diaphaneity, the quality of
being freely pervious to light; transparency. This is a crucial concept for Grice. He applies it to ‘see,’ which which, after joint endeavours with G. J. Warnock, he was obsessed!
Grice considers the ascription,
“Warnock sees that it is raining.” And then he
adds,
“And it is true, I see that it is raining, too.”
What’s the diference? Wait.
Then comes Strawson.
“Strawson, you see that it is raining, right?”
So we have
an ascription in the first, second, and third persons.
When it comes to the *identification* of a sense (like vision) via experience or qualia, we are at a
problem, because ‘see,’ allowing for what Ryle calls a ‘conversational avowal,’
that nobody has an authority to distrust, is what Grice calls a ‘diaphanous’
predicate.
More formally.
That means that “Grice sees that it is raining,” in
terms of experience, cannot really be expanded except by expanding into WHAT IS
that Grice sees, viz. that it is raining.
The same with “communicating that p,”
and “meaning that p.”
No comments:
Post a Comment