H. P. Grice's Descriptum

DESCRIPTUM -- description, attributive use of, see description, referential use of description, referential use of Logic, philosophy of language Donnellan distinguishes between the attributive and the referential use of descriptions. In the attributive use, a speaker makes an assertion about whatever or whoever fits the description, without necessarily having any idea what that thing or person is. In the referential use, a speaker has a definite individual in mind and uses the description to refer to it, thus enabling his audience to pick out or identify what he is talking about. In the referential use, the description is merely a tool for achieving reference, and the reference can succeed even if the thing referred to does not fit the description. This distinction shows that our use of descriptions is complex and that descriptions do not always refer to whatever happens to fit them. Donnellan uses his distinction to criticize the analyses of descriptions offered by Russell and Strawson. Russell ignores the referential use, while Strawson seems to ignore the attributive. “I will call the two uses of definite descriptions I have in mind the attributive use and the referential use. A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing.” Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Description,” in Schwarz (ed.), Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds -- description, theory of: Russell divided description into two kinds: indefinite description, that is, phrases of the form “a so-and-so,” and definite description, that is, phrases of the form “the so-and-so.” He claimed that descriptions are not referring expressions, and they do not need to denote anything in order to be meaningful. A description is an incomplete symbol and is meaningful only in a sentence that contains it (“contextual definition”). Both kinds of description can be analyzed away, and can be replaced by quantifiers and variables. We can replace an indefinite description with an existential quantifier (“There is one thing that is . . . ) and we can replace a definite description with a uniqueness quantifier (“There is exactly one thing such that. . . . ). Russell’s theory of definite descriptions has greatly influenced contemporary epistemology and logic, and has been cited as a model of philosophical analysis. The theory, however, is challenged by Peter Strawson, who argues that descriptions are, at least sometimes, referring expressions that can single out something. Keith Donnellan further argues that both Russell and Strawson are one-sided, for they fail to notice that description can be used either attributively or referentially. “Russell appears to claim for the Theory of Description that it gives an exact account of the working of one class of definite singular terms, viz. singular descriptions, and I am bound to deny this.” Strawson, in Davidson and Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections -- descriptive ethics Ethics, philosophy of social science The description of the moral views and moral principles held by people at a particular time in a particular community. Descriptive ethics also examines resemblances and differences among these moral views, but does not commit itself to preferring one view to another. It seeks to explain ethical discourse and statements as well. While meta-ethics specifies the proper use of ethical terms and lays down certain rules of ethical discourse, descriptive ethics does not move beyond an account of ethical discourse by placing it within a general cultural background. Descriptive ethics is more properly a branch of -- descriptive fallacy -- anthropology rather than a branch of ethics, and some philosophers believe that one cannot gain insight in descriptive ethics without testing the ethical views and principles philosophically. “I shall call the investigation of the moral code and accompanying ethical conceptions of a person or group descriptive ethics.” Ladd, The Structure of a Moral Code -- descriptive fallacy Philosophy of language, ethics J. L. Austin’s term for the practice in the traditional theory of statements of taking all statements to be descriptive and claiming that to understand the meaning of a sentence is to understand its truth condition. However, Austin argued that there are many sentences, such as those used in performative utterances, whose meanings are not determined by their truthconditions. They are not subjects of truth and falsity, for they do not specify or report features of reality, but are used to do something. To say “I swear . . .” is not to report that one swears, but is the act of swearing itself. This point is well developed by noncognitivism, whose major theme is to distinguish factual statements from ethical statements. “To overlook these possibilities in the way once common is called the ‘descriptive fallacy’.” Austin, How to Do Things with Words -- descriptive meaning Philosophy of language, ethics Some philosophers suggest that we distinguish between two kinds of meaning of expressions. Descriptive meaning contributes to a bare presentation of facts, as in the claim “This strawberry is sweet.” Evaluative meaning functions in a different way by offering an assessment, as in the claim “This strawberry is good.” The descriptive meaning of a statement can be determined by its truth conditions, while the evaluative meaning cannot. This is because the descriptive meaning is constant while the evaluative meaning varies with the reactions of those using the expression. For instance, “war” has a fixed and translatable descriptive meaning, but its emotive associations can give it different evaluative meanings. For some “war” evokes a feeling of terror, and for others it evokes a feeling of heroic courage. The distinction between these two kinds of meaning is crucial for the distinction between ethical -- descriptivism (cognitivism) and non-descriptivism (non-cognitivism). Non-descriptivism, such as emotivism and prescriptivism, holds that ethical judgments have an element of descriptive meaning, but chiefly have evaluative meaning. In contrast, descriptivism holds that the entire meaning of moral judgments is descriptive. Descriptive meaning is also called semantic meaning. “As the descriptive meaning of ‘good’ in ‘good apple’ is different from its meaning in ‘good cactus’; but the evaluative meaning is the same – in both cases we are commending.” Hare, The Language of Morals -- descriptive metaphysics Metaphysics A term introduced by P. F. Strawson in Individuals, in contrast to revisionary metaphysics. Descriptive metaphysics aims to describe the most general features of our conceptual scheme, that is, to describe reality as it manifests itself to the human understanding. Conceptual analysis is its main method. Revisionary metaphysics, on the other hand, attempts to revise our ordinary way of thinking and our ordinary conceptual scheme in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. Hence, revisionary metaphysicians generally like to establish a well-organized system beyond the world of experience. Strawson claims that the history of metaphysics can be broadly divided into these two kinds of metaphysics. Aristotle and Kant are considered to be the forerunners of descriptive metaphysics, and Strawson’s own Individuals is also subtitled An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, while Descartes, Leibniz, and Berkeley are representatives of revisionary metaphysics. This distinction may not cover all metaphysical systems, but it has been greatly influential in reviving work in metaphysics. “Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure.” Strawson, Individuals descriptive psychology Philosophy of mind, modern European philosophy The name that the German philosopher Franz Brentano gave to his psychology, in which he sought to give a pure description of the constituents of human consciousness and their modes of combination, in order to present a general notion of the entirety of human consciousness. According to Brentano, such a psychology enables us to know directly the human mind as it actually is. It is distinguished from genetic psychology because it is not concerned with the physiological genesis of psychological phenomena. However, Brentano considered it to be the basis for genetic psychology. Brentano’s descriptive psychology had great impact on Husserl’s phenomenology and Meinong’s philosophy. It has also played a significant role in the philosophy of mind. -- existence of this kind of belief has raised philosophical questions about the analysis of what is believed and about our knowledge of what is ascribed to ourselves in this way. It contrasts with de re belief, which is about external particulars and about myself when seen as an external object. -- “Descriptive psychology, we said, sets itself the task of an analysing description of our phenomena, i.e., of our immediate experiential facts, or, what is the same, of the objects which we apprehend in our perception.” Brentano, Descriptive Psychology -- descriptivism Philosophy of language, metaphysics Hare calls the division between descriptive and nondescriptive ethical theories a division between cognitive and non-cognitive ethical theories. Descriptivism or cognitivism holds that ethical statements are obtained in the same way as factual statements and accordingly that we understand the meaning of ethical judgments by determining their truth conditions. Both naturalism and intuitionism belong to descriptivism. Non-descriptivism or noncognitivism, on the other hand, argues that ethical judgments are not the same as factual statements and that they generally are neither true nor false. Their meaning contains a descriptive element which may be decided by their truth conditions, but they are chiefly emotive or prescriptive. Emotivism and prescriptivism are both varieties of non-descriptivism. “[T]hat moral judgements are a kind of descriptive judgements, i.e. that their descriptive meaning exhausts their meaning. This is descriptivism.”