"Metaphysics", authored by Grice, Strawson, and Pears, in Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, Macmillan, 1957

--- by JLS
------ for the GC

--- I THINK IT WAS A GEM TO FIND THIS ref. to Grice in P. Edwards's entry for "metaphysics" (actually by Hamlyn) in the monumental Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The thing I have discussed elsewhere, but it is NOT included in "The publications of H. P. Grice" in the PGRICE festschrift. And only very seldom if at all quoted in the literature. Some excerpts will follow as I browse the thing safely deposited in the Swimming-Pool Library:

Grice (and Pears and Strawson write):

The thing is pretty elementary, but still, no reason why not to mention in a list.

They write:

"The name of the [thing] is the name
given to a treatise by Aristotle".

p. 1.

-- The essay occupies p. 1-20 in the Pears compilation. This was the famous "Third Programmes" of Aunt Beeb.

"Aristotle described the subject
of this treatise as the science of
Being as such, a supremely general
study of existence or reality."

Grice goes on to quote directly from Bradley. The passage by Bradley is on p. 2 of Grice's article and runs:

We may agree, perhaps, to
understand by metaphysics an
attempt to know reality as
against mere appearance, or the
study of first principles or
ultimate truths, or again the
effort to comprehend the universe, not
simply peacemeal or by fragments,
but somehow as a whole.

Of course, it may well be that it was Pears that brought the passage to Grice's mind. Most likely. Recall that these Third programmes were organised by Pears (who died last year) -- he also edited the "Freedom of the Will" one, and thus felt the responsibility of checking with some of the sources to really please Aunt Beebe.

The editorial by Grice et al goes:

"This agrees with Aristotle in
contrasting metaphysics with departamental or,
as Bradley would say, fragmentary studies."

(p. 2).

Recall that this was BEFORE Strawson had published "Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics".

----

Grice et al go on to quote from that seldom quoted (now) philosopher, John Wisdom -- the cousin of John Wisdom:

But they typically being Oxonians, hasten to add:

"In any case, the relation of Wisdom's
to Bradley's account on the matter is NOT
obvious", p. 3.

They do manage to find a connection:

"The attempt to secure that
comprehensivenes which Bradley
finds characteristic of his enquiry
leads often enough to those shifts of
view expressible in paradox, which Wisdom
finds characteristically metaphysical" (p. 4).

----

They go on to discuss Kant. And find him on the right track:

"Whatever the shortcomings of Kant's
doctrine, it at least gives a clear meaning
to saying that metaphysics is concerned
with the presuppositions of science and
not merely its most general part" (p. 8).

But they find refuge again in Oxford: especially in COLLINGWOOD as rectifying Kant's mistake.

For Grice et al write:

"This was in fact Collingwood's idea
of the nature of metaphysics: the metaphysician
exposed the presuppositions of the science
of a particular epoch".

This was of course before Kuhn! (Collingwood was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford just before Ryle).

---

THIS WILL HAVE TO be, I hope, in "The Carnap/Grice Conversations" -- project with R. B. Jones:

Carnap explicitly cited on p. 8:

"This line of thought about metaphysics
is NOT peculiar to a relatively
traditional thinker like Collingwood. There
is at least some analogy between his views
and those, for example, of CARNAP, who was
once a member of the philosophically radical
Vienna Circle"

--- although apparently he was never there when one wanted him! Recall Quine writing to his mother, "Have just arrived to Vienna to see Carnap. Of course he isn't here. I'm goin to Poland tomorrow to see if I can spot him there."

-- Etc.

---Grice et al continue:

"Carnap draws a SHARP distinction between
questions which arise within [emphasis Grice's et al.]
a given system of concepts, or framework of ideas,"

--- cfr. Carnapian Jones's reply to Restall in "Carnap Corner" and "linguistic framework" --

"and questions which are sometimes raised
about [again, emphasis Grice's et al's]
that framework or system."

This is the semantic/pragmatic distinction, alla Carnap. Grice et al write:

"Questions of the FIRST sort belong to the field
of some science or of everyday life, and are
answered by the methods appropriate to those fields"

-- they had been discussing the Kinetic Theory of Gases.

"Questions of the LATTER sort have traditionally
appeared in metaphysics in the MISLEADING
form of questions about the reality of existence
of some very general class of entities
corresponding to the fundamental dieas of the system
of the concepts in question".

They had been analysing the transcendental justification of Kant in a previous passage.

They go on:

"Thus philosophers have asked whether there
really [emphasis mine. JLS] existed
such things as numbers, whether the space-time
points of physics were real, and so on."

--- I.e. Kant's points, sort of.

"But such questions can be significantly
understood ONLY as raising the practical
[emphasis Grice's et al. cfr. 'pragmatic']
issue of whether or not to embrace and
use a given conceptual scheme or framework
of ideas."

--- the external questions of Carnap.

"To answer affirmatively, according to
Carnap, is simply to ADOPT such a framework
for use, and hence to give shape or direction
to a whole field of inquiry".

--- But isn't there a drawback to this? Grice et al suggest:

"Carnap's view of the matter might seem
to make it mysterious that there should be
such things as metaphysical ASSERTIONS,
as opposed to metaphysical DECISIONS."

Good point about illocutionary force, as it were. Recall that Grice's unfinished book project by the year of his death, was "From Genesis to Revelations: a new discoruse on metaphysics".

Grice et al go on:

"The mystery could be solved
in principle by regarding metaphysicians
as engaged in a kind of propaganda
on behalf of some conceptual scheme,"

--- I like the idea of a pro-slogan, emotivist in kind.

They go on:

"the acceptance of which is obscurely
felt to be a presupposition of the development
of science in a particular decision. Like
all forms of propaganda, conceptual or metaphysical
PROPAGANDA is liable to involve distortion
or exaggeration".

Or excecrescences?

Grice et al continue to mention Carnap explicitly:

"As Carnap's remarks suggest, one form
which conceptual advocacy is liable to take
is the entering of a strong claim
for the status of reality on behalf
of some general class of entities, together
with a disposition to DENY this status to other,
less favoured things."

Foreshadow against which Grice's Ontological Marxism is invoked.

The essay goes on to quote from Hegel and Marx. There is some extended treatment of Descartes and Leibniz. Then it invokes a different 'spring' for metaphysical thought, and goes on to discuss Hume, whom they have cited before in connection with the idealism that will lead to Berkeley. The essay finishes with a general characterisation of metaphysics as essentially revisionary.

A good piece, on the whole, and one in which one READS Grice, as often, as DELIVERING the message in the oral medium: as a speaker. Not so much the tutor, this time, but the philospher of Oxford vintage aiming at the general audience. Etc.