IMPLICATVRA, in 18 volumes -- vol. XV

ring of Gyges, a ring that gives its wearer invisibility, discussed in Plato’s Republic II, 359b 360d. Glaucon tells the story of a man who discovered the ring and used it to usurp the throne to defend the claim that those who behave justly do so only because they lack the power to act unjustly. If they could avoid paying the penalty of injustice, Glaucon argues, everyone would be unjust.

Roman philosophy. Grice loved it. AENESIDEMUS: Academic philosopher, founder of a Pyrrhonist revival in Rome. ANAXAGORAS. pre-Socratic enquirer into the origin of the  cosmos -- ANDRONICUS. mid-first cent., Peripatetic; editor of Aristotle’s  works. -- ANTIOCHUS. early 1st. cent., Academic who reverted to Plato’s  dogmatism -- ANTIPATER, 1st. cent., Stoic, tutor to Cato  Uticensis. -- APOLLONIDES, mid-1st. cent., Stoic, adviser to Cato  Uticensis -- APOLLONIUS, 1st. cent. CE, Neo-pythagorean. -- APULEIUS. ca.125–180 CE, Platonic, author of "Metamorphoses". -- ARCESILAUS. mid-3rd.cent., Academic sceptic, head of the New Academy --- ARISTIPPUS. late-5th. cent., member of Socrates’s circle -- ARISTON. 3rd.  cent., Peripatetic and head of the Lyceum -- ARISTOTLE. 384–322, founder  of the Peripatetic school -- ARISTUS. early 1st. cent., head of the  Academy and teacher of Brutus -- ARIUS. 1st. cent., adviser to Augustus -- ARTEMIDORUS. 1st. cent. CE, Stoic, friend of Pliny the Younger and son-in-law of Musonius -- ATHENODORUS. mid-1st. cent., Stoic and adviser  to Cato Uticensis, in whose house he lived -- ATHENODORUS. mid-first  cent., Stoic and friend of Cicero -- ATTALUS. 1st. cent. CE, Stoic,  teacher of Seneca -- AUGUSTINE. 354–430 CE, Neo-platonist -- BION.  ca. 335–245, Cynic, popular teacher -- BOETHIUS ca. 480–524 CE,  philosopher with Stoic and Neoplatonist views, author of "The Consolation of  Philosophy" -- CARNEADES mid-2nd. cent., head of the New Academy, Sceptic  and star of the Athenian embassy to Rome in 155 -- CHAEREMON. mid-lst.  cent., CE, Stoic, tutor to Nero -- CHRYSIPPUS. ca. 280–206, head of the  Stoic school from 232 -- CICERO. 106–43, leading transmitter of  Hellenistic philosophy to Rome and Renaissance Europe, follower of the New  Academy and pupil of Philo of Larissa -- CLEANTHES. 331–232, Zeno’s  successor as head of the Stoic school from 262 -- CLITOMACHUS. late-2nd. cent., Sceptic and pupil of Carneades, head of  the New Academy from 127 -- CORNUTUS. 1st. cent. CE, Stoic, teacher and  friend of Persius and Lucan -- CRANTOR ca. 335–275, Academic, the first  commentator on Plato -- CRATES. ca.365–285, Cynic, follower of Diogenes  of Sinope and teacher of Zeno of Citium -- CRATIPPUS. mid-lst. cent.,  Peripatetic, friend of Cicero and Nigidius and teacher of Cicero’s son. -- CRITOLAUS. first half of 2nd. cent., head of the Peripatetic school and member  of the Athenian embassy to Rome in 155 -- DEMETRIUS. 1st. cent. CE,  friend of Seneca -- DEMETRIUS. mid-1st.cent., adviser of Cato  Uticensis -- DEMOCRITUS. second half of 5th. cent., pre-Socratic, founder  of atomism -- DICHAEARCHUS. late 4th. cent., Peripatetic, pupil of  Aristotle -- DIODOTUS. first of 1st.cent., Stoic, teacher and friend of  Cicero, in whose house he lived -- DIOGENES LAERTIUS. first half of 3rd.  cent. CE, author of "The Lives of the Philosophers" -- DIOGENES OF  APOLLONIA. 2nd half of 5th. cent., pre-Socratic philosopher and enquirer  into the natural world; a source for Seneca’s "Naturates Quaestiones" -- DIOGENES OF BABYLON. mid-2nd. cent., head of the Stoic school and member of the  Athenian embassy to Rome in 155, tutor to Panaetius -- DIOGENES OF  OENOANDA late 2nd. cent. CE, Epicurean and part-author of the inscription on the  stoa which he caused to be set up in Oenoanda --  DIOGENES OF SINOPE.  mid-4th.cent., founder of Cynicism --  EPICTETUS. ca. 50–120 CE, Stoic,  pupil of Musonius -- EPICURUS 341–271, principal source for Lucretius’s  poem -- EUPHRATES late-lst. cent. CE, Stoic, student of Musonius and  friend of Pliny the Younger -- FAVORINUS. ca. 85–155 CE, philosopher of  the Second Sophistic, friend of Plutarch and teacher of Fronto -- GALEN.  late-second cent. CE, physician to Marcus Aurelius, Platonist -- HECATO.  early 1st. cent., Stoic, pupil of Panaetius and member of circle of  Posidonius -- HERMARCHUS. 1st half of 3rd. cent., pupil of Epicurus  and his successor as head of the Epicurean school from 271, with Epicurus,  Metrodorus and Polyaenus, one of “The Four Men”, founders of the Epicurean  school -- HIEROCLES early 2nd. cent. CE, Stoic --  LAELIUS. ca.  190–125, consul in 140, friend of Scipio Aemilianus and Panaetius and called by  Cicero "the first Roman philosopher." -- LEUCIPPUS. second half of 5th.  cent., co-founder with Democritus of atomism -- LUCRETIUS. first half of  1st. cent., Epicurean, author of "De Rerum Natura" -- MANILIUS. ate-lst.  cent. BCE and early-lst. cent CE, Stoic author of "Astronomica" -- MARCUS  AURELIUS. 121–180 CE, Roman emperor (161–180) and Stoic, author of "To Himself",  a private diary -- MENIPPUS. first half of 3rd. cent., Cynic and  satirical author in prose and verse on philosophical subjects -- METRODORUS. ca. 331–278, friend of Epicurus and one “The Four Men”, founders of  Epicureanism -- MODERATUS. second half of 1st. cent. CE,  Neo-pythagorean -- MUSONIUS. second half of 1st. cent. CE, Roman of  Etruscan descent, Stoic, teacher of Epictetus -- NIGIDIUS. 1st. cent.,  Neo-pythagorean -- PANAETIUS. ca. 185–109, Stoic, head of the Stoic  school from 129, influential at Rome, friend of Scipio Aemilianus and major  source for Cicero’s "De Officiis" -- PARMENIDES. first half of 5th. cent., pre-Socratic, pioneer enquirer  into the nature of “what is” -- PATRON. first half of 1st. cent.,  friend of Cicero and successor of Phaedrus as head of the Epicurean  school -- PHAEDRUS. ca. 140–70, Epicurean, admired by Cicero. head of the Epicurean school in the last years of his life -- PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA.  first half of 1st. cent. CE, philosopher, sympathetic to Stoic ethics and  influential in the later development of Neo-platonism -- PHILO OF LARISSA  ca.159–84, head of the New Academy, 110–88, the most influential of Cicero’s  tutors -- PHILODEMUS. ca. 110–40, Epicurean philosopher, protegé of Piso Caesoninus and an influence on Virgil and Horace, many of his fragmentary  writings are preserved in the Herculaneum papyri -- PLATO ca. 429–347,  founder of the Academy and disciple and interpreter of Socrates -- PLOTINUS. 205–270 CE, Neo-platonist, resident in Rome and Campania -- PLUTARCH. ca. 50–120 CE, Platonist -- POLEMO. died 270,  Platonist and head of the Academy from 314. -- POLYAENUS. died before 271,  friend of Epicurus and one of “The Four Men,” founders of Epicureanism -- POSIDONIUS. ca. 135–50, Stoic, student of Panaetius and head of his own school  in Rhodes, where Cicero heard him. The dominant figure in middle Stoicism, whose  works encompassed the whole range of intellectual enquiry.--  PYRRHO. ca.  365–270, the founder of Scepticism, whose doctrines were revived in Rome by  Aenesidemus -- PYTHAGORAS OF SAMOS 6th. cent., head of a community at  Croton in S. Italy, emphasized the importance of number and proportion, his  doctrines included vegetarianism and the transmigration of souls, influenced  Plato, his philosophy was revived at Rome by Nigidius and the Sextii. -- RUSTICUS. consul in 133 and 162 CE, Stoic, friend and teacher of Marcus  Aurelius -- SENECA. 4 BCE–65 CE, Stoic, tutor, adviser and victim of  Nero, author of philosophical treatises, including "Dialogi" and "Epistulae  Morales" -- SEVERUS. consul in 146 CE, Stoic friend and teacher of Marcus  Aurelius, whose son married his daughter. -- SEXTIUS. mid-1st. cent.,  Neo-pythagorean, founder of the only genuinely Roman school of philosophy;  admired by Seneca for his disciplined Roman ethos -- SEXTUS EMPIRICUS.  late-2nd. cent. CE, Sceptic, author of philosophical and medical works and  critic of Stoicism, principal source for Pyrrhonism -- SIRO. 1st. cent.,  Epicurean, teacher in Campania of Virgil -- SOCRATES. 469–399, iconic  Athenian philosopher and one of the most influential figures in Greek  philosophy; he wrote nothing but is the central figure in Plato’s dialogues,  admired by non-Academics, including the Stoic Marcus Aurelius nearly six hundred  years after his death -- SOTION. 1st. cent. CE, Neopythagorean, teacher  of Seneca -- SPEUSIPPUS. ca. 407–339, Plato’s successor as head of the  Academy -- TELES. second half of 3rd. cent., Cynic, author of diatribes  on ethical subjects -- THEOPHRASTUS. 372–287, Peripatetic, successor to  Aristotle as head of the Lyceum from 322 -- VARRO, 116–27, Academic,  Roman polymath, author of works on language, agriculture, history and  philosophy, as well as satires, and principal speaker in the later version of  Cicero’s "Academica" -- XENOCRATES. died 314, head of the Academy from  339 --  ZENO OF CITIUM. 335–263, founder of Stoicism, originally a  follower of the Cynic Crates, taught at Athens in the Stoa Poikile, which gave  its name to his school -- ZENO OF SIDON. ca. 155–75, head of the  Epicurean school at Athens, where he taught Philodemus and was heard by Cicero.

Rorty, R. philosopher, notable for the breadth of his philosophical and cultural interests. He was educated at the  of Chicago and Yale and has taught at Wellesley, Princeton, Virginia, and Stanford. His early work was primarily in standard areas of analytic philosophy such as the philosophy of mind, where, for example, he developed an important defense of eliminative materialism. In 9, however, he published Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, which was both hailed and denounced as a fundamental critique of analytic philosophy. Both the praise and the abuse were often based on misconceptions, but there is no doubt that Rorty questioned fundamental presuppositions of many Anglo- philosophers and showed affinities for Continental alternatives to analytic philosophy. At root, however, Rorty’s position is neither analytic except in its stylistic clarity nor Continental except in its cultural breadth. His view is, rather, pragmatic, a contemporary incarnation of the distinctively  philosophizing of James, Peirce, and Dewey. On Rorty’s reading, pragmatism involves a rejection of the representationalism that has dominated modern philosophy from Descartes through logical positivism. According to representationalism, we have direct access only to ideas that represent the world, not to the world itself. Philosophy has the privileged role of determining the criteria for judging that our representations are adequate to reality. A main thrust of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is to discredit representationalism, first by showing how it has functioned as an unjustified presupposition in classical modern philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, and Kant, and second by showing how analytic philosophers such as Wilfrid Sellars and Quine have revealed the incoherence of representationalist assumptions in contemporary epistemology. Since, on Rorty’s view, representationalism defines the epistemological project of modern philosophy, its failure requires that we abandon this project and, with it, traditional pretensions to a privileged cognitive role for philosophy. Rorty sees no point in seeking a non-representationalist basis for the justification or the truth of our knowledge claims. It is enough to accept as justified beliefs those on which our epistemic community agrees and to use ‘true’ as an honorific term for beliefs that we see as “justified to the hilt.” Rorty characterizes his positive position as “liberal ironism.” His liberalism is of a standard sort, taking as its basic value the freedom of all individuals: first, their freedom from suffering, but then also freedom to form their lives with whatever values they find most compelling. Rorty distinguishes the “public sphere” in which we all share the liberal commitment to universal freedom from the “private spheres” in which we all work out our own specific conception of the good. His ironism reflects his realization that there is no grounding for public or private values other than our deep but contingent commitment to them and his appreciation of the multitude of private values that he does not himself happen to share. Rorty has emphasized the importance of literature and literary criticism  as opposed to traditional philosophy  for providing the citizens of a liberal society with appropriate sensitivities to the needs and values of others. 

Roscelin de Compiègne, philosopher and logician who became embroiled in theological controversy when he applied his logical teachings to the doctrine of the Trinity. Since almost nothing survives of his written work, we must rely on hostile accounts of his views by Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abelard, both of whom openly opposed his positions. Perhaps the most notorious view Roscelin is said to have held is that universals are merely the puffs of air produced when a word is pronounced. On this point he opposed views current among many theologians that a universal has an existence independent of language, and somehow is what many different particulars are. Roscelin’s aversion to any proposal that different things can be some one thing is probably what led him in his thinking about the three persons of God to a position that sounded suspiciously like the heresy of tritheism. Roscelin also evidently held that the qualities of things are not entities distinct from the subjects that possess them. This indicates that Roscelin probably denied that terms in the Aristotelian categories other than substance signified anything distinct from substances. Abelard, the foremost logician of the twelfth century, studied under Roscelin around 1095 and was undoubtedly influenced by him on the question of universals. Roscelin’s view that universals are linguistic entities remained an important option in medieval thought. Otherwise his positions do not appear to have had much currency in the ensuing decades. 

Rosenzweig, F. G. philosopher and Jewish theologian known as one of the founders of religious existentialism. His early relation to Judaism was tenuous, and at one point he came close to converting to Christianity. A religious experience in a synagogue made him change his mind and return to Judaism. His chief philosophic works are a two-volume study, Hegel and the State 0, and his masterpiece, The Star of Redemption 1. Rosenzweig’s experience in World War I caused him to reject absolute idealism on the ground that it cannot account for the privacy and finality of death. Instead of looking for a unifying principle behind existence, Rosenzweig starts with three independent realities “given” in experience: God, the self, and the world. Calling his method “radical empiricism,” he explains how God, the self, and the world are connected by three primary relations: creation, revelation, and redemption. In revelation, God does not communicate verbal statements but merely a presence that calls for love and devotion from worshipers.

Rosmini-Serbati, Antonio, philosopher, Catholic priest, counselor to Pope Pius IX, and supporter of the supremacy of the church over civil government Neo-Guelphism. Rosmini had two major concerns: the objectivity of human knowledge and the synthesis of philosophical thought within the tradition of Catholic thought. In his Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee “New Essay on the Origin of Ideas,” 1830, he identifies the universal a priori intuitive component of all human knowledge with the idea of being that gives us the notion of a possible or ideal being. Everything in the world is known by intellectual perception, which is the synthesis of sensation and the idea of being. Except for the idea of being, which is directly given by God, all ideas derive from abstraction. The objectivity of human knowledge rests on its universal origin in the idea of being. The harmony between philosophy and religion comes from the fact that all human knowledge is the result of divine revelation. Rosmini’s thought was influenced by Augustine and Aquinas, and stimulated by the attempt to find a solution to the contrasting needs of rationalism and empiricism.

Ross: w. d. Aristotelian scholar and moral philosopher. Born in Edinburgh and educated at the  of Edinburgh and at Balliol , Oxford, he became a fellow of Merton , then a fellow, tutor, and eventually provost at Oriel . He was vice-chancellor of Oxford  144 and president of the British Academy 640. He was knighted in 8 in view of national service. Ross was a distinguished classical scholar: he edited the Oxford translations of Aristotle 831 and tr. the Metaphysics and the Ethics himself. His Aristotle 3 is a judicious exposition of Aristotle’s work as a whole. Kant’s Ethical Theory 4 is a commentary on Kant’s The Groundwork of Ethics. His major contribution to philosophy was in ethics: The Right and the Good 0 and Foundations of Ethics9. The view he expressed there was controversial in English-speaking countries for ten years or so. He held that ‘right’ and ‘good’ are empirically indefinable terms that name objective properties the presence of which is known intuitively by persons who are mature and educated. We first cognize them in particular instances, then arrive at general principles involving them by “intuitive induction.” He thought every ethical theory must admit at least one intuition. The knowledge of moral principles is thus rather like knowledge of the principles of geometry. ‘Right’ ‘dutiful’ applies to acts, in the sense of what an agent brings about and there is no duty to act from a good motive, and a right act can have a bad motive; ‘morally good’ applies primarily to the desires that bring about action. He castigated utilitarianism as absorbing all duties into enhancing the wellbeing of everyone affected, whereas in fact we have strong special obligations to keep promises, make reparation for injuries, repay services done, distribute happiness in accord with merit, benefit individuals generally and he concedes this is a weighty matter and ourselves only in respect of knowledge and virtue, and not injure others normally a stronger obligation than that to benefit. That we have these “prima facie” duties is self-evident, but they are only prima facie in the sense that they are actual duties only if there is no stronger conflicting prima facie duty; and when prima facie duties conflict, what one ought to do is what satisfies all of them best  although which this is is a matter of judgment, not self-evidence. He conceded, however, in contrast to his general critique of utilitarianism, that public support of these prima facie principles with their intuitive strength can be justified on utilitarian grounds. To meet various counterexamples Ross introduced complications, such as that a promise is not binding if discharge of it will not benefit the promisee providing this was an implicit understanding, and it is less binding if made long ago or in a casual manner. Only four states of affairs are good in themselves: desire to do one’s duty virtue, knowledge, pleasure, and the distribution of happiness in accordance with desert. Of these, virtue is more valuable than any amount of knowledge or pleasure. In Foundations of Ethics he held that virtue and pleasure are not good in the same sense: virtue is “admirable” but pleasure only a “worthy object of satisfaction” so ‘good’ does not name just one property. 

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, philosopher, essayist, novelist, and musician, best known for his theories on social freedom and societal rights, education, and religion. Born in Geneva, he was largely self-educated and moved to France as a teenager. Throughout much of his life he moved between Paris and the provinces with several trips abroad including a Scottish stay with Hume and a return visit to Geneva, where he reconverted to Protestantism from his earlier conversion to Catholicism. For a time he was a friend of Diderot and other philosophes and was asked to contribute articles on music for the Encyclopedia. Rousseau’s work can be seen from at least three perspectives. As social contract theorist, he attempts to construct a hypothetical state of nature to explain the current human situation. This evolves a form of philosophical anthropology that gives us both a theory of human nature and a series of pragmatic claims concerning social organization. As a social commentator, he speaks of both practical and ideal forms of education and social organization. As a moralist, he continually attempts to unite the individual and the citizen through some form of universal political action or consent. In Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind 1755, Rousseau presents us with an almost idyllic view of humanity. In nature humans are first seen as little more than animals except for their special species sympathy. Later, through an explanation of the development of reason and language, he is able to suggest how humans, while retaining this sympathy, can, by distancing themselves from nature, understand their individual selves. This leads to natural community and the closest thing to what Rousseau considers humanity’s perfect moment. Private property quickly follows on the division of labor, and humans find themselves alienated from each other by the class divisions engendered by private property. Thus man, who was born in freedom, now finds himself in chains. The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right 1762 has a more ambitious goal. With an account of the practical role of the legislator and the introduction of the concept of the general will, Rousseau attempts to give us a foundation for good government by presenting a solution to the conflicts between the particular and the universal, the individual and the citizen, and the actual and the moral. Individuals, freely agreeing to a social pact and giving up their rights to the community, are assured of the liberties and equality of political citizenship found in the contract. It is only through being a citizen that the individual can fully realize his freedom and exercise his moral rights and duties. While the individual is naturally good, he must always guard against being dominated or dominating. Rousseau finds a solution to the problems of individual freedoms and interests in a superior form of moral/political action that he calls the general will. The individual as citizen substitutes “I must” for “I will,” which is also an “I shall” when it expresses assent to the general will. The general will is a universal force or statement and thus is more noble than any particular will. In willing his own interest, the citizen is at the same time willing what is communally good. The particular and the universal are united. The individual human participant realizes himself in realizing the good of all. As a practical political commentator Rousseau knew that the universal and the particular do not always coincide. For this he introduced the idea of the legislator, which allows the individual citizen to realize his fulfillment as social being and to exercise his individual rights through universal consent. In moments of difference between the majority will and the general will the legislator will instill the correct moral/political understanding. This will be represented in the laws. While sovereignty rests with the citizens, Rousseau does not require that political action be direct. Although all government should be democratic, various forms of government from representative democracy preferable in small societies to strong monarchies preferable in large nation-states may be acceptable. To shore up the unity and stability of individual societies, Rousseau suggests a sort of civic religion to which all citizens subscribe and in which all members participate. His earlier writings on education and his later practical treatises on the governments of Poland and Corsica reflect related concerns with natural and moral development and with historical and geographical considerations. 

Royce, J. philosopher best known for his pragmatic idealism, his ethics of loyalty, and his theory of community. Educated at Berkeley, at Johns Hopkins, and in G.y, he taught philosophy at Harvard from 2. Royce held that a concept of the absolute or eternal was needed to account for truth, ultimate meaning, and reality in the face of very real evil in human experience. Seeking to reconcile individuals with the Absolute, he postulated, in The World and the Individual 9,1, Absolute Will and Thought as an expression of the concrete and differentiated individuality of the world. Royce saw the individual self as both moral and sinful, developing through social interaction, community experience, and communal and self-interpretation. Self is constituted by a life plan, by loyalty to an ultimate goal. Yet selflimitation and egoism, two human sins, work against achievement of individual goals, perhaps rendering life a senseless failure. The self needs saving and this is the message of religion, argues Royce The Religious Aspects of Philosophy, 5; The Sources of Religious Insight, 2. For Royce, the instrument of salvation is the community. In The Philosophy of Loyalty 8, he develops an ethics of loyalty to loyalty, i.e., the extension of loyalty throughout the human community. In The Problem of Christianity 3, Royce presents a doctrine of community that overcomes the individualismcollectivism dilemma and allows a genuine blending of individual and social will. Community is built through interpretation, a mediative process that reconciles two ideas, goals, and persons, bringing common meaning and understanding. Interpretation involves respect for selves as dynamos of ideas and purposes, the will to interpret, dissatisfaction with partial meanings and narrowness of view,

reciprocity, and mutuality. In this work, the Absolute is a “Community of Interpretation and Hope,” in which there is an endlessly accumulating series of interpretations and significant deeds. An individual contribution thus is not lost but becomes an indispensable element in the divine life. Among Royce’s influential students were C. I. Lewis, William Ernest Hocking, Norbert Wiener, Santayana, and T. S. Eliot.

rule of law, the largely formal or procedural properties of a well-ordered legal system. Commonly, these properties are thought to include: a prohibition of arbitrary power the lawgiver is also subject to the laws; laws that are general, prospective, clear, and consistent capable of guiding conduct; and tribunals courts that are reasonably accessible and fairly structured to hear and determine legal claims. Contemporary discussions of the rule of law focus on two major questions: 1 to what extent is conformity to the rule of law essential to the very idea of a legal system; and 2 what is the connection between the rule of law and the substantive moral value of a legal system? 

Russell, Bertrand Arthur William, philosopher, logician, social reformer, and man of letters, one of the founders of analytic philosophy. Born of Celtic Highland stock into an aristocratic family in Wales (then part of England), Russell always divided his interests between politics, philosophy, and the ladies (he married six times). Orphaned at four, he was brought up by his grandmother, who educated him at home with the help of “rather dull” tutors. He studied mathematics at Cambridge and then, as his grandmother says, ‘out of the blue,’ he turned to philosophy. At home he had absorbed J. S. Mill’s liberalism, but not his empiricism. At Cambridge he came under the influence of neo-Hegelianism, especially the idealism of McTaggart, Ward his tutor, and Bradley. His earliest logical views were influenced most by Bradley, especially Bradley’s rejection of psychologism. But, like Ward and McTaggart, he rejected Bradley’s metaphysical monism in favor of pluralism or monadism. Even as an idealist, he held that scientific knowledge was the best available and that philosophy should be built around it. Through many subsequent changes, this belief about science, his pluralism, and his anti-psychologism remained constant. In 5, he conceived the idea of an idealist encyclopedia of the sciences to be developed by the use of transcendental arguments to establish the conditions under which the special sciences are possible. Russell’s first philosophical book, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry 7, was part of this project, as were other mostly unfinished and unpublished pieces on physics and arithmetic written at this time see his Collected Papers, vols. 12. Russell claimed, in contrast to Kant, to use transcendental arguments in a purely logical way compatible with his anti-psychologism. In this case, however, it should be both possible and preferable to replace them by purely deductive arguments. Another problem arose in connection with asymmetrical relations, which led to contradictions if treated as internal relations, but which were essential for any treatment of mathematics. Russell resolved both problems in 8 by abandoning idealism including internal relations and his Kantian methodology. He called this the one real revolution in his philosophy. With his Cambridge contemporary Moore, he adopted an extreme Platonic realism, fully stated in The Principles of Mathematics 3 though anticipated in A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz 0. Russell’s work on the sciences was by then concentrated on pure mathematics, but the new philosophy yielded little progress until, in 0, he discovered Peano’s symbolic logic, which offered hope that pure mathematics could be treated without Kantian intuitions or transcendental arguments. On this basis Russell propounded logicism, the claim that the whole of pure mathematics could be derived deductively from logical principles, a position he came to independently of Frege, who held a similar but more restricted view but whose work Russell discovered only later. Logicism was announced in The Principles of Mathematics; its development occupied Russell, in collaboration with Whitehead, for the next ten years. Their results were published in Principia Mathematica 013, 3 vols., in which detailed derivations were given for Cantor’s set theory, finite and transfinite arithmetic, and elementary parts of measure theory. As a demonstration of Russell’s logicism, Principia depends upon much prior arithmetization of mathematics, e.g. of analysis, which is not explicitly treated. Even with these allowances much is still left out: e.g., abstract algebra and statistics. Russell’s unpublished papers Papers, vols. 45, however, contain logical innovations not included in Principia, e.g., anticipations of Church’s lambda-calculus. On Russell’s extreme realism, everything that can be referred to is a term that has being though not necessarily existence. The combination of terms by means of a relation results in a complex term, which is a proposition. Terms are neither linguistic nor psychological. The first task of philosophy is the theoretical analysis of propositions into their constituents. The propositions of logic are unique in that they remain true when any of their terms apart from logical constants are replaced by any other terms. In 1 Russell discovered that this position fell prey to self-referential paradoxes. For example, if the combination of any number of terms is a new term, the combination of all terms is a term distinct from any term. The most famous such paradox is called Russell’s paradox. Russell’s solution was the theory of types, which banned self-reference by stratifying terms and expressions into complex hierarchies of disjoint subclasses. The expression ‘all terms’, e.g., is then meaningless unless restricted to terms of specified types, and the combination of terms of a given type is a term of different type. A simple version of the theory appeared in Principles of Mathematics appendix A, but did not eliminate all the paradoxes. Russell developed a more elaborate version that did, in “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types” 8 and in Principia. From 3 to 8 Russell sought to preserve his earlier account of logic by finding other ways to avoid the paradoxes  including a well-developed substitutional theory of classes and relations posthumously published in Essays in Analysis, 4, and Papers, vol. 5. Other costs of type theory for Russell’s logicism included the vastly increased complexity of the resulting sysRussell, Bertrand Arthur William Russell, Bertrand Arthur William 802    802 tem and the admission of the problematic axiom of reducibility. Two other difficulties with Russell’s extreme realism had important consequences: 1 ‘I met Quine’ and ‘I met a man’ are different propositions, even when Quine is the man I met. In the Principles, the first proposition contains a man, while the second contains a denoting concept that denotes the man. Denoting concepts are like Fregean senses; they are meanings and have denotations. When one occurs in a proposition the proposition is not about the concept but its denotation. This theory requires that there be some way in which a denoting concept, rather than its denotation, can be denoted. After much effort, Russell concluded in “On Denoting” 5 that this was impossible and eliminated denoting concepts as intermediaries between denoting phrases and their denotations by means of his theory of descriptions. Using firstorder predicate logic, Russell showed in a broad, though not comprehensive range of cases how denoting phrases could be eliminated in favor of predicates and quantified variables, for which logically proper names could be substituted. These were names of objects of acquaintance  represented in ordinary language by ‘this’ and ‘that’. Most names, he thought, were disguised definite descriptions. Similar techniques were applied elsewhere to other kinds of expression e.g. class names resulting in the more general theory of incomplete symbols. One important consequence of this was that the ontological commitments of a theory could be reduced by reformulating the theory to remove expressions that apparently denoted problematic entities. 2 The theory of incomplete symbols also helped solve extreme realism’s epistemic problems, namely how to account for knowledge of terms that do not exist, and for the distinction between true and false propositions. First, the theory explained how knowledge of a wide range of items could be achieved by knowledge by acquaintance of a much narrower range. Second, propositional expressions were treated as incomplete symbols and eliminated in favor of their constituents and a propositional attitude by Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment. These innovations marked the end of Russell’s extreme realism, though he remained a Platonist in that he included universals among the objects of acquaintance. Russell referred to all his philosophy after 8 as logical atomism, indicating thereby that certain categories of items were taken as basic and items in other categories were constructed from them by rigorous logical means. It depends therefore upon reduction, which became a key concept in early analytic philosophy. Logical atomism changed as Russell’s logic developed and as more philosophical consequences were drawn from its application, but the label is now most often applied to the modified realism Russell held from 5 to 9. Logic was central to Russell’s philosophy from 0 onward, and much of his fertility and importance as a philosopher came from his application of the new logic to old problems. In 0 Russell became a lecturer at Cambridge. There his interests turned to epistemology. In writing a popular book, Problems of Philosophy 2, he first came to appreciate the work of the British empiricists, especially Hume and Berkeley. He held that empirical knowledge is based on direct acquaintance with sense-data, and that matter itself, of which we have only knowledge by description, is postulated as the best explanation of sense-data. He soon became dissatisfied with this idea and proposed instead that matter be logically constructed out of sensedata and unsensed sensibilia, thereby obviating dubious inferences to material objects as the causes of sensations. This proposal was inspired by the successful constructions of mathematical concepts in Principia. He planned a large work, “Theory of Knowledge,” which was to use the multiple relation theory to extend his account from acquaintance to belief and inference Papers, vol. 7. However, the project was abandoned as incomplete in the face of Vitters’s attacks on the multiple relation theory, and Russell published only those portions dealing with acquaintance. The construction of matter, however, went ahead, at least in outline, in Our Knowledge of the External World 4, though the only detailed constructions were undertaken later by Carnap. On Russell’s account, material objects are those series of sensibilia that obey the laws of physics. Sensibilia of which a mind is aware sense-data provide the experiential basis for that mind’s knowledge of the physical world. This theory is similar, though not identical, to phenomenalism. Russell saw the theory as an application of Ockham’s razor, by which postulated entities were replaced by logical constructions. He devoted much time to understanding modern physics, including relativity and quantum theory, and in The Analysis of Matter 7 he incorporated the fundamental ideas of those theories into his construction of the physical world. In this book he abandoned sensibilia as fundamental constituents of the world in favor Russell, Bertrand Arthur William Russell, Bertrand Arthur William 803    803 of events, which were “neutral” because intrinsically neither physical nor mental. In 6 Russell was dismissed from Cambridge on political grounds and from that time on had to earn his living by writing and public lecturing. His popular lectures, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” 8, were a result of this. These lectures form an interim work, looking back on the logical achievements of 510 and emphasizing their importance for philosophy, while taking stock of the problems raised by Vitters’s criticisms of the multiple relation theory. In 9 Russell’s philosophy of mind underwent substantial changes, partly in response to those criticisms. The changes appeared in “On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean” 9 and The Analysis of Mind 1, where the influence of contemporary trends in psychology, especially behaviorism, is evident. Russell gave up the view that minds are among the fundamental constituents of the world, and adopted neutral monism, already advocated by Mach, James, and the  New Realists. On Russell’s neutral monism, a mind is constituted by a set of events related by subjective temporal relations simultaneity, successiveness and by certain special “mnemic” causal laws. In this way he was able to explain the apparent fact that “Hume’s inability to perceive himself was not peculiar.” In place of the multiple relation theory Russell identified the contents of beliefs with images “imagepropositions” and words “word-propositions”, understood as certain sorts of events, and analyzed truth qua correspondence in terms of resemblance and causal relations. From 8 to 4 Russell lived in the United States, where he wrote An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth 0 and his popular A History of Western Philosophy 5. His philosophical attention turned from metaphysics to epistemology and he continued to work in this field after he returned in 4 to Cambridge, where he completed his last major philosophical work, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits 8. The framework of Russell’s early epistemology consisted of an analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief though it has been suggested that he unintentionally anticipated Edmund Gettier’s objection to this analysis, and an analysis of epistemic justification that combined fallibilism with a weak empiricism and with a foundationalism that made room for coherence. This framework was retained in An Inquiry and Human Knowledge, but there were two sorts of changes that attenuated the foundationalist and empiricist elements and accentuated the fallibilist element. First, the scope of human knowledge was reduced. Russell had already replaced his earlier Moorean consequentialism about values with subjectivism. Contrast “The Elements of Ethics,” 0, with, e.g., Religion and Science, 5, or Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 4. Consequently, what had been construed as self-evident judgments of intrinsic value came to be regarded as non-cognitive expressions of desire. In addition, Russell now reversed his earlier belief that deductive inference can yield new knowledge. Second, the degree of justification attainable in human knowledge was reduced at all levels. Regarding the foundation of perceptual beliefs, Russell came to admit that the object-knowledge “acquaintance with a sensedatum” was replaced by “noticing a perceptive occurrence” in An Inquiry that provides the non-inferential justification for a perceptual belief is buried under layers of “interpretation” and unconscious inference in even the earliest stages of perceptual processes. Regarding the superstructure of inferentially justified beliefs, Russell concluded in Human Knowledge that unrestricted induction is not generally truthpreserving anticipating Goodman’s “new riddle of induction”. Consideration of the work of Reichenbach and Keynes on probability led him to the conclusion that certain “postulates” are needed “to provide the antecedent probabilities required to justify inductions,” and that the only possible justification for believing these postulates lies, not in their self-evidence, but in the resultant increase in the overall coherence of one’s total belief system. In the end, Russell’s desire for certainty went unsatisfied, as he felt himself forced to the conclusion that “all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever.” Russell’s strictly philosophical writings of 9 and later have generally been less influential than his earlier writings. His influence was eclipsed by that of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. He approved of the logical positivists’ respect for logic and science, though he disagreed with their metaphysical agnosticism. But his dislike of ordinary language philosophy was visceral. In My Philosophical Development 9, he accused its practitioners of abandoning the attempt to understand the world, “that grave and important task which philosophy throughout the ages has hitherto pursued.” 

Russian nihilism, a form of nihilism, a phenomenon mainly of Russia in the 1860s, which, in contrast to the general cultural nihilism that Nietzsche later criticized in the 0s as a “dead-end” devaluing of all values, was futureoriented and “instrumental,” exalting possibility over actuality. Russian nihilists urged the “annihilation”  figurative and literal  of the past and present, i.e., of realized social and cultural values and of such values in process of realization, in the name of the future, i.e., for the sake of social and cultural values yet to be realized. Bakunin, as early as 1842, had stated the basic nihilist theme: “the negation of what exists . . . for the benefit of the future which does not yet exist.” The bestknown literary exemplar of nihilism in Russia is the character Bazarov in Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Sons 1862. Its most articulate spokesman was Dmitri Pisarev 184068, who shared Bazarov’s cultural anti-Romanticism, philosophical anti-idealism, and unquestioned trust in the power of natural science to solve social and moral problems. Pisarev proclaimed, “It is precisely in the [spread-eagled, laboratory] frog that the salvation . . . of the Russian people is to be found.” And he formulated what may serve as the manifesto of Russian nihilism: “What can be broken should be broken; what will stand the blow is fit to live; what breaks into smithereens is rubbish; in any case, strike right and left, it will not and cannot do any harm.” 

Russian philosophy, the philosophy produced by Russian thinkers, both in Russia and in the countries to which they emigrated, from the mideighteenth century to the present. There was no Renaissance in Russia, but in the early eighteenth century Peter the Great, in opening a “window to the West,” opened Russia up to Western philosophical influences. The beginnings of Russian speculation date from that period, in the dialogues, fables, and poems of the anti-Enlightenment thinker Gregory Skovoroda 172294 and in the social tracts, metaphysical treatises, and poems of the Enlightenment thinker Alexander Radishchev 17491802. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century the most original and forceful Russian thinkers stood outside the academy. Since then, both in Russia and in Western exile, a number of the most important Russian philosophers  including Berdyaev and Lev Shestov 1866 8  have been  professors. The nineteenth-century thinkers, though educated, lacked advanced degrees. The only  professor among them, Peter Lavrov 18230, taught mathematics and science rather than philosophy during the 1850s. If we compare Russian philosophy to G. philosophy of this period, with its galaxy of  professors  Wolff, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Dilthey  the contrast is sharp. However, if we compare Russian philosophy to English or  philosophy, the contrast fades. No professors of philosophy appear in the line from Francis Bacon through Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Bentham, and J. S. Mill, to Spencer. And in France Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, Rousseau, and Comte were all non-professors. True to their non-professional, even “amateur” status, Russian philosophers until the late nineteenth century paid little attention to the more technical disciplines: logic, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. They focused instead on philosophical anthropology, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion. In Russia, more than in any other Western cultural tradition, speculation, fiction, and poetry have been linked. On the one hand, major novelists such as Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, and major poets such as Pasternak and Brodsky, have engaged in wide-ranging philosophical reflection. On the other hand, philosophers such as Skovoroda, Alexei Khomyakov 180460, and Vladimir Solovyov 18530 were gifted poets, while thinkers such as Herzen, Konstantin Leontyev 183, and the anti-Leninist Marxist Alexander Bogdanov 18738 made their literary mark with novels, short stories, and memoirs. Such Russian thinkers as Vasily Rozanov 18569 and Shestov, although they wrote no belles lettres, were celebrated in literary circles for their sparkling essayistic and aphoristic styles. Certain preoccupations of nineteenth-century Russian thinkers  especially Pyotr Chaadaev 17941856 during the 1820s and 1830s, the Slavophiles and Westernizers during the 1840s and 1850s, and the Populists during the 1860s and 1870s  might appear to be distinctive but in fact were not. The controversial questions of Russia’s relation to Western Europe and of Russell’s paradox Russian philosophy 805    805 Russia’s “special path” to modernity have their counterparts in the reflections of thinkers in Spain “Spain and Europe”, G.y the Sonderweg  a term of which the Russian osobyi put’ is a translation, and Poland “the Polish Question”. The content of Russian philosophy may be characterized in general terms as tending toward utopianism, maximalism, moralism, and soteriology. To take the last point first: Hegelianism was received in Russia in the 1830s not only as an allembracing philosophical system but also as a vehicle of secular salvation. In the 1860s Darwinism was similarly received, as was Marxism in the 0s. Utopianism appears at the historical and sociopolitical level in two of Solovyov’s characteristic doctrines: his early “free theocracy,” in which the spiritual authority of the Roman pope was to be united with the secular authority of the Russian tsar; and his later ecumenical project of reuniting the Eastern Russian Orthodox and Western Roman Catholic churches in a single “universal [vselenskaia] church” that would also incorporate the “Protestant principle” of free philosophical and theological inquiry. Maximalism appears at the individual and religious level in Shestov’s claim that God, for whom alone “all things are possible,” can cause what has happened not to have happened and, in particular, can restore irrecoverable human loss, such as that associated with disease, deformity, madness, and death. Maximalism and moralism are united at the cosmic and “scientific-technological” level in Nikolai Fyodorov’s 18293 insistence on the overriding moral obligation of all men “the sons” to join the common cause of restoring life to “the fathers,” those who gave them life rather than, as sanctioned by the “theory of progress,” pushing them, figuratively if not literally, into the grave. Certain doctrinal emphases and assumptions link Russian thinkers from widely separated points on the political and ideological spectrum: 1 Russian philosophers were nearly unanimous in dismissing the notorious CartesianHumean “problem of other minds” as a nonproblem. Their convictions about human community and conciliarity sobornost’, whether religious or secular, were too powerful to permit Russian thinkers to raise serious doubts as to whether their moaning and bleeding neighbor was “really” in pain. 2 Most Russian thinkers  the Westernizers were a partial exception  viewed key Western philosophical positions and formulations, from the Socratic “know thyself” to the Cartesian cogito, as overly individualistic and overly intellectualistic, as failing to take into account the wholeness of the human person. 3 Both such anti-Marxists as Herzen with his “philosophy of the act” and Fyodorov with his “projective” common task and the early Russian Marxists were in agreement about the unacceptability of the “Western” dichotomy between thought and action. But when they stressed the unity of theory and practice, a key question remained: Who is to shape this unity? And what is its form? The threadbare MarxistLeninist “philosophy” of the Stalin years paid lip service to the freedom involved in forging such a unity. Stalin in fact imposed crushing restraints upon both thought and action. Since 2, works by and about the previously abused or neglected religious and speculative thinkers of Russia’s past have been widely republished and eagerly discussed. This applies to Fyodorov, Solovyov, Leontyev, Rozanov, Berdyaev, Shestov, and the Husserlian Shpet, among others. 

Ryle, Gilbert, English analytic philosopher known especially for his contributions to the philosophy of mind and his attacks on Cartesianism. His best-known work is the masterpiece The Concept of Mind 9, an attack on what he calls “Cartesian dualism” and a defense of a type of logical behaviorism. This dualism he dubs “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine,” the Machine being the body, which is physical and publicly observable, and the Ghost being the mind conceived as a private or secret arena in which episodes of sense perception, consciousness, and inner perception take place. A person, then, is a combination of such a mind and a body, with the mind operating the body through exercises of will called “volitions.” Ryle’s attack on this doctrine is both sharply focused and multifarious. He finds that it rests on a category mistake, namely, assimilating statements about mental processes to the same category as statements about physical processes. This is a mistake in the logic of mental statements and mental concepts and leads to the mistaken metaphysical theory that a person is composed of two separate and distinct though somehow related entities, a mind and a body. It is true that statements about the physical are statements about things and their changes. But statements about the mental are not, and in particular are not about a thing called “the mind.” These two types of statements do not belong to the same category. To show this, Ryle deploys a variety of arguments, including arguments alleging the impossibility of causal relations between mind and body and arguments alleging vicious infinite regresses. To develop his positive view on the nature of mind, Ryle studies the uses and hence the logic of mental terms and finds that mental statements tell us that the person performs observable actions in certain ways and has a disposition to perform other observable actions in specifiable circumstances. For example, to do something intelligently is to do something physical in a certain way and to adjust one’s behavior to the circumstances, not, as the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine would have it, to perform two actions, one of which is a mental action of thinking that eventually causes a separate physical action. Ryle buttresses this position with many acute and subtle analyses of the uses of mental terms. Much of Ryle’s other work concerns philosophical methodology, sustaining the thesis which is the backbone of The Concept of Mind that philosophical problems and doctrines often arise from conceptual confusion, i.e., from mistakes about the logic of language. Important writings in this vein include the influential article “Systematically Misleading Expressions” and the book Dilemmas 4. Ryle was also interested in Grecian philosophy throughout his life, and his last major work, Plato’s Progress, puts forward novel hypotheses about changes in Plato’s views, the role of the Academy, the purposes and uses of Plato’s dialogues, and Plato’s relations with the rulers of Syracuse. 

Saadiah Gaon 882942, Jewish exegete, philosopher, liturgist, grammarian, and lexicographer. Born in the Fayyum in Egypt, Saadiah wrote his first Hebrew dictionary by age twenty. He removed to Tiberias, probably fleeing the backlash of his polemic against the Karaite biblicist, anti-Talmudic sect. There he mastered the inductive techniques of semantic analysis pioneered by Muslim MuÅtazilites in defending their rationalistic monotheism and voluntaristic theodicy. He learned philologically from the Masoretes and liturgical poets, and philosophically from the MuÅtazilite-influenced Jewish metaphysician Daud al-Muqammif of Raqqa in Iraq, and Isaac Israeli of Qayrawan in Tunisia, a Neoplatonizing physician, with whom the young philosopher attempted a correspondence. But his sense of system, evidenced in his pioneering chronology, prayerbook, and scheme of tropes, and nurtured by Arabic versions of Plato but seemingly not much Aristotle, allowed him to outgrow and outshine his mentors. He came to prominence by successfully defending the traditional Hebrew calendar, using astronomical, mathematical, and rabbinic arguments. Called to Baghdad, he became Gaon Hebrew, ‘Eminence’ or head of the ancient Talmudic academy of Pumpedita, then nearly defunct. His commentaries on rabbinic property law and his letters to Jewish communities as far away as Spain refurbished the authority of the academy, but a controversy with the Exilarch, secular head of Mesopotamian Jewry, led to his deposition and six years in limbo, deprived of his judicial authority. He delved into scientific cosmology, tr. many biblical books into Arabic with philosophic commentaries and thematic introductions, and around 933 completed The Book of Critically Chosen Beliefs and Convictions, the first Jewish philosophical summa. Unusual among medieval works for a lengthy epistemological introduction, its ten Arabic treatises defend and define creation, monotheism, human obligation and virtue, theodicy, natural retribution, resurrection, immortality and recompense, Israel’s redemption, and the good life. Saadiah argues that no single good suffices for human happiness; each in isolation is destructive. The Torah prepares the optimal blend of the appetitive and erotic, procreative, civilizational, ascetic, political, intellectual, pious, and tranquil. Following al-Rhazi d. 925 or 932, Saadiah argues that since destruction always overcomes organization in this world, sufferings will always outweigh pleasures; therefore as in rabbinic and MuÅtazilite theodicy God must be assumed to right the balances in the hereafter. Indeed, justice is the object of creation  not simply that the righteous be rewarded but that all should earn their deserved requital: the very light that is sown for the righteous is the fire that torments the wicked. But if requital and even recompense must be earned, this life is much more than an anteroom. Authenticity becomes a value in itself: the innocent are not told directly that their sufferings are a trial, or their testing would be invalid. Only by enduring their sufferings without interference can they demonstrate the qualities that make them worthy of the highest reward. Movingly reconciled with the Exilarch, Saadiah ended his life as Gaon. His voluntarism, naturalism, and rationalism laid philosophical foundations for Maimonides, and his inductive exegesis became a cornerstone of critical hermeneutics. 

Saint Petersburg paradox, a puzzle about gambling that motivated the distinction between expected return and expected utility. Daniel Bernoulli published it in a St. Petersburg journal in 1738. It concerns a gamble like this: it pays $2 if heads appears on the first toss of a coin, $4 if heads does not appear until the second toss, $8 if heads does not appear until the third toss, and so on. The expected return from the gamble is ½2 ! ¼4 ! 1 /88 ! . . . , or 1 ! 1 ! 1 ! ..., i.e., it is infinite. But no one would pay much for the gamble. So it seems that expected returns do not govern rational preferences. Bernoulli argued that expected utilities govern rational preferences. He also held that the utility of wealth is proportional to the log of the amount of wealth. Given his assumptions, the gamble has finite 808 S    808 expected utility, and should not be preferred to large sums of money. However, a twentieth-century version of the paradox, attributed to Karl Menger, reconstructs the gamble, putting utility payoffs in place of monetary payoffs, so that the new gamble has infinite expected utility. Since no one would trade much utility for the new gamble, it also seems that expected utilities do not govern rational preferences. The resolution of the paradox is under debate. 

