Rutinary Grice

--- by J. L. Speranza
------ for the Grice Circle.

R. B. JONES, Commentary on "Grice's Constructionism", was wondering about construction vis a vis reconstruction (and I added, deconstruction). Here is Grice in "Reply to Richards", pp. 96ff.

"It is now time for me to turn to
a consideration of the ways in which
metaphysical CONSTRUCTION is effected."

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"I should like to make one or two
general remarks about CONSTRUCTION ROUTINES."

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Grice points to a "difficult problem":

"how are we to distinguish
metaphysical construction
from scientific construction...?"

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"of such entities as [like]
electrons or quarks."

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ROUTINE 1: "projection"

ROUTINE 2: "subjectification"

Routine 3. "transsubtantiation"

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ROUTINE 1: Projection.

This includes four stages:

1. "We [do] have some initial concept. ... We can think of [this initial item]' as an "intuitive and unclarified element in our" conceptual scheme. "Application of this routine to our initial concept ('putting it thought the mangle') does furnish one with a metaphysical REcontruction of that concept, or, if the first stage is missing, we are giving a metaphysical construction of a NEW concept." (This is exactly Jones's point about the 're-' or lack thereof.).

What IS the 'mangle'?

From online etymology:

"c.1400, from Anglo-Fr. mangler, freq. of O.Fr. mangoner "cut to pieces," of uncertain origin, perhaps connected with O.Fr. mahaignier "to maim, mutilate, wound" (see maim). Meaning "to mispronounce (words), garble" is from 1530s. Related: Mangled."

From a better online source:

mangle: a machine for pressing and smoothing cloth, esp. sheets and other flat pieces, between heated rollers. Origin: Dutch "mangel" < German < Middle High German, diminutive of "mange," a mangle, from the Latin manganum, from the Greek "manganon," war machine, orig. deceptive device, from the Indo-European base *meng-, to embellish deceptively, yielding Modern Irish meng, deceit, Latin, "mango," falsifying dealer.


2. We reach a psychological attitude, in the specification of which we "use the name of the initial concept as an adverbial modifier". This attitude displays in behaviour.

3. "reference to specific states is replaced by a more general psychological verb together with an operator" and which it yet "cannot appear in subclauses".

4. "At the fourth and last stage", "there is no limitation of the apperance of the operat[or] in subordinate clauses." This last stage is "possible only via the provision of truth-conditions ... for statements within which the operators appear. Only thus can the permissible complexities be made intelligible."

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ROUTINE 2: subjectivification.

This is Aristotle's "category shift". Echoing "nominalisation", Grice speaks of 'objectification' here, which is back to Derrida on Husserl's epoche, almost. Unlike Aristotle, for Grice, "the development" of the routine "might require not one blow but a succession of blows."

(I believe there is a typo on p. 99, line 4 of "Reply to Richards" here, but Grice refers to the category of qualitas ('non-quantitative attribute') and quantitas ('quantitative attribute') and things like a given category (e.g. event) and a corresponding subordinate category (action)).

The point of the category shift is that "derivatives of, or conversions of, items which start life ... as predicable, in one non-substantial slot or another, ... may themselves come to occupy the first slot."

"They will be [a quality] or [a quantity] "of a particular type or token of a substantial". "Not being a quality or a quantity of a substance, they will not be a quality or a quantity simpliciter."

Grice suspects at this point that "only for substances ... are ALL the slots filled by predicable items" -- One reads that and is happy that Grice cared to keep his notes from seminars on Aristotle's Categories that he developed in Oxford back in the day with Strawson -- some archival material repr. in Chapman.

----- archival material on categoies in Chapman, pp. 50ff.

Chapman:

"'Mercy' can be both referred to and predicated, whereas 'Socrates' can only be referred to."

