Grice gave the Kant lectures on "Aspects of reason and reasoning" at Stanford. A few years later, he provided an updated version as the Locke lectures. They have come out as "Aspects of reason", as edited by R. Warner (Oxford: Clarendon).
The keyword is: RATIONALITY. Cfr. Grandy/Warner, "Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends", aka P.G.R.I.C.E.
Perhaps we can compare W. W. Bartley, III, and his editing of Popper, with, say, R. Warner, and his editing of Grice.
My references will be: D. Sepety, 'Non-Justificationist Rationality: an Attempt of Elucidation'.
M. Artigas, Essay on Popper.
Popper: "We should not depart from common sense without some fairly good reason".
A non-justificationist philosophy of rationality and of knowledge-progress, such as Karl Raimund Popper's, or William Warner Bartley, III's – critical rationalism (CR) or, with Bartley’s corrections, comprehensively critical rationalism (CCR) for short – has often been misunderstood and misrepresented as stretching its rejection of justification too far beyond what Popper’s and Bartley’s arguments really prove.
Should a Griceian care about THAT?
For the record, "CCR" (i.e. comprehensively critical rationalism" of the type Grice never adhered to) is often discussed, equally by many its opponents as well as by some its distinguished proponents, as if it denied the possibility and the need of justification of whatever position (statement, theory, belief, attitude, etc.) in the widest possible meaning, whatever 'justification' can mean.
Most salient example is that of Miller – probably the most reputed modern Popperian.
Miller goes as far as to argue that there are no such things as "good" reasons -- whether positive or negative --.
Miller adds that reasons, "poor things", are merely subjective epiphenomena which “has no job to do, as far as rational thought is concerned”.
Some opponents of comprehensively critical rationalism are keen to catch on such "Popperian" arguments as if they adequately represent Popper’s own views.
But the truth is that Popper’s view were a far cry from this.
To be sure, some of Popper’s statements have superficial similarity to Miller’s.
For example, in "Realism and the Aim of Science" Popper admits that we cannot give any positive justification or any positive reason for our theories and our beliefs.
That is to say, we cannot give any positive reason for holding our theories to be true.
But Popper explains that by 'justification' and 'positive reasons' he means reasons for holding them to be true, or to be at least 'probable' (in the sense of probability calculus, rather than Cicero's).
And Popper gives further explanations.
We can often give reasons for regarding one theory as preferable to another.
These reasons consist in pointing out that, and how, one theory has hitherto withstood criticism better than another.
Popper calls such reasons "critical reasons."
Giving reasons for one’s preference can of course be called a justification, in ordinary language.
As in I have a critical reason for liking peaches and cream.
But it is not "justification" in the "sense" criticised by Popper.
Our preferences are justified only relative to the present state of discussion.
We may have found some tentative reasons to believe (yes, even to believe) that a new theory comes nearer to the truth than its predecessors.
We can have good reasons – that is, good critical reasons.
In other places Popper also uses word-combination, such as “weighty reasons”.
In "Reply to My Critics "Popper makes another light-shedding statement.
Our experiences may even be described as inconclusive reasons.
They are reasons because of the generally reliable character of our observations.
They are inconclusive because of our fallibility.
Thus realists have quite a good argument for relying, up to a point – the point of fallibilism – upon observations or even perceptions.
The importance of reasons is most saliently stated by Popper in his essay, " Toleration and Intellectual Responsibility".
The principle of rational discussion: we want to try, as impersonally as possible, to weigh up our reasons for and against a theory.
Now, to recapitulate Popper’s position and point out its difference from Miller’s.
Popper denies possibility of justification and positive reasons in the meaning of logically valid demonstration that theory (belief, statement) is true or, at least, highly probable (in the sense of probability calculus).
And Popper holds that we can have good weighty critical reasons for preference of one theory over another, or for thinking-believing that it is nearer the truth than its known alternatives.
It is to be remarked that those quotations are about empirical scientific theories and universal statements of the form: all Xs are Y.
If we are concerned with truth of singular statements or statements outside empirical science, we can as well often have good reasons for believing that statement is true.
Critical reasons are "relative to the present state of discussion”, i.e. they are contents of arguments which make us judge position as true or as the best (nearest the truth) among known alternatives.
Besides, though there are no 'positive reasons' in the meaning of providing certainty-or-high-probability, there are positive reasons in another meaning – that of favourable reasons ("reasons for a theory").
In this sense, critical reasons can be positive (favourable) as well as negative (unfavourable).
And weighing up these reasons is so important “as far as rational thought is concerned”, that Popper calls it “the principle of rational discussion”.
Miller, instead, argues that both positive and negative reasons, meaning favourable and unfavourable reasons, have no job to do as far as rational thought is concerned.
Miller’s position has its opponents among modern critical rationalists.
The most outspoken and steadfast is Alan Musgrave.
Musgrave proposes to distinguish reasons for a statement or justification for a statement from reasons or justification for accepting (or believing, holding, preference for) a statement.
By reasons for a statement (justification for a statement) Musgrave means logically valid demonstration that theory (belief, statement) is true or, at least, highly probable (in the sense of probability calculus), i.e., exactly that 'justification' or 'positive reasons' which Popper rejected as impossible, for simple logical reasons.
On the other side, Musgrave argues that we can have good reasons for accepting (believing, holding, preference for) a statement, and that this was also Popper’s view.
On this ground, Musgrave criticizes, on one side, Miller and, on the other side, such Popper’s critics as Ayer, Currie etc., for conflating reasons for a statement, i.e. justification for a statement, with reasons for, or justification for, accepting (or believing, holding, preference for) a statement.
On this problem, our position is close, by meaning, to Musgrave’s.
But we have some qualms about form of Musgrave’s exposition and some of his criticisms of Popper’s opponents.
And we would explain the viewpoint of critical rationalism on "justification" in other, hopefully more elucidating, terms.
In the article Experience and Perceptual Belief, as in many others, Musgrave defines justificationism as the view that a reason for a belief-act must be a reason for its content, i.e. the assumption that a reason for believing something must also be a reason for what is believed, and that a good reason for believing something must also be a good reason in the logical sense for what is believed.
This definition is too technical, even scholastic.
You will hardly understand adequately what Sir Karl Raimund Popper, W. W. Bartley, III, and other’s critical rationalists reject as 'justificationism' from this definition, if you don’t know this in advance.
Neither Sir Karl Raimund Popper nor W. W. Bartley, III, defined or described justificationism likewise.
It is needless to say that some leading non-justificationists, especially Miller, deny the relevance of distinction between a reason for believing something and a reason for what is believed.
So, Musgrave’s definition makes them justificationists by definition.
In discussion with Miller it is clearly begging the question.
A further drawback of this definition is that it provokes controversy about phrases.
Some so-called "justificationists" can mean by phrase "to justify a statement" the same thing which Musgrave means by phrase "to justify believing (accepting) a statement".
Are we to contend that they are wrong in this?
What is the authority that decrees right phrase-meanings? This has something to do with some Musgrave’s criticisms of Popper’s opponents.
Musgrave adduces quotations of Ayer and Currie where they alternately use phrases "justification for a basic statement" and "justification (adequate grounds, reasons) for accepting a basic statement", as if these phrases mean the same.
On this ground, Musgrave charges them with conflation of "justification for accepting a basic statement" and "justification for a basic statement", which is (on his definition) justificationism.
But this would be right if, and only if, Ayer and Currie mean by "justification for a basic statement" logically valid demonstration of truth (or high probability).
Instead, they could mean by this phrase the same as "justification for accepting a basic statement".
To engage in discussion about "right" meaning would be essentialism (much criticized by Popper).
It presupposes that there are true answers to questions:
"What justification of a statement really is?" and
"What justification of believing a statement really is?",
and that these answers are different.
Justification of a statement really is not the same thing as justification of believing a statement.
We propose to escape this misleading essentialist way of discussion.
For the record, Popper himself did not make explicit distinction between "justification for accepting a statements" and "justification for a statements".
Musgrave’s discussion suggests that Popper implicitly presupposed this distinction.
Indeed, when Popper admits existence of (critical) reasons he usually use word 'reason' in combinations with verbs or verbal nouns: “reason to think that…” “reasons for regarding one theory as preferable to another”, “reasons for one’s preference”, “tentative reasons to believe (yes, even to believe) that …”
But sometimes Popper does otherwise.
For example, Popper writes about guess (as content, not as act!):
If it withstands severe criticism, then this fact may be taken as a good critical reason in favour of it.
Even more, Popper admits existence of reasons for a theory.
The principle of rational discussion: we want to try, as impersonally as possible, to weigh up our reasons for and against a theory.
Did Popper conflate "reasons for accepting a statement" and "reasons for a statement"?
Was he justificationist?
No.
He believed that words and phrases don’t matter, as far as they succeed to communicate the meaning.
To summarize and to proceed to elucidation of Popper’s-Bartley’s non-justificationism, we propose the following theses.
There is no generally accepted and adhered convention on the meaning of the phrase "to justify a statement".
Nobody possess monopoly on the "right" meaning. I.e. there is no "right" meaning, there are just different meanings in usage.
We am able to distinguish three main different meanings in which the phrase
"to justify a statement"
is sometimes used:
-- absolute justification:
To justify a statement is to demonstrate in logically valid way that it is true or, at least, highly probable (in the sense of probability calculus); absolute justification, in this sense, can be either conclusive (demonstration of truth) or probabilistic (demonstration of high probability).
It is absolute in the sense that it is not relative to some assumptions which themselves aren’t justified in this sense.
Relative inductive justification is the verification of universal statement (theory) relative to some finite set of singular statements ("basic statements").
To justify (verify) a theory T relative to a set S of basic statements is to demonstrate in logically valid way either that if all statements of S are true then T is true; or that if all statements of S are true then it is highly probable (in the sense of probability calculus) that T is true; or that if all statements of S are true then it is highly probable (in the sense of probability calculus) that next (random) singular derivation (prediction) of T which don’t belong to S is true;
-- tentative justification:
To justify a statement (or believing a statement, or preference for a statement) is to argue (provide reasons) in its favour, to defend it against criticisms, to explain my reasons for believing it true or preferable (the best among known alternatives); such "justification" is deductive and relative to some set of assumptions I (tentatively) accept as true and hope that they will also be accepted by other participants of discussion.
Given these distinctions, Popper’s-Bartley’s non-justificationism (CR-CCR) is about absolute justification (both conclusive and probabilistic), though Popper sometimes mixes it with relative inductive justification (falsificationism, negation of verification in "inductive" direction, from singular to universal statements, – which is more specific theory based on different argumentation). Popper’s and Bartley’s arguments has nothing to do with negation of tentative justification.
On the other hand, some of Popper’s supposed opponents (relegated by Popper and many Popperians to "psychologism" or "justificationism"), when discussing the problem of justification, mean tentative justification, not absolute justification or relative inductive justification.
In Musgrave’s terms, tentative justification would be described as “justification for accepting a statement”.
But, if you would agree with the above, then there is no reason to blame others for describing it as “justification for a statement” and for conflation of “justification for a statement” and “justification for accepting a statement”.
They merely may mean by these phrases the same, and I don’t think that it is decreed by some universally recognized authority that “justification of a statement” must mean something different from “justification for accepting a statement”.
Musgrave’s proposition to distinguish one from another may be useful, if accepted.
But its acceptance, – generally, acceptance or non-acceptance of proposed ways of description, – is a matter of convenience and convention, not of truth.
If so, Ayer, Currie etc. may use word-combination "justification for a statement" in the same meaning which Musgrave proposes to reserve for word-combination "justification for believing a statement", and this is not to be criticized.
Instead, Popper’s opponents may be criticized for misunderstanding Popper’s meaning, which may make their criticism of Popper mistaken.
In many cases it is more natural to describe tentative justification as tentative justification for a theory or a justification for a moral or political) attitude.
If when providing arguments in favour of a theory (attitude) or defending it against criticisms we are interested in a theory (attitude), in its merits, – not in justifying ourselves for holding it.
Also, let us notice that term "justification" is a metaphor taken from judicial practice where it means rebuttal of accusations, defence against accusations and resulting verdict "non-guilty".
The closest analogy in epistemology – refutation of criticisms.
Suppose, some position (statement, theory) we hold is criticized, and criticisms are (as they should be) impersonal, directed at the position (statement, theory), not at ourselves.
In this case refutation of criticisms is defending-justifying the position (statement, theory), not ourselves for accepting (believing) it.
To make my point more clear, let us consider a fragment from another Musgrave’s article, Critical rationalism.
Musgrave defines 'inconclusive reasons' as 'reason that establish that P is probable', and then explain (with reference to Popper’s and Miller’s arguments) why they are impossible, as well as conclusive reasons. (Musgrave 2007, 179-180)
We quite agree, given that definition.
But we think proper to remark that, as far as I see it, it is just as (if not more) natural to use the phrase 'inconclusive reasons' in a different meaning – what some call 'tentative reasons'.
For example, when Popper writes that our experiences may even be described as inconclusive reasons, he surely doesn’t mean 'reasons that establish that P is probable'.
Experiences can’t establish probability – "no more than thumping the table", as Popper wrote.
Given the fact that I have an experience of seeing a tree, there is no way to calculate probability that there is a tree.
Though in some fuzzy common language sense it can be said that probably there is a cat, especially if others see it too.
But it is not probability "in the sense of probability calculus".
Surely, Musgrave can say that Рopper did mean inconclusive reasons for accepting a statement, not inconclusive reasons for a statement.
But such wording would be sort of juggling, double-standard about the meaning of 'inconclusive'.
If inconclusiveness of 'a reason for accepting a statement' doesn’t mean probability, why inconclusiveness of 'a reason for a statement' must mean probability?
If inconclusiveness of 'a reason for accepting a statement' means tentativeness, why inconclusiveness of 'a reason for a statement' is not to mean tentativeness?
But, if inconclusiveness of 'a reason for a statement' means tentativeness, or if we explicitly use phrase 'tentative reason' (while designating 'reason that establish that P is probable' as 'probabilistic reason' or, better, 'absolute probabilistic reason'), then distinction of a reason for accepting a statement and a reason for a statement is not principal for non-justificationism.
Replacement of reasons for a statement with reasons for accepting a statement does not solve the problem of infinite justificationist regress (the problem of limits of rationality); acknowledgement of tentative character of reasons does.
Distinction of a reason for accepting a statement and a reason for a statement is useful, but not for non-justificationism (it doesn’t solve the problem of infinite justificationist regress).
It is useful for hypothetico-deductivism, for it conveys a logical structure of some important deductive arguments (and so, shows how we can do without induction), such as arguments for acceptance of scientific empirical theories.
The fact that such arguments aren’t deductive inferences from some factual premises to a theory, but deductive inferences from premises one of which defines a condition when it is reasonable to accept a theory as true to the conclusion that it is reasonable to accept a theory as true.
So, the problem of justification is not adequately explained away in terms of distinction of justification for a statement and justification for believing (acceptance, holding, preference for) a statement"
A more relevant distinction is that between absolute justification and tentative justification, conclusive-or-high-probability-providing reasons ant tentative reasons, as described above. In these terms, our understanding of Popper’s and Bartley’s non-justificationism proceeds.
Absolute justification as logically valid demonstration that statement is true or, at least, highly probable (in the sense of probability calculus) is usually logically impossible (except for tautologies).
Symmetrically, absolute refutation as logically valid demonstration that statement is false is usually logically impossible (except for self-contradictory statements).
We are to replace justificationist conception of rationality which demands justification in above sense with critical conception which equates rationality (≡ rational attitude) with openness to critical discussion aimed at truth, acknowledgement of our fallibility, willingness to find out and eliminate mistakes in our beliefs, seeing critical discussion as the best (though fallible) guide.
Relative inductive justification (verification) is logically invalid.
Asymmetrically: relative refutation (falsification) in inductive direction (from singular to universal statements) is logically valid deductive inference.
So, on assumption of some singular statements, it never logically follows that universal statement is true or highly probable; while it can follow that universal statement is false.
Justification in a weak sense, tentative justification (tentative, critical favourable reasons) can often be given, as well as tentative criticism (tentative, critical unfavourable reasons).
It is to be remarked, that both absolute justification and tentative justification – in contrast with relative inductive justification – have nothing to do with induction: they can mean purely deductive arguments.
As consequence, while there is logical asymmetry of verification (invalid) and falsification (valid) in inductive direction, and it lies at heart of Popper’s falsificationism, there is no analogous logical asymmetry between absolute justification and absolute refutation (both are impossible), tentative justification and tentative criticism (both are possible).
As far as development of knowledge is concerned, we needn’t worry about justification at all, even about tentative justification.
We needn’t aim at or look for justification.
All we need to worry about, aim at, look for is truth or falsity and explanatory power.
Justification as epistemological aim is redundant; even harmful.
Concern for justification, instead of truth and explanatory power, can only impede development of knowledge.
So, we are to renounce search for justification, and intensify search for true (or nearing the truth) theories with great explanatory power.
We are not to ask: if statement A is justified?
Neither are we to ask: if acceptance of (holding, believing) A is justified?
We are to ask: if (as far as we can judge in the light of all arguments we are able to find) A is true, or the best candidate for truth? or: if, and where, A is mistaken?
On methodological level, we are not to ask: if these methodological rules are justified?
We are to ask: what methodological rules are most conductive to true (or nearing the truth) theories with great explanatory power?
As for the whole enterprise of rationality and science, its justification is our willingness to find true and interesting explanations and our hope that we can, if we try hard enough, to succeed – more or less – in nearing this aim and sometimes even in achieving it.
Admittedly, this confusion was in part provoked by Popper himself, for he sometimes used word-combinations 'critical argument' and 'negative argument' as synonyms.
Probably this was because Popper had in mind mainly the problem of evaluation of universal statements (scientific theories) by singular statements (observational "basic statements").
As far as this problem is concerned, critical arguments well-nigh coincide with empirical refutation (falsification).
But this coincidence is not extendable on other argumentative matters.
We are often to be concerned with it for practical purposes.
We now proceed to consider the points by M. Artigas, of the Jacques Maritain Centre, Thomistic Institute, in "The Ethical Roots of Karl Popper's Epistemology" is very grateful to the organizers of the annual Thomistic Institute for having invited me to take part in this summer Institute.
When Artigas read in the invitation to the colloquium that Artigas was supposed, as the invitation letter ran,
"to give a lecture on the area of Karl Popper and Aquinas",
Artigas realized that the task was not an easy one, even for a person like Artigas who considers himself as a Thomist and has worked for some years on the philosophy of Sir Karl Raimund Popper.