Saint-Simon, Comte de, title of Claude-Henri de Rouvroy 17601825,  social reformer. An aristocrat by birth, he initially joined the ranks of the enlightened and liberal bourgeoisie. His Newtonian Letters to an Inhabitant of Geneva 1803 and Introduction to Scientific Works of the Nineteenth Century 1808 championed Condorcet’s vision of scientific and technological progress. With Auguste Comte, he shared a positivistic philosophy of history: the triumph of science over metaphysics. Written in wartime, The Reorganization of European Society 1814 urged the creation of a European parliamentary system to secure peace and unity. Having moved from scientism to pacifism, Saint-Simon moved further to industrialism. In 1817, under the influence of two theocratic thinkers, de Maistre and Bonald, Saint-Simon turned away from classical economic liberalism and repudiated laissez-faire capitalism. The Industrial System 1820 drafts the program for a hierarchical state, a technocratic society, and a planned economy. The industrial society of the future is based on the principles of productivity and cooperation and led by a rational and efficient class, the industrialists artists, scientists, and technicians. He argued that the association of positivism with unselfishness, of techniques of rational production with social solidarity and interdependency, would remedy the plight of the poor. Industrialism prefigures socialism, and socialism paves the way for the rule of the law of love, the eschatological age of The New Christianity 1825. This utopian treatise, which reveals Saint-Simon’s alternative to reactionary Catholicism and Protestant individualism, became the Bible of the Saint-Simonians, a sectarian school of utopian socialists.                                              

Same -- Sameness -- Griceian – One of Grice’s favourite essays ever was Wiggins’s “Sameness and substance” -- Griceian différance, a  coinage deployed by Derrida in De la Grammatologie 7, where he defines it as “an economic concept designating the production of differing/deferring.” Différance is polysemic, but its key function is to name the prime condition for the functioning of all language and thought: differing, the differentiation of signs from each other that allows us to differentiate things from each other. Deferring is the process by which signs refer to each other, thus constituting the self-reference essential to language, without ever capturing the being or presence that is the transcendent entity toward which it is aimed. Without the concepts or idealities generated by the iteration of signs, we could never identify a dog as a dog, could not perceive a dog or any other thing as such. Perception presupposes language, which, in turn, presupposes the ideality generated by the repetition of signs. Thus there can be no perceptual origin for language; language depends upon an “original repetition,” a deliberate oxymoron that Derrida employs to signal the impossibility of conceiving an origin of language from within the linguistic framework in which we find ourselves. Différance is the condition for language, and language is the condition for experience: whatever meaning we may find in the world is attributed to the differing/ deferring play of signifiers. The notion of différance and the correlative thesis that meaning is language-dependent have been appropriated by radical thinkers in the attempt to demonstrate that political inequalities are grounded in nothing other than the conventions of sign systems governing differing cultures.

Sanches, F. c.15511623, Portuguese born philosopher and physician. Raised in southern France, he took his medical degree at the  of Montpellier. After a decade of medical practice he was professor of philosophy at the  of Toulouse and later professor of medicine there. His most important work, Quod nihil sciturThat Nothing Is Known, 1581, is a classic of skeptical argumentation. Written at the same time that his cousin, Montaigne, wrote the “Apology for Raimund Sebond,” it devastatingly criticized the Aristotelian theory of knowledge. He began by declaring that he did not even know if he knew nothing. Then he examined the Aristotelian view that science consists of certain knowledge gained by demonstrations from true definitions. First of all, we do not possess such definitions, since all our definitions are just arbitrary names of things. The Aristotelian theory of demonstration is useless, since in syllogistic reasoning the conclusion has to be part of the evidence for the premises. E.g., how can one know that all men are mortal unless one knows that Socrates is mortal? Also, anything can be proven by syllogistic reasoning if one chooses the right premises. This does not produce real knowledge. Further we cannot know anything through its causes, since one would have to know the causes of the causes, and the causes of these, ad infinitum. Sanches also attacked the Platonic theory of knowledge, since mathematical knowledge is about ideal rather than real objects. Mathematics is only hypothetical. Its relevance to experience is not known. True science would consist of perfect knowledge of a thing. Each particular would be understood in and by itself. Such knowledge can be attained only by God. We cannot study objects one by one, since they are all interrelated and interconnected. Our faculties are also not reliable enough. Hence genuine knowledge cannot be attained by humans. What we can do, using “scientific method” a term first used by Sanches, is gather careful empirical information and make cautious judgments about it. His views were well known in the seventeenth century, and may have inspired the “mitigated skepticism” of Gassendi and others. 

sanction, anything whose function is to penalize or reward. It is useful to distinguish between social sanctions, legal sanctions, internal sanctions, and religious sanctions. Social sanctions are extralegal pressures exerted upon the agent by others. For example, others might distrust us, ostracize us, or even physically attack us, if we behave in certain ways. Legal sanctions include corporal punishment, imprisonment, fines, withdrawal of the legal rights to run a business or to leave the area, and other penalties. Internal sanctions may include not only guilt feelings but also the sympathetic pleasures of helping others or the gratified conscience of doing right. Divine sanctions, if there are any, are rewards or punishments given to us by a god while we are alive or after we die. There are important philosophical questions concerning sanctions. Should law be defined as the rules the breaking of which elicits punishment by the state? Could there be a moral duty to behave in a given way if there were no social sanctions concerning such behavior? If not, then a conventionalist account of moral duty seems unavoidable. And, to what extent does the combined effect of external and internal sanctions make rational egoism or prudence or self-interest coincide with morality?

Santayana, G., philosopher and writer. Born in Spain, he arrived in the United States as a child, received his education at Harvard, and rose to professor of philosophy there. He first came to prominence for his view, developed in The Sense of Beauty 6, that beauty is objectified pleasure. His The Life of Reason 5 vols., 5, a celebrated expression of his naturalistic vision, traces human creativity in ordinary life, society, art, religion, and science. He denied that his philosophy ever changed, but the mature expression of his thought, in Skepticism and Animal Faith 3 and The Realms of Being 4 vols., 740, is deliberately ontological and lacks the phenomenological emphasis of the earlier work. Human beings, according to Santayana, are animals in a material world contingent to the core. Reflection must take as its primary datum human action aimed at eating and fleeing. The philosophy of animal faith consists of disentangling the beliefs tacit in such actions and yields a realism concerning both the objects of immediate consciousness and the objects of belief. Knowledge is true belief rendered in symbolic terms. As symbolism, it constitutes the hauntingly beautiful worlds of the senses, poetry, and religion; as knowledge, it guides and is tested by successful action. Santayana had been taught by William James, and his insistence on the primacy of action suggests a close similarity to the views of Dewey. He is, nevertheless, not a pragmatist in any ordinary sense: he views nature as the fully formed arena of human activity and experience as a flow of isolated, private sentience in this alien world. His deepest sympathy is with Aristotle, though he agrees with Plato about the mind-independent existence of Forms and with Schopenhauer about the dimness of human prospects. His mature four-realm ontology turns on the distinction between essence and matter. Essences are forms of definiteness. They are infinite in number and encompass everything possible. Their eternity makes them causally inefficacious: as possibilities, they cannot accomplish their own actualization. Matter, a surd and formless force, generates the physical universe by selecting essences for embodiment. Truth is the realm of being created by the intersection of matter and form: it is the eternal record of essences that have been, are being, and will be given actuality in the history of the world. Spirit or consciousness cannot be reduced to the motions of the physical organism that give rise to it. It is constituted by a sequence of acts or intuitions whose objects are essences but whose time-spanning, synthetic nature renders them impotent. Organic selectivity is the source of values. Accordingly, the good of each organism is a function of its nature. Santayana simply accepts the fact that some of these goods are incommensurable and the tragic reality that they may be incompatible, as well. Under favorable circumstances, a life of reason or of maximal harmonized satisfactions is possible for a while. The finest achievement of human beings, however, is the spiritual life in which we overcome animal partiality and thus all valuation in order to enjoy the intuition of eternal essences. Santayana identifies such spirituality with the best that religion and sound philosophy can offer. It does not help us escape finitude and death, but enables us in this short life to transcend care and to intuit the eternal. Santayana’s exquisite vision has gained him many admirers but few followers. His system is a self-consistent and sophisticated synthesis of elements, such as materialism and Platonism, that have hitherto been thought impossible to reconcile. His masterful writing makes his books instructive and pleasurable, even if many of his characteristic views engender resistance among philosophers.

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, broadly, the claim that one’s perception, thought, and behavior are influenced by one’s language. The hypothesis was named after Benjamin Lee Whorf 7 1 and his teacher Edward Sapir 4 9. We may discern different versions of this claim by distinguishing degrees of linguistic influence, the highest of which is complete and unalterable determination of the fundamental structures of perception, thought, and behavior. In the most radical form, the hypothesis says that one’s reality is constructed by one’s language and that differently structured languages give rise to different realities, which are incommensurable. 

Sartre, J.-P. philosopher and writer, the leading advocate of existentialism during the years following World War II. The heart of his philosophy was the precious notion of freedom and its concomitant sense of personal responsibility. He insisted, in an interview a few years before his death, that he never ceased to believe that “in the end one is always responsible for what is made of one,” only a slight revision of his earlier, bolder slogan, “man makes himself.” To be sure, as a student of Hegel, Marx, Husserl, and Heidegger  and because of his own physical frailty and the tragedies of the war  Sartre had to be well aware of the many constraints and obstacles to human freedom, but as a Cartesian, he never deviated from Descartes’s classical portrait of human consciousness as free and distinct from the physical universe it inhabits. One is never free of one’s “situation,” Sartre tells us, though one is always free to deny “negate” that situation and to try to change it. To be human, to be conscious, is to be free to imagine, free to choose, and responsible for one’s lot in life. As a student, Sartre was fascinated by Husserl’s new philosophical method, phenomenology. His first essays were direct responses to Husserl and applications of the phenomenological method. His essay on The Imagination in 6 established the groundwork for much of what was to follow: the celebration of our remarkable freedom to imagine the world other than it is and following Kant the way that this ability informs all of our experience. In The Transcendence of the Ego 7 he reconsidered Husserl’s central idea of a “phenomenological reduction” the idea of examining the essential structures of consciousness as such and argued following Heidegger that one cannot examine consciousness without at the same time recognizing the reality of actual objects in the world. In other words, there can be no such “reduction.” In his novel Nausea 8, Sartre made this point in a protracted example: his bored and often nauseated narrator confronts a gnarled chestnut tree in the park and recognizes with a visceral shock that its presence is simply given and utterly irreducible. In The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre also reconsiders the notion of the self, which Husserl and so many earlier philosophers had identified with consciousness. But the self, Sartre argues, is not “in” consciousness, much less identical to it. The self is out there “in the world, like the self of another.” In other words, the self is an ongoing project in the world with other people; it is not simply self-awareness or self-consciousness as such “I think, therefore I am”. This separation of self and consciousness and the rejection of the self as simply self-consciousness provide the framework for Sartre’s greatest philosophical treatise, L’être et le néant Being and Nothingness, 3. Its structure is unabashedly Cartesian, consciousness “being-for-itself” or pour soi on the one side, the existence of mere things “being-in-itself” or en soi on the other. The phraseology comes from Hegel. But Sartre does not fall into the Cartesian trap of designating these two types of being as separate “substances.” Instead, Sartre describes consciousness as “nothing’  “not a thing” but an activity, “a wind blowing from nowhere toward the world.” Sartre often resorts to visceral metaphors when developing this theme e.g., “a worm coiled in the heart of being”, but much of what he is arguing is familiar to philosophical readers in the more metaphor-free work of Kant, who also warned against the follies “paralogisms” of understanding consciousness as itself a possible object of consciousness rather than as the activity of constituting the objects of consciousness. As the lens of a camera can never see itself  and in a mirror only sees a reflection of itself  consciousness can never view itself as consciousness and is only aware of itself  “for itself”  through its experience of objects. Ontologically, one might think of “nothingness” as “no-thing-ness,” a much less outrageous suggestion than those that would make it an odd sort of a thing. It is through the nothingness of consciousness and its activities that negation comes into the world, our ability to imagine the world other than it is and the inescapable necessity of imagining ourselves other than we seem to be. And because consciousness is nothingness, it is not subject to the rules of causality. Central to the argument of L’être et le néant and Sartre’s insistence on the primacy of human freedom is his insistence that consciousness cannot be understood in causal terms. It is always self-determining and, as such, “it always is what it is not, and is not what it is”  a playful paradox that refers to the fact that we are always in the process of choosing. Consciousness is “nothing,” but the self is always on its way to being something. Throughout our lives we accumulate a body of facts that are true of us  our “facticity”  but during our lives we remain free to envision new possibilities, to reform ourselves and to reinterpret our facticity in the light of new projects and ambitions  our “transcendence.” This indeterminacy means that we can never be anything, and when we try to establish ourselves as something particular  whether a social role policeman, waiter or a certain character shy, intellectual, cowardly  we are in “bad faith.” Bad faith is erroneously viewing ourselves as something fixed and settled Sartre utterly rejects Freud and his theory of the unconscious determination of our personalities and behavior, but it is also bad faith to view oneself as a being of infinite possibilities and ignore the always restrictive facts and circumstances within which all choices must be made. On the one hand, we are always trying to define ourselves; on the other hand we are always free to break away from what we are, and always responsible for what we have made of ourselves. But there is no easy resolution or “balance” between facticity and freedom, rather a kind of dialectic or tension. The result is our frustrated desire to be God, to be both in-itself and for-itself. But this is not so much blasphemy as an expression of despair, a form of ontological original sin, the impossibility of being both free and what we want to be. Life for Sartre is yet more complicated. There is a third basic ontological category, on a par with the being-in-itself and being-for-itself and not derivative of them. He calls it “being-for-others.” To say that it is not derivative is to insist that our knowledge of others is not inferred, e.g. by some argument by analogy, from the behavior of others, and we ourselves are not wholly constituted by our self-determinations and the facts about us. Sartre gives us a brutal but familiar everyday example of our experience of being-for-others in what he calls “the look” le regard. Someone catches us “in the act” of doing something humiliating, and we find ourselves defining ourselves probably also resisting that definition in their terms. In his Saint Genet 3, Sartre describes such a conversion of the ten-year-old Jean Genet into a thief. So, too, we tend to “catch” one another in the judgments we make and define one another in terms that are often unflattering. But these judgments become an essential and ineluctible ingredient in our sense of ourselves, and they too lead to conflicts indeed, conflicts so basic and so frustrating that in his play Huis clos No Exit, 3 Sartre has one of his characters utter the famous line, “Hell is other people.” In his later works, notably his Critique of Dialectical Reason 859, Sartre turned increasingly to politics and, in particular, toward a defense of Marxism on existentialist principles. This entailed rejecting materialist determinism, but it also required a new sense of solidarity or what Sartre had wistfully called, following Heidegger, Mitsein or “being with others”. Thus in his later work he struggled to find a way of overcoming the conflict and insularity or the rather “bourgeois” consciousness he had described in Being and Nothingness. Not surprisingly given his constant political activities he found it in revolutionary engagement. Consonant with his rejection of bourgeois selfhood, Sartre turned down the 4 Nobel prize for literature. 

Satisfactoriness-condition, a state of affairs or “way things are,” most commonly referred to in relation to something that implies or is implied by it. Let p, q, and r be schematic letters for declarative sentences; and let P, Q, and R be corresponding nominalizations; e.g., if p is ‘snow is white’, then P would be ‘snow’s being white’. P can be a necessary or sufficient condition of Q in any of several senses. In the weakest sense P is a sufficient condition of Q iff if and only if: if p then q or if P is actual then Q is actual  where the conditional is to be read as “material,” as amounting merely to not-p & not-q. At the same time Q is a necessary condition of P iff: if not-q then not-p. It follows that P is a sufficient condition of Q iff Q is a necessary condition of P. Stronger senses of sufficiency and of necessity are definable, in terms of this basic sense, as follows: P is nomologically sufficient necessary for Q iff it follows from the laws of nature, but not without them, that if p then q that if q then p. P is alethically or metaphysically sufficient necessary for Q iff it is alethically or metaphysically necessary that if p then q that if q then p. However, it is perhaps most common of all to interpret conditions in terms of subjunctive conditionals, in such a way that P is a sufficient condition of Q iff P would not occur unless Q occurred, or: if P should occur, Q would; and P is a necessary condition of Q iff Q would not occur unless P occurred, or: if Q should occur, P would.  -- satisfaction, an auxiliary semantic notion introduced by Tarski in order to give a recursive definition of truth for languages containing quantifiers. Intuitively, the satisfaction relation holds between formulas containing free variables such as ‘Buildingx & Tallx’ and objects or sequences of objects such as the Empire State Building if and only if the formula “holds of” or “applies to” the objects. Thus, ‘Buildingx & Tallx’, is satisfied by all and only tall buildings, and ‘-Tallx1 & Tallerx1, x2’ is satisfied by any pair of objects in which the first object corresponding to ‘x1’ is not tall, but nonetheless taller than the second corresponding to ‘x2’. Satisfaction is needed when defining truth for languages with sentences built from formulas containing free variables, because the notions of truth and falsity do not apply to these “open” formulas. Thus, we cannot characterize the truth of the sentences ‘Dx Buildingx & Tallx’ ‘Some building is tall’ in terms of the truth or falsity of the open formula ‘Buildingx & Tallx’, since the latter is neither true nor false. But note that the sentence is true if and only if the formula is satisfied by some object. Since we can give a recursive definition of the notion of satisfaction for possibly open formulas, this enables us to use this auxiliary notion in defining truth.  -- satisfiable, having a common model, a structure in which all the sentences in the set are true; said of a set of sentences. In modern logic, satisfiability is the semantic analogue of the syntactic, proof-theoretic notion of consistency, the unprovability of any explicit contradiction. The completeness theorem for first-order logic, that all valid sentences are provable, can be formulated in terms of satisfiability: syntactic consistency implies satisfiability. This theorem does not necessarily hold for extensions of first-order logic. For any sound proof system for secondorder logic there will be an unsatisfiable set of sentences without there being a formal derivation of a contradiction from the set. This follows from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. One of the central results of model theory for first-order logic concerns satisfiability: the compactness theorem, due to Gödel in 6, says that if every finite subset of a set of sentences is satisfiable the set itself is satisfiable. It follows immediately from his completeness theorem for first-order logic, and gives a powerful method to prove the consistency of a set of sentences. 

satisfice, to choose or do the good enough rather than the most or the best. ‘Satisfice’, an obsolete variant of ‘satisfy’, has been adopted by economist Herbert Simon and others to designate nonoptimizing choice or action. According to some economists, limitations of time or information may make it impossible or inadvisable for an individual, firm, or state body to attempt to maximize pleasure, profits, market share, revenues, or some other desired result, and satisficing with respect to such results is then said to be rational, albeit less than ideally rational. Although many orthodox economists think that choice can and always should be conceived in maximizing or optimizing terms, satisficing models have been proposed in economics, evolutionary biology, and philosophy. Biologists have sometimes conceived evolutionary change as largely consisting of “good enough” or satisficing adaptations to environmental pressures rather than as proceeding through optimal adjustments to such pressures, but in philosophy, the most frequent recent use of the idea of satisficing has been in ethics and rational choice theory. Economists typically regard satisficing as acceptable only where there are unwanted constraints on decision making; but it is also possible to see satisficing as entirely acceptable in itself, and in the field of ethics, it has recently been argued that there may be nothing remiss about moral satisficing, e.g., giving a good amount to charity, but less than one could give. It is possible to formulate satisficing forms of utilitarianism on which actions are morally right even if they contribute merely positively and/or in some large way, rather than maximally, to overall net human happiness. Bentham’s original formulation of the principle of utility and Popper’s negative utilitarianism are both examples of satisficing utilitarianism in this sense  and it should be noted that satisficing utilitarianism has the putative advantage over optimizing forms of allowing for supererogatory degrees of moral excellence. Moreover, any moral view that treats moral satisficing as permissible makes room for moral supererogation in cases where one optimally goes beyond the merely acceptable. But since moral satisficing is less than optimal moral behavior, but may be more meritorious than certain behavior that in the same circumstances would be merely permissible, some moral satisficing may actually count as supererogatory. In recent work on rational individual choice, some philosophers have argued that satisficing may often be acceptable in itself, rather than merely second-best. Even Simon allows that an entrepreneur may simply seek a satisfactory return on investment or share of the market, rather than a maximum under one of these headings. But a number of philosophers have made the further claim that we may sometimes, without irrationality, turn down the readily available better in the light of the goodness and sufficiency of what we already have or are enjoying. Independently of the costs of taking a second dessert, a person may be entirely satisfied with what she has eaten and, though willing to admit she would enjoy that extra dessert, turn it down, saying “I’m just fine as I am.” Whether such examples really involve an acceptable rejection of the momentarily better for the good enough has been disputed. However, some philosophers have gone on to say, even more strongly, that satisficing can sometimes be rationally required and optimizing rationally unacceptable. To keep on seeking pleasure from food or sex without ever being thoroughly satisfied with what one has enjoyed can seem compulsive and as such less than rational. If one is truly rational about such goods, one isn’t insatiable: at some point one has had enough and doesn’t want more, even though one could obtain further pleasure. The idea that satisficing is sometimes a requirement of practical reason is reminiscent of Aristotle’s view that moderation is inherently reasonable  rather than just a necessary means to later enjoyments and the avoidance of later pain or illness, which is the way the Epicureans conceived moderation. But perhaps the greatest advocate of satisficing is Plato, who argues in the Philebus that there must be measure or limit to our desire for pleasure in order for pleasure to count as a good thing for us. Insatiably to seek and obtain pleasure from a given source is to gain nothing good from it. And according to such a view, satisficing moderation is a necessary precondition of human good and flourishing, rather than merely being a rational restraint on the accumulation of independently conceived personal good or well-being.

Saussure, Ferdinand de, founder of structuralism. His work in semiotics is a major influence on the later development of  structuralist philosophy, as well as structural anthropology, structuralist literary criticism, and modern semiology. He pursued studies in linguistics largely under Georg Curtius at the  of Leipzig, along with such future Junggrammatiker neogrammarians as Leskien and Brugmann. Following the publication of his important Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-européenes 1879, Saussure left for Paris, where he associated himself with the Société Linguistique and taught comparative grammar. In 1, he returned to Switzerland to teach Sanskrit, comparative grammar, and general linguistics at the  of Geneva. His major work, the Course in General Linguistics 6, was assembled from students’ notes and his original lecture outlines after his death. The Course in General Linguistics argued against the prevalent historical and comparative philological approaches to language by advancing what Saussure termed a scientific model for linguistics, one borrowed in part from Durkheim. Such a model would take the “social fact” of language la langue as its object, and distinguish this from the variety of individual speech events la parole, as well as from the collectivity of speech events and grammatical rules that form the general historical body of language as such le langage. Thus, by separating out the unique and accidental elements of practiced speech, Saussure distinguished language la langue as the objective set of linguistic elements and rules that, taken as a system, governs the language use specific to a given community. It was the systematic coherency and generality of language, so conceived, that inclined Saussure to approach linguistics principally in terms of its static or synchronic dimension, rather than its historical or diachronic dimension. For Saussure, the system of language is a “treasury” or “depository” of signs, and the basic unit of the linguistic sign is itself two-sided, having both a phonemic component “the signifier” and a semantic component “the signified”. He terms the former the “acoustical” or “sound” image  which may, in turn, be represented graphically, in writing  and the latter the “concept” or “meaning.” Saussure construes the signifier to be a representation of linguistic sounds in the imagination or memory, i.e., a “psychological phenomenon,” one that corresponds to a specifiable range of material phonetic sounds. Its distinctive property consists in its being readily differentiated from other signifiers in the particular language. It is the function of each signifier, as a distinct entity, to convey a particular meaning  or “signified” concept  and this is fixed purely by conventional association. While the relation between the signifier and signified results in what Saussure terms the “positive” fact of the sign, the sign ultimately derives its linguistic value its precise descriptive determination from its position in the system of language as a whole, i.e., within the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations that structurally and functionally differentiate it. Signifiers are differentially identified; signifiers are arbitrarily associated with their respective signified concepts; and signs assume the determination they do only through their configuration within the system of language as a whole: these facts enabled Saussure to claim that language is largely to be understood as a closed formal system of differences, and that the study of language would be principally governed by its autonomous structural determinations. So conceived, linguistics would be but a part of the study of social sign systems in general, namely, the broader science of what Saussure termed semiology. Saussure’s insights would be taken up by the subsequent Geneva, Prague, and Copenhagen schools of linguistics and by the Russian formalists, and would be further developed by the structuralists in France and elsewhere, as well as by recent semiological approaches to literary criticism, social anthropology, and psychoanalysis.

scepticism: For some reason, Grice was irritated by Wood’s sobriquet of Russell as a “passionate sceptic”: ‘an oxymoron.” The most specific essay by Grice on this is an essay he kept after many years, that he delivered back in the day at Oxford, entitled, “Scepticism and common sense.” Both were traditional topics at Oxford at the time. Typically, as in the Oxonian manner, he chose two authors, New-World’s Malcolm’s treatment of Old-World Moore, and brings in Austin’s ‘ordinary-language’ into the bargain. He also brings in his own obsession with what an emissor communicates. In this case, the “p” is the philosopher’s sceptical proposition, such as “That pillar box is red.” Grice thinks ‘dogmatic’ is the opposite of ‘sceptic,’ and he is right! Liddell and Scott have “δόγμα,” from “δοκέω,” and which they render as “that which seems to one, opinion or belief;” Pl.R.538c; “δ. πόλεως κοινόν;” esp. of philosophical doctrines, Epicur.Nat.14.7; “notion,” Pl.Tht.158d; “decision, judgement,” Pl. Lg.926d; (pl.); public decree, ordinance,  esp. of Roman Senatus-consulta, “δ. συγκλήτου”  “δ. τῆς βουλῆς” So note that there is nothing ‘dogmatic’ about ‘dogma,’ as it derives from ‘dokeo,’ and is rendered as ‘that which seems to one.’ So the keyword should be later Grecian, and in the adjectival ‘dogmatic.’ Liddell and Scott have “δογματικός,” which they render as “of or for doctrines, didactic, [διάλογοι] Quint.Inst.2.15.26, and “of persons, δ. ἰατροί,” “physicians who go by general principles,” opp. “ἐμπειρικοί and μεθοδικοί,” Dsc.Ther.Praef., Gal.1.65; in Philosophy, S.E.M.7.1, D.L.9.70, etc.; “δ. ὑπολήψεις” Id.9.83; “δ. φιλοσοφία” S.E. P.1.4. Adv. “-κῶς” D.L.9.74, S.E.P.1.197: Comp. “-κώτερον” Id.M. 6.4. Why is Grice interested in scepticism. His initial concern, the one that Austin would authorize, relates to ‘ordinary language.’ What if ‘ordinary language’ embraces scepticism? What if it doesn’t? Strawso notes that the world of ordinary language is a world of things, causes, and stuff. None of the good stuff for the sceptic. what is Grice’s answer to the sceptic’s implicaturum? The sceptic’s implicaturum is a topic that always fascinated Girce. While Grice groups two essays as dealing with one single theme, strictly, only this or that philosopher’s paradox (not all) may count as sceptical. This or that philosopher’s paradox may well not be sceptical at all but rather dogmatic. In fact, Grice defines philosophers paradox as anything repugnant to common sense, shocking, or extravagant ‒ to Malcolms ears, that is! While it is, strictly, slightly odd to quote this as a given date just because, by a stroke of the pen, Grice writes that date in the Harvard volume, we will follow his charming practice. This is vintage Grice. Grice always takes the sceptics challenge seriously, as any serious philosopher should. Grices takes both the sceptics explicatum and the scepticss implicaturum as self-defeating, as a very affront to our idea of rationality, conversational or other. V: Conversations with a sceptic: Can he be slightly more conversational helpful? Hume’ sceptical attack is partial, and targeted only towards practical reason, though.  Yet, for Grice, reason is one. You cannot really attack practical or buletic reason without attacking theoretical or doxastic reason. There is such thing as a general rational acceptance, to use Grice’s term, that the sceptic is getting at. Grice likes to play with the idea that ultimately every syllogism is buletic or practical. If, say, a syllogism by Eddington looks doxastic, that is because Eddington cares to omit the practical tail, as Grice puts it. And Eddington is not even a philosopher, they say. Grice is here concerned with a Cantabrigian topic popularised by Moore. As Grice recollects, Some like Witters, but Moore’s my man. Unlike Cambridge analysts such as Moore, Grice sees himself as a linguistic-turn Oxonian analyst. So it is only natural that Grice would connect time-honoured scepticism of Pyrrhos vintage, and common sense with ordinary language, so mis-called, the elephant in Grices room. Lewis and Short have “σκέψις,” f. σκέπτομαι, which they render as “viewing, perception by the senses, ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ςκέψις, Pl. Phd. 83a; observation of auguries; also as examination, speculation, consideration, τὸ εὕρημα πολλῆς σκέψιος; βραχείας ςκέψις; ϝέμειν ςκέψις take thought of a thing; ἐνθεὶς τῇ τέχνῃ ςκέψις; ςκέψις ποιεῖσθαι; ςκέψις προβέβληκας; ςκέψις λόγων; ςκέψις περί τινος inquiry into, speculation on a thing; περί τι Id. Lg. 636d;ἐπὶ σκέψιν τινὸς ἐλθεῖν; speculation, inquiry,ταῦτα ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως; ἔξω τῆς νῦν ςκέψεως; οὐκ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης ςκέψις; also hesitation, doubt, esp. of the Sceptic or Pyrthonic philosophers, AP 7. 576 (Jul.); the Sceptic philosophy, S. E. P. 1.5; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ςκέψεως, the Sceptics, ib. 229. in politics, resolution, decree, συνεδρίον Hdn. 4.3.9, cf. Poll. 6.178. If scepticism attacks common sense and fails, Grice seems to be implicating, that ordinary language philosophy is a good antidote to scepticism. Since what language other than ordinary language does common sense speak? Well, strictly, common sense doesnt speak. The man in the street does. Grice addresses this topic in a Mooreian way in a later essay, also repr. in Studies, Moore and philosophers paradoxes, repr. in Studies. As with his earlier Common sense and scepticism, Grice tackles Moores and Malcolms claim that ordinary language, so-called, solves a few of philosophers paradoxes. Philosopher is Grices witty way to generalise over your common-or-garden, any, philosopher, especially of the type he found eccentric, the sceptic included. Grice finds this or that problem in this overarching Cantabrigian manoeuvre, as over-simplifying a pretty convoluted terrain. While he cherishes Austins Some like Witters, but Moores MY man! Grice finds Moore too Cantabrigian to his taste. While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice is a bit like Austin, Some like Witters, but Moores my man, with this or that caveat. Again, as with his treatment of Descartes or Locke, Grice is hardly interested in finding out what Moore really means. He is a philosopher, not a historian of philosophy, and he knows it. While Grice agrees with Austins implicaturum that Moore goes well above Witters, if that is the expression (even if some like him), we should find the Oxonian equivalent to Moore. Grice would not Names Ryle, since he sees him, and his followers, almost every day. There is something apostolic about Moore that Grice enjoys, which is just as well, seeing that Moore is one of the twelve. Grice found it amusing that the members of The Conversazione Society would still be nickNamesd apostles when their number exceeded the initial 12. Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm, a follower of Witters, which does not help, as it were, has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly Oxonian turn of phrase, such as ordinary language is. For Malcolms Moore, a paradox by philosopher [sic], including the sceptic, arises when philosopher [sic], including the sceptic, fails to abide by the dictates of ordinary language. It might merit some exploration if Moore’s defence of common sense is against: the sceptic may be one, but also the idealist. Moore the realist, armed with ordinary language attacks the idealists claim. The idealist is sceptical of the realists claim. But empiricist idealism (Bradley) has at Oxford as good pedigree as empiricist realism (Cook Wilson). Malcolm’s simplifications infuriate Grice, and ordinary language has little to offer in the defense of common sense realism against sceptical empiricist idealism. Surely the ordinary man says ridiculous, or silly, as Russell prefers, things, such as Smith is lucky, Departed spirits walk along this road on their way to Paradise, I know there are infinite stars, and I wish I were Napoleon, or I wish that I had been Napoleon, which does not mean that the utterer wishes that he were like Napoleon, but that he wishes that he had lived not in the his century but in the XVIIIth century. Grice is being specific about this. It is true that an ordinary use of language, as Malcolm suggests, cannot be self-contradictory unless the ordinary use of language is defined by stipulation as not self-contradictory, in which case an appeal to ordinary language becomes useless against this or that paradox by Philosopher. I wish that I had been Napoleon seems to involve nothing but an ordinary use of language by any standard but that of freedom from absurdity. I wish that I had been Napoleon is not, as far as Grice can see, philosophical, but something which may have been said and meant by numbers of ordinary people. Yet, I wish that I had been Napoleon is open to the suspicion of self-contradictoriness, absurdity, or some other kind of meaninglessness. And in this context suspicion is all Grice needs. By uttering I wish that I had been Napoleon U hardly means the same as he would if he uttered I wish I were like Napoleon. I wish that I had been Napoleon is suspiciously self-contradictory, absurd, or meaningless, if, as uttered by an utterer in a century other than the XVIIIth century, say, the utterer is understood as expressing the proposition that the utterer wishes that he had lived in the XVIIIth century, and not in his century, in which case he-1 wishes that he had not been him-1? But blame it on the buletic. That Moore himself is not too happy with Malcolms criticism can be witnessed by a cursory glimpse at hi reply to Malcolm. Grice is totally against this view that Malcolm ascribes to Moore as a view that is too broad to even claim to be true. Grices implicaturum is that Malcolm is appealing to Oxonian turns of phrase, such as ordinary language, but not taking proper Oxonian care in clarifying the nuances and stuff in dealing with, admittedly, a non-Oxonian philosopher such as Moore. When dealing with Moore, Grice is not necessarily concerned with scepticism. Time is unreal, e.g. is hardly a sceptic utterance. Yet Grice lists it as one of Philosophers paradoxes. So, there are various to consider here. Grice would start with common sense. That is what he does when he reprints this essay in WOW, with his attending note in both the preface and the Retrospective epilogue on how he organizes the themes and strands. Common sense is one keyword there, with its attending realism. Scepticism is another, with its attending empiricist idealism. It is intriguing that in the first two essays opening Grices explorations in semantics and metaphysics it seems its Malcolm, rather than the dryer Moore, who interests Grice most. While he would provide exegeses of this or that dictum by Moore, and indeed, Moore’s response to Malcolm, Grice seems to be more concerned with applications of his own views. Notably in Philosophers paradoxes. The fatal objection Grice finds for the paradox propounder (not necessarily a sceptic, although a sceptic may be one of the paradox propounders) significantly rests on Grices reductive analysis of meaning that  as ascribed to this or that utterer U. Grice elaborates on circumstances that hell later take up in the Retrospective epilogue. I find myself not understanding what I mean is dubiously acceptable. If meaning, Grice claims, is about an utterer U intending to get his addressee A to believe that U ψ-s that p, U must think there is a good chance that A will recognise what he is supposed to believe, by, perhaps, being aware of the Us practice or by a supplementary explanation which might come from U. In which case, U should not be meaning what Malcolm claims U might mean. No utterer should intend his addressee to believe what is conceptually impossible, or incoherent, or blatantly false (Charles Is decapitation willed Charles Is death.), unless you are Queen in Through the Looking Glass. I believe five impossible things before breakfast, and I hope youll soon get the proper training to follow suit. Cf. Tertulian, Credo, quia absurdum est. Admittedly, Grice edits the Philosophers paradoxes essay. It is only Grices final objection which is repr. in WOW, even if he provides a good detailed summary of the previous sections. Grice appeals to Moore on later occasions. In Causal theory, Grice lists, as a third philosophical mistake, the opinion by Malcolm that Moore did not know how to use knowin a sentence. Grice brings up the same example again in Prolegomena. The use of factive know of Moore may well be a misuse. While at Madison, Wisconsin, Moore lectures at a hall eccentrically-built with indirect lighting simulating sun rays, Moore infamously utters, I know that there is a window behind that curtain, when there is not. But it is not the factiveness Grice is aiming at, but the otiosity Malcolm misdescribes in the true, if baffling, I know that I have two hands. In Retrospective epilogue, Grice uses M to abbreviate Moore’s fairy godmother – along with G (Grice), A (Austin), R (Ryle) and Q (Quine)! One simple way to approach Grices quandary with Malcolm’s quandary with Moore is then to focus on know. How can Malcolm claim that Moore is guilty of misusing know? The most extensive exploration by Grice on know is in Grices third James lecture (but cf. his seminar on Knowledge and belief, and his remarks on some of our beliefs needing to be true, in Meaning revisited. The examinee knows that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815. Nothing odd about that, nor about Moores uttering I know that these are my hands. Grice is perhaps the only one of the Oxonian philosophers of Austins play group who took common sense realsim so seriously, if only to crticise Malcoms zeal with it. For Grice, common-sense realism = ordinary language, whereas for the typical Austinian, ordinary language = the language of the man in the street. Back at Oxford, Grice uses Malcolm to contest the usual criticism that Oxford ordinary-language philosophers defend common-sense realist assumptions just because the way non-common-sense realist philosopher’s talk is not ordinary language, and even at Oxford. Cf. Flews reference to Joness philosophical verbal rubbish in using self as a noun. Grice is infuriated by all this unclear chatter, and chooses Malcolms mistreatment of Moore as an example. Grice is possibly fearful to consider Austins claims directly! In later essays, such as ‘the learned’ and ‘the lay,’ Grice goes back to the topic criticising now the scientists jargon as an affront to the ordinary language of the layman that Grice qua philosopher defends. scepticism, in the most common sense, the refusal to grant that there is any knowledge or justification. Skepticism can be either partial or total, either practical or theoretical, and, if theoretical, either moderate or radical, and either of knowledge or of justification. Skepticism is partial iff if and only if it is restricted to particular fields of beliefs or propositions, and total iff not thus restricted. And if partial, it may be highly restricted, as is the skepticism for which religion is only opium, or much more general, as when not only is religion called opium, but also history bunk and metaphysics meaningless. Skepticism is practical iff it is an attitude of deliberately withholding both belief and disbelief, accompanied perhaps but not necessarily by commitment to a recommendation for people generally, that they do likewise. Practical skepticism can of course be either total or partial, and if partial it can be more or less general. Skepticism is theoretical iff it is a commitment to the belief that there is no knowledge justified belief of a certain kind or of certain kinds. Such theoretical skepticism comes in several varieties. It is moderate and total iff it holds that there is no certain superknowledge superjustified belief whatsoever, not even in logic or mathematics, nor through introspection of one’s present experience. It is radical and total iff it holds that there isn’t even any ordinary knowledge justified belief at all. It is moderate and partial, on the other hand, iff it holds that there is no certain superknowledge superjustified belief of a certain specific kind K or of certain specific kinds K1, . . . , Kn less than the totality of such kinds. It is radical and partial, finally, iff it holds that there isn’t even any ordinary knowledge justified belief at all of that kind K or of those kinds K1, . . . , Kn. Grecian skepticism can be traced back to Socrates’ epistemic modesty. Suppressed by the prolific theoretical virtuosity of Plato and Aristotle, such modesty reasserted itself in the skepticism of the Academy led by Arcesilaus and later by Carneades. In this period began a long controversy pitting Academic Skeptics against the Stoics Zeno and later Chrysippus, and their followers. Prolonged controversy, sometimes heated, softened the competing views, but before agreement congealed Anesidemus broke with the Academy and reclaimed the arguments and tradition of Pyrrho, who wrote nothing, but whose Skeptic teachings had been preserved by a student, Timon in the third century B.C.. After enduring more than two centuries, neoPyrrhonism was summarized, c.200 A.D., by Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Adversus mathematicos. Skepticism thus ended as a school, but as a philosophical tradition it has been influential long after that, and is so even now. It has influenced strongly not only Cicero Academica and De natura deorum, St. Augustine Contra academicos, and Montaigne “Apology for Raimund Sebond”, but also the great historical philosophers of the Western tradition, from Descartes through Hegel. Both on the Continent and in the Anglophone sphere a new wave of skepticism has built for decades, with logical positivism, deconstructionism, historicism, neopragmatism, and relativism, and the writings of Foucault knowledge as a mask of power, Derrida deconstruction, Quine indeterminacy and eliminativism, Kuhn incommensurability, and Rorty solidarity over objectivity, edification over inquiry. At the same time a rising tide of books and articles continues other philosophical traditions in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc. It is interesting to compare the cognitive disengagement recommended by practical skepticism with the affective disengagement dear to stoicism especially in light of the epistemological controversies that long divided Academic Skepticism from the Stoa, giving rise to a rivalry dominant in Hellenistic philosophy. If believing and favoring are positive, with disbelieving and disfavoring their respective negative counterparts, then the magnitude of our happiness positive or unhappiness negative over a given matter is determined by the product of our belief/disbelief and our favoring/disfavoring with regard to that same matter. The fear of unhappiness may lead one stoically to disengage from affective engagement, on either side of any matter that escapes one’s total control. And this is a kind of practical affective “skepticism.” Similarly, if believing and truth are positive, with disbelieving and falsity their respective negative counterparts, then the magnitude of our correctness positive or error negative over a given matter is determined by the product of our belief/disbelief and the truth/falsity with regard to that same matter where the positive or negative magnitude of the truth or falsity at issue may be determined by some measure of “theoretical importance,” though alternatively one could just assign all truths a value of !1 and all falsehoods a value of †1. The fear of error may lead one skeptically to disengage from cognitive engagement, on either side of any matter that involves risk of error. And this is “practical cognitive skepticism.” We wish to attain happiness and avoid unhappiness. This leads to the disengagement of the stoic. We wish to attain the truth and avoid error. This leads to the disengagement of the skeptic, the practical skeptic. Each opts for a conservative policy, but one that is surely optional, given just the reasoning indicated. For in avoiding unhappiness the stoic also forfeits a corresponding possibility of happiness. And in avoiding error the skeptic also forfeits a corresponding possibility to grasp a truth. These twin policies appeal to conservatism in our nature, and will reasonably prevail in the lives of those committed to avoiding risk as a paramount objective. For this very desire must then be given its due, if we judge it rational. Skepticism is instrumental in the birth of modern epistemology, and modern philosophy, at the hands of Descartes, whose skepticism is methodological but sophisticated and well informed by that of the ancients. Skepticism is also a main force, perhaps the main force, in the broad sweep of Western philosophy from Descartes through Hegel. Though preeminent in the history of our subject, skepticism since then has suffered decades of neglect, and only in recent years has reclaimed much attention and even applause. Some recent influential discussions go so far as to grant that we do not know we are not dreaming. But they also insist one can still know when there is a fire before one. The key is to analyze knowledge as a kind of appropriate responsiveness to its object truth: what is required is that the subject “track” through his belief the truth of what he believes. S tracks the truth of P iff: S would not believe P if P were false. Such an analysis of tracking, when conjoined with the view of knowledge as tracking, enables one to explain how one can know about the fire even if for all one knows it is just a dream. The crucial fact here is that even if P logically entails Q, one may still be able to track the truth of P though unable to track the truth of Q. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 1. Many problems arise in the literature on this approach. One that seems especially troubling is that though it enables us to understand how contingent knowledge of our surroundings is possible, the tracking account falls short of enabling an explanation of how such knowledge on our part is actual. To explain how one knows that there is a fire before one F, according to the tracking account one presumably would invoke one’s tracking the truth of F. But this leads deductively almost immediately to the claim that one is not dreaming: Not D. And this is not something one can know, according to the tracking account. So how is one to explain one’s justification for making that claim? Most troubling of all here is the fact that one is now cornered by the tracking account into making combinations of claims of the following form: I am quite sure that p, but I have no knowledge at all as to whether p. And this seems incoherent. A Cartesian dream argument that has had much play in recent discussions of skepticism is made explicit by Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, 4 as follows. One knows that if one knows F then one is not dreaming, in which case if one really knows F then one must know one is not dreaming. However, one does not know one is not dreaming. So one does not know F. Q.E.D. And why does one fail to know one is not dreaming? Because in order to know it one would need to know that one has passed some test, some empirical procedure to determine whether one is dreaming. But any such supposed test  say, pinching oneself  could just be part of a dream, and dreaming one passes the test would not suffice to show one was not dreaming. However, might one not actually be witnessing the fire, and passing the test  and be doing this in wakeful life, not in a dream  and would that not be compatible with one’s knowing of the fire and of one’s wakefulness? Not so, according to the argument, since in order to know of the fire one needs prior knowledge of one’s wakefulness. But in order to know of one’s wakefulness one needs prior knowledge of the results of the test procedure. But this in turn requires prior knowledge that one is awake and not dreaming. And we have a vicious circle. We might well hold that it is possible to know one is not dreaming even in the absence of any positive test result, or at most in conjunction with coordinate not prior knowledge of such a positive indication. How in that case would one know of one’s wakefulness? Perhaps one would know it by believing it through the exercise of a reliable faculty. Perhaps one would know it through its coherence with the rest of one’s comprehensive and coherent body of beliefs. Perhaps both. But, it may be urged, if these are the ways one might know of one’s wakefulness, does not this answer commit us to a theory of the form of A below? A The proposition that p is something one knows believes justifiably if and only if one satisfies conditions C with respect to it. And if so, are we not caught in a vicious circle by the question as to how we know  what justifies us in believing  A itself? This is far from obvious, since the requirement that we must submit to some test procedure for wakefulness and know ourselves to test positively, before we can know ourselves to be awake, is itself a requirement that seems to lead equally to a principle such as A. At least it is not evident why the proposal of the externalist or of the coherentist as to how we know we are awake should be any more closely related to a general principle like A than is the foundationalist? notion that in order to know we are awake we need epistemically prior knowledge that we test positive in a way that does not presuppose already acquired knowledge of the external world. The problem of how to justify the likes of A is a descendant of the infamous “problem of the criterion,” reclaimed in the sixteenth century and again in this century by Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 6, 7, and 8 but much used already by the Skeptics of antiquity under the title of the diallelus. About explanations of our knowledge or justification in general of the form indicated by A, we are told that they are inadequate in a way revealed by examples like the following. Suppose we want to know how we know anything at all about the external world, and part of the answer is that we know the location of our neighbor by knowing the location of her car in her driveway. Surely this would be at best the beginning of an answer that might be satisfactory in the end if recursive, e.g., but as it stands it cannot be satisfactory without supplementation. The objection here is based on a comparison between two appeals: the appeal of a theorist of knowledge to a principle like A in the course of explaining our knowledge or justification in general, on one side; and the appeal to the car’s location in explaining our knowledge of facts about the external world, on the other side. This comparison is said to be fatal to the ambition to explain our knowledge or justification in general. But are the appeals relevantly analogous? One important difference is this. In the example of the car, we explain the presence, in some subject S, of a piece of knowledge of a certain kind of the external world by appeal to the presence in S of some other piece of knowledge of the very same kind. So there is an immediate problem if it is our aim to explain how any knowledge of the sort in question ever comes to be unless the explication is just beginning, and is to turn recursive in due course. Now of course A is theoretically ambitious, and in that respect the theorist who gives an answer of the form of A is doing something similar to what must be done by the protagonist in our car example, someone who is attempting to provide a general explanation of how any knowledge of a certain kind comes about. Nevertheless, there is also an important difference, namely that the theorist whose aim it is to give a general account of the form of A need not attribute any knowledge whatsoever to a subject S in explaining how that subject comes to have a piece of knowledge or justified belief. For there is no need to require that the conditions C appealed to by principle A must be conditions that include attribution of any knowledge at all to the subject in question. It is true that in claiming that A itself meets conditions C, and that it is this which explains how one knows A, we do perhaps take ourselves to know A or at least to be justified in believing it. But if so, this is the inevitable lot of anyone who seriously puts forward any explanation of anything. And it is quite different from a proposal that part of what explains how something is known or justifiably believed includes a claim to knowledge or justified belief of the very same sort. In sum, as in the case of one’s belief that one is awake, the belief in something of the form of A may be said to be known, and in so saying one does not commit oneself to adducing an ulterior reason in favor of A, or even to having such a reason in reserve. One is of course committed to being justified in believing A, perhaps even to having knowledge that A. But it is not at all clear that the only way to be justified in believing A is by way of adduced reasons in favor of A, or that one knows A only if one adduces strong enough reasons in its favor. For we often know things in the absence of such adduced reasons. Thus consider one’s knowledge through memory of which door one used to come into a room that has more than one open door. Returning finally to A, in its case the explanation of how one knows it may, once again, take the form of an appeal to the justifying power of intellectual virtues or of coherence  or both. Recent accounts of the nature of thought and representation undermine a tradition of wholesale doubt about nature, whose momentum is hard to stop, and threatens to leave the subject alone and restricted to a solipsism of the present moment. But there may be a way to stop skepticism early  by questioning the possibility of its being sensibly held, given what is required for meaningful language and thought. Consider our grasp of observable shape and color properties that objects around us might have. Such grasp seems partly constituted by our discriminatory abilities. When we discern a shape or a color we do so presumably in terms of a distinctive impact that such a shape or color has on us. We are put systematically into a certain distinctive state X when we are appropriately related, in good light, with our eyes open, etc., to the presence in our environment of that shape or color. What makes one’s distinctive state one of thinking of sphericity rather than something else, is said to be that it is a state tied by systematic causal relations to skepticism skepticism 849   849 the presence of sphericity in one’s normal environment. A light now flickers at the end of the skeptic’s tunnel. In doubt now is the coherence of traditional skeptical reflection. Indeed, our predecessors in earlier centuries may have moved in the wrong direction when they attempted a reduction of nature to the mind. For there is no way to make sense of one’s mind without its contents, and there is no way to make sense of how one’s mind can have such contents except by appeal to how one is causally related to one’s environment. If the very existence of that environment is put in doubt, that cuts the ground from under one’s ability reasonably to characterize one’s own mind, or to feel any confidence about its contents. Perhaps, then, one could not be a “brain in a vat.” Much contemporary thought about language and the requirements for meaningful language thus suggests that a lot of knowledge must already be in place for us to be able to think meaningfully about a surrounding reality, so as to be able to question its very existence. If so, then radical skepticism answers itself. For if we can so much as understand a radical skepticism about the existence of our surrounding reality, then we must already know a great deal about that reality.  Sceptics, those ancient thinkers who developed sets of arguments to show either that no knowledge is possible Academic Skepticism or that there is not sufficient or adequate evidence to tell if any knowledge is possible. If the latter is the case then these thinkers advocated suspending judgment on all question concerning knowledge Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Academic Skepticism gets its name from the fact that it was formulated in Plato’s Academy in the third century B.C., starting from Socrates’ statement, “All I know is that I know nothing.” It was developed by Arcesilaus c.268241 and Carneades c.213129, into a series of arguments, directed principally against the Stoics, purporting to show that nothing can be known. The Academics posed a series of problems to show that what we think we know by our senses may be unreliable, and that we cannot be sure about the reliability of our reasoning. We do not possess a guaranteed standard or criterion for ascertaining which of our judgments is true or false. Any purported knowledge claim contains some element that goes beyond immediate experience. If this claim constituted knowledge we would have to know something that could not possibly be false. The evidence for the claim would have to be based on our senses and our reason, both of which are to some degree unreliable. So the knowledge claim may be false or doubtful, and hence cannot constitute genuine knowledge. So, the Academics said that nothing is certain. The best we can attain is probable information. Carneades is supposed to have developed a form of verification theory and a kind of probabilism, similar in some ways to that of modern pragmatists and positivists. Academic Skepticism dominated the philosophizing of Plato’s Academy until the first century B.C. While Cicero was a student there, the Academy turned from Skepticism to a kind of eclectic philosophy. Its Skeptical arguments have been preserved in Cicero’s works, Academia and De natura deorum, in Augustine’s refutation in his Contra academicos, as well as in the summary presented by Diogenes Laertius in his lives of the Grecian philosophers. Skeptical thinking found another home in the school of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, probably connected with the Methodic school of medicine in Alexandria. The Pyrrhonian movement traces its origins to Pyrrho of Elis c.360275 B.C. and his student Timon c.315225 B.C.. The stories about Pyrrho indicate that he was not a theoretician but a practical doubter who would not make any judgments that went beyond immediate experience. He is supposed to have refused to judge if what appeared to be chariots might strike him, and he was often rescued by his students because he would not make any commitments. His concerns were apparently ethical. He sought to avoid unhappiness that might result from accepting any value theory. If the theory was at all doubtful, accepting it might lead to mental anguish. The theoretical formulation of Pyrrhonian Skepticism is attributed to Aenesidemus c.100 40 B.C.. Pyrrhonists regarded dogmatic philosophers and Academic Skeptics as asserting too much, the former saying that something can be known and the latter that nothing can be known. The Pyrrhonists suspended judgments on all questions on which there was any conflicting evidence, including whether or not anything could be known. The Pyrrhonists used some of the same kinds of arguments developed by Arcesilaus and Carneades. Aenesidemus and those who followed after him organized the arguments into sets of “tropes” or ways of leading to suspense of judgment on various questions. Sets of ten, eight, five, and two tropes appear in the only surviving writing of the Pyrrhonists, the works of Sextus Empiricus, a third-century A.D. teacher of Pyrrhonism. Each set of tropes offers suggestions for suspending judgment about any knowledge claims that go beyond appearances. The tropes seek to show that for any claim, evidence for and evidence against it can be offered. The disagreements among human beings, the variety of human experiences, the fluctuation of human judgments under differing conditions, illness, drunkenness, etc., all point to the opposition of evidence for and against each knowledge claim. Any criterion we employ to sift and weigh the evidence can also be opposed by countercriterion claims. Given this situation, the Pyrrhonian Skeptics sought to avoid committing themselves concerning any kind of question. They would not even commit themselves as to whether the arguments they put forth were sound or not. For them Skepticism was not a statable theory, but rather an ability or mental attitude for opposing evidence for and against any knowledge claim that went beyond what was apparent, that dealt with the non-evident. This opposing produced an equipollence, a balancing of the opposing evidences, that would lead to suspending judgment on any question. Suspending judgment led to a state of mind called “ataraxia,” quietude, peace of mind, or unperturbedness. In such a state the Skeptic was no longer concerned or worried or disturbed about matters beyond appearances. The Pyrrhonians averred that Skepticism was a cure for a disease called “dogmatism” or rashness. The dogmatists made assertions about the non-evident, and then became disturbed about whether these assertions were true. The disturbance became a mental disease or disorder. The Pyrrhonians, who apparently were medical doctors, offered relief by showing the patient how and why he should suspend judgment instead of dogmatizing. Then the disease would disappear and the patient would be in a state of tranquillity, the peace of mind sought by Hellenistic dogmatic philosophers. The Pyrrhonists, unlike the Academic Skeptics, were not negative dogmatists. The Pyrrhonists said neither that knowledge is possible nor that it is impossible. They remained seekers, while allowing the Skeptical arguments and the equipollence of evidences to act as a purge of dogmatic assertions. The purge eliminates all dogmas as well as itself. After this the Pyrrhonist lives undogmatically, following natural inclinations, immediate experience, and the laws and customs of his society, without ever judging or committing himself to any view about them. In this state the Pyrrhonist would have no worries, and yet be able to function naturally and according to law and custom. The Pyrrhonian movement disappeared during the third century A.D., possibly because it was not considered an alternative to the powerful religious movements of the time. Only scant traces of it appear before the Renaissance, when the texts of Sextus and Cicero were rediscovered and used to formulate a modern skeptical view by such thinkers as Montaigne and Charron.  Refs.: The obvious source is the essay on scepticism in WoW, but there are allusions in “Prejudices and predilections, and elsewhere, in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC

Scheler, M.: G. phenomenologist, social philosopher, and sociologist of knowledge. Born in Munich, he studied in Jena; when he returned to Munich in 7 he came in contact with phenomenology, especially the realist version of the early Husserl and his Munich School followers. Scheler’s first works were phenomenological studies in ethics leading to his ultimate theory of value: he described the moral feelings of sympathy and resentment and wrote a criticism of Kantian formalism and rationalism, Formalism in Ethics and a Non-Formal Ethics of Value 3. During the war, he was an ardent nationalist and wrote essays in support of the war that were also philosophical criticisms of modern culture, opposed to “Anglo-Saxon” naturalism and rational calculation. Although he later embraced a broader notion of community, such criticisms of modernity remained constant themes of his writings. His conversion to Catholicism after the war led him to apply phenomenological description to religious phenomena and feelings, and he later turned to themes of anthropology and natural science. The core of Scheler’s phenomenological method is his conception of the objectivity of essences, which, though contained in experience, are a priori and independent of the knower. For Scheler, values are such objective, though non-Platonic, essences. Their objectivity is intuitively accessible in immediate experience and feelings, as when we experience beauty in music and do not merely hear certain sounds. Scheler distinguished between valuations or value perspectives on the one hand, which are historically relative and variable, and values on the other, which are independent and invariant. There are four such values, the hierarchical organization of which could be both immediately intuited and established by various public criteria like duration and independence: pleasure, vitality, spirit, and religion. Corresponding to these values are various personalities who are not creators of value but their discoverers, historical disclosers, and exemplars: the “artist of consumption,” the hero, the genius, and the saint. A similar hierarchy of values applies to forms of society, the highest of which is the church, or a Christian community of solidarity and love. Scheler criticizes the leveling tendencies of liberalism for violating this hierarchy, leading to forms of resentment, individualism, and nationalism, all of which represent the false ordering of values.

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, philosopher whose metamorscalar implicaturum Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 816    816 phoses encompass the entire history of G. idealism. A Schwabian, Schelling first studied at Tübingen, where he befriended Hölderlin and Hegel. The young Schelling was an enthusiastic exponent of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre and devoted several early essays to its exposition. After studying science and mathematics at Leipzig, he joined Fichte at Jena in 1798. Meanwhile, in such writings as Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus “Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism,” 1795, Schelling betrayed growing doubts concerning Fichte’s philosophy above all, its treatment of nature and a lively interest in Spinoza. He then turned to constructing a systematic Naturphilosophie philosophy of nature within the context of which nature would be treated more holistically than by either Newtonian science or transcendental idealism. Of his many publications on this topic, two of the more important are Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur “Ideas concerning a Philosophy of Nature,” 1797 and Von der Weltseele “On the World-Soul,” 1798. Whereas transcendental idealism attempts to derive objective experience from an initial act of free self-positing, Schelling’s philosophy of nature attempts to derive consciousness from objects. Beginning with “pure objectivity,” the Naturphilosophie purports to show how nature undergoes a process of unconscious self-development, culminating in the conditions for its own self-representation. The method of Naturphilosophie is fundamentally a priori: it begins with the concept of the unity of nature and accounts for its diversity by interpreting nature as a system of opposed forces or “polarities,” which manifest themselves in ever more complex levels of organization Potenzen. At Jena, Schelling came into contact with Tieck, Novalis, and the Schlegel brothers and became interested in art. This new interest is evident in his System des transzendentalen Idealismus 1800, which describes the path from pure subjectivity self-consciousness to objectivity the necessary positing of the Not-I, or of nature. The most innovative and influential portion of this treatise, which is otherwise closely modeled on Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, is its conclusion, which presents art as the concrete accomplishment of the philosophical task. In aesthetic experience the identity between the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real, becomes an object to the experiencing I itself. For Schelling, transcendental idealism and Naturphilosophie are two complementary sides or subdivisions of a larger, more encompassing system, which he dubbed the System of Identity or Absolute Idealism and expounded in a series of publications, including the Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie “Presentation of My System of Philosophy,” 1801, Bruno 1802, and Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums “Lectures on the Method of Academic Study,” 1803. The most distinctive feature of this system is that it begins with a bald assertion of the unity of thought and being, i.e., with the bare idea of the self-identical “Absolute,” which is described as the first presupposition of all knowledge. Since the identity with which this system commences transcends every conceivable difference, it is also described as the “point of indifference.” From this undifferentiated or “indifferent” starting point, Schelling proceeds to a description of reality as a whole, considered as a differentiated system within which unity is maintained by various synthetic relationships, such as substance and attribute, cause and effect, attraction and repulsion. Like his philosophy of nature, Schelling’s System of Identity utilizes the notion of various hierarchically related Potenzen as its basic organizing principle. The obvious question concerns the precise relationship between the “indifferent” Absolute and the real system of differentiated elements, a question that may be said to have set the agenda for Schelling’s subsequent philosophizing. From 1803 to 1841 Schelling was in Bavaria, where he continued to expound his System of Identity and to explore the philosophies of art and nature. The most distinctive feature of his thought during this period, however, was a new interest in religion and in the theosophical writings of Boehme, whose influence is prominent in the Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit “Philosophical Investigations concerning the Nature of Human Freedom,” 1809, a work often interpreted as anticipating existentialism. He also worked on a speculative interpretation of human history, Die Weltalter, which remained unpublished, and lectured regularly on the history of philosophy. In 1841 Schelling moved to Berlin, where he lectured on his new philosophy of revelation and mythology, which he now characterized as “positive philosophy,” in contradistinction to the purely “negative” philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. Some scholars have interpreted these posthumously published lectures as representing the culmination both of Schelling’s own protracted philosophical development and of G. idealism as a whole. 

Schema (Latin ‘figura,’ as in Grice, ‘figure of speech’), also schema plural: schemata, a metalinguistic frame or template used to specify an infinite set of sentences, its instances, by finite means, often taken with a side condition on how its blanks or placeholders are to be filled. The sentence ‘Either Abe argues or it is not the case that Abe argues’ is an instance of the excluded middle scheme for English: ‘Either . . . or it is not the case that . . .’, where the two blanks are to be filled with one and the same well-formed declarative English sentence. Since first-order number theory cannot be finitely axiomatized, the mathematical induction scheme is used to effectively specify an infinite set of axioms: ‘If zero is such that . . . and the successor of every number such that . . . is also such that . . . , then every number is such that . . .’, where the four blanks are to be filled with one and the same arithmetic open sentence, such as ‘it precedes its own successor’ or ‘it is finite’. Among the best-known is Tarski’s scheme T: ‘. . . is a true sentence if and only if . . .’, where the second blank is filled with a sentence and the first blank by a name of the sentence. 

Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich von, G. poet, dramatist, and philosopher. Along with his colleagues Reinhold and Fichte, he participated in systematically revising Kant’s transcendental idealism. Though Schiller’s bestknown theoretical contributions were to aesthetics, his philosophical ambitions were more general, and he proposed a novel solution to the problem of the systematic unity, not merely of the critical philosophy, but of human nature. His most substantial philosophical work, Briefe über die äesthetische Erziehung des Menschen “Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man,” 1794/95, examines the relationship between natural necessity and practical freedom and addresses two problems raised by Kant: How can a creature governed by natural necessity and desire ever become aware of its own freedom and thus capable of autonomous moral action? And how can these two sides of human nature  the natural, sensuous side and the rational, supersensuous one  be reconciled? In contradistinction both to those who subordinate principles to feelings “savages” and to those who insist that one should strive to subordinate feelings to principles “barbarians”, Schiller posited an intermediary realm between the sphere of nature and that of freedom, as well as a third basic human drive capable of mediating between sensuous and rational impulses. This third impulse is dubbed the “play impulse,” and the intermediary sphere to which it pertains is that of art and beauty. By cultivating the play impulse i.e., via “aesthetic education” one is not only freed from bondage to sensuality and granted a first glimpse of one’s practical freedom, but one also becomes capable of reconciling the rational and sensuous sides of one’s own nature. This idea of a condition in which opposites are simultaneously cancelled and preserved, as well as the specific project of reconciling freedom and necessity, profoundly influenced subsequent thinkers such as Schelling and Hegel and contributed to the development of G. idealism. 

Schlegel, Friedrich von, G. literary critic and philosopher, one of the principal representatives of G. Romanticism. In On the Study of Grecian Poetry 1795, Schlegel laid the foundations for the distinction of classical and Romantic literature and a pronounced consciousness of literary modernity. Together with his brother August Wilhelm, he edited the Athenaeum 17981800, the main theoretical organ of G. Romanticism, famous for its collection of fragments as a new means of critical communication. Schlegel is the originator of the Romantic theory of irony, a non-dialectical form of philosophizing and literary writing that takes its inspiration from Socratic irony and combines it with Fichte’s thought process of affirmation and negation, “self-creation” and “self-annihilation.” Closely connected wih Schlegel’s theory of irony is his theory of language and understanding hermeneutics. Critical reflection on language promotes an ironic awareness of the “necessity and impossibility of complete communication” Critical Fragments, No. 108; critical reflection on understanding reveals the amount of incomprehensibility, of “positive not-understanding” involved in every act of understanding On Incomprehensibility, 1800. Schlegel’s writings were essential for the rise of historical consciousness in G. Romanticism. His On Ancient and Modern Literature 1812 is reputed to represent the first literary history in a modern and broadly comparative fashion. His Philosophy of History 1828, together with his Philosophy of Life 1828 schema Schlegel, Friedrich von 818    818 and Philosophy of Language 1829, confront Hegel’s philosophy from the point of view of a Christian and personalistic type of philosophizing. Schlegel converted to Catholicism in 1808. 

Schleiermacher, F. G. philosopher, a “critical realist” working among post-Kantian idealists. In philosophy and science he presupposed transcendental features, noted in his dialectic lectures, and advocated integrative but historically contingent, empirical functions. Both develop, but, contra Hegel, not logically. Schleiermacher was a creator of modern general hermeneutics; a father of modern theological and religious studies; an advocate of women’s rights; the cofounder, with Humboldt, of the  at Berlin 180810, where he taught until 1834; and the classic translator of Plato into G.. Schleiermacher has had an undeservedly minor place in histories of philosophy. Appointed chiefly to theology, he published less philosophy, though he regularly lectured, in tightly argued discourse, in Grecian philosophy, history of philosophy, dialectic, hermeneutics and criticism, philosophy of mind “psychology”, ethics, politics, aesthetics, and philosophy of education. From the 0s, his collected writings and large correspondence began to appear in a forty-volume critical edition and in the larger Schleiermacher Studies and Translations series. Brilliant, newly available pieces from his twenties on freedom, the highest good, and values, previously known only in fragments but essential for understanding his views fully, were among the first to appear. Much of his outlook was formed before he became prominent in the early Romantic circle 17961806, distinguishable by his markedly religious, consistently liberal views.

Scholasticism, a set of scholarly and instructional techniques developed in Western European schools of the late medieval period, including the use of commentary and disputed question. ‘Scholasticism’ is derived from Latin scholasticus, which in the twelfth century meant the master of a school. The Scholastic method is usually presented as beginning in the law schools  notably at Bologna  and as being then transported into theology and philosophy by a series of masters including Abelard and Peter Lombard. Within the new universities of the thirteenth century the standardization of the curriculum and the enormous prestige of Aristotle’s work despite the suspicion with which it was initially greeted contributed to the entrenchment of the method and it was not until the educational reforms of the beginning of the sixteenth century that it ceased to be dominant. There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as Scholasticism. As the term was originally used it presupposed that a single philosophy was taught in the universities of late medieval Europe, but there was no such philosophy. The philosophical movements working outside the universities in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and the “neo-Scholastics” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries all found such a presupposition useful, and their influence led scholars to assume it. At first this generated efforts to find a common core in the philosophies taught in the late medieval schools. More recently it has led to efforts to find methods characteristic of their teaching, and to an extension of the term to the schools of late antiquity and of Byzantium. Both among the opponents of the schools in the seventeenth century and among the “neoScholastics,” ‘Scholasticism’ was supposed to designate a doctrine whose core was the doctrine of substance and accidents. As portrayed by Descartes and Locke, the Scholastics accepted the view that among the components of a thing were a substantial form and a number of real accidental forms, many of which corresponded to perceptible properties of the thing  its color, shape, temperature. They were also supposed to have accepted a sharp distinction between natural and unnatural motion. 

Schopenhauer, Arthur, G. philosopher. Born in Danzig and schooled in G.y, France, and England during a welltraveled childhood, he became acquainted through his novelist mother with Goethe, Schlegel, and the brothers Grimm. He studied medicine at the  of Göttingen and philosophy at the  of Berlin; received the doctorate from the  of Jena in 1813; and lived much of his adult life in Frankfurt, where he died. Schopenhauer’s dissertation, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 1813, lays the groundwork for all of his later philosophical work. The world of representation equivalent to Kant’s phenomenal world is governed by “the principle of sufficient reason”: “every possible object . . . stands in a necessary relation to other objects, on the one hand as determined, on the other as determining” The World as Will and Representation. Thus, each object of consciousness can be explained in terms of its relations with other objects. The systematic statement of Schopenhauer’s philosophy appeared in The World as Will and Representation 1818. His other works are On Vision and Colors 1815, “On the Will in Nature” 1836, conjoined with “On the Foundation of Morality” in The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics 1841; the second edition of The World as Will and Representation, which included a second volume of essays 1844; an enlarged and revised edition of On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 1847; and Parerga and Paralipomena, a series of essays 1851. These are all consistent with the principal statement of his thought in The World as Will and Representation. The central postulate of Schopenhauer’s system is that the fundamental reality is will, which he equates with the Kantian thing-in-itself. Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer contends that one can immediately know the thing-in-itself through the experience of an inner, volitional reality within one’s own body. Every phenomenon, according to Schopenhauer, has a comparable inner reality. Consequently, the term ‘will’ can extend to the inner nature of all things. Moreover, because number pertains exclusively to the phenomenal world, the will, as thing-initself, is one. Nevertheless, different types of things manifest the will to different degrees. Schopenhauer accounts for these differences by invoking Plato’s Ideas or Forms. The Ideas are the universal prototypes for the various kinds of objects in the phenomenal world. Taken collectively, the Ideas constitute a hierarchy. We usually overlook them in everyday experience, focusing instead on particulars and their practical relationships to us. However, during aesthetic experience, we recognize the universal Idea within the particular; simultaneously, as aesthetic beholders, we become “the universal subject of knowledge.” Aesthetic experience also quiets the will within us. The complete silencing of the will is, for Schopenhauer, the ideal for human beings, though it is rarely attained. Because will is the fundamental metaphysical principle, our lives are dominated by willing  and, consequently, filled with struggle, conflict, and dissatisfaction. Inspired by Buddhism, Schopenhauer contends that all of life is suffering, which only an end to desire can permanently eliminate as opposed to the respite of aesthetic experience. This is achieved only by the saint, who rejects desire in an inner act termed “denial of the will to live.” The saint fully grasps that the same will motivates all phenomena and, recognizing that nothing is gained through struggle and competition, achieves “resignation.” Such a person achieves the ethical ideal of all religions  compassion toward all beings, resulting from the insight that all are, fundamentally, one. 

Schröder-Bernstein theorem, the theorem that mutually dominant sets are equinumerous. A set A is said to be dominated by a set B if and only if each element of A can be mapped to a unique element of B in such a way that no two elements of A are mapped to the same element of B possibly with some elements of B left over. Intuitively, if A is dominated by B, then B has at least as many members as A. Given this intuition, one would expect that if A is dominated by B and B is dominated by A, then A and B are equinumerous i.e., A can be mapped to B as described above with no elements of B left over. This is the Schröder-Bernstein theorem. Stated in terms of cardinal numbers, the theorem says that if k m l and l m k, then k % l. Despite the simplicity of the theorem’s statement, its proof is non-trivial. 

Schrödinger, Erwin, Austrian physicist best known for five papers published in 6, in which he discovered the Schrödinger wave equation and created modern wave mechanics. For this achievement, he was awarded the Nobel prize in physics shared with Paul Dirac in 3. Like Einstein, Schrödinger was a resolute but ultimately unsuccessful critic of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Schrödinger defended the view which he derived from Boltzmann that theories should give a picture, continuous in space and time, of the real processes that produce observable phenomena. Schrödinger’s realistic philosophy of science played an important role in his discovery of wave mechanics. Although his physical interpretation of the psi function was soon abandoned, his approach to quantum mechanics survives in the theories of Louis de Broglie and David Bohm. 

Schulze, Gottlob Ernst, G. philosopher today known mainly as an acute and influential early critic of Kant and Reinhold. He taught at Wittenberg, Helmstedt, and Göttingen; one of his most important students was Schopenhauer, whose view of Kant was definitely influenced by Schulze’s interpretation. Schulze’s most important work was his Aenesidemus, or “On the Elementary Philosophy Put Forward by Mr. Reinhold in Jena. Together with a Defense of Skepticism” 1792. It fundamentally changed the discussion of Kantian philosophy. Kant’s earliest critics had accused him of being a skeptic like Hume. Kantians, like Reinhold, had argued that critical philosophy was not only opposed to skepticism, but also contained the only possible refutation of skepticism. Schulze tried to show that Kantianism could not refute skepticism, construed as the doctrine that doubts the possibility of any knowledge concerning the existence or non-existence of “things-in-themselves,” and he argued that Kant and his followers begged the skeptic’s question by presupposing that such things exist and causally interact with us. Schulze’s Aenesidemus had a great impact on Fichte and Hegel, and it also influenced neoKantianism.

realism, the view that the subject matter of common sense or scientific research and scientific theories exists independently of our knowledge of it, and that the goal of science is the description and explanation of both observable and unobservable aspects of the world. Scientific realism is contrasted with logical empiricism and social constructivism. Early arguments for scientific realism simply stated that, in light of the impressive products and methods of science, realism is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle. Formulations of scientific realism focus on the objects of theoretical knowledge: theories, laws, and entities. One especially robust argument for scientific realism due to Putnam and Richard Boyd is that the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology in the mature sciences such as physics, chemistry, and some areas of biology can be explained adequately only if we suppose that theories in the mature sciences are at least approximately true and their central theoretical terms are at least partially referential Putnam no longer holds this view. More timid versions of scientific realism do not infer approximate truth of mature theories. For example, Ian Hacking’s “entity realism” 3 asserts that the instrumental manipulation of postulated entities to produce further effects gives us legitimate grounds for ontological commitment to theoretical entities, but not to laws or theories. Paul Humphreys’s “austere realism” 9 states that only theoretical commitment to unobserved structures or dispositions could explain the stability of observed outcomes of scientific inquiry. Distinctive versions of scientific realism can be found in works by Richard Boyd 3, Philip Kitcher 3, Richard Miller 7, William Newton-Smith 1, and J. D. Trout 8. Despite their differences, all of these versions of realism are distinguished  against logical empiricism  by their commitment that knowledge of unobservable phenomena is not only possible but actual. As well, all of the arguments for scientific realism are abductive; they argue that either the approximate truth of background theories or the existence of theoretical entities and laws provides the best explanation for some significant fact about the scientific theory or practice. Scientific realists address the difference between real entities and merely useful constructs, arguing that realism offers a better explanation for the success of science. In addition, scientific realism recruits evidence from the history and practice of science, and offers explanations for the success of science that are designed to honor the dynamic and uneven character of that evidence. Most arguments for scientific realism cohabit with versions of naturalism. Anti-realist opponents argue that the realist move from instrumental reliability to truth is question-begging. However, realists reply that such formal criticisms are irrelevant; the structure of explanationist arguments is inductive and their principles are a posteriori. 

scope, the “part” of the sentence or proposition to which a given term “applies” under a given interpretation of the sentence. If the sentence ‘Abe does not believe Ben died’ is interpreted as expressing the proposition that Abe believes that it is not the case that Ben died, the scope of ‘not’ is ‘Ben died’; interpreted as “It is not the case that Abe believes that Ben died,” the scope is the rest of the sentence, i.e., ‘Abe believes Ben died’. In the first case we have narrow scope, in the second wide scope. If ‘Every number is not even’ is interpreted with narrow scope, it expresses the false proposition that every number is non-even, which is logically equivalent to the proposition that no number is even. Taken with wide scope it expresses the truth that not every number is even, which is equivalent to the truth that some number is non-even. Under normal interpretations of the sentences, ‘hardened’ has narrow scope in ‘Carl is a hardened recidivist’, whereas ‘alleged’ has wide scope in ‘Dan is an alleged criminal’. Accordingly, ‘Carl is a hardened recidivist’ logically implies ‘Carl is a recidivist’, whereas ‘Dan is an alleged criminal’, being equivalent to ‘Allegedly, Dan is a criminal’, does not imply ‘Dan is a criminal’. Scope considerations are useful in analyzing structural ambiguity and in understanding the difference between the grammatical form of a sentence and the logical form of a proposition it expresses. In a logically perfect language grammatical form mirrors logical form, there is no scope ambiguity, and the scope of a given term is uniquely determined by its context. 

Scottish common sense philosophy, a comprehensive philosophical position developed by Reid in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Reid’s views were propagated by a succession of Scottish popularizers, of whom the most successful was Dugald Stewart. Through them common sense doctrine became nearly a philosophical orthodoxy in Great Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century. Brought to the United States through the s in Princeton and Philadelphia, common sensism continued to be widely taught until the later nineteenth century. The early Reidians Beattie and Oswald were, like Reid himself, read in G.y by Kant and others; and Reid’s views were widely taught in post-Napoleonic France. The archenemy for the common sense theorists was Hume. Reid saw in his skepticism the inevitable outcome of Descartes’s thesis, accepted by Locke, that we do not perceive external objects directly, but that the immediate object of perception is something in the mind. Against this he argued that perception involves both sensation and certain intuitively known general truths or principles that together yield knowledge of external objects. He also argued that there are many other intuitively known general principles, including moral principles, available to all normal humans. As a result he thought that whenever philosophical argument results in conclusions that run counter to common sense, the philosophy must be wrong. Stewart made some changes in Reid’s acute and original theory, but his main achievement was to propagate it through eloquent classes and widely used textbooks. Common sensism, defending the considered views of the ordinary man, was taken by many to provide a defense of the Christian religious and moral status quo. Reid had argued for free will, and presented a long list of self-evident moral axioms. If this might be plausibly presented as part of the common sense of his time, the same could not be said for some of the religious doctrines that Oswald thought equally self-evident. Reid had not given any rigorous tests for what might count as selfevident. The easy intuitionism of later common sensists was a natural target for those who, like J. S. Mill, thought that any appeal to self-evidence was simply a way of justifying vested interest. Whewell, in both his philosophy of science and his ethics, and Sidgwick, in his moral theory, acknowledged debts to Reid and tried to eliminate the abuses to which his method was open. But in doing so they transformed common sensism beyond the limits within which Reid and those shaped by him operated. 

Searle, John R. b.2,  philosopher of language and mind D. Phil., Oxford influenced by Frege, Vitters, and J. L. Austin; a founder of speech act theory and an important contributor to debates on intentionality, consciousness, and institutional facts. Language. In Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 9, Searle brings together modified versions of Frege’s distinctions between the force F and content P of a sentence, and between singular reference and predication, Austin’s analysis of speech acts, and Grice’s analysis of speaker meaning. Searle explores the hypothesis that the semantics of a natural language can be regarded as a conventional realization of underlying constitutive rules and that illocutionary acts are acts performed in accordance with these rules. Expression and Meaning 9 extends this analysis to non-literal and indirect illocutionary acts, and attempts to explain Donnellan’s referential-attributive distinction in these terms and proposes an influential taxonomy of five basic types of illocutionary acts based on the illocutionary point or purpose of the act, and word-to-world versus world-toword direction of fit. Language and mind. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 3 forms the foundation for the earlier work on speech acts. Now the semantics of a natural language is seen as the result of the mind intrinsic intentionality imposing conditions of satisfaction or aboutness on objects expressions in a language, which have intentionality only derivatively. Perception and action rather than belief are taken as fundamental. Satisfaction conditions are essentially Fregean i.e. general versus singular and internal  meaning is in the head, relative to a background of non-intentional states, and relative to a network of other intentional states. The philosophy of language becomes a branch of the philosophy of mind. Mind. “Minds, Brains and Programs” 0 introduced the famous “Chin. room” argument against strong artificial intelligence  the view that appropriately programming a machine is sufficient for giving it intentional states. Suppose a monolingual English-speaker is working in a room producing Chin. answers to Chin. questions well enough to mimic a Chin.speaker, but by following an algorithm written in English. Such a person does not understand Chin. nor would a computer computing the same algorithm. This is true for any such algorithms because they are syntactically individuated and intentional states are semantically individuated. The Rediscovery of the Mind 2 continues the attack on the thesis that the brain is a digital computer, and develops a non-reductive “biological naturalism” on which intentionality, like the liquidity of water, is a high-level feature, which is caused by and realized in the brain. Society. The Construction of Social Reality 5 develops his realistic worldview, starting with an independent world of particles and forces, up through evolutionary biological systems capable of consciousness and intentionality, to institutions and social facts, which are created when persons impose status-features on things, which are collectively recognized and accepted. 

First-order predicate calculus with time-relative identity -- second-order logic, the logic of languages that contain, in addition to variables ranging over objects, variables ranging over properties, relations, functions, or classes of those objects. A model, or interpretation, of a formal language usually contains a domain of discourse. This domain is what the language is about, in the model in question. Variables that range over this domain are called first-order variables. If the language contains only first-order variables, it is called a first-order language, and it is within the purview of first-order logic. Some languages also contain variables that range over properties, relations, functions, or classes of members of the domain of discourse. These are second-order variables. A language that contains first-order and second-order variables, and no others, is a secondorder language. The sentence ‘There is a property shared by all and only prime numbers’ is straightforwardly rendered in a second-order language, because of the bound variable ranging over properties. There are also properties of properties, relations of properties, and the like. Consider, e.g., the property of properties expressed by ‘P has an infinite extension’ or the relation expressed by ‘P has a smaller extension than Q’. A language with variables ranging over such items is called thirdorder. This construction can be continued, producing fourth-order languages, etc. A language is called higher-order if it is at least second-order. Deductive systems for second-order languages are obtained from those for first-order languages by adding straightforward extensions of the axioms and rules concerning quantifiers that bind first-order variables. There may also be an axiom scheme of comprehension: DPExPx S Fx, one instance for each formula F that does not contain P free. The scheme “asserts” that every formula determines the extension of a property. If the language has variables ranging over functions, there may also be a version of the axiom of choice: ERExDyRxy P DfExRxfx. In standard semantics for second-order logic, a model of a given language is the same as a model for the corresponding first-order language. The relation variables range over every relation over the domain-of-discourse, the function variables range over every function from the domain to the domain, etc. In non-standard, or Henkin semantics, each model consists of a domain-ofdiscourse and a specified collection of relations, functions, etc., on the domain. The latter may not include every relation or function. The specified collections are the range of the second-order variables in the model in question. In effect, Henkin semantics regards second-order languages as multi-sorted, first-order languages. 

secundum quid, in a certain respect, or with a qualification. Fallacies can arise from confusing what is true only secundum quid with what is true simpliciter ‘without qualification’, ‘absolutely’, ‘on the whole’, or conversely. Thus a strawberry is red simpliciter on the whole. But it is black, not red, with respect to its seeds, secundum quid. By ignoring the distinction, one might mistakenly infer that the strawberry is both red and not red. Again, a certain thief is a good cook, secundum quid; but it does not follow that he is good simpliciter without qualification. Aristotle was the first to recognize the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter explicitly, in his Sophistical Refutations. On the basis of some exceptionally enigmatic remarks in the same work, the liar paradox was often regarded in the Middle Ages as an instance of this fallacy. 

Auto-deception – D. F. Pears -- self-deception, 1 purposeful action to avoid unpleasant truths and painful topics about oneself or the world; 2 unintentional processes of denial, avoidance, or biased perception; 3 mental states resulting from such action or processes, such as ignorance, false belief, wishful thinking, unjustified opinions, or lack of clear awareness. Thus, parents tend to exaggerate the virtues of their children; lovers disregard clear signs of unreciprocated affection; overeaters rationalize away the need to diet; patients dying of cancer pretend to themselves that their health is improving. In some contexts ‘self-deception’ is neutral and implies no criticism. Deceiving oneself can even be desirable, generating a vital lie that promotes happiness or the ability to cope with difficulties. In other contexts ‘self-deception’ has negative connotations, suggesting bad faith, false consciousness, or what Joseph Butler called “inner hypocrisy”  the refusal to acknowledge our wrongdoing, character flaws, or onerous responsibilities. Existentialist philosophers, like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and most notably Sartre Being and Nothingness, 3, denounced self-deception as an inauthentic dishonest, cowardly refusal to confront painful though significant truths, especially about freedom, responsibility, and death. Herbert Fingarette, however, argued that self-deception is morally ambiguous  neither clearly blameworthy nor clearly faultless  because of how it erodes capacities for acting rationally Self-Deception, 9. The idea of intentionally deceiving oneself seems paradoxical. In deceiving other people I usually know a truth that guides me as I state the opposite falsehood, intending thereby to mislead them into believing the falsehood. Five difficulties seem to prevent me from doing anything like that to myself. 1 With interpersonal deception, one person knows something that another person does not. Yet self-deceivers know the truth all along, and so it seems they cannot use it to make themselves ignorant. One solution is that self-deception occurs over time, with the initial knowledge becoming gradually eroded. Or perhaps selfdeceivers only suspect rather than know the truth, and then disregard relevant evidence. 2 If consciousness implies awareness of one’s own conscious acts, then a conscious intention to deceive myself would be self-defeating, for I would remain conscious of the truth I wish to flee. Sartre’s solution was to view self-deception as spontaneous and not explicitly reflected upon. Freud’s solution was to conceive of self-deception as unconscious repression. 3 It seems that self-deceivers believe a truth that they simultaneously get themselves not to believe, but how is that possible? Perhaps they keep one of two conflicting beliefs unconscious or not fully conscious. 4 Self-deception suggests willfully creating beliefs, but that seems impossible since beliefs cannot voluntarily be chosen. Perhaps beliefs can be indirectly manipulated by selectively ignoring and attending to evidence. 5 It seems that one part of a person the deceiver manipulates another part the victim, but such extreme splits suggest multiple personality disorders rather than self-deception. Perhaps we are composed of “subselves”  relatively unified clusters of elements in the personality. Or perhaps at this point we should jettison interpersonal deception as a model for understanding self-deception.  .

auto-determination -- self-determination, the autonomy possessed by a community when it is politically independent; in a strict sense, territorial sovereignty. Within international law, the principle of self-determination appears to grant every people a right to be self-determining, but there is controversy over its interpretation. Applied to established states, the principle calls for recognition of state sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs. By providing for the self-determination of subordinate communities, however, it can generate demands for secession that conflict with existing claims of sovereignty. Also, what non-self-governing groups qualify as beneficiaries? The national interpretation of the principle treats cultural or national units as the proper claimants, whereas the regional interpretation confers the right of self-determination upon the populations of well-defined regions regardless of cultural or national affiliations. This difference reflects the roots of the principle in the doctrines of nationalism and popular sovereignty, respectively, but complicates its application. 

self-evidence, the property of being self-evident. Only true propositions or truths are self-evident, though false propositions can appear to be self-evident. It is widely held that a true proposition is self-evident if and only if one would be justified in believing it if one adequately understood it. Some would also require that self-evident propositions are known if believed on the basis of such an understanding. Some self-evident propositions are obvious, such as the proposition that all stags are male, but others are not, since it may take considerable reflection to achieve an adequate understanding of them. That slavery is wrong and that there is no knowledge of falsehoods are perhaps examples of the latter. Not all obvious propositions are self-evident, e.g., it is obvious that a stone will fall if dropped, but adequate understanding of that claim does not by itself justify one in believing it. An obvious proposition is one that immediately seems true for anyone who adequately understands it, but its obviousness may rest on wellknown and commonly accepted empirical facts, not on understanding. All analytic propositions are self-evident but not all self-evident propositions are analytic. The propositions that if A is older than B, then B is younger than A, and that no object can be red and green all over at the same time and in the same respects, are arguably self-evident but not analytic. All self-evident propositions are necessary, for one could not be justified in believing a contingent proposition simply in virtue of understanding it. However, not all necessary propositions are self-evident, e.g., that water is H2O and that temperature is the measure of the molecular activity in substances are necessary but not self-evident. A proposition can appear to be selfevident even though it is not. For instance, the proposition that all unmarried adult males are bachelors will appear self-evident to many until they consider that the pope is such a male. A proposition may appear self-evident to some but not to others, even though it must either have or lack the property of being self-evident. Self-evident propositions are knowable non-empirically, or a priori, but some propositions knowable a priori are not self-evident, e.g., certain conclusions of long and difficult chains of mathematical reasoning. 

self-presenting, in the philosophy of Meinong, having the ability  common to all mental states  to be immediately present to our thought. In Meinong’s view, no mental state can be presented to our thought in any other way  e.g., indirectly, via a Lockean “idea of reflection.” The only way to apprehend a mental state is to experience or “live through” it. The experience involved in the apprehension of an external object has thus a double presentational function: 1 via its “content” it presents the object to our thought; 2 as its own “quasi-content” it presents itself immediately to our thought. In the contemporary era, Roderick Chisholm has based his account of empirical knowledge in part on a related concept of the self-presenting. In Chisholm’s sense  the definition of which we omit here  all self-presenting states are mental, but not conversely; for instance, being depressed because of the death of one’s spouse would not be self-presenting. In Chisholm’s epistemology, self-presenting states are a source of certainty in the following way: if F is a self-presenting state, then to be certain that one is in state F it is sufficient that one is, and believes oneself to be in state F. 

auto-phoric -- self-referential incoherence, an internal defect of an assertion or theory, which it possesses provided that a it establishes some requirement that must be met by assertions or theories, b it is itself subject to this requirement, and c it fails to meet the requirement. The most famous example is logical positivism’s meaning criterion, which requires that all meaningful assertions be either tautological or empirically verifiable, yet is itself neither. A possible early example is found in Hume, whose own writings might have been consigned to the flames had librarians followed his counsel to do so with volumes that contain neither “abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number” nor “experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence.” Bold defiance was shown by Vitters, who, realizing that the propositions of the Tractatus did not “picture” the world, advised the reader to “throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.” An epistemological example is furnished by any foundationalist theory that establishes criteria for rational acceptability that the theory itself cannot meet. 

self-reproducing automaton, a formal model of self-reproduction of a kind introduced by von Neumann. He worked with an intuitive robot model and then with a well-defined cellular automaton model. Imagine a class of robotic automata made of robot parts and operating in an environment of such parts. There are computer parts switches, memory elements, wires, input-output parts sensing elements, display elements, action parts grasping and moving elements, joining and cutting elements, and straight bars to maintain structure and to employ in a storage tape. There are also energy sources that enable the robots to operate and move around. These five categories of parts are sufficient for the construction of robots that can make objects of various kinds, including other robots. These parts also clearly suffice for making a robot version of any finite automaton. Sensing and acting parts can then be added to this robot so that it can make an indefinitely expandable storage tape from straight bars. A “blank tape” consists of bars joined in sequence, and the robot stores information on this tape by attaching bars or not at the junctions. If its finite automaton part can execute programs and is sufficiently powerful, such a robot is a universal computing robot cf. a universal Turing machine. A universal computing robot can be augmented to form a universal constructing robot  a robot that can construct any robot, given its description. Let r be any robot with an indefinitely expandable tape, let Fr be the description of its finite part, and let Tr be the information on its tape. Now take a universal computing robot and augment it with sensing and acting devices and with programs so that when Fr followed by Tr is written on its tape, this augmented universal computer performs as follows. First, it reads the description Fr, finds the needed parts, and constructs the finite part of r. Second, it makes a blank tape, attaches it to the finite part of r, and then copies the information Tr from its own tape onto the new tape. This augmentation of a universal computing robot is a universal constructor. For when it starts with the information Fr,Tr written on its tape, it will construct a copy of r with Tr on its tape. Robot self-reproduction results from applying the universal constructor to itself. Modify the universal constructor slightly so that when only a description Fr is written on its tape, it constructs the finite part of r and then attaches a tape with Fr written on it. Call this version of the universal constructor Cu. Now place Cu’s description FCu on its own tape and start it up. Cu first reads this description and constructs a copy of the finite part of itself in an empty region of the cellular space. Then it adds a blank tape to the new construction and copies FCu onto it. Hence Cu with FCu on its tape has produced another copy of Cu with FCu on its tape. This is automaton self-reproduction. This robot model of self-reproduction is very general. To develop the logic of self-reproduction further, von Neumann first extended the concept of a finite automaton to that of an infinite cellular automaton consisting of an array or “space” of cells, each cell containing the same finite automaton. He chose an infinite checkerboard array for modeling self-reproduction, and he specified a particular twenty-nine-state automaton for each square cell. Each automaton is connected directly to its four contiguous neighbors, and communication between neighbors takes one or two time-steps. The twenty-nine states of a cell fall into three categories. There is a blank state to represent the passivity of an empty area. There are twelve states for switching, storage, and communication, from which any finite automaton can be constructed in a sufficiently large region of cells. And there are sixteen states for simulating the activities of construction and destruction. Von Neumann chose these twenty-nine states in such a way that an area of non-blank cells could compute and grow, i.e., activate a path of cells out to a blank region and convert the cells of that region into a cellular automaton. A specific cellular automaton is embedded in this space by the selection of the initial states of a finite area of cells, all other cells being left blank. A universal computer consists of a sufficiently powerful finite automaton with a tape. The tape is an indefinitely long row of cells in which bits are represented by two different cell states. The finite automaton accesses these cells by means of a construction arm that it extends back and forth in rows of cells contiguous to the tape. When activated, this finite automaton will execute programs stored on its tape. A universal constructor results from augmenting the universal computer cf. the robot model. Another construction arm is added, together with a finite automaton controller to operate it. The controller sends signals into the arm to extend it out to a blank region of the cellular space, to move around that region, and to change the states of cells in that region. After the universal constructor has converted the region into a cellular automaton, it directs the construction arm to activate the new automaton and then withdraw from it. Cellular automaton selfreproduction results from applying the universal constructor to itself, as in the robot model. Cellular automata are now studied extensively by humans working interactively with computers as abstract models of both physical and organic systems. See Arthur W. Burks, “Von Neumann’s Self-Reproducing Automata,” in Papers of John von Neumann on Computers and Computer Theory, edited by William Aspray and Arthur Burks, 7. The study of artificial life is an outgrowth of computer simulations of cellular automata and related automata. Cellular automata organizations are sometimes used in highly parallel computers. 

sellars: philosopher, son of Roy Wood Sellars, and one of the great systematic philosophers of the century. His most influential and representative works are “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” 6 and “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” 0. The Sellarsian system may be outlined as follows. The myth of the given. Thesis 1: Classical empiricism foundationalism maintains that our belief in the commonsense, objective world of physical objects is ultimately justified only by the way that world presents itself in sense experience. Thesis 2: It also typically maintains that sense experience a is not part of that world and b is not a form of conceptual cognition like thinking or believing. Thesis 3: From 1 and 2a classical empiricism concludes that our knowledge of the physical world is inferred from sense experience. Thesis 4: Since inferences derive knowledge from knowledge, sense experience itself must be a form of knowledge. Theses 14 collectively are the doctrine of the given. Each thesis taken individually is plausible. However, Sellars argues that 2b and 4 are incompatible if, as he thinks, knowledge is a kind of conceptual cognition. Concluding that the doctrine of the given is false, he maintains that classical empiricism is a myth. The positive system. From an analysis of theoretical explanation in the physical sciences, Sellars concludes that postulating theoretical entities is justified only if theoretical laws  nomological generalizations referring to theoretical entities  are needed to explain particular observable phenomena for which explanation in terms of exceptionless observation laws is unavailable. While rejecting any classical empiricist interpretation of observation, Sellars agrees that some account of non-inferential knowledge is required to make sense of theoretical explanation thus conceived. He thinks that utterances made in direct response to sensory stimuli observational reports count as non-inferential knowledge when a they possess authority, i.e., occur in conditions ensuring that they reliably indicate some physical property say, shape in the environment and are accepted by the linguistic community as possessing this quality; and b the utterer has justified belief that they possess this authority. Sellars claims that some perceptual conditions induce ordinary people to make observation reports inconsistent with established explanatory principles of the commonsense framework. We thus might tend to report spontaneously that an object is green seen in daylight and blue seen indoors, and yet think it has not undergone any process that could change its color. Sellars sees in such conflicting tendencies vestiges of a primitive conceptual framework whose tensions have been partially resolved by introducing the concept of sense experiences. These experiences count as theoretical entities, since they are postulated to account for observational phenomena for which no exceptionless observation laws exist. This example may serve as a paradigm for a process of theoretical explanation occurring in the framework of commonsense beliefs that Sellars calls the manifest image, a process that itself is a model for his theory of the rational dynamics of conceptual change in both the manifest image and in science  the scientific image. Because the actual process of conceptual evolution in Homo sapiens may not fit this pattern of rational dynamics, Sellars treats these dynamics as occurring within certain hypothetical ideal histories myths of the way in which, from certain conceptually primitive beginnings, one might have come to postulate the requisite theoretical explanations. The manifest image, like the proto-theories from which it arose, is itself subject to various tensions ultimately resolved in the scientific image. Because this latter image contains a metaphysical theory of material objects and persons that is inconsistent with that of its predecessor framework, Sellars regards the manifest image as replaced by its successor. In terms of the Peircean conception of truth that Sellars endorses, the scientific image is the only true image. In this sense Sellars is a scientific realist. There is, however, also an important sense in which Sellars is not a scientific realist: despite discrediting classical empiricism, he thinks that the intrinsic nature of sense experience gives to conceptualization more than simply sensory stimulus yet less than the content of knowledge claims. Inspired by Kant, Sellars treats the manifest image as a Kantian phenomenal world, a world that exists as a cognitive construction which, though lacking ideal factual truth, is guided in part by intrinsic features of sense experience. This is not analytic phenomenalism, which Sellars rejects. Moreover, the special methodological role for sense experience has effects even within the scientific image itself. Theories of mind, perception, and semantics. Mind: In the manifest image thoughts are private episodes endowed with intentionality. Called inner speech, they are theoretical entities whose causal and intentional properties are modeled, respectively, on inferential and semantic properties of overt speech. They are introduced within a behaviorist proto-theory, the Rylean framework, to provide a theoretical explanation for behavior normally accompanied by linguistically overt reasons. Perception: In the manifest image sense experiences are sense impressions  states of persons modeled on two-dimensional, colored physical replicas and introduced in the theoretical language of the adverbial theory of perception to explain why it can look as if some perceptible quality is present when it is not. Semantics: The meaning of a simple predicate p in a language L is the role played in L by p defined in terms of three sets of linguistic rules: language entry rules, intralinguistic rules, and language departure rules. This account also supports a nominalist treatment of abstract entities. Identification of a role for a token of p in L can be effected demonstratively in the speaker’s language by saying that p in L is a member of the class of predicates playing the same role as a demonstrated predicate. Thus a speaker of English might say that ‘rot’ in G. plays the semantic role ‘red’ has in English. Sellars sees science and metaphysics as autonomous strands in a single web of philosophical inquiry. Sellarsianism thus presents an important alternative to the view that what is fundamentally real is determined by the logical structure of scientific language alone. Sellars also sees ordinary language as expressing a commonsense framework of beliefs constituting a kind of proto-theory with its own methods, metaphysics, and theoretical entities. Thus, he also presents an important alternative to the view that philosophy concerns not what is ultimately real, but what words like ‘real’ ultimately mean in ordinary language. 

