Kramer and Grice on the uses of argument: unius est exclusio, noscitur a sociis

by J. L. Speranza
-- for the Grice Club.

JUST BECAUSE KRAMER USED 'ex post facto' and I looked for the retronym (ex ante facto, which sounded more logical to me -- surely I need to KNOW in 'advance' to my doing -- I came across this rather sloppy use of Grice by Smith, to which Kramer is responding:

"Legal exchange is a particular kind of conversation, not
a non-conversation. And there are maxims for
interpreting contracts that indeed involve
implicature: expression unius est exclusio alterius,
noscitur a sociis and the general rule that a
contract will be construed contra proferentum - against
the party who wrote it (so that, for example, disingenuous will not pay)."

Excellent.

And there's suggestio falsi, and the rest of them!

I wish I knew more (about) legalese. When Toulmin died, recently, I wrote elsewhere about that (his death). Reviewing the reviews, and his opus magnum, "The uses of argument", I encountered this feeling, among philosophers, that Toulmin, perhaps unphilosophically, focused on 'legal' argument. But now I know what they meant!

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Grice was too wedded to 'philosophy of perception' (British vein) to care much for legalese, but I get Kramer's point.

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Now, Toulmin's take, that legal argument should be the MODEL for all argument -- hence his alternative to the premise-conclusion model of reasoning and provision of one that dwells on 'backing' and stuff, should be perhaps be interpreted in a Griceian key.

Toulmin's fare in America, he said, was unfortunate. He found his "Uses of Argument" which had been criticised by Strawson in the Oxford of Grice's day -- and in general ignored by his Oxford pares -- had become a textbook in the USA, but not in the philosophy classes or courses, but in the rhetorical ones!

I had to read Leech (and his principles of what he calls 'conversational rhetoric') to see that it is perhaps in legal rhetoric and rhetoric in general that the heart of the Griceian proposal lies. Recall that the rhetor of olden times was a bit of a lawyer.

For example, I never understood why Demosthenes would care to utter conversational moves (and explicit performatives) to the waves... Helping them to understand -- what?