Indeed, it is difficult to find two authors so different as Aquinas and
Popper.
Perhaps Grice and Leibniz?
Popper and Saint Aquinas (as Popper would never call him) differ widely in their religious beliefs, in their interests, in their methods and in their conclusions.
Empirical science, which plays a central role in Popper's entire philosophy, was almost nonexistent in Aquinas' times.
Perhaps Grice and Leibniz?
Popper and Saint Aquinas (as Popper would never call him) differ widely in their religious beliefs, in their interests, in their methods and in their conclusions.
Empirical science, which plays a central role in Popper's entire philosophy, was almost nonexistent in Aquinas' times.
Surely, at least some of you know that there exists a book, published in
1993, which is centered precisely on "Popper and Aquinas".
Its author is G. Zanotti, who teaches philosophy in the Universidad Austral in Buenos Aires.
Zanotti knows his Popper quite well and other authors in the area of contemporary epistemology. He has also written two articles where he evaluates Popper's position.
In his essay, Zanotti he even tries to approach Popper's position and Artigas's.
Zanotti represents a very specific position which deserves our attention.
We will present first an outline of it and then I will present a different kind of approach which I think is relevant for Zanotti's claim.
Its author is G. Zanotti, who teaches philosophy in the Universidad Austral in Buenos Aires.
Zanotti knows his Popper quite well and other authors in the area of contemporary epistemology. He has also written two articles where he evaluates Popper's position.
In his essay, Zanotti he even tries to approach Popper's position and Artigas's.
Zanotti represents a very specific position which deserves our attention.
We will present first an outline of it and then I will present a different kind of approach which I think is relevant for Zanotti's claim.
Zanotti holds that Popper is right in his epistemology.
He adds that Popper's epistemology requires some kind of foundation which can be provided by Aquinas' metaphysics, and he warns us that Popper's position only gives rise to philosophical difficulties if it is extrapolated from the specialized field of epistemology into a general philosophical outlook.
Therefore, in order to evaluate Zanotti's position, we must first of all determine what Popper's epistemological position is.
Here we do not attempt a systematic analysis either of Popper's or of Zanotti's views.
Artigas published a systematic account of Popper's epistemology which includes critical remarks.
Artigas's aim is now much more modest, as he focuses on Zanotti's general scheme first, and then he presents a particular interpretation of Popper's epistemology that can help us to foster the dialogue that Zanotti advocates.
He adds that Popper's epistemology requires some kind of foundation which can be provided by Aquinas' metaphysics, and he warns us that Popper's position only gives rise to philosophical difficulties if it is extrapolated from the specialized field of epistemology into a general philosophical outlook.
Therefore, in order to evaluate Zanotti's position, we must first of all determine what Popper's epistemological position is.
Here we do not attempt a systematic analysis either of Popper's or of Zanotti's views.
Artigas published a systematic account of Popper's epistemology which includes critical remarks.
Artigas's aim is now much more modest, as he focuses on Zanotti's general scheme first, and then he presents a particular interpretation of Popper's epistemology that can help us to foster the dialogue that Zanotti advocates.
According to the vast majority of authors, Zanotti included, Popper's
central epistemological thesis can be labeled as "conjecturalism" as he
concludes that all scientific knowledge is conjectural. Popper analyzes the
value of the proofs used in empirical science and concludes that we can never
provide a completely conclusive demonstration of any scientific statement.
The main reason for this is a merely logical one, namely the asymmetry between verification and falsation: actually, if we use the hypothetico-deductive method, we know that purely logical reasons make it impossible to verify any statement however numerous the positive reasons in its favor may be, whilst a single contrary case would suffice to show that the statement is false.
Therefore, we can never be certain about the truth of any scientific statement.
Besides, from the point of view of methodology, Popper stresses that science will progress insofar as we propose bold conjectures which are audacious guesses and have a precise formulation.
Indeed, the only road to progress would be to exploit our errors: even if we can never verify our hypotheses, if we are fortunate we can sometimes find out that they clash against the empirical evidence and, in that case, we can learn something and be able to propose new better hypotheses.
The main reason for this is a merely logical one, namely the asymmetry between verification and falsation: actually, if we use the hypothetico-deductive method, we know that purely logical reasons make it impossible to verify any statement however numerous the positive reasons in its favor may be, whilst a single contrary case would suffice to show that the statement is false.
Therefore, we can never be certain about the truth of any scientific statement.
Besides, from the point of view of methodology, Popper stresses that science will progress insofar as we propose bold conjectures which are audacious guesses and have a precise formulation.
Indeed, the only road to progress would be to exploit our errors: even if we can never verify our hypotheses, if we are fortunate we can sometimes find out that they clash against the empirical evidence and, in that case, we can learn something and be able to propose new better hypotheses.
Zanotti maintains that Aquinas' view provides good reasons why things would
behave this way.
He refers to the well-known passage where Aquinas says that we should not expect certainty when we formulate hypotheses to explain particular physical effects.
He also remarks that the more material an object is, the less transparent it will be for us, so that empirical science should be considered as a guesswork whose conclusions are always provisory.
Zanotti also examines other aspects of Popper's thought, such as his strong defense of realism, of objective truth, of science as a search for truth, and of the specificity of the human person, and he tries to show that in all these points one can see Popper's epistemology as a complement of Aquinas' positions and, in the reverse sense, one can see Aquinas' metaphysics as providing a deeper foundation to Popper's epistemology.
He refers to the well-known passage where Aquinas says that we should not expect certainty when we formulate hypotheses to explain particular physical effects.
He also remarks that the more material an object is, the less transparent it will be for us, so that empirical science should be considered as a guesswork whose conclusions are always provisory.
Zanotti also examines other aspects of Popper's thought, such as his strong defense of realism, of objective truth, of science as a search for truth, and of the specificity of the human person, and he tries to show that in all these points one can see Popper's epistemology as a complement of Aquinas' positions and, in the reverse sense, one can see Aquinas' metaphysics as providing a deeper foundation to Popper's epistemology.
Zanotti's position is a solid one that is sustainable and some
look at it with sympathy.
Besides, as he says at the end of his 1996 paper that perhaps Artigas agrees with Popper more than could be supposed at first sight and he conjectures that if Popper and Artigas would have had the opportunity to discuss quietly we would have reached common conclusions, Artigas accepts Zanotti's challenge and am going to develop some points that can serve to foster that dialogue.
Only, Artigas's argument will not follow the conventional line.
Artigas does not discuss the main epistemological points.
Rather, he examines Popper's epistemology from the point of view of its ethical roots and tries to show that this examination provides very important clues to evaluate Popper's position.
The result will be an unusual interpretation of Popper's epistemology.
However, it is based on solid reasons and it has also been contrasted with people who had a close personal relationship with Sir Karl Raimund Popper.
Besides, as he says at the end of his 1996 paper that perhaps Artigas agrees with Popper more than could be supposed at first sight and he conjectures that if Popper and Artigas would have had the opportunity to discuss quietly we would have reached common conclusions, Artigas accepts Zanotti's challenge and am going to develop some points that can serve to foster that dialogue.
Only, Artigas's argument will not follow the conventional line.
Artigas does not discuss the main epistemological points.
Rather, he examines Popper's epistemology from the point of view of its ethical roots and tries to show that this examination provides very important clues to evaluate Popper's position.
The result will be an unusual interpretation of Popper's epistemology.
However, it is based on solid reasons and it has also been contrasted with people who had a close personal relationship with Sir Karl Raimund Popper.
Sir Karl Raimund Popper's philosophy is usually considered as an epistemology which, when
applied to social and political problems, leads to the "open" society.
But the entire thing can also be considered in the reverse sense, i. e. that Popper's ethics provides the clue to adequately understand and interpret his entire philosophy, including his epistemology.
This has already been underlined by Hubert Kiesewetter, of the University of Eichstätt, who has written:
But the entire thing can also be considered in the reverse sense, i. e. that Popper's ethics provides the clue to adequately understand and interpret his entire philosophy, including his epistemology.
This has already been underlined by Hubert Kiesewetter, of the University of Eichstätt, who has written:
Since studying at the London School of Economics and Political Science the question of the ethical roots or moral sources of Popper's
philosophy has never ceased to occupy Artigas's mind.
In recent years Artigas extensively discussed with Sir Karl Raimund Popper the issue of the ethical foundations of his philosophy.
It is Artigas's intention to demonstrate that all of Popper's thinking is deeply rooted in ethics.
Sir Karl Raimund Popper's methodology of falsificationism or critical rationality had been formed in its nucleus long before he studied mathematics, physics and natural philosophy at Vienna.
Therefore, it is Artigas's hypothesis that Popper's method of trial and error is inseparably interwoven with ethical or moral principles.
In recent years Artigas extensively discussed with Sir Karl Raimund Popper the issue of the ethical foundations of his philosophy.
It is Artigas's intention to demonstrate that all of Popper's thinking is deeply rooted in ethics.
Sir Karl Raimund Popper's methodology of falsificationism or critical rationality had been formed in its nucleus long before he studied mathematics, physics and natural philosophy at Vienna.
Therefore, it is Artigas's hypothesis that Popper's method of trial and error is inseparably interwoven with ethical or moral principles.
Popper's philosophy becomes crystal clear when we look at it through
ethical glasses.
We can then realize that falsificationism is rooted on ethical soil.
Indeed, Popper's main concern when working on epistemological problems was to show that we should adopt a rational or humanist attitude which necessarily includes the recognition of the limits of our knowledge and the need of using the «trial and error elimination» method.
Then, we can also understand why Popper's falsificationism and fallibilism and rationalism are mainly attitudes, not doctrines; otherwise, we could become prisoners of unending discussions about naive or sophisticated or methodological falsificationism, or even worse, we could think that Popper's claims only represent some minor footnotes to the epistemological discussions of his time.
Even the notion of the open society cannot be adequately understood unless we include in it serious ethical elements which should not be reduced to some kind of social organization.
We can then realize that falsificationism is rooted on ethical soil.
Indeed, Popper's main concern when working on epistemological problems was to show that we should adopt a rational or humanist attitude which necessarily includes the recognition of the limits of our knowledge and the need of using the «trial and error elimination» method.
Then, we can also understand why Popper's falsificationism and fallibilism and rationalism are mainly attitudes, not doctrines; otherwise, we could become prisoners of unending discussions about naive or sophisticated or methodological falsificationism, or even worse, we could think that Popper's claims only represent some minor footnotes to the epistemological discussions of his time.
Even the notion of the open society cannot be adequately understood unless we include in it serious ethical elements which should not be reduced to some kind of social organization.
Surely, logical reasons occupy an important place in Popper's epistemology.
However, when Popper speaks about criticism, critical rationalism or fallibilism he often refers to a more complex issue which involves personal attitudes, as he refers, for instance, to «intellectual honesty», «self-criticism» and «intellectual modesty», and he speaks of admitting «our mistakes, our fallibility, our ignorance», which clearly implies an ethical attitude.
However, when Popper speaks about criticism, critical rationalism or fallibilism he often refers to a more complex issue which involves personal attitudes, as he refers, for instance, to «intellectual honesty», «self-criticism» and «intellectual modesty», and he speaks of admitting «our mistakes, our fallibility, our ignorance», which clearly implies an ethical attitude.
We can clarify some aspects of Popper's epistemology by analyzing its
origins, which refer to several events that happened in 1919.
Of course, I do not intend to deny the existence of other factors that influenced Popper's epistemology in its origins.
Artigas only desires to stress that the existence of ethical components in Popper's epistemology is corroborated by his 1919 experiences with Marxism, psychoanalysis and relativity.
Artigas closely follows and extensively quotes from Popper's texts because he think this necessary if we are to realize the role that ethical factors play in Popper's epistemology.
Of course, I do not intend to deny the existence of other factors that influenced Popper's epistemology in its origins.
Artigas only desires to stress that the existence of ethical components in Popper's epistemology is corroborated by his 1919 experiences with Marxism, psychoanalysis and relativity.
Artigas closely follows and extensively quotes from Popper's texts because he think this necessary if we are to realize the role that ethical factors play in Popper's epistemology.
The main account of these experiences is contained in Popper's
autobiography, section entitled, A Crucial Year: Marxism; Science and
Pseudoscience.
The account is clear and is presented as a most relevant clue for understanding Popper's entire life; it occupies an entire section and its title refers to a crucial year.
The account is clear and is presented as a most relevant clue for understanding Popper's entire life; it occupies an entire section and its title refers to a crucial year.
Yet, the reader may feel himself surprised by the magnitude of the
consequences extracted by Popper.
The events are written in the autobiography in such a way that Popper seems to be close enough to be impressed by them but, at the same time, too distant to be as strongly impressed as he tells us he was.
Indeed, the consequences of these events are impressive, as Popper himself writes:
The events are written in the autobiography in such a way that Popper seems to be close enough to be impressed by them but, at the same time, too distant to be as strongly impressed as he tells us he was.
Indeed, the consequences of these events are impressive, as Popper himself writes:
The encounter with Marxism was one of the main events in Popper's intellectual
development.
It taught Popper a number of lessons which he never forgot.
It taught Popper the wisdom of the Socratic saying, "I know that I do not know".
It made Popper a fallibilist, and impressed on Popper the value of intellectual modesty.
And it made Popper most conscious of the differences between dogmatic and critical thinking.
It taught Popper a number of lessons which he never forgot.
It taught Popper the wisdom of the Socratic saying, "I know that I do not know".
It made Popper a fallibilist, and impressed on Popper the value of intellectual modesty.
And it made Popper most conscious of the differences between dogmatic and critical thinking.
Then, what about the logical aspects, such as the asymmetry between
verification and falsification, and the difficulties of induction?
Are these aspects to be considered as secondary, given that fallibilism and criticism were already a consequence of Popper's experience of Marxism?
Are these aspects to be considered as secondary, given that fallibilism and criticism were already a consequence of Popper's experience of Marxism?
One can hardly overestimate the relevance of these logical problems in
Popper's philosophy.
They occupy a central place.
However, they have an ethical basis in two respects.
On the one hand, they arise as a consequence of ethical experiences, and on the other hand, their meaning is part of wider and deeper problems which involve the ethical responsibility of the entire human person.
They occupy a central place.
However, they have an ethical basis in two respects.
On the one hand, they arise as a consequence of ethical experiences, and on the other hand, their meaning is part of wider and deeper problems which involve the ethical responsibility of the entire human person.
Actually, although the account contained in his autobiography is very
clear, Popper provided in his last years three other occasional accounts that
are important for this subject, because they include details which are most
helpful to understand the meaning and consequences of his Marxist experiences.
They are contained in a lecture delivered in Eichstätt on the occasion of his honoris causa doctorate in that University, in another lecture delivered in the Universal Exhibition and in an interview with an Italian journalist.
They are contained in a lecture delivered in Eichstätt on the occasion of his honoris causa doctorate in that University, in another lecture delivered in the Universal Exhibition and in an interview with an Italian journalist.
We will try to provide a description of the facts and their
consequences, underlining the aspects that refer to the ethical dimensions and
to their impact on other aspects of Popper's philosophy.
We will comment on the circumstances that prepared Popper's approach to Marxism, the participation in Marxist activities including the demonstration which constitutes the kernel of the entire issue, and the consequences of his 1919 experiences.
We will comment on the circumstances that prepared Popper's approach to Marxism, the participation in Marxist activities including the demonstration which constitutes the kernel of the entire issue, and the consequences of his 1919 experiences.
Shortly after the end of the Great War, Popper leaves school and began
to study in the university, at a moment where social problems were abundant.
The breakdown of the Austrian Empire and the aftermath of the Great
War, the famine, the hunger riots in Vienna, and the runaway inflation, have
often been described.
They destroyed the world in which I had grown up; and there began a period of cold and hot civil war
Popper was a little over sixteen when the Great war ended, and the revolution incited me to stage my own private revolution.
Popper decides to leave school, late in 1918, to study on my own.
Popper enrolled at the University of Vienna where he was, at first, a non-matriculated student, since he did not take the entrance examination ("Matura") until 1922 .
It was a time of upheavals, though not only political ones.
Popper was close enough to hear the bullets whistle when, on the occasion of the Declaration of the Austrian Republic, soldiers started shooting at the members of the Provisional Government assembled at the top of the steps leading to the Parliament building.
There was little to eat.
And as for clothing, most people could afford only discarded army uniforms, adapted for civilian use.
Few thought seriously of careers.
They destroyed the world in which I had grown up; and there began a period of cold and hot civil war
Popper was a little over sixteen when the Great war ended, and the revolution incited me to stage my own private revolution.
Popper decides to leave school, late in 1918, to study on my own.
Popper enrolled at the University of Vienna where he was, at first, a non-matriculated student, since he did not take the entrance examination ("Matura") until 1922 .
It was a time of upheavals, though not only political ones.
Popper was close enough to hear the bullets whistle when, on the occasion of the Declaration of the Austrian Republic, soldiers started shooting at the members of the Provisional Government assembled at the top of the steps leading to the Parliament building.
There was little to eat.
And as for clothing, most people could afford only discarded army uniforms, adapted for civilian use.
Few thought seriously of careers.
Besides the social difficulties that helped Popper's rapprochement to
Marxism, it is interesting to note that he had already at that time some
experience of shooting and bullets.
He writes that Austrian society was then obviously unpleasant, as it was marked by famine, poverty, unemployment, inflation, and people who profited from all this by speculation.
He writes that Austrian society was then obviously unpleasant, as it was marked by famine, poverty, unemployment, inflation, and people who profited from all this by speculation.
In those circumstances, Popper joined a socialist association and, in the
spring of 1919 (March or April), he became even a communist, attracted mainly by
the apparent pacifism of the communists.
Popper became a member of the association of socialist pupils of secondary
schools (sozialistische Mittelschüler) and went to their meetings. Popper went also to the meetings of the socialist university students.
The speakers at these meetings belonged sometimes to the social democratic and sometimes to the communist parties.
Their Marxist beliefs were then very similar.
And they all dwelt, rightly, on the horrors of war.
The communist claimed that they had proved their pacifism by ending the war, at Brest-Litovsk.
Peace, they said, was what they primarily stood for.
For a time Popper was suspicious of the communists, mainly because of what his friend Arndt had told me about them.
But in the spring of 1919 Popper, together with a few friends, became convinced by their propaganda.
