H. P. Grice, "Meta-ethical implicatures"

Grice’s META-ETHICS. ethical individualism Ethics The position that only individual persons are the subject of moral predicates and values and are the central concern of moral concern. On this view, the choice of moral values is up to the individual, and the individual should be the final authority and arbiter of morality. This position is implied by the suggestion of Hume’s fact–value dichotomy that moral evaluations are not constrained by factual descriptions of the world. Ethical individualism became prominent in the nineteenth century through the criticism of Christianity as a basis for morality in the works of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. In the twentieth century, it was represented by existentialism, which holds that the individual is the only legislator of his or her morality, and by emotivism and prescriptivism, which claim that morality is nothing more than the expression of personal attitudes. “According to this doctrine [of ethical individualism], the source of morality, of moral values and principles, the creator of the very concern of moral evaluation, is the individual.” Lukes, Individualism ethical knowledge Ethics, epistemology Also called moral knowledge. Knowledge of moral truths or principles from which moral prescriptions can be derived, but it is a matter of dispute whether there is such a kind of knowledge. Ethical relativism, skepticism, and nihilism reject the existence of moral knowledge by denying that there are moral facts or moral truths to be known. Non-objective moral theorists hold that moral language expresses only sentiments, approval or disapproval or other emotional attitudes, without involving truths. They claim that ethical problems are in principle insoluble and that ethical statements are incapable of being true or false. Other philosophers insist on the existence of moral knowledge, but must explain how we can recognize a complete and correct set of rules for human conduct. Some philosophers suggest that general moral rules can be derived from reason, according to Kantian ethical rationalism, or by intuition, according to ethical intuitionism. Other moralists argue that we may start from particular moral facts and move up to wider principles, as in Ross’s intuitive induction and the common sense theory. Another problem is how to justify a moral belief or how to change moral belief into knowledge. Many disputes arise from using both foundationalism and coherentism to justify moral views. The attempts to support the possibility of moral knowledge by showing how we can establish and justify moral truths provide the content of moral epistemology. “In the last decade or two serious doubts about the very possibility of ethical knowledge have become widespread.” Baylis, Ethics ethical life Ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law [German Sittlichkeit, also called ethical order or ethical principles] For Hegel, the system of recognized ethical norms and principles of a culture and society, which constitutes a communal end for all of its members and which all members recognize and accept. Individuals can guarantee their freedom and happiness by conforming to this system of ethical norms. It is not purely transcendent and is not merely a social substance of which individuals are accidents. Hegel’s paradigm of ethical life in this sense is Greek culture. The concept of ethical life is distinguished from Moralität, which for Hegel is typified by Kantian ethics and concerns the individual and private morality of the modern bourgeoisie, who are alienated from public life. In Sittlichkeit, one’s duty is derived from one’s relations to the concrete social order. It is the morality of a social order whose rational institutions and laws provide the content of conscientious conviction. In ethical life, moral sense and social sense are unified. Hegel claims that in Moralität they are severed, for in this abstract morality one’s duty is derived from one’s own abstract moral reflection and not from relations to a concrete social order. Thus, the distinction between Sittlichkeit and Moralität reflects the difference between Hegel’s ethics and Kant’s ethics. In modern society, ethical life is characterized by civil society. “Ethical life is the idea of freedom in that on the one hand it is the good become alive – the good endowed in self-consciousness with knowing and willing and actualised by self-conscious action – while on the other hand self-consciousness has in the ethical realm its absolute foundation and the end which actuates its effort.” Hegel, Philosophy of Right -- ethical naturalism, see naturalistic ethics -- ethical objectivism: In contrast to ethical subjectivism, skepticism, and relativism, ethical objectivism or objectivistic ethics argues that ethical judgments are not about the speaker or solely about the speaker and holds that at least some ethical judgments are concerned with moral facts and can be rationally justified. They are true or false independent of subjective matters such as the speaker’s own feelings, desires, attitudes, and beliefs. Ethical objectivism has many versions. Ethical logicism claims that the truthvalue of ethical judgments can be determined by logical rules. Ethical intuitionism holds that ethical generalizations are obtained by insight. Moral sense theories hold that we can gain knowledge through the perception of the difference between right and wrong, just as we can gain knowledge through the perception of the difference between red and blue. Theological theories argue that God provides an objective criterion of what is right or wrong. Ethical naturalism holds that ethical judgments can be based on some scientific, empirical investigation of the natural or social