Lexicon griceianum -- in six volumes, vol. iv.

neo-pragmatism Philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of social science A postmodern version of pragmatism developed by the American philosopher Richard Rorty and drawing inspiration from authors such as Dewey, Heidegger, Sellars, Quine, and Derrida. It repudiates the notion of universal truth, epistemological foundationalism, representationalism, and the notion of epistemic objectivity. It is a nominalist approach that denies that natural kinds and linguistic entities have substantive ontological implications. While traditional pragmatism focuses on experience, Rorty centers on language. Language is contingent on use, and meaning is produced by using words in familiar manners. The self is seen as a “centerless web of beliefs and desires,” and Rorty denies that the subject-matter of the human sciences can be studied in the same ways as we study the subject-matter of the natural sciences. Neopragmatism, which focuses on social practice and political experimentation, claims that there is no objective and transcendental standpoint from which to pass judgment and that truth must be relative to specific social contexts and practices. “The senses in which the new pragmatism differs from the old are, first, with regard to the shift from experience to language and, second, with regard to an acquired suspicion of ‘scientific method’ deriving from the historicizing of science in the works of thinkers such as Thomas Kuhn and P. F. Feyerabend.” D. Hall, Richard Rorty neo-Pythagoreanism Ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of religion A philosophical and religious tendency that flourished from the first century bc to the third century ad. It regarded Pythagoras as the revealer of religious truth, but it actually mixed early Pythagorean material, Plato’s doctrines, and the views of the Peripatetics and Stoicism. It stressed the necessity of purification and represented the change of soul according to moral progress. It advocated abandoning all theoretical research and living in union with both superior and inferior gods. It popularized the notion of moral retribution in a future life. Major proponents of neo-Pythagoreanism include Figulus, Apollonius of Tyana, and Philo of Alexandria. Neo-Pythagoranism deeply influenced Neoplatonism and early Christianity. “For the neo-Pythagorians, philosophy became the art of curing, or a devotional guide. Men were no longer seeking to understand.” Sheen, Philosophy of Religion neo-realism Epistemology, metaphysics Also called new realism. An American philosophical movement of the early twentieth century, which originated with a common manifesto published in the Journal of Philosophy (1910), entitled “A Program and First Platform of Six Realists.” The six philosophers were Ralph Barton Perry, William P. Montague, E. B. Holt, Walter Pitkin, Edward Spaulding, and Walter Marvin. In 1912 they published a cooperative volume, The New Realism, that gave the movement its name. New realism rejected idealism, in particular that of Royce. It claimed that idealism argues fallaciously from the premise that everything known is known to the conclusion that for everything to be is to be known. It rejected the egocentric predicament, which moves from our being at the center of what we know to the claim that this placement affects the nature of what we know. The nature of reality can not be inferred merely from the nature of knowledge. The entities that are the objects of scientific studies are not conditioned by their being known, although they are presented to consciousness and have cognitive relations. As a version of direct realism, neo-realism emphasized a direct acquaintance with physical objects and claimed that what is known is independent of the knowing relation. Reality is a datum, given independently of whatever ideas may be formed about it. The perceived object is identical in substance with a part or aspect of the physical object. The movement was replaced by critical realism as a result of its failure to provide a satisfactory account of error, illusion, doubt, hypothesis, and the progress of knowledge. Occasionally, the term new realism is also used to refer to the rejection of idealism by Russell and Moore, and to their attempt to establish a logical method by which legitimate conclusions can be derived from any body of data. Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics into a modern intellectual setting in order to deal with contemporary issues. In 1879 Pope Leo XIII sent his letter Aeterni Patris to all bishops of the Church, making Thomas Aquinas the leading Doctor of the Church, and thus sanctioning Thomism as the authoritative and orthodox Catholic theology. It proposed to consider Thomism as the exclusive response in Catholic philosophy and theology to modern philosophical systems. This greatly stimulated the development of neo-scholasticism, first in Catholic educated circles and then for a wider public. Scholars produced intensive examinations and interpretations of Aquinas’ works and established a variety of Thomistic systems. There is not a unified set of doctrines in neo-Thomism, because different philosophers have adopted different versions of Thomism. Some have even resisted the description neo-Thomist, although Aquinas’ five ways for demonstrating God’s existence were regarded as vital for all neo-Thomist thinkers. The Institute Supérieur de Philosophie at Louvain founded by Cardinal Mercier has been an influential center for neo-Thomism. The French philosopher Etienne Gilson established an Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto, where the influential scholar Joseph Owens applied Thomism to reconstruct Aristotle’s metaphysics. Another important representative was Jacques Maritain, whose work has had wide public influence. “Neo-realism arose as a protest against Roycean absolutism in particular, and idealism in general.” “Neo-Scholasticism, a new-realism once more, a doctrine that refuses to fall in with the method foreshadowed by Descartes, or at least if it does so tries hard to avoid its conclusion.” Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy. Werkmeister, A History of Philosophical Ideas in America neo-scholasticism Philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of science Also called neo-Thomism, a Roman Catholic philosophical and theological movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is a revival of Thomism and seeks to demonstrate that medieval scholasticism, especially the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, is consistent with the development of modern science. The movement assumes that Aquinas’ doctrines can be re-appropriated to solve modern philosophical problems such as those arising from Cartesian dualism. Neo-scholasticism attempts to bring network theory of meaning, an alternative term for conceptual role theory Neumann, John von (1903–57) American mathematician, economist, and philosopher of quantum mechanics and game theory, born in Budapest, Hungary. Von Neumann developed the theory of linear operators and made fundamental contributions to set theory, mathematic logic, Hilbert’s proof theory, econometrics, and the theory and design of computers. He founded game theory and demonstrated how the theory neutral monism could be applied to economics. His main works include Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1955), The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (with Morgenstern) (1944), and The Computer and the Brain (1958). neural network modeling, see connectionism Neurath, Otto (1882–1945) Austrian sociologist and philosopher, a founding member of the Vienna Circle. Neurath tried to eliminate all terminology with multiple meanings and all metaphysical presuppositions in sociology. He was a major advocate of physicalism in logical positivism, claiming that all scientific statements should be translated into statements that are descriptive of the observable world. His anti-foundationalist remark that “we are like sailors who have to build their ship on the open sea . . .” influenced Quine. Neurath’s major works include the Empirical Sociology (1931) and the Foundations of the Social Sciences (1944). He planned and co-edited (with Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris) the uncompleted International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Neurath’s ship Epistemology, philosophy of science A metaphor invented by the Austrian sociologist and philosopher Otto Neurath. Neurath was a leading member of the Vienna Circle, but disagreed with the epistemological foundationalism of another important member, Rudolf Carnap. Carnap believed that there is a set of incorrigible protocol statements that directly report sense-experience. All other valid complex statements are constructed out of these protocol statements. In criticizing this picture, Neurath compared our body of knowledge to a ship, and said: “We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to dismount it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best components.” Accordingly, knowledge is historically conditioned and is maintained if a sufficient range of its claims is acceptable at any given time. Nevertheless, any piece of knowledge can be replaced to keep the whole project of knowledge going. Nothing can claim to be the foundation of knowledge. This metaphor was adopted by Quine and is widely cited as a powerful image of anti-foundationalism. “The philosopher’s task was well-compared by Neurath to that of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View neuro-philosophy, see connectionism neustic/phrastic Philosophy of language Different sentences may have the same content but different moods. For example, “Shut the door!” and “You will shut the door.” The content of these two sentences – your shutting the door in the immediate future – is the same, but the sentences differ because one is a command and the other is a statement. In The Language of Morals, R. M. Hare called the common content of such sentences the phrastic [from Greek phrazein, literally what is said, to indicate or to show] and called their different moods the neustic [from Greek neuein, to nod, to assent]. With this distinction, he claims that phrastics allow imperatives to stand in logical relations. “I shall call the part of the sentence that is common to both moods (your shutting the door in the immediate future) the phrastic, and the part that is different in the case of commands and statements (yes or please), the neustic.” Hare, The Language of Morals neutral monism metaphysics A theory formulated by the American Pragmatist William James and developed by American realism, but propounded independently by the Austrian philosopher Ernst Mach. In contrast both to idealistic monism (that mind is the real existent) and materialistic monism (that matter is the real existent), the theory holds that both mental things and physical things are constructed out of the same primary stuff, which is neither mental nor physical but neutral between them. Both mind and matter are logical functions of the same stuff. Thus there is no real distinction between mind and matter. Russell in one period accepted this view by claiming that the world is composed of neutral events. This position proposed a solution to the mind–body problem, but there are difficulties with the neutral status of that which constitutes minds and bodies and with how arrangements of what is neutral can issue in minds and bodies. If experiences are proposed as the neutral entities, it is not clear whether neutral monism clarifies or obscures the nature of experience. “ ‘Neutral monism’ . . . is the theory that the things commonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded as physical don’t differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the one set and not by the other, but differ only in respect of arrangement and context.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. VII new criticism Aesthetics A school of literary criticism developed by J. C. Ransome, A. Tate, C. Brooks, among others, in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s. It rejected the historical method in literary study that emphasized the influence of history upon literature. Instead it suggested that a literary work is not an historical object, but should be treated merely as a text. It embraced the idea of art for art’s sake and emphasized the autonomy of art. The central task of literary criticism should be to focus on the literary devices present in a work, such as harmony, structure of discourse, imagery, figurative use of language and rhythm. Facts external to the work itself were claimed to be irrelevant to the appreciation or criticism of that work. The movement has affinities with Derrida’s more recent theory of deconstruction. “This doctrine (of the new criticism) holds that in trying to understand a work of art we cannot make use of facts external to the work itself – facts of biography, convention and (perhaps) intention.” Casey, “The Autonomy of Art,” in Vesey (ed.), Philosophy and the Arts New England transcendentalism, see transcendentalism new organon Philosophy of science, logic The title of Francis Bacon’s major book and also a technical term in his philosophy. The book, titled Novum Organum in Latin, was published in 1620, as the second part of an uncompleted project called the Great Instauration. The subtitle of Novum Organum is “true directions concerning the interpretation of nature.” It was intended as a guide to the correct use of human understanding in the investigation of nature. The central idea is that we should interpret rather than anticipate nature. We can only know on the basis of what has been observed in fact or in thought. Hence, the traditional syllogistic deductive logic that starts from abstract notions and principles is not adequate. Bacon called his own logic new in order to distinguish it from Aristotle’s Organon, in which syllogistic logic is systematically elaborated. The correct logic should be inductive, although it is not the method of induction in general that he favors, but induction by elimination. What, then, does Bacon mean by a new organon? He claims that there are three basic differences between the old logic and his new logic. (1) While the old logic is aimed at inventing arguments and overcoming an opponent’s argument, the new logic aimed to discover the principles of nature itself and to command nature in action. (2) While the old logic focuses mainly on syllogism, new logic rejects it and claims that induction is the form of demonstration that upholds sense and mirrors nature. (3) While in the old logic the startingpoint of inquiry is principle, new logic requires that we start with a judgment about the information obtained through the senses. “As for the legitimate form [of induction] I refer it to the new organon.” Bacon, The Philosophical Works new realism, another name for neo-realism new riddle of induction Logic, philosophy of language A problem which has provoked heated debate about the nature of induction. Induction is normally characterized in terms of inference to the continuation of previously observed regularities on the assumption of the uniformity of nature. But Nelson Goodman argued that this analysis itself depends on an unjustifiable assumption. Suppose that so far all observed emeralds have been green. The classical analysis of induction will lead us to believe that future emeralds will be green. But suppose there is another predicate grue, such that x is grue if and only if it is green when observed before time T (in the future) and blue thereafter. Given this, all our evidence for the hypothesis that emeralds are green equally supports the hypothesis that emeralds are grue. The evidence that we naturally take as confirming a given hypothesis always confirms some contrary hypothesis to an equal degree. Thus correct induction can not be defined in terms of inferences to events similar to those observed. There are no languageindependent similarities in nature. Induction can only apply to properties that have projectibility, but the paradox shows that it is unclear what these properties are. This new riddle of induction is also called Goodman’s paradox or the grue paradox. “We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory of confirmation. It is this problem that I call the new riddle of induction.” Goodman, Problems and Projects Newcomb’s problem Logic, philosophy of action A paradox about choice formulated by the American physicist William Newcomb in the early 1960s and published by Robert Nozick in his paper “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice” (1969). Suppose that a Supreme Being who has a successful record of prediction offers you two boxes A and B. You can choose to have either both boxes or box B alone. He puts a thousand pounds in Box A, and puts either a million pounds in B if he has predicted that you will choose B alone, or nothing if he has predicted that you will choose both boxes. Now which alternative should you choose? One line of reasoning suggests that you should trust the demonstrated predictive capacity of the Supreme Being and choose B alone; so you will end up rich. The other reasoning suggests that you should take both, for you can get at least one thousand pounds in this way. If you choose B alone and the Supreme Being has predicted that you would take both boxes, you will end up with nothing. Both ways of reasoning are sound, but they are incompatible. If the Supreme Being’s prediction were based on the assumption of your rationality and one option were more rational than the other, you would know what to choose, but any attempt to predict your choice on the basis of rationality will not produce a determinate result. “Newcomb’s problem presents a conflict between dominance reasoning and expected utility reasoning, both of which seem to have great intuitive appeal.” Campbell and Sowden (eds.), Paradoxes of Rationality and Co-operation Newman, John Henry (1801–90) English philosopher of religion, born in London, the founder of the Birmingham Oratory, made a cardinal in 1879. Newman’s main philosophical work, Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870), developed a concrete mode of reasoning that operated in the middle ground between formal and informal reasoning. Newman held that the mental activity that engaged in concrete reasoning, which he called the “illative sense,” involves personal experience and insight and yields certitude in our assent to informal judgments. He argued that his theory of mind explained our certitude in religious faith. Newton, Isaac (1642–1727) English scientist and mathematician, born in Woolsthorpe, Lincolnshire. Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (“The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy,” 1687) was a revolutionary work in modern physics and mathematics that established the three laws of motion and a general law of gravitation to explain the system of the world. The laws of motion presuppose the existence of an absolute space and time. He rejected speculative hypotheses and maintained that scientific knowledge should be based on experimental observation and induction. Newton’s achievement led to the development of the view that the universe is a rational and orderly system available to mathematic reason. His work led to the development of explanations of all kinds of phenomena in terms of the concepts and theorems of the Newtonian system. Newton and Leibniz were the two founders of mathematical calculus. Nicholas of Cusa (1401–64) German theologian, philosopher, and mathematician, made a cardinal in 1448. Nicholas revived Neoplatonism and was influential in the Renaissance. In De docta ignorantia (“Of Learned Ignorance,” 1440), he claimed that knowledge was learned ignorance and argued for the limitation of rational inquiry. He held that rational enquiry can bring human beings closer to the infinite God, but that such enquiry can not comprehend God. Whilst the law of noncontradiction applies to finite things, all oppositions are united in God. Intuitive intellect enables us to grasp the coincidence of opposites. He has had great influence as a cultural critic and philosopher, although every interpretation of his philosophy has been controversial. His main works include The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–5), Beyond Good and Evil (1886), Toward a Genealogy of Morals (1887), and The Will to Power (1889). Nicod’s criterion Logic A test of the relevance of evidence for confirmation put forward by the French philosopher Jean Nicod, saying that for a generalization “All As are Bs,” an instance A is B provides confirming evidence; an instance A is not B disconfirms the generalization and justifies its rejection, and evidence of something which is neither A nor B is irrelevant, that is, it neither confirms nor disconfirms. This criterion is plausible in its own right, but when it is put together with other principles of confirmation, Hempel’s paradox of confirmation arises. nihil ex nihilo, see ex nihilo nihil fit “Nicod’s criterion . . . states that ‘φa.ϕa’ always confirms, ‘φa.~ϕa’ always disconfirms, while ‘~φa.ϕa’ and ‘~φa.~ϕa’ are always irrelevant to, ‘of physical necessity all φ’s are ϕ’s’.” Swinburne, An Introduction to Confirmation Theory Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900) German philosopher, born in Rocken, Prussia. As a founder of modern irrationalism, Nietzsche claimed that the will to power worked in all living things as a fundamental motive to attain a higher and more perfect state. He held that the will to power is characterized by self-overcoming and is life-affirming. All purposes, aims, and means are only different modes expressing the will to power, which attained its zenith in the Superman (Übermensch) and its most spiritual expression in philosophy. The Superman, as the realization of profound human potentialities, is the ideal of life for human beings when God, as a non-human source of value, is dead. Nietzsche sought to reassess all values in ethics and held that the two basic types of morality are engaged in struggle throughout history. Slave morality was derived from the resentment of the weak man and the ruled group, whereas master morality was rooted in the self-affirmation of the strong man and the ruling group. Nietzsche suffered a mental and physical collapse in 1889 and remained insane until his death. nihilism Metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy [from Latin nihil, nothing] A theory that advocates that nothing is believable and that no distinction is significant. Metaphysical nihilism claims that the world and human life do not have the value and meaning we suppose them to have. Epistemological nihilism holds that no knowledge is possible. Ethical nihilism supposes that there is no ground to justify any absolute moral value. Political nihilism suggests that any political organization must be corrupt and unworthy of support. Nietzsche claimed that he is a nihilist, but his nihilism holds that the world lacks value and meaning if value and meaning are conceived in a traditional way. His nihilism is the devaluation of all values and provides a motive to seek new values. “Right here is where the destiny of Europe lies – in losing our fear of man we have also lost our love for him, our respect for him, our hope in him and even our will to be man. The sight of man now makes us tired – what is nihilism today if it is not that?” Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals no-ownership theory Philosophy of mind A theory which maintains that states of consciousness do not belong to anything, although they may be causally dependent on the body in a contingent way. If something is owned, its ownership is logically transferable, but this is not the case with experience. Strawson ascribed this theory to Wittgenstein at one period and to Schlick, and criticizes it in his own discussion of persons. He accepts that the theory correctly claims that the unique role of a single body in one’s experience is not sufficient for ascribing experience to it, but argues that the theory itself is incoherent. For the experience of consciousness to be causally dependent on states noema of the body, it must be owned by something. We could not refer to an independent particular experience. We refer to mental states by way of their owners, and therefore experience must be owned. “The [no-ownership] theorist could maintain his position only by denying that we could ever refer to particular states or experiences at all; and his position is ridiculous.” Strawson, Individuals noble lie Ancient Greek philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of social science A falsehood uttered for the interest of the state. The term was introduced by Plato in Republic 414–415 for a myth used to safeguard social harmony by persuading a population to accept class distinctions. According to the myth, God made human beings from the earth. For the rulers, he added gold to the composition; for the auxiliaries, he added silver; and for the farmers and other workers, he added iron and bronze. For this reason, rulers should enjoy the greatest prestige. The distinction is not firmly fixed, for a golden child might be born of silver parents. It is the duty of the rulers to ensure that only a golden person can become a ruler. Plato believed that the myth can make the citizens happy with their current status and can thus promote social stability. Other Western political thinkers have accepted the legitimacy of political lies for the sake of public or party interest, and some theorists have examined related questions about the role of myth, ideology, or false consciousness in political life. “How then . . . might we contrive one of those opportune falsehoods of which we were just now speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city.” Plato, Republic noble savage Political philosophy, ethics A term associated with J. J. Rousseau’s conception of human beings before the appearance of civilization and government. In contrast to Hobbes’s view that men in the state of nature are savage, Rousseau claims that if they are savages, they are noble savages. He held that human beings in the state of nature are free, peaceful, innocent, independent, and happy. They are faithful to human nature and are free from the disease of our civilization. It is the establishment of society that deforms human nature and makes humans subject to the conditions of domestic slavery. But it is argued that Rousseau held this view only in the early stage of his thought and that in general he did not think that men in the natural state are capable of virtue and moral relationships. “Except possibly in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, written before his theories had been properly thought out, Rousseau was no believer in the ‘noble savage’, though that expression is often wrongly associated with his name.” J. Hall, Rousseau noema Modern European philosophy, philosophy of mind [from Greek noema, what is thought about; in contrast to a correlative term, noesis, the act of thinking. The terms are related to nous, reason] Husserl distinguished two aspects of intentional experience, the material and the formal. While the material aspect comprises the diverse sensory stuff passively received by consciousness, the formal aspect, or noesis, bestows sense on the material stuff and generates unity among multiplicity by means of its synthetic activities. This account is deeply influenced by Kant’s discussion of apperception. Noema, in contrast, is what is unified and synthesized by noetic activity. For Husserl, a major task for phenomenology is to reveal the noetic-noematic structure of intentional experience. The interpretation of noema is difficult and has been subject to dispute. Generally, it is neither an object nor a part of an object, but is an entity corresponding to Frege’s sense (in his distinction between sense and reference). Noema is a complex that includes every factor determining the meaning of noetic activity. It is the crucial notion for Husserl’s theory of intentionality, for he claims that mental acts are directed upon noema rather than objects. “Corresponding at all points to the manifold data of the real noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in really pure intuition, and is a correlative ‘noematic content’, or briefly, ‘noema’ – terms which we shall henceforth be continually using.” Husserl, Ideas noesis Ancient Greek philosophy, modern European philosophy, philosophy of mind [Greek, variously translated as intellection, intelligence, and understanding; it is cognate with the verb noein and its object to noeton] In a wider sense noesis is thought, in contrast to perception (Greek aisthesis). In its narrow sense, noesis is identified with nous (immediate or intuitive thinking) and contrasted to dianoia (discursive thinking). It is the thought that constitutes the being of the Unmoved Mover in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and is pure intuitive apprehension in Neoplatonism. In Plato’s simile of the line, noesis is beyond dianoia, and while dianoia is concerned with mathematical entities, noesis is the highest state of the mind, which reasons from Forms to Forms, reaches first principles, and then deduces from them. It is dialectical or philosophical reason. In modern times, the contrast between noesis and noema is fundamental to Husserl’s phenomenological account of intentional experience. “Life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception, in that of man by the power of perception or noesis.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics nomic necessity Metaphysics, philosophy of science The regularity and uniformity existing amongst contingent natural phenomena. “Spring follows winter” and “Ice melts at a certain temperature” are statements that express empirical laws. They are not logically or mathematically necessary, but appear to be necessary in some sense. This sort of necessity is often called nomic or law-like necessity. Such a necessity reveals that things will at least generally happen in that way or, in a stronger form, that they must happen in that way or that it is inevitable that they will so happen. Law-like necessity is often expressed in a hypothetical supposition: if anything had the characteristics c 1 . . . c n, then it would have the characteristic x. Different philosophers have offered various interpretations of this sort of necessity. Hume denied its objectivity by claiming that it is nothing more than our habitual expectation. Among those who have admitted it, medieval thinkers considered it to be due to God’s force, while Kant suggested that it results from the imposition of our categories of understanding upon experience. “The nomic necessity – anything characterised by p q r would be characterised by x – implies the factual universal that ‘everything that is p q r is actually x’.” Johnson, Logic nominal definition, see real definition nominal essence Metaphysics The distinction between real essence and nominal essence, drawn by Locke, roughly corresponds to the traditional metaphysical division between substance and quality or between essence and appearance. A nominal essence is the quality or qualities by which we recognize an item and which justifies on any given occasion applying the item’s name to it. For Locke, it is the abstract ideas for which a general or sortal name stands. For example, according to its nominal essence gold is a metal that is malleable, heavy, and yellow. Because gold has these properties, we can recognize it as such and can apply the name “gold” to it. A thing’s real essence is its internal but unknown constitution. While the qualities that constitute the nominal essence depend on the real essence, only the nominal essence serves to distinguish one thing from another. Traditional metaphysics emphasized real essences, but Locke’s philosophy shifted the emphasis to nominal essences. This distinction made essence qua unknown real essence superfluous. Berkeley and his followers therefore rejected the notion of real essence, and this leads to phenomenalism. “[Real essence] is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c, which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to name, which is therefore its nominal essence.” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding nominalism Metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language [from Latin nomen, name] The view that the only feature that particulars falling under the same general term have in common is that they are covered by the same term. Hence, universals are only names rather than entities in their own right, although there are universal elements in knowledge. Nominalism is opposed to realism, according to which universals are real entities that are required to explain how general terms apply to different particulars. For nominalism, language, rather than independent reality, underlies perceived similarity. Everything that exists is particular, and universals are terms invented by the mind to talk about similarities. Talk about properties and abstract entities is legitimate only if it can be reduced to talk about particulars. Nominalism follows the spirit of Ockham’s razor, that is, by avoiding positing the existence of unnecessary entities. Nominalism is the traditional empiricist theory of universals, and its major advocates include William of Ockham, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and in the twentieth century Carnap and Quine, although different philosophers in the tradition have different reasons for rejecting universals and ways of eliminating them. Many philosophers are attracted to the ontological austerity of nominalism, but problems remain concerning how language, especially predication, works on nominalist principles. “Nominalism maintains that universals are names only, corresponding to no reality.” Walsh, Reason and Experience nomological, see nomic nomological dangler Philosophy of science, philosophy of mind A term introduced by Feigl in his 1958 article “The Mental and the Physical,” referring to the law-like relations which connect intersubjectively confirmable events with events that are in principle not intersubjectively and independently confirmable. It means in particular the laws that relate non-physical conscious experience to their associated brain processes. We accept these relations or laws but they can not be accounted for in scientific formulations. They are quite outside normal scientific conceptions, that is, they dangle from the nomological net of science. The identity theory of mind attempts to rule out these danglers. In his 1960 paper “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Smart used this term for the physical entity that is supposed to dangle from the psychological law rather than to the psychophysical law itself. But he later reverted to Feigl’s use, although he viewed such laws with great suspicion. “At best a nomological dangler would merely subsume a lot of As that are associated with Bs under the generalization ‘All As are Bs’. The reason for this is that the nomological danglers would be laws purporting to connect physical events, in fact, neurophysiological ones, with allegedly nonphysical ones, conscious experiences.” J. Smart, Essays Metaphysical and Moral nomos Ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics, ethics Law or convention, and used to refer to written or customary laws and rules, customs, habits, and conventions. Because all of these are men-made and can be changed and modified by men, in Greek philosophy nomos is contrasted to phusis (nature). Democritus claims that such things as color and taste are conventions, while only atoms and the void are real (natural). In the fourth and fifth centuries bc, philosophers disputed whether human nature or human morality is nomos or phusis. The defenders of nomos, e.g. Protagoras, insist that human nature or morality is affected by the beliefs of different societies. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all attack this ethical relativism, and attempt to base human morality on objective grounds. “What is fine and what is just, the topics of inquiry in political science, differ and vary so much that they seem to rest on nomos only, not on nature.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics non-cognitivism Ethics Also called non-descriptivism, a type of meta-ethical theory that denies that we can have moral knowledge by intuition, and also denies that ethical statements can be construed as scientific statements, confirmable by observation or inductive reasoning. It claims that ethical terms do not refer to properties and that ethical judgments are neither true nor false and are not used to convey what is the case. Thus, it is opposed to the many traditional ethical theories that hold that there is ethical knowledge and that normative ethical judgments can be said to be true or false. These rival theories are therefore termed cognitivism and include both naturalist and non-naturalist varieties. The positive thesis of non-cognitivism is that in ethical thinking we should concentrate on the nonfact-stating functions of ethical expressions. Exactly what these functions are is an issue dividing many forms of non-cognitivism. For some, ethical expressions express attitude; for some, they issue commands; for some, they express exclamations; for some, they are prescriptions; and so on. The most influential non-cognitive theories are emotivism, developed by Stevenson, and prescriptivism, developed by Hare. of premises, can also be inferred validly no matter what further premises are added to the originally valid argument. It is non-monotonic if the addition of further information leads to a different conclusion. Non-monotonic logics, used in artificial intelligence research, explore logical systems in which monotonicity does not hold. “Noncognitivism: the job of ethical sentences is not to state facts.” Brandt, Ethical Theory non-natural property Ethics According to G. E. Moore, ethical terms such as “good” refer to objective properties that are the basis of truth-values of ethical statements. However, these ethical properties are not natural, that is, they are not observable or subject to scientific explanation. Instead they can only be known through moral intuition. According to Moore, any attempt to define ethical terms by appeal to natural terms commits the naturalistic fallacy. However, critics deny the existence of such properties or qualities, and claim that the appeal to a special kind of intuition is not convincing. In addition, it is hard to say how non-natural moral properties could guide our actions. non-consequentialism, see consequentialism non-descriptivism, see non-cognitivism, descriptivism non-doxastic theory, see doxastic theory non-Euclidean geometry Philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science We can informally render Euclid’s fifth ‘parallels’ postulate (or Axiom XI) as follows: “through a given point P not on a line L, there is one and only one line in the plane of P and L that does not meet L.” This axiom turns out to be independent of the other axioms of Euclid. The exploration of the consequences of this fact led to the development of various non-Euclidean geometries. They develop systems in which two different denials of this postulate are used: Lobachevskian geometry contains an infinite number of parallels through P; Reimannian geometry contains no parallels through P. Reimannian geometry has played a crucial role in the development of the general relativity theory. “If the parallel axiom is independent of the other axioms of Euclid, then a statement incompatible with the parallels axiom can be substituted for it without logically contradicting the other axioms. By trying different alternatives, new axiom systems, called non-Euclidean geometries, were created.” Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics non-monotonic logics Logic In logic, an inference is monotonic if a conclusion C, which can be inferred validly from a set “Non-monotonic inferences are inferences of the form: a; there is no reason to suppose otherwise; so b.” Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought “The alleged concept of a nonnatural property is not connected with experience, does not function to guide expectations, is not part of a theoretical system with consequences predicative of observation, in the way in which this is true of the concepts of empirical science.” Brandt, Ethical Theory non-naturalism, ethical Ethics In opposition to ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism claims that ethical terms can not be defined by appeal to natural terms. Ethical properties are presented as non-natural properties that are not observable and not subject to scientific explanation. There is a firm distinction between ought and is, or between value and fact, so that ethical statements (value statements or “ought” statements) can not be derived from statements of facts. To attempt to do so is to commit the so-called naturalistic fallacy. In contrast to noncognitivism, non-naturalism argues that ethical statements have objective meanings and truthvalues because they refer to non-natural ethical properties, but they can only be known by intuition, rather than by observation or experiment, as naturalism holds. In the twentieth century, the main proponent of non-naturalism is G. E. Moore. “The most vulnerable point of nonnaturalist doctrine, however, is the epistemology, the theory of how we know or are justified in believing ethical statements.” Brandt, Ethical Theory non-reflexive, see irreflexive nonsense Metaphysics, philosophy of language In line with Kant’s description of reason’s inevitably failed attempt to extend beyond the limits of knowledge, Wittgenstein draws a demarcation between meaningful propositions and meaningless propositions. While meaningful propositions are bipolar, that is, either true or false, meaningless propositions are not bipolar and are hence nonsensical. Such propositions are not obviously false or pointless, but simply lack sense. Most questions asked in philosophy and the propositions with which we attempt to answer them are nonsense (German Unsinn), and one can not say that they are true or false. These propositions fail in their attempt to say something about the world, due to our failure to understand the logical syntax of language that is obscured by grammar. Nonsense can be divided into overt nonsense and covert nonsense. Overt nonsense can be seen intuitively to be nonsense, such as the question “Is the good more or less identical than the beautiful?” but covert nonsense has to be discovered by analysis. For Wittgenstein, the task of proper philosophy is to clarify good sense. What is nonsensical cannot be said, but can be shown. In this respect, even Wittgenstein’s own theory of logical syntax is nonsensical, for it tries to say what can only be shown. Nonsense should be distinguished from what is senseless. In the Vienna Circle, all statements that are not capable of scientific treatment or are not verifiable are nonsense, and “nonsense” accordingly becomes a label for metaphysical statements. “It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be shown, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus non-teleological ethics, see consequentialism non-tuism Philosophy of social science, ethics A term coined by the economist Wicksteed in The Common Sense of Political Economy and Selected Papers and Reviews on Economic Theory (1933), originally referring to the specific character of economic relations. Non-tuists are not interested in the interests of those with whom they interact. This sort of motivation is neither egoistic nor altruistic. Some philosophers extend this term to the moral area to offer a rationale for morality, suggesting that people are neither egoists nor altruists. We need moral constraints, but morality is merely a device rather than a fundamental concern for others. “The market requires only that persons be conceived as not taking an interest in the interests of those with whom they exchange. This is Wicksteed’s requirement of non-tuism.” Gauthier, Morals by Agreement normative Ethics, philosophy of social science From norm, which means standard or rule, and it is associated with evaluation. A theory is normative if it involves norm-prescription and is descriptive if it simply describes the facts but does not prescribe what one ought to do. Normative ethics is the subject of inquiring about the principles or rules of correct moral behavior and is contrasted to meta-ethics, which analyzes the meaning and logical relations of evaluative terms. To define a normative term in terms of non-moral properties is called by Moore the definist fallacy. Sociologists as well as moral philosophers have pictured our lives as governed by complex hierarchies of norms. “Theories that prescribe standards are normative.” Glymour, Thinking Things Through normative egoism, see egoism, ethical notation Aesthetics The abbreviation for a notational system or notational scheme, which consists of certain characters or symbols. Notation is the mark of identification distinguishing one type of art from another and determining whether two works belong to the same form of art. It also determines whether two performances are instances of the same work or whether different inscriptions are copies of the same score. Notation indicates the constitutive properties of a work and distinguishes them from its contingent properties. Establishing this distinction generally relies on boundaries drawn in the antecedent practices. Some forms of art, such as music, have traditional notation, while others, like painting, do not. For other forms of art, like dance, attempts to provide a notation have lacked total success. Since notation is a system of characters, it should be syntactically disjoint so that all marks belonging to the same character are interchangeable without syntactic effects. It should also be finitely differentiated, that is to say, by using the notation we can tell whether or not two marks belong to the same character. Moreover, a notation should also be semantically unambiguous, so that, for example, performances of different works can not conform to the same score. “In sum, the properties required of a notational system are unambiguity and syntactic and semantic disjointness and differentiation. These are in no sense merely recommended for a good and useful notation but are features that distinguish notational systems – good or bad – from non-notational systems.” Goodman, The Languages of Art notational scheme, see notation not-being Metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy That which is not. Parmenides claimed that not-being can be neither spoken nor thought, for everything that can be spoken or thought is being. He also believed that Heraclitus’ position, that everything is always in change, amounts to saying that a thing is both being and not-being, and this is an account which can only lead to opinion rather than truth. Plato argues that Forms or Ideas are truly beings and that the sensible world as appearance is both being and not-being. According to Plato’s analysis in the Sophist, not-being is neither absolutely nothing nor a kind of thing. Instead it is the absence of being, and is “other than” or “being different from” a positive determination or being. In Plotinus, “not being” refers to matter, which is at the bottom of the hierarchy of reality, and is identified with pure passivity, evil, and darkness. Modern discussion tends to follow Plato and characterize not-being in negative terms and claim that it can be expressed by negative propositions. But there has been debate concerning how to avoid a commitment to nonexistents through negative propositions. If notbeing is a negative property, then we must find a way to distinguish negative properties from positive properties. Non-being is generally taken to be identical with nothingness. “When we speak of ‘not being’, it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists but only something that is different.” Plato, Sophist nothingness Metaphysics, modern European philosophy, philosophy of language Also called negation, notbeing, or nihilation. Nothing is an abbreviated form of “not-anything.” The nature of negation has been a difficult puzzle since the pre-Socratic philosophers. Through nominalization, negation seems to become an entity, “the not,” and the ontological status of nothing becomes a problem. Parmenides claimed that not-being is unsayable. Plato suggested that not-being exists and means “other-than-being.” Aristotle believed that not-being is what lacks any and every property. The dispute continued through medieval philosophy, which tried to connect nothingness, privation, and evil. At the beginning of his Logic, Hegel proposed a dialectic of Being and Nothingness. In contemporary philosophy, there are two quite different usages. Heidegger took “nothingness” (German das Nichts) as a referring expression, denoting a special kind of subject-matter. We can experience nothingness in experiencing that human existence has no ground and is meaningless. This experience is revealed in anxiety and culminates in the experience of death. Sartre distinguished between beingfor-itself and being-in-itself. The former is conscious being, especially human being, and the latter is the being of things in the world that are causally determined. Consciousness as being-for-itself is directed upon some object, but is also aware of itself as conscious of some object. Hence it presents a vacancy or gap between itself and its object, by which consciousness detaches itself from the rest of the world or being-in-itself and identifies itself by reference to the things that are other than itself. For Sartre, this gap is precisely what nothingness is, as an awareness of he-is-not-what-he-is or he-is-what-he-is-not. Hence, nothingness is the separation between itself and its object and is an implicit awareness of notbeing-the-object. Sartre holds that this separation is the source of human freedom by causing human beings to choose what they will be rather than simply being. Consciousness is negation in itself because it can not exist without a separation from its object. Human being, as the agent of consciousness, is the only being that can bring nothingness into the world. It takes a different view of beingin-the-world and modifies it. The awareness of nothingness results in feeling anguish, and an escape from anguish leads one to fall into bad faith. The conception of nothingness lies at the foundation of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. On the other hand, Carnap rejects Heidegger’s use of “nothing” as typical metaphysical nonsense. Nothing does not refer to anything, but simply marks the absence of an expected existent. For Carnap, Heidegger’s question about nothing is a violation of logical syntax. It is generally held in analytic philosophy that nothingness is a pseudo-object that is invoked to fill the gap produced by insisting that every mental state is intentional in form. In modern logic, “nothing” is interpreted in terms of quantified sentences rather than as a designator of an object. “We perceived then that Nothingness can be conceived neither outside of being, nor as a complementary, abstract notion, nor as an infinite milieu where being is suspended. Nothingness must be given at the heart of Being, in order for us to be able to apprehend that particular type of realities which we have called négatités.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness noumenon Metaphysics, epistemology [from Greek noein to think, hence the thing thought or the intelligible thing; plural, noumena] A thing as intelligible object or ultimate reality, in contrast to a phenomenon, which is a thing as it appears or is sensed. This ancient distinction was carefully explored in Plato’s theory of ideas, But the term noumenon is especially associated with Kant. In his philosophy, noumenon is mainly used in a negative sense, as something that is beyond the limits of sensibility, intuition, or experience, that is, beyond the world of appearance. Hence, a noumenon is an unknown thing, employed to show the limits of possible knowledge, which is postulated by pure reason as a startingpoint for all scientific inquiries. Kant held that such a postulation is necessary as a condition of a human freedom. Also, if we attribute objectivity to the noumenon, we proceed from a logical form without content to an object necessarily existing in itself as an object of positive knowledge. For Kant, this is a dialectical error that leads inevitably to the errors of traditional metaphysics. Noumenon is sometimes used interchangeably with thing-in-itself, although each term has its own emphasis. “The concept of a noumenon – that is, of a thing which is not to be thought as object of the senses but as a thing in itself, solely through a pure understanding – is not in any way contradictory.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason nous Ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of mind [Greek intellect in general or in some aspect] Anaxagoras took nous to be a cosmic force separating elements from the primitive mixture and setting up the order of the world. Although not satisfied with the detailed explanation given by Anaxagoras, Socrates was inspired by this account. In his simile of the line, Plato took nous to be the highest level of intellect. In contrast to dianoia (discursive reasoning), which is concerned with mathematical reality and proceeds from hypotheses to a conclusion, nous is concerned with Forms and proceeds from hypotheses to the first principle from which everything else is deduced. Aristotle used nous in various senses: (1) general rational thought and understanding which is not distinguished from dianoia; (2) intuitive reasoning which grasps the first principles of demonstrative sciences, principles that are necessary and admit of no further justification; (3) practical nous which grasps the relevant features of particular cases, and is an element of practical reason; (4) active reason, which immediately grasps pure forms and is an eternal, divine intellect altogether separable from body, an account that conflicts with Aristotle’s other views about soul. “No other kind of thought except nous is more accurate than scientific knowledge.” Aristotle, Posterior Analytics Nozick, R., philosopher, born in Brooklyn, New York, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. Nozick is best known for his libertarian political philosophy, which argues for the fundamental importance of rights, the entitlement to legally acquired property unconstrained by demands for an allegedly just pattern of distribution, and the limitation of the state to a minimal role. His epistemology introduces a notion of tracking truth in an analysis of knowledge that leads on to a more extensive theory of rational action and rational belief. His major works include Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), Philosophical Explanations (1981), The Nature of Rationality (1993), and Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World (2001). nuclear deterrence, see deterrence null class Logic A class or set of which nothing is a member. It is often symbolized by “ø” and is also called the null set or empty class. This is the smallest set possible. Logically, since sets are distinguished from one another by the number of members, only one null class is possible. Since we tend to think of a set or class as a heap, the existence of the null class seems puzzling, but if we think of classes more abstractly the puzzle disappears. “One of these concerns the null-class, i.e. the class consisting of no members, which is difficult to deal with on a purely extensional basis.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge nulla poena sine lege Philosophy of law [Latin, no punishment without law making it so] A principle that requires any determination of offense to be justified by appeal to clearly defined and pre-announced laws. The grounds for imposing punishment on wrongdoers can not be a discretionary matter, but must be according to expressed or expressible legal forms. Statutes must be clear in what they enjoin and forbid, so that the citizens have clear knowledge about how they should behave. An associate principle is nullum crimen sine lege (Latin, no crime without law making it so). “Nulla poena sine lege is the battlecry (and translated with strict accuracy, let us not forget, it means ‘No punishment without a statute’).” MacCormick, H. L. A. Hart nullum crimen sine lege Philosophy of law [Latin, no crime without law making it so] A principle that conduct does not constitute a crime unless it has previously been declared to be criminal by the law. Anything that is not forbidden by a certain normative rule or system is permitted by that rule or system. Whatever is not prohibited is thereby ipso facto permitted. It is a rule about people’s freedom to act, which is also called the principle of legality. If a judge creates new offenses in order to punish morally objectionable or harmful acts, he violates this principle. The principle is associated with the rule nulla poena sine lege (Latin, no punishment without law making it so). “A nullum crimen [sine lege] rule permitting all not-forbidden acts and forbearances may or may not occur within a given normative order.” von Wright, Norm and Action number Philosophy of mathematics Philosophical issues arise over the ontological status of numbers. The Greek Pythagoreans discovered relationships of ratio and proportion among natural numbers and even considered number to be the first principle that determines the structure of the world. The tendency of contemporary philosophy of mathematics to identify numbers with sets has led to the revival of Platonism in mathematics. The traditional position holds that numbers are used to answer questions of the form “How many X’s are there?” and, hence, that a number is a property ascribed to an object or group of objects. This view was rejected by Frege, who argued that a number-statement ascribes a property to concepts rather than to objects. Hence a number is a second-level predicate rather than a first-level predicate. On this basis, Frege inferred that existence, like number, is a property of concepts rather than of objects. the holy is tenable. In a related secular sense, the numinous appeals to the high emotions or aesthetic sense. “The content of a statement of number is an assertion about a concept.” Frege, The Foundations “For this purpose I adopt a word coined from the Latin numen. Omen has given us ‘ominous’, and there is no reason why from numen we should not similarly form a word ‘numinous’.” Otto, The Idea of the Holy. of Arithmetic numinous Philosophy of religion, aesthetics [from Latin numin, a spirit inhabiting a natural object or phenomenon, filling it with a sense of divine presence] A term introduced by the German philosopher of religion Rudolf Otto. Otto claimed that the term holy is used both in a religious and in an ethical sense and suggested that we need a term simply for the part of the meaning of holy that is distinct from absolute moral goodness. He put forward the numinous as a term to designate the aweinspiring and overpowering object of human religious experience. The numinous has been understood as a distinguishing feature of religion. Although the experience of the numinous is meant to characterize religion in isolation from moral sense, it is a matter of dispute whether a distinction between the numinous and other aspects of Nussbaum, M., philosopher, Professor at Harvard University, Brown University, and University of Chicago. Nussbaum brings together scholarly understanding of Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic philosophy, critical intelligence in her response to literature, and a concern for practical reason in the complex circumstances of moral life. Her conception of reason encompasses imagination and emotion to give unity to her philosophical examinations of ethics and the self. Her main works include The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (1986), Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (1990), The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (1994), and Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotion (2001). Oakeshott, Michael (1901–90) English idealist philosopher and political theorist, born in Harpenden, Hertfordshire. Oakeshott believed that various distinct modes of human experience constitute the world and that philosophy involves the perception of experience as a whole. Thus, he sought a comprehensive understanding of experience from history, science, practice, and art. He considered himself to be a liberal, although conservatives have been drawn to his rejection of the primacy of rationalist abstract theory in politics. His major works are Experience and Its Modes (1933), Rationalism in Politics (1962), On Human Conduct (1975), and On History (1983). obiter dictum, see ratio decidendi object Metaphysics, philosophy of mind [G. Gegenstand] A generic term for whatever is the bearer of a proper name, or whatever can be referred to or designated, approximately identical with “thing.” Objects can be distinguished from their properties and relations and also from subjects. Physical objects are real, but there are also unreal objects such as phantoms or images. Unlike physical objects, abstract objects are not spatio-temporal. Intentional objects are objects of mental states, like desire or hope, and need not exist. Objects are often recognized in ontology as the most basic particulars, although some recent arguments have rejected the priority of objects in favor of events. For early Wittgenstein objects are the constituents of states of affairs or atomic facts, and thus form the substance of the world. Every object contains in its nature all the possibilities of combining with other objects. In themselves, objects are simple and unchanging. What changes is the combination or separation of objects (the complex objects). In this way objects are related to the atoms of ancient atomism. Objects are correlated to the simple names that constitute propositions. The simple names are discovered through logical analysis and are the terminus of such analysis. “A name means an object. The object is its meaning.