For about two or three months Popper regarded himself as a communist.
Popper was soon to be disenchanted.
Popper recalls several times that he was impressed by the pacifist
propaganda displayed by the communists with the occasion of the treaty of
Brest-Litovsk.
After the Russian revolution on February 1917, the nationalities of the former Tsarist Empire searched for their independence, and the German army occupied Latvia, Belorussia and Ukraine. After the soviet revolution on October, Lenin decided on the end of the war at the East front.
On 15 December 1917, Lenin's Russia and the Central Powers signed an armistice at Brest-Litovsk.
After new episodes of war conducted by the German army, by the Brest-Litovsk treaty on 3 March 1918 the new communist Russia recognized the independence of Finland and Ukraine; renounced the control over Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and a great part of Belorussia; and ceded three other territories to Turkey.
This treatise meant the victory of Germany over Russia, but, at the same time, Lenin remained free to work on his revolution in Russia. Lenin presented the new communist Russia as fully involved in peace, even at the expense of losing political power.
After the Russian revolution on February 1917, the nationalities of the former Tsarist Empire searched for their independence, and the German army occupied Latvia, Belorussia and Ukraine. After the soviet revolution on October, Lenin decided on the end of the war at the East front.
On 15 December 1917, Lenin's Russia and the Central Powers signed an armistice at Brest-Litovsk.
After new episodes of war conducted by the German army, by the Brest-Litovsk treaty on 3 March 1918 the new communist Russia recognized the independence of Finland and Ukraine; renounced the control over Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and a great part of Belorussia; and ceded three other territories to Turkey.
This treatise meant the victory of Germany over Russia, but, at the same time, Lenin remained free to work on his revolution in Russia. Lenin presented the new communist Russia as fully involved in peace, even at the expense of losing political power.
As he himself tells us, Popper was strongly impressed by the
attitude of the Bolshevists.
He had a Russian-born friend who told him about their fanaticism and capacity for lying, but, in spite of this, approximately in April 1919 (he was not yet 17) he decided to try the communist party.
This means (and here begin the interesting details revealed by the old Popper) that he went to the headquarters of the Austrian communist party and offered his services as a boy for everything.
Popper remembered many years later that among the communist leaders there were Gerhardt Eisler, his brother Hans and their sister Elfride, whose father was the Austrian philosopher Rudolph Eisler, and he also remembered their future situation (for instance, Gerhard was the leader of the American communist party and was expelled from the United States after the Second World War).
These people fascinated him and he trusted them.
This should be remembered, because this implied relying on a scientific theory that turned out to be really pseudo-scientific, and this partly may help to understand why Popper was so reluctant afterwards about claims of reliability in science.
He had a Russian-born friend who told him about their fanaticism and capacity for lying, but, in spite of this, approximately in April 1919 (he was not yet 17) he decided to try the communist party.
This means (and here begin the interesting details revealed by the old Popper) that he went to the headquarters of the Austrian communist party and offered his services as a boy for everything.
Popper remembered many years later that among the communist leaders there were Gerhardt Eisler, his brother Hans and their sister Elfride, whose father was the Austrian philosopher Rudolph Eisler, and he also remembered their future situation (for instance, Gerhard was the leader of the American communist party and was expelled from the United States after the Second World War).
These people fascinated him and he trusted them.
This should be remembered, because this implied relying on a scientific theory that turned out to be really pseudo-scientific, and this partly may help to understand why Popper was so reluctant afterwards about claims of reliability in science.
It is also interesting to know, from Popper's own words, that the communist
leaders welcomed his arrival, and entrusted him with various services; besides,
he was often present in their meetings (which was unusual), so that he could
know very well their way of thinking.
Therefore, although he was too young to become a member of the party, he was really committed to it. Thus, we have already passed from the previous circumstances to his real involvement with Marxism.
Therefore, although he was too young to become a member of the party, he was really committed to it. Thus, we have already passed from the previous circumstances to his real involvement with Marxism.
That he was really involved with Marxism and communism can be shown again
by his own words, and this is most important to understand the whole affair.
He says that, in the meantime (in the days when he contacted the communist leaders), he had initiated himself in Marxist theory.
Then, when he already participated in the activities of the communists, he had several opportunities of experiencing distaste regarding their actions.
Actually, he remembers that, although he was obviously dissatisfied with the society of its times, he was uneasy because the party obviously promoted a kind of murderous instinct against class-enemies.
He was told, however, that this was necessary and that, in any case, it was not meant too seriously; also that in a revolution only victory can serve; and finally that under capitalism there are every day more victims than in the entire revolution.
Popper notes that he agreed reluctantly, with the feeling that he had to pay a high price regarding his morality.
Something similar happened regarding lies, as the leaders sometimes said one day white and the following day black; this would happen whenever they received a telegram from Moscow with the corresponding indications.
When Popper protested, he was told that those contradictions were necessary and should not be criticized, as the unity of the party was essential for the triumph of revolution.
Although it was possible to commit mistakes, it was not allowed to criticize them openly, because only the discipline of the party could carry a fast victory.
Popper remembers again that, although he reluctantly accepted this, he felt that he was sacrificing his personal integrity to the party, and that, when he realized that the leaders were disposed to contradict themselves at any moment, his attitude towards communism suffered a crisis.
He says that, in the meantime (in the days when he contacted the communist leaders), he had initiated himself in Marxist theory.
Then, when he already participated in the activities of the communists, he had several opportunities of experiencing distaste regarding their actions.
Actually, he remembers that, although he was obviously dissatisfied with the society of its times, he was uneasy because the party obviously promoted a kind of murderous instinct against class-enemies.
He was told, however, that this was necessary and that, in any case, it was not meant too seriously; also that in a revolution only victory can serve; and finally that under capitalism there are every day more victims than in the entire revolution.
Popper notes that he agreed reluctantly, with the feeling that he had to pay a high price regarding his morality.
Something similar happened regarding lies, as the leaders sometimes said one day white and the following day black; this would happen whenever they received a telegram from Moscow with the corresponding indications.
When Popper protested, he was told that those contradictions were necessary and should not be criticized, as the unity of the party was essential for the triumph of revolution.
Although it was possible to commit mistakes, it was not allowed to criticize them openly, because only the discipline of the party could carry a fast victory.
Popper remembers again that, although he reluctantly accepted this, he felt that he was sacrificing his personal integrity to the party, and that, when he realized that the leaders were disposed to contradict themselves at any moment, his attitude towards communism suffered a crisis.
We arrive then at the center of the crisis.
In his autobiography, Popper describes the experience.
In his autobiography, Popper describes the experience.
The incident that first turned me against communism, and that soon led me
away from Marxism altogether, was one of the most important incidents in my
life.
It happened shortly before Popper's seventeenth birthday.
In Vienna, shooting broke out during a demonstration by unarmed socialists who, instigated by the communists, tried to help some communists to escape who were under arrest in the central police station in Vienna.
Several young socialist and communist workers were killed.
Popper was horrified and shocked at the police, but also at myself.
For Popper felt that as a Marxist he bore part of the responsibility for the tragedy -at least in principle.
Marxist theory demands that the class struggle be intensified, in order to speed up the coming of socialism. Its thesis is that although the revolution may claim some victims, capitalism is claiming more victims than the whole socialist revolution.
It happened shortly before Popper's seventeenth birthday.
In Vienna, shooting broke out during a demonstration by unarmed socialists who, instigated by the communists, tried to help some communists to escape who were under arrest in the central police station in Vienna.
Several young socialist and communist workers were killed.
Popper was horrified and shocked at the police, but also at myself.
For Popper felt that as a Marxist he bore part of the responsibility for the tragedy -at least in principle.
Marxist theory demands that the class struggle be intensified, in order to speed up the coming of socialism. Its thesis is that although the revolution may claim some victims, capitalism is claiming more victims than the whole socialist revolution.
The incident happened, Popper says, «shortly before my seventeenth
birthday», which was 28 July 1919; in another place, he speaks of some day in
June 1919, and he also adds that in July 1919, before his seventeenth
birthday, he decided to revise his attitude towards Marxism.
A precise date is provided only by other people, namely Hubert Kiesewetter and Franz Kreuzer but Kiesewetter only quotes Kreuzer's account.
According to Kreuzer, the date is 15 June 1919.
Kreuzer adds that the demonstration happened in Hörlgasse in Vienna's 9th district, and that there were 20 people dead and 70 seriously injured.
This contrasts with Popper's accounts, where he speaks of several and, when he is more specific, he speaks in one occasion of six, in another of approximately eight people dead.
That he was in the demonstration is asserted by Popper himself.
A precise date is provided only by other people, namely Hubert Kiesewetter and Franz Kreuzer but Kiesewetter only quotes Kreuzer's account.
According to Kreuzer, the date is 15 June 1919.
Kreuzer adds that the demonstration happened in Hörlgasse in Vienna's 9th district, and that there were 20 people dead and 70 seriously injured.
This contrasts with Popper's accounts, where he speaks of several and, when he is more specific, he speaks in one occasion of six, in another of approximately eight people dead.
That he was in the demonstration is asserted by Popper himself.
Two details seem important in this context.
The first is that the people dead, at least some of them, were young workers: Popper thought that other people who, like himself, were students or intellectuals, had special responsibility for those workers, who relied on the intellectuals.
The other is that, as he said many years later, he had approved of the demonstration because it was supported by the communist party; he perhaps had even encouraged the participation of other people; and perhaps some of them were among the dead.
The first is that the people dead, at least some of them, were young workers: Popper thought that other people who, like himself, were students or intellectuals, had special responsibility for those workers, who relied on the intellectuals.
The other is that, as he said many years later, he had approved of the demonstration because it was supported by the communist party; he perhaps had even encouraged the participation of other people; and perhaps some of them were among the dead.
He was also upset by the attitude of the communist leaders.
He asked himself whether he had discussed seriously and critically the Marxist theory which served as the basis for the sacrifice of human lives, and he recognized that he had not done it.
However, when he arrived at the headquarters of the communist party, he realized that the leaders had an entirely different attitude: revolution made unavoidable the existence of such a type of victims, and furthermore this meant a kind of progress because workers would become every time more angry against the police and so they would become more and more aware of their real class-enemies.
Popper's reaction was clear: he never returned there, and this way, as he commented later, he escaped the Marxist trap.
He asked himself whether he had discussed seriously and critically the Marxist theory which served as the basis for the sacrifice of human lives, and he recognized that he had not done it.
However, when he arrived at the headquarters of the communist party, he realized that the leaders had an entirely different attitude: revolution made unavoidable the existence of such a type of victims, and furthermore this meant a kind of progress because workers would become every time more angry against the police and so they would become more and more aware of their real class-enemies.
Popper's reaction was clear: he never returned there, and this way, as he commented later, he escaped the Marxist trap.
If we join all the details, we have a picture that coincides with the
account provided in Popper's autobiography, but adds lively colors and helps to
understand Popper's reaction.
He felt responsible for what happened: not only because, as a Marxist, he shared in some way the responsibility, but also because he participated in the preparation of the demonstration.
Of course, he did not think about the possibility of killing or anything similar, but he felt nevertheless that he «bore part of the responsibility for the tragedy -at least in principle».
His very strong reaction becomes understandable only if we take this into consideration.
Popper was always a seriously ethical person and he contacted the communist party because of his sense of responsibility for social affairs and also because he was a pacifist and felt attracted by the apparent pacifism of the communists; and this is why, when he realized that his ethical standards widely differed from those of his communist friends and that he had been involved in some way in the death of the young workers, he suffered a big shock.
The consequences affected the status of a theory which presented itself as scientific, and the reliability of scientific theories in general.
He felt responsible for what happened: not only because, as a Marxist, he shared in some way the responsibility, but also because he participated in the preparation of the demonstration.
Of course, he did not think about the possibility of killing or anything similar, but he felt nevertheless that he «bore part of the responsibility for the tragedy -at least in principle».
His very strong reaction becomes understandable only if we take this into consideration.
Popper was always a seriously ethical person and he contacted the communist party because of his sense of responsibility for social affairs and also because he was a pacifist and felt attracted by the apparent pacifism of the communists; and this is why, when he realized that his ethical standards widely differed from those of his communist friends and that he had been involved in some way in the death of the young workers, he suffered a big shock.
The consequences affected the status of a theory which presented itself as scientific, and the reliability of scientific theories in general.
The immediate consequence was that Popper became aware of a «moral trap»
from which he was able to escape. He referred several times to this in his late
writings, and he described it in his autobiography.
I was shocked to have to admit to myself that not only had I accepted a
complex theory somewhat uncritically, but I had also actually noticed quite a
bit that was wrong, in the theory as well as in the practice of communism, but
had repressed this -partly out of loyalty to "the cause", and partly because
there is a mechanism of getting oneself more and more deeply involved: once one
has sacrificed one's intellectual conscience over a minor point one does not
wish to give up too easily; one wishes to justify the self-sacrifice by
convincing oneself of the fundamental goodness of the cause, which is seen to
outweigh any little moral or intellectual compromise that may be required.
With every such moral or intellectual sacrifice one gets more deeply involved.
One becomes ready to back one's moral or intellectual investments in the cause with further investments.
It is like being eager to throw good money after bad. I also saw how this mechanism had been working in my case, and I was horrified.
With every such moral or intellectual sacrifice one gets more deeply involved.
One becomes ready to back one's moral or intellectual investments in the cause with further investments.
It is like being eager to throw good money after bad. I also saw how this mechanism had been working in my case, and I was horrified.
That ethical reasons played a very important role first in the acceptance
of communism and afterwards in its rejection is clearly stated by Popper when he
says, in a lecture that he was nearly caught in the Marxist
ideological trap because he had deep moral reasons to do what seemed to be his
moral duty, and that afterwards he experienced a big moral commotion which led
him to a deep moral aversion.
If we forget those ethical reasons or if we attribute to them only a minor
relevance, then Popper will appear as a kind of child prodigy who, at a very
early age, was preoccupied by the problems related with the scientific character
of theories, and who happily compared the different status that possess in this
respect Marxism and psychoanalysis on the one hand, and Einstein's relativity on
the other.
Sure, he would have been helped by his experiences in the three ambits, according to his own testimony.
However, some important things do not fit in this scheme.
It would be hardly intelligible, for instance, why Popper says that the Marxist experience made of him a fallibilist and most conscious of the difference between dogmatic and critical thinking; and it would be even more difficult to assimilate the assertion that follows immediately afterwards in which, referring to his encounter with Marxism, he says:
Sure, he would have been helped by his experiences in the three ambits, according to his own testimony.
However, some important things do not fit in this scheme.
It would be hardly intelligible, for instance, why Popper says that the Marxist experience made of him a fallibilist and most conscious of the difference between dogmatic and critical thinking; and it would be even more difficult to assimilate the assertion that follows immediately afterwards in which, referring to his encounter with Marxism, he says:
Compared with this encounter, the somewhat similar pattern of my
encounters with Alfred Adler's 'individual psychology' and with Freudian
psychoanalysis -which were more or less contemporaneous (it all happened in
1919) -were of minor importance.
In the same part of his autobiography, Popper attributes a great importance
to his encounter with Einstein, also in 1919.
That Popper was a man filled with intellectual and social problems is a fact, as it is the circumstance that his 1919 experiences represent a unique coincidence which fits rather well with those problems.
Looking back at that year Popper was amazed that so much can happen to one's intellectual development in so short a spell.
For at the same time Popper learned about Einstein; and this become a dominant influence on my thinking -in the long run perhaps the most important influence of all», and he adds:
That Popper was a man filled with intellectual and social problems is a fact, as it is the circumstance that his 1919 experiences represent a unique coincidence which fits rather well with those problems.
Looking back at that year Popper was amazed that so much can happen to one's intellectual development in so short a spell.
For at the same time Popper learned about Einstein; and this become a dominant influence on my thinking -in the long run perhaps the most important influence of all», and he adds:
But what impressed Popper most was Einstein's own clear statement that he
would regard his theory as untenable if it should fail in certain tests.
Here was an attitude utterly different from the dogmatic attitude of Marx, Freud, Adler, and even more so that of their followers (...) This, I felt, was the true scientific attitude.
Thus Popper arrived, by the end of 1919, at the conclusion that the scientific attitude was the critical attitude, which did not look for verifications but for crucial tests which could refute the theory tested, though they could never establish it.
Here was an attitude utterly different from the dogmatic attitude of Marx, Freud, Adler, and even more so that of their followers (...) This, I felt, was the true scientific attitude.
Thus Popper arrived, by the end of 1919, at the conclusion that the scientific attitude was the critical attitude, which did not look for verifications but for crucial tests which could refute the theory tested, though they could never establish it.
All this fits well with the relevance of the Marxist experience and of its
ethical components.
It is interesting to note that, in both cases, Popper refers mainly to attitudes, and that when he explains his anti-Marxist reaction he says:
It is interesting to note that, in both cases, Popper refers mainly to attitudes, and that when he explains his anti-Marxist reaction he says:
Popper realized the dogmatic character of the creed, and its incredible
intellectual arrogance.
It was a terrible thing to arrogate to oneself a kind of knowledge which made it a duty to risk the lives of other people for an uncritically accepted dogma, or for a dream which might turn out not to be realizable.
It was particularly bad for an intellectual, for one who could read and think.
It was awfully depressing to have fallen into such a trap.
It was a terrible thing to arrogate to oneself a kind of knowledge which made it a duty to risk the lives of other people for an uncritically accepted dogma, or for a dream which might turn out not to be realizable.
It was particularly bad for an intellectual, for one who could read and think.
It was awfully depressing to have fallen into such a trap.
It seems rather obvious that the main problem here was an irresponsible
attitude related to important ethical consequences.
This sufficed to make of Popper a fallibilist, strongly suspicious of pseudo-scientific creeds: the Marxist pseudo-scientific prediction of a necessary course of history was very dangerous, and the first condition that Popper would require in the future to any allegedly scientific theory was that it should be held with an attitude of intellectual modesty, namely an attitude that recognizes the magnitude of our ignorance and never forgets that our theories are always tentative and partial trials to progress.
Scientific certainty had showed itself deceptive and should be replaced by an attitude of learning through our unavoidable mistakes.
Now, mistakes would begin to be considered not as an evil, but as the way which prepares real progress.
This sufficed to make of Popper a fallibilist, strongly suspicious of pseudo-scientific creeds: the Marxist pseudo-scientific prediction of a necessary course of history was very dangerous, and the first condition that Popper would require in the future to any allegedly scientific theory was that it should be held with an attitude of intellectual modesty, namely an attitude that recognizes the magnitude of our ignorance and never forgets that our theories are always tentative and partial trials to progress.
