--- Stanley and others have wasted (I love them!) much ink on 'logical form', context, the identity of propositions, and the subdued and vanishing propositional complexes the acts of utterer-meaning represent. So did Grice!
But Grice is explicit that he wants to 'regiment'. He will use 'mean' and its derivates ('imply') as 'terms of art' within his overall project of elucidating this or that philosophical problem. Ultimately, how rational language can be.
Consider Grice's loose comments on his loose use of 'say':
"In the sense in which I am using
the word, 'say', I intend that
someone has _SAID_ to be closely
related to ... [the code in English]."
---
More importantly:
This regimentation, Grice notes,
"of my use of 'say' LEAVES IT OPEN"
as it should?
"whether a man who says (today)
---- 'Harold Wilson is a great man'
and another who says (also today):
---- 'The British Prime Minister is a great man'
"would, IF EACH KNEW that the two singular terms
had the same reference,
HAVE SAID the same thing."
----
Odd! But true!
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