Grice's Knot Knowing
'If I know that p is the case, is it possible for me NOT to know that I know it?'
And what Grice said about it is implicatural:
To know that p is the case is not — this is very straightforward stuff — to have my mind in a certain position.
If I know, for instance, that ice melts when the sun shines, this means that when the sun shines I do not go skating.
In that case, it is perfectly possible that I do not 'consciously' know that ice melts when the sun shines.
But the question now arises of whether I know it unconsciously, and the answer is that it is possible never to have considered this.
But to analyze it still further.
Once you do ask yourself whether you know it unconsciously, can you give yourself the wrong answer?
And I think the answer to this is Yes.
The answer is that you sometimes say,
I do not know whether I know it unconsciously.
I do not know whether I 'really' know it or whether I am just guessing.
So far so good.
But can you now go on to say the following?
I *thought* that I did *not* know that ice melts when the sun shines, but then, later on, I found out that I *did* know.
Grice's conclusion is that you can feel *certain* that you did not know it.
Then when you came to it you find out you did know it.
Grice gives an illustration for the "Logic Paper" typical "Y", or "P."
Suppose they said
'Do you know HOW to tie such and such a knot?'
You say 'No.'
And then when you are drowning, they throw you a line and say
'Tie that knot on your life belt,' and you succeed in tying it.
When you are saved, they say:
'Well, you did know how to tie it after all, didn't you?'
And you could say either
'Yes, I *did* know all the time, but I was *certain* (but obviously did not know) that I did not know until I started drowning.'
Or
'I just found out how to do it: it came to me when you threw me the line.'
Friday, May 15, 2020
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