IMPLICATVRA, in 18 volumes -- vol. VI

conversational game theory: Grice: “It was Austin who made me see the philosophy of football!” -- Grice for ‘homo ludens’. In “Logic and conversation,” Grice uses the phrases, “the game of conversation,” “conversational game,” “conversational move,” “the conversational rules,” – so he knew he was echoing Neumann and Morgenstern. J. Hintikka, “Grice and game theory.” the theory of the structure of, and the rational procedures (or strategies) for performing in, games or game-like human interactions. Although there are forerunners, game theory is virtually invented by Neumann and Morgenstern. Its most striking feature is its compact representation of interactions of at least two players; e. g. two players may face two choices each, and in combination these choices produce four possible outcomes. Actual choices are of strategies, not of outcomes, although it is assessments of outcomes that recommend this or that procedure, maxim, imperative, or strategy. To do well in a game, even for each player to do well, as is often possible, generally requires taking the other player’s position, interest, and goal, into account. Hence, to evaluate an imperative or rule or strategiy directly, without reference to the outcomes they might produce in interaction with others, is conspicuously perverse. It is not surprising, therefore, that in meta-ethics, game theory has been preeminently applied to utilitarianianism. As the numbers of players and rational procedure, guideline or strategies rise, the complexity of the game of conversation increases geometrically. If players have *2* strategies each and each ranks the four possible outcomes without ties, there are already *78* strategically distinct conversations. Even minor real-life interactions may have astronomically greater complexity. Grice once complained to Hintikka that this makes game theory ‘useless,’ or ‘otiose.’ Alternatively, one can note that this makes it realistic and helps us understand why real-life choices are at least as complex as they sometimes seem. To complicate matters further, conversationalists can choose over probabilistic combinations of their pure rational guidelines or strategies. Hence, the original 4 outcomes in a simple 2 $ 2 game define a continuum of potential outcomes. After noting the structure of the game of conversation, one might then be struck by an immediate implication of this mere description. A rational agent may be supposed to attempt to maximize his potential or expected outcome in the game of conversation. But as there are at least two players in the game of conversation, in general conversationalists cannot all maximize simultaneously over their expected outcomes while assuming that all others are doing likewise. This is an analytical principle. In general, we cannot maximize over two functions simultaneously. The general notion of the greatest good of the greatest number, e. g., is incoherent. Hence, in inter-active choice contexts, the simple notion of economic rationality is incoherent. Virtually all of early game theory was dedicated to finding an alternative principle for resolving conversational game interactions. There are now many of what Grice calls a “solution theory,” most of which are about this or that outcome rather than this or that rational guideline or strategy they stipulate which outcomes or range of outcomes is game-theoretically “rational.” There is little consensus on how to generalize from the ordinary rationality of merely choosing more rather than less and of displaying consistent preferences to the general choice of strategies in games. A pay-off in early game theory is almost always represented in a cardinal, transferable utility. A transferable utility is an odd notion that is evidently introduced to avoid the disdain with which philosophers then treated interpersonal comparisons of utility. It seems to be analogous to money. One could say that the theory is one of wealth maximization. In the early theory, the “rationality” conditions are as follows.In general, if the sums of the pay-offs to each players in various outcomes differ, it is assumed that a rational player will manage to divide the largest possible payoff with the other player. 2 No rational agent will accept a payoff below the “security level” obtainable even if all the other player or players really form a coalition against the individual. Sometimes it is also assumed that no group of players will rationally accept less than it could get as its group security level  but in some games, no outcome can meet this condition. This is an odd combination of elements. The collective elements are plausibly thought of as merely predictive. If we individually wish to do well, we should combine efforts to help us do best AS A CONVERSATIONAL DYAD. But what we want is a theory that converts two individual preferences into one collective result – Grice’s conversational shared goal of influencing and being influenced by others. Unfortunately, to put a move doing just this in the foundations of the theory is question-begging. Our fundamental burden is to determine whether a theory of subjective rationality MAY produce an inter-subjectively good result, not to stipulate that it must. In the theory with cardinal, additive payoffs, we can divide games. There is the constant-sum game, in which the sum of all players’ payoffs in each outcome is a constant, and variable sum games. A zero-sum games is a special case of a constant sum game. Two-player constant sum games are games of pure conversational ‘conflict.’ Each player’s gain is the other’s loss. In constant sum games with more than two players and in all variable sum games, there is generally reason for coalition formation to improve payoffs to members of the coalition. A game without transferable utility, such as a games in which players have only ordinal preferences, may be characterized as a game of pure conflict or of pure co-ordination (or co-operation) when players’ preference orderings over outcomes are, respectively, opposite or identical, or as games of mixed motive when their orderings are partly the same and partly reversed. Grice’s nalysis of such games is evidently less tractable than that of games with cardinal, additive utility, and their theory is only beginning to be extensively developed by Griceians. Despite the apparent circularity of the rationality assumptions of early game theory, it is the game theorists’ prisoner’s dilemma that makes clear that compelling subjectivistic principles of choice can produce an inter-subjective deficient outcome. This game given its catchy but inapt name. If they play it in isolation from any other interaction between them, two players in this game can each do what seems individually best and reach an outcome that both consider inferior to the outcome that results from making opposite strategy choices. Even with the knowledge that this is the problem they face, the players still have incentive to choose the strategies that jointly produce the inferior outcome. The prisoner’s dilemma involves both coordination (or co-operation) and conflict. It has played a central role in discussions of Griceian conversational pragmatics. Games that predominantly involve coordination (or cooperation), such as when we coordinate in all driving on the right or all on the left, have a similarly central role. The understanding of both classes of games has been read into the philosophy of Hobbes and Hume and into “mutual advantage” theories of justice. 

gassendi: philosopher who advocates a via media to scientific knowledge about the empirically observable material world that avoids both the dogmatism of Cartesians, who claimed to have certain knowledge, and the skepticism of Montaigne and Charron, who doubted that we have knowledge about anything. Gassendi presented Epicurean atomism as a model for explaining how bodies are structured and interact. He advanced a hypothetico-deductive method by proposing that experiments should be used to test mechanistic hypotheses. Like the ancient Pyrrhonian Skeptics, he did not challenge the immediate reports of our senses; but unlike them he argued that while we cannot have knowledge of the inner essences of things, we can develop a reliable science of the world of appearances. In this he exemplified the mitigated skepticism of modern science that is always open to revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Gassendi’s first book, Exercitationes Paradoxicae Adversis Aristoteleos 1624, is an attack on Aristotle. He is best known as the author of the fifth set of objections to Descartes’s Meditations1641, in which Gassendi proposed that even clear and distinct ideas may represent no objects outside our minds, a possibility that Descartes called the objection of objections, but dismissed as destructive of all reason. Gassendi’s Syntagma Philosophiae Epicuri 1649 contains his development of Epicurean philosophy and science. His elaboration of the mechanistic atomic model and his advocacy of experimental testing of hypotheses were crucially important in the rise of modern science. Gassendi’s career as a Catholic priest, Epicurean atomist, mitigated skeptic, and mechanistic scientist presents a puzzle  as do the careers of several other philosopher-priests in the seventeenth century  concerning his true beliefs. On the one hand, he professed faith and set aside Christian doctrine as not open to challenge. On the other hand, he utilized an arsenal of skeptical arguments that was beginning to undermine and would eventually destroy the rational foundations of the church. Gassendi thus appears to be of a type almost unknown today, a thinker indifferent to the apparent discrepancy between his belief in Christian doctrine and his advocacy of materialist science. 

gay: j. philosopher Grice read quite a lot, who tried to reconcile divine command theory and utilitarianism. The son of a minister, Gay was elected a fellow of Sidney Sussex , Cambridge, where he taught Grecian philosophy. His essay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” argues that obligation is founded on the will of God, which, because people are destined to be happy, directs us to act to promote the general happiness. Gay offers an associationist psychology according to which we pursue objects that have come to be associated with happiness e.g. money, regardless of whether they now make us happy, and argues, contra Hutcheson, that our moral sense is conditioned rather than natural. Gay’s blend of utilitarianism with associationist psychology gave David Hartley the basis for his moral psychology, which later influenced Bentham in his formulation of classical utilitarianism. 

burlæus: Burleigh’s donkey – Grice preferred the spelling “Gualterus Burlaeus.” “One would hardly realise it’s Irish to the backbone!” – Grice. Geach’s donkey: geach, Peter b.6, English philosopher and logician whose main work has been in logic and philosophy of language. A great admirer of McTaggart, he has published a sympathetic exposition of the latter’s work Truth, Love and Immortality, 9, and has always aimed to emulate what he sees as the clarity and rigor of the Scottish idealist’s thought. Greatly influenced by Frege and Vitters, Geach is particularly noted for his powerful use of what he calls “the Frege point,” better called “the Frege-Geach point,” that the same thought may occur as asserted or unasserted and yet retain the same truth-value. The point has been used by Geach to refute ascriptivist theories of responsibility, and can be employed against noncognitivist theories of ethics, which are said to face the Frege-Geach problem of accounting for the sense of moral ascriptions in contexts like ‘If he did wrong, he will be punished’. He is also noted for helping to bring Frege to the English-speaking world, through co-translations with Max Black 9 88. In logic he is known for proving, independently of Quine, a contradiction in Frege’s way out of Russell’s paradox Mind, 6, and for his defense of modern Fregean-Russellian logic against traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic logic. He also has a deep admiration for the Polish logicians. In metaphysics, Geach is known for his defense of relative identity, the thesis that an object a can be the same F where F is a kind-term as an object b while not being the same G, even though a and b are both G’s. His spirited defense of the thesis has been met by equally vigorous attacks, and it has not received wide acceptance. An obvious application of the thesis is to the defense of the doctrine of the Trinity e.g., the Father is the same god as the Son but not the same person, which has caught the attention of some philosophers of religion. Geach’s main works include Mental Acts 8, which attacks dispositional theories of mind, Reference and Generality 2, which contains much important work on logic, and the collection Logic Matters 2. A notable defender of Catholicism despite his animadversions against Scholastic logic, his religious views find their greatest exposure in God and the Soul 9, Providence and Evil 7, and The Virtues 7. He is married to the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. 

Grice’s genitorial programme – A type of ideal observer theory -- demiurge from Grecian demiourgos, ‘artisan’, ‘craftsman’, a deity who shapes the material world from the preexisting chaos. Plato introduces the demiurge in his Timaeus. Because he is perfectly good, the demiurge wishes to communicate his own goodness. Using the Forms as a model, he shapes the initial chaos into the best possible image of these eternal and immutable archetypes. The visible world is the result. Although the demiurge is the highest god and the best of causes, he should not be identified with the God of theism. His ontological and axiological status is lower than that of the Forms, especially the Form of the Good. He is also limited. The material he employs is not created by him. Furthermore, it is disorderly and indeterminate, and thus partially resists his rational ordering. In gnosticism, the demiurge is the ignorant, weak, and evil or else morally limited cause of the cosmos. In the modern era the term has occasionally been used for a deity who is limited in power or knowledge. Its first occurrence in this sense appears to be in J. S. Mill’s Theism 1874. 

gentile: g. idealist philosopher. He taught philosophy at Pisa. Gentile rejects Hegel’s dialectics as the process of an objectified thought. Gentile’s actualism or actual idealism claims that only the pure act of thinking or the transcendental subject can undergo a dialectical process. All reality, such as nature, God, good, and evil, is immanent in the dialectics of the transcendental subject, which is distinct from the empirical subject. Among his major works are “La teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro” and “Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere.” Gentile sees conversation is a concerted act that overcomes the apparent difficulties of inter-subjectivity and realizes a unity within two transcendental subjects. Actualism was pretty influential. With Croce’s historicism, it influenced two Oxonian idealists discussed by H. P. Grice: Bernard Bosanquet and R. G. Collingwood (vide: H. P. Grice, “Metaphysics,” in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, London, Macmillan).

genus: gender. H. P. Grice calls Austin an artless sexist when referring to the trouser word. We see how after Austin’s death, Grice more and more loses his reverential attitude towards the ‘school master’ and shows Austin for what he is! Gender implicaturum – Most languages have three genders: masculine, feminine, and neuter (or epicene, or common). feminist epistemology, epistemology from a feminist perspective. It investigates the relevance that the gender of the inquirer/knower has to epistemic practices, including the theoretical practice of epistemology. It is typified both by themes that are exclusively feminist in that they could arise only from a critical attention to gender, and by themes that are non-exclusively feminist in that they might arise from other politicizing theoretical perspectives besides feminism. A central, exclusively feminist theme is the relation between philosophical conceptions of reason and cultural conceptions of masculinity. Here a historicist stance must be adopted, so that philosophy is conceived as the product of historically and culturally situated hence gendered authors. This stance brings certain patterns of intellectual association into view  patterns, perhaps, of alignment between philosophical conceptions of reason as contrasted with emotion or intuition, and cultural conceptions of masculinity as contrasted with femininity. A central, non-exclusively feminist theme might be called “social-ism” in epistemology. It has two main tributaries: political philosophy, in the form of Marx’s historical materialism; and philosophy of science, in the form of either Quinean naturalism or Kuhnian historicism. The first has resulted in feminist standpoint theory, which adapts and develops the Marxian idea that different social groups have different epistemic standpoints, where the material positioning of one of the groups is said to bestow an epistemic privilege. The second has resulted in feminist work in philosophy of science which tries to show that not only epistemic values but also non-epistemic e.g. gendered values are of necessity sometimes an influence in the generation of scientific theories. If this can be shown, then an important feminist project suggests itself: to work out a rationale for regulating the influence of these values so that science may be more self-transparent and more responsible. By attempting to reveal the epistemological implications of the fact that knowers are diversely situated in social relations of identity and power, feminist epistemology represents a radicalizing innovation in the analytic tradition, which has typically assumed an asocial conception of the epistemic subject, and of the philosopher. -- feminist philosophy, a discussion of philosophical concerns that refuses to identify the human experience with the male experience. Writing from a variety of perspectives, feminist philosophers challenge several areas of traditional philosophy on the grounds that they fail 1 to take seriously women’s interests, identities, and issues; and 2 to recognize women’s ways of being, thinking, and doing as valuable as those of men. Feminist philosophers fault traditional metaphysics for splitting the self from the other and the mind from the body; for wondering whether “other minds” exist and whether personal identity depends more on memories or on physical characteristics. Because feminist philosophers reject all forms of ontological dualism, they stress the ways in which individuals interpenetrate each other’s psyches through empathy, and the ways in which the mind and body coconstitute each other. Because Western culture has associated rationality with “masculinity” and emotionality with “femininity,” traditional epistemologists have often concluded that women are less human than men. For this reason, feminist philosophers argue that reason and emotion are symbiotically related, coequal sources of knowledge. Feminist philosophers also argue that Cartesian knowledge, for all its certainty and clarity, is very limFechner’s law feminist philosophy 305   305 ited. People want to know more than that they exist; they want to know what other people are thinking and feeling. Feminist philosophers also observe that traditional philosophy of science is not as objective as it claims to be. Whereas traditional philosophers of science often associate scientific success with scientists’ ability to control, rule, and otherwise dominate nature, feminist philosophers of science associate scientific success with scientists’ ability to listen to nature’s self-revelations. Since it willingly yields abstract theory to the testimony of concrete fact, a science that listens to what nature says is probably more objective than one that does not. Feminist philosophers also criticize traditional ethics and traditional social and political philosophy. Rules and principles have dominated traditional ethics. Whether agents seek to maximize utility for the aggregate or do their duty for the sake of duty, they measure their conduct against a set of universal, abstract, and impersonal norms. Feminist philosophers often call this traditional view of ethics a “justice” perspective, contrasting it with a “care” perspective that stresses responsibilities and relationships rather than rights and rules, and that attends more to a moral situation’s particular features than to its general implications. Feminist social and political philosophy focus on the political institutions and social practices that perpetuate women’s subordination. The goals of feminist social and political philosophy are 1 to explain why women are suppressed, repressed, and/or oppressed in ways that men are not; and 2 to suggest morally desirable and politically feasible ways to give women the same justice, freedom, and equality that men have. Liberal feminists believe that because women have the same rights as men do, society must provide women with the same educational and occupational opportunities that men have. Marxist feminists believe that women cannot be men’s equals until women enter the work force en masse and domestic work and child care are socialized. Radical feminists believe that the fundamental causes of women’s oppression are sexual. It is women’s reproductive role and/or their sexual role that causes their subordination. Unless women set their own reproductive goals childlessness is a legitimate alternative to motherhood and their own sexual agendas lesbianism, autoeroticism, and celibacy are alternatives to heterosexuality, women will remain less than free. Psychoanalytic feminists believe that women’s subordination is the result of earlychildhood experiences that cause them to overdevelop their abilities to relate to other people on the one hand and to underdevelop their abilities to assert themselves as autonomous agents on the other. Women’s greatest strength, a capacity for deep relationships, may also be their greatest weakness: a tendency to be controlled by the needs and wants of others. Finally, existentialist feminists claim that the ultimate cause of women’s subordination is ontological. Women are the Other; men are the Self. Until women define themselves in terms of themselves, they will continue to be defined in terms of what they are not: men. Recently, socialist feminists have attempted to weave these distinctive strands of feminist social and political thought into a theoretical whole. They argue that women’s condition is overdetermined by the structures of production, reproduction and sexuality, and the socialization of children. Women’s status and function in all of these structures must change if they are to achieve full liberation. Furthermore, women’s psyches must also be transformed. Only then will women be liberated from the kind of patriarchal thoughts that undermine their self-concept and make them always the Other. Interestingly, the socialist feminist effort to establish a specifically feminist standpoint that represents how women see the world has not gone without challenge. Postmodern feminists regard this effort as an instantiation of the kind of typically male thinking that tells only one story about reality, truth, knowledge, ethics, and politics. For postmodern feminists, such a story is neither feasible nor desirable. It is not feasible because women’s experiences differ across class, racial, and cultural lines. It is not desirable because the “One” and the “True” are philosophical myths that traditional philosophy uses to silence the voices of the many. Feminist philosophy must be many and not One because women are many and not One. The more feminist thoughts, the better. By refusing to center, congeal, and cement separate thoughts into a unified and inflexible truth, feminist philosophers can avoid the pitfalls of traditional philosophy. As attractive as the postmodern feminist approach to philosophy may be, some feminist philosophers worry that an overemphasis on difference and a rejection of unity may lead to intellectual as well as political disintegration. If feminist philosophy is to be without any standpoint whatsoever, it becomes difficult to ground claims about what is good for women in particufeminist philosophy feminist philosophy 306   306 lar and for human beings in general. It is a major challenge to contemporary feminist philosophy, therefore, to reconcile the pressures for diversity and difference with those for integration and commonality. 

genus generalissimum: “I love a superlative: good, gooder and goodest, my favourites!” a genus that is not a species of some higher genus; a broadest natural kind. One of the ten Aristotelian categories, it is also called summum genus. For Aristotle and many of his followers, the ten categories (twelve in Kant, four in Grice) are *not* species of some higher all-inclusive genus  say, being. Otherwise, that alleged over-arching all-inclusive genus would wholly include the differences, say, between conversational quality, conversational quantity, conversational relation, and conversational mode, and would be universally predicable of conversational quality, conversational quantity, conversational relation, and conversational mode. But no genus is predicable of its differences in this manner. Few authors explained this reasoning clearly, but Grice did: “If I appeal to four conversational categories, I know what I am doing. The principle of conversational benevolence cannot float in the air: it needs four categories – informativeness, trustworthiness, connectedness and perspicuity – to make it applicable to our conversational realities. Grice points out that if the difference ‘rational’ just meant ‘rational animal’, to define ‘man’ as ‘rational animal’ would be to define him as ‘rational animal animal’, which would infringe the conversational maxims ‘be brief,’ and ‘do not be repetitive’ – “On toop, man is a rational animal animal is ill formed.” So too generally: no genus can include its differences in this way. Thus there is no all-inclusive genus. Grice’s four conversational categories are the most general conversational genera. 

charlier: a. k. a. gerson, j. de, philosopher. He studied in Paris, and succeeded the nominalist Pierre d’Ailly as chancellor of the varsity. Both d’Ailly and Gerson played a prominent part in the work of the Council of Constance. Much of Charlier’s influence on later thinkers arose from his conciliarism, the view that the church is a political society and that a general council, acting on behalf of the church, has the power to depose a pope who fails to promote the church’s welfare, for it seemed that similar arguments could apply to other forms of political society. Gerson’s conciliarism was not constitutionalism in the modern sense, for he appealed to corporate and hierarchical ideas of church government, and did not rest his case on any principle of individual rights. His main writings dealt with mystical theology, which, he thought, brings the believer closer to the beatific vision of God than do other forms of theology. He was influenced by St. Bonaventure and Albertus Magnus, but especially by Pseudo-Dionysius, whom he saw as a disciple of St. Paul and not as a Platonist. He was thus able to adopt an anti-Platonic position in his attacks on the mystic Ruysbroeck and on contemporary followers of Duns Scotus, such as Jean de Ripa. In dismissing Scotist realism, he made use of nominalist positions, particularly those that emphasized divine freedom. He warned theologians against being misled by pride into supposing that natural reason alone could solve metaphysical problems; and he emphasized the importance of a priest’s pastoral duties. Despite his early prominence, he spent the last years of his life in relative obscurity.

gersonides: a leading Aristotelian. His oeuvre includes supercommentaries on commentaries on Aristotle, On the Correct Syllogism, a treatise on the modal syllogism; and a major Scholastic treatise, The Wars of the Lord. In addition, his biblical commentaries rank among the best examples of philosophical scriptural exegesis; especially noteworthy is his interpretation of the Song of Songs as an allegory describing the ascent of the human intellect to the agent intellect. Gersonides’ mentors in the Aristotelian tradition were Maimonides and Averroes. However, more than either of them, Gersonides held philosophical truth and revealed truth to be coextensive: he acknowledged neither the conflict that Averroes saw between reason and revelation nor Maimonides’ critical view of the limitations of the human intellect. Furthermore, while remaining within the Aristotelian framework, Gersonides was not uncritical of it; his independence can be illustrated by two of his most distinctive positions. First, against Maimonides, Gersonides claimed that it is possible to demonstrate both the falsity of the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the world Averroes’ position and the absurdity of creation ex nihilo, the traditional rabbinic view that Maimonides adopted, though for nondemonstrative reasons. Instead Gersonides advocated the Platonic theory of temporal creation from primordial matter. Second, unlike Maimonides and Averroes, who both held that the alleged contradiction between divine foreknowledge of future contingent particulars and human freedom is spurious, Gersonides took the dilemma to be real. In defense of human freedom, he then argued that it is logically impossible even for God to have knowledge of particulars as particulars, since his knowledge is only of general laws. At the same time, by redefining ‘omniscience’ as knowing everything that is knowable, he showed that this impossibility is no deficiency in God’s knowledge. Although Gersonides’ biblical commentaries received wide immediate acceptance, subsequent medieval Jewish philosophers, e.g., Hasdai Crescas, by and large reacted negatively to his rigorously rationalistic positions. Especially with the decline of Aristotelianism within the philosophical world, both Jewish and Christian, he was either criticized sharply or simply ignored. 

get across – A more colloquial way for what Grice later will have as ‘soul-to-soul-transfer,’ used by Grice in Causal: Surely the truth or falsity of Strawson having a beautiful handwriting has no bearing on the truth or falsity of his being hopeless at philosophy (“provided that is what I intended to get across,” implicating, ‘who cares,’ or ‘whatever’). His cavalier attitude shows that Grice is never really concerned with the individuation of the logical form of the implicaturum, just to note that whatever some philosopher thought was part of the sense it ain’t! This is the Austinian in Grice. Austin suggested that Grice analysed or consult with Holdcroft for all ‘forms of indirect communication.’ Grice lists: mean, indicate, suggest, imply, insinuate, hint – ‘get across’.

geulincx: a. philosopher. Born in Antwerp, he was educated at Louvain and there became professor of philosophy and dean. He was forced out of Louvain, perhaps for his Jansenist or Cartesian tendencies, and in 1658 he moved to Leyden and became a Protestant. Though he taught there until his death, he never attained a regular professorship at the varsity. His main philosophical work is his “Ethica; or, De virtute et primis ejus proprietatibus.” Other oeuvre includes “Questiones quodlibeticae”; later editions published as “Saturnalia,” a “Logica” 1661, and a “Methodus inveniendi argumenta,”.”Physica vera,” “Physica peripatetica,” “Metaphysica vera,” “Metaphysica ad mentem peripateticam,” posthumous commentaries on Descartes’s Principia Philosophiae. Geulincx was deeply influenced by Descartes, and had many ideas that closely resemble those of the later Cartesians as well as those of more independent thinkers like Spinoza and Leibniz. Though his grounds were original, like many later Cartesians, Geulincx upholds a version of occasionalism; he argued that someone or something can only do what it knows how to do (in terms of strict physiological laws). From this Geulincx infers (“fallaciously,” according to Grice) from that that he (sc. Geulincx) cannot be the genuine cause of his own bodily movement. In discussing the mind-body relation, Geulincx used a clock analogy similar to one Leibniz used in connection with his preestablished harmony. Geulincx also held a view of mental and material substance reminiscent of that of Spinoza. Finally, he proposed a system of ethics grounded in the idea of a virtuous will. As Grice notes: “Despite the evident similarities between Geulincx’s views and the views of his more renowned contemporaries, it is very difficult to determine exactly what influence Geulincx may have had on them, and they may have had on him – but then who gives?”

colonna – e. giles di roma, ome, original name, a member of the order of the Hermits of St. Augustine, he studied arts at Augustinian house and theology at the varsity in Paris 1260 72 but was censured by the theology faculty 1277 and denied a license to teach as tutor. Owing to the intervention of Pope Honorius IV, he later returned from Italy to Paris to teach theology, was appointed general of his order, and became archbishop of Bourges. Colonna both defends and criticizes views of Aquinas. He held that essence and existence are really distinct in creatures, but described them as “things”; that prime matter cannot exist without some substantial form; and, early in his career, that an eternally created world is possible. He defended only one substantial form in composites, including man. Grice adds: “Colonna supported Pope Boniface VIII in his quarrel with Philip IV of France – and that was a bad choice.”

gilson: É., philosopher, historian, cofounder of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, and a major figure in Neo-Thomism. Gilson discovered medieval philosophy through his pioneering work on Descartes’s scholastic background. Gilson argues that early modern philosophy was incomprehensible without medieval thought, and that medieval philosophy itself did not represent the unified theory of reality that some Thomists had supposed. His studies of Duns Scotus, Augustine, Bernard, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Dante, and Abelard and Héloïse explore this diversity. But in his Gifford lectures 132, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Gilson attempts a broad synthesis of medieval teaching on philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, and employed it in his critique of modern philosophy, The Unity of Philosophical Experience 7. Most of all, Gilson attempted to reestablish Aquinas’s distinction between essence and existence in created being, as in Being and Some Philosophers 9. 

gioberti, v. philosopher, He was imprisoned and exiled for advocating  unification, and became a central political figure during the Risorgimento. His major political oeuvre, “Del primato morale e civile degli italiani,” argues for a federation of the  states. Gioberti’s philosophical theory, ontologism, in contrast to Hegel’s idealism, identifies the dialectics of Being with God’s creation. Gioberti condensed his theory in the formula: “Being creates the existent.” “L’essere crea l’essistente.” The dialectics of Being, which is the only necessary substance, is a “palingenesis,” or a return to its origin, in which the existent first departs from and imitates its creator (“mimesis”) and then returns to its creator (“methexis”). By intuition, the human mind comes in contact with God and discovers truth by retracing the dialectics of Being. However, knowledge of supernatural truths is given only by God’s revelation. His oeuvre also includes “Teorica del soprannaturale” and “Introduzione allo studio della filosofia.” Gioberti criticized modern philosophers such as Descartes for their psychologism  seeking truth from the human subject instead of from Being itself and its revelation. His thought is very influential in Italy.

datum: in epistemology, the “brute fact” element to be found or postulated as a component of perceptual experience. Some theorists who endorse the existence of a given element in experience think that we can find this element by careful introspection of what we experience Moore, H. H. Price. Such theorists generally distinguish between those components of ordinary perceptual awareness that constitute what we believe or know about the objects we perceive and those components that we strictly perceive. For example, if we analyze introspectively what we are aware of when we see an apple we find that what we believe of the apple is that it is a three-dimensional object with a soft, white interior; what we see of it, strictly speaking, is just a red-shaped expanse of one of its facing sides. This latter is what is “given” in the intended sense. Other theorists treat the given as postulated rather than introspectively found. For example, some theorists treat cognition as an activity imposing form on some material given in conscious experience. On this view, often attributed to Kant, the given and the conceptual are interdefined and logically inseparable. Sometimes this interdependence is seen as rendering a description of the given as impossible; in this case the given is said to be ineffable C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order. On some theories of knowledge foundationalism the first variant of the given  that which is “found” rather than “postulated”  provides the empirical foundations of what we might know or justifiably believe. Thus, if I believe on good evidence that there is a red apple in front of me, the evidence is the non-cognitive part of my perceptual awareness of the red appleshaped expanse. Epistemologies postulating the first kind of givenness thus require a single entity-type to explain the sensorial nature of perception and to provide immediate epistemic foundations for empirical knowledge. This requirement is now widely regarded as impossible to satisfy; hence Wilfred Sellars describes the discredited view as the myth of the given. 

glanvill: English philosopher who defended the Royal Society against scholasticism. Glanvill believes that certainty is possible in the mathematical but not in the empirical realm. In “The Vanity of Dogmatizing,” he claimed that the human corruption that resulted from Adam’s fall precludes dogmatic knowledge of nature. Using traditional sceptical arguments as well as an analysis of causality that anticipate Hume, Glanvill argues that empirical belief is the probabilistic variety acquired by piece-meal investigation. Despite his scepticism he argues for the existence of witches in Witches and Witchcraft (“Probably he was married to one,” Grice comments).

gnosticism: a philosophical movement, especially important under the leadership of Valentinus and Basilides. They teach that matter was evil, the result of a cosmic disruption in which an evil archon often associated with the god of the Old Testament, Yahweh rebelled against the heavenly pleroma the complete spiritual world. In the process divine sparks were unleashed from the pleroma and lodged in material human bodies. Jesus was a high-ranking archon Logos sent to restore those souls with divine sparks to the pleroma by imparting esoteric knowledge gnosis to them. Gnosticism influenced and threatened the orthodox church from within and without. NonChristian gnostic sects rivaled Christianity, and Christian gnostics threatened orthodoxy by emphasizing salvation by knowledge rather than by faith. Theologians like Clement of Alexandria and his pupil Origen held that there were two roads to salvation, the way of faith for the masses and the way of esoteric or mystical knowledge for the philosophers. Gnosticism profoundly influenced the C. of E., causing it to define its scriptural canon and to develop a set of creeds and an episcopal organization (“My mother, Mabel Fenton Grice, was a bit of a gnostic, if I must say” – Grice).

göckel: goclenius r., philosopher, after holding some minor posts elsewhere, he becomes professor at Marburg. “Though he was well read and knowledgeable of later trends in these disciplines,” Grice ntoes, “you could clearly see his basic sympathies areAristotelian.” Goclenius was very well regarded by his contemporaries, who called him “Plato marburgensis,” the Christian Aristotle, and “TheLight of Europe,” among other things. Göckel published an unusually large number of essays, including “Psychologia, hoc est de hominis perfection,” “Conciliator philosophicus,” “Controversiae logicae et philosophicae,” and numerous other works on logic, rhetoric, physics, metaphysics, and the Latin language. But his most lasting work is his “Lexicon Philosophicum” – “very practical,” Grice notes, “since the entries are alphabetically ordered.” -- together with its companion, the “Lexicon Philosophicum Graecum” – “I gave a copy to Urmson,” Grice recalls, “and the next day he was writing the “Greek Philosopical Lexicon.” Göckel’s “Lexicon philosophicum” provides pretty obscure definitions of the philosophical terminology of late Scholastic philosophy, and “they are deemed so obscure that he is banned from quotation at some varsities.” – Grice.

gödel: cited by Grice. His incompleteness theorems, two theorems formulated and proved by the Austrian logician Kurt Gödel in his infamous “Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der  Whiteheads und Russells ‘Principia Mathematica’ und vervandter Systeme I,” probably the most celebrated results in the whole of logic. They are aptly referred to as “incompleteness” theorems since each shows, for any member of a certain class of formal systems, that there is a sentence formulable in its language that it cannot prove, but that it would be desirable for it to prove. In the case of the first theorem G1, what cannot be proved is a true sentence of the language of the given theory. G1 is thus a disappointment to any theory constructor who wants his theory to tell the whole truth about its subject. In the case of the second theorem G2, what cannot be proved is a sentence of the theory that “expresses” its consistency. G2 is thus a disappointment to those who desire a straightforward execution of Hilbert’s Program. The proofs of the incompleteness theorems can be seen as based on three main ideas. The first is that of a Gödel numbering, i.e., an assignment of natural numbers to each of the various objects i.e., the terms, formulas, axioms, proofs, etc. belonging to the various syntactical categories of the given formal system T referred to here as the “represented theory” whose metamathematics is under consideration. The second is that of a representational scheme. This includes i the use of the Gödel numbering to develop number-theoretic codifications of various of the metamathematical properties pertaining to the represented theory, and ii the selection of a theory S hereafter, the “representing theory” and a family of formulas from that theory the “representing formulas” in terms of which to register as theorems various of the facts concerning the metamathematical properties of the represented theory thus encoded. The basic result of this representational scheme is the weak representation of the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of T, where a set L of numbers is said to be weakly represented in S by a formula ‘Lx’ of S just in case for every number n, n1 L if and only if ‘L[n]’ is a theorem of S, where ‘[n]’ is the standard term of S that, under the intended interpretation of S, designates the number n. Since the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of the represented theory T will typically be recursively enumerable, and the representing theory S must be capable of weakly representing this set, the basic strength requirement on S is that it be capable of weakly representing the recursively enumerable sets of natural numbers. Because basic systems of arithmetic e.g. Robinson’s arithmetic and Peano arithmetic all have this capacity, Gödel’s theorems are often stated using containment of a fragment of arithmetic as the basic strength requirement governing the capacities of the representing theory which, of course, is also often the represented theory. More on this point below. The third main idea behind the incompleteness theorems is that of a diagonal or fixed point construction within S for the notion of unprovability-in-T; i.e., the formulation of a sentence Gödel of S which, under the given Gödel numbering of T, the given representation of T’s metamathematical notions in S, and the intended interpretation of the language of S, says of itself that it is not provable-in-T. Gödel is thus false if provable and unprovable if true. More specifically, if ‘ProvTx’ is a formula of S that weakly represents the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of T in S, then Gödel can be any formula of S that is provably equivalent in S to the formula ‘- ProvT [Gödel]’. Given this background, G1 can be stated as follows: If a the representing theory S is any subtheory of the represented theory T up to and God Gödel’s incompleteness theorems 347   347 including the represented theory itself, b the representing theory S is consistent, c the formula ‘ProvT x’ weakly represents the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of the represented theory T in the representing theory S, and d Gödel is any sentence provably equivalent in the representing theory S to ‘ProvT [Gödel]’, then neither Gödel nor -Gödel is a theorem of the representing theory S. The proof proceeds in two parts. In the first part it is shown that, for any representing theory S up to and including the case where S % T , if S is consistent, then -Gödel is not a theorem of S. To obtain this in its strongest form, we pick the strongest subtheory S of T possible, namely S % T, and construct a reductio. Thus, suppose that 1 -Gödel is a theorem of T. From 1 and d it follows that 2 ‘ProvT[Gödel]’ is a theorem of T. And from 2 and c in the “if” direction it follows that 3 Gödel is a theorem of T. But 1 and 3 together imply that the representing theory T is inconsistent. Hence, if T is consistent, -Gödel cannot be a theorem of T. In the second part of the proof it is argued that if the representing theory S is consistent, then Gödel is not a theorem of it. Again, to obtain the strongest result, we let S be the strongest subtheory of T possible namely T itself and, as before, argue by reductio. Thus we suppose that A Gödel is a theorem of S % T . From this assumption and condition d it follows that B ‘-Provr [Gödel]’ is a theorem of S % T . By A and c in the “only if” direction it follows that C ‘ProvT [Gödel]’ is a theorem of S % T . But from B and C it follows that S % T  is inconsistent. Hence, Gödel is not provable in any consistent representing theory S up to and including T itself. The above statement of G1 is, of course, not the usual one. The usual statement suppresses the distinction stressed above between the representing and represented theories and collaterally replaces our condition c with a clause to the effect that T is a recursively axiomatizable extension of some suitably weak system of arithmetic e.g. Robinson’s arithmetic, primitive recursive arithmetic, or Peano arithmetic. This puts into a single clause what, metamathematically speaking, are two separate conditions  one pertaining to the representing theory, the other to the represented theory. The requirement that T be an extension of the selected weak arithmetic addresses the question of T’s adequacy as a representing theory, since the crucial fact about extensions of the weak arithmetic chosen is that they are capable of weakly representing all recursively enumerable sets. This constraint on T’s capabilities as a representing theory is in partnership with the usual requirement that, in its capacity as a represented theory, T be recursively axiomatizable. For T’s recursive axiomatizability ensures under ordinary choices of logic for T  that its set of theorems will be recursively enumerable  and hence weakly representable in the kind of representing theory that it itself by virtue of its being an extension of the weak arithmetic specified is. G1 can, however, be extended to certain theories whose sets of Gödel numbers of theorems are not recursively enumerable. When this is done, the basic capacity required of the representing theory is no longer merely that the recursively enumerable sets of natural numbers be representable in it, but that it also be capable of representing various non-recursively enumerable sets, and hence that it go beyond the weak arithmetics mentioned earlier. G2 is a more demanding result that G1 in that it puts significantly stronger demands on the formula ‘ProvT x’ used to express the notion of provability for the represented theory T. In proving G1 all that is required of ‘ProvT x’ is that it weakly represent θ % the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of T; i.e., that it yield an extensionally accurate registry of the theorems of the represented theory in the representing theory. G2 places additional conditions on ‘ProvT x’; conditions which result from the fact that, to prove G2, we must codify the second part of the proof of G1 in T itself. To do this, ‘ProvT x’ must be a provability predicate for T. That is, it must satisfy the following constraints, commonly referred to as the Derivability Conditions for ‘ProvT x’: I If A is a theorem of the represented theory, then ‘ProvT [A]’ must be a theorem of the representing theory. II Every instance of the formula ‘ProvT [A P B] P ProvT [A] P ProvT [B]’ must be a theorem of T. III Every instance of the formula ‘ProvT [A] P ProvT [ProvT [A]]’ must be a theorem of T. I, of course, is just part of the requirement that ‘ProvT [A]’ weakly represent T’s theoremset in T. So it does not go beyond what is required for the proof of G1. II and III, however, do. They make it possible to “formalize” the second part of the proof of G1 in T itself. II captures, in terms of ‘ProvT X’, the modus ponens inference by which B is derived from A, and III codiGödel’s incompleteness theorems Gödel’s incompleteness theorems 348   348 fies in T the appeal to c used in deriving C from A. The result of this “formalization” process is a proof within T of the formula ‘ConT P Gödel’ where ConT is a formula of the form ‘- ProvT [#]’, with ‘ProvT x’ a provability predicate for T and ‘[#]’ the standard numeral denoting the Gödel number # of some formula refutable in T . From this, and the proof of the second part of G1 itself in which the first Derivability Condition, which is just the “only if” direction of c, figures prominently, we arrive at the following result, which is a generalized form of G2: If S is any consistent representing theory up to and including the represented theory T itself, ‘ProvT x’ any provability predicate for T, and ConT any formula of T of the form ‘- ProvT [#]’, then ConT is not a theorem of S. To the extent that, in being a provability predicate for T, ‘ProvT x’ “expresses” the notion of provability of the represented theory T, it seems fair to say that ConT expresses its consistency. And to the extent that this is true, it is sensible to read G2 as saying that for any representing theory S and any represented theory T extending S, if S is consistent, then the consistency of T is not provable in S.  

