The Failure of Davies

by JLS
---- for the GC

---- Trust Cambridge (University Press) to target a


Featuring the ultimate counterattack, obviously. "Failure of Gricean
Theory"? Witness the ultimate attack on conversational implicature, and the
ultimate counter-attack, of course. If you have access to a checklist of
"the Cambridge Studies in philosophy", you'll notice that they are
advertising this book by one W. A. Davis, entitled, hatefully,

_Implicature: intention, convention, & principle
in the failure of Gricean theory_.


I've grown such a hopeless Gricean that I find _that_ as complimentary,
though! It's very good that there's this philosopher in Sheffield,
Yorkshire, called J. Saul, who's done a v. good job at reading Davis's
book. Her notes are to be found in _Nous_. In it she shows how un-Gricean
Davis is.
I'll comment on Saul on Davis. Tapper is still on the road but I
dedicate these notes to him. He's enamoured to the notion of implicature,
but, as J. M. Murphy (our resident Anti-Grice) has recently told him, "So
don't pitch out the fez. You will indeed need it." I'm too lazy to see if
I can look up all the obscure words in the dico, so I'll just work with
Murphy's intentions, "don't throw away the notion of implicature. You may
indeed need it".
Thing is, can we make _sense_ of the notion of implicature? This is
what Saul and Davis are concerned with. Recall Grice's definition. We've
all seen that, but must say that Saul and Davis are, in my opinion, the
first two people to have _disarticulated_ Grice's notion so. Grice wrote in
'Logic & Conversation':
================================================
"An utterer (henceforward, U) who, by (in, when)
saying/expressing (or making as if to say/express) that p has implicated
that q, may be said to have _conversationally_ implicated that q, provided
that
Clause i: U is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at
least the Cooperative Principle.
Clause ii: the supposition that U is aware that, or thinks that, q is
required to make his saying (or making as if to say) p (or doing so in
those terms) consistent with this presumption.
Clause iii: U thinks (and would expect the addressee (henceforward A) to
think that U thinks) that it is within A's competence to work out, or grasp
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required (Grice 1967.
Repr in 1989, p.30)
=================================================
As Saul points out, Davis argues that some central tenets of Grice's
theory of "implicature" (if it was a theory, Grice prefers to refer to his
_idea_ of implicature, as e.g. in his 'Reply to Richards) are in conflict
with the role of U's intention in determining U's implicature. U's
implicature is a matter of U's intentions, but conversational implicature,
at least according to Grice's working 'characteristation' in the second
William James Lecture, is, prima facie, _not_. I add _prima facie_ since my
claim is that "secunda facie" it _is_. As Saul and Davis note, "U's
_intentions_" are nowhere to be found in the three-prong 'analysis' of "U
implicates that q" above. One is reminded at this stage of works like
Walker's, Wright's and indeed Grice's lectures V and VI, which he sees as
_refinements_ of the previous lectures. Grice's attempt being to propose a
_principled_ taxonomy of _meaning_ as either explicature (what the U has
said) and implicature. Prima facie, though, Clause (i) notably concerns A's
presumption that U is being cooperative. Clause (ii) what A is required to
believe, and Clause (iii) what U believes about A.
Davis argues, thus, that Grice's analysis of "U implicates that q" is
prima facie completely inappropriate to _capture_ what U's implicature
intuitively amounts to. It's very hateful to have Davis thinking he can
intuit on things so blatantly _invented_ by Grice, though! Commandably,
Davis directs our attention to a _previous_ pre-theoretical as it were,
characterisation of "implicature" by Grice. When he first introduces
"implicate" as a term of art, re:


(1) A: Who is C getting on in his new job at the bank.
B: Oh quite well. I think. He likes his colleagues,
and he hasn't been to prison yet.


