Grice as Bergsonian

Everyone who has read Grice's sadly forgotten -- never compiled, "Personal Identity", Mind, 1941, must have thought, "This is Bergson, but in English". And it is. By far exceeds the convoluted prose of the Frenchman. And Perry did compile the Grice thing. What we need is a compilation in Grice, Philosophical Papers, Clarendon.


"I must..give some preliminary account
of the bergsonian philosophy."
W. James, Plural Univ., 1909, p. 215

"Philosophy, you will say, doesn't lie flat
on its belly in the middle of experience,
in the very thick of its sand and gravel,
as this Bergsonism does."
W. James, op. cit., p. 277.

"The _ELAN VITAL_, all contentless and vague
as you are obliged to leave it, will be an
easy substitute to make fun of."
W. James, Letter to Bergson 13 June 1907.

"Dear Bergson,-(can't we cease
'PROFESSOR'-ing each other?)"
W. James, Letter to Bergson 28 July 1908.

For Grice, the I and the memory are conceptually united. Ditto for Bergson.

I checked for some references to Bergson in the OED (which I append in Appendix II) having come across some interesting ones, especially from his correspondence with
W. James. As for Bergson's take on 'intuition' in particular, there's an
essay at the link below (Appendix I), which has some relevant passages from
both his _Introduction to Metaphysics_ and _Creative Evolution_.


I. From http://pears2.lib.ohio-state.edu/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/yanming.htm

Bergson's concept of intuition.
"In looking closely at the various relevant passages in Bergson's
writings, we may find that there is an inconsistency in his
statements about intuition."

i. On the one hand, he seems to contend that a sharp
and irreconcilable antagonism obtains with 'intellect'.

ii. On the other, he insists that intuition supplements
intellect, and that reality in its fullness
is revealed only by a combination of the two.

As G Cunningham points out,

"the first view he Bergson constantly
and explicitly emphasizes; the second he
seemingly unconsciously and implicitly
holds."

According to Bergson, intuition or the intuitive method
comes from a "new philosophy" -- namely his own, although,
historically, it "flashed" momentarily in the works of
Descartes, Leibniz, and especially Spinoza.

Bergson defines intuition as

"the kind of intellectual sympathy
by which one places oneself within
an object in order to coincide with
what is unique in it and consequently
inexpressible."

In intuition, "what I experience will depend neither
on the point of view, since I am inside the object
itself, nor on the symbols, since I have rejected all
translations in order to possess the original." And I am
"capable of following reality in all its sinuosities and of
adopting the very movement of the inward life of things."
What intuition can offer me is a "disinterested knowledge."

It is obvious that, in this context, the concept of
intuition is treated by Bergson as a direct opposite
of intellect. The two are different not only in quantity
but also in quality. In other words, intuition is more
valuable than intellect in both epistemology and ontology.

However, in his _Creative Evolution_, Bergson offers
another model for intuition.

"By intuition I mean instinct that has
become disinterested, self-conscious,
capable of reflecting upon its object and
of enlarging it indefinitely."

When talking about the existence and function of intuition,
Bergson often has in his mind the image of an artist.

"Our eye perceives the features of the living being,
merely as assembled, not as mutually organized.
The intention of life, the simple movement that
runs through the lines, that binds them together
and gives them significance, escapes it. This
intention is just what the artist tries to regain,
in placing himself back within the object by a
kind of sympathy, in breaking down, by an effort of
intuition, the barrier, the space put between
him and his model".

It is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us.
Intuition goes in the direction of life.

"Intuition may enable us to grasp what
it is that intelligence fails to give us."

Refs.
Cunningham G. A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson.
(London: Longmans, Green and Co.)
Bergson, H. Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme
(New York and London: Knickerbocker Press)
Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell
(Lanham: University Press of America, Inc.)


II. Bergson in the OED (the entry WORD in CAPITAL): some quotes.

1911 J. M. Baldwin Thought & Things III. iv. 47

"The `ALOGISM' of Bergson, which James cites as nearer his own, seems,
however,..in its outcome, nearer to that of Bradley, since it is a mode of
higher intuition or immediacy to which Bergson makes appeal."

1907 W. James Let. to Bergson 13 June (1920) II. 292

"The _ELAN VITAL_, all contentless and vague as you are obliged to leave
it, will be an easy substitute to make fun of."

1914 J. London Let. 25 June (1966) 425,
"I have no patience with FLY-BY-NIGHT philosophers such as Bergson."

1911 Brereton & Rothwell tr. Bergson's Laughter i. 41
"`A red nose is a painted nose', `A negro is a white man in disguise', are
also absurd to the reason which rationalises; but they are GOSPEL TRUTHS to
pure imagination."

1911 Paul & Palmer tr. Bergson's Matter & Memory ii. 99 (marginal note of
translators)
"Automatism has a wide range, and representative memory is often superseded
or masked by HABIT MEMORY."

1911 A. Mitchell tr. Bergson's Creative Evolution ii. 146
"We should say perhaps not Homo sapiens, but HOMO FABER."

1911 Brereton & Rothwell tr. Bergson's Laughter iii. 135
"Each member [of society] must be ever attentive to his social
surroundings..he must avoid shutting himself up in his own peculiar
character as a philosopher in his IVORY TOWER."

1908 W. James Let. 28 July (1920) II. 308
"Dear Bergson,-(can't we cease 'PROFESSOR'-ing each other?)"

===

There are also three uses ('bergsonian', 'Bergsonians', and 'Bergsonism')
in James 1908:

1909 W. James Plural. Univ. v. 215,
"I must..give some preliminary account of the bergsonian philosophy."

p. 266
"They are now Bergsonians..and possess the principal thoughts of the master
all at once."

p.277
"Philosophy, you will say, doesn't lie flat on its belly in the middle of
experience, in the very thick of its sand and gravel, as this Bergsonism
does."

Cheers,

JLS