fontaines: g. philosopher. He taught at Paris. Among his major writings are fifteen Quodlibetal Questions and other disputations. He was strongly Aristotelian in philosophy, with Neoplatonic influences in metaphysics. Fontaines defends the identity of essence and existence in creatures against theories of their real or intentional distinction, and argues for the possibility of demonstrating God’s existence and of some quidditative knowledge of God. He admits divine ideas for species but not for individuals within species. He makes wide applications (“and misapplications,” Grice adds) of Aristotelian act-potency theory  e.g., to the distinction between the soul and its powers (this is discussed by Grice in “The power structure of the soul”), to the explanation of intellection and volition, to the general theory of substance and accident, and in unusual fashion to essence-existence “composition” of creatures.

godwin: w. English philosopher. “An Enquiry concerning Political Justice” arises heated debate. Godwin argues for radical forms of determinism, anarchism, and utilitarianism. Godwin thought that government corrupts everyone by encouraging stereotyped thinking that prevents us from seeing each other as unique individuals. His “Caleb Williams” portrays a good man corrupted by prejudice. Once we remove prejudice and artificial inequality we will see that our acts are wholly determined. This obviously makes punishment pointless. Only in a small anarchic society – such as the one he observed outside Oxford -- can people see others as they really are and thus come to feel a ‘sympathetic concern’ for his well-being. (In this he influenced Edward Carpenter of “England Arise” infame). Only so can we be virtuous, because being virtuous is acting from a ‘sympathetic’ (cf. Grice’s principle of conversational sympathy) feeling to bring the greatest happiness to the dyad affected. Godwin takes this principle (relabeled “the principle of conversational sympathy” by Grice) quite literally, and accepts all its consequences. Truthfulness has no claim on us other than the happiness it brings. If keeping a promise causes less good than breaking it, there is no reason (or duty) at all to keep it. If one must choose between saving the life either of a major human benefactor or of one’s distant uncle, one must choose the benefactor. We surely need no ‘rules’ in morals. An alleged ‘moral’ “rule” would prevent us from seeing others properly, thereby impairing the sympathetic feeling that constitutes virtue. Rights, too, are pointless. Sympathetic people will act to help (or cooperate with) others. Later utilitarians like Bentham had difficulty in separating their positions from Godwin’s notorious views.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Godwin and the ethics of conversation.’

Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhn?:  j. w. v. Goethe, a ballad from Mignon that Goethe uses in Book II of his novel, The apprentice. Grice was amused by Searle’s example – “even if it misses its point!” An British soldier in the Second World War is captured by Italian troops. The British soldier wishes to get the Italian troops to believe that he is a *German* officer, in order to get them to release him. What he would like to do is to tell them, in German, or Italian, that he is a German officer (“Sono tedesco,” “Ich bin Deutsche”) but he does not know enough German, or Italian, to do such a simple thing as that. So he, as it were, attempts to put on a show of telling them that he is a German officer by reciting the only line of German that he knows, a line he learned at Clifton, to wit: ‘Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?”. The British soldier intends to produce a certain response in his Italian captors, viz. that they should believe him to be a German officer. He intends to produce this response by means of the Italian troops’s recognition of his intention to produce it. Nevertheless, it would seem false that when the British soldier utters, "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?” what he means or communicates is that  he is a German officer. Searle thinks he can support a claim that something is missing from Grice’s account of meaning. This would (Grice think Searle thinks) be improved if it were supplemented as follows (Grice’s conjecture): "U meant that p by x" means " U intended to produce in A a certain effect by means of the recognition of U's intention to produce that effect, and (if the utterance of x is the utterance of a sentence) U intends A's recognition of U's intention (to produce the effect) to be achieved by means of the recognition that the sentence uttered is conventionally used to produce such an effect." Now even if Grice should be faced with a genuine counterexample, he should be very reluctant to take the way out which Grice suspects is being offered him. Grice finds it difficult to tell whether this is what was being offered, since Searle is primarily concerned with the characterization of something different, not with a general discussion of the nature of meaning or communication. On top he is seems mainly concerned to adapt Grice’s account of meaning to a dissimilar purpose, and hardly, as Schiffer at least tried, to amend Grice’s analysis so as to be better suited to its avowed end. Of course Grice would not want to deny that when the vehicle of meaning is a sentence (or the utterance of a sentence, as in “Mary had a little lamb” – uttered by a German officer in France to have the French believe that he is an English officer) the utterer’s intentions are to be recognized, in the normal case, by virtue of a knowledge of the conventional use of the sentence (indeed Grice’s account of “conversational” or in general "non-conventional implicaturum" depends, in some cases, on something like this idea). But Grice treats meaning something by the utterance of a sentence as being only a SPECIAL case of meaning or communicating that p by an utterance (in Grice’s extended use of ‘utterance’ to include gestures and stuff), and to treat a ‘conventional’ co-relation between a sentence and a specific response as providing only one of the ways (or modes) in which an utterance may be correlated with a response. Is Searle’s “Kennst du das land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?” however, a genuine counterexample? It seems to Grice that the imaginary situation is under-described, and that there are perhaps three different cases to be considered. First, the situation might be such that the only real chance that the Italian soldiers would, on hearing the British soldier recite the line from Goethe suppose him to be a German officer, would be if the Italians were to, as they should not, argue as follows: "The British soldier has just recited the first line from Goethe’s “Faust,” in a surprisingly authoritative tone); He thinks we are silly enough to think he is, with the British uniform and all, a German soldier.” If the situation was such that the Italian soldier were likely to argue like that, and the British soldier knew that to be so, it would be difficult to avoid attributing to him the intention, when he recited the line from “Fuast”, that they should argue like that. One cannot in general intend that some result should be achieved, if one knows that there is no likelihood that it will be achieved. But if the British soldier’s intention is as just described, he certainly would not, by Grice’s account, be meaning that he is a German soldier. For though he would intend the Italian soldier to believe him to be a German soldier, he would not be intending the Italian soldier to believe this on the basis of the Italian soldier’s recognition of his intention. And it seems to Grice that though this is not how Searle wishes the example to be taken, it would be much the most likely situation to have obtained. Second, Grice thinks that Searle wants us to suppose that the British soldier hopes that the Italian soldier will each a belief that the English soldier is a German soldier via a belief that the line from Goethe which he uttered means other than what it does, for why would they NOT know the land where the lemon trees bloom? They are in it! It s not easy to see how to build up the context of utterance so as to give the English soldier any basis for his hope that the Italian soldier thinks that the English soldier thinks that the Italian soldier knows where the lemon trees bloom – his native land! Now it becomes doubtful whether, after all, it is right to say that the English solidier did not mean (unsuccessfully communicate) that he is a German soldier. Communication is not factive. That Geothe’s line translates as "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom" is totally irrelevant. If the English soldier could be said to have meant or communicated that he was a German soldier, he would have meant that by saying the line, or by saying the line in a particularly authoritative way. It makes a difference whether U merely intends A to think that a particular sentence has a certain meaning which it does not in fact have, or whether he also intends him to think of himself as supposed to make use of his (mistaken) thought that, metabolically, the expression has this ‘meaning’ in reaching a belief about U's intentions. If A is intended to think that U expects A to understand the sentence spoken and is intended to attribute to it, metabolically, a ‘meaning’ which U knows it does not have, he utterer should not be described as meaning, by his utterance, that p. Grice does not see the force of this contention, nor indeed does he find it easy or conceptually clear to apply the distinction which it attempts to make. The general point seems to be as follows. Characteristically, an utterer intends his recipient to recognize (and to think himself intended to recognize) some "crucial" feature F, and to think of F (and to think himself intended to think of F) as co-related in a certain way or mode with some response which the utterer intends the audience to produce. It does not matter so far as the attribution of the utterer’s meaning is concerned, whether F is thought by U to be *really* co-related in that way or mode with the response or not; though of course in the normal case U will think F to be so co-related. Suppose, however, we fill in the detail of the English soldier case, so as to suppose he accompanies "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen" with gesticulations, chest-thumping, and so forth; he might then hope to succeed in conveying to the Italian soldier that he intends them to understand what the line ‘means’, to learn from the particular German sentence that the English soldier intends them to think that he is a German officer (whereas really of course the English soldier does not expect them to learn that way, but only by assuming, on the basis of the situation and the character of the English soldier’s performance, that he must be trying to communicate to them, against all reasonable hopes, that he is a German officer. Perhaps in that case, we should be disinclined to say that the English soldier means or communicates that he is a German officer, and ready to say only that the English soldier means, naturally and metabolically, as it were, the Italian solider to think that he was a German officer. Grice goes on to suggest a revised set of conditions for " U meant something by x" (Redefinition III, Version A): Ranges of variables: A: audiences f: features of utterance r: responses c: modes of correlation (for example, iconic, associative, conventional) I63 H. P. GRICE (HA) (if) (3r) (ic): U uttered x intending (i) A to think x possessesf (2) A to think U intends (i) (3) A to think off as correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (4) A to think U intends (3) (5) A to think on the basis of the fulfillment of (i) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (6) A, on the basis of fulfillment of (5), to produce r (7) A to think U intends (6). In the case of the "little girl" there is a single feature f (that of being an utterance of a particular French sentence) with respect to which A has all the first four intentions. (The only thing wrong is that this feature is not in fact correlated conventionally with the intended responses, and this does not disqualify the utterance from being one by which U means something.) In the English soldier case there is no such single feature. The Italian soldier is intended (i) to recognize, and go by, feature f1 (x's being a bit of German and being uttered with certain gesticulations, and so. forth) but (2) to think that he is intended to recognize x as havingf2 (as being a particular German sentence). So intention (2) on our revised list is absent. And so we do not need the condition previously added to eliminate this example. I think, however, that condition (7) (the old condition [i]) is still needed, unless it can be replaced by a general "anti-deception" clause. It may be that such replacement is possible; it may be that the "backward-looking" subclauses (2), (4), and (7) can be omitted, and replaced by the prohibitive clause which figures in Redefinition II, Version B. We have then to consider the merits of Redefinition III, Version B, the definiens of which will run as follows: (3A) (if) (3r) (ic): (a) U uttered x intending (I) A to think x possessesf (2) A to thinkf correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (3) A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (I) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (4) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to produce r, and (b) there is no inference-element E such that U intends both (I') A in his determination of r to rely on E (2') A to think Uto intend (I') to be false. Grice would actually often play and sing the ballad. G. writer often considered the leading cultural figure of his age. He wrote lyric poetry, dramas, and fictional, essayistic, and aphoristic prose as well as works in various natural sciences, including anatomy, botany, and optics. A lawyer by training, for most of his life Goethe was a government official at the provincial court of Saxony-Weimar. In his numerous contributions to world literature, such as the novels The Sorrows of Young Werther, Wilhelm Meister’s Years of Apprenticeship, Elective Affinities, and Wilhelm Meister’s Years of Pilgrimage, and the two-part tragedy Faust, Goethe represented the tensions between individual and society as well as between culture and nature, with increased recognition of their tragic opposition and the need to cultivate a resigned self-discipline in artistic and social matters. In his poetic and scientific treatment of nature he was influenced by Spinoza’s pantheist identification of nature and God and maintained that everything in nature is animate and expressive of divine presence. In his theory and practice of science he opposed the quantitative and experimental method and insisted on a description of the phenomena that was to include the intuitive grasp of the archetypal forms or shapes underlying all development in nature. 

tipperary: music-hall cited by Grice. Grice liked the song and would often accompany himself at the piano (“in Eb always”). He especially loved to recite the three verses (“Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day,” “Paddy wrote a letter to his Irish Molly-O,” and “Molly wrote a neat reply to Irish Paddy-O”). Grice devises a possible counter-example to his account of ‘communication,’ or strictly the conditions that have to be met for the state of affairs “Emisor E communicates that p” to hold. In Grice’s scenario, a reminiscence shared by his father, at a musical soirée in 1912, at Harborne, Grice’s grandfather sings "Tipperary” “in a raucous voice” (those are Grice’s father’s words) with the intention of getting his mother-in-law (whom he knew was never too keen on the music-hall) to leave the drawing-room. Grice’s grandfather’s mother-in-law is supposed to recognise (and to know that she is intended to recognise) that Grice’s grandfather wants to get rid of his mother in law – “to put it bluntly,” as Grice’s father has it. Grice’s grandfather, moreover, intends that his mother-in-law shall, in the event, leave because she recognizes Grice’s grandfather’s intention that she  shall go. Grice’s grandfather’s scheme is that his mother-in-law should, somewhat wrongly, think that Grice’s grandfather intends his mother-in-law to think that he intends to get rid of her by means of the recognition of his intention that she should go. In other words, the mother-in-law is supposed to argue: "My son-in-law intends me to *think* that he intends to get rid of me by the raucous singing of that awful ditty complete with the three verses – starting with “Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day” -- but of course he, rude as he is, really wants to get rid of me by means of the recognition of his intention to get rid of me. I am really intended to go because he wants me to go, not because I cannot stand the singing – I suppose. I mean, I could possibly stand it, if tied up, or something." The fact that the mother in law, while thinking she is seeing through his son-in-law’s plans, is really *conforming* to them (a situation that would not hold if she is known by her son-in-law to be ‘counter-suggestible’), is suggested as precluding Grice from deeming, here, that his grandfather means by the singing in a raucuous voice the opening line to “Tipperary” in a raucuous voice (“Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day”) that his mother-in-law should go. However, it is clear to Grice that, once one tries to fill in the detail of this description, the example becomes baffling – “even if I myself designed it.” “For, how is my grandfather’s mother-in-law sposed to reach the idea that my grandfather wants her to think that he intends to get rid of her by singing in a raucuous voice “Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day”?” “My father tells me that my grandfather sould sing in a *particular nasal tone*, so common at the music-hall, which he knows *not* necessarily to be displeasing to his mother in law (when put to use to a respectable drawing-room ballad), though it is to most people that visit the Grices.” Grice’s grandfather’s mother in law knows that Grice’s grandfather knows this particular nasa tone not to be displeasing to her, but she thinks, rather wrongly, that Grice’s grandfaather does not know that his mother-in-law knows this (she would never display his tastes in public). The mother-in-law might then be supposed to argue: "My son-in-law cannot want to drive me out of the drawing-room by his singing, awful to most, since he knows that that particularly nasal tone is not really displeasing to me. My son-in-law, however, does not know that I know he knows this. Therefore, maybe my son-in-law is does wantsme to think that he intends to drive me out, on the ground of a mere cause, rather than a reason, *by* his singing." “At this point,” Grice notes, “one would expect my grandfather’s mother-in-law to be completely at a loss to explain my grandfather’s performance.” “I see no reason at all why my grandfather’s mother in-law should then suppose that he *really* wants to get rid of her in some other way.” Whether or not this example could be made to work, its complexity is ennerving. “And the sad thing about it, is that any attempt on my part to introduce yet further restrictions would involve more ennerving complexities still.” “It is in general true that one cannot have intentions to achieve results which one sees no chance of achieving; and the success of intentions of the kind involved in communication requires he to whom communications or near-communications is addressed to be capable in the circumstances of having certain thoughts and drawing certain conclusions.” At some early stage in the attempted regression the calculations required of my grandfather’s mother-in-lawy by my grandfather will be impracticably difficult; and I suspect the limit has now been reached (if not exceeded).” “So my grandfather, is he is a Grice, cannot have the intentions – as reconstructed by my father, this was way back in 1912 -- required of him in order to force the addition of further restrictions. Not only are the calculations my grandfather would be requiring of his mother-in-law too difficult, but it would be impossible for him to find cues to indicate to her that the calculations should be made, even if they were within his mother-in-law’s compass. So one is tempted to conclude that no regress is involved.” But even should this conclusion be correct, we seem to be left with an uncomfortable situation. For though we may know that we do not need an infinite series of backward-looking sub-clauses, we cannot say just how many such sub-clauses are required. “Indeed, it looks as if the definitional expansion of "By uttering x emisor E communicates that p" might have to vary from case to case, depending on such things as the nature of the intended response, the circumstances in which the attempt to elicit the response is made (say, a musical soirée at Harborne in mid-1912), and the intelligence of the utterer (in this case my grandfather) and of the addressee (his mother in law).” It is dubious whether such variation can be acceptable. However, Grice genially finds out that this ennerving difficulty (of the type some of Grice’s tutees trying to outshine him would display) is avoided if we could eliminate potential counter-examples not by requiring the emisor to have certain additional, backward-looking, intentions, but rather by requiring the emisor *not* to have a certain sort of intention or complex of intentions. Potential counterexamples of the kind involves the construction of a situation in which the emisor E intends the sendee S, in the reflection process by which the sendee S is supposed to reach his response, both to rely on some inference-element, i. e., ome premise or some inferential step, E, and also to think that the emisor E intends his sendee S not to rely on E. “What I propose, then, is to uproot such potential counterexamples by a single clause which prohibits the emisor from having this kind of complex intention.” We reach a redefinition: "the emisor E means that p by uttering x" is true iff (for some sendee S and for some response r): (a) the emisor U utters x intending (i) the sendee to produce r  (2) the sendee S to think the emisor E to intend (i) (3) the sendee S’s fulfillment of (i) to be based on the sendee S’s fulfillment of (2) (b) there is no inference-element E such that the emsior E utters x intending both (i') that the sendee S’s determination of r should rely on the inference element e and (2') that the sendee S should think the emisor E to intend that (I') be false.”

goldman: “literally, man of gold” – Grice. philosopher who has made notable contributions to action theory, naturalistic and social epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. He has persistently urged the relevance of cognitive and social science to problems in epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and ethics. A Theory of Human Action proposes a Griceian causal theory of action, describes the generative structure of basic and non-basic action, and argues for the compatibility of free will and determinism. In “Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition” 8, he argued that traditional epistemology should be replaced by ‘epistemics’, which differs from traditional epistemology in characterizing knowledge, justified belief, and rational belief in light of empirical cognitive science. Traditional epistemology has used a coarse-grained notion of belief, taken too restrictive a view of cognitive methods, offered advice for ideal cognizers rather than for human beings with limited cognitive resources, and ignored flaws in our cognitive system that must be recognized if cognition is to be improved. Epistemologists must attend to the results of cognitive science if they are to remedy these deficiencies in traditional epistemology. Goldman later developed epistemics in Epistemology and Cognition 6, in which he developed a historical, reliabilist theory of knowledge and epistemic justification and employed empirical cognitive science to characterize knowledge, evaluate skepticism, and assess human cognitive resources. In Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences and in Knowledge in a Social World 9, he defended and elaborated a veritistic i.e., truth-oriented evaluation of communal beliefprofiles, social institutions, and social practices e.g., the practice of restricting evidence admissible in a jury trial. He has opposed the widely accepted view that mental states are functional states “The Psychology of Folk Psychology,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 and defended a simulation theory of mental state attribution, on which one attributes mental states to another by imagining what mental state one would be in if one were in the other’s situation “In Defense of the Simulation Theory,” 2. He has also argued that cognitive science bears on ethics by providing information relevant to the nature of moral evaluation, moral choice, and hedonic states associated with the good e.g., happiness “Ethics and Cognitive Science,” 3. 

bonum: good-making characteristic, a characteristic that makes whatever is intrinsically or inherently good, good. Hedonists hold that pleasure and conducing to pleasure are the sole good-making characteristics. Pluralists hold that those characteristics are only some among many other goodmaking characteristics, which include, for instance, knowledge, friendship, beauty, and acting from a sense of duty. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “E. F. Carritt on an alleged ambiguity of ‘good.’”

goodman: n. very New-World philosopher who made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, and aesthetics. Like Quine, Goodman repudiates analyticity and kindred notions. Goodman’s work can be read as a series of investigations into how to do philosophy without them. A central concern is how symbols structure facts and our understanding of them. The Structure of Appearance 2 presents Goodman’s constructionalism. Pretheoretical beliefs are vague and mutually inconsistent. By devising an interpreted formal system that derives them from or explicates them in terms of suitable primitives, we bring them into logical contact, eliminate inconsistencies, and disclose unanticipated logical and theoretical connections. Multiple, divergent systems do justice to the same pretheoretical beliefs. All systems satisfying our criteria of adequacy are equally acceptable. Nothing favors any one of them over the others. Ways of Worldmaking 8 provides a less formal treatment of the same themes. Category schemes dictate criteria of identity for their objects. So mutually irreducible category schemes do not treat of the same things. Since a world consists of the things it comprises, irreducible schemes mark out different worlds. There are, Goodman concludes, many worlds if any. Inasmuch as the categories that define identity onditions on objects are human constructs, we make worlds. Languages of Art 8 argues that art, like science, makes and reveals worlds. Aesthetics is the branch of epistemology that investigates art’s cognitive functions. Goodman analyzes the syntactic and semantic structures of symbol systems, both literal and figurative, and shows how they advance understanding in art and elsewhere. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast4 poses the new riddle of induction. An item is grue if and only if it is examined before future time t and found to be green or is not so examined and is blue. All hitherto examined emeralds are both green and grue. What justifies our expecting future emeralds to be green, not grue? Inductive validity, the riddle demonstrates, depends on the characterization as well as the classification of the evidence class. ‘Green’ is preferable, Goodman maintains, because it is entrenched in inductive practice. This does not guarantee that inferences using ‘green’ will yield truths. Nothing guarantees that. But entrenched predicates are pragmatically advantageous, because they mesh with our habits of thought and other cognitive resources. Goodman’s other works include Problems and Projects 2, Of Mind and Other Matters 4, and Reconceptions 8, written with Catherine Z. Elgin. 

gorgias: Grecian Sophist – “never to be confused with a philosopher even if they were oh-so-much cleverer than your average one!” – Grice. A teacher of rhetoric from Leontini in Syracuse, Gorgias came to Athens as an ambassador from his city and caused a sensation with his artful oratory. He is known through references and short quotations in later writers, and through a few surviving texts  two speeches and a philosophical treatise. He taught a rhetorical style much imitated in antiquity, by delivering model speeches to paying audiences. Unlike other Sophists he did not give formal instruction in other topics, nor prepare a formal rhetorical manual. He was known to have had views on language, on the nature of reality, and on virtue. Gorgias’s style was remarkable for its use of poetic devices such as rhyme, meter, and elegant words, as well as for its dependence on artificial parallelism and balanced antithesis. His surviving speeches, defenses of Helen and Palamedes, display a range of arguments that rely heavily on what the ancients called eikos ‘likelihood’ or ‘probability’. Gorgias maintained in his “Helen” that a speech can compel its audience to action; elsewhere he remarked that in the theater it is wiser to be deceived than not. Gorgias’s short book On Nature or On What Is Not survives in two paraphrases, one by Sextus Empiricus and the other now considered more reliable in an Aristotelian work, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias. Gorgias argued for three theses: that nothing exists; that even if it did, it could not be known; and that even if it could be known, it could not be communicated. Although this may be in part a parody, most scholars now take it to be a serious philosophical argument in its own right. In ethics, Plato reports that Gorgias thought there were different virtues for men and for women, a thesis Aristotle defends in the Politics.

gracian: theorist of the  baroque. Born in Belmonte, he entered the Jesuit order in 1619 and became rector of the Jesuit  at Tarragona and a favorite of King Philip III. Gracián’s most important works are Agudeza y arte de ingenio “The Art of Worldly Wisdom,” 164248 and El criticón “The Critic,” 165157. The first provides philosophical support for conceptismo, a  literary movement that sought to create new concepts through the development of an elaborate style, characterized by subtlety agudeza and ingenious literary artifices. El criticón, written in the conceptist style, is a philosophical novel that pessimistically criticizes the evils of civilization. Gracián anticipates Rousseau’s noble savage in claiming that, although human beings are fundamentally good in the state of nature, they are corrupted by civilization. Echoing a common theme of  thought at the time, he attributes the nefarious influence of civilization to the confusion it creates between appearance and reality. But Gracián’s pessimism is tempered by faith: man has hope in the afterlife, when reality is finally revealed. Gracián wrote several other influential books. In El héroe “The Hero,” 1637 and El político “The Politician,” 1640, he follows Machiavelli in discussing the attributes of the ideal prince; El discreto “The Man of Discretion,” 1646 explores the ideal gentleman, as judged by  society. Most of Gracián’s books were published under pseudonyms to avoid censure by his order. Gorgias Gracián y Morales, Baltasar 351   351 Among authors outside Spain who used his ideas are Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Voltaire, and Rousseau.

grammaticum: Is there a ‘grammar’ of gestures? How loose can an Oxonian use ‘grammar’? Sometimes geography, sometimes botany – “Grammatica” the Romans never cared to translate. Although ‘literature’ is the cognate. – For some reasons, the Greeks were obsessed with the alphabet – It was a trivial ‘art’. Like ‘logic,’ and philosophy is NOT an art or ‘techne.’ A philosopher is not a technician – and hardly an artist like William Morris (his ‘arts and crafts’ is a joke since it translates in Latin to ‘ars et ars,’ and ‘techne kai techne’). The sad thing is that at MIT, as Grice knew, Chomsky is appointed professor of philosophy, and he mainly writes about ‘grammar’! Later, Chomsky tries to get more philosophical, but chooses the wrong paradigm – Cartesianism, the ghost in the machine, in Ryle’s parlance. Odly, Oxonians, who rarely go to grammar schools, see ‘grammar’ as a divinity, and talk of the logical grammar of a Ryleian agitation, say. It sounds high class because there is the irony that an Oxonian philosopher is surely not a common-or-garden grammarian, involved in the grammar of, say, “Die Deutsche Sprache.” The Oxonian is into the logical grammar. It is more of a ‘linguistic turn’ expression than the duller ‘conceptual analysis,’ or ‘linguistic philosophy.’ cf. logical form, and Russell, “grammar is a pretty good guide to logical form.” while philosophers would use grammar jocularly, Chomsky didnt. The problem, as Grice notes, is that Chomsky never tells us where grammar ends (“or begins for that matter.”) “Consider the P, karulising elatically.” When Carnap introduces the P, he talks syntax, not grammar. But philosophers always took semiotics more seriously than others. So Carnap is well aware of Morriss triad of the syntactics, the semantics, and the pragmatics. Philosophers always disliked grammar, because back in the days of Aelfric, philosophia was supposed to embrace dialectica and grammatica, and rhetorica. “It is all part of philosophy.” Truth-conditional semantics and implicatura. grammar, a system of rules specifying a language. The term has often been used synonymously with ‘syntax’, the principles governing the construction of sentences from words perhaps also including the systems of word derivation and inflection  case markings, verbal tense markers, and the like. In modern linguistic usage the term more often encompasses other components of the language system such as phonology and semantics as well as syntax. Traditional grammars that we may have encountered in our school days, e.g., the grammars of Latin or English, were typically fragmentary and often prescriptive  basically a selective catalog of forms and sentence patterns, together with constructions to be avoided. Contemporary linguistic grammars, on the other hand, aim to be descriptive, and even explanatory, i.e., embedded within a general theory that offers principled reasons for why natural languages are the way they are. This is in accord with the generally accepted view of linguistics as a science that regards human language as a natural phenomenon to be understood, just as physicists attempt to make sense of the world of physical objects. Since the publication of Syntactic Structures 7 and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax 5 by Noam Chomsky, grammars have been almost universally conceived of as generative devices, i.e., precisely formulated deductive systems  commonly called generative grammars  specifying all and only the well-formed sentences of a language together with a specification of their relevant structural properties. On this view, a grammar of English has the character of a theory of the English language, with the grammatical sentences and their structures as its theorems and the grammar rules playing the role of the rules of inference. Like any empirical theory, it is subject to disconfirmation if its predictions do not agree with the facts  if, e.g., the grammar implies that ‘white or snow the is’ is a wellformed sentence or that ‘The snow is white’ is not. The object of this theory construction is to model the system of knowledge possessed by those who are able to speak and understand an unlimited number of novel sentences of the language specified. Thus, a grammar in this sense is a psychological entity  a component of the human mind  and the task of linguistics avowedly a mentalistic discipline is to determine exactly of what this knowledge consists. Like other mental phenomena, it is not observable directly but only through its effects. Thus, underlying linguistic competence is to be distinguished from actual linguistic performance, which forms part of the evidence for the former but is not necessarily an accurate reflection of it, containing, as it does, errors, false starts, etc. A central problem is how this competence arises in the individual, i.e., how a grammar is inferred by a child on the basis of a finite, variable, and imperfect sample of utterances encountered in the course of normal development. Many sorts of observations strongly suggest that grammars are not constructed de novo entirely on the basis of experience, and the view is widely held that the child brings to the task a significant, genetically determined predisposition to construct grammars according to a well-defined pattern. If this is so, and since apparently no one language has an advantage over any other in the learning process, this inborn component of linguistic competence can be correctly termed a universal grammar. It represents whatever the grammars of all natural languages, actual or potential, necessarily have in common because of the innate linguistic competence of human beings. The apparent diversity of natural languages has often led to a serious underestimation of the scope of universal grammar. One of the most influential proposals concerning the nature of universal grammar was Chomsky’s theory of transformational grammar. In this framework the syntactic structure of a sentence is given not by a single object e.g., a parse tree, as in phrase structure grammar, but rather by a sequence of trees connected by operations called transformations. The initial tree in such a sequence is specified generated by a phrase structure grammar, together with a lexicon, and is known as the deep structure. The final tree in the sequence, the surface structure, contains the morphemes meaningful units of the sentence in the order in which they are written or pronounced. For example, the English sentences ‘John hit the ball’ and its passive counterpart ‘The ball was hit by John’ might be derived from the same deep structure in this case a tree looking very much like the surface structure for the active sentence except that the optional transformational rule of passivization has been applied in the derivation of the latter sentence. This rule rearranges the constituents of the tree in such a way that, among other changes, the direct object ‘the ball’ in deep structure becomes the surface-structure subject of the passive sentence. It is thus an important feature of this theory that grammatical grammar grammar 352   352 relations such as subject, object, etc., of a sentence are not absolute but are relative to the level of structure. This accounts for the fact that many sentences that appear superficially similar in structure e.g., ‘John is easy to please’, ‘John is eager to please’ are nonetheless perceived as having different underlying deep-structure grammatical relations. Indeed, it was argued that any theory of grammar that failed to make a deep-structure/surface-structure distinction could not be adequate. Contemporary linguistic theories have, nonetheless, tended toward minimizing the importance of the transformational rules with corresponding elaboration of the role of the lexicon and the principles that govern the operation of grammars generally. Theories such as generalized phrase-structure grammar and lexical function grammar postulate no transformational rules at all and capture the relatedness of pairs such as active and passive sentences in other ways. Chomsky’s principles and parameters approach 1 reduces the transformational component to a single general movement operation that is controlled by the simultaneous interaction of a number of principles or subtheories: binding, government, control, etc. The universal component of the grammar is thus enlarged and the contribution of languagespecific rules is correspondingly diminished. Proponents point to the advantages this would allow in language acquisition. Presumably a considerable portion of the task of grammar construction would consist merely in setting the values of a small number of parameters that could be readily determined on the basis of a small number of instances of grammatical sentences. A rather different approach that has been influential has arisen from the work of Richard Montague, who applied to natural languages the same techniques of model theory developed for logical languages such as the predicate calculus. This so-called Montague grammar uses a categorial grammar as its syntactic component. In this form of grammar, complex lexical and phrasal categories can be of the form A/B. Typically such categories combine by a kind of “cancellation” rule: A/B ! B P A something of category A/B combines with something of category B to yield something of category A. In addition, there is a close correspondence between the syntactic category of an expression and its semantic type; e.g., common nouns such as ‘book’ and ‘girl’ are of type e/t, and their semantic values are functions from individuals entities, or e-type things to truth-values T-type things, or equivalently, sets of individuals. The result is an explicit, interlocking syntax and semantics specifying not only the syntactic structure of grammatical sentences but also their truth conditions. Montague’s work was embedded in his own view of universal grammar, which has not, by and large, proven persuasive to linguists. A great deal of attention has been given in recent years to merging the undoubted virtues of Montague grammar with a linguistically more palatable view of universal grammar.  Refs.: One source is an essay on ‘grammar’ in the H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

gramsci: a. political leader whose imprisonment by the Fascists for his involvement with the  Communist Party had the ironical result of sparing him from Stalinism and enabling him to better articulate his distinctive political philosophy. He welcomes the Bolshevik Revolution as a “revolution against Capital” rather than against capitalism: as a revolution refuting the deterministic Marxism according to which socialism could arise only by the gradual evolution of capitalism, and confirming the possibility of the radical transformation of social institutions. In 1 he supported creation of the  Communist Party; as its general secretary from 4, he tried to reorganize it along more democratic lines. In 6 the Fascists outlawed all opposition parties. Gramsci spent the rest of his life in various prisons, where he wrote more than a thousand s of notes ranging from a few lines to chapterlength essays. These Prison Notebooks pose a major interpretive challenge, but they reveal a keen, insightful, and open mind grappling with important social and political problems. The most common interpretation stems from Palmiro Togliatti, Gramsci’s successor as leader of grammar, categorial Gramsci, Antonio 353   353 the  Communists. After the fall of Fascism and the end of World War II, Togliatti read into Gramsci the so-called  road to socialism: a strategy for attaining the traditional Marxist goals of the classless society and the nationalization of the means of production by cultural means, such as education and persuasion. In contrast to Bolshevism, one had to first conquer social institutions, and then their control would yield the desired economic and political changes. This democratic theory of Marxist revolution was long regarded by many as especially relevant to Western industrial societies, and so for this and other reasons Gramsci is a key figure of Western Marxism. The same theory is often called Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, referring to a relationship between two political units where one dominates the other with the consent of that other. This interpretation was a political reconstruction, based primarily on Gramsci’s Communist involvement and on highly selective passages from the Notebooks. It was also based on exaggerating the influence on Gramsci of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Gentile, and minimizing influences like Croce, Mosca, Machiavelli, and Hegel. No new consensus has emerged yet; it would have to be based on analytical and historical spadework barely begun. One main interpretive issue is whether Gramsci, besides questioning the means, was also led to question the ends of traditional Marxism. In one view, his commitment to rational persuasion, political realism, methodological fallibilism, democracy, and pluralism is much deeper than his inclinations toward the classless society, the abolition of private property, the bureaucratically centralized party, and the like; in particular, his pluralism is an aspect of his commitment to the dialectic as a way of thinking, a concept he adapted from Hegel through Croce. 

