Henden, Edmund
Source:Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action, 9(3), 295-308. 14 p. September 2006.
Document Type:Journal Article
Subjects:DEFEASIBILITY
IRRATIONALITY
JUDGMENT
METAPHYSICS
REASONS
Persons as Subjects:DAVIDSON, DONALD
Abstract:Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, 'all things considered, it would be better for me to do 'a' rather than 'b' (or any range of alternatives to doing a)' where 'a' and 'b' stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this question, one suggested by Donald Davidson, the other by Paul Grice and Judith Baker. I argue that neither interpretation is adequate. However, a third interpretation that combines features of the Grice/Baker view with the Davidsonian view is possible. In the final section of the paper I defend this interpretation against two objections.
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