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus object language Logic, philosophy of language Russell developed the notion of a hierarchy of languages. The language of the lowest order, in which symbol and vocabulary are not determined by the logical conditions, is called the object language or primary language. This is the language with which we talk about extralinguistic things and objects. It applies object words and studying it involves the relation between sentences and non-linguistic occurrences. Any given ordinary language is an object language, in contrast to higher-order languages, which deal not with objects, but with the lower-order languages. Tarski takes the notion of an object language and contrasts it with metalanguage, in which we talk about an object language. “I call this the ‘object language’, or the ‘primary language’. In this language, every word ‘denotes’ or ‘means’ a sensible object or set of such objects; and when used alone, asserts the sensible presence of the object, or of one of the set of objects, which it denotes or means.” Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth object sentence, see pseudo-object sentence object words Logic, philosophy of language Object words indicate the presence of what they mean through indicating something that one can point to, such as “cat,” “France,” and so on. In contrast, syntax words are words such as “or,” “not,” “than,” “but,” which do not indicate anything one can point to, but can only be defined verbally in terms of other syntax words. “Some words denote objects, others express characteristics of our belief-attitude; the former are object-words, the latter syntax-words.” Russell, Human Knowledge objective knowledge Epistemology Popper’s term for linguistically formulated theories that form the constituents of his “World 3.” Knowledge in this sense is man-made but transcends its origins and has various properties and relationships independent of any subject’s awareness of them. In Popper’s view, it contrasts with subjective knowledge, which is a dispositional expectation or anticipation of relevant impending events and is a kind of adaptation to the environment. The study of subjective knowledge belongs to psychology. Popper claimed that this distinction between objective and subjective knowledge is ignored in traditional epistemology. Traditional epistemology views knowledge as justified true belief or as perception, and hence limits knowledge to the utterances or expressions of the knowing subject. This is the source of many difficulties in traditional epistemology, especially its justificationism. “The traditional theories of knowledge (from Plato’s Theaetetus to Wittgenstein’s On Certainty) fail to make a clear distinction between objective and subjective knowledge.” Popper, The Philosophy of Karl Popper objective particulars Metaphysics Strawson’s term for particulars that are not the private occurrences or states or conditions of oneself or anyone else, but rather are the actual or possible public objects of experience or states of consciousness. These particulars are reidentifiable in speaker-hearer identification. Objective particulars, which Strawson also calls public particulars, contrast to private particulars, that is, sensations, mental events, or sense-data in general. “I shall henceforth use the phrase, ‘objective particulars’ as an abbreviation of the entire phrase, ‘particulars distinguished by the thinker, etc.’.” Strawson, Individuals objectivism Metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics The contrast between objectivism and subjectivism is a central and recurring feature of philosophy. Objectivist theories claim that truth and falsity are determined by external objects and their relations independent of our minds, while subjectivist theories claim that truth and falsity are relative to our minds. The contrast between these two positions is presented differently in different areas of philosophy. Objectivist metaphysics claims that the external world exists without regard to our minds, while subjectivist metaphysics claims that the world exists only insofar as it exists for us. Objectivist epistemology holds that the source and validity of knowledge are derived from external objects, while subjectivist epistemology claims that the source and validity of knowledge are derived primarily from our sensibility and our ability to form conceptions. Both naturalist and anti-naturalist varieties of objectivist ethics suggest that ethical properties and values exist independent of our belief and desires, while subjectivist ethics proposes that moral judgments cannot be judged true or false according to an objective standard, but are rather the expression of our emotions or feelings. Objectivist aesthetics holds that aesthetic properties are inherent in things, while subjectivist aesthetics claims that they are projected by us upon the objects. Subjectivism is associated with anti-realism and idealism, while objectivism is associated with realism. However, objectivism is not identical with materialism, for it can be held in either materialist or idealist form. “[T]he objectivism of the natural sciences tries to view them [social complexes] from the outside; it treats social phenomena not as something of which the human mind is a part and the principles of whose organisation we can reconstruct from the familiar parts, but as if they were objects directly perceived by us as a whole.” Hayek, in O’Neill, Modes of Individualism and Collectivism objectivity Metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of history, ethics Belonging to objects and not to ourselves as subjects; also, beliefs or perceptions that are not limited or distorted by the bias or partiality. Objectivity can be contrasted with subjectivity and with a lack of objectivity. We can be objective in determining beliefs, and our judgments themselves can be objective. In spite of the dangers, we often use our assessment of the person judging to guide our determination of the objectivity of the judgment. A commitment to objectivity is a general mark of intellectual integrity, according to which one respects the virtue of truth and seeks valid and unbiased theories, explanations, and judgments. A theory or judgment is objective if it corresponds to external facts or can be determined to be true or false by rational means. Sometimes these two senses are related because a theory can be rationally judged as conforming or not conforming to facts, but more often a theory is abstract and idealized and does not correspond directly or sensibly to any facts. In this case, a theory is regarded as objective if it can be justified rationally, with agreement available or expected from all reasonable persons. The primary task of a theory should be to explain the sort of objectivity that is possible for it and to state the conditions that would justify its rational acceptance. Moreover, a sound account of rationality is required to enable us to achieve the objectivity of theories and judgments through overcoming partiality, arbitrariness, relativity, and bias, and to assess the objectivity of people. Because personal and social intention and prejudice are indispensably involved in many fields, the possibility of objectivity in history and ethics, for example, has been an issue of dispute. “We might explain the objectivity of a judgement that p as follows. There exists knowledge k such that everyone with this knowledge agrees that p is true (and expects that anyone else with this knowledge would agree that p is true and would have this very same expectation), while there is no further knowledge which, when added to k, undercuts the agreement that p.” Nozick, Philosophical Explanations objectual quantifier Logic Quine distinguishes two interpretations of the quantifier, the objectual quantifier and the substitutional quantifier. He, along with Davidson, endorses the objectual quantifier interpretation, according to which one should interpret a quantifier in terms the values of a variable as the objects over which the variable ranges. For example, (x)Fx is interpreted as “For all objects x in the domain D, Fx.” According to the substitutional quantifier interpretation one should interpret a quantifier by appealing to substituends rather than values of the variable, that is, the expressions that can be substituted for the variable. On this view, (x)Fx is interpreted to be “All substitution instances of F . . . are true.” These two interpretations involve some different consequences. For example, the substitutional interpretation of the quantifier says that the truth of quantified formulae can be directly defined by the truth of their substituted atomic formulae, but this is not admitted by the objectual interpretation. Also, the substitutional interpretation allows quantifiers to replace terms, such as predicates and relations, which do not designate objects. “The Q-quantifiers are called ‘objectual’. The reason is that whether or not a quantification is true upon an interpretation depends on how things are with the objects in the domain of interpretation.” Sainsbury, Logical Form obligation Ethics [from Latin obligare, to bind one to something] Generally, something we are required to do arising from some circumstance, such as having signed a contract or having made a promise. Duty is also something we are required to do, but generally because of some social or other role that we occupy. In Kant’s ethics, an obligation is the general dependence of the human will upon the moral law, while duty is the necessity of acting from obligation. Obligation informs not only duty but also rights. Many philosophers, however, use obligation and duty interchangeably as a determination of what ought to be done. “The connexion between duties and the demands of others comes out clearly in the fact that we use the word ‘obligation’ as a synonym for ‘duty’.” Nowell-Smith, Ethics obligationes Logic, medieval philosophy [Latin, the conditions under which the parties to a dispute agree to proceed] A form of disputation adopted in medieval universities from the early thirteenth century. It involved a respondent and an opponent. The opponent was obliged to make the respondent concede or deny his initial propositions. On the basis of Aristotle’s discussion of the form of debate in Topics and De Sophistic Elenchus, medieval logicians engaged in various studies concerning the rules of obligationes. Normally, the rules were characterized in terms of the feature of constructive counterfactual reasoning. “Obligationes are obligations assumed by a party to a disputation, or conditions within which such a discussion must be conducted.” Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic oblique intention, see direct intention observation language Epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science Many philosophers divide the language of each branch of the sciences into observation language and theoretical language. Observation language is directly related to sense-impressions and can be analyzed in the standard empirical way. It is characterized by observability, explicit definability, and extensionality. Theoretical language, on the other hand, is not directly related to senseexperience, but talks about unobservable properties and events (for example, atoms, electrons) that are also called theoretical constructs or hypothetical constructs. The terms an observation language employs are called observational terms, and those employed by theoretical language are called theoretical terms. One major issue in the methodology of science is about the relationship between the two kinds of languages. Should theoretical language be translated and replaced by observation language? How can it be done? How can we know that theoretical language is meaningful? What is the ontological status of an item to which a theoretical expression refers? Further discussion of these issues can be found in entries on double language model, Craig’s theorem, Ramsey sentence, and correspondence rules. “The observation language uses terms designating observable properties and relations for the description of observable things or events.” Carnap, “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts,” in Minnesota Studies of the Philosophy of Science, vol. I observation proposition, see basic proposition or protocol sentence observation sentence Epistemology, philosophy of language Observation sentences are a subset of occasion sentences. An occasion sentence is a report about observation, sense-data, or stimulations, but its acceptance relies on the circumstances of its utterance. If an occasion sentence is assented to or dissented from consistently in response to the same stimulation, it is an observation sentence. The verdict of its truth and falsity depends only on present sensory stimulation, although certain stored information that is implied in the expression of the sentence itself is inevitably relevant to determining whether it is true. Hence, an observational sentence is not private, but must be acceptable by the speech community. All speakers of a language give the same verdict when given the same concurrent stimulation. Observation sentences correspond to the protocol sentences of logical positivism, which offered an influential account of the foundations of empirical knowledge. Critics deny that protocol sentences are the basis of empirical knowledge, either because they lack the possibility of being true or false or because empirical knowledge does not need foundations. “A sentence . . . is an observation sentence if all verdicts on it depend on present sensory stimulation and on no stored information beyond what goes into understanding the sentence.” Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays observation term Philosophy of science, epistemology Empiricist philosophy of science has commonly divided the language of science into theoretical language, concerning unobservable entities, properties, and relations, and observation language, concerning items, like sense-impressions, that are claimed to be observable, although “observation” in this sense covers perception, sensation, and even introspection. Observation terms are employed in this observation language to refer to observable items. Each observation term has an explicit and determinate extension and can be displayed in a limited model. According to proponents of this view, observation terms are learned mostly by ostension, with their meaning reinforced by the presence of their objects, with any questions of context or definition irrelevant to understanding them. Observation terms are widely applied to publicly observable bodies as well as to private sensory states. Observation terms can be directly analyzed empirically. In contrast to observation terms, theoretical terms are employed by theoretical language to refer to unobservable or theoretical entities and their features. Philosophers of science disagree whether all theoretical terms can be eliminated from a theory, that is, whether they can be translated into or replaced by observation terms. Some philosophers claim that the distinction between observation terms and theoretical terms can not be maintained because all terms are theory-laden. “In regard to an observational term it is possible, under suitable circumstances, to decide by means of direct observation whether the term does or does not apply to a given situation.” Hempel, “The Theoretician’s Dilemma,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II by negating its predicate term and changing its quality either from affirmative to negative or from negative to affirmative. The conclusion, called the obverse, is a logical equivalent of the premise, called the obvertend. All four forms of proposition in traditional logic can be validly obversed: “All s are p” is obversed into “No s are non-p”; “No s are p” into “All s are non-p”; “Some s are p” into “Some s are not non-p”; and “Some s are not p” into “Some s are non-p.” “Obversion is a process of immediate inference in which the inferred proposition (or obverse), while retaining the original subject, has for its predicate the contradictory of the predicate of the original proposition (or obvertend).” Keynes, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic occasion sentence Philosophy of language, epistemology Quine’s term for sentences whose meanings are relative to their context and which contain indexical words, for example, “It is snowing” or “It is Thursday.” They are true on some occasions of utterance, and false on others. Whether such a sentence is acceptable depends on the background. We should only assent to these sentences when it is indeed snowing or Thursday. The sentence “It is snowing” is more observational than “It is Thursday.” Observation sentences are a subset of occasion sentences. If all speakers assent to an occasion sentence in response to the same stimulations, then it is an observation sentence. Occasion sentences are directly connected with sensory stimulations and are contrasted to standing sentences, which are not relative to context and which have assent by all speakers all the time. Standing sentences are either analytic or statements of a common-sense truism, for example, “Snow is white.” “We must concentrate on occasion sentences. These, as opposed to standing sentences, are sentences whose truth value changes from occasion to occasion, so that a fresh verdict has to be promoted each time.” Quine, Theories and Things obversion Logic In traditional logic, an immediate inference that derives a conclusion from another proposition occasionalism Metaphysics, philosophy of mind A doctrine developed by Descartes’s disciple Malebranche as a solution to the Cartesian mind–body problem. He claimed that the two completely distinct substances, res cogitans and res extensa, can causally interact with each other because of the miraculous intervention of God. God regulates the world so that our volitions are followed by bodily movements, and conversely that certain patterns of bodily movements give rise to appropriate emotions and sensations in the mind. The so-called natural causes are actually occasions on which God acts to produce the effects that usually accompany the natural causes. There is no real causation in the finite created world, no real efficacy of finite causes. Only an infinite substance can be a genuine cause of anything at all. Occasionalism maintained mechanical explanation by grounding it outside the limits of physics proper. This provided a new metaphysical framework. This theory was criticized by Leibniz, who replaced it with his own theory of pre-established harmony. “The occasionalists were a group of 17th century philosophers who maintained that human volitions never really cause bodily movements but are only the occasions for divine intervention in the physical world.” Pap, Elements of Analytical Philosophy Occam’s razor Metaphysics A methodological principle in theory construction associated with the medieval philosopher William of Ockham, although Aristotle suggested it in his criticism of Plato’s Theory of Ideas. The principle states that one should not posit the existence of more entities than are absolutely necessary for adequate philosophical explanation. Accordingly, if two or more theories have the same explanatory force, the one that makes use of the fewest assumptions and explanatory principles should be chosen, other things being equal. Common formulations of this principle are “Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” or “Plurality is never to be posited without need” (Latin Entia non sunt multiplicanda prater necessitate). But this is the invention of the seventeenth century rather than Ockham’s own formulation, which was “It is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer.” Simplicity is the spirit of this principle. The term Ockham’s razor was introduced by Sir William Hamilton, who identified it with the so-called principle of parsimony: nature never works by more complex instruments than are necessary. Ockham’s razor is also called the principle of simplicity or the principle of economy, and has wide application in metaphysical debates. “Ockham’s razor counsels us against an unnecessary luxuriance of principles or laws or statements of existence.” J. Smart, Essays Metaphysical and Moral Oedipus complex Philosophy of mind In Greek myth, Oedipus, acting according to his destiny, killed his father and married his mother. Freud claimed that in the mental life of a male child there is desire for his mother as a sexual object and hatred for his father as a rival. He calls this pattern the “Oedipus complex” and claims that it is a central factor in the child’s experience of his relations to his parents and in his later sexual development. Because the Oedipus complex can lead to later neuroses, Freud sought access to the feelings, images, and relations characterizing the complex in dealing with later problems. The complex itself presents a fundamental tension between sexual drive and the submission to parental authority. It is also claimed to be a source of religion, society, morals, and arts. In girls, the complex is allegedly manifested as a wish to take the mother’s place. Moving beyond the complex in a child is meant to allow acceptance of the values of one’s parents. The dissolution of the complex in society provides defense of authority. “In the very earliest years of childhood (approximately between the ages of two and five) a convergence of the sexual impulses occurs of which, in the case of boys, the object is the mother. This choice of an object, in conjunction with a corresponding attitude of rivalry and hostility towards the father, provides the content of what is known as the Oedipus Complex, which is of the greatest importance in determining the final shape of his erotic life.” Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18 offense, see harm oligarchy Ancient Greek philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of social science [from Greek oligos, few or small] Literally, rule by the few, but for Plato a state ruled by the rich, maybe because the rich are the few most likely to dominate a state. In the Republic, oligarchy is the second stage in the degeneration of the Ideal State, the first stage being timocracy, or rule by the spirited rather than the rational element. Oligarchy is dominated by the appetite for moneymaking, and the unity of the state is fragile because of conflict between the poor and the rich. Parallel to this state, the oligarchic man also lacks internal harmony. He is dominated by the desire for money, and his reason and spirits are forced to work only in the interests of money. Oligarchy is more unjust and more miserable than timocracy and will further degenerate into democracy and tyranny. “Oligarchy is of necessity not one city but two, one of the poor and the other of the rich, living in the same place and always plotting against each other.” Plato, Republic omnipotence Philosophy of religion [from Latin omnis, all + potens, powerful] One of the chief divine attributes. By being all powerful, God has infinite or maximal power and is the ruler of everything. The notion of an all-powerful being has given rise to many logical impossibilities, called the paradoxes of omnipotence. Can God create a rock so large that he cannot move it? If he cannot, he is not omnipotent because there are limits on what he can create. If he can, he is not omnipotent, because there are limits on what he can move. Other questions leading to paradox include “Can God deny God’s essence?” “Can God lie?” “Can God sin?” Some philosophers try to redefine the notion of omnipotence in order to avoid such problems. A deeper philosophical problem emerges from combining divine omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness. How are the claims that God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good compatible with the existence of evil? None of the many responses to this question, such as the claim that evil is due to the fall of the first man or the claim that God permits evil as a means of purifying the soul, has won general approval, but belief in God is often enhanced rather than diminished through experience of evil in the world. “Theists have often wished to claim that God is omnipotent, that is, literally, can do anything.” Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism omniscience Philosophy of religion [from Latin omnis, all + sciens, present participle of scire, to know] One of the chief divine attributes, according to which God is all-knowing or has unlimited knowledge. This attribute gives rise to the paradox of God’s omniscience, a perennial problem concerning freedom of the will. This paradox has two versions. The first concerns God’s omniscience and human freedom. If every future thing happens exactly as God knows it will happen, how is there room for human freedom of the will? This version of the paradox has led philosophers to examine whether God’s foreknowledge of a future human act implies that the human agent lacks control over the act or is not responsible for it. Another version of the paradox concerns God’s omniscience and his own free will. If everything occurs according to complete divine foreknowledge, how can God exercise his own free will? Another problem concerning the scope of divine foreknowledge arises if God is held to have no sensory organs and to exist outside time. It is difficult to understand how God in these circumstances could have knowledge of material and temporal things. “Traditionally, God is said to be omniscient, to know all things.” Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism on [Greek, the participle of being], see ousia one Metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy [Greek hen] Many Greek philosophers argued that their first principles, no matter whether they are one or many, must be at one with themselves and form a unity. Aristotle discussed various meanings of the term one in Metaphysics, book 5. Things might be called one because of accidental features or by their own nature. Of things that are called one in terms of their nature, they might be continuous, have the same substratum, have the same genus, or share the same definition. Things can also be one in number, in species, or in genus. Plotinus called his absolute transcendent first principle the One, and ontological argument identified it with the Good or God. It is the power behind everything, the source of the Divine Mind and Souls (Forms), although the One itself is neither Mind nor Soul. It is beyond being, for if it is a being, it must be describable by a predicate, and that would involve duality and compromise its unity. Therefore, the One can only be understood negatively and is beyond the reach of our thought or language. It is the simple object of intuitive knowledge. Plotinus’ One is based on the Good in Plato’s Republic, and prepared the way for the development of negative theology. “Everywhere the one is indivisible either in quantity or in kind.” Aristotle, Metaphysics one–many problem, see one over many one over many Metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy We can apply one predicate to many different things. How can they be related in this way? According to Plato, a common description suggests that there is a common intrinsic feature or nature shared by these different things that determines their real existence. This common nature is one and the same and stands over many particular things. This is Plato’s “one over many principle.” He called the one common nature Form or Idea and declared that Ideas are objects independent of our minds and that each of the many particulars imitates or participates in their Idea. Ideas are objects of knowledge, while particulars are objects of opinion. The central aim of Plato’s Theory of Ideas is to argue for this principle and to deal with various difficulties arising from it. These difficulties have become the problem of the relation between universals and particulars. The discussion of this problem forms one of the chief issues in Western metaphysics, although it is closely linked to logical questions about meaning and predication. The one over many problem is also called the one–many problem, but this latter expression is also used to ask whether the substance of the world is one or many in the debate between monism and pluralism. “Those who say that the Forms exist, in one respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, if they are substances; but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one over many is a Form.” Aristotle, Metaphysics O’Neill, Onora (1941– ) British Kantian moral and political philosopher, born in Aughafatten, Northern Ireland, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Essex and Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge. O’Neill offers a subtle and complex interpretation of Kant’s moral and political philosophy, which she employs to deal with questions in applied ethics that are often considered only from a utilitarian standpoint. Her understanding of Kant leaves room for communitarian values and for the individual and social cultivation of virtues. Her main works include Acting on Principle (1975), Faces of Hunger (1986), and Constructions of Reason (1989). ontico-ontological distinction Modern European philosophy, metaphysics Heidegger’s distinction, two levels of analysis of Dasein. The ontic level is concerned with the concrete, specific, and local matter of Dasein, that is, the factual matter open to observation, which Heidegger calls existentiell. The ontological level is, on the other hand, concerned with the deep structure that underlies and instantializes the ontical or existentiell matter and provides a phenomenological description. This deep structure is called by Heidegger existentiale. Dasein has three main existentiales, namely existentiality, facticity, and fallingness. The problem of traditional metaphysics is to confuse these two levels by taking being as entity. Heidegger’s own fundamental ontology is both ontical, that is, the analysis of the actual existence of Dasein, and ontological, that is, the analysis of the general conditions of possibility for existence. This is because Dasein itself is both ontical (as an entity), and ontological (the only entity that can ask the question of Being). In these terms, his thought contrasts with Husserl’s phenomenology, which brackets the phenomenon. “By indicating Dasein’s ontico-ontological priority in this provisional manner, we have grounded our demonstration that the question of Being is onticoontologically distinctive.” Heidegger, Being and Time ontological argument Philosophy of religion, metaphysics, logic One of the most celebrated arguments attempting to prove the existence of God. It was first formulated in the eleventh century by Anselm of Canterbury in Proslogion. The argument assumes that God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. If he is thus, God must exist in our understanding. But if he exists in the understanding only and does not exist in reality, a being that is greater than God is conceivable, namely a being that exists both in our understanding and in reality. Since it is a premise of the argument that God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, it is contradictory and logically impossible for us to conceive a being that is greater than God. Therefore, God must exist not only in the understanding, but also in reality. Gaunilo, a contemporary of Anselm, and later figures such as Descartes sought to reject the ontological argument by asserting that similar arguments could prove the existence of absurd things, such as the greatest possible island. Anselm replied that in talking about a thing so great that nothing greater could be conceived, he was making a logical point about greatness rather than a factual point about different kinds of things. Kant proposed the most important objection to the ontological argument with his claim that existence is not a predicate. His view is a major topic of discussion in contemporary philosophical logic. Few philosophers are convinced by the ontological argument, but many find it difficult to overcome. Today there are both opponents and defenders of the argument, and many new versions have been elaborated, with some relying on recent developments in modal logic. The American philosopher Alvin Plantinga argues in this way. It is possible for there to be a being that has maximal greatness. Therefore, a possible being in some world w has maximal greatness. A being has maximal greatness in a given world only if it has maximal excellence in every world. A being has maximal excellence in a given world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in that world. If a being has maximal excellence in every world, it has maximal excellence in this world. If a being has maximal excellence in this world, then it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in this world. But these are the attributes of God, and if a being has these attributes in this world, then that being is God. The ontological argument is so fascinating because it leads into many significant philosophical questions, such as “Is existence a property?,” “Can there be existential propositions that are necessarily true?,” and “What sense of ‘is’ is involved in saying that something does not exist?” The modern versions are more plausible if entities retain their identity across worlds, but are less persuasive if terms designate counterparts from one world to another or if possible worlds and their contents are understood as descriptions rather than as real objects of reference. If these and many other problems are not solved, a proper analysis of the ontological argument will continue to elude us. “Because of the crucial role which the concept of existence or being plays in this argument it has been called the Ontological Argument.” C. Williams, What is Existence? ontological commitment Metaphysics, logic, philosophy of language The use of language commits us to the existence of objects. A person’s ontology comprises the set of objects that he takes to exist and thereby to make up the furniture of the world. Theories differ according to the objects they posit to exist. Ontology is the answer to the question “What is there?” Determining which answer is right amounts to determining what ontological commitments are acceptable. We are thus faced with the problem of finding a criterion for ontological commitment. The famous criterion put forward by Quine concerns the ontological commitments of a theory: a theory is committed to those objects that must exist if it is true and is committed to the existence of entities of a certain kind if and only if they must be counted among the values of its bound variables of quantification in order for the theory to be true. This criterion is a development of Russell’s theory of descriptions, which shows that the occurrence of a singular term in a true statement does not automatically warrant an assertion that the term refers to something real or existent, but that the analysis of the statement into its correct logical form reveals the objects that must exist if the statement is true. “If what we want is a standard for our own guidance in appraising the ontological commitments of one or another of our theories, and in altering those commitments by revision of our theory, then the criterion at hand well suits our purpose.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View ontological guilt, another expression for anguish ontological relativity Metaphysics, philosophy of language One of Quine’s main doctrines, which holds that there are no absolute facts according to which we may determine the ontological commitments of a theory. There is no determinate answer either to the question “What is there?” or to the question “What objects is one really talking about?” The ontological import of a theory can only make sense relative to a translation or an interpretation of some background theory or language; and this background theory is itself relative to some further translation into another theory. An ontological question, if taken absolutely, is meaningless. To answer “What is F?” we have to say “An F is a G.” But then we can ask: “What is G?” We always need further terms in relation to which we can again ask or answer questions. The regress can only be stopped when we ultimately accept some background theory at face value. Hence, a full interpretation of a theory is nothing more than a complete translation of the theory into another theory, using a manual of translation that is essentially inscrutable and indeterminate. This relativity thesis is a radical departure from a basic assumption held by many analytic philosophers, including Carnap and the early Wittgenstein, that we can start with absolute talk about the structure, meaning, or content of linguistic expressions. Ontological relativity implies not only that reality itself is indeterminate, but also that the conceptual import of our language in talking about reality is similarly incomplete and indeterminate. Carnap’s distinction between external questions that deal with linguistic structures and internal questions that deal with facts collapses if this thesis is accepted, because external questions themselves become relative and factual. “Paraphrase in some antecedently familiar vocabulary, then, is our only recourse; and such is ontological relativity.” Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays ontology Metaphysics [from Greek logos, theory + ont, being] The Latin term ontologia was introduced in the seventeenth century for a branch of metaphysics to be distinguished from other branches, namely rational theology, rational cosmology, and rational psychology. Christian Wolff did much to gain acceptance for the term. As the theoretical or general part of metaphysics and as the general theory of being, ontology is often used for metaphysics as a whole. Ontology deals with the essential characteristics of being itself (of Aristotle’s being qua being), and asks questions such as “What is or what exists?,” “What kind of thing exists primarily?” and “How are different kinds of being related to one another?” The investigation of the meaning of being began with Parmenides and received a systematic discussion in Aristotle. In this century, Heidegger and Quine have taken completely different approaches to ontology. Heidegger asks what character being must have if human consciousness is to be what it is. Quine proposes his maxim “To be is to be the value of a bound variable” to determine what things a theory claims to exist. His doctrine of ontological relativity suggests that what we can take to exist is relative to the theory and language that we bring to the situation. “The use of the term ‘ontology’ to refer to metaphysics appears in early modern philosophy and is still with us. Indeed, many contemporary metaphysicians speak of their discipline as ontology.” Gracia, Metaphysics and Its Task open concept, see open texture open-question argument Ethics Moore’s argument against naturalism in Principia Ethica. Naturalism, in his understanding, defines “good” or other ethical terms by reference to natural or non-ethical qualities. If such a procedure were right, he argues, then the statement “Whatever is F (some natural property) is good” would be identical with the statement “Whatever is F is F.” But this is not the case. For “Whatever is F is F” is a tautology and its denial involves self-contradiction, while “Whatever is F is good” remains open to question. Whatever natural properties a naturalist uses to define “good,” we can still ask, “Are these natural properties good?” A negative answer to such a question will not involve self-contradiction. Hence this kind of statement is not really a definition of “good,” and naturalism is wrong. Moore claims that “good” is indefinable. This argument is a subject of controversy, for it is not generally accepted that the definition of an ethical term must be analytic. Further, not all forms of naturalism require that “good” is definable by the natural properties that turn out to be good. Also, if the meaning of an ethical term does not require definition, then ruling out a definition does not render the term indefinable. The nature and philosophical role of definition more generally can be called into question in assessing the argument. “Moore’s most important suggestion was the proposal of what has been called the ‘open question’ test or criterion for sameness of meaning.” Brandt, Ethical Theory open sentence Logic, philosophy of language A formula that has one or more free variables, in contrast to a closed sentence, which is a formula that has no free variable. When the variables in an open sentence are replaced by ordinary expressions or attached to quantifiers, it becomes a genuine or closed sentence. For instance, “X is mortal” is an open sentence. If we replace “X” with “Socrates,” we have a closed sentence, “Socrates is mortal.” If we attach “X” to an existential quantifier, we have a closed sentence “∃X, X is mortal.” Open sentences are sentential or propositional functions rather than sentences or propositions themselves, and hence are neither true nor false. An open sentence is true or false according to the values of its variables. The extension of an open sentence is the class of all the objects of which the open sentence is true. A closed sentence, on the other hand, has a truth-value and is, or can be, used to make a statement. “Expressions such as ‘X is a book’, ‘X = X’, ‘X is a man ⊃ x is mortal’, which are like statements except for containing ‘X’ without a quantifier, are called ‘open sentences’.” Quine, Methods of Logic open society Political philosophy, philosophy of social science The distinction between an open society and a closed society was first proposed by Bergson, but Popper gave the term its current importance. Members of an open society are autonomous individuals who can decide on the basis of their own intelligence what to do. Members compete fairly for social positions. In contrast, a closed society is authoritarian or totalitarian, and its members do not have a free choice over what to do. A closed society is supported by an ideology that functions like a magical taboo, while an open society is rational and critical. Liberal democratic society is an example of an open society, while the Platonic ideal state is a typical closed society. “The magical or tribal or collectivist society will also be called the closed society; the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society.” Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies open texture Philosophy of language, philosophy of law A term introduced by Friedrich Waismann in“Verifiability” for an unavoidable feature of empirical terms or statements. An empirical term, no matter how precise its core meaning, faces unlimited uncertainties of meaning when its dominant reference is extended or when it is employed in different contexts. The number of possible conditions in which it may be used is infinite. In the face of such open texture, Waismann concluded that no final verifiability is available for empirical statements. Open texture is the possibility of vagueness, because vagueness arises when a word is actually used in a fluctuating way while open texture exists because there are always possible gaps in determining the meaning of a term. The term is used widely in legal philosophy for the particular cases in which a legal rule, although having a core of settled meaning, is unclear regarding what it prescribes or prohibits. No clean-cut conceptual boundary is provided in these cases, and consequently general legal rules are limited in their capacity to determine decisions and must be supplemented by judicial discretion. H. L. A. Hart took this feature of legal rules as an instrument for the criticism of legal formalism. The notion of an open concept, which is derived from open texture, is a concept that has an incomplete intension and needs to be modified in order to deal with unforeseen situations. It does not admit of a precise definition. The necessary and sufficient conditions of its application are not fixed. An open concept is not a vague concept but is the basis of the possibility of vagueness. Such concepts can be extended or modified, but they cannot be replaced by concepts that are not open. All concepts displaying what Wittgenstein called family resemblance are open concepts. “Open texture, then, is something like possibility of vagueness.” Waismann, in Flew (ed.), Logic and Language (first series) operational definition Philosophy of science A definition of a theoretical term formed by constructing a set of performable operations or activities. A conception of an object is the sum of our ideas of the observable consequences of this object disclosed by operations. This idea can be traced back to Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and is a type of definition articulated by Bridgman as the central doctrine of operationism. A scientific term can be meaningful only when it can be defined operationally. The claim, to a certain extent, is a generalization of the working practice of scientists. “[O]perational definitions [are] statements specifying the meanings of theoretical terms with the help of observational ones.” Hempel, “The Theoretician’s Dilemma,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II operationalism, another term for operationism operationism Philosophy of science, philosophy of mind [from Latin operari, work] Also called operationalism, a theory first proposed in physics by P. W. Bridgman, and then applied to other fields. It holds that things and their properties, powers, and interactions, as the subject-matter of science, should be understood in terms of operations that scientists perform. Scientific knowledge is knowledge of operations, and the meaning of scientific terms is established in terms of a description of a set of operations, that is, in terms of operational definitions. To be operationally meaningful, a statement must be confirmable at least in principle. This theory denies the distinction between theory and evidence. In the final analysis, a scientific theory is connected to operations that are empirically rooted. As a movement within the philosophy of science, it is closely linked with logical positivism. The application of this theory to the field of psychology led to the emergence of behaviorism. A major difficulty is that it cannot guarantee that the experiments or selected operations are scientifically valuable or that the meaning of a term remains the same if it is approached from more than one experimental direction. “The principle of operationism says that a term is empirically meaningful only if an operational definition can be given for it.” Carnap, “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I operator, see logical constant O-proposition, see A-proposition optimism Philosophy of religion, ethics, philosophy of history [from Latin optimus, the best] A French term (optimisme) referring to Leibniz’s claim in Theodicy that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds because God who created it is the most perfect being. More generally, optimism is a positive and hopeful attitude toward things and the future, involving the claim that in the long run things are getting better. Optimism is contrasted to pessimism, which holds that this world is radically imperfect or that the future will be worse than the present. Schopenhauer’s thought is the most important example of pessimism in philosophy. “I cannot here withhold the statement that optimism, whether it is not merely the thoughtless talk of those who harbour nothing but words under their absurd, but also a really wicked, way of thinking, is a bitter mockery of the unspeakable sufferings of mankind.” Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation ordinary language Philosophy of language Everyday and nontechnical language as an object of philosophical investigation. It can be distinguished from natural language, a term for actual human languages as studied in the philosophy of language and linguistics. Language has been a central concern of twentiethcentury philosophy. Some philosophers believe that ordinary language is defective and must be replaced by a rigorously reconstructed language or grammatical system (an ideal language), while others argue that we should rather seek to understand the logical diversity and complexity of ordinary language and its correct use to deal with philosophical problems. It holds that a replacement for ordinary language is unnecessary and impossible. This difference in attitude has led to a major division in analytical philosophy between ideal language philosophy, represented by Russell and Carnap, and ordinary language philosophy, represented by Moore, the later Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Austin. “Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word.” Austin, Philosophical Papers ordinary language philosophy Philosophical method A kind of linguistic philosophy, originating with criticism of the ideal language philosophy of Russell, certain interpretations of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, and logical positivism. Ideal language philosophy claims that we need an artificial language to be a suitable vehicle for philosophical reasoning, with a view to solving the philosophical perplexities caused by the unsystematic, irregular, and imperfect nature of ordinary language. Ordinary language philosophy believes that the creation of an ideal language to replace ordinary language is unnecessary or impossible. Rather, we must pay close attention to the meanings, categories, implications, grammatical or logical forms, functions, uses, and distinctions of ordinary language. This approach to philosophy was pioneered by Moore and practiced in varying ways by the later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hare, Austin, and Strawson. Because this approach to philosophy was fully developed in Oxford, it also became known as Oxford philosophy. According to Strawson, we must uncover the nature of linguistic structure as it has traditionally been presented. Ordinary language presupposes a structure of reality, and hence an investigation of that language is a fruitful means of understanding what the extra-linguistic world may really be like. This is the essence of his descriptive metaphysics. Ordinary language philosophy emphasizes in particular the problems that have arisen from the use of linguistic expressions. This dimension was developed in Austin’s speech act theory. “Ordinary language philosophers saw the task of linguistic philosophy to lie in the clarification of the ordinary concepts that give rise to philosophical puzzles.” Katz, Linguistic Philosophy Organon Logic [Greek, instrument or tool] The title given to the collection of Aristotle’s logical works by sixthcentury commentators rather than by Aristotle himself. These logical works include the Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistic Elenchi. These works do not form an organic whole and were composed at different dates. The reason for naming them collectively derived from Aristotle’s view that logic is not a part of science, but is rather an instrument of thought. “Logical matters have the place of a tool (Organon) in philosophy.” Alexander of Aphrodisias, Topics original apperception, see apperception, transcendental original choice, an alternative expression for fundamental project original position Political philosophy, ethics A hypothetical bargaining situation postulated by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, in which the basic structure of just society can be rationally chosen. Each participant in the original position acts under two conditions. The first condition limits their knowledge through a veil of ignorance. Participants are ignorant of the circumstances of their society and their position in them, their particular talents, and their special interests. The second condition is motivational – participants are rational and mutually self-interested. They are not altruistic and do not have substantive moral sentiments. In addition, there are some formal constraints upon the principles to be chosen. They must be formulated in general terms that avoid proper names and hold for a well-ordered society in perpetuity; they must be universal and hold for everyone in the society throughout their lives; they must be open to public knowledge; they must be capable of ordering competing claims; and they must provide the highest and final court of appeal for claims. ostensive definition According to Rawls, the principles chosen in the original position will be the principles of justice, partly because the original position is intended to achieve ideal impartiality and partly because the principles selected will cohere with our intuitive notion of justice. The original position can be viewed as a procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative. All agents in that position are free, equal, and rational beings who are autonomous because they choose the law themselves. The original position differs from the state of nature in classical social contract theory because it is a device to give us insight into our moral and political thinking rather than an exercise in historical speculation. If an agreement on principles is not reached in the original position, we remain in our imperfect and imperfectly understood society. In classical social contract theory, the participants would return to the state of nature. “The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principle agreed to will be just.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice original sin Philosophy of religion A Judeo-Christian doctrine. According to the Bible, the common ancestors of all human beings, Adam and Eve, could not resist the temptation of the devil and broke the divine injunction not to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Hence they committed original sin and lost the favor of God. Psalms 51:5 says: “I was brought forth in inequity, and in sin did my mother conceive me” (cf. Genesis 3, Romans 5:21). This sin has been transmitted to all the descendants of Adam and Eve and is therefore shared by them all, although the precise method of this transmission has been a subject of dispute among theologians. This official doctrine of original sin is essential for the Catholic Church, for it justifies the need to have grace for redemption, the need for the sacrament of baptism, and the justification of eternal punishment for those who are not saved. It is, however, unclear whether this is a personal guilt on the part of each individual or each individual’s share of a defective human nature. The doctrine is criticized as being inconsistent with God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and his absolute goodness, for it must be God who created the Devil, and God must have had foreknowledge that Adam would be tempted. Critics ask why God did not help Adam to overcome this temptation. It is also cruel for God to multiply Adam’s sin throughout humanity. Philosophically, the doctrine might be regarded as a confession of the natural inadequacy of human beings and our inability to lead perfectly virtuous lives. The enduring power of the account of original sin lies more in the biblical narrative and in our recognition of our own imperfection than with the philosophical argument. “Original sin consists in human nature being left to itself by the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God has bestowed on men’s creation.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ortega y Gasset, José (1883–1955) Spanish existentialist philosopher, born in Madrid, Professor of Metaphysics at the University of Madrid. The conception of vital reason at the center of Ortega’s attempt to reconcile idealism and realism places us in contact with reality, including the everpresent danger of catastrophe. He distinguished between oneself and one’s life and enjoined us to live an authentic life as a drama in which we recognize that we lack a fixed identity. His politics were aristocratic, and he claimed that the masses lacked the creativity and vision to make a success of revolution. His major works include Meditations on Quixote (1912) and The Rebellion of the Masses (1930). ostensive definition Logic, philosophy of language The term, introduced by W. E. Johnson in his Logic in 1921, was discussed in detail by Russell, Wittgenstein, and the logical positivists. An ostensive definition proceeds by simply pointing to something or showing actual examples of the thing being defined, as we usually do when we teach a child. For example, we point to a house and say, “The word ‘house’ means this.” There are three factors in this kind of definition: a demonstrative term, a deictic (pointing) gesture, and a sample of what the word designates. For Wittgenstein, an ostensive definition only answers the question “What is that called?” and does not settle how a term will be used in the future. It therefore does not fix the meaning of a term at all. For a private ostensive definition, I seemingly could concentrate my attention on a particular sensation and associate it with a particular sign. The problem is that the sign must be defined in terms of our public language, but in a private ostensive definition it can only be used to name the sensation for myself alone. Wittgenstein denied the possibility of a private ostensive definition as part of his rejection of the possibility of a private language. “It is obvious that an ostensive definition must depend upon experience.” Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth ostensive proposition Epistemology Ayer’s term for a kind of proposition that other logical positivists held to be the direct record of an immediate experience and therefore to have self-evident validity. These propositions are taken to be purely demonstrative in character and cannot be refuted by further evidence. Instead, they are the ultimate foundation for determining the validity of other empirical propositions. Ayer himself denies the existence of ostensive propositions, for if a proposition is ostensive, it must consist of purely demonstrative symbols. As a consequence, it would merely name a situation without describing anything about it. Such a sentence cannot be a genuine proposition and cannot even be expressed. “But a proposition would be ostensive only if it recorded what was immediately experienced, without referring in any way beyond.” Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic Other, the Modern European philosophy, ontology, ethics, political philosophy In phenomenological philosophy since Husserl, humans other than the subject, self, or ego. The self’s relation to the Other gives rise to the problem of one’s knowledge of other minds that is also discussed in analytical philosophy, but issues concerning the Other in ontology, ethics, and political philosophy have come to be considered more fundamental. Emmanuel Levinas argued that the possibility of ethics rests on respecting the absolute altereity or otherness of the Other rather than reducing the Other to an object of consciousness. Our ability to satisfy this radical demand depends on our understanding of how we can think an altereity that transcends our categories of thought. The Other presents problems of separation, opposition, and alienation. In broader cultural terms, death, madness, and the unconscious have been called the Other because they fall outside the model of rational self-consciousness. The notion of the Other has been embraced in anthropology, post-colonial philosophy, and feminism in an attempt to undermine the entrenched conceptual priority of the metropolitan culture and the male. “The absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not form a number. The collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not a plural of the ‘I’.” Levinas, Totality and Infinity other minds Philosophy of mind If one can have direct knowledge only of one’s own mental states, it is a serious philosophical question how and what we can know about other minds, that is, whether other persons have minds and what other persons are thinking and feeling. Descartes saw free and intelligent action, especially in the use of language, inexplicable without the actor having a mind. A prominent traditional account relies on an argument by analogy. We may find correlations between our own physical behavior and our own psychological or mental states. The knowledge of these correlations can be used as inductive evidence, so that if we observe similar physical behavior exhibited by another person, we can infer ultimately by appeal to our own experience, that he has a certain kind of mental state. The conclusion thus inferred is not secure, for physical resemblance does not logically entail mental resemblance, the inductive base is very small, and we can never check to see if our inference is sound. This argument is criticized for example by behaviorists, who argue that if psychophysical relationships are contingent, then one cannot even establish a correlation between bodily states and mental states. Wittgenstein’s rejection of the possibility of a private language has challenged the basis of the argument by analogy, and for some philosophers it has undermined the problem of other minds itself. “Let us begin with the problem of other minds. How can we know another person is in pain, or thrilled, or overcome with emotion, or thinking about philosophy?” Nozick, Philosophical Explanations other-regarding, see self-regarding Otto, Rudolf (1869–1937) German neo-Kantian philosopher of religion, born in Peine, Hanover. In his most influential work, The Idea of the Holy (1917), Otto examined “the numinous” as the awe-inspiring and overpowering object of human religious experience. He classified religious feeling as numinous feeling and claimed that it has two aspects: a feeling of religious dread and a feeling of religious fascination. He provided a variety of phenomenological descriptions of numinous feeling and distinguished these from descriptions of aesthetic and moral feelings. His other important books include Naturalism and Religion (1904) and Mysticism East and West (1926). ought Ethics [related to owe, suggesting that something that is not being done should be done] A general word used in moral discourse as the principal expression of obligation and duty. Many moral philosophers consider “I ought to . . .” to be identical in meaning to “I am obligated to . . . ” Major issues surround the notion of ought. Is there a kind of “ought” which is specifically moral and, if so, how does it relate to other kinds of “ought”? What is the relation between ought and is? In particular, can evaluative claims about what we ought to do be derived solely from factual claims? Does ought imply can or are there things which we ought to attempt to do even if we know that we shall fail? Is the moral “ought” independent of other motives to action, such as sympathy or self-interest, and is the moral worth of what we do spoiled if we act on these other motives rather than through a recognition of the authority of this “ought”? The analysis of ought-statement is one of the main topics of prescriptivism. “If the analysis of ‘ought’ which I have just sketched bears any close relation to the use of ‘ought’ in ordinary language, it shows how it is that moral judgements provide reasons for acting in one way rather than another.” Hare, The Language of Morals ought implies can Ethics A formula in Kant’s ethics, meaning that correctly judging that a given agent is morally obliged to perform a certain action logically presupposes that the agent can perform it. He can perform it not just if he wants, prefers, or wills to, but in some absolute sense. This capacity is a categorical freedom in contrast to the hypothetical freedom defended by Hume and others, for it is freedom both to do and to forbear doing a certain action under the same set of conditions. “Perhaps all that the formula ‘ought implies can’ means is that it would be pointless to issue an imperative if it were impossible that the imperative should be obeyed.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy ousia Ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics [Greek, substance, essence, entity, reality, from ousa, the singular feminine participle of einai, to be; the term is closely linked to on, the neutral participle of einai] Although Plato used on and ousia synonymously, Aristotle classified different kinds of being and used ousia for on (being) in its first sense, namely, ultimate reality. In the Categories, Aristotle defined ousia as the ultimate subject that underlies everything else. According to this test, a sensible individual is primary ousia, while species and genus are secondary ousiai. In the Metaphysics, ousia is the focal meaning of being, but it is divided into form, matter, and the composite of matter and form. If ousia were still determined by the subject criterion, matter would be the primary subject and hence primary ousia. But Aristotle held this to be impossible, and presented the separation (independent existence) of substance and its status as a this (tode ti) as more important criteria for deciding what is ousia. According to these new criteria, form is ousia in the primary sense, with composites of form and matter being ousia in a derivative sense. Species and genus, which are secondary ousia in the Categories, are rejected as ousiai in the Metaphysics. This has given rise to the problem of explaining the relation between form and the universal. To search for primary ousia is tantamount to searching for primary being. Aristotle emphasized the central position of ousia in the network of categories. All other categories depend on ousia for their existence, and ousia is prior to them in time, knowledge, and definition. Thus, Aristotle claimed in the Metaphysics Z that the study of being can be reduced to the study of ousia (ousiology). Ousiology has come to be used for describing Aristotle’s mature view of ontology. Ousia is generally translated as substance as a consequence of Boethius’ influential medieval commentary on the Categories, in which ousia and subject coincide. But this translation is unsatisfactory because substance has no etymological connection with ousia. Moreover, the translation does not really fit with the doctrine of ousia in the Metaphysics. Alternative English translations of ousia include essence, entity, and reality. “It follows, then, that ‘ousia’ has two senses, (a) the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and that which, being a ‘this’, is also separated – and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing.” Aristotle, Metaphysics ousiology, see ousia outer sense, see inner sense overman, an English translation of Übermensch Owen, G(wilym) E(llis) L(ane) (1922–82) British philosopher of ancient Greek philosophy, born in Portsmouth, Professor at University of Oxford, Harvard University, and University of Cambridge. Owen exerted great influenced in the modern study of ancient Greek philosophy by combining scholarly acumen with a philosophical appreciation of method and argument that extended to contemporary controversies. His discussions of Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle’s Platonism, and Aristotle’s conception of dialectic are central to an appreciation of the importance of his work. His major works include Logic, Science and Dialectic (1986). owl of Minerva Philosophical method, philosophy of history Minerva was the Roman goddess of wisdom, and her companion the owl was traditionally regarded as being wise. In his preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel used the owl of Minerva, which flies only at dusk, as a metaphor for the nature of philosophy. It implies that philosophy is essentially retrospective and can provide understanding of a stage of reality only after it has occurred. This claim challenges the view that we have a universal capacity to know, independent of our context as subjects of knowledge. “When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy’s grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only within the falling of the dusk.” Hegel, Philosophy of Right ownership Political philosophy, philosophy of law, philosophy of mind In political and legal philosophy, a relationship of absolute or limited control between persons and property. We can ask about the origin of ownership and about its legitimacy. We can argue that ownership should be governed by rules of licit acquisition and transmission or by rules of fair distribution. As part of a general exploration of rights, we can examine whether ownership rights are absolute or relative to other social concerns. We can explore the claim that some things should not be owned or the claim that persons, if they may be owned at all, should be the subject of selfownership. We can examine whether other social relations, including relations between parents and children or between persons and social or political institutions, can be understood in terms of ownership. We can ask whether we own our actions and the actions of those whom we authorize to represent us in institutions. Ownership has been extended to examine our relations, as persons or bodies, to our mental states and to explore the claim that our bodies are our own. An investigation of ownership in this domain leads to questions about the nature of persons and about the mind–body relationship. Different accounts of causal relations between mental events and bodily events carry different justifications for our ownership of our mental states. Although in the following views ownership of our mental states is ascribed to ourselves as bodies, the mind–body relations that are discussed can also offer a necessary basis for ascribing ownership to ourselves as persons. According to interactionism, a body owns mental states if there is a particular sort of interaction between them. For epiphenomenalism, a body owns mental states if events in the body are the main or only cause of events in the mind. For double-aspect theory, mental states are owned by a body because a mind and a body are different aspects of the same basic entity and are not causally distinct from one another. For parallelism, there is a parallel relationship between mental and bodily states, with ownership related to this association rather than to causal priority. According to the identity theory of mind, mental states are owned by the body that has brain states that are identical to those mental states. All of these theories, which link mental states to bodies, conflict with a no-ownership theory, which denies that mental phenomena must belong to a certain person or to a certain body. Hume’s bundle theory of mind implies that mental items are not necessarily owned by the mind to which they belong because the mind is an accidental collection or bundle of such items, but other philosophers reject the possibility of mental states that do not belong to a subject or person. The questions of what makes my body mine and how I know that my body is mine require an understanding of the place of our bodies in our being subjects and agents. “Let us name the relation which everybody speaks of in this way by calling a certain body his own, the relation of ownership.” Wisdom, Problems of Mind and Matter Oxford philosophy Philosophical method Philosophy has been studied and taught at Oxford since the thirteenth century, and, from as early as the fourteenth century, Oxford has contributed eminent philosophers such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham were students of Oxford. From the nineteenth century to the first part of the twentieth century, Oxford has contributed John Henry Newman, Joseph Butler, John Cook Wilson, H. A. Prichard, and R. G. Collingwood, among others. However, “Oxford philosophy” as a technical term refers to a distinct approach to analytical philosophy that flourished at Oxford after the Second World War. It places emphasis on clarifying perennial philosophical problems in terms of the analysis of ordinary language, and is in contrast to logical positivism and the Russellian strand of philosophy in Cambridge. This approach started with H. H. Price and Gilbert Ryle, although it is related to the work of G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein’s later work in Cambridge. It was further articulated in distinctive ways by J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. It made Oxford the dominant center of analytical philosophy from the 1940s to the 1960s, and is also called ordinary language philosophy. Other contemporary Oxford philosophers include H. L. A. Hart, A. J. Ayer, G. E. M. Anscombe, P. Foot, H. P. Grice, G. E. L. Owen, M. A. E. Dummett, B. A. O. Williams, D. F. Pears, R. M. Hare, Charles Taylor, and Ronald Dworkin. But these philosophers have different approaches, and some would vigorously reject being classed as Oxford philosophers in the above sense. Oxford is still a major center of philosophy today and is the birthplace of this dictionary. “During the last quarter of a century Oxford has occupied, or reoccupied, a position it last held, perhaps, six hundred years ago: that of a great centre of philosophy in the Western world.” Strawson, Logico-Linguistic Papers pacifism Political philosophy [from Latin pacificare, to make or be at peace] A position that objects to war as a means to achieve national aims or to solve disputes. More broadly, it objects to any sort of killing and violence. It claims that even the use of force to meet force is wrong and that nobody may use force without specific overriding justification. Pacifism advocates cooperation and negotiation and actively encourages activities promoting peace. Absolute pacifism holds that war and violence are intrinsically wrong and cannot possibly be justified. Critics argue that pacifists fail to distinguish between aggression and legitimate national defense in a just war, and fail to distinguish between intentional harming or killing and legitimate individual self-defense. Many forms of pacifism are conditional, in that they claim that war and violence are prima facie wrong, but allow that wrong to be overridden. In this respect, they approach their rival theory of a just war. “A. J. P. Taylor coined the word pacifism as a general descriptive term designed to cover all the different attempts made (for any reason) to abolish war, and we can contrast this idea with that of pacifism proper, which involves being against a war on more than merely pragmatic grounds. Pacifism proper involves a moral judgement and a personal commitment.” Teichman, Pacifism and the Just War paideia Ancient Greek philosophy, ethics [Greek, education, from pais, child] In ancient Greece, paideia included mousike (mainly literature and song) and gymnastics. Moral education trained a youth by habituation until he acquired the right habits, that is, the right patterns of action. Education was not confined to children and youth, for adults were held to need it as well to become as virtuous as possible. “What will this paideia be? . . . It is in part physical training for the body and training in the arts for the soul.” Plato, Republic pain Philosophy of mind Either physical or mental suffering that is generally regarded to be a negative feeling. The main tenet of hedonism is that it is human nature to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain. However, philosophers have been puzzled by the nature of this feeling. Wittgenstein sought to show that pain is not a private sensation expressed by a private language that can be understood only by oneself. In order to be used in a public language, expressions for pain must have meanings for which there are public criteria given in the outward expression of pain. Other philosophers reject the criterial account in favor of reducing pain to pain behavior. This behaviorist move is rejected by the identity theory, which identifies pain with neurological processes. On the basis of his account of meaning and identity, Kripke argues that because we can describe a world in which pain states and accompanying physical states are not identical, they are not identical in the actual world. Some philosophers ask why we would wish to avoid pain on accounts that do not give central consideration to its raw qualitative feel. Scholars also debate over whether there is a common and intrinsic quality shared by all token feelings of pain. “The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain, but not to say it about myself.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations Paine, Thomas (1737–1809) English revolutionary and political thinker, born in Thetford. Paine supported the American Revolution and offered an intellectual defense of the French Revolution against Edmund Burke’s powerful attack. He also opposed clerical authority with an enlightened deism and proposed a radical agenda of social and economic reform, including proposals for the eradication of poverty. His main works include The Rights of Man (1791–2) and The Age of Reason (1794–5). panentheism Philosophy of religion [from Greek pan, all + en, in + theos, god] The view that all things are imbued with God’s being through being parts of God or Absolute Being. Because on this view God extends beyond all that there is in the world, panentheism rejects the pantheist claim that God is identical with the totality of things. Rather, God is consciousness and the highest possible unity. This position was developed by the German philosopher Karl Christian Krause by combining Spinoza’s notion of substance and Fichte’s notion of self-consciousness. Whitehead also used this term in his process theology. “Pantheism is the view that all is God, while panentheism occupies a position midway between theism and pantheism. For panentheists, while it is not strictly true that everything is God, everything is lodged or embedded within God, making the two interdependent.” Taliaferro, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy panosomatism, another term for reism panpsychism Metaphysics, philosophy of religion [from Greek pan, all + psyche, soul] The view that everything in the universe, including things that we ordinarily regard as not living, possesses a mental aspect or level of consciousness, although this does not imply that each thing has a mind or soul like our own. The universe as a whole is considered to be alive, with the character of an animated organism. God is described as being completely immanent in all things as a psychic force or spirit. Panpsychism is also called animism, hylozoism (from Greek hule, matter + zoe, life), or mentalism. In spite of the difficulty of accepting panpsychism’s explanation of mental aspects, the theory has been endorsed by some thinkers who find greater difficulty in alternative explanations of how mental phenomena can be caused by non-mental things. Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Schelling, and Whitehead offer different forms of panpsychism. “By panpsychism I mean the view that the basic physical constituents of the universe have mental properties, whether or not they are parts of living organisms.” T. Nagel, Mortal Questions pantheism Philosophy of religion [from Greek pan, all + theos, god] A term originated by John Toland for the belief that God is identical with the universe, that is, with the totality of all there is, rather than being a supernatural power above or alongside the universe. Because God is the universe taken as a whole, no divine act of creation is required and the distinction between God and his creatures, sharply drawn in Christianity, is denied. All is God, and God is all. Everything in the universe is a mode or element of God. The claim that the divine is all-inclusive distinguishes pantheism from panentheism, which holds that God includes all things but is greater than their totality. The most important pantheist was Spinoza, who offered sophisticated arguments to support the claim that there is only one substance and that this substance can be understood as God or nature. Hegel was also a pantheist in virtue of his identification of God with the whole of Being. “Pantheism applies the term ‘God’ in such a way that nothing positive can be distinct from him. God is considered wholly immanent within the universe, and the universe – in so far as it has being – is identical with God.” Ferré, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion paradigm Ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of science [from Greek paradeigma, model, pattern] Plato describes Forms as paradigms to which particular objects have a likeness or resemblance, and to which we must look in order to acquire knowledge. In the Republic it is said that the ideal state might be a paradigm laid up in the heaven; in another dialogue, the Timaeus, Forms are paradigms by reference to which the divine craftsman constructs the sensible world. In the twentieth century, the American philosopher Thomas Kuhn in his classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), employs the word “paradigm” to refer to a framework of concepts, assumptions, and approaches within which members of a scientific community conduct their research. When a paradigm has to be changed or shifted, there comes a scientific revolution. “Close historical investigation of a given speciality at a given time discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications. These are the community’s paradigms, revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises.” Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions paradigm case argument: A challenge to skepticism regarding the existence of such things as the external world, free will, valid inductive arguments, certainty, or time. The paradigm case argument claims that if we have learned to use a referring expression for which typical or paradigmatic referents have become the meaning of that expression, then such an expression refers in standard cases to genuine existents. Our ability to employ a certain type of expression in ordinary speech is proof that it has application. Accordingly, if words such as “table” and “chair” are in common use, there must be physical objects. Similarly, the fact that words such as “choose” and “decide” are in common use shows the existence of free will. This argument, influenced by Wittgenstein’s account of language games, had wide appeal in the 1950s and 1960s. The argument was criticized because different ways of teaching an expression might involve different, and perhaps conflicting, paradigms. Many philosophers are dissatisfied with conformity to linguistic norms as the mark of truth. Accordingly, the argument is currently little used. “The argument which we have been discussing has come to be known as the argument from paradigm cases. It is used as a weapon against philosophical scepticism in the interest of common sense.” Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays paradigm shift Philosophy of science In contrast to the traditional view that science is cumulative in the gradual increase of its empirical content within a stable framework, Kuhn explained scientific change in terms of revolutionary shifts in scientific paradigms, as well as in terms of work carried out within a paradigm in periods of normal science. A paradigm, in Kuhn’s sense, has two dimensions. First, it is a set of beliefs, values, techniques, practices, and examples of explanatory success shared by a scientific community within a social and institutional context. Secondly, a paradigm is the model or explanatory framework that normal sciences apply to solve problems. However, the scope of any given paradigm is limited. Once there is an accumulation of outstanding problems that cannot be solved within a paradigm, a scientific community goes into crisis. In response to the crisis, a new paradigm will emerge. The new paradigm is better than its predecessor because it can formulate new problems and set procedures for solving the existing accumulation of outstanding problems. Scientific revolutions happen when scientists reject an old paradigm and replace it with a new one. Because a new paradigm involves fundamental shifts in concepts, theoretical structures, and scientific practices, the old and new paradigms are incommensurable. Hence scientific revolution is equivalent to paradigm shift. The replacement of a paradigm by another is also informed by political and social development. “What seems to have been involved was the exploitation by genius of perceptual possibilities made available by a medieval paradigm shift.” Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in which they are embedded. Various paradoxes are recorded in this dictionary under their particular names. “A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises.” Sainsbury, Paradoxes paradox Logic [from Greek para, beyond + doxa, belief ] Literally, something which is against the generally accepted view or something which looks implausible but implies a philosophical challenge. In logic, a paradox is a contradictory position arising from sound premises or sound proof. In this sense, it is a synonym for an antinomy. Medieval logicians called paradoxes insolubilia. In ancient Greece, Zeno of Elea and the Megarians invented a number of interesting paradoxes, but paradoxes became the focus of modern philosophical concern after the discovery of Russell’s paradox, which posed fundamental issues of philosophical method and principles. Russell’s paradox gave rise to a crisis in Frege’s logicist program, and the intellectual advance of the program depended upon overcoming this paradox. Generally, following Peano and Ramsey, paradoxes are divided into two main types: semantic paradoxes and logical paradoxes (or set-theoretical paradoxes). Semantic paradoxes, such as the liar paradox, Berry’s paradox, Richard’s paradox, and Grelling’s paradox, arise because of some peculiarity of semantic concepts, such as truth, falsity, and definability. Logical paradoxes, such as Russell’s paradox, Burali-Forti’s paradox, and Cantor’s paradox, arise because of some peculiarity of set-theoretical concepts and due to faulty logic and mathematics. Such a distinction is not without controversy. Russell, for instance, claimed that all paradoxes arise because of violations of the vicious circle principle. The general solution of semantic paradoxes involves replacing ordinary language with artificially constructed language. The general procedure for solving logical paradoxes involves restricting set-existence principles. But both of these types of solutions have been contested. Recent work in paraconsistent logic seeks to tolerate some paradoxes while preventing ruinous consequences for the systems paradox of confirmation, another expression for Hempel’s paradox paradox of God’s omniscience, see omniscience paradox of self-deception, see self-deception paradox of size, see Cantor’s paradox paradox of the heap, see sorites paradox parallel distributed processing, see connectionism parallelism Philosophy of mind Also called psycho-physical parallelism, a theory which is particularly associated with Spinoza. It claims that the mental realm and the physical realm, or thought and extension, do not affect each other in any way. Instead, they are independent of each other, although there is a precise correspondence between them. “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (Spinoza, Ethics, II, 7). If two items in the physical realm are similar, their counterparts in the mental realm are similar; and vice versa. If two items in thought are related as cause and effect, their corresponding items in extension are also related as cause and effect. However, mental events never cause bodily events, and bodily events never cause mental events. There are physical causal laws and there are psychological laws, but there can not be any psycho-physical causal laws. Parallelism is a classical response to the Cartesian mind–body problem. Sometimes Spinoza claimed that such a parallelism is a relation of identity on the grounds that each mental mode is a physical mode. This view, together with his claim that thought and extension are different attributes of one and the same substance, has led many scholars to argue that Spinoza’s philosophy of mind should be termed a dual-aspect theory. “Parallelism, in the mild sense, is the proposition that for every mental event there is a bodily event which always accompanies it.” Wisdom, Problem of Mind and Matter paralogism Logic, philosophy of mind [from Greek para, beyond + logizesthai, to reason] Generally, a formally invalid inference. Aristotle in Poetics defined a paralogism as the fallacy of inferring from the truth of the consequence to the truth of the premise. For Kant, a paralogism is the inevitable erroneous outcome of reason in rational psychology when it extends beyond the limits of experience. Reason leads from the transcendental ground of the “I think” to four kinds of paralogism: (1) the soul is a substance; (2) the soul is simple; (3) the soul is identical over time; and (4) the soul is conscious only of itself. Kant also called these claims transcendental paralogisms. He held that all of these inferences are invalid because they infer from the formal conditions of thought to a substance of thought. Kant’s target in exposing the paralogism is the rational psychology of Descartes and his rationalist successors and the alleged misinterpretation of the Cogito that infers existence from thinking. “In the first kind of syllogism I conclude from the transcendental concept of the subject, which contains nothing manifold, the absolute unity of this subject itself . . . This dialectical inference I shall entitle the transcendental paralogism.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason paraphrasis, another term for contextual definition Pareto improvement, see Pareto optimality Pareto optimality Philosophy of social science, political philosophy A principle, also called Pareto efficiency, named after the Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, referring to a state whereby no one can be better off without making someone else worse off. A change that makes at least one person better off and no one worse off is called a Pareto improvement. In this case, at least one individual prefers X to Y, and no one else regards Y as better than X. To change from Y to X certainly improves the welfare of the whole society. Pareto optimality and Pareto improvement are widely accepted as criteria for justifying or criticizing changes in economic policy. They are also used to evaluate the utilitarian summing of welfare across individuals without the need to compare interpersonal utility. Since each policy change in a social context generates a loser, a Pareto improvement is hard to achieve. “The familiar economist’s concept of Pareto efficiency (or Pareto optimality) is a very different matter. A distribution of resources is Pareto efficient if no change in that distribution can be made that leaves no one worse off and at least one person better off.” Dworkin, A Matter of Principle Parfit, Derek (1942– ) British moral philosopher and philosopher of mind, born in Chengdu, China, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. Parfit argues that we can deal with the problem of personal identity by seeing that it is rational to be concerned with degrees of continuity and connectedness in life rather than with the all-or-nothing identity relationship. His metaphysics of the self underlies a wealth of engaging utilitarian arguments that endorse the rationality, in some cases, of acting to achieve the ends of others before one’s own ends. His major works include Reasons and Persons (1984). Parmenides (flourished c.480 bc) Greek philosopher, born in the City of Elea. The main extant work of Parmenides, On Truth, was written in hexameter verses. He is regarded as the originator of ontology, although there is scholarly disagreement about the details of his theory. He introduced the conception of being, on which he centered his philosophical speculation. His claim that what-is-there-to-be-thought-of and what-is-thereto-be are the same deeply influenced metaphysics in Plato and Aristotle. Parmenides rejected the reliability of sense-perception and argued that change is unreal. His successors in natural philosophy were challenged to overcome this reasoned denial of change. parsimony, the principle of, another term for Ockham’s razor partial concept Logic, philosophy of language For Kant, each concept typically contains other concepts, namely, various predicates that can jointly apply to the object or instance of this concept. A predicate contained in this concept is a partial concept, for it can identify its object only in virtue of being conjoined with other predicates contained in the same concept. All partial concepts are related, either coordinately, such as being a man and being rational, or subordinately, such as being a man and being an animal. The process of clarifying all partial concepts and their relationships is conceptual analysis, and the result of this process is an analytic judgment. “For when I make a distinct concept, I begin with parts and proceed from these to the whole.” Kant, Logic participation Ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics [Greek, methexis, from the verb metechein, to participate, to share in and to partake] In Plato’s theory of Forms, particular things possess some characteristic because they participate in the relevant Forms; for example, beautiful things are beautiful because they participate the Form “beauty.” So particular things are only the less complete realization of the Form. However, the Form is one, and particular things are many. How can one single Form be in many things at the same time? In what way do things participate in a Form? This is the problem of how universals can be in particulars. Plato formulates this problem in his self-criticism in the Parmenides, and the problem remains today. In his later dialogues Plato talks more about the participation of one Form in other Forms, rather than the participation of particular things in the Forms. Neoplatonism also uses this concept in the sense that the lower orders of beings participate in the higher. “It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it participates in that absolute beauty, and for no other reason.” Plato, Phaedo particular Metaphysics [from Latin pars, partis, part] For Aristotle, particulars cannot be predicated of things, in contrast to a universal, which can be predicated of many things. “Particular” is used as an adjective for things that are partial, limited, or some, rather than whole, unlimited, or all. As a noun, “particular” has various applications, some of which lead to philosophical dispute. As a single entity of a class or kind, a particular has a unique path through space and time and unlike universals cannot be instantiated by other entities, however similar they are to the initial particular. A particular is a unity, in contrast to an aggregation of things. If we maintain the notion of substance, a particular is a substance that bears attributes, qualities, or properties, whilst attributes are universals. Particulars include historical events, material objects, people and their shadows, but do not include qualities and properties, numbers and species. Particulars should be distinguished from individuals, for while all particulars are individuals, many individuals, instead of being particulars, are abstract and general. Philosophers have different opinions about the ontological status of particulars, depending on their account of universals. “A particular is defined as an entity which can only enter into complexes as the subject of a predication or as one of the terms of a relation, never as itself a predicate or a relation.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. VII particular proposition Logic In traditional syllogistic logic, propositions of the form “some s are p” or “some s are not p” are called particular propositions. Propositions of the first form, particular affirmative propositions, are symbolized as “I” (SIP), and propositions of the second form, particular negative propositions, are symbolized as “O” (SOP). In modern predicate calculus, a particular affirmative proposition is analyzed as “there is at least one x such that x is s and x is p.” Particular propositions are generally held to contain referring expressions and therefore to have existential import. Particular propositions are contrasted to universal propositions, that is, propositions of the form “all s are p” and “all s are not p.” Together, these are the four basic types of propositions in traditional logic. “The proposition ‘Some x’s are y’s’ makes an assertion about part of the class x and is, therefore, called a particular proposition.” Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic particularized quality, another term for abstract particular partition Logic The division of a class into sub-classes (each of which is called a partition class, and all of which jointly form an exclusive class), or a process of dividing a whole into its parts, as long as the parts are homogeneous with each other and with the whole. For instance, the property “having the same weight as” can divide a class in terms of weight into a sub-class that includes all objects with that weight. An object with that weight belongs to only one sub-class. Partition is closely related to the notion of equivalent class within which each member bears an equivalent relation to every other member. A related concept is resolution, which is a process of exhibiting a whole in terms of its components. Both partition and resolution are forms of analysis. “By partition is meant transforming what is first presented as a mere unit by exhibiting it in the form of a whole consisting of parts.” Johnson, Logic partitive term, Quine’s expression for mass term Pascal, Blaise (1623–62) French philosopher and mathematician, born in Clermont-Ferrand. His most important philosophical work Pensées was posthumously published in 1670. Pascal maintained that our knowledge of first principles is based on faith rather than on reason. Because reason is unable to establish first principles, the foundations of science and mathematics are fundamentally uncertain. This same skeptical argument led him to conclude that it is impossible to achieve a demonstrative proof of God’s existence. However, he proposed “Pascal’s wager,” the argument that it would be wiser to choose to believe in God’s existence, because if there is no God, we have no significant loss, but if God does exist, we gain eternal happiness. Pascal was also a pioneer of decision theory. Pascal’s wager Philosophy of religion A practical argument to suggest that it is rational to believe in God, formulated by the French thinker Blaise Pascal in his Pensées (1670). Pascal initiated the use of practical argumentation as a new line of thought in support of Christian faith. If we can not use metaphysics to prove decisively whether or not God exists, what then should we do? On the basis of his work on probability, Pascal claimed that belief in God is the soundest bet in the face of the uncertainty of an afterlife. If we believe, then God either exists or does not exist. If he does not exist, we lose little. If he exists, we will be awarded eternal bliss and avoid the possibility of going to hell. Hence, the choice to be a believer carries with it the possibility of immense gain, while the choice not to believe carries with it the possibility of a vastly greater loss. This argument has been treated scornfully by critics, but it has been accepted by some as a legitimate theological use of practical reason. It can be placed in a context of examples from rational choice theory, although Pascal’s wager concerns the choice of belief rather than action. For this reason, it is related to problems about the will and belief that arise in William James’s pragmatism. “Notwithstanding its methodological modernity as a course of argumentation cast in the mold of decision theory, the spirit of Pascal’s Wager is thus profoundly conservative in its substantive message.” Rescher, Pascal’s Wager passion, see feeling passive intellect, see active intellect past Metaphysics, philosophy of history The past is meant in some sense to contain what happened at an earlier time, but it is not clear that the past is real. Objectivists argue that the past exists independent of human minds and knowledge and provides a basis for historical statements. For skeptics, the past can hardly exist. What actually exists must be present, but if the past were present, it would not be the past. Because it is the past, it can not exist. For subjectivists and relativists, the past exists merely as a construction of historians. pathos How, then, would it be possible to establish the truth of a statement about the past? For skeptics, the past does not exist and knowledge of the past is impossible. According to relativists, because the intentions and prejudices of historians are indispensable to historical inquiry, historical knowledge need not be rejected, but it is not objective. For objectivists, historical knowledge represents what really took place, but because historical statements are made on the basis of memory, testimony, and evidence rather than on direct observation, we can still ask how it is possible to secure the reliability of statements about the past. Some claim that such statements are about the present rather than about the past, and others claim that they are rules for the prediction of future historical experiences. The existence and intelligibility of the past have been important topics in contemporary analytic philosophy. “From my own part, I do not find anything excessively paradoxical in the view that propositions about the past are rules for the prediction of those ‘historical’ experiences which are commonly said to verify them, and I do not see how else ‘pure knowledge of the past’ is to be analysed.” Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic past-referring term Philosophy of history In our conceptual scheme, all expressions or terms describing present objects can be classified into three kinds: past-referring terms, temporally neutral terms, and futurereferring terms. Past-referring terms apply to present events or objects in a way that entails the existence of an event or object at an earlier time logically related to the present object. For example, to call a woman a mother entails that she gave a birth to a child. Temporally neutral terms apply to present events or objects, but do not imply any reference to past or future items. For example, to call somebody a man does not imply anything about the past or future. Future-referring terms apply to present items in a way that is conditioned by their reference to some future objects or events. For example, to call a woman a mother-to-be entails that she will give birth at some future time. Historical language is rich in past-referring terms, but philosophers and logicians argue over the possibility of determining the truth-value of historical statements that contain past-referring terms. “By a past-referring term, I shall mean a term, whose correct application to a present object or event, logically involves a reference to some earlier object or event which may or may not be causally related to the object to which the term is applied.” Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History paternalism Ethics, political philosophy [from Latin pater, father] Paternalism is derived from parental caring towards one’s children. In ethics it means interfering with another person’s liberty or freedom in the belief that one is promoting the good of that person, or preventing harm from occurring to that person, even if one’s action provokes that person’s disagreement or protest. Paternalism is challenged by liberalism and is now often viewed as a violation of liberty, autonomy, and individual rights. It can be justified toward moral patients, who do not have a sufficient degree of rationality to choose and act. “Paternalistic intervention must be justified by the evident failure or absence of reason and will.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice pathetic fallacy Aesthetics The term was introduced by John Ruskin in Modern Painters, vol. 3 (1856), referring to the alleged fallacy of projecting or ascribing human emotions, intentions, dispositions, and thoughts to inanimate things as if they were really capable of these qualities. For instance, one has committed this fallacy if one says that weather is friendly or that the sea is angry. In general, it means the human tendency to project our subjective feeling caused by an external thing onto the external thing itself. “Pathetic fallacy . . . is the fallacy of treating a psychological relation as an independently existing property.” Sorensen, Thought Experiments pathos Ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of mind [Greek, suffering, feeling or what happens to affect a person; plural, pathe; from paschein, to suffer, to undergo, to experience] For Aristotle, paschein and the contrasting poiein (to make, to do) are both categories. Pathos has a passive tone. In Greek, pathos is a changeable quality, but especially concerns extreme grief, misfortune, or distress. As the feeling of an individual, it is also contrasted with êthos (communal feeling). “By pathe, I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, jealousy, pity, in general whatever implies pleasure or pain.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics patriarchy Political philosophy, philosophy of social science, ethics [from Greek pater, father + arche, rule] Originally, a social system centered around an extended family with a male as its leader (patriarch). For many feminists, patriarchy is the universally perpetuated male power over women and male aggression toward women. They claim that a patriarchal attitude or prejudice runs through all economic and social institutions. Societies are often patriarchal in the sense that the male half of the population uses various deeply embedded means to control the female half. A main concern of radical feminism is to uncover the roots of patriarchy and to reveal its various representative forms. “A name that was coined to denote the universal domination of women by men.” Nyre, Feminist Theory and the Philosophy of Man Pears, D. F. Bedfont-born philosopher of language and mind, Professor of Philosophy at University of Oxford. Pears’s subtle and stimulating works on Hume, Russell, and Wittgenstein contributed to the development of his own naturalistic empiricism. His accounts of action, personal identity, self-deception, weakness of will, solipsism, and rule-following have all been widely influential. His major works include Questions in the Philosophy of Mind (1975), Motivated Irrationality (1984), and The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, 2 vols. (1987–8). Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839–1914) The founder of American pragmatism, born in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Peirce wrote extensively in many fields of philosophy and his thought altered and developed in the different stages of his life. He formulated pragmatism as a theory of meaning, claiming that the meaning of a proposition is the sum of practical consequences that might conceivably result from the truth of that proposition. In his later writings, he called his theory “pragmaticism,” to distinguish it from the pragmatism of James and other philosophers. Peirce initiated many major developments in modern logic and philosophy of science through his theory of signs, his logic of relations, his theory of abduction, and his discovery of quantification. He rejected traditional metaphysics and, as a fallibilist, claimed that all theories and categories are answerable to further scientific investigation, although he saw truth determined by the ultimate convergence of such investigations. He developed his own metaphysics, assigning everything there is to the categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, and held that the world contains real continuous phenomena. Peirce published no book in his lifetime, but his many papers were gathered in The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (eight volumes). Peirce’s thesis Philosophy of language The claim that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the evidence for its truth. In other words, the conditions of semantic evaluation supervene upon confirmation relations or confirmation relations are semantic relations. This is a form of verificationism that equates meaning with evidence. According to this theory, if two theories have different entailments, they differ with respect to what observation statements are true. “Peirce’s thesis just is the claim that confirmation relations constitute semantic relations and are therefore not contingent.” Fodor and Lepore, Holism per accidens Metaphysics [Latin, by accident] A scholastic term for the accidents possessed by a substance or for the non-essential properties which a thing has but which it may lose without changing its nature. A per accidens predication is a predication in which an accident is predicated of a substance. A per accidens thing is either an accident or a composite of a substance and an accident. Per accidens contrasts with perceptual consciousness per se (Latin, by itself ), which is a substance itself or is the essential property that a thing possesses and cannot lose without changing its nature. In scholastic philosophy, God alone is a being per se in the absolute sense, for anything else will have to depend on God for existence. Sometimes, per se means what is directly intended in an action, while per accidens is a result that is not directly intended. “All that exists of another (quod est per accidens) comes back to what exists of itself (quod est per se).” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae per se, see per accidens percepta Epistemology The term for the properties that an observer actually perceives or observes. Percepta contrast with percipienda, the properties that we think that an object should appear to have, according to our knowledge of its nature and its position. When I look at a round tower from a distance, it is round according to percipienda, but might be square according to percepta. There are various forms of discrepancy between the percepta and percipienda of a given object. One may change while the other does not change. This distinction is useful in discussing the nature of perceptual consciousness. “I shall use the term ‘percepta’ or ‘actually perceived properties’ to refer to how the object actually appears to an observer.” Hirst, The Problem of Perception perception Epistemology The faculty of being aware of the world, the contents of sensory experience and what is perceived. Perception involves both our capacity to be sensorily affected by external objects and our ability to bring these objects under concepts, although other capacities might also have a role to play. The analysis of perception and the attempt to deal with skeptical arguments about perceptual knowledge are central philosophical topics, in particular in epistemology. A major problem is whether we directly perceive sense-data or the external physical world. This is related to problems about the nature of the external world and our knowledge of it. Perception is the area where skepticism functions actively and where the distinction between phenomenalism and realism is sharply drawn. There are various positions about how to understand perception, such as the causal theory of perception, the representative theory of perception, and various forms of perceptual realism. There are also competing accounts of the relations between perception and belief and between perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge. “ ‘Perception’ is a generic term which may be defined disjunctively as either seeing or hearing or touching or . . . etc. Perception, in short, is awareness of the external world through the senses.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy percepts Epistemology Sometimes identified with sense-data. Whereas sense-data directly represent particulars and concrete items, percepts are closer to subjective states in an act of perception. Percepts are contrasted with concepts, which are the abstractions in thinking. “The immediate object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the percept.” Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 4 perceptual consciousness Epistemology The consciousness that is presented in the same way in normal perception, illusion, and hallucination. The term is introduced by H. H. Price in order to deal with the relation in perception between sense-data and material objects and to uncover the nature of perceiving. However, the nature of perceptual consciousness itself is disputed. Some philosophers believe that it consists in seeing a datum and judging or inferring that the datum belongs to a material object. For others, including Price, perceptual consciousness senses a datum and takes it for granted that it belongs to a material object. The dispute between “judging” and “taking for granted” in an account of perceiving is characteristic of many philosophical arguments in which slight verbal differences signal important theoretical conflicts. “We must find some name for the non-sensuous mode of consciousness of which we have spoken. For the present we shall simply call it ‘perceptual consciousness’.” Price, Perception perceptual knowledge Epistemology Knowledge about the world around us acquired through the activation of our sense organs, especially our eyes. We know that we can cross the street when we see that the traffic light is green. Perceptual knowledge is concerned with perceptual facts, and so must be distinguished from the perception of simple objects. It is not sensation, pure perception, or mere acquaintance. Perceptual knowledge is associated with previously acquired ideas. A proposition of the form “S knows that P” reports perceptual knowledge if P is a perceptual proposition. It is controversial whether sense perception itself can lead to justified beliefs. While direct realism insists that experience itself can provide the justification required for this kind of knowledge, many other philosophers believe that such knowledge must involve some background knowledge or assumptions about connecting regularities that might be gained by inductive inference from past observations. “Perceptual knowledge is knowledge that one sees or hears or smells or tastes or feels some specific sort of non-mental thing(s) or state(s) of affairs or event(s).” Ginet, Knowledge, Perception and Memory percipienda, see percepta perennial philosophy, English expression for philosophia perennis perfect duty, see imperfect duty perfection, the principle of, another expression for the principle of the best perfectionism Ethics, political philosophy The ethical position which claims that the good of human actions consists in their promotion of the maximal realization of human excellence, measured by the ideal standards of perfection in fields such as art, science, and culture. This theory presupposes that there are certain kinds of activities or experiences that possess the highest values and the deepest significance and encourages people to pursue these activities and experiences. It supposes that some human beings are intrinsically inferior to other human beings and that some forms of human life are intrinsically inferior to other forms of human life. Hence it endorses an aristocratic view of human society and is opposed to egalitarianism. It argues that a society should be so arranged as to maximize the achievement of human excellence. John Rawls employed this term to refer to the position held by Aristotle and Nietzsche. Rawls argues that since the notion of intrinsic value is controversial, perfectionism should be bypassed as a political principle. “Teleological doctrines differ, pretty clearly, according to how the conception of the good is specified. If it is taken as the realisation of human excellence in the various forms of culture, we have what may be called perfectionism.