green: t. h.,  absolute idealist and social philosopher. The son of a clergyman, Green studied and taught at Oxford. His central concern was to resolve what he saw as the spiritual crisis of his age by analyzing knowledge and morality in ways inspired by Kant and Hegel. In his lengthy introduction to Hume’s Treatise, he argued that Hume had shown knowledge and morality to be impossible on empiricist principles. In his major work, “Prolegomena to Ethics,” Green contended that thought imposed relations on sensory feelings and impulses whose source was an eternal consciousness to constitute objects of knowledge and of desire. Furthermore, in acting on desires, rational agents seek the satisfaction of a self that is realized through their own actions. This requires rational agents to live in harmony among themselves and hence to act morally. In Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation Green transformed classical liberalism by arguing that even though the state has no intrinsic value, its intervention in society is necessary to provide the conditions that enable rational beings to achieve self-satisfaction. 

gregorius: I, Saint, called Gregory the Great c.540604, a pope and Roman political leader. Born a patrician, he was educated for public office and became prefect of Rome in 570. In 579, he was appointed papal representative in Constantinople, returning to Rome as counselor to Pope Pelagius II in 586. He was elected Pope Gregory I in 590. When the Lombards attacked Rome in 594, Gregory bought them off. Constantinople would neither cede nor defend Italy, and Gregory stepped in as secular ruler of what became the Papal States. He asserted the universal jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome, and claimed patriarchy of the West. His writings include important letters; the Moralia, an exposition of the Book of Job summarizing Christian theology; Pastoral Care, which defined the duties of the clergy for the Middle Ages; and Dialogues, which deals chiefly with the immortality of the soul, holding it could enter heaven immediately without awaiting the Last Judgment. His thought, largely Augustinian, is unoriginal, but was much quoted in the Middle Ages. 

gregory of Nyssa, Saint, Grecian theologian and mystic who tried to reconcile Platonism with Christianity. As bishop of Cappadocia in eastern Asia Minor, he championed orthodoxy and was prominent at the First Council of Constantinople. He related the doctrine of the Trinity to Plato’s ideas of the One and the Many. He followed Origen in believing that man’s material great chain of being Gregory of Nyssa 354   354 nature was due to the fall and in believing in the Apocatastasis, the universal restoration of all souls, including Satan’s, in the kingdom of God. 

rimini: gregorio di, philosopher, he studied in Italy, England, and France, and taught at the universities of Bologna, Padua, Perugia, and Paris before becoming prior general of the Hermits of St. Augustine in his native city of Rimini, about eighteen months before he died. Gregory earned the honorific title “the Authentic Doctor” because he was considered by many of his contemporaries to be a faithful interpreter of Augustine, and thus a defender of tradition, in the midst of the scepticism of Occam and his disciples regarding what could be known in natural philosophy and theology. Thus, in his commentary on Books I and II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Gregory rejected the view that because of God’s omnipotence he can do anything and is therefore unknowable in his nature and his ways. Gregory also maintained that after Adam’s fall from righteousness, men need, in conjunction with their free will, God’s help grace to perform morally good actions. In non-religious matters Gregory is usually associated with the theory of the complexe significabile, according to which the object of knowledge acquired by scientific proof is neither an object existing outside the mind, nor a word simplex or a proposition complexum, but rather the complexe significabile, that which is totally and adequately signified by the proposition expressed in the conclusion of the proof in question.

grice: as a count noun – “Lots of grice in the fields.” – One Scots to another -- count noun, a noun that can occur syntactically a with quantifiers ‘each’, ‘every’, ‘many’, ‘few’, ‘several’, and numerals; b with the indefinite article, ‘an’; and c in the plural form. The following are examples of count nouns CNs, paired with semantically similar mass nouns MNs: ‘each dollar / silver’, ‘one composition / music’, ‘a bed / furniture’, ‘instructions / advice’. MNs but not CNs can occur with the quantifiers ‘much’ and ‘little’: ‘much poetry / poems’, ‘little bread / loaf’. Both CNs and MNs may occur with ‘all’, ‘most’, and ‘some’. Semantically, CNs but not MNs refer distributively, providing a counting criterion. It makes sense to ask how many CNs?: ‘How many coins / gold?’ MNs but not CNs refer collectively. It makes sense to ask how much MN?: ‘How much gold / coins?’ One problem is that these syntactic and semantic criteria yield different classifications; another problem is to provide logical forms and truth conditions for sentences containing mass nouns.

grice: English philosopher, born in Harborne, “in the middle of nowhere,” as Strawson put it – (“He was from London, Strawson was”) -- whose work concerns perception and philosophy of language, and whose most influential contribution is the concept of a conversational implicaturum and the associated theoretical machinery of conversational ‘postulates.’ The concept of a conversational implicaturum is first used in his ‘presentation’ on the causal theory of perception and reference. Grice distinguishes between the ‘meaning’ of the words used in a sentence and what is implied by the utterer’s choice of words. If someone says “It looks as if there is a red pillar box in front of me,” the choice of words implies that there is some doubt about the pillar box being red. But, Grice argues, that is a matter of word choice and the sentence itself does not ‘impl’  that there is doubt. The term ‘conversational implicaturum’ was introduced in Grice’s William James lectures published in 8 and used to defend the use of the material implication as a logical translation of ‘if’. With Strawson “In Defence of Dogma”, Grice gives a spirited defense of the analyticsynthetic distinction against Quine’s criticisms. In subsequent systematic papers Grice attempts, among other things, to give a theoretical grounding of the distinction. Grice’s oeuvre is part of the Oxford ordinary language tradition, if formal and theoretical. He also explores metaphysics, especially the concept of absolute value. There is the H. P. Grice Society – Other organisations Grice-related are “The Grice Club,” “The Grice Circle,” and “H. P. Grice’s Playgroup.”

H. P. Grice’s playgroup: after the death of J. L. Austin, Grice kept the routine of the Saturday morning with a few new rules. 1. Freedom. 2. Freedom, and 3. Freedom.

Griceian. Grice disliked the spelling “Gricean” that some people in the New World use. “Surely my grandmother was right when she said she had become a Griceian by marrying a Grice!”

Brown, S. author of the Dictionary of British Philosophers (“I first thought of writing a dictionary of English philosophers, but then I thought that Russell would be out – he was born in Wales!.”

grice: g. r. – Welsh philosopher who taught at Norwich. Since H. P. Grice and G. R. Grice both wrote on the contract and morality, one has to be careful.

gricese: While Grice presented Gricese as refutation of Vitters’s idea of a private language “I soon found out that my wife and my two children were speaking Gricese, as was my brother Derek!” -- english, being English or the genius of the ordinary. H. P. Grice refers to “The English tongue.” A refusal to rise above the facts of ordinary life is characteristic of classical Eng. Phil.  from Ireland-born Berkeley to Scotland-born Hume, Scotland-born Reid, and very English Jeremy Bentham and New-World Phil. , whether in transcendentalism Emerson, Thoreau or in pragmatism from James to Rorty. But this orientation did not become truly explicit until after the linguistic turn carried out by Vienna-born Witters, translated by C. K. Ogden, very English Brighton-born Ryle, and especially J. L. Austin and his best companion at the Play Group, H. P. Grice, when it was radicalized and systematized under the name of a phrase Grice lauged at: “‘ordinary’-language philosophy.” This preponderant recourse to the ordinary seems inseparable from certain peculiar characteristics of the English Midlanders such as H. P. Grice, such as the gerund that often make it difficult if not impossible to translate. It is all the more important to emphasize this paradox because English Midlander philosopher, such as H. P. Grice, claims to be as simple as it is universal, and it established itself as an important philosophical language in the second half of the twentieth century, due mainly to the efforts of H. P. Grice. English, but especially Oxonian Phil.  has a specific relationship to ‘ordinary’ language (even though for Grice, “Greek and Latin were always more ordinary to me – and people who came to read Eng. at Oxford were laughed at!”), as well as to the requirements of everyday life, that is not limited to the theories of the Phil.  of language, in which an Eng. philosopher such as H. P. Grice appears as a pioneer. It rejects the artificial linguistic constructions of philosophical speculation that is, Met. and always prefers to return to its original home, as Witters puts it: the natural environment of everyday words Philosophical Investigations. Thus we can discern a continuity between the recourse to the ordinary in Scots Hume, Irish Berkeley, Scots Reid, and very English Jeremy Bentham and what will become in Irish London-born G. E. Moore and Witters after he started using English, at least orally and then J. L. Austin’s and H. P. Grice’s ‘ordinary’-language philosophy. This continuity can be seen in several areas. First, in the exploitation of all the resources of the language, which is considered as a source of information and is valid in itself. Second, in the attention given to the specificities—and even the defects, or ‘implicatura,’ as Grice calls them —of the vernacular --  which become so many philosophical characteristics from which one can learn. Finally, in the affirmation of the naturalness of the distinctions made in and by ordinary language, seeking to challenge the superiority of the technical language of Philosophy —the former being the object of an agreement deeper than the latter. Then there’s The Variety of Modes of Action. The passive. There are several modes of agency, and these constitute both part of the genius of the language and a main source of its problems in tr.. Agency is a strange intersection of points of view that makes it possible to designate the person who is acting while at the same time concealing the actor behind the act—and thus locating agency in the passive subject itself v. AGENCY. A classic difficulty is illustrated by the following sentence from J. Stuart Mill’s To gauge the naturalness of the passive construction in English, it suffices to examine a couple of newspaper headlines. “Killer’s Car Found” On a retrouvé la voiture du tueur, “Kennedy Jr. Feared Dead.” On craint la mort du fils Kennedy; or the titles of a philosophical essay, “Epistemology Naturalized,” L’Épistémologie naturalisée; Tr.  J. Largeault as L’Épistémologie devenue naturelle; a famous article by Quine that was the origin of the naturalistic turn in American Phil.  and “Consciousness Explained” La conscience expliquée by Daniel Dennett. We might then better understand why this PASSIVE VOICE kind of construction—which seems so awkward in Fr.  compared with the active voice— is perceived by its Eng. users as a more direct and effective way of speaking. More generally, the ellipsis of the agent seems to be a tendency of Eng. so profound that one can maintain that the phenomenon Lucien Tesnière called diathèse récessive the loss of the agent has become a characteristic of the Eng. language itself, and not only of the passive. Thus, e. g. , a Fr.  reader irresistibly gains the impression that a reflexive pronoun is lacking in the following expressions. “This book reads well.” ce livre se lit agréablement. “His poems do not translate well.” ses poèmes se traduisent difficilement. “The door opens.” la porte s’ouvre. “The man will hang.” l’homme sera pendu. In reality, here again, Eng. simply does not need to mark by means of the reflexive pronoun se the presence of an active agent. Do, make, have Eng. has several terms to translate the single Fr.  word faire, which it can render by to do, to make, or to have, depending on the type of agency required by the context. Because of its attenuation of the meaning of action, its value as emphasis and repetition, the verb “to do” has become omnipresent in English, and it plays a particularly important role in philosophical texts. We can find a couple of examples of tr. problems in the Oxonian seminars by J. L. Austin. In Sense and Considerations on Representative Government: “I must not be understood to say that” p. To translate such a passive construction, Fr.  is forced to resort to the impersonal pronoun on and to put it in the position of an observer of the “I” je as if it were considered from the outside: On ne doit pas comprendre que je dis que p. But at the same time, the network of relations internal to the sentence is modified, and the meaning transformed. Necessity is no longer associated with the subject of the sentence and the author; it is made impersonal. Philosophical language also makes frequent use of the diverse characteristics of the passive. Here we can mention the crucial turning point in the history of linguistics represented by Chomsky’s discovery Syntactic Structures,  of the paradigm of the active/ passive relation, which proves the necessity of the transformational component in grammar. A passive utterance is not always a reversal of the active and only rarely describes an undergoing, as is shown by the example She was offered a bunch of flowers. In particular, language makes use of the fact that this kind of construction authorizes the ellipsis of the agent as is shown by the common expression Eng. spoken. For a philosopher, the passive is thus the privileged form of an action when its agent is unknown, indeterminate, unimportant, or, inversely, too obvious. Thus without making his prose too turgid, in Sense and Sensibilia Austin can use five passives in less than a page, and these can be translated in Fr.  only by on, an indeterminate subject defined as differentiated from moi. “It is clearly implied, that “Now this, at least if it is taken to mean The expression is here put forward We are given, as examples, familiar objects The expression is not further defined On sous-entend clairement que Quant à cela, du moins si on l’entend au sens de On avance ici l’expression On nous donne, comme exemples, des objets familiers On n’approfondit pas la définition de l’expression . . . 1 Langage, langue, parole: A virtual distinction. Contrary to what is too often believed, the Eng. language does not conflate under the term language what Fr.  distinguishes following Saussure with the terms langage, langue, and parole. In reality, Eng. also has a series of three terms whose semantic distribution makes possible exactly the same trichotomy as Fr. : First there’s Grice’s “tongue,”which serves to designate a specific language by opposition to another; speech, which refers more specifically to parole but which is often translated in Fr.  by discours; and language in the sense of faculté de langage. Nonetheless, Fr. ’s set of systematic distinctions can only remain fundamentally virtual in English, notably because the latter refuses to radically detach langue from parole. Thus in Chrestomathia, Bentham uses “tongue” (Bentham’s tongue – in Chrestomathia) and language interchangeably and sometimes uses language in the sense of langue: “Of all known languages the Grecian [Griceian] is assuredly, in its structure, the most plastic and most manageable. Bentham even uses speech and language as equivalents, since he speaks of parts of speech. But on the contrary, he sometimes emphasizes differences that he ignores here. And he proceeds exactly like Hume in his essay Of the Standard of Taste, where we find, e. g. , But it must also be allowed, that some part of the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the very nature of language. The word, virtue, with its equivalent in every tongue, implies praise; as that of vice does blame. REFS.: Bentham, Jeremy. ChrestomathiEd.  by M. J. Smith and W. H. Burston. Oxford: Clarendon, . Hume, D. . Of the Standard of Taste. In Four Dissertations. London: Thoemmes Continuum, . First published in 175 Saussure, F. de. Course in General Linguistics. Ed.  by Bally and Sechehaye. Tr.  R. Harris. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, . First published in circulation among these forms. This formal continuity promotes a great methodological inventiveness through the interplay among the various grammatical entities that it enables.  The gerund: The form of -ing that is the most difficult to translate Eng. is a nominalizing language. Any verb can be nominalized, and this ability gives the Eng. philosophical language great creative power. “Nominalization,” as Grice calls it, is in fact a substantivization without substantivization: the verb is not substantivized in order to refer to action, to make it an object of discourse which is possible in any language, notably in philosophical Fr.  and G. , but rather to nominalize the verb while at the same time preserving its quality as a verb, and even to nominalize whole clauses. Fr.  can, of course, nominalize faire, toucher, and sentir le faire, le toucher, even le sentir, and one can do the same, in a still more systematic manner, in G. . However, these forms will not have the naturalness of the Eng. expressions: the making and unmaking the doing and undoing, the feeling, the feeling Byzantine, the meaning. Above all, in these languages it is hard to construct expressions parallel to, e. g. , the making of, the making use of, my doing wrongly, “my meaning this,” (SIGNIFICATUM, COMMUNICATUM), his feeling pain, etc., that is, mixtures of noun and verb having—and this is the grammatical characteristic of the gerund — the external distribution of a nominal expression and the internal distribution of a verbal expression. These forms are so common that they characterize, in addition to a large proportion of book titles e. g. , The Making of the Eng. Working Class, by E. P. Thomson; or, in Phil. , The Taming of Chance, or The taming of the true, by I. Hacking, the language of classical Eng. Phil. . The gerund functions as a sort of general equivalent or exchanger between grammatical forms. In that way, it not only makes the language dynamic by introducing into it a permanent temporal flux, but also helps create, in the language itself, a kind of indeterminacy in the way it is parsed, which the translator finds awkward when he understands the message without being able to retain its lightness. Thus, in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume speaks, regarding the idea, of the manner of its being conceived, which a Fr.  translator might render as sa façon d’être conçue or perhaps, la façon dont il lui appartient d’être conçue, which is not quite the same thing. And we v. agency and the gerund connected in a language like that of Bentham, who minimizes the gaps between subject and object, verb and noun: much regret has been suggested at the thoughts of its never having yet been brought within the reach of the Eng. reader ChrestomathiTranslators often feel obliged to render the act expressed by a gerund by the expression le fait de, but this has a meaning almost contrary to the English. With its gerund, Eng. avoids the discourse of fact by retaining only the event and arguing only on that basis. The inevitable confusion suggested by Fr.  when it translates the Eng. gerund is all the more unfortunate in this case because it becomes impossible to distinguish when Eng. uses the fact or the case from when it uses the gerund. The importance of the event, along with the distinction between trial, case, and event, on the one hand and happening on the other, is Sensibilia, he has criticized the claim that we never perceive objects directly and is preparing to criticize its negation as well: I am not going to maintain that we ought to embrace the doctrine that we do perceive material things. Je ne vais pas soutenir que nous devons embrasser la doctrine selon laquelle nous percevons vraiment les choses matérielles. Finally, let us recall Austin’s first example of the performative, which plays simultaneously on the anaphoric value of do and on its sense of action, a duality that v.ms to be at the origin of the theory of the performative, I do take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife—as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony Oui à savoir: je prends cette femme pour épouse’énoncé lors d’une cérémonie de mariage; How to Do Things with Words. On the other hand, whereas faire is colored by a causative sense, Eng. uses to make and to have—He made Mary open her bags il lui fit ouvrir sa valise; He had Mary pour him a drink il se fit verser un verre—with this difference: that make can indicate, as we v., coercion, whereas have presupposes that there is no resistance, a difference that Fr.  can only leave implicit or explain by awkward periphrases. Twentieth-century Eng. philosophers from Austin to Geach and Anscombe have examined these differences and their philosophical implications very closely. Thus, in A Plea for Excuses, Austin emphasizes the elusive meaning of the expression doing something, and the correlative difficulty of determining the limits of the concept of action—Is to sneeze to do an action? There is indeed a vague and comforting idea that doing an action must come down to the making of physical movements. Further, we need to ask what is the detail of the complicated internal machinery we use in acting. Philosophical Papers No matter how partial they may be, these opening remarks show that there is a specific, intimate relation between ordinary language and philosophical language in English language Phil. . This enables us to better understand why the most Oxonian philosophers are so comfortable resorting to idiomatic expressions cf. H. Putnam and even to clearly popular usage: “Meanings ain’t in the head.” It ain’t necessarily so.As for the title of Manx-ancestry Quine’s famous book From a Logical Point of View, which at first seems austere, it is taken from a calypso song: “From a logical point of view, Always marry women uglier than you. The Operator -ing: Properties and Antimetaphysical Consequences -ing: A multifunctional operator Although grammarians think it important to distinguish among the forms of -ing—present participles, adjectives, the progressive, and the gerund—what strikes the reader of scientific and philosophical texts is first of all the free in Phil. , You are v.ing something Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, regarding a stick in water; I really am perceiving the familiar objects Ayer, Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. The passage to the form be + verb + -ing indicates, then, not the progressiveness of the action but rather the transition into the metalanguage peculiar to the philosophical description of phenomena of perception. The sole exception is, curiously, to know, which is practically never used in the progressive: even if we explore the philosophical and epistemological literature, we do not find “I am knowing” or he was knowing, as if knowledge could not be conceived as a process. In English, there is a great variety of what are customarily called aspects, through which the status of the action is marked and differentiated in a more systematic way than in Fr.  or G. , once again because of the -ing ending: he is working / he works / he worked / he has been working. Unlike what happens in Slavic languages, aspect is marked at the outset not by a duality of verbal forms but instead by the use of the verb to be with a verb ending in -ing imperfect or progressive, by opposition to the simple present or past perfect. Moreover, Grice mixes several aspects in a single expression: iterativity, progressivity, completion, as in it cannot fail to have been noticed Austin, How to Do Things. These are nuances, or implicate, as Labov and then Pinker recently observed, that are not peculiar to classical or written Eng. but also exist in certain vernaculars that appear to be familiar or allegedly ungrammatical. The vernacular seems particularly sophisticated on this point, distinguishing “he be working” from “he working” —that is, between having a regular job and being engaged in working at a particular moment, standard usage being limited to “he is working” Pinker, Language Instinct. Whether or not the notion of aspect is used, it seems clear that in Eng. there is a particularly subtle distinction between the different degrees of completion, of the iterativity or development of an action, that leads Oxonian philosophers to pay more attention to these questions and even to surprising inventions, such as that of ‘implicaturum,’ or ‘visum,’ or ‘disimplicaturum.’ The linguistic dissolution of the idea of substance  Fictive entities Thus the verb + -ing operation simply gives the verb the temporary status of a noun while at the same time preserving some of its syntactic and semantic properties as a verb, that is, by avoiding substantivization. It is no accident that the substantiality of the I think asserted by Descartes was opposed by virtually all the Eng. philosophers of the seventeenth century. If a personal identity can be constituted by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, it does not require positing a substance: the substantivization of making and giving meets the need. We can also consider the way in which Russell Analysis of Matter, ch.27 makes his reader understand far more easily than does Bachelard, and without having to resort to the category of an epistemological obstacle, that one can perfectly well posit an atom as a series of events without according it the status of a substance. crucial in discussions of probability. The very definition of probability with which Bayes operates in An Essay towards Solving a Problem, the first great treatise on subjective probability, is based on this status of the happening, the event conceived not in terms of its realization or accomplishment but in terms of its expectation: The probability of any event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the value of the thing expected upon its happening.  The progressive: Tense and aspect If we now pass from the gerund to the progressive, another construction that uses -ing, a new kind of problem appears: that of the aspect and temporality of actions. An interesting case of tr. difficulty is, e. g. , the one posed by Austin precisely when he attempts, in his presentation of performatives, to distinguish between the sentence and the act of saying it, between statement and utterance: there are utterances, such as the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action How to Do Things. The tr. difficulty here is caused by the combination in the construction in -ing of the syntactical flexibility of the gerund and a progressive meaning. Does the -ing construction indicate the act, or the progressiveness of the act? Similarly, it is hard to choose to translate “On Referring” P. F. Strawson as De la référence rather than as De l’action de référer. Should one translate On Denoting Russell as De la dénotation the usual tr. or as Du dénoter? The progressive in the strict sense—be + verb + -ing— indicates an action at a specific moment, when it has already begun but is not yet finished. A little farther on, Austin allows us to gauge the ease of Eng. in the whole of these operations. “To utter the sentence is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing. The Fr.  tr. gives, correctly: Énoncer la phrase, ce n’est pas décrire ce qu’il faut bien reconnaître que je suis en train de faire en parlant ainsi, but this remains unsatisfying at best, because of the awkwardness of en train de. Moreover, in many cases, en train de is simply not suitable insofar as the -ing does not indicate duration: e. g. , in At last I am v.ing . It is interesting to examine from this point of view the famous category of verbs of perception, verbum percipiendi. It is remarkable that these verbs v., hear can be in some cases used with the construction be + verb + -ing, since it is generally said even in grammar books that they can be used only in the present or simple past and not in the progressive. This rule probably is thought to be connected with something like the immediacy of perception, and it can be compared with the fact that the verbs to know and to understand are also almost always in the present or the simple past, as if the operations of the understanding could not be presented in the progressive form and were by definition instantaneous; or as if, on the contrary, they transcended the course of time. In reality, there are counterexamples. “I don’t know if I’m understanding you correctly”; You are hearing voices; and often Oxonian Phil. , which makes their tr. particularly indigestible, especially in Fr. , where -ismes gives a very Scholastic feel to the classifications translated. In addition to the famous term realism, which has been the object of so many contradictory definitions and so many debates over past decades that it has been almost emptied of meaning, we may mention some common but particularly obscure for anyone not familiar with the theoretical context terms: “cognitivism,” noncognitivism, coherentism, eliminativism, consequentialism, connectionism, etSuch terms in which moral Phil.  is particularly fertile are in general transposed into Fr.  without change in a sort of new, international philosophical language that has almost forgone tr.. More generally, in Eng. as in G. , words can be composed by joining two other words far more easily than in Fr. —without specifying the logical connections between the terms: toothbrush, pickpocket, lowlife, knownothing; or, for more philosophical terms: aspect-blind, language-dependent, rule-following, meaning-holism, observer-relative, which are translatable, of course, but not without considerable awkwardness.  Oxonian philosophese.  Oxonian Phil.  seems to establish a language that is stylistically neutral and appears to be transparently translatable. Certain specific problems—the tr. of compound words and constructions that are more flexible in Eng. and omnipresent in current philosophical discourse, such as the thesis that la thèse selon laquelle, the question whether la question de savoir si, and my saying that le fait que je dise que—make Fr.  tr.s of contemporary Eng. philosophical texts very awkward, even when the author writes in a neutral, commonplace style. Instead, these difficulties, along with the ease of construction peculiar to English, tend to encourage non-Oxonian analytical philosophers to write directly in Gricese, following the example of many of their European colleagues, or else to make use of a technical vernacular we have noted the -isms and compounds that is frequently heavy going and not very inventive when transRomang terms which are usually transliterated. This situation is certainly attributable to the paradoxical character of Gricese, which established itself as a philosophical language in the second half of the twentieth century: it is a language that is apparently simple and accessible and that thus claims a kind of universality but that is structured, both linguistically and philosophically, around major stumbling blocks to do, -ing, etthat often make it untranslatable. It is paradoxically this untranslatability, and not its pseudo-transparency, that plays a crucial role in the process of universalization. . IThe Austinian Paradigm: Ordinary Language and Phil.  The proximity of ordinary language and philosophical language, which is rooted in classical English-language Phil. , was theorized in the twentieth century by Austin and can be summed up in the expression “‘ordinary’-language philosophy”. Ordinary language Phil.  is interested This sort of overall preeminence in Eng. of the verbal and the subjective over the nominal and the objective is clear in the difference in the logic that governs the discourse of affectivity in Fr.  and in English. How would something that one is correspond to something that one has, as in the case of fear in Fr.  avoir peur? It follows that a Fr. man—who takes it for granted that fear is something that one feels or senses—cannot feel at home with the difference that Eng. naturally makes between something that has no objective correlative because it concerns only feeling like fear; and what is available to sensation, implying that what is felt through it has the status of an object. Thus in Eng. something is immediately grasped that in Fr.  v.ms a strange paradox, viz. that passion, as Bentham notes in Deontology, is a fictive entity. Thus what sounds in Fr.  like a nominalist provocation is implicated in the folds of the Eng. language. A symbolic theory of affectivity is thus more easily undertaken in Eng. than in Fr. , and if an ontological conception of affectivity had to be formulated in English, symmetrical difficulties would be encountered.  Reversible derivations Another particularity of English, which is not without consequences in Phil. , is that its poverty from the point of view of inflectional morphology is compensated for by the freedom and facility it offers for the construction of all sorts of derivatives. Nominal derivatives based on adjectives and using suffixes such as -ity, -hood, -ness, -y. The resulting compounds are very difficult to differentiate in Fr.  and to translate in general, which has led, in contemporary Fr.  tr.s, to various incoherent makeshifts. To list the most common stumbling blocks: privacy privé-ité, innerness intériorité, not in the same sense as interiority, vagueness caractère vague, goodness bonté, in the sense of caractère bon, rightness  justesse, “sameness,” similarité, in the sense of mêmeté, ordinariness, “appropriateness,” caractère ordinaire, approprié, unaccountability caractère de ce dont il est impossible de rendre compte. Adjectival derivatives based on nouns, using numerous suffixes: -ful, -ous, -y, -ic, -ish, -al e.g., meaningful, realistic, holistic, attitudinal, behavioral. Verbal derivatives based on nouns or adjectives, with the suffixes -ize, -ify, -ate naturalize, mentalize, falsify, and even without suffixes when possible e.g., the title of an article “How Not to Russell Carnap’s Aufbau,” i.e., how not to Russell Carnap’s Aufbau. d. Polycategorial derivatives based on verbs, using suffixes such as -able, -er, -age, -ismrefutable, truthmaker. The reversibility of these nominalizations and verbalizations has the essential result of preventing the reification of qualities or acts. The latter is more difficult to avoid in Fr.  and G. , where nominalization hardens and freezes notions compare intériorité and innerness, which designates more a quality, or even, paradoxically, an effect, than an entity or a domain. But this kind of ease in making compounds has its flip side: the proliferation of -isms in liberties with the natural uses of the language. The philosophers ask, e. g. , how they can know that there is a real object there, but the question How do I know? can be asked in ordinary language only in certain contexts, that is, where it is always possible, at least in theory, to eliminate doubt. The doubt or question But is it a real one? has always must have a special basis, there must be some reason for suggesting that it isn’t real, in the sense of some specific way in which it is suggested that this experience or item may be phoney. The wile of the metaphysician consists in asking Is it a real table? a kind of object which has no obvious way of being phoney and not specifying or limiting what may be wrong with it, so that I feel at a loss how to prove it is a real one. It is the use of the word real in this manner that leads us on to the supposition that real has a single meaning the real world, material objects, and that a highly profound and puzzling one. Austin, Philosophical Papers This analysis of real is taken up again in Sense and Sensibilia, where Austin criticizes the notion of a sense datum and also a certain way of raising problems supposedly on the basis of common opinion e. g. , the common opinion that we really perceive things—but in reality on the basis of a pure construction. To state the case in this way, Austin says, is simply to soften up the plain man’s alleged views for the subsequent treatment; it is preparing the way for, by practically attributing to him, the so-called philosophers’ view. Phil. ’s frequent recourse to the ordinary is characterized by a certain condescension toward the common man. The error or deception consists in arguing the philosopher’s position against the ordinary position, because if the in what we should say when. It is, in other words, a Phil.  of language, but on the condition that we never forget that we are looking not merely at words or ‘meanings,’ whatever they may be but also at the realities we use the words to talk about, as Austin emphasizes A Plea for Excuses, in Philosophical Papers. During the twentieth century or more precisely, between the 1940s and the s, there was a division of the paradigms of the Phil.  of language between the logical clarification of ordinary language, on the one hand, and the immanent examination of ordinary language, on the other. The question of ordinary language and the type of treatment that it should be given—a normative clarification or an internal examination—is present in and even constitutive of the legacy of logical positivism. Wittgenstein’s work testifies to this through the movement that it manifests and performs, from the first task of the Phil.  of language the creation of an ideal or formal language to clarify everyday language to the second the concern to examine the multiplicity of ordinary language’s uses. The break thus accomplished is such that one can only agree with Rorty’s statement in his preface to The Linguistic Turn that the only difference between Ideal Language Philosophers and Ordinary Language Philosophers is a disagreement about which language is ideal. In the renunciation of the idea of an ideal language, or a norm outside language, there is a radical change in perspective that consists in abandoning the idea of something beyond language: an idea that is omnipresent in the whole philosophical tradition, and even in current analytical Phil. . Critique of language and Phil.  More generally, Austin criticizes traditional Phil.  for its perverse use of ordinary language. He constantly denounces Phil. ’s abuse of ordinary language—not so much that it forgets it, but rather that it exploits it by taking 2 A defect in the Eng. language? Between according to Bentham Eng. philosophers are not very inclined toward etymology—no doubt because it is often less traceable than it is in G.  or even in Fr.  and discourages a certain kind of commentary. There are, however, certain exceptions, like Jeremy Bentham’s analysis of the words “in,” “or,” “between,” “and,” etc., -- cf. Grice on “to” and “or” – “Does it make sense to speak of the ‘sense’ of ‘to’?” -- through which Eng. constructs the kinds of space that belong to a very specific topiLet us take the case of between, which Fr.  can render only by the word entre. Both the semantics and the etymology of entre imply the number three in Fr. , since what is entre intervenes as a third term between two others which it separates or brings closer in Lat., in-ter; in Fr., en tiers; as a third. This is not the case in English, which constructs between in accord with the number two in conformity with the etymology of this word, by tween, in pairs, to the point that it can imagine an ordering, even when it involves three or more classes, only in the binary mode: comon between three? relation between three?—the hue of selfcontradictoriness presents itself on the very face of the phrase. By one of the words in it, the number of objects is asserted to be three: by another, it is asserted to be no more than two. To the use thus exclusively made of the word between, what could have given rise, but a sort of general, howsoever indistinct, perception, that it is only one to one that objects can, in any continued manner, be commodiously and effectually compared. The Eng. language labours under a defect, which, when it is compared in this particular with other European langues, may perhaps be found peculiar to it. By the derivation, and thence by the inexcludible import, of the word between i.e., by twain, the number of the objects, to which this operation is represented as capable of being applied, is confined to two. By the Roman inter—by its Fr.  derivation entre—no such limitation v.ms to be expressed. Chrestomathia REFS.: Bentham, Jeremy. ChrestomathiEd.  by M. J. Smith and W. H. Burston. Oxford: Clarendon, To my mind, experience proves amply that we do come to an agreement on what we should say when such and such a thing, though I grant you it is often long and difficult. I should add that too often this is what is missing in Phil. : a preliminary datum on which one might agree at the outset. We do not claim in this way to discover all the truth that exists regarding everything. We discover simply the facts that those who have been using our language for centuries have taken the trouble to notice. Performatif-Constatif Austinian agreement is possible for two reasons:  Ordinary language cannot claim to have the last word. Only remember, it is the first word Philosophical Papers. The exploration of language is also an exploration of the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men ibid..  Ordinary language is a rich treasury of differences and embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations. These are certainly more subtle and solid than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon ibid.. It is this ability to indicate differences that makes language a common instrument adequate for speaking things in the world. Who is we? Cavell’s question It is clear that analytical Phil. , especially as it has developed in the United States since the 1940s, has moved away from the Austinian paradigm and has at the same time abandoned a certain kind of philosophical writing and linguistic subtlety. But that only makes all the more powerful and surprising the return to Austin advocated by Stanley Cavell and the new sense of ordinary language Phil.  that is emerging in his work and in contemporary American Phil. . What right do we have to refer to our uses? And who is this we so crucial for Austin that it constantly recurs in his work? All we have, as we have said, is what we say and our linguistic agreements. We determine the meaning of a given word by its uses, and for Austin, it is nonsensical to ask the question of meaning for instance, in a general way or looking for an entity; v. NONSENSE. The quest for agreement is founded on something quite different from signification or the determination of the common meaning. The agreement Austin is talking about has nothing to do with an intersubjective consensus; it is not founded on a convention or on actual agreements. It is an agreement that is as objective as possible and that bears as much on language as on reality. But what is the precise nature of this agreement? Where does it come from, and why should so much importance be accorded to it? That is the question Cavell asks, first in Must We Mean What We Say? and then in The Claim of Reason: what is it that allows Austin and Witters to say what they say about what we say? A claim is certainly involved here. That is what Witters means by our agreement in judgments, and in language it is based only on itself, on the latter exists, it is not on the same level. The philosopher introduces into the opinion of the common man particular entities, in order then to reject, amend, or explain it. The method of ordinary language: Be your size. Small Men. Austin’s immanent method comes down to examining our ordinary use of ordinary words that have been confiscated by Phil. , such as ‘true’ and ‘real,’ in order to raise the question of truth: Fact that is a phrase designed for use in situations where the distinction between a true statement and the state of affairs about which it is a truth is neglected; as it often is with advantage in ordinary life, though seldom in Phil. . So speaking about the fact that is a compendious way of speaking about a situation involving both words and world. Philosophical Papers We can, of course, maintain along with a whole trend in analytical Phil.  from Frege to Quine that these are considerations too small and too trivial from which to draw any conclusions at all. But it is this notion of fact that Austin relies on to determine the nature of truth and thus to indicate the pertinence of ordinary language as a relationship to the world. This is the nature of Austin’s approach: the foot of the letter is the foot of the ladder ibid.. For Austin, ordinary words are part of the world: we use words, and what makes words useful objects is their complexity, their refinement as tools ibid.: We use words to inform ourselves about the things we talk about when we use these words. Or, if that v.ms too naïve: we use words as a way of better understanding the situation in which we find ourselves led to make use of words. What makes this claim possible is the proximity of dimension, of size, between words and ordinary objects. Thus philosophers should, instead of asking whether truth is a substance, a quality, or a relation, take something more nearly their own size to strain at ibid.. The Fr.  translators render size by mesure, which v.ms excessively theoretical; the reference is to size in the material, ordinary sense. One cannot know everything, so why not try something else? Advantages of slowness and cooperation. Be your size. Small Men. Conversation cited by Urmson in A Symposium Austin emphasizes that this technique of examining words which he ended up calling linguistic phenomenology (and Grice linguistic botany) is not new and that it has existed since Socrates, producing its slow successes. But Grice is the first to make a systematic application of such a method, which is based, on the one hand, on the manageability and familiarity of the objects concerned and, on the other hand, on the common agreement at which it arrives in each of its stages. The problem is how to agree on a starting point, that is, on a given. This given or datum, for Grice, is Gricese, not as a corpus consisting of utterances or words, but as the site of agreement about what we should say when. Austin regards language as an empirical datum or experimental dat -- Bayes, T. . An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, with Richard Price’s Foreword and Discussion. In Facsimiles of Two Papers by Bayes. : Hafner, . First published in 176 Bentham, Jeremy. ChrestomathiEd.  by M. J. Smith and W. H. Burston. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Deontology. Ed.  by Goldworth. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Essay on Language. In The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed.  by J. Bowring. Edinburgh: W. Tait, 18384 Berkeley, George. Of Infinities. In vol. 2 of The Works, ed.  by Luce and T. E. Jessop, 4081 London: Nelson, 19485 Reprint, : Kraus, . . A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Ed.  by J. Dancy. Oxford: Oxford , . Cavell, Stanley. The Claim of Reason. : Oxford , . . In Quest of the Ordinary. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . . Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge: Cambridge , . . This New Yet Unapproachable AmericAlbuquerque: Living Batch Press, . Chomsky, Noam. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton, . Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Essays, First and Second Series. : Library of America, . Hacking, Jan. Why Does Language Matter to Phil. ? Cambridge: Cambridge , . Hume, D. . Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Ed.  by D. Coleman. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Essays, Moral, Political and Literary Ed.  by E. F. Miller. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, . . A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed.  by L. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford . 197 Laugier, SandrDu réel à l’ordinaire. : Vrin, . . Recommencer la philosophie. : Presses Universitaires de France, . Locke, J.. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford , . Mill, J. Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. In Essays on Pol. and Society, vol. 19 of Collected Works, ed.  by J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, . . Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society. Vol. 10 of Collected Works, ed.  by J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, . . A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, . Nedeljkovic, Maryvonne. D.  Hume, approche phénoménologique de l’action et théorie linguistique. : Presses Universitaires de France, . Pinker, Steven. The Language Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind. London: Penguin, . Putnam, Hilary. Mind, Language and Reality. Vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Realism with a Human Face. Ed.  by J. Conant.  , . Quine, Willard V. From a Logical Point of View.  , 195 . Word and Object. , . Ricœur, Paul. Memory, History, Forgetting. Tr.  K. Blamey and D. Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . Rorty, Richard, ed. The Linguistic Turn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . First published . Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Matter. London: Allen and Unwin, 195 . An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. : Routledge, . First published in 1950. Tesnière, Lucien. Éléments de syntaxe structural. : Klincksieck, . Urmson, J. O., W.V.O. Quine, and S. Hampshire. A Symposium on Austin’s Method. In Symposium on J. L. Austin, ed.  by K. T. Fann. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and the Brown Books. Ed.  by R. Rhees. Oxford: Blackwell, . First published in 195 . Philosophical Investigations. Tr.  G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 195 we, as Cavell says in a passage that illustrates many of the difficulties of tr. we have discussed up to this point: We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing ensures that this projection will take place in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules, just as nothing ensures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That we do, on the whole, is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and ‑of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of organism Witterscalls forms of life. Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple as it is and because it is  terrifying. Must We Mean What We Say? The fact that our ordinary language is based only on itself is not only a reason for concern regarding the validity of what we do and say, but also the revelation of a truth about ourselves that we do not always want to recognize: the fact that I am the only possible source of such a validity. That is a new understanding of the fact that language is our form of life, precisely its ordinary form. Cavell’s originality lies in his reinvention of the nature of ordinary language in American thought and in the connection he establishes—notably through his reference to Emerson and Thoreau, American thinkers of the ordinary—between this nature of language and human nature, finitude. It is also in this sense that the question of linguistic agreements reformulates that of the ordinary human condition and that the acceptance of the latter goes hand in hand with the recognition of the former. In Cavell’s Americanization of ordinary language Phil.  there thus emerges a radical form of the return to the ordinary. But isn’t this ordinary, e. g. , that of Emerson in his Essays, precisely the one that the whole of Eng. Phil.  has been trying to find, or rather to feel or taste, since its origins? Thus we can compare the writing of Emerson or James, in texts like Experience or Essays in Radical Empiricism, with that of the British empiricists when they discuss experience, the given, and the sensible. This is no doubt one of the principal dimensions of philosophical writing in English: always to make the meaning more available to the senses. J.-Pierre Cléro Sandra Laugier REFS.: Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Performatif-Constatif. In La philosophie analytique, ed.  by J. Wahl and L. Beck. : Editions du Minuit, . Tr. in Performative-Constative. In Phil.  and Ordinary Language, ed.  by E. Caton. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, . . Philosophical Papers. Ed.  by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Sense and SensibiliOxford: Clarendon, . Ayer, J. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan, 1940. ENTREPRENEUR 265 form the basis of the kingdom by means of calculated plans; to the legal domain: someone who contravenes the hierarchical order of the professions and subverts their rules; finally, to the economic domain: someone who agrees, on the basis of a prior contract an established price to execute a project collection of taxes, supply of an army, a merchant expedition, construction, production, transaction, assuming the hazards related to exchange and time. This last usage corresponds to practices that became more and more socially prominent starting in the sixteenth century. Let us focus on the term in economics. The engagement of the entrepreneur in his project may be understood in various ways, and the noun entrepreneur translated in various ways into English: by contractor if the stress is placed on the engagement with regard to the client to execute the task according to conditions negotiated in advance a certain time, a fixed price, firm price, tenant farming; by undertaker now rare in this sense when we focus on the engagement in the activity, taking charge of the project, its practical realization, the setting in motion of the transaction; and by adventurer, enterpriser, and projector, to emphasize the risks related to speculation. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Fr.  word entreprise acquired the new meaning of an industrial establishment. Entrepreneur accordingly acquired the sense of the head or direction of a business of production superintendent, employer, manager. In France, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the noun entrepreneur had strong political connotations, in particular in the abundant pamphlets containing mazarinades denouncing the entrepreneurs of tax farming. The economist Pierre de Boisguilbert wrote the Factum de la France, the largest trial ever conducted by pen against the big financiers, entrepreneurs of the wealth of the kingdom, who take advantage of its good administration its political economy in the name of the entrepreneurs of commerce and industry, who contribute to the increase in its wealth. Boisguilbert failed in his project of reforming the tax farm, or tax business, and it was left to a clever financier, Richard Cantillon, to create the economic concept of the entrepreneur. Chance in Business: Risk and Uncertainty There is no trace of Boisguilbert’s moral indignation in Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature du commerce en générale Essay on the nature of commerce in general. Having shown that all the classes and all the men of a State live or acquire wealth at the expense of the owners of the land bk. 1, ch.12, he suggests that the circulation and barter of goods and merchandise, like their production, are conducted in Europe by entrepreneurs and haphazardly bk. 1, of ch.1 He then describes in detail what composes the uncertain aspect of the action of an entrepreneur, in which he acts according to his ideas and without being able to predict, in which he conceives and executes his plans surrounded by the hazard of events. The uncertainty related to business profits turns especially on the fact that it is dependent on the forms of consumption of the owners, the only members of society who are independent—naturally independent, Cantillon specified. Entrepreneurs are those who are capable of breaking ÉNONCÉ Énoncé, from the Roman enuntiare to express, divulge; from ex out and nuntiare to make known; a nuntius is a messenger, a nuncio, ranges over the same type of entity as do proposition and phrase: it is a basic unit of syntax, the relevant question being whether or not it is the bearer of truth values. An examination of the differences among these entities, and the networks they constitute in different languages especially in English: sentence, statement, utterance, appears under PROPOSITION. V. also DICTUM and LOGOS, both of which may be acceptably Tr.  énoncé. Cf. PRINCIPLE, SACHVERHALT, TRUTH, WORD especially WORD, Box  The essential feature of an énoncé is that it is considered to be a singular occurrence and thus is paired with its énonciation: v. SPEECH ACT; cf. ENGLISH, LANGUAGE, SENSE, SIGN, SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED, WITTICISM. v.  DISCOURSE ENTREPRENEUR FR.  ENG. adventurer, contractor, employer, enterpriser, entrepreneur, manager, projector, undertaker, superintendent v.  ACT, AGENCY, BERUF, ECONOMY, LIBERAL, OIKONOMIA, PRAXIS, UTILITY. Refs.: G. J. Warnock, “English philosophy,” H. P. Grice, “Gricese,” BANC.

