IMPLICATVRA, in 12 volumes; vol. V

Grice the Deweyian: Grice was John Dewey Lecturer -- Dewey, J., philosopher, social critic, and theorist of education. During an era when philosophy was becoming thoroughly professionalized, Dewey remained a public philosopher having a profound international influence on politics and education. His career began inauspiciously in his student days at the  of Vermont and then as a high school teacher before he went on to study philosophy at the newly formed Johns Hopkins . There he studied with Peirce, G. S. Hall, and G. S. Morris, and was profoundly influenced by the version of Hegelian idealism propounded by Morris. After receiving his doctorate in 4, Dewey moved to the  of Michigan where he rejoined Morris, who had relocated there. At Michigan he had as a colleague the young social psychologist G. H. Mead, and during this period Dewey himself concentrated his writing in the general area of psychology. In 4 he accepted an appointment as chair of the Department of Philosophy, Psychology, and Education at the  of Chicago, bringing Mead with him. At Chicago Dewey was instrumental in founding the famous laboratory school, and some of his most important writings on education grew out of his work in that experimental school. In 4 he left Chicago for Columbia , where he joined F. J. E. Woodbridge, founder of The Journal of Philosophy. He retired from Columbia in 0 but remained active in both philosophy and public affairs until his death in 2. Over his long career he was a prolific speaker and writer, as evidenced by a literary output of forty books and over seven hundred articles. Philosophy. At the highest level of generality Dewey’s philosophical orientation can be characterized as a kind of naturalistic empiricism, and the two most fundamental notions in his philosophy can be gleaned from the title of his most substantial book, Experience and Nature 5. His concept of experience had its origin in his Hegelian background, but Dewey divested it of most of its speculative excesses. He clearly conceived of himself as an empiricist but was careful to distinguish his notion of experience both from that of the idealist tradition and from the empiricism of the classical British variety. The idealists had so stressed the cognitive dimension of experience that they overlooked the non-cognitive, whereas he saw the British variety as inappropriately atomistic and subjectivist. In contrast to these Dewey fashioned a notion of experience wherein action, enjoyment, and what he called “undergoing” were integrated and equally fundamental. The felt immediacy of experience what he generally characterized as its aesthetic quality was basic and irreducible. He then situated cognitive experience against this broader background as arising from and conditioned by this more basic experience. Cognitive experience was the result of inquiry, which was viewed as a process arising from a felt difficulty within our experience, proceeding through the stage of conceptual elaboration of possible resolutions, to a final reconstruction of the experience wherein the initial fragmented situation is transformed into a unified whole. Cognitive inquiry is this mediating process from experience to experience, and knowledge is what makes possible the final more integrated experience, which Dewey termed a “consummation.” On this view knowing is a kind of doing, and the criterion of knowledge is “warranted assertability.” On the first point, Dewey felt that one of the cardinal errors of philosophy from Plato to the modern period was what he called “the spectator theory of knowledge.” Knowledge had been viewed as a kind of passive recording of facts in the world and success was seen as a matter of the correspondence of our beliefs to these antecedent facts. To the contrary, Dewey viewed knowing as a constructive conceptual activity that anticipated and guided our adjustment to future experiential interactions with our environment. It was with this constructive and purposive view of thinking in mind that Dewey dubbed his general philosophical orientation instrumentalism. Concepts are instruments for dealing with our experienced world. The fundamental categories of knowledge are to be functionally understood, and the classical dualisms of philosophy mindbody, meansend, fact value are ultimately to be overcome. The purpose of knowing is to effect some alteration in the experiential situation, and for this purpose some cognitive proposals are more effective than others. This is the context in which “truth” is normally invoked, and in its stead Dewey proposed “warranted assertability.” He eschewed the notion of truth even in its less dangerous adjectival and adverbial forms, ‘true’ and ‘truly’ because he saw it as too suggestive of a static and finalized correspondence between two separate orders. Successful cognition was really a more dynamic matter of a present resolution of a problematic situation resulting in a reconstructed experience or consummation. “Warranted assertability” was the success characterization, having the appropriately normative connotation without the excess metaphysical baggage. Dewey’s notion of experience is intimately tied to his notion of nature. He did not conceive of nature as “the-world-as-it-would-be-independent-of-human-experience” but rather as a developing system of natural transactions admitting of a tripartite distinction between the physicochemical level, the psychophysical level, and the level of human experience with the understanding that this categorization was not to be construed as implying any sharp discontinuities. Experience itself, then, is one of the levels of transaction in nature and is not reducible to the other forms. The more austere, “scientific” representations of nature as, e.g., a purely mechanical system, Dewey construed as merely useful conceptualizations for specific cognitive purposes. This enabled him to distinguish his “naturalism,” which he saw as a kind of nonreductive empiricism, from “materialism,” which he saw as a kind of reductive rationalism. Dewey and Santayana had an ongoing dialogue on precisely this point. Dewey’s view was also naturalistic to the degree that it advocated the universal scope of scientific method. Influenced in this regard by Peirce, he saw scientific method not as restricted to a specific sphere but simply as the way we ought to think. The structure of all reflective thought is future-oriented and involves a movement from the recognition and articulation of a felt difficulty, through the elaboration of hypotheses as possible resolutions of the difficulty, to the stage of verification or falsification. The specific sciences physics, biology, psychology investigate the different levels of transactions in nature, but the scientific manner of investigation is simply a generalized sophistication of the structure of common sense and has no intrinsic restriction. Dewey construed nature as an organic unity not marked by any radical discontinuities that would require the introduction of non-natural categories or new methodological strategies. The sharp dualisms of mind and body, the individual and the social, the secular and the religious, and most importantly, fact and value, he viewed as conceptual constructs that have far outlived their usefulness. The inherited dualisms had to be overcome, particularly the one between fact and value inasmuch as it functioned to block the use of reason as the guide for human action. On his view people naturally have values as well as beliefs. Given human nature, there are certain activities and states of affairs that we naturally prize, enjoy, and value. The human problem is that these are not always easy to come by nor are they always compatible. We are forced to deal with the problem of what we really want and what we ought to pursue. Dewey advocated the extension of scientific method to these domains. The deliberative process culminating in a practical judgment is not unlike the deliberative process culminating in factual belief. Both kinds of judgment can be responsible or irresponsible, right or wrong. This deliberative sense of evaluation as a process presupposes the more basic sense of evaluation concerning those dimensions of human experience we prize and find fulfilling. Here too there is a dimension of appropriateness, one grounded in the kind of beings we are, where the ‘we’ includes our social history and development. On this issue Dewey had a very Grecian view, albeit one transposed into a modern evolutionary perspective. Fundamental questions of value and human fulfillment ultimately bear on our conception of the human commuDewey, John Dewey, John 230   230 nity, and this in turn leads him to the issues of democracy and education. Society and education. The ideal social order for Dewey is a structure that allows maximum selfdevelopment of all individuals. It fosters the free exchange of ideas and decides on policies in a manner that acknowledges each person’s capacity effectively to participate in and contribute to the direction of social life. The respect accorded to the dignity of each contributes to the common welfare of all. Dewey found the closest approximation to this ideal in democracy, but he did not identify contemporary democracies with this ideal. He was not content to employ old forms of democracy to deal with new problems. Consistent with instrumentalism, he maintained that we should be constantly rethinking and reworking our democratic institutions in order to make them ever more responsive to changing times. This constant rethinking placed a considerable premium on intelligence, and this underscored the importance of education for democracy. Dewey is probably best known for his views on education, but the centrality of his theory of education to his overall philosophy is not always appreciated. The fundamental aim of education for him is not to convey information but to develop critical methods of thought. Education is future-oriented and the future is uncertain; hence, it is paramount to develop those habits of mind that enable us adequately to assess new situations and to formulate strategies for dealing with the problematic dimensions of them. This is not to suggest that we should turn our backs on the past, because what we as a people have already learned provides our only guide for future activity. But the past is not to be valued for its own sake but for its role in developing and guiding those critical capacities that will enable us to deal with our ever-changing world effectively and responsibly. With the advent of the analytic tradition as the dominant style of philosophizing in America, Dewey’s thought fell out of favor. About the only arenas in which it continued to flourish were schools of education. However, with the recent revival of a general pragmatic orientation in the persons of Quine, Putnam, and Rorty, among others, the spirit of Dewey’s philosophy is frequently invoked. Holism, anti-foundationalism, contextualism, functionalism, the blurring of the lines between science and philosophy and between the theoretical and the practical  all central themes in Dewey’s philosophy  have become fashionable. Neo-pragmatism is a contemporary catchphrase. Dewey is, however, more frequently invoked than read, and even the Dewey that is invoked is a truncated version of the historical figure who constructed a comprehensive philosophical vision.

diagoge: Grice makes a triad here: apagoge, diagoge, and epagoge. Cf. Grice’s emphasis on the ‘argument’ involved in the conversational implciatum, though. To work out an impilcatum is to reach it ‘by argument.’ No argument, no conversational implicaturum. But cf. argument in Emissor draws skull and communicates that there is danger. ARGUMENT involved in that Emissor intends his addressee WILL REASON. Can the lady communicate to the pigeons that she is selling ‘twopence a bag’ for their pleasure? Grice contrasted epagoge with diagoge. Cooperation with competition. Cooperative game with competitive game. But epagoge is induction, so here we’ll consider his views on probability and how it contrastds with diagoge. The diagoge is easy to identity: Grice is a social animal, with the BA, Philosophy, conferences, discussion, The American Philosophical Association, transcripts by Randall Parker, from the audio-tapes contained in c. 10 within the same s. IV miscellaneous, Beanfest, transcripts and audio-cassettes, s. IV, c. 6-f. 8, and f. 10, and s. V, c. 8-f.  4-8 Unfortunately, Parker typed carulise for karulise, or not. Re: probability, Grice loves to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked Mills principles to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word play, Grice would speak of not bringing more Grice to your Mill. Mills System of Logic was part of the reading material for his degree in Lit. Hum.at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive methodology. In his Life and opinions he mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was interested in Kneales secondary induction, since Grice saw this as an application of a construction routine. He was also interested in Keyness notion of a generator property, which he found metaphysically intriguing. Induction. Induction ‒ Mill’s Induction, induction, deduction, abduction, Mill. More Grice to the Mill. Grice loved Hardies playing with Mill’s method of difference with an Oxford copper. He also quotes Kneale and Keynes on induction. Note that his seven-step derivation of akrasia relies on an inductive step! Grice was fortunate to associate with Davidson, whose initial work is on porbability. Grice borrows from Davidson the idea that inductive probability, or probable, attaches to the doxastic, while prima facie attaches to desirably, or desirability.  Jeffreys notion of desirability is partition-invariant in that if a proposition, A, can be expressed as the disjoint disjunction of both {B1, B2, B3} and {C1, C2, C3}, ∑ Bi ∈ AProb (Bi ∣∣ A). Des (Bi) = ∑Ci ∈ A Prob (Ci ∣∣ A). Des (Ci). It follows that applying the rule of desirability maximization will always lead to the same recommendation, irrespective of how the decision problem is framed, while an alternative theory may recommend different courses of action, depending on how the decision problem is formulated.  Here, then, is the analogue of Jeffreys desirability axiom (D), applied to sentences rather than propositions: (D) (prob(s and t) = 0 and prob(s or t) "# 0, ⊃ d ( ) prob(s)des(s)+ prob(t)des(t) es s or t =-"---- prob( s) + prob(t ) (Grice writes prob(s) for the Subjectsive probability of sand des(s) for the desirability or utility of s.) B. Jeffrey admits that "desirability" (his terms for evidential value) does not directly correspond to any single pre-theoretical notion of desire. Instead, it provides the best systematic explication of the decision theoretic idea, which is itself our best effort to make precise the intuitive idea of weighing options. As Jeffrey remarks, it is entirely possibly to desire someone’s love when you already have it. Therefore, as Grice would follow, Jeffrey has the desirability operator fall under the scope of the probability operator. The agents desire that p provided he judges that p does not obtain. Diagoge/epagoge, Grices audio-files, the audio-files, audio-files of various lectures and conferences, some seminars with Warner and J. Baker, audio files of various lectures and conferences. Subjects: epagoge, diagoge. A previous folder in the collection contains the transcripts. These are the audio-tapes themselves, obviously not in folder. The kind of metaphysical argument which I have in mind might be said, perhaps, to exemplify a dia-gogic or trans-ductive as opposed to epa-gogic or in-ductive approach to philosophical argumentation. Hence Short and Lewis have, for ‘diagoge,’ the cognates of ‘trādūco,’ f. transduco. Now, the more emphasis is placed on justification by elimination of the rival, the greater is the impetus given to refutation, whether of theses or of people. And perhaps a greater emphasis on a diagogic procedure, if it could be shown to be justifiable, would have an eirenic effect. Cf. Aristotle on diagoge, schole, otium. Liddell and Scott have “διαγωγή,” which they render as “literally carrying across,” -- “τριήρων” Polyaen.5.2.6, also as “carrying through,” and “hence fig.” “ἡ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν δ., “taking a person through a subject by instruction, Pl. Ep.343; so, course of instruction, lectures, ἐν τῇ ἐνεστώσῃ δ. prob. in Phld. Piet.25; also passing of life, way or course of life, “δ. βίου” Pl. R.344e: abs., Id. Tht.177a, etc., way of passing time, amusement, “δ. μετὰ παιδιᾶς” Arist. EN 1127b34, cf. 1177a27; “δ. ἐλευθέριος” Id. Pol.1339b5; διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν public pastimes, ib.1280b37, cf. Plu.126b (pl.). also delay, D.C. 57.3. management, τῶν πραγμάτων δ. dispatch of business, Id.48.5. IV. station for ships, f. l. in Hdn.4.2.8. And there are other entries to consider: διαγωγάν: διαίρεσιν, διανομήν, διέλευσιν. Grice knew what he was talking about! Refs.: The main sources listed under ‘desirability,’ above. There is a specific essay on ‘probability and life.’ Good keywords, too, are epagoge and induction The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

dialogical implicaturum – Grice seldom uses ‘dialogue.’ It’s always conversational with him. He must have thought that ‘dialogue’ was too Buberian. In Roman, ‘she had a conversation with him’ means ‘she had sex with him.’ “She had a dialogue with him” does not. Classicists are obsessed with the beginning of Greek theatre: it all started with ‘dialogue.’ It wasn’t like Aeschylus needed a partner. He wrote the parts for BOTH. Was he reconstructing naturally-occurring Athenian dialogue? Who knows! The *two*-actor rule, which was indeed preceded by a convention in which only a single actor would appear on stage, along with the chorus. It was in 471 B. C. that Aeschylus introduces a second actor, called Cleander. You see, Aeschylus always cast himself as protagonist in his own plays. For the season of 471 B. C., the Athenians were surprised when Aeschylus introduced Cleander as his deuteragonist. “I can now conversationally implicate!” he said to a cheering crowd! Dialogism -- Bakhtin: m. m., philosopher of dialogism -- and cultural theorist whose influence is pervasive in a wide range of academic disciplines  from literary hermeneutics to the epistemology of the human sciences, and cultural theory. He may legitimately be called a philosophical anthropologist in the venerable Continental tradition. Because of his seminal work on Rabelais and Dostoevsky’s poetics, Baden School Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich 70   70 his influence has been greatest in literary hermeneutics. Without question dialogism, or the construal of dialogue, is the hallmark of Bakhtin’s thought. Dialogue marks the existential condition of humanity in which the self and the other are asymmetrical but double-binding. In his words, to exist means to communicate dialogically, and when the dialogue ends, everything else ends. Unlike Hegelian and Marxian dialectics but like the Chin. correlative logic of yin and yang, Bakhtin’s dialogism is infinitely polyphonic, open-ended, and indeterminate, i.e., “unfinalizable”  to use his term. Dialogue means that there are neither first nor last words. The past and the future are interlocked and revolve around the axis of the present. Bakhtin’s dialogism is paradigmatic in a threefold sense. First, dialogue is never abstract but embodied. The lived body is the material condition of social existence as ongoing dialogue. Not only does the word become enfleshed, but dialogue is also the incorporation of the self and the other. Appropriately, therefore, Bakhtin’s body politics may be called a Slavic version of Tantrism. Second, the Rabelaisian carnivalesque that Bakhtin’s dialogism incorporates points to the “jesterly” politics of resistance and protest against the “priestly” establishment of officialdom. Third, the most distinguishing characteristic of Bakhtin’s dialogism is the primacy of the other over the self, with a twofold consequence: one concerns ethics and the other epistemology. In modern philosophy, the discovery of “Thou” or the primacy of the other over the self in asymmetrical reciprocity is credited to Feuerbach. It is hailed as the “Copernican revolution” of mind, ethics, and social thought. Ethically, Bakhtin’s dialogism, based on heteronomy, signals the birth of a new philosophy of responsibility that challenges and transgresses the Anglo- tradition of “rights talk.” Epistemologically, it lends our welcoming ears to the credence that the other may be right  the attitude that Gadamer calls the soul of dialogical hermeneutics. 

diaphaneity: Grice unique in his subtlety. Strawson and Wiggins. 'the quality of being freely pervious to light; transparency', OED. This is a crucial concept for Grice. He applies it ‘see,’ which which, after joint endeavours with G. J. Warnock, he was obsessed! Grice considers the ascription, “Warnock sees that it is raining.” And then he adds, “And it is true, I see that it is raining, too.” What’s the diference. Then comes Strawson. “Strawson, you see that it is raining, right?” So we have an ascription in the first, second, and third persons. When it comes to the identification of a sense (like vision) via experience or qualia, we are at a problem, because ‘see,’ allowing for what Ryle calls a ‘conversational avowal,’ that nobody has an authority to distrust, is what Grice calls a ‘diaphanous’ predicate. More formally. That means that “Grice sees that it is raining,” in terms of experience, cannot really be expanded except by expanding into WHAT IS that Grice sees, viz. that it is raining. The same with “communicating that p,” and “meaning that p.”

dictum: Cf. dictor, and dictivenss. Not necessarily involved with ‘say,’ but with ‘deixis,’ So a dictum is involved in Emissor E drawing a skull, communicating that there is danger. It is Hare who introduced ‘dictum’ in the Oxonian philosophical literature in his T. H. Green Essay. Hare distinguishes between the ‘dictum,’ that the cat is on the mat, from the ‘dictor,’ ‘I state that the cat is on the mat, yes.’ ‘Cat, on the mat, please.’ Grice often refers to Hare’s play with words, which he obviously enjoys. In “Epilogue,” Grice elaborates on the ‘dictum,’ and turns it into ‘dictivitas.’ How does he coin that word? He starts with Cicero, who has ‘dictivm,’ and creates an abstract noun to match. Grice needs a concept of a ‘dictum’ ambiguous as it is. Grice distinguishes between what an Utterer explicitly conveys, e. g. that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Then there’s what Grice implicitly conveys, to wit: that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed – in that order. Surely Grice has STATED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Grice has ASSERTED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. But if Grice were to order Strawson: “Put on your parachute and jump!” the implicatura may differ. By uttering that utterance, Grice has not asserted or stated anything. So Grice needs a dummy that will do for indicatives and imperatives. ‘Convey’ usually does – especially in the modality ‘explicitly’ convey. Because by uttering that utterance Grice has explicitly conveyed that Strawson is to put on his parachute and jump. Grice has implicitly conveyd that Strawson is to put on his parachute and THEN jump, surely.

Griceian dignitas: a moral worth or status usually attributed to human persons. Persons are said to have dignity as well as to express it. Persons are typically thought to have 1 “human dignity” an dichotomy paradox dignity 234   234 intrinsic moral worth, a basic moral status, or both, which is had equally by all persons; and 2 a “sense of dignity” an awareness of one’s dignity inclining toward the expression of one’s dignity and the avoidance of humiliation. Persons can lack a sense of dignity without consequent loss of their human dignity. In Kant’s influential account of the equal dignity of all persons, human dignity is grounded in the capacity for practical rationality, especially the capacity for autonomous self-legislation under the categorical imperative. Kant holds that dignity contrasts with price and that there is nothing  not pleasure nor communal welfare nor other good consequences  for which it is morally acceptable to sacrifice human dignity. Kant’s categorical rejection of the use of persons as mere means suggests a now-common link between the possession of human dignity and human rights see, e.g., the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One now widespread discussion of dignity concerns “dying with dignity” and the right to conditions conducive thereto. 

Griceian dilemma, a trilemma, tetralemma, monolemma, lemma  – Grice thought that Ryle’s dilemmas were overrated. Strictly, a ‘dilemma’ is a piece of reasoning or argument or argument form in which one of the premises is a disjunction, featuring “or.” Constructive dilemmas take the form ‘If A and B, if C, D, A or C; therefore, B or D’ and are instances of modus ponendo ponens in the special case where A is C and B is D; A so-called ‘destructive’ dilemma is of the form ‘If A, B, if C, D, not-B or not-D; therefore, not-A or not-C’ and it is  likewise an instance of modus tollendo tollens in that special case. A dilemma in which the disjunctive premise is false is commonly known as a “false” dilemma, which is one of Ryle’s dilemmas: “a category mistake!”

diminutive: diminished capacity: explored by Grice in his analysis of legal versus moral right -- a legal defense to criminal liability that exists in two distinct forms: 1 the mens rea variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to cast doubt on the prosecution’s assertion that, at the time of the crime, the defendant possessed the mental state criteria, the mens rea, required by the legal definition of the offense charged; and 2 the partial responsibility variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to support a claim that, even if the defendant’s mental state satisfied the mens rea criteria for the offense, the defendant’s responsibility for the crime is diminished and thus the defendant should be convicted of a lesser crime and/or a lesser sentence should be imposed. The mental abnormality may be produced by mental disorder, intoxication, trauma, or other causes. The mens rea variant is not a distinct excuse: a defendant is simply arguing that the prosecution cannot prove the definitional, mental state criteria for the crime. Partial responsibility is an excuse, but unlike the similar, complete excuse of legal insanity, partial responsibility does not produce total acquittal; rather, a defendant’s claim is for reduced punishment. A defendant may raise either or both variants of diminished capacity and the insanity defense in the same case. For example, a common definition of firstdegree murder requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant intended to kill and did so after premeditation. A defendant charged with this crime might raise both variants as follows. To deny the allegation of premeditation, a defendant might claim that the killing occurred instantaneously in response to a “command hallucination.” If believed, a defendant cannot be convicted of premeditated homicide, but can be convicted of the lesser crime of second-degree murder, which typically requires only intent. And even a defendant who killed intentionally and premeditatedly might claim partial responsibility because the psychotic mental state rendered the agent’s reasons for action nonculpably irrational. In this case, either the degree of crime might be reduced by operation of the partial excuse, rather than by negation of definitional mens rea, or a defendant might be convicted of first-degree murder but given a lesser penalty. In the United States the mens rea variant exists in about half the jurisdictions, although its scope is usually limited in various ways, primarily to avoid a defendant’s being acquitted and freed if mental abnormality negated all the definitional mental state criteria of the crime charged. In English law, the mens rea variant exists but is limited by the type of evidence usable to support it. No  jurisdiction has adopted a distinct, straightforward partial responsibility variant, but various analogous doctrines and procedures are widely accepted. For example, partial responsibility grounds both the doctrine that intentional killing should be reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter if a defendant acted “in the heat of passion” upon legally adequate provocation, and the sentencing judge’s discretion to award a decreased sentence based on a defendant’s mental abnormality. In addition to such partial responsibility analogues, England, Wales, and Scotland have directly adopted the partial responsibility variant, termed “diminished responsibility,” but it applies only to prosecutions for murder. “Diminished responsibility” reduces a conviction to a lesser crime, such as manslaughter or culpable homicide, for behavior that would otherwise constitute murder. 

direction of fit – referred to by Grice in “Intention and uncertainty,” and symbolized by an upward arrow and a downward arrow – there are only TWO directions (or senses) of fit: expressum to ‘re’ and ‘re’ to expressum. The first is indicativus modus; the second is imperativus modus -- according to his thesis of aequivocality – the direction of fit is overrated -- a metaphor that derives from a story in Anscombe’s Intention 7 about a detective who follows a shopper around town making a list of the things that the shopper buys. As Anscombe notes, whereas the detective’s list has to match the way the world is each of the things the shopper buys must be on the detective’s list, the shopper’s list is such that the world has to fit with it each of the things on the list are things that he must buy. The metaphor is now standardly used to describe the difference between kinds of speech act assertions versus commands and mental states beliefs versus desires. For example, beliefs are said to have the world-to-mind direction of fit because it is in the nature of beliefs that their contents are supposed to match the world: false beliefs are to be abandoned. Desires are said to have the opposite mind-to-world direction of fit because it is in the nature of desires that the world is supposed to match their contents. This is so at least to the extent that the role of an unsatisfied desire that the world be a certain way is to prompt behavior aimed at making the world that way. 

disgrice: In PGRICE, Kemmerling speaks of disgricing as the opposite of gricing. The first way to disgrice Kemmerling calls ‘strawsonising.’For Strawson, even the resemblance (for Grice, equivalence in terms of 'iff' -- cf. his account of what an syntactically structured non-complete expression) between (G) There is not a single volume in my uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’and the negatively existential form (LFG) ~ (Ex)(Ax . ~ Bx)’ is deceptive, ‘It is not the case that there exists an x  such that x is a book in Grice’s uncle’s library and x is written by an Englishman. FIRST, 'There is not a single volume in uncle’s library which is not by an English author' -- as normally used, carries the presupposition -- or entails, for Grice --  (G2) Some (at least one) book is in Grice’s uncle’s library. SECOND, 'There is not a single volume in Grice’s uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’ is far from being 'entailed' by (G3e) It is not the case that there is some (at least one) book in my room. If we give ‘There not a single book in my room which is not by an English author’ the modernist logical form ‘~ (Ex)(Ax .~ Bx),’ we see that this is ENTAILED by the briefer, and indeed logicall stronger (in terms of entailments) ~ (Ex)Ax. So when Grice, with a solemn face, utters, ‘There is not a single foreign volume in my uncle’s library, to reveal later that the library is empty, Grice should expect his addressee to get some odd feeling. Surely not the feeling of having been lied to -- or been confronted with an initial false utterance --, because we have not. Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage." "What you say is outrageous!" This sounds stronger than it is. An outrage is believed to be an evil deed, offense, crime; affront, indignity, act not within established or reasonable limits," of food, drink, dress, speech, etc., from Old French outrage "harm, damage; insult; criminal behavior; presumption, insolence, overweening" (12c.), earlier oltrage (11c.), From Vulgar Latin ‘ultraticum,’ excess," from Latin ultra, beyond" (from suffixed form of PIE root *al- "beyond"). Etymologically, "the passing beyond reasonable bounds" in any sense. The meaning narrowed in English toward violent excesses because of folk etymology from out + rage. Of injuries to feelings, principles, etc., from outrage, v. outragen, "to go to excess, act immoderately," from outrage (n.) or from Old French oultrager. From 1580s with meaning "do violence to, attack, maltreat." Related: Outraged; outraging. But Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage.” When Grice was only trying to tutor him in The Organon. Of course it is not the case that Grice is explicitly conveying or expressing that there there is some (at least one) book in his uncle's room. Grice has not said anything false. Or rather, it is not the case that Grice utters an utterance which is not alethically or doxastically satisfactory. Yet what Grice gives Strawson the defeasible, cancellable, license to to assume that Grice thinks there is at least one book. Unless he goes on to cancel the implicaturum, Grice may be deemed to be misleading Strawson. What Grice explicitly conveys to be true (or false) it is necessary (though not sufficient) that there should at least one volume in his uncle’s library -- It is not the case that my uncle has a library and in that library all the books are autochthonous to England, i.e. it is not the case that Grice’s uncle has a library; for starters, it is not the case that Grice has a literate uncle. Of this SUBTLE, nuantic, or cloudy or foggy, "slight or delicate degree of difference in expression, feeling, opinion, etc.," from Fr. nuance "slight difference, shade of colour,” from nuer "to shade," from nue "cloud," from Gallo-Roman nuba, from Latin nubes "a cloud, mist, vapour," sneudh- "fog," source also of Avestan snaoda "clouds,"  Latin obnubere "to veil," Welsh nudd "fog," Greek nython, in Hesychius "dark, dusky") According to Klein, the French usage is a reference to "the different colours of the clouds,” in reference to color or tone, "a slight variation in shade; of music, as a French term in English --  'sort' is the relation between ‘There is not a volume in my uncle's library which is not by an English author,’ and ‘My uncle's library is not empty. RE-ENTER GRICE. Grice suggested that Strawson see such a fine point such as that, which Grice had the kindness to call an 'implicaturum', the result of an act of an ‘implicatura’ (they were both attending Kneale’s seminar on the growth and ungrowth of logic) is irrelevant to the issue of ‘entailment’. It is a 'merely pragmatic’ implicaturum, Grice would say, bringing forward a couple of distinctions: logical/pragmatic point; logical/pragmatic inference; entailment/implicaturum; conveying explicitly/conveying implicitly; stating/implicating; asserting/implying; what an utterer means/what the expression 'means' -- but cf. Nowell-Smith, who left Oxford after being overwhelmed by Grice, "this is how the rules of etiquette inform the rules of logic -- on the 'rule' of relevance in "Ethics," 1955. If to call such a point, as Grice does, as "irrelevant to logic" is vacuous in that it may be interpreted as saying that that such a fine foggy point is not considered in a modernist formal system of first-order predicate calculus with identity, this Strawson wishes not to dispute, but to emphasise. Call it his battle cry! But to 'logic' as concerned with this or that relation between this or that general class of statement occurring in ordinary use, and the attending general condition under which this or that statement is correctly called 'true' or 'false,' this fine foggy nice point would hardly be irrelevant. GRICE'S FORMALIST (MODERNIST) INTERPRETATION. Some 'pragmatic' consideration, or assumption, or expectation, a desideratum of conversational conduct obviously underlies and in fact 'explains' the implicaturum, without having to change the ‘sense’ of Aristotle’s syllogistics in terms of the logical forms of A, E, I, and O. If we abide by an imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally giving and receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by others in the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the effect, ‘Thou shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou canst truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’ Assume the form ‘There is not a single … which is not . . .,’ or ‘It is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that ... is not ... is introduced in ‘ordinary’ language with the same SENSE as the expression in the ‘ideal’ language, ~(Ex)(Ax and ~Bx). Then prohibition inhibits the utterance of the form where the utterer can truly and truthfully simply convey explicitly ‘There is not a single ..., i. e. ~(Ex)(Fx). It is defeasible prohibition which tends to confer on the overprolixic form ('it is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that is not ...')  just that kind of an implicaturum which Strawson identifies.  But having detected a nuance in a conversational phenomenon is not the same thing as rushing ahead to try to explain it BEFORE exploring in some detail what kind of a nuance it is. The mistake is often commited by Austin, too (in "Other Minds," and "A Plea for Excuses"), and by Hart (on 'carefully'), and by Hare (on "good"), and by Strawson on 'true,' (Analysis), ‘the,’ and 'if -- just to restrict to the play group. Grice tries to respond to anti-sense-datum in "That pillar box seems red to me,” but Strawson was not listening.  The overprolixic form in the ‘ordinary’ language, ‘It is not the case that there is some (at least one x) such that ... x is not ...’ would tend, if it does not remain otiose, to develop or generate just that baffling effect in one's addressee ('outrage!') that Strawson identifies, as opposed to the formal-device in the ‘ideal’ language with which the the ‘ordinary’ language counterpart is co-related. What weakens our resistance to the negatively existential analysis in this case more than in the case of the corresponding "All '-sentence is the powerful attraction of the negative opening phrase There is not …'.  To avoid misunderstanding one may add a point about the neo-traditionalist interpretation of the forms of the traditional Aristotelian system. Strawson is not claiming that it faithfully represents this or that intention of the principal exponent of the Square of Opposition. Appuleius, who knows, was perhaps, more interested in formulating this or that theorem governing this or that logical relation of this or that more imposing general statement than this or that everyday general statement that Strawson considers. Appuleius, who knows, might have been interested, e. g., in the logical powers of this or that generalisation, or this or that sentence which approximates more closely to the desired conditions that if its utterance by anyone, at any time, at any place, results in a true statement, so does its utterance by anyone else, at any other time, at any other place.  How far the account by the neo-traditionalist of this or that general sentence of 'ordinary' langauge is adequate for every generalization may well be under debate. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “In defence of Appuleius,” BANC.

disimplicaturum: “We should not conclude from this that an implication of the existence of thing said to be seen is NOT part of the conventional meaning of ‘see’ nor even (as some philosophers have done) that there is one sense of ‘see’ which lacks this implication!” (WoW:44). If Oxonians are obsessed with ‘implication,’ do they NEED ‘disimplicaturum’? Grice doesn’t think so! But sometimes you have to use it to correct a mistake. Grice does not give names, but he says he has heard a philosopher claim that there are two SENSES of ‘see,’ one which what one sees exists, and one in which it doesn’t! It would be good to trace that! It relates, in any case to ‘remembers,’but not quite, and to ‘know.’ But not quite. The issue of ‘see’ is not that central, since Grice realizes that it is just a modality of perception, even if crucial. He coined ‘visum’ with Warnock to play with the idea of ‘what is seen’ NOT being existent.  On another occasion, when he cannot name a ridiculous philosopher, he invents him: “A philosopher will not be given much credit if he comes with an account of the indefinite ‘one’ as having three senses: one proximate to the emissor (“I broke a finger”), one distant (“He’s meeting a woman”) and one where the link is not specified (“A flower”). he target is of course Davidson having the cheek to quote Grice’s Henriette Herz Trust lecture for the BA! Lewis and Short have ‘intendere’ under ‘in-tendo,’ which they render as ‘to stretch out or forth, extend, also to turn ones attention to, exert one’s self for, to purpose, endeavour,” and finaly as “intend”! “pergin, sceleste, intendere hanc arguere?” Plaut. Mil. 2, 4, 27 Grices tends towards claiming that you cannot extend what you dont intend. In the James lectures, Grice mentions the use of is to mean seem (The tie is red in this light), and see to mean hallucinate. Denying Existence: The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of ...books.google.com › books ... then it seems unidiomatic if not ungrammatical to speak of hallucinations as ... that fighting people and 156 APPEARING UNREALS 4 Two Senses of "See"? A. Chakrabarti - 1997 - ‎Language Arts & Disciplines    The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and ...books.google.com › books sight, say sense-data; others will then say that there are two senses of 'see'. ... wrong because I am dreaming or hallucinating them, which of course could ... Stanley Cavell - 1999 - ‎Philosophy    Wittgenstein and Perception - Page 37 - Google Books Resultbooks.google.com › books For example, Gilbert Harman characterises the two senses of see as follows: see† = 'the ... which is common to genuine cases of seeing and to hallucinations. Michael Campbell, ‎Michael O'Sullivan - 2015 - ‎Philosophy    The Alleged Ambiguity of'See'www.jstor.org › stable including dreams, hallucinations and the perception of physical objects. ... existence of at least two senses of ' see' were his adherence to the doctrine that 'see' ... by AR White - ‎1963 - ‎Cited by 3 - ‎Related articles    Seeing and Naming - jstorwww.jstor.org › stable there are or aren't two senses of 'see'. If there are, I'm speaking of ... The third kind of case is illustrated by Macbeth's dagger hallucination, at least if we assume ... by RJ Hall - ‎1977 - ‎Cited by 3 - ‎Related articles    Philosophy at LaGuardia Community Collegewww.laguardia.edu › Philosophy › GADFLY-2011 PDF Lastly, I will critically discuss Ayer's two senses of 'see', ... (e.g., hallucinations); it thus seems correct to say that ... Hallucinations are hallucinations. There are.    Talking about seeing: An examination of some aspects of the ...etd.ohiolink.edu › ... I propose a distinction between delusions and hallucinations,'and argue ... say that there are two senses of .'see* in ordinary language or not, he does, as I will ... by KA Emmett - ‎1974 - ‎Related articles    Wittgenstein and Perceptionciteseerx.ist.psu.edu › viewdoc › download PDF 2 Two senses of 'see'. 33 ... may see things that are not there, for example in hallucinations. ... And so, hallucinations are not genuine perceptual experiences. by Y Arahata - ‎Related articles    Allen Blur - University of Yorkwww-users.york.ac.uk › Publications_files PDF of subjectively indistinguishable hallucination (e.g. Crane 2006). ... and material objects of sight, and correlatively for a distinction between two senses of 'see',. by K Allen - ‎Related articles    Austin and sense-data - UBC Library Open Collectionsopen.library.ubc.ca › ... › UBC Theses and Dissertations Sep 15, 2011 - (5) Illusions and Hallucinations It is not enough to reject Austin's way of ... I will not deal with Austin and Ayer on "two senses of 'see'" because I ... by DD Todd - ‎1967 - ‎Cited by 1 - ‎Related articles. Godfrey Vesey (1965, p. 73) deposes, "if a person sees something at all it must look like something to him, even if it only looks like 'somebody doing something.' With Davidson, Grice was more cavalier, because he could blame it on a different ‘New-World’ dialect or idiolect, about ‘intend.’ When Grice uses ‘disimplicaturum’ to apply to ‘cream in coffee’ that is a bit tangential – and refers more generally to his theory of communication. What would the rationale of disimplicaturum be? In this case, if the emissee realizes the obvious category mistake (“She’s not the cream in your coffee”) there may be a need to disimplicate explicitly. To consider. There is an example that he gives that compares with ‘see’ and it is even more philosophical but he doesn’t give examples: to use ‘is’ when one means ‘seem’ (the tie example).  The reductive analyses of being and seeing hold. We have here two cases of loose use (or disimplicaturum). Same now with his example in “Intention and Uncertainty” (henceforth, “Uncertainty”): Smith intends to climb Mt. Everest + [common-ground status: this is difficult]. Grices response to Davidsons pretty unfair use of Grices notion of conversational implicaturum in Davidsons analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. Pears loved Grices reply. Implicaturum here is out of the question ‒ disimplicaturum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is too social to be true when applied to intending. The doxastic condition is one of the entailments in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicaturum can. If it can be cancelled, it is best seen as a disimplicaturum, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants. Grice and Davidson were members of The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society. Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grices polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather). Grice and Pears hold a minimalist approach to intending. On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as the same mistake again of building certainty into the concept. Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational implicaturum at this point is too social to be true. Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational disimplicaturum: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees. The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a loose use of intends. The certainty on the agents part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt. Davidson was claiming that the agents belief in the probability of the object of the agents intention was a mere conversational implicaturum on the utterers part. Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an entailment of a strict use of intend, even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational disimplicaturum, it can be dropped.  The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness. Pears was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending, disimplicaturum, disimplicaturum. Strictly, a section of his reply to Davidson. If Grices claim to fame is implicaturum, he finds disimplicaturum an intriguing notion to capture those occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of intending (without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of see in Shakespeareian contexts (Macbeth saw Banquo, Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore) and the use of is to mean seems (That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise, when both conversants know that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with Youre the cream in my coffee being an utterance where the disimplicaturum (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. Disimplicaturum does not appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of conversational helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. In everyday explanation we exploit, as Grice notes, an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as the wanting family. This wanting family includes expressions like want, desire, would like to, is eager to, is anxious to, would mind not…, the idea of  appeals to me, is thinking of, etc. As Grice remarks, The likeness and differences within this wanting family demand careful attention. In commenting on Davidsons treatment of wanting in Intending, Grice notes: It seems to Grice that the picture of the soul suggested by Davidsons treatment of wanting is remarkably tranquil and, one might almost say, computerized. It is the picture of an ideally decorous board meeting, at which the various heads of sections advance, from the standpoint of their particular provinces, the case for or against some proposed course of action. In the end the chairman passes judgement, effective for action; normally judiciously, though sometimes he is for one reason or another over-impressed with the presentation made by some particular member. Grices soul doesnt seem to him, a lot of the time, to be like that at all. It is more like a particularly unpleasant department meeting, in which some members shout, wont listen, and suborn other members to lie on their behalf; while the chairman, who is often himself under suspicion of cheating, endeavours to impose some kind of order; frequently to no effect, since sometimes the meeting breaks up in disorder, sometimes, though it appears to end comfortably, in reality all sorts of enduring lesions are set up, and sometimes, whatever the outcome of the meeting, individual members go off and do things unilaterally. Could it be that Davidson, of the New World, and Grice, of the Old World, have different idiolects regarding intend? Could well be! It is said that the New World is prone to hyperbole, so perhaps in Grices more cautious use, intend is restricted to the conditions HE wants it to restrict it too! Odd that for all the generosity he displays in Post-war Oxford philosophy (Surely I can help you analyse you concept of this or that, even if my use of the corresponding expression does not agree with yours), he goes to attack Davidson, and just for trying to be nice and apply the conversational implicaturum to intend! Genial Grice! It is natural Davidson, with his naturalistic tendencies, would like to see intending as merely invoking in a weak fashion the idea of a strong psychological state as belief. And its natural that Grice hated that! Refs.: The source is Grice’s comment on Davidson on intending. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

disjunctum: Strangely enough Ariskant thought disjunctum, but not conjunctum a categorial related to the category of ‘community’!Aulus Gellius (The Attic Nights, XVI, 8) tells us about this disjunction: “There also is ■ another type of a^twpa which the Greeks call and we call disjunctum, disjunctive sentence. Gellius notes that ‘or’ is by default ‘inclusive’: where one or several propositions may be simultaneously true, without ex- cluding one another, although they may also all be false. Gellius expands on the non-default reading of exclusive disjunction: pleasure is either good or bad or it is neither good nor bad (“Aut malum est voluplas, aut bonum, aul neque bonum, neque malum est”). All the elements of the exclusive disjunctive exclude one another, and their contradictory elements, Gr. avTtxs'-p.sva, are incompatible with one another”. “Ex omnibus quae disjunguntiir, unum esse verum debet, falsa cetera.”Grice lists ‘or’ as the second binary functor in his response to Strawson. But both Grice and Strawson agreed that the Oxonian expert on ‘or’ is Wood. Mitchell is good, too, though. The relations between “v” and “or” (or “either ... or …”) are, on the whole, less intimate than those between “.” and “and,” but less distant than those between “D” and “if.” Let us speak of a statement made by coupling two clauses by “or” as an alternative statement ; and let us speak of the first and second alternatesof such a statement, on analogy with our talk of the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement. At a bus-stop, someone might say: “Either we catch this bus or we shall have to walk all the way home.” He might equally well have said “If we don't catch this bus, we shall have to walk all the way home.” It will be seen that the antecedent of the hypothetical statement he might have made is the negation of the first alternate of the alternative statement he did make. Obviously, we should not regard our catching the bus as a sufficient condition of the 'truth' of either statement; if it turns out that the bus we caught was not the last one, we should say that the man who had made the statement had been wrong. The truth of one of the alternates is no more a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement than the falsity of the antecedent is a sufficient condition of the truth of the hypothetical statement. And since 'p"Dpyq' (and, equally, * q"3p v q ') is a law of the truth-functional system, this fact sufficiently shows a difference between at least one standard use of “or” and the meaning given to “v.” Now in all, or almost all, the cases where we are prepared to say something of the form “p or q,” we are also prepared to say something of the form 4 if not-p, then q \ And this fact may us to exaggerate the difference between “v” and “or” to think that, since in some cases, the fulfilment of one alternate is not a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement of which It is an alternate, the fulfilment of one alternate is a sufficient condition of the truth of an alternative statement. And this is certainly an exaggeration. If someone says ; “Either it was John or it was Robert but I couldn't tell which,” we are satisfied of the truth of the alternative statement if either of the alternates turns out to be true; and we say that the speaker was wrong only if neither turns out to be true. Here we seem to have a puzzle ; for we seem to be saying that * Either it was John or it was Robert ' entails 4 If it wasn't John, it was Robert * and, at the same time, that ‘It was John’ entails the former, but not the latter. What we are suffering from here is perhaps a crudity in our notion of entailraent, a difficulty In applying this too undifferentiated concept to the facts of speech ; or, if we prefer it, an ambiguity in the notion of a sufficient condition. The statement that it was John entails the statement that it was either John or Robert in the sense thai it confirms it; when It turns out to have been John, the man who said that either It was John or it was Robert is shown to have been right. But the first statement does not entail the second in the sense that the step ‘It was John, so it was either John or Robert’ is a logically proper step, unless the person saying this means by it simply that the alternative statement made previously was correct, i.e., 'it was one of the two '. For the alternative statement carries the implication of the speaker's uncertainty as to which of the two it was, and this implication is inconsistent with the assertion that it was John. So in this sense of * sufficient condition ', the statement that it was John is no more a sufficient condition of (no more entails) the statement that it was either John or Robert than it is a sufficient condition of (entails) the statement that if it wasn't John, it was Robert. The further resemblance, which we have already noticed, between the alternative statement and the hypothetical statement, is that whatever knowledge or experience renders it reasonable to assert the alternative statement, also renders it reasonable to make the statement that (under the condition that it wasn't John) it was Robert. But we are less happy about saying that the hypothetical statement is confirmed by the discovery that it was John, than we are about saying that the alternative statement is confirmed by this discovery. For we are inclined to say that the question of confirmation of the hypothetical statement (as opposed to the question of its reasonableness or acceptability) arises only if the condition (that it wasn't John) turns out to be fulfilled. This shows an asymmetry, as regards confirmation, though not as regards acceptability, between 4 if not p, then q ' and * if not qy then p ' which is not mirrored in the forms ‘either p or q’ and ‘either q or p.’ This asymmetry is ignored in the rule that * if not p, then q ' and ‘if not q, then p’ are logically equivalent, for this rule regards acceptability rather than confirmation. And rightly. For we may often discuss the l truth ' of a subjunctive conditional, where the possibility of confirmation is suggested by the form of words employed to be not envisaged. It is a not unrelated difference between * if ' sentences and ‘or’ sentences that whereas, whenever we use one of the latter, we should also be prepared to use one of the former, the converse does not hold. The cases in which it does not generally hold are those of subjunctive conditionals. There is no ‘or’ sentence which would serve as a paraphrase of ‘If the Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war’ as this sentence would most commonly be used. And this is connected with the fact that c either . . . or . . .' is associated with situations involving choice or decision. 4 Either of these roads leads to Oxford ' does not mean the same as ' Either this road leads to Oxford or that road does’ ; but both confront us with the necessity of making a choice. This brings us to a feature of * or ' which, unlike those so far discussed, is commonly mentioned in discussion of its relation to * v ' ; the fact, namely, that in certain verbal contexts, ‘either … or …’ plainly carries the implication ‘and not both . . . and . . .', whereas in other contexts, it does not. These are sometimes spoken of as, respectively, the exclusive and inclusive senses of ‘or;’ and, plainly, if we are to identify 4 v’ with either, it must be the latter. The reason why, unlike others, this feature of the ordinary use of “or” is commonly mentioned, is that the difference can readily be accommodated (1 Cf. footnote to p. 86.In the symbolism of the truth-functional system: It is the difference between “(p y q) .~ (p . q)” (exclusive sense) and “p v q” (inclusive sense). “Or,” like “and,” is commonly used to join words and phrases as well as clauses. The 4 mutuality difficulties attending the general expansion of 4 x and y are/ 5 into * x is /and y is/' do not attend the expansion of 4 x or y isf into c r Is/or y is/ ? (This is not to say that the expansion can always correctly be made. We may call “v” the disjunctive sign and, being warned against taking the reading too seriously, may read it as ‘or.' While he never approached the topic separately, it’s easy to find remarks about disjunction in his oeuvre. A veritable genealogy of disjunction can be traced along Griceian lines. DISJUNCTUM -- disjunction elimination. 1 The argument form ‘A or B, if A then C, if B then C; therefore, C’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer C from a disjunction together with derivations of C from each of the disjuncts separately. This is also known as the rule of disjunctive elimination or V-elimination.  disjunction introduction. 1 The argument form ‘A or B; therefore, A or B’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer a disjunction from either of its disjuncts. This is also known as the rule of addition or Vintroduction.  . disjunctive proposition, a proposition whose main propositional operator main connective is the disjunction operator, i.e., the logical operator that represents ‘and/or’. Thus, ‘P-and/orQ-and-R’ is not a disjunctive proposition because its main connective is the conjunction operation, but ‘P-and/or-Q-and-R’ is disjunctive. Refs.: Grice uses an illustration involving ‘or’ in the ‘implication’ excursus in “Causal Theory.” But the systematic account comes from WoW, especially essay 4.

dispositum -- H. P. Grice, “Disposition and intention” – Grice inspired D. F. Pears on this, as they tried to refute Austin’s rather dogmatic views in ‘ifs’ and ‘cans’ – where the ‘can’ relates to the disposition, and the ‘if’ to the conditional analysis for it. Grice’s phrase is “if I can”. “I intend to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees,” Marmaduke Bloggs says, “if a can.” A disposition, more generally is, any tendency of an object or system to act or react in characteristic ways in certain situations. Fragility, solubility, and radioactivity, and intentionality, are typical dispositions. And so are generosity and irritability. For Ryle’s brand of analytic behaviorism, functionalism, and some forms of materialism, an event of the soul, such as the occurrence of an idea, and states such as a belief, a will, or an intention, is  also a disposition. A hypothetical or conditional statement is alleged to be ‘implicated’ by dispositional claims. What’s worse, this conditional is alleged to capture the basic meaning of the ascription of a state of the soul. The glass would shatter if suitably struck. Left undisturbed, a radium atom will probably decay in a certain time. An ascription of a disposition is taken as subjunctive rather than material conditionals to avoid problems like having to count as soluble anything not immersed in water. The characteristic mode of action or reaction  shattering, decaying, etc.  is termed the disposition’s manifestation or display. But it need not be observable. Fragility is a regular or universal disposition. A suitably struck glass invariably shatters. Radio-activity on the other hand is alleged to be a variable or probabilistic disposition. Radium may (but then again may not) decay in a certain situation. A dispositions may be what Grice calls “multi-track,” i. e.  multiply manifested, rather than “single-track,” or singly manifested. Hardness or elasticity may have different manifestations in different situations. In his very controversial (and only famous essay), “The Concept of Mind,” Ryle, who held, no less, the chair of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford, argues – just to provoke -- that there is nothing more to a dispositional claim than its associated conditional. A dispositional property is not an occurrent property. To possess a dispositional property is not to undergo any episode or occurrence, or to be in a particular state. Grice surely refuted this when he claims that the soul is in this or that a state. Consider reasoning. The soul is in state premise; then the soul is in state conclusion. The episode or occurrence is an event, when the state of the premise causes the state of the conclusion. Coupled with a ‘positivist’ (or ultra-physicalist, ultra-empiricist, and ultra-naturalist) rejection of any unobservable, and a conception of an alleged episode or state of the soul as a dispositios, this supports the view of behaviorism that such alleged episode or state is nothing but a disposition TO observable behaviour – if Grice intends to climb Mt. Everest on hands and knees if he can, there is no ascription without the behaviour that manifests it – the ascription is meant to EXPLAIN (or explicate, or provide the cause) for the behaviour. Grice reached this ‘functionalist’ approach later in his career, and presented it with full fanfare in “Method in philosophoical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.” By contrast, realism holds that dispositional talk is also about an actual or occurrent property or a state, possibly unknown or unobservable – the ‘black box’ of the functionalist, a function from sensory input to behavioural output. In particular, it is about the bases of dispositions in intrinsic properties or states. Thus, fragility is based in molecular structure, radioactivity in nuclear structure. A disposition’s basis is viewed as at least partly the cause of its manifestation in behaviour. Some philosophers, for fear of an infinite regress, hold that the basis is categorical, not dispositional D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, 8. Others, notably Popper, Madden, and Harre (Causal powers) hold that every property is dispositional. Grice’s essay has now historical interest – but showed the relevance of these topics among two tightly closed groups in post-war Oxford: the dispositionalists led by Ryle, and the anti-dispositionalists, a one-member group led by Grice. Refs.: Grice, “Intention and dispositions.”

distributum: distributio -- undistributed middle: a logical fallacy in traditional syllogistic logic, resulting from the violation of the rule that the middle term (the term that appears twice in premises) must be distributed at least once in the premises. Any syllogism that commits this error is invalid. Consider “All philosophers are persons,” and “Some persons are bad.” No conclusion follows from these two premises because “persons” in the first premise is the predicate of an affirmative proposition, and in the second is the subject of a particular proposition. Neither of them is distributed. “If in a syllogism the middle term is distributed in neither premise, we are said to have a fallacy of undistributed middle.” Keynes, Formal Logic. DISTRIBUTUM -- distribution, the property of standing for every individual designated by a term. The Latin term distributio originated in the twelfth century; it was applied to terms as part of a theory of reference, and it may have simply indicated the property of a term prefixed by a universal quantifier. The term ‘dog’ in ‘Every dog has his day’ is distributed, because it supposedly refers to every dog. In contrast, the same term in ‘A dog bit the mailman’ is not distributed because it refers to only one dog. In time, the idea of distribution came to be used only as a heuristic device for determining the validity of categorical syllogisms: 1 every term that is distributed in a premise must be distributed in the conclusion; 2 the middle term must be distributed at least once. Most explanations of distribution in logic textbooks are perfunctory; and it is stipulated that the subject terms of universal propositions and the predicate terms of negative propositions are distributed. This is intuitive for A-propositions, e.g., ‘All humans are mortal’; the property of being mortal is distributed over each human. The idea of distribution is not intuitive for, say, the predicate term of O-propositions. According to the doctrine, the sentence ‘Some humans are not selfish’ says in effect that if all the selfish things are compared with some select human one that is not selfish, the relation of identity does not hold between that human and any of the selfish things. Notice that the idea of distribution is not mentioned in this explanation. The idea of distribution is currently disreputable, mostly because of the criticisms of Geach in Reference and Generality 8 and its irrelevance to standard semantic theories. The related term ‘distributively’ means ‘in a manner designating every item in a group individually’, and is used in contrast with ‘collectively’. The sentence ‘The rocks weighed 100 pounds’ is ambiguous. If ‘rocks’ is taken distributively, then the sentence means that each rock weighed 100 pounds. If ‘rocks’ is taken collectively, then the sentence means that the total weight of the rocks was 100 pounds.  distributive laws, the logical principles A 8 B 7 C S A 8 B 7 A 7 C and A 7 B 8 C S A 7 B 8 A 7 C. Conjunction is thus said to distribute over disjunction and disjunction over conjunction. 

ditto: Or Strawson’s big mistake. Strawson quite didn’t understand what “Analysis” was for, and submits this essay on the perlocutionary effects of ‘true.’ Grice comes to the resuce of veritable analysis. cf. verum. Grice disliked Strawson’s ditto theory in Analysis of ‘true’ as admittive performatory. 1620s, "in the month of the same name," Tuscan dialectal ditto "(in) the said (month or year)," literary Italian detto, past participle of dire "to say," from Latin dicere "speak, tell, say" (from PIE root *deik- "to show," also "pronounce solemnly").  Italian used the word to avoid repetition of month names in a series of dates, and in this sense it was picked up in English. Its generalized meaning of "the aforesaid, the same thing, same as above" is attested in English by 1670s. In early 19c. a suit of men's clothes of the same color and material through was ditto or dittoes (1755). Dittohead, self-description of followers of U.S. radio personality Rush Limbaugh, attested by 1995. dittoship is from 1869.

dodgson: c. l. – Grice quotes Carroll often. Cabbages and kings – Achilles and the Tortoise – Humpty Dumpty and his Deutero-Esperanto -- Carroll, Lewis, pen name of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson 183298, English writer and mathematician. The eldest son of a large clerical family, he was educated at Rugby and Christ Church, Oxford, where he remained for the rest of his uneventful life, as mathematical lecturer until 1 and curator of the senior commonroom. His mathematical writings under his own name are more numerous than important. He was, however, the only Oxonian of his day to contribute to symbolic logic, and is remembered for his syllogistic diagrams, for his methods for constructing and solving elaborate sorites problems, for his early interest in logical paradoxes, and for the many amusing examples that continue to reappear in modern textbooks. Fame descended upon him almost by accident, as the author of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 1865, Through the Looking Glass 1872, The Hunting of the Snark 1876, and Sylvie and Bruno 9 93; saving the last, the only children’s books to bring no blush of embarrassment to an adult reader’s cheek. Dodgson took deacon’s orders in 1861, and though pastorally inactive, was in many ways an archetype of the prim Victorian clergyman. His religious opinions were carefully thought out, but not of great philosophic interest. The Oxford movement passed him by; he worried about sin though rejecting the doctrine of eternal punishment, abhorred profanity, and fussed over Sunday observance, but was oddly tolerant of theatergoing, a lifelong habit of his own. Apart from the sentimental messages later inserted in them, the Alice books and Snark are blessedly devoid of religious or moral concern. Full of rudeness, aggression, and quarrelsome, if fallacious, argument, they have, on the other hand, a natural attraction for philosophers, who pillage Carneades Carroll, Lewis 119   119 them freely for illustrations. Humpty-Dumpty, the various Kings and Queens, the Mad Hatter, the Caterpillar, the White Rabbit, the Cheshire Cat, the Unicorn, the Tweedle brothers, the Bellman, the Baker, and the Snark make fleeting appearances in the s of Russell, Moore, Broad, Quine, Nagel, Austin, Ayer, Ryle, Blanshard, and even Vitters an unlikely admirer of the Mock Turtle. The first such allusion to the March Hare is in Venn’s Symbolic Logic 1. The usual reasons for quotation are to make some point about meaning, stipulative definition, the logic of negation, time reversal, dream consciousness, the reification of fictions and nonentities, or the absurdities that arise from taking “ordinary language” too literally. For exponents of word processing, the effect of running Jabberwocky through a spell-checker is to extinguish all hope for the future of Artificial Intelligence. Though himself no philosopher, Carroll’s unique sense of philosophic humor keeps him and his illustrator, Sir John Tenniel effortlessly alive in the modern age. Alice has been tr. into seventy-five languages; new editions and critical studies appear every year; imitations, parodies, cartoons, quotations, and ephemera proliferate beyond number; and Carroll societies flourish in several countries, notably Britain and the United States.

dominium -- domain – used by Grice in his treatment of Extensionalism -- of a science, the class of individuals that constitute its subject matter. Zoology, number theory, and plane geometry have as their respective domains the class of animals, the class of natural numbers, and the class of plane figures. In Posterior Analytics 76b10, Aristotle observes that each science presupposes its domain, its basic concepts, and its basic principles. In modern formalizations of a science using a standard firstorder formal language, the domain of the science is often, but not always, taken as the universe of the intended interpretation or intended model, i.e. as the range of values of the individual variables. 

donkey – quantification – considered by Grice -- sentences, sentences exemplified by ‘Every man who owns a donkey beats it’, ‘If a man owns a donkey, he beats it’, and similar forms (“Every nice girl loves a sailor”), which have posed logical puzzles since medieval times but were noted more recently by Geach. At issue is the logical form of such sentences  specifically, the correct construal of the pronoun ‘it’ and the indefinite noun phrase ‘a donkey’. Translations into predicate logic by the usual strategy of rendering the indefinite as existential quantification and the pronoun as a bound variable cf. ‘John owns a donkey and beats it’ P Dx x is a donkey & John owns x & John beats x are either ill-formed or have the wrong truth conditions. With a universal quantifier, the logical form carries the controversial implication that every donkey-owning man beats every donkey he owns. Efforts to resolve these issues have spawned much significant research in logic and linguistic semantics. 

dossier: Grice is not clear about the status of this – but some philosophers have been too mentalistic. How would a genitorial programme proceed. Is there a dossier in a handwave by which the emissor communicates that he knows the route or that he is about to leave his emissee. It does not seem so, because the handwave is unstructured. Unlike “Fido is shaggy.” In the case of “Fido is shaggy,” there must be some OVERLAP between the emissor’s soul and the emissee’s soul – in terms of dossier. So perhaps there is overlap in the handwave. There must be an overlap as to WHICH route he means. By making the handwave the emissor communicates that HE, the emissor, subject IS (copula) followed by predicate “knower of the route.” So here we have a definite ‘the route.’ Which route? To heaven, to hell. Cf. The scots ‘high road,’ ‘low road.’ To Loch Lomond. If there is not this minimal common ground nothing can be communicated. In the alternative meaning, “I (subject) am (copula) about to leave you – where again there must be an overlap in the identification of the denotata of the pronouns. In the case of Blackburn’s skull or the arrow at the fork of a road, the common ground is instituted in situu in the one-off predicament, and there still must be some overlap of dossier. In its most technical usage, Grice wants to demystify Donnellan’s identificatory versus non-identificatory uses of ‘the,’ as unnecessary implications to Russell’s otherwise neat account. The topic interested Strawson (“Principle of assumption of ignorance, knowledge and relevance”) and Urmson’s principle of aptitude. Grice’s favourite vacuous name is ‘Bellerophon.’ ‘Vacuous names’ is an essay commissioned by Davison and Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine (henceforth, W and O) for Reidel, Dordrecht. “W and O” had appeared (without Grices contribution) as a special issue of Synthese. Grices contribution, along with Quines Reply to Grice, appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians ‒ this was the time when logic was starting to be taught outside philosophy departments, or sub-faculties), such as Mitchell, Myro, Mates, Donnellan, Strawson, Grice was particularly proud to be able to quote Mates by mouth or book. Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicatura to be given maximal scope. The device in Vacuous Namess is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation. Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special existential kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer. Someone isnt attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society. That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees. But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside Newsletter, “W and O,” vacuous name, identificatory use, non-identificatory use, subscript device. Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the New-World impact of the Old-World ideas displayed by Grice and Strawson in their attack to Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grices and Strawsons sophisticated version of the paradigm-case argument in Word and Object.  Davidson and Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical publication, to which Strawson had already contributed. It was only natural, when Davidson and Hintikka were informed by Reidel of their interest in turning the special issue into a separate volume, that they would approach the other infamous member of the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Davidson and Hintikka for “W and O.” Grice introduces a subscript device to account for implicatura of utterances like Marmaduke Bloggs won’t be attending the party; he was invented by the journalists. In the later section, he explores identificatory and non identificatory uses of the without involving himself in the problems Donnellan did! Some philosophers, notably Ostertag, have found the latter section the most intriguing bit, and thus Ostertag cared to reprint the section on Descriptions for his edited MIT volume on the topic. The essay is structured very systematically with an initial section on a calculus alla Gentzen, followed by implicatura of vacuous Namess such as Marmaduke Bloggs, to end with definite descriptions, repr. in Ostertag, and psychological predicates. It is best to focus on a few things here. First his imaginary dialogues on Marmaduke Bloggs, brilliant! Second, this as a preamble to his Presupposition and conversational implicaturum. There is a quantifier phrase, the, and two uses of it: one is an identificatory use (the haberdasher is clumsy, or THE haberdasher is clumsy, as Grice prefers) and then theres a derived, non-identificatory use: the haberdasher (whoever she was! to use Grices and Mitchells addendum) shows her clumsiness. The use of the numeric subscripts were complicated enough to delay the publication of this. The whole thing was a special issue of a journal. Grices contribution came when Reidel turned that into a volume. Grice later replaced his numeric subscript device by square brackets. Perhaps the square brackets are not subtle enough, though. Grices contribution, Vacuous Namess, later repr. in part “Definite descriptions,” ed. Ostertag, concludes with an exploration of the phrases, and further on, with some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude.  Grices choice of an ascription now notably involves an opaque (rather than factive, like know) psychological state or attitude: wanting, which he symbolizes as W.  At least Grice does not write, really, for he knew that Austin detested a trouser word! Grice concludes that (xi) and (xiii) will be derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will be derivable only from (ix).Grice had been Strawsons logic tutor at St. Johns (Mabbott was teaching the grand stuff!) and it shows! One topic that especially concerned Grice relates to the introduction and elimination rules, as he later searches for generic satisfactoriness. Grice wonders [W]hat should be said of Takeutis conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in Xs personalized system that φ, then it is necessary with respect to X that φ is true (establishable). The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary with respect to X that φ, then one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble; for such a rule is not acceptable; φ will be a volitive expression such as let it be that X eats his hat; and my commitment to the idea that Xs system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting (buletically) let X eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary with respect to X that let X eat his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier; for this version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope. A very interesting concept Grice introduces in the definite-descriptor section of Vacuous Namess is that of a conversational dossier, for which he uses δ for a definite descriptor. The key concept is that of conversational dossier overlap, common ground, or conversational pool. Let us say that an utterer U has a dossier for a definite description δ if there is a set of definite descriptions which include δ, all the members of which the utterer supposes to be satisfied by one and the same item and the utterer U intends his addressee A to think (via the recognition that A is so intended) that the utterer U has a dossier for the definite description δ which the utterer uses, and that the utterer U has specifically selected (or chosen, or picked) this specific δ from this dossier at least partly in the hope that his addressee A has his own dossier for δ which overlaps the utterers dossier for δ, viz. shares a substantial, or in some way specially favoured, su-bset with the utterers dossier. Its unfortunate that the idea of a dossier is not better known amog Oxonian philosophers. Unlike approaches to the phenomenon by other Oxonian philosophers like Grices tutee Strawson and his three principles (conversational relevance, presumption of conversational knowledge, and presumption of conversational ignorance) or Urmson and his, apter than Strawsons, principle of conversational appositeness (Mrs.Smiths husband just delivered a letter, You mean the postman!?), only Grice took to task the idea of formalising this in terms of set-theory and philosophical psychology  ‒ note his charming reference to the utterers hope (never mind intention) that his choice of d from his dossier will overlap with some d in the dossier of his his addressee. The point of adding whoever he may be for the non-identificatory is made by Mitchell, of Worcester, in his Griceian textbook for Hutchinson. Refs.: The main reference is Grice’s “Vacuous names,” in “W and O” and its attending notes, BANC.

doxastic – discussed by J. L. Austin in the myth of the cave. Plato is doing some form of linguistic botany when he distinguishes between the doxa and the episteme – Stich made it worse with his ‘sub-doxastic’! from Grecian doxa, ‘belief’, of or pertaining to belief. A doxastic mental state, for instance, is or incorporates a belief. Doxastic states of mind are to be distinguished, on the one hand, from such non-doxastic states as desires, sensations, and emotions, and, on the other hand, from subdoxastic states. By extension, a doxastic principle is a principle governing belief. A doxastic principle might set out conditions under which an agent’s forming or abandoning a belief is justified epistemically or otherwise. 

doxographia griceiana -- Griceian doxographers. A Griceian doxographer is a a compiler of andcommentators on the opinions of Grice. “I am my first doxographer,” Grice said. Grice enjoyed the term coined by H. Diels for the title of his work “Doxographi Graeci,” which Grice typed “Doxographi Gricei”. In his “Doxographi,” Diels assembles a series of Grecian texts in which the views of Grecian philosophers from the archaic to the Hellenistic era are set out in a relatively schematic way. In the introduction, Diels reconstructs the history of the writing of these opinions, viz. the doxography strictly – the ‘writing’ (graphein) of the ‘opinion’ (“doxa”) – cfr. the unwritten opinions; Diels’s ‘Doxographi’ is now a standard part of the historiography of philosophy. Doxography is important both as a source of information about a philosopher, and also because a later philosopher (later than Grice, that is), ancient, medieval, and modern, should rely on it besides what Diels calls the ‘primary’ material – “what Grice actually philosophised on.” The crucial text for Diels’s reconstruction is the book Physical Opinions of the Philosophers Placita Philosophorum, traditionally ascribed to Plutarch but no longer thought to be by him. “Placita philosophorum” lists the views of various philosophers and schools under subject headings such as “What Is Nature?” and “On the Rainbow.” Out of this oeuvre and others Diels reconstructs a Collection of Opinions that he ascribes to Aetius, a philosopher mentioned by Theodoret as its author. Diels takes Aetius’s ultimate source to be Theophrastus, who wrote a more discursive Physical Opinions. Because Aetius mentions the views of Hellenistic philosophers writing after Theophrastus, Diels postulates an intermediate source, which he calls the “Vetusta Placita.” The most accessible doxographical material for Grice is in “The Life of Opinions of the Eminent Philosopher H. P. Grice,” “Vita et sententiae H. P. Griceiani quo in philosophia probatus fuit.” by H. P. Grice, après “Vitae et sententiae eorum qui in philosophia probati fuerunt,” by Diogenes Laertius, who is, however, mainly interested in gossip. Laertius arranges philosophers by schools and treats each school chronologically.

dummett – Dummett on ‘implicaturum’ in “Truth and other enigmas” – Note the animosity by Dummett against Grice’s playgroup for Grice never inviting him to a Saturday morning! “I will say this: conversational implicaturum, or as he fastidiously would prefer, the ‘implicaturum,’ was, yes, ‘invented,’ by H. P. Grice, of St. John’s, but University Lecturer, to boot, to replace an abstract semantic concept such as Frege’s ‘Sinn,’ expelled in Grice’s original Playgroup’s determination to pay attention, in the typical Oxonian manner, to nothing but what an *emisor* (never mind his emission!) ‘communicates’ in a ‘particularised’ context — so that was a good thing -- for Grice!” “Truth and other enigmas.” Cited by Grice in Way of Words -- dummett, m. a. e. – cited by H. P. Grice. philosopher of language, logic, and mathematics, noted for his sympathy for metaphysical antirealism and for his exposition of the philosophy of Frege. Dummett regards allegiance to the principle of bivalence as the hallmark of a realist attitude toward any field of discourse. This is the principle that any meaningful assertoric sentence must be determinately either true or else false, independently of anyone’s ability to ascertain its truth-value by recourse to appropriate empirical evidence or methods of proof. According to Dummett, the sentences of any learnable language cannot have verification-transcendent truth conditions and consequently we should query the intelligibility of certain statements that realists regard as meaningful. On these grounds, he calls into question realism about the past and realism in the philosophy of mathematics in several of the papers in two collections of his essays, Truth and Other Enigmas 8 and The Seas of Language 3. In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics 1, Dummett makes clear his view that the fundamental questions of metaphysics have to be approached through the philosophy of language, and more specifically through the theory of meaning. Here his philosophical debts to Frege and Vitters are manifest. Dummett has been the world’s foremost expositor and champion of Frege’s philosophy, above all in two highly influential books, Frege: Philosophy of Language 3 and Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics 1. This is despite the fact that Frege himself advocated a form of Platonism in semantics and the philosophy of mathematics that is quite at odds with Dummett’s own anti-realist inclinations. It would appear, however, from what Dummett says in Origins of Analytical Philosophy 3, that he regards Frege’s great achievement as that of having presaged the “linguistic turn” in philosophy that was to see its most valuable fruit in the later work of Vitters. Vitters’s principle that grasp of the meaning of a linguistic expression must be exhaustively manifested by the use of that expression is one that underlies Dummett’s own approach to meaning and his anti-realist leanings. In logic and the philosophy of mathematics this is shown in Dummett’s sympathy for the intuitionistic approach of Brouwer and Heyting, which involves a repudiation of the law of excluded middle, as set forth in Dummett’s own book on the subject, Elements of Intuitionism 7. 

dworkin: analysed by Grice in his exploration of legal versus moral right -- Ronald M. b.1,  jurist, political philosopher, and a central contributor to recent legal and political theory. He has served as professor of jurisprudence,  of Oxford 998, professor of law, New York  5, and Quain Professor of Jurisprudence,  , London 8. He was the first significant critic of Hart’s positivist analysis of law as based on a determinable set of social rules. Dworkin argues that the law contains legal principles as well as legal rules. Legal principles are standards phrased generally e.g., ‘No one shall profit from his own wrong’; they do not have a formal “pedigree,” but are requirements of morality. Nonetheless, courts are obliged to apply such principles, and thus have no lawmaking discretion. Judicially enforceable legal rights must derive from antecedent political rights. Dworkin characterizes rights as political “trumps”  hence his title Taking Rights Seriously 2d ed., 8, which collects the papers that defend the views sketched. Dworkin postulates an idealized judge, Hercules, who can invariably determine what rights are legally enforceable. Dworkin denies any metaphysical commitments thereby, and emphasizes instead the constructive and interpretive nature of both adjudication and legal theory. These arguments are made in papers collected in A Matter of Principle 5. Law’s Empire 6 systematizes his view. He presents there a theory of “law as integrity.” The court’s obligation is to make the community’s law the best it can be by finding decisions that best fit both institutional du Vair, Guillaume Dworkin, Ronald M. 249   249 history and moral principle. Hercules always best determines the best fit. Dworkin has also contributed to substantive political theory. He defends a form of liberalism that makes equality as prominent as liberty. His account of equality is found in a number of independent papers; see, e.g., “Foundations of Liberal Equality,” Tanner Lectures on Human Values XI 0. Dworkin has applied his liberal theory in two ways. He has continually acted as a critical watchdog of the U.S. Supreme Court, assessing decisions for their adherence to the ideals of principle, respect for equality, and achievement of best fit. Some of these essays are in the two collections mentioned; the most recent are in Freedom’s Law 6. Life’s Dominion 3 derives from these ideals an account of abortion and euthanasia. Dworkin’s philosophizing has a conceptual richness and rhetorical fire that, when not wholly under control, give his theoretical positions a protean quality at the level of detail. Nonetheless, the ideas that adjudication should be principled and enforce rights, and that we all deserve equal dignity and respect, exercise a powerful fascination. 

e: the ‘universalis abdicative.’ Cf. Grice on the Square of Opposition, or figura quadrata -- Grice, “Circling the square of Opposition.”

Ǝ: Ǝx. The existential quantifier. When Gentzen used /\ and \/ for ‘all’ and ‘some’ he is being logical, since ‘all’ and ‘some’ behave like ‘and’ and ‘or.’ This is not transparently shown at all by the use of the inverted A and the inverted E. This Grice called Grice’s Proportion: “and:or::every:some”. Grice: “Surely there is a relation of ‘every’ to ‘and’ and ‘some’ to ‘or.’” “Given a finite domain of discourse D = {a1, ... an} “every” is equivalent to an “and” propositions “Pai /\, … Pan.””“Analogously, “some (at least one”) is equivalent to an “or” proposition having the same structure as before:“Pai V, … Pan.”“For an infinite domain of discourse the equivalences are pretty similar, and I shouldn’t bother you with it for two long. But consider the statement, “1 + 1, and 2 + 2, 3 + 3, ..., and 100 + 100, and ..., etc.” This is an infinite  “and” proposition.  From the point of view of a system like System G, this may seem a  problem. Syntax rules are expected to generate finite formulae. But my example above is fortunate in that there is a procedure to generate every conjunct. Now, as Austin once suggested to me, having translated Frege, an assertion were to be made about every *irrational* number, it would seem that is no (Fregeian) way to enumerate every conjunct, since irrational numbers cannot be enumerated. However, a succinct equivalent formulation which avoids this problem with the ‘irrational’ number uses “every” quantification. For each natural number n, n · 2 = n + n.  An analogous analysis applies to the “or” proposition: “1 is equal to 5 + 5,  2\/  is equal to 5 + 5, \/ 3 is equal to 5 + 5, ... , \/ 100 is equal to 5 + 5, or ..., etc.” This is easily rephrasable using “some (at least one)” quantification:  “For SOME natural number n, n is equal to 5+5. Aristotelian predicate calculus rescued from undue existential import As ... universal quantifier and conjunction and, on the other, between the existential quantifier and disjunction. This analogy has not passed unnoticed in logical circles. ... existential quantifiers correspond to the conjunction and disjunction operators, ...analogous analysis applies to propositional logic. ... symbol 'V' for the existential quantifier in the 'Californian' notation’ (so-called by H. P. Grice when briefly visiting Berkeley) which was ... In Grice’s system G, the quantifiers are symbolized with larger versions of the symbols used for conjunction and disjunction. Although quantified expressions cannot be translated into expressions without quantifiers, there is a conceptual connection between the universal quantifier and conjunction and between the existential quantifier and disjunction. Consider the sentence ∃xPxxPx, for example. It means that either the first member of the UD is a PP, or the second one is, or the third one is, . . . . Such a system uses the symbol ‘⋁’ instead of ‘∃.’ Grice’s manoeuver to think of the quantifier versions of De Morgan's laws is an interesting one. The statement ∀xP(x)∀xP(x) is very much like a big conjunction. If the universe of discourse is the positive integers, for example, then it is equivalent to the statement that “P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯” or, more concisely, we might write “⋀x∈UP(x),⋀x∈UP(x),” using notation similar to "sigma notation'' for sums. Of course, this is not really a "statement'' in our official mathematical logic, because we don't allow infinitely long formulas. In the same way, ∃xP(x)∃xP(x) can be thought of as “⋁x∈UP(x).⋁x∈UP(x). Now the first quantifier law can be written “¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),” which looks very much like the law “¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),” but with an infinite conjunction and disjunction. Note that we can also rewrite De Morgan's laws for ∧∧ and ∨∨ as “¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).” As Grice says, “this may look initially cumbersome, but it reflects the close relationship with the quantifier forms of De Morgan's laws.” Cited by Grice as translatable by “some (at least one)”. Noting the divergence that Strawson identified but fails to identify as a conversational implicaturum. It relates in the case of the square of opposition to the ‘particularis’ but taking into account or NOT taking into account the ‘unnecessary implication,’ as Russell calls it. “Take ‘every man is mortal.’ Surely we don’t need the unnecessary implication that there is a man!”

eco: u. – Econ provides a bridge between Graeco-Roman philosophy and Grice! Eco is one of the few philosophers who considers the very origins of philosophy in Bologna – and straight from Rome – On top, Eco is one of the first to generalise most of Grice’s topics under ‘communication,’ rather than using the Anglo-Saxon ‘mean’ that does not really belong in the Graeco-Roman tradition. Eco cites H. P. Grice in “Cognitive constraints of communication.” Umberto b.2,  philosopher, intellectual historian, and novelist. A leading figure in the field of semiotics, the general theory of signs. Eco has devoted most of his vast production to the notion of interpretation and its role in communication. In the 0s, building on the idea that an active process of interpretation is required to take any sign as a sign, he pioneered reader-oriented criticism The Open Work, 2, 6; The Role of the Reader, 9 and championed a holistic view of meaning, holding that all of the interpreter’s beliefs, i.e., his encyclopedia, are potentially relevant to word meaning. In the 0s, equally influenced by Peirce and the  structuralists, he offered a unified theory of signs A Theory of Semiotics, 6, aiming at grounding the study of communication in general. He opposed the idea of communication as a natural process, steering a middle way between realism and idealism, particularly of the Sapir-Whorf variety. The issue of realism looms large also in his recent work. In The Limits of Interpretation 0 and Interpretation and Overinterpretation 2, he attacks deconstructionism. Kant and the Platypus 7 defends a “contractarian” form of realism, holding that the reader’s interpretation, driven by the Peircean regulative idea of objectivity and collaborating with the speaker’s underdetermined intentions, is needed to fix reference. In his historical essays, ranging from medieval aesthetics The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, 6 to the attempts at constructing artificial and “perfect” languages The Search for the Perfect Language, 3 to medieval semiotics, he traces the origins of some central notions in contemporary philosophy of language e.g., meaning, symbol, denotation and such recent concerns as the language of mind and translation, to larger issues in the history of philosophy. All his novels are pervaded by philosophical queries, such as Is the world an ordered whole? The Name of the Rose, 0, and How much interpretation can one tolerate without falling prey to some conspiracy syndrome? Foucault’s Pendulum, 8. Everywhere, he engages the reader in the game of controlled interpretations. 

oeconomia: Cf. Grice on the principle of oeconomia of rational effort. The Greeks used ‘oeconomia’ to mean thrifty. Cf. effort. There were three branches of philosophia practica: philosophia moralis, oeconomia and politica.  Grice would often refer to ‘no undue effort,’ ‘no unnecessary trouble,’ to go into the effort, ‘not worth the energy,’ and so on. These utilitarian criteria suggest he is more of a futilitarian than the avowed Kantian he says he is. This Grice also refers to as ‘maximum,’ ‘maximal,’ optimal. It is part of his principle of economy of rational effort. Grice leaves it open as how to formulate this. Notably in “Causal,” he allows that ‘The pillar box seems red” and “The pillar box is red” are difficult to formalise in terms in which we legitimize the claim or intuition that ‘The pillar box IS red” is ‘stronger’ than ‘The pillar box seems red.’ If this were so, it would provide a rational justification for going into the effort of uttering something STRONGER (and thus less economical, and more effortful) under the circumstances. As in “My wife is in the kitchen or in the bedroom, and the house has only two rooms (and no passages, etc.)” the reason why the conversational implicaturum is standardly carried is to be found in the operation of some such general principle as that giving preference to the making of a STRONGER rather than a weaker statement in the absence of a reason for not so doing. The implicaturum therefore is not of a part of the meaning of the expression “seems.” There is however A VERY IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE between the case of a ‘phenomenalist’ statement (Bar-Hillel it does not count as a statement) and that of disjunctives, such as “My wife is in the kitchen or ind the bedroom, and the house has only two rooms (and no passages, etc.).” A disjunctive is weaker than either of its disjuncts in a straightforward LOGICAL fashion, viz., a disjunctive is entailed (alla Moore) by, but does not entail, each of its disjuncts. The statement “The pillar box is red” is NOT STRONGER than the statement, if a statement it is, “The pillar box seems red,” in this way. Neither statement entails the other. Grice thinks that he has, neverthcless a strong inclination to regard the first of these statements as STRONGER than the second. But Grice leaves it open the ‘determination’ of in what fashion this might obtain. He suggests that there may be a way to provide a reductive analysis of ‘strength’ THAT YIELDS that “The pillar box is red” is a stronger conversational contribution than “The pillar box seems red.” Recourse to ‘informativeness’ may not do, since Grice is willing to generalise over the acceptum to cover informative and non-informative cases. While there is an element of ‘exhibition’ in his account of the communicatum, he might not be happy with the idea that it is the utterer’s INTENTION to INFORM his addressee that he, the utterer, INTENDS that his addressee will believe that he, the utterer, believes that it is raining. “Inform” seems to apply only to the content of the propositional complexum, and not to the attending ‘animata.’

eddington: “Some like Einstein, but Eddington’s MY man.” – H. P. Grice. Einstein – discussed by Grice in “Eddington’s Two Tables” -- Albert 18795, G.-born  physicist, founder of the special and general theories of relativity and a fundamental contributor to several branches of physics and to the philosophical analysis and critique of modern physics, notably of relativity and the quantum theory. Einstein was awarded the Nobel Prize for physics in 2, “especially for his discovery of the law of the photoelectric effect.” Born in Ulm in the G. state of Württemberg, Einstein studied physics at the Polytechnic in Zürich, Switzerland. He was called to Berlin as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics 4 at the peak of the G. ultranationalism that surrounded World War I. His reaction was to circulate an internationalist “Manifesto to Europeans” and to pursue Zionist and pacifist programs. Following the dramatic confirmation of the general theory of relativity 9 Einstein became an international celebrity. This fame also made him the frequent target of G. anti-Semites, who, during one notable episode, described the theory of relativity as “a Jewish fraud.” In 3 Einstein left G.y for the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Although his life was always centered on science, he was also engaged in the politics and culture of his times. He carried on an extensive correspondence whose publication will run to over forty volumes with both famous and ordinary people, including significant philosophical correspondence with Cassirer, Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, and others. Despite reservations over logical positivism, he was something of a patron of the movement, helping to secure academic positions for several of its leading figures. In 9 Einstein signed a letter drafted by the nuclear physicist Leo Szilard informing President Roosevelt about the prospects for harnessing atomic energy and warning of the G. efforts to make a bomb. Einstein did not further participate in the development of atomic weapons, and later was influential in the movement against them. In 2 he was offered, and declined, the presidency of Israel. He died still working on a unified field theory, and just as the founders of the Pugwash movement for nuclear disarmament adopted a manifesto he had cosigned with Russell. Einstein’s philosophical thinking was influenced by early exposure to Kant and later study of Hume and Mach, whose impact shows in the operationalism used to treat time in his famous 5 paper on special relativity. That work also displays a passion for unity in science characteristic of nearly all his physical thinking, and that may relate to the monism of Spinoza, a philosopher whom he read and reread. Einstein’s own understanding of relativity stressed the invariance of the space-time interval and promoted realism with regard to the structure of spacetime. Realism also shows up in Einstein’s work on Brownian motion 5, which was explicitly motivated by his long-standing interest in demonstrating the reality of molecules and atoms, and in the realist treatment of light quanta in his analysis 5 of the photoelectric effect. While he pioneered the development of statistical physics, especially in his seminal investigations of quantum phenomena 525, he never broke with his belief in determinism as the only truly fundamental approach to physical processes. Here again one sees an affinity with Spinoza. Realism and determinism brought Einstein into conflict with the new quantum theory 526, whose observer dependence and “flight into statistics” convinced him that it could not constitute genuinely fundamental physics. Although influential in its development, he became the theory’s foremost critic, never contributing to its refinement but turning instead to the program of unifying the electromagnetic and gravitational fields into one grand, deterministic synthesis that would somehow make room for quantum effects as limiting or singular cases. It is generally agreed that his unified field program was not successful, although his vision continues to inspire other unification programs, and his critical assessments of quantum mechanics still challenge the instrumentalism associated with the theory. Einstein’s philosophical reflections constitute an important chapter in twentieth-century thought. He understood realism as less a metaphysical doctrine than a motivational program, and he argued that determinism was a feature of theories rather than an aspect of the world Einstein, Albert Einstein, Albert 256   256 directly. Along with the unity of science, other central themes in his thinking include his rejection of inductivism and his espousal of holism and constructivism or conventionalism, emphasizing that meanings, concepts, and theories are free creations, not logically derivable from experience but subject rather to overall criteria of comprehensibility, empirical adequacy, and logical simplicity. Holism is also apparent in his acute analysis of the testability of geometry and his rejection of Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism. 

eductum: eduction, the process of initial clarification, as of a phenomenon, text, or argument, that normally takes place prior to logical analysis. Out of the flux of vague and confused experiences certain characteristics are drawn into some kind of order or intelligibility in order that attention can be focused on them Aristotle, Physics I. These characteristics often are latent, hidden, or implicit. The notion often is used with reference to texts as well as experience. Thus it becomes closely related to exegesis and hermeneutics, tending to be reserved for the sorts of clarification that precede formal or logical analyses. 

effectum: causa efficiencis -- effective procedure for the generation of a conversational implicaturum --, a step-by-step recipe for computing the values of a function. It determines what is to be done at each step, without requiring any ingenuity of anyone or any machine executing it. The input and output of the procedure consist of items that can be processed mechanically. Idealizing a little, inputs and outputs are often taken to be strings on a finite alphabet. It is customary to extend the notion to procedures for manipulating natural numbers, via a canonical notation. Each number is associated with a string, its numeral. Typical examples of effective procedures are the standard grade school procedures for addition, multiplication, etc. One can execute the procedures without knowing anything about the natural numbers. The term ‘mechanical procedure’ or ‘algorithm’ is sometimes also used. A function f is computable if there is an effective procedure A that computes f. For every m in the domain of f, if A were given m as input, it would produce fm as output. Turing machines are mathematical models of effective procedures. Church’s thesis, or Turing’s thesis, is that a function is computable provided there is a Turing machine that computes it. In other words, for every effective procedure, there is a Turing machine that computes the same function. 

egcrateia: or temperantia. This is a universal. Strictly, it’s the agent who has the power – Or part of his soul – the rational soul has the power – hence Grice’s metaphor of the ‘power structure of the soul.’ Grice is interested in the linguistic side to it. What’s the use of “Don’t p!” if ‘p’ is out of the emissee’s rational control? Cf. Pears on egcreateia as ‘irrationality,’ if motivated. Cfr mesotes. the geniality of Grice was to explore theoretical akrasia. Grice’s genius shows in seeing egcrateia and lack thereof as marks of virtue. “C hasn’t been to prison yet” He is potentially dishonest. But you cannot be HONEST if you are NOT potentially DISHONEST. Of course, it does not paint a good picture of the philosopher why he should be obsessed with ‘akrasia,’ when Aristotle actually opposed the notion to that of ‘enkrateia,’ or ‘continence.’ Surely a philosopher needs to provide a reductive analysis of ‘continence,’ first; and the reductive analysis of ‘incontinence’ will follow. Aristotle, as Grice well knew, is being a Platonist here, so by ‘continence,’ he meant a power structure of the soul, with the ‘rational’ soul containing the pre-rational or non-rational soul (animal soul, and vegetal soul). And right he was, too! So, Grice's twist is Έγκράτεια, sic in capitals! Liddell and Scott has it as ‘ἐγκράτεια’ [ρα^], which they render as “mastery over,” as used by Plato in The Republic: “ἐ. ἑαυτοῦ,” meaning ‘self-control’ (Pl. R.390b; ἐ. ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν control over them, ib.430e, cf. X.Mem.2.1.1, Isoc.1.21; “περί τι” Arist.EN1149a21, al. Liddell and Scott go on to give a reference to Grice’s beloved “Eth. Nich.” (1145b8) II. abs., self-control, X. Mem.1.5.1, Isoc.3.44, Arist. EN. 1145b8, al., LXX Si.18.30, Act.Ap. 24.25, etc. Richards, an emotivist, as well as Collingwood (in “Language”) had made a stereotype of the physicist drawing a formula on the blackboard. “Full of emotion.” So the idea that there is an UN-emotional life is a fallacy. Emotion pervades the rational life, as does akrasia. Grice was particularly irritated by the fact that Davidson, who lacked a background in the humanities and the classics, could think of akrasia as “impossible”! Grice was never too interested in emotion (or feeling) because while we do say I feel that the cat is hungry, we also say, Im feeling byzantine. The concept of emotion needs a philosophical elucidation. Grice was curious about a linguistic botany for that! Akrasia for Grice covers both buletic-boulomaic and doxastic versions. The buletic-boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an emotion. Grice quotes from Kennys essay on emotion. But Grice is looking for more of a linguistic botany. As it happens, Kennys essay has Griceian implicatura. One problem Grice finds with emotion is that feel that  sometimes behaves like thinks that  Another is that there is no good Grecian word for emotio.  Kenny, of St. Benets, completed his essay on emotion under Quinton (who would occasionally give seminars with Grice), and examined by two members of Grices Play Group: Pears and Gardiner. Kenny connects an emotion to a feeling, which brings us to Grice on feeling boringly byzantine! Grice proposes a derivation of akrasia in conditional steps for both buletic-boulomaic and doxastic akrasia.  Liddell and Scott have “ἐπιθυμία,” which they render as desire, yearning, “ἐ. ἐκτελέσαι” Hdt.1.32; ἐπιθυμίᾳ by passion, oπρονοίᾳ, generally, appetite, αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐ. esp. sexual desire, lust, αἱ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας ἐ.; longing after a thing, desire of or for it, ὕδατος, τοῦ πιεῖν;” “τοῦ πλέονος;” “τῆς τιμωρίας;” “τῆς μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν πολιτείας;’ “τῆς παρθενίας;’ “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς ἐλθεῖν;’ ἐν ἐ. “τινὸς εἶναι;’ “γεγονέναι;” “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς “ἀφικέσθαι θεάσασθαι;” “ἐ. τινὸς ἐμβαλεῖν τινί;” “ἐ. ἐμποιεῖν ἔς τινα an inclination towards;” =ἐπιθύμημα, object of desire, ἐπιθυμίας τυχεῖν;” “ἀνδρὸς ἐ., of woman, “πενήτων ἐ., of sleep. There must be more to emotion, such as philia, than epithumia! cf. Grice on Aristotle on philos. What is an emotion? Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1; Konstan “Pathos and Passion” R. Roberts, “Emotion”; W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Aristotle, Rhet. II.2-12; De An., Eth.N., and Top.; Emotions in Plato and Aristotle; Philosophy of Emotion; Aristotle and the Emotions, De An. II.12 and III 1-3; De Mem. 1; Rhet. II.5; Scheiter, “Images, Imagination, and Appearances, V. Caston, Why Aristotle Needs Imagination” M. Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion, J. Cooper, “An Aristotelian Theory of Emotion, G. Striker, Emotions in Context: Aristotles Treatment of the Passions in the Rhetoric and his Moral Psychology." Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric (J. Dow, Aristotles Theory of the Emotions, Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle PLATO. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.10-11; Plato Philebus 31b-50e and Republic IV, D. Frede, Mixed feelings in Aristotles Rhetoric." Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric, J. Moss, “Pictures and Passions in Plato”; Protagoras 352b-c, Phaedo 83b-84a, Timaeus 69c STOICS The Hellenistic philosophers; “The Old Stoic Theory of Emotion” The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, eEmotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Sorabji, Chrysippus Posidonius Seneca: A High-Level Debate on Emotion. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics M. Graver, Preface and Introduction to Cicero on Emotion: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 M. Graver, Stoicism and emotion. Tusculan Disputations 3 Recommended: Graver, Margaret. "Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι." Phronesis. Tusculan Disputations; "The Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul; The Stoic life: Emotions, duties, and fate”; Emotion and decision in stoic psychology, The stoics, individual emotions: anger, friendly feeling, and hatred.  Aristotle Rhetoric II.2-3; Nicomachean Ethics IV.5; Topics 2.7 and 4.5; Konstan, Anger, Pearson, Aristotle on Desire; Scheiter, Review of Pearsons Aristotle on Desire; S. Leighton, Aristotles Account of Anger: Narcissism and Illusions of Self‐Sufficiency: The Complex Evaluative World of Aristotles Angry Man,” Valuing emotions. Aristotle Rhetoric II. 4; Konstan, “Hatred”  Konstan "Aristotle on Anger and the Emotions: the Strategies of Status." Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, C. Rapp, The emotional dimension of friendship: notes on Aristotles account of philia in Rhetoric II 4” Grice endeavours to give an answer to the question whether and to what extent philia (friendship), as it is treated by Aristotle in Rhet. II.4, can be considered a genuine emotion as, for example, fear and anger are. Three anomalies are identified in the definition and the account of philia (and of the associated verb philein), which suggest a negative response to the question. However, these anomalies are analysed and explained in terms of the specific notes of philia in order to show that Rhetoric II4 does allow for a consideration of friendship as a genuine emotion. Seneca, On Anger (De Ira) Seneca, On Anger Seneca, On Anger (62-96); K. Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice, and Future Revenge in Senecas De Ira” FEAR Aristotle, Rhet. II.5; Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9  Aristotles Courageous Passions, Platos Laws; “Pleasure, Pain, and Anticipation in Platos Laws, Book I” Konstan, “Fear”  PITY Aristotle, Rhetoric II. 8-9; Poetics, chs. 6, 9-19 ; Konstan, “Pity”  E. Belfiore, Tragic pleasures: Aristotle on plot and emotion, Konstan, Aristotle on the Tragic Emotions, The Soul of Tragedy: Essays on Athenian Drama  SHAME Aristotle, Rhet. II.6; Nicomachean Ethics IV.9 Konstan, Shame J. Moss, Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul, B. Williams, Shame and Necessity. Aristotle investigates two character traits, continence and incontinence, that are not as blameworthy as the vices but not as praiseworthy as the virtues. The Grecian expressions are’enkrateia,’ continence, literally mastery, and krasia (“incontinence”; literally, lack of mastery. An akratic person goes against reason as a result of some pathos (emotion, feeling”). Like the akratic, an enkratic person experiences a feeling that is contrary to reason; but unlike the akratic, he acts in accordance with reason. His defect consists solely in the fact that, more than most people, he experiences passions that conflict with his rational choice. The akratic person has not only this defect, but has the further flaw that he gives in to feeling rather than reason more often than the average person.  Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia: “propeteia,” or impetuosity and “astheneia, or weakness. The person who is weak goes through a process of deliberation and makes a choice; but rather than act in accordance with his reasoned choice, he acts under the influence of a passion. By contrast, the impetuous person does not go through a process of deliberation and does not make a reasoned choice; he simply acts under the influence of a passion. At the time of action, the impetuous person experiences no internal conflict. But once his act has been completed, he regrets what he has done. One could say that he deliberates, if deliberation were something that post-dated rather than preceded action; but the thought process he goes through after he acts comes too late to save him from error.  It is important to bear in mind that when Aristotle talks about impetuosity and weakness, he is discussing chronic conditions. The impetuous person is someone who acts emotionally and fails to deliberate not just once or twice but with some frequency; he makes this error more than most people do. Because of this pattern in his actions, we would be justified in saying of the impetuous person that had his passions not prevented him from doing so, he would have deliberated and chosen an action different from the one he did perform.  The two kinds of passions that Aristotle focuses on, in his treatment of akrasia, are the appetite for pleasure and anger. Either can lead to impetuosity and weakness. But Aristotle gives pride of place to the appetite for pleasure as the passion that undermines reason. He calls the kind of akrasia caused by an appetite for pleasure (hedone) “unqualified akrasia”—or, as we might say, akrasia simpliciter, “full stop.’ Akrasia caused by anger he considers a qualified form of akrasia and calls it akrasia ‘with respect to anger.’ We thus have these four forms of akrasia: impetuosity caused by pleasure, impetuosity caused by anger, weakness caused by pleasure, weakness caused by anger. It should be noticed that Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia is heavily influenced by Plato’s tripartite division of the soul. Plato holds that either the spirited part (which houses anger, as well as other emotions) or the appetitive part (which houses the desire for physical pleasures) can disrupt the dictates of reason and result in action contrary to reason. The same threefold division of the soul can be seen in Aristotles approach to this topic. Although Aristotle characterizes akrasia and enkrateia in terms of a conflict between reason and feeling, his detailed analysis of these states of mind shows that what takes place is best described in a more complicated way. For the feeling that undermines reason contains some thought, which may be implicitly general. As Aristotle says, anger “reasoning as it were that one must fight against such a thing, is immediately provoked. And although in the next sentence he denies that our appetite for pleasure works in this way, he earlier had said that there can be a syllogism that favors pursuing enjoyment: “Everything sweet is pleasant, and this is sweet” leads to the pursuit of a particular pleasure. Perhaps what he has in mind is that pleasure can operate in either way: it can prompt action unmediated by a general premise, or it can prompt us to act on such a syllogism. By contrast, anger always moves us by presenting itself as a bit of general, although hasty, reasoning.  But of course Aristotle does not mean that a conflicted person has more than one faculty of reason. Rather his idea seems to be that in addition to our full-fledged reasoning capacity, we also have psychological mechanisms that are capable of a limited range of reasoning. When feeling conflicts with reason, what occurs is better described as a fight between feeling-allied-with-limited-reasoning and full-fledged reason. Part of us—reason—can remove itself from the distorting influence of feeling and consider all relevant factors, positive and negative. But another part of us—feeling or emotion—has a more limited field of reasoning—and sometimes it does not even make use of it.  Although “passion” is sometimes used as a translation of Aristotles word pathos (other alternatives are emotion” and feeling), it is important to bear in mind that his term does not necessarily designate a strong psychological force. Anger is a pathos whether it is weak or strong; so too is the appetite for bodily pleasures. And he clearly indicates that it is possible for an akratic person to be defeated by a weak pathos—the kind that most people would easily be able to control. So the general explanation for the occurrence of akrasia cannot be that the strength of a passion overwhelms reason. Aristotle should therefore be acquitted of an accusation made against him by Austin in a well-known footnote to ‘A Plea For Excuses.’ Plato and Aristotle, Austin says, collapsed all succumbing to temptation into losing control of ourselves — a mistake illustrated by this example. I am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is served divided into segments corresponding one to one with the persons at High Table. I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing to temptation and even conceivably (but why necessarily?) going against my principles. But do I lose control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious to the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse. With this, Aristotle can agree. The pathos for the bombe can be a weak one, and in some people that will be enough to get them to act in a way that is disapproved by their reason at the very time of action.  What is most remarkable about Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia is that he defends a position close to that of Socrates. When he first introduces the topic of akrasia, and surveys some of the problems involved in understanding this phenomenon, he says that Socrates held that there is no akrasia, and he describes this as a thesis that clearly conflicts with the appearances (phainomena). Since he says that his goal is to preserve as many of the appearances as possible, it may come as a surprise that when he analyzes the conflict between reason and feeling, he arrives at the conclusion that in a way Socrates was right after all. For, he says, the person who acts against reason does not have what is thought to be unqualified knowledge; in a way he has knowledge, but in a way does not.  Aristotle explains what he has in mind by comparing akrasia to the condition of other people who might be described as knowing in a way, but not in an unqualified way. His examples are people who are asleep, mad, or drunk; he also compares the akratic to a student who has just begun to learn a Subjects, or an actor on the stage. All of these people, he says, can utter the very words used by those who have knowledge; but their talk does not prove that they really have knowledge, strictly speaking.  These analogies can be taken to mean that the form of akrasia that Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity always results from some diminution of cognitive or intellectual acuity at the moment of action. The akratic says, at the time of action, that he ought not to indulge in this particular pleasure at this time. But does he know or even believe that he should refrain? Aristotle might be taken to reply: yes and no. He has some degree of recognition that he must not do this now, but not full recognition. His feeling, even if it is weak, has to some degree prevented him from completely grasping or affirming the point that he should not do this. And so in a way Socrates was right. When reason remains unimpaired and unclouded, its dictates will carry us all the way to action, so long as we are able to act.  But Aristotles agreement with Socrates is only partial, because he insists on the power of the emotions to rival, weaken or bypass reason. Emotion challenges reason in all three of these ways. In both the akratic and the enkratic, it competes with reason for control over action; even when reason wins, it faces the difficult task of having to struggle with an internal rival. Second, in the akratic, it temporarily robs reason of its full acuity, thus handicapping it as a competitor. It is not merely a rival force, in these cases; it is a force that keeps reason from fully exercising its power. And third, passion can make someone impetuous; here its victory over reason is so powerful that the latter does not even enter into the arena of conscious reflection until it is too late to influence action. That, at any rate, is one way of interpreting Aristotle’s statements. But it must be admitted that his remarks are obscure and leave room for alternative readings. It is possible that when he denies that the akratic has knowledge in the strict sense, he is simply insisting on the point that no one should be classified as having practical knowledge unless he actually acts in accordance with it. A practical knower is not someone who merely has knowledge of general premises; he must also have knowledge of particulars, and he must actually draw the conclusion of the syllogism. Perhaps drawing such a conclusion consists in nothing less than performing the action called for by the major and minor premises. Since this is something the akratic does not do, he lacks knowledge; his ignorance is constituted by his error in action. On this reading, there is no basis for attributing to Aristotle the thesis that the kind of akrasia he calls weakness is caused by a diminution of intellectual acuity. His explanation of akrasia is simply that pathos is sometimes a stronger motivational force than full-fledged reason.  This is a difficult reading to defend, however, for Aristotle says that after someone experiences a bout of akrasia his ignorance is dissolved and he becomes a knower again. In context, that appears to be a remark about the form of akrasia Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity. If so, he is saying that when an akratic person is Subjects to two conflicting influences—full-fledged reason versus the minimal rationality of emotion—his state of knowledge is somehow temporarily undone but is later restored. Here, knowledge cannot be constituted by the performance of an act, because that is not the sort of thing that can be restored at a later time. What can be restored is ones full recognition or affirmation of the fact that this act has a certain undesirable feature, or that it should not be performed. Aristotle’s analysis seems to be that both forms of akrasia — weakness and impetuosity —share a common structure: in each case, ones full affirmation or grasp of what one should do comes too late. The difference is that in the case of weakness but not impetuosity, the akratic act is preceded by a full-fledged rational cognition of what one should do right now. That recognition is briefly and temporarily diminished by the onset of a less than fully rational affect.  There is one other way in which Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia is close to the Socratic thesis that what people call akrasia is really ignorance. Aristotle holds that if one is in the special mental condition that he calls practical wisdom, then one cannot be, nor will one ever become, an akratic person. For practical wisdom is present only in those who also possess the ethical virtues, and these qualities require complete emotional mastery. Anger and appetite are fully in harmony with reason, if one is practically wise, and so this intellectual virtue is incompatible with the sort of inner conflict experienced by the akratic person. Furthermore, one is called practically wise not merely on the basis of what one believes or knows, but also on the basis of what one does. Therefore, the sort of knowledge that is lost and regained during a bout of akrasia cannot be called practical wisdom. It is knowledge only in a loose sense. The low-level grasp of the ordinary person of what to do is precisely the sort of thing that can lose its acuity and motivating power, because it was never much of an intellectual accomplishment to begin with. That is what Aristotle is getting at when he compares it with the utterances of actors, students, sleepers, drunks, and madmen. Grice had witnessed how Hare had suffere to try and deal with how to combine the geniality that “The language of morals” is with his account of akrasia. Most Oxonians were unhappy with Hares account of akrasia. Its like, in deontic logic, you cannot actually deal with akrasia. You need buletics. You need the desiderative, so that you can oppose what is desired with the duty, even if both concepts are related. “Akrasia” has a nice Grecian touch about it, and Grice and Hare, as Lit. Hum., rejoiced in being able to explore what Aristotle had to say about it. They wouldnt go far beyond Aristotle. Plato and Aristotle were the only Greek philosophers studied for the Lit. Hum. To venture with the pre-socratics or the hellenistics (even if Aristotle is one) was not classy enough! Like Pears in Motivated irrationality, Grice allows that benevolentia may be deemed beneficentia. If Smith has the good will to give Jones a job, he may be deemed to have given Jones the job, even if Jones never get it. In buletic akrasia we must consider the conclusion to be desiring what is not best for the agents own good, never mind if he refrains from doing what is not best for his own good. Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor. We shouldnt be saying this, but we are saying it! Grice prefers akrasia, but he is happy to use the translation by Cicero, also negative, of this: incontinentia, as if continentia were a virtue! For Grice, the alleged paradox of akrasia, both alethic and practical, has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start, and not be deemed a stumbling block. Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden buletic-boulomaic version of akrasia, involving the volitive soul ‒ in term of desirability  ‒ and doxastic akrasia, involing the judicative soul proper  ‒ in terms of probability. Grice considers buletic akrasia and doxastic akrasia ‒ the latter yet distinct from Moores paradox, p but I dont want to believe that p, in symbols p and ~ψb-dp. Akarsia, see egcrateia. egcrateia: also spelled acrasia, or akrasia, Grecian term for weakness of will. Akrasia is a character flaw, also called incontinence, exhibited primarily in intentional behavior that conflicts with the agent’s own values or principles. Its contrary is enkrateia strength of will, continence, self-control. Both akrasia and enkrateia, Aristotle says, “are concerned with what is in excess of the state characteristic of most people; for the continent abide by their resolutions more, and the incontinent less, than most people can” Nicomachean Ethics 1152a2527. These resolutions may be viewed as judgments that it would be best to perform an action of a certain sort, or better to do one thing than another. Enkrateia, on that view, is the power kratos to act as one judges best in the face of competing motivation. Akrasia is a want or deficiency of such power. Aristotle himself limited the sphere of both states more strictly than is now done, regarding both as concerned specifically with “pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions arising through touch and taste” [1150a910]. Philosophers are generally more interested in incontinent and continent actions than in the corresponding states of character. Various species of incontinent or akratic behavior may be distinguished, including incontinent reasoning and akratic belief formation. The species of akratic behavior that has attracted most attention is uncompelled, intentional action that conflicts with a better or best judgment consciously held by the agent at the time of action. If, e.g., while judging it best not to eat a second piece of pie, you intentionally eat another piece, you act incontinently  provided that your so acting is uncompelled e.g., your desire for the pie is not irresistible. Socrates denied that such action is possible, thereby creating one of the Socratic paradoxes. In “unorthodox” instances of akratic action, a deed manifests weakness of will even though it accords with the agent’s better judgment. A boy who decides, against his better judgment, to participate in a certain dangerous prank, might  owing to an avoidable failure of nerve  fail to execute his decision. In such a case, some would claim, his failure to act on his decision manifests weakness of will or akrasia. If, instead, he masters his fear, his participating in the prank might manifest strength of will, even though his so acting conflicts with his better judgment. The occurrence of akratic actions seems to be a fact of life. Unlike many such apparent facts, this one has received considerable philosophical scrutiny for nearly two and a half millennia. A major source of the interest is clear: akratic action raises difficult questions about the connection between thought and action, a connection of paramount importance for most philosophical theories of the explanation of intentional behavior. Insofar as moral theory does not float free of evidence about the etiology of human behavior, the tough questions arise there as well. Ostensible akratic action, then, occupies a philosophical space in the intersection of the philosophy of mind and moral theory.  Refs.: The main references here are in three folders in two different series. H. P. Grice, “Akrasia,” The H. P. Grice Papers, S. II, c. 2-ff. 22-23 and S. V, c. 6-f. 32, BANC.