world. According to Ideal Observer theories, ethical judgments are about what some ideal being would determine if such a being existed. The common difficulty for all forms of ethical objectivism is to justify the source of objectivity and hence the existence of objective moral values. “To be an (ethical) objectivist is to hold that whether something is or is not morally right is independent of the attitudes or inclinations of any particular speaker or set of speakers.” B. Mitchell, Morality: Religious and Secular -- ethical rationalism Ethics A term describing Kantian moral theory and its claim that moral judgments are purely rational and do not concern the emotions or the development of character. Ethical rationalism is a formal and universalist position. It is related to ethical cognitivism, which believes that morality has cognitive elements instead of being a matter of personal attitude and preference. “By ‘ethical rationalism’, by contrast, I mean a theoretical position which views moral judgements as the core of moral theory, and which neglects that the moral self is not a moral geometrician but is an embodied, finite, suffering and emotive being.” Benhabib, Situating the Self -- ethical relativism: the view that ethical terms and principles are relative to cultures, societies, and even persons. There are different ethical judgments about the same subject, and there is no decisive method of reasoning that can adjudicate between these conflicting judgments. Accordingly, there is no objective ethical truth. Moral principles are not valid universally, and can do no more than follow the conventions of the societies to which we belong. The position can be traced to the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras and has subsequently had various proponents. Ethical relativism may be used to justify moral toleration, but it has major theoretical difficulties. Its claim that all conflicting moral judgments have equal values is implausible. Furthermore, even if moral values are relative to societies, problems still arise. A given society may lack consistency in its principles. In addition, individuals may belong to different societies or other collective groups, such as families, communities, political parties, or nations, which may adhere to conflicting principles. “A Greek philosopher who lived in the fifth century bc, named Protagoras, seems to have believed two things: first, that moral principles cannot be shown to be valid for everybody; and second, that people ought to follow the conventions of their own group . . . Views roughly similar to those of Protagoras may be classified as forms of ethical relativism.” Brandt, Ethical Theory -- ethical subjectivism: In contrast to ethical objectivism, ethical subjectivism or subjective ethics claims that ethical judgments are about the speaker’s feelings concerning something rather than about independent moral facts. In calling an action right, speakers state that they approve of it. In calling an action wrong, speakers state that they disapprove of it. Consequently, there are no moral truths independent of our feelings. This kind of approach to moral philosophy is explicitly expressed by Hume, who argued that morality is a matter of feeling, not reason. Ethical subjectivism is right in emphasizing the connection in morality between the meaning of “good” and the pro-attitude of the speaker, but it also faces many difficulties. A person’s feelings are changeable, and different persons may have different feelings. Thus, subjectivism makes moral evaluation unstable and also makes moral disagreements insoluble. In the twentieth century, more refined versions of ethical subjectivism were introduced, such as Stevenson’s emotivism, Hare’s prescriptivism, and John Dewey’s theory that moral statements do not express one’s feelings per se, but rather express one’s feelings after thinking things through. In a further refinement, it is claimed that one should think as reasonably and impartially as possible. Subjectivism hence has developed into non-cognitivism or non-descriptivism. “The best course is therefore to retain the term ‘subjectivist’ for those who think that moral judgements state facts about the states of mind etc. of person, and use some new term (‘non-descriptivist’ is the most perspicuous) for those who don’t think that their central function is to state facts at all.” Hare, Essays in Ethical Theory -- ethical theory: used by Williams as a technical term, opposed to the distinction between ethics and metaethics. According to this distinction, ethics concerns what one should do and how one should live, while meta-ethics concerns the status of ethical claims. They are separable and meta-ethics may involve only the analysis of ethical terms without ethical implications. For Williams this distinction is untenable. An ethical theory should combine both parts, which are inherently not separable. The consideration of the subject-matter of ethics will affect the position about what tests for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles are appropriate, and this will in turn affect substantively ethical consequences. Ethical theory can be either positive or negative. A positive one believes that there is a general test for the acceptability of basic ethical principles, while a negative one thinks that holding an ethical position simply consists of choosing one and sticking to it. Williams himself takes a more complicated version of negative ethical theory, which argues that there may be tests in some cultural circumstances and not in others. He claims that his position implies a skepticism, not about ethics, but about what philosophy can do in determining how we should think in ethics. “An ethical theory is a theoretical account of what ethics thought