Cited by Green/Bar-On, link in "Lionspeak". I loved that "PS" (Philosophical Subjects"), which contains the McDowell, "PS" is an acronym for "Peter Strawson", since it's a festschrift for him. Not as creative as "Philosohical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, categories, ends", PGRICE -- Grandy and Warner's edited festschrift for Grice)
Green and Bar-On write:
"McDowell turns to ―modes of behaviour that we can ascribe to creatures to which we would not think of ascribing intentional action‖ (1983: 40) continuing as follows"
"A bird, say, might instinctively emit
a characteristic sort of squawk on seeing
a predator; other birds might acquire, on
hearing such a squawk, a propensity towards
behaviour appropriate to the proximity of
a predator (flight, increased
caution in feeding, or whatever). This propensity
might match a propensity they would have
acquired if they had seen the predator
themselves … there is no risk of over-psychologizing
our account of the birds – crediting
them with an inner life – if we regard
such behaviour as effecting the transmission of information,
and hence as constituting a kind of communication."
(Ibid, p. 40)2"
"What separates linguistic behavior from ―this kind of information-transmission‖, McDowell continues, is the fact that the former is ―wholly overt."
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