Grice’s handwave. A sort of handwave can mean in a one-off act of communication something. It’s the example he uses. By a sort of handwave, the emissor communicates either that he knows the route or that he is about to leave the addressee. Handwave signals. Code. Cfr. the Beatles’s HELP. Explicatum: We need some body – Implicaturum: Not just Any Body. Why does this matter to the philosopher? The thing is as follows. Grice was provoked by Austin. To defeat Austin, Grice needs a ‘theory of communication.’ This theory applies his early reflections on the intentional side to an act of communication. This allows him to explain the explicatum versus the implicaturum. By analysing each, Grice notes that there is no need to refer to linguistic entities. So, the centrality of the handwave is an offshoot of his theory designed to defeat Austin. Gice: “Blame Paget for my obsession with the hand.” – Refs.: Paget, “Ta-ta: when the hands are full, use your mouth.” – H. P. Grice, The utterer’s hand-wave.”

Grice’s creatures: the pirots. The programme  he calls ‘creature construction.’ “I could have used the ‘grice,’ which was extinct by the time I was born.”

Grice’s myth. Or Griceian myths – The Handbook of Griceian mythology. At one point Grice suggests that his ‘genitorial programme’ a kind of ideal-observer theory is meant as ‘didactic,’ and for expository purposes. It seems easier, as , as Grice and Plato would agree, to answer a question about the genitorial programme rather than use a first-person approach and appeal to introspection. Grice refers to the social contract as a ‘myth,’ which may still explain, as ‘meaning’ does. G. R. Grice built his career on this myth. This is G. R. Grice, of the social-contract fame. Cf. Strawson and Wiggins comparing Grice’s myth with Plato’s, and they know what they are talking about.

Grice’s predicament.  S draws a pic- "one-off predicament"). ... Clarendon, 1976); and Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) ... But there is an obvious way of emending the account. Grice points out. ... Blackburn helpfully suggests that we can cut through much of this complexity by ... The above account is intended to capture the notion of one-off meaning. Walking in a forest, having gone some way ahead of the rest of the party, I draw an arrow at a fork of a path, meaning that those who are following me should go straight on. Gricean considerations may be safely ignored. Only when trying to communicate by nonconventional means ("one-off predicament," Blackburn, 1984, chap. Blackburn's mission is to promote the philosophy of language as a pivotal enquiry ... and dismissed; the Gricean model might be suitable to explain one-off acts. The Gricean mechanism with its complex communicative intentions has a clear point in what Blackburn calls “a one-off predicament” - a situation in which an ...

Grice’s shaggy-dog story: While Grice would like to say that it should be in the range of a rational creature to refer and to predicate, what about the hand wave? By his handwave, the emissor means that _HE_ (subject) is a knower of the road (or roate), the predicate after the copula or that he, the emissor, subject, is (the copula) about to leave his emissee – but there is nothing IN THE MATTER (the handwave) that can be ‘de-composed’ like that. The FORM attaches to the communicatum directly. This is strange, but not impossible, and shows Grice’s programme. Because his idea is that a communicatum need not a vehicile which is syntactically structured (as “Fido is shaggy”). This is the story that Grice tells in his lecture. He uses a ‘shaggy-dog’ story to explain TWO main notions: that of ‘reference’ or denotatio, and that of predicatio. He had explored that earlier when discussing, giving an illustration “Smith is happy”, the idea of ‘value,’ as correspondence, where he adds the terms for ‘denote’ and ‘predicatio,’ or actually, ‘designatio’ and ‘indicatio’, need to be “explained within the theory.” In the utterance ‘Smith is happy,’ the utterer DESIGNATES an item, Smith. The utterer also INDICATES some class, ‘being happy.’ Grice introduces a shorthand, ‘assign’, or ‘assignatio,’ previous to the value-satisfaction, to involve both the ‘designatio’ and the ‘indicatio’. U assigns the item Smith to the class ‘being happy.’ U’s intention involves A’s belief that U believes that “the item belongs to the class, or that he ASSIGNS the item to the class. A predicate, such as 'shaggy,' in my shaggy-dog story, is a part of a bottom-up, or top-bottom, as I prefer, analysis of this or that sentences, and a predicate, such as 'shaggy,' is the only indispensable 'part,' or 'element,' as I prefer, since a predicate is the only 'pars orationis,' to use the old phrase, that must appear in every sentence. In a later lecture he ventures with ‘reference.’ Lewis and Short have “rĕferre,” rendered as “to bear, carry, bring, draw, or give back,” in a “transf.” usage, they render as “to make a reference, to refer (class.),” asa in “de rebus et obscuris et incertis ad Apollinem censeo referendum; “ad quem etiam Athenienses publice de majoribus rebus semper rettulerunt,” Cic. Div. 1, 54, 122.” While Grice uses ‘Fido,’ he could have used ‘Pegasus’ (Martin’s cat, as it happens) and apply Quine’s adage: we could have appealed to the ex hypothesi unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of being Pegasus, adopting, for its expression, the verb 'is-Pegasus', or 'pegasizes'. And Grice could have played with ‘predicatio’ and ‘subjectio.’ Grice on subject.  Lewis and Short have “sūbĭcĭo,” (less correctly subjĭcĭo ; post-Aug. sometimes sŭb- ), jēci, jectum, 3, v. a. sub-jacio.  which they render as “to throw, lay, place, or bring under or near (cf. subdo),” and in philosophy, “subjectum , i, n. (sc. verbum), as “that which is spoken of, the foundation or subject of a proposition;”  “omne quicquid dicimus aut subjectum est aut de subjecto aut in subjecto est. Subjectum est prima substantia, quod ipsum nulli accidit alii inseparabiliter, etc.,” Mart. Cap. 4, § 361; App. Dogm. Plat. 3, p. 34, 4 et saep.—.” Note that for Mart. Cap. the ‘subject,’ unlike the ‘predicate’ is not a ‘syntactical category.’ “Subjectum est prima substantia,” The subject is a prote ousia. As for correlation, Grice ends up with a reductive analysis. By uttering utterance-token V, the utterer U correlates predicate P1 with (and only with) each member of P2 ≡ (∃R)(∃R') (1) U effects that (∀x)(R P1x ≡ x ∈ P1) and (2) U intends (1), and (3) U intends that (∀y)(R' P1y ≡ y ∈ P1), where R' P1 is an expression-type such that utterance-token V is a sequence consisting of an expression-token p1 of expression-type P1 and an expression-token p2  of expression-type P2, the R-co-relatum of which is a set of which y is a member. And he is back with ‘denotare. Lewis and Short have “dēnŏtare,” which they render as “to mark, set a mark on, with chalk, color, etc.: “pedes venalium creta,”  It is interesting to trace Grice’s earliest investigations on this. Grice and Strawson stage a number of joint seminars on topics related to the notions of meaning, categories, and logical form. Grice and Strawson engage in systematic and unsystematic philosophical exploration. From these discussions springs work on predication and categories, one or two reflections of which are acknowledge at two places (re: the reductive analysis of a ‘particular,’ “the tallest man that did, does, or will exist” --) in Strawson’s “Particular and general” for The Aristotelian Society – and “visible” as Grice puts it, but not acknowledged, in Strawson’s “Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics.””

Grice’s theory-theory: “I am perhaps not too happy with the word ‘theory,’ as applied to this, but that’s Ramsey for you” (WoW: 285). Grice’s theory-theory: A theory of mind concerning how we come to know about the propositional attitudes of others. It tries to explain the nature of ascribing certain thoughts, beliefs, or intentions to other persons in order to explain their actions. The theory-theory holds that in ascribing beliefs to others we are tacitly applying a theory that enables us to make inferences about the beliefs behind the actions of others. The theory that is applied is a set of rules embedded in folk psychology. Hence, to anticipate and predict the behavior of others, one engages in an intellectual process moving by inference from one set of beliefs to another. This position contrasts with another theory of mind, the simulation theory, which holds that we need to make use of our own motivational and emotional resources and capacities for practical reasoning in explaining actions of others. “So called ‘theory-theorists’ maintain that the ability to explain and predict behaviour is underpinned by a folk-psychological theory of the structure and functioning of the mind – where the theory in question may be innate and modularised, learned individually, or acquired through a process of enculturation.” Carruthers and Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Grice needs a theory. For those into implicatura and conversation as rational cooperation, when introducing the implicaturum he mentions ‘pre-theoretical adequacy’ of the model. So he is thinking of the conversational theory as a theory in the strict sense, with ‘explanatory’ and not merely taxonomical power. So one task is to examine in which way the conversational theory is a theory that explains, rather than merely ad hoc ex post facto commentary.  Not so much for his approach to mean. He polemises with Rountree, of Somerville, that you dont need a thory to analyse mean. Indeed, you cannot have a theory to analyse mean, because mean is a matter of intuition, not a theoretical concept. But Grice appeals to theory, when dealing with willing. He knows what willing means because he relies on a concept of folk-science. In this folk-science, willing is a theoretical concept. Grice arrived at this conclusion by avoiding the adjective souly, and seeing that there is no word to describe willing other than by saying it is a psychoLOGICAL concept, i.e. part of a law within that theory of folk-science. That law will include, by way of ramsified naming or describing willing as a predicate-constant. Now, this is related to metaphysics. His liberal or ecunmenical metaphysics is best developed in terms of his ontological marxism presented just after he has expanded on this idea of willing as a theoretical concept, within a law involving willing (say, Grices Optimism-cum-Pesimism law), within the folk-science of psychology that explains his behaviour. For Aristotle, a theoria, was quite a different animal, but it had to do with contemplatio, hence the theoretical (vita contemplativa) versus the practical (vita activa). Grices sticking to Aristotle’srare use of theory inspires him to develop his fascinating theory of the theory-theory.  Grice realised that there is no way to refer to things like intending except with psychological, which he takes to mean, belonging to a pscyhological theory. Grice was keen to theorise on theorising. He thought that Aristotle’s first philosophy (prote philosophia) is best rendered as Theory-theory. Grice kept using Oxonian English spelling, theorising, except when he did not! Grice calls himself folksy: his theories, even if Subjects to various types of Ramseyfication, are popular in kind! And ceteris paribus! Metaphysical construction is disciplined and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for! The way Grice conceives of his theory-theory is interesting to revisit. A route by which Grice hopes to show the centrality of metaphysics (as prote philosophia) involves taking seriously a few ideas. If any region of enquiry is to be successful as a rational enterprise, its deliverance must be expressable in the shape of one or another of the possibly different types of theory. A characterisation of the nature and range of a possible kind of theory θ is needed. Such a body of characterisation must itself be the outcome of rational enquiry, and so must itself exemplify whatever requirement it lays down for any theory θ in general. The characterisation must itself be expressible as a theory θ, to be called, if you like, Grice politely puts it, theory-theory, or meta-theory, θ2. Now, the specification and justification of the ideas and material presupposed by any theory θ, whether such account falls within the bounds of Theory-theory, θ2 would be properly called prote philosophia (first philosophy) and may turn out to relate to what is generally accepted as belonging to the Subjects matter of metaphysics. It might, for example, turn out to be establishable that any theory θ has to relate to a certain range of this or that Subjects item, has to attribute to each item this or that predicate or attribute, which in turn has to fall within one or another of the range of types or categories. In this way, the enquiry might lead to recognised metaphysical topics, such as the nature of being, its range of application, the nature of predication and a systematic account of categories. Met. , philosophical eschatology, and Platos Republic, Thrasymachus, social justice, Socrates, along with notes on Zeno, and topics for pursuit, repr.in Part II, Explorations in semantics and  metaphysics to WOW , metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, Platos Republic, Socrates, Thrasymachus, justice, moral right, legal right, Athenian dialectic. Philosophical eschatology is a sub-discipline of metaphysics concerned with what Grice calls a category shift. Grice, having applied such a technique to Aristotle’s aporia on philos (friend) as alter ego, uses it now to tackle Socratess view, against Thrasymachus, that right applies primarily to morality, and secondarily to legality. Grice has a specific reason to include this in his WOW Grices exegesis of Plato on justice displays Grices take on the fact that metaphysics needs to be subdivided into ontology proper and what he calls philosophical eschatology, for the study of things like category shift and other construction routines. The exploration of Platos Politeia thus becomes an application of Grices philosophically eschatological approach to the item just, as used by Socrates (morally just) and Thrasymachus (legally just). Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle in PPQ. So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too! Grices focus is on Plato’s exploration of dike. Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of moral justice as conceptually (or axiologically) prior to legal justice. In the proceeding, he creates philosophical eschatology as the other branch to metaphysics, along with good ol ontology. To say that just crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to make a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement. The Grice Papers locate the Plato essay in s.  II, the Socrates essay in s.  III, and the Thrasymachus essay, under social justice, in s. V. Grice is well aware that in his account of fairness, Rawls makes use of his ideas on personal identity. The philosophical elucidation of fairness is of great concern for Grice. He had been in touch with such explorations as Nozicks and Nagels along anti-Rawlsian lines. Grices ideas on rationality guide his exploration of social justice. Grice keeps revising the Socrates notes. The Plato essay he actually dates. As it happens, Grices most extensive published account of Socrates is in this commentary on Platos Republic: an eschatological commentary, as he puts it. In an entertaining fashion, Grice has Socrates, and neo-Socrates, exploring the logic and grammar of just against the attack by Thrasymachus and neo-Thrasymachus. Grices point is that, while the legal just may be conceptually prior to the moral just, the moral just is evaluationally or axiologically prior. Refs.: There is a specific essay on ‘theorising’ in the Grice Papers, but there are scattered sources elsewhere, such as “Method” (repr. in “Conception”), BANC.

Grice’s three-year-old’s guide to Russell’s theory of types, with an advice to parents by Strawson: Grice put forward the empirical hypothesis that a three-year old CAN understand Russell’s theory of types. “In more than one way.” This brought confusion in the household, with some members saying they could not – “And I trust few of your tutees do!” Russell’s influential solution to the problem of logical paradoxes. The theory was developed in particular to overcome Russell’s paradox, which seemed to destroy the possibility of Frege’s logicist program of deriving mathematics from logic. Suppose we ask whether the set of all sets which are not members of themselves is a member of itself. If it is, then it is not, but if it is not, then it is. The theory of types suggests classifying objects, properties, relations, and sets into a hierarchy of types. For example, a class of type 0 has members that are ordinary objects; type 1 has members that are properties of objects of type 0; type 2 has members that are properties of the properties in type 1; and so on. What can be true or false of items of one type can not significantly be said about those of another type and is simply nonsense. If we observe the prohibitions against classes containing members of different types, Russell’s paradox and similar paradoxes can be avoided. The theory of types has two variants. The simple theory of types classifies different objects and properties, while the ramified theory of types further sorts types into levels and adds a hierarchy of levels to that of types. By restricting predicates to those that relate to items of lower types or lower levels within their own type, predicates giving rise to paradox are excluded. The simple theory of types is sufficient for solving logical paradoxes, while the ramified theory of type is introduced to solve semantic paradoxes, that is, paradoxes depending on notions such as reference and truth. “Any expression containing an apparent variable is of higher type than that variable. This is the fundamental principles of the doctrines of types.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge. Grice’s commentary in “In defense of a dogma,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

villa grice: -- Kept by Luigi Speranza -- Grice kept a nice garden in his cottage on Banbury Road, not far from St. John’s. It was more of a villa than his town house at Harborne. While Grice loved Academia, he also loved non-Academia. He would socialize at the Flag and Lamb, at the Bird and Baby, and the cricket club, at the bridge club, etc. In this way, he goes back to Plato’s idea of an ‘academy,’ established by Plato at his villa outside Athens near the public park and gymnasium known by that name. Although it may not have maintained a continuous tradition, the many and varied philosophers of the Academy all considered themselves Plato’s successors, and all of them celebrated and studied his work. The school survived in some form until A.D. 529, when it was dissolved, along with the other pagan schools, by the Eastern Roman emperor Justinian I. The history of the Academy is divided by some authorities into that of the Old Academy Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and their followers and the New Academy the Skeptical Academy of the third and second centuries B.C.. Others speak of five phases in its history: Old as before, Middle Arcesilaus, New Carneades, Fourth Philo of Larisa, and Fifth Antiochus of Ascalon. For most of its history the Academy was devoted to elucidating doctrines associated with Plato that were not entirely explicit in the dialogues. These “unwritten doctrines” were apparently passed down to his immediate successors and are known to us mainly through the work of Aristotle: there are two opposed first principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad Great and Small; these generate Forms or Ideas which may be identified with numbers, from which in turn come intermediate mathematicals and, at the lowest level, perceptible things Aristotle, Metaphysics I.6. After Plato’s death, the Academy passed to his nephew Speusippus, who led the school until his death. Although his written works have perished, his views on certain main points, along with some quotations, were recorded by surviving authors. Under the influence of late Pythagoreans, Speusippus anticipated Plotinus by holding that the One transcends being, goodness, and even Intellect, and that the Dyad which he identifies with matter is the cause of all beings. To explain the gradations of beings, he posited gradations of matter, and this gave rise to Aristotle’s charge that Speusippus saw the universe as a series of disjointed episodes. Speusippus abandoned the theory of Forms as ideal numbers, and gave heavier emphasis than other Platonists to the mathematicals. Xenocrates who once went with Plato to Sicily, succeeded Speusippus and led the Academy till his own death. Although he was a prolific author, Xenocrates’ works have not survived, and he is known only through the work of other authors. He was induced by Aristotle’s objections to reject Speusippus’s views on some points, and he developed theories that were a major influence on Middle Platonism, as well as on Stoicism. In Xenocrates’ theory the One is Intellect, and the Forms are ideas in the mind of this divine principle; the One is not transcendent, but it resides in an intellectual space above the heavens. While the One is good, the Dyad is evil, and the sublunary world is identified with Hades. Having taken Forms to be mathematical entities, he had no use for intermediate mathematicals. Forms he defined further as paradigmatic causes of regular natural phenomena, and soul as self-moving number. Polemon led the Academy, and was chiefly known for his fine character, which set an example of self-control for his students. The Stoics probably derived their concept of oikeiosis an accommodation to nature from his teaching. After Polemon’s death, his colleague Crates led the Academy until the accession of Arcesilaus. The New Academy arose when Arcesilaus became the leader of the school and turned the dialectical tradition of Plato to the Skeptical aim of suspending belief. The debate between the New Academy and Stoicism dominated philosophical discussion for the next century and a half. On the Academic side the most prominent spokesman was Carneades. In the early years of the first century B.C., Philo of Larisa attempted to reconcile the Old and the New Academy. His pupil, the former Skeptic Antiochus of Ascalon, was enraged by this and broke away to refound the Old Academy. This was the beginning of Middle Platonism. Antiochus’s school was eclectic in combining elements of Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelian philosophy, and is known to us mainly through Cicero’s Academica. Middle Platonism revived the main themes of Speusippus and Xenocrates, but often used Stoic or neo-Pythagorean concepts to explain them. The influence of the Stoic Posidonius was strongly felt on the Academy in this period, and Platonism flourished at centers other than the Academy in Athens, most notably in Alexandria, with Eudorus and Philo of Alexandria. After the death of Philo, the center of interest returned to Athens, where Plutarch of Chaeronia studied with Ammonius at the Academy, although Plutarch spent most of his career at his home in nearby Boeotia. His many philosophical treatises, which are rich sources for the history of philosophy, are gathered under the title Moralia; his interest in ethics and moral education led him to write the Parallel Lives paired biographies of famous Romans and Athenians, for which he is best known. After this period, the Academy ceased to be the name for a species of Platonic philosophy, although the school remained a center for Platonism, and was especially prominent under the leadership of the Neoplatonist Proclus.  

griceism. Gricese. At Oxford, it was usual to refer to Austin’s idiolect as Austinese. In analogy with Grecism, we have a Gricism, a Griceian cliché. Cf. a ‘grice’ and ‘griceful’ in ‘philosopher’s lexicon.’ Gricese is a Latinism, from -ese, word-forming element, from Old French -eis (Modern French -ois, -ais), from Vulgar Latin, from Latin -ensem, -ensis "belonging to" or "originating in."

grecianism: why was Grice obsessed with Socrates’s convesations? He does not say. But he implicates it. For the Athenian dialecticians, it is all a matter of ta legomena. Ditto for the Oxonian dialecticians. Ta legomena becomes ordinary language. And the task of the philosopher is to provide reductive analysis of this or that concept in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Cf. Hospers. Grices review of the history of philosophy (Philosophy is but footnotes to Zeno.). Grice enjoyed Zenos answer, What is a friend? Alter ego, Allego. ("Only it was the other Zeno." Grice tried to apply the Socratic method during his tutorials. "Nothing like a heartfelt dedication to the Socratic art of mid-wifery, seeking to bring forth error and to strangle it at birth.” μαιεύομαι (A.“μαῖα”), ‘to serve as a midwife, act a; “ἡ Ἄρτεμις μ.” Luc. D Deor.26.2. 2. cause delivery to take place, “ἱκανὴ ἔκπληξις μαιεύσασθαι πρὸ τῆς ὥρας” Philostr. VA1.5. 3. c. acc., bring to the birth, Marin.Procl.6; ὄρνιθας μ. hatch chickens, Anon. ap. Suid.; αἰετὸν κάνθαρος μαιεύσομαι, prov. of taking vengeance on a powerful enemy, Ar. Lys.695 (cf. Sch.). 4. deliver a woman, esp. metaph. in Pl. of the Socratic method, Tht. 149b. II. Act., Poll. 4.208, Sch. OH.4.506. Pass., τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα brought into the world by me, Pl. Tht. 150e, cf. Philostr.VA5.13. Refs.: the obvious references are Grice’s allusions to Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Zeno, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

grosseteste: Grice was a member of the Grosseteste Society. Like Grice’s friend, G. J. Warnock, Grosseteste was chancellor of Oxford. Only that by the time of Warnock, the monarch is the chancellor by default, so “Warnock had to allow to be called ‘vice-chancelor’ to Elizabeth II.” “I would never have read Aristotle had it not been by this great head that grosseteste (“Greathead” is a common surname in Suffolk).” – H. P. Grice. English philosopher who began life on the bottom rung of feudal society in Suffolk and became one of the most influential figures in pre-Reformation England. He studied at Oxford, obtaining an “M. A.,” like Grice. Sometime after this period he joined the household of William de Vere, of Hereford. Grosseteste associated with the elite at Hereford, several of whose members were part of an advanced philosophical tradition. It was a centre for the study of liberal arts. This explains his interest in dialectics. After a sojourn in Paris, he becomes the first chancellor of Oxford. He was a secular lecturer in theology to the recently established Franciscan order at Oxford. It was during his tenure with the Franciscans that he studied Grecian  an unusual endeavour for an Oxonian schoolman then. He later moved to Lincoln. As a  scholar, Grosseteste is an original thinker who used Aristotelian and Augustinian theses as points of departure. Grosseteste (or “Greathead,” as he was called by the town – if not the gown) believes, with Aristotle, that sense is the basis of all knowledge, and that the basis for sense is our discovery of the cause of what is experienced or revealed by experiment. He also believes, with Augustine, that light plays an important role in creation. Thus he maintained that God produced the world by first creating prime matter (“materia prima”) from which issued a point of light lux, the first corporeal form or power, one of whose manifestations is visible light. The diffusion of this light resulted in extension or tri-dimensionality in the form of the nine concentric celestial spheres and the four terrestrial spheres of fire, air, water, and earth. According to Grosseteste, the diffusion of light takes place in accordance with laws of mathematical proportionality geometry. Everything, therefore, is a manifestation of light, and mathematics is consequently indispensable to science and knowledge generally. The principles Grosseteste employs to support his views are presented in, e.g., his commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, the De luce, and the De lineis, angulis et figuris. He worked in areas as seemingly disparate as optics and angelology. Grosseteste is one of the first to take an interest in and introduce into the Oxford curriculum newly recovered Aristotelian texts, along with commentaries on them. His work and interest in natural philosophy, mathematics, the Bible, and languages profoundly influenced Roger Bacon, and the educational goals of the Franciscan order. It also helped to stimulate work in these areas.

groot -- grotius, h., de groot, philosopher, a founder of modern views of international law and a major theorist of natural law. A lawyer and Latinist, Grotius developed a new view of the law of nature in order to combat moral skepticism and to show how there could be rational settlement of moral disputes despite religious disagreements. He argued in The Law of War and Peace 1625 that humans are naturally both competitive and sociable. The laws of nature show us how we can live together despite our propensity to conflict. They can be derived from observation of our nature and situation. These laws reflect the fact that each individual possesses rights, which delimit the social space within which we are free to pursue our own goals. Legitimate government arises when we give up some rights in order to save or improve our lives. The obligations that the laws of nature impose would bind us, Grotius notoriously said, even if God did not exist; but he held that God does enforce the laws. They set the limits on the laws that governments may legitimately impose. The laws of nature reflect our possession of both precise perfect rights of justice, which can be protected by force, and imperfect rights, which are not enforceable, nor even statable very precisely. Grotius’s views on our combative but sociable nature, on the function of the law of nature, and on perfect and imperfect rights were of central importance in later discussions of morality and law. 

