IMPLICATVRA, in 18 volumes -- vol. XVII

tempus: cited by Grice and Myro in the Grice-Myro theory of identity. tense logic, an extension of classical logic introduced by Arthur Prior Past, Present, and Future, 7, involving operators P and F for the past and future tenses, or ‘it was the case that . . .’ and ‘it will be the case that . . .’. Classical or mathematical logic was developed as a logic of unchanging mathematical truth, and can be applied to tensed discourse only by artificial regimentation inspired by mathematical physics, introducing quantification over “times” or “instants.” Thus ‘It will have been the case that p,’ which Prior represents simply as FPp, classical logic represents as ‘There [exists] an instant t and there [exists] an instant tH such that t [is] later than the present and tH [is] earlier than t, and at tH it [is] the case that pH, or DtDtH t o‹t8tH ‹t8ptH, where the brackets indicate that the verbs are to be understood as tenseless. Prior’s motives were in part linguistic to produce a formalization less removed from natural language than the classical and in part metaphysical to avoid ontological commitment to such entities as instants. Much effort was devoted to finding tense-logical principles equivalent to various classical assertions about the structure of the earlierlater order among instants; e.g., ‘Between any two instants there is another instant’ corresponds to the validity of the axioms Pp P PPp and Fp P FFp. Less is expressible using P and F than is expressible with explicit quantification over instants, and further operators for ‘since’ and ‘until’ or ‘now’ and ‘then’ have been introduced by Hans Kamp and others. These are especially important in combination with quantification, as in ‘When he was in power, all who now condemn him then praised him.’ As tense is closely related to mood, so tense logic is closely related to modal logic. As Kripke models for modal logic consist each of a set X of “worlds” and a relation R of ‘x is an alternative to y’, so for tense logic they consist each of a set X of “instants” and a relation R of ‘x is earlier than y’: Thus instants, banished from the syntax or proof theory, reappear in the semantics or model theory. Modality and tense are both involved in the issue of future contingents, and one of Prior’s motives was a desire to produce a formalism in which the views on this topic of ancient, medieval, and early modern logicians from Aristotle with his “sea fight tomorrow” and Diodorus Cronos with his “Master Argument” through Ockham to Peirce could be represented. The most important precursor to Prior’s work on tense logic was that on many-valued logics by Lukasiewicz, which was motivated largely by the problem of future contingents. Also related to tense and mood is aspect, and modifications to represent this grammatical category evaluating formulas at periods rather than instants of time have also been introduced. Like modal logic, tense logic has been the object of intensive study in theoretical computer science, especially in connection with attempts to develop languages in which properties of programs can be expressed and proved; variants of tense logic under such labels as “dynamic logic” or “process logic” have thus been extensively developed for technological rather than philosophical motives. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “D. H. Mellor on real and irreal time.”

terminus – horos – Cicero’s transliteration of the Greianism --. terminist logic, a school of semantics until its demise in the humanistic reforms. The chief goal of ‘terminisim’ – or terministic semantics -- is the elucidation (or conceptual analysis) of the  form, the “exposition,” of a proposition advanced in the context of Scholastic disputation. The cntral theory of terminisitc semantics concerns this or that property of this or that term, especially the suppositum. Terminisic semantics does the work of modern quantification theory. Important semanticists in the school include Peter of Spain, Sherwood, Burleigh (Burlaeus), Heytesbury, and Paolo Veneto.

the terminus a quo-terminus a quem distinction: used by Grice for the starting point of some process, as opposed to the terminus ad quem, the ending point. E. g., change is a process that begins from some state, the terminus a quo, and proceeds to some state at which it ends, the terminus ad quem. In particular, in the ripening of an apple, the green apple is the terminus a quo and the red apple is the terminus ad quem.

tertullian Roman – Grice says that ‘you’re the cream in my coffee’ is absurd – “Can you believe it?” -- Adored by Grice because he believed what he thought was absurd.  theologian, an early father of the Christian church. A layman from Carthage, he laid the conceptual and linguistic basis for the doctrine of the Trinity. Though appearing hostile to philosophy “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” and to rationality “It is certain because it is impossible”, Tertullian was steeped in Stoicism. He denounced all eclecticism not governed by the normative tradition of Christian doctrine, yet commonly used philosophical argument and Stoic concepts e.g., the corporeality of God and the soul. Despite insisting on the sole authority of the New Testament apostles, he joined with Montanism, which taught that the Holy Spirit was still inspiring prophecy concerning moral discipline. Reflecting this interest in the Spirit, Tertullian pondered the distinctions to which he gave the neologism trinitas within God. God is one “substance” but three “persons”: a plurality without division. The Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct, but share equally in the one Godhead. This threeness is manifest only in the “economy” of God’s temporal action toward the world; later orthodoxy e.g. Athanasius, Basil the Great, Augustine, would postulate a Triunity that is eternal and “immanent,” i.e., internal to God’s being. 

testing: Grice: “A token proving testability.” Grice: “We need a meta-test: a test for a test for implicatura.” late 14c., "small vessel used in assaying precious metals," from Old French test, from Latin testum "earthen pot," related to testa "piece of burned clay, earthen pot, shell" (see tete).  Sense of "trial or examination to determine the correctness of something" is recorded from 1590s. The connecting notion is "ascertaining the quality of a metal by melting it in a pot." Test Act was the name given to various laws in English history meant to exclude Catholics and Nonconformists from office, especially that of 1673, repealed 1828. Test drive (v.) is first recorded 1954. In the sciences, capacity of a theory to undergo experimental testing. Theories in the natural sciences are regularly subjected to experimental tests involving detailed and rigorous control of variable factors. Not naive observation of the workings of nature, but disciplined, designed intervention in such workings, is the hallmark of testability. Logically regarded, testing takes the form of seeking confirmation of theories by obtaining positive test results. We can represent a theory as a conjunction of a hypothesis and a statement of initial conditions, H • A. This conjunction deductively entails testable or observational consequences O. Hence, H • A P O. If O obtains, H • A is said to be confirmed, or rendered probable. But such confirmation is not decisive; O may be entailed by, and hence explained by, many other theories. For this reason, Popper insisted that the testability of theories should seek disconfirmations or falsifications. The logical schema H • A P O not-O not-H • A is deductively valid, hence apparently decisive. On this view, science progresses, not by finding the truth, but by discarding the false. Testability becomes falsifiability. This deductive schema modus tollens is also employed in the analysis of crucial tests. Consider two hypotheses H1 and H2, both introduced to explain some phenomenon. H1 predicts that for some test condition C, we have the test result ‘if C then e1’, and H2, the result ‘if C then e2’, where e1 and e2 are logically incompatible. If experiment falsifies ‘if C then e1’ e1 does not actually occur as a test result, the hypothesis H1 is false, which implies that H2 is true. It was originally supposed that the experiments of J. B. L. Foucault constituted a decisive falsifcation of the corpuscular theory of the nature of light, and thus provided a decisive establishment of the truth of its rival, the wave theory of light. This account of crucial experiments neglects certain points in logic and also the role of auxiliary hypotheses in science. As Duhem pointed term, minor testability 908   908 out, rarely, if ever, does a hypothesis face the facts in isolation from other supporting assumptions. Furthermore, it is a fact of logic that the falsification of a conjunction of a hypothesis and its auxiliary assumptions and initial conditions not-H • A is logically equivalent to not-H or not-A, and the test result itself provides no warrant for choosing which alternative to reject. Duhem further suggested that rejection of any component part of a complex theory is based on extra-evidential considerations factors like simplicity and fruitfulness and cannot be forced by negative test results. Acceptance of Duhem’s view led Quine to suggest that a theory must face the tribunal of experience en bloc; no single hypothesis can be tested in isolation. Original conceptions of testability and falsifiability construed scientific method as hypothetico-deductive. Difficulties with these reconstructions of the logic of experiment have led philosophers of science to favor an explication of empirical support based on the logic of probability. Grice: “Linguists never take ‘testability’ too conceptually, as one can witness in Saddock’s hasty proofs!” – Refs: H. P. Grice, “On testing for testing for conversational implicatura.”

testis (n.). (plural testes), Latin testis "testicle," usually regarded as a special application of testis "witness" (see testament), presumably because it "bears witness to male virility" [Barnhart]. Stories that trace the use of the Latin word to some supposed swearing-in ceremony are modern and groundless.  Compare Greek parastatai "testicles," from parastates "one that stands by;" and French slang témoins, literally "witnesses." But Buck thinks Greek parastatai "testicles" has been wrongly associated with the legal sense of parastates "supporter, defender" and suggests instead parastatai in the sense of twin "supporting pillars, props of a mast," etc. Or it might be a euphemistic use of the word in the sense "comrades." OED, meanwhile, points to Walde's suggestion of a connection between testis and testa "pot, shell, etc." (see tete). testis "witness," from PIE *tri-st-i- "third person standing by," from root *tris- "three" (see three) on the notion of "third person, disinterested witness." -- as Grice notes, “it is etymologically  -- or etymythologically -- related to ‘testicles,’” --  Grice proposes an analysis of ‘testify’ in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, “t is a testimony iff t is an act of telling, including any assertion apparently intended to impart information, regardless of social setting.” In an extended use, personal letters and messages, books, and other published material purporting to contain factual information also constitute testimony. As Grice notes, “testimony may be sincere or insincere” -- and may express knowledge or baseless prejudice. When it expresses knowledge, and it is rightly believed, this knowledge is disseminated to its recipient, near or remote. Second-hand knowledge can be passed on further, producing long chains of testimony; but these chains always begin with the report of an eye-witness or expert. In any social group with a common language there is potential for the sharing, through testimony, of the fruits of individuals’ idiosyncratic acquisition of knowledge through perception and inference. In advanced societies specialization in the gathering and production of knowledge and its wider dissemination through spoken and written testimony is a fundamental socio-epistemic fact, and a very large part of each person’s body of knowledge and belief stems from testimony. Thus, the question when a person may properly believe what another tells her, and what grounds her epistemic entitlement to do so, is a crucial one in epistemology. Reductionists about testimony insist that this entitlement must derive from our entitlement to believe what we perceive to be so, and to draw inferences from this according to familiar general principles. See e.g., Hume’s classic discussion, in his “Enquiry into Human Understanding,” section X. On this view, I can perceive that someone has told me that p, but can thereby come to know that p only by means of an inference  one that goes via additional, empirically grounded knowledge of the trustworthiness of that person. Anti-reductionists insist, by contrast, that there is a general entitlement to believe what one is told just as such defeated by knowledge of one’s informant’s lack of trustworthiness her mendacity or incompetence, but not needing to be bolstered positively by empirically based knowledge of her trustworthiness. Anti-reductionists thus see testimony as an autonomous source of knowledge on a par with perception, inference, and memory. One argument adduced for anti-reductionism is transcendental: We have many beliefs acquired from testimony, and these beliefs are knowledge; their status as knowledge cannot be accounted for in the way required by the reductionist, i. e., the reliability of testimony cannot be independently confirmed; therefore, the reductionist’s insistence on this is mistaken. However, while it is perhaps true that the reliability of all the beliefs one has that depend on past testimony cannot be simultaneously confirmed, one can certainly sometimes ascertain, without circularity, that a specific assertion by a particular person is likely to be correct  if, e.g.,one’s own experience has established that that person has a good track record of reliability about that kind of thing. Grice: “Sometimes I use testimonium.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Trust and rationality.”

tetens: philosopher, referred to by Grice as “Dutch Locke.” After his studies in Rostock and Copenhagen, Tetens teaches at Bützow and Kiel. He had a second successful career as a public servant in Denmark  that did not leave him time for philosophical explorations. Tetens is one of the most important mainland philosophers between Wolff and Kant. Like Kant, whom he significantly influenced, Tetens attempts to find a middle way between Descartes’s rationalism and Locke’s empiricism. Tetens’s most important work, the “Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung,” is indicative of the state of philosophical discussion  before Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Tetens, who follows the “psychological method” of Locke, tends toward a naturalism. Tetens makes a more radical distinction between sensation and reason than Hume allows and attempts to show how this or that basic rational principle – a prequel to Grice’s principle of conversational cooperation -- guarantee the objectivity of human knowledge.

thales:  called by Grice the first Grecian philosopher (“Oddly, we call him a Ionian, but the Ionian is quite a way from where he was born!”) – who poisted a ‘philosophical’ why-explanation.  Grecian philosopher who was regarded as one of the Seven Sages of Greece. He was also considered the first philosopher, founder of the Milesians. Thales is also reputed to have been an engineer, astronomer, mathematician, and statesman. His doctrines even early Grecian sources know only by hearsay: he said that water is the arche, and that the earth floats on water like a raft. The magnet has a soul, and all things are full of the gods. Thales’ attempt to explain natural phenomena in natural rather than exclusively supernatural terms bore fruit in his follower Anaximander. 

thema: a term Grice borrows from Stoic logic, after attending a seminar on the topic by Benson Mates – a ‘thema’ is a ground rule used to reduce argument forms to basic forms. The Stoics analyzed arguments by their form schema, or tropos. They represented forms using numbers to represent claims; for example, ‘if the first, the second; but the first; therefore the second’. Grice uses “so-and-so” for ‘the first’ and ‘such and such’ for the ‘second’. “If so and so, such and such, but so and so; therefore, such and such.” Some forms were undemonstrable; others were reduced to the undemonstrable argument forms by ground rules themata; e.g., if R follows from P & Q, -Q follows from P & -R. The five undemonstrable arguments are: 1 modus ponendo ponens; 2 modus tollendo tollens; 3 not both P and Q, P, so not-Q; 4 P or Q but not both, P, so not-Q; and 5 disjunctive syllogism. The evidence about the four ground rules is incomplete, but a sound and consistent system for propositional logic can be developed that is consistent with the evidence we have. See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, for an introduction to the Stoic theory of arguments; other evidence is more scattered. 

θ: Grice’s symbol for a theory. Grice uses small-case theta for a token of a theory, and capital theta for a type of theory.– Grice couldn’t quite stand some type of attitude he found in people like J. M. Rountree – Rountree was claiming that one needs a ‘theory’ of meaning. Grice responded: “ Rountree is wrong: if meaning is a matter of theory, it cannot be a matter of intuition; and I’m sure it should be a matter of intuition for Rountree!” theoretical term – Grice was once attracted to Ramsey’s essay on “Theories,” but later came to see it as ‘pretentious’. “Surely the way *I* use ‘theory’ is not Ramsey’s!” – If something is an object of an intuition by Grice, it cannot be a theoretical term – theory and intuition don’t go together. They repel each other! a term occurring in a scientific theory that purports to make reference to an unobservable entity e.g., ‘electron’, property e.g., ‘the monatomicity of a molecule’, or relation ‘greater electrical resistance’. The qualification ‘purports to’ is required because instrumentalists deny that any such unobservables exist; nevertheless, they acknowledge that a scientific theory, such as the atomic theory of matter, may be a useful tool for organizing our knowledge of observables and predicting future experiences. Scientific realists, in contrast, maintain that at least some of the theoretical terms e.g., ‘quark’ or ‘neutrino’ actually denote entities that are not directly observable  they hold, i.e., that such things exist. For either group, theoretical terms are contrasted with such observational terms as ‘rope’, ‘smooth’, and ‘louder than’, which refer to observable entities, properties, or relations. Much philosophical controversy has centered on how to draw the distinction between the observable and the unobservable. Did Galileo observe the moons of Jupiter with his telescope? Do we observe bacteria under a microscope? Do physicists observe electrons in bubble chambers? Do astronomers observe the supernova explosions with neutrino counters? Do we observe ordinary material objects, or are sense-data the only observables? Are there any observational terms at all, or are all terms theory-laden? Another important meaning of ‘theoretical term’ occurs if one regards a scientific theory as a semiformal axiomatic system. It is then natural to think of its vocabulary as divided into three parts, i terms of logic and mathematics, ii terms drawn from ordinary language or from other theories, and iii theoretical terms that constitute the special vocabulary of that particular theory. Thermodynamics, e.g., employs i terms for numbers and mathematical operations, ii such terms as ‘pressure’ and ‘volume’ that are common to many branches of physics, and iii such special thermodynamical terms as ‘temperature’, ‘heat’, and ‘entropy’. In this second sense, a theoretical term need not even purport to refer to unobservables. For example, although special equipment is necessary for its precise quantitatheoretical entity theoretical term 912   912 tive measurement, temperature is an observable property. Even if theories are not regarded as axiomatic systems, their technical terms can be considered theoretical. Such terms need not purport to refer to unobservables, nor be the exclusive property of one particular theory. In some cases, e.g., ‘work’ in physics, an ordinary word is used in the theory with a meaning that departs significantly from its ordinary use. Serious questions have been raised about the meaning of theoretical terms. Some philosophers have insisted that, to be meaningful, they must be given operational definitions. Others have appealed to coordinative definitions to secure at least partial interpretation of axiomatic theories. The verifiability criterion has been invoked to secure the meaningfulness of scientific theories containing such terms. A theoretical concept or construct is a concept expressed by a theoretical term in any of the foregoing senses. The term ‘theoretical entity’ has often been used to refer to unobservables, but this usage is confusing, in part because, without introducing any special vocabulary, we can talk about objects too small to be perceived directly  e.g., spheres of gamboge a yellow resin less than 106 meters in diameter, which figured in a historically important experiment by Jean Perrin.  Grice uses Ramsey’s concept of ‘theory’ – “granting that Ramsey overrated theory, as all Cambridge men do!” -- theory-laden, dependent on theory; specifically, involving a theoretical interpretation of what is perceived or recorded. In the heyday of logical empiricism it was thought, by Carnap and others, that a rigid distinction could be drawn between observational and theoretical terms. Later, N. R. Hanson, Paul Feyerabend, and others questioned this distinction, arguing that perhaps all observations are theory-laden either because our perception of the world is colored by perceptual, linguistic, and cultural differences or because no attempt to distinguish sharply between observation and theory has been successful. This shift brings a host of philosophical problems. If we accept the idea of radical theoryladenness, relativism of theory choice becomes possible, for, given rival theories each of which conditions its own observational evidence, the choice between them would seem to have to be made on extra-evidential grounds, since no theory-neutral observations are available. In its most perplexing form, relativism holds that, theory-ladenness being granted, one theory is as good as any other, so far as the relationship of theory to evidence is concerned. Relativists couple the thesis of theory-ladenness with the alleged fact of the underdetermination of a theory by its observational evidence, which yields the idea that any number of alternative theories can be supported by the same evidence. The question becomes one of what it is that constrains choices between theories. If theory-laden observations cannot constrain such choices, the individual subjective preferences of scientists, or rules of fraternal behavior agreed upon by groups of scientists, become the operative constraints. The logic of confirmation seems to be intrinsically contaminated by both idiosyncratic and social factors, posing a threat to the very idea of scientific rationality. 

signum – Grice: “I prefer token, so Anglo-Saxon! Plus I’m a ‘teacher’ – “to teach philosophy” --” whose explorations on the Nicomachean Ethics, in one of their earlier incarnations, as a set of lecture notes, sees me through terms of teaching Aristotle's moral theory.” “My own philosophical life in this period involves two especially important aspects.” ROBBING PETER TO PAY PAUL.. “The first is my prolonged collaboration with my tutee at St. John’s, P. F. Strawson.”“Strawson’s and my efforts are partly directed towards the giving of joint seminars.”“Strawson and I stage a number of joint seminars on topics related to the notions of meaning, categories, and logical form.” “But my association with P. F. Strawson is much more than an alliance for the purpose of teaching.” -- theory of signs, the philosophical and scientific theory of information-carrying entities, communication, and information transmission. The term ‘semiotic’ was introduced by Locke for the science of signs and signification. The term became more widely used as a result of the influential work of Peirce and Charles Morris. With regard to linguistic signs, three areas of semiotic were distinguished: pragmatics  the study of the way people, animals, or machines such as computers use signs; semantics  the study of the relations between signs and their meanings, abstracting from their use; and syntax  the study of the relations among signs themselves, abstracting both from use and from meaning. In Europe, the near-equivalent term ‘semiology’ was introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure, the Swiss linguist. Broadly, a sign is any information-carrying entity, including linguistic and animal signaling tokens, maps, road signs, diagrams, pictures, models, etc. Examples include smoke as a sign of fire, and a red light at a highway intersection as a sign to stop. Linguistically, vocal aspects of speech such as prosodic features intonation, stress and paralinguistic features loudness and tone, gestures, facial expressions, etc., as well as words and sentences, are signs in the most general sense. Peirce defined a sign as “something that stands for something in some respect or capacity.” Among signs, he distinguished symbols, icons, and indices. A symbol, or conventional sign, is a sign, typical of natural language forms, that lacks any significant relevant physical correspondence with or resemblance to the entities to which the form refers manifested by the fact that quite different forms may refer to the same class of objects, and for which there is no correlation between the occurrence of the sign and its referent. An index, or natural sign, is a sign whose occurrence is causally or statistically correlated with occurrences of its referent, and whose production is not intentional. Thus, yawning is a natural sign of sleepiness; a bird call may be a natural sign of alarm. Linguistically, loudness with a rising pitch is a sign of anger. An icon is a sign whose form corresponds to or resembles its referent or a characteristic of its referent. For instance, a tailor’s swatch is an icon by being a sign that resembles a fabric in color, pattern, and texture. A linguistic example is onomatopoeia  as with ‘buzz’. In general, there are conventional and cultural aspects to a sign being an icon. 

theosophy, any philosophical mysticism, especially those that purport to be mathematically or scientifically based, such as Pythagoreanism, Neoplatonism, or gnosticism. Vedic Hinduism, and certain aspects of Buddhism, Taoism, and Islamic Sufism, can also be considered theosophical. In narrower senses, ‘theosophy’ may refer to the philosophy of Swedenborg, Steiner, or Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky 183. Swedenborg’s theosophy originally consisted of a rationalistic cosmology, inspired by certain elements of Cartesian and Leibnizian philosophy, and a Christian mysticism. Swedenborg labored to explain the interconnections between soul and body. Steiner’s theosophy is a reaction to standard scientific theory. It purports to be as rigorous as ordinary science, but superior to it by incorporating spiritual truths about reality. According to his theosophy, reality is organic and evolving by its own resource. Genuine knowledge is intuitive, not discursive. Madame Blavatsky founded the Theosophical Society in 1875. Her views were eclectic, but were strongly influenced by mystical elements of  philosophy. 

thomism, the theology and philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The term is applied broadly to various thinkers from different periods who were heavily influenced by Aquinas’s thought in their own philosophizing and theologizing. Here three different eras and three different groups of thinkers will be distinguished: those who supported Aquinas’s thought in the fifty years or so following his death in 1274; certain highly skilled interpreters and commentators who flourished during the period of “Second Thomism” sixteenthseventeenth centuries; and various late nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers who have been deeply influenced in their own work by Aquinas. Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Thomism. Although Aquinas’s genius was recognized by many during his own lifetime, a number of his views were immediately contested by other Scholastic thinkers. Controversies ranged, e.g., over his defense of only one substantial form in human beings; his claim that prime matter is purely potential and cannot, therefore, be kept in existence without some substantial form, even by divine power; his emphasis on the role of the human intellect in the act of choice; his espousal of a real distinction betweeen the soul and its powers; and his defense of some kind of objective or “real” rather than a merely mind-dependent composition of essence and act of existing esse in creatures. Some of Aquinas’s positions were included directly or indirectly in the 219 propositions condemned by Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris in 1277, and his defense of one single substantial form in man was condemned by Archbishop Robert Kilwardby at Oxford in 1277, with renewed prohibitions by his successor as archbishop of Canterbury, John Peckham, in 1284 and 1286. Only after Aquinas’s canonization in 1323 were the Paris prohibitions revoked insofar as they touched on his teaching in 1325. Even within his own Dominican order, disagreement about some of his views developed within the first decades after his death, notwithstanding the order’s highly sympathetic espousal of his cause. Early English Dominican defenders of his general views included William Hothum d.1298, Richard Knapwell d.c.1288, Robert Orford b. after 1250, fl.129095, Thomas Sutton d. c.1315?, and William Macclesfield d.1303.  Dominican Thomists included Bernard of Trilia d.1292, Giles of Lessines in present-day Belgium d.c.1304?, John Quidort of Paris d. 1306, Bernard of Auvergne d. after 1307, Hervé Nédélec d.1323, Armand of Bellevue fl. 131634, and William Peter Godin d.1336. The secular master at Paris, Peter of Auvergne d. 1304, while remaining very independent in his own views, knew Aquinas’s thought well and completed some of his commentaries on Aristotle. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Thomism. Sometimes known as the period of Second Thomism, this revival gained impetus from the early fifteenth-century writer John Capreolus 13801444 in his Defenses of Thomas’s Theology Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae, a commentary on the Sentences. A number of fifteenth-century Dominican and secular teachers in G. universities also contributed: Kaspar Grunwald Freiburg; Cornelius Sneek and John Stoppe in Rostock; Leonard of Brixental Vienna; Gerard of Heerenberg, Lambert of Heerenberg, and John Versor all at Cologne; Gerhard of Elten; and in Belgium Denis the Carthusian. Outstanding among various sixteenth-century commentators on Thomas were Tommaso de Vio Cardinal Cajetan, Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, Francisco de Vitoria Salamanca, and Francisco’s disciples Domingo de Soto and Melchior Cano. Most important among early seventeenth-century Thomists was John of St. Thomas, who lectured at Piacenza, Madrid, and Alcalá, and is best known for his Cursus philosophicus and his Cursus theologicus. Theravada Buddhism Thomism 916   916 The nineteenth- and twentieth-century revival. By the early to mid-nineteenth century the study of Aquinas had been largely abandoned outside Dominican circles, and in most Roman Catholic s and seminaries a kind of Cartesian and Suarezian Scholasticism was taught. Long before he became Pope Leo XIII, Joachim Pecci and his brother Joseph had taken steps to introduce the teaching of Thomistic philosophy at the diocesan seminary at Perugia in 1846. Earlier efforts in this direction had been made by Vincenzo Buzzetti, by Buzzetti’s students Serafino and Domenico Sordi, and by Taparelli d’Aglezio, who became director of the Collegio Romano Gregorian  in 1824. Leo’s encyclical Aeterni Patris1879 marked an official effort on the part of the Roman Catholic church to foster the study of the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas. The intent was to draw upon Aquinas’s original writings in order to prepare students of philosophy and theology to deal with problems raised by contemporary thought. The Leonine Commission was established to publish a critical edition of all of Aquinas’s writings; this effort continues today. Important centers of Thomistic studies developed, such as the Higher Institute of Philosophy at Louvain founded by Cardinal Mercier, the Dominican School of Saulchoir in France, and the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. Different groups of Roman, Belgian, and  Jesuits acknowledged a deep indebtedness to Aquinas for their personal philosophical reflections. There was also a concentration of effort in the United States at universities such as The Catholic  of America, St. Louis , Notre Dame, Fordham, Marquette, and Boston , to mention but a few, and by the Dominicans at River Forest. A great weakness of many of the nineteenthand twentieth-century Latin manuals produced during this effort was a lack of historical sensitivity and expertise, which resulted in an unreal and highly abstract presentation of an “Aristotelian-Thomistic” philosophy. This weakness was largely offset by the development of solid historical research both in the thought of Aquinas and in medieval philosophy and theology in general, championed by scholars such as H. Denifle, M. De Wulf, M. Grabmann, P. Mandonnet, F. Van Steenberghen, E. Gilson and many of his students at Toronto, and by a host of more recent and contemporary scholars. Much of this historical work continues today both within and without Catholic scholarly circles. At the same time, remarkable diversity in interpreting Aquinas’s thought has emerged on the part of many twentieth-century scholars. Witness, e.g., the heavy influence of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas on the Thomism of Maritain; the much more historically grounded approaches developed in quite different ways by Gilson and F. Van Steenberghen; the emphasis on the metaphysics of participation in Aquinas in the very different presentations by L. Geiger and C. Fabro; the emphasis on existence esse promoted by Gilson and many others but resisted by still other interpreters; the movement known as Transcendental Thomism, originally inspired by P. Rousselot and by J. Marechal in dialogue with Kant; and the long controversy about the appropriateness of describing Thomas’s philosophy and that of other medievals as a Christian philosophy. An increasing number of non-Catholic thinkers are currently directing considerable attention to Aquinas, and the varying backgrounds they bring to his texts will undoubtedly result in still other interesting interpretations and applications of his thought to contemporary concerns. 

jarvis,  j.  Grice collaborated with Jarvis’s husband at Oxford. analytic philosopher best known for her contribution to moral philosophy and for her paper “A Defense of Abortion” 1. Thomson has taught at M.I.T. since 4. Her work is centrally concerned with issues in moral philosophy, most notably questions regarding rights, and with issues in metaphysics such as the identity across time of people and the ontology of events. Her Acts and Other Events 7 is a study of human action and provides an analysis of the part whole relation among events. “A Defense of Abortion” has not only influenced much later work on this topic but is one of the most widely discussed papers in contemporary philosophy. By appeal to imaginative scenarios analogous to pregnancy, Thomson argues that even if the fetus is assumed to be a person, its rights are in many circumstances outweighed by the rights of the pregnant woman. Thus the paper advances an argument for a right to abortion that does not turn upon the question of whether the fetus is a person. Several of Thomson’s essays, including “Preferential Hiring” 3, “The Right to Privacy” 5, and “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem” 6, address the questions of what constitutes Thomson, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Judith Jarvis 917   917 an infringement of rights and when it is morally permissible to infringe a right. These are collected in Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory 6. Thomson’s The Realm of Rights 0 offers a systematic account of human rights, addressing first what it is to have a right and second which rights we have. Thomson’s work is distinguished by its exceptionally lucid style and its reliance on highly inventive examples. The centrality of examples to her work reflects a methodological conviction that our views about actual and imagined cases provide the data for moral theorizing. Refs.: H. P. Grice and J. F. Thomson, ‘The philosophy of action and free will.’

thoreau: h. d. born in Concord, Massachusetts, New England, he attended Harvard, and, rather than the usual Rhodes scholarship to Oxford, he returns to Concord to study nature and write, making a frugal living as a schoolteacher, land surveyor, and pencil maker. Commentators have emphasized three aspects of his life: his love and penetrating study of the flora and fauna of the Concord area, recorded with philosophical reflections in Walden 1854; his continuous pursuit of simplicity in the externals of life, thus avoiding a life of “quiet desperation”; and his acts of civil disobedience. The last item has been somewhat overemphasized; not paying a poll tax by way of protest was not original with Thoreau. However, his essay “Resistance to Civil Government” immortalized his protest and influenced people like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., in later years. Thoreau eventually helped runaway slaves at considerable risk; still, he considered himself a student of nature and not a reformer. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “What Thoreau missed at Oxford.” 

