progress of science is cumulative and unidirectional within a stable framework and has had immense influence in contemporary philosophy of science. Lacan, Jacques (1901–81) French psychoanalyst, philosopher of mind and language, born in Paris, President of the Champ Freudien, University of Paris VIII (Vincennes). Lacan integrated Freudian theory with Saussurian theory of language, philosophy of mind, and language and literary theory. Language forms the world and a person’s self-identity through a public rule-governed structure that is the source of objectification and deception, but also has a capacity for free association that is driven by the unconscious to undermine fixed meanings and a false conception of oneself. His major writings include Écrits I and II (1966) and The Ego in Freud’s Theory (1978). Langer, Suzanne K. (1895–1985) American philosopher of aesthetics, mind, and language, born in New York, Professor of Philosophy, Connecticut College. Langer developed a systematic theory of art as creative symbolic expression of human feeling. Her conception of symbol in ritual, myth, and art was based on a Kantian conception of experience and explored what could not be expressed discursively in language. Her major works include Philosophy in a New Key (1942), Feeling and Form (1953), and Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, 3 vols. (1967–82). laissez-faire Political philosophy, philosophy of social science [French laisser, to allow or to let + faire, to do, hence to leave things alone and let them go their own way] A social and economic theory fashioned in nineteenth-century France. The theory advocates economic liberalism, claiming that free exchanges between individuals and the operation of market forces without intervention will produce a more efficient economic order. It also claims that society has its own order as well and that it should be governed by nature instead of the intervention of policy. Individual actions will naturally lead to an optimal state, and the government should be strictly limited to those activities that cannot be accomplished by individual actions. With its individualistic methodology, laissez-faire is the basis of libertarianism, and the term has become a motto for those opposed to government intervention in economic activity. Those who see flaws or gaps in the market question the adequacy of laissez-faire as an approach to the economy and society. “Laissez-faire is the theory that everyone will gain relatively to any other economic policy if everyone pursues his own interests within a certain framework of laws.” Barry, Political Argument Lakatos, Imre (1922–74) Hungarian-born British philosopher of science and philosopher of mathematics, born in Debrecen and taught at the London School of Economics. Lakatos is known for his “methodology of scientific research programs,” which explains the continuity in the growth of science by the replacement of degenerate research programs by progressive research programs, that is, by programs that both generate and solve scientific problems. He held that all theories are born falsified and, hence, that the rejection of falsified theories cannot constitute scientific rationality. The theory is an influential alternative to Karl Popper’s falsificationism and Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific paradigms. Lakatos also applied his methodology to the growth of mathematical knowledge. His most important works are: Proofs and Refutations (1976) and Philosophical Papers (1978, vol. I: The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes; vol. II: Mathematics, Science and Epistemology). La Mettrie, Julien Offray de (1709–51) French philosopher and physician, born in St Malo, Brittany. La Mettrie developed the mechanistic theory that man is a living or organic machine in Man the Machine (1747). He attempted to explain all mental functions and processes in terms of changes in the brain and the central nervous system, and held that all human conduct is determined by natural causes. Through this theory, La Mettrie became a representative of eighteenth-century French materialism. He denied the significance of faith, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of free will. In ethics, he was an Epicurean hedonist, holding that the goal of life is happiness and that virtue is enlightened self-love. Other works include the Natural History of the Soul (1745), the Discourse on Happiness (1748), and the Art of Enjoying Pleasures (1751). land ethics Ethics An approach to environmental ethics initiated by Aldo Leopold and elaborated by J. Baird Callicott and others. Informed by ecology, which reveals that all individuals, including human beings, are internally related to one another and are in an ecological web of interdependence, it claims that the land should be included in the community of moral consideration and that we have obligations toward the land in itself for it has the right to exist. Distinct from animal-centered ethics and lifecentered ethics, it proposes that the central concern of environmental ethics should be the ecological system or the biotic community itself and its sub-systems, rather than the individual members it contains. It is therefore also called ecocentrism. As a holistic or totalitarian approach, land ethics is in contrast to traditional individualistic ethics. Its moral slogan is described by Leopold as “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends otherwise.” The strength of land ethics is its concern for the environment as a whole and its ability to deal with many environmental crises with which other approaches fail to cope. Its critics claim that since land is not the subject of experience, it cannot be included in the moral community. It is also criticized as being environmental fascism because of its holistic characteristics. “The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.” Leopold, A Sand County Almanac language of thought Philosophy of mind, philosophy of language A term from the title of a book (1975) by the American philosopher Jerry Fodor, also called mentalese. Inspired by the notion of a Turing machine, Fodor believes that just as a computer employs a machine language as a medium of computation, so might human thinking employ a human machine language, that is, a language-like system of contentful representations. His hypothesis is plausible because there are parallels between the structures of thought and language and because the sounds and marks in natural languages are meaningless in themselves but can be used to express meaning. If thinking can be understood as talking to oneself, a thought as a mental representation can be seen as a linguistic expression within a language of thought. The language of thought is the hypothetical formalizedlanguage analogue in the brain, which has, like a computational system of symbols, its own representational elements and combinatorial rules. Such a structure is realized in the neural structure of the brain and determines the significance of spoken words. The central tenet of the language of thought hypothesis is to explain the origin of mental representation and the source of linguistic meaning. It seeks to reverse Frege’s priority of language over thought. For Fodor, this hypothesis is a precondition for any sort of serious theory construction in cognitive psychology. But his critics point out that this hypothesis is regressive, for if spoken words derive their meanings from meaningful interior speech, then what is the source of meaning of the language of thought? The language of thought is close to what Dennett calls brain writing. “It will have occurred to the reader that what I am proposing to do is resurrect the traditional notion that there is a ‘language of thought’ and that characterizing that language is a good part of what a theory of the mind needs to do.” Fodor, The Language of Thought language-games, Sprachspiel] A response developed by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy to claims about the essence of language. The formalists once compared arithmetic to a game played with mathematical symbols. Wittgenstein extends this game analogy to language as a whole. Like a game, language is an indefinite set of ruledgoverned operations carried out by different groups of people for different purposes. The rules constitute grammars. Just as there is no common feature in all games but a family likeness, there are various overlaps, but no common feature, in the wide variety of ways in which words and sentences are employed. Using language is like playing a game. Language is an autonomous activity and needs no external goal. The meaning of a word does not lie in what it stands for, but is determined by its employment in grammar. To learn the meaning of a word is to learn how to use it. Hence the idea of language as game is closely connected with the theory of meaning as use. Wittgenstein claims that many persisting philosophical problems result from confusing the different rules or conventions, so the clarification of rules of language-games should be the main business of philosophy. The account of language-games opposes Wittgenstein’s earlier view of language in the Tractatus and sees the correlation between names and the named objects as only one feature of language. “We can also think of the whole process of using words . . . as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games ‘language-games’.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations langue/parole Philosophy of language, philosophy of social science A distinction drawn by Saussure in his linguistics and translated as the language/speech distinction. According to Saussure, language as a whole can be divided into institutional and innovational elements. The institutional element is called langue, and the innovational element is called parole. Langue comprises language rules, which exist as social conventions. It contains the traditional stock of knowledge held by members of a society that make communication possible. Langue is a social phenomenon and cannot be created or modified by the individual. Parole, in contrast, is language in use whereby new definitions of situations are created day by day. It is individual, and the source of linguistic change. The langue/parole distinction has had great influence in linguistics, philosophy, and other social scientific and humane disciplines. It is the precursor of Chomsky’s competence/performance distinction. “For language itself can be analysed into things which are at the same time similar and yet different. This is precisely what is expressed in Saussure’s distinction between langue and parole, one being the structural side of language, and the other the statistical aspect of it, langue belonging to a reversible time, parole being non-reversible.” Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology laughter, see humor law of contradiction Logic Also called the law of non-contradiction. The law of contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, and the law of identity form the basic laws of thought in classical logic. The law of contradiction states that for any proposition p, p and not p cannot both be true at the same time and in the same respect. The law forbids the joint affirmation of a proposition and its negation or contradictory. According to this law, we judge that any proposition involving a contradiction is false, and that any proposition negating a contradiction is true. Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1006a2–3 defined it as the view that “it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be,” and claimed that “this is the most indisputable of all principles.” A strong motive for maintaining the law is that in classical logic the possibility of any meaningful discourse is undermined by accepting contradictions because every proposition is implied by a contradiction. In recent times, logical systems have been developed in which some contradictions are tolerated. “By means of these propositional variables we can state the general logical law, ‘Not both p and notp’. This is called the Law of Non-Contradiction and is one of three so called Laws of Thought which traditionally were regarded as, in some special but ill-defined way, basic.” D. Mitchell, An Introduction to Logic of debate in the philosophy of science. Until the eighteenth century, scientific laws were sometimes backed metaphysically and theologically by appeal to God as their author, but more recently their justification has been sought within the enterprise of science itself. “We ought to distinguish between a two-fold signification of the term of law of nature; which words do, either denote a rule or precept for the direction of the voluntary actions of reasonable agents, and in that sense they imply a duty; or else they are used to signify any general rule which we observe to obtain in the works of nature, independently of the wills of men, in which sense no duty is implied.” Berkeley, Passive Obedience law of identity, see identity, law of law of nature Ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law, philosophy of science [Latin lex naturalis] Also called natural law. In a moral and political sense, the natural rules of conduct or the general commands of morality, such as “do harm to no man,” “seek peace,” “do not steal,” or “use self-defense.” These laws are claimed to be universal, eternal, and independent of the will of any human legislator. They are discovered by reason and are the basis of natural rights and duties. As dictates of reason, they contrast with human law, which is legislated by the will of the holder of state sovereignty. In Hobbes’s political philosophy, there are two fundamental laws of nature for men in the natural state. One is to seek peace and the other is to do all one possibly can to defend oneself. According to natural law theory, human law or positive law gains its binding force only from natural law. Christian authority maintains that the existence of natural law authored by God is the basis of the universal moral order. Other theories ground natural law in some aspect of human nature or universal human interests. A critical response is given by legal positivism, whose founder Jeremy Bentham rejected the possibility of natural law. In science, natural laws are objective orders or regularities in the natural world, which are independent of human minds and discovered by scientific investigation. They are the basis for sound human prediction. The existence and character of natural law in this sense has been a major focus law of non-contradiction, another term for the law of contradiction law of the excluded middle: One of the basic laws of thought that underlie all demonstrations in classical logic. The law says that a thing is either P or not-P and that it is not possible for it to be neither P nor not-P at the same time and in the same respect. Semantically it can be expressed that for any predicate p and any object x, either p or its negation is true of x. Aristotle defined the law in Metaphysics 1011b23: “there cannot be an intermediate between contradictions, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate.” When we say that a proposition or statement must be either true or false, the law of the excluded middle becomes the principle of bivalence. It serves as the basis for the truth-table method, but is rejected in manyvalued logic and intuitionistic logic. The question of whether to adhere to this law or the principle of bivalence has been a watershed that distinguishes realism and anti-realism in contemporary logic and philosophy. “(ϕ∨~ϕ) illustrates the law of the excluded middle, which is commonly phrased as saying that every statement is true or false.” Quine, Mathematical Logic laws of thought Logic Sometimes any truth of logic is called a law of thought, but generally the term is confined to three laws that have long been regarded as the most fundamental rules of reasoning, that is, the law of identity (P = P), the law of contradiction or non-contradiction (not both P and not-P), and the law of excluded middle (either P or not-P). In traditional logic, these laws are viewed as true and irrefutable. They are held to underlie all forms of reasoning and to be the fundamental principles that guide reasoning and justify valid inference. Contemporary logic usually contends that there is no reason to think that these laws are more fundamental than other truths of logic, and logical systems have been developed which reject one or more of their claims. “Theorem . . . (‘If p then p’), forms part of the ‘law of identity’, which is one of the three traditional ‘laws of thought’, the other being the law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction.” Prior, Formal Logic Le Doeuff, Michèle, philosopher, teaches at the École Normale Supérieure de Fontenay. Le Doeuff argues that philosophy relies on an underlying “imaginary” of metaphors in pursuing its conceptual aims and that uncovering these metaphors in the language of philosophy reveals elitist exclusions affecting women and others. Her main work is Hipparchia’s Choice: Essays Concerning Women and Philosophy (1990). legal gap Philosophy of law The situation in which existing legal rules lack sufficient grounds for providing a conclusive answer in a legal case, for example, when there is no legal reason determining that a defendant is guilty or innocent. No available correct answer guides the decision. A gap can occur because the law is open-textured or because there are conflicting rules. A situation in which rules conflict creates a legal gap because conflicting legal rules block the capacity of one or another to apply throughout an appropriate domain. Rules do not have truthvalues, but legal gaps can be compared to truthvalue gaps. It is generally held that legal gaps should be filled by discretionary decisions, but this is rejected in Dworkin’s rights thesis, which rejects discretion in favor of the claim that individuals must be accorded basic rights that cannot be easily overridden by considerations of community welfare. “When an action is neither legally prohibited nor legally permitted there is a legal gap.” Raz, The Authority of Law legal philosophy, another expression for philosophy of law legal positivism Philosophy of law A tradition in legal philosophy, opposed to the natural law theory, founded by Jeremy Bentham. Although there are different versions, the basic position can be summarized by the following two claims. First, there is no internal and necessary relation between law and morality; the definition of law does not contain a moral element, and is hence morally neutral. Secondly, the validity of law is determined exclusively by reference to factual sources such as legislation, judicial precedents, and custom, without regard to whether it is just or reasonable. The existence of law is a fact, that which is, rather than an ideal, that which ought to be. Accordingly, the law must be positive, and so-called natural law does not exist. For Austin, “The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another.” Most legal positivists deny the possibility of an objective knowledge of moral right or wrong. Other major proponents of legal positivism include John Austin, Hans Kelsen, and H. L. A. Hart. They differ from each other by invoking different factual sources for legal validity, and by holding different views about the normative character of law. “Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.” Hart, The Concept of Law legal realism Philosophy of law Also called rule skepticism, a school of legal philosophy that flourished in the early part of the twentieth century. It maintains that the traditional theories of law are mythological in that they take legal rules to be abstract entities and legal concepts to have metaphysical essences. In contrast to legal formalism, legal realism is skeptical of the notion of legal rules. Rules by their nature cannot control decisions in court, and the function of law is to solve actual disputes. Law must be understood by reference to the reality of actual legal systems. Legal realism has two traditions. American legal realism, represented by O. W. Holmes, Jr. and Karl Llewellyn, was influenced by pragmatism. It claims that the law is constituted by how legislation is enacted and by what courts actually decide. Scandinavian legal realism, represented by Axel Hagerstrom, Karl Olivercrona, and Alf Ross, was influenced by Comte’s positivism. It claims that the normativity of law must be explained in terms of the psychological reactions of judges, citizens, or both. Legal realism is an attempt to understand laws in terms of what they are and how they operate. Its strength is that it is deeply rooted in the practices, insights, and practical arts of lawyers, but its weakness is that it can neither account for the legal reasoning of judges nor explain the necessity of legal reform. “Legal realism is, in large measure, the lawyer’s perspective, and though it is unlikely that this perspective is the whole story, it is almost certain that it is such an important part of the story that any legal theory that leaves it out will be essentially flawed.” Murphy and Colman, The Philosophy of Law legal reasoning Philosophy of law The rationality manifested in matters of law, especially in the public process of litigation and adjudication. It is used to seek legal justification for conduct and decisions, that is, to show that they have a sufficient legal warrant and in consequence to persuade the court to reach a favorable conclusion. Legal reasoning is also employed by lawyers to predict what the other side is likely do or what a judge is likely to decide within the limits of the law. Like other justificatory argumentation, it can be either inductive or deductive, but its chief characteristics include appeal to the plain meaning of terms in legal rules and the conceivable consequences of a decision. Legal philosophers vary in their opinions about the suitable criteria of legal reasoning. “Any study of legal reasoning is therefore an attempt to explicate and explain the criteria as to what constitutes a good or a bad, an acceptable or unacceptable type of argument in law.” MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Legal rights, see rights, legal legitimacy: A basic question in political philosophy concerns the grounds of legitimacy for a government or authority. The question can also be asked in terms of political obligation, that is, the basis of one’s obligation to obey the coercive power of a government or authority. Answering these questions requires a rationale for the right of an authority to make decisions and its justification for having them obeyed. A major attempt to justify authority, initiated by Hobbes, is provided by a variety of social contract theories. The ruled consent to the transformation of political power into political authority in exchange for benefits such as justice, security, happiness, and liberty. In contemporary political theory, the test for this ground for legitimacy is whether a government upholds certain basic human rights. Max Weber suggested three sources of legitimacy: traditions or customs, rationallegal procedures, and individual charisma. “A state is legitimate if its constitutional structure and practices are such that its citizens have a general obligation to obey political decisions that purport to impose duties on them. An argument for legitimacy need only provide reasons for that general situation.” Dworkin, Law’s Empire Lehrer, Keith (1936– ) American epistemologist, born in Minneapolis, Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona. Lehrer provides a contemporary version of Thomas Reid’s philosophy of common sense. His theory of knowledge explores the justification of belief in terms of defeasibility and criticizes foundationalist programs in epistemology in favor of subjective and objective justification involving a sophisticated account of coherence. His main works include Knowledge (1974) and Theory of Knowledge (1990). Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646–1716) German philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist, born in Leipzig and a founder of Academy of Berlin. Along with Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz is a major figure of early modern rationalism. His principal writings include Discourse of Metaphysics (1685), Theodicy (1710), and Monadology (1714). New Essays on Human Understanding (completed 1704, Lessing, Gotthold published 1765) systematically responded to Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding. He also maintained a vast learned correspondence with intellectuals in many fields. Leibniz held that the world is a compound, ultimately comprising an infinity of indivisible and mutually isolated simple substances or “monads.” Monads are soul-like and each is a mirror of the universe. There is no causal interaction among monads. Each individual substance is created to evolve according to its own determinate nature, but is nevertheless in complete harmony with other monads. The world as created by God is the best of all possible worlds and has a pre-established harmony, in contrast to Malebranche’s occasionalism, which requires the order of the world to be maintained by repeated divine interventions. Leibniz contributed many seminal ideas, such as the distinction between contingent truths and necessary truths, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, the principle of sufficient reason, the idea of a universal language, the development of the first logical calculi, mereology, the relational account of space and time, and the idea of possible worlds. Leibniz and Newton were the two founders of mathematical calculus. Leibniz’s law, see indiscernibility of identicals lemma Logic [Greek, something assumed or premise; plural, lemmata or lemmas] A proposition that is assumed or proved as a theorem in the course of argument in order to proceed to a different main conclusion. If an assumed lemma is false, the conclusion is unreliable. In ancient commentaries on Plato, lemmata were portions of text selected to be commented on. “I think in this connection of the characterisation of the lemma Y which can be ‘interpolated’ in an attempt to derive a certain conclusion Z from a certain premise set K.” Beth, Aspects of Modern Logic lesbian ethics Ethics A lesbian is a woman who loves and has sexual relations with another woman. Lesbian ethics tends to address the lesbian experience and the nature of lesbian identity with the purpose of seeking the well-being of lesbians. It joins feminist ethics in charging traditional Western ethics with promoting male dominance and female subordination through social control. Sometimes it is considered as a branch of feminist ethics. Lesbian ethics claims that while both heterosexuality and male homosexuality imply the superiority of men over women, lesbians, traditionally viewed as manhaters, suffer the worst oppression. Hence, lesbian love forms a special challenge to sexism, and is a revolutionary act against the dominant political and social system. The ethics rejects the values of dominance and subordination, and promotes the value of choice and self-understanding. It encourages intimacy, engagement, and cooperation and develops lesbian integrity and moral agency. Although it functions only for those who choose its values, lesbian ethics claims to be applicable also for heterosexual women. The term “lesbian ethics” was coined by S. Hoagland in 1978. Currently there are two professional journals in this field: Lesbian Ethics and Gossip: A Journal of Lesbian Feminist Ethics. “This book is my attempt, with much stimulation and input from a number of lesbian communities, to describe at least one way we might continue to move toward lesbian connection and create a means by which we spin out of oppressions. I call this attempt Lesbian Ethics.” Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics Lesniewski, Stanislaw (1886–1939) Polish nominalist logician and philosopher of mathematics, born in Serpukhov, Russia, Professor of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. In addition to important work on prepositional and predicate calculus, Lesniewski developed a mereology of wholes and parts based on his account of classes and an ontological interpretation of logic as yielding truths about the general structure of the world. His works appear in Collected Papers (1988). Lessing, Gotthold (1729–81) German philosopher and dramatist, born in Kamenz. Lessing was an Enlightenment figure, but anticipated Romantic concerns with expressiveness and freedom and hostility to formal constraints. He distinguished painting, which deals with the spatial array of color and form, from poetry, which is temporally organized to express passion and action. His main works include Laocoön: On the Limits of Painting and Poetry (1766). Leviathan Political philosophy Leviathan is a mythical sea monster with terrifying power, which is described in several places in the Old Testament. Many authors associate it with evil, but Shakespeare took it to symbolize strength. The British philosopher Hobbes took this name, with a reference to Job 41, for the title of his most important book and used it as a metaphor for the state and its sovereign. He argued that such an artificial Leviathan should have absolute and undivided power. Leviathan is the authority in civil government that keeps human society in order and enables people to live in peace. The book’s full title is Leviathan or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, published in English in 1651, and in a revised Latin version in 1668. It is divided into four parts: Of Man, Of Commonwealth, Of a Christian Commonwealth, and Of the Kingdom of Darkness. It is the main locus of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy. “Leviathan [is] . . . that mortal God, to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defence.” Hobbes, Leviathan Levinas, Emmanuel (1905–95) French Jewish phenomenologist, ethical philosopher and philosopher of religion, born in Kaunas, Lithuania, Professor of Philosophy, University of Paris (X, IV), Director of the École Normale Israélite Orientale. Levinas employed phenomenology in the study of an individual’s ethical relation with another person. He held that this relation has priority to a person’s relation to himself or his relation to the world of objects and can not be understood through concepts introduced through these other relations. Face-to-face encounters involve love, desire, and ultimately responsibility, but the absolute otherness of the other person is infinite, beyond conceptualization and language. His major works include Totality and Infinity (1961), Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974), and Ethics and Infinity (1982). Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1908– ) French social anthropologist and structuralist philosopher, born in Brussels. Lévi-Strauss turned to anthropology when lecturing at São Paulo University, Brazil, and conducted extensive anthropological studies in central Brazil. He is regarded as a founder of structuralism, holding that structured codes are the source of meaning and that the elements of a structure should be understood through their mutual relations. Social structures are independent of human consciousness and are found in myth and ritual. He rejected Lévy-Bruhl’s theory of primitive mentality, but followed Saussure in developing a structural approach to linguistics that he applied to the analysis of phenomena such as kinship and myth. His main works include The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949), Structural Anthropology (1958), The Savage Mind (1962), and the Mythologics, 4 vols. (1964–72). Lewis, C(larence) I(rving) (1883–1964) American logician and epistemologist, born at Stoneham, Massachusetts. Lewis’s principal writings are the Mind and the World-Order (1929), Symbolic Logic (with C. H. Langford, 1932), and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (1946). As a logician, he developed the calculus of strict implication as an attempt to avoid the paradoxes arising from Russell and Whitehead’s theory of material implication, and laid down the basis for modern modal logic. He called his epistemology “conceptual pragmatism” and sought to revise Kantian views through pragmatism. The judgments that are completely verifiable are about appearance. Human conceptual systems or categories are pragmatically justified on convenience and the long-term satisfaction of our needs rather than on Kantian transcendental arguments. Lewis, David (1941–2001) American analytical philosopher, born in Oberlin, Ohio, taught mainly in Princeton. Lewis made original and important contributions to many areas of philosophy. His modal realism about possible worlds argues that the world we inhabit is just one of a plurality of self-contained real worlds that can be ordered in terms of their likeness to one another. He developed influential theories of convention and counterfactuals and a mereological approach to set theory. He was a structural realist in the philosophy of science, a probabilist and contextualist in epistemology, and a materialist and reductionist in the philosophy of mind. His books include Convention: A Philosophical Study (1969), Counterfactuals (1973), On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), and Parts of Classes (1991). In addition, he published five volumes of collected papers (1983, 1986, 1998, 1999, 2000). Lexeme: a word may have different inflections and may be presented in different forms depending on its position in a sentence. But there must be a basic core that determines that all the various forms are the forms of the same word. This basic core is called a lexeme. For instance, “builds,” “building,” “built” are all particular inflectional variants of the verb “to build.” “To build” is the lexeme. Precisely speaking, meaning is ascribed to a lexeme rather than to a word. Hence, it is more proper to speak of lexical meaning than of word meaning. “Within semantics, the notion of word that is most useful is that of the lexeme which is an abstract grammatical construct that underlies a set of word forms which are recognised as representatives of ‘the same word’ in different syntactic environments.” Cann, Formal Semantics liar paradox Logic, philosophy of language A semantic paradox, dealing with matters of reference and truth. There are many versions, but it was initially proposed by the Magarian Eubulides in ancient Greece, although another tradition takes Epimenides as the author. The original version is: “A man says that he is lying. Is what he says true or false?” If he is speaking truly, then he is not lying, so what he says is not true; if what he says is not true, then he is indeed lying, and what he says is true. In another version, ascribed to Epimenides, a Cretan says that all Cretans are always liars. If what he says is true, then it is false. The paradox arises because the statement says something self-referentially about its own truth or falsity. The need to avoid the liar paradox was partly responsible for the development of Tarski’s semantic theory of truth, and more generally the paradox is a key constraint on attempts to devise consistent semantic theories. “Any version of the [liar] paradox involves the assertion that all propositions satisfying a certain condition are false, where the assertion itself is a proposition which satisfies that condition.” Copi, Symbolic Logic lexical ambiguity, an alternative expression for semantic ambiguity lexical order, see two principles of justice lex talionis, L. law of retaliation] A law of retaliation, which proposes to maintain a correspondence or equivalence between crime and punishment. It is stated in Exodus (21:22–5): “life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, . . . wound for wound.” It is also called jus talionis (the right of retaliation). In contemporary theory of punishment, this law is quoted to justify the view that a man must be punished if his action has violated some rule for which he deserves a penalty. Furthermore, the penalty he receives must be proportionate to the wrong he committed. “We are to observe (as we are elsewhere told explicitly) the lex talionis: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” Honderich, Punishment liberalism Political philosophy A political and social theory fundamentally emphasizing the priority of the liberty and equality of individuals. It begins with the priority of the individual rather than the community. According to liberalism, individuals have innate human rights regardless of any particular political system. They have interests that they seek to advance both publicly and in private life. Society and government should protect and promote individual freedom rather than imposing constraints. It is the mandate of government to respect individual rights. The plurality and diversity of society should be encouraged, and a society should be equal and just in the distribution of opportunities and resources. The political process should provide a fair procedure for resolving disputes when the interests of individuals clash. Because liberty and equality come into conflict, various kinds of liberalism have been formulated, depending on whether the theory emphasizes liberty or equality, or on how one seeks to reconcile them. Classical market liberalism tends to insist that civil rights are fundamental to human beings, while contemporary egalitarian liberalism focuses more on equality and argues that government or society should increase its scope of intervention in areas such as health care, education, social welfare, and discrimination. On this version, civil rights can legitimately be qualified in such areas to secure justice. Liberalism provided justification for capitalism, although it was also associated with the appeal for religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some notable liberal theorists in England include John Locke, John Stuart Mill, T. H. Green, Isaiah Berlin, H. L. A. Hart, and Ronald Dworkin; in France they include Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Benjamin Constant; in Germany they include Kant and W. H. von Humboldt, and in America John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Persons who believe in liberalism are called liberals. Liberalism is the theoretical basis of the democratic system and has dominated political and social thought in the modern Western world. Critics of liberalism are suspicious of its association with the free market. Communitarians argue that liberalism overemphasizes the autonomy of the individual and ignores the ways in which individuals are embedded in social customs and traditions. The latter is also a long-standing theme of conservative opposition to liberalism. “Liberalism was once, not very long ago, almost a consensus political theory in Britain and the United States, at least among political and legal philosophers. They disagree about it a great deal, but they all seem to accept, as close to axiomatic, a kind of egalitarian individualism.” Dworkin, A Matter of Principle libertarianism Political philosophy, ethics, metaphysics A twentieth-century political and moral movement. It is a radical form of liberalism and argues that no intervention from state and government is necessary or justified. Free choice is supreme and all conflicts can be settled through the mechanism of the market. Its strong anarchist form insists that all government is illegitimate, and that all coercive political universalism is unacceptable. In its moderate anarchist form, it concedes that government may appropriately engage in police protection, enforcement of contracts, and national defense, but no more than that. Libertarianism emphasizes in particular the rights of individuals to acquire and hold property and questions the legitimacy of the tax system. It proposes to develop rational egoism or Aristotelian eudaimonism. The most influential advocate of libertarianism is Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, State and Utopia. Libertarianism is also a metaphysical term. In this sense, it is opposed to determinism and holds that the past does not determine a single future. We can act, on the basis of rationality or the self we possess, independent of necessitating causal laws, no matter what happened in the past. This theory is now often supported by appealing to quantum mechanics, which asserts that there are uncaused events in the universe, but it is not clear that quantum indeterminism is the right way to allow for rationality and choice. “Libertarians are against what they describe as an ‘interventionist’ policy in which the state engages in ‘interference’.” G. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality libertinism: A movement that flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which demands freedom of conscience in religious affairs and moral issues. It is regarded as an antitheoretical position. Theories that are based not on reason but on divine revelation, such as immortality of the soul and punishment in the afterlife, should be rejected. Libertinism is associated with deism, materialism, and Epicureanism. Its major proponents were P. Charron, Montaigne, P. Gassendi, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Campanella. “[L]ibertinism – the belief that by grace, by the new life in Christ and salvation by faith, law or rules no longer applied to Christians.” Fletcher, Situation Ethics liberty, a synonym for freedom libido: Freud’s term for the psychophysical energy or motive force produced by sexual instinct. It is the energy of the id, and can be directed either toward the self or an object. The direction of the libido toward the self produces narcissism. Freud viewed the libido as a motive force for progress, like to like with the intellectual evolution of society explicable in terms of a theory of the libidinous development. The libido is not anatomically located, but its existence is assumed in the development of biology. Freud later replaced the concept of the libido with the concept of eros. “Libido is a term used in the theory of the instincts for describing the dynamic manifestation of sexuality.” Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18 life instinct, another term for eros (Freud) life-boat case: Tom Regan’s hypothetical case against his claim that animals have rights and hence are entitled to the same moral consideration as humans. There are five survivors on a lifeboat, each with approximately the same weight. Four of the five are human beings and the fifth is a dog. Because the boat can only support four of the survivors without being overturned, one survivor must be thrown overboard or else all will die. Which one should go? Common sense suggests that the dog should be sacrificed, but if the dog has an equal right to be respected or not to be harmed, as advocates of animal rights claim, what should the survivors do? Regan argues that this objection does not undermine the claim that animals have equal rights, because animal rights theorists can safely answer that the dog should be cast overboard. For the rights are prima facie and can be overridden in such circumstances depending on the loss of whose life will cause more harm. Since the loss of a human life will bring about greater harm than that of a dog’s life, it is justifiable to override the dog’s right to life in this case. Only some moral philosophers would allow the same considerations to determine which human life should be lost if all the survivors were human. “The lifeboat case would not be morally any different if we supposed that the choice had to be made, not between a single dog and the four humans, but between humans and any numbers of dogs.” Regan, The Case for Animal Rights life-world Metaphysics, modern European philosophy [from German Lebenswelt] Husserl’s term for the historical world in which we live as historical beings and the culturally and historically determined horizon. The life-world forms the framework of processes of reaching understanding, in which participants agree or discuss something in their communal social world. The life-world is given to us prior to all acts of consciousness and is not consciously intended. Our objective knowledge of the natural sciences springs from the life-world. This knowledge reflects the concerns of specific communities and serves as one means of accomplishing their needs. Hence, the scientific world is rooted in the life-world, and the sciences are characteristic of being historically and culturally situated. The conception of the life-world is further developed in Heidegger’s account of “Being-in-the-world,” in Gadamer’s notion of historical understanding, and in Habermas’s theory of communicative action. However, Husserl believed that various cultural life-worlds are themselves derived from an eidos or formal non-historical lifeworld, which is the product of transcendental subjectivity. In his view, one of the main tasks of phenomenology is to describe the structure of this eidos life-world. “The life-world, for us who wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the ground of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical.” Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences light of reason, an alternative expression for natural light like to like Ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of science The principle of the mutual attraction of similars in the philosophy of the Greek philosopher Empedocles, independent of his two cosmic agents of Strife and Love. While Love is the principle of unifying different elements, and Strife of separating different elements, the principle of like to like means that any portion of any element has a natural tendency to seek out and gather with other portions of the same element. It is the basis of Strife. Empedocles also employed this principle to explain sensation, which arises because one element in the body of the subject meets with the same element outside. All generating things are incessantly giving off effluences, and when these effluences are of the right size to fit into the pores of the sense organ, the meeting happens and we have sensation. “For by earth, Empedocles says, we see earth, by water, by air bright air, by fire consuming fire, Love by love, and Strife by gloomy strife.” Aristotle, Metaphysics limited variety, principle of: A principle in the theory of probability introduced by J. M. Keynes in A Treatise on Probability. It proposes that the domain from which a generalization is inferred and to which it can be applied should contain a limited or finite number of independent characteristics. This principle is held to increase the reliability of the conclusions derived in terms of Mill’s methods and of eliminative induction. If the extent of possible independent variation is infinite in the objects of our generalization, induction cannot be meaningful. The principle is close to the principle of the uniformity of nature. Both are regarded as basic assumptions for the validity of induction. “As a logical foundation for Analogy, therefore, we seem to need some such assumption as that the amount of variety in the universe is limited in such a way that there is no one object so complex that its qualities fall into an infinite number of independent groups.” Keynes, A Treatise on Probability line, simile of the Ancient Greek philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics A simile employed by Plato in the Republic to help in explicating the difference between the perceptible world and the intelligible world. Take a line AB, and divide it into two unequal parts, AC and CB, with AC representing the perceptible world and CB representing the intelligible world. Then divide each of these two parts in the same ratio. Thus we have: A—D——C———E————B, with AD:DC = AC:CB = CE:EB. Plato distinguished the portions of the perceptible world AC, by assigning different objects and corresponding mental states to them. AD stands for images (eikones) such as shadows and reflections of objects, and the corresponding mental state is illusion or imagination (eikasia); DC stands for the originals of these images, such as natural and artificial things, and the corresponding mental state is belief (pistis). In the intelligible world CB, Plato distinguished the two sections by the different methods of inquiry the mind uses in each of them. In CE, the mind uses the sensible objects of DC as illustrations, starting from hypotheses and proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion. This is the method of the mathematical sciences, and the state of mind is dianoia (intelligence, mind, thinking, reasoning). In EB, the mind makes no use of illustrations, conducts the inquiry solely by means of Forms, and proceeds to an unhypothetical first principle. This is the method of philosophy or dialectic, and the state of mind is noesis (intellect or understanding). Sometimes CE is understood to be concerned with mathematical entities and EB to be concerned with moral Forms, but this interpretation is disputable. These four sections provide a classification of cognitive states and their objects, and from AD to EB the line constitutes a continuous scale of increasing degrees of clarity and reality. The Simile is closely related to the Simile of the Sun, and the Simile of the Cave. Plato’s text is difficult, but the simile provides a basis for exploring a number of important metaphysical and epistemological issues. “There are four such processes in the soul, corresponding to the four sections of our line: noesis for the highest, dianoia for the second; give the name of pistis to the third, and eikinos to the last.” Plato, Republic linguistic act, see speech act linguistic analysis Philosophical method In its broad sense linguistic analysis is the major characteristic of analytic philosophy, which regards it as the real function of philosophy. Linguistic analysis aims to clarify and reveal the proper structure of ordinary language. It tries to show how certain uses of ordinary language have provoked metaphysical problems and how language has been misused in many alleged solutions. It is claimed that this approach might eliminate or solve the traditional philosophical problems that arise because of the misuse of language. Linguistic analysis is in the tradition of British empiricism. “Linguistic analysis distinguished it [metaphysics] sharply from science, regarding it either as a diseased intellectual condition to be cured by the therapy of the linguistic analyst, or as a group of problems that inevitably arise from the use of natural languages, and that are to be solved by linguistic elucidation.” Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics linguistic determinism, another expression for the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis linguistic framework: A chosen language or a set of analytical principles that provides the method and criterion for the formulation of any significant assertion and its solution within this framework. A body of significant knowledge can only be justified by reference to the principles or rules that make up the framework. Different frameworks reflect different ways of talking about the world. But once we adopt a framework according to the principle of tolerance we must obey all of its principles. The framework is a basis for reaching agreement about any disputed problem. It follows that any answer to a question about kinds of entities recognized by a language is relative to a framework. Carnap divided internal and external questions in terms of the notion of a linguistic framework. Internal questions are formulated according to the rules of the framework, while external questions are outside the context of any particular framework and concern the existence of the systems of entities as a whole. These latter questions are therefore metaphysical and lack theoretical significance. This conception not only played a central role in logical positivism, but also greatly influenced the development of the philosophy of science. the linguistic form, that is, the fixed combination of signaling-units or phonemes. It is the semantic feature of an expression (a word, a phrase, or a sentence) and is the common element whenever the expression is uttered, regardless of the circumstances in which it is used. Linguistic meaning contrasts to the pragmatic meaning of an expression determined by the situation in which it is employed. When the philosophy of language talks about the nature of meaning, it is generally concerned with the linguistic meaning. “By uttering a linguistic form, a speaker prompts his hearers to respond to a situation; this situation and the response to it are the linguistic meaning of the form.” Bloomfield, Language linguistic phenomenalism, see phenomenalism linguistic phenomenology: Austin’s term characterizing his own philosophical approach, which is generally called linguistic philosophy or ordinary language philosophy. He probably used the term as a methodological corrective to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and his followers. Austin claimed that discussing the functions of certain words and sentences and inventing new ways of describing phenomena is not merely linguistic, but improves our perception of reality or phenomena on the basis of a sharpened awareness of words. Hence it should be considered to be a sort of phenomenology. Austin’s philosophy itself sharpens our perception of English grammar, although appreciation of its philosophical value has declined. “If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question.” Carnap, Meaning and Necessity “When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or ‘meanings’, whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about . . . For this reason I think it might be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy, some less misunderstanding name than those given above – for instance, ‘linguistic phenomenology’, only that is rather a mouthful.” Austin, Philosophical Papers linguistic meaning Philosophy of language The meaning possessed by a linguistic expression, which is inseparable from linguistic philosophy: In a narrow and technical sense linguistic philosophy is a synonym for ordinary language philosophy, an approach that seeks to illuminate and solve traditional philosophical problems through the investigation of everyday language use. It was characteristic of the Oxford style of analytic philosophy and flourished mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, led by figures such as H. P. Grice, Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin and showing the strong influence of the later Wittgenstein. In a broad sense it is the philosophical method that takes language as a fundamental issue in discussions of philosophy. We must first come to understand the role of language before we understand our ideas and the subjects of the ideas. Starting from Plato and Aristotle, such a linguistic approach has been important, and it became dominant in the twentieth century. The whole of analytic philosophy is linguistic philosophy in this sense, and ordinary language philosophy or linguistic philosophy in the narrow sense is one of its many schools. Linguistic philosophy, which deals with a broad range of philosophical problems in many areas of the subject, can be distinguished from the philosophy of language. “The term ‘linguistic philosophy’ . . . is tied to that quite special version of analytical philosophy which flourished at Oxford in the 1950s and 60s.” Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy linguistic rule: The conventionally accepted rules that constitute or regulate the correct use of the constituent words and grammatical forms of sentences. These rules do not describe empirical facts, but determine necessary truths. Violations of the rules are classically said to result in meaninglessness, although we can often understand ungrammatical and even logically malformed utterances. I understand the meanings of the expressions of my language when I know the system of rules that determine the meanings of the sentences that contain its expressions. Misunderstandings follow from ignorance or misapplication of the rules. The notion of a linguistic rule was emphasized by Carnap and other logical positivists in their discussion of language. Their account opposed the referential theory of language, according to which each word must refer to something external in order to have a meaning. They had specific objections to this account for the logical constants, whose meaning can better be understood as constituted by the laws of logic as linguistic rules. They argued that a referential theory of language requires the existence of unnecessary metaphysical entities and misconstrues the nature of logic and language. Logical positivists argued that discussing meaning in terms of linguistic rules can lead not only to a satisfactory understanding of meaning, but also to an understanding of rationality, because science, which is the model of rationality, is essentially a set of rules governing scientific language. Accordingly, philosophy should be concerned mainly with describing the rules that govern linguistic behavior and uncovering the rule-governed relations between language and experience. Criticisms by Wittgenstein on rule-governed behavior and Quine on analyticity have questioned this account of linguistic rules. “In order to understand this conception of laws of logic as linguistic rules, we should reflect on the method of specifying the meanings of logical constants.” Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science linguistic turn Philosophical method In a broad sense, a movement claiming that the analysis of thought and knowledge must be conducted through the analysis of language and, hence, that language should be the central concern of philosophy. Traditional philosophical problems can be solved by reducing them to issues in the philosophy of language. This movement was initiated by Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein and characterizes twentieth-century analytic philosophy. More narrowly, it is a general tendency, particularly associated with H. P. Grice at Oxford, which suggests that we should deal with philosophical problems by appealing to language as it is actually used. Philosophy must find the logical form of ordinary language, and expose those natural imperfections that have given rise to so many philosophical questions. This trend was influenced by Wittgenstein, and its leaders were figures such as Ryle, Austin, Strawson, and Grice. “Once the linguistic turn had been taken, the fundamental axioms of analytical philosophy – that the only route to the analysis of thought goes through the analysis of language – naturally locutionary act appeared compelling.” Dummett, Origins of Analytical Philosophy linguistic universals: Chomsky’s term, also called universals of language, for the basic similarities contained in all known languages. They are further divided into substantive universals and formal universals. Substantive universals are common abstract syntactic features which can be found in the analysis of any natural language, for example, nouns, verbs, words, sentences, particles, morphemes, and phonemes. Formal universals are the common formal properties of grammatical structures, that is, the general characteristics of the rules that appear in grammar and the ways in which they are interconnected. Linguistic universals are closely connected with the problem of innateness. Chomsky and his followers claim that a child must possess tacit and innate knowledge of these universals and unconsciously apply them to the data of the language he or she is learning in order to grasp that language efficiently. “The study of linguistic universals is the study of the properties of any generative grammar for a natural language.” Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax “Erlebnis,” lived experience Modern European philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science [German Erlebnis, from the verb erleben, to live through] Dilthey’s term for what is immediately given to individual consciousness regarding one’s own thought and feeling. It can also be used for the experience which orients a person’s self-conception and around which an individual life organizes itself. Through lived experience, the meaning of a particular life history unfolds. We can understand society as our world on the basis of our lived experience of the forces that move society. Lived experience is distinguished from Erfahrung [German, scientific experience], the data of experiment and measurement, which can be gathered indirectly. The distinction between lived experience and scientific experience serves as a basis for the distinction between natural sciences and human sciences in Dilthey’s philosophy. He held that the human sciences are grounded in lived experience and are thus a distinct domain from the natural sciences, which are based on scientific experiences. “A more thoroughgoing grounding of the independent status of the human sciences vis-à-vis the natural sciences . . . will be developed step by step in this work through the analysis of our total lived experience of the human world and its incommensurability with all sensory experiences of nature.” Dilthey, Selected Works, vol. I Locke, John (1632–1704) British empiricist philosopher, born in Wrington, Somerset, studied and worked in Oxford, a political associate of the Earl of Shaftesbury. Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) is one of the most important works regarding knowledge and mind. He rejected the doctrine that we have innate ideas and claimed that our mind was like a blank sheet of paper (tabula rasa) at birth. All ideas and all knowledge are ultimately derived from experience, through sensation and reflection. Locke believed in the real existence of an external world, but distinguished between the primary qualities (such as extension and solidity) and secondary qualities (such as color and sound), holding that secondary qualities are not in the objects themselves but that our ideas of them are produced by powers grounded in primary qualities. Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, which appeared anonymously in 1689, is a classic of political liberalism. The first treatise attacked Robert Filmer’s Patriarchia, which advocated the divine right of absolute monarchy, and the second developed a theory of social contract to explain and justify civil government. He argued that the authority of government is justified by the tacit consent of its subjects. For Locke, civil government, in addition to preserving peace, must protect the individual’s right to property. Locke’s Letter on Toleration (1689) provided classic arguments on behalf of religious toleration. locutionary act Philosophy of language [from Latin loqui, speak, utter] Austin’s first level of analysis of speech acts. To perform a locutionary act is to perform the basic linguistic action of uttering sounds that have meaning or definite reference. In doing so, one says something in the central and basic sense of “to say.” Compared with Austin’s two other kinds of speech act, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts, locutionary acts are concerned mainly with meaning. Locutionary acts are further divided into three kinds: phonetic acts, which are merely the act of uttering certain noises; phatic acts, which utter a grammatical sentence; and rhetic acts, which utter something with a certain sense and with a certain reference. “The act of ‘saying something’ in this full normal sense I call, i.e. dub, the performance of a locutionary act, and the study of utterances thus far and in these respects the study of locutions, or of the full units of speech.” Austin, How to Do Things with Words logic, from Greek logos, reason, speech, measure] Logic is the study concerned with the conditions of valid reasoning or the structure and principles of correct inference. It is mainly thought to deal with the form of argument, independent of content, although the distinction between form and content is sometimes questioned. Aristotle, who made logic a special discipline, established the first logical system, which dominated Western conceptions of logic until the twentieth century, when Frege and others developed powerful modern systems of logic. Aristotle referred to his own logical works as analytic, and the technical sense of logic did not appear until the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Logic is now divided into two branches: formal or symbolic logic and philosophical logic. Within formal logic, classical modern logic is based on the development of the propositional calculus and the predicate calculus, although important formal systems that supplement or rival these basic systems have been developed. In philosophical logic, philosophers examine logical terms such as proposition, meaning, truth, falsity, proof, implication, entailment, reference, predication, constant, variable, quantifier, function, necessity, possibility, and tense. Sometimes, especially in the nineteenth century, logic has meant the study of epistemology and scientific methodology, as exemplified in German idealism. “If we use ‘proposition’ as a general name for what, when these forms are exemplified, we introduce or specify by such ‘that’-, ‘whether’- or ‘if-’clauses, then logic is the general theory of the propositions. It has a formal part and a philosophical part.” Strawson (ed.), Philosophical Logic logic: Hegel called his own philosophy the science of logic, but for him logic is not a static formal system of valid deduction. Rather, it concerns the process of thought according to which one category is implied by another, from which it develops as its contradictory. These categories move to unity in a higher whole, which opens the way for further stages of development. For Hegel, this is the fundamental logical process from thesis to antithesis and then to synthesis. This dynamic process, which relates concepts to each other in a systematic way, is the subject-matter of Hegel’s logic. Each concept is one moment, or inseparable part, in the self-reflection of thought. Logic is the examination of this process by which thinking itself works. This logic is thus contrasted to traditional formal logic in the sense that it involves the development of the thinking process rather than the abstract form of deduction. It also involves the contents rather than merely the forms of thinking. Furthermore, Hegel’s logic is also intended to be true of the objective world because the thinking process is the essential structure of all that actually happens in the world. Logic in this sense is also metaphysics. Hegel also called his logic a dialectic of being and dialectic logic. It was further developed by Marx and Engels as a reflection of the ever-changing processes of things based on their immanent contradictions. Critics have asked searching questions about the program of Hegel’s logic and about its details, including the notions of dialectic and contradiction, the thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula, the dynamic aspect of the logic, the relation between logic and metaphysics, the relation between logic and thought, and the ability of Hegelian method to deliver truth. “Logic is the science of the pure idea; pure, that is, because the idea is in the abstract medium of thought.” Hegel, Logic logic of change, another name for tense logic logic of scientific discovery, see demarcation, criterion of logic of terms, another name for predicate logic constituted the secular philosophical library of the early Middle Ages, and became known as the Old Logic [Logica vetus] by contrast with the New Logic – the rest of Aristotle’s Organon – as it became available during the second half of the twelfth century.” Kretzmann et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy logica docens, see logica utens logica modernorum, see logica vetus logica nova, see logica vetus logica utens Logic The distinction between logica utens and logica docens was drawn by medieval logicians and borrowed by Peirce. Logica utens is one’s unreflective judgment of the validity of informal arguments. It is a general idea of what good reasoning is. In contrast, logical docens is the reflective and precise rules of reasoning in formal systems. “Such a classification of arguments, antecedent to any systematic study of the subject, is called the reasoner’s logic utens, in contradistinction to the result of the scientific study, which is called logic docens.” Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. II logica vetus Logic [Latin, old logic] Medieval logicians called Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, and Boethius’ commentaries on them the old logic because these were the logic texts available until the middle of the twelfth century. Aristotle’s other logical books in the Organon, namely Topics, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, and Sophistici Elenchi, were then introduced into the Latin world and were called logica nova (new logic). Medieval logicians called their own development of logic logica modernorum (contemporary logic). Logica modernorum was mainly concerned with the analysis of linguistic fallacies and syncategoremata and its connection with more general topics in logic. This work was stimulated by Aristotle’s discussion of fallacies. “These very short and very difficult books [Categories and De interpretatione], along with a handful of associated treatises stemming from late antiquity, logical analysis: Logical analysis aims to discover the logical forms of propositions, which are often concealed in philosophically crucial cases by the overt structure of language, and to show the philosophical significance of providing correct accounts of different logical forms. It is concerned to show how propositions relate to one another and to provide insight into the underlying structures of language. In a broad sense, logical analysis, as the logical articulation of concepts and statements to gain philosophical understanding, has been a central feature of philosophical method throughout the history of Western philosophy. In a more technical sense, however, logical analysis is a program inspired by Frege’s logic and exemplified in the writings of Russell and Wittgenstein. On the assumption that for philosophical purposes ordinary language is too vague, ambiguous, and misleading in its apparent structure, one approach to analysis sought to replace ordinary discourse by propositions that can be understood in terms of their clear and perspicuous logical form, while another approach claimed that ordinary language needed clarification rather than replacement. Some analysts sought to reduce complex propositions into atomic or elementary propositions, and eventually to terminate their analysis by identifying the constituents of these elementary propositions, while others sought to clarify the logical structure of propositions through paraphrase without subscribing to a reductionist program. Many contemporary analytical philosophers consider logical analysis to be the main activity of philosophy and see their work as inspired by earlier forms of analysis, but they now have important disagreements over what analysis should be. “Logical analysis is, indeed, linguistic in the sense that it begins with an examination of the ways certain expressions are used.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy logical calculus: also called formal language, or by Leibniz calculus ratiocinatur (Latin, a calculus of reasoning). Distinguished from mathematical calculus, which is used for calculation, logical calculus is a syntax of logic or a system used to construct valid arguments. Its basic idea originated with Leibniz, but was developed as a branch of mathematics by Frege and Russell. Any logical calculus must have a list of symbols, a set of axioms, and a set of rules of inference. It can determine the construction of a logical formula and whether a sequence of logical formulae forms a proof. Different calculi are concerned with different kinds of valid forms of argument. The most influential logical calculi in modern logic are the propositional calculus and the predicate calculus. “The logical calculus, therefore, is, in all other parts of mathematics, of quite fundamental importance. It supplies, together with arithmetic, the type of all possible judgements concerning manifolds as such.” Russell, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. II logical consequence: if a statement B can be validly inferred or deduced from the premises A 1, A 2, . . . A n, in such a way that it is impossible that all the premises A 1, A 2, . . . A n can be true while B is false, then B is a logical consequence of these premises. Every consequence of true propositions must be true. The deductive relation that holds between premises and the conclusion is independent of the subject-matter of the words contained in premises and conclusion. Logical consequence is generally symbolized by a double turnstile 1. That B is the logical consequence of A 1, A 2, . . . A n, can be written “A1, A 2, . . . A n 1 B.” Logical consequence is a synonym of logical implication. It indicates that there is a necessary relationship between premises and conclusion. The inference is necessary, leading invariably to true conclusions from true premises. “We can define the concept of logical consequence as follows: The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the sentence X.” Tarski, Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics logical constant Logic The structural components of a sentence that indicate its logical form. Their significance does not depend upon their subject-matter, rather they serve as operators of inference. Any word in a formula can be a constant, but not necessarily a logical constant; for example bachelor is a constant, but not a logical constant. The choice of expressions that can count as logical constants varies among logicians. We can follow Quine by enumerating logical constants as basic particles, such as the truth-functions not, and, or, and implies; the identity relation, equivalence, and the quantifiers some and all. We can also include necessarily and possibly for modal logic, past, present, and future for tense logic and similarly basic terms for other kinds of logic. It is not clear whether we can go beyond enumeration to provide a principle justifying a choice of terms as logical constants. Each logical constant has a symbolic counterpart in symbolic logic. A formula that contains logical constants as its only constants is called a logical formula. “Expressions dignified by selection by formal logicians to figure as constants in their representative verbal patterns or formulae are sometimes called ‘logical (formal) constants’.” Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory logical construction: Reductive analytical procedure seeking to show that a symbol purporting to refer to an inferred entity can be replaced by a symbol whose denotation is given in sense-experience. On this view, any sentence containing a term denoting an inferred entity can be analyzed or translated into some sentence that does not contain such terms, but consists only of terms for items which are available to experience. In this sense, logical constructions provide analyses of sentences containing terms such as Russellian incomplete symbols, but are not identical with the sentences that they analyze. Russell extends this method from mathematics to the physical world, and reconstructs physical objects in terms of sets of sense-data or sensations. Epistemologically he brings physical objects closer in their nature to the experiential foundations of our knowledge, and metaphysically he eliminates logical fiction inferred entities such as matter, the self, and other minds. Logical construction as a method has been widely adopted in many areas of analytical philosophy. In another sense Russell also applies the term “logical construction” to symbols or entities constructed out of other entities, and thus makes logical constructions identical with incomplete symbols and logical fictions. “The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this: wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. VII logical construction theory: Broad’s term for the bundle theory of mind – see Grice, “The logical-construction theory of personal identity.” logical determinism: Since ancient Greece, some philosophers have believed that logic supports the thesis that a person’s fate is predetermined and that there is nothing we can do to alter it or to avoid what will happen. Any statement about the future must be either true or false now. Correspondingly, the future event it represents may either happen or not happen. Hence a statement about the future is either true before the event takes place or false before the event fails to occur. There is nothing that anyone can do to alter the truth or falsity of the statement or the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event. Stoics and scholastics advocated this doctrine to prove fatalism or God’s omniscience. The issue was first discussed by Aristotle in De Interpretatione, with the example of the sea-battle tomorrow. Aristotle’s implicit solution is that we should deny the universal validity of the principle of bivalence. The future statement is neither true nor false before the event actually occurs. This is developed in contemporary logic into three-valued or many-valued logic. Others suggest that we can deal with the problem by distinguishing different modal conceptions. Only a necessary statement entails that the event will necessarily happen. The issue is still a matter of controversy. “Logical determinism maintains that the future is already fixed as unalterably as the past.” Lucas, The Freedom of the Will logical empiricism: Another term for the philosophy of the Vienna Circle and broadly equivalent to logical positivism. Some members of the circle, including Schlick, preferred to call their philosophy “logical empiricism.” This title indicates their affinity with the British empiricist tradition and their development of that tradition through the methodology of empirical science and, more important, the logical analysis of language. This analysis sought to characterize elementary propositions and to test them against experience (according to the verification principle), as empiricism requires. For the main philosophical content of logical empiricism, see logical positivism. “The positivist theory of meaning has found its most precise formulation in contemporary logical positivism (or ‘logical empiricism’) . . . : it is postulated that concepts be formed in such a way that it is empirically decidable whether the concept does or does not apply in a given sense.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy logical equivalence: the relationship of logical equivalence between two propositions is one of mutual inference. If p is logically equivalent to q, then we can derive p from q and q from p in accordance with logical rules. The denial of such a deduction is selfcontradictory. We may also define p in terms of q, or q in terms of p. If two sentences are logically equivalent, they denote the same proposition. Logical equivalence should be distinguished from material equivalence, according to which two propositions have the same truth-value (either both true or both false), without necessarily being mutually deducible. “ ‘p’ and ‘q’ . . . are logically equivalent if they are mutually deducible such that it would be self-contradictory to affirm p and to deny q, or to affirm q and to deny p.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy logical falsity, see logical truth logical fiction Philosophy of language, metaphysics Also called pseudo-object. A type of logical construction according to which symbols are constructed from the characteristics of entities they do not denote. They are fictions because these symbols at first glance appear to denote some entities, but upon analysis this turns out to be false. Symbols that are logical fictions are symbolic devices only and do not denote any constituent of the world. The objects they appear to denote do not have their own being and are not constituents of reality. In logic and mathematics, Russell considered such crucial conceptions as classes, the class of classes, and numbers as logical fictions. As non-referring descriptions they are all incomplete symbols, that is, they do not have meaning in themselves but have meaning only as used in the context of a proposition. philosophical trouble. In Ayer’s illustration, “Martyre exists” and “Martyre suffers” have the same grammatical form, for each sentence consists of a noun following an intransitive verb. From this people infer that “to exist” is an attributive verb like “to suffer,” but the logical form of existential sentences is very different from the logical form of sentences ascribing a feature to a subject. “What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus logical formula, see logical constant “There may be no entity named by the eliminable symbol at all; if this is the case, the object seemingly referred to by the symbol under analysis may be called a ‘logical fiction’ (Russell) or a ‘pseudo-object’ (Carnap).” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy. logical grammar, another term for logical syntax logical implication, another term for logical consequence logical modality, see modality logical form; the pattern or structure of a statement or proposition that is shared with other propositions of the same type. To discover the hidden logical form from natural language is precisely the task of logic starting from Aristotle, from whom the term “formal logic” derives. Logical form is topic-neutral, for it is independent of the content of the proposition. An inference is valid or invalid in virtue of the logical form of argument. Arguments that share the same logical form have the same validity. The logical form of a proposition is determined by its constituents. A fully general proposition is a logical form closed by universal quantification. According to the doctrine of logical atomism, philosophy as logical analysis is a matter purely concerned with logical form. On this view, logical form corresponds to the basic structure of reality, for which it provides a logical picture. Some analytical philosophers tend to distinguish logical form from grammatical form, which is the surface grammatical structure of a sentence. The fact that two sentences share the same grammatical form does not entail that they share the same logical form. On the contrary, grammatical form can cover a difference of logical form and give rise to logical necessity Logic The necessity of what is logically true and guaranteed by the laws of logic. The nature and standard of logically necessary propositions has been a major concern from Leibniz to Wittgenstein, Carnap, C. I. Lewis, Kripke, and Hintikka. Logical necessity has a set of different but connected senses. It is a property attributable to a proposition P, which according to Kripke’s modal semantics means that P is true in all possible worlds. Denying such truths would conflict with the laws of logic and render all thinking chaotic. Logical necessity is equivalent to conceptual necessity or being non-contingent. It is ascribed to analytical truths, originally understood as subject-predicate sentences in which the predicate term is contained in the subject, but now understood as sentences that are true in virtue of their logical form alone. In another sense, all consequences deduced from the laws of logic are truths having logical necessity. It is a matter of debate whether logical necessity is the sole valid form of necessity and whether necessity is confined to the sphere of ideas rather than the sphere of facts. Logical truths and, according to standard accounts, mathematical truths are logically necessary, and logical positivism there are different views whether we can specify acceptable independent notions of metaphysical, transcendental, physical, nomic, or theoretical necessity. There is also debate about whether logical necessity is conventional and varies according to different logical systems. If so, there are questions about what gives the “hardness” to logical necessity and whether logical necessity is a matter of convention, discovery, construction, or choice. “A logical necessity . . . is nothing but the necessity of holding-to-be-true according to logical laws of the understanding and of reason.” Kant, Lectures on Logic logical oddness: P. H. Nowell-Smith’s term, referring to the denial of contextual implications. If P contextually implies Q, then to assert P we would naturally assert Q. But if one asserts P, but denies Q, or asks whether Q, one acts in a way that is logically odd. In the former case, the person denying Q is in a self-contradiction. In the latter case, the answer to the person’s question has already been implied, and no further or better answer can be expected to be given. “I shall say that a question is ‘logically odd’ if there appears to be no further room for it in its context because it has already been answered.” Nowell-Smith, Ethics logical paradox Logic Russell believed that his ramified set theory provides a unified solution for all paradoxes, but Ramsey claims that there are two kinds of paradoxes: logical or set-theoretical paradoxes and semantic paradoxes. Logical paradoxes occur in a logical or mathematical system and are synonymous with antinomies. They are represented by Russell’s paradox, Burali-Forti’s paradox, and Cantor’s paradox. They arise because of the peculiar nature of some set-theoretical concepts or due to faulty logic and mathematics. Semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox arise, on the other hand, because of ambiguities with respect to certain of the terms or notions employed. The general solution to logical paradoxes is to restrict the principles governing the existence of sets. “A number of paradoxes known variously as the Antinomies or the logical paradoxes are often said to share the common feature of self-reference.” Champlin, Reflective Paradoxes logical picture, another term for logical form logical positivism Epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics A general philosophical position, also called logical empiricism, developed from the 1920s by members of the Vienna Circle, such as Schlick, Neurath, and Carnap, on the basis of traditional empirical thought and the development of modern logic. Logical positivism confines knowledge to science. It divides all meaningful propositions into two categories: analytic propositions, which are necessarily true and can be known a priori; and synthetic propositions, which are contingent and can be known empirically or a posteriori. On the one hand, logical positivism pays special attention to mathematics and logic and develops logical syntax and semantics in order to reveal the logical structure of the world. On the other hand, it insists on verificationism, that is, that the meaning of a proposition consists in its method of verification. A purportedly empirical or factual proposition is meaningless if it proves incapable of being verified in experience. All justified beliefs can be reduced ultimately to protocol statements, which can be shown to be true directly without inference from other statements. On this basis, logical positivism claims that traditional metaphysical problems are not false but meaningless, for they cannot be shown to be true by a priori analysis and cannot be verified in experience. With these two approaches exhausted, they have no truth-value and are meaningless. Logical positivism greatly promoted the development of analytical philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century, but after the Second World War, all of its major tenets were criticized respectively by Quine and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. “ ‘Logical positivism’ is a name for a method, not for a certain kind of result. A philosopher is a logical positivist if he holds that there is no special way of knowing that is peculiar to philosophy, but that questions of fact can only be decided by the empirical methods of science, while questions that can be decided without appeal to experience are either mathematical or linguistic.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge logical product, see logical sum logical proposition, see fully generalized proposition logical/real opposition Epistemology, metaphysics A dichotomy that Kant introduced in his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy. A logical opposition is an abstract relation between a proposition and its negation, namely logical contradiction, which can be discerned through conceptual analysis. A real opposition involves opposing forces or tendencies that exist in the qualities of external things and can be discovered through empirical methods rather than through logical analysis. The distinction undermines the claim of rationalism that reason alone is the guarantee of knowledge, because we cannot understand real oppositions through reason alone. This distinction developed into the distinction between reason and sensibility in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. “Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels that which is posited by the other. This opposition is two-fold: it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real, that is to say, without contradiction.” Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. a universe composed of all possible-and-existing states of affairs and all possible-and-non-existing states of affairs. For Russell, it is a system of proper logical relations. Wittgenstein makes use of this conception to show that facts do not compose the world as a heap and that there is a structure of logical relations amongst them. The world is the totality of facts in logical space. “The logician is led to give the name ‘space’ to any system of relations having the same or similar logical properties.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. VI logical sum Logic A logical sum results from the disjunction of two propositions (p ∨ q), or from the union of two sets. It is the inclusive sense of the connective “or,” that is, “p or q or both” (rather than the exclusive sense of “or,” that is, “p or q, but not both”). The logical sum is contrasted to the logical product, which results from the conjunction of two propositions (p ∧ q), or from the intersection of two sets. The logical product is the truth-functional compound of p and q, that is, its truth-value is determined by the truth-value of p, the truth-value of q, and the logical connective “and.” “Frege and Russell introduced generality in association with logical product or logical sum.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus logical sentence Logic A sentence that consists solely of logical symbols. It is either analytical and, hence, a logical truth or contradictory and, hence, a logical falsehood. Such a sentence is the same as a logical formula. “A logical sentence is one that contains only logical signs.” Bergmann, Meaning and Existence logical space Logic, metaphysics The possible ways in which objects can combine into states of affairs. The term is used by analogy to physical space, which presents us with a set of locations, positions, or places that can be occupied by objects in relation to other objects. Logical space is thus the ensemble of logical possibilities, logical syntax Logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics Also called logical grammar. A system of rules governing the use of signs, which determines whether a combination of signs can be a proposition, that is, whether it can represent a logically possible state of affairs. Logical syntax belongs to the purely formal part of a logical system and is discovered through logical analysis. It aims to display the hidden logical forms of propositions. In contrast to the surface syntax or grammar of ordinary language, it is the syntax of logical or ideal language. Aside from avoiding the use of the same sign for different significations, it is not concerned with the meaning of the signs. It excludes some combinations of signs as nonsense. To say that traditional metaphysical problems are nonsensical means that they violate logically impossible logical syntax. The term was used in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, but is abandoned in his later works. Carnap attempts to establish such a system in his Logical Syntax of Language (1934). “In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar – by logical syntax.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus logical truth Logic, epistemology A logical symbol or logical formula can be a logical truth because it is true under all interpretations. A statement or proposition is logically true if it is validly deduced in a logical system. In this sense, a logical truth is generally a theorem of a logical system. More often, we say that a statement is a logical truth because it is an instance of a valid logical form. For example, “A house cannot be both warm and not warm.” The logical form of this sentence is “not both p and nonp,” and it is thus in accord with the principle of noncontradiction. If a statement is logically true, then it is analytic and is necessarily true. On the contrary, if a statement violates a logically valid form, that is, if its logical form conflicts with some logical principle, it is logically false or a logical falsity. If a statement is logically false, it is necessarily false. Accounts of the kind of logical truth that depends upon the meaning of the expressions contained in a proposition have come under pressure from Quine’s rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notions of synonymy and meaning. Without reliance on meaning, a logical truth becomes any truth which can be obtained from a valid logical scheme. “A logical schema is valid if every sentence obtainable from it by substituting sentences for simple sentence is true. A logical truth, finally, is a truth obtainable from a valid logical schema.” Quine, Philosophy of Logic logical type Logic Words or expressions can be classified into a hierarchy of classes, such as individuals, classes, class of classes, and so on. The logical type of a word or an expression is the class it is in. When two words a and b are of the same logical type, for any sentential function Fx, Fa and Fb are either both meaningful or both meaningless. In “Socrates is a philosopher” and “Aristotle is a philosopher,” “Socrates” and “Aristotle” are of the same logical type, for both of them are individuals. Yet this does not extend to “A man is a philosopher.” For “man” is a class, and hence is of a different type. “The definition of a logical type is as follows: A and B are of the same logical type if, and only if, given any fact of which A is a constituent, there is a corresponding fact which has B as a constituent, which either results by substituting B for A, or is the negation of what so results.