Grice’s grue and grellow, -- and bleen: H. P. Grice was fascinated by Goodman’s ‘grue’ paradox and kept looking for the crucial implicaturum. “The paradox is believed to be mainly as arising within the theory of induction, but I’ve seen Strawson struggling with gruesome consequences in his theory of deduction, too.” According to Nelson Goodman, “a philosopher from the New World,” every intuitively acceptable inductive argument, call it A, may be mimicked by indefinitely many other inductive arguments  each seemingly quite analogous to A and therefore seemingly as acceptable, yet each nonetheless intuitively *unacceptable*, and each yielding a conclusion contradictory to that of A, given the assumption that sufficiently many and varied of the sort of things induced upon exist as yet unexamined which is the only circumstance in which A is of interest. “Goodman then asks us to suppose an intuitively acceptable inductive argument.”A1 every hitherto observed EMERALD is GREEN; therefore, every emerald is green. Now introduce the totally unnatural colour predicate ‘grue’ – a portmanteau of blue and green – as in Welsh ‘glas’ -- where for some given, as yet wholly future, temporal interval T an object is ‘grue’ provided it has the property of being green and first examined before T OR  blue and NOT first examined before T. Then consider the following inductive argument: A2 every hitherto observed EMERALD is GRUE; therefore, every emerald is grue. The premise is true, and A2 is formally analogous to A1. But A2 is intuitively unacceptable. If there is an emerald UNexamined before T, he conclusion of A2 says that this emerald is blue, whereas the conclusion of A1 says that every emerald is green! Granted, other counter-intuitive competing arguments could be given, e.g.: A3. Every hitherto observed emerald is grellow; therefore, every emeralds is grellow. where an object is ‘grellow’ provided it is green and located on the earth or yellow otherwise. It would seem, therefore, that some restriction on induction is required. “Goodman’s alleged of induction offers two challenges. First, state the restriction  i.e., demarcate the intuitively acceptable inductions from the unacceptable ones, in some general way, without constant appeal to intuition.”“Second, justify our preference for the one group of inductions over the other.”“These two parts of the paradox are, alas, often conflated.”But it is at least conceivable that one might solve the analytical, demarcative part without solving the justificatory part, and, perhaps, vice versa. It will not do to rule out, a priori gruesome” variances in nature. H2O varies in its physical state along the parameter of temperature. If so, why might not one emerald vary in colour along the parameter of time of first examination? One approach to the problem of restriction is to focus on the conclusions of inductive arguments e.g., every emerald is green, every emerald is grue and to distinguish those which may legitimately so serve called “projectible hypotheses” from those which may not. The question then arises whether only non-gruesome hypotheses those which do not contain gruesome predicates are projectible. Aside from the task of defining ‘gruesome predicate’ which could be done structurally relative to a preferred language, the answer is no. Consider the predicate ‘x is solid and less than 0; C, or liquid and more than 0; C but less than 100; C, or gaseous and more than 100; C.’This is gruesome on any plausible structural account of gruesomeness. Note the similarity to the ‘grue’ equivalent: green and first examined before T, or blue and not first examined before T. Nevertheless, where nontransitional water is pure H2O at one atmosphere of pressure save that which is in a transitional state, i.e., melting/freezing or boiling/condensing, i.e., at 0°C or 100; C, we happily project the hypothesis that all non-transitional water falls under the above gruesome predicate. Perhaps this is because, if we rewrite the projection about non-transitional water as a conjunction of non-gruesome hypotheses  i water at less than 0; C is solid, ii water at more than 0; C but less than 100; C is liquid, and iii water at more than 100; C is gaseous  we note that iiii are all supported there are known positive instances; whereas if we rewrite the gruesome projection about the emerald as a conjunction of non-gruesome hypotheses  i* every emerald first examined before T is green, and ii* every emerald NOT first examined before T is blue  we note that ii* is as yet unsupported. It would seem that, whereas a non-gruesome hypothesis is projectible provided it is unviolated and supported, a gruesome hypothesis is projectible provided it is unviolated and equivalent to a conjunction of non-gruesome hypotheses, each of which is supported.

grundnorm: Grice knows about the ground and the common ground – and then there’s the ground norm -- also called basic norm, in a legal system, the norm that determines the legal validity of all other norms. The content of such an ultimate norm may provide, e.g., that norms created by a legislature or by a court are legally valid. The validity of such an ultimate norm cannot be established as a matter of social fact such as the social fact that the norm is accepted by some group within a society. Rather, the validity of the basic norm for any given legal system must be presupposed by the validity of the norms that it legitimates as laws. The idea of a basic norm is associated with the legal philosopher Hans Kelsen. 

guise -- Castaneda, H. N., analytical philosopher. Heavily influenced by his own critical reaction to Quine, Chisholm, and his teacher Wilfrid Sellars, Castañeda published four books and more than 175 essays. His work combines originality, rigor, and penetration, together with an unusual comprehensiveness  his network of theory and criticism reaches into nearly every area of philosophy, including action theory; deontic logic and practical reason; ethics; history of philosophy; metaphysics and ontology; philosophical methodology; philosophy of language, mind, and perception; and the theory of knowledge. His principal contributions are to metaphysics and ontology, indexical reference, and deontic logic and practical reasoning. In metaphysics and ontology, Castañeda’s chief work is guise theory, first articulated in a 4 essay, a complex and global account of language, mind, ontology, and predication. By holding that ordinary concrete individuals, properties, and propositions all break down or separate into their various aspects or guises, he theorizes that thinking and reference are directed toward the latter. Each guise is a genuine item in the ontological inventory, having properties internally and externally. In addition, guises are related by standing in various sameness relations, only one of which is the familiar relation of strict identity. Since every guise enjoys bona fide ontological standing, whereas only some of these actually exist, Castañeda’s ontology and semantics are Meinongian. With its intricate account of predication, guise theory affords a unified treatment of a wide range of philosophical problems concerning reference to nonexistents, negative existentials, intentional identity, referential opacity, and other matters. Castañeda also played a pivotal role in emphasizing the significance of indexical reference. If, e.g., Paul assertively utters ‘I prefer Chardonnay’, it would obviously be incorrect for Bob to report ‘Paul says that I prefer Chardonnay’, since the last statement expresses Bob’s speaker’s reference, not Paul’s. At the same time, Castañeda contends, it is likewise incorrect for Bob to report Paul’s saying as either ‘Paul says that Paul prefers Chardonnay’ or ‘Paul says that Al’s luncheon guest prefers Chardonnay’ when Paul is Al’s only luncheon guest, since each of these fail to represent the essentially indexical element of Paul’s assertion. Instead, Bob may correctly report ‘Paul says that he himself prefers Chardonnay’, where ‘he himself’ is a quasi-indicator, serving to depict Paul’s reference to himself qua self. For Castañeda and others, quasi-indicators are a person’s irreducible, essential means for describing the thoughts and experiences of others. A complete account of his view of indexicals, together with a full articulation of guise theory and his unorthodox theories of definite descriptions and proper names, is contained in Thinking, Language, and Experience 9. Castañeda’s main views on practical reason and deontic logic turn on his fundamental practitionproposition distinction. A number of valuable essays on these views, together with his important replies, are collected in James E. Tomberlin, ed., Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World 3, and Tomberlin, ed., Hector-Neri Castañeda 6. The latter also includes Castañeda’s revealing intellectual autobiography. guise theory, a system developed by Castañeda to resolve a number of issues concerning the content of thought and experience, including reference, identity statements, intensional contexts, predication, existential claims, perception, and fictional discourse. For example, since i Oedipus believed that he killed the man at the crossroads, and ii the man at the crossroads was his Oedipus’s father, it might seem that iii Oedipus believed that he killed his father. Guise theory blocks this derivation by taking ‘was’ in ii to express, not genuine identity, but a contingent sameness relation betweeen the distinct referents of the descriptions. Definite descriptions are typically treated as referential, contrary to Russell’s theory of descriptions, and their referents are identical in both direct and indirect discourse, contrary to Frege’s semantics. To support this solution, guise theory offers unique accounts of predication and singular referents. The latter are individual guises, which, like Fregean senses and Meinong’s incomplete objects, are thinly individuated aspects or “slices” of ordinary objects at best. Every guise is a structure c{F1 . . . , Fn} where c is an operator expressed by ‘the’ in English  transforming a set of properties {F1, . . . , Fn} into a distinct concrete individual, each property being an internal property of the guise. Guises have external properties by standing in various sameness relations to other guises that have these properties internally. There are four such relations, besides genuine identity, each an equivalence relation in its field. If the oldest philosopher happens to be wise, e.g., wisdom is factually predicated of the guise ‘the oldest philosopher’ because it is consubstantiated with ‘the oldest wise philosopher’. Other sameness relations account for fictional predication consociation and necessary external predication conflation. Existence is self-consubstantiation. An ordinary physical object is, at any moment, a cluster of consubstantiated hence, existing guises, while continuants are formed through the transubstantiation of guises within temporally distinct clusters. There are no substrates, and while every guise “subsists,” not all exist, e.g., the Norse God of Thunder. The position thus permits a unified account of singular reference. One task for guise theory is to explain how a “concretized” set of properties differs internally from a mere set. Perhaps guises are façons de penser whose core sets are concretized if their component properties are conceived as coinstantiated, with non-existents analyzable in terms of the failure of the conceived properties to actually be coinstantiated. However, it is questionable whether this approach can achieve all that Castañeda demands of guise theory. 

habermas: j. Habermas cites Grice quite extensively,, “but as extensive as he is, the more wishy washy he becomes” – A. M. Kemmerling. J. philosopher and social theorist, a leading representative of the second generation of the Frankfurt School of critical theory. His work has consistently returned to the problem of the normative foundations of social criticism and critical social inquiry not supplied in traditional Marxism and other forms of critical theory, such as postmodernism. His habilitation, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 1, is an influential historical analysis of the emergence of the ideal of a public sphere in the eighteenth century and its subsequent decline. Habermas turned then to the problems of the foundations and methodology of the social sciences, developing a criticism of positivism and his own interpretive explanatory approach in The Logic of the Social Sciences 3 and his first major systematic work, Knowledge and Human Interests 7. Rejecting the unity of method typical of positivism, Habermas argues that social inquiry is guided by three distinct interests: in control, in understanding, and in emancipation. He is especially concerned to use emancipatory interest to overcome the limitations of the model of inquiry based on understanding and argues against “universality of hermeneutics” defended by hermeneuticists such as Gadamer and for the need to supplement interpretations with explanations in the social sciences. As he came to reject the psychoanalytic vocabulary in which he formulated the interest in emancipation, he turned to finding the basis for understanding and social inquiry in a theory of rationality more generally. In the next phase of his career he developed a comprehensive social theory, culminating in his two-volume The Theory of Communicative Action 2. The goal of this theory is to develop a “critical theory of modernity,” on the basis of a comprehensive theory of communicative as opposed to instrumental rationality. The first volume develops a theory of communicative rationality based on “discourse,” or second-order communication that takes place both in everyday interaction and in institutionalized practices of argumentation in science, law, and criticism. This theory of rationality emerges from a universal or “formal” pragmatics, a speech act theory based on making explicit the rules and norms of the competence to communicate in linguistic interaction. The second volume develops a diagnosis of modern society as suffering from “onesided rationalization,” leading to disruptions of the communicative lifeworld by “systems” such as markets and bureaucracies. Finally, Habermas applies his conception of rationality to issues of normative theory, including ethics, politics, and the law. “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Moral Justification” 2 argues for an intersubjective notion of practical reason and discursive procedure for the justification of universal norms. This “discourse principle” provides a dialogical version of Kant’s idea of universalization; a norm is justified if and only if it can meet with the reasoned agreement of all those affected. Between Facts and Norms 2 combines his social and normative theories to give a systematic account of law and democracy. His contribution here is an account of deliberative democracy appropriate to the complexity of modern society. His work in all of these phases provides a systematic defense and critique of modern institutions and a vindication of the universal claims of public practical reason. 

bradley’s thatness: :The investing of the content, which is in Bradleian language a `what', with self-existent reality or ‘that-ness'." Athenaeum 24 Dec. 1904’ If thought asserted the existence of any content which was not an actual or possible object of thought—certainly that assertion in my judgment would contradict itself. But the Other which I maintain, is not any such content, nor is it another separated “ what,” nor in any case do I suggest that it lies outside intelligence. Everything, all will and feeling, is an object for thought, and must be called intelligible. This is certain; but, if so, what becomes of the Other? If we fall back on the mere “ that,” thatness itself seems a distinction made by thought. And we have to face this difficulty: If the Other exists, it must be something; and if it is nothing, it certainly does not exist. There is only one way to get rid of contradiction, and that way is by dissolution. Instead of one subject distracted, we get a larger subject with distinctions, and so the tension is removed. We have at first A, which possesses the qualities c and b, inconsistent adjectives which collide; and we go on to produce harmony by making a distinction within this subject. That was really not mere A, but either a complex within A, or (rather here) a wider whole in which A is included. The real subject is A + D; and this subject contains the contradiction made harmless by division, since A is c and D is b. This is the general principle, and I will attempt here to apply it in particular. Let us suppose the reality to be X (abcdefg . . .), and that we are able only to get partial views of this reality. Let us first take such a view as “ X (ab) is b.” This (rightly or wrongly) we should probably call a true view. For the content b does plainly belong to the subject; and, further, the appearance also—in other words, the separation of b in the predicate—can partly be explained. For, answering to this separation, we postulate now another adjective in the subject: let us call it *. The “ thatness,” the psychical existence of the predicate, which at first was neglected, has now also itself been included in the subject. We may hence write the subject as X (ab*); and in this way we seem to avoid contradiction. Let us go further on the same line, and, having dealt with a truth, pass next to an error. Take the subject once more as X (abcde . . .), and let us now say “ X (ab) is d.” To be different from another is to have already transcended one’s own being; and all finite existence is thus incurably relative and ideal. Its quality falls, more or less, outside its particular “ thatness”; and, whether as the same or again as diverse, it is equally made what it is by community with others.

The hic, the hæc, and the hoc – “Scotus was being clever. Since he wanted an abstract noun, and abstract nouns are feminine in both Greek and Latin (‘ippotes, eqquitas’), he chose the feminine ‘haec,’ to turn into a ‘thisness.’ But we should expand his rather sexist view to apply to ‘hic’ and ‘hoc,’ too. In Anglo-Saxon, there is only ‘this,’ with ‘thisness’ first used by Pope George. The OED first registers ‘thisness’ in 1643.” – cf. OED: "It is at its such-&-suchness, at its character -- in other words, at the _universal_ in it -- that we have to look. the first cite in the OED for 'thisness' also features 'thatness': "thisness,” from "this" + "-ness": rendering ‘haecceitas,’ the quality of being 'this' (as distinct from anything else): = haecceity. First cite: "It is evident that [...] THISness, and THATness belong[...] not to matter by itself, but onely as [matter] is distinguished & individuated by the form." The two further quotes for 'thisness' being: 1837 Whewell Hist Induct Sc 1857 I 244: "Which his school called ‘HAECcceity’ – from the feminine form of the demonstrative masculine ‘hic,’ in Roman, neutre ‘hoc’ (Scotus uses the femine because ‘-ity- is a feminine ending) -- or ‘thisness.’", and 1895 Rashdall Universities II 532: "An individuating form called by the later Scotists its ‘haecceitas’ or its `thisness'").  "The investing of the content, which is in Bradleian language a `what', with self-existent reality or ‘that-ness'." Athenaeum 24 Dec. 1904 868/2. -- OED, 'thatness'. Trudgill writes in _The Dialects of England_ (Oxford: Blackwell), that Grice would often consult (he was from Harborne and had a special interest in this – “I seem to have lost my dialect when I moved to Corpus.” The 'this'-'that' demonstrative system is a two-way system which distinguishes between things which are distant and things which are near. Interestingly, however, a number of traditional dialects in England (if not Oxford) differ from this system in having what Grice called a Griceian _three_-way distinction. The Yorkshire dialect, for example, has ‘this’ (sing., near), ‘thir’ (pl. near), ‘that’ (sing. Medial) ‘tho’ (plural, medial), thon (sing. distal) and ‘thon’ (pl., distal). The Mercian Anglian dialect has ‘these’ (sing. near), ‘theys’ (plural, near), ‘that’ (sing. medial), ‘they’ (pl., medial), ‘thik’ (sing./pl., distal). “The northern dialect is better in that it distinguishes between the singular and the plural form for the distal, unlike the southern dialect which has ‘thik’ for either.” Grice. Still, Grice likes the sound of ‘thik’ and quotes from his friend M. Wakelin, _The Southwest of England_. "When I awoke one May day morn/I found an urge within me born/To see the beauteous countryside/That's all round wher'I do bide./So I set out wi' dog & stick,/ My head were just a trifle thick./But good ole' fresh air had his say/& blowed thik trouble clean away." -- B. Green, in _The Dorset Year Book_. Dorset: Society of Dorset Men. “Some like Russell, but Bradley’s MY man.” – H. P. Grice: Grice: "Russell is pretentious; Bradley, an English angel, is not!" "Bradley can use 'thatness' freely; Russell uses it after Bradley and artificially." all the rest of the watery bulk : but return back those few  drops from whence they were taken, and the glass-full that  even now had an individuation by itself, loseth that, and  groweth one and the same with the other main stock : yet if  you fill your glass again, wheresoever you take it up, so it be  of the same uniform bulk of water you had before, it is the  same glassfuU of water that you had. But as I said before,  this example fitteth entirely no more than the other did. In  such abstracted speculations, where we must consider matter  without form, (which hath no actual being,) we must not expect  adequated examples in nature. But enough is said to make  a speculative man see, that if God should join the soul of a  lately dead man, (even whilst his dead corpse should lie en-  tire in his windingsheet here,) unto a body made of earth,  taken from some mountain in America; it were most true  and certain, that the body he should then live by, were the  same identical body he lived with before his death, and late  resurrection. It is evident, that sameness, thisness, and that-  ness, belongeth not to matter by itself, (for a general indiffer-  ence runneth through it all,) but only as it is distinguished and  individuated by the form. Which in our case, whensoever  the same soul doth, it must be understood always to be the  same matter and body.” (Browne, 1643).  Grice. Corbin says that English is such a plastic language, “unlike Roman,” but then there’s haec, and hæcceitas -- Duns Scotus, J., Scottish Franciscan metaphysician and philosophical theologian. He lectured at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne, where he died and his remains are still venerated. Modifying Avicenna’s conception of metaphysics as the science of being qua being, but univocally conceived, Duns Scotus showed its goal was to demonstrate God as the Infinite Being revealed to Moses as the “I am who am”, whose creative will is the source of the world’s contingency. Out of love God fashioned each creature with a unique “haecceity” or particularity formally distinct from its individualized nature. Descriptively identical with others of its kind, this nature, conceived in abstraction from haecceity, is both objectively real and potentially universal, and provides the basis for scientific knowledge that Peirce calls “Scotistic realism.” Duns Scotus brought many of Augustine’s insights, treasured by his Franciscan predecessors, into the mainstream of the Aristotelianism of his day. Their notion of the will’s “supersufficient potentiality” for self-determination he showed can be reconciled with Aristotle’s notion of an “active potency,” if one rejects the controDuhem thesis Duns Scotus, John 247   247 versial principle that “whatever is moved is moved by another.” Paradoxically, Aristotle’s criteria for rational and non-rational potencies prove the rationality of the will, not the intellect, for he claimed that only rational faculties are able to act in opposite ways and are thus the source of creativity in the arts. If so, then intellect, with but one mode of acting determined by objective evidence, is non-rational, and so is classed with active potencies called collectively “nature.” Only the will, acting “with reason,” is free to will or nill this or that. Thus “nature” and “will” represent Duns Scotus’s primary division of active potencies, corresponding roughly to Aristotle’s dichotomy of non-rational and rational. Original too is his development of Anselm’s distinction of the will’s twofold inclination or “affection”: one for the advantageous, the other for justice. The first endows the will with an “intellectual appetite” for happiness and actualization of self or species; the second supplies the will’s specific difference from other natural appetites, giving it an innate desire to love goods objectively according to their intrinsic worth. Guided by right reason, this “affection for justice” inclines the will to act ethically, giving it a congenital freedom from the need always to seek the advantageous. Both natural affections can be supernaturalized, the “affection for justice” by charity, inclining us to love God above all and for his own sake; the affection for the advantageous by the virtue of hope, inclining us to love God as our ultimate good and future source of beatitude. Another influential psychological theory is that of intuitive intellectual cognition, or the simple, non-judgmental awareness of a hereand-now existential situation. First developed as a necessary theological condition for the face-toface vision of God in the next life, intellectual intuition is needed to explain our certainty of primary contingent truths, such as “I think,” “I choose,” etc., and our awareness of existence. Unlike Ockham, Duns Scotus never made intellectual intuition the basis for his epistemology, nor believed it puts one in direct contact with any extramental substance material or spiritual, for in this life, at least, our intellect works through the sensory imagination. Intellectual intuition seems to be that indistinct peripheral aura associated with each direct sensory-intellectual cognition. We know of it explicitly only in retrospect when we consider the necessary conditions for intellectual memory. It continued to be a topic of discussion and dispute down to the time of Calvin, who, influenced by the Scotist John Major, used an auditory rather than a visual sense model of intellectual intuition to explain our “experience of God.”  haecceity from Latin haec, ‘this’, 1 loosely, thisness; more specifically, an irreducible category of being, the fundamental actuality of an existent entity; or 2 an individual essence, a property an object has necessarily, without which it would not be or would cease to exist as the individual it is, and which, necessarily, no other object has. There are in the history of philosophy two distinct concepts of haecceity. The idea originated with the work of the thirteenthcentury philosopher Duns Scotus, and was discussed in the same period by Aquinas, as a positive perfection that serves as a primitive existence and individuation principle for concrete existents. In the seventeenth century Leibniz transformed the concept of haecceity, which Duns Scotus had explicitly denied to be a form or universal, into the notion of an individual essence, a distinctive nature or set of necessary characteristics uniquely identifying it under the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Duns Scotus’s haecceitas applies only to the being of contingently existent entities in the actual world, but Leibniz extends the principle to individuate particular things not only through the changes they may undergo in the actual world, but in any alternative logically possible world. Leibniz admitted as a consequence the controversial thesis that every object by virtue of its haecceity has each of its properties essentially or necessarily, so that only the counterparts of individuals can inhabit distinct logically possible worlds. A further corollary  since the possession of particular parts in a particular arrangement is also a property and hence involved in the individual essence of any complex object  is the doctrine of mereological essentialism: every composite is necessarily constituted by a particular configuration of particular proper parts, and loses its self-identity if any parts are removed or replaced. Grice was more familiar with the thatness than the thisness (“Having had to read Bradley for my metaphysics paper!”).

haeckel: an impassioned adherent of Darwin’s theory of evolution. His wrote “Die Welträtsel,” which became a best-seller and was very influential in its time. Lenin is said to have admired it. Haeckel’s philosophy, which he called monism, is characterized negatively by his rejection of free will, immortality, and theism, as well as his criticisms of the traditional forms of materialism and idealism. Positively it is distinguished by passionate arguments for the fundamental unity of organic and inorganic nature and a form of pantheism.

ha-levi, philosopher. His philosophy introduces Arabic forms in Hebrew religious expression. He was traveling to Jerusalem on a pilgrimage when he died. His most important philosophical work is Kuzari: The Book of Proof and Argument of the Despised Faith, which purports to be a discussion of a Christian, a Muslim, and a Jew, each offering the king of the Khazars in southern Russia reasons for adopting his faith. Around 740 the historical king and most of his people converted to Judaism. HaLevi presents the Christian and the Muslim as Aristotelian thinkers, who fail to convince the king. The Jewish spokesman begins by asserting his belief in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of history who is continuously active in history, rather than the God of the philosophers. Jewish history is the inner core of world history. From the revelation at Sinai, the most witnessed divine event claimed by any religion, the Providential history of the Jews is the way God has chosen to make his message clear to all humankind. Ha-Levi’s view is the classical expression of Jewish particularism and nationalism. His ideas have been influential in Judaism and were early printed in Latin and Grecian.

hamann: philosopher. Born and educated in Königsberg, Hamann, known as the Magus of the North, was one of the most important Christian thinkers in G.y during the second half of the eighteenth century. Advocating an irrationalistic theory of faith inspired by Hume, he opposed the prevailing Enlightenment philosophy. He was a mentor of the Sturm und Drang literary movement and had a significant influence on Jacobi, Hegel, and Kierkegaard. As a close acquaintance of Kant, he also had a great impact on the development of Kant’s critical philosophy through his Hume translations. Hamann’s most important works, criticized and admired for their difficult and obscure style, were the Socratic Memorabilia 1759, “Aesthetica in nuce” and several works on language. He suppressed his “metacritical” writings out of respect for Kant. However, they were published after his death and now constitute the bestknown part of his work.

hamilton: “Hamilton and I have many things in common: he went to Balliol, I went to Corpus – but we both have a BA and a MA Lit. Hum.” – H. P. Grice.  philosopher, educated at Oxford, he was for most of his life professor at the  of Edinburgh 182156. Though hardly an orthodox or uncritical follower of Reid and Stewart, he became one of the most important members of the school of Scottish common sense philosophy. His “philosophy of the conditioned” has a somewhat Kantian flavor. Like Kant, he held that we can have knowledge only of “the relative manifestations of an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recogHaeckel, Ernst Hamilton, William 360    AM  360 nize as beyond the reach of philosophy.” Unlike Kant, however, he argued for the position of a “natural realism” in the Reidian tradition. The doctrine of the relativity of knowledge has seemed to many  including J. S. Mill  contradictory to his realism. For Hamilton, the two are held together by a kind of intuitionism that emphasizes certain facts of consciousness that are both primitive and incomprehensible. They are, though constitutive of knowledge, “less forms of cognitions than of beliefs.” In logic he argued for a doctrine involving quantification of predicates and the view that propositions can be reduced to equations. 

hampshireism: His second wife was from the New World. His first wife wasn’t. He married Renée Orde-Lees, the daughter of the very English Thomas Orde-Lees, in 1961, and had two children, a son, Julian, and a daughter. To add to the philosophers’ mistakes. There’s Austin (in “Plea for Excuses” and “Other Minds”), Strawson (in “Truth” and “Introduction to Logical Theory,” and “On referring”), Hart (in conversation, on ‘carefully,”), Hare (“To say ‘x is good’ is to recommend x”) and Hampshire (“Intention and certainty”). For Grice, the certainty is merely implicated and on occasion, only.  Cited by Grice as a member of the play group. Hampshire would dine once a week with Grice. He would discuss and find very amusing to discuss with Grice on post-war Oxford philosophy. Unlike Grice, Hampshire attended Austin’s Thursday evening meetings at All Souls. Grice wrote “Intention and uncertainty” in part as a response to Hampshire and Hart, Intention and certainty. But Grice brought the issue back to an earlier generation, to a polemic between Stout (who held a certainty-based view) and Prichard.

hare: r. m. cited by H. P. Grice, “Hare’s neustrics”. b.9, English philosopher who is one of the most influential moral philosophers of the twentieth century and the developer of prescriptivism in metaethics. Hare was educated at Rugby and Oxford, then served in the British army during World War II and spent years as a prisoner of war in Burma. In 7 he took a position at Balliol  and was appointed White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the  of Oxford in 6. On retirement from Oxford, he became Graduate Research Professor at the  of Florida 393. His major books are Language of Morals 3, Freedom and Reason 3, Moral Thinking 1, and Sorting Out Ethics 7. Many collections of his essays have also appeared, and a collection of other leading philosophers’ articles on his work was published in 8 Hare and Critics, eds. Seanor and Fotion. According to Hare, a careful exploration of the nature of our moral concepts reveals that nonironic judgments about what one morally ought to do are expressions of the will, or commitments to act, that are subject to certain logical constraints. Because moral judgments are prescriptive, we cannot sincerely subscribe to them while refusing to comply with them in the relevant circumstances. Because moral judgments are universal prescriptions, we cannot sincerely subscribe to them unless we are willing for them to be followed were we in other people’s positions with their preferences. Hare later contended that vividly to imagine ourselves completely in other people’s positions involves our acquiring preferences about what should happen to us in those positions that mirror exactly what those people now want for themselves. So, ideally, we decide on a universal prescription on the basis of not only our existing preferences about the actual situation but also the new preferences we would have if we were wholly in other people’s positions. What we can prescribe universally is what maximizes net satisfaction of this amalgamated set of preferences. Hence, Hare concluded that his theory of moral judgment leads to preference-satisfaction act utilitarianism. However, like most other utilitarians, he argued that the best way to maximize utility is to have, and generally to act on, certain not directly utilitarian dispositions  such as dispositions not to hurt others or steal, to keep promises and tell the truth, to take special responsibility for one’s own family, and so on.

harris: philosopher of language – classical. Grice adored him, and he was quite happy that few knew about Harris! Cf. Tooke. Cf. Priestley and Hartley – all pre-Griceian philosohers of language that are somehow outside the canon, when they shouldn’t. They are very Old World, and it’s the influence of the New World that has made them sort of disappear! That’s what Grice said!

hart: h. l. a. – cited by Grice, “Hare on ‘carefully.’ Philosopher of European ancestry born in Yorkshire, principally responsible for the revival of legal and political philosophy after World War II. After wartime work with military intelligence, Hart gave up a flourishing law practice to join the Oxford faculty, where he was a brilliant lecturer, a sympathetic and insightful critic, and a generous mentor to many scholars. Like the earlier “legal positivists” Bentham and John Austin, Hart accepted the “separation of law and morals”: moral standards can deliberately be incorporated in law, but there is no automatic or necessary connection between law and sound moral principles. In The Concept of Law 1 he critiqued the Bentham-Austin notion that laws are orders backed by threats from a political community’s “sovereign”  some person or persons who enjoy habitual obedience and are habitually obedient to no other human  and developed the more complex idea that law is a “union of primary and secondary rules.” Hart agreed that a legal system must contain some “obligation-imposing” “primary” rules, restricting freedom. But he showed that law also includes independent “power-conferring” rules that facilitate choice, and he demonstrated that a legal system requires “secondary” rules that create public offices and authorize official action, such as legislation and adjudication, as well as “rules of recognition” that determine which other rules are valid in the system. Hart held that rules of law are “open-textured,” with a core of determinate meaning and a fringe of indeterminate meaning, and thus capable of answering some but not all legal questions that can arise. He doubted courts’ claims to discover law’s meaning when reasonable competing interpretations are available, and held that courts decide such “hard cases” by first performing the important “legislative” function of filling gaps in the law. Hart’s first book was an influential study with A. M. Honoré of Causation in the Law 9. His inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurisprudence, “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” 3, initiated a career-long study of rights, reflected also in Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 2 and in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 3. He defended liberal public policies. In Law, Liberty and Morality 3 he refuted Lord Devlin’s contention that a society justifiably enforces the code of its moral majority, whatever it might be. In The Morality of the Criminal Law 5 and in Punishment and Responsibility 8, Hart contributed substantially to both analytic and normative theories of crime and punishment.

Hartley, British philosopher. Although the notion of association of ideas is ancient, he is generally regarded as the founder of associationism as a self-sufficient psychology. Despite similarities between his association psychology and Hume’s, Hartley developed his system independently, acknowledging only the writings of clergyman John Gay 1699 1745. Hartley was one of many Enlightenment thinkers aspiring to be “Newtons of the mind,” in Peter Gay’s phrase. In Hartley, this took the form of uniting association philosophy with physiology, a project later brought to fruition by Bain. His major work, Observations on Man 1749, pictured mental events and neural events as operating on parallel tracks in which neural events cause mental events. On the mental side, Hartley distinguished like Hume between sensation and idea. On the physiological side, Hartley adopted Newton’s conception of nervous transmission by vibrations of a fine granular substance within nerve-tubes. Vibrations within sensory nerves peripheral to the brain corresponded to the sensations they caused, while small vibrations in the brain, vibratiuncles, corresponded to ideas. Hartley proposed a single law of association, contiguity modified by frequency, which took two forms, one for the mental side and one for the neural: ideas, or vibratiuncles, occurring together regularly become associated. Hartley distinguished between simultaneous association, the link between ideas that occur at the same harmony, preestablished Hartley, David 362    AM  362 moment, and successive association, between ideas that closely succeed one another. Successive associations occur only in a forward direction; there are no backward associations, a thesis generating much controversy in the later experimental study of memory.