and practice are, which account either implies a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles or else implies that there cannot be such a test.” B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy -- ethical virtue Ancient Greek philosophy, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action [from Greek ethike arete, also translated as moral virtue or excellence of character] According to Aristotle, the kind of virtue which belongs to the part of the soul that is not rational in itself but which obeys reason. In contrast, intellectual virtue is the virtue of the rational part of the soul. Ethical virtue is concerned with feelings and actions. It is a settled disposition of character willingly to do things admired by society in a regular way, and is acquired through constant practice that creates a habit of action. Aristotle held that ethical virtue is a mean between two opposite vices. The mean is relative to us, that is to say, it is to be determined by practical wisdom. Aristotle tried to bring all ethical virtues under the doctrine of the mean. Practical wisdom is itself an intellectual virtue, but according to Aristotle, it cannot be a full virtue without ethical virtues. He also held that ethical virtues cannot be full virtues without practical wisdom. “[Ethical] virtue is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, i.e. to the reason by reference to which the person of practical wisdom would define it.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics -- ethics, axiological, see axiology -- ethics, emotive theory of: an alternative expression for emotivism. -- ethics, intuitionistic: also called ethical intuitionism. One kind of objective ethical theory that has a long tradition in Britain. Its major proponents have included Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Bishop Butler, Reid, Sidgwick, Moore, Prichard, and Ross. In a general sense, it is a thesis concerning the epistemological status of moral statements and claims that ethical knowledge is known to be true by immediate awareness or necessary insight. This position is established mainly through the rejection of alternative positions. It argues against moral skepticism, which holds that there is no moral truth. It denies the practice of defining basic ethical terms such as “good” and “right” in terms of natural properties. It claims that the position that ethical generalization is a process of ratiocination involves an infinite regress or a vicious circle. Accordingly, fundamental moral judgments must be neither inductively nor deductively justified, and they must be self-evident. In a narrow sense, ethical intuitionism is the view that we can immediately know that certain actions are morally right or wrong without consideration of their consequences. Ethical intuitionism is also called non-naturalism in the sense that it is opposed to the claim of naturalism, that we know the truth or falsity of ethical statements by experience. However, since both intuitionism and naturalism claim that there is ethical knowledge, both are types of moral cognitivism and are opposed to non-cognitivism. It is sometimes associated with ethical pluralism, which holds that there is more than one non-reducible moral principle. Rawls sees this as allowing unacceptable indeterminacy in ethics, but others embrace the flexibility such pluralism provides. The difficulty of intuitionistic ethics is that there are no criteria for checking the validity of our intuitions, and for solving the conflicts between intuitions. “The intuitional view of ethics consists in the supposition that certain rules, stating that certain actions are always to be done or to be omitted, may be taken as self-evident premises.” G. Moore, Principia Ethica -- ethics, normative Ethics A type of ethics, usually contrasted with meta-ethics. Its central concern is not with moral concepts or moral methods, but with substantive moral questions. Its basic aim is to determine what the moral principles are by which all moral agents ought to be guided for morally right actions, and thus to provide ways of resolving existing ethical disagreements. Normative ethics is usually divided into two parts. One is called consequentialism, which claims that actions are not right or wrong in themselves, but are morally determined by the good or evil consequences they cause. The right action is that which brings about the best possible balance of good over evil consequences. Consequentialist normative ethics includes ethical egoism, contractarianism, ethical altruism, and utilitarianism. It is also called teleological ethics. The other part of normative ethics is called non-consequentialist or non-teleological ethics, for it holds that moral right and wrong are not determined, or at least are not solely determined, by appeal to the consequences of actions. Another name for this view is deontology [from Greek deon, duty], since it takes duty to have prior and independent value. The distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics appeared in the early to middle part of the twentieth century, but has recently come to be less favored, for a clearcut distinction between these two types of ethics is very difficult to determine. Many ethical questions are both meta-ethical and normative. “We may reasonably ask about ethical statements, ‘Which ethical statements are true or valid?’ and ‘Why?’