Gedanke experiment – Grice: “Oddly, Turing’s Gedanke experiment’ is about the meaning of ‘gedanke’!” -- used by Grice, first, in his “Some remarks about the senses.” His Gedanke experiment involves a Martian who comes and conquers the earth. He has four eyes in his face, with two of them he x-s, with the other tow he y-s. Tthought experiment, a technique for testing a hypothesis by imagining a situation and what would be said about it or more rarely, happen in it. This technique is often used by philosophers to argue for or against a hypothesis about the meaning or applicability of a concept. For example, Locke imagined a switch of minds between a prince and a cobbler as a way to argue that personal identity is based on continuity of memory, not continuity of the body. To argue for the relativity of simultaneity, Einstein imagined two observers  one on a train, the other beside it  who observed lightning bolts. And according to some scholars, Galileo only imagined the experiment of tying two five-pound weights together with a fine string in order to argue that heavier bodies do not fall faster. Thought experiments of this last type are rare because they can be used only when one is thoroughly familiar with the outcome of the imagined situation. J.A.K. Thrasymachus fl. 427 B.C., Grecian Sophist from Bithynia who is known mainly as a character in Book I of Plato’s Republic. He traveled and taught extensively throughout the Grecian world, and was well known in Athens as a teacher and as the author of treatises on rhetoric. Innovative in his style, he was credited with inventing the “middle style” of rhetoric. The only surviving fragment of a speech by Thrasymachus was written for delivery by an Athenian citizen in the assembly, at a time when Athens was not faring well in the Peloponnesian War; it shows him concerned with the efficiency of government, pleading with the Athenians to recognize their common interests and give up their factionalism. Our only other source for his views on political matters is Plato’s Republic, which most scholars accept as presenting at least a half-truth about Thrasymachus. There, Thrasymachus is represented as a foil to Socrates, claiming that justice is only what benefits the stronger, i.e., the rulers. From the point of view of those who are ruled, then, justice always serves the interest of someone else, and rulers who seek their own advantage are unjust. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Some remarks about the senses,” in WoW – Coady, “The senses of the Martians.”

tillich: p. philosopher, born in Starzeddel, eastern Germany, he was educated in philosophy and theology and ordained in the Prussian Evangelical Church in 2. He served as an army chaplain during World War I and later taught at Berlin, Marburg, Dresden, Leipzig, and Frankfurt. In November 3, following suspension from his teaching post by the Nazis, he emigrated to the United States, where he taught at Columbia and Union Theological Seminary until 5, and then at Harvard and Chicago until his death. A popular preacher and speaker, he developed a wide audience in the United States through such writings as The Protestant Era 8, Systematic Theology three volumes: 1, 7, 3, The Courage to Be 2, and Dynamics of Faith 7. His sometimes unconventional lifestyle, as well as his syncretic yet original thought, moved “on the boundary” between theology and other elements of culture  especially art, literature, political thought, and depth psychology  in the belief that religion should relate to the whole extent, and the very depths, of human existence. Tillich’s thought, despite its distinctive “ontological” vocabulary, was greatly influenced by the voluntaristic tradition from Augustine through Schelling, Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. It was a systematic theology that sought to state fresh Christian answers to deep existential questions raised by individuals and cultures  his method of correlation. Every age has its distinctive kairos, “crisis” or “fullness of time,” the right time for creative thought and action. In Weimar G.y, Tillich found the times ripe for religious socialism. In postWorld War II America, he focused more on psychological themes: in the midst of anxiety over death, meaninglessness, and guilt, everyone seeks the courage to be, which comes only by avoiding the abyss of non-being welling up in the demonic and by placing one’s unconditional faith  ultit’ien Tillich, Paul 919   919 mate concern  not in any particular being e.g. God but in Being-Itself “the God above God,” the ground of being. This is essentially the Protestant principle, which prohibits lodging ultimate concern in any finite and limited reality including state, race, and religious institutions and symbols. Tillich was especially influential after World War II. He represented for many a welcome critical openness to the spiritual depths of modern culture, opposing both demonic idolatry of this world as in National Socialism and sectarian denial of cultural resources for faith as in Barthian neo-orthodoxy. 

tempus – applied by H. P. Grice and G. Myro in the so-called “Grice-Myro theory of identity,” a time-relative identity, drawing from A. N. Prior, of Oxford, D. Wiggins, Wykeham professor of logic at Oxford, and Geach (married to an Oxonian donna),  time, “a moving image of eternity” Plato; “the number of movements in respect of the before and after” Aristotle; “the Life of the Soul in movement as it passes from one stage of act or experience to another” Plotinus; “a present of things past, memory, a present of things present, sight, and a present of things future, expectation” Augustine. These definitions, like all attempts to encapsulate the essence of time in some neat formula, are unhelpfully circular because they employ temporal notions. Although time might be too basic to admit of definition, there still are many questions about time that philosophers have made some progress in answering by analysis both of how we ordinarily experience and talk about time, and of the deliverances of science, thereby clarifying and deepening our understanding of what time is. What follows gives a sample of some of the more important of these issues. Temporal becoming and the A- and B-theories of time. According to the B-theory, time consists in nothing but a fixed “B-series” of events running from earlier to later. The A-theory requires that these events also form an “A-series” going from the future through the present into the past and, moreover, shift in respect to these determinations. The latter sort of change, commonly referred to as “temporal becoming,” gives rise to well-known perplexities concerning both what does the shifting and the sort of shift involved. Often it is said that it is the present or now that shifts to ever-later times. This quickly leads to absurdity. ‘The present’ and ‘now’, like ‘this time’, are used to refer to a moment of time. Thus, to say that the present shifts to later times entails that this very moment of time  the present  will become some other moment of time and thus cease to be identical with itself! Sometimes the entity that shifts is the property of nowness or presentness. The problem is that every event has this property at some time, namely when it occurs. Thus, what must qualify some event as being now simpliciter is its having the property of nowness now; and this is the start of an infinite regress that is vicious because at each stage we are left with an unexpurgated use of ‘now’, the very term that was supposed to be analyzed in terms of the property of nowness. If events are to change from being future to present and from present to past, as is required by temporal becoming, they must do so in relation to some mysterious transcendent entity, since temporal relations between events and/or times cannot change. The nature of the shift is equally perplexing, for it must occur at a particular rate; but a rate of change involves a comparison between one kind of change and a change of time. Herein, it is change of time that is compared to change of time, resulting in the seeming tautology that time passes or shifts at the rate of one second per second, surely an absurdity since this is not a rate of change at all. Broad attempted to skirt these perplexities by saying that becoming is sui generis and thereby defies analysis, which puts him on the side of the mystically inclined Bergson who thought that it could be known only through an act of ineffable intuition. To escape the clutches of both perplexity and mysticism, as well as to satisfy the demand of science to view the world non-perspectivally, the B-theory attempted to reduce the A-series to the B-series via a linguistic reduction in which a temporal indexical proposition reporting an event as past, present, or future is shown to be identical with a non-indexical proposition reporting a relation of precedence or simultaneity between it and another event or time. It is generally conceded that such a reduction fails, since, in general, no indexical proposition is identical with any non-indexical one, this being due to the fact that one can have a propositional attitude toward one of them that is not had to the other; e.g., I can believe that it is now raining without believing that it rains tenselessly at t 7. The friends of becoming have drawn the wrong moral from this failure  that there is a mysterious Mr. X out there doing “The Shift.” They have overlooked the fact that two sentences can express different propositions and yet report one and the same event or state of affairs; e.g., ‘This is water’ and ‘this is a collection of H2O molecules’, though differing in sense, report the same state of affairs  this being water is nothing but this being a collection of H2O molecules. It could be claimed that the same holds for the appropriate use of indexical and non-indexical sentences; the tokening at t 7 of ‘Georgie flies at this time at present’ is coreporting with the non-synonymous ‘Georgie flies tenselessly at t 7’, since Georgie’s flying at this time is the same event as Georgie’s flying at t 7, given that this time is t 7. This effects the same ontological reduction of the becoming of events to their bearing temporal relations to each other as does the linguistic reduction. The “coreporting reduction” also shows the absurdity of the “psychological reduction” according to which an event’s being present, etc., requires a relation to a perceiver, whereas an event’s having a temporal relation to another event or time does not require a relation to a perceiver. Given that Georgie’s flying at this time is identical with Georgie’s flying at t 7, it follows that one and the same event both does and does not have the property of requiring relation to a perceiver, thereby violating Leibniz’s law that identicals are indiscernible. Continuous versus discrete time. Assume that the instants of time are linearly ordered by the relation R of ‘earlier than’. To say that this order is continuous is, first, to imply the property of density or infinite divisibility: for any instants i 1 and i 2 such that Ri1i 2, there is a third instant i 3, such that Ri1i 3 and Ri3i 2. But continuity implies something more since density allows for “gaps” between the instants, as with the rational numbers. Think of R as the ‘less than’ relation and the i n as rationals. To rule out gaps and thereby assure genuine continuity it is necessary to require in addition to density that every convergent sequence of instants has a limit. To make this precise one needs a distance measure d ,  on pairs of instants, where di m, i n is interpreted as the lapse of time between i m and i n. The requirement of continuity proper is then that for any sequence i l , i 2, i 3, . . . , of instants, if di m i n P 0 as m, n P C, there is a limit instant i ø such that di n, iø  P 0 as n P C. The analogous property obviously fails for the rationals. But taking the completion of the rationals by adding in the limit points of convergent sequences yields the real number line, a genuine continuum. Numerous objections have been raised to the idea of time as a continuum and to the very notion of the continuum itself. Thus, it was objected that time cannot be composed of durationless instants since a stack of such instants cannot produce a non-zero duration. Modern measure theory resolves this objection. Leibniz held that a continuum cannot be composed of points since the points in any finite closed interval can be put in one-to-one correspondence with a smaller subinterval, contradicting the axiom that the whole is greater than any proper part. What Leibniz took to be a contradictory feature is now taken to be a defining feature of infinite collections or totalities. Modern-day Zenoians, while granting the viability of the mathematical doctrine of the continuum and even the usefulness of its employment in physical theory, will deny the possibility of its applying to real-life changes. Whitehead gave an analogue of Zeno’s paradox of the dichotomy to show that a thing cannot endure in a continuous manner. For if i 1, i 2 is the interval over which the thing is supposed to endure, then the thing would first have to endure until the instant i 3, halfway between i 1 and i 2; but before it can endure until i 3, it must first endure until the instant i 4 halfway between i 1 and i 3, etc. The seductiveness of this paradox rests upon an implicit anthropomorphic demand that the operations of nature must be understood in terms of concepts of human agency. Herein it is the demand that the physicist’s description of a continuous change, such as a runner traversing a unit spatial distance by performing an infinity of runs of ever-decreasing distance, could be used as an action-guiding recipe for performing this feat, which, of course, is impossible since it does not specify any initial or final doing, as recipes that guide human actions must. But to make this anthropomorphic demand explicit renders this deployment of the dichotomy, as well as the arguments against the possibility of performing a “supertask,” dubious. Anti-realists might deny that we are committed to real-life change being continuous by our acceptance of a physical theory that employs principles of mathematical continuity, but this is quite different from the Zenoian claim that it is impossible for such change to be continuous. To maintain that time is discrete would require not only abandoning the continuum but also the density property as well. Giving up either conflicts with the intuition that time is one-dimensional. For an explanation of how the topological analysis of dimensionality entails that the dimension of a discrete space is 0, see W. Hurewicz, Dimension Theory, 1. The philosophical and physics literatures contain speculations about a discrete time built of “chronons” or temporal atoms, but thus far such hypothetical entities have not been incorporated into a satisfactory theory. Absolute versus relative and relational time. In a scholium to the Principia, Newton declared that “Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external.” There are at least five interrelated senses in which time was absolute for Newton. First, he thought that there was a frame-independent relation of simultaneity for events. Second, he thought that there was a frame-independent measure of duration for non-simultaneous events. He used ‘flows equably’ not to refer to the above sort of mysterious “temporal becoming,” but instead to connote the second sense of absoluteness and partly to indicate two further kinds of absoluteness. To appreciate the latter, note that ‘flows equably’ is modified by ‘without relation to anything external’. Here Newton was asserting third sense of ‘absolute’ that the lapse of time between two events would be what it is even if the distribution and motions of material bodies were different. He was also presupposing a related form of absoluteness fourth sense according to which the metric of time is intrinsic to the temporal interval. Leibniz’s philosophy of time placed him in agreement with Newton as regards the first two senses of ‘absolute’, which assert the non-relative or frame-independent nature of time. However, Leibniz was very much opposed to Newton on the fourth sense of ‘absolute’. According to Leibniz’s relational conception of time, any talk about the length of a temporal interval must be unpacked in terms of talk about the relation of the interval to an extrinsic metric standard. Furthermore, Leibniz used his principles of sufficient reason and identity of indiscernibles to argue against a fifth sense of ‘absolute’, implicit in Newton’s philosophy of time, according to which time is a substratum in which physical events are situated. On the contrary, the relational view holds that time is nothing over and above the structure of relations of events. Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity have direct bearing on parts of these controversies. The special theory necessitates the abandonment of frame-independent notions of simultaneity and duration. For any pair of spacelike related events in Minkowski space-time there is an inertial frame in which the events are simultaneous, another frame in which the first event is temporally prior, and still a third in which the second event is temporally prior. And the temporal interval between two timelike related events depends on the worldline connecting them. In fact, for any e  0, no matter how small, there is a worldline connecting the events whose proper length is less than e. This is the essence of the so-called twin paradox. The general theory of relativity abandons the third sense of absoluteness since it entails that the metrical structure of space-time covaries with the distribution of mass-energy in a manner specified by Einstein’s field equations. But the heart of the absoluterelational controversy  as focused by the fourth and fifth senses of ‘absolute’  is not settled by relativistic considerations. Indeed, opponents from both sides of the debate claim to find support for their positions in the special and general theories. H. P. Grice, “D. H. Mellor on real and irreal time.”

tempus -- time slice: used by Grice in two different contexts: personal identity, and identity in general. In identity in general, Grice draws from Geach and Wiggins, and with the formal aid of Myro, construct a system of a first-order predicate calculus with time-relative identity -- a temporal part or stage of any concrete particular that exists for some interval of time; a three-dimensional cross section of a fourdimensional object. To think of an object as consisting of time slices or temporal stages is to think of it as related to time in much the way that it is related to space: as extending through time as well as space, rather than as enduring through it. Just as an object made up of spatial parts is thought of as a whole made up of parts that exist at different locations, so an object made up of time slices is thought of as a whole made up of parts or stages that exist at successive times; hence, just as a spatial whole is only partly present in any space that does not include all its spatial parts, so a whole made up of time slices is only partly present in any stretch of time that does not include all its temporal parts. A continuant, by contrast, is most commonly understood to be a particular that endures through time, i.e., that is wholly present at each moment at which it exists. To conceive of an object as a continuant is to conceive of it as related to time in a very different way from that in which it is related to space. A continuant does not extend through time as well as space; it does not exist at different times by virtue of the existence of successive parts of it at those times; it is the continuant itself that is wholly present at each such time. To conceive an object as a continuant, therefore, is to conceive it as not made up of temporal stages, or time slices, at all. There is another, less common, use of ‘continuant’ in which a continuant is understood to be any particular that exists for some stretch of time, regardless of whether it is the whole of the particular or only some part of it that is present at each moment of the particular’s existence. According to this usage, an entity that is made up of time slices would be a kind of continuant rather than some other kind of particular. Philosophers have disputed whether ordinary objects such as cabbages and kings endure through time are continuants or only extend through time are sequences of time slices. Some argue that to understand the possibility of change one must think of such objects as sequences of time slices; others argue that for the same reason one must think of such objects as continuants. If an object changes, it comes to be different from itself. Some argue that this would be possible only if an object consisted of distinct, successive stages; so that change would simply consist in the differences among the successive temporal parts of an object. Others argue that this view would make change impossible; that differences among the successive temporal parts of a thing would no more imply the thing had changed than differences among its spatial parts would.  H. P. Grice, “D. H. Mellor on real and irreal time.”

token-reflexive, an expression that refers to itself in an act of speech or writing, such as ‘this token’. The term was coined by Reichenbach, who conjectured that all indexicals, all expressions whose semantic value depends partly on features of the context of utterance, are tokenreflexive and definable in terms of the phrase ‘this token’. He suggested that ‘I’ means the same as ‘the person who utters this token’, ‘now’ means the same as ‘the time at which this token is uttered’, ‘this table’ means the same as ‘the table pointed to by a gesture accompanying this token’, and so forth. Russell made a somewhat similar suggestion in his discussion of egocentric particulars. Reichenbach’s conjecture is widely regarded as false; although ‘I’ does pick out the person using it, it is not synonymous with ‘the person who utters this token’. If it were, as David Kaplan observes, ‘If no one were to utter this token, I would not exist’ would be true. 

toletus, F. Jesuit theologian and philosopher. Born in Córdoba, he studied at Valencia, Salamanca, and Rome, and became the first Jesuit cardinal in 1594. He composed commentaries on several of Aristotle’s works and a commentary on Aquinas’s Summa theologiae. Toletus followed a Thomistic line, but departed from Thomism in some details. He held that individuals are directly apprehended by the intellect and that the agent intellect is the same power as the possible intellect. He rejected the Thomistic doctrines of the real distinction between essence and existence and of individuation by designated matter; for Toletus individuation results from form. 

tonk, a sentential connective whose meaning and logic are completely characterized by the two rules or axioms 1 [P P P tonk Q] and 2 [P tonk Q P Q]. If 1 and 2 are added to any normal system, then every Q can be derived from any P. A. N. Prior invented ‘tonk’ to show that deductive validity must not be conceived as depending solely on arbitrary syntactically defined rules or axioms. We may prohibit ‘tonk’ on the ground that it is not a natural, independently meaningful notion, but we may also prohibit it on purely syntactical grounds. E.g., we may require that, for every connective C, the C-introduction rule [xxx P . . . C . . .] and the C-elimination rule [ - - - C - - - P yyy] be such that the yyy is part of xxx or is related to xxx in some other syntactical way. 

topic-neutral, noncommittal between two or more ontological interpretations of a term. J. J. C. Smart suggested that introspective reports can be taken as topic-neutral: composed of terms neutral between “dualistic metaphysics” and “materialistic metaphysics.” When one asserts, e.g., that one has a yellowish-orange afterimage, this is tantamount to saying ‘There is something going on that is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me, i.e., when I really see an orange’. The italicized phrase is, in Smart’s terms, topic-neutral; it refers to an event, while remaining noncommittal about whether it is material or immaterial. The term has not always been restricted to neutrality regarding dualism and materialism. Smart suggests that topic-neutral descriptions are composed of “quasi-logical” words, and hence would be suitable for any occasion where a relatively noncommittal expression of a view is required. 

topos – Grice: “I will use the Latinate ‘commonplace’” – ‘locus communis’-- topic, the analysis of common strategies of argumentation, later a genre of literature analyzing syllogistic reasoning. Aristotle considered the analysis of types of argument, or “topics,” the best means of describing the art of dialectical reasoning; he also used the term to refer to the principle underlying the strategy’s production of an argument. Later classical commentators on Aristotle, particularly Latin rhetoricians like Cicero, developed Aristotle’s discussions of the theory of dialectical reasoning into a philosophical form. Boethius’s work on topics exemplifies the later classical expansion of the scope of topics literature. For him, a topic is either a self-evidently true universal generalization, also called a “maximal proposition,” or a differentia, a member of the set of a maximal proposition’s characteristics that determine its genus and species. Man is a rational animal is a maximal proposition, and like from genus, the differentia that characterizes the maximal proposition as concerning genera, it is a topic. Because he believed dialectical reasoning leads to categorical, not conditional, conclusions, Boethius felt that the discovery of an argument entailed discovering a middle term uniting the two, previously unjoined terms of the conclusion. Differentiae are the genera of these middle terms, and one constructs arguments by choosing differentiae, thereby determining the middle term leading to the conclusion. In the eleventh century, Boethius’s logical structure of maximal propositions and differentiae was used to study hypothetical syllogisms, while twelfth-century theorists like Abelard extended the applicability of topics structure to the categorical syllogism. By the thirteenth century, Peter of Spain, Robert Kilwardby, and Boethius of Dacia applied topics structure exclusively to the categorical syllogism, principally those with non-necessary, probable premises. Within a century, discussion of topics structure to evaluate syllogistic reasoning was subsumed by consequences literature, which described implication, entailment, and inference relations between propositions. While the theory of consequences as an approach to understanding relations between propositions is grounded in Boethian, and perhaps Stoic, logic, it became prominent only in the later thirteenth century with Burley’s recognition of the logical significance of propositional logic. 

toxin puzzle, a puzzle about intention and practical rationality: trustworthy billionaire, call him Paul, offers you, Peter, a million pounds for intending tonight to drink a certain toxin tomorrow. Peter is convinced that Paul can tell what Peter intends independently of what Peter does. The toxin would make Peter painfully ill for a day. But Peter needs to drink it to get the money. Constraints on the formation of a prize-winning intention include prohibitions against “gimmicks,” “external incentives,” and forgetting relevant details; e. g. Peter will not receive the money if Peter has a hypnotist “implant the intention” or hire a hit man to kill Peter should Peter not drink the toxin. If, by midnight tonight, without violating any rules, Peter forms an intention to drink the toxin tomorrow, Peter will find a million pounds in his bank account when he awakes tomorrow morning. Peter probably would drink the toxin for a million dollars. But can you, without violating the rules, intend tonight to drink it tomorrow? Apparently, you have no reason to drink it and an excellent reason not to drink it. Seemingly, you will infer from this that you will eschew drinking the toxin, and believing that you will top-down eschew drinking it seems inconsistent with intending to drink it. Even so, there are several reports in the philosophical literature of possible people who struck it rich when offered the toxin deal! Refs: H. P. Grice, “Grice’s book of paradoxes, with puzzling illustrations to  match!”   

transcendentale: Grice: “Trust Cicero to look for the abstract!” -- transcendentia, broadly, the property of rising out of or above other things virtually always understood figuratively; in philosophy, the property of being, in some way, of a higher order. A being, such as God, may be said to be transcendent in the sense of being not merely superior, but incomparably superior, to other things, in any sort of perfection. God’s transcendence, or being outside or beyond the world, is also contrasted, and by some thinkers combined, with God’s immanence, or existence within the world. In medieval philosophy of logic, terms such as ‘being’ and ‘one’, which did not belong uniquely to any one of the Aristotelian categories or types of predication such as substance, quality, and relation, but could be predicated of things belonging to any or to none of them, were called transcendental. In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, principles that profess wrongly to take us beyond the limits of any possible experience are called transcendent; whereas anything belonging to non-empirical thought that establishes, and draws consequences from, the possibility and limits of experience may be called transcendental. Thus a transcendental argument in a sense still current is one that proceeds from premises about the way in which experience is possible to conclusions about what must be true of any experienced world. Transcendentalism was a philosophical or religious movement in mid-nineteenth-century New England, characterized, in the thought of its leading representative, Ralph Waldo Emerson, by belief in a transcendent spiritual and divine principle in human nature. 