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice performance and competence, see competence and performance performative Philosophy of language Austin’s term for utterances that are contrasted with ordinary statements, or constatives. The distinction mainly consists in two aspects. First, while a constative merely states an independently existing fact, a performative utterance, such as “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth,” or “I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow,” does not describe anything, but constitutes an action. Such sentences actually do something in the appropriate circumstances, for example, naming or betting. Secondly, while the truth or falsity of a constative is determined by the distinct fact or state of affairs it describes, a performative is open to assessment according to whether it is a happy or unhappy act, not in terms of truth and falsity. Austin made a great effort to establish a clear-cut distinction between constatives and performatives, believing that many philosophical problems have arisen because people do not understand the nature of performatives. But Austin was unable to find a satisfactory criterion for performatives, and he gave up this distinction in favor of his theory of speech acts, involving locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, in How to Do Things With Words. “The name [performative] is derived, of course, from ‘perform’, the usual verb with the noun ‘action’: it indicates that the issuing of the utterances is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something.” Austin, How to Do Things with Words. all histories of Greek natural philosophy, mathematics and astronomy, and medicine.” G. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. performative theory of truth Logic, philosophy of language A form of deflationary theory of truth, ascribed to Peter Strawson. It claims that the truth predicate is used not to describe things, but to perform certain speech acts such as agreeing, conceding, or endorsing. By saying, “That is true,” we agree or endorse another speaker’s utterance. The primary characteristic of truth is to perform this endorsing or confirmatory speech function. The theory is also called “the amen theory of truth.” perlocutionary act Philosophy of language Austin’s term for his third kind of speech act. While locutionary acts are concerned with meaning, and illocutionary acts are concerned with the way an utterance is taken, perlocutionary acts are linguistic acts which, by saying something with design or intention, bring about specific effects on the feelings, thoughts, or behavior of the hearers, for example, persuading or convincing someone to do something. It is essentially a consequential act. “A less familiar case is Strawson’s performative account of truth. This turns on . . . the fact that by saying ‘That is true’ we can endorse an utterance made by another speaker.” Price, Facts and the Functions of Truth. “Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons . . . We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary act or perlocution.” Austin, How to Do Things with Words Peripatetics Ancient Greek philosophy A term applied to Aristotle and his pupils. According to tradition, the term was derived from peripatein (to walk about) because Aristotle and his pupils were said to spend long periods every day walking up and down discussing advanced philosophical questions in the garden of the Lyceum, the school Aristotle founded in 335 bc. But according to another account, the term was derived from peripatos (covered walking hall), which was a part of the Lyceum. The Peripatetics whose names are known include Theophrastus of Eresus, Strato of Lampsacus, and Eudemus of Rhodes. If the chief characteristic of Plato’s Academy was its mathematical achievement, the Peripatetics contributed greatly to various natural sciences, in particular to botany, biology, and medicine. In the Hellenistic period, the Peripatetics, Academics, Stoics, and Epicureans were the four major schools in Athens. “The Peripatetic school, as an institution comparable to the Academy, was probably not founded until after [Aristotle’s] death. But with some distinguished students and associates he collected a natural history museum and library of maps and manuscripts . . . and organised a program of research which inter alia laid the foundation for Perry, Ralph Barton (1876–1957) American philosopher, born in Poultney, Vermont. As a founding member of American New Realism, Perry maintained that the independent and real world is directly present to the mind and that nothing stands between the knower and the independent world. He formulated the “Ego-centric Predicament.” He defined value as that which makes something an object of interest and characterized interest in terms of expectancy. He held that moral value lies in the harmony of interests. Perry’s principal works include General Theory of Value (1926) and Realms of Value (1954). perseity, see aseity person, from Latin persona, mask or actor, a man’s role or dignity in relation to other men] In theological usage, persona is the equivalent of the Greek hypostasis (standing under) and is closely related to the notion of ousia (substance). For Boethius, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Locke, in his discussion of personal identity, argued that consciousness provides the criterion of being the same person over time, although being a person presupposes having a body. Locke in turn identified consciousness with memory. He also held that person is a forensic notion that is related to responsibility and to reward and punishment. Hence, in a legal sense, there can be artificial persons, like companies, as well as natural persons, so long as persons have legal responsibility and status. For Descartes and later dualists, a person is a combination of a mind and a body that are essentially distinct. In contrast, Strawson held that “person” is a logically primitive technical term. A person owns both states of consciousness and bodily characteristics, but cannot be reduced either to something mental or to something physical. The concept of a person is presupposed by both physical states and state of consciousness. Strawson’s arguments have led to much discussion and have helped to place the nature of a person as a central topic in contemporary metaphysics. Metaphysics usually discusses persons rather than human beings, partly to leave conceptual room for non-human persons and partly to avoid giving too much emphasis to biological classification in forming the concept of a person. Some forms of species-based naturalism would challenge both of these motives. The notion of a person implies that the central phenomena of personhood, such as thinking, experiencing, acting, and having moral worth, are related to one another, although many philosophers would defend the status of severely brain-damaged human beings as persons. “What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.” Strawson, Individuals person-affecting restriction Ethics A position that claims that the evaluation of moral choices should appeal to the outcome produced by the choices for the persons affected. If choice A brings a worse outcome than choice B to at least some specific individuals and if choice B does not bring a worse outcome than choice A to any specific individuals, then choice A is worse than choice B. According to Derek Parfit, such a restriction can be applied universally in moral areas. Many choices, particularly those involving the interests of future generations, cannot be judged by their effects on future individuals because we have no way of telling what individuals there will be. “The Person-affecting Restriction: This part of morality, the part concerned with human wellbeing, should be explained entirely in terms of what would be good or bad for those people whom our acts affect.” Parfit, Reasons and Persons personal identity: n a popular sense, personal identity is determined by the fundamental values, loyalties, associations, and aims of a person’s life. In contrast, the philosophical investigation of personal identity seeks to explain the criteria by which an individual is identified as the same person at different times, in spite of having changed characteristics. The problem of personal identity (also called the problem of the self or the problem of self-identity or the problem of self-knowledge) arises from the difficulties in accounting for how the ascription of personal identity is justified. Since the discussion of personal identity concentrates on the necessary and sufficient conditions under which we recognize or re-identify a person, the problem is also called the problem of the criteria of personal identity, although criterial relations can be looser than those set out by necessary and sufficient conditions. Locke and Hume provided two classic discussions of personal identity. Locke claimed that the criterion of personal identity is consciousness, in particular memory. His position has been attacked as not providing sufficient conditions for personal identity by those who argue that personal identity is impossible without bodily continuity. Moreover, Locke’s view seems circular if we distinguish between genuine memory and apparent memory. The memory test of personal identity seems to fail because genuine memory presupposes identity rather than providing an independent test for identity. According to Hume, we perceive nothing but impressions and ideas and do not have an impression or idea of a unique and simple self. He therefore maintains that the notion of personal identity is a fiction. What we really have is a bundle or collection of particular perceptions, which we ascribe without justification (and perhaps without need of justification) to a continuing self. Contemporary discussion is characterized by sophisticated testing of the arguments for the bodily criterion and the memory criterion of personal identity. Discussion has been shaped by considerations of the logic of identity, which is an all-or-nothing relationship and a relationship that blocks two distinct entities at the same time from being identical with one another. In particular, thought experiments about split brains indicate that an apparent advantage for the bodily criterion is illusory. The English philosopher Derek Parfit argues that attempts to cope with the problem of personal identity fail, but that what is really important to us is continuity and connectedness in our lives and our survival as a person. He claims that these matters can be understood while avoiding the rigidities of personal identity. Other philosophers hold that the discussion of personal identity should be closer to science than to the science fiction of the examples introduced in many recent discussions. Quine has argued that the problem of personal identity adds nothing important to the more general problem of identity. Personal identity is intensively discussed in contemporary philosophy for its own sake, but also because it is related to other major issues, such as dualism, survival and immortality, self-knowledge, responsibility, morality, and the self. “Philosophers are continuing the long-standing debate as to whether personal identity should be analysed in terms of the identity of the relevant bodies or in terms of some sort of continuity of memory and character.” Brody, Identity and Essence personalism Metaphysics, philosophy of religion, logic Also called personism, a philosophical movement that flourished in the early part of the twentieth century in the United States, with G. H. Howison, B. P. Bowne, and E. S. Brightman as its leading proponents. According to its central doctrines, persons are ontologically ultimate and personality has the highest value. Experience, which discovers meaning, belongs to some self. All hypothetical and inferred entities must be reduced to the experience of a self, with their truth tested by their coherence with the total data of experience. Reality as a whole is an expression of a universal personal consciousness, and characteristics possessed by persons and their personality are the fundamental elements in the explanation of reality. For personalists, God is the external person who constitutes the most coherent value of all interactions. Personalism, which has developed over the last two centuries, can be traced back to the theological use of the notion of person. The Greeks associated person and hypostasis (standing under) with the notion of ousia (substance). As a consequence, personalism has been integrally connected with theism, holding that God is the transcendent person and the creator of all other persons. Personalism has had realistic, absolutist, idealistic, pantheistic, and other forms, many of which can be viewed as varieties of idealism. The exploration of human existence in existentialism and phenomenology has been influenced by personalism. In a related use, personalism concerns ideas developed by the French philosophers and theologians E. Mounier, J. Maritain, and E. Gilson, who claimed that God is an infinite person in contrast to finite persons like ourselves and that the autonomy and value of the person is of supreme importance. The term personalism also designates the philosophy of probability, initiated by Ramsey and de Finetti and developed by L. J. Savage, according to which probability is a personal expression of a degree of confidence in the truth of a proposition and not something objective to be discovered. “Personalism or personism is the philosophical theory that a person is (or many persons are) the supreme reality, i.e. highest in value and dominant in power.” Werkmeister, A History of Philosophical Ideas in America personality Philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, ethics, political philosophy The general character of being a person or the distinctive features of mind and character of an individual person. As a biological concept, personality is related to species membership. Philosophers of mind and philosophers of psychology are interested in personality as a psychological concept dealing with psychological functions, abilities, and capacities. Moral philosophers are interested in ethical personality. Political and social philosophers are concerned with persons in relation to political or social entities. The conception of personality thus has different levels. “Personality is the totality of human potentialities, activities, and habits organized by the person in the active pursuit of his self ideal.” Arnold, in Mischel (ed.), Human Action perspective Modern European philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology Nietzsche held that all knowing is perspectival and involves interpretations from one or another point of view. There is no neutral universal point of view from which we can obtain objective knowledge. Nevertheless, one point of view can be preferred to another according to its value for life rather than through objective correspondence with facts. For Russell, a perspective is all the momentary sets of data, both perceived and unperceived, which present the universe from a certain point of view. In doing so he uses the subjective data of psychologists in their classification of particulars that correspond to the “things” used by physicists to classify objects. An actually perceived perspective is called by Russell a “private world,” that is, the view of the world that a percipient has at any given moment. The totality of perspectives in an individual’s life is that person’s “biography.” “The assemblage of all my present objects of sense, which is what I call a ‘perspective’.” Russell, Mysticism and Logic persuasive definition Philosophy of language A term introduced by Stevenson. In defining terms that have both descriptive meaning (referring to qualities in things), and strongly emotive meaning (expressing or arousing affective or emotional states), we alter the descriptive meaning but keep the emotive meaning unchanged in the term’s application. The purpose of persuasive definition is, consciously or unconsciously, to secure a change in people’s attitudes and interests. The speaker introduces a new sense that the hearer accepts without being aware that he is being influenced. For example, when Hitler claimed that “national socialism is true democracy,” he was employing a persuasive definition. “A persuasive definition, tacitly employed, is at work in redirecting attitudes.” Stevenson, Ethics and Language pessimism Philosophy of religion, ethics, philosophy of history [from Latin pessimus, the worst] A term originally used for Schopenhauer’s world view in The World as Will and Representation (1844). He believed that this world is the worst of all possible worlds because it is determined by blind and irrational will. Hence hope is unreasonable, and life is nothing, empty, meaningless, and painful. The term also applies to philosophies that emphasize nihilism, nothingness, anxiety, absurdity, and death, for example those of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. In common use, pessimism is a negative and despondent attitude that focuses on the least hopeful side of situations. In contrast, optimism is a hopeful attitude that sees the world as meaningful. In a form proposed by Leibniz, optimism claims that this world is the best of all possible worlds. “There are unhappy men who think the salvation of the world impossible. Theirs is the doctrine known as pessimism.” W. James, Pragmatism Peter of Spain (c.1215–77) Spanish scholastic philosopher and theologian, born in Lisbon, made a cardinal in 1273 and elected pope ( John XXI) in 1273. Peter’s Summulae Logicales provided an admirable presentation of the essentials of Aristotelian logic and was a fundamental logic text until the seventeenth century. His distinction between signification and supposition corresponds to the distinction between connotation and denotation. In Scientia Libri de Anima, he developed a Platonist theory of soul. petitio principii, Latin term for begging the question Petrarch, Francesco (1304–74) Italian humanist and poet, born at Arezzo. Petrarch was the major representative of Renaissance Humanism. He attacked Scholastic learning and phenomenalism claimed that man and the problems of man should be the central concern of philosophy. His enthusiasm for Plato led to later humanist translations of Plato and the development of the Florentine Academy. Petrarch’s important treatises include On the Remedies of Good and Bad Fortune (1366) and On His Own Ignorance and Many Others (1367). phantom limb Epistemology, philosophy of mind A phenomenon which was first described and investigated by Descartes. If one’s arm is amputated, one may afterwards feel that it is still there and feel pain in the non-existent fingers, wrist, and forearm. This is because the nerves that previously connected the arm to the brain, and that remain in the untouched part of the limb, continue to send impulses like those normally caused by external stimulations. This phenomenon has importance for the philosophy of perception. First, it seems to indicate that sensations occur only in the brain and that the mind is not immediately affected by all parts of body, but only by the brain. Secondly, the mental states of phantom limb patients can be explained by psycho-physical laws. The pain this patient feels is akin to an hallucination. This last point suggests problems for the representative theory of perception because there is a representation without a thing being represented. “The brain – or some part of it – inadvertently played a mechanical trick on the mind. That was Descartes’ explanation of phantom-limb hallucinations.” Dennett, Consciousness Explained phenomenal property, see qualia phenomenalism Epistemology Acceptance of the sense-datum theory, according to which what we are directly aware of in perception is not the material object itself but rather sensa, renders problematic the nature and status of material objects as the cause of perception. Phenomenalism is one attempt to elucidate the nature of material objects by reducing them to sense-data. It is derived from Berkeley’s immaterialism, which holds only phenomena or sense impressions can be known. There is no underlying substratum behind appearance. Reality is the totality of all actual and possible conscious experience, and can not be said to exist independent of these experiences. Berkeley, unlike later phenomenalists, holds that material objects are combinations of actual sense-impressions. As a consequence, he has to introduce God to preserve the continuity of objects and the existence of unobserved objects. Hume’s claim that what we know to exist is nothing more than sensa occurring in various patterns or sequences raises the problem of what fills the gaps between actual sensa. J. S. Mill’s position, which is called factual phenomenalism, is that material objects are permanent possibilities of sensation. Hence a material thing consists of a family of actual and possible sense-data. However, it sounds odd to say that possible sense-data are constituents of material things. Another way of filling the gap between actual sensa, called sensibilism, was developed by Russell (although he later abandoned it) and Price. On this view, sensibilia are unsensed sense-data, while sense-data amount to sensed sensibilia. Hence a material thing is described as a family of items with a similar status, except that sense-data are sensed and sensibilia are unsensed. The dominant version of phenomenalism to appear in the twentieth century was developed by the logical positivists and operationalists and is called linguistic phenomenalism or analytical phenomenalism. This theory attempts to explain the notion of material objects by reducing or translating all statements about material objects into statements about perceptual experience or sensa. The main difficulty with linguistic phenomenalism is that the equivalence between statements about sensa and statements about physical objects is hard to find. Phenomenalism is generally considered to be unsuccessful, for to specify the meaning of sensa and to distinguish one sense-datum from another always seems to involve reference to material things. Phenomenalism gives priority to experience and constructs the world out of it, but experience itself needs to be constructed out of the actual way of the world. Even Ayer, a chief proponent of linguistic phenomenalism, disavowed it in his later works. “The phenomenalist is bound to hold that the identity of any physical body is subject to analysis in terms of sense-data.” Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge phenomenological epoche, see phenomenological reduction phenomenological reduction Modern European philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of mind The characteristic methodological procedure of Husserl’s phenomenology. Phenomenological reduction is a means of detecting the intentional or essential structure of experience. By turning away from the sense-contents of my own stream of experiences, I can concentrate on what is essential, basic, and irreducible in experience. The reduction moves from the empirical to the transcendental level and provides access to the intentional structure or noematic content of experience, which is the source of our knowledge of the world. The reduction contrasts to the reduction of all knowledge into certain basic or protocol sensory experiences or statements in phenomenalism or logical positivism. The basic instrument of phenomenological reduction is phenomenological epoche (Greek, holding back, hence suspension of judgment). In our cognitive relationship with the world, our natural attitude assumes the existence of the external spatio-temporal world and assumes the existence of ourselves as psycho-physical individuals. Husserl’s phenomenological epoche “brackets” this natural attitude or puts it out of play. This bracketing does not deny the existence of the fact-world, but refrains from any judgment regarding the world and our own physical being within it. For Husserl, we can thus regard our experience in a different manner and enter the region of transcendentally purified experiences. We can consider consciousness strictly as intentional agency, also called “transcendental consciousness,” “pure consciousness,” or “absolute consciousness.” We are in a position to have eidetic or essential intuition toward the intentional structures of experience. Phenomenological epoche is also called transcendental reduction. This is what phenomenological reduction normally means, but sometimes Husserl broadens its reference to include eidetic intuition as well. The whole program is influenced by the Cartesian method of doubt and is intended to provide absolutely certain grounds for knowledge. “On grounds of method this operation will split up into different steps of ‘disconnexion’ or ‘bracketing’, and thus our method will assume the character of a graded reduction. For this reason we propose to speak, and even preponderate, of phenomenological reductions (though, in respect of their unity as a whole, we would speak in unitary form of the phenomenological reduction).” Husserl, Ideas phenomenology Modern European philosophy, philosophical method [from Greek phainomenon, to appear + logos, theory, literally, a theory of appearance] The idea of phenomenology can be traced to Aristotle’s “saving the phainomena,” but the word was first used by J. H. Lambert, a follower of Christian Wolff, in his Neues Organon (1764), meaning the study of the forms of appearances and illusions. Kant took over this word, claiming that phenomenology determined the principles of sensibility and understanding that can be applied only to the world of appearance and not to things-in-themselves. Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit brought this word into prominence. However, for Hegel, phenomena are not illusions or appearances. They are stages in the development of knowledge, in the manifestations of which Spirit itself appears, and are the expressions of a self-developing absolute idea. Phenomenology is therefore the study of the evolutionary process of consciousness from its simplest to its most sophisticated forms. The American pragmatist C. S. Peirce developed in his early work a kind of phenomenology, also called “phaneroscopy,” as a system of categories to classify the main types of phenomena that make up the world. Phenomenology in its most popular sense refers to an influential philosophical movement, founded by Edmund Husserl and developed in Germany by Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, and Martin Heidegger and in France by Gabriel Marcel, JeanPaul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It has gradually fused with existentialism and hermeneutics. In this sense, phenomenology is a philosophy of consciousness concerned with the truth or rationale of immediate experience. Originally, Husserl conceived phenomenology as a philosophical method to reveal and elucidate the internal structures and essential features of various types of experience. Through analysis of this sort, one could discover the ultimate sources of our knowledge, especially the fundamental logical and epistemological categories. In his later stage, Husserl considered phenomenology to be first philosophy, which could describe the region of pure experience in which all sciences are rooted and provide a unified theory of science and knowledge. Husserl’s phenomenology was deeply influenced by Descartes’s demand that knowledge be clear and distinct and opposed relying on any a priori assumption that has to be justified elsewhere. Phenomenology in this sense differs from studies that seek to explain things, for example, from their causal relations or evolutionary origins. Its slogan is “to the things (phenomena) themselves.” Husserl emphasized the function of intuition in achieving insights into the essential structures of experience. Phenomenology characteristically emphasizes the intentionality of consciousness. Its philosophical novelty is the demonstration that intentional objects of every sort, existing and non-existing, can and should be described in their own right. Phenomenology can be contrasted with analytical philosophy, which is concerned with the analysis of propositions, although J. L. Austin sometimes called his work linguistic phenomenology. Heidegger analyzed the two components of the word “phenomenology.” On his analysis, phenomenon means that which shows itself in itself and logos is derived from legomenon, that which is exhibited. He concludes that phenomenology means “to let that which shows itself in itself be seen from itself.” Accordingly, phenomenology is merely a method, which prescribes how a study should be conducted rather than what should be studied. The method indicates that any subject-matter must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly. Heidegger called his own approach to Dasein and Being “hermeneutic phenomenology.” Here “hermeneutic” does not refer to a method for uncovering the meaning embodied in an expression, but to the constitution of Dasein. The whole expression refers to a method by which Being can be approached or brought to self-showing. “Phenomenology is accordingly the theory of experience in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real or intentional, given in experiences, and evidently discoverable in them.” Husserl, Logical Investigations phenomenon Epistemology, ancient Greek philosophy [from Greek phainomenon, what appears by itself, hence appearance] Perceptual appearance in general, that is, what may be observed and how things look. For Aristotle, all widely accepted beliefs about a certain matter, either those commonly held or held by the wise, are also phenomena. In this latter sense, phenomenon means the same as legomenon (what is said) and endoxa (common belief ). Phenomena of this kind were taken by Aristotle to be the startingpoint of dialectical argument. He claimed that a good theory should start from the phenomena and insofar as possible should be consistent with the phenomena and explain the phenomena. This is what he called saving the phenomena. A scientific theory should enable us to understand the empirical phenomena, and a philosophical theory should enable us to understand the phenomena in the sense of common beliefs. “This view [that there is no weakness of will] plainly contradicts the phenomena.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics philanthropy Ethics, political philosophy [from Greek philos, love + anthropos, man, loving one’s fellow men] A synonym for love, benevolence, altruism, and charity. Philanthropy is regarded as a virtue, especially in Christian ethics. In modern times, the term is used for large-scale actions to help those who are poor and in need. Sometimes, governmental agencies offering social support, such as the social welfare or health systems, are regarded as socially philanthropic institutions. Some occupations in the areas of health, education, welfare, or social work are associated with a philanthropic vocation. “If social work is to exist at all, there have to be either private philanthropists or a system of imposing philanthropy on the general public by means of taxes.” Downie and Telfer, Caring and Curing philia Ethics, ancient Greek philosophy [Greek, friendship, derived from philein, love, but without sexual implications. Empedocles uses a slightly different term philotes (also love or friendship) which, in opposition to neikos (strife), is the unifying principle of elements.] Philia is an affectionate personal relationship, requiring some degree of mutual goodwill, mutual recognition, and shared activities. Philia, which is much broader than our current notion of friendship, includes the love of members of families for each other, the favorable attitudes of business partners and of fellow citizens for each other, and the mutual admiration between virtuous men for virtuous character. Philia is a major topic in Greek ethics, for it is taken as a kind of virtue and as a necessary condition for happiness. Aristotle chiefly distinguishes three types of friendship: for pleasure, for usefulness, and for goodness. While the first two kinds are incidental, the last kind is complete and perfect, especially between virtuous men. Each virtuous person wishes the other to be good for the good of the other party itself. The root of the perfect friendship is to take the friend as another self, with friendship being a kind of self-love of a good man. Aristotle’s discussion of friendship seems to offer an approach for breaking the antithesis between egoism and altruism and therefore attracts much current attention. Friendship is also a major topic in contextualist and feminist approaches to moral philosophy. “The defining features of philia (friendship) that are found in friendship to one’s neighbours would seem to be derived from features of friendship towards oneself.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Philo of Alexandria (c.20 bc–c.50 ad) Hellenistic Jewish philosopher, born in Alexandria. Philo used Greek philosophy, especially the works of Plato, to interpret scripture. He held that God created the world by will and governed it directly. God has the power to infringe upon the laws of nature that he implanted in the world with its creation. There is individual providence as well as universal providence. Between God and the lower world there is an intermediate being that he called “Logos.” Although human knowledge of God is limited to God’s existence and not God’s essence, we can achieve contact with God through Logos. Philo’s synthesis of Greek philosophy and Jewish thought exerted great influence upon Neoplatonism and on medieval Jewish and Latin Christian philosophy. Philo’s major works include Concerning the Artisan of the World, On the Contemplative Life, and On the Eternity of the World. philosophe: The eighteenth-century French thinkers of the Enlightenment, such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Montesquieu, Helvétius, Condillac, d’Holbach, and other Encyclopedists. These philosophers are generally materialists, atheists, and liberals. They believed in the strength of reason and scientific knowledge and intended to judge everything in accordance with the measure of reason. “The French philosophes of the eighteenth century were the examples we sought to imitate, and we hope to accomplish no less results.” Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. I philosopher-king, see guardians philosophia perennis: metaphysical thesis that there is a single Divine reality as an impersonal Absolute is common to all great Western and Eastern religions. The soul is the divine spark of light in our body, and by means of its contemplative practice we can have mystical access to this divine reality. The term and the basic idea can be traced to Leibniz, but the thesis was fully explicated by Aldous Huxley in The Perennial Philosophy (1946). According to Huxley, perennial philosophy unifies all religions, with the consequence that there is only one sort of mysticism or fundamental metaphysics. Opponents who argue against the thesis say it wrongly amalgamates different strands of mysticism. “Philosophia perennis – the phrase was coined by Leibniz, but the thing – the metaphysic that recognises a divine reality substantial to the world of things and lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to, or even identical with, divine reality; the ethic that places philosophical radicals man’s final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent ground of all being – the thing is immemorial and universal.” Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy philosophical anthropology, from Greek anthropos, man] The comprehensive study of human nature, which considers each human being as a biological, psychological, cultural, social, and religious complex, in contrast to the simplicity of God and to the traditional rationalist view of man as an exclusively rational being. All discussions about man as such belong to philosophical anthropology, and in this broad sense it is as old as philosophy itself. Kant considered anthropology to be a pragmatic branch of philosophy concerning “what man as a freely acting entity makes of himself or can and should make of himself.” Feuerbach took anthropology as a synonym for philosophy. Based on the German philosophical tradition, Max Scheler introduced philosophical anthropology in Man’s Place in Nature (1928) as a special discipline. This discipline was a synthesis of Dilthey’s life philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology, but also embraced most of the social sciences. Scheler attempted to discover the basic structure of human nature and accordingly to explain human existence, experiences, potentialities, and various other aspects of human activities. He also sought to establish philosophical anthropology as the foundation of other social sciences in virtue of its central aim of achieving human self-understanding. Consistent with this aim, Scheler used philosophical anthropology to criticize his contemporary bourgeois society in terms of the theory of alienation of Hegel and Marx. Other major figures of philosophical anthropology include Plessner, Gehlen, Cassirer, and Sartre. As an interdisciplinary study, philosophical anthropology has practitioners in many areas and has developed various approaches to the study of man. “The theorists disagree, often very strongly, over the wants and desires that people have (their ‘philosophical anthropology’, as it is often termed), but neither side doubts that if only people’s wants and beliefs could be identified their action would be intelligible.” Yearley, Science and Sociological Practice philosophical behaviorism, see behaviorism philosophical logic Logic Russell’s term for the study of philosophical problems arising from applying formal logic to natural language. It does not contain formal logical systems themselves, and it is not confined to arguments that formal logic has codified. In British philosophy, philosophical logic is considered to be a basic philosophical discipline, concerned with the analysis of key notions indispensable to rational thinking such as analyticity, necessity, definition, description, entailment, existence, identity, reference, predication, proposition, quantification, truth, meaning, negation, and existential statements. Many of the problems in philosophical logic are intertwined with other branches of philosophy, especially with epistemology and ontology. Some scholars suggest that philosophical logic can also be called “philosophy of logic.” But others try to distinguish them on the grounds that philosophical logic is a philosophy interested in language, thought, and the world structure, while philosophy of logic is the study of the scope and nature of logic systems, especially philosophical issues arising from deviant logic. “The contrast between philosophical logic and philosophy of logic can accordingly be put like this: when one does philosophy of logic, one is philosophising about logic; but when one does philosophical logic, one is philosophising.” Grayling, An Introduction to Philosophical Logic philosophical psychology, see philosophy of psychology philosophical radicals Political philosophy, philosophy of social science A group of political and economic liberals deeply influenced by Jeremy Bentham and active in London in the first half of the nineteenth century, including the philosopher James Mill and later his son John Stuart Mill, legal philosopher John Austin, economist David Ricardo, lawyer E. Chadwick, and classical historian George Grote. They criticized the evils existing in the government and social policies of Britain at that time and believed that the source of all evils lay in the aristocratic principle adopted by the government, economic monopolies, and the established church. The group embraced Bentham’s utilitarianism, Adam Smith’s economics, Austin’s rational jurisprudence, and J. S. Mill’s rationale for democracy. They tried to provide a justification for radically transforming the traditional aristocratic regime into a modern, secular, democratic market society. This group exerted great influence upon British philosophy and political life. “Those whom . . . we call philosophic radicals are those who in politics observe the common practice of philosophers – that is, who, when they are discussing means, begin by considering the end, and when they desire to produce effects, think of cause.” Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. VI philosophical theology: A contemporary discipline largely derived from the methods and subjectmatter of natural theology. It employs standard techniques of reasoning and makes use of every possible consideration to justify theistic belief and to examine the coherence and implications of various traditional theistic doctrines. It aims to clarify the content of the central concepts, presuppositions, and tenets of theological commitment. Its main questions include the concept of God, the nature of divine attributes, the source of our ideas of God, proofs of the existence of God, the nature of divine knowledge, the essence of divine creation, God’s relation to time, and God’s relation to human beings. It differs from the philosophy of religion in that it is not a neutral discussion about theism, but presupposes the existence of God. It is essentially a way of using philosophy to do theology rather than an independent philosophical enterprise. “Philosophical theology is a species contained within the theological genus. Insofar as its specific difference is that it makes use of philosophical methods and techniques to explicate the meaning or to discover the implications of theological doctrines, it continues to stand within [the] ‘theological circle’.” Ferré, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion philosophy (Kant) Philosophical method Kant held that philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists concretely, but which we can endeavor to approximate by many different routes. What we learn is not philosophy itself, but how to philosophize by exercising our talent to reason on certain actually existing philosophical attempts. Since human reason is always active, it is impossible to offer an ultimate and dogmatic answer to the question of what philosophy is and who possesses it. That would mean the end of philosophizing and hence the death of philosophy. Accordingly, for Kant philosophy is an activity of reason rather than a static body of knowledge. He thought that the scholastic tradition took philosophy to be the logical perfection of knowledge, but another conception that forms the real basis of philosophy takes it as a science for relating all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason. The so-called philosopher is the lawgiver of human reason. Philosophical knowledge can arise either out of pure reason or empirical inquiry. Kant’s own philosophy is systematic, attempting to answer all the questions of philosophy in a single scheme, and critical, determining the limits as well as the extent of our knowledge through an examination of reason by itself. Kant divided the philosophy of pure reason into propaedeutic, which deals with the a priori knowledge of the faculty of reason, and metaphysics, as the system of pure reason. The latter is divided into the metaphysics of nature, which is concerned with what is, and the metaphysics of morals, which is concerned with what ought to be. They are respectively the theoretical and practical employment of pure reason. “The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom . . . the philosophy of nature deals with all that is, the philosophy of morals that which ought to be.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophical method On the basis of a strong conviction that science serves as a paradigm for all knowledge, logical positivism requires philosophy to have scientific standards of precision and objectivity. There are only two kinds of statements that meet the strict standards of science, that is, a priori statements of logic and pure mathematics, and empirical statements. Thus, most of the statements in traditional metaphysics and moral philosophy cannot constitute knowledge and should be eliminated. The positive role of philosophy is concerned with the logical analysis of the rules and frameworks of scientific theory and language and is a department of logic. Philosophy must employ scientific method to provide knowledge, and epistemology is nothing more than the philosophy of science. “Once philosophy is purified of all scientific elements, only the logic of science remains.” Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language. To clarify the nature of philosophy was one of Ryle’s major concerns. Logical positivism had dethroned philosophy from its position of priority regarding the sciences, and Ryle tried to show what is left for philosophy to do. He held that philosophy does not have its own domain and is not concerned with the problem of entities. It is a meta-occupation and an activity with the role of laying bare the logical categories that underlie the surface grammar of our ordinary or scientific language. This is necessary because these logical structures are often hidden or distorted by surface grammar. Philosophy has the function of mapping and comparing the logical geography of concepts and clarifying the connections between concepts. In brief, the task of philosophy is not to discover truth about the world but to rearrange and analyze language in order to reveal its correct logical form or real meaning. It is not an empirical science, but is closely associated with the logic of diverse categories or forms. Ryle’s work was a major example of the linguistic turn taken by English-speaking philosophy in the twentieth century. “Science talks about the world, while philosophy talks about talk about the world.” Ryle, Collected Papers. Philosophical method Philosophy does not present any picture of reality, and it can neither explain nor deduce anything. In trying to do so, philosophy becomes traditional metaphysics, which can give no meaning to its expressions. Proper philosophy should stop this misleading way of working. Philosophy is different from the natural sciences and shares no method with them. It can neither confirm nor refute scientific investigations. Since the whole of natural science is constituted by the totality of true propositions, philosophical propositions are not truths. Philosophy is an activity rather than a theory and aims to cure us of the misuse of ordinary language by means of clarifying propositions. Most traditional philosophical questions are generated through the misuse of language, and hence we should not seek to answer them (the solutions for them do not exist). We should rather treat the questions as we treat illness. We should make the questions disappear by showing how they violate logical syntax. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein proposes that the way to clarify language is to reveal its hidden structure, but in Philosophical Investigations he turns to the study of language-games to clarify language. “All philosophy is a ‘critique of language’.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus philosophy of art, see aesthetics philosophical biology: A relatively independent area of the philosophy of science, dealing with philosophical issues arising from biological studies. Because of certain characteristics of biological inquiry, philosophy of biology is more than the mere application of general principles of scientific explanation. Biology explains a trait of an organism in terms of its function to promote the well-being, development, or survival of that organism, its genes, or its species. This functional explanation seems to explain a cause by its effect and hence to differ from a standard causal explanation, which explains an effect by its cause and it also differs from the covering law model of explanation. The nature of functional or teleological explanation and its rationality therefore become major topics in the field. Many philosophers argue that we should understand biological traits in terms of the past evolutionary history of the organism rather than in terms of their future consequences. On this view, functional explanation can be assimilated to a causal account. Other philosophers of biology argue for an autonomous level of functional explanation that can not be reduced to ordinary causality. Darwin’s theory of evolution led to the formulation of various philosophical problems concerning, for example, the logic of natural selection and the implications of the concepts of adaptation and fitness. In a sense, philosophy of biology is the discussion of the philosophical problems raised by the theory of evolution. The biological classification of species had been a paradigm of philosophical classification of reality. Darwin suggested that species themselves evolve. The features of a species are not eternal, and the distinctions between species are not fixed. This evolutionary perspective has seriously transformed our understanding of the structure of the world. From the theory of evolution, philosophers have developed evolutionary epistemology, which attempts to explain cognitive faculties, knowledge acquisition, and the progress of knowledge in terms of the process of natural selection. Philosophers have also proposed an evolutionary ethics, which claims that what we ought to do should be determined on an evolutionary basis according the principle of the survival of the fittest. Evolutionary ethics can also have a less controversial role in explaining the pattern of our ethical thinking in terms of our being members of a particular naturally evolved species. Some philosophers also attempt to explain social, cultural, and psychological phenomena in terms of biological structure in a reductionist approach called sociobiology. hold that education is individualistic, existing simply for the sake of developing one’s rational mind, exploring with our natural inquisitiveness, acquiring knowledge for the sake of knowledge, or cultivating personal autonomy. The philosophy of education is concerned with a series of problems arising from this picture of education, such as the relation between education and moral development, education and censorship, education and the role of art, the education of personal emotion and feeling, and the equality of education opportunity. It also provides a critical evaluation of educational theory. Different theories of human nature result in different theories of education. In the twentieth century, the development of psychology, such as Freud’s psychoanalysis and Piaget’s theory of the stages of psychological development in the child, has deeply affected the discussion of education, although in Freud’s case not always to its benefit. In radically incompatible ways, Chomsky’s linguistics and Skinner’s behaviorism altered notions of learning. Philosophy of education is less developed than other branches of the philosophy of the social sciences. “Evolutionary biology is the centre of gravity for both the science of biology and for the philosophy of the science. The philosophy of biology does not end with evolutionary issues, but that is where I think it begins.” Sober, Philosophy of Biology philosophy of history: history is the actual human past, but it is also a branch of knowledge about the human past. Correspondingly, there are two major types of philosophy of history. Speculative philosophy of history is concerned with actual history and seeks to provide a philosophical history of the world. Analytic philosophy of history, in contrast, is concerned with historical thinking and knowledge and with other philosophical issues arising out of the practice of historians. The distinction between these two kinds of philosophy of history is widely characterized as also being a distinction between substantive and critical philosophy of history and between material and formal philosophy of history. Speculative philosophy of history can be traced to its origin in Augustine’s City of God. It assumes that history is not a sequential aggregate of random past events and argues that an underlying factor or structure renders the whole historical process rational and intelligible. The claim that temporal succession itself has logical implications was first derived from a theology and teleological worldview that viewed human history as controlled by some divine force. In the Enlightenment, some philosophers, such as the eighteenth-century French Encyclopedists, were inspired by the development of physics to explore the uniformity of history on the basis of the assumption of the uniformity of human nature. Others, such as Giambattista Vico and J. G. Herder, endorsed a more empirical approach in connecting the meaning of history with its cultural milieu. Hegel claimed that history has a plot and that the development of history is a dialectical movement governed by the absolute spirit. Marx substituted an economic foundation for Hegel’s absolute spirit as the engine for historical development. In the twentieth century, authors such as Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler continued to believe in the overall meaning of human history, but substantive philosophy of history is, in general, out of favor. Analytic philosophy of history emerged in the twentieth century. Rather than dealing with the underlying structure of actual history, its subjectmatter is the underlying structure of historical explanation and the nature of historical understanding. It is concerned with the conceptual framework of historical thinking and the nature of historical objectivity. Analytic philosophy of history has two general tendencies. The first, represented by Hempel, attempts to assimilate historical explanation to scientific explanation and to offer a model of universal laws for historical knowledge. The second, influenced by the works of Rickert, Dilthey, Croce, Collingwood, Walsh, and Dray, is the mainstream of analytic philosophy of history. It distinguishes historical study from the natural sciences and argues for the autonomy of history. It does not take a historical event as an instance of a covering law, but attempts to understand the reasons behind each action. In the work of Lyotard, Foucault, and others, it is concerned with the epistemological status of narrative, which is the characteristic form of presenting historical knowledge. “Unlike their speculative predecessors, most present-day contributors to the philosophy of history take it to be a second order form of inquiry with the aim, not of trying to seek and assess the human past itself, but rather of seeking to elucidate and assess the ways in which historians typically describe or comprehend that past.” Gardiner (ed.), The Philosophy of History philosophy of education: A branch of applied philosophy dealing with philosophical issues in education. Although philosophy of education can be traced to Plato’s Republic, it did not become a specific branch of philosophy until the beginning of the twentieth century. Interacting with political philosophy, the philosophy of education attempts to work out a conception of education that is suitable for contemporary liberal society. In contrast to both Plato and Rousseau, who believed that education aims at a just society with strongly shared values, contemporary liberal education theorists, such as John Dewey, Michael Oakeshott, Paul Hirst, and R. S. Peters, “Philosophy of education focuses on the language of educational theory and practice.” T. Moore, Philosophy of Education philosophy of language: contemporary philosophy of language resulted from the linguistic turn in philosophy and is based on the assumption that all philosophical analysis can be reduced to the analysis of language. In a broad sense, philosophy of language is nearly synonymous with analytic philosophy. Hence, logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, and the early and later Wittgenstein all exemplified different philosophical approaches to language in dealing with philosophical problems. In a narrow sense, philosophy of language is related to linguistics or the science of language and is concerned with the underlying reality of language and its philosophical import. Traditionally semiotics is divided into syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. The philosophy of language deals with the problem of the distinction between syntax and semantics, and some pragmatic problems, for example in the theory of speech acts and Grice’s theory of conversational implicature. There are different conceptions of what the philosophy of language should be, but its central concern is with semantic questions, such as meaning, truth, reference, predication, quantification, and the nature of propositions. Other major issues in this field of philosophy are the universal features of language and the relationships between language and world and between language and thought. Because of the inseparable relations between logic and language and among intentionality, understanding, thinking, and language, the philosophy of language shares many common topics with philosophical logic and the philosophy of mind. It is sometimes regarded as a part of the philosophy of mind and sometimes even as a part of the philosophy of action. An influential type of philosophy of language developed out of Chomsky’s generative grammar, which tries to uncover the structure of conceptual knowledge by revealing the linguistic structure underlying surface irregularities and variations. “Though the philosophy of language might reasonably be thought of as comprising anything that philosophers do when they think, qua philosophers, about language . . . I have presented the philosophy of language in one of its guises, as an attempt to get clear about the basic concepts we use in thinking about language.” Alston, Philosophy of Language Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law philosophy of logic, see philosophical logic philosophy of law : Also called legal philosophy, a branch of philosophy that deals with philosophical problems or issues concerning the law and legal systems and that applies philosophical method to legal problems. The major topics of this field are: the nature and the definition of law, properties and identity conditions of legal systems, the ends to be attained by law, legal responsibility, legal reasoning, the nature and justification of punishment, the nature and justification of the state’s coercive power, and the relationships between moral right and legal right, between moral obligation and legal obligation, and between law and justice. Philosophy of law is often used as a synonym for jurisprudence (from Latin juris prudentia, knowledge of or skill in law). Jurisprudence, however, has a wider reference. Some of its divisions, such as analytical jurisprudence (the logical analysis of law and of legal concepts) and normative or critical jurisprudence (the evaluation of law and legal obligations) fall into the domain of philosophy of law. Other divisions such as historical jurisprudence (dealing with the origin and development of law), sociological jurisprudence (dealing with the relationship between legal rules and legal behavior), and functional jurisprudence (dealing with legal norms and social needs), are