Grice, Farewell To All That

-------- By J. L. Speranza.
--------------- For the Grice Club.

-------------- ONLY he'll say "Goodbye". Anyway, it's very sad, I find, that a philosopher should use the word 'valedictory'. Yet he did. His 'valediction' is a gem of a piece (WoW:RE), where he comments on various things. I will excerpt here some comments on his views on 'rationality'.

GRICE has become the philosopher of rationality. Every Anglo-American philosopher worth the name is bound to feel he has to mention Grice, at least his Aspects of Reason(Gr01). Earlier exegesis of his work (e.g. Grandy/Warner) would quote in extenso from his views on 'rationality' as a faculty -- a rather outmoded term turned moded by Grice -- that 'operates' (hence the 'fac-') on pre-rational states: the sphexish states, as it were.

WHY do we need the 'pre-rational'? Well, to turn the thing into a 'commodity': rationality is supposed to 'solve', or at least is supposed to aim at solving, some issue or two. In the broader perspective, it's Grice's "faith" that pirots will behave rationally as they go one rung higher in the stairs of the 'chain of being'.

Grice has elaborated on the general 'form' of 'reason'. It's "to reason", with Grice: a verb. And utterers reason. Reason goes hand in hand with 'talking' pirots. A 'reasoner'.

A reasoner reasons, simply, from a premise to a conclusion. So don't expect a lot of krypo-technicisms here. Krypto-technicisms, Grice says, fail to address the proper questions, 'and raise the improper ones'!

But here then for his more technical bits as it connects with the corporal punished (that one may feel) constraints as they spring from the Cooperative Principle (CP) and such. Grice writes:

"Strand Six [of his "Valedictory Essay"] deals with the Conversational Maxims"(Gr89:368). He is detecting some undercurrents in his whole opus, and eight of them. Note he uses the capitals in "C" and "M" in conversational maxim: this had become indeed a krypto-technicism for him, although not one he was wedded to. The maxims are 'conversational' because they generate 'conversational' implicatures (or the other way round). One has to be slighly careful here because, as per Gr89:ii, some implicatures that everyone WOULD regard as 'conversational' he dubs, somewhat pedantically (or 'fastidiously,' as Blackburn prefers in his review of WoW) "nonconventional, nonconversational". It's the alleged GOAL that conversation is supposed to serve that turns a set of maxims (never mind the Cooperative Principle) as 'conversational'. And this goal is

mutually influencing.

i.e. pirots want to influence each other by the exchange of information about their willings and judgings (Kramer has an analogue talk for these two terms). And these willings and judgings better be true or trustworthy. It's the chance of survival of pirots. Because sense-data, as Grice has it, do not threaten or nourish: objects do.

So, this is cooperative 'submarine-hunting' in a way (vide wiki, 'evolution of cooperation'). Pirots interact with a common view to a common survival strategy. They are 'prisoners' of their environment and they have to dodge a horn or two of an alleged dilemma. Grice looks back:

"In my extended [almost apologetically, to Kant, e.g.] discussion of the properties of conversational practice [the charmer here is his earlier 1964 lectures. This discussion is particularly 'extended' to Grice in particular. He knew he had lectured one lecture too many on those things] I distinguished a number of maxims or principles [sic], observance of which I regarded as providing

STANDARDS of RATIONAL discourse."

--- where we are not sure he is concerned with the etymology of 'standard' -- cfr. "Standard English" -- banner, originally. Cfr. "stand to reason" (as per OED, elsewhere). Grice goes on:

"While the conversational maxims have on the whole been quite well received,"

Indeed, by the rather pretentious "Gricean maxim" in keywords of a few articles!

"the same cannot, I think, be said about my invocation of a supreme principle of
conversational cooperation"

He _IS_ thinking, but wouldn't say, Kasher! So he wants to 'retrospect' what he was after, as it were. He felt that

"[I]t is ONLY certain [i.e. some, or one] aspects [or aspect] of our conversational practice which are candidates for EVALUATION,"

He is careful not to go the way against, say, "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder" -- "A beautiful conversationalist," say.