At this point, A might well inquire what U was implying,
what he was suggesting, or even what he meant by expressing
that C had not yet been to prison. It is clear that whatever
U "implied", "suggested", or "meant" is distinct from what B
_explicitly expressed_, as it were, which was simply that C
had not been to prison yet. I wish to introduce, as a term of
art, the verb "implicate" to signal this. Grice, p.24


Saul, in turn, turns our attention to a pet phrase with Grice, as when we
say that the U "makes as IF to express "p". E.g. in a metaphorical
utterance, like


(2) You're the cream in my coffee


(Grice, p.34), Grice seems to suggest that one is not actually explicitly
expressing that U's addressee _is_ the cream in the U's coffee. Rather,
relying on the fact that A will _cancel_ the literal (truth-conditional)
interpretant, U could claim that he is merely _complimenting_ the


addressee. Thus, Saul writes: "A clear piece of evidence that Grice would


_not_ have accepted anything like Davis's account of implicature comes from
the fact that Grice allows for the possibility of implicating something "by
making _as if_ to express" something, rather than by "actually expressing"
(see Clause (i) above). "Meaning that p" is a _necessary condition_ for
"explicitly expressing that p". The fact that Grice held this is important
to arriving at an accurate understanding of Grice: one who utters an
utterance standardly used to _express_ that p (we are here ignoring all
sorts of complications regarding utterances containing indexicals) but
actually means that p only makes "as if to express that p". This is what
allows, for example, _irony_, as in Grice's example:

(3) He's just a fine friend


(referring to a veritable scoundrel, Grice, p.34). In (3), U certainly does
_not_ mean what's generally (optimally -- as Grice's 'Meaning Revisited'
has it) meant by the utterance U utters. Since Grice allows for this
possibility, it is just not right to attribute to him the claim that
"what-is-implicated" is, simply, "what-is-meant" but _not expressed_ by
_what_ U explicitly conveys. Note that the "Explicitly
Conveying-implies-meaning" thesis is not explicitly stated in 'Logic and
Conversation', although we can take it to be implicit in Grice's use of
'making as if to explicitly convey', particularly when discussing irony.
(The thesis _is_, though, made explicit in Lecture VI, p.120-122). But
this, Saul notes, is _not_ the _only reason_ to resist the attribution of
the view that Davis formulates to Grice. A more important reason is that
Grice seems _never_ hesitant about discussing what U means or intends, but
these notions are _notably absent_ from his preliminary discussion of
implicature in Lecture II. Saul notes _one_ notable exception here: in the
previous 'Causal Theory of Perception', Grice does say that an implicature
-- he then uses 'implication' -- must be meant. Sadly, he chose to omit
this part of the essay for its reprint in Studies in the Way of Words. Saul
notes thta it does seem _im_plausible to suppose that Grice changed his
mind, as he wouldn't then say (in Studies) that his omitting the relevant
section since "the view is substantially the same" as that in Lecture II.
Saul notes thought that it does not seem very plausible, either, alas, to
suppose he still held the view, since if that were the case he would surely
wish it to be stated somewhere.
Even if the status of the claim (Implicatures are Meant) were clear, it
would only establish that "being meant" is a necessary condition for
"implicate", though, which is much weaker than the claim that Davis is
criticisng). In any case, Grice's focus, in his working characterisation
of 'implicature' in Lecture II, tends to be on _addressee-oriented_
aspects. Take eg Grice's summary of the notion:


'"what-is-implicated" is what it is required
that one assume the U to think in order
to preserve the assumption that U is following
the Cooperative Principle (& perhaps some conversational
maxims as well), if not at the level of "what is
explicitly conveyed, at least at the level of what
is implicated. Grice, p.86


There is, again, nothing explicit at all in this about "what U means-nn".
The focus is exclusively on what _A_ needs to assume. Given this sort of
emphasis, it seems rather a stretch to attribute to Grice the view that U's
implicature is what U means by conveying explicitly something else. It
becomes even less appealing to attribute this view to Grice when we
consider some of its consequences. Consider a variant on an example by
Davis (p.74):


(4) A: I feel sick.
B: I'll go find an aspirin.


What follows is Saul's typical scenarios. Her general point, one with which
I agree, is that Grice's is trying to focus on a view of communication
based on Systematic Misundersandings! Suppose that, unbeknownst to A, what
B _means_, by uttering this, is


(5) There are aliens nearby,
probably causing A's illness,
&, thus, he should flee.