semantic: Grice was careful with what he felt was an abuse of ‘semantic’ – v. Evans: “Meaning and truth: essayis in semantics.” “Well, that’s what ‘meaning’ means, right?” The semantics is more reated to the signatum than to the significatum. The Grecians did not have anything remotely similar to the significatum, which is all about the making (facere) of a sign (as in Grice’s example of the handwave). This is the meaning Grice gives to ‘semantics.’ There is no need for the handwave to be part of a system of communication, or have syntactic structure, or be ‘arbitrary.’ Still, one thing is communicated from the emissor to his recipient, and that is all count. “I know the route” is the message, or “I will leave you soon.” The handwave may be ambiguous. Grice is aware that formalists like Hilbert and Gentzen think that they can do without semantics – but as long as there is something ‘transmitted,’ or ‘messaged,’ it cannot. In the one-off predicament, Emissor E emits x and communicates that p. Since an intention with a content involving a psychological state is involved and attached, even in a one-off, to ‘x,’ we can legitimately say the scenario may be said to describe a ‘semantic’ phenomenon. Grice would freely use ‘semantic,’ and the root for ‘semantics,’ that Grice does use, involves the richest root of all Grecian roots: the ‘semion.’ Liddell and Scott have “τό σημεῖον,” Ion. σημήϊον , Dor. σα_μήϊον IG12(3).452 (Thera, iv B.C.), σα_μεῖον IPE12.352.25 (Chersonesus, ii B.C.), IG5(1).1390.16 (Andania, i B.C.), σα_μᾶον CIG5168 (Cyrene); = σῆμα in all senses, and more common in Prose, but never in Hom. or Hes.; and which they render as “mark by which a thing is known,” Hdt.2.38;” they also have “τό σῆμα,” Dor. σᾶμα Berl.Sitzb.1927.161 (Cyrene), etc.; which they render as “sign, mark, token,” “ Il.10.466, 23.326, Od.19.250, etc.” Grice lectured not only on Cat. But the next, De Int. As Arsitotle puts it, an expression is a symbol (symbolon) or sign (semeion) of an affections or impression (pathematon) of the soul (psyche). An affection of the soul, of which a word is  primarily a sign, are the same for the whole of mankind, as is also objects (pragmaton) of which the affections is a representation or likenes, image, or copiy (homoiomaton).  [De Int., 1.16a4]  while Grice is NOT concerned about the semantics of utterers meaning (how could he, when he analyses  means  in terms of  intends , he is about the semantics of  expression-meaning. Grices second stage (expression meaing) of his programme about meaning begins with specifications of means as applied to x, a token of X. He is having Tarski and Davidson in their elaborations of schemata like ‘p’ ‘means’ that p. ‘Snow is white’ ‘means’ that snow is white, and stuff! Grice was especially concerned with combinatories, for both unary and dyadic operators, and with multiple quantifications within a first-order predicate calculus with identity. Since in Grice’s initial elaboration on meaning he relies on Stevenson, it is worth exploring how ‘semantics’ and ‘semiotics’ were interpreted by Peirce and the emotivists. Stevenson’s main source is however in the other place, though, under Stevenson. Semantics – communication – H. P. Grice, “Implicaturum and Explicature: The basis of communication” – “Communication and Intention” -- philosophy of language, the philosophical study of natural language and its workings, particularly of linguistic meaning and the use of language. A natural language is any one of the thousands of various tongues that have developed historically among populations of human beings and have been used for everyday purposes  including English, , Swahili, and Latin  as opposed to the formal and other artificial “languages” invented by mathematicians, logicians, and computer scientists, such as arithmetic, the predicate calculus, and LISP or COBOL. There are intermediate cases, e.g., Esperanto, Pig Latin, and the sort of “philosophese” that mixes English words with logical symbols. Contemporary philosophy of language centers on the theory of meaning, but also includes the theory of reference, the theory of truth, philosophical pragmatics, and the philosophy of linguistics. The main question addressed by the theory of meaning is: In virtue of what are certain physical marks or noises meaningful linguistic expressions, and in virtue of what does any particular set of marks or noises have the distinctive meaning it does? A theory of meaning should also give a comprehensive account of the “meaning phenomena,” or general semantic properties of sentences: synonymy, ambiguity, entailment, and the like. Some theorists have thought to express these questions and issues in terms of languageneutral items called propositions: ‘In virtue of what does a particular set of marks or noises express the proposition it does?’; cf. ‘ “La neige est blanche” expresses the proposition that snow is white’, and ‘Synonymous sentences express the same proposition’. On this view, to understand a sentence is to “grasp” the proposition expressed by that sentence. But the explanatory role and even the existence of such entities are disputed. It has often been maintained that certain special sentences are true solely in virtue of their meanings and/or the meanings of their component expressions, without regard to what the nonlinguistic world is like ‘No bachelor is married’; ‘If a thing is blue it is colored’. Such vacuously true sentences are called analytic. However, Quine and others have disputed whether there really is such a thing as analyticity. Philosophers have offered a number of sharply competing hypotheses as to the nature of meaning, including: 1 the referential view that words mean by standing for things, and that a sentence means what it does because its parts correspond referentially to the elements of an actual or possible state of affairs in the world; 2 ideational or mentalist theories, according to which meanings are ideas or other psychological phenomena in people’s minds; 3 “use” theories, inspired by Vitters and to a lesser extent by J. L. Austin: a linguistic expression’s “meaning” is its conventionally assigned role as a game-piece-like token used in one or more existing social practices; 4 H. P. Grice’s hypothesis that a sentence’s or word’s meaning is a function of what audience response a typical utterer would intend to elicit in uttering it. 5 inferential role theories, as developed by Wilfrid Sellars out of Carnap’s and Vitters’s views: a sentence’s meaning is specified by the set of sentences from which it can correctly be inferred and the set of those which can be inferred from it Sellars himself provided for “language-entry” and “language-exit” moves as partly constitutive of meaning, in addition to inferences; 6 verificationism, the view that a sentence’s meaning is the set of possible experiences that would confirm it or provide evidence for its truth; 7 the truth-conditional theory: a sentence’s meaning is the distinctive condition under which it is true, the situation or state of affairs that, if it obtained, would make the sentence true; 8 the null hypothesis, or eliminativist view, that “meaning” is a myth and there is no such thing  a radical claim that can stem either from Quine’s doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation or from eliminative materialism in the philosophy of mind. Following the original work of Carnap, Alonzo Church, Hintikka, and Richard Montague in the 0s, the theory of meaning has made increasing use of “possible worlds”based intensional logic as an analytical apparatus. Propositions sentence meanings considered as entities, and truth conditions as in 7 above, are now commonly taken to be structured sets of possible worlds  e.g., the set of worlds in which Aristotle’s maternal grandmother hates broccoli. And the structure imposed on such a set, corresponding to the intuitive constituent structure of a proposition as the concepts ‘grandmother’ and ‘hate’ are constituents of the foregoing proposition, accounts for the meaning-properties of sentences that express the proposition. Theories of meaning can also be called semantics, as in “Gricean semantics” or “Verificationist semantics,” though the term is sometimes restricted to referential and/or truth-conditional theories, which posit meaning-constitutive relations between words and the nonlinguistic world. Semantics is often contrasted with syntax, the structure of grammatically permissible ordering relations between words and other words in well-formed sentences, and with pragmatics, the rules governing the use of meaningful expressions in particular speech contexts; but linguists have found that semantic phenomena cannot be kept purely separate either from syntactic or from pragmatic phenomena. In a still more specialized usage, linguistic semantics is the detailed study typically within the truth-conditional format of particular types of construction in particular natural languages, e.g., belief-clauses in English or adverbial phrases in Kwakiutl. Linguistic semantics in that sense is practiced by some philosophers of language, by some linguists, and occasionally by both working together. Montague grammar and situation semantics are common formats for such work, both based on intensional logic. The theory of referenceis pursued whether or not one accepts either the referential or the truthconditional theory of meaning. Its main question is: In virtue of what does a linguistic expression designate one or more things in the world? Prior to theorizing and defining of technical uses, ‘designate’, ‘denote’, and ‘refer’ are used interchangeably. Denoting expressions are divided into singular terms, which purport to designate particular individual things, and general terms, which can apply to more than one thing at once. Singular terms include proper names ‘Cindy’, ‘Bangladesh’, definite descriptions ‘my brother’, ‘the first baby born in the New World’, and singular pronouns of various types ‘this’, ‘you’, ‘she’. General terms include common nouns ‘horse’, ‘trash can’, mass terms ‘water’, ‘graphite’, and plural pronouns ‘they’, ‘those’. The twentieth century’s dominant theory of reference has been the description theory, the view that linguistic terms refer by expressing descriptive features or properties, the referent being the item or items that in fact possess those properties. For example, a definite description does that directly: ‘My brother’ denotes whatever person does have the property of being my brother. According to the description theory of proper names, defended most articulately by Russell, such names express identifying properties indirectly by abbreviating definite descriptions. A general term such as ‘horse’ was thought of as expressing a cluster of properties distinctive of horses; and so forth. But the description theory came under heavy attack in the late 0s, from Keith Donnellan, Kripke, and Putnam, and was generally abandoned on each of several grounds, in favor of the causal-historical theory of reference. The causal-historical idea is that a particular use of a linguistic expression denotes by being etiologically grounded in the thing or group that is its referent; a historical causal chain of a certain shape leads backward in time from the act of referring to the referents. More recently, problems with the causal-historical theory as originally formulated have led researchers to backpedal somewhat and incorporate some features of the description theory. Other views of reference have been advocated as well, particularly analogues of some of the theories of meaning listed above  chiefly 26 and 8. Modal and propositional-attitude contexts create special problems in the theory of reference, for referring expressions seem to alter their normal semantic behavior when they occur within such contexts. Much ink has been spilled over the question of why and how the substitution of a term for another term having exactly the same referent can change the truth-value of a containing modal or propositional-attitude sentence. Interestingly, the theory of truth historically predates articulate study of meaning or of reference, for philosophers have always sought the nature of truth. It has often been thought that a sentence is true in virtue of expressing a true belief, truth being primarily a property of beliefs rather than of linguistic entities; but the main theories of truth have also been applied to sentences directly. The correspondence theory maintains that a sentence is true in virtue of its elements’ mirroring a fact or actual state of affairs. The coherence theory instead identifies truth as a relation of the true sentence to other sentences, usually an epistemic relation. Pragmatic theories have it that truth is a matter either of practical utility or of idealized epistemic warrant. Deflationary views, such as the traditional redundancy theory and D. Grover, J. Camp, and N. D. Belnap’s prosentential theory, deny that truth comes to anything more important or substantive than what is already codified in a recursive Tarskian truth-definition for a language. Pragmatics studies the use of language in context, and the context-dependence of various aspects of linguistic interpretation. First, one and the same sentence can express different meanings or propositions from context to context, owing to ambiguity or to indexicality or both. An ambiguous sentence has more than one meaning, either because one of its component words has more than one meaning as ‘bank’ has or because the sentence admits of more than one possible syntactic analysis ‘Visiting doctors can be tedious’, ‘The mouse tore up the street’. An indexical sentence can change in truth-value from context to context owing to the presence of an element whose reference fluctuates, such as a demonstrative pronoun ‘She told him off yesterday’, ‘It’s time for that meeting now’. One branch of pragmatics investigates how context determines a single propositional meaning for a sentence on a particular occasion of that sentence’s use. Speech act theory is a second branch of pragmatics that presumes the propositional or “locutionary” meanings of utterances and studies what J. L. Austin called the illocutionary forces of those utterances, the distinctive types of linguistic act that are performed by the speaker in making them. E.g., in uttering ‘I will be there tonight’, a speaker might be issuing a warning, uttering a threat, making a promise, or merely offering a prediction, depending on conventional and other social features of the situation. A crude test of illocutionary force is the “hereby” criterion: one’s utterance has the force of, say, a warning, if it could fairly have been paraphrased by the corresponding “explicitly performative” sentence beginning ‘I hereby warn you that . . .’..Speech act theory interacts to some extent with semantics, especially in the case of explicit performatives, and it has some fairly dramatic syntactic effects as well. A third branch of pragmatics not altogether separate from the second is the theory of conversation or theory of implicaturum, founded by H. P. Grice. Grice notes that sentences, when uttered in particular contexts, often generate “implications” that are not logical consequences of those sentences ‘Is Jones a good philosopher?’  ’He has very neat handwriting’. Such implications can usually be identified as what the speaker meant in uttering her sentence; thus for that reason and others, what Grice calls utterer’s meaning can diverge sharply from sentence-meaning or “timeless” meaning. To explain those non-logical implications, Grice offered a now widely accepted theory of conversational implicaturum. Conversational implicaturums arise from the interaction of the sentence uttered with mutually shared background assumptions and certain principles of efficient and cooperative conversation. The philosophy of linguistics studies the academic discipline of linguistics, particularly theoretical linguistics considered as a science or purported science; it examines methodology and fundamental assumptions, and also tries to incorporate linguists’ findings into the rest of philosophy of language. Theoretical linguistics concentrates on syntax, and took its contemporary form in the 0s under Zellig Harris and Chomsky: it seeks to describe each natural language in terms of a generative grammar for that language, i.e., a set of recursive rules for combining words that will generate all and only the “well-formed strings” or grammatical sentences of that language. The set must be finite and the rules recursive because, while our informationprocessing resources for recognizing grammatical strings as such are necessarily finite being subagencies of our brains, there is no limit in any natural language either to the length of a single grammatical sentence or to the number of grammatical sentences; a small device must have infinite generative and parsing capacity. Many grammars work by generating simple “deep structures” a kind of tree diagram, and then producing multiple “surface structures” as variants of those deep structures, by means of rules that rearrange their parts. The surface structures are syntactic parsings of natural-language sentences, and the deep structures from which they derive encode both basic grammatical relations between the sentences’ major constituents and, on some theories, the sentences’ main semantic properties as well; thus, sentences that share a deep structure will share some fundamental grammatical properties and all or most of their semantics. As Paul Ziff and Davidson saw in the 0s, the foregoing syntactic problem and its solution had semantic analogues. From small resources, human speakers understand  compute the meanings of  arbitrarily long and novel sentences without limit, and almost instantaneously. This ability seems to require semantic compositionality, the thesis that the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meanings of its semantic primitives or smallest meaningful parts, built up by way of syntactic compounding. Compositionality also seems to be required by learnability, since a normal child can learn an infinitely complex dialect in at most two years, but must learn semantic primitives one at a time. A grammar for a natural language is commonly taken to be a piece of psychology, part of an explanation of speakers’ verbal abilities and behavior. As such, however, it is a considerable idealization: it is a theory of speakers’ linguistic “competence” rather than of their actual verbal performance. The latter distinction is required by the fact that speakers’ considered, reflective judgments of grammatical correctness do not line up very well with the class of expressions that actually are uttered and understood unreflectively by those same speakers. Some grammatical sentences are too hard for speakers to parse quickly; some are too long to finish parsing at all; speakers commonly utter what they know to be formally ungrammatical strings; and real speech is usually fragmentary, interspersed with vocalizations, false starts, and the like. Actual departures from formal grammaticality are ascribed by linguists to “performance limitations,” i.e., psychological factors such as memory failure, weak computational capacity, or heedlessness; thus, actual verbal behavior is to be explained as resulting from the perturbation of competence by performance limitations.  Refs.: The main sources are his lectures on language and reality – part of them repr. in WOW. The keywords under ‘communication,’ and ‘signification,’ that Grice occasionally uses ‘the total signification’ of a remark, above, BANC. -- semantic holism, a metaphysical thesis about the nature of representation on which the meaning of a symbol is relative to the entire system of representations containing it. Thus, a linguistic expression can have meaning only in the context of a language; a hypothesis can have significance only in the context of a theory; a concept can have intentionality only in the context of the belief system. Holism about content has profoundly influenced virtually every aspect of contemporary theorizing about language and mind, not only in philosophy, but in linguistics, literary theory, artificial intelligence, psychology, and cognitive science. Contemporary semantic holists include Davidson, Quine, Gilbert Harman, Hartry Field, and Searle. Because semantic holism is a metaphysical and not a semantic thesis, two theorists might agree about the semantic facts but disagree about semantic holism. So, e.g., nothing in Tarski’s writings determines whether the semantic facts expressed by the theorems of an absolute truth semantic atomism semantic holism 829    829 theory are holistic or not. Yet Davidson, a semantic holist, argued that the correct form for a semantic theory for a natural language L is an absolute truth theory for L. Semantic theories, like other theories, need not wear their metaphysical commitments on their sleeves. Holism has some startling consequences. Consider this. Franklin D. Roosevelt who died when the United States still had just forty-eight states did not believe there were fifty states, but I do; semantic holism says that what ‘state’ means in our mouths depends on the totality of our beliefs about states, including, therefore, our beliefs about how many states there are. It seems to follow that he and I must mean different things by ‘state’; hence, if he says “Alaska is not a state” and I say “Alaska is a state” we are not disagreeing. This line of argument leads to such surprising declarations as that natural langauges are not, in general, intertranslatable Quine, Saussure; that there may be no fact of the matter about the meanings of texts Putnam, Derrida; and that scientific theories that differ in their basic postulates are “empirically incommensurable” Paul Feyerabend, Kuhn. For those who find these consequences of semantic holism unpalatable, there are three mutually exclusive responses: semantic atomism, semantic molecularism, or semantic nihilism. Semantic atomists hold that the meaning of any representation linguistic, mental, or otherwise is not determined by the meaning of any other representation. Historically, Anglo- philosophers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries thought that an idea of an X was about X’s in virtue of this idea’s physically resembling X’s. Resemblance theories are no longer thought viable, but a number of contemporary semantic atomists still believe that the basic semantic relation is between a concept and the things to which it applies, and not one among concepts themselves. These philosophers include Dretske, Dennis Stampe, Fodor, and Ruth Millikan. Semantic molecularism, like semantic holism, holds that the meaning of a representation in a language L is determined by its relationships to the meanings of other expressions in L, but, unlike holism, not by its relationships to every other expression in L. Semantic molecularists are committed to the view, contrary to Quine, that for any expression e in a language L there is an in-principle way of distinguishing between those representations in L the meanings of which determine the meaning of e and those representations in L the meanings of which do not determine the meaning of e. Traditionally, this inprinciple delimitation is supported by an analytic/synthetic distinction. Those representations in L that are meaning-constituting of e are analytically connected to e and those that are not meaning-constituting are synthetically connected to e. Meaning molecularism seems to be the most common position among those philosophers who reject holism. Contemporary meaning molecularists include Michael Devitt, Dummett, Ned Block, and John Perry. Semantic nihilism is perhaps the most radical response to the consequences of holism. It is the view that, strictly speaking, there are no semantic properties. Strictly speaking, there are no mental states; words lack meanings. At least for scientific purposes and perhaps for other purposes as well we must abandon the notion that people are moral or rational agents and that they act out of their beliefs and desires. Semantic nihilists include among their ranks Patricia and Paul Churchland, Stephen Stich, Dennett, and, sometimes, Quine.  -- semantic paradoxes, a collection of paradoxes involving the semantic notions of truth, predication, and definability. The liar paradox is the oldest and most widely known of these, having been formulated by Eubulides as an objection to Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth. In its simplest form, the liar paradox arises when we try to assess the truth of a sentence or proposition that asserts its own falsity, e.g.: A Sentence A is not true. It would seem that sentence A cannot be true, since it can be true only if what it says is the case, i.e., if it is not true. Thus sentence A is not true. But then, since this is precisely what it claims, it would seem to be true. Several alternative forms of the liar paradox have been given their own names. The postcard paradox, also known as a liar cycle, envisions a postcard with sentence B on one side and sentence C on the other: B The sentence on the other side of this card is true. semantic molecularism semantic paradoxes 830    830 C The sentence on the other side of this card is false. Here, no consistent assignment of truth-values to the pair of sentences is possible. In the preface paradox, it is imagined that a book begins with the claim that at least one sentence in the book is false. This claim is unproblematically true if some later sentence is false, but if the remainder of the book contains only truths, the initial sentence appears to be true if and only if false. The preface paradox is one of many examples of contingent liars, claims that can either have an unproblematic truth-value or be paradoxical, depending on the truth-values of various other claims in this case, the remaining sentences in the book. Related to the preface paradox is Epimenedes’ paradox: Epimenedes, himself from Crete, is said to have claimed that all Cretans are liars. This claim is paradoxical if interpreted to mean that Cretans always lie, or if interpreted to mean they sometimes lie and if no other claim made by Epimenedes was a lie. On the former interpretation, this is a simple variation of the liar paradox; on the latter, it is a form of contingent liar. Other semantic paradoxes include Berry’s paradox, Richard’s paradox, and Grelling’s paradox. The first two involve the notion of definability of numbers. Berry’s paradox begins by noting that names or descriptions of integers consist of finite sequences of syllables. Thus the three-syllable sequence ‘twenty-five’ names 25, and the seven-syllable sequence ‘the sum of three and seven’ names ten. Now consider the collection of all sequences of English syllables that are less than nineteen syllables long. Of these, many are nonsensical ‘bababa’ and some make sense but do not name integers ‘artichoke’, but some do ‘the sum of three and seven’. Since there are only finitely many English syllables, there are only finitely many of these sequences, and only finitely many integers named by them. Berry’s paradox arises when we consider the eighteen-syllable sequence ‘the smallest integer not nameable in less than nineteen syllables’. This phrase appears to be a perfectly well-defined description of an integer. But if the phrase names an integer n, then n is nameable in less than nineteen syllables, and hence is not described by the phrase. Richard’s paradox constructs a similarly paradoxical description using what is known as a diagonal construction. Imagine a list of all finite sequences of letters of the alphabet plus spaces and punctuation, ordered as in a dictionary. Prune this list so that it contains only English definitions of real numbers between 0 and 1. Then consider the definition: “Let r be the real number between 0 and 1 whose kth decimal place is  if the kth decimal place of the number named by the kth member of this list is 1, and 0 otherwise’. This description seems to define a real number that must be different from any number defined on the list. For example, r cannot be defined by the 237th member of the list, because r will differ from that number in at least its 237th decimal place. But if it indeed defines a real number between 0 and 1, then this description should itself be on the list. Yet clearly, it cannot define a number different from the number defined by itself. Apparently, the definition defines a real number between 0 and 1 if and only if it does not appear on the list of such definitions. Grelling’s paradox, also known as the paradox of heterologicality, involves two predicates defined as follows. Say that a predicate is “autological” if it applies to itself. Thus ‘polysyllabic’ and ‘short’ are autological, since ‘polysyllabic’ is polysyllabic, and ‘short’ is short. In contrast, a predicate is “heterological” if and only if it is not autological. The question is whether the predicate ‘heterological’ is heterological. If our answer is yes, then ‘heterological’ applies to itself  and so is autological, not heterological. But if our answer is no, then it does not apply to itself  and so is heterological, once again contradicting our answer. The semantic paradoxes have led to important work in both logic and the philosophy of language, most notably by Russell and Tarski. Russell developed the ramified theory of types as a unified treatment of all the semantic paradoxes. Russell’s theory of types avoids the paradoxes by introducing complex syntactic conditions on formulas and on the definition of new predicates. In the resulting language, definitions like those used in formulating Berry’s and Richard’s paradoxes turn out to be ill-formed, since they quantify over collections of expressions that include themselves, violating what Russell called the vicious circle principle. The theory of types also rules out, on syntactic grounds, predicates that apply to themselves, or to larger expressions containing those very same predicates. In this way, the liar paradox and Grelling’s paradox cannot be constructed within a language conforming to the theory of types. Tarski’s attention to the liar paradox made two fundamental contributions to logic: his development of semantic techniques for defining the truth predicate for formalized languages and his proof of Tarski’s theorem. Tarskian semantics avoids the liar paradox by starting with a formal language, call it L, in which no semantic notions are expressible, and hence in which the liar paradox cannot be formulated. Then using another language, known as the metalanguage, Tarski applies recursive techniques to define the predicate true-in-L, which applies to exactly the true sentences of the original language L. The liar paradox does not arise in the metalanguage, because the sentence D Sentence D is not true-in-L. is, if expressible in the metalanguage, simply true. It is true because D is not a sentence of L, and so a fortiori not a true sentence of L. A truth predicate for the metalanguage can then be defined in yet another language, the metametalanguage, and so forth, resulting in a sequence of consistent truth predicates. Tarski’s theorem uses the liar paradox to prove a significant result in logic. The theorem states that the truth predicate for the first-order language of arithmetic is not definable in arithmetic. That is, if we devise a systematic way of representing sentences of arithmetic by numbers, then it is impossible to define an arithmetical predicate that applies to all and only those numbers that represent true sentences of arithmetic. The theorem is proven by showing that if such a predicate were definable, we could construct a sentence of arithmetic that is true if and only if it is not true: an arithmetical version of sentence A, the liar paradox. Both Russell’s and Tarski’s solutions to the semantic paradoxes have left many philosophers dissatisfied, since the solutions are basically prescriptions for constructing languages in which the paradoxes do not arise. But the fact that paradoxes can be avoided in artificially constructed languages does not itself give a satisfying explanation of what is going wrong when the paradoxes are encountered in natural language, or in an artificial language in which they can be formulated. Most recent work on the liar paradox, following Kripke’s “Outline of a Theory of Truth” 5, looks at languages in which the paradox can be formulated, and tries to provide a consistent account of truth that preserves as much as possible of the intuitive notion.

semeiotics: semiological: or is it semiotics? Cf. semiological, semotic. Since Grice uses ‘philosophical psychology’ and ‘philosopical biology,’ it may do to use ‘semiology,’ indeed ‘philosophical semiology,’ here.  Oxonian semiotics is unique. Holloway published his “Language and Intelligence” and everyone was excited. It is best to see this as Grices psychologism. Grice would rarely use ‘intelligent,’ less so the more pretentious, ‘intelligence,’ as a keyword. If he is doing it, it is because what he saw as the misuse of it by Ryle and Holloway. Holloway, a PPE, is a tutorial fellow in philosophy at All Souls. He acknowledges Ryle as his mentor. (Holloway also quotes from Austin). Grice was amused that J. N. Findlay, in his review of Holloway’s essay in “Mind,” compares Holloway to C. W. Morris, and cares to cite the two relevant essay by Morris: The Foundation in the theory of signs, and Signs, Language, and Behaviour. Enough for Grice to feel warmly justified in having chosen another New-World author, Peirce, for his earlier Oxford seminar. Morris studied under G. H. Mead. But is ‘intelligence’ part of The Griceian Lexicon?Well, Lewis and Short have ‘interlegere,’ to chose between. Lewis and Short have ‘interlĕgo , lēgi, lectum, 3, v. a., I’.which they render it as “to cull or pluck off here and there (poet. and postclass.).in tmesi) uncis Carpendae manibus frondes, interque legendae, Verg. G. 2, 366: “poma,” Pall. Febr. 25, 16; id. Jun. 5, 1.intellĕgo (less correctly intellĭgo), exi, ectum (intellexti for intellexisti, Ter. Eun. 4, 6, 30; Cic. Att. 13, 32, 3: I.“intellexes for intellexisses,” Plaut. Cist. 2, 3, 81; subj. perf.: “intellegerint,” Sall. H. Fragm. 1, 41, 23 Dietsch); “inter-lego,” “to see into, perceive, understand.” I. Lit. A. Lewis and Short render as “to perceive, understand, comprehend.” Cf. Grice on his handwriting being legible to few. And The child is an adult as being UNintelligible until the creature is produced. In “Aspects,” he mentions flat rationality, and certain other talents that are more difficult for the philosopher to conceptualise, such as nose (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen, tenacity, and such. Grices approach is Pological. If Locke had used intelligent to refer to Prince Maurices parrot, Grice wants to find criteria for intelligent as applied to his favourite type of P, rather (intelligent, indeed rational.). semiosis from Grecian semeiosis, ‘observation of signs’, the relation of signification involving the three relata of sign, object, and mind. Semiotic is the science or study of semiosis. The semiotic of John of Saint Thomas and of Peirce includes two distinct components: the relation of signification and the classification of signs. The relation of signification is genuinely triadic and cannot be reduced to the sum of its three subordinate dyads: sign-object, sign-mind, object-mind. A sign represents an object to a mind just as A gives a gift to B. Semiosis is not, as it is often taken to be, a mere compound of a sign-object dyad and a sign-mind dyad because these dyads lack the essential intentionality that unites mind with object; similarly, the gift relation involves not just A giving and B receiving but, crucially, the intention uniting A and B. In the Scholastic logic of John of Saint Thomas, the sign-object dyad is a categorial relation secundum esse, that is, an essential relation, falling in Aristotle’s category of relation, while the sign-mind dyad is a transcendental relation secundum dici, that is, a relation only in an analogical sense, in a manner of speaking; thus the formal rationale of semiosis is constituted by the sign-object dyad. By contrast, in Peirce’s logic, the sign-object dyad and the sign-mind dyad are each only potential semiosis: thus, the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt were merely potential signs until the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, just as a road-marking was a merely potential sign to the driver who overlooked it. Classifications of signs typically follow from the logic of semiosis. Thus John of Saint Thomas divides signs according to their relations to their objects into natural signs smoke as a sign of fire, customary signs napkins on the table as a sign that dinner is imminent, and stipulated signs as when a neologism is coined; he also divides signs according to their relations to a mind. An instrumental sign must first be cognized as an object before it can signify e.g., a written word or a symptom; a formal sign, by contrast, directs the mind to its object without having first been cognized e.g., percepts and concepts. Formal signs are not that which we cognize but that by which we cognize. All instrumental signs presuppose the action of formal signs in the semiosis of cognition. Peirce similarly classified signs into three trichotomies according to their relations with 1 themselves, 2 their objects, and 3 their interpretants usually minds; and Charles Morris, who followed Peirce closely, called the relationship of signs to one another the syntactical dimension of semiosis, the relationship of signs to their objects the semantical dimension of semiosis, and the relationship of signs to their interpreters the pragmatic dimension of semiosis.  Refs.: The most specific essay is his lecture on Peirce, listed under ‘communication, above. A reference to ‘criteria of intelligence relates. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

sensus: sensationalism, the belief that all mental states  particularly cognitive states  are derived, by composition or association, from sensation. It is often joined to the view that sensations provide the only evidence for our beliefs, or more rarely to the view that statements about the world can be reduced, without loss, to statements about sensation. Hobbes was the first important sensationalist in modern times. “There is no conception in man’s mind,” he wrote, “which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.” But the belief gained prominence in the eighteenth century, due largely to the influence of Locke. Locke himself was not a sensationalist, because he took the mind’s reflection on its own operations to be an independent source of ideas. But his distinction between simple and complex ideas was used by eighteenthcentury sensationalists such as Condillac and Hartley to explain how conceptions that seem distant from sense might nonetheless be derived from it. And to account for the particular ways in which simple ideas are in fact combined, Condillac and Hartley appealed to a second device described by Locke: the association of ideas. “Elementary” sensations  the building blocks of our mental life  were held by the sensationalists to be non-voluntary, independent of judgment, free of interpretation, discrete or atomic, and infallibly known. Nineteenth-century sensationalists tried to account for perception in terms of such building blocks; they struggled particularly with the perception of space and time. Late nineteenth-century critics such as Ward and James advanced powerful arguments against the reduction of perception to sensation. Perception, they claimed, involves more than the passive reception or recombination and association of discrete pellets of incorrigible information. They urged a change in perspective  to a functionalist viewpoint more closely allied with prevailing trends in biology  from which sensationalism never fully recovered.  sensibile: Austin, “Sense and sensibile,” as used by Russell, those entities that no one is at the moment perceptually aware of, but that are, in every other respect, just like the objects of perceptual awareness. If one is a direct realist and believes that the objects one is aware of in sense perception are ordinary physical objects, then sensibilia are, of course, just physical objects of which no one is at the moment aware. Assuming with common sense that ordinary objects continue to exist when no one is aware of them, it follows that sensibilia exist. If, however, one believes as Russell did that what one is aware of in ordinary sense perception is some kind of idea in the mind, a so-called sense-datum, then sensibilia have a problematic status. A sensibile then turns out to be an unsensed sense-datum. On some the usual conceptions of sense-data, this is like an unfelt pain, since a sense-datum’s existence not as a sense-datum, but as anything at all depends on our someone’s perception of it. To exist for such things is to be perceived see Berkeley’s “esse est percipii“. If, however, one extends the notion of sense-datum as Moore was inclined to do to whatever it is of which one is directly aware in sense perception, then sensibilia may or may not exist. It depends on what  physical objects or ideas in the mind  we are directly aware of in sense perception and, of course, on the empirical facts about whether objects continue to exist when they are not being perceived. If direct realists are right, horses and trees, when unobserved, are sensibilia. So are the front surfaces of horses and trees things Moore once considered to be sensedata. If the direct realists are wrong, and what we are perceptually aware of are “ideas in the mind,” then whether or not sensibilia exist depends on whether or not such ideas can exist apart from any mind.  sensorium, the seat and cause of sensation in the brain of humans and other animals. The term is not part of contemporary psychological parlance; it belongs to prebehavioral, prescientific psychology, especially of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Only creatures possessed of a sensorium were thought capable of bodily and perceptual sensations. Some thinkers believed that the sensorium, when excited, also produced muscular activity and motion. sensus communis, a cognitive faculty to which the five senses report. It was first argued for in Aristotle’s On the Soul II.12, though the term ‘common sense’ was first introduced in Scholastic thought. Aristotle refers to properties such as magnitude that are perceived by more than one sense as common sensibles. To recognize common sensibles, he claims, we must possess a single cognitive power to compare such qualities, received from the different senses, to one another. Augustine says the “inner sense” judges whether the senses are working properly, and perceives whether the animal perceives De libero arbitrio II.35. Aquinas In De anima II, 13.370 held that it is also by the common sense that we perceive we live. He says the common sense uses the external senses to know sensible forms, preparing the sensible species it receives for the operation of the cognitive power, which recognizes the real thing causing the sensible species.  sentential connective, also called sentential operator, propositional connective, propositional operator, a word or phrase, such as ‘and’, ‘or’, or ‘if . . . then’, that is used to construct compound sentences from atomic  i.e., non-compound  sentences. A sentential connective can be defined formally as an expression containing blanks, such that when the blanks are replaced with sentences the result is a compound sentence. Thus, ‘if ——— then ———’ and ‘——— or ———’ are sentential connectives, since we can replace the blanks with sentences to get the compound sentences ‘If the sky is clear then we can go swimming’ and ‘We can go swimming or we can stay home’. Classical logic makes use of truth-functional connectives only, for which the truth-value of the compound sentence can be determined uniquely by the truth-value of the sentences that replace the blanks. The standard truth-functional sensibilia sentential connective 834    834 connectives are ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if . . . then’, and ‘if and only if’. There are many non-truth-functional connectives as well, such as ‘it is possible that ———’ and ‘——— because ———’.  sentimentalism, the theory, prominent in the eighteenth century, that epistemological or moral relations are derived from feelings. Although sentimentalism and sensationalism are both empiricist positions, the latter view has all knowledge built up from sensations, experiences impinging on the senses. Sentimentalists may allow that ideas derive from sensations, but hold that some relations between them are derived internally, that is, from sentiments arising upon reflection. Moral sentimentalists, such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, argued that the virtue or vice of a character trait is established by approving or disapproving sentiments. Hume, the most thoroughgoing sentimentalist, also argued that all beliefs about the world depend on sentiments. On his analysis, when we form a belief, we rely on the mind’s causally connecting two experiences, e.g., fire and heat. But, he notes, such causal connections depend on the notion of necessity  that the two perceptions will always be so conjoined  and there is nothing in the perceptions themselves that supplies that notion. The idea of necessary connection is instead derived from a sentiment: our feeling of expectation of the one experience upon the other. Likewise, our notions of substance the unity of experiences in an object and of self the unity of experiences in a subject are sentimentbased. But whereas moral sentiments do not purport to represent the external world, these metaphysical notions of necessity, substance, and self are “fictions,” creations of the imagination purporting to represent something in the outside world.

sententia: For some reason, perhaps of his eccentricity, J. L. Austin was in love with Chomsky. He would read “Syntactic Structures” aloud to the Play Group. And Grice was listening. This stuck with Grice, who started to use ‘sentence,’ even in Polish, when translating Tarski. Hardie had taught him that ‘sententia’ was a Roman transliteration of ‘dia-noia,’ which helped. Since “Not when the the of dog” is NOT a sentence, not even an ‘ill-formed sentence,’ Grice concludes that like ‘reason,’ and ‘cabbage,’ sentence is a value-paradeigmatic concept. His favourite sentence was “Fido is shaggy,” uttered to communicate that Smith’s dog is hairy coated. One of Grice’s favourite sentences was Carnap’s “Pirots karulise elatically,” which Carnap borrowed from (but never returned to) Baron Russell. (“I later found out a ‘pirot’ is an extinct fish, which destroyed my whole implicaturum – talk of ichthyological necessity!” (Carnap contrasted, “Pirots karulise elatically,” with “The not not if not the dog the.”

shaggy-dog story, v. Grice’s shaggy-dog story.

shared experience: WoW: 286.

set-theoretic paradoxes, a collection of paradoxes that reveal difficulties in certain central notions of set theory. The best-known of these are Russell’s paradox, Burali-Forti’s paradox, and Cantor’s paradox. Russell’s paradox, discovered in 1 by Bertrand Russell, is the simplest and so most problematic of the set-theoretic paradoxes. Using it, we can derive a contradiction directly from Cantor’s unrestricted comprehension schema. This schema asserts that for any formula Px containing x as a free variable, there is a set {x _ Px} whose members are exactly those objects that satisfy Px. To derive the contradiction, take Px to be the formula x 1 x, and let z be the set {x _ x 2 x} whose existence is guaranteed by the comprehension schema. Thus z is the set whose members are exactly those objects that are not members of themselves. We now ask whether z is, itself, a member of z. If the answer is yes, then we can conclude that z must satisfy the criterion of membership in z, i.e., z must not be a member of z. But if the answer is no, then since z is not a member of itself, it satisfies the criterion for membership in z, and so z is a member of z. All modern axiomatizations of set theory avoid Russell’s paradox by restricting the principles that assert the existence of sets. The simplest restriction replaces unrestricted comprehension with the separation schema. Separation asserts that, given any set A and formula Px, there is a set {x 1 A _ Px}, whose members are exactly those members of A that satisfy Px. If we now take Px to be the formula x 2 x, then separation guarantees the existence of a set zA % {x 1 A _ x 2 x}. We can then use Russell’s reasoning to prove the result that zA cannot be a member of the original set A. If it were a member of A, then we could prove that it is a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself. Hence it is not a member of A. But this result is not problematic, and so the paradox is avoided. The Burali-Forte paradox and Cantor’s paradox are sometimes known as paradoxes of size, since they show that some collections are too large to be considered sets. The Burali-Forte paradox, discovered by Cesare Burali-Forte, is concerned with the set of all ordinal numbers. In Cantor’s set theory, an ordinal number can be assigned to any well-ordered set. A set is wellordered if every subset of the set has a least element. But Cantor’s set theory also guarantees the existence of the set of all ordinals, again due to the unrestricted comprehension schema. This set of ordinals is well-ordered, and so can be associated with an ordinal number. But it can be shown that the associated ordinal is greater than any ordinal in the set, hence greater than any ordinal number. Cantor’s paradox involves the cardinality of the set of all sets. Cardinality is another notion of size used in set theory: a set A is said to have greater cardinality than a set B if and only if B can be mapped one-to-one onto a subset of A but A cannot be so mapped onto B or any of its subsets. One of Cantor’s fundamental results was that the set of all subsets of a set A known as the power set of A has greater cardinality than the set A. Applying this result to the set V of all sets, we can conclude that the power set of V has greater cardinality than V. But every set in the power set of V is also in V since V contains all sets, and so the power set of V cannot have greater cardinality than V. We thus have a contradiction. Like Russell’s paradox, both of these paradoxes result from the unrestricted comprehension schema, and are avoided by replacing it with weaker set-existence principles. Various principles stronger than the separation schema are needed to get a reasonable set theory, and many alternative axiomatizations have been proposed. But the lesson of these paradoxes is that no setexistence principle can entail the existence of the Russell set, the set of all ordinals, or the set of all sets, on pain of contradiction. 

set theory – “I distinguish between a class and a set, but Strawson does not.” – Grice --  the study of collections, ranging from familiar examples like a set of encyclopedias or a deck of cards to mathematical examples like the set of natural numbers or the set of points on a line or the set of functions from a set A to another set B. Sets can be specified in two basic ways: by a list e.g., {0, 2, 4, 6, 8} and as the extension of a property e.g., {x _ x is an even natural number less than 10}, where this is read ‘the set of all x such that x is an even natural number less than 10’. The most fundamental relation in set theory is membership, as in ‘2 is a member of the set of even natural numbers’ in symbols: 2 1 {x _ x is an even natural number}. Membership is determinate, i.e., any candidate for membership in a given set is either in the set or not in the set, with no room for vagueness or ambiguity. A set’s identity is completely determined by its members or elements i.e., sets are extensional rather than intensional. Thus {x _ x is human} is the same set as {x _ x is a featherless biped} because they have the same members. The smallest set possible is the empty or null set, the set with no members. There cannot be more than one empty set, by extensionality. It can be specified, e.g., as {x _ x & x}, but it is most often symbolized as / or { }. A set A is called a subset of a set B and B a superset of A if every member of A is also a member of B; in symbols, A 0 B. So, the set of even natural numbers is a subset of the set of all natural numbers, and any set is a superset of the empty set. The union of two sets A and B is the set whose members are the members of A and the members of B  in symbols, A 4 B % {x _ x 1 A or x 1 B}  so the union of the set of even natural numbers and the set of odd natural numbers is the set of all natural numbers. The intersection of two sets A and B is the set whose members are common to both A and B  in symbols, A 3 B % {x _ x 1 A and x 1 B}  so the intersection of the set of even natural numbers and the set of prime natural numbers is the singleton set {2}, whose only member is the number 2. Two sets whose intersection is empty are called disjoint, e.g., the set of even natural numbers and the set of odd natural numbers. Finally, the difference between a set A and a set B is the set whose members are members of A but not members of B  in symbols, A  B % {x _ x 1 A and x 2 B}  so the set of odd numbers between 5 and 20 minus the set of prime natural numbers is {9, 15}. By extensionality, the order in which the members of a set are listed is unimportant, i.e., {1, 2, 3} % {2, 3, 1}. To introduce the concept of ordering, we need the notion of the ordered pair of a and b  in symbols, a, b or . All that is essential to ordered pairs is that two of them are equal only when their first entries are equal and their second entries are equal. Various sets can be used to simulate this behavior, but the version most commonly used is the Kuratowski ordered pair: a, b is defined to be {{a}, {a, b}}. On this definition, it can indeed be proved that a, b % c, d if and only if a % c and b % d. The Cartesian product of two sets A and B is the set of all ordered pairs whose first entry is in A and whose second entry is B  in symbols, A $ B % {x _ x % a, b for some a 1 A and some b 1 B}. This set-theoretic reflection principles set theory 836    836 same technique can be used to form ordered triples  a, b, c % a, b, c; ordered fourtuples  a, b, c, d % a, b, c, d; and by extension, ordered n-tuples for all finite n. Using only these simple building blocks, substitutes for all the objects of classical mathematics can be constructed inside set theory. For example, a relation is defined as a set of ordered pairs  so the successor relation among natural numbers becomes {0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3 . . . }  and a function is a relation containing no distinct ordered pairs of the form a, b and a, c  so the successor relation is a function. The natural numbers themselves can be identified with various sequences of sets, the most common of which are finite von Neumann ordinal numbers: /, {/}, {/, {/}, {/}, {/}, {/, {/}}}, . . . . On this definition, 0 % /, 1 % {/}, 2 % {/, {/}}, etc., each number n has n members, the successor of n is n 4 {n}, and n ‹ m if and only if n 1 m. Addition and multiplication can be defined for these numbers, and the Peano axioms proved from the axioms of set theory; see below. Negative, rational, real, and complex numbers, geometric spaces, and more esoteric mathematical objects can all be identified with sets, and the standard theorems about them proved. In this sense, set theory provides a foundation for mathematics. Historically, the theory of sets arose in the late nineteenth century. In his work on the foundations of arithmetic, Frege identified the natural numbers with the extensions of certain concepts; e.g., the number two is the set of all concepts C under which two things fall  in symbols, 2 % {x _ x is a concept, and there are distinct things a and b which fall under x, and anything that falls under x is either a or b}. Cantor was led to consider complex sets of points in the pursuit of a question in the theory of trigonometric series. To describe the properties of these sets, Cantor introduced infinite ordinal numbers after the finite ordinals described above. The first of these, w, is {0, 1, 2, . . .}, now understood in von Neumann’s terms as the set of all finite ordinals. After w, the successor function yields w ! 1 % w 4 {w} % {0, 1, 2, . . . n, n + 1, . . . , w}, then w ! 2 % w ! 1 ! 1 % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w , w ! 1}, w ! 3 % w ! 2 ! 1 % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w, w ! 1, w ! 2}, and so on; after all these comes w ! w % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w, w ! 1, w ! 2, . . . , w ! n, w ! n ! 1, . . .}, and the process begins again. The ordinal numbers are designed to label the positions in an ordering. Consider, e.g., a reordering of the natural numbers in which the odd numbers are placed after the evens: 0, 2, 4, 6, . . . 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . . The number 4 is in the third position of this sequence, and the number 5 is in the w + 2nd. But finite numbers also perform a cardinal function; they tell us how many so-andso’s there are. Here the infinite ordinals are less effective. The natural numbers in their usual order have the same structure as w, but when they are ordered as above, with the evens before the odds, they take on the structure of a much larger ordinal, w ! w. But the answer to the question, How many natural numbers are there? should be the same no matter how they are arranged. Thus, the transfinite ordinals do not provide a stable measure of the size of an infinite set. When are two infinite sets of the same size? On the one hand, the infinite set of even natural numbers seems clearly smaller than the set of all natural numbers; on the other hand, these two sets can be brought into one-to-one correspondence via the mapping that matches 0 to 0, 1 to 2, 2 to 4, 3 to 6, and in general, n to 2n. This puzzle had troubled mathematicians as far back as Galileo, but Cantor took the existence of a oneto-one correspondence between two sets A and B as the definition of ‘A is the same size as B’. This coincides with our usual understanding for finite sets, and it implies that the set of even natural numbers and the set of all natural numbers and w ! 1 and w! 2 and w ! w and w ! w and many more all have the same size. Such infinite sets are called countable, and the number of their elements, the first infinite cardinal number, is F0. Cantor also showed that the set of all subsets of a set A has a size larger than A itself, so there are infinite cardinals greater than F0, namely F1, F2, and so on. Unfortunately, the early set theories were prone to paradoxes. The most famous of these, Russell’s paradox, arises from consideration of the set R of all sets that are not members of themselves: is R 1 R? If it is, it isn’t, and if it isn’t, it is. The Burali-Forti paradox involves the set W of all ordinals: W itself qualifies as an ordinal, so W 1 W, i.e., W ‹ W. Similar difficulties surface with the set of all cardinal numbers and the set of all sets. At fault in all these cases is a seemingly innocuous principle of unlimited comprehension: for any property P, there is a set {x _ x has P}. Just after the turn of the century, Zermelo undertook to systematize set theory by codifying its practice in a series of axioms from which the known derivations of the paradoxes could not be carried out. He proposed the axioms of extensionality two sets with the same members are the same; pairing for any a and b, there is a set {a, b}; separation for any set A and property P, there is a set {x _ x 1 A and x has P}; power set for any set A, there is a set {x _ x0 A}; union for any set of sets F, there is a set {x _ x 1 A for some A 1 F}  this yields A 4 B, when F % {A, B} and {A, B} comes from A and B by pairing; infinity w exists; and choice for any set of non-empty sets, there is a set that contains exactly one member from each. The axiom of choice has a vast number of equivalents, including the well-ordering theorem  every set can be well-ordered  and Zorn’s lemma  if every chain in a partially ordered set has an upper bound, then the set has a maximal element. The axiom of separation limits that of unlimited comprehension by requiring a previously given set A from which members are separated by the property P; thus troublesome sets like Russell’s that attempt to collect absolutely all things with P cannot be formed. The most controversial of Zermelo’s axioms at the time was that of choice, because it posits the existence of a choice set  a set that “chooses” one from each of possibly infinitely many non-empty sets  without giving any rule for making the choices. For various philosophical and practical reasons, it is now accepted without much debate. Fraenkel and Skolem later formalized the axiom of replacement if A is a set, and every member a of A is replaced by some b, then there is a set containing all the b’s, and Skolem made both replacement and separation more precise by expressing them as schemata of first-order logic. The final axiom of the contemporary theory is foundation, which guarantees that sets are formed in a series of stages called the iterative hierarchy begin with some non-sets, then form all possible sets of these, then form all possible sets of the things formed so far, then form all possible sets of these, and so on. This iterative picture of sets built up in stages contrasts with the older notion of the extension of a concept; these are sometimes called the mathematical and the logical notions of collection, respectively. The early controversy over the paradoxes and the axiom of choice can be traced to the lack of a clear distinction between these at the time. Zermelo’s first five axioms all but choice plus foundation form a system usually called Z; ZC is Z with choice added. Z plus replacement is ZF, for Zermelo-Fraenkel, and adding choice makes ZFC, the theory of sets in most widespread use today. The consistency of ZFC cannot be proved by standard mathematical means, but decades of experience with the system and the strong intuitive picture provided by the iterative conception suggest that it is. Though ZFC is strong enough for all standard mathematics, it is not enough to answer some natural set-theoretic questions e.g., the continuum problem. This has led to a search for new axioms, such as large cardinal assumptions, but no consensus on these additional principles has yet been reached. 