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. IX logical words: Russell divides words into two kinds: factual words, which contribute to indicating facts, and logical words, which contribute to indicating the structures of sentences and inferences. He further divides logical words into two kinds: general words like quantifiers such as “all” (universal) and “some” (existential) and conjunctions such as “not” (unary), “and” (dyadic co-ordinating), “or” (dyadic co-ordinating) and “if” (dyadic sub-ordinating) by means of which we combine atomic sentences into molecular sentences and make various inferences. Logical words are also called logical constants. Although there is broad agreement in the enumeration of the logical constants, it is much more difficult to determine why certain words have this status. “There are logical words such as ‘not,’ ‘and,’ ‘or’, ‘if’, ‘some’, ‘all,’ ‘some (at least one), and ‘the’”. Russell, Human Knowledge logically impossible Logic A purported state of affairs or fact that violates the laws of logic, and is therefore inconsistent or self-contradictory, is logically impossible. For instance, “God is a skeptic” is logically impossible because it would be self-contradictory to ascribe skepticism to a being defined as having perfect knowledge. The logically impossible should be distinguished at least from metaphysical, epistemic, and scientific impossibility, each with its own grounds. A proposition is scientifically impossible, for example, if it violates the laws of nature. Propositions are logically possible if they do not violate the laws of logic. We do not necessarily know of every proposition whether it is logically possible or logically impossible. Nor do we have a clear understanding of how different kinds of impossibility and different kinds of possibility are related. “When we hold a proposition to be logically impossible, we are claiming that it is incompatible with some general proposition which is itself logically true.” Ayer, Probability and Evidence logically perfect language Logic, philosophy of language Also called an artificial language or ideal language. Because they were dissatisfied with the ambiguities and bewildering syntax of ordinary language and because they believed that these difficulties formed the main obstacles to progress in philosophy, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein followed Leibniz in advancing the project of an ideal or logically perfect language. Such a language would have both perfect syntax and perfect vocabulary. Perfect syntax would be provided by classical predicate calculus with identity, and the perfect vocabulary would include only unanalyzable words holding of simple objects. A perfect language would immediately show the logical structure of its propositions and the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied, and in a perfect language the logical form and the grammatical form would entirely coincide, so conforming to the logical requirement that language should avoid contradiction. A sample of perfect language is the language of mathematical logic. Russell sometimes thinks that such a language will afford insight into the nature of language in general and that in this way its significance is to make graphic some metaphysical and epistemological doctrines. Because this language would be entirely free from the philosophical defects of ordinary language that Russell and Wittgenstein claim to discover, such as ambiguity, vagueness, and singular terms without reference, it is also called an ideal language. A logically perfect language is supposed to represent our thought perfectly, but having a language that expresses any one thought in only one way is generally regarded as an unattainable ideal. Furthermore, many philosophers follow the later Wittgenstein in rejecting a logically perfect language as a proper ideal to guide philosophical work. Nevertheless, a narrow notion of a logically perfect language, incorporating only the logical symbolism of Frege and Russell (predicate calculus and propositional calculus) supplemented by later logical developments, is regarded as providing a reliable instrument for carrying out deductive inferences without the risk of fallacy. This goal has been achieved to a great extent, but without fulfilling earlier promises of fundamental consequences for the whole of philosophy. “In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that center in one word for each simple component.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge logically possible, see logically impossible logically proper name Logic, philosophy of language A proper name is a simple symbol designating a particular. Russell distinguishes ordinary proper names from logically proper names. An ordinary proper name, such as “Socrates” or “The Golden Mountain” has a sense, but it has its sense because it is, in fact, a description in disguise. It is not always the case that there is a bearer that satisfies the description. Logically proper names are egocentric words or indexical words, such as “I,” “this,” “that,” and “here.” They are names for items available in current experiences, and have their meaning solely in terms of the objects they stand for. If such an object does not exist, a logically proper name is meaningless. Its meaning changes if the object it designates changes. Hence, a logically proper name refers to an object, and it refers directly without any implicit description. It denotes, but it does not connote anything. This distinction between ordinary proper names and logically proper names is crucial to Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. Whether any term can function as a logically proper name is discussed within the general context of the theory of names. “The mark of a logically proper name being that its significant use entailed the existence of the object which it was supposed to denote.” Ayer, Metaphysics and Common Sense logicism Philosophy of mathematics An approach to philosophy of mathematics developed by Frege, Russell, and Carnap, which claims that logic provides the foundations of mathematics, such that the two are continuous and even identical. According to Russell, logic has two parts: one is philosophical and deals with forms of reality and formal analysis; the other is mathematical and deals with the foundations of mathematics and the theorems deduced from these foundations. This mathematical part, which justifies the term “logicism,” is also called symbolic logic, logistic, or mathematical logic. In contrast to two other major forms of philosophy of mathematics, namely intuitionism and formalism, logicism believes that every mathematical truth – or at least the most significant ones – can be expressed as a true logical proposition which is a logical truth, and that all such truths can be deduced from a small number of logical axioms and rules. Logicism is thus a program to translate the basic mathematical ideas and theorems into logic in order to ensure that mathematical truth has the same epistemological status as logical truth. The classical presentations of logicism can be found in Frege’s Foundation of Arithmetic and Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. However, to avoid paradoxes Russell introduced set theory into his program and extended the basis of logicism beyond the purely logical. Quine argues that logicism succeeds in reducing mathematics not to logic but to logic plus set theory. However, the current close relationship between the study of mathematics and the study of logic is inspired by logicism. “Logicism, represented by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Church, and Carnap, condones the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities known or unknown, specifiable and unspecifiable, indiscriminately.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View logistic, another term for logicism l ogistic method Logic The method of constructing a formal deduction system. It starts with a specification of the primitive symbols. A sequence of symbols acceptable in a system is called a sentence or a well-formed formula. Certain well-formed formulae are singled out as axioms, and a set of rules of inference are laid down, according to which some well-formed formulae can be inferred from other well-formed formulae, which serve as premises. The method establishes a decision procedure that determines in accordance with rules of inference whether an arbitrary formula is a theorem of the system. The aim of this method is to make deductive reasoning mathematically precise and to deal with the major features of a theory, such as implication, compatibility, and interdependence, in a formal way. The formalized system of logic built by this method is called a logistic system. “By the logistic method, the principles of logic are not antecedently presumed as rules of demonstration.” Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic logistic system, see logistic method logocentrism Modern European philosophy A postmodernist characterization of the Western metaphysical tradition, taking logos (reason) as the locus of truth and meaning and believing that truth can be known by the subject via the inner light of reason. This tradition takes being as subject-matter and is excessively concerned to establish a hierarchical ordering of various conceptual oppositions and to maintain the stability of meaning and the validity of reason. According to this criticism, Western metaphysics neglects the complexity of reason in the life-world and restricts it to its cognitiveinstrumental dimension. The dominant concern of traditional metaphysics with the articulation of the source of order and structure of things is based on its cosmological and ontological assumption that the world has an ordered ground. Logocentrism is the target of Derrida’s deconstruction. In his view, philosophy should be concerned with the condition of the possibility of logos, rather than viewing logos as the condition of the possibility of truth. For Derrida, logocentrism presents itself chiefly in history as phonologism, or the emphasis of speech over writing. “Phonologism” is always used by Derrida as a synonym for “logocentrism.” “Logocentrism would thus support the determination of the being of the entity as presence. To the extent that such a logocentrism is not totally absent from Heidegger’s thought, perhaps it still holds that thought within the epoch of onto-theology, within the philosophy of presence, that is to say, within philosophy itself.” Derrida, Of Grammatology logos Metaphysics [Greek, from the verb legein, to say, to speak] From its basic meaning of anything said, a term with a wide range of derivative meanings, including speech, reputation, thought, cause, reason, argument, measure, structure, proportion, ratio, relation, principle, formula, and definition. Its exact meaning must be decided in context, but three meanings had greatest prominence in Greek philosophy: (1) in the philosophy of Heraclitus, who first uses logos as a technical term, an objective universal principle which is equally true and equally accessible for all; Stoicism also took logos to be a cosmic force, the principle both of knowledge and of causation; (2) the rational part of the soul; (3) an account or, more precisely, an account expressing the essential nature of anything, that is, a definition. The second and third meanings played a great role in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. “Listen not to me but to the Logos.” Heraclitus, in Diels and Kranze, Die Fregmente Der Vorsokratiker lottery paradox Logic A paradox formulated by Henry Kyburg in Probability of the Logic of Rational Belief (1961). I believe rationally that of a million lottery tickets there is one that will win. But I do not believe rationally that Ticket 1 will win, nor do I believe that Ticket 2 will win, and so on through all the tickets. Eventually there is no reason to believe that any single ticket will win. A paradox then arises, for I certainly believe that there is one ticket that will win. The paradox involves the relation between partial belief and full belief. Lotze, Rudolf Hermann (1817–81) German idealist philosopher. Lotze accepted mechanistic explanation for nature, but argued against the possibility of explaining consciousness in this way. He held that causally interacting entities must be conceived of on the model of consciousness as finite spirits that are grounded in an infinite spirit aiming to realize moral goodness. His major works include Microcosmos (1856–64), Logic (1874), and Metaphysics (1879). love Ethics, philosophy of mind As commonly understood, love is closely related to sexual affection. Some philosophers, such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, regard it as a natural impulse. But in the history of Western philosophy, love has been treated in various ways under different names, such as eros, philia, agape (universal benevolence), Romantic love, Sacred love (the love of God), comradeship, sympathy, care, and concern. Plato in his Symposium and Phaedrus argued that love (eros) begins with a desire for personal beauty, but its spiritual ascent culminates in a desire for beauty in itself, that is, the love of wisdom, which is philosophy in its original sense. Spiritual and divine love, which has been a major philosophical theme from the Neoplatonists to Augustine and Dante, still inspires many writers. Aristotle held that true love (philia, friendship) between virtuous people enables one to look after another for the other person’s sake. In the final analysis, however, he considered true love to be a form of self-love that is obedient to one’s rational voice. Aristotle is highly praised in contemporary virtue ethics for taking love or personal attachment into the sphere of ethical consideration. Feminism tends to develop a related ethics of care. However, since love involves partiality in personal relationships and emotions, an issue has arisen about the possibility of reconciling love with the impartial requirements of morality. “All the lottery paradox shows in any case is that in some circumstances a claim to knowledge is not adequately supported by the reasonableness of any particular partial belief however strong.” “In spite of all the misuses to which the word love is subjected, in literature and daily life, it has not lost its emotional power. It elicits a feeling of warmth, of passion, of happiness, or fulfilment, whenever it is used.” Tillich, Love, Power and Justice. Mellor, The Matter of Chance Löwenheim–Skolem paradox, see Skolem’s theorem. loyalty Ethics, political philosophy A trait of character marked by faithfulness and devotion to a person, a group, a country, a cause, or a principle. Such a feeling is not easily altered either by external forces or by the discovery that the object of loyalty lacks its supposed merits. Loyalty is related to compassion and gratitude. It is classed as a virtue because it involves selfless commitment. The stability of any political society requires at least some loyalty on the part of its citizens. In contrast to measured loyalty, loyalty can be blind and unreflective, even to the extent of taking the object of loyalty to be sacred. Because loyalty is always partial and emotional, it is difficult to reconcile with the impartial requirements of morality. “The feeling of allegiance, or loyalty . . . may vary in its objects . . . but whether in a democracy or in a monarchy, its essence is always the same; viz. that there be in the constitution of state something which is settled, something permanent, and not to be called in question; something which, by general agreement, has a right to be what it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else may change.” The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. X. of subject and object in terms of Marxist dialectics. The interpretation, which diverged from orthodox Marxist analysis of culture as superstructural phenomena related to an economic base, was worked out before the discovery of the more Hegelian doctrines of Marx’s early Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Lukács also made great contributions to the reconstruction of the philosophy of the young Marx and to aesthetics, especially in his theory of the novel. His other major books include The Soul and its Forms (1911), The Theory of the Novel (1920), The Young Hegel (1948), The Destruction of Reason (1954), and Problems of Aesthetics (1969). Lukasiewicz, Jan (1878–1956) Polish logician, born in Lvov, Professor and Rector at University of Warsaw, Professor, Royal Irish Academy. Lukasiewicz founded three-valued logic that denied the principle of bivalence in order to deal with Aristotle’s questions about the truth of future-tense statements in a way that would allow for human freedom. He used his system to deal with modal logic, and his work led to a wider range of multi-valued logics. He also introduced Polish notation in logic, reinterpreted Aristotelian syllogistic, and revived interest in Stoic logic. His major works include Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic (1957) and Selected Works (1970). Lucretius (c.95–c.54 bc) Roman Epicurean philosopher, little is known about his life and character. Lucretius wrote the long philosophical poem De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things). This work systematically expounded the Epicurean philosophy of atomism and is the main source for our knowledge of its doctrines. The book, published by Cicero, is also one of the greatest Latin literary works. Lukács, Gyorgy (1885–1971) Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary theorist, born in Budapest. In his most influential book, History and Class Consciousness (1923), Lukács developed a Hegelian interpretation of Marxist thought by focusing on the notions of reification and alienation, and sought to overcome the duality Luther, Martin (1483–1546) German theologian, Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Theology at University of Wittenberg. Luther was the leader of the Protestant Reformation. He argued for the priority of grace and revelation over reason in religion and for justification and, hence, salvation, through faith alone. His works are collected in Luther’s Works. lying Ethics Deliberately saying what one knows or believes to be false in order to deceive one or more other persons. Liars have one thing in their mind and state another conflicting claim with the intention to deceive, or at least with a lack of care about the possibility of deceiving. There is disagreement whether there should be a universal moral prohibition against lying. Both Aquinas and Kant denounced lying as a moral vice. For Kant, truthfulness constitutes a basic moral relationship between rational beings. Because it violates this relationship, lying is wrong in itself, whether or not it produces good consequences. J. S. Mill, on the other hand, argued that lying to avoid a greater evil could be justified. This is also the position implied by Plato’s concept of the noble lie. According to the utilitarian principle that an act is morally permissible if it maximizes the good, lying is not simply an evil, but must be judged according to its good or bad consequences. Accordingly, the treatment of lying is an area in which the difference between deontology and utilitarianism is clearly indicated. “I shall define as a lie any intentionally deceptive message which is stated.” Bok, Lying Lyotard, Jean-François (1924–98) French postmodernist, Professor of Philosophy, University of Paris VIII (Vincennes) and University of California, Irvine. Lyotard rejected his early Marxism and other modernist grand narratives promising truth and justice on the grounds of their implausibility and authoritarianism. He favored little narratives of individuals that pragmatically aim at freedom from specific abuses and held that the discourses of these little narratives are incommensurable. He argued that differends, capturing the incommensurability between the language-games of conflicting narratives, are intractable and frustrate Habermas’s proposal to reconcile differences through communication in ideal speech situations. His main works include The Post-modern Condition (1979) and The Differend (1983). Mach, Ernst (1838–1916) Austrian physicist and empiricist philosopher of science, born in Turas, Moravia. Mach held that science rests on sense-experience and that all branches of sciences can be unified because they are all studies of sensations. A scientific theory does not represent reality, but is an aid to predicting how things will occur. As a radical empiricist, he was deeply suspicious of any metaphysical speculation about unobservable entities and focused on the logical analysis of the structure of scientific theory. Mach’s philosophy was a precursor of logical positivism and also exerted great influence on Einstein. His views were bitterly criticized by Lenin in Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1908). Mach made important scientific discoveries in various fields of physics, especially in aeronautical design and the science of projectiles. His major works include The Science of Mechanics (1883) and The Analysis of Sensations (1906). Machiavelli, Niccoló (1496–1527) Italian political theorist and statesman, born in Florence. Machiavelli’s masterpiece, The Prince (completed 1513, published posthumously 1532), was a handbook for rulers about how to acquire and maintain power. He held that men are dominated by self-interest and contended that effective rulers should be indifferent to conventional moral standards and other constraints. Immoral means are justified if they are necessary to promote the order and stability of the state. The state should be an organic political entity independent of the Church. His other works include Discourses (1516), Art of War (1520), and Florentine Histories (1525). machine functionalism Philosophy of mind A type of functionalism proposed by Putnam, also called Turing machine functionalism, which understands the mind’s function as the operation of the computational states of a Turing machine. It claims that each mental state is identical to a machine-table state and can be defined simply in terms of the latter. A difficulty facing this version of functionalism is that while a Turing machine can only be in one computational state at a time, a mind can have several psychological states at the same time. “Putnam envisioned a theory of mind whose explications of individual mental state-types would take the form ‘to be in a mental state M is to realize or instantiate machine program P and be in functional state S relative to P’. Let us call the view that some such set of explications is correct machine functionalism.” Lycan, Consciousness MacIntyre, Alasdair, Glasgow-born philosopher and historian of philosophy, born in Glasgow, Fellow of University College, Oxford and Professor at Universities of Essex, Boston, Vanderbilt, and Notre Dame. MacIntyre argues that moral concepts make sense only within the context of historically alterable institutions and practices and that modern liberal moral theory, rather than an advance on Greek and medieval morality, is a symptom of the collapse of meaningful social patterns. Practices also shape conceptions of rationality that can be used to judge among moral orders and to seek to overcome the disarray of modern moral life. His major works include A Short History of Ethics (1966), After Virtue (1981), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990). Mind and World (1994), Mind, Value, and Reality (1998) and Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality (1998). Mackie, J. L. Sidney-born philosopher, born in Sydney, Professor of Philosophy, Universities of Otago, Sydney, and York and Fellow of University College, Oxford. In his important study of causation, Mackie argues that a cause is an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition of an effect. He claims that singular causal statements have priority over causal laws and as counterfactual statements incorporate notions of natural necessity. Mackie argues that our moral thought depends on the objectivity of ethical values, but that claims for this objectivity are groundless. Instead, we must reinvent our moral vocabulary without commitment to moral objectivity as a means of regulating our communal life. His major works include The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (1974) and Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977). macrocosm Ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics Macrocosm means large world-system, in contrast to microcosm, which means little world-system; the former refers to the universe which was, in the mind of the ancient Greeks, an organic living being, and the latter refers to man. Thus, the universe is a large creature and man is the small universe. It is said that Democritus was the first to use the term microcosm to refer to man. This analogy reflects the intimate relationship between the universe and the human body, the natural bounty and human goodness. This analogy pervades almost all Greek philosophy. In Leibniz, monads are microcosms of the world, since each in itself mirrors the entire universe. McDowell, J. H., Johannesburg-born pilosopher of mind, language and ethics, Fellow of University College, Oxford and Professor of Philosophy at University of Pittsburgh. McDowell has published important papers over a wide range of topics, including meaning and truth, sense and reference, intentionality, practical reason and virtue. He has written on Plato and Aristotle, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein and many contemporary analytic philosophers, but his own systematic philosophy also shows the influence of Hegel and Heidegger. He has developed a naturalist account of human knowledge, thought, value and action, but his naturalism allows a realist view of mental states and an externalist view of meaning. His main works include magnanimity, another expression for great-soulness McTaggart, John (1866–1925) British metaphysical philosopher of time and scholar of Hegel, born in London, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. McTaggart was a clear and rigorous ontological idealist who was indebted to Spinoza and a major expositor of Hegelian method. He is remembered chiefly for his arguments for the unreality of time. His main works are A Commentary on Hegel’s Logic (1910) and Nature of Existence, 2 vols. (1921–7). “If it can occur in microcosm it can also occur in macrocosm.” Aristotle, Physics maieutic method, another term for midwifery Maimonides, Moses (1135–1204) The leading medieval Jewish philosopher, born in Córdoba, Spain and lived mainly in Cairo. In his major philosophy work, The Guide to the Perplexed (1190), Maimonides sought to explain scriptural terms through the study of Aristotle’s philosophy and to resolve the perplexities arising from tensions between Greek philosophy and the teachings of Judaism. His studies contributed to the rediscovery of Aristotle in the West. Maimonides developed a negative theology, holding that we can know what malicious demon God is not, but cannot ascribe any positive attribute to God. He also held that only just souls can be immortal. Maimonides greatly influenced Aquinas and Spinoza. dissimulating, in some varieties he may not be quite sure to what extent, if any, he is simulating or dissimulating, and in other varieties he is completely taken by his own acting.” Ryle, The Concept of Mind Maine de Biran, François-Pierre (1766–1824) French empiricist philosopher. Maine de Biran focused on the inner experience of our belief and will to justify our claims to know our own existence, the existence of a necessary connection between cause and effect, the existence of other persons, and the existence of the external world. His main work is Essay on the Foundation of Psychology (1812). major premise Logic In a standard categorical syllogism, which consists of two premises and one conclusion, the predicate of the conclusion is called the major term, and its subject, the minor term. The term that appears twice in the premises but not in the conclusion is called the middle term. The premise that contains the major term is called the major premise, while the premise that contains the minor term is called the minor premise. “The major premise, by definition, is the one that contains the major term.” Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic make-believe Philosophy of mind, epistemology, aesthetics A state of mind that is close to pretending and to the exercise of aesthetic imagination. A person knows that an object is not genuine or does not even exist, but ignores the distinction between the real and the not real and accepts being affected by the object as if it were real or had a different character. In a welllit room a child plays that the fur rug is a bear. He knows that it is not really a bear. When the light is off, however, the child might lose a sense of safety because of the make-believe and fear that there really is a bear in the room. In some cases, make-believe carries the possibility of taking the imagined as real; in other cases, this possibility does not arise or exists only at the margins of awareness and interpretation. “It will be noticed that in some varieties of makebelieve, the pretender is deliberately simulating and Malebranche, Nicolas (1638–1715) French philosopher and theologian, born in Paris. Malebranche sought to overcome difficulties in Descartes’s dualism by advancing a doctrine of occasionalism to explain the interaction between mind and body. There is no true causation between mind and body or among bodily or physical movements. God causes every event and acts on the proper occasion to make things harmonious. To explain how our knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is possible, Malebranche argued that “we see all things in God” because ideas are not produced by external objects. Ideas exist in the divine understanding and are independent of us. Our knowledge participates in God’s knowledge. Malebranche’s philosophy influenced both Berkeley and Hume. His most important work is The Search after Truth (1674–5), and other works include the Treatise on Nature and Grace (1680), A Treatise of Morality (1684), and Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion (1688). malicious demon Epistemology [Latin malignus genius] Descartes’s fiction that there might be some omnipotent evil demon who deliberately, constantly, and systematically deceives me. Consequently, the universe and its parts may be such that they never can be clearly understood, and we can never be certain of our knowledge. The argument is introduced after Descartes’s other three main arguments for subjecting our beliefs to doubt (that is, unreliability, the possibility of dreaming, and the possible error in the reasoning of mathematics) and pushes methodological doubt to its limit. It expresses in all its rigor the radical decision “to doubt whatever can be doubted.” For Descartes, the only belief that can survive the challenge of the malicious demon argument is my awareness of my present existence, that is, cogito ergo sum, which is therefore the startingpoint for establishing the certainty of knowledge. “I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some malicious demon not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his energies in deceiving me.” Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy Manichaeism: A religion founded by the Persian Mani (c.216–77), which claimed that there is no single supreme being. Instead, the world is governed by two balanced and antagonistic cosmic forces: Light and Darkness. They dwell in different realms and are co-eternal but independent. Their strife is the cosmic background of the moral conflict in human history and in every human life. Light is associated with God, goodness, and spirit, and Darkness with Satan, evil, and matter. Humanity is also a mixture of these two forces, with the soul representing Light, and the body representing Darkness. They are in a constant struggle, although eventually victory is assured for the Good. Manichaeism advocated the pursuit of an ascetic life in order to free the soul by releasing the Light that is trapped in the body. Augustine was briefly an adherent of this religion before he became a Christian. Manichaeism was derived from Zoroastrianism and flourished between the third and fifth centuries ad. It was condemned by orthodox Christianity, but many philosophers, such as Bayle, Hume, and Voltaire, believed that it provided a better account of the origin of evil than orthodox Christian doctrine. “Positively, Manichaeism offered a comprehensive system of truth, a cosmology, a soteriology and an Eschatology. Its cosmology was based on the old Zoroastrian dualism of Good and Evil, Light and Darkness.” Burleigh, The City of God manifest image Epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science A term introduced by the American philosopher Wilfried Sellars for a conception or framework in terms of which we understand that we are in the world, with beliefs, desires, and intentions. This contrasts with what he calls the scientific image, which postulates theoretical entities to explain the relations of perceptible things. Sellars held that the contrast between these two images is not between pre-scientific and scientific images, or between uncritical and critical images, for one’s manifest image also employs correlational techniques to explain one’s behavior. However, he did believe that the scientific image is the only real image and that theoretical sciences determine what really is and what really is not. Traditional philosophy has tried to understcand the structure of the manifest image, but Sellars claims that the aim of philosophy is the unification of these images of man-in-the-world. “Our contrast then, is between two ideal constructs: (a) the correlational and categorical refinement of the ‘original image’, which refinement I am calling the manifest image; the image derived from the fruits of postulational theory construction which I am calling the scientific image.” Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality manifold Epistemology Kant’s term for the material of experience acquired through sensation. Its elements are given either empirically or through pure a priori intuition in space and time, and it is unified or held together pre-cognitively by the synthetic activity of the imagination. The synthesis of the manifold is the first step toward knowledge. According to Kant, the manifold is indispensable, because without it the concepts of pure understanding are without content and are entirely empty. “Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or a priori) is what first gives rise to knowledge.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason many-valued logic Logic A part of logic for which truth-values other than true and false are conceivable for propositions. It thus abandons certain theorems or inferences in traditional two-valued logic, such as the law of the excluded middle (the principle of bivalence) and the law of non-contradiction. Although it may be traced to Hugh MacColl and Peirce, it was inaugurated by the Polish logician Lukasiewicz’s development of three-valued logic, and independently by the American philosopher Post’s elaboration of an n-valued calculus. Three-valued logic is one of the chief forms of many-valued logic and is the model for higher-valued logics. There are various ways to designate and interpret the truth-value or truth-values other than true or false, usually in terms of the degrees of truth or the degrees of falsity. In threevalued logic developed by Lukasiewicz, truth is represented by “1,” false by “0,” and the third value, interpreted as half-true, is represented by “1/2.” An infinite-valued logic means that for propositions an infinite degree ranging from completely true to completely false can be designated. Unlike modal logic, the truth-value of a complex proposition in manyvalued logic is still determined by the truth values of its constituents. Lukasiewicz was motivated by the problem of future contingents, and others have applied many-valued logics to deal with vagueness, logical paradoxes, and quantum mechanics. “The mainstream of the development of manyvalued logic proceeded on the basis of elaborations of Lukasiewicz’s ideas – especially in their formulation in his widely read paper of 1930, where the 3-valued logic was generalised to the many-valued logic, indeed even infinite-valued logic.” Rescher, Topics in Philosophic Logic Marcel, Gabriel, Paris-born existentialist philosopher and dramatist, born in Paris. Marcel focused on the phenomenology of our being-in-the world as a participant in life and personal relationships. Our being is a condition for our life and is constantly in jeopardy. He used a distinction between reflection that distances oneself from relationships and reflection that returns oneself to relationships with an awareness of being in order to discuss religious conceptions of incarnation, survival, faith, hope, and charity. His main works are Being and Having (1935) and The Mystery of Being, 2 vols. (1949–50). Marcus Aurelius (121–180) Roman Stoic philosopher, born in Rome, Emperor from 161 to his death. Marcus Aurelius endowed chairs of philosophy in the four schools in Athens. His major writing, The Meditations, was a collection of essays that developed moral philosophy within the framework of early Stoicism. He held that the universe has a rational order directed by divine Providence. We should be guided by reason because it is placed in man by Providence. The end of life, peace of mind, can be acquired by living in accordance with nature. Death is a natural occurrence that we have no reason to fear. Because all men have the same nature, we have a duty of love toward our fellow man. Marcus, Ruth Barcan (1921– ) American logician, born in New York, Professor of Philosophy, Yale University. Marcus was a major pioneer in the development of modal logic. She established a system of modal predicate logic, employed substitutional quantification to deal with problems of mixing quantification, modality, and intentional contexts, held that true identity statements are necessarily true, and explored questions of reference and modal essentialism. Her main works include Modalities (1993). Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979) German-American social philosopher, born in Berlin and moved to the United States in 1933, an important member of the Frankfurt School. Marcuse believed that the task of philosophy is to achieve emancipation from oppressive political and social reality. In his most influential book, One Dimensional Man (1964), he condemned the repressive conditions of modern industrial society, which he held destroyed freedom of the individual and reduced people to the status of tools. His theory inspired student movements in 1960s. Although his major target of criticism was Western capitalist societies, he was equally hostile to communist dictatorships. His other important works include Reason and Revolution (1941), Eros and Civilization (1955), Soviet Marxism (1958), A Critique of Pure Tolerance (with Robert Paul Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr., 1965), and The Aesthetic Dimension (1978). Maritain, Jacques (1882–1973) French philosopher, born in Paris. Maritain converted to Catholicism in 1906 and became the leading exponent of neo-Thomism. In his major work, The Degree of Knowledge (1932), he developed an innovative interpretation of Thomas Aquinas that he applied to contemporary epistemology. He sought to justify and reconcile different sources of knowing and argued that scientific, metaphysical, and mystical knowledge are different in kind but equally legitimate and significant. His discussions of mystical union and metaphysical intuition have been influential. He added a sixth argument for the existence of God to Aquinas’s five ways: “I” must be eternal, yet any particular person is finite; hence “I” must be in the act of thinking of the infinite being. Other works include Art and Scholasticism (1920), Integral Humanism (1936), and The Person and the Common Good (1947). Marx, Karl (1818–83) German political economist, philosopher of history, and social philosopher, born in Trier. In his early Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (written in 1844, but not published until 1932), Marx used the concept of alienation to describe the relation of workers to their products under capitalism. The Communist Manifesto (with Engels, 1848) has had worldwide influence upon subsequent radical thought and political action. Grundrisse (1857–8) and Preface to A Critique of Political Economy (1859) led to Marx’s monumental Capital (3 vols., 1867, 1885, and 1894), in which he employed a materialist transformation of Hegel’s dialectic to examine and criticize the theory and practice of capitalism. Marx developed his theory of surplus value to show the exploitation of the working class. He held that the economic base of society, involving the forces and relations of production, determines its ideological and cultural superstructure, and that contradictions between base and superstructure would, as a matter of historical inevitability, lead to social revolution and socialism. Changing emphases and theoretical formulations in different periods of Marx’s work leave room for differing interpretations and schools of Marxism. Marxism Philosophical method, metaphysics, philosophy of social science, philosophy of history A term for ideas developed in the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and later developments based on their thinking. The attempt to work out a coherent Marxist system starts with Engels himself. Later Marxists have different versions, and each believes his own to be orthodox and condemns the other versions as revisionist. In the communist countries, orthodox Marxism has been developed by Lenin and Stalin in the Soviet Union and by Mao Zedong in China. The central doctrines of Marxist philosophy are called dialectical materialism and historical materialism. The essential claims of Marxism are that society consists of an economic base containing forces and relations of production, a political and legal superstructure determined by the economic base, and ideology that corresponds to the superstructure. The superstructure has partial autonomy, but the development of the forces of production are the ultimate ground for historical progress through stages, from primitive society to slave society, feudalism, capitalism, and eventually socialism and communism. Persons are members of different classes according to their respective positions in the social economy. However it is seen by members of a society, history is a history of class-struggle. All existing institutions and agencies represent, consciously and unconsciously, the interest of one or another class. Even morality, which most theorists regard as an historical and cultural matter that allows room to criticize authority, is said to reflect the interests of the ruling class. In Marxist thought, class-divisions will not disappear until the ultimate stage of social development: communism. Engels held that Marxism is the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought. Marxism is not merely a theory, but a social project as well, as expressed in Marx’s claim: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world . . . the point, however, is to change it.” The publication of Marx’s early Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts around 1930, and the end of the Second World War, led Marxism to became an area of flourishing academic research in the West, especially in Europe. Various interpretations of Marxism emerged to form different schools under the general title of Western Marxism. Major schools were initiated by Gyorgy Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfort School’s critical theory, represented by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jürgen Habermas, existential Marxism, represented by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, and Althusser’s structuralist Marxism. Analytic Marxism, which uses the methods of analytical philosophy to examine Marxist thought, is represented by G. A. Cohen, John Elster, John Roemer, and Alan Wood. “We have today a galaxy of different Marxisms, within which the place of Marx’s own thought is ambiguous.” Thomas, in Carver (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Marx. masculinism Ethics, political philosophy, epistemology From a feminist point of view, masculinism is an attitude which ignores the existence of women and is concerned exclusively with male opinions and interests. It tries to justify the claim that only male views have value and the further claim that anything that cannot be reduced or translated into men’s experience should be excluded from the subjectmatter of philosophy. In another sense, masculinism advocates the elimination of all discrimination against men because they are male. The goal of this sort of masculinism is the equality between men and women, and it is a reaction against extreme feminist claims for the superiority of women over men. masochism Ethics, metaphysics, modern European philosophy Generally, the practice of obtaining sexual pleasure by means of one’s own pain and humiliation. In Sartre’s use, a person is a masochist by becoming a mere object for a loved person, in a state of complete dependence. This kind of human relation leads to frustration and to a failure of love. For Sartre, a person cannot be a mere object and must make free choices. A person cannot be lost completely in being-for-the-other. “By masculinism in general I mean the assertion of masculine dominance over the feminine and also the practice of taking this first ‘superiority’ as a point of reference to assert other forms of supremacy which apparently have nothing to do with the duality of the sexes.” Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice. mass: In contrast to count nouns or sortals, a mass term or noun cannot occur with a definite (“the water is warm”) or indefinite article (“Some water is not drinkable.”) They do not refer distributively and provide no principle of countability. While a count noun is associated with quantifiers such as many and few, a mass noun is associated with quantifiers such as “much” and “little.” Examples of mass nouns are water, gold, music, intelligence, and information. Many abstract mass nouns are closely related to adjectives, for instance intelligence–intelligent or virtue– virtuous. There are various alternative terms for mass nouns. P. F. Strawson, borrowing from H. P. Grice, calls a mass noun a “characterizing” expression; Goodman refers to them as collective predicates, and Quine calls them partitive terms or bulk terms. masked man fallacy Logic A fallacious argument of the following form: you say that you know your father, but that you do not know this masked man and conclude that this masked man is not your father; however, this masked man is indeed your father. The recognition of this fallacy can be traced to Eubulides of Megara (third century bc) and was discussed by the Stoics. However formulated, this fallacy occurs because it treats a referentially opaque context as if it were referentially transparent. It is sometimes argued that Descartes committed this fallacy when he said that he knows certain things about his mind, but does not know anything about the nature of his body, so mind and body are really distinct. Descartes’s argument, however, is more sophisticated than this fallacy. “[A] fallacy recognized by Stoic logicians, which came to be known as the larvatus or ‘masked man’ fallacy: I do not know the identity of this masked man; I do know the identity of my father; therefore this masked man is not my father.” B. Williams, Descartes “Masochism is thus in principle a failure. There is nothing surprising in this when we think that masochism is a ‘vice’ and that vice is, in principle, love of failure.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness “So-called mass terms like ‘water’, ‘footwear’, and ‘red’ have the semantical property of referring cumulatively: any sum of parts which are water is water.” Quine, Word and Object master argument Metaphysics An argument about possibility introduced by Diodorus Cronus (c.284 bc), a member of the Greek Megarian School. The argument turns on three propositions: (1) Everything that is past is necessary; (2) nothing impossible follows from the possible; (3) what neither is nor will be is possible. According to Diodorus, (1) and (2) are evidently true, but (3) cannot be supported by (1) and (2) and must be wrong. On his account, therefore, only what is true or will be true is possible. This is also his response to Aristotle’s discussion of future contingents. But the Stoics argued that (3) is correct, and either (1) or (2) might be wrong. “According to Alexander, Diodorus constructed the Master Argument in order to establish his own definition of possibility, but a modern scholar has suggested that the title refers to the overmastering power of fate.” Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic master morality: Nietzsche held that two fundamental types of morality, arising out of different traditions, have engaged in struggle throughout history. The first, master morality, is rooted in the self-affirmation by the strong man and the ruling group and calls good everything that is noble and powerful and calls bad everything that is mediocre, undistinguished, ugly, and weak. According to Nietzsche, master morality is vigorous and desires to train man for heights. In contrast, slave morality is associated with the resentment of the weak man and the ruled group. Slave morality talks of good and evil rather than good and bad. It calls evil whatever is threatening and harmful and calls good whatever is benefiting and advantageous. Slave morality is shaped in direct and insidious reaction to master morality and emphasizes preservation from destruction. Each morality develops into a kind of value-schema rather than into a morality of a segment of the population. Nietzsche claimed that any higher complex culture, including the bourgeois, is a mixture of these two types of morality, and he attempts to find a reconciliation between them. The two moralities even exist within the soul of the same person. Nietzsche himself preferred master morality, but did not accept it as a whole, for he admitted that this type of morality contains an aspect of inhumanity. His master corresponds to Aristotle’s great-souled man. Master morality, for Nietzsche, was also called noble morality, and slave morality was also called herd morality. “According to slave morality, therefore, the ‘evil person’ arouses fear; according to master morality, it is precisely the ‘good person’ who arouses and wishes to arouse fear, whilst the ‘bad man’ is felt to be contemptible.” Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals master/slave Ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of history Hegel’s metaphor to describe the evolution of moral and political consciousness. Initially, each man is a particular individual who strives to impose himself upon others and to achieve external recognition. On this basis, one man enslaves another. The master, through his command over things, orders the slave to work for the sake of satisfying the master’s own desire. The slave, in order to survive and to retain his life, must repress his own instinct and his essence by negating himself. In a second stage, the slave transcends himself by working and becomes the master of nature. Because work raises him from slavery to freedom, the slave changes himself by changing the world. The future belongs to the working slave rather than the consuming master. History is simply the progressive negation of his own slavery by the slave. Eventually, consciousness reaches a third stage, in which men recognize themselves as universal and respect each other as ends. This mutual recognition achieves the integrity of life and essence. The thesis of mastery and the antithesis of slavery are dialectically overcome. The opposition between master and slave becomes the motive principle of the historical process. Hegel’s rich metaphor has been borrowed by a wide range of later moral and social theorists and philosophers. “While the one combatant prefers life, retains his single self-consciousness, but surrenders his claim for recognition, the other holds fast to his selfassertion and is recognised by the former as his superior. Thus arises the status of master and slave.” Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind material adequacy Logic, philosophy of language According to Tarski, any acceptable definition of truth should meet two conditions: material adequacy and formal correctness. The condition of material adequacy sets limits on possible contents, requiring that any acceptable definition of truth has as consequences all instances of the (T) schema (‘p’ is true if and only if p). This determines what the extension of the truth-predicate should be. The condition of formal correctness sets limits on the possible structural form of a language of any acceptable definition, requiring that a definition of truth should not be semantically material mode of speech closed. A definition that meets these two conditions will be able to answer our pre-theoretical intuitions about what it means for a sentence to be true. “The present article is almost wholly devoted to a single problem – the definition of truth. Its task is to construct – with reference to any given language – a materially adequate and formally correct definition of the term ‘true predicate’.” Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages,” in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics material analysis, see analysis material conditional, another term for material implication material equivalence, see logical equivalence material implication, paradoxes of: the unpalatable consequences arising from the definition of material implication. A false proposition, merely because it is false, implies every proposition; and a true proposition, merely because it is true, is implied by every proposition. Put it in another way, whenever P is false, P ⊃ Q is true; whenever Q is true, P ⊃ Q is true. The problem arises because implication is ordinarily used for a relation between two propositions, while a statement of material implication can be true even if (as is usually the case with H. P. Grice, when playing bridge) there is NO RELATION at all between its component propositions. Material implication does not concern the subject-matter or content of its components. To avoid these slightly ‘paradoxical’ consequences, it is suggested that we speak of the material ‘conditional,’ or just ‘the ‘if’’ instead of material implication. “Russell’s definition of ‘p implies q’ as synonymous with ‘either not p or q’ solicited the justified objection that according to it (1) a true proposition is implied by any proposition and (2) a false proposition implies any proposition (the two paradoxes of material implication – Johnson recognised only one).” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy material implication: A term used by Whitehead and Russell, representing the truth-function of two propositions P and Q in the form of the statement “If P then Q.” The relation is symbolized by a horseshoe ⊃, written as “P ⊃ Q,” or alternatively by an arrow →, written as “P → Q.” It is true that P materially implies Q in each of the following three cases: (1) both P and Q are true; (2) P is false, and Q is true; (3) both P and Q are false. It is false only if P is true and Q is false. This is called material implication because what is expressed by the sign ‘⊃’ is different from our ordinary notion of implication. A statement such as “If Rome is in Italy, then London is beautiful” is true by material implication, but does not seem to be an implication at all in the ordinary sense, for there is no relation between antecedent and consequent. It is due to this difference that material implication leads to many paradoxes. Some philosophers claim therefore that we should say that it is a material conditional relation instead of a relation of material implication. material mode of speech: Carnap draws a distinction between the material mode of speech and the formal mode of speech. The material mode of speech uses propositions in an object language to describe facts, objects, or phenomena. The formal mode of speech uses propositions in a metalanguage to talk about words or linguistic forms (syntactical sentences). An example of the material mode of speech is “Red is a quality,” and an example of the formal mode of speech is “ ‘Red’ is a quality-word.” For Carnap, many traditional problems arise because we treat claims about words as claims as objects. On this basis, we then speak in the material mode, producing many pseudo-object sentences. Philosophy should translate these sentences into the formal mode, that is, replace talk about meaning by the talk about the formal relations of words. “The relation in virtue of which it is possible for us validly to infer is what I call material implication . . . The relation holds, in fact, when it does hold, without any reference to the truth or falsehood of the proposition involved.” Russell, The Principles of Mathematics. “The true situation is revealed by the translation of the sentences of the material mode of speech, which are quasi-syntactical sentences, into the correlated syntactical sentences and thus into the formal mode.” Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language material objects Metaphysics, epistemology Also called physical objects, the objects which possess physical characteristics such as position, size, shape, and solidity. Such objects include physical entities such as rocks, trees, houses, and living organisms such as plants, animals, and human beings. The existence of material objects is independent of our perception, but they are the objects of perception. In this sense material objects stand in contrast to another kind of alleged object of perception, sense-data. The perception of material objects is public and durable, but it is indirect because it involves inference and interpretation, and is therefore also less certain than perception of sense-data seems to be. This contrast leads to major disputes about the nature of material objects. How can we prove the existence of material objects and combat skepticism and idealism? What is the relation between material objects and sense-data? “Nothing can be a material object except what has position in space.” Moore, Some Main Problems in Philosophy materialism Metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind The doctrine that all items in the world are composed of matter and that the properties of matter determine all other things, including mental phenomena. Every explicable thing can be explained on the grounds of natural laws. Materialism has a long history, starting from the Ionian natural philosophers and ancient atomists. It was developed by Gassendi and Hobbes in the seventeenth century, the French materialists in the eighteenth century, and Marx’s dialectical materialism and historical materialism in the nineteenth century. There has been some dispute about the nature of matter. Physicalism, which claims that all items in the world are physical entities, is a popular contemporary version of materialism, because not all physical entities are material. Both materialism and physicalism reject abstract entities and embrace the reality of particulars. Materialism claims to be an ally of common sense and it is generally deterministic. Contemporary materialism has become less ontological and is not so much concerned with the composition of things. Accordingly, the traditional contrast between materialism and idealism does not always apply. The physicalism of logical positivism was essentially epistemic and logical, claiming that all predicates can be reduced to physical predicates. Central-state materialism in the philosophy of mind proposes that all mental phenomena can be explained by appeal to neuro-physical items with which they are identical. Eliminative materialism seeks to get rid of what it claims to be scientifically inadequate folk psychological terms, like belief and desire, in favor of neuro-scientific notions. “Materialism was taken to be a logical analysis of statements about the mind and not a very general contingent or empirical theory about the nature of mental entities.” Quinton, The Nature of Things materialist theory of mind Philosophy of mind A theory developed as a result of the criticisms of the dualist theory of the relationship between body and mind. While dualism claims that mind and body are two independent entities, varieties of materialism claim that mental phenomena are determined by, identical with, or supervenient on physical phenomena. Materialism holds that human beings are distinguished from other physical objects only because of the special complexity of their physical organizations. This theory has two main versions: behaviorism claims that to have a mind is to have tendencies to behave physically in a certain way, and central-state materialism or identity theory claims that mental events are identical with certain physical events in the brain. Supervenience can allow a person to have mental states in virtue of having certain brain states without the mental states being reduced to the brain states. “In sharp opposition to any form of dualism we have materialist or physicalist theory of mind. For a materialist, man is nothing but a physical object, and so he is committed to giving a purely physical theory of mind.” D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind mathematical cyclist Logic, metaphysics A paradox devised by Quine to criticize the division between essence and accidents that is fundamental to essentialism. For Quine there is no absolute way to distinguish between the necessary or essential attributes and the contingent or accidental attributes of an object X, for our decisions in this regard are always related to our interests. In relation to some interests, some properties are essential; and in relation to others, they are accidental. Thus, essentialism is faced with a paradox that a given individual will be both essentially and accidentally so and so. A mathematician is necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged; a cyclist is necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational; then what of an individual who is both a mathematician and a cyclist? “Mathematicians are conceivably said to be necessarily rational, and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational. But what of an individual who counts among his eccentricities both mathematics and cycling?” Quine, Word and Object mathematical logic Logic, philosophy of mathematics Also called symbolic logic or modern logic. The modern embodiment of formal logic, mainly consisting of propositional and predicate logic, with quantifiers, variables, and functions as its central notions. It can be traced to Leibniz, Boole, and Peano, but in its modern form began in 1879, with the publication of Gottlob Frege’s Begriffsschrift. It was further developed by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica. Frege, Russell, and Whitehead sought to deduce mathematics from logic. Mathematical logic is a branch of mathematical study and relies heavily on symbolic techniques and mathematical methods. It is also a logical theory of mathematical analysis and is applicable to other more traditional branches of mathematics Many philosophical problems have arisen from the development of modern logic, but advanced modern logic has become a technical field for mathematicians and the philosophy of mathematics. matrix method, another name for truth-table method matter Metaphysics, philosophy of science [from Greek hule, wood] Aristotle considered matter and form to be relative terms, with matter as the material of a thing (the basic stuff ) as opposed to form as its structure. Matter is a factor within the category of substance, but is not primary substance. Matter and form together are the two major components of reality. Matter, as the subject or substratum of change, can accept contraries and so make change possible. At the beginning of change, there are remote matter-like elements, which would be prime matter in a general discussion of change. At the end of generation there is proximate matter, which is the matter appropriate to the product. A material substance is a composite of matter and form. Matter is usually, but not always, associated with potentiality. Aristotle also occasionally mentioned spatial extension as intelligible matter. The characteristics of Aristotle’s notion of matter were retained in the later development of metaphysics. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, matter was thought to be something in a spatiotemporal location and to have the properties of extension and movability. Descartes called it extended substance in contrast to mind or soul as thinking substance. This led to the problems raised by matter–mind dualism. In modern science, matter is characterized in terms of mass and extension, and is distinguished from energy on the grounds that each has its own law of conservation. This distinction no longer holds in contemporary physics. Matter is now mainly a subject for the philosophy of physics. “For my definition of matter is just this – the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result.” Aristotle, Physics matter of fact, see knowledge of relation of ideas “By the name ‘mathematical logic’, then, I will denote any logical theory whose object is the analysis and deduction of arithmetic and geometry by means of concepts which belong evidently to logic.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. VI maxim: Generally, any simple rule or guide in our life, but in H. P. Grice and in Kant’s moral theory a practical proposition that connects one’s subjective conditions, that is, one’s reason or motive, to one’s decision to act. Such maxims have the form “I will do A if that will make me happy.” Hence a maxim is a principle upon which one acts. For Kant, there are maxims of action, which express a determination to act in a certain way when a certain condition is met, and maxims of ends, which express a determination to form an intention when a certain condition is met. A maxim is distinguished from a practical law. For a maxim, the conditions (the reason or motives) are subjective and differ among persons because each person has different desires or purposes. For a practical law the conditions are objective, that is, universally valid. Therefore, Kant called a maxim the subjective principle of volition and the practical law the objective principle of volition, that is, the categorical imperative. All maxims have form or universality, matter or plurality, and totality in the complete determination. Maxims must be tested by the categorical imperative. Accordingly, a morally commendable action requires a person to act on a maxim, which can at the same time make itself a universal law so that the subjective principle of volition coincides with the objective principle of volition. “A maxim contains the practical rule which reason determines in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or his inclinations) and is thus the principle according to which the subject does act. But the law is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and it is the principle according to which he ought to act, i.e. an imperative.” Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals maximin: A procedure for choosing under uncertainty, according to which we should consider the worst possible outcome for each choice and adopt the one that has the least bad consequences. According to Rawls, because the rational agents in the original position are ignorant of their own initial positions in the society they are devising, they will reasonably employ the maximin rule for choosing principles of justice. The rationality of this procedure under conditions of ignorance is the basis for Rawls’s difference principle, according to which a just society would make the situation of its worst-off group as good as possible. While the maximin rule seeks to maximize the minimum gain, a related strategy governed by the minimax rule enjoins rational agents to minimize their maximum loss. The two rules are generally taken to be equivalent. “The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternatives the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcome of the others.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice Mead, George Herbert (1863–1931) American social philosopher and philosopher of mind, born in South Hadley, Massachusetts. The main concern of Mead’s social behaviorism was to explain the genesis of the mind and the self in terms of social language. He argued that the self develops through communication with others. His views gave rise to the school of symbolic interactionism in sociology. In metaphysics, he claimed that all reality is an active process. His major works include Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist (1934), Philosophy of the Act (1938), and The Individual and the Social Self (1982). mean Ethics [Greek mesotes, a noun derived from mesos, middle, intermediate] Aristotle claimed that virtue of character is a mean. Unlike an arithmetic mean, virtue as a mean is not a middle point between two extremes, which is one and the same for all. Instead, it is in relation to passions and actions and is a state in which passions are neither indulged without restraint (excess) nor suppressed entirely (defect). The right amount of passion is relative to us, and is different in different situations. However, that does not entail that different persons measure it in different ways. Rather, virtue is determined by practical reason. Aristotle employs the mean to analyze not only virtue in general, but also particular virtues. The doctrine of the mean in Aristotle’s ethics is famous, although it is not clear how much it tells us about virtue and vice. In addition, he uses it in his theory of perception, saying that a sense organ must be in a mean state (e.g. less hot and less cold) if it is to perceive the extreme qualities (e.g. hot or cold).“Virtue is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics meaning, communicatum: Generally, what is expressed, said, or referred to in an expression. Literal meaning is what one can directly tell or draw from the words used in an expression themselves. If two or more expressions have the same meaning, they are said to be synonymous. Meaning is used in the same way as sense, connotation, and intension in contrast to reference, denotation, and extension. Determining the way the meaning of an expression is generated involves determining the way language relates to reality, the relation between meaning and psychological states, and the relation between meaning and other key semantic notions such as truth and reference. All these make the notion of meaning a central and difficult concept, not only in the philosophy of language, but also in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. Various theories about meaning have been developed in the twentieth century. This dictionary has a single entry for each of the major influential theories. They include the behavioral theory of meaning, the ideational theory of meaning, the image theory of meaning, the picture theory of meaning, the referential theory of meaning, the truth-conditional theory of meaning, the use theory of meaning, and the verificationist theory of meaning. “For a single referring expression to have a meaning, it suffices that it should be possible in suitable circumstances to use it to refer to some one thing, person, place, etc.” Strawson, An Introduction to Logic Theory meaning of a sentence – what a sentence ‘metabolically’ “means”: In contrast to the meaning of a word, which is a potential meaning that is realized when the word is used in a sentence, the meaning of a sentence is claimed to be a certain extra-linguistic fact. Even philosophers who reject an ontology of facts can retain the priority sentence meaning over word meaning. Philosophers who accept the notion of a propositional attitude see the meaning of a sentence as the object of propositional attitudes. “The meaning of a sentence is something in the outside world at a given time and in relationship to given persons, qualities, and objects.” Bolinger and Sears, Aspects of Language meaning of life Ethics An ancient and central philosophical question asks what is the meaning of life. Some philosophers argue that nothing outside of life could give it meaning. For others, there is nothing but life, and it is meaningless. Another view is that an overall plan or ultimate goal, preferably chosen by us, gives life its meaning. In some versions, the plan and goal must be part of a larger project or derived from a source, where the project or source extends beyond the life and gives place to the commitments of the life. There are different views about the projects or sources that could give meaning to life, with candidates including God, immortality, tradition, and rationality. There are also debates over the objectivity or subjectivity of the meaning of life. If the meaning of life is an objective matter, a life can seem to have a meaning through passionate intensity, coherence, and satisfaction, without really having meaning. Accepting that there is a meaning in life leads to consideration of how one should live. “[The] meaning of life: A person’s shaping his life in accordance with some overall plan is his way of giving meaning to his life; only a being with the capacity to so shape his life can have or strive for meaningful life.” Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia meaning postulate Philosophy of language, logic A term introduced by Carnap in 1953 and originally intended to explicate but not strictly define an analytical statement that is not logically true. It was later extended to any statement or rule that specifies or clarifies the meaning of a predicate and hence determines the entailments that derive from that predicate in the non-logical vocabulary of a natural language. Examples of this kind of meaning postulate include recursive definitions and definitions in use. The advantage of this device is that it avoids a sharp distinction between the logical and non-logical vocabulary of the object language. “We draw an analytic-synthetic distinction formally only in connection with formalised languages whose inventors list some statements and rules as ‘meaning postulates’. That is, it is stipulated that to qualify as correctly using the language one must accept those statements and rules.” Putnam, “The Analytic and the Synthetic,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. III meaningless Philosophy of language, logic Loosely, what is obviously false, absurd, or pointless. In a stricter sense, questions and answers which are devoid of meaning or sense. In logical positivism, metaphysical statements are examined by logical analysis and claimed to be meaningless. One cannot say that metaphysical statements are true or false, because we lack any criterion to determine whether they are true or false. Only statements allowing such a criterion are meaningful. According to logical positivism, there are two kinds of meaningful statements: first, the formulae of logic and mathematics and second, empirical or factual statements. Any other statements that do not fall in these categories are rejected from serious philosophy as meaningless, metaphysical statements or pseudo-statements. “In the strict sense, however, a sequence of words is meaningless if it does not, within a specified language, constitute a statement.” Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis,” in Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism means/end: instrumental rationality, strategic rationality, inter-subjective rationality, conversational rationality, communicative rationality -- some things are done to achieve a further goal or purpose and are means to ends. If a thing is done not for some purpose outside itself but for its own sake, it is an end in itself, but an end can also be a means to a higher end. In line with this reasoning, many philosophers infer that there is an ultimate or final end, which is an end in an absolute sense. Such means–end reasoning, called a teleological approach or analysis [from Greek telos, end], is applied in both theology and ethics. Some philosophers hold that rationality is restricted to selecting means as instruments to achieve ends that are given non-rationally, while others hold that the selection of ends is also a matter for reason. Modern teleological ethics, represented by utilitarianism, claims that acts should be judged by their consequences, including the ends they realize. Deontology, which holds that acts should be judged according to their motive or duty rather than by their consequences, also uses the distinction between means and ends, with Kant’s categorical imperative requiring that we treat rational beings as ends rather than merely as means. Aristotle had another conception of the means–ends relation. Rather than being merely instrumental, a means can be constitutive of an end or be a major component of the end. This later conception is important for understanding Aristotle’s notion of happiness. There has been much controversy whether good ends can justify evil means. “A means is the object of an interest which is asymmetrically dependable on an ulterior interest whose object is the end.” Perry, Realms of Value means of production, see productive force mechanism Metaphysics, philosophy of science A paradigm of explanation modeled on mechanics and holding that everything can be explained by the mechanistic principle, that is, by the interaction and combination of material particles. On this view, both animals and human beings are machines, and mental phenomena are nothing more than the sophisticated arrangement of different minute parts. In general, mechanism reduces all differences of quality into the differences of quantity. The world as a whole is an aggregate rather than an organic unity. All relations among particles are external relations. This paradigm was developed by Descartes and Hobbes and was supported by Newton’s mechanics. It denies both action at a distance and Aristotelian final causes or teleology. It therefore opposes vitalism and organicism. “Mechanism represents the tendency opposed to teleology because its adherents think that the course of all phenomena in the world occurs as if in a mechanism and is not directed by purpose in the way that human conduct is.” Ajdukiewicz, Problems and Theories of Philosophy mechanistic materialism Metaphysics, philosophy of science The type of materialism prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, represented by Hobbes, Gassendi, and French materialists such as La Mettrie, Diderot, Holbach, Helvétius, and Condillac. The theory was influenced by mechanics, which was the most highly developed natural science at that time. On this view, all phenomena, including those involving life and the mind, can be explained in terms of the interactions of forces and the simple or complex arrangement of material particles. Both universe and man are viewed as machines, with La Mettrie calling his major work L’Homme Machine. Things can affect one another only by direct mechanical contact. Because the mind lacks an independent status and is explained in mechanical terms, this theory has difficulty in accounting for free will. Marx and Engels took this kind of materialism to represent outmoded metaphysical thought and claimed that it must be superseded by dialectical materialism. “Mechanical materialism not only denies that spiritual substance exists, it also considers even mental phenomena (thought, feelings, etc) to be physical processes.” Ajdukiewicz, Problem and Theories of Philosophy mediate inference, see immediate inference mediate perception, see immediate perception medical ethics, see bioethics medieval philosophy Philosophy of religion, metaphysics, logic, ethics, philosophy of language The central theme of medieval philosophy was the attempt to join faith and reason. Philosophers sought to make Christian faith intelligible and to prove the compatibility of Christianity and reason. Historical accounts of medieval philosophy normally start with Augustine, who applied Plato’s thinking to Christianity. The translation and commentary of Aristotle’s logical works by Boethius shaped much Latin technical philosophical vocabulary. Anselm of Canterbury, in virtue of his ontological argument, is known as the father of Scholasticism, a tradition that debated questions such as the ontological status of universals, free will and determinism, and the problem of evil. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the whole body of Aristotle’s work became available to Europe through transmission from the Islamic world, together with the commentaries of Arabic scholars such as al-Farabi, Avicenna (Ibn Sina), and Averroes (Ibn Rushd). The greatest medieval thinker, Thomas Aquinas, attempted to reconcile Christianity in an Aristotelian framework. Later major thinkers included Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Francisco Suárez. The divorce of philosophy and theology and the influence of modern science in the work of later philosophers, such as F. Bacon, Hobbes, and Descartes, marked the end of medieval philosophy. Many issues of medieval logic, ethics, and philosophy of language still excite interest among contemporary philosophers. “The assertion that the most important philosophical event in medieval philosophy was the discovery by the Christian West of the more or less complete works of Aristotle is an assertion which could, I think, be defended.” Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. III meditation Philosophy of religion, philosophical method Usually used in religion as a synonym for contemplation, by which one beholds some spiritual object or obtains spiritual insight. Descartes chose this word for the title of his metaphysical masterpiece: Meditations on First Philosophy (1664). Meditation here is the reflection of a solitary thinker or meditator, who retreats from the sensible world and frees himself from the influence of preconceived opinions. The purpose of meditation is to discover the indubitable first principles that can serve as the secure foundation of the system of knowledge. The Meditations on First Philosophy purports to describe the soul’s solitary quest for truth and its discovery. “I shall first of all set forth in these Meditations the very considerations by which I persuade myself that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the truth, in order to see if, by the same reasons which persuaded me, I can also persuade others.” Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy Meinong, Alexius von, Lemberg-born philosopher, a disciple of Brentano. Meinong distinguished the objects of mental acts from the contents of those acts. His philosophy was mainly devoted to the investigation of various objects of thought. In contrast to traditional metaphysics, Meinong claimed that objects should not be confined to the actual. He separated the being of an object (Sein) from its character or nature (Sosein) and held that objects that do not actually exist, such as “the round square” or “the golden mountain,” can still be the subjects of true predications. The objects of judgment and assumption, which he called “objectives,” contain objects as constituents. Russell’s theory of descriptions rejected Meinong’s account of non-existent objects. In his theory of value, Meinong classified and analyzed various kinds of feeling. His main works include Human Studies, 2 vols. (1877, 1882), On Assumptions (1902), On Object Theory (1904), On Possibility and Probability (1915), and Ground-work of the General Theory of Value (1923). memory Epistemology, philosophy of mind The capacity to recall past experience and to retain in the present the knowledge acquired in the past. Although some skeptics reject belief based on memory as knowledge on the grounds that there is always a gap between the present remembering and the past, many philosophers consider memory to be a source of knowledge. In most cases memory gives us knowledge of the past. There has been some debate as to what counts as memory, how it is possible to have knowledge of that which is no longer present, and how past knowledge can be retained in the present. Because it is generally taken that there is an analogy between memory and perception, all theories of perception have their counterparts in theories of memory. While indirect realism, or the representative theory of memory developed by Aristotle and Hume, claims that what we remember is an image that represents the past, direct realism argues that our awareness of the past is direct without an intermediary image. For phenomenalism the existence of the past is nothing more than the availability of memory experience. “Memory demands (a) an image, a belief in past existence. The belief may be expressed in the words ‘This existed’.” Russell, The Analysis of Mind Mendelssohn, Moses (1729–86) German Jewish philosopher, born in Dessau. Mendelssohn initiated the integration of Jewish culture and Enlightenment values. He argued for the immortality of the soul and sought to show the incoherence of moral authority. In his writing on art, he distinguished aesthetic perfection, which is a subjectively appreciated artificial unity of objects that humans take to be wholes, from metaphysical perfection, which is real unity in multiplicity known to God. Beauty, as aesthetic perfection, is the human representation of metaphysical perfection. His main works include Phädon (1776) and Jerusalem (1783). mens rea Philosophy of law [Latin guilty mind or guilty mental state] The mental state that a defendant has when he commits a crime. In order to secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove that the defendant has a guilty mind. The malice aforethought of such a mind and the defendant’s actus reus (Latin, guilty activity) constitute sufficient grounds for the defendant to be liable to punishment. Accordingly, a person is punishable if and only if he or she had a choice whether or not to break the law and exercised that choice in favor of breaking it. Mens rea varies from crime to crime, and the common feature is that the defendant has knowledge of the bad consequence of the action but still recklessly intends to bring it about. The mens rea requirement is contained in the definition of almost all crimes, with the exception of strict liability, which does not depend upon the mental state of the agent. If mens rea can be negated, for example by insanity or negligence, the same act will be treated rather differently. Mens rea is viewed as a restraint upon the utilitarian theory of punishment, according to which a punishment is justified if it promotes generally good consequences. “In order to prove murder, the state has the burden of proving, among other things, that the accused acted with the appropriate mental states. Such mental states requirements are usually called mens rea (very loosely, ‘guilty mind’) requirements.” Murphy and Coleman, The Philosophy of Law mental act Philosophy of mind Activities or processes such as seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling pains, calculating, or deliberating in one’s own mind. Starting with Brentano, there has been a tradition that separates the occurrence of a mental act from its content. All mental acts are mental events, but not vice versa. Mental events such as suddenly noticing something are not regarded as mental acts. But how precisely to distinguish between mental acts and other mental events has been an intensively debated problem. Other philosophers such as Russell claim that it is unnecessary to establish a special category of mental acts. “To begin with, then, I see, I hear, I smell, I taste, etc. . . . And because, in a wide sense, they are all of them things which I do, I propose to call them all ‘mental acts’. By calling them ‘acts’ I do not wish to imply that I am always particularly active when I do them.” G. Moore, “The Subjectivity of Psychology,” in Vesey (ed.), Body and Mind mental causation Philosophy of mind A term for the phenomenon of a mental event causing another event, whether physical or mental. As causation involving mental phenomena, it contrasts with physical causation. It is, however, uncertain whether there can be an intelligible notion of non-physical causation. Some believe that mental causation can be understood in purely mental terms. Some argue that mental events have both physical and mental properties and that mental properties are not epiphenomenal and have a significant causal role. A satisfactory explanation of behavior or mental events is implausible without referring to the mental properties of other mental events. Such a claim is sometimes called mental indispensability. Davidson’s anomalous monism claims that there are no psychophysical laws. Following this line, many philosophers believe that mental events, if they can produce any physical effects, must be themselves physical and that mental causation is due to the physical properties of mental events. They claim that mental causation is intelligible only when mental events or states are related to physical phenomena and to physical causality by being determined by physical causality or supervenient upon it. “The mental causation must be realized or constituted by the physical process.” Child, Causality, Interpretation and the Mind mental event Philosophy of mind An event that has mental properties, such as thinking, feeling, or willing. Either mental events exist independently or they have more fundamental physical properties. If a mental event causes some effect, must this causation be explained in terms of its physical properties, or is it because its mental properties themselves are causally potent? This question is related to the problem of the relationship between mental events and physical events, which is one of the central issues in the current debate of philosophy of mind. Davidson’s anomalous monism claims that while every mental event is a physical event, there are no strict psychophysical laws that connect the mental and physical realms. “Mental events (by which I mean events described in the mental vocabulary, whatever exactly that may be) are like many other sorts of events, and like material objects, in that we give their locations with no more accuracy than easy individuation (within the relevant vocabulary) demands.” Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events mental indispensability, see mental causation mental phenomenon Philosophy of mind Brentano’s term, also called a psychical phenomenon, in contrast to a physical phenomenon. He argued that mental phenomena are characterized by their reference to something as an object, but that their objects, using the scholastic term, have intentional inexistence and need not exist. Mental phenomena have immanent contents of consciousness and intentional objects, in contrast to physical phenomena, which contain external objects that transcend the mind. Brentano’s distinction between mental and physical phenomena in terms of intentionality has had great influence. He classified mental phenomena into presentation (I see, I hear), judgment (I affirm, I reject), and emotional acts (I feel, I wish). Mental phenomena are not merely static, but are characteristically active and directed upon some object. Mental phenomena are the objects of inner perception and the subjectmatter of psychology. The terms “mental phenomenon” and “intentional inexistence” have been closely examined by R. Chisholm and have been the subject of vigorous debate. “Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity.” Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint mental representation Epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language Representation in the mind. It is commonly believed that to think about something is to have that thing represented in one’s mind. Etymologically, “meaning” is associated with the “mind.” To mean something is to have it in one’s mind. It is claimed that to think about the White House is to have an image of the White House in one’s mind. A word or a concept is associated with a certain image in the mind of the language user. If two concepts are synonymous, they are associated with the same mental representation. But the problem of clarifying the nature of mental representation is a vexed issue. Some believe that to represent the world is to have a model of it in your mind; some believe that a representation is an image that represents things in virtue of resembling them; some suggest that a mental representation is a language-like symbol that does not have to be similar to what is symbolized; and still others think that mental representation is simply a neurophysiological state. According to Fodor, mental representations are linguistic expressions within the language of thought, and mental representations have syntactic and semantic properties comparable to those of a natural or an artificial language. There are various types of representation. Which kind counts precisely as a mental representation? Does mental representation constitute the content of thought? Does mental representation serve merely as an image or have a causal role in the brain? How can representations get to be about things in the world? These and other problems have been matters of dispute. “The central question about mental representation is this: what is it for a mental state to have a semantic property? Equivalently what makes a state (or an object) in a cognitive system a representation?” Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation mental state Philosophy of mind Mental phenomena such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and sensations. The nature of these phenomena has been a central question in the philosophy of mind. Different theories of mind are distinguished largely according to their respective answers to this problem. According to Cartesian dualism, mental states are inner, nonmaterial states of a mental substance. According to Hume, the self or mind is a succession of mental states. According to behaviorism, mental states consist simply in dispositions to behave in various ways. According to the identity theory, mental states are identical with states of the brain. According to functionalism, mental states are defined in terms of their causal relations to input stimuli, other mental states, and external behavior. All mental events are mental states, but not all mental states are mental events. “Let us describe a mental state as a state which can be directly observed only through introspection and cannot be directly observed by more than one individual, viz. the individual who is in that mental state.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy mentalese, another term for language of thought mentalism Metaphysics Synonymous with idealism and panpsychism. The position that physical or bodily things can be explained in terms of mental things, and that the latter exist in a real sense. On this view, everything is mental in character. Mentalism is thus opposed to the materialist claim that all mental things are explained in terms of physical things and that the latter exist in a real sense. Berkeley and other mentalists claim that physical objects are nothing but sensations or perceptions. Leibniz said that the monads that compose the world are ultimately spiritual. Hegel and other absolute idealists consider the whole material world to be mental in nature. These philosophers hold different versions of mentalism. “Some theories of mind and body try to reduce body to mind or some property of mind. Such theories may be called mentalist theories.” D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind mentalistic linguistics: Chomsky’s characterization for his own approach to linguistics. On the basis of the distinction between competence and performance, he claims that linguistics should study competence, that is, the speaker’s internalized transformational-generative rules of language. Introspection is one excellent source of data for the study of language. Linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology that deals with structure and process in human minds and can be connected with observed behavior only in an indirect way. Such a mentalistic approach is opposed to behaviorist approaches, which reject introspection, consciousness, and other mentalistic terms for the purpose of explaining behavior. The contrast between mentalism and behaviorism in the philosophy of language is essentially a contrast between rationalism and empiricism. “Mentalistic linguistics is simply theoretical linguistics that uses performance as data (along with other data, for example the data provided by introspection) for the determination of competence, the latter being taken as the primary object of its investigation.” Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax mentality: the possession of a mind. The features that enable a human being to think, feel, imagine, and act. Different philosophies have different explanations of mentality. According to Cartesian dualism, mentality consists of inner states independent of physical states. According to some versions of physicalism, all facts about mentality can be reduced to facts about the states of central nervous systems. Mentality in this sense becomes the subject-matter of brain science. Non-reductive physicalism identifies mental states with brain states, but retains the mental for discussion at an autonomous level of theory. Mentality can also refer to what is going on in an individual’s mind that makes him a distinct person. In this broad sense, mentality is synonymous with style of thought or way of thinking and is formed partly as a result of one’s social and cultural setting. “[H]is own mentality . . . is his own assumptions, values, expectations, and perceptions of what is possible.” Tiles and Tiles, An Introduction to Historical Epistemology mercy Ethics Also called nonmaleficence, an ethical demand that one should do one’s best to relieve the pain or suffering of another person where this is possible and to the extent that the relief is in the suffering person’s interest. In contemporary ethics, this moral demand is closely linked with the issue of euthanasia or mercy killing, that is, whether it is morally justified to end the life of a terminally ill and gravely suffering patient who is of sound mind and wants to die. Mercy is a major reason for supporting the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia, but some consider such deaths as murder. There are also problems about patients who make choices under the influence of others, about the presentation of cases of involuntary euthanasia as voluntary cases, and about euthanasia for those who are not of sound mind or who cannot express a view. In all of these cases, considerations of mercy might support euthanasia, but respect for life and free consent might oppose it. “This principle of mercy establishes two component duties: 1. the duty not to cause further pain or suffering, and 2. the duty to act to end pain or suffering already occurring.” Battin, The Least Worst Death mercy killing, another term for euthanasia mereological essentialism Metaphysics A theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, which claims that if anything is ever a part of a whole, then it is a part of that whole as long as the whole exists. The whole possesses that part in every possible world in which the whole exists. The theory is mereological because it deals with the relationship between wholes and parts, and it is essentialist because it holds that the parts of an object are essential to that object. At first glance, this claim conflicts with common sense, for we usually deny that having a part is essential for an ordinary thing to persist. But Chisholm argues that we must distinguish between a proper part in a strict philosophical sense and an improper part in a looser ordinary sense. The loss of a proper part will cause an object to change its identity, whilst the identity of an object will be maintained with the loss of an improper part. Chisholm’s theory deals with parts which a whole has necessarily and which are essential to that whole. This theory is useful in dealing with puzzles such as that of the ship of Theseus’ ship, in which we ask whether an object maintains its identity after each of its parts is successively replaced. “The principle of mereological essentialism that I have advocated may be put this way: For every X and Y, if X is ever part of Y, then Y is necessarily such that X is part of Y at any time that Y exists.” Chisholm, Person and Object mereology Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics [from Greek meros, part] The formal theory of logical relationships between wholes and parts, derived from Aristotle and developed in the twentieth century by figures such as Lesniewski, Tarski, and Nelson Goodman. It claims that any individual whole is a mereological sum, that is, the least inclusive thing that includes all of its parts. It is composed of these parts and of nothing else. Consequently, two individuals, X and Y, if identical, must have the same proper parts. David Lewis claims that a world is the mereological sum of all the possible individuals that are parts of it. Mereology was intended to provide an alternative foundation of mathematics, but its claims are controversial. Many counterexamples exist to its theorems, especially with regard to organic wholes. Nevertheless, the applications of this important formalism are still being explored. Because mereology applies to individuals, it is called the calculus of individuals, in contrast to set theory, which is called the calculus of classes. “Mereology is the theory of the relation of parts to wholes, and kindred notions. One of these kindred relations is that of a mereological fusion, or sum: the whole composed of some given parts.” D. Lewis, Parts of Classes merit Ethics, political philosophy Excellence or worth which deserves reward. We can distinguish between moral merits, such as virtues, and non-moral merits, such as skills and abilities. All merits are qualities that are or should be respected and admired in society. Whether or not a quality is a merit is determined in relation to the social purpose it serves. In contrast to egalitarianism and utilitarianism, a meritocratic political philosophy would distribute benefits and responsibilities in proportion to the merit of those who receive them, and a society would be just if it conformed to this distribution. Since merit is not allotted equally, distribution according to merit demands that unlike cases should be treated unequally. On this view, those possessing special merit deserve special and discriminatory treatment. Merit is closely related to the idea of desert, equity, fairness, and justice. A distribution based on merit is not an equal one, but it aims to promote fairness and justice. A difficulty facing this position is the ease with which power, influence, and the pretence of merit can displace real merit as a basis for enhanced reward. “I distinguish desert, which is concerned with what an agent has done, from merit, which is concerned with what he is.” Lucas, Responsibility meritocracy Political philosophy A society in which all institutional positions are filled according to selection procedures based on relevant qualifications, skills, abilities, achievements, and promise. It judges and promotes people on the grounds of the quality of their existing service. Meritocracy is a type of aristocracy, for it creates an elite group of people with special powers, but it is also democratic, for it is based on the equality of opportunities, according to which the distribution of opportunities is in accordance with capacities and achievements. However, meritocracy might lead to many types of inequalities, and it is controversial whether talent is a suitable fundamental ground for justifying these inequalities. In contrast to traditional inegalitarian meritocracy, two new forms of meritocracies have recently been proposed. In egalitarian meritocracy, inequalities would not be based on the social functions of the job but on the needs or other deserts of the job-holders. In maximin meritocracy, inequalities would be allowed, but under certain conditions that are favorable to those whose abilities are unlikely to gain high-reward jobs. Rawls raises the question of whether the talents that are used in a meritocracy as a basis of assigning positions should be seen as straightforwardly belonging to the individual in a just society. “Meritocracy: a social order built around a particular notion of merit.” Daniels, Justice and Justification Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1908–61) French phenomenological philosopher, born in Rochefort-sur-Mer. Merleau-Ponty rejected the Cartesian dualism of body and soul. The role of the body in the human subject’s experiential relationship with the world is a central theme of his philosophy. He rejected both realist and subjectivist accounts of consciousness. He held that the objects of experience are neither wholly given to us in senseperception nor wholly constructed by us, but are by nature ambiguous. He stressed the primacy of perception and claimed that all perspectives are local. His most important book is The Phenomenology of Perception (1945). Other works include The Structure of Behaviour (1942), Sense and Nonsense (1948), and The Visible and the Invisible (1964). society possesses more good but distributes it less equally and another society possesses less good but distributes it more equally, which one should we choose? How can we assess the merits of each society, and how can we strike a balance between them? The meshing problem indicates that the principle of utility has the severe limitation of ignoring distributive justice. “This ‘meshing problem’ of balancing the total amount of good at issue in a given putative distribution against the fairness of the distribution in cases where these two desiderata cut against one another is one which utilitarians (and nonutilitarians, for that matter) have never resolved satisfactorily.” Rescher, Distributive Justice meta-epistemology Epistemology Meta-epistemology is the epistemology of epistemology. Normal epistemology can be called “substantive epistemology” and concerns relations between knowledge and belief, between knowledge and truth, and between knowledge and justification, and deals with inquires about the origin of knowledge, while meta-epistemology compares and evaluates all kinds of epistemology. It analyzes basic epistemic concepts, determining their limits and the conditions of their application. “Meta-epistemology is concerned with the basic concepts we employ in epistemology, concepts of knowledge, truth, belief, justification, rationality, and so on, and with the methods, procedures, and criteria to be employed in determining how to apply these concepts.” Alston, Epistemic Justification meshing problem Political philosophy According to classical utilitarianism, we should choose a society containing the maximum total good over societies containing less good. We also believe that we should choose a society with the most nearly equal distribution of good over other societies in which the good is distributed more unequally. The ideal, of course, is to combine the greatest possible total good with the most nearly equal distribution. But the world is not perfect, and we cannot necessarily realize this ideal. The meshing problem asks how we can mesh or harmonize the desire to maximize good and the desire to distribute good relatively equally. If one meta-ethics Ethics Meta-ethics is usually said to deal with ethics itself, in contrast to normative ethics, which deals with substantive ethical questions. The major components of meta-ethics include the study of the nature of ethics, the conceptual analysis of key moral terms, and inquiry into the method for answering moral questions. The purpose of the study of the nature of ethics is to discuss what ethics is and does and to discuss the objectivity and validity of ethical claims themselves. The purpose of conceptual analysis is to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of the application of major moral concepts. The purpose of the inquiry into method is to specify the ways to answer moral questions from a moral point of view. Meta-ethics is, then, a logical and epistemological inquiry concerning the nature of normative ethical statements. The distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics appeared with the development of linguistic philosophy in the twentieth century and was deeply influenced by Moore’s distinction between saying what goodness is and saying what things are good. Ayer and Stevenson explicitly drew upon this distinction. Many analytical philosophers believed that meta-ethics should be the main concern of ethics, and this claim became one of the main characteristics of the development of ethics in English-speaking countries in the twentieth century. However, this distinction itself has become more and more problematic. Recent moral philosophers view meta-ethical judgments and normative judgments as interdependent and many judgments are hard to classify according to this distinction. “Twenty or thirty years ago, it was standard practice to distinguish ‘ethical’ from ‘meta-ethical’ theories. The first made substantive claims about what one should do, how one should live, what was worthwhile, and so on. The second concerned itself with the status of those claims: whether they could be knowledge, how they could be validated, whether they were (and in what sense) objective, and so on.” B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy The object-language/meta-language distinction:Tarski drew a distinction between object language and metalanguage. The object language is that with which we talk about extra-linguistic things and objects (the language in which we speak), while the metalanguage is the language in which we talk about the object language (the language about which we speak). An example of an object language statement is “New York is a large city” and an example of a metalanguage statement is “ ‘That New York is a large city’ is true.” Tarski argued that the definition of truth must be relative to a language, for the one and the same sentence may be true in one language but false in another. The object language is the language for which truth is defined, and the meta-language is the language in which we construct the definition of truth in the object language. Truth is in this way viewed as a semantic property of object language sentences and a predicate of a metalanguage applicable to sentences of its object language. A metalanguage contains either the object sentence itself or a translation of it. The appeal to metalanguage can avoid the danger of semantic paradoxes, for in a metalanguage the object sentences are not used but only mentioned and discussed. This distinction is significant for formal semantics. “The names of the expressions of the first language, and of the relations between them, belong to the second language, called metalanguage.” Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics metalogic Logic Motivated by Hilbert’s distinction in mathematics between meaningful inference and formalized calculus, metalogic takes the systems of formal logic as its subject-matter. It is therefore the theory of logic. It is the result of the combination of Boole’s formalism and Frege’s theory of proof. The first system of metalogic was developed by Tarski. It differs from formal logic in that it is not concerned with meaningful inference, but only with purely formal questions arising from formal logical systems, that is, formal properties of formal logic systems such as consistency; consequence, completeness, decision procedure, deduction, categoricalness, and satisfaction. It differs from the philosophy of logic because it deals with the conditions under which various formal theories possess these properties, rather than with the philosophical issues raised by logic systems. “Metalogic is the study of formal properties of formal logical systems.” Haack, Philosophy of Logics metaphilosophy Philosophical method A term introduced by Lazerowitz for the philosophical discussion of philosophy itself, including, for example, its nature, method, goals, autonomy, and objectivity. Hence it is second-order philosophy. According to the firstorder branch of philosophy under discussion, such as metaphysics, epistemology, or ethics, we can also divide metaphilosophy into metametaphysics metaphysica generalis (meta-ontology), meta-epistemology, and metaethics. The division between first-order and secondorder studies has lost some of its popularity, and philosophers now find it more difficult to draw a sharp distinction between metaphilosophy and philosophy. For those who believe that philosophy comes to an end, metaphilosophy refers to the theoretical activities after the death of philosophy. “We must recognize the distinction between the philosophic and meta-philosophic perspectives: there is a difference between the one who develops and defends a philosophical position and the one who examines that position critically.” Yolton, Metaphysical Analysis The Cream in Grice’s Coffee: metaphor from Greek metaphora, a transfer, a change] A figure of speech or a verbal composition in which an expression is used to denote a thing to which its literal sense does not apply. For example, “A baby is a flower” is a metaphor because “flower,” taken literally, does not describe a “baby.” If there were only literal meaning, all metaphors would be false. The best metaphors evoke a complex and productive mental response through indicating certain likenesses between what an expression literally denotes and the thing it metaphorically describes. The power of metaphors can also involve dissimilarities as well as likenesses. Starting from Aristotle, the nature and scope of metaphor has been of interest to philosophers. This interest has intensified in contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Major issues concerning metaphor include: can a metaphor itself be literally paraphrased? How clear-cut is the distinction between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning? Traditionally metaphor is regarded as a decoration of speech that does not contribute to the cognitive meaning of discourse. Others argue that metaphor contributes indispensably to the cognitive meaning of discourse, but there is no agreement over the kind of contribution it makes. Davidson claims that what is crucial to a metaphor is not a matter of meaning, but of use. In his view, a metaphor lacks meaning peculiar to itself other than literal meaning. But Nietzsche claimed that the nature of language itself is metaphorical, for it works by means of transference from one kind of reality to another. This view has been widely adopted by continental philosophers, who regard metaphor not merely as a rhetorical device or an aspect of the expressive function of language, but as one of the essential conditions of speech. They claim that as the way in which many kinds of discourse are structured, metaphor powerfully influences how we conceive things. “The study of metaphor is becoming important as it is being realised that language does not simply reflect but helps to constitute it.” Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Post-Modernism metaphysica generalis Metaphysics General metaphysics, in contrast to metaphysica specialis, special or particular metaphysics. The distinction can be traced back to Aristotle’s metaphysics. Aristotle himself referred to metaphysics as first philosophy or sophia (wisdom), that is, the science of ultimate causes and principles. Sometimes he said that metaphysics is the science of being qua being and that such an enquiry provides a starting-point for all other sciences. Elsewhere he held that metaphysics is concerned with a special kind of being that is beyond the sensible substances, namely God, and that it is therefore theology. The medieval philosophers called these two accounts of metaphysics respectively metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis. Aristotle believed that these two accounts of metaphysics are reconcilable, but did not offer any convincing argument for that conclusion. The problem of dealing with these two accounts has given rise to major debate in Aristotelian scholarship and greatly affects our understanding of his metaphysics. The distinction was retained in the later development of metaphysics, but the meaning varied. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, general metaphysics was identified with ontology, which was concerned with general concepts, while special metaphysics was identified with natural theology. For Wolff, general metaphysics concerned ens qua ens (being qua being), and special metaphysics concerned substance and its attributes. Brentano distinguished between broad ontology and narrow ontology. The former amounts to general metaphysics, discussing the general nature of things, and the latter amounts to special metaphysics, with theology as its subject-matter. “What is important . . . is the conception of an inquiry into being in general – general ontology, or what medieval philosophers called metaphysica generalis, as opposed to metaphysica specialis.” Hamlyn, Metaphysics metaphysica specialis, see metaphysica generalis metaphysical deduction Metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language Part of the transcendental analytic in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, although its official title is “the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding.” The metaphysical deduction is concerned with uncovering the origin of the categories and identifying them systematically, in contrast to the transcendental deduction, which is concerned with establishing the legitimacy of these categories. Knowledge must be derived from what is given in sensible intuition and the judgments we make on that basis. Taken together, these two determinations indicate that our intuition of things must conform to the logical functions of judgment. The categories are – or stem from – these logical functions of judgment. Kant therefore derived twelve categories or pure concepts of the understanding from what he regarded as the complete classification of the kinds of judgments. Only by applying one of these categories to experience can we make a judgment. This derivation is his metaphysical deduction of the categories. It shows that there is a fundamental structure of thought in judgment that gives unity to the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. Critics might accept the relation of categories to the logical functions of judgment, but seek to revise his classification of kinds of judgment in line with modern developments of logic. “In the metaphysical deduction the a priori origin of the categories has been proved through their complete agreement with the general logical functions of thought.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason metaphysical entity Metaphysics, epistemology Also called inferred entities. The term that Russell uses to refer to such items as material objects, space, and time, which are initially postulated as the ultimate constituents of reality, but which cannot be directly experienced and are instead known by inference. He also calls them unknown entities or inferred entities. In Russell’s logical atomism, these entities can be eliminated and replaced by logical constructions, and we therefore need not include them among the real constituents of the world. In contrast, the class of entities which comprise the logical constructions are called known entities. “By metaphysical entities I mean those things which are supposed to be part of the ultimate constituents of the world, but not to be the kind of thing that is ever empirically given.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell metaphysical exposition Metaphysics Part of the transcendental aesthetic in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The metaphysical exposition of the concept of space contains four arguments: (1) “space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences”; (2) “space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions”; (3) “space is not a discursive . . . but a pure intuition”; and (4) “space is represented as an infinite given magnitude.” The first two claim that space is a priori, and the latter two claim that space is an intuition. The metaphysical exposition of the concept of time makes similar points about time. “The exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason metaphysical subject Metaphysics, philosophy of mind The Cartesian self and related versions of the “philosophical ‘I’,” classically a separate, simple thinking substance, tracing a subjective path through the world and capable of surviving bodily death. Hume’s discussion of personal identity and Kant’s rejection of the main aspects of the rational theory of the soul do much to undermine such positions. Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, the “I think” which accompanies all of my representations, provides more austere grounds for an account of the metaphysical subject. Contemporary philosophers have also raised questions about the metaphysical metaphysics self. Heidegger’s Dasein is an attempt to replace the traditional notion of the self as part of his rejection of metaphysics. Wittgenstein, like Kant, rejects the view that the metaphysical subject is one object among others in the world and links his discussion of the self to his assessment of solipsism and the claim that the world is my world. “The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary (not a part) of the world.” Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 1914–1916 metaphysics Metaphysics A term originally used as the title of a compilation of Aristotle’s writings, according to tradition by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century ad. The title Ta meta ta phusika was used because the compilation came after (meta) the physical writings in the classification of Aristotle’s works. This position, however, had a philosophical basis in its subject-matter, because Aristotle intended it to be an inquiry into objects that are prior to or higher than physical objects, giving reasons for what we instinctively believe. Hence this title can be applied to a whole branch of philosophy. Metaphysics now generally refers to the study of the most basic items or features of reality (ontology) or to the study of the most basic concepts used in an account of reality. On some accounts, metaphysics deals primarily with non-sensible entities or with things outside the scope of scientific method, but other metaphysical views reject these claims. Aristotle himself referred to this kind of investigation as first philosophy or sophia (wisdom), that is, the science of ultimate causes and principles. He sometimes said that it is the science of being qua being, or what it is simply to be. Sometimes, he identified it with theology because it is concerned with a special kind of being, namely God, which is beyond the sensible substances. Medieval philosophers called these aspects of metaphysics respectively metaphysica generalis (general metaphysics) and metaphysica specialis (special or particular metaphysics). In the rationalist tradition, metaphysics was seen to be an inquiry conducted by pure reason into the nature of an underlying reality that is beyond perception, although major metaphysicians, such as Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel, disagreed sharply over what the underlying reality might be. Christian Wolff divided metaphysics into four parts: ontology (a general theory of being or existence), rational theory (about God), rational psychology (about the soul), and rational cosmology (about the world). Kant labeled all attempts to use pure reason to account for a transcendent reality beyond human understanding as speculative metaphysics. Kant thought that metaphysics is a necessary propensity of the human mind toward total explanation and that its transcendent subject-matter (God, Freedom of the Will, and Immortality) can be the grounds for the right way to act (metaphysics of morals), even though speculative metaphysics cannot yield knowledge. Kant’s critical philosophy is a metaphysics in another sense, which deals with the conditions for the possibility of experience and the presuppositions of science. Carnap and other logical positivists defined metaphysics as the field of alleged knowledge of the essence of things that transcends the realm of empirical sciences, and believed that this field should be eliminated as nonsensical. On the other hand, they considered that their own work was restricted to logic and experience and should be called scientific philosophy. For different motives, Heidegger and Derrida also sought to exclude metaphysics from their thought, although they did not satisfy themselves that they succeeded. Strawson drew a famous distinction between revisionary metaphysics and descriptive metaphysics. He called speculative metaphysicians revisionary, in contrast to descriptive metaphysics, which is concerned with the conceptual scheme according to which we think and talk about the world. Accordingly, logical positivism and other anti-metaphysical philosophies are themselves a kind of metaphysics insofar as they deal with the conceptual structure of human language and thought. In a special use associated with Marxism, metaphysics is considered to be a partial, stationary, and isolated way of thinking opposed to Hegelian dialectics. “Metaphysics is for us the name of a science, and has been for many centuries, because for many centuries it has been found necessary, and still is found necessary, to think in a systematic or orderly fashion about the subjects that Aristotle discussed in the group of treatises collectively known by that science.” Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics. In a positive sense, metaphysics for Kant is the system of knowledge arising out of pure reason, that is, knowledge which is attained a priori and involves only a priori concepts. It is divided into a speculative part, the metaphysics of nature, and a practical part, the metaphysics of morals. In a strict sense, metaphysics is confined to the metaphysics of nature, but in a wider sense, metaphysics also includes the metaphysics of morals and criticism, that is, the investigation of the faculty of reason in respect of all its pure a priori knowledge, and is propaedeutic. Metaphysics in this wide sense is the same as the philosophy of pure reason. The metaphysics of nature discusses the principles of pure reason that are derived from mere concepts and employed in the theoretical knowledge of all things. It is further divided into transcendental philosophy, which deals with understanding and reason without taking into account the objects given, and the physiology of pure reason, that is, the rational physiology of objects that can be given in experience. The latter is divided into transcendent and immanent parts. The metaphysics of morals, also called morals proper, deals with the a priori principles of morality, that is, the principles that determine and make necessary all of our actions. In both the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals, there is a transcendental analytic, which concerns the legitimate application of their a priori principles within the limits of experience, and a transcendental dialectic, which exposes the fallacies in traditional metaphysics arising when pure reason applies these principles to things in themselves beyond experience. The Critique of Pure Reason reveals in detail the illusions or errors of traditional metaphysics, especially of rational cosmology, rational psychology, and rational theology. The analytic and dialectic represent both sides of Kant’s attitude toward metaphysics. He scorns the claim of traditional metaphysics to be the queen of the sciences, but believes that the metaphysics of his critical philosophy can inquire into the properties of things and show the limits of human reason. Hence, rather than being totally demolished, metaphysics needed redefinition or reconstruction. “The title ‘metaphysics’ may also, however, be given to the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as comprehending the investigation of all that can ever be known a priori as well as the exposition of that which constitutes a system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of this type – in distinction, therefore, from all empirical and from all mathematical employment of reason.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason metaphysics of difference, see presence metaphysics of morals, see metaphysics (Kant) metaphysics of nature, see metaphysics (Kant) metaphysics of presence, see presence metempsychosis, see transmigration of the soul; reincarnation methexis, Greek term for participation method Philosophical method A combination of rules, assumptions, procedures, and examples determining the scope and limits of a subject and establishing acceptable ways of working within those limits to achieve truth. The question of philosophical method is itself a matter for philosophy and constitutes a major example of the reflective nature of the subject. Philosophers disagree about the appropriate philosophical method. The identifying mark of a philosophical school or movement lies mainly in the method it adopts. Ancient philosophy was developed according to various interpretations of dialectic method, and modern philosophy was initiated by Descartes’s method of doubt. Analytic philosophy is characterized by linguistic method, while nonanalytic European philosophy is characterized by phenomenological, historical, and textual methods. Historically, philosophers have tried to model their work on the methods of successful sciences, such as mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, and computer science, but the appropriate relationship between philosophical and scientific method is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers draw methodological implications from the claim that philosophy is a part of science or ancillary to science, while others derive their account of philosophical method from the claim that philosophy is prior to science and other disciplines and presupposed by them. “Method of concomitant variations . . . is regulated by the following canon: whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.” “By a ‘method’ I mean reliable rules which are easy to apply, and such that if one follows them exactly, one will never take what is false to be true or fruitlessly expend one’s mental efforts, but will gradually and constantly increase one’s knowledge till one arrives at a true understanding of everything within one’s capacity.” Descartes, Philosophical Writings. method of difference Logic, philosophy of science The second of Mill’s five canons or inductive methods. Suppose a phenomenon P happens in circumstances A, but not in the circumstances B. A contains conditions c, d, e, and f, and B contains conditions c, d, and e. Since A and B differ only in condition f, and P occurs in A, but not B, we may conclude that f is the cause of the phenomenon P. The principle underlying this method is that whatever cannot be excluded without preventing the phenomenon is the cause of the phenomenon. What we uncover through the method of difference is a necessary condition for a phenomenon. method of agreement Logic, philosophy of science The first of Mill’s five inductive canons. Take two instances, A and B, of a given phenomenon. If we observe that the possible causes of A include c, d, and e, and the possible causes for B include f, g, and e, we eliminate c and d, which are peculiar to A, and f and g, which are peculiar to B. There remains a common factor e for both A and B, and we may conclude that e is the cause or part of the cause of the phenomenon. The principle underlying this method is that whatever can be excluded without doing injustice to the phenomenon has no causation with it. What we uncover through this method is a sufficient condition for the phenomenon under investigation. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. VII “The canon which is the regulating principle of the method of difference may be expressed as follows: If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.” The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. VII “As this method proceeds by comparing different instances to ascertain in what they agree, I have termed it the method of agreement.” The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. VII method of concomitant variations Logic, philosophy of science The fifth of Mill’s five inductive canons states that if it is the case that when the phenomenon P changes, another phenomenon Q changes concomitantly, this sort of functional dependence between these two phenomena suggests that P must be a cause of Q, or Q of P, or both of them are the effect of the same cause. However, we need further methods to determine the exact relationship between P and Q. method of elimination, another expression for induction by elimination method of residues Logic, philosophy of science The fourth of Mill’s five canons applies to cases in which a phenomenon P can be caused by any one of the conditions e, f, or g, and we wish to determine which condition is the cause. We already know through previous induction that neither e nor f is the cause of P. Then, the remaining condition g, which is the residue, might be the sufficient condition of P. Such a conclusion is inferred and needs to be proved by further observations. “The canon of the method of residues is as follows: subtract from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedent.” The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. VII methodological collectivism Philosophy of social science Also called methodological holism, a collective or holistic approach to social phenomena. In contrast to the assertion of methodological individualism that all explanations of social phenomena must be reduced to facts about individuals, methodological collectivism holds that collective phenomena are explanatorily prior to facts about individuals. Social wholes are much better known and more immediately accessible than the individuals that constitute them. Whilst we can learn much from the study of aspects of individual humans and their actions, the social whole has its own sophisticated and complex laws that cannot be defined by appeal to the features of its component individuals. Facts about society cannot be reduced to the decisions, attitudes, and dispositions of the individuals. The social whole is a real entity and is the basis for making sense of the description of individuals, for in most of their activities individuals behave in culturally sanctioned ways. Methodological collectivism was developed by Comte and Durkheim. Hegelians and Marxists are also generally regarded as methodological collectivists. “[M]ethodological collectivism [is the] tendency to treat ‘wholes’ like ‘society’ or the ‘economy’, ‘capitalism’ (as a given historical ‘phase’) or a particular ‘industry’ or ‘class’ or ‘country’, as definitely given objects about which we can discover laws by observing their behaviours as wholes.” Hayek, in O’Neill, Modes of Individualism and Collectivism methodological holism, another expression for methodological collectivism methodological individualism Philosophy of social science A kind of reductionism which believes that a social whole or structure is merely a logical construction out of its individual components or parts, and hence that statements about the social whole can be explained in terms of statements about the features or properties of the individuals. An explanation is sound only if it is couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals. No explanations that appeal to social structures, institutional factors, and so on are legitimate. The position can be traced back to Hobbes, who claimed that it is necessary to understand the constitutive parts out of which a compound is built before we can properly understand the compound itself. This methodology was further maintained by J. S. Mill, Max Weber, and Karl Popper. All of them held that the basic elements in the explanation of historical and social progress are individual human beings. The beliefs, dispositions, and situations of the individuals are essential for understanding social phenomena. The theory is opposed to methodological holism, which holds that a social whole has its own sophisticated and complex laws that cannot be reduced to laws about its component individuals. On the contrary, a social whole is a real entity and is the basis for making sense of statements about its constituent individuals. The debate between methodological individualism and holism is prominent in sociology and the philosophy of social sciences. “The doctrine of methodological individualism may therefore be viewed as implying the reducibility of the specific concepts and laws of the social sciences (in a broad sense, including group psychology, the theory of economic behaviour, and the like) to those of individual psychology, biology, chemistry, and physics.” Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science methodological socialism, another expression for methodological collectivism methodological solipsism Philosophy of mind A term introduced by Putnam in 1975 in relation to his claim that there are two types of mental state, wide and narrow. Narrow mental states, such as pain, do not presuppose the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. Wide mental states, such as being jealous of somebody, carry reference to the world outside the subject. Narrow mental content is intrinsic, while wide content refers to one’s physical or social environment. Methodological solipsism is the doctrine that psychology ought to be concerned exclusively with narrow mental or psychological states and that mental states should be individuated by reference to items internal to the individual whose mental states they are. We should explain the content of a propositional attitude solely by identifying it with events occurring inside the mind. There is no need to investigate the environmental causes or behavioral effects of the mental states or processes. The doctrine likens a mental process to the computing of a machine that is fully determined by its physical elements. In a sense, both physicalism and functionalism carry the restriction of methodological solipsism forward to their physical account of the mental. Fodor takes it as a research strategy in cognitive psychology that psychological states are individuated without respect to their semantic evaluation. And he contrasts this strategy with his rendering of methodological individualism, which tries to individuate psychological states by reference to their causal powers. But Putnam objects to the restrictive program of methodological solipsism on the grounds that it is incompatible with the existence of ordinary mental states such as belief, jealousy, and regret. “When traditional philosophers talked about psychological states (or ‘mental states’), they made an assumption which we may call the assumption of methodological solipsism. This assumption is the assumption that no psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed.” Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality middle knowledge Epistemology, philosophy of religion [Latin scientia media] A kind of knowledge that was first ascribed to God by the Spanish theologian Luis de Molina, with the aim of reconciling the tension between God’s foreknowledge and human free will. According to this doctrine, God knows what free action a person would perform were a counterfactual condition actualized. He knows that P would freely do A were he in condition F. It is true that it is up to God to decide whether to instantiate the condition F, but before he makes his decision, the statement of what P would do in condition F has a truth-value. Since this kind of knowledge falls between God’s knowledge of what is actual (scientia visionis, knowledge by intuition) and his knowledge of what is possible (scientia simplicis intelligentia, knowledge of simple understanding), it is called middle knowledge. This term was recently revived by A. Plantinga in his approach to solving the problem of evil. It is also called counterfactuals of freedom. “What they call middle knowledge is nothing but the knowledge of contingent possibles.” Leibniz, Philosophical Essays midwifery Philosophical method, ancient Greek philosophy In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates’ art of eliciting from others what was in their minds. In Theaetetus, Socrates said that his mother was a midwife, a job that was normally taken by women who were too old to conceive or bear children themselves. He then claimed that he himself virtually practiced the art of midwifery in philosophy. He did not produce philosophical wisdom himself, but could elicit ideas from others and test these ideas for correctness. The characteristic of his midwifery was to be concerned with the soul rather the body, and the offspring were not real children but ideas that could be checked for truth and falsehood. The description of this method fits with Socrates’ practice in the earlier Platonic dialogues and has deeply influenced Western philosophy of education. Because the Greek term for midwifery is maieutikos, this method is also called the maieutic method. “Heaven constrains me to serve as a midwife, but has debarred me from giving birth.” Plato, Theaetetus Mill, James (1773–1836) Scottish utilitarian philosopher and economist, born in Forfar, assistant to Jeremy Bentham and father of John Stuart Mill. Mill developed an associationist psychology and proposed radical utilitarian educational and political reforms, arguing especially for democratic rule to ensure the greatest happiness for the greatest number. His main works include The Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829). Mill, John Stuart (1806–73) British logician, utilitarian moral and political philosopher, and economist, born in London, educated by his father James Mill (1773–1836) who was also a philosopher, and served as an administrator in the East India Company. Mill’s Utilitarianism (1861) developed and systematized the utilitarianism founded by Jeremy Bentham. A morally right action is the one that brings about the greatest happiness for everyone affected by the action, with happiness understood in terms of pleasure and the absence of pain. Mill altered Bentham’s position by distinguishing qualities as well as quantities of different kinds of pleasures and claimed that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” On Liberty (1859), a classic statement of political liberalism, defined and defended individual freedom and argued that restrictions on liberty are acceptable only to avoid harm to others. His System of Logic (1843) made significant contributions to the theory of inductive reasoning. The Subjection of Women (1869), which was radical when published, has now become a classic of liberal feminism. Mill’s main work as an economist was Principles of Political Economy (1848). Mill’s canons Logic, Philosophy of science Also called Mill’s methods, the five inductive laws formulated and generalized by Mill for discovering the causal relations among phenomena. (1) The Canon or Method of Agreement: “If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances appear is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.” (2) The Canon or Method of Difference: “If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.” (3) The Joint Canon or Method of Agreement and Difference: “If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause.” (4) The Canon or Method of Concomitant Variations: “Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.” (5) The Canon or Method of Residues: “Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.” “The classical exposition of the inductive method is as Mill’s Canons.” Harré, The Philosophies of Science Mill’s methods, another expression for Mill’s canons mimesis, Greek term for imitation mimetic theory, another expression for imitation theory mind Philosophy of mind Descartes used the terms mind and soul interchangeably. For him, the mind is identical to self, person, the substance that thinks, believes, doubts, desires, and acts. For others, like Hume, the mind is a set of psychological states, and in this sense it is close to consciousness but contrasts to physical states. Different understandings of mind lead to different understandings of the mind– body problem. If one believes in a Cartesian mental substance, the mind–body problem involves the relationship between one’s mind as a mental substance and one’s body as a physical substance. If, on the other hand, one holds that minds are collections of psychological states, the problem is to explain the relation between one’s psychological properties and one’s physical properties. There has been renewed interest in the Aristotelian account of the mind that Descartes displaced. On this view, the mind or soul is the form of the body, although this position might have theoretical presuppositions that cannot be revived. “The substance in which thought immediately resides is called mind. I use the term ‘mind’ rather than ‘soul’, since the word ‘soul’ is ambiguous and sensible is often applied to something corporeal.” Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes mind–body problem Philosophy of mind Problems concerning the relationship between soul and body can be traced to Plato and Aristotle, but it is Descartes who gave the issue a central position in modern philosophy. He believed that mind has thinking as its essence and is a totally distinct entity from body or extended substance. This view is an expression of mind–body dualism. How, then, can a spatial body interact with a non-spatial mind? How can mental phenomena be both irreducibly psychological and somehow dependent on a mechanistic causal base, such as the brain or nervous system? Descartes’s failure to provide a satisfactory account to the problem has led to many objections to his dualism and various alternative accounts of the relationship between mind and body or between mental phenomena and physical phenomena. This has become the central topic of the philosophy of mind. Of various theories developed, the most influential ones include: occasionalism, epiphenomenalism, psychophysical parallelism, idealism, monism, dual-aspect theory, panpsychism, behaviorism, identity theory or central-state materialism, functionalism, and anomalous monism, all of which are discussed in separate dictionary entries. The mind–body problem continues to provoke important debate in current philosophy. Until recently, the discussion of this problem has been from the standpoint of mind, but some philosophers are taking our new scientific understanding of the workings of the brain and nervous system as a starting-point for dealing with the question. If there is an adequate solution to the mind–body problem, it could lead to an integrated science of human nature. Other philosophers argue that there cannot be an adequate solution because raising the problem is a mistake based on misleading Cartesian assumptions. Some holding this position seek to return to an Aristotelian account of the mind or soul as the form of the body. “The question as to the relation between mental phenomenal world and physical states of the body, specifically the brain, is generally referred to as ‘the mind–body problem’.” McGinn, The Character of Mind minimal theory of truth Logic, philosophy of language One form of the deflationary theory of truth, proposed by Horwich. It holds that truth, like existence, is a logical property rather than a natural property. The truth predicate does not invoke meaning-like entities. Instead, it provides a device that enables us to formulate propositions that can be the objects of belief, desire, and so on, in cases where the proposition of primary concern is inaccessible. The simplest way of introducing this device is to introduce a new predicate of being true. “Because it contains no more than what is expressed by uncontroversial instances of the equivalence schema ‘ It is true that p if and only if p’, I shall call my theory of truth ‘the minimal theory’.” Horwich, Truth minimax rule, see maximin rule minimum sensible Epistemology A term introduced by Berkeley for the least number of our sense-impressions of extension required in order to reject the idea that extension is infinitely divisible. This is similar to what Locke calls the sensible point, that is, the smallest particle of matter or space we can discern. Berkeley’s argument is that all the objects of immediate perceptions are sense-impressions. There is nothing in a sense-impression but what is actually perceived in it, and I cannot be mistaken about my immediate sensations. The capacities of our senses are finite. Hence, sense-impressions are not infinitely divisible, but must be composed of a finite number of minimum sensibilia. There must be a minimum tangible or a minimum visible, beyond which sense cannot perceive. A minimum visible should be the same for all beings endowed with the faculty of vision. It does not include any parts and the ultimate component of any sensation is extension. Furthermore, since to be is to be perceived, the immediate objects of perceptions must also be composed of minimum sensibilia. Hence, the idea of the minimum sensible is closely related to Berkeley’s immaterialism. For Berkeley, a minimum visible has no existence without the mind of the perceiver. The position encounters difficulties in meeting Zeno’s paradoxes. It is also difficult to determine what we actually perceive. “Upon a thorough examination it will not be found, that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, it will be evident that this is never done, it being impossible.” Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge minimum vocabulary: For Russell, the words contained in a minimum vocabulary allow us to express every proposition in a given body of knowledge. No word in this vocabulary can be defined in terms of other words in it, but can only be mastered by acquaintance with the things. These words represent the hard core of experience by which our sentences are connected to the extra-linguistic world. For Russell, such a vocabulary will reduce the number of entities one’s language forces us to assume and so lessen the possibility of an unwarranted metaphysics of substance. The minimum vocabulary required for a given subject-matter diminishes with the development of the inquiry into that subject-matter. “I call a vocabulary a ‘minimum’ one if it contains no word which is capable of a verbal definition in terms of the other words of the vocabulary.” Russell, Human Knowledge miracle Philosophy of religion [from Latin miror, wonder at] An extraordinary event whose occurrence does not conform with natural law, and which is deemed to have a supernatural cause, such as God. The Bible records many miracles, such as the waters of the Red Sea dividing for Moses and Jesus raising Lazarus from the dead. The miracles are used as signs of God’s omnipotence. However, the nature and possibility of miracles have been subject to debate. It is difficult to ascertain whether events of this kind occur. Even if extraordinary events do occur, we may provide a scientific explanation for them. Even if science cannot explain such events, we still do not need to posit a supernatural cause for them, for the explanatory gap might be due to the limitation of our present knowledge. Since miracles are sharply in conflict with science, their possibility has been rejected by many religious thinkers. “A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.” Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Mises, Richard von (1883–1953) German philosopher of probabilty, born in Lemberg, Professor of Mathematics at University of Strasbourg, Dresden Technical University, University of Berlin, University of Istanbul, and Harvard University. Von Mises was an applied mathematician, pioneer of aerodynamics, philosopher of science, theorist of probability and statistics, and a member of the Vienna Circle. In seeking to develop a unified theory of probability and statistics, he proposed a frequency theory of probability. His major works include Probability Statistics and Truth (1928). mitigating circumstance, see excuse mitigation Philosophy of law The procedure for determining a less severe penalty than usual for a crime. In a criminal trial, before sentence is passed on someone convicted of a crime, a plea in mitigation can normally be presented by or on behalf of the accused, suggesting why the punishment should be moderated. This is usually done by citing evidence such as the abnormality of the criminal’s mentality when he conducted the crime or by debating the effect of minimizing the importance of other evidence or facts. Mitigation is different from justification, which proves that an action is in accordance with law, and excuse, which seeks to acquit the accused of responsibility for the action. “Mitigation . . . presupposes that someone is convicted and liable to be punished and the question of the severity of his punishment is to be decided.” Hart, Punishment and Responsibility mixed hypothetical syllogism Logic A syllogism that has a conditional proposition as one premise, and a categorical proposition as another. Its conclusion is a categorical proposition. It has two correct forms of inference: the constructive hypothetical syllogism (also called modus ponens): “If p then q; p; therefore q,” and the destructive hypothetical syllogism (also called modus tollens): “If p then q; not q, therefore, not p.” It also has two incorrect forms of inference. In contrast to the constructive hypothetical syllogism is the fallacy of affirming the consequent: “If p then q; q; then p.” In contrast to the destructive hypothetical syllogism is the fallacy of denying the antecedent: “If p then q; not p; therefore not q.” A mixed hypothetical syllogism contrasts with a pure hypothetical syllogism, which has conditional propositions as both of its premises and also has a conditional proposition as its conclusion. “A syllogism having one conditional premise and one categorical premise is called a mixed hypothetical syllogism.” Copi, Introduction to Logic mixed modes, see mode (Locke) mnemic causation Philosophy of mind, epistemology [from Greek mneme, memory] A term employed by Russell, inspired by the psychologist Richard Semon, to express the relationship between a past event and the subsequent remembering of it. An animal’s response to present impulse is determined not only by the present value of a stimulus but also by memories of past rewards and frustration. It is a kind of action at a distance by which experience produces subsequent memory-images, but it is argued that such a relation does not have to be causal. “We find sometimes that, in mnemic causation, an image or word, as stimulus, has the same effect (or very nearly the same effect) as belongs to some object.” Russell, An Analysis of Mind modal epistemic logic, see epistemic modality modal logic Logic A branch of logic which deals with the logical relationships between propositions containing modal terms such as necessarily or possibly. Its study originated with Aristotle and flourished in the medieval period. In the last century it was revived by C. I. Lewis out of dissatisfaction with the account of material implication given by Frege and Russell. Lewis introduced two new operators to propositional and predicate calculus and used them to construct modal axiom systems. The operator L is symbolized as 䊐 and read as “It is necessary that . . . ,” and the operator M is symbolized as ◊ and read as “It is possible that . . .” Important additional modal systems have been constructed, but the validity of the principles of inference in modal logic has been a matter of debate. Quine has been especially critical of modality. However, through the work of Kripke, D. Lewis, and others, modal logic has been closely associated with possible world semantics and has become a central focus of work in contemporary logic. “Modal logic is intended to represent arguments involving essentially the concepts of necessity and possibility.” Haack, Philosophy of Logics modal realism Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language A theory associated with the American philosopher David Lewis, claiming that different possible worlds exist and are as real as the actual world. These other worlds are unactualized possibilities. The inhabitants of possible worlds have their respective counterparts in our world. The only significant difference between the actual world and other possible worlds is that the actual world is the world that we inhabit and that is spatially and temporally related to us. Hence, to think in terms of logical possibilities is to think of different real worlds. Every way that a world could be is a way that some world is. Whenever such-and-such might be the case, there is some world in which such-and-such is the case. This theory has been under attack. One criticism is that if possible worlds and the actual world have the same ontological status, then a possible world would be actual rather than possible. If this were true, we could not account for the difference between an event happening in our world and merely being a logical possibility. But Lewis argues that his theory can provide the most satisfactory interpretation of modal propositions. On his account, “it is possible that p” is true if and only if in some possible worlds, p; and “it is necessary that p” is true if and only if in every possible world, p. He also believes that modal realism can be used to explain phenomena such as causation, conditionals, the content of propositional attitudes, and existential quantification. “I advocate a thesis of the plurality of worlds, or modal realism, which holds that our world is but one world among many.” D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds “An assertion de dicto, for example, ‘necessarily nine is composite’, predicates a modal property – in this instance necessary truth – of another dictum or proposition – ‘nine is composite’.” Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity modality Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language The ways or modes in which a proposition or statement is judged to be true or false. There are various classifications of modalities, such as epistemic modality [it is known (or unknown) that p]; deontic modality [it is obligatory (or permissible) that p]; temporal modality [it was (or is now or will be) p]. Of central concern to logic is logical or alethic modality [necessarily (or possibly) p]. Modal logic studies the logical relationships between statements of alethic modality. The doctrine of possible worlds has been developed to provide a semantics for modal logic and has stirred much recent debate in logic and metaphysics. Modality can be distinguished into modality de re (in which a modal term modifies a predicate ascribed to a subject, such as “a is necessarily f ”) and modality de dicto (in which a modal term modifies a whole proposition, such as “it is necessary that fa”). “Another set of notions as to which philosophy has allowed itself to fall into hopeless confusions through not sufficiently separating propositions and propositional functions are the notions of ‘modality’: necessary, possible, and impossible. (Sometimes contingent or assertoric is used instead of possible.).” Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy modality de dicto Logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics Modality de dicto attributes modal terms (necessary, possible) to describe a proposition (Latin dictum), such as “it is necessary that p.” This contrasts with modality de re, which attributes modal terms to modify an object (Latin res), such as “a is necessarily f.” The distinction can be traced to Aristotle’s Prior Analytic, I.9, and is widely discussed together with essentialism because necessity de re asserts of some object that it has some property essentially. This seems to support the recent revival of essentialism, but anti-essentialists or nominalists reject the claim that an object can necessarily possess a property and argue that all necessity is de dicto. modality de re, see modality de dicto mode Metaphysics, epistemology [from Latin modus, measure, form, or manner] The determinations a thing possesses, the way a quality presents itself, or the form in which a thing can be understood. In medieval philosophy, a mode is a characteristic of a thing that marks it out from other things. In both Descartes and Spinoza, there is a system of substance-attribute-mode. Thinking and extension are the two principal attributes of substance, and modes are various ways or forms of thinking or extension. Locke took modes as one kind of complex idea. He divided them into simple modes, which are different combinations of the same idea, and mixed modes, which are the combinations of several different simple modes. “By mode I understand the modifications of substance, or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived.” Spinoza, Ethics mode (Locke) Metaphysics, epistemology Both Descartes and Spinoza defined a mode as the affection of substance, but Locke used the word for one sort of complex idea that depends on substances. Modes are further divided into two kinds: simple and mixed. Simple modes are complex ideas that are combinations of the same simple ideas or ideas of the same kind. They are the result of the mental operations of compounding or enlarging the simple ideas given in experience. Space, time, number, and infinity, for example, are all classified as simple modes. Mixed modes are complex ideas that are combinations of different kinds of simple ideas. They can be gained through experience and observation, by invention, and by explaining the names of actions. Mixed modes differ from ideas of substance because ideas of substance must have a prototype in nature, but the mind in framing mixed modes need not determine whether they designate what exists in nature. The majority of examples of mixed modes lie in the sphere of morals and law. Mixed modes can be said to be the names of specific qualities and actions that are important for social life, especially for moral judgments. “First, modes I call such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of substances; . . . And if in this I use the word mode in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon.” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding mode of production Philosophy of social science The way of producing goods. Marx used this term in various senses. The material mode of production contains the productive forces. The social mode of production comprises the social characteristics of the productive process, including the purpose of production, the form of surplus labor presented by production, and the mode of exploitation in the production. In some uses, the mode of production includes both material and social modes and combines the productive forces and the relations of production. For Marx, modes of production vary historically. “The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual lifeprocess generally.” Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy modern logic, another name for symbolic logic modernity Philosophical method An ambiguous term that generally refers to the central characteristic of the modern period as established in the Enlightenment. Postmodernists contrast modernity with postmodernity. In philosophy, modernity is normally taken to begin with Descartes’s work in the seventeenth century and to be concerned with the issues, problems, and standards of relevance that have since occupied Western philosophers. Authors and critics vary in their accounts of the main strands of modernity. In general, modernity is associated with the supremacy of pure rationality and with the selfassertiveness of the modern self. Equipped with rationality, modern persons seek consensus over a unified metaphysical framework to view the world. They seek their own subjective autonomy and ignore the constraints of history, tradition, and culture. They aggressively attempt to organize and control the natural environment, with science as their guiding discipline. Aesthetic objects and their appreciation are measured in terms of economic benefit. Modernity was effective in the rise of industrial capitalism. The critique of modernity has been the chief topic of critical theory, postmodernism, post-structuralism, and communitarianism. Each criticism is from a separate standpoint and from a different understanding of modernity. “The project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers of the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their own logic.” Habermas, in Foster (ed.), Postmodern Culture modes of skepticism Ancient Greek philosophy, epistemology [from Greek tropos, way, manner + skepsis, investigation, enquiry] As a technical term in ancient skepticism, a pattern of argument, something like Aristotle’s topos. Ancient skepticism established many modes aiming to show the oppositions or contradictions of appearance and to conclude that suspension of judgment is necessary. The most famous and important are the Ten Modes, which form the methodology of skepticism. They are recorded by Sextus Empiricus and ascribed to the Pyrrhonist philosopher Aenesidemus: (1) the mode depending on the variations among animals; (2) that depending on the differences among animals; (3) that depending on the variable constitutions of the senseorgans; (4) that depending on circumstances; (5) that depending on positions; (6) that depending on admixtures; (7) that depending on the quantities of things; (8) that depending on relativity; (9) that depending on the frequency of encounters; (10) that depending on customs and laws. “In order for us to get a more accurate impression of these oppositions, I shall append the modes through which suspension of judgment is inferred.” Empiricus, Outline of Pyrrhonism modularity Philosophy of mind A theory of the cognitive processes in the philosophy of mind that originated largely with Jerry Fodor’s book The Modularity of Mind (1983). The traditional theory of mind considers it to be a general faculty that is exercised in various domains. But theorists of modularity claim that mind is composed mainly of modules. Modules are cognitive systems (input systems) which are relatively independent of each other, each performing its own information-processing autonomously. Fodor lists eight characteristics of being a module: domain specificity, mandatoriness, information encapsulation, speed, shallow output, lack of access of other processes to intermediate representations, natural localization, and susceptibility to characteristic breakdown. According to the modularity hypothesis, the human mind should have unique physical structures for acquiring language and for parsing sensations. Although this hypothesis has been disputed, it has led to much fruitful debate. “Roughly, modular cognitive systems are domain specific, innately specified, hardwired, autonomous, and not assembled. Since modular systems are domain-specific computational mechanisms, it follows that they are species of veridical faculties. I shall assume, hopefully, that this gives us a notion of modularity that is good enough to work with.” Fodor, The Modularity of Mind modus ponens Logic [Latin, affirming mood, also called modus ponendo ponens] A form of hypothetical syllogism named by medieval logicians and providing a rule of inference of the form: “If p then q; p; therefore q.” By this rule we infer from the antecedent of a true implication to its consequent. It is the principle that whatever a true proposition implies is itself true. It is also called the affirming mood. In contrast, modus tollens has the form: “If p then q, not q; not p.” In modus ponens, if the categorical premise affirms the consequent rather than the antecedent of the conditional premise, that is, “If p then q; q; therefore p,” the argument commits a fallacy called affirming the consequent. “In the modus ponens (also called the constructive hypothetical syllogism) the categorical premise affirms the antecedent of the hypothetical premise, thereby justifying as a conclusion the affirmation of its consequent.” Keynes, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic modus tollens Logic [Latin denying mood, also called modus tollendo tollen] A form of hypothetical syllogism providing a rule of inference of the form: “If p then q; not q; therefore not p.” By modus tollens, we infer from the denial of the consequent of an implication to the denial of its antecedent. It is the principle that whatever implies a false proposition is itself false. It contrasts with modus ponens: “If p then q; p; therefore q.” In modus tollens, if the categorical premise denies the antecedent rather than the consequent of the conditional premises, the argument commits a fallacy called denying the antecedent. “In the modus tollens (also called the destructive hypothetical syllogism) the categorical premise denies the consequent of the hypothetical premise, thereby justifying as a conclusion the denial of its antecedent.” Keynes, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic molecular facts, see atomic fact molecular propositions Logic Propositions that are built from the conjunction of atomic propositions related by words such as “and,” “or,” and “if-then.” For example, “p or q” is a molecular proposition made from the atomic propositions “p” and “q” and the logical connective “or.” While atomic propositions represent “atomic facts,” molecular propositions represent “molecular facts” composed of atomic facts. A molecular proposition is a truth-functional compound of atomic propositions. That is, its truth-value is decided by the truth-values of the atomic propositions composing it and by the logical terms conjoining those atomic propositions. “ ‘Molecular’ propositions are such as contain conjunctions – if, or, and, unless, etc. – and such words are the marks of molecular proposition.” Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World Molyneux’s problem Epistemology A problem about the correlation between sight and touch, proposed by the Irish politician and scientist William Molyneux (1656–98) in a letter addressed to Locke, and which is included by Locke in the second edition of Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ii, ix, 8). Suppose a blind person has learned to distinguish a cube from a sphere of the same metal by the sense of touch. If the person is suddenly made to see, can he immediately distinguish the two objects by sight before touching them? Both Molyneux and Locke answered this question in the negative. They believed that our ordinary perceptions depend on judgments based on experience. A perceiver must learn to build perceptual knowledge by correlating the contents from different channels. Berkeley agreed with this solution but claimed that it proved his own thesis that the data of touch and the data of sight are heterogeneous. Leibniz also discussed this problem, but derived a different answer. He suggested that the two sets of experience have one element in common, that is, extension. Hence it is possible to infer from one type of idea to another. Empirical testing seems to favor Locke’s solution. “A farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn from the solution of Mr. Molyneux’s problem, published by Mr. Locke in his Essay . . . that the blind man at first sight would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe which the cube, whilst he only saw them.” Berkeley, An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision monadic relation, Russell’s term for quality monadology, see monads monads Metaphysics [from Greek monas, unit] Leibniz’s mature term for his conception of substance. In his early period he used terms such as substantial form, substantial unity, atom of substance, or entelechy. Monads are the ultimate constituents of reality. They are simple, without parts, extension, or shape, and are indivisible. They do not affect each other. So each monad is windowless, like a world of its own. It is self-sufficient and a true atom of nature. The simplicity of a monad, however, is compatible with its internal complexity. Leibniz identified monads with perception and appetition. Thus each monad changes, but its change comes from an internal principle and not from an external cause. To be active is the main characteristic of monad. Based on the contents of their perceptions, Leibniz distinguishes three grades of monads. The first grade possesses only basic properties of perception and appetition, with no self-consciousness. The second grade is animal soul, whose perceptions are more distinct and accompanied by memory. The third grade is spirits or rational minds, which are completely self-conscious. Within any monad’s perceptual states there is a representation of the relatedness of that monad to all other monads. This provides the foundation for intermonadic relations. Each monad is a mirror of the whole universe. Although each of them is self-enclosed, there is a perfect harmonious relation among them that is pre-established by God. Leibniz’s theory of monads is called monadology. Many of the puzzling features of Leibniz’s doctrine of monads can be understood in the context of his logic and science. “A simple substance is that which has no parts. A composite substance is a collection of simple substances, or monads. Monad is a Greek word signifying unity, or what is one.” Leibniz, Philosophical Essays monarchy Political philosophy [from Greek mon, one + arche, rule, rule by one] A type of government in which supreme power and sovereignty are held by one person: the monarch, king, or emperor. In many cases, especially where succession to the monarchy is determined by a long-standing hereditary principle, the monarch is viewed as an incarnation of the historical national identity. In some cases, monarchs are elected or emerge through victory in war. The power of monarchical government does not arise from consent or a social contract. The traditional absolute monarchy was inherited and supported by the theory of the divine right of kings. Monarchy contrasts with aristocracy, in which sovereignty lies in the hands of a class of persons, and with democracy, in which sovereignty is in the hands of the majority of people. European monarchies were threatened by the French Revolution. Britain developed a compromise between absolute monarchy and liberalism, called constitutional monarchy, in which the monarch mainly plays a ceremonial role, with sovereignty formally held by the monarch and parliament. “The sovereign may concentrate the entire government in the hands of one single magistrate, from whom all the others will derive their power. This . . . form of government is the most common, and is called monarchy or royal government.” Rousseau, The Social Contract mongrel categorical statements: Ryle’s term for a statement that falls between categorical statements, which are statements of fact, and hypothetical statements, which are statements of inference or conditionals. They are semi-dispositional claims that explain something as being an occurrence but at the same time a disposition, for example, “The bird is migrating” and “John drives carefully.” They are employed to refer to an activity which is the actual display of a disposition and thus to explain something in terms of both occurrence and disposition. These kinds of statements can make sense of some mental concepts such as heeding and minding, which seem always to include an element of the actual or the here and now. “I shall call statements like ‘you would do the thing you did’ ‘semi-hypothetical’ or ‘mongrel categorical statements’.” Ryle, The Concept of Mind monism Metaphysics A term coined by Christian Wolff for any metaphysical theory claiming that only one kind of entity really exists. What really exists may be matter (as materialism holds) or mind (as idealism holds). Neutral monism holds that mind and matter are both derived from some neutral primary reality. Spinoza’s monism argued that God-Nature was the single ultimate reality. The argument for monism can be traced to Parmenides in ancient Greece. Monism is opposed both to dualism, which claims that there are two fundamental realities in the world, and to pluralism, which claims that there are many ultimate non-reducible principles in reality. A special case of monism was put forward by the British neo-Hegelians, especially Bradley. According to this claim, all relations are internal to their terms and form part of the identity of the related terms. In saying that any one object exists, we are therefore implicitly affirming the existence of all other objects and reality forms a single unity. Monism has a wider application, referring to any attempt to account for phenomena by a single principle. “In its extreme form monism sees it as a matter of logic that everything is unified.” Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century Montaigne, Michel de (1533–92) French humanist and essayist, born in Périgord. Montaigne’s chief work is Essays (3 vols.), including the philosophically influential Apology for Raymond Sebond (1580). Montaigne revived the Greek Pyrrhonist skepticism presented in Sextus Empiricus and combined it with Christian theology during the Renaissance. His motto was “What do I know?” (French, “Que sais-je?”). He held that the grasp of true principles is through divine revelation and that history has demonstrated the fallibility of rationality in achieving knowledge in theology, philosophy, or science. Since man does not really know moral truth, there is much to recommend following the simple and innocent life of the animal. Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat (1689– 1755) French Enlightenment political philosopher, born at the Château de la Brède. The Spirit of the Laws (1748), a monumental work of modern political science, compared the legal and political systems of different countries and argued that the laws of a country are related to its social customs, commerce, and geographic situations. Influenced by Locke, Montesquieu held that the best and most durable form of government is a constitutional monarchy in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers are separated. This type of government can safeguard against despotism and protect individual liberty. The love of law is the principal political virtue. His other important works include The Persian Letters (1721) and Considerations on the Romans (1734). mood Logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language In syllogistic logic, mood is every valid form within each of the four figures of categorical syllogism. For instance, the first mood of the first figure is called “Barbara,” with the form: “If all S are Q, and all P are S, then all P are Q.” In the philosophy of mind, mood is a temporary emotional state of the mind that colors a person’s reactions. In the philosophy of language, different moods, such as indicative, imperative, optative, and subjunctive, indicate different forces of the same utterance. immoral or morally wrong. A moral action is also opposed to an amoral action, which is morally value-free, that is, neither right nor wrong. Conflicts can arise between socially accepted rules of morality and rules determined by reason and individual conscience. “Given any signal σ of the system, L is to assign it an interpretation . The component, µ, called a mood, indicates whether σ is indicative or imperative. The component τ of an interpretation, called a truth condition, indicates the state of affairs in which σ is true.” D. Lewis, Convention “The word ‘moral’ when it is used as a term of praise is contrasted with ‘immoral’, or sometimes ‘amoral’, but is contrasted with ‘non-moral’ when used as a universe-of-discourse word.” Cooper, The Diversity of Moral Thinking. Moore, G. E. London-born Irish philosopher, a founder of twentieth-century analytical philosophy. Moore believed that the principal task of philosophy is to analyze ordinary concepts and arguments. His influential Principia Ethica (1903) argued that goodness is a fundamental and indefinable value that can be grasped only by intuition. Any attempt to define values in terms of facts or non-ethical concepts commits the “naturalistic fallacy.” He advocated an “ideal utilitarianism,” according to which we should act in order to maximize goodness, found especially in the experience of friendship and aesthetic enjoyment. In metaphysics, Moore broke from the neo-Hegelian Idealism that dominated English philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century and defended a common sense view of the world against skepticism. Moore’s paradox (the absurdity of saying “It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining”) raises important questions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. His other works include Philosophical Studies (1922) and Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1953). moral Ethics [from Latin moralis, manner, custom, conduct, corresponding to Greek êthos. Latin moralis places greater emphasis on the sense of social expectation, while Greek êthos gives heavier weight to individual character] Being moral concerns human actions that can be evaluated as good or bad and right or wrong. These actions are in our power and we can be held responsible for them. If a person’s actions conform to rules of what is morally right, he is said to be moral. If he violates them, he is moral absolutism Ethics The view that there are certain objective moral principles which are eternally and universally true, no matter what consequences they bring about. These principles can never justifiably be violated or given up. Paradigms of such principles include “don’t lie,” “keep your promises,” and “don’t kill innocent people.” Moral absolutism is generally represented by various religious moral systems. Kantian deontology is closely associated with moral absolutism, since it claims that some actions are right or wrong intrinsically or in themselves and that they may never be used as means to ends. However, contemporary deontology tends to distance itself from absolutism by admitting the principle of double effect, although the extent to which this stance is successful is disputed. Generally, moral absolutism is contrasted to consequentialism, which believes that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the consequences it promotes, and hence any moral principle can be overridden. It is also contrasted to ethical relativism, which claims that all concepts of right and wrong are culturally relative and provincial. “By ‘moral absolutism’ is meant the theory according to which there are certain kinds of actions that are absolutely wrong; actions that could never be right whatever the consequences.” Haber (ed.), Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics moral agent Ethics Any individual who is capable of formulating or following general moral principles and rules, and who has an autonomous will so that he can decide ultimately what acts he should perform and not perform. Moral agents can react to the acts of moral argument for the existence of God other moral agents. Accordingly they are responsible for their acts and are the subject of blame or praise. Adult human beings are paradigmatic moral agents. Moral agents are contrasted to moral patients: beings that lack rationality and cannot be held morally accountable for their acts. “Moral agents are individuals who have a variety of sophisticated abilities, including in particular the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all considered, morally ought to be done and having made this determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as he conceives it, requires.” Regan, The Case for Animal Rights moral argument for the existence of God Philosophy of religion An argument credited to Kant for the existence of God based upon human moral experience. Kant derived morality from reason alone and not from divine authority, but believed that being moral is not sufficient to secure happiness. Happiness must be added to morality, although only a moral person is worthy of being happy. Being happy means that everything proceeds according to my will and desire. A happy moral person has the highest good that can be acquired in the world. But to guarantee that everything will go according to a person’s will and desire and thus to ensure the moral person’s ultimate happiness, it is inevitable that we postulate the existence of God. The moral argument has been very popular since Hume and Kant attacked the ontological and cosmological arguments and the argument from design, although later versions depart from Kant’s formulation. In later versions the argument proceeds from the existence of moral commands to the existence of God as moral commander, from the existence of moral authority to the existence of God as the authorizer, and from the existence of moral laws to the existence of God as law-giver. Thus, morality itself is claimed to be determined by divine will. This argument is criticized by naturalistic ethics, which sees no need to postulate God in order to explain the existence of human moral institutions. “The Moral Argument is a transcendental argument in the sense that it endeavours to show the existence of God is a necessary condition of morality.” McPherson, The Philosophy of Religion moral atomism Ethics A variety of ethical theories which take individuals, their rights, values or interests, as the basis for our thinking about moral right and wrong. It contrasts with moral holism, which places ultimate value on the system rather than on the individuals that compose the system. Most Western ethical theories belong to moral atomism, while Plato’s ethics in the Republic is an example of moral holism. The contrast between moral atomism and holism is striking in environmental ethics. While one position extends human-centered ethics to consider the rights or interests of animals, the other position, represented by land ethics, claims that the ecosystem rather than the various individuals in it should be the focus of our moral consideration. This version of moral holism is also called ecological holism. “Despite their many differences, all of the normative ethical theories discussed so far are in a certain sense atomistic; that is, each demands that individuals be considered equitably.” Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Death moral certainty Epistemology, philosophy of social science The certainty that the natural sciences possess is regarded to be universal or demonstrative, while the social sciences cannot achieve such a degree of certainty, for it involves human affairs. Accordingly, social science is said to possess only moral certainty, because it is generally but not universally true. The word “moral” here is not associated with good or bad, but means pertaining to human affairs or practical concerns. This distinction can be traced to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and has been widely endorsed in the history of philosophy. “Moral certainty is sufficient to regulate the conduct of one’s life even if it is in principle possible that we can be mistaken.” Descartes, Principles of Philosophy moral community Ethics Those within the scope of moral consideration. In traditional ethics, only human beings were held to have membership of the moral community. They are the only objects of moral concern because only human beings have reason and hence know what they are doing. Furthermore, only human beings can be in reciprocal relationships involving the recognition of oneself and others as being in a moral relationship. This implies that the moral community consists exclusively of moral agents. Some contemporary moral philosophers, especially those working in environmental ethics, claim that only prejudice restricts the moral community to human beings. If cognitive conditions are necessary for moral concern, some humans, such as infants and brain-damaged persons, should be excluded, and some kinds of animals should be included. They claim that rationality should not be the grounds for belonging to the moral community. But the question of what the criterion should be is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers suggest that all subjectsof-a-life should have the same right to be respected as a member and that the moral community should extend to many kinds of animals. Others believe that sentience should be the criterion and that the moral community should include any being that is capable of suffering. Some argue that plants as well as animals should be included, while others believe that the whole ecosystem and its members belong to the moral community. Some philosophers claim that even if we encountered fully rational nonhuman beings, our basic moral concern would be restricted to humans on the basis of a recognition of ourselves as members of a species. “Let us define the notion of the moral community as comprising all those individuals who are of direct moral concern or alternatively, as consisting of all those individuals toward whom moral agents have direct duties.” Regan, The Case for Animal Rights moral compromise, see compromise moral conservatism Ethics A contemporary ethical position emerging out of the anti-theory movement, represented by Williams, Nussbaum, and MacIntyre. It attempts to establish ethics without appealing to universal principles, but through examination of particular social conventions, traditions, and practices. Its central characteristics include an emphasis on the plurality and diversity of the values and practices of a community and an objection to any impersonal or universal point of view that places moral judgments above local context. It believes that moral claims can only be assessed from within the historical tradition in which they are embedded and objects to the universal application of prescriptions. It denies the dichotomy of reason and emotion, and emphasizes the formation of virtue. Moral conservatism is associated with virtue ethics, moral particularism, and communitarianism. However, though it tries to distance itself from ethical relativism and advocates the practice of critical reflection, it still faces the major difficulty of explaining how it is possible to criticize a culture if the ethical life of the community is primary. The theory is still being developed. “The second group of writings, moral conservatism, offers positive accounts of morality in terms of custom and practice.” Clarke and Simpson, AntiTheory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism moral dilemma Ethics A situation in which one person is morally pulled in opposite directions. In these situations, different apparently sound reasons support different courses of action that cannot be jointly undertaken. The moral agent has reason to do A and has reason to do B, but he cannot do both A and B. Although it is not this person’s fault for getting into the dilemma, whatever direction is chosen will inevitably be morally wrong in some respect and result in a sense of guilt or remorse. For example, a case may arise in which telling the truth (which is required as a moral principle) will involve moral wrongdoing by breaking a promise to someone else to remain silent. In another case, returning a weapon one has borrowed may predictably lead to serious injuries to some innocent person. In such cases one cannot do all that is morally required. Moral dilemmas are the stuff of tragedies. Since to hold that there is one sovereign moral principle, for example utilitarianism, leads to moral dilemmas in many circumstances, this phenomenon represents a challenge to such theories. However, it is a test of every moral theory that it provides some reasonable way to deal with moral dilemmas, although the fact that no way is completely effective might tell us something about the nature of morality. “The standard definition of moral dilemmas seems to include all and only situations when (at the same time) an agent ought to adopt each of two alternatives separately but cannot adopt both together.” Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas moral epistemology, see moral knowledge moral expert Ethics Moral philosophers are often regarded as being able to offer advice about how one should live or about whether an action is right or wrong, just as an art-historian can advise whether an artwork is real or a forgery. This attitude takes moral philosophers to be moral experts. The notion of a moral expert is strongly objected to by moral noncognitivism. Non-cognitivism denies the existence of objective ethical value and accordingly rejects the view that there is any authority who can tell us how to live our lives. According to this theory, morality is nothing but an expression of one’s own preferences or emotions. What I need to know when I am making a moral judgment is what I feel in the situation in question. The position of noncognitivism is not widely shared. Nowadays many philosophers sit on government commissions of enquiry and corporate and institutional ethics committees. The need for advice on a variety of morally complicated issues has greatly promoted the development of applied ethics. However, it is not clear whether moral advice is a matter of good judgment that can be detached from any moral theory, an ability to articulate and clarify moral issues without drawing moral conclusions, or a combined capacity to provide moral theory leading to moral conclusions. Although they accept the notion of moral advice, some philosophers object to moral experts making moral decisions for us on the grounds that this would compromise our autonomy as moral agents. They claim that leading a life on someone else’s plan is not to lead a good life, however good the plan might be. In any case, they argue that morality cannot be taught like other subjects. On this view, the nature of moral expertise becomes problematic. “The notion of a moral expert makes no sense on the non-cognitivist view, (for) there are no moral facts about which he or she might have special knowledge.” McNaughton, Moral Vision moral holism, see moral atomism moral judgment Ethics The content of a proposition that typically discriminates between good or bad or between right and wrong and determines what should be done in a moral context. Also, moral judgment is the capacity to make such judgments or to make them well. Moral judgments are practical in that they provide direct guidance for action. Different ethical theories have different views about the nature of moral judgments and their relation to action. Moral objectivism claims that a true moral judgment corresponds to objective moral properties, but leaves open the question of why knowledge of such facts would guide action. Deontology holds that a moral judgment is a type of command, used to tell people, including ourselves, what we should or should not do. Emotivism claims that a moral judgment is an expression of a purely personal preference. A view derived from Aristotle holds that a moral judgment is an application of universal moral principles to a particular situation within the scope of the principles. This view recognizes that practical reason might need to reach an equilibrium between universal rules and particular circumstances when the rules cannot be straightforwardly applied to the circumstance. On this view, a moral judgment has cognitive and rational elements and is more than a mere response of feeling. It can be universalized and publicly advocated rather than merely privately preferred. “To make a moral judgement of an action, person, etc. is to judge the action by relating it to either a moral rule or a moral ideal.” Gert, The Moral Rules moral knowledge, another term for ethical knowledge moral law Ethics For Kant, all moral laws are principles or maxims, but not all principles or maxims are moral laws. A moral law is a maxim on which a rational being acts, and which he would will to be a maxim for all rational beings. A moral law must have objective necessity and be recognized by reason. It must give rise to imperatives that are definite and specific, yet universal in application. In Kant’s ethics, a moral law applies only to rational beings and determines how a rational being as such would necessarily act. It lays down a rule that does not admit of exceptions and which commands rather than counsels. A moral law is a categorical imperative. It is not derived from empirical fact, but is prescribed by reason itself as the ground of its own action. Since Kant believed that a person obeys a categorical imperative only if his will is free, the notion of a moral law leads to an assertion of the existence of freedom. Kant’s notion of a moral law is the culmination of a tradition in Western ethics that views ethics as a network of moral laws which are recognized a priori and applied universally. This tradition is opposed to the tradition of Aristotelian virtue ethics, which holds that the application of universal principles should be adjusted according to the salient features of the circumstances in which the principles are applied. Kant’s notion of a moral law has become the main target of the current revival of virtue ethics. also be viewed as a kind of circumstantial luck. Different luck will result in different levels of responsibility for the agent and different moral judgments by others. If I drive a car carelessly, my action will not mean much if no serious consequence occurs, but it means something entirely different if I happen to crash and kill a child. The problem of moral luck is an indispensable part of the anti-theory movement and leads to the creation of moral stances that recognize the contingencies of luck, such as virtue ethics and moral contextualism. “In contrast to laws of nature, these laws of freedom are called moral laws.” Kant, Metaphysics of Morals. moral patient Ethics A moral status, in contrast to that of moral agent. Traditionally, only rational human beings can be moral agents, for they must hold responsibility for their actions. Marginal human beings, such as children and brain-damaged people, are not regarded as having moral responsibility for their behavior, and hence are not moral agents. However, they are still the objects of moral consideration and are protected from suffering by moral laws. Accordingly they are referred to as moral patients. Moral patients cannot formulate or follow moral principles and rules. They can bring about great pain and even disasters to others, but we cannot say that they are morally wrong for doing that. Equally, their acts may bring about good consequences, but we do not say that they are morally right for performing them. Moral agents can act wrongly or rightly in ways that affect moral patients, but moral patients cannot act reciprocally toward moral agents. Contemporary environmental ethics claims that the scope of moral patients should not only include marginal human beings, but also sentient animals, and even the whole biocommunity. A difference in moral status requires different moral considerations and can involve the appeal to different moral principles. This results in a variety of moral tensions in practice. For instance, a fetus is a moral patient. To consider its interest might make abortion immoral. On the other hand, if we appeal to the autonomy of the mother, abortion might be permissible. moral luck Ethics Traditional ethics claims that one’s moral status is not subject to luck, that is, to matters of chance or factors beyond one’s control. Kant states at the outset of his Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals that good will, which is the source of moral worth, is independent of the contingencies of the world. Hence he distinguishes between a moral area that is immune to luck and an amoral area that is inevitably vulnerable to luck, and confines his ethics to rational agency and universal principles. This luckfree morality is challenged by Williams and Nagel. They argue that the estimation of moral worth, and notions such as responsibility, justification, and blame, are indeed subject to luck, and hence morality is also threatened by luck. Williams maintains that luck will influence one’s motives, intentions, and personality, and is hence closely related to one’s moral decisions and moral justifications. Nagel distinguishes different kinds of luck that deeply affect morality: constitutive luck, that is, the factors that influence one’s constitution as an agent (for example, different family background, different environment or education); circumstantial luck, for example, the problems and situations one faces; the luck which affects the cause of an action; and the luck which affects the result of an action. Moral dilemmas can “If moral luck is thinkable, possibly even acceptable, in regard to the character of particular acts, then perhaps the status of certain virtues as virtues can depend on a kind of cosmic (moral) luck.” Slote, Goods and Virtues “In contrast to moral agents, moral patients lack the prerequisites that would enable them to control their own behaviours in ways that would make them morally accountable for what they do.” Regan, The Case for Animal Rights moral philosophy, see ethics and morality moral point of view Ethics To consider or judge behavior from the perspective of moral rules or principles, rather than from the viewpoint of one’s self-interest. The main question of moral philosophy is “Why ought I to be moral?” Thus we must justify why human beings should consider their acts from a moral point of view. Different moralists provide and argue for different points of view, and they are always in conflict. A central tradition of modern moral philosophy claims that from a moral point of view morality is the only important thing in one’s life, but contemporary virtue ethics believes that morality, in itself, is at most a part of what is valuable and that human lives should have other commitments. On this basis, the main question of moral philosophy would be Socrates’ question “How should I live?” “In order to consider the relation between individual rationality and what is sometimes called ‘the moral point of view’ one has to decide on criteria of rationality, and this is a semi-conceptual investigation.” Cooper, The Diversity of Moral Thinking moral principle, see moral rule moral psychology Ethics, philosophy of law An essential part of ethics, especially contemporary virtue ethics, concerned with the structure and phenomenological analysis of those psychological phenomena that have great bearing on moral behavior or action. These phenomena include cognitive states such as deliberation and choice; emotional states such as love, mercy, satisfaction, guilt, remorse, and shame; and desires, character, and personality. Moral psychology aims to improve understanding of human motivation and also has a role in the philosophy of law. “The problem of the origin of moral judgements and moral sentiments, which is often discussed in ‘ethical’ writings . . . but nonetheless belongs to the province of moral psychology.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy moral realism Ethics Any moral theory which holds that moral facts or ethical properties, such as being good or bad or being virtuous or evil, exist independent of our beliefs and will, and that ethics should find out truths about them. It is realism applied to moral affairs and moral statements. It is related to moral objectivism, but contrasts to moral subjectivism and ethical relativism. Corresponding to Dummett’s characterization of realism, moral realism is also defined as the claim that moral judgments obey the law of excluded middle and must be either true or false. The truth of moral judgments is independent of the evaluator’s moral beliefs. Jean Piaget used the term ‘moral realism’ for an essential early stage of moral belief in which moral rules are viewed as external and independent of social function and in which the degree of praise and blame depends on the consequences of actions rather than intent. According to Piaget, this view may be found in the moral development of children in our societies and among adults in primitive societies. “Moral realism can now be defined as the claim that some moral judgments are true and every moral judgement is true if and only if certain conditions obtain that are independent of the actual and ideal moral beliefs and choices of the people who judge and are judged.” Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas moral reason Ethics The representative form of practical reason, the sort of thinking that leads one to make moral judgments and that guides one’s moral acts. Moral reason brings general moral principles to bear on the particular situations of the agent and judges whether one’s action and the way it is performed conform to the requirements of moral principles. It enables an agent to decide whether he should act and what he should do. The characteristic feature of moral reason is that it employs ethical terms and makes moral judgments that issue commands and advice. It has been disputed whether the procedure of moral reasoning can be formalized into practical syllogism and whether it deals with ends as well as means. More, Thomas “Moral reasons are ordinary considerations such as the pain I will cause here if I don’t tell her soon. This is a moral reason because it is a salient feature of a situation which generates a demand – the demand that I tell her soon, perhaps.” Dancy, Moral Reasons moral rights, see rights, moral moral rule Ethics A general statement guiding action and feeling by characterizing certain kinds of action, such as telling the truth or stealing, as generally right or generally wrong. Moral rules are distinguished from moral principles, which underlie moral rules, justify their validity, and clarify their scope of application. While moral rules are specific and concrete, moral principles are general and abstract. While moral rules are variable, moral principles hold in all circumstances. Moral principles are used to justify rules and to generate new rules to cope with unforeseen circumstances. Rules are more directly involved than principles in determining the morality of behavior. The elaboration of a consistent and intelligible body of moral principles and rules is the central task of an ethical theory. “A moral rule states that a certain kind of action is generally right (or obligatory), and leaves open the possibility that an act (or omission) of that kind may be justifiable.” M. Singer, Generalization in Ethics moral sense Ethics Analogous to the sense of beauty, moral sense is supposed to be an intuitive, disinterested faculty which enables us to recognize moral qualities, such as being good and bad, virtuous and vicious, from what we feel. If the observation of an action is painful and disquieting, the action must be bad or evil. If the observation of an action results in a pleasant feeling, the action is good and virtuous. On such a basis, moral sense further motivates us toward morally right and virtuous behavior. Moral sense conflicts with the theological position that God’s will is the basis of morality and is also opposed to rationalism, since it insists that reason cannot account for our motivation and claims that morality is felt rather than reasoned. The theory that argues for the existence of moral sense is called moral sense theory, and is particularly associated with the eighteenth-century British philosophers Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume. Moral sense theory tries to base itself on Locke’s theory of knowledge, and it is a version of moral intuitionism. It is also called sentimentalism. Its major contribution is to emphasize the role of feeling in morality. Criticism of this theory generally alludes to the fact that there is no justification for positing an extra faculty of moral sense and that such a theory cannot avoid moral relativism. “One man (Lord Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, etc) says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called ‘moral sense’.” Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation moral sense theory, see moral sense moral theory, see ethics and morality moral virtue, an alternative expression for ethical virtue morality, see ethics and morality morals, another term for ethics or moral philosophy morals proper, see metaphysics (Kant) More, Henry (1614–87) British philosopher, a leading Cambridge Platonist, born in Lincolnshire, educated and worked at Cambridge. More denied the Cartesian dichotomy between mind and matter and the mechanistic view of the world. He believed in the pre-existence of the soul and claimed that the universe is alive with souls. Spirit causes motion or action. More sought to reconcile reason and faith and maintained that man can be unified with God through right reason and moral ascent. His works include Philosophical Poems (1647) and Divine Dialogues (1668). More, Thomas (1478–1535) English Renaissance humanist, born in London. More was executed for refusing to recognize Henry VIII as head of the English Church. In On the Best Government and on New Island Utopia (1516, usually called Utopia), More invented an ideal society characterized by communism, the equality of men and women, and the provision of communal education. Utopian thought, which can be traced to Plato’s Republic and Christian Epicureanism, was further developed by Campanella’s City of the Sun and Bacon’s New Atlantis. Morris, Charles (1901–79) American philosopher of language and theorist of signs. Research Professor, University of Chicago. Morris, a pragmatist who studied with George Herbert Mead, followed Peirce in developing a general semiotics or theory of signs in Foundations of the Theory of Signs (1938) and Writings on the General Theory of Signs (1971). Morris divided semiotics into three branches: syntactics, dealing with the relations among signs; semantics, dealing with the relations of signs to what they signify; and pragmatics, dealing with the relations between signs and their users and uses. Morris’s attempt to place semiotics within Mead’s framework of social behaviorism is less widely accepted. motion, see change motive Philosophy of action, ethics The moving force which leads a person to behave or act in this way rather than in another way. A motive is closely related to our desire for the objects for which we act. Reasons and causes are generally appealed to for explaining behavior. While many philosophers believe that a reason is also a motive, Hume denied that reason has a moving force. It is a continuing matter of controversy whether motivational explanation is also a type of causal explanation, and there is also some disagreement whether a motivational explanation is an explanation in terms of pattern. “A motive is a want that leads to action, that is, a goal appraised as good for action without further deliberation; it includes effective and deliberate action tendencies.” Arnold, in Mischel (ed.), Human Action motive-consequentialism, see consequentialism motive utilitarianism Ethics A version of utilitarianism that applies the principle of utility directly to behavioral dispositions and indirectly to actions. It claims that concern for the maximization of human happiness is good, but tries to shift ethical consideration from the traditional utilitarian focus on the moral assessment of actions to the assessment of motives that give rise to actions. “The theory that will be my principal subject here is that one pattern of motivation is morally better than another to the extent that the former has more utility than the latter . . . Let us call this doctrine motive utilitarianism.” Adams, “Motive Utilitarianism,” Journal of Philosophy 73 moving rows, paradox of Logic, metaphysics One of Zeno’s paradoxes designed to show the impossibility of motion. Suppose that there are three equally sized rows A, B, and C. Each member of each row occupies a minimal unit of time and a minimal part of space. The row A is at rest, but rows C and B move in opposite directions with equal velocities. When the first member of B passes two members of A (taking two units of time), it will at the same time pass four members of C (taking four units of time), leading to the conclusion that “double the time is equal to half the time.” The arguments of this paradox are complicated, and there are various other versions. “The fourth argument is that concerning the two rows of bodies, . . . This, he thinks, involves the conclusion that half a given time is equal to double that time.” Aristotle, Physics M-predicate, see P-predicate mundus intelligibilis, see intelligible world mundus sensibilis, see intelligible world Murdoch, Iris (1919–99) Irish-born philosopher and novelist. Fellow of St Anne’s College, Oxford. Murdoch’s philosophical works include Sartre: Romantic Rationalist (1953), The Sovereignty of the Good (1970), The Fire and the Sun (1977), Acastos (1986), and Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992). Murdoch was drawn to the unity of metaphysics, morality, and religion in Plato’s philosophy and was also influenced by Wittgenstein in exploring her major themes of truth, reality, the myth of the given good, God, the soul, language, and the nature of art. Complex individual selves, whose memory and imaginative moral reflection allow them to be imperfect bearers of virtue, were crucial to her philosophical thought. mysticism Epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of religion The view that there exists a transcendent or ultimate reality that cannot be experienced or rationally conceived. That domain is beyond the description of ordinary language, and knowledge of it can only be achieved through mysterious intuition resulting from longterm spiritual cultivation. By gaining a vision of this ineffable ultimate reality, one reaches a joyous and ecstatic union with it, and this union constitutes the ultimate meaning of human life. Mysticism is associated with religious experience and doctrines. Many properties of the Christian God are ineffable and can only be divinely revealed. Mysticism is also associated with traditional metaphysics or speculative philosophy, which seeks after first principles that cannot be rationally discussed. Since the existence of mystical entities is not provable, and mystical experience is untestable, mysticism is always under suspicion. Wittgenstein was also concerned with mysticism. For him, the mystical is a realm of ultimate importance that can be shown, but cannot be said. This view of the mystical is aesthetic and ethical and is distinguished from logic. “The term mysticism is at present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible; and in proportion as their general culture and way of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote the real and the true, by another to name everything connected with superstition and deception.” Hegel, Logic myth of passage Metaphysics A term introduced by D. C. Williams in his paper “The Myth of Passage” (1951). It is very common to believe that time flows and is a passage. Some philosophers even believe that time as a rolling stream is the feature that distinguishes time from other instances of one-dimensional order, such as the order of points on a line. Williams argued that if time flows past us or if we advance through time, this would be a motion with respect to a hypertime, because we could not say that the motion of time is a motion with respect to time itself. Furthermore, if it is of the essence of time that time passes, then hypertime will pass as well, requiring a hyperhypertime and so on ad infinitum. Williams concluded that the passage of time is a myth and should be abandoned. “[There is a proposition] that over and above the sheer spread of events, with their several qualities, along the time axis . . . there is something extra, something active and dynamic, which is often and perhaps best described as passage. This something extra, I am going to plead, is a myth.” D. Williams, Principles of Empirical Realism datum -- myth of the given, a term introduced by the American philosopher W. Sellars in his essay “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” Many empiricists claim that there is a sort of knowledge that is directly presented to our consciousness and call this knowledge the given. The given, to which each of us has privileged access, presupposes no learning and no forming of associations, but provides the foundation for empirical knowledge. It offers the ultimate court of appeal for all our knowledge claims about the world. All other forms of knowledge are derived from the given according to certain rules. Sellars labels the alleged existence of such knowledge as “the myth of the given.” To call something a myth means that it does not exist at all. Sellars rejects all the central arguments that have been put forward to support the existence of the given and claims that empirical knowledge, which is a rational and self-correcting enterprise, has no need for the given. His position has had much influence in questioning the need for foundations in epistemology and other areas of philosophy. “The idea that observation, strictly and properly socalled, is constituted by certain self-authenticating non-verbal episodes, the authority of which is transmitted to verbal and quasi-verbal performances when these performances are made ‘in conformity with the semantical rules of the language’, is, of course, the heart of the myth of the given.” Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality Nagel, Ernest, philosopher of science. As a naturalist, Nagel maintained that the world must be understood in terms of efficient causation. He rejected the view that logic was ontologically determined and held instead that logical principles must be understood contextually or operationally. He also claimed that theories of knowledge should be based on the examination of the methods and results of sciences. Nagel’s principal writings are An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (with Morris R. Cohen, 1934), Logic Without Metaphysics (1956), and The Structure of Science (1961). Nagel, Thomas (1937– ) American philosopher of mind and moral philosopher, born in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and New York University. Nagel shows great ingenuity in exploring relations between the philosophy of mind and ethics. He argues from the prudence of adopting a stance of temporal neutrality regarding the satisfaction of desire over the span of one’s life to the rationality of neutrality over whose desires are to be satisfied that characterizes altruism. Our inability to eliminate consciousness and subjective mental states from the metaphysics of the self leads to two ways of seeing oneself and the world – subjectively, as the center of experience of the world, and objectively, as part of the world along with other persons and things. He uses the interplay between these two views to discuss questions of morality and political philosophy. His main works include The Possibility of Altruism (1970), Mortal Questions (1979), and The View from Nowhere (1986). naive realism Epistemology The common sense view of the world held by most ordinary people. According to this view, the external world consists of objects such as rocks and trees and the qualities they possess. The world exists and develops independently of our sensations and thought. Our sensations, like mirrors, reflect this world as it is. Such a view also believes uncritically that we have the ability to know the world. However, upon reflection, philosophers find that the nature of the world and our knowledge about it are both much more complicated and puzzling than naive realism suggests. Many so-called secondary qualities such as color, taste, and smell are inseparable from our senses rather than properties of things independent of us. Our perceptions sometimes deceive us. From here we may derive many fundamental philosophical questions, such as “What is real?” “What is appearance?” “How is illusion possible?” “Is our experience a reliable source of knowledge?” One of the major tasks of philosophy is to uncover the difficulties hidden in the common assumptions of views such as naive realism in order to understand the world better. “Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false.” Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth nomen, onoma, name: A name is traditionally believed to be a mark, sign, or expression referring to things in the world. Names are generally divided into general or common names (referring to kinds of individuals) and single or proper names (referring to particular individuals). Names help people to communicate ideas or to remember ideas. Frege distinguished between the sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) of a name. He held that the fact that two names for the same thing cannot always be used interchangeably indicates that names are not merely referential devices but also have sense in terms of which they refer to objects. Russell rejected Frege’s distinction between sense and reference and claimed that only logically proper names such as “this” or “that” refer to objects. Ordinary proper names are actually definite descriptions in disguise. Kripke rejects the view that names are descriptions in part on the grounds that the user of a name does not require identifying information about the object in question. He has proposed a theory of names according to which a name is a rigid designator that refers to the same individual in all worlds in which that individual exists. On his account, the connection between a name and its object is established and maintained causally rather than through descriptive content. “The name itself is merely a means of pointing to the thing.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge narcissism Philosophy of mind [from the Greek myth, narkissos, the youth at the riverside who fell in love with his own reflection in water] Narcissism is self-love or an erotic interest in oneself. Freud believed that narcissism exists when the libido is directed toward the self. Narcissism as a psychological phenomenon normally occurs in childhood, when individuals believe that they possess every valued perfection and that they are their own ideal. When people grow up, the response of others and their own critical judgment will lead to the realization that they are not perfect and they will seek to replace childhood narcissism with a new form of ego ideal. “Clinical experience had made us familiar with people who behaved in a striking fashion as though they were in love with themselves and this perversion had been given the name of narcissism.” Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18 narrative Philosophy of history, aesthetics A mode of discourse that establishes orders or logical relations among various events and places them in a sequence. Such a sequence is not merely a chronology of events, but provides a configurational understanding by which each occurrence introduced in the narrative forms part of a meaningful whole. In this way a narrative forms a story. A narrative can be oral or written, about what has happened or about the present, in the first person, third person, or in a mixture of the two. Narrative differs from analysis and dialogue. We also need to distinguish between the narrative and its narration, as we distinguish between the story and its telling. Any narrative is open to infinite possibilities of re-narration. Narrative is merely a form of language and is neutral regarding the truth of its contents. However, narrative has its own discoverable structure rather than being a purely subjective projection. Narrative is the characteristic way of presenting historical knowledge and literature. Its epistemological status and ontological implications have been major topics in contemporary analytic philosophy of history and philosophy of literature. Narrative seems to have important cognitive functions, but it is difficult to settle what these functions might be. “Narrative is a major organising device. It is as important to literature as representation to painting and sculpture; that is to say, it is not the essence of literature, for (like representation in plastic art) it is not indispensable, but it is the structural basic on which most works are designed.” Langer, Feeling and Form narrative sentence Philosophy of history A sentence employed by historians in ascribing historical significance to events or persons by connecting them to something that came afterwards, such as “When Petrarch climbed Mount Ventoux he opened the Renaissance.” The problem of assessing the truth-value of narrative sentences reflects a distinctive feature of historical knowledge. A person who saw Petrarch climb Mount Ventoux did not know that Petrarch opened the Renaissance because no one at that time knew that there would be a Renaissance. As a consequence, a contemporary witness could not know the truth of that narrative sentence. However, historians know that it is true through knowing what happened later. In general, the truth-value of a narrative sentence can be known only by those who have access to a temporal whole including all of the relevant time periods. “I shall designate them as ‘narrative sentences’. Their most general characteristic is that they refer to at least two time-separated events though they only describe (are only about) the earliest event to which they refer.” Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History narrow content: The kind of content of a mental state that is purely in the mind of the subject. It is not related to words and is taxonomized according to its causal power. It is not subject to existential generalization and is not freely substitutable by co-extensive terms. Narrow content contrasts with the ordinary attributes of occurring thoughts and propositional attitudes, which is called wide content or broad content. Wide content is not wholly in the mind and has a set of truth conditions. The notion of narrow content is based on Putnam’s distinction between narrow states and wide states. It is useful for providing psychological explanations of behavior and explaining the privileged access we seem to have to our own mental states. “The narrow content of a mental state is supposed to be a kind of content that is wholly internal to the mind of the person in the mental state.” Stalnaker, “Narrow Content,” in Anderson and Owen (eds.), Propositional Attitudes narrow state: A term introduced by Putnam for the mental states that do not presuppose the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. This is in contrast to wide states, such as being jealous of somebody, which have wide content that refers to the world outside the subject. Methodological solipsism is a doctrine that holds that psychology ought to be concerned exclusively with narrow mental or psychological states. What is characteristic of narrow states is narrow content, which is constituted simply by what is in the mind. Fodor uses the notion of a narrow state for those mental states that can be individuated by content without regard to truth or reference. These states are determined solely by the intrinsic properties of an individual, without presupposing that anything other than that individual exists. Other philosophers use the term for mental states shared by molecule-for-molecule duplicates. Different thinkers use different criteria for narrowness, but all agree that a narrow state cannot be a belief that is individuated by particular objects in the believer’s environment. “We shall . . . refer to the states which are permitted by methodological solipsism as ‘psychological states in the narrow sense’.” Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality. Nash equilibrium, see game theory national character Philosophy of social science, philosophy of history, political philosophy The pattern of thought, feeling, and action that is peculiar to a society and its people and forms their particular identity. A national character is cultivated from historical and cultural traditions. Although the explanatory role of national character is disputed, society is claimed to inherit its character from its earlier states, and its character is claimed to form its subsequent states. National character is embodied in public sentiment and social custom, and it greatly influences a society’s laws and form of government. J. S. Mill claimed that by analogy to political economy, the social sciences should have a branch, which he called political ethology, to study national character. Some advocates of the importance of national character, represented by Vico and Herder, emphasize that there is no common measurement of worth for different cultures or characters. This position is echoed by contemporary communitarians. Major problems facing this view are how to avoid relativism and how to make intercultural criticism possible. This approach to national character contrasts with liberal universalism, which holds that a set of universal values and rights applies to human beings irrespective of the national communities to which they belong. “The laws of national (or collective) character are by far the most important class of sociological laws.” The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. VII nationalism Political philosophy In its positive aspect, adherence to a national identity formed by the distinctive characteristics typically derived from one’s national history, culture, language, and religion. Nationalism emphasizes the nation’s rights to self-determination and sovereignty and demands the preservation of its culture. Nationalists often claim that the nation’s values and interests, at least in times of danger or crisis, override the individual rights of its citizens. Citizens are required to display patriotism by being loyal to the nation and by serving its collective aims. Negatively, nationalism attaches unreasonable importance to one’s national moral, cultural, and political values. An exclusive concern for the interests of one’s own nation leads to blindness and belligerence in assessing the values and interests of other nations or minorities within one’s own nation. In this sense, nationalism is nearly indistinguishable from chauvinism. “Nationalism, if we extended the sense of the word ‘nation’ somewhat, could include the self-centred pursuit of the interest of any individual group.” Hare, Essays on Political Morality Natorp, Paul, neo-Kantian philosopher, born in Dusseldorf, a member of the Marburg school. Influenced by Plato and Kant, he developed methodological transcendentalism to examine culture, history, and the logical foundation of science. He interpreted Plato’s Ideas as laws and principles that form the basis of sciences. Natorp’s major works include Plato’s Theory of Ideas: An Introduction to Idealism (1903) and The Logical Foundations of the Exact Sciences (1910). natura naturans Philosophy of religion, metaphysics [Latin, literally nature naturing, that is, generating or active nature, in contrast to natura naturata, literally nature natured, that is, generated or passive nature] These two terms derive from scholastic philosophy, in which natura naturans refers to God and natura naturata refers to the created world. Spinoza employed them in his Ethics, where natura naturans is used for substance and attributes, because they are self-explanatory. Natura naturata is used for modes, which follow from substances and attributes and must be explained by them. Accordingly, God and the world are one, but are not absolutely identical. “From what has gone before, I think it is plain that by natura naturans we are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence.” Spinoza, Ethics natura naturata, see natura naturans natura non facit saltum, see contiguity natural deduction Logic The method that constructs a logical system merely on the basis of a set of rules of inference without employing any logical truths as axioms. It contrasts with the standard axiomatic method of forming a logical system that requires both a set of axiom-like logical truths and a set of rules of inference. The method of natural deduction was developed independently in 1934 by the Polish logician S. Jaskowski and the German logician G. Gentzen. While standard axiomatic formalization makes logic concentrate on the choice and justification of logical truths, the axiomless formalization of natural deduction focuses on logical consequence, that is, on the move from premises to conclusions. For example, from a pair of sentences as premises one infers their conjunction, and from a conjunction one infers either conjunct. With natural deduction, a premise can be introduced at any stage of deduction without need of justification, and a hypothesis can also serve as a premise. In this way, logic not only gets rid of the most troublesome task of justifying its choice of logical truths, but also conforms more properly to its original task, that is, the study of inference. “The methods of proof so far assembled (techniques for ‘natural deduction’, as they are sometimes called) permits the demonstration of all logically true propositions constructed out of truth-functional connectives and the quantification of individual variable.” Copi, Symbolic Logic natural kinds Metaphysics, philosophy of science Things which are naturally distinguished, including the species of things such as whales and apples and elements or mass items such as water and gold. These things occur naturally, in contrast to things such as televisions and tables, which are invented by human beings. Traditionally, terms naming natural kinds, that is, natural kind terms, are taken to be general names that should be defined by giving a connotation or by specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of their application. In the 1970s, Kripke and Putnam, arguing against the traditional theory, suggested that natural kind terms, like proper names, are not connotative. While proper names are rigid designators of an individual, natural kind terms are rigid designators of a kind. They have an essential property, namely, the underlying structure discovered through empirical investigation. Water is H2O in all possible worlds, so anything that is not H2O is not water, even if it satisfies some list of superficial features that we think characterize water. Accordingly, it is a necessary truth that water is H2O, although this truth is a posteriori, that is, empirically known. A natural kind term is ascribed historically, and the justification for its use is passed on through a causal chain. “What really distinguishes the classes we count as natural kinds is itself a matter of (high level and very abstract) scientific investigation and not just meaning analysis.” Putnam, in Schwartz (ed.), Names, Necessity and Natural Kinds natural language, see ordinary language natural law, another expression for law of nature natural law theory Philosophy