Hartley, Joseph – philosopher. Hartmann: philosopher who sought to synthesize the thought of Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The most important of his essays is “Philosophie des Unbewussten.” For Hartmann both will and idea are interrelated and are expressions of an absolute “thing-in-itself,” the unconscious. The unconscious is the active essence in natural and psychic processes and is the teleological dynamic in organic life. Paradoxically, he claimed that the teleology immanent in the world order and the life process leads to insight into the irrationality of the “will-to-live.” The maturation of rational consciousness would, he held, lead to the negation of the total volitional process and the entire world process would cease. Ideas indicate the “what” of existence and constitute, along with will and the unconscious, the three modes of being. Despite its pessimism, this work enjoyed considerable popularity. Hartmann was an unusual combination of speculative idealist and philosopher of science defending vitalism and attacking mechanistic materialism; his pessimistic ethics was part of a cosmic drama of redemption. Some of his later works dealt with a critical form of Darwinism that led him to adopt a positive evolutionary stance that undermined his earlier pessimism. His general philosophical position was selfdescribed as “transcendental realism.” His Philosophy of the Unconscious was tr. into English by W. C. Coupland in three volumes in 4. There is little doubt that his metaphysics of the unconscious prepared the way for Freud’s later theory of the unconscious mind. 

hartmann, n. philosopher (“Not to be confused with Hartmann – but then neither am I to be confused with [G. R.] Grice.” – Grice. He taught at the universities of Marburg, Cologne, Berlin, and Göttingen, and wrote more than a dozen major works on the history of philosophy, ontology, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. A realist in epistemology and ontology, Hartmann held that cognition is the apprehension of something independent of the act of apprehension or any other mental events. An accurate phenomenology, such as Husserl’s, would acknowledge, according to him, that we apprehend not only particular, spatiotemporal objects, but also “ideal objects,” “essences,” which Hartmann explicitly identified with Platonic Forms. Among these are ethical values and the objects of mathematics and logic. Our apprehension of values is emotional in character, as Scheler had held. This point is compatible with their objectivity and their mindindependence, since the emotions are just another mode of apprehension. The point applies, however, only to ethical values. Aesthetic values are essentially subjective; they exist only for the subject experiencing them. The number of ethical values is far greater than usually supposed, nor are they derivable from a single fundamental value. At best we only glimpse some of them, and even these may not be simultaneously realizable. This explains and to some extent justifies the existence of moral disagreement, between persons as well as between whole cultures. Hartmann was most obviously influenced by Plato, Husserl, and Scheler. But he was a major, original philosopher in his own right. He has received less recognition than he deserves probably because his views were quite different from those dominant in recent Anglo- philosophy or in recent Continental philosophy. What is perhaps his most important work, Ethics, was published in G. in 6, one year before Heidegger’s Being and Time, and appeared in English in 2. 

hartshorne: chief  exponent of process philosophy. After receiving the Ph.D. at Harvard in 3 he came under the influence of Whitehead, and later, with Paul Weiss, edited The Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce 135. In The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation 4 Hartshorne argued that all sensations are feelings on an affective continuum. These ideas were later incorporated into a neoclassical metaphysic that is panpsychist, indeterministic, and theistic. Nature is a theater of interactions among ephemeral centers of creative activity, each of which becomes objectively immortal in the memory of God. In Man’s Vision of God 1 Hartshorne chastised philosophers for being insufficiently attentive to the varieties of theism. His alternative, called dipolar theism, also defended in The Divine Hartmann, Eduard von Hartshorne, Charles 363    AM  363 Relativity 8, pictures God as supremely related to and perfectly responding to every actuality. The universe is God’s body. The divine is, in different respects, infinite and finite, eternal and temporal, necessary and contingent. Establishing God’s existence is a metaphysical project, which Hartshorne characterizes in Creative Synthesis 0 as the search for necessary truths about existence. The central element in his cumulative case for God’s existence, called the global argument, is a modal version of the ontological argument, which Hartshorne was instrumental in rehabilitating in The Logic of Perfection 2 and Anselm’s Discovery 5. Creative Synthesis also articulated the theory that aesthetic values are the most universal and that beauty is a mean between the twin extremes of order/disorder and simplicity/complexity. The Zero Fallacy 7, Hartshorne’s twentieth book, summarized his assessment of the history of philosophy  also found in Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers 3 and Creativity in  Philosophy 4  and introduced important refinements of his metaphysics. 

hazzing: under conjunctum, we see that the terminology is varied. There is the copulatum. But Grice prefers to restrict to use of the copulatum to izzing and hazzing. Oddly Grice sees hazzing as a predicate which he formalizes as Hxy. To be read x hazzes y, although sometimes he uses ‘x hazz y.’ Vide ‘accidentia.’ For Grice the role of métier is basic since it shows finality in nature. Homo sapiens, qua pirot, is to be rational.

hedonism, the view that pleasure including the absence of pain is the sole intrinsic good in life. The hedonist may hold that, questions of morality aside, persons inevitably do seek pleasure psychological hedonism; that, questions of psychology aside, morally we should seek pleasure ethical hedonism; or that we inevitably do, and ought to, seek pleasure ethical and psychological hedonism combined. Psychological hedonism itself admits of a variety of possible forms. One may hold, e.g., that all motivation is based on the prospect of present or future pleasure. More plausibly, some philosophers have held that all choices of future actions are based on one’s presently taking greater pleasure in the thought of doing one act rather than another. Still a third type of hedonism  with roots in empirical psychology  is that the attainment of pleasure is the primary drive of a wide range of organisms including human beings and is responsible, through some form of conditioning, for all acquired motivations. Ethical hedonists may, but need not, appeal to some form of psychological hedonism to buttress their case. For, at worst, the truth of some form of psychological hedonism makes ethical hedonism empty or inescapable  but not false. As a value theory a theory of what is ultimately good, ethical hedonism has typically led to one or the other of two conceptions of morally correct action. Both of these are expressions of moral consequentialism in that they judge actions strictly by their consequences. On standard formulations of utilitarianism, actions are judged by the amount of pleasure they produce for all sentient beings; on some formulations of egoist views, actions are judged by their consequences for one’s own pleasure. Neither egoism nor utilitarianism, however, must be wedded to a hedonistic value theory. A hedonistic value theory admits of a variety of claims about the characteristic sources and types of pleasure. One contentious issue has been what activities yield the greatest quantity of pleasure  with prominent candidates including philosophical and other forms of intellectual discourse, the contemplation of beauty, and activities productive of “the pleasures of the senses.” Most philosophical hedonists, despite the popular associations of the word, have not espoused sensual pleasure. Another issue, famously raised by J. S. Mill, is whether such different varieties of pleasure admit of differences of quality as well as quantity. Even supposing them to be equal in quantity, can we say, e.g., that the pleasures of intellectual activity are superior in quality to those of watching sports on television? And if we do say such things, are we departing from strict hedonism by introducing a value distinction not really based on pleasure at all? Most philosophers have found hedonism  both psychological and ethical  exaggerated in its claims. One difficulty for both sorts of hedonism is the hedonistic paradox, which may be put as follows. Many of the deepest and best pleasures of life of love, of child rearing, of work seem to come most often to those who are engaging in an activity for reasons other than pleasure seeking. Hence, not only is it dubious that we always in fact seek or value only pleasure, but also dubious that the best way to achieve pleasure is to seek it. Another area of difficulty concerns happiness  and its relation to pleasure. In the tradition of Aristotle, happiness is broadly understood as something like well-being and has been viewed, not implausibly, as a kind of natural end of all human activities. But ‘happiness’ in this sense is broader than ‘pleasure’, insofar as the latter designates a particular kind of feeling, whereas ‘well-being’ does not. Attributions of happiness, moreover, appear to be normative in a way in which attributions of pleasure are not. It is thought that a truly happy person has achieved, is achieving, or stands to achieve, certain things respecting the “truly important” concerns of human life. Of course, such achievements will characteristically produce pleasant feelings; but, just as characteristically, they will involve states of active enjoyment of activities  where, as Aristotle first pointed out, there are no distinctive feelings of pleasure apart from the doing of the activity itself. In short, the Aristotelian thesis that happiness is the natural end of all human activities, even if it is true, does not seem to lend much support to hedonism  psychological or ethical.

plathegel and ariskant – Hegel, “one of the most influential and systematic of the idealists” (Grice), also well known for his philosophy of history and philosophy of religion. Life and works. Hegel, the eldest of three children, was born in Stuttgart, the son of a minor financial official in the court of the Duchy of Württemberg. His mother died when he was eleven. At eighteen, he began attending the theology seminary or Stift attached to the  at Tübingen; he studied theology and classical languages and literature and became friendly with his future colleague and adversary, Schelling, as well as the great genius of G. Romantic poetry, Hölderlin. In 1793, upon graduation, he accepted a job as a tutor for a family in Bern, and moved to Frankfurt in 1797 for a similar post. In 1799 his father bequeathed him a modest income and the freedom to resign his tutoring job, pursue his own work, and attempt to establish himself in a  position. In 1801, with the help of Schelling, he moved to the  town of Jena, already widely known as the home of Schiller, Fichte, and the Schlegel brothers. After lecturing for a few years, he became a professor in 1805. Prior to the move to Jena, Hegel’s essays had been chiefly concerned with problems in morality, the theory of culture, and the philosophy of religion. Hegel shared with Rousseau and the G. Romantics many doubts about the political and moral implications of the European Enlightenment and modern philosophy in general, even while he still enthusiastically championed what he termed the principle of modernity, “absolute freedom.” Like many, he feared that the modern attack on feudal political and religious authority would merely issue in the reformulation of new internalized and still repressive forms of authority. And he was among that legion of G. intellectuals infatuated with ancient Greece and the superiority of their supposedly harmonious social life, compared with the authoritarian and legalistic character of the Jewish and later Christian religions. At Jena, however, he coedited a journal with Schelling, The Critical Journal of Philosophy, and came to work much more on the philosophic issues created by the critical philosophy or “transcendental idealism” of Kant, and its legacy in the work of Rheinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. His written work became much more influenced by these theoretical projects and their attempt to extend Kant’s search for the basic categories necessary for experience to be discriminated and evaluated, and for a theory of the subject that, in some non-empirical way, was responsible for such categories. Problems concerning the completeness, interrelation, and ontological status of such a categorial structure were quite prominent, along with a continuing interest in the relation between a free, self-determining agent and the supposed constraints of moral principles and other agents. In his early years at Jena especially before Schelling left in 1803, he was particularly preoccupied with this problem of a systematic philosophy, a way of accounting for the basic categories of the natural world and for human practical activity that would ground all such categories on commonly presupposed and logically interrelated, even interdeducible, principles. In Hegel’s terms, this was the problem of the relation between a “Logic” and a “Philosophy of Nature” and “Philosophy of Spirit.” After 1803, however, while he was preparing his own systematic philosophy for publication, what had been planned as a short introduction to this system took on a life of its own and grew into one of Hegel’s most provocative and influential books. Working at a furious pace, he finished hedonistic paradox Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 365    AM  365 what would be eventually called The Phenomenology of Spirit in a period of great personal and political turmoil. During the final writing of the book, he had learned that Christina Burkhard would give birth to his illegitimate son. Ludwig was born in February 1807. And he is supposed to have completed the text on October 13, 1807, the day Napoleon’s armies captured Jena. It was certainly an unprecedented work. In conception, it is about the human race itself as a developing, progressively more self-conscious subject, but its content seems to take in a vast, heterogeneous range of topics, from technical issues in empiricist epistemology to the significance of burial rituals. Its range is so heterogeneous that there is controversy to this day about whether it has any overall unity, or whether it was pieced together at the last minute. Adding to the interpretive problem, Hegel often invented his own striking language of “inverted worlds,” “struggles to the death for recognition,” “unhappy consciousness,” “spiritual animal kingdoms,” and “beautiful souls.” Continuing his  career at Jena in those times looked out of the question, so Hegel accepted a job at Bamberg editing a newspaper, and in the following year began an eight-year stint 180816 as headmaster and philosophy teacher at a Gymnasium or secondary school at Nürnberg. During this period, at forty-one, he married the twenty-year-old Marie von Tucher. He also wrote what is easily his most difficult work, and the one he often referred to as his most important, a magisterial two-volume Science of Logic, which attempts to be a philosophical account of the concepts necessary in all possible kinds of account-givings. Finally, in 1816, Hegel was offered a chair in philosophy at the  of Heidelberg, where he published the first of several versions of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, his own systematic account of the relation between the “logic” of human thought and the “real” expression of such interrelated categories in our understanding of the natural world and in our understanding and evaluation of our own activities. In 1818, he accepted the much more prestigious post in philosophy at Berlin, where he remained until his death in 1831. Soon after his arrival in Berlin, he began to exert a powerful influence over G. letters and intellectual life. In 1821, in the midst of a growing political and nationalist crisis in Prussia, he published his controversial book on political philosophy, The Philosophy of Right. His lectures at the  were later published as his philosophy of history, of aesthetics, and of religion, and as his history of philosophy. Philosophy. Hegel’s most important ideas were formed gradually, in response to a number of issues in philosophy and often in response to historical events. Moreover, his language and approach were so heterodox that he has inspired as much controversy about the meaning of his position as about its adequacy. Hence any summary will be as much a summary of the controversies as of the basic position. His dissatisfactions with the absence of a public realm, or any forms of genuine social solidarity in the G. states and in modernity generally, and his distaste with what he called the “positivity” of the orthodox religions of the day their reliance on law, scripture, and abstract claims to authority, led him to various attempts to make use of the Grecian polis and classical art, as well as the early Christian understanding of love and a renewed “folk religion,” as critical foils to such tendencies. For some time, he also regarded much traditional and modern philosophy as itself a kind of lifeless classifying that only contributed to contemporary fragmentation, myopia, and confusion. These concerns remained with him throughout his life, and he is thus rightly known as one of the first modern thinkers to argue that what had come to be accepted as the central problem of modern social and political life, the legitimacy of state power, had been too narrowly conceived. There are now all sorts of circumstances, he argued, in which people might satisfy the modern criterion of legitimacy and “consent” to the use of some power, but not fully understand the terms within which such issues are posed, or assent in an attenuated, resentful, manipulated, or confused way. In such cases they would experience no connection between their individual will and the actual content of the institutions they are supposed to have sanctioned. The modern problem is as much alienation Entfremdung as sovereignty, an exercise of will in which the product of one’s will appears “strange” or “alien,” “other,” and which results in much of modern life, however chosen or willed, being fundamentally unsatisfying. However, during the Jena years, his views on this issue changed. Most importantly, philosophical issues moved closer to center stage in the Hegelian drama. He no longer regarded philosophy as some sort of self-undermining activity that merely prepared one for some leap into genuine “speculation” roughly Schelling’s position and began to champion a unique kind of comprehensive, very determinate reflection on the interrelations among all the various classical alternatives in philosophy. Much more controversially, he also attempted to understand the way in which such relations and transitions were also reflected in the history of the art, politics, and religions of various historical communities. He thus came to think that philosophy should be some sort of recollection of its past history, a realization of the mere partiality, rather than falsity, of its past attempts at a comprehensive teaching, and an account of the centrality of these continuously developing attempts in the development of other human practices.Through understanding the “logic” of such a development, a reconciliation of sorts with the implications of such a rational process in contemporary life, or at least with the potentialities inherent in contemporary life, would be possible. In all such influences and developments, one revolutionary aspect of Hegel’s position became clearer. For while Hegel still frequently argued that the subject matter of philosophy was “reason,” or “the Absolute,” the unconditioned presupposition of all human account-giving and evaluation, and thereby an understanding of the “whole” within which the natural world and human deeds were “parts,” he also always construed this claim to mean that the subject matter of philosophy was the history of human experience itself. Philosophy was about the real world of human change and development, understood by Hegel to be the collective self-education of the human species about itself. It could be this, and satisfy the more traditional ideals because, in one of his most famous phrases, “what is actual is rational,” or because some full account could be given of the logic or teleological order, even the necessity, for the great conceptual and political changes in human history. We could thereby finally reassure ourselves that the way our species had come to conceptualize and evaluate is not finite or contingent, but is “identical” with “what there is, in truth.” This identity theory or Absolute Knowledgemeans that we will then be able to be “at home” in the world and so will have understood what philosophers have always tried to understand, “how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” The way it all hangs together is, finally, “due to us,” in some collective and historical and “logical” sense. In a much disputed passage in his Philosophy of Religion lectures, Hegel even suggested that with such an understanding, history itself would be over. Several elements in this general position have inspired a good deal of excitement and controversy. To advance claims such as these Hegel had to argue against a powerful, deeply influential assumption in modern thought: the priority of the individual, self-conscious subject. Such an assumption means, for example, that almost all social relations, almost all our bonds to other human beings, exist because and only because they are made, willed into existence by individuals otherwise naturally unattached to each other. With respect to knowledge claims, while there may be many beliefs in a common tradition that we unreflectively share with others, such shared beliefs are also taken primarily to be the result of individuals continuously affirming such beliefs, however implicitly or unreflectively. Their being shared is simply a consequence of their being simultaneously affirmed or assented to by individuals. Hegel’s account requires a different picture, an insistence on the priority of some kind of collective subject, which he called human “spirit” or Geist. His general theory of conceptual and historical change requires the assumption of such a collective subject, one that even can be said to be “coming to self-consciousness” about itself, and this required that he argue against the view that so much could be understood as the result of individual will and reflection. Rather, he tried in many different ways to show that the formation of what might appear to an individual to be his or her own particular intention or desire or belief already reflected a complex social inheritance that could itself be said to be evolving, even evolving progressively, with a “logic” of its own. The completion of such collective attempts at self-knowledge resulted in what Hegel called the realization of Absolute Spirit, by which he either meant the absolute completion of the human attempt to know itself, or the realization in human affairs of some sort of extrahuman transcendence, or full expression of an infinite God. Hegel tried to advance all such claims about social subjectivity without in some way hypostatizing or reifying such a subject, as if it existed independently of the actions and thoughts of individuals. This claim about the deep dependence of individuals on one another even for their very identity, even while they maintain their independence, is one of the best-known examples of Hegel’s attempt at a dialectical resolution of many of the traditional oppositions and antinomies of past thought. Hegel often argued that what appeared to be contraries in philosophy, such as mind/body, freedom/determinism, idealism/materialism, universal/particular, the state/the individual, or even God/man, appeared such incompatible alternatives only because of the undeveloped and so incomplete perspective within which the oppositions were formulated. So, in one of his more famous attacks on such dualisms, human freedom according to Hegel could not be understood coherently as some purely rational self-determination, independent of heteronomous impulses, nor the human being as a perpetual opposition between reason and sensibility. In his moral theory, Kant had argued for the latter view and Hegel regularly returned to such Kantian claims about the opposition of duty and inclination as deeply typical of modern dualism. Hegel claimed that Kant’s version of a rational principle, the “categorical imperative,” was so formal and devoid of content as not to be action-guiding it could not coherently rule in or rule out the appropriate actions, and that the “moral point of view” rigoristically demanded a pure or dutiful motivation to which no human agent could conform. By contrast, Hegel claimed that the dualisms of morality could be overcome in ethical life Sittlichkeit, those modern social institutions which, it was claimed, provided the content or true “objects” of a rational will. These institutions, the family, civil society, and the state, did not require duties in potential conflict with our own substantive ends, but were rather experienced as the “realization” of our individual free will. It has remained controversial what for Hegel a truly free, rational self-determination, continuous with, rather than constraining, our desire for happiness and self-actualization, amounted to. Many commentators have noted that, among modern philosophers, only Spinoza, whom Hegel greatly admired, was as insistent on such a thoroughgoing compatibilism, and on a refusal to adopt the Christian view of human beings as permanently divided against themselves. In his most ambitious analysis of such oppositions Hegel went so far as to claim that, not only could alternatives be shown to be ultimately compatible when thought together within some higher-order “Notion” Begriff that resolved or “sublated” the opposition, but that one term in such opposition could actually be said to imply or require its contrary, that a “positing” of such a notion would, to maintain consistency, require its own “negating,” and that it was this sort of dialectical opposition that could be shown to require a sublation, or Aufhebung a term of art in Hegel that simultaneously means in G. ‘to cancel’, ‘to preserve’, and ‘to raise up’. This claim for a dialectical development of our fundamental notions has been the most severely criticized in Hegel’s philosophy. Many critics have doubted that so much basic conceptual change can be accounted for by an internal critique, one that merely develops the presuppositions inherent in the affirmation of some notion or position or related practice. This issue has especially attracted critics of Hegel’s Science of Logic, where he tries first to show that the attempt to categorize anything that is, simply and immediately, as “Being,” is an attempt that both “negates itself,” or ends up categorizing everything as “Nothing,” and then that this self-negation requires a resolution in the higher-order category of “Becoming.” This analysis continues into an extended argument that purports to show that any attempt to categorize anything at all must ultimately make use of the distinctions of “essence” and “appearance,” and elements of syllogistic and finally Hegel’s own dialectical logic, and both the details and the grand design of that project have been the subject of a good deal of controversy. Unfortunately, much of this controversy has been greatly confused by the popular association of the terms “thesis,” “antithesis,” and “synthesis” with Hegel’s theory of dialectic. These crude, mechanical notions were invented in 1837 by a less-than-sensitive Hegel expositor, Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus, and were never used as terms of art by Hegel. Others have argued that the tensions Hegel does identify in various positions and practices require a much broader analysis of the historical, especially economic, context within which positions are formulated and become important, or some more detailed attention to the empirical discoveries or paradoxes that, at the very least, contribute to basic conceptual change. Those worried about the latter problem have also raised questions about the logical relation between universal and particular implied in Hegel’s account. Hegel, following Fichte, radicalizes a Kantian claim about the inaccessibility of pure particularity in sensations Kant had written that “intuitions without concepts are blind”. Hegel charges that Kant did not draw sufficiently radical conclusions from such an antiempiricist claim, that he should have completely rethought the traditional distinction between “what was given to the mind” and “what the mind did with the given.” By contrast Hegel is confident that he has a theory of a “concrete universal,” concepts that cannot be understood as pale generalizations or abstract representations of given particulars, because they are required for particulars to Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 368    AM  368 be apprehended in the first place. They are not originally dependent on an immediate acquaintance with particulars; there is no such acquaintance. Critics wonder if Hegel has much of a theory of particularity left, if he does not claim rather that particulars, or whatever now corresponds to them, are only interrelations of concepts, and in which the actual details of the organization of the natural world and human history are deduced as conceptual necessities in Hegel’s Encyclopedia. This interpretation of Hegel, that he believes all entities are really the thoughts, expressions, or modes of a single underlying mental substance, and that this mind develops and posits itself with some sort of conceptual necessity, has been termed a panlogicism, a term of art coined by Hermann Glockner, a Hegel commentator in the first half of the twentieth century. It is a much-disputed reading. Such critics are especially concerned with the implications of this issue in Hegel’s political theory, where the great modern opposition between the state and the individual seems subjected to this same logic, and the individual’s true individuality is said to reside in and only in the political universal, the State. Thus, on the one hand, Hegel’s political philosophy is often praised for its early identification and analysis of a fundamental, new aspect of contemporary life  the categorically distinct realm of political life in modernity, or the independence of the “State” from the social world of private individuals engaged in competition and private association “civil society”. But, on the other hand, his attempt to argue for a completion of these domains in the State, or that individuals could only be said to be free in allegiance to a State, has been, at least since Marx, one of the most criticized aspects of his philosophy. Finally, criticisms also frequently target the underlying intention behind such claims: Hegel’s career-long insistence on finding some basic unity among the many fragmented spheres of modern thought and existence, and his demand that this unity be articulated in a discursive account, that it not be merely felt, or gestured at, or celebrated in edifying speculation. PostHegelian thinkers have tended to be suspicious of any such intimations of a whole for modern experience, and have argued that, with the destruction of the premodern world, we simply have to content ourselves with the disconnected, autonomous spheres of modern interests. In his lecture courses these basic themes are treated in wide-ranging accounts of the basic institutions of cultural history. History itself is treated as fundamentally political history, and, in typically Hegelian fashion, the major epochs of political history are claimed to be as they were because of the internal inadequacies of past epochs, all until some final political semiconsciousness is achieved and realized. Art is treated equally developmentally, evolving from symbolic, through “classical,” to the most intensely self-conscious form of aesthetic subjectivity, romantic art. The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion embody these themes in some of the most controversial ways, since Hegel often treats religion and its development as a kind of picture or accessible “representation” of his own views about the relation of thought to being, the proper understanding of human finitude and “infinity,” and the essentially social or communal nature of religious life. This has inspired a characteristic debate among Hegel scholars, with some arguing that Hegel’s appropriation of religion shows that his own themes are essentially religious if an odd, pantheistic version of Christianity, while others argue that he has so Hegelianized religious issues that there is little distinctively religious left. Influence. This last debate is typical of that prominent in the post-Hegelian tradition. Although, in the decades following his death, there was a great deal of work by self-described Hegelians on the history of law, on political philosophy, and on aesthetics, most of the prominent academic defenders of Hegel were interested in theology, and many of these were interested in defending an interpretation of Hegel consistent with traditional Christian views of a personal God and personal immortality. This began to change with the work of “young Hegelians” such as D. F. Strauss 180874, Feuerbach 180472, Bruno Bauer 180982, and Arnold Ruge 180380, who emphasized the humanistic and historical dimensions of Hegel’s account of religion, rejected the Old Hegelian tendencies toward a reconciliation with contemporary political life, and began to reinterpret and expand Hegel’s account of the productive activity of human spirit eventually focusing on labor rather than intellectual and cultural life. Strauss himself characterized the fight as between “left,” “center,” and “right” Hegelians, depending on whether one was critical or conservative politically, or had a theistic or a humanistic view of Hegelian Geist. The most famous young or left Hegelian was Marx, especially during his days in Paris as coeditor, with Ruge, of the Deutsch-französischen Jahrbücher 1844. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 369    AM  369 In Great Britain, with its long skeptical, empiricist, and utilitarian tradition, Hegel’s work had little influence until the latter part of the nineteenth century, when philosophers such as Green and Caird took up some of the holistic themes in Hegel and developed a neo-Hegelian reading of issues in politics and religion that began to have influence in the academy. The most prominent of the British neo-Hegelians of the next generation were Bosanquet, McTaggart, and especially Bradley, all of whom were interested in many of the metaphysical implications of Hegel’s idealism, what they took to be a Hegelian claim for the “internally related” interconnection of all particulars within one single, ideal or mental, substance. Moore and Russell waged a hugely successful counterattack in the name of traditional empiricism and what would be called “analytic philosophy” against such an enterprise and in this tradition largely finished off the influence of Hegel or what was left of the historical Hegel in these neo-Hegelian versions. In G.y, Hegel has continued to influence a number of different schools of neo-Marxism, sometimes itself simply called “Hegelian Marxism,” especially the Frankfurt School, or “critical theory” group especially Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse. And he has been extremely influential in France, particularly thanks to the lectures of a brilliant if idiosyncratic Russian émigré, Alexander Kojève, who taught Hegel in the 0s at the École Pratique des Hautes Études to the likes of Merleau-Ponty and Lacan. Kojève was as much influenced by Marx and Heidegger as Hegel, but his lectures inspired many thinkers to turn again to Hegel’s account of human selfdefinition in time and to the historicity of all institutions and practices and so forged an unusual link between Hegel and postwar existentialism. Hegelian themes continue to resurface in contemporary hermeneutics, in “communitarianism” in ethics, and in the increasing attention given to conceptual change and history in the philosophy of science. This has meant for many that Hegel should now be regarded not only as the origin of a distinctive tradition in European philosophy that emphasizes the historical and social nature of human existence, but as a potential contributor to many new and often interdisciplinary approaches to philosophy.

heideggerianism: heideggerian implicaturum of “Nothing noths.” Grice thought Heidegger was the greatest philosopher that ever lived. Heideggerianism: Arendt, h. tuteed by Heidegger and Jaspers; fled to France in 3; and emigrated in 1 to the United States, where she taught at various universities. Her major works are The Origins of Totalitarianism 1, The Human Condition 8, Between Past and Future 1, On Revolution 3, Crises of the Republic 2, and The Life of the Mind 8. In Arendt’s view, for reasons established by Kant and deepened by Nietzsche, there is a breach between being and thinking, one that cannot be closed by thought. Understood as philosophizing or contemplation, thinking is a form of egoism that isolates us from one another and our world. Despite Kant, modernity remains mired in egoism, a condition compounded by the emergence of a “mass” that consists of bodies with needs temporarily met by producing and consuming and which demands governments that minister to these needs. In place of thinking, laboring, and the administration of things now called democracy, all of which are instrumental but futile as responses to the “thrown” quality of our condition, Arendt proposed to those capable of it a mode of being, political action, that she found in pronounced form in pre-Socratic Greece and briefly but gloriously at the founding of the Roman and  republics. Political action is initiation, the making of beginnings that can be explained neither causally nor teleologically. It is done in the space of appearances constituted by the presence of other political actors whose re-sponses  the telling of equally unpredictable stories concerning one another’s actions  determine what actions are taken and give character to the acting participants. In addition to the refined discernments already implied, political action requires the courage to initiate one knows not what. Its outcome is power; not over other people or things but mutual empowerment to continue acting in concert and thereby to overcome egoism and achieve positive freedom and humanity.  Heidegger, Martin: “the greatest philosopher that ever lived” – H. P. Grice. G. philosopher whose early works contributed to phenomenology and existentialism e.g., Sartre and whose later works paved the way to hermeneutics Gadamer and post-structuralism Derrida and Foucault. Born in Messkirch in the Black Forest region, Heidegger first trained to be a Jesuit, but switched to mathematics and philosophy in 1. As an instructor at Freiburg , he worked with the founder of phenomenology, Husserl. His masterwork, Sein und Zeit Being and Time, 7, was published while he was teaching at Marburg . This work, in opposition to the preoccupation with epistemology dominant at the time, focused on the traditional question of metaphysics: What is the being of entities in general? Rejecting abstract theoretical approaches to this question, Heidegger drew on Kierkegaard’s religious individualism and the influential movement called life-philosophy  Lebensphilosophie, then identified with Nietzsche, Bergson, and Dilthey  to develop a highly original account of humans as embedded in concrete situations of action. Heidegger accepted Husserl’s chair at Freiburg in 8; in 3, having been elected rector of the , he joined the Nazi party. Although he stepped down as rector one year later, new evidence suggests complicity with the Nazis until the end of the war. Starting in the late thirties, his writings started to shift toward the “antihumanist” and “poetic” form of thinking referred to as “later Heidegger.” Heidegger’s lifelong project was to answer the “question of being” Seinsfrage. This question asks, concerning things in general rocks, tools, people, etc., what is it to be an entity of these sorts? It is the question of ontology first posed by ancient Grecian philosophers from Anaximander to Aristotle. Heidegger holds, however, that philosophers starting with Plato have gone astray in trying to answer this question because they have tended to think of being as a property or essence enduringly present in things. In other words, they have fallen into the “metaphysics of presence,” which thinks of being as substance. What is overlooked in traditional metaphysics is the background conditions that enable entities to show up as counting or mattering in some specific way in the first place. In his early works, Heidegger tries to bring this concealed dimension of things to light by recasting the question of being: What is the meaning of being? Or, put differently, how do entities come to show up as intelligible to us in some determinate way? And this question calls for an analysis of the entity that has some prior understanding of things: human existence or Dasein the G. word for “existence” or “being-there,” used to refer to the structures of humans that make possible an understanding of being. Heidegger’s claim is that Dasein’s pretheoretical or “preontological” understanding of being, embodied in its everyday practices, opens a “clearing” in which entities can show up as, say, tools, protons, numbers, mental events, and so on. This historically unfolding clearing is what the metaphysical tradition has overlooked. In order to clarify the conditions that make possible an understanding of being, then, Being and Time begins with an analytic of Dasein. But Heidegger notes that traditional interpretations of human existence have been one-sided to the extent that they concentrate on our ways of existing when we are engaged in theorizing and detached reflection. It is this narrow focus on the spectator attitude that leads to the picture, found in Descartes, of the self as a mind or subject representing material objects  the so-called subjectobject model. In order to bypass this traditional picture, Heidegger sets out to describe Dasein’s “average everydayness,” i.e., our ordinary, prereflective agency when we are caught up in the midst of practical affairs. The “phenomenology of everydayness” is supposed to lead us to see the totality of human existence, including our moods, our capacity for authentic individuality, and our full range of involvements with the world and with others. The analytic of Dasein is also an ontological hermeneutics to the extent that it provides an account of how understanding in general is possible. The result of the analytic is a portrayal of human existence that is in accord with what Heidegger regards as the earliest Grecian experience of being as an emerging-into-presence physis: to be human is to be a temporal event of self-manifestation that lets other sorts of entities first come to “emerge and abide” in the world. From the standpoint of this description, the traditional concept of substance  whether mental or physical  simply has no role to play in grasping humans. Heidegger’s brilliant diagnoses or “de-structurings” of the tradition suggest that the idea of substance arises only when the conditions making entities possible are forgotten or concealed. Heidegger holds that there is no pregiven human essence. Instead, humans, as self-interpreting beings, just are what they make of themselves in the course of their active lives. Thus, as everyday agency, Dasein is not an object with properties, but is rather the “happening” of a life course “stretched out between birth and death.” Understood as the “historicity” of a temporal movement or “becoming,” Dasein is found to have three main “existentials” or basic structures shared by every “existentiell” i.e., specific and local way of living. First, Dasein finds itself thrown into a world not of its choosing, already delivered over to the task of living out its life in a concrete context. This “facticity” of our lives is revealed in the moods that let things matter to us in some way or other  e.g., the burdensome feelings of concern that accompany being a parent in our culture. Second, as projection, Dasein is always already taking some stand on its life by acting in the world. Understood as agency, human existence is “ahead of itself” in two senses: 1 our competent dealings with familiar situations sketch out a range of possibilities for how things may turn out in the future, and 2 each of our actions is contributing to shaping our lives as people of specific sorts. Dasein is futuredirected in the sense that the ongoing fulfillment of possibilities in the course of one’s active life constitutes one’s identity or being. To say that Dasein is “being-toward-death” is to say that the stands we take our “understanding” define our being as a totality. Thus, my actual ways of treating my children throughout my life define my being as a parent in the end, regardless of what good intentions I might have. Finally, Dasein is discourse in the sense that we are always articulating  or “addressing and discussing”  the entities that show up in our concernful absorption in current situations. These three existentials define human existence as a temporal unfolding. The unity of these dimensions  being already in a world, ahead of itself, and engaged with things  Heidegger calls care. This is what it means to say that humans are the entities whose being is at issue for them. Taking a stand on our own being, we constitute our identity through what we do. The formal structure of Dasein as temporality is made concrete through one’s specific involvements in the world where ‘world’ is used in the life-world sense in which we talk about the business world or the world of academia. Dasein is the unitary phenomenon of being-in-the-world. A core component of Heidegger’s early works is his description of how Dasein’s practical dealings with equipment define the being of the entities that show up in the world. In hammering in a workshop, e.g., what ordinarily shows up for us is not a hammer-thing with properties, but rather a web of significance relations shaped by our projects. Hammering is “in order to” join boards, which is “for” building a bookcase, which is “for the sake of” being a person with a neat study. The hammer is encountered in terms of its place in this holistic context of functionality  the “ready-to-hand.” In other words, the being of the equipment  its “ontological definition”  consists of its relations to other equipment and its actual use within the entire practical context. Seen from this standpoint, the brute, meaningless objects assumed to be basic by the metaphysical tradition  the “present-at-hand”  can show up only when there is a breakdown in our ordinary dealings with things, e.g., when the hammer breaks or is missing. In this sense, the ready-to-hand is said to be more primordial than the material objects treated as basic by the natural sciences. It follows, then, that the being of entities in the world is constituted by the framework of intelligibility or “disclosedness” opened by Dasein’s practices. This clearing is truth in the original meaning of the Grecian word aletheia, which Heidegger renders as ‘un-concealment’. But it would be wrong to think that what is claimed here is that humans are initially just given, and that they then go on to create a clearing. For, in Heidegger’s view, our own being as agents of specific types is defined by the world into which we are thrown: in my workshop, I can be a craftsman or an amateur, but not a samurai paying court to a daimyo. Our identity as agents is made possible by the context of shared forms of life and linguistic practices of a public life-world. For the most part, we exist as the “they” das Man, participants in the historically constituted “cohappening of a people” Volk. The embeddedness of our existence in a cultural context explains our inveterate tendency toward inauthenticity. As we become initiated into the practices of our community, we are inclined to drift along with the crowd, doing what “one” does, enacting stereotyped roles, and thereby losing our ability to seize on and define our own lives. Such falling into public preoccupations Heidegger sees as a sign that we are fleeing from the fact that we are finite beings who stand before death understood as the culmination of our possibilities. When, through anxiety and hearing the call of conscience, we face up to our being-toward-death, our lives can be transformed. To be authentic is to clear-sightedly face up to one’s responsibility for what one’s life is adding up to as a whole. And because our lives are inseparable from our community’s existence, authenticity involves seizing on the possibilities circulating in our shared “heritage” in order to realize a communal “destiny.” Heidegger’s ideal of resolute “taking action” in the current historical situation no doubt contributed to his leap into politics in the 0s. According to his writings of that period, the ancient Grecians inaugurated a “first beginning” for Western civilization, but centuries of forgetfulness beginning with the Latinization of Grecian words have torn us away from the primal experience of being rooted in that initial setting. Heidegger hoped that, guided by the insights embodied in great works of art especially Hölderlin’s poetry, National Socialism would help bring about a world-rejuvenating “new beginning” comparable to the first beginning in ancient Greece. Heidegger’s later writings attempt to fully escape the subjectivism he sees dominating Western thought from its inception up to Nietzsche. “The Origin of the Work of Art” 5, for example, shows how a great work of art such as a Grecian temple, by shaping the world in which a people live, constitutes the kinds of people that can live in that world. An Introduction to Metaphysics 5 tries to recover the Grecian experience of humans as beings whose activities of gathering and naming logos are above all a response to what is more than human. The later writings emphasize that which resists all human mastery and comprehension. Such terms as ‘nothingness’, ‘earth’, and ‘mystery’ suggest that what shows itself to us always depends on a background of what does not show itself, what remains concealed. Language comes to be understood as the medium through which anything, including the human, first becomes accessible and intelligible. Because language is the source of all intelligibility, Heidegger says that humans do not speak, but rather language speaks us  an idea that became central to poststructuralist theories. In his writings after the war, Heidegger replaces the notions of resoluteness and political activism with a new ideal of letting-be or releasement Gelassenheit, a stance characterized by meditative thinking, thankfulness for the “gift” of being, and openness to the silent “call” of language. The technological “enframing” Gestell of our age  encountering everything as a standing reserve on hand for our use  is treated not as something humans do, but instead as a manifestation of being itself. The “anti-humanism” of these later works is seen in the description of technology the mobilization of everything for the sole purpose of greater efficiency as an epochal event in the “history of being,” a way things have come-into-their-own Ereignis rather than as a human accomplishment. The history or “sending” Geschick of being consists of epochs that have all gone increasingly astray from the original beginning inaugurated by the pre-Socratics. Since human willpower alone cannot bring about a new epoch, technology cannot be ended by our efforts. But a non-technological way of encountering things is hinted at in a description of a jug as a fourfold of earth, sky, mortals, and gods, and Heidegger reflects on forms of poetry that point to a new, non-metaphysical way of experiencing being. Through a transformed relation to language and art, and by abandoning “onto-theology” the attempt to ground all entities in one supreme entity, we might prepare ourselves for a transformed way of understanding being. 

hellenistic philosophy: “Once the Romans defeated Greece, at Oxford we stop talking of ‘Greek’ philosophy, but ‘Hellenistic’ philosophy instead – since most Greeks were brought to Rome as slaves to teach philosophy to their children” – Grice. Vide “Roman philosophy” – “Not everybody knows all these Roman philosophers, so that’s a good thing.” – H. P. Grice. Hellenistic philosophy is the philosophical systems of the Hellenistic age 32330 B.C., although 31187 B.C. better defines it as a philosophical era, notably Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism. These all emerged in the generation after Aristotle’s death 322 B.C., and dominated philosophical debate until the first century B.C., during which there were revivals of traditional Platonism and of Aristotelianism. The age was one in which much of the eastern Mediterranean world absorbed Grecian culture was “Hellenized,” hence “Hellenistic”, and recruits to philosophy flocked from this region to Athens, which remained the center of philosophical activity until 87 B.C. Then the Roman sack of Athens drove many philosophers into exile, and neither the schools nor the styles of philosophy that had grown up there ever fully recovered. Very few philosophical writings survive intact from the period. Our knowledge of Hellenistic philosophers depends mainly on later doxography, on the Roman writers Lucretius and Cicero both mid-first century B.C., and on what we learn from the schools’ critics in later centuries, e.g. Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch. ’Skeptic’, a term not actually current before the very end of the Hellenistic age, serves as a convenient label to characterize two philosophical movements. The first is the New Academy: the school founded by Plato, the Academy, became in this period a largely dialectical one, conducting searching critiques of other schools’ doctrines without declaring any of its own, beyond perhaps the assertion however guarded that nothing could be known and the accompanying recommendation of “suspension of judgment” epoche. The nature and vivacity of Stoicism owed much to its prolonged debates with the New Academy. The founder of this Academic phase was Arcesilaus school head c.268 c.241; its most revered and influential protagonist was Carneades school head in the mid-second century; and its most prestigious voice was that of Cicero 10643 B.C., whose highly influential philosophical works were written mainly from a New Academic stance. But by the early first century B.C. the Academy was drifting back to a more doctrinal stance, and in the later part of the century it was largely eclipsed by a second “skeptic” movement, Pyrrhonism. This was founded by Aenesidemus, a pioneering skeptic despite his claim to be merely reviving the philosophy of Pyrrho, a philosophical guru of the early Hellenistic period. His neo-Pyrrhonism survives today mainly through the writings of Sextus Empiricus second century A.D., an adherent of the school who, strictly speaking, represents its post-Hellenistic phase. The Peripatos, Aristotle’s school, officially survived throughout the era, but it is not regarded as a distinctively “Hellenistic” movement. Despite the eminence of Aristotle’s first successor, Theophrastus school head 322287, it thereafter fell from prominence, its fortunes only reviving around the mid-first century B.C. It is disputed how far the other Hellenistic philosophers were even aware of Aristotle’s treatises, which should not in any case be regarded as a primary influence on them. Each school had a location in Athens to which it could draw pupils. The Epicurean school was a relatively private institution, its “Garden” outside the city walls housing a close-knit philosophical community. The Stoics took their name from the Stoa Poikile, the “Painted Colonnade” in central Athens where they gathered. The Academics were based in the Academy, a public grove just outside the city. Philosophers were public figures, a familiar sight around town. Each school’s philosophical identity was further clarified by its absolute loyalty to the name of its founder  respectively Epicurus, Zeno of Citium, and Plato  and by the polarities that developed in interschool debates. Epicureanism is diametrically opposed on most issues to Stoicism. Academic Skepticism provides another antithesis to Stoicism, not through any positions of its own it had none, but through its unflagging critical campaign against every Stoic thesis. It is often said that in this age the old Grecian political institution of the city-state had broken down, and that the Hellenistic philosophies were an answer to the resulting crisis of values. Whether or not there is any truth in this, it remains clear that moral concerns were now much less confined to the individual city-state than previously, and that at an extreme the boundaries had been pushed back to include all mankind within the scope of an individual’s moral obligations. Our “affinity” oikeiosis to all mankind is an originally Stoic doctrine that acquired increasing currency with other schools. This attitude partly reflects the weakening of national and cultural boundaries in the Hellenistic period, as also in the Roman imperial period that followed it. The three recognized divisions of philosophy were ethics, logic, and physics. In ethics, the central objective was to state and defend an account of the “end” telos, the moral goal to which all activity was subordinated: the Epicureans named pleasure, the Stoics conformity with nature. Much debate centered on the semimythical figure of the wise man, whose conduct in every conceivable circumstance was debated by all schools. Logic in its modern sense was primarily a Stoic concern, rejected as irrelevant by the Epicureans. But Hellenistic logic included epistemology, where the primary focus of interest was the “criterion of truth,” the ultimate yardstick against which all judgments could be reliably tested. Empiricism was a surprisingly uncontroversial feature of Hellenistic theories: there was little interest in the Platonic-Aristotelian idea that knowledge in the strict sense is non-sensory, and the debate between dogmatists and Skeptics was more concerned with the question whether any proposed sensory criterion was adequate. Both Stoics and Epicureans attached especial importance to prolepsis, the generic notion of a thing, held to be either innate or naturally acquired in a way that gave it a guaranteed veridical status. Physics saw an opposition between Epicurean atomism, with its denial of divine providence, and the Stoic world-continuum, imbued with divine rationality. The issue of determinism was also placed on the philosophical map: Epicurean morality depends on the denial of both physical and logical determinism, whereas Stoic morality is compatible with, indeed actually requires, the deterministic causal nexus through which providence operates. 

helmholtz:  philosopher known for groundbreaking work in the philosophy of perception. Formally trained as a physician, he distinguished himself in physics in 1848 as a codiscoverer of the law of conservation of energy, and by the end of his life was perhaps the most influential figure in G. physical research. Philosophically, his most important influence was on the study of space. Intuitionist psychologists held that the geometrical structure of three-dimensional space was given directly in sensation by innate physiological mechanisms; Helmholtz brought this theory to severe empirical trials and argued, on the contrary, that our knowledge of space consists of inferences from accumulated experience. On the mathematical side, he attacked Kant’s view that Euclidean geometry is the a priori form of outer intuition by showing that it is possible to have visual experience of non-Euclidean space “On the Origins and Meaning of Geometrical Axioms,” 1870. His crucial insight was that empirical geometry depends on physical assumptions about the behavior of measuring instruments. This inspired the view of Poincaré and logical empiricism that the empirical content of geometry is fixed by physical definitions, and made possible Einstein’s use of non-Euclidean geometry in physics. 

helvétius: philosopher prominent in the formative phases of eighteenth-century materialism in France. His De l’esprit 1758 was widely discussed internationally, but condemned by the  of Paris and burned by the government. Helvétius attempted to clarify his doctrine in his posthumously published De l’homme. Following Locke’s criticism of the innate ideas, Helvétius stressed the function of experience in our acquisition of knowledge. In accord with the doctrines of d’Holbach, Condillac, and La Mettrie, the materialist Helvétius regarded the sensations as the basis of all our knowledge. Only by comparison, abstraction, and combination of sensations do we reach the level of concepts. Peculiar to Helvétius, however, is the stress on the social determinations of our knowledge. Specific interests and passions are the starting point of all our striving for knowledge. Egoism is the spring of our desires and actions. The civil laws of the enlightened state enabled egoism to be transformed into social competition and thereby diverted toward public benefits. Like his materialist contemporary d’Holbach and later Condorcet, Helvétius sharply criticized the social function of the church. Priests, he claimed, provided society with wrong moral ideas. He demanded a thorough reform of the educational system for the purpose of individual and social emancipation. In contrast to the teachings of Rousseau, Helvétius praised the further development of science, art, and industry as instruments for the historical progress of mankind. The ideal society consists of enlightened because well-educated citizens living in comfortable and even moderately luxurious circumstances. All people should participate in the search for truth, by means of public debates and discussions. Truth is equated with the moral good. Helvétius had some influence on Marxist historical materialism.

hempel: eminent philosopher of science associated with the Vienna Circle of logical empiricist philosophers in the early 0s, before his emigration to the United States; thereafter he became one of the most influential philosophers of science of his time, largely through groundbreaking work on the logical analysis of the concepts of confirmation and scientific explanation. Hempel received his doctorate under Reichenbach at the  of Berlin in 4 with a dissertation on the logical analysis of probability. He studied with Carnap at the  of Vienna in 930, where he participated in the “protocol-sentence debate” concerning the observational basis of scientific knowledge raging within the Vienna Circle between Moritz Schlick 26 and Otto Neurath 25. Hempel was attracted to the “radical physicalism” articulated by Neurath and Carnap, which denied the foundational role of immediate experience and asserted that all statements of the total language of science including observation reports or protocol-sentences can be revised as science progresses. This led to Hempel’s first major publication, “On the Logical Positivists’ Theory of Truth” 5. He moved to the United States to work with Carnap at the  of Chicago in 738. He also taught at Queens  and Yale before his long career at Princeton 55. In the 0s he collaborated with his friends Olaf Helmer and Paul Oppenheim on a celebrated series of papers, the most influential of which are “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation” 5 and “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” 8, coauthored with Oppenheim. The latter paper articulated the deductive-nomological model, which characterizes scientific explanations as deductively valid arguments proceeding from general laws and initial conditions to the fact to be explained, and served as the basis for all future work on the subject. Hempel’s papers on explanation and confirmation and also related topics such as concept formation, criteria of meaningfulness, and scientific theories were collected together in Aspects of Scientific Explanation 5, one of the most important works in postwar philosophy of science. He also published a more popular, but extremely influential introduction to the field, Philosophy of Natural Science 6. Hempel and Kuhn became colleagues at Princeton in the 0s. Another fruitful collaboration ensued, as a result of which Hempel moved away from the Carnapian tradition of logical analysis toward a more naturalistic and pragmatic conception of science in his later work. As he himself explains, however, this later turn can also be seen as a return to a similarly naturalistic conception Neurath had earlier defended within the Vienna Circle. 

Heno-theism, allegiance to one supreme deity while conceding existence to others; also described as monolatry, incipient monotheism, or practical monotheism. It occupies a middle ground between polytheism and radical monotheism, which denies reality to all gods save one. It has been claimed that early Judaism passed through a henotheistic phase, acknowledging other Middle Eastern deities albeit condemning their worship, en route to exclusive recognition of Yahweh. But the concept of progress from polytheism through henotheism to monotheism is a rationalizing construct, and cannot be supposed to capture the complex development of any historical religion, including that of ancient Israel.

Henry de Ghent: philosopher. After serving as a church official at Tournai and Brugge, he taught theology at Paris from 1276. His major writings were “Summa quaestionum ordinariarum” and “Quodlibeta.” He was the leading representative of the neoAugustinian movement at Paris in the final quarter of the thirteenth century. His theory of knowledge combines Aristotelian elements with Augustinian illuminationism. Heavily dependent on Avicenna for his view of the reality enjoyed by essences of creatures esse essentiae from eternity, he rejected both real distinction and real identity of essence and existence in creatures, and defended their intentional distinction. He also rejected a real distinction between the soul and its powers and rejected the purely potential character of prime matter. He defended the duality of substantial form in man, the unicity of form in other material substances, and the primacy of will in the act of choice.

heraclitus fl. c.500 B.C., Grice on Heraclitus: They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,/They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remembered how often you and I/Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take. Grecian philosopher. A transition figure between the Milesian philosophers and the later pluralists, Heraclitus stressed unity in the world of change. He follows the Milesians in positing a series of cyclical transformations of basic stuffs of the world; for instance, he holds that fire changes to water and earth in turn. Moreover, he seems to endorse a single source or arche of natural substances, namely fire. But he also observes that natural transformations necessarily involve contraries such as hot and cold, wet and dry. Indeed, without the one contrary the other would not exist, and without contraries the cosmos would not exist. Hence strife is justice, and war is the father and king of all. In the conflict of opposites there is a hidden harmony that sustains the world, symbolized by the tension of a bow or the attunement of a lyre. Scholars disagree about whether Heraclitus’s chief view is that there is a one in the many or that process is reality. Clearly the underlying unity of phenomena is important for him. But he also stresses the transience of physical substances and the importance of processes and qualities. Moreover, his underlying source of unity seems to be a law of process and opposition; thus he seems to affirm both the unity of phenomena and the reality of process. Criticizing his predecessors such as Pythagoras and Xenophanes for doing research without insight, Heraclitus claims that we should listen to the logos, which teaches that all things are one. The logos, a principle of order and knowledge, is common to all, but the many remain ignorant of it, like sleepwalkers unaware of the reality around them. All things come to pass according to the logos; hence it is the law of change, or at least its expression. Heraclitus wrote a single book, perhaps organized into sections on cosmology, politics and ethics, and theology. Apparently, however, he did not provide a continuous argument but a series of epigrammatic remarks meant to reveal the nature of reality through oracular and riddling language. Although he seems to have been a recluse without immediate disciples, he may have stirred Parmenides to his reaction against contraries. In the late fifth century B.C. Cratylus of Athens preached a radical Heraclitean doctrine according to which everything is in flux and there is accordingly no knowledge of the world. This version of Heracliteanism influenced Plato’s view of the sensible world and caused Plato and Aristotle to attribute a radical doctrine of flux to Heraclitus. Democritus imitated Heraclitus’s ethical sayings, and in Hellenistic times the Stoics appealed to him for their basic principles. 

herbart: philosopher who significantly contributed to psychology and the theory of education. Rejecting the idealism of Fichte and Hegel, he attempted to establish a form of psychology founded on experience. The task of philosophy is the analysis of concepts given in ordinary experience. Logic must clarify these concepts, Metaphysics should correct them, while Aesthetics and Ethics are to complement them by an analysis of values. Herbart advocated a form of determinism in psychology and ethics. The laws that govern psychological processes are identical with those that govern the heavens. He subordinated ethics to aesthetics, arguing that our moral values originate from certain immediate and involuntary judgments of like and dislike. The five basic ideas of morality are inner freedom, perfection, benevolence, law, and justice or equity. Herbart’s view of education  that it should aim at producing individuals who possess inner freedom and strength of character  was highly influential in nineteenth-century Germany.

herder: philosopher, an intellectual and literary figure central to the transition from the G. Enlightenment to Romanticism. He was born in East Prussia and received an early classical education. About 1762, while studying theology at the  of Königsberg, he came under the influence of Kant. He also began a lifelong friendship with Hamann, who especially stimulated his interests in the interrelations among language, culture, and history. After ordination as a Lutheran minister in 1765, he began his association with the Berlin Academy, earning its prestigious “prize” for his “Essay on the Origin of Language” 1772. In 1776 he was appointed Generalsuperintendent of the Lutheran clergy at Weimar through the intercession of Goethe. He was then able to focus his intellectual and literary powers on most of the major issues of his time. Of particular note are his contributions to psychology in Of the Cognition and Sensation of the Human Soul 1778; to the philosophy of history and culture in Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind 178491, perhaps his most influential work; and to philosophy in Understanding and Experience 1799, which contains his extensive Metakritik of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Herder was an intellectual maverick and provocateur, writing when the Enlightenment conception of reason was in decline but before its limited defense by Kant or its total rejection by Romanticism had become entrenched in the G.-speaking world. Rejecting any rational system, Herder’s thought is best viewed as a mosaic of certain ideas that reemerge in various guises throughout his writings. Because of these features, Herder’s thought has been compared with that of Rousseau. Herder’s philosophy can be described as involving elements of naturalism, organicism, and vitalism. He rejected philosophical explanations, appealing to the supernatural or divine, such as the concept of the “immortal soul” in psychology, a “divine origin” of language, or “providence” in history. He sought to discern an underlying primordial force to account for the psychological unity of the various “faculties.” He viewed this natural tendency toward “organic formation” as also operative in language and culture, and as ultimately manifested in the dynamic development of the various cultures in the form of a universal history. Finally, he often wrote in a way that suggested the dynamic process of life itself as the basic metaphor undergirding his thought. His influence can be traced through Humboldt into later linguistics and through Schelling and Hegel in the philosophy of history and later G. historicism. He anticipated elements of vitalism in Schopenhauer and Bergson. 

interpretatum: h “While ‘heremneia’ sounds poetic and sweet, ‘interpretatio’ sounds thomistic and rough!” – H. P. Grice. “Plus ‘hermeneia is metaphorical.’ hermeneia: hermeneutics, the art or theory of interpretation, as well as a type of philosophy that starts with questions of interpretation. Originally concerned more narrowly with interpreting sacred texts, the term acquired a much broader significance in its historical development and finally became a philosophical position in twentieth-century G. philosophy. There are two competing positions in hermeneutics: whereas the first follows Dilthey and sees interpretation or Verstehen as a method for the historical and human sciences, the second follows Heidegger and sees it as an “ontological event,” an interaction between interpreter and text that is part of the history of what is understood. Providing rules or criteria for understanding what an author or native “really” meant is a typical problem for the first approach. The interpretation of the law provides an example for the second view, since the process of applying the law inevitably transforms it. In general, hermeneutics is the analysis of this process and its conditions of possibility. It has typically focused on the interpretation of ancient texts and distant peoples, cases where the unproblematic everyday understanding and communication cannot be assumed. Schleiermacher’s analysis of understanding and expression related to texts and speech marks the beginning of hermeneutics in the modern sense of a scientific methodology. This emphasis on methodology continues in nineteenth-century historicism and culminates in Dilthey’s attempt to ground the human sciences in a theory of interpretation, understood as the imaginative but publicly verifiable reenactment of the subjective experiences of others. Such a method of interpretation reveals the possibility of an objective knowledge of human beings not accessible to empiricist inquiry and thus of a distinct methodology for the human sciences. One result of the analysis of interpretation in the nineteenth century was the recognition of “the hermeneutic circle,” first developed by Schleiermacher. The circularity of interpretation concerns the relation of parts to the whole: the interpretation of each part is dependent on the interpretation of the whole. But interpretation is circular in a stronger sense: if every interpretation is itself based on interpretation, then the circle of interpretation, even if it is not vicious, cannot be escaped. Twentieth-century hermeneutics advanced by Heidegger and Gadamer radicalize this notion of the hermeneutic circle, seeing it as a feature of all knowledge and activity. Hermeneutics is then no longer the method of the human sciences but “universal,” and interpretation is part of the finite and situated character of all human knowing. “Philosophical hermeneutics” therefore criticizes Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology and Enlightenment universalism in ethics, seeing science as a cultural practice and prejudices or prejudgments as ineliminable in all judgments. Positively, it emphasizes understanding as continuing a historical tradition, as well as dialogical openness, in which prejudices are challenged and horizons broadened. 

hermetism, also hermeticism, a philosophical theology whose basic impulse was the gnostic conviction that human salvation depends on revealed knowledge gnosis of God and of the human and natural creations. Texts ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus, a Greco-Egyptian version of the Egyptian god Thoth, may have appeared as early as the fourth century B.C., but the surviving Corpus Hermeticum in Grecian and Latin is a product of the second and third centuries A.D. Fragments of the same literature exist in Grecian, Armenian, and Coptic as well; the Coptic versions are part of a discovery made at Nag Hammadi after World War II. All these Hermetica record hermetism as just described. Other Hermetica traceable to the same period but surviving in later Arabic or Latin versions deal with astrology, alchemy, magic, and other kinds of occultism. Lactantius, Augustine, and other early Christians cited Hermes but disagreed on his value; before Iamblichus, pagan philosophers showed little interest. Muslims connected Hermes with a Koranic figure, Idris, and thereby enlarged the medieval hermetic tradition, which had its first large effects in the Latin West among the twelfth-century Platonists of Chartres. The only ancient hermetic text then available in the West was the Latin Asclepius, but in 1463 Ficino interrupted his epochal translation of Plato to Latinize fourteen of the seventeen Grecian discourses in the main body of the Corpus Hermeticum as distinct from the many Grecian fragments preserved by Stobaeus but unknown to Ficino. Ficino was willing to move so quickly to Hermes because he believed that this Egyptian deity stood at the head of the “ancient theology” prisca theologia, a tradition of pagan revelation that ran parallel to Christian scripture, culminated with Plato, and continued through Plotinus and the later Neoplatonists. Ficino’s Hermes translation, which he called the Pimander, shows no interest in the magic and astrology about which he theorized later in his career. Trinitarian theology was his original motivation. The Pimander was enormously influential in the later Renaissance, when Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Lodovico Lazzarelli, Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples, Symphorien Champier, Francesco Giorgi, Agostino Steuco, Francesco Patrizi, and others enriched Western appreciation of Hermes. The first printed Grecian Hermetica was the 1554 edition of Adrien Turnebus. The last before the nineteenth century appeared in 1630, a textual hiatus that reflected a decline in the reputation of Hermes after Isaac Casaubon proved philologically in 1614 that the Grecian Hermetica had to be post-Christian, not the remains of primeval Egyptian wisdom. After Casaubon, hermetic ideas fell out of fashion with most Western philosophers of the current canon, but the historiography of the ancient theology remained influential for Newton and for lesser figures even later. The content of the Hermetica was out of tune with the new science, so Casaubon’s redating left Hermes to the theosophical heirs of Robert Fludd, whose opponents Kepler, Mersenne, Gassendi turned away from the Hermetica and similar fascinations of Renaissance humanist culture. By the nineteenth century, only theosophists took Hermes seriously as a prophet of pagan wisdom, but he was then rediscovered by G. students of Christianity and Hellenistic religions, especially Richard Reitzenstein, who published his Poimandres in 4. The ancient Hermetica are now read in the 654 edition of A. D. Nock and A. J. Festugière. 

Herzen: philosopher, he moved in his philosophy of history from an early Hegelian rationalism to a “philosophy of contingency,” stressing the “whirlwind of chances” in nature and in human life and the “tousled improvisation” of the historical process. He rejected determinism, emphasizing the “phenomenological fact” of the experienced “sense of freedom.” Anticipating the Dostoevsky of the “Legend of the Grand Inquisitor,” he offered an original analysis of the “escape from freedom” and the cleaving to moral and political authority, and sketched a curiously contemporary-sounding “emotivist” ethical theory. After 1848, disillusioned with “bourgeois” Europe and its “selfenclosed individualism,” but equally disillusioned with what he had come to see as the bourgeois ideal of many European socialists, Herzen turned to the Russian peasant and the peasant village commune as offering the best hope for a humane development of society. In this “Russian socialism” he anticipated a central doctrine of the Russian populists of the 1870s. Herzen stood alone in resisting the common tendency of such otherwise different thinkers as Feuerbach, Marx, and J. S. Mill to undervalue the historical present, to overvalue the historical future, and to treat actual persons as means in the service of remote, merely possible historical ends. Herzen’s own central emphasis fell powerfully and consistently on the freedom, independence, and non-instrumentalizable value of living persons. And he saw more clearly than any of his contemporaries that there are no future persons, that it is only in the present that free human individuals live and move and have their being. 

heuristics, a rule or solution adopted to reduce the complexity of computational tasks, thereby reducing demands on resources such as time, memory, and attention. If an algorithm is a procedure yielding a correct solution to a problem, then a heuristic procedure may not reach a solution even if there is one, or may provide an incorrect answer. The reliability of heuristics varies between domains; the resulting biases are predictable, and provide information about system design. Chess, for example, is a finite game with a finite number of possible positions, but there is no known algorithm for finding the optimal move. Computers and humans both employ heuristics in evaluating intermediate moves, relying on a few significant cues to game quality, such as safety of the king, material balance, and center control. The use of these criteria simplifies the problem, making it computationally tractable. They are heuristic guides, reliable but limited in success. There is no guarantee that the result will be the best move or even good. They are nonetheless satisfactory for competent chess. Work on human judgment indicates a similar moral. Examples of judgmental infelicities support the view that human reasoning systematically violates standards for statistical reasoning, ignoring base rates, sample size, and correlations. Experimental results suggest that humans utilize judgmental heuristics in gauging probabilities, such as representativeness, or the degree to which an individual or event resembles a prototypical member of a category. Such heuristics produce reasonable judgments in many cases, but are of limited validity when measured by a Bayesian standard. Judgmental heuristics are biased and subject to systemic errors. Experimental support for the importance of these heuristics depends on cases in which subjects deviate from the normative standard. 

habitus: hexis Grecian, from hexo, ‘to have’, ‘to be disposed’, a good or bad condition, disposition, or state. The traditional rendering, ‘habit’ Latin habitus, is misleading, for it tends to suggest the idea of an involuntary and merely repetitious pattern of behavior. A hexis is rather a state of character or of mind that disposes us to deliberately choose to act or to think in a certain way. The term acquired a quasi-technical status after Aristotle advanced the view that hexis is the genus of virtue, both moral and intellectual. In the Nicomachean Ethics he distinguishes hexeis from passions pathe and faculties dunamis of the soul. If a man fighting in the front ranks feels afraid when he sees the enemy approaching, he is undergoing an involuntary passion. His capacity to be affected by fear on this or other occasions is part of his makeup, one of his faculties. If he chooses to stay where his commanders placed him, this is due to the hexis or state of character we call courage. Likewise, one who is consistently good at identifying what is best for oneself can be said to possess a hexis called prudence. Not all states and dispositions are commendable. Cowardice and stupidity are also hexeis. Both in the sense of ‘state’ and of ‘possession’ hexis plays a role in Aristotle’s Categories. 

tisberi -- Heytesbury: w. also called Hentisberus, Hentisberi, Tisberi before 1313c.1372, English philosopher and chancellor of Oxford . He wrote Sophismata “Sophisms”, Regulae solvendi sophismata “Rules for Solving Sophisms”, and De sensu composito et diviso “On the Composite and Divided Sense”. Other works are doubtfully attributed to him. Heytesbury belonged to the generation immediately after Thomas Bradwardine and Kilvington, and was among the most significant members of the Oxford Calculators, important in the early developemnt of physics. Unlike Kilvington but like Bradwardine, he appealed to mathematical calculations in addition to logical and conceptual analysis in the treatment of change, motion, acceleration, and other physical notions. His Regulae includes perhaps the most influential treatment of the liar paradox in the Middle Ages. Heytesbury’s work makes widespread use of “imaginary” thought experiments assuming physical impossibilities that are yet logically consistent. His influence was especially strong in Italy in the fifteenth century, where his works were studied widely and commented on many times. 

hierarchy, a division of mathematical objects into subclasses in accordance with an ordering that reflects their complexity. Around the turn of the century, analysts interested in the “descriptive set theory” of the real numbers defined and studied two systems of classification for sets of reals, the Borel (due to Emil Borel) and the G hierarchies. In the 1940s, logicians interested in recursion and definability (most importantly, Stephen Kleene) introduced and studied other hierarchies (the arithmetic, the hyperarithmetic, and the analytical hierarchies) of reals (identified with sets of natural numbers) and of sets of reals; the relations between this work and the earlier work were made explicit in the 1950s by J. Addison. Other sorts of hierarchies have been introduced in other corners of logic. All these so-called hierarchies have at least this in common: they divide a class of mathematical objects into subclasses subject to a natural well-founded ordering (e.g., by subsethood) that reflects the complexity (in a sense specific to the hierarchy under consideration) of the objects they contain. What follows describes several hierarchies from the study of definability. (For more historical and mathematical information see Descriptive Set Theory by Y. Moschovakis, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1980.) (1) Hierarchies of formulas. Consider a formal language L with quantifiers ‘E’ and ‘D’. Given a set B of formulas in L, we inductively define a hierarchy that treats the members of B as “basic.” Set P0 % S0 % B. Suppose sets Pn and Sn of formulas have been defined. Let Pn!1 % the set of all formulas of the form Q1u1 . . . Qmumw when u1, . . . , um are distinct variables, Q1, . . . , Qm are all ‘E’, m M 1, and w 1 Sn. Let Sn+1 % the set of all formulas of that form for Q1, . . . , Qm all ‘D’, and w 1 Pn. Here are two such hierarchies for languages of arithmetic. Take the logical constants to be truthfunctions, ‘E’ and ‘D’. (i) Let L0 % the first-order language of arithmetic, based on ‘%’, a two-place predicate-constant ‘‹’, an individual-constant for 0, functionconstants for successor, addition, and multiplication; ‘first-order’ means that bound variables are all first-order (ranging over individuals); we’ll allow free second-order variables (ranging over properties or sets of individuals). Let B % the set of bounded formulas, i.e. those formed from atomic formulas using connectives and bounded quantification: if w is bounded so are Eu(u ‹ t / w) and Du(u ‹ t & w). (ii) Let L1 % the second-order language of arithmetic (formed from L0 by allowing bound second-order variables); let B % the set of formulas in which no second-order variable is bound, and take all u1, . . . , um as above to be second-order variables. (2) Hierarchies of definable sets. (i) The Arithmetic Hierarchy. For a set of natural numbers (call such a thing ‘a real’) A : A 1 P0 n [ or S0 n ] if and only if A is defined over the standard model of arithmetic (i.e., with the constant for 0 assigned to 0, etc., and with the first-order variables ranging over the natural numbers) by a formula of L0 in Pn [respectively Sn] as described in (1.i). Set D0 n % P0 n Thus: In fact, all these inclusions are proper. This hierarchy classifies the reals simple enough to be defined by arithmetic formulas. Example: ‘Dy x % y ! y’ defines the set even of even natural numbers; the formula 1 S1, so even 1 S0 1; even is also defined by a formula in P1; so even 1 P0 1, giving even 1 D0 1. In fact, S0 1 % the class of recursively enumerable reals, and D0 1 % the class of recursive reals. The classification of reals under the arithmetic hierarchy reflects complexity of defining formulas; it differs from classification in terms of a notion of degree of unsolvability, that reflecting a notion of comparative computational complexity; but there are connections between these classifications. The Arithmetic Hierarchy extends to sets of reals (using a free second-order variable in defining sentences). Example: ‘Dx (Xx & Dy y % x ! x)’ 1 S1 and defines the set of those reals with an even number; so that set 1 S0 1.The Analytical Hierarchy. Given a real A : A 1 P1 n [S1 1] if and only if A is defined (over the standard model of arithmetic with second-order variables ranging over all sets of natural numbers) by a formula of L1 in Pn (respectively Sn) as described in (1.ii); D1 n % P1 n 3 S1 n. Similarly for a set of reals. The inclusions pictured above carry over, replacing superscripted 0’s by 1’s. This classifies all reals and sets of reals simple enough to have analytical (i.e., second-order arithmetic) definitions.The subscripted ‘n’ in ‘P0 n’, etc., ranged over natural numbers. But the Arithmetic Hierarchy is extended “upward” into the transfinite by the ramified-analytical hierarchy. Let R0 % the class of all arithmetical reals. For an ordinal a let Ra!1 % the class of all sets of reals definable by formulas of L1 in which second-order variables range only over reals in Ra – this constraint imposes ramification. For a limit-ordinal l, let Rl % UaThe above hierarchies arise in arithmetic. Similar hierarchies arise in pure set theory; e.g. by transferring the “process” that produced the ramified analytical hierarchy to pure set theory we obtain the constructible hierarchy, defined by Gödel in his 1939 monograph on the continuum hypothesis.

Grice’s formalists: Hilbert, D. – G. mathematician and philosopher of mathematics. Born in Königsberg, he also studied and served on the faculty there, accepting Weber’s chair in mathematics at Göttingen in 1895. He made important contributions to many different areas of mathematics and was renowned for his grasp of the entire discipline. His more philosophical work was divided into two parts. The focus of the first, which occupied approximately ten years beginning in the early 1890s, was the foundations of geometry and culminated in his celebrated Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899). This is a rich and complex work that pursues a variety of different projects simultaneously. Prominent among these is one whose aim is to determine the role played in geometrical reasoning by principles of continuity. Hilbert’s interest in this project was rooted in Kantian concerns, as is confirmed by the inscription, in the Grundlagen, of Kant’s synopsis of his critical philosophy: “Thus all human knowledge begins with intuition, goes from there to concepts and ends with ideas.” Kant believed that the continuous could not be represented in intuition and must therefore be regarded as an idea of pure reason – i.e., as a device playing a purely regulative role in the development of our geometrical knowledge (i.e., our knowledge of the spatial manifold of sensory experience). Hilbert was deeply influenced by this view of Kant’s and his work in the foundations of geometry can be seen, in large part, as an attempt to test it by determining whether (or to what extent) pure geometry can be developed without appeal to principles concerning the nature of the continuous. To a considerable extent, Hilbert’s work confirmed Kant’s view – showing, in a manner more precise than any Kant had managed, that appeals to the continuous can indeed be eliminated from much of our geometrical reasoning. The same basic Kantian orientation also governed the second phase of Hilbert’s foundational work, where the focus was changed from geometry to arithmetic and analysis. This is the phase during which Hilbert’s Program was developed. This project began to take shape in the 1917 essay “Axiomatisches Denken.” (The 1904 paper “Über die Grundlagen der Logik und Arithmetik,” which turned away from geometry and toward arithmetic, does not yet contain more than a glimmer of the ideas that would later become central to Hilbert’s proof theory.) It reached its philosophically most mature form in the 1925 essay “Über das Unendliche,” the 1926 address “Die Grundlagen der Mathematik,” and the somewhat more popular 1930 paper “Naturerkennen und Logik.” (From a technical as opposed to a philosophical vantage, the classical statement is probably the 1922 essay “Neubegründung der Mathematik. Erste Mitteilung.”) The key elements of the program are (i) a distinction between real and ideal propositions and methods of proof or derivation; (ii) the idea that the so-called ideal methods, though, again, playing the role of Kantian regulative devices (as Hilbert explicitly and emphatically declared in the 1925 paper), are nonetheless indispensable for a reasonably efficient development of our mathematical knowledge; and (iii) the demand that the reliability of the ideal methods be established by real (or finitary) means. As is well known, Hilbert’s Program soon came under heavy attack from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (especially the second), which have commonly been regarded as showing that the third element of Hilbert’s Program (i.e., the one calling for a finitary proof of the reliability of the ideal systems of classical mathematics) cannot be carried out. Hilbert’s Program, a proposal in the foundations of mathematics, named for its developer, the German mathematician-philosopher David Hilbert, who first formulated it fully in the 1920s. Its aim was to justify classical mathematics (in particular, classical analysis and set theory), though only as a Kantian regulative device and not as descriptive science. The justification thus presupposed a division of classical mathematics into two parts: the part (termed real mathematics by Hilbert) to be regulated, and the part (termed ideal mathematics by Hilbert) serving as regulator. Real mathematics was taken to consist of the meaningful, true propositions of mathematics and their justifying proofs. These proofs – commonly known as finitary proofs – were taken to be of an especially elementary epistemic character, reducing, ultimately, to quasi-perceptual intuitions concerning finite assemblages of perceptually intuitable signs regarded from the point of view of their shapes and sequential arrangement. Ideal mathematics, on the other hand, was taken to consist of sentences that do not express genuine propositions and derivations that do not constitute genuine proofs or justifications. The epistemic utility of ideal sentences (typically referred to as ideal propositions, though, as noted above, they do not express genuine propositions at all) and proofs was taken to derive not from their meaning and/or evidentness, but rather from the role they play in some formal algebraic or calculary scheme intended to identify or locate the real truths. It is thus a metatheoretic function of the formal or algebraic properties induced on those propositions and proofs by their positions in a larger derivational scheme. Hilbert’s ideal mathematics was thus intended to bear the same relation to his real mathematics as Kant’s faculty of pure reason was intended to bear to his faculty of understanding. It was to be a regulative device whose proper function is to guide and facilitate the development of our system of real judgments. Indeed, in his 1925 essay “Über das Unendliche,” Hilbert made just this point, noting that ideal elements do not correspond to anything in reality but serve only as ideas “if, following Kant’s terminology, one understands as an idea a concept of reason which transcends all experience and by means of which the concrete is to be completed into a totality.” The structure of Hilbert’s scheme, however, involves more than just the division of classical mathematics into real and ideal propositions and proofs. It uses, in addition, a subdivision of the real propositions into the problematic and the unproblematic. Indeed, it is this subdivision of the reals that is at bottom responsible for the introduction of the ideals. Unproblematic real propositions, described by Hilbert as the basic equalities and inequalities of arithmetic (e.g., ‘3 ( 2’, ‘2 ‹ 3’, ‘2 ! 3 % 3 ! 2’) together with their sentential (and certain of their bounded quantificational) compounds, are the evidentially most basic judgments of mathematics. They are immediately intelligible and decidable by finitary intuition. More importantly, they can be logically manipulated in all the ways that classical logic allows without leading outside the class of real propositions. The characteristic feature of the problematic reals, on the other hand, is that they cannot be so manipulated. Hilbert gave two kinds of examples of problematic real propositions. One consisted of universal generalizations like ‘for any non-negative integer a, a ! 1 % 1 ! a’, which Hilbert termed hypothetical judgments. Such propositions are problematic because their denials do not bound the search for counterexamples. Hence, the instance of the (classical) law of excluded middle that is obtained by disjoining it with its denial is not itself a real proposition. Consequently, it cannot be manipulated in all the ways permitted by classical logic without going outside the class of real propositions. Similarly for the other kind of problematic real discussed by Hilbert, which was a bounded existential quantification. Every such sentence has as one of its classical consequents an unbounded existential quantification of the same matrix. Hence, since the latter is not a real proposition, the former is not a real proposition that can be fully manipulated by classical logical means without going outside the class of real propositions. It is therefore “problematic.” The question why full classical logical manipulability should be given such weight points up an important element in Hilbert’s thinking: namely, that classical logic is regarded as the preferred logic of human thinking – the logic of the optimally functioning human epistemic engine, the logic according to which the human mind most naturally and efficiently conducts its inferential affairs. It therefore has a special psychological status and it is because of this that the right to its continued use must be preserved. As just indicated, however, preservation of this right requires addition of ideal propositions and proofs to their real counterparts, since applying classical logic to the truths of real mathematics leads to a system that contains ideal as well as real elements. Hilbert believed that to justify such an addition, all that was necessary was to show it to be consistent with real mathematics (i.e., to show that it proves no real proposition that is itself refutable by real means). Moreover, Hilbert believed that this must be done by finitary means. The proof of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem in 1931 brought considerable pressure to bear on this part of Hilbert’s Program even though it may not have demonstrated its unattainability.