Grice’s ego: “I follow Buber in distinguishing ‘ego’ from ‘tu.’ With conversation, there’s the ‘we,’ too.”  “If you were the only girl in the world, there would not be a need for the personal pronoun ‘ego’” – Grice to his wife, on the day of their engagement. “I went to Oxford. You went to Cambridge. He went to the London School of Economics.” egocentric particular, a word whose denotation is determined by identity of the speaker and/or the time, place, and audience of his utterance. Examples are generally thought to include ‘I,’ ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘now’, ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’. The term ‘egocentric particular’ was introduced by Russell in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth 0. In an earlier work, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” Monist, 819, Russell called such words “emphatic particulars.” Some important questions arise regarding egocentric particulars. Are some egocentric particulars more basic than others so that the rest can be correctly defined in terms of them but they cannot be correctly defined in terms of the rest? Russell thought all egocentric particulars can be defined by ‘this’; ‘I’, for example, has the same meaning as ‘the biography to which this belongs’, where ‘this’ denotes a sense-datum experienced by the speaker. Yet, at the same time, ‘this’ can be defined by the combination ‘what I-now notice’. Must we use at least some egocentric particulars to give a complete description of the world? Our ability to describe the world from a speaker-neutral perspective, so that the denotations of the terms in our description are independent of when, where, and by whom they are used, depends on our ability to describe the world without using egocentric particulars. Russell held that egocentric particulars are not needed in any part of the description of the world.  -- egocentric predicament, each person’s apparently problematic position as an experiencing subject, assuming that all our experiences are private in that no one else can have them. Two problems concern our ability to gain empirical knowledge. First, it is hard to see how we gain empirical knowledge of what others experience, if all experience is private. We cannot have their experience to see what it is like, for any experience we have is our experience and so not theirs. Second, it is hard to see how we gain empirical knowledge of how the external world is, independently of our experience. All our empirically justified beliefs seem to rest ultimately on what is given in experience, and if the empirically given is private, it seems it can only support justified beliefs about the world as we experience it. A third major problem concerns our ability to communicate with others. It is hard to see how we describe the world in a language others understand. We give meaning to some of our words by defining them by other words that already have meaning, and this process of definition appears to end with words we define ostensively; i.e., we use them to name something given in experience. If experiences are private, no one else can grasp the meaning of our ostensively defined words or any words we use them to define. No one else can understand our attempts to describe the world.  Egoism: cf. H. P. Grice, “The principle of conversational self-love and the principle of conversational benevolence,” any view that, in a certain way, makes the self central. There are several different versions of egoism, all of which have to do with how actions relate to the self. Ethical egoism is the view that people ought to do what is in their own selfinterest. Psychological egoism is a view about people’s motives, inclinations, or dispositions. One statement of psychological egoism says that, as a matter of fact, people always do what they believe is in their self-interest and, human nature being what it is, they cannot do otherwise. Another says that people never desire anything for its own sake except what they believe is in their own self-interest. Altruism is the opposite of egoism. Any ethical view that implies that people sometimes ought to do what is in the interest of others and not in their self-interest can be considered a form of ethical altruism. The view that, human nature being what it is, people can do what they do not believe to be in their self-interest might be called psychological altruism. Different species of ethical and psychological egoism result from different interpretations of self-interest and of acting from self-interest, respectively. Some people have a broad conception of acting from self-interest such that people acting from a desire to help others can be said to be acting out of self-interest, provided they think doing so will not, on balance, take away from their own good. Others have a narrower conception of acting from selfinterest such that one acts from self-interest only if one acts from the desire to further one’s own happiness or good. Butler identified self-love with the desire to further one’s own happiness or good and self-interested action with action performed from that desire alone. Since we obviously have other particular desires, such as the desires for honor, for power, for revenge, and to promote the good of others, he concluded that psychological egoism was false. People with a broader conception of acting from self-interest would ask whether anyone with those particular desires would act on them if they believed that, on balance, acting on them would result in a loss of happiness or good for themselves. If some would, then psychological egoism is false, but if, given human nature as it is, no one would, it is true even if self-love is not the only source of motivation in human beings. Just as there are broader and narrower conceptions of acting from self-interest, there are broader and narrower conceptions of self-interest itself, as well as subjective and objective conceptions of self-interest. Subjective conceptions relate a person’s self-interest solely to the satisfaction of his desires or to what that person believes will make his life go best for him. Objective conceptions see self-interest, at least in part, as independent of the person’s desires and beliefs. Some conceptions of self-interest are narrower than others, allowing that the satisfaction of only certain desires is in a person’s self-interest, e.g., desires whose satisfaction makes that person’s life go better for her. And some conceptions of self-interest count only the satisfaction of idealized desires, ones that someone would have after reflection about the nature of those desires and what they typically lead to, as furthering a person’s self-interest. 

See index to all Grice’s books with index – the first three of them.

Einheitswissenschaft:  Used by Grice ironically. While he was totally ANTI-Einheitwisseschaft, he was ALL for einheitsphilosophie!  The phrase is used by Grice in a more causal way. He uses the expression ‘unity of science’ vis-à-vis the topic of teleology. Note that ‘einheitswissenschaft,’ literally translates as unity-science – there is nothing about ‘making’ if one, which is what –fied implies. The reason why ‘einheitswissenschaft’ was transliterated as ‘unified science’ was that Neurath thought that ‘unity-science’ would be a yes-yes in New England, most New Englanders being Unitarians, but they would like to include Theology there, ‘into the bargain.’  “Die Einheit von Wissenschaft.” Die Einheit der Wissenschaft und die neopositivistische Theorie der „Einheitswissenschaft”. O. Neurath, „Einheit der Wissenschaft als Aufgabe“,Einheitswissenschaft oder Einheit der Wissenschaft? | Frank F Vierter Internationaler Kongress für Einheit der Wissenschaft, Cambridge 1938 ... Einheitswissenschaft als Basis der Wissenschaftsgeschichte (pp. positivists held that no essential differences in aim and method exist between the various branches of science. The scientists of all disciplines should collaborate closely with each other and should unify the vocabulary of sciences by logical analysis. According to this view, there is no sharp demarcation between natural sciences and social sciences. In particular, to establish universal laws in the social sciences may be difficult in practice, but it is not impossible in principle. Through Otto Neurath, this ideal of scientific unity became a program for logical positivists, who published a series of books in Vienna under the heading Unified Science. After the dissolution of the Vienna Circle, Neurath renamed the official journal Erkenntnis as The Journal of Unified Science, and planned to continue publication of a series of works in the United States under the general title The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. He thought that the work would be similar in historical importance to the eighteenth-century French Encyclopédie under the direction of Diderot. Unfortunately, this work was never completed, although Carnap and Morris published some volumes originally prepared for it under the title Foundations of the Unity of Science. “We have repeatedly pointed out that the formation of the constructional system as a whole is the task of unified science.” Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World.

Griceian elenchus: a cross-examination or refutation. Typically in Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates has a conversation with someone who claims to have some sort of knowledge, and Socrates refutes this claim by showing the interlocutor that what he thinks he knows is inconsistent with his other opinions. This refutation Grice calls a ‘conversational elenchus.’ “It is not entirely negative, for awareness of his own ignorance is supposed to spur one’s conversational interlocutor to further inquiry, and the concepts and assumptions employed in the refutations serve as the basis for positive Griceian, and implicatural, treatments of the same topic.” “Now, in contrast, I’ll grant you that a type of “sophistic elenchi” that one sometimes sees at Oxford, usually displayed  by Rhode scholars from the New World or the Colonies, under the tutelage of me or others in my group, may be merely eristic.” “They aim simply at the refutation of an opponent by any means.” “That is why, incidentally, why Aristotle calls a fallacy that only *appear* to be a refutation a “sophistici elenchi.” 

Grice’s “sc.”: as the elliptical disimplicaturum -- ellipsis as implicaturum: an expression from which a ‘part’ has been deleted.. “I distinguish between the expression-whole and the expression-part.” The term Grice uses for ‘part’ is ‘incomplete’ versus ‘complete,’ and it’s always for metabolical ascriptions primarily. Thus Grice has "x (utterance-type) means '. . .' " which is a specification of timeless meaning for an utterance-type ad which can be either (i a) “complete” or (i b) non-complete (partial) or incomplete]. He also has "x (utterance-type) meant here '...'", which is a specification of applied timeless meaning for an utterance-type which again can be either (2a) complete or (2b) partial, non-complete, or incomplete. So ellipsis can now be redefined in terms of the complete-incomplete distinction. “Smith is” is incomplete. “Smith is clever” is complete.  “Uusually for conciseness.” As Grice notes, “an elliptical or incomplete sentence is often used to answer a questions without repeating material occurring in the question; e. g.  ‘Grice’ may be the answer to the question of the authorship of “The grounds of morality” or to the question of the authorship of “Studies in the Way of Words.” ‘Grice’ can be seen as an ‘elliptical’ name when used as an ellipsis of ‘G. R. Grice’ or “H. P. Grice” and “Grice” can be seen as an elliptical *sentence* when used as an ellipsis for ‘G. R. Grice is the author of ‘The Grounds of Morality”” or “H. P. Grice is the author of Studies in the Way of Words.’Other typical elliptical sentences are: ‘Grice is a father of two [+> children]’, ‘Grice, or Godot, arrived for the tutorial past twelve [+> midnight]’. A typical ellipsis that occurs in discussion of ellipses involves citing the elliptical sentences with the deleted material added in brackets often with ‘sc.’ or ‘scilicet’ – “Grice is a father of two (sc. Children),” Grice, or Godot, as we tutees call him, arrived for the tutorial past twelve (sc. midnight)” -- instead of also presenting the complete sentence. As Grice notes, ellipsis can also occurs above the sentential level, e.g. where well-known premises are omitted in the course of argumentation, as in “Grice is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.” ‘Enthymeme,’ literally, ‘in-the-breast,’ designates an elliptical argument expression from which one or more premise-expressions have been deleted, “or merely implicated.” -- ‘elliptic ambiguity’ designates ambiguity arising from ellipsis, as does ‘elliptic implicaturum.’ “Sc.” Grice calls “elliptical disimplicaturum.”

Emersonian implicaturum: r. w., New-World (specifically New-England) philosophical essayist, lecturer, and poet, a leading figure in the transcendentalist movement. He was born in Boston and educated at Harvard. As a young man he taught school and served as a Unitarian minister 182632. After he resigned his pastorate in 1832, he traveled to Europe to visit Coleridge, Carlyle, and Wordsworth. Upon his return, he settled in Concord, Massachusetts, and began anew as a public lecturer, essayist, and cultural critic. All the while he maintained a voluminous correspondence and kept a detailed, evocative journal. Most of this material has been published, and it casts considerable light on the depth of his thought, at times more so than his public presentations and books. His life was pockmarked by personal tragedies, notably the death of his father when Emerson was eight; the death of his first wife, Ellen, after two years of marriage; and the death of his oldest son, Waldo, at the age of five. Such afflictions belie the commonly held assumption that Emerson was a thinker who did not face the intractable problem of evil. To the contrary, his writings should be read as a continuing struggle to render the richest possible version of our situation, given that “things are in the saddle and ride mankind.” Although Emerson did not write a systematic work in philosophy, he unquestionably bequeathed an important philosophical vision and countless philosophical pieces. Beginning with his concentration on the motif of nature, its embracing quality, and the rhythms of our inextricable presence within its activities, Emerson details the “compensatory” ebb and flow of the human journey. The human soul and nature are related as “print” to “seal,” and yet nature is not always beneficent. In his essay “Compensation,” emanationism Emerson, Ralph Waldo 258   258 Emerson writes that “the value of the universe continues to throw itself into every point. If the good is there, so is the evil; if the affinity, so the repulsion, if the force, so the limitation.” After the acclaim given the publication of Emerson’s first book, Nature 1836, he began to gather his public lectures, a presentational medium at which he was riveting, convincing, and inspiring. In 1841 Emerson published his Essays  First Series, which included the lovely piece “Circles,” wherein he follows the blunt maxim “we grizzle every day” with the healing affirmation that “life is a series of surprises.” This volume also contains “Self-Reliance,” which furnished a motto for the self-proclaiming intrepidity of nineteenth-century  individualism. The enthusiastic response to Emerson’s essays enabled him to publish three additional collections within the decade: Essays  Second Series 1844, Nature, Addresses and Lectures 1849, and Representative Men 1850. These books and their successors contained lectures, orations, poems, and addresses over a wide range of topics, philosophical, personal, characterological, travel, historical, and literary. Emerson’s prose is swift, clear, and epigrammatic, like a series of written stochastic probes, resulting in a Yankee crazy quilt, munificent of shape and color. Emerson spoke to be heard and wrote to be read, especially by the often denigrated “common” person. In fact, during Emerson’s European lecture tour in 1848, a letter to a London newspaper requested lowering the admission price so that poorer people could attend, for “to miss him is to lose an important part of the Nineteenth Century.” Emerson’s deeply democratic attitude had a reflective philosophical base. He believed that ordinary experience was epiphanic if we but open ourselves to its virtually infinite messages. Despite his Brahmanic appearance and demeanor, Emerson was in continuous touch with ordinary things. He wrote, “Our chief experiences have been casual.” His belief in the explosive and pedagogical character of ordinary experience is especially present in his influential oration “The  Scholar.” After criticizing  thought as thoroughly derivative, he plots the influences necessary to generate a genuine scholar, paramount among them nature and the learning of the past, though he cautions us not to be trapped in excessive retrospection at the expense of “an original relation to the universe.” It is his discussion of “action” as the third influence on the scholar that enables him to project his clearest statement of his underlying philosophical commitment. Without action, “thought can never ripen into truth,” moreover, “thinking is a partial act,” whereas living is a “total act.” Expressly opposed to any form of psychological, religious, philosophical, or behavioral dualism, he counsels us that the spiritual is not set apart, beyond reach of those who toil in the everyday. Rather, the most profound meanings of the human condition, “lurk” in the “common,” the “low,” the “familiar,” the “today.” The influence of the thought of Emerson reaches across class, caste, genre, and persuasion. Thinkers as diverse as James, Nietzsche, Whitman, Proust, Gertrude Stein, Robert Frost, Frank Lloyd Wright, Frederick Law Olmsted, and Wallace Stevens are among those deeply indebted to Emerson. Yet, it was Dewey who best caught the enduring bequest of Emerson, writing of “the final word of Emerson’s philosophy, [as] the identity of Being, unqualified and immutable, with character.”

sender and sendee: Emissee: this is crucial. There’s loads of references on this. Apparently, some philosopher cannot think of communication without the emissee. But surely Grice loved Virginia Woolf. “And when she was writing ‘The Hours,’ I’m pretty sure she cared a damn whether the rest of the world existed!” Let's explore the issue of the UTTERER'S OCCASION-MEANING IN THE ABSENCE OF A (so-called) AUDIENCE -- or sender without sendee, as it were. There are various scenarios of utterances by which the utterer or sender is correctly said to have communicated that so-and-so, such that there is no actual person or set of persons (or sentient beings) whom the utterer or sender is addressing and in whom the sender intends to induce a response. The range of these scenarios includes, or might be thought to include, such items as -- the posting of a notice, like "Keep out" or "This bridge is dangerous," -- an entry in a diary, -- the writing of a note to clarify one's thoughts when working on some problem, -- soliloquizing, -- rehearsing a part in a projected conversation, and -- silent thinking. At least some of these scenarios are unprovided for in the reductive analysis so far proposed. The examples which Grice's account should cover fall into three groups: (a) Utterances for which the utterer or sender thinks there may (now or later) be an audience or sendee (as when Grice's son sent a letter to Santa). U may think that some particular person, e. g. himself at a future date in the case of a diary entry, may (but also may not) encounter U's utterance.Or U may think that there may or may not be some person or other who is or will be an auditor or sendee or recipient of his utterance. (b) An utterances which the utterer knows that it is not to be addressed to any actual sendee, but which the utterer PRETENDS to address or send to some particular person or type of person, OR which he thinks of as being addressed (or sent) to some imagined sendee or type of sendee (as in the rehearsal of a speech or of his part in a projected conversation, or Demosthenes or Noel Coward talking to the gulls.(c) An utterances (including what Occam calls an "internal" utterance) with respect to which the utterer NEITHER thinks it possible that there may be an actual sendee nor imagines himself as addressing sending so-and-so to a sendee, but nevertheless intends his utterance to be such that it would induce a certain sort of response in a certain perhaps fairly indefinite kind of sendee were it the case that such a sendee *were* present.In the case of silent thinking the idea of the presence of a sendee will have to be interpreted 'liberally,' as being the idea of there being a sendee for a public counter-part of the utterer's internal, private speech, if there is one. Austin refused to discuss Vitters's private-language argument.In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that some cases of verbal thinking (especially the type that Vitters engages in) do fall outside the scope of Grice's account. When a verbal though  merely passes through Vitters's head (or brain) as distinct from being "framed" by Vitters, it is utterly inappropriate (even in Viennese) to talk of Vitters as having communicated so-and-so by "the very thought of you," to echo Noble. Vitters is, perhaps, in such a case, more like a sendee than a sender -- and wondering who such an intelligent sender might (or then might not) be. In any case, to calm the neo-Wittgensteinians, Grice propose a reductive analysis which surely accounts for the examples which need to be accounted for, and which will allow as SPECIAL (if paradigmatic) cases (now) the range of examples in which there is, and it is known by the utterer that there is, an actual sendee. A soul-to-soul transfer. This redefinition is relatively informal. Surely Grice could present a more formal version which would gain in precision at the cost of ease of comprehension. Let "p" (and k') range over properties of persons (possible sendees); appropriate substituends for "O" (and i') will include such diverse expressions as "is a passer-by," "is a passer-by who sees this notice," "understands the Viennese cant," "is identical with Vitters." As will be seen, for Grice to communicate that so-and-so it will have to be possible to identify the value of "/" (which may be fairly indeterminate) which U has in mind; but we do not have to determine the range from which U makes a selection. "U means by uttering x that *iP" is true iff (30) (3f (3c):  I. U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has q would think that (i) x has f (2) f is correlated in way c with M-ing that p (3) (3 0'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has b' would think, via thinking (i) and (2), that U4's that p (4) in view of (3), U O's that p; and II. (operative only for certain substituends for "*4") U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has 0, he would via thinking (4), himself a that p; ' and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has 0 will both (i') rely on E in coming to O+ that p and (2') think that (3k'): Uintends x to be such that anyone who has O' will come to /+ that p without relying on E. Notes: (1) "i+" is to be read as "p" if Clause II is operative, and as "think that UO's" if Clause II is non-operative. (2) We need to use both "i" and "i'," since we do not wish to require that U should intend his possible audience to think of U's possible audience under the same description as U does himself. Explanatory comments: (i) It is essential that the intention which is specified in Clause II should be specified as U's intention "that should there be anyone who has 0, he would (will) . . ." rather than, analogously with Clauses I and II, as U's intention "that x should be such that, should anyone be 0, he would ... ." If we adopt the latter specification, we shall be open to an objection, as can be shown with the aid of an example.Suppose that, Vitters is married, and further, suppose he married an Englishwoman. Infuriated by an afternoon with his mother-in-law, when he is alone after her departure, Vitters relieves his feelings by saying, aloud and passionately, in German:"Do not ye ever comest near me again!"It will no doubt be essential to Vitters's momentary well-being that Vitters should speak with the intention that his remark be such that were his mother-in-law present, assuming as we say, that he married and does have one who, being an Englishwoman, will most likely not catch the Viennese cant that Vitters is purposively using, she should however, in a very Griceian sort of way, form the intention not to come near Vitters again. It would, however, be pretty unacceptable if it were represented as following from Vitters's having THIS intention (that his remark be such that, were his mother-in-law be present, she should form the intnetion to to come near Vitters again) that what Vitters is communicating (who knows to who) that the denotatum of 'Sie' is never to come near Vitters again.For it is false that, in the circumstances, Vitters is communicating that by his remark. Grice's reductive analysis is formulated to avoid that difficulty. (2) Suppose that in accordance with the definiens o U intends x to be such that anyone who is f will think ... , and suppose that the value of "O" which U has in mind is the property of being identical with a particular person A. Then it will follow that U intends A to think . . . ; and given the further condition, fulfilled in any normal (paradigmatic, standard, typical, default) case, that U intends the sendee to think that the sendee is the intended sendee, we are assured of the truth of a statement from which the definiens is inferrible by the rule of existential generalisation (assuming the legitimacy of this application of existential generalisation to a statement the expression of which contains such "intensional" verbs as "intend" and "think"). It can also be shown that, for any case in which there is an actual sendee who knows that he is the intended sendee, if the definiens in the standard version is true then the definiens in the adapted version will be true. If that is so, given the definition is correct, for any normal case in which there IS an actual sendee the fulfillment of the definiens will constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for U's having communicated that *1p. 

sendeeless: ‘audienceless’ “One good example of a sendeeless implicaturum is Sting’s “Message in a bottle.” – Grice. Grice: “When Sting says, “I’m sending out an ‘s.o.s’ he is being Peirceian.”

emissum: emissor. A construction out of ex- and ‘missum,’ cf. Grice on psi-trans-mis-sion. Grice’s utterer, but turned Griceian, To emit, to translate some Gricism or other. Cf. proffer.  emissum. emissor-emissum distinction. Frequently ignored by Austin. Grice usually formulates it ‘roughly.’ Strawson for some reason denied the reducibility of the emissum to the emissor. Vide his footnote in his Inaugural lecture at Oxford. it is a truth implicitly acknowledged by communication theorists themselves -- this acknowledgement is is certainly implicit in Grice's distinction between what speakers actually say, in a favored sense of 'say', and what they imply (see "Utterer's Meaning, SentenceMeaning and Word-Meaning," in Foundations of Language, 1968) -- that in almost all the things we should count as sentences there is a substantial central core of meaning which is explicable either in terms of truth-conditions or in terms of some related notion quite simply derivable from that of a truth-condition, for example the notion, as we might call it, of a compliance condition in the case of an imperative sentence or a fulfillment-condition in the case of an optative. If we suppose, therefore, that an account can be given of the notion of a truthcondition itself, an account which is indeed independent of reference to communicationintention, then we may reasonably think that the greater part of the task of a general theory of meaning has been accomplished without such reference. So let us see if we can rephrase the distinction for a one-off predicament. By drawing a skull, Blackburn communicates to his fellow Pembrokite that there is danger around. The proposition is ‘There is danger around’. Of the claims, one is literal; the other metabolical. Blackburn means that there is danger around. Blackburn communicates that there is danger around, possibly leading to death. The emissum, Blackburn’s drawing of the skull ‘means’ that there is danger around. Since the fact that Blackburn communicates that p is diaphanous, we have yet another way of posing the distinction: Blackburn communicates that there is danger around. What is communicated by Blackburn – his emissum – is true. Note that in this diaphanous change from ‘Blackburn communicates that there is danger around’ and ‘What Blackburn communicates, viz. that there is danger around, is true’ we have progressed quite a bit. There are ways of involving ‘true’ in the first stage. Blackburn communicates that there is danger around, and he communicates something true. In the classical languages, this is done in the accusative case. emissum. emit. V. emissor. A good verb used by Grice. It gives us ‘emitter, and it is more Graeco-Roman than his ‘utterer,’ which Cicero would think a barbarism.

emotum: the emotum, the motum. Grice enjoyed a bit of history of philosophy. Cf. conatum. And Urmson’s company helped. Urmson produced a brilliant study of the ‘emotive’ theory of ethics, which is indeed linguistic and based on Ogden. Diog. Laert. of Zeno of Citium. πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, "πολλοί σου καταγελῶσιν," "ἀλλ ἐγώ," ἔφη, "οὐ κατα- γελῶμαι; to the question, who is a friend?, Zeno’s answer is, ‘a second self (alter ego). One direct way to approach friend is via emotion, as Aristotle did, and found it aporetic as did Grice. Aristotle discusses philia in Eth. Nich. but it is in Rhet. where he allows for phulia to be an emotion. Grice was very fortunate to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardies lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees! Grice is concerned with the rather cryptic view by Aristotle of the friend (philos, amicus) as the alter ego. In Grices cooperative, concerted, view of things, a friend in need is a friend indeed! Grice is interested in Aristotle finding himself in an aporia. In Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix, Aristotle poses the question whether the happy man will need friends or not. Kosman correctly identifies this question as asking not whether friends are necessary in order to achieve eudæmonia, but why we require friends even when we are happy. The question is not why we need friends to become happy, but why we need friends when we are happy, since the eudæmon must be self-sufficient. Philia is required for the flourishing of the life of practical virtue. The solution by Aristotle to the aporia here, however, points to the requirement of friendships even for the philosopher, in his life of theoretical virtue. The olution by Aristotle to the aporia in Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix is opaque, and the corresponding passage in Eudeiman Ethics VII.xii is scarcely better. Aristotle thinks he has found the solution to this aporia. We must take two things into consideration, that life is desirable and also that the good is, and thence that it is desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself as it belongs to them. If then, of such a pair of corresponding s. there is always one s. of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are in general constituted by their participation in the nature of the determined, so that to wish to perceive ones self is to wish oneself to be of a certain definite character,—since, then we are not in ourselves possessed of each such characters, but only in participation in these qualities in perceiving and knowing—for the perceiver becomes perceived in that way in respect in which he first perceives, and according to the way in which and the object which he perceives; and the knower becomes known in the same way— therefore it is for this reason that one always desires to live, because one always desires to know; and this is because he himself wishes to be the object known. emotion, as conceived by philosophers and psychologists, any of several general types of mental states, approximately those that had been called “passions” by earlier philosophers, such as Descartes and Hume. Anger, e.g., is one emotion, fear a second, and joy a third. An emotion may also be a content-specific type, e.g., fear of an earthquake, or a token of an emotion type, e.g., Mary’s present fear that an earthquake is imminent. The various states typically classified as emotions appear to be linked together only by overlapping family resemblances rather than by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Thus an adequate philosophical or psychological “theory of emotion” should probably be a family of theories. Even to label these states “emotions” wrongly suggests that they are all marked by emotion, in the older sense of mental agitation a metaphorical extension of the original sense, agitated motion. A person who is, e.g., pleased or sad about something is not typically agitated. To speak of anger, fear, joy, sadness, etc., collectively as “the emotions” fosters the assumption which James said he took for granted that these are just qualitatively distinct feelings of mental agitation. This exaggerates the importance of agitation and neglects the characteristic differences, noted by Aristotle, Spinoza, and others, in the types of situations that evoke the various emotions. One important feature of most emotions is captured by the older category of passions, in the sense of ‘ways of being acted upon’. In many lanemotion emotion 259   259 guages nearly all emotion adjectives are derived from participles: e.g., the English words ‘amused’, ‘annoyed’, ‘ashamed’, ‘astonished’, ‘delighted’, ‘embarrassed’, ‘excited’, ‘frightened’, ‘horrified’, ‘irritated’, ‘pleased’, ‘terrified’, ‘surprised’, ‘upset’, and ‘worried’. When we are, e.g., embarrassed, something acts on us, i.e., embarrasses us: typically, some situation or fact of which we are aware, such as our having on unmatched shoes. To call embarrassment a passion in the sense of a way of being acted upon does not imply that we are “passive” with respect to it, i.e., have no control over whether a given situation embarrasses us and thus no responsibility for our embarrassment. Not only situations and facts but also persons may “do” something to us, as in love and hate, and mere possibilities may have an effect on us, as in fear and hope. The possibility emotions are sometimes characterized as “forward-looking,” and emotions that are responses to actual situations or facts are said to be “backward-looking.” These temporal characterizations are inaccurate and misleading. One may be fearful or hopeful that a certain event occurred in the past, provided one is not certain as to whether it occurred; and one may be, e.g., embarrassed about what is going to occur, provided one is certain it will occur. In various passions the effect on us may include involuntary physiological changes, feelings of agitation due to arousal of the autonomic nervous system, characteristic facial expressions, and inclinations toward intentional action or inaction that arise independently of any rational warrant. Phenomenologically, however, these effects do not appear to us to be alien and non-rational, like muscular spasms. Rather they seem an integral part of our perception of the situation as, e.g., an embarrassing situation, or one that warrants our embarrassment.  emotive conjugation: I went to Oxford; you went to Cambridge; he went to the London School of Economics”: a humorous verbal conjugation, designed to expose and mock first-person bias, in which ostensibly the same action is described in successively more pejorative terms through the first, second, and third persons e.g., “I am firm, You are stubborn, He is a pig-headed fool”. This example was used by Russell in the course of a BBC Radio “Brains’ Trust” discussion. It was popularized later that year when The New Statesman ran a competition for other examples. An “unprecedented response” brought in 2,000 entries, including: “I am well informed, You listen to gossip, He believes what he reads in the paper”; and “I went to Oxford, You went to Cambridge, He went to the London School of Economics” Russell was educated at Cambridge and later taught there.  -- emotivism, a noncognitivist metaethical view opposed to cognitivism, which holds that moral judgments should be construed as assertions about the moral properties of actions, persons, policies, and other objects of moral assessment, that moral predicates purport to refer to properties of such objects, that moral judgments or the propositions that they express can be true or false, and that cognizers can have the cognitive attitude of belief toward the propositions that moral judgments express. Noncognitivism denies these claims; it holds that moral judgments do not make assertions or express propositions. If moral judgments do not express propositions, the former can be neither true nor false, and moral belief and moral knowledge are not possible. The emotivist is a noncognitivist who claims that moral judgments, in their primary sense, express the appraiser’s attitudes  approval or disapproval  toward the object of evaluation, rather than make assertions about the properties of that object. Because emotivism treats moral judgments as the expressions of the appraiser’s pro and con attitudes, it is sometimes referred to as the boohurrah theory of ethics. Emotivists distinguish their thesis that moral judgments express the appraiser’s attitudes from the subjectivist claim that they state or report the appraiser’s attitudes the latter view is a form of cognitivism. Some versions of emotivism distinguish between this primary, emotive meaning of moral judgments and a secondary, descriptive meaning. In its primary, emotive meaning, a moral judgment expresses the appraiser’s attitudes toward the object of evaluation rather than ascribing properties to that object. But secondarily, moral judgments refer to those non-moral properties of the object of evaluation in virtue of which the appraiser has and expresses her attitudes. So if I judge that your act of torture is wrong, my judgment has two components. Its primary, emotive sense is to express my disapproval of your act. Its secondary, descriptive sense is to denote those non-moral properties of your act upon which I base my disapproval. These are presumably the very properties that make it an act of torture  roughly, a causing of intense pain in order to punish, coerce, or afford sadistic pleasure. By making emotive meaning primary, emotivists claim to preserve the univocity of moral language between speakers who employ different criteria of application for their moral terms. Also, by stressing the intimate connection between moral judgment and the agent’s non-cognitive attitudes, emotivists claim to capture the motivational properties of moral judgment. Some emotivists have also attempted to account for ascriptions of truth to moral judgments by accepting the redundancy account of ascriptions of truth as expressions of agreement with the original judgment. The emotivist must think that such ascriptions of truth to moral judgments merely reflect the ascriber’s agreement in noncognitive attitude with the attitude expressed by the original judgment. Critics of emotivism challenge these alleged virtues. They claim that moral agreement need not track agreement in attitude; there can be moral disagreement without disagreement in attitude between moralists with different moral views, and disagreement in attitude without moral disagreement between moralists and immoralists. By distinguishing between the meaning of moral terms and speakers’ beliefs about the extension of those terms, critics claim that we can account for the univocity of moral terms in spite of moral disagreement without introducing a primary emotive sense for moral terms. Critics also allege that the emotivist analysis of moral judgments as the expression of the appraiser’s attitudes precludes recognizing the possibility of moral judgments that do not engage or reflect the attitudes of the appraiser. For instance, it is not clear how emotivism can accommodate the amoralist  one who recognizes moral requirements but is indifferent to them. Critics also charge emotivism with failure to capture the cognitive aspects of moral discourse. Because emotivism is a theory about moral judgment or assertion, it is difficult for the emotivist to give a semantic analysis of moral predicates in unasserted contexts, such as in the antecedents of conditional moral judgments e.g., “If he did wrong, then he ought to be punished”. Finally, one might want to recognize the truth of some moral judgments, perhaps in order to make room for the possibility of moral mistakes. If so, then one may not be satisfied with the emotivist’s appeal to redundancy or disquotational accounts of the ascription of truth. Emotivism was introduced by Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic 2d ed., 6 and refined by C. L. Stevenson in Facts and Values 3 and Ethics and Language 4.  Refs.: There is an essay on “Emotions and akrasia,” but the topic is scattered in various places, such as Grice’s reply to Davidson on intending. Grice has an essay on ‘Kant and friendship,’ too, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

conversational empathy – principle of conversational empathy -- Principle of Conversational Empathy – a term devised by Grice for the expectation a conversationalist has that his co-partner will honour his conversational goal, however transitory. imaginative projection into another person’s situation, especially for vicarious capture of its emotional and motivational qualities. The term is an English rendering by the Anglo psychologist E. G. Titchener, 1867 7 of the G. Einfühlung, made popular by Theodore Lipps 18514, which also covered imaginative identification with inanimate objects of aesthetic contemplation. Under ‘sympathy’, many aspects were earlier discussed by Hume, Adam Smith, and other Scottish philosophers. Empathy has been considered a precondition of ethical thinking and a major contributor to social bonding and altruism, mental state attribution, language use, and translation. The relevant spectrum of phenomena includes automatic and often subliminal motor mimicry of the expressions or manifestations of another’s real or feigned emotion, pain, or pleasure; emotional contagion, by which one “catches” another’s apparent emotion, often unconsciously and without reference to its cause or “object”; conscious and unconscious mimicry of direction of gaze, with consequent transfer of attention from the other’s response to its cause; and conscious or unconscious role-taking, which reconstructs in imagination with or without imagery aspects of the other’s situation as the other “perceives” it.

empedocles: Grecian preSocratic philosopher who created a physical theory in response to Parmenides while incorporating Pythagorean ideas of the soul into his philosophy. Following Parmenides in his rejection of coming-to-be and perishing, he accounted for phenomenal change by positing four elements his “roots,” rizomata, earth, water, air, and fire. When they mix together in set proportions they create compound substances such as blood and bone. Two forces act on the elements, Love and Strife, the former joining the different elements, the latter separating them. In his cyclical cosmogony the four elements combine to form the Sphere, a completely homogeneous spherical body permeated by Love, which, shattered by Strife, grows into a cosmos with the elements forming distinct cosmic masses of earth, water the seas, air, and fire. There is controversy over whether Empedocles posits one or two periods when living things exist in the cycle. On one view there are two periods, between which intervenes a stage of complete separation of the elements. Empedocles accepts the Pythagorean view of reincarnation of souls, seeing life as punishment for an original sin and requiring the expiation of a pious and philosophical life. Thus the exile and return of the individual soul reflects in the microcosm the cosmic movement from harmony to division to harmony. Empedocles’ four elements became standard in natural philosophy down to the early modern era, and Aristotle recognized his Love and Strife as an early expression of the efficient cause.  Vide “Italic Griceians” – While in the New World, ‘Grecian philosophy’ is believed to have happened ‘in Greece,’ Grice was amused that ‘most happened in Italy!’

empiricism: One of Grice’s twelve labours -- Condillac, Étienne Bonnot de, philosopher, an empiricist who was considered the great analytical mind of his generation. Close to Rousseau and Diderot, he stayed within the church. He is closely perhaps excessively identified with the image of the statue that, in the Traité des sensations Treatise on Sense Perception, 1754, he endows with the five senses to explain how perceptions are assimilated and produce understanding cf. also his Treatise on the Origins of Human Knowledge, 1746. He maintains a critical distance from precursors: he adopts Locke’s tabula rasa but from his first work to Logique Logic, 1780 insists on the creative role of the mind as it analyzes and compares sense impressions. His Traité des animaux Treatise on Animals, 1755, which includes a proof of the existence of God, considers sensate creatures rather than Descartes’s animaux machines and sees God only as a final cause. He reshapes Leibniz’s monads in the Monadologie Monadology, 1748, rediscovered in 0. In the Langue des calculs Language of Numbers, 1798 he proposes mathematics as a model of clear analysis. The origin of language and creation of symbols eventually became his major concern. His break with metaphysics in the Traité des systèmes Treatise on Systems, 1749 has been overemphasized, but Condillac does replace rational constructs with sense experience and reflection. His empiricism has been mistaken for materialism, his clear analysis for simplicity. The “ideologues,” Destutt de Tracy and Laromiguière, found Locke in his writings. Jefferson admired him. Maine de Biran, while critical, was indebted to him for concepts of perception and the self; Cousin disliked him; Saussure saw him as a forerunner in the study of the origins of language. Empiricism – one of Grice’s twelve labours – This implicates he saw himself as a Rationalist, rather -- Cordemoy, Géraud de, philosopher and member of the Cartesian school. His most important work is his Le discernement du corps et de l’âme en six discours, published in 1666 and reprinted under slightly different titles a number of times thereafter. Also important are the Discours physique de la parole 1668, a Cartesian theory of language and communication; and Une lettre écrite à un sçavant religieux 1668, a defense of Descartes’s orthodoxy on certain questions in natural philosophy. Cordemoy also wrote a history of France, left incomplete at his death. Like Descartes, Cordemoy advocated a mechanistic physics explaining physical phenomena in terms of size, shape, and local motion, and converse Cordemoy, Géraud de 186   186 held that minds are incorporeal thinking substances. Like most Cartesians, Cordemoy also advocated a version of occasionalism. But unlike other Cartesians, he argued for atomism and admitted the void. These innovations were not welcomed by other members of the Cartesian school. But Cordemoy is often cited by later thinkers, such as Leibniz, as an important seventeenth-century advocate of atomism.  Empiricism: one of Grice’s twelve labours -- Cousin, V., philosopher who set out to merge the  psychological tradition with the pragmatism of Locke and Condillac and the inspiration of the Scottish Reid, Stewart and G. idealists Kant, Hegel. His early courses at the Sorbonne 1815 18, on “absolute” values that might overcome materialism and skepticism, aroused immense enthusiasm. The course of 1818, Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien Of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, is preserved in the Adolphe Garnier edition of student notes 1836; other early texts appeared in the Fragments philosophiques Philosophical Fragments, 1826. Dismissed from his teaching post as a liberal 1820, arrested in G.y at the request of the  police and detained in Berlin, he was released after Hegel intervened 1824; he was not reinstated until 1828. Under Louis-Philippe, he rose to highest honors, became minister of education, and introduced philosophy into the curriculum. His eclecticism, transformed into a spiritualism and cult of the “juste milieu,” became the official philosophy. Cousin rewrote his work accordingly and even succeeded in having Du Vrai third edition, 1853 removed from the papal index. In 1848 he was forced to retire. He is noted for his educational reforms, as a historian of philosophy, and for his translations Proclus, Plato, editions Descartes, and portraits of ladies of seventeenth-century society. Empiricism – one of Grice’s twelve labours -- empirical decision theory, the scientific study of human judgment and decision making. A growing body of empirical research has described the actual limitations on inductive reasoning. By contrast, traditional decision theory is normative; the theory proposes ideal procedures for solving some class of problems. The descriptive study of decision making was pioneered by figures including Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Richard Nisbett, and Lee Ross, and their empirical research has documented the limitations and biases of various heuristics, or simple rules of thumb, routinely used in reasoning. The representativeness heuristic is a rule of thumb used to judge probabilities based on the degree to which one class represents or resembles another class. For example, we assume that basketball players have a “hot hand” during a particular game  producing an uninterrupted string of successful shots  because we underestimate the relative frequency with which such successful runs occur in the entire population of that player’s record. The availability heuristic is a rule of thumb that uses the ease with which an instance comes to mind as an index of the probability of an event. Such a rule is unreliable when salience in memory misleads; for example, most people incorrectly rate death by shark attack as more probable than death by falling airplane parts. For an overview, see D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 2. These biases, found in laypeople and statistical experts alike, have a natural explanation on accounts such as Herbert Simon’s 7 concept of “bounded rationality.” According to this view, the limitations on our decision making are fixed in part by specific features of our psychological architecture. This architecture places constraints on such factors as processing speed and information capacity, and this in turn produces predictable, systematic errors in performance. Thus, rather than proposing highly idealized rules appropriate to an omniscient Laplacean genius  more characteristic of traditional normative approaches to decision theory  empirical decision theory attempts to formulate a descriptively accurate, and thus psychologically realistic, account of rationality. Even if certain simple rules can, in particular settings, outperform other strategies, it is still important to understand the causes of the systematic errors we make on tasks perfectly representative of routine decision making. Once the context is specified, empirical decision-making research allows us to study both descriptive decision rules that we follow spontaneously and normative rules that we ought to follow upon reflection.  empiricism from empiric, ‘doctor who relies on practical experience’, ultimately from Grecian empeiria, ‘experience’, a type of theory in epistemology, the basic idea behind all examples of the type being that experience has primacy in human knowledge and justified belief. Because empiricism is not a single view but a type of view with many different examples, it is appropriate to speak not just of empiricism but of empiricisms. Perhaps the most fundamental distinction to be drawn among the various empiricisms is that between those consisting of some claim about concepts and those consisting of some empirical empiricism 262   262 claim about beliefs  call these, respectively, concept-empiricisms and belief-empiricisms. Concept-empiricisms all begin by singling out those concepts that apply to some experience or other; the concept of dizziness, e.g., applies to the experience of dizziness. And what is then claimed is that all concepts that human beings do and can possess either apply to some experience that someone has had, or have been derived from such concepts by someone’s performing on those concepts one or another such mental operation as combination, distinction, and abstraction. How exactly my concepts are and must be related to my experience and to my performance of those mental operations are matters on which concept-empiricists differ; most if not all would grant we each acquire many concepts by learning language, and it does not seem plausible to hold that each concept thus acquired either applies to some experience that one has oneself had or has been derived from such by oneself. But though concept-empiricists disagree concerning the conditions for linguistic acquisition or transmission of a concept, what unites them, to repeat, is the claim that all human concepts either apply to some experience that someone has actually had or they have been derived from such by someone’s actually performing on those the mental operations of combination, distinction, and abstraction. Most concept-empiricists will also say something more: that the experience must have evoked the concept in the person having the experience, or that the person having the experience must have recognized that the concept applies to his or her experience, or something of that sort. What unites all belief-empiricists is the claim that for one’s beliefs to possess one or another truth-relevant merit, they must be related in one or another way to someone’s experience. Beliefempiricisms differ from each other, for one thing, with respect to the merit concerning which the claim is made. Some belief-empiricists claim that a belief does not have the status of knowledge unless it has the requisite relation to experience; some claim that a belief lacks warrant unless it has that relation; others claim that a belief is not permissibly held unless it stands in that relation; and yet others claim that it is not a properly scientific belief unless it stands in that relation. And not even this list exhausts the possibilities. Belief-empiricisms also differ with respect to the specific relation to experience that is said to be necessary for the merit in question to be present. Some belief-empiricists hold, for example, that a belief is permissibly held only if its propositional content is either a report of the person’s present or remembered experience, or the belief is held on the basis of such beliefs and is probable with respect to the beliefs on the basis of which it is held. Kant, by contrast, held the rather different view that if a belief is to constitute empirical knowledge, it must in some way be about experience. Third, belief-empiricisms differ from each other with respect to the person to whose experience a belief must stand in the relation specified if it is to possess the merit specified. It need not always be an experience of the person whose belief is being considered. It might be an experience of someone giving testimony about it. It should be obvious that a philosopher might well accept one kind of empiricism while rejecting others. Thus to ask philosophers whether they are empiricists is a question void for vagueness. It is regularly said of Locke that he was an empiricist; and indeed, he was a concept-empiricist of a certain sort. But he embraced no version whatsoever of belief-empiricism. Up to this point, ‘experience’ has been used without explanation. But anyone acquainted with the history of philosophy will be aware that different philosophers pick out different phenomena with the word; and even when they pick out the same phenomenon, they have different views as to the structure of the phenomenon that they call ‘experience.’ The differences on these matters reflect yet more distinctions among empiricisms than have been delineated above. 

enantiamorphs: “When Moore said that he knew he had two hands, he implicated, ‘I have two enantiamorphic hands,’ before they were able to cancel his talk and his implicaturum.” from Grecian enantios, ‘opposite’, and morphe, ‘form’, objects whose shapes differ as do those of a right and left hand. One of a pair of enantiamorphs can be made to look identical in shape to the other by viewing it in a mirror but not merely by changing its spatial orientation. Enantiamorphs figure prominently in the work of Kant, who argued that the existence of enantiamorphic pairs entailed that Leibnizian relational theories of space were to be rejected in favor of Newtonian absolutist theories, that some facts about space could be apprehended empiricism, constructive enantiamorphs 263   263 only by “pure intuition,” and that space was mind-dependent. 

ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA: encyclopædia Griceiana. Grice went to Paris and became enamoured with encyclopedia, or “encyclopédie,” “or a Descriptive Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts and Trades,” launched by the Parisian publisher Le Breton, who had secured d’Alembert’s and Diderot’s editorship, the Encyclopedia was gradually released despite a temporary revocation of its royal privilege. Comprising seventeen folio volumes of 17,818 articles and eleven folio volumes of 2,885 plates, the ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA required a staff of 272 Griceian engravers. “But the good thing,” Grice says, “is that it incorporates the accumulated knowledge and rationalist, secularist views of the  Enlightenment and prescribed economic, social, and political reforms.” Strawson adds: “Enormously successful at Oxford, ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA was reprinted with revisions five times before Grice died.” “Contributions were made by anyone we could bribe!” – As in the old encycloopaedia, the philosophes Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, d’Holbach, Naigeon, and Saint-Lambert; the writers Duclos and Marmontel; the theologians Morellet and Malet; enlightened clerics, e.g. Raynal; explorers, e.g. La Condamine; natural scientists, e.g. Daubenton; physicians, e.g. Bouillet; the economists Turgot and Quesnay; engineers, e.g. Perronet; horologists, e.g. Berthoud; and scores of other experts. “The purpose of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA,” writes Grice in the “Foreword”, “is to collect this or that bit of Griceian knowledge dispersed on the surface of the earth, and to unfold its general system.” “The Encyclopedia,” Strawson adds, “offers the educated Oxonian a comprehensive, systematic, and descriptive repository of contemporary liberal and mechanical arts, with an appendix on implicaturum by Grice hisself.” D’Alembert and Diderot developed a sensationalist epistemology, “but I don’t.” “Preliminary Discourse” under the influence of Locke and Condillac. Grice and Strawson (with the occasional help from Austin, Warnock, Pears and Thomson) compiled and rationally classified existing knowledge according to the noetic process memory, imagination, and reason. Based on the assumption of the unity of theory and praxis, the approach of the ENCYCLOOPÆDIA GRICEIANA is positivistic and ‘futilitarian.’ The ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA vindicates experimental reason and the rule of nature, fostered the practice of criticism, and stimulated the development of both old and new sciences. In religious matters, the ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA cultivates ambiguity and implicaturum to escape censorship by Queen Elizabeth II, an avid reader of the supplements. Whereas most contributors held either conciliatory or orthodox positions, J. F. Thomson barely concealed his naturalistic and atheistic opinions. Thomson’s radicalism was pervasive. Supernaturalism, obscurantism, and fanaticism, and Heideggerianism are among the Encyclopedists’ favorite targets. The Griceian Encyclopaedists identify Roman Catholicism (of the type Dummett practiced) with superstition and theology with occult magic; assert the superiority of natural morality over theological ethics; demand religious toleration; and champion human rights and conventional implicaturum alike. They innovatively retrace the historical conditions of the development of Oxford (“and a little Cambridge”) philosophy. They furthermore pioneer ideas on trade and industry and anticipate the relevance of historiography, sociology, economics, and ‘conversational pragmatics.’ As the most ambitious and expansive reference work Oxford ever saw, the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA crystallizes the confidence of England’s midlands bourgeoisie in the capacity of reason to dispel the shadows of ignorance and improve society – “at least Oxonian society, if I can.”

English futilitarians, The: Bergmann’s pun on H. P. Grice and J. L. Austin. from futile. Cf. conversational futilitarianism. Can there be a futilitarian theory of communication? Grice’s! The issue is a complex one. Some may interpret Grice’s theory as resting “on Kantian grounds.” Not everybody was present at Grice’s seminars at Oxford on helpfulness, where he discusses the kind of reasoning that a participant to a conversation will display in assuming that his co-conversationalist is being conversationally helpful, conversationally benevolent, conversationally ‘altruist,’ almost, and conversationally, well, co-operative. So, as to the basis for this. We can simplify the scenario by using the plural. A conversationalist assumes that his co-conversationalist is being co-operative on Kantian grounds. What are the alternatives, if any? One can re-describe “Kantian grounds” as “moral grounds.” Conversationalists abide with the principle of conversational helpfulness on Kantian, moral grounds. Kant wrote the “Critique of practical reason,” so Kant would allow for a rephrase of this as follows. Conversationalists abide with the principle of conversational helpfulness on practical, indeed moral, grounds – which is the topic of Grice’s last Kant lecture at Stanford. How to turn a ‘counsel of prudence,’ which is ‘practical’ into something that covers Kant’s “Kategorische Imperativ.” And then there’s the utilitarian. Utilitarianism IS a moral theory, or a meta-ethical theory. So one would have to allow for the possibility that conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on “utilitarian grounds,” which would be “practical grounds,” AND “moral grounds,” if not Kantian grounds. In any case, the topic WAS raised, and indeed, for someone like Grice who wrote on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘happiness,’ it does not seem futilitarian to see him as a futilitarian. Unfortunately, you need a serious philosophical background to appreciate all this, since it touches on the very serious, or ‘deep,’ as Grice would say, “and fascinating,” suburbia or practicality. But surely the keyword ‘utilitarian’ as per “conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on utilitarian grounds” is a possibility. Cf. Grice’s reference to the ‘least effort,’ and in the Oxford lectures on helpfulness to a conversationalist not getting involved in “undue effort,” or getting into “unnecessary trouble.” “Undue effort” is ‘forbidden’ by the desideratum of conversational candour; the ‘unnecessary trouble’ is balanced by the ‘principle of conversational self-love.’ And I don’t think Kant would ever considered loving himself! Grice being keen on neuter adjectives, he saw the ‘utile’ at the root of utilitarianism. There is much ‘of value’ in the old Roman concept of ‘utile.’ Lewis and Short have it as Neutr. absol.: ūtĭle , is, n., what is useful, the useful: omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci, Hor. A. P. 343: “bonus atque fidus Judex honestum praetulit utili,” id. C. 4, 9, 41: “utilium tardus provisor,” id. A. P. 164: “sententiae de utilibus honestisque,” Quint. 3, 8, 13; cf. id. 1, 2, 29. —Ultimately, Grice’s meta-ethics, like Hare’s, Nowell-Smith’s, Austin’s, Hampshire’s, and Warnock’s derives into a qualified utilitarianism, with notions of agreeableness and eudaemonia being crucial. Grice well knows that for Aristotle pleasure is just one out of the three sources for phulia; the others being profit, and virtue. As an English utilitarian, or English futilitarian, Grice plays with Griceian pleasures. Democritus, as Grice remarks, seems to be the earliest philosopher to have categorically embraced a hedonistic philosophy. Democritus claims that the supreme goal of life is contentment or cheerfulness, stating that joy and sorrow are the distinguishing mark of things beneficial and harmful. The Cyrenaics are an ultra-hedonist Grecoam school of philosophy founded by Aristippus. Many of the principles of the school were set by his grandson, Aristippus the Younger, and Theodorus. The Cyrenaic school is one of the earliest Socratic schools. The Cyrenaics teach that the only intrinsic ‘agathon’ is pleasure ‘hedone,’ which means not just the absence of pain, but a positively enjoyable momentary sensation. A physical pleasure is stronger than a pleasure of anticipation or memory. The Cyrenaics do, however, recognize the value of social obligation, and that pleasure may be gained from altruism. The Cyrenaic school dies out within a century, and is replaced by Epicureanism.  The Cyrenaics are known for their sceptical epistemology. The Cyrenaics reduce logic to a basic doctrine concerning the criterion of truth. The Cyrenaics think that one can only know with certainty his immediate sense-experience, e. g., that he is having a sweet sensation. But one can know nothing about the nature of the object that causes this sensation, e.g., that honey is sweet. The Cyrenaics also deny that we can have knowledge of what the experience of others are like. All knowledge is immediate sensation. Sensation is a motion which is purely subjective, and is painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as it is violent, tranquil or gentle. Further, sensation is entirely individual and can in no way be described as constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only possible criterion of knowledge and of conduct. The way of being affected is alone knowable. Thus the sole aim for everyone should be pleasure. Cyrenaicism deduces a single, universal aim for all which is pleasure. Furthermore, feeling is momentary and homogeneous. It follows that past and future pleasure have no real existence for us, and that in present pleasure there is no distinction of kind. Socrates speaks of the higher pleasure of the intellect. The Cyrenaics denies the validity of this distinction and say that bodily pleasure (hedone somatike), being more simple and more intense, is preferable. Momentary pleasure, preferably of a physical kind, is the only good for a human. However, an action which gives immediate pleasure can create more than their equivalent of pain. The wise person should be in control (egcrateia) of pleasure rather than be enslaved to it, otherwise pain results, and this requires judgement to evaluate this or that pleasure of life. Regard should be paid to law and custom, because even though neither law nor custom have an intrinsic value on its own, violating law or custom leads to an unpleasant penalty being imposed by others. Likewise, friendship and justice are useful because of the pleasure they provide. Thus the Cyrenaics believe in the hedonistic value of social obligation and altruistic behaviour.  Epicureanism is a system of philosophy based upon the teachings of Epicurus, an atomic materialist, following in the steps of Democritus and Leucippus. Epicurus’s materialism leads him to a general stance against superstition or the idea of divine intervention. Following Aristippus, Epicurus believes that the greatest good is to seek modest, sustainable pleasure in the form of a state of tranquility and freedom from fear (ataraxia) and absence of bodily pain (aponia) through knowledge of the workings of the world and the limits of desire. The combination of these two states, ataraxia and aponia, is supposed to constitute happiness in its highest form. Although Epicureanism is a form of hedonism, insofar as it declares pleasure as the sole intrinsic good, its conception of absence of pain as the greatest pleasure and its advocacy of a simple life make it different from hedonism as it is commonly understood. In the Epicurean view, the highest pleasure (tranquility and freedom from fear) is obtained by knowledge, friendship and living a virtuous and temperate life. Epicurus lauds the enjoyment of a simple pleasure, by which he means abstaining from the bodily desire, such as sex and the appetite, verging on asceticism. Epicurus argues that when eating, one should not eat too richly, for it could lead to dissatisfaction later, such as the grim realization that one could not afford such delicacies in the future. Likewise, sex could lead to increased lust and dissatisfaction with the sexual partner. Epicurus does not articulate a broad system of social ethics that has survived but had a unique version of the golden rule.  It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, agreeing neither to harm nor be harmed, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life. Epicureanism is originally a challenge to Platonism, though later it became the main opponent of Stoicism. Epicurus and his followers shun politics. After the death of Epicurus, his school is headed by Hermarchus. Later many Epicurean societies flourish in the Late Hellenistic era and during the Roman era, such as those in Antiochia, Alexandria, Rhodes and Ercolano. The poet Lucretius is its most known Roman proponent. By the end of the Roman Empire, having undergone attack and repression, Epicureanism has all but died out, and would be resurrected in the seventeenth century by the atomist Pierre Gassendi. Some writings by Epicurus have survived. Some scholars consider the epic poem “De natura rerum” by Lucretius to present in one unified work the core arguments and theories of Epicureanism. Many of the papyrus scrolls unearthed at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum are Epicurean texts. At least some are thought to have belonged to the Epicurean Philodemus. Cf. Barnes on epicures and connoiseurs. Many a controversy arising out of this or that value judgement is settled by saying, ‘I like it and you don’t, and that s the end of the matter.’ I am content to adopt this solution of the difficulty on matters such as food and drink. Even here, though, we admit the existence of epicures and connoisseurs.Why are we not content to accept the same solution on every matter where value is concerned? The reason I am not so content lies in the fact that the action of one man dictated by his approval of something is frequently incompatible with the action of another man dictated by his approval of something. This is obviously philosophical, especially for the Grecian hedonistic Epicureians made popular by Marius and Walter Pater at Oxford. L and S have "ἡδονή,” also “ἁδονά,” or in a chorus in tragedy, “ἡδονά,” ultimately from "ἥδομαι,” which they render it as “enjoyment, pleasure,” “prop. of sensual pleasure.” αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡ. Plato, Republic, 328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1151a13; αἱ περὶ πότους καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Plato, Republic, 389e; but also ἀκοῆς ἡ; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl. R. 582b; of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡ.; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι, to give way to pleasure; Pl. Lg. 727c; κότερα ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ; shall I speak truly or so as to humour you? εἰ ὑμῖν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ, “one feels pleasure at the thought that …” ; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to be satisfied with; ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει; ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), of a temple; δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν;  ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ.; πρὸς ἡ. Λέγειν, “to speak so as to please another”; δημηγορεῖν; οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα; πάντα πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας; later πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι; καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν κλύειν; καθ᾽ ἡδονήν ἐστί μοι; καθ᾽ ἡ. τι δρᾶν, ποιεῖν; καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι, it is a pleasure or delight to another; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχειν τινάς, to take pleasure in them; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, oοἱ λυπηροί; μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ; ἡδονᾷ with pleasure; a pleasure; ἡδοναὶ τραγημάτων sweetmeats; plural., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts. In Ionic philosophers, taste, flavour, usually joined with χροιή. Note that Aristotle uses somatike hedone. As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well aware of the centrality of hedone in Aristotles system. Pleasure is sometimes rendered “placitum,” as in “ad placitum,” in scholastic philosophy, but that is because scholastic philosophy is not as Hellenic as it should be. Actually, Grice prefers “agreeable.” One of Grices requisites for an ascription of eudaemonia (to have a fairy godmother) precisely has the system of ends an agent chooses to realise to be an agreeable one. One form or mode of agreeableness, Grice notes, is, unless counteracted, automatically attached to the attainment of an object of desire, such attainment being routinely a source of satisfaction. The generation of such a satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for preferring one system of ends to another. However, some other mode of agreeableness, such as e. g. being a source of delight, which is not routinely associated with the fulfilment of this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of other features relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and another. Further, a system of ends the operation of which is especially agreeable is stable not only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the somewhat weakening effect of ‘egcrateia,’ incontinence, or akrasia, if you mustn’t. A disturbing influence, as Aristotle knows from experience, is more surely met by a principle in consort with a supporting attraction than by the principle alone. Grices favourite hedonistic implicaturum was “please,” as in “please, please me,” by The Beatles. While Grice claims to love Kantotle, he cannot hide his greater reverence for Aristotle, instilled early on at Corpus. An Oxonian need not recite Kant in what during the Second World War was referred to as the Hun, and while Aristotle was a no-no at Clifton (koine!), Hardie makes Grice love him. With eudaemonia, Grice finds a perfect synthetic futilitarian concept to balance his innate analytic tendencies. There is Grecian eudaemonism and there is Griceian eudaemonism. L and S are not too helpful. They have “εὐδαιμονία” (Ion. –ιη), which they render not as happiness, but as “prosperity, good fortune, opulence;” “χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐ.;” of countries; “μοῖρ᾽ εὐδαιμονίας.” In a second use, the expression is indeed rendered as “true, full happiness;” “εὐ. οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐν χρυσῷ; εὐ. ψυχῆς, oκακοδαιμονίη, cf. Pl. Def. 412d, Arist. EN 1095a18, sometimes personified as a divinity. There is eudaemonia and there is kakodaemonia. Of course, Grice’s locus classicus is EN 1095a18, which is Grice’s fairy godmother, almost. Cf. Austin on agathon and eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics, unearthed by Urmson and Warnock, a response to an essay by Prichard in “Philosophy” on the meaning of agathon in Aristotle’s ethics. Pritchard argues that Aristotle regards “agathon” to mean conducive to “eudaemonia,” and, consequently, that Aristotle maintains that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire for eudaemonia. Austin finds fault with this. First, agathon in Aristotle does not have a single usage, and a fortiori not the one Pritchard suggests. Second, if one has to summarise the usage of “agathon” in one phrase, “being desired” cannot fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides “τό άγαθόν,” even if Davidson would disagree. Prichard endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, “agathon” seems to mean simply that being desired or an ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim of a person. In other contexts, “αγαθον” takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as “a good.” Prichard argues that by "αγαθον" Aristotle actually means, except in the Nicomachean Ethics, conducive to eudaemonia, and holds that when a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to attain eudaemonia. Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of man’s ultimate aim. Grice takes life seriously: philosophical biology. He even writes an essay entitled “Philosophy of life,” listed is in PGRICE. Grice bases his thought on his tutee Ackrill’s Dawes Hicks essay for the BA, who quotes extensively from Hardie. Grice also reviews that “serious student of Greek philosophy,” Austin, in his response to Prichard, Grice’s fairy godmother. Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what Grecian eudaimonia means is that eudaemonia is to be understood as the name for that state or condition which one’s good dæmon would, if he could, ensure for one. One’s good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to one, solely by concern for one’s eudaemonia, well-being or happiness. To change the idiom, eudæmonia is the general characterisation of what a full-time and unhampered fairy godmother would secure for one. Grice is concerned with the specific system of ends that eudaemonia consists for Ariskant. Grice borrows, but never returns, some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. Johns, Ackrill. Ackrills point is about the etymological basis for eudaemonia, from eudaemon, the good dæmon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and taken literally. Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription of eudaemonia to the agent. For Grice, as for Kantotle, telos and eudaemonia are related in subtle ways. For eudaemonia we cannot deal with just one end, but a system of ends, although such a system may be a singleton. Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising end so that a particular ascription of an end may entail an ascription of eudaemonia. Grice follows the textual criticism of his tutee Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that eudaemonia is literally related to the eudaemon. In PGRICE Warner explores Grice’s concept of eudaemonia. Warner is especially helpful with the third difficult Carus lecture by Grice, a metaphysical defence of absolute value. Warner connects with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception seen in an evolutionary light and the Kantotelian idea of eudaemonia. In response to Warner’s overview of the oeuvre of Grice for the festschrift that Warner co-edited with Grandy, Grice refers to the editors collectively as Richards. While he feels he has to use “happiness,” Grice is always having Aristotle’s eudaemonia in mind. The implicaturum of Smith is ‘happy’ is more complex than Kantotle thinks. Austen knew. For Emma, you decide if youre happy. Ultimately, for Grice, the rational life is the happy life. Grice took life seriously: philosophical biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the Descartes essay in WOW, where he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit, even if he implicates he is no Cartesian scholar – what Oxonian would? It concerns certainty. And certainty is originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian, in parts. Ayer says that to know is to assure that one is certain or sure. So he could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play and explore this authoritative voice of introspection: incorrigibility and privileged access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is authoritative. And Grice plays with meaning, too when provoking Malcolm in a don recollection: Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know? Are you certain you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one means Strawsonian and otiose. Tutees. Grice loved to place himself in the role of the philosophical hack, dealing with his tutees inabilities, a whole week long – until he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday morning. Now, the logical form of certain is a trick. Grice would symbolize it as numbering of operators. If G ψs p, G ψs ψs p, and G ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers something like a backing for it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesnt think so. Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological attitude, state or stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to deliver his BA lecture he chooses ‘intention and uncertainty’ as its topic, just to provoke. Not surprisingly, the “Uncertainty” piece opens with the sceptics challenge. And he will not conclude that the intender is certain. Only that theres some good chance (p ˃0.5) that what he intends will get through! When there is a will, there is a way, when there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing, there is a palæo-Griceian way-ing! Perhaps by know Moore means certain. Grice was amused by the fact that Moore thought that he knew that behind the curtains at the lecture hall at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window, when there wasnt. He uses Moores misuse of know – according to Malcolm – both in Causal theory and Prolegomena. And of course this relates to the topic of the sceptics implicaturum, above, with the two essays Scepticism and Common sense and Moore and Philosophers Paradoxes repr. partially in WOW. With regard to certainty, it is interesting to compare it, as Grice does, not so much with privileged access, but with incorrigibility. Do we not have privileged access to our own beliefs and desires? And, worse still, may it not be true that at least some of our avowals of our beliefs and desires are incorrigible? One of Grices problems is, as he puts it, how to accommodate privileged access and, maybe, incorrigibility. This or that a second-order state may be, in some fashion, incorrigible. On the contrary, for Grice, this or that lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged access. Note that while he is happy to allow privileged access to lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or second-order may, in some fashion, be said to count as an incorrigible avowal. It rains. P judges it rains (privileged access). P judges that P judges that it rains (incorrigible). The justification is conversational. It rains says the P, or expresses the P. Grice wants to be able to say that if a P expresses that p, the P judges₂ that p. If the P expresses that it rains, the P judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order, higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick with judging here. Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones. If P expresses !p, P ψ-s₂ that !p. His second-order, higher-order buletic state is incorrigible (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a third-order buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a matter only of privileged access. For a study of conversation as rational co-operation this utilitarian revival modifies the standard exegesis of Grice as purely Kantian, and has him more in agreement with the general Oxonian meta-ethical scene. Refs.: Under ‘futilitarianism,’ we cover Grice’s views on ‘pleasure’ (he has an essay on “Pleasure,”) and “eudaemonia” (He has an essay on ‘happiness’); other leads are given under ‘grecianism,’ since this is the Grecian side to Grice’s Ariskant; for specific essays on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘eudaimonia,’ the keywords ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ are useful. A good source is the essay on happiness in “Aspects,” which combines ‘eudaemonia’ and ‘agreebleness,’ his futilitarianism turned Kantotelian. BANC.

ens a se: Grice defines an ‘ens a se’ as a being that is completely independent and self-sufficient. Since every creature depends at least upon God for its existence, only God could be ens a se. In fact, only God is, and he must be. For if God depended on any other being, he would be dependent and hence not self-sufficient. To the extent that the ontological argument is plausible, it depends on conceiving of God as ens a se. In other words, God as ens a se is the greatest conceivable being. The idea of ens a se is very important in the Monologion and Proslogion of Anselm, in various works of Duns Scotus, and later Scholastic thought. Ens a se should be distinguished from ens ex se, according to Anselm in Monologion. Ens a se is from itself and not “out of itself.” In other words, ens a se does not depend upon itself for its own existence, because it is supposed to be dependent on absolutely nothing. Further, if ens a se depended upon itself, it would cause itself to exist, and that is impossible, according to medieval and Scholastic philosophers, who took causality to be irreflexive. It is also transitive and asymmetric. Hence, the medieval idea of ens a se should not be confused with Spinoza’s idea of causa sui. Later Scholastics often coined abstract terms to designate the property or entity that makes something to be what it is, in analogy with forming, say, ‘rigidity’ from ‘rigid’. The Latin term ‘aseitas’ is formed from the prepositional phrase in ‘ens a se’ in this way; ‘aseitas’ is tr. into English as ‘aseity’. A better-known example of forming an abstract noun from a concrete word is ‘haecceitas’ thisness from ‘haec’ this.  -- ens rationis Latin, ‘a being of reason’, a thing dependent for its existence upon reason or thought; sometimes known as an intentional being. Ens rationis is the contrasting term for a real being res or ens in re extra animam, such as an individual animal. Real beings exist independently of thought and are the foundation for truth. A being of reason depends upon thought or reason for its existence and is an invention of Enlightenment ens rationis 266   266 the mind, even if it has a foundation in some real being. This conception requires the idea that there are degrees of being. Two kinds of entia rationis are distinguished: those with a foundation in reality and those without one. The objects of logic, which include genera and species, e.g., animal and human, respectively, are entia rationis that have a foundation in reality, but are abstracted from it. In contrast, mythic and fictional objects, such as a chimera or Pegasus, have no foundation in reality. Blindness and deafness are also sometimes called entia rationis.  -- ens realissimum: used by Grice. Latin, ‘most real being’, an informal term for God that occurs rarely in Scholastic philosophers. Within Kant’s philosophy, it has a technical sense. It is an extension of Baumgarten’s idea of ens perfectissimum most perfect being, a being that has the greatest number of possible perfections to the greatest degree. Since ens perfectissimum refers to God as the sum of all possibilities and since actuality is greater than possibility, according to Kant, the idea of God as the sum of all actualities, that is, ens realissimum, is a preferable term for God. Kant thinks that human knowledge is “constrained” to posit the idea of a necessary being. The necessary being that has the best claim to necessity is one that is completely unconditioned, that is, dependent on nothing; this is ens realissimum. He sometimes explicates it in three ways: as the substratum of all realities, as the ground of all realities, and as the sum of all realities. Ens realissimum is nonetheless empirically invalid, since it cannot be experienced by humans. It is something ideal for reason, not real in experience. According to Kant, the ontological argument begins with the concept of ens realissimum and concludes that an existing object falls under that concept Critique of Pure Reason, Book II, chapter 3. 

entelecheia --  used by Grice in his philosophical psychology -- from Grecian entelecheia, energeia, actuality. Aristotle, who coins both terms, entelecheia and energeia, treats entelecheia as a near synonym of Energeia (“which makes me often wonder why he felt the need to coin TWICE” – H. P. Grice.). Entelecheia figures in Aristotle’s definition of the soul (psyche) as the first actuality of the natural body (De Anima, II.1). This is explained by analogy with knowledge: first actuality is to knowledge as second actuality is to the active use of knowledge. ’Entelechia’ is also a technical term, but in German, in Leibniz for the primitive active force in every monad, which is combined with primary matter, and from which the active force, vis viva, is somehow derived (“But I rather use ‘entelecheia’ in the original Grecian.” – Grice). “The vitalist philosopher Hans Driesch used the Aristotelian term in his account of biology, and I feel vitalistic on occasion.” “Life, Driesch holds, is not a bowl of cherries, but an entelechy; and an entelechy is a substantial entity, rather like a mind, that controls organic processes.” “To me, life is rather a bowl of cherries, don’t make it serious! It’s just mysterious!”

implicaturum – “I am aware that with ‘implicaturum,’ as opposed to ‘implicaturum,’ the distinction with ‘implicatio’ is lost – for ‘what is implied,’ in contrast, sounds vulgar.” And then there’s ‘entailment” is not as figurative as it sounds: it inovolves property and limitation -- “Paradoxes of entailment,” “Paradoxes of implication.” Philo and his teacher. Grice is not sure about ‘implicaturum.’ The quote by Moore, 1919 being:"It might be suggested that we should say "p ent q" 'means' "p ) q AND this proposition is an instance of a formal implication, which is not merely true but self-evident, like the laws of formal logic." This proposed definitions would avoid the paradoxes involved in Strachey's definition, since such true formal implications as 'All the persons in this room are more than five years old' are certainly not self-evident; and, so far as I can see, it may state something which is in fact true of p and q, whenever and only whenp ent q. I do not myself think that it gives the meaning of 'p ent q,' since the kind of relation which I see to hold between the premises and a conclusion of a syllogism seems to me one which is purely 'objective' in the sense that no psychological term, such as is involved in the meaning of 'self-evident' is involved in its definition (it it has one). I am not, however, concerned to dispute that some such definition of "p ent q" as this may be true." --- and so on. So, it is apparently all Strachey's fault. This view as to what φA . ent . ψA means has, for instance, if I understand him rightly, been asserted by Mr. O. Strachey in Mind, N.S., 93; since he asserts that, in his opinion, this is what Professor C. I. Lewis means by “φA strictly implies ψA,” and undoubtedly what Professor Lewis means by this is what I mean by φA . ent . ψA. And the same view has been frequently suggested (though I do not know that he has actually asserted it) by Mr. Russell himself (e.g., Principia Mathematica, p. 21). I 1903 B. Russell Princ. Math. ii. 14 How far formal implication is definable in terms of implication simply, or material implication as it may be called, is a difficult  question.  Source : Principles : Chapter III. Implication and Formal Implication. –  Source : Principia, page 7 : "When it is necessary explicitly to discriminate "implication" [i.e. "if p, then q" ] from "formal implication," it is called "material implication." – Source : Principia, page 20 : "When an implication, say ϕx.⊃.ψx, is said to hold always, i.e. when (x):ϕx.⊃.ψx, we shall say that ϕx formally implies ψx"Many logicians did use ‘implicaturum’ not necessarily to mean ‘conversational implicaturum,’ but as the result of ‘implicatio’. ‘Implicatio’ was often identified with the Megarian or Philonian ‘if.’ Why? thought that we probably did need an entailment. The symposium was held in New York with Dana Scott and R. K. Meyer. The notion had been mis-introduced (according to Strawson) in the philosophical literature by Moore. Grice is especially interested in the entailment + implicaturum pair. A philosophical expression may be said to be co-related to an entailment (which is rendered in terms of a reductive analysis).  However, the use of the expression may co-relate to this or that implicaturum which is rendered reasonable in the light of the assumption by the addressee that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of conversational helfpulness. Grice thinks many philosophers take an implicaturum as an entailment when they surely shouldnt! Grice was more interested than Strawson was in the coinage by Moore of entailment for logical consequence. As an analyst, Grice knew that a true conceptual analysis needs to be reductive (if not reductionist). The prongs the analyst lists are thus entailments of the concept in question. Philosophers, however, may misidentify what is an entailment for an implicaturum, or vice versa. Initially, Grice was interested in the second family of cases. With his coinage of disimplicaturum, Grice expands his interest to cover the first family of cases, too. Grice remains a philosophical methodologist. He is not so much concerned with any area or discipline or philosophical concept per se (unless its rationality), but with the misuses of some tools in the philosophy of language as committed by some of his colleagues at Oxford. While entailment, was, for Strawson mis-introduced in the philosophical literature by Moore, entailment seems to be less involved in paradoxes than if is. Grice connects the two, as indeed his tutee Strawson did! As it happens, Strawsons Necessary propositions and entailment statements is his very first published essay, with Mind, a re-write of an unpublication unwritten elsewhere, and which Grice read. The relation of consequence may be considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise. Grices Bootstrap is a principle designed to impoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own! Grice then takes a look at Strawsons very first publication (an unpublication he had written elsewhere). Grice finds Strawson thought he could provide a simple solution to the so-called paradoxes of entailment. At the time, Grice and Strawson were pretty sure that nobody then accepted, if indeed anyone ever did and did make, the identification of the relation symbolised by the horseshoe with the relation which Moore calls entailment, p⊃q, i. e. ~(pΛ~q) is rejected as an analysis of p entails q because it involves this or that allegedly paradoxical implicaturum, as that any false proposition entails any proposition and any true proposition is entailed by any proposition. It is a commonplace that Lewiss amendment had consequences scarcely less paradoxical in terms of the implicatura. For if p is impossible, i.e. self-contradictory, it is impossible that p and ~q. And if q is necessary, ~q is impossible and it is impossible that p and ~q; i. e., if p entails q means it is impossible that p and ~q any necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition and any self-contradictory proposition entails any proposition. On the other hand, Lewiss definition of entailment (i.e. of the relation which holds from p to q whenever q is deducible from p) obviously commends itself in some respects. Now, it is clear that the emphasis laid on the expression-mentioning character of the intensional contingent statement by writing pΛ~q is impossible instead of It is impossible that p and ~q does not avoid the alleged paradoxes of entailment. But it is equally clear that the addition of some provision does avoid them. One may proposes that one should use “entails” such that no necessary statement and no negation of a necessary statement can significantly be said to entail or be entailed by any statement; i. e. the function p entails q cannot take necessary or self-contradictory statements as arguments. The expression p entails q is to be used to mean p⊃q is necessary, and neither p nor q is either necessary or self-contradictory, or pΛ~q is impossible and neither p nor q, nor either of their contradictories, is necessary. Thus, the paradoxes are avoided. For let us assume that p1 expresses a contingent, and q1 a necessary, proposition. p1 and ~q1 is now impossible because ~q1 is impossible. But q1 is necessary. So, by that provision, p1 does not entail q1. We may avoid the paradoxical assertion that p1 entails q2 as merely falling into the equally paradoxical assertion that p1 entails q1 is necessary. For: If q is necessary, q is necessary is, though true, not necessary, but a contingent intensional (Latinate) statement. This becomes part of the philosophers lexicon: intensĭo, f. intendo, which L and S render as a stretching out, straining, effort. E. g. oculorum, Scrib. Comp. 255. Also an intensifying, increase. Calorem suum (sol) intensionibus ac remissionibus temperando fovet,” Sen. Q. N. 7, 1, 3. The tune: “gravis, media, acuta,” Censor. 12. Hence:~(q is necessary) is, though false, possible. Hence “p1Λ~(q1 is necessary)” is, though false, possible. Hence p1 does NOT entail q1 is necessary. Thus, by adopting the view that an entailment statement, and other intensional statements, are non-necessary, and that no necessary statement or its contradictory can entail or be entailed by any statement, Strawson thinks he can avoid the paradox that a necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition, and indeed all the other associated paradoxes of entailment. Grice objected that Strawsons cure was worse than Moores disease! The denial that a necessary proposition can entail or be entailed by any proposition, and, therefore, that necessary propositions can be related to each other by the entailment-relation, is too high a price to pay for the solution of the paradoxes. And here is where Grices implicaturum is meant to do the trick! Or not! When Levinson proposed + for conversationally implicaturum, he is thinking of contrasting it with ⊢.  But things aint that easy. Even the grammar is more complicated: By uttering He is an adult, U explicitly conveys that he is an adult. What U explicitly conveys entails that he is not a child. What U implies is that he should be treated accordingly. Refs.: One good reference is the essay on “Paradoxes of entailment,” in the Grice papers; also his contribution to a symposium for the APA under a separate series, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

enthymeme: an incompletely stated syllogism, with one premise, or even the conclusion, omitted. The term sometimes designates incompletely stated arguments of other kinds. We are expected to supply the missing premise or draw the conclusion if it is not stated. The result is supposed to be a syllogistic inference. For example: ‘He will eventually get caught, for he is a thief’; or ‘He will eventually be caught, for all habitual thieves get caught’. This notion of enthymeme as an incompletely stated syllogism has a long tradition and does not seem inconsistent with Aristotle’s own characterization of it. Thus, Peter of Spain openly declares that an enthymeme is an argument with a single premise that needs to be reduced to syllogism. But Peter also points out that Aristotle spoke of enthymeme as “being of ycos and signum,” and he explains that ycos here means ‘probable proposition’ while signum expresses the necessity of inference. ‘P, therefore Q’ is an ycos in the sense of a proposition that appears to be true to all or to many; but insofar as P has virtually a double power, that of itself and of the proposition understood along with it, it is both probable and demonstrative, albeit from a different point of view. 

conversational entropy. -- Principle of Conversational entropy, a measure of disorder or “information.” The number of states accessible to the various elements of a large system of particles such as a cabbage or the air in a room is represented as “W.” Accessible microstates might be, e. g., energy levels the various particles can reach. One can greatly simplify the statement of certain laws of nature by introducing a logarithmic measure of these accessible microstates. This measure, called “entropy” by H. P. Grice is defined by the formula: SEntropy % df. klnW, where “k” is Grice’’s constant. When the conversational entropy of a conversational system increases, the system becomes more random and disordered (“less dove-tailed,” in Grice’s parlance) in that a larger number of microstates become available for the system’s particles to enter. If a large system within which exchanges of energy occur is isolated, exchanging no energy with its environment, the entropy of the system tends to increase and never decreases. This result is part of the second law of thermodynamics. In real, evolving physical systems effectively isolated from their environments, entropy increases and thus aspects of the system’s organization that depend upon there being only a limited range of accessible microstates are altered. A cabbage totally isolated in a container e. g. would decay as complicated organic molecules eventually became unstructured in the course of ongoing exchanges of energy and attendant entropy increases. In Grice’s information theory, a state or event (or conversational move) is said to contain more information than a second state or event if the former state is less probable and thus in a sense more surprising (or “baffling,” in Grice’s term) than the latter. Other plausible constraints suggest a logarithmic measure of information content. Suppose X is a set of alternative possible states, xi , and pxi  is the probability of each xi 1 X. If state xi has occurred the information content of that occurrence is taken to be -log2pxi . This function increases as the probability of xi decreases. If it is unknown which xi will occur, it is reasonable to represent the expected information content of X as the sum of the information contents of the alternative states xi weighted in each case by the probability of the state, giving: This is called the Shannon’s or Grice’s entropy. Both Shannon’s and Grice’s entropy and physical entropy can be thought of as logarithmic measures of disarray. But this statement trades on a broad understanding of ‘disarray’. A close relationship between the two concepts of entropy should not be assumed, not even by Grice, less so by Shannon.  

environmental implicaturum: For Grice, two pirots need to share an environment -- environmental philosophy, the critical study of concepts defining relations between human beings and their non-human environment. Environmental ethics, a major component of environmental philosophy, addresses the normative significance of these relations. The relevance of ecological relations to human affairs has been recognized at least since Darwin, but the growing sense of human responsibility for their deterioration, reflected in books such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 2 and Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation 5, has prompted the recent upsurge of interest. Environmental philosophers have adduced a wide variety of human attitudes and practices to account for the perceived deterioration, including religious and scientific attitudes, social institutions, and industrial technology. Proposed remedies typically urge a reorientation or new “ethic” that recognizes “intrinsic value” in the natural world. Examples include the “land ethic” of Aldo Leopold 78, which pictures humans as belonging to, rather than owning, the biotic community “the land”; deep ecology, a stance articulated by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess b.2, which advocates forms of identification with the non-human world; and ecofeminism, which rejects prevailing attitudes to the natural world that are perceived as patriarchal. At the heart of environmental ethics lies the attempt to articulate the basis of concern for the natural world. It encompasses global as well as local issues, and considers the longer-term ecological, and even evolutionary, fate of the human and non-human world. Many of its practitioners question the anthropocentric claim that human beings are the exclusive or even central focus of envelope paradox environmental philosophy 268   268 ethical concern. In thus extending both the scope and the grounds of concern, it presents a challenge to the stance of conventional interhuman ethics. It debates how to balance the claims of present and future, human and non-human, sentient and non-sentient, individuals and wholes. It investigates the prospects for a sustainable relationship between economic and ecological systems, and pursues the implications of this relationship with respect to social justice and political institutions. Besides also engaging metaethical questions about, for example, the objectivity and commensurability of values, environmental philosophers are led to consider the nature and significance of environmental change and the ontological status of collective entities such as species and ecosystems. In a more traditional vein, environmental philosophy revives metaphysical debates surrounding the perennial question of “man’s place in nature,” and finds both precedent and inspiration in earlier philosophies and cultures. 

epistemic deontologism, a duty-based view of the nature of epistemic justification. A central concern of epistemology is to account for the distinction between justified and unjustified beliefs. According to epistemic deontologism, the concept of justification may be analyzed by using, in a specific sense relevant to the pursuit of knowledge, terms such as ‘ought’, ‘obligatory’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’. A subject S is justified in believing that p provided S does not violate any epistemic obligations  those that arise from the goal of believing what is true and not believing what is false. Equivalently, S is justified in believing that p provided believing p is  from the point of view taken in the pursuit of truth  permissible for S. Among contemporary epistemologists, this view is held by Chisholm, Laurence BonJour, and Carl Ginet. Its significance is twofold. If justification is a function of meeting obligations, then it is, contrary to some versions of naturalistic epistemology, normative. Second, if the normativity of justification is deontological, the factors that determine whether a belief is justified must be internal to the subject’s mind. Critics of epistemic deontologism, most conspicuously Alston, contend that belief is involuntary and thus cannot be a proper object of obligations. If, e.g., one is looking out the window and notices that it is raining, one is psychologically forced to believe that it is raining. Deontologists can reply to this objection by rejecting its underlying premise: epistemic obligations require that belief be voluntary. Alternatively, they may insist that belief is voluntary after all, and thus subject to epistemic obligations, for there is a means by which one can avoid believing what one ought not to believe: weighing the evidence, or deliberation.  -- epistemic logic, the logical investigation of epistemic concepts and statements. Epistemic concepts include the concepts of knowledge, reasonable belief, justification, evidence, certainty, and related notions. Epistemic logic is usually taken to include the logic of belief or doxastic logic. Much of the recent work on epistemic logic is based on the view that it is a branch of modal logic. In the early 0s von Wright observed that the epistemic notions verified known to be true, undecided, and falsified are related to each other in the same way as the alethic modalities necessary, contingent, and impossible, and behave logically in analogous ways. This analogy is not surprising in view of the fact that the meaning of modal concepts is often explained epistemically. For example, in the 0s Peirce defined informational possibility as that “which in a given state of information is not perfectly known not to be true,” and called informationally necessary “that which is perfectly known to be true.” The modal logic of epistemic and doxastic concepts was studied systematically by Hintikka in his pioneering Knowledge and Belief2, which applied to the concepts of knowledge and belief the semantical method the method of modal sets that he had used earlier for the investigation of modal logic. In this approach, the truth of the proposition that a knows that p briefly Kap in a possible world or situation u is taken to mean that p holds in all epistemic alternatives of u; these are understood as worlds compatible with what a knows at u. If the relation of epistemic alternativeness is reflexive, the principle ‘KapPp’ only what is the case can be known is valid, and the assumption that the alternativeness relation is transitive validates the so-called KK-thesis, ‘Kap P Ka Ka p’ if a knows that p, a knows that a knows that p; these two assumptions together make the logic of knowledge similar to an S4-type modal logic. If the knowledge operator Ka and the corresponding epistemic possibility operator Pa are added to quantification theory with identity, it becomes possible to study the interplay between quantifiers and epistemic operators and the behavior of individual terms in epistemic contexts, and analyze such locutions as ‘a knows who what b some F is’. The problems of epistemic logic in this area are part of the general problem of giving a coherent semantical account of propositional attitudes. If a proposition p is true in all epistemic alternatives of a given world, so are all logical consequences of p; thus the possible-worlds semantics of epistemic concepts outlined above leads to the result that a person knows all logical consequences of what he knows. This is a paradoxical conclusion; it is called the problem of logical omniscience. The solution of this problem requires a distinction between different levels of knowledge  for example, between tacit and explicit knowledge. A more realistic model of knowledge can be obtained by supplementing the basic possible-worlds account by an analysis of the processes by which the implicit knowledge can be activated and made explicit. Modal epistemic logics have found fruitful applications in the recent work on knowledge representation and in the logic and semantics of questions and answers in which questions are interpreted as requests for knowledge or “epistemic imperatives.”  -- epistemic principle, a principle of rationality applicable to such concepts as knowledge, justification, and reasonable belief. Epistemic principles include the principles of epistemic logic and principles that relate different epistemic concepts to one another, or epistemic concepts to nonepistemic ones e.g., semantic concepts. Epistemic concepts include the concepts of knowledge, reasonable belief, justification, epistemic probability, and other concepts that are used for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of beliefs and knowledge claims. Epistemic principles can be formulated as principles concerning belief systems or information systems, i.e., systems that characterize a person’s possible doxastic state at a given time; a belief system may be construed as a set of accepted propositions or as a system of degrees of belief. It is possible to distinguish two kinds of epistemic principles: a principles concerning the rationality of a single belief system, and b principles concerning the rational changes of belief. The former include the requirements of coherence and consistency for beliefs and for probabilities; such principles may be said to concern the statics of belief systems. The latter principles include various principles of belief revision and adjustment, i.e., principles concerning the dynamics of belief systems.  -- epistemic privacy, the relation a person has to a proposition when only that person can have direct or non-inferential knowledge of the proposition. It is widely thought that people have epistemic privacy with respect to propositions about certain of their own mental states. According to this view, a person can know directly that he has certain thoughts or feelings or sensory experiences. Perhaps others can also know that the person has these thoughts, feelings, or experiences, but if they can it is only as a result of inference from propositions about the person’s behavior or physical condition.  -- epistemic regress argument, an argument, originating in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, aiming to show that knowledge and epistemic justification have a two-tier structure as described by epistemic foundationalism. It lends itself to the following outline regarding justification. If you have any justified belief, this belief occurs in an evidential chain including at least two links: the supporting link i.e., the evidence and the supported link i.e., the justified belief. This does not mean, however, that all evidence consists of beliefs. Evidential chains might come in any of four kinds: circular chains, endless chains, chains ending in unjustified beliefs, and chains anchored in foundational beliefs that do not derive their justification from other beliefs. Only the fourth, foundationalist kind is defensible as grounding knowledge and epistemic justification. Could all justification be inferential? A belief, B1, is inferentially justified when it owes its justification, at least in part, to some other belief, B2. Whence the justification for B2? If B2 owes its justification to B1, we have a troublesome circle. How can B2 yield justification or evidence for B1, if B2 owes its evidential status to B1? On the other hand, if B2 owes its justification to another belief, B3, and B3 owes its justification to yet another belief, B4, and so on ad infinitum, we have a troublesome endless regress of justification. Such a regress seems to deliver not actual justification, but at best merely potential justification, for the belief at its head. Actual finite humans, furthermore, seem not to be able to comprehend, or to possess, all the steps of an infinite regress of justification. Finally, if B2 is itself unjustified, it evidently will be unable to provide justification for B1. It seems, then, that the structure of inferential justification does not consist of either circular justification, endless regresses of justification, or unjustified starter-beliefs. We have foundationalism, then, as the most viable account of evidential chains, so long as we understand it as the structural view that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially i.e., without deriving justification from other beliefs, but can nonetheless provide justification for other beliefs. More precisely, if we have any justified beliefs, we have some foundational, non-inferentially justified beliefs. This regress argument needs some refinement before its full force can be appreciated. With suitable refinement, however, it can seriously challenge such alternatives to foundationalism as coherentism and contextualism. The regress argument has been a key motivation for foundationalism in the history of epistemology.  -- epistemology from Grecian episteme, ‘knowledge’, and logos, ‘explanation’, the study of the nature of knowledge and justification; specifically, the study of a the defining features, b the substantive conditions or sources, and c the limits of knowledge and justification. The latter three categories are represented by traditional philosophical controversy over the analysis of knowledge and justification, the sources of knowledge and justification e.g., rationalism versus empiricism, and the viability of skepticism about knowledge and justification. Kinds of knowledge. Knowledge can be either explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge is self-conscious in that the knower is aware of the relevant state of knowledge, whereas tacit knowledge is implicit, hidden from self-consciousness. Much of our knowledge is tacit: it is genuine but we are unaware of the relevant states of knowledge, even if we can achieve awareness upon suitable reflection. In this regard, knowledge resembles many of our psychological states. The existence of a psychological state in a person does not require the person’s awareness of that state, although it may require the person’s awareness of an object of that state such as what is sensed or perceived. Philosophers have identified various species of knowledge: for example, propositional knowledge that something is so, non-propositional knowledge of something e.g., knowledge by acquaintance, or by direct awareness, empirical a posteriori propositional knowledge, nonempirical a priori propositional knowledge, and knowledge of how to do something. Philosophical controversy has arisen over distinctions between such species, for example, over i the relations between some of these species e.g., does knowing-how reduce to knowledge-that?, and ii the viability of some of these species e.g., is there really such a thing as, or even a coherent notion of, a priori knowledge?. A primary concern of classical modern philosophy, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the extent of our a priori knowledge relative to the extent of our a posteriori knowledge. Such rationalists as Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza contended that all genuine knowledge of the real world is a priori, whereas such empiricists as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume argued that all such knowledge is a posteriori. In his Critique of Pure Reason 1781, Kant sought a grand reconciliation, aiming to preserve the key lessons of both rationalism and empiricism. Since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a posteriori knowledge has been widely regarded as knowledge that depends for its supporting ground on some specific sensory or perceptual experience; and a priori knowledge has been widely regarded as knowledge that does not depend for its supporting ground on such experience. Kant and others have held that the supporting ground for a priori knowledge comes solely from purely intellectual processes called “pure reason” or “pure understanding.” Knowledge of logical and mathematical truths typically serves as a standard case of a priori knowledge, whereas knowledge of the existence or presence of physical objects typically serves as a standard case of a posteriori knowledge. A major task for an account of a priori knowledge is the explanation of what the relevant purely intellectual processes are, and of how they contribute to non-empirical knowledge. An analogous task for an account of a posteriori knowledge is the explanation of what sensory or perceptual experience is and how it contributes to empirical knowledge. More fundamentally, epistemologists have sought an account of propositional knowledge in general, i.e., an account of what is common to a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Ever since Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus c.400 B.C., epistemologists have tried to identify the essential, defining components of knowledge. Identifying these components will yield an analysis of knowledge. A prominent traditional view, suggested by Plato and Kant among others, is that propositional knowledge that something is so has three individually necessary and jointly sufficient components: justification, truth, and belief. On this view, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This is the tripartite definition that has come to be called the standard analysis. We can clarify it by attending briefly to each of its three conditions. The belief condition. This requires that anyone who knows that p where ‘p’ stands for any proposition or statement must believe that p. If, therefore, you do not believe that minds are brains say, because you have not considered the matter at all, then you do not know that minds are brains. A knower must be psychologically related somehow to a proposition that is an object of knowledge for that knower. Proponents of the standard analysis hold that only belief can provide the needed psychological relation. Philosophers do not share a uniform account of belief, but some considerations supply common ground. Beliefs are not actions of assenting to a proposition; they rather are dispositional psychological states that can exist even when unmanifested. You do not cease believing that 2 ! 2 % 4, for example, whenever your attention leaves arithmetic. Our believing that p seems to require that we have a tendency to assent to p in certain situations, but it seems also to be more than just such a tendency. What else believing requires remains highly controversial among philosophers. Some philosophers have opposed the belief condition of the standard analysis on the ground that we can accept, or assent to, a known proposition without actually believing it. They contend that we can accept a proposition even if we fail to acquire a tendency, required by believing, to accept that proposition in certain situations. On this view, acceptance is a psychological act that does not entail any dispositional psychological state, and such acceptance is sufficient to relate a knower psychologically to a known proposition. However this view fares, one underlying assumption of the standard analysis seems correct: our concept of knowledge requires that a knower be psychologically related somehow to a known proposition. Barring that requirement, we shall be hard put to explain how knowers psychologically possess their knowledge of known propositions. Even if knowledge requires belief, belief that p does not require knowledge that p, since belief can typically be false. This observation, familiar from Plato’s Theaetetus, assumes that knowledge has a truth condition. On the standard analysis, if you know that p, then it is true that p. If, therefore, it is false that minds are brains, then you do not know that minds are brains. It is thus misleading to say, e.g., that astronomers before Copernicus knew that the earth is flat; at best, they justifiably believed that they knew this. The truth condition. This condition of the standard analysis has not attracted any serious challenge. Controversy over it has focused instead on Pilate’s vexing question: What is truth? This question concerns what truth consists in, not our ways of finding out what is true. Influential answers come from at least three approaches: truth as correspondence i.e., agreement, of some specified sort, between a proposition and an actual situation; truth as coherence i.e., interconnectedness of a proposition with a specified system of propositions; and truth as pragmatic cognitive value i.e., usefulness of a proposition in achieving certain intellectual goals. Without assessing these prominent approaches, we should recognize, in accord with the standard analysis, that our concept of knowledge seems to have a factual requirement: we epistemology epistemology 274   274 genuinely know that p only if it is the case that p. The pertinent notion of “its being the case” seems equivalent to the notion of “how reality is” or “how things really are.” The latter notion seems essential to our notion of knowledge, but is open to controversy over its explication. The justification condition. Knowledge is not simply true belief. Some true beliefs are supported only by lucky guesswork and hence do not qualify as knowledge. Knowledge requires that the satisfaction of its belief condition be “appropriately related” to the satisfaction of its truth condition. This is one broad way of understanding the justification condition of the standard analysis. More specifically, we might say that a knower must have adequate indication that a known proposition is true. If we understand such adequate indication as a sort of evidence indicating that a proposition is true, we have reached the traditional general view of the justification condition: justification as evidence. Questions about justification attract the lion’s share of attention in contemporary epistemology. Controversy focuses on the meaning of ‘justification’ as well as on the substantive conditions for a belief’s being justified in a way appropriate to knowledge. Current debates about the meaning of ‘justification’ revolve around the question whether, and if so how, the concept of epistemic knowledge-relevant justification is normative. Since the 0s Chisholm has defended the following deontological obligation-oriented notion of justification: the claim that a proposition, p, is epistemically justified for you means that it is false that you ought to refrain from accepting p. In other terms, to say that p is epistemically justified is to say that accepting p is epistemically permissible  at least in the sense that accepting p is consistent with a certain set of epistemic rules. This deontological construal enjoys wide representation in contemporary epistemology. A normative construal of justification need not be deontological; it need not use the notions of obligation and permission. Alston, for instance, has introduced a non-deontological normative concept of justification that relies mainly on the notion of what is epistemically good from the viewpoint of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity. Alston links epistemic goodness to a belief’s being based on adequate grounds in the absence of overriding reasons to the contrary. Some epistemologists shun normative construals of justification as superfluous. One noteworthy view is that ‘epistemic justification’ means simply ‘evidential support’ of a certain sort. To say that p is epistemically justifiable to some extent for you is, on this view, just to say that p is supportable to some extent by your overall evidential reasons. This construal will be non-normative so long as the notions of supportability and an evidential reason are nonnormative. Some philosophers have tried to explicate the latter notions without relying on talk of epistemic permissibility or epistemic goodness. We can understand the relevant notion of “support” in terms of non-normative notions of entailment and explanation or, answering why-questions. We can understand the notion of an “evidential reason” via the notion of a psychological state that can stand in a certain truth-indicating support relation to propositions. For instance, we might regard nondoxastic states of “seeming to perceive” something e.g., seeming to see a dictionary here as foundational truth indicators for certain physical-object propositions e.g., the proposition that there is a dictionary here, in virtue of those states being best explained by those propositions. If anything resembling this approach succeeds, we can get by without the aforementioned normative notions of epistemic justification. Foundationalism versus coherentism. Talk of foundational truth indicators brings us to a key controversy over justification: Does epistemic justification, and thus knowledge, have foundations, and if so, in what sense? This question can be clarified as the issue whether some beliefs can not only a have their epistemic justification non-inferentially i.e., apart from evidential support from any other beliefs, but also b provide epistemic justification for all justified beliefs that lack such non-inferential justification. Foundationalism gives an affirmative answer to this issue, and is represented in varying ways by, e.g., Aristotle, Descartes, Russell, C. I. Lewis, and Chisholm. Foundationalists do not share a uniform account of non-inferential justification. Some construe non-inferential justification as self-justification. Others reject literal self-justification for beliefs, and argue that foundational beliefs have their non-inferential justification in virtue of evidential support from the deliverances of non-belief psychological states, e.g., perception “seem-ing-to-perceive” states, sensation “seeming-to-sense” states, or memory “seeming-toremember” states. Still others understand noninferential justification in terms of a belief’s being “reliably produced,” i.e., caused and sustained by some non-belief belief-producing process or source e.g., perception, memory, introspection that tends to produce true rather than false beliefs. This last view takes the causal source of a belief to be crucial to its justification. Unlike Descartes, contemporary foundationalists clearly separate claims to non-inferential, foundational justification from claims to certainty. They typically settle for a modest foundationalism implying that foundational beliefs need not be indubitable or infallible. This contrasts with the radical foundationalism of Descartes. The traditional competitor to foundationalism is the coherence theory of justification, i.e., epistemic coherentism. This is not the coherence definition of truth; it rather is the view that the justification of any belief depends on that belief’s having evidential support from some other belief via coherence relations such as entailment or explanatory relations. Notable proponents include Hegel, Bosanquet, and Sellars. A prominent contemporary version of epistemic coherentism states that evidential coherence relations among beliefs are typically explanatory relations. The rough idea is that a belief is justified for you so long as it either best explains, or is best explained by, some member of the system of beliefs that has maximal explanatory power for you. Contemporary coherentism is uniformly systemic or holistic; it finds the ultimate source of justification in a system of interconnected beliefs or potential beliefs. One problem has troubled all versions of coherentism that aim to explain empirical justification: the isolation argument. According to this argument, coherentism entails that you can be epistemically justified in accepting an empirical proposition that is incompatible with, or at least improbable given, your total empirical evidence. The key assumption of this argument is that your total empirical evidence includes non-belief sensory and perceptual awareness-states, such as your feeling pain or your seeming to see something. These are not belief-states. Epistemic coherentism, by definition, makes justification a function solely of coherence relations between propositions, such as propositions one believes or accepts. Thus, such coherentism seems to isolate justification from the evidential import of non-belief awareness-states. Coherentists have tried to handle this problem, but no resolution enjoys wide acceptance. Causal and contextualist theories. Some contemporary epistemologists endorse contextualism regarding epistemic justification, a view suggested by Dewey, Vitters, and Kuhn, among others. On this view, all justified beliefs depend for their evidential support on some unjustified beliefs that need no justification. In any context of inquiry, people simply assume the acceptability of some propositions as starting points for inquiry, and these “contextually basic” propositions, though lacking evidential support, can serve as evidential support for other propositions. Contextualists stress that contextually basic propositions can vary from context to context e.g., from theological inquiry to biological inquiry and from social group to social group. The main problem for contextualists comes from their view that unjustified assumptions can provide epistemic justification for other propositions. We need a precise explanation of how an unjustified assumption can yield evidential support, how a non-probable belief can make another belief probable. Contextualists have not given a uniform explanation here. Recently some epistemologists have recommended that we give up the traditional evidence condition for knowledge. They recommend that we construe the justification condition as a causal condition. Roughly, the idea is that you know that p if and only if a you believe that p, b p is true, and c your believing that p is causally produced and sustained by the fact that makes p true. This is the basis of the causal theory of knowing, which comes with varying details. Any such causal theory faces serious problems from our knowledge of universal propositions. Evidently, we know, for instance, that all dictionaries are produced by people, but our believing that this is so seems not to be causally supported by the fact that all dictionaries are humanly produced. It is not clear that the latter fact causally produces any beliefs. Another problem is that causal theories typically neglect what seems to be crucial to any account of the justification condition: the requirement that justificational support for a belief be accessible, in some sense, to the believer. The rough idea is that one must be able to access, or bring to awareness, the justification underlying one’s beliefs. The causal origins of a belief are, of course, often very complex and inaccessible to a believer. Causal theories thus face problems from an accessibility requirement on justification. Internalism regarding justification preserves an accessibility requirement on what confers justification, whereas epistemic externalism rejects this requirement. Debates over internalism and externalism abound in current epistemology, but internalists do not yet share a uniform detailed account of accessibility. The Gettier problem. The standard analysis of knowledge, however elaborated, faces a devastating challenge that initially gave rise to causal theories of knowledge: the Gettier problem. In 3 Edmund Gettier published a highly influential challenge to the view that if you have a justified true belief that p, then you know that p. Here is one of Gettier’s counterexamples to this view: Smith is justified in believing the false proposition that i Jones owns a Ford. On the basis of i, Smith infers, and thus is justified in believing, that ii either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. As it happens, Brown is in Barcelona, and so ii is true. So, although Smith is justified in believing the true proposition ii, Smith does not know ii. Gettier-style counterexamples are cases where a person has justified true belief that p but lacks knowledge that p. The Gettier problem is the problem of finding a modification of, or an alternative to, the standard analysis that avoids difficulties from Gettier-style counterexamples. The controversy over the Gettier problem is highly complex and still unsettled. Many epistemologists take the lesson of Gettier-style counterexamples to be that propositional knowledge requires a fourth condition, beyond the justification, truth, and belief conditions. No specific fourth condition has received overwhelming acceptance, but some proposals have become prominent. The so-called defeasibility condition, e.g., requires that the justification appropriate to knowledge be “undefeated” in the general sense that some appropriate subjunctive conditional concerning defeaters of justification be true of that justification. For instance, one simple defeasibility fourth condition requires of Smith’s knowing that p that there be no true proposition, q, such that if q became justified for Smith, p would no longer be justified for Smith. So if Smith knows, on the basis of his visual perception, that Mary removed books from the library, then Smith’s coming to believe the true proposition that Mary’s identical twin removed books from the library would not undermine the justification for Smith’s belief concerning Mary herself. A different approach shuns subjunctive conditionals of that sort, and contends that propositional knowledge requires justified true belief that is sustained by the collective totality of actual truths. This approach requires a detailed account of when justification is undermined and restored. The Gettier problem is epistemologically important. One branch of epistemology seeks a precise understanding of the nature e.g., the essential components of propositional knowledge. Our having a precise understanding of propositional knowledge requires our having a Gettier-proof analysis of such knowledge. Epistemologists thus need a defensible solution to the Gettier problem, however complex that solution is. Skepticism. Epistemologists debate the limits, or scope, of knowledge. The more restricted we take the limits of knowledge to be, the more skeptical we are. Two influential types of skepticism are knowledge skepticism and justification skepticism. Unrestricted knowledge skepticism implies that no one knows anything, whereas unrestricted justification skepticism implies the more extreme view that no one is even justified in believing anything. Some forms of skepticism are stronger than others. Knowledge skepticism in its strongest form implies that it is impossible for anyone to know anything. A weaker form would deny the actuality of our having knowledge, but leave open its possibility. Many skeptics have restricted their skepticism to a particular domain of supposed knowledge: e.g., knowledge of the external world, knowledge of other minds, knowledge of the past or the future, or knowledge of unperceived items. Such limited skepticism is more common than unrestricted skepticism in the history of epistemology. Arguments supporting skepticism come in many forms. One of the most difficult is the problem of the criterion, a version of which has been stated by the sixteenth-century skeptic Montaigne: “To adjudicate [between the true and the false] among the appearances of things, we need to have a distinguishing method; to validate this method, we need to have a justifying argument; but to validate this justifying argument, we need the very method at issue. And there we are, going round on the wheel.” This line of skeptical argument originated in ancient Greece, with epistemology itself. It forces us to face this question: How can we specify what we know without having specified how we know, and how can we specify how we know without having specified what we know? Is there any reasonable way out of this threatening circle? This is one of the most difficult epistemological problems, and a cogent epistemology must offer a defensible solution to epistemology epistemology 277   277 it. Contemporary epistemology still lacks a widely accepted reply to this urgent problem

