H. P. Grice, "Boethius on the multiplicity of 'esse'"

ESSE -- ens ab alio, see ens a se -- ens a se Metaphysics, philosophy of religion [Latin, being from itself and in itself ] A medieval term for a kind of being, which contrasts with being out of itself (ens ex se) and with being that depends upon another thing as the ground of its existence (ens ab alio). In medieval philosophy, ens a se is a thing that is completely self-sufficient and depends on nothing else for its existence, and this description is ascribed solely to God. The idea is derived from the biblical teaching that God is the Creator. God is ens a se by existing independent of anything else, but all created things, including human beings, are ens ex se because they depend on God for their existence. The term aseity (Latin aseitas) was formed from ens a se for the abstract property of being completely independent. Some scholastics used the distinction between ens a se and ens ab alio as the basis of a proof of the existence of God. They argued that since we experience the things in this world as ens ab alio, which depend on another thing for the ground of their existence, there must be something which is ens a se on which they depend. Otherwise, an infinite regress would ensue. An account of God as ens a se, on which we depend for our being, poses the problem of how to reconcile the existence of God with human free will. Spinoza transformed the notion of ens a se into causa sui (self-cause), which he identified with substance, that is, God or nature. He also transformed the notion of ens ab alio into his concept of mode. -- “As well as being a se, I understand God to be ‘metaphysically necessary’. By this I mean that he is the or a cause of every logically contingent ‘fact’, or state of affairs, at any time and at any place.” Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time -- ens ex se, see ens a se ens irreale, see ens reale ens necessarius Metaphysics, philosophy of religion [Latin, a necessary being] A necessarily existing being, whose essence necessarily and directly implies its existence. It is the only being in which essence and existence coincide. This being is not constrained by reason and is self-sufficient because it is free from both rational motives and external causes. God is claimed to be such a being and moreover to be the only being of this kind. Spinoza argued that his substance is such a being and is identical with God or nature. Some philosophers argue that the notion of a necessary being is philosophically confused because only propositions or sentences can be necessary. Because existence is not a predicate, “X necessarily exists” does not say anything that could be true. Other philosophers reply that there can be de re necessity ascribed to things and that something would exist necessarily if it existed in all possible worlds. “Ens necessarius, i.e. an entity of which the essence is such that it would not be what, qua essence, it is, if it did not also exist.” Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being -- ens rationis Metaphysics, logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language A thing which has only rational or mental being (plural, entia rationis). An ens rationis can be thought or said, but does not really exist in the world. For example, abstract entities, universals, possibilities, fictions, and ideal things are entia rationis. They exist as objects of knowledge and as mental constructs. The nature of beings of this kind is a topic of everlasting concern for metaphysicians and logicians. For Kant, an ens rationis was a concept without an object, excluded from the possibilities, but not on those grounds rendered impossible. Brentano, who calls an ens rationis an object-type that is conventionally introduced to express what there is, claims that we can call it being only in a loose and improper sense. Other writers defend a more robust ontological status for some sorts of ens rationis. “Entia rationis, things which somehow exist in the mind.” Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint -- ens reale: Brentano divided things into ens reale (plural, entia realia) and ens irreale (plural, entia irrealia). The former is ordinarily translated as “real (or actual) thing” and the latter as “unreal thing.” But this is not precise. Entia realia are not only real things such as dogs, human beings, and tables, but also imaginary things such as unicorns. Hence, Chisholm suggests translating this term as “individuals.” Entia irrealia are such things as privations, possibilities, properties, concepts, and propositions, and Chisholm translates the term as “non-individuals.” An alternative translation renders ens reale as “concretum” and ens irreale as “nonconcretum.” Brentano’s realism holds that entia realia are the only things that exist and are the only things of which we can think. On this view, all statements about entia irrealia can be reduced upon analysis into statements about entia realia. “Brentano’s more general point may be put this way: we can think only of entia realia; and to think of an ens reale is to think of something which, if it existed, would be an individual.” Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic Value -- ens successivam Metaphysics [Latin, successive being] An entity which changes one or another of its parts as it endures through time. The term was introduced by Augustine, who claimed that the universe is such an entity, in that it is composed of successively existing parts. For Aquinas, it is a thing with some parts that do not exist at the same time as other of its parts. The term was revived in mereological essentialism, which claims that the parts of an object are essential to its identity and cannot change so long as the object maintains its identity. The succeeding parts of a thing, therefore, are not parts in any real sense. “This is what might be called the ens successivum – the ‘successive table’ that is made up of different parts at different times.” Chisholm, Person and Object