H. P. Grice's Desideratum

DESIDERATUM -- desire Ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action [Greek orexis] Aristotle distinguished three forms of desire: (1) boulesis: a wish or rational desire for objects conceived as good; (2) thumos: an emotional or non-rational desire for objects that appear good. Because Aristotle frequently associated it with selfassertive feelings involving pride and anger, thumos can also be translated as “spirit” or “temper”; (3) epithumia: an appetite or irrational desire for an object believed to be pleasant. These desires are associated especially with basic biological needs, such as desires for food or sex. Aristotle’s classification is apparently based on Plato’s tripartite division of the soul, ascribing different desires to different parts of the soul. Desire, in each form, is a motive force leading to movement. In contemporary philosophy, desire includes all kinds of wants and interests that lead one to act in order to satisfy them, in particular the wants related to bodily pleasure or certain dispositions. As a source of motion, desire is a prominent but complicated concept in moral philosophy and theory of action. Desire can be divided into intrinsic desire (a desire of something for its own sake as an end) and extrinsic desire (a desire of something as a means to further ends). This roughly corresponds to the distinction between basic and derivative desires. Desire is a basic psychological state, which is distinguished from belief because a desire never purports to represent the way the world is and because believing something to be true or good need not rationally affect our desires. This raises a matter of dispute, whether a desire is simply a fact that cannot be assessed in terms of truth and falsehood and that is not subject to rational criticism. Desire is usually ascribed to the appetitive part of the soul, but Plato believed that even reason itself has a desire for the Good. Hume argued that desire is neither true nor false, neither rational nor irrational. Another long-standing debate concerns the relationship between desire and reason in the initiation of action. Aristotle believed that both of them are involved. Hume held that reason is motivationally inert and that ethics must be based on desire. Kant argued that reason can itself lead one to act and that moral laws should be independent of contingent desires. “Desire: an animal engaged in pursuing a purpose is said to desire the condition in which it will be in relative equilibrium.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. IX