erfahrung: Grice used the German, ‘since I find it difficult to translate.” G. term tr. into English, especially since Kant, as ‘experience’. Kant does not use it as a technical term; rather, it indicates that which requires explanation through more precisely drawn technical distinctions such as those among ‘sensibility’, ‘understanding’, and ‘reason’. In the early twentieth century, Husserl sometimes distinguishes between Erfahrung and Erlebnis, the former indicating experience as capable of being thematized and methodically described or analyzed, the latter experience as “lived through” and never fully available to analysis. Such a distinction occasionally reappears in later texts of phenomenology and existentialism. 

erigena: j. s. – a Mediaeval Griceian -- also called John the Scot, Eriugena, and Scottigena, Irish-born scholar and theologian. He taught grammar and dialectics at the court of Charles the Bald near Laon from 845 on. In a controversy in 851, John argued that there was only one predestination, to good, since evil was strictly nothing. Thus no one is compelled to evil by God’s foreknowledge, since, strictly speaking, God has no foreknowledge of what is not. But his reliance on dialectic, his Origenist conception of the world as a place of education repairing the damage done by sin, his interest in cosmology, and his perceived Pelagian tendencies excited opposition. Attacked by Prudentius of Troyes and Flores of Lyons, he was condemned at the councils of Valencia 855 and Langres 859. Charles commissioned him to translate the works of Pseudo-Dionysius and the Ambigua of Maximus the Confessor from the Grecian. These works opened up a new world, and John followed his translations with commentaries on the Gospel of John and Pseudo-Dionysius, and then his chief work, the Division of Nature or Periphyseon 82666, in the Neoplatonic tradition. He treats the universe as a procession from God, everything real in nature being a trace of God, and then a return to God through the presence of nature in human reason and man’s union with God. John held that the nature of man is not destroyed by union with God, though it is deified. He was condemned for pantheism at Paris in 1210. J.Lo. eristic, the art of controversy, often involving fallacious but persuasive reasoning. The ancient Sophists brought this art to a high level to achieve their personal goal. They may have found their material in the “encounters” in the Erfahrung eristic 279   279 law courts as well as in daily life. To enhance persuasion they endorsed the use of unsound principles such as hasty generalizations, faulty analogies, illegitimate appeal to authority, the post hoc ergo propter hoc i.e., “after this, therefore because of this” and other presumed principles. Aristotle exposed eristic argumentation in his Sophistical Refutations, which itself draws examples from Plato’s Euthydemus. From this latter work comes the famous example: ‘That dog is a father and that dog is his, therefore that dog is his father’. What is perhaps worse than its obvious invalidity is that the argument is superficially similar to a sound argument such as ‘This is a table and this is brown, therefore this is a brown table’. In the Sophistical Refutations Aristotle undertakes to find procedures for detection of bad arguments and to propose rules for constructing sound arguments. 

erlebnis: G. Grice used the German term, “since I find it difficult to translate” -- term for experience used in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century G. philosophy. Erlebnis denotes experience in all its direct immediacy and lived fullness. It contrasts with the more typical G. word Erfahrung, denoting ordinary experience as mediated through intellectual and constructive elements. As immediate, Erlebnis eludes conceptualization, in both the lived present and the interiority of experience. As direct, Erlebnis is also disclosive and extraordinary: it reveals something real that otherwise escapes thinking. Typical examples include art, religion, and love, all of which also show the anti-rationalist and polemical uses of the concept. It is especially popular among the Romantic mystics like Novalis and the anti-rationalists Nietzsche and Bergson, as well as in phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie, and existentialism. As used in post-Hegelian G. philosophy, the term describes two aspects of subjectivity. The first concerns the epistemology of the human sciences and of phenomenology. Against naturalism and objectivism, philosophers appeal to the ineliminable, subjective qualities of experience to argue that interpreters must understand “what it is like to be” some experiencing subject, from the inside. The second use of the term is to denote extraordinary and interior experiences like art, religion, freedom, and vital energy. In both cases, it is unclear how such experience could be identified or known in its immediacy, and much recent G. thought, such as Heidegger and hermeneutics, rejects the concept. 

erotetic: in the strict sense, pertaining to questions. Erotetic logic is the logic of questions. Different conceptions of questions yield different kinds of erotetic logic. A Platonistic approach holds that questions exist independently of interrogatives. For P. Tichý, a question is a function on possible worlds, the right answer being the value of the function at the actual world. Erotetic logic is the logic of such functions. In the epistemic-imperative approach of L. Bqvist, Hintikka, et al., one begins with a system for epistemic sentences and embeds this in a system for imperative sentences, thus obtaining sentences of the form ‘make it the case that I know . . .’ and complex compounds of such sentences. Certain ones of these are defined to be interrogatives. Then erotetic logic is the logic of epistemic imperatives and the conditions for satisfaction of these imperatives. In the abstract interrogative approach of N. Belnap, T. Kubigski, and many others, one chooses certain types of expression to serve as interrogatives, and, for each type, specifies what expressions count as answers of various kinds direct, partial, . . .. On this approach we may say that interrogatives express questions, or we may identify questions with interrogatives, in which case the only meaning that an interrogative has is that it has the answers that it does. Either way, the emphasis is on interrogatives, and erotetic logic is the logic of systems that provide interrogatives and specify answers to them. In the broad sense, ‘erotetic’ designates what pertains to utterance-and-response. In this sense erotetic logic is the logic of the relations between 1 sentences of many kinds and 2 the expressions that count as appropriate replies to them. This includes not only the relations between question and answer but also, e.g., between assertion and agreement or denial, command and report of compliance or refusal, and for many types of sentence S between S and various corrective replies to S e.g., denial of the presupposition of S. Erotetic logics may differ in the class of sentences treated, the types of response counted as appropriate, the assignment of other content presupposition, projection, etc., and other details. 

eschatologicum: Possibly related to Latin ‘summum, ‘as in ‘summum genus,’ and ‘summun bonum. From Greek, 5. in the Logic of Arist., τὰ ἔ. are the last or lowest species, Metaph.1059b26, or individuals, ib.998b16, cf. AP0.96b12, al.; “τὸ ἔ. ἄτομον” Metaph.1058b10. b. ὁ ἔ. ὅρος the minor term of a syllogism, EN1147b14. c. last step in geom. analysis or ultimate condition of action, “τὸ ἔ. ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως” de An.433a16. II. Adv. -τως to the uttermost, exceedingly, “πῦρ ἐ. καίει” Hp.de Arte8; “ἐ. διαμάχεσθαι” Arist.HA613a11 ; “ἐ. φιλοπόλεμος” X.An.2.6.1 ; “φοβοῦμαί σ᾽ ἐ.” Men.912, cf. Epicur.Ep. 1p.31U. b. -τως διακεῖσθαι to be at the last extremity, Plb.1.24.2, D.S.18.48 ; “ἔχειν” Ev.Marc.5.23 ; “ἀπορεῖν” Phld.Oec.p.72J. 2. so ἐς τὸ ἔ.,=ἐσχάτως, Hdt.7.229; “εἰς τὰ ἔ.” X.HG5.4.33 ; “εἰς τὰ ἔ. μάλα” Id.Lac.1.2 ; “τὸ ἔ.” finally, in the end, Pl.Grg.473c ; but, τὸ ἔ. what is worst of all, ib.508d. Why ontology is not enough. The philosopher needs to PLAY with cross-categorial barriers. He is an eschatologist. Socrates was. being and good, for Aristotle and Grice cover all. Good was a favourite of Moore and Hare, as Barnes was well aware! Like Barnes, Grice dislikes Prichards analysis of good. He leans towards the emotion-based approach by Ogden. If Grice, like Humpty Dumpty, opposes the Establishment with his meaning liberalism (what a word means is what I mean by uttering it), he certainly should be concerned with category shifts. Plus, Grice was a closet Platonist. As Plato once remarked, having the ability to see horses but not horsehood (ἱππότης) is a mark of stupidity – rendered by Liddell and Scott as “horse-nature, the concept of horse” (Antisth. et Pl. ap. Simp.in Cat.208.30,32, Sch.AristId.p.167F). Grice would endure the flinty experience of giving joint seminars at Oxford with Austin on the first two books of Aristotles Organon, Categoriae, and De Int. Grice finds the use of a category, κατηγορία, by Aristotle a bit of a geniality. Aristotle is using legalese, from kata, against, on, and agoreuô [ἀγορεύω], speak in public), and uses it to designate both the prosecution in a trial and the attribution in a logical proposition, i. e., the questions that must be asked with regard to a Subjects, and the answers that can be given. As a representative of the linguistic turn in philosophy, Grice is attracted to the idea that a category can thus be understood variously, as applying to the realm of reality (ontology), but also to the philosophy of language (category of expression) and to philosophical psychology (category of representation). Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate, shall we say, categories: his explorations with Austin (very serious), and those with Strawson (more congenial). Where is Smiths altruism? Nowhere to be seen. Should we say it is idle (otiose) to speak of altruism? No, it is just an attribute, which, via category shift, can be made the Subjects of your sentence, Strawson. It is not spatio-temporal, though, right. Not really.  ‒ I do not particularly like your trouser words. The essay is easy to date since Grice notes that Strawson reproduced some of the details in his Individuals, which we can very well date. Grice thought Aristotle was the best! Or at any rate almost as good as Kantotle! Aristotle saw Categoriæ, along with De Int. as part of his Organon. However, philosophers of language tend to explore these topics without a consideration of the later parts of the Organon dealing with the syllogism, the tropes, and the topics ‒ the boring bits! The reason Grice is attracted to the Aristotelian category (as Austin and Strawson equally were) is that category allows for a linguistic-turn reading. Plus, its a nice, pretentious (in the Oxonian way) piece of philosophical jargon! Aristotle couldnt find category in the koine, so he had to coin it. While meant by Aristotle in a primarily ontological way, Oxonian philosophers hasten to add that a category of expression, as Grice puts it, is just as valid a topic for philosophical exploration. His tutee Strawson will actually publish a book on Subjects and predicate in grammar! (Trivial, Strawson!). Grice will later add an intermediary category, which is the Subjects of his philosophical psychology. As such, a category can be construed ontologically, or representationally: the latter involving philosophical psychological concepts, and expressions themselves. For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford (Only the poor learn at Oxford ‒ Arnold), there are (at least ‒ at most?) ten categories. Grice doesnt (really) care about the number. But the first are important. Actually the very first: theres substantia prima, such as Grice. And then theres substantia secunda, such as Grices rationality. The essentia. Then there are various types of attributes. But, as Grice sharply notes, even substantia secunda may be regarded as an attribute. Grices favourite game with Strawson was indeed Category Shift, or Subjects-ification, as Strawson preferred. Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute. We would have substantia prima AND attribute, which in turn gets divided into essential, the izzing, and non-essential, the hazzing. While Austin is not so fun to play with, Strawson is. Smith is a very altruist person. Where is his altruism? Nowhere to be seen, really. Yet we may sensically speak of Smiths altruism. It is just a matter of a category shift. Grice scores. Grice is slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understands, that Strawson, who footnotes Grice as the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic in Introduction to logical lheory, fails to acknowledge that most of the research in Strawsons Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations at joint seminars with Grice. Grice later elaborates on this with Code, who is keen on Grices other game, the hazz and the hazz not, the izz. But then tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics sounds slightlier clumsier, as far as the implicaturum goes. Categories, the Grice-Myro theory of identity, Relative identity, Grice on =, identity, notes, with Myro, metaphysics, philosophy, with Code, Grice izz Grice – or izz he? The idea that = is unqualified requires qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didnt. Grice wants to allow for It is the case that a = b /t1 and it is not the case that a = b /t2. The idea is intuitive, but philosophers of a Leibnizian bent are too accustomed to deal with = as an absolute. Grice applies this to human vs. person. A human may be identical to a person, but cease to be so. Indeed, Grices earlier attempt to produce a reductive analsysis of I may be seen as remedying a circularity he detected in Locke about same. Cf. Wiggins, Sameness and substance. Grice makes Peano feel deeply Griceian, as Grice lists his = postulates, here for consideration. And if you wondered why Grice prefers Latinate individuum to the Grecian. The Grecian is “ἄτομον,” in logic, rendered by L and S as ‘individual, of terms,’ Pl. Sph. 229d; of the εἶδος or forma, Arist. Metaph.1034a8, de An. 414b27.2. individual, Id. APo. 96b11, al.: as a subst., τό ἄτομον, Id. Cat. 1b6, 3a38, Metaph.1058a18 (pl.), Plot. 6.2.2, al. subst.; latinised from Grecian. Lewis and Short have “indīvĭdŭum,” an atom, indivisible particle: ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni affirmat, Cic. Ac. 2, 17 fin.: ne individuum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahive non possit, id. N. D. 3, 12, 29. Note the use of individuum in alethic modalities for necessity and possibility, starting with (11).  ⊢ (α izzes α). This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. Grice applies it to war: War is war, as yielding a most peculiar implicaturum. (α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ) ⊃ α izzes γ. This above is transitivity, which is crucial for Grices tackling of Reids counterexample to Locke (and which according to Flew in Locke on personal identity was predated by Berkeley.  α hazzes β ⊃ ~(α izzes β). Or, what is accidental is not essential. Grice allows that what is essential is accidental is, while misleading, true. ⊢ α hazzes β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β)  ⊢ (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes a forma). This above defines a universalium as a forma, or eidos. (α hazzes β ∧ α izzes a particular) ⊃ (∃γ).(γ≠α ∧ α izzes β) ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α)  ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α  ⊢ α izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) α = β ⊃⊂ α izzes β ∧ β izzes α  ⊢ α izzes an individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β)  ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)); α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)  ⊢ α izzes some-thing ⊃ α izzes an individuum.  ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium) 16. ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α)  ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of α  ⊢ α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β; ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β 20. α izzes a particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum. ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α) 22. ⊢~ (∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma) α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α)  x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izz β)  ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazz α); α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazz A)  ⊢ (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ izzes essentially predicable of α) ⊢ (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing); (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing) ⊢ α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β izzes essentially predicable of α); (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β)⊃ α izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β. The use of this or that doxastic modality, necessity and possibility, starting above, make this a good place to consider one philosophical mistake Grice mentions in “Causal theory.” What is actual is not also possible. Cf. What is essential is also accidental. He is criticising a contemporary, if possible considered dated in the New World, form of ordinary-language philosophy, where the philosopher detects a nuance, and embarks risking colliding with the facts, rushing ahead to exploit it before he can clarify it! Grice liked to see his explorations on = as belonging to metaphysics, as the s.  on his Doctrines at the Grice Collection testifies. While Grice presupposes the use of = in his treatment of the king of France, he also explores a relativisation of =. His motivation was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against Strawsons criterion of space-time continuancy for the identification of the substantia prima. Grice wants to apply = to cases were the time continuancy is made explicit. This yields that a=b in scenario S, but that it may not be the case that a = b in a second scenario S. Myro had an occasion to expand on Grices views in his contribution on the topic for PGRICE. Myro mentions his System Ghp, a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of Grices System Q, in gratitude to to Grice. Grice explored also the logic of izzing and hazzing with Code. Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of qualified identity. The formal aspects were developed by Myro, and also by Code. Grice discussed Wigginss Sameness and substance, rather than Geach. Cf. Wiggins and Strawson on Grice for the BA. At Oxford, Grice was more or less given free rein to teach what he wanted. He found the New World slightly disconcerting at first. At Oxford, he expected his tutees to be willing to read the classics in the vernacular Greek. His approach to teaching was diagogic, as Socratess! Even in his details of izzing and hazzing. Greek enough to me!, as a student recalled! correspondence with Code, Grice sees in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotles underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as izzing and hazing, izzing and hazzing, Code on the significance of the middle book in Aristotles Met. , Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book. Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this! The organisation of Aristotle’s metaphysics was a topic of much concern for Grice. With Code, Grice coined izzing and hazzing to refer to essential and non-essential attribution. Izzing and hazzing, “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being” (henceforth, “Aristotle”) PPQ, Aristotle on multiplicity, “The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly” (henceforth, “PPQ,” posthumously ed. by Loar, Aristotle, multiplicity, izzing, hazzing, being, good, Code. Grice offers a thorough discussion of Owens treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the snares of ontology. Grice distinguishes between izzing and hazzing, which he thinks help in clarifying, more axiomatico, what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on essential versus non-essential predication. Surely, for Grice, being, nor indeed good, should not be multiplied beyond necessity, but izzing and hazzing are already multiplied. The Grice Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication by Loar in memoriam Grice. Note that the Grice Papers contains a typically Griceian un-publication, entitled Aristotle and multiplicity simpliciter. Rather than Aristotle on, as the title for the PPQ piece goes. Note also that, since its multiplicity simpliciter, it refers to Aristotle on two key ideas: being and the good. As Code notes in his contribution to PGRICE, Grice first presents his thoughts on izzing and hazzing publicly at Vancouver. Jones has developed the axiomatic treatment favoured by Grice. For Grice there is multiplicity in both being and good (ton agathon), both accountable in terms of conversational implicatura, of course. If in Prolegomena, Grice was interested in criticising himself, in essays of historical nature like these, Grice is seeing Aristotles Athenian dialectic as a foreshadow of the Oxonian dialectic, and treating him as an equal. Grice is yielding his razor: senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. But then Aristotle is talking about the multiplicity of is and is good. Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be! There is a further item in the Grice collection that combines Aristotle on being with Aristotle on good, which is relevant in connection with this. Aristotle on being and good (ἀγαθόν). Aristotle, being, good (agathon), ἀγαθός. As from this f., the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with Aristotle, Grice will explore Aristotle on being or is and good (ἀγαθός) in explorations with Code. Grice comes up with izzing and hazzing as the two counterparts to Aristotles views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication. Grices views on Aristotle on the good (strictly, there is no need to restrict Arisstotles use to the neuter form, since he employs ἀγαθός) connect with Grices Aristotelian idea of eudaemonia, that he explores elsewhere. Strictly: Aristotle on being and the good. If that had been Grices case, he would have used the definite article. Otherwise, good may well translate as masculine, ἀγαθός ‒the agathetic implicaturum.  He plays with Dodgson, cabbages and kings. For what is a good cabbage as opposed to a cabbage? It does not require very sharp eyes, but only our willingness to use the eyes one has, to see that speech is permeated with the notion of purpose. To say what a certain kind of thing is is only too frequently partly to say that it is for. This feature applies to talk of, e. g., ships, shoes, sailing wax, and kings; and, possibly and perhaps most excitingly, it extends even to cabbages! Although Grice suspects Urmson might disagree. v. Grice on Urmsons apples. Grice at his jocular best. If he is going to be a Kantian, he will. He uses Kantian jargon to present his theory of conversation. This he does only at Harvard. The implicaturum being that talking of vaguer assumptions of helpfulness would not sound too convincing. So he has the maxim, the super-maxim, and the sub-maxim. A principle and a maxim is Kantian enough. But when he actually echoes Kant, is when he introduces what he later calls the conversational categories – the keyword here is conversational category, as categoria is used by Aristotle and Kant  ‒ or Kantotle. Grice surely knew that, say, his Category of Conversational Modality had nothing to do with the Kantian Category of Modality. Still, he stuck with the idea of four categories (versus Aristotles ten, eight or seven, as the text you consult may tell you): category of conversational quantity (which at Oxford he had formulated in much vaguer terms like strength and informativeness and entailment), the category of conversational quality (keyword: principle of conversational trust), and the category of conversational relation, where again Kants relation has nothing to do with the maxim Grice associates with this category. In any case, his Kantian joke may be helpful when considering the centrality of the concept category simpliciter that Grice had to fight with with his pupils at Oxford – he was lucky to have Austin and Strawson as co-lecturers! Grice was irritated by L and S defining kategoria as category. I guess I knew that. He agreed with their second shot, predicable. Ultimately, Grices concern with category is his concern with person, or prote ousia, as used by Aristotle, and as giving a rationale to Grices agency-based approach to the philosophical enterprise. Aristotle used kategorein in the sense of to predicate, assert something of something, and kategoria. The prote ousia is exemplified by o tis anthropos. It is obvious that Grice wants to approach Aristotles semantics and Aristotles metaphysics at one fell swoop. Grice reads Aristotles Met. , and finds it understandable. Consider the adjective French (which Aristotle does NOT consider) ‒ as it occurs in phrases such as Michel Foucault is a French citizen.  Grice is not a French citizen. Michel Foucault once wrote a nice French poem.  Urmson once wrote a nice French essay on pragmatics. Michel Foucault was a French professor.  Michel Foucault is a French professor.  Michel Foucault is a French professor of philosophy. The following features are perhaps significant. The appearance of the adjective French, or Byzantine, as the case might be ‒ cf. I’m feeling French tonight. In these phrases is what Grice has as adjunctive rather than conjunctive, or attributive. A French poem is not necessarily something which combines the separate features of being a poem and being French, as a tall philosopher would simply combine the features of being tall and of being a philosopher. French in French poem, occurs adverbially. French citizen standardly means citizen of France. French poem standardly means poem in French. But it is a mistake to suppose that this fact implies that there is this or that meaning, or, worse, this or that Fregeian sense, of the expression French.  In any case, only metaphorically or metabolically can we say that French means this or that or has sense. An utterer means. An utterer makes sense. Cf. R. Pauls doubts about capitalizing major. French means, and figuratively at that, only one thing, viz. of or pertaining to France. And English only means of or pertaining to England.  French may be what Grice (unfollowing his remarks on The general theory of context) call context-sensitive. One might indeed say, if you like, that while French means ‒ or means only this or that, or that its only sense is this or that, French still means, again figuratively, a variety of things. French means-in-context of or pertaining to France. Symbolise that as expression E means-in-context that p. Expression E means-in-context C₂ that p₂. Relative to Context C₁ French means of France; as in the phrase French citizen. Relative to context C₂, French means  in the French language, as in the phrase, French poem ‒ whereas history does not behave, like this. Whether the focal item is a universal or a particular is, contra Aristotle, quite irrelevant to the question of what this or that related adjective means, or what its sense is. The medical art is no more what an utterer means when he utters the adjective medical, as is France what an utterer means by the adjective French. While the attachment of this or that context may suggest an interpretation in context of this or that expression as uttered by the utterer U, it need not be the case that such a suggestion is indefeasible. It might be e.g. that French poem would have to mean, poem composed in French, unless there were counter indications, that brings the utterer and the addressee to a different context C₃. In which case, perhaps what the utterer means by French poem is poem composed by a French competitor in this or that competition. For French professor there would be two obvious things an utterer might mean. Disambiguation will depend on the wider  expression-context  or in the situational context attaching to the this or that circumstance of utterance. Eschatology. Some like Hegel, but Collingwoods *my* man!  ‒ Grice. Grice participated in two consecutive evenings of the s. of programmes on metaphysics organised by Pears. Actually, charming Pears felt pretentious enough to label the meetings to be about the nature of metaphysics! Grice ends up discussing, as he should, Collingwood on presupposition. Met.  remained a favourite topic for Grices philosophical explorations, as it is evident from his essay on Met. , Philosophical Eschatology, and Platos Republic, repr. in his WOW . Possibly Hardie is to blame, since he hardly tutored Grice on metaphysics! Grices two BBC lectures are typically dated in tone. It was the (good ole) days when philosophers thought they could educate the non-elite by dropping Namess like Collingwood and stuff! The Third Programme was extremely popular, especially among the uneducated ones at London, as Pears almost put it, as it was a way for Londoners to get to know what is going on down at Oxford, the only place an uneducated (or educated, for that matter) Londoner at the time was interested in displaying some interest about! I mean, Johnson is right: if a man is tired of the nature of metaphysics, he is tired of life! Since the authorship is Grice, Strawson, and Pears, Met. , in Pears, The Nature of Met., The BBC Third Programme, it is somewhat difficult to identify what paragraphs were actually read by Grice (and which ones by Pears and which ones by Strawson). But trust the sharp Griceian to detect the correct implicaturum! There are many (too many) other items covered by these two lectures: Kant, Aristotle, in no particular order. And in The Grice Collection, for that matter, that cover the field of metaphysics. In the New World, as a sort of tutor in the graduate programme, Grice was expected to cover the discipline at various seminars. Only I dislike discipline! Perhaps his clearest exposition is in the opening section of his Met. , philosophical eschatology, and Platos Republic, repr. in his WOW , where he states, bluntly that all you need is  metaphysics! metaphysics, Miscellaneous, metaphysics notes, Grice would possible see metaphysics as a class – category figuring large. He was concerned with the methodological aspects of the metaphysical enterprise, since he was enough of a relativist to allow for one metaphysical scheme to apply to one area of discourse (one of Eddingtons tables) and another metaphysical scheme to apply to another (Eddingtons other table). In the third programme for the BBC Grice especially enjoyed criticising John Wisdoms innovative look at metaphysics as a bunch of self-evident falsehoods (Were all alone). Grice focuses on Wisdom on the knowledge of other minds. He also discusses Collingwoods presuppositions, and Bradley on the reality-appearance distinction. Grices reference to Wisdom was due to Ewings treatment of Wisdom on metaphysics. Grices main motivation here is defending metaphysics against Ayer. Ayer thought to win more Oxonian philosophers than he did at Oxford, but he was soon back in London. Post-war Oxford had become conservative and would not stand to the nonsense of Ayers claiming that metaphysics is nonsense, especially, as Ayers implicaturum also was, that philosophy is nonsense! Perhaps the best summary of Griceian metaphysics is his From Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics. It’s an ontological answer that one must give to Grices metabolic operation from utterers meaning to expression meaning, Grice had been interested in the methodology of metaphysics since his Oxford days. He counts as one memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for the BBC Third Programme on The nature of metaphysics with the organiser, Pears, and his former tutee, Strawson on the panel. Grice was particularly keen on Collingwoods views on metaphysical presuppositions, both absolute and relative! Grice also considers John Wisdoms view of the metaphysical proposition as a blatant falsehood. Grice considers Bradleys Hegelian metaphysics of the absolute, in Appearance and reality. Refs.: While Grice’s choice was ‘eschatology,’ as per WoW, Essay, other keywords are useful, notably “metaphysics,” “ontology,” “theorizing,” and “theory-theory,” in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

