Grice's Qualitas

by J. L. Speranza
for the Grice Circle.

-- KRAMER, 'ex post facto', comment, this blog:

"Assumed truthfulness seems to me more a prerequisite to conversation than a feature of conversation. A cannot infer anything from something U says if A does not believe U is being truthful."

Agreed. In my PhD I used 'trustworthiness' instead -- trying to impress the jury of course! Using 'truth' sounded TOO True to be true!

---

In fact, and in general, the English idea of 'truth' is confused! "Verum" does much better in Latin and Italian ('vero').

----

While Grice does use 'true' in Qualitas, he is being, I hope, rhetorical. One can replace it by 'trustworthy':

Grice:

"Under the category of Quality falls a supermaxim -- "Try to make our contribution one that is true""

---

"Be trustworthy".

"and two more specific maxims:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false"

--- Do not be untrustworthy.

"2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence".

I.e. be trustworthy. Be reliable.

--- To trust, in English, is the most you can get out of the language. Truth springs, conceptually, in English, from the subjective psychological attitude of 'trusting'.

The problem I had with this is the doxastic-boulomaic distinction. As Grice notes, it is a BELIEF that is true. Hardly a desire!

But we want conversations to include 'directive' moves:

"Open the door!"

-- trustworthy? Yes: if you WANT the door open. True? Nonsense!

----

Now back to Kramer:

"Assumed truthfulness seems to me more a prerequisite to conversation than a feature of conversation. A cannot infer anything from something U says if A does not believe U is being truthful."

Indeed. But I can. In fact, I rely so much on the addressee's and utterer's irony that I'm never sure if I want them trustworthy.

I would often ask for opinions for which my co-conversationalist partner IS supposed to 'lack adequate evidence'. I find adequate evidence slightly boring.

Note that Grice, while not saying, is trading on Gettier. By having 'adequate evidence' and 'truth' and 'belief', he gets "knowledge" but we do not need to GO there!

"Assumed truthfulness seems to me more a prerequisite to conversation than a feature of conversation. A cannot infer anything from something U says if A does not believe U is being truthful."

But A can infer that U is at least
INTENDING (or merely willing) A to
think that U displays psychological attitude psi with content p.

To THIS U is committing himself. Not so much the very truth (about p), let alone U's sincere psychological attitude.

I analysed this -- in my PhD -- along THREE features of the Griceian analysis of meaning: exhibitiveness, the Grice way, and the anti-sneak clause. The one that concerns us here is the first: exhitiveness. How does Grice explains this? It's on p. 111:

"Let us draw a distinction between what I might
call "purely exhibitive" utterances (utterances by
which the utterer U itnends to impart a belief that
he [U] has a certain propositional attitude), and
utterances which are not only exhibitive but what I might
call "protreptic" (that is, utterances by which U intends,
via imparting the belief that he [U] has a certain
propositional attitude, to induce a corresponding
attitude in the [addressee]."

This is Austin's perlocutionary distinction between 'convince' and 'persuade' with a vengeance!

He returns to the 'exhibitive' on p. 123:

"The effect of the second change ... will be
to introduce a distinction between what I
might call"

--- he just did! But this was ANOTHER day. It is a different lecture!

"EXHIBITIVE utterances (utterances by which the
utterer U M-intends ["M", circularly, for 'meaning']
to impart a belief that he (U) has a certain
propositional attitude) and utterances which are not only
exhibitive but what I might call "protreptic""

-- the man refused to republish "Causal theory of perception" on the ground that it would have been repetitive, but he is repeating himself after less than, say, 10 pages! You gotta love him!

"(utterances by which U M-intends, via imparting
a belief taht he (U) has a certain propositional
attitude, to induce"

-- favourite Gricean verb there --

"a corresponding attitude in the [addresee]."

So, back to Kramer:

"Assumed truthfulness seems to me more a prerequisite to conversation than a feature of conversation. A cannot infer anything from something U says if A does not believe U is being truthful."

Surely A can merely expect that U is being 'purely exhibitive'? I know it's hard, but try!

The FIRST condition for meaning then, becomes:

-- U intends that A believes that U believes that p.

How do you fulfil this intention? Not by being truthful! But by achieving it and its goal. I.e. the point that A will believe that U believes that p.

Note that Grice agrees with Kramer that 'truth' is at the heart of the matter. Moore's our man.

"It is raining but I don't believe it".

Grice comments:

By uttering "p", Grice suggests:

"the natural thing to say ths that [U] has
EPXRESSED (or at least purported to express)
the belief that p."

He adds:

"He has of course COMMITTED himself, in a
certain way"

that I'm never certain about!

"to its BEING THE CASE that"

not p, but

"he [i.e. U] believes that p, and while
this commitment is NOT a case of"

explicitly stating it,

"it is bound up, in a special way, with"

.p

(where .p indicates the assertion sign of Frege. Versus !p for 'Close the door').

"The nature of this connection will, I hope, become
apparent when I say somethingabout the function
of the indicative mood".

Or mode.

I can hear sighs from the Audience. "So, this man is going to tell us that the function of the indicative mode is to indicate?!"