Scientific certainty had showed itself deceptive and should be replaced by an attitude of learning through our unavoidable mistakes.
Now, mistakes would begin to be considered not as an evil, but as the way which prepares real progress.
In the last analysis, the origin of Popper's fallibilism depends, in a
great extent, on the feeling of personal responsibility.
Some people had relied on him (on communism through him), and he had uncritically contributed to their misfortune.
He had lacked a critical attitude towards a doctrine that, when carefully analyzed, turned out to be a pseudo-scientific moral trap.
All this explains also why Popper, during his entire life, stressed strongly the moral responsibility of intellectuals.
He saw many human troubles as caused by chains of people who rely on one or several intellectuals, and saw that these chains too often are moral chains.
Fallibilism appeared, above all, as an ethical duty.
Some people had relied on him (on communism through him), and he had uncritically contributed to their misfortune.
He had lacked a critical attitude towards a doctrine that, when carefully analyzed, turned out to be a pseudo-scientific moral trap.
All this explains also why Popper, during his entire life, stressed strongly the moral responsibility of intellectuals.
He saw many human troubles as caused by chains of people who rely on one or several intellectuals, and saw that these chains too often are moral chains.
Fallibilism appeared, above all, as an ethical duty.
The preceding analysis provides us with a perspective which will be most
helpful in order to realize what the meaning and scope of Popper's main
epistemological tenets about the conjectural character of scientific knowledge
are, which are usually labeled as fallibilism.
We will consider now the relationship of fallibilism with conjecturalism, which is a germane concept, and with skepticism, which may seem its consequence.
Afterwards, we will return to the double key of fallibilism, the logical and the ethical, and we will examine the meaning of critical rationalism as a label that is often used to characterize Popper's epistemology.
We will consider now the relationship of fallibilism with conjecturalism, which is a germane concept, and with skepticism, which may seem its consequence.
Afterwards, we will return to the double key of fallibilism, the logical and the ethical, and we will examine the meaning of critical rationalism as a label that is often used to characterize Popper's epistemology.
One of the main contentions of Popper is that the quest for certainty is
mistaken.
We should not forget, however, that Popper's assertions in this line always suppose a point of departure that, trivial as it may seem, has far reaching consequences; actually, Popper supposes that we try to test our theories by using empirical statements.
Then, mere logical arguments show that there is not a single universal theory or law that may be proved this way.
So far, and even if we admit that this has far-reaching consequences in the ambits of epistemology and of science as well, this kind of conjecturalism does not preclude our attaining some kind of certainty which can be sufficient for many purposes, even in science.
We should not forget, however, that Popper's assertions in this line always suppose a point of departure that, trivial as it may seem, has far reaching consequences; actually, Popper supposes that we try to test our theories by using empirical statements.
Then, mere logical arguments show that there is not a single universal theory or law that may be proved this way.
So far, and even if we admit that this has far-reaching consequences in the ambits of epistemology and of science as well, this kind of conjecturalism does not preclude our attaining some kind of certainty which can be sufficient for many purposes, even in science.
When considered as a methodological caveat, conjecturalism is a most
healthy approach and it can prevent many shortcomings.
Of course, it relies on a logical basis, but it refers mainly to a methodological attitude.
Moreover, although it can be extended to include any kind of knowledge, it refers primarily to scientific theories which, actually, depend on our theoretical constructions which, in their turn, also depend on the concrete possibilities, conceptual and empirical, that we can use in every epoch and circumstances.
Of course, it relies on a logical basis, but it refers mainly to a methodological attitude.
Moreover, although it can be extended to include any kind of knowledge, it refers primarily to scientific theories which, actually, depend on our theoretical constructions which, in their turn, also depend on the concrete possibilities, conceptual and empirical, that we can use in every epoch and circumstances.
All this amounts to recognizing that scientific knowledge is always
perfectible, that we should never consider our theories as definitively
established, that we can always discover some error in them and even should look
for errors if we desire to progress towards better theories.
If this is what is meant by fallibilism, all of us should be fallibilists.
If this is what is meant by fallibilism, all of us should be fallibilists.
Actually, on one of the occasions in which Popper tries to clarify the
entire issue, he argues in a way that will be useful to quote and to analyze.
Popper denies the existence of a general criterion of truth, and he explains what this means:
Popper denies the existence of a general criterion of truth, and he explains what this means:
It merely means, quite simply, that we can always err in our choice.
We can always miss the truth, or fall short of the truth.
Certainty is not for us (or even knowledge that is highly probable, as I have shown in various places, for example in chapter 10 of Conjectures and Refutations).
We are fallible.
This, for all we know, is no more than the plain truth.
There are few fields of human endeavour, if any, which seem to be exempt from human fallibility.
What we once thought to be well-established, or even certain, may later turn out to be not quite correct (but this means false), and in need of correction.
We can always miss the truth, or fall short of the truth.
Certainty is not for us (or even knowledge that is highly probable, as I have shown in various places, for example in chapter 10 of Conjectures and Refutations).
We are fallible.
This, for all we know, is no more than the plain truth.
There are few fields of human endeavour, if any, which seem to be exempt from human fallibility.
What we once thought to be well-established, or even certain, may later turn out to be not quite correct (but this means false), and in need of correction.
In the preceding quotation, Popper denies first the existence of a general
criterion of truth.
Even if we can provide arguments which can be used as some kind of criteria, there is not one single general criterion which could be applied automatically to ensure the truth of any statement or theory.
Then, Popper asserts that we can always err, which is true.
Then he adds that certainty is not for us.
This is a difficult point that should be carefully analyzed, and it depends on our ideas about certitude.
Even if we can provide arguments which can be used as some kind of criteria, there is not one single general criterion which could be applied automatically to ensure the truth of any statement or theory.
Then, Popper asserts that we can always err, which is true.
Then he adds that certainty is not for us.
This is a difficult point that should be carefully analyzed, and it depends on our ideas about certitude.
Indeed, if we use a strong idea of certainty, which means to identify
certainty with the state reached when we can provide a fully logical proof that
leaves no room for the smallest contrary possibilities, then it is easy to agree
that we cannot reach such a state.
In this context, we should remember that even the most elementary factual truths, which constitute our usual basic certainties, cannot be proved by means of logic alone.
By using logical arguments alone, we cannot reach either certainty or subjective probability, which are subjective states; therefore, Popper is right.
However, it could be argued that this idea of certainty is too strong and that we can distinguish different kinds of certainty (remember, for instance, the classical distinctions between metaphysical, physical and moral certitude); and also that certainty, and its different degrees, includes logical argument but also some kind of subtleties which cannot be reduced to logic alone.
In this context, we should remember that even the most elementary factual truths, which constitute our usual basic certainties, cannot be proved by means of logic alone.
By using logical arguments alone, we cannot reach either certainty or subjective probability, which are subjective states; therefore, Popper is right.
However, it could be argued that this idea of certainty is too strong and that we can distinguish different kinds of certainty (remember, for instance, the classical distinctions between metaphysical, physical and moral certitude); and also that certainty, and its different degrees, includes logical argument but also some kind of subtleties which cannot be reduced to logic alone.
Popper could agree with such arguments, and we have two reasons
for this.
The first and more important is that his defense of fallibilism is meant to avoid dogmatic positions that forget rigor, self-criticism and honesty, but is not opposed to any attitude which would include these values.
Actually, Popper did not change his mind easily on the important issues: he assumed a philosophical position which he developed throughout his entire life, and he argued for his views in a forceful and elegant way, as a man with deep convictions.
He had a strong sense of intellectual honesty and this is why he was aware of the difficulties involved in the quest for certainty.
Besides, we should not forget that in theoretical physics, which is the main ambit of his philosophical reflections, Popper is completely right without qualifications when he insists that our theories always include aspects which can change and that no theory should claim to have been definitively established.
The first and more important is that his defense of fallibilism is meant to avoid dogmatic positions that forget rigor, self-criticism and honesty, but is not opposed to any attitude which would include these values.
Actually, Popper did not change his mind easily on the important issues: he assumed a philosophical position which he developed throughout his entire life, and he argued for his views in a forceful and elegant way, as a man with deep convictions.
He had a strong sense of intellectual honesty and this is why he was aware of the difficulties involved in the quest for certainty.
Besides, we should not forget that in theoretical physics, which is the main ambit of his philosophical reflections, Popper is completely right without qualifications when he insists that our theories always include aspects which can change and that no theory should claim to have been definitively established.
The second argument includes personal references.
Artigas published my first book as an attempt to summarize in an orderly way Popper's epistemological position.
He sent it to Popper and, on this occasion, he also sent to him a letter in which I said that I shared many of his views but also that I had difficulties with his conjecturalism.
Artigas wrote this words:
«I think furthermore that many scientific statements are true and we can be sure of their truth, although sometimes they are partial and can be improved. I think I understand your banishing all certitude, but I don't share it».
Popper sent Artigas a copy of "The Poverty of Historicism" along with a letter, in which he answered my question.
Some years later, Artigas wanted to use that text as an illustration for an article published in the Spanish edition of Scientific American, and he asked for the corresponding permission.
Mrs. Melitta Mew answered in the name of Sir Karl granting the permission for the text.
Finally, Artigas did not use that illustration.
Popper's text was this:
I also think that many scientific statements are true.
I also think that we can be pretty sure of the truth of some of them.
But no theory was better tested than Newton's -and we certainly cannot be sure of it.
Einstein has shown that it is possible that Newton's theory may be false.
---- END OF LETTER.
Artigas published my first book as an attempt to summarize in an orderly way Popper's epistemological position.
He sent it to Popper and, on this occasion, he also sent to him a letter in which I said that I shared many of his views but also that I had difficulties with his conjecturalism.
Artigas wrote this words:
«I think furthermore that many scientific statements are true and we can be sure of their truth, although sometimes they are partial and can be improved. I think I understand your banishing all certitude, but I don't share it».
Popper sent Artigas a copy of "The Poverty of Historicism" along with a letter, in which he answered my question.
Some years later, Artigas wanted to use that text as an illustration for an article published in the Spanish edition of Scientific American, and he asked for the corresponding permission.
Mrs. Melitta Mew answered in the name of Sir Karl granting the permission for the text.
Finally, Artigas did not use that illustration.
Popper's text was this:
I also think that many scientific statements are true.
I also think that we can be pretty sure of the truth of some of them.
But no theory was better tested than Newton's -and we certainly cannot be sure of it.
Einstein has shown that it is possible that Newton's theory may be false.
---- END OF LETTER.
This unusual statement in which Popper says that we can be pretty sure about the truth of some scientific statements, shows that he could accept qualifications about certainty, such as 'pretty', and also that his conjecturalism mainly refers to scientific statements and theories which can be substituted by better ones.
It would not be reasonable to doubt the existence of electrons in the sense that there exists something real which corresponds in some way to the well known properties of electrons, although we know that, in spite of the great progress in this field, we know little about it and therefore we should continue our search for better theories.
I would say that conjecturalism makes sense if we interpret it as the
possibility of always reaching a better knowledge and as the attitude of
searching for it.
This is closely related with being aware of the limits of our knowledge and, therefore, with an open-mindedness which favors toleration and respect.
And it is easy to discover the unmistakable ethical flavor of this attitude.
This is closely related with being aware of the limits of our knowledge and, therefore, with an open-mindedness which favors toleration and respect.
And it is easy to discover the unmistakable ethical flavor of this attitude.
Popper's fallibilism should not be interpreted in a relativist way.
He is very clear about this and argues strongly for objective truth and for progress in scientific inquiry:
He is very clear about this and argues strongly for objective truth and for progress in scientific inquiry:
If we thus admit that there is no authority beyond the reach of criticism
to be found within the whole province of our knowledge, however far we may have
penetrated into the unknown, then we can retain, without risk of dogmatism, the
idea that truth itself is beyond all human authority. Indeed, we are not only
able to retain this idea, we must retain it.
For without it there can be no objective standards of scientific inquiry, no criticism of our conjectured solutions, no groping for the unknown, and no quest for knowledge.
For without it there can be no objective standards of scientific inquiry, no criticism of our conjectured solutions, no groping for the unknown, and no quest for knowledge.
Fallibilism is presented by Popper as opposed to skepticism.
Popper is aware of the dangers of relativism, and in this line he refers to a great problem.
How can we admit that our knowledge is a human -and all too human- affair, without at the same time implying that it is all individual whim and arbitrariness?
His answer is unequivocal:
Popper is aware of the dangers of relativism, and in this line he refers to a great problem.
How can we admit that our knowledge is a human -and all too human- affair, without at the same time implying that it is all individual whim and arbitrariness?
His answer is unequivocal:
The solution lies in the realization that all of us may and often do err, singly and collectively, but that this very idea of error and human fallibility involves another one -the idea of objective truth: the standard which we may fall short of.
Thus the doctrine of fallibility should not be regarded as part of a pessimistic epistemology.
According to Popper, the very existence of science, its progress, and our
ability to use arguments, presuppose objective truth and objective standards of
criticism.
Besides, when he explains this, he introduces further qualifications of fallibilism:
Besides, when he explains this, he introduces further qualifications of fallibilism:
By 'fallibilism' I mean here the view, or the acceptance of the fact, that
we may err, and that the quest for certainty (or even the quest for high
probability) is a mistaken quest.
But this does not imply that the quest for truth is mistaken. On the contrary, the idea of error implies that of truth as the standard of which we may fall short.
It implies that, though we may seek for truth, and though we may even find truth (as I believe we do in very many cases), we can never be quite certain that we have found it.
There is always a possibility of error.
But this does not imply that the quest for truth is mistaken. On the contrary, the idea of error implies that of truth as the standard of which we may fall short.
It implies that, though we may seek for truth, and though we may even find truth (as I believe we do in very many cases), we can never be quite certain that we have found it.
There is always a possibility of error.
It is not necessary to share Popper's ideas about
certainty in order to see that he does not advocate any kind of relativism, and
this is my main point here.
Popper clearly asserts that fallibilism need in no way give rise to any skeptical or relativist conclusions.
Popper clearly asserts that fallibilism need in no way give rise to any skeptical or relativist conclusions.
Every discovery of a mistake constitutes a real advance in our knowledge.
Criticism, it seems, is the only way we have of detecting our mistakes, and of learning from them in a systematic way.
Fallibilism is mainly an attitude, namely «the acceptance of the fact that
we may err».
This attitude is connected with logical arguments (for instance, the impossibility of verifying an universal statement by means of particular tests).
But it has nothing to do with relativism.
Indeed, Popper strongly opposes to relativism as a kind of irrationalism, as he says that
This attitude is connected with logical arguments (for instance, the impossibility of verifying an universal statement by means of particular tests).
But it has nothing to do with relativism.
Indeed, Popper strongly opposes to relativism as a kind of irrationalism, as he says that
One of the more disturbing aspects of the intellectual life of our time is
the way in which irrationalism is so widely advocated, and the way in which
irrationalist doctrines are taken for granted.
One of the components of modern irrationalism is relativism -- the doctrine that truth is relative to our intellectual background, which is supposed to determine somehow the framework within which we are able to think: that truth may change from one framework to another.
One of the components of modern irrationalism is relativism -- the doctrine that truth is relative to our intellectual background, which is supposed to determine somehow the framework within which we are able to think: that truth may change from one framework to another.
What are then, in the last analysis, the reasons for fallibilism?
Popper's arguments for fallibilism derive from the conjectural character of
our knowledge and the amount of our ignorance. However, Popper combines these
arguments with ethical considerations.
The principles that form the basis of every rational discussion, that is,
of every discussion undertaken in the search for truth, are in the main ethical
principles, and he formulates three of them this way:
Perhaps I am wrong and perhaps you are right.
But we could easily both be wrong.
We want to try, as impersonally as possible, to weight up our reasons for and against a theory
We can nearly always come closer to the truth in a discussion which avoids personal attacks.
Perhaps I am wrong and perhaps you are right.
But we could easily both be wrong.
We want to try, as impersonally as possible, to weight up our reasons for and against a theory
We can nearly always come closer to the truth in a discussion which avoids personal attacks.
That these principles include ethical components is remarked on by Popper
as he continues by saying:
It is worth noting that these three principles are both epistemological
and ethical principles.
For they imply, among other things, toleration.
If I hope to learn from you, and if I want to learn in the interest of truth, then I have not only to tolerate you but also to recognize you as a potential equal; the potential unity and equality of all men somehow constitute a prerequisite of our willingness to discuss matters rationally.
For they imply, among other things, toleration.
If I hope to learn from you, and if I want to learn in the interest of truth, then I have not only to tolerate you but also to recognize you as a potential equal; the potential unity and equality of all men somehow constitute a prerequisite of our willingness to discuss matters rationally.
A merely logical or epistemological account cannot reflect this situation,
because the main ideas involved in it «are both epistemological and ethical».
This is why there is no vicious circle: ethics serve as a basis for the rational attitude (although this does not mean a complete autonomy of ethics.
The rational and the ethical are closely intertwined and related in both directions.
This is why there is no vicious circle: ethics serve as a basis for the rational attitude (although this does not mean a complete autonomy of ethics.
The rational and the ethical are closely intertwined and related in both directions.
It is also worth noting that Popper includes the principle of fallibility
as one of the principles that are in the main ethical principles.
This assertion could suffice to show that fallibilism does not refer to a mere logical affair, and that it not only includes ethical dimensions, but has, in Popper's own words, mainly an ethical character.
This assertion could suffice to show that fallibilism does not refer to a mere logical affair, and that it not only includes ethical dimensions, but has, in Popper's own words, mainly an ethical character.
Popper also refers to equality and unity among men as another ethical
component of his fallibilism, and this has strong anthropological connotations.
I dare say that here we reach the basic presupposition of Popper's entire philosophy: he believes in man, in freedom, reason, in peace, in respect.
Popper is strongly committed to these values, and all his arguments presuppose them.
I dare say that here we reach the basic presupposition of Popper's entire philosophy: he believes in man, in freedom, reason, in peace, in respect.
Popper is strongly committed to these values, and all his arguments presuppose them.
Thus ethical principles form the basis of science.
The idea of truth as the fundamental regulative principle -the principle that guides our search- can be regarded as an ethical principle.
The search for truth and the idea of approximation to the truth are also ethical principles; as are the ideas of intellectual integrity and of fallibility, which lead us to a self-critical attitude and to toleration.
