What is 'logical matter', as opposed to 'logical form'?

We are considering 'logical hylemorphism', i.e. the idea that each utterance ('statement', assertion, what have you -- vide Strawson, Grice on 'meaning' bearers and truth-bearers) carries the well-known (yet usually unscrutable),

a. logical form (Greek 'morphe', rather than eidos)

and

b. logical matter. (As in Clinton, "I never had sex with that woman; for, for one, it depends on the meaning of 'copula' ("is") and -- stuff).

J agrees and writes:

"Tempis foogit! Dutch gal [who uses 'logical hylemorphism' on week days] was correct to distinguish logical hylomorphism from the metaphysical sort, ie essencia, forms, substances, "potencia," spooks,etc."

Yes. Yet,

"do not multiply hylemorphisms beyond necessity," my motto.

Surely there is this idea that

1. reality
2. thought
3. language

all fit. Else, why wonder about whether the moon is made of cheese and say it? The point is that

----- The moon ---- (S)
------------------------ is (copula)
----------------------------------- made of cheese (P)

may be the content of my cousin's thought.

And HE believes that it corresponds to a fact (of the 'matter' -- cfr. 'fact of the form' -- Quine, "by virtue of its logical form):

To wit:

that the moon (an entity) is made (composed, etc.) of a certain type of organic matter, to wit: cheese.

J adds:

"The pragmatists' critique still has some merit--context will often determine whether the form of the argument (ie, validity), or the matter (ie, confirming premises) has greater significance, or something."

Yes. But logicians NEVER study the 'matter'. The point of validity is that it's 'formal validity'. Toulmin was criticised as offering 'informal logic' when what he offered (and failed) was 'material logic', rather.

--- Aristotle was clear about that above: he thought it would be otiose to require of the moralist the same 'formalisms' that he asked the mathematician. Grice disagreed, till Putnam reminded him that 'he was too formal'.

Grice notes that he stopped being formal when he started to think of issues of moral theory (with his former PhD student, Judith -- he called her "Judy" -- Baker). The idea is that there is little point in formalising ethics. I disagree of course. I think it confuses people bunches in the right sort of way when you provide a deontic model, say, for Nixon's arguments in Watergate (Universe of Discourse: Watergate)

J adds:

"Logicians, at least the few remaining, may call them premises; a few doors down, the economists and sociologists call it data."

Right. There was a point about this in World Wide Words. Data, datum. Nice terms. In Latin, of course, it means, 'the given' (as in 'dative').

----

J adds:

"Validity and proofs may impress like Steinford U geeks, but mere mortals tend to prefer like, well, does it work/fly/download files faster/get you stoned, etc. I'm against pure instrumentalism/applicability if you will (normativity creeps in usually), but pure formality--ie, the Fregean/Russellian school- is another type of intellectual sin."

Yes. The problem is they don't know it. I mean, if all your life you are associated with the Department of Pure Mathematics, why wander outside?

J adds:

"Or something. Might as well work out chess combinations as the old proofs, IMHE"

Well, the issue is a serious one. I'm NOT interested in eccentric applications. Just in the _form_ of something like:

"The cat sat on the mat"

There's phonetic form:

Grice was obsessed with phonetic form:

"He was caught in the grip of a /vais/"

/vais/ may represent the word: 'vyse', the tool carpenters use.

/vais/ may represent ANOTHER word, 'vice', a sin.

Yet, someone, an ignoramus, may utter,

"I regret to report that he was caught in the grip of a vice"

without, himself, being clear as to what he means. My neighbours talk like that.

----

So we have 'physical medium'.

THEN we have what linguists mis-call 'morphology' (also 'form'):

'the'
'cat'
'is'
'on'
'the'
'mat'

Then we have the syntatic structure, which, for one, is hierarchical

NP VP

Det N V PP
det N

the cat sat on the mat.


Then you have the semantic representation, deep structure, or logical form:

S(c, m)

----

which should be expanded to account, in LF-2, for iota operators, 'the' CAT, 'the' mat:

ix.iy. (Cx & My & S(x,y)).


----

THEN you have the 'thought':

propositional attitude (mode: belief)
content: the cat sat on the mat.


THEN you have the form of the sense DATA or percepts that explain what you mean by 'cat' and 'mat':

"Hardly a cat; it's a tiger; and I'd call that _rug_, rather".


----

Then you have the 'fact' of the 'matter': the actual cat sitting on the mat, in a time of the past (hence 'sat').

---

Etc.

So, no need to bring in chess, however lovely that might be!

Of course, it is sad that cats cannot _utter_, 'The cat sat on the mat' (there is a lecture by Stegmann on that, teleosemantic, he calls it).

For one, they lack the idea of the 'past'.

They don't operate with iota opertors.

They don't speak.

----

So, I would suggest that for the _cat_, his 'forms' are different. "Her" forms are different, if you wish. A cat's reality is not a homo-sapiens reality. So there is something like a 'logical form' for part of a cat's utterance:

"Miaouw"

---- unstructured utterance, unlike "Cat sat on the mat"

Content: "the rat I've just digested gave me an indigestion".

----

and so on.

Problem with cats is that it's what they 'say' to other cats that should matter, not what they try to say to _us_.

Etc.