“what-is-hinted” -- hint hinting. Don’t expect Cicero used this. It’s Germanic and related to ‘hunt,’ to ‘seize.’ As if you throw something in the air, and expect your recipient will seize it. Grice spends quite a long section in “Retrospective epilogue” to elucidate “Emissor E communicates that p via a hint,” versus “Emissor E communicates that p via a suggestion.” Some level of explicitness (vide candour) is necessary. If it is too obscure it cannot be held to have been ‘communicated’ in the first place! Cf. Holdcroft, “Some forms of indirect communication” for the Journal of Rhetoric. Grice had to do a bit of linguistic botany for his “E implicates that p”: To do duty for ‘imply,’ suggest, indicate, hint, mean, -- “etc.” indirectly or implicitly convey.

hintikka, J. Non-Indo-European Finnish philosopher who emigrated Finland early on to become the first Finnish Griceian (vide his contribution in P. G. R. I. C. E.)  with contributions to logic, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, linguistics and philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and history of philosophy. His work on distributive normal forms and model set techniques yielded an improved inductive logic. Model sets differ from Carnap’s state-descriptions in being partial and not complete descriptions of “possible worlds.” The techniques simplified metatheoretical proofs and led to new results in e.g. probability theory and the semantic theory of information. Their main philosophical import nevertheless is in bridging the gap between proof theory and model theory. Model sets that describe several possible “alternative” worlds lead to the possible worlds semantics for modal and intensional logics. Hintikka has used them as a foundation for the logic of propositional attitudes (epistemic logic and the logic of perception), and in studies on individuation, identification, and intentionality. Epistemic logic also provides a basis for Hintikka’s logic of questions, in which conclusiveness conditions for answers can be defined. This has resulted in an interrogative model of inquiry in which knowledge-seeking is viewed as a pursuit of conclusive answers to initial “big” questions by strategically organized series of “small” questions (put to nature or to another source of information). The applications include scientific discovery and explanation. Hintikka’s independence-friendly logic gives the various applications a unified basis. Hintikka’s background philosophy and approach to formal semantics and its applications is broadly Kantian with emphasis on seeking-andfinding methods and the constitutive activity of the inquirer. Apart from a series of studies inspired by Kant, he has written extensively on Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Frege, and Wittgenstein. Hintikka’s academic career has been not only in Finland, chiefly at the University of Helsinki, but (especially) in the United States, where he has held professorships at Stanford, Florida State, and (currently) Boston University. His students and co-workers in the Finnish school of inductive logic and in other areas include Leila Haaparanta (b.1954), Risto Hilpinen (b.1943), Simo Knuuttila (b.1946), Martin Kusch (b.1959), Ilkka Niiniluoto (b.1946), Juhani Pietarinen (b.1938), Veikko Rantala (b.1933), Gabriel Sandu (b.1954), Matti Sintonen (b.1951), and Raimo Tuomela (b.1940). Hintikka set, also called model set, downward saturated set, a set (of a certain sort) of well-formed formulas that are all true under a single interpretation of their non-logical symbols (named after Jaakko Hintikka). Such a set can be thought of as a (partial) description of a logically possible state of affairs, or possible world, full enough to make evident that the world described is indeed possible. Thus it is required of a Hintikka set G that it contain no atomic formula and its negation, that A, B 1 G if A 8 B 1 G, that A 1 G or B 1 G if A 7 B 1 G, and so forth, for each logical constant.

hippocrates, philosopher from Cos. Some sixty treatises survive under his name, but it is doubtful whether he was the author of any of them. The Hippocratic corpus contains material from a wide variety of standpoints, ranging from an extreme empiricism that rejected all grand theory (On Ancient Medicine) to highly speculative theoretical physiology (On the Nature of Man, On Regimen). Many treatises were concerned with the accurate observation and classification of diseases (Epidemics) rather than treatment. Some texts (On the Art) defended the claims of medicine to scientific status against those who pointed to its inaccuracies and conjectural status; others (Oath, On Decorum) sketch a code of professional ethics. Almost all his treatises were notable for their materialism and rejection of supernatural “explanations”; their emphasis on observation; and their concern with the isolation of causal factors. A large number of texts are devoted to gynecology. The Hippocratic corpus became the standard against which later doctors measured themselves; and, via Galen’s rehabilitation and extension of Hippocratic method, it became the basis for Western medicine for two millennia.

historicism, the doctrine that knowledge of human affairs has an irreducibly historical character and that there can be no ahistorical perspective for an understanding of human nature and society. What is needed instead is a philosophical explication of historical knowledge that will yield the rationale for all sound knowledge of human activities. So construed, historicism is a philosophical doctrine originating in the methodological and epistemological presuppositions of critical historiography. In the mid-nineteenth century certain German thinkers (Dilthey most centrally), reacting against positivist ideals of science and knowledge, rejected scientistic models of knowledge, replacing them with historical ones. They applied this not only to the discipline of history but to economics, law, political theory, and large areas of philosophy. Initially concerned with methodological issues in particular disciplines, historicism, as it developed, sought to work out a common philosophical doctrine that would inform all these disciplines. What is essential to achieve knowledge in the human sciences is to employ the ways of understanding used in historical studies. There should in the human sciences be no search for natural laws; knowledge there will be interpretive and rooted in concrete historical occurrences. As such it will be inescapably perspectival and contextual (contextualism). This raises the issue of whether historicism is a form of historical relativism. Historicism appears to be committed to the thesis that what for a given people is warrantedly assertible is determined by the distinctive historical perspective in which they view life and society. The stress on uniqueness and concrete specificity and the rejection of any appeal to universal laws of human development reinforce that. But the emphasis on cumulative development into larger contexts of our historical knowledge puts in doubt an identification of historicism and historical relativism. The above account of historicism is that of its main proponents: Meinecke, Croce, Collingwood, Ortega y Gasset, and Mannheim. But in the twentieth century, with Popper and Hayek, a very different conception of historicism gained some currency. For them, to be a historicist is to believe that there are “historical laws,” indeed even a “law of historical development,” such that history has a pattern and even an end, that it is the central task of social science to discover it, and that these laws should determine the direction of political action and social policy. They attributed (incorrectly) this doctrine to Marx but rightly denounced it as pseudo-science. However, some later Marxists (Lukács, Korsch, and Gramsci) were historicists in the original nonPopperian sense as was the critical theorist Adorno and hermeneuticists such as Gadamer.

heterological: Grice and Thomson go heterological. Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell’s remarks on heterological and its implicate. Grice is particularly interested in Russell’s philosophy because of the usual Oxonian antipathy towards his type of philosophising. Being an irreverent conservative rationalist, Grice found in Russell a good point for dissent! If paradoxes were always sets of propositions or arguments or conclusions, they would always be meaningful. But some paradoxes are semantically flawed and some have answers that are backed by a pseudo-argument employing a defective lemma that lacks a truth-value. Grellings paradox, for instance, opens with a distinction between autological and heterological words. An autological word describes itself, e.g., polysyllabic is polysllabic, English is English, noun is a noun, etc. A heterological word does not describe itself, e.g., monosyllabic is not monosyllabic, Chinese is not Chinese, verb is not a verb, etc. Now for the riddle: Is heterological heterological or autological? If heterological is heterological, since it describes itself, it is autological. But if heterological is autological, since it is a word that does not describe itself, it is heterological. The common solution to this puzzle is that heterological, as defined by Grelling, is not what Grice a genuine predicate  ‒ Gricing is!In other words, Is heterological heterological? is without meaning. That does not mean that an utterer, such as Baron Russell, may implicate that he is being very witty by uttering the Grelling paradox! There can be no predicate that applies to all and only those predicates it does not apply to for the same reason that there can be no barber who shaves all and only those people who do not shave themselves. Grice seems to be relying on his friend at Christ Church, Thomson in On Some Paradoxes, in the same volume where Grice published his Remarks about the senses, Analytical Philosophy, Butler (ed.), Blackwell, Oxford, 104–119. Grice thought that Thomson was a genius, if ever there is one! Plus, Grice thought that, after St. Johns, Christ Church was the second most beautiful venue in the city of dreaming spires. On top, it is what makes Oxford a city, and not, as villagers call it, a town. Refs.: the main source is Grice’s essay on ‘heterologicality,’ but the keyword ‘paradox’ is useful, too, especially as applied to Grice’s own paradox and to what, after Moore, Grice refers to as the philosopher’s paradoxes. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

hobbes: “Hobbes is a Griceian” – Grice. Grice was a member of the Hobbes Society -- Thomas. English philosopher whose writings, especially the English version of Leviathan (1651), strongly influenced all of subsequent English moral and political philosophy. He also wrote a trilogy comprising De Cive (1642; English version, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, 1651), De Corpore (On the Body, 1655), and De Homine (On Man, 1658). Together with Leviathan (the revised Latin version of which was published in 1668), these are his major philosophical works. However, an early draft of his thoughts, The Elements of Law, Natural and Political(also known as Human Nature and De Corpore Politico), was published without permission in 1650. Many of the misinterpretations of Hobbes’s views on human nature come from mistaking this early work as representing his mature views. Hobbes was influential not only in England, but also on the Continent. He is the author of the third set of objections to Descartes’s Meditations. Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-politicus was deeply influenced by Hobbes, not only in its political views but also in the way it dealt with Scripture. Hobbes was not merely a philosopher; he was mathematical tutor to Charles II and also a classical scholar. His first published work was a translation of Thucydides (1628), and among his latest, about a half-century later, were translations of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. Hobbes’s philosophical views have a remarkably contemporary sound. In metaphysics, he holds a strong materialist view, sometimes viewing mental phenomena as epiphenomenal, but later moving toward a reductive or eliminative view. In epistemology he held a sophisticated empiricism, which emphasized the importance of language for knowledge. If not the originator of the contemporary compatibilist view of the relationship between free will and determinism (see The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, 1656), he was one of the primary influences. He also was one of the most important philosophers of language, explicitly noting that language is used not only to describe the world but to express attitudes and, performatively, to make promises and contracts. One of Hobbes’s outstanding characteristics is his intellectual honesty. Though he may have been timid (he himself claims that he was, explaining that his mother gave birth to him because of fright over the coming of the Spanish Armada), his writing shows no trace of it. During more than half his long lifetime he engaged in many philosophical controversies, which required considerably more courage in Hobbes’s day than at present. Both the Roman Catholic church and Oxford University banned the reading of his books and there was talk not only of burning his books but of burning Hobbes himself. An adequate interpretation of Hobbes requires careful attention to his accounts of human nature, reason, morality, and law. Although he was not completely consistent, his moral and political philosophy is remarkably coherent. His political theory is often thought to require an egoistic psychology, whereas it actually requires only that most persons be concerned with their own self-interest, especially their own preservation. It does not require that most not be concerned with other persons as well. All that Hobbes denies is an undifferentiated natural benevolence: “For if by nature one man should love another (that is) as man, there could no reason be returned why every man should not equally love every man, as being equally man.” His argument is that limited benevolence is not an adequate foundation upon which to build a state. Hobbes’s political theory does not require the denial of limited benevolence, he indeed includes benevolence in his list of the passions in Leviathan: “Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.” Psychological egoism not only denies benevolent action, it also denies action done from a moral sense, i.e., action done because one believes it is the morally right thing to do. But Hobbes denies neither kind of action. But when the words [’just’ and ‘unjust’] are applied to persons, to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavor in all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. Hobbes’s pessimism about the number of just people is primarily due to his awareness of the strength of the passions and his conviction that most people have not been properly educated and disciplined. Hobbes is one of the few philosophers to realize that to talk of that part of human nature which involves the passions is to talk about human populations. He says, “though the wicked were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned.” Though we may be aware of small communities in which mutual trust and respect make law enforcement unnecessary, this is never the case when we are dealing with a large group of people. Hobbes’s point is that if a large group of people are to live together, there must be a common power set up to enforce the rules of the society. That there is not now, nor has there ever been, any large group of people living together without such a common power is sufficient to establish his point. Often overlooked is Hobbes’s distinction between people considered as if they were simply animals, not modified in any way by education or discipline, and civilized people. Though obviously an abstraction, people as animals are fairly well exemplified by children. “Unless you give children all they ask for, they are peevish, and cry, aye and strike their parents sometimes; and all this they have from nature.” In the state of nature, people have no education or training, so there is “continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of man, [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” But real people have been brought up in families; they are, at least to some degree, civilized persons, and how they will behave depends on how they are brought up. Hobbes does not say that society is a collection of misfits and that this is why we have all the trouble that we do – a position congenial to the psychological egoist. But he does acknowledge that “many also (perhaps most men) either through defect of mind, or want of education, remain unfit during the whole course of their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human nature; wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education.” Education and training may change people so that they act out of genuine moral motives. That is why it is one of the most important functions of the sovereign to provide for the proper training and education of the citizens. In the current debate between nature and nurture, on the question of behavior Hobbes would come down strongly on the side of nurture. Hobbes’s concept of reason has more in common with the classical philosophical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle, where reason sets the ends of behavior, than with the modern tradition stemming from Hume where the only function of reason is to discover the best means to ends set by the passions. For Hobbes, reason is very complex; it has a goal, lasting selfpreservation, and it seeks the way to this goal. It also discovers the means to ends set by the passions, but it governs the passions, or tries to, so that its own goal is not threatened. Since its goal is the same in all people, it is the source of rules applying to all people. All of this is surprisingly close to the generally accepted account of rationality. We generally agree that those who follow their passions when they threaten their life are acting irrationally. We also believe that everyone always ought to act rationally, though we know that few always do so. Perhaps it was just the closeness of Hobbes’s account of reason to the ordinary view of the matter that has led to its being so completely overlooked. The failure to recognize that the avoidance of violent death is the primary goal of reason has distorted almost all accounts of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy, yet it is a point on which Hobbes is completely clear and consistent. He explicitly says that reason “teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution [mortem violentam] as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature.” He continually points out that it is a dictate of right reason to seek peace when possible because people cannot “expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature, that is, of war.” And he calls temperance and fortitude precepts of reason because they tend to one’s preservation. It has not generally been recognized that Hobbes regarded it as an end of reason to avoid violent death because he often talks of the avoidance of death in a way that makes it seem merely an object of a passion. But it is reason that dictates that one take all those measures necessary for one’s preservation; peace if possible, if not, defense. Reason’s dictates are categorical; it would be a travesty of Hobbes’s view to regard the dictates of reason as hypothetical judgments addressed to those whose desire for their own preservation happens to be greater than any conflicting desire. He explicitly deplores the power of the irrational appetites and expressly declares that it is a dictate of reason that one not scorn others because “most men would rather lose their lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander.” He does not say if you would rather die than suffer slander, it is rational to do so. Hobbes, following Aristotle, regards morality as concerned with character traits or habits. Since morality is objective, it is only those habits that are called good by reason that are moral virtues. “Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the same reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also; and therefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy (which we have demonstrated to be necessary to peace), are good manners or habits, that is, virtues.” Moral virtues are those habits of acting that the reason of all people must praise. It is interesting to note that it is only in De Homine that Hobbes explicitly acknowledges that on this account, prudence, temperance, and courage are not moral virtues. In De Cive he distinguishes temperance and fortitude from the other virtues and does not call them moral, but he does not explicitly deny that they are moral virtues. But in De Homine, he explicitly points out that one should not “demand that the courage and prudence of the private man, if useful only to himself, be praised or held as a virtue by states or by any other men whatsoever to whom these same are not useful.” That morality is determined by reason and that reason has as its goal self-preservation seems to lead to the conclusion that morality also has as its goal self-preservation. But it is not the selfpreservation of an individual person that is the goal of morality, but of people as citizens of a state. That is, moral virtues are those habits of persons that make it rational for all other people to praise them. These habits are not those that merely lead to an individual’s own preservation, but to the preservation of all; i.e., to peace and a stable society. Thus, “Good dispositions are those that are suitable for entering into civil society; and good manners (that is, moral virtues) are those whereby what was entered upon can be best preserved.” And in De Cive, when talking of morality, he says, “The goodness of actions consist[s] in this, that it [is] in order to peace, and the evil in this, that it [is] related to discord.” The nature of morality is a complex and vexing question. If, like Hobbes, we regard morality as applying primarily to those manners or habits that lead to peace, then his view seems satisfactory. It yields, as he notes, all of the moral virtues that are ordinarily considered such, and further, it allows one to distinguish courage, prudence, and temperance from the moral virtues. Perhaps most important, it provides, in almost self-evident fashion, the justification of morality. For what is it to justify morality but to show that reason favors it? Reason, seeking self-preservation, must favor morality, which seeks peace and a stable society. For reason knows that peace and a stable society are essential for lasting preservation. This simple and elegant justification of morality does not reduce morality to prudence; rather it is an attempt, in a great philosophical tradition stemming from Plato, to reconcile reason or rational self-interest and morality. In the state of nature every person is and ought to be governed only by their own reason. Reason dictates that they seek peace, which yields the laws of nature, but it also allows them to use any means they believe will best preserve themselves, which is what Hobbes calls The Right of Nature. Hobbes’s insight is to see that, except when one is in clear and present danger, in which case one has an inalienable right to defend oneself, the best way to guarantee one’s longterm preservation is to give up one’s right to act on one’s own decisions about what is the best way to guarantee one’s long-term preservation and agree to act on the decisions of that single person or group who is the sovereign. If all individuals and groups are allowed to act on the decisions they regard as best, not accepting the commands of the sovereign, i.e., the laws, as the overriding guide for their actions, the result is anarchy and civil war. Except in rare and unusual cases, uniformity of action following the decision of the sovereign is more likely to lead to long-term preservation than diverse actions following diverse decisions. And this is true even if each one of the diverse decisions, if accepted by the sovereign as its decision, would have been more likely to lead to long-term preservation than the actual decision that the sovereign made. This argument explains why Hobbes holds that sovereigns cannot commit injustice. Only injustice can properly be punished. Hobbes does not deny that sovereigns can be immoral, but he does deny that the immorality of sovereigns can properly be punished. This is important, for otherwise any immoral act by the sovereign would serve as a pretext for punishing the sovereign, i.e., for civil war. What is just and unjust is determined by the laws of the state, what is moral and immoral is not. Morality is a wider concept than that of justice and is determined by what leads to peace and stability. However, to let justice be determined by what the reason of the people takes to lead to peace and stability, rather than by what the reason of the sovereign decides, would be to invite discord and civil war, which is contrary to the goal of morality: a stable society and peace. One can create an air of paradox by saying that for Hobbes it is immoral to attempt to punish some immoral acts, namely, those of the sovereign. Hobbes is willing to accept this seeming paradox for he never loses sight of the goal of morality, which is peace. To summarize Hobbes’s system: people, insofar as they are rational, want to live out their natural lives in peace and security. To do this, they must come together into cities or states of sufficient size to deter attack by any group. But when people come together in such a large group there will always be some that cannot be trusted, and thus it is necessary to set up a government with the power to make and enforce laws. This government, which gets both its right to govern and its power to do so from the consent of the governed, has as its primary duty the people’s safety. As long as the government provides this safety the citizens are obliged to obey the laws of the state in all things. Thus, the rationality of seeking lasting preservation requires seeking peace; this in turn requires setting up a state with sufficient power to keep the peace. Anything that threatens the stability of the state is to be avoided. As a practical matter, Hobbes took God and religion very seriously, for he thought they provided some of the strongest motives for action. Half of Leviathan is devoted to trying to show that his moral and political views are supported by Scripture, and to discredit those religious views that may lead to civil strife. But accepting the sincerity of Hobbes’s religious views does not require holding that Hobbes regarded God as the foundation of morality. He explicitly denies that atheists and deists are subject to the commands of God, but he never denies that they are subject to the laws of nature or of the civil state. Once one recognizes that, for Hobbes, reason itself provides a guide to conduct to be followed by all people, there is absolutely no need to bring in God. For in his moral and political theory there is nothing that God can do that is not already done by reason. Grice read most of Hobbes, both in Latin (for his Lit. Hum.) and in English. When in “Meaning,” Grice says “this is what people are getting at with their natural versus artificial signs” – he means Hobbes.

Hobson’s choice:  willkür – Hobson’s choice. One of Grice’s favourite words from Kant – “It’s so Kantish!” I told Pears about this, and having found it’s cognate with English ‘choose,’ he immediately set to write an essay on the topic!” f., ‘option, discretion, caprice,’ from MidHG. willekür, f., ‘free choice, free will’; gee kiesen and Kur-kiesen, verb, ‘to select,’ from Middle High German kiesen, Old High German chiosan, ‘to test, try, taste for the purpose of testing, test by tasting, select after strict examination.’ Gothic kiusan, Anglo-Saxon ceósan, English to choose. Teutonic root kus (with the change of s into r, kur in the participle erkoren, see also Kur, ‘choice’), from pre-Teutonic gus, in Latin gus-tus, gus-tare, Greek γεύω for γεύσω, Indian root juš, ‘to select, be fond of.’ Teutonic kausjun passed as kusiti into Slavonic. There is an oil portrait of Thomas Hobson, in the National Portrait Gallery, London. He looks straight to the artist and is dressed in typical Tudor dress, with a heavy coat, a ruff, and tie tails Thomas Hobson, a portrait in the National Portrait Gallery, London. A Hobson's choice is a free choice in which only one thing is offered. Because a person may refuse to accept what is offered, the two options are taking it or taking nothing. In other words, one may "take it or leave it".  The phrase is said to have originated with Thomas Hobson (1544–1631), a livery stable owner in Cambridge, England, who offered customers the choice of either taking the horse in his stall nearest to the door or taking none at all. According to a plaque underneath a painting of Hobson donated to Cambridge Guildhall, Hobson had an extensive stable of some 40 horses. This gave the appearance to his customers that, upon entry, they would have their choice of mounts, when in fact there was only one: Hobson required his customers to choose the horse in the stall closest to the door. This was to prevent the best horses from always being chosen, which would have caused those horses to become overused.[1] Hobson's stable was located on land that is now owned by St Catharine's College, Cambridge.  Early appearances in writing According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first known written usage of this phrase is in The rustick's alarm to the Rabbies, written by Samuel Fisher in 1660:[3]  If in this Case there be no other (as the Proverb is) then Hobson's choice...which is, chuse whether you will have this or none.  It also appears in Joseph Addison's paper The Spectator (No. 509 of 14 October 1712); and in Thomas Ward's 1688 poem "England's Reformation", not published until after Ward's death. Ward wrote:  Where to elect there is but one, 'Tis Hobson's choice—take that, or none. The term "Hobson's choice" is often used to mean an illusion of choice, but it is not a choice between two equivalent options, which is a Morton's fork, nor is it a choice between two undesirable options, which is a dilemma. Hobson's choice is one between something or nothing.  John Stuart Mill, in his book Considerations on Representative Government, refers to Hobson's choice:  When the individuals composing the majority would no longer be reduced to Hobson's choice, of either voting for the person brought forward by their local leaders, or not voting at all. In another of his books, The Subjection of Women, Mill discusses marriage:  Those who attempt to force women into marriage by closing all other doors against them, lay themselves open to a similar retort. If they mean what they say, their opinion must evidently be, that men do not render the married condition so desirable to women, as to induce them to accept it for its own recommendations. It is not a sign of one's thinking the boon one offers very attractive, when one allows only Hobson's choice, 'that or none'.... And if men are determined that the law of marriage shall be a law of despotism, they are quite right in point of mere policy, in leaving to women only Hobson's choice. But, in that case, all that has been done in the modern world to relax the chain on the minds of women, has been a mistake. They should have never been allowed to receive a literary education.[7]  A Hobson's choice is different from:  Dilemma: a choice between two or more options, none of which is attractive. False dilemma: only certain choices are considered, when in fact there are others. Catch-22: a logical paradox arising from a situation in which an individual needs something that can only be acquired by not being in that very situation. Morton's fork, and a double bind: choices yield equivalent, and often undesirable, results. Blackmail and extortion: the choice between paying money (or some non-monetary good or deed) or risk suffering an unpleasant action. A common error is to use the phrase "Hobbesian choice" instead of "Hobson's choice", confusing the philosopher Thomas Hobbes with the relatively obscure Thomas Hobson  (It's possible they may be confusing "Hobson's choice" with "Hobbesian trap", which refers to the trap into which a state falls when it attacks another out of fear).[11] Notwithstanding that confused usage, the phrase "Hobbesian choice" is historically incorrect. Common law In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983), Justice Byron White dissented and classified the majority's decision to strike down the "one-house veto" as unconstitutional as leaving Congress with a Hobson's choice. Congress may choose between "refrain[ing] from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking function to the executive branch and independent agency".  In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978),[15] the majority opinion ruled that a New Jersey law which prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste from other states into New Jersey was unconstitutional based on the Commerce Clause. The majority reasoned that New Jersey cannot discriminate between the intrastate waste and the interstate waste with out due justification. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated:  [According to the Court,] New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations, leaving itself to cast about for a presently nonexistent solution to the serious problem of disposing of the waste generated within its own borders, or it must accept waste from every portion of the United States, thereby multiplying the health and safety problems which would result if it dealt only with such wastes generated within the State. Because past precedents establish that the Commerce Clause does not present appellees with such a Hobson's choice, I dissent.  In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)[16] the judgement of the court was that  [T]here was ample support for Blair's view that the Sherman Amendment, by putting municipalities to the Hobson's choice of keeping the peace or paying civil damages, attempted to impose obligations to municipalities by indirection that could not be imposed directly, thereby threatening to "destroy the government of the states".  In the South African Constitutional Case MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others v Pillay, 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC)[17] Chief Justice Langa for the majority of the Court (in Paragraph 62 of the judgement) writes that:  The traditional basis for invalidating laws that prohibit the exercise of an obligatory religious practice is that it confronts the adherents with a Hobson's choice between observance of their faith and adherence to the law. There is however more to the protection of religious and cultural practices than saving believers from hard choices. As stated above, religious and cultural practices are protected because they are central to human identity and hence to human dignity which is in turn central to equality. Are voluntary practices any less a part of a person's identity or do they affect human dignity any less seriously because they are not mandatory?  In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and added in one of the footnotes that the petitioners "faced a Hobson’s choice: accept arbitration on their employer’s terms or give up their jobs".  In Trump et al v. Mazars USA, LLP, US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia No. 19-5142, 49 (D.C. Cir. 11 October 2019) ("[w]orse still, the dissent’s novel approach would now impose upon the courts the job of ordering the cessation of the legislative function and putting Congress to the Hobson’s Choice of impeachment or nothing.").  Popular culture Hobson's Choice is a full-length stage comedy written by Harold Brighouse in 1915. At the end of the play, the central character, Henry Horatio Hobson, formerly a wealthy, self-made businessman but now a sick and broken man, faces the unpalatable prospect of being looked after by his daughter Maggie and her husband Will Mossop, who used to be one of Hobson's underlings. His other daughters have refused to take him in, so he has no choice but to accept Maggie's offer which comes with the condition that he must surrender control of his entire business to her and her husband, Will.  The play was adapted for film several times, including versions from 1920 by Percy Nash, 1931 by Thomas Bentley, 1954 by David Lean and a 1983 TV movie.  Alfred Bester's 1952 short story Hobson's Choice describes a world in which time travel is possible, and the option is to travel or to stay in one's native time.  In the 1951 Robert Heinlein book Between Planets, the main character Don Harvey incorrectly mentions he has a Hobson's choice. While on a space station orbiting Earth, Don needs to get to Mars, where his parents are. The only rockets available are back to Earth (where he is not welcome) or on to Venus.  In The Grim Grotto by Lemony Snicket, the Baudelaire orphans and Fiona are said to be faced with a Hobson's Choice when they are trapped by the Medusoid Mycelium Mushrooms in the Gorgonian Grotto: "We can wait until the mushrooms disappear, or we can find ourselves poisoned".In Bram Stoker's short story "The Burial of Rats", the narrator advises he has a case of Hobson's Choice while being chased by villains. The story was written around 1874.  The Terminal Experiment, a 1995 science fiction novel by Robert J. Sawyer, was originally serialised under the title Hobson's Choice.  Half-Life, a video game created in 1998 by Valve includes a Hobson's Choice in the final chapter. A human-like entity, known only as the 'G-Man', offers the protagonist Gordon Freeman a job, working under his control. If Gordon were to refuse this offer, he would be killed in an unwinnable battle, thus creating the 'illusion of free choice'.  In Early Edition, the lead character Gary Hobson is named after the choices he regularly makes during his adventures.  In an episode of Inspector George Gently, a character claims her resignation was a Hobson's choice, prompting a debate among other police officers as to who Hobson is.  In "Cape May" (The Blacklist season 3, episode 19), Raymond Reddington describes having faced a Hobson's choice in the previous episode where he was faced with the choice of saving Elizabeth Keen's baby and losing Elizabeth Keen or losing them both.  In his 1984 novel Job: A Comedy of Justice, Robert A. Heinlein's protagonist is said to have Hobson's Choice when he has the options of boarding the wrong cruise ship or staying on the island.  Remarking about the 1909 Ford Model T, US industrialist Henry Ford is credited as saying “Any customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black”[19]  In 'The Jolly Boys' Outing', a 1989 Christmas Special episode of Only Fools and Horses, Alan states they are left with Hobson's Choice after their coach has blown up (due to a dodgy radio, supplied by Del). There's a rail strike, the last bus has gone, and their coach is out of action. They can't hitch-hike as there's 27 of them, and the replacement coach doesn't come till the next morning, thus their only choice is to stay in Margate for the night.  See also Buckley's Chance Buridan's ass Boulwarism Death and Taxes Locus of control Morton's fork No-win situation Standard form contract Sophie's Choice Zugzwang References  Barrett, Grant. "Hobson's Choice", A Way with Words  "Thomas Hobson: Hobson's Choice and Hobson's Conduit". Historyworks.  See Samuel Fisher. "Rusticus ad academicos in exercitationibus expostulatoriis, apologeticis quatuor the rustick's alarm to the rabbies or The country correcting the university and clergy, and ... contesting for the truth ... : in four apologeticall and expostulatory exercitations : wherein is contained, as well a general account to all enquirers, as a general answer to all opposers of the most truly catholike and most truly Christ-like Chistians called Quakers, and of the true divinity of their doctrine : by way of entire entercourse held in special with four of the clergies chieftanes, viz, John Owen ... Tho. Danson ... John Tombes ... Rich. Baxter ." Europeana. Retrieved 8 August 2014.  See The Spectator with Notes and General Index, the Twelve Volumes Comprised in Two. Philadelphia: J.J. Woodward. 1832. p. 272. Retrieved 4 August 2014. via Google Books  Ward, Thomas (1853). English Reformation, A Poem. New York: D.& J. Sadlier & Co. p. 373. Retrieved 8 August 2014. via Internet Archive  See Mill, John Stuart (1861). Considerations on Representative Government (1 ed.). London: Parker, Son, & Bourn. p. 145. Retrieved 23 June 2014. via Google Books  Mill, John Stuart (1869). The Subjection of Women (1869 first ed.). London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer. pp. 51–2. Retrieved 28 July 2014.  Hobbes, Thomas (1982) [1651]. Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. New York: Viking Press.  Martinich, A. P. (1999). Hobbes: A Biography. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-49583-7.  Martin, Gary. "Hobson's Choice". The Phrase Finder. Archived from the original on 6 March 2009. Retrieved 7 August 2010.  "The Hobbesian Trap" (PDF). 21 September 2010. Retrieved 8 April 2012.  "Sunday Lexico-Neuroticism". boaltalk.blogspot.com. 27 July 2008. Retrieved 7 August 2010.  Levy, Jacob (10 June 2003). "The Volokh Conspiracy". volokh.com. Retrieved 7 August 2010.  Oxford English Dictionary, Editor: "Amazingly, some writers have confused the obscure Thomas Hobson with his famous contemporary, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes. The resulting malapropism is beautifully grotesque". Garner, Bryan (1995). A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 404–405.  https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/437/617/  "Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs. - 436 U.S. 658 (1978)". justicia.com. US Supreme Court. 6 June 1978. 436 U.S. 658. Retrieved 19 February 2014.  "MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay (CCT 51/06) [2007] ZACC 21; 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC); 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) (5 October 2007)". www.saflii.org.  Snicket, Lemony (2004) The Grim Grotto, New York: HarperCollins Publishers p.145 - 147  Henry Ford in collaboration with Samuel Crowther in My Life and Work. 1922. Page 72 External links Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Hobson's Choice" . Encyclopædia Britannica. 13 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 553. Categories: English-language idiomsFree willMetaphors referring to peopleDilemmas. Refs.: H. P. Grice and D. F. Pears, The philosophy of action, Pears, Choosing and deciding. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

hohfeld, of Stanford and Yale. His main contribution to moral theory was his identification of EIGHT fundamental conceptions: One person X has a duty to a second person Y to do some act A when it is required that X to do A for Y. X has a privilege (or liberty) in face of Y to do A when X has no duty to Y not to do A. X has a right (or claim) against Y that Y do A when Y has a duty to X to do A. X has a no-right against Y that Y not do A when Y has a liberty in face of X to do A. X has a power over Y to effect some consequence C for Y when there is some voluntary action of X that will bring about C for Y. X has a disability in face of Y to effect C when there is no action X can perform that will bring about C for Y. X has a liability in face of Y to effect C when Y has a power to effect C for X. X has a immunity against Y from C when Y has no power over X to effect C. Philosophers have adapted Hohfeld’s terminology to express analogous conceptions. In ethics, these fundamental conceptions provide something like atoms into which all more complex relationships can be analyzed. Semantically, these conceptions reveal pairs of correlatives, such as a claim of X against Y and a duty of Y to X, each of which IMPLIES the other, and pairs of opposites, such as a duty of X to Y and a liberty of Y in face of X, which are contradictories. In the theory of rights, his distinctions between liberties, claims, powers, and immunities are often used to reveal ambiguities in the language of rights or to classify species of rights – Grice thought this was “all implicatural, and due to an inability to understand Hohfeld.”

hölderlin: studied at Tübingen, where he befriended Schelling and Hegel, and at Jena, where he met Schiller and Fichte. Since Hölderlin never held an academic position or published any of his philosophical writings, his influence on philosophy was primarily through his personality, conversations, and letters. He is widely viewed as the author of the so-called “Oldest System-Program of German Idealism,” a fragment that culminates in an exaltation of poetry and a call for a new “mythology of reason.” This theme is illustrated in the novel Hyperion (1797/99), which criticizes the subjective heroism of ethical idealism, emphasizes the sacred character of nature, and attempts to conflate religion and art as “overseers of reason.” In his veneration of nature and objections to Fichte’s treatment of the “Not-I,” Hölderlin echoed Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. In his Hellenism and his critique of the “philosophy of reflection” (see Ueber Sein und Urteil [“On Being and Judgment”]) he anticipated and influenced Hegel. In Hölderlin’s exaltation of art as alone capable of revealing the nature of reality, he betrayed a debt to Schiller and anticipated Romanticism. However, his view of the poet possesses a tragic dimension quite foreign to Schelling and the younger Romantics. The artist, as the interpreter of divine nature, mediates between the gods and men, but for this very reason is estranged from his fellows. This aspect of Hölderlin’s thought influenced Heidegger.