The idea of truth as the fundamental regulative principle -the principle that guides our search- can be regarded as an ethical principle.
The search for truth and the idea of approximation to the truth are also ethical principles; as are the ideas of intellectual integrity and of fallibility, which lead us to a self-critical attitude and to toleration.
It is difficult to exaggerate the relevance of these assertions.
They open new views which refer to the ethical basis of science, an entire field of research, and they show that the crucial aspects of Popper's epistemology cannot be properly understood without a reference to their ethical components.
They open new views which refer to the ethical basis of science, an entire field of research, and they show that the crucial aspects of Popper's epistemology cannot be properly understood without a reference to their ethical components.
Popper's epistemology is usually labeled as critical rationalism -- keywords: PCR, CCR.
We will examine now Popper's own use of that expression.
We will examine now Popper's own use of that expression.
In a discussion where Popper refers to the difference between higher values
which are to be sought by individuals and public affairs which should
concentrate on avoiding evils, he says: «he uses that expression, he
writes:
This is only part of the case against irrationalism, and of the
consequences which induce me to adopt the opposite attitude, that is, a critical
rationalism.
This latter attitude with its emphasis upon argument and experience, with its device
'I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort we may get nearer to the truth', is, as mentioned before, closely akin to the scientific attitude. It is bound up with the idea that everybody is liable to make mistakes.
This latter attitude with its emphasis upon argument and experience, with its device
'I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort we may get nearer to the truth', is, as mentioned before, closely akin to the scientific attitude. It is bound up with the idea that everybody is liable to make mistakes.
It is interesting to note that, in this text, Popper speaks specifically
about critical rationalism, which is the general label applied by Popper
himself to his entire philosophy.
Critical rationalism is usually considered as an epistemological position linked to the analysis of scientific knowledge.
But is it easy to notice that, in the text just quoted, the motivation of critical rationalism does not come from epistemology alone, but also from ethics.
Critical rationalism is usually considered as an epistemological position linked to the analysis of scientific knowledge.
But is it easy to notice that, in the text just quoted, the motivation of critical rationalism does not come from epistemology alone, but also from ethics.
Popper refers also in other places to «the basic attitude of the
rationalist, 'I may be wrong and you may be right'.
Seen under this light, his rationalism has a strong ethical component.
Seen under this light, his rationalism has a strong ethical component.
The link between rationalism and humanitarianism is very close.
A rationalist attitude seems to be usually combined with a basically egalitarian and humanitarian outlook.
A rationalist attitude seems to be usually combined with a basically egalitarian and humanitarian outlook.
He adds that the reasons for rationalism are largely ethical reasons:
We have tried to analyse those consequences of rationalism and
irrationalism which induce me to decide as we do.
We wish to repeat that the decision is largely a moral decision.
Considered in this way, the counter-attack upon irrationalism is a moral attack.
We wish to repeat that the decision is largely a moral decision.
Considered in this way, the counter-attack upon irrationalism is a moral attack.
It is most important, therefore, to realize that Popper's rationalism does
not coincide with the meaning usually associated with this term as a
philosophical position opposed to empiricism.
Instead, it refers to a moral attitude which involves all human existence, and this is why to adopt it implies a moral decision.
Popper hopes that violence can be brought under the control of reason.
This is perhaps why I, like many others, believe in reason.
Why does Popper call himself a rationalist?
He is a a rationalist because he sees in the attitude of reasonableness the only alternative to violence.
Instead, it refers to a moral attitude which involves all human existence, and this is why to adopt it implies a moral decision.
Popper hopes that violence can be brought under the control of reason.
This is perhaps why I, like many others, believe in reason.
Why does Popper call himself a rationalist?
He is a a rationalist because he sees in the attitude of reasonableness the only alternative to violence.
In the same vein, Popper provides a kind of definition of rationalism which
runs this way:
A rationalist, as Popper uses the word, is a man who attempts to reach decisions by argument and perhaps, in certain cases, by compromise, rather than by violence.
The rationalist is a man who would rather be unsuccessful in convincing another man by argument than successful in crushing him by force, by intimidation and threats, or even by persuasive propaganda.
Popper then points out that the difference does not lie mainly in the use
of argument or in the conclusive character of our arguments.
It lies rather in an attitude of give and take, in a readiness not only to convince the other man but also possibly to be convinced by him.
What Popper calls the attitude of reasonableness may be characterized by a remark.
I think I am right, but I may be wrong and you may be right, and in any case let us discuss it, for in this way we are likely to get nearer to a true understanding than if we each merely insist that we are right.
It will be realized that what I call the attitude of reasonableness or the rationalistic attitude presupposes a certain amount of intellectual humility.
In other places, Popper attributes to 'rationality' another meaning, especially when he discusses what he labels 'the rationality principle'.
But even then, he clearly stresses the relevance of 'rationality' understood as a personal attitude:
It lies rather in an attitude of give and take, in a readiness not only to convince the other man but also possibly to be convinced by him.
What Popper calls the attitude of reasonableness may be characterized by a remark.
I think I am right, but I may be wrong and you may be right, and in any case let us discuss it, for in this way we are likely to get nearer to a true understanding than if we each merely insist that we are right.
It will be realized that what I call the attitude of reasonableness or the rationalistic attitude presupposes a certain amount of intellectual humility.
In other places, Popper attributes to 'rationality' another meaning, especially when he discusses what he labels 'the rationality principle'.
But even then, he clearly stresses the relevance of 'rationality' understood as a personal attitude:
Rationality as a personal attitude is the attitude of readiness to correct
one's beliefs.
In its intellectually most highly developed form it is the readiness to discuss one's beliefs critically, and to correct them in the light of critical discussions with other people.
In its intellectually most highly developed form it is the readiness to discuss one's beliefs critically, and to correct them in the light of critical discussions with other people.
Of course, this does not mean than one should be in a permanent state of
doubt.
Popper himself sustained deep commitments about his central humanitarian and rationalist views.
Popper obviously refers to open-mindedness and respect towards other people's ideas and creeds, and to the readiness to analyze them and eventually to correct our own ideas as a consequence of discussion.
Popper himself sustained deep commitments about his central humanitarian and rationalist views.
Popper obviously refers to open-mindedness and respect towards other people's ideas and creeds, and to the readiness to analyze them and eventually to correct our own ideas as a consequence of discussion.
Although Popper is not inclined to devote much effort to dispute about
words, in this case he made such an effort, and this means that he considered
the issue most relevant.
He presented his idea in a very straightforward way.
He presented his idea in a very straightforward way.
It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that
'I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth'.
In short, the rationalist attitude, or, as I may perhaps label it, the 'attitude of reasonableness', is very similar to the scientific attitude, to the belief that in the search for truth we need cooperation, and that, with the help of argument, we can in time attain something like objectivity.
We can realize that Popper uses time and again the same expression and that
he adds different accents in every case.
Such a rationalism is rooted, according to Popper, in ancient Greece and
Christianity:
Our Western civilization owes its rationalism, its
faith in the rational unity of man and in the open society, and especially its
scientific outlook, to the ancient Socratic and Christian belief in the
brotherhood of all men, and in intellectual honesty and responsibility.
Last but not least, it is worth noting that Popper's accent on rationality,
which is closely related to the scientific attitude, does not imply any kind of
scientism.
On the contrary, Popper asserts:
I am on the side of science and rationality, but I am against those exaggerated claims for science that have sometimes been, rightly, denounced as scientism.
Popper also recognizes the existence of ultimate questions which cannot be solved by using only scientific means:
On the contrary, Popper asserts:
I am on the side of science and rationality, but I am against those exaggerated claims for science that have sometimes been, rightly, denounced as scientism.
Popper also recognizes the existence of ultimate questions which cannot be solved by using only scientific means:
It is important to realize that science does not make assertions about
ultimate questions -about the riddles of existence, or about man's task in this
world.
All this indicates the existence of a true humanist position.
Besides, the ethical roots of Popper's central ideas become apparent in this context.
The fact that science cannot make any pronouncement about ethical principles has been misinterpreted as indicating that there are no such principles; while in fact the search of truth presupposes ethics.
Besides, the ethical roots of Popper's central ideas become apparent in this context.
The fact that science cannot make any pronouncement about ethical principles has been misinterpreted as indicating that there are no such principles; while in fact the search of truth presupposes ethics.
Popper declares his opposition to the nihilist doctrine that all purpose is only apparent purpose, and that
there cannot be any end or purpose or meaning or task in our life.
We have tried to show that Popper's fallibilism is not a merely logical
thesis.
It contains logical features, but it also refers to ethics: it arose as a consequence of a deep ethical experience, and it refers mainly to an attitude which is closely related with reasonableness and intellectual responsibility.
We will complete now this analysis by adding further clarifications about fallibilism and its relationship to a realist epistemology.
It contains logical features, but it also refers to ethics: it arose as a consequence of a deep ethical experience, and it refers mainly to an attitude which is closely related with reasonableness and intellectual responsibility.
We will complete now this analysis by adding further clarifications about fallibilism and its relationship to a realist epistemology.
Obviously, fallibilism occupies an important place in Popper's philosophy
and it cannot be reduced to a mere reaction of the young Popper when he faced
some particular events, important as they may be.
We will comment on some aspects that can help us to reach a more complete account.
We will comment on some aspects that can help us to reach a more complete account.
Sometimes, Popper explains fallibilism as the position opposed to
verificationism.
Thus, regarding the problem of knowledge, Popper distinguishes two main groups of philosophers this way:
Thus, regarding the problem of knowledge, Popper distinguishes two main groups of philosophers this way:
The members of the first group -- the verificationists or justificationists -- hold, roughly speaking, that whatever cannot be supported by positive reasons is unworthy of being believed, or even of being taken into serious consideration.
On the other hand, the members of the second group -- the falsificationists or fallibilists -- say, roughly speaking, that what cannot at present in principle be overthrown by criticism is at present unworthy of being seriously considered.
While what can in principle be so overthrown and yet resists all our critical efforts to do so may quite possibly be false, but is at any rate not unworthy of being seriously considered and perhaps even of being believed -though only tentatively.
Falsificationists -- the group of fallibilists to which Popper belongs -- believe -as most irrationalists also believe- that they have discovered logical arguments which show that the programme of the first group cannot be carried out: that we can never give positive reasons which justify the belief that a theory is true.
Popper therefore relates closely fallibilism and falsificationism, so that
falsificationism is considered as a particular species of fallibilism, and this,
in its turn, is characterized by means of an attitude related with some kind of
values: that which characterizes fallibilism as well as justificationism is that
they consider that some kind of assertions are worthy or unworthy of being
believed or seriously considered.
This means that fallibilism and justificationism are not merely logical doctrines.
Besides, falsificationism is based on the logical impossibility of providing conclusive verifications on behalf of theories; but this typical reason, which is of a logical kind and shows that the verificationist program cannot be carried out, is shared, according to Popper, also by most irrationalists: therefore, falsificationism should be based also on other reasons.
This means that fallibilism and justificationism are not merely logical doctrines.
Besides, falsificationism is based on the logical impossibility of providing conclusive verifications on behalf of theories; but this typical reason, which is of a logical kind and shows that the verificationist program cannot be carried out, is shared, according to Popper, also by most irrationalists: therefore, falsificationism should be based also on other reasons.
One of the main difficulties of fallibilism seems to be that it provides a
negative account of scientific method and, therefore, it does not justice to the
positive results and the corresponding reliability of scientific theories.
On this line, Eugene Freeman and Henryk Skolimowski regret that the methodology of Popper (and Peirce) should be called by so inapt a term as 'fallibilism', because this term suggests «the human propensity to make mistakes» and usually means «liable to err» or «liable to be erroneous or inaccurate».
Therefore, they say, «the term is singularly inapt, almost to the point of caricature, as a name for the method of science», because «this misses the main point about what science is doing when it is making its mistakes -and that is, not that it makes them, but that
(a) it recognizes them, and
(b) it eliminates them, and
(c) it advances beyond them, and thus, asymptotically, gets closer and closer to the truth».
They suggest that a much happier designation for identifying the methodology of both Peirce and Popper is found in Popper's inspired phrase, 'conjectures and refutations', which comes much closer to capturing the essence of Scientific Method.
These comments are contained in the Freeman-Skolimowski contribution to The Philosophy of Karl Popper.
When Popper replies, although he comments extensively other parts of the paper, he makes no comment about this.
This may perhaps mean that he does not attribute any relevance to that criticism, because it is obvious that fallibilism should not be interpreted as a summary of the scientific method.
On this line, Eugene Freeman and Henryk Skolimowski regret that the methodology of Popper (and Peirce) should be called by so inapt a term as 'fallibilism', because this term suggests «the human propensity to make mistakes» and usually means «liable to err» or «liable to be erroneous or inaccurate».
Therefore, they say, «the term is singularly inapt, almost to the point of caricature, as a name for the method of science», because «this misses the main point about what science is doing when it is making its mistakes -and that is, not that it makes them, but that
(a) it recognizes them, and
(b) it eliminates them, and
(c) it advances beyond them, and thus, asymptotically, gets closer and closer to the truth».
They suggest that a much happier designation for identifying the methodology of both Peirce and Popper is found in Popper's inspired phrase, 'conjectures and refutations', which comes much closer to capturing the essence of Scientific Method.
These comments are contained in the Freeman-Skolimowski contribution to The Philosophy of Karl Popper.
When Popper replies, although he comments extensively other parts of the paper, he makes no comment about this.
This may perhaps mean that he does not attribute any relevance to that criticism, because it is obvious that fallibilism should not be interpreted as a summary of the scientific method.
Instead, among Popper's comments on the Freeman-Skolimowski paper, there is
one that may have an especial interest here, and is the following one:
Popper's more far-reaching fallibilism, on the other hand, is the direct result
of Einstein's revolution.
The comparison refers to Peirce.
We have seen in detail why Popper's Marxist experience made him a fallibilist, and also that this negative experience was completed in the positive aspect when he noticed Einstein's attitude.
However, the reference to fallibilism as a result of Einstein's revolution has here a different meaning: it means that we can never be sure about the truth of any scientific theory, even if it has been proved correct in many instances, because (quoting again Popper's letter to Artigas),
No theory was better tested than Newton's -- and we certainly cannot be sure of it.
Einstein has shown that it is possible that Newton's theory may be false.
Popper often refers to the situation provoked by Einstein's revolution in similar terms.
But we should notice that Einstein's revolution involved great scientific theories; perhaps we can never be sure of such theories, but we can wonder whether the same holds for more modest scientific statements.
Why can we not be sure of, say, the existence of entities like atoms or electrons, or empirical laws such as Ohm's law, or configurations like DNA's double helix?
We have seen in detail why Popper's Marxist experience made him a fallibilist, and also that this negative experience was completed in the positive aspect when he noticed Einstein's attitude.
However, the reference to fallibilism as a result of Einstein's revolution has here a different meaning: it means that we can never be sure about the truth of any scientific theory, even if it has been proved correct in many instances, because (quoting again Popper's letter to Artigas),
No theory was better tested than Newton's -- and we certainly cannot be sure of it.
Einstein has shown that it is possible that Newton's theory may be false.
Popper often refers to the situation provoked by Einstein's revolution in similar terms.
But we should notice that Einstein's revolution involved great scientific theories; perhaps we can never be sure of such theories, but we can wonder whether the same holds for more modest scientific statements.
Why can we not be sure of, say, the existence of entities like atoms or electrons, or empirical laws such as Ohm's law, or configurations like DNA's double helix?
Popper supposes that we are aware of the distinctions which
exist between different levels of generality in our scientific constructs, as
well as between events, entities, processes and properties, and so on.
Popper very seldom considers this kind of issue, and this can be a source of misunderstandings, because the meaning of fallibilism will partly depend on the nature of the different specific subjects.
Popper very seldom considers this kind of issue, and this can be a source of misunderstandings, because the meaning of fallibilism will partly depend on the nature of the different specific subjects.
Actually, if fallibilism refers to theories and means that any scientific
theory may be superseded and that, therefore, we should cultivate an
open-mindedness which would exclude any claim of reaching a definitive and
irrefutable theory, and also that we should always search for potential
refutations in order to improve our theories, then I think that we all are or
should be fallibilists.
A different issue arises, instead, if someone considers fallibilism as a complete account of scientific method or, at least, of its essentials; this attempt would be seriously incomplete.
This is so obvious that perhaps, as already noted, this is why Popper does not comment on the corresponding observation of Freeman and Skolimowski.
A different issue arises, instead, if someone considers fallibilism as a complete account of scientific method or, at least, of its essentials; this attempt would be seriously incomplete.
This is so obvious that perhaps, as already noted, this is why Popper does not comment on the corresponding observation of Freeman and Skolimowski.
All this suggests a very important qualification, namely that we should
never forget the context of Popper's assertions about fallibilism.
We do not refer only to the literal context, but also to the ideal one.
Actually, the target of Popper's fallibilism is certitude, mainly, absolute certitude, but also probabilistic certitude.
He correctly distinguishes the objective ambit of truth from the subjective ambit of certitude, and then he claims that epistemology only refers to truth, leaving certainty outside the reach of epistemology.
Thus, the search for truth should be completely distinguished from the search for certitude, because our subjective states are completely irrelevant with respect to truth-claims.
Popper also stresses the logical impossibility of achieving a complete verification of any theory, the breakdown of the alleged definitive character of Newtonian physics, and the dangers involved in the claim to reach definitive theories -- also the danger of stagnation: when we think that our theory is a final one, we will cease to search for a better one.
All this is important.
However, Popper's opposition to any kind of certainty may seem too unilateral.
We do not refer only to the literal context, but also to the ideal one.
Actually, the target of Popper's fallibilism is certitude, mainly, absolute certitude, but also probabilistic certitude.
He correctly distinguishes the objective ambit of truth from the subjective ambit of certitude, and then he claims that epistemology only refers to truth, leaving certainty outside the reach of epistemology.
Thus, the search for truth should be completely distinguished from the search for certitude, because our subjective states are completely irrelevant with respect to truth-claims.
Popper also stresses the logical impossibility of achieving a complete verification of any theory, the breakdown of the alleged definitive character of Newtonian physics, and the dangers involved in the claim to reach definitive theories -- also the danger of stagnation: when we think that our theory is a final one, we will cease to search for a better one.
All this is important.
However, Popper's opposition to any kind of certainty may seem too unilateral.
