The inverted iota was understood as a function
mapping the propositional function it takes as argument onto the sole argument to
that propositional function that yields a true proposition if there is such an argument,
and a chosen object, otherwise.
Russell borrowed the inverted iota from Peano (1897, 1906), who uses it for a function mapping a singleton class onto its single
member.
Russell’s understanding of the inverted iota also owes a lot to Frege’s sign ‘\’ from Grundgesetze §11, which
Russell’s understanding of the inverted iota also owes a lot to Frege’s sign ‘\’ from Grundgesetze §11, which
stands for a function that has as value, if its argument is the value-range of a concept true of ONLY ONE object (Frege's example: "God") the sole
object that falls under the concept, and a chosen object otherwise.
Using this device, in a certain sense, Russell maintains
that propositional functions are to be taken as fundamental.
Russell goes on to analyse
‘y=the father of x’
by beginning with the relation
‘y=the father of x’
by beginning with the relation
R, a function whose value for every argument x is a propositional function that itself
yields a true proposition only for fathers of x as argument.
He would then analyse
He would then analyse
‘THE father of x’ as
i‘(R‘x)
Another denoting function Russell takes as
primitive is the function that maps a propositional function onto the class of entities
satisfying that function.
However, Russell thinks sets
However, Russell thinks sets
can be done away with entirely. Russell considers this function to
be in fact definable in a similar way to the "the father" case using the inverted iota and
what Whitehead calls relation Kl .
However, Russell was never happy
However, Russell was never happy
with the function i, and it bothered him to have only a single function that worked
so differently than the others he had on the table.
For a discussion of Russell's dislike of this
For a discussion of Russell's dislike of this
use of the symbol I see Klement). Of course, he finally managed to purge
his logic completely of denoting functions in 1905 when he came across the theory of
‘incomplete symbols’ of ‘On Denoting’ and the possibility of defining away both descriptive
phrases and class-terms in context.
And then came Grice.
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