Sextus Empiricus, the sixth son of Empiricus the Elder – “My five brothers were not philosophers” -- Grecian Skeptic philosopher whose writings are the chief source of our knowledge about the extreme Skeptic view, Pyrrhonism. Practically nothing is known about him as a person. He was apparently a medical doctor and a teacher in a Skeptical school, probably in Alexandria. What has survived are his Hypotoposes, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and a series of Skeptical critiques, Against the Dogmatists, questioning the premises and conclusions in many disciplines, such as physics, mathematics, rhetoric, and ethics. In these works, Sextus summarized and organized the views of Skeptical arguers before him. The Outlines starts with an attempt to indicate what Skepticism is, to explain the terminology employed by the Skeptics, how Pyrrhonian Skepticism differs from other so-called Skeptical views, and how the usual answers to Skepticism are rebutted. Sextus points out that the main Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Academic Skepticism which is presented as a negative dogmatism, claimed that they would bring the adherent peace of mind, ataraxia. Unfortunately the dogmatic adherent would only become more perturbed by seeing the Skeptical objections that could be brought against his or her view. Then, by suspending judgment, epoche, one would find the tranquillity being sought. Pyrrhonian Skepticism is a kind of mental hygiene or therapy that cures one of dogmatism or rashness. It is like a purge that cleans out foul matter as well as itself. To bring about this state of affairs there are sets of Skeptical arguments that should bring one to suspense of judgment. The first set are the ten tropes of the earlier Skeptic, Anesidemus. The next are the five tropes about causality. And lastly are the tropes about the criterion of knowledge. The ten tropes stress the variability of sense experience among men and animals, among men, and within one individual. The varying and conflicting experiences present conflicts about what the perceived object is like. Any attempt to judge beyond appearances, to ascertain that which is non-evident, requires some way of choosing what data to accept. This requires a criterion. Since there is disagreement about what criterion to employ, we need a criterion of a criterion, and so on. Either we accept an arbitrary criterion or we get into an infinite regress. Similarly if we try to prove anything, we need a criterion of what constitutes a proof. If we offer a proof of a theory of proof, this will be circular reasoning, or end up in another infinite regress. Sextus devotes most of his discussion to challenging Stoic logic, which claimed that evident signs could reveal what is non-evident. There might be signs that suggested what is temporarily non-evident, such as smoke indicating that there is a fire, but any supposed linkage between evident signs and what is non-evident can be challenged and questioned. Sextus then applies the groups of Skeptical arguments to various specific subjects  physics, mathematics, music, grammar, ethics  showing that one should suspend judgment on any knowledge claims in these areas. Sextus denies that he is saying any of this dogmatically: he is just stating how he feels at given moments. He hopes that dogmatists sick with a disease, rashness, will be cured and led to tranquillity no matter how good or bad the Skeptical arguments might be. 

Shaftesbury, Lord, in full, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, title of Anthony Ashley Cooper, English philosopher and politician who originated the moral sense theory. He was born at Wimborne St. Giles, Dorsetshire. As a Country Whig he served in the House of Commons for three years and later, as earl, monitored meetings of the House of Lords. Shaftesbury introduced into British moral philosophy the notion of a moral sense, a mental faculty unique to human beings, involving reflection and feeling and constituting their ability to discern right and wrong. He sometimes represents the moral sense as analogous to a purported aesthetic sense, a special capacity by which we perceive, through our emotions, the proportions and harmonies of which, on his Platonic view, beauty is composed. For Shaftesbury, every creature has a “private good or interest,” an end to which it is naturally disposed by its constitution. But there are other goods as well  notably, the public good and the good without qualification of a sentient being. An individual creature’s goodness is defined by the tendency of its “natural affections” to contribute to the “universal system” of nature of which it is a part  i.e., their tendency to promote the public good. Because human beings can reflect on actions and affections, including their own and others’, they experience emotional responses not only to physical stimuli but to these mental objects as well e.g., to the thought of one’s compassion or kindness. Thus, they are capable of perceiving  and acquiring through their actions  a particular species of goodness, namely, virtue. In the virtuous person, the person of integrity, natural appetites and affections are in harmony with each other wherein lies her private good and in harmony with the public interest. Shaftesbury’s attempted reconciliation of selflove and benevolence is in part a response to the egoism of Hobbes, who argued that everyone is in fact motivated by self-interest. His defining morality in terms of psychological and public harmony is also a reaction to the divine voluntarism of his former tutor, Locke, who held that the laws of nature and morality issue from the will of God. On Shaftesbury’s view, morality exists independently of religion, but belief in God serves to produce the highest degree of virtue by nurturing a love for the universal system. Shaftesbury’s theory led to a general refinement of eighteenth-century ideas about moral feelings; a theory of the moral sense emerged, whereby sentiments are  under certain conditions  perceptions of, or constitutive of, right and wrong. In addition to several essays collected in three volumes under the title Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times second edition, 1714, Shaftesbury also wrote stoical moral and religious meditations reminiscent of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. His ideas on moral sentiments exercised considerable influence on the ethical theories of Hutcheson and Hume, who later worked out in detail their own accounts of the moral sense.  H. P. Grice, “My favourite Cooper.”

Sheffer stroke – see abdicatum, Grice, “Negation and privation” and “Lectures on negation” -- also called alternative denial, a binary truth-functor represented by the symbol ‘_’, the logical force of which can be expressed contextually in terms of ‘-’ and ‘&’ by the following definition: p_q % Df -p & q. The importance of the Sheffer stroke lies in the fact that it by itself can express any well-formed expression of truth-functional logic. Thus, since {-,7} forms an expressively complete set, defining -p as p_p and p 7 q as p_p _q_q provides for the possibility of a further reduction of primitive functors to one. This system of symbols is commonly called the stroke notation.

Shyreswood -- Sherwood, William, also called William Shyreswood, English logician who taught logic at Oxford and at Paris between 1235 and 1250. He was the earliest of the three great “summulist” writers, the other two whom he influenced strongly being Peter of Spain and Lambert of Auxerre. His main works are “Introductiones in Logicam,” “Syncategoremata,” “De insolubilibus,” and “Obligationes.” Some serious doubts have recently arisen about the authorship of the latter work. Since M. Grabmann published Sherwood’s Introductiones, philosophers have paid considerable attention to this seminal Griceian. While the first part of Introductiones offer the basic ideas of Aristotle’s Organon, and the latter part neatly lays out the Sophistical Refutations, the final tract expounds the doctrine of the four properties of a term. First, signification. Second, supposition. Third, conjunction, Fourth, appellation -- hence the label ‘terminist’ for this sort of logic. These logico-semantic discussions, together with the discussions of syncategorematic words, constitute the “logica moderna,” (Grice’s ‘mdoernism’) as opposed to the more strictly Aristotelian contents of the earlier logica vetus (Grice’s neo-traditionalism) and logica nova (“It took me quite a while to explain to Strawson the distinction between ‘logica nova’ and ‘logica moderna,’ only to have him tell me, “worry not, Grice – I’ll be into ‘logica vetus’ anyways!””. The doctrine of properties of terms and the analysis of syncategorematic terms, especially those of ‘all’ (or every) ‘no’ (or not or it is not the case) and ‘nothing’, ‘only’, ‘not’, ‘begins’ and ‘ceases (to eat iron) ‘necessarily’, ‘if’ (Latin ‘si,’ Grecian ‘ei’), ‘and’ (Latin ‘et’, Grecian ‘kai’) and ‘or’ (Latin ‘vel’)  may be said to constitute Sherwood’s or Shyrewood’s philosophy of logic. Shyrewood not only distinguishes categorematic descriptive and syncategorematic logical words but also shows how some terms are used categorematically in some contexts and syncategorematically in others – “he doesn’t explain which, and that’s one big map in his opus.”– Grice. He recognizes the importance of the order of words (hence Grice, ‘be orderly’) and of the scope of logical functors; he also anticipates the variety of composite and divided senses of propositions. Obligationes, if indeed his, attempts to state conditions under which a formal disputation may take place. De Insolubilibus deals with paradoxes of self-reference and with ways of solving them. Understanding Sherwood’s logic is important for understanding the later medieval developments of logica moderna down to Occam whom Grice laughed at (“modified Occam’s razor.”).  

ship of Theseus, the ship of the Grecian hero Theseus, which, according to Plutarch “Life of Theseus,” 23, the Athenians preserved by gradually replacing its timbers. A classic debate ensued concerning identity over time. Suppose a ship’s timbers are replaced one by one over a period of time; at what point, if any, does it cease to be the same ship? What if the ship’s timbers, on removal, are used to build a new ship, identical in structure with the first: which ship has the best claim to be the original ship?

shpet: phenomenologist and highly regarded friend of Husserl. Shpet plays a major role in the development of phenomenology. Graduating from Kiev  in 6, Shpet accompanied his mentor Chelpanov to Moscow, ommencing graduate studies at Moscow  M.A., 0; Ph.D., 6. He attends Husserl’s seminars at Göttingen during 213, out of which developed a continuing friendship between the two, recorded in correspondence extending through 8. In 4 Shpet published a meditation, “Iavlenie i smysl,” nspired by Husserl’s Logical Investigations and, especially, Ideas I, which had appeared in 3. Between 4 and 7 he published six additional books on such disparate topics as the concept of history, Herzen, philosophy, aesthetics, ethnic psychology, and language. He founds and edited the philosophical yearbook Mysl’ i slovo Thought and Word between 8 and 1, publishing an important article on skepticism in it. He was arrested and sentenced to internal exile. Under these conditions he made a running commentary of Hegel’s Phenomenology. He was executed.

sidgwick: h. English philosopher. Best known for “The Methods of Ethics,” he also wrote “Outlines of the History of Ethics.” In the “Methods,” Sidgwick tries to assess the rationality of the main ways in which ordinary people go about making this or that moral decision. Sidgwick thinks that our common “methods of ethics” fall into three main patterns. The first pattern is articulated by the philosophical theory known as intuitionism. This is the view that we can just see straight off either what particular act is right or what binding rule or general principle we ought to follow. A second pattern is spelled out by what self-love or egoism, the view that we ought in each act to get as much good as we can for ourselves. – vide: H. P. Grice, “The principle of conversational self-love and the principle of conversational benevolence,” H. P.  Grice, “Conversational benevolence, not conversational self-love.” The third widely used method is represented by utilitarianism, the view that we ought in each case to bring about as much good as possible for everyone affected. Can any or all of the methods prescribed by these views be rationally defended? And how are they related to one another? By framing his philosophical questions in these terms, Sidgwick makes it centrally important to examine the chief philosophical theories of morality in the light of the common-sense morals of his time. Sidgwick thinks that no theory wildly at odds with common-sense morality would be acceptable. Intuitionism, a theory originating with Butler (of ‘self-love and benevolence’ fame), transmitted by Reid, and most systematically expounded during the Victorian era by Whewell, is widely held to be the best available defense of Christian morals. Egoism (Self-love) was thought by many to be the clearest pattern of practical (or means-end) rationality and is frequently said to be compatible with Christianity. And J. S. Mill had argues that utilitarianism is both rational and in accord with common sense. But whatever their relation to ordinary morality, the three methods or patterns seem to be seriously at odds with one another. Examining all the chief commonsense precepts and rules of morality, such as that promises ought to be kept, Sidgwick argues that none is truly self-evident or intuitively certain. Each fails to guide us at certain points where we expect it to answer our practical questions. Utilitarianism, he found, could provide a complicated method for filling these gaps. But what ultimately justifies utilitarianism is certain very general axioms seen intuitively to be true. Among them are the principles that what is right in one case must be right in any similar case, and that we ought to aim at good generally, not just at some particular part of it. Thus intuitionism and utilitarianism can be reconciled. When taken together they yield a complete and justifiable method of ethics that is in accord with common sense. What then of egoism and self-love? Self love and egoirm can provide as complete a method as utilitarianism, and it also involves a self-evident axiom. But  the results of egoism and self-love often contradict those of utilitarianism. Hence there is a serious problem. The method that instructs us to act always for the good generally and the method that tells one to act solely for one’s own good are equally rational. Since the two methods give contradictory directions, while each method rests on self-evident axioms, it seems that practical reason is fundamentally incoherent. Sidgwick could see no way to solve the problem. Sidgwick’s bleak conclusion is not generally accepted (especially at Oxford), but his Methods is widely viewed as one of the best works of moral philosophy ever written in what Grice calls ‘insular’ philosophy (as opposed to mainland philosophy).  Sidgwick’s account of classical utilitarianism is unsurpassed. Sidwick’s discussions of the general status of morality and of particular moral concepts are enduring models of clarity and acumen. His insights about the relations between egoism (self-love) and utilitarianism have stimulated much valuable research. And his way of framing moral problems, by asking about the relations between commonsense beliefs and the best available theories, has set much of the agenda for ethics. 

siger of Brabant: Grice: “Sigier is mentioned in Dante; I’m not!” -- philosopher, an activist in the philosophical struggles within the arts faculty at Paris. Siger ie is usually regarded as a leader of a “radical Aristotelianism” Siger holds that everything originates through a series of emanations from a first cause. The world and each species including the human species are eternal. Human beings share a single active intellect. There is no good reason to think that Siger advances the view that there was a double truth, one in theology and another in natural philosophy. It is difficult to distinguish Siger’s own views from those he attributes to “the Philosophers” and thus to know the extent to which he held the heterodox views he taught as the best interpretation of the prescribed texts in the arts curriculum. In any case, Siger is summoned before the  Inquisition, but wisefully flees Paris and settles in Orvieto. Siger is  never convicted of heresy, but it seems that the condemnations at Paris are partially directed at his teaching. He was suspiciously and criminally stabbed to death by his own clerk in Orvieto -- the papal sea. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Implicatura in Dante.”

signatum: Cf. “to sign” as a verb – from French. Grice uses designatum, too – but more specifically within the ‘propositio’ as a compound of a subjectum and a predicatum. The subject-item indicates a thing; and the predicate-item designates a property. As Grice notes, there is a distinction between Aristotle’s use, in De Int., of ‘sumbolon,’ for which Aristotle sometimes means ‘semeion,’ and their Roman counterparts, ‘signum’ sounds otiose enough. But ‘significo’ does not. There is this –fico thing that sounds obtrusive. The Romans, however, were able to distinguish between ‘make a sign,’ and just ‘signal.’ The point is important when Grice tries to apply the Graeco-Roman philosophical terminology to a lexeme which does not belong in there: “mean.” His example is someone in pain, uttering “Oh.” If he later gains voluntary control, by uttering “Oh” he means that he is in pain, and even at a later stage, provided he learns ‘lupe,’ he may utter the expression which is somewhat correlated in a non-iconic fashion with something which iconically is a vehicle for U to mean that he is in pain. In this way, in a communication-system, a communication-device, such as “Oh” does for the state of affairs something that the state of affairs cannot do for itself, govern the addresee’s thoughts and behaviour (very much as the Oxfordshire cricket team does for Oxfordshire what Oxfordshire cannot do for herself, viz. to engage in a game of cricket. There’s rae-presentatum, for you! Short and Lewis have ‘signare,’ from ‘signum,’ and which they render as ‘to set a mark upon, to mark, mark out, designate (syn.: noto, designo),’ Lit. A. In gen. (mostly poet. and in post-Aug. prose): discrimen non facit neque signat linea alba, Lucil. ap. Non. 405, 17: “signata sanguine pluma est,” Ov. M. 6, 670: “ne signare quidem aut partiri limite campum Fas erat,” Verg. G. 1, 126: “humum limite mensor,” Ov. M. 1, 136; id. Am. 3, 8, 42: “moenia aratro,” id. F. 4, 819: “pede certo humum,” to print, press, Hor. A. P. 159; cf.: “vestigia summo pulvere,” to mark, imprint, Verg. G. 3, 171: auratā cyclade humum, Prop. 4 (5), 7, 40. “haec nostro signabitur area curru,” Ov. A. A. 1, 39: “locum, ubi ea (cistella) excidit,” Plaut. Cist. 4, 2, 28: “caeli regionem in cortice signant,” mark, cut, Verg. G. 2, 269: “nomina saxo,” Ov. M. 8, 539: “rem stilo,” Vell. 1, 16, 1: “rem carmine,” Verg. A. 3, 287; “for which: carmine saxum,” Ov. M. 2, 326: “cubitum longis litteris,” Plaut. Rud. 5, 2, 7: “ceram figuris,” to imprint, Ov. M. 15, 169: “cruor signaverat herbam,” had stained, id. ib. 10, 210; cf. id. ib. 12, 125: “signatum sanguine pectus,” id. A. A. 2, 384: “dubiā lanugine malas,” id. M. 13, 754: “signata in stirpe cicatrix,” Verg. G. 2, 379: “manibus Procne pectus signata cruentis,” id. ib. 4, 15: “vocis infinitios sonos paucis notis,” Cic. Rep. 3, 2, 3: “visum objectum imprimet et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem,” id. Fat. 19, 43.— B. In partic. 1. To mark with a seal; to seal, seal up, affix a seal to a thing (usually obsignare): “accepi a te signatum libellum,” Cic. Att. 11, 1, 1: “volumina,” Hor. Ep. 1, 13, 2: locellum tibi signatum remisi, Caes. ap. Charis. p. 60 P.: “epistula,” Nep. Pel. 3, 2: “arcanas tabellas,” Ov. Am. 2, 15, 15: “signatis quicquam mandare tabellis,” Tib. 4, 7, 7: “lagenam (anulus),” Mart. 9, 88, 7: “testamentum,” Plin. Ep. 2, 20, 8 sq.; cf. Mart. 5, 39, 2: “nec nisi signata venumdabatur (terra),” Plin. 35, 4, 14, § 33.—Absol., Mart. 10, 70, 7; Quint. 5, 7, 32; Suet. Ner. 17.— 2. To mark with a stamp; hence, a. Of money, to stamp, to coin: “aes argentum aurumve publice signanto,” Cic. Leg. 3, 3, 6; cf.: “qui primus ex auro denarium signavit ... Servius rex primus signavit aes ... Signatum est nota pecudum, unde et pecunia appellata ... Argentum signatum est anno, etc.,” Plin. 33, 3, 13, § 44: “argentum signatum,” Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 25, § 63; Quint. 5, 10, 62; 5, 14, 26: “pecunia signata Illyriorum signo,” Liv. 44, 27, 9: “denarius signatus Victoriā,” Plin. 33, 3, 13, § 46: “sed cur navalis in aere Altera signata est,” Ov. F. 1, 230: “milia talentūm argenti non signati formā, sed rudi pondere,” Curt. 5, 2, 11.— Hence, b. Poet.: “signatum memori pectore nomen habe,” imprinted, impressed, Ov. H. 13, 66: “(filia) quae patriā signatur imagine vultus,” i. e. closely resembles her father, Mart. 6, 27, 3.— c. To stamp, i. e. to license, invest with official authority (late Lat.): “quidam per ampla spatia urbis ... equos velut publicos signatis, quod dicitur, calceis agitant,” Amm. 14, 6, 16.— 3. Pregn., to distinguish, adorn, decorate (poet.): “pater ipse suo superūm jam signat honore,” Verg. A. 6, 781 Heyne: caelum corona, Claud. Nupt. Hon. et Mar. 273. to point out, signify, indicate, designate, express (rare; more usually significo, designo; in Cic. only Or. 19, 64, where dignata is given by Non. 281, 10; “v. Meyer ad loc.): translatio plerumque signandis rebus ac sub oculos subiciendis reperta est,” Quint. 8, 6, 19: “quotiens suis verbis signare nostra voluerunt (Graeci),” id. 2, 14, 1; cf.: “appellatione signare,” id. 4, 1, 2: “utrius differentiam,” id. 6, 2, 20; cf. id. 9, 1, 4; 12, 10, 16: “nomen (Caieta) ossa signat,” Verg. A. 7, 4: “fama signata loco est,” Ov. M. 14, 433: “miratrixque sui signavit nomine terras,” designated, Luc. 4, 655; cf.: “(Earinus) Nomine qui signat tempora verna suo,” Mart. 9, 17, 4: “Turnus ut videt ... So signari oculis,” singled out, looked to, Verg. A. 12, 3: signare responsum, to give a definite or distinct answer, Sen. Ben. 7, 16, 1.—With rel.-clause: “memoria signat in quā regione quali adjutore legatoque fratre meo usus sit,” Vell. 2, 115.— B. To distinguish, recognize: “primi clipeos mentitaque tela Adgnoscunt, atque ora sono discordia signant,” Verg. A. 2, 423; cf.: “sonis homines dignoscere,” Quint. 11, 3, 31: “animo signa quodcumque in corpore mendum est,” Ov. R. Am. 417.— C. To seal, settle, establish, confirm, prescribe (mostly poet.): “signanda sunt jura,” Prop. 3 (4), 20, 15. “signata jura,” Luc. 3, 302: jura Suevis, Claud. ap. Eutr. 1, 380; cf.: “precati deos ut velint ea (vota) semper solvi semperque signari,” Plin. Ep. 10, 35 (44). To close, end: “qui prima novo signat quinquennia lustro,” Mart. 4, 45, 3.—Hence, A. signan-ter , adv. (acc. to II. A.), expressly, clearly, distinctly (late Lat. for the class. significanter): “signanter et breviter omnia indicare,” Aus. Grat. Act. 4: “signanter et proprie dixerat,” Hier. adv. Jovin. 1, 13 fin. signātus, a, um, P. a. 1. (Acc. to I. B. 1. sealed; hence) Shut up, guarded, preserved (mostly ante- and post-class.): signata sacra, Varr. ap. Non. 397, 32: limina. Prop. 4 (5), 1, 145. Chrysidem negat signatam reddere, i. e. unharmed, intact, pure, Lucil. ap. Non. 171, 6; cf.: “assume de viduis fide pulchram, aetate signatam,” Tert. Exhort. 12.— 2. (Acc. to II. A.) Plain, clear, manifest (post-class. for “significans” – a back formation!): “quid expressius atque signatius in hanc causam?” Tert. Res. Carn.Adv.: signātē , clearly, distinctly (post-class.): “qui (veteres) proprie atque signate locuti sunt,” Gell. 2, 6, 6; Macr. S. 6, 7 Comp.: “signatius explicare aliquid,” Amm. 23, 6, 1. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Sign and sign-making – the Roman signi-ficare, and beyond.”

significatum: or better ‘signatum.’ Grice knew that in old Roman, signatum was intransitive, as originally ‘significatum’ was – “He is signifying,” i. e. making signs. In the Middle Ages it was applied to ‘utens’ of this or that expression, as was an actum, ‘agitur,’ Thus an expression was not said to ‘signify’ in the same way. Grice plays with the expression-communication distinction. When dealing with a lexeme that does NOT belong in the Graeco-Roman tradition, that of “mean,” he is never sure. His doubts were hightlighted in essays on “Grice without an audience.” While Grice explicitly says that a ‘word’ is not a sign, he would use ‘signify’ at a later stage, including the implicaturum as part of the significatum. There is indeed an entry for signĭfĭcātĭo, f. significare. L and S render it, unhelpfully, as “a pointing out, indicating, denoting, signifying; an expression, indication, mark, sign, token, = indicium, signum, ἐπισημασία, etc., freq. and class. As with Stevenson’s ‘communico,’ Grice goes sraight to ‘signĭfĭco,’ also dep. “signĭfĭcor,” f. ‘significare,’ from signum-facere, to make sign, signum-facio, I make sign, which L and S render as to signify, which is perhaps not too helpful. Grice, if not the Grecians, knew that. Strictly, L and S render significare as to show by signs; to show, point out, express, publish, make known, indicate; to intimate, notify, signify, etc. Note that the cognate signify almost comes last, but not least, if not first. Enough to want to coin a word to do duty for them all. Which is what Grice (and the Grecians) can, but the old Romans cannot, with mean. If that above were not enough, L and S go on, also, to betoken, prognosticate, foreshow, portend, mean (syn. praedico), as in to betoken a change of weather (post-Aug.): “ventus Africus tempestatem significat, etc.,”cf. Grice on those dark clouds mean a storm is coming.  Short and Lewis go on, to say that significare may be rendered as to call, name; to mean, import, signify. Hence, ‘signĭfĭcans,’ in rhet. lang., of speech, full of meaning, expressive, significant; graphic, distinct, clear: adv.: signĭfĭcanter, clearly, distinctly, expressly, significantly, graphically: “breviter ac significanter ordinem rei protulisse;” “rem indicare (with proprie),”  “dicere (with ornate),”  “apertius, significantius dignitatem alicujus defendere,” “narrare,”“disponere,” “appellare aliquid (with consignatius);” “dicere (with probabilius).” -- signifier, a vocal sound or a written symbol. The concept owes its modern formulation to the Swiss linguist Saussure. Rather than using the older conception of sign and referent, he divided the sign itself into two interrelated parts, a signifier and a signified. The signified is the concept and the signifier is either a vocal sound or writing. The relation between the two, according to Saussure, is entirely arbitrary, in that signifiers tend to vary with different languages. We can utter or write ‘vache’, ‘cow’, or ‘vaca’, depending on our native language, and still come up with the same signified i.e., concept. H. P. Grice, “Significatum and English ‘meaning.’”

simmel: Grice, “As Simmel would say, information is like money – the giver hardly knows to what use the recipient is going to to put it.” philosopher and one of the founders of sociology as a distinct discipline. Born and educated in Berlin, he was a popular lecturer at its university. But the unorthodoxy of his interests and unprofessional writing style probably kept him from being offered a regular professorship until late in his career, and then only at ‘provincial’ Strasbourg. He died four years later.Simmel’s  writings range from conventional philosophical topics  with essays on ethics, philosophy of history, education, religion, and the philosophers Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche  to essays on Rembrandt, Goethe, and the philosophy of money. He wrote numerous essays on various artists and poets, on different cities, and on such themes as love, adventure, shame, and on being a stranger, as well as on many specifically sociological topics. Simmel is regarded as a Kulturphilosoph who meditates on his themes in an insightful and digressive rather than scholarly and systematic style. Though late in life he sketches a unifying Lebensphilosophie that considers all works and structures of culture as products of different forms of human experience, Simmel has remained of interest primarily for a multiplicity of insights into specific topics. Anyone who uses a sentence of the form X is meeting a woman this evening would normally implicate that the person to be met was someone other than X' s wife, mother, sister, or perhaps even close platonic friend. Similarly, if I were to say X went into a house yesterday and found a tortoise inside the front door, my hearer would normally be surprised if some time later I revealed that the house was X's own. I could produce similar linguistic phenomena involving the expressions a garden, a car, a college, and so on. Sometimes, however, there would normally be no such implicature ('I have been sitting in a car all morning'), and sometimes a reverse implicature ('I broke a finger yesterday'). I am inclined to think that one would not lend a sympathetic ear to a philosopher who suggested that there are three senses of the form of expression an X: one in which it means roughly 'something that satisfies the conditions defining the word X,' another in which it means approximately 'an X (in the first sense) that is only remotely related in a certain way to some person indicated by the context,' and yet another in which it means 'an X (in the first sense) that is closely related in a certain way to some person indicated by the context.' Would we not much prefer an account on the following lines (which, of course, may be incorrect in detail): I I ; .. ' Logic and Conversation 57 When someone, by using the form of expression an X, implicates that the X does not belong to or is not otherwise closely connected with some identifiable person, the implicature is present l >ecause the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have been expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific. This is a familiar implicature situation and is classifiable as a failure, for one reason or another, to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity. The only difficult question is why it should, in certain cases, be presumed, independently of information about particular contexts of utterance, that specification of the closeness or remoteness of the connection between a particular person or object and a further person who is mentioned or indicated by the utterance should be likely to be of interest. The answer must lie in the following region: Transactions between a person and other persons or things closely connected witl1 him are liable to be very different as regards their concomitants and results from the same sort of transactions involving only remotely connected persons or things; the concomitants and results, for instance, of my finding a hole in MY roof are likely to be very different from the concomitants and results of my finding a hole in someone else's roof. Information, like money, is often given without the giver's knowing to just what use the recipient will want to put it. If someone to whom a transaction is mentioned gives it further consideration, he is likely to find himself wanting the answers to further questions that the speaker may not be able to identify in advance; if the appropriate specification will be likely to enable the hearer to answer a considerable variety of such questions for himself, then there is a presumption that the speaker should include it in his remark; if not, then there is no such presumption. 

simplicius: Grecian Neoplatonist philosopher. His surviving works are extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, Physics, and Categories, and on the Encheiridion of Epictetus. The authenticity of the commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul attributed to Simplicius has been disputed. He studied with Ammonius in Alexandria, and with Damascius, the last known head of the Platonist school in Athens. Justinian closed the school in 529. Two or three years later a group of philosophers, including Damascius and Simplicius, visited the court of the Sassanian king Khosrow I Chosroes but soon returned to the Byzantine Empire under a guarantee of their right to maintain their own beliefs. It is generally agreed that most, if not all, of Simplicius’s extant works date from the period after his stay with Khosrow. But there is no consensus about where Simplicius spent his last years both Athens and Harran have been proposed recently, or whether he resumed teaching philosophy; his commentaries, unlike most of the others that survive from that period, are scholarly treatises rather than classroom expositions. Simplicius’s Aristotle commentaries are the most valuable extant works in the genre. He is our source for many of the fragments of the preSocratic philosophers, and he frequently invokes material from now-lost commentaries and philosophical works. He is a deeply committed Neoplatonist, convinced that there is no serious conflict between the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. The view of earlier scholars that his Encheiridion commentary embodies a more moderate Platonism associated with Alexandria is now generally rejected. Simplicius’s virulent defense of the eternity of the world in response to the attack of the Christian John Philoponus illustrates the intellectual vitality of paganism at a time when the Mediterranean world had been officially Christian for about three centuries.  H. P. Grice, “Why we should study Simplicius.”

simulation theory: Grice: “How does one simulate an implicature? I challenge AI, so-called, to do it!” --  the view that one represents the mental activities and processes of others by mentally simulating them, i.e., generating similar activities and processes in oneself. By simulating them, one can anticipate their product or outcome; or, where this is already known, test hypotheses about their starting point. For example, one anticipates the product of another’s theoretical or practical inferences from given premises by making inferences from the same premises oneself; or, knowing what the product is, one retroduces the premises. In the case of practical reasoning, to reason from the same premises would typically require indexical adjustments, such as shifts in spatial, temporal, and personal “point of view,” to place oneself in the other’s physical and epistemic situation insofar as it differs from one’s own. One may also compensate for the other’s reasoning capacity and level of expertise, if possible, or modify one’s character and outlook as an actor might, to fit the other’s background. Such adjustments, even when insufficient for making decisions in the role of the other, allow one to discriminate between action options likely to be attractive or unattractive to the agent. One would be prepared for the former actions and surprised by the latter. The simulation theory is usually considered an alternative to an assumption sometimes called the “theory theory” that underlies much recent philosophy of mind: that our commonsense understanding of people rests on a speculative theory, a “folk psychology” that posits mental states, events, and processes as unobservables that explain behavior. Some hold that the simulation theory undercuts the debate between philosophers who consider folk psychology a respectable theory and those the eliminative materialists who reject it. Unlike earlier writing on empathic understanding and historical reenactment, discussions of the simulation theory often appeal to empirical findings, particularly experimental results in developmental psychology. They also theorize about the mechanism that would accomplish simulation: presumably one that calls up computational resources ordinarily used for engagement with the world, but runs them off-line, so that their output is not “endorsed” or acted upon and their inputs are not limited to those that would regulate one’s own behavior. Although simulation theorists agree that the ascription of mental states to others relies chiefly on simulation, they differ on the nature of selfascription. Some especially Robert Gordon and simple supposition simulation theory 845   845 Jane Heal, who independently proposed the theory give a non-introspectionist account, while others especially Goldman lean toward a more traditional introspectionist account. The simulation theory has affected developmental psychology as well as branches of philosophy outside the philosophy of mind, especially aesthetics and philosophy of the social sciences. Some philosophers believe it sheds light on traditional topics such as the problem of other minds, referential opacity, broad and narrow content, and the peculiarities of self-knowledge. 

singulare: singular term -- singŭlāris , e, adj. singuli. I. Lit. A. In gen., one by one, one at a time, alone, single, solitary; alone of its kind, singular (class.; “syn.: unus, unicus): non singulare nec solivagum genus (sc. homines),” i. e. solitary, Cic. Rep. 1, 25, 39: “hostes ubi ex litore aliquos singulares ex navi egredientes conspexerant,” Caes. B. G. 4, 26: “homo,” id. ib. 7, 8, 3; so, “homo (with privatus, and opp. isti conquisiti coloni),” Cic. Agr. 2, 35, 97: “singularis mundus atque unigena,” id. Univ. 4 med.: “praeconium Dei singularis facere,” Lact. 4, 4, 8; cf. Cic. Ac. 1, 7, 26: “natus,” Plin. 28, 10, 42, § 153: “herba (opp. fruticosa),” id. 27, 9, 55, § 78: singularis ferus, a wild boar (hence, Fr. sanglier), Vulg. Psa. 79, 14: “hominem dominandi cupidum aut imperii singularis,” sole command, exclusive dominion, Cic. Rep. 1, 33, 50; so, “singulare imperium et potestas regia,” id. ib. 2, 9, 15: “sunt quaedam in te singularia ... quaedam tibi cum multis communia,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 88, § 206: “singulare beneficium (opp. commune officium civium),” id. Fam. 1, 9, 4: “odium (opp. communis invidia),” id. Sull. 1, 1: “quam invisa sit singularis potentia et miseranda vita,” Nep. Dion, 9, 5: “pugna,” Macr. S. 5, 2: “si quando quid secreto agere proposuisset, erat illi locus in edito singularis,” particular, separate, Suet. Aug. 72.— B. In partic. 1. In gram., of or belonging to unity, singular: “singularis casus,” Varr. L. L. 7, § 33 Müll.; “10, § 54 ib.: numerus,” Quint. 1, 5, 42; 1, 6, 25; 8, 3, 20; Gell. 19, 8, 13: “nominativus,” Quint. 1, 6, 14: “genitivus,” id. 1, 6, 26 et saep. —Also absol., the singular number: “alii dicunt in singulari hac ovi et avi, alii hac ove et ave,” Varr. L. L. 8, § 66 Müll.; Quint. 8, 6, 28; 4, 5, 25 al.— 2. In milit lang., subst.: singŭlāris , is, m. a. In gen., an orderly man (ordonance), assigned to officers of all kinds and ranks for executing their orders (called apparitor, Lampr. Alex. Sev. 52): “SINGVLARIS COS (consulis),” Inscr. Orell. 2003; cf. ib. 3529 sq.; 3591; 6771 al.— b. Esp., under the emperors, equites singulares Augusti, or only equites singulares, a select horse body-guard (selected from barbarous nations, as Bessi, Thraces, Bæti, etc.), Tac. H. 4, 70; Hyg. m. c. §§ 23 and 30; Inscr. Grut. 1041, 12 al.; cf. on the Singulares, Henzen, Sugli Equiti Singolari, Roma, 1850; Becker, Antiq. tom. 3, pass. 2, p. 387 sq.— 3. In the time of the later emperors, singulares, a kind of imperial clerks, sent into the provinces, Cod. Just. 1, 27, 1, § 8; cf. Lyd. Meg. 3, 7.— II. Trop., singular, unique, matchless, unparalleled, extraordinary, remarkable (syn.: unicus, eximius, praestans; “very freq. both in a good and in a bad sense): Aristoteles meo judicio in philosophiā prope singularis,” Cic. Ac. 2, 43, 132: “Cato, summus et singularis vir,” id. Brut. 85, 293: “vir ingenii naturā praestans, singularis perfectusque undique,” Quint. 12, 1, 25; so, “homines ingenio atque animo,” Cic. Div. 2, 47, 97: “adulescens,” Plin. Ep. 7, 24, 2.—Of things: “Antonii incredibilis quaedam et prope singularis et divina vis ingenii videtur,” Cic. de Or. 1, 38, 172: “singularis eximiaque virtus,” id. Imp. Pomp. 1, 3; so, “singularis et incredibilis virtus,” id. Att. 14, 15, 3; cf. id. Fam. 1, 9, 4: “integritas atque innocentia singularis,” id. Div. in Caecil. 9, 27: “Treviri, quorum inter Gallos virtutis opinio est singularis,” Caes. B. G. 2, 24: “Pompeius gratias tibi agit singulares,” Cic. Fam. 13, 41, 1; cf.: “mihi gratias egistis singularibus verbis,” id. Cat. 4, 3: “fides,” Nep. Att. 4: “singulare omnium saeculorum exemplum,” Just. 2, 4, 6.—In a bad sense: “nequitia ac turpitudo singularis,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 44, § 106; so, “nequitia,” id. ib. 2, 2, 54, § 134; id. Fin. 5, 20, 56: “impudentia,” Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 7, § 18: audacia (with scelus incredibile), id. Fragm. ap. Quint. 4, 2, 105: “singularis et nefaria crudelitas,” Caes. B. G. 7, 77.— Hence, adv.: singŭlārĭter (singlā-rĭter , Lucr. 6, 1067). 1. One by one, singly, separately. a. In gen. (ante- and post-class.): “quae memorare queam inter se singlariter apta, Lucr. l. l. Munro (Lachm. singillariter): a juventā singulariter sedens,” apart, separately, Paul. Nol. Carm. 21, 727.— b. In partic. (acc. to I. B. 1.), in the singular number: “quod pluralia singulariter et singularia pluraliter efferuntur,” Quint. 1, 5, 16; 1, 7, 18; 9, 3, 20: “dici,” Gell. 19, 8, 12; Dig. 27, 6, 1 al.— 2. (Acc. to II.) Particularly, exceedingly: “aliquem diligere,” Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 47, § 117: “et miror et diligo,” Plin. Ep. 1, 22, 1: “amo,” id. ib. 4, 15, 1. Grice: “I would define a ‘singular implicaturum’ as any vehicle of communicatum such as an expression, like ‘Zeus’, ‘Pegasus,’ ‘the President’, ‘Strawson’s dog,’ ‘Fido,’ or ‘my favorite chair’, that can be the grammatical subject of what is semantically a subject-predicate sentence.” Grice: “By contrast, what one might call a ‘general,’ or ‘non-singular term, such as ‘horse,’ ‘dog,’‘table’ or ‘swam’ is one that can serve in predicative position.” It is also often said that a singular term (‘nomen singularis,’ ‘expressio singularis’) is a word or phrase that could refer or ostensibly refer, on a given occasion of use, only to a single (or ‘singular’) object – unless you show me a ‘general’ object --, whereas a general term is predicable of *more than one* singular object, if not a ‘general’ object, which does not exist. A singular term is thus the expression that replace, or are replaced by, an individual variable (x, y, z, …) in applications of such quantifier rules as universal instantiation and existential generalization or flank ‘%’ in identity statements.” H. P. Grice, “System G: the rudiments.”

situation ethics, a kind of anti-theoretical, caseby-case applied ethics in vogue largely in some European and  religious circles for twenty years or so following World War II. It is characterized by the insistence that each moral choice must be determined by one’s particular context or situation  i.e., by a consideration of the outcomes that various possible courses of action might have, given one’s situation. To that degree, situation ethics has affinities to both act utilitarianism and traditional casuistry. But in contrast to utilitarianism, situation ethics rejects the idea that there are universal or even fixed moral principles beyond various indeterminate commitments or ideals e.g., to Christian love or humanism. In contrast to traditional casuistry, it rejects the effort to construct general guidelines from a case or to classify the salient features of a case so that it can be used as a precedent. The anti-theoretical stance of situation ethics is so thoroughgoing that writers identified with the position have not carefully described its connections to consequentialism, existentialism, intuitionism, personalism, pragmatism, relativism, or any other developed philosophical view to which it appears to have some affinity. 

st. john’s: st. john’s keeps a record of all of H. P. Grice’s tutees. It is fascinating that Strawson’s closest collaboration, as Plato with Socrates, and Aristotle with Plato, was with his tutee Strawson – whom Grice calls a ‘pupil,’ finding ‘tutee’ too French to his taste. G. J. Warnock recalls that, of all the venues that the play group held, their favourite one was the room overlooking the garden at st. john’s. “It’s one of the best gardens in England, you know. Very peripathetic.” In alphabetical order, some of his English ‘gentlemanly’ tutees include: London-born J. L. Ackrill, London-born David Bostock, London-born A. G. N. Flew, Leeds-born T. C. Potts, London-born P. F. Strawson. They were happy to have Grice as a tutorial fellow, since he, unlike Mabbot, was English, and did not instill on the tutees a vernacular furrin to the area.

skolem: semanticist, he made fundamental contributions to recursion theory (Grice: “which I need for my account of communication”), set theory in particular, the proposal and formulation of the axiom of replacement, and model theory. The first work devoted exclusively to recursive definability was Skolem’s (1923) paper  The foundations of elementary arithmetic established by the recursive mode of thought, without the use of apparent variables ranging over infinite domains.  This work is significant with respect to the subsequent development of computability theory for at least three reasons. First, it contains a informal description of what we now call the primitive recursive functions. Second, it can be regarded as the first place where recursive definability is linked to effective computability (see also Skolem 1946). And third, it demonstrates that a wide range of functions and relations are primitive recursive in a manner which anticipates Gödel’s (1931) use of primitive recursion for the arithmetization of syntax.  One of Skolem’s stated goals was to present a logical foundation for number theory which avoids the use of unrestricted quantifiers. He was inspired in this regard by the observation that it is possible to develop much of elementary arithmetic without the use of the expressions “always” (i.e. for all) and “sometimes” (i.e. there exists) which figure in the formalization of number theory given by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica (1910–1913). This was to be accomplished by formulating arithmetical theorems as what he referred to as functional assertions. These took the form of identities between terms defined by primitive recursive operations which Skolem referred to as descriptive functions. For instance, the commutativity of addition is expressed in this form by an equation with free variables  x+y=y+x  In cases where such statements are provable in the system Skolem describes, the intended interpretation is that the claim holds universally for all natural numbers—e.g., ∀x∀y(x+y=y+x). But in Skolem’s system there is no means of negating such a statement to express a bare existential assertion without producing a witness.  Statements like (5) would later be referred to by Hilbert & Bernays (1934) (who provided the first textbook treatment of recursion) as verifiable in the sense that their individual instances can be verified computationally by replacing variables with concrete numerals. This is accomplished by what Skolem referred to as the “recursive mode of thought”. The sense of this phrase is clarified by the following properties of the system he describes:  the natural numbers are taken as basic objects together with the successor function x+1; it is assumed that descriptive functions proven to be equal may be substituted for one another in other expressions; all definitions of functions and relations on natural numbers are given by recursion; functional assertions such as (5) must be proven by induction. Taking these principles as a foundation, Skolem showed how to obtain recursive definitions of the predecessor and subtraction functions, the less than, divisibility, and primality relations, greatest common divisors, least common multiples, and bounded sums and products which are similar to those given in Section 2.1.2 below.  Overall Skolem considered instances of what we would now refer to as primitive recursion, course of values recursion, double recursion, and recursion on functions of type N→N. He did not, however, introduce general schemas so as to systematically distinguish these modes of definition. Nonetheless, properties i–iv of Skolem’s treatment provide a means of assimilating calculations like (2) to derivations in quantifier-free first-order logic. It is thus not difficult to discern in (Skolem 1923) the kernel of the system we now know as Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (as later formally introduced by Hilbert & Bernays 1934, ch. 7). Skolem’s most important results for philosophical semantics are the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, whose first proof involved putting formulas into Skolem normal form; and a demonstration of the existence of models of first-order arithmetic not isomorphic to the standard model. Both results exhibit the extreme non-categoricity that can occur with formulations of mathematical theories in first-order logic, and causes Skolem to be sceptical about the use of a formal systems such as System G (after Grice), particularly for set theory, as a foundation for semantics. The existence of non-standard models is actually a consequence of the completeness and first incompleteness theorems by Gödel, for these together show that there must be sentences of arithmetic if consistent that are true in the standard model, but false in some other, nonisomorphic model. However, Skolem’s result describes a general technique for constructing such models. Skolem’s theorem is now more easily proved using the compactness theorem, an easy consequence of the completeness theorem. The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem produces a similar problem of characterization, Skolem’s paradox. Roughly, Skolem’s paradox says that if first-order set theory has a model, it must also have a countable model whose continuum is a countable set, and thus apparently non-standard. This does not contradict Cantor’s theorem, which merely demands that the countable model contain as an element no function that maps its natural numbers one-toone onto its continuum, although there must be such a function outside the model. Although usually seen as limiting first-order logic, this result is extremely fruitful technically, providing one basis of the proof of the independence of the continuum hypothesis from the usual axioms of set theory given by Gödel and Cohen. This connection between independence results and the existence of countable models was partially foreseen by Skolem. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Skolem’s recursive implicatura.” Skolem, Thoralf, 1923, “Begründung Der Elementaren Arithmetik Durch Die Rekurrierende Denkweise Ohne Anwendung Scheinbarer Veranderlichen Mit Unendlichem Ausdehnungsbereich”, Videnskapsselskapets Skrifter, I. Matematisk-Naturvidenskabelig Klasse, 6: 1–38. –––, 1946, “The development of recursive arithmetic” In Dixíeme Congrés des Mathimaticiens Scandinaves, Copenhagen, 1–16. Reprinted in Skolem 1970, pp. 499–415. –––, 1970, Selected Works in Logic Olso: Universitetsforlaget. Edited by J.E. Fenstad.

Recursum: Grice, ‘anti-sneak.”

