Deviant Implicatures

J wrote in commentary to previous blog post:

"--Quine sounded a bit Peircean at times (from my readings)--even the Two Dogmas, and web of beliefs, or something."

Yes. There are TWO DOGMAS. Grice (and Strawson) dismissed the second dogma. "One dogma too many," they would argue. The first dogma concerns the important point (by which Quine is betraying Carnap) about the 'vicious circle' involved in stuff like 'analytic/synthetic'. The OTHER dogma concerns 'empiricism' itself, and the idea that experience is basic. One would think Quine is a spiritualist, challenging that, but he is going "French" and quoting from Duhem, instead.

J:

"But he sort of gave in to the behaviorist impulse--but lets not forget he's taking on the platonic-realist tradition as well."

Yes. I'm glad Quine was never my tutor. I'm currently reseraching on how biased uni research is. It is so subtle to _teach_. You have Grice as teacher and you would think you should need to write and defend implicature. You have Strawson as tutor and you come out thinking there are truth-value gaps.

Quine did teach at Harvard. He spent most of his life drawing ideas from other people and travelling around, though. He was from Ohio, originally (Akron). I should find that quote where he notes that Grice's teeth left a lot to be desired. At least Grice was the very athletic type that Quine never was!

---

J:

"--there's another issue with Russell's descriptions, which we might call...scope of the existence quantifier (attached to the front of his DD formula, raht). Does BR actually know whether ...in the ENTIRE universe there is or is not a bald King of France??"

Well, it is never clear which king he means. I suppose he means the _last_. Cfr. "The king of Italy". Apparently, there is a gentleman, who lives not far from where _I_ live, who claims he is the present king of Italy (since he dismisses Mussolini).

"Bald" is possibly hyperbolic. Dummett's example was:

"Queen Elizabeth I was bald"

He holds that this is very difficult to prove (as per intuitions), and thus neither true nor false.

"Bald" applies to people as they live. Once the king of France 'dies' (or is beheaded), it would be otiose to say that a corpse is bald. The particles that made up for "the king of France" (Marie Antoinette's husband) MUST exist somewhere.

If the quantification held over those particles, then it makes sense to ask whether those particles _are_ bald. Or not.

It may be said that 'bald' applies to things which the particles composing a body do not portray. I wouldn't know.

But then, WHAT physical property can we predicate of "the king of France" and the particles that composed him? Surely not: "The king of France was well read", since particles are hardly 'well-read' or fail to do so.

"White" seems a stretch. For while "the King of France is white", while hyperbolic, is intelligible, I wouldn't know if a little particle can be said to be _white_. I don't think atoms are colourful.

"weighty" is perhaps a good one. Grice considers Boyle and Locke on _bulk_ and primary qualities of matter.

"The king of France is weighty".

The particles which now exist, somewhere (in some French cemetery) composing what once was the King of France, are weighty.

It may be said that Russell's phrase is:

"The PRESENT king of France"

as opposed to 'past'. I prefer 'current'. In this respect, "the present King of France" is more like an irreal object, alla Meinong.

Grice was obsessed with Meinong. In particular, he thought that Strawson was a closet Meinongian. On the other hand, Grice writes, in "Vacuous Names": "My system creates no Meinongian jungle". R. B. Jones knows about this.

"Meinong" is possibly non-referential, today.

---- Oddly, Brentano, who followed Meinong, may refer to (a) a philosopher, (b) a city in Italy.

---

J goes on:

"OK--safe bet there isn't. But he can't really verify that. Galaxy Andromeda might have a planet with a bald KIng and country named France. So again, the logician overlooks something like scope (also seen among shall we say naive atheists--who claim there is no "God"--well, maybe He, or They live in the Ring Nebula. Not saying They're necessarily biblical ). Russell's DD"s may be astute analysis but a somewhat sloppy use of quantifiers."

Yes. There is a further complication, which I'm currently researching. A lot of the stuff logic is made of is based on natural language:

vel (p v q) is supposed to be a Latin-language particle, 'vel' (versus 'aut').

And there are others. When Frege used

(x)Fx

and

(Ex)Fx

he is using the inverted "A", above, to mean, "Alle", which is German for "All". As in "allemanic", the German people. Hyperbolic for 'all-man'. So one has to be careful. He was polite enough to invert the "A".

When it comes to (Ex) he also inverted the E. But the idea is that of "Existenz". There 'exists'. A rather technical term. We don't use it often. We say,

"There are figs in the bridge"

NOT that 'figs exist' in the Fridge.

If you IN-sist, I may stick with "EX-ist". But why should I?

So, yes, there is a domain-restriction, which is usually underestimated by Russell, but not by Boole or Venn (their 'universe of discourse').

This may relate to:

---- questions of what Chomsky calls "LF" logical form simpliciter versus "ILF" (interpreted logical form). When we _interpret_ (alla Grice, "Vacuous Name") an existential or quantificational in general, wff (well formed formula), which are the least committed ways to do so?

--- questions of decidability. Propositional or sentential logic for some reason IS decidable. Quantificational logic is NOT. Surely this is because the interpretation of a 'relation' (and predicate in general) is a difficult thing, and there's no Goedel number co-rrelated to each formula. Etc.

J goes on:

"That said, I still think the Toulmin had a point on ...excessive formality of the analytical phil. posse."

Yes. Toulmin does extend on the syllogism. (by introducing 'backing', warrants, etc.) But one should also revise Grice, "Aspects of Reason". Grice, drawing from the early Hare and Kenny ("Practical Inferences", Analysis), considers various

alethic
non-alethic

types of reasoning. These are ignored by Toulmin.

If you say

.p & .(p ) q), then .q

this is alethic modus ponens.

But there are patterns which extend BEYOND the alethic (or the indicative mode, as Grice preferred): imperative inferences, deontic inferences, inferences in the 'optative' mode, etc.

So, there is no need NOT to be formal when dealing with those inferences which are NOT in the indicative mode, or that go beyond a restricted view of what logicians are up to.

Oddly, Grice used one formal symbol too many. He confesses in "Reply to Richards". "I have ceased to use so many formal symbols, after Putnam, of all people, told me that I was too formal".

----

So there!