Example by Grice/Strawson:

A: Bunbury is really disinterested.
B: Disinterested persons do not exist. Real disinterestedness does not exist.
A: Yes, they do. Disinterested persons do exist. Yes, it does. Real disinterestedness does exist. Bunbury is really disiniterested.

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The the following is "not linguistic in order" (Grice's and Strawson's wording):

A: Bunbury is really disinterested.
B: There is no such person as Bunbury.
A: Yes, there is. He is really disinterested.

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Chapman comments: "Producing a sentence in which something is predicated of a SUBSTANTIAL is not enough to guarantee the existence of that subjet."

"[Grice and Strawson] note that the situation would be quite different" if we replace 'is really disinterested' by "in the next room":

A: Bunbury is in the next room.
B: There is no such person as Bunbury.
A: Yes, there is; he is in the next room.

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"Here", Chapman comments as she quotes verbatim from the Grice collection, "A's choice of predicate does MORE than just offer a description of Bunbury."

This should appeal Jones:

"['in the next room'] points to a way
of verifying his existence." (emphasis mine. JLS).

"Our use of language," Chapman concludes as she reads Grice, "then, very often, presupposes the existence of substantial objects."

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Back to "Reply to Richards" (this section is now repr. in Grice 1991, thanks to J. Baker's editing it out of the festschrift into Grice's own book).

Grice goes on:

"Some of these substantials which are NOT substances
may derive from a plurality of items from DIFFERENT
original categories."

To elaborate on his point in "Actions and Events" (Philosophical Quarterly, 1986), he notes: "Events, for example, might be COMPLEX substantials deriving from [at least] a substance, an attribute, and a time."

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"The introduction of a new category of entities must be properly motivated; if it is not, perhpas it FAILS to be a case of entity CONSTRUCTION altogether".

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What sort of motivation? Well, explanatory. "It may be", Grice notes in a brilliant reference to Ryle's colleague at Oxford (by 'colleague' I mean generational), William Calvert Kneale, "that..."

"the substantial introduction of
abstract entities, like properties,
makes possible the application of ...
secondary induction -- the principles
at work in primary induction".

--- the ref. here being to "Probability and Induction", p. 104).

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What DEGREE of motivation. Sort of motivation is not enough, "It is not only the sort but the degree of motivation which is in question."

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"If they work, they exist".

Is constructed existence mandatory or merely 'well-motivated'?

"It seems that to achieve REALITY"

e.g. for VALUE to achieve reality, or for practical reason to achieve reality,

"the acceptance of a category
of entities has to be MANDATORY."

"Can we tolerate a division of
CONSTRUCTED REALITY into two segments,
with admission requirements of different
degrees of stringency? Or is there, rather,
just ONE sort of admission requirement
which is in some casess over-fulfilled?"

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Routine III: transubtantiation.

Genitorial programme. Pirotologica.

"Let us suppose that the Genitor has sanctioned
the appearance of a biological type."

"He, perhaps unwittingly, may have thereby
created a breed of POTENTIAL METAPHYSICIANS."

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1. The item in question.

2. relatived or absolute? If relativised, not mandatory -- or 'dispensable'.

3. rational demand. "That metaphysical house-room be found for ... [the item in question] is a rational demand." This is rather like "to say that there is good reason for WANTING it to be true that [the item is acceptable."

"Whatever limits are imposed by metaphyisical CONSTRUCTIONS already made, we are free to rig our metaphysics."

Grice sees this as "quasi-practical".

4. A class of creatures has been 'invented' into a class of substances. "Once the concept ... [x] qua-member-of-a-kind has been set up for a class of substances, the way is opened for the appearance of transmitting relationships which will extend the application of [x]-in-a-kind to suitably qualified non-substantial aspects if members of a kind."

5. To reach the goal of securing the admissibility of the item, and we "need a class of pirmary examples of an unqualified version" of that item. We reach x not just 'qua-member-of-a-kind', but "tout court". Such item "could be attributed to the kind", and even to "individual members of the kind."

So -- who's rutinary?