"namely those which are _crucial_ to its RATIONALITY"

Cfr. Pirot P reasons from premise p to conclusion c"

"rather than to whatever other merits or demerits it may possess. So; nothing which I sai[d] should be regarded as bearing upon the SUITABILITY or unsuitability of particular issues of conversational exploration."

E.g. the dialogues of Joyce, or Pinter, etc.

"[I]t is the RATIONALITY (or irrationality)of conversational conduct which I have been concerned to track down."

This is a bit scary, vis a vis Foucault. Everytime a philosopher merely mentions 'irrationality', I get scared: because it means they have BEEN there. I.e. it takes a 'sharp' eye to try to set the boundaries between the asylum and what's outside!

"rather than any more general characterisation"

But of less philosophical import, he means -- he is after all "in the tradition of Kantotle" as Bennett's review of PGRICE for the TLS supplement went.

"of conversational adequacy."

'Adequacy' is a good one. Consider:
A: Did Charles see "Star Trek" yesterday?
B: No.
vs. "He was in Boston, darling!"
"Adequate?". Perhaps not. Rational? Perhaps yes.

"So," Grice adds, "we may expect principles (sic in plural) of CONVERSATIONAL RATIONALITY"

cfr Sp --

"to _abstract_from the special"

i.e. specific -- Gk eidos.

"character of conversational interests."

Whatever they are: we shouldn't care, qua philosophers, he says about himself. But there is a _second_ point (He does use 'second'):

"I have taken it as a working assumption"

Cfr. his reference to 'frictionless solids'

"that, whether a particular enterprise aims at a SPECIFICALLY conversational result or outcome,"

his goal-directed view.

"and so perhaps is a specifically conversational practice, or whether its central character is more generally conceived as having no special connection with communication, the same principles will determine the rationality of its conduct."

This is a special pet with Grice. It's the aequi-vocality, as he calls it (sic italic in part) of 'reason'. (Do not multiply 'reason' beyond necessity: there is only ONE reason -- a corollary of his modified Ockham razor. (I use the "ck" spelling as a reminder of Surrey). Grice goes on, in the same passage:

"It is i-rrational to bite off more than you can chew whether the object of your pursuit is hamburgers or the Truth."

Horn indeed entitled "Hamburgers and Truth" his talk in Berkeley in memory of Grice (ed. K. Hall, "Legacy of Grice", Berkeley Linguistics Society, vol. 69). I'm not sure -- about truth. It may be a bit of an evaluative principle to aim at biting off MORE than _she_ can chew.) (Never mind hamburgers -- I've seen some pirots! It's like they think they won't survive elsehow). Grice goes on:

"Within the dimention of voluntary exchanges (which are [or should. JLS]
be all that concern us)" we are into the topic of "COLLABORATION in achieving exchange of information or the institution of DECISIONS"

This is the goal that conversation is 'served' to adapt. So that flouts are 'ex-aptive,' rather, and thus _fun_. Grice goes on to confess he is NOT the cold rationalist his scheme may have you think he is: he refers to the "over-the-garden-wall chatter in which MOST OF US from time to time engage". Grice goes on with a 'refurbished' (valedictory) account of Gr67:

"A list is presented of conversational maxims (or 'conversational imperatives')"

The topic is important vis a vis Gr01, for maxims (or counsels of prudence, really in Kant -- vide the German for this, Prudenz) _are_ hypothetical imperatives, not categorial. To think what Kant may have thought of 'say the truth' as hypothetical is mind-boggling Kant Kant engage in, but should, perhaps). (And this was why he gathered so much scorn from British philosophers, Grice goes on to note, Gr89 -- the famous attic-example, as discussed e.g. by Hampshire contra Hare). Grice goes on:

"These 'conversational' IMPERATIVES, are such that, in paradigmatic cases"

'Conversational conversation', in his favoured use: _not_ cross-examination, over-the-garden-wall chatter, etc.

"their observance PROMOTES"

Or maximises, more technically, for we need a criterion here for even postulating them qua them rather than qua any other set you may think of.

"and their violation"

But not FLOUT.

"dispromotes conversational rationality".