transcendental argument: Grice: “I prefer metaphysical argument.’ -- an argument that elucidates the conditions for the possibility of some fundamental phenomenon whose existence is unchallenged or uncontroversial in the philosophical context in which the argument is propounded. Such an argument proceeds deductively, from a premise asserting the existence of some basic phenomenon such as meaningful discourse, conceptualization of objective states of affairs, or the practice of making promises, to a conclusion asserting the existence of some interesting, substantive enabling conditions for that phenomenon. The term derives from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which gives several such arguments. The paradigmatic Kantian transcendental argument is the “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.” Kant argued there that the objective validity of certain pure, or a priori, concepts the “categories” is a condition for the possibility of experience. Among the concepts allegedly required for having experience are those of substance and cause. Their apriority consists in the fact that instances of these concepts are not directly given in sense experience in the manner of instances of empirical concepts such as red. This fact gave rise to the skepticism of Hume concerning the very coherence of such alleged a priori concepts. Now if these concepts do have objective validity, as Kant endeavored to prove in opposition to Hume, then the world contains genuine instances of the concepts. In a transcendental argument concerning the conditions for the possibility of experience, it is crucial that some feature entailed by the having of experience is identified. Then it is argued that experience could not have this feature without satisfying some substantive conditions. In the Transcendental Deduction, the feature of experience on which Kant concentrates is the ability of a subject of experience to be aware of several distinct inner states as all belonging to a single consciousness. There is no general agreement on how Kant’s argument actually unfolded, though it seems clear to most that he focused on the role of the categories in the synthesis or combination of one’s inner states in judgments, where such synthesis is said to be required for one’s awareness of the states as being all equally one’s own states. Another famous Kantian transcendental argument  the “Refutation of Idealism” in the CriToynbee, Arnold transcendental argument 925   925 tique of Pure Reason  shares a noteworthy trait with the Transcendental Deduction. The Refutation proceeds from the premise that one is conscious of one’s own existence as determined in time, i.e., knows the temporal order of some of one’s inner states. According to the Refutation, a condition for the possibility of such knowledge is one’s consciousness of the existence of objects located outside oneself in space. If one is indeed so conscious, that would refute the skeptical view, formulated by Descartes, that one lacks knowledge of the existence of a spatial world distinct from one’s mind and its inner states. Both of the Kantian transcendental arguments we have considered, then, conclude that the falsity of some skeptical view is a condition for the possibility of some phenomenon whose existence is acknowledged even by the skeptic the having of experience; knowledge of temporal facts about one’s own inner states. Thus, we can isolate an interesting subclass of transcendental arguments: those which are anti-skeptical in nature. Barry Stroud has raised the question whether such arguments depend on some sort of suppressed verificationism according to which the existence of language or conceptualization requires the availability of the knowledge that the skeptic questions since verificationism has it that meaningful sentences expressing coherent concepts, e.g., ‘There are tables’, must be verifiable by what is given in sense experience. Dependence on a highly controversial premise is undesirable in itself. Further, Stroud argued, such a dependence would render superfluous whatever other content the anti-skeptical transcendental argument might embody since the suppressed premise alone would refute the skeptic. There is no general agreement on whether Stroud’s doubts about anti-skeptical transcendental arguments are well founded. It is not obvious whether the doubts apply to arguments that do not proceed from a premise asserting the existence of language or conceptualization, but instead conform more closely to the Kantian model. Even so, no anti-skeptical transcendental argument has been widely accepted. This is evidently due to the difficulty of uncovering substantive enabling conditions for phenomena that even a skeptic will countenance. 

transcendentalism, a religious-philosophical viewpoint held by a group of New England intellectuals, of whom Emerson, Thoreau, and Theodore Parker were the most important. A distinction taken over from Samuel Taylor Coleridge was the only bond that universally united the members of the Transcendental Club, founded in 1836: the distinction between the understanding and reason, the former providing uncertain knowledge of appearances, the latter a priori knowledge of necessary truths gained through intuition. The transcendentalists insisted that philosophical truth could be reached only by reason, a capacity common to all people unless destroyed by living a life of externals and accepting as true only secondhand traditional beliefs. On almost every other point there were disagreements. Emerson was an idealist, while Parker was a natural realist  they simply had conflicting a priori intuitions. Emerson, Thoreau, and Parker rejected the supernatural aspects of Christianity, pointing out its unmistakable parochial nature and sociological development; while James Marsh, Frederick Henry Hedge, and Caleb Henry remained in the Christian fold. The influences on the transcendentalists differed widely and explain the diversity of opinion. For example, Emerson was influenced by the Platonic tradition, G. Romanticism, Eastern religions, and nature poets, while Parker was influenced by modern science, the Scottish realism of Reid and Cousin which also emphasized a priori intuitions, and the G. Higher Critics. Emerson, Thoreau, and Parker were also bonded by negative beliefs. They not only rejected Calvinism but Unitarianism as well; they rejected the ordinary concept of material success and put in its place an Aristotelian type of selfrealization that emphasized the rational and moral self as the essence of humanity and decried idiosyncratic self-realization that admires what is unique in people as constituting their real value. 

transcendentale: Grice: “The formation of this Ciceronian expression is fascinating. There’s the descent of the lark, and the transcend of the lark!” -- transcendentals, also called transcendentalia, terms or concepts that apply to all things regardless of the things’ ontological kind or category. transcendental deduction transcendentals 926   926 Terms or concepts of this sort are transcendental in the sense that they transcend or are superordinate to all classificatory categories. The classical doctrine of the transcendentals, developed in detail in the later Middle Ages, presupposes an Aristotelian ontology according to which all beings are substances or accidents classifiable within one of the ten highest genera, the ten Aristotelian categories. In this scheme being Grecian on, Latin ens is not itself one of the categories since all categories mark out kinds of being. But neither is it a category above the ten categories of substance and accidents, an ultimate genus of which the ten categories are species. This is because being is homonymous or equivocal, i.e., there is no single generic property or nature shared by members of each category in virtue of which they are beings. The ten categories identify ten irreducible, most basic ways of being. Being, then, transcends the categorial structure of the world: anything at all that is ontologically classifiable is a being, and to say of anything that it is a being is not to identify it as a member of some kind distinct from other kinds of things. According to this classical doctrine, being is the primary transcendental, but there are other terms or concepts that transcend the categories in a similar way. The most commonly recognized transcendentals other than being are one unum, true verum, and good bonum, though some medieval philosophers also recognized thing res, something aliquid, and beautiful pulchrum. These other terms or concepts are transcendental because the ontological ground of their application to a given thing is precisely the same as the ontological ground in virtue of which that thing can be called a being. For example, for a thing with a certain nature to be good is for it to perform well the activity that specifies it as a thing of that nature, and to perform this activity well is to have actualized that nature to a certain extent. But for a thing to have actualized its nature to some extent is just what it is for the thing to have being. So the actualities or properties in virtue of which a thing is good are precisely those in virtue of which it has being. Given this account, medieval philosophers held that transcendental terms are convertible convertuntur or extensionally equivalent idem secundum supposita. They are not synonymous, however, since they are intensionally distinct differunt secundum rationem. These secondary transcendentals are sometimes characterized as attributes passiones of being that are necessarily concomitant with it. In the modern period, the notion of the transcendental is associated primarily with Kant, who made ‘transcendental’ a central technical term in his philosophy. For Kant the term no longer signifies that which transcends categorial classification but that which transcends our experience in the sense of providing its ground or structure. Kant allows, e.g., that the pure forms of intuition space and time and the pure concepts of understanding categories such as substance and cause are transcendental in this sense. Forms and concepts of this sort constitute the conditions of the possibility of experience. 

Trans-finitum, definitum, infinitum: Trans-finite number, in set theory, an infinite cardinal or ordinal number.

transformation – Grice: “My system G makes minimal use of transformations” -- minimal transformation rule: an axiom-schema or rule of inference. Grice: “Strictly, an Ovidian metamorphose!” -- A transformation rule is thus a rule for transforming a possibly empty set of wellformed formulas into a formula, where that rule operates only upon syntactic information. It was this conception of an axiom-schema and rule of inference that was one of the keys to creating a genuinely rigorous science of deductive reasoning. In the 0s, the idea was imported into linguistics, giving rise to the notion of a transformational rule. Such a rule transforms tree structures into tree structures, taking one from the deep structure of a sentence, which determines its semantic interpretation, to the surface structure of that sentence, which determines its phonetic interpretation. Grice: “Chomsky misuses ‘transformation.’” --

metaosiosis – cited by Grice, one of his metaphysical routines. transubstantiation, change of one substance into another. Aristotelian metaphysics distinguishes between substances and the accidents that inhere in them; thus, Socrates is a substance and being snub-nosed is one of his accidents. The Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches appeal to transubstantiation to explain how Jesus Christ becomes really present in the Eucharist when the consecration takes place: the whole substances of the bread and wine are transformed into the body and blood of Christ, but the accidents of the bread and wine such as their shape, color, and taste persist after the transformation. This seems to commit its adherents to holding that these persisting accidents subsequently either inhere in Christ or do not inhere in any substance. Luther proposed an alternative explanation in terms of consubstantiation that avoids this hard choice: the substances of the bread and wine coexist in the Eucharist with the body and blood of Christ after the consecration; they are united but each remains unchanged. P.L.Q. transvaluation of values.

transversum -- Transversality – a term Grice borrowed from Heidegger – ‘the greatest philosopher that ever lived.” --  transcendence of the sovereignty of identity or self-sameness by recognizing the alterity of the Other as Unterschied  to use Heidegger’s term  which signifies the sense of relatedness by way of difference. An innovative idea employed and appropriated by such diverse philosophers as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, transversality is meant to replace the Eurocentric formulation of truth as universal in an age when the world is said to be rushing toward the global village. Universality has been a Eurocentric idea because what is particular in the West is universalized, whereas what is particular elsewhere remains particularized. Since its center is everywhere and its circumference nowhere, truth is polycentric and correlative. Particularly noteworthy is the  phenomenologist Calvin O. Schrag’s attempt to appropriate transversality by splitting the difference between the two extremes of absolutism and relativism on the one hand and modernity’s totalizing practices and postmodernity’s fragmentary tendencies on the other.

arbor griceiana, arbor porphyriana:  a structure generated from the logical and metaphysical apparatus of Aristotle’s Categories, as systematized by Porphyry and later writers. A tree in the category of substance begins with substance as its highest genus and divides that genus into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive subordinate genera by means of a pair of opposites, called differentiae, yielding, e.g., corporeal substance and incorporeal substance. The process of division by differentiae continues until a lowest species is reached, a species that cannot be divided further. The species “human being” is said to be a lowest species whose derivation can be recaptured from the formula “mortal, rational, sensitive, animate, corporeal substance.” 

trinitarianism, -- “Raining, raining, raining.” -- the theological doctrine that God consists of three persons, “in Strawson’s usage of the expression” – Vide Grice, “Personal identity,” -- The persons who constitute the Holy Trinity are the Father; the Son, who is Jesus Christ; and the Holy Spirit or Holy Ghost. The doctrine states that each of these three persons is God and yet they are not three Gods but one God. According to a traditional formulation, the three persons are but one substance. In the opinion of Aquinas, the existence of God can be proved by human reason, but the existence of the three persons cannot be proved and is known only by revelation. According to Christian tradition, revelation contains information about the relations among the three persons, and these relations ground proper attributes of each that distinguish them from one another. Thus, since the Father begets the Son, a proper attribute of the Father is paternity and a proper attribute of the Son is filiation. Procession transparent Trinitarianism 928   928 or spiration is a proper attribute of the Holy Spirit. A disagreement about procession has contributed to dividing Eastern and Western Christianity. The Eastern Orthodox church teaches that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. A theory of double procession according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son has been widely accepted in the West. This disagreement is known as the filioque ‘and the Son’ controversy because it arose from the fact that adding this Latin phrase to the Nicene Creed became acceptable in the West but not in the East. Unitarianism denies that God consists of three persons and so is committed to denying the divinity of Jesus. The monotheistic faiths of Judaism and Islam are unitarian, but there are unitarians who consider themselves Christians. H. P. Grice, “Raining, raining, raining – my mother and the Trinitarians.”

troeltsch: philosopher whose primary aim was to provide a scientific foundation for theology. Educated at Erlangen, Göttingen under Ritschl and Lagarde, and Berlin, he initially taught theology at Heidelberg and later philosophy in Berlin. He launched the school of history of religion with his epoch-making “On Historical and Dogmatical Method in Theology” 6. His contributions to theology The Religious Apriori, 4, philosophy, sociology, and history Historicism and Its Problems, 2 were vastly influential. Troeltsch claimed that only a philosophy of religion drawn from the history and development of religious consciousness could strengthen the standing of the science of religion among the sciences and advance the Christian strategy against materialism, naturalism, skepticism, aestheticism, and pantheism. His historical masterpiece, Protestantism and Progress 6, argues that early Protestantism was a modified medieval Catholicism that delayed the development of modern culture. As a sociologist, he addressed, in The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches 2, the twofold issue of whether religious beliefs and movements are conditioned by external factors and whether, in turn, they affect society and culture. From Christian social history he inferred three types of “sociological self-formation of the Christian idea”: the church, the sect, and the mystic

tropic: Grice: “Cf. Cicero, ‘Tropicus, and sub-tropicus’ –“ used by R. M. Hare and H. P. Grice – Hare introduced the ‘tropic’ to contrast with the ‘phrastic,’ the ‘neustic,’ and the ‘clistic’ – “I often wondered if Hare was not distinguishing too narrowly” – H. P. Grice --trope, in recent philosophical usage, an “abstract particular”; an instance of a property occurring at a particular place and time, such as the color of the cover of this book or this . The whiteness of this  and the whiteness of the previous  are two distinct tropes, identical neither with the universal whiteness that is instantiated in both s, nor with the  itself; although the whiteness of this  cannot exist independently of this , this  could be dyed some other color. A number of writers, perhaps beginning with D. C. Williams, have argued that tropes must be included in our ontology if we are to achieve an adequate metaphysics. More generally, a trope is a figure of speech, or the use of an expression in a figurative or nonliteral sense. Metaphor and irony, e.g., fall under the category of tropes. If you are helping someone move a glass table but drop your end, and your companion says, “Well, you’ve certainly been a big help,” her utterance is probably ironical, with the intended meaning that you have been no help. One important question is whether, in order to account for the ironical use of this sentence, we must suppose that it has an ironical meaning in addition to its literal meaning. Quite generally, does a sentence usable to express two different metaphors have, in addition to its literal meaning, two metaphorical meanings  and another if it can be hyperbolic, and so forth? Many philosophers and other theorists from Aristotle on have answered yes, and postulated such figurative meanings in addition to literal sentence meaning. Recently, philosophers loath to multiply sentence meanings have denied that sentences have any non-literal meanings.Their burden is to explain how, e.g., a sentence can be used ironically if it does not have an ironical sense or meaning. Such philosophers disagree on whether tropes are to be explained semantically or pragmatically. A semantic account might hypothesize that tropes are generated by violations of semantical rules. An important pragmatic approach is Grice’s suggestion that tropes can be subsumed under the more general phenomenon of conversational implicaturum.

verisimilitude -- truthlikeness, a term introduced by Karl Popper to explicate the idea that one theory may have a better correspondence with reality, or be closer to the truth, or have more verisimilitude, than another theory. Truthlikeness, which combines truth with information content, has to be distinguished from probability, which increases with lack of content. Let T and F be the classes of all true and false sentences, respectively, and A and B deductively closed sets of sentences. According to Popper’s qualitative definition, A is more truthlike than B if and only if B 3 T 0 A 3 T and A 3 F 0 B 3 F, where one of these setinclusions is strict. In particular, when A and B are non-equivalent and both true, A is more truthlike than B if and only if A logically entails B. David Miller and Pavel Tichý proved in 4 that Popper’s definition is not applicable to the comparison of false theories: if A is more truthlike than B, then A must be true. Since the mid-0s, a new approach to truthlikeness has been based upon the concept of similarity: the degree of truthlikeness of a statement A depends on the distances from the states of affairs allowed by A to the true state. In Graham Oddie’s Likeness to Truth 6, this dependence is expressed by the average function; in Ilkka Niiniluoto’s Truthlikeness 7, by the weighted average of the minimum distance and the sum of all distances. The concept of verisimilitude is also used in the epistemic sense to express a rational evaluation of how close to the truth a theory appears to be on available evidence.

verum – Grice: “Cognate with German ‘wahr’” -- there’s the ‘truth table’ and the ‘truth’ -- truth table, a tabular display of one or more truth-functions, truth-functional operators, or representatives of truth-functions or truth-functional operators such as well-formed formulas of propositional logic. In the tabular display, each row displays a possible assignment of truthvalues to the arguments of the truth-functions or truth-functional operators. Thus, the collection of all rows in the table displays all possible assignments of truth-values to these arguments. The following simple truth table represents the truth-functional operators negation and conjunction: truth, coherence theory of truth table 931   931 Because a truth table displays all possible assignments of truth-values to the arguments of a truth-function, truth tables are useful devices for quickly ascertaining logical properties of propositions. If, e.g., all entries in the column of a truth table representing a proposition are T, then the proposition is true for all possible assignments of truth-values to its ultimate constituent propositions; in this sort of case, the proposition is said to be logically or tautologically true: a tautology. If all entries in the column of a truth table representing a proposition are F, then the proposition is false for all possible assignments of truth-values to its ultimate constituent propositions, and the proposition is said to be logically or tautologically false: a contradiction. If a proposition is neither a tautology nor a contradiction, then it is said to be a contingency. The truth table above shows that both Not-P and Pand-Q are contingencies. For the same reason that truth tables are useful devices for ascertaining the logical qualities of single propositions, truth tables are also useful for ascertaining whether arguments are valid or invalid. A valid argument is one such that there is no possibility no row in the relevant truth table in which all its premises are true and its conclusion false. Thus the above truth table shows that the argument ‘P-and-Q; therefore, P’ is valid.  Verum -- truth-value, most narrowly, one of the values T for ‘true’ or F for ‘false’ that a proposition may be considered to have or take on when it is regarded as true or false, respectively. More broadly, a truth-value is any one of a range of values that a proposition may be considered to have when taken to have one of a range of different cognitive or epistemic statuses. For example, some philosophers speak of the truth-value I for ‘indeterminate’ and regard a proposition as having the value I when it is indeterminate whether the proposition is true or false. Logical systems employing a specific number n of truthvalues are said to be n-valued logical systems; the simplest sort of useful logical system has two truth-values, T and F, and accordingly is said to be two-valued. Truth-functions are functions that take truth-values as arguments and that yield truth-values as resultant values. The truthtable method in propositional logic exploits the idea of truth-functions by using tabular displays. Verum -- truth-value semantics, interpretations of formal systems in which the truth-value of a formula rests ultimately only on truth-values that are assigned to its atomic subformulas where ‘subformula’ is suitably defined. The label is due to Hugues Leblanc. On a truth-value interpretation for first-order predicate logic, for example, the formula atomic ExFx is true in a model if and only if all its instances Fm, Fn, . . . are true, where the truth-value of these formulas is simply assigned by the model. On the standard Tarskian or objectual interpretation, by contrast, ExFx is true in a model if and only if every object in the domain of the model is an element of the set that interprets F in the model. Thus a truth-value semantics for predicate logic comprises a substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers and a “non-denotational” interpretation of terms and predicates. If t 1, t 2, . . . are all the terms of some first-order language, then there are objectual models that satisfy the set {Dx-Fx, Ft1, Ft2 . . . .}, but no truth-value interpretations that do. One can ensure that truth-value semantics delivers the standard logic, however, by suitable modifications in the definitions of consistency and consequence. A set G of formulas of language L is said to be consistent, for example, if there is some G' obtained from G by relettering terms such that G' is satisfied by some truth-value assignment, or, alternatively, if there is some language L+ obtained by adding terms to L such that G is satisfied by some truth-value assignment to the atoms of L+. Truth-value semantics is of both technical and philosophical interest. Technically, it allows the completeness of first-order predicate logic and a variety of other formal systems to be obtained in a natural way from that of propositional logic. Philosophically, it dramatizes the fact that the formulas in one’s theories about the world do not, in themselves, determine one’s ontological commitments. It is at least possible to interpret first-order formulas without reference to special truth-table method truth-value semantics 932   932 domains of objects, and higher-order formulas without reference to special domains of relations and properties. The idea of truth-value semantics dates at least to the writings of E. W. Beth on first-order predicate logic in 9 and of K. Schütte on simple type theory in 0. In more recent years similar semantics have been suggested for secondorder logics, modal and tense logics, intuitionistic logic, and set theory. Truth, the quality of those propositions that accord with reality, specifying what is in fact the case. Whereas the aim of a science is to discover which of the propositions in its domain are true i.e., which propositions possess the property of Trinity truth 929   929 truth  the central philosophical concern with truth is to discover the nature of that property. Thus the philosophical question is not What is true? but rather, What is truth?  What is one saying about a proposition in saying that it is true? The importance of this question stems from the variety and depth of the principles in which the concept of truth is deployed. We are tempted to think, e.g., that truth is the proper aim and natural result of scientific inquiry, that true beliefs are useful, that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions that would render it true, and that valid reasoning preserves truth. Therefore insofar as we wish to understand, assess, and refine these epistemological, ethical, semantic, and logical views, some account of the nature of truth would seem to be required. Such a thing, however, has been notoriously elusive. The belief that snow is white owes its truth to a certain feature of the external world: the fact that snow is white. Similarly, the belief that dogs bark is true because of the fact that dogs bark. Such trivial observations lead to what is perhaps the most natural and widely held account of truth, the correspondence theory, according to which a belief statement, sentence, proposition, etc. is true provided there exists a fact corresponding to it. This Aristotelian thesis is unexceptionable in itself. However, if it is to provide a complete theory of truth  and if it is to be more than merely a picturesque way of asserting all instances of ‘the belief that p is true if and only if p’  then it must be supplemented with accounts of what facts are, and what it is for a belief to correspond to a fact; and these are the problems on which the correspondence theory of truth has foundered. A popular alternative to the correspondence theory has been to identify truth with verifiability. This idea can take on various forms. One version involves the further assumption that verification is holistic  i.e., that a belief is verified when it is part of an entire system of beliefs that is consistent and “harmonious.” This is known as the coherence theory of truth and was developed by Bradley and Brand Blanchard. Another version, due to Dummett and Putnam, involves the assumption that there is, for each proposition, some specific procedure for finding out whether one should believe it or not. On this account, to say that a proposition is true is to say that it would be verified by the appropriate procedure. In mathematics this amounts to the identification of truth with provability and is sometimes referred to as intuitionistic truth. Such theories aim to avoid obscure metaphysical notions and explain the close relation between knowability and truth. They appear, however, to overstate the intimacy of that link: for we can easily imagine a statement that, though true, is beyond our power to establish as true. A third major account of truth is James’s pragmatic theory. As we have just seen, the verificationist selects a prominent property of truth and considers it to be the essence of truth. Similarly the pragmatist focuses on another important characteristic  namely, that true beliefs are a good basis for action  and takes this to be the very nature of truth. True assumptions are said to be, by definition, those that provoke actions with desirable results. Again we have an account with a single attractive explanatory feature. But again the central objection is that the relationship it postulates between truth and its alleged analysans  in this case, utility  is implausibly close. Granted, true beliefs tend to foster success. But often actions based on true beliefs lead to disaster, while false assumptions, by pure chance, produce wonderful results. One of the few fairly uncontroversial facts about truth is that the proposition that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white, the proposition that lying is wrong is true if and only if lying is wrong, and so on. Traditional theories of truth acknowledge this fact but regard it as insufficient and, as we have seen, inflate it with some further principle of the form ‘X is true if and only if X has property P’ such as corresponding to reality, verifiability, or being suitable as a basis for action, which is supposed to specify what truth is. A collection of radical alternatives to the traditional theories results from denying the need for any such further specification. For example, one might suppose with Ramsey, Ayer, and Strawson that the basic theory of truth contains nothing more than equivalences of the form, ‘The proposition that p is true if and only if p’ excluding instantiation by sentences such as ‘This proposition is not true’ that generate contradiction. This so-called deflationary theory is best presented following Quine in conjunction with an account of the raison d’être of our notion of truth: namely, that its function is not to describe propositions, as one might naively infer from its syntactic form, but rather to enable us to construct a certain type of generalization. For example, ‘What Einstein said is true’ is intuitively equivalent to the infinite conjunction ‘If Einstein said that nothing goes faster than light, then nothing goes faster than light; and if Einstein said truth truth 930   930 that nuclear weapons should never be built, then nuclear weapons should never be built; . . . and so on.’ But without a truth predicate we could not capture this statement. The deflationist argues, moreover, that all legitimate uses of the truth predicate  including those in science, logic, semantics, and metaphysics  are simply displays of this generalizing function, and that the equivalence schema is just what is needed to explain that function. Within the deflationary camp there are various competing proposals. According to Frege’s socalled redundancy theory, corresponding instances of ‘It is true that p’ and ‘p’ have exactly the same meaning, whereas the minimalist theory assumes merely that such propositions are necessarily equivalent. Other deflationists are skeptical about the existence of propositions and therefore take sentences to be the basic vehicles of truth. Thus the disquotation theory supposes that truth is captured by the disquotation principle, ‘p’ is true if and only if p’. More ambitiously, Tarski does not regard the disquotation principle, also known as Tarski’s T schema, as an adequate theory in itself, but as a specification of what any adequate definition must imply. His own account shows how to give an explicit definition of truth for all the sentences of certain formal languages in terms of the referents of their primitive names and predicates. This is known as the semantic theory of truth.  .

