H. P. Grice's Dispositum

DISPOSITUM. dispositional property Metaphysics, philosophy of science Properties of material things have, since Locke, been traditionally divided into primary and secondary qualities. Recent philosophers further divide primary qualities into substantial and dispositional properties. A dispositional property is the capacity of an object to affect or to be affected by other things. An active capacity of a thing to affect others is also called a power. For instance, falling down is a dispositional property of a thing that has weight, and being poisonous is a dispositional property of arsenic. Dispositional properties are analyzable into nothing but dispositions, and hence they can be distinguished from substantial properties, which are independent particulars. Substantial properties might provide a basis for dispositional properties, but some philosophers hold that all properties are dispositional. “It is a dispositional property of a paper that it will burn.” Joske, Material Objects dispositions Logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind [from Latin dis, away + ponere, place] The tendency, habit, ability, or proneness to act or react in a certain way in certain circumstances. It is not an entity, a state of affairs, or an instance of behavior, but a behavioral pattern. One will display this pattern through a number of instances of behavior. To attribute a disposition to X is to say that X is prone to do Y in circumstance C. Sentences embodying dispositional claims are always hypothetical in form: “If circumstance C occurs, then X will do Y.” The term “disposition” is prominent in Ryle’s philosophy of mind, for his strategy is to replace the Cartesian mental substance and its activities with behavioral dispositions. He claims that the Cartesian concept of mind commits a category mistake, for it takes the mind to be one sort of ontological category, substance, when in fact the mental belongs to the category of disposition. He analyzes the majority of mental states in terms of dispositions. Since Descartes does not think of the mind as a disposition, any dispositional account of the mind is incompatible with Cartesian dualism. However, there are various views about dispositions. For Ryle, a disposition does not involve any hidden internal cause and is simply manifested in the circumstances specified. Armstrong, on the other hand, argues that dispositions are derivative and that their existence requires the prior existence of an underlying state of affairs. He attempts to identify dispositions with their bases. Others think that dispositions have categorical bases, but are not identical with them. “To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realised. The same is true about specifically human dispositions such as qualities of character.” Ryle, The Concept of Mind