Grice, “philosophical semanticist.”

slippery slope argument, an argument that an action apparently unobjectionable in itself would set in motion a train of events leading ultimately to an undesirable outcome. The metaphor portrays one on the edge of a slippery slope, where taking the first step down will inevitably cause sliding to the bottom. For example, it is sometimes argued that voluntary euthanasia should not be legalized because this will lead to killing unwanted people, e.g. the handicapped or elderly, against their will. In some versions the argument aims to show that one should intervene to stop an ongoing train of events; e.g., it has been argued that suppressing a Communist revolution in one country was necessary to prevent the spread of Communism throughout a whole region via the so-called domino effect. Slippery slope arguments with dubious causal assumptions are often classed as fallacies under the general heading of the fallacy of the false cause. This argument is also sometimes called the wedge argument. There is some disagreement concerning the breadth of the category of slippery slope arguments. Some would restrict the term to arguments with evaluative conclusions, while others construe it more broadly so as to include other sorites arguments. 

smart and place: Cambridge-born Australian philosopher whose name is associated with three very non-Oxonian doctrines in particular: the mind-body identity theory, scientific realism, and utilitarianism. A student of Ryle’s at Oxford, from the other place, he rejected logical behaviorism in favor of what came to be known as Australian or ‘colonial’ or “Dominion” materialism. This is the view that mental processes  and, as, -- “the other colonial,” – Grice -- Armstrong brought Smart to see, mental states  cannot be explained simply in terms of behavioristic dispositions. In order to make good sense of how the ordinary person talks of them we have to see them as brain processes  and states  under other names. Smart developed this identity theory of mind and brain, under the stimulus of his colleague, Yorkshire-born, Rugby and Corpus-Christi (via Open Scholarship), tutee of Ryle, U. T. Place, in “Sensations and Brain Processes” Philosophical Review. It became a mainstay of twentieth-century philosophy. Smart endorsed the materialist analysis of mind on the grounds that it gave a simple picture that was consistent with the findings of science. He took a realist view of the claims of science, rejecting phenomenalism, instrumentalism, and the like, and he argued that commonsense beliefs should be maintained only so far as they are plausible in the light of total science. Philosophy and Scientific Realism 3 gave forceful expression to this physicalist picture of the world, as did some later works. He attracted attention in particular for his argument that if we take science seriously then we have to endorse the four-dimensional picture of the universe and recognize as an illusion the experience of the passing of time. He published a number of defenses of utilitarianism, the best known being his contribution to J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism, For and Against 3. He gave new life to act utilitarianism at a time when utilitarians were few and most were attached to rule utilitarianism or other restricted forms of the doctrine. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Ryle and the devil of scientism,” H. P. Grice, “What Smart learned from Ryle.”

smith: Scots philosopher, a founder of modern political economy and a major contributor to ethics and the psychology of morals. His first published work is “The Theory of Moral Sentiments.” This book immediately made him famous, and earned the praise of thinkers of the stature of Hume, Burke, and Kant. It sought to answer two questions: Wherein does virtue consist, and by means of what psychological principles do we determine this or that to be virtuous or the contrary? His answer to the first combined ancient Stoic and Aristotelian views of virtue with modern views derived from Hutcheson and others. His answer to the second built on Hume’s theory of sympathy  our ability to put ourselves imaginatively in the situation of another  as well as on the notion of the “impartial spectator.” Smith throughout is skeptical about metaphysical and theological views of virtue and of the psychology of morals. The self-understanding of reasonable moral actors ought to serve as the moral philosopher’s guide. Smith’s discussion ranges from the motivation of wealth to the psychological causes of religious and political fanaticism. Smith’s second published work, the immensely influential An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 1776, attempts to explain why free economic, political, and religious markets are not only more efficient, when properly regulated, but also more in keeping with nature, more likely to win the approval of an impartial spectator, than monopolistic alternatives. Taken together, Smith’s two books attempt to show how virtue and liberty can complement each other. He shows full awareness of the potentially dehumanizing force of what was later called “capitalism,” and sought remedies in schemes for liberal education and properly organized religion. Smith did not live to complete his system, which was to include an analysis of “natural jurisprudence.” We possess student notes of his lectures on jurisprudence and on rhetoric, as well as several impressive essays on the evolution of the history of science and on the fine arts. 

co-agency: social action: Grice: “My principle of co-operation you can call the ‘conversational contract.’ In this respect, I agree with Grice: Grice: “When I speak of conversation, I mean of a social action – where one agent’s expectations influence his co-agent’s” -- a subclass of human action involving the interaction among agents and their mutual orientation, or the action of groups. While all intelligible actions are in some sense social, social actions must be directed to others. Talcott Parsons 279 captured what is distinctive about social action in his concept of “double contingency,” and similar concepts have been developed by other philosophers and sociologists, including Weber, Mead, and Vitters. Whereas in monological action the agents’ fulfilling their purposes depends only on contingent facts about the world, the success of social action is also contingent on how other agents react to what the agent does and how that agent reacts to other agents, and so on. An agent successfully communicates, e.g., not merely by finding some appropriate expression in an existing symbol system, but also by understanding how other agents will understand him. Game theory describes and explains another type of double contingency in its analysis of the interdependency of choices and strategies among rational agents. Games are also significant in two other respects. First, they exemplify the cognitive requirements for social interaction, as in Mead’s analysis of agents’ perspective taking: as a subject “I”, I am an object for others “me”, and can take a third-person perspective along with others on the interaction itself “the generalized other”. Second, games are regulated by shared rules and mediated through symbolic meanings; Vitters’s private language argument establishes that rules cannot be followed “privately.” Some philosophers, such as Peter Winch, conclude from this argument that rule-following is a basic feature of distinctively social action. Some actions are social in the sense that they can only be done in groups. Individualists such as Weber, Jon Elster, and Raimo Tuomela believe that these can be analyzed as the sum of the actions of each individual. But holists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Margaret Gilbert reject this reduction and argue that in social actions agents must see themselves as members of a collective agent. Holism has stronger or weaker versions: strong holists, such as Durkheim and Hegel, see the collective subject as singular, the collective consciousness of a society. Weak holists, such as Gilbert and Habermas, believe that social actions have plural, rather than singular, collective subjects. Holists generally establish the plausibility of their view by referring to larger contexts and sequences of action, such as shared symbol systems or social institutions. Explanations of social actions thus refer not only to the mutual expectations of agents, but also to these larger causal contexts, shared meanings, and mechanisms of coordination. Theories of social action must then explain the emergence of social order, and proposals range from Hobbes’s coercive authority to Talcott Parsons’s value consensus about shared goals among the members of groups.  -- social biology, the understanding of social behavior, especially human social behavior, from a biological perspective; often connected with the political philosophy of social Darwinism. Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species highlighted the significance of social behavior in organic evolution, and in the Descent of Man, he showed how significant such behavior is for humans. He argued that it is a product of natural selection; but it was not until 4 that the English biologist William Hamilton showed precisely how such behavior could evolve, namely through “kin selection” as an aid to the biological wellbeing of close relatives. Since then, other models of explanation have been proposed, extending the theory to non-relatives. Best known is the self-describing “reciprocal altruism.” Social biology became notorious in 5 when Edward O. Wilson published a major treatise on the subject: Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Accusations of sexism and racism were leveled because Wilson suggested that Western social systems are biologically innate, and that in some respects males are stronger, more aggressive, more naturally promiscuous than females. Critics argued that all social biology is in fact a manifestation of social Darwinism, a nineteenthcentury philosophy owing more to Herbert Spencer than to Charles Darwin, supposedly legitimating extreme laissez-faire economics and an unbridled societal struggle for existence. Such a charge is extremely serious, for as Moore pointed out in his Principia Ethica 3, Spencer surely commits the naturalistic fallacy, inasmuch as he is attempting to derive the way that the world ought to be from the way that it is. Naturally enough, defenders of social biology, or “sociobiology” as it is now better known, denied vehemently that their science is mere right-wing ideology by another name. They pointed to many who have drawn very different social conclusions on the basis of biology. Best known is the Russian anarchist Kropotkin, who argued that societies are properly based on a biological propensity to mutual aid. With respect to contemporary debate, it is perhaps fairest to say that sociobiology, particularly that pertaining to humans, did not always show sufficient sensitivity toward all societal groups  although certainly there was never the crude racism of the fascist regimes of the 0s. However, recent work is far more careful in these respects. Now, indeed, the study of social behavior from a biological perspective is one of the most exciting and forward-moving branches of the life sciences.  -- social choice theory, the theory of the rational action of a group of agents. Important social choices are typically made over alternative means of collectively providing goods. These might be goods for individual members of the group, or more characteristically, public goods, goods such that no one can be excluded from enjoying their benefits once they are available. Perhaps the most central aspect of social choice theory concerns rational individual choice in a social context. Since what is rational for one agent to do will often depend on what is rational for another to do and vice versa, these choices take on a strategic dimension. The prisoner’s dilemma illustrates how it can be very difficult to reconcile individual and collectively rational decisions, especially in non-dynamic contexts. There are many situations, particularly in the provision of public goods, however, where simple prisoner’s dilemmas can be avoided and more manageable coordination problems remain. In these cases, individuals may find it rational to contractually or conventionally bind themselves to courses of action that lead to the greater good of all even though they are not straightforwardly utility-maximizing for particular individuals. Establishing the rationality of these contracts or conventions is one of the leading problems of social choice theory, because coordination can collapse if a rational agent first agrees to cooperate and then reneges and becomes a free rider on the collective efforts of others. Other forms of uncooperative behaviors such as violating rules established by society or being deceptive about one’s preferences pose similar difficulties. Hobbes attempted to solve these problems by proposing that people would agree to submit to the authority of a sovereign whose punitive powers would make uncooperative behavior an unattractive option. It has also been argued that cooperation is rational if the concept of rationality is extended beyond utility-maximizing in the right way. Other arguments stress benefits beyond selfinterest that accrue to cooperators. Another major aspect of social choice theory concerns the rational action of a powerful central authority, or social planner, whose mission is to optimize the social good. Although the central planner may be instituted by rational individual choice, this part of the theory simply assumes the institution. The planner’s task of making a onetime allocation of resources to the production of various commodities is tractable if social good or social utility is known as a function of various commodities. When the planner must take into account dynamical considerations, the technical problems are more difficult. This economic growth theory raises important ethical questions about intergenerational conflict. The assumption of a social analogue of the individual utility functions is particularly worrisome. It can be shown formally that taking the results of majority votes can lead to intransitive social orderings of possible choices and it is, therefore, a generally unsuitable procedure for the planner to follow. Moreover, under very general conditions there is no way of aggregating individual preferences into a consistent social choice function of the kind needed by the planner.  -- social constructivism, also called social constructionism, any of a variety of views which claim that knowledge in some area is the product of our social practices and institutions, or of the interactions and negotiations between relevant social groups. Mild versions hold that social factors shape interpretations of the world. Stronger versions maintain that the world, or some significant portion of it, is somehow constituted by theories, practices, and institutions. Defenders often move from mild to stronger versions by insisting that the world is accessible to us only through our interpretations, and that the idea of an independent reality is at best an irrelevant abstraction and at worst incoherent. This philosophical position is distinct from, though distantly related to, a view of the same name in social and developmental psychology, associated with such figures as Piaget and Lev Vygotsky, which sees learning as a process in which subjects actively construct knowledge. Social constructivism has roots in Kant’s idealism, which claims that we cannot know things in themselves and that knowledge of the world is possible only by imposing pre-given categories of thought on otherwise inchoate experience. But where Kant believed that the categories with which we interpret and thus construct the world are given a priori, contemporary constructivists believe that the relevant concepts and associated practices vary from one group or historical period to another. Since there are no independent standards for evaluating conceptual schemes, social constructivism leads naturally to relativism. These views are generally thought to be present in Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which argues that observation and methods in science are deeply theory-dependent and that scientists with fundamentally different assumptions or paradigms effectively live in different worlds. Kuhn thus offers a view of science in opposition to both scientific realism which holds that theory-dependent methods can give us knowledge of a theory-independent world and empiricism which draws a sharp line between theory and observation. Kuhn was reluctant to accept the apparently radical consequences of his views, but his work has influenced recent social studies of science, whose proponents frequently embrace both relativism and strong constructivism. Another influence is the principle of symmetry advocated by David Bloor and Barry Barnes, which holds that sociologists should explain the acceptance of scientific views in the same way whether they believe those views to be true or to be false. This approach is elaborated in the work of Harry Collins, Steve Woolgar, and others. Constructivist themes are also prominent in the work of feminist critics of science such as Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway, and in the complex views of Bruno Latour. Critics, such as Richard Boyd and Philip Kitcher, while applauding the detailed case studies produced by constructivists, claim that the positive arguments for constructivism are fallacious, that it fails to account satisfactorily for actual scientific practice, and that like other versions of idealism and relativism it is only dubiously coherent.  Then there’s the idea of a ‘contract,’ or social contract, an agreement either between the people and their ruler, or among the people in a community. The idea of a social contract has been used in arguments that differ in what they aim to justify or explain e.g., the state, conceptions of justice, morality, what they take the problem of justification to be, and whether or not they presuppose a moral theory or purport to be a moral theory. Traditionally the term has been used in arguments that attempt to explain the nature of political obligation and/or the kind of responsibility that rulers have to their subjects. Philosophers such as Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant argue that human beings would find life in a prepolitical “state of nature” a state that some argue is also presocietal so difficult that they would agree  either with one another or with a prospective ruler  to the creation of political institutions that each believes would improve his or her lot. Note that because the argument explains political or social cohesion as the product of an agreement among individuals, it makes these individuals conceptually prior to political or social units. Marx and other socialist and communitarian thinkers have argued against conceptualizing an individual’s relationship to her political and social community in this way. Have social contracts in political societies actually taken place? Hume ridicules the idea that they are real, and questions what value makebelieve agreements can have as explanations of actual political obligations. Although many social contract theorists admit that there is almost never an explicit act of agreement in a community, nonetheless they maintain that such an agreement is implicitly made when members of the society engage in certain acts through which they give their tacit consent to the ruling regime. It is controversial what actions constitute giving tacit consent: Plato and Locke maintain that the acceptance of benefits is sufficient to give such consent, but some have argued that it is wrong to feel obliged to those who foist upon us benefits for which we have not asked. It is also unclear how much of an obligation a person can be under if he gives only tacit consent to a regime. How are we to understand the terms of a social contract establishing a state? When the people agree to obey the ruler, do they surrender their own power to him, as Hobbes tried to argue? Or do they merely lend him that power, reserving the right to take it from him if and when they see fit, as Locke maintained? If power is merely on loan to the ruler, rebellion against him could be condoned if he violates the conditions of that loan. But if the people’s grant of power is a surrender, there are no such conditions, and the people could never be justified in taking back that power via revolution. Despite controversies surrounding their interpretation, social contract arguments have been important to the development of modern democratic states: the idea of the government as the creation of the people, which they can and should judge and which they have the right to overthrow if they find it wanting, contributed to the development of democratic forms of polity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  and  revolutionaries explicitly acknowledged their debts to social contract theorists such as Locke and Rousseau. In the twentieth century, the social contract idea has been used as a device for defining various moral conceptions e.g. theories of justice by those who find its focus on individuals useful in the development of theories that argue against views e.g. utilitarianism that allow individuals to be sacrificed for the benefit of the group -- social epistemology, the study of the social dimensions or determinants of knowledge, or the ways in which social factors promote or perturb the quest for knowledge. Some writers use the term ‘knowledge’ loosely, as designating mere belief. On their view social epistemology should simply describe how social factors influence beliefs, without concern for the rationality or truth of these beliefs. Many historians and sociologists of science, e.g., study scientific practices in the same spirit that anthropologists study native cultures, remaining neutral about the referential status of scientists’ constructs or the truth-values of their beliefs. Others try to show that social factors like political or professional interests are causally operative, and take such findings to debunk any objectivist pretensions of science. Still other writers retain a normative, critical dimension in social epistemology, but do not presume that social practices necessarily undermine objectivity. Even if knowledge is construed as true or rational belief, social practices might enhance knowledge acquisition. One social practice is trusting the opinions of authorities, a practice that can produce truth if the trusted authorities are genuinely authoritative. Such trust may also be perfectly rational in a complex world, where division of epistemic labor is required. Even a scientist’s pursuit of extra-epistemic interests such as professional rewards may not be antithetical to truth in favorable circumstances. Institutional provisions, e.g., judicial rules of evidence, provide another example of social factors. Exclusionary rules might actually serve the cause of truth or accuracy in judgment if the excluded evidence would tend to mislead or prejudice jurors.  -- social philosophy, broadly the philosophy of socisocial Darwinism social philosophy 856   856 ety, including the philosophy of social science and many of its components, e.g., economics and history, political philosophy, most of what we now think of as ethics, and philosophy of law. But we may distinguish two narrower senses. In one, it is the conceptual theory of society, including the theory of the study of society  the common part of all the philosophical studies mentioned. In the other, it is a normative study, the part of moral philosophy that concerns social action and individual involvement with society in general. The central job of social philosophy in the first of these narrower senses is to articulate the correct notion or concept of society. This would include formulating a suitable definition of ‘society’; the question is then which concepts are better for which purposes, and how they are related. Thus we may distinguish “thin” and “thick” conceptions of society. The former would identify the least that can be said before we cease talking about society at all  say, a number of people who interact, whose actions affect the behavior of their fellows. Thicker conceptions would then add such things as community rules, goals, customs, and ideals. An important empirical question is whether any interacting groups ever do lack such things and what if anything is common to the rules, etc., that actual societies have. Descriptive social philosophy will obviously border on, if not merge into, social science itself, e.g. into sociology, social psychology, or economics. And some outlooks in social philosophy will tend to ally with one social science as more distinctively typical than others  e.g., the individualist view looks to economics, the holist to sociology. A major methodological controversy concerns holism versus individualism. Holism maintains that at least some social groups must be studied as units, irreducible to their members: we cannot understand a society merely by understanding the actions and motivations of its members. Individualism denies that societies are “organisms,” and holds that we can understand society only in that way. Classic G. sociologists e.g., Weber distinguished between Gesellschaft, whose paradigm is the voluntary association, such as a chess club, whose activities are the coordinated actions of a number of people who intentionally join that group in order to pursue the purposes that identify it; and Gemeinschaft, whose members find their identities in that group. Thus, the  are not a group whose members teamed up with like-minded people to form  society. They were  before they had separate individual purposes. The holist views society as essentially a Gemeinschaft. Individualists agree that there are such groupings but deny that they require a separate kind of irreducibly collective explanation: to understand the  we must understand how typical  individuals behave  compared, say, with the G.s, and so on. The methods of Western economics typify the analytical tendencies of methodological individualism, showing how we can understand large-scale economic phenomena in terms of the rational actions of particular economic agents. Cf. Adam Smith’s invisible hand thesis: each economic agent seeks only his own good, yet the result is the macrophenomenal good of the whole. Another pervasive issue concerns the role of intentional characterizations and explanations in these fields. Ordinary people explain behavior by reference to its purposes, and they formulate these in terms that rely on public rules of language and doubtless many other rules. To understand society, we must hook onto the selfunderstanding of the people in that society this view is termed Verstehen. Recent work in philosophy of science raises the question whether intentional concepts can really be fundamental in explaining anything, and whether we must ultimately conceive people as in some sense material systems, e.g. as computer-like. Major questions for the program of replicating human intelligence in data-processing terms cf. artificial intelligence are raised by the symbolic aspects of interaction. Additionally, we should note the emergence of sociobiology as a potent source of explanations of social phenomena. Normative social philosophy, in turn, tends inevitably to merge into either politics or ethics, especially the part of ethics dealing with how people ought to treat others, especially in large groups, in relation to social institutions or social structures. This contrasts with ethics in the sense concerned with how individual people may attain the good life for themselves. All such theories allot major importance to social relations; but if one’s theory leaves the individual wide freedom of choice, then a theory of individually chosen goods will still have a distinctive subject matter. The normative involvements of social philosophy have paralleled the foregoing in important ways. Individualists have held that the good of a society must be analyzed in terms of the goods of its individual members. Of special importance has been the view that society must respect indisocial philosophy social philosophy 857   857 vidual rights, blocking certain actions alleged to promote social good as a whole. Organicist philosophers such as Hegel hold that it is the other way around: the state or nation is higher than the individual, who is rightly subordinated to it, and individuals have fundamental duties toward the groups of which they are members. Outrightly fascist versions of such views are unpopular today, but more benign versions continue in modified form, notably by communitarians. Socialism and especially communism, though focused originally on economic aspects of society, have characteristically been identified with the organicist outlook. Their extreme opposite is to be found in the libertarians, who hold that the right to individual liberty is fundamental in society, and that no institutions may override that right. Libertarians hold that society ought to be treated strictly as an association, a Gesellschaft, even though they might not deny that it is ontogenetically Gemeinschaft. They might agree that religious groups, e.g., cannot be wholly understood as separate individuals. Nevertheless, the libertarian holds that religious and cultural practices may not be interfered with or even supported by society. Libertarians are strong supporters of free-market economic methods, and opponents of any sort of state intervention into the affairs of individuals. Social Darwinism, advocating the “survival of the socially fittest,” has sometimes been associated with the libertarian view. Insofar as there is any kind of standard view on these matters, it combines elements of both individualism and holism. Typical social philosophers today accept that society has duties, not voluntary for individual members, to support education, health, and some degree of welfare for all. But they also agree that individual rights are to be respected, especially civil rights, such as freedom of speech and religion. How to combine these two apparently disparate sets of ideas into a coherent whole is the problem. John Rawls’s celebrated Theory of Justice, 1, is a contemporary classic that attempts to do just that. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Grice and Grice on the conversational contract.”

sozzini: -- Socinianism, NELLA PRIMA METÀ DEL SEDICESIMO SECOLO NACQUERO IN QUESTA CASA LELIO E FAUSTO SOZZINI LETTERATI INSIGNI FILOSOFI SOMMI DELLA LIBERTÀ DI PENSIERO STRENUI PROPUGNATORI ______ CONTRO IL SOPRANNATURALE VINDICI DELLA UMANA RAGIONE FONDARONO LA CELEBRE SCUOLA SOCINIANA PRECORRENDO DI TRE SECOLI LE DOTTRINE DEL MODERNO RAZIONALISMO ______  I LIBERALI SENESI AMMIRATORI REVERENTI QUESTA MEMORIA POSERO 1879 a movement originating in the sixteenth century from the work of  reformer Laelius Socinus “Sozzini” and his nephew Faustus Socinus.  Born in Siena of a patrician family, Sozzini is widely read. Influenced by the evangelical movement, Sozzini makes contact with noted Protestant reformers, including Calvin and Melanchthon, some of whom questioned his orthodoxy. In response, Sozzini writes a confession of faith, one of a small number of his writings to have survived. After his death, Sozzini’s oeuvre was carried on by his nephew, Faustus, whose writings including “On the Authority of Scripture,” “On the Savior Jesus Christ,”  and “On Predestination,” expressed heterodox views. Sozzini believed that Christ’s nature is entirely human, that the souls does not possess immortality by nature though there is selective resurrection for believers, that invocation of Christ in prayer is permissible but not required, and he argues, like Grice, Pears, and Thomson, against predestination. After publication of his  writings, Sozzini is invited to Transylvania and Poland to engage in a dispute within the Reformed churches there. He decides to make his permanent residence in Poland, which, through his tireless efforts, became the center of the Socinian movement. The most important document of this movement was the Racovian Catechism, published shortly after Faustus’s death. The Minor church of Poland, centered at Racov, became the focal point of the movement. Its academy attracted hundreds of students and its publishing house produced books in many languages defending Socinian ideas. Socinianism, as represented by the Racovian Catechism and other writings collected by Faustus’s disciples, involves the views of Laelius and especially Faustus Socinus, aligned with the anti-Trinitarian views of the Polish Minor church.. It accepts Christ’s message as the definitive revelation of God, but regards Christ as human, not divine; rejects the natural immortality of the soul, but argues for the selective resurrection of the faithful; rejects the doctrine of the Trinity; emphasizes human free will against predestinationism; defends pacifism and the separation of church and state; and argues that reason  not creeds, dogmatic tradition, or church authority  must be the final interpreter of Scripture. Its view of God is temporalistic: God’s eternity is existence at all times, not timelessness, and God knows future free actions only when they occur. In these respects, the Socinian view of God anticipates aspects of modern process theology. Socinianism was suppressed in Poland in 1658, but it had already spread to other European countries, including Holland where it appealed to followers of Arminius and England, where it influenced the Cambridge Platonists, Locke, and other philosophers, as well as scientists like Newton. In England, it also influenced and was closely associated with the development of Unitarianism.  H. P. Grice, “Sozzini, rationalism, and moi.”

athenian dialectic – Socrates, Grecian philosopher, the exemplar of the examined life, best known for his dictum that only such a life is worth living. Although he wrote nothing, his thoughts and way of life had a profound impact on many of his contemporaries, and, through Plato’s portrayal of him in his early writings, he became a major source of inspiration and ideas for later generations of philosophers. His daily occupation was adversarial public conversation with anyone willing to argue with him. A man of great intellectual brilliance, moral integrity, personal magnetism, and physical self-command, he challenged the moral complacency of his fellow citizens, and embarrassed them with their inability to answer such questions as What is virtue?  questions that he thought we must answer, if we are to know how best to live our lives. His ideas and personality won him a devoted following among the young, but he was far from universally admired. Formal charges were made against him for refusing to recognize the gods of the city, introducing other new divinities, and corrupting the youth. Tried on a single day before a large jury 500 was a typical size, he was found guilty by a small margin: had thirty jurors voted differently, he would have been acquitted. The punishment selected by the jury was death and was administered by means of poison, probably hemlock. Why was he brought to trial and convicted? Part of the answer lies in Plato’s Apology, which purports to be the defense Socrates gave at his trial. Here he says that he has for many years been falsely portrayed as someone whose scientific theories dethrone the traditional gods and put natural forces in their place, and as someone who charges a fee for offering private instruction on how to make a weak argument seem strong in the courtroom. This is the picture of Socrates drawn in a play of Aristophanes, the Clouds, first presented in 423. It is unlikely that Aristophanes intended his play as an accurate depiction of Socrates, and the unscrupulous buffoon found in the Clouds would never have won the devotion of so serious a moralist as Plato. Aristophanes drew together the assorted characteristics of various fifth-century thinkers and named this amalgam “Socrates” because the real Socrates was one of several controversial intellectuals of the period. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the charges against Socrates or Aristophanes’ caricature were entirely without foundation. Both Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Plato’s Euthyphro say that Socrates aroused suspicion because he thought a certain divine sign or voice appeared to him and gave him useful instruction about how to act. By claiming a unique and private source of divine inspiration, Socrates may have been thought to challenge the city’s exclusive control over religious matters. His willingness to disobey the city is admitted in Plato’s Apology, where he says that he would have to disobey a hypothetical order to stop asking his philosophical questions, since he regards them as serving a religious purpose. In the Euthyphro he seeks a rational basis for making sacrifices and performing other services to the gods; but he finds none, and implies that no one else has one. Such a challenge to traditional religious practice could easily have aroused a suspicion of atheism and lent credibility to the formal charges against him. Furthermore, Socrates makes statements in Plato’s early dialogues and in Xenophon’s Memorabilia that could easily have offended the political sensibilities of his contemporaries. He holds that only those who have given special study to political matters should make decisions. For politics is a kind of craft, and in all other crafts only those who have shown their mastery are entrusted with public responsibilities. Athens was a democracy in which each citizen had an equal legal right to shape policy, and Socrates’ analogy between the role of an expert in politics and in other crafts may have been seen as a threat to this egalitarianism. Doubts about his political allegiance, though not mentioned in the formal charges against him, could easily have swayed some jurors to vote against him. Socrates is the subject not only of Plato’s early dialogues but also of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socinus, Faustus Socrates 859   859 and in many respects their portraits are consistent with each other. But there are also some important differences. In the Memorabilia, Socrates teaches whatever a gentleman needs to know for civic purposes. He is filled with platitudinous advice, and is never perplexed by the questions he raises; e.g., he knows what the virtues are, equating them with obedience to the law. His views are not threatening or controversial, and always receive the assent of his interlocutors. By contrast, Plato’s Socrates presents himself as a perplexed inquirer who knows only that he knows nothing about moral matters. His interlocutors are sometimes annoyed by his questions and threatened by their inability to answer them. And he is sometimes led by force of argument to controversial conclusions. Such a Socrates could easily have made enemies, whereas Xenophon’s Socrates is sometimes too “good” to be true. But it is important to bear in mind that it is only the early works of Plato that should be read as an accurate depiction of the historical Socrates. Plato’s own theories, as presented in his middle and late dialogues, enter into philosophical terrain that had not been explored by the historical Socrates  even though in the middle and some of the late dialogues a figure called Socrates remains the principal speaker. We are told by Aristotle that Socrates confined himself to ethical questions, and that he did not postulate a separate realm of imperceptible and eternal abstract objects called “Forms” or “Ideas.” Although the figure called Socrates affirms the existence of these objects in such Platonic dialogues as the Phaedo and the Republic, Aristotle takes this interlocutor to be a vehicle for Platonic philosophy, and attributes to Socrates only those positions that we find in Plato’s earlier writing, e.g. in the Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Ion, Laches, Lysis, and Protagoras. Socrates focused on moral philosophy almost exclusively; Plato’s attention was also devoted to the study of metaphysics, epistemology, physical theory, mathematics, language, and political philosophy. When we distinguish the philosophies of Socrates and Plato in this way, we find continuities in their thought  for instance, the questions posed in the early dialogues receive answers in the Republic  but there are important differences. For Socrates, being virtuous is a purely intellectual matter: it simply involves knowing what is good for human beings; once we master this subject, we will act as we should. Because he equates virtue with knowledge, Socrates frequently draws analogies between being virtuous and having mastered any ordinary subject  cooking, building, or geometry, e.g. For mastery of these subjects does not involve a training of the emotions. By contrast, Plato affirms the existence of powerful emotional drives that can deflect us from our own good, if they are not disciplined by reason. He denies Socrates’ assumption that the emotions will not resist reason, once one comes to understand where one’s own good lies. Socrates says in Plato’s Apology that the only knowledge he has is that he knows nothing, but it would be a mistake to infer that he has no convictions about moral matters  convictions arrived at through a difficult process of reasoning. He holds that the unexamined life is not worth living, that it is better to be treated unjustly than to do injustice, that understanding of moral matters is the only unconditional good, that the virtues are all forms of knowledge and cannot be separated from each other, that death is not an evil, that a good person cannot be harmed, that the gods possess the wisdom human beings lack and never act immorally, and so on. He does not accept these propositions as articles of faith, but is prepared to defend any of them; for he can show his interlocutors that their beliefs ought to lead them to accept these conclusions, paradoxical though they may be. Since Socrates can defend his beliefs and has subjected them to intellectual scrutiny, why does he present himself as someone who has no knowledge  excepting the knowledge of his own ignorance? The answer lies in his assumption that it is only a fully accomplished expert in any field who can claim knowledge or wisdom of that field; someone has knowledge of navigational matters, e.g., only if he has mastered the art of sailing, can answer all inquiries about this subject, and can train others to do the same. Judged by this high epistemic standard, Socrates can hardly claim to be a moral expert, for he lacks answers to the questions he raises, and cannot teach others to be virtuous. Though he has examined his moral beliefs and can offer reasons for them  an accomplishment that gives him an overbearing sense of superiority to his contemporaries  he takes himself to be quite distant from the ideal of moral perfection, which would involve a thorough understanding of all moral matters. This keen sense of the moral and intellectual deficiency of all human beings accounts for a great deal of Socrates’ appeal, just as his arrogant disdain for his fellow citizens no doubt contributed to his demise. Socrates Socrates 860   860  -- Socratic intellectualism, the claim that moral goodness or virtue consists exclusively in a kind of knowledge, with the implication that if one knows what is good and evil, one cannot fail to be a good person and to act in a morally upright way. The claim and the term derive from Socrates; a corollary is another claim of Socrates: there is no moral weakness or akrasia  all wrong action is due to the agent’s ignorance. Socrates defends this view in Plato’s dialogue Protagoras. There are two ways to understand Socrates’ view that knowledge of the good is sufficient for right action. 1 All desires are rational, being focused on what is believed to be good; thus, an agent who knows what is good will have no desire to act contrary to that knowledge. 2 There are non-rational desires, but knowledge of the good has sufficient motivational power to overcome them. Socratic intellectualism was abandoned by Plato and Aristotle, both of whom held that emotional makeup is an essential part of moral character. However, they retained the Socratic idea that there is a kind of knowledge or wisdom that ensures right action  but this knowledge presupposes antecedent training and molding of the passions. Socratic intellectualism was later revived and enjoyed a long life as a key doctrine of the Stoics.  -- Socratic irony, a form of indirect communication frequently employed by Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues, chiefly to praise insincerely the abilities of his interlocutors while revealing their ignorance; or, to disparage his own abilities, e.g. by denying that he has knowledge. Interpreters disagree whether Socrates’ self-disparagement is insincere.  -- Socratic paradoxes, a collection of theses associated with Socrates that contradict opinions about moral or practical matters shared by most people. Although there is no consensus on the precise number of Socratic paradoxes, each of the following theses has been identified as one. 1 Because no one desires evil things, anyone who pursues evil things does so involuntarily. 2 Because virtue is knowledge, anyone who does something morally wrong does so involuntarily. 3 It is better to be unjustly treated than to do what is unjust. The first two theses are associated with weakness of will or akrasia. It is sometimes claimed that the topic of the first thesis is prudential weakness, whereas that of the second is moral weakness; the reference to “evil things” in 1 is not limited to things that are morally evil. Naturally, various competing interpretations of these theses have been offered. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Oxonian dialectic; or, Athenian dialetic, revisited.”

solus ipse, solipsism: Grice: “If my theory of conversation has any value, is the refutation of solipsism!” -- the doctrine that there exists a firstperson perspective possessing privileged and irreducible characteristics, in virtue of which we stand in various kinds of isolation from any other persons or external things that may exist. This doctrine is associated with but distinct from egocentricism. On one variant of solipsism Thomas Nagel’s we are isolated from other sentient beings because we can never adequately understand their experience empathic solipsism. Another variant depends on the thesis that the meanings or referents of all words are mental entities uniquely accessible only to the language user semantic solipsism. A restricted variant, due to Vitters, asserts that first-person ascriptions of psychological states have a meaning fundamentally different from that of second- or thirdperson ascriptions psychological solipsism. In extreme forms semantic solipsism can lead to the view that the only things that can be meaningfully said to exist are ourselves or our mental states ontological solipsism. Skepticism about the existence of the world external to our minds is sometimes considered a form of epistemological solipsism, since it asserts that we stand in epistemological isolation from that world, partly as a result of the epistemic priority possessed by firstperson access to mental states. In addition to these substantive versions of solipsism, several variants go under the rubric methodological solipsism. The idea is that when we seek to explain why sentient beings behave in certain ways by looking to what they believe, desire, hope, and fear, we should identify these psychological states only with events that occur inside the mind or brain, not with external events, since the former alone are the proximate and sufficient causal explanations of bodily behavior.

Solovyov: philosopher, author of major treatises and dialogues in speculative philosophy,  The mystical image of the “Divine Sophia,” which Solovyov articulated in theoretical concepts as well as poetic symbols, powerfully influenced the Russian symbolist poets of the early twentieth century. His stress on the human role in the “divine-human process” that creates both cosmic and historical being led to charges of heresy from Russian Orthodox traditionalists. Solovyov’s rationalistic “justification of the good” in history, society, and individual life was inspired by Plato, Spinoza, and especially Hegel. However, at the end of his life Solovyov offered in Three Conversations on War, Progress, and the End of History, 0 a contrasting apocalyptic vision of historical and cosmic disaster, including the appearance, in the twenty-first century, of the Antichrist. In ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of history, and theory of culture, Solovyov was both a vigorous ecumenist and a “good European” who affirmed the intrinsic value of both the “individual human person” Russian lichnost’ and the “individual nation or people” narodnost’, but he decisively repudiated the perversions of these values in egoism and nationalism, respectively. He contrasted the fruits of English narodnost’  the works of Shakespeare and Byron, Berkeley and Newton  with the fruits of English nationalism  the repressive and destructive expansion of the British Empire. In opposing ethnic, national, and religious exclusiveness and self-centeredness, Solovyov also, and quite consistently, opposed the growing xenophobia and antiSemitism of his own time. Since 8 long-suppressed works by and about Solovyov have been widely republished in Russia, and fresh interpretations of his philosophy and theology have begun to appear. 

sophisma, a sentenca illustrating a semantic or logical issue associated with the analysis of a syncategorematic term, or a term lacking independent signification. Typically a sophisma was used from the thirteenth century into the sixteenth century to analyze relations holding between logic or semantics and broader philosophical issues. For example, the syncategorematic term ‘besides’ praeter in ‘Socrates twice sees every man besides Plato’ is ambiguous, because it could mean ‘On two occasions Socrates sees every-man-but-Plato’ and also ‘Except for overlooking Plato once, on two occasions Socrates sees every man’. Roger Bacon used this sophisma to discuss the ambiguity of distribution, in this case, of the scope of the reference of ‘twice’ and ‘besides’. Sherwood used the sophisma to illustrate the applicability of his rule of the distribution of ambiguous syncategoremata, while Pseudo-Peter of Spain uses it to establish the truth of the rule, ‘If a proposition is in part false, it can be made true by means of an exception, but not if it is completely false’. In each case, the philosopher uses the ambiguous signification of the syncategorematic term to analyze broader logical problems. The sophisma ‘Every man is of necessity an animal’ has ambiguity through the syncategorematic ‘every’ that leads to broader philosophical problems. In the 1270s, Boethius of Dacia analyzed this sophisma in terms of its applicability when no man exists. Is the knowledge derived from understanding the proposition destroyed when the object known is destroyed? Does ‘man’ signify anything when there are no men? If we can correctly predicate a genus of a species, is the nature of the genus in that species something other than, or distinct from, what finally differentiates the species? In this case, the sophisma proves a useful approach to addressing metaphysical and epistemological problems central to Scholastic discourse.   sophisma: Grice: “Literally, a wisecrack.” “’Sophisma’ is a very Griceian and Grecian pun on ‘sophos,’ the wise men of Gotham -- any of a number of ancient Grecians, roughly contemporaneous with Socrates, who professed to teach, for a fee, rhetoric, philosophy, and how to succeed in life. They typically were itinerants, visiting much of the Grecian world, and gave public exhibitions at Olympia and Delphi. They were part of the general expansion of Grecian learning and of the changing culture in which the previous informal educational methods were inadequate. For example, the growing litigiousness of Athenian society demanded Solovyov, Vladimir Sophists 862   862 instruction in the art of speaking well, which the Sophists helped fulfill. The Sophists have been portrayed as intellectual charlatans hence the pejorative use of ‘sophism’, teaching their sophistical reasoning for money, and at the other extreme as Victorian moralists and educators. The truth is more complex. They were not a school, and shared no body of opinions. They were typically concerned with ethics unlike many earlier philosophers, who emphasized physical inquiries and about the relationship between laws and customs nomos and nature phusis. Protagoras of Abdera c.490c.420 B.C. was the most famous and perhaps the first Sophist. He visited Athens frequently, and became a friend of its leader, Pericles; he therefore was invited to draw up a legal code for the colony of Thurii 444. According to some late reports, he died in a shipwreck as he was leaving Athens, having been tried for and found guilty of impiety. He claimed that he knew nothing about the gods, because of human limitations and the difficulty of the question. We have only a few short quotations from his works. His “Truth” also known as the “Throws,” i.e., how to overthrow an opponent’s arguments begins with his most famous claim: “Humans are the measure of all things  of things that are, that they are, of things that are not, that they are not.” That is, there is no objective truth; the world is for each person as it appears to that person. Of what use, then, are skills? Skilled people can change others’ perceptions in useful ways. For example, a doctor can change a sick person’s perceptions so that she is healthy. Protagoras taught his students to “make the weaker argument the stronger,” i.e., to alter people’s perceptions about the value of arguments. Aristophanes satirizes Protagoras as one who would make unjust arguments defeat just arguments. This is true for ethical judgments, too: laws and customs are simply products of human agreement. But because laws and customs result from experiences of what is most useful, they should be followed rather than nature. No perception or judgment is more true than another, but some are more useful, and those that are more useful should be followed. Gorgias c.483376 was a student of Empedocles. His town, Leontini in Sicily, sent him as an ambassador to Athens in 427; his visit was a great success, and the Athenians were amazed at his rhetorical ability. Like other Sophists, he charged for instruction and gave speeches at religious festivals. Gorgias denied that he taught virtue; instead, he produced clever speakers. He insisted that different people have different virtues: for example, women’s virtue differs from men’s. Since there is no truth and if there were we couldn’t know it, we must rely on opinion, and so speakers who can change people’s opinions have great power  greater than the power produced by any other skill. In his “Encomium on Helen” he argues that if she left Menelaus and went with Paris because she was convinced by speech, she wasn’t responsible for her actions. Two paraphrases of Gorgias’s “About What Doesn’t Exist” survive; in this he argues that nothing exists, that even if something did, we couldn’t know it, and that even if we could know anything we couldn’t explain it to anyone. We can’t know anything, because some things we think of do not exist, and so we have no way of judging whether the things we think of exist. And we can’t express any knowledge we may have, because no two people can think of the same thing, since the same thing can’t be in two places, and because we use words in speech, not colors or shapes or objects. This may be merely a parody of Parmenides’ argument that only one thing exists. Antiphon the Sophist fifth century is probably although not certainly to be distinguished from Antiphon the orator d. 411, some of whose speeches we possess. We know nothing about his life if he is distinct from the orator. In addition to brief quotations in later authors, we have two papyrus fragments of his “On Truth.” In these he argues that we should follow laws and customs only if there are witnesses and so our action will affect our reputation; otherwise, we should follow nature, which is often inconsistent with following custom. Custom is established by human agreement, and so disobeying it is detrimental only if others know it is disobeyed, whereas nature’s demands unlike those of custom can’t be ignored with impunity. Antiphon assumes that rational actions are selfinterested, and that justice demands actions contrary to self-interest  a position Plato attacks in the Republic. Antiphon was also a materialist: the nature of a bed is wood, since if a buried bed could grow it would grow wood, not a bed. His view is one of Aristotle’s main concerns in the Physics, since Aristotle admits in the Categories that persistence through change is the best test for substance, but won’t admit that matter is substance. Hippias fifth century was from Elis, in the Peloponnesus, which used him as an ambasSophists Sophists 863   863 sador. He competed at the festival of Olympus with both prepared and extemporaneous speeches. He had a phenomenal memory. Since Plato repeatedly makes fun of him in the two dialogues that bear his name, he probably was selfimportant and serious. He was a polymath who claimed he could do anything, including making speeches and clothes; he wrote a work collecting what he regarded as the best things said by others. According to one report, he made a mathematical discovery the quadratrix, the first curve other than the circle known to the Grecians. In the Protagoras, Plato has Hippias contrast nature and custom, which often does violence to nature. Prodicus fifth century was from Ceos, in the Cyclades, which frequently employed him on diplomatic missions. He apparently demanded high fees, but had two versions of his lecture  one cost fifty drachmas, the other one drachma. Socrates jokes that if he could have afforded the fifty-drachma lecture, he would have learned the truth about the correctness of words, and Aristotle says that when Prodicus added something exciting to keep his audience’s attention he called it “slipping in the fifty-drachma lecture for them.” We have at least the content of one lecture of his, the “Choice of Heracles,” which consists of banal moralizing. Prodicus was praised by Socrates for his emphasis on the right use of words and on distinguishing between synonyms. He also had a naturalistic view of the origin of theology: useful things were regarded as gods.

sorel: sphilosopher best known for his “Reflections on Violence,” which develops the notion of revolutionary syndicalism as seen through proletarian violence and the interpretation of myth. An early proponent of the quasiMarxist position of gradual democratic reformism, Sorel eventually developed a highly subjective interpretation of historical materialism that, while retaining a conception of proletarian revolution, now understood it through myth rather than reason. He was in large part reacting to the empiricism of the  Enlightenment and the statistical structuring of sociological studies. In contrast to Marx and Engels, who held that revolution would occur when the proletariat attained its own class consciousness through an understanding of its true relationship to the means of production in capitalist society, Sorel introduced myth rather than reason as the correct way to interpret social totality. Myth allows for the necessary reaction to bourgeois rationalism and permits the social theorist to negate the status quo through the authenticity of revolutionary violence. By acknowledging the irrationality of the status quo, myth permits the possibility of social understanding and its necessary reaction, human emancipation through proletarian revolution. Marxism is myth because it juxtaposes the irreducibility of capitalist organization to its negation  violent proletarian revolution. The intermediary stage in this development is radical syndicalism, which organizes workers into groups opposed to bourgeois authority, instills the myth of proletarian revolution in the workers, and allows them in postrevolutionary times to work toward a social arrangement of worker and peasant governance and collaboration. The vehicle through which all this is accomplished is the general strike, whose aim, through the justified violence of its ends, is to facilitate the downfall and ultimate elimination of the bourgeoisie. In doing so the proletariat will lead society to a classless and harmonious stage in history. By stressing the notion of spontaneity Sorel thought he had solved the vexing problems of party and future bureaucracy found in much of the revolutionary literature of his day. In his later years he was interested in the writings of both Lenin and Mussolini. 

sorites, an argument consisting of categorical propositions that can be represented as or decomposed into a sequence of categorical syllogisms such that the conclusion of each syllogism except the last one in the sequence is a premise of the next syllogism in the sequence. An example is ‘All cats are felines; all felines are mammals; all mammals are warm-blooded animals; therefore, all cats are warm-blooded animals’. This sorites may be viewed as composed of the two syllogisms ‘All cats are felines; all felines are mammals; therefore, all cats are mammals’ and ‘All cats are mammals; all mammals are warm-blooded animals; therefore, all cats are warm-blooded animals’. A sorites is valid if and only if each categorical syllogism into which it decomposes is valid. In the example, the sorites decomposes into two syllogisms in the mood Barbara; since any syllogism in Barbara is valid, the sorites is valid. 

sorites paradox from Grecian soros, ‘heap’, any of a number of paradoxes about heaps and their Sorel, Georges sorites paradox 864   864 elements, and more broadly about gradations. A single grain of sand cannot be arranged so as to form a heap. Moreover, it seems that given a number of grains insufficient to form a heap, adding just one more grain still does not make a heap. If a heap cannot be formed with one grain, it cannot be formed with two; if a heap cannot be formed with two, it cannot be formed with three; and so on. But this seems to lead to the absurdity that however large the number of grains, it is not large enough to form a heap. A similar paradox can be developed in the opposite direction. A million grains of sand can certainly be arranged so as to form a heap, and it is always possible to remove a grain from a heap in such a way that what is left is also a heap. This seems to lead to the absurdity that a heap can be formed even from just a single grain. These paradoxes about heaps were known in antiquity they are associated with Eubulides of Miletus, fourth century B.C., and have since given their name to a number of similar paradoxes. The loss of a single hair does not make a man bald, and a man with a million hairs is certainly not bald. This seems to lead to the absurd conclusion that even a man with no hairs at all is not bald. Or consider a long painted wall hundreds of yards or hundreds of miles long. The left-hand region is clearly painted red, but there is a subtle gradation of shades and the right-hand region is clearly yellow. A small double window exposes a small section of the wall at any one time. It is moved progressively rightward, in such a way that at each move after the initial position the left-hand segment of the window exposes just the area that was in the previous position exposed by the right-hand segment. The window is so small relative to the wall that in no position can you tell any difference in color between the exposed areas. When the window is at the extreme left, both exposed areas are certainly red. But as the window moves to the right, the area in the right segment looks just the same color as the area in the left, which you have already pronounced to be red. So it seems that one must call it red too. But then one is led to the absurdity of calling a clearly yellow area red. As some of these cases suggest, there is a connection with dynamic processes. A tadpole turns gradually into a frog. Yet if you analyze a motion picture of the process, it seems that there are no two adjacent frames of which you can say the earlier shows a tadpole, the later a frog. So it seems that you could argue: if something is a tadpole at a given moment, it must also be a tadpole and not a frog a millionth of a second later, and this seems to lead to the absurd conclusion that a tadpole can never turn into a frog. Most responses to this paradox attempt to deny the “major premise,” the one corresponding to the claim that if you cannot make a heap with n grains of sand then you cannot make a heap with n ! 1. The difficulty is that the negation of this premise is equivalent, in classical logic, to the proposition that there is a sharp cutoff: that, e.g., there is some number n of grains that are not enough to make a heap, where n ! 1 are enough to make a heap. The claim of a sharp cutoff may not be so very implausible for heaps perhaps for things like grains of sand, four is the smallest number which can be formed into a heap but is very implausible for colors and tadpoles. There are two main kinds of response to sorites paradoxes. One is to accept that there is in every such case a sharp cutoff, though typically we do not, and perhaps cannot, know where it is. Another kind of response is to evolve a non-classical logic within which one can refuse to accept the major premise without being committed to a sharp cutoff. At present, no such non-classical logic is entirely free of difficulties. So sorites paradoxes are still taken very seriously by contemporary philosophers. 

sort: Grice, “One of the few technicisms introduced by an English philosopher, in this case Locke.” – a sortal predicate, roughly, a predicate whose application to an object says what kind of object it is and implies conditions for objects of that kind to be identical. Person, green apple, regular hexagon, and pile of coal would generally be regarded as sortal predicates, whereas tall, green thing, and coal would generally be regarded as non-sortal predicates. An explicit and precise definition of the distinction is hard to come by. Sortal predicates are sometimes said to be distinguished by the fact that they provide a criterion of counting or that they do not apply to the parts of the objects to which they apply, but there are difficulties with each of these characterizations. The notion figures in recent philosophical discussions on various topics. Robert Ackermann and others have suggested that any scientific law confirmable by observation might require the use of sortal predicates. Thus ‘all non-black things are non-ravens’, while logically equivalent to the putative scientific law ‘all ravens are black’, is not itself confirmable by observation because ‘non-black’ is not a sortal predicate. David Wiggins and others have discussed the sortal sortal predicate 865   865 idea that all identity claims are sortal-relative in the sense that an appropriate response to the claim a % b is always “the same what as b?” John Wallace has argued that there would be advantages in relativizing the quantifiers of predicate logic to sortals. ‘All humans are mortal’ would be rendered Ex[m]Dx, rather than ExMxPDx. Crispin Wright has suggested that the view that natural number is a sortal concept is central to Frege’s or any other number-theoretic platonism. The word ‘sortal’ as a technical term in philosophy apparently first occurs in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke argues that the so-called essence of a genus or sort unlike the real essence of a thing is merely the abstract idea that the general or sortal name stands for. But ‘sortal’ has only one occurrence in Locke’s Essay. Its currency in contemporary philosophical idiom probably should be credited to P. F. Strawson’s Individuals. The general idea may be traced at least to the notion of second substance in Aristotle’s Categories. 