I.e. as it happens, B _likes_ to protect herself from the aliens by holding
an aspirin in front of her, & so, she thinks that mentioning that she's
going to find an aspirin is a good way to _warn_ her addressee. However, A
knows, alas, nothing of B's beliefs about aliens. Here, Saul notes, "there
is very little temptation to say that B has _implicated_ that A should
flee". But, on Davis's account, this is just what B does. By uttering 'I'll
go find an aspirin', B meant-nn that A should flee & it's this what it is,
precisely, for B to implicate it. What Davis has lost is, as Saul rather
grandly call it, the "normative dimension to conversational implicature".
On Grice's rather more conservative account, further, U may _not_ just
implicate whatever he means by conveying explicitly something else. Grice's
clauses (i) and (ii) above seem to prima facie prevent this.
Clauses (i) and (ii) prevent U from conversationally implicating _whatever
U pleases_. Implicature is somehow dependent on expression meaning (or core
meaning, as Murphy and Tapper would have it, or "truth conditions" as I
would). So, it would seem, what an utterance type or an expression means
may prevent U from implicating whatever U pleases. In any case, it would
seem as though B did _not_ implicate that A should flee, because A did not
need to assume that B thought this in order to understand B as cooperative.
In other words, Clause (ii) seems to fail. Which seems, however, "a
desirable result", at least for Saul. Saul writes: "What Grice's theory
gives us (and Davis' does not) is the idea that "what is implicated" is not
wholly up to U." This is importantly parallel to Grice's notion of
"explicitly conveying". For all Grice's focus on U's M-intentions, "what is
explicitly conveyed" is _not_ left completely up to U. Thus, if, say, U
chooses the wrong utterance (as with malaprop and mistranslation -[cfr.
Davidson], U will _not_ manage to say what he is trying to say. Saul's
example involves Spanish, and it's her brother uttering:


(6) Estoy embarasado.


meaning "I am embarrasssed" but actually _saying" "I am pregnant". On
Grice's treatment of implicature B has chosen the _wrong_ (i.e. far from
optimal) means for his intended implicature, and as a result he doesn't
succeed in implicating. We needn't, and shouldn't, suppose that everything
which is meant by "what is explicitly conveyed" is conversationally
implicated: the constraints on implicature placed by Grice's three prong
characterisation may serve an important purpose. But this means that "Davis
is simply wrong about the role of intention in implicature", Saul notes. If
Davis is wrong about the views he attributes to Grice re Intention, he may
be right about that hateful feature that implicatures have:
"indeterminacy". Grice suggests that an implicature is "indeterminate":


Since, to calculate a conversational implicature
is to calculate what has to be supposed in order
to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative
Principle is being observed, and since there may
be various possible specific explanations, a list
of which may be open, the conversational implicatum
in such cases will be a disjunction of such specific
explanations; and if the list of these is open, the
implicatum will have just the same kind of indeterminacy
that many actual implicata do in fact seem to possess
Grice, p39.


Saul trying to find some rationale for Davis's criticism leads our
attention to metaphor -- Grice's example:


(7) You're the cream in my coffee


(Studies, p.34). Is this best understood as "indeterminate"? The most
important problem Davis raises for this view, though, is that it's very
_im_plausible to suppose that U actually intends to convey something as
weak as a disjunctive proposition. Davis notes that the poet who says


(8) My love is a red rose.


does _not_ mean


(9) My love is either beautiful
or sweet-smelling
or highly-valued.


He rightly points out that the poet would not be pleased by one who replies
with


(10) Yes, that's true. She _does_ smell good,
despite being ugly & rather worthless.


(Davis, pp.70-2). Thus, Davis claims that Clause (ii) in Grice's
three-prong characterisation fails: 'There is notably _no_ belief that U is
required to possess' (p. 72). Saul notes: "Davis seems here to be onto a
very important problem for Grice, one that is not easily solved, and one
that is _not_, alas, confined to metaphor." Saul points at _two_ problems
with this this:
1. Clause (ii) is _not_ concerned with what beliefs U is required to
possess, but, rather, with what belief _A_ is required to attribute to U.
(Don't you love Saul? I do!)
2. Davis' argument against the claim that U means a _disjunctive belief_ is
a bit wishy washy: the mere fact that U (of (8)) would be _displeased_ by
someone insulting his love (by saying that although she smells good she is
otherwise ugly and worthless) does _not_, strictly, prove anything about
what he meant!
"Why", Saul writes, "one may just as well mean a disjunction and still
be displeased by having someone agree by affirming the opposites of two of
the disjuncts!" Saul invites us to consider a slightly different example,
which has become her recent obsession, and which he adapts from one used by
Grice in 'Causal Theory'. "Suppose that I am asked to write a letter of
reference for C. I write only,


(11) I cannot recommend C highly enough.