Turing: Grice: “While not a philosopher, Turing’s thought experiment is about the ‘conceptual analysis’ of ‘thought’” --similar to a Griceian machine -- a machine, an abstract automaton or imagined computer consisting of a finite automaton operating an indefinitely long storage tape. The finite automaton provides the computing power of the machine. The tape is used for input, output, and calculation workspace; in the case of the universal Turing machine, it also specifies another Turing machine. Initially, only a finite number of squares of the tape are marked with symbols, while the rest are blank. The finite automaton part of the machine has a finite number of internal states and operates discretely, at times t % 0, 1, 2, . . . . At each time-step the automaton examines the tape square under its tape head, possibly changes what is there, moves the tape left or right, and then changes its internal state. The law governing this sequence of actions is deterministic and is defined in a state table. For each internal state and each tape symbol or blank under the tape head, the state table describes the tape action performed by the machine and gives the next internal state of the machine. Since a machine has only a finite number of internal states and of tape symbols, the state table of a machine is finite in length and can be stored on a tape. There is a universal Turing machine Mu that can simulate every Turing machine including itself: when the state table of any machine M is written on the tape of Mu, the universal machine Mu will perform the same input-output computation that M performs. Mu does this by using the state table of M to calculate M’s complete history for any given input. Turing machines may be thought of as conceptual devices for enumerating the elements of an infinite set e.g., the theorems of a formal language, or as decision machines e.g., deciding of any truth-functional formula whether it is a tautology. A. M. Turing showed that there are welldefined logical tasks that cannot be carried out by any machine; in particular, no machine can solve the halting problem. Turing’s definition of a machine was theoretical; it was not a practical specification for a machine. After the modern electronic computer was invented, he proposed a test for judging whether there is a computer that is behaviorally equivalent to a human in reasoning and intellectual creative power. The Turing test is a “black box” type of experiment that Turing proposed as a way of deciding whether a computer can think. Two rooms are fitted with the same input-output equipment going to an outside experimenter. A person is placed in one room and a programmed electronic computer in the other, each in communication with the experimenter. By issuing instructions and asking questions, the experimenter tries to decide which room has the computer and which the human. If the experimenter cannot tell, that outcome is strong evidence that the computer can think as well as the person. More directly, it shows that the computer and the human are equivalent for all the behaviors tested. Since the computer is a finite automaton, perhaps the most significant test task is that of doing creative mathematics about the non-enumerable infinite.

turnbull, G.: moral sense philosopher and educational theorist. He was briefly a philosophy regent at Aberdeen and a teacher of Reid. His Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy 1740 and Discourse upon the Nature and Origin of Moral and Civil Laws 1741 show him as the most systematic of those who aimed to recast moral philosophy on a Newtonian model, deriving moral laws “experimentally” from human psychology. In A Treatise on Ancient Painting 1740, Observations Upon Liberal Education 1742, and some smaller works, he extolled history and the arts as propaedeutic to the teaching of virtue and natural religion. 

Grice’s Martian Chronicles -- Twin-Earth – as opposed to Mars -- a fictitious planet first visited by Hilary Putnam in a thought experiment inspired by H. P. Grice in “Some remarks about the senses” -- designed to show, among other things, that “ ‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head” “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” 5. Twin-Earth is exactly like Earth with one notable exception: ponds, rivers, and ice trays on Twin-Earth contain, not H2O, but XYZ, a liquid superficially indistinguishable from water but with a different chemical constitution. According to Putnam, although some inhabitants of Twin-Earth closely resemble inhabitants of Earth, ‘water’, when uttered by a Twin-Earthling, does not mean water. Water is H2O, and, on Twin-Earth, the word ‘water’ designates a different substance, XYZ, Twin-water. The moral drawn by Putnam is that the meanings of at least some of our words, and the significance of some of our thoughts, depend, in part, on how things stand outside our heads. Two “molecular duplicates,” two agents with qualitatively similar mental lives, might mean very different things by their utterances and think very different thoughts. Although Twin-Earth has become a popular stopping-off place for philosophers en route to theories of meaning and mental content, others regard Twin-Earth as hopelessly remote, doubting that useful conclusions can be drawn about our Earthly circumstances from research conducted there.  Suppose that long-awaited invasion of the Martians takes place, that they turn out to be friendly creatures and teach us their language. We get on all right, except that we find no verb in their language which unquestionably corresponds to our verb “see.” Instead we find two verbs which we decide to render as “x” and “y”: we find that (in their tongue) they speak of themselves as x-ing, and also as y-ing, things to be of this and that color, size, and shape. Further, in physical appearance they are more or less like ourselves, except that in their heads they have, one above the other, two pairs of organs, not perhaps exactly like one another, but each pair more or less like our eyes: each pair of organs is found to be sensitive to light waves. It turns out that for them x-ing is dependent on the operation of the upper organs, and y-ing on that of the lower organs. The question which it seems natural to ask is this: Are x-ing and y-ing both cases of seeing, the difference between them being that x-ing is seeing with the upper organs, and y-ing is seeing with the lower organs? Or alternatively, do one or both of these accomplishments constitute the exercise of a new sense, other than that of sight? If we adopt, to distinguish the senses, a combination of suggestion (I) with one or both of suggestions (III) or (IV), the answer seems clear: both x-ing and y-ing are seeing, with different pairs of organs. But is the question really to be settled so easily? Would we not in fact want to ask whether x-ing something to be round was like y-ing it to be round, or whether when something x-ed blue to them this was like or unlike its y-ing blue to them? If in answer to such questions as these they said, “Oh no, there’s all the difference in the world!” then I think we should be inclined to say that either x-ing or y-ing (if not both) must be something other than seeing: we might of course be quite unable to decide which (if either) was seeing. (I am aware that here those whose approach is more Wittgensteinian than my own might complain that unless something more can be said about how the difference between x-ing and y-ing might “come out” or show itself in publicly observable phenomena, then the claim by the supposed Martians that x-ing and y-ing are different would be one of which nothing could be made, which would leave one at a loss how to understand it. First, I am not convinced of the need for “introspectible” differences to show themselves in the way this approach demands (I shall not discuss this point further); second, I think that if I have to meet this demand, I can. One can suppose that one or more of these Martians acquired the use of the lower y-ing organs at some comparatively late date in their careers, and that at the same time (perhaps for experimental purposes) the operation of the upper x-ing organs was inhibited. One might now be ready to allow that a difference between Some Remarks about the Senses 47 x-ing and y-ing would have shown itself if in such a situation the creatures using their y-ing organs for the first time were unable straightaway, without any learning process, to use their “color”-words fluently and correctly to describe what they detected through the use of those organs.) It might be argued at this point that we have not yet disposed of the idea that the senses can be distinguished by an amalgam of suggestions (I), (III), and (IV); for it is not clear that in the example of the Martians the condition imposed by suggestion (I) is fulfilled. The thesis, it might be said, is only upset if x-ing and y-ing are accepted as being the exercise of different senses; and if they are, then the Martians’ color-words could be said to have a concealed ambiguity. Much as “sweet” in English may mean “sweet-smelling” or “sweet-tasting,” so “blue” in Martian may mean “blue-x-ing” or “blue-y-ing.” But if this is so, then the Martians after all do not detect by x-ing just those properties of things which they detect by y-ing. To this line of argument there are two replies: (1) The defender of the thesis is in no position to use this argument; for he cannot start by making the question whether x-ing and y-ing are exercises of the same sense turn on the question (inter alia) whether or not a single group of characteristics is detected by both, and then make the question of individuation of the group turn on the question whether putative members of the group are detected by one, or by more than one, sense. He would be saying in effect, “Whether, in x-ing and y-ing, different senses are exercised depends (inter alia) on whether the same properties are detected by x-ing as by y-ing; but whether a certain x-ed property is the same as a certain y-ed property depends on whether x-ing and y-ing are or are not the exercise of a single sense.” This reply seems fatal. For the circularity could only be avoided by making the question whether “blue” in Martian names a single property depend either on whether the kinds of experience involved in x-ing and y-ing are different, which would be to reintroduce suggestion (II), or on whether the mechanisms involved in x-ing and y-ing are different (in this case whether the upper organs are importantly unlike the lower organs): and to adopt this alternative would, I think, lead to treating the differentiation of the senses as being solely a matter of their mechanisms, thereby making suggestion (I) otiose. (2) Independently of its legitimacy or illegitimacy in the present context, we must reject the idea that if it is accepted that in x-ing and y-ing different senses are being exercised, then Martian color-words will be ambiguous. For ex hypothesi there will be a very close correlation between things x-ing blue and their y-ing blue, far closer 48 H. P. Grice than that between things smelling sweet and their tasting sweet. This being so, it is only to be expected that x-ing and y-ing should share the position of arbiters concerning the color of things: that is, “blue” would be the name of a single property, determinable equally by x-ing and y-ing. After all, is this not just like the actual position with regard to shape, which is doubly determinable, by sight and by touch? While I would not wish to quarrel with the main terms of this second reply, I should like briefly to indicate why I think that this final quite natural comparison with the case of shape will not do. It is quite conceivable that the correlation between x-ing and y-ing , in the case supposed, might be close enough to ensure that Martian color-words designated doubly determinable properties, and yet that this correlation should break down in a limited class of cases: for instance, owing to some differences between the two pairs of organs, objects which transmitted light of a particular wavelength might (in standard conditions) x blue but y black. I suggest, then, that given the existence of an object which, for the Martians, standardly x-ed blue but y-ed black (its real color being undecidable), no conclusion could be drawn to the effect that other objects do, or could as a matter of practiSome Remarks about the Senses 51 cal possibility be made to, x one way and y another way either in respect of color or in respect of some other feature within the joint province of x-ing and y-ing. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Some remarks about the senses,” in WoW --. Coady, “The senses of the Martians.”

tychism: from Grecian tyche, ‘chance’, Peirce’s doctrine that there is absolute chance in the universe and its fundamental laws are probabilistic and inexact. Peirce’s tychism is part of his evolutionary cosmology, according to which all regularities of nature are products of growth and development, i.e., results of evolution. The laws of nature develop over time and become increasingly rigid and exact; the apparently deterministic laws of physics are limiting cases of the basic, probabilistic laws. Underlying all other laws is “the tendency of all things to take habits”; Peirce calls this the Law of Habit. In his cosmology his tychism is associated with synechism, the doctrine of the continuity of nature. His synechism involves the doctrine of the continuity of mind and matter; Peirce sometimes expressed this view by saying that “matter is effete mind.”

Grice’s “The Three-Year-Old’s Guide to Russell’s Theory of Types,” with an advice to parents by P. F. Starwson -- type theory, broadly, any theory according to which the things that exist fall into natural, perhaps mutually exclusive, categories or types. In most modern discussions, ‘type theory’ refers to the theory of logical types first sketched by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics 3. It is a theory of logical types insofar as it purports only to classify things into the most general categories that must be presupposed by an adequate logical theory. Russell proposed his theory in response to his discovery of the now-famous paradox that bears his name. The paradox is this. Common sense suggests that some classes are members of themselves e.g., the class of all classes, while others are not e.g., the class of philosophers. Let R be the class whose membership consists of exactly those classes of the latter sort, i.e., those that are not members of themselves. Is R a member of itself? If so, then it is a member of the class of all classes that are not members of themselves, and hence is not a member of itself. If, on the other hand, it is not a member of itself, then it satisfies its own membership conditions, and hence is a member of itself after all. Either way there is a contradiction. The source of the paradox, Russell suggested, is the assumption that classes and their members form a single, homogeneous logical type. To the contrary, he proposed that the logical universe is stratified into a regimented hierarchy of types. Individuals constitute the lowest type in the hierarchy, type 0. For purposes of exposition, individuals can be taken to be ordinary objects like chairs and persons. Type 1 consists of classes of individuals, type 2 of classes of classes of individuals, type 3 classes of classes of classes of individuals, and so on. Unlike the homogeneous universe, then, in the type hierarchy the members of a given class must all be drawn from a single logical type n, and the class itself must reside in the next higher type n ! 1. Russell’s sketch in the Principles differs from this account in certain details. Russell’s paradox cannot arise in this conception of the universe of classes. Because the members of a class must all be of the same logical type, there is no such class as R, whose definition cuts across all types. Rather, there is only, for each type n, the class Rn of all non-self-membered classes of that type. Since Rn itself is of type n ! 1, the paradox breaks down: from the assumption that Rn is not a member of itself as in fact it is not in the type hierarchy, it no longer follows that it satisfies its own membership conditions, since those conditions apply only to objects of type n. Most formal type theories, including Russell’s own, enforce the class membership restrictions of simple type theory syntactically such that a can be asserted to be a member of b only if b is of the next higher type than a. In such theories, the definition of R, hence the paradox itself, cannot even be expressed. Numerous paradoxes remain unscathed by the simple type hierarchy. Of these, the most prominent are the semantic paradoxes, so called because they explicitly involve semantic notions like truth, as in the following version of the liar paradox. Suppose Epimenides asserts that all the propositions he asserts today are false; suppose also that that is the only proposition he asserts today. It follows immediately that, under those conditions, the proposition he asserts is true if and only if it is false. To address such paradoxes, Russell was led to the more refined and substantially more complicated system known as ramified type theory, developed in detail in his 8 paper “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types.” In the ramified theory, propositions and properties or propositional functions, in Russell’s jargon come to play the central roles in the type-theoretic universe. Propositions are best construed as the metaphysical and semantical counterparts of sentences  what sentences express  and properties as the counterparts of “open sentences” like ‘x is a philosopher’ that contain a variable ‘x’ in place of a noun phrase. To distinguish linguistic expressions from their semantic counterparts, the property expressed by, say, ‘x is a philosopher’, will be denoted by ‘x ^ is a philosopher’, and the proposition expressed by ‘Aristotle is a philosopher’ will be denoted by ‘Aristotle is a philosopher’. A property . . .x ^ . . . is said to be true of an individual a if . . . a . . . is a true proposition, and false of a if . . . a . . . is a false proposition where ‘. . . a . . .’ is the result of replacing ‘x ^ ’ with ‘a’ in ‘. . . x ^ . . .’. So, e.g., x ^ is a philosopher is true of Aristotle. The range of significance of a property P is the collection of objects of which P is true or false. a is a possible argument for P if it is in P’s range of significance. In the ramified theory, the hierarchy of classes is supplanted by a hierarchy of properties: first, properties of individuals i.e., properties whose range of significance is restricted to individuals, then properties of properties of individuals, and so on. Parallel to the simple theory, then, the type of a property must exceed the type of its possible arguments by one. Thus, Russell’s paradox with R now in the guise of the property x ^ is a property that is not true of itself  is avoided along analogous lines. Following the  mathematician Henri Poincaré, Russell traced the type theory type theory 935   935 source of the semantic paradoxes to a kind of illicit self-reference. So, for example, in the liar paradox, Epimenides ostensibly asserts a proposition p about all propositions, p itself among them, namely that they are false if asserted by him today. p thus refers to itself in the sense that it  or more exactly, the sentence that expresses it  quantifies over i.e., refers generally to all or some of the elements of a collection of entities among which p itself is included. The source of semantic paradox thus isolated, Russell formulated the vicious circle principle VCP, which proscribes all such self-reference in properties and propositions generally. The liar proposition p and its ilk were thus effectively banished from the realm of legitimate propositions and so the semantic paradoxes could not arise. Wedded to the restrictions of simple type theory, the VCP generates a ramified hierarchy based on a more complicated form of typing. The key notion is that of an object’s order. The order of an individual, like its type, is 0. However, the order of a property must exceed the order not only of its possible arguments, as in simple type theory, but also the orders of the things it quantifies over. Thus, type 1 properties like x ^ is a philosopher and x ^ is as wise as all other philosophers are first-order properties, since they are true of and, in the second instance, quantify over, individuals only. Properties like these whose order exceeds the order of their possible arguments by one are called predicative, and are of the lowest possible order relative to their range of significance. Consider, by contrast, the property call it Q x ^ has all the first-order properties of a great philosopher. Like those above, Q also is a property of individuals. However, since Q quantifies over first-order properties, by the VDP, it cannot be counted among them. Accordingly, in the ramified hierarchy, Q is a second-order property of individuals, and hence non-predicative or impredicative. Like Q, the property x ^ is a first-order property of all great philosophers is also second-order, since its range of significance consists of objects of order 1 and it quantifies only over objects of order 0; but since it is a property of first-order properties, it is predicative. In like manner it is possible to define third-order properties of individuals, third-order properties of first-order properties, third-order properties of second-order properties of individuals, third-order properties of secondorder properties of first-order properties, and then, in the same fashion, fourth-order properties, fifth-order properties, and so on ad infinitum. A serious shortcoming of ramified type theory, from Russell’s perspective, is that it is an inadequate foundation for classical mathematics. The most prominent difficulty is that many classical theorems appeal to definitions that, though consistent, violate the VCP. For instance, a wellknown theorem of real analysis asserts that every bounded set of real numbers has a least upper bound. In the ramified theory, real numbers are identified with certain predicative properties of rationals. Under such an identification, the usual procedure is to define the least upper bound of a bounded set S of reals to be the property call it b some real number in S is true of x ^ , and then prove that this property is itself a real number with the requisite characteristics. However, b quantifies over the real numbers. Hence, by the VCP, b cannot itself be taken to be a real number: although of the same type as the reals, and although true of the right things, b must be assigned a higher order than the reals. So, contrary to the classical theorem, S fails to have a least upper bound. Russell introduced a special axiom to obviate this difficulty: the axiom of reducibility. Reducibility says, in effect, that for any property P, there is a predicative property Q that is true of exactly the same things as P. Reducibility thus assures that there is a predicative property bH true of the same rational numbers as b. Since the reals are predicative, hence of the same order as bH, it turns out that bH is a real number, and hence that S has a least upper bound after all, as required by the classical theorem. The general role of reducibility is thus to undo the draconian mathematical effects of ramification without undermining its capacity to fend off the semantic paradoxes. 

token-type distinction – Grice: “Strictly, they are not antonyms – and token is too English!” Grice: “Token is cognate with ‘teach,’ a Graeco-Roman thing, cfr. insignum – insignare – to teach is to show, almost, with an m-intention behind.” -- first the token, then the type – if necessary; “After all a type is a set of tokens” -- used by Grice: there’s a type of an utterer, but there’s the individual utterer: In symbols, “u” is an individual utterer, say, Grice. “U” is a type of utterer, say Oxonian philosophy dons. Aas drawn by Peirce, the contrast between a category and a member of that category. An individual or token is said to exemplify a type; it possesses the property that characterizes that type. In philosophy this distinction is often applied to linguistic expressions and to mental states, but it can be applied also to objects, events, properties, and states of affairs. Related to it are the distinctions between type and token individuation and between qualitative and numerical identity. Distinct tokens of the same type, such as two ants, may be qualitatively identical but cannot be numerically identical. Irrespective of the controversial metaphysical view that every individual has an essence, a type to which it belongs essentially, every individual belongs to many types, although for a certain theoretical or practical purpose it may belong to one particularly salient type e.g., the entomologist’s Formicidae or the picnicker’s buttinsky. The typetoken distinction as applied in the philosophy of language marks the difference between linguistic expressions, such as words and sentences, which are the subject of linguistics, and the products of acts of writing or speaking the subject of speech act theory. Confusing the two can lead to conflating matters of speaker meaning withmatters of word or sentence meaning as noted by Grice. An expression is a linguistic type and can be used over and over, whereas a token of a type can be produced only once, though of course it may be reproduced copied. A writer composes an essay a type and produces a manuscript a token, of which there might be many copies more tokens. A token of a type is not the same as an occurrence of a type. In the previous sentence there are two occurrences of the word ‘type’; in each inscription of that sentence, there are two tokens of that word. In philosophy of mind the typetoken distinction underlies the contrast between two forms of physicalism, the typetype identity theory or type physicalism and the tokentoken identity theory or token physicalism. 

uncertainty: one of those negativisims by Grice – cfr. ‘non-certainty’ -- v. certum. It may be held that ‘uncertain’ is wrong. Grice is certain that p. It is not the case that Grice is certain that p.

universale: Grice: “Very Ciceronian – not found in Aristotle.” -- Like ‘qualia,’ which is the plural for ‘quale,’ ‘universalia’ is the plural for ‘universale.’ The totum for Grice on “all” -- This is a Gricism. It all started with arbor porphyriana. It is supposed to translate Aristotle’s “to kath’olou” (which happens to be one of the categories in Kant, “alleheit,” and which Aristotle contrasts with “to kath’ekastou,” (which Kant has as a category, SINGULARITAS. For a nominalist, any predicate is a ‘name,’ hence ‘nominalism.’ Opposite ‘realism.’ “Nominalism” is actually a misnomer. The opposite of realism is anti-realism. We need something like ‘universalism,’ (he who believes in the existence, not necessary ‘reality’ of a universal) and a ‘particularist,’ or ‘singularist,’ who does not. Note that the opposite of ‘particularism,’ is ‘totalism.’ (Totum et pars). Grice holds a set-theoretical approach to the universalium. Grice is willing to provide always a set-theoretical extensionalist (in terms of predicate) and an intensionalist variant in terms of property and category. Grice explicitly uses ‘X’ for utterance-type (WOW:118), implying a distinction with the utterance-token. Grice gets engaged in a metabolical debate concerning the reductive analysis of what an utterance-type means in terms of a claim to the effect that, by uttering x, an utterance-token of utterance-type X, the utterer means that p. The implicaturum is x (utterance-token). Grice is not enamoured with the type/token or token/type distinction. His thoughts on logical form are provocative. f you cannot put it in logical form, it is not worth saying. Strawson infamously reacted with a smile. Oh, no: if you CAN put it in logical form, it is not worth saying. Grice refers to the type-token distinction when he uses x for token and X for type. Since Bennett cares to call Grice a meaning-nominalist we should not care about the type X anyway. He expands on this in Retrospective Epilogue. Grice should have payed more attention to the distinction seeing that it was Ogdenian. A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty thes on a page, and, of course, they count as twenty words. In another use of the word word, however, there is but one word the in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page, or be heard in any voice. Such a Form, Peirce, as cited by Ogden and Richards, proposes to term a type. A single object such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, Peirce ventures to call a token. In order that a type may be used, it has to be embodied in a token which shall be a sign of the type, and thereby of the object the type signifies, and Grice followed suit. Refs.: Some of the sources are given under ‘abstractum.’ Also under ‘grecianism,’ since Grice was keen on exploring what Aristotle has to say about this in Categoriae, due to his joint research with Austin, Code, Friedman, and Strawson. Grice also has a specific Peirceian essay on the type-token distinction. BANC.

universalis: Grice – “A Ciceronian technicism, not found in Aristotle. -- (‘the altogether nice girl’) dictum de omni et nullo, also dici de omni et nullo Latin, ‘said of all and none’, two principles that were supposed by medieval logicians to underlie all valid syllogisms. Dictum de omni applies most naturally to universal affirmative propositions, maintaining that in such a proposition, whatever falls under the subject term also falls under the predicate term. Thus, in ‘Every whale is a mammal’, whatever is included under ‘whale’ is included under ‘mammal’. Dictum de nullo applies to universal negative propositions, such as ‘No whale is a lizard’, maintaining that whatever falls under the subject term does not fall under the predicate term.  SYLLOGISM. W.E.M. Diderot, Denis 171384,  philosopher, Encyclopedist, dramatist, novelist, and art critic, a champion of Enlightenment values. He is known primarily as general editor of the Encyclopedia 174773, an analytical and interpretive compendium of eighteenth-century science and technology. A friend of Rousseau and Condillac, Diderot tr. Shaftesbury’s Inquiry Concerning Virtue 1745 into . Revealing Lucretian affinities Philosophical Thoughts, 1746, he assailed Christianity in The Skeptics’ Walk 1747 and argued for a materialistic and evolutionary universe Letter on the Blind, 1749; this led to a short imprisonment. Diderot wrote mediocre bourgeois comedies; some bleak fiction The Nun, 1760; and two satirical dialogues, Rameau’s Nephew 1767 and Jacques the Fatalist 176584, his masterpieces. He innovatively theorized on drama Discourse on Dramatic Poetry, 1758 and elevated art criticism to a literary genre Salons in Grimm’s Literary Correspondence. At Catherine II’s invitation, Diderot visited Saint Petersburg in 1773 and planned the creation of a Russian . Promoting science, especially biology and chemistry, Diderot unfolded a philosophy of nature inclined toward monism. His works include physiological investigations, Letter on the Deaf and Dumb 1751 and Elements of Physiology 177480; a sensationalistic epistemology, On the Interpretation of Nature 1745; an aesthetic, Essays on Painting 1765; a materialistic philosophy of science, D’Alembert’s Dream 1769; an anthropology, Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville 1772; and an anti-behavioristic Refutation of Helvétius’ Work “On Man” 177380. 

universalisierung:   Grice: “Ironically, the Dutch so careful with their lingo, this is vague, in that the universe is not a pluriverse.” -- While Grice uses ‘universal,’ he means like Russell, the unnecessary implication of ‘every.’ Oddly, Kant does not relate this –ung with the first of his three categories under ‘quantitas,’ the universal. But surely they are related. Problem is that Kant wasn’t aware because he kept moving from the Graeco-Roman classical vocabulary to the Hun. Thus, Kant has “Allheit,” which he renders in Latinate as “Universitas,” and “Totalität,” gehört in der Kategorienlehre des Philosophen Immanuel Kant zu den reinen Verstandesbegriffen, d. h. zu den Elementen des Verstandes, welche dem Menschen bereits a priori, also unabhängig von der sinnlichen Erfahrung gegeben sind. “Allheit” wird wie Einheit und Vielheit den Kategorien der “Quantität” zugeordnet und entspricht den Einzelnen Urteilen (Urteil hier im Sinn von 'Aussage über die Wirklichkeit') in der Form „Ein S ist P“, also z. B. „Immanuel Kant ist ein Philosoph“. Sie wird von Kant definiert als „die Vielheit als Einheit betrachtet“ (KrV, B 497 f.)[3]. Siehe auch Transzendentale Analytik Weblinks. Allheit – Bedeutungserklärungen, Wortherkunft, Synonyme, Übersetzungen Einzelnachweise  Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Reclam, Stuttgart 1966, ISBN 3-15-006461-9.  Peter Kunzmann, Franz-Peter Burkard, Franz Wiedmann: dtv-Atlas zur Philosophie. dtv, München 1991, ISBN 3-423-03229-4, S. 136 ff.  Zitiert nach Arnim Regenbogen, Uwe Meyer (Hrsg.): Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe. Meiner, Hamburg 2005, ISBN 3-7873-1738-4: Allheit Kategorie: Ontologie. Referred to by Grice in his “Method,” – “A requisite for a maxim to enter my manual, which I call the Immanuel, is that it should be universalizable. Die Untersuchung zur »Universalisierung in der Ethik« greift eine Problematik auf, die für eine Reihe der prominentesten Ethikentwürfe der Gegenwart sowohl des deutschsprachigen wie des angelsächsischen Raumes zentral ist, nämlich ob der normative Rationalitätsanspruch, den ethische Argumentationen erheben, auf eine dem wissenschaftlichen Anspruch der deskriptiven Gesetzeswissenschaften vergleichbare Weise eingelöst werden kann, nämlich durch Verallgemeinerungs- oder Universalisierungsprinzipien. universalizability Ethics The idea that moral judgments should be universalizable can be traced to the Golden Rule and Kant’s ethics. In the twentieth century it was elaborated by Hare and became a major thesis of his prescriptivism. The principle states that all moral judgments are universalizable in the sense that if it is right for a particular person A to do an action X, then it must likewise be right to do X for any person exactly like A, or like A in the relevant respects. Furthermore, if A is right in doing X in this situation, then it must be right for A to do X in other relevantly similar situations. Hare takes this feature to be an essential feature of moral judgments. An ethical statement is the issuance of a universal prescription. Universalizability is not the same as generality, for a moral judgment can be highly specific and detailed and need not be general or simple. The universalizability principle enables Hare to avoid the charge of irrationality that is usually lodged against non-cognitivism, to which his prescriptivism belongs, and his theory is thus a great improvement on emotivism. “I have been maintaining that the meaning of the word ‘ought’ and other moral words is such that a person who uses them commits himself thereby to a universal rule. This is the thesis of universalizability.” Hare, Freedom and Reason.

unstructured: Grice: “Paget was able to structure compositionality with his hands!” -- one of those negativisms of Grice (cfr. ‘non-structured’). Surely Grice cared a hoot for French anthropological structuralism! So he has the ‘unstructured’ followed by the structured. A handwave is unstructured, meaning syntactically unstructured, and in it you have all the enigma of reason resolved. By waving his hand, U means that SUBJECT: the emissor, copula IS, predicate: A KNOWER OF THE ROUTE, or ABOUT TO LEAVE the emissor.There is a lot of structure in the soul of the emissor. So apply this to what Grice calls a ‘soul-to-soul transfer’ to which he rightly reduces communication. Even if it is n unstructured communication device, and maybe a ‘one-off’ one, to use Blackburn’s vulgarism, we would have the three types of correspondence of Grice’s Semantic Triangle obtaining. First, the psychophysical. The emissor knows the route, and he shows it. And he wants the emissee to ‘catch’ or get the emissor’s drift. It is THAT route which he knows. So the TWO psychophysical correspondences obtain. Then there are the two psychosemiotic correspondences. The emissor intends that the emissor will recognise the handwave as a signal that he, the emissor, knows the route. As for the emissee’s psychosemiotic correspondence: he better realise it is THAT route – to Banbury, surely, with bells in his shoes, as Grice’s mother would sing to him. And then we have the two semio-physical correspondences. If the emissor DOES know the route (and he is not lying, or rather, he is not mistaken about it), then that’s okay. Many people say or signal that they know because they feel ashamed to admit their ignorance. So it is very expectable, outside Oxford, to have someone waving meaning that he knows the route, when he doesn’t. This is surely non-natural, because it’s Kiparsky-non-factive. Waving the hand thereby communicating that he knows the route does not entail that he knows the route (as ‘spots’ do entail measles). From the emissee’s point of view, provided the emissor knows the route and shows it, the emissee will understand, hopefully, and feel assured that the emissor will hopefully reach the destination, Banbury, surely, safely enough.

uptake: used by Grice slightly different from Austin. Austin: “The performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake.” “I distinguish some senses of consequences and effects, especially three senses in which effects can come in even with illocutionary acts, viz. securing uptake, taking effect, and inviting a response.” “Comparing stating to what we have said about the illocu-  tionary act, it is an act to which, just as much as to other  illocutionary acts, it is essential to ‘secure uptake’ : the  doubt about whether I stated something if it was not  heard or understood is just the same as the doubt about  whether I warned sotto voce or protested if someone did  not take it as a protest, &c. And statements do ‘take  effect’ just as much as ‘namings’, say: if I have stated  something, then that commits me to other statements:  other statements made by me will be in order or out of  order.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Verstehen and uptake.”

urmsonianism. Who other than Urmson would come up with a counter-example to the sufficiency of Grice’s analysis of an act of communication. In a case of bribery, the response or effect in the emittee is NOT meant to be recognised. So we need a further restriction unless we want to say that the briber means that his emittee recognise the ‘gift’ as a meta-bribe. Refs.: Urmson, “Introduction” to Austin’s Philosophical Papers, cited by Grice. Urmson, Introduction to Austin’s How to do things with words, cited by Grice. Urmson on Grice, “The Independent.” Urmson on pragmatics.

urmson’s bribe: Urmson’s use of the bribe is ‘accidental.’ What Urmson is getting at is that if the briber intends the bribe acts as a cause to effect a response, even a cognitive one, in the bribe, the propositional complexum, “This is a bribe,” should not necessarily be communicated. It is amazing how Grice changed the example into one about physical action. They seem different. On the other hand, Grice would not have cared to credit Urmson had it not believed it worth knowing that the criticism arose within the Play Group (Grice admired Urmson). In his earlier “Meaning,” Grice presents his own self-criticisms to arrive at a more refined analysis. But in “Utterer’s meaning and intention,” when it comes to the SUFFICIENCY, it’s all about other people: notably Urmson and Strawson. Grice cites Stampe before Strawson, but many ignore Stampe on the basis that Strawson does not credit him, and there is no reason why he should have been aware of it. But Stampe was at Oxford at the time so this is worth noting. It has to be emphasised that the author list is under ‘sufficiency.’ Under necessity, Grice does not credit the source of the objections, so we can assume it is Grice himself, as he had presented criticisms to his own view within the same ‘Meaning.’ It is curious that Grice loved Stampe. Grice CHANGED Urmon’s example, and was unable to provide a specific scenario to Strawson’s alleged counterexample, because Strawson is vague himself. But Stampe’s, Grice left unchanged. It seems few Oxonian philosohpers of Grice’s playgroup had his analytic acumen. Consider his sophisticated account of ‘meaning.’ It’s different if you are a graduate student from the New World, and you have to prove yourself intelligent. But for Grice’s playgroup companion, only three or four joined in the analysis. The first is Urmson. The second is Strawson. The case by Urmson involved a tutee offering to buy Gardiner an expensive dinner, hoping that Gardiner will give him permission for an over-night visit to London. Gardiner knows that his tutee wants his permission. The appropriate analysans for "By offering to buy Gardiner an expensive dinner, the tuttee means that Gardiner should give him permission for an overnight stay in London" are fulfilled: (1) The tutee offers to buy Gardiner an expensive dinner with the intention of producing a certain response on the part of Gardiner (2) The tutee intends that Gardiner should recognize (know, think) that the tutee is offering to buy him an expensive dinner with the intention of producing this response; (3) The tutee intends that Gardiners recognition (thought) that the tutee has the intention mentioned in (2) should be at least part of Gardiners reason for producing the response mentioned. If in general to specify in (i) the nature of an intended response is to specify what was meant, it should be correct not only to say that by offering to buy Gardiner an expensive dinner, the tutee means that Gardiner is to give him permission for an overnight stay in London, but also to say that he meas that Gardiner should (is to) give him permission for an over-night visit to London. But in fact one would not wish to say either of these things; only that the tutee meant Gardiner to give him permission. A restriction seems to be required, and one which might serve to eliminate this range of counterexamples can be identified from a comparison of two scenarios. Grice goes into a tobacconists shop, ask for a packet of my favorite cigarettes, and when the unusually suspicious tobacconist shows that he wants to see the color of my money before he hands over the goods, I put down the price of the cigarettes on the counter. Here nothing has been meant. Alternatively, Grice goes to his regular tobacconist (from whom I also purchase other goods) for a packet of my regular brand of Players Navy Cuts, the price of which is distinctive, say 43p. Grice says nothing, but puts down 43p. The tobacconist recognizes my need, and hands over the packet. Here, I think, by putting down 43p I meant something-Namesly, that I wanted a packet of Players Navy Cuts. I have at the same time provided an inducement. The distinguishing feature of the second example seems to be that here the tobacconist recognized, and was intended to recognize, what he was intended to do from my "utterance" (my putting down the money), whereas in the first example this was not the case. Nor is it the case with respect to Urmson’s case of the tutees attempt to bribe Gardiner. So one might propose that the analysis of meaning be amended accordingly. U means something by uttering x is true if: (i) U intends, by uttering x, to induce a certain response in A (2) U intends A to recognize, at least in part from the utterance of x, that U intends to produce that response (3) U intends the fulfillment of the intention mentioned in (2) to be at least in part As reason for fulfilling the intention mentioned in (i). This copes with Urmsons counterexample to Grices proposal in the Oxford Philosophical Society talk involving the tutee attempting to bribe Gardiner.

use: Grice: “I would rephrase Vitter’s adage, ‘Don’t ask for the expression meaning, as for the UTTERER’s meaning, if you have to axe at all!” -- while Grice uses ‘use,’ as Ryle once told him, ‘you should use ‘usage, too.’ Parkinson was nearby. When Warnock commissioned Parkinson to compile a couple of Oxonian essays on meaning and communication, Parkinson unearthed the old symposium by Ryle and Findlay on the matter. Typically, when Ryle reprinted it, he left Findlay out!

sender: Grice: “Surely, if there is a ‘recipient,’ there must be a ‘sender.’” Grice: “I prefer ‘sender’ as correlative for ‘recipient,’ since there is an embedded intentionality about it.” Cf. Sting, “Message in a bottle – sending out an S. O. S.” – Grice: “Addresser and addressee sound otiose.” – Grice: “Then there’s this jargon of the ‘target’ addressee’ – while we are in the metaphorical mode!” -- emissor: utterer: cf. emissum, emissor. Usually Homo sapiens sapiens – and usually Oxonian, the Homo sapiens sapiens Grice interactes with. Sometimes tutees, sometimes tutor. There is something dualistic about the ‘utterer.’ It is a vernacularism from English ‘out.’ So the French impressionists were into IM-pressing, out to in; the German expressionists were into EX-pressing, in to out. Or ‘man’. The important thing is for Grice to avoid ‘speaker.’ He notes that ‘utterance’ has a nice fuzziness about it. He still notes that he is using ‘utter’ in a ‘perhaps artificial’ way. He was already wedded to ‘utter’ in  his talk for the Oxford Philosopical Society. Grice does not elaborate much on general gestures or signals. His main example is a sort of handwave by which the emissor communicates that either he knows the route or that he is about to leave the addressee. Even this is complex. Let’s try to apply his final version of communication to the hand-wave. The question of “Homo sapiens sapiens” is an interesting one. Grice is all for ascribing predicates regarding the soul to what he calls the ‘lower animals’. He is not ready to ascribe emissor’s meaning to them. Why? Because of Schiffer! I mean, when it comes to the conditions of necessity of the reductive analysis, he seems okay. When it comes to the sufficiency, there are two types of objection. One by Urmson, easily dismissed. The second, first by Stampe and Strawson, not so easily. But Grice agrees to add a clause limiting intentions to be ‘in the open.’ Those who do not have a philosophical background usually wonder about this. So for their sake, it may be worth considering Grice’s synthetic a posteriori argument to refuse an emissor other than a Homo sapiens sapiens to be able to ‘mean,’ if not ‘communicate,’ or ‘signify.’ There is an objection which is not mentioned by his editors, which seems to Grice to be one to which Grice must respond. The objection may be stated thus. One of the leading strands in Grice’s reductive analysis of an emissor communicating that p is that communication is not to be regarded exclusively, or even primarily, as a ‘feature’ of emissors who use what philosophers of language call ‘language’ (Sprache, Taal, Langage, Linguaggio – to restrict to the philosophical lexicon, cf. Plato’s Cratylus), and a fortiori of an emissor who emits this or that “linguistic” ‘utterance.’ There are many instances of NOTABLY NON-“linguistic” vehicles or devices of communication, within a communication-system, which fulfil this or that communication-function; these vehicles or devices are mostly syntactically un-structured or amorphous. Sometimes, a device may exhibit at least some rudimentary syntactic structure, in that we may distinguish a totum from a pars and identify a ‘simplex’ within a ‘complexum.’ Grice’s intention-based reductive analysis of a communicatum, based on Aristotle, Locke, and Peirce, is designed to allow for the possibility that a non-“linguistic,” and, further, indeed a non-“conventional” 'utterance' token, perhaps even manifesting some degree of syntactic structure, and not just a block of an amorphous signal, may be within the ‘repertoire’ of ‘procedures’ of this or that organism, or creature, or agent, which, even if not relying on any apparatus for communication of the kind that that we may label ‘linguistic’ or otherwise ‘conventional,’  ‘do’ this or that ‘thing’ thereby ‘communicating’ that p, or q. To provide for this possibility, it is plainly necessary that the key ingredient in any representation of ‘communicating,’ viz. intending that p, should be a ‘state’ of the emissor’s soul the capacity for which does not require what we may label the ‘possession’ of, shall we say, a ‘faculty,’ of what philosophers call ‘a’ ‘language’ (Sprache, Taal, langue, lingua – note that in German we do not distinguish between ‘die Deutsche Sprache’ and ‘Sprache’ as ‘ein Facultat.’). Now a philosopher, relying on this or that neo-Prichardian reductive analysis of ‘intending that p,’ may not be willing to allow the possibility of such, shall we call it, pre-linguistic intending that p, or non-linguistic intending that p. Surely if the emissor realizes that his addressee does not share what the Germans call ‘die Deutsche Sprache,” the emissor may still communicate with his addresse this or that by doing this or that. E. g. he may simulate that he wants to smoke a cigarette and wonders if his addressee has one to spare. Against that objection, Grice surely wins the day. But Grice grants that winning the day on THAT front may not be enough. And that is because, as far as Grice’s Oxonian explorations on communication go, in a succession of increasingly elaborate moves – ending with a ‘closure’ clause which cut this succession of increasingly elaborate moves -- designed to thwart this or that scenario, later deemed illegitimate, involving two rational agents where the emissor relies on an ‘inference-element’ that it is not the case that he intends his addressee will recogise – Grice is led to restrict the ‘intending’ which is to constitute a case of an emissor communicating that p to C-intending. Grice suspects that whatever may be the case in general with regard to ‘intending,’ C-intending seems for some reason to Grice to be unsophisticatedly, viz. plainly, too sophisticated a ‘state’ of a soul to be found in an organism, ‘pirot,’ creature, that we may not want to deem ‘rational,’ or as the Germans would say, a creature that is destitute of “Die Deutsche Sprache.” We need the pirot to be “very intelligent, indeed rational.”Grice regrets that some may think that what he thought were unavoidable rear-guard actions (ending with a complex reductive analysis of C-intending) seem to have undermined the raison d'etre of the Griciean campaign.”Unfortunately, Grice provides what he admittedly labels “a brief reply” which “will have to suffice.” Why? Because “a full treatment would require delving deep into crucial problems concerning the boundaries between vicious and virtuous circularity.” Which is promising. It is not something totally UNATTAINABLE. It reduces to the philosopher being virtuously circular, only! Why is the ‘virtuous circle’ so crucial – vide ‘circulus virtuosus.’ virtŭōsus , a, um, adj. virtus, I.virtuous, good (late Lat.), Aug. c. Sec. Man. 10. A circle is virtuous if it is not that bad. In this case, we need the ‘virtuous circle’ because we are dealing with ‘a loop.’ This is exactly Schiffer’s way of putting it in his ‘Introduction’ to Meaning (second edition). There is a ‘conceptual loop.’ Schiffer is not interested in ‘communicating;’ only ‘meaning.’ But his point can be transferred. He is saying that ‘U means that p,’ may rely on ‘U intends that p,’ where ‘U intends that p’ relies on ‘U means that p.’ There is a loop. In more generic terms:We have a creature, call it a pirot P1 that, by doing thing T, communicates that p. Are we talking of the OBSERVER? I hope so, because Grice’s favourite pirot is the parrot. So we have Prince Maurice’s Parrot. Locke: Since I think I may be confident, that, whoever should see a CREATURE of his own shape or make, though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a PARROT, would call him still A MAN; or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a PARROT; and say, the one was A DULL IRRATIONAL MAN, and the other A VERY INTELLIGENT RATIONAL PARROT. A relation we have in an author of great note, is sufficient to countenance the supposition of A RATIONAL PARROT. The author’s words are: I had a mind to know, from Prince Maurice's own mouth, the account of a common, but much credited story, that I had heard so often from many others, of an old parrot he has, that speaks, and asks, and answers common questions, like A REASONABLE CREATURE. So that those of his train there generally conclude it to be witchery or possession; and one of his chaplains, would never from that time endure A PARROT, but says all PARROTS have a devil in them. I had heard many particulars of this story, and as severed by people hard to be discredited, which made me ask Prince Maurice what there is of it. Prince Maurice says, with his usual plainness and dryness in talk, there is something true, but a great deal false of what is reported. I desired to know of him what there was of the first. Prince Maurice tells me short and coldly, that he had HEARD of such A PARROT; and though he believes nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he had so much curiosity as to send for the parrot: that it was a very great parrot; and when the parrot comes first into the room where Prince Maurice is, with a great many men about him, the parrot says presently, What a nice company is here. One of the men asks the parrot, ‘What thinkest thou that man is?,’ ostending his finger, and pointing to Prince Maurice. The parrot answers, ‘Some general -- or other.’ When the man brings the parrot close to Prince Maurice, Prince Maurice asks the parrot., “D'ou venez-vous?” The parrot answers, “De Marinnan.” Then Prince Maurice goes on, and poses a second question to the parrot. “A qui estes-vous?” The Parrot answers: “A un Portugais.” Prince Maurice asks a third question. “Que fais-tu la?” The parrot answers: “Je garde les poulles.”Prince Maurice smiles, which pleases the Parrot. Prince Maurice, violating a Griceian maxim, and being just informed that p, asks whether p. This is his fourth question. “Vous gardez les poulles?” The Parrot answers, “Oui, moi; et je scai bien faire.” The Parrott appeals to Peirce’s iconic system and makes the chuck four or five times that a man uses to make to chickens when a man calls them. I set down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said them to me. I ask Prince Maurice in what ‘language’ the parrot speaks. Prince Maurice says that the parrot speaks in Brazilian. I ask Prince William whether he understands the Brazilian language. Prince Maurice says: No, but he has taken care to have TWO interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that spoke Brazilian, and the other a Brazilian that spoke Dutch; that Prince Maurice asked them separatelyand privately, and both of them AGREED in telling Prince Maurice just the same thing that the parrot had said. I could not but tell this ODD story, because it is so much out of the way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say Prince Maurice at least believed himself in all he told me, having ever passed for a very honest and pious man. I leave it to naturalists to reason, and to other men to believe, as they please upon it. However, it is not, perhaps, amiss to relieve or enliven a busy scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the purpose or no.Locke takes care that the reader should have the story at large in the author's own words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible.For it cannot be imagined that so able a man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close, not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and piety, a story which, if he himself thought incredible, he could not but also think RIDICULOUS. Prince Maurice, it is plain, who vouches this story, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker A PARROT. And Locke asks any one else who thinks such a story fit to be told, whether, if this PARROT, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it this one did,- whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of RATIONAL ANIMALS; but yet, whether, for all that, they would have been allowed to be MEN, and not PARROTS? For I presume it is not the idea of A THINKING OR RATIONAL BEING alone that makes the idea of A MAN in most people's sense: but of A BODY, so and so shaped, joined to it: and if that be the idea of a MAN, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as  THE SAME IMMATERIAL SPIRIT, go to the making of the same MAN. So back to Grice’s pirotology.But first a precis of the conversation, or languaging:PARROT: What a nice company is here.MAN (pointing to Prince Maurice): What thinkest thou that man is?PARROT: Some general -- or other. (i. e. the parrot displays what Grice calls ‘up-take.’ The parrot recognizes the man’s c-intention. So far is ability to display uptake.PRINCE MAURICE: D'ou venez-vous?PARROT: De Marinnan.PRINCE MAURICE: A qui estes-vous?PARROT: A un Portugais.PRINCE MAURICE: Que fais-tu la?PARROT: Je garde les poulles.PRINCE MAURICE SMILES and flouts a Griceian maxim: Vous gardez les poulles?PARROT (losing patience, and grasping the Prince’s implicaturum that he doubts it): Oui, moi. Et je scai bien faire.(The Parrott then appeals to Peirce’s iconic system and makes the chuck five times that a man uses to make to chickens when a man calls them.)So back to Grice:“According to my most recent speculations about communication, one should distinguish between what I call the ‘factual’ or ‘de facto’ character of behind the state of affairs that one might describe as ‘rational agent A communicates that p,’ for those communication-relevant features which obtain or are present in the circumstances) the ‘titular’ or ‘de jure’ character, viz. the nested C-intending which is only deemed to be present. And the reason Grice calls it ‘nested’ is that it involves three sub-intentions:(C) Emissor E communicates that (psi*) p iff Emissor E c-intends that A recognises that E psi-s that p iffC1: Emissor E intends A to recognise that A psi-s that p.C2: Emissor intends that A recognise C1 by A recognising C2C3: There is no inference-element which is C-constitutive such that Emissor relies on it and yet does not intend A to recognise.Grice:“The titular or de jure character of the state of affairs that is described as “Emissor communicates that p,” involves self-reference in the closure clause regarding the third intention, C3, may be thought as being ‘regressive,’ or involving what mathematicians mean when they use “, …;” and the translators of Aristotle, ‘eis apeiron,’ translated as ‘ad infinitum.’There may be ways of UNDEEMING this, i. e. of stating that self-reference and closure are meant to BLOCK an infinite regress. Hence the circle, if there is one – one feature of a virtuous circle is that it doesn’t look like a circle simpliciter --  would be virtuous. The ‘de jure’ character stands for a situation which, in Grice’s words, is “infinitely complex,” and so cannot be actually present in toto – only DEEMED to be.”“In which case,” Grice concludes pointing to the otiosity or rendering inoperative, “to point out that THE INCONCEIVABLE actual presence of the ‘de jure’ character of ‘Emissor communicates that p’ WOULD, still, be possible, or would be detectable, only via the ‘use’ of something like ‘die Deutsche Sprache’ seem to serve little, if any, purpose.”“At its most meagre, the factual or ‘de facto’ character consists merely in the pre-rational ‘counterpart’ of the state of affairs describable by “Emissor E communicates that p,” which might amount to no more than making a certain sort of utterance in order thereby to get some creature to think or want some particular thing.This meagre condition does not involve a reference to any expertise regarding anything like ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’Let’s reformulate the condition.It’s just a pirot, at a ‘pre-rational’ level. The pirot does a thing T IN ORDER THEREBY to get some other pirot to think or do some particular thing. To echo Hare,Die Tur ist geschlossen, ja.Die Tur ist geschlossen, bitte.Grice continues as a corollary: “Maybe in a less straightforward instance of “Emissor E communicates that p” there is actually present the C-intention whose feasibility as an ‘intention’ suggests some ability to use ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’But vide “non-verbal communication,” pre-verbal communication, languaging, pre-conventional communication, gestural communication – as in What Grice has as “a gesture (a signal).” Not necessary ‘conventional,’ and MAYBE ‘established’ – is one-off sufficient for ‘established’? I think so. By waving his hand in a particular way (“a particular sort of hand wave”), the emissor communicates that he knows the route (or is about to leave the addressee).  Grice concludes about the less straightforward instances, that there can be no advance guarantee when this will be so, i. e. that there is actually present the C-intention whose feasibility as an intention points to some capacity to use ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’Grice adds: “It is in any case arguable that the use of ‘die Deutsche Sprache’ would here be an indispensable aid to philosophising about communication, rather than it being an element in the PHILOSOPHISING about communication!  Philosophers of Grice’s generation use ‘man’ on purpose to mean ‘mankind’. What a man means. What a man utters. The utterer is the man. In semiotics one can use something more Latinate, like gesturer, or emitter – or profferer. The distinction is between what an utterer means and what the logical and necessary implication. He doesn’t need to say this since ‘imply’ in the logical usage does not take utterer as subject. It’s what the utterer SAYS that implies this or that. (Strawson and Wiggins, p. 519). The utterer is possibly the ‘expresser.’

unamuno: m. d. b. Born in Bilbao, he studied in Bilbao and Madrid and taught Grecian and philosophy in Salamanca. His open criticism of the  government led to dismissal from the  and exile 430 and, again, to dismissal from the rectorship in 6. Unamuno is an important figure in  letters. Like Ortega y Gasset, his aim was to capture life in its complex emotional and intellectual dimensions rather than to describe the world scientifically. Thus, he favored fiction as a medium for his ideas and may be considered a precursor of existentialism. He wrote several philosophically significant novels, a commentary on Don Quijote 5, and some poetry and drama; his philosophical ideas are most explicitly stated in Del sentimiento trágico de la vida “The Tragic Sense of Life,” 3. Unamuno perceived a tragic sense permeating human life, a sense arising from our desire for immortality and from the certainty of death. In this predicament man must abandon all pretense of rationalism and embrace faith. Faith characterizes the authentic life, while reason leads to despair, but faith can never completely displace reason. Torn between the two, we can find hope only in faith; for reason deals only with abstractions, while we are “flesh and bones” and can find fulfillment only through commitment to an ideal.

unexpected examination paradox, a paradox about belief and prediction. One version is as follows: It seems that a teacher could both make, and act on, the following announcement to his class: “Sometime during the next week I will set you an examination, but at breakfast time on the day it will occur, you will have no good reason to expect that it will occur on that day.” If he announces this on Friday, could he not do what he said he would by, say, setting the examination on the following Wednesday? The paradox is that there is an argument purporting to show that there could not be an unexpected examination of this kind. For let us suppose that the teacher will carry out his threat, in both its parts; i.e., he will set an examination, and it will be unexpected. Then he cannot set the examination on Friday assuming this to be the last possible day of the week. For, by the time Friday breakfast arrives, and we know that all the previous days have been examination-free, we would have every reason to expect the examination to occur on Friday. So leaving the examination until Friday is inconsistent with setting an unexpected examination. For similar reasons, the examination cannot be held on Thursday. Given our previous conclusion that it cannot be delayed until Friday, we would know, when Thursday morning came, and the previous days had been examination-free, that it would have to be held on Thursday. So if it were held on Thursday it would not be unexpected. So it cannot be held on Thursday. Similar reasoning sup938 U   938 posedly shows that there is no day of the week on which it can be held, and so supposedly shows that the supposition that the teacher can carry out his threat must be rejected. This is paradoxical, for it seems plain that the teacher can carry out his threat. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Grice’s book of paradoxes, with pictures and illustrations to confuse you.”

uniformity of nature – Grice: “’uniformity’ has nothing to do with ‘form’ here!” – Grice: “I once used the phrase in a tutorial with Hardie: “What do you mean by ‘of’?’ he asked” --  a state of affairs thought to be required if induction is to be justified. For example, inductively strong arguments, such as ‘The sun has risen every day in the past; therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow’, are thought to presuppose that nature is uniform in the sense that the future will resemble the past, in this case with respect to the diurnal cycle. The Scottish empiricist Hume was the first to make explicit that the uniformity of nature is a substantial assumption in inductive reasoning. Hume argued that, because the belief that the future will resemble the past cannot be grounded in experience  for the future is as yet unobserved  induction cannot be rationally justified; appeal to it in defense of induction is either question-begging or illicitly metaphysical. Francis Bacon’s “induction by enumeration” and J. S. Mill’s “five methods of experimental inquiry” presuppose that nature is uniform. Whewell appealed to the uniformity of nature in order to account for the “consilience of inductions,” the tendency of a hypothesis to explain data different from those it was originally introduced to explain. For reasons similar to Hume’s, Popper holds that our belief in the uniformity of nature is a matter of faith. Reichenbach held that although this belief cannot be justified in advance of any instance of inductive reasoning, its presupposition is vindicated by successful inductions. It has proved difficult to formulate a philosophical statement of the uniformity of nature that is both coherent and informative. It appears contradictory to say that nature is uniform in all respects, because inductive inferences always mark differences of some sort e.g., from present to future, from observed to unobserved, etc., and it seems trivial to say that nature is uniform in some respects, because any two states of nature, no matter how different, will be similar in some respect. Not all observed regularities in the world or in data are taken to support successful inductive reasoning; not all uniformities are, to use Goodman’s term, “projectible.” Philosophers of science have therefore proposed various rules of projectibility, involving such notions as simplicity and explanatory power, in an attempt to distinguish those observed patterns that support successful inductions and thus are taken to represent genuine causal relations from those that are accidental or spurious. 

