Grice: implicatio, implicatum, implicans, implicandum

C. D. Narvaes wrote in "Philosophical Quarterly":


"Grice’s causal-intentional theory of meaning can also be understood as relying on closure under implication. ... But [he] seem[s] to disregard the difference between the consequences of an utterance and the consequences of the content of an utterance, a fact which might be related to the predominance of the ‘formalist’ view of the validity of inferences and consequences."

I disagree. I.e. I would not think Grice disregards. If there's one thing about Grice is that he seldom disregards. Unregards perhaps (I disagree with Kramer that 'dis-' is a harmless 'negative' -- cfr. "How I met my wife", this blog -- "If pathology is the study of diseases, what is the study of eases called?").

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Narvaes goes on:

"Grice uses the phrase ‘what a sentence says’ as opposed to what it implicates (hence associating the property of saying with its semantics and that of implicating with pragmatic aspects)."

This again imports serious ontological 'issues' that may need a fine-tooth comb analyis alla Grice.

In any case, Narvaes is right in adjudicating some weight to the 'implicans'/'implicandum' distinction, which has received little attention in Grice Studies (*ENROLL IN THE "PHD" PROGRAMME IN GRICE STUDIES, GRICELAND). Or not.