The remedy sometimes will be easy, as it will suffice to consider
explicitly the different aspects of the particular problem and then we will
realize that we can be pretty sure about the existence of laws, entities,
properties or processes within the corresponding scientific context.
In other cases, however, we will find severe difficulties if we desire to attribute a definite degree of certitude to our scientific constructions; this usually happens when we consider the great theories, which provide an entire system whose global truth can hardly be defined.
In any case, all this corresponds to an entire theory of scientific knowledge which transcends the particular problems relating to fallibilism and should include qualifications about different kinds of subjects and types of certainty.
In other cases, however, we will find severe difficulties if we desire to attribute a definite degree of certitude to our scientific constructions; this usually happens when we consider the great theories, which provide an entire system whose global truth can hardly be defined.
In any case, all this corresponds to an entire theory of scientific knowledge which transcends the particular problems relating to fallibilism and should include qualifications about different kinds of subjects and types of certainty.
Popper wanted to enlarge "The Open Society" with two addenda.
The second, dated 1965, is very brief and refers to Marx.
The first, dated 1961, is entitled, Facts, Standards, and Truth: A Further Criticism of Relativism.
It is long, and Popper divided it into 18 paragraphs, so that it constitutes something like a new end of the book, in which the basic ideas about truth and knowledge are revisited.
In its conclusion, Popper exposes what a fallibilist approach has to offer to the social philosopher, and he mentions two issues.
The first refers to the possibility of evaluating tradition as well as revolutionary thought.
About the second, which became the very conclusion of the book, he writes:
The second, dated 1965, is very brief and refers to Marx.
The first, dated 1961, is entitled, Facts, Standards, and Truth: A Further Criticism of Relativism.
It is long, and Popper divided it into 18 paragraphs, so that it constitutes something like a new end of the book, in which the basic ideas about truth and knowledge are revisited.
In its conclusion, Popper exposes what a fallibilist approach has to offer to the social philosopher, and he mentions two issues.
The first refers to the possibility of evaluating tradition as well as revolutionary thought.
About the second, which became the very conclusion of the book, he writes:
Even more important, it can show us that the role of thought is to carry
out revolutions by means of critical debates rather than by means of violence
and of warfare; that it is the great tradition of Western rationalism to fight
our battles with words rather than with swords.
This is why our Western civilization is an essentially pluralistic one, and why monolithic social ends would mean the death of freedom: of the freedom of thought, of the free search for truth, and with it, of the rationality and the dignity of man.
This is why our Western civilization is an essentially pluralistic one, and why monolithic social ends would mean the death of freedom: of the freedom of thought, of the free search for truth, and with it, of the rationality and the dignity of man.
These words clearly show the ethical component of Popper's philosophy.
However, they could be interpreted, following literally his own words, as a kind of social consequence of Popper's epistemology.
Interesting as it could be, it would remain outside the core of Popper's philosophy.
However, they could be interpreted, following literally his own words, as a kind of social consequence of Popper's epistemology.
Interesting as it could be, it would remain outside the core of Popper's philosophy.
We should read Popper and interpret his arguments in the light of ethical values, namely his commitment to human dignity, freedom, reason, and truth.
Otherwise, we seriously risk misunderstanding him and we easily can substitute the real Popper by a dead skeleton full of unsolved problems.
From the chronological point of view, the priority corresponds to the ideas
elaborated by Popper on the occasion of his encounter with Marxism.
He tells us in his autobiography:
He tells us in his autobiography:
Once I had looked at it critically, the gaps and loopholes and
inconsistencies in the Marxist theory became obvious.
It took Popper some years of study before he felt with any confidence that I had grasped the heart of the Marxist argument.
Even then Popper had no intention of publishing his criticism of Marx, for anti-Marxism in Austria was a worse thing than Marxism.
Since the social democrats were Marxist, anti-Marxism was very nearly identical with those authoritarian movements which were later called fascist.
Of course, Popper talked about it to his friends.
But it was not till sixteen years later that Popper began to write about Marxism with the intention of publishing what he wrote.
As a consequence, two books emerged: "The Poverty of Historicism" and "The Open Society and Its Enemies".
It took Popper some years of study before he felt with any confidence that I had grasped the heart of the Marxist argument.
Even then Popper had no intention of publishing his criticism of Marx, for anti-Marxism in Austria was a worse thing than Marxism.
Since the social democrats were Marxist, anti-Marxism was very nearly identical with those authoritarian movements which were later called fascist.
Of course, Popper talked about it to his friends.
But it was not till sixteen years later that Popper began to write about Marxism with the intention of publishing what he wrote.
As a consequence, two books emerged: "The Poverty of Historicism" and "The Open Society and Its Enemies".
Therefore, we could say that, even if The Logic of Scientific Discovery was
Popper's first published book, the ideas underlying the two books on social
philosophy seen through ethical glasses had the real priority and influenced to
a great extent the development of Popper's epistemology.
Popper's epistemology becomes a source of all kinds
of problems when we forget -and this is usually done- its connections with
social issues and ethical attitudes.
Epistemology cannot be reduced to the study of logical relations between statements, because science is, above all, a human activity directed towards some goals that are achieved through very sophisticated methods, and those methods include stipulations and decisions which go far away from pure logic.
Of course, logic must be respected as an indispensable tool, but science would not progress guided by logic alone.
Actually, Popper knew this very well and includes in his epistemology, already in his first writings and always after, important references to the pragmatical, ethical and social values which are relevant in scientific practice.
However, the usual image of his work on epistemology is centered around logic alone.
This may be due to the relevance of his remarks about the logical reasons that make impossible the verification of hypotheses, and also to the contrast of his epistemology with the Kuhn-inspired and sociologically-centered epistemology in which the problem of truth is missing.
Epistemology cannot be reduced to the study of logical relations between statements, because science is, above all, a human activity directed towards some goals that are achieved through very sophisticated methods, and those methods include stipulations and decisions which go far away from pure logic.
Of course, logic must be respected as an indispensable tool, but science would not progress guided by logic alone.
Actually, Popper knew this very well and includes in his epistemology, already in his first writings and always after, important references to the pragmatical, ethical and social values which are relevant in scientific practice.
However, the usual image of his work on epistemology is centered around logic alone.
This may be due to the relevance of his remarks about the logical reasons that make impossible the verification of hypotheses, and also to the contrast of his epistemology with the Kuhn-inspired and sociologically-centered epistemology in which the problem of truth is missing.
The ethical features of Popper's epistemology are not found only, or
mainly, in his last years.
They are present from the very beginnings.
For instance, in an address delivered in June 1947 and first published in 1948, after describing the evils of the post-war situation, he says:
They are present from the very beginnings.
For instance, in an address delivered in June 1947 and first published in 1948, after describing the evils of the post-war situation, he says:
But in spite of all this I am today no less hopeful than I have ever been
that violence can be defeated that violence can be reduced, and brought
under the control of reason.
This is perhaps why I, like many others, believe in reason; why I call myself a rationalist.
I am a rationalist because I see in the attitude of reasonableness the only alternative to violence.
This is perhaps why I, like many others, believe in reason; why I call myself a rationalist.
I am a rationalist because I see in the attitude of reasonableness the only alternative to violence.
Years later, in a paper first published in 1970, Popper explained something
that he repeated tirelessly during many years.
If the method of rational critical discussion should establish itself, then this should make the use of violence obsolete. For critical reason is the only alternative to violence so far discovered.
It is the obvious duty of all intellectuals to work for this revolution -for the replacement of the eliminative function of violence by the eliminative function of rational criticism.
If the method of rational critical discussion should establish itself, then this should make the use of violence obsolete. For critical reason is the only alternative to violence so far discovered.
It is the obvious duty of all intellectuals to work for this revolution -for the replacement of the eliminative function of violence by the eliminative function of rational criticism.
I abhor violence.
Popper's philosophy is built, in all of its elements, on the basis of this quotation.
Reasonableness, rational criticism, fallibilism, are labels that represent several features of the same reality: peace, respect, freedom.
Popper's philosophy is built, in all of its elements, on the basis of this quotation.
Reasonableness, rational criticism, fallibilism, are labels that represent several features of the same reality: peace, respect, freedom.
Popper's philosophy is usually labeled, following his own proposal, as
critical rationalism, because its central tenet is criticism, i. e. the attitude
which considers knowledge not as something definitive but as always open to
further objections. In this context, the conjectural character of all knowledge
occupies a central place, and the quest for certainty appears as a mistaken
perspective which should be substituted by the critical approach.
All this is repeatedly asserted by Popper, so that it is unnecessary to prove it.
Then, a big question arises.
Which is the basis of critical rationalism itself?
Or, put in another way, can critical rationalism be applied to itself?
And, if this were not the case, the question arises about its coherence.
Is critical rationalism tenable, even when its basic thesis cannot be submitted to the exigencies that this thesis proclaims?
All this is repeatedly asserted by Popper, so that it is unnecessary to prove it.
Then, a big question arises.
Which is the basis of critical rationalism itself?
Or, put in another way, can critical rationalism be applied to itself?
And, if this were not the case, the question arises about its coherence.
Is critical rationalism tenable, even when its basic thesis cannot be submitted to the exigencies that this thesis proclaims?
These questions are anything but new, and Popper himself faced them.
Their answer is a straightforward one.
Following Popper's own words, the reasons for his rationalism are largely ethical reasons.
This is clearly stated already in "The Open Society and its enemies", where Popper speaks about faith in reason, or rationalism, or humanitarianism, or humanism, and claims that humanism is, after all, a faith which has proved itself in deeds, and which has proved itself as well, perhaps, as any other creed.
Their answer is a straightforward one.
Following Popper's own words, the reasons for his rationalism are largely ethical reasons.
This is clearly stated already in "The Open Society and its enemies", where Popper speaks about faith in reason, or rationalism, or humanitarianism, or humanism, and claims that humanism is, after all, a faith which has proved itself in deeds, and which has proved itself as well, perhaps, as any other creed.
Popper's rationalism, therefore, is doubtless a faith, a creed, which can
be compared with other faiths and creeds -- and it is a creed based on faith in
reason.
That this faith is based on a moral choice is also clearly stated by Popper when he discusses the reasons for and against critical rationalism and he says that critical rationalism recognizes the fact that that the fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith -from faith in reason.
Accordingly, our choice is open.
We may choose some form of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form.
But we are also free to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its origin in an irrational decision (and which, to that extent, admits a certain priority of irrationalism).
The choice before us is not simply an intellectual affair, or a matter of taste.
It is a moral decision.
For the question whether we adopt some more or less radical form of irrationalism, or whether we adopt that minimum concession to irrationalism which Popper terms 'critical rationalism', will deeply affect our whole attitude towards other men, and towards the problems of social life.
That this faith is based on a moral choice is also clearly stated by Popper when he discusses the reasons for and against critical rationalism and he says that critical rationalism recognizes the fact that that the fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith -from faith in reason.
Accordingly, our choice is open.
We may choose some form of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form.
But we are also free to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its origin in an irrational decision (and which, to that extent, admits a certain priority of irrationalism).
The choice before us is not simply an intellectual affair, or a matter of taste.
It is a moral decision.
For the question whether we adopt some more or less radical form of irrationalism, or whether we adopt that minimum concession to irrationalism which Popper terms 'critical rationalism', will deeply affect our whole attitude towards other men, and towards the problems of social life.
The reference to "The Open Society and its enemies" is clarifying because in
that essay Popper defends the dualism of facts and decisions, by arguing that nature consists of facts and of regularities, and is in itself neither moral
nor immoral.
It is we who impose out standards upon nature, and who in this way introduce morals into the natural world, in spite of the fact that we are part of this world.
As Popper goes on, he speaks about decisions for which we are morally responsible, claims that responsibility, decisions, enter the world of nature only with us, and also that these decisions can never be derived from facts (or from statements of facts).
It is we who impose out standards upon nature, and who in this way introduce morals into the natural world, in spite of the fact that we are part of this world.
As Popper goes on, he speaks about decisions for which we are morally responsible, claims that responsibility, decisions, enter the world of nature only with us, and also that these decisions can never be derived from facts (or from statements of facts).
Therefore, we can conclude that Popper in some way identifies his critical
rationalism with his humanism, that both are based on a kind of faith in reason
which is a true faith because it cannot be derived from facts, and also that
this faith is the result of a choice that has a moral character because it has
many important consequences in our attitudes towards human persons.
We should add that, according to Popper, the moral choice for rationalism
is not a blind one, as it can be helped by arguments:
As we have seen in our analysis of
the uncritical version of rationalism, arguments cannot determine such a
fundamental moral decision.
But this does not imply that our choice cannot be helped by any kind of argument whatever.
On the contrary, whenever we are faced with a moral decision of a more abstract kind, it is most helpful to analyse carefully the consequences which are likely to result from the alternatives between which we have to choose.
But this does not imply that our choice cannot be helped by any kind of argument whatever.
On the contrary, whenever we are faced with a moral decision of a more abstract kind, it is most helpful to analyse carefully the consequences which are likely to result from the alternatives between which we have to choose.
In "The Open Society and its Enemies", we find other statements which insist on this line and
show that these points are central in Popper's attitude, for instance when
Popper says that he has tried to analyse those consequences of rationalism and
irrationalism which induce him to decide as he did.
Popper wishes to repeat that the decision is largely a moral decision.
It is the decision to take argument seriously.
This is the difference between the two views; for irrationalism will use reason too, but without any feeling of obligation; it will use it or discard it as it pleases.
But I believe that the only attitude which I can consider to be morally right is one which recognizes that we owe it to other men to treat them and ourselves as rational.
Considered in this way, Popper's counter-attack upon irrationalism is a moral attack.
Popper wishes to repeat that the decision is largely a moral decision.
It is the decision to take argument seriously.
This is the difference between the two views; for irrationalism will use reason too, but without any feeling of obligation; it will use it or discard it as it pleases.
But I believe that the only attitude which I can consider to be morally right is one which recognizes that we owe it to other men to treat them and ourselves as rational.
Considered in this way, Popper's counter-attack upon irrationalism is a moral attack.
We have found already some references to Popper's analysis of the
consequences of rationalism and irrationalism.
Typically, they include, since the times of "The Open Society and its Enemies", references to the critical rationalist's device,
I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort we may get nearer to the truth.
Other consequences of this view are that «Faith in reason is not only a faith in our own reason, but also -and even more- in that of others», so that rationalism is therefore bound up with the idea that the other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend his arguments.
It thus implies the recognition of the claim to tolerance»; also, that rationalism is linked up with the recognition of the necessity of social institutions to protect freedom»; and finally, that the adoption of rationalism implies, moreover, that there is a common medium of communication, a common language of reason.
It establishes something like a moral obligation towards that language, the obligation to keep up its standards of clarity and to use it in such a way that it can retain its function as the vehicle of argument.
We should not be surprised to find in this context, once more, the expression «faith in reason» as a central characteristic of rationalism, which is attributed by Popper to the greatest among the founders of the tradition of critical rationalism, Socrates.
Typically, they include, since the times of "The Open Society and its Enemies", references to the critical rationalist's device,
I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort we may get nearer to the truth.
Other consequences of this view are that «Faith in reason is not only a faith in our own reason, but also -and even more- in that of others», so that rationalism is therefore bound up with the idea that the other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend his arguments.
It thus implies the recognition of the claim to tolerance»; also, that rationalism is linked up with the recognition of the necessity of social institutions to protect freedom»; and finally, that the adoption of rationalism implies, moreover, that there is a common medium of communication, a common language of reason.
It establishes something like a moral obligation towards that language, the obligation to keep up its standards of clarity and to use it in such a way that it can retain its function as the vehicle of argument.
We should not be surprised to find in this context, once more, the expression «faith in reason» as a central characteristic of rationalism, which is attributed by Popper to the greatest among the founders of the tradition of critical rationalism, Socrates.
All this does not correspond to a particular stage of Popper's thought.
On the contrary, it is a constant claim that is repeated in the different works and times as something really important. A reference to two statements in works posterior to "The Open Society and its enemies" will suffice to show it.
In the lecture "Utopia and Violence", Popper refers to his non-dogmatic rationalism as something that cannot be proved and that includes faith in reason and in man with the following clear accent:
On the contrary, it is a constant claim that is repeated in the different works and times as something really important. A reference to two statements in works posterior to "The Open Society and its enemies" will suffice to show it.
In the lecture "Utopia and Violence", Popper refers to his non-dogmatic rationalism as something that cannot be proved and that includes faith in reason and in man with the following clear accent:
Popper thinks he has said enough to make clear what he intended to convey by
calling himself a rationalist.
Popper's rationalism is not dogmatic.
Popper fully admits that he cannot rationally prove it.
Popper frankly confesses that he chooses rationalism because he hates violence, and I does not deceive himself into believing that this hatred has any rational grounds.
Or to put it another way, my rationalism is not self-contained, but rests on an irrational faith in the attitude of reasonableness.
Popper does not see that we can go beyond this.
One could say, perhaps, that Popper's irrational faith in equal and reciprocal rights to convince others and to be convinced by them is a faith in human reason; or simply, that I believe in man.
Popper's rationalism is not dogmatic.
Popper fully admits that he cannot rationally prove it.
Popper frankly confesses that he chooses rationalism because he hates violence, and I does not deceive himself into believing that this hatred has any rational grounds.
Or to put it another way, my rationalism is not self-contained, but rests on an irrational faith in the attitude of reasonableness.
Popper does not see that we can go beyond this.
One could say, perhaps, that Popper's irrational faith in equal and reciprocal rights to convince others and to be convinced by them is a faith in human reason; or simply, that I believe in man.
In his "Die Erkenntnistheorie und das Problem
des Friedens", Popper speaks about his basic position as his religion and as opposed
to some false religions of our days.
In the "Introduction" to "The Myth of the Framework",
Popper includes some considerations which, if considered isolated from
other works, could perhaps seem a kind of senile moralizing, but which,
considered in the background of the previous quotations, show that they are, in
a very strict sense, a literal summary of Popper's main contentions.
They are so important that they deserve a long quotation
They are so important that they deserve a long quotation
All, or almost all, the papers collected in this volume are written to
defend rationality and rational criticism. It is a way of thinking, and even a
way of living: a readiness to listen to critical arguments, to search for one's
own mistakes, and to learn from them.
It is, fundamentally, an attitude that I have tried to formulate in the following two lines,
'I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth'.
These two lines in italics here quoted were first printed in 1945 in Popper's "Open Society" and he italicised the lines in order to indicate that I regarded them as important.