unity in diversity, in aesthetics, the principle that the parts of the aesthetic object must cohere or hang together while at the same time being different enough to allow for the object to be complex. This principle defines an important formal requirement used in judging aesthetic objects. If an object has insufficient unity e.g., a collection of color patches with no recognizable patterns of any sort, it is chaotic or lacks harmony; it is more a collection than one object. But if it has insufficient diversity e.g., a canvas consisting entirely of one color with no internal differentiations, it is monotonous. Thus, the formal pattern desired in an aesthetic object is that of complex parts that differ significantly from each other but fit together to form one interdependent whole such that the character or meaning of the whole would be changed by the change of any part. 

einheit – H. P. Grice, “Unity of science and teleology.” unity of science, a situation in which all branches of empirical science form a coherent system called unified science. Unified science is sometimes extended to include formal sciences e.g., branches of logic and mathematics. ‘Unity of science’ is also used to refer to a research program aimed at unified science. Interest in the unity of science has a long history with many roots, including ancient atomism and the work of the  Encyclopedists. In the twentieth century this interest was prominent in logical empiricism see Otto Neurath et al., International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. I, 8. Logical empiricists originally conceived of unified science in terms of a unified language of science, in particular, a universal observation language. All laws and theoretical statements in any branch of science were to be translatable into such an observation language, or else be appropriately related to sentences of this language. In unified science unity of science 939   939 addition to encountering technical difficulties with the observationaltheoretical distinction, this conception of unified science also leaves open the possibility that phenomena of one branch may require special concepts and hypotheses that are explanatorily independent of other branches. Another concept of unity of science requires that all branches of science be combined by the intertheoretic reduction of the theories of all non-basic branches to one basic theory usually assumed to be some future physics. These reductions may proceed stepwise; an oversimplified example would be reduction of psychology to biology, together with reductions of biology to chemistry and chemistry to physics. The conditions for reducing theory T2 to theory T1 are complex, but include identification of the ontology of T2 with that of T1, along with explanation of the laws of T2 by laws of T1 together with appropriate connecting sentences. These conditions for reduction can be supplemented with conditions for the unity of the basic theory, to produce a general research program for the unification of science see Robert L. Causey, Unity of Science, 7. Adopting this research program does not commit one to the proposition that complete unification will ever be achieved; the latter is primarily an empirical proposition. This program has been criticized, and some have argued that reductions are impossible for particular pairs of theories, or that some branches of science are autonomous. For example, some writers have defended a view of autonomous biology, according to which biological science is not reducible to the physical sciences. Vitalism postulated non-physical attributes or vital forces that were supposed to be present in living organisms. More recent neovitalistic positions avoid these postulates, but attempt to give empirical reasons against the feasibility of reducing biology. Other, sometimes a priori, arguments have been given against the reducibility of psychology to physiology and of the social sciences to psychology. These disputes indicate the continuing intellectual significance of the idea of unity of science and the broad range of issues it encompasses. 

universal instantiation: Grice: “Slightly confusing in that the universe is not a pluri-verse.” -- discussed by Grice in his System G -- also called universal quantifier elimination. 1 The argument form ‘Everything is f; therefore a is f’, and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer that any given thing is f from the premise that everything is f. In classical logic, where all terms are taken to denote things in the domain of discourse, the rule says simply that from vA[v] one may infer A[t], the result of replacing all free occurrences of v in A[v] by the term t. If non-denoting terms are allowed, however, as in free logic, then the rule would require an auxiliary premise of the form Duu % t to ensure that t denotes something in the range of the variable v. Likewise in modal logic, which is sometimes held to contain terms that do not denote “genuine individuals” the things over which variables range, an auxiliary premise may be required. 3 In higher-order logic, the rule of inference that says that from XA[X] one may infer A[F], where F is any expression of the grammatical category e.g., n-ary predicate appropriate to that of X e.g., n-ary predicate variable. G.F.S.

universalisability: -- Grice: ‘Slightly confusing, in that the universe is not a pluri-verse” -- discussed along three dimension by Grice: applicational conceptual, and formal. -- 1 Since the 0s, the moral criterion implicit in Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal law,” often called the principle of universality. A maxim or principle of action that satisfies this test is said to be universalizable, hence morally acceptable; one that does not is said to be not universalizable, hence contrary to duty. 2 A second sense developed in connection with the work of Hare in the 0s. For Hare, universalizability is “common to all judgments which carry descriptive meaning”; so not only normative claims moral and evaluative judgments but also empirical statements are universalizable. Although Hare describes how such universalizuniversal universalizability 940   940 ability can figure in moral argument, for Hare “offenses against . . . universalizability are logical, not moral.” Consequently, whereas for Kant not all maxims are universalizable, on Hare’s view they all are, since they all have descriptive meaning. 3 In a third sense, one that also appears in Hare, ‘universalizability’ refers to the principle of universalizability: “What is right or wrong for one person is right or wrong for any similar person in similar circumstances.” This principle is identical with what Sidgwick The Methods of Ethics called the Principle of Justice. In Generalization in Ethics 1 by M. G. Singer b.6, it is called the Generalization Principle and is said to be the formal principle presupposed in all moral reasoning and consequently the explanation for the feature alleged to hold of all moral judgments, that of being generalizable. A particular judgment of the form ‘A is right in doing x’ is said to imply that anyone relevantly similar to A would be right in doing any act of the kind x in relevantly similar circumstances. The characteristic of generalizability, of presupposing a general rule, was said to be true of normative claims, but not of all empirical or descriptive statements. The Generalization Principle GP was said to be involved in the Generalization Argument GA: “If the consequences of everyone’s doing x would be undesirable, while the consequences of no one’s doing x would not be, then no one ought to do x without a justifying reason,” a form of moral reasoning resembling, though not identical with, the categorical imperative CI. One alleged resemblance is that if the GP is involved in the GP, then it is involved in the CI, and this would help explain the moral relevance of Kant’s universalizability test. 4 A further extension of the term ‘universalizability’ appears in Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality 8. Gewirth formulates “the logical principle of universalizability”: “if some predicate P belongs to some subject S because S has the property Q . . . then P must also belong to all other subjects S1, S2, . . . , Sn that have Q.” The principle of universalizability “in its moral application” is then deduced from the logical principle of universalizability, and is presupposed in Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency, “Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as yourself,” which is taken to provide an a priori determinate way of determining relevant similarities and differences, hence of applying the principle of universalizability. The principle of universalizability is a formal principle; universalizability in sense 1, however, is intended to be a substantive principle of morality. 

universe of discourse: Grice: “The phrase is confusing, seeing the uni-verse, is not a pluri-verse.” Tthe usually limited class of individuals under discussion, whose existence is presupposed by the discussants, and which in some sense constitutes the ultimate subject matter of the discussion. Once the universe of a discourse has been established, expressions such as ‘every object’ and ‘some object’ refer respectively to every object or to some object in the universe of discourse. The concept of universe of discourse is due to De Morgan in 1846, but the expression was coined by Boole eight years later. When a discussion is formalized in an interpreted standard first-order language, the universe of discourse is taken as the “universe” of the interpretation, i.e., as the range of values of the variables. Quine and others have emphasized that the universe of discourse represents an ontological commitment of the discussants. In a discussion in a particular science, the universe of discourse is often wider than the domain of the science, although economies of expression can be achieved by limiting the universe of discourse to the domain. 

use-mention distinction: Grice: “I once used Jevons’s coinage in a tutorial with Hardie; he said, ‘What do you mean by ‘of’?’” -- Grice: “Strictly, if you mention, you are using!” -- discussed by Grice in “Retrospective epilogue” – the only use of a vehicle of communication is to communicate. two ways in which terms enter into discourse  used when they refer to or assert something, mentioned when they are exhibited for consideration of their properties as terms. If I say, “Mary is sad,” I use the name ‘Mary’ to refer to Mary so that I can predicate of her the property of being sad. But if I say, “ ‘Mary’ contains four letters,” I am mentioning Mary’s name, exhibiting it in writing or speech to predicate of that term the property of being spelled with four letters. In the first case, the sentence occurs in what Carnap refers to as the material mode; in the second, it occurs in the formal mode, and hence in a metalanguage a language used to talk about another language. Single quotation marks or similar orthographic devices are conventionally used to disambiguate mentioned from used terms. The distinction is important because there are fallacies of reasoning based on usemention confusions in the failure to observe the use mention distinction, especially when the referents of terms are themselves linguistic entities. Consider the inference: 1 Some sentences are written in English. 2 Some sentences are written in English. Here it looks as though the argument offers a counterexample to the claim that all arguments of the form ‘P, therefore P’ are circular. But either 1 asserts that some sentences are written in English, or it provides evidence in support of the conclusion in 2 by exhibiting a sentence written in English. In the first case, the sentence is used to assert the same truth in the premise as expressed in the conclusion, so that the argument remains circular. In the second case, the sentence is mentioned, and although the argument so interpreted is not circular, it is no longer strictly of the form ‘P, therefore P’, but has the significantly different form, ‘ “P” is a sentence written in English, therefore P’. 

English futilitarians: utilitarianism, the moral theory that an action is morally right if and only if it produces at least as much good utility for all people affected by the action as any alternative action the person could do instead. Its best-known proponent is J. S. Mill, who formulated the greatest happiness principle also called the principle of utility: always act so as to produce the greatest happiness. Two kinds of issues have been central in debates about whether utilitarianism is an adequate or true moral theory: first, whether and how utilitarianism can be clearly and precisely formulated and applied; second, whether the moral implications of utilitarianism in particular cases are acceptable, or instead constitute objections to it. Issues of formulation. A central issue of formulation is how utility is to be defined and whether it can be measured in the way utilitarianism requires. Early utilitarians often held some form of hedonism, according to which only pleasure and the absence of pain have utility or intrinsic value. For something to have intrinsic value is for it to be valuable for its own sake and apart from its consequences or its relations to other things. Something has instrumental value, on the other hand, provided it brings about what has intrinsic value. Most utilitarians have held that hedonism is too narrow an account of utility because there are many things that people value intrinsically besides pleasure. Some nonhedonists define utility as happiness, and among them there is considerable debate about the proper account of happiness. Happiness has also been criticized as too narrow to exhaust utility or intrinsic value; e.g., many people value accomplishments, not just the happiness that may accompany them. Sometimes utilitarianism is understood as the view that either pleasure or happiness has utility, while consequentialism is understood as the broader view that morally right action is action that maximizes the good, however the good is understood. Here, we take utilitarianism in this broader interpretation that some philosophers reserve for consequentialism. Most utilitarians who believe hedonism gives too narrow an account of utility have held that utility is the satisfaction of people’s informed preferences or desires. This view is neutral about what people desire, and so can account for the full variety of things and experiences that different people in fact desire or value. Finally, ideal utilitarians have held that some things or experiences, e.g. knowledge or being autonomous, are intrinsically valuable or good whether or not people value or prefer them or are happier with them. Whatever account of utility a utilitarian adopts, it must be possible to quantify or measure the good effects or consequences of actions in order to apply the utilitarian standard of moral rightness. Happiness utilitarianism, e.g., must calculate whether a particular action, or instead some possible alternative, would produce more happiness for a given person; this is called the intrapersonal utility comparison. The method of measurement may allow cardinal utility measurements, in which numerical units of happiness may be assigned to different actions e.g., 30 units for Jones expected from action a, 25 units for Jones from alternative action b, or only ordinal utility measurements may be possible, in which actions are ranked only as producing more or less happiness than alternative actions. Since nearly all interesting and difficult moral problems involve the happiness of more than one person, utilitarianism requires calculating which among alternative actions produces the greatest happiness for all people affected; this is called the interpersonal utility comparison. Many ordinary judgments about personal action or public policy implicitly rely on interpersonal utility comparisons; e.g., would a family whose members disagree be happiest overall taking its vacation at the seashore or in the mountains? Some critics of utilitarianism doubt that it is possible to make interpersonal utility comparisons. Another issue of formulation is whether the utilitarian principle should be applied to individual actions or to some form of moral rule. According to act utilitarianism, each action’s rightness or wrongness depends on the utility it produces in comparison with possible alternatives. Even act utilitarians agree, however, that rules of thumb like ‘keep your promises’ can be used for the most part in practice because following them tends to maximize utility. According to rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, individual actions are evaluated, in theory not just in practice, by whether they conform to a justified moral rule, and the utilitarian standard is applied only to general rules. Some rule utilitarians hold that actions are right provided they are permitted by rules the general acceptance of which would maximize utility in the agent’s society, and wrong only if they would be prohibited by such rules. There are a number of forms of rule utilitarianism, and utilitarians disagree about whether act or rule utilitarianism is correct. Moral implications. Most debate about utilitarianism has focused on its moral implications. Critics have argued that its implications sharply conflict with most people’s considered moral judgments, and that this is a strong reason to reject utilitarianism. Proponents have argued both that many of these conflicts disappear on a proper understanding of utilitarianism and that the remaining conflicts should throw the particular judgments, not utilitarianism, into doubt. One important controversy concerns utilitarianism’s implications for distributive justice. Utilitarianism requires, in individual actions and in public policy, maximizing utility without regard to its distribution between different persons. Thus, it seems to ignore individual rights, whether specific individuals morally deserve particular benefits or burdens, and potentially to endorse great inequalities between persons; e.g., some critics have charged that according to utilitarianism slavery would be morally justified if its benefits to the slaveowners sufficiently outweighed the burdens to the slaves and if it produced more overall utility than alternative practices possible in that society. Defenders of utilitarianism typically argue that in the real world there is virtually always a better alternative than the action or practice that the critic charges utilitarianism wrongly supports; e.g., no system of slavery that has ever existed is plausibly thought to have maximized utility for the society in question. Defenders of utilitarianism also typically try to show that it does take account of the moral consideration the critic claims it wrongly ignores; for instance, utilitarians commonly appeal to the declining marginal utility of money  equal marginal increments of money tend to produce less utility e.g. happiness for persons, the more money they already utilitarianism utilitarianism have  as giving some support to equality in income distribution. Another source of controversy concerns whether moral principles should be agent-neutral or, in at least some cases, agent-relative. Utilitarianism is agent-neutral in that it gives all people the same moral aim  act so as to maximize utility for everyone  whereas agent-relative principles give different moral aims to different individuals. Defenders of agent-relative principles note that a commonly accepted moral rule like the prohibition of killing the innocent is understood as telling each agent that he or she must not kill, even if doing so is the only way to prevent a still greater number of killings by others. In this way, a non-utilitarian, agent-relative prohibition reflects the common moral view that each person bears special moral responsibility for what he or she does, which is greater than his or her responsibility to prevent similar wrong actions by others. Common moral beliefs also permit people to give special weight to their own projects and commitments and, e.g., to favor to some extent their own children at the expense of other children in greater need; agent-relative responsibilities to one’s own family reflect these moral views in a way that agent-neutral utilitarian responsibilities apparently do not. The debate over neutrality and relativity is related to a final area of controversy about utilitarianism. Critics charge that utilitarianism makes morality far too demanding by requiring that one always act to maximize utility. If, e.g., one reads a book or goes to a movie, one could nearly always be using one’s time and resources to do more good by aiding famine relief. The critics believe that this wrongly makes morally required what should be only supererogatory  action that is good, but goes beyond “the call of duty” and is not morally required. Here, utilitarians have often argued that ordinary moral views are seriously mistaken and that morality can demand greater sacrifices of one’s own interests for the benefit of others than is commonly believed. There is little doubt that here, and in many other cases, utilitarianism’s moral implications significantly conflict with commonsense moral beliefs  the dispute is whether this should count against commonsense moral beliefs or against utilitarianism. Refs.:  H. P. Grice, “Bergmann on Stephen and the English utilitarians.”

vagum: Oddly, A. C. Ewing has a very early thing on ‘vagueness.’ Grice liked Ewing. There is an essay on “Clarity” which relates. Cf. Price, “Clarity is not enough” Which implicates it IS a necessity, though. Cf. “Clarity – who cares?” Some days, Grice did not feel ‘Grecian,’ and would use very vernacular expressions. He thought that what Cicero calls ‘vagum’ is best rendered in Oxfordshire dialect as ‘fuzzy.’ It is not clear which of Grice’s maxim controls this. The opposite of ‘vague’ is ‘specific.’ Grice was more concerned about this in the earlier lectures where he has under the desideratum of conversational candour and the principle of conversational benevolence, and the desideratum of conversational clarity that one should be explicit, and make one’s point explicit. But under the submaxims of the conversational category of modus (‘be perspicuous [sic]), none seem to prohibit ‘vagueness’ as such: Avoid obscurity of expression.Avoid ambiguity.Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).Be orderly The one he later calls a ‘tailoring principle’ ‘frame your contribution in way that facilitates a reply’, the ‘vagueness’ avoidance seems implicit. Cf. fuzzy. The indeterminacy of the field of application of an expression, in contrast to precision. For instance, the expression “young man” is vague since the point at which its appropriate application to a person begins and ends cannot be precisely defined. Vagueness should be distinguished from ambiguity, by which a term has more than one meaning. The vagueness of an expression is due to a semantic feature of the term itself, rather than to the subjective condition of its user. Vagueness gives rise to borderline cases, and propositions with vague terms lack a definite truth-value. For this reason, Frege rejected the possibility of vague concepts, although they are tolerated in recent work in vague or fuzzy logic. Various paradoxes arise due to the vagueness of words, including the ancient sorites paradox. It is because of its intrinsic vagueness that some philosophers seek to replace ordinary language with an ideal language. But ordinary language philosophers hold that this proposal creates a false promise of eliminating vagueness. Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance in part is a model of meaning that tolerates vagueness. As a property of expressions, vagueness extends to all sorts of cognitive representations. Some philosophers hold that there can be vagueness in things as well as in the representation of things. “A representation is vague when the relation of the representing system to the represented system is not one–one, but one–many.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. IX. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Fuzzy impicatures, and how to unfuzz them;” H. P. Grice, “The conversational maxim of vagueness avoidance.”