essentia: Explored byy Grice in “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”. To avoid equivocation, Grice distinguishes between the ‘izz’ of essentia, and the ‘hazz’ of accidentia. ssentialism, a metaphysical theory that objects have essences and that there is a distinction between essential and non-essential or accidental predications. Different issues have, however, been central in debates about essences and essential predication in different periods in the history of philosophy. In our own day, it is commitment to the notion of de re modality that is generally taken to render a theory essentialist; but in the essentialist tradition stemming from Aristotle, discussions of essence and essential predication focus on the distinction between what an object is and how it is. According to Aristotle, the universals that an ordinary object instantiates include some that mark it out as what it is and others that characterize it in some way but do not figure in an account of what it is. In the Categories, he tells us that while the former are said of the object, the latter are merely present in it; and in other writings, he distinguishes between what he calls kath hauto or per se predications where these include the predication of what-universals and kata sumbebekos or per accidens predications where these include the predication of how-universals. He concedes that universals predicated of an object kath hauto are necessary to that object; but he construes the necessity here as derivative. It is because a universal marks out an entity, x, as what x is and hence underlies its being the thing that it is that the universal is necessarily predicated of x. The concept of definition is critically involved in Aristotle’s essentialism. First, it is the kind  infima species  under which an object falls or one of the items genus or differentia included in the definition of that kind that is predicated of the object kath hauto. But, second, Aristotle’s notion of an essence just is the notion of the ontological correlate of a definition. The term in his writings we translate as ‘essence’ is the expression to ti ein einai the what it is to be. Typically, the expression is followed by a substantival expression in the dative case, so that the expressions denoting essences are phrases like ‘the what it is to be for a horse’ and ‘the what it is to be for an oak tree’; and Aristotle tells us that, for any kind, K, the what it is to be for a K just is that which we identify when we provide a complete and accurate definition of K. Now, Aristotle holds that there is definition only of universals; and this commits him to the view that there are no individual essences. Although he concedes that we can provide definitions of universals from any of his list of ten categories, he gives pride of place to the essences of universals from the category of substance. Substance-universals can be identified without reference to essences from other categories, but the essences of qualities, quantities, and other non-substances can be defined only by reference to the essences of substances. In his early writings, Aristotle took the familiar particulars of common sense things like the individual man and horse of Categories V to be the primary substances; and in these writings it is the essences we isolate by defining the kinds or species under which familiar particulars fall that are construed as the basic or paradigmatic essences. However, in later writings, where ordinary particulars are taken to be complexes of matter and form, it is the substantial forms of familiar particulars that are the primary substances, so their essences are the primary or basic essences; and a central theme in Aristotle’s most mature writings is the idea that the primary substances and their essences are necessarily one and the same in number. error theory essentialism 281   281 The conception of essence as the ontological correlate of a definition  often called quiddity  persists throughout the medieval tradition; and in early modern philosophy, the idea that the identity of an object is constituted by what it is plays an important role in Continental rationalist thinkers. Indeed, in the writings of Leibniz, we find the most extreme version of traditional essentialism. Whereas Aristotle had held that essences are invariably general, Leibniz insisted that each individual has an essence peculiar to it. He called the essence associated with an entity its complete individual concept; and he maintained that the individual concept somehow entails all the properties exemplified by the relevant individual. Accordingly, Leibniz believed that an omniscient being could, for each possible world and each possible individual, infer from the individual concept of that individual the whole range of properties exemplified by that individual in that possible world. But, then, from the perspective of an omniscient being, all of the propositions identifying the properties the individual actually exhibits would express what Aristotle called kath hauto predications. Leibniz, of course, denied that our perspective is that of an omniscient being; we fail to grasp individual essences in their fullness, so from our perspective, the distinction between essential and accidental predications holds. While classical rationalists espoused a thoroughgoing essentialism, the Aristotlelian conceptions of essence and definition were the repeated targets of attacks by classical British empiricists. Hobbes, e.g., found the notion of essence philosophically useless and insisted that definition merely displays the meanings conventionally associated with linguistic expressions. Locke, on the other hand, continued to speak of essences; but he distinguished between real and nominal essences. As he saw it, the familiar objects of common sense are collections of copresent sensible ideas to which we attach a single name like ‘man’ or ‘horse’. Identifying the ideas constitutive of the relevant collection gives us the nominal essence of a man or a horse. Locke did not deny that real essences might underlie such collections, but he insisted that it is nominal rather than real essences to which we have epistemic access. Hume, in turn, endorsed the idea that familiar objects are collections of sensible ideas, but rejected the idea of some underlying real essence to which we have no access; and he implicitly reinforced the Hobbesian critique of Aristotelian essences with his attack on the idea of de re necessities. So definition merely expresses the meanings we conventionally associate with words, and the only necessity associated with definition is linguistic or verbal necessity. From its origins, the twentieth-century analytic tradition endorsed the classical empiricist critique of essences and the Humean view that necessity is merely linguistic. Indeed, even the Humean concession that there is a special class of statements true in virtue of their meanings came into question in the forties and fifties, when philosophers like Quine argued that it is impossible to provide a noncircular criterion for distinguishing analytic and synthetic statements. So by the late 0s, it had become the conventional wisdom of philosophers in the Anglo- tradition that both the notion of a real essence and the derivative idea that some among the properties true of an object are essential to that object are philosophical dead ends. But over the past three decades, developments in the semantics of modal logic have called into question traditional empiricist skepticism about essence and modality and have given rise to a rebirth of essentialism. In the late fifties and early sixties, logicians like Kripke, Hintikka, and Richard Montague showed how formal techniques that have as their intuitive core the Leibnizian idea that necessity is truth in all possible worlds enable us to provide completeness proofs for a whole range of nonequivalent modal logics. Metaphysicians seized on the intuitions underlying these formal methods. They proposed that we take the picture of alternative possible worlds seriously and claimed that attributions of de dicto modality necessity and possibility as they apply to propositions can be understood to involve quantification over possible worlds. Thus, to say that a proposition, p, is necessary is to say that for every possible world, W, p is true in W; and to say that p is possible is to say that there is at least one possible world, W, such that p is true in W. These metaphysicians went on to claim that the framework of possible worlds enables us to make sense of de re modality. Whereas de dicto modality attaches to propositions taken as a whole, an ascription of de re modality identifies the modal status of an object’s exemplification of an attribute. Thus, we speak of Socrates as being necessarily or essentially rational, but only contingently snub-nosed. Intuitively, the essential properties of an object are those it could not have lacked; whereas its contingent properties are properties it exemplifies but could have failed to exemplify. The “friends of possible worlds” insisted that we can make perfectly good sense of this intuitive distinction if we say that an object, x, exhibits a property, P, essentially just in case x exhibits P in the actual world and in every possible world in which x exists and that x exhibits P merely contingently just in case x exhibits P in the actual world, but there is at least one possible world, W, such that x exists in W and fails to exhibit P in W. Not only have these neo-essentialists invoked the Leibnizian conception of alternative possible worlds in characterizing the de re modalities, many have endorsed Leibniz’s idea that each object has an individual essence or what is sometimes called a haecceity. As we have seen, the intuitive idea of an individual essence is the idea of a property an object exhibits essentially and that no other object could possibly exhibit; and contemporary essentialists have fleshed out this intuitive notion by saying that a property, P, is the haecceity or individual essence of an object, x, just in case 1 x exhibits P in the actual world and in all worlds in which x exists and 2 there is no possible world where an object distinct from x exhibits P. And some defenders of individual essences like Plantinga have followed Leibniz in holding that the haecceity of an object provides a complete concept of that object, a property such that it entails, for every possible world, W, and every property, P, either the proposition that the object in question has P in W or the proposition that it fails to have P in W. Accordingly, they agree that an omniscient being could infer from the individual essence of an object a complete account of the history of that object in each possible world in which it exists. 

ethos: philosophical ethology – phrase used by Grice for his creature construction routine. ethical constructivism, a form of anti-realism about ethics which holds that there are moral facts and truths, but insists that these facts and truths are in some way constituted by or dependent on our moral beliefs, reactions, or attitudes. For instance, an ideal observer theory that represents the moral rightness and wrongness of an act in terms of the moral approval and disapproval that an appraiser would have under suitably idealized conditions can be understood as a form of ethical constructivism. Another form of constructivism identifies the truth of a moral belief with its being part of the appropriate system of beliefs, e.g., of a system of moral and nonmoral beliefs that is internally coherent. Such a view would maintain a coherence theory of moral truth. Moral relativism is a constructivist view that allows for a plurality of moral facts and truths. Thus, if the idealizing conditions appealed to in an ideal observer theory allow that different appraisers can have different reactions to the same actions under ideal conditions, then that ideal observer theory will be a version of moral relativism as well as of ethical constructivism. Or, if different systems of moral beliefs satisfy the appropriate epistemic conditions e.g. are equally coherent, then the truth or falsity of particular moral beliefs will have to be relativized to different moral systems or codes. -- ethical objectivism, the view that the objects of the most basic concepts of ethics which may be supposed to be values, obligations, duties, oughts, rights, or what not exist, or that facts about them hold, objectively and that similarly worded ethical statements by different persons make the same factual claims and thus do not concern merely the speaker’s feelings. To say that a fact is objective, or that something has objective existence, is usually to say that its holding or existence is not derivative from its being thought to hold or exist. In the Scholastic terminology still current in the seventeenth century ‘objective’ had the more or less contrary meaning of having status only as an object of thought. In contrast, fact, or a thing’s existence, is subjective if it holds or exists only in the sense that it is thought to hold or exist, or that it is merely a convenient human posit for practical purposes. A fact holds, or an object exists, intersubjectively if somehow its acknowledgment is binding on all thinking subjects or all subjects in some specified group, although it does not hold or exist independently of their thinking about it. Some thinkers suppose that intersubjectivity is all that can ever properly be meant by objectivity. Objectivism may be naturalist or non-naturalist. The naturalist objectivist believes that values, duties, or whatever are natural phenomena detectable by introspection, perception, or scientific inference. Thus values may be identified with certain empirical qualities of anybody’s experience, or duties with empirical facts about the effects of action, e.g. as promoting or hindering social cohesion. The non-naturalist objectivist eschewing what Moore called the naturalistic fallacy believes that values or obligations or whatever items he thinks most basic in ethics exist independently of any belief about them, but that their existence is not a matter of any ordinary fact detectable in the above ways but can be revealed to ethical intuition as standing in a necessary but not analytic relation to natural phenomena. ‘Ethical subjectivism’ usually means the doctrine that ethical statements are simply reports on the speaker’s feelings though, confusingly enough, such statements may be objectively true or false. Perhaps it ought to mean the doctrine that nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so. Attitude theories of morality, for which such statements express, rather than report upon, the speaker’s feelings, are also, despite the objections of their proponents, sometimes called subjectivist. In a more popular usage an objective matter of fact is one on which all reasonable persons can be expected to agree, while a matter is subjective if various alternative opinions can be accepted as reasonable. What is subjective in this sense may be quite objective in the more philosophical sense in question above.  -- ethics, the philosophical study of morality. The word is also commonly used interchangeably with ‘morality’ to mean the subject matter of this study; and sometimes it is used more narrowly to mean the moral principles of a particular tradition, group, or individual. Christian ethics and Albert Schweitzer’s ethics are examples. In this article the word will be used exclusively to mean the philosophical study. Ethics, along with logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, is one of the main branches of philosophy. It corresponds, in the traditional division of the field into formal, natural, and moral philosophy, to the last of these disciplines. It can in turn be divided into the general study of goodness, the general study of right action, applied ethics, metaethics, moral psychology, and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. These divisions are not sharp, and many important studies in ethics, particularly those that examine or develop whole systems of ethics, are interdivisional. Nonetheless, they facilitate the identification of different problems, movements, and schools within the discipline. The first two, the general study of goodness and the general study of right action, constitute the main business of ethics. Correlatively, its principal substantive questions are what ends we ought, as fully rational human beings, to choose and pursue and what moral principles should govern our choices and pursuits. How these questions are related is the discipline’s principal structural question, and structural differences among systems of ethics reflect different answers to this question. In contemporary ethics, the study of structure has come increasingly to the fore, especially as a preliminary to the general study of right action. In the natural order of exposition, however, the substantive questions come first. Goodness and the question of ends. Philosophers have typically treated the question of the ends we ought to pursue in one of two ways: either as a question about the components of a good life or as a question about what sorts of things are good in themselves. On the first way of treating the question, it is assumed that we naturally seek a good life; hence, determining its components amounts to determining, relative to our desire for such a life, what ends we ought to pursue. On the second way, no such assumption about human nature is made; rather it is assumed that whatever is good in itself is worth choosing or pursuing. The first way of treating the question leads directly to the theory of human well-being. The second way leads directly to the theory of intrinsic value. The first theory originated in ancient ethics, and eudaimonia was the Grecian word for its subject, a word usually tr. ‘happiness,’ but sometimes tr. ‘flourishing’ in order to make the question of human well-being seem more a matter of how well a person is doing than how good he is feeling. These alternatives reflect the different conceptions of human well-being that inform the two major views within the theory: the view that feeling good or pleasure is the essence of human well-being and the view that doing well or excelling at things worth doing is its essence. The first view is hedonism in its classical form. Its most famous exponent among the ancients was Epicurus. The second view is perfectionism, a view that is common to several schools of ancient ethics. Its adherents include Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Among the moderns, the best-known defenders of classical hedonism and perfectionism are respectively J. S. Mill and Nietzsche. Although these two views differ on the question of what human well-being essentially consists in, neither thereby denies that the other’s answer has a place in a good human life. Indeed, mature statements of each typically assign the other’s answer an ancillary place. Thus, hedonism, as expounded by Epicurus, takes excelling at things worth doing  exercising one’s intellectual powers and moral virtues in exemplary and fruitful ways, e.g.  as the tried and true means to experiencing life’s most satisfying pleasures. And perfectionism, as developed in Aristotle’s ethics, underscores the importance of pleasure  the deep satisfaction that comes from doing an important job well, e.g.  as a natural concomitant of achieving excellence in things that matter. The two views, as expressed in these mature statements, differ not so much in the kinds of activities they take to be central to a good life as in the ways they explain the goodness of such a life. The chief difference between them, then, is philosophical rather than prescriptive. The second theory, the theory of intrinsic value, also has roots in ancient ethics, specifically, Plato’s theory of Forms. But unlike Plato’s theory, the basic tenets of which include certain doctrines about the reality and transcendence of value, the theory of intrinsic value neither contains nor presupposes any metaphysical theses. At issue in the theory is what things are good in themselves, and one can take a position on this issue without committing oneself to any thesis about the reality or unreality of goodness or about its transcendence or immanence. A list of the different things philosophers have considered good in themselves would include life, happiness, pleasure, knowledge, virtue, friendship, beauty, and harmony. The list could easily be extended. An interest in what constitutes the goodness of the various items on the list has brought philosophers to focus primarily on the question of whether something unites them. The opposing views on this question are monism and pluralism. Monists affirm the list’s unity; pluralists deny it. Plato, for instance, was a monist. He held that the goodness of everything good in itself consisted in harmony and therefore each such thing owed its goodness to its being harmonious. Alternatively, some philosophers have proposed pleasure as the sole constituent of goodness. Indeed, conceiving of pleasure as a particular kind of experience or state of consciousness, they have proposed this kind of experience as the only thing good in itself and characterized all other good things as instrumentally good, as owing their goodness to their being sources of pleasure. Thus, hedonism too can be a species of monism. In this case, though, one must distinguish between the view that it is one’s own experiences of pleasure that are intrinsically good and the view that anyone’s experiences of pleasure, indeed, any sentient being’s experiences of pleasure, are intrinsically good. The former is called by Sidgwick egoistic hedonism, the latter universal hedonism. This distinction can be made general, as a distinction between egoistic and universal views of what is good in itself or, as philosophers now commonly say, between agent-relative and agent-neutral value. As such, it indicates a significant point of disagreement in the theory of intrinsic value, a disagreement in which the seeming arbitrariness and blindness of egoism make it harder to defend. In drawing this conclusion, however, one must be careful not to mistake these egoistic views for views in the theory of human well-being, for each set of views represents a set of alternative answers to a different question. One must be careful, in other words, not to infer from the greater defensibility of universalism vis-à-vis egoism that universalism is the predominant view in the general study of goodness. Right action. The general study of right action concerns the principles of right and wrong that govern our choices and pursuits. In modern ethics these principles are typically given a jural conception. Accordingly, they are understood to constitute a moral code that defines the duties of men and women who live together in fellowship. This conception of moral principles is chiefly due to the influence of Christianity in the West, though some of its elements were already present in Stoic ethics. Its ascendancy in the general study of right action puts the theory of duty at the center of that study. The theory has two parts: the systematic exposition of the moral code that defines our duties; and its justification. The first part, when fully developed, presents complete formulations of the fundamental principles of right and wrong and shows how they yield all moral duties. The standard model is an axiomatic system in mathematics, though some philosophers have proposed a technical system of an applied science, such as medicine or strategy, as an alternative. The second part, if successful, establishes the authority of the principles and so validates the code. Various methods and criteria of justification are commonly used; no single one is canonical. Success in establishing the principles’ authority depends on the soundness of the argument that proceeds from whatever method or criterion is used. One traditional criterion is implicit in the idea of an axiomatic system. On this criterion, the fundamental principles of right and wrong are authoritative in virtue of being self-evident truths. That is, they are regarded as comparable to axioms not only in being the first principles of a deductive system but also in being principles whose truth can be seen immediately upon reflection. Use of this criterion to establish the principles’ authority is the hallmark of intuitionism. Once one of the dominant views in ethics, its position in the discipline has now been seriously eroded by a strong, twentieth-century tide of skepticism about all claims of self-evidence. Currently, the most influential method of justification consistent with using the model of an axiomatic system to expound the morality of right and wrong draws on the jural conception of its principles. On this method, the principles are interpreted as expressions of a legislative will, and accordingly their authority derives from the sovereignty of the person or collective whose will they are taken to express. The oldest example of the method’s use is the divine command theory. On this theory, moral principles are taken to be laws issued by God to humanity, and their authority thus derives from God’s supremacy. The theory is the original Christian source of the principles’ jural conception. The rise of secular thought since the Enlightenment has, however, limited its appeal. Later examples, which continue to attract broad interest and discussion, are formalism and contractarianism. Formalism is best exemplified in Kant’s ethics. It takes a moral principle to be a precept that satisfies the formal criteria of a universal law, and it takes formal criteria to be the marks of pure reason. Consequently, moral principles are laws that issue from reason. As Kant puts it, they are laws that we, as rational beings, give to ourselves and that regulate our conduct insofar as we engage each other’s rational nature. They are laws for a republic of reason or, as Kant says, a kingdom of ends whose legislature comprises all rational beings. Through this ideal, Kant makes intelligible and forceful the otherwise obscure notion that moral principles derive their authority from the sovereignty of reason. Contractarianism also draws inspiration from Kant’s ethics as well as from the social contract theories of Locke and Rousseau. Its fullest and most influential statement appears in the work of Rawls. On this view, moral principles represent the ideal terms of social cooperation for people who live together in fellowship and regard each other as equals. Specifically, they are taken to be the conditions of an ideal agreement among such people, an agreement that they would adopt if they met as an assembly of equals to decide collectively on the social arrangements governing their relations and reached their decision as a result of open debate and rational deliberation. The authority of moral principles derives, then, from the fairness of the procedures by which the terms of social cooperation would be arrived at in this hypothetical constitutional convention and the assumption that any rational individual who wanted to live peaceably with others and who imagined himself a party to this convention would, in view of the fairness of its procedures, assent to its results. It derives, that is, from the hypothetical consent of the governed. Philosophers who think of a moral code on the model of a technical system of an applied science use an entirely different method of justification. In their view, just as the principles of medicine represent knowledge about how best to promote health, so the principles of right and wrong represent knowledge about how best to promote the ends of morality. These philosophers, then, have a teleological conception of the code. Our fundamental duty is to promote certain ends, and the principles of right and wrong organize and direct our efforts in this regard. What justifies the principles, on this view, is that the ends they serve are the right ones to promote and the actions they prescribe are the best ways to promote them. The principles are authoritative, in other words, in virtue of the wisdom of their prescriptions. Different teleological views in the theory of duty correspond to different answers to the question of what the right ends to promote are. The most common answer is happiness; and the main division among the corresponding views mirrors the distinction in the theory of intrinsic value between egoism and universalism. Thus, egoism and universalism in the theory of duty hold, respectively, that the fundamental duty of morality is to promote, as best as one can, one’s own happiness and that it is to promote, as best as one can, the happiness of humanity. The former is ethical egoism and is based on the ideal of rational self-love. The latter is utilitarianism and is based on the ideal of rational benevolence. Ethical egoism’s most famous exponents in modern philosophy are Hobbes and Spinoza. It has had few distinguished defenders since their time. Bentham and J. S. Mill head the list of distinguished defenders of utilitarianism. The view continues to be enormously influential. On these teleological views, answers to questions about the ends we ought to pursue determine the principles of right and wrong. Put differently, the general study of right action, on these views, is subordinate to the general study of goodness. This is one of the two leading answers to the structural question about how the two studies are related. The other is that the general study of right action is to some extent independent of the general study of goodness. On views that represent this answer, some principles of right and wrong, notably principles of justice and honesty, prescribe actions even though more evil than good would result from doing them. These views are deontological. Fiat justitia ruat coelum captures their spirit. The opposition between teleology and deontology in ethics underlies many of the disputes in the general study of right action. The principal substantive and structural questions of ethics arise not only with respect to the conduct of human life generally but also with respect to specific walks of life such as medicine, law, journalism, engineering, and business. The examination of these questions in relation to the common practices and traditional codes of such professions and occupations has resulted in the special studies of applied ethics. In these studies, ideas and theories from the general studies of goodness and right action are applied to particular circumstances and problems of some profession or occupation, and standard philosophical techniques are used to define, clarify, and organize the ethical issues found in its domain. In medicine, in particular, where rapid advances in technology create, overnight, novel ethical problems on matters of life and death, the study of biomedical ethics has generated substantial interest among practitioners and scholars alike. Metaethics. To a large extent, the general studies of goodness and right action and the special studies of applied ethics consist in systematizing, deepening, and revising our beliefs about how we ought to conduct our lives. At the same time, it is characteristic of philosophers, when reflecting on such systems of belief, to examine the nature and grounds of these beliefs. These questions, when asked about ethical beliefs, define the field of metaethics. The relation of this field to the other studies is commonly represented by taking the other studies to constitute the field of ethics proper and then taking metaethics to be the study of the concepts, methods of justification, and ontological assumptions of the field of ethics proper. Accordingly, metaethics can proceed from either an interest in the epistemology of ethics or an interest in its metaphysics. On the first approach, the study focuses on questions about the character of ethical knowledge. Typically, it concentrates on the simplest ethical beliefs, such as ‘Stealing is wrong’ and ‘It is better to give than to receive’, and proceeds by analyzing the concepts in virtue of which these beliefs are ethical and examining their logical basis. On the second approach, the study focuses on questions about the existence and character of ethical properties. Typically, it concentrates on the most general ethical predicates such as goodness and wrongfulness and considers whether there truly are ethical properties represented by these predicates and, if so, whether and how they are interwoven into the natural world. The two approaches are complementary. Neither dominates the other. The epistemological approach is comparative. It looks to the most successful branches of knowledge, the natural sciences and pure mathematics, for paradigms. The former supplies the paradigm of knowledge that is based on observation of natural phenomena; the latter supplies the paradigm of knowledge that seemingly results from the sheer exercise of reason. Under the influence of these paradigms, three distinct views have emerged: naturalism, rationalism, and noncognitivism. Naturalism takes ethical knowledge to be empirical and accordingly models it on the paradigm of the natural sciences. Ethical concepts, on this view, concern natural phenomena. Rationalism takes ethical knowledge to be a priori and accordingly models it on the paradigm of pure mathematics. Ethical concepts, on this view, concern morality understood as something completely distinct from, though applicable to, natural phenomena, something whose content and structure can be apprehended by reason independently of sensory inputs. Noncognitivism, in opposition to these other views, denies that ethics is a genuine branch of knowledge or takes it to be a branch of knowledge only in a qualified sense. In either case, it denies that ethics is properly modeled on science or mathematics. On the most extreme form of noncognitivism, there are no genuine ethical concepts; words like ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘good’, and ‘evil’ have no cognitive meaning but rather serve to vent feelings and emotions, to express decisions and commitments, or to influence attitudes and dispositions. On less extreme forms, these words are taken to have some cognitive meaning, but conveying that meaning is held to be decidedly secondary to the purposes of venting feelings, expressing decisions, or influencing attitudes. Naturalism is well represented in the work of Mill; rationalism in the works of Kant and the intuitionists. And noncognitivism, which did not emerge as a distinctive view until the twentieth century, is most powerfully expounded in the works of C. L. Stevenson and Hare. Its central tenets, however, were anticipated by Hume, whose skeptical attacks on rationalism set the agenda for subsequent work in metaethics. The metaphysical approach is centered on the question of objectivity, the question of whether ethical predicates represent real properties of an external world or merely apparent or invented properties, properties that owe their existence to the perception, feeling, or thought of those who ascribe them. Two views dominate this approach. The first, moral realism, affirms the real existence of ethical properties. It takes them to inhere in the external world and thus to exist independently of their being perceived. For moral realism, ethics is an objective discipline, a discipline that promises discovery and confirmation of objective truths. At the same time, moral realists differ fundamentally on the question of the character of ethical properties. Some, such as Plato and Moore, regard them as purely intellective and thus irreducibly distinct from empirical properties. Others, such as Aristotle and Mill, regard them as empirical and either reducible to or at least supervenient on other empirical properties. The second view, moral subjectivism, denies the real existence of ethical properties. On this view, to predicate, say, goodness of a person is to impose some feeling, impulse, or other state of mind onto the world, much as one projects an emotion onto one’s circumstances when one describes them as delightful or sad. On the assumption of moral subjectivism, ethics is not a source of objective truth. In ancient philosophy, moral subjectivism was advanced by some of the Sophists, notably Protagoras. In modern philosophy, Hume expounded it in the eighteenth century and Sartre in the twentieth century. Regardless of approach, one and perhaps the central problem of metaethics is how value is related to fact. On the epistemological approach, this problem is commonly posed as the question of whether judgments of value are derivable from statements of fact. Or, to be more exact, can there be a logically valid argument whose conclusion is a judgment of value and all of whose premises are statements of fact? On the metaphysical approach, the problem is commonly posed as the question of whether moral predicates represent properties that are explicable as complexes of empirical properties. At issue, in either case, is whether ethics is an autonomous discipline, whether the study of moral values and principles is to some degree independent of the study of observable properties and events. A negative answer to these questions affirms the autonomy of ethics; a positive answer denies ethics’ autonomy and implies that it is a branch of the natural sciences. Moral psychology. Even those who affirm the autonomy of ethics recognize that some facts, particularly facts of human psychology, bear on the general studies of goodness and right action. No one maintains that these studies float free of all conception of human appetite and passion or that they presuppose no account of the human capacity for voluntary action. It is generally recognized that an adequate understanding of desire, emotion, deliberation, choice, volition, character, and personality is indispensable to the theoretical treatment of human well-being, intrinsic value, and duty. Investigations into the nature of these psychological phenomena are therefore an essential, though auxiliary, part of ethics. They constitute the adjunct field of moral psychology. One area of particular interest within this field is the study of those capacities by virtue of which men and women qualify as moral agents, beings who are responsible for their actions. This study is especially important to the theory of duty since that theory, in modern philosophy, characteristically assumes a strong doctrine of individual responsibility. That is, it assumes principles of culpability for wrongdoing that require, as conditions of justified blame, that the act of wrongdoing be one’s own and that it not be done innocently. Only moral agents are capable of meeting these conditions. And the presumption is that normal, adult human beings qualify as moral agents whereas small children and nonhuman animals do not. The study then focuses on those capacities that distinguish the former from the latter as responsible beings. The main issue is whether the power of reason alone accounts for these capacities. On one side of the issue are philosophers like Kant who hold that it does. Reason, in their view, is both the pilot and the engine of moral agency. It not only guides one toward actions in conformity with one’s duty, but it also produces the desire to do one’s duty and can invest that desire with enough strength to overrule conflicting impulses of appetite and passion. On the other side are philosophers, such as Hume and Mill, who take reason to be one of several capacities that constitute moral agency. On their view, reason works strictly in the service of natural and sublimated desires, fears, and aversions to produce intelligent action, to guide its possessor toward the objects of those desires and away from the objects of those fears. It cannot, however, by itself originate any desire or fear. Thus, the desire to act rightly, the aversion to acting wrongly, which are constituents of moral agency, are not products of reason but are instead acquired through some mechanical process of socialization by which their objects become associated with the objects of natural desires and aversions. On one view, then, moral agency consists in the power of reason to govern behavior, and being rational is thus sufficient for being responsible for one’s actions. On the other view, moral agency consists in several things including reason, but also including a desire to act rightly and an aversion to acting wrongly that originate in natural desires and aversions. On this view, to be responsible for one’s actions, one must not only be rational but also have certain desires and aversions whose acquisition is not guaranteed by the maturation of reason. Within moral psychology, one cardinal test of these views is how well they can accommodate and explain such common experiences of moral agency as conscience, weakness, and moral dilemma. At some point, however, the views must be tested by questions about freedom. For one cannot be responsible for one’s actions if one is incapable of acting freely, which is to say, of one’s own free will. The capacity for free action is thus essential to moral agency, and how this capacity is to be explained, whether it fits within a deterministic universe, and if not, whether the notion of moral responsibility should be jettisoned, are among the deepest questions that the student of moral agency must face. What is more, they are not questions to which moral psychology can furnish answers. At this point, ethics descends into metaphysics.  ethnography, an open-ended family of techniques through which anthropologists investigate cultures; also, the organized descriptions of other cultures that result from this method. Cultural anthropology  ethnology  is based primarily on fieldwork through which anthropologists immerse themselves in the life of a local culture village, neighborhood and attempt to describe and interpret aspects of the culture. Careful observation is one central tool of investigation. Through it the anthropologist can observe and record various features of social life, e.g. trading practices, farming techniques, or marriage arrangements. A second central tool is the interview, through which the researcher explores the beliefs and values of members of the local culture. Tools of historical research, including particularly oral history, are also of use in ethnography, since the cultural practices of interest often derive from a remote point in time.  ethnology, the comparative and analytical study of cultures; cultural anthroplogy. Anthropologists aim to describe and interpret aspects of the culture of various social groups  e.g., the hunter-gatherers of the Kalahari, rice villages of the Chin. Canton Delta, or a community of physicists at Livermore Laboratory. Topics of particular interest include religious beliefs, linguistic practices, kinship arrangements, marriage patterns, farming technology, dietary practices, gender relations, and power relations. Cultural anthropology is generally conceived as an empirical science, and this raises several methodological and conceptual difficulties. First is the role of the observer. The injection of an alien observer into the local culture unavoidably disturbs that culture. Second, there is the problem of intelligibility across cultural systems  radical translation. One goal of ethnographic research is to arrive at an interpretation of a set of beliefs and values that are thought to be radically different from the researcher’s own beliefs and values; but if this is so, then it is questionable whether they can be accurately tr. into the researcher’s conceptual scheme. Third, there is the problem of empirical testing of ethnographic interpretations. To what extent do empirical procedures constrain the construction of an interpretation of a given cultural milieu? Finally, there is the problem of generalizability. To what extent does fieldwork in one location permit anthropologists to generalize to a larger context  other villages, the dispersed ethnic group represented by this village, or this village at other times?  ethnomethodology, a phenomenological approach to interpreting everyday action and speech in various social contexts. Derived from phenomenological sociology and introduced by Harold Garfinkel, the method aims to guide research into meaningful social practices as experienced by participants. A major objective of the method is to interpret the rules that underlie everyday activity and thus constitute part of the normative basis of a given social order. Research from this perspective generally focuses on mundane social activities  e.g., psychiatrists evaluating patients’ files, jurors deliberating on defendants’ culpability, or coroners judging causes of death. The investigator then attempts to reconstruct an underlying set of rules and ad hoc procedures that may be taken to have guided the observed activity. The approach emphasizes the contextuality of social practice  the richness of unspoken shared understandings that guide and orient participants’ actions in a given practice or activity.

eudaemonia: from Grecian eudaimonia, and then there’s eudaemonism --‘happiness’, ‘flourishing’, the ethical doctrine that happiness is the ultimate justification for morality. The ancient Grecian philosophers typically begin their ethical treatises with an account of happiness, and then argue that the best way to achieve a happy life is through the cultivation and exercise of virtue. Most of them make virtue or virtuous activity a constituent of the happy life; the Epicureans, however, construe happiness in terms of pleasure, and treat virtue as a means to the end of pleasant living. Ethical eudaimonism is sometimes combined with psychological eudaimonism  i.e., the view that all free, intentional action is aimed ultimately at the agent’s happiness. A common feature of ancient discussions of ethics, and one distinguishing them from most modern discussions, is the view that an agent would not be rationally justified in a course of action that promised less happiness than some alternative open to him. Hence it seems that most of the ancient theories are forms of egosim. But the ancient theories differ from modern versions of egoism since, according to the ancients, at least some of the virtues are dispositions to act from primarily other-regarding motives: although the agent’s happiness is the ultimate justification of virtuous action, it is not necessarily what motivates such action. Since happiness is regarded by most of the ancients as the ultimate end that justifies our actions, their ethical theories seem teleological; i.e., right or virtuous action is construed as action that contributes to or maximizes the good. But appearances are again misleading, for the ancients typically regard virtuous action as also valuable for its own sake and hence constitutive of the agent’s happiness. 

event: used by Grice in “Actions and Events,” -- anything that happens; an occurrence. Two fundamental questions about events, which philosophers have usually treated together, are: 1 Are there events?, and 2 If so, what is their nature? Some philosophers simply assume that there are events. Others argue for that, typically through finding semantic theories for ordinary claims that apparently concern the fact that some agent has done something or that some thing has changed. Most philosophers presume that the events whose existence is proved by such arguments are abstract particulars, “particulars” in the sense that they are non-repeatable and spatially locatable, “abstract” in the sense that more than one event can occur simultaneously in the same place. The theories of events espoused by Davidson in his causal view, Kim though his view may be unstable in this respect, Jonathan Bennett, and Lawrence Lombard take them to be abstract particulars. However, Chisholm takes Euler diagram event 292   292 events to be abstract universals; and Quine and Davidson in his later view take them to be concrete particulars. Some philosophers who think of events as abstract particulars tend to associate the concept of an event with the concept of change; an event is a change in some object or other though some philosophers have doubts about this and others have denied it outright. The time at which an event, construed as a particular, occurs can be associated with the shortest time at which the object, which is the subject of that event, changes from the having of one property to the having of another, contrary property. Events inherit whatever spatial locations they have from the spatial locations, if any, of the things that those events are changes in. Thus, an event that is a change in an object, x, from being F to being G, is located wherever x is at the time it changes from being F to being G. Some events are those of which another event is composed e.g., the sinking of a ship seems composed of the sinkings of its parts. However, it also seems clear that not every group of events comprises another; there just is no event composed of a certain explosion on Venus and my birth. Any adequate theory about the nature of events must address the question of what properties, if any, such things have essentially. One issue is whether the causes or effects of events are essential to those events. A second is whether it is essential to each event that it be a change in the entity it is in fact a change in. A third is whether it is essential to each event that it occur at the time at which it in fact occurs. A chief component of a theory of events is a criterion of identity, a principle giving conditions necessary and sufficient for an event e and an event eH to be one and the same event. Quine holds that events may be identified with the temporal parts of physical objects, and that events and physical objects would thus share the same condition of identity: sameness of spatiotemporal location. Davidson once proposed that events are identical provided they have the same causes and effects. More recently, Davidson abandoned this position in favor of Quine’s. Kim takes an event to be the exemplification of a property or relation by an object or objects at a time. This idea has led to his view that an event e is the same as an event eH if and only if e and eH are the exemplifications of the same property by the same objects at the same time. Lombard’s view is a variation on this account, and is derived from the idea of events as the changes that physical objects undergo when they alter.