Grice: Is Rationality Self-Justifying?

Speranza

I was reading about the infamous polemic between Sir Karl (Popper) and W. W. Bartley, III, as per Wikipedia:

"Bartley and Popper had a great admiration for each other, partly because of their common stand against justificationism. However, at the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science at Bedford College, University of London, July 11–17, 1965, they came into conflict with each other. Bartley had presented a paper, "Theories of Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics," in which he accused Popper of displaying a positivist attitude in his early works and proposed that Popper's demarcation criterion was not as important as Popper thought it was. Popper took this as a personal attack, and Bartley took his reply as indicating that Popper was ignoring his criticism. 1f Their friendship was not restored until 1974, after the publication of The Philosophy of Karl Popper (edited by Paul Schillpp). Bartley changed the tone of his remarks about Popper's criterion of demarcation, making it less aggressive. However, despite the restored friendship, Bartley's view was never accepted by Popper, who criticised it even after Bartley's death."

And one wonders about Grice.

Would Grice consider rationality as self-justifying.

Consider

i. x is rational

(x) x is rational

It is well-known (since Grandy's essay in The Journal of Philosophy) that Grice's analysis of 'mean' (notably the self-reflective intention) involves something like

(p) Utterer intends Addressee to recognize (p).

So there doesn't seem to be anything wrong with self-justification of rationality, either?