valitum: Oddly Vitters has a couple of lectures on ‘value,’ that Grice ‘ignored.’ Valitum should be contrasted from‘validum.’ ‘Valid,’ which is cognate with ‘value,’ a noun Grice loved, is used by logicians. In Grice’s generalised alethic-cum-deontic logic, ‘valid’ applies, too. ‘Valid’ is contrasted to the ‘satisfactoriness’ value that attaches directly to the utterance. ‘Valid’ applies to the reasoning, i.e. the sequence of psychological states from the premise to the conclusion. How common and insidious was the talk of a realm of ‘values’ at Oxford in the early 1930s to have Barnes attack it, and Grice defend it? ‘The realm of values’ sounds like an ordinary man’s expression, and surely Oxford never had a Wilson Chair of Metaphysical Axiology.  validum is the correct form out of Roman ‘valeor.’ Grice finds the need for the English equivalent, and plays with constructing the ‘concept’ “to be of value”! There’s also the axiologicum. The root for ‘value’ as ‘axis’ is found in Grice’s favourite book of the Republic, the First! Grice sometimes enjoys sounding pretentious and uses the definite article ‘the’ indiscriminately, just to tease Flew, his tutee, who said that talking of ‘the self’ is just ‘rubbish’. It is different with Grice’s ‘the good’ (to agathon), ‘the rational,’ (to logikon), ‘the valuable’ (valitum), and ‘the axiological’. Of course, whilesticking with ‘value,’ Grice plays with Grecian “τιμή.” Lewis and Short have ‘vălor,’ f. ‘valeo,’ which they render as ‘value,’ adding that it is supposed to translate in Gloss. Lab, Grecian ‘τιμή.’ ‘valor, τιμή, Gloss. Lab.’ ‘Valere,’ which of course algo gives English ‘valid,’ that Grice overuses, is said by Lewis and Short to be cognate with “vis,” “robur,” “fortissimus,” cf. debilis” and they render as “to be strong.” So one has to be careful here. “Axiology” is a German thing, and not used at Clifton or Oxford, where they stick with ‘virtus’ or ‘arete.’ This or that Graeco-Roman philosopher may have explored a generic approach to ‘value.’ Grice somewhat dismisses Hare who in Language of Morals very clearly distinguishes between deontic ‘ought’ and teleological, value-judgemental ‘good.’ For ‘good’ may have an aesthetic use: ‘that painting is good,’ the food is good). The sexist ‘virtus’ of the Romans perhaps did a disservice to Grecian ‘arete,’ but Grice hardly uses ‘arete,’ himself. It is etymologically unrelated to ‘agathon,’ yet rumour has it that ‘arete,’ qua ‘excellence,’ is ‘aristos,’ the superlative of ‘agathon.’ Since Aristotle is into the ‘mesotes,’ Grice worries not. Liddell and Scott have “ἀρετή” and render it simpliciter as “goodness, excellence, of any kind,” adding that “in Hom. esp. of manly qualities”: “ποδῶν ἀρετὴν ἀναφαίνων;” “ἀμείνων παντοίας ἀρετὰς ἠμὲν πόδας ἠδὲ μάχεσθαι καὶ νόον;” so of the gods, “τῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀ. τιμή τε βίη τε;” also of women, “ἀ. εἵνεκα for valour,” “ἀ. ἀπεδείκνυντο,” “displayed brave deeds.”  But when Liddell and Scott give the philosophical references (Plathegel and Ariskant), they do render “ἀρετή,” as ‘value,’ generally, excellence, “ἡ ἀ. τελείωσίς τις” Arist. Met. 1021b20, cf. EN1106a15, etc.; of persons, “ἄνδρα πὺξ ἀρετὰν εὑρόντα,” “τὸ φρονεῖν ἀ. μεγίστη,” “forms of excellence, “μυρίαι ἀνδρῶν ἀ.;” “δικαστοῦ αὕτη ἀ.;” esp. moral virtue, opp. “κακία,” good nature, kindness, etc. We should not be so concerned about this, were not for the fact that Grice explored Foot, not just on meta-ethics as a ‘suppositional’ imperratives, but  on ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ by Foot, who had edited a reader in meta-ethics for the series of Grice’s friend, Warnock. Grice knows that when he hears the phrases value system, or belief system, he is conversing with a relativist. So he plays jocular here. If a value is not a concept, a value system at least is not what Davidson calls a conceptual scheme. However, in “The conception of value” (henceforth, “Conception”) Grice does argue that value IS a concept, and thus part of the conceptual scheme by Quine. Hilary Putnam congratulates Grice on this in “Fact and value,” crediting Baker – i. e. Judy – into the bargain. While utilitarianism, as exemplified by Bentham, denies that a moral intuition need be taken literally, Bentham assumes the axiological conceptual scheme of hedonistic eudaemonism, with eudaemonia as the maximal value (summum bonum) understood as hedone. The idea of a system of values (cf. system of ends) is meant to unify the goals of the agent in terms of the pursuit of eudæmonia. Grice wants to disgress from naturalism, and the distinction between a description and anything else. Consider the use of ‘rational’ as applied to ‘value.’ A naturalist holds that ‘rational’ can be legitimately apply to the ‘doxastic’ realm, not to the ‘buletic’ realm. A desire (or a ‘value’) a naturalist would say is not something of which ‘rational’ is predicable. Suppose, Grice says, I meet a philosopher who is in the habit of pushing pins into other philosophers. Grice asks the philosopher why he does this. The philosopher says that it gives him pleasure. Grice asks him whether it is the fact that he causes pain that gives him pleasure. The philosopher replies that he does not mind whether he causes pain. What gives him pleasure is the physical sensation of driving a pin into a philosopher’s body. Grice asks him whether he is aware that his actions cause pain. The philosopher says that he is. Grice asks him whether he would not feel pain if others did this to him. The philosopher agrees that he would. I ask him whether he would allow this to happen. He says that he guesses he would seek to prevent it. Grice asks him whether he does not think that others must feel pain when he drives pins into them, and whether he should not do to others what he would try to prevent them from doing to him. The philosopher says that pins driven into him cause him pain and he wishes to prevent this. Pins driven by him into others do not cause him pain, but pleasure, and he therefore wishes to do it. Grice asks him whether the fact that he causes pain to other philosophers does not seem to him to be relevant to the issue of whether it is rationally undesirable to drive pins into people. He says that he does not see what possible difference can pain caused to others, or the absence of it, make to the desirability of deriving pleasure in the way that he does. Grice asks him what it is that gives him pleasure in this particular activity. The philosopher replies that he likes driving pins into a philosopher’s resilient body. Grice asks whether he would derive equal pleasure from driving pins into a tennis ball. The philosopher says that he would derive equal pleasure, that into what he drives his pins, a philosopher or a tennis ball, makes no difference to him – the pleasure is similar, and he is quite prepared to have a tennis ball substituted, but what possible difference can it make whether his pins perforate living men or tennis balls? At this point, Grice begins to suspect that the philosopher is evil. Grice does not feel like agreeing with a naturalist, who reasons that the pin-pushing philosopher is a philosopher with a very different scale of moral values from Grice, that a value not being susceptible to argument, Grice may disagree but not reason with the pin-pushing philosopher. Grice rather sees the pin-pushing philosopher beyond the reach of communication from the world occupied by him. Communication is as unattainable as it is with a philosopher who that he is a doorknob, as in the story by Hoffman. A value enters into the essence of what constitutes a person. The pursuit of a rational end is part of the essence of a person. Grice does not claim any originality for his position (which much to Ariskant), only validity. The implicaturum by Grice is that rationalism and axiology are incompatible, and he wants to cancel that. So the keyword here is rationalistic axiology, in the neo-Kantian continental vein, with a vengeance. Grice arrives at value (validitum, optimum, deeming) via Peirce on meaning. And then there is the truth “value,” a German loan-translation (as value judgment, Werturteil). The sorry story of deontic logic, Grice says, faces Jørgensens dilemma. The dilemma by Jørgensens is best seen as a trilemma, Grice says; viz. Reasoning requires that premise and conclusion have what Boole, Peirce, and Frege call a “truth” value. An imperative dos not have a “truth” value. There may be a reasoning with an imperative as premise or conclusion. A philosopher can reject the first horn and provide an inference mechanism on elements – the input of the premise and the output of the conclusion -- which are not presupposed to have a “truth” value. A philosopher can reject the second horn and restrict ‘satisfactory’ value to a doxastic embedding a buletic (“He judges he wills…”). A philosopher can reject the third horn, and refuse to explore the desideratum. Grice generalizes over value as the mode-neutral ‘satisfactory.’ Both ‘p’ and “!p” may be satisfactory. ‘.p’ has doxastic value (0/1); ‘!p’ has buletic value  (0/1). The mode marker of the utterance guides the addresse you as to how to read ‘satisfactory.’ Grice’s ‘satisfactory’ is a variation on a theme by Hofstadter and McKinsey, who elaborate a syntax for the imperative mode, using satisfaction. They refer to what they call the ‘satisfaction-function’ of a fiat. A fiat is ‘satisfied’ (as The door is closed may also be said to be satisfied iff the door is closed) iff what is commanded is the case. The fiat ‘Let the door be closed’ is satisfied if the door is closed. An unary or dyadic operator becomes a satisfaction-functor. As Grice puts it, an inferential rule, which flat rationality is the capacity to apply, is not arbitrary. The inferential rule picks out a transition of acceptance in which transmission of ‘satisfactory’ is guaranteed or expected. As Grice notes, since mode marker indicate the species ‘satisfactory’ does. He imports into the object-language ‘It is satisfactory-d/p that’ just in case psi-d/b-p is satisfactory. Alla Tarski, Grice introduces ‘It is acceptable that’: It is acceptable that psi-d/b-p is satisfactory-b/d just in case ‘psi-d/b-p is satisfactory-d/b’ is satisfactory-b/d. Grice goes on to provide a generic value-assignment for satisfactoriness-functors. For coordinators: “φ Λ ψ” is 1-b/d just in case φ is 1-b/d and ψ is 1-b/d. “φ ν ψ”  is 1-b/d just in case one of the pair, φ and ψ, is 1-b/d. For subordinator: “φ⊃ψ” is 1-b/d just in case either φ is 0-b/d or ψ is 0-b/d. There are, however, a number of points to be made. It is not fully clear to Grice just how strong the motivation is for assigning a value to a mode-neutral, generic functor. Also he is assuming symmetry, leaving room for a functor is introduced if a restriction is imposed. Consider a bi-modal utterance. “The beast is filthy and do not touch it” and “The beast is filthy and I shall not touch it” seem all right. The commutated “Do not touch the beast and it is filthy” is dubious. “Touch the beast and it will bite you,” while idiomatic is hardly an imperative, since ‘and’ is hardly a conjunction. “Smith is taking a bath or leave the bath-room door open” is intelligible. The commutated “Leave the bath-room door open or Smith is taking a bath” is less so. In a bi-modal utterance, Grice makes a case for the buletic to be dominant over the doxastic. The crunch comes, however, with one of the four possible unary satisfactoriness-functors, especially with regard to the equivalence of  “~psi-b/d-p” and “psi-b/d-~p). Consider “Let it be that I now put my hand on my head” or  “Let it be that my bicycle faces north” in which neither seems to be either satisfactory or unsatisfactory. And it is a trick to assign a satisfactory value to “~psi-b/d-p” and “~psi-b/d~p.” Do we proscribe this or that form altogether, for every cases? But that would seem to be a pity, since ~!~p seems to be quite promising as a representation for you may (permissive) do alpha that satisfies p; i.e., the utterer explicitly conveys his refusal to prohibit his addressee A doing alpha. Do we disallow embedding of (or iterating) this or that form? But that (again if we use ~!p and ~!~p  to represent may) seems too restrictive. Again, if !p is neither buletically satisfactory nor buletically unsatisfactory (U could care less) do we assign a value other than 1 or 0 to !p (desideratively neuter, 0.5). Or do we say, echoing Quine, that we have a buletically satisfactoriness value gap? These and other such problems would require careful consideration. Yet Grice cannot see that those problems would prove insoluble, any more than this or that analogous problem connected with Strawsons presupposition (Dont arrest the intruder!) are insoluble. In Strawsons case, the difficulty is not so much to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present themselves. Grice takes up the topic of a calculus in connection with the introduction rule and the elimination rule of a modal such as must. We might hope to find, for each member of a certain family of modalities, an introduction rule and an elimination rule which would be analogous to the rules available for classical logical constants. Suggestions are not hard to come by. Let us suppose that we are seeking to provide such a pair of rules for the particular modality of necessity □. For (□,+) Grice considers the following (Grice thinks equivalent) forms: if φ is demonstrable, □φ is demonstrable. Provided φ is dependent on no assumptions, derive φ from □φ. For  (□,-), Grice considers From □φ derive φ. It is to be understood, of course, that the values of the syntactical variable φ would contain either a buletic or a doxastic mode markers. Both !p and .p would be proper substitutes for φ but p would not. Grice wonders: [W]hat should be said of Takeuti’s conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in P’s personalised system that φ, it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ is doxastically satisfactory/establishable. The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ, one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble. For such a rule is not acceptable. φ will be a buletic expression such as Let it be that Smith eats his hat. And my commitment to the idea that Smiths system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting volitively Let Smith eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary, with respect to X, that let X eat his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier. For this person-relativised version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope.  Grice, following Mackie, uses absolutism, as opposed to relativism, which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions (but cf. Hare on Subjectsivism). Grice is concerned with the absence of a thorough discussion of value by English philosophers, other than Hare (and he is only responding to Mackie!). Continental philosophers, by comparison, have a special discipline, axiology, for it! Similarly, a continental-oriented tradition Grice finds in The New World in philosophers of a pragmatist bent, such as Carus. Grice wants to say that rationality is a value, because it is a faculty that a creature (human) displays to adapt and survive to his changing environments. The implicaturum of the title is that values have been considered in the English philosophical tradition, almost alla Nietzsche, to belong to the realm irrational. Grice grants that axiological implicaturum rests on a PRE-rational propension. While Grice could play with “the good” in the New World, as a Lit. Hum. he knew he had to be slightly more serious. The good is one of the values, but what is valuing? Would the New Worlders understand valuing unattached to the pragmatism that defines them? Grice starts by invoking Hume on his bright side: the concept of value, versus the conception of value. Or rather, how the concept of value derives from the conception of value. A distinction that would even please Aquinas (conceptum/conceptio), and the Humeian routine. Some background for his third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what Mackie means when he says that a value is ultimately Subjectsive. What about inter-Subjectsive, and constructively objective? Grice constructs absolute value out of relative value. But once a rational pirot P (henceforth, P – Grice liked how it sounded like Locke’s parrot) constructs value, the P assigns absolute status to rationality qua value. The P cannot then choose not to be rational at the risk of ceasing to exist (qua person, or essentially rationally human agent). A human, as opposed to a person, assigns relative value to his rationality. A human is accidentally rational. A person is necessarily so. A distinction seldom made by Aristotle and some of his dumbest followers obsessed with the modal-free adage, Homo rationale animal. Short and Lewis have “hūmānus” (old form: hemona humana et hemonem hominem dicebant, Paul. ex Fest. p. 100 Müll.; cf. homo I.init.), adj., f. “homo,” and which they render as “of or belonging to man, human.” Grice also considers the etymology of ‘person.’ Lewis and Short have ‘persōna,’  according to Gabius Bassus ap. Gell. 5, 7, 1 sq., f. ‘persŏno,’ “to sound through, with the second syllable lengthened.’ Falsa est (finitio), si dicas, Equus est animal rationale: nam est equus animal, sed irrationale, Quint.7,3,24:homo est animal rationale; “nec si mutis finis voluptas, rationalibus quoque: quin immo ex contrario, quia mutis, ideo non rationalibus;” “a rationali ad rationale;” “τὸ λογικόν ζῷον,” ChrysiStoic.3.95; ἀρεταὶ λ., = διανοητικαί, oἠθικαί, Arist. EN1108b9; “λογικός, ή, όν, (λόγος), ζῶον λόγον ἔχον NE, 1098a3-5. λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων, man alone of all animals possesses speech, from the Politics. Grice takes the stratification of values by Hartmann much more seriously than Barnes. Grice plays with rational motivation. He means it seriously. The motivation is the psychological bite, but since it is qualified by rational, it corresponds to the higher more powerful bit of the soul, the rational soul. There are, for Grice, the Grecians, Kantotle and Plathegel, three souls: the vegetal, the animal, and the rational. As a matter of history, Grice reaches value (in its guises of optimum and deeming) via his analysis of meaning by Peirce. Many notions are value-paradeigmatic. The most important of all philosophical notions that of rationality, presupposes objective value as one of its motivations. For Grice, ratio can be understood cognoscendi but also essendi, indeed volendi and fiendi, too. Rational motivation involves a ratio cognoscendi and a ratio volendi; objective, “objectum,” and “objectus,” ūs, m. f. “obicio,” rendered as “a casting before, a putting against, in the way, or opposite, an opposing; or, neutr., a lying before or opposite (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose): dare objectum parmaï, the opposing of the shield” “vestis;” “insula portum efficit objectu laterum,” “by the opposition,” “cum terga flumine, latera objectu paludis tegerentur;” “molis;” “regiones, quæ Tauri montis objectu separantur;” “solem interventu lunæ occultari, lunamque terræ objectu, the interposition,” “eademque terra objectu suo umbram noctemque efficiat;” “al. objecta soli: hi molium objectus (i. e. moles objectas) scandere, the projection,” transf., that which presents itself to the sight, an object, appearance, sight, spectacle;” al. objecto;  and if not categoric. This is analogous to the overuse by Grice of psychoLOGICAL when he just means souly. It is perhaps his use of psychological for souly that leads to take any souly concept as a theoretical concept within a folksy psychoLOGICAL theory. Grice considered the stratification of values, alla Hartmann, unlike Barnes, who dismissed him in five minutes. “Some like Philippa Foot, but Hare is MY man,” Grice would say. “Virtue” ethics was becoming all the fashion, especially around Somerville. Hare was getting irritated by the worse offender, his Anglo-Welsh tutee, originally with a degree from the other place, Williams. Enough for Grice to want to lecture on value, and using Carus as an excuse! Mackie was what Oxonians called a colonial, and a clever one! In fact, Grice quotes from Hares contribution to a volume on Mackie. Hares and Mackies backgrounds could not be more different. Like Grice, Hare was a Lit. Hum., and like Grice, Hare loves the Grundlegung. But unlike Grice and Barnes, Hare would have nothing to say about Stevenson. Philosophers in the play group of Grice never took the critique by Ayer of emotivism seriously. Stevenson is the thing. V. Urmson on the emotive theory of ethics, tracing it to English philosphers like Ogden, Barnes, and Duncan-Jones. Barnes was opposing both Prichard (who was the Whites professor of moral philosophy – and more of an interest than Moore is, seeing that Prichard is Barness tutor at Corpus) and Hartmann. Ryle would have nothing to do with Hartmann, but these were the days before Ryle took over Oxford, and forbade any reference to a continental philosopher, even worse if a “Hun.” Grice reaches the notion of value through that of meaning. If Peirce is simplistic, Grice is not. But his ultra-sophisticated analysis ends up being deemed to hold in this or that utterer. And deeming is valuing, as is optimum. While Grice rarely used axiology, he should! A set of three lectures, which are individually identified below. I love Carus! Grice was undecided as to what his Carus lectures were be on. Grice explores meaning under its value optimality guise in Meaning revisited. Grice thinks that a value-paradeigmatic notion allows him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible vicious circle in his approach to semantic and psychological notions. The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the construction, alla Hume, of a value-paradeigmatic notion in general, and value itself. Grice starts by quoting Austin, Hare, and Mackie, of Oxford. The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a philosophical general audience. Most of the second lecture is a subtle exploration by Grice of the categorical imperative of Kant, with which he had struggled in the last Locke lecture in “Aspects,” notably the reduction of the categorical imperative to this or that counsel of prudence with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at eudæmonia. The Carus Lectures are three: on objectivity and value, on relative and absolute value, and on metaphysics and value. The first lecture, on objectivity and value, is a review Inventing right and wrong by Mackie, quoting Hare’s antipathy for a value being ‘objective’. The second lecture, on relative and absolute value, is an exploration on the categorical imperative, and its connection with a prior hypothetical or suppositional imperative. The third lecture, on metaphycis and value, is an eschatological defence of absolute value. The collective citation should be identified by each lecture separately. This is a metaphysical defence by Grice of absolute value. The topic fascinates Grice, and he invents a few routines to cope with it. Humeian projection rationally reconstructs the intuitive concept being of value. Category shift allows to put a value such as the disinterestedness by Smith in grammatical subject position, thus avoiding to answer that the disinterestedness of Smith is in the next room, since it is not the spatio-temporal continuan prote ousia that Smith is. But the most important routine is that of trans-substantatio, or metousiosis. A human reconstructs as a rational personal being, and alla Kantotle, whatever he judges is therefore of absolute value. The issue involves for Grice the introduction of a telos qua aition, causa finalis (final cause), role, or métier. The final cause of a tiger is to tigerise, the final cause of a reasoner is to reason, the final cause of a person is to personise. And this entails absolute value, now metaphysically defended. The justification involves the ideas of end-setting, unweighed rationality, autonomy, and freedom. In something like a shopping list that Grice provides for issues on free. Attention to freedom calls for formidably difficult undertakings including the search for a justification for the adoption or abandonment of an ultimate end. The point is to secure that freedom does not dissolve into compulsion or chance. Grice proposes four items for this shopping list. A first point is that full action calls for strong freedom. Here one has to be careful that since Grice abides by what he calls the Modified Occams Razor in the third James lecture on Some remarks about logic and conversation, he would not like to think of this two (strong freedom and weak freedom) as being different senses of free. Again, his calls for is best understood as presupposes. It may connect with, say, Kanes full-blown examples of decisions in practical settings that call for or presuppose libertarianism. A second point is that the buletic-doxastic justification of action has to accomodate for the fact that we need freedom which is strong. Strong or serious autonomy or freedom ensures that this or that action is represented as directed to this or that end E which are is not merely the agents, but which is also freely or autonomously adopted or pursued by the agent. Grice discusses the case of the gym instructor commanding, Raise your left arm! The serious point then involves this free adoption or free pursuit. Note Grices use of this or that personal-identity pronoun: not merely mine, i.e. not merely the agents, but in privileged-access position. This connects with what Aristotle says of action as being up to me, and Kant’s idea of the transcendental ego. An end is the agents in that the agent adopts it with liberum arbitrium. This or that ground-level desire may be circumstantial. A weak autonomy or freedom satisfactorily accounts for this or that action as directed to an end which is mine. However, a strong autonomy or freedom, and a strong autonomy or freedom only, accounts for this or that action as directed to an end which is mine, but, unlike, say, some ground-level circumstantial desire which may have sprung out of some circumstantial adaptability to a given scenario, is, first, autonomously or freely adopted by the agent, and, second, autonomously or freely pursued by the agent. The use of the disjunctive particle or in the above is of some interest. An agent may autonomously or freely adopt an end, yet not care to pursue it autonomously or freely, even in this strong connotation that autonomous or free sometimes has. A further point relates to causal indeterminacy. Any attempt to remedy this situation by resorting to causal indeterminacy or chance will only infuriate the scientist without aiding the philosopher. This remark by Grice has to be understood casually. For, as it can be shown, this or that scientist may well have resorted to precisely that introduction and in any case have not self-infuriated. The professional tag that is connoted by philosopher should also be seen as best implicated than entailed. A scientist who does resort to the introduction of causal indeterminacy may be eo ipso be putting forward a serious consideration regarding ethics or meta-ethics. In other words, a cursory examination of the views of a scientist like Eddington, beloved by Grice, or this or that moral philosopher like Kane should be born in mind when considering this third point by Grice. The reference by Grice to chance, random, and causal indeterminacy, should best be understood vis-à-vis Aristotles emphasis on tykhe, fatum, to the effect that this or that event may just happen just by accident, which may well open a can of worms for the naive Griceian, but surely not the sophisticated one (cf. his remarks on accidentally, in Prolegomena). A further item in Grices shopping list involves the idea of autonomous or free as a value, or optimum. The specific character of what Grice has as  strong autonomy or freedom may well turn out to consist, Grice hopes, in the idea of this or that action as the outcome of a certain kind of strong valuation  ‒ where this would include the rational selection, as per e.g. rational-decision theory, of this or that ultimate end. What Grice elsewhere calls out-weighed or extrinsically weighed rationality, where rational includes the buletic, of the end and not the means to it. This or that full human action calls for the presence of this or that reason, which require that this or that full human action for which this or that reason accounts should be the outcome of a strong rational valuation. Like a more constructivist approach, this line suggests that this or that action may require, besides strong autonomy or freedom, now also strong valuation. Grice sets to consider how to adapt the buletic-doxastic soul progression to reach these goals. In the case of this or that ultimate end E, justification should be thought of as lying, directly, at least, in this or that outcome, not on the actual phenomenal fulfilment of this or that end, but rather of the, perhaps noumenal, presence qua end. Grice relates to Kants views on the benevolentia or goodwill and malevolentia, or evil will, or illwill. Considers Smiths action of giving Jones a job. Smith may be deemed to have given Jones a job, whether or not Jones actually gets the job. It is Smiths benevolentia, or goodwill, not his beneficentia, that matters. Hence in Short and Lewis, we have “bĕnĕfĭcentĭa,” f. “beneficus,” like “magnificentia” f. magnificus, and “munificentia” f. munificus; Cicero, Off. 1, 7, 20, and which they thus render as “the quality of beneficus, kindness, beneficence, an honorable and kind treatment of others” (omaleficentia, Lact. Ira Dei, 1, 1; several times in the philos. writings of Cicero. Elsewhere rare: quid praestantius bonitate et beneficentiā?” “beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet,” “comitas ac beneficentia,” “uti beneficentiā adversus supplices,”“beneficentia augebat ornabatque subjectsos.” In a more general fashion then, it is the mere presence of an end qua end of a given action that provides the justification of the end, and not its phenomenal satisfaction or fulfilment. Furthermore, the agents having such and such an end, E1, or such and such a combination of ends, E1 and E2, would be justified by showing that the agents having this end exhibits some desirable feature, such as this or that combo being harmonious. For how can one combine ones desire to smoke with ones desire to lead a healthy life? Harmony is one of the six requirements by Grice for an application of happy to the life of Smith. The buletic-doxastic souly ascription is back in business at a higher level. The suggestion would involve an appeal, in the justification of this or that end, to this or that higher-order end which would be realised by having this or that lower, or first-order end of a certain sort. Such valuation of this or that lower-order end lies within reach of a buletic-doxastic souly ascription. Grice has an important caveat at this point. This or that higher-order end involved in the defense would itself stand in need of justification, and the regress might well turn out to be vicious. One is reminded of Watson’s requirement for a thing like freedom or personal identity to overcome this or that alleged counterexample to freewill provided by H. Frankfurt. It is after the laying of a shopping list, as it were, and considerations such as those above that Grice concludes his reflection with a defense of a noumenon, complete with the inner conflict that it brings. Attention to the idea of autonomous and free leads the philosopher to the need to resolve if not dissolve the most important unsolved problem of philosophy, viz. how an agent can be, at the same time, a member of both the phenomenal world and the noumenal world, or, to settle the internal conflict between one part of our rational nature, the doxastic, even scientific, part which seems to call for the universal reign of a deterministic law and the other buletic part which insists that not merely moral responsibility but every variety of rational belief demands exemption from just such a reign. In this lecture, Grice explores freedom and value from a privileged-access incorrigible perspective rather than the creature construction genitorial justification. Axiology – v. axiological.  Valitum -- Fact-value distinction, the apparently fundamental difference between how things are and how they should be. That people obey the law or act honestly or desire money is one thing; that they should is quite another. The first is a matter of fact, the second a matter of value. Hume is usually credited with drawing the distinction when he noticed that one cannot uncontroversially infer an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ the isought gap. From the fact, say, that an action would maximize overall happiness, we cannot legitimately infer that it ought to be done  without the introduction of some so far suppressed evaluative premise. We could secure the inference by assuming that one ought always to do what maximizes overall happiness. But that assumption is evidently evaluative. And any other premise that might link the non-evaluative premises to an evaluative conclusion would look equally evaluative. No matter how detailed and extensive the non-evaluative premises, it seems no evaluative conclusion follows directly and as a matter of logic. Some have replied that at least a few non-evaluative claims do entail evaluative ones. To take one popular example, from the fact that some promise was made, we might it appears legitimately infer that it ought to be kept, other things equal  and this without the introduction of an evaluative premise. Yet many argue that the inference fails, or that the premise is actually evaluative, or that the conclusion is not. Hume himself was both bold and brief about the gap’s significance, claiming simply that paying attention to it “wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason” Treatise of Human Nature. Others have been more expansive. Moore, for instance, in effect relied upon the gap to establish via the open question argument that any attempt to define evaluative terms using non-evaluative ones would commit the naturalistic fallacy. Moore’s main target was the suggestion that ‘good’ means “pleasant” and the fallacy, in this context, is supposed to be misidentifying an evaluative property, being good, with a natural property, being pleasant. Assuming that evaluative terms have meaning, Moore held that some could be defined using others he thought, e.g., that ‘right’ could be defined as “productive of the greatest possible good” and that the rest, though meaningful, must be indefinable terms denoting simple, non-natural, properties. Accepting Moore’s use of the open question argument but rejecting both his non-naturalism and his assumption that evaluative terms must have descriptive meaning, emotivists and prescriptivists e.g. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, and Hare argued that evaluative terms have a role in language other than to denote properties. According to them, the primary role of evaluative language is not to describe, but to prescribe. The logical gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, they argue, establishes both the difference between fact and value and the difference between describing how things are and recommending how they might be. Some naturalists, though, acknowledge the gap and yet maintain that the evaluative claims nonetheless do refer to natural properties. In the process they deny the ontological force of the open question argument and 302 F   302 treat evaluative claims as describing a special class of facts.  Refs.: The main source is The construction of value, the Carus lectures, Clarendon. But there are scattered essays on value and valuing in the Grice Papers. H. P. Grice, “Objectivity and value,” s. V, c. 8-f. 18, “The rational motivation for objective value,” s. V, c. 8-f. 19, “Value,” s. V, c. 9-f. 20; “Value, metaphysics, and teleology,” s. V, c. 9-f. 23, “Values, morals, absolutes, and the metaphysical,” s. V., c. 9-f.  24; “Value sub-systems and the Kantian problem,” s. V. c. 9-ff. 25-27; “Values and rationalism,” s. V, c. 9-f. 28; while the Carus are in the second series, in five folders, s. II, c-2, ff. 12-16, the H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

velia -- Velia -- Grice as Eleatic -- School, strictly, two fifth-century B.C. Grecian philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno of Elea. The Ionian Grecian colony of Elea or Hyele in southern Italy became Velia in Roman times and retains that name today. A playful remark by Plato in Sophist 242d gave rise to the notion that Xenophanes of Colophon, who was active in southern Italy and Sicily, was Parmenides’ teacher, had anticipated Parmenides’ views, and founded the Eleatic School. Moreover, Melissus of Samos and according to some ancient sources even the atomist philosopher Leucippus of Abdera came to be regarded as “Eleatics,” in the sense of sharing fundamental views with Parmenides and Zeno. In the broad and traditional use of the term, the Eleatic School characteristically holds that “all is one” and that change and plurality are unreal. So stated, the School’s position is represented best by Melissus. Grice: “Crotone and Velia are the origins of western philosophy, since Greece is eastern!” – Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice a Velia,” Villa Grice.

verificatum: Grice: “Strictly, what is ‘verified’ is therefore ‘made true,’ analytically.” -- see ayerism. Grice would possibly NOT be interested in verificationism had not been for Ayer ‘breaking tradition’ “and other things” with it --. Oppoiste Christian virtuous –ism: falsificationism. Verificationism is one of the twelve temptations Grice finds on his way to the City of Eternal Truth. (Each one has its own entry). Oddly, Boethius was the first verificationist. He use ‘verifico’ performatively. “When I say, ‘verifico’, I verify that what I say is true.” He didn’t mean it as a sophisma (or Griceisma, but it was (mis-)understood as such! “When I was listing the temptations, I thought of calling this ‘Ayerism,’ but then I changed my mind. verification theory of meaning The theory of meaning advocated by the logical positivists and associated with the criterion of verifiability. The latter provides a criterion of meaningfulness for sentences, while the verification theory of meaning specifies the nature of meaning. According to the criterion, a sentence is cognitively meaningful if and only if it is logically possible for it to be verified. The meaning of a sentence is its method of verification, that is, the way in which it can be verified or falsified, particularly by experience. The theory has been challenged because the best formulations still exclude meaningful sentences and allow meaningless sentences. Critics also claim that the theory is a test for meaningfulness rather than a theory of meaning proper. Further, they claim that it fails to recognize that the interconnectedness of language might allow a sentence that cannot itself be verified to be meaningful. “The verification theory of meaning, which dominated the Vienna Circle, was concerned with the meaning and meaningfulness of sentences rather than words.” Quine, Theories and Things verificationism Philosophical method, philosophy of science, philosophy of language A position fundamental to logical positivism, claiming that the meaning of a statement is its method of verification. Accordingly, apparent statements lacking a method of verification, such as those of religion and metaphysics, are meaningless. Theoretical expressions can be defined in terms of the experiences by means of which assertions employing them can be verified. In the philosophy of mind, behaviorism, which tries to reduce unobserved inner states to patterns of behavior, turns out to be a version of verificationism. Some philosophers require conclusive verification for a statement to be meaningful, while others allow any positive evidence to confer meaning. There are disputes whether every statement must be verified separately or theories can be verified as a whole even if some of their statements cannot be individually verified. Attempts to offer a rigorous account of verification have run into difficulties because statements that should be excluded as meaningless nevertheless pass the test of verification and statements that should be allowed as meaningful are excluded. “For over a hundred years, one of the dominant tendencies in the philosophy of science has been verificationism, that is, the doctrine that to know the meaning of a scientific proposition . . . is to know what would be evidence for that proposition.” Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality verisimilitude Philosophy of science [from Latin verisimilar, like the truth] The degree of approximation or closeness to truth of a statement or a theory. Popper defined it in terms of the difference resulting from truth-content minus falsity-content. The truthcontent of a statement is all of its true consequences, while the falsity-content of a statement is all of its false consequences. The aim of science is to find better verisimilitude. One theory has a better verisimilitude than competing theories if it can explain the success of competing theories and can also explain cases where the other theories fail. Popper emphasized that verisimilitude is different from probability. Probability is the degree of logical certainty abstracted from content, while verisimilitude is degree of likeness to truth and combines truth and content. “This suggests that we combine here the ideas of truth and content into one – the idea of a degree of better (or worse) correspondence to truth or of greater (or less) likeness or similarity to truth; or to use a term already mentioned above (in contradistinction to probability) the idea of (degrees of ) verisimilitude.” Popper, Conjectures and Refutations.

