IMPLICATION
ENGLISH entailment,
implicature
FRENCH implication
GERMAN
nachsichziehen,
zurfolgehaben,
Folge(-rung),
Schluß,
Konsequenz,
Implikation,
Implikatur
GREEK”
sumpeplegmenon
[συμπεπλεγμένον] “sum-peplegmenon”
sumperasma [συμπέϱασμα] “sum-perasma”
sunêmmenon [συνημμένον], “sunemmenon,”
akolouthia [ἀϰολουθία], “akolouthia,”
antakolouthia [ἀνταϰολουθία],
“ana-kolouthia.”
LATIN
illatio– from ‘in-fero.’
The Romans adopted two different roots for this, and saw them as having the
same ‘sense’ – cf. referro, relatum, proferro, prolatum
inferentia – in-fero.
consequentia, --
con-sequentia. The seq- root is present in ‘sequitur,’ non sequitur. The ‘con-‘
is transliterating Greek ‘syn-’ in the three expressions with ‘syn’:
sympleplegmenon, symperasma, and synemmenon. The Germans, avoiding the
Latinate, have a ‘follow’ root: in “Folge,” “Folgerung,” and the verb “zur-folge-haben.
and perhaps ‘implicatio,’
which is the root Grice is playing with.
In Italian and French it underwent changes, making ‘to imply’ a doublet with Grice’s
‘to implicate’ (the form already present, “She was implicated in the crime.”).
The strict opposite is ‘ex-plicatio,’ as in ‘explicate.’ ‘implico’ gives both ‘implicatum’
and ‘implicitum.’ Consequently, ‘explico’ gives both ‘explicatum’ and ‘explicitum.’
In English Grice often uses ‘impicit,’ and ‘explicit,’ as they relate to
communication, as his ‘implicatum’ does. His ‘implicatum’ has more to do with
the contrast with what is ‘explicit’ than with ‘what follows’ from a premise.
Although in his formulation, both readings are valid: “by uttering x,
implicitly conveying that q, the emissor CONVERSATIONALY implicates that p’ if
he has explicitly conveyed that p, and ‘q’ is what is required to ‘rationalise’
his conversational behavioiur. In terms of the emissor, the distinction is
between what the emissor has explicitly conveyed and what he has
conversationally implicated. This in turn contrasts what some philosophers
refer metabolically as an ‘expression,’ the ‘x’ ‘implying’ that p – Grice does
not bother with this because, as Strawson and Wiggins point out, while an
emissor cannot be true, it’s only what he has either explicitly or implicitly
conveyed that can be true.
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