not the concerns of philosophy of law. Philosophy of law can be traced to Plato’s Laws, and Aristotle’s distinction between distributive justice and corrective justice. Major philosophical approaches to law include natural law theory, represented by Thomas Aquinas, which holds that law is essentially connected with moral right and good; legal positivism, represented by Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and H. L. A. Hart, which argues for the moral neutrality of law and separates law from morality; and legal realism, represented by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Alf Ross, which claims that the law should be understood in terms of how it operates in courts. “The philosophy of law studies philosophical problems raised by the existence and practice of law.” philosophy of mathematics: Starting with Plato, mathematics has been viewed by philosophers as the model of necessary truth and a priori knowledge. Hence, the ontological status of mathematical objects, the foundation of mathematics, the nature of mathematical knowledge and truth, and the structure and function of mathematical theories have been of central interest for many philosophers. Modern philosophy of mathematics started with Frege’s logicism and the establishment of set theory in mathematics. In opposition to the traditional claim that there is a kind of mathematical intuition that guarantees the necessity of mathematical truth, logicism argues that mathematics can be reduced to logic, and this idea was classically presented in Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. The approach inspired logical positivism, but was attacked by Quine with his criticism of the notion of analyticity. The paradox Russell discovered in set theory led to a foundational crisis of mathematics. To cope with the crisis, philosophers of mathematics have adopted different approaches. Some philosophers, following Plato, believe that mathematical objects are abstract entities independent of our minds, and this realistic position is called mathematical Platonism. Others, like Quine and Putnam, suggest that mathematics does not have objects proper to itself. Hilbert’s formalist program saw the meaning of mathematical expressions in terms of the formal mathematical system to which they belong rather than in terms of objects. Hilbert’s attempt to prove the consistency and completeness of formal systems expressing arithmetic was undermined by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. In the Kantian tradition, others claim that mathematical objects are mental constructions or creations, a view best represented by constructivism. Brouwer’s intuitionism, which attempted to explain mathematical reasoning in terms of the construction of proofs, led to the denial of the law of excluded middle that is at the heart of classical mathematics. Philosophy of mathematics is closely connected with contemporary issues in ontology and epistemology and with current debates between realism and anti-realism. empirical studies of the mind and have linked philosophy of mind with such fields as computational modeling and cognitive psychology. “The central problem in the philosophy of mathematics is the definition of mathematical truth.” Curry, Outline of a Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics. “The aim of the philosophy of mind is to conduct an a priori investigation into the essential nature of mental phenomena, by elucidating the latent content of mental concepts.” McGinn, The Character of Mind. philosophy of mind Philosophy of mind The philosophical examination of the nature of the mind and its relationship with body. Plato and Aristotle provided theories of mind, and so have many modern philosophers, in particular Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant. But only with the emergence of psychology as a distinct discipline at the end of the nineteenth century did the philosophy of mind become an independent subdiscipline within philosophy. Since then, theories of mind have aimed at deepening our understanding of the mind itself, rather than at placing an account of the mind within a traditional metaphysical or epistemological framework. Franz Brentano and his successors played a major role in this process. Contemporary philosophy of mind established a new focus with the publication of Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949). Ryle tried to understand our mental states by analyzing the logical structures and relations of our mental concepts. This work is distinguished from psychology, which studies the actual operations of mind through experimental methods, and from philosophy of psychology, which investigates the philosophical implications of the results and methods of psychology. Major topics in the philosophy of mind include the mind–body problem; the nature of the mind; consciousness; mental causation; intentionality, propositional attitudes, and mental content; knowledge and belief; representation; perception; feelings; sensations; thought and language; will; and the emotions. Various approaches to the mind have been explored, such as dualism, phenomenalism, epiphenomenalism, behaviorism, parallelism, materialism, functionalism, and eliminativism. The philosophy of mind has been an extremely active discipline in recent decades. In the most recent years, some philosophers have sought to soften the distinction between philosophical and philosophy of nature: in one sense, the analysis and clarification of the concepts used by natural scientists, particularly those concepts that cut across the frontiers of the various scientific disciplines. In a traditional sense, philosophy of nature employs the philosophical contemplation of nature to work out general principles to explain the constituent stuff, basic structure, and movement of the natural world. This study was the main preoccupation of the pre-Socratic philosophers who originated Western philosophy. Philosophy of nature is also called “physics” [from Greek phusis, nature], and one of Aristotle’s major philosophical works is entitled Physics. Philosophy of nature has been a standard part of Western metaphysical systems, although it has been increasingly superseded by the empirical study of nature. Kant, however, held that philosophy of nature should seek to determine the basic concepts and principles on which scientists could build the whole structure of their knowledge of the world by establishing the a priori presuppositions of natural science. For Hegel, philosophy of nature stood above the empirical natural sciences by providing its own insights into the structure of facts and by going beyond scientific investigation. Philosophy of nature is also called “natural philosophy,” but it should not be confused with the nature-philosophy (Naturphilosophie) of the German romantic movement. “The philosophy of nature takes up the material which physics has prepared for it empirically, at the point to which physics has brought it, and reconstitutes it, so that experience is not its final warranted base.” Hegel, Philosophy of Nature philosophy of organism: a term used by A. N. Whitehead for his own metaphysical outlook, although his metaphysics is also called process philosophy. Influenced by field theory in physics, he believed that the ultimate basis of the natural world is force rather than matter. Nature is analyzed into units called actual occasions. An actual occasion is a process of becoming with its own orientation. It is like the Leibnizian monad, although, rather than being windowless, each actual occasion actively interrelates with other actual occasions in its immediate past. This process is called concrescere (Latin, to grow together) and generates an actual entity. Whitehead claimed that this picture explains the organic structure of the world. Physics studies smaller units, while biology studies larger units. Each unit has its own inner structure and is an organism. Larger units are systems of smaller units. “In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through its accidental embodiments, and apart from these accidents is devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed ‘creativity’.” Whitehead, Process and Reality philosophy of physics: A discipline of philosophy of science dealing with the philosophical impact of the development of modern physics, in particular philosophical issues arising in the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, modern thermodynamics, and contemporary cosmology. The major topics of philosophy of physics include space, time, motion, probability, causation, and objectivity in the quantum world. The discipline also investigates the foundations of physical theory, the aim of a physical theory, the interrelation of physical theories, and scientific methodology in physics and the logical systems suitable for modern physics. By exploring ideas and methods developed in physics, philosophy of physics contributes to our understanding of physics as a science. It tests the implications of new metaphysical claims arising within physics and shapes our insight into both human knowledge and the nature of things. “The philosophy of physics performs at least four useful functions, which may be called philosophical assimilation, research planning, quality control, and home cleaning.” Bunge, Philosophy of Physics philosophy of psychology: he study of psychological concepts and theories, philosophical presuppositions of approaches to psychology, and implications of psychological discoveries. It is part of a general development in the philosophy of science toward the integration of empirical and philosophical aspects of study, but in some respects philosophy of psychology overlaps with philosophy of mind. For many contemporary philosophers, philosophy of psychology has replaced philosophical psychology, which sought to analyze psychological concepts without attending to major developments in scientific psychology. Philosophy of psychology is concerned with empirical or experimental psychology. Empirical psychology as an independent discipline began with the establishment of the first psychology laboratory at University of Leipzig in 1879 by the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, although empirical psychology was also based initially on the associationist theory developed by Hume and J. S. Mill. Philosophy of psychology explores complex relations among different theories of mind, empirical data, and experiment in seeking a general account of the nature of mind. Psychological theories contributing to philosophical discussions about the mind have included Gestalt theory, Freudian theory, and behaviorism, but the source of much recent influence is cognitive science, in which the boundary between philosophy and psychology remains undetermined. This boundary is also challenged within philosophy, with Quine’s naturalistic epistemology tending to reduce epistemology to psychology. “[P]hilosophy of psychology, that is, the philosophical study of the nature and significance of the results and methods of scientific psychology.” McGinn, The Character of Mind philosophy of pure reason, see metaphysics (Kant) philosophy of religion Philosophy of religion A branch of philosophy dealing with the meaning, nature, and philosophical implications of religious beliefs and claims and of religious practices. Theoretically, all religions constitute its subject-matter, but since the philosophy of religion is a specialty developed in Western philosophy of social science countries, it naturally focuses on the claims of Western religions, especially the doctrines of Christianity but also including the doctrines of Judaism and Islam. Its main topics include: the conception of God; the conceptual analysis of divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, eternity, and the paradoxes resulting from these attributes; the logical characteristics of religious language; the examination of the logical structure of arguments for and against the existence of God, in particular of the most influential arguments such as the ontological argument, the argument from design, the cosmological argument, and the problem of evil; the relation between faith and reason; the relations between religion and morality, art and science; the philosophical comparison of different forms of religion; the phenomenology of religious experience and its role, if any, in justifying religious belief; the methods of religious argument; the afterlife or immortality; the discussions of particular Christian doctrines such as the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement. Many of these themes are also included in metaphysics and were the central topics in medieval philosophy. “What are the distinctive features of religious ideas? Do they here and there contain contradictions? On what possible basis can they be considered true or false? How do they mesh in, if at all, with the other concepts which we use? Such are the questions which typically fall within the ambit of the philosophy of religion.” N. Smart, The Philosophy of Religion philosophy of science: The study of logical, epistemological, and metaphysical problems arising from reflections on the sciences and scientific activities. It is a philosophical critique of science. This area is new as a specific discipline and has emerged in conjunction with the intellectual achievements of modern science, but in a wider sense has been a part of epistemology and metaphysics in the philosophical tradition. The exact bound of its research domain is hard to define, for science itself comprises a wide range of activities, modes of thought, and discourses. In general, the most important issues it investigates include the aims of science; the relations between scientific concepts and between scientific propositions; the principles assumed in science; the nature and structure of scientific rationality and methodology; scientific knowledge and its confirmation; rationality and scientific progress; explanation; scientific laws; natural necessity; probability; the unity or diversity of science; reduction and relations among the sciences; objectivity in science; certainty and fallibility in science; theory, observation, experiment in science; models in science; the ontological implications of science and the nature of theoretical entities; scientific creativity, invention, and discovery; science and other knowledge; science and religion; the social effects of scientific ideas; the relation of philosophy of science to history and sociology of science; the ethics of science. Major figures in this field include the logical positivists (logical analysis of the structure of science, verificationism), Hempel (scientific explanation), Popper (falsificationism), Lakatos (progressive and degenerating research programs), and Kuhn (paradigm shift and scientific revolutions). Before the Second World War, philosophy of science mainly focused on the logic of science. Since then, philosophers have been more interested in the developmental paradigms of sciences and the epistemology of science. Aside from general issues regarding the enterprise of science, there are specific problems arising in particular fields of science leading to discipline-specific studies, such as philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, and philosophy of psychology. “In any event, much is gained in the way of clarifying the aims of philosophical analysis by limiting the philosophy of science to a group of related questions that arise in attempting to understand the intellectual products of scientific inquiry as embodied in explicitly formulated statements.” E. Nagel, in Danto and Morgenbesser (eds.), Philosophy of Science philosophy of social science: In the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment, social sciences aimed to achieve the ideal of scientific objectivity and universality. But are natural sciences and social sciences similar? Philosophers who emphasize the meaning of human action or the role of ideology in social scientific inquiry believe that social sciences explain the social world in a distinct way. The tension between scientific explanation and interpretative understanding led to the emergence of the philosophy of social sciences. This discipline is concerned with the methodology and knowledge claims of the social sciences, especially with the logic of theory construction in the social sciences, with the nature, validity, and adequacy of social theory, and with causation or laws among social phenomena. It is also concerned with explanation without universal laws and the role of meaning and interpretation in the social sciences. It aims to elucidate the forms of reasoning and explanatory frameworks practiced in social sciences. A central question concerns the relation between social institutions and individuals with regard to explanatory priority, leading to a longstanding controversy concerning methodological collectivism and methodological individualism. Major approaches in the philosophy of social science include those initiated by Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber. The hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey and Hans-Georg Gadamer have challenged the unity of science model of the social sciences proposed by the logical positivists. The later work of Wittgenstein influenced Peter Winch’s attack on an account of the social sciences on the model of the natural sciences. Martin Hollis, who emphasizes the importance of rationality in understanding society, has argued for a possible accommodation between the rival traditions in the philosophy of social sciences. On this view, we must take care to determine the sort of questions we are asking and the sort of answers that would be appropriate. The philosophy of social sciences should be distinguished from social philosophy, for while social philosophy is the philosophical discussion of the features of human society, the philosophy of social science deals with philosophical, in particular epistemological and methodological, issues arising out of the practice of social scientists. Nevertheless, the work of Alasdair MacIntyre is a recent example of how these two philosophical enterprises can influence one another and in some instances merge. “To what extent can society be studied in the same way as nature? Without exaggerating, I think one could call this question the primal problem of the philosophy of the social sciences.” Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism philosophy of thought: A philosophical approach to thought represented by C. A. B. Peacocke and G. J. A. Evans. Its roots can be traced to Frege’s criticism of psychologism and his assertion that thought is the third realm (the others being the physical and the psychological). In contrast to the central tenet of traditional analytical philosophy, that an analysis of thought must depend on the analysis of language and that language is prior to thought, advocates of the philosophy of thought believe that the order of priority of this analysis should be reversed. Language can only be explained in terms of antecedently given notions that are thought-laden. Hence, the central consideration of philosophy is no longer language, but thought. It is thought that determines language, and not vice versa. Thought can be explained independently of language. Of course, traditional Cartesian epistemology also focuses on the question of the nature of thought, but the philosophy of thought considers thought as the content of propositions and deals with questions such as what it is to be a thought, how a thought can be grasped, how a thought is structured, how a thought can be about something, how we can judge a thought to be true, and how concepts that we grasp are related to thoughts. This type of philosophy is distinct from the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, although it is related to them. “The philosophy of thought concerns itself with the question what it is to be a thought, and with the structure of thoughts and their components: what it is for a thought to be about an object of one or another kind, what it is to grasp a concept and how a concept can be a component of a thought.” Dummett, Origins of Analytical Philosophy phonologism Modern European philosophy Derrida’s term for the feature of traditional metaphysics that establishes an opposition between speech and writing and then prefers speech or voice to writing. Voice [Greek phono] is traditionally considered to be the locus of truth, the real sign of essence and truth and the presence of consciousness to itself. One “hears” the voice of “reason” when one seeks the truth. Writing is considered to be a parasitic, supplementary, inferior, and derivative form of communication. Such a philosophical tradition is fully presented in Plato’s Phaedrus, and even Lévi-Strauss accepts this view. Derrida’s notion of phonologism is closely associated with, or even used interchangeably with, his notions of logocentrism and metaphysics of presence. The speech/writing opposition is one of the main objects of Derrida’s deconstruction. “This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning.” Derrida, Of Grammatology phrase-marker Philosophy of language Chomsky’s term for the components of the structural skeleton of a sentence. It is generated by starting with a rule for rewriting the sentence and further expanding its components using phrase-structure rules, eventually reaching a categorial structure. This structure will mark items such as noun phrases, prepositional phrases, and clauses. Phrase-markers are the elementary units from which deep structures are constituted. When we insert words into phrase markers and tidy them up, for example to ensure that the words have the right endings, we will have an actual sentence. “The base of the syntactic component is a system of rules that generate a highly restricted (perhaps finite) set of basic strings, each with an associated structural description called a base phrase-marker.” Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax phrase-structure grammar Philosophy of language One of the three models Chomsky uses in order to characterize our understanding of language and grammar (the other models are finite-state grammar and transformational grammar). It is a form of grammar associated with the theory of linguistic structure based upon immediate constituent analysis or parsing (from Latin pars, part). This analysis parses a sentence into various components and then assigns these components to categories such as Noun, Verb, Adverb, and so on. A language that can be thus derived is called a phrase-structure language. This analysis is characterized by the use of diagrams and the introduction of rewriting rules for turning symbols into other symbols. For example, we can rewrite “Sentence” as “Noun Phrase + Verb Phrase” and then rewrite “Noun Phrase” as “Article + Noun,” and so on. The different aspects of an utterance are successively disclosed in such an analysis. However, it can only be applied when we know what sentence we want to derive, and it fails to exhibit the intuited interrelationships that hold between different sentences. For instance, this grammar cannot incorporate “to be” into the class of verbs. Hence, Chomsky takes this grammar to be inadequate for linguistic description, and holds that it should be replaced by transformational grammar. “A phrase-structure grammar consists of an unordered set of rewriting rules, and assigns a structural description that can be represented as a tree-diagram with nodes labelled by symbols of the vocabulary.” Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax phrase-structure language, see phrase-structure grammar phrastic, see neustic/phrastic phronesis, Greek term for practical wisdom physical determinism Metaphysics, philosophy of science, ethics The belief that everything in the world, including human action, is governed by universal laws of nature. This position was presented in ancient atomism, and was fully articulated by Hobbes. The development of modern science, especially physics, led many to think that physical determinism must be true. Science claims that its aim is to discover these objective laws. If we can provide a complete physical explanation at this time for one thing, we will be able to predict its future on the grounds of natural laws. Human freedom should be understood as the lack of constraints, rather than as freedom from such causation. If all that we do is explicable in terms of physical laws, the immortality of soul must be denied. “Physical determinism is based on there being physical laws of nature, many of which have actually been discovered, and of whose truth we can reasonably hope to be quite certain, together with the claim that all other features of the world are dependent on physical factors.” Lucas, The Freedom of the Will physical objects, another term for material objects physical phenomenon, see mental phenomenon physicalism Philosophy of science, philosophy of mind A refinement of materialism introduced because not all physical phenomena are material. Physicalism assumes that physical science can encompass everything in the world, and that ultimately everything in the world can be explained through physics. It is possible to reduce any scientific predicate to a physical predicate. The word was introduced by the logical positivists for the claim that all scientific statements could be translated into statements about physical or observable objects. In this sense, physicalism is close to scientism, which claims that any language that can not be reduced to scientific language is defective. Carnap took physicalism as a synonym for behaviorism. However, the Australian philosopher J. J. C. Smart contrasted physicalism with behaviorism, taking the former to be a scientific approach and the latter a linguistic approach. Smart’s physicalism is also called the identity theory of mind or central-state materialism, because its main thesis is that mental events are identical to brain events. On this view, propositions about mental states turn out to be propositions about brain states that belong to the science of neurophysiology. Neuro-physiology, in turn, is reducible to physics. However, the physicalist view that the identity between mental states and brain states is contingent identity has been challenged by Kripke’s claim that all identity is necessary identity. The issues raised by this criticism include the nature of reference, description, meaning, identity, modality, and theory. “The thesis of physicalism maintains that the physical language is a universal language of science – that is to say, that every language of any subdomain of science can be equipollently translated into the physical language.” Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language. physico-theological argument Philosophy of religion Kant’s term for his version of the argument from design. The physicotheological argument is one of the three main theistic proofs for the existence of God, the other two being the ontological argument and the cosmological argument. It argues from observations that the world is purposive and teleologically arranged to the conclusion that there must be an intelligent designer who created it. For Kant, this argument is not sufficient to prove the existence of God because it relies upon the presupposition that there is a supreme being and is thus ultimately based on the ontological argument. Kant argued in detail for the impossibility of the ontological argument and held that its rejection showed that both the cosmological and physico-theological arguments are impossible as well. “Thus the physico-theological proof of the existence of an original or supreme being rests upon the cosmological proof, and the cosmological upon the ontological.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason pictorial form Metaphysics, philosophy of language Wittgenstein claimed that a proposition is a logical picture of reality. The elements in a picture are connected with one another in a certain way, and this is the structure of a picture. But how is such a structure possible? The possibility of the structure is called its pictorial form, which is the common element shared by a picture and the reality it represents. Pictorial form is the way a picture represents how objects are related to one another, allowing a picture to depict any reality whose form it has. The conception of pictorial form generalizes the notion of picture beyond its primitive base. The distinction between form and structure enables Wittgenstein to solve the ancient puzzle of the possibility of false judgment. “Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus picture theory Metaphysics, philosophy of language Wittgenstein’s theory of the proposition in the Tractatus, according to which a proposition is a picture of reality. To understand a proposition is to know the situation that it represents. The term “picture” (German Bild) is derived both from a drawn picture and from the mathematical sense of an abstract model. All propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Each elementary proposition is composed of unanalyzable names that designate simple objects. The sense of a proposition is the state of affairs it depicts. The way that elements are related in a proposition represents the same way in which objects are related to each other. Hence, a proposition has a pictorial nature. However, it is a logical picture that shares a pictorial form with what it depicts, rather than resembling what it depicts spatially. Although all propositions are pictures, not all pictures are propositions. It is a matter of dispute whether the picture theory of propositions collapses with Wittgenstein’s rejection of the metaphysics of logical atomism of the Tractatus. “It is commonly said that Wittgenstein after the Tractatus abandoned the picture theory of propositions.” Kenny, The Legacy of Wittgenstein piecemeal engineering Political philosophy, philosophy of social science Popper’s proposal for an approach to social change. Piecemeal social engineering contrasts with the utopian engineering of rapid, large-scale reform or revolution. Instead of setting up a positive blueprint for society and then seeking the means to realize it, piecemeal engineering confronts the ills of society through a succession of limited reforms. Social life is so complicated that we can not tell in advance the unintended consequences of any policy, and these consequences might be harmful. If reform is too complex, rapid, or wide-ranging, we can not trace harmful consequences to their source and correct them. Popper argued that reforming society by piecemeal social engineering would improve institutions and maintain social stability more effectively that utopian strategies. Some critics argue that a policy of piecemeal social engineering would succeed only if there were social agreement, but on such matters there are often deep divisions. “The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good.” Popper, Open Society and Its Enemies pietism Philosophy of religion A devotional religious movement within Protestantism, springing from Lutheranism and flourishing in Germany in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It was founded by a German Lutheran pastor, Philipp Jakob Spener. The name of the movement was derived from the twice-weekly Bible study meetings for devout lay-people (called collegia pietatis) under Spener’s organization. The movement aimed at being free from the influence of Church and tradition. It stressed autonomous subjectivity and claimed that the real purpose of redemption is to bring the religious subjectivity of man into lively play. The real interest of theology should be to promote the exercise of godliness. The individual should determine the shape of his own religious life by confronting the Bible. The movement emphasized individual experience and practicality rather than evidence and reason. It was concerned with particular problems and situations rather than with the establishment of universal principles. Pietism was the religion of Kant, and the movement also produced figures such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Gotfried Arnold. “Pietism represented a turning towards a more inward, emotional, and enthusiastic form of Christianity.” Pinson, Pietism as a Factor in the Role of German Nationalism pineal gland Philosophy of mind Descartes held that mind and body are two entities that are completely different in nature. How, then, can the soul have a unified relationship with the entire body? How can mind and body mutually affect one another? Descartes’s answer is that the soul does not exercise its functions directly on the body, but affects the body through the pineal gland. The pineal gland is an organ that is situated in the middle of the brain and is unique to humans. For Descartes, the pineal gland is the seat of the soul. He claimed that the mind generates movements in the pineal gland, which in turn generates movements in the nerves and hence the body. Giving a location to mind–body interaction is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of psycho-physical causation. The rejection of this appeal to the pineal gland led to the parallelism of Spinoza, the occasionalism of Malebranche, and the pre-established harmony of Leibniz. “There is no other place in the body where they can be thus united unless they are so in this gland.” Descartes, The Passions of the Soul plagiarism, see forgery Plantinga, Alvin (1932– ) American logician and philosopher of religion, born in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Professor at Calvin College and University of Notre Dame. Plantinga has used the techniques of modern logic and philosophy to discuss classical questions in the philosophy of religion. He argues that belief in the existence of God can be justified in the same way as belief in the existence of other minds. An account of modal logic in terms of possible worlds is the basis of his treatment of the problem of evil and of his version of Anselm’s ontological argument. His major works include God and Other Minds (1967) and The Nature of Necessity (1974). Plato (427–347 bc) Greek philosopher, born in Athens, founder of a school, the Academy, in Athens in 387 bc. Plato’s writings are in the form of dialogues in which the main speaker is Socrates. Hence, there are problems in distinguishing between the philosophy of the historical Socrates and Plato’s own philosophy. There are also controversies about the chronological order of his dialogues. The orthodox division recognizes three stages: the early, middle, and late dialogues. The early dialogues include Apology, Crito, Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Ion, Protagoras, and Gorgias. These dialogues are generally short (except the last two), aporetic, and ethical in content. They are considered to be closely related to the thought and practice of the historical Socrates and are also called the “Socratic dialogues.” The middle dialogues, including Meno, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus, contain Plato’s mature thought. In them Plato established his influential theory of Ideas (or Forms). Beyond the sensible world there is a world of Ideas that is the real object of knowledge. The existence of sensible things is due to their participation in Ideas. In the Republic, the centerpiece of Plato’s philosophy, he developed various metaphors to illustrate the relation between two worlds, such as the allegories of the Sun, the Line, and the Cave. He also established theories of the tripartite soul, the ideal state, and the philosopher-king. All these were aimed to answer the question of why one should be moral. The late dialogues include Parmenides, Theaetetus, Cratyus, Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Statement, Philebus, and Laws. The first part of the Parmenides introduced the Third Man argument to criticize the theory of forms established in the middle dialogues, but scholars disagree about the implications of this self-criticism. Other late dialogues mainly developed different themes of the Republic. There are various approaches in reading Plato’s dialogues. Some claim that Plato’s philosophy undergoes a development of several different stages. Others believe that we should treat his thought as a unified whole. Still others suggest that we should read each dialogue separately. Plato’s beard Logic Quine’s term for a classical puzzle, which can be traced to Plato’s Sophist and concerns the existence of non-being. We can formulate the true sentence, “The Queen of China does not exist,” but it seems plausible to claim that the non-existent Queen must in some sense be for us to make sense of denying her existence. Yet it seems selfcontradictory to say that we can infer the being of something from its non-being. This puzzle has led philosophers to examine both the nature of reference and the logical form of existential propositions. “This is the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Plato’s beard.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View Platonism Metaphysics Philosophy derived from the spirit of the philosophy of Plato, in particular from his Theory of Forms, which contrasts reality with phenomena; soul with body; knowledge with opinion; reason with sensation; and rationality with emotion. It then claims that the first member of each contrasting pair is superior or more real than the second member. Such contrasts form an essential ingredient of Western philosophy and have inspired many philosophers since Plato. In this sense, Whitehead reasonably claimed that all subsequent philosophies are footnotes to Plato. Those who claim explicitly to be the heirs of Plato include the Academy tradition (the Old, Middle, and New Academy), Neoplatonism, the Renaissance Platonism of Marsilio Ficino, and the Cambridge Platonism of the seventeenth century. In contemporary philosophy, all positions that suggest the independent existence of abstract objects are called Platonism. According to these accounts, abstracta can be grasped by the mind, but can not be created by it. Platonism in this sense is virtually synonymous with realism and is opposed to nominalism. “Empiricism may properly be contrasted with platonism. For the platonist believes . . . that the propositions of logic and mathematics concern an abstract (non-physical and changeless) but genuinely mind-independent realm of objects, including universals such as beauty and wisdom, as well as mathematical entities such as the natural numbers.” Carruthers, Human Knowledge and Human Nature plausibility Epistemology A claim is plausible if it subjectively seems worthy of belief even if we have not necessarily studied its objective ground. Plausibility is thus acceptable credibility, and its degree of credibility can depend in part on the authority that advocates it. A plausible claim can turn out to be false, and an implausible claim can turn out to be true. People can disagree on what they find plausible. Plausibility is distinct from probability, which is related to alternatives. A belief is probable if its degree of likelihood is greater than that of its alternatives. On most accounts, probability is more objective than plausibility, although the personalism of de Finetti and Ramsey understands probability as a subjective degree of belief. “All holding-to-be-true based on grounds concerning which we do not investigate whether they contain a large or a small degree of truth is plausibility.” Kant, Lectures on Logic. pleasure Philosophy of mind, ethics, philosophy of action [Greek hedone, from which hedonism is derived] Pleasure is taken to be contrary to pain but related to enjoyment and liking. Plato in the Philebus argues that pleasure is an indeterminate state and can not be measured, a position challenged by social choice and other theories that depend on some way of measuring pleasure. Aristotle holds that pleasure, in contrast to movement, is an activity having its own end and is the natural accompaniment of successful activity, whether of the mind or the senses. Pleasure is not identical to happiness, but is an important part of it. This position opposes traditional hedonism, which claims that pleasure is the only good or the highest good. According to Utilitarianism an action is justified to the extent that it tends to produce pleasure and to reduce pain. Pleasure is often viewed as an agreeable feeling, but there is much debate regarding its nature, classification, and relation to desire, in part because of its central role in the discussion of human motivation and value. “Appetite’s concern is pleasure and pain.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Plekhanov, Georgii Valentinovich (1856–1918) Russian Marxist philosopher, born in Lijseck. He sought to develop the thought of Marx and Engels into a system, which he called dialectical materialism. Plekhanov criticized economic determinism and maintained that historical development was also partly influenced by psychological and other noneconomic factors. He also extended his version of Marxism to aesthetics and ethics. Plekhanov was once a collaborator of Lenin, but later supported the Mensheviks against the Bolsheviks. Plekhanov’s major writings include In Defense of Materialism (1895) and The Development of the Monist View of History (1895). Plotinus (c.204–270) Greco-Roman philosopher, born in Egypt, founder of Neoplatonism. Plotinus’ masterpiece is the Enneads, a collection of 54 essays, which his student Porphyry, who edited the volume, arranged into six groups, each containing nine treatises. Plotinus claimed that the world had three hypostases or realities: (1) the One, which, as the highest principle,is above Being and is ineffable; (2) Intelligence, which is the realm of true being; and (3) the Soul. The relationship among these realities was described as a process of “emanation”: Intelligence emanates from the One, and the Soul emanates from Intelligence. Further, matter emanates from the Soul. Man can grasp the One by contemplating it and by becoming one with it. In that state, the Soul experiences ecstasy. pluralism Metaphysics, ethics [from Latin pluris, more than one] A doctrine, opposed to monism and dualism, holding that reality consists of many things and that none of its constituents is more fundamental than any of the others. It is therefore impossible to reduce everything in reality to one or two ultimate principles. For pluralism there are many worlds that we are able to construct through the use of different systems of concepts and different standards of measurement. Leibniz’s theory of monads, Russell’s logical atomism, and later Wittgenstein’s theory of language-games are different forms of pluralism. Sometimes pluralism means that reality has no basic unity or continuity, but is essentially fragmented or indeterminate. In ethics, pluralism means that there are various competing ethical interests or values that can not be reduced to one single overriding interest or value. “The extreme form of pluralism is the assumption that all relations are external, with the consequence that the existence of any one object is logically independent of the existence of any other.” Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century pneuma Ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of science [Greek, breath] A key term in Stoic philosophy of nature. Pneuma was held to be a compound of fire and air, although not a simple chemical compound, and was also called artistic or intelligent pneuma. Through having two components, pneuma was held to have a peculiar tensional movement making it continuously active. It was described as a material substance with fine and tenuous structure, but also as a cohesive force or energy that pervades the universe to account for its change and persistence. As nature, God, or the universal logos, it acted on matter, that is, the elements of earth and water,to hold them together. Pneuma worked in the macrocosm and also in every individual body. The concept of pneuma was influenced by the preSocratics and in turn influenced the postulation of aether in the science of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. It is also comparable to a field of force in contemporary physics. “This pneuma possesses two parts, elements or conditions, which are blended with one another through and through, the cold and hot, or if one wished to describe them by different names taken from their substances: air and fire.” Chrysippus, in Gelen, On Hippocrates and Plato’s Doctrines pneumatology, another expression for rational psychology poiesis Ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of action [Greek from poiein, to act, to do, or to make] For Aristotle, poiesis is restricted to making or producing that has as its aim something beyond itself, for example shipbuilding, which has the aim of producing a vessel. It is distinguished from praxis (action, conduct), which has aims and value in itself. Poiesis belongs to techne (craft), while praxis belongs to phronesis (practical reason). In another sense, poiesis is used specifically for poetry and its composition. “The state involving reason and concerned with action is different from the state involving reason and concerned with poiesis.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Poincaré, Jules Henri (1854–1912) French scientist and philosopher of science, born in Nancy. As a conventionalist, he maintained that the fundamental geometrical axioms were established as a matter of convention, according to the criteria of simplicity and economy. Hence, these axioms are neither verifiable nor non-verifiable. However, he also accepted the order of the external world and claimed that the aim of physics is to discover this universal order. In mathematics, he was an intuitionist and rejected Russell’s philosophy of mathematics. Poincaré’s major books in philosophy of science include Science and Hypothesis (1902), The Value of Science (1905), and Science and Method (1908). polar-related concept pair Philosophy of language, metaphysics A pair of concepts that are opposite in meaning, where each of them can be understood or identified only in terms of its contrast with the other. The notion is also called conceptual polarity. Neither member of the pair has an autonomous existence as a concept apart from the other, and neither member can logically be reduced to the other. In many cases, one concept of the polar pair is formed in association with the other from which it is distinguished. Examples of polar pairs include up and down, unity and plurality, physical and mental, and error and truth. The application of each entails the possibility of applying the other. In the history of Western philosophy, various polarities have been established, and usually one member is thought to be superior to the other. Derrida’s deconstructionism is intended to reject dichotomous conceptual structures and their relations of unequal power and value, but it is difficult to determine whether we can do without such concept pairs or whether objectionable implications of value can be detached from them. political liberty Political philosophy According to liberalism, the basic rights or liberties that citizens of a just society hold equally. It is the liberty held in virtue of citizenship. Political liberty includes negative liberties, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest and the freedom to pursue one’s own interest and plan without obstruction, and positive liberties, such as freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to possess property. Political liberties provide the main content of human rights. “A particularly important type of discrimination is that where one concept, so to speak, includes by exclusion. Concepts related in this way constitute the most important concepts of our thinking, we denoted as ‘polar-related concept pairs’.” Reiss, The Basis of Scientific Thinking. “I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others.” Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty Polish notation Logic The notation employed in contemporary logic is generally Russellian symbolism. Yet there is an important kind of notation that was originated by the Polish logician Lukasiewicz and was widely employed by Polish logicians between the two world wars. It was also preferred by the logician Arthur Prior. The chief characteristic of Polish notation is that it places all its operators immediately before their arguments, and thus gets rid of parentheses. This helps avoid ambiguity and better serves automatic processing. The following is the list of this set of notation, with an English explanation in bracket: Np (not p) Apq (either p or q) Kpq (both p and q) Cpq (if p then q) Epq (p if and only if q) Mp (possibly p) Lp (necessarily p) Ixy (x is the same as y) Sxfx (for some x, fx) Pxfx (for every x, fx) “Polish notation shows which expressions are arguments and which expressions are functions by always writing all arguments to the right of their functions.” Williams, What is Existence political obligation Political philosophy The duty to obey the laws and rules of the state. A fundamental problem for political philosophy concerns the grounds for accepting the authority of the state, given that state jurisdiction has the character of universality and compulsion. Under what conditions is obedience required or disobedience justified? These issues are closely associated with attempts to determine the basis of the authority of the state, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate governments, and the problem of civil disobedience. Political obligation can not be understood merely in terms of prudence and the fear of coercive power. Various theories of political obligation have been put forward over the centuries, such as those focusing on divine right, the social contract, consent, the general will, justice, rationality, or membership in an historically determined community. “[H]aving a political obligation ordinarily presupposes the existence of a rule (whether a legal rule or some other type) which forbids or requires a specified form of conduct.” Flathman, Political Obligation political philosophy Political philosophy Political philosophy is distinguished from political science on the grounds that political science is empirical and descriptive, explaining how government in fact works, while political philosophy is normative, establishing the norms or ideal standards that prescribe how governments ought to work. In fact, the boundary between the two fields is not clear. Political theory includes both empirical and normative investigations. Contemporary political philosophers bring analytic skill and ethical commitment to their work. They seek theoretical insight into basic political concepts, such as justice, equality, liberty, democracy, nationalism, the state, power, authority, citizenship, rights, and obligations, and look for rational grounds to accept or reject particular political institutions. Political philosophers assess existing political institutions and ideologies and in some cases seek to justify alternative political and social systems if existing arrangements are unacceptable. Plato’s Republic remains the major classic. Other prominent political philosophers include Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Burke, Hegel, Mill, and Marx. Much recent discussion in political philosophy has responded to the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. A rigid demarcation between political and social philosophy is impossible, and social philosophers, such as Jürgen Habermas, have influenced recent political philosophy. Social philosophy also deals with philosophical issues relating to institutions such as the family, religion, and education. Critiques of culture and modernity derived from Nietzsche and his successors have also influenced political philosophy. “Politics is the exercise of the power of the state, or the attempt to influence that exercise. Political philosophy is therefore, strictly speaking, the philosophy of the state.” Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism political theory Political philosophy, philosophy of social science An academic discipline aiming to provide a systematic understanding of the nature and purpose of government and to provide certain views about how political institutions ought to be improved. It is distinct from political philosophy, which seeks to explicate and give theoretical insight into normative political concepts, such as justice, liberty, equality, the state, democracy, authority, citizenship, and rights, and from political science, which seeks to provide explanatory theories and classifications in relation to the empirical data of politics. Nevertheless, political theory is closely related to these other disciplines and is often regarded as the theoretical aspect of political science. Traditionally, its main preoccupation has been to analyze the work of the classical political thinkers, from Plato to Marx, and to apply their insights to current political affairs. Recently, political theorists have become interested in constructing formal models of political processes. With the contemporary questioning of the analytic-synthetic and fact-value distinctions, political philosophy, political theory, and political science have drawn more closely together. “Political theory is . . . an essentially mixed mode of thought. It not only embraces deductive argument and empirical theory, but combines these with normative concerns . . . so acquiring a practical, action-guiding character.” Miller and Siedentop (eds.), The Nature of Political Theory polyadic, see dyadic polysyllogism Logic An inference composed of a series of syllogisms in which the conclusion of an earlier syllogism becomes a premise of a later syllogism in the series. The earlier syllogism is called a prosyllogism, and the later syllogism is called an episyllogism. For example, take (1) all rs are ps; (2) all ps are qs; (3) all rs are qs; (4) all qs are ds; (5) all rs are ds. Not only is (3) a conclusion derived from (1) and (2), but it is also a premise of the syllogism composed of (3), (4), and (5). A syllogism with more than two premises is generally analyzed as two or more syllogisms. “A series of syllogisms, one providing a premise of another, is called a polysyllogism.” Joseph, An Introduction to Logic polytheism Philosophy of religion [from Greek poly, many + theos, god] A belief that there are many gods, instead of one. Religions that accept and worship many gods are called polytheistic religions. This view is opposed to monotheism (from Greek mono, one, single + theos, god), the belief that there is only one God. The religion of the ancient Greeks was polytheistic, and Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are monotheistic. It is often held that polytheism is inconsistent with true religious belief, because its gods, who are pictured as quarrelling, lying, and cheating, are far from moral perfection. Based on the observation that polytheism characterizes the religions of early societies, monotheists argue that polytheism is a stage of human religious development that culminates in monotheism. “Polytheism: more than one god exists.” Sorensen, Thought Experiment Pomponazzi, Pietro (1462–1525) Italian Renaissance Aristotelian philosopher, born in Mantua. Pomponazzi distinguished between what we know through natural reason and what we accept through faith, and said that, in view of conflicting arguments about mortality and immortality, we can accept the immortality of the human soul as a matter of faith. He maintained that divine predestination and human free will are compatible and argued that natural causes can explain apparent miracles. His main books are On the Immortality of the Soul (1516) and On Fate, Free Will, and Predestination (1520). pons asinorum Logic [Latin, the bridge of asses, because asses were traditionally thought to have difficulty in crossing bridges] This term has several uses. It refers to proofs from Euclid’s Elements of two theorems: first, if two sides of a triangle are equal, then the angles opposite those sides are also equal; and secondly, the Pythagorean theorem, the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. Those who fail to follow these proofs are considered to be as stupid as asses. In another sense, a pons asinorum is a bridgelike diagram proposed by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. It was used as a study aid to show how to proceed from premises to a given conclusion. “In the later Middle Ages this diagram (with accompanying mnemonic verses to distinguish good connexions from bad) was used extensively for the teaching of syllogistim and came to be known as the pons asinorum.” Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic. Popper, Sir Karl Raimund (1902–94) Austrian–British philosopher, born in Vienna, knighted in 1965. In philosophy of science, Popper’s important books include The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935, 1959), Conjectures and Refutations (1963), and Objective Knowledge (1972). In contrast to the verifiability criterion of meaning put forward by logical positivists, Popper proposed a criterion of falsifiability to demarcate empirical science from metaphysics and pseudo-sciences. He held that science advances by proposing daring conjectures and then testing them by seeking falsifying instances, in contrast to the traditional empiricist view that science grows by finding inductive support for hypotheses. In this way, he sought to circumvent the traditional problem of induction and saw science to be provisional rather than dogmatic. His propensity theory of probability understood probability as the propensity or disposition of an individual situation to produce a given result. His epistemology involved the evolution of a world of things objectively known as well as physical things and subjective states. In social and political philosophy, his major books include The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols. (1945) and The Poverty of Historicism (1957). He defended the ideal of an open society against authoritarianism in Plato, Hegel, and Marx and rejected claims that laws of history lead to inevitable outcomes. He argued that social reform by piecemeal social engineering, which allows the intended and unintended consequences of change to be rationally assessed, is preferable to revolution and utopian planning. popular art Aesthetics Art is often distinguished into serious, higher, or esoteric art and popular art. Popular art has dominated modern mass-media culture and has great social influence. Critics of popular art claim that it is inferior to the higher forms of art and fear that it corrupts higher culture. They allege that popular art lacks creativity in both form and content and does no more than please its audience. They see it as intellectually shallow and emotionally disruptive and argue that its appreciation requires neither effort nor training, but only passive response. Popular art is alleged to produce spurious gratification rather than real aesthetic satisfaction. In all, these critics see popular art as intrinsically worthless in aesthetic terms. Cultural elitists claim that popular art is a lower taste that reduces the quality of our culture. Perhaps led by aesthetic attention to film, many recent critics and cultural theorists have adopted a more favorable attitude toward popular arts. They have challenged much of the hostile assessment given above and have argued that fastidious higher arts have benefited greatly from the exuberant strength of popular arts. We should at least distinguish among different forms of popular art. Intelligent appreciation might improve them without destroying their character or their legitimate function. “The distinction between esoteric and popular arts almost coincides in our civilisation with that between art and entertainment, but need not do so; the former distinction, unlike the latter, does not impute insincerity and the will to manipulate.” Sparshott, The Structure of Aesthetics pornography Aesthetics, ethics A genre of fiction, initially associated with brothels, focusing on the representation of obscene – often perverse – sexual activities, with the intention of sexually arousing its readers, mainly men. The term now extends to cover any work in any medium with the same content and intention. Although the boundaries are difficult to draw, hardcore pornography, which depicts cruelty, violence, and explicit arousal can be distinguished from soft-core, which does not. Pornography, as distinct from erotic art, is generally considered to have little redeeming aesthetic interest, for its dominant aim is the gratification of sexual fantasy. Because pornography is thought to be morally harmful and degrading to individuals and society, many consider that any material found to be pornographic should be restricted or prohibited. Others argue that pornography should be eliminated because it supports in fantasy real and objectionable patterns of patriarchal domination in society. Opponents argue that pornography has a positive function of dealing with sexual desire without involving unwelcome sexual advances. The issue of censorship of pornography is debated in terms of the freedom of thought and the press, on the one hand, and the need to avoid degrading creators and users of pornography, women and society, on the other. “If we assume that the majority is correct, and that people who publish and consume pornography do the wrong thing, or at least display the wrong sort of character, should they nevertheless have the legal right to do so?” Dworkin, A Matter of Principle Porphyrian tree Ancient Greek philosophy, philosophical method The Greek Neoplatonist Porphyry, the editor of Plotinus’ Enneads, wrote an introduction (Greek Isagoge) to Aristotle’s Categories. It was translated into Latin by Boethius and became the standard philosophical textbook in the Middle Ages. In his introduction, Porphyry presented the basis of Aristotle’s thought as a tree-like scheme of dichotomous divisions, which indicates that a species (subgenera) is defined by genus et differentia and that the process continues until the lowest species (infima species) is reached. In the category of substance, the tree is: Substance Corporeal Incorporeal Animate Sensitive Inanimate Insensitive Irrational Rational Mortal Immortal Thus, to define a human being (for example, Socrates), we shall say that he is a mortal, rational, sensitive, animate, corporeal substance. The tree is the standard device by which medieval metaphysics classified natural kinds. “A Porphyrian Tree begins with an Aristotelian category . . . and moves via a series of dichotomies from the most general genus through at least some of its species.” Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism Porphyry (c.232–c.305) Neoplatonist philosopher, born in Tyre, the editor of Plotinus’ Enneads. Porphyry helped to popularize and spread Neoplatonism throughout the Roman Empire. In his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, Isagoge (Introduction), he introduced “species” as the fifth predicable and presented the “Tree of Porphyry” as a way of relating genus, species, and individuals. This work was translated into Latin by Boethius and exerted a great influence on medieval logic and discussion of the problem of universals. Port-Royal Logic Logic In 1662, French theologians and philosophers Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole published La Logique; Ou, l’Art de Penser (Logic; Or the Art of Thinking). Both of them were teachers at Port Royal, a monastery in the southwest of Paris and the intellectual center of Jansenism. Hence the book is generally called the Port-Royal Logic. The book defines logic as the art of managing one’s reason in the knowledge of things for the instruction of others and one-self. It claims that the mind has four principal operations: conceiving, judging, reasoning, and ordering, and the book is divided into four corresponding parts. The Port-Royal Logic is established on the basis of Cartesian epistemology and rejects the subtleties of medieval logic. It introduced into logic modern scientific methods and contributed to propositional logic. The book became the standard logic textbook until the nineteenth century and had a wide impact on the development of modern logic. It is also regarded as the precursor of modern linguistic analysis. “Port Royal Logic . . . both contains an argument against probabilism and is the first occasion on which ‘probability’ is actually used in what is identifiably our modern sense, susceptible of numerical measurement.” Hacking, The Emergence of Probability posit Epistemology, metaphysics The assumption or hypothesis that is given as the starting-point of a theory or an explanation. The question of its truth is often left to a later stage of dealing with the theory or explanation, or is not dealt with separately at all. For Quine, all the entities we use to explain and organize sense experience are posits. Hence, they are everything that we claim to exist aside from sense experience, including abstract objects as well as physical objects. “Everything to which we conclude existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory-building process and simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being built.” Quine, Word and Object positive fact, see negative fact positive freedom, an alternative expression for positive liberty positive law Philosophy of law [from Latin jus, law + positivum, to lay down, hence laws established by human society and institutions] In contrast to natural law, which holds that laws were authored by God or are based on human nature, positive law relies on the will of legislators and applies only to the members of the community for which the legislators legislate. In the philosophy of law, natural law theory claims that the authority of positive law is derived from its compliance with natural law, while legal positivism argues that there is no necessary connection between positive law and morality. In Austin’s command theory of law, the conception of positive law is narrowed to the laws laid down by the sovereign of a political society or its subordinates. “As contradistinguished to natural law, or to the law of nature (meaning, by these expressions, the law of God), the aggregate of the rules, established by political superiors, is frequently styled positive law, or law existing by position.” Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence positive liberty Ethics, political philosophy Positive liberty or positive freedom is concerned with enabling one to be the self-determining master of one’s own life and action. With positive liberty, one is autonomous and can freely exercise one’s own will. On this view, one’s life and decisions do not depend on external forces, but are limited solely by one’s capabilities, resources, and opportunities. According to Isaiah Berlin, positive liberty contrasts with negative liberty, which is freedom from external interference. Unlike negative liberty, positive liberty has a specific content, so that a person is not deemed to be free unless living according to that content. Berlin argued that such a notion of positive liberty carried with it the danger of despotism and he preferred the more open political systems incorporating negative liberty. “The positive sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master.” Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty “Apart from Kantianism, there is no contemporary philosophical movement so closely associated with exact science as positivism.” Schlick, Philosophical Papers positivism Philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of religion A philosophical tradition founded by the French philosopher Auguste Comte, although its ancestry may be traced to Francis Bacon. The general spirit of positivism is that philosophy should only be concerned with what is positively given (this is also the meaning of the word “positive”) and should avoid any speculative thinking that goes beyond given experience. Accordingly, positivism takes the study of scientific methodology as its major task and presents itself as a kind of philosophy of science. Comte’s positivism has a famous Law of the Three Stages, which claims that the human mind has developed historically through stages. An initial theological stage was characterized by attempts to explain the inner nature of things in terms of supernatural beings. In a subsequent metaphysical stage, earlier deities were depersonalized and became explanatory abstractions such as essence or force. Finally, in the positivist stage, the human mind realizes that all genuine knowledge is based on sense experience and can only be advanced by means of observation and therefore understands that metaphysics should be abandoned. Comte also initiated a positive sociology, which studied human societies in terms of positive methods, and a positive religion, which sought to replace the worship of God with the worship of Humanity. Herbert Spencer linked positivism with the theory of evolution to make the study of the all-embracing evolutionary process the major task of philosophy. The descendants of positivism include the empirio-criticism of Mach and Avenarius, which held that science describes sense-experience and has no need to postulate any hidden entities such as the atom; the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, which developed the principle of verification, incorporated the new logical developments of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, and held an extremely hostile attitude to metaphysics; and legal positivism, which emphasizes that law should be as it is (positive law) rather than as we might believe it should be (natural law). possibilism, see actualism possible world Logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics Although philosophers had been talking about what is possible long before, the origin of a possible world discourse is generally credited to Leibniz, who claimed that although our world contains much that is evil, it is nonetheless the best of all possible worlds. In contemporary philosophy, discussion of possible worlds developed into a semantic interpretation for modal logic and a proposal to solve the truth-value problem of counterfactual conditionals. The idea is to construe a counterfactual as stating some possible states of affairs in which things are other than the way they actually are. There are two views about how to understand possible worlds. One is the extreme possibilism held by David Lewis, which claims that the actual world we inhabit is only one of many real worlds, each of which exemplifies ways that things could have been besides the ways that they are. Such an objective interpretation gives rise to the problem of transworld identity, which in turn motivated Lewis to develop his counterpart theory. The other account of possible worlds, represented by Kripke, is in terms of one or more intensional items such as properties, propositions, or states of affairs and of some modal notions such as instantiability or possible truth. On this view, a possible world is a world whose properties are not actually instantiated or a world that has obtainable but not actually obtaining states of affairs. According to this latter interpretation, a possible world is not another world, but is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it. In order to distinguish this account from Lewis’s account, Kripke sometimes suggests that we use terms such as a possible state or history of the world or a counterfactual situation to replace the notion of a possible world. There is much debate about the theory of possible worlds, regarding problems such as essentialism, possible but non-actual entities, transworld identity, reference and meaning. Currently, modal concepts are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds. “Necessarily p” is equivalent to “P is true in every possible world,” and “Possibly p” is equivalent to “P is true in some possible world.” “Possible worlds are total ‘ways the world might have been’, or states or histories of the entire world.” Kripke, Naming and Necessity post-historical art, see death of art post hoc ergo propter hoc, see fallacy of false cause postmodernism: A fashionable but elusive term used originally among artists and critics in the 1960s to reject any dominant framework dictating artistic style. Postmodernism in art was a reaction to modernism, which has provided such a framework throughout the twentieth century. Modernism emphasizes experimentation, an inner truth behind surface appearances, and the presence of paradoxical ambiguities and uncertainties in our life experience. In art and literature, postmodernism seeks to cancel the boundary between art and daily life and the distinction between elite and popular taste. It emphasizes surface instead of depth and stylistic form rather than content. In the 1970s, postmodernism was taken up by some influential continental philosophers. Modernity is normally taken to have begun with the work of Descartes in the seventeenth century and has shaped the issues, problems, and standards of relevance that have occupied Western philosophers since then. If Descartes is seen as the father of modernism, then postmodernism comprises a variety of cultural positions that reject major features of Cartesian (or allegedly Cartesian) modern thought. A major characteristic of Cartesian modernism is to insist on the supremacy of pure rationality. The pursuit of knowledge should be independent of practical concerns, traditional beliefs, and any social, political, and economic interests of those seeking knowledge. Views that stress the priority of the social to the individual; that reject the universalizing tendencies of philosophy; that prize irony over knowledge; and that give the irrational and the rational equal claims to roles in our procedures for acquiring knowledge all fall under the postmodernist umbrella. Postmodernism tries to replace logic with narrative because it disputes the claim that meaning can be determined by logical and semantic analysis. It denies univocality and linearity and rejects any theoretical grounds for culture. The major exponents of postmodernism include Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty, Jean-François Lyotard, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard, and Gilles Deleuze. Postmodernism has also greatly influenced the contemporary feminist movement, represented by Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. Postmodernist criticism of modernist concerns with meaning, truth, objectivity, rationality, and universality has not led a constructive alternative, but not having a constructive alternative is perhaps part of the point of postmodernism. “Postmodernism is of great interest to a wide range of people because it directs our attention to changes, the major transformations, taking place in contemporary society and culture.” Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-structuralism and Post-modernism post res universals, see universalia, ante rem post-structuralism Modern European philosophy The Saussurian model of linguistics is the basis of structuralism. Post-structuralism originated with the rejection of that model. While Saussure emphasized that each signifier acquires its semantic value only by virtue of its differential position within the structure of language, post-structuralists augmented their account of the relations among signifiers through, for example, Nietzschean concerns with power and Freudian concerns with unconscious origin. They reject the existence of the unity of the stable sign and question the possibility of any descriptive and analytical language. They do not believe that authors are the authority for the meaning and truth of what they write, but claim instead that reading is an active performance creating interpretations rather than a passive consumption of a product. Post-structuralism rejects a static notion of meaning and is hostile to any system or attempt at systemconstruction. A truth-claim for what we say or write is not a matter of course, and meaning is not tightly bound up with truth. Thought is constituted through and through by the codes, conventions, language-games, and discourses that make up a given cultural order. In a sense, post-structuralism seeks to subvert the traditional understanding of the structures of language. The movement is influenced by Nietzsche, and its major representatives include Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, JeanFrançois Lyotard, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida. Post-structuralism shares many common features with postmodernism. “While structuralism sees truth as being ‘behind’ or ‘within’ a text, post-structuralism stresses the interaction of reader and text as a productivity.” Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Post-modernism postulates of empirical knowledge Epistemology, metaphysics For each of his four groups of categories, Kant introduced principles to show the objective validity of the employment of categories of that kind. For the categories of quantity, quality, and relation, the principles are respectively the axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, and analogies of experience. For the categories of modality, the principles are the postulates of empirical knowledge. While the other principles determine the ways in which appearances are related to each other, the postulates determine the modes in which the subject of experience is related to its experiences. The postulates include the principle of the possible, which requires that the concepts of things should agree with the formal conditions of experience; the principle of the actual, which requires that the concept is connected to the material conditions of experience; and the principle of the necessary, which requires that the actual experience conforms to both the formal and material conditions of experience. These principles are called postulates, not in the mathematical sense of being immediately certain without justification, but in the sense that they are procedural specifications of relations between the understanding and the synthesis of appearances. “The same can be asserted of the postulates of empirical thought in general, which concern the synthesis of mere intuition (that is, of the form of appearance), of perception (that is, of the matter of perception), and of experience (that is, of the relation of these perceptions).” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason potentiality Metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy [Greek dunamis, the power or capacity of one subject to effect change in another subject or the power or capacity of one subject to be affected by another thing] We can distinguish non-rational capacities (the capacity of eyes to see) from rational capacities (the capacity of a person to build). The realization of these capacities is their exercise. For Aristotle, however, this sense is not important philosophically. Potentiality was important for him through connection with substantial change, in which potentiality is associated with matter. In this sense, potentiality was the possible but unrealized state of a thing. See also the entry on potentiality/actuality. “For in the course of our analysis it will also become clear, with regard to potentiality, that we not only ascribe potentiality to that whose nature is to move something else, or to be moved by anything else . . . but also use the word in another sense.” Aristotle, Metaphysics potentiality/actuality Metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy When Aristotle moved from a static discussion of the structure of reality to a dynamic discussion, he introduced a distinction between potentiality and actuality in association with a distinction between matter and form. He even used these two distinctions interchangeably. Aristotle divided relationships between actuality and potentiality into two major kinds. The first kind likened the relationship to that between motion and power. It conformed to the etymological senses of potentiality and actuality and concerned relations such as that between the capacity to build and the exercise of that capacity. The second kind likened the relationship to that between generated substance and matter. With regard to Aristotle’s discussion of substance, it can also be divided into two types. In the first type, matter (potentiality) develops into some form (actuality) to generate a thing, with potentiality and actuality thus belonging to two different stages. In the second type, form (actuality) and proximate matter (potentiality) in a sense exist together as two aspects of the same thing. In various ways, Aristotle held that actuality is prior to potentiality. In Aristotle’s theology, God, having an eternal nature, is pure actuality, without involving any potentiality. “To all such potentialities, then actuality is prior both in formula and in substantiality; and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another not.” Aristotle, Metaphysics pour-soi/en-soi, see being-for-itself power Political philosophy, philosophy of social science The ability or capacity to compel others to act according to one’s aims so that they will do what they would not otherwise have done. Power can also affect how such actions are performed. Political power is the ability to get people to obey explicit or tacit commands in virtue of what they anticipate to be the consequences of obeying or disobeying them. The consequences can range from crude threats and promises to subtle patterns of social control. Political power is not only power to do something, but is also power over others through coercion, domination, or hegemony. Understanding the relationship between political power and political authority is central to understanding the relationship between political science and political philosophy. Unlike authority, power does not involve rights, but it is related both to responsibility and force. Relations of political power may be shaped by culture, history, or tradition as well as by brute force. “Power is the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation P-predicate Metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind Strawson’s term for any predicate ascribed to persons and only persons. To apply a P-predicate to something at least implies the possession of consciousness by that individual. Examples of this kind of predicate include “is smiling,” “is in pain,” “believes that you will meet on Tuesday.” Philosophical problems arise concerning the possibility of delimiting the class of P-predicates and concerning the closely related possibility of formulating the concept of a person. The logical criteria for the ascription of P-predicates to others closely involves the question of personal identity. P-predicates are contrasted to M-predicates, which can be ascribed to material bodies without consciousness as well as to persons. “The second kind consists of all the other predicates we apply to persons. These I shall call P-predicates.” Strawson, Individuals practical ethics, see applied ethics practical law, see maxim, categorical imperative practical reason: The practical application of reason, which concerns what one ought to do, in contrast to the theoretical application of reason (theoretical or speculative reason), which concerns what is. Although Kant held that theoretical and practical reason are fundamentally the same, he recognized their different functions and claimed that practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason, in line with the primacy of our being rational agents over our being rational knowers. While theoretical reason is limited by the bounds of experience, practical reason is inseparable from freedom. Kant identified practical reason with the will, which initiates action. Like theoretical reason, practical reason determines and applies its own principles, but in the case of practical reason the application of its principles commands action. Its supreme principle is the categorical imperative. Hence it is the home of the moral law and is the fundamental basis of our autonomy. In Kant’s critical philosophy, three works, The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, The Critique of Practical Reason, and The Metaphysics of Morals examine the operation of practical reason. “Pure practical reason is a capacity for ends generally.” Kant, Metaphysics of Morals practical reasoning Philosophy of action, ethics, philosophy of social science A kind of argumentation that is directed toward a certain goal and is based on knowledge of an agent’s situation and knowledge that a certain sort of action is a means to reach that goal. Its conclusion is an imperative to pursue a course of action for a particular agent. Its sequence of inference is called practical inference because it aims at a practical conclusion. Practical reasoning gives reasons for actions or desires and it is essentially pragmatic. In contrast, theoretical reasoning aims to derive truth from premises and concentrates on the formal validity of arguments. Practical reasoning was first discussed in Aristotle’s theory of practical wisdom, where the action itself was seen as the conclusion. In the twentieth century, practical reasoning became a special field of philosophical inquiry, partly due to the works of Anscombe and von Wright. It is characterized as a form of argument appropriate to the humanities, rather than as merely a vehicle of means–end deliberation. Although there is much debate about the elements, scope, and procedure of practical reasoning, it is widely agreed that it is significant for explaining human action, establishing ranking and priority in one’s life plan, understanding personal responsibility for action, and evaluating the actions of others. Some theorists have employed a wider notion of practical reasoning to extend rational choice theory in seeking to understand institutions as well as individual behavior. Moral reasoning is one of the main forms of practical reasoning. “What then, is practical reasoning? It is the transition (not necessarily conscious) from belief in the premises to acceptance of the putative conclusions of a practical inference.” Raz (ed.), Practical Reason practical syllogism Ancient Greek philosophy, ethics, philosophy of action Aristotle’s concept, although he instead used the term sullogismos ton prakton (syllogism about action). An inference of practical reason starting from a universal ethical premise and concluding with an action. It has a major premise, such as “since the end is such and such,” and a minor premise, such as “this is such and such,” and a conclusion. In contrast to modern thinking, Aristotle insisted that the conclusion is not an imperative to do something, but the action itself. According to him, if a man gets an order but does not proceed to act, it is not a practical reason. Of the two premises, one provides the good end, and the other gives a possible way to achieve the end. Aristotle offers many examples in his writings, but he does not formalize this reasoning. There is much controversy whether such a formalization is possible. “For the syllogism about actions have an origin, viz. ‘since the end, i.e. what is best, is of such and such a nature’, whatever it may be.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics practical wisdom Ancient Greek philosophy, Ethics, philosophy of action [Greek phronesis, thought or understanding, also translated as intelligence, practical reason or prudence] Aristotle’s technical term for the reasoning that leads to practical activity. In contrast, contemplation, or theoretical wisdom, is concerned with invariable things, although both theoretical and practical wisdom are intellectual virtues. Like theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom operates at a general level, concerned with the truth of practical judgment and formulating general rules of action. But practical wisdom also works at a particular level, applying general rules to concrete situations of life and finding the right actions to do. It contains a practical intuition, which grasps the features of the particular action, and a practical syllogism, which infers ways and means of achieving the end. pragmaticism Practical wisdom is inseparable from the virtues of character, for the latter decides the right end. Without a right end, a man can only be said to have cleverness rather than practical wisdom. A person of practical wisdom is a phronimos. Aristotle’s theory of practical wisdom is ambiguous and unsystematic. It was criticized by Hume, who claimed that emotion rather than reason determines action. It has nevertheless attracted much attention in contemporary moral theory, especially in virtue ethics. If there really is a kind of reason peculiar to moral actions, it may give a new foundation to ethics and solve many traditional difficulties, such as the tension between objectivity and the practical application of moral judgment. “[P]ractical wisdom is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for human beings.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics practicalism, mentalism another expression for experi- pragmatic maxim, see pragmaticism pragmatic theory of truth Logic, epistemology, philosophy of language A theory of truth held in different forms by the American pragmatists Peirce, James, and Dewey. Their common ground was the claim that truth should be approached by enquiring about the difference made by a belief being true, namely to examine the idea of truth at work in its context of use. But their views are somewhat different. Peirce held that truth is the eventual consensus of those who use scientific method and go on long enough in their exploration. James believed that true beliefs are those that are confirmed or verified by experience in the long run. For Dewey, truth is a property attaching to ideas that we are warranted in asserting. He preferred the term warranted assertibility to truth. In addition to his attempt to connect utility with verifiability, according to which truth is useful belief in the sense that it is belief that is secure in the long run, James held that truth is that which is good, useful, or expedient to believe. Truth is the expedient in our way of thinking just as the right is the expedient in our way of behaving. This account of truth connects truth with utility and was bitterly criticized by Moore, Russell, and Carnap on the grounds that false ideas can have utility and still be false and that we should seek truth for itself rather than for its consequences. This later version of James’s theory is generally taken to be the standard pragmatic theory of truth, although the accounts of Peirce and Dewey might prove more fruitful. “It is the cardinal feature of pragmatic theories of truth that true propositions are characterised as those that we accept.” Ayer, The Concept of a Person pragmaticism Logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of science Although Peirce introduced the word pragmatism, he later invented the term pragmaticism for his own version of pragmatism, in order to distance himself from other versions, in particular from the anti-intellectualism he saw in James’s more popular pragmatism. Pragmaticism was originally a method of logic based on Peirce’s pragmatic maxim: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” This is a criterion of the clarity of meaning that connects the meaning of general terms with expectations of consequences. To attain a clear meaning of an abstract formula, we need only consider what conceivable practical effects it may involve. The conception of these effects is for us the whole positive significance of that formula. Peirce then tried to use this criterion to clarify traditional problems of philosophy and to dismiss traditional metaphysical problems, although he developed his own robust metaphysical doctrines. Peirce emphasized that pragmaticism is a theory of logic rather than a speculative philosophy. “So then, the writer, finding his bantling ‘pragmatism’ so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word ‘pragmaticism’, which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers.” Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. V pragmatics Philosophy of language [from Greek pragma, action] The analysis of the relations between signs or languages and their users. It is a branch of semiotics, the other two branches being syntactics or syntax, which deals with grammar, and semantics, which deals with reference and truth. General pragmatics is concerned with the general principles of utterance, and applied pragmatics is concerned with special kinds of linguistic interaction. Pragmatics focuses on the context of the actual use of language by speakers such as its purposes, effects, implications, and the relations between speakers and listeners. Many philosophers are concerned with its relations to semantics. Pragmatics classifies a wide variety of interesting types of speech acts, and studies the use and implications of indexical expressions, such as I, you, this, here, and now. Pragmatics is an important aspect of contemporary philosophy of language. “Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed.” Stalnaker, “Pragmatics,” in Davidson and Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language pragmatism Logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of science [from Greek pragma, things done, action] When Peirce introduced this term in his article “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878), he called it his pragmatic maxim, a criterion of meaning according to which the meaning of a theory is equivalent to the practical effects of adopting it. The term was borrowed by William James, who extended pragmatism from a criterion of meaning to a theory of truth, such that an idea is respectable or true if the results of accepting it are good or satisfactory. This theory was further developed by John Dewey and F. C. S. Schiller. Russell and Moore accused James of confusing the theory of truth with the theory of utility. Pragmatism claims that knowledge must relate to practical human purposes and to our adaptation to our environment. Intellectual beliefs should be justified in terms of their social, moral, and biological utilities. Truth and theory are tools or instruments, and they are not for solving abstract enigmas. Any idea that proves to have a value for concrete life is true. Pragmatism rejects abstraction and absolute principles and turns toward concreteness, facts, and action. This philosophy tries to assimilate modern science, especially the theory of evolution and new statistical modes of reasoning, within a fallibilist philosophy and criticizes traditional metaphysical speculations. This theory also became an attitude toward life and a movement emphasizing actions and practices. But Peirce himself disliked the anti-intellectual tone of this later development and introduced the word pragmaticism for his own version of pragmatism. Pragmatism has been regarded as a typically American approach to philosophy and has exerted great influence upon contemporary American philosophers such as Quine, Putnam, and Rorty. “Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed.” W. James, Pragmatism praxis, Greek term for action preconceived opinions Epistemology [Latin praejudicia, prejudices] Descartes adopted this term for the beliefs that everyone forms in childhood. These beliefs are derived from a reliance on tradition and authority and are also generated from the mere use of senses without consulting the light of reason. These opinions are always so deeply rooted in one’s mind that they are generally regarded as implanted by nature and are accepted as utterly true and evident. According to Descartes, these preconceived opinions are the chief source of error and when we begin to philosophize seriously, the first step should be to doubt the certainty of these preconceived opinions and replace them with ideas which are consistent with the standards of reason. “We must first of all lay aside all our preconceived opinions, or at least we must take the greatest care not to put our trust in any of the opinions accepted by us in the past until we have first scrutinised them afresh and confirmed their truth.” Descartes, Principles of Philosophy predicables preconception Ancient Greek philosophy, epistemology [Greek prolepseis, also translated as anticipation] A term in the epistemology of Epicurus and Stoicism, a general concept or mental picture generated by repeated similar impressions and experience. Preconceptions record and classify our experience of the world and are foundations of judgments. For example, when we hear “table,” we anticipate the kind of thing to which this term refers. Preconceptions are also viewed as the criteria of true perceptual statements. They can be combined together as a basis for inference, and can be used to form new concepts of things not encountered in experience. “Preconception, they say, is as it were a perception, or correct opinion or conception, or universal ‘stored notion’ (i.e. memory) of that which has frequently become evident externally.” Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers preconscious Philosophy of mind Freud’s term for the latent elements of mind waiting to be discovered. These elements, though not in consciousness, can be brought to consciousness by ordinary introspective methods. Freud distinguishes explicitly between the unconsciousness and the preconscious. The unconscious is repressed and cannot become conscious in an ordinary way. Furthermore, the unconscious is dynamic in that it is active in the determination of behavior. The preconscious does not have this function. “The latent, which is unconscious only descriptively, not in the dynamic sense, we call ‘preconscious’.” Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 9 predestination Philosophy of religion, metaphysics, logic [from Latin praedestinare, a synonym of predetermination] A theological doctrine that means that all events in someone’s life, no matter whether they have happened, are happening, or will happen, have been determined to happen in advance by God. Whether a person’s soul will go to heaven or hell has also been decreed by the sovereign will of God when that person was born, no matter how the person behaves in life. According to the doctrine of predestination, God not only has foreknowledge of all that will happen, but also has foreordained that it will happen. This claim arises from the view that God is the cause of everything and is also associated with the view that human beings can be saved only by God’s grace. The position had scriptural support in Romans 8 and 9 and Ephesians 1 and was held by Augustine and Calvin, among others. The notion of predestination or predetermination provides the basis for fatalism. Problems arise for the notion of predestination. If God plans everything and we do not have free will, then God seems to be responsible for our evil deeds. But this can not be true if God is perfectly good. It is difficult to understand the relation between God’s foreknowing and God’s foreordaining. In this domain, his omniscience and omnipotence seem hard to distinguish. In logic, the law of excluded middle has been thought by Lukasiewicz and others to force us into logical predestination when applied to statements about the future. On this view, the truth or falsity of such statements has always been fixed independent of any questions concerning divine knowledge or power. This thought provided a major motive for giving up the law of excluded middle and for developing many-valued logic in contemporary non-classical logic, but others – including many who admire the achievements of many-valued logic – attempt to overcome logical predestination within classical logic. “If it is held that everything that happens . . . is planned in every detail, then I do not see how it can be denied that if the responsibility for what we do can be assigned to anyone at all, it must ultimately fall upon the planner rather than ourselves . . . For someone who takes this view, the doctrine of predestination does seem irresistible.” Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays predetermination, another term for predestination predicables Logic, metaphysics The different relations in which a predicate might stand to a subject in a proposition. In the Topics, Aristotle distinguished various predicables: (1) definition, in which the predicate states the essence of the subject; (2) property, in which the predicate expresses something which is not a constitutive part of the essence, but is inseparably bound up with the subject, for example, as ‘is capable of learning’ is bound up with man; (3) genus, in which the predicate defines the subject together with a differentia; (4) accident, in which the predicate expresses a feature that is neither a constitutive part of the essence nor inseparably bound up with the subject. In the first two of these predicables, the subject and predicate are convertible (we can argue from “X is Y” to “Y is X”), but the latter two are not convertible. According to Aristotle, all problems can be brought under one or other of the predicables, so these predicables are the framework for his whole treatment of the topoi (commonplaces). The medieval logician Porphyry added species as a fifth kind of predicable. Because species is a subject rather than a predicate for Aristotle, Porphyry’s classification produced much confusion. In addition to this historical sense of predicable, there is an additional sense introduced by the contemporary British philosopher Peter Geach. He noticed that in modern logic the term predicate might refer both to a role that a particular word or phrase is playing in a particular proposition and to a syntactical category to which expressions belong in virtue of their ability to play this role. To avoid this ambiguity, he uses predicable for membership of the syntactical category and reserves predicate for the actual performance of the predicative role. “I use ‘predicables’ as a term for the verbal expressions called ‘predicates’ by other logicians; I reserve the term ‘predicate’ for a predicable actually being used as the main function in a given proposition.” Geach, Logic Matters predicament, the medieval scholastic equivalent of an Aristotelian category predicate Logic, philosophy of language [from Latin pare, in front + dicere, to say, literally that which is said in front of ] A basic sentence expresses a proposition that some object has a certain attribute (“The dog is running” or “This flower is red”) or that there is certain relation between two or more objects (“The horse is larger than the sheep”). The expressions standing for an object (for example “the dog,” “this flower,” or “the horse” and “the sheep”) are called subjects, and the expressions standing for an attribute (for example “is running,” “is red”) or relation (for example “is larger than”) are predicates. A predicate is what is said of a subject in a sentence. A predicate can be a verb, adjective phrase, or noun phrase. Predicates are also called predicate expressions or predicate terms. If a given sentence has one subject, its predicate is a one-place predicate; if there are two subjects, its predicate is a two-place predicate, and so on. One-place predicates are connected with intransitive verbs, and two-place predicates are connected with transitive verbs or relations. There is also a distinction between logical (first-order) and grammatical (second-order) predicates. A logical or first-order predicate applies to some object, and a grammatical or second-order predicate is predicated of a first-order predicate. According to this distinction, words such as “exist” are grammatical predicates rather than logical predicates. “The subject is that term about which affirmation or denial is made. The predicate is that term which is affirmed or denied of the subject.” Keynes, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic predicate logic, another name for predicative calculus predicate nominalism Philosophy of language, metaphysics A term introduced by the Australian philosopher David Armstrong for the theory that what universals there are is simply a matter of what predicates there are. In other words, universals are parasitic upon predicate expressions. Although a predicate-like “tree” can apply in principle to more than one object, we need not posit some common property by which a common predicate or general term applies to objects. On the contrary, the applicability of a common predicate needs no further explanation and determines the existence of a universal. Strawson’s characterization of universals in Individuals is sometimes said to express this theory. Predicate nominalism is one attempt to solve the fundamental difficulty of nominalism, namely, if only particulars exist, how can we bring numerically different particulars under the same general terms? The difficulty for predicate nominalism is that it does not explain how predicates can determine properties or universals. logical subject, but indicates the kind of material stuff (bones and flesh) from which the predicate (Socrates) is constituted or generated by substantial change. “According to Predicate Nominalism, an object’s possession of (say) the property, being white, is completely determined by the fact that the predicate ‘white’ applies to this object.” D. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism. “Let’s say that a predicate (a linguistic term) is linguistically predicated of its subject, but that a predicable (a metaphysical term) is metaphysically predicated of its subject.” F. Lewis, Substance and Predication in Aristotle. predicative adjective, see attributive adjective predicate term, another name for predicate predication Logic, philosophy of language The attribution of a predicate to a subject, or the combination between them. Predication expresses the relation between a thing and its attributes, which is the basic combination in logical thinking. Much of logic depends on understanding the different logical roles of subject and predicate. Predication can be symbolized as Fa (a is F) or Rab (a has relation R with b). Frege held that predicates are unsaturated, that is, they contain logical holes that can be filled by subject terms or can be held open by variables. If a predication contains a one-place predicate, it is a one-place predication. If it contains a two-place predicate, it is a two-place predication, and so on. Frege suggested that we distinguish predication from assertion, for assertion involves an assent to the truth or falsity of the sentence. While every assertion must be expressed by a predication, not every predication is necessarily an assertion. “Predication: in logic, the joining of a predicate to a subject of a proposition so as to increase the logical breadth without dismissing the logical depth.” Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. II predication, metaphysical Metaphysics A kind of predication related to Aristotle’s theory of matter and form, particularly his view that form is predicated of matter, also called form predication. Metaphysical or form predication differs from linguistic predication, which picks out a logical subject and states what that subject is or has. In metaphysical predication, such as “these bones and flesh are Socrates,” matter as subject is not a predicative calculus Logic Also called the logic of terms, predicate logic, or the calculus of predicates. A logic that analyzes subject-predicate sentences, including sentences involving “not” and the quantifiers “all” and “some.” It deals with the inner structure of propositions, and the arguments whose validity depends on the arrangement of the terms within the premises and conclusion. Predicative calculus is thus distinguished from propositional calculus, which is concerned with propositional structures and has propositions as its units. Predicative calculus is sometimes characterized as the logic of terms, while propositional logic is the logic of propositions. Predicative logic introduces “x, y, z” as variables ranging over individual objects and “F, G, H” as signs for predicates. At its core is quantification theory, which was developed by Frege to analyze the logical properties of quantifiers. First-order predicate logic, which is elementary logic and a modern replacement of Aristotelian syllogism, deals only with individual variables and their quantifications, while second-order or other higher-order predicate logic is also concerned with predicates and other predicate variables. “The laws of the predicative calculus are of two kinds; 1. those that are peculiar to itself (that is to the logic of terms) and 2. those that are analogous or specifications of the laws of the propositional calculus. The propositional calculus and the predicative calculus belong to one system.” D. Mitchell, An Introduction to Logic prediction Epistemology, philosophy of science To forecast that something will happen in advance of its actual happening. This capacity is essential for the human species to survive and is also a central feature of human intelligence. Predicting and controlling the future is a major reason that we pursue knowledge. The problem of how to predict rationally has been of central interest in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Predictability is the main measure by which we may test the efficiency of a scientific theory. The notion of prediction has been associated with the discussion of topics such as free will and determinism, chaos and chance and induction. Problems concerning the truth-value of predictions led to the development of three-valued logic. “The chain of reasoning which leads from given observational findings to the ‘prediction’ of new ones actually involves, besides deductive inferences, certain quasi-inductive steps each of which consists in the acceptance of an intermediate statement on the basis of confirming, but usually not logically conclusive, evidence.” Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation prediction paradox, another term for surprise examination paradox pre-established harmony Metaphysics, philosophy of mind Leibniz’s proposed solution to the Cartesian mind–body problem. The world, including minds and bodies, is ultimately composed of independent substances or monads. Each monad is isolated and self-enclosed, and develops in accordance with its own internal nature. There is no interaction between finite minds and bodies. No state of a substance has as a real cause some state of another substance, for a substance that is properly so called, must have a kind of self-sufficiency that is incompatible with causal dependence. Yet God, in creating the universe, has pre-established a perfect non-causal harmony of activity among all possible monads. Each monad is like a mirror that reflects the whole universe. A change in one will correspond to a change in all others. This harmony is analogous to the non-causal harmony of activity existing between two clocks whose ticking is synchronized perfectly. The doctrine of pre-established harmony is at the center of Leibniz’s metaphysics. It is, in a sense, an incorporation of occasionalism and the view that each substance has its own internal activity. “There remains only my hypothesis, that is the way of pre-established harmony, through a prior divine artifice, which has formed each of these substances from the beginning in such a way that by following only its own laws, laws which it received with its being, it nevertheless agrees with the other, as if there were a mutual influence, or as if God always meddled with it, over and above his general concourse.” Leibniz, Philosophical Essays preface paradox Logic, epistemology An author, based on the experience that all her previous works contain some mistakes, reasonably acknowledges in the preface of her new book that it also contains mistakes, in spite of her best efforts. This acknowledgment creates a contradiction. On the one hand, she holds that propositions P1, P2, P3, . . . Pn (which are the views she argues for in this book) are true; on the other hand, she also believes that at least one of them is false. This amounts to saying that at one and the same time she believes that all these propositions are true and believes that some of them are false. This reveals an imperfection in what we take ourselves to know. “We occupy the posture of the so-called ‘preface paradox’ – standing in the shoes of the author who apologises in his preface for those errors that have doubtless made their way into his work, and yet blithely remains committed to all those assertions in the body of the work itself.” Rescher, Empirical Inquiry prejudice Epistemology, modern European philosophy Prejudice is a target of Cartesian doubt and other rationally based philosophy because it is thought to obstruct reason and philosophy in the pursuit of truth. Prejudice is rehabilitated in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, where it is viewed as an essential element in our understanding, on the basis of Heidegger’s notion of a fore-structure of understanding. All understanding involves the projection of meanings arising out of one’s own situation and obtained from a certain perspective. Because this fore-structure of understanding is prejudice, understanding is inevitably rooted in prejudice. There is no neutral point of view from which we may get the “real” meaning of a text. According to Gadamer, this does not mean that understanding and interpretation are purely subjective. Prejudice is not a matter of subjective opinion, nor is it personal property. Instead, he holds that it is part of tradition and is developed within the historical tradition to which we belong. Prejudice is the historically and culturally determined horizon and the effectivity of history. Furthermore, Gadamer claims that prejudice is not an obstacle or limit to understanding, but by serving as our orientation to meaning, it is the basis for the possibility of understanding. “What is necessary is a fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do justice to man’s finite, historical mode of being.” Gadamer, Truth and Method pre-reflective cogito Philosophy of mind, modern European philosophy Sartre’s term for a crucial kind of human consciousness. Our consciousness is always directed upon some object of which we are aware. This is the Cartesian or reflective cogito. But this consciousness is itself accompanied by a consciousness that we are aware. Sartre called this second-order awareness, which is consciousness directed upon consciousness, pre-reflective cogito. This consciousness, which always passes without being reflected upon, makes reflection possible. The pre-reflective cogito is the condition of the reflective cogito. On Sartre’s view of intentionality, therefore, consciousness operates on two levels at once. Sartre’s account of consciousness led to his rejection of Freud’s notion of the unconscious. A major task of Sartre’s philosophy was to give a descriptive account of the pre-reflective cogito. “I believe that I have demonstrated that the first condition of all reflection is a pre-reflective cogito. This cogito, to be sure, does not posit an object; it remains within consciousness. But it is nonetheless homologous with the reflective cogito since it appears as the first necessity for non-reflective consciousness to be seen by itself.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness prescriptivism Ethics A moral theory developed by R. M. Hare in The Languages of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963). According to this theory, the main concern of moral philosophy is to clarify the nature of moral terms and moral statements. Distinct from fact-stating statements that tell us what is the case, ethical statements tell us to do something and are used to guide choices. Such statements must have irreducibly prescriptive elements. To express agreement to a prescription or to accept it is to express one’s resolve or decision to carry it out. Prescriptivism emphasizes the typically prescriptive use of moral judgments. It also claims that moral prescription is universal, and is directed to everyone at all times. This principle of universalizability is the reason that Hare calls his theory “universal prescriptivism.” Both prescriptivism and emotivism are types of non-cognitivism, but they have significant differences. While emotivism emphasizes the emotional impact of a moral judgment, and its influence on the hearer’s attitude, prescriptivism thinks that this result is not necessary for the success of prescription. Emotivism, in distinguishing between factual statements and ethical statements, claims that only factual statements are the objects of reasoning. Prescriptivism, on the other hand, claims that one can also reason about moral questions. It thus avoids the charge of irrationality. “For the sake of a name, let me refer to the type of doctrine which I put forward in The Language of Morals, and still hold, as ‘universal prescriptivism’ – a combination, that is to say, of universalism (the view that moral judgements are universalizable) and prescriptivism (the view that they are, at any rate typically, prescriptive).” Hare, Freedom and Reason presence Modern European philosophy, metaphysics According to Derrida, Western metaphysics from Parmenides to Husserl held the prejudice that the locus of truth is in the pure presence of things themselves to consciousness. Hence he calls traditional Western metaphysics the metaphysics of presence. Because presence gives priority to the spoken over the written, he also considers Western metaphysics to be a tradition of phonocentrism. “To return to the things themselves” has been a central philosophical slogan of the tradition. For Plato, truth lay in the idea or eidos (form) that is present to reason, the soul’s sight. Plato thus united the notions of presence and evidence with those of objectivity, ideality, and the Good. He established the dichotomy of sensibility and rationality as an ultimate pair of opposing concepts. Plato authorized philosophy as the philosophy of presence or philosophy of logos. Derrida calls reason-centered philosophy logocentrism. Aristotle set up a notion of temporal presence through a continuity of time and history. He developed a position of taking the presence of a thing to be its substance, essence, and existence. Descartes claimed that the condition of the possibility of knowledge and truth is the clarity and distinctness of ideas immediately present to consciousness. Hegel systematically demonstrated the self-presence of the subject. For most people, presence is the province of certainty. By denying presence, Derrida seems to deny the importance of actual experience. The implications of the complex displacement of presence, speech, and reason require careful assessment. “We already have a foreboding that phonocentrism merges with the historical determination of the meaning of being in general as presence, with all the subdeterminations which depend on this general form and which organise within it their system and their historical sequence.” Derrida, Of Grammatology presence-at-hand, see ready-to-hand pre-Socratics Ancient Greek philosophy A term invented by historians of philosophy to group together the Greek thinkers living between approximately the first half of the sixth century bc and Socrates’ lifetime. These include mainly the Milesian school (Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes), the Pythagoreans, the Eleatic school (Parmenides, Zeno, and Milissus), Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomists (Leucippus and Democritus). The name is sometimes misleading because some philosophers in this period were actually contemporaries of Socrates. The unity consists rather in the fact that none of them was influenced by Socrates and Plato. They were also called natural philosophers, for many of them concentrated on finding principles to explain the world of nature, although this is not true of Parmenides’ way of truth or of Zeno. The pre-Socratics took part in the first period of the history of Western philosophy, which began the tradition of free and rational inquiry. None of these philosophers left us a single complete work, so the study of them relies on the scanty and disconnected fragments preserved in the quotations and discussions of the later philosophers, in particular in Aristotle’s works and those of his commentators. There was no separation of science and philosophy in this period, but the road leading to this separation was prepared by them. Many contemporary philosophers admire the intellectual freedom and speculative brilliance of the pre-Socratics and are inspired by their views of man and universe. “In saying that the Pre-Socratics were rational men I mean no more than this: that the broad and bold theories which they advanced were presented not as ex cathedra pronouncements for the faithful to believe, and the godless to ignore, but as the conclusions of arguments, as reasoned propositions for reasonable men to contemplate and debate.” Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers presumption Epistemology A statement that has some grounds to be considered a candidate for truth, but whose truth is not yet established. It is provisionally acceptable, but falls short of being conclusively acceptable. A presumption possesses a positive but low-level cognitive status and is the raw material for the production of knowledge. A presumption has some similarity to Epicurus’ notion of prolepsis, the anticipation of the application of a term. “A presumption is a thesis that is avowedly not known (i.e. known to be true), but having some claim – however tentative or imperfect – to be regarded as a truth.” Rescher, Methodological Pragmatism presupposition Logic In general, what is taken to be true without question as a premise for some conclusion. In this sense, if A presupposes B, B is derivable from A. As a semantic notion, presupposition is a relation between two statements A and B such that A presupposes B if the truth of B is a necessary condition of A of being either true or false. The relation of presupposition differs from the relation of entailment, for if A entails B, the truth of B is a necessary condition of the truth of A, rather than a necessary condition of A possessing a truth-value at all. This distinction between presupposition and entailment was employed by Strawson in his attack on Russell’s theory of descriptions. For Russell, the statement “The present king of France is bald” entails “There is a present king of France.” But Strawson claimed that the former presupposes the latter, but does not entail it. The notion of presupposition is important in the debate about whether “exists” is a predicate and in challenges to the principle of bivalence in three-valued logic. “For if a statement S presupposes a statement S′ in the sense that the truth of S′ is a precondition of the truth-or-falsity of S, then of course there will be a kind of logical absurdity in conjoining S with the denials of S′.” Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory Price, H. H. Wales-born philosopher of mind, belief, and perception, Professor of Logic at University of Oxford. Price developed a non-phenomenalist account of the place of sense-data in perception and a dispositional account of conceptual thought. His examination of theories of belief in the philosophy of mind is important in its own right and also led to a defense of the rationality of belief in the immortality of the soul and in the existence of God. His works include Perception (1932), Thinking and Experience (1953), and Belief (1969). Price, Richard (1723–91) Welsh moral philosopher, born in Tynton, Glamorgan. In Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals (1758), Price criticized the moral sense theory of Hutcheson and Hume and argued that right and wrong are objective characteristics of actions that can be perceived by the understanding. His book on the French revolution, Discourse on the Love of Our Country (1789), provoked Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France. Prichard, H(arold) A(rthur) (1871–1947) British philosopher, born in London, a leading Oxford moral intuitionist. Prichard is best known for his paper “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” (Mind, 1912), in which he criticized Kant from the perspective of moral intuitionism. He argued that a general theory of obligation or duty is impossible and that an attempt to formulate such a theory is a mistake. Instead, he claimed, we saw what we ought to do by direct perception in particular situations. prima facie duties Ethics [Latin prima facie, so far as it appears on the surface, or on first appearance] A notion elaborated by W. D. Ross in his ethics, for duties relative to occasions, in contrast to absolute duties or duties proper, which we ought to perform in any situation without exception. Prima facie duties are also called conditional duties. We have many sorts of selfevident duties, such as keeping a promise, beneficence, justice, and self-improvement. In a particular moral situation, more than one of these duties may matter. In such a situation, we have no way of knowing for certain which duty is fundamental. The only thing we can do is to rank all obligations involved in this particular situation and attempt to decide which one is most important on this occasion or to determine where the balance lies. The duty on which we act and which we take to be the most important on this occasion could be less important on another occasion. Thus, all such duties that we perform are prima facie, rather than absolute. Ross’s theory rejects the moral monism of Kantian or utilitarian theories, which hold that there is an ultimate moral principle to guide our choices or actions. It faces the problem of accounting for the possibility of measuring the importance of different kinds of duties. “I suggest ‘Prima facie duty’ or ‘conditional duty’ as a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant.” Ross, The Right and the Good prima facie justification, see defeasibility prima facie rights, see rights, prima facie primary and secondary qualities Metaphysics, epistemology The distinction between primary and secondary qualities can be traced tothe ancient atomist Democritus and was also suggested by Galileo, Descartes, and the seventeenthcentury corpuscularian philosophers such as Robert Boyle. But it is Locke who provided philosophical argument for this distinction and made it a significant topic in modern philosophy. For Locke, primary qualities are those that are not separable from the body, such as size, shape, texture, and bulk, while secondary qualities are those that are not in the objects themselves but are the powers of primary qualities to produce in us various sensations such as colors, sounds, and tastes. In an even broader sense, a secondary quality is also a thing’s power to change another thing’s operation. The ideas produced by primary qualities resemble the qualities themselves, that is, these ideas are qualitatively identical with the qualities in the body that initiated the whole causal process of perception. In contrast, the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything in the bodies at all, for although we habitually think of these qualities as existing in the objects themselves, they are actually only powers to produce ideas in us rather than actual attributes which these ideas resemble. Primary qualities, because they really exist in the bodies, are called real qualities. The ideas of primary qualities, unlike the ideas of secondary qualities, were taken to offer something that could be measured and were thus considered a suitable basis for scientific explanation. Further, it was claimed that all secondary qualities could be reduced to primary qualities. While Locke claimed that secondary qualities have their physical basis in the bodies that are causally responsible for the ideas of them, Berkeley interpreted secondary qualities as those qualities that do not exist independently of the perception of them. Berkeley took Locke’s distinction between perceptible qualities and powers as a distinction between mind-independent and mind-dependent qualities. Because he rejected the possibility of the former, he saw all qualities to be on the same footing. “These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz., solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding primary goods Ethics, political philosophy For Rawls, the things that every rational person would want, whatever his plan of life or value orientation might be. Primary goods are basic to the life plans of all rational beings. They are divided into two categories: natural primary goods, including health, vigor, intelligence, and imagination, and social primary goods, including wealth, power, opportunities, civil rights, such as freedom of thought and speech, and the right to participate in political decision making, and, as Rawls particularly emphasizes, self-respect. The distribution of social primary goods is of basic concern to the participants who choose the principles of justice in the original position. Primary goods are the subject-matter of the single thin theory of good and provides the motivation for the unanimous selection of principles of justice behind the veil of ignorance. Critics argue that consideration of primary goods can not lead to a decision about the principles of justice, either because too little is known for any choice or because too much is known for a unanimous choice. Others argue for a different array of primary goods with different consequences for justice or claim that different values and life plans will affect the weighting of the goods even if the agents are temporarily ignorant of them. “Now primary goods, as I have already remarked, are things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice primary language, another term for object language primary matter Metaphysics Leibniz distinguished between primary matter and secondary matter. Primary matter is matter in itself, or bulk. It is not a complete substance, for it is separated from soul or substantial form, and needs the latter to be an organic unity. Primary matter is what is passive in any complete substance, but it serves as the foundation of continuity. Secondary matter, on the other hand, as an aggregate or mass, is a collection of substances. “I understand matter as either secondary or primary. Secondary matter is, indeed, a complete substance, but it is not merely passive; primary matter is merely passive, but it is not a complete substance.” Leibniz, Philosophical Essays primary reason Philosophy of action Traditionally, reason has been held to explain action. What, then, is the exact relation between a reason and the action it explains? Davidson claims that when agents perform actions, they have a pro-attitude toward an action under a certain kind, because reason has led them to see or think they see in an action under the description of that kind some feature or consequence which they want or value. Furthermore, agents need to have a belief that acting in a certain way promotes that which they want or value. Such a pro-attitude and belief form the primary reason for agents to act as they do. On Davidson’s view, this is how reasons rationalize an action. Their logical relationship can be expressed by a practical syllogism involving the propositional contents of the belief and the pro-attitude. The doctrine of primary reason is the central element of Davidson’s causal theory of action, because a primary reason for acting in a certain way can cause an agent to act in that way. “R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description D only if R consists of a pro-attitude of the agent towards action with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the description, has that property.” Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events primary rules, see rule of recognition prime matter Metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy Aristotle’s concept of what exists at the absolute beginning of generation. While elements are basic matter for all things, prime matter serves as the subject when elements change into each other. It is therefore more basic than the elements. Prime matter lacks characteristics in itself, but is what remains after even the three dimensions are stripped away, with nothing left to be removed. In itself, prime matter is in none of the categories, but can potentially be everything. “And not only is nature the prime matter (and this in two senses, either the first, counting from the thing, or the first in general; . . . ), but also the form and essence.” Aristotle, Metaphysics. prime mover, an alternative expression for unmoved mover primitive belief, see primitive knowledge primitive force Metaphysics Leibniz claimed that active force is either primitive or derivative. Primitive force is inherent in every corporeal substance and stands in contrast to primary matter. It provides the principle of unity for primary matter and forms an organic unity with it. It is what Leibniz also called substantial form or the first entelechy. Derivative force, on the other hand, arises from a limitation of primitive force through the collision of bodies with one another. “Primitive force (which is nothing but the first entelechy) corresponds to the soul or substantial form.” Leibniz, Philosophical Essays primitive ideas Logic, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology The ideas which serve as the grounds for explaining other ideas in a system, but which are not themselves defined by any other ideas within the system. These terms can only be explained by pointing to what is meant. Primitive ideas are associated with primitive propositions, which are the propositions within a given system that are undemonstrable by any other propositions but which form the basis for demonstrating other propositions. Each axiomatic system contains certain primitive ideas and primitive propositions. It is methodologically preferable that any such system should contain the least possible number of primitive ideas and primitive propositions. “Following Peano, we shall call the undefined ideas and undemonstrated propositions primitive ideas and primitive propositions respectively.” Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica primitive knowledge Epistemology Russell draws a distinction between primitive knowledge and derivative knowledge. Since knowledge is used here in the sense of belief, the distinction is also drawn between primitive belief and derivative belief. Primitive knowledge or belief is immediate self-evident experience, which does not need the support of any outside evidence. Derivative knowledge or belief is the belief caused by other beliefs and is something that we believe as a result of inference, although the inference might not be strictly logical. For instance, we judge somebody’s feelings from the expression on his face. This distinction between primitive and derivative knowledge is similar to that between hard data and soft data. “The first thing that appears when we begin to analyse our common knowledge is that some of it is derivative, while some is primitive.” Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World principle Ethics [from Latin principium, composed of primus, first, chief + cipium, a termination, corresponding to Greek arche, starting-point, beginning] A general reason for doing or omitting to do something or for believing or not believing something. A principle is a foundation or starting-point for any physical or mental operation that applies in a wide range of situations. The most general principles are normally not proven by appeal to subordinate principles derived on their basis. “All unprovable judgements, in so far as they are the ground of all judgements, are called principles, and they are either theoretical or practical.” Kant, Lectures on Logic principle of charity Philosophy of language A methodological principle for translation or interpretation. A favored truth theory for a language L should assign truth conditions to most of its sentences held true by a speaker of L, in accord with our own view of what is true. In interpreting or translating a system of thought, we must assume that most of the propositions in it are true, that is, we must maximize the extent of rationality of the subjects from our point of view. For Quine, this principle is a pre-condition for the possibility of radical translation, and for Davidson it is a pre-condition for radical interpretation. A good theory of interpretation, according to Davidson, should maximize agreement. The principle is based on the claim that only against a background of massive agreement can we intelligibly agree and disagree. It is a charitable assumption about human rationality. It might be false, but if there is no better alternative in interpretation, the principle can help us to understand what we want to interpret and can thus make communication possible. “Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters.” Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation principle of fractional prudence Philosophy of action A term introduced by C. I. Lewis for the human tendency to choose a good thing which is available now rather than a better thing in the future, even though it is equally likely that one will be able to obtain the latter. It is an expression of the preference that humans have for satisfying present desires and the immediate future. Other authors call such a tendency time-preference. On some interpretations, humans are biologically determined to care less about our remote desires and about the distant future. Lewis claimed that this kind of concern is irrational, and Derek Parfit calls it a bias because a sound rationality should be concerned with the good of our whole life and should not sacrifice distant goods to near ones. Others, including Bentham, argue that a preference for the near future is a requirement of practical rationality. “This anomalous conception, that although we should rationally be concerned with the future, we should be less concerned about it according as it is more remote . . . This might be called the principle of fractional prudence or of prudence mitigated by impulse.” C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation principle of humanity Philosophy of language A principle put forward by R. E. Grandy with the intention of improving the principle of charity. The principle of charity claims that when we translate a different language, we should suppose that most of its assertions and inferences are true and rational. However, granted that, if the translation turns out to be unintelligible for us, it is still useless for our purpose. Hence, in interpreting or translating a system of thought, we must impute to this system patterns of relations among beliefs and desires that are similar to our own. We should suppose that the speaker of that language is a person and has certain basic similarities to ourselves. In this way, we can make the best possible predictions and explanation of the speaker’s behavior. “We have, as a pragmatic constraint on translation, the condition that the imputed patterns of relations among beliefs, desires and the world be as similar to our own as possible. This principle I shall call the principle of humanity.” Grandy, “Reference, Meaning and Belief,” Journal of Philosophy 70 principle of indeterminacy Philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics Also called the principle of uncertainty. A principle established by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg in 1927, claiming that in the subatomic world it is in principle impossible to determine simultaneously to an arbitrary degree of accuracy both the position of certain particles, such as electrons, and the momentum (velocity or direction) of their movement. If the position is known, the determination of their motion is uncertain, and vice versa. Hence full predictive knowledge is permanently impossible concerning the future behavior of these particles. It has been a major issue whether this uncertainty is a matter of epistemology or ontology. A corollary of this principle is that observed phenomena in the subatomic world do not give an accurate picture of reality, for the process of discovery affects what is discovered in the world at this level. On this basis, determinism can not apply to the subatomic world and is therefore seriously limited. Some philosophers believe that these limits on determinism make room for freedom of the will, while others argue that indeterminacy provides an inappropriate ground for the rationality and intelligence required for the notion of freedom. “If this principle [of indeterminacy] is true, and physicists seem to have little doubt that it is, it follows that some events are strictly unpredictable even in theory. We simply cannot know enough to make a valid prediction.” Baylis, Ethics principle of indifference Logic, philosophy of science If we do not have positive reason to favor either one of a pair of mutually exclusive and competing theories, we must be indifferent or impartial, and ascribe to them the same degree of probability, since there is no positive ground for assigning unequal degrees. This principle was proposed by Bernoulli, who called it the principle of non-sufficient reason, Laplace, and J. M. Keynes, who also criticized it. The principle is useful in the theory of choice, but faces difficulties with inductive theories. Its application leads to Bertrand’s paradox. “The principle of indifference asserts that if there is no known reason for predicting of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability.” Keynes, A Treatise on Probability principle of individuation Metaphysics To individuate is to specify a character possessed solely by a thing and thus to distinguish it from other things within the same class or species. The principle of individuation explains how such distinctions can be drawn. The problem is associated by medieval philosophers with Aristotle. In Metaphysics Z8 he said that when form is universal, matter becomes the principle to distinguish individuals within the same form. However, Aristotle’s view of individuation varied, for he also argued that matter itself is indeterminate and must be individuated by form. Leibniz proposed the identity of indiscernibles as a principle of individuation. He argued that if two entities possess exactly the same characteristics, then these two entities are numerically identical. This principle implies that entities are different because each possesses a unique set of characteristics and is described by a unique set of predicates. But it is highly disputed whether Leibniz’s principle is a necessary truth, with some philosophers arguing that it is logically possible for two numerically distinct entities to have precisely the same set of characteristics. In Individuals, Strawson argues that space and time lie at the basis of all identification and that we can pick out an individual by making reference to the spatio-temporal path it follows and its current position. There are problems with his view, although they can perhaps be overcome. If space and time are relative to entities, then we can determine the spatio-temporal location of any one entity only against the background of an established system of individuated objects in space and time. It is not clear whether our inability to individuate all entities within an absolute space and time is a crucial flaw in a Strawsonian program of individuating within a relativist setting. Some philosophers argue that individuation is determined by the bundle of all the characteristics possessed by an individual, and others argue that it is determined by the essential properties of an individual. The essentialist view has different versions, according to whether individual essences as well as essences of kinds are admitted. The principle of individuation has an ontological dimension, dealing with the process or circumstances whereby something becomes an individual. “Given that there are substances, the question that next arises is what marks off any one substance from any other. The mediaeval philosophers called this the problem of the principle of individuation.” Hamlyn, Metaphysics principle of induction Logic, philosophy of science The ground for the validity of inductive reasoning. It assumes that if a certain type of thing A has been found to be associated with a certain type of thing B, if no As are observed that are not associated with Bs, and if the number of observed associations between As and Bs is sufficiently great, then when we observe on a new occasion the presence of an A, a B will probably appear as well. Sometimes this is regarded as equivalent to the principle of the uniformity of nature, which assumes that the future will resemble the past. Because the principle of induction seems to be justified only on the basis of induction, the proof of the principle, if one is needed, presupposes itself. “The principle [of induction] itself is constantly used in our reasoning, sometimes consciously, and sometimes unconsciously; but there is no reasoning which, starting from some simpler self-evident principle, leads us to the principle of induction as its conclusion.” Russell, The Problems of Philosophy principle of non-sufficient reason, another term for the principle of indifference principle of parsimony, another name for Ockham’s razor principle of perfection, see principle of plentitude principle of plenitude Metaphysics [from Greek pleroma, fullness, completeness] A principle that anything that is possible is realized. A temporalized version of the principle, ascribed to Aristotle, claims that if p is genuinely possible, p will be actualized or realized at some time. The American philosopher Arthur Lovejoy introduced this term and connected the principle with the doctrine of the great chain of being. On his formulation, “no genuine possibility of being can remain unfulfilled.” The principle of plenitude is a negative version of the principle of sufficient reason: unless there is sufficient reason for something not to be, then that thing exists. According to Lovejoy, the principle has been widely held in the history of philosophy and is identical with what Russell called the principle of perfection in his discussion of Leibniz’s philosophy. The principle implies that nature makes no leaps and that there are no sudden transitions of level in the hierarchy of beings in the universe. If an apparent possibility cannot be realized, then it is not genuine, and there are no non-actualized possibilities. These intriguing claims have given rise to much debate. “I shall call it the principle of plenitude, but shall use the term to cover a wider range of inference from premises identical with Plato’s than he himself draws; that is, not only the thesis that the universe is a plenum formarum in which the range of conceivable diversity of kinds of living things is exhaustively exemplified, but also any other deductions from the assumption that no genuine potentiality of being can remain unfulfilled.” Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being principle of substitutivity, another name for indiscernibility of the identicals principle of the best Philosophy of religion, metaphysics, ethics Leibniz claimed that when God created this world, he did not exercise his will at random but acted according to the principle of the best. God intended to choose to create among an infinite number of possible worlds the best possible world and had the power and knowledge necessary to work out what that best world would be. Thus, any part of the world, any particular contingent thing, has the nature that it has because it is a part of the best possible world. This principle, also called the principle of fitness, or the principle of perfection, offers a reason why this world rather than any other was created and explains the cause of events and existence of things. Leibniz also used this principle to distinguish contingent truths from necessary truths by saying that while necessary truths are based on the principle of non-contradiction, a contingent truth is that “which is or appears to be the best among several things which are equally possible.” Sometimes Leibniz called this principle the principle of sufficient reason, although the precise meaning of the latter is that every truth has a reason. “The contingent which exists owes its existence to the principle of what is best, the sufficient reason for things.” Leibniz, The Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence principle of tolerance Logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science At one stage Carnap claimed that an objective answer to questions can be reached so long as all researchers share the same linguistic framework. A linguistic framework embodies a system of logical principles, and sets up logical relations that connect experience to non-protocol sentences. Because linguistic frameworks are various, a problem arises about how we decide to employ one framework rather than another, for we adopt a framework only if we believe that it is true – but this seems to be circular. Carnap replied that in choosing a framework, we are not concerned with truth, but with pragmatic considerations of simplicity and usefulness. Thus we are at liberty to build up our own form of language or our own logic as we wish. Such an attitude concerning the choice of framework is called by Carnap the principle of tolerance, and it is also called the principle of the conventionality of language forms. For Carnap, there are no morals in logic. What is required of a logician is that he state his method clearly. We should be cautious in making assertions and be critical in examining them, but should be tolerant in permitting linguistic forms. “The Principle of Tolerance: It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions.” Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language principle of uncertainty, another term for the principle of indeterminacy principle of utility Ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law Also called the greatest happiness principle or the greatest felicity principle, the principle of utility is central idea of utilitarianism and was first formulated by Jeremy Bentham. It claims that we should judge the moral value of an action according to the consequence it produces. An action is right in proportion to its tendency to promote utility or happiness and wrong according to its tendency to produce pain for the parties concerned. Utility is proposed not only as the sole criterion of morality, but also as the basis for assessing institutions and for justifying political obligation to the state. Bentham claimed that the principle is the secular foundation of any legal system, with utility as the test for what laws there ought to be. The principle of utility has been challenged on many grounds, including its emphasis on consequence rather than intention in evaluation of actions, the priority it gives to the theory of good over the theory of right, its indifference to the distribution of happiness, and the difficulty in measuring and aggregating happiness. Versions of the principle have replaced happiness with other goods, such as the satisfaction of wants. “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question.” Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Prior, A. N. (1914–69) New Zealander logician, born in Masterton, Professor of Philosophy at Universities of Canterbury and Manchester and Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. Prior employed deontic logic in his study of ethics, invented tense logic on the model of modal logic to deal with the philosophy of time, and explained the logic of belief statements and statements involving propositional attitudes in terms of a special kind of connective between individuals and propositions. More generally, his formal inventiveness has extended the application of logic in many areas of philosophy. His major works include Logic and the Basis of Ethics (1949), Formal Logic (1955), Time and Modality (1957), Objects of Thought (1971), and Worlds, Times, and Selves (with Kit Fine) (1977). prisoner’s dilemma Philosophy of action, political philosophy, ethics A classical problem in the theory of choice and the theory of self-interest. Two prisoners charged with some joint crime are questioned by the prosecutors separately. Both of them know the following options: (1) if neither of them confesses, each will serve one year in prison; (2) if each confesses, everyone will serve two years; (3) if one confesses and the other does not, then the one who confesses will be released, and the other will serve three years. Neither knows the other’s choice. What is the rational choice for each? If every prisoner pursues his own best interest, the reasonable choice for him is to confess. But then neither gets the best result, and there is the worst overall outcome (four person-prison years). The case shows that furthering one’s own interest does not entail that one gets the best consequence or that the public good will be furthered efficiently. On the contrary, only if both cooperate and neither confesses will the best overall result be obtained. The prisoner’s dilemma is widely discussed in modern social, political, and moral philosophy, for it challenges fundamentally the theory of self-interest. Many political situations, such as an arms race between powers, can be modeled as prisoner’s dilemmas. “The hazards of the generalised prisoner’s dilemma are removed by the match between the right and the good.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice privacy Philosophy of mind In traditional dualism, one assumes that whatever is mental, such as experiences, sense-data, representations, or ideas, is private. This can be meant in two senses. In the first sense, my mental phenomena are inalienably owned by me. Only I have them. In the second sense, only I have access to my mental phenomena. They are incommunicable. For example, only I am in a position to know or to feel that I am in pain. This idea leads to skepticism about other minds, for it implies that one can never know whether another person is in pain. It also leads to solipsism, for if all experiences must be interpreted through my private experience, the world can only be my world. The idea of privacy is attacked in detail by later Wittgenstein. “In what sense are my sensations private? – Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations private good, see common good private language Philosophy of language, philosophy of mind A term introduced by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy. A private language is a language the words of which refer to the speaker’s immediate private sensations and can not be understood by another person. Modern philosophy generally starts by claiming that our knowledge is based on our own immediate experience and this experience can be expressed by language, at least to oneself. The possibility of such a private language seems to be supported by the apparent capacity of a person to record the occurrence of a particular kind of sensation in his diary and to propose calling it by some name. Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations, sections 243–315, argues against the possibility of a private language and the capacity to name occurrences of a kind of private sensation. He held that any use of language presupposes a community in which there is agreement in the rules of applying words and signs in judgments. If a language is private, there is no way to distinguish between thinking that one is obeying a rule and actually obeying it. So a private language is not a language, and the notion of a private language is not coherent. Philosophy based on the possibility of a private language is misguided because it misunderstands both the nature of experience and the nature of language. The so-called “private language argument” of Wittgenstein is complicated and is subject to various interpretations. It has stimulated much discussion in contemporary philosophy. “And sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’ might be called a ‘private language’.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. can be basic particulars, in contrast to the empiricist tradition of constructing persons and external objects from allegedly basic mental entities. “Identifying reference to ‘private particulars’ depends on identifying reference to particulars of another type altogether, namely persons.” Strawson, Individuals private morality, see public morality private ostensive definition Philosophy of language In a private ostensive definition, I concentrate my attention on a particular sensation that can be named only by myself privately rather than in terms of a public language. I associate the sensation with a sign, for example the sign “S.” I alone can know the meaning of this private sign, and another person can not understand it. For this to be the case, a private ostensive definition requires that there be a private object that only I can recognize. This view is rejected, along with the possibility of a private language, by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, 243–311. If a private object exists as the object of a private ostensive definition, there must be private thought, expressible only in terms of a private language. However, a private language is impossible. Any means of communication must involve criteria of meaning available to others. It is true that sensations have an aspect of subjectivity, but their subjectivity is not of the radical sort that would support a private language and private ostensive definitions. “You keep on steering towards the idea of the private ostensive definition.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations private particular Metaphysics, philosophy of mind Strawson’s term covering sensations, mental events, or sense-data, in contrast to public or objective particulars. To identify private particulars in our common language we need to identify another class of particulars, that is, persons who have them. For instance, to identify a private impression of red one must assign the impression to the person who has it. Because of the dependence of their identification upon the identification of persons, Strawson denies that private particulars private/public dichotomy, see public/private dichotomy private world, another expression for perspective privation, steresis, from steresthai, to lack or to be deprived of ] Normally, something suffers privation when it lacks an attribute that, according to its nature, it should possess. According to Aristotle’s analysis, privation, substratum, and form are the three basic elements in the process of change. Privation at the beginning of change is the absence of a character which the change will provide at its completion and which the substratum is capable of receiving. For example, if a man changes from being unmusical to being musical, the man is the substratum, unmusical is the privation, and musical is the form the man will gain when the change is finished. “For a thing comes to be from the privation, which in its own nature is not-being – this not surviving as a constituent of the result.” Aristotle, Physics privileged access Epistemology The special position that apparently gives one awareness of what is presently going on in one’s own mind, such as one’s thoughts, beliefs, intentions, and emotions. Privileged access is contrasted with the lack of special access in one’s knowledge of the external world and other minds. For while one’s knowledge of the world and other minds is mediated through certain causal factors and is subject to being checked by experience, one’s awareness of one’s mind is claimed to be immediate, infallible, and incorrigible. On this view, either these states are detectable by oneself alone or one is the final authority concerning their existence and their character. On either version, the accuracy of the reports of these mental states is verified by oneself. Since Descartes, many philosophers have believed that this special position exists. One’s mental states are private and the first-person account has authority. But Ryle, W. Sellars, Wittgenstein, and others denied that one has special access to one’s own mind that differs from one’s access to other minds, in part because the meaning of expressions used from a first-person perspective needs the support of a third-person use in a single language. It is still difficult to understand how to avoid a collapse of mental terms into first-person solipsism or third-person behaviorism. “I have also tried to show that from the fact that I do have privileged access to my present thoughts and feelings, in the sense that my testimony concerning them cannot be overridden, it does not follow that they are exclusively mine.” Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays pro-attitude Ethics, philosophy of action A term borrowed by Davidson from ethical theory for his causal theory of action. A pro-attitude is an agent’s mental attitude directed toward an action under a certain description. Such attitudes include wants, desires, urges, moral views, aesthetic principles, and economic prejudices. Such a set of mental attitudes, together with the agent’s belief that acting in a certain way promotes what the agent wants or values, form the primary reason for an agent to act in that way. “Reference to other attitudes besides wanting, or thinking he ought, may help specify the agent’s reasons, but it seems that some positive, or proattitude must be involved.” Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events probabilism Ethics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of science Initially, a doctrine developed by the Jesuits in the sixteenth century to determine what one should do when different authorities are found to disagree. The theory claims that if one is willing to perform an action, and that action has some probability in its favor, one has reason to perform that action without being condemned. Here, probable means supported by authority rather than supported by evidence. One may follow a course of action if it is authorized by some authority of the Church. It does not matter how much weight the authority has. The theory has difficulty in making sense of responsibility and was criticized by the Port-Royal Logic. The appearance of probabilism suggests a sense of loss of the certainty that characterized the Renaissance. In another sense, probabilism is any position that requires one to be content with probability because certainty does not obtain or because it is difficult to know whether certainty could obtain. Probabilism is also used for the claim that, all things being equal, the simplest theory is the most probable. When two theories seem to be equally supported by the evidence, the simpler one is in general more likely to be true. “The first contact of theories of probability with modern ethics appears in the Jesuit doctrine of probabilism. According to this doctrine, one is justified in doing an action for which there is any probability, however small, of its results being the best possible.” Keynes, A Treatise on Probability probability Logic, epistemology The different degrees of truth that a rational belief has when such a belief is more or less inconclusive. Probability can apply the occurrence of events, the existence of states, or the truth of propositions. There are various conceptions of probability corresponding to different theories of probability. Relative frequency theory, associated with J. Venn and R. von Mises, identifies probability with the frequency of occurrence of events of a given kind. Such an understanding of probability is addressed mainly to physical probability, that is, probability as an objective factor in the world and as the subjectmatter of statistics. Physical probability is indefinite in that it attaches to states of affairs or attributes rather than to propositions. Propensity theory argues that physical probability can pertain to specific individuals as propensities. Subjectivism or personalism, associated with de Finetti and Ramsey, takes probability as the degree of belief in an event. On this understanding probability is epistemic and is concerned with knowledge and opinion rather than with the physical structure of the world. This kind of probability is definite in the sense that it attaches to propositions rather than to attributes. Confirmation theory and range theory hold that probability is a connection between our judgment and the objective world. On this understanding probability has physical and epistemic aspects. All theories of probability attempt to establish that their notion of probability satisfies the formal requirement of the probability calculus. “In metaphysics, in science, and in conduct, most of the arguments, upon which we habitually base our rational beliefs, are admitted to be inconclusive in a greater or less degree. Thus, for a philosophical treatment of these branches of knowledge, the study of probability is required.” Keynes, A Treatise on Probability probability, a priori theory of another expression for probability, logical relation theory of probability, classical theory of Logic The earliest interpretation of probability, developed during the eighteenth century by Bernoulli, Bayes, and Laplace. Laplace defined probability as the ratio of the number of favorable cases to the total number of relevant and equally likely cases. This came to be known as the classical definition of probability. This theory takes probability as a ratio among equipossible alternatives and has received comprehensive mathematical elaboration. According to the principle of indifference, it assumes that prior to having any evidence, the same degree of probability (equipossibility) should be assigned to each alternative. This account involves a vicious circle because it defines probability in terms of equipossible alternatives, but equipossibility presupposes an understanding of probability. Various attempts have arisen to emend the principle of indifference to avoid this consequence. “The classical interpretation [of probability] is one of the oldest and best known; it defines probability as the ratio of favourable to equally possible cases.” Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific Inference probability, logical relation theory of Logic Also called the logical theory of probability or the a priori theory of probability, an interpretation of probability which proposes that probability is related to propositions rather than to the occurrence of events. Unlike the relative frequency theory, it holds that probability does not concern frequency but is a logical relation between propositions that have been formulated in accordance with evidence, and other propositions that are hypotheses, whose truth or falsity has not yet been determined by evidence. The probability of a proposition is thus relative to the given evidence and varies with it. It is a measure of the logical support for a proposition on the basis of evidence. The theory was developed by J. M. Keynes, W. E. Johnson, Harold Jeffreys, and Carnap, among others. While Keynes and Jeffreys rejected the frequency interpretation of probability, Carnap believed that logical probability differs in nature from empirical or statistical probability, which is the subject-matter of frequency theory. Logical relation theory is a more sophisticated version of the classical theory of probability. It defines probability as the degree of certainty that our beliefs about future events can have as rationally justified by the available evidence. A problem for the theory is that it can not verify the ways of constructing the required logical relation. Also, as Carnap saw, not all probability claims can be dealt with by the theory. “The whole logical relation theory is vitiated, I believe, because it makes out probability to attach to the relations between evidence and conclusions rather than to propositions, or propositional functions, by themselves.” Lucas, The Concept of Probability probability, propensity theory of Logic, philosophy of science An interpretation of probability, associated with Popper, that developed out of the relative frequency theory of probability. Both theories agree that probability is an objective feature of reality. While the relative frequency theory considers probability to be an attribute of an infinite sequence of events that we can represent with a finite sample, the propensity theory considers probability primarily to be a primitive undefined attribute of single events, although it can also account for the probability of sequences. Probability should be understood as the propensity or disposition of a situation to produce a given result. The main difficulty with this theory lies in the primitiveness of the notion of propensity, which seems to introduce a mysterious theoretical entity. Also, it is unclear whether the propensity of a single case is necessary to understand probability over a sequence. “All versions of the propensity theory have two important features that no relative frequency account can have. They apply just as well to indefinite populations as to finite ones. And they all allow probabilities to be assigned to superficial individual events.” L. Cohen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability probability, relative frequency theory of Logic, philosophy of science An interpretation of probability that holds that probability is the relative or statistical frequency of occurrence within a reference class. It applies primarily to infinite sequences, of which we must take finite samples. It is an objective theory for, as observed frequency, probability is an attribute of the real world. A probability statement is taken as an assertion about the world. Probability concerns a group or a series. That one event is more likely to happen than another means that, for an infinite sequence or a large finite sample, events of the first kind will occur more frequently than events of the other kind. The theory can be traced to Aristotle, who claimed that the probable is that which happens for the most part. Its modern expositors include John Venn, Hans Reichenbach, and Richard von Mises. This theory fits well with common sense and has great appeal for the empiricists, but its understanding of probability in terms of hypothetical infinite sequences is rejected by some as being unnecessarily abstract. The theory invites other objections, including those related to the possibility of ascertaining the values of the limit to which the relative frequency will tend over an infinite sequence. There are also problems in applying a frequency to the probability of a single event. A given event may be seen as belonging to different reference classes yielding different probabilities. “Relative frequency theory [of probability] . . . defines probability as the (limiting) relative frequency of some characteristic in some (infinite) sequence.” Logue, Projective Probability probability, subjective theory of Logic, epistemology, philosophy of mind Also called personalism, an interpretation of probability which claims that the probability of a proposition is the measure of the subject’s degree of reasonable belief or confidence in it. Reasonable belief is constrained by coherence rather than by empirical evidence. Since the intensity of confidence varies from one person to another, it follows that probability varies between subjects. Probability is the degree of belief that a given person has in a given statement on the basis of given evidence. If I believe with perfect certainty that it will rain tomorrow, then my subjective probability is 1. This theory differs from the logical relation theory of probability in that it does not take the relation between a statement and a body of evidence as a purely logical relation. This position has been defended by Ramsey, B. de Finetti, and L. J. Savage. Its major difficulty is to justify the notion of reasonable belief, which seems to require a conception of probability. It also has difficulty in explicating the intersubjective assessment of probabilities. Hence, a subjective theory of probability can not fully account for the concept of probability. “The subjective theory . . . defines probability as the degree of belief of a given person in a given proposition at a specific time.” Weatherford, Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory probability calculus Logic Of the conclusions inferred from probable inferences, some are more reliable than others. Logicians and probabilists have developed a branch of mathematics to determine degrees of probability, and this is called the probability calculus. This is a deductive meta-logical system, which is neutral about the material meanings of probability and studies only the mathematical laws involving probability or the logical structure of probability. There are many versions of this calculus. The basic axioms these different systems share include: (1) If P and Q are disjoint, their probability is the sum of the probability of each disjunct minus the probability of their conjunction: Prob (P ∨ Q) = Prob + Prob – Prob (P ∧ Q); (2) If P is a tautology, then Prob = 1; (3) 0 ≤ Prob ≤ 1. “We have then a calculus of probability, which, when given its customary interpretation in terms of scientific statements, allows us to calculate relative probabilities of alternative hypotheses in the light of changing evidence.” Caws, The Philosophy of Science productive force problem of evil, see evil problem of other minds, see other minds the idea of ‘process’ or ‘becoming’ must be taken as the chief category for interpreting the nature of both the world and God.” H. Owen, Concepts of Deity problem of the self, see personal identity problem of the speckled hen, an alternative expression for the dilemma of attention. process–product ambiguity Metaphysics An expression is ambiguous if it has more than one meaning and it is uncertain which meaning should be used in a given context. Some expressions can be used both to stand for a process and to stand for the product resulting from that process. The word “see” might mean either “I am seeing” or “I have seen.” The failure to distinguish between a process and a product in the same context can lead to confusion. “As a source of confusion, the process–product ambiguity is over-rated. Most processes are easily distinguished from their corresponding product.” Dretske, Explaining Behaviour process theology Philosophy of religion An approach to God within the conceptual framework of Whitehead’s process philosophy, also employed by the American philosopher and theologian Charles Hartshorne. While in traditional theology God is pure actuality and stands above the world of change, process theology explains God and his relation to the world in terms of change. It emphasizes the temporality of God and believes that to be unchanging is to be abstract and dead. For Whitehead, God’s being has two aspects: a primordial nature, which is his nature in himself, and a consequential nature, which is constituted by his response to the temporal world and is characterized by process or becoming. The former aspect is formal, conceptual, and unconscious, while the latter aspect is material, determined, and conscious. Hartshorne also adopts a similar distinction between the necessary existence of God and his contingent actuality. He claims that God can be understood as a temporal process of experiential events. “The term ‘process theology’ is applied to the theological speculations produced by a group of twentieth century thinkers. . . . They believe that Proclus (c.410–485) Greek Neoplatonist, born in Constantinople, the last head of Plato’s Academy. In works including Elements of Theology, Platonic Theology, and Concerning Providence and Fate, Proclus maintained that reality as universal consciousness is mental but objective. The world comprises a hierarchy of One, Power, Mind, Soul and/or Nature, and the world of appearances. The One, which is God, is the ultimate cause and contains all diversity within its identity, whereas the world of appearance is the effect of this cause. productive force Philosophy of social science, philosophy of history [German Productivkräfte, also translated as force of production or productive power] The key category in Marx’s historical materialism, covering the sum of the elements or factors in the process of producing material use-value, including both the subjective factor of human labor power and the objective factors of the means of production. The means of production are further divided into the object of labor (natural resources including both raw materials and non-raw materials) and the means of labor, such as instruments. For historical materialism, the forces of production are fundamental in explanatory terms. They determine the character of the relations of production, that is, the economic structure, and inform the legal/political and ideological superstructure with content. Productive forces set humans above animals and actualize human capacity. According to Marx, the forces of production always advance throughout history. When they develop to a certain stage, the existing relations of production will no longer correspond to them and will constrain further development. At such times, Marx claimed, social revolutions will take place because the forces of production will break through the fetters of existing relations of production and establish new relations of production that are suitable for further progress. Productive forces are the ultimate determinant of human history. All of the main claims for the role of productive forces in Marx’s explanatory structure have been challenged and defended within Marxism and by other theorists. “A social formation never comes to an end before all the forces of production which it can accommodate are developed and new, higher relations of production never come into place before the material conditions of their existence have gestated in the womb of the old society.” Marx, Preface to the Critique of Political Economy prohairesis, Greek term for decision projectibility Logic, epistemology, philosophy of science A term introduced by Goodman in his discussion of the problem of confirmation. A projection is an inference from the known to the unknown on the grounds of induction from past experience. Projectibility is the degree of entrenchment of this inference. If all observed emeralds are green, we may reasonably infer that future emeralds are green, but not that they are grue (green before some future time T and blue thereafter), for “green” is a projectible predicate and is well entrenched, having a high frequency of projection, while “grue” is not well entrenched. This is true even though the claims that all emeralds are grue and that all emeralds are green have equal inductive support. Grounding projectibility involves distinguishing between valid projections and invalid projections. Inductive reasoning can apply only to projectible properties or hypotheses rather than to all properties or hypotheses. Hence, to decide which property is projectible becomes an important issue in epistemology. According to Goodman, a hypothesis is projectible if all conflicting hypotheses are overridden. By introducing the notion of projectibility, and by defining it in terms of the historical record of entrenchment through actual projections, Goodman rejects the traditional discussion of confirmation that allows green and grue to be equally confirmed and aims to construct a purely syntactical definition of confirmation. “If we start with past projections as well as evidence and hypotheses, our task becomes that of defining valid projection – or projectibility – on the basis of actual projections.” Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast. “Hilbert introduced his proof theory. This theory treated the axiom systems of mathematics as pure syntax, distinguishing them from what he called mathematics, where meaning was permitted.” Moore, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences, vol. XI propensity Metaphysics, logic, philosophy of mind Generally conceived as the inner and probabilistic disposition or state in virtue of which a thing or a person will act in a certain way under normal circumstances, unless it is blocked by some external force. That I have a propensity to reduce my weight means that I do so if no counter-measures are taken. That I have the propensity to have a certain belief means that I will maintain this belief unless it is strongly refuted by some concluding evidence. The term propensity is closely related to the acquisition of belief and to the theory of probability. Popper developed a propensity interpretation of probability according to which the probability of a single case is its propensity. “Let us say that someone has a propensity to be j if he is in such a state that he will be j unless some special blocking factors intervene.” Smith and Jones, The Philosophy of Mind proof theory Philosophy of mathematics, logic A theory dealing with axiomatic systems, founded by Hilbert in the 1920s as a tool for carrying out his program in the foundations of mathematics. In rejecting the claim that the foundations of mathematical analysis were built on sand, Hilbert introduces proof theory to show the consistency of both analysis and set theory, and to establish the decidability of each mathematical question. Although Hilbert’s program was undermined by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Gerhard Gentzen proved the consistency of elementary mathematics by using natural deduction and sequent calculi. Gentzen extended proof theory into a general theory that examines how proofs in formal logical systems, that is, systems determined by their axioms and rules of inference, can be investigated by mathematical techniques. Proof theory is now a branch of mathematical logic. proper name Logic, philosophy of language A simple symbol for a particular, which does not have further symbols as its parts, in contrast to a description, which is a complex symbol. Whether a proper name has sense in itself has been a puzzling question since Plato’s Theaetetus. Frege points out that proper names can occur in informative identity statements, for example “The Morning Star is the Evening Star,” and uses his distinction between sense and reference to account for this phenomenon. The claim that proper names have descriptive content gains support from the fact that proper names can appear in existential statements, such as “The Morning Star exists.” Wittgenstein in the Tractatus claims that a proper name designates a particular directly and has that particular as its meaning. As a consequence, the proper name has no sense in itself. Russell, in a defense of Wittgenstein’s view, distinguishes between ordinary proper names and logically proper names. An ordinary proper name has sense, but is in fact a disguised description. For example, “Socrates” is an abbreviation of something like “the philosopher who drank hemlock.” On the other hand, logically proper names, for example names for the items in one’s current experience, have their meaning in the objects they stand for. Kripke and Putnam criticize Frege’s and Russell’s accounts of proper names. Descriptions can be useful in fixing the reference of a proper name, but the meaning of the name is determined by the essential features (for example, of inner structure or origin) that make the item what it is. These features need not be immediately available to experience but, like water being H2O, can be discovered. is a subject of experience that has this awareness or experience. “I” is a proper name for this particular subject. A difficulty for this position is that even if we accept that I perceive a self as a subject of experience, it is not clear how I would establish that this self is myself. “The only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for a particular is a proper name, and the whole matter of proper names is rather curious.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge property (political and legal philosophy), see ownership proper name theory Metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind A theory about the meaning of the word “I,” holding that the word “I” is a logically proper name, that is, a word that directly designates an object with which the speaker is acquainted. I can know that I am aware of something or that I am having a certain experience only because I have perceived that there property instance, another term for abstract particular “According to proper name theory the person who knows an ego-centric fact is prehending, not only a certain particular as an experience of a certain kind, but also another particular.” Broad, Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy property Metaphysics A property is a feature or aspect by which a thing can be described or characterized. It is a characteristic that a thing is said to possess and is synonymous with “attribute.” An Aristotelian or medieval proprium, a characteristic which is unique to the essence of a thing but which is not in its definition, is also a property. Properties are often divided into essential and accidental properties, which are also called internal and external properties. An essential or internal property belongs to the essence of a thing, such that the thing can not lose an essential property without losing its identity. On the other hand, the possession or non-possession of an accidental or external property by a thing does not affect its identity. Interest in essential properties has been revived by recent work in modal logic, the logic of necessity and possibility. “A property is simply an aspect of a thing as described or characterized – a predicable.” Hamlyn, Metaphysics property dualism, see dualism proposition Logic, philosophy of language The basic unit of logical analysis, characteristically stated by a declarative sentence and the bearer of the truth-value true or false. There is controversy over the relationships between propositions, statements, and sentences. Many theorists identify propositions with statements. Both are distinguished from sentences, but some philosophers wish to eliminate propositions as abstract entities in favor of sentences. If both kinds of entity are accepted, all propositions are sentences or are expressed by sentences. Only declarative sentences generally express propositions, although sentences of interrogative, imperative, and other forms have propositional content. A proposition can usually be represented by a “that” clause. Understanding the nature and structure of propositions is often seen as the central task of philosophical logic. Philosophers consider the functions of components of propositions, such as names, predicates, and logical constants, and consider how the components are unified into something having a truth-value. They examine how the form, meaning, and use of propositions are related and how different propositions can enter into logical relations. There has been much recent discussion of how linguistic or psychological states can have propositional content. “Let us . . . define a proposition as any complete sentence capable of expressing a statement.” Russell, Collected Papers, vol. VII proposition/sentence Logic, philosophy of language A sentence is a group of words (symbols, signs) ordered according to some grammatical rule in any natural or artificial language. Sentences of various grammatical forms are best suited to indicate, plead, request, order, interrogate and so on, although such sentences can also be used outside their primary functions. A sentence is not necessarily meaningful, and the same sentence may have different meanings and may be used in different ways. All these characteristics make it difficult to determine in the abstract whether a given sentence is true or false or even whether in principle it is verifiable. Philosophers therefore introduce the term “proposition” for abstract objects that are expressed by sentences and which bear truth-values. A proposition can in principle be expressed by a sentence, but not all sentences express propositions. Once sentences and propositions are distinguished, philosophers ask how features of meaning and truth should be divided between the two, which is the vehicle for asserting or denying, for stating that some predicate holds of some subject or that certain items are related in a certain way. A proposition can be expressed by grammatically different sentences or by sentences in different languages, so long as the sentences have the same content. For instance, “A conquered B” and “B was conquered by A” are two sentences that express the same proposition. Propositions seem at first glance to be most closely related to indicative sentences, but sentences of other kinds can also be understood as having propositional content. Ayer takes propositions to be logical constructions out of synonymous sentences rather than as Platonic entities existing in their own right. A proposition, not a sentence, is generally recognized as the truth-bearer, whilst meaning is often ascribed to sentences or statements. We can say that truth or falsity are not merely for one particular sentence S, but for all sentences that are logically equivalent to S. However, there are widely disputed problems in philosophical logic about the existence, nature, and individuation of propositions. Philosophers hostile to abstract entities try to do without propositions or to see them as a mere device for dealing with sentences. Realists and reductionists of various sorts must all provide accounts of how propositions and sentences are related. “The word ‘proposition’ . . . will be reserved for what is expressed by sentences which are literally meaningful.” Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic propositional attitude Philosophy of mind Russell’s term for mental activities signified by verbs, such as think, hope, fear, want, wish, believe, guess, and consider. These verbs are propositional verbs, in contrast to the cognitive verbs such as know, see, smell, or feel. Both kinds of verb demand a grammatical accusative. However, propositional verbs, unlike cognitive verbs, do not necessarily have to have something in reality that answers to their grammatical accusatives. If I see X, there is an X, and if I see that p, then p is true. However, if I hope for X, it is open whether there is an X or not, and if I hope that p, it remains open whether p is true. A propositional attitude expresses an attitude to a proposition. Thus, the contexts of all propositional attitudes are intentional. propositional knowledge There are many philosophical problems associated with the notion of propositional attitudes. These include the question of whether co-referential designators can be substituted salva veritate in the context of propositional attitudes. If not, these contexts are referentially opaque. There are also problems with related notions such as belief, intentionality, and content. “We pass next to the analysis of propositional attitudes, that is believing, desiring, doubting, etc. that so-and-so is the case.” Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth propositional belief, see belief in and belief that propositional calculus Logic One main branch of modern formal logic, also called propositional logic, sentential calculus, sentential logic, the logic of propositions, and the theory of truth-functions. Anticipated partially by the Stoics, the prepositional calculus was systematically developed in the works of Frege, Peirce, Russell, and Wittgenstein. It formulates the principles of inference in terms of the truth-functional constants of arguments. These constants include negation (not), conjunction (and), disjunction (or), implication (if . . . then), and equivalence (if and only if ). Each of them is symbolized by logical notation. There are various schemes of logical notation, but one widely used notation contains “~” (negation), “∧” (conjunction), “∨” (disjunction), “⊃” (implication), and “≡” (equivalence). The basic constituents of an argument are propositions (symbolized as p, q, r . . . ). The validity of an argument is determined through the truth-table method by the truth-values of its components and the logical constants connecting them. Since propositional logic requires that all the propositions are either true or false and can not be both, it is also called two-valued logic. Because of its importance for any systematic development of thought, it was also called by Whitehead and Russell, the theory of deduction, or by Kneale primary logic. “The propositional calculus is characterised by the fact that all its propositions have as hypothesis and as consequent the assertion of a material implication.” Russell, The Principles of Mathematics propositional content, see content propositional form, another term for form of proposition propositional function Logic An expression or schema, such as “x is mortal,” which can be converted into a proposition, such as “Socrates is mortal,” by replacing “x” with a determinate value, in this case “Socrates.” The term originates in Frege’s investigation into the possibility of deriving mathematics from logical axioms. Russell, who applies the notion of propositional functions in the analysis of propositions, argues that general propositions state connections between propositional functions. For instance, “all men are mortal” can be analyzed into “whatever x may be, if x is a man, x is mortal.” The appeal to propositional functions enables Russell to dispose of the grammatical subjects of universal propositions that we wrongly suppose to refer to existing objects. This maneuver is a major factor in his theory of descriptions. A propositional function is necessary if it always true. It is possible if it is sometimes true and sometimes false. It is impossible if it is never true. “A form of words containing an undetermined variable – for instance, ‘x is a man’ – is called a ‘propositional function’ if when a value is assigned to the variable, the form of words becomes a proposition.” Russell, Human Knowledge propositional knowledge Epistemology Knowledge that something is the case, instances of which are expressed in the form S knows that p, where “S” stands for a person and “p” can be replaced by a proposition. As knowing-that or knowledge by description, propositional knowledge contrasts with knowledge by acquaintance (perceptual knowledge of a simple object), a priori knowledge, and knowing-how. The traditional or standard analysis of propositional knowledge is that it must satisfy three conditions: A knows p requires that (1) A believes that p, (2) p is true, and (3) A is justified in believing p. Historically, the majority of epistemological theories have analyzed each of these conditions and their interrelationships. Since Gettier posed his counterexamples to this definition, epistemologists have discussed whether we need to add a fourth condition to propositional knowledge and, if so, what it should be. “The general definition of propositional knowledge that I propose to defend is along traditional lines and can be expressed as follows: S knows that P if and only if (1) P, (2) S is confident that P, and (3) S’s being so is supported by a disinterested justification for being so, (4) that is externally conclusive.” Ginet, Knowledge, Perception, Memory propositional logic, another term for propositional calculus propositional object, another expression for proposition propositional sign Logic A sign that expresses a thought or a proposition. In medieval Latin propositio has this meaning, although in modern English “proposition” refers rather to propositional content. According to Wittgenstein, if a sign is a propositional sign, all of its elements must be coordinated with one another in a determinate way. A proposition is not a different entity from a propositional sign, but is just a propositional sign taken together with its pictorial relation to its objects. “A proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus propositional verb, see propositional attitude Protagoras (490–420 bc) Greek philosopher, a leading sophist, born in Abdera. All of Protagoras’ works were lost, with only a few fragments surviving. His claim that “man is the measure of all things” shows optimism about human strength and creativity, but has also been interpreted to imply epistemological relativism. Protagoras maintained that all customs are equally arbitrary and, hence, equally valid. He was agnostic about the existence or features of the gods and was an influential teacher of the rhetorical art. He claimed that there are two contradictory logoi or accounts about everything. He was portrayed in Plato’s dialogue Protagoras. prosentential theory of truth Logic The term “prosentence” was formed on analogy with “pronoun,” in line with the claim that sentences containing truth predicates such as “That is true” relate to sentences in the way that pronouns relate to nouns. An anaphoric pronoun acquires its references from antecedent expressions and can be replaced by its antecedent. For instance, in “John is a student, and he is intelligent,” the pronoun “he” acquires its reference through its relation to the earlier expression “John” and can be replaced by “John.” The prosentential theory of truth claims that a sentence with the truth predicate “is true” has a similar anaphoric function. The only difference is that its reference is acquired from an antecedent sentence rather than an antecedent noun. “That is true,” can be replaced by an antecedent sentence. Accordingly, the truth predicate responds to and comments upon the assertion expressed by that sentence. In particular, the truth predicate does not introduce a property or common characteristic shared by true propositions. It is content-redundant and can be used to provide emphasis. The theory resembles the disquotational theory of truth. “Briefly, a principal claim of the prosentential theory is that ‘That is true’ and ‘It is true’ are ‘prosentences’. Prosentences function much as pronouns do, expect that prosentences occupy the positions in sentences that declarative sentences occupy, while pronouns occupy the positions names occupy.” Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Truth protocol sentences Epistemology, philosophy of science [from German Protokollsatze, sometimes translated as protocol statements] For Carnap and Neurath, statements which others call basic propositions, basic sentences, or basic statements. They are also similar to the atomic proposition of Russell and Wittgenstein. Carnap, in the material mode of speech, defines protocol sentences in terms of our simplest state of knowledge and holds that they refer to directly given experience or phenomena. More satisfactorily, in the formal mode of speech he characterizes these sentences by their logical place in science, saying that they are the statements that need no further justification and that all other statements of science are verified by reference to them. The notion of protocol statement is significant for logical positivism, which held that science is a system of statements based on and verified by experiment and observation and that protocol statements are the basis of verification. It is a characteristic of protocol sentences that they can be verified only solipsistically and that they therefore provide a poor basis for publicly shared scientific knowledge. Given their peculiar nature, problems arise about the meaning and truth of protocol sentences. There are difficulties in deciding how to identify sentences as protocol sentences and to explain why their truth should be immune from further tests. The private language argument deepens these problems. These difficulties about protocol sentences made the views of logical positivism about the foundations of science untenable. As a result, Carnap and Neurath were driven to rely upon the logical relations between statements rather than ascribing a privileged epistemological position to some. Protocol sentences are also called “observation sentences,” but Schlick claimed that observation statements, unlike protocol statements, can not be written down or memorized. “Regardless of this diversity of opinion it is certain that a sequence of words has a meaning only if its relations of deductibility to the protocol sentences are fixed, whatever the characteristics of the protocol sentences may be.” Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language,” in Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism providence Philosophy of religion [from Greek pronoia, foresight, foreknowledge and the Latin equivalent, providentia] A crucial religious term for the relation between God and the world, although the extent and meaning of providence has been a topic of dispute. In Stoicism, providence is a non-personal divine order pervading the world. In Christianity, it concerns God’s prior knowledge or his plan that guides the path of the world and man. In a broad sense, it covers all of the activities by which God directly controls nature, man, and history, including creating and sustaining the world. Theologians usually distinguish between general providence, which is God’s working through natural laws, and special providence, which is God’s working through some specific action such as delivering a message through a prophet. Some argue that special providence includes miracles as well, but this view was rejected by Aquinas. No matter how providence is understood, the relationship between providence and human free will has been a central problem for theology. “In taking care of things, there is a distinction between the two, namely the reason in their planned disposition, and this is termed providence, and the disposing and execution, and this is termed government. The first is eternal, the second temporal.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae prudence Ethics The exercise of intelligence or rationality to safeguard one’s own interests. According to prudence, the calculation of individual loss and gain motivates an action. It judges what one ought to do with respect to one’s desires, inclinations, and interests. Prudence differs from morality, which judges what one ought to by reference to the rights of others and one’s obligations to others, as well as by reference to one’s moral concerns with oneself. To act prudently is in itself neither moral nor immoral, but is simply to act wisely and rationally within the scope of one’s aims and interests. Acting prudently does not entail that one will satisfy one’s own desire at the expense of others. Prudence is opposed not to morality, but to imprudence, that is, to acting unwisely, irrationally, or foolishly. An immoral person does not necessarily act prudently, and an imprudent person does not necessarily act immorally. Prudence often coincides with commonsense morality. “The word ‘prudence’ is used in a double sense: firstly, it can mean worldly wisdom, and secondly, private wisdom. The former is the skill of someone in influencing others so as to use them for his own purposes. The latter is the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own lasting advantage. The value of the former is properly reduced to the latter, and it might better be said of one who is prudent in the former sense but not in the latter that he is clever and cunning, but on the whole imprudent.” Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals pseudo-concepts Philosophy of language, metaphysics A logical positivist term for concepts that appear to be meaningful but which are actually meaningless. Any word or concept should have a meaning that allows it to pick out objects or other entities. According to logical positivists, however, many words are deprived of any meaning through their metaphysical use. Terms such as Principle, God, the Absolute, the Infinite, Being as Being and Essence are all pseudo-concepts. Although metaphysicians think that they have meaning, these words can not be used in sentences to assert anything. They are merely allusions to associated images and feelings that do not bestow a meaning on the expressions. They fail to satisfy empirical criteria of meaningfulness, and the definitions given to them in metaphysics are pseudo-definitions. The sentences that contain a pseudo-concept are pseudo-sentences. “If it only seems to have a meaning while it really does not, we speak of a ‘pseudo-concept’.” Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis,” in Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism pseudo-definitions, see pseudo-concepts pseudo-object, another term for logical fiction pseudo-object sentence Philosophy of language, metaphysics Carnap distinguishes among three kinds of sentences: (1) An “object sentence,” which speaks of an object, for instance, “Babylon was a big town”; (2) a “syntactical sentence,” which speaks of a word, for instance, “The word ‘Babylon’ occurred in yesterday’s lecture”; (3) a “pseudo-object sentence,” which is formulated as though it refers to objects in the world while in reality it is a syntactical sentence that concerns expressions of the object-language, for instance, “Babylon was treated of in yesterday’s lecture.” Such a sentence has a misleading resemblance to a sentence that speaks about the object Babylon, but it is actually about the word “Babylon.” The sentence “Roundness is a universal” is a pseudoobject sentence, and should be replaced with the syntactical sentence “ ‘round’ is a predicate.” Carnap also calls this kind of sentence a quasi-syntactical sentence. According to him, philosophical statements are syntactical, but in the history of philosophy they have been treated as object sentences or statements. In this mistake lies the root of many traditional problems. We should translate pseudo-object sentences from the material mode of speech into the formal mode of speech by replacing them by their syntactical equivalents, that is, we should treat pseudo-object sentences as claims about words, a practice which would avoid much confusion and endless controversy. “Thus, these sentences are syntactical sentences in virtue of their content, though they are disguised as object sentences. We will call them pseudoobject sentences.” Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language pseudo-paradox, see barber paradox pseudo-predicate Philosophy of language, metaphysics Also called metaphysical predicate. A term introduced by Carnap for predicates such as “individual,” “universal,” “number,” and “necessary,” which are employed frequently in metaphysics. Sentences in which these predicates function appear to convey certain ontological information, but they do not actually introduce any properties of the objects designated by these sentences. A sentence containing a pseudo-predicate is either analytically true or meaningless. The real role of these predicates concerns syntactical classification. The sentence “2 is a number” does not express anything about a property of 2, but rather classifies “2” as a numerical expression. A pseudo-predicate is eliminated when one converts a material mode of speech into a formal mode of speech. “ ‘P’ is a pseudo-predicate if any sentence obtained from the sentential function ‘Px’ by substituting a value for ‘x’ is either analytically true or meaningless on account of resulting from the substitution of an inadmissible value.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy pseudo-problem Philosophy of language, metaphysics Early analytical philosophy, especially logical positivism, claimed that the majority of traditional and perennial metaphysical problems are not genuine pseudo-statement questions, although they appear to be. Logical analysis reveals that although these problems have the same grammatical form as genuine questions, they in fact arise from a misuse of language. For example, the question “Does God exist?” arises because metaphysicians confuse the copulative use and the existential use of the verb “to be.” Accordingly, pseudo-problems can be dismissed through semantic analysis. “Grammatical similarities foster the illusion, which proves a source of immortal metaphysical pseudo-problems, as though ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ referred to opposite properties of things, just like ‘kind-unkind’, ‘living-dead’, ‘stable-unstable’.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy pseudo-proposition Philosophy of language A term introduced by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, referring to any judgment that attempts to say that which can only be shown. Unlike other propositions, pseudopropositions can not be analyzed into atomic pictures and their combinations and therefore they are not pictures of the world. Wittgenstein thinks that in different ways the propositions of logic, mathematics, the a priori parts of natural science, ethics, and philosophy – including the propositions of his own Tractatus – are all pseudo-propositions. Logical positivists develop this idea in their attack on metaphysics by saying that all propositions and statements that purport to make a factual claim but which can not be verified by experience are pseudo-propositions. They have emotional significance, but lack cognitive meaning. There are many attempts to retrieve at least some of the fields discarded in this way by logical positivism. “The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus pseudo-science Philosophy of science [from Greek pseudo, false or unreal] A doctrine or set of views that falsely claims the status of science or knowledge. In unhealthy academic circumstances, especially where an enforced orthodoxy exists, all other schools can be condemned without justification as pseudo-sciences. Determining whether a doctrine is a pseudo-science is an issue in the philosophy of science and requires that one first determine what counts as scientific knowledge. For logical positivism, if a thesis satisfies the verifiability criterion, it is scientific; otherwise it is pseudo-scientific. Accordingly, traditional metaphysics is pseudo-scientific and meaningless because none of its claims can be verified. Popper claimed that the criterion for demarcating science from pseudo-science is that of falsifiability. To be scientific, a theory must be falsifiable, that is, in principle there must be some observation statements that would contradict the theory. Popper does not deny that the statements of a pseudo-science are meaningful. Some critics of Popper claim that pseudo-sciences are typically both falsifiable and falsified, but are still retained by their supporters. From this perspective, the integrity of individual investigators and of the institutions of the scientific community is a more important consideration in distinguishing science from pseudo-science. “Social scientists use the epithets ‘scientific’ and ‘pseudo-scientific’ as a major part of the ritual language of denunciation.” Yearley, Science and Sociological Practice pseudo-statement Philosophy of language, metaphysics A statementlike word sequence which can not be reduced to protocol sentences or statements and which can not pass the test of the verification principle, either because it contains meaningless words (pseudoconcepts) or because it puts together meaningful words in a way violating syntax. Such a wordsequence appears to be a statement but it is not. It fails to assert anything and expresses neither a true proposition nor a false proposition. Pseudostatements are of major concern to logical positivism, which labels all metaphysical statements as pseudo-statements. They claim that the origin of metaphysical pseudo-statements lies in the logical defects of ordinary language. The notion of pseudostatements is the target of much criticism that has been directed at logical positivism. “Our thesis, now, is that logical analysis reveals the alleged statements of metaphysics to be pseudostatements.” Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language,” in Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism psyche, Greek term for soul psychoanalysis Philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science A therapeutic practice and associated theory of mind founded by Freud. As a theory, it postulates the existence of an unconscious mind, comprising painful thoughts that through repression are excluded from consciousness, except as disguised through symbolic transformation in such phenomena as dreams, puns, and slips of the tongue. The unconscious has a dynamic role in determining behavior. Psychoanalytic theory places great emphasis on the origin of neurosis in the sexual drives and fantasies of early childhood, especially in the relations of a child to his parents through the Oedipus complex. The theory claims to reveal and explain a variety of affective disturbances and intellectual blindnesses in people not suffering from a psychic disorder. The theory has a causal physical side in Freud’s early concern with the workings of the nervous system, but also an interpretative side, based on interpreting back to their origin the repressed thoughts that surface consciously in symbolically distorted ways. For analysts, anything important in an analytic session is likely to be below the surface of overt meaning. As a therapy, classical psychoanalysis is ideally conducted as a kind of talking cure. In regular conversations between analyst and patient, the analyst’s neutrality allows the patient to project the repressed early relations and emotions allegedly at the root of the disorder. The analyst may employ various techniques, including dream interpretation or free association, to reach what is repressed. The analyst analyzes what the patient says, trying to reveal from the recovered material the repressed unconscious thoughts considered to be at the root of the patient’s illness. The main aim of psychoanalysis is to bring repressed thoughts to consciousness, and this kind of discovery, when accepted by the patient, is meant to lead to a cure. Freud claimed that psychoanalysis, after the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions, was the third blow to human claims to uniqueness. He believed that it provided a key to the theory of human nature and suggested that philosophy should correct its long-term prejudice in favor of the conscious. The discovery of the processes of the unconscious mind would enlarge our conception of the self and greatly enhance human self-knowledge. Freud also used a psychoanalytic approach to interpret art and culture. In spite of a suggestive richness that placed psychoanalysis near the center of many developments of twentieth-century culture, virtually all of its major claims as a theory and its major practices as a therapy have been attacked by outside critics and through schisms and expulsions among those within the psychoanalytic movement. The promise of therapeutic success remains broadly unfulfilled. Psychoanalysis has been attacked as bad science, as pseudo-science, and as a bad humane discipline, and the best way to characterize and assess the enterprise remains in dispute. Some philosophy of mind and almost all major schools of modern European philosophy have been influenced by psychoanalysis. “Psycho-analysis is the name (1) of a procedure for the investigation of material processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way; (2) of a method (based on that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline.” Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18 psycholinguistics Philosophy of social science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language An interdisciplinary science of psychology and linguistics, dealing mainly with individual psychological reality and the processes which determine the production, acquisition, and learning of language. Although the name of this discipline appeared in 1895 in a book by the German scholar Meringer, the discipline did not flourish until the 1950s, marked by the publication of C. E. Osgood and T. A. Sebeok (eds.), Psycholinguistics: A Survey of Theory and Research Problems (1954). The development of psycholinguistics is stipulated by Chomsky’s work in linguistics and psychological cognitivism. Scholars disagree widely about the characterization of this discipline and its main problems. But its basic tenet is to oppose the behavioral theory of language, to discover the psychological psychologist’s fallacy entities behind linguistic structures and to determine the competence beneath the performances of language speakers. Recently its focus has been on the devices of language acquisition. “Psycholinguistics is the study of the mental mechanisms that make it possible for people to use language. It is a scientific discipline whose goal is a coherent theory of the way in which language is produced and understood.” Garnham, Psycholinguistics psychological determinism Philosophy of mind, philosophy of action The view that human behavior or action is determined by psychological events within the agent’s mind, rather than by objective natural laws, as physical determinism claims. What underlies this position is the dualist view of the relation between body and soul that was dominant in ancient Greek philosophy and was fully articulated by Descartes. On this view, the body and soul are two distinct entities, with the soul governing the body. Psychological determinism denies that there is a problem of free will. Freedom is freedom from coercion and constraints, and an act is free if the agent performs it in accordance with the determination of the mind. “Psychological determinism maintains that there are certain psychological laws, which we are beginning to discover, enabling us to predict, usually on the basis of his experiences in early infancy, how a man will respond to different situations throughout his later life.” Lucas, The Freedom of the Will psychological egoism Philosophy of mind, philosophy of action The position that by nature people pursue what they believe to be in their self-interest and are by nature egoistic. Certainly, people may sacrifice their immediate and obvious self-interests but only if doing so is a means to a longer-term self-interested goal. This is a psychological theory about the dispositions and motivations of human nature, rather than an ethical position about the moral virtue of these motivations and consequent behavior. For this reason, ethical egoism is also called normative egoism. Psychological egoism provides a basis for ethical egoism, and, if it is true, all versions of ethical altruism are psychologically groundless. Yet it is hard to prove that psychological egoism is true, and critics maintain that we are also motivated by non-egoistic desires. “Psychological egoism . . . can be formulated as follows: A person can perform an act only if that act has at least as much agent utility as any alternative.” Feldman, Introductory Ethics psychologism Logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science A theory that became popular in the nineteenth century and was initiated by the German philosophers J. F. Fries and F. E. Beneke. According to its neo-Kantian position, psychology is the basis of philosophy and introspection is the primary method of philosophical enquiry. Every discipline in philosophy is nothing more than applied psychology. The view was especially associated with logic. In that area it rejected Kant’s transcendental psychology as unscientific and claimed that logic is based upon laws of thought that can be explained in terms of empirical psychological principles. It attempted to explain logical connections in terms of psychological causes and therefore tended to confuse logical issues and psychological issues. It had some connection with both British empiricism and naturalism. J. S. Mill and R. H. Lotze defended psychologism in their logic by claiming that introspection provides the only basis for the axioms of mathematics and the principles of logic. The position was severely criticized by Frege and Carnap, but has been revived in naturalized epistemology. “Psychologism, that is, the explanation of sense in terms of some inner psychological mechanism possessed by the speaker.” Dummett, The Seas of Language psychologist’s fallacy Philosophy of social science William James’s term for the confusion of a psychologist’s own characterizations of a mental state with the actual features of the original mental state that he is studying. It has different formulations, and can refer either to a psychologist’s relation to the experience of others or to a person’s comments on his own experience. The fallacy also arises from the psychologist’s failure to recognize the hierarchy of relations of an psycho-physical parallelism original mental state. A person who possesses such a mental state may report at a higher level, and the psychologist will comment in turn on the report. He will believe that the original mental state may only have the characteristics he defines within his theory and will take his own knowledge as the whole sphere of knowledge about the object. With the formulation of this fallacy, James claimed that there is a gap between theoretical constructs and the experience on which they are based. “Another variety of the psychologist’s fallacy is the assumption that the mental state studied must be conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it.” W. James, The Principles of Psychology psycho-physical parallelism, see parallelism public choice Political philosophy, philosophy of action, philosophy of social science Also called social choice, an area of political philosophy that is heavily influenced by economic theory and concerns the establishment of a logic of rational social action, such as voting procedures, lobbying, or electoral reform. Each individual is motivated to act by self-interest, and a rational choice is necessary for an action to achieve greatest advantage. However, under many circumstances, action has to be social, and the rationality of individual choice has to depend on the rationality of the choices of other agents. Otherwise, a choice seeking the best consequence can turn out to obtain the worst outcome, as the prisoner’s dilemma powerfully indicates. A major concern of public choice theory is to establish how rational agents might coordinate their choices to achieve their mutual advantage. Since the public good is not the simple aggregate of individual goods, another aspect of public choice theory is to work out the strategy by which a society can generate a single rational and impartial choice to maximize public goods from the various rational preferences of individuals, although Kenneth Arrow has shown that on certain plausible assumptions this is not possible. Since democracy is based on such an ideal, public choice theory becomes important for virtually every operation of democracy. “Public choice applies economists’ method to politics, and in particular, to two central problems: the collective action problem and the problem of aggregating preferences.” McLean, Public Choice public goods Political philosophy Goods that anyone may enjoy whether or not they pay for them, for instance police protection or traffic lights. They are not subjected to crowding, that is, one person’s enjoyment of a public good does not entail that other people will enjoy the good less. The problem of public goods is associated with that of the free rider, for if no one pays for enjoying them, the public goods will be difficult to maintain. As a result, either the quality of the goods will be reduced or these goods might be entirely withdrawn. Understanding the possibility of maintaining public goods is also a central concern of public choice theory. “A pure public good is defined as a good requiring indivisibility of production and consumption, nonrivalness and non-excludability.” McLean, Public Choice public morality Ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law The sphere in which standards of human behavior are enforced by the law and violations of this moral legislation are subject to punishment according to the criminal law. Murder and stealing, for instance, are matters for public morality. It is generally held that public morality is essential to the maintenance of communal existence. In contrast, private morality and law are different spheres, and violations of private moral principles are condemned but are not subject to the law. Sometimes the demarcation between public and private morality is not easy to draw, for example in the cases of prostitution and pornography. It is a matter of controversy on what grounds and to what extent a society has the right to enforce its prevailing morality. “The public morality of a state consists partly of those central tenets of morality which no reasonable man, we think, can reasonably dissent from; and partly of those collective aspirations and ideals which the community, either implicitly in the course of its history, or explicitly by deliberate avowals, has collectively adopted or affirmed.” Lucas, The Principles of Politics public particulars see objective particulars public/private dichotomy Ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law The distinction between the public and private spheres amounts to a distinction between the political and the personal and between what falls under the law and what falls outside the law. The state and social power should not apply to the private sphere, which is the limit of the public institutions of law. Traditionally, the family, home, and personal taste and preference are private or domestic matters. Religion sometimes joins these other concerns and is a sign that the distinction is not absolute. Whatever the boundaries, the invasion of the private sphere is considered shameful. In contrast, the public sphere is the domain of relationships that are subject to the regulations of law and political authority. The distinction between the public and the private is essential for liberal theory to maintain the privacy-based rights and freedom of the individual (although other rights are based in the public sphere) and to indicate the legitimate extent of political authority. The distinction is not respected in fascist and totalitarian systems. The distinction is challenged by many feminists, who describe the public sphere as one of justice, autonomy, and independence and the private sphere as one of care, nurturing, and bonding. Feminists claim that the distinction is gender-based, that it legitimates the exclusion of women from the public sphere, that it ignores domestic violence and male domination over women and children in the private sphere. Hence, feminism attempts to demolish this dichotomy or to remove it from patterns of domination. “A clear dichotomy between the public (political and economic) and the private (domestic and personal) has been taken for granted, and only the former has been regarded as the appropriate sphere for developmental studies and theories of justice, respectively, to attach to.” Okin, in Nussbaum and Glover (eds.), Women, Culture and Development punctuate property Metaphysics, philosophy of language Also called atomistic property, a property that is unique to the thing that possesses it and is not shared by any other things. In contrast, an anatomic property orholistic property is a property possessed by at least two things. A major question in contemporary philosophy of language asks whether a semantic property can be punctuate. “An atomistic or punctuate property is one which might, in principle, be instantiated by only one thing.” Fodor and Lepore, Holism punishment Ethics, philosophy of law Punishment contains three factors: (1) It is the infliction of harm to the wrongdoer; (2) this infliction is imposed by authority; (3) the authority imposes the infliction intentionally. Since punishment itself looks like a kind of harm, it requires a theoretical justification. Historically, there are two rival theories of the justification of punishment. The first is retributivism, which claims that a wrongdoer deserves a punishment because it is in proportion to his offense. Through punishment, a society indicates its intolerance of certain types of behavior committed by rational beings. Accordingly, punishment in itself is an intrinsic good. The second position is utilitarianism or consequentialism, which claims that punishment itself is an evil, but it can be justified if this evil is outweighed by the good consequences of its results. These consequences include deterring the same offender from committing crime again, preventing others from doing the same wrong, and rehabilitating the offender. There is much debate among consequentialists about which of these consequences should have priority in justifying punishment. These two positions have vied with one another for acceptance. According to retributivism, a utilitarian position could justify punishment of the innocent provided that it can produce better consequences. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, charges retributivism with cruelty, for it favors harm and suffering even if it does not produce any good. Various proposals have been advanced to reconcile the conflict between retributivism and utilitarianism concerning punishment, but they are generally unconvincing. One influential suggestion is that utilitarianism should be appealed to when we justify the need for a society to have a system of punishment, and retributivism should be appealed to if we need to justify the punishment of a particular person in a particular way. “Let us describe punishment as simply an authority’s infliction of a penalty on an offender, and now allow an offender to be a man who has broken a rule out of intention or negligence, or a man who has broken certain rules out of neither, or a man who occupies a certain position of authority with respect to a rule-breaker in either of the preceding sense.” Honderich, Punishment pure Metaphysics, epistemology In Kant’s philosophy, something that is independent of experience. For Kant, “pure” is associated with terms such as transcendental, form, spontaneity, autonomy, original, a priori, and rational and is contrasted with terms such as empirical, matter, receptivity, heteronomy, derived, a posteriori, and sensational. Kant always used pure as an adjective to qualify terms such as apperception, concept, intuition, principle, reason, and representation. “A priori modes of knowledge are entitled pure when there is no admixture of anything empirical.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason pure apperception, see transcendental apperception pure concepts of reason, see ideas (Kant) pure ego theory Epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind Locke claimed that we do not know the substance that is the bearer of all attributes and only recognize its existence through its various attributes. The pure ego theory of the self is the application of this epistemological and metaphysical claim to the problem of the self. The theory holds that the self itself is unknown, for it is outside experience, yet we know of its existence through its manifestations. A pure ego is the substance of all psychological attributes, and is the grammatical subject of all psychological statements. It is a peculiar constituent that supports the unity of the various events in one temporal slice of the history of a self, and it is the unity of the successive slices of the total history of a self. Such a pure ego is an inferred entity, which is posited because there must be something that underlies and supports various modes of experience. We may call it the I, the self, the ego, or the subject. The totality of states of the same mind belong to this pure ego, and it persists as long as the mind persists. This theory can be contrasted to Hume’s bundle theory. A major difficulty faced by pure ego theory is how to account for the knowledge of one’s own self. Kant’s claim that the “I think” which accompanies all our representations is not an object and Wittgenstein’s critical assessment of the metaphysical subject might help us to retain the self without requiring that it is a pure substantial basis for our experiences. “The pure ego theory preserves the unity and the endurance of the self, but it does so at the cost of making the self non-experiential, and that is at odds with our native knowledge of ourselves.” Evans, The Subject of Consciousness pure hypothetical syllogism, see mixed hypothetical syllogism pure reason, see Critique of Pure Reason pure theory of law Philosophy of law A theory developed by the Austrian legal philosopher Hans Kelsen and philosophically based on neo-Kantianism. The theory is pure in the sense that the law should be a universally valid system that is free of all that is changeable and yet able to give ideals that guide lawyers in the search for justice. All moral, political, and sociological contents must be purged from the science of law. According to Kelsen, law is a system of norms, a hierarchy of normative relations that measures human conduct by the use of sanction. The legal norms constitute a relation of condition and sequence rather than a command: “If A is done, B ought to happen.” The validity of legal norms is not based on conflicting authorities, but is ultimately derived from a basic norm (Grundnorm) that is postulated in the historically first constitution. The validity of the basic norm is not derived, but must be assumed as an initial hypothesis. Legal theory is concerned with the conceptual tools for analyzing the relations between the fundamental norms and all lower norms within a legal system. It is not concerned with its moral content, which should be the subject-matter of politics or moral theory. On this basis, Kelsen attacked natural law theory, which insists on a necessary connection between law and morality. He drew a sharp distinction between “is” and “ought,” and denied the possibility of obtaining objective knowledge of legal norms. The science of law is descriptive rather than prescriptive. Kelsen’s pure theory of law is one of the most influential twentiethcentury legal theories. His approach is similar to Austin’s analytical jurisprudence, and was further developed by H. L. A. Hart. “A pure theory of law must be uncontaminated by politics, ethics, sociology, history. Its task is knowledge of all that is essential and necessary to law, and therefore freed from all that is changing and accidental in it.” Friedmann, Legal Theory purely referential, see referentially opaque Putnam, Hilary (1926– ) American philosopher of mathematics, science, mind, language, metaphysics, epistemology, and social sciences, born in Chicago, Illinois, Professor of Philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University. Putnam not only has a broad range of interest, but also has rejected important positions that he previously advocated, including realism in the philosophy of science and functionalism in the philosophy of mind. His famous twin earth argument opposes the claim that meaning is in the mind and leads to influential views about meaning and reference. His major works include Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), Mind, Language and Reality (1975), Realism and Reason (1983), and Representation and Reality (1988). Pyrrho (c.360–c.271 bc) Hellenistic philosopher, born in Elis, founder of Pyrrhonic skepticism. Pyrrho wrote nothing, and his views were reported by his disciple Timon. Pyrrho questioned the basis for claims to knowledge and truth in other philosophical schools and held that it is impossible to know the real nature of the entities that we assume to exist independently of our perceptual experiences. Contradictory accounts of all matters cause much confusion in our minds. Since each account can be countered by its contradictory, none is more valid than any other. The wise should suspend judgment in order to achieve peace of mind or tranquility. Pyrrhonism, see skepticism Pythagoras (c.570–495 bc) Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, born on Samos in the eastern Aegean and moved to Croton (in southern Italy) around 525. Pythagoras was reported to have founded a religious and political community, but little is known about his own views. Pythagorean philosophy is a mixture of the views of Pythagoras and his followers. From their study of mathematics and music, the Pythagoreans believed that number is the principle of the cosmos and that the entire universe is a harmonious arrangement (in Greek, kosmos) ordered by number. This theory provides a mathematical or formal interpretation of the universe, in contrast to the materialist interpretation of the Milesians. Pythagoreans also held the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. Pythagoreanism Ancient Greek philosophy Philosophy of the Greek philosopher Pythagoras and his followers. Little literature exists to enable us to present a systematic picture of this philosophy or even to distinguish Pythagoras’ own view from those of his followers. Generally, Pythagoreanism is a mixture of religion and science. It accepted the transmigration of the soul and enjoined the practice of an ascetic way of life. The aim of philosophy was to purify the soul. Through its study in mathematics, music, and astronomy, Pythagoreanism derived the doctrine that number is the first principle of all things and that the whole universe is a harmony. Accordingly, it held that everything could be explained in mathematical terms. All this deeply influenced Euclid, Empedocles, and especially Plato. In the first century bc there was a revival of Pythagoreanism, usually called neo-Pythagoreanism, which concentrated on the mystical and superstitious side of Pythagoeanism and its reverence for number. This revival had great impact on Neoplatonism. “With Pythagoreanism begins the transformation of the Greek mode of thought by a foreign element which originated in the Orphic mysticism.” Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy