Survival of the Liar

by J. L. Speranza
-- for the Grice Club.

KRAMER in 'ex post facto, ex ante facto' comment, this blog:

"to the extent A believes that U is not speaking truthfully, A will regard U's utterance as a charade, not as part of conversation. But to the extent that A believes U, I don't see how analysis of the conversation that A thinks is happening is aided by any reference to the fact that U is lying."

---

Good point. Perhaps evolutionary point? I must say that if I am an evolutionist it's because of Kramer. He evolved me into that.

I would think Grice is thinking of thought transmissions. Consider WoW: 286. Tired of analysis, Grice is venturing a 'myth'. Why one would care to have TRUE beliefs about things. Note that I know People who rather not!

Grice writes:

"The creature C"

or pirot, as I prefer

"may be frustrated if certain psychological
correspondences do not obtain. For instance, if
C believes WRONGLY that the object in front of
it is a piece of cheese, or things WRONGLY
of cheese as being from its point of view
as soeming to eat, then at the very least, C
may get indegestion when it consumes the object"

-- which happened to be a venomous fungus. And death followed indigestion.

Grice goes on:

"For this reason, psychological correspondences
are required (things like beliefs HAVE to be true,
and so on) for the operation of the psychological
mechanisms which I have sketched to be
BENEFICIAL to the creature in question"

In my "The feast of conversational reason", I just expanded on the co-pirotic situation.

A: That's cheese, right?
B: No; it's a poisonous venom.

Why would B, who is a friendly pirot, or co-pirot (cfr. pun in "Pirots of Penzance") lie about such a crucial stuff? It's not like they are enemies, or anything.

Kramer:

"to the extent that A believes U, I don't see how analysis of the conversation that A thinks is happening is aided by any reference to the fact that U is lying."

I'm not sure I'm getting Kramer's point, since MINE is so obvious it hurts. Of course, qua conversationalists, qua engaged in the alleged common goal of 'exchanging 'information'', by definition true, should care otherwise!

The liar is a no-no! But, it seems he goes BEYOND meaning.

Consider, again, irony.

Irony is NOT a lie, you know, but the point Grice makes about irony and meaning -- ironising about -p via uttering "p") and meaning that p, and lying about -p by uttering 'p' -- may all connect:

Grice's example is

"Palmer gave Nicklaus quite a beating."

what U meant:

Perhaps:

--- that Palmer gave Nicklaus quite a beating.

But, perhaps, Grice notes, U is being ironical, in which case, it is not the case that by uttering "It is raining" U meant that it is raining.

----

U is not lying either.

Grice imagines the scenario of someone reporting:

(R):

"When U uttered the sentence, 'Palmer gave Nicklaus
quite a beating', U meant THAT Palmer vanquished
Nicklaus with some ease."

Grice comments:

"U might have been speaking IRONICALLY,"

-- never mind lying --

"in which case he would likely have meant
that _Nicklaus_ vanquised _Palmer_ with some ease. In that case [(R)] would clearly be false."

So, at one stage, the lying or non-lying circumstances are just 'round the corner' but I have no petrol to sell!