Berths of Language

--- By JLS
------- for the GC

---- IN A VERY APT METAPHOR, that in a way echoes Kripke, Grice speaks of the 'shallow berths of language', THIS BLOG. He refers to the surface syntax contraints that are so embedded in our ways of thinking that we cannot navigate away from them. Danny Frederick has pointed out to me that he won't think of language as that.

When Dummett compiled his stuff (Grice did not really discussed Dummett much -- where this is innuendo) he called it, alla Kripke, "Seas of Language". The reference being to the charming example by this wunder kid:

"Socrates is called 'Socrates'", Kripke writes.

"See how deep the seas of language are, even at their shallowest."

--- Meanwhile, the weather in the streets, etc.

Kripke:

"Actually sentences like 'Socrates is called "Socrates" ' are very interesting and one can spend, strange as it may seem, hours talking about their analysis. I actually did, once, do that. I won't do that, however, on this occasion. (See how high the seas of language can rise. And at the lowest points too.)."

Grice -- archival material from Chapman:

Chapman:

"In considering the link between GRAMMATICAL
structure and the status of information, [WoW:P&CI]
draws on Grice's GENERAL interest in ways
in which meaning MAY DRIVE syntax."
(Ch06:126).

Chapman goes on:

"An unpublished paper from much later in
his life suggest the directions in which his
thoughts may have developed. In 1985, Grice
was seeking to reconcile the Oxford
school of philosophy" with the rest of it.

----

"[Grice] proposes to adopt the hypothesis
that opinion"

-- ta legomena

"is generally reflected in language"

-- ta legomena.

"with different 'levels' [Grice's own word. JLS]"

where each level

"represent[s]" a "different degree of commitment".

In Chapman's reading,

"Some aspects of 'knowledge' receive
the DEEPEST level of EMBEDDING within
syntax"

They reside, Chapman writes,

"in what Grice describes as the 'deep berths' of language."

"It is not possible", Chapman suggests Grice suggests,

"for a speaker"

-- of English, say.

"even to USE the language"

-- English, say.

"WITHOUT being COMMITTED to these."

--- hence his polemic with Strawson on metaphysics, in being descriptive, is eo ipso revisionary, if practiced well enough. The 'it' and its implicata, say.

Chapman goes on:

"The DEEPEST LEVELS are at premium."

"So, it is in the interests of speakers
to RESERVE THESE for their
DEEPEST commitments"

--- to an Aristotelian metaphysic of substance and attribute, say, while Amerindian languages that have 'gavagai' as a process of a rabbit are not so (Aristotelian) but more Whiteheadian in nature.

Chapman goes on:

"People MIGHT challenge these, Grice suggests"

-- but they are like Collingwood's presuppositions and what Husserl always thought philosophy SHOULD challenge -- presuppositionless philosophy.

"but", Chapman goes on,

"it would be DANGEROUS to do so." (p. 126).

-- or otiose, I would say.

"If we subscribe to this account," Chapman writes, "we might be tempted to argue that first principles"

-- redundancy from Aristotle -- prote arche -- principium primum --. As opposed to secondary secs of course.

"... of 'knowledge' [so-called. JLS] are to be
found in the [surface, shallow. JLS] syntactic
structure, rather than the vocabulary, of
language" -- the empty, dummy, 'it' that prompted Strawson in "Introduction to Logical Theory" to grant substantival expressions which are not referring -- on occasion. He CAN be dogmatic, Strawson can. I go with Kramer that it's up to U or A to decide whether they are using 'it' referentially -- cfr. Molloy as brought up by J. Kennedy.

Chapman goes on to quote directly from archival material, where Grice writes:

how we talk ought [emphasis Grice's, underscored. JLS]
to reflect our most solid, cherished and
generally accepted opinions.

Note here.

----

Chapman goes on as it may relate:

A: It is raini...
B: Wait a sec. What d'you mean, it?

----

Chapman:

"In this discussion of what is presented
as uncontroversial"

-- but unnecessarily so, from a 'metaphysical' standpoint -- for are philosophers to do but to direct the attention to these issues? -- or forget the 'but' but you get my drift -- as in the case of "It is midnight and it is raining" -- Theism? Languagism?

"... and what is available for
denial"

-- or acceptance. Because paradigms are expensive -- "even in this economy", as Kramer aptly puts it in his "I had it; no wait, I've got it", first paragraph.

Chapman concludes the passage: "... Grice mgith be described as interested in the ways in which DIFFERENT [alternative, including deviant -- provided they don't implicaturally cost much. JLS] syntactic devices available for conveying [old and new -- is old ok here?] information bring with them different existential [even in Kramer's sense] and ontological commitments [more along Strawson's favourite echo of Quine, On What There Is]."

-----

The issue of new/old info is a good one, perhaps, vis a vis what Kramer and I call the "Queen Anne is dead" tag. As per Rp as 'redundant'. A says 'p', and B re-affirms the falsity with the implicatum, "The Pope _is_ Catholic".

Cfr. "Today, I was informed that 'it' referred to the weather." "Today, I was informed that Obama was the American president." vs. "Today, I was 'informed' -- I already knew it -- or believed it -- that Obama was the American president." This of course as different from Grice's claim which I recalled Floridi and got a credit for that in his meta-studies on communication, that 'false information is, just, not information' (WoW: 371: "False information", so-called, Grice has it, "is NOT an inferior kind of information; 'it' just is NOT information" -- Oddly Grice does not use scare quotes, but I'm scared enough! -- I did discuss this with THE informational Gricean on this: the Genial Dennis W. Stampe discussing I. Dretske's adventures in Griceland.

"and