-- by JLS
---- for the GC
---- IN A RECENT POST TO HIST-ANALYTIC listserv R. B. Jones was wondering about Grice's project, as to whether, say, his appeal to psychological attitude reports involved a desire to elucidate the notion of rationality. Seeing that Jones is having a broader project of his own involving such a notion, I will say: yes, that _was_ Grice's project.
GRICE DID NOT PROBABLY SEE himself as a philosopher of rationality back _then_ -- when he was talking of rational constraints for, say, dialogue, back in 1952, when Strawson was already reporting on his views in the memorable footnote of Strawson's vademecum in logic. But I would say it developed with time, Grice's notion of rationality.
AS A PHILOSPHER MYSELF I too have come to think -- especially on weekdays -- that rationality IS the philosophica notion par excellence. And I especially have come to value Grice in his trying to get to the core of this notion. This core, as he would have it in Aspects of Reason involves:
ψA(p)
ψA(p ->q)
---------
∴ ψA(q)
This above is just _one_ format of one specific step in reasoning -- Modus Ponendo Ponens, as it happens. But it already shows some of the main features of the notion -- of "reasoning" qua verb:
i. It involves a transitional, of the psychological kind. Where "A" is the reasoner, the scheme shows that the premises (A believes that p, and A believes that if p, q) yield, CAUSALLY, and not just transitionally, and this much via the link with desire and intention, the conclusion (that A believes that q).
ii. Desire or intention. Grice was still working on these notions by the time he replied to the 'introduction' to his festschrift in 1986 ("Reply to Richards" proper). He refers back in 1986 (written circa 1984) to his 1977 Kant Lectures (at Stanford) where he had elaborated a first shot at the sufficient and necessary clauses involving "reasoning" -- as he had done vis a vis "meaning". It was obvious to him that a 'desire' -- or an 'intention', even -- that there IS a logical supplementation on there being a 'link' which would be more than 'arbitrary' for the conclusion being yielded by the premises.
iii. The openness of the psychological attitude involved. Grice is onto what he calls the aequi-vocality of 'reason'. There is not one theoretical reason -- the realm of physics, say -- and a 'practical' reason attached to it -- Kant's realm of ends --. Both spring from neutral considerations.
iv. "Reasoning" is founded on psychological attitudes as such. An animal may be held to hold such attitudes -- and thus, his account requires that we explain attitude report in terms OTHER than a connection with a 'sentence' -- since, after all, monkeys cannot ceteris paeribus talk (WoW:iii). Even in homo sapiens, there's such thing as irrational action, self-deception, and 'motivated' akrasia, to use Pears's phrase --. Grice did not see this as detrimental to the notion of reasoning, but quite the contrary, as a safe foundation for it in the realm of general ethology. We need an agent to _behave_ first, in order to have him behaving _rationally_ at a second stage.
v. Non-monotonic. While Grice would distinguish between, roughly, 'logical' and 'pragmatic' inferences -- the latter should also be counted as some sort of manifestation of the faculty of 'reason' or 'rationality'. This would entail allowing for defeasibility -- caeteris paribus character -- and a broad range of variability -- 'probability', 'desirability' -- attached to the idea of 'satisfactoriness' that lies behind the philosophical recontruction of reason.
vi. Etc.
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Comment by RBJ for JLS on GC
ReplyDeleteThanks for coming back on that JL.
I expect I will look closer into this stuff for the Carnap/Grice conversation. My own predominant interest in rationality seems rather different, so I might as well say something about it and see whether you can see any connections.
I have a threefold interest, which in order of importance are:
1. Rationality as embodied in some general conception of analytic method, which I think important because of the problems considered in 2.
2. The pathologies of supposedly rational discourse (i.e. when it isn't in fact rational), particularly as exhibited in 20th century analytic philosophy in the large. Here I am looking for identification and exposure, which then leads to 3.
3. Diagnosis, explanation. This I think of as like Hume's response to the fact that we all hold beliefs which he supposed not to be rationally justified (though I don't agree on most of them).
He went off to engage in the empirical study of Human Nature. Possibly Grice is doing something similar. This is where I am tempted to find enlightenment in evolutionary theory.
Since this is the furthest removed from my own competence I have reservations about getting into it. However, I can't see a lot of point in taking a stance in my (1) which is not informed by an understanding of how and why things go "wrong" at this level.
Whereas, from your description of Grice I have the impression that his approach to rationality is primarily through philosophical psychology, I am inclined to take a logical/analytic stand towards my 1 and 2, and only get into psychology in 3.
My (1) includes "X-Logic" (on the philosophical connections of which I still owe you an explanation) which is intended (inter alia) to address perceived problems in the area of your (v)
(non-monotonicity) while avoiding so called non-monotonic logics ("epistemic retreat" helps).