verum: Porphyry called the verum one of the four transcendental, along with unum, pulchrum and bonum – Grice agreed. Grice’s concern with the ‘verum’ is serious. If Quine is right, and logical truth should go, so truth should go. Grice needs ‘true’ to correct a few philosophical mistakes. It is true that Grice sees a horse as a horse, for example. The nuances of the implicaturum are of a lesser concern for Grice than the taming of the true.  The root of Latin ‘vero’ is cognate with an idea Grice loved: that of ‘sincerity.’ The point is more obviously realised lexically in the negative: the fallax versus the mendax. But ‘verum’ had to do with candidum – and thus very much cognate with the English that Grice avoided, ‘truth,’ cognate with ‘trust.’ quod non possit ab honestate sejungi The true and simple Good which cannot be separated from honesty, Cicero, Academica, I, 2, but also for the ontological which one can find in Cicero’s tr. Topica, 35 of etumologia ἐτυμολογία by veriloquium. Most contemporary hypotheses propose that verus —and the words signifying true, vrai, vérité, G. wahr, G. Wahrheit — derive from an Indo-European root, *wer, which would retain meanings of to please, pleasing, manifesting benevolence, gifts, services rendered, fidelity, pact. Chantraine Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque links it to the Homeric expression êra pherein ἦϱα φέϱειν, to please, as well as to ἐπίηϱα, ἐπίηϱος, and ἐπιήϱανος, agreeable Odyssey, 19, 343, just like the Roman verus cf. se-vere, without benevolence, the G.  war, and the Russian vera, faith, or verit’ верить, to believe. Pokorny adds to this same theme the Grecian ἑοϱτή, religious feast, cult. And from the same basis have come terms signifying guarantee, protect: Fr.  garir and later garant, G.  Gewähren, Eng. warrant, to grant. According to Chantraine, this root *wer should be distinguished from another root ver-, whence eirô εἴϱω in Grecian , verbum in Roman word in English, etc., and words from the family of vereor, revereor, to fear, to respect, verecundia respectful fear. According to Chantraine, this root *wer should be distinguished from another root ver-, whence eirô εἴϱω in Grecian , verbum in Roman word in English, etc., and words from the family of vereor, revereor, to fear, to respect, verecundia respectful fear. Alfred Ernout does not support this separation. We should recall that plays on the words verum and verbum were common, as Augustine mentions verbum = verum boare, proclaiming the truth, Dialectics 1. P. Florensky, following G. Curtius, “Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie,” also claims a single root for the ensemble of these derivations, including the Sanskrit vratum, sacred act, vow, promise, the Grecian bretas βϱέτας, cult object, wooden idol Aeschylus, Eumenides, v. 258, and the Roman “ver-bum.” The signification of verus must be considered as belonging first to the field of religious ritual and subsequently of juridical formulas: strictly speaking, verus means protected or grounded in the sense of that which is the object of a taboo or consecration Pillar and Ground. Then there’s from the juridical to the philosophical. “Verum” implies a rectification of an adversarial allegation considered to be fraudulent, as is indicated by the original opposition verax/fallax-mendax. It thus signifies the properly founded in fact or in the rules of law: crimen verissimum a well-founded accusation Cicero, In Verrem, 5, 15. In texts of grammar and rhetoric, but also in juridical texts as well, verus and veritas signify the veracity of the rule, inasmuch as it can be distinguished from usage. “Quid verum sit intellego; sed alias ita loquor ut concessum est I know what is correct, but sometimes I avail myself of the variation in usage, Cicero, De oratore, Loeb Classical Library; Consule veritatem: reprehendet; refer ad auris: probabunt If you consult the strict rule of analogy, it will say this practice is wrong, but if you consult the ear, it will approve 1586. The juridical connotation of the word verus and thus of veritas is retained and subsequently reinforced. In the glosses of the Middle Ages, verus signifies legitimate and the Roman sense of the word, legal and authentic or conforming to existing law. One normally finds “verum est” in legal texts to certify that a new rule conforms to preexisting ones Digest, 8, 4, 1. It is this juridical dimension that produces the meaning of verus as authenticated, authentic in contrast to false, imitative, deceiving and thus real as in real cream or a genuine Rolex watch.  The juridical here provides a foundation not only for the moral Verum et simplex bonum. The paradigm of “verum” is not easy to separate from any epistemological dimensions, as is evident in the varied fates of the Indo-European root *wer, from which derives, in addition to vera in Russian, belief, the old Fr.  garir, in the sense of certifying as true, designating as true, whence the participle garant. The evolution of these derived words inscribes G. “wahr,” and “Wahrheit” in a semantic network from which emerge two directions, belief and salvation. Belief. “Wahr” is often linked back, in composite words, to the idea of belief, in the sense of true belief, to take as true. “Wahrsagen,” to predict, “wahr haben,” to admit, agree upon, “für wahr halten,” to hold as true, to believe. This is the term that Kant employs in the Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental theory of method, ch.2, 3 On Opinion, Science, and Belief: “das Fürwahrhalten” is a belief, as a modality of subjectivity, that can be divided into conviction Überzeugung or persuasion Überredung and that is capable of three degrees: opinion Meinung, belief Glaube, and science Wissenschaft. Safeguarding, conservation. Similarly “wahren,” “bewahren” in the sense of to guard, to conserve is linked to “Wahrung” in the sense of defending one’s interests or safeguarding. One might refer to Heidegger’s use of this etymological and semantic relation in reference to Nietzsche. It remains to be said that many common or colloquial expressions, in Fr.  as well as in English, play on the semantic slippages of vrai and real, between the ontological sense and linguistic meanings. Thus in Fr. , c’est pas vrai! does not mean it is false, but rather that it is not reality. In English, the opposite is the case: get real! means come back down to earth, accept the truth. Grice’s main manoeuvre may be seen as intended to crack the crib of reality. For he wants to say some philosophers engaged in conceptual analysis are misled if they think an inappropriate usage reveals a truth-condition. By coining ‘implicaturum,’ his point is to give room for “Emissor E communicates that p,” as opposed to ‘emissum x ‘means’ ‘p.’ Therefore, Grice can claim that an utterance may very well totally baffling and misleading YET TRUE (or otherwise ‘good’), and that in no way that reveals anything about the emissum itself. This is due to the fact that ‘Emissor E communicates that p’ is diaphanous. And one can conjoin what the emissor E communicates to what he explicitly conveys and NOT HAVE the emissor contradicting himself or uttering a falsehood. And that is what in philosophy should count. H. P. Grice was always happy with a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth. It was what Aristotle thought. So why change? The fact that Austin agreed helped. The fact that Strawson applied Austin’s shining new tool of the performatory had him fashion a new shining skid, and that helped, because, once Grice has identified a philosophical mistake, that justifies his role as methodologist in trying to ‘correct’ the mistake. The Old Romans did not have an article. For them it is the unum, the verum, the bonum, and the pulchrum. They were trying to translate the very articled Grecian ‘to alethes,’ ‘to agathon,’ and ‘to kallon.’ Grecian Grice is able to restore the articles. He would use ‘the alethic’ for the ‘verum,’ after von Wright. But occasionally uses the ‘verum’ root. E. g. when his account of ‘personal identity’ was seen to fail to distinguish between a ‘veridical’ memory and a non-veridical one. If it had not been for Strawson’s ‘ditto’ theory to the ‘verum,’ Grice would not have minded much. Like Austin, his inclination was for a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth alla Aristotle and Tarski, applied to the utterance, or ‘expressum.’ So, while we cannot say that an utterer is TRUE, we can say that he is TRUTHFUL, and trustworthy (Anglo-Saxon ‘trust,’ being cognate with ‘true,’ and covering both the credibility and desirability realms. Grice approaches the ‘verum’ in terms of predicate calculus. So we need at least an utterance of the form, ‘the dog is shaggy.’ An utterance of ‘The dog is shaggy’ is true iff the denotatum of ‘the dog’ is a member of the class ‘shaggy.’ So, when it comes to ‘verum,’ Grice feels like ‘solving’ a problem rather than looking for new ones. He thought that Strawson’s controversial ‘ditto’ was enough of a problem ‘to get rid of.’ VERUM. Along with verum, comes the falsum. fallibilism, the doctrine, relative to some significant class of beliefs or propositions, that they are inherently uncertain and possibly mistaken. The most extreme form of the doctrine attributes uncertainty to every belief; more restricted forms attribute it to all empirical beliefs or to beliefs concerning the past, the future, other minds, or the external world. Most contemporary philosophers reject the doctrine in its extreme form, holding that beliefs about such things as elementary logical principles and the character of one’s current feelings cannot possibly be mistaken. Philosophers who reject fallibilism in some form generally insist that certain beliefs are analytically true, self-evident, or intuitively obvious. These means of supporting the infallibility of faculty psychology fallibilism 303   303 some beliefs are now generally discredited. W. V. Quine has cast serious doubt on the very notion of analytic truth, and the appeal to self-evidence or intuitive obviousness is open to the charge that those who officially accept it do not always agree on what is thus evident or obvious there is no objective way of identifying it, and that beliefs said to be self-evident have sometimes been proved false, the causal principle and the axiom of abstraction in set theory being striking examples. In addition to emphasizing the evolution of logical and mathematical principles, fallibilists have supported their position mainly by arguing that the existence and nature of mind-independent objects can legitimately be ascertained only be experimental methods and that such methods can yield conclusions that are, at best, probable rather than certain. false consciousness, 1 lack of clear awareness of the source and significance of one’s beliefs and attitudes concerning society, religion, or values; 2 objectionable forms of ignorance and false belief; 3 dishonest forms of self-deception. Marxists if not Marx use the expression to explain and condemn illusions generated by unfair economic relationships. Thus, workers who are unaware of their alienation, and “happy homemakers” who only dimly sense their dependency and quiet desperation, are molded in their attitudes by economic power relationships that make the status quo seem natural, thereby eclipsing their long-term best interests. Again, religion is construed as an economically driven ideology that functions as an “opiate” blocking clear awareness of human needs. Collingwood interprets false consciousness as self-corrupting untruthfulness in disowning one’s emotions and ideas The Principles of Art, 8.  . false pleasure, pleasure taken in something false. If it is false that Jones is honest, but Smith believes Jones is honest and is pleased that Jones is honest, then Smith’s pleasure is false. If pleasure is construed as an intentional attitude, then the truth or falsity of a pleasure is a function of whether its intentional object obtains. On this view, S’s being pleased that p is a true pleasure if an only if S is pleased that p and p is true. S’s being pleased that p is a false pleasure if and only if S is pleased that p and p is false. Alternatively, Plato uses the expression ‘false pleasure’ to refer to things such as the cessation of pain or neutral states that are neither pleasant nor painful that a subject confuses with genuine or true pleasures. Thus, being released from tight shackles might mistakenly be thought pleasant when it is merely the cessation of a pain. Refs: Grice, “Rationality and Trust,” Grice, “The alethic.” “P. F. Strawson and the performatory account of ‘true’”, The Grice Papers.

vico --  Danesi, Marcel. Vico, Metaphor, and the Origin of Language. Bloomington: Indiana. Serious scholars of Vico as well as glottogeneticists will find much of value in this excellent monograph. Vico Studies. A provocative, well-researched argument which might find reapplication in philosophy." —Theological Book Review. Danesi returns to Vico to create a persuasive, original account of the evolution and development of language, one of the deep mysteries of human existence. The Vico’s reconstruction of the origin of language is described at length, then evaluated in light of Grice’s philosophical conversational pragmatics. Glottogenesis Vico’s Reconstruction. The New Science Basic Notions. Language and the Imagination: Vito’s Glottogenetic Scenario Vico’s Approach Reconstructing the Primal Scene After the Primal Scence. The Dawn of Communication: Iconicity and Mimesis Hypotheses The Nature of Iconicity. Imagery, Iconicity, and Gesture. Iconic Representation. Osmosis Hypothesis Ontogenesis From Percepts to Concepts The Metaphoricity Metaphor Metaphor and Concept-Formation Mentation, Narrativity, and Myth  The Sociobiological-Computationist Viewpoint:A Vichian Critique The Vichian Scenario Revisited Revisting the Genetic Perspective computationism. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Vico e Grice,” Villa Grice.

vis: When in a Latinate mood, Grice would refer to a ‘vis’ of an expression. Apparently, ‘vis’ is cognate with ‘validum,’ transf., of abstr. things, force, notion, meaning, sense, import, nature, essence (cf. significatio): “id, in quo est omnis vis amicitiae,” Cic. Lael. 4, 15: “eloquentiae vis et natura,” id. Or. 31, 112: “vis honesti (with natura),” id. Off. 1, 6, 18; cf. id. Fin. 1, 16, 50: “virtutis,” id. Fam. 9, 16, 5: “quae est alia vis legis?” id. Dom. 20, 53: “vis, natura, genera verborum et simplicium et copulatorum,” i.e. the sense, signification, id. Or. 32, 115: “vis verbi,” id. Inv. 1, 13, 17; id. Balb. 8, 21: “quae vis insit in his paucis verbis, si attendes, si attendes, intelleges,” id. Fam. 6, 2, 3: “quae vis subjecta sit vocibus,” id. Fin. 2, 2, 6: “nominis,” id. Top. 8, 35: μετωνυμία, cujus vis est, pro eo, quod dicitur, causam, propter quam dicitur, ponere, Quint. 8, 6, 23.

vagum – Oddly, Grice does not have a conversational, ‘be precise,’; but he did. In his earlier desideratum of conversational clarity, the point was to make your point precise – rather than fuzzy -- vagueness, a property of an expression in virtue of which it can give rise to a “borderline case.” A borderline case is a situation in which the application of a particular expression to a name of a particular object does not generate an expression with a definite truth-value; i.e., the piece of language in question neither unequivocally applies to the object nor fails to apply. Although such a formulation leaves it open what the pieces of language might be whole sentences, individual words, names or singular terms, predicates or general terms, most discussions have focused on vague general terms and have considered other types of terms to be nonvague. Exceptions to this have called attention to the possibility of vague objects, thereby rendering vague the designation relation for singular terms. The formulation also leaves open the possible causes for the expression’s lacking a definite truth-value. If this indeterminacy is due to there being insufficient information available to determine applicability or non-applicability of the term i.e., we are convinced the term either does or does not apply, but we just do not have enough information to determine which, then this is sometimes called epistemic vagueness. It is somewhat misleading to call this vagueness, for unlike true vagueness, this epistemic vagueness disappears if more information is brought into the situation. ‘There are between 1.89 $ 106 and 1.9 $ 106 stars in the sky’ is epistemically vague but is not vague in the generally accepted sense of the term. ’Vagueness’ may also be used to characterize non-linguistic items such as concepts, memories, and objects, as well as such semilinguistic items as statements and propositions. Many of the issues involved in discussing the topic of vagueness impinge upon other philosophical topics, such as the existence of truth-value gaps  declarative sentences that are neither true nor false  and the plausibility of many-valued logic. There are other related issues such as the nature of propositions and whether they must be either true or false. We focus here on linguistic vagueness, as it manifests itself with general terms; for it is this sort of indeterminacy that defines what most researchers call vagueness, and which has led the push in some schools of thought to “eliminate vagueness” or to construct languages that do not manifest vagueness. Linguistic vagueness is sometimes confused with other linguistic phenomena: generality, ambiguity, and open texture. Statements can be general ‘Some wheelbarrows are red’, ‘All insects have antennae’ and if there is no other vagueness infecting them, they are true or false  and not borderline or vague. Terms can be general ‘person’, ‘dog’ without being vague. Those general terms apply to many different objects but are not therefore vague; and furthermore, the fact that they apply to different kinds of objects ‘person’ applies to both men and women also does not show them to be vague or ambiguous. A vague term admits of borderline cases  a completely determinate situation in which there just is no correct answer as to whether the term applies to a certain object or not  and this is not the case with generality. Ambiguous linguistic items, including structurally ambiguous sentences, also do not have this feature unless they also contain vague terms. Rather, an ambiguous sentence allows there to be a completely determinate situation in which one can simultaneously correctly affirm the sentence and also deny the sentence, depending on which of the claims allowed by the ambiguities is being affirmed or denied. Terms are considered open-textured if they are precise along some dimensions of their meaning but where other possible dimensions simply have not been considered. It would therefore not be clear what the applicability of the term would be were objects to vary along these other dimensions. Although related to vagueness, open texture is a different notion. Friedrich Waismann, who coined the term, put it this way: “Open texture . . . is something like the possibility of vagueness.” Vagueness has long been an irritant to philosophers of logic and language. Among the oldest of the puzzles associated with vagueness is the sorites ‘heap’ paradox reported by Cicero Academica 93: One grain of sand does not make a heap, and adding a grain of sand to something that is not a heap will not create a heap; there945 V   945 fore there are no heaps. This type of paradox is traditionally attributed to Zeno of Elea, who said that a single millet seed makes no sound when it falls, so a basket of millet seeds cannot make a sound when it is dumped. The term ‘sorites’ is also applied to the entire series of paradoxes that have this form, such as the falakros ‘bald man’, Diogenes Laertius, Grammatica II, 1, 45: A man with no hairs is bald, and adding one hair to a bald man results in a bald man; therefore all men are bald. The original version of these sorites paradoxes is attributed to Eubulides Diogenes Laertius II, 108: “Isn’t it true that two are few? and also three, and also four, and so on until ten? But since two are few, ten are also few.” The linchpin in all these paradoxes is the analysis of vagueness in terms of some underlying continuum along which an imperceptible or unimportant change occurs. Almost all modern accounts of the logic of vagueness have assumed this to be the correct analysis of vagueness, and have geared their logics to deal with such vagueness. But we will see below that there are other kinds of vagueness too. The search for a solution to the sorites-type paradoxes has been the stimulus for much research into alternative semantics. Some philosophers, e.g. Frege, view vagueness as a pervasive defect of natural language and urge the adoption of an artificial language in which each predicate is completely precise, without borderline cases. Russell too thought vagueness thoroughly infected natural language, but thought it unavoidable  and indeed beneficial  for ordinary usage and discourse. Despite the occasional argument that vagueness is pragmatic rather than a semantic phenomenon, the attitude that vagueness is inextricably bound to natural language together with the philosophical logician’s self-ascribed task of formalizing natural language semantics has led modern writers to the exploration of alternative logics that might adequately characterize vagueness  i.e., that would account for our pretheoretic beliefs concerning truth, falsity, necessary truth, validity, etc., of sentences containing vague predicates. Some recent writers have also argued that vague language undermines realism, and that it shows our concepts to be “incoherent.” Long ago it was seen that the attempt to introduce a third truth-value, indeterminate, solved nothing  replacing, as it were, the sharp cutoff between a predicate’s applying and not applying with two sharp cutoffs. Similar remarks could be made against the adoption of any finitely manyvalued logic as a characterization of vagueness. In the late 0s and early 0s, fuzzy logic was introduced into the philosophic world. Actually a restatement of the Tarski-Lukasiewicz infinitevalued logics of the 0s, one of the side benefits of fuzzy logics was claimed to be an adequate logic for vagueness. In contrast to classical logic, in which there are two truth-values true and false, in fuzzy logic a sentence is allowed to take any real number between 0 and 1 as a truthvalue. Intuitively, the closer to 1 the value is, the “more true” the sentence is. The value of a negated sentence is 1 minus the value of the unnegated sentence; conjuction is viewed as a minimum function and disjunction as a maximum function. Thus, a conjunction takes the value of the “least true” conjunct, while a disjunction takes the value of the “most true” disjunct. Since vague sentences are maximally neither true nor false, they will be valued at approximately 0.5. It follows that if F is maximally vague, so is the negation -F; and so are the conjunction F & -F and the disjunction ~F 7 -F. Some theorists object to these results, but defenders of fuzzy logic have argued in favor of them. Other theorists have attempted to capture the elusive logic of vagueness by employing modal logic, having the operators AF meaning ‘F is definite’ and B F meaning ‘F is vague’. The logic generated in this way is peculiar in that A F & YPAF & AY is not a theorem. E.g., p & -p is definitely false, hence definite; hence A p & -p. Yet neither p nor -p need be definite. Technically, it is a non-Kripke-normal modal logic. Some other peculiarities are that AF Q A -F is a theorem, and that AFPBF is not. There are also puzzles about whether B FP ABF should be a theorem, and about iterated modalities in general. Modal logic treatments of vagueness have not attracted many advocates, except as a portion of a general epistemic logic i.e., modal logics might be seen as an account of so-called epistemic vagueness. A third direction that has been advocated as a logical account of vagueness has been the method of supervaluations sometimes called “supertruth”. The underlying idea here is to allow the vague predicate in a sentence to be “precisified” in an arbitrary manner. Thus, for the sentence ‘Friar Tuck is bald’, we arbitrarily choose a precise number of hairs on the head that will demarcate the bald/not-bald border. In this valuation Friar Tuck is either definitely bald or definitely not bald, and the sentence either is true or is false. Next, we alter the valuation so that there is some other bald/not-bald bordervagueness vagueness 946   946 line, etc. A sentence true in all such valuations is deemed “really true” or “supertrue”; one false in all such valuations is “really false” or “superfalse.” All others are vague. Note that, in this conception of vagueness, if F is vague, so is -F. However, unlike fuzzy logic ‘F & -F’ is not evaluated as vague  it is false in every valuation and hence is superfalse. And ‘F 7 -F’ is supertrue. These are seen by some as positive features of the method of supervaluations, and as an argument against the whole fuzzy logic enterprise. In fact there seem to be at least two distinct types of linguistic vagueness, and it is not at all clear that any of the previously mentioned logic approaches can deal with both. Without going into the details, we can just point out that the “sorites vagueness” discussed above presumes an ordering on a continuous underlying scale; and it is the indistinguishability of adjacent points on this scale that gives rise to borderline cases. But there are examples of vague terms for which there is no such scale. A classic example is ‘religion’: there are a number of factors relevant to determining whether a social practice is a religion. Having none of these properties guarantees failing to be a religion, and having all of them guarantees being one. However, there is no continuum of the sorites variety here; for example, it is easy to distinguish possessing four from possessing five of the properties, unlike the sorites case where such a change is imperceptible. In the present type of vagueness, although we can tell these different cases apart, we just do not know whether to call the practice a religion or not. Furthermore, some of the properties or combinations of properties are more important or salient in determining whether the practice is a religion than are other properties or combinations. We might call this family resemblance vagueness: there are a number of clearly distinguishable conditions of varying degrees of importance, and family resemblance vagueness is attributed to there being no definite answer to the question, How many of which conditions are necessary for the term to apply? Other examples of family resemblance vagueness are ‘schizophrenia sufferer’, ‘sexual perversion’, and the venerable ‘game’. A special subclass of family resemblance vagueness occurs when there are pairs of underlying properties that normally co-occur, but occasionally apply to different objects. Consider, e.g., ‘tributary’. When two rivers meet, one is usually considered a tributary of the other. Among the properties relevant to being a tributary rather than the main river are: relative volume of water and relative length. Normally, the shorter of the two rivers has a lesser volume, and in that case it is the tributary of the other. But occasionally the two properties do not co-occur and then there is a conflict, giving rise to a kind of vagueness we might call conflict vagueness. The term ‘tributary’ is vague because its background conditions admit of such conflicts: there are borderline cases when these two properties apply to different objects. To conclude: the fundamental philosophical problems involving vagueness are 1 to give an adequate characterization of what the phenomenon is, and 2 to characterize our ability to reason with these terms. These were the problems for the ancient philosophers, and they remain the problems for modern philosophers. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The conversational maxim for vagueness avoidance.”

vaihinger: Grice once gave a seminar on Vaihinger – “but thinking it would not attract that many, I titled it ‘As if.’” – H. P. Grice. philosopher best known for Die Philosophie des Als Ob; tr. by C. K. Ogden as The Philosophy of “As If” in 4. A neo-Kantian, he was also influenced by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. His commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 2 vols., 1 is still a standard work. Vaihinger was a cofounder of both the Kant Society and Kant-Studien. The “philosophy of the as if” involves the claim that values and ideals amount only to “fictions” that serve “life” even if they are irrational. We must act “as if” they were true because they have biological utility.

valentinianism: a form of Christian gnosticism of Alexandrian origin, founded by Valentinus in the second century and propagated by Theodotus in Eastern, and Heracleon in Western, Christianity. To every gnostic, pagan or Christian, knowledge leads to salvation from the perishable, material world. Valentinianism therefore prompted famous refutations by Tertullian Adversus Valentinianos and Irenaeus Adversus haereses. The latter accused the Valentinians of maintaining “creatio ex nihilo.” Valentinus is believed to have authored the Peri trion phuseon, the Evangelium veritatis, and the Treatise on the Resurrection. Since only a few fragments of these remain, his Neoplatonic cosmogony is accessible mainly through his opponents and critics Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria and in the Nag Hammadi codices. To explain the origins of creation and of evil, Valentinus separated God primal Father from the Creator Demiurge and attributed the cruVaihinger, Hans Valentinianism 947   947 cial role in the processes of emanation and redemption to Sophia. 

valentinus: gnostic teacher, born in Alexandria, where he taught until he moved to Rome. A dualist, he constructed an elaborate cosmology in which God the Father Bythos, or Deep Unknown unites the the feminine Silence Sige and in the overflow of love produces thirty successive divine emanations or aeons constituting the Pleroma fullness of the Godhead. Each emanation is arranged hierarchically with a graded existence, becoming progressively further removed from the Father and hence less divine. The lowest emanation, Sophia wisdom, yields to passion and seeks to reach, beyond her ability, to the Father, which causes her fall. In the process, she causes the creation of the material universe wherein resides evil and the loss of divine sparks from the Pleroma. The divine elements are embodied in those humans who are the elect. Jesus Christ is an aeon close to the Father and is sent to retrieve the souls into the heavenly Pleroma. Valentinus wrote a gospel. His sect stood out in the early church for ordaining women priests and prophetesses. Grice: “Since he lived in Rome, he was almost a Roman.” – Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Valentinus e Grice,” Villa Grice.

valla: l. humanist and historian who taught rhetoric in Pavia and was later secretary of King Alfonso I of Aragona in Naples, and apostolic secretary in Rome under Pope Nicholas V. In his dialogue On Pleasure or On the True Good 143134, Stoic and Epicurean interlocutors present their ethical views, which Valla proceeds to criticize from a Christian point of view. This work is often regarded as a defense of Epicurean hedonism, because Valla equates the good with pleasure; but he claims that Christians can find pleasure only in heaven. His description of the Christian pleasures reflects the contemporary Renaissance attitude toward the joys of life and might have contributed to Valla’s reputation for hedonism. In the later work, On Free Will between 1435 and 1448, Valla discusses the conflict between divine foreknowledge and human freedom and rejects Boethius’s then predominantly accepted solution. Valla distinguishes between God’s knowledge and God’s will, but denies that there is a rational solution of the apparent conflict between God’s will and human freedom. As a historian, he is famous for The Donation of Constantine 1440, which denounces as spurious the famous document on which medieval jurists and theologians based the papal rights to secular power. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Valla e Grice,” Villa Grice.