Saul writes: "There are at least _two_ ways to explain U's apparent


violation of the maxim of quantity, viz: (12) or (13):

(12) C is so wonderful
that I cannot find adequate words of praise
(13) C is so lacking
that I don't feel I can give a sufficiently
positive recommendation for the job.


However, Saul stipulates, "What I mean to convey is, let's say, (12), but
there is nothing -- in the expression itself -- to indicate this. It may
have just _not_ occurred to the U that the utterance could be taken to
suggest anything _but_ the praise that U intends." Saul concludes: "It
seems clear, in this case, thus, that:
1. there is no one belief A must attribute to
U in order to understand U as cooperative
2. the utterance does indeed fail; and
3. U does _not_ mean the disjunctive implicature:


(14) Either (12) or (13), i.e
Either: C is so wonderful that I cannot find
adequate words of praise,
or: C is so lacking that I don't feel
I can give a sufficiently positive recommendation
for the job.


Saul notes that one may claim that all this may _not_ be genuinely
problemic _for Grice_ (as different from Davis's Grice as it were. I wish
these people had _more interesting surnames, so that I could concoct
something like Kripkenstein). For:
1. Grice's discussion of the indterminacy of implicature gives us _a single
claim_ as implicature in these cases -- the disjunctive one -- and this
claim is therefore _the one_ that A is required to attribute (rather than
either of its disjuncts).
2. It is genuinely unclear whether Grice took "being meant by U by uttering
x" to be a necessary condition for x to carry a conversational implicature.
He may well have done so, but the only place in which he states this
explicitly is that passage in 'The Causal Theory of Perception' which he
chose to omit when he collected his papers for Studies. But variants of
these problems remain, even if we are as strict as possible in our
interpretation of Grice. Viz:
1. It doesn't seem mighty possible to suppose that the A could be required
to attribute the disjunctive belief, i.e.


(14) C is either great or awful.


to U in order to understand U as cooperative. In fact, this would be worse
than useless to the project of trying to understand me as cooperative!
2. Even if we don't assume that "being meant" is a _necessary condition_
for "being implicated", Clause (iii) -- in Grice's characterisation as it
being the clause concerned with U's beliefs -- fails to hold. U may _not_
need assume that A can work out that either C is so wonderful that U cannot
find adequate words of praise, or C is so lacking that U doesn't feel U can
give a sufficiently positive recommendation for the job. And this for the
simple reason that it just hasn't occurred to U that his utterance could be
taken as anything but praise, and U wouldn't have made the utterance if it
had. Saul expands on her pet topic: reference letters. "Consider now the
following philosophy reference letter" (15), or (16) (Grice, Causal Theory,
discussed in Platts), or (17) (Studies, p.33)


(15) C uses rather lovely fonts.
(16) C has beautiful handwriting.
(17) C's attendance to tutorials has been regular.


Possible implicatures of all these may include any of the following:


(18) You should not hire C
(19) C's a poor philosopher.
(20) I don't think well of C.



Saul writes: "The reference-letter's recipient could understand U as


cooperative by attributing any of these beliefs to him. According to what
Grice says on "indeterminacy", thus, the implicature carried by the letter
will be

(21) Either you should not hire C
or C's a poor philosopher
or I don't think well of C.


But, in order to meet Grice's necessary conditions for conversational
implicature, U would have to believe that A could work this out (Clause
iii), and A would have to be required to work this out (Clause ii).
Neither of these is likely to obtain, given the open nature of the
disjunction." Highly indeterminate implicatures -- and we are reminded of
Murphy's blanket denials here, drawing as he does from Hall, in trying to
defend Austin contra Grice -- arise, then, "even in what should be the
simplest cases. And they pose serious problems, even in these cases", Saul
thinks. Davis may turn out to be doing something very positive for Grice,
though (unlike Kripe for Witters). On Davis's account, it is difficult to
say what is _implicated_ by, say,


(8) My love is a red rose.


precisely to the extent that it's difficult to say what the poet _means_ by
it -- if the poet _means_ (qua means-nn) something specific by it, the poet
_implicates_ something specific. Similarly, the U of


(11) I cannot recommend C highly enough.


does _not_ seem to implicate anything negative about C because U did not
mean, stipulatively, anything negative by it. Saul notes that the
"beautiful handwriting"-type case, with its endless possible, closely
related implicatures, is "trickier": If U means some very specific
proposition -- say, that C is a bad philosopher -- U implicates that very
specific proposition, and no other. If, however, what U means is
_intrinsically indeterminate_, and U really couldn't choose between the
various possible negative implicatures, what U implicates is _genuinely
indeterminate_. In fairness to Davis, Saul notes that "it may look a bit
counter-intuitive to say that the implicature generated by the C letter
stating