However, it is pluralistic, so non-monotonic logics are admitted.
RBJ
Excellent to hear from you, co-author!
ReplyDeleteYes, your enterprise sounds indeed more, shall I say, rational. Must say I learned about it from your RBJOnes blog where you encapsulate so coherently all you want to say!
--- I think it's fabulous to focus first on (i) as you do -- the method indeed! I think L. J. Cohen has a good one there, especially as it elaborates on the 'rights' -- you'll do the wrongs -- I will call you the pathologist of Grice, if you don't mind! --. His "Dialogue of Reason". I think I saw the thing but bored me. But it's mainly about analytic philosophy as I recall it!
Cohen was a good one. More on this next post right now.
"The Dialogue of Reason" is a book by this Oxonian, London-born philosopher, Laurence J. Cohen. I first heard from him when he said,
ReplyDelete"particles"!
which, we (i.e. Jones and I) know is the term, almost laughable if you laugh at it, that Carnap used for "logical constants" and such -- and which Cohen had the cheek to use in an essay that I had to import from Tel-Aviv!
It's
"Grice on the logical particles of natural language".
A bit of a disappointment I can say now that Cohen died. He features on Cockney speakers -- or Irish, on St. Patrick's Day!
"I will not have no more bear not half of a pint never not I will not have!"
Cohen counts the 'not' and decides that if it's an even number it gets affirmative. Since, for Grice "not" is "-". But Cohen says the Cockney or Irish is DENYING he wants more beer, by the sound of it.
Walker destroyed Cohen, but Cohen was still happy to have his "Can the conversationalist hypothesis be defended?" Phil. Studies in 1977.
---- So that's just an example of rationality in philosophical argumentation where the defender of 'reason' gets it all wrong!
--- The point that Grice did consider was reasonable as made by Cohen was the embedding thing: if "p -> q" implicates this or that, then the negation of "p -> q" should be a negation of the implicatum as well, but it ain't. Etc. We discussed this with Kramer under "illogicality" or something -- or his "Early to bed" actually -- the search engine is not working properly.
So I'll go back to your point (i) and see how it relates.
A good philosopher for rationality is Nicholas Rescher. But my tutor said he would never read the books by an author who publishes ten of them per year. This one is called "Rationality".
Jones mentions a three-stage project involving rationality and not X-rays, but X-logic, something very important philosophical (indeed, more important than X-rays) (* I had a discussion with my friend Bunnell who is visiting me in Argentina -- for another post, maybe, "Philosophical Question" --.
ReplyDeleteJones:
Rationality as embodied in some general conception of analytic method
You are right -- nothing about this in Grice. He is interested, rather in your link to Locke's essay where (your rbjones.com pages) where Locke says that Prince Maurice's parrot,
while very intelligent-looking, was hardly rational. Grice's pirots, on the other hand, are the epitome of reason, -- and a model of ourselves, he says, "at least in our better moments".
He is presupposing that philosophers ARE rational, which is like the biggest presupposition that Husserl would say philosophers shoud never make (see Husserl -- the cover, the book itself is a bore: "Philosophy without presuppositions").
So, analytic method. This is good. Indeed, if Ayer is right, analytic propositions constitute logic and mathematics, but NOT necessarily, philosophy. Philosophers DRAW the distinction. It doesn't mean all they say IS analytic. As you say about many authors -- including non-philosophers, like Dawkins -- 'this is synthetic', and thus empirical.
My friend likes a manicure. He cannot find a place where they let a MALE (as he is) doing the manicure. He said today to me on a taxi, "Here's a philosophical question for you: how can a country be so obscenely sexist as to have elected a woman President, and yet one which does not allow a man to have his manicure?". (He was denied a service in a shop, apparently, on grounds of he being male). I first suggested 'womanicure' for that THEY (females) get. He wasn't convinced. I then said, "Sociological" -- pronounced this fastidiously 'soziolo-', rather than more loosely, 'sosholo-'. "It's a moot sociological point," I said, "Hardly philosophical". "If it involves statistics, as to democratic methods, and things like manicures -- it canNOT be a philosophical point". He agrees. Of course all this is jocular to us. I'm glad he recalls the philo course he did take: "Descartes, Locke -- those issues are philosophical" -- and to connect the thing with R. B. Jones's query about analytic method being 'philosophical' -- i.e. a general thing.
But perhaps R. B. Jones may want to say that 'analytic method' is not per se philosophical while yet rational. Indeed, I always envied my high school mates when I had enrolled in philosophy, and I was studying Greek and Latin, and Plato's Eutyphro, and THEY were having courses called "Analysis I" and "Analysis II". Ah well.