Lexicon griceianum -- in six volumes, vol. i.

H. P. Grice’s Pocket Dictionary – Fitted for the Gentleman’s Pocket – In Nine Volumes Compiled by H. P. Grice’s Play Group Deposited at The Bodleian. ABANDONMENT. An experience gained through realizing that there are no objective principles or authorities to guide one’s life. According to existentialism, this experience helps us to recognize that one cannot attain authenticity by appeal to God or to philosophical systems. We should each understand our own unique existential condition, reject bad faith, and assume full responsibility for life. The conception of abandonment is hence related to the existentialist account of the autonomy of the agent. “When we speak of ‘abandonment’ – a favourite word of Heidegger – we only mean to say that God does not exist, and that it is necessary to draw the consequence of his absence right to the end.” Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism ABUDCTUM. cf. inductum, transductum, retroductum. – “apagoge” – cf. epagoge, diagoge. Latinate: ab-ductio, retro-ductio. Peirce’s term for the logic of discovery, a creative process that is one of the three fundamental types of reasoning in science, along with induction and deduction. When we encounter a new phenomenon that cannot be explained through the application of a general law, we should pick out certain characteristic features of this new phenomenon and attempt to find relations among these features. After forming several theories or hypotheses that might explain the phenomenon, we should select one of them to test against experience. Such a process of reasoning to form empirical theories or hypotheses for testing is called abduction. Peirce also called it retroduction, hypothesis or presumption, but other philosophers have normally called it induction. Peirce distinguished abduction from induction by defining induction as the experimental testing of a theory. He held that abduction is what Aristotle discussed as “apagoge” (Greek, leading away, substituting a more likely premise for a less acceptable one). “Presumption, or more precisely, abduction . . . furnishes the reasoner with the problematic theory which induction verifies.” Peirce, Collected Papers. ABELARD, A castrated philosopher. b. Nantes, Bretagne. Abelard, whose main concern was logic, made valuable contributions to discussion of issues such as inference, negation, predicate-expressions, and transitivity. He sought to discuss theological problems by analyzing the propositions used to state these problems. He steered a middle course between realism and nominalism and maintained that the reference of a universal term is not necessarily something that exists. In ethics, he focused on the intention of the agent rather than on the action itself and considered sin to be an intention to act against God’s will and virtue to be living in love with God. His major works include Dialectica, Theologian Scholarium, Ethics (Scito te ipsum) and Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew. He also wrote commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione. The story of love between Abelard and Heloise has fascinated many later generations. ABORTION; the intentional killing of a fetus or fertilized human egg by causing its expulsion from the mother’s womb before its birth. Whether abortion should be morally permitted has been intensively debated in the past few decades and has become a major political and legal issue. One focus of the debate is on the moral status of a fetus. Is a fetus a person with a substantive right to life? The anti-abortion argument holds that a fetus is already a person and therefore should be within the scope of the moral rule that “you should not kill.” This view leads to a discussion concerning the concept of personhood, that is, at what stage between conception and birth does a fetus becomes a person? Another focus concerns the rights of the pregnant woman. Does she have a right to bodily autonomy, including the right to decide what happens to her own body? Even if a fetus is a person, how shall we balance its rights and the woman’s rights? Still another problem concerns the extent to which we should take into account the undesirable consequences of the prohibition of abortion, such as poverty and overpopulation. Different sides of the debate hold different positions resulting in part from the moral principles they accept. There is currently no common basis to solve all the disagreement. Nevertheless, abortion, which was legally permitted only in Sweden and Denmark until 1967, has become accepted in the majority of Western countries. “Induced abortion is the termination of unwanted pregnancy by destruction of the fetus.” Rita Simon, comparative or varying according to circumstances. ABSOLUTUM: In metaphysics, the Absolute, as a technical term, is a single entity that is ultimate, unchanging, overriding and all-comprehensive. Nicholas of Cusa uses this expression to refer to God. Subsequently, the Absolute is always associated with concepts such as the one, the perfect, the eternal, the uncaused, and the infinite and has been regarded as the reality underlying appearance and providing rational ground for appearance. The revival of the notion of the Absolute in modern philosophy derives from the debate in the 1770s between Mendelssohn and Jacob about Spinoza’s definition of substance. Schelling, employing Spinoza’s notion of substance, defines the Absolute as a neutral identity that underlies both subject (mind) and object (nature). Everything that is mental or physical is an attribute of the Absolute or of “indefinite substance.” He further claims that the Absolute is a living force, an organism, and something that is self-generating rather than mechanistic. Hegel claimed that the Absolute is the unity of substance and its modes, of the infinite and the finite. Such an Absolute is both a substance and a subject, developing from the underlying reality to the phenomenal world and reaching absolute knowledge as its highest phase. Thus, the Absolute is a self-determining activity, a spirit, and a concrete dynamic totality. Its development mirrors the development of knowledge. Hegel’s metaphysics sought to work out the process and implications of this development. The Absolute is particularly associated with Oxford philosopher F. H. Bradley, who conceives the Absolute to be a single, self-differentiating whole. Anti-metaphysical thought argues for the elimination of the Absolute as an entity that cannot be observed and that performs no useful function in philosophy. “Absolutes are the limits of explanation, and as such they have been the main theme of traditional philosophy.” Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute. Used with the definite article, ‘the. F. L. absolutus, in turn originating from ab, away, from and solvere, free, loosen; free from limitations, qualifications or conditions] To call something absolute is to say that it is unconditional or universal, in contrast to what is relative, A ‘conceptio absoluta’ is a concept introduced by B. A. O. Williams in his study of Descartes for a conception of reality as it is independent of our experience and to which all representations of reality can be related. To gain such a conception requires overcoming the limitations of our enquiry and any systematic bias, abstract/concrete distortion, or partiality in our outlook. Such a conception may enable us to view our representations as one set among others and to avoid assessing the views of others from our own standpoint. Williams claims that our notion of knowledge implies that such a conception is possible. “This notion of an absolute conception can serve to make effective a distinction between ‘the world as it is independent of our experience’ and ‘the world as it seems to us’.” B. A. O. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Then there’s the ‘idea absoluta,’ as used by Hegel, is equivalent to absolute truth in his Phenomenology of Mind and to the absolute in his Logic. It is also called absolute spirit. For Hegel, an idea is not something mental or separate from particulars, but is the categorical form of spirit. The absolute idea is the idea in and for itself, an infinite reality and an all-embracing whole. It exists in a process of self-development and self-actualization. As a metaphysical counterpart of the Christian God, it is the basis for the teleological development of both the natural and social worlds. Its determinate content constitutes reality. The absolute idea is what truly is, and the final realization of truth. For Hegel, the absolute idea is a dynamic self, involving inner purposiveness and normative ideals. By characterizing reality as the absolute idea, Hegel showed that his notion of reality is fundamentally conceptual. It is a unity of the ideal of life with the life of cognition. The core of Hegel’s idealism is the claim that the being of all finite things is derived from the absolute idea. In terms of this notion, Hegel integrated ontology, metaphysics, logic, and ethics into one system. “The defect of life lies in its being only the idea implicit or natural, whereas cognition is in an equally one-sided way the merely conscious idea, or the idea for itself. The unity and truth of these two is the Absolute Idea, which is both in itself and for itself.” Hegel, Logic. Then there’s IDENTITAS ABSOLUTA, s traditionally understood, identity is a rigorous notion that cannot have variant forms, and the identity relation is taken absolutely. According to Frege, this absolute notion of identity can be expressed in two theorems: (1) reflexivity: x = x (everything is identical with itself ) and (2) the indiscernibility of identicals (or Leibniz’s law): if a and b are identical, whatever is true of a is true of b, and vice versa. Hence, “a is identical with b” means simply “a is the same as b.” P. T. Geach, H. P. Grice, and G. Myro, this account the classical theory of identity and believe that it is mistaken. Instead, Grice claims that identity is always relative, so that a is not simply the same as b, but rather that a can be the same as b relative to one concept but not the same as b relative to another concept. In response, some argue that relative identity is qualitative identity, while numerical identity remains absolute. “Absolute identity seems at first sight to be presupposed in the branch of logic called identity theory.” Geach, Logic Matters. Then there’s absolute rights, see rights, absolute. Then there’s the absolute spirit, another term for absolute idea. Then there’s absolutism: a term with different references in different areas. In metaphysics, it is opposed to subjectivism and relativism and claims that there is an ultimate, eternal, and objective principle that is the source and standard of truth and value. Ethical absolutism holds that there is a basic universal principle of morality that every rational being should follow, despite their different empirical circumstances. Moral absolutism is opposed to moral relativism, which denies that any single moral principle has universal validity. In political theory, it is the view that the government’s power and rights are absolute and that they always have priority when they come into conflict with the rights, interests, needs, preferences, or desires of citizens or groups in society. “In ethics, the rejection of absolutism leads initially to the recognition of multiple moral authorities, each claiming its own local validity.” Toulmin, Human Understanding ABSTRACTUM. f. L. abstrahere, to remove something from something else and concrescere, to grow together, at the outset of a process of recognition our concepts are likely to be vague or superficial. We must first abstract them in order to understand their diverse determinations. Being abstract is the product of abstraction, that is, of drawing away something common from diverse perceptible or sensory items and disregarding their relatively inessential features. Concepts and universals are thus formed. To say that something is abstract means that it is conceptual, universal, essential, or a matter of principle, while to say that something is concrete means that it is contextual, particular, personal, sensible. To be concrete is equivalent to being rich and vivid. Since what is abstract is drawn from what is concrete, to be abstract is equated with lacking the detail and individuality of the concrete and is thought to be meager, dependent, and lifeless. The existence and nature of abstract entities such as numbers and universals has long been a matter of dispute. In another usage, which is especially prominent in Hegel’s philosophy, being abstract means being cut off from thoughts or from other sensory items, while being concrete is to be relational. Hence, a particular is abstract if it is isolated from other particulars, while a concept or universal is concrete if it is related to other concepts or universals and is one item in an organic system. Hegel called such a concept a “concrete concept” or “concrete universal.” “What we abstract from are the many other aspects which together constitute concrete objects such as people, economies, nations, institutions, activities and so on.” Sayer, Method in Social Science abstract entities Metaphysics Objects that are not actualized somewhere in space and time, that is, non-particulars such as numbers, properties, relations, proposition, and classes. They stand in contrast to spatio-temporal physical objects. Whether these entities actually exist – whether we should ascribe reality to them – is a question of persistent dispute in philosophy. Empiricists and nominalists try to conceive of abstract entities as having merely a linguistic basis. However, if mathematics embodies general truths about the world and has abstract entities as its subject matter, abstract entities would be objects of reference and hence real existents. This is the claim of Platonism and is also a position admitted by Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. The discussion of abstract entities is related to the problem of being, to the problem of universals, and also to the theory of meaning. “Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions, etc.” Carnap, Meaning and Necessity abstract ideas Epistemology, philosophy of language How can an idea stand for all individuals of a given kind even though the individuals vary in their properties? How can we form general statements about kinds of things and reason with regard to them? Locke introduced the notion of abstract ideas, also called general ideas, and claimed that they are universal concepts generated as a result of a process of abstraction from our ideas of individual exemplars of a kind, by leaving out their specific features and keeping what is common to all. As an empiricist, Locke believed that only particulars exist in the world. An abstract idea does not refer to something individual or particular, but is a special kind of mental image. This image is the meaning of the abstract general term. The function of abstract ideas is to classify individuals into different kinds for us. As classically understood in Locke, abstraction is something in the mind between reality and the way we classify it. He believed that an abstract idea encompasses a whole kind of thing. This claim was rejected by Berkeley, who insisted that all ideas are particular and only become general through our use of them. Berkeley’s criticism of Locke’s notion of abstract ideas, like his criticism of Locke’s theory of real essence, has been very influential, but it is a matter of dispute whether his criticism is sound. “This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their name general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas.” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Then there’s the abstractum particularis, n individual property that is peculiar to the individual or particular possessing it, for example the white color possessed only by Socrates and not shared by any other white things. A property is generally regarded as being universal, that is, abstraction capable of being exemplified in many individuals or particulars. But some philosophers believe that there are also particularized qualities or property-instances. These are abstract particulars. The issue can be traced to Aristotle. He classified all the realities into four kinds in his Categories: (1) that which is neither predicated of a subject nor inherent in a subject, namely, primary substances; (2) that which is predicated of a subject but not inherent in a subject, namely, secondary substances such as species and genus; (3) that which is predicated of a subject and also inherent in a subject, namely, universal attributes or properties; and (4) that which is not predicated of a subject, but which is inherent in a subject. For this last kind of reality, Aristotle’s example is a particular piece of grammatical knowledge. He seems to be distinguishing universal properties and particular properties. In contemporary metaphysics, some philosophers claim that individual properties are constitutive of concrete particulars, that is, of events and physical objects, while others apply Ockham’s razor to deny their existence. Alternative terms for abstract particulars are perfect particulars, particularized qualities, unit of properties, tropes, cases, and property-instances. “Stout calls particulars which he postulates ‘abstract particulars’. In calling them ‘abstract’ it is not meant that they are other-worldly . . . It is simply that these particulars are ‘thin’ and therefore abstract by comparison with the ‘thick’ or concrete particulars which are constituted out of the abstract particulars.” D. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. 1. Then there’s the abstractum expresssum, term naming an abstract entity, such as “natural number,” “real number,” “class,” or “property.” Different abstract terms can name the same abstract entity, and abstract terms can be either singular or general. Such terms have been used in mathematics and physics. In relation to the problem of the ontological status of abstract entities, it is also disputed whether the use of these terms will indicate the truth of Platonic realism. For according to Quine’s theory, to admit names of abstract entities commits us to the existence of the abstract entities named by them. “The distinction between meaning and naming is no less important at the level of abstract terms.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View. Then tehre’s the abstractum simpliciter, abstract entities or objects, which are not perceptible and have no spatio-temporal location. Because we cannot point to them, abstracta are not objects of ostensive definitions. It is generally thought that abstracta do not have causal powers, but this point is controversial in contemporary epistemology. Abstracta are contrasted with concreta (plural of Latin concretum), which are the things that make up the observable world. It is widely held that abstracta are dependent on concreta. “Abstracta . . . are combinations of concreta and are not directly observable because they are comprehensive totalities.” Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Then there’s abstractio, . L. abs, away from + trahere, draw, draw away from. A mental operation that forms a concept or idea (an abstract idea) by picking out what is common to a variety of instances and leaving out other irrelevant properties. This is a process of deriving universals and establishing classifications. From this mental act we may form concepts, and then build them up into judgments involving combinations of concepts, and further join judgments into inferences. In ancient philosophy there was a persistent problem about the ontological status of abstract things, and this is also the central point in Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms. Aristotle also refers to abstraction as a mental analysis that separates form from matter. Locke takes abstraction as the means of making ideas represent all objects of the same kind by separating ideas from other existence. For him it is the capacity for abstraction that distinguishes between human beings and animals. His theory of abstract ideas is criticized by Berkeley. “This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas.” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ABSURDUM. Out of tone, used as a synonym for “the irrational.” In epistemology, an obvious and undeniable contradiction or incoherence in a belief or a proposition, such as “the square is a circle.” Absurdity is stronger than an error arising from a misapplication of a name to an object. The aim of a reductio ad absurdum argument is to reveal the absurdity of a proposition and by these means to show the truth of its negation. Absurdity is associated primarily with language and hence with human beings. Philosophical absurdities can arise from using terms belonging to one category as though they belonged to another category. Ryle calls such absurdities “category mistakes.” For existentialism, there are two other uses of “absurdity.” The first concerns the meaninglessness of human existence that derives from its lack of ground or ultimate purpose. In the second use, absurdity transcends the limitations of the rational and requires our whole power of conviction and feeling to be embraced. As an equivalent of the transcendental, the absurd is profound and valuable. Absurdity in this latter sense is derived from existentialist criticism of the absolute claims of reason and displays the characteristic irrationalism of existentialism. “This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.” Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus. LIBERUM ARBITRIUM: Libertas academica: academic freedom: The free performance of academic activities, especially research and teaching, without externally imposed constraints. Academic freedom is a necessary condition for the pursuit of unknown truths and for passing them on by teaching. Academic freedom needs protection because the search for new ideas and knowledge is crucial for the development of any society. Historically, academic activities, especially regarding controversial and unpopular subjects, have always been interfered with by authorities and other forces, who characteristically claim that developing this kind of knowledge is harmful to society. Various original and creative scholars in each generation have therefore been suppressed and even prosecuted for the new ideas they have developed. But history has repeatedly proved that such interference is mistaken. Since nobody and no organization can decide beforehand which knowledge is harmful, we have no reason to censor any scholarly performance on the grounds that it will produce harm. Academic freedom also requires justice in distributing research and teaching facilities, including job security for academics, research support, publication space, and appropriate ways of evaluating teaching. “The greatest external threats to academic freedom come from ideologies and governments; and most of all from governments in the service of ideologies.” Kenny, The Ivory Tower. DIALECTICA ATHENIENSIS. The Academia is the school that Plato founded around 385 bc, so named because it was located in a park with a gymnasium sacred to the hero Academus. The Academia was like a college in an ancient university, with all members sharing the same religious connections and the ideal of a common life. It was a progenitor of European educational institutions. The curriculum of the the Academia is generally believed to have been similar to the scheme presented by Plato in the Republic for training rulers. “Academia” is a term also used to refer to the philosophy of Plato and his followers. Historians differ regarding the history of the Academy. Some divide it into the Old Academy (Plato, 427–347 bc, Speusipus, 407–339 bc, and Xenocrates, 396–314 bc) and the New Academy (Arcesilaus of Pitane, 316– 241 bc and Carneades, c.214–129 bc). Some prefer to ascribe Arcesilaus to the Middle Academy, and Carneades to the New Academy. Others want to add a Fourth Academy (Philo of Larissa, 160–80 bc), and a Fifth Academy (Antiochus of Ascalo, 130–68 bc). The general position of the Academy was to explain and defend Plato’s doctrines. Plato’s successors in the Old Academy were more interested in his “Unwritten Doctrines.” The leaders of the Middle and New Academies were skeptics. Philo tried to reconcile their position with that of the Old Academy, and Antiochus is known for his eclecticism. Aristotle studied with Plato in the Academy leaving on Plato’s demise. Much of our information about the Old Academy comes from his writings. The Academy should be distinguished from Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, although it was one of the main proponents of Neoplatonism. Along with other pagan schools, the Academy was closed by the Eastern Roman emperor, Justinian I, in 529. During the Renaissance, the intellectual circle led by Ficino in Firenze was called the Academia. Most of its activities involved commenting on Plato’s works. From the eighteenth century, all societies organized for advanced learning, and subsequently all universities and colleges, have also been called academies. “The Academy that Aristotle joined in 367 was distinguished from other Athenian schools by two interests: mathematics . . . and dialectic, the Socratic examination of the assumptions of mathematicians and cosmologists.” G. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic SEPTE PECATI CAPITALI: accedie, Latin, generally, but inadequately, translated as sloth; also spelled accidie. One of the “seven deadly sins,” a spiritual attitude that rejects all the pleasures of life and turns away from what is good. In accedie the mind is stagnant and the flesh a burden. Accedie resembles apathy, but they are not the same. Accedie concerns the lack of feeling and has a negative sense, while apathy concerns mental states in which emotion is governed by reason and is regarded as a virtue. “Accedia . . . is sadness over a spiritual value that troubles the body’s ease.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae ACCEPTUM: Philosophers of science disagree about what it means for a theory to be acceptable and about what determines degrees of acceptability. In this debate, the degree of acceptability is closely associated with issues concerning the degree of confirmation and the degree of probability. Some hold that to be acceptable a theory has to be proven. Others claim that a theory is acceptable if it is rendered probable by the available evidence. Others argue that the acceptability has nothing to do with reliability, but is simply related to the fact that a theory performs more successfully than its competitors when undergoing testing. “If we mean by the degree of acceptability of a theory the degree to which it is satisfactory from the point of view of empirical knowledge – that is, from the point of view of the aims of empirical science – then acceptability will have to become topologically equivalent to corroboration.” Popper, Realism and the Aims of Science ACCIDENS: L. something that happens, related to the Greek sumbebekos, from the verb sumbainein, to come together, to happen, and better translated “co-incident” or concomitant. For Aristotle, a technical term that contrasts with essence and has three major meanings: (1) the permanent features of a thing that are inherent and inseparably bound up with it, but that do not constitute part of its essence. Aristotle sometimes called these features “proprium” (Greek, “idion”); (2) the features that belong to the subject only for a time, with their addition or loss not affecting whether the subject remains the same thing. These correspond to the modern notion of accidental properties, which contrast with essential properties, the loss of which will change the identity of a thing; (3) the secondary categories (categories other than substance) that are accidents to substance. In another sense, they are essential, for example white is an accident to Socrates, but it is essentially a color. Accidents of this sort are more properly called attributes or properties, although they still do not contribute to the identity of individual substances. They can only inhere in a substance and do not have independent existence. Medieval philosophers distinguished accident per se, which as an attribute is itself an entity, from accident per accidens, which is a way of talking about something inessential to an object. Modern philosophy has tended to reject the distinction between substance and accident and has understood accident, in a manner similar to Aristotle’s third sense, as an attribute, quality, or property. Accordingly, Descartes claimed that there is no science except the accidental, Locke distinguished primary qualities from secondary qualities, and Bishop Berkeley claimed that substance itself is nothing but a set or cluster or bunch of accidents. Then there’s the accidental property: “Accident means that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor usually.” Aristotle, Metaphysics accidental property Metaphysics A property that is not a defining or essential feature of a particular. The identity of a particular is not affected by the change or loss of its accidental properties. For instance, the color of a wall or roof is an accidental property of a house. The relationship between an accidental property and the particular of which it is a property is external rather than internal. Accidental properties are contrasted to “essential properties,” the change or loss of which alters the identity of the particular. Traditionally, rationality has been taken to be an essential property of being a human being. When people mention a particular, it is its essential properties rather than its accidental properties that are crucial in determining the identity of that particular and the kind of thing that it is. Although the discussion of accidental and essential properties goes back to Aristotle, the revival of essentialism in the work of Kripke and Putnam has renewed interest in the distinction. “P is an accidental property of members of class A, if ‘A’ is not defined in terms of ‘p’.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy. ACHIEVING: For Ryle, some verbs merely signify actions, such as reading or hunting. Ryle calls these “task verb.”. Other verbs not merely signify actions, but also indicate that the actions are suitable or correct. Not only has some performance been gone through, but also something has been brought off by the agent in going through it. These acts and operations, which have had certain positive results, are called achievement verbs by Ryle. A mark of an achievement verb such as “see” is that as soon as it is correct to say that a person sees something it is also correct to say that he has seen it. Such verbs are also called success verbs or success words. Correspondingly, there are failure verbs, such as lose or misspell. All perception verbs are achievement verbs since they involve an acquiring of knowledge about the physical world. “There was another motive for desiderating a mistake-proof brand of observation, namely that it was half-realised that some observation words, such as ‘perceive’, ‘see’, ‘detect’, ‘hear’, and ‘observe’ (in its ‘final’ sense) are what I have called ‘achievement verbs’.” Ryle, The Concept of Mind ACHILLES. Was the paradox discussed in Roman times, when they translated Laertius? The most widely discussed of Zeno’s paradoxes, which were designed to show that the concept of motion is incoherent. Achilles, the Olympic champion in running, can never catch up with the slow-moving tortoise if the latter is given a head start. Achilles has to take some time to reach the place where the tortoise started, but when he reaches that place, the tortoise will have moved to a further point. The same is true when Achilles reaches that further point, because the tortoise will again have moved on. This process will be repeated endlessly, and the gap, which may get smaller and smaller, will remain. So as long as the tortoise keeps moving forward, Achilles cannot possibly overtake it, yet the paradox arises because we know that faster runners do overtake slower ones. The difficult problem is to explain the concepts of space, time, and motion in a way that shows what goes wrong in Zeno’s reasoning. This paradox, which is closely connected with the dichotomy paradox, depends on the assumption that space and time are continuous and infinitely divisible. Our source for all of Zeno’s paradoxes is Aristotle’s account in Physics. “Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, such as his ‘Achilles and the Tortoise’, revealed grave and subtle difficulties in the notion of infinite divisibility.” Copi, The Theory of Logical Types acosmism, f. Greek, a, not + cosmos, world, order, Spinoza’s identification of God and world has often been interpreted as an assertion of atheism, but Hegel interpreted Spinoza as claiming that God rather than the world really exists. He entitles this position “acosmism.” This position does not mean that God and the world are two distinct entities, but Hegel believed that it left unsolved questions about the appearance of the world and of the philosophizing metaphysical subject. “[T]he system of Spinoza was not Atheism but acosmism, defining the world to be an appearance lacking in true reality.” Hegel, Logic COGNITIO DIRECTA: Or acquaint, the way in which a knowing subject is aware of an object by experiencing it directly and immediately. Acquaintance contrasts with description, where an object is known through an intermediary process of inference. There is controversy over what are the objects of acquaintance. Among the items proposed for this role are sense-data, memories, and universals such as redness, roundness. The notion of acquaintance has been used to constrain what we can be said to experience. Russell calls the knowledge derived through acquaintance knowledge by acquaintance, which is the direct knowledge of things and is distinguished from knowledge by description, which reaches truth through inference. “Acquaintance: an animal is said to be acquainted with an object when the object, or an image of it, is part of the animal at the moment.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell AUDITTUM. Gr. Acroama, For L. auditum For Kant, a basic principle, especially of philosophy. In contrast, an axiom is a basic principle of mathematics or science. This is a distinction between axioms and discursive principles or between mathematical and philosophical principles. An axiom requires the intuition of objects and thus considers the universal in the particular, while an acroama is discursive and considers the particular in the universal. All principles of pure understanding are acroama, for they are established by the analysis of language and a discursive process of proof. Kant drew this distinction to criticize the tendency in traditional metaphysics to apply mathematical principles to philosophy. “I should therefore prefer to call the first kind acroamatic (discursive) proofs, since they may be conducted by the agency of words alone (the object in thought), rather than demonstrations which, as the term itself indicates, proceed in and through the intuition of the object.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason ACTUM – ACTUM CONVERSATIONALIS. Then there’s act-centered, there’s agent-centered-morality. COMMISIO: To act is to do something, while an omission is a failure to act in circumstances where one has the ability and opportunity to act. In euthanasia, one acts if one actively kills a patient, but this can be distinguished from omitting to act, where not acting allows a death that intervention could have prevented. In contrast to killing, an omission lets die or does not strive to keep alive. To send poisoned food to the starving is an act that kills them, while failing to aid them is an omission that lets them die. In these and other similar moral situations, objectionable acts are open to moral condemnation. What then is the moral status of apparently parallel omissions? Are they equally wrong or are they permissible? Are such omissions something that morally ought not to be allowed? This question gives rise to a complex debate regarding the moral significance of the distinction between act and omission. Consequentialism denies the importance of the distinction, while deontology holds on to it. “It [the acts and omissions doctrine] holds that there is an important moral distinction between performing an act that has certain consequences – say, the death of a disabled child – and omitting to do something that has the same consequences.” P. Singer, Practical Ethics. CONSEQUENTIA. Then there’s act-consequentialism: Consequentialism is generally divided into act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism. Act-consequentialism holds that an action is right if it produces a better consequence than alternative actions available to the agent. Rule-consequentialism, on the other hand, claims that the rightness of an action depends not on its direct consequences but on whether it conforms to a set of rules that lead to better consequences than other alternative rules. Act-utilitarianism is the most typical and familiar form of act-consequentialism. But there are also other forms of act-consequentialism that hold that pleasure or happiness are not the only factors by which we assess the goodness of the consequences. Like act-utilitarianism, act-consequentialism is criticized for considering all things from an impersonal standpoint. “Different act-consequentialist theories incorporate different conceptions of the overall good but all such theories share the same conception of the right which requires each agent in all cases to produce the best available outcome overall.” Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism act-object theory: an analysis of sensation introduced by G. E. Moore in his sense-datum theory, which suggests that sensation consists of sense-data (objects) and the act of sensing. Sense-data are entities that are distinct from the act of seeing. A sensation is a genuine relation between a subject and a really existent object. Objects exist independently of acts. Moore uses this distinction in criticizing Berkeley’s idealist thesis that esse est percipi by saying that it fails to distinguish between the object sense-datum and the act of consciousness that is directed upon it. “Yellow” is an object of experience, and the sensation of “yellow” is a feeling or experience. Russell claims that perceiving and other cognitive processes are acts of attention, directed at some object. But under the influence of adverbial analysis, Russell later abandons this actobject analysis. For Broad, sensa-data cannot exist independent of the act of sensing, and he call them “sensa.” “The sensum theory . . . holds that this [sensation] is a complex, and that within it there can be distinguished two factors: X itself, which is the sensum and is an object, and a subjective factor, which is called the ‘act of sensing’.” Broad, Scientific Thought ACTUM INDIVIDUALE: aact token: Alvin Goldman distinguishes between act tokens and act types. An act type is a kind of action, such as driving a car or writing a paper. An act token is a particular act or action that is performed by a particular person in a particular circumstance: for instance, driving my Ford Escort yesterday afternoon or writing my paper about Aristotle’s concept of substance. An act type is an action property, while an act token is an exemplification of such a type. An act token is the performance of an act. If an act type is wrong, allact tokens that belong to it are wrong. There has been a debate about the identity conditions for actions. Generally, two act tokens are thought to be identical if and only if they involve the same agent, the same property, and the same place and time. “A particular act, then, consists in the exemplifying of an act-property, by an agent at a particular time. I shall call such particular acts ‘act tokens’.” Goldman, A Theory of Human Action ACTUM ABSTRACTUM, act type, see act token ACTUM. act, f. L. agere, to do. Some philosophers draw a distinction between acts and actions and suggest that while an act is the deed that is done, an action is the doing of it. But most believe that this distinction is hard to maintain and take an act as a synonym for an action. Although there are actions in nature, such as the action of a river on its bank, an action is generally defined as what is intentionally done by a human rational agent. Natural action is described as a mere process, happening, or occurrence. Action has been the focus of much discussion in recent philosophy of mind, especially concerning human intention and deliberation. Many theories have been developed to explain what it means to act intentionally and to show how to distinguish actions from other events involving persons. On one standard account, an action is an event by which an agent brings about changes through bodily movement. A rival mental action theory argues that not all actions involve bodily movement and identifies actions with primary mental events in the causal chain between the agent and behavioral events. According to the causal theory of action developed by Davidson, Searle, and Goodman among others, actions are the effects of primary mental events. Other philosophers reject such primary mental events and deny that actions are events at all. One bodily movement can bring about, directly and indirectly, many changes and the consequences of this for identifying and explaining actions are unclear. X moves his hand; by moving his hand, he turns the steering wheel; and by turning the steering wheel, he drives his car; and so on. Is there one action in this case or are there many? When should we distinguish an action from its consequences? Some philosophers suggest that we can deal with these problems by identifying basic actions that cause other actions but that are not themselves caused by actions. But there is much dispute regarding how to identify basic action. Actions can be discussed in isolation, but they often occur in a pattern of activity either in a single life or involving others. Social action was profoundly explored by Weber. If we seek a causal account of action, are actions caused by reason, desire, or both? Would another framework be more appropriate for explaining or understanding action either within a causal account or as a rival to it? It is unclear whether an explanation by reasons that is not a form of causal explanation is coherent. Answering such questions requires the analysis of many key notions, such as motives, intentions, voluntary and involuntary action, practical reason, wants, and desires. The question of explaining action is closely associated with the problem of free will and determinism and the problem of responsibility. Another much debated problem in philosophy of law and moral philosophy is the relation between action and omission, inaction or negligence. “The word ‘action’ does not very often occur in ordinary speech, and when it does it is usually reserved for fairly portentous occasions. I follow a useful philosophical practice in calling anything an agent does intentionally an action, including intentional omission.” Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events. Actum is meant to translate Gr. praxis, from the verb prattein, to do] Broadly, everything that an agent does intentionally, in contrast to speech and to being acted upon. Humans, including children, and some non-human animals are capable of this sort of action. More strictly, action is confined to carrying out rational choice, something that non-humans cannot do. It is doing what is or could be the outcome of deliberation on the part of the agent or for what the agent is held responsible. This sense, which is central to moral philosophy, is related to the problem of free will and responsibility. Only in this sense is action open to moral praise and blame. Aristotle also used praxis narrowly for rational action that is its own end, and that is not done merely for the sake of some further end. This sense contrasts with production (Greek, poiesis), which is for the sake of some end product. According to this contrast, ethical actions, unlike technical performances, are done and valued for their own sake. Philosophers also discuss the conceptual relations between these sorts of action and action in nature that does not involve intention, reason, or purpose, such as the action of a river on its bank. “[An unconditional goal is] what we achieve in action, since doing well in action is the goal.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Then there’s ACTUM DISTANS, action at a distance: action at a distance is contrasted to action by contact or local action. Whether one thing can act on another at a distance without postulating some kind of intervening medium as involved in the interaction has been a topic of debate in physics and philosophy since ancient Greece. The dominant tendency is to reject any such possibility. Atomism claims that atoms cannot interact without contact. Aristotle believes that every object in local motion must have a conjoined mover. This is also the main attitude in physics and philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Descartes, Newton, Locke, and Leibniz all reduce actions at a distance to actions through a medium of some sort, yielding actions that are continuous, although there is no agreement about what the medium is. In contemporary field theory the question is still disputed. The problem of action at a distance is related to the question of whether causality is something more than correlation. “The formula by which we determine what will happen in a given region will contain references to distant regions, and it may be said that this is all we can mean by ‘action at a distance’.” Russell, The Analysis of Matter INTELLECTUM. Then there’s intellectus activus, nous poietikos. Aristotle claimed in De Anima III, 5 that, as with anything else, one can draw a distinction between form and matter and between actuality and potentiality within the soul. The formal and actual aspect of the soul is active intellect, and the material and potential aspect of the soul is passive intellect. Passive intellect amounts to ordinary apprehension that is receptive of the sensible and intelligible forms of objects. This kind of knowing is only potential. Passive intellect will perish at the death of an individual. Active intellect is the agent that brings the passive intellect’s potential knowledge of objects to actuality. Active intellect is separable, unmixed, and impassable. The distinction between active and passive intellect and the nature and function of active intellect are ambiguous in Aristotle’s writings and gave rise to many debates among commentators in the later Hellenistic and medieval periods and in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship as well. Controversial questions include: Is the distinction between active and passive intellect realized only within the human soul, or does active intellect exist outside human beings? Is active reason identical with God as described in the Metaphysics? If active intellect is entirely independent of body, how can we reconcile it with Aristotle’s standard view that soul is the form of body? “Intellect in this sense of it is separable, impassable, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms).” Aristotle, De Anima. Then there’s active reason, another name for active intellect. ACTUALITAS: actual idealism, see actualism. Then there’s Actualism has several senses. First, it is the actual idealism of the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile. This theory claims that the pure act of spirit (that is, the transcendent subject as opposed to the empirical subject) is the only real thing in the dialectical process. Such acts are acts of self-affirmation and constitute a synthesis of the self and the world. Secondly, actualism (also called factualism) is the view, proposed by Plantinga, Stalnaker, and Armstrong, that only the actual world exists. The world is wholly composed of actual entities, including concrete individuals and instantialized abstractions. All sorts of potentialities, tendencies, forces, andunexampled essences are not admitted. This view contests those theories of possible worlds that accept the existence of possible worlds and their contents as well as the existence of the actual world. Thirdly, actualism as a theory of choice claims that an agent should choose the best option that he or she will actually do, rather than the best option that he or she can do. This latter view is called possibilism. “I assume the truth of what may be called actualism. According to this view, we should not postulate any particular except actual particulars, nor any properties and relations (universals) save actual, or categorical, properties and relations.” D. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? Then there’s actualization. energeia: actuality/actualization Ancient Greek philosophy [Gr. energeia, actuality, from ergon, function or action, etymologically associated with motion or activity; entelecheia, actualization (Greek), from enteles echein, having an end within, etymologically associated with the completion of an action or a process] Aristotle used these two terms interchangeably and ignored their different etymologies. In many places, he contrasted energeia with motion (kinesis) saying that motion is an incomplete activity that aims at some end beyond itself, while energeia is a complete activity which is its own end. Both energeia and entelecheia are used in contrast to potentiality for the fulfillment or realization of different kinds of potentiality. In Aristotle’s discussion of substantial change, actuality or actualization is identical with form, and sometimes even with the composite of matter and form, that which has been shaped out of the matter. “The word ‘actuality’ which we connect with actualisation has in the main been extended from motion to other things; for actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with motion.” Aristotle, Metaphysics. Then there’s actuality: G. Wirklichkeit, from wirken, to be active, or effectual] In the preface to Philosophy of Right, Hegel claimed that “what is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational.” This has been criticized as a conservative doctrine that allows no attack on existing political systems and institutions, however tyrannical or perverse they might be. But this response is based on a mistaken understanding of Hegel’s notion of actuality. Hegel employed the standard contrast between actuality and possibility or potentiality, but also contrasted actuality to mere existence or appearance, so that not everything existing is actual. In his Logic, actuality is the unity of existence and essence, of inward reality and outward reality. Something actual is fully developed according to the inner rationality of the species to which it belongs. For Hegel, everything has its own teleological necessity and can be said to be actual only when this necessity has been fully worked out. Hence, an infant, although it exists, is not actual with respect to the essence of human species. “Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with existence, or of inward with outward.” Hegel, Logic. Then there’s actualization, see actuality/actualization. Then there’s actus reus, see mens rea ADDITUM: additive fallacy, an alternative expression of the additivity assumption. Then there’s additivity assumption: also called the additive fallacy. Utilitarianism argues that we can add individual utilities together to make up a total utility and that any action that results in a larger amount of total utility is morally more acceptable than other actions that result in less total utility. Here a working hypothesis is assumed that individual utilities can be quantitatively measured, compared, and combined into an overall outcome. This is the additivity assumption. It is not only central to utilitarianism, but is also active in many other moral theories, insofar as they appeal to notions such as “balancing,” “weighing,” and “simple-complex.” Critics, however, maintain that individual utilities are always qualitatively different and incommensurable and therefore that it is impossible to compare and contrast them. Furthermore, even if an aggregation is possible, this would not be sufficient to establish the moral status of an action, for a larger amount of utility does not entail an equal or just distribution. “The view that the moral status of an act is the sum of individual positive and negative contributions – the particular reasons for and against performing the act – is, as I suggested, a familiar and attractive one. Nonetheless, I believe that the additive assumption should be rejected.” Kagan, “Additive Fallacy,” Ethics. ADEQUAETUM; adequacy conditions on definitions of truth, see material adequacy. Then there’s the ‘idea adequate,’ adequate idea. For Spinoza, adequate ideas are the ideas from the second grade of cognition, reason, and from the third grade of cognition, intuitive knowledge, in contrast to the ideas formed from the first grade of cognition, sense experience. Adequate ideas are wholly caused from within individual minds, either by seeing them to be selfevident or by deriving them from other ideas that are self-evident. Adequate ideas are coextensive with true ideas, and bear all the internal marks of truth. In Leibniz, adequate ideas are those that are clearly and distinctly conceived. “By adequate idea I understand an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without reference to the object, has all the properties or internal marks of a true idea.” Spinoza, Ethics AD HOC -- ad hoc hypothesis – L. ad hoc, for this, to this. Something that is ad hoc is only for the purpose at hand. A theory might be saved from a challenge that is inspired by contrary evidence if we introduce an additional hypothesis. Such a hypothesis, if it has no independent rationale but is used merely to preserve the theory, is called an ad hoc hypothesis. An ad hoc hypothesis is generally rejected by a satisfactory scientific explanation, for it is not testable independently of the effect to be explained, and hence does not have any theoretical power. In another sense, ad hoc also means an explanation introduced to account for some fact after that fact had been established. “A satisfactory explanation is one which is not ad hoc.” Popper, Objective Knowledge ADORNOIAN IMPLICATUM. Adorno, Theodor, Frankfurt-born philosopher, sociologist, and musicologist, a leading member of the Frankfurt School of critical theory. His most important work, Negative Dialectics, is a critique of thinking based on identity and the presentation of a negative dialectic of non-identity that has exerted great influence on postmodern and post-structuralist thought. He was co-author of The Authoritarian Personality (1950), a study of the psychological origins of fascism and Nazism. With Horkheimer, he published Dialectic of the Enlightenment (1947), which traces totalitarianism and scientism in modern society to the Enlightenment conception of reason. He criticized Husserl in Against Epistemology (1956) and Heidegger in The Jargon of Authenticity (1965). His Aesthetic Theory was left unfinished at his death. ADVERBUM: adverbial materialism: A theory of mind that combines the adverbial analysis of sense-experience with materialism or physicalism, developed by J. W. Cornman. In the spirit of adverbial analysis, the theory claims that when people perceive something red in the appropriate conditions, they do not sense red sense-data, but rather they sense red-ly. It further takes this sensing event to be identical with a brain event. Every sensing event is reduced to a physical event. The theory is opposed to phenomenalism and is compatible with direct materialism. Critics suggest that this analysis leaves out the most central element of perception, the perceptual experience itself. ADVENTUM -- adventitious ideas – f. L. d, to + venire, to come. Descartes’s term for those ideas that we get through senses and that are caused by things existing outside one’s mind. Adventitious ideas contrast both to innate ideas and to fictitious ideas. Innate ideas are not obtained by experience, but are carried by the mind from birth. Fictional ideas are created by mind in imagination. Descartes argued that it is impossible for all ideas to be adventitious. In contrast, British empiricists claimed that all ideas can be reduced to adventitious ideas and specifically denied the existence of innate ideas. On their account, all universals result from the operation of mind on the basis of adventitious ideas. The treatment of adventitious and innate ideas became one of the major divergences between rationalism and empiricism. ADVERBUM -- adverbial theory: an analysis of sensing that intends to convert the objects of sensation into senseexperience characterized in an adverbial way. An adverb is introduced to describe the way a sensing activity is taking place; thus, “I sense a red color patch” should be regarded as a statement of how I sense, that is “I sense red-ly.” The purpose of this analysis is to deny that sense-data are independent entities; rather, it takes them as sense-contents that cannot exist independent of the act of sensing of them. Sense-data are considered as modes of awareness instead of internal objects of awareness. The starting-point of this theory is the idea that sensations cannot exist when not sensed. It eliminates mental objects by reducing all statements about sensations to statements about the way or mode in which a subject is sensing. The analysis influenced both Moore and Russell with regard to their actobject theory of sensation and was later advocated by C. J. Ducasse, Ayer, and Chisholm. The analysis becomes difficult once a complex sensation is involved, such as, “I sense a red color patch to the left of a blue color patch.” It is also challenged for its inability to distinguish sense-experience from purely mental imaging.“I marvel indeed at the train of reasoning by which you try to prove that all our ideas are adventitious and none of them constructed by us, saying – because the mind has the power not only of perceiving these very adventitious ideas, but, besides this, of bringing together, dividing, reducing, enlarging, arranging, and everything similar to this.” Descartes, Meditations, Reply to Objection V. “This [theory of adverbial materialism] is the theory that each sensory experience consists in an objectless sensing event that is not only identical with but also nothing but some physical event, presumably a neuronal brain event.” Cornman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science SENSUM: aesthetic imagination “If the adverbial theory is right, it tells us how I am sensing and does not require for its truth that there be an object being sensed.” Jackson, Perception SENSUM: aesthetic attitude: a special attitude with which to approach art, nature, and other objects. First, it differs from a practical attitude and has no concern with practical (sensual, intellectual, or moral) utilities. An aesthetic attitude takes nature or a work of art “for its own sake.” In this sense it is “disinterested,” as Kant emphasized in his Critique of Judgement. Secondly, it does not involve personal desires, motives, or feelings in dealing with an object. This freedom from desire or emotion is called “aesthetic distance” or “aesthetic detachment.” Thirdly, in contrast to a cognitive or scientific attitude, it is indifferent to the real existence, the content or the meaning of a thing. It does not appreciate an object through bringing it under concepts. Instead it is a pure appreciation or contemplation of the perceptual qualities of an object as an object of sensation. It is claimed that in this way we can live in the work of art as an embodiment of our feeling. Schopenhauer and Heidegger ascribe a metaphysical importance to the aesthetic attitude by saying that it can reveal the essence of reality more profoundly than conceptualization. The possible existence and role of a pure aesthetic attitude are topics of dispute. “All appreciation of art – painting, architecture, music, dance, whatever the piece may be – requires a certain detachment, which has been variously called the ‘attitude of contemplation’, the ‘aesthetic attitude’, or the ‘objectivity’ of the beholder.” Langer, Feeling and Form aesthetic autonomy Aesthetics The idea that art has its own sphere demarcated from other human activities and determines its own principles or rules. Art cannot be replaced by other activities without loss. Aesthetic experience should be explained by aesthetic terms or attributes, and art should be valued by itself alone. The idea is intended to protect art from being assimilated to scientific, religious, or moral functions and to insist that art has a different domain from science and morality. The position demands that human beings should be liberated from various instrumental attitudes towards art and that the development of art should not be unjustifiably subjected to the service of extra-aesthetic concerns. In this century, aesthetic autonomy has gained popularity in the face of the danger of submerging the aesthetic attitude into the cognitive attitude. “The only answer, in short, is in terms of aesthetic value beyond which we cannot go. We assume the autonomy of aesthetics and all we can do is to see where this assumption will lead to.” Saw, Aesthetics SENSUM. aesthetic detachment, see aesthetic attitude SENSUM -- aesthetic distance, see aesthetic attitude SENSUM -- aesthetic education: Education directed at developing a person’s aesthetic capacities and experiences of art. Its purpose is to educate a person’s feeling and to enhance the harmony between emotion and reason in order to elevate our character. Its function regarding one’s soul is analogous to the function of physical education for one’s body. As early as Plato’s Republic, there is a detailed discussion to show that education should have an aesthetic concern. An account of this education is most systematically developed in Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. There are contrasting views of what such an education should be, according to different theories of art. “Aesthetic education is possible only if it involves criticism; and edifies only when its mirror images are not merely produced or consumed, but when they are critically grasped and appropriated.” Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics. SENSUM -- aesthetic imagination: the imagination that plays a role in the production and appreciation of artworks. Aesthetic imagination explores the possibilities suggested by the connection of aesthetic experience. It accompanies indispensably our interactions with art. While scientific imagination is bound by agreement with reality and is in the service of theoretical work, aesthetic imagination is free and operates in the service of aesthetic feeling. Its purpose is the satisfaction of the feeling that inspires it. It broadens our understanding, gives rise to emotional identification with the object, and enables us to experience a wider range of feelings than we can experience in actual life. For Kant, aesthetic experience involves a free play of the imagination and the understanding. “Aesthetic imagination can perceive the ennobling beauty and truth of past art produced in more harmonious times.” Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics SENSUM -- aesthetic judgment: the ascription of an aesthetic property or value to an object, as distinguished from cognitive or logical judgment that gives us knowledge. The determining ground for such an ascription has been hotly disputed. For objectivism, an aesthetic judgment attributes an objective property to a thing judged and does not essentially involve the feelings of the person who is judging. It is hence a universal judgment. For subjectivism, the feelings, such as liking or disliking, of the person who judges are the decisive ground, and hence aesthetic judgment is not universal. The most influential frameworks of analysis of aesthetic judgments were developed by Hume and Kant. According to Hume, although aesthetic properties are not inherent in things, aesthetic judgments are not merely an expression of personal pleasure or displeasure. Like judgments of color, they are determined by contingent causal relations between object and subject, although their ultimate ground is the sensibility of human beings. Kant claims that aesthetic judgments do not depend on a set of formulated rules or principles. Unlike objective knowledge claims, they rest on subjective response and personal acquaintance. He suggests that in a broad sense aesthetic judgments include empirical aesthetic judgment and “judgments of taste.” An empirical aesthetic judgment judges the agreeable or the pleasant and concerns that which simply gratifies desire. A judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment in its narrow sense. It is the judgment of beauty and is “disinterested,” in the sense that it is independent of all personal desires and motivations. Hence, a person making such a judgment expects other people to have similar responses under the same circumstance. Hence, judgments of taste have a type of subjective validity or universality. “Aesthetic judgements, just like theoretical (i.e. logical) ones, can be divided into empirical and pure. Aesthetic judgements are empirical if they assert that an object or a way of presenting it is agreeable or disagreeable; they are pure if they assert that it is beautiful. Empirical aesthetic judgements are judgements of science (material aesthetic judgements); only pure aesthetic judgements (since they are formal) are properly judgements of taste.” Kant, Critique of Judgement SENSUM -- aesthetic pleasure: Distinguished from both sensual pleasure and intellectual pleasure, aesthetic pleasure or aesthetic enjoyment is the emotional element in our response to works of art and natural beauty. It can vary from pleasure in its mildest form to rapturous enthusiasm. To characterize the peculiar nature of aesthetic pleasure has been a challenging job for aesthetics. Since Kant, many theorists have accepted that aesthetic pleasure is a result of a disinterested and non-conceptual engagement with an object. But it is a point of dispute whether this pleasure arises from apprehending the formal character of the object, its content, or both. It is also unclear how much subjective elements contribute to this process. Other major issues concern the relation between aesthetic pleasure and the aesthetic attitude and the distinction, if there is one, between aesthetic pleasure in response to nature and to art. “Aesthetic pleasure is manifested in a desire to continue or repeat the experience.” Sheppard, Aesthetics SENSUM -- aesthetic property: a quality that contributes to determining the aesthetic value of an artwork. Such properties can be subject either to positive evaluation, such as being beautiful, charming, elegant, sublime, balanced, graceful, or majestic, or to negative evaluation, such as being ugly, boring, clumsy, garish, or lifeless. There can, of course, be beautiful depictions of ugly objects or lifeless depictions of beautiful ones. Some aesthetic qualities, such as being sad or joyful, can be non-evaluative. It is widely agreed that we require a special sensitivity, “taste,” to perceive them. Aesthetic properties are the ultimate sources of “aesthetic value,” and contribute to determining the nature of artworks. Positively aesthetic properties make artifacts into works of art and figure in a aesthetics subject’s account of why an artwork pleases him. Some philosophers argue that as emergent properties aesthetic properties supervene on non-aesthetic properties, but others insist that aesthetic properties must be seen as entirely independent of nonaesthetic properties. “I imagined explaining my emotional response to the painting by pointing out some of its aesthetic properties; the colours, although pastel, are warm rather than faded, the faces of the saints ‘sweet and gentle.’” Mothersill, Beauty Restored SENSUM -- aesthetic value Aesthetics The properties rendering a work of art good or successful, such as balance, charm, elegance, grace, harmony, integrity, or unity. Aesthetic value is whatever contributes to the “beauty” of a piece of art, in contrast to that which contributes to its usefulness, truth, or moral goodness. “Beauty” is the supreme name for aesthetic value, and “ugliness” is the supreme name for aesthetic disvalue. The history of aesthetics has been characterized by disputes about whether aesthetic value is waiting to be discovered objectively in the objects, independent of the responses of observers, or exists subjectively in the experiences of human agents, or lies in the connection between the object and the feelings of its observers. “Instead of saying that an aesthetic object is ‘good’, they [philosophers] would say that it has aesthetic value. And correspondingly, instead of saying that one object is better than another, but not because it has a higher cognitive or moral value, they would say that it has a higher aesthetic value, or is aesthetically more valuable.” Beardsley, Aesthetics SENSUM -- aestheticism Aesthetics The position that art should be valued only according to its intrinsic aesthetic properties, such as beauty, harmony, unity, grace, or elegance. It maintains the supreme value of art over everything else. A work of art is nothing more than a work of art and should not be viewed as a means to further ends. Its internal aesthetic value is supreme. Pure beauty has nothing to do with utility. The pursuit of such beauty is the supreme source of human happiness and should not be constrained by moral or other considerations. In its extreme form, aestheticism claims that any art that has externa functions or purposes is ugly. The slogan of aestheticism is “art for art’s sake” (French, L’art pour l’art). An art critic should not be concerned with art for the sake of citizenship, patriotism, or anything else. Aestheticism is rooted in Kantian aesthetic formalism and flourished in the nineteenth century, first in French literature, represented by Flaubert, and then in English literature, represented by Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde. Aestheticism opposes society’s interference with artistic creation, for artworks characterized by adventurousness are always subject to criticism based on customs and established modes of thought and feeling. But it is problematic whether an artwork can be completely isolated from its environment and social consequences. The opposite view, which can be called “instrumentalism,” proposes that art should serve the needs of the people and the community. “[Aestheticism] is the view that aesthetic objects are not subject to moral judgements, that only aesthetic categories can be, or ought to be, applied to them.” Beardsley, Aesthetics SENSUM -- aesthetics: Although many problems discussed in contemporary aesthetics as a branch of philosophy can be traced to Plato’s dialogues (especially Ion, Symposium, Phaedrus, Republic, and Philebus) and Aristotle’s Poetics, aesthetics did not become an independent discipline until the eighteenth century. The term was coined by Alexander Baumgarten in his Reflections in Poetry (1735), based on the Gr. “aesthesis” (sensation, perception), opp. ‘nous.’ Baumgarten defines it as “the science of sensitive knowing,” which studies both art and sensible knowledge. Kant inherited these two senses. The first part of Critique of Pure Reason, the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” deals with a priori sensible form; the first part of Critique of Judgement, called “Critique of Aesthetic Judgement,” is a critique of taste, concerning the judgment of beauty and the sublime and the “autonomy of taste.” Nowadays the word “aesthetics” is confined to the study of experience arising from the appreciation of artworks and covers topics such as the character of aesthetic attitude, aesthetic emotions, and aesthetic value; the logical status of aesthetic judgments; the nature of beauty and its allied notions; and the relation between moral education and works of art. It also encompasses problems dealt with by the “philosophy of art” such as the nature of art and the perception, interpretation, and evaluation of artworks. Philosophy of art is thus a part of aesthetics. The development of aesthetics in the twentieth century has been deeply influenced by developments in the philosophy of mind, theories of meaning, and hermeneutics. “The Germans are the only people who currently make use of the word ‘aesthetic’ in order to signify what others call the critique of taste. This usage originated in the abortive attempt made by Baumgarten, that admirable analytical thinker, to bring the critical treatment of the beautiful under rational principles, and so to raise its rules to the rank of a science.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason AETERNITAS -- Aeterni Patris, see neo-scholasticism NATURA -- ether: a rarified element believed to fill the heavens. Anaxagoras considered aether to be derived from aithein (Greek, to ignite, to blaze) and identified it with fire. Some other pre-Socratic philosophers considered aether to be derived from aei thein (Greek, runs always), and took it to be a divine element, different from other basic elements. Aristotle developed their idea by arguing that aether is a fifth element in addition to the usual four elements: fire, air, earth, and water. He divided the cosmos into two levels. While the lower world, which is within the sphere of the moon, is composed out of the four elements, the upper world, from the moon upwards to the first heaven, is composed of aether. Aether has no property in common with the four simple elements in the lower world and cannot be transformed into them, and the four elements cannot go up to the outer region. Aether as a divine body has no movement except uniform circular motion and is indestructible. This cosmology became the foundation of the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. Seventeenth-century science postulated aether as the medium of interactions in the heavens. Nineteenth-century science postulated aether as the medium of transmission in the wave theory of light. This term is also retained in contemporary quantum field theory.“They [natural philosophers], believing that the primary body was something different from earth and fire and air and water, gave the name aether to the uppermost region, choosing its title from the fact that it ‘runs always’ and eternally.” Aristotle, De Caelo DEDICATUM -- AFFIRMATUM -- affirmative method: from Latin via affirmativa or via positive, Christian theological method for obtaining knowledge of God, in contrast to negative method (via negativa). The affirmative method rejects the claim of the via negativa that God cannot be apprehended by human concepts and discourse. On the basis of the doctrine that man is made in the image of God, it claims that the highest human qualities are pointers and signs of the perfection of God. We can, therefore, deduce divine attributes through analogy to these qualities. The basic procedure is to start with the highest human categories and to proceed through intermediate terms to particular divine titles. In this way we can indicate how human terms such as goodness, wisdom, and power are applicable to God in a manner that transcends our experience. Because knowledge obtained in this way is pre-eminent, the via positiva is also called the via eminentiae. Some theologians, such as Aquinas, claim that the via negativa cannot be used in isolation, but is a necessary preliminary step to the via positiva. There are difficulties in applying a method of analogy like the affirmative method beyond the possibility of our experience. “The affirmative method means ascribing to God the perfections found in creatures, that is, the perfections which are compatible with the spiritual nature of God, though not existing in Him in the same manner as they exist in creatures.” Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. II DEDICATUM affirming mode, another term for modus ponendo ponens DEDICATUM affirming the consequent Logic A logical fallacy of the form “If p then q; q; therefore p,” that is, the categorical premise affirms the consequent of the conditional premise, while the conclusion affirms its antecedent. For instance, “if he is sick, he does not come to work; he does not come to work; therefore he is sick.” This is invalid because in the conditional premise the truth of the consequent does not entail the truth of the antecedent. The correct form should infer from the antecedent of a true implication to its consequent; that is, it should be of the form “If p then q; p; therefore q.” This was called modus ponens by the medieval logicians and is also called the affirming mood. “ ‘P ⊃ Q, Q, therefore P’ bears a superficial resemblance to the valid argument form modus ponens and was labelled the fallacy of affirming the consequent.” Copi, Introduction to Logic. FORTITUDO – Grice’s strength -- A FORTIORI: a fortiori: L. for a stronger reason, even more so or with more certainty, an argument that if everything that possesses A will possess B, then if a given thing possesses A to a greater degree, it has a stronger reason (a fortiori) to possess B. For example, if all old men who are healthy can run, then a fortiori a young man who has greater health than old men can run. “All the so-called relational (or a fortiori) syllogisms depend on the transitivity of the relations.” Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. PERSONA -- afterlife, see disembodiment CARITAS -- agape: Gr., love; its Latin translation, caritas, in contrast to other terms for love, such as eros and philia, agape is used for Christian love and is one of the primary virtues in Christian ethics. Its content is expressed in two biblical injunctions: “Love the lord your God with all your heart, and all your soul, and all your mind” (Matthew 22: 9, but adapted from Leviticus 19:18) and “Love your neighbor as yourself ” (Matthew 22:37, but previously Deuteronomy 6:5). Agape is wholly unselfish, but there has been some dispute whether it includes rational self-love. The relationship of agape to justice is also problematic. In comparative religion, agape has been compared with Confucian jen, humanity. “Agape is that form of love in which God loves us, and in which we are to love our neighbour, especially if we do not like him.” Tillich, Ultimate Concern RINACIMENTO -- age of adventure, another name for the Renaissance. ILLUMINATIO – LUX RATIONIS -- age of reason, another name for the Enlightenment. ACTUM -- agent, from L. agens, what is acting, referring to a rational human being who is the subject of action, an agent can decide to act or not. Having decided to act, an agent can deliberate how to act. Once the means of acting are chosen, an agent can apply the means to bring about certain changes. The kind of capacity intrinsic to an agent is called agency. The change caused by an agent is called agent-causation, in contrast to event causation in which one thing is caused externally by another. In ethics, only agents are members of a moral community and bearers of moral responsibility. “The way a cause operates is often compared to the operation of an agent, which is held responsible for what he does.” von Wright, Explanation and Understanding ACTUM -- agent-centered morality, also called agent-related ethics. It demands that moral consideration should be given to moral agents rather than merely to the consequences of the agent’s acts. It is a thesis opposed to consequentialism, in particular to utilitarianism, which it labels outcome-centered ethics. It accuses consequentialism of ignoring the integrity of the characters of moral agents, for consequentialist ethics requires that what an agent is permitted to do in any situation is limited strictly to what would have the best overall outcome impersonally judged. In contrast, agent-centered morality focuses on the agent’s rights, duties, or obligations. It holds that our primary responsibility as agents is to guarantee that our actions conform to moral rules and do not violate our obligations towards others. Agents should perform such actions even if they know that the consequences of what they do would be better if they were willing to compromise their principles. Major issues for this view are to classify the forms of agent-relativity, to justify agent-relative principles, and to offer an adequate rationale for agent-centered restrictions. ACTUM -- “Agent-centred morality gives primacy to the question of what to do, a question asked by the individual agent, and does not assume that the only way to answer it is to say what it would be best if he did.” T. Nagel, Mortal Questions. ACTUM -- agent-neutral reason: the evaluation of something objectively, independently of one’s own interests. This is in contrast to “agent-relative reason,” which values things by taking one’s situations into consideration. Agent-neutral reason cares about everyone, while an agentrelative reason cares more particularly about oneself. The introduction of this dichotomy of reasons for acting is credited to Derek Parfit, but Thomas Nagel borrows it (using the terms objective reason and subjective reason) and uses it widely. It plays a great role in the contemporary debate between “consequentialism” and “agent-related ethics.” Consequentialism is generally characterized as “agent-neutral,” for it requires that everyone should act so as to maximize the amount of happiness for all involved. Some philosophers therefore claim that it asks moral agents to consider their actions from an impersonal point of view and is thus in conflict with common sense. On the other hand, agentrelated ethics is believed to be based on “agentrelative reason” because it allows moral agents to base their moral aims on their moral characters. Consequentialism is also called “agent-neutral morality” or “act-centered ethics,” and its opposite is called “agent-related ethics” or “agent-centered morality.” “Nagel calls a reason objective if it is not tied down to any point of view. Suppose we claim that there is a reason to relieve some person’s suffering. This reason is objective if it is a reason for everyone – for anyone who could relieve this person’s suffering. I call such reasons agent-neutral. Nagel’s subjective reasons are reasons only for the agent. I call these agent-relative.” Parfit, Reasons and Persons. ACTUM -- agent-related ethics, another expression for agent-centered morality. ACTUM -- agent-relative reason, see agent-neutral reason. AGGLOMERATUM -- agglomeration principle: a term introduced by B. A. O. Williams and now used as a rule of inference in deontic logic. According to the principle, if one has a duty to do A and if one also has a duty to do B, one has a duty to do A and B. The principle also extends to cover all situations in which a property can be conjoined out of two other properties. The validity of the principle has been a matter of controversy because it needs to be reconciled with the principle that ought implies can. In some cases, a person can do a and can do b separately, but cannot do both of them and will therefore not have a duty to do both. There is a converse to the principle of agglomeration, called the division principle, which states that if one has a duty to do both a and b, then one has a duty to do a and has a duty to do b. “. . . that ‘I ought to do a’ and ‘I ought to do b’ together imply ‘I ought to do a and b’ (which I shall call the agglomeration principle) . . .” B. Williams, Problems of the Self. INCOGNITO -- agnosticism, f. Gr. a, not + gnostikos, one who knows, a term used by T. H. Huxley for a position that neither believes that God exists nor believes that God does not exist and denies that we can have any knowledge about the nature of God. Agnosticism is contrasted both to theism, which holds that we can know the existence and nature of God, and to atheism, which denies the existence of God. Many agnostics argue that human reason has inherent and insuperable limitations, as shown by Hume and Kant. Therefore, we cannot justify any claims supporting either theism or atheism and should suspend our judgment over these issues. The attitude of agnosticism has persisted in many periods, but it became important philosophically in nineteenth-century debates concerning science and religious belief. Agnosticism is also used more generally for the suspension of judgment about the truth or falsity of claims going beyond what we directly sense or commonly experience. “Agnosticism: this is the theory that we have no means of telling what are the characteristics of those relatively permanent things and processes which manifest themselves partially to us by the interrelated sensa which we from time to time sense.” Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature PLACITUM -- Angenehme, das; agreeable. For Kant, what the senses find pleasurable in sensation, that is, the feeling of pleasure evoked by the presence of a sensible object. Whatever is liked is agreeable. This feeling gratifies desire and offers a pathologically conditioned delight, not only for man, but also for non-rational animals. In contrast, the good evokes delight by pure rational determination. Kant believed that the nature of this delight is both agreeable and good. Judgment about the agreeable implies no universality, but universal agreement is required where the judgment is transferred to the morally good. “Agreeable is what the senses like in sensation.” Kant, Critique of Judgement ARTIFICIALIS -- AI, abbreviation of artificial intelligence AJDUKIEWICZIANUM MPICATUM: Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz, Tarnopoi-born philosopher. Ajdukiewicz continued the development of twentieth-century Polish logic initiated by Twardowski and Lukasiewicz. He combined work on semantic categories, syntax, and meaning with a conventionalism in ontology and a pluralist epistemology. His conception of categorical grammar brought together his interests in logic and ontology. His major works include Problems and Theories of Philosophy and Language and Knowledge. ALBERTUSIANUM IMPLICATUM: Albert the Great Dominican Aristotelian, born in Germany. Albert the Great taught in Cologne and Paris. Under the influence of Neoplatonism, he attempted to reconcile Greek and Islamic philosophy and science with Christianity, a project that led to the great medieval synthesis of his student Aquinas. Albert’s major works, including commentaries on Aristotle and Summa Theologiae, appear in his Opera Omnia. ALBOIANUM IMPLICATUM: Albo, Joseph, Spain-born philosopher. Albo used Jewish, Islamic, and Christian sources to provide a rational justification for Judaism. In his major work The Book of Principle (1425), he examined religious and philosophical discussions of the existence of God, providence, and the Torah as revelation, and developed a doctrine of natural, conventional, and divine law as a basis for political and social life. DALEMBERTIANUM IMPICATUM: d’Alembert, Jean Le Rond, Paris-born Enlightenment philosopher, member of the Académie des Sciences, co-editor of the Encyclopédie (with Diderot). In his Discourse préliminaire to the great Enlightenment project of the Encyclopédie (1751–65), d’Alembert showed the influence of Bacon, Locke, and Newton as well as Descartes in laying down the methods of establishing human knowledge within a single rational framework of principles. He argued that these principles could be known through scientific investigation rather than through metaphysical argument. ALGORITHMUS IMPLICATUM -- Algorithm, from the name of the Islamic mathematician al-Khuwarizmi, a step-by-step procedure for reaching a sound result. The steps are finite in number, and each has instructions for its proper implementation, so that the whole procedure can be carried out in a mechanical fashion. An algorithm can be a calculative procedure to compute the value of a function for any argument within a domain. It can also be a decision procedure to determine whether a specific object has a particular property. The truth table test of the truth-value of a formula is one paradigm of an algorithm. It is important to know whether an algorithm is possible for a given kind of problem. “An algorithm is a procedure, brutish or not, that guarantees solution.” Boden, Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man EGO ET ALIUS -- Entfremdung, from fremd, alien or Entäusserung, from entäussern, to make outer or external, which is associated with Latin, alius, another. Also translated as estrangement. A state in which a thing is separated, through its own act, from something else that used to belong to it, so that this other thing becomes self-sufficient and turns against its original owner. The idea of alienation may be traced to the Christian doctrine of original sin and to Rousseau’s theory of the social contract, in which individuals in a state of nature relinquish their natural freedom in favor of civil freedom upon entering a social state. It is explicated by Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx. For Hegel, the development of the absolute idea is a process of alienating or eternalizing ideas in the natural world and then de-alienating or recovering them at a higher stage. Each category develops into its contrary, which is originally contained in it. It thus enters a state of alienation, followed by reconciliation into a higher unity. This unity itself proceeds to further alienation. Nature is an alienation of the absolute idea. Each individual will be alien to social substance and also to his particular self although he is identified with the universal substance. The process of alienation and de-alienation corresponds to the process of the growth of human knowledge. Feuerbach held that God is nothing but the alienated human self. Marx claimed that alienation is a universal phenomenon of capitalist societies, rooted in the alienation of workers from the products of their labor. In capitalism these products take the form of commodities, money, and capital. For Marx, alienation can only be overcome by replacing capitalism by communism. The concept of alienation gained wide currency in the twentieth century, largely due to the influence of Marx’s Economical and Political Manuscripts, which was written in 1844 and published in 1932. Neo-Marxists, especially Lukács, used the notion to provide a new interpretation of Marxism. Existentialism and the Frankfurt school take alienation to be a basic malaise of modern society and some Marxist theorists have looked for theoretical grounds to explain alienation in socialist societies. Alienation is discussed not only in philosophy, but also in other social sciences and daily life, to deal with disunities, bifurcations, or dichotomies affecting human well-being. Alienation has various forms, but the selfalienation of human beings has attracted particular attention. Self-alienation refers to the separation of individuals from their real self, their nature, and their consciousness. It is a state in which a person loses individual integrity and independence and becomes a stranger to oneself. “This ‘otherness’, this acting of a role imposed upon one, imposed perhaps by the unintended consequences of the behaviour of one’s self or one’s fellows in the past, which comes to threaten and coerce one as if it were a real entity menacing one from outside – this is the phenomenon of alienation, to which Rousseau and Hegel, Kierkegaard and Marx, and much modern psychology and sociology have given a central role.” Berlin, The Magus of the North ALTERNUM -- alternation: complex statement in the form “p or q,” also called disjunction in contrast to conjunction. The logical word “or” in such a statement admits of both exclusive or non-exclusive interpretations in ordinary language. When it is used in an exclusive sense, “p or q” is true if only one of its components is true. It means either p or q, but not both. In a non-exclusive sense, “p or q” is true if at least one of its components is true. It means either p or q, or both. While alternation can include both senses of “or,” some logicians prefer to confine alternation to the exclusive sense of “or,” and others prefer to confine it to the non-exclusive sense. “Whereas a conjunction is true if and only if its components are all true, an alternation is false if and only if its components are all false.” Quine, Methods of Logic ALTHUSSERIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Althusser, Louis, Birmendreis-born structural Marxist. Under the influence of LéviStrauss’s structuralism and Bachelard’s notion of an epistemological break, Althusser stressed the importance of Marx’s mature views and rejected Marx’s earlier humanistic writings as ideological rather than scientific. He sought to understand historical processes in structural terms without theoretical recourse to the human subjects filling the roles determined by structures. He nevertheless saw the base and superstructure of Marx’s social theory as mutually influential, with changes in the overdetermined superstructure capable of initiating revolution. His major writings include For Marx (1965) and Reading Capital (with Étienne Balibar, Pierre Macherey, and others) (1965) H. P. Grice’s principle of conversational altruism -- EGO ET ALTER -- Altruism, from Latin alter, other or another. A term introduced into ethics by Auguste Comte and imported into England by Herbert Spencer. Altruism is the disinterested or benevolent concern for other people, that is, a regard to promote the welfare of others for their own sake rather than to promote one’s own interest or a placing of the interests of others ahead of those of oneself. It opposes egoism, which tries to reduce morality to self-interest. Altruism has been a perennial problem for ethics. Greek ethics believed that it is one among many equally important values, but the mainstream of modern moral theory claims that it is the most important concern of ethics. On the other hand, some anti-traditionalist philosophers like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard condemn altruism on the grounds that it will lead to low self-esteem and self-negation. The strength of altruism lies in the facts that altruistic acts undeniably occur in any society and that moral codes universally advocate altruism or benevolence and condemn selfishness. The issues surrounding altruism include the following. Given the self-preserving tendency of human nature, how are we to account for the existence of altruism? Even if we can understand how altruism occurs, is it morally justified? Are altruistic acts merely apparent and really motivated by self-interest? Since one should reasonably pursue one’s own interests, does the good of others itself provide reason for an agent to promote that good? Given the difficulty in understanding another person, how can altruism really serve the good of others? Is there an adequate distinction between altruism and paternalism? “ ‘Altruism’ means, not ‘doing good to others for a duty’s sake’, but ‘doing good to others for its own sake’ or ‘doing good to others for the sake of doing good to others’.” Nowell-Smith, Ethics AMBIGUUM -- ambiguity: To say that a word or expression is ambiguous means that different senses or references are associated with the word or expression, and that it is not clear from the given context which of these senses is meant. This is called lexical or semantic ambiguity. To say a sentence or statement is ambiguous means that the sentence is confusing in its whole meaning, although each word in it is clear, because of the grammatical structure among the words. This is ambiguity of construction which is also called structural or syntactic ambiguity or amphiboly. The grammatical relations that most often produce syntactic ambiguity include misplaced modifiers, loosely applied adverbs, elliptical constructions and omitted punctuation. Other major types of ambiguity include process–product ambiguity arising from the confusion between a process (behavior or movement) and a corresponding product; act– object ambiguity, in which a statement can refer to either an act or an object and it is not clear which is intended in the given context; and type–token ambiguity, in which an expression can refer to either a type or a token and it is not clear which is intended in the given context. The ideal language philosophers such as Frege and Carnap claim that natural language is full of ambiguities, and hence that it must be replaced by a logically perfect language that is free of ambiguity. In literature, ambiguity is a prized feature rather than something to be eliminated. “Semanticists and philosophers usually call a word ‘ambiguous’ only when there is some uncertainty about which meaning is being used in a particular instance. A word is not ambiguous by itself, it is used ambiguously.” Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. AMBIGUUM – AEQUIVOCATIO -- ambiguous middle, fallacy of, another term for four-term fallacy ANIMA COLLECTIVA -- âme collective, see group mind AMORALIA: amoralism. In Greek, a is a negative prefix, and “amoral” literally means not moral. Amorality is distinguished from immorality (evil, wrong), where “amoral” is synonymous with “non-moral,” referring to actions that are morally value-free and that are neither moral nor immoral and neither right nor wrong. In another sense, the amoral is distinguished from both the immoral and the non-moral, referring to actions that are not the concern of standard moral or social concepts of good or bad. Generally “amoralism” is used in this latter sense for an attitude that ignores or rejects the ways in which morality governs human lives and is skeptical of the necessity of ethical life. Hence it becomes a task of ethics to justify morality by showing that ethical life is rational. “[W]hen an amoralist calls ethical considerations into doubt, and suggests that there is no reason to follow the requirements of morality, what can we say to him?” B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. AMOR: amour de soi: Rousseau’s term for the instinctive sentiment or disposition of selfpreservation which human beings have in the state of nature. It is born to humans, but also belongs to other animal creatures. Amour-propre and the natural feeling of pity are two supreme principles governing human behavior prior to the formation of society. Acts out of amour de soi tend to be for individual well-being. They are naturally good and not malicious because amour de soi as self-love does not involve pursuing one’s self-interest at the expense of others. The sentiment does not compare oneself with others, but is concerned solely with oneself as an absolute and valuable existence. It is related to an awareness of one’s future and can restrain present impulse. For Rousseau, amour de soi contrasts with amour-propre, a self-love that presupposes a comparison between oneself and others and consequently generates all the vicious and competitive passions. “Amour de soi-même is a natural feeling which leads every animal to look to its own preservation, and which, guided in man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue.” Rousseau, Discourse. AMOR PROPRIUS -- amour-propre: A term introduced by Rousseau in contrast to “amour de soi.” Amour de soi is an instinctive disposition of self-preservation that is possessed by human beings in the state of nature and that contains no desire to surpass others. “Amour-propre” is generated after the formation of society or association and leads one to pursue superiority over others, even at the expense of the interests of others. For amour-propre, the well-being of the self relies on one’s standing relative to other selves and on comparisons between oneself and others. It impels one to seek power and dominance, giving rise to relentless competition and conflict. It engenders deception, aggression, hypocrisy, malice, and all other evils that appear in human relationships. The immorality of amour-propre leads to the corruption of society. To avoid this, according to Rousseau, one should withdraw from society and return to nature. “Amour-propre is only a relative and factitious sentiment which is born in society, which leads each individual to make more of himself than of every other, which inspires in men all the evils they perpetrate on each other, and is the real source of the sense of honour.” Rousseau, in Ritter and Bondanella (eds.), Rousseau’s Political Writings AMPHIBOLIA – METABOLIA -- amphiboly: A kind of sentential ambiguity arising from the different combinations of the words in a sentence, e. g. the sentence “The brave son’s mother is kind” can be understood either as saying that the son is brave or that the son’s mother is brave. Hence this sentence is amphibolous. Amphiboly is also called syntactical or structural ambiguity. Under many circumstances an amphibolous sentence is true on one interpretation and false on another. If in one argument, a person uses the correct interpretation of the sentence as a premise, but infers using the false interpretation, he is committing the fallacy of ambiguity. “A statement is amphibolous when its meaning is indeterminate because of the loose or awkward way in which its words are combined.” Copi, Introduction to Logic AMPLIATUM -- ampliative induction, f. L. ampliatio, broadening. A term introduced by Kneale for reasoning that proceeds from the observed to the unobserved or from the particular to the universal. Since its conclusion goes beyond what is contained in the premises, it is ampliative. Kneale claims that this is the method characteristic of natural sciences in establishing general propositions and that it is distinguished from summative induction, which characterizes work in social sciences; intuitive induction; and recursive induction, which operates in mathematics. “One of the most striking characteristics of the induction used in natural sciences is that it goes in some sense beyond its premises, which are the singular facts of experience; I propose, therefore, to call it ampliative induction.” Kneale, Probability and Induction. See: ampliative judgment, see ampliative reasoning ampliative reasoning, f. Latin ampliatio, broadening; in contrast to restrictio, narrowing: in medieval logic, the broadening of a term’s extension. For Peirce, ampliation is ampliative reasoning in which the conclusion goes beyond what is contained in the premises. For example, we infer from “some x are y” to “all x are y.” Ampliative induction, in contrast to other forms of induction, reasons in this way. In contrast, the conclusion of deductive reasoning is generally thought to be already contained in the premises. For Kant, a synthetic judgment is an ampliative judgment, because its predicate adds something new to its subject, in contrast to analytic or clarificatory judgments, in which the predicate can be derived through analysis of the subject term. “In ampliative reasoning the ratio may be wrong, because the inference is based on but a limited number of instances; but on enlarging the same the ratio will be changed till it becomes approximately correct.” Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. II. PROPORTIONATM -- ANALOGICUM -- analogies of experience: Kant introduced four groups of categories, with each group having principles or rules to show its objective validity in employment. Analogies of experience are these rules for the categories of relation, that is, the categories of substance, causality, and interaction. The analogies correspond to three temporal modes, namely duration, succession, and coexistence. The first analogy is the principle of the permanence of substance; the second is the principle of the fixed order of succeeding states; and the third is the law of reciprocity or community. Kant held that these principles are necessary conditions for the possibility of temporal experience. They enable our perceptions of objects in time to relate necessarily to one another, and hence make experience possible. The analogies of experience are merely regulative, not constitutive, principles, and they do not tell us whether there is an objective substance, causal relation, or interaction. “An analogy of experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. analogy, f. Gr., ana, up, throughout + logos, reason, originally meaning a mathematical proportion between different things, the term has been extended to refer to similarities and likenesses between different things. An expression has an analogical sense when it extends its application to additional things that are similar in certain respects to the original things covered by the term. An analogical argument states that because a thing a is like another thing b in some respect, it is possible that a is like b in other respects as well. Typical examples include the argument from design and certain responses to the other minds problem. In religion it is often held that a transcendent God can only be described analogically by human language. Analogical argument is metaphorical and correlative. It is suggestive but not conclusive. “Analogy is the inference that a not very large collection of objects which agree in various respects may very likely agree in another respect.” Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. DEPOSITUM vs. COMPOSITUM -- SEPARATUM -- analysandum, see analysis -- analysans, see analysis -- analysis Philosophical method [f. Gr. ana, up + lyein, loose, untie] The mental process of dissolving a whole into its components and the relations between its components. The analysis into constituents is called material analysis, while the analysis of the manner of combination of the constituents is called formal analysis. The item to be analyzed is called the analysandum, and the item that does the analysis is called the analysans. In this century, analysis has become the central method of analytical philosophy. Its central characteristic is that we must investigate our language to make clear our thinking about the world. We approach the world through thought, and on this view the only way to approach the structure of our thought is to study what we say. Analysis is not a set of unified doctrines, but a style or manner of philosophy. Because different philosophers have different notions of analysis, there are different schools in analytical philosophy itself. For Frege, Moore, Russell, and early Wittgenstein, analysis aimed to overcome traditional philosophical problems through replacing the apparent structure of statements by their real and underlying logical structure. For them, as for logical positivism, analysis involves a reduction of complex discourse to simple elementary propositions. This sort of analysis is also called logical analysis. For later Wittgenstein and Oxford ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers, the notion of an underlying logical structure of language is unnecessary, but we still need to analyze our ways of talking to establish an understanding of our conceptual scheme. This sort of analysis is also called linguistic analysis. “Analysis may be defined as the discovery of the constituents and the manner of combination of a given complex.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. VII. -- analysis, paradox of: A paradox, originally formulated by C. H. Langford in his discussion of G. E. Moore’s notion of analysis, leads to the conclusion that all analysis is either trivial or false. An analysis states relations between an analysandum (the expression to be analyzed) and an analysans (the analyzing expression). These expressions are either synonymous or not synonymous. If they are synonymous, the analysis does not convey any information and is trivial. If they are not synonymous, the analysis is false. Therefore, analysis is either trivial or false and is not a significant philosophical or logical procedure. This paradox involves an analysis of the notion of analysis. The standard response to it involves the use of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference. The truth of the analysis is a matter of the different expressions having the same reference, but triviality is avoided if the expressions have difference senses. “And the paradox of analysis is to the effect that, if the verbal expression representing the analysandum has the same meaning as the verbal expression representing the analysans, the analysis states a bare identity and is trivial; but if the two verbal expressions do not have the same meaning, the analysis is incorrect.” Langford, in Schilpp (ed.), Philosophy of G. E. Moore. -- analytic: Analytic is a term Aristotle used for his syllogism and for the discussion of the conditions of demonstrative knowledge presented in his Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics. In contrast, Aristotle presented what he called dialectic in the Topics, another part of his Organon. Since the sixteenth century, it has been common practice to divide logic into two parts: analytic, which concerns the elements of judgment, and dialectic, which concerns the persuasive force of syllogism, and this practice influenced German philosophy. In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant adopted this usage and divided his transcendental logic into the transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic. Analytic, in his understanding, is an analysis of the form of understanding and of reason. It seeks to determine the necessary rules of all formal truth and is a canon for deciding on the formal connectives of our knowledge. Kant practiced such an analytic in all of his three Critiques. In the first Critique, the transcendental analytic, including an analytic of concepts and an analytic of principles, seeks to uncover the concepts and principles of theoretical reason. In the second and third Critique, Kant used analytic to discover the principles of pure practical reason and of the power of aesthetic judgment. “The analytic brings to light, by sundering them, all acts of reason that we exercise in thinking.” Kant, Logic. analytic ethics: a term for any analysis of moral concepts, but as a distinct approach it starts with G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica (1913). It claims that the fundamental task of ethics is not to discuss substantive moral questions and to seek solutions for them, but rather to examine the meaning of moral terms such as “good,” “duty,” “right,” “ought” and to make them as clear and precise as possible. It then evolved into the linguistic analysis of moral judgments, their types and their functions. This development was represented by Ayer’s account of morality, Stevenson’s emotivism, and Hare’s prescriptivism. Another dimension of analytic ethics is to examine moral reasoning and the basis for distinguishing moral judgments from other value judgments. This is represented especially in the work of Stephen Toulmin. Analytic ethics can be viewed as synonymous with meta-ethics. In the 1960s, as the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics came into question, analytic ethics as a distinctive approach also lost favor. Many moral philosophers now believe that ethics should investigate both moral terms and moral questions. Nevertheless, analytic ethics, through its sharply defined analysis of moral terms, has had a lasting influence on ethics through raising the precision and theoretical level of ethical discussion. “Analytic ethics as a branch of philosophy should, then, be clearly distinguished from empirical ethics, from a genetic or descriptive study of moral valuations, and from propagandistic morals.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy. analytic Marxism: A term not for a body of doctrine, but for a tendency or style developed during the past decade that attempts to bring Marxism into the web of contemporary political theory in order to benefit from rigorous critical standards and further development. It characteristically employs the conceptual tools and methods of analytical philosophy, game theory, and decision theory in its discussion of Marxism. Analytic Marxism is inspired by Marxist questions such as alienation, exploitation, class, social theory, theory of justice, theory of history, and Marx’s theory of surplus value. Unlike conventional Marxism or Western Marxism, analytic Marxism does not stress Marxist exegesis, but it does seriously consider Marx’s ideas as philosophy and discusses them with clarity and rigor. It is mainly directed to the underlying principles of Marxist theory and examines questions such as: “Is socialism in the interest of workers in modern capitalism?” “Why is exploitation wrong?” In general, it rejects Marx’s methodological collectivism in favor of methodological individualism, which seeks to explain social arrangements and life by appeal to the rational behavior of differently endowed individuals. The major representatives of analytic Marxism include G. A. Cohen, Jon Elster, John Roemer, and Alan Wood. The tendency is also called neoclassical Marxism, rational choice Marxism and game theory Marxism. Analytic Marxists might in principle reject many of the main features of the traditional theory of Marxism, but proponents argue that this pattern of development through rational criticism is characteristic of science in general. “The project of Analytic Marxism is to clarify, criticise and develop the theory of Marxism, using the methods and techniques of analytical philosophy.” Sayers, in Ware and Nielsen (eds.), Analysing Marxism. analytic philosophy: Analytic philosophy arose from Russell and Moore’s criticism of Bradley’s absolute idealism at the beginning of the twentieth century and developed out of the combination of Frege’s logic and the British empirical tradition. The philosophers of the first generation of analysis held on to the distinction between fact and value and between analytic and synthetic propositions. They rejected traditional metaphysics and normative ethics as the products of confusions generated by the surface grammar of language, and concentrated on the reductive logical analysis of the deep structure of language. Philosophy was understood as nothing but conceptual analysis. The early Wittgenstein, who did not share Russell’s empiricism, held that such analysis also revealed the structure of the world. For logical positivists, analysis was focused on the logical forms of scientific discourse and much traditional philosophical discourse was rejected as nonsense. After the Second World War, the main object of logical analysis became ordinary language, the view being that philosophy should concern itself with language per se rather than with its alleged essence. This tendency was influenced by the later Wittgenstein, but was mainly developed in Oxford through the work of such figures as Ryle, Austin, and Strawson. Ryle’s behavioristic analysis of mind set the agenda for the philosophy of mind. Austin’s speech act theory made the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind interrelated disciplines. Strawson’s notion of descriptive metaphysics restored the position of metaphysics in analytic philosophy. From the middle of the 1940s to the 1960s, analytic philosophy was regarded by many as synonymous with Oxford philosophy or linguistic philosophy, though this is not precisely correct. Ayer, for example, was critical of the emphasis on ordinary language, especially in Austin’s work. In the United States, Quine rejected the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions that was essential to early analytic philosophy and saw philosophy as a continuing enterprise of science. This has changed the landscape of analytic philosophy. As a movement, analytic philosophy carries with itself a large variety of methods and doctrines. What unifies this movement is the spirit of the respect for rationality, the suspicion of dogmatic assumptions, and the pursuit of argumentative rigor and clarity on the model of the natural sciences. On these grounds, many recent innovations in philosophy, such as functionalism, the causal theory of reference, various theories of meaning and truth, the post-positivist philosophy of science, Rawls’s theory of justice and virtue ethics, can be seen as developments within analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy is often contrasted with continental philosophy, but this distinction should not be understood to be a geographical one. Although analytic philosophy is the dominant tendency in English-speaking countries, it is also practiced in many European countries, and was also contributed to greatly by continental philosophers such as Brentano, Frege, and the members of the Vienna Circle. The single most influential analytic philosopher, Wittgenstein, was from Austria. “The basic tenet of analytical philosophy, common to such disparate philosophers as Schlick, early and later Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, Ayer, Austin, Quine and Davidson, may be expressed as being that the philosophy of thought is to be equated with the philosophy of language.” Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. analytic philosophy of history, see philosophy of history. analytic-synthetic: this dichotomy is first explicated by Kant. In an analytic judgment the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject, and we can tell that the proposition is true by analyzing the relevant subject concept. An analytic judgment is tautologous, and its negation involves self-contradiction. In a synthetic judgment, the concept of the predicate adds something new to the concept of the subject, and the truth or falsity of the proposition cannot bedetermined by analysis. Such a judgment provides a synthesis of two concepts and tells us something about the world. Kant connects this dichotomy with the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. He claims that all analytic judgments are a priori, and he is concerned with how synthetic a priori judgment is possible. The adequacy of Kant’s account of this distinction has been a topic of much dispute, in particular because it is unclear what it means to say that a predicate is “contained” or “included” in the subject and because the distinction thus formulated can only be applied to the sentential structure “S is P.” Various other accounts have been developed this century. Many of them concentrate on the idea that a negation of an analytic proposition is selfcontradictory, and that an analytic proposition cannot be false. Others suggest that a proposition P is analytic iff P is true by virtue of the meaning of the constituents of P, or that P is analytic iff it is true in all possible worlds, or that P is analytic iff P can be proved by logic and definition alone, or that P is analytic in a Language L iff P is true in virtue of the semantic rules of L. Quine famously criticizes this distinction as a dogma of empiricism. He argues that the explication of the notion of analyticity is unsatisfactory since it appeals to the equally unclear notions of “necessity,” “semantic rules,” “synonym,” etc. The explanation of these later notions either involves circularity or Platonic realism. He does not believe that this distinction, which plays such a great role in the development of modern philosophy, is sound. But P. F. Strawson and others argue that it is valid since the use we make of semantic meanings is indispensable. “In all judgements in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought . . . , this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgement analytic, in the other synthetic.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. analytical behaviorism: A type of behaviorism, proposed by Hempel and others, in which all sentences containing sensation terms or psychological terms can be translated or reformulated into sentences containing only physicalistic terms. Hence, psychological terms do not refer to mental objects, events, or states. This theory extensively employs meaning analysis and contextual definition, and its goal is to deny the existence of mental substance. The major problem it faces is its difficulty in analyzing some psychological sentences in behavioral terms. “Analytical behaviourism is the theory that all sentences using psychological or mentalistic terms are transformable by analysis of what they mean into sentences using no psychological terms, but containing only terms used to describe bodily behaviour and bodily dispositions to behave.” Cornman, Materialism and Sensations analytical definition: A definition of a word that can be derived purely by explaining the property ascribed to the word in linguistic usage. For example, an analytical definition of “uncle” is “a man who has the same parents as a parent of another person,” because this definiens gives the property that English ascribes to the word “uncle.” Such a definition is necessarily true. To reject an analytical definition involves a violation of a rule of meaning for the language. “Analytic definitions of concepts can give rise to analytic statements.” Arthur Pap, “Theory of Definition,” An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, vol. I analytical jurisprudence Philosophy of law John Austin first brought out the distinction between analytical jurisprudence and normative jurisprudence. Analytical jurisprudence is the branch of legal theory or philosophy that is concerned with the linguistic and logical elucidation of legal concepts. It deals with the articulation and analysis of concepts, rules, and structures of law as it is. Normative jurisprudence, on the other hand, is concerned with the evaluative criticism of legal practices and with the prescription of what law ought to be. Analytical jurisprudence does not aim at ascertaining the meaning of a term in a particular text. It intends to reveal the conceptual framework that is common to all properly constituted legal systems and thus to achieve an improved understanding of legal ideas and legal rules. After John Austin, the approach was further developed in this century by the American jurist W. N. Hohfeld and by the Oxford legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart in association with the development of linguistic philosophy. “Analytic jurisprudence is concerned with the logical analysis of the basic concepts that arise in law, e.g. duty, responsibility, excuse, negligence, and the concept of law itself.” Murphy and Coleman, The Philosophy of Law. analytical phenomenalism, see phenomenalism. analytical priority: The priority in the order of philosophical analysis. If X must be appealed to in explaining Y, while the explanation of X itself does not need to involve Y, then X has analytical priority over Y. One of the main characteristics of analytical philosophy is the view that language is analytically prior to thought, and that we should focus on the analysis of language. The philosophy of thought, on the other hand, holds that thought is analytically prior to language. That is, the meaning of a language should be explained in terms of the thought that the language is used to express. Analytical priority is distinguished from ontological priority in which X is prior to Y because Y depends on X for its existence, while X does not exist because of Y. It is also distinguished from epistemological priority in which X is prior to Y because the knowledge of Y presupposes the knowledge of X, but not vice versa. “To say that the notion of X is analytically prior to the notion of Y is to say that Y can be analysed or elucidated in terms of X, while the analysis or elucidation of X itself does not have to advert to Y.” Davies, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy.. analytical Thomism, see Thomism REMINISCENTIA. anamnesis, Greek term for recollection. ANARCHISMUS -- anarchism Political philosophy [from Greek a, not + arche, ruling, governing, literally the lack of government] In a popular sense, pejoratively understood as a position opposing all existing authority and institutions and associated with lawlessness, chaos, violence, and terrorism. Proudhon (1809–65) was the first to identify himself as an anarchist. In his sense, anarchism is a theory that advocates that voluntary and contractual social and economic organizations should replace the existing authoritarian and coercive state and statelike institutions. Accordingly, anarchism is a political theory that rejects authoritarianism and demands the establishment of a better society on the basis of free competition, cooperation, and equality. For anarchism, state power is not legitimate and does not have satisfactory justification. Authority involves oppression and domination and entails the promotion of privilege and wealth for a certain minority of the population. It is not helpful in achieving social goals, but produces undesirable consequences. Hence, a society may need certain forms of organization, but should remove all authoritarian and coercive regulations. Political obligation to the state should vanish. Such a view can be traced to Greek Stoicism and Chinese Taoism. It was fully expressed in modern times in William Godwin’s An Inquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793). With regard to the means to realize the desired anarchic state, different anarchists have different plans. For example, Proudhon and Max Stirner (1806–56) believed that anarchism should be achieved through the peaceful change of the existing coercive institutions, while M. Bakunin (1814–76) called for a violent revolution to destroy the current machinery of the state. Anarchism has met tremendous difficulties, for it cannot find an acceptable means of maintaining social order and rectifying degenerate or evil societies. But in theoretical terms it is a significant source for the critique of authoritarianism. It also poses fundamental questions about the justification of political power and political obligation. “The forms of anarchism anchored in social and philosophical theories do not deny the value of security and order, but they believe that these are maintainable without a state, without a government, without a monopoly of power.” Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience. anarchism (scientific) Philosophy of science A position concerning the growth of science, associated in particular with Paul Feyerabend, who denied that there is an overall methodology of science. It is an illusion to believe that there are transcultural norms of rationality of science that guide scientific activities. Hence all attempts to seek universal paradigms of scientific development and its rules are futile. The success of science depends on rhetoric, persuasion, and propaganda, rather than on rational argument. To adhere to a set of theories and to demand consistency and invariable meaning discourages development. We should rather advocate the proliferation of conflicting and competing theories. Science should be an anarchistic enterprise that proceeds according to the maxim “anything goes.” Feyerabend also called his position theoretical pluralism and claimed that pluralism is essential for the growth of knowledge. “Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its lawand-order alternatives.” Feyerabend, Against Method. anarchy, see anarchism. ANATOMICUM -- anatomic property, fr Gr. ana, up + atomos, indivisible, not atomic. If a property of something is not peculiar to that thing, but is also possessed by at least one more thing, this property is anatomic. For instance, weighing 70 pounds is an anatomic property, for it is not the case that there is only one thing in the world that weighs 70 pounds. An anatomic property contrasts with an atomic or punctuate property, which can be instantiated only by one thing, but is the same as a holistic property, which is a property such that if anything has it, then other things have it. The distinction between anatomic and atomic properties is significant for the discussion of meaning holism. While traditional British empiricism, logical positivism, and behaviorism emphasize the relation between a symbol and what is symbolized in the non-linguistic world and hence treat properties atomistically, contemporary semantic holism claims that the meaning of a symbol is determined by its role in a language and is accordingly anatomic. “A property is anatomic just in case if anything has it, then at least one other thing does.” Fodor and Lepore, Holism. ANAXAGORIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Anaxagoras (500–428 bc) Pre-Socratic natural philosopher, born in the small Ionian city of Clazomenae, and emigrated to Athens in 480 bc. Anaxagoras claimed that in the beginning the world comprised an original boundless and indeterminate mixture containing all ultimate constituents or seeds. All other things in the cosmos are generated out of this mixture through rotation, and every stuff contains a portion of every other stuff. The theory was a result of his attempt to answer Parmenides’ denial of change. Anaxagoras also suggested that the mind (nous), as an allpowerful and omniscient agency, ordered the cosmos. This teleological idea excited Plato and Aristotle, although they complained that Anaxagoras failed to develop it. ANAXIMANDERIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Anaximander (flourished c.550 bc) Pre-Socratic natural philosopher, born in Miletus, a student of Thales. Anaximander was said to have been the first person to construct a map of the world. He believed that there was one material stuff out of which everything in the cosmos came and into which everything returned in the end. Probably thinking that every ordinary material element could be destroyed by its opposite, he took the single cosmic stuff to be something boundless or indeterminate (apeiron in Greek). The apeiron is eternal and encompasses all the opposites. He held that the generation and destruction of things follow a principle of cosmic justice. SPATIUM ET TEMPUS: spatio-temporal states of affairs, events, and processes and to be continuous with science. He was an empiricist committed to the real existence of material objects in epistemology and was a naturalist in ethics and aesthetics. Several of his most influential essays are included in Studies in Empirical Philosophy (1962). ANDROCENTRICUM: androcentrism -- from Greek andro, the stem of the word man] Androcentrism is a male-centered perspective. According to many feminists, Western culture is androcentric because it is preoccupied with theoretical rather than practical issues and with reason rather than experience. It devalues women’s experience and does not take women’s concerns seriously. On this view, an androcentric bias is implicit in virtually every aspect of social life. One of the goals of feminism is to deconstruct the traditional androcentric philosophical framework. Androcentrism is opposed by gynocentrism [from Greek gene, woman], a female-centered perspective. “The radical feminist position holds that the epistemologists, metaphysicians, ethics, and politics of the dominant forms of science are androcentric.” Harding, The Science Question in Feminism. DIALECTICA OXONIENSIS: Oxford philosophy, another term for analytic philosophy. ANXIETAS: Angst , German term for anxiety Anaximenes (flourished c.550 bc) Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, born in Miletus, a student of Anaximander. Following Thales and Anaximander, Anaximenes believed that there was one underlying principle from which everything comes and to which everything returns. For him, this principle is air. Air is boundless, but not as indeterminate as Anaximander’s apeiron. It is through the process of condensation and rarefaction that air is transformed into everything else. Anderson, John (1893–1962) Scottish-Australian philosopher, born in Scotland, Professor of Philosophy at University of Sydney. Anderson was a crucial figure in establishing a distinctive school of Australian philosophy. He considered philosophy to be concerned with ANGUISH -- anguish, French, angoisse, also translated as dread, one of the typical existentialist attitudes toward the world, similar to anxiety. A person is both free to act as he or she chooses and to be conscious of this freedom. The feeling of anguish arises when a person is brought face to face with this consciousness or recognition of freedom. If a choice is original and cannot be justified by reasons outside one’s own choice, then a person will always enter upon self-questioning concerning the rightness of the choice or the failure to choose and, hence, will experience a sort of uncertainty. Anguish is connected with the absurdity of the world, rather than directed at any particular danger. Most people flee from anguish through bad faith while an authentic person is aware, through this feeling, of the gap between what is present and what is possible for him or her, and proceeds to increased creativity in the use of his own potentiality. Some existentialists also call this feeling “ontological guilt,” a sense of guilt arising not from the violation of some particular prohibitions, but from the self-awareness of free choice. Both the moral psychology and the ontology of this central existentialist notion can be called into question. “It is by anguish that man becomes conscious of his freedom, or in other words, anguish is the manner of existence of freedom as consciousness of existing.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness. ANIMATUM -- anima, Latin term for soul. -- anima mundi, Latin term for world-soul -- animal Philosophy of science, philosophy of mind [from Latin anima, soul, corresponding to Greek, psyche; Aristotle’s Peri Psyche (On the Soul) is generally translated as De Anima] The distinction between living and non-living things lies, according to Aristotle, in the fact the former have souls, although there is a hierarchy of souls, from vegetative, locomotive, and sensory to rational souls. Only man has a rational soul, and plants have no more than vegetative souls. The Bible says that living things are animated with “the breath of life.” Thus, the mark of living things is that they are animated or ensouled. Nowadays we distinguish between plants and animals, with humans considered to be a special kind of animal. Descartes, as a consequence of his dualism, described animals as mechanical automata and preferred to call them beasts rather than animals. The normal way to distinguish between human beings and nonhuman animals appeals to the fact that humans alone are self-conscious and genuine language users. “In my opinion the main reason for holding that animals lack thought is the following . . . It has never been observed that any brute animal has attained the perfection of using real speech, that is to say, of indicating by word or sign something relating to thought alone and not to natural impulse.” Descartes, The Philosophical Writings -- animal-centered ethics, see animal liberation, environmental ethics animal liberation Ethics The term comes from the title of a book by Peter Singer in 1975. The movement to liberate slaves demanded the cessation of prejudice and discrimination against black people on the grounds of skin color. The women’s liberation movement demanded the cessation of prejudice and discrimination against women on the grounds of gender. Analogically, the animal liberation movement calls for an end to prejudice and discrimination against animals on the grounds of species. Traditional ethics excludes animals from the ethical community because they lack the full range of human rationality, and animals have been exploited for food, in experiments, and as the victims of hunting. Singer accuses this tradition of speciesism. He argues that animals are capable of suffering and should be included in the community of beings that merit moral consideration. We need a new ethics to deal with human relationships with non-human animals. He claims that abusing and killing animals is not morally justified. Although there is controversy whether animals can have rights and whether these rights would entail that humans should be vegetarians, the animal liberation movement has greatly influenced human attitudes and behavior toward animals. It is widely accepted that we should at least avoid unnecessary animal suffering and avoid killing animals in brutal ways. “Animal liberation is human liberation too.” P. Singer, Animal Liberation. -- animal rights, see rights, animal animal spirits Philosophy of action A term Descartes adopted from scholasticism for the principle of movement in automata rather than something spiritual. It was a key term in his theory of animal movement. “Animal” here included both humans and other animals. “Animal spirits” were claimed to be a subtle matter, something in the blood that is distributed through the pineal gland and moves the limbs causing various internal muscular motions. They were likened to “the fire without light in the heart.” Animal spirits could be lively or sluggish, coarse or fine, and it was claimed that due to this fact an animal machine could move itself. “The parts of the blood which penetrate as far as the brain serve not only to nourish and sustain its substance, but also and primarily to produce in it a certain very fine wind, or rather a very lively and pure flame, which is called the animal spirits.” Descartes, The Philosophical Writings. animal symbolicum: A term used by the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer. The tradition since Aristotle has defined a human being as animal rationale (a rational animal). However, Cassirer claimed that man’s outstanding characteristic is not in his metaphysical or physical nature, but rather in his work. Humanity cannot be known directly, but has to be known through the analysis of the symbolic universe that man has created historically. Thus man should be defined as animal symbolicum (a symbol-making or symbolizing animal). On this basis, Cassirer sought to understand human nature by exploring symbolic forms in all aspects of a human being’s experience. His work is represented in his three-volume Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen, and is summarized in his An Essay on Man. “Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum.” Cassirer, An Essay on Man. animism, another term for panpsychism ANOMALIA: anomalous monism Philosophy of mind [from Greek a, not + nomos, law, order] Donald Davidson’s term for his theory about the relationship between the mental and the physical. There is only one fundamental kind of thing, physical objects, upon which all mental events are supervenient. Hence this theory is a type of monism rather than a dualism. This theory asserts that there are no psychophysical laws that relate mental phenomena to physical ones. It is therefore impossible to reduce all mental phenomena to physical phenomena, or to explain mental events fully in terms of the physical structure of the brain. For this reason, Davidson calls this monism anomalous. Davidson contrasts his theory with three possible alternative theories about the mind–body relationship: nomological monism, which affirms the existence of laws correlating the mental and the physical; nomological dualism, which is ontologically dualist and which assumes a conceptual correlation between mind and body; and anomalous dualism, which is ontologically dualist but denies the possibility of mental reduction. Anomalous monism is a combination of ontological monism and conceptual nonreductionism. It considers mental events not as types but as particulars, as individual token events, and therefore replaces the widely accepted type-type identity theory by the token-token identity theory. “Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that all events are physical, but rejects the thesis usually considered essential to materialism, that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations.” Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events ANSOMBEIANUM IMPLICATUM: Anscombe, G. E. M. Limerick-born philosopher, taught in Oxford and Cambridge. Anscombe was a student and friend of Wittgenstein and one of his literary executors. Her translation of Philosophical Investigations (1953) and her study An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1959) helped to bring Wittgenstein’s views to a wider public. She was a major philosopher in her own right. Intention (1957), which founded contemporary philosophy of action, was considered by Davidson to be “the most important treatment of action since Aristotle.” Her paper “Modern Moral Philosophy” offered penetrating criticism of modern philosophical ethics and led to the contemporary revival of virtue ethics. Her many important papers were included in the Collected Philosophical Papers, 3 vols. (1981). As a committed Catholic, she published numerous influential articles on contemporary moral issues. ANSELMENENSE IMPICATUM; Anselm of Canterbury, St (1033–1109) Medieval Italian philosopher, theologian, and archbishop of Canterbury, born in Aosta, Piedmont. As a founder of scholasticism, Anselm held that reason is essential to understanding faith. He is most famous for devising the ontological argument for the existence of God, which infers from the premise that God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to the conclusion that God must exist in reality as well as in thought. Consideration of this and later formulations of the ontological argument have been continued to the present. Anselm’s most important works are Monologion and Proslogion. ANTHROPOLOGICUM -- a human being. According to G. H. Lewes (1817– 78), anthropomorphism describes animals, plants, and the universe in terms of such attributes as consciousness, feelings, thought, and communication, which are ordinarily thought to belong only to human beings. anthropological holism: a thesis derived from the later Wittgenstein, Austin, and others, claiming that there is an internal relation between a symbol and its non-linguistic role in conventions, rituals, practices, and performances. Hence, language cannot be narrowly understood as a set of sentences and linguistic philosophers should not concentrate only on establishing phrase-structure trees for sentences. Instead, they should take language as belonging to forms of life and explore the relation between linguistic symbols and their cultural and practical background. “Anthropomorphism, . . . is the attribution to things not human of characteristics that apply only to humans.” Regan, The Case for Animal Rights. “Anthropological holism is distinct from semantic holism only in so far as it concerns the relation between language and its intentional background – that is, the relation between language and the cultural background of beliefs, institutions, practices, conventions, and so forth upon which, according to anthropological holists, language is ontologically dependent.” Fodor and Lepore, Holism. anthropomorphism Philosophy of religion [from Greek anthropos, man, human kind + morphe, shape, form, figure] The ascription of human forms and qualities to non-human things, in particular God. In Homer and Hesiod, gods are described in terms of human characteristics and feelings. This type of religious anthropomorphism was first attacked by the Greek philosopher Xenophanes, who claimed that if horses or oxen had hands and could produce works of art, they too would represent the gods after their own fashion. Others replied to this objection by claiming that we can talk of God in terms of human attributes because man is made in the image of God. Man is the medium through which God manifests or reveals himself. According to this understanding, anthropomorphism, while explaining God in terms of man, ascribes man a theomorphic nature. The Christian doctrine of the incarnation is a typical example of anthropomorphism because God himself becomes ANTICIPATUM anticipation: G. Vorlaufen, an existential attitude towards one’s death and the future] Heidegger distinguished anticipation from expectation [German, Erwarten]. In the face of death, that is, in confronting that one’s existence is limited and finite, expectation seeks a secure and stable relationship with other human beings and the world of the “they,” forgetting one’s past and passively awaiting the occurrence of death. Anticipation, on the other hand, views death as revealing one’s uttermost possibility and seeks the meaning of what lies ahead. In anticipation Dasein finds itself moving toward itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. It faces up to one’s past. Rather than maintaining or continuing the process already dominant in the past and present, anticipation contains the possibility of drastic changes in one’s future life. While the authentic future is called “anticipation,” the authentic present is called “moment-of-vision,” and the authentic past is called “repetition.” “Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being – that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence.” Heidegger, Being and Time anticipations of perception Epistemology, metaphysics [German, Antizipatione, Kant’s translation of Epicurus’ Greek, prolepsis, a preconception that renders perception possible] For Kant, the rules intended to show the objective employment of the categories of quality: reality, negation, and limitation. Kant extended the meaning of anticipations to all knowledge that determines a priori the qualitative form of empirical knowledge. The leading principle for these categories is that any given perception will have an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree of reality. The qualities we sense must come in degrees, for example, the acuteness of a pain or the loudness of a noise. According to Kant, it is impossible for us to perceive appearances unless they possess this intensive magnitude. Anticipations of perception are contrasted to axioms of intuition, whose leading principle is that any perception has extensive magnitude. Both anticipations of perception and axioms of intuition are mathematical principles, in contrast to the dynamic principles of the analogies of experience and the postulate of empirical thought. By anticipations of perception, Kant claimed that the mathematics of intensity must apply to our experience. However, he did not specify what these anticipations are, and his discussion linking the principles to the categories remained vague. “The principle which anticipates all perceptions as such is as follows: In all appearances sensation, and the real which corresponds to it in the object (realitas phaenomenon), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. CONTRA-INDIVIDUUM -- anti-individualism Political philosophy, philosophy of mind A term used in contrast to individualism. In social philosophy, it is the claim that the value of community is prior to individual freedom. In political theory, it is the view that a society should have a common goal and that the individual should be subordinate to this goal. Social coherence and uniformity of view are emphasized, rather than diverse individual voices. Anti-individualism does not accept the value of individual experience and is intolerant of difference. In some versions, the existence of an individual is regarded as being determined by his place in society, and individual existence is considered to be a fiction. This position is reinforced through combination with social Darwinism, which suggests that individual experience contributes little to the progress of mankind. Other anti-individualist positions also involve claims limiting the role of individuals in social explanation as well as claims limiting the value of individuals. In another use, anti-individualism in the philosophy of mind is the view that a person’s mental events are fundamentally related to his social and linguistic contexts and hence cannot be individuated solely by appeal to the properties of their owner. “His [Comte’s] ‘organic’ interpretation of society involves the extremist anti-individualism, derealization of the human individual, worship of Humanity as the only real individual.” Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason CONTRAPOSITIO: antilogism: A term for any situation in which three propositions cannot all be true simultaneously and at least one of them must be false. In a strict sense, it involves syllogistic reasoning whereby the conjunction of two premises implies the negation of the conclusion. Seeking an antilogism was a basic method to test the validity of a syllogism. A syllogism can only be valid when its two premises and the negation of its conclusion are inconsistent. Such an inconsistency is also called an inconsistent triad. “When limited to three propositions constituting a disjunctive trio, the antilogism may be formulated in terms of illustrative symbols as follows: ‘the three propositions p, q, and r cannot be true together.’ ” Johnson, Logic. ANTINOMIA : Antinomianism, from Greek anti, against + nomos, law or rule, hence, against law] A term introduced by Luther for the position that rejects the legitimacy of all regulations and laws. The position was embraced by certain early Christian sects, which believed that divine grace enables Christians to determine which conduct is right or wrong. Hence law should be superseded by the gospel. The term is now also used for the extreme relativist position that rejects all moral norms and claims that only sensitivity to a particular given situation can provide it with an ethical solution. The resolution of moral conflicts should depend upon the circumstances. Existentialist ethics is sometimes described as a type of antinomianism. “Antinomianism . . . is the approach with which one enters into the decision-making situation armed with no principles or maxims whatever, to say nothing of rules.” Fletcher, Situation Ethics. antinomy Epistemology[from Greek anti, against + nomos, law, an extreme form of paradox] A pair of opposed propositions, called a thesis and antithesis, each of which seems to be supported by formally valid argument, but which are inconsistent with one another. Guintilian (ad 35–100) presented antinomies as conflicting arguments side-by-side. Kant used this form, which was widely adopted in sixteenthcentury jurisprudence, in the dialectic of all three Critiques to show that reason will inevitably lead to antinomies when it extends beyond the limits of experience in the hope of finding completeness and unity in explanation. Kant’s most influential account of antinomies appears in the Transcendental Dialectic of his first Critique. He claimed that the rational cosmology of traditional metaphysics inevitably leads to antinomies. These are four sets of dialectical inferences about the nature of the world, corresponding to the four groups of categories. (1) Quantitative antinomy: thesis: the world is finite in space and time; antithesis: the world is infinite. (2) Qualitative antinomy: thesis: everything is made up of simple constituents; antithesis: nothing is made up of simple constituents. (3) Relational antinomy: thesis: everything has a cause, and there is no freedom; antithesis: not all things have a cause, and there is freedom. (4) Modal antinomy: thesis: a necessary being exists that explains the universe; antithesis: no necessary being exists. In the second Critique, Kant presented the practical antinomy: thesis: the desire for happiness must be the motive for maxims of virtue; antithesis: the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause for happiness. In the third Critique, he presented the antinomy of aesthetic judgment: the judgment of taste is not based on concepts; antithesis: the judgment of taste is based on concepts. All of these Kantian antinomies are drawn from opposing positions in the history of philosophy. According to Kant, once we show how these antinomies are generated from malfunctions of reason, they are shown to be illusory and preventable. Logical positivists were indebted to this aspect of Kant’s thought. Hegel claimed that antinomies are not confined to those uncovered by Kant, but appear in each area of thought. This contributed to the development of Marx’s materialist account of dialectic, and the notion of antinomy continues to be employed by Western Marxists and others as a tool for criticizing society. “The second kind of pseudo-rational inference is directed to the transcendental concept of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for any given . . . The position of reason in these dialectical inferences I shall entitle the antinomy of pure reason.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. ANTIOCLUSIANA IMPLICATUM: Antiochus (c.130–68 bc) Hellenistic philosopher, born in Ascalon. He claimed to return to authentic Platonism by reviving the doctrines of the Old Academy, although his thought combined Stoicism with Platonism. He abandoned Academic skepticism and argued that Plato’s epistemological stance was consistent with the Stoic doctrine of cognitive certainty. All of his works were lost. CONTRA-REALISMUS: anti-realism: Antirealism opposes realism, but its meaning varies according to how we formulate realism. Various sorts of realism argue for the objective existence of different objects and properties, such as the external world, mathematical objects, universals, moral and aesthetic properties, other minds, scientific laws, or theoretical entities. Correspondingly, anti-realism has many forms involving the denial of the objective existence of these objects and properties. Realism claims that the items under dispute exist independently of our experience, knowledge, and language and that the world is more than we can know. Antirealism argues that since we know the world only through our mind-related perceptual and conceptual faculties, we cannot sensibly talk about a mindindependent world. The debate between realism and anti-realism takes different forms for different issues. For example, materialists and idealists debate the existence of the external world, and realists and nominalists debate the existence of universals. An influential kind of anti-realism, particularly associated with M. Dummett, C. Wright, and J. McDowell, is sometimes called semantic antirealism. According to this view, realism has an arbitrary metaphysical assumption that an objective reality exists independent of our knowledge. The position is characterized by following intuitionist logic in denying the principle of bivalence. Truth and falsity are not exhaustive, as they would be according to realism, because truth or falsity are determined by the conditions under which we can correctly assert or deny a sentence. Because there are circumstances in which neither assertion nor denial is justified, bivalence and realism fail. This position is influenced by Frege and by later Wittgenstein’s use of the theory of meaning and is seen by critics as being closely related to verificationism. “The general argument Dummett has given for anti-realism starts from the following thesis: that the content of a sentence is determined by the class of recognizable situations with respect to which it would be acknowledged as true and the class of recognizable situations with respect to which it would be acknowledged as false.” Peacocke, Thoughts: An Essay on Content ANASTISHENESIANUM IMPICATUM -- Antisthenes (c.444– c.366 bc) Greek philosopher, born in Athens, one of the founders of the Cynic school. As a follower of Socrates, Antisthenes claimed that definition was a major goal of philosophy. He emphasized the role of education and self-improvement. Although accepting that pleasure resulting from labor was good, he condemned luxury and advocated a simple life. He argued that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Only a few fragments of his many works survived. HAMPSHIRE -- Hampshire’s anti-theory: an ethical movement represented by figures such as S. N. Hampshire, Annette Baier, Bernard Williams, John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Rort. The “theory” that this movement opposes is modern moral theory, which takes it as its central task constructing and justifying a set of abstract universal moral rules and principles to guide and evaluate the moral behavior of all rational beings. These principles are completely context-free and can be applied in an almost computational way to any particular case. Correct moral judgments and practices seem to be deducible from these timeless principles, and all moral values are commensurable with respect to a single standard. Any moral conflict can be solved in a rational way. The anti-theory movement claims that moral theory of this sort is unnecessary, narrow, and impossible, for it cannot specify moral norms embedded in cultural and historical traditions, it cannot account for virtue that is culturally informed and it is incompatible with the fact that there are irresolvable moral conflicts and dilemmas. In contrast, this movement suggests that ethics should return to Aristotelian virtue ethics, claims the primacy of social moral practice over rational principles and the primacy of ethical perception over rules, and emphasizes the plurality of social conventions and customs. It is united in its opposition to modern moral theory, but varies in its positive doctrines. Authors supporting this movement have their own versions of what ethics should be. In many cases, this movement leads to moral contextualism, conservatism, or communitarianism. “The expression ‘anti-theory’ emphasises opposition to any assertion (whether in the form of a substantive moral principle or a meta-ethical theory about the nature of moral claims) that morality is rational only insofar as it can be formulated in, or grounded on, a system of universal principles.” S. G. Clarke and E. Simpson (eds.), Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism. ANXIETAS -- Anxiety: Angst, also translated as dread or uneasiness] A type of existential experience similar to Sartre’s “anguish.” The topic was introduced into philosophy by Kierkegaard in his The Concept of Dread (1844). Heidegger distinguished anxiety from fear. Fear arises from a specific threat, and there is some external entity about which to be afraid. Anxiety, on the other hand, is a state of mind arising not from any particular and determinate affliction, but from one’s own indefinite existence. Anxiety comes to us from nowhere and in the face of nothing. For Heidegger, it is simply concerned with our “thrownness in the world,” that is, with Being-in-the-world itself. Anxiety reveals to us how we are in the world and brings us to face the alienated, not-home-like world. The framework in which we make sense of our own existence and of the world is not given once and for all. For each of us, anxiety makes our individuality, our determinate self and our own possibility. In particular, it reveals to us that no individual can escape death with the aid of the public. For Heidegger, anxiety is closely related to Dasein (the Being of human beings, which is Being-in-the-world). Thus through individuating Dasein, anxiety is a distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed. Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and in the meantime, as a state of mind it is also a basic kind of Beingin-the-world. The affirmative or passive attitude toward anxiety may lead respectively to authentic or inauthentic existence. “That in the face of which one has anxiety is Beingin-the-world as such.” Heidegger, Being and Time apathy Ethics [from Greek a, not + patheia, affection, passion, emotion] A state of indifference to pleasure or pain in which one gains peace of mind or tranquillity by being emotionally unaffected by the external sensible world. In apathy, the control of emotion by reason is justified on the grounds that emotion is irrational, and it therefore stands in contrast to ordinary indifference or insensitivity. For Stoicism, apathy is the highest virtue, with the Stoic sage characterized as being emotionally detached and acting purely out of reason. This ideal is echoed in religions that despise worldly pleasures and in philosophical systems that devalue the role of emotion. Critics claim that at least some emotions are rational, thus undermining the general claim for the value of indifference. “Apathy is a sort of depression which stops us doing anything, a weariness with work, a torpor of spirit which delays getting down to anything good.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. INDEFINITUM -- Apeiron: Greek, from a, not + peras, limit or boundary, hence unbounded, infinite] The unbounded was contrasted with peras or kosmos (world), which was widely believed by the Greeks to be bounded. The Milesian philosopher Anaximander took the unbounded to be the first principle or ultimate generative force for all the things and events in the world. The apeiron is immortal and imperishable, unbounded both in space and in time, and does not have the characteristics of ordinary elements and their composites. Aristotle interpreted the apeiron of Anaximander as a material cause, analogous to Thales’ water or Anaximenes’ air. But because apeiron appears to be more abstract than other material elements, what Anaximander meant by this term has been a subject of debate. Pythagoreans took apeiron and peras as two principles from which the world evolved and considered peras to be good and apeiron to be evil. Parmenides believed that what is cannot be incomplete and infinite and thus confined his ontology to peras and denied apeiron. For Anaxagoras, mind is apeiron, which is infinite or indefinite in extent. “[Anaximander] said that the apeiron was the principle and element of things.” Simplicius, Physics. DEMOSNTRATUM -- Apodeictic, from Greek apo, from + deiktikos, to be able to show, also spelled apodictic, that which is demonstrable, necessarily true or absolutely certain. Aristotle contrasted the apodeictic (beyond dispute) with the eristic (subject to dispute). Kant distinguished the apodeictic (necessary) from the problematic (possible) and the assertoric (actual). All three belong to the modal categories. An apodeictic judgment has the form of “X must be Y” or “X cannot be Y.” “Geometric propositions are one and all apodeictic, that is, are bound up with the consciousness of their necessity.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason apodeictic practical principle, another expression for categorical imperative apodictic, another expression for apodeictic Apollonian, see Dionysian apologetics Philosophy of religion [from Greek apologia, defence against a charge, answering back; hence Plato’s Apology describes Socrates’ defence against accusations in an Athenian court] A dimension of Christian theology aimed at defending orthodox theistic beliefs against external criticism or against other world views. While theology is a rational inquiry by the faithful for the faithful, apologetics is a discourse between the faithful and those outside the faith that seeks to defend the validity of belief with reasons that will be meaningful to those who do not share the same faith. Historically, apologetics has had different forms and has employed different standards of judgment in expounding and defending religious belief according to its intended audience. Each generation has developed an apologetics in response to the criticism of religion of its time. For example, Augustine’s City of God was written in reply to the pagans; Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles is an argumentative work directed at Muslim theology; and Butler wrote The Analogy of Religion to refute deism. The contemporary apologetic, represented by Paul Tillich, is characterized by its appeal to value as against fact. The practice of apologetics has impact upon hermeneutics. “The essential task of apologetics is the defence or ‘answering back’ of religion, and particularly the Christian faith against the doubts or accusations of its ‘cultured despisers’.” Ferré, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion. ABDICATUM -- apophatic theology, another expression for apophaticism apophaticism Philosophy of religion Also called apophatic theology or negative theology, a doctrine rejecting our capacity to know God. It belongs mainly to Neoplatonism and eastern Christian thought. Clement of Alexandria is credited with its formulation, and its major exponents include Meister Eckhart and Moses Maimonides. Apophaticism claims that God cannot be conceptualized in any way, nor can God be an object of intellect or sense. No language provides us with real knowledge of God, for he is beyond positive human understanding. The soul can come close to God only through faith and prayer. “Apophaticism teaches us to see above all a negative meaning in the dogmas of the church; it forbids us to follow natural ways of thought and to form concepts that would usurp the place of spiritual realities.” Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church APORIA -- aporia Philosophical method, ancient Greek philosophy [from Greek a, not + poros, path, passage; literally, no way through, a puzzle or perplexity] In the early Platonic dialogues, Socrates raises various problems without offering solutions to them, whilst showing that the people he questions are unable to offer acceptable solutions either. This aporetic method leads to the development of the dialectical method, by which Socrates elicits truth through questioning. The term “aporia” is introduced by Aristotle for puzzles concerning incompatibilities that arise either among the views we hold without prompting, or among the reputable beliefs adopted commonly or by the wise. His approach is to seek the minimal adjustments needed to reconcile these conflicting views. According to him, philosophy exists to solve these kinds of aporia. Recently, “aporia” has also been used to refer to a text or an approach that contains contradictory lines of thinking. “The aporia of our thinking points to a knot in the object; for in so far as our thought is in aporia, it is in like case with those who are bound; for in either case it is impossible to go forward.” Aristotle, Metaphysics APPARENS -- apparent variable, Russell and Whitehead’s term for bound variable appeal to authority Logic [Latin: argumentum ad verecundiam, argument to reverence or respect] A fallacious argument that tries to establish its conclusion by appeal to the opinion of an expert or authority. It is a misuse of authority. For instance, “Something is true because some expert says that it is true.” This argument is widely employed in everyday life, but it is logically fallacious because it uncritically accepts anything an expert or a great figure says rather than proving the conclusion by appeal to positive evidence. The view of a trained or legitimate expert nevertheless carries some weight although it is open to challenge. An argument of this form is especially poor if its conclusion goes beyond the field for which the authority has expertise. “The appeal to authority typically involves three persons: the arguer, the listener or reader, and the person whom the arguer cites as an authority.” Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic -- appearance Metaphysics, epistemology [from Latin a, as, to, toward + parere, come forth, become visible; what is seen or what is immediately given to consciousness, equivalent to Greek, phainomenon, to appear to be so, but also to be so manifestly. Thus Aristotle took the opinion of the majority, especially of wise men, as phainomenon] Appearance, what things seem to be, is often contrasted to reality, what things are themselves. It is a major distinction in philosophy; and different philosophers offer different accounts of the relationship between appearance and reality. Some philosophers, such as Plato, say that appearance is an incomplete and imperfect copy of reality. Some, such as Aristotle, say that reality is in appearance. Some, such as Descartes, say that appearance is regrettable and even spurious. Some, such as Kant, say that our knowledge is restricted to appearance (phenomena), but that for morality we can make sense of a more fundamental reality (noumena). And some, such as Hegel and Bradley, say that appearance is a partial aspect of reality. In metaphysics appearance is generally regarded as less valuable than reality. Contemporary linguistic philosophers distinguish two groups of appearance idioms. Seeming idioms, such as “appears to be” or “gives the appearance,” are not strictly related to senses, while looking idioms, such as “looks” or “feels,” are strictly related to senses. “Appearance means that one perceives it so.” Plato, Theatetus Traditionally, appearance ( phenomenon) is contrasted to reality. Appearance is thought to be the object of perception or belief, while reality is characterized as the object of knowledge. Kant transformed this contrast in his distinction between appearance ( phenomenon) and thing-in-itself (noumenon). Appearances are objects as we experience them with our spatial and temporal forms of sensibility and our categories of understanding, while things-in-themselves are those objects as they might be in themselves and known by a pure intellect. He further claimed that appearance (German, Erscheinung) should be distinguished from illusion (Schein). Illusion is an abnormal perception of an actually present object and signifies a representation to which nothing real corresponds. In contrast, appearance is always the appearance of a given object and is constant and universal. Contrary to the traditional view, he argued that appearance is the only object of science and is that to which the concepts of the understanding apply. In contrast, the thing-in-itself is beyond knowledge, although Kant argued that its existence is a necessary condition for an object of one’s awareness to count as an appearance, for appearance itself presupposes that there is something that appears. He held that if the objects of experience were not appearances, then all the problems of reason falling into conflict with itself would re-emerge. Nevertheless, this claim and the relation between appearance and thing-in-itself remain matters of dispute. “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled appearance.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason APPERCEPTUM -- apperception [from Latin ad, to, towards + percipere, perceive] In contrast to perception, which refers to the external world, apperception is introspection, conscious thought, or the consciousness of internal states. It is at the same time consciousness of, or reflection on the “I” or the self, that is the subject of these states. In apperception the self is aware of itself as being a unity and as possessing the power to act. For Leibniz, all monads have perception, but only a special kind of monad, which he called “rational soul,” has apperception. According to him, it is by virtue of this consciousness that we become persons, or members of a moral world. Leibniz’s distinction implies that there can be unconscious perception. The concept of apperception played a central role for Kant. Kant distinguished between empirical apperception (inner sense), which amounts to introspection, and the transcendental unity of apperception (I think) that accompanies all of our representations and combines concepts and intuitions in knowledge. “It is well to make the distinction between perception, which is the internal state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the reflexive knowledge of this internal state itself and which is not given to all souls nor at all times to the same soul.” Leibniz, Principles of Nature and Grace APPREHENSUM -- apprehension application Modern European philosophy Application in the scientific world applies general knowledge or a universal law to particular instances by subsuming the instances under a general concept and rule. In the humanities, on the other hand, application is not so straightforward, for the distance between general laws (if there are any) and their instances is very great. Application is rather a process of intertwining theory and practice. Traditional hermeneutics classifies application as the third fundamental element in the act of understanding, besides “understanding” and “interpretation.” In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, application becomes an essential and integral part involved in all interpretative understandings. Aristotle argues that ethical or practical knowledge must be tied to particular circumstances and modified to suit these circumstances. The meaning of an ethical norm can only be shown in a concrete situation of action. Analogically, Gadamer claims that all understanding must be historically situated. A text can only be understood in relation to the present and through modifications in accordance with changed historical circumstances. This is the moment of application in understanding. Understanding is always applied understanding, even when application is not the intended purpose. Understanding that is independent of the particular situation to which it is applied must be abstract and reductive. Since the situations in which applications occur are constantly changing, an historical text must be understood in every situation in a new and different way. According to Gadamer, application therefore involves the distinction between past and present, rather than the distinction between general and particular. “We consider application to be as integral a part of the hermeneutical act as are understanding and interpretation.” Gadamer, Truth and Method applied ethics Ethics Also called practical ethics. The study of how to apply ethical principles, rules, and reasons to analyze and deal with moral concerns arising in practical and social areas. Such a practical application of ethical theory has been a dimension of traditional ethics. Aristotle claimed that all universal moral standards must be adjusted and modified throughtheir application to particular circumstances. However, applied ethics as a distinctive discipline, in contrast to other aspects of ethics, such as metaethics, normative ethics, and ethical theory, started to flourish in the middle of the twentieth century. Thus far, relatively well-established branches of applied ethics include academic ethics, agricultural ethics, bioethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, legal ethics, medical ethics, and nursing ethics. Since the moral principles to be applied are derived from different ethical systems, and are hence various and subject to conflict, applied ethics can seldom provide fixed answers to practical problems. It can, however, contribute to making discussion of these problems as clear and rigorous as possible. The development of applied ethics has also led philosophers to involve themselves in committees dealing with policy making, decision making, and evaluation. “While some saw ‘applied ethics’ as a straightforward task of applying moral principles to particular situations and professions, others were working out complex modes of interrelation.” Edel, Flower, and O’Connor (eds.), Morality, Philosophy, and Practice -- apprehension, Greek katalepsis, holding or grasping, also translated as cognition, an important epistemological concept for Stoicism and Epicureanism] In Stoicism, recognition has four stages: reception of visual appearance (represented by an open hand); perception or attention, which results from the conjunction of visual appearance and the assent of mind (represented by a closed hand); apprehensive impression, which is accurate perception (represented by a fist); and knowledge (represented by grasping the fist with the other hand). At the third stage, apprehension instantaneously grasps an impression that reveals the real object and results in apprehensive or cognitive impression (Greek, phantasia kataleptike). Epicurus used apprehension as the criterion of truth by guaranteeing the clarity of an image. Because of ambiguity in the extant writings, some scholars interpret this as a kind of intuition, while others explain it as concentration or attention. -- apprehensive impression. “Zeno did not attach reliability to all impressions but only to those which have a peculiar power of revealing their objects. Since this impression is discerned just by itself, he called it ‘apprehensive’; . . . But once it had been received and accepted, he called it an apprehension, resembling things grasped by the hand.” Cicero, Academic apprehensive impression, see apprehension ADPROPRIUM. appropriate act Ethics, ancient Greek philosophy [Greek, kathekon, fitting] A key Stoic ethical term for an action that accords with nature and can be rationally justified. An appropriate act is a virtuous act and is the opposite of an inappropriate or vicious act. Other acts, for example walking, are neither inappropriate and vicious nor appropriate and virtuous, but intermediate between these two by being for natural ends that are indifferent as to virtue and vice. An intermediate act, however, can be either virtuous or vicious in some particular instance according to the disposition of the agent. The behavior of a good man is a continuous series of appropriate selections and rejections, and such a man knows that by the performance of appropriate acts he makes virtuous progress. “Zeno was the first to use this term ‘appropriate act’, the name being derived from kata tinas hekein, ‘to have arrived in accordance with certain persons’; appropriate act is an activity appropriate to constitutions that accords with nature.” Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers APPROPRIATUM -- Appropriation: William James’s technical term for the hanging together or continuity of experience. For James, experience is a continuous stream or chain, each link of which is inseparable from its predecessors and successors. Our present experience constitutes one point, but one point in a chain. It appropriates past experience, and is appropriated by future experience. This appropriating capacity of one’s experience forms one’s self-consciousness, representative of the entire past stream. It is hence the basis of personal identity. Other than this, there is no independent self. The relationship between appropriation and the self has been charged with circularity, for appropriation allegedly presupposes an existence of a self. But James claimed that what performs appropriation is not an ego, but only the passing experience that one’s body feels. “Its appropriations are therefore less to itself than to the most intimately felt part of its present object, the body, and the central adjustments, which accompany the act of thinking, in the head. These are the real nucleus of our personal identity.” W. James, Principles of Psychology. A POSTERIORI -- a priori/a posteriori Epistemology [Latin, a priori, from what is earlier; a posteriori, from what comes after] This epistemological distinction was originally applied to two kinds of arguments in Aristotle and in medieval logic. If an argument proceeds from a cause to its effect, it is called a priori, and if it proceeds from an effect to its cause it is a posteriori. The distinction was later applied to concepts, propositions, knowledge, and truth. Leibniz distinguishes truth a priori (truth of reason) from truth a posteriori (truth established by experience). This corresponds to Hume’s distinction between knowledge about matters of fact and knowledge about relations of ideas. For Kant, knowledge is a priori if it is independent of experience and does not require experience to establish its truth, and is a posteriori if it is based on experience. He also connects this dichotomy with the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, and claims that all analytic judgments are a priori. His major concern in the Critique of Pure Reason is how synthetic a priori judgment is possible. The distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is also related to the distinction between the “necessary” and the “contingent.” But the relations among these distinctions pose various problems. Philosophers have been debating whether a priori propositions must be necessary, or universal, and whether a posteriori propositions must be contingent. Kripke argues that a posteriori necessity is logically possible. “There are two kinds of cognition. An a priori one, which is independent of experience; and an a posteriori one, which is grounded on empirical principles.” Kant, Lectures on Logic TOMASIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Aquinas, St Thomas a priori knowledge Epistemology Knowledge that is believed to be universally certain and necessarily true. It is known and justified independently of experiential evidence. A priori knowledge is in contrast to empirical or a posteriori knowledge. Rationalism assumes the existence of a priori knowledge mainly from the necessity of mathematical and logical truths. This is elaborated in detail by Kant, who also argues that a priori knowledge can be synthetic. His three distinctions, i.e. a priori/a posteriori, necessary/contingent, analytic/synthetic, have been the focus of the contemporary discussion of a priori knowledge. Some empiricists admit the existence of a priori knowledge, but claim that it is trivial and only expresses the relations between our ideas (Locke), or that it can only be analytic truth based on the meanings of the words rather than knowledge about the world. Other empiricists tend to reject the existence of this form of knowledge, by claiming that prominent examples of a priori knowledge such as mathematical truths can be inductively justified (Mill), or that the distinction between analytic and synthetic is not tenable, and that no necessity can be known other than empirically (Quine). Kripke and Putnam also deny the internal relation between necessity and the a priori. The proponents of a priori knowledge usually claim that we have a faculty of intuition by which we may ascertain the truth of a priori propositions. On the other hand, the opponents of a priori knowledge insist that there is no psychological evidence to suggest that we have such a mysterious cognitive faculty. “An instance of knowledge is a priori if and only if its justification condition is a priori in the sense that it does not depend on evidence from sensory experience.” Moser (ed.), A Priori Knowledge A POSTERIORI a priori proposition Epistemology A proposition or statement whose truth is not based on empirical investigation. In contrast to empirical or a posteriori propositions, which are known through experience. Mathematical axioms, logical laws, and metaphysical propositions are generally regarded as examples of a priori propositions. If all the concepts in an a priori proposition are a priori concepts, the proposition is called an -- A POSTERIORI -- absolutely a priori proposition. Otherwise, it is called a relatively a priori proposition. Empiricism holds that all knowledge must be based on experience. Consequently, it tends to reject speculative metaphysics, although it then becomes a major task to provide a satisfactory empiricist account of mathematical and logical truths. “It is traditional to say that an a priori proposition is a proposition that is ‘independent of experience’, and is such that ‘if you understand it, then you can see that it is true’.” Chisholm, Person and Object BARBARA -- A-proposition Logic In syllogisms, categorical propositions are divided into four kinds, according to their quality (affirmative or negative) and quantity (universal or particular). The medieval logicians designated them by letter names corresponding to the first four vowels of the Roman alphabet: A, E, I, O. An A-proposition is the universal affirmative (All S are P), meaning that every member of the S class is a member of the P class. An E-proposition is the universal negative (No S are P), meaning that no member of the S class is a member of the P class. An I-proposition is the particular affirmative (Some S are P), meaning that at least one member of the S class is a member of the P class. An O-proposition is the particular negative (Some S are not P), meaning that at least one member of the S class is not a member of the P class. “The central concern of traditional logic is the investigation of the logical relations of four propositional forms – Universal affirmative (A), Universal Negative , Particular Affirmative , Particular Negative .” D. Mitchell, An Introduction to Logic TOMASSIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Aquinas, St Thomas (1224/5–74) Medieval Italian philosopher and theologian, the greatest scholastic thinker, born at Roccasecca, near Aquino, Naples, studied under Albertus Magnus in Paris and Cologne, taught at the University of Paris from 1252 to 1259 and again from 1266 to 1272, canonized in 1323. Aquinas systematically interpreted and defended Aristotle’s thought and sought to reconcile it with Christian doctrines. He held that faith in God’s existence could be justified by human reason and proposed the famous “five ways” to prove the existence of God on the basis of Aristotle’s account of causes. Because he held that reason could not have complete knowledge of the nature of God, Aquinas argued that faith and reason must supplement each other. Aquinas constructed the most comprehensive Christian philosophical system and also contributed an important theory of natural law. Among his voluminous works, the most important are the two encyclopedic syntheses of philosophy and theology: Summa contra Gentiles (1259–64) and Summa Theologiae (1266–73). He also composed commentaries on Aristotle that are of great philosophical interest. ARBITRIUM -- arbitrariness of grammar, another term for autonomy of language Arcesilaus (c.315–240 bc) Hellenistic skeptic philosopher, born in Pitane, Aeolis, the founder of the Middle Academy. He rejected Stoic dogmatism and claimed that nothing could be known, including the knowledge that one knows nothing. Hence, no one should assert anything, and life can be guided only by probability. For this reason, he did not write a single book, but his views were recorded by Cicero and Sextus Empiricus. archaeology of knowledge Modern European philosophy A term introduced by the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. Archaeology here is not a study of origin (arche in Greek), but is rather a study of what Foucault calls an “archive,” that is, the deep structure or form that determines the conditions of possibility of knowledge in a particular period. An archive, which is also called the “historical a priori,” is timebound and factual. It is discovered rather than deduced. Archaeology is hence a distinct approach to the analysis of the history of thought, in contrast to the standard history of ideas. While the history of ideas is an interpretative discipline and defines the thoughts, themes and representations that are revealed in discourse, archaeology is concerned with the discourses themselves, taking them as practices obeying certain rules. While the history of ideas seeks continuity and coherence to relate discourses to their predecessors, their backgrounds, and their impacts, archaeology seeks to show the specificity of discourses and the irreducibility of the sets of rules that govern the operations of particular discourses. While the history of ideas places emphasis on individual thinkers and their relations, archaeology of knowledge claims that the consciousness and statements of individual thinkers are determined by the underlying conceptual structures at a given time. Accordingly, we should aim to delineate this structure, which is beyond the beliefs and intentions of individual thinkers. Finally, while the history of ideas intends to identify what has been said and bring back the distant, archaeology seeks to provide a systematic description of discourse. Archaeology has four basic methodological principles: attribution of innovation, the analysis of contradictions, comparative descriptions, and the mapping of transformations. These principles are fully discussed in Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge. “The rights of words – which is not that of the philologists – authorises, therefore, the use of the term archaeology to describe all these searches. This term does not imply the search for a beginning; it does not relate analysis to geological excavation. It designates the general theme of a description that questions the already-said at the level of its existence: of the enunciative function that operates within it, of the discursive formation, and the general archive system to which it belongs.” Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge PRINCIPIUM -- arche, from Greek archein, to start; hence archê the startingpoint or beginning, first principle or origin; plural, archai] Aristotle claimed that philosophy should investigate the fundamental archai and causes of generation, existence, and knowledge. He described how at the very beginning of philosophy Thales sought the arche to account for the generation of the world. Thales believed this to be water. Anaximander is said to be the first person to use the word arche to name such a first entity. Aristotle called each of his four causes arche. He also called the basic premises for scientific deduction archai, discoverable by an intuitive faculty nous. In ethics the end, that is, the good to be pursued, is called arche as well. ARENDTIANUM IMPICATUM -- Arendt, Hannah “It is common, then, to all archei to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known.” Aristotle, Metaphysics archetype Metaphysics [from Greek arche, first + typos, pattern or stamp, the original model or pattern from which things are formed or from which they become copies] One of the main claims of Plato’s Theory of Forms or Ideas is that Ideas are archetypes for sensible things. Locke, like Descartes, took archetypes as the referents or external causes of ideas. Real ideas conform to real beings or archetypes, and adequate ideas are those that perfectly represent their archetypes. However, complex ideas of modes and relations are not copies, but are themselves originals or archetypes. Berkeley considered archetypes to be ideas in the mind of God. In Kant, archetypes in metaphysics can only be regulative principles. Hence, he criticized Plato for hypostatizing Ideas by making them into the constitutive principles of the origin of things. On the other hand, archetypes in ethics are ideals for imitation. In the analytical psychology of Carl Jung, archetypal images and symbols are said to emerge from the collective unconscious of humankind. “Adequate ideas are such as perfectly represent their archetypes.” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. “EST” -- to be, and the metaphysics of nature, dealing with what is. He further divided the metaphysics of nature into transcendental philosophy, which is concerned with the understanding and reason, and the physiology (natural science) of given objects. This rational physiology again had two branches, transcendental and immanent. Transcendental physiology includes rational cosmology and rational theology. For Kant, this framework was supported by traditional logic. The notion of architectonic has been used to oppose attempts to break up human knowledge into different independent branches, although some critics claim that overemphasizing the demands of system can frustrate philosophical work that is critical of a particular system or philosophical systems in general. The idea of architectonic was developed by Hegel and also by the Logical Positivists in their ideal of unified science. “By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason ARCHAEOLOGICUM -- archive, see archaeology of knowledge ARCHITECTURA -- architectonic Philosophical method Kant’s conception for the systematic relations of all human knowledge and for the art of constructing such a system. These two senses are interconnected, for he believed that human reason possesses by nature such a function of construction and that all knowledge arising from pure reason belongs to one system. Architectonic is contrasted with the technical, for while a technical investigation starts from empirical criteria, architectonic anticipates these criteria. Kant himself designed an architectonic system. He began by distinguishing first (pure) philosophy from empirical philosophy and then subdivided pure philosophy into a propaedeutic investigation of pure reason (criticism) and the system of pure reason (metaphysics). He divided metaphysics in turn into the metaphysics of morals, dealing with what ought ARENDTIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Arendt, Hannah (1906–75) Jewish political philosopher, born in Hanover, Germany, a student of Martin Heidegger at Marburg and Karl Jaspers at Heidelberg. Arendt moved to the USA in 1941 as a refugee from the Nazis and taught at a number of universities. Her work started from reflections on the moral and social issues raised by the catastrophic history of modern Europe. She examined Nazism and communism as major forms of totalitarianism and sought to explore politics as a distinct sphere of human activity. Her major works include The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), The Human Condition (1958), On Revolution (1963), Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), On Violence (1970). She planned a threevolume work, Life of the Mind, as a systematic examination of the faculties of thinking, willing, and judging, but lived to complete only the first two volumes. VIRTUOSUM -- aretaic judgment, another name for judgment of value arête, Greek term for virtue or excellence ARGUMENTUM -- argument Logic [from Latin arguere, to make clear] The reasoning in which a sequence of statements or propositions (the premises) are intended to support a further statement or proposition (the conclusion). The passage from the premises to the conclusion is justified through following acceptable patterns of inference and often marked by means of locutions such as “so,” “hence,” “it follows that,” or “because.” Generally, arguments are divided into two types: deductive arguments, in which the conclusion makes clear something implied in the premises, and inductive arguments, in which the conclusion goes beyond what the premises provide. While a statement is said to be true or false, an argument is said to be valid or invalid, sound or unsound. To discriminate valid from invalid forms of argument is precisely the task of logic. In another technical use, especially in mathematics and logic, an argument, in contrast to a function, is a member of the domain of a function. “The aim of argument is conviction; one tries to get someone to agree that some statement is true or false.” Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory argument a posteriori Logic, philosophy of religion An argument a posteriori proceeds from an effect to its cause, in contrast to an argument a priori, which proceeds from a cause to its effect. The pair of terms a priori and a posteriori are used here in their pre-Kantian sense. The distinction between these two types of arguments or demonstrations was made by the scholastic philosopher Albert the Great, but the idea can be traced to Aristotle’s view that we may either proceed from what is evident to us to what is evident in nature or proceed from what is evident in nature to what is evident to us. In the philosophy of religion, arguments that seek to prove God’s existence from the current condition of the world are called proof a posteriori (a typical example being the argument from design), while the proofs that start from our concepts of God’s nature are a priori. -- “Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man . . . By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.” Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religio -- argument a priori, see argument a posteriori -- argument by analogy Epistemology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind An inference from certain similarities between two things to the conclusion that these things are also alike in other respects. Such a form of inference is not decisive, for it depends upon an implicit premise that the fact that two things are similar in some given respects entails that they are similar in other respects as well, and this premise is not obviously true. Arguments of this form can, however, be suggestive and are therefore widely employed. The argument from design is a version of an argument by analogy. It infers analogically from the relationship between human agents and artifacts (for example between a watch-maker and a watch) to the existence of God as the designer of the world. Indeed, analogical argument is represented in various forms of teleological arguments for God’s existence. In the philosophy of mind, some philosophers adopt this form of argument to attribute a mind and mental phenomena, which are generally assumed to be private, to other individuals. “The following is the structure of an analogical argument. Two objects A and B share several properties, say, a, b, c; A has an additional property d, therefore B has the property d also.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy -- argument from design Philosophy of religion A traditional and popularly accepted argument for the existence of God. Natural phenomena present a complex and intricate order, like that of a machine or a work of art. This provides evidence for thinking that there must be a designer who is responsible for the structural and adaptive order of natural things and who has capacities far exceeding human abilities. Hence, we may reasonably -- argument from the relativity of perception presume that God exists as this designer. The argument from analogy, a version of this argument, argues that since the world is like a clock, it must derive from something like a clock-maker, which is God. The argument from design can be traced to the Stoics and is the fifth of Aquinas’ Five Ways of proving the existence of God. It was attacked by Hume, who introduced many other possible explanations for natural order, thus providing methodological objections to the dogmatic acceptance of the divine origin of the world, especially where experience cannot test our judgment. Kant also rejected the validity of the argument from design. The argument was further challenged when Darwin’s theory of evolution explained by natural selection the adaptive features of living things that were cited to prove that the world might be designed. “The argument from design reasons, from the fact that nature’s laws are mathematical, and her parts benevolently adapted to each other, that its cause is both intellectual and benevolent.” W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience -- argument from differential certainty Epistemology An argument for the existence of sense-data. Suppose I perceive something, for example a tomato, but I do not know what it is. What I can be certain that I am perceiving are some sense-data such as red, round shape. These sensedata are the objects of my direct awareness and are infallible. But I cannot be certain that I am perceiving a real tomato, or even a material thing, for what I am perceiving may be a fake, an illusion, or an hallucination. That of which I can be certain cannot be identical with that of which I cannot be certain; therefore there are sense-data whose existence is distinct from that of material things. Critics of this argument maintain that, even though it is true that there are different degrees of certainty in perceptions and statements, this does not entail that there are ontologically different kinds of things corresponding to my different levels of certainty. “It might be true that for the speaker in our argument from differential certainty, the statement ‘I see a tomato’, in the conditions specified, is less certain than statements such as ‘I am directly aware of something red and with a tomato-ish shape’.” Pitcher, A Theory of Perception -- argument from religious experience Philosophy of religion An argument for the existence of God in terms of the inner, emotional experience of the presence and activity of something divine and transcendent. Some people have this kind of experience in daily life, but unless there is indeed something that is divine and transcendent, we cannot have experience of it. Hence God must exist. This kind of argument was developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by philosophers of religion as a result of dissatisfaction with the traditional theistic arguments. Since religious experience provides a non-inferential mode of knowledge of God, analogous to sense perception of the external world, this argument is presented as the main proof of the existence of God. Critics argue that religious experience might be explained reductively through sociology, psychology, or other fields and as a consequence it begs the question to ascribe independent cognitive value to it. We can have the experiences without being obliged to explain them by the existence of God. However, we often accept reductive explanation in terms of other fields where the primary belief is irrational, but the rationality or irrationality of religious belief must be determined before this objection to the argument for religious experience can be assessed. Further, it is argued that because religious experience is inherently mysterious and untestable, it cannot constitute persuasive evidence for those who do not have similar experiences. “As a method of showing the existence of a God not otherwise known or believed to exist the Argument from Religious Experience is indeed absurd. It is not absurd if considered as a method of getting to know something about a God already known, or believed, to exist.” McPherson, The Philosophy of Religion -- argument from the relativity of perception Epistemology Under certain circumstances, the ways that things are perceived by us are not the ways that they really are. For instance, a straight oar with one end in water looks bent. When the conditions of a perceiver change, the same thing that he perceived before will be different from what he perceives now. For instance, the same food will taste differently when one is healthy and when one is sick. Hence, what is perceived to be and what really a rgumentum ad baculum is are different. This argument has been employed by many philosophers from Plato, Descartes, Locke, and Hume to Russell and Ayer, but for different purposes. Rationalism makes use of it to prove the unreliability of sense-experience and to show the ontological difference between reality and phenomena. Empiricism, on the other hand, suggests that the properties we perceive are sense-data and are not properties of physical objects themselves. This argument is similar to the argument from illusion. “[A]rguments from the relativity of perception . . . start from the familiar observation that how things look to us is heavily dependent on the lighting, our angle of vision or whether we are wearing spectacles.” Smith and Jones, The Philosophy of Mind -- argumentum ad baculum Logic [Latin, argument to a stick, meaning appeal to force] An attempt to win assent for a conclusion by appealing to force or by issuing threats concerning the consequence that will follow if the conclusion is not accepted. This sort of argument is frequently employed in international politics and in lobbying campaigns. It is a fallacy because the conclusion is not justified on a rational basis. It is perhaps not an argument at all, but a way to get one’s position accepted, in particular when rational arguments in support of the position fail. “The argumentum ad baculum is the fallacy committed when one appeals to force or the threat of force to cause the acceptance of a conclusion.” Copi, Introduction to Logic -- argumentum ad hominem Logic [Latin, argument against or directed to the man] Rejecting a person’s argument or view by attacking the person who is maintaining the view. There are various ways of making such an attack, and the standard way is to abuse the character of the opponent, for instance by claiming that he is a liar. Although in practical life the opinion of a person with a bad record regarding truthfulness is generally not respected, this argument is logically fallacious because even a person with a history of dishonesty can speak the truth. That a person is untrustworthy does not entail that his opinion is always mistaken. This fallacy is close to the genetic fallacy, which focuses on the source of a view rather than on the view itself. “This is traditionally called the ad hominem argument – an argument, that is, directed against the man (ad hominem) rather than to the point (ad rem).” Sullivan, Fundamentals of Logic -- argumentum ad ignorantiam Logic [Latin, argument to ignorance] The inference that a conclusion A is false from the fact that A is not proved to be true or known to be true, or that A is true from the fact A is not proved to be false or known to be false. This kind of argument can be used to shift the burden of proof or to reach a tentative conclusion, but the conclusion cannot have much strength. Our ignorance of A entails neither that A is false nor that A is true. Truth is one thing, and whether or not the truth is known by us is another. “The argumentum ad ignorantiam is committed whenever it is argued that a proposition is true simply on the basis that it has not been proved false or it is false because it has not been proved true.” Copi, Introduction to Logic -- argumentum ad misericordiam Logic [Latin, argument to pity] An argument making use of an appeal to the pity, sympathy, and compassion of the audience in order to establish its conclusion. This widely employed argument is logically fallacious because it puts an emotional burden on the audience rather than concentrating on the argument itself. The fact that an argument is accepted out of pity or charity does not entail that it is logically strong. Argument is a matter of reason. Often, an argument ad misericordiam is offered to sway an audience in defiance of factual evidence and sound reasoning. “The argumentum ad misericordiam is the fallacy committed when pity is appealed to for the sake of getting a conclusion accepted, where the conclusion is concerned with a question of fact rather than a matter of sentiment.” Copi, Introduction to Logic -- argumentum ad populum Logic [Latin, argument to the people] An argument that seeks to get its conclusion accepted by appeal to popular opinion, mass enthusiasm, group interests Aristotelian principle or loyalties, or customary ways of behaving. For example, “Since most people believe that this thing is true, it is true.” This kind of argument is widely used in social life, but it is logically fallacious because it does not establish its conclusion on the basis of facts and relations between premises and the conclusion. Broadly conceived, this argument contains an argumentum ad misericordian if the enthusiasm appealed to is based on pity. “We may define the argumentum ad populum fallacy a little more narrowly as the attempt to win popular assent to a conclusion by arousing the emotions and enthusiasms of the multitude rather than by appeal to the relevant facts.” Copi, Introduction to Logic -- argumentum ad verecundiam, the Latin term for appeal to authority argumentum ex consensu gentium Logic [Latin, argument from the consensus of the nations, an argument that supports a conclusion by appeal to common human consent] An argument that because all people consent that this is the case, so it is. The argument has been widely used in the history of philosophy to attempt to establish divine existence (the common consent argument for the existence of God) or to establish a variety of general moral principles. Sometimes it is treated as an instance of argumentum ad populum. It is difficult to distinguish cases in which common consent might have some weight in justifying claims or show that no justification is necessary from cases in which common consent cannot provide needed justification. “The argument ex consensu gentium is that the belief in God is so widespread as to be grounded in the rational nature of man and should therefore carry authenticity with it.” W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience ARISTPPUSIANUM IMPICATUM -- Aristippus (c.435–356 bc) Greek philosopher, born in Cyrene, North Africa, a follower of Socrates and the founder of the Cyrenaic school of hedonism. He claimed that pleasure was the highest end of life and that pleasure and suffering were the criteria of good and evil. All pleasures are equal in value, but differ in degree and duration. However, he also emphasized that happiness consists in the rational control of pleasure and not in the slavery of subordination to pleasure. His grandson, also named Aristippus, was said to have systematized the theory of the Cyrenaic school. aristocracy Political philosophy [from Greek aristos, best + kratia, rule, hence rule by the best] The form of constitution that appoints the best people to the offices of government. In ancient Greek society, the best people were determined by their good birth, property, education, and merit. Thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle believed that because aristocracy carries with it a high sense of honor, responsibility, and duty, it is better than its rivals, that is, monarchy (rule by one) and democracy (rule by the people). The degenerate form of aristocracy is oligarchy (rule by a rich minority), which regards only the interest of the ruling class. Aristocracy has been widely rejected by modern liberal egalitarianism. “The sovereign may confine the government to the hands of a few, so that there are more ordinary citizens than there are magistrates: this form of government is called aristocracy.” Rousseau, The Social Contract ARISKTANIANUM IMPLICATUM Aristotelian logic, see traditional logic -- Aristotelian principle Ethics, philosophy of action, political philosophy A principle of motivation or a psychological thesis that everyone’s central goals in life are bound up with the exercise of one’s natural or acquired abilities or faculties. The greater our ability, the greater satisfaction we can expect to get from the exercise of our skill. Believing that this idea is implicit in Aristotle’s ethics, Rawls has introduced this term and uses the principle to explain both why certain things are recognized as primary goods and how to rank primary goods in importance. Hence this principle is essential for Rawls’s thin theory of the good and its role in his theory of justice. Basing his theory of the good upon this psychological principle strikingly distinguishes his theory from utilitarianism, which is based on psychological hedonism. “It will be recalled that the Aristotelian principle runs as follows: other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realised capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realised, or the greater its complexity.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice Aristotelianism Philosophical method The tradition of translation, commentary, and interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrines by various groups in different historical periods. Each group or period has read into Aristotle its own preoccupations and has focused on different aspects of Aristotle’s thought. Hence Aristotelianism presents different and even contradictory outlooks. It is sometimes also called peripateticism, after the Aristotelian peripatikos (Greek, walking) school whose members liked to discuss philosophical issues while walking. The interpretation of Aristotle starts with Aristotle’s disciple and successor Theophrastus. In the first century bc, Andronicos of Rhodes edited and published the first Complete Works of Aristotle, containing all the esoteric works. Other exoteric works survive only in the form of fragments, which were first collected by V. Rose in the nineteenth century. The Neoplatonists Plotinus and Proclus took Aristotle’s thought as a preface to Plato’s philosophy and attempted to reconcile them. Plotinus’ disciple Porphyry wrote a famous commentary to Aristotle’s Categories that set the stage for the subsequent long-standing discussion between realism and nominalism regarding the nature of universals. This tendency was further reinforced in the sixth century by Boethius’s commentary to Porphyry’s Isogage, a book that was based on Aristotle’s Organon. Boethius also translated the Categories and On Interpretation, which were the only primary Aristotelian materials that were available to Western Europeans until the twelfth century, and constituted the major basis for the development of medieval logic. Arabic Aristotelianism developed in the ninth century, largely through the work of Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd), who translated Aristotle’s works into Arabic and commented on them. They paid much attention to Aristotle’s doctrine of active intellect in the De Anima. Their work helped Western Europeans to understand Aristotle, particularly through the study of their commentaries in the arts faculties of Paris and Oxford during the thirteenth century. Their influence led to the condemnation of Aristotle’s philosophy by the Bishop of Paris in 1277 and to a short-lived prohibition of the study of Aristotle. In the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, Aristotle’s texts in Greek reached Paris and Oxford and stimulated a renaissance of interest in Aristotle. Aristotle’s works were systematically translated and studied. The major contributors to this movement included Roger Bacon, Robert Grosseteste, St Bonaventura, and, above all, St Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas, the most important philosopher of the medieval age, was preoccupied with justifying the claims of Christian teachings in terms of Aristotle’s doctrines. Aristotelianism is therefore associated with scholasticism and Thomism. Aristotle was simply called the philosopher, or in Dante’s words, the master of those who know. The scientific revolution launched by Copernicus and Galileo in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attacked Aristotle’s system as an obstacle to the progress of learning, although this claim is more justly leveled at the Aristotle of the scholastics rather than Aristotle himself. Nowadays Aristotle’s views about the physical and animal world have been superseded, but much of his writing over a wide range of fields can still inspire important philosophical work. In the early part of the twentieth century, the study of Aristotle benefited from the Oxford translation of his works edited by W. D. Ross and was influenced methodologically by W. Jaeger’s genetic method. The study has developed greatly since the middle of this century, stimulated by the work of excellent scholars, such as G. E. L. Owen and John Ackrill, and many other Oxford and Cambridge philosophers have been influenced by the study of Aristotle. Recent developments in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and virtue ethics, have generated a new revival of Aristotelianism, sometimes called neoAristotelianism. Philosophically, Aristotelianism is contrasted with the contrary tendency of Platonism. The distinction between them has been roughly portrayed as being that between empiricism and rationalism or naturalism and idealism, although the real relationships linking the thought of Plato and Aristotle are still a matter of scholarly debate. ARNAULDIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Arnauld, Antoine “ ‘Aristotelianism’ certainly means an emphasis on the primacy of the subject matter, the experienced world encountered.” Randall, Aristotle ARISTKANTIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Aristotle (384–322 bc) Greek philosopher, born in Stagira in Macedon, moved to Athens in 367 to become Plato’s student until Plato’s death at 347, tutor of Alexander the Great. In 355, Aristotle established his own school in Athens, the Lyceum. He believed that by nature human beings desire to know, and classified knowledge into theoretical sciences (including mathematics, physics or natural philosophy, and theology or first philosophy), practical sciences (including ethics and political science), and productive sciences (including poetics and rhetoric). Although most of his writings were reported to be lost, the surviving works contain great contributions to nearly all of these areas. In theoretical sciences, the major works include Physics; De Caelo; De Anima; De Partibus Animalium; De Motu Animalium; De Generatione Animalium; and Metaphysics. He claimed that philosophy is a science of being qua being. The primary being is substance, while all other beings are attributes of substance. Hence the study of substance, the primary being, is the core of the science of being. Substance can be analyzed into form, matter, and the composite of form and matter. Of these, form (which is identified with essence) is primary substance or ultimate reality. Each thing has its own nature, that is, its inner principle of motion, and form and matter are two natures. The relation between soul and body should be understood in terms of the relation between form and matter. To know each thing, one needs to know its four causes (the material cause, the formal cause, the efficient cause, and the final cause). In natural things, the formal cause, efficient cause, and final cause coincide, and they are different operations of the same form. Natural things develop from potentiality to actuality. The whole universe is ordered, for everything in the world, in its pursuit of eternity, is moved by the Prime Mover. In practical sciences the important works include Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. According to Aristotle, ethics should focus on character and virtue and should address the issue of how to lead a good or flourishing life. Furthermore, ethics and politics are inseparable, for human beings are political animals and politics should mainly concern the best constitution in which citizens can develop their character. Aristotle’s ethics is the intellectual source of the contemporary revival of virtue ethics. In productive sciences, Aristotle left us Rhetoric and Poetics. In addition, Aristotle’s six treatises on logic (Categories; De Interpretatione; The Prior Analytics; The Posterior Analytics; Topics; and The Sophistical Elenchi) were grouped together by later commentators under the title of “Organon” (literally, tool, or instrument). In the Organon Aristotle developed syllogistic logic and an analysis of demonstrative science. For a long time in the history of Western philosophy, Aristotle was referred to simply as “The Philosopher.” Scholars differ over understanding Aristotle’s philosophy in terms of a process of development involving different stages or as a unified system. Armstrong, David (1926– ) Australian philosopher of knowledge, philosopher of mind, philosopher of science, and metaphysician, born Melbourne, Professor of Philosophy at University of Sydney. Armstrong is an empiricist and realist. His early work on epistemology was followed by his influential formulation of a non-reductionist materialist theory of mind. Armstrong’s ontology, based on states of affairs, accepts the reality of individuals, properties, and relations on the grounds that what is real is a matter of what has causes and effects. He is committed to the reality of universals, although it is an empirical question which predicates stand for universals and which do not. Laws of nature are empirically discovered relations of nonlogical necessity between universals. Among his prolific writings are Perception and the Physical World (1961), A Materialist Theory of Mind (1968), Universals and Scientific Realism (1978), and What is a Law of Nature? (1983). Arnauld, Antoine (1612–94) French theologian, mathematician, and philosopher. Arnaud was a leading figure among the Port-Royal Jansenists. His objections to Descartes’s Meditations raised the problem of the Cartesian circle, namely, we know that God exists because we have a clear and distinct idea of God, but what we perceive clearly and distinctly is guaranteed to be true only if God exists. His major work is Port-Royal Logic (with Pierre Nicole, 1662). Arrow, Kenneth (1921– ) American economist and theorist of social choice, Professor of Economics at Stanford University, winner of Nobel Prize in 1972. Arrow is best known to philosophers for Arrow’s paradox, which shows that there is no function meeting certain commonsense conditions that can order options for a society in terms of the preferences of individual members of that society. This insight, discussed in his work Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), has important consequences for democratic theory. arrow of time Metaphysics, philosophy of science One of the central notions in the philosophy of time. We ordinarily believe that time is inherently directional. Time seems to be asymmetric, for we can affect the future in a way that we cannot affect the past. The past is fixed and the future is open. This is why we can talk about free will. This seems to suggest that natural processes have a natural temporal order. We talk about this directionality of time as the arrow of time. However, physics claims that time as such does not have an intrinsic orientation. It does not move toward the future as it does not move toward the past. The philosophical basis of the so-called arrow of time has been a topic of dispute. “It has become an almost universal practice to refer to the direction of time or the arrow of time in physics, with the implicit meaning of the direction of flow or movement of the now from past to future.” Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry Arrow’s impossibility theorem Philosophy of social science, political philosophy Also called Arrow’s paradox, first formulated by the American economist Kenneth J. Arrow in Social Choice and Individual Values (1951). Intuitively, a social choice can be obtained through the aggregation of individual preferences. Such a choice, if acceptable, must satisfy the following reasonable formal conditions: (a) a social ordering can be obtained from any set of individual orderings and preferences; if at least one individual prefers A to B and nobody else objects to it, then the society should choose A (Pareto optimality); the social choice cannot be determined dictatorially; the choice with regard to A and B should be decided between them alone, independent of irrelevant alternatives. But Arrow proves that on these conditions there is no method to determine social ordering through the aggregation of individual preferences. Various attempts have been made to get out of this paradox, but none turns out to be satisfactory. The theorem indicates that the notion of general will conceived by Rousseau and prominent in social and political debate cannot easily be determined in practice. The voting paradox is an example of this theorem. “ ‘Arrow’s impossibility theorem’ brings about, in a dramatic way, the tension involved in ruling out the use of interpersonal comparisons of utility, in aggregating individual preferences into consistent and complete social choice, satisfying some mildlooking conditions of reasonableness.” Sen, On Ethics and Economics ARROWIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Arrow’s paradox another expression for Arrow’s impossibility theorem ARTIFICIALIS -- art Aesthetics [from Latin ars, artis, skill, human products that can arouse aesthetic experience] Starting from the eighteenth century, art replaced “beauty” to become the central notion of aesthetics. However, it has been difficult to provide a suitable definition of art to enable one to distinguish artworks from other objects and to bring all artistic activities, such as painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and literature, under one heading. In an objective objectcentered account, Plato defined art as mimesis, that is, the representation or display of certain aspects of reality. However, not all arts are representational. Another traditional definition claims that art is the expression of emotions, feelings, and moods. Artexpression is a specific form of self-expression. This is a subjective artist-centered notion. Other accounts include art as significant form (aesthetic formalism); art as what is recognized by an institution (institutional theory of art); art as creation; and art as play. Another major issue dividing theories of art concerns the function of art. Some theorists hold that art is functional, serving psychological, moral, social, -- artworld and other practical purposes, while others claim that art is autonomous and not-functional. In their view art should be pursued for its sake and for pure aesthetic value. “Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human being.” Langer, Feeling and Form art for art’s sake, see aestheticism artificial intelligence Philosophy of mind, logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of action Often abbreviated as AI. The use of programs to enable machines to perform tasks that human beings perform using their intelligence, and to simulate on a computer human thinking and problem solving. Artificial intelligence aims to bypass the human brain and body and to achieve a fuller understanding of rationality. The idea can be traced to Turing’s intelligent machine. In 1956, the first AI program, called “Logical Theorist,” devised by Herbert Simon and others, was capable of proving on its own 38 of the first 52 theorems from Principia Mathematica. Today, AI has developed into a domain of research, application, and instruction within computer science and other disciplines, focusing on issues such as new programming languages, methods of inference and problem solving, visual recognition, and expert systems. Early AI avoided human psychological models, but this orientation has been altered due to the development of connectionism, based on theories of how the brain works. In connectionism, complex functions, including learning, involve the transmission of information along pathways formed among large arrays of simple elements. AI seeks to understand human intelligent processes in terms of symbol manipulation and raises questions about the conditions, if any, in which we would be justified in ascribing mental attributes to purely physical systems. It has also contributed to the development of cognitive science and to some controversies in the philosophy of mind. There is a distinction between the strong thesis of AI and the weak thesis of AI. The weak thesis, which proposes only that a computer program is helpful for understanding the human mind, is widely accepted. The strong thesis, that computer “minds” instantiate human psychological processes, is highly controversial. It is chal-lenged by John Searle’s argument that the syntactic manipulation of symbols by a machine is not complemented by a semantic understanding of the meaning of the symbols for the machine, as it is for human beings. “Artificial intelligence is not the study of computers, but of intelligence in thought and action. Computers are its tools, because its theories are expressed as computer programs that enable machines to do things that would require intelligence if done by people.” Boden, Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man -- artificial virtue, see natural virtue artworld Aesthetics A word transformed into a technical term by the American philosopher Arthur Danto in his 1964 paper “The Artworld.” For Danto, an artworld provides an atmosphere or context in which artworks are embedded. It is mainly constituted by the history and theory of art. Such a world varies according to time and place. According to Danto, this theoretical context takes an artwork up into the world of art and keeps it from collapsing into the real object that it is. Another American philosopher, George Dickie (1926– ), developed the notion of an artworld from a figure of speech to something having an ontological status. He first defines it as a formal institution comprising such things as museums, galleries, and art journals on the one hand, and artists, art critics, organizers of exhibitions and others possessing relevant authority about art and the art market, on the other. Representatives of an artworld can confer upon an artifact the status of an artwork. This account of an artworld has become essential for his “institutional theory of art.” Later Dickie modified his notion into one of an art circle, an interrelated structure of relationships among artists and their audiences. Dickie’s notion of an artworld is more concrete than Danto’s. Nevertheless, their common idea is that art has its own environment and is the product of a type of specialized and unique institutionalized activity. Accordingly, art does not serve human life, as Plato and Aristotle claim, but is disengaged from worldly concerns. Art is a world in which one can apply one’s own set of practices. The theory may explain the transcultural and transhistorical nature of artworks. -- “To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.” Danto, “Artworld,” in The Journal of Philosophy 61 ASCETICUM -- asceticism Ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion [from Greek askesis] Originally meaning a course of self-discipline such as that undertaken by athletes, and later associated with rigorous self-discipline, abstinence, simplicity, and the solitary and contemplative life, popular in ancient society, early Christianity, and some forms of Buddhism and Hinduism. Some ascetics also follow exercises that consist in many means of tormenting themselves. Philosophically, asceticism proposes that a person should repress desires. A strong version requires one to relinquish one’s desires totally, while a weaker version demands only that one denies bodily or worldly desires. There have been various grounds for advocating this unnatural style of life. Morally, asceticism is seen as the way to free one’s soul from the body’s pollution. Epistemologically, it is considered to be the way to gain truth or virtue. Religiously, it is claimed that the ascetic life will be rewarded by God. For every grain of pain now, we shall have a hundred grains of pleasure by and by. Asceticism, in contrast to hedonism, approves of actions that tend to diminish present pleasure or to augment present pain. “Asceticism has commonly assumed that the impulses connected with the body are base and are to be treated accordingly.” Blanshard, Reason and Goodness ASCRIPTUM -- ascriptivism: A position regarding the meaning of statements about the voluntariness of acts. It claims that in saying that “This act is voluntary,” we are ascribing responsibility for the act to its agent, rather than describing the act as being caused by its agent in a certain way. Thus, to call an act voluntary or intentional is not a causal statement. Such statements are not matters of fact, but are matters of practical (legal or moral) decision. They are not true or false. The idea of ascriptivism was introduced by H. L. A. Hart and belongs to a more general position of non-cognitivism. Peter Geach, who named the view, rejects ascriptivism and insists that to ascribe an act to an agent is a causal description of an act. “Ascriptivists hold that to say an action X was voluntary on the part of an agent A is not to describe the act X as caused in a certain way, but to ascribe it to A, to hold A responsible for it.” Geach, “Ascriptivism,” Philosophical Review LXIX ASEITAS -- aseity Metaphysics, philosophy of religion, modern European philosophy [from Latin aseitas, a, from + se, itself ] The property of being completely and absolutely independent of anything distinct from oneself and deriving solely from oneself. As selfdetermination of the self as itself, it is absolute freedom. In the later medieval scholasticism, God was thought to be the only entity that has this status. God is responsible for his own existence and does not depend on anything else. Everything else, on the contrary, relies for existence on God. Based on aseity, God is ascribed various other perfections. In modern times, Schopenhauer used the term for the ontological status of Will. In existentialism, since God is dead, man comes to have aseity as absolute freedom. Nothing should be in man that is not by him. The problem of reconciling absolute freedom with the place of man in society was explored by Sartre in Critique of Dialectical Reason. A related property perseity (from Latin per, by + se, itself, intrinsically) is a state in which a thing acts out of its own inner structure. Any substance, in contrast to its attributes, is in a state of perseity. However, only God can be in a perfect state of perseity, because through aseity God alone is completely independent of anything else, while other substances rely on God for their existence. “Men have occasionally claimed that God is the cause of his own existence or of his being the kind of being which he is, although this is not a claim normally made by traditional Theologians. Etymology would suggest that this is what is meant when God is said to have ‘aseity’ (his existence deriving from himself, a se).” Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism ASSERTUM – EXPLICATUM -- assertion-sign A-series of time Metaphysics A term introduced by McTaggart for the temporal ordering of events according to whether they are past, present, or future, in contrast to the B-series of time, which orders events according to whether they are before or after one another or earlier or later than one another in time. These two kinds of temporal series are different. Events in the B-series of time will not change their ordering over time. Plato’s time is always earlier than Hegel’s time, and this relationship will never change. According to the A-series, every event will successively be future, present, and past. Although McTaggart admitted that the tense-distinctions in the A-series are essential to understanding the nature of temporality, he uses the A-series to introduce his famous argument against the reality of time. Since past, present, and future are contradictory attributes and since the A-series ascribes possession of these contradictory attributes to the same events, McTaggart concluded that time is not real. On this basis one is led to argue that the past and the future are not realms of true existence. Even if this timeseries were not real, however, we always perceive it as though it were real. McTaggart called this perceptible time-series the C-series. “For the sake of brevity I shall give the name of the A-series to that series of positions which runs from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present through the near future to the far future, or conversely.” McTaggart, The Nature of Existence COME SI -- as if Metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics For Kant, a form of analogical argument as a maxim of regulative judgment. In theoretical philosophy, traditional metaphysical entities such as God and the soul are beyond the limits of experience, and we cannot really know their nature. Nevertheless we may still suppose them as if they were working principles. We take them as guidance for determining the constitution and connection of empirical objects. This regulative principle can also be applied to practical philosophy and aesthetics. A moral agent should act as if he were a legislator in the kingdom of ends. A finished work of art should appear as if it were a product of nature, but without the constraint of rules. “We declare, for instance, that the things of the world must be viewed as if they received their existence from a highest intelligence.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason ASSSERTUM -- assertion Logic A term used synonymously with judgment for affirming or denying what can be true or false. Traditionally, an asserted sentence is composed of a subject-expression, a predicate-expression, and a copula. On this view, the copula is essential to unite any pair of terms into an assertion, but Frege, Wittgenstein, and others have offered different accounts of how a proposition or assertion has unity. An asserted sentence is contrasted to other sentences in terms of its assertoric force. In traditional logic assertoric force is bound up with the grammatical predicate. Assertion does not merely express a thought or hypothesis and does not issue a command or ask a question, but is committed to the truth of the sentence or puts forward a thought as being true. Wittgenstein criticized Frege’s proposal of an assertion-sign to indicate whether a thought is asserted. Important questions arise about the asserted and non-asserted occurrence of sentences that are part of other sentences. If we assert “P and Q,” we also assert both component sentences, but this is not the case in asserting “P or Q.” In asserting “John believes that P,” we do not assert “P.” To reason is to infer any assertion from assertions already admitted. “It is one thing merely to express a thought and another simultaneously to assert it. We can often tell from the external circumstances which of the two things is being done . . . This is why I distinguish between thoughts and judgements, expressions of thought and assertions.” Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence ASSERTUM -- assertion-sign The symbol “2” that Frege placed in front of a sentence to indicate that the sentence is asserted (that is affirmed or denied) or is a judgment. Frege needed this symbol to distinguish asserted propositions from unasserted ones, because while in traditional logic assertoric form is marked by the grammatical predicate, Frege’s concept-script disassociated assertoric force from predication. In this – assertoric -- symbol, “ |” is called the judgment-stroke and “—” is called the content-stroke or horizontal stroke. “ |” is crucial because without it, “—” only expresses a content, without being committed to its truth. In modern logic this symbol has two further uses. When it is written between sets of sentences, it indicates that the sentences following it can be derived from the sentences preceding it; for example, “[A 1 . . . A n] 2B” means that B may be deduced from the premises A 1 . . . A n. Furthermore, 2B also means that B is a theorem in a system, that is, it may be assumed without any proof. “The assertion-sign – what Frege called the ‘judgment-stroke’ – can be attached only to the name of a truth-value, i.e. to a sentence.” M. Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy -- assertoric A judgment or proposition by which one asserts that something is or is not the case. An affirmative assertoric judgment has the form: “X is Y,” while a negative assertoric judgment has the form: “X is not Y.” An assertoric is a modal form of proposition or judgment, in contrast to two other modal categorical judgments: problematic (possible) and apodeictic (necessary). Expressed adverbially, an assertoric judgment can be stated: “X is actually Y,” or “X is actually not Y.” “In assertoric judgements affirmation or negation is viewed as real (true).” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason assertoric force Frege’s term for the force that makes a sentence an assertion rather than a hypothetical, interrogative, or imperative sentence. Assertoric force is distinguished from assertoric sense. The former is the act of asserting, and is represented using the “assertion-sign,” while the latter is the thought or judgeable content contained in a sentence. In English, the indicative mood of the main verb has assertoric force, for it makes the expression of a thought into an assertion. The idea of assertoric force inspired Austin to develop his speech act theory. “Assertoric force can most easily be eliminated by changing the whole into a question; for one can express the same thought in a question as in an assertoric sentence, only without asserting it.” Frege, Collected Papers ASSOCIATUM -- association of ideas Epistemology, philosophy of mind A view, especially important in Hume, explaining the patterned occurrence of ideas in our minds. The human mind can synthesize and combine various simple ideas into complex ones that are previously unknown. Exploiting the analogy of the principle of universal gravitation in the natural world, Hume believes that there are certain principles according to which the mind operates to connect all sorts of ideas. The occurrence of one idea will lead the mind to its correlative. These principles are three in number: resemblance, contiguity in time and place, and causation. They were used by Hume to explain all the complicated operations of the mind that unify thought in the imagination. This constructive mechanism of the human mind became the basis for associationism, but was undermined by its own internal problems and by rival views, such as behaviorism. “We have already observed that nature established connexions among particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of connexion or association we have reduced to three, namely, resemblance, contiguity and causation.” Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals -- associationism Philosophy of mind A position claiming that the association of elementary mental contents and representations is sufficient to account for complex mental states and processes, because the latter can be broken into or reduced to the elements of their association. Hence, all postulations of external entities that are supposed to explain mental phenomena are unnecessary. The position has been favored by British empiricism, including Berkeley, Hume, and J. S. Mill. Hume believed that there are three fundamental principles of association, that is, contiguity, resemblance, and causation based on constant conjunction. Associationism refers also to the psychological program, called associationistic psychology, developed by Hartley and in modern times by B. F. Skinner. Associationism is generally connected with ethical hedonism and metaphysical reductionism. INDIVIDUUM -- atom “Classical Associationists – Hume, say – held that mental representations have transportable constituents and, I suppose, a combinational semantics: the mental image of a house contains, as proper parts, mental images of proper parts of houses.” Fodor, in Mind and Action astrology Philosophy of science As a theory, astrology is related to ancient cosmology and Ptolemaic astronomy, but it is mainly known as a divinatory art, to foretell one’s future life according to the pattern of the heavenly bodies at birth or to predict future human events on the basis of current celestic movements. Astrology presupposes that a person’s fate has been determined and written in the stars and leaves no place for human freedom. It has been a target of criticism in the Western rationalist tradition and is now presented as a prime example of a pseudo-science. “Astrology . . . pretends to discover that correspondence or concatenation which is between the superior globe and the inferior.” Bacon, The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon SYMMETRIA – COMMENSURATUM -- asymmetric relation, see symmetric relation DEUS -- atheism Philosophy of religion [from Greek a, not + theos, God, the absence of belief in God] The belief that God – especially a personal, omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent God – does not exist. Throughout much of Western history, atheism has been a term of abuse, and atheists have been attacked for impiety and immorality. The non-believers of a particular religion have also been called atheists by the believers of that religion. As a philosophical position, atheism is supported by several arguments. Because science proves that matter is eternal, there is no need for God to be the creator of the material universe. The existence of so many evils and defects in the world is incompatible with the existence of a God with the traditional supreme attributes. God is claimed to exist necessarily, but it is difficult to make sense of the notion of necessary existence. These arguments contest important arguments for the existence of God. Of significant philosophers, Holbach, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Sartre were all atheists. Atheism should be distinguished from pantheism, which claims to identify God with the world, and from agnosticism, which claims that we do not know whether God exists. In another sense, atheism is the position of not being a theist. God might exist, but does not govern or care for the world. This view, which is faithful to the Greek etymology of the term, is sometimes called negative atheism, in contrast to the positive atheism discussed above. “. . . the controversy between atheists and nonatheists in Western society has usually been about the question of whether an all-good, all knowing, all-powerful being exists.” M. Martin, Atheism a this Metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy [Greek tode ti, sometimes translated as thisness] Unlike tode (this), which is simply a pronoun that can refer to everything, tode ti is a technical term introduced by Aristotle. In the Categories he defines it as “individual and numerically one” and takes it as a mark of a primary substance (sensible particular). In contrast, a secondary substance (species and genus) is marked by poion ti (a kind). In the Metaphysics, tode ti is one criterion for primary substance. In contrast, the universal is not substance and is labeled toionde (Greek, such, the equivalent of poion ti). Aristotle claimed that among form, matter, and the composite of form and matter, form best meets the criterion of tode ti, with the composite second. Since tode ti seems straightforwardly to denote a particular thing, Aristotle’s form appears to be a particular. But this is a disputable point, for many who believe that Aristotelian form is a kind of universal maintain that tode ti is not necessarily a particular, but can mean a determination and that an infirma species can also be tode ti. The morphology tode ti suggests that one of its two constituent words is a class-name and that the other restricts the class to a single member, but it is disputable which function should be assigned to which word. “Everything that is common indicates not ‘a this’, but ‘such’, but substance is ‘a this’.” Aristotle, Metaphysics, INDIVIDUUM -- atom Metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of science [from Greek atomos, in turn from a, not + temos, cut, hence the smallest unit, which -- atomic fact -- cannot be further cut or divided] The central conception of the Greek atomists, such as Leucippus and Democritus, who claimed that atom and void are the principles from which everything else in the world is composed. Atoms are ungenerated, imperishable, indivisible, homogeneous, and finite. The attributes ascribed to an atom are similar to the properties that Parmenides ascribed to his “is.” Atoms move in the void and differ only in size, shape, and position. Thus sensible features like color, taste, and smell do not belong to external bodies but are the result of the interaction between atoms and ourselves. The conception of the atom is broadly viewed as one of the greatest achievements of ancient natural philosophy; and it has been a subject of dispute in the later development of philosophy and science, especially in the corpuscularian philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In Greek philosophy, Aristotle also used the term atom for the infirma species. “By convention are sweet and bitter, hot and cold, by convention is colour; in truth are atoms and the void.” Democritus, in Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus Mathematicos (Against the Grammarians) -- atomic fact Metaphysics, logic, philosophy of language A term introduced by Russell and also employed by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus. For Russell, atomic facts are the simplest kind of facts given in experience, but Wittgenstein is less interested in this epistemological aspect than in the role of atomism in logic and in the possibility of language. Atomic facts consist in the possession of a quality by some particular thing (i.e. “This is white”) or in a relation among some particulars (i.e. “A gives B to C”). The relation can be dyadic (between two things), triadic (among three things), tetradic (among four things), and so on. Russell also calls a quality a “monadic relation,” allowing the integration of predication into his general account of relations. Each atomic fact contains a relation and one or more terms of the relation. Those propositions expressing atomic facts are called atomic propositions and assert that a certain thing has a certain quality or that certain things have a certain relation. Atomic facts determine the truth or falsity of atomic propositions, and there is a logical isomorphism between them. Atomic -- facts are the terminating points of logical analysis. A “molecular fact,” that is, complex facts such as “p or q”, is constituted by more than one atomic fact. Molecular facts are represented by the truthfunctional compound propositions of atomic propositions, called molecular propositions. “There you have a whole infinite hierarchy of facts – facts in which you have a thing and a quality, two things and a relation, three things and a relation, four things and a relation, and so on. That whole hierarchy constitutes what I call atomic facts, and they are the simplest sort of facts.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge -- atomic proposition Logic A proposition asserting that a certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation, such as “This is white,” or “This is between a and b.” Atomic propositions can be either positive (“This is white”) or negative (“This is not white”). They express atomic facts and have their truth or falsity determined by atomic facts. An atomic proposition itself cannot be further analyzed into other component propositions, but the combination of two or more atomic propositions through logical connectives forms a molecular proposition. “We may then define an atomic proposition as one of which no part is a proposition, while a molecular proposition is one of which at least one part is a proposition.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. VII -- atomism Metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language [from Greek atom, the indivisible] A position holding that the world is composed of a infinite number of indivisible small elements and the void. It was first proposed as a metaphysical hypothesis by the Greek philosophers Leucippus and Democritus in order to account for the phenomenon of change denied by Parmenides. This ancient atomism, which was later developed by Epicurus, claimed that there are an infinite number of imperceptible material atoms, differing in quantitative properties. The atoms meet in the void and join together to form various compounds that may again divide into atoms. Their quantitative differences ATTRIBUTUM -- attribute determine the qualitative differences of the compounds. All movement in the world can be reduced to the arrangement and rearrangement of atoms in the void. This metaphysical doctrine was revived in modern philosophy by Gassendi in the form of corpuscularism. Such speculation about the structure of the world was supported by the chemical investigations of John Dalton (1766–1844) and then in physics. In this century, Russell and early Wittgenstein developed a kind of logical atomism, claiming that the world is ultimately composed of elementary or atomic facts, to which elementary propositions correspond. Semantic atomism, developed by F. Dretske and J. Fodor and others, proposes that the meaning of a concept is determined by its relation to the thing to which it applies, rather than by its relation to other concepts. “The logic which I will advocate is atomistic . . . When I say that my logic is atomistic, I mean that I share the common-sense belief that there are many separate things.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge atomistic property, another term for punctuate property atonement Philosophy of religion, ethics Originally, the condition of being at one after two parties have been estranged from one another, but later an act or payment through which harmony is restored. The Jewish Day of Atonement (Hebrew Yom Kippur) is a holy day requiring abstinence and repentance from all believers. In Christianity, the primary act of atonement was the self-sacrificial death of Jesus Christ in order to redeem humankind from sin, leading to the reunion of God and men. This mysterious account represents a primitive morality of paying back what one owes, but understanding the nature of this sacrifice has been a topic of debate. Interpretations include paying a ransom exacted by the devil, satisfying an outraged God, restoring God’s honor insulted by sin, repaying what is our debt to God, substituting for us and giving an example of love that inspires repentance. It is difficult to render any of these theories coherent with the notion of a perfect deity. Jesus is innocent and human beings are sinful. How can the sacrifice of the former substitute for that of the latter? If God accepts that sacrifice, how can he be just? The Resurrection of Christ and the identity between the Son and the Father make atonement even more problematic. “Atonement, following our view, is a ‘sheltering’ or ‘covering’, but a profounder form of it.” Otto, The Idea of the Holy ACTITUS -- attitude Ethics, philosophy of action A mental state of approval or disapproval, favoring or disfavoring. It is associated with emotion and feeling, but is contrasted to belief. While belief is concerned with fact and is cognitive, attitude is concerned with evaluation and emotional response. People having the same beliefs might have different attitudes, or have the same attitudes although they have different beliefs toward the same object. Hence the distinction between attitude and belief amounts to the distinction between value and fact. Subjectivist ethics claims that attitude is more directly related to motivation and behavior and that ethical and other value judgments are matters of attitude rather than of cognition. “The term ‘attitude’ . . . designates any psychological disposition of being for and against something.” Stevenson, Facts and Values attribute Metaphysics, logic [from Latin ad, upon + tribure, assign, bestow] In contrast to the notion of substance, attributes are things that can be predicated of or attributed to a substance and are represented by predicates in logic. The development of metaphysics further distinguishes between essential and accidental attributes. An essential attribute is a characteristic a thing must possess during its existence, while an accidental attribute is a characteristic that a thing may or may not possess, and the alteration of which will not affect the nature of that thing. This distinction corresponds to that between essence and accident. An attribute is generally taken to be the same thing as a property, quality, or characteristic. The basic description of attribute is from Aristotle’s philosophy. Attributes are ontological complements to objects. While an object is concrete and ATTRIBUTUM attribute theory of mind ATTRIBUTM -- independent, an attribute is abstract and metaphysically incomplete. Attributes are the different ways of existing that an object exhibits. The notion of attribute also plays an important role in rationalism, especially in the philosophy of Spinoza. For him, attributes were the things that constitute, express, or pertain to the essence or nature of God or substance. Substance has an infinite number of attributes, each of which expresses one infinite and eternal essence. However, human intellect knows only two attributes, thought and extension. This account differed from Descartes, who claimed that thought and extension actually form two independent substances. However, Spinoza thought that there is a real distinction between thought and extension, and he developed a theory of psycho-physical parallelism to explain their interactions. Contemporary philosophy considers a state of affairs as comprising the having of an attribute by an object. Various discussions regarding the notion of attribute are based on the identification of attributes with universals. Philosophers debate questions such as the ontological status of attributes, whether there are uninstantiated attributes and how an attribute is related to an object. There is also a view that can be traced to Aristotle according to which an attribute can be a particular. The white color of Socrates’ skin might be peculiar to Socrates himself and vanish along with his death. A universal attribute, according to this view, is merely a resemblance among particular attributes. “By attributes I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence.” Spinoza, Ethics-- attribute theory of mind, an alternative term for the double-aspect theory attributive adjective Logic, ethics Peter Geach distinguishes attributive adjectives from predicative adjectives. While predicative adjectives have the same application to different nouns to which they are attached, attributive adjectives can yield various applications with regard to different nouns. If X can be both A (a singer), and B (a criminal), and if X can be a CA (an intelligent singer) and CB (an intelligent criminal), then C is a predicative adjective. If X can be both A (a singer) and B (a criminal), and X can be DA (a nice singer), but cannot be DB (a nice criminal), then D is an attributive adjective. The purpose of the distinction is to illuminate the meaning of the concept good by showing that good is an attributive rather than a predicative adjective. “I shall say that in a phrase ‘an A B’ (‘A’ being an adjective and ‘B’ being a noun) ‘A’ is a (logically) predicative adjective if the predication ‘is an A B’ splits up logically into a pair of predications ‘is a B’ and ‘is A’; otherwise I shall say that ‘A’ is a (logically) attributive adjective.” Geach, in Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics SUBLATUM -- aufheben, German word for sublation AUGUSTINIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Augustine of Hippo, St (354–430) Medieval theologian and philosopher, born in Thagaste, North Africa, moved in 383 to teach in Rome and Milan, converted from Manichaeism to Neoplatonism and then to Christianity, and, after returning to North Africa, became Bishop of Hippo in 395. Augustine played a crucial role in the transition from classical antiquity to the Middle Ages. For him, Neoplatonism is a preparation for Christianity, and philosophy can discover wisdom and help to achieve human blessedness. He provided Neoplatonic interpretations of major Christian teachings and made significant contributions to topics such as the corruption of human nature, free will, predestination, sin, love, grace, Divine law, and time. His masterpiece Confessions (397–400) is both a spiritual autobiography and a philosophical classic. His other important works include City of God (413– 26) and The Trinity (420). Augustinian picture of language Philosophy of language A view that Wittgenstein attributed to St Augustine and criticized at the beginning of Philosophical Investigations. According to this view, each word has a meaning which is the object for which it stands, and so it has a meaning in virtue of its being correlated with some entity. This view is criticized as being oversimplified because it concentrates excessively on names and ignores other kinds of words that function very differently from names. Furthermore, even in the case of names the meaning-relation is more complicated. From this view Wittgenstein himself authenticity proceeded to develop an alternative approach to language that emphasizes the multiplicity of different kinds of words and uses of language. “In this [Augustinian] picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations AUTHENTICUM. Augustinianism Philosophy of religion, medieval philosophy A philosophical and theological tradition based on the thought of St Augustine and defended by his followers. Augustine applied Plato’s teaching to Christian dogmas. The main elements of Augustinianism are its doctrines of grace and predestination. Human beings have inherited the sin of Adam and Eve, and have lost the capacity that they had in the original paradisal state to will and do good. Individuals themselves are incapable of ameliorating the situation, and only God’s grace can save them. God’s grace provides humanity with the knowledge of the good and the capacity to will the good and the joy in doing the good. The Scriptures constitute a special revelation that is beyond the reach of philosophy and reason. Faith in Christ alone enables man to understand the world and his own position in it on a rational basis. This later became the official doctrine of grace in the Latin Christian Church. Augustine also claimed that the chance of salvation is predestined and that man’s will is impotent to attain it. The choice of God as to who would be saved and who would be condemned is hidden from us. This view of predestination gives rise to much debate in medieval philosophy. Augustinianism dominated medieval thought until the time of Aquinas. In the twelfth and thirteenth century it became the main rival of Aristotelianism and Thomism and has remained a major part of Western theology. “The gulf between nature and God can be bridged only by grace. This is the governing principle of Augustinianism.” Leff, Medieval Thought AUSTINIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Austin, John (1790–1859) British legal philosopher, born in Creeting Mill, Suffolk, legal positivist. Austin was appointed to the chair of jurisprudence at the newly founded University College, London, in 1826. He founded analytic jurisprudence, which examines the concepts and terminology common to any legal system, rather than focusing on the historical and sociological dimensions of the law. Influenced by his friend Bentham, his view of law was utilitarian, and his command theory of law initiated legal positivist accounts of the distinctive nature and normativity of the law. His masterpiece is The Providence of Jurisprudence Determined (1832). AUSTINIANUM -- Austin, J(ohn) L(angshaw) (1911–60) British philosopher, born in Lancaster, educated and taught at Oxford. As a leading figure of Oxford ordinary language philosophy, Austin maintained that the main task of philosophical investigation is to examine and elucidate the concepts of ordinary language. His most significant contribution to philosophy is the speech act theory, according to which what an utterance is used to do is a main factor in determining its meaning. He understood saying something as performing linguistic acts and classified speech acts into three kinds: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. According to him, we can remove many traditional philosophical problems by distinguishing these acts. His papers are collected in Philosophical Papers (1961), How to Do Things with Words (1961), and Sense and Sensibilia (1962). AUTHENTICUM -- authenticity Modern European philosophy [German Eigentlichkeit, from eigen, own, literally, my ownness, what is mine] Anxiety, the feeling arising from our sense of freedom, reveals to us that each person is uniquely himself or herself and no one else. According to Heidegger, each of us has our own potentialities to fulfill and has to face our death on our own. If, as Heideggerian Dasein, one has a resolute attitude in facing this lonely condition and holds a responsible position toward one’s uniqueness and individuality, that person is said to lead an authentic existence and to be aware of what this condition means. Authenticity holds onto both the future and the past and provides a constancy of the self. It also requires Dasein to accept its own death. Indeed, Heidegger claims that the real authentic self is revealed when one encounters one’s own death. In authenticity, “I” always comes first, although this “I” is not a Subject. If one is led by anxiety to protect oneself through absorption into the mass AUTHORITAS: authoritarianism AUTHENTICUM -- and the anonymous “they,” as people generally do, then that person leads an inauthentic existence. In inauthenticity, “they” comes first, and one’s own existence is lost. This attitude is what Heidegger calls Dasein’s “fallingness,” that is, Dasein’s turning away from itself and allowing itself to be engrossed in day-to-day preoccupations and to drift along with trends of the crowd. “As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.” Heidegger, Being and Time authoritarianism Political philosophy A political view that claims that subjects should obey some authority whose excellence or legitimacy is not open to question. In practice, within an authoritarian political system the government has unlimited power and lacks proper constitutional constraint. The authority can make decisions without needing to consult or negotiate with those to whom the decisions will apply. Such a society is ruled by a person or persons rather than by law. Hobbes’s Leviathan provides a rationale for subjects to obey an authoritarian ruler. In modern times, authoritarianism has been displayed in various forms of dictatorship. It is opposed to liberal individualism and is widely condemned for suppressing individuality and encroaching upon personal rights. Defenders of authoritarianism claim that it can provide security and order for society and that it is preferable to the limitations and corruption of a liberal democratic system. In ethics, authoritarianism is an ethical system that presupposes that the majority are ethically incompetent and need to obey ethically competent authority. “Authoritarianism in its pure form . . . states its basic prescription of obedience in such a way that there is no need for a higher validating principle.” Ladd, The Structure of Moral Code AUTHORITAS -- authority Political philosophy, philosophy of law The right possessed by a person, organization or state to issue commands and have them obeyed. This right implies an obligation upon those who are subject to the authority to respect and obey the commands. AUTHORITAS Authority is a kind of power, but not every kind of power is authority. Several kinds of power are merely coercive and do not have any legitimacy. A major problem in political philosophy is to justify the grounds of state authority that provides the final appeal in settling dispute. Social contract theory is one attempt to provide a solution. It claims that legitimate authority among men can come only through covenants. The scope and limits of state authority also need explanation. Authority can hold in some areas but not in others or over some people but not over others. Max Weber distinguished three kinds of authority: rational-legal authority, which is from reason and law; traditional authority, which is from tradition; and charismatic authority, which is from some special qualities a person has [Greek charisma, divine gift]. Outside political and legal contexts, an authority is a reliable source of information. “To have authority to do something is to have the right to do it.” Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy AUTHORITAS -- authority de facto, see authority de jure authority de jure Political philosophy, philosophy of law Legitimate authority that is derived from rules that people are legally or morally obliged to obey. In contrast, de facto authority is based on power rather than legitimacy. For authority to be stable, power and legitimacy must be combined, and in practice there is no clear way of distinguishing between de jure and de facto authority. Authority de jure is a normative concept that is intrinsically related to the notion of rights. In contrast, authority de facto is a causal concept based on tradition or power. The distinction plays a central role in contemporary discussions of authority and brings together the characteristic concerns of political philosophy with legitimacy and political science with power. The validity of the distinction is questioned by theorists, who hold that one kind of authority is basic and that the other kind of authority must be reduced to it. “So long as men believe in the authority of states, we can conclude that they possess the concept of de jure authority.” Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism AUTONOMUM -- autonomy of language automaton Philosophy of mind, philosophy of action A moving thing whose motion is due to the internal structure of its parts rather than to an external cause. Descartes uses automaton as a synonym of selfmoving machine. For him, the whole world is an automaton, for it contains in itself the corporeal principle of the movements for which it is designed. All animated bodies (including human bodies) are automata and they are not essentially different from inanimate matter but simply exhibit greater complexity in the disposition and function of their parts. Non-human animals are automata pure and simple. All their actions and reactions can be accounted for in terms of the automatic movements of their organs, which are essentially like those performed by any artificially constructed machine. Humans are distinguished from automata because some of their actions are initiated freely by the will. Currently “automaton” may refer either to a machine that imitates human intelligence or to a machine running according to a program. “We do not praise automatons for accurately producing all the movements they were designed to perform, because the production of these movements occurs necessarily. It is the designer who is praised for constructing such carefully-made devices.” Descartes, The Philosophical Writings autonomy Political philosophy, ethics [from Greek auto, self + nomos, law, self-rule] A term traced to Machiavelli, who used it to mean both free from dependence and self-legislation. Rousseau claimed that the people of a politically autonomous society are bound only by the laws that they legislate themselves. Kant applied this notion to the moral domain and established it as a central concept in his ethical theory. A moral agent is autonomous if his will is not determined by external factors and if the agent can apply laws to itself in accordance with reason alone. Such agents respect these laws and are bound only by them. In Kant, autonomy contrasts with heteronomy (from Greek hetero, other + nomos, law, ruled by others) in which one’s will is controlled by outside factors, including one’s desires. Autonomy is linked to freedom and is a necessary condition for ascribing responsibility to an agent. Respect for a person as a self-determined being is a common moral theme. However, since each of us lives in a society and is inevitably constrained by various external elements, it is possible to dispute the extent to which true individual autonomy is possible and practical. In other areas, autonomy is logical or conceptual independence. “Autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.” Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals -- autonomy of grammar, another term for autonomy of language -- autonomy of language Philosophy of language, Metaphysics Also called arbitrariness of grammar, or autonomy of grammar. The view that the grammar of language and its constituent linguistic rules do not mirror the essence of reality or the world, as held by linguistic foundationalism. If language is autonomous, it does not correspond to (with?) extra-linguistic reality, nor is it constrained by such a reality, and an account of reality cannot be justified by what is represented in language. Language is not a product of the rational representation of an external reality. This idea has led Leibniz, Frege, and Russell to attempt to invent an ideal language to construct a better representation of the world than ordinary language. Wittgenstein disagrees with the autonomy of language in his Tractatus, but later embraces and develops it in great detail in his account of language games. He argues that the meaning of a word is determined by grammatical rules governing its use rather than by the external metaphysical nature of the world. Language is like a game, which is determined by its rules. The aims of language are fixed by the rules of grammar. If we change the rules, a word has a different meaning. The autonomy of language does not imply that what a term means is a matter of personal choice, but indicates that language is not merely an instrument to depict what is outside language. In this sense of autonomous, Wittgenstein claims that speaking a language is part of a communal activity and is embedded in a form of life. The idea of the autonomy of language is criticized by essentialists such as Kripke and Putnam, who argue that the meaning of a word is determined -- autonomy of morals -- by the nature of that to which it refers, and that our understanding of the meaning of a word changes in accordance with the development of scientific knowledge of that nature. -- “Those young men whom we have called guardians hitherto we shall call auxiliaries to help the rulers in their decisions.” Plato, Republic -- “The analogies of language with chess are useful in that they illustrate the autonomy of language. Thus in the case of chess there is no temptation to think that it is essential to point outside to some object as the meaning.” Wittgenstein, Manuscript. MEDIANUM -- averageness, another expression for everydayness AUTONOMUM -- autonomy of morals Ethics The claimed independence of morality or ethics as a discipline from other fields such as biology, psychology, sociology, or religion, and even from other disciplines of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology, or political philosophy. Instead, morality is claimed to have its own internal rational methods of justification and criticism. Moral terms do not refer to natural properties and hence cannot be defined by them. Moral judgments cannot be judged by any objective principles outside morality. Value judgments are not derived from statements of fact. The distinction between fact and value, between is and ought, and the alleged naturalistic fallacy are all derived from attempts to justify the autonomy of morals. “The fundamental term of normative evaluation, the one in terms of which the others are defined, must itself be indefinable. This thesis, which many philosophers find quite plausible, may be called the doctrine of the autonomy of morals.” F. Feldman, Introductory Ethics AUXILIARUM -- uxiliaries Political philosophy, ancient Greek philosophy [Greek epikoupoi] In the Republic, the class of warriors in Plato’s Ideal State or its EXECUTIVE branch of government. It was the second class, separated from the class of guardians, which was composed of noble men. The function of the auxiliaries was to carry out the executive orders of the guardians for the preservation and maintenance of the city. While the guardians had knowledge, the auxiliaries only had true beliefs. Their virtue was courage, and they corresponded to the spirited element in the soul. AVERROESIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Averroes (c.1126–98) The Latin name for Ibn Rushd, medieval Islamic philosopher, born in Cordoba, Spain. Averroes composed a massive set of commentaries on the whole corpus of Aristotle’s works. The Latin translations of his commentaries formed an integral part of the educational curriculum in European universities of his time, and, as a result, he was simply called “the commentator.” His careful explication and original discussion of Aristotle’s doctrines, such as those of the soul and of active and passive intellect, exerted great influence on Western medieval philosophy from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, although church leaders frequently condemned some Islamic aspects of teachings. His name is often associated with the doctrine of double truth. His own major work is The Incoherence of the Incoherence (c.1180). Avicenna (980–1037) The Latin name of Ibn Sina, medieval Islamic philosopher and physician, born near Bukhara, Persia. Avicenna introduced Aristotle to the Islamic world and developed a system that combined the philosophy of Aristotle and Plotinus with Islamic thought. God is necessary being and the necessitating cause of all existents. Essence and existence are identical only in God. Avicenna also described the spiritual journey to God in terms of Islamic mysticism. He wrote more than a hundred works on philosophy, religion, and science. His most important philosophical works are Healing: Directives and Remarks and Deliverance, and his Canon of Medicine was a standard textbook until the seventeenth century. The translation of his writings into Latin initiated the Aristotelian revival of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and had profound effects on the Latin West, particularly through the writings of Aquinas. His works were a major influence on Christian theology. avowal Philosophy of mind, philosophy of language A term associated with Wittgenstein’s later account PRINCIPIUM -- axiom of the mind and introduced into philosophy by Ryle. Along with expression and utterance, it is an English translation of the German word Ausdruk. An avowal is the utterance of a first-person present-tense sentence to express a mental state (for example “I am in pain”) rather than to describe something. For Wittgenstein, an avowal is not a cognitive claim that can be true or false, and it makes no sense to justify what I avow by reference to further grounds. Rather, an avowal is an act that characterizes being in the inner state which it expresses. It is nonsense to say that “I know that I am in pain.” This notion is associated with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. This argument rejects the traditional Cartesian claim that an expression of mind is a description of inner mental states and raises many issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. However, it remains controversial whether first-person psychological sentences must be understood as something other than reports of facts about ourselves. “Not many unstudied utterances embody explicit interest phrases, or what I have elsewhere been calling ‘avowals’, like ‘I want’, ‘I hope’, ‘I intend’, ‘I dislike’ . . . ; and their grammar makes it tempting to misconstrue all the sentences in which they occur as self-descriptions. But in its primary employment ‘I want . . .’ is not used to convey information, but to make a request or demand.” Ryle, The Concept of Mind COGNITIO -- awareness, direct and indirect, see immediate perception axiarchism Ethics, metaphysics [from Greek axis, value + arche, rule, rule by what is good and valued] A term invented by John Leslie for the belief that the world is largely or entirely determined by what is ethically valuable, and that things in this world have an intrinsic desire for the good. It is thought that this optimistic metaphysical outlook has been held by many philosophers throughout history. The belief that the universe is the product of a directly ethical requirement is extra axiarchism. “Axiarchism is my label for theories picturing the world as ruled largely or entirely by value.” Leslie, Value and Existence VALIDUM -- axiological ethics, see axiology axiology Ethics [from Greek axios, worthy + logos, theory or study] The general study of value and valuation, including the meaning, characteristics, and classification of value, the nature of evaluation, and the character of value judgments. The topics have traditionally been attached to the general study of ethics, but have developed into a special branch since the last century. Axiology is also called the theory of value and is mainly an epistemology of value. The word “axiology” was first introduced into philosophy by Urban as a translation of the German Werttheorie. Major contributors to axiology as a special discipline include Ehrenfels, Meinong, Brentano, Max Scheler, N. Hartmann, G. E. Moore, R. B. Perry, H. Rashdall, W. D. Ross, and C. I. Lewis. The ethics that extends the analysis of value to practical demands is called “axiological ethics.” “ ‘Axiology’ meant the study of the ultimately worthwhile things (and of course of the ultimately counterworthwhile things) as well as the analysis of worthwhileness (or counterworthwhileness) in general.” Findlay, Axiological Ethics axiom Philosophy of mathematics, logic [from Greek axioma, something worthy of acceptance or esteem] An initial set of propositions selected as the foundations of a systematic field of knowledge. Axioms serve as the basis for a mathematical or logical system, although they themselves cannot be proved within the system. A system in which certain propositions are inferred from axioms in accordance with a set of inferring rules is called an axiomatic system. The propositions derived from axioms are called theorems. Traditionally, a proposition is chosen as an axiom because it is basic, in that it cannot be derived from other propositions in the system, self-evident and intuitively true. Axioms can be divided into non-logical axioms, which are propositions with non-logical contents, and logical axioms, which contain only logical constants and variables. A logical axiom is also called axiom schema, which is a distinctive form of axiom that can be embodied in an infinite number of specific statements. PRINCIPIUM -- axiom of choice -- “Axioms . . . require no such deduction, and for the same reason are evident – a claim which the philosophical principles can never advance, however great their certainty.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason -- axiom of choice Logic, philosophy of mathematics An axiom of set theory formulated by Zermelo. It states that for any infinite set, A, of non-empty subsets, no two of which having a common member, there is a set composed of choosing exactly one member from each of the subsets of the set A. Alternatively, it can be formulated that for a given class of classes, each of which has at least one number, there always exists a selector-function that selects one number from each of these classes. This axiom is independent of other axioms of set theory and many mathematical principles turn out to be equivalent to it. The axiom implies the existence of a set that we are unable to specify and hence challenges mathematical constructivism, which identifies the existence of a mathematical object with its construction by a rule. This axiom is essential for the development of set theory. “The axiom of choice asserts that for every set S there is a function f which associates each nonempty subset A of S with a unique number f (A) of A.” Moore, Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice axiom of infinity Logic, philosophy of mathematics An axiom that is introduced by Russell to define the series of natural numbers in response to difficulties for such a definition arising from his theory of types. The axiom is a hypothesis that there is some type (the lowest type of individuals) with an infinity of instances. This axiom is widely criticized because its commitment to contentious claims about the world seem to exclude it from being a truth of logic. This in turn undermines Russell’s original programme of deriving arithmetic from logic alone. “It cannot be said to be certain that there are in fact any infinite collections in the world. The assumption that there are is what we call the ‘axiom of infinity’.” Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy -- axiom of reducibility Logic, philosophy of mathematics Russell’s ramified theory of types imposes too many restrictions upon mathematics, with the result that substantial mathematical theorems cannot be formulated and proved. To save them, Russell introduces the axiom of reducibility, which sorts propositional functions into levels and claims that for every propositional function of a higher order there exists a corresponding function of the first order which is extensionally equivalent to it. This axiom meets many difficulties, but Russell himself does not take it as a self-evident truth of logic. “The axioms of reducibility, . . . could perfectly well be stated as a hypothesis whenever it is used, instead of being assumed to be actually true.” Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy -- axiom schema, see axiom axiomatic method Logic, philosophy of mathematics The basic procedure of the axiomatic method is (1) the assumption of a set of propositions, axioms, or fundamental truths that are logically independent of one another, and (2) the deduction of theorems (that is, propositions that are logically implied or proven by the axioms) from them in accordance with a set of rules of inference, as we infer a conclusion validly from a set of premises. Its result is to produce an axiomatic system. Axiomatic method has powerfully influenced philosophy, although each feature of the method has been criticized as inappropriate for philosophy. “Familiar in mathematics is the axiomatic method, according to which a branch of mathematics begins with a list of undefined terms and a list of assumptions or postulates involving these terms, and theorems are to be derived from the postulates by the methods of formal logic.” Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic -- axiomatic system Logic, philosophy of mathematics A system in which a series of propositions are derived from an initial set of propositions in accordance with a set of formation rules and transformation rules. The members of the initial set of propositions are called axioms. They are independent, that is, not -- ENFANT TERRIBLE -- Ayer, Sir A(lfred) J(ules) derivable from within the system. The derived series of propositions are called theorems. The formulation rules specify what symbols are used and what combinations of the symbols are to count as axioms and propositions directly derived from axioms. It is thus a system in which all axioms and theorems are ordered in a hierarchical arrangement and the relations between them are necessarily deductive. All propositions conforming to formation rules are called well-formed formulae (wff ). The transformation rules determine how theorems are proved. If there is a decision procedure with respect to which all theorems of the system are provable, the system is said to be sound. If all provable formulae are theorems of that system, the system is said to be complete with respect to that decision procedure. If a system does not involve contradiction, it is said to be consistent. Soundness, completeness, and consistency are the characteristics required of an axiomatic system. “In an axiomatic system a change anywhere ramifies into a change everywhere – the entire structure is affected when one of its supporting layers is removed.” Rescher, Cognitive Systematization axioms of intuition Epistemology, metaphysics For Kant, in order for quantitative experience to be possible, we must apply the categories of quantity, unity, plurality, and totality. We need rules to make these categories conform to the conditions of intuitions of objects. These rules for showing the objective validity of the categories of quantity are the axioms of intuitions. The leading principle for these axioms is that all intuitions are extensive magnitudes, meaning that they have magnitudes that are spatially or temporarily extended. This principle is purported to explain the application of geometry to empirical objects and to render possible the measurement of the experiential world. Kant did not, however, specify what these axioms are. This omission raises questions about the relations between the axioms of intuition and their leading principle and about the relation between the axioms of intuition and the categories of quantity. “Axioms of intuition. Their principle is: All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason ENFANT TERRIBLE -- Ayer, Sir A(lfred) J(ules) (1910–89) British philosopher, born in London, taught at Oxford and London, knighted in 1970. Ayer’s widely read Language, Truth and Logic (1936) linked logical positivism to the British tradition of linguistic analysis, especially Hume’s philosophy, and effectively introduced this anti-metaphysical philosophical movement to the English-speaking world. Ayer discussed various philosophical topics, such as perception, memory, other minds, personal identity, and skepticism and was a pioneer of ethical emotivism. His other books include the Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940), Thinking and Meaning (1947), The Problem of Knowledge (1956), The Central Questions of Philosophy (1972). BACHELARDIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bachelard, Gaston (1884–1962) French philosopher of science and critic, born in Bar-sur-Aube, Professor of the History and Philosophy of Science at the Sorbonne. Bachelard rejected the positivist account of the progress of science by steady incremental accumulation and argued for the role of creative discontinuities or breaks in science and art. He stressed the importance of rejecting fixed orthodoxies and of replacing a static rationalism by a mutable conception of reason. Similar themes appear in his later critical writings. Among his major works are The New Scientific Spirit (1934) and The Psychoanalysis of Fire (1938). backward causation Metaphysics, philosophy of science Causation is normally taken to be forward causation, in which a cause brings about an effect occurring at the same time as the cause or later. However, philosophers such as David Pears and Michael Dummett argue that backward causation is logically possible, with the ordinary temporal direction of causality reversed and the effect preceding its cause. If this is true, a current happening might bring about an earlier event and what happens in the present can affect the past. The plausibility of backward causation depends upon our account of causation. Let us suppose that a cause is a sufficient condition for an event to take place. On this account, if an event occurring at a later time is a sufficient condition for a previous event, then the later event should be seen as a cause of the earlier event. As an example of backward causation, we can consider Aristotelian final causation, according to which an end determines something to act or move in order to realize that end. The end comes into existence later as a result of the earlier action that it determines. Backward causation can also explain many phenomena in quantum mechanics. However, such a notion does not entail that we can interfere with an earlier event, for we can only be an observer rather than an agent for this type of causation. Even so, there is still controversy whether what already exists can be caused by what does not yet exist. “We can conceive of a world in which a notion of causality associated with the opposite direction would have been more appropriate and, so long as we consider ourselves as mere observers of such a world, there is no particular conceptual difficulty about the conception of such a backward causation.” Dummett, “Bringing about the Past,” in Philosophical Review 73 BACONIANUM IMPLCATUM -- Bacon, Francis (1561–1626) British philosopher and statesman, born in London, educated at Cambridge. Bacon was a man of great learning and a complex personality. Through his deep conviction that science, as a systematic study of nature, could positively transform man’s estate, he became a prophet of modern science. He attacked Aristotelian and Platonic traditions and summarized the prejudices and false ways of thinking that hindered the acquisition of knowledge as the “four idols” of the mind. He attempted to construct a new method of scientific discovery, which he called the Great Instauration. Although he did not complete his project, his systematic presentation of the method of scientific induction remains a remarkable achievement. His important philosophical works are The Advancement of Learning (1605) and Novum Organum (1620). His other influential works include Essays (1597) and New Atlantis (1624). BACONIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bacon, Roger (c.1215–c.1292) English medieval philosopher, scientist, and theologian, born in Somerset, taught in Oxford and Paris. Bacon’s rejection of Aristotelian thought and his project for a unified science based on mathematics and experiment anticipated developments in early modern science, but he held that philosophy, mathematics, and the study of language were most importantly devoted to theology and gaining knowledge of God. He held that the role of reason was to formulate hypotheses that could be confirmed only by experimental methods. His major work is Opus Maius (1267). bad faith Modern European philosophy, philosophy of mind [French mauvaise foi, a kind of self-deception; for Sartre not merely a lie to oneself, but a lie about one’s freedom] A person in bad faith takes a negative attitude with respect to himself or herself. This existential phenomenon is highlighted by Sartre in Being and Nothingness and illustrated in his literary works, although his discussion is ambiguous and is subject to much dispute in interpretation. Human reality lies in the intricate relationship between freedom and responsibility. Bad faith ignores their inner relationship, and is an attempt to evade responsibility for what one has freely chosen, by pretending to oneself and others that things are predetermined and could not have been otherwise. A person who falls into bad faith regards himself as merely a passive subject of outside influences. Bad faith refuses to acknowledge that human beings are self-determining and hence differ from things in the world. Bad faith is rooted in our freedom of consciousness and is possible because human consciousness brings nothingness and non-being into the world. The phenomenon reveals the discrepancy inherent in human reality between the human condition and human behavior, between our abstract awareness of our nature and our concrete acts. According to Sartre, a person in bad faith is playing, and the instability of play makes bad faith possible in the face of the apparently paradoxical nature of self-deception. In contrast to bad faith, good faith acknowledges oneself as a self-conscious human being freely and responsibly acting within the world. “It is best to choose and to examine one determined attitude which is essential to human reality and which is such that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself. This attitude, it seems to me, is bad faith.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness bad infinity Metaphysics, philosophy of religion Hegel’s term for an endless series advancing from one thing to another, like a straight line with no end. It is an infinite series of causes and effects and is separated from the finite. A bad infinity contrasts with true infinity, which is closely associated with the finite, for something that is infinite in one perspective can also be finite in another. True infinity is like a circle, finite but unbounded, and it is associated in Hegel’s system with the negation of the negation. From the perspective of bad infinity, God is infinite and the world is finite, and hence there arises a contrast between God and the world. Hegel claims that this division is overcome in the perspective of true infinity. “Something becomes an other; this other is itself somewhat; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum. This infinity is the bad or negative infinity: it is only a negation of an infinite; but the finite rises again the same as ever, and is never got rid of and absorbed.” Hegel, Logic BAIERIANUM IMPLICATUM Baier, Annette (1929– ) New Zealander moral philosopher, born in Queenstown, New Zealand, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh. Baier seeks to understand mental and moral phenomena, including reason and intentionality, in terms of human social being. As a scholar of Hume, she stresses the importance of sentiment and custom in moral life and argues against a conception of moral philosophy that attempts to find a system of universal moral rules. Her main work is Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals (1985). Baier, Kurt (1917– ) Australian moral philosopher, born in Vienna, Austria, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh. Baier argues for the truth and falsity of normative moral judgments and for the objectivity and verifiability of ethics as a rational system governing human interaction, based on the moral point of view rather than egoism. Within this framework, he has developed theories of fairness, obligation, punishment, law, and applied ethics. His main work is From a Moral Point of View (1955). Bain, Alexander (1818–1903) Scottish psychologist and philosopher, born in Aberdeen and Professor of Logic and Rhetoric at University of Aberdeen. Bain sought to unite associationist psychology, reflex physiology and empiricist philosophy in a single theory of the mind and founded the journal Mind to promote this project. His understanding of belief in terms of action prepared the ground for the development of pragmatism. His major works include The Senses and the Intellect (1855) and The Emotions and the Will (1859). BAKUNINIANUM PLICATUM -- Bakunin, Michael (1814–76) Russian political thinker, exponent of anarchism. Bakunin was the major figure of nineteenth-century anarchism as a revolutionary activist and thinker. He argued for a negative revolt against the positive institutions of church and state in order to establish a society based on free cooperation without private property. He rejected the control of society by a scientific elite, including a Marxist elite committed to scientific socialism. His major works include Revolutionary Catechism (1865) and Federalism, Socialism and Anti-Theologism. SOPHISMA -- bald man paradox, see sorites paradox -- SOPHISMA -- barber paradox Logic There is a barber in a remote village who claims to shave all and only those villagers who do not shave themselves. Does the barber shave himself ? If he does, then he does not, because he shaves only those who do not shave themselves; if he does not, then he does, because he shaves all those who do not shave themselves. The barber shaves himself if and only if he does not shave himself. This paradox was recounted by Russell, although he attributed it to an unknown source. It is similar in form to Russell’s paradox, that is, whether the set of all sets that are not members of themselves is a member of itself, but it is different in nature. For while Russell’s paradox has deep implications for logic and mathematics, we may dismiss the existence of such a barber (because there cannot be one). It is for this reason that the barber paradox, together with others of this sort, is called a pseudo-paradox, in contrast to logical and semantic paradoxes. “We respond to the barber paradox simply by saying that there is no such barber.” Sainsbury, Paradoxes BARCANIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Barcan formula Logic A principle in quantified modal logic, introduced by the American logician Ruth Barcan Marcus. It states that if possibly there exists something that is A, then there is something that is possibly A. That is, ◊(∃x)A strictly implies (∃x)◊A. This is also true for its converse: (∃x)◊A strictly implies ◊(∃x)A. The Barcan formula also includes the following thesis: If everything is necessarily A, necessarily everything is A. That is, (∀x) 䊐 A ⊃ 䊐 (∀x)A. The formula is rejected by Kripke and Rescher by appeal to the theory of possible worlds, for in this formula the antecedent might be true of the actual world, but its consequent might be false in certain possible worlds. “. . . The Barcan Formula stipulating the implication from ◊(∃x) φ x to (∃x)◊ φ x.” Rescher, A Theory of Possibility FACTUM -- bare fact, another term for brute fact bare particular Metaphysics A thing changes its properties over time while remaining the same thing. The traditional explanation is that the substance or essence of a thing remains or endures and does not involve change unless the thing itself is destroyed. An alternative account can be provided on the basis of the notion of bare particular. On this view, instead of being a continuing entity, an individual is a series of momentary objects that stand in contingent relations to other objects in the series. These relations guarantee that the thing endures. Each momentary object comprises universal properties, relations, and a further element called a bare particular. The bare particular is the instantiation of the universal properties and serves as the bearer of the characteristics co-present with it. The bare particular is different from either properties or relations, is without characteristics (hence, bare), and is even more basic than time and space. Since a bare particular cannot be a constituent of two different momentary objects, it confers individuality upon substances by being the basis for their numerical oneness. The difference between a basic particular and the usual notion of substance is that it is momentary rather than continuing. The theory of basic particulars is opposed to the cluster theory, according to which a substance is the sum of the characteristics we associate with them. It further opposes the principle of the identity of indiscernibles by allowing the logical possibility of two or more substances having all of their characteristics in common. The notion of bare particulars is disputable. It is suspect epistemologically, for a thing without characteristics is neither perceivable nor knowable. Many philosophers, while finding difficulties in accepting the claim that a particular is a bundle of universals, also reject the notion that a particular can exist without properties. “The bare particular and the pure universal are vicious abstractions from states of affairs.” D. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? DEMANDUM -- bargaining Philosophy of social science, political philosophy A procedure for deciding disputes and negotiating an optimal solution for two or more parties. Bargaining is an important social fact. It is widely used in market economies and daily civil affairs, and the notion has been borrowed by political theorists as a strategy of coalition formation in politics. Bargaining is always a process during which a series of outcomes appear, each yielding some level of utility for the bargaining parties, until a final outcome is reached that is acceptable to each party. It is essential in bargaining to consider carefully what risks one can afford to take as well as the advantages that are offered. “I shall therefore extend ‘bargaining’ to cover any situation where one party offers another either some advantage or the removal of the threats of some disadvantage in return for the other party’s performing some specific action.” Barry, Political Argument BARTHIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Barth, Karl (1886–1968) Swiss theologian, born in Basle, Professor, University of Basle. The sole object of Barth’s theology is the God who addresses fallen human beings with his Word through Jesus Christ. His theology is dialectical rather than metaphysical because it focuses on this revelation and the human response to it rather than focusing on natural theology or an analogy of being between God and human beings. His major works include Romans (1919), Anselm (1931), and Church Dogmatics (1932). basic action Philosophy of action Some actions are done by performing other actions. In some sense, the latter actions cause the former actions. If I am driving a car, the action of driving a car is accomplished by such things as turning the steering wheel, depressing the accelerator or brake, and checking the road and the mirror. These actions in turn are accomplished by moving my hands, feet, and eyes. The chain of actions that are responsible for other actions must terminate in actions that are not accomplished by performing other actions. Danto calls these actions basic actions and calls actions performed by means of other actions non-basic actions. In many cases it is unclear how to identify basic actions. Discussion concerning the nature of basic actions has been a central focus of action theory. “B is a basic action of a if and only if B is an action and (ii) whenever a performed B, there is no other action A performed by a such that B is caused by A.” A. C. Danto, “What We Can Do,” Journal of Philosophy 60 BASICUM -- basic norm Philosophy of law A term introduced by the Austrian legal philosopher Hans Kelsen. As a legal -- basic particulars -- positivist, Kelsen objected to the reduction of the validity of law to morality. How, then, are we to account for the source of legal validity? Kelsen claims that law is a system of norms. Each lower-level norm derives its authority from norms at a higher level. This chain of validation will eventually lead to an ultimate norm, that is, a basic norm (German Grundnorm) which, at the historical starting-point of norm creation conferred legislative power on the fathers of the first constitution. A basic norm is a presupposition that must be assumed by anyone who seeks to explain our knowledge of positive law. As the ultimate power-conferring source, the basic norm corresponds to Austin’s command of the sovereign and Hart’s rule of recognition. “Coercive acts ought to be carried out only under the conditions and in the way determined by the ‘fathers’ of the constitution or the organs delegated by them. This is, schematically formulated, the basic norm of the legal order of a single state.” Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State basic particulars Metaphysics, epistemology Strawson’s term for a distinguishable class of particulars that can be identified and re-identified without reference to particulars of other kinds. Other particulars are identifiable only through making identifying reference to basic particulars. As constituents of our conceptual framework, basic particulars bestow their characteristics upon this scheme. Because the possibility of identifying particulars lies in locating these particulars in a single unified spatio-temporal system, and because material bodies are three-dimensional objects that endure through time and are accessible to observation and experience, Strawson argues that material bodies are the best candidates for basic particulars. -- present experience, such as “I feel a headache.” Propositions of this kind are considered to be basic because of their privileged epistemological position. They are incorrigible, that is, their truth cannot be denied by other evidence. Further, they can provide the test for the truth or falsity of other propositions and are the terminus of any process of empirical verification. In these respects, they are claimed to provide the foundations of all knowledge. But for there to be such incorrigible propositions would require that I have private experiences to which I can give private descriptions, a view sharply disputed in Wittgenstein’s discussion of the possibility of a private language. Other logical positivists call basic propositions “protocol propositions,” “experiential propositions,” observational proposition, or “elementary proposition.” “It is characteristic of these propositions, which I have elsewhere called ‘basic propositions,’ that they refer solely to the content of a single experience.” Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic -- basic sentence, another term for basic proposition Bataille, George (1897–1962) French Nietzschean thinker, born in Billom, curator and librarian. Bataille embraced Nietzsche’s rejection of external authority and certainty to develop an atheistic mysticism that explored the ego and the limits of interior experience. He used the techniques of yoga to replace rational conscious thought with horrific visions of an ineffable beyond. His main works include Theory of Religion (1948), Literature and Evil (1957), and Eroticism (1957). -- “The assertion that material bodies are basic particulars in our actual conceptual scheme, then, is now to be understood as the assertion that, as things are, identifying thought about particulars other than material bodies rests in general on identifying thought about material bodies, but not vice versa.” Strawson, Individuals BAUERIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bauer, Bruno (1809–82) German philosopher, theologian, and historian, Professor at University of Bonn. Bauer became a leading Left Hegelian, who argued that the Christ of the New Testament was a fiction and that political life must be freed from oppressive religious authority. His understanding of Hegel focused on the development of human self-consciousness toward freedom. His main works include The Good Cause of Freedom (1842). BASICUM -- basic proposition Epistemology For logical positivists, a proposition or statement that describes the content of one’s BAUMGARTENIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Baumgarten, Alexander (1714–62) German aesthetician, taught at Berlin and Frankfurt an der Oder. Baumgarten developed Wolff’s systematic philosophy in studies of metaphysics and ethics, but his most important work gave the name to the modern study of aesthetics. His major work was Aesthetica, 2 vols. (1750–8). CRAZY BAYESY -- Bayes, Thomas (1702–61) English clergyman and theorist of probability. Bayes established the basis of an account of confirmation, explaining how evidence can support hypotheses by altering the prior probability of the hypotheses being true. Bayesian philosophy of science has flourished in recent decades. His most important work is An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances (1763). Bayes’s theorem Logic, philosophy of science A theorem of the probability calculus, named after the eighteenthcentury English mathematician Thomas Bayes, which compares the degree of support for a hypothesis prior to acquiring new evidence and after obtaining that evidence. As such it provides the basis for a general account of science. The theorem can be formulated as follows: Prob (H/E) = Prob x Prob (E/H)/Prob , where H is the hypothesis whose probability is to be evaluated, and E is new evidence; Prob is the probability of H prior to acquiring the evidence; Prob is the prior probability of acquiring that evidence; Prob (H/E) is the probability of H given the new evidence; and Prob (E/H) is the prior probability of acquiring the evidence given the assumption that H is true. The theory states that the conditional probability of H given E is greater than the unconditional probability of H to the extent that E is improbable in itself, but probable given H. This theorem indicates rational grounds for altering one’s assessment of probability for a hypothesis in the face of new evidence. On the assumption that belief can vary by degrees, evidence that is improbable on other hypotheses but probable on this hypothesis will raise the degree of belief for this hypothesis more than evidence that is similarly probable on this and other hypotheses. “Bayes’ theorem can be used to justify the assignment of a comparatively high . . . posterior probability to a hypothesis provided the latter’s antecedent probability is not too small.” Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science -- Bayesian epistemology, another expression for Bayesianism -- Bayesianism Epistemology, philosophy of science Also called Bayesian epistemology, a theory of epistemic justification, claiming that a belief P is justified if and only if the probability of P is reasonably high and that the probability for changing epistemic justification through the acquisition of new data can be calculated and predicated according to the probability calculus, including Bayes’s theorem. On a Bayesian view, the assignment of probability to belief is both subjective and rational. Different investigators can subjectively hold hypotheses with different initial degrees of belief. The operation of Bayes’s theorem in rationally altering these subjective assignments in the light of new evidence will tend toward convergence in the beliefs held by the investigators. In using evidence, evidence that is unlikely in itself but likely on a given hypothesis will increase the degree of belief in that hypothesis more than evidence that is likely in itself or equally likely on this and competing hypotheses. Because of its emphasis on the role of new evidence, the theory does not deal so well retrospectively with old evidence, and the prior assignment of likelihood can also be arbitrary. Also the balance between subjectivity and rationality can be questioned, with parallel tracks of investigation rather than convergence being a possible outcome. “Bayesianism is like probabilism in maintaining that: scientists’ (and others’) degrees of belief are measured by probabilities, but unlike probabilism, it sees no significance in very high or low probabilities.” Miller, Critical Rationalism Bayle, Pierre (1647–1706) French skeptic. Bayle argued with wit and scholarship against the presumptions of reason to establish religious and philosophical truth. He examined a wide range of historical thinkers as well as biblical and mythological figures to support his skeptical conclusions. His views were widely influential among eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers. His most important work is Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697). BEATIFICUM -- beatific vision Philosophy of religion A term introduced by Thomas Aquinas for the vision of God. This vision does not use the senses, concepts, or any mental structures or processes. Instead it is meant to be an intimate and direct union with God. It is a kind of supernatural light by which one sees God face to face. All reasoning and deliberation is eliminated, although the certitude of judgment remains. Within it, God’s essence is manifested. This is what man’s ultimate beatitude consists in, as the consummation of the union with God. By nature, the vision belongs to God alone, but he grants it to human beings when he embraces them. Philosophers examine what the epistemological implications of beatific vision would be. “In order that a person comes to the full, beatific vision, the first requisite is that he believes God, as a learner believing the master teaching him.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae PULCHRUM -- beauty Aesthetics An object’s capacity to arouse pleasant experiences for its observer. For Plato, whose dialogues Hippias Major, Symposium, Phaedrus, and Philebus concentrate on the notion of beauty (Greek kalon), it is an objective form, a paradigm shared and imitated by all things that we call beautiful. Beauty is thus knowable and measurable. For others, beauty lies in the “eye of the beholder” and is not inherent in objects. On this view, beauty must be linked to human apprehension, and different individuals may respond differently to the same object. Accordingly, beauty is subjective. Other positions claim that beauty is produced through the relation between an object and its observer. Philosophers also disagree whether beauty is a unifying notion. Some claim that beauty is a general notion of aesthetic value, encompassing all other aesthetic experiences. To be beautiful amounts to “to be recommendable aesthetically.” Consistent with this understanding, beauty cannot be defined in terms of other qualities, and can only be intuited. Others believe that beauty is merely one species of aesthetic value, alongside such qualities as elegance, harmony, or uniformity. Until the eighteenth century, beauty was considered to be the central notion of aesthetics, as good was the central notion of ethics. The most important question for aesthetics was, “What is beauty?” Then aesthetics becomes more concerned with the notion of art. While for ancient thinkers, all works of art were beautiful, this ceased to be true in modern times. Many modern artworks are thought to be ugly according to the common standard, although they might still be beautiful according to some peculiar theories of art or within some aesthetic practices. The notion of beauty is still not fully explored in contemporary aesthetics. “For beauty includes three conditions: integrity or perfection, since these things which are impaired are by that very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness or clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright colour.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–86) French existentialist and feminist, born in Paris. De Beauvoir was Sartre’s life-long companion and an independent and original thinker in her own right. She was best known for her book The Second Sex (1949), which explored women’s social situation and historical predicament and provided a systematic analysis of gender and sexual difference. The book is the most important classic in the development of contemporary feminism. Her other philosophical work includes The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947). She was a well-known novelist and autobiographical writer, with works including Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter (1958), The Prime of Life (1960), The Force of Circumstance (1963), A Very Easy Death (1964), All Said and Done (1972), and A Farewell to Sartre (1981). becoming Metaphysics [from Greek gignesthai, coming to be, the generation of something new] Aristotle’s term for substantial change in which a new composite of form and matter is generated. In contrast, kinesis (Greek, motion) is reserved for non-substantial changes in quality, quantity, or place. Gignesthai is also contrasted with phthora (Greek, ceasing to be), and one of Aristotle’s books is entitled Peri geneseos kai phthoras (On Coming to Be and Ceasing to Be, Latin De Generatione et Corruptione). However, Aristotle did not always observe the distinction between gignesthai and kinesis and sometimes uses these terms interchangeably. CONDUCTUM -- behavioral theory of meaning In contemporary philosophy, becoming is generally understood in the sense of Aristotelian substantial change, that is, a change involving something coming into existence from the present to the future rather than a change in the attributes of some existing thing. Some philosophers such as McTaggart claim that the distinction between present and future is not real. On this view, it becomes difficult to answer the questions of what the thing is that becomes and what becoming itself is. C. D. Broad proposed that becoming is a sui generis type of change that defies analysis. “Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or ever perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematography inside us.” Bergson, Creative Evolution COMMUNICATUM -- Bedeutung, see sense and reference – COLEOPTERA -- beetle in a box Philosophy of language, epistemology Part of Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of a private language. Suppose every language user has a private box into which no one else is allowed to look, and suppose that we refer to the contents of these boxes as beetles. Since the contents of different boxes are different, the word “beetle” plays no role in the language-game at all, for other language users have no idea what it means. They use the same word “beetle,” but it may refer to totally different things. By analogy, if one ascribes a private definition or name to one’s private sensations, it is semantically irrelevant, for it has no genuine sense and cannot be used as a name. “Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle . . . If so it would not be used as a name of a thing.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations PETITIO PRINCIPII -- begging the question Logic Also called petitio principii or circular reasoning. A kind of informal logical fallacy that assumes implicitly as a premise in an argument something to be proved. That is, at least one premise needs support from the conclusion to be argued for. Sometimes the circularity can only be exposed after a series of intermediate arguments. For instance, one uses S1 to argue for S2, and uses S2 to argue for S3, and so on until Sn, but then one uses Sn to argue for S1. Since it is a general requirement that the evidence used to establish a conclusion should have prior and independent reliability, circular reasoning seriously undermines the acceptability of an argument. However, not all circularities are vicious. “Since the aim of a proof is to bring knowledge, the conditions for a proof’s being circular or begging the question are stated in terms of knowledge.” Nozick, Philosophical Explanations behavior Philosophy of mind Broadly, all actions and reactions and the workings and performances of all kinds of material things. For the purposes of behaviorism, it is restricted to animal or specifically human actions comprising all publicly observable ordinary voluntary or involuntary acts, such as running, walking, talking, or eating. Behavior normally implies a relationship with mind or consciousness, but includes mere physical movements or passions of the body. Sometimes philosophers call the former behavior proper and the latter physical behavior. Behavior is the central notion of behaviorism, which seeks to eliminate any mentalistic entity or property in the explanation of what we do or to reduce these mental things to physical entities or properties. “ ‘Behaviour proper’ entails ‘physical behaviour’, but not all ‘physical behaviour’ is ‘behaviour proper’, for the latter springs from the mind in a certain particular way.” D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind CONDUCTUM -- behavioral theory of meaning Philosophy of language Behaviorism rejects any account of the mental that requires positing inner and publicly inaccessible items and claims that overt behavior, construed in terms of a stimulus-response model, provides the basis for understanding mental life. By applying this approach to analyze the concept of meaning, some philosophers suggest that the meaning of an utterance is the response it evokes in an audience in a particular context. The forerunner of this tendency was John B. Watson. The linguist L. Bloomfield put forward a simple version of such a theory that claims that meaning can be identified with regularly evoked behavioral responses. Charles Morris, who assumed that every meaningful expression is a sign for something, elaborated a more sophisticated version of this theory, based on dispositions to respond rather than actual overt responses. According to Morris, meaning is identified with considered dispositions to response produced by utterances. A certain level of behavioral disposition is sufficient for a mental life. Charles L. Stevenson’s discussion of the emotive meanings of evaluative terms also falls within this theory. However, the theory does not leave room for the relation between a sentence and the sorts of things it is used to talk about. Moreover, behavior does not always carry with it mental states. The theory ceased to be a focus of philosophical debate with the decline of behaviorism. “The behavioural theory of meaning also concentrates on what is involved in using language in communication, but it differs from the ideational theory in focusing on publicly observable aspects of the communication situation.” Alston, Philosophy of Language -- behaviorism Philosophy of mind Contemporary behaviorism had its origins in psychology, with the Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) and especially the American psychologist J. B. Watson (1878–1958). It was extended by B. F. Skinner and others as an attempt to explain psychological functioning in terms of observed behavioral data. It stands in contrast to introspective psychology, which appeals to the notion of a mental state. Behaviorism was introduced to philosophy, particularly by G. Ryle in The Concept of Mind, as a new approach to dealing with the relationship between mind and body. Philosophical behaviorism is a type of reductive materialism that proposes that all our talk about mental states and process can be explained by a set of statements about people’s overt behavior or disposition to behave. Accordingly, there is no need to appeal to an inner life or to mental phenomena such as desires, beliefs, moods, or emotions as separately existing entities. Descartes’s mental substance, which is contrasted to physical substance, constitutes the myth of the ghost in the machine. The later Wittgenstein’s private language argument is also said by some to be a version of behaviorism, although others deny this interpretation. Through its criticism of the dominant mind–body dualism of modern philosophy, behaviorism avoids certain intrinsic difficulties of dualism, such as the interaction between mind and body, but its total repudiation of inner mental states makes it unable to explain many phenomena. Two persons with completely similar behavior could nevertheless differ psychologically. This and other theoretical problems led to the emergence of the identity theory of mind and functionalism as anti-dualist strategies. “According to philosophical behaviourism, for something to ‘have a mind’ is simply for it to be a material object that behaves, or is disposed to behave, in certain complicated ways.” Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity ESSE -- being Metaphysics, logic A participle from the verb “to be.” Its Greek equivalence is on, so ontology means a theory of being. Being can be ascribed to everything that can be talked about. Whatever we say using language must involve the verb “to be” in some form, and in this sense, as Hegel says, it is the widest but also the emptiest of all notions. Merely to say that something is amounts to saying nothing about it. But when Parmenides took being as a kind of subject-matter, his speculation about the nature of being was an attempt to locate the object of knowledge and to explain that it is the simple and unchanging ultimate reality behind the changing sensible world. Starting from Parmenides, metaphysics takes “what being is” as its central question. Different metaphysical systems can be viewed as different answers to this question. Plato claimed that only the universal forms are beings, while sensible things are both being and not being. His distinction initiates the lasting dichotomies between reality and phenomenon and between universal and particular. He eventually identified being in the truest sense with the Good. Aristotle thought that being is not a genus divisible into species, but rather that it has many senses. In his Categories, he discusses ten senses of being and argues that substance is the primary sense, while other categories such as quality, quantity, and relation are secondary senses. Thus, in seeking to determine “what is being” Aristotle focused his investigation on substance. Primary being is primary substance, which in turn is primary essence. Aristotle’s ontology is the source of the dichotomy between substance and attributes and between essential and accidental properties. In some of his discussion, he ascribed primary substance, that is, primary being, to God. The medieval metaphysicians distinguished between existence (that it is) and essence (what it is) on the basis that everything is created by God. God alone is the unity of existence and essence, while all other existing things have their essence necessarily grounded in God. Descartes claimed, “I think, therefore I am,” and Berkeley’s slogan was “To be is to be perceived.” These theses essentially determine the development of modern philosophy. The discussions of substance and essence in modern philosophy are all discussions about being. Contemporary existentialism is also mainly concerned with the relation between existence and essence in the search for authentic meaning in the contingency of human life. Heidegger claimed that we are still not clear about the word “being,” and launches a new investigation into the meaning of Being in his Being and Time. However, many other philosophers, such as Hume, Kant, Frege, Moore, Wittgenstein, and the logical positivists believe that it is a mistake to ask questions about what is being. Traditional metaphysics fails to notice that the verb “to be” has a number of different uses, as copula, as sign of identity, as a sign of existence. Being or existence, that is, the existential sense of “to be,” is argued by contemporary philosophical logicians not to be a first-order predicate that ascribes a property to an object, but rather to be a second-order predicate that ascribes a property to a concept. The tendency to reject the pursuit of necessary existential grounds for contingent things does not imply that the question “what being is” disappears. Quine believes that in asking about being we are asking what it is for an entity of any given kind to exist. His answer is that “to be is to be the value of a variable.” What exists is anything that can be substituted for a variable of an acceptable quantified formula if that formula could form part of a scientifically acceptable theory about the world. A major focus of current discussion of being in analytic philosophy concerns what we should say about the existence of abstract entities such as possibilities, numbers, and classes and what we should say about the existence of fictitious entities, such as characters in a novel. Another version of the question “what being is” asks what is the distinguishing mark of an existing thing and leads on to questions of the distinguishing features of identity. “And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz what being is, is just the question, what is substance?” Aristotle, Metaphysics being (Aquinas) Metaphysics, medieval philosophy [Latin esse or ens] Following Aristotle, Aquinas believed that the word “being” is used in many ways and distinguished the actually existent in its own right (ens per se), the actually existent coincidentally (ens per accidens), potential and actual existents, and existence in the sense of the true (esse ut verum). In addition to restating Aristotle’s doctrines of being, Aquinas distinctively held that the existent in its own right is the predicate that is genuinely predicated of an individual, and is therefore a first-order predicate. In contrast, existence in the sense of true is ascribed to the predicate that indicates the nature of a kind and can therefore be applied to any subject of that kind, but does not belong to an individual. Thus existence in the sense of true is a second-order predicate that does not carry existential import. This idea was taken by Frege for his diagnosis of existence according to which existence is not a predicate. Aquinas clearly stated the distinction between existence (the fact that it is) and essence (what a being is), a contrast that originated in Avicenna’s distinction between necessary and possible being. All finite things owe their existence to the creation of God and do not exist necessarily in virtue of their essence. Only in God is there a unity of existence and essence. “We use the verb ‘is’ to signify both the act of existing, and the mental uniting of predicate to subject which constitutes a proposition.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae --- Das Sein: For Hegel, the existence of things in general, in contrast to their inner essence and also to the antithesis of thought. More specifically, being serves as the first category in Hegel’s logic. In this sense, being is pure, without any determination, although it can be thought. To say of something that it is means merely that it is and nothing more. Being is thus in contrast to Dasein (determinate being). Since for Hegel there is nothing to think about regarding pure being, it passes into nothingness. To think about being amounts to thinking about nothing and vice versa. Being and nothing are synthesized in the category of becoming, which in a sense is being and in another sense is nothing. Being, nothing, and becoming form the first triad of Hegel’s dialectic. Hegel associated being with Parmenides and becoming with Heraclitus. While Greek philosophy generally valued being over becoming, Hegel emphasized becoming as the development of spirit rather than being. This change of focus has exerted profound influence upon German philosophy. “Being is the notion implicit only: its special forms have the predicate ‘is’; when they are distinguished they are each of them an ‘other’; and the shape which dialectic takes in them, i.e. their further specialisation, is a passing over into another.” Hegel, Logic being (Heidegger) Metaphysics, contemporary European philosophy Like Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger particularly emphasizes being as the subject-matter of philosophy. However, the meaning of being for him differs considerably from traditional conceptions. The Western metaphysical tradition has been centered on the question, “What is Being?”. For Heidegger, the question up to his time not only lacks an answer, but is also obscure and without direction. All traditional approaches to being, Heidegger says, are concerned not with Sein (Being itself ), but Seinede (beings). Seinede is translated as “existents,” “entities,” “beings,” or “assents,” that is, as individual existents or as essential properties. Thus a concern with beings has led to a forgetfulness of Being. The distinction between Being and entities is prior to the traditional distinction between being as essence and being as existent. Thus we not only lack a proper answer to the meaning of Being, but the question of Being as well is not properly constructed. Traditional metaphysics or ontology since Plato and Aristotle has changed the study of being into the study of entities. Heidegger’s distinction leads him to reinterpret the history of Western philosophy, in particular to destroy the history of ontology. His Being and Time seeks to provide a disclosure of Being through unlocking what the forgetfulness of Being hides from us. For Heidegger himself, Being is the Being of entities, but it is not itself a kind of entity. Rather it determines entities as entities. He never gives an explicit answer to what Being itself is, but says that this inquiry should proceed through an analysis of an entity that enjoys a privileged relationship with Being in general. This entity is Dasein, the only entity that can question its own existing and raises the question of Being. To distinguish his own philosophy from traditional metaphysics and ontology, he calls his own metaphysics “fundamental ontology,” that is, philosophy that is concerned with the foundations of any other ontology. The study of Dasein is supposed to be preliminary to understanding Being in general. But Heidegger never finished his work to show how such a general understanding is reached. “Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being.” Heidegger, Being and Time -- l’être-pour-soi: In Sartre’s distinction between two regions of being, being-for-itself is human consciousness or conscious being, in contrast to being-in-itself [French l’être-en-soi], a thing or nonconscious being. Here, “for-itself ” means being that has presence to itself. The distinction is essentially a distinction between mind and body, consciousness and things. Sartre employs different words to avoid the impression of dualism. Being-for-itself is also being-in-itself insofar as its “is” is concerned, but it is characterized by the negative activity of consciousness, that is, by the freedom of choice. A human being, as a being-for-itself, is the only being that can detach itself from the rest of the world and thereby cause “Nothingness” to emerge. In this sense, the belief distinction between being-for-itself and being-initself corresponds to the distinction between nothingness and being. “. . . the being of the cogito has appeared to us as being-for-itself ”. Sartre, Being and Nothingness being-in-itself, see being-for-itself being-in-the-world Contemporary European philosophy [German In-der-Welt-sein] A central term in Heidegger’s Being and Time. To say that Dasein is being-in-the-world does not mean that Dasein is spatially contained in the world. The world here does not mean the universe or the connections of real things, but is an existential-ontological concept, referring to the historical and cultural contexts in which Dasein exists or is formed. This world is not external, but belongs to Dasein’s own structure. Dasein, as Being-there, must have a place. Being-in-the-world is the basic state or the fundamental existential constitution of Dasein. It is a unitary phenomenon. By this term Heidegger indicated the inseparability of human being from the world and was thus opposed to the traditional approach to a human being an isolated agency. The structure of Being-in-the-world is characterized by care, and is revealed by existential analysis. “In the preparatory stage of the existential analytic of Dasein, we have for our leading theme this entity’s basic state, Being-in-the-world.” Heidegger, Being and Time -- being qua being: Aristotle’s term for the subject-matter of metaphysics, in which qua being specifies the aspect of being to be treated. Mathematicians deal with number qua number, namely, the numerical character of number. Philosophers are concerned with being qua being by investigating things with respect to the nature of their being. Since Aristotle divided being into many categories, being qua being deals with being in each category. Ontology, as the science of being qua being, considers how each of these categories can be a kind of being and how different senses of beings are related to each other. A study of being qua being does not involve questions of content but addresses only the nature of being itself. Therefore it is a universal science, contrasted with the special sciences that study distinct classes of being. Because according to the focal meaning pattern all senses of being are related to substance, the study of substance (ousiology) is the chief and central subject-matter of the science of being qua being. Aristotle’s description of being qua being is ambiguous, giving rise to several major disputes, for example concerning whether being qua being can be reduced to substance and concerning how the science of being qua being can be connected to theology – Aristotle’s other account of the subject-matter of metaphysics. “There is a science which investigates being qua being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.” Aristotle, Metaphysics being-with Contemporary European philosophy [German Mitsein] A central feature of Heidegger’s Dasein, according to which we are not isolated from other humans, but are so constituted that our being is available in principle to one another even prior to our experience of others. Being-with aims to reject the isolation of the individual in the social world through the constitution of Dasein, in the way that the concept of being-in-the-world rejects the isolation of the individual in the world. Being-with thus seeks to overcome the account of the isolated self in the Cartesian tradition and especially in the works of Husserl. “Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is being-with Others . . .” Heidegger, Being and Time belief Epistemology Since Plato defined knowledge as justified belief plus a logos, belief has been a central concept in epistemology. Many discussions in the theory of knowledge take belief rather than knowledge as their starting-point. It is generally thought that belief is inherently relational and thus needs an object. Belief has often been represented as a state available to introspection with a certain relation to a present image or complex of images. The object of belief has been variously understood to be an actual or possible sensory state, a state of affairs, or a proposition. “I believe that P” means that I have an attitude of acceptance toward P, with some (possibly inconclusive) reason. But functionalism disputes the view that belief must have an object. Traditionally, belief is considered as a state of mind serving as a causal factor in behavior, but Ryle argued that belief is a tendency to say or to do something, rather than a state of mind. Most analyses of belief hold that beliefs are either true or false, although intuitionists hold that some beliefs are neither true nor false. In addition, probabilism or probability theory holds that belief comes in degrees. There is also an eliminativist rejection of belief as a postulated entity in outdated folk psychology. Major philosophical issues about belief include the possibility of infallible belief as the ultimate justification of other beliefs, the relation of belief with acceptance, reason, conceptual and linguistic capacity, the relation between justified true belief and knowledge and the distinction between belief de re and belief de dicto. Moore’s paradox, which arises from the absurdity of uttering “P, but I do not believe that P,” and the intentionality of belief sentences raise important questions about the nature of belief. “To believe is thus nothing but to accept something of which I am not yet logically certain. Belief, furthermore, is also a practically sufficient holding-to-be-true.” Kant, Lectures on Logic CREDITUM -- belief de dicto Epistemology, logic [Latin dicto, proposition] Belief de dicto, or de dicto belief, is the acceptance of a proposition and has the form “I believe that P.” In contrast, belief de re, or de re belief, is belief about an individual object [Latin res, thing], and has the form “I believe of A that it is X.” Belief de re puts the believer in a particular relation to the believed object or person. The believer is ascribing something to that object. It implies that there must be an object that the belief is about. Belief de dicto, on the other hand, does not involve such a relation. The distinction is drawn for the purpose of determining the nature of belief attributions. Some argue that belief de re can be characterized as a species of belief de dicto, because belief de re can be thought to be a belief about a singular proposition, or because a belief de re must presuppose a de dicto belief. In contrast, some philosophers argue that belief de re ascribes a real relation between believers and the object of their belief. “There are two varieties of belief – de re beliefs, which are somehow ‘directly’ about their objects, and de dicto beliefs, which are about their objects only through the mediation of a dictum, a definite description (in a natural language, or in some ‘language of thought’).” Dennett, Kinds of Minds belief de re, see belief de dicto belief/desire thesis Philosophy of action A thesis that originated with Hume and provides an answer to the question what it is for an agent to have a reason to act. The thesis states that there are two factors that motivate us to act: desire and belief. Joining these two factors gives a sufficient condition for an agent to act in a certain way. However, Hume maintained that desire is an essentially motivating state, for it is internally related to motivation, but that belief motivates in a contingent way, because it can only fulfill its motivating function with the help of desire. The desire to drink a cup of water provides the motivational push but cannot determine whether the water is drinkable. This sort of information is supplied by belief, although belief does not have motive force in itself. Desires without beliefs are blind, and beliefs without desires are inert. There have been recent attempts to give alternatives to the belief/desire thesis as an account of motivation. “A complete motivating state – a state which is sufficient for action – must be a combination of belief and desire. This is the belief/desire thesis.” Dancy, Moral Reasons -- belief in Philosophy of religion Traditionally, “belief in” is seen to be an evaluative attitude to a person, whether human or divine, while “belief that” is a cognitive attitude to a proposition. “Belief that” is also called propositional belief. The standard modern analysis of belief suggests that the object of belief is a proposition P and that all belief can be reduced to “belief that,” for “I believe P” amounts to “I believe that P is true.” In line with this program there has been an attempt to eliminate the distinction between “belief in” and “belief that.” But this turns out to be difficult. “Belief in” includes “belief that,” but possesses an additional proattitude. BERDYAEVIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Berdyaev, Nikolai That “I believe in God” not only implies that “I believe that God exits,” but also involves commitment or trust toward God. “Belief in” in such cases is identical with faith. While “belief that” can be corrected or removed easily, “belief in” is often unshakeable by counter-experience. Whether this approach to reducing “belief in” to “belief that” can succeed is still a matter of dispute in epistemology. “The question whether belief-in is or is not reducible to ‘belief-that’ is by no means trivial, nor is it at all an easy question to answer.” Price, Belief CREDITUM belief that, see belief in H. P. Grice’s principle of conversational beneficence -- beneficence Ethics [from Latin bene, well or good + facio, to do] Literally doing something to promote the good or interest of somebody else, due to a benevolent character. The word “benefit” comes from the same root. Beneficence is to act in a way that benefits others, and it is supplemented by non-maleficence [from Latin male, bad + facio, to do], that is, doing no harm. Beneficence has been recognized as a basic obligation or duty. To deal with possible conflicts between the principle of beneficence and other duties, such as the respect for autonomy, is a major topic in various areas of applied ethics. “[I]t must be remembered that ‘duty of beneficence’ means an obligation to do good to others.” Nowell-Smith, Ethics H. P. Grice’s principle of conversational benevolence Ethics Affection for others, a desire for the good of others, or a disposition to act to promote their welfare. Benevolence is associated with love, compassion, charity, and altruism. Benevolence is an altruistic sentiment that motivates us to act for the interests of others for their own sake. Some moral philosophies, such as Christian ethics, Hume’s ethics, and especially utilitarianism, ascribe benevolence fundamental importance in ethics. Nevertheless, humans generally give priority to the pursuit of their own interests, and the explanation of the general presence of benevolence in human nature and attempts to explain altruism in terms of benevolence remain matters of dispute. “The term [‘benevolence’] stands for a positive reaction to other people’s desire and satisfactions, which the benevolent person has only because they are the desires and satisfactions of others.” B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy BENJAMINIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940) German Marxist cultural and literary theorist, born in Berlin, a member of the Frankfurt School. Benjamin’s ironic writings on art and culture initiated many themes at the center of current philosophical assessments of modernity. He was drawn to popular culture, especially theater, photography, and cinema, and to the experience of European urban life in a period of crisis. His critical and theoretical originality grew from close attention to social and aesthetic phenomena that he explored. His main works include The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928) and Illuminations (1968). Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832) English political, legal, and moral philosopher and social reformer, founder of utilitarianism, born in London. Bentham sought to promote “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” as the aim of both action and legislation, and he developed a “hedonistic calculus” to determine the amount of happiness, that is, the quantities of pleasure and pain, brought about by alternative courses of action. He sought to use utilitarianism to design a perfect legal and political system, rather than as an ethics to guide personal action. Major works are: A Fragment on Government (1776) and An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). Berdyaev, Nikolai (1874–1948) Russian religious philosopher, born in Kiev, Professor of Philosophy at University of Moscow before exile in Paris. Berdyaev’s religious philosophy emphasized human subjective ethical creativity in a fallen world, although he held that human individuals can achieve their full personality through mystical access to inexpressible knowledge of a noumenal world of values. His existentialist account of the priority on freedom recognizes evil, but links human creativity to the creativity of God. His main works include The Meaning of History (1923) and The Destiny of Man (1931). BERSONIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bergson, Henri (1859–1941) French philosopher, born in Paris, Professor at the Collège de France from 1900 to 1921, the recipient of the 1927 Noble Prize for literature. For Bergson, whereas science is based on intellect and concerns the inert physical world, metaphysics is based on intuition and concerns spirit. In his Time and Free Will (1889), Bergson distinguished between the scientific concept of spatialized time and continuous duration, the time of direct experience. He used duration to criticize mechanism and determinism and to explain the nature of human freedom. In Creative Evolution (1907), he combined Darwin’s theory of evolution, Plotinus, and traditional French vitalism, holding that there is a creative impetus of life (élan vital) that underlies and determines the whole evolutionary process to make the world dynamic rather than static. Bergson believed that his views explained the dominant features of evolution better than Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Other major works include Matter and Memory (1896) and Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). ESSE EST PERCIPI -- Berkeley, George (1685–1753) Irish philosopher, born at Kilkenny, Ireland, a fellow at Trinity College, Dublin in 1707, Anglican bishop of Cloyne from 1734. As an immaterialist, Berkeley rejected the existence of inert material substance and attacked the doctrine of abstract ideas. He also rejected Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities and argued that sensible objects are not mind-independent, but are a collection of perceived qualities. His highly original thesis “to be is to be perceived” (esse est percipi) made him the most important representative of subjective idealism. Whatever is not actually perceived by human beings is an object of perception of God. His view that natural sciences should focus on what experience reveals to us and on predicting human experience has great influence on nineteenth- and twentieth-century positivism. His main works are: An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), De Motu (1721), and Siris (1744). BERNOULLIANUM IMPLICATUM Bernoulli’s theorem Logic A theorem about the probability of the frequency of occurrence of events in a sequence of independent trials, first proved by the Swiss mathematician Jakob Bernoulli (1654–1705). Suppose that we have a sequence of n trials. If there is a possible outcome, A, of each trial, and the probability P of A in each trial is the same, then as the number n of trials increases and approaches infinity, the probability of the relative frequency of As in the sequence lies within the range P ± x, where x is an arbitrary small number. This is also called the weak law of large numbers. -- “Bernoulli’s theorem in its classical form holds as an approximation for the direct inference, if the sample is larger and the population still larger or even infinite.” Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability BERLINIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Berlin, Isaiah, Riga-born philosopher and historian of ideas, educated and taught at Oxford, knighted in 1957. Berlin was a leading liberal thinker who turned from analytic philosophy to the history of ideas. He was an important figure in the contemporary revival of political philosophy in the Englishspeaking world. His commitment to the diversity of incompatible ultimate values led him to reject claims that there is a single ideal of the good life. He also rejected Hegelian and Marxist claims of the inevitability of objective progress of history. He envisaged a liberal society in which a variety of ends of life are pursued and social organization is based on small autonomous communities. He famously distinguishes two senses of liberty: the negative liberty characterized as the absence of obstructions, and the positive liberty characterized by self-mastery, and claimed that the latter was liable to lead to totalitarianism. His major works include Historical Inevitability (1954), Two Concepts of Liberty (1959), Vico and Herder (1976), Concepts and Categories (1979), Against the Current (1980), The Crooked Timbers of Humanity (1991), and Magus of the North (1993). PARADOXA BERRYANA -- Berry’s paradox Logic A paradox formulated in Principia Mathematica by Russell and Whitehead and attributed by Russell to Berry, a librarian at the Bodleian Library in Oxford. Names of integers consist of a finite sequence of syllables in English. Some of them can be named in one syllable (such as 2, 5), and others need at least two (such as 7, 14). All the names of some integers must consist of at least 19 syllables and among these there must be a least. Now the phrase The least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables expresses a finite integer. Although any name of this integer must contain at least 19 syllables, the words printed above in italics amount to a name for it and they contain only 18 syllables. This is contradictory. “A third [semantical paradox] is Berry’s, concerning the least number not specifiable in less than nineteen syllables. That number has just now been specified in eighteen syllables.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View intends to create a possible world, but also knows what is the best and has the capacity to actualize it, our world must actually be the best. Accordingly, it is a logical consequence of orthodox theism that our world is the best possible world. This idea is satirized by Voltaire in Candide through his protagonist’s claim that “everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.” “This supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best . . . There would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better . . . So it may be said that if this were not the best of all possible worlds, God would not have created any.” Leibniz, Theodicy BERTRANDIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bertrand’s paradox Logic A paradox proposed by the French mathematician Joseph Bertrand (1822–1900). How can we find the probability that a randomly drawn chord to a given circle is longer than one side of an equilateral triangle inscribed in the same circle? It is longer if its midpoint falls at the inner half of the radius that bisects the chord. Its probability is 1/2. It is also longer if its midpoint lies in the area of the inner circle with radius bisecting the original; since this circle occupies one quarter of the area of the original, its probability is 1/4. There are further possibilities. This paradox shows that the principle of indifference cannot be simply used in choosing among alternatives in such cases. BICONDITIONALIS -- biconditional Logic Also called material equivalence. -- The combination of the conditional proposition “If p then q” and its reversal “If q then p.” It is written as “p if and only if q,” and is symbolized in standard predicate calculus by a triple-bar sign “p≡q” or a double-headed arrow “p↔q.” “If and only if ” is often abbreviated as “iff.” In the truth-functional treatment, “p iff q” is true when p and q are both true or both false, and is false if one of them is true while the other is false. Hence p and q are taken to be logically equivalent. “A biconditional [φ ≡ι] is true just in case φ and ι are alike in truth value.” Quine, Mathematical Logic “It is one of three problems formulated by Bertrand in his calcul des probabilités of 1889, pp. 4–5 in order to show that it is senseless to speak of choosing at random from an infinity of alternatives . . . The name ‘Bertrand paradox’ was given to this particular problem by Poincaré.” Kneale, Probability and Induction. BIFURCATION -- bifurcation of nature Metaphysics Whitehead’s term for a tendency in modern philosophy to divide reality into two parts and then assign to them different degrees of reality. One version distinguishes primary qualities from secondary qualities (such as color), and then assigns primary qualities to the physical world and secondary qualities to subjective experience. Another version separates nature apprehended in awareness and nature that is the cause of awareness. A further version distinguishes between sensations or sense-data and things. Whitehead claimed that this practice is mechanistic and a fallacy of modern philosophy. His philosophy of process is intended to overcome these divisions by exhibiting in one system the interrelations of all that is observed. “What I am essentially protesting against is the bifurcation of nature into two systems of reality, which, in so far as they are real, are real in different senses.” Whitehead, The Concept of Nature MUNDUS POSSIBILE -- best of all possible worlds Metaphysics, philosophy of religion Leibniz claimed that because God is the most perfect being, the world he chose to create must be the most perfect and best among all possible worlds. To choose to create a lesser world would have been a sign of imperfection in God. Furthermore, since God, as an omnipotent and omniscient being, not only BIOETHICA -- bioethics Ethics [From Greek bios, life] A branch of applied ethics dealing with the moral issues about life and death arising from modern biological and medical research and health care practice. These issues include the allocation of scarce medical resources, the extent of the autonomy of the patient and the scope and limits of the authority of doctors and nurses, abortion and euthanasia, experiments with human subjects, genetic research and its applications, birth control, exogenesis, new medical techniques in human reproduction, prenatal screening, surrogate motherhood, and tissue or organ donation. Additional topics will arise as research advances. Many discussions surround such key moral notions of autonomy, equality, beneficence, justice, and responsibility. Bioethics is generally regarded as a synonym of “medical ethics” or “health care ethics,” although it covers many issues beyond the sphere of medically related matters. Since its central focus is health-related matters, bioethics provokes great public interest. “Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. To distinguish this view from the many others in the field, I call it ‘biological naturalism’.” Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind biomedical ethics, see bioethics BIOGRAPHIA PHILOSOPHICA -- biography Philosophy of mind In Russell’s use of the term, all of the percepts perceived by one percipient throughout a life. This total experience and complete data of one’s experience is distinguished from momentary data as part of one’s experience, which Russell calls a “perspective.” Wryly, Russell designates a biography not lived by anyone an “official” biography. Questions of biography also arise in relation to hermeneutics, personal identity, and responsibility. BIPOLARITAS -- bipolarity Logic Wittgenstein’s principle, meaning that every proposition, like a magnet, has two poles. It must be capable of both being true or being false. If a proposition is to be capable of truth, it must also be capable of falsehood. This is different from the principle of bivalence, which states that a proposition is either true or false. While the principle of bivalence can be symbolized as “ (p ∨ ¬p),” the principle of bipolarity can be symbolized as “ (◊p ∧ ◊¬p).” Wittgenstein puts forward this principle in order to distinguish between names and propositions. While a name has a reference, and has only a one-way relationship with reality, a proposition has sense and has a two-way relationship with reality. For a proposition can have sense if it can determine a possibility that reality either satisfies or not. Even if a proposition is not true, it is still meaningful. In his later period, Wittgenstein seems to give up this principle. “The sum-total of all particulars that are (directly) either simultaneous with or before or after a given particular may be defined as the ‘biography’ to which the particular belongs.” Russell, Mysticism and Logic. BIPOLARITAS “To understand a proposition p it is not enough to know that p implies ‘p is true’, but we must also know that ~p implies ‘p is false’. This shows the bi-polarity of the proposition.” Wittgenstein, Notebooks. BIOETHICA -- “It is through applying the language of bioethics that health care understands its place in a culture, and the culture comprehends the significance of health care practices and the biomedical sciences it sustains.” Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics NATURA -- biological naturalism Philosophy of mind Materialism claims that all mental states and events are determined by physical processes. Dualism claims that mental phenomena cannot be reduced to physical properties. John Searle believes that these two seemingly irreconcilable positions are not in fact inconsistent. He develops a position called biological naturalism, according to which all mental phenomena including intentionality and consciousness are higher-level characteristics of the brain. They are caused by lower-level neurobiological processes in the brain, although these lower-level elements do not themselves possess the features of mental phenomena. In terms of this view, Searle claims that all difficulties arising from attempts to reconcile the natures of mind and body can be solved. TERTIUM NON DATUR -- bivalence Logic A basic principle of classical or standard logic, according to which every statement or proposition must be either true or false. It is closely associated with the law of the excluded middle, but its status is controversial in modern non-standard logic. Many logicians and philosophers claim that some statements or propositions (for example, future contingents, mathematical claims without constructive proofs, or paradoxical, vague, or modal statements) are neither true nor false, but rather have an intermediate truth-value. Modern systems of multivalued logic, partly motivated by such claims and partly developed as important formal investigations in their own right, are truth-valueless or have from three truth-values to an infinite number of truthvalues. Since Dummett, this principle has become the focus of the debate between realism and antirealism. According to anti-realism, the basic position of realism is to hold that a statement must be either true or false, no matter whether we know it. “The principle that every statement is true or false is called the principle of Bivalence.” Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic FUNCTUM -- black box Philosophy of mind A system or entity whose internal organization, mechanism, or structure is either unknown or viewed as insignificant. We know about it through its input-output functions rather than through its internal mechanism. In other words, we know what it does, but not how it works. In the philosophy of mind, behaviorism holds that knowing the functions of the mind exhausts our knowledge of the mind. We can leave aside questions about the nature of the internal mechanisms if we know these functions. This view can be called the black box theory of mind. There is also a black box theory of science that holds that a theory should be taken as a device for predicting without any need to know the inner mechanisms of the phenomena performing the functions. “So far we have actually been treating consciousness itself as something of a black box. We have taken its ‘behaviour’ (= phenomenology) as ‘given’ and wondered about what sort of hidden mechanism in the brain could explain it.” Dennett, Consciousness Explained BLACKIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Black, Max, Baku-born philosopher, Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University. Black wrote a wide range of influential essays using conceptual analysis to illuminate topics such as vagueness, scientific method, inductive inference, paradox, justification, metaphor, and practical reason. He accepted the philosophical importance of common sense in his search for intellectual clarity. His main works include The Nature of Mathematics (1933), Language and Philosophy (1949), and The Labyrinth of Language (1968). Blackburn, Simon (1944– ) British philosopher of language and metaphysician, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina and University of Cambridge. Blackburn is best known for his quasi-realism about items whose reality is disputed. He holds, for example, that values supervene on natural properties through their projection on the world of patterned human perception and activity and can be discussed in judgments that are true or false. Their status, therefore, lies between independently existing properties of the world and subjective expressions that have no place in reality. His main works include Spreading the Word (1984) and Essays in Quasi-Realism (1993). CAECUM -- blindsight Epistemology Some visual cortex-damaged patients claim that although they can see nothing in a portion of their visual field, they can take in visual information from the environment and act on that information. For instance, such persons can have beliefs about how items are located in this field and move according to their beliefs. This phenomenon suggests that such people can have a visual capacity without a conscious visual experience, for they are blind with respect to those items in the blind-sighted region of their environment. This phenomenon is, paradoxically, called blindsight. The philosophical interest of this case is that it reveals that the relation between perception and consciousness is more complicated than we thought. It indicates that perceptual experience is not the same as the mere obtaining and processing of information. “The person sees with the blind-sighted part of his eye, and so takes in perceptual information, and can form beliefs on the basis of the information, but has no visual experience.” Lyons, Approaches to Intentionality BLOCHIANUM IMPICATUM -- Bloch, Ernst (1885–1977) German Marxist metaphysician and humanist, born in Ludwigshofen, taught in Leipzig and University of Tübingen. Bloch’s heterodox Marxist views understood reality as a teleological development toward a utopian end of human society and consciousness unmarred by exploitation. This development does not involve objective forces, but takes place subjectively in individual minds according to a principle of hope that is the human expression of a fundamental hunger of existence. His main works include The Principle of Hope, 3 vols. (1954–9) and Natural Law and Human Dignity (1961). Block, Ned (1942– ) American philosopher of mind and of psychology, Professor of Philosophy, New York University. Block is best known for a series of ingenious articles that criticize behaviorism and functionalism in the philosophy of mind and discuss related questions of images, qualia, consciousness, and causality. His thought experiments claim that we would not ascribe intelligence to computers whose human-like capacities can be explained without recourse to consciousness and experience. An influential article is “Trouble with Functionalism” in Savage (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. IX: Perception and Cognition (1978). Blondel, Maurice (1861–1941) French metaphysician, theologian, and philosopher of action, born in Dijon, Professor of Philosophy, University of Aix-en-Provence. Blondel’s phenomenological study of willing and doing allowed human action to be intelligible only if directed toward a transcendent deity. He used his concrete analysis of action and morality to criticize the emerging neoscholasticism of his time and, as a Catholic philosopher, sought to explore metaphysical and moral themes in dialogue with non-believers. His main works include Action (1893). BODINIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bodin, Jean (1530–96) French political theorist and early economist. Bodin established a theory of sovereignty in which the sovereign ruler has absolute authority to establish laws governing subjects and regulating interests. The sovereign’s rule is constrained only by divine law, natural law, and the constitution and is properly employed to achieve the common good. His main works include Six Books on the Republic (1576). body Philosophy of mind, philosophy of science [Greek soma and Latin corpus] The material composition of a human, in contrast to mind or soul. Body does not rely for its existence upon human thought. Yet traditionally, especially in religious doctrines, the body is viewed as a tomb, an obstacle to the soul’s aspiration to a purely spiritual existence. Many contemporary philosophers have tried to explain the mind–body relationship in terms of identity, reduction, or supervenience. Body is also a synonym for “material object,” and even more generally for “matter.” While for Descartes, body as matter is identified with extension, Hobbes believed that body is coextensive with space. “The substance which is the immediate subject of local extension and of the accidents which presuppose extension, such as shape, position, local motion, and so on, is called body.” Descartes, The Philosophical Writings CORPUS -- body (Merleau-Ponty) Philosophy of mind, contemporary European philosophy The Cartesian tradition views a human being as a combination of body and mind. The former was considered to be a passive object, while the latter was an active subject and the source of all knowledge. To overcome this dualism, MerleauPonty claimed that the human body is itself a subject in dialogue with the world and with others. Body and mind are not opposed to one another, but together form one reality that is at the same time material and spiritual. Body is certainly corporeal, but also provides us with the power of existence or transcendence, which enables us creatively to modify our corporeity. Traditional thinking only paid attention to the subjective ego, but ignored the fact that both the voluntary ego and objective things implicitly depend on an actual body living in the world. Our perception takes up a sense that is already latent in what is given because the body originally animates in its own way the spectacle of what is perceived. Our perception depends on our body’s place in the world. Body is in primordial contact with being and is the common texture of all objects. We should live with and experience body rather than taking it as a mere object. Since everything should be embodied or incarnated in the body, purely subjective phenomena are impossible, and body has an intentionality as well as the mind. Merleau-Ponty’s conception of body is the key term for his phenomenology of perception. “I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at the same time my body is as it were a ‘natural’ subject, a provisional sketch of my total being. Thus experience of one’s own body runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other, and which gives us only the thought about the body, or the body as an idea, and not the experience of the body or body in reality.” Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception BOETHIUSIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus (c.480–524) Roman philosopher, born in Rome. Boethius was Theodoric’s principal minister for many years, but was imprisoned in 523 and executed on a charge of treason. His Latin translations of and commentaries on Aristotle’s logical writings were the major sources of medieval philosophy. His commentaries on Porphyry’s Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories stimulated the scholastic controversy on the ontological status of universals. His De Consolatione Philosophiae (The Consolation of Philosophy), composed in prison, is a dialogue between the figure of Philosophy and the author that seeks to show that true happiness consists in virtue and is not affected by changes in earthly fortune. Boltzmann, Ludwig (1844–1906) Austrian physicist and philosopher of science, born in Vienna, and taught in various German and Austrian universities. Boltzmann used statistical methods to defend atomism against contemporary critics and argued against phenomenalists that unobservable entities and properties must be posited in science. His fallibilist epistemology rejected foundational claims put forward for experimental facts by empiricist programs in science. His major works include Theoretical Physics and Physical Problems (1974). Bolzano, Bernard (1781–1848) Bohemian philosopher, theologian, mathematician, and logician, Professor of the Science of Religion, Charles University, Prague. Bolzano argued that the existence of abstract entities, such as ideas, propositions, and truths, must be accepted to establish the objectivity of knowledge against the claims of skepticism and the dangers of subjectivity. His accounts of logical derivation and of substitution of propositions and their parts were precursors of later developments in the theory of logic and quantification. His realist ontology and semantics influenced Husserl. His major works include Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols. (1837). BONAVENTURIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bonaventura, St (1221–74) Medieval Italian theologian and philosopher, born in Bagnorea, Tuscany, with the real name of Giovanni di Fidanza. Bonaventura was professor of theology of the University of Paris (1253–7) and became minister-general of the Franciscan order in 1257. He sought to reconcile philosophy and theology, and developed many arguments for the existence of God. He held that the culmination of human wisdom is quasi-experiential knowledge of God. His main works are: Breviloquium (1257), De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam (On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology), Itinerarium mentis in Deum (The Mind’s Journey to God, 1259), Biblia Pauperum (Poor Man’s Bible), Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. EMOTUM -- boo-hurrah theory: a nickname for emotivism, because emotivism claims that ethical judgments, rather than being statements of facts, are only expressions of emotion, and are neither true nor false. Moral judgments are attitudes rather than beliefs. In this way, to say something is right is to have a favorable attitude toward it and amounts to saying “Hurrah!” To say something is wrong is to have an unfavorable attitude toward it and is equivalent to saying “Boo!” “On that [non-cognitivist] view, to say that stealing is wrong is merely to voice one’s disapproval of stealing, so the remark could be more revealingly rewritten as ‘stealing-Boo’. Similarly, ‘God is good’ could be translated as ‘Hurrah for God’. Not surprisingly, this view was dubbed the Boo-Hurrah theory of ethics.” McNaughton, Moral Vision BOOLEIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Boole, George (1815–64) English mathematician and logician, born in Lincoln. Boole was largely self-educated and taught at the University of Cork from 1849. Boolean algebra translated symbols expressing logical relations into algebraic equations and then manipulated them in accordance with a set of algebraic laws. This work is the foundation of the development of modern symbolic logic. His principal works are: The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847) and An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854). LIMITATUM -- borderline case Logic, philosophy of language A term for cases at the margin of application for expressions lacking a clear-cut extension, where there is no sharp boundary to mark the field of its application. This vagueness is not due to our ignorance or imprecise knowledge, but is intrinsic to the word itself. For instance, the concept of a person leaves it undetermined whether a fetus or a brain-damaged human being is a person. Our concept of ought leaves the boundary between prudential judgments and moral judgments uncertain. Some philosophers wish to replace our current terms with others that have sharp boundaries, but others argue that new borderline cases can always arise. “Most words admit of what are called borderline cases. What this means is that for most words there are things which are such that we are uncertain (not as a result of lack of knowledge) whether to call them w or non-w.” Carney and Scheer, Fundamentals of Logic. BOOOLEIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Boolean algebra Logic The algebraic treatment of logic, first discussed by the Irish mathematician and logician George Boole in The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847). He translated symbols expressing logical relations into algebraic equations, and then manipulated them in accordance with a set of algebraic laws that he took as axioms governing the operations. This has become the central idea in modern mathematical logic. The characteristic axioms Boole’s system contains are as follows: for every term there exists a complement; for any two terms there exists a sum; for any two terms there exists a product; for any term there exists a universal class; for any term there exists a null class; any two classes are commutative with regard to disjunction and conjunction; and any three classes are distributive with regard to disjunction and conjunction. The variables in this algebra are unquantified and can be read as schematic one-place predicate letters. Boolean algebra has been developed and applied to many areas. Any abstract structure constitutes such an algebra if its appropriate operations satisfy these axioms. BOSANQUETIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bosanquet, Bernard (1848–1923) British neo-Hegelian philosopher and aesthetician, born at Alnwick, taught at Oxford (1871–81) and St Andrews (1903–8). Bosanquet claimed that reality or the Absolute is systematic and that truth is comprehensible only within systems of knowledge. He focused in particular on the notion of individuality in the idealist tradition. An individual is a concrete universal or the harmony of differences, and the expression of individuality, through imagination, is beauty. Ultimately, the only real individual is the Absolute itself. In social philosophy, he emphasized the influence of the community upon the individuals and defined freedom as self-mastery. The most important of his many books are: Knowledge and Reality (1885), Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge (1888), History of Aesthetics (1892), The Philosophical Theory of the State (1899), The Principle of Individuality and Value (1912), and Three Lectures on Aesthetics (1915). BOOLEIANUM IMPLICATUM -- “The Boolean algebra of unions, intersections, and complements merely does in another notation what can be done in that part of the logic of quantification which uses only one-place predicate letters.” Quine, Philosophy of Logic CONSTANS -- bound variable Logic If a variable occurs in a quantified sentence (for example “There exist a number of Xs such that . . .”), it falls within the scope of its prefixed quantifier and is therefore bound. This contrasts CEREBRUM -- brains in a vat with a free variable, which is a variable occurring in an unquantified sentence (for example “X is . . .”). Substitution is not permissible for a bound variable. One cannot take individual expressions as values. It is possible that the same variable may be bound in a whole sentence and free in some part. Russell and Whitehead call bound variables apparent variables. For Quine, a bound variable involves ontological commitment. “Among the contexts provided by our primitive notation, the form of context (α) φ is peculiar in that the variable α lends it no indeterminacy or variability . . . A variable in such a context is called bound; elsewhere, free.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View BOYLEIANUM IMPLICATUM Boyle, Robert (1627–91) English natural philosopher and chemist. Boyle argued for a scientific method that explained phenomena in terms of physical atomism, although he also saw the activity of God in natural phenomena. His account of science was based on hypothesis and experiment, and he was hostile to the claims of rationalist theory in science. His major works include The Origin of Forms and Qualities according to the Corpuscular Philosophy (1666) and A Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things (1688). bracketing, method of Modern European philosophy The crucial step in Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. In our cognitive relationship with the world we naturally assume the existence of the external spatio-temporal world and the existence of ourselves as psychophysical individuals. Husserl claims that we should bracket or “put between quotation marks” this natural attitude. This does not entail that the world is no longer thematic, but only that we should prohibit naive natural assertions and the use of any objective judgments. Husserl held that through using this method we can confine ourselves to the region of transcendentally pure experiences, wherein consciousness is strictly considered as intentional agency. We are accordingly in a position to obtain eidetic or essential intuitions toward intentional structures of experiences. “The true significance of the method of phenomenological ‘bracketing’ (Einklammerung) does not lie absolutely in the rejection of all transcendent knowledge and objects of knowledge, but in the rejection of all naively dogmatic knowledge in favour of the knowledge that is alone in the long run justified from the phenomenological point of view of essence.” Husserl, Shorter Works BRADLEYIANUM IMPICATUM -- Bradley, F(rancis) H(erbert) (1846–1924) British neo-Hegelian idealist, born in Glasbury, Brecknockshire, a fellow at Merton College, Oxford, from 1870. In his most important work, Appearance and Reality (1893), Bradley conceived absolute reality to be a single, self-differentiating whole and the only subject of predicates. The Absolute includes appearances but also transcends them. Many common categories, such as relation and time, are selfcontradictory and hence are mere appearances. In Ethical Studies (1876), he criticized Mill’s utilitarianism from a Hegelian point of view and took selfrealization as the end of morality. His other works are the Principles of Logic (1883) and Essays on Truth and Reality (1914). Bradley was one of the major targets of Moore and Russell in their turn from absolute idealism to philosophical analysis. brain writing, see language of thought brains in a vat Epistemology A thought-experiment imitating Descartes’s argument from dreaming. Suppose we remove a person’s brain from his body and keep it alive in a vat, and then wire the vat to a computer that provides the normal stimuli. The result would be that this brain in a vat would have a mental life that merges perfectly with its past life so that it is not aware of what has happened. There is no basis for the brain to distinguish between its present situation and its previous situation. The conceptual possibility of this experiment leads to skepticism about the reliability of experience and empirical knowledge in our actual lives. Some philosophers, however, challenge the value of such “science fiction” examples in philosophy. “Suppose we (and all other sentient beings) are and always were ‘brains in a vat’. Then how does it come about that our word ‘vat’ refers to noumenal vats and not to vats in the image?” Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences BRANDTIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Brandt, Richard (1910– ) American moral philosopher, born in Wilmington, Ohio, Professor of Philosophy, Swarthmore College and University of Michigan. Brandt’s moral philosophy addresses the question of what moral code fully rational persons would endorse for their own society. His utilitarian answer to this question is empirically grounded in psychological studies as well as in philosophy. He is also ready to redefine crucial terms such as “rational” in ways answerable to empirical evidence. His main works include Ethical Theory (1959) and A Theory of the Good and the Right (1979). BRENTANOIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Brentano, Franz (1838–1917) German-Austrian philosopher and psychologist, born at Marienburg, taught at the universities at Wurzburg and Vienna. Brentano developed a descriptive psychology to classify mental phenomena without prior assumptions as a basis for all philosophy. His program deeply influenced Meinong, Husserl, and later phenomenology. Brentano is best known for his revival of the medieval doctrine of intentionality, according to which the fundamental feature of a mental act is its directedness toward objects or its possession of contents. The objects of mental acts are characterized by “intentional inexistence,” that is, they need not exist. For Brentano, intentionality distinguishes the mental from the physical. His major works are: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1889), and The True and the Evident. Brentano’s thesis Philosophy of mind, modern European philosophy A thesis ascribed to the German philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano on the basis of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874). Brentano revived the medieval notion of intentionality as the fundamental feature of mental phenomena, in contrast to physical phenomena. An intentional state has contents by being directed upon an object or a state of affairs. The contents of intentional states are characterized by inexistence, that is, they need not exist or be true. On this basis, Brentano claims that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. They are peculiar and cannot be reduced to physical properties or states. As a result, psychology should be autonomous from physical science. This thesis has exerted a great influence upon modern and contemporary philosophy of mind and epistemology, although it has been challenged by the identity theory of mind and its physicalist successors. Intentionality is also central to Husserl’s phenomenology. “A consequence of this [Brentano’s] thesis (or another way of putting it) is that intentional concepts such as belief, which might relate to the ‘inexistence’, cannot be defined except in other terms of psychology, that is to say, in other intentional terms.” Nelson, The Logic of Mind BRIDGMANIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bridgman, Percy (1882–1962) American physicist and operationalist philosopher of science, born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, taught at Harvard University. Bridgman’s instrumentalist philosophy of science accepted only those concepts that could be reduced to experimental operations, although he accepted constructs if they could be experimentally correlated with other constructs out of operations. His operationalism was influenced by Einstein’s treatment of time in the theory of relativity. His main work is The Logic of Modern Physics (1927). BROADIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Broad, Charles Dunbar (1887–1971) English empiricist philosopher of mind, science, and psychical research, born in Harlsden, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Cambridge. Broad provided careful, balanced assessments of competing positions in the areas of philosophy drawing his interest. His scrupulous examinations provide one model of philosophical method, but Broad lacked the brilliant insight of his Cambridge contemporaries Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein. His main works include The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925), Five Types of Ethical Theory (1930), and An Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy (1933). broad content, see narrow content BROUWERIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan (1881–1966) Dutch intuitionist philosopher of mathematics, born in Overschie, Professor of Mathematics, University of Amsterdam. Brouwer’s intuitionism sought foundations of mathematics that avoided antinomies and paradoxes, especially concerning infinite classes. His interpretation of Kant’s constructivist demands on mathematical proof led to his rejection of the law of excluded middle and the principle of double negation of classical logic in his intuitionist mathematics. Even those who accept classical mathematics and look to other means to avoid contradiction recognize the importance of Brouwer’s formal system, and his intuitionism has influenced accounts of meaning and truth in contemporary anti-realism. His writings are contained in Collected Works (1975–6). BROWNSONIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Brownson, Orestes (1803–76) American transcendentalist philosopher, born Stockbridge, Vermont. Brownson was an important figure in New England Transcendentalism, who later converted to Catholicism. He saw the need to base reform on changes in the political and social system rather than solely on the moral development of individual citizens. His main works include The American Republic: Its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny (1865). BRUNOIANUM IMPLICATUM Bruno, Giordano (1548–1600) Italian Renaissance philosopher, born at Nola. Influenced by Hermetic writings, Bruno developed a version of pantheism that he combined with Greek atomism. He held that the universe is infinite in extent and diversity, but united in the One and identical with God. He also defended the Copernican theory of heliocentricity. His unorthodox views, in particular his works on magic, led to his arrest in 1592 by the Inquisition. He was condemned as a heretic and was burned to death on the Campo de’Fiori in Rome. His major works include On the Infinite Universe and Worlds (1584), On Cause, Principle and Unity (1584), and On Heroic Enthusiasms (1585). He has been regarded as a martyr, and his philosophy of nature exerted influence on seventeenth-century cosmology and metaphysics. BRUNMSCHVICGIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Brunschvicg, Léon (1869–1944) French idealist theologian and historian of philosophy and science, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne and École Normale Supérieure. Brunschvicg rejected Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories as an abstract universal account of the conditions of knowledge in favor of a Hegelian reflective understanding of the progress of human consciousness in history. In applying this approach to the philosophy of science, he sought to reconcile idealism and positivism. His main works include The Progress of Consciousness (1927). brute fact Metaphysics, epistemology Also called bare fact. In an absolute sense, a fact that is obtained or explained by itself rather than through other facts and that has a fundamental or underlying role in a series of explanations. We normally cannot give a full account why the fact should be what it is, but must accept it without explanation. The first principles of systems of thought generally possess such a status. Brute facts correspond to causa sui or necessary existence in traditional metaphysics and are ultimately inexplicable. For empiricism, what is given in sense-perception is brute fact and provides the incorrigible basis of all knowledge. In a relative sense, any fact that must be contained in a higher-level description under normal circumstances is brute in relation to that higher-level description, although in another situation the fact could itself become a higher-level description containing its own brute fact. “There is something positive and ineluctable in what we sense: in its main features, at least, it is what it is irrespective of any choice of ours. We have simply to take it for what it is, accept it as ‘brute fact’.” Walsh, Reason and Experience B-series of time, see A-series of time BUBERIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Buber, Martin (1878–1965) Austrian-born Israeli existentialist religious and social philosopher, born in Vienna, Professor at University of Frankfurt am Main and Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Buber’s philosophy centered on relations between the self and others, which he radically contrasted to relations between the self and objects. He argued that central features of our ethical, social, and religious life become unintelligible if we understand human relations and relations to God in terms of our relations to objects. In human relations, we respond to the presence and individuality of others in forming joint human projects rather than seeing others as objects to manipulate. His theology understood God as the ultimate “Thou.” His main works include I and Thou (1922) and Paths in Utopia (1949). EMPERIEA -- “I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.” Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. MASSA -- bulk term, another expression for mass term BULTIMANNIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Bultmann, Rudolf (1884–1976) German demythologizing existentialist theologian, born in Wiefelstede, Professor at University of Marburg. Bultmann drew on Heidegger’s ontology to develop a theology suitable for modernity. He sought to demythologize the scriptures by translating biblical language into terms of human fallenness and God’s call to authentic existence. His main works include Faith and Understanding (1969), History and Escatology (1957), and Theology of the New Testament, 2 vols. (1948–53). DUALE bundle dualism, see bundle theory of mind bundle theory of mind Philosophy of mind A theory associated with Hume. After contemplating the difficulties of Cartesian dualism, Hume rejected the existence of an enduring, substantial self that remains the same throughout one’s life. We cannot discern any continuing spiritual principle within ourselves. All one can observe is a sequence or a bundle of experiences occurring in succession from birth to death. The mind is nothing more than a bundle of perceptions. It is a theater in which different perceptions successively make their appearance. Since perceptions or impressions cannot endure, there cannot be an enduring self. Only because there is resemblance, contiguity, and regularity in the bundle of perceptions, do we attribute a self or an identity to ourselves, but this is a customary association of ideas rather than a real connection among perceptions. The position is popular among empirical philosophers, and is also called the serial theory (because it claims that the self is a series of experiences), the associationist theory, or the logical construction theory. Since the mind is a succession of non-physical items distinct from the body, this theory also implies a kind of dualism that is called bundle dualism. The theory contrasts with the pure ego theory. Hume not only proposed the bundle theory, but also saw grave difficulties in it. BURALI-FORTIIANUM IMPICATUM -- Burali-Forti’s paradox Logic This paradox of the greatest ordinal was the first paradox discovered in modern set theory and was formulated by Cesare Burali-Forti. An ordinal number can be assigned to every well-ordered set, that is, a set for which every subset has at least one member. Such ordinals can be compared for size, and the set of these ordinals is a well-ordered set. The ordinal of this set must be larger than any ordinal contained within the set, but because the set is of all ordinals of well-ordered sets, the ordinal of the set must be contained within it. The ordinal of this set is therefore larger than and not larger than any ordinal within the set. According to Russell, the way of solving this paradox is to deny that the set of all ordinal numbers is well-ordered. “It is that in order to avert Burali-Forti’s paradox the authors of Principia felt called upon to suspend typical ambiguity and introduce explicit type indices at the crucial point.” Quine, Selected Logical Papers ONUS PROBANDI -- burden of proof Philosophical method [Latin onus probandi] Originating in classical Roman law, an adversary proceeding where one party tries to establish and another to rebut some charge before a neutral adjudicative tribunal. The term has come to refer to a rule concerning the division of the labor of argumentation. Suppose A and B represent two competing views. If A has a favorable position, B will be required to produce strong arguments to defend its less favorable position. This is to say, A sets the burden of proof on B. If B cannot shift this burden, its position is defeated, even though it might be right. On the other hand, if B puts forward arguments that show that its position is stronger than A’s, then it transfers the burden of proof to A. It is a basic rule of dealing with evidence. Normally any position that argues for or against something has the burden. For instance, because common sense usually has an intuitive appeal prior to argument, any philosophical position standing against common sense bears the burden of proof. “To say that the burden of proof rests with a certain side is to say that it is up to it to bring in the evidence to make out the case.” Rescher, Methodological Pragmatism BURIDANIANUM IMPLICATUM. Buridan, Jean (c.1295–c.1358) French medieval logician and natural philosopher, born in Béthune, taught at the University of Paris. Buridan proposed a nominalist account of language in which universals have no real existence and an ontology that accepted only particular substances and qualities. His theory of propositions and discussion of paradoxes were the main features of his logic. He explained projectile motion in terms of impetus rather than through final causes, and his theory of action allowed freedom through deferring action in the absence of a compelling reason to choose what to do. His main works include Compendium Logicae (1487) and Consequentiae (1493). Buridan’s ass Metaphysics, philosophy of action The fourteenthcentury French philosopher Jean Buridan proposed that reasons determine our choice between two alternatives and that we will do what our reason tells us is best. To argue against this theory, a case was devised to the effect that a starving ass is placed between two haystacks that are equidistant and equally tempting. There is no more reason to go toward one stack than the other, without additional relevant information. Thus, according to Buridan’s theory, the ass would starve to death. This thought experiment has been influential in the discussion of free will and determinism. It is also related to the principle of indifference. But decision theory suggests that although the ass cannot decide which stack it should choose, it surely can decide between starving to death and having either of the stacks. “Buridan’s ass, which died of hunger being unable to decide which of the two haystacks in front of it happened to be superior, could have rationally chosen either of the haystacks, since it has good reason for choosing either rather than starving to death.” Sen, On Ethics and Economics BURKEIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Burke, Edmund (1729–97) British political philosopher and aesthetician, born in Dublin. In A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757), Burke criticized the rationalist emphasis on intellectual clarity in art and argued that the most powerful quality of an artwork is its obscurity. He distinguished between the beautiful and the sublime in terms of the finite and the infinite. Burke was an active politician who wrote widely on politics. He supported the Irish Movement and American Independence, but preferred the inherited wisdom of tradition to political innovation allegedly justified by reason. His classic work of political conservatism, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), condemned the French Revolution for tearing apart the established social fabric and introducing a new set of values based on false rationalistic philosophy. business ethics Ethics Business ethics is a branch of applied ethics developed largely in the second half of the twentieth century. Business, in spite of its profit-seeking nature, is believed neither to be unethical by its very nature nor to have its own special code. Rather, it is subject to the constraints of social responsibility and should be conducted in accordance with general ethical rules. Business ethics addresses three levels of concern: business persons, business enterprises, and the business community. With regard to business persons, it deals with the moral responsibilities and rights of individual employees, such as those involving honesty and integrity, job discrimination, and working conditions. With regard to business enterprises, it deals with corporate governance, responsibilities concerning consumers, product safety, and the environment, and relations among owners, managers, and employees. Since enterprises are the main business entities, this level is the primary concern of business ethics. With regard to the business community, it deals with the moral justification of economic systems. Along with the development of international business, this level involves wider consideration of cultural and social background. “Business ethics is a specialised study of moral right and wrong. It concentrates on how moral standards apply particularly to business policies, institutions, and behaviour.” Velasquez, Business Ethics BUTLERIANUM IMPPLICATUM -- Butler, Joseph (1692–1752) English moral philosopher and natural theologian, born in Wantage, Berkshire. Butler was the Bishop of Bristol (1738–50) and Bishop of Durham (1750– 2). In his ethical work Fifteen Sermons (1726), he claimed that human nature is complex, containing many affections, including both the self-love and benevolence that Hobbes and Shaftsbury respectively took to be the foundation of morality. He held that the distinctive human faculty of reflection or conscience is superior to affections and is our guide to right conduct. In Analogy of Religion (1736), he defended revealed religion against the deists, holding that nature and revelation are complementary and that the revealed doctrines of Christianity can be confirmed through the study of nature. CAIETANUM IMPLICATUM Cajetan, Thomas de Vio (1468–1534) Italian scholastic philosopher, born in Gaeta, taught at Padua and Rome, became a Cardinal. Cajetan promoted revived interest in Aquinas and scholasticism, but his most important original work dealt with the role of analogy in human knowledge of God. He distinguished improper analogy of inequality and analogy of attribution from acceptable analogy of proportion. Analogy of proportion allows us to use the same terms to characterize God and ourselves without equivocation. This discussion is contained in De Nominum Analogia (1498). CALCULATUM -- -- calculus Logic [from Latin for pebbles (plural: calculi) ] A rule-governed formal symbolic system that can be mechanistically applied for calculation and reasoning in mathematics and logic. The word was adopted because in ancient times calculation was done with pebbles. All axiomatic systems, together with other systems of calculation, measurement, or comparison, are calculi. As a branch of mathematical analysis, calculus was principally developed by Leibniz, Newton, Lagrange, Cauchy, Cantor, and Peano. Leibniz also developed calculus as a formal system of reasoning, that is, to reduce valid argument forms or structures to a calculus by whose rules we can construct and criticize arguments. This is what he called calculus ratiocinatur (a calculus of reasoning), or what we generally mean by a logical calculus. Based on the work of Frege, modern logical calculus is generally divided into propositional calculus, which deals with the truth functions of propositions, and predicate calculus, which is concerned with items such as the quantifiers, variables, and predicates of first-order languages. “A calculus is, in fact, any system wherein we may calculate.” Langer, An Introduction to Symbolic Logic -- calculus theory – of -- calculus of mereology CLASSIS -- classes, another term for set INDIVIDUUM individuals, -- another term for CALCULATUM -- calculus ratiocinatur, see calculus CALVINIANUM IMPLICATUM Calvin, John (1509–64) French Protestant reformer and theologian, born in Noyon, taught in Geneva. Calvin argued that knowledge of God and knowledge of ourselves are jointly grounded in our recognition of misery and corruption in our lives. Without a sense of our own limitations, we cannot know God, and without knowing God and acknowledging his benevolence and love, we have false estimates of ourselves. Conscience is the subjective aspect of knowing, worshiping, and obeying God and sin is a wilful resistance to this knowledge, worship, and obedience. In his social and political teachings, Calvin argued for the separation of church and state and for justice in civic affairs, ideally through a republic. His major work, Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536), was repeatedly revised and developed throughout his life. CAMBIUM -- real change. A Cambridge change can occur because there is a real change elsewhere. Whenever there is a mere Cambridge change there must be a real change somewhere, but the converse is not true. Geach used this notion to explain the ascription of change to an unchanging God in virtue of God’s relation to a changing created world. CALVINIANUM IMPLICATUM Calvinism Philosophy of religion The theological teaching and political views developed by the French theologian and church reformer John Calvin and defended by seventeenth-century Calvinist scholars. Calvin rejected Aristotelian scholasticism and advocated a kind of natural theology in which our belief in God is rooted in our innate instinct. Scripture is the norm as well as the source by which the faithful can attain certitude with regard to the content of revelation without the need of an infallible ecclesiastical interpretation. Calvin emphasized the doctrine of predestination and claimed that humans have not had freedom since the Fall. He claimed that church and state have different tasks and should be constructed independently of each other. Church is not a supernatural instrument for salvation. It should be reformed and corrected by each of the faithful according to the scriptures. A resistance to the rulers rather than passive submission is also advocated. Calvin’s thinking exerted great influence in the Renaissance and Reformation era throughout Western Europe. CAMBIUM -- “An object O is said to ‘change’ in this sense if and only if there are two propositions about O, differing only in that one mentions an earlier and the other a later time, and one is true, and the other false. I call this an account of ‘Cambridge change’.” Geach, Truth, Love and Immortality CALVINIANUM IMPLICATUM -- “For Calvinists, the question of whether or not their souls were predestined to salvation was of the utmost significance.” Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science CAMBIUM -- Cambridge change: The Cambridge philosophers Russell and McTaggart argued that the criterion of change for an entity X is that the sentence “X is F” is true at time t1, and false at time t2. Peter Geach called a change according to this criterion a Cambridge change and argued that it need not be a real change. Suppose that the sentence “Socrates is taller than Theaetetus” was true when Socrates was 55 and Theaetetus was 15, but false five years later. Because Theaetetus grew taller, there was a Cambridge change in Socrates even if his height remained the same over this period. Socrates did not undergo a PLATONICUM IMPLICATUM -- Cambridge Platonists: A group of philosophers and theologians in the seventeenth century, mainly associated with the University of Cambridge, who took Plato and Neoplatonism as their authorities. The chief representatives included B. Whichcote (1609–82), J. Smith (1618–52), R. Cudworth (1617–80) and H. More (1614–87). The Cambridge Platonists characteristically emphasized the role of reason and consciousness, which they acclaimed to be “the candle of the Lord” (Whichcote’s phrase). Metaphysically, this position is antagonistic toward mechanism and materialism, especially that of Hobbes. In anticipation of Kant, it claimed that consciousness is not secondary and derivative, but is rather the architect of reality. Ethically, the Cambridge Platonists stressed love, character, and motivation, rather than external and universal creed and moral principle. It paved the way for the eighteenth-century British moral philosophers, such as Hume and Hutcheson, for moral sense theory and the intuitionist moral tradition. In religious terms, these philosophers opposed Calvinism, sectarianism, and fanaticism. They argued that people accept the existence of God due neither to some doctrine nor to the supreme will of God, but out of one’s inner rational love. It proposed a rational theology and broad toleration. “English seventeenth-century philosophy seems to us dominated by the rise of empiricism. But the Erasmian tradition was still alive and fighting, most notably in a group of thinkers loosely referred to as the ‘Cambridge Platonists’.” C. Taylor, Sources of the Self CAMPANELLAIANUM IMPLICATUM. Campanella, Tommaso (1586–1639) Italian Renaissance theologian and philosopher, born in Stilo, imprisoned for heresy and conspiracy. Campanella sought knowledge in scripture and nature and anticipated Descartes in articulating a method of doubt and founding knowledge and certainty on self-consciousness. He is best known for his account in The City of the Sun (1623) of a utopian egalitarian society that is without private property and is ruled by philosophers. CAMUSIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Camus, Albert (1913–60) French existentialist philosopher and novelist, born in Mondovi, Algeria. The central theme of Camus’s writing is that human existence is absurd. The world is meaningless, and there is no metaphysical guarantee of the validity of human values. The problem of suicide is the focus of his most influential philosophical work, The Myth of Sisyphus (1943). His early value-nihilism was replaced by a humanistic ethic in his second philosophical work, The Rebel (1951). His existentialist novels include The Outsider (1942), The Plague (1947), and The Fall (1956). In 1957 Camus was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. CANGUILHEMIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Canguilhem, Georges (1904–95) French philosopher and historian of science, Professor of the History and Philosophy of Science, the Sorbonne. Canguilhem’s work on the history of biology focused on epistemological breaks between the conceptual frameworks of science in different periods, and the radical changes of perspective accompanying these breaks. He understood change in scientific disciplines as emerging from attempts to deal with problems that could not be solved within existing conceptual frameworks. His major works include The Normal and the Pathological (1943) and Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciences (1977). CANONICUM -- canon Logic, epistemology [from Greek kanon, a rule to measure or set a limit] For Epicurus, the rule for distinguishing between true and false judgments, in contrast to Aristotle’s Organon, which deals with rules for attaining demonstrative knowledge and hence can extend one’s knowledge. Later, both organon and canon became terms for logic, in contrast to dialectic. Mill’s five rules of induction are also called five canons of induction. Kant’s whole project of critical philosophy is based on the contrast between canon and organon. He takes an organon to be an instruction about how knowledge may be extended and how new knowledge may be acquired. Critical philosophy is not an organon, but is rather a canon in the sense of setting the limit for human understanding and reason. His transcendental analytic provides a canon for the understanding in its general discursive or analytic employment. Reason in its speculative employment does not have a canon, because it cannot be correctly applied. In its practical employment, however, reason deals with two problems: “Is there a God?” and “Is there a future life?” and has two criteria for its canon: “What ought I to do?” and “What may I hope?” “I understand by a canon the sum-total of the a priori principles of the correct employment of certain faculties of knowledge.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason -- canonical notation Logic Quine’s term for a notation that reflects the simplest kind of grammatical or logical framework that is adequate for all our propositional thinking, whatever its subject-matter. This simplest structure is supposed to reveal the broadest features of reality, and is the framework shared by all the sciences. To seek to construct such a notation is the same as the quest for ultimate categories, a project that has been the aim of many philosophers, as we can explicitly see in Aristotle, Kant, Peirce, Frege, Carnap, and Quine. “The quest of a simplest, clearest overall pattern of canonical notation is not to be distinguished from a quest for ultimate categories, a limning of the most general traits of reality.” Quine, Word and Object CANTORIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Cantor, Georg (1845–1918) German mathematician, born in St Petersburg, Russia, Professor, University of Halle. Cantor’s account of set theory and transfinite arithmetic established the basis of the logicist program of deriving mathematics from set theory and the mathematics of infinity. His treatment of the ordering of infinite sets, continuity and discontinuity, and the paradoxes of set theory have all had major consequences for mathematics and philosophy. His works are contained in Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1932). Cantor’s paradox Logic A paradox showing that we cannot treat the set of all sets as a set-theoretical entity. It was discovered by Georg Cantor through comparing the number of sets contained in the set of all sets S and the number of sets contained in PS (the power set of S), where the power set of a set is the set of all the subsets of that set. Cantor’s theorem shows that for any set A, its power set PA contains more sets than A. The paradox arises because no set can contain more sets than the set of all sets S, yet the power set of S does contain more sets than S. Cantor’s paradox and Burali-Forti’s paradox together are called the paradoxes of size. “In Cantor’s paradox it is argued that there can be no greatest cardinal number and yet that the cardinal number of the class of cardinal number . . . must be the greatest.” Quine, Selected Logical Papers riding worth, we must find an alternative form of punishment, such as long-term imprisonment, which does not compromise its value. Many countries have indeed abolished capital punishment. But this position would also have difficulties if it turned out that other forms of punishment were less effective than capital punishment in crime prevention and deterrence and that they increased the economic burdens on society. Weighing the importance of moral principles, empirical findings, and democratic preferences in deciding the question of adopting or maintaining capital punishment involves many important disputes. “Capital punishment has its own special cruelties and horrors, which change the whole position. In order to be justified, it must be shown, with good evidence, that it has a deterrent effect not obtainable by less awful means, and one which is quite substantial rather than marginal.” Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives PUNITIO CAPITALIS -- capital punishment Ethics, political philosophy The death penalty, or the execution according to the law of murderers and in some societies others who have committed serious crimes. The killing is done by officials in the name of society and on its behalf. The morality of capital punishment has been a puzzling problem for philosophers, especially against the background of the humanism of the Enlightenment. Granted the sanctity of human life, would not the punishment of the death penalty be a violation of the murderer’s right to life? The defenders of capital punishment usually follow Locke’s view that although the human right to life is natural, whenever a person violates the right to life of another, he forfeits his own right and it thus need not be respected. This position faces many theoretical difficulties, for it actually denies that the human right to life has absolute value and asserts that it can be yielded in the name of social defense and retributive justice. Philosophers who oppose capital punishment argue that punishment is necessary in order to reduce crime rates, but that it is not necessary to take a person’s life to achieve this end. To forfeit one’s right to life is not identical with forfeiting one’s life. They point to many cases in which innocent people have been executed in miscarriages of justice that cannot be corrected. Because human life has an over- VIRTOUSUM -- cardinal virtues Ethics [from Latin cardo, hinge] Cardinal virtues are presented as the highest ideals or forms of conduct for human life. Plato in his Republic listed four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice. This doctrine is associated with his theory of the tripartite soul. Temperance is the virtue of appetite, courage is the virtue of emotion, and wisdom is the virtue of reason. If each of the three parts of soul realizes its respective virtue, the whole soul has the virtue of justice. In medieval philosophy, Thomas Aquinas called these virtues natural or human virtues and added three other theological virtues: faith, hope, and love. Together they form seven cardinal virtues. In modern time, philosophers such as Schopenhauer claimed that there are only two cardinal virtues: benevolence and justice. This diversity raises questions concerning why different cardinal virtues have been recognized in different times and circumstances and concerning the kinds of justification that are appropriate in distinguishing cardinal virtues from other virtues. “By a set of cardinal virtues is meant a set of virtues such that (1) they cannot be derived from one another and (2) all other moral virtues can be derived from or shown to be forms of them.” Frankena, Ethics CARUM -- care Modern European philosophy [German Sorge] For Heidegger, care is the state in which Dasein is concerned about its Being. Since Dasein’s essence lies in its existence, that is, in fulfilling its possibilities, its concern with the movement from any present actuality to another future condition must raise the question, “What shall I do?” This is care, which lies in the capacity of Dasein to choose its Being. Care is viewed as the fundamental relationship between Dasein and the world and is the basis of Dasein’s significance in the world. It is the state that underlies all of Dasein’s experiences. Since all choice has to be made in the world, care characterizes Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-world. Care comprises existence (Being-ahead-of-itself ), facticity (Being-alreadyin), falling (Being-alongside), and discourse and shows Dasein in its entirety. It is essentially connected with temporality, that is, the time structure of human life. The division “Dasein and Temporality” in Being and Time attempts to reveal temporality as the basis of all the elements of care. “We have seen that care is the basic state of Dasein. The ontological signification of the expression ‘care’ has been expressed in the ‘definition’: ‘ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world)’ as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world).” Heidegger, Being and Time caring Ethics Caring or care is a moral sentiment and concern for the well-being of others. As an emotional attitude toward other individuals as individuals, care differs from benevolence or sympathy, which concerns other individuals as human beings in accordance with abstract moral principles. Hence, caring is much deeper and particularized than sympathy. It is certainly not merely a feeling, but also has a cognitive element, that is, understanding another person’s real needs, welfare, and situation. Care has generally been taken as one among many important attitudes. Heidegger, however, saw care as the fundamental attitude of Dasein or human being. In the second half of the twentieth century, feminist thinkers have considered care to be the fundamental ethical phenomenon and have attempted to construct an entire ethical approach on its basis, that is, the ethics of care or the caring perspective.-- “The caring so central here is partly emotional. It involves feelings and requires high degrees of empathy to enable us to discern what morality recommends in our caring activities.” Held, Feminist Morality CARYLEIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Carlyle, Thomas (1795–1881) Scottish historian, critic, philosopher of culture, and political thinker, born in Ecclefechan. Carlyle conceived history in terms of biography, especially the biography of the heroes of an age, and understood biography in terms of critical moral assessment. His cultural criticism rejected the mechanical understanding of nineteenth-century materialist, democratic, industrial society and sought deeper personal and cultural self-understanding. Among his major works are Sartor Resartus (1833–4), History of the French Revolution (1837), and On Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in History (1840). CARNAPIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Carnap, Rudolf (1891–1970) German-American philosopher, a leading member of the Vienna Circle, born in Ronsdorf, Germany and emigrated to the United States in 1935, where he taught at University of Chicago and UCLA. Influenced by Frege and Wittgenstein, Carnap held that metaphysical problems are pseudo-problems and that philosophy should proceed by applying the methods of modern logic and mathematics. The analysis of syntax is especially significant in solving philosophical disputes, and Carnap also sought philosophical clarification by distinguishing between the material questions about the world and formal questions about our framework of concepts. In his long and productive career, he made many influential contributions on topics such as logical syntax, perception, the philosophy of science, the theory of meaning, the foundations of mathematics, formal semantics, the foundations of modal logic, physicalism, probability and confirmation, induction and the unity of science. With Reichenbach, he founded the journal Erkenntnis, and edited the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science with Neurath and Morris. His major works include The Logical Construction of the World (1928), The Logical Syntax of Language (1934), Meaning and Necessity (1947), and The Logical Foundations of Probability (1950). DODGSONIANA -- Dodgson, C. L. Carroll, Lewis (1832–98) Pen name of Charles Dodgson. English mathematician, logician, and writer, born in Daresbury, taught at Christ Church, Oxford. Carroll’s puzzles of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language, often articulated at the point of absurdity, contribute life and humor to his classic writings for children and provide an informal introduction to many modern philosophical preoccupations. His major works include Alice in Wonderland (1865), Through The Looking-Glass (1871), and The Hunting of the Snark (1876). CIRCULUS CARTESIANUS -- Cartesian circle Epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of religion A challenge to Descartes’s program to establish a scientific system on a purely metaphysical basis. Descartes tried to prove that whatever we perceive clearly and distinctly must be true and can serve as the foundation of a science. His argument goes like this: We have a clear and distinct idea that an omnipotent and benevolent God exists; the existence of such a deity entails that we cannot be subject to deception; therefore, our clear and distinct ideas must be reliable. This argument involves a circle. On the one hand, the existence of a perfect and non-deceiving God is the sole guarantee of the truth of what we perceive clearly and distinctly. On the other hand, Descartes claims that our intellect’s power of clear and distinct perception is the sole guarantee of the truth of God’s existence. Hence, what is to be proved has been taken for granted during the proof. The circle was noticed by his contemporary critics Arnauld and Gassendi. Descartes’s answer to this challenge is to say that God only warrants the veracity of our memory, while clear and distinct perception is a self-sufficient guarantee of our immediate ideas. But his answer is generally considered to be unsatisfactory. “Since it is only by relying on the validity of clear and distinct ideas that he proves the existence of God, to rely on God for the validation of clear and distinct ideas seems to be arguing in a circle. This is the famous Cartesian Circle, of which he has repeatedly been accused.” B. Williams, Descartes Cartesian dualism Metaphysics, philosophy of mind Descartes divided the world into extended substance, or matter, and thinking substance, or mind or soul. He claimed that the nature of the mind is completely alien to the nature of matter. Accordingly, the soul is entirely distinct from the body. Although it joins the body during life, the soul is incorporeal, not extended, and can survive the death of the body. This is Descartes’s most famous metaphysical doctrine and, as the main form of dualism, it has greatly influenced modern European philosophy. The doctrine is a criticism of Aristotle’s account of soul according to which the soul is the function or form of the body. In contrast to his own account of physical nature, Descartes held that mental phenomena cannot be mechanistically explained on the basis of physical properties. His theory also provided a metaphysical basis for the Christian doctrine of immortality. Its major problem is that since mind and matter are distinct, it is unclear how the mental and the physical are related, and how subjective cognition can attain reliable knowledge of objective reality. This becomes the famous mind–body problem that has dominated subsequent philosophy of mind. “Cartesian dualism results from trying to put these forces in equilibrium: the subjectivity of the mental is (supposedly) accommodated by the idea of privileged access, while the object of that access is conceived, in conformity with the supposed requirement of objectivity, as there independently – there in a reality describable from no particular point of view – rather than as being constituted by the subject’s special access to it.” McDowell, in Lepore and McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events -- Cartesianism Philosophical method, metaphysics, epistemology Cartesian is an adjective deriving from Cartesius, the Latin version of the name Descartes. Cartesianism is a philosophical tradition in the spirit of the philosophy of Descartes. Its main features include (1) Cartesian doubt, that is, starting from an attitude of universal doubt in order to find secure foundations for the epistemic edifice; (2) the Cartesian ego, established through the argument cogito ego sum, the indubitable awareness we have of our own existence that serves as the first principle of metaphysics; (3) clear and distinct ideas that God implants in us and that serve as the starting-points of a solid scientific enterprise. They also provide the foundation of epistemic justification. The use of God to validate clear and distinct ideas and the use of clear and distinct ideas to justify belief in God constitute the Cartesian circle; (4) Cartesian dualism, according to which mind and body are two heterogeneous entities. Various important discussions in contemporary philosophy have started from the criticism of one or more aspects of Cartesianism. “ ‘Cartesianism’ aptly labels the radically foundationalist view that a belief is cognitively justified if and only if its object either (a) is manifest in itself to the believer in the absence of any but manifest presuppositions (amounting thus to something given), or is arrived at through deductive proof from ultimate premises all of which are thus manifest.” Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective CARTWRIGHTIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Cartwright, Nancy (1943– ) philosopher of science, born in Pennsylvania, Professor at Stanford University and the London School of Economics. Cartwright’s philosophy of science derives from her detailed understanding of scientific practice. She is a realist about scientific entities and their capacities, but rejects realism about scientific laws and models. The real causal powers of entities, therefore, have precedence over imperfect causal generalizations. She has also argued against the need for a single theoretical structure for science and holds that science can better be seen as a patchwork, with different theories developed in different fields. Her major works include How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983), Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement (1989), and The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (1999). SOLIDUS -- cash-value Epistemology William James’s term. The test of the truth of an idea or a proposition lies in its agreement with reality. This amounts to asking for its cash-value, that is, the fulfillment of the senseexperience that the proposition either records or predicts. We must put each concept to work in practical contexts. If an idea or a proposition operates, its cash-value is actualized. We may ascribe truth to it, in particular on the occasions on which it works. The notion of cash-value corresponds to Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, which holds that the meaning of a scientific concept is its practical bearing. “Matter is known as our sensations of colour, figure, hardness and the like. They are the cashvalue of the term. The difference matter makes to us by truly being is that we then get such sensations; by not being, is that we lack them.” W. James, Pragmatism CASSERIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Cassirer, Ernst, Breslau-born philosopher, a representative of the Marburg neo-Kantian school, taught at various universities in Germany, Britain, Sweden, and the United States. Cassirer defined man as the symbolizing animal and maintained that symbolic representation is the fundamental function of human consciousness. His philosophy is a Kantian transcendental analysis of the nature and function of symbolic representation, with the aim of examining the organizing principles of the human mind in all its aspects, including science, art, religion, and language. His most important work is The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (3 vols. 1923–9). Other works include The Problem of Knowledge in the Philosophy and Science of Modern Times (4 vols, 1906–20), Language and Myths (1925), An Essay on Man (1945), and The Myth of the State (1947). CASUS -- casuistry Ethics [from Latin casus, case] The study of individual moral cases to which general moral principles cannot be directly applied in order to decide whether they can be brought into the scope of general norms. Its major procedures include appeal to intuition, analogy with paradigm cases, and the assessment of particular cases. Casuistry has a derogatory sense as a species of sophistry by which any conduct might be justified. Casuistry has traditionally been seen to be a part of rhetoric and was widely practiced in the medieval period in the elaboration of church creed and practice. It developed into probabilism, that is, the view that if a practical counsel is possibly true, then it is wise to follow it. Casuistry in this sense was attacked by Pascal. However, casuistry also has a positive meaning in ethics. Aristotle’s ethics established that practical reason is crucial for adjusting universal moral norms to make them suit particular circumstances. Casuistry is the art of practical reasoning, in contrast to the mechanistic application of rigid rules of conduct. In the second half of the twentieth century, with the flourishing of applied ethics, casuistry has also been revived. “There can be rational discussion whether a given extension of the term properly bears the spirit or underlying principle of its application to the core cases. Arguments in this style are, in the Catholic tradition, known as arguments of casuistry (the unfriendly use of that term was a deserved reaction to devious use made of the technique).” B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy CATEGORIA -- categorematic, see syncategorematic IMPERATUM -- categorical imperative Ethics According to Kant, the fundamental absolute formal demand (or set of demands) on our choice of maxims or principles on which to act. He proposed a number of formulations of the categorical imperative that on the surface differ radically from one another, although Kant himself believed that the different formulations are equivalent. On the first version, the principle on which one acts should also be capable of becoming a universal law. As a rational agent, I must accept that a sufficient reason for me is a sufficient reason for another rational being in an exactly similar situation. The second formulation requires that one should treat humanity in oneself and others never simply as means but also as ends. One should never simply use people, for rational beings have an intrinsic worth and dignity. The third formulation requires that we treat others as autonomous and selfdetermining agents. To treat people as ends in themselves is to respect their autonomy and freedom. In choosing principles, one should act as though one were legislating as a member of a kingdom of ends. The core of Kant’s deontology is to ground all duties in the categorical imperative. Unlike the categorical imperative, hypothetical imperatives have force only if we have certain desires or inclinations. Recent expositions have tried to show the unity of Kant’s formulations and have defended the categorical imperative against the traditional criticism that it produces an empty formalism. “Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one wants (or may possibly want). The categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end.” Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals CATEGORICUS -- categorical proposition Logic The basic subject-predicate proposition in which a predicate is used to affirm or negate all or some of what a subject indicates. The subject and the predicate are the terms of the proposition. In traditional logic, there are four categorical propositions: (1) the universal affirmative, “All S are P”; (2) the universal negative, “All S are not P”; (3) the particular affirmative, “Some S are P”; and (4) the particular negative, “Some S are not P.” They are respectively abbreviated as A, E, I, O. Categorical propositions are so called in order to distinguish them from modal propositions (which express possibility or necessity), conditional propositions, and other complex propositions. If both of the premises and the conclusion of a syllogism are expressed in the form of a categorical proposition, then the syllogism is called a categorical syllogism. “In a categorical proposition, there is always something, the ‘predicate’, which is either affirmed or denied of something else, the ‘subject’.” Prior, Formal Logic -- categorical syllogism, see categorical proposition categoricity Logic Dewey’s term, although the idea is much older, for a semantic property ascribed to a theory or an axiomatic system, according to which any two of its satisfying interpretations (or models) are isomorphic. That is, any two models, M and N, of a theory T have the same structure, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the domain of M and the domain of N. A theory with such a standard structure or model is categorical. Categoricity is an ideal property for the axiomatic method, but its application is very limited. -- category “Categoricity, as thus defined for the first-order language x, is a relatively trivial notion. None of the usual axiomatically formulated mathematical theories will be categorical, because any set of sentences of x with an infinite model will have models that are of differing cardinality and hence are not isomorphic.” Mates, Elementary Logic -- category Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language [from Greek kategorein, to accuse] The basic and general concepts of thought, language, or reality. Aristotle and Kant provided the classical discussions of categories, although categories play different roles in their thought. Aristotle introduced the term in a logical-philosophical context, meaning “to assert something of something” or “to be predicated of something.” Thus, his notion of category is closely connected to the subject-predicate form. Categories are, in the first instance, kinds of predicates. In the Categories and the Topics 1.9, Aristotle introduced ten kinds of categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection. As kinds of predicate, they reveal different ways in which a subject can be. Because there is a corresponding kind of being for each category, each category can also be considered to be a kind of being. Some categories come from ordinary interrogatives (what, when, where, how); others are derived from grammatical structures (for instance, the active and the passive). Only in two places does Aristotle list all ten categories; in other places he gives a shorter list, often ended by “and so on.” Through his classification of categories, Aristotle explained many difficulties in the philosophy of Parmenides and Plato, and greatly influenced the later development of metaphysics. Categories for Kant are pure non-empirical concepts of the understanding by which we must structure and order the objects of experience in order for experience itself to be possible. They are the concepts under which things intuited must fall or the concepts that give unity to the synthesis of intuition. Aristotle set forth the first table of categories as our basic structure of talking about the world. Kant revived Aristotle’s approach, but criticizes him for identifying the categories haphazardly and took it upon himself to identify them exhaustively, systematically, and with certainty. Kant believed that categories stem from the act of judgment, that is, the logical function of thought in judgment. While the act of judgment holds representations in a unity, categories are precisely the pure concepts according to which we organize experience in a given intuition. Categories and acts of judgment are therefore one and the same thing in the sense that both give unity to the synthesis of intuition. For Kant there are as many categories as there are acts of judgment. Traditional logic classified four kinds of judgment, each kind containing three moments: (1) Quantity: Universal, Particular, Singular; (2) Quality: Affirmative, Negative, Infinite; (3) Relation: Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive; and (4) Modality: Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic. Accordingly, Kant’s table of categories has four headings, each of which has three members: (1) Quantity: Unity, Plurality, Totality; (2) Quality: Reality, Negation, Limitation; (3) Relation: Substance/Accidents, Cause/Effect, Reciprocity between Agent/Patient; (4) Modality: Possibility/Impossibility, Existence/ Non-Existence, Necessity/Contingency. Within each heading, the first two members constitute a dichotomy, and the third member arises from their combination. Together these twelve categories form the grammar of thinking. Kant’s table of categories has been a subject of controversy. Some agree that categories should be derived from fundamental principles of thinking, but propose to emend it either because it is not exhaustive or because it does not reflect modern developments in logic. For other critics, philosophical reflection on judgment should be concerned not with its basic structure, but with its actual use, thus requiring non-Kantian grounds for identifying the categories. Some philosophers accept that categories are non-empirical concepts that we must use for experience or language to be possible, but seek to understand categories outside a systematic context. Ryle’s notion of category sees a relatively open-ended set of categorical distinctions. “The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figure of categories; for the sense of being are just as many as these figures.” Aristotle, Metaphysics – ERROR CATEGORICUS -- category mistake Philosophical method, logic Ryle’s term for a kind of error typically involved in the generation of philosophical problems and in attempts to solve them. The logical type or category to which a concept belongs is constituted by the set of ways in which it is logically legitimate to operate with that concept. When one ascribes a concept to one logical type or category when it is in fact of another, a category mistake is committed. For instance, to say “time is red” is to commit such a mistake, for time is not the sort of thing that could have a color. In another example, it is a mistake to assign the Average Man to the same category as actual individual men like Smith and Jones. According to Ryle, the Cartesian dogma of the ghost in the machine commits a category mistake by describing the mind as belonging to the category of substance, when it actually belongs to the category of disposition. The way to expose a category mistake is through a reductio ad absurdum argument, showing the conceptually unacceptable consequences of treating an item as belonging to an inappropriate category. “It is, namely, a category mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another.” Ryle, The Concept of Mind PURGATIO -- catharsis Aesthetics, ancient Greek philosophy [Greek, cleansing or purging] Aristotle defined the function of tragedy as the catharsis of such emotions as pity and fear. In contrast, Plato claimed that tragedy encourages the emotions. Aristotle did not give an exact explanation of what he meant by catharsis. In Greek, the word can mean either religious purification from guilt or pollution or medical purgation of various bodily evils. Accordingly, there developed two dominant interpretations of this term. One view tends to translate it as “purification” and takes Aristotle to mean that tragedy has a moral effect of achieving psychological moderation and refinement. It can relieve tensions and quiet destructive impulses. The other view tends to translate it as “purgation” and believes that Aristotle proposed that tragedy arouses relaxation and amusement rather than having moral significance. The debate between these two accounts has persisted over the whole history of philosophy. But it is generally agreed that tragedy has the function of catharsis because of its inherent value or worth. In the twentieth century, this term became more complicated through association with Freudian psychoanalysis. “There is often a very special refreshing feeling that comes after aesthetic experience, a sense of being unusually free from inner disturbance or unbalance. And this may testify to the purgative or cathartic, or perhaps sublimative, effect.” Beardsley, Aesthetics causa sui Metaphysics, philosophy of religion [Latin, selfcause, cause of itself ] Spinoza introduces causa sui as one of the major characteristics of substance or God. God is caused not by anything else, but by itself. Here “cause” is not used in its ordinary sense as the agency that brings something into being. Thomas Aquinas has pointed out that to say that God is self-caused in the ordinary sense of “cause” is self-contradictory. For the idea of such a causal power implies the separation between the cause itself and its effect. But the meaning of Spinoza’s causa sui is that the reason for God’s existence lies in his nature or essence. God or substance does not owe its existence to anything else, but is rather the source of its own existence. This is in a sense an abbreviation of the ontological argument for God’s existence. “By causa sui I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing.” Spinoza, Ethics causal analysis of mental concepts Philosophy of mind The initial step in D. Armstrong’s central-state materialism. A token behavior must have a cause within the person, and the cause is that person’s mental states. Unlike a behaviorist analysis, mind is not behavior but is the cause of behavior. According to Armstrong, the concept of a mental state is primarily “the concept of a state of the person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behavior.” On the basis of his causal analysis, Armstrong moves to the second step of his theory, which is to identify mental states with states in the brain. The central task of his book CAUSATUM -- causal theory of action A Materialist Theory of the Mind is to work out this analysis of mental concepts. The major challenge to this theory is the claim that it is inadequate as an explanation of consciousness. “Indeed, it is startling to observe that Wittgenstein’s dictum, ‘An “inner process” stands in need of outward criteria’, might be the slogan of a Causal analysis of mental concepts.” D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind -- causal determinism Metaphysics The view that the world is governed by the principle of causality, that is, for anything that happens, there must be a cause. Nothing can exist and cease to exist without a cause. Causality is the objective and necessary connection that exists and functions universally. To understand a phenomenon is to understand its causal relations. The view is also called causalism. “While the causal principle states the form of the causal bond (causation), causal determinism asserts that everything happens according to the causal law.” Bunge, Causality causal deviance, another term for wayward causal chain causal dualism, see dualism causal explanation Metaphysics, philosophy of science The explanation of an event or state of affairs as an effect of another preceding or concurrent event or state of affairs, which is the cause. On most accounts, the cause and effect must be linked by a causal law that holds universally between items of their types in a specified range of initial conditions. Some philosophers require causal accounts to explain why an effect must take place, while others reject causal necessity and see the universality of causal explanation merely as a limiting condition of statistical explanation. Causal explanation can be given materially in terms of events or states of affairs and initial conditions, or formally in terms of the truth of relevant propositions. Causal explanation is the most important type of deductive-nomological or covering law explanation. Historically, the theory of deductivenomological explanation was developed out of the theory of causal explanation. To provide a causal explanation is to specify the cause in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the effect. Causal explanations can be complex, with the choice over what is a cause and what is a background condition determined in part by the interests of the investigator. Necessary and sufficient conditions can be nested within one another, as in Mackie’s account of a cause as an insufficient but necessary element of an unnecessary but sufficient condition of the effect. Establishing a causal law determined an invariable sequential order of dependence between kinds of events or states of affairs in certain initial conditions, but there is controversy whether there could be causal laws of backward causation. “To give a causal explanation of a certain event means to derive deductively a statement (it will be called a prognosis) which describes that event, using as premises of the deduction some universal laws together with certain singular or specific sentences which we may call initial conditions.” Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemy, vol. II -- causal theory of action Philosophy of action A theory of action which proposes that the distinguishing feature of free action is that it is caused by appropriate antecedent mental events and episodes such as desires, beliefs, rememberings, and so on. It is a necessary condition for behavior to be an intentional action that it be caused by a mental event. Hence to explain action is to specify the prior mental events that are the proximate cause of the action. This is to reject the view, held by the later Wittgenstein, Anscombe, and Hampshire that explanations of actions by reasons are not causal explanations. The classic discussion of the causal theory of action can be found in Davidson’s paper, “Actions, Reasons and Causes” (1963). Davidson claims that there is a primary reason that explains an action by rationalizing it. Primary reason has two components: a pro-attitude toward so acting and a belief that acting in this way is to promote what the pro-attitude is directed upon. This is the agent’s reason for performing the action and the cause of that action. Finding the reason for so acting is a species of causal explanation, and freedom can be explained in terms of causal power. The causal theory of action is now the most influential account of action. Other proponents include Goldman, Searle, and Castaneda. The major problem it faces arises from the possibility of a wayward or deviant causal chain, in which a nonstandard causal chain between a mental event and an action calls into question the intentionality of the action. -- causal theory of perception, an alternative term for representationism -- causal theory of knowledge Epistemology An attempt to modify the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief in the light of challenges such as “Gettier’s problem.” The theory suggests that the justification condition should be conceived as a causal condition between the believer and the fact that he believes. Hence knowledge is true belief that bears a proper relationship with the believed fact. This is an externalist position, for the subject need not necessarily be aware that this causal condition is fulfilled. The theory has different formulations depending on how one conceives of the causal criterion. The theory also intends to reject Platonist abstract entities and substitute causal connection. The classical position is expressed by Alvin Goldman in his paper “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Different versions by other philosophers such as Armstrong and Dretske are developed as a rejection of Goldman’s position. The areas of debate regarding this theory include issues involving the sort of causal relationship that can be sufficient for knowledge, how to account for knowledge of future events, and whether it is possible to have knowledge without causation. -- causal theory of reference Logic, philosophy of language Also called the causal theory of meaning. Most traditional theories of reference depend on the distinction of intension (a list of properties) and extension (reference) and then claim that intension is the ground for describing the meaning of a term, while extension or reference is decided by the description of meaning. The causal theory of reference, developed recently in the United States by Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Hilary Putnam, and, more influentially, Saul Kripke, is a rebellion against such a tradition. Although each of these philosophers presents a different version of theory, the common attribute of the theory is that referential expressions are neither connotative appellations nor disguised or abbreviated descriptions. Proper names and natural kind terms (such as “gold” or “water”) have no intension as understood by these theorists, and accordingly do not have their reference fixed by the concepts or descriptions associated with them. They acquire meaning through the causal linguistic or non-linguistic circumstances of their initial use and maintain it through a historical chain of communication. Although we may fix the reference of a term by giving descriptions, this is not the same as giving the meaning of that term. A speaker uses a name correctly if his usage is causally linked in an appropriate way to the chain of communication. Hence what we need is a definite theory of reference that would capture this causal relation. This theory is, to some extent, an updated version of Mill’s view that proper names have denotations but no connotations. It introduces social and contextual considerations into semantic theory that traditionally focuses on the semantic relations that hold between certain linguistic expressions and the objects for which they stand. -- “The spirit of any account worthy of the name [of causal theory of knowledge] will include the idea that to know about something one must have some sort of causal connection with the thing known.” J. Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind -- “[There] is the idea that certain real (usually causal) relations between our words and the world may make an essential contribution to the content of utterance without in any way figuring in the knowledge of those who utter them. Causal -- “According to causal theories of intentional action, if one has appropriate reasons for doing something and if these reasons cause one to do that, what is done is an intentional action.” Moya, The Philosophy of Action -- causal theory of meaning, another term for the causal theory of reference -- causation theories of the references of singular terms and essentialist theories of the extension of natural-kind words both advance such a claim.” von Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth -- causalism, another expression for causal determinism causality, see causation causality, principle of Metaphysics, philosophy of science A common and deeply held belief that every event or state of affairs has a cause and that every proposition about the world can be derived from other propositions about the world in virtue of causal relations among the items given in the propositions. If we knew enough relevant facts, we could infer any other fact about the world. The principle is also called the principle of determinism. The justification of this principle is a matter of dispute. For physicalism, it is based on the uniformity of nature. For Hume, it is based subjectively on the habit of associating like events. In Kant’s version of the principle, every event follows upon a preceding event in accordance with a rule. But his characterization is regarded as too narrow, since not all causality involves succession. “The principle of causality, . . . asserts, to put it in a simple, unsophisticated way, that every event has a cause.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy causation Metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science One of the fundamental topics in metaphysics, also called causality. Causation is the firm and constant relation between events such that if an event of the first kind occurs, an event of the second kind will or must occur. The occurrence of the first event, the cause, explains the occurrence of the second event, the effect. Some philosophers believe that items other than events, such as objects, states of affairs, and facts can also enter into causal relations. The traditional view before Hume claimed that causation is an actual trait, which involves objective interdependence among real events. Hence, causation was seen as an ontological category, for necessary connection is a relation objectively holding between objects or happenings that are said to be causally related. But according to the British empiricists, causation is only an epistemological category. Locke took it to be a connection between sensation and the sensed object, while for Hume it was purely a relation of ideas, and was just a matter of our imposing our mental habits upon the world. Hume argued that the traditional conception of causation is mistaken. Because nothing but experience can teach us of the orderliness of nature and because we do not experience instances of necessary connection, the phrase “necessary connection” is meaningless. We can verify spatial contiguity and temporal priority in our impressions, but not necessary connection. The real basis for our idea of causation is observed regularity. Events of type a have always been followed by events of type b, and so when a new a-type event occurs we predict by custom that a b-type event will follow. This is not a logical, demonstrable, or self-evident connection, but concerns our habitual attitudes and what happens in our minds. Hence Hume claimed that predictions of causation can have only an inductive basis, not a necessary or certain one. Hume’s theory was established on the basis of his principle of the association of ideas and it has been the focus of much debate. Kant’s attempt to establish causation as a category, or as a condition for the possibility of experience, provides a major rival to the Humean account. What, then, is the distinctive feature of cause and effect? Various approaches have been presented. Among them, the most influential include the regularity theory, which claims that causal relations are instances of a kind of regularity; the counterfactual theory, which claims that a cause is a cause because without its occurrence the effect would not have occurred; and the manipulation analysis, which proposes that a cause is a cause because by manipulating it we can produce something else. Other problems widely discussed include: the possibility of backward causation, where an effect precedes cause; the relations between causation and explanation, between causation and determinism, and between causation and necessity; the role of causation in natural laws; causal deviance; and the eliminativist possibility of science getting rid of the notion of causation. “The term causation . . . signifies causingness and causedness taken together.” The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill -- cause Metaphysics In modern usage, a cause normally involves an agent or event that exerts power and effects a change. A cause produces or brings about an effect. If X occurs and Y invariably follows, then X is the cause and Y is its effect, and the relationship between them is called causation or causality. A cause is often regarded as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of its effect, but there are complex arguments over the role of sufficient and necessary conditions in an adequate account of causes and effects. The existence of causal chains is a necessary condition for the possibility of science. A cause is generally taken to precede its effect, but some argue that there could be backward causation (where a cause follows its effect), and concurrent causation (where a cause is simultaneous with its effect). According to Davidson, the reason for an action is a mental act that is causally linked to the action and that explaining an action by giving a reason is a sort of causal explanation. Cause is also employed to translate the Greek term aitia. Hence, Aristotle’s theory of four aitia is translated as “four causes.” However, aitia as cause means more broadly explanatory feature. Of Aristotle’s four causes, only efficient cause bears some resemblance to the modern notion of cause, while all of the other three (material, formal, and final causes) are inactive and cannot be agents. “Power being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called causes, and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called effects.” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding -- causes, four Ancient Greek philosophy [Greek aition, cause or explanatory factor, from the adjective aitos, responsible] Aristotle held that we know by means of causes, of which there are four sorts: material causes (out of which things come to be), formal causes (what things essentially are), efficient causes (sources of movement and rest), and final causes (purposes or ends). He claimed that all his predecessors sought after these causes, but only vaguely and incompletely. In modern use, a cause is an agent or event exerting power and effecting a change, and a cause must do something to bring about an effect. Of Aristotle’s four causes, only efficient cause resembles this modern notion, and even here there are differences. What Aristotle was distinguishing are different sorts of answers that can be given to the questions “Why?” or “Because of what?” Aristotelian causes are four types of explanatory factors or conditions necessary to account for the existence of a thing. Aristotle sometimes said that formal and final causes are identical, especially in his natural teleology, and sometimes went further, to say that formal, final, and efficient causes are identical. “Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of the original causes (for we say we know each thing only when we think we recognise its first cause), and causes are spoken of in four senses.” Aristotle, Metaphysics -- cause in fact, see sine qua non cave, simile of the Ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology A fundamental image of human knowledge and reality described by Plato in the Republic (514– 21). Imagine prisoners in an underground cave who have been there since their childhood. They are chained in such a way that they cannot turn their heads but can only see the shadows on the cave wall in front of them. The shadows are cast by a fire behind them and by the artifacts that men carry and pass along a track across the cave, like the screen at a puppet show. The prisoners naturally believe that the shadows are the only real things. If one of them happens to be released and turns round to the fire and to see the objects themselves, he will initially be bewildered, his eyes will be in pain, and he will think that the shadows are more real than their originals. If he is further dragged upward through the entrance of the cave and to the sunlight, he will be even more dazzled and angry. At first, he will only be able to see the reflections of the real things in the water, and then the things themselves in the light of the sun, and finally even the sun itself. At that time, he will be in a condition of real liberation and will pity his fellow-prisoners and his old beliefs and life. CENTRUM -- central-state materialism If he goes back to save his fellow-prisoners, it will take time for him to get used to the darkness in the cave, and he will find it hard to persuade the prisoners to follow him upward. This simile is connected with the simile of the Sun and the simile of the Line, with the world inside the cave corresponding to the perceptible world and the world outside the cave corresponding to the intelligible world, but the text has been subjected to a variety of divergent interpretations. Plato explicitly stated that the prisoners are like us and serve as a representation of the human condition, and the prisoner being dragged out of the cave is analogous to a process of enlightenment by education. We can interpret the upward journey and the contemplation of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm. The Cave simile exerted great influence on later political and educational theories. “Socrates is meant to tell us in the [simile of the] cave that the general condition of mankind is one of seeing things indirectly through their images.” Crombie, An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines CEMENTUM -- cement of the universe Metaphysics, philosophy of mind Hume’s term for what he took to be the most basic principles of the association of ideas, that is, resemblance, contiguity in time or in place, and causation. These are the links that connect us with any person or object exterior to ourselves. For Hume, the human mind operates according to these principles to construct various complex ideas and consequently to build up our picture of the universe. These principles are themselves associated, and the presence of one will introduce the other two to the mind. The contemporary philosopher John Mackie took “The Cement of the Universe” to be the title for his influential book about causation (1974). “As it is by means of thought only that any thing operates upon our passions, and as these are the only ties of our thoughts, they [the principles of association] are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend on them.” Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature CENSURA -- censorship Ethics, political philosophy The inspection and restriction of the contents of publications, films, and performances by a religious or government office or some other body. There are generally two kinds of censorship. The first examines works for illegitimate or immoral contents, such as hard-core pornography; the other concerns political and ideological content and seeks to prohibit or alter what is offensive to the government or other censoring body. Liberalism especially condemns political censorship on the grounds that such a practice violates the basic right of free speech. This gives rise to the problem of how and to what extent free speech must be protected. The prior restraint of publication or performance is considered more difficult to justify than providing penalties afterwards, but there is also the possibility that afterwards penalties will contribute to self-censorship. In some circumstances, such as wartime, there is a greater tolerance of censorship than in ordinary times. “If we recognise the general value of free expression, therefore, we should accept a presumption against censorship or prohibition of any activity when that activity even arguably expresses a conviction about how people should live or feel, or opposes established or popular convictions.” Dworkin, A Matter of Principle CENTRUM -- central-state materialism Philosophy of mind Also called the central-state theory of mind and synonymous with the identity theory, a materialist or physicalist theory of mind that holds that mental states, such as visual perceptions, pains, and beliefs are inner states that cause behavior. These inner mental states, however, are identified with states or processes occurring in the brain and central nervous system. Mind is in brain. That is not to say that it is a substance, but that it is possessed by a substance. This theory can be traced to Thomas Hobbes, and in contemporary philosophy has been developed by Feyerabend, Place, Putnam, and especially by the Australian philosophers J. J. C. Smart and D. Armstrong. In the standard version, the identity between mental states and physical states is contingent, not necessary. The theory, which occupies the middle ground between dualism and Ryle’s behaviorism, emerged as an attempt to overcome one of the major difficulties faced by the latter, that is, the denial of the existence of inner mental states. But the theory itself has trouble in analyzing the intentionality of mental states, how they can have content and be about something. Some critics also object that it has difficulty in accounting for the logical possibility of disembodied existence. “For the most part these who profess physicalism (or materialism) are advocating a physicalism of substance combined with something like a dual aspect theory of events. They assert that mental events are identical with physical events within an organism’s central nervous system or brain. The theory is sometimes called central state materialism.” Hodgson, The Mind Matters central-state theory of mind, another term for central-state materialism certainty Epistemology, logic [from Latin certus, sure] Either a state of mind (psychological certainty), such as acceptance, trust, taking as reliable, and not disputing or questioning, or a property of a proposition of being incapable of being doubted and being undeniable (propositional certainty). Psychological certainty is opposed to doubt and skepticism, and propositional certainty contrasts to probability. Psychological certainty regarding truth is insufficient to establish propositional certainty without further justification. What is known to be certain is a kind of true knowledge, but certainty is different from truth because “certainly true” is stronger than “true” and because we can also judge that a proposition is “certainly false.” The distinction between certainty and probability can be compared to the distinction between necessity and contingency. Certainty admits varying degree according to the nature and extent of the testimony. Modern philosophy has sought to ground knowledge on certainty, which was understood by Descartes in terms of the impossibility of doubt. Some have located certainty in thoughts or experiences that could not be denied and that could provide the basis for the acceptance of riskier items. Others, like Peirce, proposed a general fallibilism, according to which knowledge was possible without the requirement of certainty. In response to Moore’s discussion of certainty in terms of common sense, Wittgenstein’s account in On Certainty distinguishes between certainty and knowledge. What is certain provides a partially changing array of “hinge” propositions, on which our whole system of belief in ordinary propositions depends. “Certain, possible, impossible: here we have the first indication of the scale that we need in the theory of probability.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus CAETERIS PARIBUS -- ceteris paribus: the generalization of a scientific law or regularity is reached on the assumption that normal conditions obtain, and its application also generally assumes normal circumstances or conditions. All abnormal and exceptional conditions are ruled out. Hence all generalizations imply an unstated ceteris paribus clause, which may be stated “other things being equal,” or “if conditions are normal, then . . .” The existence of ceteris paribus clauses suggests the limitation of the validity and the scope of general explanations. The development of science reduces the scope of ceteris paribus clauses by including some previously excluded circumstances within more complex and comprehensive theories. Some philosophers hold that science will always deal with simplified models of reality and that ceteris paribus clauses will never be fully eliminated. “In actual causal arguments in the social sciences, it will often emerge that the claim that C is sufficient for E rests upon an unstated ceteris paribus clause: c is sufficient for e under normal circumstances.” Little, Varieties of Social Explanation chance Ancient Greek philosophy, metaphysics [Greek tuche, from tunchanein, to happen; also translated as fortune, luck] In a broad sense, tuche is used as a synonym of automaton (spontaneous). Sometimes Aristotle distinguished the two terms, but the distinction was neither important nor always observed. Something happening by chance does not happen for any reason. Its cause cannot be accounted for, and it is an exception to the general rule. Chance can be either good or bad, that is, either good luck or bad luck, fortunate or unfortunate. In ethics, charity matters of chance or luck are uncontrolled events that are beneficial or harmful to somebody. In modern philosophy, chance contrasts with determinism and is discussed without ethical aspects in statistics and probability theory. “Thus to say that chance is a thing contrary to rule is correct.” Aristotle, Physics CAMBIUM -- change Metaphysics [Greek metabole, alloiosis, gignesthai or kinesis, which are also be translated by other terms, such as alteration, generation, becoming, motion and movement] Any transition to something. Aristotle analyzed three elements in a change: a pair of opposites: the lack of a character prior to the change (privation) and the character after the change (form); and the subject or substratum that underlies the opposites. He held that all change is from the potential to the actual. He also distinguished two types of change on the basis of his theory of categories. First, a non-substantial change occurs if a definite thing changes its attributes and comes to be such-and-such a thing, with the substratum of change being an individual. For example, there is a nonsubstantial change if a man changes from being unmusical to being musical. Non-substantial change includes change of place, qualitative change and quantitative change. Secondly, substantial change occurs if the subject itself, rather than its attributes, changes, with the substratum of change being matter. Substantial change is coming-into-being, the generation of a new composite of form and matter. Sometimes Aristotle distinguished among kinesis (non-substantial change); gignesthai (substantial change) in contrast with phthora (ceasing to be); and metabole (the whole change), but did not always observe these distinctions. His theory of change is a criticism of Parmenides, who claimed that change is impossible because being cannot be generation from not-being. According to Aristotle, not-being is an absence that changes through being replaced by a positive characteristic. Contemporary philosophers understand change as the difference between a thing T at time t1 and at time t 2 ; as the replacement of one thing T by another thing T′ at time t; or as the occurrence of an event at time t. Cambridge change, which need not involve a real change in a thing, occurs if some predicate is true of T at t1 but false of T at t 2. This has provoked much debate, for in such cases T can undergo a Cambridge change without really altering. Since change involves time, philosophers who deny the reality of time deny the existence of change as well. There is also a tradition, starting from Heraclitus and represented in the twentieth century by Whitehead, that reduces physical objects to changes or processes. “If change proceeds . . . from the contrary, there must be something underlying changes into the contrary state; for the contraries do not change.” Aristotle, Metaphysics CHARACTER -- character Ethics [Greek êthos, character or disposition] A state of desiring and feeling resulting from early habituation. The notion is closely connected with habit and custom. From êthos we derive the name of the philosophical discipline “ethics,” literally meaning “concerned with the character.” The character of a person makes that person the sort of person he is. The cultivation of character requires the education of the non-rational parts or aspects of the soul. Aristotle divides virtue (excellence) into virtues of intelligence and virtues of character. A large part of his ethics concerns the formation of virtues of character. “Virtue of character results from habit; hence its name ethics, slightly varies from Êthos.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics CHARATERISATUM -- characterizing term, Strawson’s term for mass term CHARITAS -- charity Ethics, philosophy of religion [from Latin caritas, generally translated as love] The benevolent love for God and one’s neighbors (others). Charity, along with faith and hope, is one of the three cardinal Christian theological virtues. Among them, faith is first in order of origin, while charity is the highest in order of perfection. Charity is the fundamental and underlying spiritual orientation for Christian life, and determines all other moral and intellectual virtues. For Christians, this is because we come from God and will go back to God. Charity is not instrumental but is unconditional and is pursued beyond the present life. Currently, charity is the voluntary provision for the poor and suffering and the pursuit of other good causes. It is taken to mean the same as philanthropy. “Charity is the mother and root of all the virtues in as much as it is the form of them all.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae ANIMATUM -- Chinese room argument Philosophy of mind A thought experiment devised by John Searle in his 1980 paper “Minds, Brains and Programs.” It is designed to demonstrate that software cannot make a computer conscious or give it a mind that is anything like a human mind. Suppose an English speaker, who cannot speak Chinese, is locked in a room with two windows and an instruction book in English. Pieces of paper with questions in Chinese written on them are put into the room through one window. The person matches these pieces of paper with other pieces of paper with Chinese symbols according to the instructions in the book and then passes these other pieces of paper through the other window. Searle believes that this is basically what the set-up inside a computer is like and that the non-Chinese-speaking person is like the computer. He processes everything received from the input according to a program, and his output might, as a matter of fact, take the form of answers to the Chinese questions he received. Hence he passes the Turing test, but still does not gain an understanding of Chinese. Similarly, a computer only operates according to designed formal rules, and cannot be aware of the contents of the symbols it manipulates. Searle then concludes that a program is not a mind, for the former is formal or syntactical, while the latter has semantic content. Semantics is not intrinsic to syntax, and syntax is not sufficient for semantics. The Chinese room argument is a powerful criticism of the position of strong artificial intelligence, which claims that a mind is nothing more than a computer program. The logic and implications of this Chinese room argument have been hotly debated over the past decade. “I believe the best-known argument against strong AI was my Chinese room argument that showed a system could instantiate a program so as to give a perfect simulation of some human cognitive capacity, such as the capacity to understand Chinese, even though that system had no understanding of Chinese whatever.” Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind CHISHOLMIANUM IMLPLICATUM -- Chisholm, Roderick (1916–99) American philosopher, born in North Attleboro, Massachusetts, educated at Harvard, taught at Brown. Chisholm was heavily influenced by Brentano and revived the notion of intentionality in analytic philosophy. His Theory of Knowledge is one of the most widely used textbooks of epistemology. Chisholm contributed many original positions on issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, ontology, and ethics. His views on the primacy of the intentional over semantics, the problem of criteria, foundationalism, internalism, the adverbial theory of sensory experiencing, agent causality, ontological categories, intrinsic value, and mereological essentialism provoked lively debates in metaphysics and epistemology. His works include Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (1957), Person and Object (1976), The First Person (1981), The Foundations of Knowing (1982), On Metaphysics (1989), and A Realistic Theory of Categories (1996). He edited the journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. choice, see decision Chomsky, Noam (1928– ) American theorist of linguistics, philosopher of language and mind, and political thinker, born in Philadelphia, Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Chomsky radically altered the development of theoretical linguistics by introducing transformational and generative grammar and by claiming that our acquisition and use of language shows that the human mind has innate genetically given linguistic features. In keeping with a program of minimalism, his later linguistic writings have sought to reduce a range of transformational rules to a single abstract transformational principle. His work has deeply influenced philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. His major works include Syntactic Structures (1957), Cartesian Linguistics (1966), Knowledge of Language (1986), Deterring Democracy (1992), and Language and Thought (1993). TEMPUS -- chronological logic, another name for tense logic CHRYSIPPUSIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Chrysippus (c.280–c.208 bc) Stoic philosopher, born in Soli, Asia Minor. After studying in Athens under Zeno and Cleanthes, he became the third head of the Stoa. None of his complete works survived, although he was extensively quoted by Plutarch and other secondary sources. He is credited with systematizing and defining Stoic philosophy and defending it against Academic attack. He developed Stoic logic that anticipated modern prepositional calculus and is considered to be the first to formulate truth conditions for conditional statements. Diogenes Laertius remarked that “If there had been no Chrysippus there would have been no Stoa.” CHURCHIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Church, Alonzo (1903–95) American mathematical logician, born in Washington, DC, Professor at Princeton and UCLA. In mathematical logic, Church’s theorem proved the undecidability of first-order logic, and Church’s thesis linked the notion of effective computation to recursiveness. Church argued for realism regarding abstract objects and contributed to the theory of probability as well as playing a major role in the development of mathematical logic. His works include Introduction to Mathematical Logic, vol. 1 (1956). Church’s theorem, see Church’s thesis Church’s thesis Logic “That the notion of an effectively calculable function of positive integers should be identified with that of a recursive function . . .” This thesis was proposed by the American mathematical logician Alonzo Church in 1935. It combines Gödel’s notion of recursiveness with the notion of computability. A function is computable if and only if it is recursive and Turing-computable. Since this thesis is closely related to the concept of Turing-computability, it is sometimes called the Church–Turing thesis. The notion of effective computability in Church’s thesis is an intuitive rather than proven notion. For this reason, Church’s thesis is a thesis rather than a theorem. There is, however, Church’s theorem, proved by Church in 1936, which states that there is no decision procedure for determining whether an arbitrary formula of predicate calculus is a theorem of the calculus. It is a negative solution to the decision problem. Church’s thesis serves as one of the premises of Church’s theorem. “Church’s thesis, if true, guarantees that a Turing machine can compute any ‘effective’ procedure.” Baker, Saving Belief CICERONIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Cicero, Marcus Tullius (106–43 bc) Roman philosopher and orator, born at Arpinum in Latium. His writings include the Academica, De finibus, Tusculan Disputations, De fato, De Officiis (On Duties), De Re Publica (On the State), and De Legibus (On the Laws). Cicero sought to make Greek philosophy available to Latin speakers and was the creator of philosophical vocabulary in Latin. He was a trained Academic skeptic, but was inclined toward Stoicism in moral philosophy. His writings show the influence of Stoicism, Epicurus, and Skepticism. His exposition of the Stoic concepts of natural law and justice greatly influenced Roman law. CIRCULUS circular definition Logic A definition is circular if its definiens has to be explained by appeal to its definiendum, or if its definiendum appears in its definiens. This is in violation of the rule in formal logic that the definiens should not contain any part of the definiendum. A more common form of circularity occurs in a set of definitions, if a term A is defined by B, and B by C, and then C by A. “If a definition contains the definiendum in the definiens, the definition is said to be circular.” Adams, The Fundamentals of General Logic circular reasoning, another term for begging the question citizenship Political philosophy The legal status of being a member of a nation or state. In contemporary political philosophy, citizenship is both a dutyrelated and rights-related concept. As a citizen, one has a duty to promote and defend the interest of the state, even, if necessary, at the expense of one’s own life. Citizens are also obliged to sacrifice some of their private life to engage in public activity. Citizens, however, are recognized as having a right to participate in public life, rights to vote and to stand for public office, rights to education and other welfare, and rights to legal protection. Other rights, such as those involving free speech, free association, and access to a free press, also derive from the notion of citizenship. Citizenship has been described as a democratic ideal that distinguishes free individuals from mere subjects who live under various forms of undemocratic regimes. The equality of democratic citizenship is a central topic in the political discussion of equality. “Democratic citizenship is a status radically disconnected from every kind of hierarchy.” Walzer, Spheres of Justice civil disobedience Political philosophy, philosophy of law Activity engaged in openly but deliberately against the law in order to express some conscientious and deeply held convictions in the hope of changing perceived injustices in the law and government policies. The laws broken need not be the laws against which protest is raised. Civil disobedience must be distinguished from militant actions and organized forcible resistance. As a mode of address or protest for a vital social purpose, civil disobedience generally occurs in a well-ordered, democratic society and against a constitutional regime. The activity itself is in violation of law, but it is performed by people who accept the basic principles of a democratic society. Problems arise regarding questions such as the grounds on which these acts can be justified and how the legal systems might legitimately respond to them. The discussion of civil disobedience is closely related to the question of political obligation. “I shall begin by defining civil disobedience as a public, non-violent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice civil duty, see civil rights civil liberties, see civil rights civil rights Political philosophy, philosophy of law Civil matters pertain to the dealings of the state with its citizens as citizens. Civil rights are the rights granted to the citizens by the constitution and laws of a state and must be protected by the constitution and laws. These rights, or civil liberties, generally include freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of religious belief, and freedom of political participation. In this sense, they cover the rights stated in articles 1–21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The right to due process in the law and other legal protections are also included. It is a matter of dispute whether fundamental economic and social rights, such as the rights to education, work, shelter, and health care, should also be regarded as civil rights. Questions arise concerning the relations among civil rights. Are they all on a par, or are some more fundamental than others? What should be done if the rights conflict? Can each stand on its own or are they interdependent? Civil rights are correlated with civil duties. If A has a right to X, then other citizens and the state have an obligation not to interfere with A’s right. The United States enacted a Civil Rights Act in 1964, which addressed in particular the problem of racial equality. Here “civil rights” means the equal rights of black people to education, employment, and the vote. “The liberal, therefore, needs a scheme of civil rights whose effect will be to determine those political decisions that are antecedently likely to reflect strong external preferences and to remove those decisions from majoritarian political institutions altogether.” Dworkin, A Matter of Principle civil society Political philosophy [German burgerliche Gesellschaft] A major term in Hegel’s political philosophy for an economic organization of independent persons. Civil society is distinguished from an autonomous and sovereign political state. It includes a system of needs, that is, the institutions and practice involved in the economic activities that meet a variety of needs, the administration of justice, public authority, and corporations. A political state makes one a citizen, while a civil society makes one a bourgeois. In a civil society, the individual pursues his own private good and has equal civil rights. However, there is also a determinate system that guarantees both the freedom of the individual and the harmony of individual needs and the collective needs of the community. Hence civil society characterizes modern ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Hegel’s original distinction between civil society and the political state helps to understand the central role of the economic market in modern society. “Civil society – an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal systems – the means to security of person and property – and by an external organisation for attaining their particular and common interests.” Hegel, Philosophy of Right civitas, see commonwealth CLARKEIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Clarke, Samuel (1675–1729) English rationalist philosopher and natural theologian, born in Norwich, rector of St James, Westminster. Clarke was an early exponent of Newton’s scientific achievements and defended them in correspondence with Leibniz. In his ethical writings, he argued for the objectivity of moral qualities and relations and held that we could have rational knowledge of these on the analogy of our mathematical knowledge. His works include A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (1704–5), A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion and the Truth and Certainty of Christian Revelation (1706), and The Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence (1717). class Logic A collection of entities satisfying a condition for membership in the class, that is, having certain common properties. The notion of a class or set is fundamental to set theory. A class is said to be open if it has infinite members and closed if its members are numerable. According to the axiom of extensionality, if two classes are exactly alike with respect to their members, they are identical. If a class has no members, it is called the null class or empty class. Class is usually used interchangeably with set, but some suggest that while set covers only those classes that are members of other classes, class covers collections that are not members of any other classes. The distinction is thought to be significant for solving Russell’s paradox, which is also called the class paradox. “By ‘class’ I mean things that have members.” D. Lewis, Parts of Classes classical Aristotelian conception of truth Logic, philosophy of language Tarski asserted that his task was to enunciate the conception of truth in Aristotle’s formula: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true.” Aristotle’s conception is the standard version of the correspondence theory of truth: “The truth of a sentence consists in its agreement with reality.” This formula is equivalent to the semantic notion of truth: “A sentence is true if it designates an existing state of affairs.” This is in turn the same as Tarski’s (T) schema: “ ‘p’ is true iff p.” “We should like our definition to do justice to the intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception of truth.” Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth,” in Feigl and Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis class-inclusion Logic A transitive relationship such that if an individual S (or a class A) is included in a class B, and B is in turn included in a higher class C, then if S (or class A) belongs to class B, S (or class A) also belongs to class C. For instance, if Socrates is a human being, and human beings are animals, then Socrates is an animal. In contrast, class-membership is an intransitive relationship. If A is a member of B, and B is a member of C, it does not follow that A is a member of C. For instance, Smith is a member of Oxford University, and Oxford University is a member of the National Union of Universities. But Smith is not a member of the National Union of Universities. “The relation of class-inclusion is to be distinguished from the relation of class-membership, most importantly because class-membership is non-transitive.” Alexander, A Preface to the Logic of Science class-membership, see class-inclusion Cleanthes (c.331–232 bc) Greek Stoic philosopher, born in Assos. He succeeded Zeno of Citium as the second head of the Stoic school in 262 bc. Of his writings, only Hymn to Zeus is extant. He was credited to have made important contributions to Stoic theology and cosmology. clear and distinct: Descartes’s general criterion of the certainty of knowledge or truth. It is based on methodological doubt and attached to the intellectual perception of ideas. Clarity is in contrast to obscurity. A perception or idea is clear if it contains no implications that might subsequently cause us to doubt them. This requires the attentiveness of the mind. An idea is distinct if it is separated from everything else and contains absolutely nothing else but clear ideas. Distinctness is contrasted to confusion and is a stricter notion than clarity. An idea may be clear without being distinct, but a distinct idea is always clear. Descartes claimed that sorting out what is clear and distinct from what is obscure and confused is a laborious task. However, since this criterion relies on the intellect’s power, it is usually criticized as failing to provide a genuine solution to the problem of the validation of human knowledge, for it simply declares that truth is self-manifesting to the human mind. “I call a perception ‘clear’ when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind . . . I call a perception ‘distinct’ if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains within itself only what is clear.” Descartes, The Philosophical Writings CLEMENTINUM IMPLICATUM -- Clement of Alexandria (c.150 –c.219) Alexandrian Christian theologian, probably born in Athens. Clement argued that philosophy was in harmony with Christian doctrine and could help to understand it. He emphasized a Neoplatonic contrast between simple and complex unity. God is a simple unity who can not be named or discussed in terms of the Aristotelian categories. The Son, however, is knowable as a complex unity. Clement used further philosophical doctrines to discuss God’s goodness and human virtue, truth, and faith. His major philosophical work was Stromateis. closed sentence, see open sentence closed society, see open society COGITO; ERGO, SUM -- cogito ergo sum Metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind [Latin, I think, therefore I am] The first principle or first truth of Descartes’s metaphysical system. I can doubt everything, including whether I have a body. But as long as I am engaged in the process of thinking, I exist. Even if I doubt my existence, there must exist an “I” who can doubt. It would be a contradiction to deny the existence of something that is thinking. Thus this proposition is certain and indubitable. It is the first limitation to the agnostic doubt, and the starting-point of strict knowledge. It implies, of course, some prior knowledge of the meaning of the terms involved and their logical implications, but it is the first matter of existence of which one can be sure. The proposition might be construed syllogistically as presupposing a major premise that everything that thinks exists. But Descartes emphasized that the certainty of my existence is not a logical inference; rather it is an individual and immediate act of thinking. “Observing that this truth ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ (Ego cogito ergo sum) was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.” Descartes, Discourse on Method COGNITUM -- cognition Epistemology [from Latin cognitio, awareness, or the formation of the ideas of something] Cognitio is usually translated as “knowledge”; but this is not precise. While “knowledge” is also used to translate “scientia,” Descartes distinguished cognition from knowledge (scientia), for much of our cognition is confused and inadequate. Spinoza distinguished among three grades of cognition. The first grade is composed of mere second-hand opinion, imagination and cognition derived from shifting experience. This kind of cognition admits of falsity. The second grade is reason (ratio), which seeks the underlying reason or cause of phenomena, and to find necessary truths. The third and highest grade is intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitive), which advances from adequate ideas of the essence of attributes to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. The distinction between intuitive knowledge and reason roughly corresponds to Aristotle’s distinction between nous, which grasps the first principles, and apodeixis (demonstration), which involves deduction from the established first principles. In general philosophical usage, cognition comprises those states and processes leading to knowledge and is distinguished from sensation, feeling, and volition. In contemporary cognitive psychology and cognitive science, cognition is viewed as the representational state and process of the mind, including not only thinking, but also language-using, symbol-manipulating, and behavior-controlling. “Cognition of the first kind alone is the cause of falsity; cognition of the second and third orders is necessarily true.” Spinoza, Ethics cognitive science Philosophy of mind An interdisciplinary investigation of human cognition and cognitive processes such as thinking, reasoning, memory, attention, learning, mental representation, perception, and problem solving. It emerged in the 1970s, and psychology, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience, computer science, and artificial intelligence all contribute to this enterprise. While artificial intelligence attempts to get computing machines to approximate a human mind, the basic idea of cognitive science is to view the human mind as a computer-like information processing system. It is hence an attempt to understand the human cognition system in terms of the developments of computer science and artificial intelligence. Initially cognitive science viewed computation as the manipulation of symbols, but its recent development has taken the form of connectionism or neural network modeling. “The basic inspiration of cognitive science went something like this: human beings do information processing.” Searle, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy -- cognitive value Logic, philosophy of language A term Frege introduced to contrast with truth-value. The truthvalue of a sentence is its truth or falsity and does not vary if we substitute for one of its components another term having the same reference. However, the substitution might result in a different understanding of the sentence. For the substitute term might have the same reference (that is, what it designates) but a different sense (that is, what it means). Hence, the substantial information the sentence conveys will be changed. This sense is the cognitive value of a sentence, which we understand when we understand the sentence. Cognitive value is also called epistemic value. “a = a and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value.” Frege, Collected Papers cognitivism Ethics, philosophy of mind Ethical theories that hold that there is knowledge of moral facts and that normative ethical judgments can be said to be true or false. Cognitivism includes the majority of traditional ethical theories. In contrast, non-cognitivism, represented by emotivism and prescriptivism, holds that moral statements do not possess truth-values and cannot be known. Outside of ethics, cognitivism is a psychological theory that explains behavior by appeal to the information-processing states of the physical brain. “Roughly, cognitivists hold that there is ethical knowledge; non-cognitivists deny it.” Hancock, Twentieth-Century Ethics COHENIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Cohen, Gerald Alan (1941– ) Canadian-British analytical Marxist political philosopher, born in Montreal, Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at University of Oxford. Cohen is a leading exponent of analytical Marxism, using rigorous analytic methods to explicate, reconstruct, and criticize Marx’s theoretical claims. In particular, he defended Marx’s account of history by reconstructing Marx’s historical determinism in terms of functional explanation. His works include Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense (1978) and History, Labour and Freedom: Themes from Marx (1988). Cohen, Hermann (1842 –1918) German-Jewish neo-Kantian philosopher, born in Coswig, Professor at University of Marburg and Lecturer at the High School for the Science of Judaism. Cohen founded the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism with Paul Natorp and interpreted Kant’s theory of knowledge in psychological terms. He later turned to questions of religion. He interpreted Judaism as an ethical system based on biblical prophecy, giving priority to ethics over ritual. He argued for the integration of Jews in European society and against Zionism. His main works include The Concept of Religion in the Philosophical System (1915) and The Religion of Reason Taken from Jewish Sources (1918). “A coherence theory of truth may be seen in an essentially regulative role governing the considerations relating to the classification of empirical propositions as true, rather than claiming to present the constitutive essence of truth as such.” Rescher, COHENIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Cohen, Morris Raphael (1889–1947) American legal philosopher, philosopher of science, and logician, born Minsk, Russia. Professor, City College of New York. Cohen argued that as part of science, logic was based on the nature of things rather than forming a set of abstract tautologies. He was a realist regarding abstract entities, but held that claims about their existence and the principles of science, ethics, and law were fallible and always open to further testing. His principle of polarity, that opposite qualities must involve each other, supported a dialectical practice of reasoning from opposing views. His major works include Reason and Nature (1931), Law and Social Order (1933), and An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (with Ernest Nagel, 1934). The Coherence Theory of Truth COHERENTIA -- coherence theory of truth Logic, epistemology, philosophy of language A theory taking truth to consist in coherent relations among the members of a set of beliefs and propositions, rather than in relations between a proposition and a corresponding fact. This theory arises due to the failure of the correspondence theory of truth to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature of correspondence. The coherence of a proposition with other propositions is the ultimate criterion of truth. Truth is defined in terms of the coherence of propositions. Coherence usually means consistency and independence. Generally speaking, the proponents of this theory have their philosophical outlook shaped by an admiration for mathematics. For many rationalists, this theory of truth is an essential ingredient in their epistemology. In the twentieth century, this theory was proposed by the idealist Bradley and the logical positivist Neurath, and was most recently defended by Rescher. Its major problem is that it generally goes beyond one’s power to put a proposition into a holistic system of beliefs. Furthermore, a proposition might be coherent with others in its system, but the system as a whole might be incompatible with another system of beliefs. Accordingly, coherence and truth do not seem to be the same. -- coherentism: L. cohaerere, to adhere together, stick together] Coherentism is a theory of epistemic justification, in opposition to foundationalism. It denies the view that there is a set of self-warranting perceptual beliefs that serve as the ultimate justification for all other beliefs. Instead, it suggests that all beliefs form a network within which each has equal epistemic status. A cognitive system is a family of interrelated theses that are linked to one another by an interlacing network of connections. These connections are inferential in nature but not necessarily deductive. Justification is a matter of coherence. A belief is justified if and only if it coheres with the background system of beliefs. There are various ways of understanding the nature of coherence; and different views of what coherence is form different versions of coherentism. Since coherence is essentially an internal relation among beliefs, there is a major difficulty for coherentism to deal with, that is, how to fill the gap between justified belief and external reality. It is also difficult for this theory to accommodate perceptual knowledge. In another usage, coherentism means the view that a complete inductive logic is restricted to a principle of credal coherence. “Coherentism . . . views the network-interrelatedness of factual theses as the criterial standard of their acceptability.” Rescher, Cognitive Systematization COLLECTUM -- collective predicate, Goodman’s term for mass noun collective responsibility Ethics, political philosophy Modern ethics has been traditionally individualistic in the sense that only the individual can be the focus of ethical consideration and that an action of a group can be morally meaningful only when it can be reduced to the actions of individuals. But there is a tendency to believe that in certain circumstance we can have a notion of group or collective responsibility that cannot be reduced to individual responsibility. For example, some seek to ascribe responsibility or blame collectively to white South Africans under apartheid and to Germans as a whole under the Nazi regime. The problem is how to talk about this group responsibility. It does not seem correct to model it on the discourse of individual responsibility. What is important is to define what the group is. It is generally thought that the group in question should not be a random collection of individuals, but must be one that has a group cohesion and identity. All its members should have common interests and a sense of pride and shame in the group. Blame or responsibility should be ascribed to this kind of group not only when all of its members do something wrong, but also when some of its members commit significant blameworthy actions in virtue of their membership. The issue, along with similar questions regarding group interest, group rights, and group justice, remains open and is unlikely to be settled until we have a better understanding of the metaphysical nature of social entities and the relationship between groups and their members. “My account makes it a necessary condition for the ascription of collective responsibility to unorganised groups that each member of a group engage in acts or omissions which contribute to the harmful consequences for which the group is held collectively responsible.” May, The Morality of Groups collectivism Political philosophy, philosophy of social science In contrast to individualism, which gives priority to individual interests over collective interests, the view that the common interests of a group or society are more important than the interests of its individual members. The significance of an individual cannot be considered apart from the group or state to which he belongs, and an individual can flourish or develop freedom only within the necessary background conditions provided by some collectivity. When the interests of an individual and society clash, the individual should concede in order to allow the society to meet its goals. Like individualism, collectivism has ethical, metaphysical, explanatory, and methodological versions, which need not all be accepted. One can accept the claim that there are collective entities like families or states that have some kind of metaphysical priority over their individual members without accepting a moral priority for the goals of the collective over the aims of the individuals. Often collectivism is equated with socialism, on the basis of Marx’s explanation of social and historical phenomena in terms of class conflict based on the forces and relations of production, and of his understanding of individualism as a product of the capitalist mode of production. Socialism proposes the use of the apparatus of state and government power to control, command, and regulate the economy and various other sectors of civil society for the good of the proletariat and ultimately other social classes until class-based society is superseded by communism. This sophisticated theory and its criticism raises many fundamental questions about the claims of collectivism. “I use the term ‘collectivism’ only for a doctrine which emphasises the significance of some collective or group, for instance, the state (or a certain state; or a nation; or a class) as against that of the individual.” Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies I COLLINGWOODIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Collingwood, R(obin) G(eorge) (1889–1943) British philosopher and archaeologist of Roman Britain, born in Coniston, Lancaster, studied and taught in Oxford. Collingwood made significant contributions to metaphysics, aesthetics, and the Philosophy of history. He held that metaphysics should explicate the absolute presuppositions of the thought of a given society in a particular period and study their changes. These presuppositions cannot be assessed as true or false, but can only be shown historically. Influenced by Croce, he systematically developed an expression theory of art. He held that history, being concerned with the world of human activity, should seek to reconstruct in imagination the reasons that historical agents acted as they did. He was a prolific writer, and representative works include The Principles of Art (1938), An Essay on Metaphysics (1940), The Idea of Nature (1945), and The Idea of History (1946). He also wrote a widely read Autobiography (1939). IMPERATUM -- command Ethics, philosophy of language, logic As a central concept in Kant’s moral philosophy, a law that must be obeyed and followed even in opposition to inclination. A command is formulated through an imperative and is expressed as an ought. It is the subjection or conformity of the inclinations of the will to objective moral law. Categorical imperatives are commands in the absolute sense, while hypothetical imperatives are commands that are subject to certain conditions regarding the aims of those to whom they are addressed. In contemporary philosophy of language, a command is a kind of speech act which, when addressed to other people, expresses a mandate and involves a prescription. The logic of commands or imperatives has been part of a more general development of contemporary logic. “The representation of an objective principle insofar as it necessitates the will is called a command (of reason).” Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals -- command theory of law Philosophy of law A theory that can be traced to Jeremy Bentham, but which became widely known through the work of his disciple John Austin, who elaborated the theory in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832). Austin rejected the claim of natural law theory that positive law is derived from natural law. Instead, he defined law as a species of command issued by a sovereign person or body that has purpose or power to inflict punishment. Law is a coercive method of social control, and we do not have an option to avoid following legal requirements. In his understanding, a command has two aspects: (1) it signifies a desire or wish conceived by a rational being; (2) it can inflict evil or harm on those who fail to satisfy this desire. Accordingly, his definition of law excludes customary law, constitutional law, and international law, because they are not commands in his sense. If the sovereign has stipulated a sanction, one is under a legal duty. Austin’s command theory of law is generally criticized as being too narrow, for law does more than merely command. In recent times, his definition of law is examined by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law. -- “Austin’s particular theory is often called ‘the command theory of law’ because he makes the concept of command central in his account of law and maintains that all laws are commands, even when they do not take a form that appears imperative in nature.” Murphy and Coleman, The Philosophy of Law COMMESURATUM -- commensurability, see incommensurability COMMUNIO -- common consent argument, another term for consensus gentium argument common good Ethics, political philosophy The public and shared interests of a community, such as peace, order, and security, the enjoyment of which by some community members does not prevent enjoyment of it by others. The common good is contrasted to individual or private goods, the enjoyment of which precludes the rights of others to them. The common good is essential for human happiness and every member of the community is obliged to pursue it. In the traditional theory of natural law, protecting and promoting the common good is the sufficient and necessary condition for the authenticity of the law. The existence of the common good demands that the individual should be subordinate to the community and that in certain circumstances individual interests should be sacrificed to secure the common good. A major issue in contemporary ethical and political theory is to justify the rationality and scope of this subordination and sacrifice. “Government is assumed to aim at the common good, that is, at maintaining conditions and achieving objectives that are similarly to everyone’s advantage.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice common notion Epistemology, logic [Greek koine ennoia] A Stoic term for notions that refer to the most basic features of a conceived object and that arise naturally in the minds of all sensible men. These notions are thought to be self-validating, self-evident, and are the starting-point of all reasoning and investigation. In Euclid’s geometry, common notions are axioms or first principles. In modern philosophy, some philosophers such as Thomas Reid consider them as intuitively known and unquestionable beliefs that -- commonwealth are generally accepted and arise out of natural instinct. Descartes used the conception of common notion for fundamental logical truths or axioms, such as “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time.” The truth of a common notion is completely assured. According to Descartes, we do not arrive at these notions out of natural instinct. They are rather acquired by the natural light of reason, though some people whose natural light is obstructed would not perceive them properly. Common notions form a part of the content of the mind and are a condition of knowledge. “Common notions, . . . are, as it were, links which connect other simple natures together and whose self-evidence is the basis for all the rational inferences we make.” Descartes, The Philosophical Writings SENSUS COMMUNIS -- common sense Epistemology The natural and ordinary beliefs that are taken for granted by people independent of philosophical training. While rationalistic philosophy often starts by challenging and rejecting common sense, there is a kind of philosophy that argues that the general consent that exists regarding the views of common sense offers justification for accepting them in preference to skeptical or revisionary doctrines. Historically, Thomas Reid, the main figure in the Scottish school of common sense, argued with great subtlety against Hume’s skepticism and his associated theory of ideas. G. E. Moore, the leading defender of common sense in the last century, claims in his famous paper “A Defense of Common Sense” that a philosopher’s common sense convictions are more certain that any of the arguments purporting to establish skepticism. Another meaning of common sense, initiated by Aristotle (Greek, koine aisthesis), refers to a faculty that integrates the data from the five specialized senses. This meaning is accepted by the scholastics and also elaborated in the philosophy of Descartes. Kant adapted the Aristotelian notion to form an account of common sense as reflective, public, and critical, in contrast to what he saw as Reid’s vulgar account of common sense. “Both common sense and physics supplement precepts by the assumption that things do not cease to exist when unperceived.” Russell, Human Knowledge -- common sense morality Ethics Pre-theoretical moral convictions, held by ordinary people. Its value in ethics has been a subject of dispute. While some philosophers, such as Plato and Aquinas, believe that ordinary morality must be subject to theoretical examination and guidance, others, such as Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, those in the British moral sense tradition, moral intuitionists, Rawls and applied ethical theorists, believe that an adequate ethics must lie primarily in systematizing our common sense moral judgments. If the conclusions derived from a moral theory deeply conflict with common sense, the theory itself must be defective. Common sense morality denies that we need moral experts to guide our daily life, but it must combat moral relativism and can face a demand to provide a criterion to test the adequacy of common sense moral beliefs. “I submit that analogous to this internal common sense of law there is an internal common sense of morality which every rational morality ought to respect.” Cooper, The Diversity of Moral Thinking common sense psychology, another term for folk psychology commonwealth Political philosophy In a broad sense, a commonwealth contrasts with the state of nature and is identical with a civil state or civitas. In a narrow sense, it is government, in particular democratic government. Both Hobbes and Locke endorsed the broad sense. A commonwealth as a civil state is formed when people in a state of nature consent to give up some of their rights and powers in exchange for the protection of other rights and powers. It is generally believed that in a commonwealth people can live in a peaceful and orderly manner. A commonwealth must have some form of government, that is, some system of subjection and obedience. In this regard, it is different from a community in which there is no system of subjection. Both Hobbes and Locke held that a commonwealth should be one coherent living body. Among the various forms of governments a commonwealth might have, Hobbes preferred monarchy, while Locke proposed democracy. “By common-wealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a Democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community which the Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in our language, is commonwealth, and most properly expresses such a Society of Man, which Communities or city in English does not, for there may be subordinate Communities in a Government.” Locke, Two Treatises on Government COMMUNICATUM -- communicative action Ethics, political philosophy For Habermas, a distinct and crucially important type of social interaction that is oriented toward reaching mutual understanding through a process of argumentation. Within such action, participants harmonize their respective plans on the basis of having a common understanding of the situation and make claims that all concerned can accept as valid. Communicative action seeks public agreement rather than private advantage: agents do not seek to influence others to act in ways solely favoring their own interests and plans. Communicative action is opposed to strategic action, in which individual participants are oriented toward achieving their own goals by manipulating their opponents. Strategic action is instrumental and egoistic, with individual agents seeking to achieve their ends by any effective means. Communicative action is a matter of dialogue and is characterized by reciprocity. There are implicit canons of normative validity in communicative action, and each side acts out of unforced obligations based upon mutual understanding. Discourse is the idealization of communicative action. Philosophy should reveal the universal conditions determining the possibility of communicative action. It should show how communicative actions of different types are embedded in historical situations and how they change in historical time. The theory of communicative action is inspired by speech act theory. “The concept of communicative action presupposes languages as the medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the course of which participants, through relating to a world, reciprocally raise validity claims that can be accepted or contested.” Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action I -- communicative ethics, another name for discourse ethics -- communicative rationality: Habermas’s term for the rationality that is implicitly contained in the structure of human speech and shared by all competent speakers. Standard accounts of rationality represent it as involving one-dimensional logical relations between propositions and as centered in the thought and action of individual subjects. In contrast, communicative rationality is twodimensional and involves a dialogical relationship between different speakers. The traditional conception of rationality is represented in the paradigm of our knowledge of objects, while communicative rationality is expressed in the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects who are capable of speech and action and in an understanding of the world that is decentered away from the individual subject. It is the life-world rationality, dealing with the intersubjectivity of valid claims. Its sphere of validity corresponds to the sphere of human speech. For Habermas, the notion of communicative rationality is the basis for communicative action. He calls the process by which communicative action replaces strategic action communicative rationalization. “This communicative rationality recalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch as it brings along with it the connotations of a noncoercively unifying, consensus-building force of a discourse in which the participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favour of a rationally motivated agreement.” Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity -- communicative rationalization, see communicative rationality COMMUNITAS OXONIENSIS -- communitarianism Political philosophy A family of positions that stand in contrast to liberal individualism. While liberal individualism, which developed from utilitarian and Kantian thought to Rawls and Nozick, focuses on the individual as the bearer of rights and as the center of moral and political analysis, communitarianism shifts this focus to the community. It insists that the individual is embedded into competence and performance a concrete moral, social, historical, and political context that is constitutive of individual identity. Hence communitarianism replaces the atomistic conception of the person with a contextualist view of human identity and agency. It emphasizes the social nature of life and the relationships constituting it rather than freedom of choice. It claims that communal good is prior to individual rights and that there is no single distributive principle that is applicable to all social goods. The intelligibility and justification of justice must be connected to tradition and the shared conception of the good. We cannot stand outside the discourse and traditions of particular societies. The major proponents of communitarianism include A. MacIntyre, M. Sandel, C. Taylor, and R. Rorty, but the position has not yet been systematized and does not have a common manifesto. The major charge facing at least some communitarian positions is that they have conservative social and political implications and that they make cross-cultural criticism difficult. “As the name suggests, communitarianism is concerned with community, and more particularly its absence from the liberal account.” Archard, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy -- community Ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of social science In ethics, community is not an institution that is organized for any special purpose in accordance with rules. Instead, it is the social context in which members are united by mutual cooperation and reciprocity. Community in this sense has been seen as a virtue in traditional conceptions of the good or ideal society. Liberal individualism places priority on the individual in contrast to community by isolating individuals from their historical and social context and treating individuals as abstract bearers of rights. Contemporary communitarianism argues that community rather than the individual should be the basis of ethics and political theory. The community is constitutive of the individual’s identity. It is a formative context and an organic whole rather than an aggregate of atoms. This idea can be traced to Aristotle’s emphasis on the role of the polis in the cultivation of virtues and Hegel’s doctrine of Stattlichkeit. Since in a contemporary society, national identity and historical, ethical, or religious identities do not coincide, the boundaries of political communities have become unclear. “Integrity demands that the public standards of the community be both made and seen, so far as this is possible, to express a single, coherent scheme of justice and fairness in the right relation.” Dworkin, Law’s Empire COMPATIBILIS compatibilism Metaphysics, philosophy of action Also called soft determinism, a position that holds that determinism and free will are compatible. Hence human actions can be caused, but still be free. Free actions are not uncaused actions, but are actions that are closely linked with an agent’s inner causation through one’s own beliefs and desires. On this view, I did X freely means that if I had wanted to I could have done otherwise and that I did X as a result of my own desire and deliberation rather than as a result of being compelled and coerced. Accordingly, the study of human beings can yield some predictability within the terms of an inexact science, although complete accuracy is not possible. The truth of determinism carries no threat to moral responsibility. For freedom is in contrast with coercion or constraint, rather than with having a cause. That my action is causally determined does not entail that I am constrained to do it and does not entail that I am not free. The proponents of this view include Hume and Mill. In contrast, incompatibilism, also called hard determinism, holds that determinism and free will are not compatible and that the truth of determinism will destroy the grounds of moral responsibility. “Compatibilist philosophers ascribe to us a single conception of the initiation of action, and a kind of belief as to the sufficiency of this initiation in so far as moral approval and disapproval are concerned. The conception is that of a voluntary action, and here a determinism is taken to affect moral responsibility not at all.” Honderich, The Consequence of Determinism COMPETENS -- competence and performance Philosophy of language A distinction drawn by Chomsky. Competence is a person’s acquaintance with a set of grammatical rules, which are abstracted to a considerable degree from actual linguistic activities. It is the person’s underlying linguistic ability. Performance applies this competence in actual circumstances to produce grammatical sentences. According to Chomsky, a linguist should be concerned with linguistic competence rather than the non-regularities of actual performance. A suitable grammar should be a description of an ideal speaker-hearer’s intrinsic competence. The distinction between competence and performance is related to Saussure’s distinction between langue and parole. It is also said to be close to Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and knowing that, but this claim is controversial. “We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations).” Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax COMPLETUM -- complete notion Metaphysics, logic, philosophy of language For Leibniz, a concept of an object that contains all the predicates truly attributable to that object. The objects of such a concept can only be the individuals that are the real subjects of categorical judgments. Correspondingly, an entity is an individual substance if and only if its concept is complete. An individual is nothing but the object of a complete concept. In comparison, an accident is a being whose notion does not include everything that can be attributed to the subject to which the notion is attributed. Since an individual contains all the predicates in itself, and is a complete world, many other propositions in Leibniz’s metaphysics are derived directly from his account of a complete notion, such as the thesis of the identity of indiscernibles, the thesis that individuals are ungenerable and indestructible, the thesis that individuals are incapable of real interaction, and the thesis that each substance is quasi-omniscient and quasi-omnipotent since each is a micro-cosmos. “We can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed.” Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics -- completeness Logic A property ascribed to a system of formal logic, an axiomatic system or a theory, generally meaning that all truths of the system or the theory can be derived or proved within the system or theory. A logical system is semantically complete if and only if all of its semantically valid formulae are theorems of the system. It is syntactically complete if an addition of a non-theorem will lead to inconsistency. Syntactical completeness is the stronger sense of completeness. A theory is complete or negation-complete if any of its statements or the negation of that statement is provable within the theory. However, according to Gödel’s theorem, none of the systems of ordinary arithmetic is complete for it must either be inconsistent or contain at least one truth that is not provable within the system itself. This thesis of incompleteness effectively undermines Hilbert’s program of providing mathematical proofs of its own consistency. “The notion of completeness of a logical system has a semantical motivation, consisting roughly in the intention that the system shall have all possible theorems not in conflict with the interpretation.” Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic COMPLEXUM -- complex ideas Epistemology Locke distinguished between simple and complex ideas. While simple ideas come directly from sensation or reflection, complex ideas are compounded by the mind from simple ideas and can also be decomposed into them. Complex ideas are the results of mental operation on simple ideas, and their existence indicates that we are not entirely passive in experience. In the first edition of his Essay, Locke divided complex ideas into modes, substances (ideas), and relations. Modes, such as triangle or gratitude, are said not to contain the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are dependent on substances. Substances, ideas such as man or sheep, are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves. Relations consist in the consideration and comparison of one idea with another. However, in the fourth edition of the Essay, relations became products of the mind’s power of comparing both simple and complex ideas with one another. In that edition Locke added a new category, that is, general COMPUTATUM -- computational model of mind ideas or universals, which are the results of abstraction in which the mind separates ideas from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence. “When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas.” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding COMPOSITUM -- compositionality Philosophy of language A language is compositional if its syntactically complex expressions, for example sentences, derive their meanings from their syntactic structures and the meanings of their lexical constituents. For instance, the meaning of the sentence “Snow is white” is a function of the meaning of “snow,” the meaning of “white,” and the places that these expressions occupy in the subject-predicate structure of the sentence. The semantic feature of compositionality has a wide application in the philosophy of language. It also forms the basis for the truth-conditional theory of meaning. A satisfactory semantic theory should explain how the meanings of small expressions contribute to the meanings of larger ones that contain them. It has become the principle that the meaning of an expression is a function of the meaning of its parts and the syntactic structure of these parts. This principle is generally ascribed to Frege and is also called the Fregean principle. “The principle of compositionality: The meaning of an expression is a monotonic function of the meaning of its parts and the way they are put together.” Cann, Formal Semantics compound thought Logic, philosophy of language Analogous to a compound sentence, which consists of two or more sentences. Frege introduced the notion of compound thought, which is a whole combined out of two or more thoughts by something that is not a thought. As a compound sentence is itself a sentence, a compound thought is itself a thought, and it can also be compounded into other thoughts. Frege distinguishes six different types of compound thought. With A and B representing different single thoughts, they are: (1) A and B; (2) (not A) and (not B); (3) (not A) and B; (4) not (A and B); (5) not (not A) and (not B); and (6) not ((not A) and B). Frege believed that in a mathematical compound thought, if one component is replaced by another thought having the same truth-value, the new compound thought has the same true-value as the original. The idea is central to propositional logic. “By ‘compound thought’ I shall understand a thought consisting of thoughts, but none of thoughts alone.” Frege, Collected Papers COMPROMISSUS -- compromise Ethics, political philosophy The agreement reached through joint negotiations by contending parties after each party makes some concessions from its initial demands. Compromise is based on the premise that for each party cooperation in dealing with the issues in question is better than the breakdown of the relationship. Surrender of some goals is seen by each as helping to secure other and perhaps more important goals. When compromise in this sense applies to conflicts arising from rationally irreconcilable ethical commitments, it is called moral compromise. Moral compromise is necessary for people within a society where conflicting moral principles and interests prevail. Otherwise, a peaceful and non-coercive agreement on a single course of action by proponents of opposing principles cannot be achieved. However, because moral compromise involves sacrificing basic principles and can damage the integrity of the moral agents, it normally carries a derogatory sense. Compromise always involves a tension between uniting with people with different moral convictions and maintaining loyalty to one’s principles and oneself. This tension leads to discussion of how we should understand the role of moral principles and integrity. “Compromise is both something ‘reached’ and a ‘way of reaching’. As something reached, a compromise is a certain type of outcome of a conflict or disagreement; as a way of reaching, it is a process for resolving conflict or disagreement.” Benjamin, Splitting the Difference COMPUTATUM -- computational model of mind Philosophy of mind While artificial intelligence attempts to get computing machines to approximate the abilities of minds, cognitive science is based on the assumption that mind is a machine, with the implication for the philosophy of mind that the mind is viewed as a computational informationprocessing system. Philosophers who accept this analogy attempt to solve problems regarding the mind/body relationship in terms of this analogy. They try to reveal facts about human functional and representational organization by modeling them on the basis of a computer’s internal set-up. This is the project of assimilating mind to computer. Advocates of different understandings of computation develop different models. However, various aspects of the whole project have been criticized. One of the most influential objections is presented in Searle’s Chinese room argument, which seeks to show that the mind is not merely a kind of software or program. “That causal relations reconstruct inferential relations is a foundational assumption of computational theories of mental processes.” Fodor and Lepore, Holism COMPUTATUM -- computer functionalism, another term for the strong thesis of AI Comte, Auguste (1798–1857) French philosopher, the founder of positivism, born in Montpellier. Comte maintained that the progress of human mind goes through three stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific. These three stages offer explanations respectively in terms of gods, abstractions, and observations. He held that sociology is the crowning empirical science and applied his law of three stages to social and political development. He was a pioneer of methodological individualism, the idea that social scientific explanation of collective behavior is ultimately based on the explanation of individual behavior. In his later years he also sought to establish a universal religion of humanity, based on his positivism. His main works are: Course on the Positive Philosophy (6 vols. 1830–42), System of Positive Polity (4 vols. 1851–4), Catechism of Positivism (1852), and The Subjective Synthesis (1856). concept Logic, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language A general notion or idea that may apply to a multiplicity of things and that is expressed by general words. It is the simplest content of our thinking. Concepts are contrasted to proper names, which refer only to one individual thing. Individuals fall under concepts, and we talk about individuals in terms of concepts. Concepts themselves admit a degree of generality. A genus concept is wider in extension than a species concept. A concept is a component of propositions. It mediates between the mind and physical reality, and is a psychological entity with a non-psychological content. Hence it belongs to what Frege called the third realm. A central concern for analytical philosophy is to classify our most fundamental concepts by analyzing their contents and their logical relations with other concepts. Philosophy is concerned with analyzing concepts such as truth, meaning, person, mind, body, justice, goodness, object, cause, matter, motion, space, time, beauty, and their logical relations. Such concepts have wide applications and are crucial in expressing and understanding. Often, their analysis takes place within the context of sophisticated theories using many basic concepts rather than in isolation. Concepts themselves do not admit of truth or falsity, but the propositions of which concepts are components are the bearers of truth value. Frege distinguished concepts from objects, suggesting that the former are expressed by predicates, the latter by subjects or names. “A representation through reason is a concept . . . Universal representations are concepts, and concepts are universal representations.” Kant, Lectures on Logic CONCEPTUM -- concept and object Logic, philosophy of language A distinction based by Frege on an analogy between functional expressions in mathematics and subject-predicate propositions, according to which such propositions can be analyzed in terms of argument and function. Concepts are given through the functional aspect or the predicate part of a proposition. Predicate expressions are concept words. The argument of the function or the subject part of a proposition stands for an individual object. In the subjectpredicate formula, predicates are taken formally, referring not to an individual but to a form or essence. In mathematics, each function is incomplete -- conceptual role theory and contains an empty space to be filled by the argument. Similarly, in propositions a concept is unsaturated, and can be completed by various objects picked out by subject terms. For Frege, this combination of predicate and subject terms to introduce concepts and to pick out objects to complete them is the way that language works. Frege also distinguished between first-order concepts (under which objects fall) and second-order concepts (under which concepts fall) and derived a corresponding distinction between first-order and second-order predicates. Frege claimed that the major fault in the ontological argument for the existence of God is that it treats existence as a first-order concept when it is actually a secondorder concept. The distinction between concepts and objects suggests that predicates correspond to concepts rather than to objects and that the abstract objects expressed by the concept are parasitic upon concrete objects. This position can claim to correct Aristotle’s view that predicates correspond to objects. Aristotle’s ten categories (ten forms of predication) can be regarded as ten kinds of concepts under which concrete objects fall. The notions of concept and object reflect more precisely the roles performed in language by predicates and subjects. But they also create a paradox that “the concept horse” is not a concept, but an object for it is a definite entity that is not incomplete and that can be referred to. This paradox leads Wittgenstein to distinguish formal concepts from ordinary concepts. “The concept (as I understand the word) is predicative. On the other hand, a name of an object, a proper name, is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate.” Frege, Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege -- concepts reflection of -- reflection, see -- conceptual analysis: The activity of attempting to clarify the meanings of concepts or ideas by employing logical devices. It tries to discover what elements a concept is composed of and how these elements are related. It also states the relations between certain concepts and the necessary and sufficient conditions of the application of given concepts. Conceptual analysis is the basis for propositional analysis. Only when we understand the meaning of a word can we employ it in formulating precise questions and thus provide correct solutions. For analytical philosophy, this activity of reaching the understanding of a given concept is vital. In its early period, conceptual analysis was taken as a synonym of philosophy. “So his (i.e., the analytical philosopher’s) selfawarded title of ‘analytical philosopher’ suggests ‘conceptual analysis’ as the favoured description of his favoured activity.” Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics -- conceptual content, see judgeable content conceptual polarity, another expression for polarrelated concept pair conceptual relativism Metaphysics, epistemology, ethics The claim that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme, and that there are different conceptual schemes in different cultures and traditions. Different people can and sometimes do adopt and use different specific notions of being true, being moral, and being right. Each of these different notions has its own rationality, and there is no common measurement among them. The position does not entail that the fact that one believes something automatically makes it true, but it advocates a pluralist attitude. “Conceptual relativism . . . apparently implies that conceptual variability admits of no rational assessment.” Moser, Philosophy after Objectivity – transcendental -- concepts of the understanding, pure, another Kantian term for categories -- conceptual role theory Philosophy of language, philosophy of mind A semantic theory that claims that the meaning of a linguistic expression is determined by its role in a language or theory. What a person means by an utterance depends on the network of associated beliefs that the person has. There are various ways of understanding the notion of conceptual role, and hence there are a number of versions of the theory. It is called variously the cognitive role theory, the causal role theory, the functional role theory, and the network theory of meaning. The general idea concerns the way an expression associates with other expressions in a language. The theory originated with Wilfrid Sellars and has been developed by Ned Block, Paul Churchland, Devitt, Harman, and Lycan. It criticizes the traditional view that the meaning of an expression involves a word–world relation and argues that the same word can mean a number of different things because it has a number of linguistic roles although it has the same reference. The theory contributes to the understanding of the meaning of some expressions such as logical constants. Applied to mental representations, it suggests that something is a representation and has the content it does in virtue of its cognitive role. Hence one can locate a mental representation in a cognitive network by considering the possible cognitive consequences of occurrences of that mental representation in the system. Its main problem, according to Fodor, is that the conceptual role theory cannot account for truth and reference conditions. Furthermore, an expression that belongs to different languages will be different in meaning and this leads to linguistic relativism. “The meaning of an expression for an individual is a function of the role that expression plays in his internal representational economy – that is, of how it is related to sensory input and behavioural output and of its inferential/computational role within the internal economy. Sparing the niceties, this is the network theory of meaning, otherwise known as the holistic theory or the conceptualrole theory.” Churchland, Neurophilosophy conceptual scheme Metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science A scheme itself has a structure. It contains some basic concepts that can explain anything else, but that are not explained by others. A conceptual scheme, also called a “conceptual framework,” is a network of concepts and propositions by which we organize, describe, and explain our experience. Each discipline has its own conceptual scheme, and it changes along with the development of the science. A conceptual scheme is the backbone of a language. Philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, and Strawson believe that reality is represented in our conceptual scheme, and to understand what there is we must understand our conceptual scheme. Strawson therefore characterizes descriptive metaphysics as a study of conceptual schemes, believing that it is an instrument of conceptual change and a means of furthering new directions or styles of thought. However, each of these three philosophers believes that at the deepest level human beings all share one common conceptual scheme. Belief in the existence of a global conceptual scheme is in contrast to “conceptual relativism,” which claims that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme, and that there are different conceptual schemes in different cultures and traditions. Davidson claims that although there appear to be many conceptual schemes, if we are to understand an alternative conceptual scheme, we must translate it, at least partially, into our present conceptual scheme. The availability of such a translation suggests that the translated scheme might not be a genuine alternative. “Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures or periods survey the passing scene.” Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation -- conceptualism Metaphysics A theory of universals that claims that universals exist as thoughts or concepts formed by the knowing mind. It is one of the three positions about the nature of universals mentioned in Porphyry’s Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories. The other two are nominalism, which claims that universals are merely common names, and realism, which claims that universals exist in some mindindependent fashion. Conceptualism holds a position midway between realism and nominalism and argues that universals neither exist merely as names nor exist in their own right. A universal is a predicate, but predicates can be truly or falsely predicated of things only because they stand for concepts. As a product of mind, universals can be instantiated by many particulars at the same time. They are mental representations or ideas, conceptualized out of the particular things to which they apply. Their main function is to serve as principles of classification -- “Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View CONCRETUM -- “The standpoint of the concrete other, by contrast, requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution.” Benhabib, in Kittay and Meyers (eds.), Women and Moral Theory -- concreta, see abstracta concrete/abstract, see abstract/concrete concrete concept, another expression for concrete universal concrete essence Modern European philosophy Merleau-Ponty’s term for the meaning or sense of a thing or its non-sensory presence. According to his account of our existential hold on things, a thing is given or acquired through contact. As a consequence, essence can be grasped only through its actualization within the world. Hence essence must be concrete, and pure essence is impossible. This account stands in opposition to Husserl’s notion of essence (eidos). “The concrete essence of the triangle . . . is not an essence of objective ‘properties’, but the formula of an attitude, a certain modality of my hold on the world, a structure.” Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la Perception -- concrete other Ethics, political philosophy In the self–other relationship, a standpoint from which to understand others as concrete, historical, and emotional individuals, with their own needs, capacities, and life plans. Such a view pays attention to the private sphere of life and emphasizes complementary reciprocity in one’s relations with others. In contrast, we treat individuals from the standpoint of the generalized other by dealing with them as abstract and rational entities with a set of rights and duties. According to feminist critics, the standpoint of the generalized other has dominated the history of Western moral and political theory, with the consequence of focusing ethics on the public sphere of justice and ignoring the private sphere of care. Hence, the experience of women has been excluded from the consideration of moral theory. According to these critics, the remedy for this prejudice is to establish a new type of ethics that recognizes the concrete as well as the generalized other. -- concrete universal Metaphysics A term introduced by Hegel to correct the traditional view that a universal is abstract through referring to the common nature of a kind of entity by abstraction. Hegel held that a universal is concrete rather than an abstract form. A true universal is not a mere sum of features common to several things, but is self-particularizing or self-specifying. A universal is not isolated from particulars, nor does it transcend them. Rather it inheres in particulars as their essential determination. Hegel even claimed that particulars are nothing but dialectical relations among universal concepts. Further, a universal concept is not isolated from other universals, but can be derived from them and, hence, is one item in a system. In Hegel’s logic, each category contains its contrary and develops into that contrary. Together, the category and its contrary are synthesized into a third category, which becomes a member of a new triad. The absolute idea is the culmination of this development as the largest concrete universal. “End . . . is the concrete universal, which possesses in its own self the moment of particularity and externality and is therefore active and the urge to repel itself from itself.” Hegel, Science of Logic concretism, another term for reism DESIDERATUM -- concupiscence Ethics [from Latin con, with + cupere, desire] Sexual and other bodily desires, or the human faculty that generates these desires, which are traditionally seen as not being derived from reason. For Augustine, concupiscence is the incentive to sin that baptism cannot take away. Unlike its opposite love or charity, it is something with which we must always struggle. Concupiscence is the first step in the chain of evil, but it will diminish as charity grows. Aquinas used concupiscence as equivalent to epithumia (Greek epi, upon + thumos, desire). -- He held that these desires are in the part of the soul that we share with other kinds of animals and that this part should be morally subjected to regulation by the rational part of the soul. Because of concupiscence, the incontinent man will act contrary to a decision he had reached through reason about a course of action. “Concupiscence is a general cause of sin.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae CONCURSUS DEI -- concurrence of God Philosophy of religion [from Latin concursus dei] A thesis in medieval theology that proposes that God has the power to preserve the existence of things and activate them once he created them, a power that is essentially identical with his divine act of creation. All created substances are active and have causal powers, but the exercise of their causal powers must have the concurrence of God. If God withdrew his concurrence, created substances would collapse into nothing. A human action is the effect of one’s own deliberation and choice and God’s causal endorsement. Descartes sometimes used the phrase “regular concurrence” to account for the conservation of motion in the world whose quantity was imparted to matter when it was created. He also used the phrase “divine concurrence” to express the view that things are allowed by God to act under their own systems as they were created. “Created substances . . . are things which need only the concurrence of God to exist.” Descartes, Principles of Philosophy -- concursus dei, Latin term for concurrence of God CONDILLACIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de (1715–80) French Enlightenment philosopher, born in Grenoble. Condillac developed an empiricist account of the human mind in which complex powers, such as attending, judging, and reasoning, were analyzed by being broken down and reconstituted in terms of sensations. His analytic method was linked to a conception of a lucid and complete well-made language of simples that would be adequate to express all knowledge. In a thought experiment, he added our senses one by one to a marble statue until the sense of touch gave grounds for the existence of the external world. His major works include Treatise on Sensations (1754). conditio sine qua non, see sine qua non “SI” -- conditional Logic A conditional, or a conditional statement, is a complex sentence of the form: “if p then q.” Both p and q are statements, with p the antecedent and q the consequent. The logical relation between the antecedent and consequent is called implication. The converse of the conditional, that is, “if not q then not p,” is called the contrapositive. Conditionals are also called hypotheticals. In propositional logic, a conditional is generally symbolized as “p→q” or “p⊃q.” The major problem associated with conditionals is determining their truth condition. Most commonly a conditional is treated as a truthfunction such that “if p then q” is false if and only if p is true and q is false. This is called the material conditional or material implication. But there is a paradox associated with the material conditional that has led to a revision called the strict conditional, which claims that a conditional is true if and only if when p is true, q is necessarily true. There are, however, also problems associated with strict conditionals. A much-debated issue concerns the truth conditions of the counterfactuals in which the antecedent is false. For example, “If Kennedy had not been killed, he would have won the next election.” The problem of counterfactuals is also closely associated with the discussion of possible worlds. “A sentence of the form ‘If . . . then . . .’, where the blanks are to be filled with other sentences, is called a conditional.” Mates, Elementary Logic conditional duty, see prima facie duties conditional probability Logic The probability of an event e′ occurring after the occurrence of another event e. The value of this probability is determined by the effect of the probability of e on the probability of e′ before e occurred. A related notion is conditional proof. If B is deduced from a set of premises that includes A n, then in a deductive system we can infer from the remaining premises the conditional if A n then B. This rule of conditional proof is presented as the conjunction following: If A 1 . . . A n ◊B, then A 1 . . . A n−1◊ A n ⊃B. This rule is also called the rule of ⊃ introduction. “Crudely, the expected frequency of a kind of outcome, B, given that a kind of outcome, A, has occurred, is the probability of B conditional on A or the conditional probability of B given A.” Sklar, Philosophy of Physics Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–94) French encyclopedist, born in Ribemont, secretary of the Académie des Sciences and member of the Académie Française. Condorcet saw human history as a history of progress and hoped that the French Revolution would lead to a new stage that abolished inequalities through rational government. His most important work foreshadowed the later development of philosophy of the social sciences through the application of the calculus of probability and statistics to social and political questions, such as voting and rational decision making. His major works include Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions (1785) and The Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind (1795). confirmation Logic In ordinary language, to confirm is to verify. As a logical term, confirmation is the measurement of the extent to which evidence raises the probability of a hypothesis. Hence, it is closely related to probability and to the problem of induction. A confirmation proposition assesses the probability of a hypothesis. Carnap in his Logical Foundations of Probability claims that a confirmation-proposition can be classificatory (e[vidence] confirms h[ypothesis] ), comparative (e confirms h more than e1 confirms h 1 ), or quantitative (the confirmation of h given e is c). Confirmation theory examines how different evidence renders different hypotheses probable and how much the evidence affects the probability. Confirmation (or affirmation) is a translation of Konstatierung (German), a term used by Schlick to denote what he takes to be the peculiar characteristic of observation statements, namely that one may be absolutely certain of their truth. Unlike many other logical positivists, he denies that observations are fundamental in the edifice of knowledge, since they are always of the form “here now so and so.” Instead, their place in the system comes at the end rather than at the beginning of knowledge. Other statements are hypotheses, which in a sense depend upon the fleeting confirmations but not in the sense of being built up from them. “Many writers use the term ‘confirms’ or some technical term for describing the extent to which evidence renders hypotheses probable.” Swinburne, An Introduction to Confirmation Theory conjecture Philosophy of science For Karl Popper, science does not start with observations, but with practical problems and an existing problematic theory. We attempt to offer tentative solutions to the problems. These tentative solutions are conjectures or hypotheses that can be subjected to severe testing or trial, whose object is to refute them. If a conjecture is refuted in testing, it must be rejected. Because Popper denied that induction can lead to conclusive verification, he rejected a central role for induction in science. He held, however, that conclusive refutation is possible through falsification and that a hypothesis is corroborated by withstanding serious attempts to refute it. Popper views science as a dynamic enterprise that grows from old problems to new problems by means of conjectures and refutations. This is the main point of his falsificationism. “The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially, our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures.” Popper, Conjectures and Refutations conjunction Logic A complex proposition of the form “p and q.” Both p and q are propositions and are called conjuncts. In propositional calculus, a conjunction is symbolized either as “p·q,” “p∧q,” or “p&q.” Taking it as truth-functional, “p and q” is true if and only if each of p and q is true. If either conjunct is false, or both are false, then the conjunction is false. We may infer from the premise p and the premise q to the conclusion p and q. This is called the rule of conjunction or conjunction introduction. We may also infer from the premise “p and q” to the conclusion p or to the conclusion q. This is called CONJUNCTUM -- conjunction elimination: conjunction can also be used to join together more than two statements in the process of asserting them all. “A conjunction of statements all of which are true is true; and a conjunction of statements not all of which are true is false.” Quine, Methods of Logic conjunction elimination, see conjunction conjunction introduction, see conjunction connectionism Philosophy of mind A program in artificial intelligence and cognitive science that is designed to help us understand how the brain operates in terms of computer models of brain functioning. The theory considers the brain as a network of neural units that interact until they reach a stable state in response to external inputs. The information-process is parallel and distributed, that is to say that a lot of information is processed simultaneously and each connection contributes to many contents. Connectionism is also called parallel distributed processing (PDP) or neural network modeling. This approach, pioneered by F. Rosenblatt and O. Selfridge, contrasts with the traditional approach in cognitive science, which treats the brain as a rule-governed linear manipulator. The central philosophical implication of connectionism is that human intelligence can be understood to arise out of the whole structure of neural systems in the brain. Such a philosophical approach is sometimes called neuro-philosophy. “Connectionism (or PDP, for parallel distributed processing) is a fairly recent development in AI that promises to move cognitive modelling closer to neural modelling, since the elements that are its bricks are nodes in parallel networks that are connected up in ways that look rather like neural networks in the brain.” Dennett, Consciousness Explained connective, see logical constant CONNOTATUM -- connotation Logic, philosophy of language J. S. Mill distinguishes connotation from denotation. A connotation is the signification or conception of a term that indicates those attributes we really mean to predicate of the object. Denotation, in contrast, is the scope for which a term is truly predicated. The term “red,” for instance, denotes all red things, but connotes the attribute of redness. Mill claims that we must distinguish connotative terms from non-connotative terms. The former denote a subject and imply an attribute; and therefore have a meaning. A proper name has denotation, but has no connotation; hence it is not a connotative term. This idea is fully developed in Russell’s theory of definite description. Other logicians use intension to name what Mill calls connotation, and extension to name denotation. “Whenever the names given to objects convey any information – that is, where they have properly any meaning – the meaning resides not in what they denote but in what they connote.” Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. VII conscience Ethics [from Latin con, with + scire, know] The immediate and intuitive human moral consciousness, the inborn restraining or directing force by which an individual judges what he ought to do or what is morally permissible. Conscience has been held to be one of the main sources of morality. Different philosophers describe it as a human faculty of moral sense, as the voice of God, as a personal demon, or as the voice of reason. The British philosopher Bishop Butler claimed that conscience is a sentiment of the understanding and treated it as the basis for his whole moral system. But others, especially Christian moralists, believe in the existence of erring or bad conscience, for moral agents may have mistaken ideas about what they ought to do, and they are liable to be deceived. Hence we need to distinguish between voluntary bad conscience, which is blameworthy, and involuntary bad conscience, which should be forgiven. In a question related to the problem of the weakness of will, we may ask whether an agent may act against his conscience. “If obeying and disobeying a mistaken conscience are both bad, it seems that men with mistaken consciences are caught in a trap, and cannot avoid sin.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae consent consciousness Philosophy of mind Various forms of subjective experience such as sensation, mood, emotion, retrospection, memory, thought, and self-consciousness. There are grave difficulties in all attempts to develop a philosophical account of what consciousness is or how it might be explained. If we concentrate on what it is like to be a conscious human being, we have no explanation; if we try to explain consciousness in terms of what goes on in our brains, the sheer feel of consciousness itself is left aside. Descartes believed that consciousness is the essence of mind or the general property of mental states, implying that all mental states are conscious. On a Cartesian view, consciousness is irreducibly subjective in the sense that the individual with that consciousness appears to have privileged access to it in a way that no one else can achieve. Various versions of behaviorism, functionalism, and naturalism challenge these Cartesian points and try to explain consciousness in physical, functional, or neurological terms. But the problem of how we can understand consciousness on a physical or neural basis, the so-called explanatory gap, still remains. Major contemporary issues concerning consciousness include: Does consciousness have a causal role? If so, what is it? Are all mental states conscious? What is the relation between consciousness and intentionality? What is the philosophical importance of the raw feel of conscious states? Do persons have privileged access to their conscious states? “Consciousness: a person is said to be conscious of a circumstance when he uses words, or images of words, to others or to himself, to assert the circumstance.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. IX consensus gentium argument Philosophy of religion Also known as the common consent argument for the existence of God, this argument is based on the premise that belief in God is virtually, if not strictly, universal. According to the version of the Stoic philosopher Seneca, the near universality of this belief suggests that it is innate and instinctive and that it must therefore be true. This biological version of the argument was severely attacked by Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (iv, 9). Locke rejected the claim that the belief is universal and also argued that universality would not entail that the idea of God is innate. Mill challenged the link between the innateness of the belief that God exists and its truth. Another version was formulated by the British philosopher G. H. Joyce. The universality of a belief suggests that human reason assures us that it is true. If human reason is trustworthy, which is obviously the case, then the belief that God exists must be true. Setting aside the dubious premise of the universality of this belief, this version has been criticized on the grounds that most believers come to their belief in God by traditional indoctrination. The consensus gentium argument appears to lack logical force. It was once universally believed that the earth is flat, but the universality of this belief does not show that it was true. Nevertheless, this argument raises questions of whether some of our universal beliefs do not need external justification and whether religious beliefs could be among these. “The argument for consensus gentium is a fallacy, which means only that we can’t be sure that a belief is true just because it may be true that everyone, or nearly everyone holds it. But we certainly can’t be sure that it is false either.” Penelhum, Problems of Religious Knowledge consent Philosophy of religion, political philosophy Epistemologically identical with assent, that is, believing or accepting some propositions. Locke described how consent is involved in the formation of beliefs, and he attacked the universal consent argument for God’s existence. Consent is more often used in a political context, where it is contrasted with coercion or exploitation and is offered as grounds for the legitimation of social and political practice. In the state of nature there is no consent regarding the standard of right and wrong. To gain security, people consent to form a social contract and create a single body politic in which each individual agrees to give some of his liberty to the government and to obey the laws, and in return enjoys the rights of being protected. The consent of individuals is what constitutes the community; but for a society to act as a living body, it must be run according to the consent of the majority. This is because the aim of the social contract, which is based on consent, is to preserve the lives, freedom, and property of all, and not merely of a minority of rulers. However, there are many occasions on which we do not give our express consent to the decisions of a government. To cope with this problem, Locke put forward a notion of tacit consent, that is, consent without any verbal or behavioral expression. There has been debate about what constitutes tacit consent. In contemporary political philosophy, express and tacit consent are also called actual and potential consent. Potential consent is ascribed to a person if a normal subject would rationally consent to something in a given situation. “The beginning of political society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society.” Locke, Two Treatises on Government claimed to be the following. First, it is agent-neutral in that it ignores the interests, projects, and personal relationships of the moral agents themselves and can require the unlimited sacrifice of any one of them. It is thus an impersonal and disinterested standpoint. This feature is condemned by common sense morality, intuitionism, and in particular, agentcentered virtue ethics. Secondly, consequentialism overemphasizes the importance of good consequences and hence implies the possibility that any act, no matter how immoral it is, can be justified as long as it can bring about the best consequences. The claim that consequences are prior to morality strongly violates moral common sense. In its defense, proponents of consequentialism have formulated various notions of consequence in an attempt to answer some of the criticism. “Any form of consequentialism locates ethical value ultimately in states of affairs.” B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy consequential characteristics, see supervenience CONSEQUENTIA -- consequentialism Ethics The term may be traced to G. E. M. Anscombe’s 1958 paper “Modern Moral Philosophy.” It is now a general practice to divide moral theory into consequentialism and nonconsequentialism, also called teleological and nonteleological ethics. Consequentialism or teleological ethics holds that the value of an action is determined entirely by its consequences and thus proposes that ethical life should be forwardlooking, that is, concerned with maximizing the good and minimizing the bad consequences of actions. Utilitarianism and pragmatism are important representatives of consequentialism. Sometimes consequentialism is divided into restricted or ruleconsequentialism, according to which an action is right if it accords with rules that lead to better consequences than alternative rules, and extreme or act-consequentialism, according to which an action is right if it produces better consequences than alternative actions open to the agent. Another form of consequentialism is motive-consequentialism, which holds that a motive is good if it intends to bring about the best consequences. Consequentialism has been subjected to criticism in contemporary ethics. Its major demerits are CONSERVATUM -- conservatism Political philosophy A political position that accords primacy in politics to upholding traditional, inherited, and established values and practices. Conservatism opposes large and sudden social and cultural change, especially violent revolution, because it holds that any large-scale radical reform will bring unforeseen and unintended adverse consequences. Conservatism does not absolutely reject change, but requires that change must be continuous, gradual, and tested against experience. In Britain, conservatism was first systematically developed by Edmund Burke in his response to the violence of the French Revolution. Conservatism generally distrusts any abstract theory that seeks to establish universal and objective political principles on the basis of an allegedly universal human nature. In contrast, it holds that the nature of human beings is correlated with the societies and circumstances in which humans find themselves. A society has its distinct history and cultural setting. Political theory should articulate the knowledge and rules that are presupposed in political practice. This approach to political philosophy, mainly represented in the twentieth century by Michael Oakeshott and Roger Scruton, has some common features with communitarian thought. A major objection facing conservatism is that existing values and institutions might have arisen historically from violent revolution or radical reform. In addition, even flexible and imaginative conservatives sometimes must deal with a radically defective historical inheritance. “By ‘conservatism’ I intend here to refer to any view to the effect that all attempts to transform societies in accordance with principles (whether they be want-regarding or ideal-regarding principles) are pernicious: dangerous and self-defeating at once.” Barry, Political Argument consilience of inductions Philosophy of science [from Latin con, together + salire, to jump] A term introduced by the British philosopher of science William Whewell to describe a feature of the best kind of induction. In the process of induction, seemingly diverse and apparently unrelated phenomena may provide evidence that leaps in the same direction to support an unforeseen and uncontemplated scientific hypothesis. According to Whewell, a theory formed on the basis of the consilience of induction might not only explain different phenomena but also uncover their underlying cause. It is hence more general and credible than induction without consilience and has deductive force. One example is Newton’s theory of gravitation, which applies not only to the motions of the heavenly bodies but also to the motions of the tides. “Accordingly the cases in which inductions from classes of facts altogether different have thus jumped together, belong only to the best established theories which the history of science contains . . . I will take the liberty of describing it by a particular phrase; and will term it the ‘consilience of inductions’.” Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences consistency Logic Propositions are consistent if they can all be true. A system of propositions can be shown to be inconsistent if it contains a contradiction (a proposition and its negation). No proposition is consistent with its own denial. If two propositions are true, then they must be consistent. However, it does not follow from the fact that two propositions are consistent that both are true. The relation of consistency is symmetrical. Consistency and completeness are two key concerns of modern logic. “When we speak of two propositions as ‘consistent’, we mean that it is not possible, with either one of them as premise, to deduce the falsity of the other.” Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic constant Logic As a technical logical term, any operator with a fixed meaning. In predicate logic, the quantifiers some (symbolized as ∃) and all (symbolized as ∀) are constants. In modal logic, the operators necessarily (䊐) and possibly (◊) are constants. In propositional logic, the truth-functional operators, that is, the connectives which indicate the logical form of a proposition, such as not (~), and (∧), or (∨), if . . . then (→) and if and only if (↔) are constants. More generally, constants contrast with variables, which range over a domain, with constants (a, b, c) distinguished from the variables (x, y, z) that they instantiate. It is difficult to determine a principle distinguishing logical constants from non-logical constants, although philosophers agree on their enumeration. “The expressions which occur in formulae, but are not variables, are constants.” Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory constant conjunction Metaphysics Hume’s term for the relation that exists when the occurrence of an event of one kind A is invariably attended by the occurrence of an event of another kind B. Fire is generally followed by heat; hence there is a constant conjunction between fire and heat. The experience of constant conjunction between two or more kinds of event conveys to our mind the idea of a necessity connection between these events, and leads us to label the precedent events as causes and the attendant events as effects. On the basis of such an experience, when we observe A, we infer the existence of B. Thus Hume claimed that our idea of causation is derived from constant conjunction. “. . . the constant conjunction of objects determines their causation.” Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature CONSTATUM -- constative: J. L. Austin’s term for utterances such as “John is running,” which state, report, or describe facts in the world. The utterance “John is running,” depends for its truth or falsity on whether it is the case that John is running. Here the act or fact and the utterance are distinct and the former decides the truth of the latter. Most language clearly belongs to this kind of utterance. Constative utterances are contrasted with performative utterances, which have a similar linguistic structure but do not issue true or false statements about the world. However, Austin was not satisfied with this distinction, and he later replaced it with his theory of illocutionary acts. “Not all true or false statements are descriptions, and for this reason I prefer to use the word ‘Constative’.” Austin, How to Do Things with Words constitutive principles Metaphysics Kant’s term for the principles that objectively state what is present in the object itself, that is, what is the constitution of appearance. Constitutive principles are principles of pure understanding that are laid down by us as standard and necessary constituents of the world of appearance. Constitutive principles are contrasted with regulative principles, which are rules to show how experience may be organized or regulated without reference to the constitution of the object. Regulative principles, such as transcendental ideas, play no part in determining the objective character of the world of appearance. They are maxims, neither provable nor disprovable, and are not to be understood as true or false. They serve to guide our inquiry within experience and can lead us to transgress the limits of reason from the conditioned to the unconditioned. For Kant we must observe the distinction between these two kinds of principles. If we use regulative principles as constitutive, dialectical illusions or errors arise. Kant’s transcendental dialectic is a presentation of what these errors are. CONSTRUCTUM -- constructionism: An idealist view of history, developed by L. J. Goldstein and J. W. Meiland. They claim that there is no real past consisting of events that exist independent of our knowledge of them. The task of historians, therefore, is not to discover what happened in the past but to construct a past or a narrative of the past on the basis of present evidence and in accordance with certain methodological rules. Consequently, if historians come to possess new evidence or change their methodology, their historical account could be greatly altered. Constructionism contests the objectivity of historical statements by denying that these statements refer to an actual past. “Constructionism is just the thesis that whatever historians do is to be conceived not as discovering but as constructing the past.” Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History -- constructivism Philosophy of mathematics The view that mathematics should confine itself only to the entities that it can construct, that is, which it can prove systematically in virtue of things we already accept. Thus, constructivism opposes mathematical Platonism, which treats mathematical objects as entities independent of cognitive operations and treats the facts concerning mathematical objects as not depending on the possibilities of verification. Constructivism is a term covering many different doctrines: finitism rejects abstract notions such as set and operation; predicativism claims definitions of mathematical objects should be predicative; and Bishop’s constructive mathematics takes it that the statements of mathematics should have numerical meaning; Markov’s constructive recursive mathematics and the mathematical intuitionism of Brouwer and Heyting belong to the center of constructivist thought. -- “The principles of pure understanding, whether constitutive a priori, like the mathematical principles, or merely regulative, like the dynamical, contain nothing but what may be called the pure schema of possible experience.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. -- “Constructivism in the broad sense is by no means homogeneous, and even the views expressed by different representatives of one school, or by a single mathematician at different times, are not always homogeneous.” Troelstra and Dalen Constructivism in Mathematics TEMPUS -- contemporaneity Modern European philosophy, philosophy of history According to Kierkegaard, there are two kinds of history: one is secular and the other sacred. Secular history consists of past events and a process of temporal becoming. Sacred history, for Kirkegaard Christian history, also has temporal becoming, but, paradoxically, it is also always present in virtue of its eternity. Eternity knows neither past nor future, but is the everlasting now. Christ is not merely an historical person. By accepting his existence, a believer is always contemporary with him. In relation to him, there is only one situation of contemporaneity, and to believe in him is to become contemporary with him. This conception attempts to answer a question arising from the incarnation: if Christ lived in human form at a particular time, what bond is there to sustain his relationship to later generations of believers? “The person who actually became a Christian on the presupposition of the contemporaneity of the transitional situation with Christianity’s coming into the world indeed knew what Christianity is.” Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments CONTENTUM -- content: L. continere, contain, That which a mental or propositional attitude is about or means, and hence also called mental content or propositional content. The content of a belief, intention, hope, and other attitude is typically expressed in language by a that-clause, for example, “I believe that it will rain tomorrow” or “I fear that you will be late.” The logical structure of such sentences is puzzling. For most attitudes the sentences are not extensional, and it is difficult to understand their structure and why they have it. Content seems to be abstract and language-dependent and to have truth conditions, but it is also generally considered to be a distinctive feature of thought. We can distinguish between the narrow content and the broad or wide content of what we say or think. Narrow content is about the same objects and properties whatever the circumstances, whilst broad or wide content incorporates certain aspects of one’s embedding situation or environment and can vary in what it is about according to these circumstances. Suppose two liquids seem exactly similar in surface properties, but have different internal constitutions. According to narrow content, we should use different terms for the two liquids, but according to broad content, the situation in which they both could be used alike could allow us to use the same term for them. Some philosophers believe that content can be understood as a set of possible worlds in which certain objects and properties are realized, while others believe that content should be understood in terms of a structured composite of substance and attributes. There is also debate about what makes a token mental state a belief and about the relation between the acceptability conditions and the truth conditions of a content. “Content is typically attributed in English by ‘that’ clauses and this feature permits an ontologically and theoretically neutral way to distinguish one belief from another (or one desire from another, and so on).” Baker, Saving Belief content holism Philosophy of language A type of semantic holism, which claims that an expression can have a content only as a part of a whole language. It cannot have a content unless many other expressions have contents. If I believe a proposition P, then I would have to believe various propositions that are in the context of P. Content holism contrasts with linguistic atomism, which believes that an expression can have a meaning by itself through its relation to an extra-linguistic entity. “What we will call content holism is the claim that properties like having content are holistic in the sense that no expression in a language can have them unless many other (nonsynonymous) expressions in that language have them too.” Fodor and Lepore, Holism -- content stroke, see assertion-sign TEXTUM -- context principle Logic, Philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language Introduced by Frege in The Foundations of Arithmetic as a fundamental methodological principle, it asserts that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. Frege’s original intention was to solve the problem of how numbers are given to us. By this principle, he transferred the question from an epistemological approach to a linguistic investigation into how we are able to fix the senses of sentences containing numeric terms. According to Dummett, the context principle is significant in the linguistic turn of philosophy and is essential to the whole movement of analytic philosophy. On the basis of this principle, Dummett himself derived the dependence thesis. If it is impossible to grasp the sense of a word independent of the sentence in which it occurs, then it is also impossible to grasp a constituent of a thought without apprehending the whole thought of which it is a constituent. “The context principle . . . is . . . the thesis that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has meaning.” Dummett, Origins of Analytic Philosophy contextual definition Logic, philosophy of language A definition conveying the sense of a term by defining the sentence or the text in which it occurs. Excellent examples are provided by Russell’s analyses of definite descriptions, which amount to definitions of the sentences in which the definite descriptions occur. According to Russell, all incomplete symbols have their meanings by contextual definitions, for incomplete symbols are not denoting expressions that stand for something, and they have meaning only in a context of a sentence or a formula. In employing contextual definitions, Russell had a device for eliminating unwanted entities. Ayer claimed that philosophical analysis in its entirety is a matter of contextual definition. But this is generally regarded as an inadequate account of philosophical analysis, for contextual definition only reveals the logical structure of language and is applied only to linguistic complexes. Philosophical analysis, on the other hand, is applied also to mental and other complexes. Contextual definition is also called definition in use, and Bentham called it paraphrasis. “Contextual definition of a term showed how to translate sentences containing the term into equivalent sentences lacking the term.” Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays IMPLICATUM -- contextual implications: P. H. Nowell-Smith’s term for a distinctive use of ethical language. The proper use of ethical language in a given context authorizes certain inferences that the original ethical sentences cannot be said to assert or state, but which their use implies in that context. Any logical implication can be said to be a sub-class of contextual implication, but not vice versa. The denial of contextual implications is logically odd. The proper use of ethical language itself implies that the speaker believes his statement is true and conforms with the relevant recognized moral rules or his own moral principles. It also implies that what the speaker says may be assumed to be relevant to the interests of his audience and that he would make the same statement in similar situations. “I shall say that a statement P contextually implies a statement Q if anyone who knew the normal conventions of the language would be entitled to infer Q from P in the context in which they occur.” Nowell-Smith, Ethics TEXTUM -- contextual relativism, an alternative term for contextualism contextualism Ethics, philosophy of language Also called contextual relativism, a position in both ethics and the philosophy of language that claims that various sorts of contexts should be taken into account when we consider a moral position or the meaning of a term. Both ethical contextualism and linguistic contextualism are directed against formalism, which claims that we can establish a set of abstract moral principles that have universal application without regard to particular situations (ethical formalism) or that we may determine the meaning of a statement through the study of its logical structure (linguistic formalism). Ethical contextualism holds that we cannot deal with ethical problems in detachment from the particular practical situations in which the problems arise. Instead, ethics should be concerned with ethical problems in given contexts. Historically, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, and Hegel are considered to be contextualists to some degree. In the twentieth century, influenced by pragmatism and logical contingent identity positivism, contextualism has been used specifically for the view that in any given context there are always some ethical premises that are themselves unquestioned, although they may be questioned in another context. These premises, conjoined with the result of common experience or science, can lead to a suitable resolution of the problems that arise in that context. On this view, abstract ahistorical principles are dispensable. Dewey, Austin, and Wittgenstein are claimed as representatives of this kind of position. Ethical feminism also endorses this position, but it claims, controversially, that universal principles are masculine illusions, while women’s moral consideration is contextual and concrete. In the philosophy of language, contextualism proposes that the meaning of a word is determined by its use or occurrence in a sentence, that is, by its contribution to the content of the sentence. Accordingly, sentences or propositions are prior to words or concepts in the explanation of meaning. To understand a word is to understand how it can be employed in a sentence. Contextual definition, which means explaining a word by appeal to the sentence in which it occurs, is based on contextualism. By analogy with contextualism, Quine and Davidson developed what is called semantic holism, that is, the view that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its use in a whole language. Contextualism is also used for the claim that the meaning of a theory varies according to its placement in different non-logical contexts. Meaning must be qualified by certain historical, semantic, social, and political perspectives. “The contextualists . . . felt that there was much more to theory than its being a logical calculus which merely enabled the scientists to make predictions.” Aronson, A Realist Philosophy of Science contiguity Philosophy of mind, metaphysics If two objects are next to or succeed each other, they are contiguous. For Hume, contiguity is one of the three basic principles of the association of ideas (the other two are resemblance and causation). If we experience the constant conjunction of two contiguous objects, this experience will lead the mind to infer the existence of one of them from the presence of the other. This is a necessary condition for us to establish that there is a relation of cause and effect between these two objects. Hence, for Hume, contiguity is essential for our notion of causation. For Leibniz, the principle of contiguity is a natural law that each natural change is continuous rather than abrupt. It can be summarized by the slogan natura non facit saltum (Nature makes no leaps). “ ’Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects.” Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature contingent identity Logic A crucial notion for central-state materialism or the identity theory. This theory in the philosophy of mind claims that mental states or processes are nothing other than processes in the brain. But linguistics argued that the logic of statements about brain states and the logic of statements about mental states are different and that brains and minds cannot therefore be identical. To deal with this objection, physicalism introduced the notion of contingent identity to say that the identity between mental states and brain states is not logical or necessary identity. Expressions for the states are not identical in meaning, but pick out the same items contingently or accidentally, and the identity holds as a matter of contingent fact. The identity is not a conceptual truth. The world could have been otherwise, but it happens to be the case that mental states are brain states. The notion of contingent identity has been attacked by Kripke, who claims that contingent statements involving descriptions do not reflect any genuine identity. Identity statements must be made using names rather than descriptions, but then, following Leibniz’s law, if an identity statement is true, it must be necessarily true. “Everyone agrees that descriptions can be used to make contingent statements . . . Certainly when you make an identity statement using description – when you say ‘the x such that ϕx and the x such that ψx are one and the same’ – that can be a contingent fact.” Kripke, Naming and Necessity contingent/necessary Logic, metaphysics A basic philosophical distinction. Contingent propositions happen to be true or happen to be false, but could be otherwise. According to a possible world account, a proposition is contingent if and only if it is true in at least one possible world and false in at least one other possible world. Necessary propositions are true whatever the circumstances. Necessary propositions are true in all possible worlds. Philosophers disagree whether there are any necessary propositions. Some restrict necessary propositions to propositions that are analytic or true because of their logical form, including logical and mathematical propositions. Others argue that some propositions can be metaphysically, transcendentally, or naturally necessary. A contingent event is one that does not necessarily take place. If there are necessary events, natural rather than logical necessity is involved. The provision of a semantics for modal terms (such as necessary and possibly) and the revival of essentialism has led to renewed interest in the distinction between what is necessary de dicto (of a statement) and what is necessary de re (of a thing). “Classical metaphysics depreciated the contingent . . . As late as Hegel, ‘necessary’ is a word for laudation, and ‘contingent’ of denigration.” Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method contingentism, see necessitarianism continuum, see continuum hypothesis continuum hypothesis Philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science A continuum is a collection of points, such that between any two points there are distinct points. Classical examples of continua are lines, planes, and spaces. This notion can be traced to Aristotle’s definition of continuity in Physics V, which states that “things are called continuous when the touching limits of each become one and the same and are, as the word implies, contained in each other.” In his theory of infinite cardinal numbers (the numbers measuring the size of infinite sets), Cantor postulates the continuum hypothesis that the cardinality of any power set of an infinite set (the set of all of its subsets) is the second highest cardinality after that of the set itself. Gödel proved in 1938 that this hypothesis is compatible with the most popular system of the set theory (the Zermelo– Fraenkel–Skolem system). However, Paul Cohen proved in 1963 that its negation is also compatible with that system. Hence this hypothesis is independent of the accepted axioms of set theory. The question of the truth or falsity of this hypothesis constitutes the so-called continuum problem. “It is now known that the truth or falsity of the continuum hypothesis and other related conjectures cannot be determined by set theory as we know it today.” P. Cohen, Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis contractarianism Ethics, political philosophy An approach to ethics on the basis of social contract theory. It has two forms: Hobbesian contractarianism and Kantian contractarianism. Hobbesian contractarianism starts from the assumption that people have a natural equality of physical power and proceeds to infer that to prevent harm to one another it is mutually advantageous to reach an agreement that protects each person’s interests. Accordingly, there is no inherent right or wrong, and morality flows from the constraints necessary for mutually beneficial cooperation. This position is criticized because it does not take morality as a value in itself, and, furthermore, the pursuit of mutual advantage itself requires some prior moral claims. Kantian contractarianism, which is also called contractualism, argues that people have a natural equality of moral status. John Rawls is the most influential contemporary proponent of this position. According to Rawls, if a contract is negotiated from an original position of equality, it can give equal consideration to each of its contractors. Thus, moral thinking is about what agreements people could make in such circumstances. An action is wrong if its performance is disallowed by a system of rules that is set by informed, unforced, and general agreement and that no one could reasonably reject in those circumstances. Some critics argue that this position offers an intellectual account of morality, but fails to uncover any real motivation for acting morally. They claim that it does not give any reason for persons possessing greater power to avoid using it to harm others in the pursuit of their own interests, and that it does not give any reason to give moral consideration to the interests of future generations. “A disturbing feature of Contractarianism is the way it ties people’s moral claims to their bargaining power.” Glover, What Sort of People Should There Be? contractualism, another name for contractarianism contradiction Logic [from Latin contra against + dicere speak] A contradiction conjoins a statement and its negation (“p and not p”), ascribes and denies the ascription of the same feature to an individual (“a is f and not f ”), or, more broadly, is false on logical grounds alone. According to the law of non-contradiction, “p” and “not p” cannot both be true. They are logically exclusive and logically exhaustive and cannot be true or false together. These two inconsistent statements are called contradictories. Contradictories are distinguished from contraries because while contradictories can neither be both true nor both false, contraries cannot both be true but can both be false. In the square of oppositions, the universal affirmative judgment (A) “All S are P” and the particular negative judgment “Some S are not P” are contradictories, and so are the universal negative “All S are not P” and the particular affirmative “Some S are P.” Traditionally, finding a contradiction has been a way of showing that a system must be rejected. Accepting contradictions has been considered intellectually ruinous because every proposition follows from a contradiction. But there have been recent explorations of logical systems that seem able to tolerate some contradictions. Hegel and Marx understood contradictions to be conflicts necessary to the dialectical development of spirit or history. Their accounts should not be confused with other discussions of contradiction. “A contradiction cancels itself and leaves nothing.” Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory contradictories, see contradiction contrafactuals Logic, philosophy of science Also called counterfactuals or contrary-to-fact conditionals. Propositions expressed in the form: “if P had been the case, then Q would have been the case.” The antecedent is presupposed or known to be false and hence describes a contrary to fact or contrafactual state of affairs. The consequent claims how things would have been were the antecedent state of affairs to be realized. For example, “If I had been the president of the United States at that time, I would not have got involved in the Vietnam War.” All contrafactuals are subjunctive, but not all subjunctive conditionals are counterfactual. The peculiarity of counterfactuals is that they are not truth-functional. Their truth-value cannot be determined by the truth-values of their components. They involve neither material implication nor strict implication. Thus there arises a problem about how to determine the truth conditions of counterfactuals. Currently there are three main positions. One, held by Chisholm, Goodman, and Rescher, suggests that a counterfactual is true if its antecedent P, when conjoined with law-like generalizations and statements of background conditions, will logically entail the consequent Q. The second, held by D. Lewis and Stalnaker, has been developed on the basis of possible world theory and claims that a counterfactual is true if its consequent Q is true in the nearest possible world in which the antecedent P is true. The third argues that a counterfactual should be treated as an argument and should be judged as valid or invalid, but not as true or false. Each solution has some difficulties and the problem of counterfactual conditionals is still a subject of lively debate. “Any adequate analysis of the contrafactual conditional must go beyond mere truth values and consider causal connections, or kindred relationships, between matters spoken of in the antecedent of the conditional and matters spoken of in the consequent.” Quine, Methods of Logic contraposition Logic In traditional logic, an immediate inference formed by negating both the subject term and the predicate term of a proposition and exchanging their positions. The result is called the contrapositive, in which the predicate of the original proposition becomes the subject. Thus, contraposition is the operation of converting the obverse of a proposition or of obverting its converse. Of the four basic categorical propositions in traditional logic, the contrapositive of SAP (“All s are p”) is “all not p are not s”; that of SEP (“All s are not p”) is “all not p are not not s”; that of SIP (“Some s are p”) is “Some not p are not s,” and that of SOP (“Some s are not p”) is “some not not p are not s.” The contrapositions of SAP and SIP are valid, while that of SEP and SOP are invalid. In modern logic, contraposition is an inference consisting in negating both the antecedent and the consequent of a conditional, and exchanging their positions. For instance, from the premise “If p then q,” contraposition yields “if not q then not p.” This is a valid inference. of what I add will be very small, it may not repay my contribution. It may thus be better for me if I do not contribute. This can be true whatever others do. But it will be worse for everyone if fewer people contribute. This is the contributor’s dilemma, and it raises the question of what difference a single altruistic choice would make in cases that involve many people and whether it is rational to contribute in such cases. In rational choice theory this dilemma is related to the problem of the free rider. “Contraposition may be defined as a process of immediate inference in which from a given proposition another proposition is inferred having for its subject the contradictory of the original predicate.” Keynes, Formal Logic CONVENITUM -- convention, L. conveniens, suitable, proper; related to Greek nomos, laws, social customs, in contrast to physis, nature] Conventions are acceptable regularities or patterns in a community or population group, with examples including such things as moral rules, laws, and traffic rules. Conventions arise either unconsciously or from specific agreement. They are inherited, imitated, and taught explicitly within a community. Philosophy of language holds that many words gain their meaning by convention, rather than being determined by the nature of the objects they refer to. What it is for a sentence S to mean X is explained in terms of the existence of a convention in a population of speakers that S should be used to mean X. There is a convention relation between sentences in general and the propositions they express. According to logical positivism, a language framework is also determined by convention. There are various discussions about the precise mechanism that gives rise to a convention and the way it is maintained. contraries Logic Two statements that cannot both be true but may both be false. For example, “this cat is black” and “this cat is white” are contrary statements or contraries because a cat cannot be both completely black and completely white. It might, however, be neither black nor white, but, say, tan. Contraries differ from contradictions because in a pair of contrary statements, the negation of one does not entail the other. In traditional logic, the universal affirmative judgment “all S are P” and the universal negative judgment “all S are not P” are contraries. “To say of two statements that they are contraries is to say that they are inconsistent with each other, while leaving open the possibility that there is some statement inconsistent with both.” Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory “It is often claimed that, in those contributor’s dilemmas that involve very many people, what each person does would make no difference.” Parfit, Reasons and Persons “Conventions are to be explained in terms of the patterns of beliefs and intentions of the members of the population.” Stalnaker, Inquiry contrary, see contraries contrary-to-fact conditional, see contrafactual contributor’s dilemma Ethics, political philosophy Should I contribute to public goods? If I help, I will add to the sum of benefits. But only a very small portion of the benefit I add will come back to me. Since my share conventional implicature, see conversational implicature conventionalism Philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, ethics The view that human conventions rather than independent realities or necessities shape our basic concepts of the world, scientific theories, ethical principles, and the like. On this view, scientific laws and theories are conventions or postulates, rather than absolute and independent. They depend on our choices from among alternative ways of organizing and explaining experience. Human arrangements are the measure and final source of their authority. We choose a given theory on the basis of its convenience or simplicity, but it is not any more true than the rival theories. This position developed out of Kant’s claims that the laws we find in the natural world are dependent on the character of our rational human minds and on our conceptual structure, although Kant argued that the basic concepts and principles so originating were unique and not open to successful challenge. The major proponent of conventionalism was H. Poincaré, who held that mathematical theorems are relative to our framework of knowledge, are subject to revision, and may even be totally abandoned. The difference between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry is not factual but conventional. The only necessary limitation on our choice of theorems and laws is the avoidance of contradiction. Other proponents include E. Mach, P. Duhem, and, in some respects, the later Wittgenstein. Conventionalism is close to instrumentalism and pragmatism, but is opposed to realism. Its difficulty is that it must admit that alternatives to our accepted principles are also workable conventions and that the choice between rival principles is arbitrary. Among its critics are M. Schlick, K. Popper, and E. Nagel. In moral philosophy, conventionalism is the view that moral rules are due to social conventions. “Conventionalism . . . tries to show that most of the epistemological questions contain no questions of truth-character, but are to be settled by arbitrary decisions.” Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction conventionality of language forms, see principle of tolerance IMPLICATUM CONVERSATIONALE -- conversational implicature: H. P. Grice’s term for a structure of implications based on features governing conversation and its context that supplements and at times overrides implications licensed by logic and the conventional meaning of terms. This notion is central to Grice’s influential theory of language. A person by saying a statement S implicates another statement T if he is aware that T is required to complete what he is saying and is also aware that his cooperative hearer s can normally work out the implied T from the spoken S according to certain principles governing a conversation. In this case, the conversation has an implicature, and T is the implicatum. One of the most important principles of conversational implicature is the cooperative principle, which states that you should “make your conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” Conversational implicature is contrasted to conventional implicature, which is derived from the conventional meanings of the lexical terms occurring in the sentence and the sentential structure. “I wish to present a certain subclass of nonconventional implicatures, which I shall call conversational implicatures, as being essentially connected with certain features of discourse.” Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words. conversion Logic In traditional logic, an operation that obtains a proposition by interchanging the subject term and predicate term of another proposition. The resultant proposition is called the converse of the original proposition. For instance, the converse of SAP (“All s are p”) is “All p are s.” Of the four basic categorical propositions in traditional logic, the converse of SEP and that of SIP are valid, for they do not involve a change of quantity. Hence, they are also called simple conversions. The converse of SAP and of SOP are invalid, for they involve a change of quantity. They are also called conversion per accidens. In modern logic, conversion refers to an operation that infers a conclusion by interchanging the positions of the antecedent clause and the consequent clause, that is, from “If p then q” to “If q then p.” This is invalid. “We convert a proposition when we transpose the terms of the original proposition.” D. Mitchell, An Introduction to Logic WILSONIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Cook Wilson, John (1849 –1915) English philosopher of logic and epistemology, born in Nottingham, Professor of Logic, University of Oxford. Cook Wilson rejected the neo-Hegelian absolute idealism of his Oxford contemporaries and argued for a common-sense logical realism based on grammar and on the ordinary understanding of terms undistorted by logical or philosophical theory. His method had influence through his students on later ordinary language philosophy. His major work is Statement and Inference (1926). COPERNICANUM -- Copernican revolution Metaphysics, epistemology In opposition to the traditional geocentric, Ptolemaic framework for explaining the appearance of planetary motion, Nicolaus Copernicus established a new mode of thought that claims that the earth is in motion and that the sun is immovable at the center of the planetary system. This hypothesis was confirmed by Kepler and Newton, and represents a fundamental transformation in the development of modern science. In opposition to the traditional metaphysical claim that knowledge must conform to the objects, Kant in his critical philosophy sought to establish that objects must conform to our knowledge and that understanding is the lawgiver of nature. He drew a famous analogy in the preface to the second edition of the first Critique, comparing his new mode of thought in philosophy to what Copernicus did in astronomy. In proposing that objects must conform to our knowledge, he claimed to proceed “precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ primary hypothesis.” Apparent features of our experience can be ascribed to ourselves rather than to the objects of our experience. Commentators accordingly take Kant’s philosophy to be a Copernican revolution in metaphysics. Moreover, while Copernicus’ thesis is only a hypothesis, Kant claimed that he has demonstrated his thesis apodeictically by examining the nature of the forms of intuition and categories. “This indeed is the essence of the ‘Copernican Revolution’ which Kant proudly announced as the key to a reformed and scientific metaphysics. It is only because objects of experience must conform to the constitution of our minds that we can have the sort of a priori knowledge of the nature of experience which is demonstrated, in outline, in the Critique itself.” Strawson, The Bounds of Sense -- Copernicus, Nicolaus (1473–1543) Polish astronomer and physician, born in Torun, canon of the Cathedral of Frauenburg. Copernicus revolutionized traditional astronomy by placing the sun, rather than the earth, at the center of the planets. His theory seemed to contradict our common experience of seeing the sun rise and set and also contradicted scriptural authority. His account raised questions about the role of theory and experience in scientific knowledge and about the grounds for choice among rival theories in terms of different measures of simplicity, scope, and power. His major work is On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Orbs (1543). copula Logic The function of the verb “to be” when it joins the subject-expression and predicate-expression in an assertion to show that there is affirmation or denial. Sometimes the copula is also viewed as a part of the predicate itself. “To be” also serves as an identity-sign between expressions, but that is a different function from that of the copula. While the expressions are reversible when “to be” serves as an identity-sign, the subject and predicate cannot exchange positions when “to be” serves as a copula. As a copula it may be eliminated without affecting the meaning of a statement, but as an identity-sign it may not. In the philosophy of logic, there is discussion as to whether the copula divides every elementary proposition into “S-P” form, and whether the copula involves a commitment to the existence of various sorts of entities and structures. “A copula is the link of connexion between the subject and the predicate, and indicates whether the latter is affirmed or denied of the former.” Keynes, Formal Logic corporatism Political philosophy A system in which interests are represented and policies are determined through the activities of organized groups in society acting as legitimate intermediaries between their members and the state. Corporate groups seek to limit or modify the activity and effect of market forces and the state and to bargain for the interests of their members in terms of class compromise. Many theorists believe that corporatist interference with the market VERUM -- correspondence theory of truth offers short-term comfort at the expense of longterm inefficiency and stagnation. Corporatism has a long history, and its different forms correspond to different stages of economic development and different ideological motivations. Corporatism that is imposed by a centralized state, as in the case of fascism, can become a part of an authoritarian system, but corporatism can also be a relatively autonomous product of pressures from the working class. Corporatism resembles the syndicalism of the anarchist tradition, which seeks to free workers from all capitalist and state controls and to establish a society with a decentralized system of worker-owned and worker-managed economic organizations. “Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberation representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.” Schmitter in Schmitter and Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation CORPUSCULUM -- corpuscularianism Metaphysics, philosophy of science A metaphysical view of the world in the spirit of the Greek atomism of Democritus. It holds that everything is composed of indivisible corpuscles or atoms, which are the units at the last stage of the analysis of material things into their components. This theory accepts the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and claims that corpuscles differ intrinsically in their primary qualities such as size, shape, mutual arrangement, and motion. With these differences, they form various kinds of materials and things. Every change can be reduced to mechanical action, with geometry and mechanics as the paradigms of science. Modern corpuscularianism was developed by the Irish scientist Robert Boyle in the middle of the seventeenth century as an attempt to replace the Aristotelian world view of hylomorphism, but it is also associated with Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Newton, and chemical atomism. The dominance of the theory declined with the emergence of the field theory in the middle of the nineteenth century, but it still exerts great influence on contemporary philosophy of science. “Corpuscularians, although disagreeing quite substantially about specific details, held that the things we experience are in fact made up of small material particles and the way we experience them is a product of the action of these small particles on our sense organs.” Tiles and Tiles, An Introduction to Historical Epistemology corrective justice, an alternative expression for rectificatory justice correspondence rules Philosophy of science In the double language model developed by Carnap and Ernest Nagel, the language of science is divided into theoretical language and observation language. Correspondence rules serve to relate these two languages. These rules are statements containing both theoretical terms and observational terms. By means of these rules, a theoretical term can be partially and indirectly explained empirically. These rules are also called by different authors “mixed sentences,” “operational definitions,” or “correlative definitions.” “[C]orrespondence rules, as I call them . . . connect the theoretical terms with the empirical ones.” Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics VERUMM -- correspondence theory of truth Logic, philosophy of language The most widely held theory of truth, taking truth to consist in a relation of correspondence between propositions and the way things are in reality. A proposition is true if it states what is the case, and false otherwise. It is a kind of replica or map of reality. This theory can be traced to Aristotle’s dictum in the Metaphysics that “to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” Locke provided an empirical foundation for it, because if sense-experience is the main source of our knowledge, truth must consist in a kind of correspondence. Russell and Wittgenstein, during their logical atomism periods, offered versions of the theory, according to which truth is correspondence and correspondence is a relation of structural isomorphism between propositions and facts. A true proposition is one where the elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought. The correspondence theory has been attacked because it presupposes a controversial metaphysics of things and facts. Moreover, the notion of correspondence is ambiguous. Various words have been employed to convey the meaning of correspond, such as accord with, fit in with, agree with and tally with, yet the sort of relation alleged to exist between a sentence and fact is still unclear. To avoid this criticism Austin developed a version that explains correspondence in terms of two kinds of correlation involving descriptive conventions and demonstrative conventions between words and world. His theory is also controversial. Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is also an attempt to reconstruct the essence of the traditional notion of correspondence. “The property of being a mother is explained by the relation between a woman and her child; similarly, the suggestion runs, the property of being true is to be explained by a relation between a statement and something else . . . I shall take the licence of calling any view of this kind a correspondence theory of truth.” Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation CORROBORATUM -- corroboration Logic, philosophy of science Popper’s term for the support obtained by a hypothesis or conjecture that survives serious testing and is not superseded by another hypothesis or conjecture. Popper preferred to call the testable degree of a hypothesis its degree of corroboration rather than its probability. Corroboration is introduced to distinguish Popperian testing from confirmation and to show that the probabilistic theory of induction is wrong. Corroboration is a measurement or report of the past performance of a theory and does not make a theory universal or more reliable. Hence, the degree of corroboration of theory has nothing to do with prediction or future decision making. For Popper, a theory can never be established beyond doubt. The aim of science is not to verify, but to falsify. “The term ‘confirmation’ has lately been so much used and misused that I have decided to surrender it to the verificationists and to use for my own purposes ‘corroboration’ only.” Popper, Conjectures and Refutations COSMOGONIA -- cosmogony Ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of science The theory of the genesis and growth of the cosmos, the main theoretical form of pre-Socratic philosophy. There were many pre-philosophical mythical and religious cosmogonies among the ancient Greeks, Egyptians, and Babylonians, but the pre-Socratics differed fundamentally from all of them by seeking the origin of the world on a rational basis, rather than by appealing to a supernatural force. Nevertheless, their cosmogony was deeply influenced by Hesiod’s theogony or genealogical account of the divine kingdom. All of the pre-Socratics held that the cosmos has a beginning. Some set up one or more elements as fundamental principles, claiming that the primary opposites, hot and cold, wet and dry, evolved from these principles and that the other parts of the cosmos evolved from these opposites. Other philosophers claimed that there was an original mixture from which evolved first the four basic elements and then natural substances and the organic world. Although views differed about the process, the whole picture was evolutionary rather than creative and involved no design. Compared with scientific cosmogony, the theories of the pre-Socratics were largely speculative, but they nevertheless demonstrated rational intelligence, which yielded many profound insights. “Practically all that we know about the philosophy of the Milesians concerns their cosmogony, their account of how the world came into being.” A. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy COSMOLOGICUM -- cosmological argument Philosophy of religion A family of arguments advanced to prove the existence of God. These arguments are based not on the analysis of God’s essential nature, but on the nature of the cosmos or universe. Different versions argue respectively from the empirical facts that the universe is in motion, causally organized, contingent, or ordered to the conclusions that there must be an unmoved mover, an uncaused cause, a necessary being, or an orderer. God is then identified with the being that is shown to be necessary in order to explain the selected features of the world. In the history of philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, and Locke are among the defenders of one or more versions of the cosmological argument, while Hume, Kant, Mill, and Russell are among the critics. A major difficulty facing all versions of the argument lies in the ambiguous nature of their key notions, such as necessity or causality. Even if the argument succeeds, it shows the existence of a divine object, whereas religion requires God to be known primarily as a person. “In the widest sense of the term, any theistic argument that proceeds from the world to God can be described as cosmological.” Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God -- cosmology Metaphysics, philosophy of science [from Greek kosmos, the world or universe + logos, theory or study] A study of the universe as a whole, especially its constitution and structure. Philosophical cosmology is a rational inquiry that combines some scientific evidence and substantial speculation. It is also called rational cosmology, in contrast to mythic cosmology and to modern cosmology, which is a branch of astronomy. Wolff took rational cosmology to be one of three branches of specific metaphysics, with the others being rational theology and rational psychology. The most general issues discussed in philosophical cosmology include space, time, causality, necessity, contingency, change, eternity, and infinity. Cosmology was the dominant concern of the pre-Socratics. It also played a significant role in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and in medieval philosophy. Most claims of traditional cosmology were undermined by Renaissance science, but the subject was revived by Leibniz and Newton. Kant applied his critical philosophy to cosmology, claiming that cosmological problems can never be solved because we cannot apply categories beyond their spatio-temporal limits. Attempts to resolve such problems result in antinomies. According to Kant, cosmology arises from a natural inclination of human reason to seek absolute knowledge of the world, and he claimed that a positive critical cosmology is needed to set the limit of reason in this regard. Later, Schelling and Hegel turned rational cosmology into the philosophy of nature. Contemporary cosmology is grounded in empirical natural sciences, particularly modern physics. Since few observations are available in this area, metaphysical theories still play an important role. The main problems of contemporary cosmology include the origin, size, and development of the universe, the possibility of other universes, the nature of space, time, matter, and energy, and the kinds of logic needed for cosmological theory. “Cosmology seeks to understand the nature of brute matter, considered as the cause of phenomena and as the foundation of physical laws.” Duhem, Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science COSTUS -- cost–benefit analysis: A type of practical reasoning that analyzes or evaluates an issue by calculating how much cost we need to put in and how much interest or benefit the outcome is going to produce. We then choose the alternative that, measured by some common scale, costs least but gains most. It is a standard utility calculus and is widely employed in economic affairs and social policy. In order to apply this sort of reasoning, the goals of an action must be well defined. Furthermore, it must be possible to compare costs of alternative policies in terms of some definite unit and to quantify benefits in a way that renders them commensurable with one another. This approach is therefore limited regarding those moral and social issues that resist quantitative analysis. Not all significant costs and benefits can be measured or can be brought into a system of commensurability. “Cost-benefit analyses are not popular now in some quarters; and they have indeed been misused, by failing to include very important costs and benefits (often because they are not measurable in terms of money).” Hare, Essays on Political Morality NOMEN -- count noun Philosophy of language, metaphysics A noun used for a kind of countable thing such as “table,” “river,” or “body.” A count noun has grammatical plural forms and can be modified by an indefinite article. The question “How many Cs are there?” has an answer if C is a count noun. A count noun can replace a variable in predicate logic. A count noun corresponds to a sortal, but contrasts with a mass term, which refers to an uncountable thing or substance such as wood, water, or flesh. Mass nouns do not have plural forms and are not modified by an indefinite article. They are used to answer the question “How much M is there?” “Count nouns have plurals; in the singular they admit of the indefinite article, and it is appropriate where c is a count-noun to ask the question ‘How many Cs are there?’ ” C. Williams, Being, Identity and Truth EXEMPLUM -- counterexample Logic, philosophical method A counterexample to a generalization is a case that is an instance of the kind to which the generalization applies but which does not have the property that the generalization asserts that things of that kind possess. For instance, “All swans are white” is a generalization. But if there is one swan that is not white, that non-white swan becomes a counterexample. A counterexample to an argument is a case in which all premises are true but the conclusion is false. The discovery of a counterexample to an argument indicates that the argument is not logically valid, or at least that its conclusion cannot be universally applied. Hence the absence of a counterexample becomes a mark of the validity of an argument. A valid inference is one that has no counterexample. Otherwise, it is invalid. “To find an interpretation which shows that an argument is logically invalid is the same thing as finding a counterexample to the argument.” Suppes, Introduction to Logic CONTRAFACTUM -- counterfactuals, see contrafactuals counterfactuals of freedom, another expression for middle knowledge counterpart theory Metaphysics A theory that can be traced to Leibniz, but has recently been developed by D. Lewis to cope with the problem of trans-world identity. For Lewis, an individual can exist only in one of the plurality of possible worlds, because a thing can only be in one place at a time. There is nothing that inhabits more than one world. Hence, individuals are worldbound, and there are no identical individuals in different worlds. How, then, are we to analyze what is possible or impossible for a worldbound individual? Lewis claims that individuals have counterparts in other worlds. Even though they are not identical with their actual-world counterparts, they resemble them more closely than do other things in their worlds. They are such that for anything X in the actual world W, its counterpart X-in-Wn is just as X-in-W would have been, had things been different in the way things are different between W and Wn. Trans-world resemblance is the counterpart relation, and is a substitute for transworld identity. “In general, something has for counterparts at a given world those things existing there that resemble it closely enough in important respects of intrinsic quality and extrinsic relations, and that resemble it no less closely than do other things existing there.” D. Lewis, Counterfactuals courage Ethics [Greek andreia, related to aner, an adult man; hence manliness or bravery, corresponding to Latin virtus] One of the prominent virtues in ancient Greece. In the ancient world, a good man had to be courageous or brave in battle and in the face of other dangers. Socrates argued that courage as a virtue must involve knowledge of what is and what is not truly to be feared. Moreover, courage is not only fortitude in the face of physical danger, but also involves enduring in one’s convictions against all adversity and temptation. Courage is the subject of Plato’s dialogue Laches and is further discussed in the Republic. It corresponds to the spirited element in the tripartite of the soul, and is the virtue of the auxiliaries. Aristotle considered courage to be a mean between fear and confidence. “Hence whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondingly confident, is a courageous person.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics LEX -- covering law model Philosophy of science, philosophy of social science A term for an account of scientific explanation, according to which an event is explained through deduction from a general law and certain initial conditions. In an explanation, the event is subsumed or covered by the general law. This is called the deductive-nomological model of explanation (D-N model). The model can also apply to the covering law itself, that is, the law can be explained by deducing it from a higher order covering law or body of laws. Such a theory of explanation was elaborated by Hempel. In an extended sense, the covering law model can employ statistical laws to explain an event by showing that it is highly probable. This model of explanation, which is usually inductive, is called the inductiveprobabilistic model. The term “covering law model” was used by Dray for the first model in Law and Explanation in History (1957). Hempel extended the term to the second model as well. Many disputes have arisen concerning each model. For the deductivenomological model, some critics claim that in some cases a law is not needed to provide an explanation, while at least some accounts satisfying the model do not have explanatory force. On one diagnosis, these problems arise because the formal approach of the model does not leave room for contextual elements in explanation. There is also debate about the nature of the statistical model and whether a purely statistical law can explain. The covering law model is also called the subsumption theory of explanation. “The Hempelian theory of explanation has become known as the Covering Law model (or theory).” von Wright, Explanation and Understanding CRAIGIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Craig’s theorem Logic, philosophy of science A theorem in mathematical logic put forward and proved by the American logician William Craig in his paper “On Axiomatizability within a System” ( Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1953). The theorem states that if we separate the vocabulary of a formal system into the T (theoretical) terms and the O (observational) terms, there is a formalized system T′ such that (a) the axioms of T′ contain only the observational terms, and T and T′ imply the same O-sentences. This theorem shows that theoretical terms are in principle eliminable from empirical theories. It is thus a method by which we may formulate all connections between observables without having to make use of theoretical terms. To apply this method, one needs first to distinguish the essential expressions of the system from the auxiliary expressions, and to take the content of the system to be identical with the class of essential expressions and then to construct a new axiomatized system that contains all the essential expressions and none of the auxiliary expressions. This system has the same observational consequences as the original one. Craig himself does not think that this method really dissolves the problem of analyzing the empirical meaning of theoretical terms and holds that this method applies only to completed deductive systems. Nevertheless, his theorem has greatly influenced discussion in the philosophy of science of the relationship between theoretical terms and observational terms. The method is close in spirit to the notion of the Ramsey sentence. “What Craig’s theorem provides is a general method of eliminating a selected group of terms from a formalised system without changing the content of the system.” H. Brown, Perception, Theory and Commitment EX NIHILO NIHIL -- creation ex nihilo Philosophy of religion Creation out of nothing, in contrast to the claim that ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes out of nothing). Christian theists held the doctrine that God created the world out of nothing, contrary to the view of the relation between God and the world expressed by Plato and Neoplatonism. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo maintains that matter is not eternal and that no matter existed prior to a divine creative act at the initial moment of the cosmic process. Whilst the pre-existence of matter would restrict God to the role of a formal cause or an agent that orders or arranges pre-existing stuff, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo holds that matter was created instantaneously by God out of nothing, in the strict sense of absolute non-being. On this view, creation is absolutely without determination. For example, God did not create the world because he needed this action to complete his nature. God is held to be necessary and is not confronted with any alien and rival necessity that might determine or constrain his acts. “According to classical theism God created the world ‘out of nothing’ (ex nihilo).” H. Owen, Concepts of Deity CREATUM -- creativity Aesthetics Generally, to create is to make something new, including both material objects and ideas. Creativity has a wide application in human activities, but is of particular significance in the production of art. In Greek thought, a poet is called “maker” (Greek poietes). Aristotle’s masterpiece on aesthetics, what is usually translated as “poetics”, is in its Greek original “poietikos” (“concerned with making”). Art has long been seen as a creative activity, but there have been disagreements regarding what it means to say that an activity is a creative artistic activity. Creativity implies novelty and involves producing something different from what has been produced before, but also extends beyond mere novelty. In creation, an artist seeks to assimilate within a design recalcitrant features of a subject and to keep and enhance the subject’s initiative and freedom. There is disagreement whether the process of artistic creation is explicable. For Plato, artists themselves lack knowledge and are under the influence of divine inspiration. Hence artistic creativity is associated with madness. For others, although artistic creation derives from inspiration, it is also subject to rational analysis. “Creative activity in art, that is to say, is not a paradigm of purposive activity, that is, of activity engaged in and consciously-controlled so as to produce a desired result.” Tomas (ed.), Creativity in the Arts CREDITUM -- credo ut intelligam Philosophy of religion [Latin, I believe in order that I may understand] An avowal from St Anselm’s Proslogion, in which the ontological argument was first expressed. Anselm claimed that it is impossible to understand Christian doctrines without faith or belief. Reason itself cannot discover anything intelligible about God. The view has inspired other explorations of non-intellectual or non-rational conditions of understanding. Outside theology, it is popular to affirm that one must use the practical means of living in a culture in order to understand that culture, and that detached rational understanding of a culture is impossible. “I do not seek to understand in order that I may believe, but I believe in order that I may understand (credo ut intelligam). For this I also believe; that if I did not believe, I could not understand.” Anselm, Proslogion CRITERIUM -- criterion, problem of the Epistemology A criterion is a test or standard by which truth, existence, identity, or meaning can be determined. There is an influential question concerning the relation between criteria and that for which they are criteria, called the problem of the criterion. The problem was originally formulated by Sextus Empiricus in the Outline of Pyrrhonism (II, 4). To know the truth, one needs a proof that what one knows is the truth. How, then, can a proof be true? It seems that any proof requires a criterion to confirm it, and the criterion needs a proof to demonstrate its truth. That involves a circular process of reasoning. This paradox has historically had various formulations and has been a subject of wide discussion. Chisholm presents the problem in this way: We have two general questions in epistemology: (A) “What do we know?” and “How do we know anything?” Question A concerns the extent of our knowledge, and B the criterion for knowledge. However, if we try to answer A, we must answer B first. To know whether things are really as they seem to be, we need to have a procedure for distinguishing appearance from reality. On the other hand, if we want to answer question B, we must answer question A first. For to know whether a procedure is good or proper, we must first know the distinction between appearance and reality. To get out of this circle, we must show that we can justify our criteria of knowledge without appealing to what these criteria countenance as knowledge. This involves the distinction of different levels of knowledge and different levels of justification. Fulfilling this task has become one of the major problems of epistemology and of philosophy in general. “The problem of the criterion seems to me to be one of the most important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy. I am tempted to say that one has not begun to philosophise until one has faced this problem and has recognised how unappealing, in the end, each of the possible solutions is.” Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing -- CRITICUM -- critical realism criterion of verifiability Philosophical method, epistemology, philosophy of language A test proposed by logical positivists to distinguish genuine propositions from pseudopropositions. By virtue of demonstrating that metaphysics is composed of pseudo-propositions, they attempted to show that philosophy, as a genuine branch of knowledge, must be distinguished from metaphysics. What purports to be a factual proposition has cognitive sense if and only if it is empirically verifiable. If it cannot be shown to be true or false, it is factually insignificant, although it can perhaps have emotive meaning for those who utter it. We can distinguish between practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. Many propositions could, with sufficient effort, be verified in practice. For others, such as “there are planets of stars in other galaxies,” we can conceive of an observation allowing us to decide its truth or falsity, but lack the means which would enable us actually to make such an observation. Because we know that being in a position to make the observation would allow verification, this kind of proposition is verifiable in principle. There is a further distinction between a strong and a weak sense of verifiable. According to the strong sense, held by Schlick, a proposition is verifiable if and only if its truth is conclusively or practically established in experience; according to the weak sense, developed by Ayer, a proposition is verifiable if it is possible for experience to render it probable. “The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability.” Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic critical cognitivism Epistemology A term introduced by Roderick Chisholm for an approach to the problem of how to formulate the criterion that determines disputed knowledge claims, such as knowledge of ethical facts, religious knowledge, knowledge of other minds, or knowledge of the past and future. The difficulty with this kind of knowledge is to show how we can infer from what is directly evident to what is indirectly evident. We may reasonably assume that we have just four sources that yield knowledge, that is, external perception, inner consciousness, memory, and reason. None of them can individually and directly provide us with knowledge of the disputed type. We have also induction and deduction, but they do not help either. Chisholm then attempts to establish the existence of principles of evidence other than the principles of induction and deduction and called this approach critical cognitivism. It tells us under what conditions cognitive states will confer evidence or reasonableness upon propositions about external things. It takes the knowledge produced by other approaches as sign or evidence for more dubious knowledge and reaches the latter from the former facts of experience. “The other type of answer might be called critical cognitivism. If we take this approach, we will not say that there are empirical sentences that might serve as translations of the sentences expressing our ethical knowledge; but we will say that there are empirical truths which enable us to know certain truths of ethics.” Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge --- critical ethics, another name for meta-ethics critical idealism, another term for transcendental idealism critical realism Epistemology, metaphysics An American epistemological movement that flourished in the early twentieth century. Its representatives include George Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars, and Arthur O. Lovejoy. The movement took its name from Sellars’s book Critical Realism (1916). A volume, Essays in Critical Realism: A Cooperative Study of the Problem of Knowledge (1920), became the manifesto of the school. By claiming that there is an objective and independent physical world that is the object of knowledge, critical realism opposed idealism. It also opposed the naive version of direct realism proposed by the new realists, specifically their claim that we directly perceive the objective things themselves. Critical realism is called “critical” because it claims that what is present directly in consciousness are mental states and not the physical things as such. They held that the mind knows the external world via the mediation of the mental. Critical realists tried to account for the relationship between the mediating elements and what they represent. They believed their accounts to be the most reasonable way to explain phenomena such as error, illusion, and perceptual variation. However, critical realists had many disagreements over the nature of the mediating elements and the roles they filled. Candidates for the mediating elements ranged over essences, ideas, and sense-data. Because of differences, critical realism did not survive as a school. “Critical realism accepts physical realism. Like common sense, it holds to the belief that there are physical things; and, like enlightened common sense, its idea of the physical world is moulded by the conclusions of science. It is a criticism of naive realism, and an attempt to free it from its presupposition that knowledge is, or can be, an intuition of the physical thing itself.” Sellars, Essays in Critical Realism -- critical theory Ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of social science A type of social theory that originated with Western Marxist thinkers attached to the Institute of Social Research at the University of Frankfurt. Leading critical theorists included Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse. The Institute moved to Geneva and during the Second World War to the United States, but it returned to Germany in 1950. The original proponents of critical theory are also called the Frankfurt school. The project of critical theory was inspired by Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach,” in which Marx said, “Philosophers have given different interpretations of the world; the point is to change it.” Critical theory rejected the attempt of logical positivism to find universal laws in the human sciences. It held that modern science and technology have been totally reduced to an administrative system governed by a purely technological rationality. To counteract this, critical theory focused on the superstructure rather than the economic base of societies and emphasized moral, political, and religious values. It claimed that knowledge is relative to human interest and introduced a wide range of cultural criticism into Marxist social theory. It sought to reveal the false embodiment of the ideals of reason in the social and political conditions of capitalist societies -- Critical theory sought to identify the possibility of social change and to promote a selfreflective, domination-free society. Critical theory developed into a new phase with the work of Jürgen Habermas, who was based at the same Institute. Habermas’s ambition was to replace the technological rationality predominant in modern societies with communicative rationality, which reaches conclusions through discussion and dialogue. He tries to achieve this goal by shifting philosophical emphasis from the subject–object relation to the process of intersubjective communication. He believes that the act of communication anticipates the goal of critical theory and also establishes a universalistic discourse ethics as the evaluative foundation of social critique. “The expression ‘critical theory’ has been applied to a wide range of different theoretical standpoints. In its narrowest sense, it refers to the views advocated by members of the Frankfurt school, especially in the early writings of Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse.” Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science -- critical thinking, another term for informal logic -- Critique of Judgement Aesthetics, philosophy of science The third and last critique in Kant’s critical philosophy. First published in 1790, the Critique of Judgement is an examination of the power or faculty of judgment, that is, the possibility of making judgments. This issue is related to the schematism of the first critique. Kant divides judgment into two kinds: a determinant judgment applies a rule or concept to particular instances, and a reflective judgment (or judgment of reflection) discovers the rule or concept under which a given particular instance falls. The thinking in determinant judgment is from the universal to the particular, but in reflective judgment, the thinking is from the particular to the universal. The Critique of Judgement concerns reflective judgment, especially its two most problematic forms: aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment. The book is divided into two parts: the critique of aesthetic judgment of taste, and the critique of teleological judgment. Each has its own analytic and dialectic. There are generally two approaches to the third Critique. One approach emphasizes its role in the whole critical enterprise. The first critique discussed the realm of nature, the second the realm of freedom, and the third is viewed as a bridge that combines these two realms and completes the critical philosophy. The other approach focuses on the critique of aesthetic judgment of taste. The analytic of this part includes an analytic of the beautiful and an analytic of the sublime, which are viewed as the origin of modern aesthetics. On this approach, these questions of aesthetics are considered independently. “A Critique of pure reason, i.e. of our faculty of judging on a priori principles, would be incomplete if the critical examination of judgement, which is a faculty of knowledge, and as such, lays a claim to independent principles, were not dealt with separately.” Kant, Critique of Judgement -- Critique of Practical Reason Ethics The second critique of Kant’s critical philosophy, first published in 1788. The book was divided into two parts: the doctrine of the elements of pure practical reason and the methodology of pure practical reason. The former part was further divided into the Analytic and the Dialectic. The Analytic sought to determine synthetic a priori principles about what we ought to do and to demonstrate the legitimacy of these principles. The Dialectic dealt with an antinomy concerning the definition of the highest good, with the conflicting theses represented by Epicurus and the Stoics. While the first critique rejected the traditional metaphysical notions of God, freedom, and immortality as objects of knowledge, the Critique of Practical Reason justified them for morality as postulated objects of faith. The book elaborated and developed the central ideas about morality that Kant established in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). reason, which contains constitutive a priori principles solely in respect of the faculty of desire, gets its holding assigned to it by the Critique of Practical Reason.” Kant, Critique of Judgement -- Critique of Pure Reason Epistemology, metaphysics Kant’s greatest masterpiece, one of the most important books in the history of Western philosophy. It fundamentally shaped the development of modern philosophy. For Kant, a critique was a critical examination, and pure reason was contrasted with empirical reason, with pure reason seeking to provide knowledge independent of experience. Kant saw a critique of pure reason as a critical examination of these claims of pure reason conducted by pure reason itself. While the logical use of reason unifies knowledge already gained through other faculties, pure reason tries to add to our knowledge through its own labors, and thus becomes the source of dialectical error. Pure reason is also the name that followers of Wolff gave to their philosophy, which was dominant in Kant’s time. Kant’s criticism of pure reason has both of these aspects in mind. The first Critique is an examination of the limits and conditions of human theoretical reason. It was first published in 1781, but very extensively revised for its second edition in 1787. The first edition is designated A and the second edition B. In modern editions and translations, the page numbers of both editions are normally marked in the margin. The book is divided into two parts: the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements and the Transcendental Doctrine of Methods. The former occupies five-sixths of the book, and the Doctrine of Methods is merely a systematic presentation of the basic elements of knowledge discovered in the previous part. The Doctrine of the Elements is divided into the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic, which is further divided into the Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic. The first Critique purported to carry out a Copernican revolution in philosophy by proposing that objects must conform to our knowledge rather than our knowledge to objects. This position is related to the complex and controversial claims of Kant’s transcendental idealism, which he sought to combine with empirical realism. The Transcendental Aesthetic deals with sensibility. Kant sought to demonstrate that sensibility has a priori forms, space and time, that are subjective forms of intuition. He also offered influential claims about the nature of mathematics. The Transcendental Analytic deals with understanding. Kant proposed his table of categories as pure concepts of the understanding and a schematism for the application of the categories to sensible objects. The claim that judgment and perception involve both sensibility and understanding is a major theme of the first Critique. The crucially important transcendental deduction of the categories attempted to justify our use of the categories as conditions for the possibility of experience. Kant also provided important examinations of individual categories and of ourselves as subjects of experience. These two parts attempt to answer Kant’s central question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. Kant tried to provide a metaphysical foundation for Newtonian physics. The pure concepts of understanding can only be applied to a spatiotemporal phenomenal world. Once human reason attempts to make use of them beyond our experience to things-in-themselves, illusions, errors, or antinomies are generated. According to Kant, this is the source of the errors of traditional metaphysics. The task of the transcendental dialectic, which is concerned with reason, is to expose these errors. “I do not mean by this [the critique of pure reason] a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason Croce, Benedetto (1866–1952) Italian idealist philosopher and historian, born in Pescasseroli, Abruzzi. Deeply influenced by Hegel, Croce maintained that philosophy and history are unified. His philosophy of spirit distinguished four levels of mental activity: the aesthetic, the logical, the economic, and the ethical. His most influential philosophical work is in the field of aesthetics. He claimed that aesthetics is the science of intuitive cognition and that all art is lyrical in character. He pioneered the expression theory of art, which was later developed by Collingwood. Croce founded the journal La Critica in 1904. From 1925, he was the main anti-fascist Italian intellectual, and he was also active in public life after the Second World War. His most important book is Aesthetics as Science of Expression and General Linguistics (1902). Other works include Logic as the Science of Pure Concept (1905), Philosophy of the Practical, the Economical, and the Ethical (1909), Poetry and Literature: An Introduction to Its Criticism and History (1936). crucial experiment Philosophy of science [Latin experimentum crucis] A term introduced by Francis Bacon in Novum Organon. At a certain stage of scientific development, two rival hypotheses appear to have equal explanatory power. When this occurs, it is of great importance that scientists should devise an experiment that can play a decisive role in determining which one of rival scientific theories should be refuted or accepted. Eddington’s measurement of the gravitational bending of light rays during a solar eclipse was crucial in the debate between Einstein’s general relativity and Newtonian mechanics. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the notion of a crucial experiment has become an important topic in the discussion of scientific methodology. Some, like Duhem, argue that a crucial verifying experiment is impossible. Others, like Popper, believe that a crucial experiment functions decisively in falsifying one of the rival theories. Still others, like Lakatos, suggest that a crucial experiment cannot be final in overthrowing a theory, although it may be an indication of the progress or demise of a research program. “In most cases we have, before falsifying a hypothesis, another one up our sleeves; for the falsifying experiment is usually a crucial experiment designed to decide between the two. That is to say, it is suggested by the fact that the two hypotheses differ in some respect; and it makes use of this difference to refute (at least) one of them.” Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery cruelty Ethics [from Latin cruor, spilled blood] Cruelty is traditionally conceived as an activity of inflicting pain upon other persons. In addition to physical pain, which is related to spilling blood, it also covers mental or psychological pain. It is opposed to care and beneficence, and is regarded as a paradigmatic evil. Cruelty can be committed by individual persons or by institutions (for example, by the slave system or by Nazi Germany), although in many cases they are difficult to separate. Institutional cruelty involves a relationship between the strength of the institution and the weakness of its victims. There are issues concerning the complicity of the individual agents or members of the institution and the extent to which they are responsible for such cruelty. In some CULTURA -- culture cases, questions of assessment arise because persons believe themselves to be caring, but those affected by their actions consider them to be cruel. There is dispute whether and to what extent cruelty to evil doers can be justified. One important case concerns whether capital punishment is cruel. In contemporary environmental ethics, cruelty as an evil extends from the human community to human relationships with animals. The animal liberation movement demands that we stop cruelty to nonhuman animals. “Cruelty or savageness is the desire whereby any one is incited to work evil to one whom we love or whom we pity.” Spinoza, Ethics C-series of time, see A-series of time Cudworth, Ralph (1617–88) English philosopher and theologian, one of the leading Cambridge Platonists, born in Aller, Somerset. Cudworth sought to refute atheistic determinism and Hobbes’s materialism. He held that all knowledge and virtue participate in eternal ideas of truth and goodness in the mind of God. God works through the spiritual plastic natures that exist between the conscious mind and material objects. There are eternal moral truths and distinctions in ethics. His major works are: The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (1731), and A Treatise of Free Will (1838). cultural relativism Epistemology, ethics, philosophy of social science A theory that holds that each culture is a unique and arbitrary system of thought and behavior. What is considered to be a reasonable claim in one society is not necessarily thought to be so in another culture, and consequently it is impossible to compare and rank different cultures. Any behavior has to be explained in terms of the society and context in which it occurs. Any attempt to compare different cultures would inevitably have to appeal to some assumptions universally found in human cultures, but cultural relativism denies that there are such significant cultural universals. Cultural relativism was the dominant conviction in anthropology in the 1930s and 1940s and is still employed in many studies of the social sciences, including studies of ethics. Many philosophers reject cultural relativism as incoherent, on the grounds that it undermines our concepts of truth, objectivity, and meaning. “The reason cultural relativism is so crucial is that it challenges the orthodoxies of our civilisation. To the confirmed relativist, the ideas of our society (whether moral or existential) are a matter of convention and are not rooted in absolute principles that transcend time and place.” Hatch, Culture and Morality -- culture Philosophy of social science In its most central sense, culture refers to the forms of life and the tools, symbols, customs, and beliefs that are characteristic of a distinct historical group of people. This sense of culture, associated with the notion of society, provides much of the subject-matter of sociology and anthropology. The variety of cultures has led some thinkers to endorse “cultural relativism,” the claim that the culture of any society must be judged in its own terms and not by standards provided by the culture of another society. Others have accepted the importance of culture while rejecting cultural relativism. Culture may also refer to the system of value and ways of thinking peculiar to a society. This amounts to “the consciousness of a society.” In its widest sense, culture refers to the totality of human thoughts, behaviors, and the products of human activities. Culture in this sense, which stands in contrast to biological nature and has been used to distinguish humans from animals, belongs to the subject of philosophical anthropology. More selectively, culture comprises art, sports, entertainment, and other leisure activities. High culture, containing the most significant and accomplished works of visual art, music, dance, and literature, has often been contrasted with popular culture, although the two in some circumstances influence one another. Culture also means personal cultivation through education and training. The science of culture seeks to understand that which is defined by the creation of values. “A culture is an interrelated network of customs, traditions, ideals and values.” M. Singer (ed.), American Philosophy CUMBERLANDIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Cumberland, Richard (1632–1718) English moral philosopher, born in London, fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge, Bishop of Peterborough. Cumberland argued that there is a foundation of morality in nature and rejected the Hobbesian claim that morality derived from the decree of a sovereign and the claim that morality derived from the decree of God. His claim that there is a universal human inclination toward benevolence and that an action is morally right through promoting the general good anticipated later utilitarian theory. His main philosophical work is On the Laws of Nature (1672). cunning of reason Metaphysics, philosophy of history According to Hegel, the absolute idea or spirit accomplishes its end through the interactions and competitions of particular things, although reason itself cunningly avoids being dragged into the struggle. It remains in the background to control the whole process without being the object of explicit awareness. Reason does not work directly on the subject or lower itself to becoming a particular thing, but nevertheless achieves its goal. Particular things are merely means used for the end of reason, but are themselves parts of a necessary process. The play of contingency serves to realize the necessary plan or the inner teleology of the world. In the area of history, everyone pursues his own purpose and falls into battle with others, but eventually history develops its own pattern out of particular and selfish human actions. “It is not the universal idea which places itself in opposition and struggle, or puts itself in danger; it holds itself safe from attack and uninjured in the background and sends the particular of passion into the struggle to be worn down. We can call it the cunning of reason that the Idea makes passions work for it, in such a way that whereby it posits itself in existence it loses thereby and suffers injury.” Hegel, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte. “The curve-fitting problem: two different curves are defined at all points and pass exactly through each data point, why should we think that the smooth curve is more probably true?” Sober, Simplicity CYBERNETICUM -- cybernetics Philosophy of science, philosophy of mind [from Greek kybernetes, pilot, helmsman, governor] A term introduced by Norbert Wiener in 1947 for the study of communication and the manipulation of information in self-regulating systems and control systems, both in machines and in living organisms. Its central notion is control. Cybernetic theory is closely related to communication theory and biology, and in the popular understanding is the simulation of human data-processing and regulative functions in a digital computer. The philosophical interest in this field concerns computers that are developed by combining simple components through complex and goal-directed cybernetic processes. “In the present content, the term [cybernetics] is used to designate the study of communication and central function of living organisms, in particular human beings, in view of their possible simulation in mechanical terms.” Syre, Cybernetics and Philosophy of Mind curve-fitting problem Philosophy of science A problem first proposed by Legendre (1753–1833) and Gauss (1777–1855). Curve-fitting to the data on a graph is a method of inferring from observed data. If a scientist tries to connect two variables on the grounds of a set of n data points, he will join them with a curve. There might be a family of curves that fit these n points to any desirable degree. How, then, can the scientist locate the best-fitting curve? Intuitively, and also based on common sense, a smooth curve will be chosen. But why is this one the best fitting? Philosophically, there is a problem of simplicity, that is, how we determine the simplest curve from all those curves that pass through every one of a set of data points on a graph, and how we justify choosing it. This problem is relevant not only to the definition of simplicity but also to the problem of induction. CYNICUM IMPLICATUM -- Cynics Ancient Greek philosophy, ethics [from Greek kunikos, dog-like, in turn from kuon, dog] A Greek school founded by Socrates’ disciple Antisthenes, and represented by Diogenes of Sinope. The school got its name because it was opposed to the existing civil life and against any cultural constraints (norm), requiring instead that we conform to nature (physis), and live like dogs, that is, live shamelessly from the point of view of civil life. They not only advocated an ascetic lifestyle, but actually practiced it. Nevertheless, the Cynics were not moral nihilists. They believed that virtue is sufficient for a happy life, which lies in the freedom to do what reason requires, self-mastery of desires and feelings, and indifference to external disturbances such as wealth, social status, pleasure, and pain. They held that virtue is independent of fate and fortune and that a virtuous life is intrinsically better than a nonvirtuous life. This position seeks to isolate human nature from social and historical contexts. Animal behavior is taken as a criterion of naturalness. It deeply influenced the Hellenistic ideal of sagacity and, in particular, Stoic ethics. “One omnipresent figure since the mid-fourth century had been that of the itinerant Cynic, whose main tenets would be the absolute self-sufficiency of virtue and the total inconsequentiality of all social norms, physical comforts, and gifts of fortune.” Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. CYRENAICUM IMPLICATUM -- Cyrenaics Ancient Greek philosophy A Greek philosophical school, noted for its radical hedonism. Its origin can be traced to Socrates’ disciple Aristippus, and the name is derived from his native city, the North African Greek colony of Cyrene. The founder of this school was his grandson, referred to as Aristippus junior (about 340 bc), and other major exponents included Anniceris, Hegesias, and Theodorus, all of whom were contemporaries of Epicurus. Cyrenaics claimed that because the past is gone and the future is not certain, the present enjoyment of sensual pleasure, that is, what they called “the smooth motion of the flesh,” is the supreme good in life. Their view thus contrasted with the hedonism of Epicurus, which emphasized recollection and anticipation. The epistemological basis of the Cyrenaic position was their claim that momentary perception and feeling are the only authentic source of guidance. Its metaphysical ground is that all living creatures pursue pleasure and avoid pain by nature. The school has been criticized for ignoring those deep long-term needs that go beyond sensory gratification. “Aristippus, a native of Cyrene (whence the name of his followers, Cyrenaics) was said to have been brought to Athens by the fame of Socrates.” Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy DAEMON -- daimon Ancient Greek philosophy [Greek, spirit, divinity] In Greek philosophy, sometimes god and sometimes an immortal spirit, that is, the divine soul which is incarnated in a mortal body but which may return to its god-like state. In another use, a daimon is guardian angel which looks after an individual both in life and after death. Happiness in Greek is eudaimonia, having a good daimon. Socrates claimed that he had a daimon, which ordered him to do what he did, although his daimon was his reason. “When anyone dies, his own daimon, which was given charge over him in his life, tries to bring him to a certain place where all must assemble.” Plato, Phaedo ALIGHIERIANUM IMPLICATUM -- Dante Alighieri (1265–1321) Italian philosophical poet, born in Florence. Although not an original philosopher himself, Dante’s works provide an enduring model of the expression of philosophy in literature. His writings are infused with philosophical thought and reflections, from Convivio, in which he argues for the consolation of philosophy, to his ideal of peaceful secular rule to free the human intellect in De Monarchia and the Augustinian vision of his masterpiece Divine Comedy. Dantoianum implicatum: Danto, Arthur (1924– ) American philosopher of art, history, action, epistemology, born in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University. Danto has extended the range of analytic philosophy to discuss art, history, and contemporary European philosophy. His discussion of the artworld explores the context in which works can be seen as artworks. His main works include Analytic Philosophy of History (1965), Analytic Philosophy of Action (1973), and The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981). Darwin, Charles (1809–82) English biologist and theorist of evolution, born in Shrewsbury. Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection brought about a revolution in our understanding of science and provided a naturalistic account of the complexity and capacities of organisms, including human beings. Discussion of his work is at the center of philosophy of biology and has influenced evolutionary approaches to psychology, society, and ethics. His major works include On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871). Darwinism Philosophy of science A scientific doctrine based on the work of the British naturalist, Charles Darwin, and in particular on his book On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859). It claims that the organic world, including the human species, came into being through a natural and gradual process of evolution and its major mechanism of natural selection. Nature selects those species and those members of the same species that are best adapted to the environment in which they live. When we notice that members of the species S′ have feature F for the sake of advantage G, we should understand this to be a result of evolution. For some members of a preceding species S had F and other members of S did not have F, but members of S that had F thereby had advantage G, and members of S without F did not have advantage G. In the long run, only members of S with F survived, so now all members of the successor species S′ have F. Because it can explain functional adaptation and the variety of species in natural terms, Darwinism rejects the argument from design for the existence of God and the theory of genesis. It also rejects teleology, since the development of an organism is determined by the environment and environment changes, hence there is no final goal for each organism other than adaptation to its environment. It also suggests that distinctions between species or natural kinds are not absolute and challenges traditional essentialism. Darwinism deprives humankind of its alleged superiority over other species by locating the species in terms of natural evolution. All the central features of Darwin’s theory have provoked long-lasting debates and have dramatically changed our view of the world. The questionable attempt to introduce the notion of the survival of the fittest into an account of human society through social Darwinism has generated various ethical and social controversies. Darwin himself did not have an adequate theory about the nature of heredity and genetic change, and this gap has been filled by the modern science of genetics. Contemporary evolutionary theory is a neo-Darwinian synthesis of the theory of natural selection and genetic theory. “The one criterion for Darwinism is the abstract success or prevalence of whatever happens to prevail, without any regard for its character.” Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality ESSE. Dasein Modern European philosophy, metaphysics [German being-there] A crucial term for Heidegger, but it is generally left untranslated. In traditional German philosophy, Dasein is broadly every kind of being or existence, and narrowly the kind of being that belongs to persons. Heidegger uses the term solely for the modes of human being. Human being must have a place there in the world and must be considered as Being-in-the-world. This Being is a human structure rather than the being of this or that particular man (der Mensch). Heidegger claimed that the meaning of Being is the subject-matter of philosophy. Dasein is the only kind of Being that can raise the question about Being and wonder about itself as existing. By making the understanding of Being possible, it is ontologically distinctive. Rather than being an object of some sort, Dasein is defined as being-in-the-world. By being viewed as a life story unfolding between birth and death, it is associated with the conception of “historicity” or “temporality.” For Heidegger, any inquiry about Being must start with the investigation of Dasein. The analysis of Dasein is the inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of understanding Being in general. Instead of being an epistemological study that is concerned with our way of knowing Being, the study is an ontological investigation into what Being is. The study of Dasein, which is the theme of Heidegger’s Being and Time, constitutes a necessary preliminary to the question of Being in general. The book begins with an examination of the static or formal structure of Dasein, and then discusses its temporal structures. To describe ourselves as Dasein is sharply distinct from the Cartesian view of human beings as an external combination of mind, as an isolated subject, and body. “This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term ‘Dasein’.” Heidegger, Being and Time SENSE-DATUM. data Epistemology [The singular datum from Latin datum, given] The materials or information from which any inquiry or inference begins. Data are the beliefs that need no further reason and that are the indispensable minimum of premises for our knowledge of the world. The data have different degrees of certainty and can be further divided into hard data and soft data. The former are the beliefs which are certain, self-evident, and are believed on their own account, and the latter are the beliefs that are found upon examination not to have this status but which are inferred from other beliefs. Russell always uses “data” and “hard data” as synonymous. This distinction also corresponds to another of Russell’s distinctions between primitive knowledge and derivative knowledge. “I give the name ‘data’ or rather ‘hard-data’ to all that survives the most severe critical scrutiny of which I am capable, excluding what, after the scrutiny, is only arrived at by argument and inference.” Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World Davidson, Donald (1917–2003) American analytic philosopher of mind and language, born in Springfield, Massachusetts, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley. Davidson has made major contributions on a wide range of philosophical topics. His discussion of the logical form of causal and action sentences places events at the center of his ontology. He argued for a causal account of the role of reasons in explaining actions, and defended physicalism in the philosophy of mind in terms of anomalous monism rather than through systematic relations between types of mental events and types of physical events. He adopted a holistic approach to the ascription of beliefs and other propositional attitudes to individuals and supplemented Quine’s theory of radical translation with a theory of radical interpretation governed by a principle of charity. He also employed this principle to counter skepticism and relativism. In philosophy of language, he adapted Tarski’s theory of truth for formalized languages to provide a semantic theory of meaning for natural languages, with special attention to the difficulties arising from indexical expressions and indirect speech contexts. His major works include Essays on Actions and Events (1980), Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), and Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (2001). LA MORTE DI WITTERS. death Ethics, metaphysics Death is the final cessation of life. Murder, suicide, euthanasia, capital punishment, and war all raise complicated moral questions about death. Questions in medical ethics arise because different criteria of death can come into conflict. In addition, there are moral questions concerning the death of animals. The unnatural and unwilled death of an innocent person is regarded as a harm because it deprives that person of future experiences. But it is difficult to determine whether some other deaths are straightforward harms, harms outweighed by additional concerns, or not harms at all. One can consider, for example, self-chosen death, natural death, or death legally imposed as punishment for certain major crimes, such as murder. It is possible to ask when the harm of death takes place. Before death, the person is not yet dead, although he is capable of suffering from the anticipation of death. After death, the person is already dead and cannot suffer. Harm restricted to the moment of death would lack the weight that we normally ascribe to the harm of death. The experience of death has been a chief concern for existentialism. In Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, death reveals the terrible temporality of our existence. In this revelation, he claimed, we find the ground of our authentic existence. Everyone dies his or her own death. As an experience entirely of one’s own, death cannot be shared. This experience makes one focus on one’s finitude, on one’s uniqueness and on one’s determinate self. The analysis of death is not only the ground of authenticity and freedom, but also the ground for the totality of Dasein. A total perspective of Dasein can only be reached when one is dead. This complete account is not possible until my death actually takes place. But we may provide an account of the required sort from the first-person standpoint by being aware that “I am going to die.” Death is hence characterized as Being-towards-the-end. This Being is the way one comports oneself in pondering when and how this possibility of death may be actualized. It has been widely proposed that the finitude imposed by death is part of what gives life meaning and that an immortal life is morally meaningless. “Death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped.” Heidegger, Being and Time death instinct Philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science The biological basis of Freud’s psychoanalysis postulates that in mental life there are two classes of instinct, which correspond to the contrary processes of dissolution and construction in the organism. These two classes of instinct are the death instinct and the life instinct. He also expresses this contrast as the contrast between thanatos (Greek, death) and eros (Greek, love), a pair of notions that can be traced to the cosmology of Empedocles. The life instinct, or eros, establishes order and prolongs one’s life. The death instinct, which is also called the destructive impulse, ego-instinct, or even the aggressive instinct, is an impulse to destroy order and to return to a pre-organic state. According to Freud, these two kinds of instinct are present in living beings in regular mixtures, and life consists in the manifestation of the conflict or interaction between them. For the individual, reproduction represents the victory of the life instinct, while death is the victory of the death instinct. Their conflict and interaction also dynamically promote the development of culture. The idea of the death instinct is influenced by Schopenhauer’s idea that the goal of life is death. There are problems with both life and death instincts. Although the life instinct could be explained in Darwinian terms, it is more difficult to see how the death instinct could be explained by natural selection within the process of evolution. “The one set of instincts, which work essentially in silence, would be those which follow the aim of leading the living creature to death and therefore deserve to be called the ‘death instincts’; those would be directed outwards as the result of the combinations of numbers of unicellular elementary organisms, and would manifest themselves as destructive or aggressive impulses.” Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18 death of art: Also called end of art. On the basis of Hegel’s theory, the American philosopher Arthur C. Danto believes that art has an ultimate goal of self-realization through self-comprehension. He argues that because twentieth-century art fulfilled this goal and realized its destiny, the history of art has come to an end. In art, there is no longer a distinction between subject and object. Knowledge becomes its own object. Rather than seeking to understand the external world directly, art depends more and more on theory for its existence. Things that are hardly works of art can now become artworks by means of an atmosphere of theory in an artworld. The quest for itself transforms the character of the object. Questions about what art is and what art means seem to have been answered. The traditional boundaries between art forms are no longer stable. In this situation, art is alienated more and more from the public and becomes philosophy. Artistic activities lose direction. Certainly, we continue to produce artworks, but they now miss the historical importance that art once possessed. We make works of art only by habit. Danto calls contemporary art “post-historical art.” Danto has been criticized for basing the alleged death of art on a very narrow notion of art. Critics argue that because art meets the demands of human nature, so long as human nature does not come to an end, art will continue its history. “It supposes that its own philosophy is what art aims at, so that art fulfils its destiny by becoming philosophy at last. Of course art does a great deal more or less than this, which makes the death of art an overstatement. That ours is a post-historical art, however, is a recognition deepened with each succeeding season.” Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art death penalty, an alternative name for capital punishment decidability Logic A theory (system or set) is decidable if there is an algorithm for determining whether an arbitrary well-formed formula is or is not a theorem of the theory. If the solution is positive, there is a decision procedure that enables one to determine this mechanically by following a rule within a finite number of steps. The truth-table is a decision procedure for propositional calculus. Gödel’s theorem proved that in any axiomatic system there are well-formed formulae which are not decidable within the system itself. “A set of sentences G is decidable just in case there is a decision procedure – an effective finitary method – for determining any sentence in the language whether or not it is in G.” Chellas, Modal Logic DECISUM -- Deciding: decision Ethics [Greek prohairesis, decision, from pro, before in the sense of temporal and preferential priority + hairesis, choosing] In Aristotle’s ethics, the origin of action. His theory of decision is viewed as a predecessor of the modern theory of will. Choice may be based on emotion and appetite, while prohairesis is rational choice. Decision is a mental act that combines both thinking and desiring and comprises both a rational desire for some good as an end in itself and deliberation about how to achieve the end. It is an impulse following upon a judgment reached by deliberation. Action or decision can be the outcome of practical reason in deliberation. “For it is our decision to do what is good and bad, not our beliefs that make the characters we have.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics -- decision procedure Logic A mechanistic procedure for determining whether an arbitrary well-formed formula is a theorem of a given formal system or theory by following a rule within a finite number of steps or a procedure to determine its semantic validity. A decision procedure determines whether a well-formed formula is true under any interpretation. A decision procedure is an algorithm. For instance, the truth-table is a decision procedure for propositional calculus. A proof that such a procedure exists for a theory provides a positive solution to the decision problem for that theory. Otherwise, there is a negative solution. A decision procedure is also a way of finding whether a concept can be applied in any given case. A concept connected with such a procedure is called definite and is regarded as meaningful. “A procedure of decision for a class of sentences is an effective procedure either, in semantics, for determining for any sentence of that class whether it is true or not . . . or, in syntax, for determining for any sentence of that class whether it is provable in a given calculus.” Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability -- decision theory Ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of social science, political philosophy The mathematically oriented theory of rational choice or decision making, which aims to make clear what is the best thing to do in a given situation. There are many situations in which an agent is faced with a set of alternatives that have various degrees of risk and various probabilities of possible outcomes being realized. Sometimes the agent has only limited knowledge of the consequences of possible actions. Decision theory helps an agent confronted with such a situation to decide the most rational way to act given the relevant available information. The common approaches include assigning probability to the outcomes of each possible action and then either to choose the action with the maximum expected utility or to choose the action that is least bad compared with other alternatives. Decision theory is philosophically interesting, because it is closely associated with notions such as preference, choice, and deliberation and is hence widely applicable in moral and political theory. Game theory is one part of decision theory, for while decision theory must take into account all factors involved, including natural and blind chance, game theory only involves interactions with the choices of other rational agents. “Decision theory as an empirical theory holds that there is some specification of alternative actions, outcomes, and beliefs about these and their probabilities, and preferences among these, such that the person acts so as (for example) to maximise expected utility.” Nozick, Philosophical Explanations Grice’s LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION THEORY. deconstruction Modern European philosophy A term introduced by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, and characteristic of his thought. He believes that preceding Western metaphysical systems were established on the basis of fundamental conceptual oppositions, such as speech/writing, soul/body, transcendent/ empirical, nature/culture, and good/evil. For each conceptual pair, one term was allegedly superior to the other. Deconstruction is a philosophical practice that aims to remove our thinking from the domination of these opposites by asking how they are possible. It is an analysis or critique of the meaning of linguistic expressions by attending to their use or to the role that they play in human activities. Derrida begins by demonstrating that the supposedly inferior concept within each pair has the same defining characteristics as the allegedly superior one and that there is no ground for giving priority to one over the other. He then displaces the opposition by introducing an overarching concept that avoids having the fixity or determinateness that a concept normally possesses. To a limited extent, deconstruction is similar to Hegel’s procedure of following the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, although Derrida repeatedly emphasizes that deconstruction is not a scientific procedure. The term can be traced to Husserl’s Abbau [German, dismantling] and Heidegger’s destruction of the history of ontology. Some commentators compare deconstruction to Kant’s critique of reason. Both Kant and Derrida are concerned with the possibility of metaphysics and the possibility of objectivity discoverable by reason. Deconstruction is not purely negative, but seeks to attain the ultimate foundation of concepts. In addition to its influence in philosophy, deconstruction has had a great impact on literary criticism. “All sentences of the type ‘deconstruction is x’ or ‘deconstruction is not x’, a priori, miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false. As you know, one of the principal things at stake in what is called in my texts ‘deconstruction’, is precisely the delimiting of ontology and above all of the third-person present indicative: ‘S is P’.” Derrida, in Wood (ed.), Derrida and Difference DE SENSU – OBLIQUE -- de dicto: The distinction between de dicto and de re (about a thing) propositions gained currency with St Thomas Aquinas. De dicto propositions predicate certain terms of a subject-predicate proposition as a whole, thus forming a second-order statement. De re propositions predicate certain terms of a subject. This distinction has a wide application, but is particularly important in the analysis of modal propositions, that is, propositions concerning necessity and possibility. De dicto modality concerns the ascription of “necessary” or “possible” to a proposition, for example, “it is possible that Socrates is running.” De re modality concerns the ascription of these modal terms to a subject or object, such as, “Socrates is possibly running.” A de dicto interpretation and a de re interpretation will result in different truth-values for a proposition. Controversy over the distinction has revived with the renewal of interest in modal logic and essentialism. “These terms are often explained by saying that in a modality de dicto necessity (or possibility) is attributed to a proposition (or dictum), but that in a modality de re it is attributed to the possession of a property by a thing (res).” Hughes and Cresswell, An Introduction to Modal Logic. de dicto belief, another term for belief de dicto deduction Logic [from Latin de, away, from + ducere, lead, draw] An inference which proceeds from a more general to the less general, or from the necessary to the contingent. It contrasts with induction, which is an inference proceeding from the particular or less general to the more general. A conclusion derived deductively is the logical consequence of the premises; hence deduction is also a process of making explicit the logical implications of general statements. A deduction is valid if it is impossible that all the premises are true while the conclusion is false. Deductive logic reveals the inferential relationship of entailment existing between premises and conclusions and codifies the rules of deduction. A deductive system that has been viewed as the paradigm of scientific knowledge is one in which all other rules can be deduced from a small set of axioms or theorems. In jurisprudence, deduction means the establishing of a legal rather than factual ground for an action. It is this meaning that Kant borrows in his transcendental deduction. “In deduction, a proposition is proved to hold concerning every member of a class, and may then be asserted of a particular member.” Russell, The Principles of Mathematics DEDUCTUM. deduction (Kant) Philosophical method, epistemology, metaphysics Deduction is normally used in a logical or geometrical sense for the derivation of a conclusion from premises, but Kant adopted a different use from the practice of jurists. The law distinguishes between the question of right (quid juris) and the question of fact (quid facti). Both these questions need to be proved. While questions of fact are proved through experience, the proof of questions of right is called deduction. In this sense, a deduction is a proof of the legitimacy of something. In his critical philosophy, Kant set out various a priori intuitions and concepts, but argued that he needed to provide justification and explanation of how they can be validly applied to objects. This procedure is what he called deduction. He further distinguished three types of deduction: metaphysical deduction, which is the argument that derives the categories from the twelve forms of judgment; empirical deduction, which shows the legitimacy of applying an empirical concept in terms of our experience of empirical objects; and transcendental deduction, which is carried out by a transcendental argument. The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason. “Now among the manifold concepts which form the highly complicated web of human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. deductive logic Logic Deductive logic analyzes the logical concepts related to deduction and classifies propositions in terms of their logical forms. It seeks to formulate logic explicitly by analyzing the logical forms of arguments and the relationship of valid entailment in deductive argument in order to reveal the forms of argument in which the conclusion is necessarily inferred from the premises. A proposition that implies a false conclusion cannot be true. An argument is valid if premises and the negation of the conclusion involve a self-contradiction. “The task of deductive logic is often defined as the explicit formulation of the implicitly recognised rules of deductive inference.” Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy. deductive-nomological model Philosophy of science A theory of explanation developed by Hempel. On this model, an event is explained by logically deducing the sentence describing it from a law-like generalization and a statement of certain initial conditions. The law-like generalizations are called nomological generalizations or covering laws. This model of explanation, abbreviated as the D-N model, can also apply to the covering laws themselves. A covering law can be explained by deducing it from a higher-order covering law or body of laws. The D-N model is a sub-model of the covering law model, with the inductive-statistical model considered to be another sub-model. Because it is the variant of greatest importance and most frequent employment, the deductive-nomological model is often taken as synonymous with the covering law model. “The general conception of explanation by deductive subsumption under general laws or theoretical principles . . . will be called the deductive nomological model, or the D-N model of explanation.” Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation deep structure Philosophy of language The distinction between deep structure and surface structure is one of the most influential and significant features of Chomsky’s theory of language. Deep structure is actually the abstract features of grammatical structure. It has some affinity with the logical structure of sentences and is closely associated with meaning. For Chomsky, deep and surface structure do not distinguish between profound and superficial linguistic features, but between what is abstract and what is concrete in language. Surface structure is present in the sensory or observational characterization of an utterance and is closely associated with the phonetic structure of the spoken language. This structure, according to Chomsky, cannot reveal the ambiguity of a sentence. In some cases, two sentences may mean the same but differ in their surface structures; in other cases, two sentences may have the same surface structure but differ in their syntax. Since surface structure is a poor guide to the meaning of a sentence, we need to postulate the existence of deep structure, that is, the underlying abstract structure that determines the semantic interpretation of a sentence. Deep structure does not cause surface structure. They are generally distinct, but in some cases they may coincide. However, Chomsky does not say how we can detect or identify deep structure. There has been much debate about this notion amongst linguists. Historically this distinction can be traced to von Humboldt’s notions of inner form and outer form, and Wittgenstein’s distinction of surface grammar and deep grammar in his Philosophical Investigations, although the latter distinction is only concerned with the use of a word. “The syntactic component of a grammar must specify, for each sentence, a deep structure that determines its semantic interpretation and a surface structure that determines its phonetic interpretation. The first of these is interpreted by the semantic component; the second by the phonological component.” Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax H. L. A. Hart’s defeasibility Ethics, philosophy of law, epistemology A term for the liability of certain legal or moral principles and rules to be overridden in appropriate circumstances. In the face of Gettier’s problem, which challenges the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, a defeasibility theory of knowledge has also developed. This theory maintains that for a belief to count as knowledge, it is necessary, but not sufficient, for it to be true and justified. Because a currently justified belief might be defeated in the face of new evidence, the belief is defeasible, and its justification is merely prima facie justification. New evidence that overcomes justified belief can be called a defeater. It renders doubtful the connection between the belief and the original justification. Epistemologists argue whether we should define knowledge as undefeated justified true belief. A defeasible knowledge claim can be made confidently, but should recognize the possibility in principle that further evidence could give reason to withdraw the claim. A concept can also be defeasible. The standard criteria for the correct application of a defeasible concept allow for that application to be retracted in the light of further evidence. Verification of claims using defeasible concepts is never conclusive and is always open to the possibility of revision. “The notion of defeasibility was first introduced in moral philosophy where it was applied to concepts such as duty, obligation, and responsibility. Such concepts were said to be defeasible in that their applicability could be negated or overridden by one or other of a set of circumstances.” O’Connor and Carr, Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge DEFINITUM -- definiendum, see definition definiens, see definition definist fallacy Logic Frankena’s term for the mistake of defining one predicate by means of another predicate which cannot properly define it. This is the fallacy of identifying two distinct properties. He regards Moore’s “naturalistic fallacy” – the practice that attempts to define general ethical terms such as “good” in terms of some supposedly identical natural property – as a species of definist fallacy. In logic, “definist fallacy” refers more generally to a tactic in argument that defines a term in a way favorable to one’s position, and then insists that the debate should continue on that basis. For example, an anti-abortion activist insists on defining a fetus as a person, and turns the debate about the morality of abortion into a debate about the morality of killing a person. Sometimes “definist fallacy” also refers to an attitude that requires that a term must be defined before it can be employed. “The definist fallacy is the process of confusing or identifying two properties, of defining one property by another, or of substituting one property for another.” Frankena, “Naturalist Fallacy,” Mind XLVIII -- definite description Logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics An expression that picks out something as the sole individual having a certain set of properties and has the form “the so-and-so.” In contrast, an indefinite or ambiguous description is an expression that may apply to many different objects and has the form “a so-and-so.” A definite description is not a name, but a complex symbol such as “The author of Waverley.” Russell’s theory of definite descriptions provides a classic analysis of definite descriptions. A proposition containing definite descriptions can be analyzed into three parts: an existence condition, a uniqueness condition, and a predication. A proposition “the F is G” can be presented as “there is one and only F and it is G.” In such a case, a definite description is analyzed through a contextual definition. Russell held that his theory can solve a number of semantic problems about the apparent reference to non-existents, as with the expression “the present King of France.” It removes the burden of finding objects to which these expressions seem to refer and was seen as the central paradigm of analytic philosophy. But Russell’s analysis was criticized by Peter Strawson for failing to distinguish between sentences and the statements made by the speaker in uttering the sentences. “I want you to realize that the question whether a phrase is a definite description turns only upon its form, not upon the question whether there is a definite individual so described.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge Richard Robinson’s Definition Logic [from Latin definire, limit; equivalent to Greek horismos or horos, boundary or setting a boundary] The use of an expression (Latin definiens, the part of the definition which does the defining) to clarify the meaning of some other expression (Latin definiendum, the word or expression which is to be defined). In Greek philosophy the canonical form of definition gives the essence or species of something by stating its genus and the differentia of the genus, thus marking off the defined species from other species of same genus. To define “man,” for example, we say that it is a rational (differentia) animal (genus). Definition increases information and prevents ambiguity and is essential for various kinds of intellectual investigation, but its nature and status are themselves a topic of philosophical debate. While essentialists like Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Husserl hold that essential definitions reveal the essence of what is defined, nominalists or prescriptivists like Hobbes, Russell, Quine, and Carnap reject the notions of essence and real definition and hold that nominal or verbal definitions are only a matter of symbolic convention, and that the definiendum is just a word and not a concept as understood by realists. Further common types of definition are: (1) lexical or reportive definitions, which clarify the meaning of an already existing term; (2) stipulative definitions, which show how an author intends to use a term; (3) functional definitions, which define something by showing what functions it performs; (4) extensional or denotative definitions, which provide a list of members to which the definiens can be correctly applied; and (5) intensional or connotative definitions, which reveal the common property shared by all things to which the definiens can be applied, although many terms lack a common property and instead have patterns of likeness which link the items to which they can be applied. In addition, there are other types of definition that are philosophically useful, such as contextual definitions, recursive definitions, inductive definitions, ostensive definitions, and persuasive definitions. “A definition is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence.” Aristotle, Topics definition by genus and difference Logic [from Latin genus et differentia] The most generally applicable form of intensional definition, which conveys the meaning of a term by picking out the genus or larger class to which it belongs and the difference or attribute which distinguishes it from the other members of its genus. Hence what is achieved is a genus qualified by a specific difference. For instance, “man” is defined by “the rational” (the difference) and “animal” (the genus). “A definition by genus and difference assigns a meaning to a term by identifying a genus term and one or more difference words that, when combined, convey the meaning of the term being defined.” Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic definition in use, another term for contextual definition deflationary theory of truth, see truth GRADUS. degree of belief Logic, epistemology, philosophy of science The central notion of an account holding that belief comes in degrees rather than being a simple matter of “yes” or “no.” That we have different degrees of subjective confidence in our beliefs is a basic tenet of Bayesianism, which argues that the subjective probability or degree of belief of propositions can be altered by new evidence, according to a procedure recommended by Bayes’s theorem. Beliefs can be compared in the sense that the degree of belief or subjective probability of one belief is greater than another. Degrees of belief can be analyzed in terms of the degree of belief with which a belief is actually held or of the degree of belief with which it rationally should be held. Bayesian theory allows purely subjective initial assignments of degrees of belief, but applies rational discipline to the alteration of beliefs in light of new evidence, with the expectation that there will be convergence in the degrees of belief assigned to beliefs by different investigators. For personalists such as Ramsey and de Finetti, the consistent degrees of beliefs must conform to the rules of probability calculus. This notion implies a perspective from which we may quantify beliefs and suggests a possible approach to a rigorous science of behavior. “The degree of belief that a person S has in the sentence P is a numerical measure of S’s confidence in the truth of P, and is manifested in the choices S makes among bets, actions, etc.” Garber, “Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. X -- degree of confirmation Logic, philosophy of science A term introduced by Carnap. If one knows what observations would be relevant to the truth or falsity of a statement, the statement is said to be confirmable. How much evidence, then, is required for one to say that the statement is actually confirmed? The degree of confirmation is the measure by which generalized statements may be ranked in order of acceptability. It is a quantitative concept of confirmation and of probability. If we take h to be a statement, e to be evidence, q to be a real number between 0 and 1, and c to be a symbol for degree of confirmation, then c(h.e) = q or the degree of confirmation of h with respect to e is q. “Given certain observations e and a hypothesis h (in the form, say, of a prediction or even of a set of laws), then I believe it is in many cases possible to determine, by mechanical procedures, the logical probability, or degree of confirmation, of h on the basis of e.” Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics deism Philosophy of religion [from Latin deus, god] A doctrine of natural, as distinct from revealed, religion claiming that reason assures us that God exits, but that the mode of divine existence is absolute and transcendent. This account denies all of God’s mystical relations to the world and human affairs. Divine revelations, dogma, and religious superstitions should also be excluded as fictions. Once God set the universe in motion, he intervened no more and left it to its own laws, just as a watch maker leaves a watch which has been set in motion. Although both theism and deism are associated with belief in the existence of God, deism is less orthodox than theism. The idea of deism can be traced to Aristotle’s notion of a prime mover, but in Christianity the term was first used by the Calvinists during the latter part of the sixteenth century, and developed over the following two centuries. Deism was a reaction against the attempt of medieval theology to subordinate philosophy to theology, and represented an attempt to place religion within the framework of reason. Voltaire, Locke, and Kant all took a deistic position. In modern times, deism has led to anti-authoritarian political and social positions and has promoted a growth of the spirit of tolerance. “Deism . . . uses the word ‘God’ . . . to refer to the great force who initially caused the universe to function but who has since that time withdrawn from any active participation or ‘interference’ with his artefact.” Ferré, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion Deleuze, Gilles (1925–95) French post-structuralist philosopher, taught at University of Paris VIII (Vincennes). Deleuze approached philosophical questions through culture, art, literature, and psychology, with a focus on desire, difference, and liberation. His account of language and thought centered on desire and the irrational. His main works include Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962), Difference and Repetition (1968), and The Logic of Sense (1969). DELIBERATUM. deliberation Ethics, philosophy of action [Greek bouleusis, a prerequisite of prohairesis, decision] Aristotle discussed deliberation in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book 3, Ch. 3. The objects of deliberation are the things that can be calculated with probability and can be brought about by our efforts. Starting from an assumed end, that is, an accepted object of desire or wish, deliberation analyzes the ways and means by which the end can be achieved, and terminates in a rational choice and appropriate action. In Greek “means to the end” are things related to a goal, and the term is broader than the modern conception of instrumental means to an end. Deliberation, which enables a person to know what he must do if he is to achieve his objective, is a major feature in Aristotle’s ethics and in contemporary virtue ethics. “We deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes ends.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics demarcation, criterion of Philosophy of science Popper maintained that the demarcation problem, that is, the problem of distinguishing genuine scientific theories from pseudo-scientific theories, is one of the most fundamental problems for the philosophy of science. To deal with this problem, it is crucial to establish a criterion of demarcation. Popper proposed falsifiability as the criterion. Unless scientists state the conditions under which their theories can be refuted, their theories belong to pseudo-science. For Popper, the problem of demarcation is precisely the problem of scientific rationality and his criterion of demarcation determines the logic of scientific discovery and the definition of science. Critics argue that some pseudoscientific claims satisfy the criterion and are indeed falsified, but that their proponents ignore their refutation. On this view, the demarcation becomes a matter of scientific integrity rather than a formal test of falsifiability. Lakatos argued that all theories from their inception are surrounded by falsifying instances. For this reason, demarcation cannot be sharply drawn in terms of falsification, and scientific rationality involves pursuing potentially fruitful theories. Others argue that scientific theories have histories and that only at some stages is the question of falsifiability appropriate. On this view, the question of demarcation is dealt with historically. “. . . I tentatively introduced the idea of the falsifiability (or testability or refutability) of a theory as a criterion of demarcation.” Popper, in The Philosophy of Karl Popper Demiurge Ancient Greek philosophy In Plato’s Timaeus, the divine craftsman, who made the lower gods, the soul of the universe, and the immortal part of the human soul. The lower gods in turn made all physical things. In creating, the Demiurge uses the Forms or Ideas as his model, works on given existing or material elements, and must persuade necessity to cooperate in order to finish the job ideally well. Although the idea of the Demiurge had great influence on Christianity, the Demiurge is thus not identical with the biblical Creator. For Plato, it is a literary device to symbolize the rational element in the world order. “The work of the Demiurge, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect.” Plato, Timaeus democracy Political philosophy [from Greek demos, people + kratia, mighty, powerful, literally, rule by the people] A form of government, traditionally contrasted to aristocracy (rule by the best), oligarchy (rule by the few), and monarchy (rule by the one). Ideally, democracy requires all citizens to join in making governmental decisions, but such pure democracy, excluding women and slaves, was only practiced for a short period in ancient Athens. The standard democratic form is representative democracy, that is, rule by a group of representatives who are elected for limited periods directly or indirectly by the people. A representative democracy governs through discussion and persuasion rather than by force. Decisions are generally made by majority vote in order that policies will reflect at least to some degree the will or interests of the people. In order to prevent the over-concentration of power, the main legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government are separated. The values and principles underlying this form of government are liberty and equality, sometimes called the democratic ideals. According to the principle of liberty, individuals should make decisions for themselves, rather than allowing decisions to be made on their behalf and imposed on them. The principle of equality requires all citizens to have an equal right to select those holding governmental office and to stand for office themselves. The active role of citizens in a democracy underlies the recognition of certain rights and liberties that shape their personality outside political life and ground the rule of law. Among these rights are the freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and protection against arbitrary arrest. It is widely believed, especially by members of Western societies and by contemporary political theorists, that representative democracy can secure a maximum of freedom and rights for citizens and a minimum of the abuse of political power. Nonetheless, there are difficulties in maintaining an authentic democratic system in the face of the overwhelming influence of wealth and power, indifference, ideological fixations, mutual hatred, and corruption. Rousseau’s democratic theory has clearly totalitarian aspects, and J. S. Mill recognized that the rights of a minority in a democracy could be violated by the majority. Part of the theory of democracy deals with the transition from lesser to greater democracy and with determining the institutional contexts in which democracy can function with stability and effectiveness. “The sovereign may put the government in the hands of the whole people, or of the greater part of the people, so that there are more citizensmagistrates than there are ordinary private citizens. This form of government is known as democracy.” Rousseau, The Social Contract Democritus (c.460–370 bc) Greek philosopher, born in Abdera. Together with his teacher Leucippus, Democritus founded ancient atomism, holding that the ultimate constituents of the universe are atoms, literally “indivisible things” or “things that could not be further divided.” Atoms are real beings that are unlimited in number. They move about in the void (also called “the nothing” or “not being”). Changes among atoms are causally determined. Souls are composed of fine atoms and are not immortal. Only atoms and the void are real, although we recognize other things as a matter of convention. Democritus was said to have written many books, but only a few fragments on ethics survive. His ethics was based on his conception of eudaimonia.