Grice cited by that most analytic of analytic American philosophers: genial J. L. Pollock, 1967

Abstract for his study on "non-analytic implication" where he refers to cancellations "a la Grice":

Pollock writes:

"Some ordinary language philosophers, including

Stanley Cavell, have attacked certain tendencies

of traditional philosophers as follows. E.g., when

we say that something looks red to us, we imply

that we think it isn't really red. Thus we

are breaking a rule of language when we say that

something looks red to us when we know it is red. And

thus there is something logically wrong with

the traditional attempt, to say that what justifies

us in thinking that something is red is its

looking red to us. In this article it is maintained

that the 'implication' invoked above is a

contingent relation having to do with what

makes a fact noteworthy, and that the

existence of this implication does not show

that there is anything logically wrong with

the traditional positions being attacked."