(11) I cannot praise C highly enough.


is _entirely_ positive." Similarly, it seems a bit strange to suppose that
whether or not the "beautiful handwriting" case is one of indeterminacy
will depend completely on whether U had a specific proposition in mind as
the meaning of his utterance. It _also_ feels odd to say that the poet's
implicature would be utterly determinate if the poet had some particular
proposition in mind. But this counterintuition is only apparent, we hopes!
Saul is also concerned with what Davis has to say about "convention" which
features prominently in his study. Davis has explored for us the
conventionality of non-conventional implicature, as it were. Davis
discusses a wide variety of cases in which both "calculability" (it's
always possible to _calculate_ an implicature", Grice, p.39) and Clause
(ii) seem _not_ to hold, Davis thinks, "due to the role played in
communication" by what he calls "convention". As Saul notes, Davis is
wrong, of course, to suppose that the role of convention in implicature has
this result. But Davis is into something here though. Consider his
examination of Grice's two examples of tautologies as implicature-carriers:


(22) Women are women.
(23) War is war.


(Grice, p.33. Saul has (22), being the feminist philosopheress that she is as:


(24) Men are men.


But that _is_ false! Men are _beasts_, which is not _tautologous, but
_analytic_! Ain't it, Susan (Susan being the only non-beast who subscribes
in here). An implicature carrying implicature is commonly explained as
arising from a violation of the maxim of quantity. The maxim of quantity
demands that U gives neither too much nor too little information. The
information actually expressed by a tautology is about as minimal as
information gets, and unlikely to be of much use, prima facie, to anybody.
As a result of this blatant violation of quantity at the level of what is
_explicitly conveyed_, Grice argues, a conversational implicature is
hopefully and happily generated or 'triggered'. Davis argues, though, that
the _specific_ implicature in various English phrases are not ones that the
"JL" could work out. He does not say "JL" but I can _imagine_. Thus, Davis
notes that while (23) standardly implicates something like


(25) War is terrible.


this _other_ tautology:


(26) A war's a war.


rather, standardly seems to implicate somethig like:


(27) One war is much the same is another.


Why, JL axes, does (26) _not_ carry the same sort of implicature as (25)?
("They are both tautologies, all right. Are you trying to drive me
_nuts_?"). Davis also deals with


(28) A deal's a deal.


which does not even start to implicate anything about one deal being as
much the same as another, let alone about a deal being terrible... (I'm
glad that my favourite student, Tapper, will explain all that _to me_ when
he's off the road, sometime (in the future)). Davis notes that the Furriner
has his revenge, though. Cross-linguistic attempts (by Anglos) complicate
things quite a bit, too. There's no French subscriber in here, but, as
Davis notes, and we can trust him, in order to achieve in French the
standard implicature carried by


(23) War is war.


"one would need to use a sentence which actually translates as"


(29) That is war.


cfr. C'est la vie = Such is life). These observations, which Davis draws
from the work of Wierzbicka, are interesting and significant: they show
rather clearly that "JL, if not an addressee in general, cannot work out
the implicature from conversational principles alone." Saul notes. Now, it
would seem as though, according to _Davis's_ understanding of
calculability, these implicatures are _not_ calculable. Similarly, Clause
(ii) seems as though it must go unsatisfied, as there is _no_ _one_
implicature which A is required to arrive at in order to uphold the
assumption that U is being cooperative. Thus, implicatures carried by a
tautology and others that seem to rely heavily on this alleged routines of
"convention" do not pose these problems for Davis. But Grice's
calculability requirement is crucially different from the one Davis
attributes to him. Davis' understanding is: 'conversational implicature can
always be worked out or inferred from the conversational principles'.
Grice, however, is quite explicit that conversational principles are not
all that A has to draw on in working out the implicature (Grice 1989: 31)
Rather, A _also_ makes use of background information, which may perfectly
well include information about some community-wide "convention", to use
Davis's term. Once this information is allowed to enter into A's
calculations, the implicature carried by a tautology becomes perfectly
calculable [see Wilson/Sperber in Grandy/Warner for this]. With this
information a part of the calculation, A also becomes much more restricted
as to what hypotheses are reasonable to consider in trying to make sense of
U as cooperative. Given the background information about routines, grammar,
and conventions, it seems far more plausible to suppose that A might be
required to assume the implicature that a tautology routinely carries. So,
despite much noise by Davis to the contrary, neither Calculability nor
Clause (ii) need fail. How's that for an argumentative circle?
A further problem that Davis raises, however, and one which we've
discussed here -- to no obvious resolution -- by R. Vanegas, Murphy, and
Tapper, inter alii, is "somewhat more difficult to deal with", Saul notes.
But then, let's see. "Davis rightly points out that Grice's Modified
Occam's Razor