For these two lines were an attempt to summarize a very central part of my moral articles of faith.
The view that they summed up Popper called 'critical rationalism'.
But the critics of Popper's "Open Society" and of critical rationalism were, it seemed, blind to these two lines.
So far as Popper knew, none of my critics showed any interest in them, or quoted them.
This is the reason why, after half a century, I am quoting them here.
They were intended to contain, in a nutshell, a confession of faith, expressed simply, in unphilosophical, ordinary English; a faith in peace, in humanity, in tolerance, in modesty, in trying to learn from one's own mistakes; and in the possibilities of critical discussion.
It was an appeal to reason.
It is, fundamentally, an attitude that I have tried to formulate in the following two lines,
'I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth'.
These two lines in italics here quoted were first printed in 1945 in Popper's "Open Society" and he italicised the lines in order to indicate that I regarded them as important.
For these two lines were an attempt to summarize a very central part of my moral articles of faith.
The view that they summed up Popper called 'critical rationalism'.
But the critics of Popper's "Open Society" and of critical rationalism were, it seemed, blind to these two lines.
So far as Popper knew, none of my critics showed any interest in them, or quoted them.
This is the reason why, after half a century, I am quoting them here.
They were intended to contain, in a nutshell, a confession of faith, expressed simply, in unphilosophical, ordinary English; a faith in peace, in humanity, in tolerance, in modesty, in trying to learn from one's own mistakes; and in the possibilities of critical discussion.
It was an appeal to reason.
The preceding lines clearly show the deepest character of Popper's critical
rationalism, its roots and its main consequences.
After reading them there can be no doubt that they are seriously meant to summarize the central features of Popper's position and that this position has deep ethical components.
After reading them there can be no doubt that they are seriously meant to summarize the central features of Popper's position and that this position has deep ethical components.
Popper refers in those lines to the fact that his critics were blind to his
main tenets.
Important as this may be, there is another fact which is perhaps even more important, namely, the interpretation of Popper's critical rationalism in the hands of his friends.
Did they realize what Popper really meant?
Important as this may be, there is another fact which is perhaps even more important, namely, the interpretation of Popper's critical rationalism in the hands of his friends.
Did they realize what Popper really meant?
Surely, the most influential interpretation of Popper's thought in a
friendly way was proposed by William Warren Bartley, III, and its relevance for our
present considerations can hardly be overestimated.
William Warren Bartley, III, arrived from Harvard at the London School of Economics in September
1958 to work on his doctoral studies with Popper.
Until 1965, their relations were excellent.
It was during this epoch that W. W. Bartley, III, found critical rationalism insufficient because of the element of faith it included in its basis, and he wanted to formulate an extension of Popper's theory which called 'comprehensive critical rationalism' and, afterwards, 'pan-criticism'.
The main idea was that criticism had to be extended in such a way that the elements related with any kind of faith could be eliminated in order to obtain a completely critical position.
Until 1965, their relations were excellent.
It was during this epoch that W. W. Bartley, III, found critical rationalism insufficient because of the element of faith it included in its basis, and he wanted to formulate an extension of Popper's theory which called 'comprehensive critical rationalism' and, afterwards, 'pan-criticism'.
The main idea was that criticism had to be extended in such a way that the elements related with any kind of faith could be eliminated in order to obtain a completely critical position.
W. W. Bartley, III, discussed these problems with Popper, who introduced in the 1962
edition of his Open Society several changes, and recognized his debt to Bartley
with this words:
Popper writes that he is deeply indebted to Dr. William W. Bartley's incisive criticism which
not only helped him to improve a chapter of his book ("especially page 231", Popper adds) but
also induced him to make important changes in the present addendum.
Nevertheless, W. W. Bartley, III, judges that the changes were insufficient because the
faith-elements were retained, and continued to work in his own line of
thought.
Nobody knows what would have happened if W. W. Bartley, III's relationship with Popper
had not been interrupted, owing to the paper that W. W. Bartley, III, presented in
the International Symposium held in London.
When good relations were restored, W. W. Bartley, III, was a great help for the publication of Popper's Postscript.
What we know is that W. W. Bartley, III's pancriticism provoked considerable discussion and that Popper himself did not intervene in it.
When good relations were restored, W. W. Bartley, III, was a great help for the publication of Popper's Postscript.
What we know is that W. W. Bartley, III's pancriticism provoked considerable discussion and that Popper himself did not intervene in it.
We also know that, in spite of W. W. Bartley, III's comments, Popper did not change
his mind in the written text of "The Open Society and its enemies", as can be easily seen in
volume ii, page 231 (the one which Popper mentions especially), because there we
find several references to faith in reason.
Popper previously says that neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rationalist attitude; for only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them.
Popper previously says that neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rationalist attitude; for only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them.
He goes on to say that we have to conclude from this that no rational argument will have a
rational effect on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude. Thus a
comprehensive rationalism is untenable.
He concludes that this means that whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so
because he has adopted, consciously or unconsciously, some proposal, or
decision, or belief, or behavior -- an adoption which may be called 'irrational'.
Whether this adoption is tentative or leads to a settled habit, we may describe it as an irrational faith in reason. So rationalism is necessarily far from comprehensive or self-contained.
Whether this adoption is tentative or leads to a settled habit, we may describe it as an irrational faith in reason. So rationalism is necessarily far from comprehensive or self-contained.
All this is clear enough.
Nevertheless, someone could ask whether Popper changed his mind or not during the long period that elapsed after the fourth edition of "The Open Society and its enemies".
Probably, the most important allusion to this subject is contained in several pages of volume I of Popper's "Postscript", edited by W. W. Bartley, III, himself.
These pages were later partly rewritten, as Popper tells us, and some people think that they contain Popper's appropriation of Bartley's views.
Nevertheless, someone could ask whether Popper changed his mind or not during the long period that elapsed after the fourth edition of "The Open Society and its enemies".
Probably, the most important allusion to this subject is contained in several pages of volume I of Popper's "Postscript", edited by W. W. Bartley, III, himself.
These pages were later partly rewritten, as Popper tells us, and some people think that they contain Popper's appropriation of Bartley's views.
The pages just mentioned contain a discussion of Popper's
anti-justificationist philosophy in dialogue with W. W. Bartley, III, and we can read in
them several positive judgments of W. W. Bartley, III's comments and a sharp negation of
the relevance of belief in the following terms.
Now, like E. M. Forster, Popper does not believe in belief.
Popper is not interested in a philosophy of belief, and he does not believe that beliefs and their justification, or foundation, or rationality, are the subject-matter of the theory of knowledge.
Now, like E. M. Forster, Popper does not believe in belief.
Popper is not interested in a philosophy of belief, and he does not believe that beliefs and their justification, or foundation, or rationality, are the subject-matter of the theory of knowledge.
Should we expect something else in order to interpret definitively Popper's
rationalism in a Bartleyan way?
Nevertheless, we do not think that this is the case.
That belief and its justification should not play any role in the theory of knowledge and that philosophy should concentrate on the objective-logical features of knowledge, be it true or false, is anything but new in Popper's philosophy, as he has repeated this on almost countless occasions.
That we cannot rationally argue for belief, be it true or false, pertains to the very notion of belief used by Popper.
However, if we read carefully Popper's quoted words, and the entire section from which they are extracted as the most representative part for our purpose, we will not find anything contrary to that 'faith in reason' which is presupposed by Popper's rationalism.
Besides, we should not forget that this rationalism is equated by Popper to his humanism, and that it includes not only a kind of faith in reason which could be easily dismissed as something not too important, but an entire set of presuppositions and attitudes that constitute the core of Popper's own position.
That belief and its justification should not play any role in the theory of knowledge and that philosophy should concentrate on the objective-logical features of knowledge, be it true or false, is anything but new in Popper's philosophy, as he has repeated this on almost countless occasions.
That we cannot rationally argue for belief, be it true or false, pertains to the very notion of belief used by Popper.
However, if we read carefully Popper's quoted words, and the entire section from which they are extracted as the most representative part for our purpose, we will not find anything contrary to that 'faith in reason' which is presupposed by Popper's rationalism.
Besides, we should not forget that this rationalism is equated by Popper to his humanism, and that it includes not only a kind of faith in reason which could be easily dismissed as something not too important, but an entire set of presuppositions and attitudes that constitute the core of Popper's own position.
Last but not least, we dispose of a commentary of Popper on this subject,
in "The Myth of the Framework", with an Introduction already quoted as containing a clear
account of the core of Popper's critical rationalism.
There, explaining his classical phrase,
I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.
Popper complains that his critics have paid no attention to it, and afterwards extends his complaints to other misunderstandings of his position.
One of them, that which is relevant here, is the following:
There, explaining his classical phrase,
I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.
Popper complains that his critics have paid no attention to it, and afterwards extends his complaints to other misunderstandings of his position.
One of them, that which is relevant here, is the following:
There also was an attempt to replace my critical rationalism by a more
radically critical and more explicitly defined position.
But because this attempt bore the character of a definition, it led to endless philosophical arguments about its adequacy.
But because this attempt bore the character of a definition, it led to endless philosophical arguments about its adequacy.
It is most difficult to interpret this last comment, although it does not
contain an explicit reference to W. W. Bartley, III (who by that time was already dead),
except as a denial of W. W. Bartley, III's pancriticism.
The issue is very important because a correct interpretation of Popper's philosophy depends, to a great extent, on this point, and it is easy to follow one of his best disciples and collaborators.
That this should not be the case can be certified by the words that follow Popper's comment on W. W. Bartley, III, in "The Myth of the Framework".
These words refer again to the two lines, I may be wrong and you may be right,
and they say that Popper never found anyone who had taken notice of the two lines that I had intended as my moral credo.
The issue is very important because a correct interpretation of Popper's philosophy depends, to a great extent, on this point, and it is easy to follow one of his best disciples and collaborators.
That this should not be the case can be certified by the words that follow Popper's comment on W. W. Bartley, III, in "The Myth of the Framework".
These words refer again to the two lines, I may be wrong and you may be right,
and they say that Popper never found anyone who had taken notice of the two lines that I had intended as my moral credo.
We find again an unmistakable reference to Popper's moral credo, and
therefore to his ethics and faith which, besides, are united in a single
expression.
And we face a strong lament, clearly voiced at the end of his life, where Popper himself perhaps desires to tell us that the usual interpretations of his philosophy are not correct at all, because they fail to note that what constitutes the hard core of his rationalism and humanism, which has an ethical character and relies on a special kind of faith, namely faith in reason, in freedom, in peace, in humanism, in mutual respect and in tolerance.
And we face a strong lament, clearly voiced at the end of his life, where Popper himself perhaps desires to tell us that the usual interpretations of his philosophy are not correct at all, because they fail to note that what constitutes the hard core of his rationalism and humanism, which has an ethical character and relies on a special kind of faith, namely faith in reason, in freedom, in peace, in humanism, in mutual respect and in tolerance.
There have been several attempts to provide a unifying key to Popper's
philosophy.
J. Watkins, who worked for many years with Karl Popper in the Department of Philosophy of the London School of Economics, proposes indeterminism as such a key.
Emergence is another good candidate.
Popper himself, in his comment to the paper of Watkins just quoted, manifested his preference for criticism as the key of his entire philosophy, and his textual words are worth quoting.
Indeed, even if Popper recognized that Watkins' attempt was coherent and well argued, he wrote:
J. Watkins, who worked for many years with Karl Popper in the Department of Philosophy of the London School of Economics, proposes indeterminism as such a key.
Emergence is another good candidate.
Popper himself, in his comment to the paper of Watkins just quoted, manifested his preference for criticism as the key of his entire philosophy, and his textual words are worth quoting.
Indeed, even if Popper recognized that Watkins' attempt was coherent and well argued, he wrote:
Artigas sees the unity of his philosophy in a slightly different way.
Artigas is inclined to regard his emphasis on criticism, or the doctrines of critical realism or critical optimism, as being more appropriate than indeterminism is to the unity of my theoretical and practical thinking.
Artigas is inclined to regard his emphasis on criticism, or the doctrines of critical realism or critical optimism, as being more appropriate than indeterminism is to the unity of my theoretical and practical thinking.
This words are important because they show that when Popper spoke about
criticism he connected this idea with realism.
The central concern of Popper's epistemology is truth and our effort to progress in our search for truth.
The central concern of Popper's epistemology is truth and our effort to progress in our search for truth.
It is not Artigas's aim to present another attempt in this line.
Instead, the ethical perspective provides an understanding of Popper's philosophy at a different level which refers to the origins of the other keys.
More specifically, it permits us to understand the meaning of Popper's criticism and critical rationalism.
Indeed, when we see Popper's epistemology as explained by the ethical key we realize that it represents an attitude rather than a doctrine.
It is a doctrine centered around an attitude, the attitude of reasonableness, of giving importance to rational discussion, a discussion in which we are open-minded with respect to any kind of objections or qualifications, ready to give up a cherished opinion when there are reasons to abandon it.
Popper's epistemology can be seen as a theoretical articulation of this kind of attitude.
Instead, the ethical perspective provides an understanding of Popper's philosophy at a different level which refers to the origins of the other keys.
More specifically, it permits us to understand the meaning of Popper's criticism and critical rationalism.
Indeed, when we see Popper's epistemology as explained by the ethical key we realize that it represents an attitude rather than a doctrine.
It is a doctrine centered around an attitude, the attitude of reasonableness, of giving importance to rational discussion, a discussion in which we are open-minded with respect to any kind of objections or qualifications, ready to give up a cherished opinion when there are reasons to abandon it.
Popper's epistemology can be seen as a theoretical articulation of this kind of attitude.
Popper is mainly interested in truth.
Popperian criticism is essentially connected to the pursuit of truth: it is an attitude whose relevance lies precisely in the essential role that it plays if we are to search a true knowledge about the real world.
When Popper argues for philosophical realism as opposed to any form of subjectivism and idealism, his arguments adopt a tone which almost makes us forget his insistence on the conjectural character of our knowledge, as I will show now.
Popperian criticism is essentially connected to the pursuit of truth: it is an attitude whose relevance lies precisely in the essential role that it plays if we are to search a true knowledge about the real world.
When Popper argues for philosophical realism as opposed to any form of subjectivism and idealism, his arguments adopt a tone which almost makes us forget his insistence on the conjectural character of our knowledge, as I will show now.
The first volume of Popper's postscript to "The Logic of Scientific
Discovery" was entitled precisely realism and the aim of science.
Popper strongly argues in favor of a metaphysical realism which recognizes the reality of a world independent of our will and also of an epistemological realism which considers the pursuit of a true knowledge of that world as the main objective of science.
Popper's emphasis in his argument is so strong that we find there some expressions that might seem quite un-Popperian.
But they are there.
This means that once again we have good reasons to interpret Popper's criticism as an attitude that may be complemented with further metaphysical doctrines.
Popper strongly argues in favor of a metaphysical realism which recognizes the reality of a world independent of our will and also of an epistemological realism which considers the pursuit of a true knowledge of that world as the main objective of science.
Popper's emphasis in his argument is so strong that we find there some expressions that might seem quite un-Popperian.
But they are there.
This means that once again we have good reasons to interpret Popper's criticism as an attitude that may be complemented with further metaphysical doctrines.
Artigas refers to several of those expressions such as they are contained in a
section of the first chapter of the Postscript, volume I, which is entitled, "Metaphysical Realism".
There, Popper refers first to realism as an important ingredient of The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
He says that, even if that book was not a book on metaphysics, yet he stated in it that he believed in metaphysical realism, and he adds something:
And I believe in metaphysical realism still.
He goes on by saying that metaphysical realism is not a part or a presupposition of that book, but he adds.
Yet, it is very much there.
It forms a kind of background that gives point to our search for truth.
Rational discussion, that is, critical argument in the interest of getting nearer to the truth, would be pointless without an objective reality, a world which we make it our task to discover.
In case that the reader might think that these are accidental second thoughts, Popper adds:
This robust if mainly implicit realism which permeates the Logic of Scientific Discovery is one of its aspects in which I take some pride.
It is also one of its aspects which links it with this postscript, each volume of which attacks one or another of the subjectivist, or idealist, approaches to knowledge.
Then, he announces that he will devote ten sections to discussion of this subject.
There, Popper refers first to realism as an important ingredient of The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
He says that, even if that book was not a book on metaphysics, yet he stated in it that he believed in metaphysical realism, and he adds something:
And I believe in metaphysical realism still.
He goes on by saying that metaphysical realism is not a part or a presupposition of that book, but he adds.
Yet, it is very much there.
It forms a kind of background that gives point to our search for truth.
Rational discussion, that is, critical argument in the interest of getting nearer to the truth, would be pointless without an objective reality, a world which we make it our task to discover.
In case that the reader might think that these are accidental second thoughts, Popper adds:
This robust if mainly implicit realism which permeates the Logic of Scientific Discovery is one of its aspects in which I take some pride.
It is also one of its aspects which links it with this postscript, each volume of which attacks one or another of the subjectivist, or idealist, approaches to knowledge.
Then, he announces that he will devote ten sections to discussion of this subject.
We realize that, in the text just quoted, Popper says that he believed
and continues to believe in metaphysical realism.
This is apparently quite un-Popperian if we recall that in a section of the same chapter he emphasizes that he does not believe in belief.
We find other apparently un-Popperian expressions when Popper develops his discussion about realism.
He says, for instance, that both realism and idealism share the common characteristic of being non-demonstrable and irrefutable.
But, he adds, there is an all-important difference between them.
Metaphysical idealism is false, and metaphysical realism is true.
We do not, of course, know this, in the sense in which we may know that
2 + 3 = 5
That is to say, we do not know it in the sense of demonstrable knowledge.
We also do not know it in the sense of testable 'scientific knowledge'.
But this does not mean that our knowledge is unreasoned, or unreasonable.
On the contrary, there is no factual knowledge which is supported by more or by stronger (even though inconclusive) arguments».
This assertion about realism and idealism could not be stronger, and the talk about positive arguments seems to clash with the extreme criticism often attributed to Popper.
Besides, Popper continues speaking of «the positive arguments in support of metaphysical realism».
This is apparently quite un-Popperian if we recall that in a section of the same chapter he emphasizes that he does not believe in belief.
We find other apparently un-Popperian expressions when Popper develops his discussion about realism.
He says, for instance, that both realism and idealism share the common characteristic of being non-demonstrable and irrefutable.
But, he adds, there is an all-important difference between them.
