Grice on supercalifragilisticexpialidocious

I would have written Kramer, but hey.

In a post under a similar title I consider a Tarski schema for

x is supercalifragilisticexpialidocious

In "qua", Kramer writes:

"I actually like "qua." It makes explicit just which logical device a physical device instantiates."

This

logical-phisical distinction (qua device) is very serious.

I think it overstates, or understates, I forget, some of the compositionality of our talk.

Think

supercalifragilisticexpialidocious

Kramer and perhaps Grice would say that

as an "utterance-part" it has a meaning.

This is a logical device. As a vehicle for meaning.

As a physical device it also has a meaning.

But there are divergences. Any other vehicle to convey the same logical device is, by daffynition, a different 'phsyical' device.

By classifying things as this or that phsyical device to signal this or that logical device we seem to be lumping

-- and hey, I love to lump unless when I can split --


the rich compositional nature of EACH physical device. Whatever the logical device is behind

"supercalifragilisticexpialidocious"

-- eg. to mean that something -- usually a race at Ascot or similar place -- is supercalifragilisticexpialidocious.

But can it be used ironically. Grice doubts that

"You're such a scoundrel"

may be mean ironically to mean 'you are a fine fellow'. "You can only be ironical regarding _bad_ things" he writes (WoW:iii).

So there is a physical device

"supercalifragilisticexpialidocious"

and there is a logical device, i.e. the _meaning_ of the physical device, to wit:

supercalifragilisticexpialidocious

Like Saussure, I use italics to mean a concept (his _arbor_, as meant/signified by 'tree', or by Latin, 'arbor').

Etc.

But the distinction becomes very apt when dealing with ...

dinosaurs.

Esp. my favourite one, Tyrannosaurus rex.

(This last bit, because it's impolite to disagree with another club member)

Etc.