. A person’s answer to these questions may be called his ‘normative ethical theory’.” Brandt, Ethical Theory -- ethics and morality Ethics Ethics in Greek is êthikos, literally meaning something concerned with êthos (Greek, character), which in turn is connected with ethos (social custom, habit). Cicero employed the Latin moralis to translate the Greek êthikos. Moralis literally means something concerned with mores (Latin, character, manner, custom, and habit). Hence, etymologically ethics and morality mean the same thing. Both ethics and morality can refer to social regulations that are embedded in cultural and historical traditions governing people’s character and behavior. Different societies have different moralities and the same society can have different morality at different times or conflicting moralities at the same time, but the overriding purpose of all moralities is to preserve social harmony. -- ethics of care Both ethics and morality also refer to a branch of philosophy that studies these social regulations, to answer the questions “How should a person live?” or “How should a person act?” In this usage, ethics is also called ethical theory, and morality is called moral philosophy or moral theory. This study can be further divided into meta-ethics, that is, the study of moral language and central moral terms such as right, duty, obligation, virtue, value, and freedom; normative ethics, the establishment of moral principles and rules which people should follow; and applied ethics, the application of moral rules to solve practical issues arising in various social areas. Starting from the middle of the twentieth century, there has been a tendency to distinguish ethics from morality. Morality (and therefore moral theory) is confined to the scope of modern ethical theories such as utilitarianism and deontology, which try not only to incorporate diverse rules into a coherent system, but also to set up certain universal rules applicable to all societies. It is closely associated with the emphasis of duty or obligation, a strict demand of responsibility, and an impartial concern for the non-instrumental goods of others. On the other hand, ethics is used to cover, in addition, the Aristotelian approach of emphasizing the formation of virtues in the agent rather than his actions, and is concerned with the happiness of agents rather than their duty or obligation. Such a distinction between ethics and morality is associated with the rise of contemporary virtue ethics and of the anti-theory movement. The value of the distinction is still in dispute. “From now on, therefore, I shall for the most part use ‘ethical’ as the broad term to stand for what this subject is certainly about, and ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ for the narrower system.” B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy -- ethics of belief Epistemology The study of what we ought to believe, what we have a right to believe, or how we can know that what we believe is certain. As ethics seeks to evaluate ethical behavior, ethics of belief seeks to determine rules for the evaluation of doxastic states. It is called ethics of belief because what we ought to believe is not a private matter, but is a public concern with social consequences, and is hence a matter of morality. Nevertheless, as a part of epistemology, this type of belief formulation is different from the formulation of genuinely moral belief. This part of epistemic activity can be traced to Locke, but the term is introduced by the British philosopher W. K. Clifford, who insisted that what determines belief choice is sufficient evidence. R. M. Chisholm claims that the rule of determination is logical consistency. Alternatively, William James believed that we can appeal to other elements beyond epistemological consideration in order to decide what we should believe. “We can simplify Locke’s rather complicated formulation of his ‘ethics of belief ’ as follows: the degree of our assent to a proposition ought to be proportioned to the strength of the evidence for that proposition.” Price, Belief ethics of care Ethics The feminist ethics that attempts to construct an entire ethical approach on the basis of caring or care. Care has been taken to be a central value and a fundamental ethical phenomenon. Care is not merely a feeling, but also an understanding of another person’s real needs, welfare, and situation. The ethics of care focuses on specific individuals rather than on universal principles. It extends from caring for children to care about the globe. In terms of this approach, feminism labels all modern ethical theories, the ethics of justice. The ethics of justice is characterized as male-biased because it emphasizes rational moral law and ignores the role of feeling and the experience of women. Feminism claims that care ethics is modeled on the family, while the male ethics of justice or rights ethics is modeled on the social contract. Carol Gilligan, in her book In a Different Voice, argues that women speak in a different voice, the voice of care. However, care is generally involved in one-to-one encounters. It is still to be elaborated how the ethics of care can be elevated to a general and public level, and how it can be reconciled with the requirements of justice and rights. Besides, it is also disputed how much we should care, and what is the relation between care and self-interest. It is realized that the voices of justice and of care should be presented as complementary ones. Justice is related to institutions, care to characters. Some argue that we should combine them rather than idealizing an ethic of care at the expense of the ethics of justice. “In advocating an ethic of care these critics, we have seen, come close both to traditional misogynist positions and to ethical relativism. When the ‘voices’ of justice and of care are presented as alternatives between which we must choose, each is viewed as a complete approach to moral issues. However, the two in fact focus on different aspects of life.” Valdes, in Nussbaum and Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life. -- ethics of justice, see ethics of care