of law, political philosophy A position holding that there is a system of natural laws that guides political and legal authority and sets the moral standards for human conduct. It argues that law is essentially normative and that an unjust law is not a law. Natural law theory has two major forms. Classical natural law theory is based on the distinction between nature and convention and considers natural law to be a conception of justice. It is universal and everlasting, grounded either in God’s will or in human nature and discovered by human reason. This form can be traced to Aristotle’s teleological ethics and Stoicism and was developed by medieval philosophers in combination with Christian thought. It was revived in the twentieth century, especially by John Finnis and Robert Nozick. Modern natural law theory claims that natural laws grant natural rights to each individual. These include rights to freedom, life, and equality. Political rights and obligations are derived through a social contract among individuals who hold these natural rights. This theory was developed by Grotius, Locke, and Rousseau and was revived in the twentieth century, especially by John Rawls. Natural law theory forms a major tradition in legal philosophy in virtue of its claim that law is necessarily connected with morality. Human law derives its binding force from natural law and is null if it does not conform to natural law. The chief motive for developing legal positivism was to reject natural law theory. “A ‘natural law’ theorist . . . would insist that all valid moral standards are tacitly incorporated by the Constitution, so that any interpretation that ascribes to it moral standards of an inferior or defective kind must be mistaken.” Feinberg, Offense to Others, 1985 natural light Epistemology [Latin lumen naturale, also called lux rationis, the light of reason] Generally regarded by seventeenth-century philosophers as a universal faculty shared by all human beings that could be expected to reach the same view about certain basic issues. Descartes in particular favored this term, using it to refer to the transparent clarity of cognition. Truths that are presented to the intellect by the natural light allow no room for denial and are not open to doubt. Descartes used it as an authority whenever he wished to introduce some fundamental premises as a basis for further argument. He associated this notion with intuition by defining intuition as what the mind clearly and indubitably conceives from the natural light. According to this view, the natural light could be developed through the study of sciences, but could also be obscured if we are not capable of heeding reason. “The light of nature or faculty of knowledge which God gave us never encompass any object which is not true in so far as it is indeed encompassed by this faculty; that is, in so far as it is clearly and distinctly perceived.” Descartes, The Philosophical Writings natural philosophers Ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of science [Greek phusikoi or phusiologi, literally the men who talk about nature; also translated as physicists, referring to the pre-Socratic philosophers, who attempted to explain the world by appeal to natural causes, in contrast to the theologi, who explained the generation and structure of the world in terms of myth and supernatural forces] Aristotle claimed that the founder of natural philosophy was Thales. Natural philosophy is concerned with the question “What is the world made of ?” and natural philosophers usually answer the question by appeal to a single material substratum, something equivalent to Aristotle’s material cause. Historians of philosophy, however, generally believe that Aristotle’s account is not very accurate, for natural philosophers did not have the concept of matter, and their keyword was “nature,” the principle of a thing’s growth and present organization. Most of them wrote books entitled “On Nature.” “Natural philosophers have two modes of explanation. The first set make the underlying body one . . . The second set assert that the contrarieties are contained in the one and emerge from it by segregation.” Aristotle, Physics natural philosophy, another name for philosophy of nature natural religion, another expression for natural theology natural rights Political philosophy, philosophy of law Rights which belong to us simply because of our humanity and not because of any special legal, political, or social institutions. According to many writers of the Enlightenment, natural rights, which are held in the state of nature in virtue of natural law, can not be transferred to the government through a social contract. According to Hobbes, with no government in the state of nature, an individual has a right to take everything necessary to preserve his life or to promote his survival. The supreme natural right to defend and preserve oneself also establishes one of the basic natural laws. But because everyone has natural rights that can conflict with the natural rights of everyone else, Hobbes depicted the state of nature as a state of war of all against all. According to John Locke, natural rights include the rights to life, liberty, and property. Bentham notoriously rejected the possibility of natural rights on the grounds that nature does not provide rights and that rights can be created only by law. In spite of his objections, the notion of natural rights remains influential in moral, social, and political thought. Natural rights are considered to be basic rights at the core of human rights. Writers are divided over the need to associate natural rights with natural law. “The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own judgment, and reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.” Hobbes, Leviathan natural selection Philosophy of science A central term of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. Organisms have features with functions that are adapted to the natural world and that help them survive and reproduce. Christianity claims that this is due to God’s design, but Darwin showed that this functional adaptation for survival can be explained by a causal mechanism, natural selection. Adaptations are selected because they aid the survival of individuals or species and are transmitted to succeeding generations. Natural selection gives rise not only to the often striking forms and functions of living creatures but also to their enormous diversity. Those organisms that fail to develop suitable features lose in the struggle for survival and reproduction. The basic spirit of natural selection is summarized in Spencer’s phrase “survival of the fittest.” Natural selection is still at the center of evolutionary theory, although whether it operates at the level of species, individual, or gene is a matter of controversy. experience where reason inevitably falls into conflict with itself, although he claimed that belief can be maintained not as knowledge but as a matter of faith and hope. Much of natural theology has been assimilated into contemporary philosophical theology. “Drawing on the analogy of the animal and plant breeders’ skill at transforming through picking desired forms, Darwin christened his new mechanism ‘natural selection’.” Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously. “The fourth branch of metaphysics is natural or rational theology. The notion of God, or God as a possible being, the proofs of his existence, and his properties, formed the study of this branch.” Hegel, Logic natural theology Philosophy of religion, metaphysics Also called natural religion or rational theology, a theological discipline which tries to prove truths about the existence and attributes of God through the employment of natural human reason. From this viewpoint, reason unaided by revelation can provide a firm basis for religion and shows that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God who created the world. It does not propose a supernatural communication with God through revelation and grace, because such revelation is not rationally justifiable. Rather, it makes use of data available to all rational beings. It intends to prove that theistic beliefs are not only true to believers, but to all rational human beings. It also tries to understand the action of divine providence regarding human beings and to deal with the problem of evil. Natural theology is thus contrasted with supernatural theology, which locates the source of truths about God in revelation. In this sense, natural religion is rational, while supernatural theology is not based on reason. This contrast is associated with the contrast between rational and revealed theology. For this reason, natural theology is a branch of metaphysics dealing with divine being. Many traditional arguments for God’s existence, such as the ontological argument, cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument, and argument from design, are examples of natural theology. Aquinas’ five ways are its paradigm. Natural theology was criticized by Hume and Kant. Hume provided especially important criticism of the argument from design. For Kant, natural theology cannot be right because the object whose existence it aims to prove is outside possible human natural virtue Ethics For Hume, virtue is the moral quality in ourselves or others that is approved of by our moral sentiments. He distinguished between natural virtue and artificial virtue. Natural virtues are virtuous tendencies and characteristics that arise from the fundamental propensities of human nature itself and are not cultivated deliberately. These characteristics include charity, benevolence, generosity, love of ones’ children, clemency, and so on. Artificial virtues, such as justice, allegiance, and fidelity, in contrast, are effects of artifice and education and are obtained over a long period of time. They are artificial and invented, but not arbitrary. Hume claimed that natural virtues provide the basis for family life and intimate friendship, while artificial virtue is required for our broader social life. “When I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word, natural, only as opposed to artificial.” Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature naturalism Metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science The claim that everything is a part of the world of nature and can be explained using the methodology of the natural sciences. Naturalism accepts explanatory monism rather than dualism or pluralism, is committed to science, and is opposed to mysticism. In different areas, naturalism has different forms. In metaphysics, it rejects the postulation of any unnatural theoretical entities, faculties, or causes, and it rejects supernatural beings and processes that are inaccessible to scientific inquiry. It also contests the claim that first philosophy is prior to natural science. In epistemology, naturalism holds that epistemological justification and explanation are continuous with natural science and argues that scientific method is the only way to secure our knowledge. According to nineteenth-century psychologism and twentieth-century naturalistic epistemology, epistemology should be assimilated to empirical psychology. Ethical naturalism rejects the is–ought or fact–value distinction and explains ethical terms in terms of natural properties. This position was characterized by Moore as the “naturalistic fallacy,” but it is uncertain whether it is a real fallacy. In aesthetics, naturalism holds that an artwork should represent the world as it is. In philosophy of mind, naturalism holds that mental phenomena are, or are caused by, brain processes. Recent naturalistic interpretations of Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein place emphasis on unavoidable natural human tendencies rather than on the priority of science. For any form of naturalism, there is a corresponding form of anti-naturalism. beliefs prior to any scientific reasoning. Quine argues that epistemology should be a branch of natural science, especially a chapter of psychology. Epistemology is contained in the natural sciences and the natural sciences are contained in epistemology. Quine believes that the approach of naturalized epistemology can diminish skepticism and free epistemology from the labor of refuting skepticism. Quine’s controversial project has been followed by many other philosophers, who explicitly consider themselves to be pursuing normative epistemology. They see human beings and their cognitive faculties are entities in nature and hold that the results of natural sciences, particularly biology and empirical psychology, are crucial to epistemology. “Naturalism has a representative already in 1830 in the antimetaphysician Auguste Comte, who declared that positive philosophy does not differ in method from the special sciences.” Quine, Theories and Things. Shimony and Nails (eds.), Naturalistic Epistemology naturalistic epistemology Epistemology A term from Quine’s paper, “Epistemology Naturalised,” although Quine himself does not offer an explicit definition of it. Quine takes it as an epistemological project, which suggests that in order to discover the grounds for construing knowledge and its acquisition, we must appeal to behavioral psychology and to the historical study of science. The proper questions about knowledge are not about the justification of claims to knowledge, but about how the formation of knowledge is to be explained. We need to reconstruct the notion of evidence so that it refers to the sensory stimulations that cause us to have the scientific beliefs that we possess. The main question that epistemology asks is how one’s output of a theory of nature, which transcends one’s input of evidence, is generated in a human subject. Naturalized epistemology was established partly by criticizing traditional epistemology, which was initiated by Descartes, and asks how we ought to arrive at our “The systematic assessment of claims to knowledge is the central task of epistemology. According to naturalistic epistemologists, this task can not be well performed unless proper attention is paid to the place of the knowing subject in nature.” naturalistic ethics Ethics Also called ethical naturalism. In a broad sense, the view that ethical statements are empirical or positive and must be understood in terms of natural propensities of human beings, without mysterious intuitions or divine help. As attacked by Moore, it is the view held, for example, by utilitarianism and evolutionary ethics, according to which there is no sharp demarcation between statements of fact and statements of value. As a consequence, ethical properties are natural properties and we may derive “ought” from “is.” Moore accuses this view of committing the naturalistic fallacy, but proponents of naturalistic ethics have tried to show that this is not a fallacy at all. “Theories which owe their prevalence to the supposition that good can be defined by reference to a natural object . . . are what I mean by the name . . . ‘Naturalistic Ethics’.” G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica naturalistic fallacy Ethics Moore claims that philosophers traditionally define the conception of good in terms of natural properties or attributes, such as pleasure, the desirable, progress in evolution; in so doing they confuse the ethical conception of “good” with a natural object, and ignore the distinction between what good means and what things are good. This, according to Moore, is the “naturalistic fallacy.” Instead of seeking a naturalistic definition, Moore argued that we should see “good” as a simple indefinable non-natural quality to which we have access through a kind of intuition. Moore argues that all philosophers who derive ethics from metaphysics committed this fallacy. Consequently, he claims that ethics could not be based on metaphysics and could not be reduced to any natural or social science. This idea echoes Hume’s view that “ought” is different from and can not be derived from “is.” But it is disputable whether this is really a genuine fallacy. In particular, there have been recent attempts to justify the derivation of “ought” statements from “is” statements. Moore’s influential Principia Ethica attempted to dispose of the naturalistic fallacy, but his arguments both against naturalism and for his own account have been challenged. “That [naturalistic] fallacy, I explained, consists in the contention that good means nothing but some simple or complex notion, that can be defined in terms of natural qualities.” Moore, Principia Ethica nature Metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of science [Greek phusis, from the verb phuein, to grow or to give birth to; Aristotle’s book Physics is “On Nature”] Nature stands in contrast to things made by men, such as conventional things or artifacts. Aristotle defines nature as the inner origin of the change or stability of a thing. Such a source comprises (1) the material from which a thing is made, and (2) the structure of the thing. Both matter and form are thus nature, although Aristotle held that form is more a nature than matter. Pre-Socratic philosophy is generally called the philosophy of nature because it seeks for the ultimate material stuff out of which the world is constructed. For Aristotle, a discussion of matter as nature leads to a discussion of necessity. His discussion of form as nature leads to teleology, and eventually to the theory of the unmoved mover as the final cause of nature, for Aristotle claims that a formal cause coincides with an efficient cause and a final cause. Aristotle requires those who study nature to know both matter and form, but the latter is more important. In Aristotle’s ethics, nature means (1) the original constitution or tendency that a man has without involving human intervention, in contrast to what results in him from law and education, and (2) a man’s function or the end to which he tends. The task of ethics is to develop this natural tendency in order to achieve the appropriate natural end. Nature is also used to refer to the totality of things in the universe. Our knowledge of this natural world changes with the development of sciences. Nature in this sense is sometimes contrasted with man, with nature seen as exploitable by human rationality, but this attitude has been recently challenged by some aspects of environmental philosophy, according to which humans must be seen only as part of nature. “The word nature has two principal meanings: it either denotes the entire system of things, with the aggregate of all their properties, or it denotes things as they would be, apart from human intervention.” Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. X Naturphilosophie Philosophy of science [German, nature-philosophy] A view of nature that flourished in the Romantic criticism of science in Germany at the beginning of nineteenth century and was fully elaborated by the German philosopher Schelling. It criticized the Newtonian scientific view of nature that treated nature as mechanistic and meaningless and suggested that nature undergoes a process of self-development culminating in a state of self-presentation. It emphasized unities between the subjective and objective and between the ideal and real. In opposition to the scientific method of exploring nature through external observation and experiment, it sought to understand nature’s own language through intuition and contemplation on the grounds that natural phenomena are expressions of life. It also rejected the dichotomy of subject and object, according to which the thinking subject is simply opposed to nature as a world of objects. Instead it claimed that the subject is itself part of nature. “If you recall what was said about the Naturphilosophie, what in humankind is conscious of itself and has come to itself is what has gone through the whole of nature, which has, as it were, carried everything, experienced everything, it is that which has brought everything back into itself, into its essence, from self-alienation.” Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy nausea Modern European philosophy For Sartre, an existentialist feeling of disgust for the facticity and contingency of our bodies in analogy to our physical disgust at our bodies. According to Sartre, awareness of my own body is the basic means by which I have contact with the external world, and nausea becomes my primitive and original feeling about the world and my pure apprehension of myself as factual experience. This basic nausea produces vomiting and provides the ground for various concrete and empirical nauseas, such as those caused by spoiled meat or fresh blood. Nausea is an inescapable concomitant of physical existence and is a disclosure that one’s existence is contingent. Nausea is nihilated by active transcendence. The title of one of Sartre’s novels is Nausea. “This perpetual apprehension on the part of my for-itself of an insipid taste which I cannot place, which accompanies me even in my efforts to get away from it, and which is my taste – this is what we have described elsewhere under the name of Nausea. A dull and inescapable nausea perpetually reveals my body to my consciousness.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness necessarily false, see logical truth necessarily true, see logical truth necessary condition Logic Suppose the statements P and Q are related so that Q only if P. Consequently, if P is not the case, then Q is not the case, and if P is the case, then Q is not necessarily the case. P is then a necessary condition of Q. In contrast, suppose P and Q are related so that if P then Q. Consequently, if P is the case, then Q is the case, but if P is not the case, then Q is not necessarily the case. P is then a sufficient condition of Q. If P is a necessary condition of Q, then Q is a sufficient condition of P, and if P is a sufficient condition of Q, then Q is a necessary condition of P. If P and Q are related so that P if and only if Q and Q if and only if P, then P is both a necessary and sufficient condition of Q. If P is a necessary and sufficient condition of Q, then Q is a necessary and sufficient condition of P. P and Q are then logically equivalent statements. Logicians use “iff ” as shorthand for “if and only if.” “When one statement entails another, the truth of the first is a sufficient condition of the truth of the second, and the truth of the second is a necessary condition of the truth of the first.” Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory necessary/contingent, see contingent/necessary necessary truth Logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science The distinction between necessary truth and contingent truth is a version of Leibniz’s distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. A necessary truth must be true and could not be false, whatever way the world is. It is true in itself. A contingent truth, on the other hand, depends upon the empirical world and might have been false had the world been different. Logically necessary truths are based on the principle of contradiction, having negations that are logically impossible. Necessary truths are not established on the basis of senseexperience. They are either intuitively analytic or deduced from intuitively acceptable premises. Logical and mathematical truths are generally regarded as the paradigms of necessary truths. For rationalism, necessary truth is truth of reason and is based on the insight into real connections between facts. For empiricism, knowledge of the world must be based on perception. Hence either there are no necessary truths, or there are necessary truths, but they have no direct reference to the factual world. The necessary/contingent distinction is closely related to the a priori/a posteriori distinction and the analytic/synthetic distinction. It is difficult to get an adequate grasp of any one of these without understanding the others. A crucial question is whether Kant was justified in claiming that some fundamental necessary truths are synthetic and a priori. Kripke has argued that some necessary truths are a posteriori. If there are other kinds of necessity and possibility, such as metaphysical or natural necessity and possibility, they could also be used to distinguish between necessary and contingent truths, and necessary truth would become relative to the sort of necessity in question. We could then ask about the relations among the various kinds of necessary truths. In this sense, the term “necessary truth” becomes ambiguous and varies with different accounts of necessity. “It appears that necessary truths, such as we find in pure mathematics and particularly in arithmetic and geometry, must have principles whose proof does not depend on instances nor, consequently, on the testimony of the senses, even though without the senses it would never occur to us to think of them.” Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding necessitarianism Metaphysics, philosophy of science The doctrine that what happens in the world is determined or necessitated by the essence of things or by general laws, and hence that necessity and possibility are objective notions. The world has different modes of necessity, such as logical, nomic, and metaphysical necessity. Objectively necessary relations in the natural world are the subject-matter of scientific inquiry. The clearest expression of necessitarianism is physical determinism, which claims that nature is determined by universal laws. Necessitarianism is opposed by philosophers who reject all necessity, reject non-logical necessity, or consider necessity to be a matter of expectation, a degree of epistemic commitment, or a verbal feature, rather than as an objective property. This opposing view can be termed anti-necessitarianism. Another contrasting theory is contingentism, which holds that nature and mind are not completely predetermined and that the world contains irreducible elements of the unpredictable. As necessitarianism is associated with determinism, contingentism is related to indeterminism and accepts the existence of free will. “Peirce gave the name ‘necessitarianism’ to the belief in the principle of universal lawfulness.” Bunge, Causality necessity Logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science Necessity is ascribed to a state that must occur or is always the same, irrespective of changing circumstances or of our interventions. Necessity is distinguished from contingency or possibility, which is ascribed to a state that may or may not occur and that varies with circumstances. If necessity is unconditional, it is absolute necessity, but if it is based on certain premises, it is relative necessity. Logical necessity is ascribed to a statement or proposition that could not have been false and is guaranteed to be true by the laws of logic. In contrast, a contingent statement is one whose contradiction is possible. Necessity attached to a whole proposition (in the form “it is necessarily true that . . .”) is necessity de dicto, in contrast to necessity de re, in which necessity belongs to an object. Necessary knowledge is true under all circumstances and is hence universal. Traditionally, a necessary truth is thought to be analytical and to be known a priori, although Kant introduced synthetic a priori judgments and the notion of transcendental necessity to characterize judgments giving the conditions for the possibility of experience. Kripke introduced the notion of necessary a posteriori truth for truths concerning the essence of a thing that are known through empirical inquiry. This is also called metaphysical necessity. Some philosophers hold that nature is governed by laws of natural necessity, but Hume argued that what appear to be necessary connections in the world are associations of ideas in mind and involve psychological necessity rather than objective necessity. “A thing is called necessary either in reference to its essence or its cause. For the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from the essence and definition of the thing itself or from a given efficient cause.” Spinoza, Ethics necessity, absolute Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics For Leibniz, the contrast between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity is basic. Absolute necessity, also called logical, metaphysical, or mathematical necessity, is necessary in itself. It is the necessity possessed by a truth whose denial would involve a contradiction, as in the case of the truths of arithmetic and geometry. Absolute necessity is universally and unconditionally the case. The truth of such necessity is the truth of reason. Hypothetical necessity, also called moral, consequential, or physical necessity, is necessary, given that such and such antecedents occur. The term “hypothetical necessity” is derived from Aristotle’s Physics 200a13–14. According to Leibniz, the present state of the world is not absolutely necessary, but is only hypothetically necessary. All laws of nature are only hypothetical, for they depend on God’s will to create the best possible world. The distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity is an attempt to avoid Spinozistic rigid determinism and to establish the possibility of freedom of the will. It also plays an important role in Leibniz’s metaphysics of possible worlds. For other philosophers, hypothetical necessity is also called relative necessity because it is relative to underlying premises. “There are necessities, which ought to be admitted. For we must distinguish between an absolute and a hypothetical necessity.” Leibniz, The Leibniz– Clarke Correspondence: Fifth Paper to Clarke necessity, hypothetical, see necessity, absolute necessity, natural Philosophy of science Also called physical necessity. The necessary connection existing between distinct events in the natural world. This sort of necessity is not logical, for it is not guaranteed by the laws of logic, but is based on the laws of nature. It exists, according to some philosophers, because objects are endowed with a force that compels, under certain circumstances, the occurrence of such and such effects. Rationalism generally holds that such a natural necessity serves as the basis of induction and scientific knowledge. But Hume and his followers object to its existence, for no such force is observable. For them, the necessity between matters of fact is psychological, arising from the constant conjunction of states of affairs of given kinds. “Some necessity is itself necessary; other necessity is contingent. It is, moreover, feasible to think that logical necessity is of the formal type, but that natural or physical necessity is of the latter.” von Wright, Truth, Knowledge and Modality necessity, physical, another name for natural necessity necessity, psychological Philosophy of mind A form of necessity first discussed by Hume. According to rationalists, logical necessity was the sole valid form of necessity and was confined to the sphere of ideas. Hume claimed that in our knowledge of the natural world, we connect one idea with another through the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. There is a sort of necessary connection between the idea of a cause and the idea of its effect, but that is not logical necessity. The causal relation is simply a relation of regularity. This sort of necessity is brought about by the constant conjunction of the two ideas in our minds. Hence it is subjective and psychological rather than objective and logical. “Psychological necessity, in Hume’s view, marks some of our knowledge of matter of fact.” Walsh, Reason and Experience necessity, relative, see necessity, absolute needs Ethics, political philosophy Anything required to lead a normal human life. It is widely claimed that fundamental and universal needs for a rational agent include the physical conditions for survival and freedom. Further, it is held that a central task of any government is to arrange for the satisfaction of the basic needs of its members, either by itself or through non-governmental institutions. There are various other kinds of human needs, some of which are culturally relative. Philosophers dispute the weight that should be given to the claims of needs in considering how to treat the members of society and how to distribute resources. These disputes are important in discussing justice and in determining the relation between equality and equity. “The thought we have now arrived at is that a person needs X [absolutely] if and only if, whatever morally and socially acceptable variation it is (economically, technologically, politically, historically, etc.) possible to envisage occurring within the relevant time-span, he will be harmed if he goes without X.” Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth negation Logic, metaphysics [from Latin negare, to say no] As a logical term, negation is contrasted to affirmation and the positive and denies either a proposition as a whole or a predicate within a proposition. The standard sign of negation is ¬. In standard logic, a proposition and its negation form a contradiction: both can not be true and both can not be false. The truth of one implies the falsehood of the other. If a proposition is true, its negation must be false, and vice versa. A predicate and its negation are also contradictory. Negation is thus a truth-functional operator, so that we can know the truth-value of a proposition formed by the negation of an initial proposition if we know the truth-value of the initial proposition. In Hegel’s philosophy, negation is mainly a feature of concepts or things. Following Spinoza’s idea that all determination is negation, Hegel claimed that negation is also a way of determining what it negates and hence has a positive result. natural unity; the second stage is one of separation; and the third stage, the negation of the negation, repairs the separation and restores unity on the higher level of a harmonious whole. Hegel also took this pattern of development to characterize the process of cognition. The first stage of cognition is abstract and corresponds to understanding; the second stage corresponds to negative reason; and the third stage, the negation of the negation, corresponds to positive reason. The negation of the negation was later adopted to become a basic feature of dialectical materialism, especially by Engels in Anti-Dühring. He claimed that the negation of the negation is also a law of the natural world and a law in the history of philosophy. Critics have questioned the alleged ubiquity of the dialectic pattern and its capacity to explain the development of consciousness, nature, cognition, or history. They question Hegel’s understanding of negation and logic. “Negation is no longer an abstract nothing, but as a determinate being and somewhat, is only a form of such being – it is as otherness.” Hegel, Logic “The second negative, the negative of the negative, at which we have arrived, is this sublating of the contradiction.” Hegel, Science of Logic negation of the negation Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of history Also called double negation. In formal logic, the negation of the negation of a proposition returns to the starting-point of the original and unnegated proposition. The negation of “this is red” is “this is not red,” but the negation of “this is not red” once again becomes “this is red.” Hegel supposed that a negation of the negation does not return to its original affirmative state, but reaches a higher degree of affirmation than the initial state and represents a greater development of the thing itself. Any finite affirmative contains its contrary or its negation and, according to Hegel, will develop into the latter. This is the first negation. The negation of the negation overcomes the opposition between the original affirmation and its negation. The negation of the negation will itself be negated as the process of negation proceeds. The process of “affirmation–negation–negation of the negation” is equivalent to the process of “thesis– antithesis–synthesis.” It provides the architectonic of Hegel’s philosophy and is omnipresent in his system. In this process, the first stage is a simple or negative facts Metaphysics, philosophy of language A negative fact is the non-existence of a state of affairs, that is, “something is not the case,” in contrast to a positive fact, the existence of a state of affairs, that is, “something is the case.” There has been a debate about the nature of negative facts. Russell believes that negative facts exist and are represented by negative propositions. Wittgenstein claims that all elementary propositions depict positive facts and that negative facts, rather than really existing, merely indicate that there is no such combination between objects or things. Hence, what corresponds to a negative fact is a false elementary proposition. “I think you will find that it is simpler to take negative facts as facts, to assume that ‘Socrates is not alive’ is really an objective fact in the same sense in which ‘Socrates is human’ is a fact.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge negative freedom Philosophy of action, ethics The ability to act independent of constraint, coercion, or compulsion negative theology external to the one’s own will. Negative freedom (freedom from . . . ) is contrasted with positive freedom (freedom to . . . ) or the power of a subject to choose his own goals and course of conduct among alternatives. Negative freedom is freedom from determination by external causes, while positive freedom is the capacity of pure reason to determine itself as a will. Isaiah Berlin used a related distinction between positive and negative conceptions of liberty to argue that too much emphasis on the positive conception of liberty has led to tyranny. “Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom. The positive concept of freedom is that of the capacity of pure reason to be of itself practical.” Kant, Metaphysics of Morals negative liberty Political philosophy The Oxford philosopher Isaiah Berlin distinguished between positive and negative liberty. Positive liberty is the “liberty or freedom to,” while negative liberty is the “liberty or freedom from.” Negative liberty is characterized by an absence of coercive force. With negative liberty, one is protected from the constraints of moral, legal, political, and social requirements, but such constraints seem needed to achieve any sort of positive freedom. Different political philosophies give different priorities to these two kinds of freedom, with proponents of each seeing the rival conception as frustrating its own notion of liberty. Berlin, himself, supports the liberalism associated with negative liberty, while others from a Hegelian or idealist perspective emphasize positive liberty. The soundness of this distinction has been contested, but rich debate has contributed much to contemporary discussions of liberty. “The first of these senses of freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the same), which (following much precedent) I shall call the ‘negative’ sense, is involved in the answer to the question ‘What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons.” Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty negative responsibility Philosophy of action, ethics The responsibility for something which is not caused directly by the agent but which the agent fails to prevent from happening. The notion is derived from the distinction between action and omission or between intervening and letting things take their own course. Moral agents must bear positive responsibility for their actions or interventions, but should they be responsible for their omissions or for letting things happen? It is a matter of dispute whether we can have negative responsibility. Utilitarianism claims that we should bring about the best consequences, and this implies that we all have negative responsibility. But its critics point out that by accepting this claim we would have boundless responsibilities. “[T]he notion of negative responsibility: that if I am ever responsible for anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things that I allow or fail to prevent, as I am for things that I myself, in the more everyday restricted sense, bring about.” B. Williams, in Smart and Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism: For and Against negative theology Philosophy of religion Also called apophatic theology, theism based on the method of the via negativa. It describes God by saying what he is not, rather than what he is, because as finite beings we can not recognize God’s attributes in any real and full sense and because God is beyond what our language can positively describe. Negative theology claims that religious language is non-cognitive and equivocal. The ultimate thing is beyond all human concepts, and so what is affirmed of it must also be denied. Hence, all predicates – not only the negative ones such as evil and false, but also the positive ones such as good and true – should be subtracted from God. Such a negation of description does not lead to skepticism or unbelief, but leads instead to the truth that God is beyond all such words. It is only by removing from God all the imperfections of his creatures that his transcendence and otherness can be safeguarded. Negative theology enables us to maintain the radical distinction between God and his creatures. The Scriptures are full of paradoxical descriptions of God because they try to show something inexpressible that can not be stated positively. This type of theology is rooted in Platonic thought as developed in Neoplatonism. Clement of Alexandria is thought to be its founder, and its main proponents were the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides and the German theologian Eckhart. “When the negative theology says that no conceptions apply to God, it is, in a perhaps still subtler way, making a comparable mistake. For where there are no definite common aspects there are no definite contrasts either.” Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method neo-Darwinism, see Darwinism neo-Hegelianism Philosophical method, metaphysics Also called British idealism. A Hegelian school developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the British philosophers F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, John McTaggart, and the American philosopher Josiah Royce. This school sought to build an idealistic metaphysical system in which all internally connected particulars are absorbed into a single reality. It ignored the dialectical and historical dimension of Hegel’s thought and instead emphasized the relations between time and eternity, between matter and mind, and between the many and the one. It claimed that “what is” is the manifestation of spirit and in principle can be known by the human spirit. Subject and object are correlative because they are both rooted in one ultimate spiritual principle. Neo-Hegelianism was a form of absolute idealism that opposed the British empirical tradition and dominated British philosophy for nearly half a century. The interpretation of Hegel in the English-speaking world has been greatly influenced by this school. The analytic philosophy of Russell and Moore grew out of their criticisms of neo-Hegelianism. “It is not altogether unreasonable to describe British idealism, as is often done, as a Neo-Hegelian movement, provided at least that it is understood that it was a question of receiving stimulus from Hegel rather than of following him in the relation of pupil to master.” Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. VII neo-Kantianism Philosophical method, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science A philosophical movement prevailing in late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury German philosophy, with a motto “back to Kant” from Liebman’s manifesto, Kant and the Epigoni. Precursors of the movement included H. von Helmholtz, Liebman, A. Lange, E. Zeller, and Kuno Fischer. Common features of the movement were the repudiation of speculative naturalism and materialism, irrationalism, and the authority of natural science and its emphasis on the central status of Kant’s epistemology in philosophy. More loosely, neo-Kantianism comprised a variety of schools which had different directions and which debated with one another. Among these, the Marburg and Heidelberg schools were the most influential. The logicomethodological Marburg school emphasized Kant’s theoretical philosophy, especially his idealism in relation to natural science. Its major representatives were H. Cohen, P. Natorp, and E. Cassirer. The axiological Heidelberg school, also called the Baden or Southeast German school, was more interested in applying Kant’s transcendental method to specifying universal cultural value. Its major representatives were W. Windelband and H. Rickert. Outside these schools, A. Riehl’s realistic neo-Kantianism argued for the reality of Kant’s thing-in-itself. In Göttingen, L. Nelson developed a psychological neoKantianism, which holds that introspection plays a central role in discovering a priori principles. “Neo-Kantians . . . announced that they had had enough of the airy metaphysical speculations of the idealists and that it was time to return to the spirit of Kant himself.” Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. VII Neoplatonism Ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of religion The philosophical tradition founded by Plotinus, developed through his disciple Porphyry, the Syrian School of Iamblichus, the school of Athens, represented by Plutarch, Proclus, and Simplicius, and the Alexandrian school until the fall of Alexandria in 642. Plotinus’ Enneads (edited by Porphyry) was the source of this tradition, and Proclus’ Elements of Theology was the systematic exposition of its doctrines. Neoplatonism, which was the last philosophical system of the classical world, explained the origin of the world in terms of Plotinus’ three hypostases (the one, nous, and the soul) and the process of emanation. Neoplatonism attempted to reconcile the two supposedly incompatible systems of Plato and Aristotle, by considering Aristotle’s philosophy as an introduction to Plato’s higher wisdom. This attitude led many Neoplatonists to comment extensively on both Plato and Aristotle and thus contributed greatly to the history of philosophy. Neoplatonism advocated polytheism and mysticism and had a favorable attitude toward theology. Hence it became the main opposition of early Christianity, which it directly attacked. The school of Athens, which was based on Plato’s academy, was closed by the emperor Justinian in 529 precisely because of its conflict with Christianity. This event is usually regarded as marking the end of Hellenistic philosophy. However, Neoplatonism exerted great influence upon the development of Christian philosophy because it sought to explain the world by appeal to one ultimate principle. Neoplatonism was revived in the Renaissance by Ficino in Florence, and there was another resurgence by the Cambridge Platonists in the seventeenth century. “Neo-platonism emphasised that aspect of Plato’s thought that stressed the transcendence of the One (or the Good), and the way the One is beyond all categorical language or thought.” Stiver, The Philosophy of Religious Language