Lepore, really, as per:
ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/lepore/arist4.ps
"Since Schiffer contests the need for an internally represented compositional semantic, whether any epistemic relationship between an [utterer] and this semantics need exist cannot even arise."
"So, if the Fodor\Schiffer account, translationism, merely to label it, is correct, then the semanticist’s is not, as Fodor likes to say, the only game in town."
"But how could translationism be right?"
"Isn’t it obvious speakers of Italian, for example, know semantic facts this below?"
‘‘Sta nevicando’’ means that it’s snowing.
"Translationists can agree that the above is a truth Italian speakers know."
"But why, they wonder, must such knowledge be invoked in order to understand Italian? (1) is true only because [utterers] of Italian use ‘‘Sta nevicando’’ to com-
municate (‘‘encode’’ or ‘‘express’’) the thought that it’s snowing [Schiffer, 1993, 1994, pp.303-04]."
"So, if someone knows that truth above), this must be because he knows his words can express this thought."
"From this it does NOT follow that such knowledge is (or need be) utilized in understanding ‘‘Sta nevicando’’"
"THIS is *all* Fodor means when he writes he is "Gricean in spirit though certainly not in detail"".
[Fodor 1975, pp.103-104; see, also, 1987, p.50; and Schiffer 1982, p.120; 1994, p.323]."
Lepore notes:
"Fodor -- and even Schiffer now -- are Gricean only inasmuch as both hold that
whatever semantic properties natural language expressions have they [are] inherent from (a language of) thought."
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