Soto, Domingo de -- Dominican theologian and philosopher. Born in Segovia, he studied in Paris, taught at Segovia and Salamanca, and was named official representative of the Holy Roman Empire at the Council of Trent by Charles V. Among Soto’s many works, his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and On the Soul stand out. He also wrote a book on the nature of grace and an important treatise on law. Soto was one of the early members of the school of  Thomism, but he did not always follow Aquinas. He rejected the doctrine of the real distinction between essence and existence and adopted Duns Scotus’s position that the primary object of human understanding is indeterminate being in general. Apart from metaphysics and theology, Soto’s philosophy of law and political theory are historically important. He maintained, contrary to his teacher Vitoria, that law originates in the understanding rather than in the will of the legislator. He also distinguished natural from positive law: the latter arises from the decision of legislators, whereas the former is based on nature. Soto was a founder of the general theory of international law. 

soul: -- cf. Grice on “soul-to-soul transfer” -- also called spirit, an entity supposed to be present only in living things, corresponding to the Grecian psyche and Latin anima. Since there seems to be no material difference between an organism in the last moments of its life and the organism’s newly dead body, many philosophers since the time of Plato have claimed that the soul is an immaterial component of an organism. Because only material things are observed to be subject to dissolution, Plato took the soul’s immateriality as grounds for its immortality. Neither Plato nor Aristotle thought that only persons had souls: Aristotle ascribed souls to animals and plants since they all exhibited some living functions. Unlike Plato, Aristotle denied the transmigration of souls from one species to another or from one body to another after death; he was also more skeptical about the soul’s capacity for disembodiment  roughly, survival and functioning without a body. Descartes argued that only persons had souls and that the soul’s immaterial nature made freedom possible even if the human body is subject to deterministic physical laws. As the subject of thought, memory, emotion, desire, and action, the soul has been supposed to be an entity that makes self-consciousness possible, that differentiates simultaneous experiences into experiences either of the same person or of different persons, and that accounts for personal identity or a person’s continued identity through time. Dualists argue that soul and body must be distinct in order to explain consciousness and the possibility of immortality. Materialists argue that consciousness is entirely the result of complex physical processes. 

soundness: Grice: “The etymology if fascinating.” The English Grice. "Most of the terms I use are Latinate." "I implicate: a few are not." "I say that System G should be sound." "free from special defect or injury," c. 1200, from Old English gesund "sound, safe, having the organs and faculties complete and in perfect action," from Proto-Germanic *sunda-, from Germanic root *swen-to- "healthy, strong" (source also of Old Saxon gisund, Old Frisian sund, Dutch gezond, Old High German gisunt, German gesund "healthy," as in the post-sneezing interjection gesundheit; also Old English swið "strong," Gothic swinþs "strong," German geschwind "fast, quick"), with connections in Indo-Iranian and Balto-Slavic. Meaning "right, correct, free from error" is from mid-15c. Meaning "financially solid or safe" is attested from c. 1600; of sleep, "undisturbed," from 1540s. Sense of "holding accepted opinions" is from 1520s Grice: “’sound’ is not polysemous, but it has different usages: of an argument the property of being valid and having all true premises; of a system, like Sytem G,  the property of being not too strong in a certain respect. A System G  has weak soundness provided every theorem of G  is valid. And G has strong soundness if for every set S of sentences, every sentence deducible from S using system G is a logical consequence of S.

spatium: space, an extended manifold of several dimensions, where the number of dimensions corresponds to the number of variable magnitudes Soto, Domingo de space 866   866 needed to specify a location in the manifold; in particular, the three-dimensional manifold in which physical objects are situated and with respect to which their mutual positions and distances are defined. Ancient Grecian atomism defined space as the infinite void in which atoms move; but whether space is finite or infinite, and whether void spaces exist, have remained in question. Aristotle described the universe as a finite plenum and reduced space to the aggregate of all places of physical things. His view was preeminent until Renaissance Neoplatonism, the Copernican revolution, and the revival of atomism reintroduced infinite, homogeneous space as a fundamental cosmological assumption. Further controversy concerned whether the space assumed by early modern astronomy should be thought of as an independently existing thing or as an abstraction from the spatial relations of physical bodies. Interest in the relativity of motion encouraged the latter view, but Newton pointed out that mechanics presupposes absolute distinctions among motions, and he concluded that absolute space must be postulated along with the basic laws of motion Principia, 1687. Leibniz argued for the relational view from the identity of indiscernibles: the parts of space are indistinguishable from one another and therefore cannot be independently existing things. Relativistic physics has defused the original controversy by revealing both space and spatial relations as merely observer-dependent manifestations of the structure of spacetime. Meanwhile, Kant shifted the metaphysical controversy to epistemological grounds by claiming that space, with its Euclidean structure, is neither a “thing-in-itself” nor a relation of thingsin-themselves, but the a priori form of outer intuition. His view was challenged by the elaboration of non-Euclidean geometries in the nineteenth century, by Helmholtz’s arguments that both intuitive and physical space are known through empirical investigation, and finally by the use of non-Euclidean geometry in the theory of relativity. Precisely what geometrical presuppositions are inherent in human spatial perception, and what must be learned from experience, remain subjects of psychological investigation. 

space-time, a four-dimensional continuum combining the three dimensions of space with time in order to represent motion geometrically. Each point is the location of an event, all of which together represent “the world” through time; paths in the continuum worldlines represent the dynamical histories of moving particles, so that straight worldlines correspond to uniform motions; three-dimensional sections of constant time value “spacelike hypersurfaces” or “simultaneity slices” represent all of space at a given time. The idea was foreshadowed when Kant represented “the phenomenal world” as a plane defined by space and time as perpendicular axes Inaugural Dissertation, 1770, and when Joseph Louis Lagrange 17361814 referred to mechanics as “the analytic geometry of four dimensions.” But classical mechanics assumes a universal standard of simultaneity, and so it can treat space and time separately. The concept of space-time was explicitly developed only when Einstein criticized absolute simultaneity and made the velocity of light a universal constant. The mathematician Hermann Minkowski showed in 8 that the observer-independent structure of special relativity could be represented by a metric space of four dimensions: observers in relative motion would disagree on intervals of length and time, but agree on a fourdimensional interval combining spatial and temporal measurements. Minkowski’s model then made possible the general theory of relativity, which describes gravity as a curvature of spacetime in the presence of mass and the paths of falling bodies as the straightest worldlines in curved space-time. 

spatio-temporal continuity, a property of the careers, or space-time paths, of well-behaved objects. Let a space-time path be a series of possible spatiotemporal positions, each represented in a selected coordinate system by an ordered pair consisting of a time its temporal component and a volume of space its spatial component. Such a path will be spatiotemporally continuous provided it is such that, relative to any inertial frame selected as coordinate system, space, absolute spatiotemporal continuity 867   867 1 for every segment of the series, the temporal components of the members of that segment form a continuous temporal interval; and 2 for any two members ‹ti, Vi and ‹tj, Vj of the series that differ in their temporal components ti and tj, if Vi and Vj the spatial components differ in either shape, size, or location, then between these members of the series there will be a member whose spatial component is more similar to Vi and Vj in these respects than these are to each other. This notion is of philosophical interest partly because of its connections with the notions of identity over time and causality. Putting aside such qualifications as quantum considerations may require, material objects at least macroscopic objects of familiar kinds apparently cannot undergo discontinuous change of place, and cannot have temporal gaps in their histories, and therefore the path through space-time traced by such an object must apparently be spatiotemporally continuous. More controversial is the claim that spatiotemporal continuity, together with some continuity with respect to other properties, is sufficient as well as necessary for the identity of such objects  e.g., that if a spatiotemporally continuous path is such that the spatial component of each member of the series is occupied by a table of a certain description at the time that is the temporal component of that member, then there is a single table of that description that traces that path. Those who deny this claim sometimes maintain that it is further required for the identity of material objects that there be causal and counterfactual dependence of later states on earlier ones ceteris paribus, if the table had been different yesterday, it would be correspondingly different now. Since it appears that chains of causality must trace spatiotemporally continuous paths, it may be that insofar as spatiotemporal continuity is required for transtemporal identity, this is because it is required for transtemporal causality. Refs.: H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, “Categories,” in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

specious present: the supposed time between past and future. The phrase was first offered by  Clay in “The Alternative: A Study in Psychology,”  and is cited by James in his Principles of Psychology  Clay challenges the assumption that the “present” as a “datum” is given as “present” to us in our experience. “The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the *past*, a recent past  delusively given as benign time that intervenes between the past and the future. Let it be named ‘the specious present,’ and let the past that is given as being the past be known as ‘the obvious past.’” For James, this position is supportive of his contention that consciousness (conscientia) is a stream and can be divided into parts only by conceptual addition, i.e., only by our ascribing past, present, and future to what is, in our actual experience, a seamless flow. James holds that the “practically cognized present is no knife-edge but a saddleback,” a sort of “ducatum” which we experience as a whole, and only upon reflective attention do we “distinguish its beginning from its end.” Whereas Clay refers to the datum of the present as “delusive,” one might rather say that it is perpetually *elusive*, for as we have our experience, now, it is always bathed retrospectively and prospectively. Contrary to common wisdom, no single experience ever is had by our consciousness utterly alone, single and without relations, fore and aft. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The logical-construction theory of personal identity.”

speculatum: Grice: “Philosophy may broadly be divided into ‘philosophia speculativa” and “philosophia practica.”” -- speculative philosophy, a form of theorizing that goes beyond verifiable observation; specifically, a philosophical approach informed by the impulse to construct a grand narrative of a worldview that encompasses the whole of reality. Speculative philosophy purports to bind together reflections on the existence and nature of the cosmos, the psyche, and God. It sets for its goal a unifying matrix and an overarching system whereswith to comprehend the considered judgments of cosmology, psychology, and theology. Hegel’s absolute idealism, particularly as developed in his later thought, paradigmatically illustrates the requirements for speculative philosophizing. His system of idealism offered a vision of the unity of the categories of human thought as they come to realization in and through their opposition to each other. Speculative thought tends to place a premium on universality, totality, and unity; and it tends to marginalize the concrete particularities of the natural and social world. In its aggressive use of the systematic principle, geared to a unification of human experience, speculative philosophy aspires to a comprehensive understanding and explanation of the structural interrelations of the culture spheres of science, morality, art, and religion. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Practical and doxastic attitudes: why I need exhibitive clauses.”

austinianism: speech act theory, the theory of language use, sometimes called pragmatics, as opposed to the theory of meaning, or semantics. Based on the meaninguse distinction, it categorizes systematically the sorts of things that can be done with words and explicates the ways these are determined, underdetermined, or undetermined by the meanings of the words used. Relying further on the distinction between speaker meaning and linguistic meaning, it aims to characterize the nature of communicative intentions and how they are expressed and recognized. Speech acts are a species of intentional action. In general, one and the same utterance may comprise a number of distinct though related acts, each corresponding to a different intention on the part of the speaker. Beyond intending to produce a certain sequence of sounds forming a sentence in English, a person who utters the sentence ‘The door is open’, e.g., is likely to be intending to perform, in the terminology of J. L. Austin How to Do Things with Words, 2, 1 the locutionary act of saying expressing the proposition that a certain door is open, 2 the illocutionary act of making the statement expressing the belief that it is open, and 3 the perlocutionary act of getting his listener to believe that it is open. In so doing, he may be performing the indirect speech act of requesting illocutionary the listener to close the door and of getting perlocutionary the hearer to close the door. The primary focus of speech act theory is on illocutionary acts, which may be classified in a variety of ways. Statements, predictions, and answers exemplify constatives; requests, commands and permissions are directives; promises, offers, and bets are commissives; greetings, apologies, and congratulations are acknowledgments. These are all communicative illocutionary acts, each distinguished by the type of psychological state expressed by the speaker. Successful communication consists in the audience’s recognition of the speaker’s intention to be expressing a certain psychological state with a certain content. Conventional illocutionary acts, on the other hand, effect or officially affect institutional states of affairs. Examples of the former are appointing, resigning, sentencing, and adjourning; examples of the latter are assessing, acquitting, certifying, and grading. See Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, 9. The type of act an utterance exemplifies determines its illocutionary force. In the example ‘The door is open’, the utterance has the force of both a statement and a request. The illocutionary force potential of a sentence is the force or forces with which it can be used literally, e.g., in the case of the sentence ‘The door is open’, as a statement but not as a request. The felicity conditions on an illocutionary act pertain not only to its communicative or institutional success but also to its sincerity, appropriateness, and effectiveness. An explicit performative utterance is an illocutionary act performed by uttering an indicative sentence in the simple present tense with a verb naming the type of act being performed, e.g., ‘I apologize for everything I did’ and ‘You are requested not to smoke’. The adverb ‘hereby’ may be used before the performative verb ‘apologize’ and ‘request’ in these examples to indicate that the very utterance being made is the vehicle of the performance of the illocutionary act in question. A good test for distinguishing illocutionary from perlocutionary acts is to determine whether a verb naming the act can be used performatively. Austin exploited the phenomenon of performative utterances to expose the common philosophical error of assuming that the primary use of language is to make statements. 

spencer: English philosopher, social reformer, and editor of The Economist. In epistemology, Spencer adopted the ninespeculative reason Spencer, Herbert 869   869 teenth-century trend toward positivism: the only reliable knowledge of the universe is to be found in the sciences. His ethics were utilitarian, following Bentham and J. S. Mill: pleasure and pain are the criteria of value as signs of happiness or unhappiness in the individual. His Synthetic Philosophy, expounded in books written over many years, assumed both in biology and psychology the existence of Lamarckian evolution: given a characteristic environment, every animal possesses a disposition to make itself into what it will, failing maladaptive interventions, eventually become. The dispositions gain expression as inherited acquired habits. Spencer could not accept that species originate by chance variations and natural selection alone: direct adaptation to environmental constraints is mainly responsible for biological changes. Evolution also includes the progression of societies in the direction of a dynamical equilibrium of individuals: the human condition is perfectible because human faculties are completely adapted to life in society, implying that evil and immorality will eventually disappear. His ideas on evolution predated publication of the major works of Darwin; A. R. Wallace was influenced by his writings. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Evolutionary pirotology,” in “Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.”

speranza: luigi della --. Italian philosopher, attracted, for some reason, to H. P. Grice. Speranza knows St. John’s very well. He is the author of “Dorothea Oxoniensis.” He is a member of a number of cultivated Anglo-Italian societies, like H. P. Grice’s Playgroup. He is the custodian of Villa Grice, not far from Villa Speranza. He works at the Swimming-Pool Library. Cuisine is one of his hobbies – grisottoa alla ligure, his specialty. He can be reached via H. P. Grice. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Vita ed opinion di Luigi Speranza,” par Luigi Speranza. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

spinoza: Jewish metaphysician, born in the Netherlanads -- epistemologist, psychologist, moral philosopher, political theorist, and philosopher of religion, generally regarded as one of the most important figures of seventeenth-century rationalism. Life and works. Born and educated in the Jewish ‘community’ of Amsterdam, he forsook his given name ‘Baruch’ in favor of the Latin ‘Benedict’ at the age of twenty-two. Between 1652 and 1656 he studied the philosophy of Descartes in the school of Francis van den Enden. Having developed unorthodox views of the divine nature and having ceased to be fully observant of Jewish practice, he was excommunicated by the Jewish community in 1656. He spent his entire life in Holland; after leaving Amsterdam in 1660, he resided successively in Rijnsburg, Voorburg, and the Hague. He supported himself at least partly through grinding lenses, and his knowledge of optics involved him in an area of inquiry of great importance to seventeenth-century science. Acquainted with such leading intellectual figures as Leibniz, Huygens, and Henry Oldenberg, he declined a professorship at the  of Heidelberg partly on the grounds that it might interfere with his intellectual freedom. His premature death at the age of fortyfour was due to consumption. The only work published under Spinoza’s name during his lifetime was his Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae, Pars I et II, 1663, an attempt to recast and present Parts I and II of Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy in the manner that Spinoza called geometrical order or geometrical method. Modeled on the Elements of Euclid and on what Descartes called the method of synthesis, Spinoza’s “geometrical order” involves an initial set of definitions and axioms, from which various propositions are demonstrated, with notes or scholia attached where necessary. This work, which established his credentials as an expositor of Cartesian philosophy, had its origins in his endeavor to teach Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy to a private student. Spinoza’s TheologicalPolitical Treatise Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was published anonymously in 1670. After his death, his close circle of friends published his Posthumous Works Opera Postuma, 1677, which included his masterpieces, Ethic, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. The Posthumous Works also included his early unfinished Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, his later unfinished Political Treatise Tractatus Politicus, a Hebrew Grammar, and Correspondence. An unpublished early work entitled Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being Korte Vorhandelung van God, de Mensch en deszelvs Welstand, in many ways a forerunner of the Ethics, was rediscovered in copied manuscript and published in the nineteenth century. Spinoza’s authorship of two brief scientific treatises, On the Rainbow and On the Calculation of Chances, is still disputed. Metaphysics. Spinoza often uses the term ‘God, or Nature’ “Deus, sive Natura“, and this identification of God with Nature is at the heart of his metaphysics. Because of this identification, his philosophy is often regarded as a version of pantheism and/or naturalism. But although philosophy begins with metaphysics for Spinoza, his metaphysics is ultimately in the service of his ethics. Because his naturalized God has no desires or purposes, human ethics cannot properly be derived from divine command. Rather, Spinozistic ethics seeks to demonstrate, from an adequate understanding of the divine nature and its expression in human nature, the way in which human beings can maximize their advantage. Central to the successful pursuit of this advantage is adequate knowledge, which leads to increasing control of the passions and to cooperative action. Spinoza’s ontology, like that of Descartes, consists of substances, their attributes which Descartes called principal attributes, and their modes. In the Ethics, Spinoza defines ‘substance’ as what is “in itself, and is conceived through itself”; ‘attribute’ as that which “the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence”; and ‘mode’ as “the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which also it is conceived.” While Descartes had recognized a strict sense in which only God is a substance, he also recognized a second sense in which there are two kinds of created substances, each with its own principal attribute: extended substances, whose only principal attribute is extension; and minds, whose only principal attribute is thought. Spinoza, in contrast, consistently maintains that there is only one substance. His metaphysics is thus a form of substantial monism. This one substance is God, which Spinoza defines as “a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each expresses an eternal and infinite essence.” Thus, whereas Descartes limited each created substance to one principal attribute, Spinoza claims that the one substance has infinite attributes, each expressing the divine nature without limitation in its own way. Of these infinite attributes, however, humans can comprehend only two: extension and thought. Within each attribute, the modes of God are of two kinds: infinite modes, which are pervasive features of each attribute, such as the laws of nature; and finite modes, which are local and limited modifications of substance. There is an infinite sequence of finite modes. Descartes regarded a human being as a substantial union of two different substances, the thinking soul and the extended body, in causal interaction with each other. Spinoza, in contrast, regards a human being as a finite mode of God, existing simultaneously in God as a mode of thought and as a mode of extension. He holds that every mode of extension is literally identical with the mode of thought that is the “idea of” that mode of extension. Since the human mind is the idea of the human body, it follows that the human mind and the human body are literally the same thing, conceived under two different attributes. Because they are actually identical, there is no causal interaction between the mind and the body; but there is a complete parallelism between what occurs in the mind and what occurs in the body. Since every mode of extension has a corresponding and identical mode of thought however rudimentary that might be, Spinoza allows that every mode of extension is “animated to some degree”; his view is thus a form of panpsychism. Another central feature of Spinoza’s metaphysics is his necessitarianism, expressed in his claim that “things could have been produced . . . in no other way, and in no other order” than that in which they have been produced. He derives this necessitarianism from his doctrine that God exists necessarily for which he offers several arguments, including a version of the ontological argument and his doctrine that everything that can follow from the divine nature must necessarily do so. Thus, although he does not use the term, he accepts a very strong version of the principle of sufficient reason. At the outset of the Ethics, he defines a thing as free when its actions are determined by its own nature alone. Only God  whose actions are determined entirely by the necessity of his own nature, and for whom nothing is external  is completely free in this sense. Nevertheless, human beings can achieve a relative freedom to the extent that they live the kind of life described in the later parts of the Ethics. Hence, Spinoza is a compatibilist concerning the relation between freedom and determinism. “Freedom of the will” in any sense that implies a lack of causal determination, however, is simply an illusion based on ignorance of the true causes of a being’s actions. The recognition that all occurrences are causally determined, Spinoza holds, has a positive consolatory power that aids one in controlling the passions. Epistemology and psychology. Like other rationalists, Spinoza distinguishes two representational faculties: the imagination and the intellect. The imagination is a faculty of forming imagistic representations of things, derived ultimately from the mechanisms of the senses; the intellect is a faculty of forming adequate, nonimagistic conceptions of things. He also distinguishes three “kinds of knowledge.” The first or lowest kind he calls opinion or imagination opinio, imaginatio. It includes “random or indeterminate experience” experientia vaga and also “hearsay, or knowledge from mere signs”; it thus depends on the confused and mutilated deliverances of the senses, and is inadequate. The second kind of knowledge he calls reason ratio; it depends on common notions i.e., features of things that are “common to all, and equally in the part and in the whole” or on adequate knowledge of the properties as opposed to the essences of things. The third kind of knowledge he calls intuitive knowledge scientia intuitiva; it proceeds from adequate knowledge of the essence or attributes of God to knowledge of the essence of things, and hence proceeds in the proper order, from causes to effects. Both the second and third kinds of knowledge are adequate. The third kind is preferable, however, as involving not only certain knowledge that something is so, but also knowledge of how and why it is so. Because there is only one substance  God  the individual things of the world are not distinguished from one another by any difference of substance. Rather, among the internal qualitative modifications and differentiations of each divine attribute, there are patterns that have a tendency to endure; these constitute individual things. As they occur within the attribute of extension, Spinoza calls these patterns fixed proportions of motion and rest. Although these individual things are thus modes of the one substance, rather than substances in their own right, each has a nature or essence describable in terms of the thing’s particular pattern and its mechanisms for the preservation of its own being. This tendency toward self-preservation Spinoza calls conatus sometimes tr. as ‘endeavor’. Every individual thing has some conatus. An individual thing acts, or is active, to the extent that what occurs can be explained or understood through its own nature i.e., its selfpreservatory mechanism alone; it is passive to the extent that what happens must be explained through the nature of other forces impinging on it. Thus, every thing, to whatever extent it can, actively strives to persevere in its existence; and whatever aids this self-preservation constitutes that individual’s advantage. Spinoza’s specifically human psychology is an application of this more general doctrine of conatus. That application is made through appeal to several specific characteristics of human beings: they form imagistic representations of other individuals by means of their senses; they are sufficiently complex to undergo increases and decreases in their capacity for action; and they are capable of engaging in reason. The fundamental concepts of his psychology are desire, which is conatus itself, especially as one is conscious of it as directed toward attaining a particular object; pleasure, which is an increase in capacity for action; and pain, which is a decrease in capacity for action. He defines other emotions in terms of these basic emotions, as they occur in particular combinations, in particular kinds of circumstances, with particular kinds of causes, and/or with particular kinds of objects. When a person is the adequate cause of his or her own emotions, these emotions are active emotions; otherwise, they are passions. Desire and pleasure can be either active emotions or passions, depending on the circumstances; pain, however, can only be a passion. Spinoza does not deny the phenomenon of altruism: one’s self-preservatory mechanism, and hence one’s desire, can become focused on a wide variety of objects, including the well-being of a loved person or object  even to one’s own detriment. However, because he reduces all human motivation, including altruistic motivation, to permutations of the endeavor to seek one’s own advantage, his theory is arguably a form of psychological egoism. Ethics. Spinoza’s ethical theory does not take the form of a set of moral commands. Rather, he seeks to demonstrate, by considering human actions and appetites objectively  “just as if it were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies”  wherein a person’s true advantage lies. Readers who genuinely grasp the demonstrated truths will, he holds, ipso facto be motivated, to at least some extent, to live their lives accordingly. Thus, Spinozistic ethics seeks to show how a person acts when “guided by reason“; to act in this way is at the same time to act with virtue, or power. All actions that result from understanding  i.e., all virtuous actions  may be attributed to strength of character fortitudo. Such virtuous actions may be further divided into two classes: those due to tenacity animositas, or “the Desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to preserve his being”; and those due to nobility generositas, or “the Desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and join them to him in friendship.” Thus, the virtuous person does not merely pursue private advantage, but seeks to cooperate with others; returns love for hatred; always acts honestly, not deceptively; and seeks to join himself with others in a political state. Nevertheless, the ultimate reason for aiding others and joining them to oneself in friendship is that “nothing is more useful to man than man”  i.e., because doing so is conducive to one’s own advantage, and particularly to one’s pursuit of knowledge, which is a good that can be shared without loss. Although Spinoza holds that we generally use the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ simply to report subjective appearances  so that we call “good” whatever we desire, and “evil” whatever we seek to avoid  he proposes that we define ‘good’ philosophically as ‘what we certainly know to be useful to us’, and ‘evil’ as ‘what we certainly know prevents us from being masters of some good’. Since God is perfect and has no needs, it follows that nothing is either good or evil for God. Spinoza’s ultimate appeal to the agent’s advantage arguably renders his ethical theory a form of ethical egoism, even though he emphasizes the existence of common shareable goods and the instrumental ethical importance of cooperation with others. However, it is not a form of hedonism; for despite the prominence he gives to pleasure, the ultimate aim of human action is a higher state of perfection or capacity for action, of whose increasing attainment pleasure is only an indicator. A human being whose self-preservatory mechanism is driven or distorted by external forces is said to be in bondage to the passions; in contrast, one who successfully pursues only what is truly advantageous, in consequence of genuine understanding of where that advantage properly lies, is free. Accordingly, Spinoza also expresses his conception of a virtuous life guided by reason in terms of an ideal “free man.” Above all, the free man seeks understanding of himself and of Nature. Adequate knowledge, and particularly knowledge of the third kind, leads to blessedness, to peace of mind, and to the intellectual love of God. Blessedness is not a reward for virtue, however, but rather an integral aspect of the virtuous life. The human mind is itself a part of the infinite intellect of God, and adequate knowledge is an eternal aspect of that infinite intellect. Hence, as one gains knowledge, a greater part of one’s own mind comes to be identified with something that is eternal, and one becomes less dependent on  and less disturbed by  the local forces of one’s immediate environment. Accordingly, the free man “thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death.” Moreover, just as one’s adequate knowledge is literally an eternal part of the infinite intellect of God, the resulting blessedness, peace of mind, and intellectual love are literally aspects of what might be considered God’s own eternal “emotional” life. Although this endows the free man with a kind of blessed immortality, it is not a personal immortality, since the sensation and memory that are essential to personal individuality are not eternal. Rather, the free man achieves during his lifetime an increasing participation in a body of adequate knowledge that has itself always been eternal, so that, at death, a large part of the free man’s mind has become identified with the eternal. It is thus a kind of “immortality” in which one can participate while one lives, not merely when one dies. Politics and philosophical theology. Spinoza’s political theory, like that of Hobbes, treats rights and power as equivalent. Citizens give up rights to the state for the sake of the protection that the state can provide. Hobbes, however, regards this social contract as nearly absolute, one in which citizens give up all of their rights except the right to resist death. Spinoza, in contrast, emphasizes that citizens cannot give up the right to pursue their own advantage as they see it, in its full generality; and hence that the power, and right, of any actual state is always limited by the state’s practical ability to enforce its dictates so as to alter the citizens’ continuing perception of their own advantage. Furthermore, he has a more extensive conception of the nature of an individual’s own advantage than Hobbes, since for him one’s own true advantage lies not merely in fending off death and pursuing pleasure, but in achieving the adequate knowledge that brings blessedness and allows one to participate in that which is eternal. In consequence, Spinoza, unlike Hobbes, recommends a limited, constitutional state that encourages freedom of expression and religious toleration. Such a state  itself a kind of individual  best preserves its own being, and provides both the most stable and the most beneficial form of government for its citizens. In his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza also takes up popular religion, the interpretation of Scripture, and their bearing on the well-being of the state. He characterizes the Old Testament prophets as individuals whose vivid imaginations produced messages of political value for the ancient Hebrew state. Using a naturalistic outlook and historical hermeneutic methods that anticipate the later “higher criticism” of the Bible, he seeks to show that Scriptural writers themselves consistently treat only justice and charity as essential to salvation, and hence that dogmatic doxastic requirements are not justified by Scripture. Popular religion should thus propound only these two requirements, which it may imaginatively represent, to the minds of the many, as the requirements for rewards granted by a divine Lawgiver. The few, who are more philosophical, and who thus rely on intellect, will recognize that the natural laws of human psychology require charity and justice as conditions of happiness, and that what the vulgar construe as rewards granted by personal divine intervention are in fact the natural consequences of a virtuous life. Because of his identificaton of God with Nature and his treatment of popular religion, Spinoza’s contemporaries often regarded his philosophy as a thinly disguised atheism. Paradoxically, however, nineteenth-century Romanticism embraced him for his pantheism; Novalis, e.g., famously characterized him as “the God-intoxicated man.” In fact, Spinoza ascribes to Nature most of the characteristics that Western theologians have ascribed to God: Spinozistic Nature is infinite, eternal, necessarily existing, the object of an ontological argument, the first cause of all things, all-knowing, and the being whose contemplation produces blessedness, intellectual love, and participation in a kind of immortality or eternal life. Spinoza’s claim to affirm the existence of God is therefore no mere evasion. However, he emphatically denies that God is a person or acts for purposes; that anything is good or evil from the divine perspective; or that there is a personal immortality involving memory. In addition to his influence on the history of biblical criticism and on literature including not only Novalis but such writers as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Heine, Shelley, George Eliot, George Sand, Somerset Maugham, Jorge Luis Borges, and Bernard Malamud, Spinoza has affected the philosophical outlooks of such diverse twentieth-century thinkers as Freud and Einstein. Contemporary physicists have seen in his monistic metaphysics an anticipation of twentieth-century field metaphysics. More generally, he is a leading intellectual forebear of twentieth-century determinism and naturalism, and of the mindbody identity theory. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Hampshire’s Spinoza.”

spir: philosopher. He served in the Crimean War as a Russian officer. His major works are “Forschung nach der Gewissheit in der Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit,” and “Denken und Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie..” The latter essay presents a metaphysics based on the radical separation of the apparent world and an absolute reality. All we can know about the “unconditioned” is that it must conform with the principle of identity. While retaining the unknowable thing-in-itself of Kant, Spir argues for the empirical reality of time, which is given to us in immediate experience and depends on our experience of a succession of differential states (cf. Grice, “Personal identity”). The aim of philosophy is to reach fundamental and immediate certainties. Of the works included in his “Gesammelte Schriften,” the essay “Right and Wrong,” was tr.There are a number of references to Spir in the writings of Nietzsche, which indicate that some of Nietzsche’s central notions were influenced, both positively and negatively, by Spir’s analyses of becoming and temporality, as well as by his concept of the separation of the world of appearance and the “true world.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bradley’s absolute: a relative account.”

split brain effects, a wide array of behavioral effects consequent upon the severing of the cerebral commisures, and generally interpreted as indicating asymmetry in cerebral functions. The human brain has considerable leftright functional differentiation, or asymmetry, that affects behavior. The most obvious example is handedness. By the 1860s Bouillaud, Dax, and Broca had observed that the effects of unilateral damage indicated that the left hemisphere was preferentially involved in language. Since the 0s, this commitment to functional asymmetry has been reinforced by studies of patients in whom communication between the hemispheres has been surgically disrupted. Split brain effects depend on severing the cerebral commisures, and especially the corpus callosum, which are neural structures mediating communication between the cerebral hemispheres. Commisurotomies have been performed since the 0s to control severe epilepsy. This is intended to leave both hemispheres intact and functioning independently. Beginning in the 0s, J. E. Bogen, M. S. Gazzaniga, and R. W. Sperry conducted an array of psychological tests to evaluate the distinctive abilities of the different hemispheres. Ascertaining the degree of cerebral asymmetry depends on a carefully controlled experimental design in which access of the disassociated hemispheres to peripheral cues is limited. The result has been a wide array of striking results. For example, patients are unable to match an object such as a key felt in one hand with a similar object felt in the other; patients are unable to name an object Spir, Afrikan split brain effects 874   874 held in the left hand, though they can name an object held in the right. Researchers have concluded that these results confirm a clear lateralization of speech, writing, and calculation in the left hemisphere for righthanded patients, leaving the right hemisphere largely unable to respond in speech or writing, and typically unable to perform even simple calculations. It is often concluded that the left hemisphere is specialized for verbal and analytic modes of thinking, while the right hemisphere is specialized for more spatial and synthetic modes of thinking. The precise character and extent of these differences in normal subjects are less clear.

square of opposition – figura quadrata – Grice: “It is clear that the apparatus of Modernism does not give a faithful account of the character of semantic phenomena. One such less than faithful account, indeed, deviant account, appears in the treatment of the square of opposition.” cited by Grice in “Retrospective epilogue.” Since tutoring Strawson on this for Strawson’s ‘logic paper,’ Grice kept an interest, if only to witness Strwson’s playing with the square – and ‘uselessly trying to circle it’ -- a graphic representation of various logical relations among categorical propositions. Relations among modal and even among hypothetical propositions have also been represented on the square. Two propositions are said to be each other’s 1 contradictories if exactly one of them must be true and exactly one false; 2 contraries if they could not both be true although they could both be false; and 3 subcontraries if at least one of them must be true although both of them may be true. There is a relation of 4 subalternation of one proposition, called subaltern, to another called superaltern, if the truth of the latter implies the truth of the former, but not conversely. Applying these definitions to the four types of categorical propositions, we find that SaP and SoP are contradictories, and so are SeP and SiP. SaP and SeP are contraries. SiP and SoP are subcontraries. SiP is subaltern to SaP, and SoP is subaltern to SeP. These relations can be represented graphically in a square of opposition: The four relations on the traditional square are expressed in the following theses: Contradictories: SaP S -SoP, SeP S -SiP Contraries: -SaP & SeP or SaP P -SeP Subcontraries: SiP 7 SoP Subalterns: SaP P SiP, SeP P SoP For these relations to hold, an underlying existential assumption must be satisfied: the terms serving as subjects of propositions must be satisfied, not empty e.g., ‘man’ is satisfied and ‘elf’ empty. Only the contradictory opposition remains without that assumption. Modern interpretations of categorical propositions exclude the existential assumption; thus, only the contradictory opposition remains in the square.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Apuleius on the square of opposition,” H. P. Grice, “Boethius and the square of opposition.”

standard:  Grice: “People, philosophers included, misuse ‘standard’ – in Italian, it just means ‘flag’!” -- model, a term that, like ‘non-standard model’, is used with regard to theories that systematize part of our knowledge of some mathematical structure, for instance the structure of natural numbers with addition, multiplication, and the successor function, or the structure of real numbers with ordering, addition, and multiplication. Models isomorphic to this intended mathematical structure are the “standard models” of the theory, while any other, non-isomorphic, model of the theory is a ‘non-standard’ model. Since Peano arithmetic is incomplete, it has consistent extensions that have no standard model. But there are also non-standard, countable models of complete number theory, the set of all true first-order sentences about natural numbers, as was first shown by Skolem in 4. Categorical theories do not have a non-standard model. It is less clear whether there is a standard model of set theory, although a countable model would certainly count as non-standard. The Skolem paradox is that any first-order formulation of set theory, like ZF, due to Zermelo and Fraenkel, has a countable model, while it seems to assert the existence of non-countable sets. Many other important mathematical structures cannot be characterized by a categorical set of first-order axioms, and thus allow non-standard models. The  philosopher Putnam has argued that this fact has important implications for the debate about realism in the philosophy of language. If axioms cannot capture the spontaneity, liberty of standard model 875   875 “intuitive” notion of a set, what could? Some of his detractors have pointed out that within second-order logic categorical characterizations are often possible. But Putnam has objected that the intended interpretation of second-order logic itself is not fixed by the use of the formalism of second-order logic, where “use” is determined by the rules of inference for second-order logic we know about. Moreover, categorical theories are sometimes uninformative. 

state, Grice: “I will use the phrase ‘state of the soul’ – This may sound pedantic, and it is!” – “I will use ‘psychological state,’ where the more correct phrase would be ‘state’ of the ‘soul,’ since theory – as in ‘-logical,’ has nothing to do with it. Now you’ll wonder if the soul has states. A state of the soul – or a ‘frame of mind,’ as Strawson wrongly puts it – is a physical state on which a ‘state’ of the soul supervenes, alla Funcionalism” – “Note that a ’state’ of the soul may be quite specific and involving other states, like the belief that Strawson’s dog is shaggy.” – “A state is anything that follows a ‘that’-clause; the way an object or system basically is; the fundamental, intrinsic properties of an object or system, and the basis of its other properties. An instantaneous state is a state at a given time. State variables are constituents of a state whose values may vary with time. In classical or Newtonian mechanics the instantaneous state of an n-particle system consists of the positions and momenta masses multiplied by velocities of the n particles at a given time. Other mechanical properties are functions of those in states. Fundamental and derived properties are often, though possibly misleadingly, called observables. The set of a system’s possible states can be represented as an abstract phase space or state space, with dimensions or coordinates for the components of each state variable. In quantum theory, states do not fix the particular values of observables, only the probabilities of observables assuming particular values in particular measurement situations. For positivism or instrumentalism, specifying a quantum state does nothing more than provide a means for calculating such probabilities. For realism, it does more  e.g., it refers to the basis of a quantum system’s probabilistic dispositions or propensities. Vectors in Hilbert spaces represent possible states, and Hermitian operators on vectors represent observables. 

state of affairs. Grice: “My poor friend D. F. Pears got himself into a lot of trouble by offering to correct C. K. Ogden’s passe translation of Vitters’s Tractatus!” a possibility, actuality, or impossibility of the kind expressed by a nominalization of a declarative sentence. The declarative sentence ‘This die comes up six’ can be nominalized either through the construction ‘that this die comes up six’ or through the likes of ‘this die’s coming up six’. The resulting nominalizations might be interpreted as naming corresponding propositions or states of affairs. States of affairs come in several varieties. Some are possible states of affairs, or possibilities. Consider the possibility of a certain die coming up six when rolled next. This possibility is a state of affairs, as is its “complement”  the die’s not coming up six when rolled next. There is in addition the state of affairs which conjoins that die’s coming up six with its not coming up six. And this contradictory state of affairs is of course not a possibility, not a possible state of affairs. Moreover, for every actual state of affairs there is a non-actual one, its complement. For every proposition there is hence a state of affairs: possible or impossible, actual or not. Indeed some consider propositions to be states of affairs. Some take facts to be actual states of affairs, while others prefer to define them as true propositions. If propositions are states of affairs, then facts are of course both actual states of affairs and true propositions. In a very broad sense, events are just possible states of affairs; in a narrower sense they are contingent states of affairs; and in a still narrower sense they are contingent and particular states of affairs, involving just the exemplification of an nadic property by a sequence of individuals of length n. In a yet narrower sense events are only those particular and contingent states of affairs that entail change. A baseball’s remaining round throughout a certain period does not count as an event in this narrower sense but only as a state of that baseball, unlike the event of its being hit by a certain bat. 

statistics – Grice: “I shall use the singular, ‘statistic’”  -- statistical explanation. Grice: “Jill says, “Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.” Is the validty of her reasoning based on statistics?” -- an explanation expressed in an explanatory argument containing premises and conclusions making claims about statistical probabilities. These arguments include deductions of less general from more general laws and differ from other such explanations only insofar as the contents of the laws imply claims about statistical probability. Most philosophical discussion in the latter half of the twentieth century has focused on statistical explanation of events rather than laws. This type of argument was discussed by Ernest Nagel The Structure of Science, 1 under the rubric “probabilistic explanation,” and by Hempel Aspects of Scientific Explanation, 5 as “inductive statistical” explanation. The explanans contains a statement asserting that a given system responds in one of several ways specified by a sample space of possible outcomes on a trial or experiment of some type, and that the statistical probability of an event represented by a set of points in the sample space on the given kind of trial is also given for each such event. Thus, the statement might assert that the statistical probability is near 1 of the relative frequency r/n of heads in n tosses being close to the statistical probability p of heads on a single toss, where the sample space consists of the 2n possible sequences of heads and tails in n tosses. Nagel and Hempel understood such statistical probability statements to be covering laws, so that inductive-statistical explanation and deductivenomological explanation of events are two species of covering law explanation. The explanans also contains a claim that an experiment of the kind mentioned in the statistical assumption has taken place e.g., the coin has been tossed n times. The explanandum asserts that an event of some kind has occurred e.g., the coin has landed heads approximately r times in the n tosses. In many cases, the kind of experiment can be described equivalently as an n-fold repetition of some other kind of experiment as a thousandfold repetition of the tossing of a given coin or as the implementation of the kind of trial thousand-fold tossing of the coin one time. Hence, statistical explanation of events can always be construed as deriving conclusions about “single cases” from assumptions about statistical probabilities even when the concern is to explain mass phenomena. Yet, many authors controversially contrast statistical explanation in quantum mechanics, which is alleged to require a singlecase propensity interpretation of statistical probability, with statistical explanation in statistical mechanics, genetics, and the social sciences, which allegedly calls for a frequency interpretation. The structure of the explanatory argument of such statistical explanation has the form of a direct inference from assumptions about statistical probabilities and the kind of experiment trial which has taken place to the outcome. One controversial aspect of direct inference is the problem of the reference class. Since the early nineteenth century, statistical probability has been understood to be relative to the way the experiment or trial is described. Authors like J. Venn, Peirce, R. A. Fisher, and Reichenbach, among many others, have been concerned with how to decide on which kind of trial to base a direct inference when the trial under investigation is correctly describable in several ways and the statistical probabilities of possible outcomes may differ relative to the different sorts of descriptions. The most comprehensive discussion of this problem of the reference class is found in the work of H. E. Kyburg e.g., Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, 1. Hempel acknowledged its importance as an “epistemic ambiguity” in inductive statistical explanation. Controversy also arises concerning inductive acceptance. May the conclusion of an explanatory direct inference be a judgment as to the subjective probability that the outcome event occurred? May a judgment that the outcome event occurred is inductively “accepted” be made? Is some other mode of assessing the claim about the outcome appropriate? Hempel’s discussion of the “nonconjunctiveness of inductivestatistical” explanation derives from Kyburg’s earlier account of direct inference where high probability is assumed to be sufficient for acceptance. Non-conjunctiveness has been avoided by abandoning the sufficiency of high probability I. Levi, Gambling with Truth, 7 or by denying that direct inference in inductive-statistical explanation involves inductive acceptance at all R. C. Jeffrey, “Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference,” in Essays in Honor of C. G. Hempel. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Jack and Jill.”

steiner: Austrian spiritualist and founder of anthroposophy. Trained as a scientist, he edited Goethe’s scientific writings and prepared the standard edition of his complete works from 9 to 6. Steiner’s major work, Die Philosophie der Freiheit, was published in 4. His Friedrich Nietzsche: Ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit 5 was tr. in 0 by Margaret deRis as Friedrich Nietzsche: Fighter for Freedom. Steiner taught at a workingmen’s  and edited a literary journal, Magazin für Literatur, in Berlin. In 1 he embraced a spiritualism which emphasized a form of knowledge that transcended sensory experience and was attained by the “higher self.” He held that man had previously been attuned to spiritual processes by virtue of a dreamlike state of consciousness, but was diverted from this consciousness by preoccupation with material entities. Through training, individuals could retrieve their innate capacity to perceive a spiritual realm. Steiner’s writings on this theme are The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity 4, Occult Science: An Outline 3, On the Riddle of Man 6, and On the Riddles of the Soul 7. His last work was his autobiography 4. To advance his teachings, he founded the Anthroposophical Society 2 and a school of “spiritual science” called the Goetheanum near Basel, Switzerland. His work inspired the Waldorf School movement, which comprises some eighty schools for children. The anthroposophy movement he established remains active in Europe and the United States. G.J.S. Stephen, Sir Leslie 18324, English literary critic, editor, intellectual historian, and philosopher. He was the first chief editor of the great Dictionary of National Biography, writing hundreds of the entries himself. Brought up in an intensely religious household, he lost his faith and spent much of his time trying to construct a moral and intellectual outlook to replace it. His main works in intellectual history, the two-volume History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century 1876 and the three-volume English Utilitarians 0, were undertaken as part of this project. So was his one purely philosophical work, the Science of Ethics 2, in which he tried to develop an evolutionary theory of morality. Stephen was impatient of philosophical technicalities. Hence his treatise on ethics does very little to resolve the problems  some of them pointed out to him by his friend Henry Sidgwick  with evolutionary ethics, and does not get beyond the several other works on the subject published during this period. His histories of thought are sometimes superficial, and their focus of interest is not ours; but they are still useful because of their scope and the massive scholarship they put to use.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Steiner and moi.”

Stillingfleet: e.  English divine and controversialist who first made his name with “Irenicum,” using natural-law doctrines to oppose religious sectarianism. His “Origines Sacrae” ostensibly on the superiority of the Scriptural record over other forms of ancient history, was for its day a learned study in the moral certainty of historical evidence, the authority of testimony, and the credibility of miracles. In drawing eclectically on philosophy from antiquity to the Cambridge Platonists, he was much influenced by the Cartesian theory of ideas, but later repudiated Cartesianism for its mechanist tendency. For three decades he pamphleteered on behalf of the moral certainty of orthodox Protestant belief against what he considered the beliefs “contrary to reason” of Roman Catholicism. This led to controversy with Unitarian and deist writers who argued that mysteries like the Trinity were equally contrary to “clear and distinct” ideas. He was alarmed at the use made of Locke’s “new,” i.e. nonCartesian, way of ideas by John Toland in Christianity not Mysterious, and devoted his last years to challenging Locke to prove his orthodoxy. The debate was largely over the concepts of substance, essence, and person, and of faith and certainty. Locke gave no quarter in the public controversy, but in the fourth edition of his Essay he silently amended some passages that had provoked Stillingfleet. 