"Do not multiply senses beyond necessity.
Implicate if you can."


hasn't got the least plausibility" once we consider "routines" of
interpretation, etc. It no longer seems right to say that working out a
conversational implicature requires _fewer items_ of highly specific
knowledge than "disambiguation". Ambiguity solutions and implicature
solutions are pretty much on a par as far as knowledge of specific
conventions goes. This relates to Murphy's problem in his lattest to
Tapper. "There's a garage round the corner + Rule 48.2 -> The garage is
open". We need _not_ postulate that "there's a garage round the corner"
_means_ that the garage is _open_. Davis's claim is, bluntly put: if the
Modified Occam's Razor is a central tenet of Grice's theory, Grice's theory
must go. Saul notes, though: "it doesn't seem obvious that such a Razor is
a central tenet of his theory. Grice first puts it forward _after the
original theory_", in Lecture III rather than Lecture II, and does so
rather hesitantly:


So, at least, so far as I can see (not far, I think),
there is as yet no reason not to accept Modified
Occam's Razor. p.49


Certainly it is easy to imagine "Grice's theory without the Razor", and
this was indeed how Grice first imagined it himself. Still, there may be
serious problems for Grice even if the Razor (which Davis calls "Grice's
Razor" than "Modified Occam's Razor" -- so much for credits! -- is not a
central tenet of his theory. Grice's Razor, or 'Grice Saves' as Horn calls
it, is what gives us a reason to postulate a conversational implicature
rather than a polysemy or an ambiguity, as Cohen would. And cfr. Murphy on
voluntarily-l vs. voluntarily-2 in his lattest to Tapper. Without the
Razor, why should we _ever_ prefer a implicature explanation? "It is far
from clear whether or not there is a satisfactory solution to this
problem", Saul notes. What's good for the goose is good for Uganda, I'll
say! It is also far from clear, as it turns out, that Davis can provide a
satisfactory solution to this problem, _anyhow_.
I happen to agree with Saul: Davis' attacks on Grice's theory of
implicature may not succeed in showing it to be bankrupt, but hey, it's
good that Cambridge found it worthwhile to have a whole book about a
philosophical notion concocted by an Oxford man (= Grice). Grice's theory
is, to start with, quite different from what Davis takes it to be, in
important and worthwhile ways. Saul thinks that Grice's is better. I'm not
so sure. I think Davis's own theory is pretty neat, if _derivative_.
Nonetheless, the problems Davis raises are well worth serious consideration
and many of them are not easily solved. Davis's study is bound to set an
agenda of problems to be solved by _any_ theory of conversational
implicature (including his own), and it deserves alot [sic] of credit. As
as for the Failure of the Gricean theory, well, we can always forgive an
Hyperbolic prof of Georgetown (such as Davis is) and recall, with Grice:


My theory of conversational
implicature does _bristle_ with
horrible problems, but hey, I do not
find that as being in the
least daunting. If philosophy
(my theory of conversational implicature, even)
generated no new problems, it would be dead,
because it would be finished. So, those whose still
look to philosophy for their bread and butter


[some obvious reference to my tutor, Larry M. Tapper here]


should pray that the supply of new problems never
dries up, or should they?
Reply to Richards. p.106.


JL
Chair
Grice Club.


REFERENCES
Cohen LJ. Grice on the logical particles of natural languages.
In Y Bar-Hillel, Pragmatics of Natural Language. Reidel.
(misquoted in Levinson as "The logical particles...")
Davidson D. A nice derangement of epitaphs [sic: a nice arrangement of
epithets].
In Grandy/Warner, PGRICE.
Davis WA. An intro to logic. Prentice-Hall.
Essay. Philosophical Review
Essay. Mind.
Essay. American Philosophical Quarterly
Essay. Linguistics and Philosophy
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