Grice Goes Shopping (Buying a Tie)

"Suppose that two people are considering the purchase
of a tie which both of them KNOW to be medium green", Grice propounds in WoW:iii:

"They look at it in different lights." "And say such things as"

(NOUM 1) -- It is a LIGHT green now

or

(NOUM 2) -- It has a touch of BLUE in it in this light

Strictly, it would be (more) correct for them to say

(PHAIN 1) -- It _seems_ a light GREEN now.

(PHAIN 2) -- It _seems_ to have a touch of BLUE in it in this light.

--- [cfr. McGinn, Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts -- JLS -- for
the relevance of _this_ and _that_ light].

Grice's caveat: DISIMPLICATURE at sight:

"It seems OTIOSE to add such qualificatory words
(when) there is no question of a real change of colour"

Grice is more precise here:

"iff both know (and know that the other knows) that."


A lot of the bibliography in the mit-page refers to Locke and the causal
theory of perception (e.g. Jackson) so I should revise that, on a longer
day. (I like the mit-biblio because it is very specific as to journal articles
and most of my favourite philosophers, e.g. Hacker, successor of Grice at
St. John's, are listed there).

Grice's example may seem prosaic, but so is Hume when Prichard -- in the
wiki essay -- notes that the mind is possibly more enterprising than Hume
allows. Still, the case of colour in connection with seem/is implicature seems
interesting per se. Also: why are colour words used mainly adjectivally?
etc. This and other questions revising the mit-biblio).

Etc.

JLS