H. P. Grice, "Metaphysical Wisdom"

--- I THINK IT WAS A GEM TO FIND THIS ref. to Grice in P. Edwards's entry for "metaphysics" (actually by Hamlyn) in the monumental Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The thing I have discussed elsewhere, but it is NOT included in "The publications of H. P. Grice" in the PGRICE festschrift. And only very seldom if at all quoted in the literature. Some excerpts will follow as I browse the thing safely deposited in the Swimming-Pool Library: Grice (and Pears and Strawson write): The thing is pretty elementary, but still, no reason why not to mention in a list. They write: "The name of the [thing] is the name given to a treatise by Aristotle". p. 1. -- The essay occupies p. 1-20 in the Pears compilation. This was the famous "Third Programmes" of Aunt Beeb. "Aristotle described the subject of this treatise as the science of Being as such, a supremely general study of existence or reality." Grice goes on to quote directly from Bradley. The passage by Bradley is on p. 2 of Grice's article and runs: We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply peacemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole. Of course, it may well be that it was Pears that brought the passage to Grice's mind. Most likely. Recall that these Third programmes were organised by Pears (who died last year) -- he also edited the "Freedom of the Will" one, and thus felt the responsibility of checking with some of the sources to really please Aunt Beebe. The editorial by Grice et al goes: "This agrees with Aristotle in contrasting metaphysics with departamental or, as Bradley would say, fragmentary studies." (p. 2). Recall that this was BEFORE Strawson had published "Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics". ---- Grice et al go on to quote from that seldom quoted (now) philosopher, John Wisdom -- the cousin of John Wisdom: But they typically being Oxonians, hasten to add: "In any case, the relation of Wisdom's to Bradley's account on the matter is NOT obvious", p. 3. They do manage to find a connection: "The attempt to secure that comprehensivenes which Bradley finds characteristic of his enquiry leads often enough to those shifts of view expressible in paradox, which Wisdom finds characteristically metaphysical" (p. 4). ---- They go on to discuss Kant. And find him on the right track: "Whatever the shortcomings of Kant's doctrine, it at least gives a clear meaning to saying that metaphysics is concerned with the presuppositions of science and not merely its most general part" (p. 8). But they find refuge again in Oxford: especially in COLLINGWOOD as rectifying Kant's mistake. For Grice et al write: "This was in fact Collingwood's idea of the nature of metaphysics: the metaphysician exposed the presuppositions of the science of a particular epoch". This was of course before Kuhn! (Collingwood was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford just before Ryle). --- THIS WILL HAVE TO be, I hope, in "The Carnap/Grice Conversations" -- project with R. B. Jones: Carnap explicitly cited on p. 8: "This line of thought about metaphysics is NOT peculiar to a relatively traditional thinker like Collingwood. There is at least some analogy between his views and those, for example, of CARNAP, who was once a member of the philosophically radical Vienna Circle" --- although apparently he was never there when one wanted him! Recall Quine writing to his mother, "Have just arrived to Vienna to see Carnap. Of course he isn't here. I'm goin to Poland tomorrow to see if I can spot him there." -- Etc. ---Grice et al continue: "Carnap draws a SHARP distinction between questions which arise within [emphasis Grice's et al.] a given system of concepts, or framework of ideas," --- cfr. Carnapian Jones's reply to Restall in "Carnap Corner" and "linguistic framework" -- "and questions which are sometimes raised about [again, emphasis Grice's et al's] that framework or system." This is the semantic/pragmatic distinction, alla Carnap. Grice et al write: "Questions of the FIRST sort belong to the field of some science or of everyday life, and are answered by the methods appropriate to those fields" -- they had been discussing the Kinetic Theory of Gases. "Questions of the LATTER sort have traditionally appeared in metaphysics in the MISLEADING form of questions about the reality of existence of some very general class of entities corresponding to the fundamental dieas of the system of the concepts in question". They had been analysing the transcendental justification of Kant in a previous passage. They go on: "Thus philosophers have asked whether there really [emphasis mine. JLS] existed such things as numbers, whether the space-time points of physics were real, and so on." --- I.e. Kant's points, sort of. "But such questions can be significantly understood ONLY as raising the practical [emphasis Grice's et al. cfr. 'pragmatic'] issue of whether or not to embrace and use a given conceptual scheme or framework of ideas." --- the external questions of Carnap. "To answer affirmatively, according to Carnap, is simply to ADOPT such a framework for use, and hence to give shape or direction to a whole field of inquiry". --- But isn't there a drawback to this? Grice et al suggest: "Carnap's view of the matter might seem to make it mysterious that there should be such things as metaphysical ASSERTIONS, as opposed to metaphysical DECISIONS." Good point about illocutionary force, as it were. Recall that Grice's unfinished book project by the year of his death, was "From Genesis to Revelations: a new discoruse on metaphysics". Grice et al go on: "The mystery could be solved in principle by regarding metaphysicians as engaged in a kind of propaganda on behalf of some conceptual scheme," --- I like the idea of a pro-slogan, emotivist in kind. They go on: "the acceptance of which is obscurely felt to be a presupposition of the development of science in a particular decision. Like all forms of propaganda, conceptual or metaphysical PROPAGANDA is liable to involve distortion or exaggeration". Or excecrescences? Grice et al continue to mention Carnap explicitly: "As Carnap's remarks suggest, one form which conceptual advocacy is liable to take is the entering of a strong claim for the status of reality on behalf of some general class of entities, together with a disposition to DENY this status to other, less favoured things." Foreshadow against which Grice's Ontological Marxism is invoked. The essay goes on to quote from Hegel and Marx. There is some extended treatment of Descartes and Leibniz. Then it invokes a different 'spring' for metaphysical thought, and goes on to discuss Hume, whom they have cited before in connection with the idealism that will lead to Berkeley. The essay finishes with a general characterisation of metaphysics as essentially revisionary. A good piece, on the whole, and one in which one READS Grice, as often, as DELIVERING the message in the oral medium: as a speaker. Not so much the tutor, this time, but the philospher of Oxford vintage aiming at the general audience. Etc.