Grice observes a squarrel (Philosophical Psychology grounded on Ethology)

From Bar-On/Green refer to

"something the Gricean proponent of Continuity can acknowledge."

"What it means is that,
in the above Myth we should see the first stage on X‘s way to nonnatural meaning as beginning with involuntary m-expression."

"Grice, however, takes X from naturally expressive behavior more or less directly to speaker meaning: quite early on, X recognizes her own behavior as expressing her mental states, and intends to communicate that mental state to Y by relying on Y‘s recognition of that very intention. Yet Sellarsian skepticism would strike earlier in the story."

"It would question X‘s transition to speaker meaning. The Sellarsian may grant that once we understand how a creature becomes capable of speaker meaning – which is itself a special kind of m-expression19 – we could perhaps understand how sentences come to s-express propositions. This could be achieved via a
and a bit of behavior, we doubt such a relation is sufficient for expression: a galvanic skin response is caused by but does not express arousal. (See Bar-On 2004, esp. Ch. VII, and Green (2007) for further discussion.)

"In his (2000), Robert Brandom invokes a notion of expression central to his ―constitutive, pragmatist, relationally linguistic, conceptual expressivism‖ (p.9). The relation of Brandom‘s notion of expression to the forms of expression we discuss here is a bit delicate, but as far as we can tell, his notion is a special case of what we have called s-expression. For Brandom, expressing is making explicit something that is implicit in human practice by conceptualizing it. And the paradigm of the conceptualization in question, for Brandom, is ―saying something… in the sense of claiming‖ (p.13).


17 According to a recent suggestion – ―the unbearable automaticity of being‖ – due to Bargh (1999), a great deal of our behavior, including our communicative behavior, is like that.
18 For much fuller discussions, see Bar-On (2004), esp. Ch.s VI-VIII, Green (2007), and Green 2009.
19 See Green 2007 Chapters 3 and 4.
16

"process of conventionally ‗fossilizing‘ speaker meaning. For instance, and roughly, the sentence ―Grass is green‖ could s-express the proposition that grass is green in virtue of the fact that speakers regularly speaker mean (and thereby m-express their belief) that grass is green with utterances of this sentence.20 But the Sellarsian would point out that this at best allows us to understand s-expression as it applies to items in a public language, provided we understand s-expression as it applies to the mental states that speakers intend to convey to their audience."

"For the Gricean Continuity story appeals to X‘s intention to communicate via her m-expressive behavior propositional attitudes – which are states endowed with powers of s-expression all on their own. The Sellarsian challenge is thus: how can a Continuity story be told that takes us from creatures engaging in naturally expressive behavior – prior to the introduction of speaker meaning – to creatures like us who engage in linguistic communication? In what follows we suggest one way in which such a story might be developed."

And it gets more interesting by the end of their essay. When they finally reach "Hawk!" -- Gricean way.