By Roger Bishop Jones for The Grice Club
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Here's a question for the scholars.
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I understand that Grice responded to Quine's "Two Dogmas"
(with Strawson of course) because (or partly because?) he
saw it as an attack on ordinary language philosophy.
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It is obvious that it is an attack on Logical Positiivism
and Carnap, but not so obvious to me that ordinary language
philosophy should feel under assault.
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Can anyone clarify for me, why Grice thought it so, or if
not, then did he have any other particular reason for
defending the distinction?
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Of course the obvious "reason" is that there is nothing
wrong with it and hence something wrong with Quine's
critique, and the Grice/Strawson critique is certainly well
worth publishing without need of any particular reason. But
I am interested in particular reasons if they are known,
since they might cast some light on how our conversation
between Carnap and Grice might proceed.
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RBJ
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Sure, it arose out of politeness. Recall the cooperative principle. This is the very efficient thing philosophers engage. But there are rules, 'moral in character', Grice says, such as 'be polite' (WoW:ii). So the thing is, Quine was _VISITING_ Grice at St. John's -- it was the centenary celebration of something at this GRAND college on St. Giles' that I know so well. Plus, Quine was meant to meet with dons (on Mondays, as it happens). Quine HAD to attend or would attend (he was under a scholarship programme, paid by Harvard). So Grice knew that the poor man had to endure those long seminars that he (Grice) was conducting at that time with his former pupil Strawson. So they wrote the thing -- they didn't care who was saying that and thus it's a joint thing -- and they read to Quine on that Monday evening of 1955. ---- The publication history etc is a different animal. Quine was thus made to participate in the joint seminars given by Grice and Strawson which were only being organised as part of the Lit.Hum. and PPE (Philosophy/Politics/Economy) students at Oxford -- and which were meant for those students. There have been some misunderstandings about motivations, but mine is right! Notably Bennett, who should know better or should have known better, in various publ. but mainly in his "Linguistic Behaviour" which I quote in my first public. ever and which I intend soon to scan and 'publish' (republish), fails to see the context (it's odd because he WAS in Oxford at the time). He sees, for example Grice's Meaning as a sequel to "Defense of a dogma". That's ok as publication dates go: 1956 and then 1957. But WoW (who credits Bennett on p. i) notably has the 1957 ("Meaning") date as actually 1948 -- well before any problem with Quine. The major issue Jones raises is very important, and no, I don't think Grice/Strawson or Grice simpliciter would have thought the Quine argument undermined anything. He will go, again out of politeness, to say that he never met anyone as intelligent as Quine ("Reply to Richards") but typically goes on to say, "Not that I ever shared ONE SENTENCE with all he said"). So there!
ReplyDeleteThis from Quine's memoir, while I look for Chapman's exegesis of the 'history behind': Quine is recalling the 'annual feast' at St. John's where Grice was vice-president, and Quine had come 'as a guest', and how he was charmed at his "white tie and tails, fashion plate". This is Chapman96:53: "One weekend during Quine's 1953-4 visit, Grice and Strawson put together their response to this argument" How she found out it's a weekend is marvellous! But I can imagine. I don't know where Strawson was living (I know Grice lived in a flat given by the college up Woodstock Rd, not far from St. John's and that he would telephone Strawson so often and so late at night that Lady Anne (Strawson) once called Grice to ask him to 'stop it' if he could. Chapman goes on: "to be presented at a seminar on the Mnday." For the history: "In 1956, Strawson" -- for Grice could care less by then -- "revised the paper ON HIS OWN [emphasis mine. JLS -- recall what he had done with Grice's handwritten "Meaning", 1948 -- he and Lady Ann had typed it and sent _as sent by Grice_ to the Philosophical Review in 1957 --]. Chapman goes on: "and sent it to The Philosophical Review, where it was published as 'In defence of a dogma'". I wondered if he used the 's' in 'defense'. It would have bounced at the board. The rest, as they say, is legend. Etc. How Quine recalled the meetings is fun. They would READ from the thing, "In 'Two dogmas of Empiricism', Mr. Quine has expressed some doubts regarding..." -- then they would have an OPEN session -- with Quine bringing in some input but mainly for students to see and witness what kind of 'polite' conversation could and should be carried in philosophy. Quine sort of makes fun on that, (words:) "To many "misters" and "references to pages, and to petty things". This is Quine recalling the seminar in the Spring of 1954, from his memoir: "Peter and Paul would alternate". "Towards the foot of page 9, I believe you said". "Considered judgement was of the essence; spontaneity was not". Perhaps because (or I'm sure because) Grice thought that Quine did not belong. Sponteneity was left for the Play Group. Quine goes on: "When in its final phase, the meeting was opened to PUBLIC discussion, neither Peter nor Paul were outgoing." He quotes exact phrases he'd hear, "I'm not sure what to make of that qusetion". "It depends, I should have thought, on what one means by ...". Etc.
ReplyDeleteThat's all very fascinating JL, but it sounds like
ReplyDeleteyou are saying that they didn't write the defence
because they felt the need to defend the position, but rather, because they were intent on incommoding Quine!
Is that what you meant to say??
Yes, in the Oxonian way they have of incommoding people by regaling them with critics to things! Quine was _not_ the sporty type Grice would have preferred: play cricket and stuff. The tie and tails were possibly the first ones Quine had ever seen, and Grice could wear them with such panache! I THINK "Quine" was the logician Grice refers to as having been invited to the "PlayGroup" too: "They say logic is a game, well, let's play it". But Quine is not mentioned by name, so I wouldn't know. Seeing all the monstrosities that Quine said against Austin, I would be saddened to see that the man could take such a bitter vengeance with the group (or kindergarten, as Austin called it) that were meant to amuse Quine. I do think Grice was not meaning to publish the thing at all, and that it was Strawson's idea, who revised it, and sent it to Philosophical Review. If it was meant to incommodate Quine it was Grice's way of doing so, by talking and talking and talking. The way he would talk to his tutees. Just FOCUS on the examples G/S give:
ReplyDelete(S) "My neighbour's three-year-old son
understands Russell's theory of types"
(A) "My neighbour's three-year-old son
is an adult"
The first synthetic, the second analytic. THE ONLY CRITERION they offer is the right sort of conversational move:
REPLY TO (S):
"Come on, he cannot be THAT smart!"
REPLY TO (A):
"Come on, he cannot be THAT freaky!"
---or more formally:
To (S): "What you've just said is INCREDIBLE and I refuse to believe it"
To (A): "What you've just said is STUPID, and I not so much refuse to believe it but to UNDERSTAND it."
That type of consideration had gone over the head in Quine's approach. That Quine will make the rounds and gain MORE AND MORE popularity by saying, "Oxford types I don't care what they say" shows that what was a mismatch in the beginning -- after all Grice and Strawson were carefully and peacefully studying Aristotle till Quine came in -- should not be taking as more than it was! Or so I think!