Metaphysical idealism is false, and metaphysical realism is true.
We do not, of course, know this, in the sense in which we may know that
2 + 3 = 5
That is to say, we do not know it in the sense of demonstrable knowledge.
We also do not know it in the sense of testable 'scientific knowledge'.
But this does not mean that our knowledge is unreasoned, or unreasonable.
On the contrary, there is no factual knowledge which is supported by more or by stronger (even though inconclusive) arguments».
This assertion about realism and idealism could not be stronger, and the talk about positive arguments seems to clash with the extreme criticism often attributed to Popper.
Besides, Popper continues speaking of «the positive arguments in support of metaphysical realism».
Then, we find a series of assertions that have an unmistakable flavour of
certainty that could be a surprise again for the supporters of an extreme
version of criticism.
Indeed, when Popper exposes his argument in favor of metaphysical realism, he writes:
Indeed, when Popper exposes his argument in favor of metaphysical realism, he writes:
Popper's argument is this.
Popper knows that he has not created Bach's music, or Mozart's; that he has not created Rembrandt's pictures, or Botticelli's.
He is quite certain that he never could do anything like that.
He knows that he does not have the imagination to write anything like the "Iliad" or the "Inferno" or "The Tempest".
He knows that he is incapable of creating, out of my own imagination, anything as beautiful as the mountains and glaciers of Switzerland, or even as some of the flowers and trees in his own garden.
he knows that ours is a world he never made.
Popper knows that he has not created Bach's music, or Mozart's; that he has not created Rembrandt's pictures, or Botticelli's.
He is quite certain that he never could do anything like that.
He knows that he does not have the imagination to write anything like the "Iliad" or the "Inferno" or "The Tempest".
He knows that he is incapable of creating, out of my own imagination, anything as beautiful as the mountains and glaciers of Switzerland, or even as some of the flowers and trees in his own garden.
he knows that ours is a world he never made.
Popper deals here with very elementary truths.
But he deals with them in a completely realistic way without any concession to the typical arguments of the subjectivist or idealist philosophies.
In this field, Popper does not seem afraid of saying that he really knows something for certain.
He even adds shortly afterwards:
But he deals with them in a completely realistic way without any concession to the typical arguments of the subjectivist or idealist philosophies.
In this field, Popper does not seem afraid of saying that he really knows something for certain.
He even adds shortly afterwards:
None of these arguments should be needed.
Realism is so obviously true that even a straightforward argument such as the one presented here is just a little distasteful.
Realism is so obviously true that even a straightforward argument such as the one presented here is just a little distasteful.
I think that all this argument about metaphysical realism could be
subscribed to by a Thomist like Gilson.
Popper the criticist uses the same kind of arguments used by Gilson in order to arrive to the same conclusion with the same kind of certainty.
Popper the criticist uses the same kind of arguments used by Gilson in order to arrive to the same conclusion with the same kind of certainty.
This is not, however, the only occasion in which Popper argues about
metaphysical issues.
When accused of being or having been a positivist, he would reply that he never denied the meaningfulness of metaphysics and also that he had often discussed metaphysical problems, which is true.
Even if Popper were to tell us that his points of view should be considered as conjectures, in fact he argues as strongly as anyone would argue when he attacks materialism or argues for realism, indeterminism and emergence.
When accused of being or having been a positivist, he would reply that he never denied the meaningfulness of metaphysics and also that he had often discussed metaphysical problems, which is true.
Even if Popper were to tell us that his points of view should be considered as conjectures, in fact he argues as strongly as anyone would argue when he attacks materialism or argues for realism, indeterminism and emergence.
The entire issue can be clarified if we recall that, arguing in favor of
realism, Popper writes.
We do not, of course, know this, in the sense in which we may know that
2 + 3 = 5
That is to say, we do not know it in the sense of demonstrable knowledge.
We also do not know it in the sense of testable scientific knowledge.
But this does not mean that our knowledge is unreasoned, or unreasonable».
A dialogue about this text could suffice to reach a wide agreement on some issues between Popper and many philosophical realists, Thomists included.
We do not, of course, know this, in the sense in which we may know that
2 + 3 = 5
That is to say, we do not know it in the sense of demonstrable knowledge.
We also do not know it in the sense of testable scientific knowledge.
But this does not mean that our knowledge is unreasoned, or unreasonable».
A dialogue about this text could suffice to reach a wide agreement on some issues between Popper and many philosophical realists, Thomists included.
From a Thomistic point of view, one could say that we hardly know anything
about the physical world «in the sense in which we may know that
2 + 3 = 5
So that, if we consider this as the paradigm of «demonstrable knowledge», Popper would be right when he considers our knowledge as basically conjectural.
This point is forcefully argued by Zanotti, who examines the Thomistic doctrine about the knowledge of physical essences.
If we consider knowledge in the sense of testable scientific knowledge, we should be ready to admit that in empirical science there is a special source of intersubjectivity and truth.
This source, however, is nothing mysterious: it consists in the fact that the natural world is organized around spatio-temporal repeatable patterns.
Scientific experiments are possible because there are repeatable patterns.
Instead, when we deal with the human sciences, we must take into account specific human dimensions which, even if they are related to spatio-temporal patterns, they also transcend them.
Therefore, we cannot settle metaphysical discussions by using exactly the same kind of arguments used in empirical science.
Nevertheless, we can eventually reach conclusions that are much more certain than the conclusions of the empirical sciences. Zanotti also provides good arguments and examples about this.
2 + 3 = 5
So that, if we consider this as the paradigm of «demonstrable knowledge», Popper would be right when he considers our knowledge as basically conjectural.
This point is forcefully argued by Zanotti, who examines the Thomistic doctrine about the knowledge of physical essences.
If we consider knowledge in the sense of testable scientific knowledge, we should be ready to admit that in empirical science there is a special source of intersubjectivity and truth.
This source, however, is nothing mysterious: it consists in the fact that the natural world is organized around spatio-temporal repeatable patterns.
Scientific experiments are possible because there are repeatable patterns.
Instead, when we deal with the human sciences, we must take into account specific human dimensions which, even if they are related to spatio-temporal patterns, they also transcend them.
Therefore, we cannot settle metaphysical discussions by using exactly the same kind of arguments used in empirical science.
Nevertheless, we can eventually reach conclusions that are much more certain than the conclusions of the empirical sciences. Zanotti also provides good arguments and examples about this.
Popper advocates several philosophical doctrines that are most important
for a Thomist and for many other realist philosophers.
This is the case when he argues for metaphysical realism.
This can be also extended
-- to the image of empirical science as a human enterprise whose aim is the pursuit of truth
-- to the relevance of ethical reasons for the search of truth
-- to the claim that our search for empirical knowledge must be based on the method of conjectures and refutations; to the idea that beyond empirical science there exists an ambit of metaphysical questions which cannot be settled by experiments but nevertheless can be rationally discussed
-- to the relevance of intellectual modesty especially in the ambit of intellectual enterprises
-- to the necessity of fostering the attitude of dialogue and reasonableness in human affairs.
This is the case when he argues for metaphysical realism.
This can be also extended
-- to the image of empirical science as a human enterprise whose aim is the pursuit of truth
-- to the relevance of ethical reasons for the search of truth
-- to the claim that our search for empirical knowledge must be based on the method of conjectures and refutations; to the idea that beyond empirical science there exists an ambit of metaphysical questions which cannot be settled by experiments but nevertheless can be rationally discussed
-- to the relevance of intellectual modesty especially in the ambit of intellectual enterprises
-- to the necessity of fostering the attitude of dialogue and reasonableness in human affairs.
Therefore, Artigas was not surprised when he found out that a Thomist like Gabriel
Zanotti interpreted Popper with sympathy and argued that Popper could be
considered as a complement of Thomism.
In some way he sees Popper's methodology, anthropology and social theory as complementary with Aquinas' metaphysics.
In some way he sees Popper's methodology, anthropology and social theory as complementary with Aquinas' metaphysics.
Of course, the differences between Popper and Aquinas are great and Zanotti
is aware of them.
Popper was an agnostic who did not like to discuss theological issues and Aquinas was a saint who was mainly a theologian.
The kind of problems that are central in their respective philosophies are also quite different.
Only, there are also important points of contact.
Popper was an agnostic who did not like to discuss theological issues and Aquinas was a saint who was mainly a theologian.
The kind of problems that are central in their respective philosophies are also quite different.
Only, there are also important points of contact.
We dare say that some apparent difficulties could be overcome by a
preliminary dialogue directed towards an understanding of the respective
frameworks.
However, the task is not an easy one.
We would not say now that Popper's philosophy is mainly an epistemology that is applied to the social field
Rather, the reverse is true.
If this is the case, the dialogue of a Thomist with a Popperian is probably more feasible than it seems at first sight, but, in any case, it is not an easy affair.
This essay on the ethical roots on Popper's epistemology can perhaps help to make that task easier.
However, the task is not an easy one.
We would not say now that Popper's philosophy is mainly an epistemology that is applied to the social field
Rather, the reverse is true.
If this is the case, the dialogue of a Thomist with a Popperian is probably more feasible than it seems at first sight, but, in any case, it is not an easy affair.
This essay on the ethical roots on Popper's epistemology can perhaps help to make that task easier.
NOTES.
Artigas's essay was originally prepared for a Thomistic Seminar held
at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana. Gabriel Zanotti, "Karl Popper: Búsqueda con esperanza" (Buenos Aires:
Editorial de Belgrano). G. Zanotti, «Epistemología contemporánea y filosofía cristiana»,
Sapientia, 46. G. Zanotti, «El problema de la "Theory-Ladenness" de los juicios
singulares en la epistemología contemporánea», Acta Philosophica, 5. M. Artigas, "Karl Popper: Búsqueda sin término" (Madrid: Magisterio
Español). H. Kiesewetter, Ethical Foundations of Popper's Philosophy, in: A.
O'Hear (editor), "Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems", Royal Institute of
Philosophy Supplement: 39 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Karl Popper, "In Search of a Better World: lectures and Essays from
Thirty Years "(London-New York: Routledge, Karl Popper, "Autobiography", in: Paul Arthur Schilpp
(editor), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court). One lecture is entitled «Gegen den Zynismus in der Interpretation der
Geschichte» in: Karl Popper, "Alles Leben ist Problemlösen.
Über Erkenntnis, Geschichte und Politik" (München: Piper). Some interesting data and comments can be found in the corresponding laudatio by H. Kiesewetter: «Karl Popper -ein Jünger von Sokrates,
in Eichstätter Materialien. Abteilung Philosophie und Theologie, 6
(Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet. A lecture was published originally in a German version, «Gedanken
über den Kollaps des Kommunismus: Ein Versuch, die Vergangenheit zu verstehen,
um die Zukunft zu gestalten»: Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen. Published originally in Italian with the title "La lezione di questo
secolo." The relevant pages for our issue are «La lezione di questo secolo»,
Interview with Giancarlo Bosetti, in G. Bosetti, La lezione di
questo secolo (Venezia: Marsilio). There is now an English
version, "The Lesson of this Century. With two Talks on Freedom and the
Democratic State, Karl Popper interviewed by Giancarlo Bosetti (London and New
York: Routledge). Karl Popper, Autobiography of Karl Popper, p. 24. Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen. Karl Popper, Autobiography of Karl Popper. Giancarlo Bosetti (editor), La lezione di questo secolo, p. 6; Karl
Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, p. 304. Giancarlo Bosetti (editor), La lezione di questo secolo. Karl
Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, p. 304. Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, p. 304. Ibid. Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, pp. 308-309; Giancarlo
Bosetti (editor), La lezione di questo secolo, p. 7. Karl Popper, Autobiography of Karl Popper, p. 25. Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, p. 309. Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, p. 303; Giancarlo Bosetti
(editor), La lezione di questo secolo, p. 3. Hubert Kiesewetter, «Karl Popper -ein Jünger von Sokrates».
F. Kreuzer, Vorwort in: Karl Popper, Die Zukunft ist offen (mit
Konrad Lorenz), Das Altenberger Gesprach, mit den Texten des Wiener
Popper-Symposiums, herausgegeben von Franz Kreuzer, 4 Auflage (München: Piper), p. 7. Giancarlo Bosetti (editor), La lezione di questo secolo, Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, p. 309.Giancarlo Bosetti (ed), La lezione di questo secolo, p. 10; Karl
Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, p. 309. Karl Popper, Autobiography of Karl Popper, p. 25; Giancarlo Bosetti
(editor), La lezione di questo secolo, pp. 10-11. Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, pp. 309-310. Ibid., p. 310. Ibid., pp. 268-270 and 304-310. Karl Popper, Autobiography of Karl Popper, p. 25. Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, p. 305. Karl Popper, Autobiography of Karl Popper, p. 28. Obviously, this
experience was very different from the Marxist one, but both shared, in Popper's
account, the verificationist attitude that closes its eyes when contrary data
are found and nevertheless continues to pretend a scientific character. Karl Popper, Autobiography of Karl Popper, pp. 28-29. Ibid., p. 26. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, reprinted from the 5th
revised edition (London: Routledge). Artigas's text corresponds to Popper's letter. Popper's
handwritten answer to that letter is not dated. Then there's the letter, written by Melitta Mew at the request
of Professor Sir Karl Popper. Popper's handwritten
letter can be found in the Popper's Archives, Hoover Institution. It also shows that Popper was extremely careful about the most
important issue of the falsification of the Newtonian theory, which doubtless
would be a first-rate example of falsification. Karl Popper, In Search of a Better World, Karl Popper,Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific
Knowledge, 5th edition (London: Routledge, 1974), Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2, p. 375. Ibid., pp. 375-376. Karl Popper,The Myth of the Framework. In Defence of Science and
Rationality, edited by Mark A. Notturno (London: Routledge, 1994). Karl Popper, In Search of a Better World, p. 199. Ibid. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2, pp.
237-238. Ibid., p. 240. Karl Popper,Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 355-356. Ibid., 356. Karl Popper,The Myth of the Framework, p. 181. This quotation is taken
from the final part of an essay where Popper compares rationality as an attitude
and the rationality principle. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies. Karl Popper, «Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind», in: Gerard
Radnitzky and William W. Bartley, III (editors), Evolutionary Epistemology,
Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court), p. 141. This point is most important for an analysis of science as a
human activity that has pursuit of truth as its primary goal, and therefore for
an ethics of science that, on the one hand, constitutes a relevant part of the
philosophy of science, and, on the other hand, opposes to relativism. Nevertheless, we have seen that the core of fallibilism was already an
immediate consequence of the 1919 Marxist experience. As Kiesewetter puts it,
«Ein lokalpolitisches Ereignis wurde zum Auslöser der Theorie des
Falsifikationismus!»: H. Kiesewetter, «Karl Popper -ein Jünger von
Sokrates», p. 17. Karl Popper,Conjectures and Refutations. E. Freeman and H.Skolimowski, The Search for Objectivity in
Peirce and Popper, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (editor), The Philosophy of Karl
Popper, Karl Popper, Replies to My Critics, in: Paul Arthur Schilpp (editor),
The Philosophy of Karl Popper, p. 1072. Ibid., p. 1065. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Karl Popper, Autobiography of Karl Popper, p. 26. Karl Popper,Conjectures and Refutations, p. 355. Karl Popper,The Myth of the Framework, p. 69. Ibid., p. 34. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2, p. 258. Ibid., pp. 231-232. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 61-63. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 232. bid., p. 240. References to this statement as the basic attitude of critical
rationalists can be found in The Open Society and Its Enemies. Karl Popper,Conjectures and Refutations. Karl Popper, Alles Leben ist Problemlösen, p. 123. Karl Popper,The Myth of the Framework, pp. xii-xiii. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies. See: William W. Barley, III, Theories of Demarcation between Science
and Metaphysics, in: Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Problems in the
Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam: North-Holland). Popper's
reply: Karl Popper, Remarks on the Problems of Demarcation and of Rationality», and Bartley's reply to Popper. See the seven papers, devoted to this subject, which are collected in "The theory of rationality and problems of self-reference» of Gerard
Radnitzky & W. W. Bartley, III (eds), "Evolutionary Epistemology,
Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge. The first and the last are written
by W. W. Bartley, III, Theories of Rationality,, and A Refutation
of the Alleged Refutation of Comprehensively Critical Rationalism.
Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies. Karl Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science, from the Postcript to the
Logic of Scientific Discovery, edited by W. W. Bartley, III (London:
Hutchinson). These pages belong to the Introduction,
section, The Critical Approach: Solution of the Problem of
Induction, which has the motto: I do not believe in belief -- E. M. Forster. On page 18 note 1, Popper refers to two of Barley's publications, Bartley adds a
third reference, and Popper notes, The present section was partly rewritten in
1979. Karl Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science. Karl Popper,The Myth of the Framework, p. xii. The proposal of John Watkins is contained in The Unity of
Popper's Thought, in: Paul Arthur Schilpp, The Philosophy of Karl
Popper. J. Corcó sees emergence and creativity as the unifying key of
Popper's thought in "Novedades en el universo. La cosmovisión
emergentista de Karl R. Popper" (Pamplona: Eunsa). A hint in this line can
be found in J. Dumoncel, L'anti-reductionisme poppérien face aux tendances
dominantes de la philosophie analytique, in Renée Bouveresse and Hervé
Barreau, Karl Popper. Science et philosophie (Paris: Vrin), and also in: William W. Bartley, III, «The Philosophy of Karl Popper», part II:
«Consciousness and Physics: Quantum Mechanics, Probability, Indeterminism, and
the Mind-Body Problem», Philosophia, 7 -- Karl Popper, «Watkins on Indeterminism as the Central Problem of My
Philosophy», in: Replies to My Critics. -- Karl Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science.
Bartley, W. W., III. The Retreat to Commitment. La Salle, London: Open Court.
-- Bio of Popper.
Grice, H. P. Aspects of reason. Clarendon Press.
Miller, D. Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defense. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
Musgrave, A. Critical Rationalism. In E.Suárez-Iñiguez, ed., The Power of Argumentation (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol.93). Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi :171-211.
Musgrave, A. Experience and Perceptual Belief. In Rethinking Popper (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Volume 272). S. Parusnikova and R.S. Cohen (eds). Dordrecht: Springer Science and Business Media:5-19.
Popper, K. Replies to My Critics. In P.A.Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
Popper, K. In Search of a Better World. London and New York: Routledge.
Popper, K. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London and New York: Routledge.
Popper, K. Realism and the Aim of Science. London and New York: Routledge.
Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations. London and New York: Routledge.
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