He goes on: "Somewhat LIKE moral commandments"

But in the more fastidious talk of Gr67:89:ii, these are NOT 'moral' in character --

"these maxims" (are)[conjoining the four conversational categories, which he makes the point of quoting in full on p. 370:

"Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modus" -- in that order. "An initial class of actual talk-exchanges MANIFESTS rationality", and it does so "by its conformity to the maxims."

Here he uses the verb, "to rationalize", to good effect, in somewhat the use of Anne Freud. Utterers _rationalise_ each other's behaviour, and they rationalise each other by relating the conversational moves to such maxims, or 'violations' (sic in quotes: "seeming, not real") in 'letter', but not 'spirit' (distinction Grice's, p. 370, sic with specific terms). Grice goes on:

"The convesational maxims are thus 'specific' (i.e. they spring from something like, 'be rational') yet they are "still highly general".

Indeed, 'hopelessly vague,' some critics have said, and will continue to say. Elsewhere I have attempted a more general, indeed, quasi-evolutionary (but I'm no Dawkins! No Axelrod, either) format, along what Grice calls elsehwere the manual or immanuel, rather -- the pun on Kant. This is the Grice I enjoy. The punny, rather than the fastidiously 'grand' that some of the Griceans or anti-Griceans even, want!In Gr75 he suggests that immanuels spring from the pirots' necessities to survive. They are adaptable -- indeed so adaptable that some of the adaptations are best seen as ex-aptations! But the conversational maxims can be seen, very cleverly -- as I do elsewhere, SpTAF -- to be instanstiables of a more general pattern of formula. This formula, or formulae, will display three considerations of 'generality': (a) conceptual; (b) applicational, and (c). formal.

For each conversational maxim under each of the four categories, indeed, we look for (remember they are four of them, i.e. FOUR conversational categories) (I call them a decalogue, elsewhere, just to play on Grice, -- "Moses must have brought something else from Sinai than the ten commandments" --, written overleaf a statement of account of Peoples Bank).

First, CONCEPTUAL generality: informativeness (QUAN), trustworthiness (QUAL), relation (R), and modus (M). These are _very_ basic requirements which need to be formulated in philosophically appropriate terms, i.e. _general_ terms. The concepts should be "psychological": information, say, or 'strength' better, for pirots. Trustworthiness in terms of the 'factiveness' of what a pirot displays. "It's raining!", therefore displaying his belief, "honestly", that it _is_ raining. Relatio: "What time is it? Four o'clock." "Four o'clock understood as the answer to the question." "Four o'clock, you said?! It's eleven o'clock." "Sorry, I wasn't answering your question. I did not have a watch to hand; and I was commenting to you on the average time when Brits have tea". Modus: "Quel heur est-il? "eleven forty-nine". I mean, one has to be clear.

Second, APPLICATIONAL generality. This is the evolution of the Golden Rule (wiki, 'evolution of cooperation), as per St. Matthew. The pirots want the maxims instituted, if they want them instituted at all, on condition that _all_ pirots will abide by them. Indeed, if this is almost sphexishly part of what counts as being an 'intelligent, indeed rational' pirot (I have to doublecheck if Grice uses the comma there -- but he is only citing Locke, who I think does not. Vide Jones) there's not much of a choice we have. "A pirot will karulise elatically", i.e. will converse, but rationally (talk). But if he doesn't, i.e. if he does not do it _rationally_ he's just not pirotising! A rational animal who ceases to be rational cannot be said to keep 'humanising'. For each pirot, at each stage of development, there is a _metier_ or raison d'etre (ratio essendi). Tigers tigerise (Grice's example in Gr91), cabbages cabbagise (his example appres "Of Kings and Cabbages" -- 'cabbage' as a value-oriented, or teleo-functional word). Here Grice is being a strict essentialist: the detachment of the essential property to a given pirot just EXTERMINATES the pirot. (Pirots in asyla don't count, then, under this rather eugenic view of things -- but I have to revise his wording to this effect. Surely his wording is softer and more in line with Aristotle's weaker requirements as to what makes a 'man', say, 'rational' (Cfr. Hobbes, "Mann is the onlie beaste reasonable".

Third, and finally, there's FORMAL generality. This has to do with features of discourse. The layout is such structured that we have some sort of gadget to ... play, etc. But will delay discussion of this for a longer day.