Schmidt: -- Stirner, Max, pseudonym of Kasper Schmidt, philosopher who proposed a theory of radical individualism. Born in Bayreuth, he taught in Gymnasiums and later at a Berlin academy for women. He tr. what became a standard G. version of Smith’s Wealth of Nations and contributed articles to the Rhenische Zeitung. His most important work was statistical probability, “Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum,” tr. by Steven T. Byington as The Ego and His Own, and Grice as “The idiot and his idiocy.” -- His second book was “Die Geschichte der Reaktion.” Schmidt is in reaction to Hegel and was for a time associated with the left Hegelians. He stressed the priority of will and instinct over reason and proposed a radical anarchic individualism. Each individual is unique, and the independent ego is the fundamental value and reality. Stirner attacks the state, religious ideas, and abstractions such as “humanity” as “spectres” that are deceptive illusions, remnants of erroneous hypostatizations. His defense of egoism is such that the individual is considered to have no obligations or duties, and especially not to the state. Encouraging an individual “rebellion” against state domination and control, Stirner attracted a following among nineteenthand twentieth-century anarchists. The sole goal of life is the cultivation of “uniqueness” or “ownness.” Engels and Marx attack his ideas at length under the rubric “Saint Marx” in The G. Ideology. Insofar as his theory of radical individualism offers no clearly stated ethical requirements, it has been characterized as a form of nihilistic egoism. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “Schmidt, or the idiot and his idiocy.”

stochastic process – 1660s, "pertaining to conjecture," from Greek stokhastikos "able to guess, conjecturing," from stokhazesthai "to guess, aim at, conjecture," from stokhos "a guess, aim, fixed target, erected pillar for archers to shoot at," perhaps from PIE *stogh-, variant of root *stegh- "to stick, prick, sting." The sense of "randomly determined" is from 1934, from German stochastik (1917). a process that evolves, as time goes by, according to a probabilistic principle rather than a deterministic principle. Such processes are also called random processes, but ‘stochastic’ does not imply complete disorderliness. The principle of evolution governing a stochastic or random process is precise, though probabilistic, in form. For example, suppose some process unfolds in discrete successive stages. And suppose that given any initial sequence of stages, S1, S2, . . . , Sn, there is a precise probability that the next stage Sn+1 will be state S, a precise probability that it will be SH, and so on for all possible continuations of the sequence of states. These probabilities are called transition probabilities. An evolving sequence of this kind is called a discrete-time stochastic process, or discrete-time random process. A theoretically important special case occurs when transition probabilities depend only on the latest stage in the sequence of stages. When an evolving process has this property it is called a discrete-time Markov process. A simple example of a discrete-time Markov process is the behavior of a person who keeps taking either a step forward or a step back according to whether a coin falls heads or tails; the probabilistic principle of movement is always applied to the person’s most recent position. The successive stages of a stochastic process need not be discrete. If they are continuous, they constitute a “continuous-time” stochastic or random process. The mathematical theory of stochastic processes has many applications in science and technology. The evolution of epidemics, the process of soil erosion, and the spread of cracks in metals have all been given plausible models as stochastic processes, to mention just a few areas of research.  H. P. Grice, “Stochastic implicatum.”

stoa – H. P. Grice: “The Stoa and Athenian dialectic.” -- stoicism, one of the three leading movements constituting Hellenistic philosophy. Its founder was Zeno of Citium, who was succeeded as school head by Cleanthes. But the third head, Chrysippus, was its greatest exponent and most voluminous writer. These three are the leading representatives of Early Stoicism. No work by any early Stoic survives intact, except Cleanthes’ short “Hymn to Zeus.” Otherwise we are dependent on doxography, on isolated quotations, and on secondary sources, most of them hostile. Nevertheless, a remarkably coherent account of the system can be assembled. The Stoic world is an ideally good organism, all of whose parts interact for the benefit of the whole. It is imbued with divine reason logos, its entire development providentially ordained by fate and repeated identically from one world phase to the next in a never-ending cycle, each phase ending with a conflagration ekpyrosis. Only bodies strictly “exist” and can interact. Body is infinitely divisible, and contains no void. At the lowest level, the world is analyzed into an active principle, god, and a passive principle, matter, both probably corporeal. Out of these are generated, at a higher level, the four elements air, fire, earth, and water, whose own interaction is analogous to that of god and matter: air and fire, severally or conjointly, are an active rational force called breath Grecian pneuma, Latin spiritus, while earth and water constitute the passive substrate on which these act, totally interpenetrating each other thanks to the non-particulate structure of body and its capacity to be mixed “through and through.” Most physical analysis is conducted at this higher level, and pneuma becomes a key concept in physics and biology. A thing’s qualities are constituted by its pneuma, which has the additional role of giving it cohestochastic process Stoicism 879   879 sion and thus an essential identity. In inanimate objects this unifying pneuma is called a hexis state; in plants it is called physis nature; and in animals “soul.” Even qualities of soul, e.g. justice, are portions of pneuma, and they too are therefore bodies: only thus could they have their evident causal efficacy. Four incorporeals are admitted: place, void which surrounds the world, time, and lekta see below; these do not strictly “exist”  they lack the corporeal power of interaction  but as items with some objective standing in the world they are, at least, “somethings.” Universals, identified with Plato’s Forms, are treated as concepts ennoemata, convenient fictions that do not even earn the status of “somethings.” Stoic ethics is founded on the principle that only virtue is good, only vice bad. Other things conventionally assigned a value are “indifferent” adiaphora, although some, e.g., health, wealth, and honor, are naturally “preferred” proegmena, while their opposites are “dispreferred” apoproegmena. Even though their possession is irrelevant to happiness, from birth these indifferents serve as the appropriate subject matter of our choices, each correct choice being a “proper function” kathekon  not yet a morally good act, but a step toward our eventual end telos of “living in accordance with nature.” As we develop our rationality, the appropriate choices become more complex, less intuitive. For example, it may sometimes be more in accordance with nature’s plan to sacrifice your wealth or health, in which case it becomes your “proper function” to do so. You have a specific role to play in the world plan, and moral progress prokope consists in learning it. This progress involves widening your natural “affinity” oikeiosis: an initial concern for yourself and your parts is later extended to those close to you, and eventually to all mankind. That is the Stoic route toward justice. However, justice and the other virtues are actually found only in the sage, an idealized perfectly rational person totally in tune with the divine cosmic plan. The Stoics doubted whether any sages existed, although there was a tendency to treat at least Socrates as having been one. The sage is totally good, everyone else totally bad, on the paradoxical Stoic principle that all sins are equal. The sage’s actions, however similar externally to mere “proper functions,” have an entirely distinct character: they are renamed ‘right actions’ katorthomata. Acting purely from “right reason,” he is distinguished by his “freedom from passion” apatheia: morally wrong impulses, or passions, are at root intellectual errors of mistaking what is indifferent for good or bad, whereas the sage’s evaluations are always correct. The sage alone is happy and truly free, living in perfect harmony with the divine plan. All human lives are predetermined by the providentially designed, all-embracing causal nexus of fate; yet being the principal causes of their actions, the good and the bad alike are responsible for them: determinism and morality are fully compatible. Stoic epistemology defends the existence of cognitive certainty against the attacks of the New Academy. Belief is described as assent synkatathesis to an impression phantasia, i.e. taking as true the propositional content of some perceptual or reflective impression. Certainty comes through the “cognitive impression” phantasia kataleptike, a self-certifying perceptual representation of external fact, claimed to be commonplace. Out of sets of such impressions we acquire generic conceptions prolepseis and become rational. The highest intellectual state, knowledge episteme, in which all cognitions become mutually supporting and hence “unshakable by reason,” is the prerogative of the wise. Everyone else is in a state of mere opinion doxa or of ignorance. Nevertheless, the cognitive impression serves as a “criterion of truth” for all. A further important criterion is prolepseis, also called common conceptions and common notions koinai ennoiai, often appealed to in philosophical argument. Although officially dependent on experience, they often sound more like innate intuitions, purportedly indubitable. Stoic logic is propositional, by contrast with Aristotle’s logic of terms. The basic unit is the simple proposition axioma, the primary bearer of truth and falsehood. Syllogistic also employs complex propositions  conditional, conjunctive, and disjunctive  and rests on five “indemonstrable” inference schemata to which others can be reduced with the aid of four rules called themata. All these items belong to the class of lekta  “sayables” or “expressibles.” Words are bodies vibrating portions of air, as are external objects, but predicates like that expressed by ‘ . . . walks’, and the meanings of whole sentences, e.g., ‘Socrates walks’, are incorporeal lekta. The structure and content of both thoughts and sentences are analyzed by mapping them onto lekta, but the lekta are themselves causally inert. Conventionally, a second phase of the school is distinguished as Middle Stoicism. It developed largely at Rhodes under Panaetius and Posidonius, both of whom influenced the presentation of Stoicism in Cicero’s influential philosophical treatises mid-first century B.C.. Panaetius Stoicism Stoicism 880   880 c.185c.110 softened some classical Stoic positions, his ethics being more pragmatic and less concerned with the idealized sage. Posidonius c.135c.50 made Stoicism more open to Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, reviving Plato’s inclusion of irrational components in the soul. A third phase, Roman Stoicism, is the only Stoic era whose writings have survived in quantity. It is represented especially by the younger Seneca A.D. c.165, Epictetus A.D. c.55c.135, and Marcus Aurelius A.D. 12180. It continued the trend set by Panaetius, with a strong primary focus on practical and personal ethics. Many prominent Roman political figures were Stoics. After the second century A.D. Stoicism as a system fell from prominence, but its terminology and concepts had by then become an ineradicable part of ancient thought. Through the writings of Cicero and Seneca, its impact on the moral and political thought of the Renaissance was immense. 

stoutianism: g. f., philosophical psychologist, astudent of Ward, he was influenced by Herbart and especially Brentano. He influenced Grice to the point that Grice called himself “a true Stoutian.”  He was editor of Mind 20. He followed Ward in rejecting associationism and sensationism, and proposing analysis of mind as activity rather than passivity, consisting of acts of cognition, feeling, and conation. Stout stressed attention as the essential function of mind, and argued for the goal-directedness of all mental activity and behavior, greatly influencing McDougall’s hormic psychology. He reinterpreted traditional associationist ideas to emphasize primacy of mental activity; e.g., association by contiguity  a passive mechanical process imposed on mind  became association by continuity of attentional interest. With Brentano, he argued that mental representation involves “thought reference” to a real object known through the representation that is itself the object of thought, like Locke’s “idea.” In philosophy he was influenced by Moore and Russell. His major works are Analytic Psychology 6 and Manual of Psychology 9.

Strato: Grecian philosopher and polymath nicknamed “the Physicist” for his innovative ideas in natural science. He succeeded Theophrastus as head of the Lyceum. Earlier he served as royal tutor in Alexandria, where his students included Aristarchus, who devised the first heliocentric model. Of Strato’s many writings only fragments and summaries survive. These show him criticizing the abstract conceptual analysis of earlier theorists and paying closer attention to empirical evidence. Among his targets were atomist arguments that motion is impossible unless there is void, and also Aristotle’s thesis that matter is fully continuous. Strato argued that no large void occurs in nature, but that matter is naturally porous, laced with tiny pockets of void. His investigations of compression and suction were influential in ancient physiology. In dynamics, he proposed that bodies have no property of lightness but only more or less weight. 

strawsonise: verb invented by A. M. Kemmerling. To adopt Strawson’s manoever in the analysis of ‘meaning.’ “A form of ‘disgricing,’” – Kemmerling adds.

Strawsonism – Grice’s favourite Strawsonisms were too many to count. His first was Strawson on ‘true’ for ‘Analysis.’ Grice was amazed by the rate of publishing in Strawson’s case. Strawson kept publishing and Grice kept criticizing. In “Analysis,’ Strawson gives Grice his first ‘strawsonism’ “To say ‘true’ is ditto.’ The second strawsonism is that there is such a thing as ‘ordinary language’ which is not Russellian. As Grice shows, ordinary language IS Russellian. Strawson said that composing “In defence of a dogma” was torture and that it is up to Strawson to finish the thing off.  So there are a few strawonisms there, too. Strawson had the courtesy never to reprint ‘In defence’ in any of his compilations, and of course to have Grice as fist author. There are ‘strawsonisms’ in Grice’s second collaboration with Strawson – that Grice intentionally ignores in “Life and opinions.” This is a transcript of the talk of the dynamic trio: Grice, Pears, and Strawson, published three years later by Pears in “The nature of metaphysics.” Strawson collaborated with “If and the horseshoe” to PGRICE, but did not really write it for the occasion. It was an essay he had drafted ages ago, and now saw fit to publish. He expands on this in his note on Grice for the British Academy, and in his review of Grice’s compilation. Grice makes an explicit mention of Strawson in a footnote in “Presupposition and conversational implicaturum,” the euphemism he uses is ‘tribute’: the refutation of Strawson’s truth-value gap as a metaphysical excrescence and unnecessary is called a ‘tribute,’ coming from the tutor – “in this and other fields,” implicating, “there may be mistakes all over the place.” Kemmerling somewhat ignores Urmson when he says, “Don’t disgrice if you can grice.” To strawsonise, for Kemmerling is to avoid Grice’s direct approach and ask for a higher-level intention. To strawsonise is the first level of disgrice. But Grice first quotes Urmson and refers to Stampe’s briddge example before he does to Strawson’s rat-infested house example.

strawson’s rat-infested house. Few in Grice’s playgroup had Grice’s analytic skills. Only a few cared to join him in his analysis of ‘mean.’ The first was Urmson with the ‘bribe.’ The second was Strawson, with his rat-infested house. Grice re-writes Strawson’s alleged counterexample. To deal with his own rat-infested house example, Strawson proposes that the analysans of "U means that p" might be restricted by the addition of a further condition, namely that the utterer U should utter x not only, as already provided, with the intention that his addressee should think that U intends to obtain a certain response from his addressee, but also with the intention that his addressee should think (recognize) that U has the intention just mentioned. In Strawson's example, in The Philosohical Review (that Grice cites on WOW:x) repr. in his "Logico-Linguistic Papers," the potential home buyer is intended to think that the realtor wants him to think that the house is rat-infested. However, the potential house-buyer is not intended by the realtor to think that he is intended to think that the realtor wants him to think that the house is rat infested. The addressee is intended to think that it is only as a result of being too clever for the realtor that he has learned that the potential home buyer wants him to think that the house is rat-infested; the potential home-buyer is to think that he is supposed to take the artificially displayed dead rat  as a evidence that the house is rat infested. U wants to get A to believe that the house A is thinking of buying is rat-infested. S decides to· bring about this belief in A by taking into the house and letting loose a big fat sewer rat. For S has the following scheme. He knows that A is watching him and knows that A believes that S is unaware that he, A, is watching him. It isS's intention that A should (wrongly) infer from the fact that S let the rat loose that S did so with the intention that A should arrive at the house, see the rat, and, taking the rat as "natural evidence", infer therefrom that the house is rat-infested. S further intends A to realize that given the nature of the rat's arrival, the existence of the rat cannot be taken as genuine or natural evidence that the house is rat-infested; but S kilows that A will believe that S would not so contrive to get A to believe the house is rat-infested unless Shad very good reasons for thinking that it was, and so S expects and intends A to infer that the house is rat-infested from the fact that Sis letting the rat loose with the intention of getting A to believe that the house is rat-infested. Thus S satisfies the conditions purported to be necessary and sufficient for his meaning something by letting the rat loose: S lets the rat loose intending (4) A to think that the house is rat-infested, intending (1)-(3) A to infer from the fact that S let the rat loose that S did so intending A to think that the house is rat-infested, and intending (5) A's recognition of S's . intention (4) to function as his reason for thinking that the house is rat-infested. But even though S's action meets these conditions, Strawson feels that his scenario fits Grice's conditions in Grice's reductive analysis and not yet Strawson's intuition about his own use of 'communicate.' To minimise Strawson's discomfort, Grice brings an anti-sneaky clause. ("Although I never shared Strawson's intuition about his use of 'communicate;' in fact, I very rarely use 'communicate that...' To exterminate the rats in Strawson's rat-infested house, Grice uses, as he should, a general "anti-deception" clause. It may be that the use of this exterminating procedure is possible. It may be that any 'backward-looking' clauses can be exterminated, and replaced by a general prohibitive, or closure clause, forbidding an intention by the utterer to be sneaky. It is a conceptual point that if you intend your addressee NOT TO REALISE that p, you are not COMMUNICATING that p. (3A) (if) (3r) (ic): (a) U utters x intending (I) A to think x possesses f (2) A to thinkf correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (3) A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (I) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (4) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to produce r, and (b) There is no inference-element E such that U intends both (I') A in his determination of r to rely on E (2') A to think Uto intend (I') to be false. In the final version Grice reaches after considering alleged counterexamples to the NECESSITY of some of the conditions in the analysans, Grice reformulates. It is not the case that, for some inference element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ both rely on E in coming to ψ, or think that U ψ-s, that p and  think that (Ǝφ) U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E. Embedded in the general definition. By uttering x, U means that-ψ­_b-dp ≡ (Ǝφ)(Ǝf)(Ǝc) U utters x  intending x to be such that anyone who has φ think that x has f, f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, and (Ǝφ') U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has f and that f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, and in view of (Ǝφ') U intending x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has f, and f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, U ψ-s that p, and, for some substituends of ψ_b-d, U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has φ, he will, via thinking in view of (Ǝφ') U intending x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has f, and  f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, U ψ-s that p himself ψ that p, and it is not the case that, for some inference element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ both rely on E in coming to ψ, or think that U ψ-s, that p and  think that (Ǝφ) U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E,

strawson: p. f. – Grice’s tutee. b.9, London-born, Oxford-educated philosopher who has made major contributions to logic, metaphysics, and the study of Kant. His career has been mainly at Oxford (he spent a term in Wales and visited the New World a lot), where he was the leading philosopher of his generation, due to that famous tutor he had for his ‘logic paper’: H. P. Grice, at St. John’s. His first important work, “On Referring” argues that Baron Russell’s theory of descriptions fails to deal properly with the role of descriptions as “referring expressions” because Russell assumed the “bogus trichotomy” that sentences are true, false, or meaningless: for Strawson, sentences with empty descriptions are meaningful but “neither true nor false” because the general presuppositions governing the use of referring expressions are not fulfilled. One aspect of this argument was Russell’s alleged insensitivity to the ordinary use of definite descriptions. The contrast between the abstract schemata of formal logic and the manifold richness of the inferences inherent in ordinary language is the central theme of Strawson’s “ Introduction to Logical Theory,” where he credits H. P. Grice for making him aware of ‘pragmatic rules’ of conversation – Grice was amused that Baron Russell cared to respond to Strawson in “Mind” – where Russell’s original “On denoting” had been published. Together, after a joint seminar with Quine, Strawson submitted “In defense of a dogma,” co-written with Grice – A year later Strawson submitted on Grice’s behalf “Meaning” to the same journal – They participated with Pears in a Third programme lecture, published by Pears in “The nature of metaphysics” (London, Macmillan”). In Individuals, provocatively entitled “an essay in DESCRIPTIVE (never revisionary) metaphysics,” Strawson, drawing “without crediting” on joint seminars with Grice on Categories and De Interpretatione, Strawson  reintroduced metaphysics as a respectable philosophical discipline after decades of positivist rhetoric. But his project is only “descriptive” metaphysics  elucidation of the basic features of our own conceptual scheme  and his arguments are based on the philosophy of language: “basic” particulars are those like “Grice” or his “cricket bat”, which are basic objects of reference, and it is the spatiotemporal and sortal conditions for their identification and reidentification by speakers that constitute the basic categories. Three arguments are especially famous. First, even in a purely auditory world objective reference on the basis of experience requires at least an analogue of space. Second, because self-reference presupposes reference to others, persons, conceived as bearers of both physical and psychological properties, are a type of basic particular – cfr. Grice on “Personal identity.” Third, “feature-placing” discourse, such as ‘it is snowing here now’, is “the ultimate propositional level” through which reference to particulars enters discourse. Strawson’s next book, The Bounds of Sense 6, provides a critical reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. His aim is to extricate what he sees as the profound truths concerning the presuppositions of objective experience and judgment that Kant’s transcendental arguments establish from the mysterious metaphysics of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Strawson’s critics have argued, however, that the resulting position is unstable: transcendental arguments can tell us only what we must suppose to be the case. So if Kant’s idealism, which restricts such suppositions to things as they appear to us, is abandoned, we can draw conclusions concerning the way the world itself must be only if we add the verificationist thesis that ability to make sense of such suppositions requires ability to verify them. In his next book, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties 5, Strawson conceded this: transcendental arguments belong within descriptive metaphysics and should not be regarded as attempts to provide an external justification of our conceptual scheme. In truth no such external justification is either possible or needed: instead  and here Strawson invokes Hume rather than Kant  our reasonings come to an end in natural propensities for belief that are beyond question because they alone make it possible to raise questions. In a famous earlier paper Strawson had urged much the same point concerning the free will debate: defenders of our ordinary attitudes of reproach and gratitude should not seek to ground them in the “panicky metaphysics” of a supra-causal free will; instead they can and need do no more than point to our unshakable commitment to these “reactive” attitudes through which we manifest our attachment to that fundamental category of our conceptual scheme  persons. 

structuratum: mid-15c., "action or process of building or construction;" 1610s, "that which is constructed, a building or edifice;" from Latin structura "a fitting together, adjustment; a building, mode of building;" figuratively, "arrangement, order," from structus, past participle of struere "to pile, place together, heap up; build, assemble, arrange, make by joining together," related to strues "heap," from PIE *streu-, extended form of root *stere- "to spread.” structuralism, a distinctive yet extremely wide range of productive research conducted in the social and human sciences from the 0s through the 0s, principally in France. It is difficult to describe structuralism as a movement, because of the methodological constraints exercised by the various disciplines that came to be influenced by structuralism  e.g., anthropology, philosophy, literary theory, psychoanalysis, political theory, even mathematics. Nonetheless, structuralism is generally held to derive its organizing principles from the early twentieth-century work of Saussure, the founder of structural linguistics. Arguing against the prevailing historicist and philological approaches to linguistics, he proposed a “scientific” model of language, one understood as a closed system of elements and rules that account for the production and the social communication of meaning. Inspired by Durkheim’s notion of a “social fact”  that domain of objectivity wherein the psychological and the social orders converge  Saussure viewed language as the repository of discursive signs shared by a given linguistic community. The particular sign is composed of two elements, a phonemic signifier, or distinctive sound element, and a corresponding meaning, or signified element. The defining relation between the sign’s sound and meaning components is held to be arbitrary, i.e., based on conventional association, and not due to any function of the speaking subject’s personal inclination, or to any external consideration of reference. What lends specificity or identity to each particular signifier is its differential relation to the other signifiers in the greater set; hence, each basic unit of language is itself the product of differences between other elements within the system. This principle of differential  and structural  relation was extended by Troubetzkoy to the order of phonemes, whereby a defining set of vocalic differences underlies the constitution of all linguistic phonemes. Finally, for Saussure, the closed set of signs is governed by a system of grammatical, phonemic, and syntactic rules. Language thus derives its significance from its own autonomous organization, and this serves to guarantee its communicative function. Since language is the foremost instance of social sign systems in general, the structural account might serve as an exemplary model for understanding the very intelligibility of social systems as such  hence, its obvious relevance to the broader concerns of the social and human sciences. This implication was raised by Saussure himself, in his Course on General Linguistics6, but it was advanced dramatically by the  anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss  who is generally acknowledged to be the founder of modern structuralism  in his extensive analyses in the area of social anthropology, beginning with his Elementary Structures of Kinship 9. Lévi-Strauss argued that society is itself organized according to one form or another of significant communication and exchange  whether this be of information, knowledge, or myths, or even of its members themselves. The organization of social phenomena could thus be clarified through a detailed elaboration of their subtending structures, which, collectively, testify to a deeper and all-inclusive, social rationality. As with the analysis of language, these social structures would be disclosed, not by direct observation, but by inference and deduction from the observed empirical data. Furthermore, since these structures are models of specific relations, which in turn express the differential properties of the component elements under investigation, the structural analysis is both readily formalizable and susceptible to a broad variety of applications. In Britain, e.g., Edmund Leach pursued these analyses in the domain of social anthropology; in the United States, Chomsky applied insights of structuralism to linguistic theory and philosophy of mind; in Italy, Eco conducted extensive structuralist analyses in the fields of social and literary semiotics. With its acknowledgment that language is a rule-governed social system of signs, and that effective communication depends on the resources available to the speaker from within the codes of language itself, the structuralist approach tends to be less preoccupied with the more traditional considerations of “subjectivity” and “history” in its treatment of meaningful discourse. In the post-structuralism that grew out of this approach, the  philosopher Foucault, e.g., focused on the generation of the “subject” by the various epistemic discourses of imitation and representation, as well as on the institutional roles of knowledge and power in producing and conserving particular “disciplines” in the natural and social sciences. These disciplines, Foucault suggested, in turn govern our theoretical and practical notions of madness, criminality, punishment, sexuality, etc., notions that collectively serve to “normalize” the individual subject to their determinations. Likewise, in the domain of psychoanalysis, Lacan drew on the work of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss to emphasize Freud’s concern with language and to argue that, as a set of determining codes, language serves to structure the subject’s very unconscious. Problematically, however, it is the very dynamism of language, including metaphor, metonymy, condensation, displacement, etc., that introduces the social symbolic into the constitution of the subject. Althusser applied the principles of structuralist methodology to his analysis of Marxism, especially the role played by contradiction in understanding infrastructural and superstructural formation, i.e., for the constitution of the historical dialectic. His account followed Marx’s rejection of Feuerbach, at once denying the role of traditional subjectivity and humanism, and presenting a “scientific” analysis of “historical materialism,” one that would be anti-historicist in principle but attentive to the actual political state of affairs. For Althusser, such a philosophical analysis helped provide an “objective” discernment to the historical transformation of social reality. The restraint the structuralists extended toward the traditional views of subjectivity and history dramatically colored their treatment both of the individuals who are agents of meaningful discourse and of the linguistically articulable object field in general. This redirection of research interests particularly in France, due to the influential work of Barthes and Michel Serres in the fields of poetics, cultural semiotics, and communication theory has resulted in a series of original analyses and also provoked lively debates between the adherents of structuralist methodology and the more conventionally oriented schools of thought e.g., phenomenology, existentialism, Marxism, and empiricist and positivist philosophies of science. These debates served as an agency to open up subsequent discussions on deconstruction and postmodernist theory for the philosophical generation of the 0s and later. These post-structuralist thinkers were perhaps less concerned with the organization of social phenomena than with their initial constitution and subsequent dynamics. Hence, the problematics of the subject and history  or, in broader terms, temporality itself  were again engaged. The new discussions were abetted by a more critical appraisal of language and tended to be antiHegelian in their rejection of the totalizing tendency of systematic metaphysics. Heidegger’s critique of traditional metaphysics was one of the major influences in the discussions following structuralism, as was the reexamination of Nietzsche’s earlier accounts of “genealogy,” his antiessentialism, and his teaching of a dynamic “will to power.” Additionally, many poststructuralist philosophers stressed the Freudian notions of the libido and the unconscious as determining factors in understanding not only the subject, but the deep rhetorical and affective components of language use. An astonishing variety of philosophers and critics engaged in the debates initially framed by the structuralist thinkers of the period, and their extended responses and critical reappraisals formed the vibrant, poststructuralist period of  intellectual life. Such figures as Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, Kristeva, Maurice Blanchot, Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Philippe LacoueLabarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Irigaray inaugurated a series of contemporary reflections that have become international in scope. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The structure of structure.”

Suarez, also known as Doctor Eximius,  Jesuit philosopher and theologian. Born in Granada, he studied at Salamanca and taught there and at Rome, Coimbra, and other leading universities. Suárez’s most important works are De legibus “On Law,” 1612, De Deo uno et trino “On the Trinity,” 1606, De anima “On the Soul,” 1621, and the monumental Disputationes metaphysicae “Metaphysical Disputations,” 1597. The Disputationes has a unique place in philosophy, being the first systematic and comprehensive work of metaphysics written in the West that is not a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Divided into fifty-four disputations, it discusses every metaphysical issue known at the time. Its influence was immediate and lasting and can be seen in the work of Scholastics in both Europe and Latin America, and of modern philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, and Schopenhauer. Suárez’s main contributions to philosophy occurred in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of law. In all three areas he was influenced by Aristotle and Aquinas, although he also drew inspiration from Ockham, Duns Scotus, and others. In metaphysics, Suárez is known for his views on the nature of metaphysics, being, and individuation. Metaphysics is the science of “being insofar as it is real being” ens in quantum ens reale, and its proper object of study is the object concept of being. This understanding of the object of metaphysics is often seen as paving the way for early modern metaphysical theory, in which the object of metaphysics is mental. For Suárez the concept of being is derived by analogy from the similarity existing among things. Existing reality for Suárez is composed of individuals: everything that exists is individual, including substances and their properties, accidents, principles, and components. He understands individuality as incommunicability, namely, the inability of individuals to be divided into entities of the same specific kind as themselves. The principle of individuation is “entity,” which he identifies with “essence as it exists.” This principle applies both to substances and their properties, accidents, principles, and components. In epistemology, two of Suárez’s views stand out: that the intellect knows the individual through a proper and separate concept without structuralism, mathematical Suárez, Francisco 884   884 having to turn to reflection, a position that supports an empiricist epistemology in which, contrary to Thomism, knowledge of the individual is not mediated through universals; and 2 his view of middle knowledge scientia media, the knowledge God has of what every free creature would freely do in every possible situation. This notion was used by Suárez and Molina to explain how God can control human actions without violating free will. In philosophy of law, Suárez was an innovative thinker whose ideas influenced Grotius. For him law is fundamentally an act of the will rather than a result of an ordinance of reason, as Aquinas held. Law is divided into eternal, divine, natural, and human. Human law is based on natural or divine law and is not the result of human creation. 

Sub-perceptual -- subdoxastic, pertaining to states of mind postulated to account for the production and character of certain apparently non-inferential beliefs. These were first discussed by Stephen P. Stich in “Beliefs and Subdoxastic States” 8. I may form the belief that you are depressed, e.g., on the basis of subtle cues that I am unable to articulate. The psychological mechanism responsible for this belief might be thought to harbor information concerning these cues subdoxastically. Although subdoxastic states resemble beliefs in certain respects  they incorporate intentional content, they guide behavior, they can bestow justification on beliefs  they differ from fullyfledged doxastic states or beliefs in at least two respects. First, as noted above, subdoxastic states may be largely inaccessible to introspection; I may be unable to describe, even on reflection, the basis of my belief that you are depressed. Second, subdoxastic states seem cut off inferentially from an agent’s corpus of beliefs; my subdoxastic appreciation that your forehead is creased may contribute to my believing that you are depressed, but, unlike the belief that your forehead is creased, it need not, in the presence of other beliefs, lead to further beliefs about your visage. 

Sub-iectum – sub-iectificatio -- subjectification: Grice is right in distinguishing this from nominalization, because not all nominalization takes the subject position. Grice plays with this. It is a derivation of the ‘subjectum,’ which Grice knows it is Aristotelian. Liddell and Scott have the verb first, and the neuter singular later. “τὸ ὑποκείμενον,” Liddell and Scott note “has three main applications.” The first is “to the matter (hyle) which underlies the form (eidos), as opp. To both “εἶδος” and “ἐντελέχεια” Met. 983a30; second, to the substantia (hyle + morphe) which underlies the accidents, and as opposed to “πάθη,” and “συμβεβηκότα,” as in Cat. 1a20,27 and Met.1037b16, 983b16; third, and this is the use that ‘linguistic’ turn Grice and Strawson are interested in, “to the logical subject to which attributes are ascribed,” and here opp. “τὸ κατηγορούμενον,” (which would be the ‘praedicatum’), as per Cat.1b10,21, Ph.189a31. If Grice uses Kiparsky’s factive, he is also using ‘nominalisation’ as grammarians use it. Refs.: Grice, “Reply to Richards,” in PGRICE, also BANC.

sub-iectum -- subjectivism: When Grice speaks of the subjective condition on intention, he is using ‘subject,’ in a way a philosophical psychologist would. He does not mean Kant’s transcendental subject or ego. Grice means the simpler empiricist subject, personal identity, or self. The choice is unfelicitious in that ‘subject’ contrasts with ‘object.’ So when he speaks of a ‘subjective’ person he means an ‘ego-centric’ condition, or a self-oriented condition, or an agent-oriented condition, or an ‘utterer-oriented’ or ‘utterer-relative’ condition. But this is tricky. His example: “Nixon should get that chair of theology.” The utterer may have to put into Nixon’s shoes. He has to perceive Nixon as a PERSON, a rational agent, with views of his own. So, the philosophical psychologist that Grice is has to think of a conception of the self by the self, and the conception of the other by the self. Wisdom used to talk of ‘other minds;’ Grice might speak of other souls. Grice was concerned with intending folloed by a that-clause. Jeffrey defines desirability as doxastically modified. It is entirely possible for someone to desire the love that he already has. It is what he thinks that matters. Cf. his dispositional account to intending. A Subjectsive condition takes into account the intenders, rather than the ascribers, point of view: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt. Everest on hands and knees. Bloggs might reason: Given my present state, I should do what is fun. Given my present state, the best thing for me to do would be to do what is fun. For me in my present state it would make for my well-being, to have fun. Having fun is good, or, a good. Climbing a mountain would be fun. Climbing the Everest would be/make for climbing fun. So, I shall climb the Everest. Even if a critic insisted that a practical syllogism is the way to represent Bloggs finding something to be appealing, and that it should be regarded as a respectable evaluation, the assembled propositions dont do the work of a standard argument. The premises do not support or yield the conclusion as in a standard argument. The premises may be said to yield the conclusion, or directive, for the particular agent whose reasoning process it is, only on the basis of a Subjectsive condition: that the agent is in a certain Subjectsive state, e.g. feels like going out for dinner-fun. Rational beings (the agent at some other time, or other individuals) who do not have that feeling, will not accept the conclusion. They may well accept as true. It is fun to climb Everest, but will not accept it as a directive unless they feel like it now. Someone wondering what to do for the summer might think that if he were to climb Everest he would find it fun or pleasant, but right now she does not feel like it. That is in general the end of the matter. The alleged argument lacks normativity. It is not authoritative or directive unless there is a supportive argument that he needs/ought to do something diverting/pleasant in the summer. A practical argument is different. Even if an agent did not feel like going to the doctor, an agent would think I ought to have a medical check up yearly, now is the time, so I should see my doctor to be a directive with some force. It articulates a practical argument. Perhaps the strongest attempt to reconstruct an (acceptable or rational) thought transition as a standard arguments is to treat the Subjectsive condition, I feel like having climbing fun in the summer, as a premise, for then the premises would support the conclusion. But the individual, whose thought transition we are examining, does not regard a description of his psychological state as a consideration that supports the conclusion. It will be useful to look more closely at a variant of the example to note when it is appropriate to reconstruct thinking in the form of argument. Bloggs, now hiking with a friend in the Everest, comes to a difficult spot and says: I dont like the look of that, I am frightened. I am going back. That is usually enough for Bloggs to return, and for the friend to turn back with him. Bloggss action of turning back, admittedly motivated by fear, is, while not acting on reasons, nonetheless rational unless we judge his fear to be irrational. Bloggss Subjectsive condition can serve as a premise, but only in a very different situation. Bloggs resorts to reasons. Suppose that, while his friend does not think Bloggss fear irrational, the friend still attempts to dissuade Bloggs from going back. After listening and reflecting, Bloggs may say I am so frightened it is not worth it. I am not enjoying this climbing anymore. Or I am too frightened to be able to safely go on. Or I often climb the Everest and dont usually get frightened. The fact that I am now is a good indication that this is a dangerous trail and I should turn back. These are reasons, considerations implicitly backed by principles, and they could be the initial motivations of someone. But in Bloggss case they emerged when he was challenged by his friend. They do not express his initial practical reasoning. Bloggs was frightened by the trail ahead, wanted to go back, and didnt have any reason not to. Note that there is no general rational requirement to always act on reasons, and no general truth that a rational individual would be better off the more often he acted on reasons. Faced with his friends objections, however, Bloggs needed justification for acting on his fear. He reflected and found reason(s) to act on his fear. Grice plays with Subjectsivity already in Prolegomena. Consider the use of carefully. Surely we must include the agents own idea of this. Or consider the use of phi and phi – surely we dont want the addressee to regard himself under the same guise with which the utterer regards him. Or consider “Aspects”: Nixon must be appointed professor of theology at Oxford. Does he feel the need? Grice raises the topic of Subjectsivity again in the Kant lectures just after his discussion of mode, in a sub-section entitled, Modalities: relative and absolute. He finds the topic central for his æqui-vocality thesis: Subjectsive conditions seem necessary to both practical and alethic considerations. Refs.: The source is his essay on intentions and the subjective condition, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

sub-iectum, subject: hypokeimenon -- When Frege turned from ‘term logic’ to ‘predicate logic’ “he didn’t know what he was doing.” Cf. Oxonian nominalization. Grice plays a lot on that. His presentation at the Oxford Philosophical Society he entitled, in a very English way, as “Meaning” (echoing Ogden and Richards). With his “Meaning, Revisited,” it seems more clearly that he is nominalizing. Unless he means, “The essay “Meaning,” revisited,” – alla Putnam making a bad joke on Ogden: “The meaning of ‘meaning’” – “ ‘Meaning,’ revisited” --  Grice is very familiar with this since it’s the literal transliteration of Aristotle’s hypokeimenon, opp. in a specific context, to the ‘prae-dicatum,’ or categoroumenon. And with the same sort of ‘ambiguity,’ qua opposite a category of expression, thought, or reality. In philosophical circles, one has to be especially aware of the subject-object distinction (which belong in philosophical psychology) and the thing which belongs in ontology. Of course there’s the substance (hypousia, substantia), the essence, and the sumbebekon, accidens. So one has to be careful. Grice expands on Strawson’s explorations here. Philosophy, to underlie, as the foundation in which something else inheres, to be implied or presupposed by something else, “ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων . . ὑ. τις ἴδιος οὐσία” Pl.Prt.349b, cf. Cra.422d, R.581c, Ti.Locr.97e: τὸ ὑποκείμενον has three main applications: (1) to the matter which underlies the form, opp. εἶδος, ἐντελέχεια, Arist.Metaph.983a30; (2) to the substance (matter + form) which underlies the accidents, opp. πάθη, συμβεβηκότα, Id.Cat.1a20,27, Metaph.1037b16, 983b16; (3) to the logical subject to which attributes are ascribed, opp. τὸ κατηγορούμενον, Id.Cat.1b10,21, Ph.189a31: applications (1) and (2) are distinguished in Id.Metaph.1038b5, 1029a1-5, 1042a26-31: τὸ ὑ. is occasionally used of what underlies or is presupposed in some other way, e. g. of the positive termini presupposed by change, Id.Ph.225a3-7. b. exist, τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον the external reality, Stoic.2.48, cf. Epicur.Ep.1pp.12,24 U.; “φῶς εἶναι τὸ χρῶμα τοῖς ὑ. ἐπιπῖπτον” Aristarch. Sam. ap. Placit.1.15.5; “τὸ κρῖνον τί τε φαίνεται μόνον καὶ τί σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἔτι καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται” S.E.M.7.143, cf. 83,90,91, 10.240; = ὑπάρχω, τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα the existing state of affairs, Plb.11.28.2, cf. 11.29.1, 15.8.11,13, 3.31.6, Eun.VSp.474 B.; “Τίτος ἐξ ὑποκειμένων ἐνίκα, χρώμενος ὁπλις μοῖς καὶ τάξεσιν αἷς παρέλαβε” Plu.Comp.Phil.Flam.2; “τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ὑποκειμένης” Id.2.336b; “ἐχομένου τοῦ προσιόντος λόγου ὡς πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον” A.D.Synt.122.17. c. ὁ ὑ. ἐνιαυτός the year in question, D.S.11.75; οἱ ὑ. καιροί the time in question, Id.16.40, Plb.2.63.6, cf. Plu.Comp.Sol.Publ.4; τοῦ ὑ. μηνός the current month, PTeb.14.14 (ii B. C.), al.; ἐκ τοῦ ὑ. φόρου in return for a reduction from the said rent, PCair.Zen.649.18 (iii B. C.); πρὸς τὸ ὑ. νόει according to the context, Gp.6.11.7. Note that both Grice and Strawson oppose Quine’s Humeian dogma that, since the subjectum is beyond comprehension, we can do with a ‘predicate’ calculus, only. Vide Strawson, “Subject and predicate in logic and grammar.” Refs: H. P. Grice, Work on the categories with P. F. Strawson, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c.

sub-ordination. Grice must be the only Oxonian philosopher in postwar Oxford that realised the relevance of subordination. Following J. C. Wilson, Grice notes that ‘if’ is a subordinating connective, and the only one of the connectives which is not commutative. This gives Grice the idea to consult Cook Wilson and develop his view of ‘interrogative subordination.’ Who killed Cock Robin. If it was not the Hawk, it was the Sparrow. It was not the Hawk. It was the Sparrow. What Grecian idiom is Romanesque sub-ordinatio translating. The opposite is co-ordination. “And” and “or” are coordinative particles. Interrogative coordination is provided by ‘or,’ but it relates to yes/no questions. Interrogative subordination involves x-question. WHO killed Cock Robin. The Grecians were syntactic and hypotactic. Varro uses jungendi. is the same and wherefrom it is different, in relation to what &c." It may well be doubted whether he has thus improved upon his predecessors. Surely the discernment of sameness and difference is a function necessarily belonging to soul and necessarily included in the catalogue of her functions : yet Stallbaum's rendering excludes it from that catalogue. The fact that we have ory hv $, not orcp ecri, does not really favour his view—" with whatsoever a thing may be the same, she declares it the same.' I coincide then with the other interpreters in regarding the whole sentence from orw t' hv as indirect INTERROGATION SUBORDINATE interrogation subordinateto \iyeiThis mistake in logic carries with it serious mistakes in trans lation. The clause otw t av ti tovtov rj kcu otov hv erepov is made an indirect INTERROGATIVE COORDINATE with itpbs o tC re pu£Aio-ra xai ottt? [ 39 ] k.t.\., which is impossible. Stallbaum rightly makes the clause a substantive clause and subject of elvai or £vp.f}aivei elvai. (3) eKao-ra is of course predicate with elvai to this sthe question, ‘How many sugars would Tom like in his tea?’ is not ‘satisfied’ by the answer ‘Tom loves sugar’. It may well be true that Tom loves sugar, but the question is not satisfied by that form of answer. Conversely the answer ‘one spoonful’ satisfies the question, even though it might be the wrong answer and leave the tea insufficiently sugary for the satisfaction of Tom’s sweet tooth.

sub-perceptum: This relates to Stich and his sub-doxastic. For Aristotle, “De An.,” the anima leads to the desideratum. Unlike in ‘phuta,’ or vegetables, which are still ‘alive,’ (‘zoa’ – he had a problem with ‘sponges’ which were IN-animate, to him, most likely) In WoW:139, Grice refers to “the pillar box seems red” as “SUB-PERCEPTUAL,” the first of a trio. The second is the perceptual, “A perceives that the pillar box is red,” and the third, “The pillar box is red.” He wishes to explore the truth-conditons of the subperceptum, and although first in the list, is last in the analsysis. Grice proposes: ‘The pillar box seems red” iff (1) the pillar box is red; (2) A perceives that the pillar box is red; and (3) (1) causes (2). In this there is a parallelism with his quasi-causal account of ‘know’ (and his caveat that ‘literally,’ we may just know that 2 + 2 = 4 (and such) (“Meaning Revisited). In what he calls ‘accented sub-perceptum,’ the idea is that the U is choosing the superceptum (“seems”) as opposed to his other obvious choices (“The pillar box IS red,”) and the passive-voice version of the ‘perceptum’: “The pillar box IS PERCEIVED red.” The ‘accent’ generates the D-or-D implicaturum: By uttering “The pillar box seems red,” U IMPLICATES that it is denied that or doubted that the pillar box is perceived red by U or that the pillar box is red. In this, the accented version contrasts with the unaccented version where the implicaturum is NOT generated, and the U remains uncommitted re: this doubt or denial implicaturum. It is this uncommitment that will allow to disimplicate or cancel the implicaturum should occasion arise. The reference Grice makes between the sub-perceptum and the perceptum is grammatical, not psychological. Or else he may be meaning that in uttering, “I perceive that the pillar box is red,” one needs to appeal to Kant’s apperception of the ego. Refs.: Pecocke, Sense and content, Grice, BANC.

subscriptum: Quine thought that Grice’s subscript device was otiose, and that he would rather use brackets, or nothing, any day.  Grice plays with various roots of ‘scriptum.’ He was bound to. Moore had showed that ‘good’ was not ‘descriptive.’ Grice thinks it’s pseudo-descriptive. So here we have the first, ‘descriptum,’ where what is meant is Griceian: By uttering the “The cat is on the mat” U means, by his act of describing, that the cat is on the mat. Then there’s the ‘prae-scriptum.’ Oddly, Grice, when criticizing the ‘descriptive’ fallacy, seldom mentions the co-relative ‘prescriptum.’ “Good” would be understood in terms of a ‘prae-scriptum’ that appeals to his utterer’s intentions. Then there’s the subscriptum. This may have various use, both in Grice. “I subscribe,” and in the case of “Pegasus flies.” Where the utterer subscribes to his ontological commitment. subscript device. Why does Grice think we NEED a subscript device? Obviously, his wife would not use it. I mean, you cannot pronounce a subscript device or a square-bracket device. So his point is ironic. “Ordinary” language does not need it. But if Strawson and Quine are going to be picky about stuff – ontological commitment, ‘existential presupposition,’ let’s subscribe and bracket! Note that Quine’s response to Grice is perfunctory: “Brackets would have done!” Grice considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack wants someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him.Grice notes that there are clearly at least two possible readings of an utterance like our (i): a first reading in which, as Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii). A second reading is one in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv). Grice goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order predicate calculus. Ja wants that p becomes W^jap where ja stands for the individual constant Jack as a super-script attached to the predicate standing for Jacks psychological state or attitude. Grice writes: Using the apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent, respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an intentio secunda or intentio obliqua) as (Ǝx)W^jaFxja and W^ja(Ǝx)Fxja. Grice then goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an intentio seconda.Grice notes: But suppose that Jack wants a specific individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been deceived into thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill, though in fact Joe is an only child. The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill with is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent. Let us recall that Grices main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes, emptiness! In these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i) is true only on reading (vii), where the existential quantifier occurs within the scope of the psychological-state or -attitude verb, but we cannot now represent (ii) or (iii), with Jill being vacuous, by (vi), where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the scope of the psychological-attitude verb, want, since [well,] Jill does not really exist, except as a figment of Jacks imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as purely intentionalist, and thus favouring by far Suppess over Chomskys characterisation of Grice as a mere behaviourist, Grice hopes that we should be provided with distinct representations for two familiar readings of, now: Jack wants Jill to marry him and Jack wants Jill to marry him. It is at this point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values merely indicate the order of introduction of the symbol to which it is attached in a deductive schema for the predicate calculus in question. Only the first formulation represents the internal reading (where ji stands for Jill): W₂^ja4F₁ji₃ja₄ and W₃^ja4F₂ji₁ja_4. Note that in the second formulation, the individual constant for Jill, ji, is introduced prior to want, – jis sub-script is 1, while Ws sub-script is the higher numerical value 3. Grice notes: Given that Jill does not exist, only the internal reading can be true, or alethically satisfactory. Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of the opaqueness of a verb standing for a psychological state or attitude like that expressed by wanting with one observation that further marks him as an intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian type. He is willing to allow for existential phrases in cases of vacuous designata, provided they occur within opaque psychological-state or attitude verbs, and he thinks that by doing this, he is being faithful to the richness and exuberance of ordinary discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice puts it, we should also have available to us also three neutral, yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs), as a philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a generality! Jill now becomes x. W4ja5Ǝx3F1x2ja5, Ǝx5W2ja5F1x4ja3, Ǝx5W3ja4F1x2ja4. As Grice notes, since in (xii) the individual variable x (ranging over Jill) does not dominate the segment following the (Ǝx) quantifier, the formulation does not display any existential or de re, force, and is suitable therefore for representing the internal readings (ii) or (iii), if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to faithfully represent ordinary discourse, for the possibility of expressing the fact that a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.

more grice to the mill: sous-entendu: used by, of all people, Mill. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophybooks.google.com › books ... and speak with any approach to precision, and adopting into [the necessary sufficient clauses of a piece of philosophical conceptual analysis] a mere sous-entendu of common conversation in its most unprecise form. If I say to any one, Cf. understatement, as opposed to overstatement. The ‘statement’ thing complicates things, ‘underunderstanding’ seems better, or ‘sub-understanding,’ strictly. Trust Grice to bring more Grice to the Mill and provide a full essay, indeed theory, and base his own philosophy, on the sous-tentendu! Cf. Pears, Pears Cyclopaedia. “The English love meiosis, litotes, and understatement. The French don’t.” Note all the figures of rhetoric cited by Grice, and why they have philosophical import. Many entries here: hyperbole, meiosis, litotes, etc. Grice took ‘sous-entendu’ etymologically serious. It is UNDERSTOOD. Nobody taught you, but it understood. It is understood is like It is known. So “The pillar box seems red” is understood to mean, “It may not be.” Now a sous-entendu may be cancellable, in which case it was MIS-understood, or the emissor has changed his mind. Grice considers the paradoxes the understanding under ‘uptake,’ just to make fun of Austin’s informalism. The ‘endendu’ is what the French understand by ‘understand,’ the root being Latin intellectus, or intendo.

stoicus --- stoicism -- Neo-stoicism -- du Vair, Guillaume, philosopher, bishop, and political figure. Du Vair and Justus Lipsius were the two most influential propagators of neo-Stoicism in early modern Europe. Du Vair’s Sainte Philosophie “Holy Philosophy,” 1584 and his shorter Philosophie morale des Stoïques “Moral Philosophy of the Stoics,” 1585, were tr. and frequently reprinted. The latter presents Epictetus in a form usable by ordinary people in troubled times. We are to follow nature and live according to reason; we are not to be upset by what we cannot control; virtue is the good. Du Vair inserts, moreover, a distinctly religious note. We must be pious, accept our lot as God’s will, and consider morality obedience to his command. Du Vair thus Christianized Stoicism, making it widely acceptable. By teaching that reason alone enables us to know how we ought to live, he became a founder of modern rationalism in ethics. Stōĭcus , a, um, adj., = Στωϊκός, I.of or belonging to the Stoic philosophy or to the Stoics, Stoic: “schola,” Cic. Fam. 9, 22 fin.: “secta,” Sen. Ep. 123, 14: “sententia,” id. ib. 22, 7: “libelli,” Hor. Epod. 8, 15: “turba,” Mart. 7, 69, 4: “dogmata,” Juv. 13, 121: “disciplina,” Gell. 19, 1, 1: “Stoicum est,” it is a saying of the Stoics, Cic. Ac. 2, 26, 85: “non loquor tecum Stoicā linguā, sed hac submissiore,” Sen. Ep. 13, 4: “est aliquid in illo Stoici dei: nec cor nec caput habet,” Sen. Apoc. 8.— Subst.: Stōĭcus , i, m., a Stoic philosopher, a Stoic, Cic. Par. praef. § 2; Hor. S. 2, 3, 160; 2, 3, 300; plur., Cic. Mur. 29, 61; and in philosophical writings saepissime.— 2. Stōĭca , ōrum, n. plur., the Stoic philosophy, Cic. N. D. 1, 6, 15.—Adv.: Stōĭcē , like a Stoic, Stoically: “agere austere et Stoice,” Cic. Mur. 35, 74: dicere, id. Par. praef. § 3.H. P. Grice, “The Stoa: from Athenian to Oxonian dialectic,” H. P. Grice, “The Stoa and Athenian dialectic.”

stupid. Grice loved Plato. They are considering ‘horseness.’ “I cannot see horeseness; I can see horses.” “You are the epitome of stupidity.” “I cannot see stupidity. I see stupid.”