Grice on construction and reconstruction

by J. L. Speranza
-- for the Grice Club.

JONES WAS TAKING UP my suggestion to distinguish, transitorily, between construction and reconstruction (vis a vis, of course, Derrida's deconstruction.

Jones wrote ("Commentary" to "Grice's Constructionism"):

"The re- seems appropriate ... when the construction is exegetical, and possibly also for not quite exegetical but similar in some respects things "descriptive" ... [i.e.] attempts to construct an account ... of something which is already more or less definitely out there. Constructive without the re- suggests something more novel, a construction which stands on its own merits rather than serving only to make clearer some prior construction, either in an author or something less personal like a language."

Excellent and indeed. In my "Rutinary Grice" I summarise Grice's remarks about "construction routines" in general and his choice of three construction routines in particular (projection, objectification, and transubstantiation). The first involves precisely the point made by Jones, and note that Grice is not saying that if you apply ONE routine you may not need the other. The point about the construction-reconstruction distinction applies to the very first stage of construction routine No. 1: projection. For Grice writes:

"We [do] have some initial concept. ... We can
think of [this initial item]' as an
"intuitive and unclarified element in our" conceptual scheme."

The point is important for Grice because he wants the construction routines to provide MORE than what he calls a 'way of speaking'. So the scheme or framework is conceptual rather than merely linguistic (but I'm not sure Carnap would take this distinction seriously enough!). Grice goes on:

"Application of this [prjective] routine to
our initial concept ('putting it thought the mangle') does
furnish one with a metaphysical REcontruction of
that concept, or, if the first stage is missing, we
are giving a metaphysical construction of
a NEW concept."

Now, the point Grice wants to make (and does) between hypostasis and hypothesis (phlogiston, atom, quark) may be relevant here.

Also relevant may be the question: why bother?

I.e. why bother with the construction of a NEW concept? Personally, I would need to be strongly persuaded that we NEED a new concept! It's different with a quark, say, because hypotheses are supposed to picture what is 'out there'. But in metaphysics?! Give me a break! I'm joking, but you get my drift!

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I discussed the phlogiston theory that Grice refers to in "Actions and Events" elsewhere at some length in this blog. Note that Grice would say that explanatory adequacy (if I may use that ugly term by Chomsky) is just one type of adequacy that may count in hypostasis. While we trust boring scientists are only aiming at EXPLAINING stuff. Etc. I write 'boring' just to provoke the Devil of Scientism! Or not!

But then, when it comes to lingo. Imagine if you were to be told, qua philosopher, or student of philosophy: "Okay, your job it will be from now on to analyse English!" Boring linguistic stuff! The philosopher SHOULD never feel imprisoned like that. He should be able to rig the metaphysics, as Grice puts it. Or not!